half of which were destroyed by the Allies.
Out of 39,000 men
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
Karl Dönitz
Karl Dönitz, (b. Sept. 16, 1891, Grünau in Berlin, Germany - d.
Dec. 22, 1980, Aumühle, Schleswig-Holstein, West Germany),
president of Germany (1945). He entered the German Navy in
1910 and during World War I served as a submarine officer in the
Black Sea and the Mediterranean. After the war he continued his
naval career first as commander of a torpedo boat and later of
the cruiser Emden. In the aftermath of Adolf Hitler's accession to
power, despite the Versailles Treaty's absolute ban on German
submarine construction, Dönitz clandestinely supervised the
creation of a new U-boat fleet, over which he was subsequently
appointed commander (1936). Because of the shortage of
materials and the priority Hitler gave to the Luftwaffe, Germany
had only 25 U-boats capable of service in the Atlantic at the
outbreak of World War II. By the end of the war, however, around
1,000 U-boats had been built and placed in service, more than
1
who served aboard German U-boats, 27,082 perished. In the
midst of World War II, in January 1943, he was called to replace
Adm. Erich Raeder as commander in chief of the German Navy.
His loyalty and ability soon won him the confidence of Hitler. On
April 20, 1945, shortly before the collapse of the Nazi regime,
Hitler appointed Dönitz head of the northern military and civil
command. Finally - in his last political testament - Hitler named
Dönitz his successor as president of the Reich, minister of war,
and supreme commander of the armed forces. Assuming the
reins of government on May 2, 1945, Dönitz retained office for
only a few days. In 1946 he was sentenced to 10 years'
imprisonment by the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg. He was released from prison in 1956.
Notes Regarding The F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
August 15, 1939 to January 15, 1945
Without this "composite" collection, researchers have to
struggle through a series of nearly 130 separate reports
to follow the sequence of 'expectations and reports'
about the movement of Germany's WWII U-Boats, a time-
consuming exercise which, for many, thankfully, can be
short-cut here by simply using the Edit / Find facility on
the computer toolbar and entering no more than the
number of the U-Boat in question.
The reports here may be found in the archives of The U.S. Naval
Historical Center (NHC), at The Navy Yard, Washington D.C. and
too, in German, in The U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland, a suburb of
Washington D.C..
Not included here, is either the report for the period October
16 to 31, 1943, the original, unfilmed, to be found as item RM
87/32, in the custody of the Bundesarchiv-Abt. Militararchiv, or
the reports from January 16 to April 21, 1945, which are
understood to be found elsewhere, in German, on 'microreels
3900 and 1755-1759, 1995'.
Only the opening report, for August 15 to September 15,
1939 has been 'tidied up' for ease of reading and
introduction, those following being 'text scans' of the
translated reports and, being 'unedited further',
interrupted by Date, Position, Wind, Weather and Sea
State, Illumination, Events, Time, Air Pressure and
Moonlight etc. 'log book page column headings', these
'page layouts' adhered to by the various translators.
Anyone who might be tempted to continue the scheme of
highlighting and 'tightening up' of the 'raw text' reports should
be prepared set aside some 400 hours of work, around some
three months of their lives, to complete the works initiated here,
the product 'cosmetic' rather than of any much extra
functionality !
15 August 1939 (Kiel)
1200 Telephone call from Supreme Command of the Navy
(Lieut.(s.g.) Fraesdorf) saying that the officers' party for U-boat
officers was to be on Saturday 19.8 and as many as possible
were to be present. Were there no orders ?
1300 Following steps taken :
1) F.O. U/B informed by telephone.
2) Deputy S.O. of 2nd U-Flotilla, Lieut. Franz, informed.
U-28 / U-29 / U-33 / U-34 can be ready by Saturday.
3) C.O. of U-26 informed of emergency order for North
Sea. Detailed orders received later through S.O.
6th U-Flotilla.
4) 6th U-Flotilla ordered by radio to break off firing
practice.
5) U-57 recalled from Pillau, U-47 from Neustadt. U-
48, with S.O. 7th U-Flotilla on board, recalled and
S.O. 7th U-Flotilla informed of the North Sea
emergency exercise. He is making preparations
immediately. U-45/51 will arrive, tonight.
1700 T/P from Supreme Command of the Navy received :
2
a) 10 U-boats to sail 19.8 (Orders are ready and will be
issued).
b) 4 U-boats of the 2nd U-Flotilla are to sail with the
above (Arranged, see 1330).
c) These 4 boats to be replaced by boats of the 5th U-
Flotilla.
d) Further boats are to be made ready quickly and it is
to be reported when they are ready. Staff officer to
Eckenfoerde to see about U-42.
2240 "Memel" arrived, having been recalled, with 1 G7a (T.N.
air-driven torpedo) and 15 G7e (T.N. electric torpedo) belonging
to 7th U-Flotilla on board to be handed over to boats of the 7th
U-Flotilla.
2300 The question of giving U-58-59 another torpedo practice
with a target ship and 4 torpedo recovery vessels was
considered, but the project was later abandoned as impractical
in view of the general situation.
16 August 1939
0230 S.O. 6th U-Flotilla arrived and was informed of duties and
situation in accordance with "emergency exercise North Sea."
He then left on board U-37 for Wilhelmshaven, with orders for U-
28 / U-29 / U-33 / U-34, to prepare his boats.
1007 Decision by Supreme Command of the Navy: radio
service to begin 0800/19/8 German Summer Time.
1140 Orders received from F.O. Scouting Forces for case WEISS.
1315 Telephone call from Group West, C-in-C Group West wishes
to see F.O. U/B-designate personally.
1400 F.O. U/B returned from leave. Chief of Staff handed over
to F.O. U/B.
1500 Arranged with Supreme Command of the Navy for U-boat
radio service to begin at 0000/19/8, so that the boats can put to
sea as soon as ever possible.
1530 F.O. U/B arranged to see C-in-C Group West at 1730/18/8.
17 August 1939
Instructions to 2nd, 6th and 7th U-Flotillas :
6th U-Flotilla to sail, with Flotilla S.O., at 0000/19/8.
7th U-Flotilla to sail at 0000/19/8.
4 boats of 2nd U-Flotilla to follow at first light on 19.8 or
later.
Station Commands will supply the boats of the 3 flotillas
with 2nd watch-keeping officers.
1900 During a telephone conversation with Wilhelmshaven it
came out that there were not enough operational torpedoes
ready. This was immediately reported by telephone to Berlin.
See also F.O. U/B's special report on operational torpedoes, of
which there are an insufficient number in spite of F.O. U/B's
urging the matter for nearly 4 years.
18 August 1939
0900 S.O. 3rd U-Flotilla informed that F.O. U/B had decided to
finish watchkeeping officers' torpedo-firing practice; and
boats then to enter port on Friday night (18/19/8) to
receive further orders.
1000 After consulting with Supreme Command of the Navy the
following organization was approved by Naval War
Staff(1st Division) :
F.O. U/B with staff on board ERWIN WASSNER
3
F.O. U/B West Lieut. Comdr. Ibbeken, with Lieut. Loof
(Staff office) and staff of 1st and 2nd U-Flotillas
Also F.O. U/B Baltic At the disposal of Commander
Schomburg with staff of F.O. U/B Baltic.
If case WEISS should develop into a major action, F.O. U/B
would go to Wilhelmshaven with ERWIN WASSNER.
1130 F.O. U/B took leave of the C.O.s of the 7th U-Flotilla, who
are going into the Atlantic.
1430 F.O. U/B flew to Wilhelmshaven. Took leave of the C.Os of
the 6th U-FLotilla and 4 C.O.s of the 2nd U-Flotilla who are
going into the Atlantic. F.O. U/B gave personal
instructions to the S.O. of the 6th U-Flotilla who is going
into the Atlantic in U-37. F.O. U/B introduced S.O. of 2nd
U-Flotilla, who is taking over the duties of F.O. U/B West, to
the Group Command. F.O. U/B ordered U 31/32/35 to be in
Kiel on the afternoon of 21/8 and the C.O.s to come on
board ERWIN WASSNER to receive orders. "Saar" to be in
Kiel at 0700/21/8 to re-adjust mines if necessary.
19 August 1939
0000 The following sailed :
U 45/46/47/48/52 from Kiel
U 37/38/39/40/41 from Wilhelmshaven
U 28/29/33/34 from Wilhelmshaven.
0800 S.O. 6th U-Flotilla, in U 37 was put in tactical command.
F.O. U/B remains in operational command.
0900 S.O.s of 3rd and 5th U-Flotilla arrived for conference.
Orders were issued and the 3rd and 5th U-Flotillas
instructed to be in the Rügen and Warnemünde sea areas
respectively on the evening of 22/8. Depot ships to
remain at sea until Y hour. Flotillas fitting out. F.O. U/B
 took leave of S.O.s. He did not take leave of the C.O.s of
these flotillas as their duties are not so vital for the
present.
1030 Chief of Staff phoned the Commander of the U-boat
school. Firing practice to be continued until 26/8.
Recovery vessels to stay. Aim to work 4 of the 7 C.O.s so
that they are ready for operations by the evening of 26/8.
3 boats to continue practice 28/8-2/9. Supreme
Command of the Navy's orders "TREIBRIEMEN" and
PRISENSCHEIBE" arrived too late and can only be
delivered to the boats which have sailed by courier a/c by
night.
1130 Fleet Command had not yet been informed of the new
organization of F.O. U/B and was so informed by
telephone.
1300 F.O. U/B and staff transshipped from "HECHT" to "ERWIN
WASSNER".
1500 F.O. U/B West instructed to convey all F.O. U/B's orders on
secret grid charts to the Group Command and also to
inform them that 4 U-boats will arrive on 30/8 at the
disposal of Group West (U 36, 1, 3 and 4).
20 August 1939
0930 S.O. 1st U-Flotilla, returning from journey abroad, received
instructions and began fitting out.
Supreme Command of the Navy was requested to convey
to F.O. U/B any observations of U-boats made by English
a/c.
21 August 1939
The following will be ready to fit out :
U 50 evening of 21/8
4
U 27 evening of 22/8
U 26 evening of 32/8
U 53 evening of 26/8
F.O. U/B enquired whether all boats at readiness were to
be sent out or if it would not be better to keep some as
relief's or operational reserve. Supreme Command of the
Navy decided that all U-boats were to be used. The
decision was received in the afternoon, times of sailing
were to be reported.
1000 Code word "ELEPHANT" received with additions
"SCHWEDEN 1, 2, 3" for F.O. U/B. This last order is only a
preparatory order, as cleared up by telephone. C.O.s of
Hela boats were ordered to supply and will be instructed
by F.O. U/B personally as to their duties. They will take
over torpedoes at night, will sail at 0400/22/8 and are
then to take over TM's (T.N.: torpedo-tube mines) and
report.
Situation as at 21.8.1939
I.) General
1) Fitting out has gone according to plan, except for
operational torpedoes The excessive number of orders
and code-words have been a disadvantage. Preliminary
plans were thought out in detail and to cover all
eventualities, but code-words are liable to be forgotten
when it comes to carrying out.This causes worry and
confusion . Transmission of instructions has also been
unreliable. For instance, F.O. U/B did not receive the
highly important order "to be at readiness on the evening
of 22/8" until 24 hours too late, and then only verbally. If
peacetime organization differs from that on mobilization,
the peacetime method of transmitting orders must be
kept until new conditions are properly established.
2) Everything possibly was done to keep the preparations tactical commander and under the operational command
secret (e.g. by informing the S.O.s personally, breaking off of F.O. U/B.
current exercises to give priority to F.O. U/B's exercises
etc.). The mobilization of so many units can never be 4) My plans have all been restricted by lack of boats. The
kept absolutely secret. But, although the enemy can situation is, by the evening of 21/8 :
discover that something is happening, he cannot form any
clear idea. 7 U-boats of the 1st U-Flotilla ready with
Group West
3) The very confident attitude of the crews deserves 4 " 2nd " on their way to The
special mention. In my opinion it is a sign that the broad Atlantic
masses of the people have great faith in the government. 3 " 2nd " " The
Baltic
4 " 5th " " The
Baltic
II. Operational Situation 5 " 6th " " The
Atlantic
1) The number of U-boats at present in the Baltic seems 5 " 7th " " The
adequate. The development of the political situation with Atlantic
Russia will make it possible later to release boats of the
3rd and 5th U-Flotillas to reinforce the numbers in the Total 35 U-boats.
North Sea.
During the period up to 30.8.1939 the following will be ready
2) The North Sea patrols planned can start as soon as the and some on their way :
1st U-Flotilla has fitted out. I consider Group West's
complaint that the Northern Sector of the North Sea is 1 U-boat of the 2nd U-Flotilla (U30) sailing
insufficiently defended is justified. I therefore, intend to 0300/22/8 for The Atlantic
hasten the training of 4 of the 7 school boats so that they 1 U-boat of the 2nd U-Flotilla (U 27) sailing evening
can be at the disposal of Group West from 30.8. of 23/8 for The Atlantic.
1 U-boat of the 2nd U-Flotilla (U26) ready by
3) The Atlantic boats are on their way to their positions. I midday 26.8.
am of the opinion that the convoy system will not come 1 U-boat of the 7th U-FLotilla (U53) sailing
into full effect in the first days of the war. Even if the 1200/29/8 for The Atlantic.
government were to order it at once, there would still be 4 U-boats of the U-boat School (36/1/2/3/4) at
many single ships on the sea routes until it had got disposal of Group West from 30.8.
started. The important thing is to catch these ships at
once. A flotilla C.O. has been sent with the boats and it is Total 8 boats.
intended later to send a second S.O. Thus the boats can
always be divided into a N. and S. Group, each under a These are all the U-boats we can count on. (We cannot count on
the following 9 boats: U 2, U 8, U 10 of the U-boat school, U 42,
5
51 long dockyard periods, U 49, 60, 61 with U-boats trials Group
and U 11 with Communications Experimental Department).
In order to occupy the positions, which are not many, without a
break with the minimum of boats I would need a further 43 boats
and an additional 43 boats which, as experience shows, would
be in dock undergoing overhaul.
Thus, for a war of some length, 130 U-boats should be
necessary. Even then I would have no reserves, so that I could
send out 3 or 4 boats from home against a worthwhile transport
reported by the intelligence service. Also there are not enough
boats for the Atlantic and none for remote sea areas. Therefore,
the minimum requirement to be aimed at 300 U-boats.
22 August 1939
0700 "ERWIN WASSNER" sailed from Kiel to Swinemünde with
F.O. U/B.
Non-agression pact (see also situation review).
U 30 sailed at 0300 (Operations Order Atlantic No. 2), will
operate with U 27 at the N. entrance to the Irish Sea. This
was reported to Supreme Command of the Navy, also :
U 27 - ready at 1200/23/8
U 53 - ready at 1200/29/8
U 26 - to be reported later. Boat is starting
working up with her new C.O. (Lieut. (s.g.) Ewerth) on
23.8.
1500 Hela U-boats reported fitting-out completed.
1930 "ERWIN WASSNER" entered Swinemuende.
2230 Instruction by telephone from Group Command:
"Operation FRITZ cancelled. Written confirmation follows.
The following radio message was made immediately to
the 3rd U-Flotilla: "Operation FRITZ cancelled. On receipt
of code-word only operation IRMGARD is to be carried out
6
by U 22. Remaining boats of 3rd U-Flotilla are to remain in
the Rügen area until further orders." F.O. U/B
A radio intelligence report of a cruiser and 8 steamers in
the central North Sea points to convoys having been
formed.
Commander Schomburg, with F.O. U/B Baltic's staff, took
over Headquarters WALFISCH.
U 26 is expected to be ready to sail by 28.8.
Situation on 23.8.1939
Operational Control
F.O. U/B will exercise operational control as F.O. U/B (Naval War
Staff) and F.O. U/B Baltic. Commander Schomburg is at the
disposal of F.O. U/B and will take over as F.O. U/B Baltic when F.O.
U/B is in the North Sea.
Lieut. Commander Ibbeken has taken over the duties of F.O. U/B
West. Lieut.(s.g.) Sobe is in charge in Kiel of duties and fitting
out of boats which are not yet operational.
Distribution of Boats
The following are on their way to the Atlantic :
2nd U-Flotilla : U 28/29/30/33/34
6th U-Flotilla : U 37/38/39/40/41
7th U-Flotilla : U 45/46/47/48/52
U 27/26/53 will sail shortly.
Thus all the boats available for the Atlantic have sailed and they
cannot be relieved. If the situation continues as at present, or if
war breaks out, the boats will begin to dribble back by about the
middle of September. Naval War Staff planned to recall the
boats before their time and thus get a second wave, but I do not
agree with this, as too much time is lost on the long outward and
inward-bound passages. These long passages are due to the
order to proceed around the Faroes, on which Naval War Staff
has insisted contrary to F.O. U/B's intentions. The S.O. of the 6th
U-Flotilla is in U-37. Later he can take over tactical command if
necessary if the situation makes it necessary to change the
operations order.
North Sea : 1st U-Flotilla.
Baltic : 3rd U-Flotilla, 5th U-Flotilla and U 31/32/35.
3 boats of the U-boat school: U 5/6/7.
Under training at U-boat school :
1. Wave : U 1/5/4/36
2. Wave : U 2/8/10
Undergoing trials : U 60/61/49/42.
Not at war readiness : U 25/51/11.
23 August 1939
A.M. After the non-aggression pact with Russia, some boats are
likely to be released from the Baltic.
On the orders of Naval War Staff reconnaissance of the
Gulf of Finland and off Gotland has been cancelled for
case WEISS. One boat is to remain off the Irmon Straits,
however, and one off Lipau.
(Naval War Staff Most Secret 1796/39).
At about the same time the order was given to apply
"Transport exercise LUEBECK" to Danzig Bay only. This
releases: U 12/16/20/24 and 56. If "Transport exercise
LUEBECK" is over by Y day for case WEISS
U 14 and 18 will also be free.
7
The boats will be sent to Wilhelmshaven at the disposal of
F.O. U/B West. F.O. U/B arranged by telephone with F.O.
U/B West (Lieut. Loof) to use the remaining boats for the
North Sea as follows :
3rd U-Flotilla : Operation against English bases, after
reconnaissance.
5th U-Flotilla : to relieve 1st U-Flotilla for operation
"ULLA".
U 1/3/4 : operation North of the declared area.
S.O. 5th U-Flotilla is going to Kiel to relieve S.O. 7th U-
Flotilla when the later goes to the Atlantic.
P.M. Operations order No. 3 Atlantic for U 28 and U 53 drafted.
U 53 with Lieut.(s.g.) Sobe off the North entrance to the
Irish Sea, outer position, U 28 to take over the inner
operations area from U 37.
When these boats arrive there will be a flotilla S.O. North
and South and if a new disposition is made they can take
over tactical command. For the present however, boats
are to operate individually.
2300 U 27 sailed. Reported to Supreme Command of the Navy.
S.O. 7th U-Flotilla has arranged for U 49/60/61/51 to do
firing practice from 28.8 or 4.9 to 9.9. These boats will
not be operational yet, however as they are still on trials
and under training and U 51 has to undergo alterations
lasting 3 months.
24 August 1939
0430 Preparation period for case WEISS began, see F.O. U/B
Baltic's War Log.
1100 F.O. U/B telephoned Lieut.(s.g.) Fraesdorf, Naval War Staff
(1st Division). F.O. suggested relinquishing the Turkish
S/M Batiray and speeding up new construction. Naval War
Staff (1st Division) replied that no obvious preparations
 were to be made at present, but preliminary steps could
be taken towards manning the S/M.
1200 F.O. U/B's Chief of Staff telephoned Lieut(s.g.) Fraesdorf.
F.O. U/B wished to find out if S.S. "Ammerland"
(ex-"August Schulze") could still be sent to Spain with
supplies of arms and ammunition. Naval War Staff (1st
Division) replied that "Ammerland" was under repair.
Repairs would be hastened as far as possible. Decision as
to her sailing would depend on the situation. F.O. U/B
further requested that, when danger zones were declared,
the area at present occupied by U-boats should not be
reduced. The boundaries of danger zones 200 miles West
of England, as planned in the war game of 1938/39 were
not sufficient. Naval War Staff (1st Division)(Fraesdorf)
replied at 1700 that the danger zones had not yet been
fixed and that F.O. U/B's wishes would be taken into
account as far as possible.
1553 Atlantic boats informed that England and Poland are
mobilizing and that the non-aggression pact had been
signed. This radio message was not passed on in
Supreme Command of the Navy, as, according to Lieut.
Commander Reinicke, Naval War Staff (1st Division),
Atlantic forces would be informed by Supreme Command
of the Navy and not before 25.8. I do not agree with this.
F.O. U/B must be able to give his boats general
information as well as just the dry bones of orders if good
relations are to be maintained between him and his
subordinates.
2100 The boundaries of the G.A.F.'s operations areas in
accordance with Supreme Command of the Navy's Most
Secret 173/39 of 19.8, means canceling the mining
operations planned for Calais and Dover. F.O. U/B
suggested using boats which become available because of
this in the same way as the 3rd U-Flotilla. It will be
necessary for them to re-equip with torpedoes. LOOFF
said that the boats should sail tonight and it was
8
therefore, proposed to exchange boats of the 1st and 3rd
Flotillas. F.O. U/B agreed. LOOFF informed that the 3rd U-
Flotilla was not as far out as F.O. U/B had suggested.
25 August 1939
0130 Code-word "Special Command ULLA" received. Re-
transmitted with "emergency" priority at 0140 to Naval
Communications Officers Wilhelmshaven, List, Borkum,
info. F.O. U/B West.
0400 The following sailed by order of F.O. U/B West : U 13, 15,
17, 21, 23, 12, 16, 20, 24, 56, 58, 59.
Apparently therefore, F.O. U/B West exchanged U 9 and U
19 for boats of the 3rd Flotilla.
1025 U 9 and U 19 sailed at 1000.
1636 Following verbal instructions from Group Command, code-
word for Y time case WEISS communicated to boats.
1800 Instructions by telephone from Supreme Command of the
Navy to use U 26 and 53 with TMB's against English troop
embarkation ports. Discussion of this question was
postponed until the next day as at
2018 Y order was cancelled. For details see F.O. U/B Baltic's War
Log.
2155 Provisional orders were given to prepare TMB's for U 26
and U 53.
26 August 1939
Use of TMB's in the English Channel.
Contrary to 1938 plans, it was not intended to use TMB's in the
English Channel now. Last year it was intended to use U-boats
mainly against enemy forces of war because at the time, with
the few boats available, no success could be expected against
enemy merchant shipping. The use of TBM's off harbors where
there was strong anti-S/M activity could be considered because,
as things then stood, there would have been a certain element
of surprise.
In accordance with Supreme Command of the Navy's
instructions, U-boats have now been disposed against enemy
merchant shipping only. There were too few boats available to
permit splitting them up and using some against merchant
shipping and some against forces of war and troop transports in
the Channel at the same time. The element of surprise will be
lacking this year. Well-trained anti-S/M forces must be expected
to be in action already when U-boats arrive at the position where
mines are to be laid.
Portsmouth, Portland, Plymouth and Falmouth are possible ports
off which mines could be laid. Falmouth is ruled out as it is not
sufficiently important. In the main depths of 20-30 meters
(effective at 30 meters against ships of 8000 tons, displacement
and above) off all harbors are only found immediately off the
entrance, though off Portland and the entrances to the Needles
channel there are 20-30 meters outside the 3 mile zone. It is
presumed that mine-laying will be permitted outside this zone.
Anti-S/M activity is likely to be strong everywhere, especially off
Portland where the A/S school is. Nevertheless it should be
possible to get the mines to the required position. Portland and
Portsmouth are within the are reserved to the G.A.F. According
to Supreme Command of the Navy, however, this does not
matter. This leads one to wonder what point there is making the
delimitation at all. In any case, U-boats cannot operate in an
area where a/c have already laid mines.
U-boat warfare must at all times be concentrated against
merchant shipping. For this reason it was planned to send out
the S.O. of the 7th U-Flotilla in U 53, so that later 2 groups could
be found under the respective tactical commands of the S.O.s of
9
the 6th and 7th Flotillas. I regard this as more important than
mine-lays in the channel. Supreme Command of the Navy has
agreed to my proposal to use U 26 only with TM's for this reason.
Result : after repairing a leak in a tank and fitting out, U 26 will
sail in accordance with operations order Atlantic No. 4. She will
approach North of England (at 14 knots she could reach her
waiting position in the West Channel in about 5 days). Operation
: to lay mines off the Spithead Roads, the Needles, Portland,
Plymouth or in the Bristol Channel. The place of laying will be
decided later.
U 53, with S.O. 7th U-Flotilla, will join the Atlantic boats as
planned. Supreme Command of the Navy has accepted F.O.
U/B's proposal not to use this boat with TM's.
27 August 1939
2030 Supreme Command of the Navy, Naval War Staff (3rd
Division) requested to confirm that Atlantic U-boats have
been informed that peacetime cypher memorands are still
in force, despite X time.
28 August 1939
At present, although all boats at all available are being used,
there are not enough operational boats and the time has come
to reconsider the question of new construction. It is intended to
request Supreme Command of the Navy to do everything
possible to speed up new construction. Only Supreme
Command of the Navy can deal with purely constructional
questions.
1130 Chief of Staff discussed the question of communications
to U-boats with Lieut.(s.g.) Fraesdorf. It was decided
1) As F.O. U/B (Naval War Staff) is in a different place
from Naval War Staff, Berlin will inform the Atlantic boats
 direct of the political situation and the results of radio
intelligence service. Information which has so far been
sent to the boats will be forwarded to F.O. U/B in collected
form and further information will be passed to him
currently.
2) F.O. U/B may, at his discretion, pass other
information to U-boats and inform Naval War Staff at the
same time.
3) The transmission of operational orders is the
concern of F.O. U/B alone.
A satisfactory solution has thus been reached. It remains to be
seen in what form the results of radio intelligence of English
merchant shipping, contained in Supreme Command of the
Navy, Chief Radio Intelligence Depts. 2801 and Naval
Communications Officer Kiel's secret 2830 B, will be transmitted
to the Atlantic boats. The report that English merchant ships are
not to use the normal routes shows that the wide loose
disposition of U-boats was right.
1700 Telephone conversation Lieut. Fraesdorf with Chief of Staff
: the question of using another boat with TMB's against
English troop embarkation ports is to be reconsidered. The
following possibilities were considered :
U 53 I consider the job of embarking the S.O. 7th U-
Flotilla as possible tactical commander more important
than using the boat with TMB's. Also, the boat already
has her operations order, and if this is altered, it would
give the impression of indecision at high level.
U 36 C.O. and crew have had no TM training. The C.O. has
so far only been C.O. in the U-boat school and has not the
necessary experience for such a difficult task. It would
not be a good thing to change the C.O. and put Lieut.(s.g.)
Schütze in command. The present C.O. has worked up
with his boat, and Lieut. Schütze, who has so far only
10
commanded a small boat, would have to work up with the
boat and practice torpedo firing and laying TMs. The
principle of putting an officer in command to suit the task
should not be accepted; the task must rather be suited to
the abilities of the C.O. and boat combined.
U 59 This boat cannot be used for the task as her radius of
action is only just adequate for an outward passage of 10
miles and a return passage of 8 miles, but leaves no
margin of reserve for the operations area. In my opinion
therefore, the following are possible alternatives :
1) To use boats already in the Atlantic with torpedoes
on troop transport routes in the Channel. Those
boats are already in the vicinity of the operations
area.
2) To withdraw one of the 2nd U-Flotilla boats,
operating in the Baltic (U 31, 32, 35) and use this
for the Channel operation. The channel operation is
more important than the one intended with these
boats off Hela. I consider that 2 boats are sufficient
to close the route off Hela in view of the few Polish
forces. U 32 should be the one to be withdrawn, as
she is not being used to patrol off Hela and her
patrol off the light buoy can be cancelled without
altering the remaining operations orders.
1745 Captain Fricke informed of my views by telephone. The
proposal to let U 53 sail with S.O. 7th U-Flotilla on 29.8 as
planned was approved. Decision as to detaching one of
the 3 boats U 31, 32, 35 will be made later.
The following was radioed to Atlantic forces :
Secret German mobilization
Position of English cruiser Ajax
Closing of Mediterranean to English merchant shipping
British Admiralty control of English merchant shipping
 Use of old and new grid charts.
Wartime cypher material not to come into force etc.
Amendment to Communications order of 19.8
Therefore, the important information on the darkening of English
merchant ships and their avoidance of the normal routes has not
been transmitted. It is intended to wait and see whether Berlin
transmits this information by 29.8, otherwise F.O. U/B will do so.
2212 The following further information has been radioed to
Atlantic forces : situation still uncertain, no hostilities,
continue on passage.
25 August 1939
situation still uncertain, no hostilities, continue
passage.
26 August 1939
possibility of negotiations, instructions to merchant
shipping to put into German or neutral ports.
29 August 1939
0900 A II requested Naval War Staff (3rd Division) (Lieut. Comdr.
Lucan) to inform boats of the "Areas" mentioned in
Admiralty Instructions. This was agreed, provided they
were known in Berlin.
1200 U 26 and U 53 (with S.O. 7th U-Flotilla) sailed
1350 Lieut.(s.g.) Fraesdorf telephoned Naval War Staff's
decision that no other boat was to be sent to the Channel.
Atlantic U-boats have received a detailed review of the
political situation with Naval War Staff (1st Division's)
Most Secret 5802.
1530 Supreme Command of the Navy's Most Secret 3812
received, on the subject of oil and provisions. If the
present state of emergency continues the supply of dry
provisions will be of first importance. It is doubtful if this
can be gotten in Spain. I consider it necessary to send
these provisions there either by air or by camouflaged
ships.
Supreme Command of the Navy has ordered that oil be
transferred by funnel and a 45 mm. hose. At the moment
the boats have 60 mm. hose and adjustment for 90 mm.
As it is necessary to supply with oil in one night as quickly
as possible hose of a larger diameter than 45 mm. must
be provided.
on 30 August 1939
1305 The information supplies to U-boats on 29.8 is incomplete
insofar as the important reports on the darkening of ships
and diversion from the ordinary shipping routes were not
passed on by Supreme Command of the Navy. The boats
were therefore informed by F.O. U/B in radio message
T.O.O. 1305. There were numerous telephone
conversations between F.O. U/B and Naval War Staff about
the use of a further boat in the Channel, the organization
of supplies of provisions and oil and the question of the
incomplete information sent to U-boats. The question
therefore arises if F.O. U/B (Naval War Staff) should not be
located nearer to Naval War Staff. It will be considered
further. Atlantic U-boats were informed of the sailing of U
26, 27, 30 and 53 in radio message T.O.O. 1308.
31 August 1939
A.M. Now that the Polish destroyers have sailed (see F.O. U/B
Baltic's War Log) the duties of the SALTZWEDEL boats in
the Baltic are redundant. It was therefore, decided with
Naval War Staff by telephone and confirmed in writing :
11

1) that F.O. U/B should proceed to Wilhelmshaven as
F.O. U/B West and F.O. U/B (Naval War Staff) and
2) that U 31, 32, 35 should be allocated to F.O. U/B
(Naval War Staff).
1500 F.O. U/B left for Wilhelmshaven with 2 staff officers.
1700 Arrived Wilhelmshaven and took over duties of F.O. U/B
West. F.O. U/BWest's War Log will be kept separately.
1830 Supreme Command of the Navy radioed Atlantic boats as
follows in message T.O.O. 1743.
1) Start of hostilities against Poland 0445/1/9.
2) Attitude of Western powers uncertain.
3) No attacks against English etc. forces, except in self
defense or by special order.
4) Boats to remain in waiting positions for the present.
1 September 1939
A.M. The Atlantic boats will have to leave their operations area
when their fuel stocks are used up, on approximately the
following dates :
2nd U-Flotilla to leave 15.9 home by 24.9
6th U-Flotilla " 19.9 " 3.10
7th U-Flotilla " 26.9 " 5.10
These dates can only be estimated. It cannot be foreseen how
long it will take to overhaul boats when they get back. It will
probably be about 3 weeks. There will therefore, be a big gap
from the middle of September. At present U 31, 32, 35 are
available as reserves. I intend to keep U 31 and 32 back for the
present and to recall U 26 as soon as she has completed her
minelay, so that there will be at least something, at hand to
relieve Atlantic boats.
12
U 35 will be used for minelaying in the Channel. Then 2 of the
positions planned can be fouled. U 2, 8, 10 are to remain in
Neustadt for training engineer officers in particular. This was
decided after discussion with the Commander of the U-boat
school. Supreme Command of the Navy approves. U 10 will be
exchanged with one of the small boats U 1, 6 when opportunity
occurs. In Most Secret 172 S.O. only I have set out my views on
the development of the U-boat Arm and submitted them to Fleet
Command. It is true that the memorandum is based on the
assumption that there will not now be a war with England; but if
it should come to such a war the requirements set out here for
the development of the U-boat Arm would be even more
important.
2 September 1939
Radio intelligence reports show that there is a rendezvous for
inward-bound steamers in the Bristol Channel. This seems to
point to there being no protection for merchant shipping as yet
further out to sea. It is not possible to bring the boats up yet, as
on the orders of Naval War Staff, they may not leave their
waiting positions.
Supreme Command of the Navy abandoned the idea of using the
recovery vessels at present with the U-boat school as S/M
chasers under Group Baltic, after I had made representations.
The vessels are urgently needed in Neustadt for training.
3 September 1939 - Outbreak of War with
England.
Naval War Staff made the following radio message to Atlantic
forces at 1256 : hostilities with England with immediate
effect. In order to avoid confusion with the order given on 31.8,
radio message T.O.O. 1550 was made from here : "Open
hostilities against England immediately, do not wait to be
attacked first." In radio message T.O.O. 1400 Naval War Staff
ordered: "U-boats to make war on merchant shipping in
accordance with operations order." This should exclude any
misunderstanding, as the operations order expressly orders war
against merchant shipping in accordance with prize law.
1513 U 26 received orders for minelay off Portland, disregarding
the 3-mile limit. Radio intelligence reports transport
traffic from Portland and Weymouth is said to be a base
for east bound steamers. Supreme Command of the Navy
informed the boats of the steamer rendezvous in the
Bristol Channel. They have not been ordered to take
action, as it is not known in what positions they have been
waiting.
1752 Supreme Command of the Navy made the following to F.O.
U/B and Atlantic boats: "France considers herself at war
with Germany from 1700. Boats are to take no hostile
action against merchant ships for the present, except in
self defense."
This order means that, in war against merchant shipping
according to prize law, French ships and cargoes must be
released. It will not however be possible to avoid stopping
French ships, because the nationality of a ship cannot be
recognized for certain until she has been examined.
4 September 1939
Atlantic boats are informed of forces reported in their areas as
they arise. But the information is so inaccurate that it will not be
of any practical use.
As soon as the new rendezvous for merchant ships in the Bristol
Channel became known U 26 was ordered, in radio message
0930 to operate against this. I do not intend to make any
extensive changes in the dispositions for the present. As long as
the convoy system is not complete and the war against
merchant shipping is to be conducted according to prize law, the
present disposition is correct.
13
1035 The sinking of the English SS "Athenia" became known
through radio intelligence and broadcasts. There is no
precise information as to the position of sinking.
1100 C-in-C Navy at headquarters. Short discussion on the
situation and on my memorandum on U-boat construction.
The orders so far given were checked again after the
sinking of the Athenia. It is inconceivable that they could
be misinterpreted. Nevertheless, in order to make
absolutely certain, radio message 1655 was made, to call
boats' attention once more to the war against merchant
shipping in accordance with prize law: "Operations orders
para. VIa remains in force for the war against merchant
shipping."
2353 Radio message from Naval War Staff to all U-boats: "By
the Fuehrer's orders no hostile action is to be taken for the
present against passenger ships, even if in convoy." There
is no definition of the term passenger ship. Nor do I think
that it could be defined in any way which would be of
practical assistance to C.O.s.
5 September 1939
Convoy assembly points in the Bristol Channel are still being
transmitted to boats. Radio intelligence does not show any
success on the part of U 28, which is operating against these
rendezvous.
1700 U 32 sailed in accordance with operations order Atlantic
No. 5. I intend to let the boat proceed through the
Channel for a minelaying operation off Portsmouth. It is
true that instructions have been issued to English
merchant shipping that the Straits of Dover, outside the
Downs, can only be passed at own risk. There are also
various reports of buoys off Warne lightship and East
Goodwin lightship, but so far no reports or warnings of
minefields. In these circumstances I think it would be
wrong to exclude the Channel route. U-boats passed
 through the Channel even in 1918. Radio intelligence
service reports that S.S. "Bosnia" and "Browning" have
been sunk. - probably by U 48 or U 47.
2050 A radio intelligence report mentions mines in the Straits of
Dover for the first time. Therefore I think it is better for U
32 to sail around the North of England. U 17 must now be
near the Downs; it is best to wait for her report before
sending U 31 and 35 through the Channel. U 32 was
given orders accordingly.
6 September 1939
Naval War Staff made the following radio message T.O.O. 1748:
"The situation with France is still not clear. No hostile action is to
be taken against French units, including merchant ships, except
in self defense. Merchant ships identified as French are not to be
stopped. Avoid incidents with France at all costs." So the French
Merchant ships are to be treated better than the neutrals.
There are several radio intelligence reports which point to the
introduction of the convoy system. Assembly ports Milford and
Plymouth. No clear picture can be expected after only 3 days at
war. The boats will also not be able to
report much now. I intend however, to let a few boats radio
reports in a few day's time.
Radio intelligence service has picked up numerous U-boat
positions, mainly in Biscay (U47). Many of these are probably
duplicated. If the war against merchant shipping is to be fought
according to prize law it is unavoidable that the boats' positions
will be revealed.
There are very many obviously fake reports, which show that
there is a wide-spread U-boat scare. There have been numerous
telephone conversations with Naval War Staff on the subjects of
U-boats in the Atlantic and the development of the U-boat Arm,
since C-in-C was here.
14
The boats which are out at present will have to return during the
second half of September, except U 26 and 53. Then only 26, 53
and 31, 32 and 35 will be out. IF there are to be boats in the
Atlantic again by the first half of October, the 6th and 7th
Flotillas, or at least one of them, must be recalled immediately.
These could then sail again at the beginning of October; it is
doubtful whether the 2nd Flotilla could put to sea again so soon
if they were recalled as their boats would probably need a longer
overhaul. I am making an official journey to Berlin on 7.9 to
discuss this question and also the basic problem of whether U-
boats are to be used primarily against merchant shipping or
naval forces.
7 September 1939
Withdrawal of Boats from the Atlantic
The first thing to be decided is whether the Atlantic boats are to
operate against merchant shipping or against English Naval
forces. Real success against naval forces can only be expected
if lured out of the ports into the open sea. Our surface forces are
so weak that they can hardly effect this. It is conceivable that
the main body of the English fleet, believed to be in Scapa, could
be driven out by air attacks. But air attacks are not policy at the
moment.It was therefore decided, in accordance with my
proposal, to continue to use the boats against merchant
shipping.
With an even distribution there would be about 6-8 boats out at
a time.Only chance successes can be achieved with those. I
consider it better to alternate periods of few boats at sea with
periods of as many as possible and then score one large success
in one place, for instance the destruction of a whole convoy.
In order to achieve this the ebb and flow of U-boats must be
made to correspond as far as possible with the ebb and flow of
merchant shipping. It is doubtful whether reconnaissance will
make this possible later on. At the present moment however,
judging by information available to Supreme Command of the
Navy and the comparatively few successes reported by the radio
intelligence service, merchant shipping traffic is at a low level;
presumably stocks were brought up during the emergency
period and preparations are now being made for a convoy
service. It is to be assumed that traffic will rise again about the
beginning of October.
It was therefore, proposed to recall the 6th and 7th U-Flotillas
and the proposal was approved by Naval War Staff. The order
was given in radio message 1902/7/9. The remaining boats will
be re-distributed over the main areas :
U 30 and U 27 areas U and V off the North entrance to the
Irish Sea.
U 28 Area C
U 29 Area E
U 33 Area J
U 34 Area F
U 53 Area B
Although there has so far been no information of successes off
the North entrance to the Irish Sea, I do not want to leave this
area entirely unoccupied.
8 September 1939
In order to make use of the return passage for purposes of
reconnaissance of the sea area Iceland-Shetlands-Norway, the
boats have been ordered in radio message 1445 to make the
following routes :
a) Between Iceland and the Faroes :
North third U 45, center third U 46, South third U
48/52
b) Between the Faroes and the Shetlands :
North third U 47/37, center third U 38/41, South
third U 39/40
c) Between the Shetlands and Norway :
15
West third U 37, 38, 39, 41; center third U 40, 45,
46 and East third U 47, 48, 52.
There is still no news of U 26. There is however no reason to
worry, as the operation may have been delayed for a variety of
reasons.
1200 U 31 and 35 sailed according to operations order No. 6
they are to occupy:
U 31 Area C East of 90 West.
U 35 Area F East of 70 West.
It is probable, however, that, when they arrive, the boats which
put to sea first (U 28, 29, 33, 34) will have to start on their return
passage. New positions will therefore have to be ordered for U
26 and 32, and U 53, 27, and 30 which are remaining at sea.
According to reports from U 17, which has returned from a
mining operation in the Downs, there is no reason to suppose
that the Channel is not passable. U 31 and U 35 have therefore,
been ordered to proceed through the Channel and to report their
observations of the situation there as opportunity arises.
The results of the conferences on the development of the U-boat
Arm are as follows : When C-in-C Navy visited Headquarters
West I gave him a short expose of my memorandum and
emphasized the necessity of setting up a U-boat Department. C-
in-C Navy said that large scale U-boat construction was planned
and that he intended to put a head of Department in charge of
this.
On the 4.9 C-in-C Navy's adjutant rang up and said that C-in-C
had read my memorandum. He did not however, in any
circumstances wish F.O. U/B to take over this commitment of
Supreme Command of the Navy. C-in-C requested my views on
the question of putting Rear-Admiral ARNAULD at the head of a
U-boat Department to be formed. I replied that I would give my
answer next day, as the fitting of such a post would have very
widespread consequences. I decided :

It is right that I myself should take over the commitment of
developing the U-boat Arm, as head of the Department. It is
wrong in itself for the active service officer, who has directed the
training of the branch from the Start, who knows the officers and
ratings and what they can do and is known by them, to abandon
the control of the Arm branch at the very moment when this
training is being put to the test. It is also possible that in the
future in a crisis, or if it is necessary to increase personnel to a
large extent, the most experienced officer would be required to
endeavor to maintain morale and the standard of training of the
branch at its proper level.
On the other hand, it is a fact that the operational activities of
the branch in its present state will soon be practically non-
existent and control of it therefore superfluous unless we
succeed in building up quickly a numerically strong and effective
U-boat Arm.
The task of creating this force must therefore be regarded as the
most important for the future of U-boats. It is therefore only
right that the most experienced officer, who knows what the
operational requirements are, should be entrusted with this task.
A large-scale U-boat construction program will certainly be
launched by C-in-C Navy personally, but its practical execution,
involving questions and difficulties arising daily in all spheres,
requires initiative in detail from an officer in charge of it and
nothing can be done without a thorough specialist knowledge.
On 5.9 therefore, I explained my views to Chief of Staff Naval
War Staff (Rear Admiral Schniewind) in a long telephone
conversation, in the presence of Captain von Friedeburg.
Admiral Schniewind said that he would submit my views to C-in-
C Navy, who was returning from Swinemuende in the afternoon.
Admiral Schniewind rang me up on the evening of the 5th : C-
in-C Navy had said that in his opinion the present F.O. U/B could
not be spared from the front line. Admiral Schniewind also said
that C-in-C Navy intended that the U-boat Department to be in
practice subordinate to F.O. U/B who would state his
16
requirements, which the U-boat Department would have to fulfil
as they stood.
I told Admiral Schniewind that I did not think it possible to exert
this influence from below and that effective and uniform control
could only be exercised from the top, i.e. from Berlin. Admiral
Schniewind said that the matter had not yet been decided and I
would in any case have another chance to state my opinion. On
the same day I told Captain Netzband when he rang up that I
thought I should be head of the U-boat Department. On 6.9 it
became apparent that I would have to fly to Naval War Staff as
soon as possible, to discuss operational questions. When I was in
Berlin on 7.9 I set out my reasons for thinking that I should
become head of the U-boat Department in detail to :
1) The head of Naval War Staff (1st Division), Captain Fricke, in
the presence of Commander Wagner and Lieut.(s.g.) Fraesdorf.
Captain Fricke and his officers were at first opposed to my
making this appointment, because he considered my presence in
the front line necessary, for the same reasons as I myself stated
earlier; but he could not oppose my arguments and in the end
agreed with me.
2) Chief of Staff, Naval War Staff, Rear Admiral Schniewind. He
agreed to submit my reasons to C-in-C Navy in the evening,
when the latter was expected back from the Fuehrer. I
requested in any case to have a personal interview with C-in-C
Navy before a decision was reached.
On 8.9 Rear Admiral Schniewind telephoned: C-in-C Navy did
not wish me to come to Berlin. C-in-C would give me his reasons
for his decision that I should remain in my present position in a
personal letter. Captain Siemens had been appointed head of
the U-boat Department.
10 September 1939
In radio message 0604 Naval War Staff gave the following
instructions in regard to French ships : "Enemy convoys may be
attacked North of the latitude of Brest even if they are escorted
by French or French and English forces. U-boats are not to take
action against passenger ships even if under escort."
1120 An extract from intelligence gained by Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces from London broadcasts was received
via Lieut. Fraesdorf, according to which a German U-boat
laying mines had been successfully attacked. On the
same day (8.9) the Paris transmitter had stated that
attacks on German U-boats were continuing and had been
successful in at least one case. It is remarkable that this
information did not reach F.O. U/B until today, with 2 days
delay.
This report must concern U 28, as there are no other boats on
minelaying operations at present. To clear up the situation U 26
was ordered to report her position. Even if this is not answered
there is still no reason to give up all hope. The boat may have
been attacked while laying mines and so damaged that she
cannot transmit. In any case I have ordered strictest secrecy for
the present.
U 26 had a lot of secret material on board, including a complete
set of cypher material. In F.O. U/B's Most Secret 146 C.O. of
16.8.39 boats were ordered to land all their superfluous cypher
material. They were not ordered to land their cypher material so
that the uses of the boats would not be restricted. If this boat
really was lost while minelaying cypher material may have fallen
into enemy hands. This risk is run in all minelaying operations
which of necessity have to be carried out in shallow water.
U 32 is at present on her way to lay mines off Portsmouth. Even
if U 26 is lost I see no reason to cancel this operation. The
possible success is worth the risk. The danger of cypher
material falling into enemy hands must, however, be avoided.
For this reason I requested Naval War Staff's approval to operate
the boat in the Bristol Channel, where there is less danger,
rather than off Portsmouth. Naval War Staff agreed and U 32
was ordered by radio message 1822 to carry out her operation
17
South of 510 27 mins., so as to exclude what are believed to be
the most dangerous places.
Future boats on minelaying operations will only carry the most
essential secret documents and cypher material. This means
that they will have to make directly for the laying position and
return immediately when the operation has been carried out.
They will not receive the signals made to the other boats in
Naval Enigma but only the ones essential for themselves,
encyphered according to A.F.B. (T.N.: hand code system).
After the order had been made to U 32, Naval War Staff ordered
that all non-essential secret material held in U 32 was to be
destroyed before the operation. U 32 was given an order
accordingly, with details. There was thus no longer any reason
to carry out the operation in the Bristol Channel rather than off
Portsmouth. However, I refrained from altering the orders again.
2350 English warning to shipping received, via Chief Radio
Intelligence Department: "The Shambles are to be passed
to the south." This confirms that U 26 was the boat
attacked. She sailed on 29.8. She was supplied for 6
weeks, i.e. until about the 10th October. Nothing further
can be done therefore until the middle of October.
11 September 1939
Radio intelligence report of the sinking of S.S. Firby (4683 BRT) in
square 1366 AM West of the Faroes. This success should have a
very strong effect, as so far U-boats have not appeared in this
area. Radio intelligence reports of convoys are coming in in
increasing numbers. The rendezvous in the Bristol Channel are
still being transmitted to the boats. Otherwise there is no clear
picture.
In radio message 2230 U 31, which should be West of the
Channel on the 12th or 13th, was ordered to proceed to area
East off the Bristol Channel, and U 35 and 34 East and West of
70 West in area F off the Channel.

Discussed the organization and duties of the U-boat party at
Supreme Command of the Navy with Captain Siemens, the
future head of the U-boat department and Commander
Hüffmeyer.
12 September 1939
Atlantic boats on return passage were ordered to report when off
Norderney or Abelö. The boats should not be approaching the
line Shetlands-Iceland. Little heard so far from U 30. In radio
message 0950 she was ordered to make a situation report.
2115 U 30 reported in radio message 1451 "weather and
visibility conditions unfavorable. Little traffic. S.S.
"Blairlogie" sunk.". It will not now be possible for this boat
to come up into the Channel, her fuel stocks are not
sufficient. The other boats of the first series - U 28, 29,
35, 34 - will also soon have exhausted theirs. They were
therefore ordered : 2300 "When fuel is used up return
North of the Shetlands. Chance to attack warships West
of the Orkneys. U 30 to transfer operations area to
position V if possible."
2310 Returning boats were given instructions on the approach
routes to Kiel and Wilhelmshaven.
13 September 1939
0007 U 26 reported operation carried out in position BF 1828.
Boat seems to have carried out her operation with
determination despite anti-S/M activity. Radio message:
"Well done!" Boat was ordered to operate in are F.
0835 Radio message to Atlantic boats, informing them of
warning to shipping along the line Dungeness - Downs
and mines off St. Catherine's lightship. U 35 reported that
18
she had abandoned the attempt to break through the
Channel. It is assumed that U 31 got through. Details of
return passage of Atlantic boats passed to Group Baltic,
F.O.I.C. Baltic defenses and F.O. U/B Baltic.
2030 U 26, 34, 35, given freedom of action to attack in the
whole of area F. This sea area is big enough for it.
Now that the 6th and 7th U-Flotillas have left, the distribution is
as follows :
U 30, U 27 off the North Channel in areas U and V.
U 30 also has permission to attack in area V.
U 53: Area B.
U 28, 31, 32 Area C off the Bristol Channel.
U 29 Area B, West of the Channel.
U 26, 34, 35 Area F, West of the Channel (inside).
U 33 Area J (Biscay).
Revised list of contraband received in Naval War Staff's secret
6035. An extract was transmitted to Atlantic boats.
14 September 1939
Analysis of sinkings known through radio intelligence shows that
most of them were in U 29's area Radio message 0930 was
therefore made to U 55: "Extension to operations area seems
promising and is recommended."
A.M. Conference with Admiral Superintendent of Dockyard on
the torpedo situation. Dockyard had stated that all G7e
issued were adapted for angled shots. U-boats were
accordingly informed on 7.9. Then, on the evening of the
13th, the dockyard informed us by T/P that gyro-angling
gear had been fitted, but the tails had not been adapted.
These mistakes must not occur. It remains to be seen
whether this has caused misses. 90 degree angled shots
were cancelled.
P.M. Radio Intelligence Service reports that the steamers
Vancouver City, British Influence and Faned Head have
been sunk; tonnage sunk has thus passed the 100,000
sunk mark.
15 September 1939
U 31 reported in radio message 0700: "Convoy in square 1253,
main course 2400, speed 10 knots." That is off the Bristol
Channel. This is the first clear report of a convoy. The boats in
the neighboring areas U 34, 29, 53, should now operate against
the convoy - they may have luck. I have dinned it into the C.O.s
again and again that they must not let such chances go by. It is
not possible to do anything from this end.In any case the boats
must now be nearly at the end of their fuel. If only there were
more boats at sea now ! Nevertheless I still think it was right to
recall the boats - without then there would be a complete lack of
U-boats by the beginning of October, and by then there should
be more traffic.
So U 31 got through the Channel and had different experiences
than U 35. This shows that it is possible to pass through the
Channel, even if not in all circumstances as is shown in the case
of U 35. I do not intend to use the Channel as the normal route.
In the course of the day U 46, 47 put into Kiel, U 37 into
Wilhelmshaven. U 47 reports that she has sunk : S.S. Bosnia
2407 BRT 3200 tons Sulphur; Rio Claro 4086 BRT 4777 tons
mixed cargo; Gartavon 1777 BRT 2900 tons ore.
The boat was in her operations area for 4 days (3 - 7.9) after the
outbreak of war. A very nice beginning. U 37 and 46 no success
- bad luck. Further details will have to be gathered from the
C.O.'s reports. The disposition of the next series of boats is
under constant consideration; they must destroy a convoy.
2300 The Belgian S.S. Alex von Opstal is said to have been
torpedoed by a U-boat near the Shambles. Her position is
within the area fouled by U 26. Numerous radio
19
intelligence reports received point to an increase in
convoy traffic. Since 13.9 no more steamer rendezvous
have been published in the Bristol Channel. This also
points to the convoy system being perfected.
Towards evening U 45 entered Kiel. No success, as her position
seems to have been outside the areas frequented by
shipping.
(signed) : Dönitz, Captain B.d.U.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
16 - 30 September 1939
PG30248
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
16.9
Group Headquarters West
In order to get further information on English trade
routes, the amount of merchant shipping traffic and the convoy
system, a collection of questions for investigation has been sent
to the intelligence service.
With Supreme Command of the Navy, Naval War Staff
(1st Division)'s Most Secret 6559 control of U-boats under F.O.
U/B Baltic passes to F.O. U/B West. For details see War Log of
F.O. U/B West.
U 30 requested leave to call at Reykjavik to land a
seriously wounded man; she reports slight damage to her bows,
2 tubes out of action. She has 2 captured Air Force officers on
board. Permission was given in radio message 0145. She will
probably put into Reykjavik during the night 16/17. The Consul The British radio published the sinking of the a/c carrier
is to be informed by Naval War Staff as late as possible, so that Courageous (22,500) tons by a U-boat. A wonderful success and
her movements will not be known too soon. U 26 made contact further confirmation of the fact that the English defense forces
with the convoy reported by U 31 at 1900/15. According to dead are not as effective as they advertise themselves to be.
reckoning it was making 6-8 knots. According to a radio A number of radio intelligence reports received during
intelligence report one boat appears to have attacked. 17.9 U the last week show clearly that the enemy is introducing the
41, 48, 52 entered port. convoy
Successes: U 41 brought in 2 Finnish ships from the North
Sea as prize. No sinkings.
U 48 sank: S.S. Winkleigh 5,055 tons
S.S. Royal Sceptre 4,053 tons - 24 -
S.S. Firby 4,869 tons
14,977 tons

U 52 sank a ship type Appalachee, 8826 tons. "ERWIN

WASSNER" sailed for Kiel. This completed the separation of the
operational and administrative staffs. It remains to be seen how
it will work out. In the evening U 32 reported her operation
carried out:
"As per your order, lettered E
have fouled the British swine his sea."
(Minelay in the Bristol Channel). The boat has been
allocated operations area C. U 31 and U 28 are also there. The
latter will, however, have to return home very soon. There is
nothing against having 3 boats in such a wide sea area. C is one
of the best positions and must therefore be heavily occupied.
18.9 U 34 reported that she had started her return
passage, the first boat of the 2nd U-Flotilla.This flotilla has
orders to remain in the operations area until ammunition and
fuel are used up. The equipment has therefore sufficed for 18
war days in positions.
U 38 and U 40 entered port.
Successes: U 38 sank Manaar 7,200 tons
Inverliffey 9,445 tons
14, 645 tons
U 40 no sinkings.
20
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
systems in the Mediterranean. Agents' reports point to
English troop transports leaving for France from Channel ports.
U 35 has therefore been ordered to occupy area F and operate
from there against these troop transports. It is also intended to
attack them simultaneously from the North Sea. (War Log F.O.
U/B West).
The inadequate firing of torpedoes is causing grave
concern. G7a and G7e torpedoes have repeatedly exploded
after a run of about 250 meters, before reaching the target. In
one case the boat was slightly damaged owing to this (U 27).
The Torpedo Inspectorate does not know the reason at present.
Everything is being done to remedy the defect.
 Towards midday C-in-C Navy arrived at Group
Headquarters. He enquired into the process of the U-boat war
and raised the question of sending U-boats to the Mediterranean
to withdraw light Naval forces from the North Sea. In my opinion
it would not be a good thing, with the very few U-boats available
at present, to split them up over too many theatres of war. The
withdrawal of light Naval forces from the one area can also be
achieved by transferring the war against merchant shipping to
the areas West of Gibraltar and Portugal. This was already done
with the first disposition and it is intended to continue on the
same lines later.
Then C-in-C Navy spoke of the conduct of the war in
general. He said that the next step he intended to take in the
war at sea against England, before declaring unrestricted danger
zones, was to declare danger zones only against English ships,
not against neutrals. He wished first however, to hear F.O. U/B's
views. I replied that in my opinion warfare limited to certain
nations would not bring the desired results, because:
1) In most cases the U-boat, which has to wait submerged for
a suspicious ship, cannot identify the ship's nationality in time to
attack without warning.
2) Presumably the enemy would very soon sail his merchant
ships under the protection of neutral markings and flags.
The results would be:
a) either many neutrals would be sunk without warning as
supposed enemies, which is just what we want to avoid
b) or many enemy ships would get away as supposed neutrals,
which we want to avoid ever more.
19.9 U 26, 27 and 23 reported:
Started on return passage. U 27 and U 33 had been expected
to leave the operational area since the 15th. They have been
out longer than was expected, 17 days, apart from the time
before the outbreak of war during which they used up provisions
only. U 26 on the other hand has left much sooner. The reason
is probably lack of ammunition. She was only able to take 6
torpedoes besides the mines. As she made contact with the
convoy reported by U 31 she probably fires some torpedoes at
21
ships in it. No report has yet been received from U 30 about her
putting into Reykjavik. Possibly the boat is having to proceed at
most economical speed, as she had not expected this detour.
- 25 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
20.9 Radio intelligence reports give the impression that
England is now using her air force on a large scale against U-
boats. The operation is favored by the calm weather conditions.
U 28 reported that she was starting her return passage.
There are now only 4 boats at stations.This void cannot be
concealed from the enemy; this is shown by the fact that far
fewer U-boat warnings and sightings are received. Many of them
are still false and cover a wide area, but the total number is less.
There is still no news of U 30. Also none of U 39. The
boat could have been home some days ago, but there are many
possible reasons for delay. It is not intended to order her to
make her position, as this cannot help the boats and may make
their return passage more difficult.
21.9 The long awaited report from U 30 was received.
The boat put into Reykjavik on the 19th and is at present SE of
Iceland. It is now essential to get news of U 39. In radio
message 0837 she was ordered for the first time to report her
position.
 Naval War Staff has sent a T/P to F.O. U/B, ordering that
all attacks on French ships are to be avoided at all costs. This
means that U-boats cannot operate in the Channel against troop
transports. This operation (U 35 see also F.O. U/B West's War
Log) was arranged because of Naval War Staff's orders that
convoys could be attacked North of the Latitude of Brest even if
the escort consisted of French Forces. It can be taken as certain
that these transports sail at night; and at night the U-boat must
be able to assume that a darkened ship is an enemy ship, even if
in convoy. It is often impossible to establish the nationality of
ships in convoy even by day and when flags are not being
misused, but at night it is quite out of the question. I therefore
informed Naval War Staff that, if this order is to stand, I cannot
let the boats operate in the Channel. At first Naval War Staff
would not make a final decision as to conduct towards France,
but later Captain Fricke informed me by telephone, that today's
order was cancelled and that things stood as before, i.e. French
ships could be sunk without warning if they were proceeding in
convoy North of the latitude of Brest.
22.9 It does not appear necessary or desirable to define
definite limits of operations areas for the 4 boats remaining in
the sea area SW of England. There is hardly any information
available here as to escort of shipping, sea patrol main direction
of traffic etc. in this area. Positions of sinkings show that there is
much traffic from the south to the Channel and the Irish Sea, but
little from the North to the Irish Sea. Boats are to adapt
themselves as much as possible to the traffic situation and be
able to get away from local patrol. The South and West limits of
the operations area have therefore been lifted. In the evening U
53 and U 32 reported that they were starting their return
passage. This is much sooner than expected and must be due to
their having used up their ammunitions. There are therefore
only 2 boats left at stations. U 39 was again ordered to report
her position.The signal was made several times during the night
on both the North Sea and Atlantic waves.
22
- 26 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
23.9 U 39 did not report. It is possible that her radio is
out of order, but even at slow speed she should have reached
home by now. She must be presumed lost. A british broadcast
reports the arrival of captured U-boat men in England.
U-boats which have returned say, that in very many
cases ships use their radio when they are ordered to stop, with
the result that in several cases a/c have appeared over the
positions reported. In this way ships assist enemy anti-S/M
activity. I consider it necessary to take action against such ships
in order to prevent their taking part in anti-S/M operations in this
way, and I have asked Naval War Staff for a ruling. The question
of the treatment of French ships is becoming increasingly urgent
with present developments (troop transports, convoys).
24.9 In Most Secret 8027 Naval War Staff gives the
following ruling: French ships are to be treated in the same way
as English ships. For passenger ships, orders as hitherto issued
remain in force. Merchant ships which use their radio when
stopped are either to be brought in or sunk. Mines may be laid
on the French coast. Boats received orders accordingly in radio
message 1641.
25.9 U 33, on return passage in the North Sea, reported
at 2217 an enemy cruiser and 3 destroyers on the Ling Bank,
course 1000, speed 15 knots. Apparently the boat soon lost and Sea State, Illumination, Events
contact. (see also F.O. War Log) Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

26.9 U 31 reports: Have started on return passage

because of lack of fuel. This boat is also returning much sooner U 26 carried out a difficult minelaying operation with
than had been calculated. She was not expected to leave until determination and ability. Except for the Belgian S.S. "Alex van
7.10. Opsal", sank shortly afterwards in the minefield, she did not
Experience so far has shown that such calculations are meet with any success.
very unreliable in the end. It is not possible to judge from here
how much fuel a boat actually uses in the operations area. It U 29 sank:
depends on how often and for how long she has to chase ships.
Engine defects lower the speed and make it necessary to leave the a/c carrier "Courageous" 22,500 tons
earlier. The period a boat can spend in the operations area is the tanker "Regent Tiger" 10,176 tons
finally dependent on her stocks and consumption of ammunition. " "British Influence" 8,431 tons
The condition of boats when they return varies greatly the tug "Neptunia" 900 tons
from case to case. Periods required for repairs differ very much 19,507 tons
and the next operation often depends more on this than on the
state of the crew. For operational control this means that of An outstandingly successful patrol.
necessity if full use is made of the boats, there will be periods
during which a large number of boats are out against the enemy U 34 sank:
and periods when there will be only a few in operations area.
U 30, coming from Reykjavik, gave her position as AN S.S. "Pukkastan" 5,809 tons
3840 and reported one Diesel unserviceable and other damage. S.S. "Kennebec" 5,548 tons
She was picked up by a minesweeper and escorted to route 11,357 tons
Blau.
U 26, U 29 and U 34 entered port. and also brought in the Estonian S.S. "Hanonia", 2543 tons,
as prize.

Towards midday heavy English naval forces were

- 27 - reported in the central North Sea. Apparently U-boats made no
contact. (see F.O. U/B West's War Log).

27.9 Several heavy units of the English Naval forces

which penetrated to the center of the North Sea have been
damaged by a/c bombs. According to reconnaissance and radio
intelligence reports, they are returning to their bases. U 32 and
U 53, which are believed to be off the Shetlands, were ordered to
wait off Scapa for as long as fuel stocks permit. U 53 reported
Date Position, Wind, Weather that her fuel would not run to this.
23
 F.O. U/B gave details, in the presence of C-in-C Navy and
U 30 entered port. She sank: Major General Keitel only, of the operation of U-boats so far and
S.S. "Blairlogic" 4,425 tons further prospects for U-boat warfare. After explaining individual
S.S. "Fanad Head " 5,274 tons operation problems for the Atlantic and the North Sea, I
9,699 tons. summarized my views as follows:
1) The actual and psychological effect of the U-boat over a
Stopping "Fanad Head" nearly proved fatal for the boat. wide area is still very great and not less than in the World War.
While the prize party was examining the ship, a/c appeared and 2) It is not true that England has technical means which nullify
the C.O. was faced with the problem of either taking unrestricted the U-boat danger. Boat's experience confirm that English anti-
action or losing the prize party. He chose the first alternative S/M activity is not as effective as it claims to be.
and finally achieved all he wanted by skill and daring. 3) Undoubtedly progress has been made in anti-S/M warfare, but
This case shows how very difficult it is for U-boats to it is balanced by considerable improvements in the U-boat:
have to act according to prize law, especially with a/c. They a) The boats proceed more quietly.
make themselves vulnerable and lose their strength, which lies b) Splashless discharge of torpedoes, which does not give the
in being able to surprise and to dive. boat away.
c) The torpedo's track is invisible and its effect much greater
U 33 entered port. She sank: than before.
S.S. "Olive Grove" 4,060 tons 4) Enormous strides have been made in U-boat
S.S. "Arkleside" 1,567 tons communications. It is possible today to operate U-boats over
S.S. "Coldew" 600 tons the widest areas according to plan and to let them operate
6,227 tons. together. It is thus possible to counter a concentration of
merchant ships in convoys with a concentration of U-boats. The
convoy becomes the focal point for all U-boats stationed in the
area. The Biscay exercises from 11-15 May showed that this was
- 28 - a practical proposition.
5) After considering all questions relating to U-boat warfare I am
convinced that it is a means of inflicting decisive damage on
England at her weakest point.
6) U-boat war can only be waged successfully if there are
enough boats. This means at least 300 boats. Therefore a far
larger number of boats must be built, as the current losses have
to be covered.
7) If this number of boats is available. I believe that the U-boat
Date Position, Wind, Weather Arm can achieve decisive success.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. The Führer spent an hour with the U-boat officers at their
club and then left Wilhelmshaven.

28.9 The Fürhrer visited U-boat headquarters.

24
 29.9 U 28 entered port. No merchant ships sunk. One
auxiliary cruiser with strong escort attacked, hit and probably
sunk.
U 28 was SW of the cruiser in the Bristol Channel. The
C.O. confirmed my suspicion that the assembly points for ships
- 29 -
transports or convoys. Heavy single ship traffic off the English
coast. Little traffic off the French coast, including Le Harve.
Impossible to act according to prize law because of patrol
vessels." etc. Valuable due to the present state of affairs in the
Channel.
U 32 entered port. She carried out her minelaying
operation according to plan and, in addition sank:
S.S. "Kensington Court " 4,863 tons
S.S. "Jern" 875 tons
5,738 tons.

U 53 entered Kiel. She sank:

S.S. "Cheyanne" 8,825 tons
S.S. "Kafiristan" 5,193 tons
14,018 tons.

Nearly all boats are at home now. I shall take advantage

Date Position, Wind, Weather of this opportunity to address the U-boat commanders in
and Sea State, Illumination, Events Wilhelmshaven and afterwards in Kiel, to give them instructions
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. once more and explain the mistakes made before they put to
sea again.

given at first were not correct. They were probably points

of reference. (signed): Dönitz
It is 10 days since U 27 reported that she was starting Captain and Commodore
her return passage at 0700/19/9. She will be ordered to report B.d.U.
her position tonight. If she does not answer is must be assumed
that something happened to her. F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

30.9 U 27 has not reported. A few days ago the English 1 - 15 October 1939
radio again spoke of captured U-boat men. They were interned
in the North of England. A merchant ship captain told of firing PG30249
on a U-boat which was said to have got caught up in a
fisherman's net. There may be some connection.
Radio message from U 35 (English Channel): "One week
in the area Portland, Casquets, Dieppe, Hastings. Very strong air
patrol. S/M's and small surface craft, no large warships, Date Position, Wind, Weather
25
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
1.10
Group Command Headquarters West.
will be ready for operations during the first half of October:
U 42 on 2.10 U 45 on 8.10
37 on 5.10 40 on 16.10 doubtful
46 on 4.10 25 on 15.10
47 on 4.10 34 on 11.10
48 on 4.10
operate along the sea routes in the Atlantic, always 2 at a time.
Occasionally remote cover by heavy units.
d) Boats which were stationed immediately off the coast, off the
English Channel, in the Bristol Channel and adjacent sea areas
were less successful than those in remote sea areas. Apparently
they are too much hindered by patrol.
The following boats e) The best area has been southwest of Ireland.
f) There is a great accumulation of traffic off Gibraltar. There is a
lot of reliable information on convoys here. The outstanding
feature of our own situation is the small number of available
boats. In view of the enemy's concentration of shipping into
convoys, I do not think it wise to scatter them individually over a
very wide area.

I intend to operate them against merchant shipping in

the Atlantic. They are almost all boats of large radius of action.
I regard the enemy situation as follows:
a) Convoy system has been widely introduced. Ports for - 31 -
incoming convoys are: Weymouth for the channel area, Barry
for the Bristol Channel - Irish Sea. Ports for outward bound
convoys are:
Plymouth for the Channel area
Milford Haven for the Bristol Channel - Irish Sea
Gibraltar is used by convoys bound in all directions and as port
of control for ships bound for northern Europe.
Ramsgate or the Downs are ports of control for east bound
traffic coming from the Channel. Date Position, Wind, Weather
b) The strength of convoys varies between 4 and 20 ships, their and Sea State, Illumination, Events
speed between 7 and 18 knots. Very fast convoys have only Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
been observed in the Mediterranean.
c) Convoy escort:
Close escort by 4-6 destroyers, sometimes also cruisers, a/c Our aim must be to intercept convoys and to concentrate
accompany the convoys off the coast. on sinking them with our few available boats. It is difficult to
Remote protection: find convoys at sea. The boats must be operated in areas where
Strong air activity all around England. there is likely to be traffic, as is the case for instance southwest
Stationary a/c carriers: of England and in the Gibraltar area.
In the Scapa area, west of Iceland, southwest of Iceland, in the The England position has the advantage of a shorter outward
Channel area, in the gibraltar area. Protection in coastal areas passage, but patrol is strong in the coastal area and is made
by patrol vessels and other light forces. French submarines
26
from many bases. Bad weather must be expected here at this U 31 entered port. She sank:
time of year. S.S. "Hazelside" 4,646 tons.
Gibraltar has the disadvantage of a long outward passage, but She also attacked 2 ships in the convoy she reported at
as the outward route cuts across merchant shipping routes, the time and sank one for certain.
successes may be expected here, also there is a great This boat gives the impression of being particularly
concentration of shipping around Gibraltar. Weather conditions smart and cheerful.
may be expected to be more favorable than in the north. There
is little information on patrol, mostly to the effect that it is
concentrated in the Straits; it can only be sent out from Gibraltar
or Casablanca. - 32 -
I have decided to operate the boats against Gibraltar traffic.
Execution: Success will depend on the boats making a surprise
appearance together. They will be ready on different dates.
They will therefore sail on different days and will occupy an
operations area southwest of Ireland, which sinking figures so far
have shown to be the best area. When all the boats have
arrived there, they will receive orders to proceed on from F.O.
U/B; he will order them to leave sooner or later according to the
situation. Lieut Commander Hartmann will be in U 37 as S.O. of Date Position, Wind, Weather
this Atlantic group and he will, if necessary, take over control in and Sea State, Illumination, Events
convoy operations. If he finds things are not promising off Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Gibraltar he will be authorized to order a new disposition, rather
further from the enemy bases, along the west coast of Spain and
Portugal. Only north-south bound merchant ships would be In Most Secret 9212 of 30.9 Naval War Staff has
picked up here, of course. ordered that the U-boat war against merchant shipping in the
North Sea and Baltic be stopped.
A further order from Naval War Staff states:
2.10 Naval War Staff has authorized an area around Ships which, in the view of the C.O., are equipped to carry
England in which darkened ships may be sunk without warning. more than 120 passengers, are to be regarded as passenger
This will be a great relief to U-boats. Nevertheless the area is ships. M.D.V. 87 (T.N.: German Naval official publication)
very narrow, so the practical results will probably be few. It has explains this further. The main points to note are the number of
become known in Germany that English merchant ships have boats - 4 or more each side of the ship, length and number of
repeatedly attacked U-boats which had stopped them in promenade decks, bull's eyes.
accordance with prize law. It was announced that if such cases Boats were instructed on these orders.
were repeated German U-boats would have to take steps The term "passenger ship" is a very wide one, and its
accordingly. In reply, the Admiralty announced an instruction to final definition left to the C.O.'s impressions. It must be realized
all English merchant ships to heave to and ram any German U- that in practice this order is open to very wide interpretation,
boats sighted. especially as the submerged boat's powers of observation are
limited.
27
 3.10 Several radio intelligence reports indicate that the
Greek S.S. "Diamantis" has been sunk at the western entrance
to the Channel. They are confirmed by a radio message from U
35, reporting that the entire crew of the ship sunk are on board
unharmed. Presumably the C.O. made the signal because he
thought he ought to contradict contrary reports.
4.10 The following orders on the conduct of the war
against merchant shipping were received from Naval War Staff:
1) The area within which darkened ships may be attacked
without restriction is extended westwards to 150 west.
2) U boats may attack immediately without restriction any
enemy merchant ships which are unmistakably seen to be
armed or which Naval War Staff announce as being armed, on
the basis of unmistakable evidence available to them. Steps are
to be taken to save the crew if circumstances permit, this
without endangering the U-boat. Passenger ships are still not to
be attacked provided they are not troop transports, even if they
are armed.
Both these orders mean a good step forward for the conduct of
the war. They are better suited to the nature of a U-boat attack
and increase chances of success.
U 46 and U 48 sailed for their operations area. U 46 had to turn
back in the evening because of engine trouble and was ordered
to put into Wilhelmshaven. U 35 reported that she was starting
on her return passage. The radio message also mentioned that:
1) Again there had been 2 spontaneous explosions of G7a
pistols.
2) She had to land the crew of the Greek ship on the Irish coast.
- 33 -
28
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
5.10 U 37 sailed for her operations area.
Late in the evening U 45 sailed from Kiel through the
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. The boat was ready sooner than
expected. All the boats of this way will sail via the Bight. I
consider the route through the Baltic approaches less safe at
present. Experience has confirmed that there are too many
opportunities here for enemy S/M's to lie in wait for U-boats. Our
own defenses have not been able to master this danger. In
order to lessen it U-boats have been ordered to proceed
submerged by day when using the Baltic approaches between
Äbelö and Skagen. This stretch cannot be covered in one night
surfaced and therefore this route takes a lot of time. Conditions
are more favorable in the North Sea. There are 3 routes which
are less restricted from a navigational viewpoint. They are far
apart and each can be covered in one night. Defense forces can
concentrate on the area off river mouths and is not restricted by
natural territorial waters.
6.10 The English S.S. "Lockgoil", 9,462 tons, ran into the
minefield laid by U 32 in the Bristol Channel.
Sinking not certain.
On the orders of Naval War Staff U-boats are in future to
report:
1) Cases of ships guilty of incorrect behavior, contrary to
neutrality and international law, when stopped.
2) Cases of armed merchant ships.
3) Incidents with neutral a/c and warships.
4) Own violation of neutral territorial waters.
5) Illegal action on the part of neutrals.
Statements from witnesses are to be obtained in writing
and signed by them. If possible the witnesses are to be brought
in person.
Reports are to be made as soon as possible, so that
they may be exploited for political and propaganda purposes in
good time. They are not however, to be made if this entails
operational disadvantage for the boat.
7.10 U 46 sailed, her engines having been repaired.
U 47, which should have sailed for the Atlantic on 4.10,
has been given a special operation and will not take part in this
Atlantic patrol. (For special operation see F.O. U/B West's War
Log).
8.10 The period during which U 39 might have returned,
or news have been received of her, has expired. The boat can
no longer be expected to return. The crew are to be regarded as
"missing".
- 34 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
29
Enquiries about members of the crew, who may have been
taken prisoner are to be conducted in such a way that the
enemy cannot discover that the boat has been lost if he does
not already know this from other sources.
U 15, a North Sea boat, entered port from the Channel
and brought valuable reconnaissance results. The following is of
importance for Atlantic boats:
1) Channel patrol, including the line Dover-Calais, was only
slight, the weather being bad on an average. Patrol vessels'
listening gear was little effective and inaccurate. Other forms of
location were not observed. There are only a few uncertain
reports of echo ranging from U 17 (Downs) and U 14 (Orkneys).
2) Accurate navigational orientation was possible everywhere.
There were a number of lights showing, if only in restricted
sectors in some areas. There were a number of sea marks.
3) No barrages were observed, but several buoys appeared to be
in connection with barrage defenses.
U 15's statements agree with U 31's, though the latter
only passed through the Channel and was not stationed there for
observation as U 15. U 35's experiences show that conditions
can be different on occasions. Nevertheless it is clear that, for
the present at least, it is possible to proceed through the
channel.
This means a considerable shortening of the approach
route for the Atlantic boats. It remains to be decided whether
the added risk is justified by the success to be expected if U-
boats use the Channel route and can therefore remain longer in
their operations area.
The following order was received from Naval War Staff:
As so far the English have not seized German exports in neutral
ships, enemy exports in neutral ships bound for neutral ports are
not to be seized by us either.
 9.10 The following are expected to be ready, as the next
wave of Atlantic boats:
U 25 on 17.10 U 26 on 20 or 22.10
31 on 19.10 53 on 21.10
32 on 19.10
3 boats with large and 2 with small radius of action. I
intend to use the large boats in the Mediterranean,
approximately between Gibraltar and Oran. There are so many
reports of convoys there that it should be worthwhile to send
them in spite of the long approach route and the consequent
short period in the operations area. I think there will be very
little opportunity for warfare according to prize law, but the
chances of attacking without warning should be many. Also the
long narrow sea areas makes a certain amount of cooperation
possible between boats, even with so few. There is also the
point that it is policy, especially now with so few boats available,
to worry the enemy in as many and as remote places as
possible. He is then forces to provide for anti-S/M action
everywhere and to maintain patrols. This means a weakening
- 35 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
of local defenses. The more forces the enemy is able to
use in anti-S/M operations the more necessary it becomes for us
30
to change the operations areas frequently and thus avoid the
expected concentrated attack.
Boats of the 2nd U-Flotilla can only be used in the sea
area around England. There are several minelaying operations
which have been shown to be worthwhile, and I intend to carry
them out now as follows:
1) Fouling of Loch Ewe. It is to be expected with certainty that
this place will be in due course used as an anchorage by heavy
English forces, especially when Scapa is attacked by air, which is
not yet permitted.
2) Fouling of English convoy and control ports, first of all Milford
Haven, then the Bristol Channel and off Liverpool.
3) Fouling of the steamer routes in the Channel.
Fouling of Loch Ewe and Milford are of first importance.
The operations in the Channel can be done as well by the small
boats and are therefore not to be considered for Atlantic boats.
The following are reasons for paying more attention to
minelaying as a whole at the present moment:
1) The long nights and the bad weather to be expected at this
time of year reduce the chances of a torpedo-carrying U-boat,
but are just the right conditions for minelaying operations.
2) There is now sufficient information on the routes of English
merchant shipping to enable us to pick out the most valuable
positions.
3) It is very probable that the enemy has no means of detecting
and sweeping ground mines. This fact must be exploited.
10.10 U 40 sailed for her operations area. She has been
ordered to try and break through the Channel, but to take the
route around the north of England if strong opposition is
encountered. I decided to give this order because, as long as it
is not definitely known that the Channel is impossible, we cannot
let pass the advantage of this much shorter approach route,
which offers many more opportunities of success even on the
way out. So far it is not definitely known that the English
Channel is impassable. There are only warnings, which are
countered by the fact that U 31 and U 15 got through almost
unhindered. I would not really have been necessary for U 35 to
turn back. The C.O. was too much influenced by a few
observations, as he himself now agrees. My decision was also
influenced by the fact that the disposition planned off Gibraltar
can only lead to the expected success if there are enough boats
there. U 40 was not ready for operations until much later than
the others and the only way to compensate for this delay is to
shorten her outward passage.
11.10 The question of creating bases comes to mind
again and again when considering the boat's long approach
routes to their operations areas during which they are in
constant danger, but have
- 36 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
little opportunity of taking action themselves. There are 2
possibilities:
1) Fixed bases in friendly neutral countries.
2) Floating bases.
To 1. Supplying to a limited extent has been agreed to in
remote northwest Spanish bays. Several rendezvous with supply
ships have been fixed. The actual feasibility of the scheme can
only be tested in practice.
31
To 2. S.S. Ammerland is being converted into a supply ship. It
is intended to station her in a suitable bay in Iceland,
camouflaged as a ship with engine trouble.
12.10 U 35 entered port. She sank:
1) English trawler "Arlita" 325 tons
2) " " "Lord Minto" 285 tons
3) a freighter from a convoy 9,000 tons
4) the Belgian S.S. "Suzen" 2,239 tons
5) the Greek S.S. "Diamantis" 4,990 tons
16,839 tons
She also scored a hit on a tanker of 17,000 tons, the sinking
of which was not observed as the boat had to dive.
She also encountered the "Aquitania", darkened in the
Channel. She did not attack, as permission to attack darkened
ships did not arrive until 48 hours later.
This has been a particularly successful patrol. The crew
gave a very good impression on return.
13.10 The first sign of the activity of the boats which
have put to sea has been a sudden large number of radio
intelligence reports of sightings of and actions with U-boats in
the Atlantic. U 37 reported the first sinking.
14.10 Radio intelligence reports of U-boats continue to
increase. They give the impression of a very promising surprise
in the area planned for the operation.
U 40 which sailed on the 10th, has not yet reported on
her passage through the Channel. She had verbal orders to do
this. She is not yet through therefore and must have been
delayed.
15.10 Radio intelligence reports from the Atlantic have
abated almost entirely. Only S.S. "Stonepool" in contact with a
U-boat. U 48 reported her sinkings, 4 ships totaling 29,000 tons,
 PG30250

- 37 -

Date Position, Wind, Weather

and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
and made a short situation report. She reports good weather
(she was even able to reload upper deck torpedoes), while on
information here it had been assumed that weather conditions in
the operations area were very bad. It becomes clear how
valuable such situation reports are for operations control. As the
weather was believed to be definitely bad, the flotilla S.O. was
advised on the 13th to leave position "GELB" and go to position
"SCHWARZE" (Ops. order No. 7).
Towards evening reports were received showing that
apparently there has been a large-scale S/M hunt in area "GELB".
16.10 The general impression in the Atlantic is as follows:
Group Headquarters West Position "GELB" was a very
happy choice. Now that a few more reports of sinkings have
been received, the total tonnage sunk in the last 3 days has
risen to nearly 56,000. The enemy then immediately changed
merchant shipping route and sent anti-S/M forces to this area.
There is therefore no purpose in remaining long in this position.
The boats will be ordered to proceed on to area "SCHWARZ".
During the last few days the British news service has several
times stated that several German U-boats had been sunk,
including 2 of the largest and newest type. In spite of the many
sinkings in area "GLEB", only U 37 and U 48 had reported. U 42,
45 and 46 were therefore ordered to give their position and
situation report. There were no misgivings about this order, as
the boats are leaving their areas and their presence has in any
case become known through their activities. U 46 reported, but
U 42 and U 45 did not. It can therefore only be taken for certain
that U 37, U 46 and U 48 are proceeding on.

17.10

(signed) Dönitz 0055 Radio signal from U 46 reporting the sighting of a large
Rear Admiral and B.d.U. cruiser, course north, 14 knots. It could not be gathered
whether the boat was shadowing or trying to regain contact.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
U 34 sailed for her operations area.
16 - 31 October 1939
32
 0851 U 46 reported a convoy of 20 ships escorted by 12
destroyers, on a main course northeast. Boat was shadowing,
lost contact for a while, regained it and shadowed until
afternoon. Then English costal radio stations received reports of
the torpedoing of 2 ships. At 2000 U 37 reported: convoy
scattered, one ship sunk. She must therefore have reached the
convoy. After the convoy had scattered, contact was lost. In
order to regain it, U 37 ordered a reconnaissance line to be
formed the following morning which is intended to pick up the
convoy from the northeast.
18.10 At 0029 U 48 sighted the enemy again. She reported:
"A straggler sunk. A second straggler steering a northerly
course in square 6789 BE. All torpedoes used."
The boat shadowed this ship. At 0500 U 37 gave the order
to act on U 48's report, thus canceling the order for a
reconnaissance line. At first light U 48 again sighted the convoy,
which had apparently reassembled meanwhile. At 0630 a
second U-boat was reported in sight of a ship. Therefore at least
one more boat had reached the enemy on U 48's shadower's
report. Towards midday a/c appeared, contact was lost. U 37
ordered the boats which had been driven off to go to position
"SCHWARZ". (For radio review of the attack see appendix).
Reports received show that 5 ships were sunk for certain,
probably 4. But again torpedo failures were reported. 2 assumed that the boats got through the mined Dover-Calais
explosions at the end of the run, 2 surface runners and 2
explosions at the end of the safety range. It is first
- 39 -
33
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
in attacks on such strongly escorted convoys that these
can have the most unpleasant and serious consequences for the
boat, because they give it away, quite apart from the approach
made for nothing and which can often not be repeated for many
hours.
U 48 has been ordered to start back as she has no more
torpedoes. An enquiry elicited the fact that U 37 and U 46 will
only have 30 and 5 tons of fuel respectively when they reach
position "SCHWARZ". U 46 has therefore been allocated an
operations area closer to. (off Lisbon).
U 25 sailed for her operations area.
19.10 Still no report from U 40 on her Channel passage.
This fact, added to radio intelligence reports on the 14th that 4
U-boats had been sunk, one of them by French forces, gives rise
to the suspicion that U-40 and U 12 (see F.O. U/B West's War
Log) have been lost in the Channel.
According to radio intelligence reports 2 boats were
sighted in the Channel west of the Straits of Dover, so it must be
narrows and were lost west of this. I view the question of the
Channel passage as follows:
1) U 31 passed the Dover-Calais narrows once, U 15 twice,
probably also U 12 and U 40 once each.
2) U 35 did not have to turn back, her doing so does not disprove
the possibility of getting through the Channel.
3) Danger from mines must be regarded as the most dangerous
aspect of the Channel passage. In all probability however, there
have not been any victims of mines as yet, possibly U 12 on her
way back.
4) Losses of boats so far have been 2 in the Atlantic or North Sea
(U 27, 30), 2 probably in the Atlantic (U 42, 45), 2 perhaps in the
Channel. These losses do not preclude the Channel passage.
5) The danger of surprise air attack is no greater in the Channel
than in the open sea area, as boats have to proceed submerged
by day anyhow.
6) I am therefore loath at present to give up the enormous
advantage of the short approach route through the Channel. But
the question will have to come up for constant consideration.
U 46 encountered a fresh convoy of 15 ships, but she
was soon driven off by destroyers and lost contact. On the
orders of Naval War Staff, the area in which unrestricted action
can be taken against darkened ships has been extended to 300
west.
20.10 There is so much damage to U 32's engines that
they will have to be exchanged. The boat was to have sailed
within the next few days. Now she will be out of action for
several weeks. She was just about to load mines. This will have
far reaching consequences.
- 40 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 31 will have to take over her operation and will thus not
be able to sail until 3 days later. The operation originally
assigned to this boat will have to be postponed. This is an
34
excellent example of what happens almost all the time. Again
and again plans are reversed because completion dates for the
boats are postponed. One thing is certain: the M.A.N. engines
have not proved their worth because their casing is too light.
Presumably things will not improve until all the boats have been
fitted with the new casings.
21.10 U 31 and U 53 sailed for their operations areas.
U 31 to mine Loch Ewe with TMB in accordance with
operations Order No. 9 (the operation originally intended for U
32).
U 53 is to proceed first to an area southwest of Ireland.
She is to operate there against merchant shipping until U 26,
which is sailing on 22.10, has had time to carry out her
minelaying operation.
22.10 U 26 sailed for Gibraltar. After minelaying
(Operations Order No. 6) it is intended to send her to the
western Mediterranean together with U 25 and U 53. As she is
first to carry out a mining operation she may only be issued with
absolutely essential confidential books and cypher material.
(Standing War Order No. 17). The consequent disadvantages
and difficulties when working together with other boats have to
be accepted, as the risk of the confidential books and cypher
material falling into enemy hands if the boat is lost in shallow
water is too great. This point has to be taken into account in all
operations in shallow water.
23.10 U 34, which sailed on 17.10, has orders to take up
a position within disposition "SCHWARZ". As events have made
this disposition redundant, there is no point now in sending her
there, not only because she would be there alone, but also
because her fuel stocks would only permit her to operate there
for a short time.
As far as supplies of fuel are concerned, information
received meanwhile from Naval War Staff shows that
considerable difficulty has been encountered and supply is by no
means assured. THe first experiment in supplying is therefore to
be made with a boat which is in any case stationed near the
supply points agreed and does not depend on supply for her
operation. This could be done with U 25, U 26 or U 53 on their
way out or back (operations area Mediterranean). Fuel has to be
ordered 10 days ahead and has been requested for 1 November.
On the subject of U-boat losses: of the Atlantic and
North Sea boats, U 27, U 39 and U 12 are definitely lost, U 42
and U 45 probably, U 40 possibly. The following is known about
the boats: U 27 reported on 19.9 that she was leaving her
operations area. There is no information on U 39 since she
sailed. One major part of both crews are prisoners of war. This
means that the boats were probably surprised on the surface
and attacked with gunfire and possibly also by a/c. It is possible
that they were so damaged as to be unable to dive, so that the
crews had to abandon the boats in the face of the enemy and
sink them. The large number of survivors cannot be explained in
any other way. If they had been destroyed underwater the
losses would have been much greater. U 12 passed the line
Dover-Calais and was operating west of this; this is proved
- 41 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
by a number of sightings and attack reports, which on the
whole have proved very accurate apart from the first weeks of
war, during which they were not very reliable. A radio
35
intelligence report suggests that the boat may have been
rammed. (For the rest, see F.O. U/B West's War Log).
Nothing has been heard of U 42 and U 45 since they
sailed. They did not reply to orders to report their positions.
Enemy broadcasts and the enemy press indicate that there was
an anti-S/M hunt on 13th October during which 2 large boats
were sunk. One report mentions S.S. "Stonepool" as having
contributed to the destruction of U-boats. On the 13th she had
reported that she was in action with a U-boat.On the 15th she
reported another U-boat; 2 destroyer flotillas (or at least part of
them), were sent out from Portland to this position. According to
another report, part of the crew of a U-boat, including the C.O.,
were on board a destroyer, which had picked up survivors from
S.S. "Bretagne". Yet another report says that a member of the
crew of a steamer, who had fired on a U-boat with his gun,
observed that later on destroyers came up and sank the U-boat,
which was no longer able to dive. (This cannot be S.S.
Stonepool).
Actions are therefore said to have been fought between
steamers and U-boats. Both steamers got away and in both
cases the U-boat is said to have been destroyed at least one of
them on the surface.
There are still no reports from U 40 on her Channel
passage, but a steamer has been torpedoed in the sea area west
of the Channel and a U-boat sighted twice. (Radio intelligence
reports). There cannot be any other boat there except U 40. It
is therefore possible that she got through the Channel after all,
but that her transmitter is out of action and she has not been
able to report. It is therefore by no means certain that she is
lost.
Summary:
a) Maximum number of losses: 6 boats, of which 3 were fairly
certainly destroyed above water (U 27, 39 and U 43 or 45), 2
probably underwater (U 12 and U 40. Mine hits possible). 1
cause of loss doubtful.
b) Minimum number of losses: 3, of which 2 above water (U 27,
39), 1 underwater (U 12).
c) Probable losses: 5 boats, of which 3 above water (U 27, 39
and U 42 or U 45), 1 underwater (U 12) and one doubtful (U 42
or U 45).
As experience in the world war showed, losses on the surface
are usually due to:
1) The risks which the boat runs when waging war in accordance
with prize law.
2) The risks which the boat runs in a gun action with an armed
merchant vessel. One hit may render the boat incapable of
diving and therefore the certain prey of destroyers. (It is not
surprising that circumstances are different from those in the
world war. At that time steamers were only gradually being
armed; today all this has apparently been carefully planned and
the effect of
- 42 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
this form of defense must therefore be expected to be
greater).
36
3) A surprise encounter with the enemy, especially in poor
visibility. (This danger has risen considerably since the world
war, because of a/c).
4) Occasional carelessness on the part of the boat, especially
after successful operations or when making long passages
through areas of little shipping.
The dangers listed under 3) and 4) can only be dealt with by the
crews themselves, but the prize war does involve additional
dangers and losses, which can only be eliminated if,
1) The prize war is renounced, i.e. only such ships are attacked
as may be attacked without warning, or
2) we resort to unrestricted warfare. In both cases the U-boats
would have to be forbidden to use their guns,
a) to stop ships or to quell resistance.
b) to sink ships.
Of its nature the U-boat is intended to fight with
torpedoes and not with guns. Her strength is in being able to
make a surprise attack and her protection in deep diving. A full-
scale torpedo attack always promises success; a gun action,
which is always full-scale as soon as the boat is within range of
the enemy guns does not by any means promise the same
results. Nevertheless it must not be forgotten that she needs
her guns to stop the ship and break resistance when she is not
from the first in a position to fire a torpedo at the enemy. It
takes a long time to haul ahead and it is not always possible. To
renounce the use of guns altogether would therefore lower the
chances of success considerably.
Present losses are apparently very high. They exceed
supplies of new boats and must therefore lead to paralysis of U-
boat warfare if no means can be devised of keeping them lower.
But measures to prevent losses must never be on such a scale
that they prejudice the success of warfare. U-boat warfare will
always mean considerable losses and those have to be taken
into account. It is necessary to preserve the correct proportions
between the number of boats operating and the success to be
expected.
 In this connection the Channel problem had to be re-
examined in the light of information on the present war situation
and also of world war experiences. It is necessary to distinguish
between the Channel,
1) as an operations area
2) as a route.
The Channel as Operations Area:
A large proportion of enemy merchant shipping sails in
the Channel. The main part of this traffic is destined for the
Thames ports and the east coast, therefore proceeds through
the whole length of the Channel. U-boats find many worthwhile
targets here and are well able to attack these ships. Cross-
channel traffic is undoubtedly as heavy and particularly
important because it is mainly
- 43 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
troop and war material transport. It is presumably heavier in
the east than in the west owing to the shorter routes. This
traffic proceeds at night, strongly escorted, and consists of fast
ships. The chances of attacking it are therefore considerably
less favorable than in the case of the through-channel traffic.
37
Patrol in the Channel is strong everywhere. Anti-S/M defenses
are strongest in the Dover-Calais Straits and northeast of this
line; boats are better able to attack in the somewhat wider west
sector, where they are better protected by greater depths of
water. Provided they can attack without warning, this is a good
operations area for U-boats. War against merchant shipping
according to prize law is out of the question here however,
owing to the patrols and the proximity of the enemy bases.
The Channel as a Route:
If the Channel is passable at all, the advantages of this
route are many. It means:
a) Saving time on the outward passage, i.e. a longer period in
operations areas.
b) Saving fuel, i.e., raising the range of the boats, or giving them
greater freedom of action.
c) Better prospects of attacking on the outward and return
passages.
d) Better use of personnel and material by shortening passages
through areas in which the boat is in danger, but has little
chance to attack herself.
The disadvantages are as follows:
a) Greater danger to the boats in the narrower sea area, in
shallow water, from anti-S/M operations, anti-S/M nets and
barrages.
b) Greater navigational difficulties.
c) Greater strain on the crew on passage.
I have come to the following conclusions:
1) The question of passage through the Channel must be kept
under constant revision. Decisions will vary from case to case
according to circumstances. In principle the Channel can be
regarded as passable.
2) The enemy must know as little as possible of U-boats passing
through the Dover-Calais Straits. Everything which would cause
him to lay barrages or increase his patrol must be avoided.
Within a fixed zone therefore no direct attacks are to be made.
Mining operations are not affected.
3) The Channel must on no account be abandoned as an
operations area, but only attacks without warning can be made.
4) As long as the through passage is possible, the Channel as
operations area must be reserved for small boats. Such
operations must not exceed 8-10 days, as due to the strong
patrols, a sharper look-out and greater concentration are
required than in open sea areas and any slackening is more
- 44 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
5) Boats should concentrate on the routes along the
coasts. Attacks on cross-channel traffic are less likely to be
successful and are therefore of secondary importance.
6) Apart from torpedo operations, mining operations must be
planned to cover such areas in which the operation of boats with
torpedoes are not promising, i.e. areas of shallow water or
strong anti-S/M activity.
7) Everything must be done to get information on the Channel
passage. Air reconnaissance must take in the Dover-Calais line
at regular intervals. It may also be necessary sometimes to
send a U-boat there for reconnaissance purposes.
38
24.10 U 37 reports: 2 ships sunk today off Gibraltar, one
Q ship hit. Depth charged for 9 hours. Fuel running out.
Starting return passage.
Presumably the boat went up close to Gibraltar. Her
observations of this area are important for U 26 and U 25 and
53. She has been ordered to report her experiences as soon as
circumstances permit.
25.10 U 48 entered Kiel. She sank:
French tanker "Emile Miquet" 14,115 tons
English S.S. "Herouspool" 5,202 tons
English S.S. "Sueaton" 6,903 tons
Unidentified ship from a convoy believed it to be "City of
Mandalay" 3,667 tons
Therefore certainly more than 7,014 tons
29,897 tons and probably 36,911 tons
A very successful patrol, especially as it only lasted 3
weeks. U 48 used all her torpedoes, but reports 5 failures, which
caused her to lose several ships which would otherwise have
certainly been sunk. It is unnecessary to go into the causes and
results of these failures again. The Torpedo Inspectorate is being
kept informed, and the importance stressed: B.d.U. is in close
contact with the Inspectorate.
U 46 sighted a convoy from her position 60 miles
northwest of Lisbon. U 25, which was assumed to be off the
southwest corner of Ireland, was ordered to take action.
Provided contact is maintained, it might be possible for her to
reach the convoy, as for the time being the enemy's course is
restricted by the coast line. This is an experiment to discover if
it is any good to have a few boats working together over a large
area. Contact was lost after 4 hours.
26.10 As U 46 did not regain contact, but reported that
she was leaving her operations area because of lack of fuel, it
was no longer possible for U 25 to operate against the convoy.
Meanwhile this boat had come a long way south. She was
allocated a new operations area northwest of Cape Finisterre.
 operational readiness will therefore have to be divided into a
mining and an operational group.
I intend to assemble the latter, up to 4 boats, in the
- 45 - area southwest of Ireland. They are then to take up an attacking
disposition south and west of Portugal with the purpose of
intercepting traffic north-bound from Gibraltar. Later a
disposition is planned northwest of Cape Finisterre at about the
time when U 47 should have arrived (Operations Order No. 11).

