In the name of Allah the most (Compassionate and MercifulSECRER NNNNVV — ESA228BRA939 00 RUQMHR DE RUFNPS 1426 #151947 15 JAN79 2} NY SSSSS 22H 000893 0 P 1518452 JAN 79 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3496 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9899 ACTION; RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY. TEHRAN PRIORITY 3976 POL 3 BT INFO; SECRET PARIS 91426 AMB. DCN E,0. 12965: GDS 1/15/85 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-P ECON 2 TAGS: PFOR, US, UR, IR, FR PM SUBJECT: SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATLON oR ICA REF: STATE 19289 ADM CRU 2 (S - ENTIRE TEXT) MFA DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST/ 8 GAM NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS LECOMPT ONFIRMEDOTO US JANUARY 1§ THAT A SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL OF COUNSELOR RANK HAD REFERRED TO THE 1981 USSR-IRAN TREATY IN A CONVERSATION WITH A MFA OFFICIAL ABOUT 3 WEEKS AGO LECOMPT SAID THE REFERENCE MADE IN THE COURSE OF A CONVERSATION AND WAS NOT TAKEN BY THE MFA AS A DE- MARCHE. THE SOVIET COUNSELIR REFERRED TO THE TREATY, SAID IT WAS STILL OPERATIVE, AND ADDED THAT IT PERMITTED THE USSR TO INTERVENE IN IRAN IN THE EVENT OF INTERVENTION BY AN OUTSIDE FORCE. TO LECOMPT'S KNOWLEDGE, THE SOVIETS HAVE MENTIONED THE TREATY TO THE FRENCH JUST THIS ONCE. LECOMPT DID NOT TAKE THE REFERENCE AS A THREAT, SINCE HE SAW NO REASON WHY THE SOVIETS WOULD THREATEN THE FRENCH ON THIS SUBJECT. HARTMAN BT 1426 SECRETae te WYNVY — ESASZ6ER(IE8 Acti iG PP RUGTHR DE RUEHC #8827 @34u324 2ny cocce 27H CONFIDENTIAL 2nb8 PR 390352 FEB 79 a Fa SECSTATE waSHDc Pe agit ti la feet 03 Nz fo NFIDENT IAL STATE 928807 i E.0, 12965: GDS 2/1/89 (CLEMENT, CARL) ane TaGS: PINT, IR een 2 SUBJECT: EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH SOVIETS ON IRAN bn 1, SCVIET ENSASSY THIRD SECRETARY, MAGOMED OSMANOV, AT ADM HIS RECUEST AGAIN CALLED ON NEA/IRN OFFICER FEBRUARY 1 CRU 2 CHANGE VIS ON SITUATION IN IRAN, DEPOFF DECLINED 9 GAR uOV'S RECURST TO SPECULATE ON POSSIBLE HYPOTHETICAL COnTS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS IN IRAN. HE EXPLAINED TO NOV THAT THE UsSey WITHOUT INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL ‘AInS OF IRA’, HAD TRIFD TO ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES IWCLVED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF Izéd THROUGH DELIBERATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN IN THE STREETS, DEPOFF ADDED THAT U.S. HAD ALSO ATTESPTED TO TiiPRESS UPON ALL PARTIES THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT AND AVOIDANCE OF PROVOCATIONS SO THaT SOLUTIONS COULD BE SOUCHT THROUGH A LEGAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE. 2, I! RESPONSE TO A QUESTION CONCERNING APPARENT SOVIET SDI6 TILT IN FAVOR OF KYOMEINI, OSMANOV MAINTAINED THAT OVIET MEDIA WAS NOW BEING MORE “OBIECTIVE” IN ITS TREAT- MENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN, HE SAID THAT SOVIETS HaD COM TO THE CONCLUSION THAT KHOMEINI REPRESENTS “PRO~ GRESSIVE” TENDENCIES, ON THE BASIS OF nIS OVERWHE NING SUPPORT AMONG THE PEOPLE OF IRAN, OSMANOV ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE USSR VAS ATTEMPTING TO STEER A “NEUTRAL” COURSE VIS-A-VIS KHOMEINI, ABOUT WHOM THE SOVIETS STILL HaD MANY DOUZTS AND RESERVATIONS, THE SOVIETS WERE HOPEFUL THAT ONC! XHONEINI waS EXPOSED TO THE THINKING OF HIS TOP FOLLCWERS AND RELATIVES IN IRAN, HE WOULD MODERATE SOME OF KIS VIEWS AND POSITIONS, AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS SD ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN AND ARE. SITUATION COULD TURN INTO: ARMED STEUSRLE OR CIVIL WAR, DESPITE THEIR CONCERN, WHICH 7 LABELED AS “LEGITIMATE,” GIVEN THE FACT THeT IRAN RS ON THE COVI) UNION, THE SOVIETS DO NOT FEEL HAVE SY ' ER CHOICE BUT TO WAIT AND OBSERVE HTS, OStiA'\JV VOLUNTEERED THAT THE SOVIETS aLSO IDER THAT THE U.S, HAS IMPORTANT LEGITIMATE INTERESTS 1 IRAN.