27.10 In order to lessen our losses and based on the

reflections set out in the War Log on 23.10, I have decided to
issue the following orders:
Date Position, Wind, Weather 1) Boats may not board ships which have been stopped, for
and Sea State, Illumination, Events examination.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. 2) Ships are to be sunk by torpedo only, even when they are
only attacked after examination (which can now only consist in
looking through the papers) or after resistance has been quelled
The following boats are expected to be ready for with gunfire.
operations next:
U 33 on 29.10 U 38 on 8.11
43 " 1.11 28 " 8.11
41 " 2.11 29 " 11.11 28.10 U 37 reported a convoy near the coast off
49 " 4.11 47 " 13.11 Finisterre, course northeast. Contact lost after an hour.
35 " 13.11
The French Admiralty announced the sinking of a
German U-boat in the Atlantic. Corpses were said to have been
I consider the following mining operations to be of next salvaged.
importance:
1) inside the Bristol Channel, north of the Foreland 29.10 Naval War Staff has ordered that passenger ships
2) off Swansea in enemy convoy be attacked.
3) off Milford Haven.
U 33 sailed for a minelaying operation north of the
Foreland.
Information available suggests that they would be very
successful. But as they mean entering an area which is probably
strongly patrolled, they must be carried out as soon as possible,
before anti-S/M defenses reach their full extent. - 46 -
U-boats of the 2nd U-Flotilla must be considered for this,
because of their range; i.e. U 33, U 28, and U 29. Boats at
39

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 25 and U 34 were ordered to make a situation report. I
must know whether the French Admiralty's claim concerns one of
these boats. It might of course be U 40, but she could not
answer, as presumably her transmitter is out of order (see
22.10). After going into the question of keeping losses down
again, I have decided only to order the boats to keep a sufficient
distance in gun actions, and not to go all out. I do not think it
necessary or justifiable to restrict the use of guns further, e.g.
a) to order the boats to avoid all gun actions, i.e. to leave the
enemy as soon as opposition is encountered, or
b) to renounce the use of guns altogether.
Commanding officers must be required not to go all out
for the enemy, but to keep at a range which makes it impossible
for the enemy to use his guns effectively, or to break off the
action if they are faced with superior guns.
U 31 reported: "Operation carried out". (Loch Ewe). U
37's report of experiences off Gibraltar received:
1) Patrol by Q ships, motor vessels and a/c. Cooperation
between these.
2) Air patrol in the area Cape Spartel, Trafalgar, St. Vincent
Larache. Hunts apparently only with hydrophones, no location.
3) Traffic: ships making 9 knots and over are routed
independently, more than 10 miles south of the usual steamer
routes.
40
This report gives valuable information for the operation
of U 25, U 26 and U 53, which are to pass through the Straits of
Gibraltar into the Mediterranean.
A conference was held between B.d.U. and the General
Staff of the G.A.F. on the problem of getting more information on
the Channel.The G.A.F. agreed to fly an extensive photographic
reconnaissance of the whole Dover-Calais area. It remains to be
seen whether pictures taken of the surface of the sea from such
a height can provide any practical clues as to mines and net
barrages and other details of navigational importance. The only
experiences are of much smaller sea areas. I am of the opinion
however, that every means of reconnaissance must be used.
Even if the results cannot be analyzed accurately from a
navigational standpoint, they will still be of great value.
30.10 Situation reports received from U 25 and U 34,
thus the French Admiralty's claim can only refer to U 40, whose
radio is apparently out of action. It is not at all impossible
however, that the reports are connected with the loss of U 16 off
Dover (see F.O. U/B West's War Log). U 25 has only observed
slight neutral single-ship traffic and torpedo boats or patrolling
destroyers.
U 34 sank a steamer from a convoy off the west
entrance to the Channel, torpedoed 3 others, but could not
observe results owing to anti-S/M activity. She is returning
because of a crack in the inner compensating tank.
- 47 -
 Date Position, Wind, Weather must be losing confidence in their torpedoes. In the end their
and Sea State, Illumination, Events fighting spirit will suffer. The torpedo failure problem is at
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. present the most urgent of all the problems of U-boat warfare.

31.10 U 31 entered port. She encountered no patrol off

Loch Ewe. There is however, a net barrage in the bay, in which
the boat was entangled for some time, as she did not see the (signed): Dönitz
flat buoys until too late. There was a hospital ship inside, but Rear Admiral and B.d.U.
nothing else. As it did not seem possible to get inside, the boat F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
laid the mines across the entrance to the bay at the minimum
safety distance. The position of the mines is excellent. Success 1 - 15 November 1939
seems certain, but it is doubtful if we shall hear anything about
it. PG30251

U 25 reported a convoy northwest of Finisterre. This is

the second convoy reported within a few days in this area, fairly
close to the coast. This too was steering a main course to the
north. It is remarkable that all the 4 convoys reported so far Date Position, Wind, Weather
have been north-bound. South-bound traffic apparently keeps and Sea State, Illumination, Events
further to the west. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

The problem of torpedo failures is unfortunately still far

from being solved. U 25 reports 4 failures at one stopped ship,
shots at short range. The Torpedo Inspectorate's instructions
were observed. There is therefore no longer any doubt that the
Torpedo Inspectorate themselves do not understand the matter.
At present torpedoes cannot be fired with non-contact firing
units, as this has led to premature detonation. Their depth
setting has to be 2 meters less than the draught of their target.
There depth may not be less than 3 meters, as otherwise there
may be surface runners in which especially the engines of the
G7a may be damaged. Exact instructions are given for setting
the safety range and these are observed. Nevertheless at least
30% of the torpedoes are duds. They either do not detonate at
all or they detonate in the wrong place. There does not seem to
be any sense in issuing new instructions to the boats as they
never lead to the desired results. The Commanding Officers
41
1.11
Group Headquarters West
Naval War Staff informed me that U 25 could not be
supplied on the Spanish coast, as Spain had recently made
political difficulties. Supply could only be arranged in Farrol in a
case of extreme necessity. I have decided not to send the boat
there, in order to have this possibility in hand for really urgent
cases. I am not surprised at this development; I always
regarded this matter as very uncertain.
2.11 U 49's operational readiness will be delayed a few
days. U 47 also will not be ready until very late, not before the
middle of November. There is a choice between letting the
boats sail alone at long intervals or keeping the first ones back
until they can all operate together. I have decided on the latter
course, because I would like for once to have several boats out
and off Gibraltar. So far such an operation has been planned,
but never carried out, as events took a different turn. But the
attack on the convoy by U 37, 46 and 48 opened up possibilities
which I want to see used to the full. If this is successful there
will be every justification for holding boats back.
U 26 reported that she had passed 450 north. The other 2
boats of this wave (U 25 and U 53) will be kept in their
operations areas for about another 3 days in order to give U 26
enough time in hand to carry out her operation.
3.11 Naval War Staff requested B.d.U to go into the
question of attacking England's timber imports from north
Russian ports. These imports are regarded as of great
importance.
I had in any case planned to operate U 36 against those
timber transports in the area east of North Cape. I think that
chances of success are good in this area, but nevertheless I
cannot decide further until I get information of the situation from
this operation.
Naval War Staff also informed me at the same time that
there was a chance of setting up a "Base North". I think
everything possible should be done to get this matter cleared
up.
The advantages of a base in the north are:
1) The much better position for attacking the north Russia-
England convoy routes.
2) The safe approach route, loading well away from England
through deep water.
The disadvantages are:
1) A lengthening of the approach route by about 300 miles.
2) Lack of suitable dock and repair facilities and the difficulty of
supplying material overland.
42
As long as boats can pass through the North Sea without
running too great a risk or losing too much time, a base in the
north would only be important for attacking timber transports
from
- 49 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
the north Russian ports. But if at any time the disadvantage
of the longer route should outweigh the increasing dangers of a
passage through the North Sea, the Northern Base would
assume very great importance.
It cannot be foreseen how long the timber transports will
continue, but it is justifiable to assume that they will either stop
soon or else the political conditions for this base will become
void.
The base would also have to have reliable radio
communication with the boats and with home. As a large-scale
undertaking cannot be kept secret for long, there would have to
be military protection from the first in order to prevent surprise
coups by the enemy.
A proposal has been worked out on these lines and sent
to Naval War Staff.
 4.11 18th to 23rd November have been submitted to her recapture, U 34, U 37 and U 46 on their return passage, have
Naval War Staff as target dates for the first supply in the been ordered to take such action as their fuel stocks permit. For
Northern base for U 36. further details see F.O. U/B West's War Log.

U 25 reported that she was returning as the crosspiece

of her forward torpedo hatch had broken. She might not be
capable of diving if depth charged. The Commanding Officer has - 50 -
therefore acted correctly. His position is northwest of Cape
Finisterre.

Naval War Staff informed me that 10 German steamers

would be ready to sail from Vigo about the middle of November
and requested that they be given U-boat protection on their way
home in as far as possible. This is a task for which the U-boat is
imperfectly suited. If she is forced to dive, which is always the
case if a/c appear, she cannot maintain the speed of the
steamers. They will have to stop, or else contact will be lost.
The U-boat is not very effective against destroyers as it is. Also
on escort duty, starting from Vigo means that afterwards the
boat or boats cannot be used elsewhere as their fuel stocks will
be exhausted. While the value of the escort is doubtful the
disadvantage for the U-boat war as a whole would be
considerable. I must therefore advise against a close escort.
Remote protection will be available if the steamers sail at such
times as there are U-boats in the vicinity (position "ROT") in
accordance with operations Plan No. 11. These times will be
communicated to Naval War Staff for onward transmission to the
steamers.
5.11 U 25 reported a convoy, apparently making for the
Channel on a northeast course. There were no further
shadower's reports.
U 53 was ordered to continue her passage south, as U
26 must be by now far enough ahead to carry out her
minelaying operation. The "City of Flint", once taken in prize by
the "Deutschland", has been detained in Bergen. The prize crew
is said to have been interned there and the prize ship herself
released. As the Naval War Staff attaches great importance to
43
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
6.11 It is still not known what bases the British fleet is
using at present. The ban on anchoring within certain limits in
the Firth of Clyde make it likely that it is intended to base in
these ports. Lough Swilly would be a good, well-protected berth.
According to information available to B.d.U. it is a base used by
the British fleet. Operations planned here some time ago
however, were vetoed by Naval War Staff on the grounds that it
stretched into Irish territory in parts and that Irish neutrality was
not to be violated at any cost.
After renewed pressure Naval War Staff has promised to
obtain information on the political aspect of this area via our
Ambassador in Ireland. U 43 sailed for her operations area
(Operations Plan No. 12).
7.11 U 46 grounded in the Little Belt, but got away again
under her own power after several hours.
 U 41 sailed for her operations area. attacking depth. This confirms the impression that this sea area
is often used by the Home
According to Naval War Staff it is again questionable
whether U 36 can be supplied in the Northern Base in November,
as requested.
- 51 -
U 46 entered Kiel. She sank one steamer of about 5,000
tons. The result is rather meager, but the C.O.'s verbal report
tells quite another story of the patrol. The boat was in convoys
3 times. On one occasion the C.O. fired at a wall of several
overlapping ships - failures. She had a stationary cruiser at
inclination 90 off her bows. Again several failures, which finally
warned the cruiser and she made off. 7 shots were quite
definitely failures and not attributable to errors in drill. In spite
of this, due to the C.O.'s determination, the boat still went on Date Position, Wind, Weather
searching for the enemy and attacking. The boat could have and Sea State, Illumination, Events
sunk 30 or 40,000 tons; she actually sank 5,000. The crew are Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
naturally somewhat depressed. Several patrols like this will turn
keenness into indifference, if all efforts are to no purpose.

8.11 U 28 sailed for her operations area (Operations

Order No. 10). Fleet. Information hitherto has been obtained from U 56's
observation (see F.O. U/B West's War Log), from radio
U 37 entered port. She sank: intelligence and odd agent's reports. All Atlantic boats have
1) S.S. Vistula 1,018 tons Swedish therefore been ordered to alter course so as to pass through this
2) S.S. Asis 4,810 tons Greek area, even if it means delay.
3) S.S. Vermont 5,186 tons French
4) S.S. Yorkshire 10,183 tons English 9.11 U 49 sailed for her operations area in accordance
5) S.S. Menin Ridge 2,474 tons " with Operations Order No. 11. U 36's operational readiness
6) S.S. Ledbury 3,528 tons " postponed for another 8 days.
7) S.S. Tafna 4,413 tons "
8) S.S. Thrasyroulos 3,693 tons Greek 10.11 U 38 will also be delayed for several days.
Total 35,305 tons. Meanwhile U 26 must have decided whether or not she can carry
out her operation off Gibraltar. There is no news from the boat
Very good work. On her way out the boat encountered a and no reports of her being sighted by patrols.
battleship of the Royal Sovereign class and a cruiser of "C" or
"D" class between the Orkneys and the Hebrides. She could not Freight rates and risk premiums in the Mediterranean
attack, as weather conditions did not permit keeping at have been reduced, therefore presumably there is thought to be

44
less danger from U-boats. The appearance of a U-boat there - 52 -
should cause great alarm. The next few days should show.

11.11 Analysis of information on the whereabouts of the

British battle fleet shows that it is probably distributed over
various places outside the North Sea. The possibilities if mining
these places with TMB's must therefore be considered. The
main difficulties will probably be navigational. It is hardly likely
that all these places are under constant strong patrol, or that
local defenses are very extensive. The first area to be
considered is the Bay of Oban. The battleship Rodney was lying
there some time ago.
Information received so far on the effects of the
minefields laid by U-boats shows that not all the ships which ran
into the fields were sunk. We must therefore try to lay the mines
in shallow water and reduce their sensitivity so that they are
only exploded by largish ships.
12.11 U 36 will not be ready for another week and
operations against the timber transports will get more difficult as
it gets darker, I have therefore decided to send U 38 up there.
This boat was to have operated together with U 41, U 43 and U
49, but her sailing has been delayed so long that only a partial
cooperation would be possible now. U 36 will then be the
second boat to go north. Chances of success will be
considerably improved if the boats are disposed in quarterline in
the direction of the traffic, about 100-120 miles apart, as then
there would always be at least one boat on the steamer route by
day.
U 34 entered port. She sank:
1) S.S. Gustav Adolf 935 tons Swedish contraband
2) British Sperrbrecher 1,200 tons British
3) S.S. Malabar 7,976 tons British
4) Steamer type Cairnona 4,666 tons " destroyers, and finally could do no more. The Commanding
45
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
5) S.S. Bronte 5,317 tons
6) Tanker 6-7,000 tons
Total 26,094 tons
She also brought in the Norwegian "Snar", 3,176, tons,
timber, as prize.
13.11 U 40 declared missing today. There is definite
news of a member of the crew being prisoner of war. It must
now be assumed after all that she was lost in the Channel.
Otherwise she would have reported that she had got through.
Meanwhile further information has been received of the other
missing boats, which give a different view of the circumstances
of their loss.
Letters from prisoners, whose names have gradually
been given out over the English wireless, show:
U 27: C.O. and crew all prisoners. The boat was chased by
Officer writes: It was only by a lucky chance that we were able
to ge out of the sinking boat, after we managed to surface her
with our last resources and a lot of luck." She must therefore
have shipped so much water through damage to the pressure
hull or through leaks in the stern-tube stuffing boxes or exhaust
valves, that she could no longer be controlled, or her battery
must have been empty. At all events she had to surface and
surrender in the face of the enemy. The depth of water at this
point was 1500 meters. It was therefore presumably west of the
North Channel.
U 39: C.O. and crew prisoners of war. This boat too was hunted
with D/C's. She is said to have suffered much the same fate as
U 27.
The original assumption that these boats were surprised
on the surface is therefore incorrect.
Close attention must be paid to the problem of pressure-
tightness. The stern-tubes will therefore be repacked after every
patrol. The exhaust valves have been fitted with new packings.
As there are so few boats available for operations at one
time it is particularly important that they should be able to
remain a long time at great depths. The enemy is able to use a
large proportion of his anti-S/M forces against each boat
detected and thus cover a wide area, out of which the boats
have to escape. The long nights will make it easer for them to
get away from the pursuing formations, but the summer will
mean more trouble. With regard to the loss of U 42, it is now
known for certain that the C.O. and about half the crew (at least
16) are prisoners of war. She must therefore have faced
differently than U 27 and U 39.
Nothing further is known of U 45.
U 25 entered port. The boat did not have much luck.
The C.O.'s task was no easy one. There were torpedo failures,
the guns failed at a decisive moment and this boat, parts of
which are still rather antiquated, is not easy to handle. She
scored one hit on
- 53 -
46
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
each of 2 ships, but did not observe the results owing to anti-
S/M activity. As the ships were of medium size, it can be
assumed that they were so damaged that they could not be
brought in to a port. They can therefore be assumed sunk.
14.11 U 38 and U 29 sailed for their operations areas.
Attacks on English timber traffic and minelaying off Milford
Haven. (Operations Orders No. 10 and 12). Professor Cornelius
visited B.d.U. He was nominated "Torpedo Dictator" some days
ago, with wide powers, which give him a great deal of scope to
reorganize and develop torpedoes. His duties are of major
importance for the U-boat Arm. It is to be hoped that he will be
completely successful. His duties cover 3 main fields:
1) to eliminate the faults in the pistols
2) to ensure that the torpedoes will keep perfect depth
3) to ensure adequate production.
While at present the torpedo can in no way be regarded
as a front-line weapon of any use, the TMB has proven a very
effective weapon for U-boats. It has nevertheless been found:
1) that large ships are not sunk for certain at depths of about
30 meters
2) that the mines are fired by smaller ships than intended.

This has led me to go into the question of the use of
mines again with a specialist. The following are the results of a
conference with Commander Lucht:
1) The TMB can only be expected to be fatal up to about 25
meters.
2) The firing of the mines by too small ships can be avoided at
all depths by a coarser setting of the mine. New tables will have
to be brought out accordingly.
3) The effect of the mine can probably be increased by
increasing the charge, without any great difficulty.
The following steps must therefore be taken at once:
1) New conversion tables must be brought out for coarser
settings.
2) The practical possibilities of increasing the weight of the
charge must be examined. The aim would be to construct a
mine which would:
a) fill half the tube
b) fill the whole tube.
The latter would only be for special, rare undertakings, if
water depths would make the others unlikely to be effective or
where the mines were intended against the largest ships.
Practical conclusions to be drawn are:
- 54 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
47
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
1) TMB's may only be laid at depths not exceeding 25 meters.
2) Even shallower depths should be aimed at. For shallower
water, the mines must be set according to the type of ship
against which they are primarily intended to react.
15.11 U 43 reported from the area southwest of Ireland
that the weather was so bad that she could take no offensive
action. According to metrological observations it is not likely to
improve in the near future and conditions are much quieter on
the Portuguese coast; U 41, 43 and 49 have therefore been
ordered to proceed on to position "ROT".
U 53 reported a convoy west of Gibraltar. During the last few
days Radio Intelligence Service has provided some very useful
reports on convoys, no action could be taken as there were no
boats in the areas concerned. Today several more reports were
received on which the boats may in fact be able to act. Reports
of enemy surface forces have also now reached such a degree of
accuracy that they are of practical value, which was only seldom
the case to begin with. It is however, desirable that they be
confined to hard facts, without any inferences from individual
radio stations; those inferences make it more difficult to sift the
material. Reports can only be evaluated by a unit which is
adequately informed on the whole situation and can take all
factors into account. It would be much easer for the operational
units to make use of the material if it were sifted by a central
department and passed on by them to units concerned. It would
be necessary of course to work very quickly; comprehensive and
connected situation reports are of less value than a collection of
connected reports and dependent operations.

A radio message from U 45, intercepted by another boat
on 14th October, has now reached B.d.U. It was not received
here.
"B.d.U. from U 45: 3 large darkened steamers, 15 knots,
sunk. Am chasing a 4th steamer 3366 to 3355 BRT."
This is the last news of this boat. At any rate the enemy
paid dearly for her loss.
Radio intelligence reports have provided the following
information on the whereabouts of the British battlefleet:
1) the fast battleships and battlecruisers and several a/c
carriers are not in home waters, but on special operations
(chasing pocket battleships or escorting particularly valuable
convoys from Canada).
2) The major part of the remaining battleships apparently use
mainly the Firth of Clyde as anchorage.
The question of a U-boat action here against the English
fleet has been considered and the following conclusions:
a) U-boats cannot attack the anchorages themselves. The ships
are laying in a long, fairly narrow strip of water, the only access
to which is closed by a boom.
- 55 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
48
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
b) It would be quite possible for U-boats to penetrate into the
wider part of the Firth, as far as the boom. There is a shallow
position here, exactly on the main route, where mines could be
laid.
This operation must be carried out as soon as possible.
There is a good chance of catching large warships. It will
however, be necessary to use mines of greater explosive effect
than the TMB, as these cannot be guaranteed to sink if laid at
this depth. Then setting must be sufficiently coarse for them not
to be exploded by the many merchant vessels which ply in these
waters. The operation cannot be carried out until the mines
have been manufactured.
c) If the fleet sails north from the Clyde, it will be bound by
navigational considerations. U-boats might operate with success
along their route.The only question is: when will the fleet sail?
As long as it has nothing to do off the entrance to the North Sea,
this is entirely uncertain. It must therefore be forced to go to
sea at a certain time. This can only be effected by operations by
our own battleships.
The operation of a lot of U-boats against the Home Fleet
in the Firth of Clyde therefore only promises to be worthwhile if it
is carried out in cooperation with our own surface forces.
Group Command informs that Naval War Staff have
agreed to operations of battleships beyond the line Shetlands-
Norway, as long as the British Fleet is in the Clyde and that such
an operation is being planned for the next days. It appears
however, that it is impossible to postponed this even for a few
days, which would be necessary to prepare the U-boats and get
them to their positions. If it could only have been postponed for
4 days a total of 11 U-boats would have been available. On the
date fixed on the other hand only 3-4 boats can be sent.
A similar operation will therefore have to be planned for
a later date. If it is planned long enough in advance, the rest of
the U-boat war will not suffer to any extent.
The date must be chosen to fit in with the sailing times
of the U-boats, so that they will only have to be kept back for a
few days and at the worst if the operation falls through, they can
go on to their operations areas for the war against merchant
shipping.
U 31 and U 35 on 18 November
U 48 on 20 "
U 36 " 25 "
I intend to send U 31 and 35 to the sea area south of
Ireland and to allow them considerable freedom of action there.
They must be able to approach the coast or move further out to
sea according to weather conditions and patrol. Cooperation will
only be possible to a limited extent and will probably be confined
to an exchange of individual reports rather than shadowing for
any length of time. At first U 28 and 29 will be in the same
area.

(signed): Donitz U 48 is a boat with wide radius of action. She is

Rear Admiral and B.d.U. therefore to operate west of Spain and Portugal, where U 47 will
also be and possibly U 49.
This area has 2 great advantages:
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log 1) The weather is better here in the winter than it is further
north.
16 - 30 November 1939 2) There is less patrol, especially air patrol. If there is any air
activity at all it must be very slight. The traffic situation is very
PG30252 favorable.

U 53 has apparently lost the convoy which she reported

Date Position, Wind, Weather on the 15th for good. Her last report said that she had been
and Sea State, Illumination, Events driven off by a/c with bombs. It was a small convoy of 7 ships.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. As the boat is now west of Gibraltar and her operations area is
east of Gibraltar, she has presumably started on her return
passage.

17.11 C-in-C Home Fleet is in the area north and

northwest of Scotland. U 29 is approximately north of the
16.11 U 47 sailed for her operations area in accordance Shetlands. She has been informed.
with Operations Order No. 11.
Group Headquarters West U 53 reported another convoy off Lisbon, 18 ships in 4
The next boats to be ready for operations will be: columns, 5 destroyers escorting. Speed 7-8 knots, main course
49
north. It is clearly the same convoy that the Radio Intelligence
Service picked up on 16 November and fixed several times.
It is valuable to have the radio intelligence report
confirmed by the U-boat. If reports continue to be as accurate
and to arrive in such good time they will be of great use in the
conduct of the war. U 41 and U 43 are still very far north. It is
known from experience that it is too early to order them to
operate against this convoy yet; but they are proceeding south
and should be on a level with it in 2 days time. U 53 is
shadowing and reporting at intervals of several hours
Order received from Naval War Staff to the effect that
unrestricted action can be taken against passenger ships which
are seen to be armed. As most passenger ships are already
armed, this will mean a great step forward.
- 57 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
In practice of course, boats will only be able to attack
passenger ships which they can recognize as armed. Written
lists of armed ships are seldom of any value, because the C.O.
usually cannot identify the type of ship until very late on, shortly
before he reaches a favorable position for firing. Mush time is
50
then lost looking up in lists to see if the ship is armed and once
the enemy has passed the boat has to haul ahead again; this
means that she must have a greater speed than the ship, which
is not usually the case with passenger ships.
18.11 U 31 and 35 sailed for their operations area in
accordance with Operations Order No. 13.
U 53 continued to shadow the convoy. If contact is
maintained it may be possible to bring up U 41 and 43. The last
24 hours prove that it can be maintained. U 41 and 43 have
been ordered to operate against the convoy.
U 31 had to enter port again because of engine trouble.
19.11 Contact with the convoy was lost after it altered
course, shortly before first light, just at the critical moment. By
afternoon the other boats could have been there. Enemy
destroyers drove U 53 off. Although this was very regrettable,
the C.O.'s achievement in shadowing for 36 hours must be
recognized.
At 1330 the boat had made contact again however. The
others should have been in the vicinity. It must be taken into
account that they have been in operations areas in the north for
several days in bad weather. Considerable errors in E.P. were to
be expected. U 53 was therefore ordered to make beacon
signals. The danger of her being D/F'd was small; it would have
been impossible from shore and unlikely from the convoy. At
1820 contact was lost again, but only an hour later U 41 sighted
the convoy. It had come off; a second boat had been brought up
to the convoy. Soon U 53 was also there again. The boat's error
in EP was about 6-8 miles; this is not much. Nothing was heard
of U 43, but this does not necessarily mean that she was not
there. She had no cause to report, as the enemy was under
constant observation.
After a long silence U 26 reported from west of Gibraltar.
She has not carried out the minelay.
 U 49 reported a premature detonation with the adapted
pistol. This is so far an isolated case and no judgment can be
made.
20.11 U 55 lost the convoy when it altered course. U 41
was still there however, and made beacon signals. It is odd that
there is no news of sinkings yet after such a long pursuit. U 55
attacked and heard 2 explosions. It must be assumed that U 41
also attacked. No failures have been reported. Probably the
boats have not been able to observe results after firing. Perhaps
the enemy is purposely not making any losses known, as has
happened before. If he has had losses however, he should by
now have strengthened the escort and sent out a/c. The convoy
is only 200 miles away from the French coast. As it is so near
the coast it will not be possible to attack
- 58 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
it for much longer. Boats taking part will have to have new
operating areas. Nothing is known so far of U 43 and U 49.
According to a French report, a German U-boat is said to have
been sunk. Both boats have been ordered to report their
positions and intentions.
51
Later U 43 made a radio message. She was ahead of
the convoy, but not yet in sight of it and was waiting for daylight
to make an attack.
21.11 U 49 did not report until much later. She was
damaged by D/C's, and her bow torpedo gear unserviceable. As
she has only one stern torpedo left serviceable, she has been
ordered to return. U 41's gyro is temporarily out of action due to
D/C's.
The attack on the convoy must be regarded as ended.
The boats have been given a new operations area between 50
and 480 north, east of 120 west. The disposition originally
planned cannot be carried out now as U 49 has to return home
and the other boats have only a limited amount of fuel left.
U 53 reported that she was starting on her return
passage.
U 31 and U 48 sailed, for the first time with anti-mine
escort through the declared area.
In connection with a large-scale operation by our own
battleships U 35, U 47 and U 33 have been kept back in the area
west of the Orkneys. According to a sighting report, not entirely
reliable, from an a/c, the Home Fleet is supposed to be in Scapa.
22.11 U 38 lay off Westfjord for a few days. The weather
was very bad and the boat observed no traffic. In accordance
with orders she reported that she was proceeding north.
23.11 U 43 made contact with a convoy 60 miles north of
Cape Ortegal. Unfortunately there are no other boats in the
vicinity. U 26 is the nearest, approximately in the latitude of
Porto. As she has been in her operational area for a very long
time, she presumably has only little fuel remaining. Cooperation
must be attempted however. Unfortunately U 26 has only AFB
on board, and shadower's reports will therefore have to be made
with this clumsy and slow cypher system.
 By evening U 43 was driven off and contact lost.
24.11 U 33 reported that she had sunk a Q ship. Radio
Intelligence reports received late this afternoon indicate that an
enemy unit may have been sunk in connection with the
operation of our surface forces, begun on the 22nd, north of the
line Shetlands-Norway. Thus the enemy must know that there
are German forces in this area. It remains to be seen what his
reaction will be. As there is no clue as to what he will do, the 4
boats off the Orkneys and Shetlands have been left in their
present positions. The deterioration in weather conditions will
probably mean that the U-boat's action will be restricted.
- 59 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
25.11 There is still no indication as to what steps the
British C-in-C is taking. Weather conditions preclude air
reconnaissance. As it can no longer be assumed however, that
the British Fleet is in the Clyde, the 2 western boats - U 47 and U
35 - were ordered to move further to the northeast, off the
Pentland Firth and Fair Island Passage. Here also they will be in
52
a better position to cut off the fleet east of the Shetlands if this
should become necessary.
26.11 Bad weather continues. It is very doubtful if light
forces will still be at sea; they have probably sought shelter off
the coast. It is also possible that they have had to put into
protected places to refuel, as they have been at sea for some
time. The 4 boats were therefore ordered to search the east
coasts of the Shetlands and Orkneys especially Lerwik. Another
good reason for giving this order was the fact that, in this
weather at sea, boats will probably not be able to attack, where
as on the leeward coast it might still be possible.
U 33 entered port; she laid mines according to plan and
encountered little patrol. There was no traffic in her operations
area off the North Channel, and in the end she attacked fishing
trawlers before she left in order not to come home empty-
handed. The C.O.'s report shows that this was a well-conducted
patrol and it is not the fault of the boat that she had so little
success.
27.11 Air reconnaissance identified several groups of
light and heavy naval forces at midday in the Shetland-Norway
Straits, with varying courses. Contact was lost after 2 hours,
owing to the shadowing a/c's lack of fuel. It is nevertheless plain
that the enemy intends to take up a cutting-off position here.
Search along the leeward coast apparently led to no success. A
temporary slight improvement in the weather is forecast. I
decided to let the 3 boats off the Shetlands coast reconnoiter to
the east as far as the Norwegian coast.
Reasons:
1) Searching the coast did not lead to anything; there is
apparently nothing there.
2) The enemy was in the Shetlands-Norway Straits. As the
situation as a whole has not changed, it can be expected that he
will still be there tomorrow (Our own battleships had not yet
returned).
3) The improvement in the weather forecast should mean that
the boats will be able to attack.
Our own battleships have returned from the operation;
their return passage apparently went unnoticed.
28.11 Air reconnaissance again identified enemy forces
in the Straits.
- 60 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Soon after U 35 reported a London class cruiser and
then U 47 reported a hit on another cruiser of the same class.
The decision to send the boats into the Straits was
therefore correct.
As there is no indication that the enemy knows that C-
in-C Fleet has returned home, it is to be expected that he will
remain in his cutting off position again tomorrow. I have decided
to let the U-boats remain in the same area.
53
29.11 Again air reconnaissance identified light naval
forces and a convoy northeast of these in the same area. The
weather continues very stormy. Apparently the U-boats have not
been able to fire.
As it must now be taken that C-in-C Fleet's return cannot
remain unknown to the enemy for much longer, there is no point
in the boats remaining in the Shetland-Norway Straits for
another day, especially as there are believed to be many
destroyers in the vicinity.
U 47 and 48 will continue on their passage to the North
Atlantic.
U 31 and 35 have been ordered to occupy the
operations areas on the east coast of England. Their radius of
action is too small to make it worthwhile for them to go into the
Atlantic after the operations of the last few days. They are to
report their stocks of fuel when leaving.
A radio message received from U 29. She does not
consider that the minelaying operation off Milford can be carried
out in the present circumstances. (She had orders not to carry
out the operation if undue risks were involved). The boat was
allocated an operations area in the Bristol Channel.
U 49 entered port. She only managed to fire one torpedo
during the short time she was in the Atlantic, at an escorted
steamer which probably sunk. The boat suffered considerable
damage from D/C's. There are no further details. The
propaganda organization has exaggerated U 47's hit on a cruiser
to a sinking. From the service man's point of view these
inaccuracies and exaggerations are undesirable.
Radio message from U 38: No shipping sighted off Lola
Bay. No successes. This boat was sent there on the orders of
Naval War Staff, in the belief that there was considerable traffic
in the area. Later information received by Naval War Staff
indicated that these hopes were unjustified. Now the boat
herself has confirmed this. In the circumstances it is pointless to 1) To attack military bases (in continuation of the attack on
keep the boat there any longer. She has been ordered to return. Scapa Flow) with the object of driving the enemy out of ports
near the North Sea.
U 31's fuel report received, but not U 35's. The boat Acting on these lines, B.d.U. carried out minelays in the
was again ordered to report. beginning of November in Loch Ewe, off the entrance to
Invergordon, and at the entrance to Rosyth in the Firth of Forth.
U 53 entered port. This is the boat which shadowed the 2) To attack enemy merchant shipping. The following fields were
convoy west of Portugal and Biscay from the 17th to the 19th laid for this purpose:
and the operations orders of which were to penetrate into the 2 in the Bristol Channel
Mediterranean. She sank nothing on this patrol. The C.O.'s 1 off the Shambles (Portland)
report shows that she had many chances to attack but did not 1 off South Goodwin
make use of them. The boat did not show enough fighting spirit. 2 off Orfordness
I have therefore decided to 2 off Lowestoff
1 off Newark Lightship
1 off Inner Dowsing
1 off Flamborough Head
- 61 - 1 off Middlesborough (Hartlepool).

3) The following points are of importance with regard to

the mining war:
a) It is a good thing to lay mines at many suitable places, so
that shipping is disorganized everywhere.
b) Places which are particularly suitable, because of narrow
entrances, should be entirely closed for as long as possible by
Date Position, Wind, Weather several minefields.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events c) Mines should therefore be laid starting at the innermost point
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. and working outwards, so that possible later operations are not
prejudiced, even if this means that the first mines are laid in less
promising positions.
d) Mines must be laid at depths at which their effect is likely to
be fatal. Wartime experience has shown that, despite peacetime
expectations, TMB's do not have this effect at depths greater
relieve the C.O. than 25 meters. The Inspectorate of Mining and Barrage was
therefore requested at the beginning of November to construct a
On 30.11 B.d.U. reported to C-in-C Navy in Berlin on the S/M-laid ground mine with a much heavier charge. They have
results of the mining war and further intentions: worked very energetically at this and at present 2 new mines,
The mining war has 2 aims. type TMC, with a 1000 Kg charge, have already been
manufactured for experimental purposes.
54
4) The next steps in the mining war are therefore planned as a) Closing the Bristol Channel by adding to the 2 minefields
follows: already laid. The minefields to be laid now by U 26 and U 29 off
A) Military Positions: Milford Haven and Swansen also come within this framework.
a) Closing the Firth of Forth, first with 2 TMB-minefields north b) Laying TMB's off Liverpool.
and south of the one laid by U 21 and afterwards by 3 TMC fields c) Laying TMC's on the south coast, off Falmouth, St. Alban's
east of this, but not Head, St. Catherine's Point, Royal Sovereign and Dungeness.
d) Laying TMB's on the east coast at the north entrance to
Yarmouth Roads off Cockle Lightship (now being laid by U 59), off
Newcastle (now being laid by U 61), and off Dundee.
5) As there are so few boats and torpedo warfare still has to be
waged, this plan will take some time to carry out. Some of the
operations can only be carried out at new moon and they are so
- 62 - difficult that special commanding officers have to be selected, all
of which means time.

C-in-C Navy agreed to the proposals and also instructed

me to go into the question of laying mines off Halifax and Blyth.
I requested to defer the Halifax operation until the weather
improves, as in bad weather the boat's radius of action does not
Date Position, Wind, Weather permit their remaining off Halifax for long. Blyth will be mined
and Sea State, Illumination, Events by one of the small boats.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
(signed): Donitz
Rear Admiral and B.d.U.

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

further east than the longitude of May Island. 1 - 15 December 1939

b) Fouling of the Clyde with TMC. After the Scapa incident the
Clyde became the main anchorage for the heavy ships. Only PG30253
TMC's can be used in the Clyde.
c) Completing the minefield off Invergordon with 2 TMB
minefields, followed by 2 TMC fields outside these.
d) Fouling of Plymouth with TMC's.
e) Fouling of the Needles Channel (Portsmouth) with TMC's. Date Position, Wind, Weather
B) Minelaying against merchant shipping: and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
55

Group Headquarters West
1.12.
The second order to U 35 has remained unanswered. As
every radio message is made at various times on long and short
wave, it is out of the question that the boat did not receive it.
Either her radio is out of order or something has happened to
her.
2.12. U 47 and 48 have also been ordered to report their
fuel stocks. It is necessary to find out how far south they could
still operate, as weather conditions off the Channel seem very
unfavorable.
3.12. According to reports received they could still
operate south of Finisterre for a few days. No decision can be
reached until we see what the weather is like when they arrive
off the Channel, not before 5.12. In itself it would be better to
have them off the Channel, as they could operate there longer.
U 38, on her way back from Kola Bay, was ordered to
occupy the Westfjord as operations area and to attack the ore
exports to England, outside the 3 mile limit. There have been
many reports of this traffic, which is fairly heavy. English ships
take a large part. Apparently the ships do not sail individually,
but assemble off Loedingen and sail together, escorted by
English forces. It is not known whether close escort is provided
or whether the escorting vessels merely remain in the vicinity.
The main difficulties of intercepting this traffic are:
1) the uncertainty as to when the ships sail. The attacking
boat might have to wait a very long time.
2) The uncertainty as to whether the ships sail from or at what
point they leave territorial waters.
56
The area off Westfjord is too large to be covered by one boat,
especially in the long winter months.
There is not much hope of success therefore with a
single boat off the Westfjord. There are no further boats
available in view of requirements in the other theatres of war It
is therefore necessary to penetrate into the Westfjord.
Permission to do this has only recently been received from Naval
War Staff. It is stated that the whole of the fjord need no longer
be regarded as territorial waters, as claimed by the Norwegians,
but that here too Germany will only respect the 3 mile zone.
U 46 will be ready for operations within the next few
days. She is to operate on the west coast of Portugal. At
present this is the best area for U-boats operating against
merchant shipping, as conditions in the winter are better.
U 30 and U 32 will be ready to sail approximately on
10th December. I intend to give both boats minelaying
operations. By their radius of action they are limited to the area
around England, where weather conditions are at present
unfavorable for torpedo operations, while the long nights assist
minelaying close inshore. U 32 will lay mines off the Clyde with
the large TMC's, which have
- 64 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 the same way as at present and accept the inevitable losses. It
is only thus that the small U-boat arm, pitted against far superior
meanwhile been finished (charge 1,000 Kg). U 30 will proceed forces, can hold its own as a part of the war as a whole.
to the Irish Sea, off Liverpool. I think this latter operation should
be very successful because: 5.12. C-in-C Navy paid a short visit to Group
1) There is a great deal of merchant shipping traffic here. Headquarters and to B.d.U.
2) So far no U-boats have appeared in this area.
U 26 entered port. She did not carry out her minelaying
operation off Gibraltar as the weather there was too bad. She
was afterwards in the Mediterranean, as ordered, but apparently
The British radio announced the sinking of a German U- struck a poor time for traffic.
boat the crew of which had landed at a Scottish port. Similar The result of her patrol is one steamer sunk. Very little
reports by the enemy have so far been found to be correct. U 35 for 44 days. The stormy weather is mainly to blame. The C.O.
must be presumed lost. Nothing has been heard of U 28 or 29, cannot be blamed for not carrying out the minelaying operation
which should by now have carried out their operations, and it is because he did not consider it possible in view of local
feared that something may have happened to them too. But it is conditions.
also possible that they are waiting for the new moon to lay their These things can only be judged at the time. But he did
mines. In that case they should report within the next few days. not take long enough to make his observations; he should have
at least made one more attempt in different weather conditions.
4.12. U 43 reported that she was starting her return
passage and added that a southwest gale was raging off the
Irish Sea. - 65 -
U 47 and U 48, which will be arriving there soon, will
hardly be able to do anything in such weather conditions. U 47
was ordered to report if weather made action impossible. In this
case I intend to send the boats south of Finisterre in spite of the
short time they will be able to remain there. Letters from
captured members of her crew indicate that U 40 struck a mine.
This is the first proof of mines in the Channel. Air
reconnaissance of the Dover-Calais Straits has not so far been
carried out. Buoys and lightships have been laid off the English Date Position, Wind, Weather
coast, showing that minefields have been laid, but nothing and Sea State, Illumination, Events
certain is known of their position and type. I must now give up Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
this route into the Atlantic; there must not be losses on passage.
With so few boats, each loss means such a considerable
reduction in strength that it outweighs the disadvantages of a
long and fruitless passage. With regard to the boat's operations
as such, I do not see any other way of conducting them if It was a mistake to send U 25, U 26 and U 53 into the
successes are not to decrease. It will be necessary to carry on in Mediterranean. U 25 had to return before she ever got there, U
57
53 did not get through and U 26 hardly encountered any
shipping worth mentioning. This patrol shows all the
disadvantages of a long outward passage. The boat can only
operate for a few days and the operation is without success if
she does not come upon any traffic in those few days.
6.12. B.d.U. requested Naval War Staff to extend the
limits within which darkened ships may be attacked without
warning. This is desirable:
1) in view of U 38's present operation off and in the
Westfjord. It is most probable that the English ships there are
darkened. Nearly all of them are painted grey, to make them
less visible, and are armed.
2) for U-boat operations in the Mediterranean and off the
Portuguese coast. Returned boats say that they sighted
darkened ships there and were never certain what to do. Action
according to prize law is very difficult and dangerous for the boat
especially near Gibraltar.
Naval War Staff would not give their approval, as there
might be German ships off the Norwegian and Spanish coasts.
7.12. U 29 reported that she was returning. The boat
could not carry out her minelaying operation because of anti-S/M
activity and weather conditions (11 days of gales) and now has
to return home as her fuel stocks are exhausted. Thank God our
fears for her safety were without foundation.
U 41 entered port. She sank:
1) Trawler Creswell 275 tons
2) Tanker Arne Kjode 11,500 tons
3) S.S. Darine 1,350 tons
4) Trawler Les Barges 290 tons
13,415 tons
On her way out the weather was bad and sometimes
stormy and she did not encounter much shipping. Northwest of
58
Cape Finisterre in good weather, she came upon the convoy
reported by U 53, but could not maneuver into a good attacking
position. She fired a number of failures and misses, reasons for
which are being investigated. She still had the old type pistols.
The results of her patrol were only fair, due to these failures, but
nevertheless shows ability and determination.
8.12. An indication of the presence of U 47 and U 48 off
the Channel and south of Ireland is given in the first reports of
ships sunk.
U 38 has fired 12 torpedoes and has reported that she is
- 66 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
returning.She had new type pistols. It remains to be seen how
many of these shots were failures.
9.12. U 30 sailed for her operations area. Minelaying off
Liverpool.
10.12. There is no news of U 28 and some cause for
concern. If so far she has not been able to lay her mines because
of the weather and the moon, she must at least be able to
decide now, with a new moon and calm weather, whether she
can lay them at all. In any case her fuel stocks should have
forced her to return by now.
11.12. U 30 reported from the northern North Sea that
her port exhaust valve would not close. The boat was in the
dockyard from 9.10 to 5.12, during which time her engine casing
was changed and her diving tanks altered. She sailed on 9.12.
If the exhaust valve cannot be repaired at sea, the boat will be
unable to dive and therefore forced to break off her patrol. This
means that the operation will have to be postponed until the
next new moon. After that long dockyard period it is hardly too
much to ask that the exhaust valve should be in working order.
If U 30 has to break off her operation I shall demand a
thorough investigation by the dockyard to determine who is to
blame.
U 47 reported that she is starting her return passage.
She too has had several dud electric torpedoes, though the
nature of the failure is not mentioned in the report. One thing is
certain now, however; the steps which the Torpedo Inspectorate
promised themselves would remove the cause of these failures
have not led to the desired results.
U 31 entered port. She was kept back off the Orkneys
for a time, in connection with an operation by our own surface
forces, and then operated in the North Sea (See F.O. U/B West's
War Log).
In the evening a report was received from U 28. I had
begun to think she was lost. She has been on her way home for
several days and has carried out her minelaying operation.
There could have been no better news today! The German U-
boat Arm has one more boat than we thought.
12.12. U 30 has not been able to repair her exhaust
valve and is returning.
59
The fate of U 35 is now known. A newspaper picture
from Scotland shows the C.O. and some members of the crew.
The British radio has given out several names of members of the
boat's crew.
The boat has been declared missing with effect from 12
December.
- 67 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 47 reported that she was starting on her return
passage. She has had 6 torpedo failures. U 48 is now the only
boat left in the Atlantic operations area.
13.12. An English S/M successfully attacked some of our
light surface forces in the North Sea. So that as extensive a S/M
hunt as possible can be organized, all boats in the North Sea
were ordered to make their positions. All the Atlantic boats
reported, except U 38. There is some clue to her position
however, because of a sinking report near the west coast of
Norway.
14.12. U 38 reported her position off Utsire. U 30 and U
43 entered port. U 43 sank:
1) steamer unidentified: 6 - 8,000 tons
2) tanker, " : 10 - 12,000 tons
3) S.S. Uskmouth: 2,483 tons
total at least 18,483 tons
The Commanding Officer did very well in spite of his
young, inexperienced crew and, considering the circumstances,
was very successful.
The case of U 30 has led me to take up the whole
question of dockyard repairs and to get in touch with the Admiral
Superintendent.
The failure of torpedoes has had a very bad effect on U-
boat operations. The material weaknesses of the boats are of no
less importance and they seem to have come more into
evidence since the engine casings have been changed. Even if
this matter were settled, there still remains the fact that the
dockyard periods are very long by comparison with the number
and duration of patrols and that this state of affairs cannot go
on.
1) One of the reasons for the long dockyard periods are
defects in the boats which are only coming to light now in the
war and can lead to losses. So for instance, defects in the
exhaust valves have meant that boats could not operate or had
to return home, because they could not dive to a sufficient
depth. Against my recommendations, boats were not allowed to
dive below 50 meters in peacetime; if they had these defects
would have been found out before the war started. After they
can only be put right by structural alterations and long and
tedious work. This means more work for the dockyard in
addition to the extra efforts required in wartime.
2) Long dockyard periods mean that there are many boats in the
dockyard at a time, which leads to shortage of skilled labor and
supervisors. Personnel untrained in U-boat work cannot take the
place of skilled workmen. Either therefore the skilled workers
are overworked or else the untrained men make mistakes which
mean an even longer period in the dockyard.
60
- 68 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
3) The dockyard periods must be shortened by rigid
organization of the work. I will not accept bad organization
which causes boats to have to remain days longer in the
dockyard. Individual commanding officers have been ordered to
assist the dockyard by departments in carrying out the work.
4) On 5.12 I had a conference with the admiral Superintendent
of the Dockyard to discuss these matters. The following was
established:
a) that short dockyard periods of 3-4 weeks after patrols are
necessary, apart from changing engines and making other
alterations.
b) that numbers of trained dockyard personnel must be
increased to meet the greater demands. The nucleus of
workmen to service 8 boats is not considered adequate. Peak
requirements cannot be met by withdrawing labor from surface
vessels.
c) Items of work must be organized by the dockyard quickly
and efficiently.
The length of dockyard periods for operational boats must be
reduced at all costs.
 Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
15.12. "Graf Spee" is damaged and has put into Montevideo
after her action in the South Atlantic. Naval War Staff has asked
B.d.U. what support U-boats could give the pocket battleship off
the mouth of the La Plata. I have assured Naval War Staff that I
will do all I can and I am determined to try everything possible, 16.12. The U-boat operation in support of "Graf Spee" has
in spite of the great difficulties which an operation of this kind been cancelled. Apparently political considerations make it
with U-boats involves. necessary to decide the pocket battleship's fate sooner.
2 U-boats (U 44 and U 46) can be got ready in time to
reach the La Plata at the beginning of February. The operation U 29 and U 38 entered port.
depends mainly on the question of supply. It will be necessary U 29 has had an unfortunate patrol. The boat sank
to refuel on the way out, on the way back and in the operations nothing and did not carry out her minelaying operation. The
area. Naval War Staff promises supplies in the Canaries and off C.O. obviously made the mistake of thinking all activity of enemy
the La Plata from "Altmark". This means that the operation can patrol vessels and suspicious craft was directed specifically
be attempted. It means going into the Tropics and there is no against his boat, so he did not achieve anything. He will be
experience of U-boats in these areas. Preparations must be given a similar operation next time in order to overcome this
made accordingly. mistake.
Special attention will have to be paid to victualling U 38 sank:
supplies, clothing and medical matters in view of the changes of 1) S.S. "Thomas Walton" 4,500 tons
climate, high temperatures and strong sun. Torpedo pistols, 2) S.S. "Garonfalia" 4,700 tons
electric torpedo batteries and ammunition are also likely to be 3) S.S. "Bredford" 4,000 tons
effected. The necessary steps are being taken immediately. 13,200 tons

(signed): Dönitz She observed lively neutral single traffic on the

Rear Admiral and B.d.U. Norwegian coast. No convoys or English warships seen. Little
traffic off Kola Bay, medium patrol. Adequate lighting from
aurora borealis.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
17.12. U 47 entered port.:
16 - 31 December 1939 She sank:
1) Unidentified steamer about 12,000 tons
PG30254 2) tanker (Norway) " 10,000 tons
3) tanker (Holland) " 9,000 tons
about 31,000 tons

61
 She also scored one certain hit on a London class cruiser concentration of about 15 boats can however, be expected in
east of the Shetlands on 28.11. Apparently however, the cruiser January and February.
did not sink. This was a good patrol. There is nothing in
particular to say about it. 20.12. U 48 entered port, she sank:
1) tanker "Gustav Reuter" 6,336 tons
18.12. U 28 entered port. 2) S.S. "Navasota" 8,795 tons
She carried out her minelaying operation off Swansea 3) tanker "San Alberto" 7,397 tons
well. She also sank: 4) S.S. "Germaine" 5,217 tons
1) tanker "Sliedrecht" 5,130 tons 27,745 tons
2) steamer from convoy
presumably "Royston Grange" 5,144 tons
10,274 tons This is the C.O.'s third successful patrol. He has sunk
80,380 tons since the beginning of the war.

U 25 reported a bad leak of oil from one tank. The boat

19.12. U 25 and U 46 sailed. Originally U 46 should have has only made one short patrol since the beginning of the war
put to sea earlier, but her sailing had to be postponed owing to and has been in the dockyard the rest of the time. Now she has
engine trouble. Both boats are going to the sea area off the to break off and return to the dockyard again.
west coast of Portugal.
21.12. U 25 entered port and docked. U 46 is the only
Atlantic boat still at sea.
- 70 -
22.12. Nothing to report.

23.12. The reason for the oil leak in U 25 has not yet been
discovered. All the external fuel tanks will have to be
hydraulically tested, which will take until about December 30.

Damage caused by D/C's in U 43 inspected. Damage to

plating of bow-caps - this could be improved. Damage to one
Date Position, Wind, Weather external fuel tank, aft of the conning tower, to starboard - as far
and Sea State, Illumination, Events as can be gathered in retrospect, D/C exploded about 3 meters
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. away.Skin plating dented, several small holes, a few cracks.
Pressure hull shows no effects of the explosion. Supports of
upper deck containers for torpedoes bent. General impression:
material and construction of this type of boat stood up
remarkably well. This impression is confirmed by the experience
U 48 has reached the North Sea via the Fair Isle Passage, of the commanding officer, who says that the boat was
and thus there are no German U-boats in the Atlantic. A
62
absolutely pressure-tight at depths far exceeding normal (Deutsche Werft and Stuelken), so as not to overburden the West
maximum diving depths. dockyard any more.
3) Admiral Superintendent gave assurances that he would see
U 30 sailed. to it that the West dockyard got the necessary labor.

24.12. Weather report from U 26 - position west of the

Herbrides.
25.12. Nothing to report.
Conference with Admiral Superintendent of the
Dockyard. 26.12. Radio Intelligence Service fixed the position of a
1) It was agreed on 15.12 that U 28 and U 29 could also be convoy on the west coast of Portugal. U 46 informed.
repaired in the West dockyard, as there was no lack of skilled
labor. 27.12. Sailing of U 32 again delayed. Exhaust valve leaky.

28.12. U 32 at last ready towards evening. Sailed in

accordance with Operations Order No. 16.

- 71 - 29.12. U 30 reported an attack on a battleship of the

Repulse class on the 28th northwest of the Herbrides. She fired
4 torpedoes and scored one probable hit. According to Radio
Intelligence, this is "Barham". She could however, still make 12
knots and probably proceeded to the Clyde. Shortly after U 30
reported that she had sunk a patrol vessel by gunfire. She has
only one torpedo left.

30.12. U 25 will not sail for at least another day. There

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
2) In actual fact it appears that there is not enough skilled
labor to deal with the boats already in the dockyard. U 32, 30
have been delayed. Mr. SPERLING (West's dockyard's request for
skilled workmen was not conceded by the main dockyard).
B.d.U. himself therefore transferred U 28 and U 29 to Hamburg
63
are still traces of oil.
Enemy news service gave a description of the sinking of
a German U-boat off the west coast of Spain. No date given. If
this is not an old report, it can only refer to U 46, the last direct
news of which was received on the 24th (weather report from
west of Ireland). Several sighting reports of 28th and 29th
appear to refer to this boat.
31.12. U 25 sailed. Weather forecast indicates a very cold
spell. The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal and the entrances to the Baltic
may be expected to freeze up. If this is so, U-boat warfare will
probably be affected.
 *25.1 U 54 West of Spain and Portugal. Torpedoes
(signed): Dönitz *31.1 U 51 " " "
Rear Admiral and B.d.U.
*New boats or change of C.O.

1940 General considerations for operation:

1) New boats with new C.O.'s will be used as torpedo carriers to get
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log them used to war conditions. Operations areas chosen dependent on radius
of action and expected weather conditions.
1 - 15 January 1940 2) Long nights to be used for as many nine-laying operations as possible,
but restricted to the main enemy, England. Another point in favor of
PG30255 mining operations for boats with small radius of action is the fact that in
winter weather conditions in the operations areas which they can reach are
often such that they cannot take offensive action. In general, reasons for
mining operations are:
1. the fact that the sooner the operations are carried out the less
Date Position, Wind, Weather opposition may be expected.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events 2. the fact that at the moment the enemy has no defense against ground
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. mines and those are therefore largely effective at present.

For these reasons I intend also to use large boats for this if
necessary. Furthermore, boats fitted with mines, are not a total loss to
torpedo warfare, as they only carry one full load of mines in the bow
Group Headquarters West tubes. Reloading mines does not appear to be expedient and in many cases
1.1 During January the following boats will become ready: is not even possible.
Date Boat Intended Operation Weather conditions make it necessary to look ahead and take steps
* 6.1 U 44 West of Spain and Portugal. Torpedoes to get the U-boats in and out through the river estuaries which are freezing
11.1 U 34 Falmouth. TMC up and through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. Ice situation discussed with
15.1 U 31 Loch Ewe. TMC Station North. I consider that all the available means of one waterway
20.1 U 41 West of Spain and Portugal. Torpedoes should be centralized under one authority, which would see that
22.1 U 37 " " " a) the waterway was kept open all the time
22.1 U 48 Not yet decided. b) that tug assistance and escort are available when U-boats have to pass
24.1 U 29 Bristol Channel. TMB through.
*24.1 U 55 West of Spain and Portugal. Torpedoes
25.1 U 28 Portsmouth. TMB
64
 ice-breaking on the Jade. Station Baltic has taken similar steps for the
Baltic independently.
- 73 - Thus everything possible appears to have been done to prevent a
hold-up in U-boat warfare through ice conditions for as long as possible.

3.1 According to dead reckoning U 30 is now in the Irish Sea. She

may be expected to carry out the operation within the next days.

4.1 Nothing to report.

Group Command has requested B.d.U. to name a suitable time for

Date Position, Wind, Weather a combined operation by surface forces and U-boats about the end of
and Sea State, Illumination, Events January.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. Reckoning that the boats will need about 7 days for the outward
passage, as far as can be seen at present the 30th would be the earliest
possible date for the first day of the operation.

5.1 U 32 off the Clyde, according to dead reckoning. Nothing to

The matter is being discussed between Chief of Staff B.d.U. and report.
Staff Officer Station North and agreement will be reached.
6.1 U 44 sailed for her operations area in accordance with
U 25 again reports a trace of oil. She will have to turn back. Operations Order No. 18.

Naval War Staff has extended the orders for the conduct of the war
against merchant shipping, as far as Greek ships are concerned. - 74 -

2.1 U 46 reported that she was returning, as one main engine was
out of order.
In her case it has been shown that the enemy's sinking reports are
not very reliable unless they contain definite statements of prisoners taken.

The following agreement has been reached on the ice situation:

Station North will request Supreme Command of the Navy for the
old battleships to give assistance with ice on the Elbe, where conditions Date Position, Wind, Weather
are most difficult especially off Brunsbüttel. F.O.I.C. North Frisia has and Sea State, Illumination, Events
been put in charge of ice-breaking on the Elbe, and Naval dockyard with Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
65
 11.1 U 34 sailed in accordance with Operations Order No. 19. Ice
conditions are gradually becoming more difficult. Boats can no longer
make trial runs in the Jade. These have to be carried out off Heligoland.
Boats are piloted in and out by Sperrbrecher and 2 tugs.
Boats are also protecting their sensitive bow-caps by a wooden
7.1 Nothing to report. shoe which is brought out while proceeding through ice.

8.1 U 32 reports that she cannot carry out her minelaying operation 12.1 Nothing to report.
off the Clyde. She has observed fixed listening stations and encountered
strong patrols. She has not apparently succeeded in penetrating into the 13.1 U 25 sailed in accordance with Operations Order No. 18.
inner firth. Naval War Staff has extended the orders for the conduct of the war in
She also reports traffic observed close inshore south of Ailsa Craig certain areas. U 44, which should at present be southwest of Ireland,
Island, at water depths at which mines could be laid. She suggested
making this alternative position and has been given orders to carry out the
operation there. - 75 -
Until I hear the Commanding Officer's verbal report I shall not be
satisfied that the first operation was really impossible.

9.1 C-in-C Navy visited headquarters. Made a report to him on the

state of the U-boat war and future intentions.

10.1 U 46 entered port. She only sank one 3,000 ton steamer, then
fired several misses and failures and received numerous D/C's.
In spite of the small result, the C.O. cannot be accused of Date Position, Wind, Weather
slackness. He went to it, but his firing skill apparently requires perfecting. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
I have decided to give the boat a period of firing practice before her next Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
patrol.

U 30 reported that she had completed her operation off Liverpool.

This is very good work and will certainly lead to success.

U 32 reported that she had carried out her operation in the has been ordered to remain off the western approach to the Channel for
alternative position. She has been allocated an operations area off the east a few days, and then proceed to the west coast of Spain at about the same
coast of England further remaining torpedoes. time as U 25.

14.1 Nothing to report.

66
 17.1 U 30 entered port. She sank a patrol vessel type Agatha on
15.1 Nothing to report. her way out and scored a hit on "Barham". The minelay off Liverpool
went off well and according to plan. It required a lot of dash, thought,
ability and determination. It was carried out in shallow water strongly
patrolled. By the 16th 3 mined areas had been declared off the port.
On the day of his return the Commanding Officer had the
satisfaction of knowing that the whole of Liverpool harbor had been
temporarily closed because of mines.

(signed): Dönitz U 31 sailed for her operations area according to Operations Order
Rear Admiral No. 20, after completing trial runs off Heligoland.

A conference was held in Wilhelmshaven with representatives of

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log the Torpedo Experimental Command because of renewed unexplained
torpedo failures. The main matter under discussion was the suspicion held
16 - 31 January 1940 by B.d.U. for some time now that MZ could fail to fire, even if shot under.
There have been repeated cases of shots fired at close range with good
PG30256 firing data which have not brought results and the reasons have been
obscure even to the Torpedo Inspectorate (U 470). These cases have
increased particularly recently (U 24, U 15, U 20, U 59, U 60). The
Director of the Torpedo Experimental Command reports that U 20's shots
cannot be explained. Even if the speed had been wrongly estimated, at
Date Position, Wind, Weather least one shot should have hit. The only possible explanation for the
and Sea State, Illumination, Events failure of the 3 torpedoes to fire would be the fact that the size of the ship
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. had been very much over estimated. The Commanding Officer of the boat
denies this possibility. I have reached the following conclusions with
regard to these and similar failures!
All the Torpedo Experimental Command's analyses of shots are
possible for the particular case under consideration and possibly correct in
some cases. But I cannot believe that, with a whole series of failures of
this kind, there are other reasons in every case. I am convinced that there
Group Headquarters West is a connection between all these so-called unexplained shots and there is a
16.1 U 44 reports passage from the sea area west of the Channel common cause for their failure which has not yet been discovered. Up to
that she has sunk 3 steamers, including the Dutch S.S. "Arendskork". She now I have believed that in many cases boats have fired past, due to
has started on her passage south, as her position is known. misinterpretation of the firing data or aiming mistakes. In individual cases
I have sent the boat for further training. But now, with these failures of
67
shots fired under the most simple conditions by a series of the best-trained
Commanding Officers and torpedomen, I cannot accept this explanation
any longer. Some of these C.O.'s have undergone 2 years of training in
peacetime and all of them, when reexamined, were found to have good or
very good skill in firing.
From now on, I shall regard all such shots at closest range, where
a detailed examination of the circumstances and the firing data exclude the
possibility of a miss, and which so far have been regarded as unexplained,
as failures of the firing unit. It has happened again and again in these
cases that the Torpedo Inspectorate
- 77 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
has held the view that the boats have missed or made incorrect
observations, only because the reason for the possible failure was not
known and could not therefore be made to apply and that afterwards their
view was turned out to be incorrect. See, for instance, premature
detonations, detonations half-way through the run, firing under with
impact firing.
68
The attitude to be adopted to this problem is therefore, other
unknown causes of failures are possible. Otherwise we shall never get
anywhere.
18.1 There is still uncertainty about the actual possibilities of
supplying in Spain and a practical experiment is therefore necessary. U
44, at present off the west coast of Spain, can be used for this; she can then
operate together with boats which are sailing up to 14 days after her.
Supply has therefore been ordered for 25/26 in Cadiz.
19.1 Nothing to report.
20.1 Ice is beginning to have a direct effect on plans for operations.
Firing and diving training in the Baltic will have to be suspended for the
present. There is a choice between delaying the operation of several boats
with new C.O.'s until the cold spell is over or sending them on to
operations before they have completed the scheduled working up and
firing practice periods. As they are all officers whom I believe already
capable of handling difficult situations, I have decided to send them on to
operations immediately. They will first of all go to operations areas where
comparatively little patrol is to be expected. As soon as possible all boats
will be transferred from the Baltic to the North Sea.
21.1 U 34 reported that she had carried out her minelaying
operation off Falmouth. She has managed it very quickly.
Further sinkings indicate the presence of U 44 off the northwest
coast of Spain. Several U-boat warnings show that the enemy is taking
action.
The Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate telephoned me today.
Trial shots have been made against T 123, which did not fire, and magnetic
measurements have been made on torpedoes in store, with the result that
the Torpedo Inspectorate considers the possibility of torpedoes not firing is
proven.
 The fact that its main weapon, the torpedo, has to a large extent
proved useless in operation has been the greatest difficulty with which the
U-boat Arm has had to contend with since the beginning of the war and it
has had a most serious effect on results. At least 25% of all shots fired
have been torpedo failures. According to statistics covering all shots up to
6.1., 40.9% of unsuccessful shots were torpedo failures.
1) In August 1939, before the boats left port during the emergency
period, a conference held in the Torpedo
- 78 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Trials Department during which the doubts expressed by B.d.U. with
regard to the proper functioning of the pistol were dismissed as unfounded
by Rear Admiral Wehr, Director of Torpedo Trials Department.
2) On 14.9 U 29 reported by radio that 2 torpedoes had fired prematurely
after covering the safety distance. The Torpedo Inspectorate first wished
to make out that the U-boats had made an error in position of 30-60 miles.
I would not accept this explanation. The Torpedo Inspectorate then
69
recommended setting the pistol 2 zones lower, in order to lessen its
sensitivity. This meant that they would not be certain to fire against
merchant ships under 3,000 BRT if shot under and such ships would
therefore have to be attacked with impact firing. An order was
accordingly given to the U-boats by B.d.U. on 14.9.
3) Failures were not eliminated however. Further premature detonations
were reported.(U 27 reported that the explosion caused slight damage to
the boat). Until the cause was discovered, the Torpedo Inspectorate
arranged for the torpedoes to be fitted with an "A" setting of the switch,
which made it possible to cut out electric firing.
4) After the "A" setting of the switch had been fitted, B.d.U. ordered on
2.10 that only impact shots were to be fired. This meant that for the
present the danger of premature detonation was eliminated. The step was
taken for the sake of safety of the boats, until such time as the cause of
premature detonation was discovered.
5) At the beginning of October the Torpedo Inspectorate stated that the
cause of premature detonation in the G7e had been traced to a bad cable
lay-out. The cables had now been laid differently and the G7e could once
more be fired under. In the case of the G7a mechanical disturbances were
causing premature detonation and the G7a could therefore still not be fired
under until the question was finally cleared up.
I expressed doubts on these different explanations for premature
detonations, but as the Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate assured me
that the G7e was now safe, I decided to try and I released the G7e for
firing under with "MZ".
6) On 18.10 U 46 reported a premature detonation of a G7e in an attack on
a convoy. It was therefore established beyond question that the pistol was
not safe in the G7e despite the adaptation made. I again ordered impact
firing only also for the G7e, with electric firing cut out (switch setting
"A").
We were thus back where we were in 1914/18. But I had to make this
difficult decision to abandon the much-vaunted, much-discussed magnetic
firing in order to avoid losing boats, directly or indirectly, through our own
weapons and in the interests of U-boat successes.
7) On 20.10 the Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate informed me by
telephone that he had discovered that day that the torpedo (G7a and G7e)
was keeping a depth 2 meters below
- 79 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
that indicated. Numerous reports from boats, stating that the
torpedoes had failed to fire with impact firing units despite good firing
data, also indicated that the torpedoes were running deeper than their
setting and therefore passing under the target. I therefore ordered on 20.10
that torpedoes with impact firing were to be set at a maximum depth of 4
meters. At the suggestion of the Torpedo Inspectorate, I ordered further
that torpedoes with impact firing were to be set at 2 meters or less than the
draft of the target. But in order to avoid surface breaking and consequent
cold running the minimum depth setting had to be fixed at 3 meters, and 4
meters in an Atlantic swell. This meant that torpedoes could not be fires at
70
targets with a draft of less than 5 or 6 meters, e.g. destroyers could not be
attacked.
8) On 23.10 a conference was held in Wilhelmshaven between B.d.U.,
Director of Torpedo Inspectorate and Director of Torpedo Trials
Department and Torpedo Experimental Command, in which the following
points were confirmed:
a) variations in depth considerably greater than hitherto assumed were to
be expected.
b) that the cause of premature detonation had not yet been established.
c) at B.d.U.'s request, it was agreed that at least the explosion at the end of
the run which had also frequently occurred, should be eliminated in the
near future.
It was thus established that the effective functioning of the torpedo was
very limited indeed:
with impact firing, danger of passing under with "MZ" shot, danger of
premature detonation.
9) On 5.11 a new (adapted) pistol was brought out and it was hoped that,
by stabilization of the needle, it would be proof against premature
detonation. The pistol was designated Pi(A-B). With this pistol use of
magnetic firing was again permitted. Depth was to be set at draft of target
plus 1 meter. All our hopes were now centered on this pistol and further
reports received of failures of the present pistol seemed less important.
10) U 28 and U 49 were the first boats to sail with Pi(A-B), on 8.11 and
9.11 respectively. On 19.11 U 49 reported one G7a premature detonator
after the safety distance had been covered, one G7e probably failed to fire,
2 G7a detonated after covering 2000 meters. This was a bitter
disappointment and our best hopes were dashed in one blow. Apparently
there was no improvement on previous conditions. Further reports
followed from other boats of premature detonations and failures to fire.
11) Some of the specialists in the Torpedo Inspectorate suggested that the
pistols should be set 2 zones below the setting shown in the chart in order
to reduce sensitivity and so avoid premature detonation. The depth setting
should be the same as the draft of the target and

- 80 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
the torpedo thus brought closer to the ship so that the firing field
would be effective even at the reduced pistol sensitivity. I was against this
and the Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate and the remaining specialists
agreed with me.
12) Small alterations to the pistol (insulation of the copper cap, smoothing
a thrust collar) did not bring any improvement. Every now and then
premature detonations seemed to become fewer for a time and firing under
was adhered to, because firing with impact firing units would again have
meant many failures due to passing under.
13) Report of shots, in which the pistol failed to fire, despite certain firing
data, became more and more numerous. The Torpedo Inspectorate
believed that the pistol could not fail to fire if shot under and refused to
accept any idea that failures could be caused by this section of the pistol. I
had all shots, which the commanding officers believed to be failures to fire
71
examined by the Torpedo Inspectorate. They thought that these must be
due to misses or be regarded as unexplained. I can no longer accept this
explanation. in view of the large number of reports of shots failing to fire
with certain firing data. I consider that in many cases the failure of the
pistol to fire is proven and I made this quite clear in a conference with
Torpedo Experimental Command on 19.1 (see War Log of 17.1).
14) Experimental firing at T 123 afterwards showed that in fact several
pistols failed to fire when shot under. The Torpedo Inspectorate now
admits the possibility of failures to fire and issued the following
instructions, to be passed on to the boats, on 21.1:
1. For targets under 4,000 BRT, destroyers and surfaced S/M's, depth
setting 4 meters.
2. The pistol may fail to fire against targets under 1,000 BRT.
3. For all other targets, depth setting draft plus 1 meter, even in bad
weather.
The results remain to be seen.
15) In addition to the negative results of trial firing at T 123, recent
magnetic measurements of the body of the torpedo and the battery
compartment have shown that these exercise an irregular, unstable
magnetic effect on the pistol and may cause a strengthening (premature
detonators) or a weakening (firing failures) of the magnetic unit. The
torpedoes in store are to be demagnetized. The Torpedo Inspectorate
doubts if this will be successful. The causes of the failures have therefore
by no means been mastered.
16) The Commanding Officers' and crews' confidence in the torpedo is
very much shaken. Again and again the boats have tried, in the face of
strong enemy activity, to fire their torpedoes under the best possible
conditions and often when they have made a daring attack they have been
 - 81 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
rewarded with failures and even danger to themselves. At least 300,000
tons, which might have been sunk, can be reckoned lost through torpedo
failures. I think it is certain, for instance, that U 47 Lieut.(s.g.) Prein's shot
at the London class cruiser was a premature detonator. It is very bitter for
Commanding Officers and the executive control to find that the U-boat
Arm cannot achieve the success expected of it, in spite of a thorough
peacetime training, because of torpedo failures.
I will continue to do all I can to keep up the fighting spirits of the U-
boats in the face of all the setbacks. We must continue to fire torpedoes in
order to discover the causes of the defects and remove them. But
commanding officers and crews will only gradually regain full confidence
in the torpedo if lasting technical improvements can be made.
22.1 U 32 entered port.She carried out her minelaying operation
and also sank a steamer of 800-1,000 tons in the North Sea.
The Commanding Officer's explanation of why he thought the
minelay could not be carried out in the Clyde is not convincing. He
pressed a long way forward and turned back when he was in the midst of
anti-S/M forces and only a few miles from the position in which he was to
72
lay the mines, although he himself did not think he had been detected. He
did not make another attempt on another day. The operation was a
difficult one - too difficult for this C.O. I shall arrange for another boat to
carry it out.
23.1 U 34 and U 44 each reported a convoy in her operations area.
At the moment there are so few boats in operations area - 2 off the coast of
Portugal and 2 south of Ireland - that it will be a matter of great luck if
these few boats, which are spread over a wide area, succeed in working
together. But the attempt must be made.
In one case it was possible to achieve cooperation between boats
which were at first 800 miles apart. The danger of the boat making beacon
signals being D/F'd and the enemy taking action accordingly, by evasive
maneuvers and anti-S/M hunts, must be regarded as much less
considerable than was feared before the war. As far as it has been possible
to carry out any investigations, the following has been established:
1) Bearing errors, dependent on the distance from the enemy coasts,
average 60-80 miles at a range of 300 miles and often amount to much
more. The best bearing known to B.d.U. was 30 miles out, and that in the
immediate vicinity of the west coast of France. The largest error was 325
miles at a range of 600 miles.
2) So far it has not been observed that convoys alter their route when such
warnings are received. It is doubtful whether this would be of any use as
any detours made, unless they were very long, would be as likely to bring
the convoy nearer to the U-boat DF'd as away from it.
3) There is some indication that the enemy sends anti-S/M forces into the
area in which radio D/F bearings have
- 82 -
 25.1 No news of U 51 and U 55, both on their first patrol west of
the English Channel.

Ice conditions are causing major delays in spite of all measures

taken (see F.O. U/B West's War Log). Kiel boats can no longer be easily
Date Position, Wind, Weather transferred. On some days even old battleships cannot pass the Elbe.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events There are delays and hold-ups a days on which many boats have to be
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. taken in and out. In spite of ice escort, damage still occurs. U 48
damaged her propellers, even though she was being towed, and U 29 her
bow caps. U 53's protective ice shoe on the bows broke and she had to
turn back.

been obtained. A direct attack is likely to be successful in only very rare 26.1 The supply planned for U 44, under cover name "Moro" has
cases, in view of the errors in fixing, but the anti-S/M forces are then in had to be abandoned. The boat has been pursuing a convoy and has used
the vicinity and are able to strike more quickly and surely if reliable details so much fuel that if she makes the detour to the place of supply and then
of the U-boat's position are received (sinkings, sighting reports). meets with difficulties which prevent her taking over supplies, she may not
The use of radio must therefore continue to be reduced to a be able to reach home.
minimum, but radio silence must not become an end in itself. Successes These unforeseen difficulties will continue to cruise until practical
are not likely to be reduced by the use of radio. On the contrary, if it is experiment has shown that the preparations made correspond to the
correctly used, chances are increased, but it also means that anti-S/M requirements. U 25 has been ordered to supply instead of U 44.
activity will increase.
At present it is not possible to make the desired mass attacks on 27.1 Naval War Staff has extended the areas of "A" and "B" zones
merchant shipping, as there are not enough boats available, but and delimited the new zone "C" in the North Sea.
nevertheless the procedure for possible organized attacks must be studied
and tried, so that, if the war should last for some time and when the
numbers of U-boats have been increased to meet operational requirements,
there will be plenty of well-trained tactical leaders and all technical - 83 -
questions of operational control will be cleared up. If in this war the effect
of U-boats has been greater rather than smaller by comparison with the
World War in spite of undoubtedly stronger opposition this must be
ascribed at least in part to a more carefully planned and controlled
disposition made possible by more extensive technical means of control
than were available in the World War.

24.1 Nothing to report.

Date Position, Wind, Weather
73
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 31 reported that she had carried out her minelaying operation in
the position planned and was starting on her return passage.
case the principle has to be relaxed. It is very doubtful whether the
operation will have the desired effect at all, i.e. that of drawing away the
patrol vessels and it is possible that it will merely attract more such
vessels. It will hardly come as a surprise, as it is known for certain that 4
German U-boats are believed to be in that area. Nevertheless, after
consulting Naval War Staff, I decided to give the order, so that I shall at
least have done everything possible to assist the sailing of the steamers.

28.1 U 34 and U 44 reported that they were starting return passage. (signed): Dönitz
Rear Admiral
29.1 U 55 reported a convoy southwest of Land's End. Later radio
intelligence reports showed that a 5,000 ton steamer had been sunk. The
boat lost contact towards the evening. Enemy radio traffic became very F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
active, with U-boat warnings and orders for anti-S/M forces.
1 - 15 February 1940
30.1 U 51 reported that she was returning owing to a technical
defect in the bow caps. PG30257

The enemy news service announced the sinking of a U-boat.

According to the description of the incident, which sounds genuine, it
must be U 55. The boat is said to have been unable to dive and destroyed
by A/C. Some of the crew were saved. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
31.1 U 48 sailed for a minelaying operation in accordance with Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Operations Order No. 22.

News was received overland of supply operation under cover

name "Moro". Everything went off according to plan. U 25 has now been
ordered to make a surprise attack on French patrol vessels which have
recently been reported several times off Vigo, so that the German steamers 1.2 U 26 and U 37 sailed for operations in accordance with
in Vigo will be able to sail on 6.2 as planned without difficulty. In itself Operations Orders No. 23 and 21. U 31 reported that she was returning.
this is not a suitable operation for a U-boat as the patrol consists of
trawlers and destroyers, vessels which can act as S/M chasers but present a 2.2 Nothing to report.
difficult target for the U-boat. In the ordinary way efforts must be made to
operate U-boats in areas where there are no anti-S/M vessels, but in this 3.2 U 31 entered Heligoland.
74
 4.2 U 31 left Heligoland for her operations area in accordance with U 34 entered Wilhelmshaven. She carried out her minelaying
Operations Order No. 23. She had to turn back in the evening as her gyro
was out of order.
- 85 -
Ice conditions this winter make it clear that a base for U-boats in
Heligoland is essential. It is therefore particularly gratifying to B.d.U. that
steps were already taken in peacetime so that there are now some facilities,
though limited. The use of Heligoland and the adjacent exercise area at
present are limited by the following conditions:
1) There are only mediocre berths for U-boats in the harbor. The
structure of the harbor makes supply and refueling difficult. There are at
present no facilities for extensive repairs, docking etc. It is difficult to get
spare parts, as ice conditions make communication with the island difficult Date Position, Wind, Weather
and subject to delays. Specialist personnel have to be sent with them from and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Wilhelmshaven. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
2) The sea area around the island is not free of enemy activity. S/M hunts
cannot be carried out in the U-boats training areas. Danger from the air
has to be accepted without it being possible to call on local defense forces.
There are not enough S/M chasers and patrol vessels.

U 31 entered Wilhelmshaven from Heligoland after a passage
lasting 10 hours. She carried out her minelaying operation off Loch Ewe
well. Conditions during the whole patrol undoubtedly made it easier for
her. She did not encounter any patrol by sea or air the whole time.
5.2 U 34 entered Heligoland.
operation off Falmouth well and quickly. She also sank a steamer of
12,000 tons. West of North Channel she sighted 2 battleships and a cruiser
steering for the North Channel, but she had no torpedoes left and would
not in any case have reached firing range. Several U-boats have observed
2 battleships in company in the area west and north of Scotland. It seems
probable that there is a permanent patrol here by a battle group of heavy
ships, covering the approach to the North Sea from the Atlantic.

U 28 and U 33 left Wilhelmshaven for Heligoland to make trial A S/M alarm on 5.2 immediately off Heligoland made it necessary
runs etc., and will proceed from there to their operations areas. to take decisive measures for boats training there. (see F.O. U/B West's
War Log).
6.2 U 50 and U 53 sailed in accordance with Operations Order No.
23. U 50 turned back towards evening owing to a trace of oil due to a U 29 sailed for Heligoland.
burst pipe.
75
 7.2 U 33 left Heligoland in accordance with Operations Order No. 38,266 tons
24.

8.2 U 51 entered port, having completed her first patrol. She had
to return sooner than would have otherwise been necessary owing to a
technical defect which impaired her ability to dive. Her results are - 86 -
therefore small.
Unidentified steamer about 1,600 tons
S.S. "Eika" 1,503 tons
3,103

Nevertheless the Commanding Officer showed determination. He

had the right idea. The second steamer which he sank, a Norwegian whose
identity was so unrecognizable that he thought it was an English ship right
up to the end, attempted to ram the U-boat when submerged. The C.O. Date Position, Wind, Weather
then made a quick decision to fire in spite of the fine inclination. It was and Sea State, Illumination, Events
only when the steamer was sinking that he identified her as a neutral and Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
saved 2 members of the drew, who were apparently the only survivors, in
order to discover whether she really was a neutral ship or a camouflaged
enemy. As in a similar case some months ago in which a Danish steamer
tried to ram U 3 (see F.O. U/B West's War Log), this incident proves that
greatest care is necessary even with neutrals. In this case the steamer
received her first punishment. This is the most successful patrol so far, perfectly executed and
rewarded with well-earned success.
9.2 U 44 entered port. She sank:
1) A darkened steamer about 3,000 tons Boats which have recently been in contact with convoys all report
2) Dutch S.S. "Arendskerk" 7,906 tons very broad, not very deep cruising formations with small distances
contraband between ships. The escort was in some cases over 1000 meters ahead. In
3) Darkened steamer about 4,200 tons some cases the escort was close up to the convoy, around and on both
contraband wings, and the wing destroyers made circles around several ships, i.e.
4) Danish S.S. "Canadian Reefer" 1,831 tons passed through the gaps.
5) S.S. "Ecatontracos Draculi" 5,329 tons
darkened 10.2 Operations against "Ark Royal", "Renown" and "Exeter"
6) Steamer in convoy about 6,000 tons On 7.2 a radio intelligence report was received stating that "Ark
7) Armed steamer " 7,000 tons Royal", "Renown" and "Exeter" had left freetown and that "Ark Royal"
8) Steamer without markings " 3,000 tons would be in a certain indicated position about 200 miles northwest of
76
Madeira at 000/11/2, course 150, speed 22 knots. "Renown" and "Exeter" so definite that hope of the boat's only having been seen need be
would be about 180 miles astern of this, making 16 knots. abandoned.
As these positions are very far away and there is yet no indication
of what port they are making for, I consider that it would be premature for
the boats to take action on this report from the positions they have at - 87 -
present reached. The Chief Radio Intelligence station today expressed the
view that a channel port was probably the port of destination, but this still
does not alter my opinion. In order to be able to act on further details,
more exact details from the Radio Intelligence Service, I decided however,
to keep back the boats in the area south of Ireland off the Channel
approach. U 26, 37 and 48 received orders accordingly, although it is not
certain that these boats have actually reached this position. It is doubtful if
U 26 and U 37 have got so far, and it is not known if U 48 has completed
her minelaying operation. It must also be remembered that the C.O. of U Date Position, Wind, Weather
26 has had little experience and ought not, if possible, to be faced with the and Sea State, Illumination, Events
difficult task of operating against warships on his first patrol. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

11.2 U 29 left Heligoland in accordance with Operations Order No.

22.

After U 25's successful supply operation, cover name "Moro", U

41 has now been ordered to supply in the same way. This boat has been
west of Vigo for the last few days in order to make use of chances of
attacking enemy patrol vessels and thus make it easier for our own
merchant ships to leave the port. So far no results of her activity are
known. Most of the steamers have sailed however, and the operation can
therefore be regarded as completed.
U 48 reported that she had carried out her minelaying operation in
the main position and had also sunk the Dutch S.S. "Burgendyk" in
accordance with prize law.
12.2 U 54 sailed in accordance with Operations Order No. 25.
Radio Intelligence Service has reports of the sinking of a U-boat in
the Clyde. If this is correct, it can only be U 33. But the report's are not
77
C-in-C Navy visited Headquarters West. B.d.U. briefed him on
the situation and future intentions.
Operation against "Ark Royal" etc.
A fresh Radio Intelligence report on Ark Royal gives the A/C
carrier's exact position for 0900/12/2 with her escort of 4 destroyers.
According to this, she has altered course. Assuming that she is still
making 22 knots, she can be expected to pass the Channel-approach about
the morning of 13.2. There is further confirmation of the suspicion that
she is making for the Channel. Although the exact positions of the U-
boats were not known, I decided to operate the boats kept back in this area
against her. It was known that U 48 is west of the Channel again and it
could therefore be assumed that U 26 and U 37 will have arrived there by
now at the latest. On the morning of 12.2 they were allocated operations
areas in the Channel approach. Shortly after this order was given U 48
reported a convoy on a westerly course. As she was in contact with the
enemy and possibly about to score a success, I did not think it right to
interfere with her operations. U 37 also made a radio message. She was
in a favorable position for an attack on "Ark Royal". Nothing was known
of U 26's position. During the night however, she also made a radio
message. She was a long way off and could not make sufficient speed
against the heavy sea to reach her position in time. Meanwhile U 48 had Date Position, Wind, Weather
lost the convoy. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
13.2 Operations against "Ark Royal" etc.
On the morning of 13.2 the situation was:
U 37 presumably in position
U 48 also in position, or in the immediate vicinity.
U 26 a long way off, making little headway against the sea.
I gave the following order: 14.2 Reports have been received of several steamers sunk in the
"U 37 and U 48 to make every effort to take up the attacking sea area south of Ireland, including a 12,000 tonner.
position ordered. Only particularly valuable targets are to be attacked until
boats are dismissed from this position. 15.2 "Ark Royal", "Renown" and "Exeter" have arrived at the
U 26 will occupy an attack area......" (an area corresponding to her Channel ports. U 37 therefore required new orders. She was ordered to
present position). This was necessary, because she could no longer reach proceed to the west coast of Spain with U 26 and to act there as tactical
her position and was then in danger of using up her fuel for nothing. leader of the group U 26, U 37, U 50, U 53, U 54 and perhaps later also U
At midday a radio message was received from U 48 which, from 41.
the position given, showed that she had tried to regain contact with the
convoy. She pursued it so far to the west and was then such a long way According to a radio intelligence report a convoy is to be west of
from the Channel approach (340 miles) that she was unlikely to be able to Porto on 17.2 and the nearest boats, U 26, U 37 and U 53 will will first be
get back there inside 2 days (wind E 7). operated against this. U 29 has been kept off the North Channel because
This action by the C.O. of U 48 will have to be thoroughly of the "Nordmark" operation which is to take place within the next days.
investigated when he gets back. It was already doubtful whether he should (see F.O. U/B West's War Log).
have been left with the convoy, but when he had lost contact and received
new orders, he should never have allowed himself to be lured so far west U 53 reported that she had sunk 30,000 tons.
that in the end he could not carry out these orders.
(signed): Dönitz

- 88 - ---------------------------------------

Appendix to B.d.U. Naval War Staff's War Log

78
 MOST SECRET
Operations against "Ark Royal", "Renown" and "Exeter"
1) 2020/7/2 radio intelligence report:
A/C carrier"Ark Royal" will be in square DH 1359, course 150, speed 22
knots at 257/10/2. Battleship "Renown" and heavy cruiser "Exeter" will
be in square DH 4377, course 30, speed 16 knots at 0011/11/2.
2) 1720/9/2 radio intelligence report:
A/C carrier "Ark Royal" is expected to be in the area of the western
approach to the Channel on 13/2, and heavy cruiser "Exeter" on 14.2. The
units are expected to proceed to Portsmouth or Davenport. The destroyers
"Diamond" and "Dainty" are probably with the ships mentioned.
3) 1100/10/2 T/P from Naval War Staff to B.d.U.:
Radio Intelligence Service's exact information on the homeward passage
of "Ark Royal", "Renown" and "Exeter" appear promising for a mass
operation of Atlantic boats at the western approach to the Channel.
4) 1725/10/2 radio message to U 26:
Operations area for U 26 until further orders is: square 3000 BE right half
and square 1000 BF left half.
5) 1750/10/2 radio message to U 37 and U 48:
Operations area for U 37 for the present is off the Channel approach east
of 90 west and south of 490 20 mins. north. U 48 will be north of this line.
- 89 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
79
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
6) 8050/12/2 radio intelligence report:
French patrol vessels were informed early on 12/2 by Admiral West that
English A/C carrier "Ark Royal" would be in square 9191 at 0900/12/2
GMT.
7) 0900/12/2 radio intelligence report:
Additional to radio intelligence report 0845: there are English destroyers
with "Ark Royal".
8) 0915/12/2 radio message from U 37:
Enemy destroyer and suspicious ship in sight. Enemy is steering a
westerly course, making high speed, square 1737 BF.
9) 0920/12/2 radio message to U 26, U 37, U 48:
Proceed to channel approach between Start Point and Quessant.
10) 0945/12/2 radio message to U 26, U 37, U 48:
Take up attacking position along the line Lizard Head-Los Sept Isles, U
48 north of 490 40 mins. north, U 26 south of 490 18 mins. north, U 37 in
the center "Ark Royal" is expected to pass eastbound early on 13/2,
"Renown" and "Exeter" early on 14/2.
11) Midday 12/2 received from U 48:
Enemy convoy 490 55 mins. north, 090 36 mins. west, course 2600,
speed 9 knots. There followed the following radio messages with T.O.O.
as given:
1307: 490 59 mins. north, 090 56 mins. west, course 2600, speed 8 knots.
1359: 400 58 mins. north, 090 53 mins. wets, course 2650, speed 8 knots.
1501: 490 58 mins. north, 100 06 mins. west, course 2500, speed 8 knots.
1730: 490 56 mins. north, 100 48 mins. west, course 2600, 9 knots.
1755: Contact lost. Last position observed:
490 55 mins. north, 100 54 mins. west.
12) 2132/12/2 radio message to U 26, U 37, U 48:
 "Ark Royal" was in 450 north, 150 west at 0900/12/2, speed so far 22
knots. Expected port of destination Portsmouth.
13) 2350/12/2 radio message from U 26:
1) Position 3592 BE, can only make 7 knots owing to weather.
2) 3 premature detonators.
14) 0819/13/2 radio message to U 26, U 37, U 48:
U 37 and U 48 make every effort to take up attacking position ordered.
Until boats are dismissed from this position only particularly valuable
targets are to be attacked. U 26 to occupy square 3000 BE right half and
square 1000 BE left half as attack area.
Position 49 03 N., 14 35 W. wind E7, 65 cbm. remaining, 3 electric
torpedoes, 2 air-driven torpedoes ready. S/M chaser croup 4950 N., 11 25
W. No secret grid chart on board.
16) 1440/13/2 radio message to U 26, U 48:
U 26 to operate north of 400 30 mins. north, U 48 south of the line.
17) 2209/14/2 radio message to U 26 and U 53:
Proceed on to area "ROT". U 53 was in 500 50 mins. north, 140 30 mins.
west at 1900.
18) 0015/15/2 radio message to U 37:
Move off to operations area in accordance with Operations Order IV, b).
19) 0550/16/2 radio intelligence report:
By 15/2 A/C carrier "Ark Royal" was in Portsmouth and had probably
been there since the evening of 13/2. Battle cruiser )T.N.: sic) "Renown"
and heavy cruiser "Exeter" entered Plymouth at 0800/15/2 GMT.
Destroyer "Here" arrived at Portsmouth towards 1630/15/2 GMT.

- 90 -
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 29 February 1940

PG30258

Date Position, Wind, Weather

and Sea State, Illumination, Events Date Position, Wind, Weather
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

15) 1215/13/2 radio message from U 48:

80
 16.2 It seems more and more likely that U 33 has been lost.
Several radio intelligence reports show that she was in action with an U 25 entered port. She sank:
English minesweeper and then surrendered. Assistance was requested to 1) Armed merchant ship about 5,000 tons
rescue survivors. The English authorities assumed that mines had been 2) Norwegian Enid 1,440 tons
laid. This is not improbable, as these events took place in the early (attempted to escape)
morning hours. The boat would certainly not have chosen this time to 3) Escorted steamer (Pajala?) 6,873 tons
penetrate into the Clyde and she then at latest would have been on her way 4) Norwegian Sonja 2,977 tons
out. If she really did lay the mines, the high price paid will have been (contraband)
worth it. 5) S.S. Armanistan (English) 6,805 tons
6) Steamer in Zone A 5,000 tons
17.2 U 37 reported a convoy in southwest Biscay on a 27,795 tons
southwesterly course. She pursued it for some hours and lost it again
towards evening.
She was also the first boat to supply under "Moro". C.O.'s report
U 53 sighted the convoy reported by the Radio Intelligence on this: Enemy patrol vessels immediately outside territorial waters.
Service and was shadowing. Careful, effective preparations had been made at the place of supply. No
difficulty in supplying without being noticed. No moon essential.
18.2 U 37 came up to the convoy reported by U 53. Apparently 2
ships were sunk. Then U 53 lost contact. Meanwhile the boats had used so
many torpedoes that they had to reload from the upper deck containers. - 92 -
Both tried to do this, independently of one another, off the Spanish coast.
Neither succeeded owing to strong patrol. They started on their return
passage and reported their intention of trying again off the Irish coast. U
37 reported 43,000 tons sunk.

There is no information on U 26. She was operating against the

same convoy and must therefore be in the same sea area. She was ordered
to go to operations area "ROT" and to report.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
Information was received overland that U 41 did not turn up for and Sea State, Illumination, Events
supply "GATA". She may have been delayed a day. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

U 28 sailed in accordance with Operations Order No........

19.2 U 26 reported. She is returning to her old operations area

south of Ireland, as she is short of fuel.
81
 "Nordmark" operations completed. U 29 has been ordered to
continue on her passage. U 52 is a new boat. She is to make her first patrol alone in areas
which are less strongly patrolled.
20.2 Nothing to report.
U 38 will probably be the first boat ready and first to go to the area
21.2 Nothing to report. west of Portugal. She may later join the attacking group.

22.2 U 50 made contact with a convoy and sank a tanker from the 24.2 U 32 sailed for her operations area, but had to enter port again
group.She was then ordered to return to port since one of her diesels had on the same day because of a trace of oil.
broken down.
U 48 entered port. She carried out her minelaying operation
23.2 Ice conditions still do not permit an estimation of the dates of quickly and well, and also sank:
readiness of the next boats. It is to be expected however, that U 30, U 34, 1. Dutch S.S. Burgerdyk 6,853 tons
U 38 and U 52 will be ready by the end of February and U 43, U 47, U 49, 2. English S.S. Sultan Star 12,306 tons
U 46 and U 51 at about the same time at the beginning of March. A 3. Dutch tanker Den Haag 8,971 tons
special operation had originally been planned for U 38 and U 43, but it has 4. Enemy steamer of about 6,000 tons
been postponed by C-in-C Navy for political reasons. Then it was 34,130 tons
intended to operate these boats in the Mediterranean in the Cape Bon sea
area. This project also had to be abandoned on the orders of C-in-C Navy,
for political reasons. I now intend to form an attacking group with the
boats which will be ready at about the same time, i.e. U 43, U 46, U 47, U
49 and U 51. Its main task will be to intercept a convoy in the area of - 93 -
greatest convoy traffic. If this succeeds I think it will have better results
than would the same amount of single-ship tonnage sunk. It is also
necessary to get experience of controlled U-boat operations in good time,
so that, when more boats are available, there will be a clear idea of the best
way of conducting such operations. The subsidiary task for this group will
be to rake the sea area north and northwest of Scotland for warships which
have often been reported there. (For execution see Operations Order No.
29).
Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 30 and U 34 cannot join this group as their radius of action is and Sea State, Illumination, Events
too small. They are to operate west of the Channel. This is a good area, Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
but cooperation is difficult as it is so close to the coast. The boats will
have to operate individually in the main. They can therefore sail as soon
as they are ready and need not wait for one another.
82
 5) Steamer in Zone B 6,500 "
6) Steamer 7,000 "
She has now sunk a total of 16 ships, 114,510 tons, in 4 patrols. 7) " 8,000 "
Her sinking figures are the highest at present. She has done excellent 8) Tanker 6,000 "
work, especially as her last patrol was a mining as well as torpedo 45,000 tons
operation. Successes from the minelay are not yet known, but can
certainly be expected, and will have to be added to the figures sunk given
above. An excellent patrol.
With regard to the C.O.'s decision to pursue the convoy instead of The boat observed strong enemy patrols off the Spanish coast,
taking up the "Ark Royal" position, it is a fact that he did not act in which confirms the recent radio intelligence picture. THis will have to be
accordance with orders. taken into consideration for later operations.
But in view of the impression which he had, he only realized late
that he had done wrong. I have therefore omitted to take any further 28.2 U 53 did not report. The order has been repeated.
action.
29,2 No news of U 53. Otherwise nothing to report.
25.2 U 26 reported that she was starting on her return passage.
(signed): Donitz
No news has been received of U 41. She did not turn up for Rear Admiral and B.d.U.
supply "Cata". She should have reported if she had been prevented from
carrying out the supply operation. She cannot yet be presumed lost for
certain, but her loss is likely. F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

26.2 U 32 and U 38 left for their operations areas in accordance 1 - 15 March 1940
with Operations Orders No. 26 and 29.
PG30259
27.2 U 53 has been ordered to report her position. Since she
reported her intention to reload torpedoes on the Irish coast, nothing has
been heard of her. It is possible that she started on her return passage
without reporting and has now been in the North Sea for some time.
Operations control must know where she is. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 37 entered port. She sank: Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
1) Tanker about 6,000 tons
2) Steamer in Zone A " 7,000 "
3) " " B " 4,500 "
4) Patrol vessel " ? "
83
 1.3 Nothing to report. U 29 reported that she had carried out her minelaying operation in
the inner position. Particularly good results are expected from this.
2.3 U 50 entered port. She sank:
1) Steamer without markings in Zone A about 3,500 tons 6.3 U 38 and U 52 will both be kept back in the areas they have
2) Steamer type "Christine Maersk", Zone A " 5,200 tons now reached, so that they can, if necessary, be used in the impending
3) Tanker " 8,300 tons operations.
4) Darkened steamer west of the Herbrides " 5,000 tons
5) " " " west of Finisterre " 4,000 tons 7.3 The operations planned call for an extensive concentration of
6) Tanker from a convoy west of Finisterre " 1,000 tons all available boats. U 38 has therefore been withdrawn to the sea area
36,000 tons north of Scotland. Only U 28 and U 32 will remain in their old operations
areas to carry out their minelaying. U 29 is on return passage.

Excellent work for this boat's first patrol.

- 95 -
Countermeasures are being prepared against an expected English
operation extending into the Bight. U 52, who is to sail today for her
operations area, will be kept back in a waiting position west of the
declared area. For details see F.O. U/B West's War Log.

3.3 In a radio message U 33 reported, among other things, 3

premature detonations. This type of torpedo failure became less frequent
for a while, but increased again after the torpedoes had been
demagnetized. It is notable that premature detonations are far more Date Position, Wind, Weather
numerous with some boats than with others. U 50 had only one during her and Sea State, Illumination, Events
whole patrol out of 12 torpedoes fired, while U 32 had 50% prematures, Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
barely 8 days after leaving port, with a total of 6 torpedoes.

U 52 has been ordered to continue on her passage.

4.3 Enemy news service reports an attack by a U-boat on a convoy

southwest of Spain. If this report is correct, this can only be U 54. There 8.3 Nothing to report.
has been no news of her since she left port.
9.3 Nothing to report.
5.3 B.d.U. attended a conference at Supreme Command of the
Navy, in which further instructions were given for the coming operations.
84
 10.3 U 28 reported that she had carried out her minelaying
operation in the main position in accordance with Operations Order No. 13.3 U 43 and U 44 sailed in accordance with Operations Order
22. North Sea/Atlantic No. 1 (see Appendix 1).

11.3 U 38 and U 52 have been allocated operations areas on the 14.3 Preliminary regulations have been framed for the AA
Norwegian coast. (see Appendix 1 to War Log). protection of all U-boats entering and leaving port and on trials. A
minesweeper or patrol vessel will accompany every U-boat in the area
U 31 did not return from her trial runs in the Schilling Roads. which is particularly dangerous (outside the protection of
Search showed that she had sunk near Black Buoy No. 12, after an attack
by an English A/C. (Details of this accident are set out in Appendix 2 to
War Log). - 96 -
It is particularly regrettable that a boat should have been lost by
enemy action in the immediate vicinity of her own base, inside our own
barrage defenses. Losses of this kind should be avoidable.
This is the second time that an enemy A/C has flown very low
over the Schilling Roads and attacked U-boats.
We must have sufficient AA defenses for the approach route on the
Jade so that at least the enemy is prevented from flying low undisturbed.
B.d.U. has made demands accordingly.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 30, U 34, U 46, U 47, U 49, U 51 sailed for their operations and Sea State, Illumination, Events
areas (see App. 1). Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

12.3 U 32 reported that she had carried out her minelaying

operation. (Operations Order No. 26). This minefield closes the gap left
beside the field laid by U 30 and is therefore likely to produce good
results.
Wilhelmshaven as far as the 30 meter line).
U 29 entered port. She carried out her minelaying operation
(Operations Order No. 22) very well, and in addition sank by torpedo: 15.3 U 41 and U 53 declared missing with effect from 15.3.
1) Darkened steamer about 5,000 tons
2) S.S. "Pacific Reliance" 6,717 tons
3) S.S. "San Florentino" 12,842 tons
24,559 tons (signed): Dönitz
Rear Admiral and B.d.U.

85
 Appendix to B.d.U.'s War Log
Incident U 31 12/13 March 1940
Towards - 97 -
1615 Telephone call from Group Department A4, stating that there
were rumors in Jever that an English A/C had attacked a U-boat in the
Schilling Roads.
It was confirmed with the flotillas that all U-boats which had put
to sea for exercises had returned to port, except U 31. This boat was to
have been back by afternoon and had passed Schilling on her way in at
1150.
Telephoned the Adjutant of the fighter squadron in Jever:
1) Request to F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses for vessels. He made 2 S/M Date Position, Wind, Weather
chasers of the 12th S/M Chaser Flotilla. available. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
2) Request to F.O.I.C. coast for vessels (He sent harbor defense boats). Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
3) "Saar", in Heligoland, was ordered to proceed to the scene of distress, to
have her boats ready to search for survivors, to detect the place by means
of echo-ranging gear and have her anchors, emergency air plant,
compartment ventilation and divers ready.
4) U 30, lying in the lock ready to sail, was ordered to search at the scene
of distress and to call with S/T. 1800 8) U 31 asked for her position. No reply. U 30 left.
5) Lieut. Commander Sorbe was ordered to come over immediately from
Kiel and take charge of the salvage operations. He could arrive by 0200. 1830 "Saar" left Heligoland.
2nd Flotilla to arrange for a Chief Engineer who is familiar with this type
of boat and a medical officer to accompany him. Meanwhile the personnel of the steamer had been interrogated
6) Dockyard was requested to get salvage material from Bugsier Shipping (Appendix 1) and a report received from the sergeant from Wangerooge
Company. (See Appendix 1a) . Neither gave a clear idea of what had happened. A
7) Group Command, F.O.I.C. North Sea Defense, F.O.I.C. Coast informed boat which was near by had only heard an explosion (U 21).
by telephone.
1945 Report from No. 12 S/M Chaser Flotilla which had found the
scene of distress. There was an echo and oil rising up. (Appendix 2).
Meanwhile "Ruestringen" entered port. The scene of distress was F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses was requested to give orders to the vessels, to
fixed off Black Buoy No. 12. "Saar", U 30 and F.O.I.C. North Sea watch the scene of distress especially for survivors.
Defenses informed.
2030 U 30 reported a patch of oil and knocking noises (Appendix
3).
86
 fact that he had heard a dull explosion and that a column of water had
F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses informed us that in the course of the crashed over the U-boat, which was at periscope depth. The boat's bows
night at least 4 minesweepers would arrive at the scene of distress to then surfaced and she sank stern first. (See Appendix 1 and 8).
search and primarily to provide Flak defense.
2350 Situation report from "Saar". "Saar", S/M chasers 121, 127,
Dockyard informed us that Messrs. Friese and Sperrling were 117, 113, A, B, C and U 30 were at anchor at the scene of distress.
being sent to the scene of distress immediately at the request of B.d.U. U- Searching operations continued.
boat Acceptance Command (Commander Bräutigam) was also requested
to send a representative.
- 98 -
2150 Radio message made to Saar and U 30 (Appendix 4)
informing them,
1) that salvage vessels "Kraft" and "Wille" would arrive towards 0300
or 0400,
2) that Lieut. Commander Sobe was arriving in charge of salvage
operations, with Messrs. Friese and Sperrling,
3) that a minesweeping flotilla was arriving to guard the position and
provide Flak defense.
U 30 was then to continue on her passage and report. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

2147 Radio message to Saar and U 30: Until Lieut. Commander

Sobe arrives C.O. of "Saar" is in charge of salvage. (Appendix 4a).

S.O. 12th S/M Chaser Flotilla reported that he had formed a close
screen around the scene of distress, including U 30, and that knocking
noises had been heard (see Appendix 5). There were then at the scene of
distress giving assistance: "Saar", 12th S/M Chaser Flotilla with 9 boats,
11th S/M Chaser Flotilla with 2 boats, U 30. A short report was made to
Supreme Command of the Navy etc., on findings so far and steps taken
(see Appendix 6).
12/13
0500 "Saar" reported that a boat had arrived with Friese and
Sperrling, the Flotilla Engineer of the 2nd U-Flotilla, Lieut.(s.g.) School
and a medical officer. U 30 proceeded. At 0230, "Saar" had given the
signal to leave the U-boat and ordered ship's boats to stand by to pick up.
NOthing happened as a result of this. Later it was stated that there had
probably been a mistake about the knocking noises heard.

2245 "Saar" and U 30 were ordered to inform the sunk boat that 1000 At the request of Captain Bräutigam, Chief Diver Bastian was
vessels were waiting to pick up any persons surfacing (see Appendix 7). sent to the scene of distress with the salvage tug "Hermes" from the Navy
Further interrogation of the mate of the steamer Ruestringen elicited the Dockyard.
87

1125 A situation report was received from Lieut. Commander Sobe,
Officer in Charge of salvage operations (Appendix 9). The diver had
found the boat but had been unable to establish any details during the short
time that the water remained calm. No answer was received to knocking
signals. At the same time he requested the services of Salvage Inspector
Meier of the Bugsier Company. Meier was informed through Navy
Dockyard Hamburg and set out as soon as possible.
radio stated that the English A/C had seen the German U-boat just as she
was surfacing.
2400 Officer in Charge of salvage operations informed that
Inspector Meier of the Bugsier Company was on his way to "Saar" and
that B.d.U. would come to the scene of distress on 13.3. At the same time
a report was received that the diver had fixed a buoy to the conning tower
and that the boat had a heavy list to starboard.

On the orders of F.O.I.C. East Frisian Coast, the Captain, mate and
helmsman of the steamer "Ruestringen", which is under his command,
were again interrogated by a Naval lawyer. These persons then made far
more detailed statements than they had to the officer of the coastwise - 99 -
shipping control station. (See Appendix 10). Details were briefly as
follows:
The A/C dived at the steamer "Ruestringen" from a 200 meter high
cloud base with her engines shut off, and then, suddenly, at a height of
about 30 meters, made a sharp turn towards the submerged U-boat. The
English A/C dropped bombs on the U-boat, which was proceeding at
periscope depth. After the hit, the boat's bows surfaced for a short time
and she then sank immediately, stern heavy by 450. From "Ruestringen" a
second U-boat was soon sighted steering an approximate course for the Date Position, Wind, Weather
scene of distress. The ship's officers assumed that this boat had seen the and Sea State, Illumination, Events
whole incident and would do everything necessary, and they therefore took Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
no further action and proceeded on their way. For the same reason they
did not report what happened to anyone in Wilhelmshaven, so that finally
the first information was received through Jever.
Towards
1830 Officer in Charge of salvage operations made a further
situation report. The boat was lost when the tidal stream turned and was Enquires of the Flotillas elicited the fact that the U-boat observed
only found again later by sounding. No further signs of life were heard. surfacing by "Ruestringen" must have been U 21 which was in the vicinity
at the time. The Commanding Officer's remarks are set out in the attached
The attack in the Shilling Roads was reported in the evening news report (see Appendix 11).
from Daventry, adding that a hit was observed between the conning tower
and the foreship and that the boat had probably sunk. Later the English 1700 The situation was reported by T/P to Supreme Command of
the Navy, Fleet, Group West. (B.d.U. Most Secret 500).
88
 I do not know if any passengers were on deck at the time.
(signed): Ammermann
Captain.
---------------------------------------------------
------------- ---------------------------------------------------
-------------
COPY
COPY
Officer in Charge Coastwise Shipping Control Station Wilhelmshaven Wilhelmshaven, 11 March 1940
Wilhelmshaven, 11 March 1940 Interrogation.
Reg. No. Secret 135/40. At 1205 I relieved the helmsman of the steamer "Ruestringen". The
mate drew my attention to the U-boat periscope on our starboard side
To: B.d.U.'s Staff for Lieut. Commander Godt, Songwarden. about 8 meters away. The periscope would have been just astern when an
Attached is the report from the Captain of the steamer "City of A/C bore down upon us from the port side, flying very low,
Ruestringen", and the interrogations of the mate Franz and seaman
Fellensick.
- 100 -
(signed): Koehne
Sub-Lieut.
for Officer-in-Charge

---------------------------------------------------
-------------

COPY
Wilhelmshaven, 11 March 1940.
Report
I cannot give any information on the incident, as I was below decks
first then, having my dinner.
When I returned to the bridge at about 1220; the mate Franz told me
what he had seen.
I did not take any action, as there was another U-boat near by and we
were also too far off by the time I got back to the bridge. We were about 2
miles below York Buoy, it was fairly misty. We have no radio on board. I
did not take any action in Wangerooge either, as I thought that the other U-
boat would already have reported the incident.
89
(about 25 meters), and made a sudden curve towards the U-boat. The 2
engines were shut off, I had to attend to my course, then I suddenly heard a
dull explosion and, on looking astern, I saw a column of water. The mate
sent me below to call the captain, but I did not find him, he had already
gone to the bridge. The A/C had rings under its wings. When the
explosion occurred, a second U-boat surfaced quickly to starboard, about 4
meters off, and steered for the first boat. The A/C flew away and
disappeared in the fog.
(signed):
Karl Fellensick,
Sea
man.

---------------------------------------------------
-------------
COPY
Wilhelmshaven, 11 March 1940.
Interrogation
On 11 March 1940, towards 1210, I as mate of the steamer
"Ruestringen" on passage to Wangerooge, observed a U-boat periscope
about 2 miles down-Jade from the York wreck on the starboard side about
4 points abaft the beam. I suddenly heard a dull explosion and saw a
column of water rise. An A/C was flying low, about 30 meters, over the
U-boat, apparently with its engines shut off and made off in the direction
of Butjadinger Land. It was misty. A second U-boat, which was
submerged nearby to starboard, surfaced and made for the spot. When I
saw the second U-boat was making for the position, I maintained course
and speed (course N 15 deg. W speed about 10 knots) and informed the
captain, who took over control of the ship. The A/C was twin-engined. It
had rings as markings. There were no service personnel on deck during
the incident, only an official and a civilian.
(signed): E. Franz
Mate of the steamer "City of
Ruestringen"
(signed): Koehne
Sub-Lieut.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Appendix 1a
COPY
Teleprint to: B.d.U. Wilhelmshaven for Admiral Dönitz.
Report of Sergeant Hoffmann of the Wangerooge Fighter Group.
90
At 1045/11 March 1940 the steamer Ruestringen left Wilhelmshaven
for Wangerooge. After an hour and a half I went from the upper deck to
the 'tween deck and I saw an A/C of a type unfamiliar to me astern on the
horizon about 2-3 km away. I walked along the 'tween deck on the port
side and to the right, about 1 1/2 to 2 km away I saw a ship which I
believed to be a U-boat sinking away over the stern. About one third of
the ship was above water. I watched for some time and saw nothing
further. Later a number of the crew asked me if I had seen that a U-boat
had been bombed by an A/C. I did not answer. I asked 2 civilians, who
were with me on the upper deck for nearly 2 1/2 hours, if they had seen
anything. One of them said he thought an A/C had approached very close
to "Ruestringen", then turned away and attacked a U-boat. He claimed to
have seen for
- 101 -
certain that the A/C dropped a bomb which hit the U-boat aft of the
conning tower. The U-boat sank. The civilians claimed shortly after to
have seen the periscope of a second U-boat. I asked them if they had
identified the A/C and they said that they had seen the English markings
quite clearly under the wings. The A/C disappeared in the direction of
Jade Bay. They knew nothing further about the incident. While I was
talking to the civilians the Captain appeared and told us to go below, so
that I should not be recognized as a service man. The captain said:
"Otherwise we'll get it in the neck too." We obeyed, and the Captain
continued on his course.
Wangerooge
Fighter Group.
---------------------------------------------------
------------- The following will arrive tonight:
1) Salvage vessels "Wille" and "Kraft" towards 0300 or 0400.
Appendix 2 2) Lieut. Commander Sobe as Officer-in-Charge of salvage operations and
Friese and Sperrling, construction engineers.
SECRET 3) Minesweeping flotillas for Flak defense and searching. U 30 is to
Cyphered Radio Message 11.3.40 proceed on her way and report, as soon as the construction engineers have
F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses. arrived and the scene of loss handed over to Saar. B.d.U.
S.O. S-boats.
Your radio message 1658: Am at scene of distress with an echo-
ranging group. Echo and rising oil, request orders. - 102 -
S.O. 12th S/M Chaser
Flotilla.

---------------------------------------------------
-------------

Appendix 3
COPY Appendix 4a
Emergency. MSG 1717 11.3.2025 COPY
T/P to: B.d.U. West Secret. Radio message to Saar, U 30.
Large patch of oil near scene of distress, knocking noises, no S/T., C.O. Saar will take charge of salvage operations until Lieut.
dark, foggy. Consider therefore that assistance of many vessels, boats, Commander Sobe arrives, about 0400/12/3. B.d.U.
searchlights, also divers and medical officer essential.
---------------------------------------------------
U 30. Naval Signal -------------
Station Schillig 1113.
Appendix 5.
--------------------------------------------------- COPY
------------- T/P Emergency MUW 0827 11.3. 2140.

Appendix 4 To: Supreme Command of the Navy

COPY Repeated TM 2: Group Command North
F.O.I.C. E. Frisian Coast
Radio message Secret Emergency F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses
To: "Saar", U 30 Wilhelmshaven Dockyard
91
 Further to my Reg. No. Secret 135/4 of 11.3.1940, 3 further
Most Secret documents are submitted, attached.
U 31 sank in the Schilling Roads off No. 12 buoy on 11 March.
Salvage work begun. Boat found. 2 corpses sighted in the vicinity. (signed): Koehne
Knocking noises in the boat. Discoveries so far: Sub-Lieut.
Last report from boat on passing Shillig at 1150. Members of the for Officer-in-
crew and passengers of the steamer "Ruestringen" saw an English A/C Charge.
drop a bomb on a U-boat at about 1210. Low cloud base, bad visibility.
Boat apparently hit. The steamer continued on her passage without ---------------------------------------------------
investigating. B.d.U. -------------

--------------------------------------------------- COPY
------------- Wilhelmshaven, 11 March 1940
When questioned, the mate Ewin Franz made the following additional
Appendix 7 statement:
COPY I did not see a bomb dropped. I heard a dull explosion and saw a
column of water crash over the U-boat's stern. The bows of the boat were
Secret To Saar, U 30. above the water and sank.
Inform U 31 that any persons escaping will be picked up for certain.
B.d.U. (signed): E. Franz,
Mate.

- 103 - ---------------------------------------------------
-------------

COPY
Wilhelmshaven, 11 March 1940
When questioned, the seaman Karl Fellensick made the following
statement:
I was helmsman at the time in question. I did not see a bomb
Appendix 8 dropped. I heard an explosion and saw a column of water. I did not
COPY observe a hit. I then saw nothing more of the U-boat or the A/C. I had to
Officer-in-Charge Coastwise Shipping Control Station Wilhelmshaven pay attention to my course.
Wilhelmshaven, 11 March 1940.
Reg. No. secret 135/40. (signed): Karl
To: B.d.U.'s Staff for Lieut. Commander Godt, Songwarden. Fellensick.
92
 S.O. Tactical U-
--------------------------------------------------- Flotilla and Dockyard.
------------- Naval Signal
Station Schillig 1206 U.
COPY
Wilhelmshaven, 11 March 1940 ---------------------------------------------------
When questioned the Captain of the steamer "City of Ruestringen" -------------
said:
I neither heard a noise nor an A/C, as I was below deck at the time in Appendix 10
question. COPY
Present:
(signed): U. Naval Lawyer Kannengiesser
Ammermann. Naval Inspector of Law Barthel
as Archives official
--------------------------------------------------- Wilhelmshaven, 12 March 1940
------------- There appeared:
1) Ammermann
- 104 - My name is Uke, I am Captain of the steamer "City of Ruestringen".
I am 57 years old, Protestant. I cannot make any statement on the incident
from personal observation, as I was below deck at the time in question. I
did not receive a report until I returned to the bridge at about 1220. The
Mate Franz then told me that an A/C with rings had previously flown over
the steamer, had then turned away and made for 2 U-boats which were
nearby. One of these U-boats was submerged. The A/C had dropped a
bomb on this one. He had also heard an explosion. He also thought that
Appendix 9 the second U-boat had gone to the assistance of the first. For this reason
COPY he did not inform me.
I had seen the surfaced U-boat through the cabin porthole on the
T/P: Emergency. B.d.U. West 1045/12/3 starboard beam while I was having my dinner. It was about 300 meters
away. This would have been shortly after 1200, but I cannot be certain of
Secret. Urgent. the time. I happened to look out to see if it was getting mistier, so I did
Boat found, depth 17 meters. On an even keel with a list to starboard. not pay any attention to the U-boat. I imagined that she was making trial
One diver has been down. No reply to knocking signals. State of runs there. I think she was on approximately the same course as I was, but
watertightness and damage not yet established. Next diving operation I cannot be sure of this either.
1500. It is then intended to lift her with vessels from the Bugsier When I had finished my dinner I returned to the bridge. THere the
company. Both lifting vessels are here. mate told me at once what happened. I asked him why he had not
93
informed me. He replied that he had sent the helmsman Fellensick to find
me. The latter got to the cabin after I had left it by another way, as it
afterwards turned out.
- 105 -
When I got to the bridge it was about 1220. I looked for the place in
question, but could see nothing because of mist. I did not hear anything
further either.
As the mate had told me that there had been a second U-boat in the
vicinity, and 10 minutes had already passed, I took no further action. The
sea was also quite calm, so I thought that the second U-boat would manage
alone. When I arrived at Wangerooge, I did not make a report, because I
assumed that the U-boat would already have requested assistance.
I have traced my ship's course in red on the accompanying chart. If I
altered my course, this was not because I was afraid we would be bombed
ourselves. I never thought of such a thing.
When I returned to Wilhelmshaven I did not report anything of my
own accord. The question only arose when Sub-Lieut. Koehne asked me
if I had seen anything of U-boats.
While I was on my way to the bridge, someone said something to me
about A/C and U-boats. I do not know who it was. Some time or other I
also ordered all hands below, as I was afraid we might be attacked from
the air. I think this was shortly after the mate reported the incident to me.
(signed): U.
Ammermann.
Wilhelmshaven, 12 March 1940
94
2) There appeared:
The Mate Franz.
Mt Christian name is Erwin, I am 26 years old, Protestant, mate in
"Ruestringen".
On 11 March I took over the watch shortly before 1200. We were
steering for No. 13 buoy. Ar 1200 I altered course to N. 150 W. Towards
1205 I saw a periscope on the starboard beam, 2-250 meters away. In my
opinion the U-boat was stationary, I did not see any feather on the
periscope. I continued to observe the U-boat but in between whiles I paid
attention to my course. Then I suddenly heard a dull explosion. I looked
around and made the following observation:
Bearing about 1350, about 1000 meters away there was a U-boat
down by the stern. Bows and jumping wire could be clearly seen. The
bows were about 2 meters above water. I had the impression that the U-
boat was at an angle of 450. Her stern was underwater. The sea around
the U-boat was foamy and white. I did not see the conning tower, I
thought it was underwater. It was only then that I saw the A/C. It was
coming from the east and flying in the direction of our stern. When it was
over the stern, it turned away and flew towards the U-boat. It was painted
with camouflage. The rings could be seen quite clearly.
At the same time a second U-boat surfaced bearing about 250 at a
distance of 40 - 60 meters. The C.O. entered the conning tower and she
immediately steered for the first boat. I sent the helmsman Fellensick for
the Captain and took the wheel myself. When the Captain arrived on the
bridge the first U-boat had already disappeared. I did not myself see the
first U-boat sink. The second U-boat
- 106 -

was still in sight when the Captain came onto the bridge. It passed us at a
distance of about 50 -60 meters. The Captain took command, while I sent
everybody below, so that we should not be attacked ourselves.
As the second U-boat surfaced so suddenly and the C.O. appeared in
the conning tower so quickly even though the boat was not yet completely
surfaced, I assumed that she was going to the assistance of the other U-
boat. I must however, admit that she did not steer immediately for the
scene of distress. We did not inform this U-boat of the incident, because
we assumed that she had observed it herself. We did not alter course and
we proceeded on to Wangerooge. We did not make any report there.
The incident was also observed by a dockyard official and a civilian
besides the helmsman and myself. I do not know their names, but they
could be found out. They thought that we should make a signal. I said
that this was not possible because we had no radio on board. I also spoke
of the matter with a G.A.F. Sergeant who had been told of the incident by
the civilians.
The second U-boat was a 250 tonner.
Wilhelmshaven, 12 March 1940
3) There appeared:
Seaman Fellensick
My name is Karl, I am 30 years old, Protestant, working in the
steamer "Ruestringen".
I fell in as helmsman at 1205. Shortly afterwards I drew the mate's
attention to a periscope, which was passing close to us on the starboard
beam. I do not know if the U-boat was on the starboard quarter the mate
drew my attention to an a/c which was approaching us midships at about
mast height with its engines off. It approached from port. The mate
thought it was English. When I was close up to the ship it turned away
and made for the periscope, which was now astern. Immediately after that
I heard an explosion. I turned around and saw a column of water astern of
our ship. The A/C disappeared immediately in the fog. I myself paid
attention to the course and did not see the effect of the bomb. Immediately
afterwards a second U-boat surfaced on the starboard beam. Then the
95
mate sent me to the Captain. When I returned to the bridge, the Captain
was already there. Both men were talking about the incident. The Captain
would not at first believe that a bomb had been dropped, because he had
heard no explosion. Nothing was said about our heaving to.
The column of water was at most 2 ship's lengths astern, a good 100-
200 meters.
Then mate Franz and seaman Fellensick were brought together, but
seaman Fellensick stuck to his statement even when confronted with that
of the mate Franz then said:
It is possible that I made a mistake and that the a/c actually
approached from the port side and then dropped the bomb.
- 107 -
Appendix 11
COPY
Songwarden 13 March 1940
To: B.d.U. Songwarden.
Report
I was in the Schillig Roads at midday on 11.3 with my boat for
practice runs submerged. Towards 1210 I was submerged at periscope
depth off N. Buoy. I saw the steamer "Ruestringen" on my starboard bow,
inclination 10, distance about 8000-1000 meters. Periscope observation
was very difficult, as the periscope was very stiff and the eyepiece was
constantly blurred by rain. At about 1210 I heard an explosion, which was
different from the detonation of a D/C or a torpedo familiar to me. It
sounded rather like a sounding-device exploding on the pressure hull. The
distance was 4-600 meters, I immediately gave the order to blow and vent
to the conning tower. I proceeded on an inward course on main engines, Appendix 1 to B.d.U's War Log
then changed over to Diesels at high speed and blew. I passed the steamer
"Ruestringen" at a distance off of about 200 meters. When the tanks were 1 - 31 March 1940
blown I reduced to slow speed and then to very slow speed when I saw a
streak of foam about 200 to port 800 meters off. I observed that it was a U- (Weseruebung)
boat periscope flying a red flag. The boat appeared to be on an outward
course at high speed and to be keeping very good depth, as the length of Invasion of Denmark and Norway
the periscope visible remained the same all the time. I turned towards the
periscope and reduced speed, and approached to within about 80 meters of PG30261
the periscope. I also gave the order to man the S/T. The position of the
submerged boat was about 1/2 a mile to a mile off York wreck-marking
buoy, bearing 2400. As I could not see anything unusual and the boat
appeared to be proceeding calmly submerged, I turned away and entered Appendix 1 to B.d.U.'s War Log
port. 1 - 31 March 1940
While I was proceeding submerged my multi-unit hydrophones were
manned and I received constant hydrophone reports of the steamer S.O. Only
"Ruestringen". No hydrophone bearing of a U-boat was reported to me. By hand of officer.
Now that I have heard what happened, I think the boat must have
bottomed with her periscope extended and that the streak of foam must WESERUEBUNG
have been caused by the incoming current. I did not see any oil patches,
or anything else which might have indicated distress. Until I entered port I 4.3 The following order concerning U-boats was received from Naval
thought that the explosion must have been due to the fact that the steamer War Staff in Naval War Staff (1st Division)'s Operations S.O. only 226/40:
"Ruestringen" was working with explosive sounding-devices. I never 1) Further U-boat sailings are to be stopped. U-boats which have
thought of a bomb; visibility being so bad, I did not observe an A/C. already sailed are not to operate off the Norwegian coast.
2) All Naval forces to be ready for operations as quickly as possible. No
(signed): Stiebler special degree of readiness.
Lieut.(s.g.)
Commanding U 21. U-boat Situation when this order was received:
1. In the Atlantic:
Annex I to B.d.U War Log U 28, U 29, U 32 - carrying out minelaying operations on the south and
west coasts of England.
(Invasion of Denmark and Norway) U 38 - West of Ireland, war against merchant shipping.
2. In the North Sea:
U 7 NW of the declared area.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log U 56 in the Bight. Both boats on their way to their operations areas off
the Norwegian coast.
96
 U 14 in her operations area at the northern approach to the Channel,
war against merchant shipping.
U 52 central North Sea, on her way out to the Atlantic. On her first
patrol.
3. Ready for operations: (Atlantic boats underlined):
5.3: U 21, 24, 58, 59, 34, 43, 46, 47
6.3: U 30
7.3: U 9, U 51
8.3: U 49
9.3: U 22
13.3: (uncertain) U 31, 44
The following measures were taken when the order was received:
a) U 7 held back in the position she had reached, until the situation
becomes clear.
b) U 56, which was at most 12 hours out of Wilhelmshaven, recalled.
- 111 -
c) U 14 left in her operations area. U 52 continuing on her passage.
d) The flotillas were ordered to make all boats ready for operations as
quickly as possible, disregarding all previous intentions (discharge of U-
boats to U-boat school, large-scale repairs) and to report completion dates.
e) The boats of the U-boat school received the same order.
Preparations for the occupation of Norway and Denmark by the German
Armed Forces.
A) Intention: Surprise, simultaneous landing of troops in Narvik,
Trondheim, Bergen, Egersund, Kristiansand and Oslo. Troops to be
transported to the first 4 places by Naval forces, to the last 2 by Naval
forces and transports. Air-borne troops to be transported by air (T.N.: SIC)
B) Situation:
a) Norway is actually neutral, but her sympathies lie with the enemy
powers rather than with Germany. Nevertheless, once a successful
surprise landing has been made, no stiff resistance is expected.
b) A restricted area has been declared in Scotland northeast of the
Caledonian Canal which appears to have some connection with the
massing of troops in that area, and English surface forces are beginning to
return to Scapa from the west coast. These and other indications make it
appear possible that the enemy is preparing an attack on Norway to
support Finland. This possibility must be reckoned with until our own
plans have been carried out.
c) When the operation has succeeded, strong reaction from the enemy
is expected. It may be directed against our own newly-captured bases, or
towards securing bases of his own. In both cases it is assumed that he will
try to cut off communications by sea between Norway and Germany.
C) Basic Outline of Execution: (insofar as it concerns B.d.U.):
a) Surprise is essential. No incidents violating Norway's territorial
rights, or which could be interpreted as doing so, must occur until the time
of execution. Military measures which could cause premature uneasiness
in Norway are to be avoided.
b) The following steps are to be taken to screen our operation:
1) Operations to prevent the enemy obtaining bases which could be
used for counter-action

5.3 B.d.U. took part in the conferences with Chief of Staff Naval War - 112 -
Staff in Berlin.
Subject of conference:
97

2) Screening against surprise attacks if the enemy should start a
similar operation at the same time or shortly beforehand.
3) Early attack on the enemy's naval forces and transport ships, if he
should start an action against Norway.
4) Extensive screening of our own shipping from enemy surface
forces.
5) Screening our own surface forces, once they have entered inshore
waters, against pursuing enemy forces.
c) Advantage to be taken of opportunities of attack which may arise in
the course of enemy counter-operations.
D) The operation is to be carried out in 4 days. Preparations are to be
completed by the 10th March. Delays must be expected until the
codeword is given.
6.3 B.d.U.'s Situation review:
B.d.U.'s part in the operation planned is very extensive.
1) It consists chiefly in protecting our own Naval forces and landing
troops once they have penetrated into Norwegian territorial waters, taking
the Norwegians by surprise. The geographic structure of the Norwegian
coast makes it necessary to have a large number of boats for this. Narvik
must be considered as particularly endangered as the position and
importance of this place will make it appear valuable in the eyes of the
enemy both from a strategic and an economic point of view, and defense
against enemy counter-measures will be most difficult there.
2) This operation will be a great challenge to the enemy and our own
surface forces will be moving beyond the Shetlands-Norway line, so that
enemy operations in the direction of the Norwegian coast are to be
expected, which should offer numerous opportunities of attack. The aim
of such operations maybe:
a) Counterlandings by the enemy.
98
These are to be expected: In the area of Westfjord - partly because of
the importance of Narvik, partly because the remote situation will give the
enemy the chance to make use of his superior sea power.
In the area of the Shetlands-Norway narrows - in order to control
those narrows and as a starting position for action against German troops.
b) Operations by Naval forces against the German-Norway sea route,
aimed to cut off the German Naval forces taking part in the landing from
home and to make supply through the North Sea impossible.
Such operations may be expected to take place in the area Shetlands-
Norway-western approach to Skagerrak.
- 113 -
Conclusion for our boats:
To a. It will not be possible to prevent landings by disposing boats in
deep formation off the possible landing places, because such places and
the approaches to them are too numerous and there are not enough boats.
One would only run the risk of being in the wrong place or having too few
forces. It is better to have groups of U-boats in the open sea area, within
reach of the endangered positions, which can press on and cut off when the
direction of the enemy advance is known. The disposition of these groups
can be so chosen that they have some prospect of intercepting the
approaching enemy.
To b. Disposition of attacking groups in areas which the enemy is most
likely to use for his operations.
To a and b. Disposition of boats along the approach routes which the
enemy is expected to take, as close as possible to his bases.
 3) The most likely bases for the enemy to use are:
Scapa-Kirkwall in the first place. Invergorden, Cromarty and Rosyth in
the second.
In the present state of their defenses, only minelaying operations can be
carried out against these bases.
This is possible for all 3.
i.e.: off the wide Firth near Kirkwall inside Moray Firth, at approach to
the Firth of Forth.
It would take so long however, that the boats in question would
probably not be available for the operation proper. In view of the few
boats available no minelaying can be considered sufficiently important and
urgent as to warrant this.
4) Preliminary decisions:
I have therefore decided to keep all boats back. In addition, B.d.U.'s
responsibilities require that all boats within reach be made ready, if
necessary postponing the less important repairs and trials.
Flotillas have been given orders accordingly. Boats in the Atlantic and
on outward passage, U 38 and U 52, have been kept back in the positions
they have reached. U 7 has been ordered to return.
U 14 has been left in her operations area, but she is expected to return
very soon in any case. Boats of the U-boat school have been ordered to
proceed to Kiel and fit out. They have only a small radius of action and
nothing much can be expected from the training which their commanding
officers have had, but in these circumstances they should nevertheless be
able to take part. U 64 and U 65, still on trials, have been ordered to speed
up their operational readiness with every available means. Everything has
thus been done to make use of all boats which are able to proceed. It is
expected that the following will be able to take part in the operation.
- 114 -
99
12 Atlantic boats
10 small operational boats
6 school boats
Total 28 U-boats
There are also 3 further boats in view for case "GELB".
U 38 has been ordered to return to the sea area north of the Shetlands.
Here she will be together with U 52. Both these boats can be operated
from here in time in connection with the operation planned.
C-in-C Group West is in control of the whole operation west of the line
Ryvingen-Hanstholm. He gives the following instructions in his Most
Secret S.O. only 531/40 to B.d.U.:
1) To screen the ports occupied against penetration by enemy forces.
2) To attack and damage forces approaching from enemy ports or
operational areas.
3) Before the undertaking starts:
a) To lay mines off the convoy and fuel bases in the Orkneys and
Shetlands and attack and damage enemy naval forces and convoys in this
area.
b) If possible, and if Supreme Command of the Navy approves, to
ascertain what enemy traffic there is in the area Stadtlandet-North
Shetlands, and to damage it and enemy naval forces.
My view of these 3 requirements is:
A) Points 1 and 2 cover the period after the operation has begun. U-
boats can carry out these tasks within the framework of the whole
operation.
B) Point 3 covers the period before the operation begins. The
minelaying required has only direct connection with the operation planned
in so far as it is directed against those enemy bases from which
countermeasures may be expected which would endanger the execution of
"Weseruebung" proper, i.e. the surprise landing. These are places at which
enemy landing troops could be embarked or from which part of the supplies if the final date should be postponed. At present there is no
English battle fleet and its accompanying escort forces might be expected guarantee that this will not happen.
to sail. In my opinion the minelaying does not cover the bases of patrol
forces and other usable anchorages, which would only be resorted to 9.3 B.d.U.'s Operations Plan:
possibly later in the operation. 1. Preliminary considerations.
The main aim must be to ensure the success of the landings. The a) The following ports are to be screened:
situation after that will have to be considered as it develops. Minelays in Narvik distance roughly 1000 miles
places which are desirable in themselves and had already been planned (U Trondheim " " 750 "
56 had already sailed with a load of mines, but was ordered back) must be Bergen " " 450 "
abandoned in favor of the main aim. As regards minelaying operations Stavanger " " 400 "
against the main bases, I do not consider these Egeroe " " 300 "

Narvik must be considered particularly important and particularly

endangered.
- 115 - b) Range and endurance of the different types of boats are limited as
follows by supplies of fuel and provisions:
Boats of the U-boat school:
As far as the western approach to Skagerrak.
southwest Norway
Endurance in operations area 7-8 days.
Type Weddingen:
As far as 620 N (Bergen)
opportune either, in view of the few boats available, for the reasons set Endurance in operations area about 18 days.
out on 6.3 in the War Log Appendix 1 para 3. A boat which lays a few Atlantic boats:
mines and is not available for the main operation has not the same value as Whole Norwegian coast.
a boat equipped with torpedoes for this operation. Endurance off Narvik about 30 days.
The attack on enemy merchant shipping and convoy bases has no This is assuming that there will be no opportunity to supply away from
connection with the operation planned. It would mean splitting up the home. There is of course the chance that they may be able to supply in
forces and would lead to the danger that boats would use up all their several ports after the operation has succeeded, but this cannot yet be
torpedoes and draw anti-S/M forces into an area in which their presence is taken for certain. That would be counting your chickens before they were
undesirable for the operation. hatched. So far the operation has not been carried out, the supply vessels
Reconnaissance of enemy traffic between Stadlandet and the Shetlands have not yet reached their ports of destination unharmed. The number of
would be only partly in the interests of the operation proper. There would torpedoes which they can carry
be a danger that the boats used for this would be out of action for the
actual operation as they would have to turn back when they had used their

100
 - 116 -
must be considered when determining the distance at which the boats
can be used. The small boats only carry 4 or 5 torpedoes. They might use
them all in a very short time. A long outward passage would be out of all
proportion to their fighting power. Finally, their cruising speed would not
permit them to go beyond the latitude of 630 in 4 days. This time is very
short even for the large boats to reach Narvik. It cannot be certain that it
will suffice. If the boats are sent out before the codeword is given, they
may use up their supplies too soon and not be able to remain in their
positions for long enough after the operation has started. If any boats are
sent out before time It must be the large ones.
2) Operations Plan:
I intend to carry out my task as follows:
a) To screen the landing places north of the latitude of 630 by large
boats, south of this by small boats.
To form a concentration off Narvik by disposing 4 boats in deep
formation. To cut off Trondheim with 2 boats in deep formation inside the
approach.
To close Bergen with 5 boats, 2 each in deep formation off both the
main approaches, the 5th immediately off the harbor.
To close Stavanger with 2 boats, of which one will lie immediately off
the harbor approach, the the second outside the harbor entrance. The latter
will patrol the Haugesund at the same time.
b) To form two attacking groups. The northern group will consist of 6
large boats and will be in waiting positions in the area northeast of the
Shetlands, while the southern group, consisting of 3 small boats, will be
held in readiness east of the Orkneys, along the supposed approach route
of the enemy forces in the Shetlands-Norway area. Both groups will be
disposed in such a way as to make quick operation in the Shetlands-
101
Norway narrows possible, but they will also be sufficiently far away from
the narrows that they can still operate with some prospect of success
against enemy forces which may approach west of the Shetlands to the
northeast or through the Fair Passage to the southeast.
c) A group of 2 boats will be disposed off Pentland Firth to cover the
eastern approach to Scapa. I do not intend to dispose boats off other
enemy jumping-off bases, as this would mean weakening other groups,
which would have serious consequences. Also, boats off jumping-off
harbors only have a chance to attack in the short time that enemy forces
are entering or leaving. If these movements take place at night at high
speed prospects of success are small. I think it more profitable to have
boats in area in which the enemy will have to operate.
d) The distance at which the U-boat school boats can operate is very
limited and the low standard of training of the crews has to be taken into
consideration. 2 of them will
- 117 -
be in positions off Stavanger, which are likely to be less important
than other inshore positions.1 boat will be west of the northern gap in the
minefield planned in the Skagerrak. The remaining 3 boats will form an
attacking group southwest of Norway against enemy forces which may
penetrate as far as the central North Sea, and will at the same time cover
the western approach to the Skagerrak. (the boat's approach passage will
be short and they may reach their positions as much as 2 days before the
others. They are to make use of this period to hunt the S/M's which have
often been reported south of Norway and so reduce the S/M danger to our
own surface forces. They will accordingly be allocated temporary
operations areas which they are to leave when the landings start.
e) The following points must be remembered:
1) Boats must approach unnoticed and remain undetected until the day
of the landings.
2) The entrances must be closed as quickly as possible after our own
forces have passed.
3) Encounters between our own surface forces and U-boats must be
avoided.
4) The approach of our own surface forces must be screened.
f) Our own forces are few by comparison with the enemy's superior sea
power and it is necessary to concentrate exclusively on the landing and
consciously abandon any chances of success which are not immediately
connected with this main aim; therefore:
1) No splitting up against subsidiary targets.
2) No attacks on merchant ships and convoys.
3) Radio silence, except for signals which are of importance for this
operation.
4) No waste of ammunition for purposes which do not serve to screen
the operation or weaken operational enemy forces.
g) Details of execution have been set out for the U-boats in Operations
Order "Hartmut".
10.3 The fitting-out of the boats is complete. Except for 4 U-boat
school boats, which have been delayed by ice, all are in harbor ready for
operations. U 38 and U 52 are at sea, close to their future operations areas.
The code-word has not yet been given, for reasons unknown to
B.d.U. The boats are at 12 hours readiness.
11.3 In Most Secret 287/40 I Op. Naval War Staff has ordered that the
boats intended for Narvik and Trondheim are to sail at once and
- 118 -
102
patrol the respective approaches unnoticed in order to frustrate possible
enemy intentions.4 other large boats are also to put to sea to patrol Bergen
and Stavanger.
They are to attack and report only if enemy warships or troop
transports are encountered. U 30, 34, 46, 47, 49, 51 sailed (Narvik and
Trondheim).
U 38 and U 52 have been ordered to occupy the areas south of
Utvaer and off the Kors Fjord. In agreement with the Naval War Staff, it
was then decided that the 2 other boats should sail on 13.3 (because U 31
is unexpectedly out of action and U 43 has still to complete some small
repairs). The 2 positions off Bergen and Skudesnes will be occupied by 2
Narvik boats for the present. They will be relieved by U 43 and U 44.
Boats have been ordered to observe the 3 mile territorial waters limit.
12.3 Situation unchanged.
13.3 U 43 and U 44 sailed to relieve the 2 Narvik boats off Bergen
and Skudesnes.
Russia and Finland have made peace.
14.3 Decyphered messages show that unusually large number of
English S/M's are stationed off the western approach to the Skagerrak.
This may have some connection with imminent English operations.
After the Russian-Finnish peace the situation seems to be even
more obscure. With regard to the coming operation, there is no indication
of a possible date and Naval War Staff does not think the word will be
given before the 20th; I have therefore decided to send 8 small boats for a
short operation against the English S/M's reported.
For further details of the operation see F.O. U/B West's War Log.
Preparations have been begun to transfer the U-boat school boats to
the North Sea. Part of their task lies in attacking enemy S/M's anyhow, so
that they too can be operated now without deviating from the general plan.
For this also see F.O. U/B West's War Log.
15.3 The situation is still not clear and enemy operations are
possible in the northern North Sea. It therefore seems wise to hold back
some of the boats which are proceeding north. All the large boats have
been ordered to proceed at 9 knots only.
- 119 -
16.3 In resent circumstances 2 boats seem insufficient for the Narvik
approach and it is desirable to have more boats in the northern North Sea.
I have therefore decided to send 2 Narvik boats to take up waiting
positions at approximately the latitude of 630. (U 47, U 49). They can be
moved quickly enough from here in any direction.
17.3 An apparently successful air attack on Scapa. Where there are at
present 6 battleships and light naval forces. It is possible that:
a) Ships were damaged and will need dockyard repairs.
b) The English battle fleet will leave this anchorage, which is so exposed
to air attack, especially if the air attacks are continued with vigor, as the
G.A.F. intends.
103
In view of this, Naval War Staff issued instructions that the large
boats were to be re-disposed as directed by Group West, except for 2 boats
off Narvik and 2 off Trondheim, at least 4 boats are to be off the north
coast of Scotland to make use of the G.A.F.'s results. I think this is very
promising, but only if:
1) the G.A.F.'s successes really are extensive
2) they can be pressed home.
I therefore suggested to Group West that the large U-boats, with the
exception of U 52, which has not had sufficient experience to be able to
operate against large warships, be disposed in deep formation west of the
Orkneys and that the eastern approach to Pentland Firth be occupied by 2
small boats from the anti-S/M group already at sea.
The following points have to be considered with regard to the
disposition:
a) Either a deep, extensive formation in the direction in which damaged
ships are likely to proceed or in the direction which ships are likely to
follow when withdrawing to other bases, less endangered by air attack, or
b) A close formation off the entrances to Pentland Firth.
I prefer the first alternative, because:
1) It is not good to mass boats in waters which are difficult to navigate.
2) The strongest anti-S/M activity is to be expected off Pentland Firth.
3) This anti-S/M activity would cover all, or at least the majority of the
boats.
Group Command approved my proposal. The boats were ordered to
make for positions at maximum speed. U 52 received orders
- 120 -
 to patrol all approaches to Bergen. She is now the only boat remaining
off the central Norwegian coast.
Boats in the Orkneys area received permission to attack valuable
targets, the others convoys only.
19.3 There have been no further air attacks on Scapa, apparently
because of the weather. The area in which the large boats are stationed
west of the Orkneys is possibly the scene of strong anti-S/M operations
and, as things are, the units in Scapa are not likely to leave because of
danger from the air; boats have therefore, been given freedom to move
away up to 80 miles to the northwest if they encounter strong anti-S/M
activity. They will then still be near enough to take up their positions
again if there should be further effective air attacks.
In the early evening U 47 reported 3 battleships putting to sea on
northwest and later northerly courses. After a time the boat was driven off
by destroyers, no other boat made contact. It is clear that the forces
assembled in Scapa are moving. Operation against the 3 battleships does
not promise success, since they were not shadowed and there are not clues
as to where they may now be. The time has come either to regard the
situation as changed, in which case the boats must be brought back to the
North Sea, or to anticipate that further forces will leave Scapa, in which
case the positions along the enemy's route should be occupied again. I
decided to send them back to their old positions, especially as they will
there have a chance to regain contact with the enemy battleships if these
should alter course to the southwest.
20.3 A decyphered message shows that 5 English battleships and
several cruisers, with destroyers, have left Scapa. The reason for their
leaving is not given. The northerly course which U 47 reported does not
suggest that they are being transferred to the Clyde, but rather that they are
putting to sea according to plan or are on a special operation. Radio
intelligence reports of the last few days indicate the latter. The whole
situation with regard to the occupation of Norway remains very obscure.
Naval War Staff cannot give any information, except that plans are
unaltered. I cannot judge at all whether it is necessary to withdraw the
boats west of the Orkneys back to the North Sea now already, and thus
104
miss possible opportunities in their present area. In view of the part I have
to play in the occupation of Norway, I would much rather withdraw them.
Then I would have them at hand and the chances of losses occurring
would be less than in the dangerous area near the English coast. Now that
Scapa has been cleared, boats are not likely to achieve such great
successes that the losses would be warranted, especially as their freedom
to attack is very limited.
21.3 According to Naval War Staff, plans for the next few days
appear to be more definite, insofar as English landing operations are not
expected in the immediate future and our own operations are not expected
to begin for 4 or 5 days. I have therefore decided to send U 52 for the
present into the area east of the Shetlands in order to give this boat, which
has never fired a single torpedo (firing practice abandoned because of ice
in the Baltic), the chance
- 121 -
to wage war against merchant shipping according to the orders issued,
without any restriction as to size of target.
22.3 The operation of the large boats west of the Orkneys has been a
waste of time. They have achieved nothing. The English battleships have
not arrived in the Clyde or at any other base otherwise, according to
previous experience, radio intelligence would have given some indication.
It must therefore be assumed that they are still at sea. The reasons for
which the positions west of the Orkneys were occupied are no longer
valid. The boats have been ordered to form a patrol line between Far Oer
and the Shetlands. I intend to rake the sea area west of Shetlands and then
if necessary, to withdraw the boats into the North Sea. From her position
south of Norway U 2 reported an enemy cruiser with several destroyers on
an easterly course. This agrees with a report made by an agent to the
Attache' in Oslo. The possibility of enemy operations against Norway
cannot yet be excluded and such operations might be directed towards
Bergen where there is at present no U-boat. U 52 has therefore been
ordered to take up her position off Utsire at maximum speed. She is not to
attack anything but warships and troop transports. The other boats are at
least 1 1/2 days run away.
23.3 The fears that enemy reports of 22.3 bothered the start of
operations against Norway have not been realized. But the situation which
arose yesterday evening proved one thing quite clearly:
If slow U-boats away from the area in which they are to play their
part in a certain operation, the great risk is run that they will not be there in
time if the enemy takes unexpected steps. What they may achieve in these
other areas cannot directly affect the course of the main action. Only an
authority which controls the whole war at sea can judge and decide what
the U-boats can do to give the most valuable support. Cases like this show
that a B.d.U. who is not with Naval War Staff cannot, even from a Group
Command headquarters, have a sufficiently clear picture to enable him to
judge these matters. Naval War Staff at present is of the opinion that no
decision or operations on our part can be expected before 1.4, and that
enemy operations which might cut across these operations are unlikely.
They consider that it is necessary to leave several boats in the area north of
England, to search for chances to attack warships. They will also have
freedom to attack all targets according to standing war orders. There is no
great danger that they will use all their torpedoes, as there is little traffic in
these areas, but I think it is important to give them a bit more scope in
their choice of targets after waiting and standing off for so long.
26.3 Naval War Staff now feel in a position to say that
"Weseruebung" is not likely to begin for about 10 days. It is necessary to
bring back as many as possible of the boats which are out and have them
ready for "Weseruebung". If this is delayed any longer we shall reach the
105
point where the majority of the large U-boats are no longer fully fit for
operations. With normal dockyard periods the present number of
operational U-boats would not be reached again until about May, and
meanwhile there would be no merchant shipping sunk worth mentioning.
- 122 -
In addition, every U-boat at sea with her freedom to attack restricted and
often in dangerous areas little frequented by valuable targets, raises the
risk of losses without successes to counterbalance them.
Naval War Staff have agreed that only one boat shall be left off
Narvik and Trondheim and the number north of England be reduced to 3.
The following will remain in operations areas:
U 46 off Narvik
U 51 off Trondheim
U 38, 43, 52 north of England
The latter 3 boats will again be restricted to attacking warships, transports
and merchant ships over 5,000 tons. U 46 and U 51: warships and
transports only.
29.3 U 30, 34, 47, 49 have entered port, but there is no news of U 44.
30.3 U 44 has not replied to an order to report her position. She
should certainly have reached port today from her operations area. She is
overdue and it is feared she may be lost. The 3 boats operating northwest
of England apparently had no success. Their present operations areas are
rather too remote. I have decided to transfer them to the area east of the
Shetlands, as Naval War Staff only requires that they shall be north of
England and has left the details of disposition to B.d.U. They will have
the same chances here of encountering warships and perhaps rather more
prospects of contacting valuable merchant convoys. It is also desirable to
transfer them because, even though there have been no sinkings, their Date Position, Wind, Weather
presence in the old area may have become known after such a long time and Sea State, Illumination, Events
and this may mean that traffic will be re-routed and anti-S/M hunts Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
organized. Naval War Staff attaches great importance at the moment to
successes against warships proceeding to Scapa. The best way of
achieving this is to dispose the boats very close to the approaches, but the
large U-boats are very unsuited to this. This task will therefore be taken
over by 4 small boats, one of which is already in position and the others
due to sail in the near future. (see F.O. U/B West's War Log). 16.3 For operation and orders for the Atlantic boats, except U 28
and U 32, which are still on their way back, see Appendix 1 to B.d.U.'s
31.3 Written confirmation of this order was received in Most Secret War Log.
571/40 I Op. S.O. only.
17.3 Nothing to report.
U 13, 58, 59 sailed for the area immediately off Scapa. U 22 is
already in waiting position east of Pentland Firth. The final disposition 18.3 Nothing to report.
will be 2 boats west and 2 east of Pentland Firth. The positions are
expected to be occupied by April 3rd and 4th. 19.3 Nothing to report.

(signed): Dönitz 20.3 Nothing to report.

Rear Admiral and B.d.U.
21.3 Nothing to report.

Additional: The further course of "Weseruebung" is not the subject of an 22.3 Nothing to report.
appendix, but has been incorporated straight into the War Log.
23.3 U 28 and U 32 entered port. The boats took a particularly
long time on their return passage through the North Sea as they had very
heavy head seas.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
U 28: Minelaying operation square 3163 BF. She carried it out
16 - 31 March 1940 according to plan on a new moon night. The position of the minefield gap
was fixed by observing shipping traffic. The boat found the Channel coast
PG30260
106
darkened, including lights at sea. She encountered little traffic during the
entire patrol, including the Channel. She sank: Date Position, Wind, Weather
1) Darkened steamer about 6,000 tons and Sea State, Illumination, Events
2) Darkened tanker " 6,000 " Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
" 12,000 tons

The commanding officer's way of tackling the operation was good.

U 32: Minelaying operation square AM 9322. Carried out according to 24.3 - 31.3 Nothing to report.
plan during a new moon night. The mines are in an excellent position. So
far no definite successes are known, but this is in itself unimportant and
can be attributed to the fact that the enemy is gradually beginning to
understand the need for more complete radio silence and other security
measures.
Once the boat was undoubtedly picked up by echo-ranging gear at
a considerable depth, while bottomed. This fact confirms the view, based
on the experience and observations of other boats, that the enemy has 2 (signed): Donitz
types of echo-ranging gear: one horizontal and one vertical, which give Rear Admiral and B.d.U.
accurate results once the boat has been picked up, but are unreliable if the
boat is at great depth close to the bottom or lying on the bottom. F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
In addition to mines, this boat also had 7 torpedoes, but 5 of these
were failures and 2 misses. 1 - 15 April 1940
Apart from her well-executed minelaying operation, she only sank
the Swedish S.S. "Lagaholm", 2,818 tons, carrying contraband, with PG30262
gunfire.

- 109 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

107

Kriegstagebuch B. d. U.
At sea:
a) In the area east to southeast of Shetlands: U 38, 43, 52.
b) East of Pentland Firth: U 22
c) Approaching the entrance to Scapa: U 13, 58, 59.
d) Off Narvik: U 46. Off Trondheim U 51.
e) Possibly also U 44. Position unknown, loss however, is probable.
Intention:
To recall U 38, 43 and 52 as soon as U 13, 58, 59 reach the Orkney
area. B.d.U. will be informed by telephone of the imminent sending of the
keyword. As the boats U 38, 43 and 52 at sea and fully armed, should be
well prepared for the "Weser Exercise" it is high time that they were
recalled. In order to shorten their return route they have already been in
the area east of the Shetlands for several days. As long as their engine
equipment is ready for action a supplementation of consumable stores is
still possible up to the estimated beginning of the exercise. In this
connection, I have decided to order the return passage of these boats. The
keyword for the "Weser Exercise" will be received in the evening. It is the
9th of April.
3. / 4. Put out to take up position: U 7, 10, 19, 25, 30, 34, 47, 49.
Otherwise no events.
4. / 4. Put out to take up position: U 9, 14, 48, 56, 57, 60, 62.
U 52 put in. No successes as the boat was in a traffic-less area
and was for the most part restricted to action.
5. / 4. Put out to take up position: U 1, 2, 4, 5, 6.
108
6. / 4. Put out to take up position: U 50 also U 64 escorting the
auxiliary cruiser "Ship 36". After executing her assignment (escorting the
auxiliary cruiser until breakthrough into the Atlantic) this boat is at the
disposal of B.d.U.
At the moment therefore 2 U-boats are detailed for escort duties
with outward bound auxiliary cruisers (U 37, U 64). Their participation in
the Weser operation is, it is true, intended, but does not appear certain. It
is not possible to foresee the course of the duties assigned to them so
exactly that almost with any reserves of time, they may be further
deployed. Enemy action or adverse weather conditions could easily upset
calculations and cause delay and surprise. In view of the tireless
concentration demanded by the coming task I have done everything to
avoid splitting up.
I consider the value of U-boat protection for surface craft
negligible. I see 2 possibilities in the execution:
1) Indirect protection: i.e.
Occupation of potentially dangerous areas by U-boats. Protection of
these areas by U-boat attacks on patrol surface
-1-
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

craft in this area. Warning auxiliary cruisers of enemy forces, which
should be observed here.
Stipulation: large number of available U-boats.
Advantage: ship and U-boat are not dependent on one another they each
operate in the way best suited to them.
Disadvantage:
a) The protection of the ships is to take place in certain limited areas, not
during the entire passage. If the ship is not to dispense with protection it
must pass through pre-arranged area of the U-boat and cannot therefore
presume every U-boat to be encountered to be an enemy boat.
b) Large number of U-boats required.
2) Direct protection by a permanent U-boat escort:
Advantages:
a) Permanent protection by the U-boat.
b) Independence in choice of course, therefore, the possibility of adapting
the course to the enemy situation without having to dispense with U-boat
protection.
c) Need of only one U-boat from time to time.
Disadvantages:
a) Dependence on maintenance of contact between ship and U-boat
difficult, time-wasting and not always certain.
b) Necessary mutual consideration of the tactical measures appropriate to
the differing peculiarities of surface craft and U-boats in an encounter with
the enemy and during passage - which would cause numerous restrictions
on both sides.
As we, at present, possess so very few U-boats the last possibility is
to be given preference under all circumstances. The simultaneous
employment of U-boats in operation for merchant shipping warfare
109
promises small success as the penetration route of an auxiliary cruiser
must lead through the most far off and little used areas and these have long
approaches. If only 4 boats were used for this purpose, it would, in the
present situation, mean an absence of 50% of all the large U-boats now in
use against the enemy for the duration of the operations. As not one, but
several cruisers are involved, such an operation would considerably
influence U-boat warfare. (sinking figures of large U-boats for February
over 200,000 tons, an amount unlikely to be exceeded by auxiliary
cruisers).
U 38 and U 43 have put in. While U 43 observed no traffic in her
operations area west and north of England and was unable to sink
anything, U 38 had more luck. It sank: 5 steamers one in a convoy, of
altogether 17 to 19,794 tons. Both boats report strong and hindering U-
boat patrol by fishing boats in the Shetland and Orkney area. None of the
three boats recently berthed are in a fit state to put out again in the next
few days.
U 51 (Trondheim area patrol) has received orders to return to its original
position in West Fjord, while the boats U 30 and 34, which have in the
meantime arrived,
-2-
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

are to take over the patrol of Trondheim. U-boats at sea have received
instructions to open the operational orders for the occupation of Norway.
The general political situation is coming to a head. English operations
against Norway again appear imminent. This time a landing does not
appear to be indicated by operations against German merchant shipping in
territorial waters. According to operational instructions transmitted before
"Weser" day, the U-boats of the 1st U-boat Group off Westfjord are to
patrol the fjord, if they are already there in place of delayed U 64 which
put out with the auxiliary cruiser. U 25 received orders to take up its
position. U 37 is intended as 4th boat of the group. The boat should leave
the auxiliary cruiser in good time, so that it will be able to take up this
position before the 9th. The fjord is to be patrolled for as long as possible.
The intermediate positions (to cut out changes) are only to be occupied
shortly before the arrival of our destroyers (2000 on 8.4).
7. / 4. U 30 and U 34 must have reached their waiting position
before tomorrow.
As owing to the early intelligence of the Weser day the boats have
already taken up position two days before zero hour in the harbor area, one
boat (U 30) is to take over the patrol of the entrance. U 37 reported
leaving escort duties with ship 16. The boat's position is so far west, that
prompt occupation of the intended position near Narvik is no longer
possible. (Note: I regret this very much as I considered the presence of
tried and older commanders at this spot, where the greatest number of U-
boats was deployed especially desirable.)
U 52 has put out.
8. / 4. U 13 reports the presence of a heavy cruiser and 2 destroyers
full speed ahead on a northeasterly course east of Pentland Firth. Short
signal received from U 64 according to which contact with the auxiliary
cruiser was lost 24 hours ago. Orders were given to proceed to Westfjord
110
at high speed and to join 1st U-boat Group, while U 37, which would
arrive too late in any case, is to be re-directed to a meeting point with the
auxiliary cruisers. The announcement of English declared areas on the
Norwegian coast makes the appearance of English forces in the coastal
waters appear probable. The quickest possible closing of the entrances to
our own landing ports is in this case particularly desirable. Orders to draw
in the end positions is therefore not only for the isolated groups but partly
for the boats individually distributed. (F.T. No. 3)
U 57 reports a heavy cruiser with destroyers on a southeasterly
course east of Pentland Firth. It presumes this to be a French unit.
U 38 has put out.
A German transport ship was torpedoed off the south coast of
Norway.
9. / 4. Shortly before midnight Norwegian coastal lights were
extinguished. This apparently caused no delay to our surface craft putting
into the rocky waters. Reports are received according to plan. The U-
boats received orders to take in the end positions up to U 56 (inner
position off Bergen) if this has not already been done as the occupation of
these positions no longer appears necessary with the appearance of
adequate patrols by other forces. It remains for free disposal in the area
west of Bergen.
-3-
 Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
a) Situation:
"Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" contacted heavy enemy units at
dawn about 60 sea miles west of Westfjord. No further reports have been
received today. It is presumed that the battleships have managed to elude
the enemy.
U 51 reported 5 enemy destroyers on a southwesterly course in
Westfjord at 2100.
b) Waters of Shetland and Norway
The evaluation of the enemy situation of 8.4 makes it appear certain
that the enemy has strong forces at sea. The enemy contact with our own
battleships confirms this conjecture. His heavy forces are far to the north.
In this case, the 5th U-boat Group's task - to intercept the enemy
approaching to the northeast from English bases, pointless. The enemy is
already to the north in force. Further, with the moving up of the Bergen
boats to the area west of Bergen there is a gap which it would be desirable
to fill.
For this reason I have decided to transfer the group about 90 sea
miles in the direction of 1200.
U 37 is relieved of her escort duties, and receives orders to
proceed at high speed to the area northeast of the Shetlands. Together with
U 38 and U 56 it joins the 5th U-boat Group.
A W/T message was received from U 56 at 0920 reporting the
sighting of 2 battleships on a southerly course in grid 8747 (northern east
section of the Straits Shetland/Norway). On account of radio intelligence
111
reports the S.O. Home Fleet is presumed to be in this area, while a group
of 2 battle cruisers are said to be in the north. The enemy's southerly
course - he is aware of German battleships to the north - shows that he has
no intention of operating with the groupdirect.It must be presumed in this
connection, that he will spread out in a cutting off position south of it with
a group of heavy forces. In order to deflect him on the way there, it is
necessary to dispose as many U-boats as possible on his suspected course.
U 7's waiting position is to be transferred to the east. The 3 U-boat
training ships U 2, 5 and 6 are to be moved somewhat to the west, in order
protect the flanks of our own sea route to Norway. While, for the time
being, there are no further U-boat reports, several a/c reports show that the
enemy is actually moving forward in the area southwest of Norway. Here,
he is without question in an area that can no longer be occupied by U-
boats. It also lies within close range of our Air Force. It is impossible to
move U-boats there quickly enough. At 1815 U 49 approaching from the
north established contact. The enemy, however, withdrew northwards.
1955 U 49 reported again losing sight of him. Apparently no
other boats have come up. Meanwhile - against my own judgment, by
order of the Group - I have transferred the 4 U-boats disposed around
Scapa, to the east.
The group is of the opinion that the boats at present off Scapa
where there are no more enemy forces, fulfill no useful purpose for the
time being, while their presence east of the Shetlands could be of great
value in the event of the enemy repeating his movements in the next few
days. U 10 and U 19 will in any case be
-4-

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
moved further to the east. Such measures need more time for execution.
No noteworthy progress can be expected before the close of the coming
night as in the operational area alone it will be necessary to submerge
frequently owing to danger from a/c. The withdrawal of the Scapa boats
means as far as can be seen, that during the operations, they will be
entirely lost to this position. The area in which they were disposed
provided every possibility of contact with the enemy, as sooner or later he
must pass through it.
The question as to which area is most important in view of the
whole operation depends on an assessment of the war situation as a whole
- a survey I am not in a position to make - in all operations with U-boats,
however, one must not lose sight of the fact that the U-boat is a slow,
unmaneuverable weapon which can only experience more than accidental
success if given time to be effective in the ordered area. In the case of
transfer, it is especially to be remembered that they must be ordered in the
evening and not in the morning, because in areas threatened by air activity
U-boat practically only makes progress at night.
A signal was received at 2145 that heavy enemy ships damaged in
air attacks at 1730 were in grid AN 2338. U 49, 50 and 52 received orders
to proceed thither and to attack them.
U 65 has put out for the operations area.
2) Enemy reports: See Appendix 2 to KTB of 9.4.
112
3) Sketch of position and movements of U-boats with enemy reports in
Appendix 3. (not attached)
4) Collection of most important W/T messages to the U-boats, including
boats disposition at 1000. (in ink: see Appendix 1)
10. / 4. As they have not established contact, the operation was
broken off as being no longer promising, so that the boats could take up
their intended positions before dawn.
U 49 was in contact with 2 large cruisers from 0159 to 0229. They
disappeared from sight at high speed on a southerly course. U 50 and 52
were detailed to attack but did not sight them
1) Situation:
a) English destroyers attempted at dawn in mist weather and snow
flurries to penetrate the Westfjord as far as Narvik. They were detected
with losses to both sides. The U-boats disposed in the Westfjord could
not, it seems, prevent the penetration. The reason for this will be clear
when the boats put in. Without a doubt, their task is very tricky, especially
opposed to destroyers which force their way through at high speed using
depth charges, and twice as difficult in misty weather. The operation
shows though that one cannot be strong enough for such tasks. In the
course of the forenoon Naval War Staff ordered the dispatch of two boats
to Trondheim and 4 to Narvik. This order crossed with a relevant
suggestion of mine to the Group. There, the center point of the operation
appears to have moved.This would be especially attractive to the English
as an area for counter-attacks as it would be more difficult for us to be
reinforced from home. This situation is tricky for our own forces, as
supplies have not arrived - the destroyers are for the most part unready to
sail
-5-

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
and their putting out is now questionable owing to the enemy - one
small boat has been assigned to patrol the Kors Fjord
b) A new distribution of boats in the northern North Sea is necessary as
a result of this movement. One has the impression that the English fleet
has withdrawn in a northerly and southwesterly direction. The Naval War
Staff does not believe that a counter-landing on the southwest of Norway
is imminent; in this connection they see no necessity for the enemy to
operate near German bases from where apparently successful air attacks
were carried out on 9.4. In view of the considerable losses of surface craft
and the return of units still lying in the landing ports, in the near future,
they (SKL) consider the U-boat's main task to consist not so much in
searching for targets as in the patrol of the recently occupied areas. The
new disposition shows here a concentration in the eastern section of the
Shetland/Norway Straits. The Narvik boats, to whom the very difficult
and decisively important task at the moment calls - that of protecting these
ports against every pursuing enemy - have received orders to penetrate still
deeper into the fjord so that all boats are disposed in the narrowest
possible positions, abandoning outer sections which are difficult to patrol.
113
11. / 4. Two destroyers of the Narvik Group attempted to put out
of the Westfjord. The attempt failed because they sighted a cruiser and a
destroyer when they were still in the narrow part of the fjord, and were
unable to pass them in the clear night. They returned. On their report of
the enemy, U 51 received orders to attack. The boat, however, did not
apparently find the enemy. It can be seen from the repeated confirmation
of enemy forces in this area that he constantly patrols it, systematically,
perhaps against the U-boats, passing their positions. I must make a picture
of the situation and therefore request a situation report from the boats.
There is no need to maintain wireless silence in this area. There is no
danger of bearings being taken. The confirmation of U-boats here can
only have a discouraging effect on the enemy, which is what we want. U
46 has has no contact with the enemy. U 51 was pursued by destroyers - it
fired 2 misses and 2 self detonators. U 25 reports having torpedoed 2
destroyers last night in her position. The effect of the explosion not
observed. Hydrophone search. Non report from U 64. Summing up the
situation in the North Sea this afternoon, the Group said that imminent
enemy battle fleet operations were not expected. For the time being, the
enemy has withdrawn from the area apparently under the impression that
there would be successful air attacks during the momentary favorable
flying weather. The Group is in favor of a concentration of U-boats
around the Shetland area, in order to have reconnaissance independent of
the weather, for the return of our own battleships. This task must not be
underrated, it means, however, that the more promising disposition of
small U-boats in the area around Scapa must be finally abandoned.
U 48 in the Group proceeding to Narvik established contact with
heavy cruisers; later also battleships and light forces. The enemy is
apparently patrolling northwest of Trondheim. Although the other boats
belonging to the group must be in the vicinity, no other boat managed to
come up.
-6-

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Address
Excerpt from
Enquiry into Torpedo Failures
M 83 S/42 Most Secret III copy
6) The point of view expressed by B.d.U. in his reports and War Diary,
that shortages of torpedoes and warhead pistols were especially prevalent
during the Norwegian operations and had a decisive effect on the outcome
makes it necessary to point out that one cannot speak of a particularly
noticeable increase of failures during the Norwegian operation in the
comparison with previous U-boat results. The mishaps of this period can
be attributed to a far greater extent to explained misses - 41.8%. They
were considerably influenced by the unique, tricky conditions of U-boat
warfare experienced in this operation (high firing range, small fast-moving
targets, heavy protection, short light nights, un-heated torpedoes and
unusual light conditions.
Kr (Archives) is to include this statement in the text of B.d.U.'s War
Diary dealing with the Norwegian operations and is to indicate the
relevant passages in the War Diary.
(signed): Raeder.
114
U 48 reported 2 triple spreads in the evening on a large cruiser, no
hits scored, 4 self detonators. THis report of failure, together with those of
U 51 and U 25 give rise to extreme doubts as to the effectiveness of
magnetic fuse in Zone O. The question of torpedo failure appears to
threaten the success of the entire operation. The following reflections are
given and relevant measures taken.
On 11 April and during the night of 11/12 the following W/T
messages were received:
11.4 T.O.R. 1350:
W/T message T.O.O. 1246........2 destroyers torpedoed on the evening
of April 10th. Effect of explosion not observed. U 25.
11.4 T.O.R. 2340:
W/T message 2115. Triple spread miss on Cumberland, one
detonation at end of run. Triple spread on York cruiser in grid 5617 at
2115. Spread fused prematurely. Depth 7 meters, zone - 4. Position grid
5672. U 48.
12.4 T.O.R. 0305:
W/T message 2250. 2 failures, one detonated at safety distance, one
after 30 seconds, 100 meters off large destroyer. U 51.
According to the wireless messages of U 48 and U 51 the
possibility of a premature fuse must be also conjectured in the case of U
25, as all further information on the sinking of the destroyer is lacking that
means that in one day, there were 6 to 8 self detonators out of 12 torpedoes
- a percentage of 50-75%. (There is, of course, the possibility in the case
of U 48 that the premature fusing of the third caused the counter
detonation of the other two torpedoes.)
-7-

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
These premature fusings mean, especially in the present area of
operations, not only a significant lack of hits, but a considerable danger to
the boats themselves. This particularly affects the boats defending
Westfjord, which, after firing at a destroyer with a premature, are greatly
handicapped in the comparatively restricted area during the search for
them. An alteration of the state of affairs is therefore urgently requested.
Telephone conversations with Torpedo Institute and Professor Cornelius
bring me no support in this doubtful situation. The latter advises sticking
to methods employed tendency for granted that Norway has any effect on
the magnetic fuse.
On the latter point B.d.U. expressed his doubts to the Torpedo
Institute in November 1939 (in connection with U 38's operations) and
requested an enquiry and definite ruling. They were unanimously of the
opinion that no magnetic effect existed. The Torpedo Institute suggests
firing torpedo spreads either with acoustic detonation or magnetic
detonators with a time interval of 8 seconds (between each). Both sources
point out that a change over to contact detonators would mean the
discontinuation of attacks on destroyers owing to the probability of
undershooting. On no account especially after the events of today
forenoon (destroyer battle off Narvik) can I abandon anti-destroyer
warfare, as for the most part, without it, U-boats would be unable to carry
out their duties. The following decision must be made:
1) Introduction of contact firing device with switch setting A.
Advantage: Cutting out of self detonators and therefore the greater
safety of the boats.
115
Disadvantage: Relinquishing of destroyer warfare and with it, the
boat's duties. Further disadvantage:slighter torpedo effect on large target.
2) Continuing to use magnetic firing device:
Advantage: Greater effect with the event of a hit.
Disadvantage: Considerably less likelihood of hit owing to
prematures. (with regard to the facts given now I must presume a 50%
proportion of failures.)
A further disadvantage weighing heavily against it: Considerable
danger to valuable boats, which if lost would be lacking not only for their
protective duties but also for further operations.
The failures have so far only been in Zone O and north of this,
while there have been no failures in among the several successes in the last
few weeks in the southerly area.
The following points are relevant:
1) Boats must be able to fulfill their protective duties against every
opponent, including destroyers.
2) The endangering of the boats through premature detonation is on no
account justifiable during the present operations, as the chances of success
are also jeopardized, and boats lost cannot be replaced by other forces.
Protection of the fjords and bases is, however, an essential task at the
moment.
-8-
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 therefore decided to move U 65 also to Narvik where other losses appear
to have taken place.

Our surface craft which have put into the landing ports have
I have come to the following conclusions regarding the boats: received orders to return home as soon as the situation permits. The F.O.
1) In Zone O and to the north of it, keep 3 torpedoes with switch Scouting Forces is already back."Hipper" and the C-in-C Fleet intend to
setting A, and 1 torpedo with magnetic fuse setting, ready for action. pass through the Shetlands/Norway narrows during the coming night.
2) Fire on ships only with setting A. Depth setting depth 2 meters.
3) Always double shot, first torpedo setting A, depth 3 meters, then The disposition of the U-boats southwest of Norway is thereby
torpedo with magnetic setting, depth - draught - 1 meter, time interval if justified. They are available for other duties and are to receive new
possible 8 seconds. waiting positions in the vicinity of the north barrier gap of the Skagerrak
I am aware that this means giving up the considerably greater minefield. There they will lie in wait for the English U-boats proceeding
torpedo effects obtained by magnetic detonation, in order to make the to the Kattegatt. These are apparently in this area in large numbers to
chances of hitting more certain. (Even a large warship is put out of action dislocate German transport traffic to Norway.
for at least the duration of the operation by contact torpedo hit) With the
double shot on destroyers, I hope, in consideration of the tricky situation,
to obtain at least one hit with one torpedo and to thereby considerably -9-
decrease the danger to the U-boats.
We are, then, technically in the same position as in 1910 with the
reservation that the torpedo is less reliable in maintaining depth. The
difficulties and obscurities which arise in the use of the magnetic firing
device are after Professor Gerlach's recent research, at the moment
insurmountable and in no way even nearly clearly outlined.
There is no doubt that the premature detonation of torpedoes has
caused U-boat losses; it will perhaps never be known how many boats we
have lost on this account. Date Position, Wind, Weather
I intend to use contact detonators at least during the current and Sea State, Illumination, Events
operations, or at any rate in the areas momentarily especially endangered Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
in the northerly zones. If premature detonation also occurs in the
southerly areas, a general change over to contact detonators will be
unavoidable if and when a return to magnetic detonators will follow
depends on the results of research and trial shots.

The recent enemy report from U 48 strengthens my belief that the For the time being the disposition must wait, as according to a
central point in the sea operations is moving to the northeast. I have radio intelligence report an English operation is to take place in the area
between 580 N on the Norwegian coast on 12.4 and their deployment is
116
more necessary there. They are to be disposed off England. U 48 again
established contact with a heavy enemy cruiser in the evening. It was
again lost after a time, owing to poor visibility. It must be presumed that
the positions of the Narvik boats are known to the enemy as a result of the
English attack on Narvik. They are to be moved slightly, and incorporated
with the new boats (U 38, 47, 48, 49). The latter are to patrol the
Westfjord continuously.
12. / 4. U 2 reports return passage owing to damage to
hydroplane.
U 48 regained contact unfortunately only temporarily, with 2
large cruisers with destroyers on a southerly course, medium speed. The
enemy is then, in the area northwest of Trondheim. I do not now consider
a new deployment of the boats proceeding to Narvik, which must be in the
vicinity, advisable. If the enemy is in this area it only is a starting off point
for operations against the neighboring areas. Narvik appears especially
threatened. The boats are to proceed there with the utmost speed in order
to be in position when the enemy arrives. A message from U 38 indicates
a change in the situation, this boat sighted 2 freighters and an escorting
destroyer on a northeasterly course. Convoys of ordinary merchant ships
do not now sail in this area. These units were in all probability transport
ships used in connection with an enemy operation - possibly transport of
material for a landing. U 38 received orders to attack, or if that is not
possible, to maintain contact. It is important to know where these
steamers are going.
At the same time the 1st U-boat Group receives permission to
attack all ships (not just warships and troop transport ships as previously)
as it is practically certain that no ordinary merchant shipping now
proceeds through this area.
A reliable radio intelligence report relates to the putting out of an
English cruiser with 2 destroyers from Scapa for Vaagsfjord. This
confirms the conjecture that the enemy plans counter operation possibly
landings north of Narvik after being beaten off in Westfjord. From this I
117
see another situation. A disposition of U-boats is necessary and promising
on the strength of this report. 3 boats from the group proceeding to Narvik
are to be deflected to the Vaagsfjord.
2 other boats to protect Andalsnes and Namsos from possible landings
are to be detailed. Only U 65, proceeding to Narvik is still available. The
second boat will be taken from the Trondheim group which appears
comparatively adequately safeguarded when the first coastal batteries there
are ready for action. There is to be new distribution of positions for the
Narvik boats (which U 48 joins today) and a supplementation of supplies
by one boat, from the supply ship "Jan Wellem" is intended for the coming
day.
At the same time the boat is to hand over its small arms and
machine guns to the Harbormaster for the use of the infantry.
U 43 and U 61 have put out for Narvik with munitions.
The U-boat next available will be detailed to supply troops in
Narvik. The following have put out: U 43 with 35 tons of cargo for
Narvik, 15 tons of which consists of 2 cm. ammunition, 13 tons of infantry
ammunition, 7 tons of heavy mortar ammunition.
- 10 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 will be the Trondheim group. U 50 receives orders to proceed to the Folla
Fjord.

The question of relieving the small boats of their duties in order to

U 26 and U 29 will also be available in the next few days. supplement supplies, is becoming increasingly urgent. The boats put out
almost simultaneously. If they remain at sea until supplies are exhausted,
13. / 4. The following deductions may be made from the radio they will also begin the return passage at the same time. There will then
intelligence reports received during the night: be a complete absence of boats in the operations area. The possibility of
1) C-in-C Home Fleet is directing all operations on the northwest coast taking on supplies above all in Bergen is being energetically looked into.
of Norway. He is himself at sea.
2) A fighter Group "A" has been formed, consisting presumably of 3 U 48 and U 52 have been expressly assigned to reconnoiter the
heavy cruisers and destroyers, under S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron. They are areas in the vicinity of their operational sector.
operating off Indre Folder where a landing has already taken place. For one thing I wish to obtain a picture of the situation in the
3) Fighter Group "B" consisting of 1 battleship, i battle cruiser, 1 a/c neighborhood of the ordered positions for another thing to give the boats
carrier, 1 cruiser, and 9 destroyers under S.O. Battle Cruiser Squadron, is an opportunity of finding the enemy themselves, not obliging them to wait
to carry out operations in the Narvik area on the afternoon of 13.4. Two until the enemy comes into their area.
convoys were mentioned in connection with this group,
a) 2 transport vessels and one net layer, which put out of Scapa on 12.4
and - 11 -
b) a convoy proceeding from a west coast port, which was in North
Minch on 12.4.
4) Further operations are planned in the Vaagsfjord area. A part of the
forces intended for this are already at sea; another section intends to reach
Vaagsfjord on the morning of 15.4.
5) Mining operations are to be carried out in the Skudesnes area.
U 1 and U 4 are to be informed of the mining operations, While U-
boats are either disposed or about to be disposed in all other English
operational areas Folla Fjord is still unoccupied.Only the occupation of Date Position, Wind, Weather
Namsen Fjord branching to the south by U 65 now en route is intended. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Another U-boat is to be transferred for the patrol of this fjord, by order of Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
the Naval War Staff.

As no other large boat is at the moment available in open waters

(U 37 can only operate for a short time owing to shortage of lubricating
oil) I shall have to take this boat away from the least vulnerable coastal
protection group. When several coastal batteries are ready for action this
118
 U 38 and U 64 who were requested to report and did not, have
reported today.
A report of a new break-through by English forces in the Ofot
Fjord and off Narvik, was received in the afternoon. There were 9
destroyers and a battleship. The report came from the Naval Signal
Officer, Narvik, not from the U-boats who apparently were neither able to
give warning nor prevent the penetration in spite of the fact that there were
at least 3 boats one behind the other in the narrow channel of the fjord. I
cannot, as yet, obtain a clear picture of events. One must wait for the
boat's reports and messages, in order to explain the circumstances. One
thing is certain, the boats did what they could.The protective duties
assigned to them were tricky and it seems, too difficult, against a strong,
well-equipped enemy prepared for U-boats and as a result of torpedo
shortage only combated at a disadvantage.
All boats in Westfjord have received orders to proceed to Narvik
and attack the enemy as a result of the news of the successful break-
through.
U 46 reported at 2000 that the enemy battleship had again put out.
All boats off Narvik are requested to send a situation report. I
must form a picture from closer information of the break-through and
know which of the boats is still there. In Naval War Staff Most Secret
4432/40 the order is received to move all large boats up to U-50 to the
north - to carry out supplying of small boats' consumable goods - if
possible in Bergen and then to dispense them in all positions south of
Westfjord.
U 30, 34, 52, 65 received orders to proceed at high speed to the
Lofoten Islands.
Supplying in Bergen has, in the meantime, been proved possible.
The 5 boats off, and in the approaches are not to put in until dawn, as for
119
the time being, it is impossible to pass through the rocks at night owing to
danger of mines and tricky navigation.
Trondheim is, therefore, cleared of U-boats. The coastal batteries
here, however do provide a certain amount of protection. In my opinion it
is far more important to leave a boat in Romsdal Fjord and Folla Fjord
where there can no longer be any doubt of the enemy's landing intentions.
The reoccupying of these positions by small boats will not be possible for
several days. The enemy operations, however, are imminent.
U 52, 30 and 34, have been recalled all the same against my
judgment. As the number of U-boats in Norway is in no way adequate for
the tasks assigned to them, Naval War Staff is detailing the boats lying in
readiness for operation "Gelb" for action in Norway.
U 17, 23, 24 are putting out for the present for the northern North
Sea where they will receive further orders by W/T.
14. / 4. U 65 received orders to proceed to the Vaagsfjord west of
the Lofoten Islands. I presume that there is the center point of the English
operations and therefore affirm that the strengthening of the Westfjord
position.
- 12 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

W/T messages from U 38 and 47 in the Vaagsfjord were received
last night. U 38 sighted an English destroyer near Anderes. U 47 reports
its position and area free of enemy units. It probably transmitted because
it thought it was also requested to send a situation report. When in reality
this request was merely directed at the boats in Westfjord. The group
identification will again be repeated by W/T.
While I have no fear of the enemy D/F'ing W/T messages in this
area it is possible that the boats might betray their presence if enemy units
were in the vicinity. I therefore consider it circumspect to use W/T only in
an emergency on contacting main targets, heavy forces or transport ships.
The boats are to receive the relevant order.
Radio Intelligence Service gives the route of an enemy convoy. It
passes west of the Lofotens also probably in the Vaagsfjord. While the
possibility of a landing in the area of this extensively branching fjord
increases, there is still doubt as to which part of the fjord could be used for
disembarkation.
Naval War Staff considers Lavangen or Grabangen most likely. I
have decided to use U 47 for reconnaissance in this area, after U 65 has
put in (expected on about 15.4).
Meanwhile fresh directions on U-boat warfare have been received
from Naval War Staff. All large boats except U 65, which is to proceed,
are now to operate in the Trondheim, Namsen, Romsdal area. The boats
are to proceed to a grid in the direction of the new disposition for the time
being, and if no further orders are received from Naval War Staff I will
indicate the final positions.
Further, the Naval War Staff orders boats with supplies to no
longer proceed to Narvik, but instead to Trondheim where the introduction
of supplying facilities for U-boats is being attempted.
120
The boats ordered to take on supplies in Bergen, put in during the
day. The supplying appeared to work without a hitch. All boats will put
out again in the evening and will proceed on a northerly course to a pre-
arranged grid, until the final distribution has been decided upon.
The boats are then ordered to take on supplies north of the
Shetlands, except for 3 boats which are to remain in the area. Boats
requiring extensive repairs are to proceed to Wilhelmshaven the rest to
Bergen.
U 4 returned to Wilhelmshaven unexpectedly. It was unable to
report the return passage owing to W/T breakdown. The boat destroyed an
English U-boat in its position.
U 61 is to patrol the Namsen Fjord with U 34.
U 1 which should put to sea soon is to be transferred from
Stavanger to the Lindesnes area as English U-boat chaser, as it is no longer
needed in its former area. If protection of the approaches to Bergen is
momentarily superfluous the same applies to Stavanger. As, according to
reports received, the presence of light enemy forces must already be
presumed in Vaagsfjord, U-boats are not to attack destroyers in order to
keep the surprise attack until the arrival of the transport vessels.
15. / 4. It would seem from all the messages received in the
forenoon that the enemy is consolidating his position in the area between
- 13 -
 Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Tromsoe and Vaagsfjord including Harstadt, reinforced by the
Norwegian sea, land and air forces there. In this connection, the sending
of 4 U-boats to Vaagsfjord was justified. Conditions for attack are
extremely tricky there, very short nights, at the moment very calm
weather. The best U-boat commanders are up there.
U 47 (Lieut. Prien) was forced (beneath the surface) for 20 hours
by steamers and fishing vessels. Fishing craft suitable.
U-boat chasers are available in unlimited numbers. Prien was not
able to fire a shot. U 48 (Lieut. Schulze, Herbert) attacked the Warspite in
Westfjord yesterday without success. He reported in the afternoon that his
second attempt to proceed to Narvik had failed, owing to hydrophone and
depth charge activity.
Torpedo misses and failures on 2 destroyers.
U 64 (Lieut. W. Schulz) was lost in Ofot Fjord as a result of a
bombing attack. 8 men were rescued.
The boats in Westfjord have received instructions to withdraw to
the western entrance and to search the inlets.
According to messages received there is no possibility of success
- scarcely possibility of survival in Ofot Fjord, owing to very strong
defense.
U 65 (Lieut. v. Stockhausen) reported at 1400 that a transport ship
escorted by a battleship and destroyers put into the Anden Fjord at 0800.
Double shot a transport ship. No successes.
121
U 65 was forced therefore to submerge from 0800 to 1400.
THe position is unfavorable, as U 49 and U 39 in the northerly
section of Vaagsfjord, received the important message too late, and are
now unable to proceed promptly to the south by day in order to attack the
transport vessel. Everything depends on reaching the transport by all
means.
I therefore order the boats in Vaagsfjord to pursue to the limits of
the fjord.
I gave the following order to the Vaagsfjord boat at 2020: Operate
according to opportunity and defense situation in Vaagsfjord and
Andefjord area. The aforementioned considerations lead to this decision.
The steamer "Unitas" under the command of Lieut. (Reserve)
Heye has put into Bergen with fuel and lubricating oil for the U-boats.
THis passage through the North Sea carried out with speed and dash
deserves recognition. The supply situation of U-boats in Bergen is thereby
improved.
(signed): Dönitz
- 14 -
Appendix I to Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. Op. of 9.4. 1940.
A) Disposition of U-boats at 1000 on 9.4. 1940:
1) U-boat groups At end positions as ordered:
 a) U 46; b) U 25; c) U 64 in passage in position early on 10.4; d) U New waiting disposition U 47 48.49. and 50 at 90 sea miles towards
51. 1200; U 52 grid 2310, U 38 grid 2810 AN, U 37 grid 7890 AF.
2) U-boat groups At end position as ordered: 7) 0930 W/T message to U 7:
a) U 30; b) U 34. New waiting position grid 2880. Utmost speed.
3) " " At end position as ordered: 8) 1004 W/T message to 8th U-group:
a) U 9; b) U 14; c) Unoccupied; d) U 60; e) U 62. New waiting positions: U 2 grid 4610; U 5 grid 4650; U 6 grid 4340.
4) " " At end position as ordered: 9) 1127 W/T message to all boats:
a) U 1; b) U 4. Join 5th group. U 37, 38 and 56.
5) " " In waiting position 18 sea miles around central point: 10) 1809 W/T message to U 65:
a) U 47 grid 2258 AN; b) U 48 grid 7959 AF; Proceed to position unobserved.
c) U 52 grid 2310 AN; d) U 50 grid 8787 AF;
e) U 49 grid 2359 AN; f) U 56 grid 8715 AF;
g) U 37 grid 7890 AF; (in position evening of 10.4)
h) U 38 grid 2810 AN.
6) " " In end position as ordered: - 15 -
a) U 13; b) U 57?; c) U 58; d) U 59.
7) " " Southern North Sea. Not yet determined.
8) " " Waiting positions:
a) U 2 grid 4610 AN; b) U 5 grid 4650 AN; c) U 6 grid 4340 AN.
9) " " Waiting positions:
a) U 19 grid 2620 AN ; b) U 7 grid 2880 AN; c) U 10 grid 2710 AN.

11) 2000 W/T message to U 30, 34, 65:

Immediate course Lofoten.
B) Important Wireless Messages: Maximum cruising speed. Confirm.
1) 0654 W/T message to U 38: Danger of mines in Skjörn Fjord for 2nd group.
New waiting position grid 4340 AN. Full speed ahead. 12) 2055 W/T message to U 52:
2) 0450 W/T message to 1st U-boat group: Course Lofoten.
Occupy end positions. One straggler. Maximum cruising speed. Confirm.
3) 0457 W/T message to 2nd U-boat group: 13) 2122 W/T message to U-boats in Westfjord:
Occupy end positions. Report situation as soon as possible. Add weather report.
4) 0558 W/T message to 3rd U-boat group, minus U 56: 14) 0138 W/T message to U 61:
Occupy end positions. Patrol Namsen Fjord, in grid 6497 AF.
5) 0725 W/T message to U 37: Enemy landing possible. Remain unobserved.
Take up waiting position in grid 7890 AF with utmost speed. Passage report near 620 N.
6) 0751 W/T message to all boats:
122
15) 0012 Most Immediate. W/T message to Narvik U-boats. Enemy U 34 grid 9116 AF; U 30 grid 9112 AF; U 50 grid 6777 AF; U 52 for
destroyer in Narvik Bay near Framnes and Rombaken. Attack. Havet. Concentration in south. Latter to go over to Atlantic system at
2400 on 10th April 1940.
10) 1300 W/T message to all boats:
Prevent pressing on by English in occupied ports. Of decisive
--------------------------------------------------- importance supplies overland insured.
------------- 11) 1908 W/T message to U 65:
Waiting position grid 2290 AN.
Appendix I to KTB B.d.U. Op. of 10.4. 1940. 12) 2126 W/T message to 1st U-boat group:
U 46 to patrol narrows Fornes west of 170, 10 mins. E. Remaining boats
Important Wireless Messages. to withdraw to a position to the east. Possible break-through by heavy
forces.
1) 0146 W/T message to U 49, 50, 52: 13) 0150 W/T message to U 51:
If no contact with damaged ship, take up ordered position before Enemy cruisers and destroyers near Tranoex. Attack.
daylight.
2) 0255 radio signal to U 48, 50, 52:
Z.AQ. 2338.
3) 0947 W/T message to U 50 and 52:
New waiting position grid 5930 AF. Utmost speed. - 16 -
4) 0946 W/T to U 7:
New waiting position patrol Kors Fjord west of 50 08 minutes E.
Utmost speed.
5) 1001 W/T message to U 56:
New waiting position grid 2330 AN. Utmost speed.
6) 1220 W/T message to all U-boats: '
New waiting disposition: U 37 grid 2340; U 19 grid 2390; U 57 grid
2820; U 59 grid 2790; U 13 grid 2890 all AN. U 2, 5, 6 36 sea miles to Appendix I to KTB B.d.U. Op. of 11.4. 1940.
the east.
7) 1143 W/T message to U 38, 47, 48, 49: Important Wireless Messages.
Proceed to Narvik at high speed.
8) 1144 W/T message to all boats: 1) 0955 W/T message to following boats:
All Norwegian warships to be treated as enemy units. New waiting position:
9) 1031 W/T message to all boats: U 58 grid 7810; U 37 grid 7830; U 57 grid 7850; U 59 grid 7870; U
To occupy waiting positions: 13 grid 7890; U 56 grid 7920; U 19 grid 7940; U 10 grid 7980; U 65
grid 7670; all in AF. Cruising speed 10 knots. Large boats full speed
ahead.
123
2) 1140 W/T message to 1st U-boat group:
All boats situation and position report.
3) 1511 W/T message to U 38, U 52: Appendix I to KTB B.d.U. Op. of 12.4. 1940.
Attack. Heavy units in grid 5830 AF.
4) 1846 W/T message to U 38, 52: Important Wireless Messages.
Proceed if no contact.
5) 1847 W/T message to U 5, 6, 2: 1) 0118 W/T to U 2, 5, 6:
New waiting disposition: U 2 return passage route 2; U 6 to occupy grid 3196 instead of U 2;
U 2 north of 5748 N east of 0655 as far as barrier gap; U 6 north of 5754 Meeting with Hipper possible forenoon in grid 4600 -4900.
between 0620 and 0644 E; U 5 south of U 6 as far as 5742 N. Look out 2) 1022 W/T message to U 38:
for U-boats. With ref. to W/T 0835. Attack. Otherwise maintain contact and report.
6) 2222 W/T message to Narvik boats: 3) 1516 W/T to U 38, 47, 49:
1) New positions: U 25 east of Nero 1 to 1655 E; U 64 between Nero 1 Acknowledge receipt. Proceed at high speed west of Lofotens to
and 2; U 51 between Nero 2 and 3. Vaagsfjord on 69 degree North. Remain unobserved.
2) U 38, 47, 48, 49 are not to wait for one another, but to enter 4) 1607 W/T message to U 38, 47,49:
Westfjord and wait there in patrol strips of the same depth. Distribution 1) Waiting disposition in Vaagsfjord:
from NW to SE. Subsequently waiting dispositions west of Nero 3: U 38 U 38 northeast of Aakercey Island
north; U 49 south of Line Barey on 600. Nero 3: U 47; Nero 2 U 48. U 47 south of Sandsoey Island.
3) U 38 etc. arrive presumably in 12th April. Ensure surprise arrival. Attack warships, transport vessels and supply
7) 2052 W/T message to U 65: ships only.
Proceed to Narvik. Maximum cruising speed. Go over to Atlantic 2) Situation: Cruiser Southampton left Scapa for Vaagsfjord midday on
system on 12 April at 0600. 12.4 with 2 destroyers, possibly escort for transport ship. Landing attempt
8) 0038 W/T message to all boats: expected there.
Enemy attack expected on Stavanger or Egersund on 12.4. New waiting 5) 1652 W/T message to U 52 and U 65:
disposition. Take up waiting positions as guard against landings. U 52 Romsdal
U 6 grid 3192 - 3193; U 2 grid 3196; U 5 grid 3274 Fjord on about 7 deg. 20 mins. E. U 65 Namsen Fjord on about 11 degs.
08 mins. E.
6) 1914 W/T message to U 5, 6:
New waiting disposition. U 5 north of 5748 east of 0655 to barrier gap;
U 6 north of 5742 between 0620 and 0644 E. Lookout for U-boats.
- 17 - 7) 1853 W/T message to 3rd and 4th U-boat groups and U 7:
Report supply etc. situation.
8) 1902 W/T message to Narvik boats:
U 46 waiting position between Nero 2 and 3. U 48 waiting position
Nero 3. Both boats to search area for enemy forces. U 51 patrol Fornes
narrows west of 17 deg. 10 mins. E.
124
9) 2237 W/T message to U 1, 4: Take up waiting disposition immediately at western exit Volla Fjord on
English destroyer to lay mines near Skuegsnes. Time unknown. 64 degs. 38 mins. N. Danger of landing, above all near Namsen. U 65 is
10) 0005 T/P message Emergency Group East: in Namsen Fjord.
Secret! Urgent! U 5 north 5748 east 0655 E to 0720 E; U 6 north 5742 3) 1153 W/T message to U 48:
N between 0620 E and 0644 E. Reconnoiter along coast of Tranoey, Brenneset to Helligvaer. Report
11) 0027 W/T to U 51: results, English declared area between:
1) Put into Narvik in daylight. Supply supplement from Jan Wellem. a) 67 deg. 25 mins. N; 1434 E
2) Hand over machine guns and small arms if convenient and required, b) 67 deg. 27 mins. N; 1424 E
also guns to harbor master for Army. c) 67 deg. 29 mins. N; 1407 E
d) 67 deg. 34 mins. N; 1352 E
e) 67 deg. 38 mins. N; 1402 E
f) 67 deg. 27 mins. N; 1439 E
4) 1156 W/T message to U 52:
- 18 - Reconnoiter unobserved as far as Andalsnes and report situation.
5) 1238 W/T message to boats north of Shetlands:
As soon as fuel situation necessitates return passage proceed. Boats not
requiring important repairs refuel in Bergen. Short signal VPL on passing
0230 E. Route for putting in and pilot station will be transmitted. Boats
needing repairs to return to Wilhelmshaven by route II. Short signal NEW
on passing 59 N.
6) 1238 W/T message to Admiral West Coast:
3) Rest if situation allows. Again take up position on April 14th Propose fuel, lubricating oil, provisioning of U-boats in Bergen.
before daylight. Request preparations for delivery, entrance channel, installation of Pilot
stations.
7) 1447 W/T message to Narvik U-boats:
Proceed to Narvik. English forces penetration.
--------------------------------------------------- 8) 1730 W/T message to Narvik U-boats:
------------- Enemy battleship and destroyer in Rombaken east of Narvik.
9) 1530 W/T message to Narvik U-boats:
Appendix I to KTB B.d.U. Op. of 13.4. 1940. Further orders: The attack on Narvik to be beaten off by all means.
10) 1315 W/T message to 9th U-boat group:
Important Wireless Messages. New waiting disposition. U 10 square 2830; U 19 square 2720.
11) 1416 W/T message to 6th and 9th U-boat group:
1) 1009 W/T message to U 6: New waiting disposition. U 13 square 2770; U 57 square 2790; U 59
Take up waiting disposition immediately between Nero 1 and 2. square 2620; U 58 square 2710.
2) 1011 W/T message to U 50 12) 1736 W/T message to 5th, 6th and 9th U-boat groups:
125
 Move the positions already ordered 20 miles to 1350.
- 19 -
13) 2205 W/T message to U 49, 50 and 52. At 1730 GAF reported large
vessel in square 2338 AN. Damaged. Listing. Attack.
14) 2300 Radio message to U 19:
New waiting disposition is square 2760 AN.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Appendix I to KTB B.d.U. Op. of 14.4. 1940.
Important Wireless Messages.
1) 0455 W/T message to all boats:
Entrance to Bergen is Kors Fjord Leroeyosen Fleslands light Helliver
route. Pilots for By-Fjord to be expected near Stangen owing to mine
barrier. Put in only in daylight.
2) 0456 W/T message to 3rd U-boat group and U 7:
Put into Bergen and Kors Fjord at dawn. Take on entire supply of food
and provisions. Danger of air attacks. Report likely time of completion
after putting in.
3) 1009 W/T message to Admiral West Coast:
126
Report requested up to 1900 on 14.4 whether the supplying of 5 more
boats including provisioning is possible in Bergen on 15.4.
4) 1228 W/T message to U 30, 34, 52:
Immediate: U 30, 34 waiting disposition in grid 5690 AF. U 52 return
from Romsdal Fjord as far as Andelsnes.
5) 1101 W/T message to all boats: Vaagsfjord boats - U 38, 47, 49, 65.
Wireless silence except for important enemy reports.
6) 1101 W/T message to U 65:
Proceed to Vaagsfjord via Andenes.
7) 1538 W/T message to 3rd U-boat group and U 7:
As soon as supplying completed, report. Put out for grid 8250 AF.
8) 1823 W/T message to U 30, 34:
To occupy the following positions: U 30 Romsdals Fjord. U 52 also
here. Varstonen as far as Andalsnes. U 34 Namsen Fjord. U 50 is in west
section of Foller. Boats are to remain unobserved.
9) 2038 W/T message to U 56:
Occupy grid 7830.
10) 2037 W/T message to boats in Westfjord:
Report position and situation.
11) 2037 W/T message to boats in Vaagsfjord:
Enemy landing must be expected in Ratangen and Lavangen. U 47 to
reconnoiter there on 15.4. U 65 occupies position south of Kjoetta.
12) 2126 W/T message to U 1 and U 6 to be passed to U 5:
U 6 group to operate north of 57 degs. 54 mins. N. U 1 new position
grid 3550 southern half.
13) 2142 W/T message to U 50:
Destroyer sighted putting into Namsen Fjord. Landing probable.
Pursue.
14) 2213 W/T message to Vaagsfjord boats:
Main task surprise appearance on arrival of transport ships. Before this
permission to attack destroyers is not given.
- 20 -

15) 2255 W/T message emergency to Vaagsfjord boats:
Only report troop transport ships and warships.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
APPENDIX 2 to KTB
Enemy Situation on 8.4.1940.
0730 - At 0030 in grid 1643 one heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers, northeasterly
course, high speed - U 13
1010 - At 0930 in grid 5855 AF in action with enemy destroyers - B.v.A.
1240 - At 1139 cruiser "Galathea" reported a/c in grid 4524 AN.
1525 - Bearing of unknown unit at 1445 north of 64 N between 08 degs.
and 09 degs. E.
1800 - Additional report of a/c reconnaissance:
1) At 1348 in grid 8172; 2 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 6 destroyers,
northerly course, high speed.
Addition from Main Observation post:
Leading ship 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron "Birmingham" and destroyer
2nd Flotilla. 2nd battleship probably Rodney.
2) One cruiser off Narvik.
3) At 1145 in grid 4260, 18 destroyers northeasterly course.
2000 - Radio intelligence report from Oslo: Warships near Hustadvika
Bay north of Bud, one ship battleship(?)
127
2115 - A/c report: At 1145 in grid 4260, 17 to 19 destroyers, course NE,
high speed.
2120 - Radio intelligence report: Admiralty sent first OU W/T at 1850 to
S.O. Battle Cruisers and 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadron.
2309 - At 2000 in grid 1647 one heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers. 1400
medium speed. - U 57
2320 - Radio intelligence report: French unit in grid 1562 AN at 0730 on
9.4. From Brest through Irish Sea.
2330 - Re: message of 2020. Enemy destroyers are 2 French torpedo
cruisers(?) (translator's query) and possibly Emil Bertie (translator's note:
French cruiser minelayer 5,886 tons "Emile Bertie"?)
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
APPENDIX 2 to KTB
Enemy Situation on 9.4.1940.
- 21 -
0225 - Wireless message: Norway has extinguished all lights on
Norwegian coast from Lister to Narvik.
0416 - Urgent OU W/T message to U-boats on English area broadcast.
0420 - From Naval War Staff: Norwegian air forces in state of readiness.
0520 - Heavy forces in grid 3440 AF in action with fleet.
0742 - Radio intelligence report: C-in-C Home Fleet at 000 in grid 8444.
Southerly course, speed 18 knots.
0827 - Radio intelligence report: At 0738 one battleship, one destroyer in
grid 2736 presumably C-in-C Home Fleet.
0830 - Radio intelligence report: "Repulse" and "Renown" presumed to be
to the north.
0920 - At 0830 2 battleships in grid 8747 southerly course medium speed.
- U 56.
0922 - At 0800 C-in-C Home Fleet encountered light cruiser squadron
about 60 degs. N, 3 degs. E.
1025 - At 0955, 3 enemy cruisers, 15 destroyers in grid 2734 90 degs. -
A/c. At 0955, 3 heavy cruisers, 5 light cruisers, course E. 1030 change of
course to 30 degs. high speed, no destroyers. - A/c.
1112 - Corrupt report of 1?5?11? course 400, medium speed. - A/c.
1120 - Radio intelligence report: French units possibly in north Scottish
waters - 3 large units. 5 Flotilla leaders and destroyers.
1810 - At 1400, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers; 20 destroyers in grid 2811.
Northerly course. - A/c.
1815 - At 1535 3 battleships in grid 2238, northerly course, medium speed.
- U 49.
1821 - At 1648 battle cruiser, one light cruiser, 2 destroyers in grid 2236.
Northerly course, medium speed. - U 49.
1836 - Radio intelligence report: 4th and 6th Destroyer Flotilla near C-in-
C Home Fleet.
1955 - At 1805 enemy out of sight, grid 2235. Light cruiser northeasterly
course, medium speed. - U 49.
2045 - At 2025, 2 destroyers in grid 2353 course 1450, medium speed. -
A/c.
2050 - At 2035 4 destroyers in grid 2324 course 900, medium speed. - A/c.
2124 - 2100, 5 destroyers, southwesterly course, medium speed.
Westfjord. - U 51.
2145 - At 1730 hit on battleship or heavy cruiser in grid AN 2338 damaged
with list. In grid AN 2417, 1 cruiser and destroyers. - A/c.
128
- 22 -
Enemy Situation on 10.4.1940.
0105 - Radio intelligence report: Glasgow and Southampton damaged.
Probably by air attack.
0243 - At 0159 2 large cruisers in grid 2338. - U 49.
0345 - 0229 enemy out of sight in 1800 high speed. - U 49.
1035 - 0948 1 light cruiser in grid 2765 AN westerly course. - U 19.
1120 - 1105 1 destroyer in grid 2718 course W., very high speed. - A/c.
1153 - 1125 1 destroyer in grid 2352 course west, very high speed. - A/c.
1120 one enemy destroyer in grid 2717 course west. - A/c.
1249 - "Warspite" put out of Scapa at 2130 on 9.4 with 6 destroyers of the
7th Flotilla. "Furious" is at sea.
1810 - Radio intelligence report: Cruiser "Birmingham" reported bombing
attack at 1643 in grid 1455.
1848 - "Birmingham" reported U-boat at 1709 in grid 1458.
1914 - At 1815, 5 destroyers in fixed position near Bremnes. - U 51.
1920 - Radio Intelligence report: "Repulse" is presumed to be in Lofoten
area and 2nd Destroyer Flotilla off Narvik, 8th Destroyer Flotilla off Scapa
on evening of 9.4.
2114 - Flying Corps X sighted one battleship, 2 heavy, 2 light cruisers,
several destroyers at 1650 in grid 2646.
2207 - Intelligence reports: French squadrons with battleships
"Strasbourg", "Dunkerque", a/c carrier "Bearn", 2nd Torpedo (boat?)
Flotilla. 1st U-boat Flotilla on 10.4 forenoon in Channel exit North Sea
direction. Time and position unlikely. Presence in North Sea possible.
2210 - Radio Intelligence report: A/c attacks at grid 1832 on northbound
convoy in grid AN, 0156 and at 1834 in grid 1837.
2256 - Radio intelligence report: English units bombed at 1850 in grid
2798 AN.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 11.4.1940.
0050 - Operations control from 4th Destroyer Flotilla: Turned back with
"Zenker", "Giese" at 2200 as destroyer(s) near Tranoe, followed by
cruiser(s).
0115 - Intelligence report: Steamer "Leopard"(?) reported U-boat at 0020
in grid 4164 (south of Oslo Fjord).
- 23 -
0135 - Intelligence report: Majority of large cruisers put out from Toulon
for NOrth Sea.
0330 - Radio intelligence report: Unreliable bearing on English units at
0200 in grid 3390 (SE of Norwegian coast).
0725 - W/T message 0554 from U 5: Enemy U-boat in grid 3446.
1044 - Radio intelligence report: Put into Scapa on 10.4: "Aurora" at
1620. 2000-2100, "Sheffield", "Glasgow", "Birmingham", Galatea",
129
"Arethusa", Manchester", "Southampton". French cruiser "Emile Bartin",
flotilla leader "Tartu" and "Maille Breze".
1051 - A/c report: 2 destroyers in grid 2941, course N, medium speed.
1120 - Radio signal 1113 from U 48: 4 heavy cruisers in grid 5863 AF.
1350 - W/T message 1246 from U 25: Nero 2, destroyer hydrophone
activity. 2 destroyers torpedoed on the evening of 10.4. Effect not
observed.
1515 - Radio signal 1429 from U 48: 3 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light
cruiser, 5 destroyers on changing course, high speed, up and down grid
5830 AF.
1935 - Radio intelligence report: S.O. 3rd Destroyer Flotilla confirmed at
sea on the afternoon of 11.4.
1950 - Flying Corps X reported: Sighting report at 1740 in grid 5593 AF,
1 a/c carrier, 3 heavy cruisers, 8 light cruisers. Full speed ahead, course
ENE.
2000 - Daventry: Churchill announced: On Monday "Glowworm sunk
after destroyer action. Damaged on Tuesday in air attack, 2 light cruisers,
battleship "Rodney", destroyer "Gurhka" sunk, "Renown" in action with
"Scharnhorst".
2000 - Radio intelligence report: At 1815 "AW" OU W/T to S.O. Battle
Cruisers and Admiralty bearing direction grid 3380.
2018 - Radio intelligence report: At 1700 OU W/T from C-in-C Home
Fleet (?) to S.O. Battle Cruiser Squadron and Admiralty from Trondheim
area.
2036 - Bearings: AC 1950 in AN 6410. AY 1943 in direction west of
Orkneys.
2113 - Flying Corps X reported: At 1800 in grid 5567 AF, heavy enemy
group attacked. Consisting of 1 a/c carrier, 3 battle cruisers, 20 light
forces course 210 0.
2155 - Radio intelligence report: 1707 OU W/T from Admiralty to S.O.
Battle cruisers and unknown unit. 1841 S.O. Battle Cruisers sent OU W/T
to C-in-C Home Fleet info. Admiralty.
2225 - W/T message from Trondheim patrol: 2 English destroyers off
Agdenes in action with Hysnes Battery.

- 24 -
2229 - Radio signal 2158 from U 48: One heavy cruiser, out of control
in grid 5675.
2339 - Radio intelligence report: At 1915 W/T message from Admiral
Rosyth to light cruiser squadron about planned operation on 12.4 against
Norwegian coast between 580 and 590 N (probably in the afternoon.)
(Translator's note: too abbreviated to be clear)
2340 - W/T message from U 48: At 1230 triple spread on "Cumberland"
in grid 5917. At 2115 triple spread on "York" cruiser in grid 5672.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 12.4.1940.
0340 - Radio intelligence report: From W/T Rosyth to Light Cruiser
Squadron: Operation of 12th afternoon between 58 degs. and 59 degs.
info. to Adm. C-in-C Home Fleet, Adm. Scapa., Cruiser Glascow.
Transport ships (Polish steamers) Chrobry and Balory with 6 destroyers of
"V" class and the U-boat from Thames put into Scapa.
0650 - C-in-C Home Fleet reported, 11th: Bombing attack on "Furious"
at 2051. Subsequently Group led by C-in-C Home Fleet was in grid 5569
AF at 1800 on 11.4.
0705 - Radio intelligence report: Daventry from Stockholm. English
troop landings in Oslo Fjord
130
0915 - Radio signal 0835 from U 38 (see Radio signal 1056): One
destroyer, 2 freighters in 3760 AF northeasterly course.
0945 - Radio intelligence report: W/T message of 9.4 contains report that
"Furious covered by "Warspite" is to put in on 10.4 and that destroyers are
to patrol off Bergen.
1025 - Radio intelligence report: U-boat positions on 12.4 at 0700: Seal
of Skudesnes "Unity" in grid 3945 (south of Habstholm).
1056 - Radio signal 1056 from U 38: Enemy forces consist of 2 destroyers
1 tanker. Have lost contact.
1435 - Radio intelligence report: "Southampton", "Electra", and
"Escapada" are to put out for Vaagsfjord at midday on 12.4.
1516 - Radio signal 1431 from U 48: One destroyer in grid 3558 NE
course, medium speed.
1530 - Radio intelligence report: Daventry gives declared mined area in
North Sea, Skagerrak and Kattegat.
1650 - Intelligence report: From Intelligence Organization Spain: English
Mediterranean Fleet passed Gibraltar to the west. (Still to be confirmed).
1715 - A/c W/T message: At 1430 in grid 3539 2 English U-boats on the
surface. Westerly course.
1730 - Most Immediate 1705: Carrier borne a/c attack on Bergen.
2125 - Radio signal 2010: 2 destroyers in grid 3610 AF northeasterly
course.
- 25 -
2205 - Radio signal 2024 from U 48: 2 destroyers in grid 3610 NE
course.
2235 - Radio intelligence report: A destroyer flotilla is to lay mines near
Skudesnes.
2250 - W/T message 2024 from 4th Destroyer Division: Attack by carrier
borne a/c at about 1850.
2315 - Flying Corps X report: A/c sighted Westfjord in afternoon: "where
it begins to be narrow", 1 large ship with 2 funnels, 1 small ship with 1
funnel, 4 torpedo boats, 3 destroyers further out.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 13.4.1940.
0033 - W/T message from U 37: Suspect of enemy U-boat north of
Shetlands. Noise of torpedo under the boat at 2200. Sunk up to now: 2
armed steamers, an armed tanker of 17,000 tons.
0145 - W/T message from U 64: Report of strong destroyer patrol in
Westfjord.
0245 - Radio intelligence report: (special): Unidentified convoy is
escorted by "Warspite", "Repulse" and "Furious". 3 destroyers in Scapa
Flow transport ship escort, after carrying out escort duties they are to
return to operations area with "Warspite".
0330 - Radio intelligence report 0300: At 0700 on 12.4 "Aurora" (with a
Flag OFficer on board) reported to "Southampton" that she would arrive at
Vaagsfjord early on 15th.
0345 - Radio intelligence report 0315: S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron reported
landing operations by "Indresia" (Indre Folda) "Isis" has found Namsos
and Mosjoen suitable for landings.
0457 - Radio intelligence report: 0430 order from C-in-C Home Fleet of
12.4: S.O. Battle Cruisers on "Repulse", Warspite", Beecoutin Pujabi",
one destroyer of 6th Flotilla "Cossack", one destroyer of Tribal class,
"Foxhound", "Forester", "Hero", and one destroyer of 3rd Flotilla
comprise B forces for Operation Atlantic: Attack defenses at - - - - - - -
131
0615 - Radio intelligence report 0525: 4 ships escorted by 4 units are
proceeding northwards at 2000 on 12.4 in 3656 AM.
0615 - Radio intelligence report 0525: At 1515 on 12.4 netlayer
"Protector" put out of Scapa with "Batory" and "Chroby" escorted by 4
units ("V" class destroyers?).
0802 - Radio intelligence report: 0745 operation according to radio
intelligence report 0430 is to take place at Narvik on the afternoon of 13.4.
0900 - Radio intelligence report: All given forces are to take part in the
operation.
0900 - Radio intelligence report: Presumably C-in-C Home Fleet, 1st
Cruiser Squadron and destroyers from Forces A. The following were
mentioned with Forces B (see RIP 0430): 1) Convoy "Batory", "Chrobry",
4 destroyers put out of Scapa at 1515 on 12.4. 2) Convoy from west coast
north of Minch at 1200.
- 26 -
1045 - W/T message from M.11: In action with U-boat in grid 3946.
1055 - Radio intelligence report: C-in-C Home Fleet to "Penelope" and
destroyers - The following are to take part in Operation 13, one destroyer
of 3rd Flotilla, 6th Destroyer Flotilla and Tribal destroyer, in 3530 AF or to
the north at 0800.
1116 - Radio signal 0911: Underwater engine noise in 4465 - F.O.I.C.
Baltic Defenses.
1337 - Radio signal 1154 from U 49: One enemy cruiser, varying course
in grid 3460.
1358 - Radio intelligence report 1340: Wick radio sent urgent W/T
message to Alesund for Admiral Smart in Lillhammer at 1232. At 1240
extremely urgent W/T message for Reid at Grand Hotel Andalsnes.
1420 - Radio signal 1330 from U 49: Enemy out of sight direction 300.
1425 - W/T message 1300: Destroyer action in Ofotfjord, 9 English
destroyers broke through.
1335 - W/T message 1325 from ship 40: Have been torpedoed by U-boat
in grid 4517.
1440 - W/T message 1315: from 4th Destroyer Division: A large unit
apart from destroyers in destroyer flotilla.
1500 - W/T message 1427 from List: A/c reported 1245, Norwegian time;
Norwegian minelayer "Froeya" grid 6775.
1512 - Intelligence report: Agent reported: One French squadron with 3rd
Light Cruiser Division, 5th and 7th Destroyer Divisions and 3rd torpedo
boat Division. 7 U-boats and a/c carrier "Bearn" or "Teste" with 4
transport vessels carrying about 10,000 men put out Brest on the night of
the 11th or 12th for an unknown destination. 3 French transport vessels
and 2 destroyers put out of Cherbourg and Dunkirk for England on 11.4.
1555 - W/T message 1426 from Naval Signal Officer Narvik: English
destroyer Z.O. 3 on fire.
1600 - Radio signal 1230 from U 37: 1 light cruiser and destroyer in grid
7835 AF medium speed northerly course.
1635 - W/T message 1300 from U 37: "Have attacked Glascow
type"-------
1635 - W/T message 1402 from Group Narvik: In action with English
surface and air forces.
1705 - Radio signal 1529 from U 49: One battleship, one a/c carrier, 2
light cruisers in grid 3510 AF. Enemy no longer visible. Direction 350.
1700 - Flying Corps X reports: Reported by a/c reconnaissance: In grids
8510 and 8520 AF: 6 destroyers, 1 cruiser and torpedo boats (3?), 1
battleship (?) proceeding to and fro.
1720 - W/T message from Narvik: Battleship in Rombaken.
132
- 27 -
1725 - W/T message from Narvik: Enemy warships surround Narvik,
attempt landing in Rombaken.
1810 - W/T message 1554 - from Narvik: -------English destroyer. F 05
on ground in the harbor.
1845 - W/T message 1813 from Narvik: Battleship leaves Rombaken.
1925 - W/T message 1707 from U 37: Oil patches and wreckage at
contact point.
2030 - W/T message 1900 from U 34: Minelayer "Freeya" torpedoed
sitting on the beach.
2232 - W/T message 2200 from M6: Burning oil in grid 9477, 1.0 after
depth charge. (Note: U-boat presumably sunk).
2310 - W/T message 2000 from U 46: Battleship and 6 destroyers put out
of Ofotfjord--------
2355 - W/T message 2157 from Narvik: Destroyer near Framnes and
Rombaken.
Radio Intelligence Situation Report 1700:
C-in-C Home Fleet in command of operations. Re-transmission by
"Rodney" and destroyers, area west of line Trondheim-Narvik.
Force B: Op. near Narvik
In command: S.O. Battle Cruiser Squadron. "Repulse", "Warspite",
"Furious", "Penelope" and 9 destroyers.
Force A: Op. Indre Folda
(landing took place)
In command S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron "York", "Berwick", "Suffolk",
destroyers.
 Taking part: "Sheffield", "Glasgow".
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 14.4.1940.
0045 - W/T message 1852 from Narvik: F 03 grounded in harbor.
0045 - W/T message 1709 from Narvik: Destroyer F 75 lacks port 2nd
gun. H 74 also taking part (in ops.).
0335 - W/T message 2120 from U 38: 2 destroyers northeasterly course
Andesnes.
0505 - W/T message 0315 from 15th Patrol Flotilla: U-boat on the surface
sighted in grid 4462 (east of Skagen).
0530 - W/T message 0325 from 1508: Half submerged U-boat passed
through grid 4464. Center.
0530 - W/T message 0318 from 19th Minelaying Flotilla: U-boat in grid
4437 left upper section.
0530 - A/c report: At 2040 east of Molde, Romsdal (or Lang) Fjord 3
destroyers, course 800 and 1 destroyer at the jetty. 3 destroyers, course
800 in Fanne(?) Fjord.
- 28 -
0615 - W/T message from Group 506: Evening reconnaissance. In grid
8611 Romsdal Fjord 7 English destroyers, 1 tied to the jetty.
133
0645 - W/T traffic Aalesund to Wick: The Germans are coming (GKR).
0802 - Radio intelligence report (special) 0750: The following U-boats are
in Skagerrak and Kattegat (12) Orzel, Triad, Sterlet, Sealion, Sunfish,
Snapper, Spearfish, Porpoise, Seawolf, Severn, Shark, Clyde.
0947 - W/T message 0744 from Naval Signals Officer Narvik: Grounded
English destroyer presumably towed off during the night.
1130 - Intelligence report: Between 0300 and 0400 on 12.4 8 PLM ships
and 2 destroyers of Simon class carrying 1st Division Marines from
Cherbourg and Calais to presumably Newcastle.
1230 - Intelligence report:
a) 2nd Battalion Irish Fusiliers embarked at Falmouth to reinforce
Weygands Army. Transport will be escorted by cruiser squadron.
b) French Reconnaissance Squadron 1B Brest put out from English coast
to the north on 12.4.
1345 - Flying Corps X: Reconnaissance results early 14.4. 6 English
destroyers in grid 8292 AF northerly course, high speed at 0510 1 10,000
ton tanker "Orarkaer" in grid 8328 AF, unknown.
1500 - Flying Corps X: English destroyers near Aalesund in Lang Fjord
and Fanne Fjord on the evening of 13.4.
1230 - W/T message 1943 from Admiral West: Dive bombing attack from
0730 to 0800. Army patrols report penetrating craft in Korsfjord (--------
not yet explained).
1425 - Radio intelligence report (special) 1345: C-in-C Mediterranean
Fleet orders ships to get up steam for full speed ahead and half hour
readiness for action.
1600 - Radio intelligence report (special) 1550: C-in-C Home Fleet is in
grid 3165 AF at 2330 on 13.4. Course 45 degs., speed 15 knots. Reports
position to S.O. 3rd Destroyer Division S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron info.,
S.O. Battle Cruisers.
1620 - Intelligence report from Intelligence Group Spain 14.4: "Ark
Royal" and "Glorious" were not yet at Gibraltar on the afternoon of 14.4.
1640 - Radio intelligence report (special): Y positions, 2 U-boats in grid
9557. "Unity", "Ursula" and another boat north of Utsire. "Seal" near
Skudesnes (?), "Triton", "Thistle" at Ris afternoon of 14.4. One Trident
boat from Skag.(errak) to Ros.(ythe?).One U-boat left Ros.(ythe) on the
afternoon of 13.4.
1750 - Radio intelligence report (special) 1715: Wick to unknown unit
directions to proceed via grid 4964 AF, 3715 AF to prearranged position.
(added by Intelligence Office: presumably convoy).
- 29 -
1555 - Radio intelligence report 1725: Unit reported unidentified a/c at
1630 in grid AN 7355.
1755 - Radio intelligence report 1710: According to W/T, mine-laying U-
boat "Porpoise" proceeded to position 4494 AO via AN 7312, AN 5388,
AN 3476 and about AN 3565 for operations FD 5.
1755 - Radio intelligence report 1730: A/c reported at 1605 that contact
with enemy U-boat was lost. Last contacted in AF 8515.
1825 - W/T message 1603 from Naval Signals Officer Narvik: Enemy
destroyers off Narvik. Bombing attack by Norwegian planes.
1900 - Radio intelligence report (special) 1840: Destroyers "Nubian" and
"Fortune" put out of Scapa for Westfjord at nearly 2100 with tanker.
(Reported by U 49).
2120 - Flying Corps X reports: 7 English destroyers in grid 6487 AF at
1850. Northeasterly course, medium speed (11-17 knots) 1905 enemy
making for Namsen Fjord.
2140 - Radio intelligence report 2045:
1) "Hostile" and "Ivanhoe" ordered by S.O. Battle Cruiser Squadron to
proceed to Narvik at 1955 on 13.4.
2) "Galatea" put out of Scapa at 1415 on 13.4.
2216 - Radio signal 2115 from U 38: 3 destroyers in 1110 AG southerly
course. High speed.
134
2220 - Radio intelligence report (special) 2140: Presumably "Repulse"
and "Enterprise" put into Scapa on 14.4. "Bedouin" and "Eskimo" intend
to arrive at Skiel Fjord at 0400 on 15.4. (lofotens).
2215 - Radio signal 1150 (2150?) from U 38: 1 light cruiser, 1 destroyer
NE course Vanopy Fjord (Vaagsfjord).
2332 - W/T message 2030 from U 48: "Warspite" put out with escort.
Grid 3620 AF.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 15.4.1940.
0011 - W/T message 2300 from U 47: Situation in Vaagsfjord: 1 cruiser
at least 6 destroyers. Radar activity by trawler and steamer.
0018 - Radio signal 2330 from U 37: Suspicious vessel in 7942 AF
southwesterly course, high speed.
0018 - Radio signal 2359 from U 37: Enemy no longer visible.
0110 - Radio intelligence report 0025: "Aurora" reported at midday that
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cheatfield had embarked.
0200 - Radio intelligence report 0130: C-in-C Home Fleet at 1516 14.4 to
S.O. Light Cruiser Squadron info. S.O. 3rd Destroyer Division: "Furious"
detached to Ivansoe.
0235 - W/T message 1245 from U 51: Continuous destroyer patrol in
Westfjord....
- 30 -
 1930 - Radio signal 1900 from U 43: Light cruiser in 8774 upper edge
center. Medium speed. Course 00.
0420 - Radio signal 0328 from U 34: 3 enemy destroyers (near) 2135 - Radio intelligence report (special) 2045: It appears from message
lighthouse Kya (grid 6713) course 2300, medium speed. that the "Southampton" has landed troops near Salangen in 68 degs. 48
0540 - Radio intelligence report (special) 0515: "Curlew" informed of mins. N., 17 degs. 45 mins. E. At the same time a Norwegian Division.
assembly point in possibly grid 3443 AF (or 6446 AF) for 1730 on 15.4 at 2140 - W/T message 1900 from a/c: 2 English destroyers in 6497 AF one
2230 on the 14th by unidentified command. putting out. There is apparently an a/c carrier in grid 6732.
1325 - Radio signal 0829 from U 65: 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 5
destroyers, 3 troop transport ships putting into Andoey Fjord.
1350 - W/T message 1125 from U 65: With ref. to signal Alpha 105
enemy proceeding at low speed. Double miss on transport vessel, enemy
out of sight in fjord, appears to be making for Topsund. - 31 -
1400 - Radio intelligence report (special) 1345: "Warspite" is to primarily
remain in Narvik area....... "Renown" was mentioned in same W/T
message.
1420 - W/T message 1332 from U 65: Position grid 9743 AB. Proceed.
1425 - W/T message 0610 from U 34: Grid 6486 2 destroyers course
2600, miss. Destroyer patrol with radar and fishing boat protection near
Knapholmen.
1433 - T/P from Flying Corps X: W/T report 1030 from 1 KG 40 (Bomber 2240 - Radio intelligence report (special) 2205: Destroyer "Imogen"
Squadron): 16 merchant ships, 5 transport ships, 1 cruiser (?) at Harstad. reported to S.O. Battle Cruisers that Norwegian Liaison Officer has
1435 - Radio intelligence report (special) 1340: 3 French U-boats coming arrived in Kirkenes.
from the south, were in the vicinity of Outer-Gabland at 1230 on 14.4.
Passage to the north possible.
1623 - Flying Corps X reported: 1 enemy destroyer in grid 8525 at 1200.
Flying Corps X reported: English destroyer in Namsen Fjord at 1348. F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1653 - Radio signal 1548 from U 59: 1 light cruiser in 2228 AN, northerly
course, speed 15 knots. 16 - 30 April 1940
1657 - Radio signal 1645 from U 59: Enemy no longer visible. Grid
2234. PG30263
1700 - Radio intelligence report (special): S.O. 18th (?) Cruiser Squadron
to S.O. 6th Destroyer Division, cruiser "Glascow" (info. 2nd Cruiser
Squadron): Transport ship "Chobry" proceeding to Namsos.
1740 - Radio signal 1718 from U 10 or U 19: Heavy cruiser in 7895.
Course 2050. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
135
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
K r i e g t a g e b u c h.
B. d. U. - Op.
16. - 30.4.
1940
16.4. At 0410 a report was received from U 47 that she had found
the transports at anchor in Bygden (Vaagsfjord). 4 misses! U 65 had
already fired a double shot (most probably at close range therefore)
without success. I am now beginning to suspect that even the use of
impact firing is not preventing torpedo failures. Either the G7e is keeping
a much greater depth than hitherto known or the pistol does not arm. A
second report from U 47 confirms this idea: in a second attack on the
transports another 4 torpedoes failed to fire. This means a total of 8
unsuccessful shots by our best U-boat commander. It is quite clear to me
that these failures are responsible for the commanding officer's lack of
success.
I requested immediate assistance from C-in-C Navy by telephone
and made a corresponding T/P to Supreme Command of the Navy, giving
a list of failures during the last few days. I requested the Director of the
Torpedo Inspectorate to come to Wilhelmshaven tomorrow for a
discussion. U 47's reports shows that it was right to leave the boats in the
Vaagsfjord in spite of the high risks. It was only in the south of the
Vaagsfjord that they were able to regain contact with the transports. But
now that U 47's attack has failed and will be followed by a corresponding
anti-S/M activity on the part of the enemy. It is necessary to get the boats
out of this witches' cauldron and dispose them at the entrance to the Anden
fjords.
136
Reports from U 25 and U 46 confirm my view that things are very
difficult for the boats in the fjords, as they have no means of attacking
destroyers; an "AZ" shot passes under the destroyers, and "MZ" shot
detonates prematurely. The short, light nights and a sea as smooth as glass
add to their difficulties. I am therefore withdrawing the U-boats from the
Namses and Romsdale fjords as well as from the Vaagsfjord to positions
off the fjords.
In reply to her radio message 2100/15/4, received 0948/16/4, U 46
has been ordered to return.
The Trondheim position, which was not occupied yesterday, is
occupied again.
U 46 and U 51 are interrupting their return passage and have been
given new positions as they still have torpedoes left.
Group FOELLA has joined the groups mentioned yesterday,
between Lofoten and Narvik. U 57 has been ordered to the position off
Scapa and further U-boats are to go there. After Kristiansand was
occupied, I sent Lieut.(s.g.) Windler, the Flotilla Engineering Officer, with
additional personnel, cypher material etc., to fetch U 21. U 21 is now fit
to proceed and dive and can sail from Kristiansand today. Lieut.(s.g.)
ROESING has inspected the Norwegian S/M's and reports that they are
unfit for use either operationally or in the U-boat school. Further details
remain to be seen; I have made the organization department responsible
for finding and requisitioning Scandinavian S/M's. U 13 reported the
sinking of a Tribal class destroyer N. of the Shetlands, so the "MZ" has
worked in this area. This points to Zone setting O being being responsible
for premature detonators.
U 26 and U 43 are to be converted for patrol transport when they
get back. U 32, UA, U 101, U 122 are already being adapted for this
purpose.
 - 33 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
17.4. It becomes increasingly obvious that the failure of the
torpedoes is the cause of our lack of success. On 15.4: U 48 reported
misses and failures at destroyers. U 65: one double miss at a transport
(Vaagsfjord). U 47: 4 misses at transports lying at anchor (Vaagsfjord). U
47: 1 G7a failure, 3 electric torpedoes failed to fire (Vaagsfjord), probably
also at transports.
These reports from the Vaagsfjord and Westfjord boats are
depressing. The hopes that things would be improved by switching over
to "AZ" have proved unfounded. I have placed the most capable
commanding officers at these vital points for the operation. From their
reports and from what is known of their personal qualities and abilities,
there can be no doubt that they made determined efforts and tried
everything possible. I can only accept part of the shots as misses. A large
part were undoubtedly failures of torpedo or firing unit.
Results have shown that it was a mistake to go over to "AZ". The
essential conditions were that the torpedo should not keep a depth more
than 1.75 meters below that set and that impact firing should work for
certain.
137
These conditions are clearly not fulfilled. The reason for the
failures must be either that the torpedo runs considerably deeper and the
targets are undershot or that, for some reason, the pistol does not fire or
does not arm. This suspicion of mine is increased firstly by the fact that
the information which I have received from the responsible authorities on
depth-keeping has varied considerably with time, so that I have the
impression that there is no certainty on this point, and secondly by the fact
that already in October and November odd reports were received from
boats which indicated that shots had hit without an explosion following.
This partly confirmed by information from the Torpedo
Inspectorate. U 65 and U 48 were fitted out with pistols with 4 bladed
propellers. It appears that these pistols are liable not to arm. They too
have been issued to the boats without adequate trial.
The Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate visited me today with
some of his assistants to discuss the failures during the last few days and
the possible causes and remedies.
The results of the conference were:
1) 10% failures to arm must be expected with 4 bladed pistols. Due to an
oversight, improvements which had already been recognized as necessary,
were not made to these pistols. This is a fresh, quite unjustifiable source
of failures and it remains to be seen who is responsible.
2) The Torpedo Inspectorate does not consider it possible that the pistol
fails to arm when switch setting "A" is made.
3) According to information given to the Torpedo Inspectorate by the
hydrographer, magnetic influences on the pistol must be expected in the
fjords. But this influence need only be feared close inshore. It could only
be present in the open sea area if there are hitherto undiscovered layers of
ore below the sea bottom and then only in depths
- 34 -
 18.4. Following Naval War Staff's new instructions 4654, boats are
being distributed as follows:
A) Small boats:
Date Position, Wind, Weather The following will go to the U-boat School as soon as possible:
and Sea State, Illumination, Events U 1 - 7, 9, 10, 18, 19, 20 and 21 - 13 boats
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. The following will remain off Bergen until their supplies are exhausted:
U 14, 17, 23, 24 - 4 boats
Total 17 boats
The following will remain for operations:
U 13, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62.
B) Large boats:
of water up to 100 meters. 1) U 25, 38, 49, 65 will remain in the Lofoten area until they have used
4) The Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate is doubtful of the advisability all their torpedoes.
of using impact firing with switch setting "A" as he does not trust the
torpedo's depth keeping, and he strongly advised a return to "MZ".
5) Experiments with torpedoes with adapted depth-gear have been
satisfactory on the whole so far. Variations in depths were between plus or
minus 0.5 meters. Sufficient experiments have not yet been made,
however, to give a final judgment. - 35 -
As a result of the conference the following instructions were given to
the boats, in agreement with the Torpedo Inspectorate:
a) The G7e probably runs more than 2 meters below the depth set.
b) Boats in zone O are therefore no longer to use switch setting "A", but to
fire with "MZ" except inside narrow fjords. Danger of premature
detonation is greater in these.
c) No fans with time switches are to be fired with "MZ", but multiple shots
according to fire control memorandum or improvised fans with 8 second
intervals. Date Position, Wind, Weather
d) With "MZ", set depth to equal draft, 4 meters against destroyers, 3 or 4 and Sea State, Illumination, Events
meters against S/M's. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
e) With "AZ" set 4 meters, 3 meters in good weather.
These instructions are so complicated that I would never give them to
operational boats except in present circumstances.
138
 U 51 reported a double shot at a Southampton class cruiser, no
success.
2) U 30, 34, 50 will remain in the Trondheim area.
3) U 47, 48 37 are on their way back. Reports from U 52 and U 65 show again under what difficulties
4) U 29 is on her way out. the boats are operating in the fjords: almost no darkness, strong anti-S/M
5) U 46, 51, 52 are being recalled. activity at times, reloading only possible by moving away.
6) U 28 is under repair
Total: 15 boats. It is therefore correct to withdraw the boats in the Namsos fjord to
The following are intended for transport to north Norway: positions further out. U 34 and U 50 have been ordered to waiting
U 26, 32, 43, 101, 122, UA - 6 boats. positions off Folla, near the island of Kya.
These will patrol up and down the NOrwegian coast at the same time.
Of these only U 26 is at sea, about to enter Trondheim. 19.4. All operational and tactical questions are again and again
With these preliminary arrangements there will be: colored by the intolerable state of the torpedo arm. The problem of where
to operate the boats depends not only on the usual conditions, but in every
case the question: "Will the torpedo work?" has to be considered. The
8 small boats torpedo situation today is as follows:
15 large boats On 18.4 U 37 reported on her return that she had 2 prematures
23 U-boats detonators in the area between the Shetlands and Iceland and had then
scored successes with switch setting "A". This is further proof of the fact
left for the main operation by the beginning of May, and the 6 transport that premature detonations do not only occur
boats will only be available to a limited extent.

U 47, which was recalled owing to engine defects, is ready again

and she has been ordered to the area west of the Shetlands-North Minch. - 36 -
U 26 entered Trondheim.

U 13 and U 61 have been ordered to put in to Bergen to refuel.

They are to operate again with U 57, 58, 59 and the first wave of the
remaining small operational boats.

U 37 has returned from patrol. This boat also had premature detonators
in zone O, but nevertheless sank 3 steamers, totaling about 18,600 tons,
and a warship, probably a cruiser, with switch setting "A" or south of zone Date Position, Wind, Weather
O. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

139

near the coast: plainly the magnetic influence exercised on the pistol in
zone O are not explained. So far no premature detonators have been
reported from the southern zones, on the other hand there have been 2
successes (hit on English S/M by U 3, hit on Tribal class destroyer by U
13).
Torpedo Inspectorate informed us by telephone that investigations
had shown that a further 7 boats were issued with the pistol with 4 bladed
propeller from which 10% failures to arm are to be expected. The boats
are U 38, 43, 50, 52, 57, 61 and 62. We will therefore have to take further
failures due to non-arming into account without being able to do anything
about it. Efforts will be made to exchange the pistols in U 61 when she
puts into Bergen to supply. Arrangements are being made to fly the pistols
to Bergen.
On 19.4 in the morning the Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate
telephoned that the results of trial firing showed that the G7e when set at 2
meters, kept a depth of 3.5-4.7 meters, i.e. up to 2.7 meters below set
depth.
My suspicions and the doubts expressed by the Director of the
Torpedo Inspectorate on 17.4 on the torpedo's depth-keeping have thus
proved well-founded. I have therefore decided to let the boats leave the
Vaagsfjord and Westfjord, as their operation there can no longer be
justified. Conditions are very difficult for those boats with the short nights
(practically no darkness) and the narrow operations area, making it almost
impossible for them to move away and the constantly recurring premature
detonations mean great danger. But in the light of this fresh information
on the torpedo's depth-keeping it is no longer possible to go over the
switch setting "A" as no targets with a draft of less than 5 or 6 meters
could be torpedoed (the shallowest possible depth setting is 3 meters in
good weather). In effect, therefore, the boats are unarmed.
During the night 19/20/4 U 47 reported 2 torpedoes fired at
"Warspite" in square 5446 (about latitude of Namsos), which failed to
detonate. Range - 900 meters, depth 8 meters, zone minus 4, one end-of-
140
run detonator. U 65 reported a G7e premature detonator after 22 seconds
at the cruiser "Emerald" in square 9741 (approach to Vaagsfjord). In zone
O (north of 62.5 degs. N), of 22 shots fired during the last few days at
least9 have been premature detonators, which in their turn have caused
other torpedoes fired at the same time to explode prematurely or to miss.
These premature detonators have occurred not only close to the shore but
to a large extent, also in the open sea area. The use of "AZ" with switch
setting "A" is barred for reasons given earlier.
At present, therefore, the Navy has no torpedo which can be used
in the area north of latitude 62.5. I am therefore, withdrawing the boas
remaining in this area (off Andalsnes) in order to operate them to better
effect in a suitable area south of this danger zone. For shots against
destroyers and submarines I have ordered a depth setting of 3 meters,
which according to present knowledge and experience is the shallowest
depth setting which leaves any certainty that the torpedo will not break
surface.
I was somewhat reluctant at first to take the Torpedo Inspectorate's
advice and order a depth setting of 2 meters in good weather. It is based
on the fact that, with the 30 test shots mentioned, not one broke the surface
when set at 2 meters, but these test shots were fired from an underwater
tube from a depth of 4 meters and it
- 37 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

is questionable whether the torpedo will not break the surface if it is
fired from a tube at 10 meters depth (depth of discharge tube when boat is
submerged) with a depth setting of 2 meters, and what happens if the boat
is down by the stern, which is not always avoidable when firing? A
surface runner, by day at least, is even more dangerous for the boat than a
premature detonator. On the other hand everything possible must be tried
to eliminate under-firing. I therefore, ordered U 30 to fire 2 test shots
immediately from periscope depth with electric torpedoes, with a depth
setting of 2 meters, one with the boat on an even keel, the other 30 stern
heavy, and to report the result, giving the seaway. The result was
satisfactory, neither of the torpedoes broke the surface in a head sea 3. I
therefore gave the following order for depth setting of torpedoes: Radio
message 0103/21/4:
In "MZ" shots, depth to equal draft minus 1 meter, against destroyers,
submarines and steamers under 4,000 tons: depth 3 meters, in good
weather 2 meters. For "AZ": depth 3 meters against all targets, 2 meters
in good weather.
The torpedoes fired by U 47 at "Warspite" on 19.4 which failed to
detonate, are still unexplained. I think it improbable that, with a depth
setting of 8 meters, the torpedoes could have run under the firing field of a
battleship, even if they actually kept a depth of 11 or even 12 meters.
If these shots were not misses (which is highly unlikely in view of
the commander's unmistakable report of failure to explode and the short
range of 900 meters and a double shot), then it must be assumed that there
was a degaussing effect.
I consulted Professor Cornelius and Professor Gerlach by
telephone and they consider that it would be extraordinarily difficult to fit
D.G. gear in battleships and that it is therefore very unlikely in such ships
at present.
141
I am not quite convinced. We have definite information that the
English have fitted many of their merchant ships with D.G. gear for
sometime past. They will attach the greatest importance to the protection
of their most valuable ships and make every effort to achieve it. But for
the few cases where a boat manages to fire at a large warship I would like,
as far as lies in my power, to exclude the smallest chance of failure. I
therefore ordered, at midday on 21.4 a depth setting of 5 meters for shots
at battleships. Then, even if the torpedo runs 3 meters deeper, i.e., at 8
meters, impact firing may still take effect. At the same time I restricted the
use of the 2 meter shot to the G7e, as, with the G7a, there is still the
danger of surface-runners. During the last few days the boats have been
overwhelmed with a large number of orders on the use of torpedoes, type
of firing unit and depth-setting. Resetting the pistols always means long
re-loading jobs, which cannot always be carried out. THe commanding
officers are burdened and restricted by the frequent contradictory orders.
I was forced to give these orders because of the constant fresh
failures and the conclusions drawn therefrom, but, above all, by the almost
daily new discoveries made by the Torpedo Inspectorate of the defects of
their torpedo. It now appears that the Torpedo Inspectorate had no reliable
information on any aspect of the G7e.
I had to do everything possible to prevent further failures when the
causes of failure became known and especially to prevent as far as
possible unjustifiable risk of the boats.
- 38 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
It is monstrous that B.d.U. should have to be burdened with
lengthy discussions and investigations of the causes of torpedo failures and
their remedy. This is the business of the technical inspectorates and
departments. But as long as these authorities are slow to do what is
necessary, I am forced to take action.
The most urgent requirement now is to improve the depth-keeping
of the torpedo:
1) The influences affecting the "MZ" pistol are not yet fully understood,
a remedy cannot therefore be expected for the present. The situation gets
more confused with each day instead of better.
2) The danger of the enemy using D.G. gear is increasing daily. We will
then be reduced to using impact firing only for the present, until another
form of firing is really ready for operational use.
The first trial shots with the adapted depth-keeping gear are very
promising; it is to be hoped that we shall find our way out of the maze of
errors along this narrow path.
I find myself forced to withdraw the U-boats from zone O because
of the torpedoes. As the England/Norway area has still to be guarded, they
will operate west and east of the Orkneys and Shetlands, in the hope of
intercepting the traffic to north Norway.
U 3, 5, 6 and 48 entered port.
Orders to the boats for re-grouping:
0930 To vaagsfjord boats and U 25: New waiting position west of the
Shetlands. Move off in the direction of square 1200 AN. Attack
according to Standing War Orders.
142
0905 To U 26 and U 43: Return after delivering supplies. Report when
leaving.
2125 To U 52: Freedom of action to operate west of the Shetlands and
Orkneys in accordance with Standing War Orders. Report intentions by
short signal.
2125 U 23 to occupy an operations area east of the Shetlands as far as
03000 E. Attack according to Standing War Orders.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
EXTRACT FROM INVESTIGATION OF TORPEDO FAILURES
Most Secret M83 s/42 third issue of 9.2.42.
6) B.d.U.'s view, expressed in his reports and in his War Log, that defects
in the torpedoes and their pistols were particularly apparent during the
Norway operation and had a decisive effect on the results, must be
amended, insofar as there cannot be said to have been a particularly
noticeable increase in torpedo failures during the Norway operation as
compared with the results of U-boat warfare before this time. Lack of
success during this period is rather mainly to be attributed to explained
misses, which amounted
- 39 -
to 41.8%. They were largely due to the unusually difficult conditions for
U-boat operations during this undertaking (longer ranges, small fast
targets, strong escort, short light nights, unheated torpedoes, unaccustomed U 23 has been given a new position east of the Shetlands. U 57, U
lighting conditions). 58 and U 59 can transfer their operations areas 70 miles in direction 350,
Historical Department will incorporate the above text in B.d.U.'s as in their present positions they are restricted by strong anti-S/M activity
War Log of the Norway operation and will annotate the relevant passages at present.
in the War Log accordingly.
................................ U 13, which has refueled in Bergen, has been ordered to a position
(signed): Raeder. west of Pentland Firth.

--------------------------------------------------- U 38 reported, among other things, that she could not maintain a
-------------- high continuous speed owing to consumption of lubricating oil. It is not
desirable to judge from here what effect technical defects are having on
the boat. The commander will have to decide himself what to do.

Date Position, Wind, Weather U 48 entered port.

and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. U 21, which left Kristiansand on 16.4, released from internment,
entered Kiel.

I am withdrawing U 30, 34, 50, which are still north of the

Trondheim Fjord, to the southwest.

20.4 U 34 reported convoys yesterday and today, but had no success 21.4 U 47 has pursued the convoy which she reported yesterday and
with a double shot. has brought up U 65 and U 38.

U 47 managed to shadow a convoy. The boats which previously in
the Vaagsfjord and U 25 can operate against this.In the open sea, far off
the coast, they will probably be able to make their attacks without constant
interference from a/c. Whether or not the torpedoes will detonate remains
to be seen!
U 61 has arrived at Bergen and will take over oil and exchange
pistols. Different pistols have been sent for her by air. She is then to
proceed off the Minch.

This morning alone there have been reports of 12 unsuccessful - 40 -

shots!

U 9 reported the sinking of an ex-Polish destroyer. South of zone

O!

143

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
There have been no reports for some days from the following:
U 1: last sailing report 6.4 from Nordeney. U 1 is in the inner position
off Stavanger.
U 25: last report 16.4 Ofotfjord.
U 49: " " 13.4 square 3510 AF.
U 50: " " 6.4 leaving Nordeney.
There is a radio intelligence report of 19.4 of the landing of 40 U-
boat prisoners-of-war in Scotland and the sinking credited to a trawler. No
conclusions can be drawn.
Observations covering the last 5 days show that the convoys from
England to the Lofoten Islands and Tromsoe sail from off the North Minch
and proceed via square 7500 AF. U 13, 52, 30, 34, as "western boats", will
therefore occupy the area around the Shetlands: .
U 13 square 1500 AN U 30 square 1300 AN and 7700, 3400 AM
U 52 square 3500 and 3600 U 34 square 1100 and 1200 AM.
Because of Y-reports received, all boats were warned of S/M
danger in square 3700 and 3500 AN.
U 51: was fired on unsuccessfully in square 3751. There is danger
of mines and S/M's off approach route "GRUEN"; this route has been used
for a long time. It is necessary to change to route I.
144
U 7 and U 10 entered port.
22.4. U 47, 65 and 38 were still shadowing the convoy reported by
U 47 on 20.4. U 38 attacked unsuccessfully. Contact was lost late
yesterday evening in spite of bright moonlight. The wind was NNW 6 and
there was a swell; from time to time the convoy steered a course N. The
boats therefore had difficulty in following and hauling ahead. It would be
useless to try to regain contact in this weather and it is also very doubtful
if the torpedoes would fire.
This morning at 0230 I therefore gave the order for these boats to
move off to square 1200 AN, if they had lost contact, and to report their
stocks of torpedoes by short signal.
U 59 reported very light nights. It was hardly possible to operate
close to the coast.
23.4. U 25 reported again. (Her transmitter was out of order). U
29 at last put into Trondheim.
There have been so many radio messages that it had to be
investigated whether the boats are not being requested to make too many
reports.
Enemy reports are already limited to battleships, cruisers and troop
transports, and these are essential if a picture is to be formed of the
situation in the operations area and a/c or other boats are to be sent out.
The only possibility is to use short signals more. Whether or not these can
be D/F'd must be tested by our own D/F network with the next boats to
sail.
U 65 again reported battleships and destroyers. She should arrive
in the area west of the Shetlands tomorrow together with U 25
- 41 -

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
and also U 61, coming from Bergen. It will then be necessary to re-
dispose the "western boats" in this area. Although during the short time
that boats have been there since the occupation of Norway no successes
have been achieved, it must nevertheless be assumed that the main route
for English supply lies through this area.
A scattered disposition is best for anti-S/M activity at this time of
year, at least for the larger boats, while the 2 small boats on the western
side can approach closer to the coast and the starting points (Scapa and
Loch Ewe).
Relevant boats have been informed of the assembly points at
Sullom Voe and Luna Ness reported by radio intelligence and a/c. They
themselves will have to find out what opportunities these offer.
U 43, 9, 19, 46 entered port.
U 43 (Lieut.(s.g.) Ambrosius) took 35 tons ammunition to
Trondheim and several times sighted cruisers and destroyers, with out
being able to attack.
145
U 46 (Lieut. (s.g.) Sohlen) was operating in the Westfjord and the
Ofotfjord and was chased by destroyers. An attack on Warspite failed,
because the boat hit a rock when about to fire. A double shot at a French
"Albatross" torpedo cruiser, at close range ran under, although the depth
set was 3 meters. In spite of her best efforts this boat achieved no success.
The Commanding Officer, to whom no blame attaches, will have to be
relieved because of nervous exhaustion.
U 9 probably sank a large or Jervis class destroyer; the ship could
no longer be heard in the hydrophones after the shot. The sinking is not
absolutely certain however.
For the rest, there is nothing particular to mention about these
small boats.
Mines are suspected in the Elbe. Arrangements have been made
with F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses for the next boats to have mine escort.
Losses due to mines in our own waters must be avoided at all costs and it
should be perfectly possible to avoid them.
24.4. Boats in the operational area, excluding those on their way
back or on transport trips, are now distributed as follows:
U 14, 17, 24 off the approaches to Bergen
U 23, 57, 58, 59 east of the Shetlands and Orkneys
U 13, 61, 25, 30, 34, 65 west of the Shetlands
and Orkneys or on their way there.
U 49, 50 doubtful. Loss probable.
No reports have yet been received from their area west of the
Orkneys etc. U 30 and 34 reported by short signal that there was little
traffic or patrol.
25.4. English attacks on Bergen and consequent chances of success for
the boats there are no longer to be expected. These boats
 U 56, 60 and 62 returned from patrol. These boats were operating
- 42 - off Bergen and between the Shetlands and Norway, temporarily also in the
area north of Stadtlandet. They had no opportunities to attack, but sighted
numerous enemy forces (destroyers).

The commanders of U 51 (Lieut.(s.g.) Knorr) and U 64

(Lieut.(s.g.) Schulz, W.) reported on their operation in the Westfjord.
In spite of difficult conditions (short light nights, calm sea, no
chance of taking avoiding action) there were possibilities of success which
could have had a decisive effect on operations in the north if the numerous
Date Position, Wind, Weather torpedo failures had not caused every attack to fail.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events U 64 was to have provided outward escort for the auxiliary
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. cruiser ship 36, but she did not find her and afterwards operated off
Narvik. After heavy D/C attacks she put into Narvik for repairs and
changing and was sunk by air attack in the Herjangsfjord on 13.4. The
crew was saved except for 8 ratings.

27.4. Lieut.(s.g.) Prien reported on U 47, which entered Kiel on

are therefore being disposed northeast of the Shetlands where prospects
are likely to be more favorable, especially as U 59 reported a convoy east
of the Shetlands
U 26 entered Wilhelmshaven, having transported ammunition etc.
to Trondheim. She sank a transport. Otherwise the trip was without
incident.
26.4. U 17 has succeeded in rescuing the crew of an a/c which made
a forced landing between the Orkneys and the Shetlands.
U 34 attacked the 20,000 ton "Franconia" north of the Minch. The
ship's course had been obtained by Radio Intelligence Service. No
success. End-of-run detonator. Probably a miss at long range.
Nevertheless it shows that it is possible to attack in this area. U 34 is
returning as she has used all her torpedoes.
146
26.4. He was operating against the transports entering the Vaagsfjord and
was stationed in the southern sector of the fjord, where the transports
could be expected to unload. He twice attacked cruisers and destroyers
lying at anchor in the Vaagsfjord (Bygden). If the torpedoes had not failed
this would have meant a success which would have changed the whole
situation in the Narvik area.
U 38 entered port. She too made unsuccessful attacks on
"Warspite" in the Vaagsfjord and on a cruiser in the Andfjord. On her way
back she made contact with a convoy, which U 47 had shadowed in a
masterly fashion, but was forced to dive before she could attack and depth
charged.
Naval War Staff issued the following new directions for U-boat
operations:
1) Orkneys-Minch area to be occupied constantly.
2) As strong a disposition as possible in the Atlantic.
3) For the present further supplies to Trondheim.
 Orkneys-Minch area and west of the Shetlands. These too will have to
return soon without being relieved. They too will need some time after
their return before they can operate again. I have decided to leave them
there until they have exhausted their supplies. It is not yet proven that
there are no opportunities to attack, but every ton of enemy supplies sunk
- 43 - there has a greater value than a ton sunk in the Atlantic.
Later the small boats can operate in the Orkneys-Minch area and
the large ones in the Atlantic.
The requirements can only be met with the few boats if they are
concentrated and used to best effect. The lack of every boat which is
detached for subsidiary operations makes itself felt. It is therefore
regrettable that 5 boats are still engaged on transport. U 32 and UA will
sail for Trondheim today with ammunition and petrol.

Date Position, Wind, Weather 28.4. Nothing to report.

and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. 29.4. U 101 left for Trondheim with ammunition and petrol. U 29,
which is on her way back from Trondheim and was first to have patrolled
the English supply routes, has been ordered to return directly, so that she
can leave for the Atlantic as soon as possible. It was only intended to use
this boat for one transport trip.

4) if necessary operation for case "GELB". U 17, 23, 61, 30 have started on their return passage.
5) U-boat training.
30.4. U 13, 14 and U 30 started on their return passage. The
following are thus left in the operations area:
On the other hand no further action is required in the Norwegian U 25, U 65 NW and W of the Shetlands.
coast area. U 24, 57, 58, 39 NE and E of the Shetlands and Orkneys.
It is not at present possible to fulfill the 2 main requirements,
occupation of the Orkneys-Minch area and operation in the Atlantic, U 65 reported a convoy; she did not manage to attack, but this is
simultaneously. nevertheless an indication of traffic in this area.
The small boats which are now E and NE of the Shetlands will
have to return within the next few days. The 8 small boats which remain U 13, 17, 34 and 52 entered port.
for operational purposes will need long rests before they can put to sea
again. They have carried out 2 and even 3 patrols with only very short
intervals between them. U 13, 61, 25, 30, 34 and 65 are still in the
147

- 44 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 34 was first off Trondheim, then off the Follafjord and finally
west of the Shetlands. She sighted numerous targets off the Follafjord, but
only seldom managed to attack because of strong anti-S/M forces. Certain
success against a cruiser and a destroyer was frustrated in each case by
torpedo failures. She attacked "Franconia" north of the Minch. See 26.4.
U 52 penetrated into the Foldafjord as far as Andalsnes without
encountering anything except a torpedo boat, which chased her. For the
rest of the time she was in the area from the Romdalfjord to the Shetlands
and had no opportunities to fire.
The following points were made:
1) Torpedo situation. Most urgent requirement: to master the depth
keeping of the torpedo. To create a sure impact firing unit. The problems
of torpedo failures were already known and C-in-C Navy has ordered most
urgent steps to be taken to solve them.
2) Small number of boats makes concentration necessary. Secondary
duties must be abandoned. Training necessary, otherwise the boats cannot
148
be manned after 1.9. Request that transport operations be cancelled. C-in-
C Navy decided that 2 U-boats should be withdrawn from transport at
once (U 32 and U 101).
3) Analysis of numbers of U-boats up to 1.1.41, taking into account new
construction and losses. C-in-C Navy's decision for large boats: Atlantic
warfare.
4) Anti-S/M situation. B.d.U. emphasized that the development of a
counter-measure to Asdic, which had already been stated in peacetime to a
most urgent requirement, was essential to the success of future U-boat
warfare. B.d.U. again requested that the best sonic technicians, chemists
and physicists, be set to evolve a countermeasure. C-in-C issued orders
accordingly.
5) B.d.U. reported that his opinion of the Norway operation, even after
the event, was:
a) that the operational and tactical disposition was correct.
b) that anti-S/M activity was very strong, and weather conditions
unfavorable (short nights, smooth sea).
c) that, of course, the slow boats have less chance of success against
fast, escorted warships than against merchant ships, but that nevertheless
the numerous opportunities to attack show that chances of success were
not unfavorable.
d) that torpedo failures cheated the boats of certain successes, even after
all doubtful shots and misses had been subtracted.
(signed): Dönitz
Rear Admiral and B.d.U.
- 45 -

Enemy Situation on 16.4.1940.
0000 - Radio signal 2330 from U 23: Warning. Enemy S/M in square
3186, course NE.
0035 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0035: C-in-C Home Fleet to Flag
Officer in Aurora and S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron: Proceed to Kirkenes
(Tromsoe area) in Devonshire and Berwick with one destroyer.
0054 - Radio message 2130 from U 14: Double miss at "Enterprise"
unescorted.
0057 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0015: S.O. 18th Cruiser Squadron
12.4 to Admiralty: after inspection and intelligence, consider a landing in
Tromsoe very. . . . . . . .
0205 - Radio message from U 65: Enemy landing unit left Andfjord,
2200.
0230 - Radio message 2140 from Narvik: . . . . . . . . destroyer patrol off
Narvik . . . . . . . .
0410 - Corrupt radio message without T.O.O. or signature: Troop landings
with fishing smacks in . . . . . . . . transports at anchor at the southern end
of Bygden, 4 misses.
0418 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0400: Battery Chrobry was with
transport Chrobry on 15.4 . . . . . . . . Cruiser "Glasgow" in control of
operation.
0418 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0410: Aurora and Southampton due
to arrive in Skelfjord at 2000 on 14.4.
0627 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0545: Enemy situation sea area
Bergen to Narvik. Namsos areas: Glasgow, Chrobry, destroyers.
Unidentified port: Botory Westfjord: Warspite, Penelope, Curlew,
destroyers. Vaagsfjord: Southampton, Aurora, destroyers. Fransoe-
Kirkenes: Furious, Devonshire, Berwick, presumably C-in-C Home Fleet,
S.O. 18th Cruiser Squadron.
149
0713 - Radio massage 0458 from Flying Corps X: Early morning
reconnaissance 0445 3 English destroyers square 6494 AF. 0530 square
811 Norwegian destroyer, course SW. Evening reconnaissance 15th: 2
English destroyers square 6492 AF. 1930 Norwegian destroyer square
8298 AF.
0813 - Radio signal from U 19: 2 destroyers square 7984 AF, medium
speed, NE course.
1215 - Radio intelligence report 1200: English unit reported at 0430
German U-boat square AF 5634 or 5334.
1215 - Radio message 1229 from Flying Corps X: One a/c carrier and one
cruiser in Namsosfjord on 16.4.
1438 - G.I.S. report: "Ark Royal" left Gibraltar eastbound 0830/16. 0930
passed Bearn Straits, course east.
- 46 -
1445 - Radio message from G.O.C. Air Forces West: A/c A 208 attacked
English S/M in square 6166, believed sunk.
2620 - Radio intelligence report 1535: Destroyers Jupiter, Punjab received
orders from Admiralty 1400/16/4 to proceed to Andalsnes at maximum
speed.
1635 - Radio signal from M 8: U-boat warning square 1659 (Oslofjord)
left center.
1715 - Radio intelligence report 1625: Unidentified a/c reported 1529 air
attack in square 7891 AF.
1800 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1710: Cruiser York intended to leave
Scapa early on 16.4.
1840 - Radio intelligence report: 1802 AD made a radio message from
square 5510 AF to C-in-C Home Fleet and Admiralty.
1850 - Radio message 1547 from Group 506: According to information
here there is no a/c carrier in Namsosfjord.
1910 - Radio signal 1655 from U 19: Enemy destroyer square 7941,
course 700, medium speed.
1914 - Radio signal 1845 from U 51: Light cruiser in Westfjord
Moskenesoe, NE course, medium speed.
1920 - Radio message 1706 from Narvik: 2 enemy destroyers off Narvik
went close inshore near Skomnes towards midday, towards 1500 evaded
German bombers to the west.
1923 - Telephone call from Group Command: English a/c reported at
1845 enemy S/M square 2977. Dropped 2 bombs, no hits.
1940 - Situation report from Group Command: Flying Corps X reported
that a/c had sunk an English cruiser 15.4 in square 8134. 16.4 an He-111
attacked an English S/M, Spearfish class in square 6166. Sinking unlikely.
2014 - Radio signal 1945 from U 51: Enemy out of sight, bearing 450.
2040 - Radio message 1743 from Group West:Square 3659 AF 3 cruisers
and 4 destroyers sighted stationary. Presumably unloading.
2050 - Radio message 1701 from Group West: A/c reported 3 troop
transports in square 3889 AF, one of them with three funnels, about 25,000
tons. In the Siorafjord 2 cruisers, 5 destroyers. Passed Vega eastbound at
1000.
2112 - Radio signal 2100 from U 30: One light cruiser square 8516 AF,
course 20 degs., medium speed.
2330 - Radio message 2112 from U 13: One tribal class destroyer sunk.
2230 - Radio message 2050 from U 51: . . . . . . . . little patrol in the
Westfjord. 1 destroyer off Moskensoy.
- 47 -
150
Enemy Situation on 17.4.1940.
0000 - Radio message 2210 from U 52: Romsdalfjord reconnoitered, no
enemy sightings.
0100 - Radio message 2244 from U 3: Miss at S/M square 3510 AN.
0100 - Radio message 2205 from U 46: Slight patrol only in Westfjord.
0210 - Radio intelligence report (X) of 0055/17/4: Trawler "India Star"
received orders from S.O. 18th Cruiser squadron at 1847/16/4 to operate in
the Namsos area under the orders of cruiser "Glasgow".
0500 - Radio message 2131 from Narvik: 2 British destroyers patrolling
off Narvik.
0505 - Radio message from Group 506: Afternoon reconnaissance: 4
destroyers square 6277, SSW, high speed, 1530/16/4. No enemy forces in
Namsos fjord.
Radio message 0023 from Group 26 Stavanger: Action report
1600/16/4: square 3252 AF: 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 2
transports. Square 3232: 3 cruisers, 2 transport-ships. 1546 Harstad: 2
light cruisers, 6 destroyers, 3 transport ships. 1600 Bygden: 2 cruisers, 3
transports. 1530 Narvik harbor: 7 transports. 1700 N. of Stasmer: 2
transports, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers.
0820 - Intelligence report (X) 0430/17/4: Furious reported to 1st Cruiser
Squadron at 0755/16/4: arrived Tromsoe 0430.
0914 - Radio intelligence situation report of 0800/17/4: N. Trondheim: 2
cruisers with destroyers of the 6th and 4th Destroyer Flotilla detached to
the Harofjord 0315/17/4 to take over patrol of the fjord. 8 trawlers
transferred to the Namsos fjord and will arrive there probably 23.4.
Cruiser Penelope seems still to be in the Westfjord with several destroyers.
0956 - Radio message 0800 from U 46: 3 troop transports with destroyer
escort in 66 degs., 20 min. N, 11 degs., 40 mins. E, course SW.
1049 - Radio message 0815 from U 34: Constant air patrol. 0600 2
Southampton class cruisers putting to sea, course west. 0700 5 destroyers,
varying courses, disappeared to the NW. Position square 6479.
1051 - Radio message 0913 from Narvik: Destroyer patrol off Narvik to
Rombaken fjord. Otherwise situation unchanged.
1124 - U 46 1019: Enemy in sight 65 degs. 55 mins. N, 10 degs. E.
1140 - U 46 1115: ENemy out of sight 65 degs. 50 mins. N, 10 degs. E.
1245 - Radio message from a/c K2/106: 3 English cruisers and destroyers
course west, high speed.
- 48 -
1245 - Radio intelligence report 1040: A/c carrier Glorious is probably
being transferred to the northern area.
1250 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1225: Cruiser Effingham was in 70
degs., 02 mins. N, 19 degs., 19 mins. E, course 115 degs., speed 27 knots
at 0300/17/4.
1410 - Radio message from a/c K21/106: The enemy forces reported
consist of: 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 3 destroyers.
1655 - Radio message from Group 506 1330: Result of morning
reconnaissance 0502/17/4: 1 light cruiser, 6 destroyers, square 6484,
2600, medium speed; 2 light cruisers, 5 destroyers square 6477, 2400,
medium speed.
1753 - G.I.S.: Report from Belgium:
1) According to English pilots another landing attempt near Namsos is
imminent.
2) 40 miles south of Scapa there are 60 units with troops for Scapa.
1915 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1755: 4 French ships arrived Harwich
PM 17.4 from Cherbourg.
151
2120 - Radio message 1916 from Narvik: Situation 1900/17: Patrol by 2
destroyers from 1700. Bombarded 10 cm. battery position. Framnes etc.,
2134 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2110: Position of battle cruiser
Repulse 1800 in square 2650 AN.
2239 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2200: Cruiser Suffolk requested tug
assistance from Scapa at 1540.
2319 - Group Narvik 2115: 1700 - 1710 2 English destroyers bombarded
position in Framesodden etc.,
2333 - Radio message 2237 U 23: MTB's and English S/M's off
Korsfjord. Evaded 2 attacks by S/M.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 18.4.1940.
0005 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2355: Tug Buccanneer was ordered
at 1852 to proceed to square AN 2663 right top to assist Suffolk.
0017 - Radio message U 52 2200: Yesterday night during hunt with D/C's
and hydrophones. . . . . . . . by torpedo boat near Hovdems. . . . . . . .
Operation in Romsdalsfjord doubtful owing to inadequate visibility and
restricted space.
0035 - Radio message U 7 0002: French destroyers and S/M's patrolling
off Iselenfjord. Accurate hydrophone hunt. D/C attack etc.,
0300 - Radio message from Narvik 2202: 1 a/c carrier, 2 cruisers off
Narvik town. 2005 . . . . . . . . landed. 1830 2 English destroyers east of
Viga.
- 49 -

Enemy Situation on 16.4.1940.
0335 - Radio message from S.O. 15th M/S Flotilla 0220: S.S. Hamm
torpedo hit square 4220 right center.
0425 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0400: Suffolk was in square 1464 at
2225/17/4, speed 12 knots. This position was given to tugs St. Mellons
and Buccaneer.
0830 - Radio message U 19 0810: 4 light cruisers square 7943, course 20
deg., medium speed.
0830 - Radio intelligence (X) situation report 0800: There are cruisers of
the 2nd (Glasgow) and 18th Cruiser Squadrons in the area of the
Indrefjord and N and S of this. Battle cruiser "Repulse" was 30 miles SE
of the southern tip of the Shetlands at 1800.
Heavy cruiser "Suffolk" was badly damaged in yesterday's bombing
attack. She was 50 miles E of Fair Island at about 1900. Already at 1540
she had urgently requested tug assistance. At about 2300 Suffolk was off
Fair Island, course 256 degs., speed 12 knots. Tugs Buccaneer and St.
Mellons were sent to her assistance P.M.
0955 - Radio messages from Group "Weiss" 2202, 2132: 2050 army
landed in Dorax. Reported 1535 06 E 5350 2 battleships, 1 cruiser, course
S. 1838. . . . . . . . 1 a/c carrier, 2 cruisers, 9 merchant ships off Narvik
town. 1830 3 English destroyers E of Vigra.
0955 - From Supreme Command of the Navy, Main Radio Intelligence
Department: According to press reports (via attache) a USA cruiser
"Trenton" and 2 destroyers have been ordered from Lisbon to Norway to
protect USA citizens there.
1000 - Radio message Narvik 0842: Situation 0900/18/4 unchanged. No
destroyers off Narvik.
1204 - Group West 1150: According to a report from an a/c, about 10
watching mines were observed off Lindesnes in square 5329 and square
3537.
152
1230 - Radio message U 10 1200: Enemy in sight, 1 light cruiser, course
2200, slow speed.
1242 - Radio intelligence report 1205: Ark Royal left Gibraltar westbound
during the night 16/17/4. Is in radio communication with Channel bases.
Probably on passage home.
1303 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1235: Early on 17.4 the following
destroyers left Dover for Scapa: Busilisk, Beagle, Wren, Witch, Antelope,
Wolverine, Vansittard and 2 unidentified. 18th Cruiser Squadron was
ordered at midday 15.4 to proceed to Lilles Jona (about 66 degs. N, 13 E,
near Indrelet).
1355 - Radio message a/c E 3/406 1217: English cruiser square 2246,
course 2300, medium speed. Am shadowing enemy forces.
1425 - Radio message from Group Narvik 1215: Enemy reported to have
landed in Salagen and Lavangen. So far no results of own reconnaissance
received.
- 50 -
1540 - Radio message from a/c D2/406 1325: Square 2610 English
cruiser, 200 degs., slow speed.
1540 - Radio message from a/c K6/EL 1400: Cruiser course 230 degs.
1543 - Radio message from a/c A2/406: square 2189 1 English battle
cruiser, course 230 degs., medium speed.
1543 - Radio message from a/c K2/406 1435: 4 cruisers, 5 destroyers in
line ahead, high speed, course 3100, square 2645.
1605 - Radio intelligence report from Naval Communications Officer
Elbe-Weser Radio Station: Daventry 1520: Air Ministry announces
among other things: 1 German U-boat successfully attacked at low height,
1 hit observed. Admiralty announced losses in S/M "Thistle": 5 officers,
48 ratings.
1815 - Radio intelligence (X) situation report 1700/18/4: Damaged cruiser
Suffolk in Scapa. The following French forces are in north Scottish
waters: Cruiser"Emil Bertie", 2nd Flotilla Leader Division, Battleships
"Dunkerque" and Strassburg" possible. An unidentified ship was
torpedoed on 18.4 north of the Shetlands.
1851 - Radio intelligence report Naval Communications Officer Elbe-
Weser Radio Station. 1600: Admiralty announces British losses during
the Norway operations as 4 destroyers, 1 S/M.
1936 - 1 S/M in 59 degs. N, 15 degs. E. No further positions reported.
2000 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1830: French minelayer cruiser "Emil
Bertie" was in 62 degs. N, 02 degs. W at 0900/18/4.
2325 - Radio message U 65 2041: 0330 light cruiser or large destroyer
entered Andfjorden, 1630 one ship type Emerald left. Practically no
darkness. Have to move off to reload, position thus unoccupied for hours.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 19.4.1940.
0007 - Radio intelligence (X) report 2345: 1213/18/4 S.O. 18th Cruiser
Squadron transmitted to Admiralty General Wiart's report of landing
carried out in. . . . . . . . (remainder unresolved).
0139 - Radio intelligence report 0125 Naval Communications Officer
Elbe-Weser Radio Station: Daventry 0110: 1) British S.S. "Swainby"
4,936 tons, torpedoed yesterday off coast of north of Scotland. 38
members of crew today landed in a north Scottish port. 2) 40 U-boat
prisoners-of-war landed at a NW Scottish port this evening.
0147 - Radio message Admiral West Coast of Norway 2152: Situation
report: 1730 Norwegian time S 21, 23 in action with a Norwegian torpedo
boat in Hardanger fjord.
153
0400 - Radio message Trondheim 2348: Unidentified a/c, apparently
destroyer, 2210 west of Agdenes inshore, sighted for a short time.
- 51 -
Enemy Situation on 16.4.1940.
0515 - Radio messages Group 506, 2215 - 2316 - 2342:
1) Reconnaissance results 1415/18/4 L2/506 square 8542 one cruiser 270
degs. and 1425 square 8288 left heavy cruiser circling.
2) 1645 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers SW 67 degs. 55 mins. N, 1305 E,
bombed at 800 meters, result not observed. Heavy flak defense.
0902 - T/P from Flying Corps X: 0753 in square 06E 7684 left English
light cruiser, course 300 degs., high speed.
1257 - Radio message from U 1 1235: 2 light cruisers square 8250, W.
course, medium speed.
1311 - Radio message from U 40 1204: Enemy in sight, 1 battleship
square 5596 AF, SE course, medium speed.
1350 - Radio message from U 9 1330: 2 light cruisers, square 8250, W
course, medium speed.
1505 - Radio intelligence report 1425: S/M Sealion and others informed at
1830/18/4 that 3 French S/M's had left Harwich.
1807 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1750: Battleship Resolution had left
Portsmouth midday 11.4 and arrived in the Clyde P.M. 12.4.
1939 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1845: Flak cruiser "Cairo" and
destroyer "Zulu" left Skelfjord 1600/18/4 to join 18th Cruiser Squadron.
At 1300/18/4 S.O. Destroyers of the Home Fleet ordered destroyer
"Basilisk" to proceed to an area approximately 60 degs. N 0020 W at
maximum speed.
2035 - Radio message from Narvik 1702: Heavy ship landed from boats
off Bogen.
2035 - Radio message from Narvik 1858: 3 destroyers and 1 heavy ship
approaching Narvik.
2110 - Radio message from Narvik 1931: Enemy ships left west-bound.
Target for bombers from Trondheim.
2110 - Radio message from U 51 1656: Double shot at "Southampton"
class cruiser, both probably end-of-run detonators square 8182 AF. Patrol
by 2 cruisers. NW 3, overcast, snow.
2120 - Radio message from Group Narvik 1927: Enemy battleship and 3
destroyers in Ofotfjord, latitude of Bogen. Motor boat traffic between
warships and Bogen.
2200 - Radio message from Trondheim 1907: 1853 a/c report light cruiser
at anchor square 8615.
2240 - Radio message U 34 1832: 2 battleships, 3 troop transports, 2 light
cruisers. Enemy zigzagging. Enemy steering southerly course, medium
speed.
2240 - Radio message from Narvik 2103: Enemy warships in Ofotfjord,
latitude of Bogen. Lively boat traffic to Bogen.
- 52 -
Enemy Situation on 20.4.1940.
154
0006 - Radio message U 57 1500: York entered Pentland. Yesterday
hydrophone target.
0028 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2355: Unidentified French units were
ordered at 1900 to rendezvous in AF 6473 at 2000. Course 310 degs., 22
knots.
0028 - Radio message U 59 2309: Strong destroyer and trawler patrol in
operations area, with echo-ranging gear, as far as 2 degs. W. Mostly
forced to dive deep by day. Sea 4 NE wind 4, position square 1640.
0150 - Radio message U 47 1553: Square 5446 AF 2 torpedoes at
Warspite. Failed to detonate 900 depth 8 zone minus 4. One end-of-run
detonator. Two electric torpedoes left.
0220 - Radio message U 65 2112: Triple fan without success at "Emerald"
square 9744 AB 2040. Center shot premature detonator. Leaving.
Situation: Warships entering and leaving between 3 and 7, 1800 and
2200.
0250 - Radio message U 38 0103: Quadruple fan at type Frobisher, long
range, detonation after 9 minutes. Hit not observed, as submerged.
Failure not probable. 1 bow, 4 stern torpedoes remaining.
0440 - Radio intelligence report (X): France. One high-ranking Flag
Officer afloat assembled units subordinate to him at 2135/19/4. 2315 he
was ordered to Sullom Voe (Shetlands). The unit mentioned in radio
intelligence report 2355 received the same order at 2345. Additional: the
warships reported by U 34 at 1832 were probably French.
0555 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0540: S.O. of Naval Forces off
Narvik ordered S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron to join him, in a radio message
2235/19/4.
0600 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0525: S.O. 2nd Cruiser Squadron
reported at 1700/19/4 that cruisers "Galathea" and Arethusa" were leaving
for Rosyth.
0640 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0555: Unidentified unit was at 0215
given a starting point for 0700 in square AF 6473.
0640 - Radio message U 47 0530: Enemy in sight, 1 battleship, 4
destroyers, square 4961, course 20 degs., medium speed.
0655 - Radio message U 47 0615: Enemy convoy in sight, consisting of
10 vessels, escorted by destroyers, square 4937, steering northerly course,
medium speed.
0819 - Radio message U 47 0812: Enemy convoy in sight square 4931,
NE course, am shadowing, am SW of convoy.
0820 - T/P from Flying Corps X: 0507 6 transports in Namsos fjord, 6
transports leaving.
- 53 -
0851 - Radio message U 47 0838: The convoy reported is escorted by 1
battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, square 4698 left bottom, 8
knots.
0905 - Radio message U 26 0625: 1 Afridi and 2 Albatross 80 degs.,
square 6479.
0942 - Radio message U 65 0800: 1 battleship, 1 troop transport square
3169 AF, zigzagging, steering 50 degs., medium speed.
1016 - Radio message U 47 1045: 7 torpedo boats square 4696 right top.
1145 - Radio message U 38 1110: Enemy in sight, 1 battleship, 1 troop
transport, square 3223 AF, steering NE course, medium speed.
1223 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1210: battle cruiser "Renown"
informed 2300/19/4 by C-in-C Rosyth that lights and boom had been
ordered. Accordingly she intends to enter Rosyth.
1238 - Radio message U 47 1219: Enemy convoy square 5472 left top.
1240 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1210: S/M "Sunfish" intended 19.4 to
put into Harwich. "Ursula" intended to arrive Rosyth 1100/20/4.
1345 - Radio message U 47 1321: Square 5449 center bottom, 650, 7
knots.
1500 - Radio message Narvik 1321: Cruiser "Penelope"bombarding
Narvik railway station.
155
1545 - Radio message U 47 1435: Enemy convoy in sight, square 5457
left center.
1800 - T/P from Flying Corps X 1130: 1035 Andalsnes 1 light cruiser, 1
transport ship.
1800 - Radio message U 34 1448: Double shot "AZ" at cruiser, depth 3
meters, range 7 hectometers, no success. Situation: Warships, transport,
entering and leaving morning and evening. Otherwise constant patrol by
destroyers and a/c. Leaving square 6476.
1800 - Radio message U 30 1520: Leaving west of Anlesund. Patrol by
destroyers and a/c. Hydrophone hunt with D/C's. Fired on by S/M on
17th. . . . . . . .
1805 - T/P from Flying Corps X.I 1145: 1 destroyer in 06 E 5332 1045,
one in 06 E 4327. Course 120 degs., medium speed.
1825 - Radio message Group Narvik 1314: English cruiser bombarding N.
beach of Narvik from direction of Rombaken light.
1830 - Radio message U 47 1753: Enemy convoy in sight square 5453
upper half center.
1923 - Radio message U 47 1911: Enemy convoy in sight, left center,
enemy making 7 knots.
- 54 -
2110 - Radio message U 47 2054: Enemy convoy in sight square 5432.
2145 - Radio message Group Narvik 1929: Cruiser Penelope and
destroyers off Narvik and Rombaken 1230-1600 cruiser sank a Rombaken
ferry and damaged the ore railway bridge near Forsnesht, repair possible.
Some casualties. Warship off Bogen.
2245 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2210: England: Following
decyphered 1940 from radio message from unidentified English unit 2
JGQ to Admiral Commanding Orkneys and Shetlands, T.O.O. 1300/20:
Namsos in flames. Forces under my command constantly bombed by
enemy a/c since 1100. 1 trawler hit and drifted onto the coast, others very
short of ammunition. Request assistance, am taking up position agreed
whenever possible. The same unit reported with T.O.O. 1730/20,
intercepted 2000: Situation now desperate, request immediate assistance.
Am being bombed constantly.
2319 - Radio message U 47 2226: Enemy convoy in sight square 5277 left
center, course 50 degs., enemy making 7 knots.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 21.4.1940.
0128 - Radio message U 47 0058: Enemy convoy in sight square 5272
right center.
0412 - Radio message U 47 0328: Enemy convoy in sight square 5258 left
top.
0655 - Radio message U 47 0510: Enemy convoy in sight square 5255.
0810 - Radio message U 47 0605: Square 5261 center top.
0845 - Radio message U 47 0802: Square 5235 main enemy force in
sight.
0845 - Radio message U 65: Send beacon signals every 30 minutes 0900
out of order, perhaps 0952 between beacon signals report distance and
bearing of reported enemy forces by radio signal. (T.N.: this is a literal
rendering of the text, including punctuation or lack thereof. It is
unintelligible to the translator)
0910 - Radio message U 47 0856: Enemy convoy square 5239 left top.
0920 - Radio message U 65 0904: Enemy in sight square 5237.
0925 - Radio message Admiral West Coast 0135: Danger of mines W of
Leroe and between northern tip of Lule Sorta and Faroes. Own minefields
156
W and N Byfjord. Hieltefjord not checked. Danger of S/M's at all
approaches. Permanent pilot service around Boern-Stangen etc.
1145 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0930: S.S. "Balmaha", joining 21st
and 23rd anti-S/M Flotillas, was on her way to Namsos on 20.4 and was
re-directed to Skielfjord in late evening. 21st and 32nd (T.N. : sic) anti-
S/M Flotillas were already on passage north and anchored probably at
2000 in 6515 N 1335 E (Ranenfjord). S.S. "Black Heath" mentioned in
same connection. This ship still making for Namsos.
- 55 -
1145 - Radio intelligence report Daventry 1000: 2 British steamers,
"Hondy", 5,000 tons (not registered) and "Uersy", 1,037 tons, sank
yesterday off SE coast of England. Cause not mentioned.
1200 - Radio message U 47 1128: Square 5312 right top enemy convoy in
sight.
1246 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1215: Unidentified English unit
reported sighting a surfaced U-boat at 0700. She had attacked the U-boat
with D/C's, after the latter had crash-dived, until 0745 and had then lost
contact in square 3253 AM right top.
1325 - Radio message U 30 1315: Enemy convoy in sight square 7815
AF. Enemy steering southerly course, speed 12 knots.
1409 - Radio message U 47 1340: Square 2984 enemy convoy in sight.
1422 - Radio message U 30 1340: Enemy convoy in sight square 7845
course 190 degs., 13 knots.
1542 - Radio message Narvik 1412: 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer 4 miles west of
Narvik. Request action.
1634 - Radio intelligence reprt (X) 1610: "Furious" informed 0150/21/4
that there was an enemy base in Halmlaoe in 68 degs. N, 1715 E.
1700 - Radio message U 47 1635: Have lost contact square 2950.
1800 - Radio message U 38 1634: Position square 5313, Heavy D/C's
when attacking. NNW 5, swell. Am trying to haul ahead.
1843 - Radio message U 65 1800: Enemy convoy in sight, square 2997,
steering NE course, speed 7 knots, am shadowing, an SW of convoy
square 5325.
1920 - Radio message U 65 1901: Square 2991 AF enemy steering
northerly course.
2045 - Radio message U 65 2015: Enemy convoy square 2967 northerly
course.
2105 - Radio message Narvik 1833: Evening report: Cruisers and
destroyers around Narvik since 1430. Ore railway bridge demolished by
cruiser. Live boat traffic from warships and trawlers in the direction of
Bogen etc.
2205 - Radio intelligence (X) report 2145: Flotilla leader "Tigre" informed
at 1450 that, according to unreliable radio D/F bearing, a U-boat had been
fixed in 6030 N about 0200 W and was ordered to search for U-boats in
this area.
2320 - Radio message U 51 2205: Fired on unsuccessfully in square 3751
by enemy S/M.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 22.4.1940.
0840 - Radio intelligence report 0740 Naval Communication Officer
West: 1 S/M in 170 degs. 10 miles off AF 7523.
0915 - Radio message Group Narvik 0721: Enemy destroyers passing up
and down all the time, presumably covering enemy unloading
157
- 56 -
in Boyen Bay or approach of enemy transports etc.
1118 - Flying Corps X 1000: 0835 06 E 6346 1 destroyer and 1 transport
ship course 260 degs., slow speed. 0829 06 E 6326 1 destroyer.
1133 - Radio message U 30 0948: Enemy battleship in sight square 7527.
Enemy steering SW course, medium speed.
1220 - Radio message U 30: Yesterday convoy from square 7870 AF at
night with 3 ships to square 7523. There today sighted by a/c while
attacking "Royal Sovereign" and forced by destroyer to remain
submerged.
1525 - T/P from Head of B.d.U. Org.: France: from Army report 18.4
P.M. The wreck of the German U-boat which was attacked by Avisos a
few days ago and the sinking of which was not certain and not officially
announced by the French Admiralty, was today found by divers at great
depth and identified.
1622 - Supreme Command of the Navy, Main Radio Intelligence Dept.: Y-
positions 0700/22/4. One unidentified, 1 unidentified Swordfish, Sterlet
and 1 unidentified in area Skagerrak and Kattegat. Sterlet proceeded to
Harwich P.M. 1 unidentified each near the following positions: Square
2922 AN, 3122, 3841 AN, 3841 AN, N of Teseel. Area of E Frisian
Islands. Seawolf and Shark square 3547 AN on passage to "Harwich"
"Triad" in square 3473 AN, 1 unidentified square 4835 AN. Both on
passage to Rosyth. "Ursula" left Blyth 1100 for Tyne. Triton and Trident
left Rosyth A.M. for Skagerrak area. Additional: Some of the unidentified
S/M's are French.
1730 - Radio message U 62: Square 3748 AN fouled with mines. U 62
1745 - Radio intelligence situation report 1700/22/4: According to a
report from a British a/c a U-boat was bombed at low level in the Bristol
Channel at 1335.
1931 - T/P from Flying Corps X: 1550 1 battleship, 3 cruisers in square
4349 o6 E. Note: were attacked unsuccessfully by 2 a/c.
1931 - T/P from Flying Corps X: 1500 S/M diving square 05 E 7849,
course NE.
2036 - Radio intelligence report Reuter 1935: Norwegian S.S. "Bravore",
1,458 tons, sank today off the SE coast of England after an explosion. 4
survivors landed at a SE coast port.
2100 - Flying Corps X Ic: 1605 3 destroyers W of Aalesund
1536 1 transport Storfjord
1635 1 destroyer 06 E 5316
2105 - Radio message U 26 1930: Square 2373 AN left top drifting mines,
believed German.6,000 ton supply steamer in convoy sunk square 8196.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 23.4.1940.
0035 - Radio message Narvik 2224: English destroyers patrolling in
immediate vicinity around Narvik. No further bombardments.
- 57 -
158
Enemy Situation on 16.4.1940.
0118 - Radio message U 57: Large enemy cruiser in sight and 1 destroyer
square 2623, NE course, have lost contact.
0902 - Radio intelligence situation report of 0800/23/4/40: 1 English a/c
attacked a U-boat unsuccessfully at 1800 in square AN 4922 right top.
1030 - Radio message Narvik 0750: Quiet night. English warships are
bombarding railway installations on Rombaken. Shot down 1 English a/c
yesterday afternoon.
1230 - Radio intelligence report 1210: Battle cruiser "Hood" may be in
the area of the west coast of England.
1232 - Enemy situation Group West 1220: S/M's sighted: Square 4157
AO, 7156 AO, 4955 AN, 3671 AN.
1315 - Group West T/P 1310 - Small motor sailing vessel slightly damaged
by explosion position Elbe 3, being towed in. Necessary to close Elbe. . . .
....
1430 - Radio message U 65 1257: Enemy convoy 8114 AF, NE course,
medium speed.
1757 - Radio intelligence (X) report 1700: Cruiser "Vindictive" is
probably controlling net-laying operations on the Norwegian coast. 1 a/c
attack 1 German U-boat at 0745 in square 1142 AN without success. It
continued to shadow and at 1845 another a/c of the same unit was ordered
to attack the U-boat.
1959 - Radio message U 26 1643: S/M heard in hydrophones square
4984.
1959 - T/P G.O.C. Air Forces Baltic 1910: Submerged S/M square 4129.
2012 - Radio message patrol vessel 810 1915: German S.S. "Sege" struck
a mine in square 8335 right top. Am proceeding to Borkum with survivors
and wounded.
2101 - Radio message T 155 1955: S/M warning square 4185. 2 tracks.
2119 - Radio message Narvik 1857: 1 Afridi, 1 Grom, 2 Hardy constantly
off Narvik-Rombaken. P.M. Penelope bombarded ore railway. Division
expects major attack.
2215 - Radio message Stavanger 1943: According to a/c report submerged
S/M 60 degs., 9 mins. 18" N., 5 degs., 9 mins., 30" E.

---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 24.4.1940.
Radio message U 65 2254: Enemy in sight: battle cruiser, destroyer
square 7358, southerly course, medium speed.
0443 - Enemy destroyer got away in square 3625.
0500 - Radio message S.O. 7th Patrol Vessel Flotilla 0420: Action with
enemy destroyers.
0500 - Radio message S.O. 7th Patrol Vessel Flotilla 0423: Require
assistance urgently, have been hit.
- 58 -
0525 - Radio message S.O. 7th Patrol Vessel Flotilla 0453: Was in
action with 3 Cossack class enemy destroyers. Guns out of action,
wounded on board.
0700 - Radio message S.O. 6th S-boat Flotilla 0500: S-boats report 3
Fantasque square 3625, course SW, high speed.
1005 - Radio message a/c 1/406 0950: Have sight of 2 cruisers in square
4697, 2700, high speed.
159
1020 - Radio message a/c A1/406 1011: The enemy forces reported by
radio consist of 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers. Enemy zigzagging around a
main course 2300. A/c A1/406.
1102 - Radio message a/c A1/406 1057: Cruiser, believed French torpedo
cruiser, very high speed.
1425 - Radio message a/c M 7 BK 1300: Reported enemy forces in sight,
consisting of one cruiser, 2 destroyers square 4985.
1450 - T/P Flying Corps X: 1 English cruiser at anchor off Andalsnes
1210 (Flak cruiser)
1135 one transport ship off Jondal and one off Ulvik in Hardangerfjord.
1458 - Radio message U 30 1446: Am in operations area ordered. Little
traffic, action very well possible.
1527 - Radio message U 34 1449: Am in operations area ordered, little
traffic, action limited owing to weather, medium patrol.
1722 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1700: 1 a/c carrier expected to leave
Scapa for Namsos area.
2011 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1935: At 1548 the French Admiralty
informed Admiral North and Admiral West that there had been a U-boat in
square BF 2617. At 1800 a flying boat from Landeve-Poulmic base
landed in this position, presumably air reconnaissance was flown for the
U-boat.
2013 - Radio message Naval Communications Officer Narvik 1848: The
following took part in today's bombardment: "Warspite", "Queen
Elizabeth", "Enterprise", "Penelope", 7 destroyers including one Pole, 2
armed trawlers.
2227 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2210: A/c carrier "Furious" was
ordered by Admiral Narvik at 1053/24/4 to proceed immediately to Scapa.
1722 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1700: S.S. "Franconia", 10,175 tons,
is at present on her way to the Clyde, off the north coast of Norway.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 25.4.1940.

0058 - Radio message U 59 0003: Enemy convoy in sight, steering NE
course. Have lost contact.
0600 - Radio message MT IL 0537: Attacked S/M in square 3892.
Bombs.
- 59 -
0830 - Radio intelligence report (X) situation report 25.4: "Glorious" is
off the NOrwegian coast. She was in the sea area west of Aalesund
towards midday. Cruiser "Galatea" has not yet arrived in Rosyth for short
overhaul, but was attacked by German a/c at about 1900 N of the
Shetlands.
0830 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0800: S.O. Andalsnes reported to
Admiralty 0830/24/4: S.O. 2nd Cruiser Squadron in "Galatea",
cruiser"Glasgow", destroyer "Ivanhoe", "Impulsive", "Vansittard", "Witch"
have left. Landing of troops and material completed.
1145 - Radio message Narvik 0915: Quiet night, close patrolling
destroyers. At present only 3 destroyers off Narvik.
1147 - Radio intelligence report, Daventry 1110: 2 German Naval Officers
were landed as prisoners-of-war in Scottish ports yesterday, including
Captain Oskar Scharf of Alster.
1210 - Radio message Narvik 1210: Successful attack in progress since
0430 against Norwegians (about 150 men) which took up position 2 km E
of Elvenes on 24.4. Destroyers patrolling off Narvik and Rombaken.
160
1225 - Radio message Narvik 1015: Since about 0900 a Hardy destroyer
has been bombarding positions in the E approach to Narvik. 3 white rings
on her funnel. Polish Bursa No. H 3 1 also there.
1225 - Radio message Narvik 1048: 1030 bombardment by "Enterprise".
1348 - Y-positions: 4 unidentified (French), Trident, 7 unidentified in
Skagerrak-Kattegat area Swordfish square 3603
Sterlet square 3577
Shark square 6161
Seawolf square 6781
All on the way to Harwich. 1 unidentified 0700/25/4 to Harwich.
Unidentified left Blyth for Firth of Forth
3 unidentified left Harwich 1530 for the areas: 1 to N of Teseel, 1 to
area E Frisian Islands (W sector), 1 to area E Frisian Islands (center
sector). All S/M's operating in the North Sea area picked up.
1400 - T/P: 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser 1100 Harstad. 1 destroyer,
course 3000, off Landfjord 0545.
1718 - Radio intelligence (X) situation report 1700: A/c carrier Glorious
in sea area off the central Norwegian coast.
1750 - T/P Flying Corps X 1645: 1540 battle cruiser "Hood" with 2
destroyers in square AF 7893, course 2750.
1800 - Radio message Narvik 1545: 2 light cruisers and 2 destroyers have
been bombarding harbor installations since 1000. So far no damage of
importance. Request bombers.
1830 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1810: A radio message, not
completely intercepted mentions mines in an area bounded by the
following positions:
5117.30 N 0144 E
5117.30 N 0210 E
5115.30 N 0210 E
5115.30 N 0144 E
- 60 -

2135 - Radio message Trondheim 1821: Air recce results: Namsos 1
heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser. Andalsnes 1 light cruiser leaving. Bombing
attacks on cruisers without result.
2231 - Radio intelligence report Daventry 2205: Following an
announcement by the French Navy Minister Campinchi in a speech, Paris
reports that a French destroyer recently sank 2 German torpedo boats, 1
MTB, and 1 750 ton U-boat in the Skagerrak. The action is said to have
taken place within the last 48 hours.
2325 - Radio message U 47 2235: Several suspicious fishing vessels
immediately off western approach to route I.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 26.4.1940.
0030 - T/P 2223/24/4 F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses informs: Mine
explosion near patrol vessel 802 1.3 miles off West Ems southern buoy
bearing 3000, channel still suspected of mines.
0045 - Radio message U 38 2310: Apparently trawler patrol at NW corner
of extended declared area.
0330 - Radio intelligence report 0105-0304: Landsend radio to all: SSS
Franconia Latitude 59.48 N Longitude 5.59 W attacked 0105/26 - 600 M
square 3427 AN (T.N.: text partly quoted in English).
0518 - Radio intelligence report Naval Communications Officer Elbe-
Weser: English S.S. "Cree" GOGP 4,791 tons to all: SSS at 0315 at
Smiths Knoll Buoy S.S. Cree mined - 600 M (T.N.: Text mainly in
English amended).
161
0825 - Radio message U 34 0610: 0245 square 3419 AN double shot at
Franconia, no explosion (8 letters corrupt) were not taken off. No
torpedoes. Starting return passage.
0830 - Radio intelligence (X) situation report 0800: S/M Truant, which on
25.4 was on her way to Songnefjord, has broken off and intends to dock
P.M. 25.4.
? - Radio message N.O.I.C. Trondheim 1050: 2 enemy destroyers, one
each in square 5995 and square 8334, varying courses.
1446 - Radio message Flying Corps Trondheim: 0430 convoy in square
5675 course E 0715 convoy with 1 heavy cruiser, square 7382, course E.
1520 - N.O.I.C. Trondheim 1310: 1207 square 5689 convoy course 2000.
? - Bomber Group 506 1720: 0707 square 8321 4 destroyers 160 degs.,
very high speed.
1600 - Radio message Bomber Group 506 0410: 0513 convoy square
5675 3 destroyers, 3 merchant ships, 800. No shadower.
1832 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1805: F.O.I.C. Andalsnes requested
MTB's on 25.4. They are urgently required for communication between
Molde (and presumably Andalsnes).
- 61 -
2010 - Group West: Situation 26.4 evening. Narvik again bombarded
until 1645. Heavy losses were inflicted by our troops on an enemy
infantry regiment which had landed north of Salangen. Bergen is
supporting the Army operation against Voss. In the sea area north of
Trondheim 2 convoys with destroyer escort were sighted by air recce in
squares 5689 and 7382, both course E. 2 destroyers were sighted in
Frohavet and 2 in Drontheimslela. One cruiser in the Sogne Fjord off
Kirkeboe at midday. No report from ship 26 and 37.
2215 - Radio message G.O.C. Air Forces Trondheim: 1750 square 5699
convoy, 3 destroyers, 3 merchant ships, course 300. 1805 square 5998
right bottom 2 destroyers, square 8332 bottom center 2 destroyers course
SW.
2224 - Radio message N.O.I.C. Trondheim 1825: 1130 square 6732 one
light cruiser.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 27.4.1940.
0208 - Radio message U 23 2200: Double miss at heavy cruiser square
2182.
0718 - Main Radio Intelligence Department 0715: Y-positions: S/M
Swordfish, which was in the sea area N Hanstholm, received orders at
1930/26/4 to return to Blyth. The S/M is to pass the line 5726 N 0550 E to
5543 N 0100 W within 10 miles either side.
0810 - Radio intelligence situation report (X) 0800: Several French units,
which were in the Irish Sea on the evening of 25.4, have arrived in Brest.
0805 - Radio message Coastal a/c Group 506 0632: 0354 square 8326 2
English destroyers course NE, slow speed. 0520 square 8223 English
convoy consisting of 3 destroyers, 4 merchant ships. Course SW. 0600
course S.
1452 - T/P Flying Corps X 1410: Recce results of Recce Group
Stavanger: 0825 square 6743 3 transports with 1 escort ship, slow speed.
Course NE.
0850 square 5634 8 transports, high speed, course NE.
0855 square 5569 2 light cruisers, high speed, course 30 degs.
0915 square 5734 2 cruisers, 350 degs.
0915 square 5554 2 a/c carriers, 1 heavy cruiser, several destroyers, 30
degs.
162
1910 - Radio intelligence report 1800: A troop convoy was reported off
Portsmouth at 1630/27/4. The following French troops passed the
Channel off Dungeness in French ships towards 0200/26/4: 5 battalions of
Alpine troops, Colonial Infantry Regt. 43, 1 battalion of the regiment, 2 of
the Foreign Legion.
2309 - G.I.S.: 3 Polish S/M's fitted out with fuel and ammunition in
Stockholm by night on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. S/M's are
reported to be going to Maelarsen presumably through the canal to
Gothunburg. Note: According to Weyer the S/M's draft is 4.2m.
According to information here lock depths in the Goeta Canal will not take
this draft.
- 62 -
Enemy Situation on 26.4.1940.
0305 - (G.A.F Station) Trondheim 2358:
1) According to sighting report there were 2 a/c carriers, 1 heavy cruiser
and several destroyers 250 km NW of Trondheim at 1400/27/4. Course
NE, could not be attacked as dive bombers had not arrived.
2) 2 destroyers cruised off the Trondheim fjord all day 27.4.
3) a/c reported 2100/27/4 1 transport 15,000 tons, 1 cruiser and several
destroyers off the Namsos fjord.
0405 - Radio message Bomber Group 0105: Situation report 27.4
evening: 2 destroyers square 8326 and 2 5896. Convoy of 3 destroyers, 4
merchant ships square 8221 SW 1520. 2 destroyers square 5996. 1600
recce for Army towards Stoeven.
0805 - T/P Flying Corps X 0710: 0620 Namsos fjord 2 light cruisers, 2
destroyers, 5 transports.
0828 - Radio intelligence situation report 0800: English S.S. "Scottish
American" (7,000 tons) torpedoed off Cape Wrath during the night
27/28/4.
1447 - Radio intelligence report: English a/c reports: 1331 U-boat in AN
1673, course 320 degs.
1650 - Radio intelligence report: At 1616 from Wick Radio to all
merchant ships in the Home area - from Admiralty. Reference Admiralty
message AD position of F Cape Wrath 2336/27th April 0329/28 (T.N.:
text in English. Unammended).
1740 - Flying Corps X 1515: 1130 Aarstadt 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers,
3 destroyers. Square 6963 3 transports, 2 destroyers AD 2260, square
7953 1 destroyer. All plus 16 E.
1520 - 1335 Molde fjord 1 cruiser, course W. 1315 AN 06 E 5432 one
carrier, probably the one first reported 0746 in square 6441.
1620 - 1450 square 9550 (5936 AF) French destroyer, 180 degs.,
medium speed.
2215 - Radio message S.O. 1st M/S Flotilla 2109: AO center
2206: S/M warning, with Asdic,
square 4461 AO center.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
Enemy Situation on 29.4.1940.
0715 - G.I.S.: Report from Spain: At 1100/28/4 British Admiralty
ordered all warships and merchant ships in harbor to be ready to sail
within 4 hours.
0717 - T/P Group West 0630: Following radio message received here:
0332/3 Admiral West Coast: According to radio intelligence report enemy
S/M in Bjoerne Fjord.
163
- 63 -
0815 - Radio intelligence situation report 0800: North Sea: Between
1700 and 1730 several units were attacked by German a/c in the area about
75 miles NW of Namsos. At 1530/28/4 English S/M's at sea received
information about transport ships which had sailed early on Sunday. One
hour later there was a similar message, which mentioned Bjoerne Fjord
and presumably a S/M stationed there.
0825 - Radio intelligence report 0810: English unit reported 0700/29/4
from the Trondheim area that she was being bombed.
0928 - Radio intelligence report 2205/28/4 Cleethorpe's broadcast 2025
the following mine warning:
Norway Westfjord and approaches:
A) Mines have been laid in the Westfjord N of a line from Vaeray Island
Light in 67 degs., 39 mins. N, 12 degs., 43 mins. E, bearing 126 degs. to
mainland.
1140 - Radio intelligence report 1130: It is reported from Stockholm that
a Swedish 3,000 ton steamer struck a mine in the sound and sank. Name
and time not mentioned.
1145 - Radio intelligence report 1140: 1045 a/c E269 reported enemy U-
boat in AN 2736, enemy course 340 degs. U-boat dived.
1406 - Radio intelligence (X) report 1340: A/c carrier Glorious intended
to arrive Scapa 1700/28/4 with 6 destroyers, including "Grenade". Cruiser
"Arethusa" was off Scapa AM 28.4. She also intended to put into Scapa.
2042 - Radio intelligence (X) report 2020: A partly decyphered radio
message of P.M. 24.4 shows that flak cruiser "Curacao" was damaged in
engine and boiler rooms.
2226 - Radio intelligence report Daventry 2200: British Air Ministry time of year, if they are able to move away from the coast to rest the crews
announces: A sunderland Flying Boat and charge their batteries.
U 13 very probably sank a Tribal class destroyer north of the
Shetlands.

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log UA put into Trondheim after a record patrol. U 44 must be
declared missing and with her one of the best commanding officers,
1 - 15 May 1940 Lieut.(s.g.) MATTHES, who sank 36,000 tons on his first patrol. This
boat was off the Norwegian coast and west of the Shetlands before the
PG30264 Norway operation. There is no clue as to her fate.

3.5. U 24 and U 57 started on their return passage, U 58 entered

port.
U 58's observations confirm the view that operation east of the
Date Position, Wind, Weather Shetlands is possible. U 7 and U 9, training boats, will have to be
and Sea State, Illumination, Events prepared for operations for case "GELB", in spite of my concern for the
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. effect on their training. Other U-boats are not yet able to proceed after the
Norway operation.

Of the transport boats, U 32 and U 101 (both still at sea) will be

1.5. Nothing to report.
2.5. U 13, 17, 23, 58 entered port and UA put into Trondheim. U
17 and U 23 have nothing special to report off Bergen and near the
Shetlands. Reports from U 13 and U 58 show:
East of the Orkneys and Shetlands and east of Pentland Firth very
infrequent shipping but very strong patrol and numerous destroyers.
Operation during the summer (short nights) promises little success and
losses may be incurred.
West of Pentland Firth rather more shipping, including
independently-routed, unescorted ships. U 13 succeeded in sinking 2
steamers there, including the 7,000 ton tanker "Scottish American". It
would appear possible for small boats to operate in this area even at this
withdrawn. These boats have the least petrol carrying capacity. UA, U 26,
U 122 and later U 123 are also intended for transport duties.
4.5. U 59 started on her return passage.
U 29 and U 30 entered port, U 101 entered Trondheim. U 29 took
material to Bergen and Trondheim, was heavily depth-charged in
FROHAVET off Trondheim and on her way back made an attack which
failed. U 30 was heavily bombarded by "Hipper" and "Eckholdt" in the
approach to Trondheim, fortunately without results. She was then to
operate off the Romsdal Fjord, but did not succeed in entering the fjord as
there was strong anti-S/M activity and she frequently touched ground in
badly charted waters. West of the

164

- 65 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Shetlands the boat found little patrol, but also no shipping. On her way
there she had to abandon the attack on a convoy as, when she hauled
ahead, the Shetlands were between her and the convoy.
U 32, about whom considerable concern had been felt, reported her
position. A few days ago she reported petrol gas in the boat, which proves
that there is danger in transporting petrol, even in outer fuel tanks.
5.5. U 25 and U 65, the only boats west of the Shetlands, have been
given freedom of action in the whole area.
U 32 entered Trondheim, U 14 Kiel. Her experience off Bergen
and NW of the Shetlands do not differ from those of other boats.
UA and U 101 have been ordered to return direct from
Trondheim.Now that the English have retreated from the whole of
165
southern Norway, an operation against the supply routes to Narvik doesn't
promise success.
According to radio intelligence reports, 2 steamers, one a 6,000
tonner, have run into the minefield laid by U 9 in the Firth of Moray. This
is further proof of the fact that such minefields, laid with the mines far
apart, are successful in the long run.
"Gneisenau" struck an a/c mine between the Elbe and the Jade. It
is thus necessary for boats to proceed only with mine escort until they
reach the 25 meter line. This will mean delays, with the few forces we
have at present which are suitable as escort against contact mines.
U 24, 57, 59, 61 were first ordered to Wilhelmshaven instead of to
the Elbe, as it was thought that the mine hit had occurred in the Elbe,
Gneisenau having given a wrong position.
6.5. U 9 sailed for case "GELB", UA and U 101 for Trondheim.
U 25, 24, 57, 59, 61 entered Wilhelmshaven, U 25 unexpectedly.
She had trouble with her transmitter during the last few days and could not
report. She made the same observations as the other boats in the
Westfjord, but the Commanding Officer knew how to make clever use of
the positive aspects of disposition in the fjords. He is probably responsible
for the sinking of a destroyer off Narvik. U 24 had no opportunities to
attack off Bergen and NE of the Shetlands.
U 61 was operating first off Trondheim (Gripshoelm) and then off
the Minch. Her experiences agree with those of U 13 (see 2.5). Off the
Minch she sighted the "Warspite" at 12,000 meters and later had to start on
her return passage as one diesel was out of action.
U 57 and U 59 confirm the impression that it is now hardly
possible to operate east of the Orkneys and Shetlands. U 57 was heavily
depth-charged. She had 2 unmistakable gyro failures and so lost her
chances of success.

Since 16.1 U 57 has been at sea for 82 days out of 111 (-74%).
With this, the limits of the possible have been reached.
- 66 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
there are similar cases with other boats. Many boats will require a long
period of rest after these weeks of utmost strain.
7.5. Narvik requested U-boats as defense against enemy landings.
Naval War Staff refused. A request from Sea Defense Commandant
Trondheim to use U 32 as wing protection for Army troops proceeding
north also had to be refused.With the few U-boats available, it is already
difficult to do without the transport boats. It is essential to avoid wasting
boats for other subsidiary tasks, especially if these do not promise any
success.
8.5. U 65 has been recalled. She is alone NW of the ORkneys and
it is no longer possible for her to proceed to another more favorable
166
operations area, as she has used up most of her supplies. It is therefore
better not to keep this boat at sea any longer, but to make her ready at time
for operation in the Atlantic, now that it is finally clear that operation west
of the Orkneys is very difficult for large boats.
9.5. U 101 and UA entered Heligoland and in the afternoon both
proceeded up the Elbe to Kiel, attached to an escort unit. These boats have
carried supplies to Trondheim. The transport of petrol was unpleasant, but
presented no major difficulties. No attacks were made.
10.5. C-in-C Navy in the plotting room, head of Operations
Department reported to him.
The transport boats are being redistributed: U 25, a boat which is
not very suitable for use in the Atlantic, will be converted for transport. U
122 will make one transport trip and then be available for use in the
Atlantic.
UA, U 26 and U 123 will remain detached for transport, U 123
after she has commissioned. The smaller Type VII boats, which have only
a small carrying capacity for a/c petrol, will thus be released from
transport duties.
11.5. Nothing to report.
12.5. U 32 requested to enter port along Route II, without giving a
reason. It was assumed that she had encountered strong anti-S/M forces
on the W boundary of the declared area and this was later confirmed by
the Commanding Officer.
13.5. U 43 sailed for Trondheim with supplies for "Theodor Riedel"
and will later proceed into the Atlantic. U 65 entered port via Heligoland.
She was operating in the Vaagsfjord and in the area Faroes-Shetlands-
Minch. She scored no successes.
 - 67 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
14.5. Recently war logs and verbal reports have shown that the
mainly good hydrophone results obtained have often misled the C.O.'s into
diving, even in the open sea area, without there being any great enemy
activity and thus certainly missing some good opportunities to attack.
Instructions covering this have therefore been given to the Flotillas for the
boats (B.d.U. Most Secret 834 of 18.5 1940). Contents: Hydrophones
should only be used as auxiliaries and the commanding officer must
control their activity. The human eye is always a better means of
obtaining data as a basis for tactical procedure.
15.5. Naval War Staff has now decided that no more petrol is to be
transported to Norway. UA and U 26 will therefore be reconverted to their
normal state and U 25's conversion for petrol transport has been cancelled.
U 122, which is ready to sail at Kiel, will put to sea with the petrol she has
on board, otherwise her sailing would have been delayed for about 6 days.
A part of her remaining cargo of supplies would also have had to have
been unloaded, as the light specific weight of petrol raises buoyancy and
permits the boat to take a greater load.
167
U 37 sailed for the Atlantic.
Experiments at the Torpedo Trials Department proved that the
"AZ" unit of the pistol is liable to a high percentage of failures: premature
release of the firing pin. Detonation of the priming.
My suspicions of October and November and later that even the
"AZ" does not always work, have thus been proved correct.
The facts are worse than could ever have been suspected. I have
been informed that the correct functioning of the "AZ" was considered to
be proved in peacetime after only two shots and even these were not
perfect. A method of working such as this can only be regarded as
criminal.
The numerous defects of the torpedoes were only suspected bit by
bit by B.d.U. on the basis of practical operational experiences and show
up; premature detonations, failure of the impact firing unit, failure of the
torpedo to fire, faulty depth keeping. In all cases the torpedo technicians
either denied the possibility of a failure or else attributed it now to one
cause, now to another. In all cases a basic defect was actually finally
discovered.
The results is staggering. After 20 years' peacetime work one
might have expected a torpedo better than the one used in the last war, a
torpedo, for instance, capable of sinking a battleship with one shot (shot at
Barham 28.12.39).
It is true that splashless discharge has been developed - but
otherwise there is nothing right with our torpedoes.
I do not believe that ever in the history of war men have been sent
against the enemy with such a useless weapon.
 - 68 -
(signed): Dönitz
Rear Admiral and B.d.U.

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 31 May 1940

Date Position, Wind, Weather PG30265

and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

Date Position, Wind, Weather

and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Many past shots which were taken as misses will now have to be
regarded in a new light on the basis of this fresh information. In many
cases the Commanding Officers have reported that they heard an impact
for certain and no explosion followed. There is also the case of the shot by
U 56 at "Nelson" on 30.10.39 (Churchill on board). It will never be
known how many other shots hit without the torpedo exploding. 16.5. U 122 sailed from Kiel.
Past analysis of failures and hits are more or less valueless now.
I hope now for a pistol of the simplest type, in which the striker 17.5. U 122 reported that she was attacked by an enemy S/M in
will transfer the blow immediately aft and not, as in ours, work from aft Route I. Route I is therefore known to the enemy. Our own U-boats have
forward after a complicated transmission of the striking force. I have been ordered to cruise along a line 5 miles off the center of Route I,
therefore demanded, as set out in a T/P to the Torpedo Inspectorate, that provided they have adequate navigational data.
the English pistol be copied as quickly as possible. A faultless functioning
of this pistol may be expected by reason of its simple construction. We 18.5. U 43 left Trondheim for the Atlantic.
will then abandon magnetic firing which is in any case becoming mythical
with the enemy's increased use of magnetic gear. When depth-keeping and U 37 is NW of Scotland, on her way out into the Atlantic.
impact firing are working properly, we can wait for the development of an
effective non-contact firing unit without any questions. U 122 is north of the line Shetlands-Bergen, on her way to
Trondheim with supplies for the G.A.F.

168
 19.5. The auxiliary warship "KAMERUN" has been commissioned
as U-boat repair ship.
U 122 entered Trondheim.
As there are so few Sperrbrechers, it is necessary to organize the
outward escort of operational boats and U-boat trial runs very carefully.
Only one of the 2 Sperrbrechers 4 and 9 has magnetic gear, i.e. 4. It must
therefore be accepted that some boats will be escorted by the inadequate
Sperrbrecher 9. F.O.I.C. Northern Defenses has suggested abandoning this
protection for U-boats until there actually has been enemy minelaying
activity in the sea are to be passed, but this cannot be permitted. While
there are so few U-boats it is essential that all means should be used for
their protection even when absolute safety is not guaranteed.
20.5. U 28 has left Wilhelmshaven for the Atlantic.
21.5. U 101 left Kiel for the Atlantic.
U 122 left Trondheim for Wilhelmshaven.
22.5. Naval War Staff asked whether U-boats could now be
operated off Narvik against enemy supplies. The answer was in the
negative.
Reasons:
1) In that area it does not get dark any more, the boats would therefore
have to operate in positions remote from the disembarking places and
would only score chance successes.
- 70 -
169
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
2) It is certain that "MZ" does not function in that sea area, though there
is still hope that better results may be obtained with this type of firing in
the Atlantic. Experiences with "AZ" have been very bad.
3) The attack on English shipping routes has once more become of first
importance.
4) Finally, this area was not cleared of U-boats without reason and these
reasons have not changed.
U 26 sailed for Trondheim with supplies for the G.A.F.
U 37 reported in radio message 0045:
"1) Erik Frisell air driven torpedo spontaneous ignition 75 seconds.
Sunk with gunfire.
2) Dunster Grange electric torpedo, "MZ" safe. No success. Electric
torpedo "MZ" premature detonation 19 seconds. Air driven torpedo miss.
Electric torpedo no success at 500 meters. Gun action broken off." In
spite of the worst possible experiences during the Norway operation and in
spite of the ever increasing danger of degaussing on the part of the enemy,
I have not so far abandoned magnetic firing, for the following reasons:
1) Impact firing with switch setting "A" led to practically nothing but
failures during October and April, partly because of bad depth-keeping,
partly because of failure of the pistol itself.
 2) "MZ" brought many successes in the southern and central North Sea
and in the Atlantic (last February), despite a number of failures to fire and
premature detonators.
Although information received made it appear more and more
likely that the enemy was using degaussing, I still hoped to achieve
something in open sea areas, until the "AZ" was satisfactorily improved.
A thorough examination of the pistol showed a number of faults in
construction, and improvement and adaptation of various parts were
begun.
Independently of this, I demanded that the English impact pistol
captured in "Seal" be copied. We were to go over to "AZ" as soon as the
pistol was in order for impact firing.
Today's report from U 37 alters the situation: of 5 torpedoes, 2
were premature detonators and 2 probably failed to fire. If one or two of
the torpedoes were affected by degaussing cannot be decided on present
information. In any case magnetic firing has become almost useless.
Boats at sea have therefore been ordered to go over to "AZ" with switch
setting "A".
It is quite clear to me that I must expect a further considerable
number of failures due to the known defects of the "AZ", but
- 71 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
170
I have no other choice, unless I withdraw the boats altogether. But I
cannot lay the boats up now, of all times, without damaging the whole arm
to an unpredictable degree. As long as there is the chance of a small
percentage of success, operations must be continued.
Work is already in progress on the adaptation of the impact firing
unit. It is hoped that by inserting an electric contact a large proportion of
the "AZ" failures will be avoided. The boats which are ready to sail will
therefore be kept back until they have been fitted out with adapted pistols.
The delay of 2-4 days can be accepted if it will mean better results.
24.5. U 122 entered Heligoland and from there Wilhelmshaven.
She took supplies to Trondheim and did not have any opportunity to
attack.
U 37 reported by short signal that she had transferred her
operations area to square BF SW sector. In order to make cooperation
between the boats possible, U 43 will also be sent to the sea area of
Finisterre; it is not thought necessary to separate the operations areas. The
area west and northwest of Finisterre seems favorable, traffic coming from
the Mediterranean and the South Atlantic meets here, danger from the air
is slight as enemy air bases are so far away and therefore only carrier-
borne a/c and long-range reconnaissance planes are to be expected.
25.5. U 26 and U 101, which are west of the Orkneys and Herbrides
on their outward passage, have been ordered to operate in the English
Channel. The development of the situation on land has led to this
decision. If, as is to be expected, the coast of Calais and Boulogne falls
into our hands, cross-channel traffic between England and France, which
so far has to a large extent plied the Dover-Calais Straits, will have to be
drawn further west. Le Havre and Cherbourg will have more and more
valuable traffic. Even the larger boats can operate in this sector of the
Channel, the mining situation is favorable, water depths are adequate and
the sea area is sufficiently wide for them to move away if necessary. 29.5. Nothing to report.

26.5. U 48 left Kiel.
U 122 is proceeding to Kiel, as it appears that she can be made
ready for operations more quickly there.
27.5. U 28 reported engine damage which has caused considerable
loss of lubricating oil. This boat has had to be recalled, as otherwise there
is the danger that she may not be able to manage on her remaining
lubricating oil. She will go to Trondheim for repairs.
28.5. U 101 has been ordered to penetrate into the Channel and to
make a situation report on the area Cherbourg - Le Havre - Dieppe.
30.5. U 48 reports that she requires dockyard assistance, because of
a leaking access hatch. She has been sent to Trondheim in order to save
time and avoid passage through the dangerous area. Another instance of
operational boat delayed for several days because the dockyard repair jobs
have not been done with sufficient care. Such delays cannot be accepted.
Recently they have occurred with U 48, U 28 and U 29. Owing to this a
simultaneous operation of several boats in the reopening of warfare against
merchant shipping in the Atlantic has been frustrated.
31.5. Nothing to report.

(signed): Dönitz
Rear Admiral and B.d.U.

- 72 - F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 June 1940

PG30266

Date Position, Wind, Weather Date Position, Wind, Weather

and Sea State, Illumination, Events and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

171
 effect had already been reported to Naval War Staff earlier in Most Secret
1.VI. U 28 and U 48 put into Trondheim to repair engine and S.O. only 18 of 20.1.40.
structural damage. UA cannot use mines as her torpedo tubes are not adapted for
laying TN's. Ship 33 will nevertheless carry TM's, which can possibly be
2.VI. Nothing to report. used for an operation by another boat off W. African ports when the ship
returns.
3.VI. U 48 left Trondheim.
5.VI. U 26 entered port. She had carried supplies to Trondheim.
U 32 left Wilhelmshaven, both for the Atlantic. Mines found at the No attacks.
southwest corner of our own declared area indicate that the minefield
positions found in "Seal" may refer to this area and to routes I and II. The
inward and outward routes are therefore being changed. Boats on their
way out will for the present use route "BLAU" and boats entering, route - 74 -
"GRUEN". It is not impossible that U-boats on their way out have already
been lost in these minefields. (e.g. U 44, U 1, U 50). On the other hand
no inward-bound boats have been lost in the routes.

In accordance with instructions from Naval War Staff, Atlantic

boats have been ordered not to cross the line Cadiz, bearing 2500 - latitude
360 N to the south.

4.VI. U 47 left Kiel for the Atlantic. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Our own boats in the North Sea have received orders to avoid the Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Skagerrak and the Norwegian coast, in order to prevent confusion with our
own surface forces at sea there.

Conferences with C.O.'s of ship 33 and the U-boat UA on the

subject of supplies of fuel, weapons and provisions which the U-boat is to
take over from the ship in the Atlantic. The U-boat is to attack the 6.VI. U 38 sailed for the Atlantic.
Northern Patrol SE of Iceland on her way out and then make use of all
opportunities to attack on passage to her actual operations area. She is U 45 reported from the sea area Porto-St. Vincent: no anti-S/M
then to operate off the west coast of Africa and be at the rendezvous with activity, no shipping. She is proceeding north to the Finisterre sea area.
ship 33 on 18 July.
Extensive cooperation between ship and U-boat was discussed, but 7.VI. UA and U 51 left Kiel for the Atlantic.
it was thought that it would hinder rather than assist both. Views to this
172
 U 46 reported that she had sunk a passenger ship of about 14,000 U 65: An 11
tons, with 6-8 guns, off the North Channel. It turned out later that this was U 52: square AF 77
the English auxiliary cruiser "Carinthia", 20,277 tons. U 46 also reported U 25: AM 32.
a convoy off the North Channel and, according to radio intelligence, the
S.S. "Eros" was probably also sunk there by a U-boat. Heavier traffic is
therefore now to be expected in this area. In order to investigate this, all
U-boats have been instructed to make observations when passing the
approach to the North Channel.
- 75 -
U 46 has been ordered to operate in square BE 90, U 43 in square
BF 70, west of Finisterre. These areas, according to present experiences,
are much frequented by shipping.

8.VI. The following sailed: U 28 from Trondheim

U 52 from Kiel
U 25, U 30, U 65 from Wilhelmshaven.
All these boats are for the Atlantic.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 48 reported sinking 2 steamers off the North Channel. U 101 and Sea State, Illumination, Events
and U 29 reported that no action was possible off the western approach to Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
the Channel because of constant fog. Both boats were ordered to the
Finisterre area.
According to the general weather situation fog is to be expected in
the Channel for several more days. It had been planned to penetrate into
the Channel again, but this has been cancelled.
As the English are evacuating Narvik, opportunities to attack
9.VI. U 37 put into Wilhelmshaven. She sank over 43,000 tons in warships and transports are to be expected.
26 days, a very satisfactory result after the reopening of operations against
enemy trade routes in the Atlantic. 10.VI. U 65, in the central North Sea on her way out, reported she
requires repairs urgently, owing to a leaky welded seam on a pressure hull
According to instructions received from Naval War Staff, UA, U flange. She has been sent to Bergen; as such repairs can be done there.
51, U 52, U 65 and U 25, on their outward passage, have been ordered to
make for the following operations areas west of the Shetlands at maximum No clear idea can be formed of the situation in northern waters.
cruising speed: Air reconnaissance and radio intelligence do not give the same results.
UA: square AE 99 Naval War Staff believes that the transports from Narvik back to England
U 51: square AM 33 and 34 have already reached home but I think that a considerable proportion of
173
the transports are still north of the Faroes and Shetlands and I therefore pass unhindered, it must be expected that they will be stopped from time to
think it best to let the boats remain for some time in the Faroes - Shetlands time.
area. This will not mean an appreciable delay in attacking supply lines in
the Atlantic and it will give the always welcome chance to score successes
against warships and troop transports. - 76 -
In the course of the day this view was confirmed by further reports.
A large convoy of 7 steamers, 1 a/c carrier, 1 battleship and several
destroyers is to pass through the area occupied by the U-boats on 11.6.

11.VI. By midday no reports had been received from boats off the
Faroes-Shetlands, and the weather there was becoming bad, visibility poor.
Boats were therefore ordered to continue on their passage in accordance
with operations orders. They will thus rake through the area once more
and most of them will arrive SW of Ireland in time to operate against the Date Position, Wind, Weather
Halifax convoy. Radio Intelligence Service has obtained particularly good and Sea State, Illumination, Events
data on this convoy HX 48, exact details of its return route are known and Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
above all the position of the rendezvous with the inward escort. U 25
sighted the convoy expected from Narvik, but lost it again. Bad visibility
came to the enemy's assistance.

UA is proceeding to Iceland to attack the Northern Patrol. She has

been informed of the last alterations in the instructions to the Northern
Patrol (Alvidruhamrar light the new point of reference).
The boats in the Finisterre area today sighted 3 convoys.
Unfortunately only one of these was attacked, by U 29, and that
unsuccessfully. It is regrettable that the other boats in the group did not
manage to attack, the convoys were coming from the south and west at
low speed and the remoter boats should have been able to attack. Further
details will not be known until the boats return. It is once more confirmed
that the area west of Finisterre is a good hunting ground for U-boats. As U
37 had already observed in February, the escort passes from the
Mediterranean to the Home Fleet and vice versa at this point.
U 101 reported that she had stopped S.S. "Washington" by mistake;
she mistook the ship for a Greek. In spite of warnings to let such ships
174
12.VI. U 65 entered Bergen.
UA's attention has been called to the fact that not all the Northern
Patrol positions may be occupied. U 38 was apparently seen before she
carried out her special task.
U 46 reported that she successfully attacked a convoy in the
Finisterre area.
According to radio intelligence convoy U-S 3, Queen Mary and 2
other large passenger ships, with 26,000 Australian and New Zealand
troops on board, escorted by Hood, 1 a/c carrier and several cruisers, has
arrived in the Freetown sea area.
It must be attacked.
 1) Valuable ships like this with troops on board cannot be ignored, even
if data for an operation are few and far between.
2) The convoy is a comparatively fast one and particularly well escorted.
It will therefore not be possible to shadow.
3) During the last few days U-boats in the Finisterre area have been
particularly active. It must therefore be assumed that the convoy will
proceed further off the coast than it otherwise would. The convoy's
general course is along 12 degs. W. It seems best to dispose the boats west
of this longitude. Date Position, Wind, Weather
4) The convoy's course is so uncertain that it will be necessary to distribute and Sea State, Illumination, Events
the few boats (only 5 are available) over a large area. It is to be hoped that Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
at least one boat will manage to fire. In the opinion of Naval War Staff the
convoy is making for England and not for France, another circumstance in
favor of disposing the boats away from the coast. According to
information available, a convoy speed of up to 17 knots must be expected.
It could thus be in the latitude of Finisterre by midday 13.6.
with time, and the presumed onward passage from the rendezvous to the
English Channel or the St. George's Channel. In order if possible to give
The boats U 48 (with S.O. 7th U-Flotilla as tactical commander if the boats a chance to attack the day before the rendezvous, in easier
necessary), U 46, U 101, U 43 will be disposed in the area 1330 West to conditions, they have been ordered to take up positions through which the
1845 West and 4530 North to 4200 North. 3 boats in the south. Boat's enemy, coming from the west, should pass at about midday on 16th June.
distance off the presumed enemy course line 50 miles. 2 boats 100 miles As good visibility is likely, it may be expected that an area of about 90
astern of this, in quarterline slightly to the east on the assumption that the miles to the north and 100 miles to the south of the enemy's course will be
convoy will alter course for England at the latitude of Finisterre. THese covered. Behind this screen of 5 boats there is a further boat on the
positions will be reached on the morning of 13.6. enemy's supposed course line, and it is therefore to be expected for certain
that 2 boats will be able to attack on June 16; even if the convoy passes the
Radio Intelligence Service has obtained very detailed information outer boats positions.
on convoy HX 48. It is making for square 6342 BE at 8 to 9 knots, course If no contact is made on June 16, the boats have orders to surround
78 degs. to 81.5 degs., and will be picked up here at 0630/17/6 BST by the the rendezvous in attacking positions at 0630/17/5.
inward escort. All available boats must therefore be operated.
A Group "PRIEN" has been formed, comprising U 47 (in tactical 13.VI. Both groups, "ROESING" and "PRIEN", have been ordered
command if necessary), U 32, U 28, U 25, U 30 and U 51. The operation to keep radio silence, and to attack only valuable targets until the convoys
will be based on: course of approach, enemy's rendezvous arrive.

- 77 -
175
 The question of fuel supplies in NW Spain for group "ROESING"
has been examined once more and the boats informed, so that they can
make arrangements accordingly. - 78 -

U 25 sank the English auxiliary cruiser "Scotstown".

U 122 left Kiel.

U 65 left Bergen after completing repairs.

14.VI. U 122 left Heligoland for the Atlantic.

Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 47 reported a large convoy coming from the west SW of Ireland. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 38 is to operate against it. In these circumstances these 2 boats might Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
not be able to reach their attacking positions for 1000/16/6. U 52 was
therefore asked if she could reach the area, she replied no. U 30 on the
other hand replied that she could and was directed to steer for it.

U 101 started on her return passage. She has sunk 41,500 tons.
contact. The boats have therefore been given freedom to operate in
15.VI. U 43 and U 29 reported that their fuel stocks were coming to strips without limits E or W. The direction of their operations will
an end. They are to make use of supply facilities in NW Spain. therefore cross the general convoy and shipping route.

U 30 has been sent to reinforce Group "PRIEN". The number of

boats operating against convoy "HX 48" will thus be 7 ( U 47, U 38, both
of which reached their positions in time in spite of attacking the convoy (signed): Dönitz
reported by U 47 on 14.6, U 28, U 32, U 51, U 25 and U 30).

U 52 is to operate against traffic between the Bristol and English F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
Channels and Atlantic ports, which, according to radio intelligence, is
lively. This is also likely in view of the general military situation in 16 - 30 June 1940
France, probably considerable numbers of British troops are being
withdrawn. PG30267

The disposition of Group "ROESING" against the fast, strongly

escorted convoy from Australia did not succeed. No boat made
176
 Date Position, Wind, Weather 17.6. Group "PRIEN" has made no contact with the Halifax convoy.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events As the convoy might be delayed, the group was to remain in position for
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. today. In the afternoon a further radio intelligence report was received to
the effect that the rendezvous had been transferred further south. A new
disposition is no longer possible, the boats are already too far back. They
have been ordered to operate at the approaches to the English and St.
Georges Channels and the French Atlantic ports.
They will thus be attacking the same targets as U 52.
16.6. Positions of our own boats:
U 29 has requested to refuel in NW Spain. Her supply is planned
In the Atlantic operations area: UA, U 25, U 28, U 29, U 30, U 32, for a later date than U 43.
U 38, U 43, U 46, U 47, U 48, U 51, U 52, U 101.
U 99 left Kiel for the Atlantic.
On the way out: U 122 off the Shetlands. U 65 off the Herbrides.
18.6. U 52 and U 38 sighted valuable targets. U 52 soon lost
Boats have reported the following successes: contact with a troop transport as her speed was too low. U 38 shadowed a
U 46: 53,000 tons. convoy for some hours and later apparently U 25 also sighted it.
U 101: 41,580 tons including the English "Wellington Star" of 11,400
tons. U 101 is starting her return passage she has used all her torpedoes. UA has started on her passage to her actual operations area. She
UA: sank the auxiliary cruiser "Andania", 13,950 tons, belonging to the intended to proceed at a great distance off the coast, which is contrary to
Northern Patrol. her operations order. She has therefore been ordered to approach closer to
the coast and operate along the shipping route.

U 43 has requested supply in NW Spain, it is planned for 18.6.

- 80 -
U 52 is to operate against the traffic from England round Quessant
to the French Atlantic ports, which according to radio intelligence, is
heavy. U 52 is the boat which could not arrive in time to operate against
the HX 48 convoy from Halifax.
The reason for this traffic is the general situation on land:
Occupation of the Channel coast and the Army's rapid advance towards the
Atlantic coast is forcing England to divert her transports to ports in the
Gironde and Loire estuaries and Quiberon Bay. It is probably a matter of
withdrawing British land forces and material. Date Position, Wind, Weather
177
and Sea State, Illumination, Events There was a further conference with Group West on the mining
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. situation. It would be desirable to clear the minefields in the English
Channel as well as those off the bases which we intend to set up in France.
As with the few forces available, only one of these problems can be
solved, it was thought best first of all to make sure of one suitable fitting-
out place on the Atlantic coast and postpone sweeping in the English
Channel which would be a long drawn out task. Group command will
19.6. U 43 has supplied and has given a different approach route to issue instructions to concentrate all forces on Brest and later possibly on
that given in the Spanish instructions. St. Nazaire. Lieut. Commander BRUMMER-PATZIG and Lieut.(E)(s.g.)
LOOSCHEN from B.d.U. Headquarters are on their way to look for
U 25 was rammed while making a submerged night attack on a suitable fitting-out ports in France. The torpedo train, with 24 torpedoes
convoy. Periscope and bridge damaged. She tried at first to remain in her will remain in Wilhelmshaven until the situation is clearer. Efforts are
operations area, but the damage was so heavy that she had to start her being made to get a mobile radio station for the torpedo train.
return passage.

20.6. U 26 left Wilhelmshaven.

- 81 -
U 99 requested permission to put into a Norwegian base to land a
sick man.

21.6. U 29 supplied according to plan. According to a report from

Spain she may have been seen.

U 48 reported 48,000 tons sunk, she has started on her return

passage, as most of her torpedoes have been used.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 99 was so badly damaged by a/c bombs that she had to return to and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Wilhelmshaven. It is possible that the boat was attacked by an a/c from Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
"SCHARNHORST". The matter cannot be cleared up until U 99 and
"SCHARNHORST" have both entered port.

22.6. U 34 left Wilhelmshaven, U 102 Kiel, both for the Atlantic.

U 32 and U 47 successfully attacked a convoy approaching from 23.6. U 30 requested supply in N Spain. She has been ordered to
the west. carry out "AROZ" during the night 25/26/6. She has so far sunk 2
steamers.
178

U 46 attacked an a/c carrier proceeding on a SW course at high
speed, escorted by 2 destroyers. This is probably "Illustrious" which,
according to radio intelligence analysis, is on her way to the West Indies.
It is doubtful if the attack was successful.
U 28 reported that weather conditions made action impossible.
occupied by U 25. U A has been ordered not to enter the area between 36
degs. and 30degs. N.E. of 11 degs., the area occupied by the only Italian
U-boat in the Atlantic. Of the 5 Italian U-boats which left for operation in
the Atlantic, only one actually arrived there. There is one in Centa and one
in Algeciras, and there is no news here of the other two. This seems to
indicate that nothing much can be expected of our ally's U-boat Arm, at
any rate for the present.

U 43, which is much further south, reported: Action restricted by Naval War Staff informs us that U 29 supplied in Spain without
weather conditions. According to weather data available, the unfavorable incident, but that she may have been seen by fishing vessels or picket
conditions cover the whole area from the latitude of the Faroes to the boats.
latitude of Gibraltar. It is not possible therefore to direct the boats to a
better area. U 30 is therefore to carry out "ARROZ" instead of "BERNARDO",
so that the latter is not compromised by too frequent use. "ARROZ" has
Group "RÖSING" is being dissolved, as torpedoes have mostly become less favorable recently because Italian ships anchored in the
been used and boats have to return. Only U 29 and U 43, which have vicinity. A decision is to be made today.
supplied in Spain, will remain in the operations area and a dividing line
has therefore been ordered for their operation, a line bearing 110 degs. The question of transferring B.d.U. Headquarters to an
from Cape Villano. The great successes of the Army and the G.A.F. in the
west have forced France to ask for an armistice. In a short time the French
Atlantic ports will be able to be used as supply bases for torpedoes and - 82 -
fuel and later for repairs. In order that torpedoes can be supplied as soon
as possible, the torpedo train, which has been made ready in anticipation
and consists of goods wagons with torpedoes, air pumps, torpedo material
and the necessary personnel has left for Paris under the command of the
Torpedo Director of Wilhelmshaven Naval Dockyard, Captain TROTHA.
From Paris it can be sent quickly to any place on the coast.

24.6. U 99 entered Wilhelmshaven. The dockyard will need about 2

1/2 days to repair her. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 32 has started on her return passage, having used all her Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
torpedoes. She has sunk 23,000 tons.

U 52 has been ordered to operate along a line at the latitude of

square 41 BF without limit east or west. This area has so far been
179

Atlantic port has been considered:
1) U-boat operations in the Atlantic are of just importance. They require
shortest lines of communication to Naval War Staff and personal contact
with the U-boat commanders. Good telephone lines are desirable to the
Organization Department in Kiel and to Group West.
2) Close cooperation with G.O. commanding air forces Brest would be a
great advantage.
3) A U-boat staff officer would have to be attached to Group West to
control arrivals and departures of U-boats.
4) The port can only be considered fully fit for use if U-boats can enter it
(mines) and all the necessary means of communication are available to
control the U-boats, in cooperation with the G.A.F. and home stations.
5) Before a decision is reached B.d.U. himself will inspect the relevant
ports with his Communications Staff Officer
The sea area N of 5880 and E of 0300 E has been closed until
further notice to our own U-boats, so that the Air Force may carry out a
constant anti-S/M hunt.
27.6. U 99 left Wilhelmshaven for the Atlantic.
U 38 reported the sinking of 35,000 tons. She is returning as she
has used all her torpedoes.
U 34 sighted a battleship with 3 destroyers, course SW, for a short
time, NW of the Herbrides. This is probably "Valiant", coming from the
North Sea.
U 122 has reached the latitude of Finisterre. Her operation area
will be square CF 30, where U 101 observed large steamers on course of
30 degs. and 120 degs.

U 30 will carry out supply "ARROZ" today. - 33 -

25.6. U 101 entered Heligoland and came on to Kiel under escort.

This boat just penetrated into the Channel and sank 2 steamers there.
Because of strong air patrol, she proceeded off the western approach to the
Channel and finally to the Finisterre sea area.
Total results: 41,500 tons.

All U-boats have been given Naval War Staff's order not to take
any action against French ships which are clearly making for a French Date Position, Wind, Weather
port, but to treat then as enemies if they are darkened or in convoy or and Sea State, Illumination, Events
steering for an enemy port. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

26.6. U 30 has carried out "ARROZ" and is to have an operational

strip at the latitude of square 41 BF without limit E or W.

U 43 and U 29 have been ordered to concentrate on square BE 90.

180

28.6. U 47 requested refuelling in Spain, reporting at the same time
that she had sunk 33,130 tons for certain and a further 7,000 probably.
Shortly afterwards she reported sinking another 6,500 tons and that she
would not refuel, but start her return passage with 2 torpedoes left.
U 99 reported that she was attacked by a/c with German markings
in an area not released for anti-S/M hunts. There is good reason to believe
that it was one of our machines as a report from a Stavanger a/c gives the
same time and a position about 40 miles away from that given by the U-
boat.

U 26 reported one oil cooler out of action, damage cannot be
repaired with own resources. The boat's speed is thus reduced. As there
are so few Atlantic boats available U 26 is to continue her patrol even
under these difficult conditions.
29.6. U 48 entered Kiel, U 25 Wilhelmshaven.
U 48 operated in the Atlantic after short repairs in Trondheim. She
successfully attacked convoys and sank altogether about 42,686 tons.
U A requested supply in the Las Palmas Roads, but this has been
refused for reasons of security. The boat has sufficient reserves of fuel for
her operations.
30.6. U 47 reported the sinking of 51,086 tons.
U 43 and U 30 attacked a convoy reported by U 43 herself.
According to radio intelligence reports 2 steamers were damaged and
abandoned by the convoy.

U 25 missed a battle cruiser (Renown or Repulse) because the

firing gear failed in the center shot of a triple fan. She afterwards attacked
the convoy which this heavy ship was escorting, but it evaded the attack - 84 -
by making a smoke screen and turning away. U 25 then sank the auxiliary
cruiser "Scotstown" off the North Channel and fired on another large
steamer with very good firing data. The shot had no effect, clearly because
the impact firing unit failed. While making an attack submerged by night
she was rammed and the damage to periscope and conning tower forced
her to return home. Result: 23.000 tons.

U 28 started on her return passage with a result of 11,000 tons, also

U 51 with 32,000 tons for certain and a probable further 6,000. The gaps Date Position, Wind, Weather
thus created will be filled by U 34, U 26 and U 102, new arrivals in the and Sea State, Illumination, Events
operations area. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

Boats' reports and meteorological forecasts indicate that weather

will be bad in the northern half of Biscay for some days and boats have
therefore been advised to operate further south for a time.

U 26 and U 102 also each managed to make contact with a convoy.

181
 2.VII.40. U 52 reported BERNARDO carried out.

(signed): Dönitz U 38 entered Wilhelmshaven.

Rear Admiral and B.d.U.
Zones "A" and "F" are to be bounded to the south along the line square
8176 BE - square 8357 BF - Belle Isle, in order to protect our own prize
ships returning to the occupied Atlantic coast from the Atlantic, our own
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log steamers from Spain and French vessels. B.d.U. returned from tour of
inspection of the Atlantic coast.
1 - 15 July 1940 Every effort must be made to get the Atlantic ports ready for use as soon
as possible and when this is done B.d.U.'s headquarters must be
PG30268 transferred there. I stated my views on this subject in my Most Secret
1049 of 2/7/40 to Supreme Command of the Navy. In my opinion the aim
must be achieved in the following stages.
1) Facilities for supply of fuel, provisions and water.
2) Facilities for short repairs.
Date Position, Wind, Weather 3) Transfer the headquarters as soon as conditions 1 and 2 are fulfilled for
and Sea State, Illumination, Events the majority of Atlantic boats.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. 4) Facilities for complete overhaul of boats.

The steps immediately necessary for 1 are being taken from here,
immediately.

1.VII.40. Distribution of U-boats: 3.VII.40. U 29 reported the sinking of "Atheland", 8,999 tons. Boat is
In Atlantic operations area: returning because of damage to periscope.
U A, U 26, U 29, U 30, U 34, U 43, U 52, U 102, U 122.
On outward passage: U 47. Lorient will be ready for fitting out U-boats from 6.7. There is mine
escort for boats entering and leaving. Officer-in-Charge of the base is
On return passage: U 28, U 38, U 47, U 51, U 65. Lieut. Commander BRUMMER-PATZIG, Lieut.(E)(s.g.) LOOSCHEN is
Wilhelmshaven dockyard: U 25, U 32, U 37. his assistant.
Kiel dockyard: U 46, U 48, U 101.
4.VII.40. U 52 reported sinking 21,000 tons.
U 65 attacked a convoy; apparently the Dutch S.S. "Amstelland, 8,156
tons, was sunk.
182
 6.VII.40. U 43 again reported little traffic, but there are frequent reports
- 86 - of traffic on the Spanish coast and from Spanish ports.

U 28 entered Wilhelmshaven. The boat had to interrupt her outward

passage and repair engine damage in Trondheim. Like U 47, 26, 51, 32,
38 and 30, she made no contact with the Halifax convoy, the rendezvous
of which with the escort was changed, she operated patrolling E-W off the
N. half of the English Channel and sank 3 steamers totaling 10,860 tons.

U 47 entered Kiel. On her way out she rescued some of our own airmen
Date Position, Wind, Weather from an a/c which had made a forced landing in the Shetlands area.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events Before reaching her position for the Halifax convoy she apparently
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. successfully attacked the previous convoy from Canada. After the
disposition against the HX 48 had been dissolved she operated with great
success against convoys and independent ships, patrolling E-W off the
English Channel. During this patrol she sank ten ships, totaling 66,587
tons, it is so far the most successful patrol of this war.

U 30 requested to supply with torpedoes in Lorient. It has been ordered 7.VII.40. U 65 entered Wilhelmshaven.
for 6.7. After repairing a flange in Bergen the boat operated in central Biscay
and sank 5 steamers and tankers, totaling 56,500 tons.
U A has been instructed to avoid the area between 200 N to 360 N east
of 200 W, as 2 Italian U-boats will be operating there from 7.7. U 30 entered Lorient, the first boat to fit out there.

5.VII.40. U 51 entered Kiel. After the operation against the Halifax 8.VII.40. U 34 reported the sinking of the English destroyer "Whirland"
convoy failed owing to the transfer of the rendezvous. She operated and one steamer and one tanker.
patrolling E-W off the English Channel and sank 5 ships totaling 40,311
tons. 9.VII.40. U A has been instructed to operate against the English units

U A reported no traffic and is therefore proceeding on to square DT.

- 87 -
Conference with C.in C. Air Force regarding cooperation in the attack
area from the French Atlantic Coast on English supply traffic in the
Atlantic. (see B.d.U. operation Most Secret 1057C of 6.7.40).

183
 14.VII.40. U 26, U 102 and U 122 have not reported again. U 26 last
made a short signal on 3.7, U 102 made a reconnaissance signal on 30.6
and was at the time near an enemy convoy in square BF 4131, U 122 last
Date Position, Wind, Weather made a weather report at 2300 21.6.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. U 34 reported the sinking of 6 steamers totaling 22,807 tons, she is
proceeding to Lorient to refuel.

15.VII.40. U 43, which has been at sea since 13.5, reported that she still
had 1-3 torpedoes below deck.She was ordered to start on her return
passage, making use of all opportunities to attack.
which are taking action against French forces in Dakar. This boat is at
present off Cape Verde and it is doubtful whether she will reach Freetown, U 52 reported: Use of armament in operations area easily possible.
as she has to be at the rendezvous with ship 33 in the 18th.
(Signed): Donitz
10.VII.40. U 43 reported her results so far as as 35,000 tons. She Rear-Admiral and B.d.U.
encountered strong patrols of a/c and surface vessels with efficient
location sets.

11.VII.40. U 29 entered Wilhelmshaven. This boat first operated off the F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
Channel at the beginning of June and penetrated into the Western approach
to the Channel. She then supplied in NW Spain and continued to wage 16 - 31 July 1940
war on merchant shipping in the sea area NW of Finisterre. Total results:
5 steamers and tankers totaling 29,184 tons. PG30269

12.VII.40. Nothing to report.

13.VII.40. U 99 reported use of armament S. of Ireland restricted by

weather conditions. Little traffic.

U 30 has been ordered to go to Gibraltar and operate against enemy Date Position, Wind, Weather
warships. Radio intelligence and G.I.S. report that there is frequent and Sea State, Illumination, Events
warship activity there. The boat will not be a loss to the war against Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
merchant shipping as she is to proceed via the traffic route between 130
and 150.

184

16.7. Distribution of the U-boats:
In the Atlantic operations area: U A in the Cape Verde area, U 26, 30,
34, 52, 99, 102, 122 in the sea area W of Cape Finisterre, Biscay, W
approach to the English Channel.
On return passage: U 43 W. of Ireland.
In Wilhelmshaven dockyard: U 25, 28, 29, 32, 37, 38, 65.
In Kiel dockyard: U 46, 47, 48, 51.
U A reported her results so far as 23,600 tons, she must therefore have
sunk at least 2 medium-sized steamers in addition to the auxiliary cruiser
in the N. patrol. She considers it necessary to return home owing to
damage to her engines.
U 52 requested limited supplies for her return passage, which is
necessary owing to engine trouble. She has so far sunk 24,700 tons and
reported no traffic in square BE 56 - BF 46.
19.7. U 30 reported considerable engine damage: one piston broke,
damaging the crank case and causing large cracks in the engine casing.
She will have to break off the Gibraltar operation and return home, she
will first be sent to Lorient for impromptu repairs. As there are at present
so few boats in the Atlantic and meanwhile a Halifax convoy has been
announced, I have decided not to detail another boat for the Gibraltar
operation, so that besides U 34 at least U 99 can also be used against the
Halifax convoy.

17.7. Radio intelligence reports, and reports from the G.A.F. indicate that
traffic to England is being re-routed, owing to especially to the activity of
the G.A.F. on the sea routes in the English Channel. One convoy has - 89 -
already put into the North Channel and another is to be expected shortly,
according to radio intelligence. Numerous convoys have also been
observed sailing N. of Scotland to east coast ports. This means that the
North Channel, Minch and Moray Firth areas are more important for the
operation of the next wave of U-boats. At the moment the North Channel
is always occupied by 2 boats, boats appear every now and then in Moray
Firth and off the Minch. Off the Western approach to the Channel there
will be another void during the next few days, as the boats have to leave
their positions and either refuel in Lorient or return home for major Date Position, Wind, Weather
repairs. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
18.7. U 99 reported her successes as 31,300 tons and one prize which
has course instructions for Bordeaux. The boat requested to refuel in
Lorient. She is expected to enter port in company with U 56 on 21.7.

U 34 entered Lorient, she sank 7 steamers, totaling 26,338 tons, and the
destroyer "Whirlwind". She will be ready to put to sea again on 22.7. 20.7. Radio intelligence has once more supplied very good information
on the "HX 58" convoy, mentioned above. It will probably be picked up
185
by the inward escort on 27.7 in square AL 0316. This convoy's route 24.7. The Italian Navy have offered to use a maximum number of U-
confirms the view that traffic is being re-routed to the North Channel. boats, from a base in France organized by themselves, under German
operational control. In view of impending operations it is considered that
21.7. U 52 entered Lorient. Success: 4 steamers totaling 24,700 tons. the offer should be accepted and put into effect quickly.
Also U 99: Success: 6 steamers totaling 31,300 tons.
25.7. U 99 left Lorient for the North Channel.
Contrary to information issued here as to areas which are free for anti-
S/M hunts, a formation consisting of "Nordmark" and 4 destroyers, with
close air escort, is proceeding from Stavanger to Hanstholm. U 43 is in
the same area on her way home and U 5 on her way out. The position of - 90 -
the new minefields NW of our own mined area forces the U-boats to take
the route along the coast of Norway on their way in and out. There they
are exposed to danger from enemy S/M's and our own a/c in close escort
of formations. C.in C. G.A.F. has been requested to instruct all a/c again
that, in areas which are not declared open for anti-S/M hunts, only such
S/M's may be attacked as are unmistakably identified as enemy.

22.7. U 43 entered Wilhelmshaven. She was at sea for 10 weeks. She

first carried out a transport duty to Trondheim and then operated in Biscay Date Position, Wind, Weather
off the Spanish and Portuguese coasts. She did not score any success until and Sea State, Illumination, Events
she had been at sea for 5 weeks and had carried out supply operation Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
BERNARDO. Altogether she sank 4 steamers and tankers, totaling 38,509
tons. In contrast to other boats she encountered strong anti-S/M activity
and was severely attacked with depth charges for several hours by vessels
with efficient location gear.

23.7. U 58 entered Lorient. Success: 2 steamers totaling 14,000 tons.
U 61 entered Bergen to refuel for passage home.
U 34 left Lorient for the North Channel.
The Red Cross telephoned from Berlin that the whole crew of U 26 are
prisoners of war in England. This decides the fate of one of the three
missing boats.
186
U 56 left Lorient for the Western approach to the Channel and the St.
George's Channel.
According to radio intelligence S.S. "Sarita", 5,824 tons, sank recently
off the Cape Verde Islands (Statements by survivors landed in Brazil); this
is presumably the result of U A's activities.
The Italian offer has been accepted, with the proviso that Bordeaux may
have to be used if the number of our own U-boats increases or if Lorient is
increasingly threatened by air attack.
 26.7. Conference with G.O.C. Air Forces on air reconnaissance starting
from Brest. At present there are only 4 DO 18's for reconnaissance from
Brest. The range of these a/c and their small striking power as compared - 91 -
with enemy a/c makes it possible for them to make reconnaissance flights
as far as about square BE 3000 (approx. 150 W) and in a SW direction, but
the area N. of this is not to be covered, owing to the proximity of the
enemy air bases, so as to avoid unnecessary losses. This reconnaissance Date Position, Wind, Weather
will be flown from tomorrow. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
From 29.7 there will be DO 17's 3 DO 26's and later a few HE 115's
available. These types of a/c can be used off the North Channel, there the
most shipping is to be found at present. Unfortunately the only U-boat
available at the moment for operation against this traffic, e.g. the convoy
HX 58, is U 34.
31.7. U 99 was attacked W. of Ireland by a submerged S/M with 2
27.7. U 34 reported 48,000 tons sunk in her operations area W. of the torpedoes.
North Channel off Rockall, 42,000 of them from an outward-bound
convoy. This boat only sailed from Lorient on 23.7 and has achieved a
very great success in a very short time.

U 52 left Lorient at 2100.

(Signed): Donitz
28.7. Nothing to report. Rear-Admiral and B.d.U.

29.7. U 57 and U 58, at present off the northern approach to the Minch F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
and W. of this, have been ordered to proceed to the North Channel if they
do not encounter much traffic in their present operation area. U 56 is also 1 - 15 August 1940
to make for the North Channel from the western approach to the English
Channel and the St. George's Channel via Fastnet Rock. According to PG30270
G.I.S. reports, ships carrying Spanish ore to England make for Fastnet
Rock.

U 99 reported the sinking of 18,736 tons.

30.7. Nothing to report.

187
 Date Position, Wind, Weather a) The route was several times used by U-boats after the date of issue of
and Sea State, Illumination, Events "Seal's" chart, and was check-swept by F.O. North Sea Defences forces.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. b) 2 sample sweeps were made in the route about a fortnight ago.
c) Except for the Seal document, which does not give any definite
indication of mines, there is no indication at all that the route is fouled.
4) Changes of inward and outward routes, which have always been aimed
at and effected, reduces the risk of these routes becoming known.

1.8.1940. From today the same War Log will be kept for large and small
U-boats, as in future they will be used for the same operations.

Distribution of U-boats: - 93 -
In the Atlantic operations area: U A, U 52, U 56, 57, 58, 59, 99, 102,
122.
On return passage: U 34 off the Shetlands, U 62 route GRUEN.
On outward passage: U 60 route I.
In Kiel:U 46, 47, 48, 51, 61, 101.
In Lorient: U 30.
In Bremen: U 124.
In Wilhelmshaven: U 25, 28, 29, 37, 38, 43, 65.
In Memel: U 32. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 25, 37, 38 left Wilhelmshaven, U 46 Kiel. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
They have been ordered to use route I for the following reasons:
1) In the area N. of route BLAU and off the Norwegian Coast English
ships have repeatedly appeared, attacked our forces ("LUCHS", U 62,
transports) and have been attacked by our own patrol forces and a/c. At
least U 1 was definitely torpedoed in this area.
2) The danger in this area is the greater because for some time U-boats Route I must therefore be considered the safer route at the moment.
have entered and left on this route only.
3) In view of these known dangers on the Northerly route, route I appears U 34 reported the sinking of the English S/M "Spearfish" off the
to be the safer. Is has not been used for some time. At the time when a Orkneys.
change was contemplated, a chart captured from "Seal" showed 2 circles
entered in this route, which led F.O. North Sea Defences to suspect that U 57 and U 58 are transferring their operations area from North Minch
there were enemy minefields within these circles. to the North Channel.
Against this however:
188
 U 59 is proceeding to Bergen as she has no serviceable torpedoes left. well as in route I. For the moment however this requirement cannot be
She has sunk one 6,000 ton steamer. met.

U 99, 52, 56 and 58 have been allocated operations areas off the North 4.8.1940. U 46 reported. Her transmitter was out of order and she
Channel.

2.8.1940. U 99 reported the sinking of independently routed steamers, - 94 -

totaling 24,211 tons, and one freighter and 3 tankers from a convoy
totaling 31,957 tons. It appears (radio intelligence) that 3 of the vessels
reported sunk were only damaged and returned to England. But it may be
that the English a/c making the report confused these with other ships.

From today repair service is in operation at Naval Arsenal Lorient.

3.8.1940. U 34 entered Wilhelmshaven, U 60 Bergen.

Date Position, Wind, Weather
U A is starting on her return passage owing to defects in her motors. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 37 and U 38 reported passing through route I, but no such reports
have been received from U 25 and U 46, which sailed later, neither have
they replied to radio messages. A/c sent out to search observed one new
and one older patch of oil in route I and also reported mine-like objects in
the water near the fresh oil patch. The following was then decided in a
discussion with F.O. North Sea Defences. was proceeding to Bergen for repairs and arrived there P.M.
1) 2 patrol boats would immediately search the area around the oil
patches. U 337's bow caps were damaged in a bombing attack and she is
2) 2 minesweepers were detailed to check the mines. proceeding to Lorient immediately.
3) One diving tender from the dockyard, manned by diving personnel from
the flotilla and carrying one U-boat officer, proceeded to the suspected U 57 is proceeding to Lorient to refuel. She has sunk a steamer of 5,000
scene of loss with flak protection. At the same time further a/c were tons.
detailed to search.
U 30 left Lorient, U 60 Bergen.

In view of this experience it seems indicated now only to allow U- U 59 entered Bergen.
boats to proceed through the endangered area in the S. North Sea with
mine escort, as mines have been observed in routes GRUEN and BLAU as
189
 During the search operation for U 25, a S/M chaser struck a mine and 6.8.1940. The area off the North Channel is to be divided into several
sank. She had detected a wreck shortly beforehand with her echo ranging operation areas.
gear. U 25 must be presumed to have been lost in route I. There is one
small hope, in that the boats transmitter was slightly defective. A 7.8.1940. U 57 entered Lorient. Since leaving Kiel and after
dockyard workman repaired it shortly before she sailed, but there is a
chance that it may have failed again.
- 95 -
The probable loss of this boat led me to reconsider my views set out on
1.8 on the subject of outward routes. I am still of the opinion that the
decision to use route 1 was right in the light of information available. One
could have reproached oneself with justice if a boat had been lost on the
N. route through the known dangers there. The mines observed in route I
were recently laid, as the over growth showed they were also outside the
periphery of the Seal circle. The fact that the boats used this route to a
considerable extent after the date of the Seal document, without being
mined or observing any mines and now suddenly, besides U 25, a S/M Date Position, Wind, Weather
chaser and a minesweeper have struck mines, shows that this is a new and Sea State, Illumination, Events
field. It must therefore be assumed that U 25, if she is in fact lost, was the Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
victim of a new, hitherto unknown danger.

5.8.1940. U 99 entered Lorient.

U 52 is starting on her return passage because of d/c damage. She has

sunk a further 3 steamers, totaling 16,875 tons, since leaving Lorient.
B.d.U.'s requirement of 3.8 for mine escort in the S. Northern Sea is to
be fulfilled in future. Boats are to be escorted through BLAU or GRUEN
as far as square 3875 AN, and boats returning will be picked up here
whenever possible.
Passage between the approach to route BLAU and square 2800 AN
must be made by the U-boats unobserved, i.e. surfaced during darkness
only and in bad visibility.
replenishing with torpedoes at Bergen, this boat has sunk 3 steamers
totaling 16,600 tons, in 2 patrols.
U 48 left Kiel.
A radio intelligence report indicates that listening and/or echo-ranging
gear may have been laid out in Fair Passage. This passage is therefore
closed for U-boats.
Lorient reported that a dock would be ready for U 37 from 12.8

Routes I and II are out of use. 8.8.1940. U 65 left Wilhelmshaven, U 46 and U 59 Bergen. U 46 is
sailing despite a defective short wave transmitter. A signal station is to be
190
set up on the Isle de Groix so as to ensure that boats which are unable to
transmit can establish visual signal connection as soon as possible with the
coast which they are approaching. - 96 -

9.8.1940. U 51, 100, 101 left Kiel.

U 38 reported that use of armament was restricted by weather.

10.8.1940. U 58 reported that she had a trace of oil. She was ordered to
Lorient. She has sunk one freighter of 8,724 tons.

U 30 reported the sinking of a steamer of 5,800 tons and that operation Date Position, Wind, Weather
was difficult owing to weather. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 38 reported the sinking of the English S.S. "Accra" 9,337 tons from a
convoy.

As "Hipper" is entering through route BLAU with air and surface

escort, movements of U-boats have been ordered so as to prevent an
encounter. 11.8.1940. U 28 left Wilhelmshaven.

The following decisions were reached in a conference with the Rear Reports of Success:
Admiral PARONA, Royal Italian Navy. U 37 Upway Grange 9,130 tons.
1) The base for Italian U-boats will be Bordeaux. U 56 Mohammed Ali El Kebir 7,290 tons.
2) Germany will provide minesweeping forces, a harbor defence flotilla U 30 Llanfair 4,966 tons.
and Flak protection, everything else will be organized by the Italians. (All English totaling 21,386 tons).
3) Experienced U-boat officers will be appointed as liaison officers to both
staffs. U A has arrived on square CF on her way home.
4) Good telephone and teleprinter connections will be ensured.
5) Constant, exhaustive exchange of experiences is to be aimed at. The 12.8.1940 U 37, U 58 put into Lorient.
possibility of an exchange of sea-going officers will be kept in view.
6) The Italian U-boats now operating in the Atlantic will enter Bordeaux 13.8.1940. Group 606 is now tactically subordinate to Group West. The
for the first time when their supplies are exhausted. The base will be ready following reconnaissance is desired:
by about 23.8. 1) In the direction of Fastnet Rock, including establishing the position
of gaps in the English mined area in the Bristol and St. George Channels.
2) As far west as possible.
191
3) In the Finisterre Sea area. PG30271

U 48, U 38 and U 46 have been ordered to operate against the Halifax

convoy picked up by radio intelligence. It is to be in square AL 0316 on
15 or 16.8.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
14.8.1940. U 56 entered Lorient. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U A reported engine trouble, but judging from her course, it can't be so
bad and she has therefore been ordered to operate against a rendezvous for
English forces reported by radio intelligence. (1900/16/8 square CF 2811
right lower edge).

From today K.G. 40 (FLIEGERKORPS 40) will fly reconnaissance in 16.8.1940. Distribution of U-boats:
our operations area off the North Channel. In the operations area off the North Channel: U 30, 38, 65, 46, 48, 59,
100.
15.8.1940. U 65 reported that she could not carry out her special On outward passage: U 32, 51, 101, 28 in the North Sea.
operation. She has therefore been ordered to the operations area off the In the Atlantic: U A.
North Channel, which has been divided into 10 part areas for individual In the Baltic: U 31, 34.
boats. In Kiel: U 47, 52, 61, 62.
In Wilhelmshaven: U 29, 43, 124.
U 60 has used up all her torpedoes. She sank 2 steamers totaling about In Lorient: U 37, 56, 58, 99.
12-14,000 tons and is now proceeding to Lorient to supply. On passage to Lorient: U 60.
On passage from Lorient to the North Channel: U 57.

(Signed): Dönitz U 57 reported the sinking of the tanker "Sylvafield", 5,709 tons. Boat is
Rear-Admiral and B.d.U. forced to proceed to Lorient for repairs because of bomb damage.

U 65 has had to break off her patrol and dock in Lorient for repairs.

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log U 59 was hunted NW of Ireland and sank a freighter of about 4,500
tons.
16 - 31 August 1940

192
 The convoy which should have arrived at latest today at the rendezvous
with the inward escort and against which U 48, 38 and 46 were detailed in
13.8 to operate, has been rerouted 50 miles to the north. Boats were
ordered to pursue it as this could still be successful, and U 48 made
contact with another outward bound convoy.
Heavy seas and bad visibility prevent the boats reaching the inward
bound Halifax convoy.
No. 371 Flak Detachment is at present in Lorient as flak defence. I
consider this defence inadequate for Lorient base, especially with regard to
light flak. The dockyard, the U-boat berths and B.d.U. Headquarters are
not adequately protected against dive bombers. On 24.7 Fliegerkorps IV.
agreed to send another Flak detachment, but this could not be arranged
owing to the present air attack on England. The reinforcement is
necessary and I have again put in a request for it. It will be necessary
unless and until the G.A.F's successes in England eliminate the threat to
Lorient base.
17.8.1940. U A was detailed to operate against the rendezvous for Task
Force H and found nothing there. Later, on 20.8, Radio Intelligence
Service discovered that the rendezvous was not reached until 2 days later.
U A so far has sunk 32,300 tons.
U 30 reported the sinking of the freighter "Clan Mac Phee", 6,628
tons, and bad weather and bad visibility in her operation area.
- 98 -
193
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The Fuehrer's orders, containing permission for unrestricted action
against all vessels in the sea area around England, were passed to the
boats.
18.8.1940. U 60 put into Lorient. She sank 2 steamers totaling 12 -
14,000 tons.
U 101 reported little traffic and bad weather in her operation area.
19.8.1940. U 48 has sunk a Swedish freighter of about 4,000 tons from a
convoy and a Belgian S.S. "Ville de Gent", not listed in the register.
U 100 has sunk 6,680 tons. Like U 101 she reports strong air activity in
her operation area.
U 28 met with little traffic and bad weather off the Minch and has
therefore been ordered to proceed on to the North Channel.
U A now reports her total results as 41,000 tons.
U 65 and U 59 entered Lorient.
20.8.1940. There is good information from radio intelligence on the
movements of the Northern Patrol and I have decided to operate U A again
against these enemy forces.
 U-boats are being badly hampered off the North Channel by bad
visibility and air activity. The disposition is being altered so as to give the
boats a better chance of evading enemy surface craft and a/c.
So far they have been disposed in a N-S line, so that as many as
possible would cross the steamer route, the general direction of which is
E-W. Now however, air activity makes it necessary to dispose them in an
E-W line and allocate central points for individual boats. They will then
have the chance of moving away from the west. The angle of intersection
between the operational line of U-boats and the steamer route will be less
favorable, but this will have to be accepted for the sake of giving the boats
greater freedom of action. The more valuable of the inward-bound
transports at least approach the North Channel on a SE course and there is
thus at least a small angle of intersection.
U 124, outward-bound astern of minesweeper escort, was attacked by
enemy a/c without success in route BLAU. The disadvantage of escort
through the North Sea therefore is clearly that the escort attracts a/c.
U 51 did not arrive at the rendezvous with the escort off Lorient and
has not replied to radio signals. The boat's last position reported by radio
was in square BF 14 at 1918/18/8. The minesweeping flotilla stationed at
Lorient immediately
- 99 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
194
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
checked the inward route for mines, without result. A/c sent out from
Brest to search, flew from square BF 14 to Lorient without sighting
anything.
Because of the danger of mines off Lorient, definite orders have again
been issued to the effect that U-boats may only enter Lorient during the
time 2 hours before to 2 hours after high tide with escort. The steamer
ROSTOCK, which is to be converted to a Sperrbrecher, has been
requested as permanent Sperrbrecher for Lorient base. She will have to
take over the escort when weather conditions are so bad that the R-boats
cannot put to sea.
21.8.1940. U 30 reported that she was returning owing to engine trouble.
Recent, rare radio intelligence reports indicate that convoys leaving the
North Channel may proceed S of 580, while inward-bound convoys pass
N. of this line.
Naval War Staff calls attention to this new situation.
This fresh information will be taken into account and the boats will be
disposed in the area as far as 590 N. in line with central points for
individual boats.
22.8.1940. U 65 entered Brest.
U 46 reported the sinking of 15,000 tons. She made the report via U
28, as her short wave transmitter is out of action.
23.8.1940. U A is returning because of engine trouble, she did not attack
the Northern Patrol.
 U 48 has attacked a convoy.
The possibility of an outward passage through the Baltic has again been
examined, because of danger to the boats sailing through the North Sea
from air attack (U 124) and mines (U 25). A convoy sails daily from Kiel
to the Kattegat to Zealand Rev, from there the steamers proceed
independently E. of LAESOE northward. Individual escort for U-boats
can only be provided in exceptional cases (verbal information from Group
North A1). U 47 is to sail with the usual convoy through the Baltic.
Brest Group reported that a large patch of oil was seen in square BF 14
during reconnaissance. As U 51 last reported from this square, the oil
patch may have some connection with her.
The entrance to Lorient is closed. The enemy laid a/c mines there
during last night.
24.8.1940. U 37 reported the sinking of English S.S. "Severnleigh" and
"Brookwood" and another steamer of 4,000 tons.
- 100 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
195
25.8.1940. U 37 further successes: Destroyer of the Viscount class and a
steamer of 7,000 tons. The boat has to proceed to Lorient because of
depth charge damage.
U 48 total successes: 46,170 tons. She is proceeding to Lorient to
supply.
U 28 and U 32 reported a convoy, which was successfully attacked by U
124 during the night (4 steamers totaling 30,000 tons). U 124 is to haul
out N. of the present disposition of U-boats, as it is suspected that traffic to
England is proceeding even further N. than 590.
26.8.1940. U 59 left Lorient for the North Channel.
U 57 is starting on her return passage as she requires a long period in
the dockyard.
U 37 has sunk the English S.S. "Yewcrest", 2,500 tons.
U 101 reports from her operation area: No traffic, no success.
Boats further E have sighted convoys on an E. course and weather and
visibility conditions have been bad during the last few days. No new
disposition has therefore been ordered in view of this report, but it is
planned for tomorrow if the situation has not changed by then.
27.8.1940. U 30 entered Heligoland.
U 47 left Kiel in company with the convoy through the Baltic as far as
Kristiansand.
 No reports have been received from boats from the operations area for
2 days and there is danger that the enemy has changed his shipping routes
in view of the recent numerous U-boat successes. I have therefore decided
to make a new disposition with the intention of giving the boats greater
freedom of movement and cover a larger area. The boats will be disposed
in a NW - SE line between central Ireland and the Northern approach to
the Minch.
Owing to the great importance of weather reports, Naval War Staff has
ordered that in the future one boat is to be in the area between 55 - 600 N
and 20 - 250 W. Another boat is to lay weather buoys NW and W of
Scotland.
U 101 made reconnaissance signal of a convoy.
28.8.1940. U 30 and U A entered Wilhelmshaven.
U 30 repaired in Lorient and then started for home, as major repair
work is required. She remained in her operation area off the North
Channel as long as the state of her engines permitted
- 101 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
196
and was also successful there, sinking 3 steamers totaling 17,373 tons.
U A made a long patrol from the Northern Patrol to the sea area off
Carnawen - Cape Verde Islands - Freetown and sank 7 vessels altogether,
totaling 41,400 tons, including the English auxiliary cruiser "Adania". She
supplied from ship 33 SW of the Cape Verde Islands as planned.
Operation in the tropics did not present any unforeseen difficulties with
regard to material or personnel with additional air-conditioning apparatus
even our present types of boats should be fit for use in the tropics. Taken
as a whole this patrol was not altogether satisfactory. Not all opportunities
to attack were exploited and lack of perseverance can be seen.
Convoy reports from U 28, 56, and 100 confirmed present information
on the routes followed by inward and outward-bound transports.
A/c mines were laid for the first time off and in the approach to Lorient.
The mines are apparently fitted with delay mechanisms and special care is
indicated.
29.8.1940. U 61 left Kiel via the Baltic for Bergen to supply.
U 48 entered Lorient. She had to remain at sea for one day longer until
Lorient approach was free of mines.
U 51 entered Bergen to supply for her return passage.
U 38 reported the sinking of 14,000 tons and is proceeding to Lorient to
supply.
At 1200 B.d.U.'s Headquarters were transferred to Paris.
I arrived there P.M.
30.8.1940. U 65 left Brest after repairing.

U 37 entered Lorient to repair bomb damage.

1.9.1940. Distribution of U-boats:
U 59 which only left Lorient on 26.8, reported the sinking of 3 vessels In the Atlantic Operations Area: U 28, 32, 38, 46, 56, 60, 65, 101, 124.
totaling 29,000 tons, an excellent result for this short time and this small On outward passage from home: U 61 in the North Sea, U 47 W. of the
boat. Orkneys.
On return passage home: U 57.
Exact details were received from Radio Intelligence Service of the On return passage to Lorient: U 59, 100.
route of Convoy SC 2. U 124, 47 and 65 can operate and will be given In Lorient: U 48, 58, 99, 37.
orders accordingly on 2.9. In the Baltic: U 31.
In Wilhelmshaven: U 29, 30, 43.
31.8.1940. U 57 left Bergen and will return home via route GRUEN. In Kiel: U 52, 62, UA.
In Danzig: U 34.

(Signed): Dönitz U 100 entered Lorient. This boat operated off the North Channel into
Rear Admiral and B.d.U. the sea area of the Rockall Bank and sank 7 vessels totaling about 43,000
tons, 5 of them from a convoy. As nearly all boats so far, U 100 suffered
from bad weather and bad visibility.

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log Commanding Officer of U 37 made a personal report of his last patrol:
Strong patrol, especially by a/c in the area NW of the Orkneys. 2 bow
1 - 15 September 1940 tubes were damaged by bombs and the boat proceeded to Lorient to repair.
She then scored good successes fairly far west and the Commanding
PG30272 Officer here showed particularly good ability and determination. Total
results: 1 destroyer and 7 steamers totaling about 36,381 tons.
Commanding Officer of U 48 reported personally on his last patrol: No
particular experiences. 7 vessels totaling about 46,170 tons sunk within 10
days off the North Channel.

U 61 entered Bergen to refuel.

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events U 32 reported the sinking of "Scythia", 19,761 tons, from a strongly
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. escorted convoy. U 56 reported a heavy westerly swell, which prevented
this small boat from shadowing a convoy, let alone getting ahead.

197
 Radio intelligence analysis shows that U-boats in the operations area
have been particularly successful during the last days. Today alone 5
sinkings were reported, including 2 steamers of over 15,000 tons each.
2.9.1940. U 58 left Lorient and sighted an enemy S/M in square BF
6177. U 29 left Wilhelmshaven, U 61 Bergen.
U 124, 65, 47 and 101 are to operate against the SC 2 convoy. U 101
reported that she still had 6 torpedoes left and more than half of her fuel.
Contact is to be made before the convoy is picked up by the inward escort.
According to reckoning the convoy should be in square AL 0216 at
midday on 6.9. One U-boat will be stationed at this point and the others in
quaterline astern of her, so that a certain depth is achieved and a total
breadth of 40 miles covered. It can then be expected that, if the convoy
proceeds according to
- 103 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
plan, all boats will be able to attack, and if it deviates from the
rendezvous, at least one boat. Boats are to keep radio silence except for
198
convoy reports. U 124 is to continue with her scheduled weather reports
for the present, mines have been detected SW of Pen March at depths
below 100 meters. Boats have been warned accordingly. The danger from
mines and S/M's along the approach route to Lorient has increased.
3.9.1940. U 38 and U 59 entered Lorient.
U 38 suffered considerably from air activity and bad weather in her
operations area off the North Channel and W. of the Herbrides. She sank 3
vessels totaling 19-20,000 tons. U 59 attacked 3 vessels from an outward
bound convoy on her way to her operations area and hit one tanker of
12,000 tons and 2 freighters of 7,000 and 10,000 tons respectively. Only
one freighter (10,000 tons) was observed to sink, but the sinking of the
other 2 is likely from the Commanding Officer's report.
U 46 reported a total of 51,507 tons sunk, including probably the
auxiliary cruiser "Dunvegan Castle" (15,007 tons). She is starting on her
return passage to Lorient.
U 28 reported on continued bad weather. She sank 2 steamers totaling
27,000 tons and observed traffic in considerable strength approaching the
North Channel from square AM 5382 to 5241.
U 32 is returning to Lorient.
U 57 was rammed towards 0300, when entering the Brunsbüttel lock,
by the Norwegian S.S. "Rona" and sank immediately. 6 men are missing.
It is not yet established for certain where the fault lay, but apparently it
was with the Norwegian, which made a signal of one short and then after
all turned towards the boat. I have requested the relevant authorities to see
that U-boats are not hindered when locking in and out and that all other
traffic is stopped at these times. I received the following impression from
a short stay in Lorient:
1) The accommodation for the flotilla requires improvement, necessary
work is in hand. Conditions for the ratings should be very good in Lorient,
with the rest hostel in Quiberon.
2) Danger from mines and S/M's is great and will require constant strong
defense forces.
3) Flak defenses must also be regarded as inadequate after the last attacks.
5 English a/c were able to fly as low as 300 meters over the dockyard and
drop 10 bombs which fell in the immediate vicinity of the U-boats. There
is a distinct gap in the defenses to the N and NE of Lorient which the
English use to fly in. A third heavy flak battery will have to be stationed
there. But above all there is a lack of light guns in the dockyard itself
against low-flying a/c. These conditions will have to be improved.
- 104 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Taken as a whole, Lorient base is entirely suitable, and extremely
valuable, but it will hardly be able to take more than 10-15 boats at a time
for repairs. Even this number means accumulation which is a great
disadvantage as long as air attacks can still be expected. It is necessary to
obtain further bases on the Atlantic coast for the new U-boat flotillas. U
99 left Lorient
199
4.9.1940. U 29 will have to put into Bergen, as her attack periscope was
sticking. U 124 is, on the orders of Naval War Staff, to continue to act
only as weather boat, and there are therefore only 3 boats available for
operation against the SC 2 convoy. Their disposition:
U 47 in AL 0216, on the convoy's probable course
U 65 in AL 2858 and U 101 in AL 3777.
5.9.1940. U 29 entered Bergen to repair attack periscope. As U 99 and U
58 cannot arrive in time to operate against the SC convoy, they have been
ordered to operate off the North Channel in squares 52 and 53. There will
then be 3 boats in this area, U 56, 58, 99 and U 61 is off the Minch. These
boats may encounter sections of SC 2, which can be expected in these
areas on 8/9.9.
CinC Navy visited headquarters and I reported to him on the present U-
boat situation and plans for operation Seelöwe. The Grand Admiral gave
orders that he himself would decide the date for breaking off training. I
called attention to the urgent need for increased Flak defenses for Lorient
base. CinC agreed and will give the necessary orders.
6.9.1940. U 60 entered Lorient.
U 65 made contact with convoy SC 2 as planned. Unfortunately
weather conditions prevented use of armament for the present; there was a
W. wind force 8 and bad visibility.
7.9.1940. U 47 made contact and lost it again, as did also U 65. In spite
of the bad weather U-boats greatly hampered by a/c.
8.9.1940. U 32 entered Lorient.
U 47 and 65 regained contact. U 47 had some success for certain.
 9.9.1940. U 43 left Wilhelmshaven. The weather buoys were not fully
serviceable when she left and they will be given to the next boat to sail, U
103.
U 101 is returning to Lorient owing to engine defects.
- 105 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 99 and U 47 again made contact with the Canada convoy SC 2. 5
steamers totaling 34,300 tons were sunk from this convoy between 7-9.9,
in spite of unfavorable weather conditions. U 124 reported damage to her
bow caps and requires dockyard assistance. She will be relieved as
weather boat, so that weather reports will be made from the areas 550 -
600 N, 200 - 250 W and 550 - 600 N, 70 - 150 W.
Boats will be redisposed when the SC 2 convoy has passed, the NW-SE
lines will be retained.
10.9.1940. U 138 left Kiel for the Atlantic via the Baltic without
refueling in Bergen.
200
U 43 reported that there had been 6 loud explosions a few hundred
meters away from the boat in square AN 3812. Group North is going to
have the sea area searched for mines by minesweeping forces. Boats have
been instructed to avoid square 3810.
11.9.1940. U 100 left Lorient.
U 29 left Bergen.
U 56 entered Bergen. This boat unsuccessfully attacked a London class
cruiser NW of the Herbrides, although the range was only 12 hectometers.
12.9.1940. U 43 entered Bergen to repair leaks in the air intake and one
torpedo tube.
U 61 started on her return passage; she had no success. 3 of the Italian
Atlantic U-boats have now arrived in Bordeaux, 9 others are in their
operations area or on their way from their home port to Bordeaux. For the
latter I recommend operation against the ore and timber import traffic from
Spain and Portugal to England.
2 S/M chasers have arrived in Lorient and have been detailed by B.d.U.
to carry out A/S operations off Lorient. They have been allocated a hunt
area S. of Pen March for the present and this area is closed to U-boats.
13.9.1940. Nothing to report.
14.9.1940. U 137 left Kiel via the Baltic for direct passage to her
operations area off the North Channel.
The Italians have acted on my suggestion and will operate 3 boats off
the Spanish and Portuguese coasts.
- 106 -
 have therefore given orders that for the present all boats, including those
from Wilhelmshaven, are to leave via the Baltic. The safety offered by the
escort outweighs the disadvantage of the delay.

(Signed): Dönitz

Date Position, Wind, Weather

and Sea State, Illumination, Events F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
16 - 30 September 1940

PG30273

The Commanding Officer of the Italian U-boat "Malaspina",

Commander LEONI, made a verbal report of his patrol. He was ar sea for
38 days and sank 2 ships totaling 27,000 tons. The after hydroplane
jammed when the boat was crash diving away from a destroyer in the
Straits of Gibraltar and this unpleasant emergency was ably handled. After Date Position, Wind, Weather
a night attack he dived too soon and therefore did not observe the result; and Sea State, Illumination, Events
success was doubtful. On the whole there is nothing to criticize in this Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
patrol.

15.9.1940. U 43 left Bergen after completing repairs.

U 61 entered Lorient, U 56 Kiel.

U 59 reported that she was returning.She has apparently had no success.
U 48 attacked and split up a convoy inward-bound off the North
Channel.
It is suspected that the enemy has laid mines in the North Sea between
570 30' N and 580 N and 4 to 50 E. also in squares 4830, 4840, 4860 and I
201
16.9.1940 Positions of U-boats:
In operations areas: U 47 in the west as weather reporting boat, U 65, U
99, U 48, U 100, U 29, U 58.
On outward passage: U 43, 138 in the Shetlands area, U 137 on the SW
coast of Norway, U 60 off Lorient, U 31, 103 off Wilhelmshaven.
On return passage to Lorient: U 28, 59.
In Lorient: U 32, 37, 38, 46, 61, 101, 124.
In Wilhelmshaven: U 123.
 In Kiel: UA, U 52, 56, 57, 139.
In Stettin: U 30.
In Danzig: U 34.
U 58 is returning as her fuel stocks are exhausted; no successes.
U 137 has been ordered to Stavanger, at the request of Admiral Norway,
to take part in a special operation against an English S/M in cooperation
with A/S forces.
17.9.1940. U 137 entered Stavanger, U 28 Lorient (In report see 18.9).
U 65 reported an inward-bound convoy in square AM 1574. Radio
Intelligence Service established that 3 steamers had been sunk, including
the "City of Benares", 11,081 tons, probably by U 47.
18.9.1940. U 32 left Lorient.
During a visit to Lorient I observed that, following action by CinC
Navy, the flak defenses had been reinforced. This made itself felt during
last night's attack; the English a/c were prevented from flying low.
The C.O.'s of U 28, 61, 101 and 124 reported:
U 28 encountered no traffic or patrol on the Minch sea area, but there
was constant bad visibility, so that her observations cannot be taken as a
basis for further decisions. There must be traffic there. This assumption
was confirmed a few days later by other boats. In the operations area off
the North Channel this boat then sank 5 vessels, totaling 30,599 tons, in
spite of bad weather and strong air activity.
U 61, coming from the Baltic, refueled in Bergen and then operated off
the North Channel. She scored no successes, owing to bad weather, strong
air activity wrong tactics and avoidable
- 108 -
202
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
engine defects. The Commanding Officer will have to give proof of his
efficiency on his next patrol.
U 101 operated off the North Channel in bad weather and visibility
conditions and sank 3 vessels totaling 15,576 tons. She was severely
depth-charged once.
U 124 attacked an inward-bound convoy on her way out, following
shadower's reports, and sank 4 vessels totaling about 28,000 tons within a
few hours. She then hauled off to the west as weather boat and
encountered further traffic, but scored no successes.
19.9.1940. U 123 left Wilhelmshaven via the Baltic for her operations
area off the North Channel.
U 29 reported engine damage and is returning to Lorient. Brest Group
reported shipping movements through the English mined area in the St.
George's Channel. This report contradicts our own observations and a
request was therefore made for air reconnaissance A.M. in the area S. of
Ireland. I have the impression that there can be only little traffic from the
Irish Sea around Lands End into the Channel, otherwise the U-boats would
have met shipping S. of Ireland on their way to and from Lorient. Only
fishing vessels have, however, been sighted there.
20.9.1940. U 58, 59 Lorient.
U 58 on her way out from Lorient, was surprised by an English S/M
type "Clyde", at night a short distance off (200 meters) and apparently
unsuccessfully attacked with a torpedo. Off the North Channel the boat
was hampered by bad weather and air activity and only once managed to
approach a steamer. This attack was unsuccessful, the torpedo, set at 3
meters, ran under the target.
U 59 used up an unusually large quantity of fuel owing to continuous
bad weather and was only able to operate for a few days off the North
Channel without success.
U 60 has been ordered to attack along the routes to the E. coast of
England off Pentland Firth. There is constant lively traffic there.
U 137 left Stavanger, as her further retention there for a special
operation cannot be justified.
U 47 made contact with an inward-bound convoy. At the same time
Radio Intelligence Service picked up enemy course instructions for a
convoy coming from the west. It was first thought that these convoys
were one and the same, because the course at first reported by the boat
corresponded approximately to that given by Radio Intelligence. All boats
in the vicinity were therefore ordered to attacking positions on the enemy's
course which would give them a chance to contact the enemy in daylight.
Later reports from U 47 showed clearly, however, that the convoy was
making a detour to the SE and the boats received orders to operate against
it in accordance with shadowing reports from U 47.
- 109 -
203
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 48 was the first boat to sight the convoy and she sank 2 steamers and
took over as shadower. During the day U 99 and U 100 made successful
attacks; U 65 attacked without success. U 103, U 123 left Kiel.
U 59 entered Lorient.
The Italians accepted, in part only, B.d.U.'s suggestion that their boats
be left in operations areas not only for a certain period ordered, but until
their supplies were exhausted. The boats are now to remain three days
longer in their operations area.
22.9.1940. U 100 was driven off by destroyers which had meanwhile
reached the convoy. This inward-bound convoy was attacked altogether
by 5 boats, which were originally up to 380 miles away from the first point
of sighting. 13 ships were sunk. This success is thanks to:
1) early intelligence of the convoy far west when the escort was still
weak.
2) correct tactical procedure of boats as shadowers and operating over a
wide area.
3) favorable weather.
 U 47 had already fired all her torpedoes beforehand and some of the
other boats had only a few left.
Actions during the last few days have shown that the principles
established in peacetime for use of radio in sight of the enemy and the
training of U-boats for attacks on convoys were correct.
U 138 reported 4 steamers, totaling 29,000 tons, sunk from another
convoy N. of Ireland. This boat is returning to Lorient.
U 46 left St Nazaire after short repairs in dock.
23.9.1940. U 47 reported a total success of 6 steamers totaling 40,250
tons and one freighter, 4,000 tons, damaged. She is returning to Lorient.
24.9.1940. U 37, 61 left Lorient.
U 29 shadowed an outward-bound convoy and brought up U 31 and U
43. No successes have been reported either by the boats or by Radio
Intelligence (U 31 reported a miss only).
During the next few days there will be up to 10 boats operating off the
North Channel and it is suspected that the convoys are now passing S. of
Rockall Bank. I have therefore decided on a new form of disposition
which will extend further to the west and will be narrower in a N-S
direction. 2 boats will be far to the west (including one weather boat)
approximately at 230 W; 5-6
- 110 -
204
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
medium and large boats, which have sufficient speed to operate over
long stretches and haul ahead, will be between 190 and 120 W and 2 small
boats immediately off the North Channel.
Our own catapult ship "Ostmark" was torpedoed off Belle Isle and
minefields have been detected near Pen March. I have therefore given
orders for boats leaving Atlantic ports to make a passage report by short
signal when passing 100 W so as to be certain that they have got through
the danger area.
25.9.1940. U 38 left Lorient.
U 48, 65, 99, 100 left Lorient.
All these boats operated from Lorient off the North Channel and some
very successfully. They all attacked the convoy on 20, 21 and 22.9.
Successes: U 48 9 steamers totaling 51,896 tons and the gunboat
Dundee.
U 65 2 steamers totaling 12,200 tons, several regrettable misses.
U 99 9 steamers totaling 25,498 tons and 2 steamers of unknown
tonnage.
U 100 3 tankers, 5 steamers totaling 61,300 tons within 3 hours on 22.9.
 26.9.1940 U 137 reported 4 steamers attacked from convoy: 2 sunk, 1
on fire, 1 probably sunk.
U 32 reported 4 steamers sunk totaling 23,735 tons.
U 29 was in contact with a convoy. Wrong squares were given in the
first reports and no other boat succeeded in attacking.
U 29 herself had to break off the pursuit owing to engine defects.
U 47, U 138 entered Lorient.
U 47 did excellent work off the North Channel and as weather boat W.
of Rockall and as shadower. She sank 6 steamers totaling about 40,250
tons and brought all the other boats up to the convoy.
U 138, immediately off the North Channel, sank or severely damaged
4 steamers totaling 29,000 tons. U 138 was attacked with a 4-fan by a
submerged S/M , on her way into Lorient. Later both boats were
unsuccessfully attacked by an a/c. I am therefore forced to ask for fighter
escort for inward-bound boats in the future, so that on the one hand enemy
S/M's are forced to dive before our own U-boats arrive and on the other
there is some defense against enemy a/c. This requirement cannot be met
at the moment, however, as there are not enough a/c. Group Command
will support my request for bases for Naval a/c on the Atlantic coast.
- 111 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
205
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
27.9.1940. U 46 has had to start on her return passage because of
jamming of the hydrophones. She reported at the same time 2 freighters
sunk.
There was an air attack on Lorient. There was damage to military
installations, but several U-boat men and personnel belonging to shore
stations were killed or wounded.
28.9.1940. Nothing to report.
29.9.1940. U 46 entered St. Nazaire.
U 137 entered Lorient.
U 32 shadowed an outward-bound convoy and attacked.
30.9.1940. U 31 and U 38 each reported an outward-bound convoy. U
31 last contact during the night after she had been fired upon by an enemy
S/M which apparently formed part of the escort. U 38 also lost contact
without bringing up another boat.
Visit to F.O. Italian Atlantic boats, Rear-Admiral PARONA, in
Bordeaux.
Apart from a general exchange of views, the main object of the visit was
to discuss the operation of the Italian U-boats shortly to leave Bordeaux.
These, and other boats leaving Bordeaux later, will be controlled from
there while boats sailing from Italian ports are controlled from Rome. The
general impression received was that the Italians were very ready to
cooperate and willing to accept control by B.d.U., especially in view of
our greater experience of war. The Italians, on the other hand, appear to be
sadly lacking in war experience. I therefore consider, the first patrols of
boats leaving Italy for the Azores, where there should not be much enemy
A/S activity, as good training.
The aim will be later to operate the Italians in the more promising, but
increasingly strongly defended northern areas.
The first 3 boats will leave Bordeaux on about 5 October.
They are to operate as follows:
They will be disposed SW of our own boats off the North Channel in
approximately the following areas:
a) square AL 18 and AL 01 and W. of this
b) S. of these boats as far as the line square 5451 to 7147
c) AL 55 and AL 58 and W. of this as far as the dividing line between c)
and b).
The weather boat's area will be reduced accordingly. The Italian U-
boats will attack on making contact with the enemy and
- 112 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
206
will shadow even if this leads them into the German boat's areas.
Enemy reports will be made to Bordeaux and transmitted on from there by
T/P to Paris. They are expected to take an hour. The Italians are equipped
with our recognition signals and there are no misgivings therefore on
either side about operating German and Italian boats in the same area. The
German boats will be given large-scale silhouettes of the Italian U-boats,
as confusion is more likely between Italian and English than between
German and English S/M's. Operation in the Freetown sea area is under
consideration for the large Italian boats.
(Signed): Dönitz.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 October 1940
PG30274
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
1.10 Positions of U-boats:
In the Atlantic operations area: U 31, 32, 37, 38, 43, 60, 61, 103, 123.
 On return passage off Lorient: U 29.
In Lorient: U 28, 47, 48, 58, 59, 65, 99, 100, 101, 124, 137, 138. 2.10 U 59 left Lorient.
In St. Nazaire: U 46.
In Stettin: U 30.
In Kiel: UA, U 52, 56. - 114 -
The following are now detached for training purposes, besides boats
types IIa and b.: U 62, 139, 140, 141, 142, 34.
U 52 and 94 are temporarily at the disposal of the training flotillas.
The following will join the training flotillas on completing their next
repairs: U 30, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 143.
There are therefore at present available for operations:
6 boats type IIc, 4 of which will go home shortly.
10 boats type VII
7 boats type IX Date Position, Wind, Weather
1 special type (UA) and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 29 entered Lorient. She had to put into Bergen for a few days for
repairs on her way out. She hardly encountered any traffic in her
operations area and only met with convoys on her way to Lorient. The
poor condition of her engines was a great disadvantage on operations.
Success: 1 steamer (Emyedin), 6,300 tons.
During the last few days no traffic has been observed in the sea area N. U 31 reported that she was starting on her return passage, because of a
of 58, which has hitherto been used by the English for imports. U 29 crack in her diving tank.
sighted a convoy to the south approximately at the latitude of 51,
approaching the North Channel on a NE course. English air U 38 reported the sinking of "Highland Patriot", 14,172 tons. U 32
reconnaissance also reported an English convoy on the same course off the reported further successes and has now sunk a total of 42,644 tons on this
Porcupine Bank. The English thus seem to be scattering their inward- patrol and damaged a steamer with several gun hits.
bound shipping considerably. As the 5 boats at present on operations can
only effectively cover a restricted area, I have decided to draw them closer U 60 reported on entering Bergen that there had been explosions close
together and search to the SW. The G.A.F. should fly reconnaissance N, to the boat off the North Channel, which caused her to report suspected
NE, S, and SE of the operations area but, in spite of my efforts, has not mines by radio. Details correspond more or less to those given by U 43,
sufficient a/c to do this. The boats thus have to carry out reconnaissance, which had a similar experience about a month ago off the SW coast of
which is not properly their task. They will be disposed in attacking Norway. It is unlikely that mines are involved, but the respective areas
positions, distance apart about 60 miles, i.e. double the maximum visual must nevertheless be regarded as possibly mined and boats have been
range. In taking up those positions they will at the same time survey a informed accordingly.
considerable sea area.
207
3.10 U 103 reported one weather buoy laid, the second was a dud. - 115 -

4.10 U 61 reported starting on her return passage, no success, all

torpedoes still on board.

There is bad weather in the operations area and off Lorient. Boats
which left Lorient had to return to port, as the escort vessels could not hold
their own against the heavy seas outside the harbor entrance.

5.10 U 60 left Bergen via route GRUEN for Kiel. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 28, 48, 101, 124 left Lorient. U 28 is going to dock in St. Nazaire, Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
the remaining boats are proceeding to the operations area off the North
Channel.

U 58 and 59 have been ordered to operate off the North Channel. If bad
weather continues they are to go to Pentland Firth and take up position off
the W. or E. approach according to weather conditions.
U 93 left Kiel via the Baltic and the Kattegatt for the operations area.
6.10 U 61 entered Bergen.
U 32 entered Lorient. This boat again successfully operated against
convoys reported by others and sank 7 ships totaling 39,393 tons within 18
days, making full use of her torpedoes and guns.
Soon after leaving port U 93 reported a break in one of her periscope
wires. She is proceeding on and repairs will be carried out in Bergen.
The reconnaissance line in the SW of the operations area has not so far
intercepted a convoy. Reconnaissance must now be carried out to the N.
across the inward routes. The boats will turn and cruise through the center
of the operations area on a NE course to
a position line from AL 3566 to AM 1985. The boats coming from
Lorient, now S of Ireland, have been ordered to the area A 43 to 51. When
they arrive there will be 7 boats covering an area of about 280 miles in
deep quarterline.
7.10 U 61 left Bergen via route GRUEN for Kiel.
8.10 U 31 entered Lorient. She operated NW of Ireland. Success: 1
steamer of 4300 tons, 1 small sailing vessel. While attacking a convoy she
was herself attacked by an enemy S/M with torpedoes. Damage forced her
to return off Lorient she was again attacked by an enemy S/M with 2 fans
and afterwards U 31 thought she saw the enemy laying mines. This is
unlikely, but a search will be made.
U 60 entered Kiel.
U 93 entered Bergen to repair her periscope.

U 138 left Lorient.

208
9.10 U 93 left Bergen for Atlantic operations area.
The line of U-boats consisting of U 123, 103, 48, 38 and 37 has now
arrived W. of Rockall Bank. Nothing was found on passage northward at
right angles to the inward routes. Today however, U 103 reported an
inward-bound convoy and shadowed until she was driven off with D/C's.
Although I took action, none of the boats was able to keep in contact, very
bad visibility and heavy seas reduced their speed, made their position
uncertain and made it impossible to use their armament. As a last attempt,
the boats have been ordered to form a patrol line ahead of the convoy by
A.M. 10.10.
In accordance with instructions from Naval War Staff, U 65 is to operate
off Freetown base, which has now become important. Freetown is used as
a base for all convoys in the E. Atlantic and heavily occupied and there is a
lot of traffic; defenses are thought to be weak, as so far none of our forces
have appeared in this sea area. A surprise operation should lead to
considerable actual success in sinking valuable units, in addition to the
desired diversionary effect.
10.10 The convoy reported by U 103 was not found again, owing to fog.
The boats have therefore again been redisposed, concentrating around the
Rockall Bank, as inward-bound traffic apparently steers for this point.
An Italian U-boat S. of Cape St. Vincent reported a convoy bound for
England. Attempts to shadow failed, because the Italians have not been
trained for this type of warfare. They are only prepared for attacks on
warships and bases, and they have neither practiced holding a convoy and
bringing up other boats nor is their communications equipment and
procedure suited to such an operation.
- 116 -
209
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 58 reported the sinking of an English ship type "Clan Mac Arthur",
10,528 tons.
U 48 encountered a convoy in her operations area which is fairly far
west, and shadowed and attacked in spite of bad weather (she reported
wind force 9, visibility 1/2 mile). U 48 was ordered to make beacon
signals to bring up other boats. Contact was lost during the night after U
48 had sunk 3 steamers.
U 100 left Lorient, U 28 St. Nazaire.
12.10 U 59 reported the sinking of 2 steamers, 1 type "Pacific Ranger",
6,000 tons, and 1 type "Loch Geil", 9,000 tons.
According to radio intelligence an Italian (Argo or Tacroli) sank the
Yugoslav S.S. "Orav" 5,135 tons S. of Cape St. Vincent. There may have
been a second success.
Contact with the convoy was not regained during the day because of bad
visibility and heavy seas, even though there must have been 6 boats in the
vicinity. The convoy is now approaching the coastal zone, strongly
patrolled by a/c and surface forces, and no improvement in the weather is
expected in the east. Boats have therefore been ordered to take up their
old positions after dark. 2 boats made a short situation report, which
confirmed the impression I had formed so far: both convoys were only
slightly damaged, although the boat's tactics were correct. The
unfavorable weather was on the enemy's side. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
13.10 U 46 has left St. Nazaire, U 99 Lorient. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

U 59 started on her return passage to Lorient. She has sunk 2 steamers

totaling 16,300 tons.

14.10 U 47 left Lorient.

U 138 is returning, having used all her torpedoes. She sank 2 tankers
U 58 left Bergen for home. totaling about 20,000 tons and damaged S.S. "Dagnin".

U 59 entered Bergen to refuel for her return passage.

(Signed): DÖNITZ
U 43 started on her return passage to Lorient.

U 93 and U 137 each made contact with a convoy and boats in the F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
vicinity were detailed to operate. U 137 soon lost contact but not until she
had sunk the armed S.S. "Devonshhire", 11,100 tons. 16 - 31 October 1940

15.10 U 65 left Lorient for Freetown. She was attacked with torpedoes PG30275
by an English S/M off Lorient.

U 37 is returning to Lorient because her fuel supplies are exhausted.

U 93 lost contact.

Date Position, Wind, Weather

- 117 - and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

210
 U 93 is still shadowing the outward-bound convoy.

16.10 Position of U-boats: 18.10 Not until midday was a report received from U 38, according to
In operations area: U 37, 38, 48, 93, 101, 103, 123, 124, Malaspina. which at 0200 the convoy was after all further north than expected. It
On passage to operations area: U 46, 47, 99, 28, 100, 65 (to Freetown), remains to be explained why U 38 did not report earlier and did not
Dandolo, Barlarigo, Otaria. pursue.
On return passage to Lorient: U 137, 138, 43.
On return passage home: U 58, 59.
In Kiel: UA. - 119 -

U 103 is returning, having used all her torpedoes. She has sunk 5
steamers totaling 31,000 GRT.

U 93 is shadowing an outward-bound convoy. For the present only U

38 can operate against it.

17.10 Towards 0300 U 48 made contact with an inward-bound convoy in

square AL 3380 (25 ships, 3 gun boats).
The order was given: Attack the convoy reported by U 48
This order could not be carried out by: U 38, 93 because of enemy
action elsewhere (U 93's convoy). U 28, 47, which are still too far away.
U 124 which as weather boat, is too far west.
U 46, 99, 100, 101, 123 operated against the convoy.
U 48 attacked but soon lost contact and was forced to dive. No further
reports were received and towards midday Operations Control gave the
order "continue to operate against the convoy reported, general direction
of advance 1200, 8 knots". Towards 1800 a report was received from U 48
giving the last observed position of the convoy at 0930, which was further
N, than hitherto reported, and its course which was also further north and
could obviously only be steered for a time.
This must have confused the boats. They were therefore ordered to
form patrol line by 0800/18 which will be at right angles to the most
probable direction of advance and should intercept the convoy in the
morning. U 46, 100, 101 and 123 can reach their positions but not U 28
and 99.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
There is a danger now that the convoy would skirt the patrol line to the
north. At 1500 the boats were ordered to operate in accordance with U
38's last report and were given the position by dead reckoning, at 1400.
This order was hardly carried out however, because at 1800 U 101 made
contact and brought up the other boats.
U 93 lost her convoy, but soon sighted another outward-bound one,
which she shadowed and which U 124 and Malaspina were able to attack.
U 93's reports were transmitted to Bordeaux currently.

211
 U 43 sighted a submerged enemy S/M on her way into Lorient. This 20.10 The following ships were sunk during the night from U 47's
boat operated W of England after short repairs in Bergen. During a patrol convoy:
lasting five weeks she sank only one medium-sized steamer. The U 38 2 ships 13,000 GRT
Commanding Officer, who had a good peace-time training, is apparently
past his job and will be relieved. His previous patrol was also
unsatisfactory.
- 120 -
19.10 The convoy first reported by U 48 then by U 38 and U 101 was
attacked by U 46, 99, 101 and 123.
The following were sunk according to reports from the boats:
17.10 U 48 3 ships 21,000 tons:
18/19.10 U 46 4 ships 21,000 "
U 99 7 ships 45,000 "
U 100 3 ships 14,000 "
U 101 8 ships 51,000 "
U 123 5 ships 44,000 " Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
30 ships 196,000 tons. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

U 99, 101, and 123 started on their return passage having used all their
torpedoes.

U 47 sighted another inward-bound convoy in the morning in square AL U 46 3 ships 23,000 GRT
0243 and shadowed. U 46 and 100 from the last convoy should be able to U 47 8 ships 50,500 "
operate against it, U 38 and 48 from the north, and U 28 which should U 48 1 ship 7,000 "
have arrived in the operations area meanwhile. U 100 3 ships 19,600 "

U 93 shadowed the outward-bound convoy until evening but no other
boats managed to attack. She lost contact in about 300 W.
U 103 entered Lorient. As a subsidiary operations, she laid weather
buoys and the sunk 6 vessels totaling about 35,986 tons.
U 31 left Lorient.
212
17 ships 113,100 GRT
By joint attack during the last 3 days 7 U-boats with 300 men have sunk
47 ships totaling about 310,000 GRT. A colossal success.
Conclusions:
1) The operations prove that the principle of which the development of
U-boat tactics and training has been based since 1935, namely that of
countering concentration in convoys with a concentration of U-boats,
attacks, was right. This concentration has been made possible by the 21.10 Group Command West has been requested to lay barrages to
development of communications since the World War. protect
2) Such operations can only be carried out with Commanding Officers and
crews which are thoroughly trained for them. It follows that there must be
extensive and long training in wide sea areas. This training would not be
possible if we did not have the Baltic Sea free of enemy interference.
3) Such operations can only be carried out if there are enough U-boats in
the operations area. In this war this is so far only been the case from time
to time.
4) The more U-boats there are in operations area the more frequently such
operations will be possible.
5) Also, if there were more boats, the English supply routes would not be - 121 -
left free of U-boats after such attacks because, as today nearly all the boats
have to return because they have used all their torpedoes.
6) Successes such as in these operations can not always be expected. BAd
weather and other circumstances can sometimes ruin every chance.

The main thing however will always be the ability of the C.O.

U 31 reported that she was again fired upon on leaving Lorient.

After the great success in the attacks on the 2 convoys, most of the boats Date Position, Wind, Weather
have no torpedoes left and are proceeding to Lorient (U 47, 99, 100, 103, and Sea State, Illumination, Events
123, 38, 101). Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

U 124, 46 and 28 are the only boats left in the operations area and U 46
has only 2 stern torpedoes left so that it is useless to keep her back any
longer. She will only remain for another 2 days. U 124 will act as weather
boat N of 560 22 N in square AL 23 to 26, U 28 will act as weather boat
off Rockall Bank. The Italian U-boats which have meanwhile arrived in the approach routes to Lorient against S/M attack and minelayers.
the operations area will be sent 100 seamiles further E. They will than be
in the area in which our own boats picked up several convoys and which is 22.10 U 37, 99 entered Lorient.
at present estimated to be promising.
U 37 sank 6 steamers in her operations area off the North Channel,
totaling 31,545 tons.
213
 engine only. She was ordered to go to Kristiansand, which is the nearest
U 99 sank 6 ships during the night 19/20.10, totaling 38,606 tons. Her port (135 miles). Group Command North will provide fighter protection
whole patrol only lasted 9 days. by 2 aircraft and escort by 2 S/M chasers.

23.10 U 47, 100, 123 entered Lorient.
U 47 shadowed the convoy she sighted excellently, so that U 48, 38, 100
and 46 reached it, some of them from a long way off. U 47 herself sank 8
ships totaling about 50,500 GRT within a few hours during the night. Her
patrol also only lasted 9 days. U 100 operated against 2 convoys (U 48
and U 47) and sank or severely damaged 5 ships totaling 38,365 tons,
including one independently-routed vessel.
U 123 made her first patrol from home. She first encountered
independently-routed ships and sank 3. She then sank 3 more steamers
from the convoy reported by U 48. Total results: 6 ships totaling 40,943
tons.
B.d.U. reported to the Führer on U-boat operations from 17 - 20
October (attacks on convoys in the Rockall Bank area) and on general
questions affecting U-boat warfare.
26.9 U 46 entered Kristiansand. She left again with escort for Kiel via
the Baltic approaches, having landed a seriously-wounded man who has
now died.
A successful air attack was made A.M. on "Empress of Britain", 42,000
tons. Radio Intelligence and air reconnaissance confirmed
- 122 -

U 32 left Lorient.

24.10 U 38, 101 entered Lorient.

Now that U 31 has arrived in the operations area, U 28 is to operate

north and U 31 south of 570 30' N.

U 48 has arrived in the sea area SW of Norway. Scheer is to pass Date Position, Wind, Weather
through here on about 26.10 and S/M's are suspected in the vicinity. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Group Command North had therefore ordered an intensive anti-S/M hunt Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
by aircraft and surface forces for today. U 48 has been withdrawn to the
NW and she is only to proceed south by night provided she can be 30
miles south of Scheer's intended route by morning.

25.10 U 93 entered St. Nazaire.

that the ship was on fire and unable to proceed. Radio Intelligence
U 46 reported that she had been hit by a bomb in square 4394. One established that extensive rescue operations had been started. Ship's
man seriously wounded, boat unable to dive and able to proceed with one position was AM 5455 and U-boats were informed. U 32 is nearest.
214

27.10 U 28, 31, 32 are to patrol in an E-W direction W of the North
Channel, concentrating in the E. The Italian U-boats Finzi, Bagnolini,
Barrico which are on their way out, will take up positions W of this,
between 150 and 200 W. They can reach their positions on about the 29th.
There are 4 further Italian U-boats at about the same latitude W of 200 W.
This disposition means that the German boats have more difficult positions
in the E while the Italian boats are much further away, certainly outside the
range of air reconnaissance by shore based a/c.
U 31 sighted an outward-bound convoy towards midday in square 6335
AL.
29.10 U 29 reported by short signals that she could not make contact
with Ship 21 before 2300. It is doubtful whether she will succeed by
night.
U 104's date of operational readiness has been postponed by 9 days.
30.10 Weather and situation reports from boat show that there has been
very bad weather for several days in the sea area W of the North Channel.
It will certainly affect the success of U-boat operations. The operations
area for the weather boat U 124 has been extended E. as far as 160 W.
U 99 left Lorient for an operations area W of the North Channel.

The Italian F.O. U-boats was informed and ordered the 4 Italian U-boats 31.10 U 29 entered Brest according to plan as escort for Ship 21. She
already in the ops. area once to operate against it. No further reports were will probably leave on November 2nd after refueling.
received, and U 31 was asked if she was still shadowing. She replied not.
The Italian boats nevertheless continued. (Signed): DÖNITZ

Report by C.O. of U 38 his boat sank 5 steamers totaling 36,225 GRT.

Nothing special to note on this patrol. Report by C.O. of U 101: his boat
sank 9 steamers totaling 47,779 tons. 8 of them from a convoy, and also
badly damaged a 3,5oo ton steamer. This were very good patrols in which
the Commanding Officers made determined use of every chance they had F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
against the convoy.
1 - 15 November 1940
28.10 U 32 reported that she has sunk the "Empress of Britain"
PG30276
Group Command West requested that a boat be made available as the
escort for Ship 21 returning with damaged engines, which last night
reported her position in square 6441 BE via Italian U-boat. U 29 was the
only boat in the vicinity and was given orders accordingly. A radio
message from U 29 indicates that the rendezvous is not likely to take place
before dawn on 29.10. because the boat has engine trouble and the weather
is apparently very bad. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
215
 U 124 reported a total of 28,813 tons sunk. She has 1 stern torpedo
left. She is to remain as weather boat until U 99 arrives.

An Italian U-boat made contact with a group of 10 - 20 steamers

1.11. Positions of U-boats at 0800 1 November: without escort in square 3995 AL. The report did not give their courses
In the operations area: and contact was apparently lost again. Our own boats could not therefore
U 28 - AM 29 be directed to operate.
U 31 - AM 43
U 32 - AM 46 2.11. The Italian U-boats reported that the steamers were steering S.E.
U 124 - AL 26 as weather boat. too late. The only value of this report lies in the fact that it indicated that
Italian U-boats: there is traffic in this area.
J 6 - AL 27
J 16 - AL 29
J 25 - AL 52 - 124 -
J 15 - AL 65
J 2 - AL 38
J 10 - AL 03
Outward passage: U 99 - BF 42 to relieve U 124 as weather boat.
also:
J 7 - AL 99
J 5, J7 left the Ginonde
5 Italian U-boats on their way to the Atlantic are still in the
Mediterranean Date Position, Wind, Weather
On return Passage: None of our own boats, the following Italian: and Sea State, Illumination, Events
J 4, 12, 21, 22 in the area N.W. of Spain. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The following will be ready for operations by the middle of November.
3 November: U 43, 93, 100, 103, Lorient and St. Nazaire.
13 November: U 123 Lorient
Approximately 14 November U 104 Wilhelmshaven.

At the suggestion of B.d.U. the Ops. area for the Italian U-boats have U 28, 31 and 32 were ordered to make a situation report by short signal.
been changed. They will patrol at the latitude of the North Channel in an U 28 reported: no traffic.
E-W direction corresponding approximately to the movements of our own
boats. There will be no dividing line, but our U-boats have orders to U 29 left Brest for the operations area.
concentrate their activity in the E.
216
3.11. U 47 and U 137 left Lorient for the Operations area.
U 31 and U 32 have not yet made situation reports as ordered. One
Italian U-boat Malespina, on her return passage, has also been asked to
report the situation. I must have an idea of the traffic situation in the area
at present occupied by U-boats.
45" was established by radio intelligence. "Outward" Gibraltar and
outward-bound convoy. The boat was sighted by day 6 miles off
according to a radio intelligence report: she probably did not get close up
to the convoy therefore. Contact was lost at dusk and not regained.
5.11. Passage report from U 29 from BF 18.

According to an a/c and a radio intelligence report there are at present 2 U 138 left Lorient to operate W. of the North Channel.
convoys in the area W of Ireland. There are no details of course and
speed. The U-boat cannot therefore be directed to operate but the reports The Italian F.O. U-boat Rear Admiral PAPONA, visited B.d.U. to
confirm that there is traffic in this area, as was supposed. discuss:

4.11. U 99 reported sinking:

Laurentic 18,724 tons - 125 -
Patroclus 11,314 "
Casanare 5,376 "
Total 35,414 tons.

Another great success for this boat. Her C.O. has now sunk 217,198
and is the second to pass the 200,000 tons mark. He was awarded the Oak
Leaves to the Knights Cross the same day.

U 31 and U 32 have still not made their situation reports as ordered Date Position, Wind, Weather
another signal has been made to them. I am beginning to be worried about and Sea State, Illumination, Events
these boats. Enemy reports do not give any clue with regard to them. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

At 1530 U 99 contact with an inward-bound convoy of 30 ships

including several tankers, in square AL 6918. Escort 6 gunboats. Contact
was lost for a time but was re-established just before dark and maintained
until morning. During the night U 28 reported her position in the vicinity
of the convoy. She must have operated therefore and there is a chance that 1. All questions of cooperation.
she may have attacked. 2. What measure could be taken to make it easier for the Italians to get
accustomed to war conditions in the Atlantic.
J 6 "Malaspina" reported a second convoy in square 8899 AL at 1630. I adopted the following basic attitude.
She gave contradictory details of course in various messages. No clear A. The main object must be to do as much damage as possible to
idea could be formed of the convoy's movements, until its identity "OG England.
217
 B. I intend to achieve this aim as follows:
1. General operational control, allocation of operation areas, and
decisions as to methods of cooperation must remain in my hands. - 126 -
2. Within the framework of this essential unified supreme control the
Italian F.O. U-boats should have as much independence and responsibility
as possible. The Italian U-boats should not only be made to feel that they
are controlled by Italians, but they should also in fact be so controlled.
3. The Italians will have to learn tactical procedure from us.
Experience hitherto and these already permit a final assessment to be made
- show that this is an indispensable condition if they are to be more
successful. They must also, conform to our tactical methods so as to make
cooperation possible. Taking their character into account, I think this can Date Position, Wind, Weather
best be achieved by showing what they lack in such a way that they realize and Sea State, Illumination, Events
it of their own accord and themselves accept our experiences instead of Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
having our ways forced upon them rudely and suddenly.
C. 1. In order to give them the benefit of our experiences the available
Commanding Officers are now being sent out to GDYNIA for a short
course and to take part in tactical training.
2. Italian Commanding Officers have made long trips in our U-boats.
It is also intended to carry out tactical exercises for boats in operated against this convoy.
Bordeaux in southern Biscay, under the direction of the Liaison Officer
(Lieut. Commander ROSING) in an advisory capacity, as this should be U 29 has been detailed to relieve U 124 as weather boat.
the quickest way of giving the C.O.'s the experience which they lack. The
risk to the U-boats from enemy action will have to be accepted. The U 28 operated against U 99's convoy, 3 misses.
danger is only slight in this area and the training even if short can be
expected to give a distinct advantage. Enemy news service announced the sinking of 2 German U-boats,
including the boat which sank the "Empress of Britain" (i.e. U 32). Part of
Radio Intelligence Service reported that the convoy sighted by the crew of the latter is said to have been rescued.
Malaspina had dispersed and was making for a new assembly point P.M.
on the 6th. U 28 was then allocated the whole area W. of the North Channel as ops.
area.
In the afternoon U 99 regained contact with her convoy of the previous
day. She lost it again some hours later and reported all torpedoes used: I suspect that the enemy is again sending out A/S groups. Increased
one tanker. She was ordered to return. precautions are necessary and these precautions must cover the use of
radio. The boats have been given orders accordingly.
It remains to be seen what extent Italian U-boats
218
 W. of the U-boats operations area "Scheer" attacked several steamers, - 127 -
probably a convoy. Apart from their great immediate effect, from my
point of view such actions, especially in the vicinity of the U-boats' ops.
areas should mean:
1. Less anti-S/M activity.
2. Increased prospects of attacking warships.

6.11. U 28 reported that she was returning owing to lack of fuel. She has
apparently only sunk one medium-sized steamer.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 65 reported by short signal that she would not be at the rendezvous and Sea State, Illumination, Events
with "Nordmark" before 11 - 14 November. Reception conditions were Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
good in her ops. area.

7.11. U 138 made her passage report on her way out to the operations
area. Otherwise nothing to report.

8.11. U 29 has reached her position for weather reporting. U 124 is damaged warship failed because details of course and speed were not
relieved and will return. obtained from the a/c in time.

9.11. U 43 and U 103 left Lorient for the operations area. U 43 returned
to port the same day because of technical defects.
Ops. areas allocated for boats which have sailed or which will now sail.
Disposition W of the North Channel: the small boats (U 137, 138)
patrolling E-W immediately off the entrance to the Channel, the large
boats N and S of this, concentrating off 160 W.
The object of this broad disposition is to establish what routes shipping
is following at the moment, as there has been little information on this
subject for for some time. It is intended to concentrate all large boats
when a clear idea has been formed.
Our a/c attacked the "Empress of Japan" W. of Ireland. An attempt to
operated U-boats against the
10.11. U 43 left Lorient for the operations areas, but had to turn back
again in the evening because of an oil trace and other defects discovered
while test-diving to great depths. Delays such as this must be expected as
long as no thorough trial runs can be made at the end of a period in the
dockyard.
11.11. U 65 reported that she had supplied from the supply ship. She
was probably sighted by civil a/c. Air routes will therefore have to be
taken into consideration when determining the rendezvous. The boat
reported nothing of successes or traffic.
B.d.U. Ops. Department moved to Kerneval near Lorient. Control was
taken over by this establishment at 0900.
12.11. U 104 left Kiel via the Baltic for the operations area.

219
 U 137 and 138 ordered to make situation reports by short signal. From
their reports I hope to get an idea of the main direction of traffic from the
North Channel. Both boats reported their position, but U 138 only: no
traffic.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
13.11. U 124 entered Lorient. She was mainly stationed in the remote and Sea State, Illumination, Events
weather-reporting area, but nevertheless sank 5 steamers totaling 28,813 Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
tons. A very well executed patrol which requires no further comment.

14.11. Weather reports from boats detailed for this show that on the
whole weather conditions have become calmer, W. of the North Channel.
USe of armament at least still seems possible. Although visibility was
reported good, the boats stationed there have not found any traffic, which
fact they reported in turn by short signal.
U 123 left Lorient for the operations area.
15.11. U 93 and U 100 were ordered to concentrate further E. to 90 W.
There can be no doubt that a large part of the enemy traffic makes for the
North Channel. If no shipping approaches from the W. it must be coming
from the SW or N. The order given to U 93 and U 100 is intended to
provide reconnaissance of the northern route.
In accordance with their small experience, 2 Italian U-boats which
sailed recently, will occupy remote ops. area on the SW route.
I also decided to let all boats W of 150 (including the Italians) report
daily by short signal. The risk of their giving away their position can be
regarded as slight, and I have hopes these reports will provide some clue
as to the best disposition to be made. Only an incomplete picture can of
course be formed, as there are very few boats, to cover a
very wide sea area and each of them can only cover a small section at a
time. I therefore consider it extremely desireable, if at all possible, to fly
air reconnaissance of the relevant sea areas. This is the most effective
means of supporting U-boat operations. Group Commands North and
West have suitable a/c available. I made a request to both Group
Commands for:
1. Air reconnaissance in the area NW of Scotland.
2. Air reconnaissance of the SW route in the area between 520 30' N and
540 30' N between 120 W and 180 W.
This request is covered by a requirement made by Naval War Staff to
the Group Commands.
U 28 entered Wilhelmshaven.
(Signed): Dönitz.

- 128 -
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 30 November 1940

220
PG30277 Group Command agreed to the air reconnaissance requested and
ordered it to be carried out today. U 47 and 93 reported no traffic, but U
103 sighted an inward-bound convoy in the area SW of Ireland (square
AM 4475). She apparently lost contact. She made no further report after
the first. It was only in the evening that U 103 reported contact lost, use of
armament impossible because of weather. It is unsatisfactory that this
report was received do late. It will have to be seen when the boats return
Date Position, Wind, Weather if it really could not have been made earlier.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. U 137 sighted an outward-bound convoy in square AM 5159 and
shadowed it until evening. She reported inward and outward bound traffic
in a direction 250 from the North Channel. The air reconnaissance
planned could only be carried out in part in the NW, as one a/c crashed.
No enemy units were sighted. It is planned to continue the reconnaissance
for the SW area on 17 November. I requested Group Command West to
16.11. Positions at 0700 16 November. continue on the following days and they agreed.
In the operations area:
U 29 square AL 2650 (weather boat) 17.11. U 52 left Kiel, U 43 Lorient for the operations area.
U 100 3660
U 93 3850 U 104 entered Bergen because of defective gyro-equipment. A slight
U 47 3930 (weather boat) alteration has been made in the disposition of the boats. The majority have
U 103 square AM 4470 been concentrated in the area WSW of the North Channel, where there
U 137 0250 appeared to be more traffic at present than in the north.
U 138 5150
U 104 AN 3110 on outward passage A report was received of a convoy route from the south, then along the
U 123 BF 4430 " " " Irish coast through the St. George's Channel to England. This is the first
U 65 ES 56 " " " definite information that we have had for a long time of a route through
this area.
Also 9 Italian U-boats in the operations area W of the North Channel.
On return passage in route GPUN: U 28. 18.11. - 19.11. U 137 reported that she was returning - 4 steamers
In Kiel: U A, U 46, 48, 52, 94, 95, 140. totaling 23,887 GRT. Soon after U 138 also reported that she was
In Lorient: U 37, 38, 43, 99, 101, 124., returning because of
Ready for operations by end of November: U 37, 43, 52, 94, 95, 99,
101, 140.
- 130 -

221
 were ordered to new ops. areas, concentrating W to SW of the North
Channel.

U 65 reported:
1) 4 steamers totaling about 21,000 GRT sunk within 2 days
2) Heavy traffic.
Conditions did not seem to warrant large-scale surprise attacks and she
Date Position, Wind, Weather therefore attacked small independently routed targets. One Admiralty U-
and Sea State, Illumination, Events boats warning shows that her presence there has meanwhile become
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. known. As her report sounds so promising, I have decided to let her
supply again from the supply ship, probably on about 28 November.

20.11. U 94, 95 and 140 left Kiel via the Kattegatt for the operations area
W of the North Channel. I intend to send these new inexperienced boats to
areas far to the west, so that they will not be at once confronted with very
a thrust bearing which has run. Both boats will proceed to home ports difficult operations.
via Bergen.
U 93 sighted a destroyer which has probably been brought from the
At 1840 U 137 made contact with an outward-bound convoy in square U.S.A.
AM 5731, consisting partly of very large ships. It was zig-zagging at
about 15 knots. The boat lost sight of the convoy at 2220 and after that 21.11. Nothing to report.
several times reported a receding hydrophone bearing. THis small boat
did not succeed in regaining sight of the fast enemy formation but her 22.11 Weather conditions are very variable in the operations area,
reports brought up U 100 and U 145. She reported 7 steamers and 4 according to the weather reports. Mainly over 6, but at times much less,
destroyers. After U 100 arrived, U 137 continued on her return passage. visibility about 10 miles.
U 100 shadowed the convoy until 0641, then she too lost contact,
apparently owing to rising seas. Mean while U 47 had also reached the U 137 entered Bergen.
convoy. She reported as 0405 3 misses, one tube-runner and one surface
runner. Air reconnaissance was flown at daybreak over the area through
which the convoy was believed to be proceeding, but no results were
obtained because of bad visibility. 4 Italian U-boats which were in very - 131 -
favorable positions and were also ordered to operate, did not report and
apparently did not sight it. In the afternoon it had to be accepted that
contact was lost for good. Boats were ordered to report their positions by
short signal. These showed that U 93 and U 103 had also succeeded in
reaching the convoy. No reports of successes were received. The boats
222

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
22.11. - 23.11. U 100 made contact with a convoy at 2345 in square AM
4568, course 70 - 800, 6 knots. She shadowed until 0608 then lost contact
for a time, and regained it at 0731 in square AM 4638: 800, 8 knots. At
0431 U 93 requested beacon-signals.
At 0607 U 123 reported another outward-bound convoy in square AL
3958, 240 - 2500, 5 knots. U 43 and 29 were within range and were
ordered to operate. J 2, which on the previous day had made a very
delayed report of a convoy in square AL 3743, 1000 now reported that she
could not carry out the order because of bad weather, wind 9-10. U 43
reported her position still very far south. U 123 therefore remained alone
with the convoy. In the evening she reported that she was returning,
because both periscopes were out of action after an underwater collision.
She also reported 6 steamers totaling 29,000 GRT sunk. She has only been
at sea since November 14 and has been able to achieve this success in spite
of bad weather. Soon after U 100 reported that she was returning, having
sunk 7 steamers totaling about 40,000 GRT, (at sea since November 7) U
93 pursued the same convoy far to the E, but, although she made contact
for a short time, she was not able to hold or regain it.
J 2, Finzi, again sighted a convoy on an E. course in square AL 2699.
She did not succeed in shadowing. Boats were not ordered to operate
against this convoy, but they were informed of the sighting.
24.11. U 140 entered Bergen, to refuel.
U 137 left Bergen. South bound.
223
U 101 left Lorient for the operations area.
Several radio intelligence reports indicate that:
1. Besides U 100 and U 123, U 103 and 104 have also probably been
successful during the last few days.
2. That one of the steamers attacked by U 100 and one attacked by U 123
have not yet sunk and are awaiting tug assistance from England.
Regular air reconnaissance flown during the last few days in the area W
of Ireland has not sighted anything except a few independently-routed
steamers.
25.11. U 94 and U 95 have been allocated ops area in square 35 to 38 AL
and patrolling in the latitude of square 62 AL respectively.
U 29 is returning and U 43 will relieve her as weather boat.
U 47 reported: so far no success. She has several times had anti-S/M
forces in the vicinity 2 hours after making her weather report. I do not
regard this as a coincidence, but think that the messages have been d/f'd.
As the reports are made regularly and the boat cannot alter her position
appreciably in between times, even a very inaccurate single bearing would
in the long run give the enemy a clear idea of the boat's ops area. He will
undoubtedly make use of this information.
- 132 -

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
26.11. U 93 returning because of lack of fuel. No successes.
Otherwise nothing to report.
27.11. U 47 will occupy the area left free by U 93, SW of the North
Channel. A temporary improvement in weather conditions in the
operations area has had its effect in the sinking of 2 steamers.
U 100 entered Lorient.
U 99 sailed for the operations areas.
28.11. Another steamer was torpedoed.
U 140 and 101 are in the North Channel and have been allocated remote
attack areas.
A number of radio intelligence (X) and other reports, give some
indication of the trade routes between England and the W. coast of Africa.
I have decided to send another boat to this area, especially on view of U
65's favorable situation report. She is to operate off the Portuguese coast
first, then proceed south, between 20 and 250 W, refuel in the Canary Is,
proceed along the same longitude, and then operate in the sea area W of
Freetown. There she will be supplied with ammunition and fuel by a
supply ship and operate further according to the situation.
U 37 is to carry out this operation.
224
U 123 entered Lorient.
U 37 sailed.
29.11. U 43, 52, 94, 95 reported no traffic during the past 24 hours.
Short reports from returned boats:
U 100: at sea since 7.11. Sank 6 steamers totaling 31,000 GRT at
minimum range from a convoy in extremely difficult conditions.
U 123: at sea since 14.11. Sank 2 independent steamers and 4
steamers from an outward-bound convoy, total 30,454 GRT. While firing
a finishing shot at the last steamer she collided underwater with an
unidentified object and her conning tower was damaged and both
periscopes bent. She then had to break off and return.
30.11. There is a strong impression that at present shipping is
approaching the North Channel from the SW and I decided to regroup the
boats slightly in this direction. U 52 and 95 are to move further south. U
99 will also have an ops. area on this route.
U 65 reported her second supply operation from the supply ship carried
out.
U 29 entered Bergen.
U 101 reported slight traffic, U 94 none.
In reply to an enquiry as to her success and the traffic situation U 65
reported that she had not sunk any further ships. Details of traffic are
approximately the same as
- 133 -
 Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

1.12. Positions of our own boats at 0800.

1) In the operations area W of the North Channel:
U 140 AM 18; U 94 AL 37
previously reported. She has been about 5 days in her ops. area since 104 19; 43 55 (Weather boat)
her last report of success.It is not yet possible to decide whether there is 103 41; 101 58
any purpose in her continuing to operate or in sending out another boat. 99 47; 95 65
52 68
U 29 entered Bergen. She will remain there for a time, because Hipper
is sailing. Italian U-boats:
J 13 - AL 39
U 47 reported that she was returning. She has been ordered to go to J 26 - AL 68
Lorient. 2) West of Spain and Portugal: U 37, 65, (Freetown).
3) On return passage home: U 29
" " to Lorient: U 47 (still in the
(Signed): Dönitz. operations area)
also J 2, 18 and J 14 (still in the operations area)
4) In Lorient: U 38, 96, 100, 123, 124.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log " Kiel: UA, U 46, 48, 96.
" Bordeaux: J 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 25.
1 - 15 December 1940 Ready for operations by December 15: U 96, 100, 124 and several
Italian U-boats.
PG30278
In order to strengthen the disposition in the direction SW of the North
Channel U 104 moved further south at midday and U 140 to a position
directly off the North Channel (into the area which U 137 reported as a
scene of considerable activity). On the same day U 101 made contact at
1800 with an inward-bound convoy in square AL 5883. The positions of
all the boats are very favorable as regards this convoy. U 101 was the boat
Date Position, Wind, Weather furthest west, and made contact and all other boats are within range. Some
and Sea State, Illumination, Events of them have the chance to reach it the same night, while all the others
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
225
should be there at latest by the following night, provided, of course, that
contact is maintained.
U 101 was ordered not to attack herself until the other boats had arrived.
She shadowed the convoy until the following morning, then reports "All
torpedoes used" Diesel breakdown. There must have already been other
boats at the convoy. U 101 was ordered to shadow until other boats had
taken over. All boats were ordered to report if they were in a position to
attack so as to clarify the situation.
2.12. U 52 and 47 reported: yes. It was to be assumed however that U
95 was also in the vicinity, as she had requested beacon signals. U 99 also
came up. She reported at 0940. An auxiliary cruiser sunk. According to
radio Intelligence, this was "Caledonia". Contact was nevertheless lost for
the day. Apparently there were strong A/S and escort forces with the
enemy. The great thing was to establish contact. This couldn't be done:
a) by the boats themselves. For this it was necessary to know
approximately their present position. Only U 47 and 43 however replied
to the order to give their position. U 94 was still some
- 135 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
226
distance off. U 47 and 43 S and NW respectively astern of the convoy.
b) Or by a/c of which unfortunately only a very few were available:
One FW 200 from KG/40 Bordeaux
Two BV 138 from Brest, Group 406.
They did not make contact.
The situation therefore remained obscure during the day. This
operation shows up the gaps which inevitably result from warfare with so
few U-boats. It is necessary to concentrate these few available U-boats
against the enemy formation, once it has been detected, if any major
success is to be achieved. There are not sufficient boats to make at all sure
that the enemy will be held. The U-boats slow speed and small visual
range make things difficult anyhow. But is is equally clear that these gaps
can be very effectively filled, as far as making contact goes, by using a/c.
Even a few isolated reports would be of greatest value. But there are only
2 BV 138 from GAF Coastal Group 406 available for this task and one
FW 200 from KG 40, which is used for this purpose by arrangement with
the Group. Success is correspondingly small: they did not make contact.
At 1644, U 94 sighted the convoy. All boats were ordered to operate,
even U 101, who has no torpedoes left. It is vital to shadow until night
fall.
U 43 sighted several Outward-bound ships while still 60 miles away
from the convoy. She pursued them and was drawn away to the west. She
sank 2 totaling 20,000 tons.
At 2348 U 94 reported: convoy dispersed.
From all reports received by morning it was seen that the following
were sunk on December 2:
By U 94 - 3 ships totaling 21,000 GRT
101 - 5 ships " 41,000 "
95 - 2 ships " 12,000 "
99 - 3 ships " 29,698 "
52 - 3 ships " ?
47 - 2 ships " 17,000 "
6 boats 18 ships 120,698 GRT
Including the auxiliary cruiser sunk by U 99, but excluding the tonnage
of the 3 ships sunk by U 52.
Damaged: U 101 - 2 ships totaling 10,000 tons. One of these may have
been sunk by U 99.
A Radio Intelligence report suggests that another steamer was torpedoed
near the North Channel. The name of the ship is not known. She can only
have been torpedoed by U 140.
U 103 was operating against the convoy, apparently without contact her
behavior will have to be explained when she returns - also U 104, whose
long silence despite orders to report, gives cause for concern.
U 100 sailed for the operations area.
13.2. The attack on the convoy must be regarded as ended. U 47, 95,
101 are returning (torpedoes used or lack of fuel).
U 43, 103, 104 must be expected to return soon.
U 99, 52 and 94 can remain in the operations area for some time.
I am assuming that the enemy will for the next few days avoid the area
in which the last attack took place.
- 136 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
227
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
My assumption was confirmed by an opportune Radio Intelligence (X)
report, which stated that 2 inward-bound convoys are being re-routed, one
of them hauling out far to the north, the other SC 13, evading to the south
along a route about 70 - 120 miles S of the route taken by the scattered
convoy. Here we have an enemy report which is reliable, judging from all
previous experience, but unfortunately does not give any details of time. I
decided nevertheless to operate the 5 boats still in the operations area,
realizing that they may have to wait for several days. The boats are
disposed in deep formation along the convoy's route. In the west are 2
boats on the same longitude so as to have a better chance of intercepting
the convoy. There are only 5 boats including the weather boat, 2 of them
will probably have to return soon and only one other U 101 is on outward
passage to the operations area. So that the regular Radio message from the
weather boat will not give away the disposition, the weather reports are
temporarily to be taken over by an Italian boat.
Air reconnaissance detected a convoy inward-bound immediately off the
North Channel. There was no question of U-boats operating as it would be
in the North Channel, long before they reached it. When a/c returned the
convoy's position was shown to be 50 miles out. This is an example of the
various difficulties which still arise in cooperation between a/c and U-
boats. They can probably only be overcome by maintaining close contact
and by a training directed to achieve the common aim.
4.12. U 96 left Kiel for the operations area.
U 103 reported 6 steamers totaling 31,470 GRT sunk (at sea since
November 9).
 No report from U 104, but there has been a U-boat warning for the area
in which she may be.
As no weather reports have been received from the Italian boats, I find
myself forced to detail one of our boats for this. It will have to be one of
the 5 in the attacking positions ready for the convoy, announced by Radio
Intelligence. This is very undesirable, but I have no alternative. I do not
think any danger need be feared from the probably very inaccurate
bearings of the undivided short weather reports, but when there are many
regular reports made from approximately the same area, the enemy is
likely in the end to discover this boat's ops. area. This, new very modest
attempt to cooperate with the Italians has failed. Two of them were
ordered to make the weather reports. Neither of them produced messages
which were any use.
This is unfortunately not the only disappointment I did not expect that
the Italians would at once sink a lot of shipping. They are still too
unaccustomed to this theatre of operations. They have never yet operated
in similar waters under similar weather conditions. They are not
adequately equipped for it. But I did at least hope that they would
contribute to a better reconnaissance of the operations area. In actual fact
during the whole time I have not received one single enemy report from
them on which I could take action. All they have produced are several
very delayed, mainly incomplete or inaccurate sighting reports. They have
never managed to maintain contact even for a very short time.
During the period in which the German boats sank 26,000 GRT in the
same operations area, the Italian successes amounted to 12,800 tons at the
best (8,000 of these doubtful) and one destroyer.
- 137 -
228
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
I am not at all sure that their presence in the operations area of the
German boats, the way they let themselves be sighted, their radio traffic,
their clumsy attacks do not do us more harm than good.
The main reasons for their failure are:
1. They do not know how to attack unnoticed or to remain unseen.
2. They do not understand how to haul ahead of a slower enemy.
3. They have no idea of night surface attack.
4. They understand nothing of shadowing and reporting.
The attitude of the Navy Department in Rome put paid to my intention
to give them the opportunity to learn the basic principles of procedure in
sight of the enemy, under guidance of German Officers.
My attempts to make use of them for warfare off the North Channel
have proved in vain. They do not serve any practical purpose. From the
point of view of the war, as a whole this can only be regretted. I think that
in the end the real reasons for their failure lies with the personnel. They
are not sufficiently hard and determined for this type of warfare. Their
way of thinking is too long-winded and lacking in initiative to allow them
to adapt themselves readily and simply to the changing conditions of war.
Their personal conduct lacks discipline and they cannot keep calm in face
of the enemy.
In view of all this, I am forced to detail and operate the German boats
without regard for the Italians. It is to be hoped that the Italians will
benefit with time to an increasing extent from opportunities arising for
them out of this.
5.12. U 99 reported wind 10 and 11 from the operations area.
6.12. Weather continues very bad in the operations area. Use of
armament cannot be expected.
U 47 and 95 entered port.
Both boats had bad weather for the whole time they were in the
operations area and were able to achieve only little success, Lieut (s.g.)
Schreiber C.O. of U 95 on the whole carried out his first patrol well. He
acted with decision and tenacity but unfortunately also made several
mistakes.
U 100 has been allocated to ops. area within the disposition for the
expected convoy.
There have been a great number of SOS reports from Merchant Ships in
the area west of England, which gives some indication of the routes at
present in use. It is interesting to note that there is still traffic far to the
north, about 59 to 600 N.
7.12. Air reconnaissance W of Ireland was not flown as the a/c could not
take off owing to weather conditions.
U 140 reported: no use of armament because of weather.
8.12. A Radio Intelligence (X) report shows beyond doubt that a radio
message from a U-boat (U 99) from about 200 W was D/F'd.
- 138 -
229
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The bearing was 70 - 100 miles out.
According to Radio Intelligence S.S. "Farmsum" has been torpedoed.
A U-boat warning for square CF 5159 point to activity by U 37.
9.12. U 99 reported that she was returning because of engine damage. U
103 is returning having sunk 3 steamers totaling about 46,000 tons. The
C.O. has now passed the 100,000 ton mark. It is possible that after all the
expected convoy has got through. The disposition of the 4 U-boats
remaining in this area has therefore been loosened and they are to patrol
N-S in the area in which they are at present concentrating. Air
reconnaissance by a/c of Group 406 (BV 138's) has had to be abandoned
for the present because of technical defects in this type of a/c (probably for
about 2 months).
10.12. U 93 was slightly damaged in dock in Lorient by several bombs
which fell in her vicinity. Pressure hull penetrated at several points by
shrapnel. Her date of operational readiness will be delayed for about 3
weeks. Otherwise nothing to report.
11.12. U 96 has been detailed as weather boat, as the G.A.F. cannot do
without weather reports from U-boats.
 U 100, 43 and 52 reported no traffic and U 94 slight traffic only but U
96 made contact at 1620 with an inward-bound convoy in square 2379
pursued it to square AM 3914 and scattered it. She sank 4 ships totaling
30,000 GRT. This is an excellent performance for this new boat. The only
other boat in the vicinity was U 140 and U 96 was ordered to bring her up.
12.12. U 140 is returning to Bergen having sunk 3 ships totaling 15,700
GRT.
U 99 and 103 entered Lorient. Otherwise nothing to report.
U 100 temporarily acting as weather boat for U 96.
13.12. U 43 started on her return passage. She has sunk another 6,000
GRT and altogether 3 steamers totaling 26,000 GRT.
The Italian U-boat ARGO is the first Italian U-boat to complete a
really satisfactory patrol in the area W of the North Channel. She severely
damaged the Canadian destroyer Saguenay and sank one 12,000 GRT
steamer.
Reports from both the Commanding Officers who have returned show
that U-boat operations in the North Atlantic at this time of year are very
severely hampered by weather conditions. Nevertheless U 103 sank 8
ships totaling 46,000 GRT in barely 5 weeks and U 99 4 ships totaling
34,900 GRT in 16 days. I am always reconsidering whether it would not
be more profitable in winter to transfer the theatre of operations further
south into calmer areas and I always come to the conclusion that in spite of
the bad weather in the north, as enemy traffic is more concentrated there,
more can be sunk within a given time than in the south. Only the amount
of tonnage is of real importance for the final outcome of the war and I
have therefore stuck to the north as the main center
- 139 -
230
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
of U-boat operations. It is of course desirable to worry the enemy in
other areas and achieve a diversionary effect. This would relieve pressure
in the main theatre of war, but it is no way to defeat the enemy. The forces
required for this should in the first place consist of those which are less
suitable for the main task, i.e. the annihilation of enemy merchant
shipping. However, the central Atlantic operations area must not be
neglected altogether and experience of this area for U-boat operations
must be obtained and information as to the success which can be achieved
there. U 37 and 65 will be quite sufficient for this purpose at present. All
the other boats will go to the north for the time being.
14.12. U 43 hit S.S. "Orari", 10,300 GRT with her last torpedo on her
return passage in square BE 2442. The steamer did not sink however and
proceeded on at slow speed. There are none of our boats in the vicinity,
but the steamer is within range of the G.A.F. (Condor a/c). Apart from the
desirability of sinking this damaged, valuable steamer, I am anxious to
consolidate cooperation with the G.A.F. by a success to which the U-boats
have contributed and to test the practicability of bring up aircraft by means
of U-boat reports. U 43 was ordered to shadow as far as her fuel stocks
would permit and also to make beacon signals from dawn onwards and
make a weather report immediately. KG 40 promised to send out an
aircraft. The take off was delayed however, until 1100 and the aircraft
could not reach the target before 1400 - 1500. U 43 reported that she was
forced to continue her return passage because of lack of lubricating oil. I - 140 -
very much regret this failure of my plan, especially as every individual
success attracts the attention of the authorities which would be concerned
in the organization of a large-scale cooperation and proves its
practicability better than theoretical exposition can.
Cooperation is necessary
The war has shown that the tactics of operating several U-boats together
against a convoy are correct and lead to great success. In all cases
however the first contact with the convoy was a matter of chance. The
convoy approached a U-boat. In other cases, when this did not come off, Date Position, Wind, Weather
the boats were at sea for days to no purpose. Time was wasted in the and Sea State, Illumination, Events
operations area. Full use of the U-boats against the enemy is not being Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
made because of the lack of any form of reconnaissance.
B.d.U. is aware that Naval War Staff has been advocating the necessary
reconnaissance with the G.A.F. Ops. Staff for a long time. B.d.U.'s views
on cooperation with the G.A.F. are as follows:
a) The U-boat is not suitable for reconnaissance. Its height of sight is
too low. It is too slow to be able to cover a large sea area in a short time. that no enemy formations pass through the area occupied by U-boats
We have not got the necessary number of U-boats. To use them for this without their even detecting them because of their small visual range.
purpose also means wasting their striking power. The U-boat can achieve d) But cooperation between a/c and U-boats does not end with pure
much more if it does not have to hang around for weeks waiting for its reconnaissance. The a/c should shadow by day until the boats reach the
prey to turn up, but, by means of previous reconnaissance, can be directed enemy, they should bring up the boats by making beacon signals, they
to the area where the enemy actually is. Every arm, except the U-boat should regain contact after first light of the next day, etc,. It is therefore a
arm, has its own means of reconnaissance. question of closest tactical cooperation for a single operation.
b) By extensive reconnaissance the G.A.F. can provide us with definite e) The a/c's own attack on Merchant Shipping traffic is in no way
information as to the whereabouts of the enemy, and can thus provide Ops. hampered by fulfillment of these requirements. It can only be an
Control with data on which to base the disposition of the U-boats. advantage to the U-boats if these a/c attack and sink and damage ships,
c) It can also support the immediate operations of the U-boats by flying worry, divert and scatter the enemy.
exhaustive reconnaissance of the area where the boats are disposed, by The areas in which the U-boats are stationed are definitely promising for
reporting the valuable targets immediately and thus ensuring that enemy a/c attacks, because the boats occupy the busiest areas. The a/c attack is
units within range are actually attacked and not affected even if the U-boats are in the immediate vicinity. The only
thing which the a/c may not do is to attack S/M's. Experience has shown
that the danger of mistaking enemy S/M's for our own U-boats is too great
231
to permit the a/c to attack even if it is certain that it is dealing with an
enemy S/M. 16 - 31 December 1940
f) The best thing would be to discuss this form of cooperation directly with
the G.A.F. units concerned and try it out in practice. Put in order to make PG30279
cooperation really effective it is necessary
1) to have sufficient forces.
2) to have a clear ruling as to authority and subordination.
As soon as a convoy has been sighted from the cooperation, such as
shadowing by the a/c making beacon signals, must be controlled by the
man who is controlling convoy operation without encroaching upon the
tactical leadership of the G.A.F. Officer Commanding. This means that Date Position, Wind, Weather
B.d.U. must decide where reconnaissance is to be flown and how many a/c and Sea State, Illumination, Events
are to be used in each case and have the available means at his disposal if a Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
unified and rational method of cooperation is to be achieved. Close
cooperation has so far been carried out with the following units:

a) Coastal G.A.F. Group 406 Brest, which is tactically subordinate to

Group Command West. Their long-range a/c type BV 138 are however 16.12. Positions of U-boats at 0800.
grounded for about 2 months because of technical defects. 1) In the operations area: U 100 - AL 0150
b) KG 40 Bordeaux - in no way dependent. Cooperation by personal North Channel: U 96 - AL 3450
agreement. Type FW 200. At the present generally only one a/c out by U 52 - AL 0250
day. U 94 - AM 4150
c) Luftflotte 5 flies reconnaissance of a certain area on special request in
each case. So far only carried out once. Recently requested again but also U 104, but no report since 19.11.
refused because of lack of forces. 2) In the operating area Canaries - Freetown:
U 65 - ET 62
U 37 - DU 12.
3) On return passage : U 140 - AF 7860
15.12. Nothing to report. U 43 - BE 6140 (Lorient)

4) In Lorient: U 38, 47, 93, 95, 99, 101, 123, 124.

(Signed): DÖNITZ In Kiel: UA, U 46, 48,
Total: 21 boats.
5) Ready for operations by 1st January: U 38, 95, 123, 124, 105.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log 6) Italian boats.
232
 for the operations area
W of the North Channel: 4 boats U 100 reported the sinking of 10,300 GRT S.S. "Naiper Star". The C.O.
" " Spain 2 boats Lieut (s.g.) Schepke is thus the third officer to pass the 200,000 ton mark.
On outward passage to
W of the North Channel: 2 boats 20.12. U 95 and 124 are to patrol in a NW direction from the North
" " from Bordeaux: 1 boat Channel. Otherwise nothing to report.
Approaching from the
Mediterranean/Tangiers: 2 boats
In Bordeaux/La Pallice: 15 boats - 142 -
Total: 26 boats

U 100 reported sinking of 2 steamers totaling 7,950 GRT.

U 95 and U 124 sailed for the operations area W of the North Channel.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
17.12. U 140 entered Bergen. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 65 gave her position as ET 67.

18.12. KG 40 has been instructed by G.A.F. Ops. Staff to cooperate with

B.d.U. as far as this can be combined with their other duties. According to
Radio Intelligence 3 9-10,000 ton steamers were torpedoed W of the North
Channel. 21.12. U 65 reported that she had no further success. Little traffic in her
ops. area.
U 96 reported several outward-bound tankers, one of which she
torpedoed. She has now used all her torpedoes, but has nevertheless been Supply of U 37 in the Canaries has again had to be postponed because
ordered to shadow in order to bring up U 52 and U 100. of enemy activity.

U 38 sailed for the operations area. My view that U-boats operation in the Southern area do not lead to
success which can be achieved in the North is again confirmed. Operation
19.12. Supply for U 37 in the Canaries which was planned for the 10th in the Southern area is also subject to the possibility of supplying with
has had to be postponed until the 21st, owing to the presence of enemy material and ammunition. As the present case shows difficulties can arise
forces. here, which can mean uncertainty and delay for the boats and reduce their
233
chances of success, which are already rather meager. I have therefore
decided to recall both the boats and afterwards send to the more promising
Northern area. It is intended to operate the 3 large Italian boats in the
Freetown area, starting with "Capellini" who will arrive there at the end of
the year.
U 52 entered Lorient. Well executed patrol which requires no further
comment.
29.12. U 65 reported her total success so far as 45,974 GRT sunk.

22.12. U 65 reported the sinking of S.S. "Charles Pratt" (8,982 GRT).
3 FW 200's flew the air reconnaissance W of Ireland, but obtained no
results because of bad visibility.
23.12. U 100 reported all her torpedoes used. 3 steamers totaling 18,069
GRT. She has been ordered to proceed home for a long overhaul.
U 140 entered Kiel.
U 96 entered Lorient on her first patrol she sank 40,900 GRT and
damaged one 10,700 GRT steamer. The Commanding Officer acted with
clarity and decision.
30.12. Nothing to report.
31.12. U 94 entered Lorient. Total successes 24,360 GRT a very well
executed patrol.

24.12. U 52 is returning, having sunk 25,500 GRT. - 143 -

Temporary improvement in the weather in operations area.

U 105 left Kiel for the operations area.

25.12. Nothing to report.

26.12. Radio Intelligence obtained information of a point for which 20

very fast steamers are said to be making. It is within range of U 38, 95 Date Position, Wind, Weather
and 124. They have been ordered to operate. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
27.12. Nothing to report.

Conference at Kerneval headquarters with Fliegerkorps 4, a

representative from KG 28 and Officer Commanding KG 40 on the
possibility of cooperation with the G.A.F.
The operation of the boats against the fast steamers did not lead to any
28.12. U 94 reported that she was returning having sunk 4 steamers success. It afterwards turned out that Radio Intelligence Service's data for
totaling 24,340 GRT.
234
the point of reference was wrong. The boats are now to patrol E-W of the Italian U-boats:
Rockall Bank concentrating off 150 W. J 3 AL 24 J 12 AL 48
J 8 AL 25 J 22 BE 29, return passage
J 24 AL 39 J 17 BF 17, return passage
(Signed): DÖNITZ J 21 AL 67 J 1 off the Gironds, return passage

1941 In Lorient: U 43, 47, 52, 93, 94, 96, 99, 101, 103, 123.
In Kiel: U 100, 46, 48, 106, 107, UA.
Ready for preparations by 15.1: U 93, 48, 96, 106, 123.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
U 37 reported no traffic.
1 - 15 January 1941 U 65 was probably responsible for the torpedoing of an English 8,500
ton tanker in DT 63.
PG30280
2.1. Nothing to report.

On the orders of C-in-C Navy, discussion with General Jodl on the U-

boat Arm's requirements with regard to air support (see War Log of
Date Position, Wind, Weather 14.12.1940. For reconnaissance and tactical co-operation, requirements:
and Sea State, Illumination, Events about 12 aircraft of the longest range types at one time in the operations
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. area).

3.1. Nothing to report.

4.1. U 106 left Kiel for the operations area. Otherwise nothing to report.
Group Command Headquarters West. 5.1. Nothing to report.
1.1. Positions of the boats ar 0800: 6.1. U 95 reported: No traffic. Otherwise nothing to report.
U 105 AM 15
U 124 AM 17
U 95 AM 19 Concentrating at 150 W.
U 38 weather boat in AL 10, 20, 30, S of 60 degrees N., and E of 250 W. -1-
U 37 West of Spain and Portugal.
U 65 Canary Islands sea area.

235

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
7.1. U 95 is returning owing to lack of fuel.
U 124 sank the English S.S. "Empire Thunder" in AL 1447.
U 38 report: no traffic.
U 37 entered Lorient. She sank 6 ships altogether, totaling 20,600 GRT.
Her patrol was broken off prematurely and did not result in any greater
success because she was operating in fairly quiet areas. On the whole the
Commanding Officer acted correctly on his first patrol and showed that he
possessed the right qualities.
On the Fuehrer's Orders No. I Combat Group/40 is to be made
operationally subordinate to B.d.U. with immediate effect. The conduct of
U-boat warfare has taken a decided step forward as a result of this order.
It is only the first step in this direction and tangible results will not be very
considerable yet, as so few aircraft are available at present and there are a
number of technical problems to be solved, but I have great hopes that this
co-operation will eventually lead to great success. The conditions
necessary to achieve this are discussed elsewhere in the War Log.
8.1. U 38, 105 and 124 have been given new attack areas between 530
N and 550 30' N and 160 W to 220 W. They cannot have much fuel left; I
236
therefore want to draw them gradually further south, so that they can
concentrate S.W. of the North Channel together with U 94 and U 96 which
are sailing within the next few days.
The boats have had practically no success in the North owing to
continual bad weather, poor visibility and the short days. When more
boats arrive in the operations area I intend to make another sweep to the
North into the area N. of 600 N. I think that Naval War Staff could very
well open this area temporarily in the present situation.
9.1. U 94 and U 96 sailed for the operations area. B.d.U. went on leave.
Commander GODT will be his deputy for operational control.
10.1. U 105 reported the sinking of a 4,500 GRT steamer. U 65 entered
Lorient. During her operation in the Freetown area from 15 October 1940
to 10 January 1941 she sank 8 ships, altogether totaling 52,801 GRT, and
severely damaged one steamer of 8,532 GRT. Sinking not observed. After
all, this patrol turns out to have been well worth while, though at times it
had appeared quite the contrary. The Commanding Officer should have
kept Operations Control more fully informed of the situation and his
operations.
-2-
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
without knowing further details, the fact that the boat had no success
between November 18 and December 21, i.e. for more than 4 weeks,
naturally gave the impression that prospects there were small. In spite of
the good success achieved the patrol can only be regarded as barely
satisfactory in view of the long time it lasted. The boat will have been
detached for this operation for 6 months including time from the
operations area. This is a very important fact in view of the few
operational boats available at present. More eyes in the operational area
mean better chances for all the boats there.
The next patrol in this area is to be carried out by UA.
any use. The attempt failed, as the aircraft did not receive the necessary
instructions in time. The convoy was not found.
U 105 was ordered to return to her attack area after dark.
U 93 has been allocated an attack area which will extend the present
disposition of boats in the W. to the N.
U 95 entered Lorient. During 4 weeks patrol, hampered by bad weather
and often poor visibility, she sighted altogether 6 fast ships, only one of
which, the 12,823 GRT WAIOTIRA, she managed to sink. Nevertheless
this is a certain success. The young C.O. did his best.In addition to greater
experience a lot of luck is required to make a successful attack on fast
independent ships, especially in such difficult weather conditions.
15.1. Nothing to report.
(signed): GODT Chief of Operations
Department, for B.d.U.

11.1. U 93 left Lorient for the operations area.

Air reconnaissance reported 5 steamers and one destroyer in square AM
7142. Apparently a convoy was assembled. Boats were informed. A
controlled operation was not possible as the aircraft was driven off and F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
could not obtain further information.
16 - 31 January 1941
12.1. Nothing to report.
PG30281
13.1. Nothing to report

14.1 U 105 reported a convoy on a S.W. course at 0615 in square AL

6746. She lost contact towards 0800 and was ordered to press on. At the
same time an attempt was made to get the 2 aircraft, which had taken off Date Position, Wind, Weather
for reconnaissance, onto the convoy. The boat was ordered to make and Sea State, Illumination, Events
beacon signals at a stated time, in order to make it easier for the aircraft to Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
find the convoy. If they found the boat they would have a starting point
from which to search S.W. It was important to find out whether the
transmission of beacon-signals in the present form at such long range is
237
 16.1. Position of the U-boats at 0800:
1. In area West of North Channel:
U 106 - weather boat in AL 10 and 20 and 30 South 60 North, Eastward -4-
250 West.
U 93 - AL 52 and 61
U 38 - AL 55 and 64
U 105 - AL 67 and 68
U 124 - AL 92 and 93
Further East-West line with focal point at 150 West level with following
grid positions:
U 94 - AM 44
U 96 - AM 41 Date Position, Wind, Weather
2. Putting out: and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 123 about BF 45. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
3. In Lorient: U 37, 43, 47, 52, 65, 95, 99, 101, 103.
In Kiel: U 46, 48, 100, 107, UA.
4. Probably ready for operations 1 February:
U 103, 48, 101, 107, 37, possibly U 46 by end of January.
5) Italian U-boat in operational areas:
J 6 - AL 28 The following are the only boats which can be considered for operations
J 21 - AL 02 on account of the fuel situation:
J 18 - AL 93 U 96 - AM 0180; U 94 - AM 44; U 106 - AL 01; U 93 - AL 65
Returning to port: (presumably).
J 8 - BE 66 The boats are in a very favorable position.
J 24 - Off the Gironde The following conditions are against operations:
Putting out: J 9 to AL 39. 1. There has been only one single enemy sighting made so far and
In Bordeaux: J 1, 2, 3, 10, 7, 11, 12, 15, 23, 27, 25, 19, 16, 14, 20, 22, contact cannot be kept.
26, 17. 2. The single course report received allows only general conclusions as to
the course of the convoy. In favor of operations are:
U 96 reported sinking steamer "Oropesa" (14,118 tons). About 1300 1. The conclusion that boats will be in position farther north within the
hours the aircraft reconnaissance operating in the N. area found a convoy next few days.
of 30 - 40 ships on West course and sank a medium steamer therefrom. 2. The constant possibility of picking up the convoy.
3. The fact that no targets have been picked up so far in this area.
238

Operation will be ordered and U 96 will be ordered to seek contact at
once.
U 106, 94, 93 are to take up attack positions in AL 3620, 3680, 3850.
Aircraft reconnaissance is planned for the 17th, using one aircraft in the
area east of these positions.
In order to enlarge the aircraft's radius of operation it is to return to
Brest rather than Bordeaux.
U 93 reported after dusk that her position was still farther S.W. Since
she received AL 29 and 02 as her new attack areas, whereas U 96 received
orders to occupy U 93's position in AL 3850 in case no contact was made.
17.1. News of the sinking of the steamer "Almeda Star" can only be
associated with U 96 and we must conclude that this boat was in AM 1678
at 0700 hours.
Through later reports from the boat it is presumed that she has fired all
her torpedoes and received orders to return via pre-arranged areas so she
could act as observer for other U-boats.
Intercepts of last night report the steamer "Zealandik" (8,443 T)
torpedoed in AL 2672. U 106 is believed to be responsible. After aircraft
were unable to find the convoy in the prescribed area, U 94 and U 106
received orders to search to the N.E. at cruising
-5-
Date Position, Wind, Weather
239
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
speed. Since no success was met up until dusk, the operation against
the convoy was called off and eventually positions were ordered in the
attack area 60 as follows:
U 106 - AM 11 and 12; U 94 - AM 14 and 23; U 93 - AL 22,31, 32 (in
position approximately 18 January); U 123 - AL 24, 33, 34 (in position
approximately 20 January).
At 2345 hours an Italian U-boat reported convoy at 1700 hours in AL
6827, course 2500. Owing to her late arrival and apparent loss of contact,
it does not seem likely that operations by boats in the vicinity stand much
chance of success.
U 38 reports being on return passage. Has sunk 2 steamers of 8,600
tons. Heavy depth-charge damage.
18.1. U 124 returning as reported by short signal. Otherwise nothing
new.
19.1. No special reports.
20.1. Air reconnaissance reports 2 convoys, one of which is just off the
North Channel about to enter port. No U-boats nearby. Therefore no
operation possible. A second convoy in AL 6850, course 600, putting in.
Aircraft is giving bearing reports. U 105 has been informed, being the
only boat in the area. She made contact herself with an outbound convoy
at 1520 hours in AL 6850 but lost contact later. She reports it impossible
to use weapons because of weather conditions. Whether the aircraft led
the U-boat to the enemy and to what extent this was done can only be
established upon the return of the U-boat to base.
 21.1. New information indicates that the enemy is more successful now
than at the beginning of the war in taking bearings on radio reports and
short weather reports of U-boats. This surmise must be given the most
careful attention. In view of the small number of craft in areas where U-
boats concentrate, bearing signals reveal that the enemy is by-passing
attack areas. It is noteworthy that:
1) In all cases we make sure that radio is used only when it is important
in an operational sense. All other radio messages, position reports, etc.,
are to be transmitted only when an exact bearing on the U-boat no longer
matters, that is to say, when her presence has been discovered by other
means.
2) Weather boats are to be so used that the other boats will not be
jeopardized.
U 103 left Lorient for her operational area.
-6-
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
240
22.1. U 38, 96, 124 putting in. All three boats were badly hindered by
poor weather in their attack areas. In every case bad visibility prohibited
making contact with the enemy. The successes scored by both boats were
correspondingly small - U 38, 2 vessels totaling 8,700 GRT, and U 124, 1
vessel of 5,500 GRT. U 96 had unusual luck, in that 2 large steamers
sailing alone came in range and were sunk - "Almeda Star" and "Oropesa"
total 29,054 tons.
The boats are not to be blamed for their small success in view of the fact
that their opportunities were so limited.
Now that surface operations have commenced, it is necessary to recall
boats from the northern area. Boundaries will be more closely defined by
High Command in combined operations. The new operation sets Rockhall
Bank as the next focal point. In case enemy routes are still not clear, these
boats will move southward, even at the cost of sacrificing concentration
for greater width of patrol area.
Attack areas: U 93 - AM 15 and 16; U 106 - AM 17 and 18; U 94 -
AM 19 and 01; U 123 - AL 30 within the declared blockade area (the boat
stationed to the west so that it can act as weather boat when U 105
returns).
U 52 left Lorient for her operational area.
23.1. U 101 left Lorient for her operational area. Otherwise nothing
new.
24.1. Nothing of special interest.
25.1. U 48 and U 107 put out from Heligoland for their operational
areas.
Attack areas for U 103 - AL 62 and 63, also AM 41.

26.1. Air reconnaissance carried out daily by 2 aircraft in the following
areas:
1) Area N. of Ireland, westward of Herbrides.
2) Area W.N.W. of Ireland. They located a single steamer W. of Ireland
and attacked her with some success.
In order to clear up the possibilities of direct co-operation between U-
boats and aircraft a bearing test was carried out between an aircraft and U
10?
Purpose: To establish whether it is possible for a U-boat to take
bearings on aircraft in the Atlantic
Aircraft will be ordered to send bearing signals as soon as they have
reported a convoy contacted. Rapid transmission of orders to cover D/F
frequencies will be secured.
For the near future it is further proposed:
1) To make a single reconnaissance in the area W. of North Channel
with as many aircraft as possible. However the number of aircraft
operating is to be kept so that normal reconnaissance will not be
interrupted for the next few days.
2) Reconnaissance of area N. and N.W. of Herbrides with 1 aircraft every
2 days, using Stavanger as the return base.
U 52 has been allocated AL 65 and 66 and AM 44 as attack areas.

27.1. U 101 has been allocated AL 69, AM 47 and 48 as attack areas.

Otherwise nothing new.
-7-
28.1. U 105 reports returning to port, having sunk 2 steamers of total
11,500 tons.

U 123 acting as new weather boat.

Projected aircraft reconnaissance is being carried out with 5 aircraft. 1

aircraft made contact with an outbound convoy at 1100 hours. At first its
position was not clear. It was only established after several hours had
Date Position, Wind, Weather elapsed by means of prolonged inquiries which were rendered more
and Sea State, Illumination, Events difficult by bad receiving conditions and apparent lack of training in radio
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. procedure, as well as on the basis of an S.O.S. from the attacked vessel
which was received in the meantime, and which appeared to be only
temporarily attached to the convoy. This placed the convoy in a probable
position of AM 5150 at 1100 hours, course 2700. All boats apart from
weather boats were given orders to operate against the convoy. Aircraft
reconnaissance will be sent against the convoy on 29 January.
and whether the intended frequency is suitable. The test turned out
positive. The U-boat signaled that she could take bearings.
241
 29.1. At 0245 hours U 93 made contact with an incoming convoy in AM
4124. Boats will be detailed to attack this convoy. Contact was broken at
0730 hours in AM 4134 and was not picked up again by the aircraft. At
1030 hours, U 93 reported no contact. 2 steamers, 1 tanker total 20,000
tons sunk by U 93. Boats ordered to operate against the convoy course in
spite of loss of contact. Should no contact with enemy be established by
nightfall, it is proposed to redistribute the boats since further success in the
vicinity of the coast is not likely.
-8-
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
No further contact was established. Following attack areas were
ordered:
U 48 - AM 15 and 16; U 106 - AL 38, AM 17 and 18; U 94 - AL 03,
AM 19 and 01; U 107 - AL 28, 37, 02, 39; U 103 - AL 61 to 63; U 52 -
AL 64 to 66; U 93 - AM 41, 42, 44, 45; U 101 - AL 68, 69, AM 47.
242
30.1. Group North proposed to B.d.U. that U 48 and U 107, both on
return passage, be sent to act as long range reconnaissance for surface craft
in the area between Ireland - Faroes. This proposition was turned down
since experience in this area shows small success possibilities due to the
expanse of the area, the long hours of darkness and bad weather.
Air reconnaissance reported an incoming convoy in AL 6369 at 1300
hours. The boats were not able to make contact. They were ordered to
return to their attack areas by dark. In this way it was certain that the area
in question would be covered the next day. Operations on the basis of a
single enemy message, whose position could not be exactly determined
promises only slight chance of success over a protracted period.
31.1. U 105 putting in. During her 5 weeks patrol she sank 2 steamers
total 11,843 tons. The new boat with an experienced Captain (Lt. Schewe)
completed her first war cruise.Had enemy movements been greater, the
success of this boat would have mounted in proportion.
(signed): Dönitz
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 February 1941
PG30282
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 2.2. Contrary to first impressions, from observations made by U 65 in
the Southern area, it seems that this area is after all promising for U-boat
operations. U 37, whose sailing has been delayed for several days, has
1.2. Position of the U-boats at 0800: received orders to fit out for this area. I intend to send other large boats
1. In the operations area W. of the North Channel: there if circumstances warrant.
U 48 AM 15 and 16
U 106 AL 38, AM 17 and 18 Nothing to report.
U 94 AL 03, AM 19 and 01
U 167 AL 28 and 37 and 02 and 39 3.2. U 107 made contact with an outward-bound convoy in square AL
U 103 AL 61 to 63 0264 in the evening. U 123, 52, 103 and 96 were ordered to operate
U 52 AL 64 to 66 against it and U 94 and 101 if their positions permitted. U 107 shadowed
U 93 AM 41 and 42 and 44 and 45 and sank a 5,000 ton steamer. The convoy dispersed shortly after
U 101 AL 68 and 69 and AM 47
U 123 as weather boat between 220 W. and 250 W., S. of 56 0 N.
2. On outward passage: U 96 BF 4270.
3. In Lorient: U 37, 38, 43, 47, 65, 95, 99, 105, 124.
In Kiel: UA, U 46, U 108
4. Expected to be ready for operations by 15.2: U 37, 43, 73, 46, 69, 47, - 10 -
95, 108.
5. Italian boats:
On return passage: In the Operations Area:
J 25 - BF 9340 J 16 - AL 9130
J 9 - BF 4640 J 20 - AL 6830
J 6 - BE 3990 J 10 - AL 6190
J 7 - CF 5550

In Bordeaux: J 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
B.d.U. returned from leave.

It seems possible that training will have to stop in the Baltic, owing to
ice conditions. I have decided in this case to send the boats which are fit
for operations to sea for one patrol.

243
 midnight. Non other boats sighted it. All those operating were ordered
to return to their attack areas it they had no chance of making contact with 9.2. A U-boat warning was given on the convoy's main course, indicating
a ship by afternoon. that U 37 had probably been observed. Attempts will be made to bring the
aircraft to the convoy by means of beacon-signals transmitted from the
4.2. There was a new U-boat warning on the convoy's mean course and it boat in addition to shadower's reports.
may therefore be concluded that another steamer was sunk, probably after
the convoy had dispersed. U 106 reported by short signal that she was
starting on her return passage.
- 11 -
For reasons as yet unexplained U 43's Diesel and main engine rooms
flooded during last night. She will probably not be at war readiness for
several months. (the boat is at Lorient).

5.2. Nothing to report.

6.2. U 106, on her return passage, reported sinking 2 steamers totaling

12,000 GRT.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
S.S. "Maplecourt" was attacked by a U-boat. Probably U 93. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
7.2. Nothing to report.

8.2. U 73 left Heligoland for the operations area.

Towards 1100 U 37 made contact with a convoy in square CG 8527,

which, according to an agent's report, left Gibraltar on February 6. She
was ordered to attack, also to shadow and report, so as possibly to bring up
other forces even though there were no U-boats in the vicinity. Group
Command West was asked whether there was any question of Hipper
operating (she was in a neighboring sea area); the reply was no. If
however, the boat manages to shadow until morning it may be possible for
aircraft to operate. This is likely to be successful in so far as aircraft have
never yet appeared here. It is intended to use 5 aircraft. Weather
conditions are favorable. The boat is still shadowing and reported that the
convoy consisted of 18 steamers, 1 destroyer, 1 gunboat. It was steering a
westerly course at slow speed.
244
Towards 1700 all 5 aircraft had reached the convoy. 4 aircraft damaged
9 steamers totaling 45,500 GRT, some of them apparently severely. The
results of the fifth aircraft are not yet known: Great importance is attached
to this first success of an operation by aircraft brought to the enemy by a
U-boat, not only because of the tonnage damaged, but also because it
proves for the first time that even at this early stage co-operation between
U-boats and G.A.F. can lead to considerable success.
It is hoped that U 37 will be able to take advantage of the situation
brought about by the air attack.
 Naval War Staff has extended the operations are to the north and the - 12 -
attack areas of all boats W. of the North Channel are being transferred
accordingly: U 107 - square AE 79 and 87; U 48 - square AE 88 and 89
and 97; U 96 - square AL 32 and AM 11; U 103 - square AL 33 and 34;
U 101 square AM 12 and 21; U 52 - square AM 13 and 14; U 93 - square
AM 15 to 18; U 94 - square AL 35 to 38.
U 123 will remain in her present area as weather boat.

It can be taken for certain that there is also traffic in the north. As little
has been sighted in the old operations area during the last few weeks the Date Position, Wind, Weather
amount of traffic in the north is at least not likely to be any less. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
10.2. U 37 was again ordered to attack the convoy and to report only if
this was possible in addition to making an attack. She lost contact
temporarily, but regained it again in the afternoon. The boat's reports were
not altogether clear. She reported "still 9 steamers" and was then ordered
in the evening to attack and "sink the remaining 9 steamers".
failure.
11.2. U 37 lost contact at midnight, but pressed on. She reported 4
steamers sunk and one probably sunk, total 21,500 GRT. She also reported U 48 reported from her attack area at 2133 one battle cruiser and one
6 unexplained electric torpedo misses, which cannot be investigated in light cruiser with escort in AE 8896. Unfortunately the boat seems to have
detail until she returns. been sighted according to radio intelligence.

Contrary to their original intentions, Group Command West decided to
operate Hipper against the convoy after all. U 37 received orders to search
again and when contact was made to make beacon-signals every 2 hours,
without however imparing her own chances of attack. According to
K.G.40's preliminary report the beacon-signals during the aircraft attack
were very satisfactory. The U-boat's signals were heard by the aircraft at a
distance of 150 miles and for this reason alone the aircraft continued their
approach flight beyond the actual limit of their range.
The bearing was accurate to within 20 degrees at a range of 80 miles.
These results are very good indeed, especially as peace-time experiments
on these lines had been a total
Another radio intelligence report of 0330 (SSS from S.S. Jamaica
Producer) spoke of a U-boat sighted in AM 2459. Actually there should
not be a U-boat there. But it is impossible that a boat took action on U
48's report and arrived thus far east. It is regrettable that the enemy has
obtained information of the transfer of the boats north. On the other hand
a radio intelligence report of an aircraft attack on a U-boat in square AM
1989 cannot be explained.
U 73 reported passing 62 degrees north on her way out.
U 147 is delayed in Cuxhaven owing to fog.

U 69 is on passage through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.

245
 These are the first boats whose training has either had to be abandoned
completely or curtailed owing to ice conditions. As the ice became much
worse very suddenly it was only possible to get some of the boats out of
the Baltic to Kiel, and some of these suffered considerable damage in
consequence. 3 operational boats and a number of training boats have had
to stay in the Baltic as the western Baltic is blocked by ice.
At the request of Group Command West U 37 was ordered to continue
the search for the lost convoy E. of 20 degrees W.
U 73 has been given an attack area N. of the other boats.
Air reconnaissance by KG 40 from Bordeaux can only cover the SE
corner of the present U-boat disposition, even if the aircraft return to
Stavanger or Aalborg. It can therefore really only provide information on
the traffic situation in the southern sector, at present only occupied by
Italian boats. Immediate co-operation with our own boats is not possible.
This state of affairs is unsatisfactory. There are considerable difficulties
involved in the transfer of the whole Group to Stavanger and Aalborg and
the advantages to be gained by such a move are outweighed by
considerable disadvantages which would result. The matter must be
discussed with the Commanding Officer of the Group as soon as possible.
12.2. The results achieved by the U-boats during the last few weeks are
unsatisfactory. This can no longer be attributed purely to the bad weather.
poor visibility and long hours of darkness and there is reason to suspect
that the English have rerouted their traffic to a considerable extent. They
can only have diverted it north. For this reason the boats were transferred
north, but even this move has not proved entirely satisfactory. I have
therefore decided to transfer the boats' attack areas another 50 miles to the
north. The whole area between Iceland and the northern approach to the
Minch will then be covered. This means that the approach routes from
- 13 -
246
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
the west to the North Channel are temporarily unoccupied. Towards
midday HIpper encountered a convoy (presumably U 37's) in CF 80 and
apparently annihilated it. Thus, for the first time in Naval History, a
combined operation between U-boats, aircraft and surface forces has
reached a successful conclusion. As counter-operations on the part of the
English are to be expected, U 37 has been allocated an attack area in CF
20, 30, 50, 60 E. of 20 degrees. She will then have to return to Lorient as
she will have used all her torpedoes and she will not be able to carry out
the intended operation in the Freetown area.
Since U 65 returned it has, however, been seen that:
The unsuccessful period of 4 weeks in December, which led to U 37 and
65's patrols being broken off, was not due to lack of traffic but to the
conduct of the boat which had moved away to the west to supply again
without reporting this. The traffic situation off Freetown was favorable
throughout and the results of the patrol were good compared with present
successes off the North Channel.
Now that U 37 will have to return, I have decided to send the next large
boats which are ready, U 105 (21.2), U 124 (23.2) and U 106 (25.2) to the
southern area. They can supply off Moro, Culebra and from Nordmark, - 14 -
though Nordmark has only sufficient torpedoes for one boat.

After a long interval enemy submarines have again been observed off
Brest.

C-in-C G.A.F. believes that there are mines off the S.W. corner of
Ireland. This was suspected once before, and boats were then ordered to
remain outside the 200-meter line.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
All available KG 40 aircraft are being used to fly reconnaissance for the and Sea State, Illumination, Events
return of Hipper, which means foregoing our own reconnaissance for the Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
next few days.

13.2. U 93 and 101 reported that they were starting on their return
passage. U 93 has bomb damage. U 101's reasons remain to be seen. She
only left port on 24.1.
Sperrbrechers are out of action they will have to sail without mine
A discussion with the Commanding Officer of I/KG 40 showed that a escort in spite of the grave doubts felt. They should get through safely
transfer of the Group is not possible at present, and cannot be effected provided there are no further incursions by aircraft.
before the Spring. A request has however, been made via KG 40 for the
development of Stavanger and Rennes so that there will be better facilities U 37 is to be left in her attack area in CF 30. Operations by the British
available. appear to be still in progress (Force H leaving Gibraltar).

The 10,000 ton tanker Arthur F. Corvin reported from AL 3248 that she
had been torpedoed. This must have been the work of U 103. This and
one other radio intelligence report of a steamer in AL 2177 prove that there
is traffic in the area N. of 60 degrees now occupied.
U 93 entered port A.M. U 69 left Heligoland for the operations area. U
147 left for Bergen.
U 108, 46 and 552 are to leave Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven and
Brunsbüttel respectively for Heligoland. As all
14.2. According to Radio Intelligence a steamer has been torpedoed in
AL 6519 and another successfully attacked by KG 40 in AM 4496.
Also according to Radio Intelligence, 2 British aircraft reported convoys
in AE 8733 and 8973. These are probably one and the same convoy and
the aircraft have made errors in their positions, as in each case 25 ships
and 1 escort ship were reported. The reports were however, so late and
inaccurate that the boats could not be ordered to operate.
15.2. There is no further information on Force H and the British Home
Fleet. U 37 has therefore been ordered to return to Lorient. After one

247
more short patrol this boat will have to return home for a complete
overhaul. F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

U 94 reported that she was starting on her return passage, having sunk 3 16 - 28 February 1941
steamers of 19,000 tons, otherwise nothing sighted. This boat was S.W.
and N.W. of the Rockhall Bank for about 4 weeks. This is therefore a PG30283
further indication that there is now very little traffic in these areas which
were previously so good.

The sailing of U 46, 108 and 552 has been delayed again until 16.2,
owing to difficulties in obtaining escort. The boats are in Heligoland. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
The necessity for boats to proceed submerged by day in the North Sea Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
has been emphasized again by an air attack on a convoy in the Heligoland
Bight.

The Commanding Officer of U 93 reported on his patrol. Apart from

the convoy on 28.1. and S.S. Dione reported by aircraft, the boat only
sighted one steamer and one light. 16.2. In operational sectors in the operational area:
Total results: U 73 Grid AE 73 t0 82
From the convoy 1 steamer 6,000 tons U 107 Grid 76 and 84
1 tanker 10,000 tons (Walker) U 48 85 to 94
1 steamer 4,900 tons U 96 87 and 88
Dione 2,660 tons U 52 AM 11 and 12 (return passage on 16.2)
24,000 tons. U 103 AL 31 and 32
U 123 as weather boat between 220 and 250 W, south of 580 N.

She heard the beacon-signals of the aircraft shadowing the outward-
bound convoy on 28.1, but, while operating against this convoy, she
encountered another inward-bound one at night, attacked this later and
brought up U 106 and apparently one other boat.
(Signed): DÖNITZ
Proceeding to operational area: U 69 south of the Faroes; U 147 off
Bergen, where it will put in for exercises inside the Fjord; U 95, putting
out of Lorient on the evening of the 16th; U 108 putting out of Heligoland
on the evening of the 16th.
On return passage to Lorient: U 37, U 94, U 101 which reported the
sinking of two ships of altogether 11,000 tons, and U 52 which reported
being on return passage on the evening of the 16th.
6 Italian boats are in the area south of 580 west of 150.

248
 The consideration that, for the time being, the thing to do is to obtain the
clearest possible picture of traffic in the northern area, and that above all
this will have to be obtained by a narrow, as far as possible unbroken line
of boats, leads to a new disposition. The disadvantages resulting from the
lack of depth in the disposition of the boats in the event a convoy being
intercepted, will have to taken into account. The boats are assigned
operational areas with a depth of 40 sea miles in the following grids:
U 73 7395 AE ; U 107 7643 AE
U 48 7932 AE; U 96 7949 AE
U 69 3135 AL; U 103 3174 AL
U 73 reported that there was no traffic in its area hard south of Iceland,
no activity owing to weather conditions. The sending of such messages,
also by means of short signals, is forbidden owing to the danger of D/Fing.
The 10,000 ton tanker Edwy F. Brown (Grid AL 2435) reported having
been torpedoed from U 103's area.
A reconnaissance report from Fliegerführer North of a battleship in
Grid AM 3260 unfortunately arrived very late via both Group North and
Group West as U 69 must have been approximately in the same area.
Group North is requested to insure quicker communication.
- 16 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
249
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
17.2. After about AL 64, aerial reconnaissance yielded no results. The
urgently needed reconnaissance to the north, approaching from
Stavanger/Aalborg, is still not possible owing to the weather conditions at
these airfields. Air reconnaissance is still further restricted by the fact that
only one aircraft is available every day for about 14 days owing to much
needed training of crews for the FW 200.I am willing to put up with these
restrictions in order to attain higher figures later.
U 46 put out of Heligoland for its operational area.
A daylight air attack has taken place, in Brunsbüttel at midday, on Route
Green in the Heligoland Bight several days ago. This proves the necessity
of proceeding during daylight in this area in a shallow sea only with anti-
aircraft escort, in deep water submerged.
18.2. Torpedoed, according to Radio Intercept reports, during the night.
English steamers "Siamese Prince" and "Shaftsbury" in AM 1435
(presumably by U 69) and the American steamer "Black Osprey" in AE
7967 (presumably by U 96 or 48). In the last few days therefore, 5 ships
have been torpedoed between 590 30' and 610 30' North. It is possible that
traffic will be diverted to the north or south. Our own boats are still in the
north. In the south the Italians have received instructions to move about
80 seamiles to the north to close the gap between the German and Italian
boats.
The English D/F Service presumably intercepted U 123's weather report
sent from AL 42 and U 94's approach message. In spite of the distance,
the first bearing is correct to within about 50 seamiles, the second fairly
inaccurate (about 150 seamiles out). All the same, this is yet another
indication that the English D/F Service is in a position to D/F short signals
also, to an increasing degree. The boat received orders to vary the wave
length used. Apart from this the Naval War Staff has, following a
telephone request from me, decreed that only one message is to be sent
daily, except on special occasions, such as in the event of remarkable
changes in weather conditions.
U 97 has put out of Heligoland.
U 37 has put into Lorient. Operations on the convoy reported by Radio
Intercept Service, and the maintenance of contact while repeatedly
attacking from the forenoon of 8.2 to the afternoon of 10.2., are a
particularly fine achievement on the part of the Commander.He was
thereby the indirect cause of "Hipper's" success on 11.2. Although
"Hipper" it appears, only sank one steamer in this convoy, this operation
lead to the interception of another convoy.
In the evening the British steamer "Seaforth" of 4,199 tons was
torpedoed, perhaps by a boat on the return passage (without reporting the
fact).
- 17 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
250
19.2. Air reconnaissance at last over the northern area to Stavanger (one
aircraft) sighted an apparently unescorted west-bound convoy consisting
of 45 ships in AM 3443 in the afternoon. Operations must be attempted by
the boats - fairly well placed in the north. The convoy appears as likely to
deviate to the north as to the south. I have therefore decided in favor of a
patrol line lying in the center, ahead of the reported "W" course of the
convoy. The convoy's speed must be presumed to be 7 to 8 knots. The
boats can reach a patrol line lying to the west of the midday position of the
convoy sailing at a speed of 7 knots. If the convoy is sailing at a speed of
8 knots the boats should encounter it on the last stretch of their outward
passage. The boats are therefore ordered to take up position in patrol lines
with a depth of 6 seamiles from Grid 2111 to 2377 at 1200. U 73, 107, 48,
96, and 69 are concerned, U 103 reports having started upon the return
passage. This means a distance of 25 seamiles between boats, adequate, in
view of the size of the convoy and the anticipated good visibility. Two
Italian boats will extend the patrol line to the south.
Three aircraft are to carry out reconnaissance at hourly intervals from
dawn on the probable convoy forces.
U 108 has received instructions to proceed via the northern tip of the
Faroes along the south coast of Iceland between 160 30' W and Reykjavik
in order to ascertain whether there is any traffic there at all.
U 46 has been ordered to operate between the Shetlands - Faroes - Cape
Wrath, both boats (U 108 and 46), as it seems increasingly likely that at
least a part of the British traffic has been diverted from the Northern
Channel.
U 97 has put out of Heligoland, U 94 and U 101 have put out of Lorient
 U 94 (Lt. Kuppisch) operating west of the Northern Channel and to the
North of Rockall Bank only since the 9.1., has sighted and sunk:
In grid 8955 AE a steamer of 2,500 tons presumably bound for Iceland
from England.
In grid 4130 AM a steamer of 7,500 tons, in the convoy reported by U
93 on 29.1.
In grid 2970 AM a steamer of 9,000 tons.
The attacks were carried out with great determination. The boat was
attacked with depth charges for five hours on 29.1.
U 101 (Lt. Mengersen) at sea since 24.1, was beaten off and forced to
submerge by convoy escort forces on 29.1 and likewise by a smaller
convoy on 30.1. which the boat unfortunately failed to report.
- 18 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Later it sank 2 steamers of 6,000 and 5,000 tons. In addition, the boat
had one or two unexplained electrical torpedo misses, which, together with
251
those reported by U 37, give rise to great anxiety. The matter is being
looked into thoroughly.
20.2. Report of convoy in AM 2393, course 3000, at 1050, was sent by
air reconnaissance at about 1130; the aircraft gave the position as correct
and sent bearing signals. Two further aircraft in 2 waves are approaching
as continuous contact relief. The situation appears therefore to be "a
cinch"; the boats have received orders to attempt to establish contact. At
about 1400 the second aircraft's convoy report was received. It was
reported to be in AM 2733 and to consist of 31 steamers, 1 destroyer and 4
patrol boats, as opposed to the 40 unescorted steamers of the first convoy.
This position was also reported as "correct for U-boats". Immediately
afterwards one of the two Italian boats, which should be in the patrol lines,
reported being in a totally different position far to the west; whether the
other boat is in position is doubtful.
The situation is at present as follows: The convoys general course,
according to aircraft reports of yesterday and early today, is 2600 and
indicates roughly the southern flank of the German boats. At the moment,
these are operating to the north on a course of 3000 reported by an aircraft.
If this course was only temporary, and the enemy's general course
somewhat west or slightly more to the south, there is danger of the convoy
passing to the south of the boats, especially as the Italian boats cannot be
counted on being to the south of the German boats. It is better therefore,
not to allow the boats to operate freely on aircraft reports, as previously
ordered, but rather to attempt to intercept the convoy by means of a narrow
patrol channel, as formerly, without considering the Italians.
U 73, 107, 48, 96 and 69 received orders to form a patrol channel from
AM 2148 to 2518. For this purpose, they were to steer a course of about
1800 across the convoy's line of approach; the convoy should have
reached this position by nightfall.
It cannot be presumed that both aircraft reports refer to the same
convoy. A radio intercept report was received in the afternoon, according
to which an English Naval unit reported their convoy being attacked by
aircraft in AM 2514 at 1230. That is, 20 seamiles south of the patrol
channel first allocated, where in fact, the Italians should be. It has long
been suspected however, that position reports of this kind are misleading.
For the time being therefore, I left the boats in the patrol lines last ordered,
relying on the last aircraft report. If this was correct as regard position,
then contact should have been established before 1900. This had not
occurred at 2000. The last chance was to take the radio intercept report as
correct, and base further operations on it.
This i what happened, in as far as that boats received orders to take up
position in a new patrol channel from AL 3821 to 0362, at high speed.
- 19 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
According to the English report the convoy can reach this position
towards 1500, the boats should also be able to be there by that time, at the
latest. Only one aircraft, on the return flight from Stavanger, is available
as reconnaissance, and this will operate in the area in question. Three
252
Italian boats are to extend the patrol channel to the north (2) and the south
(1).
U 47 put out of Lorient with orders to proceed to the area off the
Northern Channel.
21.2. Towards 1130, a message was received from the aircraft returning
from Stavanger, reporting the convoy's position in AL 3861 at 1030.
Westerly course.
This message would tie up with both the Radio Intercept report from
AM 2514, and the aircraft report from AM 2733.
This will have to be taken as correct as it is the only information. On
the other hand, as the boats have been making for their new position since
yesterday evening in a wind of approximately strength 4 to 7, their
position is not clear. In particular, it is impossible to decide whether the
boats are to the west or the east of the convoy. It is most probable that
they are to the east of the convoy, otherwise the convoy and U-boat
courses must have crossed one another. A fixed deployment of the boats is
no longer possible with this uncertainty. They are therefore, only ordered
to operate on the convoy's reported position, and to attempt to establish
contact.
A Radio Intercept report was received towards 1300, according to
which the convoy reported yesterday in AM 2514 in a Radio Intercept
report, was today in AL 3455 at 1030, and was bombed by aircraft. The
longitude agrees with the aircraft report entirely, the latitude differs by 110
seamiles. It would have been scarcely possible for the aircraft to have
been in this position. Once more then, there is a considerable difference
between the Radio Intercept and the aircraft report. This increases the
suspicion that either the information given by the Radio Intercept Service
is wrong, or that the English disguise their radio signals by means of a
kind of recognition signal setting disc. The aircraft report was therefore in
all probability the more reliable, and further operations were based on it.
The search yielded no results, however, and was broken off at dusk. The
operations carried out since the first aircraft report at midday on the 19th,
were, therefore, unsuccessful. The reason for this is as yet obscure, it may
lie in the following points:
1) In deployment, as the boats were sent from their patrol lines to
operate on the convoy immediately on receipt of the first aircraft report, at
midday on the 20th. It would have been better perhaps, not to have
dispersed the patrol lines at once, instead, for the time being to have tried
to contact the convoy by means of a wide rake, and then, only when a U-
boat was in contact with the enemy, to have allowed the boats to converge
on it.
- 20 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
2) In that the U-boats did not reach the ordered positions owing to
weather conditions, bad visibility, incorrect fixes, or that they were
253
unlucky in their operations. This point can be settled on the return of the
boats.
3) In the weather, its influence on the positions and opportunities of the U-
boats.
4) In the inaccuracy of the aircraft reports. I intend to clear up all
questions connected with this, personally, with KG 40 on the 24th, and to
obtain an accurate picture of the navigational possibilities and
achievements of the aircraft.
5) In the Radio Intercept reports. 3 Naval War Staff and 1 Naval War Staff
suggest a clarification of the question of grading radio intercept messages.
22.2. From messages requested during the night:
a) U 73, 107, 96 and 69 remain in the operational area. U 107 and 96
may soon be expected to begin the return passage.
b) U 48 is on the return passage, this boat has sunk a steamer of 4,351
tons. U 52 reports on the return passage, having sunk 2 steamers of 7,000
tons. Also in operational area: U 108 off Iceland; U 123 with freedom of
movement; U 95 as weather boat; U 46 in the operational area between
Shetlands - Faroes - Herbrides. Outward bound: U 552, U 97, U 47 (to
the Northern Channel); U 147 (to the area Shetlands - Faroes - Herbrides -
southern section); U 73, 69, 96, 107, 552 and 97 receive operational area
west of the Faroes - Herbrides area between 610 30' and 580 30' and
between 70 and 120. The impression that there is traffic here has been
strengthened by events of the last few days. Here too, a certain amount of
co-operation with U 46 and later U 147 is possible.
2 Italian boats are proceeding to AE 76 and 79 and AL 37 and 39.
An aircraft returning from Stavanger reported a convoy in AN 1435. U
552 and 46 are to operate for the time being. This message was later
corrected, the position being given as AM 2321, convoy of 40 ships, 5
destroyers, course 2600. This corrected message was not received until
1200.
U 73, 96, 69 must be in a fairly favorable position, U 107 less so. As
the boats, however, have been proceeding at "cruising speed" which can
vary considerably, since the evening of 21.2, their position was too
uncertain to insure the formation of a patrol line ahead of the convoy
before nightfall. In order to at least take up some kind of formation, U 73,
96 and 69 received orders to search in 20 seamile wide lines, between 600,
30' N and 590 30' N. U 107 and U 123 which were further off were not
restricted. U 552 was to pursue if the outlook was favorable, U 46 was to
remain in the operational area. Shortly afterwards, U 107 reported being
on return passage.
- 21 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
A Radio Intercept report of an aircraft attack on the convoy gave its
position as AM 5371, course 2740, speed 7 knots. The speed only was
used as a basis for operations, the position is so inaccurate and an air
254
attack cannot possibly have taken place at the point given, this proves
conclusively that the information given by Radio Intercept control station
no longer applies.
U 73 established contact in AM 1369 at 1616, the aircraft report
therefore must have been very good. Contact must be maintained at all
costs. The night promises the best opportunities for attack.
U 73 received instructions to send bearing signals and only to attack
when ordered to do so. U 96, 69 and 123 were free to attack (by day
though, only under particularly favorable conditions) and were to report
contact immediately in a short message. U 73 would then be free to
attack. U 95 was also ordered to operate on the convoy and therefore
relieved of weather reporting duties.
No further messages were received from U 73. It is unlikely in these
circumstances, that another boat established contact during the night.
Early tomorrow morning therefore, an attempt must be made to again
intercept the convoy by means of a patrol channel. U 73, 96, 69 and 123
should then, if they have not gained contact before 2200, take up position
in offensive lines from AL 2658 to AL 2869 at 1000 and approach the
convoy on a course of 650, speed 7 knots. An Italian boat is to extend the
line on either flank. These offensive lines must lie ahead of the convoy,
even if the enemy's speed is 10 knots. The contact boat is merely to
maintain contact, and not to attack, so as not to be beaten off during the
day. U 99 has put out of Lorient for the north, U 105 for the south.
23.2. U 96 picked up the convoy at 1000 in AL 3552 and maintained
continuous contact. U 73 came up at 1200 and U 69 at 1530 and they
reported in a short message. The convoy deviated to the north. U 95 and
U 123 should also have been in a favorable position. An aircraft belonging
to KG 40, detailed to reconnoiter, did not appear, the convoy was at the
limit of its range.
U 124 put out of Lorient for the south.
 giving their position, were not received. U 552 was therefore free to
24.2. U 96's convoy dispersed during the night after the U-boat attacks. attack, but lost contact at 2305 and this was not regained, although U 95
The following reported: and U 97 were in the vicinity. There was no message from U 108. It was
U 96 - 7 ships 55,600 tons (3 to 26,500 from 1 convoy, including 1 not until later that U 97 reported having sunk one steamer and one tanker
auxiliary cruiser.) (together 16,000 tons) damaged a further tanker, and started on the return
U 107 - 4 ships 21,000 tons passage. This was fundamentally wrong (except in special circumstances).
U 95 (3 - 18,000 The boat should have taken over contact duties on its own initiative,
thereby enabling U 552 to attack.

U 74 put out of Heligoland for Bergen, where the boat is to exercise for
about 4 days before putting out on operations.
- 22 -
25.2. U 103 and U 52 put into Lorient. For the first part of their
operations they saw little and had few opportunities of attacking. U 103's
total result: 4 ships of altogether 33,204 tons, U 52 - 2 ships of altogether
7,000 tons.

U 552 regained contact with a section of the convoy in AE 7915, U 95

requested and received bearing signals, it must therefore have been in the
vicinity. Contact was lost, however, towards evening. It appears pointless
Date Position, Wind, Weather to continue this operation, especially as the convoy is dispersing and the
and Sea State, Illumination, Events weather was bad. The boats are assigned to the following operational
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. areas if they are not in contact with the convoy:
U 108 between 140 00' and 170 00' West.
" 610 00' and 600 20' North.
U 552 south of this to 590 40' North.
U 95 south of this to 590 00' North
U 70 is destined for the area north of this position.
U 73 - 1 ship 6,500 tons (1 - 6,500? This area covers the traffic routes mainly observed recently.
U 69 - 3 ships 25,900 tons (3 - 25,900
U 103 - 4 ships 33,204 tons U 552 lost contact with the convoy during the night, as it dispersed.
22 ships 160,200 tons (10 - 76,900 from convoy Offensive action was restricted. Operations on this convoy are therefore
discontinued.
U 69, 96, 107 and 123 had to start the return passage owing to torpedo
and fuel shortage. U 95 and U 108, possibly also U 97, should be able to
attack during the day. The short messages requested from the other boats
255
 - 23 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 47 picked up an outward bound convoy in AM 4430 at 1411. The
boat was temporarily beaten off by aircraft but was again on the scene at
1900. U 97 and U 73 were detailed for action and ordered as a precaution
to take up position in a patrol channel with U 47 at 1000 on the 26th, in
case contact was lost. Two Italian boats extended the patrol lines on the
flanks, one aircraft was operating as reconnaissance. U 47 established
contact, the patrol line therefore, became superfluous. U 73 and U 99
were expected to come up, also U 97, which admittedly had no torpedoes
ready for firing, and could only act as contact.
26.2. U 46 (between the Faroes and the Orkneys) received orders to
return for a new screw.
U 47 maintained continuous contact, but reports stopped coming in at
1700. As the boat reported later, it had been beaten off and attacked with
depth charges. 22,000 tons of shipping were sunk. At 1931 however, U
97 took over as contact - it must also be taken into account that this boat
was detailed to operate on the convoy without torpedoes.
256
Towards 2400 the convoy dispersed, U 97 maintained contact with two
steamers for a while, the contact was completely lost. The boats, U 47, 73,
and 99 which must be in the vicinity according to their reports, were
ordered to proceed in the general sailing direction. A steamer (Balistan
6,803 tons) was reported to have been torpedoed at 0515 in a Radio
Intercept report. A strict distribution of operational areas for the boats
does not appear to have any point in this case.
According to U-boats reports, I.K.G.40 attacked with considerable
success, at midday with one, in the evening with five aircraft.
27.2. U 73 began the return passage. U 70 received the operational area
north of U 108 (see 25.2) as far north as 610 40' North. The concentration
in the south of U 147's operational area Orkneys - Faroes was lifted.
U 48 put into St. Nazaire, U 37 put out of Lorient for the south, UA put
out of Heligoland for the Atlantic, U 74 put into Bergen for exercises
lasting about four days.
The search for the remaining steamers belonging to the convoy was
unsuccessful. Air reconnaissance did not receive the order to search for
the convoy in time, and merely sighted two isolated steamers in the area of
yesterday's attack. The boats received the following orders: U 97 to
proceed to the weather reporting area, U 47 and 99 to cover the position of
yesterday's attack, where there must still be some damaged steamers in the
Rockall Bank area.
- 24 -
 certain conditions by means of undecyphered wireless messages using
reference points.

Date Position, Wind, Weather

and Sea State, Illumination, Events Apart from this, the sinking of 7 ships and 47,333 tons is a particularly
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. fine achievement on the part of Lt. Lehmann-Willenbrock whose tenacity
in maintaining contact contributed largely to the success on 23.2. U 123
(Lt. Moehle), encountered fairly lively isolated traffic in the grid AL 42
and 51, during weather reporting duties, and sank 4 ships of altogether
33,130 tons. The result is all the more gratifying as it was believed that
the boat had encountered little, if any, traffic. Boats must be more
28.2. U 96 and U 123 put into Lorient. frequently requested to send traffic reports.

From U 96's report: U 48 had bad luck and sighted very few ships, it sank 2 ships of
On 20.2, the boat obtained bearings on the beacon signals in both the altogether 8,640 tons.
aircraft messages, at 1050 and 1200. Both beacon radiations indicate a
position near that reported by 2 aircraft in AM 2733. (see K.T.B. of 20.2). (signed): DÖNITZ

From this one must conclude that the first position report sent by an
aircraft was incorrect, and in actual fact only referred to one convoy in the F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
position reported by the second aircraft. Recognition of this fact would
have been of considerable value to B.d.U. the outcome of the operation 1 - 15 March 1941
would, with this knowledge, have been different. Inference from this is as
follows: PG30284
1) Considerable unreliability of fix must be expected in the case of
aircraft messages.
2) It is impossible to operate directly on an aircraft message and assemble
in the area given, rather, contact must be attempted by means of the
broadest possible raking operation. Direct operations on the enemy may Date Position, Wind, Weather
be started upon only when a U-boat has established contact, thereby and Sea State, Illumination, Events
confirming the position of the enemy. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
3) A knowledge of the U-boats bearing results, is necessary in order to
check aircraft reports and the disposition of the rake. In the future, in a
case like this, the boats must report their position bearing direction, for the
time being by wireless. A simplified method is being prepared; under
257
 1.3. In Operational area: - 26 -
a) U 70, 108, 552, 95 in operations areas between 590 and 620 and
between 140 and 170 30'.
b) U 99 and U 147 receive the following operations areas as from 1.3:
U 99 40 seamile wide channels south of the boats given above.
U 47 area west of Rockall Bank.
c) U 97 as weather boat between 220 and 250 south of 580 N.
d) U 147 between Shetlands and Faroes.
On outward passage in Operational Area:
a) U 37 to the north, approximately grid BF 41. Date Position, Wind, Weather
b) UA in the North Sea. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
c) U 74 in Bergen, where it is practicing for a few days. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
d) U 105, 124 and 106 on outward passage to supply Culebra.
On return passage:
U 46 to St. Nazaire, U 69 and U 107 are putting in to Lorient.

The convoy should be intercepted by the boats early in the morning. U

Very few boats will be ready for action in March: U 100 on about 5.3.,
U 48 on 15.3., U 52 on 21.3., in addition, the boats frozen up in the Baltic,
U 76, U 98 and U 110 which can now be brought through to Kiel.
Naval War Staff have agreed to the south boats extending the
operational area south of 300 N to 250 W. They have received orders to
proceed to the south on 210 to 220 after replenishment of supplies which
is planned for 3, 4 and 5.3. Traffic is presumed to be here, and this is born
out by a new intelligence report.
70, 108, 552, 95, 99, 47 are to take up reconnaissance lines from AL 3794
to 6259, at 1000. 2 Italian boats are to extend the flanks. In this way,
assuming a convoy speed of 9 knots, and if the course lies between 2500
and 2900, the boats will be ahead of the convoy.
Air reconnaissance by 3 aircraft at 1000, between 1510 and 1645 W.
The boats received orders to report position and D/F direction on picking
up aircraft beacon signals, and only to operate when ordered to do so.
(Experiences of 20.2 and report U 96 of 28.2.).

2.3. One of the two aircraft detailed for reconnaissance to the N.
returning to Stavanger, reported a convoy at 1030 in AM 2920 (inexact).
The course was given as west, only after further enquiry. The position was
improved by the report of a bombed steamer in AM 2991. This position
was assumed to be correct.
258
U 37 is detailed as weather boat and informed of the traffic confirmed in
AL 42 and 51 by U 123. U 97 received orders, therefore, to return (the
boat has only upper deck torpedoes).
3.3. Aerial reconnaissance saw nothing of the convoy. It is questionable
which position the aircraft has in fact reached, with the uncertain fix. It is
still possible that the area to the south of the reconnaissance lines is
covered. It is also possible that the convoy carried out an evasive
movement after the air attack on 2.3 probably followed by one to the
north. The reconnaissance lines were transferred 10 seamiles on a
northerly course, when the possibility of this had been confirmed on a
request for a weather report. The reconnaissance lines are to proceed until
2400 and then remain stationary as patrol lines in order to exhaust the
possibilities of the situation up to dawn on 4.3 and until the appearance of Date Position, Wind, Weather
air reconnaissance. It is still possible owing to weather conditions, that the and Sea State, Illumination, Events
convoy has not passed the longitude of the patrol lines. The situation Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
strengthens suspicion to a conviction, that the convoys react to air attacks
by greatly altering course - a course which must have seemed obvious to
the English, with the development of cooperation between aircraft and U-
boat.

In this connection, therefore, KG 40 is only to attack isolated vessels,
convoys though are to be shadowed if possible unobserved, and not
attacked. A lamentable, but necessary restriction. It remains to be seen
how such questions should be decided after the statement of the
"Fliegerführer Atlantic" under C-in-C G.A.F. Whether an unobserved
shadowing is altogether possible with the large Condor aircraft also
remains to be seen.
U 552 reported heavy traffic from AM 12 and 21, U 147 between
Minch and Faroe Bank. After carrying out convoy operations this locality
will again be occupied.
U 69, 107 and 73 report on their operations. U 69 (3 ships of 25,956
tons) and U 107 (4 ships of 21,000 tons) have achieved very encouraging
results for a first operation. U 73 (1 ship of 6,500 tons) was temporarily
stationed below Iceland but encountered only fishing craft and coastal
sailing vessels.
4.3. The Condor returning from Stavanger reported a convoy putting out
in AM 2554, course 3000 at 0900. The composition is the same as that of
the convoy of 2.3. It is possible that this is the same convoy, which, owing
to the especially unfavorable weather conditions, has been lying
practically hove to.
The convoy cannot now be reached before darkness. The available
boats, including UA 70, 47, 99, 95 and 108 and 552 are to be in patrol
lines from AL 3122 to 3585 at 1000 on 5.3. and on a course of 1150 and a
speed of 10 knots run across the convoy which with a speed of 9 knots
must be ahead of the patrol channels. A Italian boat is on the southern
flank.
U 46 put into St. Nazaire, has had no contact with the enemy, U 147 has
begun return passage to Germany.
U 124 has carried out supply from Culebra.

5.3. U 74 has put out of Bergen for the operational area.

- 27 -
U 105 has carried out supplying from Culebra. U 95 reported by W/T
from the center of the ordered patrol lines, having fired torpedoes and sunk
259
tonnage amounting to 27,000 tons. The sending of this superfluous W/T
message from the patrol channel was an extremely clumsy mistake, when
the boat was not already with certainty observed by the enemy.
The reconnaissance lines did not bring any success up to the hours of
darkness. Up to now than, all attempts to operate on aircraft reports have
remained without success, (except in the case U 73 and U 96 on
22.2.1941). The reasons are as follows:
a) Insufficient reliability of aircraft positions. A deviation of 70
seamiles on 20.2. must be attributed to the D/Fing of U 96. In addition, it
may be suspected that on this, and the days following, the aircraft
positions were incorrect, the radio interception reports correct.
b) With the former method, the aircraft reports only gave one position, and
the course given might only be that steered at the time.
c) For the most part, the U-boats detailed for operations could not intercept
the target until the next day. During this long interval the first report will
have decreased in reliability. Also, the uncertainty resulting from this
cannot be compensated for, even by the operation of a wide U-boat rake.
- 28 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
260
Another method of c0-operation must therefore be found in order to
obtain a more exact position and course of the target from the reports of
several U-boats in succession. Until this has been tried out there will be
no more U-boat operations undertaken on aircraft reports. In spite of this,
aircraft reconnaissance is important in the area not covered by U-boats.
Ordered for Bomber Squadron 40's operations:
a) Routine flights daily, with at least two aircraft if possible,
reconnaissance west and northwest of Ireland.
b) Take off at intervals of 1 to 2 hours on the same flying route.
c) Convoys are the target. These are to be reported as quickly as possible
(for the time being course and speed). Contact is to be maintained as long
as fuel supply allows.
d) The second, and all following aircraft fly to the convoy reported by the
previous aircraft and make their own complete reconnaissance report
according to paragraph c). The report of the first aircraft can be checked
by that of the second. Each aircraft must therefore report according to his
own navigation, regardless of the report sent by his predecessor.
e) Convoys may be attacked until further notice.
The various short wave D/F stations will be detailed to take bearings on
the reporting aircraft to check the position reports.
The boats were assigned to the following new operational areas:
U 70 and U 99, lines in the vicinity of AM 11
U 47 lines in the vicinity of AM 13
U 108 lines in the vicinity of AM 15
U 552 West of Rockall Bank
These are the areas in which according to the latest report the most
traffic may be expected.

U 95 received orders to return.
6.3. U 95 reported that yesterday, instead of proceeding on a course of
1150, speed 15 knots, from the patrol lines, it remained there. That the
convoy escaped through the resulting gap, is not entirely out of the
question, but very unlikely.
- 29 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 106 has carried out replenishment of supplies. The supplying of three
boats in Culebra apparently went without a hitch.
The three boats in the south received orders to proceed to the south on
20, 21 and 220, thereby raking the presumed main traffic route.
Of the boats in the north, U 108 started upon the return passage; it has
sunk 2 ships of altogether 12,061 tons. U 74 is assigned to the operational
261
area north of the remaining boats; U 37, formerly weather boat, is to
occupy U 108's area, UA is to be weather boat.
7.3. The commanding officer of U 97, Lieutenant Heilmann, reported on
putting in. His boat sank 2 ships of 16,000 tons reported by U 552 on
23.2, also damaged a tanker of 11,000 tons; apart from this though, there
were again 5 entirely inexplicable failures.
U 47 contacted a north-bound convoy in AM 1452 on the evening of
6.3., and maintained contact until 0440. U 99, 70 and UA were detailed to
operate on the convoy, also U 37, although this boat was however, some
distance away. Only U 70 reported on request that it had come up to the
convoy. Further reports are lacking for the time being. U 70 and U 47
have not replied to their call up.
Torpedoed according to Radio Intelligence report:
at 0747 Athelbeach 6,568 tons (twice torpedoed)
at 0632 Mydrecht 7,493 tons
at 0604 Delilian 6,423 tons
Towards 2200, UA presumably contacted the same convoy in AL 3153
and reported again at 0025. U 37 requested D/F signals, and must also be
in the vicinity. No other messages have come in, but the steamer "Empire
Attendance", however, was torpedoed nearby.
According to a position report, U 99 is not in the convoy area, but
probably further to the east, where it has presumably sunk the whale
factory "Terje Viken" of 20,638 tons, which reported sinking after torpedo
attack.
U 74 intercepted a S.E. bound convoy in AE 8945 at 0246 on 8.3. U 99
was detailed to operate on this. The last message from U 74 on this
convoy was originated at 1106, presumably the boat was subsequently
forced to submerge.

At 1410 a message was received from the Fleet reporting a convoy on a
northerly course in DT 90. The Fleet units i.e. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,
are maintaining contact apparently without attacking owing to the
presence of an enemy battleship. For the boats U 124, U 105, U 106,
- 30 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
still to the north proceeding to the south, this is a particularly favorable
situation. They must be able to approach, and should, if possible, attack
the battleship in order to give our ships the chance to attack.
8.3. U 124 and U 105 report that they are up with the battleship's convoy
and U 124 later reported having sunk 5 ships of altogether 33,000 tons. In
the evening a message was received from U 106 reporting that it was still
further to the north. The battleships reported that they were withdrawing
to the west, after enemy movements were indicated from Radio
Interception reports. Contact was broken off.
262
U 74 reported the convoy putting in far to the north, attacks were not
observed.
UA reported the sinking of a steamer sailing in the convoy U 47/UA,
also considerable damage after depth-charge attack, the boat, however is
able to carry out its duties. There is no point in pursuing this convoy
further; UA and U 37 receive operational areas between 59 and 620 N.
Reports have not come in from U 70 and U 47.
On the request of the Naval War Staff, U 552 and U 95 are to be
disposed 300 seamiles northwest and southwest of the Northern Channel
as weather boats, in preparation for air attacks during the full-moon period
between 10 and 20.3; a considerable "freezing" of forces for this
subsidiary purpose.
9.3. U 74 reports having lost contact. U 74 and U 99 receive operations
areas between 59 and 620 with U 37, while UA is to be withdrawn further
to the west. For the time being therefore the operations in the north have
come to a standstill. U 70 and U 47 were again requested to send a
situation report in the evening, but without result. Both boats are causing
great anxiety, as they have not yet replied to the request made on the
evening of the 7th. There is still hope that this silence is only due to W/T
breakdown, especially in the case of U 47, which had already experienced
a breakdown on this trip.
Of the south boats, U 105 reports the sinking of a steamer of 10,000
tons. A further search with such small forces seemed pointless after the
withdrawal of the battleships. U 124, which has used most torpedoes, is to
replenish supplies from Ship 41 in position Red on 16.3; U 105 and 106
are to proceed for the time being to the Freetown area.
- 31 -
 UA was forced to begin the return passage owing to depth charge
damage; U 37 has taken over as weather boat. The fantastic position
therefore arises whereby of 4 boats stationed in the northern operational
area (U 74, 99, 37, 95) two are detailed for weather service and therefore
Date Position, Wind, Weather at a great disadvantage while one of these is even at sea without torpedoes
and Sea State, Illumination, Events exclusively for meteorological work. U 70 and 47 are not taken into
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. consideration here.

U 37 sighted 3 destroyers in its operational area.

The supplying of U 124 has been postponed to 15.3. U 105 and 106 are
to be supplied on about 25.3. It is hoped that before then at least the 13
10.3. U 147 put into Heligoland. U 552 is to start upon its return torpedoes on Ship 41 can be taken off, at present this is not possible.
passage in 48 hours. UA is to take over as weather boat.
13.3. U 98 has put out from Brunsbüttel for the operational area. U 551
An incomplete short signal giving position was picked up, but not has put into Bergen to carry out several exercises.
repeated on request. This could possibly have been originated by U 70,
more likely by U 47.
- 32 -
Reichs Minister Todt is in Lorient. In addition to previous plans, shelter
berths are to be constructed in La Pallice and the necessary permission is
to be obtained from O.K.M. For one thing these are necessary because in
the course of the summer, the repair facilities in St. Nazaire, Lorient and
Brest will be absolutely exhausted. La Pallice can provide space for the
simultaneous repair of 9 to 10 boats. Apart from this I propose the fullest
possible development of Lorient which according to experts has a capacity
of 30, Brest and St. Nazaire 20 boats each. Shelter berths are also
proposed for the NOrwegian bases Bergen and Trondheim, there are no Date Position, Wind, Weather
difficulties as regards the Organization Todt. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
11.3. It is apparent from U 147's short message that traffic proceeds
from the Minch via grid 2265 to the west. U 74 and 99, both of which are
in this area have been informed accordingly.

12.3. U 108 has put into Lorient.

263
 before putting out on operations. Otherwise nothing to report.

14.3. U 110 has received the the area between 620 30' N. and 590 N. and
between 190 and 230 W.; penetration as far as the coast of Iceland is left to
this boat.

As relief for the south weather boat U 95, presumably leaving on 15 Date Position, Wind, Weather
March. U 74 has received orders to proceed to this area and to send and Sea State, Illumination, Events
weather reports from 000 on 16th. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

15.3. I. In operational area:

a) Northwest of Northern Channel:
U 110 between 620 30' N. and 590 N. and between 190 and 230 W.
U 74 line between 610 48' N. and 600 54' N., east of 200 W.
U 99 south of this to 600 N., east of 200 W. d) Probably ready for action up to the 1st April:
U 37 between 580 N. and 600 N. and between 13 and 200 W., at the U 46, 48, 69, 551, 97, 52, 101, 73, 107, 94, 103 and U 76, recently
same time northerly weather boat. arrived from home waters.
U 95 southern half of grid AL as southerly weather boat. e) Italian U-boats:
Outward bound: In operational areas:
U 100 - AF 7580; U 98 - AN 3110 J 17 - AL 2650
On return passage: J 26 - AL 2890
UA - BE 2300; U 552 - BF 4550. J 27 - AL 6230
b) In southern area: J 23 - AL 6270
Southward bound, roughly: J 22 - AL 6810
U 105 - ES 33; U 106 - EK 71 and U 124 - ER 56; also presumably, J 19 - AL 9120
position intended for supplying. J 2 - GF 3450
c) In Lorient: U 38, 43, 52, 65, 69, 73, 93, 94, 97, 101, 103, 107, 108,
123. In Bordeaux/Pauillac:
In St. Nazaire: U 46 (proposes to put out on 15.3); U 48; U 96. U 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 20, 24, 25, 14.

Operational area assigned:

- 33 - U 100 the area between 6 and 100 W. and between 58 and 620 N.
U 147 has confirmed heavy traffic in this area, above all on the line grid
AM 3395 - AM 2265, and from here to the west.
264

U 99, in addition to the area preciously allocated, an east to west
channel 54 seamiles wide, to the north and south of it.
The Naval War Staff has announced that weather reporting by two
boats (N.W. and S.W. of the Northern Channel) will probably be necessary
up to the 20th March.
U 106 established contact with a convoy on a northerly course in grid
EK 7473 at 2110. It may be presumed, from a U-boat warning sent at
1600 in EK 7710, that an attack had already taken place. The boat
received instructions to direct U 105 (in the vicinity) to the scene of action.
Contact was maintained throughout the day.
Ship 41 reported the transfer, owing to the weather conditions, of U
124's supply area to grid ER 89.
U 110 contacted a convoy putting in in grid AE 7983, course 90
degrees at 2353.
U 46 put out of St. Nazaire for the operational area.
(signed): DÖNITZ.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
16 - 31 March 1941
PG30285
Date Position, Wind, Weather
265
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
16.3. U 552 put into St. Nazaire. The Commander carried out his first
operational trip with the new boat extremely well. Owing to numerous
torpedo failures, the total result is only two steamers of altogether 13,000
GRT.
Convoy U 106:
U 106 maintained contact until 1056. From a U-boat warning at 1700 in
EJ 69, it was conjectured that there was a least one boat in the area at this
time. U 105 reported being in the convoy area.
Convoy U 110:
U 99 requested beacon signal from contact; it is therefore in the
immediate vicinity.
U 110 temporarily lost contact between 0205 and 0405 and then
remained with the convoy until 0810 which was reported to consist of 15
ships and two destroyers. At 0830 the boat reported breakdown and
requested a relief contact boat. For the time being contact appeared to be
lost. In the meantime U 74 which was to relieve U 95 as south weather
boat, reported its position as AM 11; far to the north, therefore, and in the
vicinity of the convoy. This boat was also detailed for operations on the
convoy. The reasons for not carrying out the order to relieve U 95 will be
examined later. At present the following may be presumed to be in the
convoy area. U 110, 99, 37, 100 and 74. At 1220 U 37 sighted the enemy
in AE 8793 and sent beacon signal. At 1720 U 110 was again up to the
convoy and at 1920 U 99 reported on request that it was in contact with
the convoy. During the course of the evening a wireless message was
received from U 37, reporting having been rammed beneath the surface. It
received orders to return.
 17.3. U 48 put out of St. Nazaire for the operational area.
Italian U-boats are to be detailed temporarily for duties as weather
boats, as our own boats are lacking. On the whole, the reports received are
prompt and adequate.
Convoy U 106:
U 106 regained contact at 0700. No further messages were picked up
during the day.
In the evening further messages were received; according to these U
106 was still up to the convoy, while U 105 lost contact at 2209.
- 35 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Recent messages from the boats reporting numerous unexplained
failures, and surface runners, give rise to deep anxiety as regards the
torpedo question. The following report thus:
a) U 37, 9 unexplained misses and failures between the 8 and 10.2.
266
b) U 107, 3 unexplained failures and a surface runner between 3 and 23.2.
c) U 69, 3 unexplained failures and two surface runners between 12 and
24.2.
d) U 97,5 unexplained misses on 24.2.
e) U 73, a surface runner on 24.2.
f) U 552,7 unexplained failures on 23.2.
g) U 147, 2 unexplained misses at the end of February.
After a thorough examination of the existing battle and firing conditions
on the return of the boats, and on the grounds of my personal knowledge
of the capabilities and achievements of the Commanders, I am convinced
that for the most part the misses referred to were simply failures. The
Torpedo Inspection (Department) and Torpedo Ordnance Department have
so far given no explanation for the torpedo failures. That these failures
should suddenly appear after an uneventful six months in torpedo
situation, must in my opinion, be significant.
As all the boats concerned, with the exception of U 37, were fitted out in
home waters during the cold weather, the suspicion that the low
temperature was in some way responsible, may not be unfounded.
I requested Professor Cornelius to come to Lorient for further enquiry
and an intensive examination of the situation on the spot. Boats putting
out from home waters have received orders to maintain and check
torpedoes with particular care.
Fitting out depots have received instructions not, if possible, to give
boats torpedoes which had been exposed to extreme temperatures after
ranging. Recently received reports of successes from boats fitted out in
Lorient stress the observation that the torpedoes belonging to these boats
are in order. As a conclusion to the inquiry made by Professor Cornelius
in conjunction with the Director of Torpedoes, Lorient, a conference took
place today at which the Inspector of Torpedoes was present.
The inquiry has not resulted in an exact confirmation with regard to the
cause of the failures, however the material available was examined and put
in order, so that practical tests for the discovery and the circumventing of
the cause may be started upon. There is,
 - 36 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
however, complete agreement that torpedo failures are the cause of the
increased number of misses by U-boats from German ports, and that
B.d.U.'s conjecture that the cold had influenced this, was the most likely
explanation. The question arises whether the oil used for torpedoes is cold
resisting. B.d.U. must demand that the Torpedo Technical Department
must test the torpedo in all conditions it is likely to experience (also the
effect of cold), before it is used in action. It must not be, in this
connection, that boats in action take the initiative, after a number of
valuable enemy ships have been missed.
18.3. Convoy U 110:
At 0321 U 110 reported the convoy changing course to the SE. At 0503
the boat reported that the convoy had scattered. Contact was not
reestablished, even with a section of the convoy. The attack therefore
came to an end. Apart from U 110 which reported the sinking of two
tankers, no reports of successes were received from the boats. Radio
Intercept Service reported the torpedoing of three ships. Boats were
requested to report as soon as circumstances allow.
267
Convoy U 106:
It may be presumed from the two U-boat warnings, that at least two
attacks took place on it on 17.March. At 0203 U 106 lost contact. U 105
was also silent and was therefore probably not on the scene. In the
evening both boats received instructions to proceed to the south if they
were not in contact with the enemy.
UA has put into Lorient. One steamer of 8,000 GRT was sunk. The
Commander was forced to break off operations prematurely as the boat
sustained heavy damage in a depth charge attack and further operations
were complicated. He carried out duties well and with determination.
There was a conference - B.d.U. with the newly appointed
Fliegerführer Atlantic; KG 40 (previously operationally under B.d.U.) and
other Luftwaffe Groups for operational duties over sea are now under him.
Questions of cooperation and the form it should take in the near future
were clarified.
U 69 put out of Lorient and U 551 out of Bergen for the operational
area in the Western North Channel.
19.3. It appears from a message from U 99, picked up by U 37, that the
crew have been obliged to abandon the boat and scuttle it.
The lack of any kind of news of U 100, in spite of repeated requests,
since the passage report from the North Sea, also increases the anxiety
with regard to this boat. At the moment, I can only reckon with certainty
on three boats in the northern area.
- 37 -
 0835. U 46, outward bound in the vicinity, and the Italian boats to the
west have been informed of the enemy sighting.
U 46 gained contact with the convoy at 1100, and maintained it until
1945. None of our own boats were in the area. 4 Italian boats were
Date Position, Wind, Weather detailed for action, also several aircraft which are to be directed to the
and Sea State, Illumination, Events convoy by the boats.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
A further convoy, putting in to port, was confirmed by the Luftwaffe at
0905 in AM 4616. There are no boats available for deployment.

A third convoy was also reported by the Luftwaffe at 1130 in AM 3364.

Course 2700. An immediate U-boat operation is impossible here too.
U 76 put out of Kiel for the operational area. After repeated consultation with the Fliegerführer, an intensified air
reconnaissance was planned for the following day in the convoy area,
U 95 has put in to St. Nazaire from a long-distance voyage. which can be reached by then, while the available U-boats - 3 altogether -
Convoy U 106: are brought up, far enough to the west however, so that they are certain of
U 106 reported the sinking of three steamers of approximately 21,000 being ahead of the outward-bound convoy when the Luftwaffe
GRT from the convoy and two isolated steamers of altogether 14,316 GRT. reconnoiters the area.
U 105 regained contact with the enemy at 0240 and was again beaten off
at 0306. It may be assumed from Radio Intercept reports that it had sunk 2
steamers, including a 6,000 ton tanker. Contact was again temporarily lost - 38 -
during the day and was reestablished by U 106 at 1602. The boat reported
that a battleship of the Malaya Class was acting as escort. This lengthy
pursuit of the enemy makes it questionable whether my intention to permit
both these boats to replenish supplies from ship 41 on about 25 March can
be carried out. It is possible that by reason of insufficient fuel, the boats
could no longer return from so far south. A forewarning for the
replenishment of supplies in Culebra is therefore necessary.

A message from U 124, the first boat to take on supplies from the ship Date Position, Wind, Weather
on 15 and 17 March, has not yet been received. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Convoy U 46:
Aerial reconnaissance reported an outward-bound convoy consisting of
more than 25 ships and 6 destroyers, course 270 degrees, in AM 4649, at

268
20.3. U 97 put out of Lorient for the operational area.

U 124 reported having replenished supplies from Ship 41. The boat is
returning to the area west of Freetown as instructed.
The Commander of U 95 reports having sunk 5 steamers of altogether
33,000 GRT. Duties well and efficiently carried out, result very gratifying.
21.3. At 1201, U 69 outward bound, reported a convoy in sight in AL
8822. Easterly course. U 48 also outward bound in the vicinity was
detailed for action as were 4 returning Italian boats. It appeared possible
from the probable

Convoy U 106: - 39 -
U 106 continues to send messages at long intervals. According to this
boat the enemy deviated first in a northwesterly, later in a southwesterly
direction.
U 105 appears to have kept up with the enemy, as it reported at 2358:
"contact lost, request beacon signal".

U 46, which lost contact with its convoy the previous evening, reported
its position in the forenoon. From this it would appear not to have found
the convoy again. The Italian U-boats have presumably also passed by. Date Position, Wind, Weather
Altogether 2 FW 200s from Stavanger and 1 FW 200 from Bordeaux were and Sea State, Illumination, Events
sent out against the north-bound convoy confirmed by the Luftwaffe at Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
1130 on 19.3.
The aircraft were not able to locate it in the medium visibility. The
three U-boats brought up to action positions to the east, were left in their
positions until evening, then, when it was no longer considered possible to
intercept the convoy by day, they were ordered, together with the
remaining boats still coming up, to the following operational areas: positions of the boats that the convoy could be reached before nightfall.
a) Lines between 10 and 190 W. in the vicinity of the grids: The medium visibility reported from the area made things more difficult.
U 551 - AE 84 U 69 lost sight of the enemy at 1415, regained it temporarily at 1840,
U 74 - AE 87 reported being beaten off, and finally lost contact.
U 98 - AM 11
U 46 - AM 13 The Naval War Staff announces that from now on, only one weather
b) report from a German boat between 0200 and 0500 and from an Italian
U 110 west of Ireland as far as 250 W., research into traffic to Reykjavik. boat towards midday is necessary.
U 48 - grid AE 74 and 75 and 77 and 78.
U 69 - grid AL 12 and 14 and 21 to 24. 22.3. Convoy U 106:
269
 While both boats were still up with the convoy, U 106 reported at 0212
having expended all torpedoes below deck and at about the same time, U
105 reported only having one more stern torpedo below deck. The boats
received orders to reload torpedoes, weather permitting, and to keep up
with the convoy, or to proceed to the assembly point to replenish supplies
from the store ship. The boats reported being unable to reload.
Replenishment of supplies is planned for 29 March. Operations on this
convoy are therefore broken off. The following have been sunk according
to messages received:
U 105 - 6 steamers of altogether 41,000 GRT
U 106 - 5 steamers of altogether 36,000 GRT
A total of 11 steamers, of altogether 77,000 GRT.
An excellent performance by both boats, and an exemplary instance of
the increased possibilities, resulting from the cooperation between several
boats.
U 48 and U 69, which have apparently not regained contact with the
enemy, received orders to proceed.
U 52 has put out of Lorient for the operational area. It had to return
owing to engine trouble.
23.3. U 110 reports damage from tube prematures, which restricts
submerging. It has started upon the return passage to Lorient.
t 1238, U 97 reported a convoy in BE 2242. Southwest course. No
further messages have been received.
A japanese Naval Commission is visiting Lorient. Inspecting several U-
boats. Lecture on German U-boat warfare.
- 40 -
270
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
24.3. U 46 reported in a short message that no traffic had been observed.
The remaining three boats in the northern area, U 74, 98 and 551 were
requested to report on traffic in a short signal. U 74 and U 98 reported
absence of traffic.
No message has been received from U 551.
As, in the last few days altogether 4 convoys as well as isolated vessels
have been confirmed in the area S.W. of the Northern Channel by aircraft
and U-boats, while merely a few isolated steamers have been intercepted
in the north since 18 March, the question arises as to whether it is right to
leave the majority of the boats there. The enemy has possibly diverted his
traffic and transferred it to the south. Previous experience has shown that
a sensational transfer of merchant shipping routes is unlikely. It has been
proved time and time again, that the English stick to the same areas, in
spite of heavy losses. I therefore intend to wait another two days with an
entirely new distribution of operational areas, and extensive air
reconnaissance is to be carried out in the whole area to the north, west and
southwest of the Northern Channel, beforehand.
U 101 put out for the operational area but was forced to return owing to
engine trouble.
25.3. No message from U 551.

U 76 has had to turn back owing to technical difficulties and put into
Bergen for repairs in the evening.
Owing to the poor visibility anticipated on 26 March - the day I had
planned for the large-scale aerial reconnaissance - I have decided to order
the redispersal of the boats (intended for the 27.) for today. I am
strengthened in this decision by the consideration that it is inadvisable to
remain in an area in which heavy losses, the reason for which has not yet
been fully explained, appear to have occurred within a short period. The
following operational area are ordered:
Channels between 19 and 250 W in the vicinity of the grids:
U 48 - AE 78; U 69 - AL 22; U 74 - AL 24; U 98 - AL 26; U 46 - AL
28; U 551 - AL 02 further; U 97 - the grids AL 50 and 60.
U 73 has put out for the operational area west of the Northern Channel.
- 41 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
271
26.3. Air reconnaissance, reinforced by five aircraft, confirmed a small
heavily escorted convoy on a course of 1550, S.W. of the Faroes (AE
9857), and an isolated steamer on a course of 1450, N.E. of the Rockall
Bank (AM 1699). On the previous day another steamer was sighted in
AM 3110, while on both days no traffic was observed S.W. of the
Northern Channel. Even if this reinforced air reconnaissance is defective,
events prove that the area N. and N.W. of the Northern Channel is being
navigated.
U 76 has put into Bergen.
27.3. U 52 and U 101 put out of Lorient for operations in the area west
of the Northern Channel. In accordance with the planned extension of the
blockade area round England, I have proposed to the Naval War Staff a
considerable extension of the U-boats operational area. I do not see that
the possibility of U-boats encountering our own surface craft is an obstacle
to the extension. Experiences in this area strengthen this conviction. The
Naval War Staff have agreed.
28.3. Aerial reconnaissance has confirmed several isolated steamers on
a westerly course in the area S.W. of the Faroes to Rockall Bank.
Otherwise nothing to report.
29.3. U 48 reported a convoy on an easterly course in AE 7844. The
boat maintained contact until 1522 when presumably, owing to strong
escort encountered, either on the spot or in the vicinity, it was lost. 8
torpedo-boats were reported. The torpedoing of four steamers of
altogether 24,500 GRT was reported by Radio Intercept Service.
U 69 sighted an outward bound convoy in AL 1282 at 1254, steering
first on a west, then on a northwesterly course. The north boats received
orders to operate according to circumstances, on one of the two convoys
for the time being; all things being equal, the outward bound convoy was
to be chosen.
 I consider the escort belonging to U 48's convoy too strong for the at
present, extremely inexperienced boats.
U 69 kept up with the convoy until 1930. From wireless messages and
situation reports, it appeared that U 48 and U 46 were operating on the
convoy, U 98, on the other hand, had sheered of far to the east in an
attempt to intercept U 48's convoy. The torpedoing of an unidentified
steamer in AL 3171 reported by the Radio Intercept Service,
- 42 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
can probably be attributed to U 98.Air reconnaissance sighted another
convoy in AM 5420. Its position is still so far east, that for the time being
U-boat operations do not appear worth while. I therefore propose a
strengthened air reconnaissance for tomorrow, and to move up the two
boats in question, U 73 and U 97, to the east.
U 76 has put out of Bergen, U 94 out of Lorient, for operations in the
area west of the Northern Channel.
272
U 107 has put out of Lorient for the operational area west of Africa.
30.3. U 52 was forced to turn back owing to damage to the engines.
U 69 probably pursued its convoy longer than was implied from
wireless as, though no enemy reports were received from it after 1930
yesterday, a report of having lost contact was received at 1300 today. Also
the weather report U 98 was to have sent has not been picked up. It
appears that receiving conditions have been exceptionally poor during the
last twenty hours.
U 69 reported having broken off the chase at 2000. THe boat sank a
steamer of 7,000 GRT and had 5 failures with electrical torpedoes. U 46
sank another isolated steamer of 6,000 GRT roughly the same area. This
possibly belonged to U 69's convoy, which according to previous
experience, must have dispersed on about 250 W.
Air reconnaissance again confirmed the convoy reported on 29 March,
the U-boats U 73 and 97 stationed at a distance of about 150 seamiles
ahead however, have not approached.
Owing to very bad reception it is impossible to judge whether the boats
have heard the aircrafts bearing signals or not. The number of convoy
escort vessels was given as eight. According to another aircraft report five
destroyers, probably a chaser group, are in the vicinity. Altogether, it
appears from recent events, that there is strong convoy protection and U-
boat escort. I have therefore decided to withdraw the boats further to the
west. Even if the traffic bunching is less there, one can expect a
considerably greater freedom of movement for the boats, owing to the lack
of defence and surveillance. In any case, losses in the last month have
been so high and the reason for them so obscure, that at the moment it
appears inadvisable to remain in the area.
New operational areas assigned:
U 48 - grid AK 23 to 33
U 69 and U 98 - grid AK 26 and 36
 positions to act as check on the convoy position. No messages have been
received. There was no contact with the enemy. In the evening the boats
- 43 - received orders to occupy their operational areas. U 94 and U 101
received grid AK 02 as position, U 76 the grid AL 15.

U 98, from which no message was received for several days in spite of
repeated requests, sent a position report.

U 106 reported having carried out replenishment of supplies.

In the light of experience, especially in the case of the last convoy

Date Position, Wind, Weather reported by aircraft which was unable to remain unobserved, and the
and Sea State, Illumination, Events resulting strengthening of Fliegerführer Atlantic's conviction that an
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. unobserved shadowing is impossible with the type FW 200, I have decided
to give the aircraft in general freedom to attack. I hope in this way to
cause the enemy to report on the air attack - from which the position may
be obtained by the Radio Intercept Service.

This had in fact happened twice today, and once previously.

U 46 - grid AK 28 and 38
U 73 - grid AK 39 and AL 19
U 97 - grid AK 63 and AL 42 (Signed): DÖNITZ

31.3. Aircraft again established contact with the convoy confirmed on 29 F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
and 30.3. COnvoy position at 0930, AL 6582. The aircraft was forbidden
to attack and was to attempt to shadow unobserved. This it was unable to 1 - 15 April 1941
do, however, it was sighted by a convoy unit, which reported the convoy
position in AL 6887. The difference in fix amounted to about 70 seamiles. PG30286
It was thought that the convoy units report might very well be a reference
point, a frequent surmise. However, as a second aircraft reported the
convoy in AL 9136 at 1230, and the convoy unit reported the second
aircraft in AL 9211, this last position can be taken as certain. The first
aircraft's fix then was 70 seamiles out. U 73, U 97 and U 101 were Date Position, Wind, Weather
detailed for action. These boats were in a favorable position about 100 to and Sea State, Illumination, Events
120 seamiles ahead of the convoy. The aircraft sent bearing signals which Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
should have been picked up by the U-boats and reported with their
273
 against this convoy they would be returning to an area from which I had
withdrawn them because I suspected that anti-submarine activity there was
too strong. I do not therefore intend to attack this convoy until it is in the
vicinity of the present attack areas. Everything will thus depend on
1.4. Positions at 0800: maintaining contact. U 76 has orders to do her utmost to shadow, but not
1) Operations area W. of North Channel: to attack by day. Her main task is to keep in contact. At 1532 she reported
U 48 - square AK 22 to 33 from AE 8511 that she had lost the convoy and at 2212 added that she had
U 69 and 98 - square AK 26 to 36 been forced to dive from 1100 to 2000 by sailing vessels and trawlers. She
U 46 - square AK 28 to 38 had last seen the enemy at 1100 on a N.W. course. She is to press on.
U 74 - square AK 39 to AL 19
U 97 - On passage to square AK 63 to AL 42 - in AL 4885 U 103 left Lorient, but had to return to port owing to Diesel defects.
U 73 - On passage to AK 39 to AL 19 (in company with U 74) in AL
4835 2.4. U 48 reported that she was returning owing to fuel shortage. She
U 94 - AL 8285 - orders to steer for AK 02 still has one stern torpedo. She has so far sunk 5 steamers totaling 35,304
U 101 - AL 8115 - orders to steer for AK 02 GRT and possibly one further 6,000 tonner.
U 76 - AE 8535 - orders to steer for AL 15.
Also U 551, of whom there has been no news for some time.
2) Operations area W. of Freetown: - 45 -
U 124 - square ET
U 106 - square ER 90 on passage to ET
U 105 - square ER 80, still supplying
U 107 - on passage to square BF 75.
3) Expected to be ready for operations by April 15:
U 103, 108, 52, 38, 123, 75, 110, 65, UA, 553, 71, 93.
4) Italian boats:
In Bordeaux/La Pallice: J 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23,
25, 26, 27. Date Position, Wind, Weather
In operations areas: J 1 - square DU 17 and Sea State, Illumination, Events
J 24 - square CG 25 Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
On passage: J 1 - square BF 5890 (passage south, Cape Verde to
Freetown).

U 76 made contact with a convoy on a W. course at 0856 in square AE U 76 did not regain contact with the convoy. I then decided to use all
8535. The other boats are at least 400 miles away. If they were to operate boats in the northern area to pick it up. They were disposed in a line at
274
right angles to the convoy's presumed direction of advance, in such a way by short signal. I then intended to detail one boat to sink her, so that not
as to give the best chance of picking it up by day, assuming its speed to be more than one would be withdrawn from the pursuit of the convoy. At
between 7 and 12 knots. The attack areas are: 0810 U 46 reported that her ability to dive was restricted. Her total
U 46 - AD 7931 U 73 - AD 8747 results: 5 steamers, totaling 31,027 GRT, 3 of them from the convoy.
U 98 - AK 2227 U 97 - AK 2269
U 101 - AK 2435 U 48 - AK 3349 U 74 could not shadow any longer owing to lack of fuel. U 69 was the
U 69 - AK 3543 U 74 - AK 3597 only boat to report: am in the vicinity of the damaged ship.

Short signal from U 97: have 1/3 of my fuel stocks remaining.

Depth 10 miles.
U 73, 76, 94, 98 and 101 were therefore the only boats still available for
U 76 is to make for square AK 32. further operation. Of these, U 98 has been at sea the longest. These boats
were still under orders to pursue the convoy.
U 106 reported sinking of a 5,000 GRT steamer, U 124 that of Umona
(3,760 GRT). Both boats added situation and traffic reports, which
showed that traffic is distributed over the whole area between 200 and 280 - 46 -
W.

At 2112 U 74 sighted an inward bound convoy in AK 3588. U 69 was

nearby and requested beacon-signals. The shadowing boat was forbidden
to attack so that the others, almost all of which were near enough to reach
the convoy tonight, could be brought up. Boats which reach the convoy
are to report the fact by short signal.

3.4. Reports were received at regular intervals from U 74 until 0320 and Date Position, Wind, Weather
then stopped. U 97 was the only boat to report: "am at the convoy". At and Sea State, Illumination, Events
0336 U 74 was given permission to attack. Radio intelligence showed that Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
4 ships totaling 29,000 GRT had been torpedoed. At 0630 U 74 reported:
convoy scattered in AK 3689. 1/4 fuel stocks. No torpedoes below decks.
Damaged one 12 - 15,000 GRT steamer. Latter still proceeding at 1 knot.
This may be the S.S. Worcestershire, 11,402 GRT, reported by Radio
Intelligence as torpedoed.
U 69 was short of fuel and apparently still searching for the damaged
U 74 was ordered to shadow this ship. All other boats were to continue ship.
to operate along the convoy's mean course E. Boats which were near the
valuable damaged ship and were operating against it were to report the fact U 46, 48, 74 were on return passage.
275
 At 2123 U 94 made contact with the convoy and reported regularly.
There must have been several others in the vicinity and U 94 was therefore
forbidden to attack before 2400 or until another boat attacked. On 2.4 U
73 sank 4 ships from the convoy, totaling 30,000 GRT. She was driven off
after a hydrophone hunt.
U 52, 103, 108 left Lorient for their operations areas, U 103 south, the
other two north.
The southern boats were allocated the following attack area:
U 124 - patrolling off ET 29 south of 0830 N.
U 105 and 106 north of this and patrolling ET 25. All boats E of 200
W.
According to all reports received so far the success of the attack on the
convoy was as follows:

U 108 has special orders to attack the enemy warships which our own - 47 -
surface forces have observed in the Denmark Straits.

U 105 reported: supply carried out.

4.4. U 94 apparently lost contact at 0420. I did not think it would be

wise to let the boats press on much further; it was likely that strong anti-
submarine forces would soon arrive after 2 nights of attacks.

The boats were therefore ordered to occupy the following attack areas Date Position, Wind, Weather
if they were not actually in contact with the enemy: and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 94 - AK 23 to 33 Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 76 - AK 26 to 36
U 101 and U 69 - AK 28 to 38
U 73 and U 98 - AK 39 to AL 19
U 97 - AK 63 to 42.

Then U 94 sighted the convoy again at 0741 in AL 2731. Boats were Sunk:
ordered to make position and success reports. Their presence is known to 1. U 46 British Reliance 7,000 GRT
the enemy, and I had to know where they were in order to plan further 2. U 46 Aldenpool 4,313 GRT
operations. U 74, 48, 46 were on return passage. U 69 and 97 had very 3. U 46 ? about 6,000 GRT
little fuel and had to be counted out for further operations. 4. U 73 ?
At midday the situation was: 5. U 73 ? 30,000 GRT
U 98 - AL 2373, operating against the convoy 6. U 73 ?
U 76 - AL 2586, operating against the convoy 7. U 73 ?
U 101 - AK 66 - out of range of the convoy. 8. U 94 ? about 5,000 GRT
276
9. U 98 Welcome 5,122 GRT
10. U 98 Helle 2,467 GRT U 94 was ordered to occupy the area NW of Ireland to attack the
11. U 74 ? 20,000 GRT warships observed there. (U 108, on outward passage, has the same
12. U 74 ? orders).

12 ships 79,902 GRT Naval War Staff has ordered 2 U-boats to be sent off Rio to cover the
sailing of the minelayer Lech lying there with valuable cargo. As she will
U 74 also damaged S.S. Worcestershire, 11,402 GRT. The boats further have to leave by the end of April there are only 2 possible boats.
reported the following sinkings during the last few days, apart from the
attack on the convoy:
1. U 46 Swedish S.S. Castor 8,714 GRT - 48 -
2. U 46 ? 5,000 GRT
3. U 98 ? 8,000 GRT
4. U 76 Daphne 1,939 GRT

4 ships 23,653 GRT

In the afternoon Radio Intelligence Service reported the torpedoing of Date Position, Wind, Weather
S.S. Athenic, 5,351 GRT. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Another steamer, S.S. Brazil, 8,130 GRT, was attacked west of the
North Channel, probably by U 97.

5.4. U 69 and U 97 started on their return passage.

U 69 sank 2 ships totaling 14,500 GRT, including one tanker of 7,500 U 105 and 106 have been ordered to supply immediately from
GRT from U 74's convoy. U 97 has sunk 21,000 GRT altogether. Nordmark and then proceed south. I consider the U-boat's task of getting
the ship out is difficult and not certain to be successful. The disadvantage
The following attack areas were ordered for boats remaining in the of sending boats to this remote area lies in the fact that it means scattering
operations area: our few available forces. It means that the Freetown Groups will be
U 76 - square AD 84 to 86 broken up. There will only be one boat there (I 124) until the beginning of
U 101 - square AD 87 to 89 May. The same thing is happening at present in the northern area owing to
U 73 - square AK 31 to AL 11 the withdrawal of U 94 and U 108 for attacks on warships N.W. of Ireland.
UU 98 - AK 33 to AL 13 These tasks will probably result in less tonnage sunk and I am bound to
277
call attention to this fact, although I cannot foresee from here in how far
this will be balanced by the advantages gained if the other undertakings, - 49 -
especially that off Rio, are successful.

6.4. Nothing to report.

7.4. The G.A.F. observed a convoy in square AM 3159, course 310

degrees. I requested that reconnaissance be flown during the next few days
in order to obtain data for a later U-boat operation. It is not however
expected that this can be carried out, as the aircraft would have to take off
from Stavanger and return there and so far this has never been possible. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 52 has been allocated an attack area from square AK 33 to AL 13. U Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
98 is there at present, but is likely to leave any day now. U 552 left St.
Nazaire for the operations area W. of the North Channel.

8.4. U 94 has been ordered to make a protracted return passage as she

has only one electric torpedo left below decks. She has sunk another
5,580 GRT steamer and torpedoed a 15,000 tonner.
On the orders of Naval War Staff 2 boats have again been detailed for
weather reporting for the G.A.F.
B.d.U. had a conference in Paris with C-in-C Fleet on the possibilities
of U-boat support for battleship operations.
U 48 entered St. Nazaire.
9.4. U 107 reported 3 steamers totaling 17,000 GRT sunk.
Radio Intelligence indicates that another steamer (Duffield - 8,500
GRT) has been torpedoed and this can only be attributed to U 107.
The operations area for boats S.W. of Iceland has been extended to 340
W. owing to a report from U 94 of heavy traffic W. of the attack areas of
the other boats.
U 38 left Lorient for the southern area.
Report from the C.O. of U 48 (Lieut. (s.g.) Schulze): This officer has
made another excellent patrol, sinking 6 ships totaling 40,330 GRT.
10.4. U 123 left Lorient, U 75 Kiel, both for the NOrth Channel
operations area. U 46 and U 97 entered St. Nazaire.
Otherwise nothing to report.

U 98 started on her return passage. 11.4. U 103 has been ordered to continue south between 170 W. and 240
W. Numerous sightings of fishing vessels etc. point to a considerable
U 106 reported supply carried out. amount of enemy traffic here.

278
 Report from the C.O. of U 46 (Lieut. (j.g.) Endrass): Good patrol. The
Commanding Officer acted ably and made full use of his opportunities.
Results: 5 steamers totaling 32,340 GRT.
Report from the C.O. of U 97 (Hellmann): This young officer has
many opportunities to attack, some of which he did not understand how to
exploit. Nevertheless, the total results, 3 ships totaling 21,028 GRT, are
satisfactory for such an inexperienced boat:
U 74 entered St. Nazaire, U 69 Lorient.
12.4. U 124 reported heavy traffic. She is W. of Freetown.
U 65 left Lorient, U 95 and 96 St. Nazaire for the northern area.
Report from the C.O. of U 74 (Kentrath): This new boat carried out a
patrol the final results of which are wholly satisfactory in spite of the
difficult conditions often encountered and the Commanding Officer's lack
of experience. 3 ships totaling 14,500 tons.
Report from U 69 (Metzler): 2 ships totaling 14,500 GRT. The
Commanding Officer had no luck on this patrol. By comparison with
what the boat sighted the results are meager, due to technical defects,
torpedo failures and the fact that the Commanding Officer did not always
act for the best.
From the reports of all boats which have recently entered port it can be
seen that the idea that there was a strong patrol in the northern area was
not correct. Some of the boats encountered
- 50 -
279
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
very few patrolling forces, although of course enemy anti-submarine
activity as a whole has increased considerably as compared with 6 months
ago, especially in the coastal areas.
13.4. U 108 has orders to search the sea area W. of Iceland and report the
results.
U 105 and 106 are being detained in square FK for the present as the
expected date for the special operation is the 28th of April and the boats
must not come too close to Rio if the ban on attacks within the USA
Neutrality Zone, at present still in force, should be lifted, Naval War Staff
holds out the prospect of this within the immediate future. The boats S.W.
of Iceland have been ordered to make a traffic report so that, now that they
have been in the area for 5 days, an idea may be formed of the situation
there.
14.4. No reply was received from U 76. The remaining boats reported
medium traffic (1 ship within the last 2 days). U 101 pursued 5
independently-routed ships; apparently a convoy had dispersed in the
vicinity. U 108 reported the sinking of a 10,000-ton auxiliary cruiser. U
108 observed no other traffic. Her task is thus completed. She has been
included in the disposition of the other boats and has been allocated AD 75
and AD 86 as attack area. U 76 should be there too but she has not replied
to an order to report her position (last report from her was on April 4).
 Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 124 started on her return passage owing to fuel shortage. She has
sunk another ship (unidentified, about 7,000 GRT). The lifting of the ban
on attacks in the U.S.A. Neutrality Zone for U 105 and U 106 cannot be
counted on. Naval War Staff advised B.d.U. to carry out the operation
with one boat only. I therefore decided to withdraw U 105 back into the
area W. of Freetown. U 106 was given permission to operate outside the U 553 and U 141 left Brunsbüttel for the area west of the North
Neutrality Zone during the long time which she has to wait before the Channel.
minelayer Lech sails. She reported however that she could not do this,
apparently because of fuel and lubricating oil. The whole operation has U 98 entered Lorient. This was the first patrol both for the boat and the
miscarried. First of all it was to be carried out before the new moon (26 C.O. (Gysae). Success 4 steamers totaling 21,000 GRT, a wholly
April) and now it is not to take place until 28th April. This means a satisfactory result.
useless period of waiting for the boats which they could have spent more
profitably in the operations area off Freetown.In addition, they cannot be 15.4. U 110 left Lorient for the northern area.
given freedom to attack enemy ships outside the scope of their escort duty
for Lech, although originally assurances were received from Naval War New attack areas were ordered for boats in the northern area and on
Staff that this would be allowed.They have therefore not only been their way out:
withdrawn from a good area for several weeks, but they will have been a Patrolling E - W:
total loss to the war against merchant shipping during this time and their U 76 and U 108 - square AD 76 to AD 85
long passage will make demands on their engines which will eventually U 101 - square AD 87 to AD 89
mean a longer period repairing when they return. U 73 - square AK 31 to AL 11
U 52 - square AK 34 to AL 14
UA left Lorient for the southern area. U 552 - square AK 36 to AL 16.
Patrolling N - S:
U 96 - square AE 72 to AE 78
- 51 - U 95 - square AL 22 to AL 26.
This disposition means that the forces available at present are
concentrated considerably in the N.W. Observations of traffic however
indicate that most of the shipping is in the north. It is intended to use the
Italian boats south of our own disposition and have the area S.W. of the
North Channel, which is not covered by the boats, reconnoitered by the
G.A.F.

Date Position, Wind, Weather (signed): DÖNITZ.

and Sea State, Illumination, Events
280
 U 201, 553, 138, 141, 143, 147, 97, 66, 77, 109, 111, 556, 557.
Positions of Italian U-boats
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log J 24 - CG 5850 J 8 - AL 2940
10 - CG 8550 16 - CG 8850
16 - 30 April 1941 1 - DU 1700 3 - CF 6750

PG30287 On outward passage: J 4 - BF 6860

On return passage: J 2 - BF 7580

U 110 has ordered to occupy as attack area a strip 60 miles wide from
AL 18 to Al 61 in order to close the existing gaps between the air
Date Position, Wind, Weather reconnaissance requested (S. sector of the operations area) and the present
and Sea State, Illumination, Events U-boat disposition.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 96 reported a convoy in AL 6938, course N.W.
U 65 and 95 which were in the vicinity were ordered to operate against
the convoy.

U 103 reported a light cruiser in DU 2316, course S.W., a sign that the
16.4 Positions at 0700: English are sailing close inshore on the W. African coast.
U 76 - AD 7650 U 108 - AD 8450
101 - AD 7988 73 - AL 1113 U 96 lost contact in AL 6695.
52 - AK 3340 552 - AK 3520
123 - AK 0370 96 - AM 4750 17.4. U 107 reported the area between 240 and 280 W. north of the Cape
95 - AL 9370 65 - BE 2310 Verde Islands as favorable. She has been ordered to operate there.
94 - BE 5320 110 - BF 5490
75 - AE 9150 553 - AN 3850
141 - AN 3884 - 53 -

U 124 - ET 13 U 106 - FK 55
105 - FD 69 103 - DU 44
107 - DT 88 38 - CF 8361
UA - BF 7552

The following boats are expected to be ready for operations by 1.5:

281
 Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Naval War Staff gave ordered for the restrictions in force on the use of
weapons against neutral warships in the blockade area around England to
be abolished with immediate effect. All forces are to take unrestricted
action in this area against all warships and merchant ships. Finnish and
Russian merchant vessels are not affected.
Visit from C-in-C Navy. Inspection of the ORGANIZATION TODT
construction site.
line and on 5.3 by a patrol line. The convoy was first reported on a W.
course, but was then diverted a long way to the north and the second patrol
line, which was very favorably placed for the convoy's new course, also
failed to intercept it. These are of course only conjectures, nevertheless
the slightest possibility in this direction must be radically excluded
regardless of the disadvantages involved. I have therefore again given
orders within the U-boat Arm that the number of persons having
knowledge of U-boat operations is to be kept as small as possible. For the
same reason I have forbidden the daily position reports to Group
Command West, G.O.C. Atlantic Air Forces, and Naval Liaison Officer
Bordeaux. On the orders of C-in-C Navy stations outside the U-boat Arm
which may use the U-boat wave have been restricted to the essential. This
will exclude listening-in on the U-boat wave by unauthorized persons. All
stations which have to cover the U-boat wave for operational or radio
technical reasons have been informed of the suspicion and have been
ordered by C-in-C Navy to

U 147 sailed from Brunsbüttel.

- 54 -
18.4. U 108 reported: No traffic. She has been given a strip 60 miles
wide from AD 85 to AE 47 as attack area.

U 96 has been ordered to concentrate in the northern half of her attack

areas. I want to get an exact idea of the area immediately off the coast of
Iceland.

U 94 entered Lorient.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 94 has at times encountered N - S traffic in squares AD 76 and AD and Sea State, Illumination, Events
79, outside her attack area. U 101 made the same observation in almost Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
the same area, also outside her allocated attack area. The impression is
given that the English traffic is being deliberately routed to avoid the
attacking disposition. It is therefore suspected that by some means the
enemy has obtained information of our attack areas. This may also explain
the failure of the convoy operation on 4.3. in cooperation with the G.A.F.
The convoy was to have been picked up that same day by a reconnaissance
282
 observe strict security measures and limit the number of persons 21.4. U 107 reported no traffic N.W. of the Cape Verde Islands. UA has
involved. In addition Supreme Command of the Navy have approved my started on her return passage because of damaged steering gear.
request for the introduction of a special U-boat cipher. The boats have
been ordered to the following new attack areas:
1) 60 - mile - wide strips: - 55 -
U 108 from AD 52 to AE 71
123 from AD 57 to AD 86
65 from AD 75 to AK 22
110 from AL 02 to AL 69
2) Patrolling E - W:
U 96 from AE 72 to AE 81
95 from AE 76 to AE 85
52 from AE 78 to AE 87
552 from AL 21 to AL 31 Date Position, Wind, Weather
3) U 101 squares AL 23 to 28. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

U 75 - AK 36 and 38 and 03 and AL 15 and 17 and 19.

This disposition is intended to intercept traffic E - W in the northern
sector of the operations area and/or off the Icelandic coast. By extending
the disposition south I want to continue to cover the central sector of the
operations area, which is not covered by air reconnaissance, and be able to
operate against any convoys reported by the boats.
19.4. U 103 and U 38 reported no traffic in the area off of the African
coast. The Intelligence Service had reported single-ship traffic there.
According to dead reckoning, U 105 may have arrived back in the
Freetown area.
20.4. U 73 reported that she had sunk EMPIRE ENDURANCE on her
return passage in AL 84.
U 124 reported no traffic in the Canary Islands area.
U 553 left Bergen.
The traffic situation in the northern area is unsatisfactory. Although
there are more than the average number of boats there, little is being
sighted. The bad weather and poor visibility cannot be the only cause.
There must be less traffic. I therefore intend to narrow the disposition so
that the boats can cover smaller area more thoroughly. I have detailed 3
boats for the SW-bound traffic from and to the North Channel which has
recently been observed by boats on their way out and back. U 553 is to
join these 3 later. There are Italian U-boats flanking this disposition. I
want to continue to concentrate our own boats in the north so as to make
effective use of the increased air reconnaissance (3 Condors and 3 HE 111
simultaneously) which is to start in this area on 24 or 25.4.
I have also now got 1 or 2 small boats in the area between the Faroes,
Shetlands and Herbrides, which will be increased t 4 later on, and which

283
may be able to cooperate with the U-boats in the north. The boats have
been given the following attack areas:
U 96 - AE 73 U 123 - AL 33
95 - AE 84 65 - AL 36
52 - AE 79 75 - AL 54
552 - AL 32 110 - AL 58
101 - AL 91
They are to concentrate in the centers of the squares ordered.
U 108 - 60 mile wide strip from AD 31 to AD 51
U 147 - AM 31 and 33 and 35 upper and center thirds
U 107 reported one ship sunk, probably the English S.S. CALCHAS
(10,305 tons), mentioned by Radio Intelligence.
22.4. Boats in the northern area have received orders to make no radio
signals, including short signals, except those of tactical importance.
U 105 reported from the area W. of Freetown that she had seen nothing
for 4 days.
J 9, on her way to her operations area, reported an inward-bound
convoy in AL 9750, 8 knots, course 250.
U 110 was ordered to attack.
U 101 was ordered to operate against the convoy.
As J 9 unfortunately made no further shadower's reports and U 101
reported that she could not operate against the convoy, U 110 was ordered
to continue to operate in the direction of the convoy's supposed advance,
as air reconnaissance was to be flown against it on 23.4.
- 56 -
284
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 553 has been given AL 51 as attack area.
U 201 left Kiel.
In connection with the transfer of FW 200's to Stavanger, 3 FW 200's
are flying from Bordeaux to Stavanger on 23.4.
23.4. J 9 reported a second convoy in AL 8856, course 2700, speed 13
knots. With the boats' present positions an operation would be hopeless
owing to the high speed of the convoy.
U 95 reported a convoy on a N.W. course in AE 8852, but lost contact.
She was ordered to press on and to report the weather. All boats N. of 580
N. (except U 147) were ordered to operate against the convoy. They were
informed that, if no contact was made by evening, it was intended to form
a patrol line AM on 24.4 from approximately AE 78 to AE 72, so that they
could conduct their operations accordingly.
Air reconnaissance SW of Ireland brought no results. U 95 reported at
1844 that what she reported as a convoy was no convoy, but 6 patrol
vessels. Thus, the whole of today's operations were in vain. Boats were
allocated the following attack areas:
U 95, 52 and 55 to form a patrol line from AE 8985 to AM 1355, depth
20 miles, at cruising speed.
 U 108 - AE 79 U 110 - AL 91
553 - AL 54 101 - AL 95
75 - AL 58
25.4. U 147 reported that she had seen 2 ships and 3 destroyers in AM
Remaining boats to occupy their previous attack areas. 3358. U 103 reported: 1 ship sunk.

24.4. U 108 reported no traffic in the area SW of Iceland. No further reports were received from U 95 on yesterday's convoy.

U 38 reported no traffic off the W. African coast. U 553 is returning owing to engine defects.

U 138 entered Bergen because of engine trouble. The C.O. of U 73 made his report: a well-executed, successful patrol.

U 103 and 105 were ordered to operate against traffic bound for
Freetown from the S.W.
U 95 reported a small convoy (4 ships) with 2 destroyers in AE 3677,
course 2900. She was given permission to attack and ordered to make
shadower's reports, but she lost sight of the convoy at 1959 in AE 8596.
U 73 entered Lorient.
- 57 -
26.4. U 95 reported that she had seen 2 large fast steamers escorted by 2
destroyers in AE 8728. There is a noticeable recurrence of small, heavily
escorted groups of steamers.
U 96 reported no traffic off the south coast of Iceland, only patrol. Air
reconnaissance reported considerable warship activity in AM 2666. The
following attack area were ordered:
U 147 - AM 33 southern half and AM 35 upper and center thirds.
U 143 - Am 33 northern half and AM 31
U 95 - AE 89
U 96 - AM 12
U 552 - AM 13
U 123 - the area N.W. of these attack areas as far as 200 W.
Now that U 108 has left, having sighted nothing recently W. of
Reykjavik, the most northerly area off Iceland is unoccupied. U 96 also
sighted nothing there.

Boats have been concentrated in the area to be covered by air

reconnaissance taking off from Stavanger, in order to make another
Date Position, Wind, Weather attempt at direct cooperation. Owing to unforeseen technical difficulties,
and Sea State, Illumination, Events however, the reinforced air reconnaissance, which should have started on
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. 25.4., will be delayed.

UA entered Lorient.
285
 Visit from LUTZE, Chief of Staff, SA.
27.4. U 52 reported from AE 68 that she had sighted nothing since 14.4
and had sunk 2 ships (including VILLE DE LIEGE) totaling 14,4430 GRT.
She is returning home.
- 58 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Air reconnaissance was started today with 2 FW 200. Both aircraft
were damaged on their outward flight while attacking a ship, so that they
had to break off. The reconnaissance was thus practically useless, the
aircraft did not act in accordance with instructions. Tomorrow, it is
intended to fly reconnaissance of the area between Iceland and 580 N.
Boats in this area have been informed accordingly.
U 201 put into Bergen to repair her gyro.
U 38 has been allocated ET 10 and ET 20 as attack area concentrating
on traffic leaving Freetown.
286
28.4. U 123 made contact at 0106 with an inward-bound convoy in AL
2326 and reported at 0204 that she had been driven off. She regained
contact at 0728 in AL 3313. The situation was fairly favorable for the
other boats. Radio message to U 123: attack permitted, continue to
shadow.
All boats N. of 580 N are to operate against the convoy.
U 147 and 143 to remain in their attack areas.
Air reconnaissance was requested for the area in which the convoy had
been reported. The aircraft sighted various groups of destroyers and a
convoy in AE 8932. It consisted of 5 ships, strongly escorted, and was
inward-bound. U 143 was informed accordingly. The reconnaissance
aircraft did not on the other hand succeed in picking up U 123's convoy,
which proves how inadequate a reconnaissance with few aircraft is even
against a reported target.
U 123 made regular shadower's reports, but was driven off at 1407. U
96 took over and reported the convoy in AL 3426 at 1740, but must then
have been forced to dive, as no further reports were received.
As no further reports were received on the northern convoy I ordered the
boats to continue operating along the probable route and informed them
that air reconnaissance would be flown at 0900/29/4.
U 75 reported 2 W-bound steamers in AL 4867. She was ordered to
attack and to shadow, as U 108 should be in the vicinity.
Shadower's reports continued to come in from U 75.
- 59 -
 U 75 reported that she had sunk S.S. CITY OF NAGPUR, 10,146 tons,
in AL 7421.

U 106 reported: LECH encountered.

U 201 and 141 left Bergen.

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events 30.4. U 552 reported sinking BEACON GRANGE (10,119 tons) and an
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. 8,000 ton tanker in AM 2477.

U 110 was allocated an attack area from AL 52 to AM 71, U 75 from AL

48 to AL 98, both in strips 100 miles wide. This will at least provide some
reconnaissance of the approach to the North Channel from the S.W.

29.4. No boat made contact with the convoy by 0400. I therefore Air reconnaissance sighted nothing but odd merchant ships.
ordered U 123, 95, 552, 65 and 96 to form a patrol line by 0900 from AM
1265 to 1495, depth 10 miles. U 107 reported from the southern area that she had sunk CALCHAS,
10, 305 tons, in DT 42 and LASELL, 7,417 tons, in EH 93.
As the convoy was not picked up either by this patrol line or air
reconnaissance, boats were ordered at 1400 to form a patrol line from AM
2616 to AM 2759 at cruising speed, in one more attempt to intercept the (Signed): DÖNITZ.
convoy on its course for the North Channel (last reported as 1100). Air
reconnaissance was again requested for the evening.

This also failed to lead to success. In order to take account of the last F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
possibility, i.e. that the convoy had not yet reached this patrol line, I
ordered the boats to proceed west from 2400 from the positions that had 1 - 15 May 1941
then reached. If this also failed, they were to proceed to the following
attack areas at 0600/30/5. PG30288
U 123 - AL 23 to AL 34.
95 - L 25 to AL 36
65 - AL 27 to AL 38
96 - AL 29 to AL 03
U 552 freedom of action, as she will presumably have to return very Date Position, Wind, Weather
soon. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
287
 - 61 -

1.5. The following are in position west of the North Channel:

U 123 from AL 23 to AL 34
95 25 36
65 27 38
96 29 03
110 52 AM 71
75 48 AL 98
Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 143 square AM 31 and upper half right of AM 33. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 147 square AM 33 south half and AM 35, upper and middle third. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
On return passage: U 108 in Be 62
U 101 in BF 41
U 553 in BF 54
On outward passage: U 94 in BF 41
In the area of the Shetlands: U 141 and U 201.
U 38 in ET 13 On outward passage: J 20 putting out of La Pallice.
U 103 in ET 29
U 107 in EH 93 At 1630 air reconnaissance reported an outgoing convoy in AM 2271,
U 105 in ES 54 course 3100. Orders were given to U 123, U 95, U 65, U 96 to form a
U 106 in GB 38 patrol line from AE 8725 to AL 3285. Air reconnaissance was requested
J 4 in AL 1990 for 2 May, concentrating on the suspected position of the convoy. U 141
J 6 on passage into new operational area, AK 58 to AK 67 and AK 82 to reported from this area N.W. of the Herbrides heavy patrol by aircraft and
AK 91 naval vessels. She was assigned to the area W. of the North Channel, E. of
J 9 on passage into new operational area AK 39 to AL 19 and AK 65 to 110 W., for attack
AL 44.
J 3 in DT 63 U 98 put out of Lorient.
On return passage: J 1 in DT 96 U 97 put out of Kiel.
J 10 in CG 27 U 556 put out of Kiel.
J 8 in AL 98. U 124 put into Lorient.

288
 It was established that the air reconnaissance operating on 29 April on
the convoy of U 123 could not be carried out, since the machine intended
for this area was shot down before reaching the suspected convoy position.
2.5. Air reconnaissance operated on the reported convoy with 3 FW 200
and 1 HE 111, but made no contact. Further operations against this
convoy, therefore, are hopeless. The boats have been assigned new attack
areas as N.S. patrol line N. of 56 degrees in the following squares:
U 201 - AL 15
U 94 - AL 16
U 65 - AL 25
U 123 - AL 26
U 95 - AL 35
U 96 - AL 36
Naval War Staff have asked whether U 106 can effect escort of the
vessel "Winduk"out of Santos. After enquiry from the boat she has been
ordered to take up position on the 5th May in GA 37 in order to carry out
this second escort operation. Refuelling has been ordered for U 107 and U
105 for the 3rd May from "Nordmark", for the 9th May from "Egerland" at
Point Red.
3.5. U 123 reported starting on return passage. U 110 has been assigned
her operational area (N.S. patrol N. of 560 in AL 26), since
- 62 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
289
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
she reported, on enquiry, that the traffic situation in her present
operational area (AL 52 to AM 71) was unfavorable.
U 552 reported heavy traffic and strong escorts in AM 52 to AM 43.
She sank in this area the vessel "Nerissa" (5,583 tons).
At 2050 U 143 contacted a convoy in AM 3137. The course given -
2200 was considered very unlikely, however, it was confirmed once more
by the boat upon enquiry. U 141 and U 147 were ordered to operate
against the convoy. Towards 0100 U 143 reported contact lost.
U 93 put out from Lorient.
U 106 reported escort operation carried out.
The Commanding Officer of U 124 (Lt. Wilhelm Schulz) came in to
give his report. The boat had been operating in the west African area and
in the Freetown area, and encountered a great deal of traffic. The
Commanding Officer carried out the operation efficiently and with
success. He sank 12 ships, 64,300 tons.
4.5. The aircraft reconnaissance operating on the convoy of U 143 had
no success. The other boats also did not approach the convoy. Only single
merchant ships and warships were sighted.
U 96 contacted in AE 8457 a convoy with course E. She was ordered
to attack. U 143 and U 147 were to operate against the reported convoy, U
141 and other boats likewise, if their position was favorable. Air
reconnaissance was requested for the 5th MAy, concentrating on the
reported convoy.
The Commanding Officer of U 108 (Lt. Scholtz) came in to give his
report. She pursued tenaciously and finally sank the auxiliary cruiser
"Rajputana" (16,644 tons). The boat had been for a long time on the west
coast of Iceland and off Reykjavik but observed no traffic apart from
fishing vessels.
The Commanding Officer of U 101 (Lt. Mengersen) came in to give his
report. The operation was unsuccessful owing to unlucky circumstances,
engine trouble and bad weather.
5.5. U 96 gave further reports of contact until 0545 in AE 8572. Since,
during the day, no boat contacted the reported convoy, boats operating
against this convoy were ordered to return to their former operational S.W.
of the Faroes, with no limitation, in order to give them more freedom in
this area if escorts were strong. U 75 was assigned to operational area S.
of 560 N, no limitation. U 97 was assigned, as operational area, a N.S.
patrol line N. of 560 N. in AK 36, i.e. in the area of the other boats.
U 69 and U 98 put out from Lorient, U 111 from Wilhelmshaven.
- 63 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
290
U 105 and U 107 reported having carried out refuelling from
"Nordmark" in the vicinity of Point Red. Since U 105 had only fired one
torpedo, she again proceeded into the area off Freetown, and will proceed
subsequently to Lorient. U 107 has only one torpedo left, is to refuel on
the 9th May from "Egerland", waiting therefore in the vicinity of Point
Red. U 105 reported having sunk the vessel "Ena de Larrinaga" (5,200
tons) on the 5th April in FD 16.
The Naval War Staff informed me that the "Windhuk" could not be
expected to leave Santos on the 5th of May. U 106 was, therefore, ordered
to return for refuelling to Point Red.
According to an intercept message the British vessel "Suret" (5,529
tons) was torpedoed in ET 29.
The Commanding Officer of U 553 (Lt. Thurmann) came in to give his
report: The patrol had to be broken off owing to engine trouble. The boat
sighted no enemy ships en route from Norway around the Faroes to St.
Nazaire.
6.5. For boats U 95, 96, 65 and 110 operational area have been extended
to the S. up to 510 N.
Experiences and observations just lately have led to the following
conclusions:
1) Enemy traffic scatters up to about 250 W over the whole Iceland area
up to a line North Channel - Porcupine Bank, and further to the S.W. It is
assumed that approximately between 250 and 300 W. there is the greatest
spread on the whole route from America to England, while the greatest
concentration in the west is approximately in the area of the
Newfoundland Bank, in the east directly off the North Channel and the
Faroe-Herbrides Passage.
There is as yet no indication that a part of the traffic takes the route north
of Iceland.
2) Scattering of traffic according to plan has not been observed up to now.
Traffic has been observed always in the whole area south of Iceland up to
approximately 500. Intensification of traffic, however, has been observed
in the north at times.
3) In the operational area defence and escort by sea and air forces has been
observed to an increasing degree, intensified in view of the increasing
hours of daylight. These defence measures have resulted in boats being
driven off in various cases even though they managed to approach the
convoy, and not being able to guide other boats which, apart from this,
were themselves hindered in their movements by air cover. There have,
therefore, been no great successes. No substantial result can be obtained
with individual chance successes.
- 64 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
291
4) Attempts at direct cooperation with the Air Force have been
disappointing. In no case has it been possible, with their aid, to guide U-
boats on to the enemy. The reasons for this are to be attributed to the
inaccuracy in fixes by the aircraft, their low endurance and consequently
short time of maintaining contact.
5) Little support can be expected from the Italian boats. In spite of
attempts to increase their abilities by constant influence, taking Italian
Commanding Officers along on operational boats and training in the
Baltic, they still remain unsatisfactory. They sight nothing, report nothing
or report too late, and their tactical knowledge is practically nil. Taking
into consideration these points, new methods must be tried to achieve
success. It is necessary to search out an area where traffic is less
concentrated. This may occur in the east - nearer under the coast - and in
the west. The disadvantage against the east, however, is that here defence
measures are stronger and the U-boat is therefore more restricted, and that
operations against incoming convoys by several boats is quite impossible
owing to the proximity of the land.
On the other hand, towards the west defence decreases. Scattering of
traffic is at least no greater, in fact it may be expected to be less already at
approximately 350 than in the present operational area, while the expanse
of the area and the scanty defence allows of free operations.
I have, therefore, decided that boats which have just put out and those
putting out next, will proceed approximately into square AK to the S.W.
border of the operational area. The boats concerned are U 93, 94, 97, 98,
201 and 556, later U 109 and 111 from home waters and U 43 and 74 from
French bases.
The work of aircraft reconnaissance will remain general reconnaissance
of traffic in the areas near England, which can at least give a survey of the
areas used while direct co-operation is not possible. In view of the
unfavorable experiences in the last few months, it is possible also to do
without close co-operation.
The air reconnaissance will be made partly from Stavanger and partly in
flights from Bordeaux to Stavanger and vice versa. This will be settled in
discussions with the Air Corps, Atlantic.
 The Italians will be assigned an area between 470 30' and 530 N and 150
- 250 W. Here they cannot adversely affect the area of our own operations,
and on the other hand, even if they are only sighted without achieving any
success, they may help by diverting traffic into the area of our own boats.
Apart from this, they will operate, as they wish very much to do, with our
own boats west of Gibraltar.
Air reconnaissance reported at 0830 an incoming convoy in AL 3425,
course 1200. Shortly after, a second aircraft reported a convoy in AM
1275. (Difference in fix 100 miles).
- 65 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Both reports were almost completely the same as regards the strength of
the convoy, course and escorts, so that it was assumed that they concerned
the same convoy.
292
Information was obtained from an intercept message that a convoy was
in AL 3261 at 1700. In view of the experiences with fix inaccuracy on the
part of aircraft, this position was given to the boats as the most likely one.
At 1530 (only after landing) an aircraft reported having sighted a convoy
in AL 3159, course S.W. at 0730. Nothing can be done with regard to this.
U 141 reported returning owing to engine trouble caused by enemy
action.
U 552 put into St. Nazaire.
U 105 was assigned to operational area W. of Freetown. SHe reported
having sunk in ES 4449 the vessel "Oakdene" (4,225 tons).
7.5. The boats were informed that air reconnaissance had sighted at
0920 in AE 9438 a convoy, course 1800.
U 95 reported at 1040 a convoy in AM 2732, course 1200. Boats could
not be sent in to operate owing to the easterly position of the convoy.
At 2118 U 94 reported a convoy in AE 7772 with course N.W. She was
ordered to attack if possible, if not to report contact.
This frequency of reports on convoys and sightings in the last few days
(air reconnaissance has also reported much traffic, even though this could
not be exploited by U-boats) is significant.
As the boats are not in a really different operational area nor has air
reconnaissance been intensified, I am more than ever convinced that in
April there was a certain curtailment of traffic.
U 106 requested refuelling on the 16th of May owing to fuel shortage
and engine trouble.
The Commanding Officer of U 552 (LT. Topp) came in to give his
report. This was a very hard operation, pluckily carried out. The
Commanding Officer utilized all his opportunities. He reported very
heavy defence and aircraft patrol west of the North Channel. Sunk: 3
vessels and 1 escort, 24,319 tons.
8.5. U 94 reported having sunk, during a daylight attack, 4 vessels -
26,000 tons. She was pursued and depth-charged. Contact was lost in AD
8966. Among these 4 vessels there were probably the "Eastern Star"
(5,658 tons) and "Jxion" (10,263 tons) reported by intercept messages to
have been sunk in AE 7741.
- 66 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Air reconnaissance reported at 1000 a convoy in AM 4551, course 900.
Nothing could be done with regard to this, owing to great proximity to the
North Channel.
I am moving the operational area of the northern boats to the west for
reasons fully set out on the 6th May.
293
The following boats will be given new operational areas, spacing 20
miles:
U 94 - AK 1715; U 556 - AK 1815; U 201 - AK 1935; U 97 - AK
0135; U 93 - AK 5135; U 98 - AK 5315.
The boats are to leave their former areas in such a way that the new
areas are reached at the same time on the morning of the 12th MAy. Radio
silence is to be observed, except for important tactical messages. This
group will be termed the "West Group".
U 97 sank 13,000 tons and torpedoed a Q ship. Position BD 5536.
At 2203 U 110 contacted a convoy in AD 8752, course west, speed 7
knots. She was ordered to attack if possible and if not, to give reports of
contact. Other boats operating against the convoy were ordered to report
position by means of a short signal.
U 74 put out from St. Nazaire.
THe question of safety in carrying out refueling in mid-Atlantic was
again raised by the sighting of an enemy aircraft carrier by an Italian U-
boat south of Cape Verden. I have come to the conclusion that it is quite
possible that such supply points might be discovered by an aircraft and
have, therefore, ordered that refuelling be effected only by night.
9.5. U 110 gave a further report of contact, according to which the
convoy was in AD 8788.
U 201 and U 556 gave their positions in AD 8752, and AL 11, i.e. that
they were operating against the convoy. U 210 also reported having sunk
in AL 3160 on the 3rd May the damaged (probably by U 552) tanker
"Capulet" (8,109 tons).
Since U 110 had moved far to the N.W., in view of this convoy
operation, she was ordered to join the West Group and was assigned as
operational area AK 1525, spacing 20 miles.
 According to an intercept message the following vessels were torpedoed
from the convoy of U 110: U 93 and U 98 have been ordered to continue their passage into new
Vessel "Empire Caribou" - (4,861 tons)? operational areas so that they may be reached as ordered if no contact with
"Gregalia" - (5,802 tons) the enemy is made until then.
"Esmond" - (4,976 tons)
"Bengore Head" - (2,609 tons) U 94 made contact at 1125 in AL 1284 with a convoy, course N.W.,
speed 10 knots. She was ordered to maintain contact, and given freedom
of attack. At 1321 she reported from AL 1282: "Am being driven off".

- 67 - In order to avoid mistakes and doubts, the boats of Group West were
reminded that operations on a target intercepted by U-boats, in this case
against the convoy of U 110 and U 94, has precedence over taking up the
ordered operational areas at the right time.

U 95 reported from AL 9246 return passage, vessel "Taranger" (4,873

tons) sunk.

Return passage: U 143, U 147 (both to Bergen) and U 75.

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events 10.5. U 556 reported at 0444 in AK 1490 a convoy, course 2100. She
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. was ordered to attack if possible, if not to maintain contact. She later
reported that the convoy has dispersed and she had sunk 3 vessels, 20,000
tons and 1 escort.

U 75 reported from AM 7250 no traffic since 28th April. "City of

Air reconnaissance reported at 0715 a convoy in AL 6674, course 2500.
The boats were informed accordingly.
U 123 reported from BE 29 having sunk the vessel "Venezuela" as a
result of operations.
In view of operations by the boats on the last enemy reports and the
departure of the "West Group" the operational areas ordered , N.S. patrol
line W. of the North Channel, have become superfluous. I have, therefore,
ordered U 95, 96 and 65 to operate without limitation off N.W. England.
294
Nagpur" (10,146 tons) sunk.
U 201 sank 2 ships, 18,000 tons, from the convoy of U 110. Strong
escort. This convoy, first reported by U 94 then by U 110, was therefore
attacked also by U 201 and U 556. From reports by the boats and
according to intercept reports, the following sinkings are confirmed.
U 94 - 4 vessels 20,000 tons.
U 201 - 2 vessels 18,000 tons.
U 556 - 3 vessels 20,000 tons.
Through intercept service (probably U 110) 18,248 tons.
76,248 tons.
 concentration of shipping is as large as possible and to remain there, is,
therefore, again confirmed as correct.
U 147 reported from AN 1143 having sunk 1 vessel (3,000 tons). The
boat is proceeding to Bergen. U 110 gave no report of position as requested. She must be considered
lost.

- 68 - 11.5. Air reconnaissance detected the following convoys in the course of

the day:
1) An outward-bound convoy in AE 8788.
2) An incoming convoy in AL 6636.
3) A formation consisting of a battlecruiser, two cruisers, three destroyers
and 1 transport in AL 0372, course 240 degrees. The boats were informed
accordingly.

Date Position, Wind, Weather U 201 contacted convoy in AK 1864, course southwest. She was
and Sea State, Illumination, Events ordered to attack as soon as other boats had approached, or in the dark.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. The other boats of the "West" Group were ordered to operate against the
convoy.
At 1845 U 201 reported the convoy in AK 1849 and at 2300 in AK
1767. COntact lost owing to fog.

U 74 contacted in BE 51 a south-bound convoy. She was given

An Italian U-boat (J-15) contacted at 0545 a South-bound convoy in AL permission to attack but reported at 1930 from BE 54 pursuit broken off
9735, but later last contact. owing to the weather.

At 1400 air reconnaissance sighted in AM 1239 an outward-bound U 147 put into Bergen.
convoy.
U 107 reported refuelling carried out.
From all these reports it must be concluded that the enemy does not
keep to certain convoy routes but proceeds anywhere and scatters traffic. U 123 and U 141 put into Lorient.
It has also been confirmed once more that he does not on principle avoid
areas in which sinkings have been made by U-boats. 12.5. An Italian U-boat reported 3 vessels, escorted by destroyers, in AL
On the contrary, he may even reckon on the boats leaving these areas in 4251, course 900. However, she soon lost contact again.
the meantime. The decision to have the boats proceed into an area where

295
 - 69 - The Commanding Officer of U 141 (Lt. Schuler) came in to give his
report: The boat and Commanding Officer were on their first independent
operation. The boat gathered important experiences in the very heavily
patrolled areas west of the North Channel, but did not have any success.
The operation had to be broken off prematurely in view of engine damage
through aircraft bombs.

14.5. Air reconnaissance reported at 0820 a convoy in AM 4268, course

2300. The Italian boats are in a favorable position to this direction of
Date Position, Wind, Weather advance. They will be sent out from Bordeaux. For the 15th May further
and Sea State, Illumination, Events air reconnaissance has been requested on this convoy. Since I anticipate
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. less defense west of the present operational area of the Western boats, and
heavier concentration of traffic can be expected and since approach from
the bases is not substantially further than to the present positions, I have
ordered the Western boats to take up new operational areas in direction
2150, 240 miles from the former operational areas. Since the boats are
now outside the blockade area and there is a possibility of encountering
U 69 reported from the area north of Cape Verden: No traffic. enemy merchant vessels in neutral convoy, the boats have been ordered,
following on discussions with the Naval War Staff, to proceed according to
Nothing further to report. Standing War Orders and the following:
1) Only attack warships proceeding alone and as escort protection, if
13.5. For boats coming newly into the operational area, the following they are definitely recognized to be enemy vessels or when they are
operational areas are ordered: blacked-out or begin an engagement.
U 111 - AK 1525; U 109 - AK 5535; U 74 - AK 6415; Spacing 20 2) Enemy merchant vessels in neutral convoy may be attacked without
miles. warning.
3) Only attack merchant vessels recognized to be neutral ones if under
U 111 reported having sunk a ship. enemy escort or when supporting enemy measures, however not when in
neutral convoy.
U 557 and U 66 put out from Kiel.

The Commanding Officer of U 123 (Lt. Moehle) came in to give his

report: The boat did not have any great success on this operation owing to
scarcity of traffic. Operations on the convoy on the 28th April also were - 70 -
unsuccessful owing to defensive measures.

296

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The Commanding Officer of U 95 (Lt. Schreiber) came in to give his
report: Nothing special to remark regarding the operation. Sank 1 vessel
of 4,800 tons.
The Commanding Officer of U 75 (Lt. Ringelmann) came in to give his
report: The boat and Commanding Officer were on their first enemy
operation. The Commanding Officer sank, after a lengthy and tenacious
pursuit, a vessel of 10,146 tons.
15.5. Several Italian boats contacted the convoy reported on the 14th
May by air reconnaissance. The Air Corps, Atlantic, sent out several
machines to attack during the evening. Aircraft, however, did not find the
convoy again. The Italian boats also lost contact towards evening.
U 98 reported having sunk a British auxiliary cruiser of 20,000 tons, on
the 13th May in AJ 3825.
U 138 has been assigned operational area N.W. of the Herbrides, no
limits.
U 43 has been assigned operational area AK 4774, spacing 20 miles.
U 201 reported returning, owing to a trace of oil. 26,000 tons sunk.
297
The Italian Flag Officer commanding U-boats in the Atlantic, Admiral
Parona, came for discussions in Kernevel.
The Italian U-boats will be assigned, as laid down on the 6th May the
following:
a) Area west of Gibraltar.
b) Area between 150 and 280 W and between 470 30" and 550 N.
In addition, they will be permitted to operate also North of the area
under b), and in the Freetown area, according to an earlier agreement. In
view of Communication 1, Naval War Staff Group Command 9648 of the
10th May, however, they were informed that they could not be permitted to
operate in the Cape Town area as anticipated by them. Subsequently the
Italians were given permission to operate south of 470 30' eastward of 250
with the understanding that they might only attack convoys in this area
(prize route).
I based these measures on the following facts to the Italian Flag Officer
commanding U-boats.
1) The traffic situation seems to indicate two main lines in the northern
operational area: that to the west and that to the south.
2) With numbers of boats increasing and for general reasons it seems
practical to operate in one area only with boats of one nationality.
- 71 -
 Date Position, Wind, Weather 16.5. West Group boats are in the following positions:
and Sea State, Illumination, Events U 111 AJ 6386
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. U 94 AJ 6678
U 556 AK 4487
U 97 AK 4876
U 93 AK 7275
U 98 AK 7385
U 74 AK 8486
3) The Mediterranean is becoming increasingly important. Intensified U 109 AK 8312
operations against the Straits of Gibraltar, therefore, are called for.

The following are west of the North Channel:

U 65 AL 2848
U 96 AL 6346

(signed): DÖNITZ.
In the area S.W. of the Faroes:
U 138 AE 9775

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

Outward bound:
16 - 31 May 1941 U 43 BE 7585
U 46 BF 5499
PG30289

On return passage:
U 201 BE 2365

Date Position, Wind, Weather

and Sea State, Illumination, Events In the southern area, off Freetown:
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. U 107 EJ 74
U 105 ET 49

In the supply area:

U 106 ER 53
298
 U 38 ES 44
U 103 ER 39

On passage to operations area:

UA DS 63 Immediate action is permitted outside the blockade area:
U 69 EJ 41 1) In accordance with Standing war Order No. 101 paragraph II 4 b - d
and 5.
2) Against enemy merchant ships in neutral convoy. Warships sailing
4 Italian boats (J 11, J 15, J 6, J 25) in patrol line from BE 1525 to BE outside the blockade area, independent or as convoy escort, are only to be
2415. attacked if they are identified as enemy for certain or if darkened or if they
On return passage: take action first.
J 20 BE 2865
J 4 BF 4699

U 105 reported as sunk:

From the southern area: "Benwrakie" (6,434 tons) FD 36
J 3 CG 44 "Bienvenue" (5,920 tons) ET 72
"Rodney Star" (11,803 tons) ET 47

The order given to the Western boats on procedure in the blockade area
has been altered as follows on the instructions of the Naval War Staff: The boat has one man wounded owing to a tube runner. She has orders
to hand over the wounded man to EGERLAND at point ROT and to refuel
for return passage to Lorient.
- 73 -
17.5. U 43 has been allocated as attack area the position vacated by U
201 in the disposition of the Western boats. These boats are to form a
patrol line from square AJ 6385 to AK 8485.

At present they are: U 111, 94, 556 (43), 97, 93, 98, `09, 74.

U 65 has again been ordered to report the weather and again failed to
reply. There is grave concern about this boat.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events 18.5. U 38, 103 and 106 reported supply carried out. EGERLAND's
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. torpedo stocks are thus used up except for 6 torpedoes. A request has been
299
made for another supply ship to be sent to the southern area for U-boats The British S.S. Piako, 8,253 GRT, was torpedoed in the Freetown area
and approved by Naval War Staff. P.M. on the 18th.

U 66 reported 620 N. passed. Aircraft reported one inward and one outward bound convoy in North
Minch.
U 201 entered Lorient.
The Italian U-boat OTARIA reported a convoy, course 700, in AL 8855
Air reconnaissance observed a convoy inward-bound at 1030 in AM at 1000. U-boat BIANCHI and BARBARIGO were in the vicinity.
4842, course 700. An escort unit reported the aircraft at the same time and Radio intelligence indicates that S.S. Starcon, 4,662 GRT was
gave the position as AM 4831, course 730. U 128 and 96 were informed. torpedoed in this area.
Another convoy was observed by aircraft in AM 1618, course 1600 at
1700. U 94 made contact with a convoy in AJ 6636 at 1655, course N. She
was ordered to stick to it. All Western boats were ordered to operate and U
19.5. U 96 reported that she was returning and had sunk a 9,000 GRT 94 not to attack until other boats had arrived.
tanker from a convoy and other tankers totaling 24,000 GRT from U 123's
convoy. 20.5. At 0050 U 94 reported the enemy on a course of 3100, about 15
steamers and one auxiliary cruiser. Further shadowers' reports showed that
visibility was beginning to deteriorate. It was thought that no other boats
- 74 - had reached the convoy and U 94 was ordered to make beacon-signals. At
0400 she was given permission to attack. She sank a 6,000 GRT ship, but
then lost contact at 0545 in a fog. She pressed on and regained contact at
0905 in AJ 3773. At 1026 U 556 requested beacon-signals and must
therefore have been nearby.
By 1300 U 93 and by 1504 U 98 had reached the enemy.
Radio Intelligence reported 5 ships torpedoed.
At 1930 U 94 reported contact lost. Convoy apparently dispersed. She
later added that the convoy's last course observed was 00 and that the
Date Position, Wind, Weather auxiliary cruiser and the fast ships had made off independently. Besides
and Sea State, Illumination, Events these she had observed a group of 5 probably slow ships. U 98 and 556
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. started on their return passage, the former because of fuel shortage, the
later because she has used all her torpedoes. According to Radio
Intelligence the following ships were torpedoed from the convoy, which
had not yet dispersed.:
Tanker SAN FELIX 13,037 GRT
Tanker BRITISH SECURITY 8,470 GRT
S.S. ROTHERMERE 5,356 GRT
300
S.S. JOHN P. PETERSEN 6,128 GRT U 46 has been allocated a position in the disposition of the Western
S.S. DARLINGTON COURT 4,974 GRT Group.

According to reports so far received from boats the following has been U 73 left Lorient for enemy patrol.
sunk:
U 94 1 ship 6,000 GRT (not included in Radio Intelligence figures) 21.5. U 93 made contact with a convoy at 0200. She first reported 10
U 94 J.P. Petersen 6,128 GRT ships, later 18. Course N.E., 10 knots. This was probably a part of the
U 556 2 tankers 22,000 GRT scattered convoy, or the convoy itself. The number of ships was greater,
U 556 1 ship 5,000 GRT but this could be due to an error on the part of this boat or U 94. Later U
93 reported 5 destroyers with the convoy. She was given freedom to
attack as soon as other boats did so and made shadowers' reports until
2100.
- 75 -
U 98 started on her return passage, having used all her torpedoes and
sunk altogether 35,356 GRT.

22.5. No further reports were received of the convoy. All boats were
ordered to report if they had reached it and, if they had no contact to make
their position by short signal. Position reports were received from U 46,
66, 557 and 94. They therefore had no contact. U 74 reported serious
depth-charge damage and was forced to return (W. France).
Date Position, Wind, Weather Boats were ordered to move off to the S.W. to square AJ 60.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. U 69 reported sinking S.S. EXMOOR, 4,999 GRT and
TEWKESBURY, 4,601 GRT.

U 105 had supplied.

At 1710 U 111 sighted the convoy, apparently strongly escorted. This

6 ships totaling 43,965 GRT torpedoed, of which, according to boats'
reports, 5 ships totaling 39,128 GRT sunk.
U 556 reported the total results of her patrol 7 ships totaling 49,900
GRT.
301
confirmed my opinion that it was best for the boats to break off the attack
now. While all the boats were making for their new position, dummy
radio traffic was started to deceive the enemy into believing that the attack
was going on. U 111 made dummy signals. Radio messages were
received from U 93, showing that she had not pursued the convoy and that
her transmitter had been temporarily out of order, but was now working
again.
 The attack on the convoy was then concluded. All boats taking part 23.5. U 111 reported that her fuel stocks were down to one third. There
reported afterwards and according to these reports the results were: are several supply ships in the Northern area, taking part in a Fleet
U 94 1 ship unidentified 6,000 GRT operation, which are also equipped to supply U-boats. A request was made
U 94 JOHN P. PETERSEN 6,128 GRT for one of these to refuel U 111 and the supply was arranged for May 25.
U 556 2 tankers, unidentified 22,000 GRT
U 556 1 ship, unidentified 5,000 GRT U 106 reported: No traffic observed for 4 days.

The tanker BRITISH GRENADIER was torpedoed S.W. of Freetown,

probably by U 103.
- 76 -
24.5. U 204 left Kiel.

In the early morning hours enemy units made contact with the
BISMARK and PRINZ EUGEN, which was breaking out through the
Denmark Straits. There was an engagement with enemy battleships during
which HOOD was sunk. Western Group boats were informed of this and
that further enemy operations were likely.
It was considered whether anything could be done at once with these
Date Position, Wind, Weather boats to give support to the BISMARK group, but it was decided to wait
and Sea State, Illumination, Events until C-in-C. Fleet's intentions were known. I telephoned C.-in-C. West
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. and placed all the U-boats at his disposal regardless of the war against
merchant shipping and he confirmed my view. He would make his
requirements known as soon as he heard from C.-in-C. Fleet.
As operations proceeded, C.-in-C. Fleet requested that Western Group
U-boats be concentrated together in square AJ 68, he intended to lure the
enemy units which were still shadowing him into the U-boat's positions
U 98 1 ship unidentified 10,000 GRT A.M. on the 25th. At 1613 an order was given for U 94, 43, 46, 557 and
U 98 ROTHERMERE 5,356 GRT 66 to form a patrol line to run N.W. to S.E. through the square. U 93 and
U 109 1 ship, unidentified 7,000 GRT 73, which were further away, were to take up positions N.E. of this patrol
U 93 1 ship, unidentified 10,000 GRT line. In preparation for the event of the Fleet's returning, U 48, 97, 98, on
Total: 71,484 GRT passage in Biscay, were ordered to attack areas in BE 6420 to 6620, at the
request of Group Command West. U 138 was to have occupied the
position adjoining those to the East, but could not carry out her orders
U 96 entered St. Nazaire. owing to lack of lubricating oil.
U 48 left St. Nazaire.

302
 - 77 - The disposition in Western Biscay was reinforced by U 73, which was
nearer to this group than the Western Group, and U 74. Although she had
been badly hit by depth-charges and was on her way back, U 74, realizing
the seriousness of the situation, had reported of her own accord that she
could reach a position near the Biscay Group by next morning.
This meant that at least 6 boats were disposed along BISMARK's
inward route, although 2 of them (U 556 and 98) had no torpedoes and one
(U 74) was badly damaged.
The Western boats in patrol line were ordered to proceed E. at cruising
Date Position, Wind, Weather speed to intercept the enemy units (aircraft carriers) which were following
and Sea State, Illumination, Events the battleship. Contact with our own ships was lost at 0213 and apparently
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. not regained.

25.5. (A.M.) At the request of Group Command West the boats in

Biscay were given the following order:
"U 73, 556, 97, 98, 48 to form a patrol line from BE 6155 to BF 7155,
depth 20 miles. U 74 to make for BE 5350 as attack area".
U 556 (on her return passage without torpedoes) was ordered to join this As soon as it could be assumed that our own units were sufficiently far
group. south, the Western Group was ordered to resume their original positions in
U 73, on outward passage, which should have been about half way patrol line.
between the Western and Biscay groups, was ordered to make her position,
after which she was to to be allocated to one or other group. U 147 left Bergen and was allocated the area N. of England to west of
U 108 and 552 were also to leave Lorient and St. Nazaire respectively the North Channel.
P.M. on the 25th to join the Biscay group.The Flotilla S.O. had, of his own
accord, given orders for U 552 to be ready to sail.
All available forces had then been mobilized. By evening it was known - 78 -
that the Fleet's intentions were changed: the 2 ships were to separate,
PRINZ EUGEN to move away to the S.W. and BISMARK probably to
enter St. Nazaire. Boats concentrated in AJ 68 were then dispersed and, on
Group Command's instructions, ordered to form a patrol line from AJ 6115
to AK 7215.

25.5. (Night) When news was received that BISMARK had been
torpedoed by an enemy carrier-borne aircraft it seemed more than ever
likely that she would put into St. Nazaire. The question of screening the Date Position, Wind, Weather
inward-bound battleships came into the foreground. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
303
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. U 98 could not carry out her orders owing to lack of fuel She was
ordered to remain in her position as long as possible.

U 111 reported supply completed. She returned to the Western boats'

patrol line.

26.5. U 103 reported 11 ships totaling 56,245 GRT sunk so far. 27.5. oo15 U 73 sighted BISMARK and enemy forces in BE 6155. At
0042 the U-boats were ordered to search the area BE 6277 to BE 6192.
BISMARK's return passage proceeded according to plan. She was BISMARK was to make beacon-signals to assist them.
unobserved until 1050, then picked up by an enemy aircraft and shadowed. U 73 reported at 0231: "Last observation: Gunnery action between 3
Surface forces then came up. She reported her position at 1844 in BE 53, units BE 6119. No further hydrophone bearing". A situation report of
course 115, 24 knots. She was being shadowed by a Sheffield class 2345 from C.-in-C. Fleet (which contained no position) showed that the
cruiser. The situation was now clear, the enemy was to be expected from battleship was surrounded by enemy forces.
the N.W. BISMARK passed E. of the U-boat line. U 48, who was then At 0300 U 556 obtained a bearing of 2000 from BE 6153. She
not expected to encounter the enemy in the south, was ordered north by observed a gunnery action at 0340 bearing 2300 15 miles off from BE
radio. 6164 and herself made beacon signals. At 0430 she reported gun flashes
U 556 reported T.O.O. 2010: BE 5332 KING GEORGE, ARK ROYAL, bearing 2300 from BE 6164 left bottom. No more D/F/ bearings of
air activity. She lost visual contact with the enemy at 2035 and at 2240 BISMARK.
also her hydrophone contact which had been maintained until then. At 0631: Starshell bearing 2700 from BE 6192.
Towards 2130 information was received from Group Command West
that BISMARK had been hit by 2 more torpedoes and was no longer
maneuverable. Her position was BE 6192. All boats in Biscay which still - 79 -
had torpedoes, i.e. U 74, 48, 73, 97, were ordered at 2141 to make for this
position at maximum speed. Task: protection of BISMARK.
No further reports were received from or of BISMARK and at 2319 the
boats without torpedoes, U 556 and 98 were also sent to BE 6277, so as to
make contact with the battleship, to bring up the torpedo carriers and
provide better cover for this area, which must now be the main scene of
events.
After consultation with Group Command West, square BE 6279 was,
on the basis of all available information (including a number of Radio Date Position, Wind, Weather
Intelligence reports from enemy shadowers) taken as BISMARK's most and Sea State, Illumination, Events
likely position. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The U-boats' operations were greatly hampered by the heavy weather
(wind 7 - 9). Use of armament was hardly possible.

304
 U 107 and UA (which is supplying today) north of this.
All boats are to remain N. of 50 N., E. of 300 W., and S. of this E. of
At 0700 C.-in-C. Fleet requested that his War Logs be fetched by a U- 250 W.
boat. U 556, which was probably the nearest, was ordered to do this.
After all data had been re-examined, the U-boats were informed that Supply was requested for U 93 for May 29 in the Northern area and
BISMARK's position was believed to be BE 6150. This was Group approved.
Command West's assumption. I myself believed it to be further N.W. and I
informed the boats of this possibility. 28.5. U 97 is returning because of the fuel situation.
At midday U 556 reported that she would have to return because of lack
of fuel. U 74 received orders to fetch the War Log instead of her.
As no further news was received which helped to clarify the situation, - 80 -
all U-boats taking part in the operation were ordered at 1326 to report their
last sighting of BISMARK and any other observations made by them.
U 73 and U 74 reported, but their observations were old and inaccurate.
At 1400 the battleship had to be presumed lost in view of English
broadcasts and the situation in general. The boats were ordered at 1416 to
search N.W. from BE 6150 for survivors.
This search was unsuccessful and at 1954 they were ordered to cover
the following areas:
U 108 - BE 6110 U 97 - BE 6150 Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 48 - BE 6120 U 73 - BE 6190 and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 74 - BE 6140 Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

At 2059 U 74 rescued 3 survivors in BE 6142 and according to their

statements the ship must have been sunk at about 1000 in BE 5330, i.e.
N.W. of BE 6150. This agreed with B.d.U.'s assumptions.
All boats were ordered to join U 74 and to search from there to BE
5330. It was intended to form a searching line the next day at 0800 from
BE 5330 with U 73, 74 and 48, direction 1400, speed 6 knots.
The present disposition of the Southern boats was designed mainly to
intercept convoys, but the boats have not picked up a convoy for 8 - 9
days. I therefore decided to redistribute them in new attack areas with the
object of concentrating on single-ship traffic. (U 107 had reported another
3 ships totaling 21,000 GRT sunk). The new attack areas are:
U 103 and U 38 south of line Freetown bearing 400
305
U 108 made her passage report, according to which she was still 200
miles off the position of sinking at 2100. At 0925 U 48 reported a number
of floating corpses, a paravane and wreckage in BE 6141. The Biscay
boats were ordered at 1041 to search the area around BE 6141 and to
leeward of this. The homeward bound Italian U-boat BARBARIGO was
to take part in the search according to her fuel stocks.
According to a report of 1320 from U 48 there was wreckage in BE 6141
southern half and in 6142.
At 1348 U 74 reported wreckage in BE 6145.
 After consultation with C.-in-C. West the search was broken off at dusk
on the orders of C.-in-C. Navy, no further reports of successful rescue
operations having been received by evening.
U 73 and 74 reported:search unsuccessful.
The boats continued on their passage.
accord without waiting for orders. There was already considerable doubt
about the suitability of this Commanding Officer during his training and
this doubt has been confirmed by this general conduct on this patrol. I
have therefore found it necessary to relieve him at once.

U 101 left Lorient. - 81 -

29.5. The trawler SACHSENWAL rescued another 2 survivors after

midnight in BE 6150. Group Command West then requested, on the
orders of Supreme Command of the Navy, to order U 48, 73, 101 and 108
back to square BE 61 to continue the search. The decision to search the
area again carefully means that the boats will be occupied in this for at
least 3 days. Boats which have been at sea for some time (U 73, U 48)
will by then have used a considerable amount of their fuel. I requested
that they be refueled at sea by a tanker intended for the Fleet. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
The Western boats have not picked up any enemy convoys in their Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
patrol line since May 22 and have orders to form a new patrol line from AJ
9855 to BD 1855 by June 1. They are at present: U 93 (which should
have supplied by then), U 111, 43, 46 and 66.

U 94 reported that she was returning.

30.5. Entered port: U 74 and 97 St. Nazaire, U 556 Lorient.
U 557 was ordered to supply in AJ 21 on June 1.
U 74 was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine with a
U 75 left St. Nazaire, U 77 Kiel. quadruple fan in BF 5534. This boat sank nothing, as she was severely
damaged by enemy anti-submarine forces during her first contact with the
U 109 entered Lorient, U 98 St. Nazaire. enemy, owing to unfortunate circumstances. She then had to return, but
took part in the BISMARK action for some time.
The Commanding Officer of U 109 made his report: It was the boat's
first patrol. The crew was almost entirely new. Result was a 7,000 GRT U 556: An excellent, intelligently executed patrol, with the high result
ammunition ship. The general impression made by the Commanding of 8 ships totaling 48,000 GRT.
Officer was one of uncertainty and worry. The boat sank to a great depth
during a depth-charge hunt and was only just saved by the presence of
mind of an experienced Petty Officer who blew the tanks of his own
306
 Commanding Officer of U 98 reported: A good patrol, executed with Date Position, Wind, Weather
ability and determination. Result: 3 ships totaling 13,000 GRT sunk, 1 and Sea State, Illumination, Events
ship of 5,000 GRT damaged. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

UA reported supply completed.

31.5. U 141 left Lorient for an operation in the Scilly Islands area.
According to the results of air reconnaissance there should be constant
traffic off the coast here. This patrol will show what chances a small boat 1.6. Positions at 0800:
has here. As far as can be foreseen prospects are favorable. North Area:
U 111, 43, 46, 66 in patrol line from AJ 9815 to BD 3266.
Supreme Command of the Navy abandoned further search for U 93 and U 557 in AJ 21 (refuelling).
BISMARK survivors as hopeless. U 108, 73, 48, 101 and 75 were ordered U 48, 73, 75, 101, 108 approximately in BE west sector, proceeding into
to make for square BD 13. the patrol line.
U 141 west of Quessant.
U 93 reported that she had not yet found the supply ship. An attempt is U 77 northern North Sea, on return passage.
being made to bring the 2 together with the aid of beacon-signals. U 147 in the operational area west of the Herbrides.
U 94 on return passage in approximately BD 39.
U 38 requested supply as soon as possible and reported her success so
far as 44,000 GRT. South Area:
U 103 and U 38 south of line Freetown at 400, U 107 and UA to the
U 107 reported 2 more ships, totaling 9,412 GRT, sunk. north thereof. U 105 and U 106 in area of Cape Verden. U 69
approximately square FF.

In Lorient:
(signed): DÖNITZ U 74, 109, 123, 124, 138, 201, 556.

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log In St. Nazaire:

U 95, 96, 97, 98, 552, 553.
1 - 15 June 1941
In Kiel:
PG30290 U 71, 83, 143, 203, 371, 559, 651, 751, 558.

In Wilhelmshaven:
U 67

307
 The following will be in operation until the 15th June:
U 751, 558, 553, 552, 559, 79, 203, 371, 651, 123, 201, 143, 71.
U 558 out from Kiel for long-distance patrol.
Refuelling for U 38 is planned for the 7th June.
U 107 reported auxiliary cruiser or "Q" ship "Alfred Jones", 4,022 GRT,
sunk
- 83 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
2.6. U 204 reported: "No traffic". She has searched the area west and
southwest of Iceland without intercepting the enemy.
U-boats approaching will be incorporated in the patrol line of the
Western boats. The new patrol line includes: U 557, 93, 111, 43, 46, 66,
108, 101, 75, 48 and 73 and extends from AJ 9415 to BD 1895.
U 93 and 557 are still in AJ 21 for refuelling purposes.
308
U 48, U 73 and U 108 will have reached their positions by the 4th June,
and U 75 and U 101 probably by the 5th June.
U 147 contacted an outward-bound convoy in AM 0237 at 1330. Since
there were no other boats in the vicinity, she was given freedom of attack
and ordered not to report again. According to intercept messages a vessel
of the convoy was torpedoed.
3.6. In the eastern part of square BD 2 steamers were torpedoed,
according to intercept messages, and a further one pursued by a U-boat. U
101 and U 75 are the ones in question.
U 105 is returning. She reported the sinking, during return passage, of
"Scottish Monary", 4,719 GRT.
U 552 has left St. Nazaire, and U 751 Kiel for long-distance patrol.
Refuelling of U 93 and U 557 has probably come up against difficulties.
There are still no reports from the boats. It does not appear to me to be
quite certain.
U 204, therefore, has been ordered not to proceed to the refueling
rendezvous but to BD 14.
4.6. U 557 reported: "Supply ship "Belchen" sunk by a destroyer". She
has 50 survivors on board and is returning. My plan to hand the survivors
over to another supply ship, and have the boat refuel and go out on further
operations, was prevented because the boat reported that she did not have
sufficient fuel for the necessary detour in case refuelling was not effected.
5.6. U 73, as south-easterly boat of the patrol line of the Western boats,
reported heavy traffic. U 48 reported in BD 29 a large number of single
vessels, and she sank 2, together 15,500 GRT. These are different vessels
from those reported by intercept messages to have been torpedoed on the
3rd June in BD.
 - 84 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
In view of these reports it appears that there is heavy traffic in BD,
which has been confirmed in this area already by earlier observations of
the Meteorological Trawler. I am under the impression that this traffic
runs S.E. of the present U-boat positions, and have decided to move the
patrol line by 180 miles in direction 1800.
U 66 is returning owing to damage to the bow cap.
U 69 reports operation Takoradi and Lagos carried out, and a 4,100 GRT
vessel sunk on the roads off Acra. A U-boat warning off Lagos indicates
that a vessel has struck a mine.
U 111 will be sent out, in agreement with the Naval War Staff, to
investigate the traffic in the following areas:
1) East of Belle Isle Strait and,
2) Out from Cape Race in a northerly and north-easterly direction.
309
She has been restricted to attacks on specially important ships and is to
report on any traffic at once if she confirms it. I intend, in this case, to
send in several boats for operations there.
U 204 will take up former position of U 111.
6.6. A convoy, course 2600, was detected by air reconnaissance in AL
6294. The boats were informed accordingly. According to intercept
messages, there is a convoy in AL 6976. U 552 may be in the vicinity and
has been informed of this report.
U 77 has been ordered to join the Western Group and to take up
position in area BC 2641.
U 93 reported in AL 7826 a south-bound convoy with strong escort, but
could not maintain contact owing to fuel shortage and the survivors of the
"Belchen" on board. It was not possible to operate against this convoy
with the boats of the Western Group as they were too far away.
The Commanding Officer of U 94, Lt. Kuppisch, gave his report. This
was a very good operation, tenaciously and successfully carried out. 6
vessels, 37,391 GRT, sunk.
7.6. Air reconnaissance reported at 0715 a convoy in AM 1642, course
2700, speed 9 knots.
Reports of convoys, which have again occurred frequently in the last
few days, lead me to point out once more the possibility of spasmodic
traffic on the part of the British.
- 85 -

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
According to an intercept message, the British vessel "Tregathere",
5,201 GRT, was sunk in BD 48.
UA observed in ET 6579 a fast group consisting of 6 ships, course 1500.
U 38 reported that the "Egerland" sank at supply rendezvous red. She
did not refuel and has been obliged, therefore, to return. Since, through
the loss of the "Egerland" refuelling for the South boats is questionable for
some time, the boats have been ordered to return to the supply point
"Culebra", and therefore to leave the operational area.
The Italian U-boats off Gibraltar sank, out of 2 convoys, 7 ships,
approximately 45,000 GRT. The boats are still off the south-bound
convoy in DH 3441.
U 105, which is on return passage, has been informed of this.
U 651 has put out from Kiel, and U 553 has put out from St. Nazaire.
The Head of the Intercept Control Station at a conference with Flag
Officer Commanding U-boats. A report was given by the Officer in
Charge of Intercept Service, Lt. Cdr. Teuber, on the present information
and the views of the Intercept Control Station on the questions of radio use
by U-boats and location by the enemy.
310
Teuber's statements, supported by data and information from the
Intercept Service, help to clarify some questions, but do not really show
anything new. I am quite clear regarding the danger from the enemy
intercept and D/F service, but, in a number of examples given, do not
consider the use of radio by U-boats, but other known or suspected causes,
as a reason for resultant reaction on the part of the enemy. A U-boat which
was attacked by an aircraft, or sank a vessel calling for assistance, does not
need to fear any D/F at this moment. A U-boat which is off a convoy must
send. A U-boat under way needs to pay little attention to the danger of
D/F. These cases, considered individually, cannot be disputed, but perhaps
on the whole they may lead to the view: "The U-boats radio too much".
The cause and effect can only be recognized by careful examination and
evaluation. The question is being pursued continuously by my Operational
Division, and I am grateful for any data from other departments. I have
stated in detail my views in a letter to the Naval High Command and
interested parties (B.d.U. Op. Group Command 1390 A.4. of 9.6.41) and
advised the boats in a Standing War Order.
8.6. U 46 reported return passage as her periscope is out of order due to
ramming. She reported 2 tankers sunk, with 16,500 GRT, of which the
British tanker "Ensis" (6,207 GRT) in BD 3745 is probably known by
intercept message.
- 86 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 43 has been ordered to take up position of U 46. The adjacent boats
will move up in the patrol line, therefore, by one position to the S.E. Short
signal from U 48: "Returning".
U 557 was instructed to report the fog frequency in the area of the last
two patrol lines. She experienced 50% fog, which agrees with the monthly
charts and the experiences by U 94.
From the south area U 107 reported having sunk a ship. Probably this
was the motor vessel "Adda" (7,816 GRT) in ET 2930 detected through an
intercept message. U 106 is returning.
U 38 reported having sunk 8 vessels, with 54,000 GRT. In this area
(south of Freetown) she observed only incoming traffic which agrees with
the assumption of Flag Officer commanding U-boats regarding traffic off
Freetown. Her position is ER 3752. She is returning owing to fuel
shortage and torpedoes expended. According to an intercept message the
British vessel "Elmdene" (4,853 GRT) was sunk in ET 24.
U 201 out from Lorient into operational area west of North Channel.
U 123 put out of Lorient into the South area.
9.6. U 48 reported return passage to Bergen begun. She sank 2 further
vessels, 15,947 GRT.
U 46, which also began return passage yesterday, reported 4 torpedo
misfires. A further freighter (5,000 GRT) sunk in BD 6245.
311
On the request of the Naval War Staff I am sending 2 boats into the
Denmark Straits. Here chances of attacks are probable in view of the
transfer of surface forces to Norway. Reconnaissance in this area is also
desirable.
U 559 has been assigned, as operational area, square AD 29.
U 79 has been assigned to squares AD 54 and 55.
U 143 put out from Kiel.
10.6. The boats have been informed that, according to intercept
messages, a convoy was in AM 4561 at 0950.
U 141 reported moving her operational area into the middle part of
square AM. She does not, therefore, consider a position off the Scilly Isles
as having good prospects of attack.
U 108 reported the statements of survivors according to which British
traffic after dispersal of convoy at 480 N. 270 W. does not proceed any
further N. than 480 N.
- 87 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

This statement can only be considered as an individual case and not as a
general rule. She sank 27,340 GRT.
boats will be instructed regarding this, and those boats which at the time
do not need to return and , therefore, can refuel should report this fact by
means of a short signal. If this refuelling fails they must be able to return
as far as Culebra. The need for our own U-boat tankers and supplies on
land is becoming increasingly urgent in view of the tanker losses. If
"Lothringen" should be lost there is only Culebra available at present.

An incoming very large convoy (60 ships) with strong escort was U 93 put into St. Nazaire.
detected in AM 6656 by air reconnaissance.
11.6. U 77 reported, on instruction, that there is no ice in BC 10. U 143
Since the patrol line has not shown any success up to now, the ice limit will have to put into Bergen in view of engine trouble.
in the S.E. of Newfoundland (according to intercept message) is presumed
to be in BC 85, and several reports of sightings and sinkings have been
confirmed S.E. of the present patrol line, I must assume that traffic is - 88 -
proceeding further to the S., passing the patrol line.

It is therefore, necessary to move the patrol line to the south. In this

way, however, we come into the area hitherto prohibited for U-boats.

The Naval War Staff is not agreeable to alteration of the routes of our
own tankers or of prizes in this area. However, it is agreeable to the
following extension of the operational areas for U-boats:
Between 400 and 500 W. north of 370 N. The limit in the east is the Date Position, Wind, Weather
line on 400 W from 370 N - 430 N. Further, N.W. of a line from 430 N., and Sea State, Illumination, Events
40 W to 470 30' N 290 W. From thence N. of 470 30' N. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

The boats will be newly disposed, therefore, as follows: U 77, 557,

108, 101, 75 will take up position in patrol line from CC 3385 to CC 6625.

Further, operational area will be taken up as follows: U 73 - BC 93 and

BD 71 and 72; U 43 - BD 47, 48 and 49; U 204 - BD 45, 46 and 54. U 107 and U 103 reported position by short signal in ET 43 and ET 17.
That signifies that both boats can and wish if possible to refuel.
U 105 reported a heavy warship formation in CF 9815, course S.W.
U 123 reported returning, as both periscopes faulty.
Facilities for refuelling for the Southern boats have been agreed with the
Naval War Staff for the 17.6 at point "Weiss" from "Lothringen". The
312
 The Fuehrer has awarded the Commanding Officer of U 38, Lt. Liebe,
and the Commanding Officer of U 46, Lt. Endrass oak leaves to the
Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. Both have sunk over 200,000 GRT. - 89 -

12.6. U 48 reported having sunk the vessel "Empire Dew". Total

sinkings in this operation 41,000 GRT in AK 97. THe Commanding
Officer, Lt. Herbert Schultze, therefore, has passed the 200,000 limit and
the Fuehrer has awarded him oak leaves to the Knight's Cross of the Iron
Cross.

U 553 sank a freighter of 5,000 GRT in BD 93.

Date Position, Wind, Weather
From the southern area UA reported her position in ET 37, i.e. she can and Sea State, Illumination, Events
and wishes to refuel. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

U 38 reported in the area south of 170 N. between 280 and 300 W.

south-bound convoy.

U 69 has only a limited number of code books. (Given over to

"Egerland" in view of mining operation). She was, therefore, asked in a be kept temporarily in an operational area east of the Shetlands. She
disguised message whether she could refuel. She wishes to refuel. will continue her passage after about 24 hours.

U 138 left Lorient. U 651 left Bergen.
The Commanding Officer of U 66, Lt. Cdr. Zapp made his first
independent operational run. He saw little and broke off the operation too
soon as he was under the false impression that he could only dive to 50 m.,
with open tubes as the bow-caps had been knocked off. No sinkings.
13.6. For boats U 203 and U 651 outgoing route will, on the suggestion
of Group North, be over squares AE 86 to AE 75.
Cruiser "Lützow" was damaged during her transfer to Norway by an
enemy aircraft torpedo on the west coast of Norway, and had to return.
Since operations against the damaged ship by enemy forces appear
possible, U 651, in the northern North Sea, will
313
Italian U-boats attacked a convoy in the western sector of CF, and sank,
up to now, 3 vessels (20,000 GRT). The position of the convoy at 0600
was CF 4562, course 3200, speed 9 knots. Since it is to be assumed that
one of the Italian boats is maintaining contact, I have decided to send in
against the convoy the 3 boats east of the Western Group, U 204, U 43, U
73. The boats will be informed accordingly and will be ordered to take up
position in squares BE 17, BD 39, BD 38. U 201 is also in the same area,
so that the convoy can be attacked, if necessary, with 4 boats.
U 553 reported sinking in BD 97 the tanker "Ranella" (5,590 GRT).
U 553 and 558 have been ordered to take up as wing positions in the
patrol line squares BC 8787 and CC 6922.
 On orders of the Naval War Staff, the area of restricted operations east - 90 -
of 400 W. to the south up to 410 N. has been temporarily extended as from
now in view of a homecoming vessel.

According to an intercept message one ship has sunk off Lagos and 1
ship has been damaged off Takoradi. This is an indication of the
successful mining of both these harbors.

U 46 has put into St. Nazaire.

U 105 has put into Lorient.
The Commanding Officer of U 105, Lt. Schowe, came in to give his
report. Schowe, who has been on operations since the beginning of the
War but has little success up to the last trip, proved by this well conducted
operation that the trust which had been placed in him was justified. Sink:
13 vessels - 89,273 GRT in 112 days at sea.
14.6. In order to intercept the convoy reported by the Italian U-boats U
201 was ordered to take up position in square BE 18, i.e. to extend the
patrol line to the east. There have been no further reports of contact from
the Italians. I suspect that the convoy's mean course is 3500.
U 111 reported from BC 43 having encountered pack ice off the Belle
Isle Straits. On proceeding further to BC 17 she encountered fog and large
icebergs. No traffic. 2 shutters knocked off tube. She sank 3 vessels,
22,000 GRT. The question is, therefore, solved as to whether traffic passes
through the Belle Isle Straits or close to the Newfoundland coast.
U 111 has been ordered to take up position in square BC 8722 in the
patrol line of the Western boats.
U 559 which is in a position N.W. of Iceland has reported that she is
returning as her periscope has been damaged by ice. She has
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
requested to put into Bergen. No traffic to report. Since there is no
periscope repair shop in Bergen, she has been ordered to proceed to BD 33
so that she may be brought into Lorient or may be left in this area for night
attacks.
The Southern boats have been notified regarding the characteristics of
"Lorthringen" and the point of rendezvous. I have left it to the discretion
of boats to refuel by day or during the night, as it seems to me that the
danger of surprise by day through aircraft and at night by planned searches
of surface forces is equally great.
U 71 has put out from Kiel.
The Commanding Officer of U 46, Lt. Endrass, came in to give his
report. Endrass carried out the operation extremely well and utilized to the
full all operational possibilities. Sunk: 2 tankers, 1 vessel - 20,707 GRT.
15.6. Nothing special to report.

314
 Outward-bound: U 71 northern North Sea.
U 123 Biscay area, Southern boat.
(signed): DÖNITZ U 138 west of Portugal. Special Operations according to Operational
Order 44.

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log In South area:

U 103, 107, 69 and UA proceeding to refuelling rendezvous White,
16 - 30 June 1941 approximately 200-300 m. southeast therefrom.

PG30291 In Lorient: U 66, 74, 105, 109, 124, 556.

St. Nazaire: U 46, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98.

Kiel: U 68, 202, 561, 564, 566, 652, 137, 146.

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events Wilhelmshaven: U 67.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Bergen: U 143.

Ready to put out up to 1st July: U 202, 564, 556, 96, 137, 146, 562,
143, 66, 98, 109, 56, 125, 83.

16.6. Positions at 0800:
In the patrol line "Western Boats" from BC 8720 to CC 6980:
U 111, 77, 557, 108, 101, 75, 553, 751.
In the patrol line "Kurfürst" from BD 38 to BE 18:
U 204, 43, 73 and 201.
Operational area west of Iceland: UU 79 and U 559.
Operational area west of North Channel: U 552, 147, 141.
South of Iceland under way: U 203, 371.
Italian U-boats: I 22, 17, 23, 27 returning approximately BD 60. All
other boats in base.
In order to disguise orders regarding disposition of U-boars points of
reference will be introduced.
U 557 reported avoiding a torpedo track in CC 3656 and later observed
a British U-boat of the Thames Class making off in a north-westerly
direction. Nothing further to report.

Returning: U 106 Biscay area.

U 38 approximately Cape Verde Islands. - 92 -
U 48 North of Shetlands.
315

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
17.6. U 371 reported sinking a freighter of 9,800 GRT, thereby
experiencing 3 failures when firing recovered torpedoes, one of them
being a pistol failure. She has only 50 cbm fuel left and will, therefore, be
assembled with the other boats which have little fuel to Group "Kurfürst"
which covers a patrol line from square BD 19 to BE 18.
U 143, as the first boat ready for operations, has been assigned for
"Barbarossa" (invasion of Russia) in the North Sea the operational area
west of the Orkneys and Shetlands.
U 202, 564, 137, and 146 have left Kiel for operations.
Operational areas north of the Shetlands are planned for U 137 and U
146. The other two boats will proceed into the Atlantic.
U 106 has put out from Lorient.
18.6. U 552 reported sinking 25,541 tons, and withdrawing to AK
owing to an oil trace. U 552 had been operating in the outlet of the North
Channel and achieved obvious success but there was also strong defensive
action.
316
U 559, which had reported a faulty periscope, has been ordered to take
up position in the northern half of squares BD 20 and BD 30, if she is able
to carry out night attacks.
The lull in traffic in the area of the Western boats is striking. I have
ordered that the most northerly boat of the patrol line (U 111) should
advance to the N.W. up to the ice limits, in order to determine the position
of the ice limit and whether there is traffic between it and the patrol line. I
have ordered the patrol line, with the aid of reference points, from BC
8720 to CD 5540. On the one hand, in order still to intercept the traffic
proceeding through the S.E. sector of the operational area open to U-boats
and, on the other hand, to mislead the enemy, in case he had knowledge of
the patrol line, by this new disposition.
U 38 gave her passage report in DH 44.
The Commanding Officer of U 106, Lt. Oesten, came in to give his
report. This Commanding Officer carried out an operation in the south,
while escorting the vessel "Lach" from Rio through the American safety
zone. He sank 11 vessels, 70,159 tons.
He probably obtained a hit in confusion during an attack on the convoy
not on a steamer but on the battleship "Malaya" which was torpedoed at
the time according to an intercept message.
19.6. U 73 is returning, and U 559 will take up her position.
- 93 -

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 552 reported towards evening a convoy on north-easterly course in
AM 4471, that is incoming. U 552 was given freedom of attack and was
to maintain contact for the two small boats. In the course of the night,
however, she was driven off and reported contact lost.
According to an intercept message a British convoy was at 1700 on the
18th June 5 miles southwest of Cadiz. U 123 was informed accordingly.
Put out: from Kiel U 562, from Lorient U 556, from St. Nazaire U 96.
20.6. The disposition of U-boats as it is at present has not brought the
expected success. I had hoped to intercept the enemy convoys by
concentration of the boats in one patrol line in an area where I suspected
traffic to be heavily concentrated.
There are three possible reasons why the enemy was not intercepted:
1) Passing through the waters round Newfoundland which are
dangerous owing to ice conditions and heavy fog. This entails acceptance
of danger constituted by natural circumstances which, however, form at
the same time a protection from danger of being detected by the enemy.
2) By-passing the patrol line in the south, in the area of the German prize
route, in which operations by U-boats are not possible.
3) Breaking through the patrol line itself under protection of the frequent
fog in this area, and perhaps with the aid of far-reaching location gear.
The possibilities given under 1) and 2), however, show that the enemy
can scatter his traffic even along the Newfoundland Bank and that
317
operations so far west will only intercept with certainty a large
concentration of traffic if this can be approached west of 500 off the
Canadian and North American ports of departure themselves.
This is not possible at present owing to political reasons. I have,
therefore, decided to have the U-boats leave the area south of the
Newfoundland Bank, which constitutes only one possibility of
encountering traffic and to dispose them at the narrowest point S.E. of
Greenland up to our own prize route. A loose and wide disposition which
is no more unfavorable for the interception of traffic, considering the
character of the U-boat, than the apparently close patrol in the patrol line.
The boats in the North Atlantic, therefore, have been ordered to take up the
following operational areas, with spacing 100 miles:
U 71 - AJ 2550; U 96 - AJ 3850; U 203 - AJ 8250;
79 - AJ 5650; 651 - AK 1750; 371 - AK 4840;
108 - AK 7730; 553 - AK 5950 556 - AL 7191;
552 - AL 0150; 201 - AL 5543; 751 - BD 2350;
75 - BD 1550; 558 - BD 4550; 557 - BD 5328;
77 - BC 2350; 101 - BC 9250; 111 - BC 8720.
- 94 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

U 43 and U 559 have not been limited in their operational areas, as they
are about to return.
For the following boats operational areas are extended within the large
squares in which they are at present, but without any limitation to the east,
as follows:
U 552 in the latitude of part square 10
U 201 in the latitude of part square 40
U 556 in the latitude of part square 70
U 71 and U 101 - spacing 200 miles.
On departure for the new areas for attack U 73, 108 and 79 are
instructed to report total success and situation in the operational area.
U 73 did not sink any tonnage and had 1 pistol failure and 2 failures,
cause unknown. She sighted in BD 19 S.W. bound traffic and in BD 72
and BD 55 1 freighter.
1) Immediate operations against USA warships are permitted only when
they have passed over the western boundary of the blockade area by 20 or
more miles to the east.
2) Within this 20-mile strip on the western edge of the blockade area
procedure is to be the same as ordered outside the blockade area.
The following new attack areas have been ordered in the Southern area
in case further refuelling is effected:
UA south of a line with a bearing 400 from Freetown, U 103, 107 and
69 north therefrom.
21.6. U 111 reported from BC 42 having proceeded over Cape Race,
Johns, to BC 51. She encountered 100% fog and saw only one iceberg.
New operational areas are ordered as follows:
- 95 -

U 108, has sunk, up to now, 4 ships, 27,340 tons amongst them the
"Michael E" which was probably an auxiliary cruiser as she had a catapult
aircraft on board. She observed in BD 6370 heavy west-bound traffic but
has sighted nothing since 10th June. U 79 has sighted nothing since
leaving Iceland. 50% fog.

U 203 sighted the USA battleship "Texas" in the blockade area. She
reported attack unsuccessful. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
I am giving the following order as a precaution - USA warships should Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
not be attacked even in the blockade area, since the present permission to
do this does not seem to agree with the political views of the Fuehrer.
After discussions, however, with the Naval War Staff the following order
from the High Command will be given to the U-boats:

318
 For U 202 - AJ 3850; U 564 - AK 1150; U 96 - AL 8750, spacing 100
miles.
Regarding the procedure in connection with USA warships, the
following radio message has been sent to the boats, in accordance with
new instructions from Naval War Staff.
"The Fuehrer has ordered, for the next weeks, avoidance of any incident
with the U.S.A. Procedure accordingly in any doubtful case. Further,
attacks on warships within and outside the blockade area until further
notice only cruisers, battleships and aircraft carriers and only if these are
definitely recognized as enemy vessels. If warships are proceeding
without lights this is not to be taken as an indication that they are enemy
ones".
22.6. U 43 reported, upon enquiry, that she had sunk 3 ships, 10,000
tons, but encountered no other traffic.
U 204 sank the vessel "Mercier" (7,886 tons) on the 10th June. Since
then nothing further sighted. Returning.
23.6. Air reconnaissance detected an outward-bound convoy in the outlet
of the North Channel. The convoy is proceeding to AM 4243, course 3000.
The boats were informed accordingly but it is not assumed that any of
them is in a favorable position.
U 552 contacted an incoming convoy. She reported it once at 0400 and
then at 0800 in AL 2514, course 800, speed 7 knots. She was given
permission to attack and ordered to report on further contact, as there was
a possibility of the boats coming from the north, and U 202 and 564,
approaching the convoy. U 552 reported the enemy once again in AL 2372
on a zig-zag course. There were then no further reports of contact.
U 203 reported towards 1500 contact in AJ 9253 with an incoming
convoy. She had then to remain in contact and not attack, so that as many
boats as possible might be brought up to the convoy.
- 96 -

U 141 reported a 4,000 ton vessel sunk. She had a pistol failure and a
surface runner. Returning as torpedoes expended.

In the Southern area the supply ship "Lothringen" has apparently been
detected by the enemy, since U 103 reported returning not having met the
supply ship. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 107 reported that UA intends to proceed to Freetown. U 69 Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
requested refuelling on the 30th June from "Culebra", and that she herself
is returning direct to Lorient as her torpedoes are expended. 90,272 tons
in all sunk.

U 48 has left Kiel.

In the course of the evening U 203 gave further reports of contacts
which ceased, however, towards midnight. Boats operating against the
319
convoy were ordered, even if contact was broken off, to proceed further in In the case of the N.E. bound convoy also U 79 lost contact in the
the general direction of advance. meantime at 2000. U 371 reported returning owing to fuel shortage. This
was extremely early for the boat and regrettable for the situation at the
At the request of Group "West" U 66, putting out into the southern area, time, since U 371 was in a very favorable position as regards the reported
has been sent along route "B" since it is suspected that there are enemy convoy. U 71 reported by means of a short signal contact with the
warships here. convoy.The convoy was attacked at 1130 by U-boats, according to
intercept messages.
U 66 out into the southern area. In the night U 65 reported by a short signal that she had contacted the
N.E. convoy and later reported once more having been driven off in AK
U 98 put out from St. Nazaire. 1973. She was ordered to pursue and try to establish contact with every
means in her power.
24.6. U 79 contacted, at 0641 in AK 4445, the convoy reported
yesterday by U 203. She gave further reports of contact up to 1500. In the
meantime U 203 reported at 1330 that he had contacted a convoy, course - 97 -
S.W. in AK 4543. 2 convoys were, therefore, meeting in a very narrow
area. The boats were ordered to go into operation against the most
favorable one. All the boats, therefore, even those to the south which
cannot operate with any prospect of success against the N.E. bound
convoy, have good prospects for attack. U 203, however, gave only one
further report of contact at 1632 in AK 4460, 2200, speed 9 knots, but
subsequently reported at 2020 that she was returning owing to broken
muffler valve. 4 ships were sunk, 24,000 tons. It was wrong of the boat to
attack before other boats were up to the convoy. It was also wrong to Date Position, Wind, Weather
leave the convoy without an urgent reason, after expending her torpedoes. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
The Commanding Officer, who is still inexperienced and was on his first Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
operation, was, therefore, ordered to remain if possible with the convoy if
able to dive, and to report the last position and course of the enemy.
She then gave the last enemy position in AK 4467, course 2200, at
1700. She reported limited ability to dive and contact lost. Returning.It
cannot be established definitely until the boat returns whether it was
absolutely necessary for her to do so. In any case it was a mistake on the U 552 reported, on enquiry, from AK 3299: "pursued and depth-
part of the boat not to report immediately on starting back also on the last charged for 12 hours, Q ship, operating on convoy of U 79".
enemy position etc. In view of good prospects for other boats it would
even have been in order for the boat to continue to maintain contact U 147 was requested for the last time to give her position. No answer.
without regard to ability to dive. An order to this effect, however, is of no There is cause for grave anxiety regarding this boat.
purpose now, since the boat left the convoy several hours ago.
320
 In the South area U 123 was ordered to refuel from "Culebra" in the
night of 24th to 25th. She gave her position in DH 91. U 75 has started on return passage.

The Italian U-boat I 8 sighted in CG 1421 an aircraft carrier and 2 U 556 reported at 0958 that she suspected the convoy to be in AK 1420
destroyers. as she had sighted destroyers and aircraft. At 1045 she contacted the
convoy in AK 1423. The convoy was proceeding on a N.E. course, and
U 38, Commanding Officer, Lt. Liebe, has put into Lorient. Operation there were further reports of contact. U 552 could not operate against this
had to be broken off earlier than intended owing to lack of refuelling convoy owing to her fuel situation. She started on return passage from AK
facilities. Sinkings: 8 vessels, 54,259 tons. The Commanding Officer 1895.
has, therefore, sunk over 200,000 tons, and will be awarded oak leaves to
the Knight's Cross.
- 98 -
25.6. U 71 has started on return passage. She reported no traffic in the
operational area. While attacking the convoy she was depth-charged, but
is able to dive. According to an intercept message, the ships of the
outgoing convoy were to keep N. and W. of a line from AJ 5782 to BC
1517. This means, therefore, that the ships were to proceed, in spite of the
danger of ice and fog, over the Newfoundland Bank.

U 111 broke off as hopeless her passage to the N.W. against the
outgoing convoy. She reported overall thick fog. Since 7th June there Date Position, Wind, Weather
have been only 100 hours without fog. Owing to fuel situation she is and Sea State, Illumination, Events
continuing her return passage. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

In the South area U 123 carried out refueling from "Culebra" in the
night of 24th to 25th June.

UA has had no success up to now, only having encountered neutral

ships, and is proceeding to Freetown.
U 561 has put out from Kiel.
26.6. U 101 reported from square BC 3796 having broken off operations
against the S.W. convoy as they were hopeless owing to fog. Since the 9th
June she has sighted nothing and has sunk up to now 12,771 tons. She has
10 torpedoes left and has started on return passage.
321
U 201 and U 96 reported their positions on request, and U 564 also as
follows: AK 36, AL 75 and AK 21.
Further reports of contacts, according to which the convoy was
proceeding on an easterly course, and details regarding escorts were
received from U 556. U 564 and U 201 reported by a short signal "Yes",
i.e. they were up to the convoy. According to an intercept message 4
tankers, 37,286 tons, have been torpedoed up to now.
 The last report from U 556 was at 2330 from AK 2275. U 143 was sent to Bergen for refueling, so that 2 boats always, of the
three stationed north of the Shetlands, might be in position.
U 98 has been assigned, as operational area, square AJ 83, spacing 200
miles. U 146 is to make advances into the area left by U 143.

U 107 gave passage report from DH 47. In the Southern area U 69 detected a convoy, in the early morning
hours, in DT 6220, course 00, speed 10 knots. In a second
U 141 has put into Lorient.

27.6. At 0203 U 556 reported the convoy in AK 2291. She observed - 99 -

that a boat sank one tanker and one freighter. U 79 is returning from AK
2401. She sank a 10,000 ton tanker, this probably being one of those
already known by an intercept message to have been sunk.
There were no further reports of contact until towards midday. U 651
and 562 reported by means of a short signal "Yes", i.e. they were up to the
convoy. U 651 then gave, upon request, a contact report at 1400,
according to which the position of the convoy was AK 3278, course 800,
speed 9 knots. There were escorts around the convoy. No further reports.
At 2030 U 651 reported from AK 3293 that the convoy had dispersed Date Position, Wind, Weather
into groups and single vessels. Contact lost. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 562 was pursued and depth-charged for 4 hours. She reported fog. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
She had contact last with a heavily escorted (8 destroyers, 2 corvettes) part
of the convoy (15 vessels). No contact for 9 hours. Port coupling faulty.
The convoy has, therefore, dispersed, the valuable vessels apparently
heavily escorted by destroyers. Probably none of the boats still have
contact.
radio message she reported two vessels sunk, one probably, total result
U 552 reported a torpedo failure. Torpedoes expended in AK 2818. In 30,724 tons, torpedoes expended (DT 3971). She was ordered to maintain
this area a sinking was also reported by intercept messages. contact, as far as her fuel allowed, for U 123. U 123 made a contact at
1230 in DT 3587. There was air cover over the convoy. She was given
U 77 operated against the S.W. bound convoy reported by U 203. She permission to attack and ordered to report on further contact. U 66 was to
reported extensive fog and, in the east half of square BC, slight traffic. operate against the convoy.
She sank the vessels "Tresillian", "Alexandria" and "Anna Burgaris", At 2200 there was a further report of contact from U 123 in DT 3415.
together 13,700 tons. The convoy was then proceeding on a course of 3100.

322
 Refueling from "Culebra" is planned for U 69 for the night of 29th to
30th June. - 100 -

28.6. The following reports have been received from the boats operating
against the north convoy:
U 201 was not able to carry out attack owing to fog. She has had no
further contact since 1500 of the previous day, and has also seen nothing in
the position last reported by U 651. U 564 sank with certainty 2 vessels,
13,000 tons, and a third one (5,000 tons) probably.
On this convoy, therefore, there has been no contact for hours and it
appears to have escaped to the east into the more strongly defended area Date Position, Wind, Weather
and in order to prevent unnecessary fuel consumption, I had just ordered and Sea State, Illumination, Events
the boats which were off this convoy to withdraw to the S.W., when U 651 Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
again made contact in AL 2278 at 1530. The enemy was proceeding with
course east, speed 10 knots. Boats which were favorably placed to this
position were to operate again against the convoy, otherwise to report
"No" and withdraw to the S.W. U 651 was given freedom of attack. There
were further reports of contact from U 651 until 2358 from AL 3323. U
201 was the only boat to report "No", meaning that she was not operating The boats will be assigned their operational areas in loose disposition,
against the convoy. She was chased by an anti-submarine group with so that they can be concentrated at a given time. The boats on return
aircraft from AL 2195 to AL 1234. I assume, therefore, that all other boats passage have been instructed to remain as long as possible in the area
in this area are operating against the convoy. ordered.
British vessel "Grayburn", 6,342 tons, was sunk in AL 3356, according
to an intercept message (probably by U 651). In the Southern area U 123 contacted the north-bound convoy. She
reported it at 0200 in DT 2623, with course 2800, speed 7 knots. Up to
U 558 and 553 were operating against the S.W. bound convoy reported now she has sunk 1 tanker and 2 freighters, with 20,000 tons. No contact
by U 203. Both reported that operations without a shadower were after being pursued and depth-charged. She pressed on and made contact
hopeless and were therefore broken off. They reported extensive fog, and again at 1430 in DT 2246, was again driven off and kept up pursuit. The
nothing sighted. convoy is now proceeding on a course 3000. U 66 has been ordered to
operate at maximum speed against the convoy.
According to estimated dead reckoning the convoy reported by U 69,
still being contacted by U 123, will be in the area of the Northern boats on U 109 has put out from Lorient.
3rd to 4th July. I shall attempt to intercept this convoy once more up
there, and the boats will be assembled in the area formed by squares 10 U 204 has put into Brest.
and 20 of the large square BE and square 30 of the large square BD.

323
 29.6. There have been no further reports from the boats operating - 101 -
against the north-bound convoy. It was once again detected at 0745 in AL
3666 by air reconnaissance.

At 0720 air reconnaissance reported in AL 9121 two cruisers and 2

merchant vessels, probably a convoy, course 2400. This course is in the
exact direction of the new disposition of the boats ordered yesterday.
Early morning reconnaissance has, therefore, been requested from the Air
Corps, Atlantic, for the 30th June in the area in which the convoy is
expected tomorrow morning. In order to make more certain that the Date Position, Wind, Weather
convoy would not turn away from the favorable S.W. course, to the S., I and Sea State, Illumination, Events
intended that radio traffic should be sent to create the impression of danger Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
in this area E. of 230. Returning boats E. of 230 W were, therefore,
requested to give their position. The following reported:
U 71 - BE 64; U 552 - BE 31; U 371 - BE 29; U 43 - 36 hours off
port of destination.

U 552 reported a Q ship this morning in AL 9424.
U 201 has been assigned AL and AM as operational area.
U 562 reported from AK 61 that she still had all her torpedoes not
having fired any owing to the weather.
The two Italian boats I 8 and I 10 have been sent out from Bordeaux to
operate against this convoy.
According to intercept message the two harbors of Takoradi and Lagos
have been closed by the British Admiralty until further notice. Success of
operation by U 69. It is assumed that several vessels were sunk.

In the Southern area U 103 apparently encountered single vessels from
the convoy of U 123. She reported 2 vessels, 11,472 GRT, sunk in DG
9240. THe convoy must, therefore, have been near U 103. U 103 was to
keep contact as far as her fuel supplies permitted and, if necessary, request
"Culebra".
At 1430 U 123 reported that the convoy once again in DG 9421, course
3150, speed 7 knots, open formation, and at 2205 that she had been driven
off in DG 27 by the auxiliary cruiser "Rio Azul" had then sunk it and was
continuing pursuit.
324
U 203 has put into St. Nazaire.
U 143 has put into Bergen.
The Commanding Officer of U 204, Lt. Kell came in to give his report.
This was the first operation by Commanding Officer and boat.
He encountered little traffic. Sunk: 1 vessel - 7,886 tons, 1 drifter.
The Commanding Officer of U 203, Lt. Mutzelburg, came in to give his
report.
This was also the first operation by Commanding Officer and boat. His
mistake in withdrawing, as the only boat contacting, from the S.W. bound
convoy on the 24th June without urgent reasons and without immediately
informing B.d.U., has been admitted and will serve as experience for Date Position, Wind, Weather
future cases. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Sunk: 4 vessels, 24,000 GRT. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

30.6. In connection with the awaited convoy S.W. Ireland, the boats
have been ordered to look out for a beacon signal from aircraft sent in
against this convoy. Nothing, however , was sent. The aircraft apparently
did not find the convoy. At 1615 there was a special intercept message,
according to which the position of the awaited convoy at 2000 on the 29th The following boats reported sinkings from the N.E. convoy:
June was about 510 N., 220 W. The boats were ordered to proceed to the U 203 - 2 vessels 12,000 tons.
S.E. at maximum speed and then sent position BE 1917 calculated by dead U 371 - 1 vessel 7,000 tons.
reckoning for 1700. U 564 - 3 vessels 16,000 tons.
U 564 - 1 vessel 5,000 tons. probably.
The Air Corps, Atlantic, was asked to send out intensified air U 79 - 1 tanker 10,356 tons. torpedoed.
reconnaissance on the morning of 1st July in the area BE 41 to BE 46 1 vessel 1,524 tons sunk.
where the convoy was expected to be at this time. Towards evening the 53,380 tons.
Air Corps, Atlantic informed me that at 0900 this morning a Condor
machine had sighted the convoy in BE 2145. There was no report from According to intercept messages, the following were reported
the sea as radio was faulty. The position is somewhat different from that torpedoed:
of the special intercept message but it is unlikely to be more accurate. In Vessel "Malaya" 8,651 tons.
order not to create confusion, this position was not given to the boats. Vessel "Maasdam" 8,812 tons.
Tanker "Kongsgaard" 9,467 tons.
U 202 reported from AJ 3838 not having fired any torpedoes as she had Tanker "Tibia" 10,356 tons.
sighted nothing. U 564 sank another vessel of 3,000 GRT and her position The following were reported sunk:
at 0425 was in AK 15. Tanker "Inverlee" 9,158 tons.
Vessel "Grayburn" 6,342 tons.

- 102 - Of these U 79 probably sank the tanker "Tibia". How far U 564
contributed to these sinkings and torpedoings, can only be established
definitely after the boat has returned.
The actual extent of the sinkings in the convoy can no longer be
confirmed as the two boats which were up to the convoy for the longest
period, U 556 and U 651, are no longer reporting. They must be
considered lost.

325
 For the boats leaving the N.E. convoy the following attack areas have "U 43" - off Lorient
been ordered: "U 371" - off Brest
U 202 - AJ 5345; U 564 - AJ 3785; U 562 - AJ 6765; U 561 is at first "U 71" - BF 44
to proceed to the above attack area of U 564. "U 552" - BF 42
"U 201" - Operational area AL
In the Southern area U 69 has carried out refueling and gave her "U 562" - AK 54
passage report in DH 69. "U 564" - AJ 37
"U 561" - AL 12
U 95 has put out from St. Nazaire. U 68 has put out from Kiel. U 43 "U 751" - BD 62
has put into Lorient. "U 559" - BD 18
"U 557" - BD 66
Reichsminister Dr. Todt has handed over in St. Nazaire the first three "U 553" - AK 56
completed U-boat pens. "U 202" - AJ 53
"U 111" - BD 62
"U 108" - BD 55
(signed): DÖNITZ "U 101" - BD 62
"U 98" - BD 57
"U 96" - AL 77
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log "U 95" - BF 55
"U 79" - BE 14
1 - 15 July 1941 "U 77" - BD 27
"U 75" - BE 37
PG30292 "U 66" - in the Kattegat
"U 137" - North of the Shetlands
"U 146"
"U 138" - off Gibraltar
"U 147", "U 556", "U 651" must be considered lost
Date Position, Wind, Weather "U 69" - DH 35
and Sea State, Illumination, Events "U 66" - DG 20
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. "U 123" - DG 20
"U 103" - DG 20
"U 107" - BF 57
"U 109" - CG 17

1.7. Positions at 0800 on the 1st July:

326
 U 751 reported return passage begun. She sank a freighter of 5,500 As the aircraft apparently did not find the convoy again the boats were
GRT on the 14th June, but observed no other traffic. requested to give their position. From the resulting

Boats in large square BD were ordered to keep radio silence. They were
to look out for a radio beacon as from 0700, since air reconnaissance was - 104 -
operating against the south-bound convoy.

At 1050 aircraft detected the convoy and sent out a radio beacon. They
reported it in BE 1990, course 2100, medium speed. 5 boats which had
fixed the radio beacon reported to B.d.U. The point of intersection gave
an approximate position of the convoy at 1100 in about BE 5143. This
position was communicated to the boats with the course of 2100 reported
by aircraft. They were to operate on the basis of this report. The first
boats could have made contact towards 1600, but nothing happened. Date Position, Wind, Weather
Either the convoy was not sighted owing to bad weather or it made an and Sea State, Illumination, Events
extensive avoiding movement. This was the first occasion on which the Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
position of a convoy reported by aircraft reconnaissance was successfully
established by fixes of the U-boats. It seems that bad deterioration in
visibility prevented the boats from approaching. Fresh air reconnaissance
had to be requested for the next morning.

According to a special intercept message there was a convoy at 2000 on reports it was seen that boats U 79, 108, 77, 96 and 557 were in the
the 30th June in AK 2650 or 2660, course 38. The boats were informed by vicinity of the supposed convoy position. Further air reconnaissance for
radio. tomorrow morning has been requested.

In the Southern area U 123 and U 66 were ordered to continue their
passage to the south. U 66 was to report her position. U 103 was to
continue her return passage, if necessary requesting "Culebra".
U 371 put into Brest.
U 43 put into Lorient.
2.7. The boats operating against the south-bound convoy were ordered to
look out for a beacon signal from aircraft reconnaissance as from 1030.
At 1645 U 108 contacted a west-bound convoy in BE 7176.
From further reports of contact from U 108 I have come to the
conclusion that it is not the south-bound convoy on which operations are
now being made but another one probably proceeding from Gibraltar to
England, since the mean course is between 300 and 3200. U 77 requested
beacon signal and reported position. She was therefore in close proximity.
The other boats were ordered, as far as fuel supplies allowed, to operate
against the convoy of U 108, as this was more certain than the south-
bound one, against which the boats with less fuel were to continue to
operate.

327
 At 2214 U 108 lost contact in BD 9362 owing to fog. Here also the 3.7. The south-bound convoy was not detected today either. Attempts
unfavorable weather spoiled a promising operation. must be made at least to detect the convoy reported by U 123 by a loose
disposition in front of its probable direction of advance.
U 559 reported from BE 46 return passage. She had all her torpedoes
still but her main periscope was out of order.
- 105 -
U 561 was assigned, as operational area, square AK 4525, spacing 200
miles.

U 66 reported from DG 58 having sunk 3 vessels, 16,240 GRT, in DG

60 and damaged a vessel in the course of an artillery engagement. She has
3 pistol failures and 5 failures, cause unknown.

The fresh water generator on U 109 is faulty. She suggests that the
necessary parts be dismantled from U 103, which is on return passage, Date Position, Wind, Weather
stored on "Culebra" and then reinstalled on U 109. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 97 put out from St. Nazaire.

U 331 put out from Kiel.

U 552 and U 71 put into St. NAzaire.

U 107 put into Lorient.
The Commanding Officer of U 43, Lt. Lüth, came in to give his
report.The boat sighted little during the whole course of the operation, the
weather often being very unfavorable. Sunk: 2 steamers and 1 sailing
vessel, 9,950 GRT.
The following new operational areas were ordered:
U 95 - BE 75 UA - BD 95
U 97 - BD 75 U 98 - BD 85
U 77 reported having searched between BD 6844 and BD 6592, without
success, for the convoy reported by U 108 on the 2nd July. Returning.

The Commanding Officer of U 552, Lt. Topp, came in to give his
report. This efficient Commanding Officer carried out a successful
operation in the difficult operational area of the North Channel outlet, and
sank 3 vessels, 25,548 GRT. A series of torpedo failures prevented the
success from being any greater.
U 137 has started on return passage. She still has all her torpedoes,
there being no traffic in the operational area. This return passage is very
premature. It is surprising as the boat has only been at sea for 14 days.
The Commanding Officer will be asked to give a reason for it.

328
 U 69 sank in DH 19 a 5,000 ton ship (4 guns, 6 Flak machine guns) U 137 put into Bergen.
with artillery.

For U 103 refueling is planned from "Culebra" in the night of 5th - 6th - 106 -
July.
The exchange of parts through "Culebra" has been ordered. U 109 is to
operate in the Azores area until next new moon.

The Commanding Officer of U 107, Lt. Hessler, came in to give his

report: The boat sank, during operations lasting from 29th March to 2nd
July on the African coast 11 steamers, 2 tankers and 1 auxiliary cruiser -
90,793 GRT. This was an outstanding achievement on the part of the
Commanding Officer and crew. It should be noted particularly that, apart Date Position, Wind, Weather
from two, all the ships had their name boards covered. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The Commanding Officer of U 71, Lt. Flachsenberg, found himself in a
very difficult situation through depth-charge pursuit, during this first
operation, owing to his inexperience, but managed to come through it by
calm, courageous and decisive action (he surfaced and withdrew under
artillery fire).
U 101 put into Lorient.
The Commanding Officer of U 371, Lt. Driver, at the beginning of his
first operation used up the fuel supplies of the boat very quickly by 5.7. New operational areas have been ordered for the following:
unnecessarily high speed, so that in the decisive moment when pursuing a U 68 - AJ 3780 U 97 - BD 7550
convoy, he had to return owing to fuel shortage. This mistake has been U 564 - AK 7730
accredited to experience. Sink: 2 ships - 17,000 tons.

U 75 put into St. Nazaire. U 79 reported from BF 5443 3 suspicious ships (steamers and war ship)
in sight, course south. The enemy was lost from sight again soon.
4.7. U 108 has started on return passage. She sank 32 ships, 11,848
GRT. Nothing further to report. U 96 sank a south-bound, escorted steamer of 12,000 GRT in BD 9419,
and heard a hit on a second steamer. Extensive damage from depth
The Commanding Officer of U 75. Lt. Ringelmann, came in to give his charges. Return passage begun.
report. Nothing special to note.
Sunk: 3 vessels, 18,256 GRT.

329
 The Commanding Officer of U 101, Lt. Mengersen, came in to give his
report. The boat sighted little and had very bad weather. Otherwise a
well-carried out operation.
Sunk: 2 steamers, 12,751 GRT.

U 751 and U 559 put into St. Nazaire.

U 79 put into Lorient.

Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 126 put out from Kiel. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
6.7. U 74 was ordered to take up position of U 96, which was returning
on account of depth-charge damage.

U 143 put out from Bergen. U 103 reported refueling carried out from
"Culebra".
The Commanding Officer of U 559, Lt. Heidtmann, came in to give his
report. The boat had been sent into the Denmark Straits on instructions
from the Naval War Staff. Here her periscope became bent in the ice and
she was sent for operations in the southern part of the operational area -
only fit for night attacks - sighted little and sank nothing.
The Commanding Officer of U 751, Lt. Bigalk, utilized all operational
possibilities which arose during his first trip. Sunk: 1 steamer - 5,500
GRT.
The Commanding Officer of U 79, Lt. Kaufmann. came in to give his
report. Kaufmann was on his first operation with the boat, during which
difficult situations were experienced for a new boat while making attacks
on the N.E. convoy. These situations were skillfully and efficiently
handled by the Commanding Officer. Sunk: 1 steamer - 1,524 GRT. 1
tanker, 10,356 tons ("Tibia") torpedoed.
- 107 -
330
7.7. Air reconnaissance sighted at 0730 in AM 4266 an outward-bound
convoy, course 2600. This report was given to the boats and strong air
reconnaissance requested in this area for tomorrow morning.
U 331 has been assigned as operational area, square BD 2423.
West of Gibraltar an Italian U-boat sighted an outward-bound convoy at
1600 in CG 8856, course 2050. U 103, which should be in the vicinity,
was informed regarding this convoy.
The Commanding Officer of U 108, Lt. Scholz, came in to give his
report. This was a well-carried out and successful operation. In all 7 ships
were sunk, 38,188 GRT.
U 111, Commanding Officer, Lt. Kleinschmidt, has made his first
operation. Owing to refueling carried out from tanker "Belchen", the boat
was able to remain at sea for 9 weeks in all. She was mostly in a position
very far to the west, and carried out reconnaissance of the Belle Isle Straits
and off Cape Roer amongst other things. Chances of success, therefore,
were restricted very much for a time. Apart from this, she had a great deal
of fog and poor visibility. In view of these facts, and considering that it
was the first operation by the boat and the Commanding Officer, the total
result of 2 ships sunk - 14,500 GRT, is quite satisfactory.
U 77 put into St. Nazaire.
U 111 and U 108 put into Lorient.
8.7. U 565 left Drontheim for long-distance patrol.
U 69 put into St. Nazaire.
9.7. The following reports were received from boats:
U 557 has started on return passage. She had 70% fog and only sank an
8,000 GRT vessel. Her last position was in area BE.
U 109 has been in the Azores area for 7 days but observed no traffic
apart from an auxiliary ship which she chased without success.
U 564 reported from the area S.E. of Greenland that she had sighted
nothing for 4 days.
U 373 and U 401 put out from Drontheim, for long-distance patrol.
U 96 put into St. Nazaire.
U 558, Lt. Krech, put into Brest from operations against the enemy.
- 108 -
331
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
This was the first operation by boat and Commanding Officer. Apart
from one steamer in a heavy storm no further merchant ships were sighted.
No results. It is not possible to judge the Commanding Officer on the
basis of this operation.
The Naval War Staff has left to the discretion of B.d.U., further
operations by the 3 small U-boats which were sent in for action in the area
of the Shetlands in connection with the operations against Russia. Only U
143 of these boats is at present in the operational area. She has been given
freedom of operation in the area west of the North Channel.
U 96 put into St. Nazaire.
U 558 put into Brest.
U 401 and 372 put out from Drontheim.
10.7. U 553 is returning. She has sighted nothing in the last few days.
U 431 put out from Drontheim, U 203 put out from St. Nazaire for
long-distance patrol.
The time during which, in agreement with the Naval War Staff, our own
boats were allowed to operate between 470 30' N and 420 N. (route A)
expires on the 13th July at midnight. The U-boats at present in this area
have, therefore, been ordered to take up the following new operational and Sea State, Illumination, Events
areas by 13th July at midnight: Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 74 - square BD 4465; U 95 - square BD 1619; U 97 - square BC
9215; U 98 - square BD 3493.

U 126 and 565, proceeding out from home waters, have been assigned
as operational areas the following:
U 126 - AK 9735; U 565 - BC 3645. Spacing for all 200 miles. U 557 put into Lorient.

Air reconnaissance reported an incoming convoy in AM 4270, course 12.7. U 201 encountered no traffic in square AM 40, and is moving her
700. operational area. She has been given freedom of action to search for
targets with her remaining fuel supplies. Up to now she has not fired a
U 124 put out from Lorient for operations against the enemy. torpedo.

U 146 put into Bergen. U 66 has arrived in the Freetown area. She did not detect any further
traffic in the area of Cape Verden.
U 203 put out from St. Nazaire.
U 103 put into Lorient.
U 431 put out from Drontheim.
U 94 put out from St. Nazaire.
11.7. U 124 had to return owing to engine trouble.
U 93 put out from St. Nazaire.
U 98 reported 2 vessels sunk, 10,842 GRT, in the area CE 10. Nothing
further to report. 13.7. The following new operational area were ordered:
U 203 - BE 1555; U 431 - AK 4756; U 372 - AJ 5559; U 401 - AJ
9855; spacing 200 miles.
- 109 -
UA reported from the Southern area, she had sighted neither traffic nor
air patrol since the 1st July off Freetown and on the 200 m. line. She has
started on return passage.

The Commanding Officers of U 69, 96, 557 and 103 came in to give
their reports.

The Commanding Officer of U 69, Lt. Metzler, carried out an operation

Date Position, Wind, Weather in the south with a boat type VII. He carried out with caution and great
332
skill the very difficult task of laying mines in Takoradi and Lagos, so that
the British Admiralty was forced to close both harbors. Apart from this he
sank 6 ships, 36,224 GRT.
Lt. Lehmann, the Commanding Officer of U 96, had to break off
operations prematurely owing to leakages in the exhaust valves and one
diving fuel tank, caused by depth-charges. He sank a 12,000 GRT steamer
and torpedoed a further one of 5,000 GRT.
The Commanding Officer of U 557, Lt. Paulssen, was on the first
operation with his boat. He had much bad weather and fog, and sighted
little. There was little success from the operation apart from the 8,000
GRT steamer which was sunk.
Lt. Cdr. Schütze, the Commanding Officer of U 103, sank 13 ships,
67,717 GRT, on this southern operation. Unfortunately, amongst these
was the Italian vessel "Ernani" which was reported but did not correspond
in appearance to the facts given in the report. Schütze will leave command
of the U 103 after this operation and become Senior Officer of the 4th U-
Flotilla.
- 110 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
333
14.7. U 202 reported from AJ 3927. She still has all her torpedoes and
observed no traffic.
The following operational areas will be taken up:
U 431 - AD 9845 spacing 300 miles,
U 97 - AK 4756 spacing 200 miles,
U 141 put out from Lorient.
U 143 put into Bergen.
15.7. U 201 is returning. The boat has been assigned an unlimited
operational area since 29th June and has sighted nothing. The problem of
finding the enemy is always the most difficult one. Only when the number
of boats is larger and there are more of them to keep a look-out, will the
situation become more favorable. It is right to dispose the boats in such a
manner that further boats can benefit from one report. I shall, therefore,
assemble more closely those boats which are at present loosely disposed.
The intermediate areas, therefore, will become somewhat narrower and
cooperation after sighting perhaps better. As regarding finding the enemy
the narrow disposition will hardly be of any practical advantage, since the
areas surveyed by the boats do not alter as the enemy may be expected
anywhere and it is the same whether the boats are disposed a bit more
loosely or closer together. The 4 boats in square AL should be in a good
position for the south-bound traffic and should to a certain extent also,
intercept the S.W. traffic from and to the North Channel. Apart from this,
they are in a favorable position in case of any air reconnaissance report to
keep further contacts there.
The following operational area have been ordered:
U 372 - AJ 2950; U 431 - AJ 3850;
U 565 - AK 7550; U 331 - AK 8150;
U 562 - BD 2550; U 561 - BD 3450; "U 565" - AK 72
U 98 - AL 8750; U 203 - AL 7250; "U 74" - AK 8750
U 401 - AJ 6650 ; U 68 - AK 4550; "U 562" - BD 25
U 74 - AK 8750; U 126 - AK 8950; "U564" - BD 53
U 564 - BD 5350; U 97 - AL 7750; "U 98" - AL 87
U 95 - AL 8250; "U 95" - BD 31
"U 401" - AJ 66
"U 68" - AK 4550
U 124 put out from Lorient. "U 331" - AK 81
"U 126" - AK 89
U 125 put out from Kiel. "U 561" - BD 34
"U 97" - BD 18
"U 203" - AL 72
(Signed): DÖNITZ "U 141" is in BF 42

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log Outward-bound "U 125" in AN 36

16 - 31 July 1941 Returning "U 201" in BE 63

"U 202" in AK 67 and "U 553" in BE 63
PG30293
In the southern area: "U 66" in ET, "U 123" in ET 55 and UA returning in
EJ 82
Proceeding into the southern operational area are:
"U 93" - BF 76
Date Position, Wind, Weather "U 94" - BE 97
and Sea State, Illumination, Events "U 124" - BF 58
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

In Lorient: "U 43, 38, 101, 106, 557, 111, 79, 105, 107, 103".
In St. Nazaire: "U 77, 96, 46, 559, 71, 73, 75, 552, 69, 751".
In Brest: "U 204, 558, 371".
In Kiel: "U 146".
16.7. Positions on the morning of the 16th July: In Bergen: "U 137, 143".
In the North Atlantic:
"U 372" - AJ 29 As I am not quite sure what the traffic situation is at the southern point
"U 431" - AJ 38 of Greenland in view of ice and fog conditions, U 372 has been ordered to
334
advance out of her operational area (AJ 2950) up to the ice limits in the
direction of the southern point of Greenland. There she will report on the
traffic situation and ice and fog conditions.
Refueling by U-boats from "Culebra" is no longer possible at present
owing to a British protest to the Spanish government. As an alternative,
refueling is proposed by the Naval War Staff from "MORO".
U 109 which was to have refueled during the next few days from
"Culebra" will be diverted.
17.7. U 564, upon enquiry, reported from her operational area no traffic.
At 0900 air reconnaissance reported a convoy in AM 1992, course 2800,
consisting of 36 ships, and 5 destroyers. The aircraft added: position
inaccurate for U-boats.
- 112 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
335
As a preliminary measure U 203, 95 and 98 were ordered to proceed on
a northerly course. U 126 and U 97 are to operate in the direction of
advance of the convoy, 2800.
Further air reconnaissance has been requested for this evening.
According to an intercept message the position of the convoy at 0830 was
in AM 4265. This report was passed on to the boats. At 2023 air
reconnaissance detected the convoy for the second time and sent out
beacon signals. The position observed was AL 6377, and course 2700.
The beacon signals were heard by two boats and reported. The point of
intersection of these two fixes agreed practically with the position reported
by the machine. It was given to the boats once again. A second intercept
message came in, which gave the position of the convoy at 2100 in AM
4421. The cross bearing appeared to be more certain to the relative
position of the U-boats.
The five boats sent in for operations against this convoy were ordered to
proceed at maximum speed on the mean course of the convoy of 2600.
There will be air reconnaissance at 0900 tomorrow morning in the area of
the convoy. The boats should look out for beacon signals.
For the remaining boats I have ordered course E., cruising speed, so that
they may be brought nearer to the convoy.
U 561, 562, 564, which no longer have much fuel, are to remain in their
operational areas.
U 125 reported heavy thrusting of the port propeller. She is proceeding
to Bergen for docking.
The Southern boats were informed that there are no more facilities for
refueling owing to elimination of "Culebra". Refueling only in cases of
emergency from "Moro".
18.7. At 0850 air reconnaissance reported the convoy in AL 6652,
course 2500 and sent beacon signals. 2 boats received and reported the
beacon signals, and, according to their point of intersection, the position of
the convoy at 0900 in AL 6536 was given to the boats. An intercept
message was received, according to which the position of the convoy at
0902 was to be assumed in AL 6687, with present course 1950.
The course of 1950 appears, as a mean course, to be very far south,
especially as, according to Intercept Control Station, this was not an OG
convoy which would now have been proceeding in the direction of
Gibraltar, but an outgoing Atlantic convoy. If the intercept message of the
morning of the 17th July and that just received were connected, this gave a
south-westerly mean course which is very likely. The five boats operating
were informed that the course of the convoy was possibly more southerly
than 260. The boats to the west had in any case to be drawn nearer to the
convoy. They have to be assembled in an area
- 113 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
where they would meet the convoy at dawn on the 20th July. (An
earlier meeting was not possible in view of distance being too great).
I therefore ordered them temporarily into a patrol line from AK 6525 to
BE 1455. I can later alter this patrol line according to the situation. Since,
up to the evening, no boat contacted the convoy, I decided to dispose the 5
336
operative boats in a patrol line from AL 8161 to AL 9759 in front of the
probable direction of advance of the convoy. The boats should have
reached their positions tomorrow morning at 0900. U 202, returning, is to
extend the patrol line to the S.E. The boats were to report their position by
means of a short signal if they could not carry out the order. In the course
of the night U 97 reported in AL 47, U 95 in AL 91, U 126 in AL 81 and U
98 in AL 55, the latter boat also reporting return passage. U 98, therefore,
was eliminated for further operations.
U 372, which had been ordered to advance to the southern point of
Greenland, reported no traffic observed up to 580 30' North, no ice,
frequent fog. From the Fuehrer's Headquarters support has been requested
for the Army Group Dietl fighting in Norway by transfer of U-boats into
the Arctic. U 81 and U 652 which were proceeding into the operational
area were, therefore, ordered to Kola Bay, Murmansk.
The Southern boats were informed of the departure of a British convoy
from Gibraltar, the position of which, according to an intercept message,
was at 0850 on the 18th July in CG 9752 with course W.N.W.
19.7. Today's air reconnaissance, with only one reconnaissance and one
meteorological machine, brought no result. As no further strong air
reconnaissance can be made owing to lack of machines, I have decided to
put the 5 operational boats into the large patrol line intended for the 20th
July, and to dispose this in such a manner, according to courses and
positions calculated, that the boats will be in front of the convoy at dawn.
The patrol line will be ordered for the 20th July at 0900 from AK 9655 to
BE 5117. The boats are to take up position in the following sequence: U
431, 401, 68, 565, 331, 74, 562, 561, 564, 97, 203, 226, 95. The boats are
to cruise backwards and forwards in the patrol line according to special
instructions.
From the Southern area UA reported return passage, no traffic. She
requested refueling from "Moro".
U 201 put into Brest.

U 553 put into St. Nazaire.
20.7. There have been no reports from the boats in the northern area.
Towards evening it transpired that the convoy had escaped. It cannot be
said to which side of the patrol line or whether through it. I shall keep the
boats in the patrol line until tomorrow
- 114 -
U 123 sank the "Auditor" (5,444 GRT). She reported neutral traffic in
ET. Off Freetown heavy incoming and outgoing traffic by USA ships has
been observed. Anti-submarine activities daily on the incoming routes.
Both boats were ordered to move their operational area into the area off
the Cape Verde Islands up to 300 West, in case chances of success appear
too slight off Freetown. I suspect the most important point of the traffic to
be further west than 300, since, following on the great successes by U-
boats in the area east of 300, a final by-passing of this area now is only too
probable. My request to the Naval War Staff for permission to operate
also west of 300 was, however, refused in view of our own prizes
proceeding there.

The Commanding Officers of U 201 and 553 came in to give their

report.

Lt. Schnee, Commanding Officer of U 201, returned without having

achieved any success. He only sighted one vessel in the whole operation
during which he had a free operational area for the most part. Lt.
Date Position, Wind, Weather Thurmann, the Commanding Officer of U 553, sank 2 ships, 10,590 GRT.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events Nothing to remark.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The lack of traffic in July is significant. The bad visibility at present in
all areas of the North Atlantic may have a lot to do with this. However, I
am under the impression that the number of single vessels has again
become considerably less. Only very fast ships have been encountered
just lately as single vessels, unless U-boats out in the west accidentally
morning and then order a new disposition. encountered vessels of a dispersed convoy. The difficult problem as ever
is to find convoys. For this purpose it is desirable to assemble forces so
An outward-bound convoy was confirmed at 1900 in AM 1198 by that nearby boats can make use of a report on sighting by one U-boat.
means of a special intercept message. There are no prospects of
operations. I have, therefore, ordered the following new operational areas which
should serve to intercept the south and southwest traffic and which also
From the Southern area U 66 reported a 7,000 GRT vessel sunk in DT appear favorable for cooperation with aircraft.
95.
The following will occupy, concentrating in the middle, a 50 mile wide
east-west patrol line, western boundary 20 degrees:
337
 U 203 - AM 4111 U 74 - AM 4177 In the southern area I intend that the 3 south-bound boats, U 93, 94 and
U 95 - AM 4711 U 97 - AM 7111. 124, shall proceed in rake formation. They have been ordered to take up
Operational areas, with spacing 100 miles, are to be taken up as position at 0800 on the 23rd July at about 350 N., U 94 at 290, U 93 at 270
follows: and U 124 at 250 West, subsequently proceeding south, with days run
U 401 - AL 6410 U 372 - AL 4158 approximately 100 miles. They are to make sweeps up to 10 to each side.
U 431 - AL 4583 U 565 - AL 5781 This rake formation runs along the western edge of the permitted
U 68 - AL 8259 U 331 - AL 9455 operational area. If this does not achieve any success it will be certain that
U 126 - AL 9859 single traffic has been moved entirely west of 300. In this case, further
operations by U-boats in the Southern area would be useless, since in this
wide area the interception of slight convoy traffic would have too little
prospects of success.
- 115 -
U 79 put out from Lorient.

22.7. U 203 has proceeded too far to the south. She is to take up the
position of U 97. U 97, 95 and 74 will each move one position further to
the north.

At 2130 the Italian U-boat "Barbarigo" reported a convoy in CF 8989,

course 330 degrees. "Barbarigo" has been ordered by me not to attack, but
Date Position, Wind, Weather to make every effort to maintain contact. Relying on the fact that he will
and Sea State, Illumination, Events succeed in this, I decided to operate against this convoy with those
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. southern boats which were in a favorable position to the convoy. The
boats were given orders accordingly and were to report their position by
means of a short signal when able to operate against the convoy. U 93
reported in CF 75 and U 203 from BE 4850. U 203 does not belong to the
Southern boats but has come so far south in pursuit of the fast single
vessel, that she is now in a position 600 miles before the convoy.
U 561, 562 and 564 will remain S.W. of this disposition without
limitation of operational areas, as these boats may report returning at any U 204 put out from Brest.
moment.
23.7. U 93 and U 203 were ordered to break off operations against the
U 203 chased a fast single vessel on course south, but did not catch up convoy reported yesterday by Italian U-boats, since unfortunately no
with it. U 126 reported 2 torpedo misses on a steamer but no traffic further reports have been received from the Italian boat keeping contact.
observed up to now. U 141 reported having moved her operational area into the middle part of

338
AM. The following operational areas have been ordered for boats newly 24.7. The Intercept Service has confirmed two convoys, these being an
arrived in this area: outward-bound Gibraltar convoy and an incoming SL convoy.

U 79 - east-west patrol line 50 miles wide with the concentration in AM The boats in a southerly position will be sent in to operate against the
7111. outward-bound convoy. They have been sent the following radio message:
"Intercept Service reports a convoy bound for Gibraltar at 0100 on the
24th July, AM 7422, speed 7 knots, course west. Seek contact on the
- 116 - following convoy courses: U 79 at 190 to 2100, U 126 at 210 to 2300, U
331 at 230 to 2500, U 68 at 250 to 2700, U 561, 562, 564, 203 freedom of
action according to position."

The position of the second incoming convoy at 2000 on the 23rd July
was in BE 1944, 6.5 miles off. Courses between 0 and 650.

With the other boats, U 431, 565, 401, 74, 95, 97, a patrol line will be
taken up in the presumed direction of advance from AL 5796 to AM 7447.
Date Position, Wind, Weather These positions can be reached by the boats tomorrow in the course of the
and Sea State, Illumination, Events day and the convoy may also be in this area late in the afternoon. Air
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. reconnaissance has been requested for tomorrow morning between 0800
and 1000 in the area AL 90 and BE 10. The boats have been ordered to
look out for beacon signals.

U 109 reported having carried out refueling from "Moro" and

continuing passage to the south from DH 36. She was assigned ET as
U 203 - BE 1623) operational area and has been ordered to proceed south to 300 W.
U 371 - AL 6853) spacing 100 miles.
U 204 - AL 2926) The Commanding Officers of U 98 and U 202 came in to give their
reports. Lt. Gysae, the Commanding Officer of U 98 sank on this
operation 2 ships 10,841 GRT. Fast single vessels were observed in the
U 371 put out from Brest. northern half of square BD. Persistent fog prevented the boat from
achieving any success.
U 202 put into Brest.
Lt. Linder, Commanding Officer of U 202, made several tactical errors
U 98 put into St. Nazaire. on this first operation. He sighted little and had no success.

U 205 put out from Drontheim.

339

25.7. Air reconnaissance contacted the south-bound convoy at 1115 and
sent out beacon signals. Bearings were reported by 11 boats, which for the
most part were very good. According to these the position of the convoy
at 1300 was assumed to be approximately in BE 2697.
- 117 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The boats were informed accordingly by radio. According to the report
of the shadowing boat the convoy altered course at 1300 on to 2400. In
the afternoon there was further air reconnaissance. The convoy was
detected again by a machine which sent out beacon signals. 15 boats
reported bearings according to which the position of the convoy towards
1600 was assumed to be in BE 2925. A south-westerly course was
established. The source of one of the bearings was quite close (about 14
miles) from the assumed convoy position; the boat in question should have
made contact at any moment but this did not happen.
U 564 reported her bearing from AL 9914, return passage begun.
340
It is not understood why none of the boats made contact. U 126
reported by means of a radio message that she had met U u79 in the
middle of square BE 2919 at 1900. The convoy should have been here if
the assumed position BE 2925 at 1600 and course S.W. had been correct.
The boat suspected a more westerly course by the convoy than 2400. Both
boats continued to search on different courses. In order to make further
searches according to plan the boats sent in to operate against the south-
bound convoy were ordered to advance on various convoy courses if no
contact had been made by sundown.
U 371 on courses 170 to 1900.
U 79 on courses 190 to 2100.
U 331 on courses 210 to 2300.
U 126 on courses 230 to 2500.
U 203 on courses 250 to 2700.
U 68, 561 and 562 were given freedom of action on the convoy.
The boats sent in to operate against the north-bound convoy made no
contact in the ordered patrol line. At 1600 the whole patrol line was
ordered to proceed on course 2050 in order to go to meet the convoy.
When by 2100 no contact had been made with the enemy, and darkness
was falling, I ordered the patrol line to halt and the boats to cruise up and
down in the patrol line from 2200, in order to be able to survey a larger
area in the darkness.
26.7. At 1120 a machine again contacted the south-bound convoy and
sent beacon signals. The position was given as in BE 4310. 6 boats
reported bearings, according to which the position of the convoy for 1200
could be expected to be in BE 5650. This was given to the boats. U 371
reported direct from square BE 5650, the presumed position of the convoy,
her bearing in direction 2410. The convoy must, therefore, have been
S.W. of this square and U 371 must have been in the direct vicinity. Since
aircraft had reported the course of the convoy as 2400, U 371 was
probably behind the convoy and was D/Fing it on her course.
- 118 -
 unexplained. This case, however, shows that it is senseless to operate on
positions reported by aircraft. It is necessary to confirm the position by
bearings.
U 68 was ordered at once to remain close to the convoy and send out
beacon signals. The remaining boats were to report "Yes" as soon as the
convoy came into sight.
Flag Officer commanding Italian U-boats was notified regarding the
convoy. I 1 and I 15 were sent in to operate against it.
Date Position, Wind, Weather U 68 gave further reports of contact, from which it was seen that the
and Sea State, Illumination, Events convoy was proceeding on a southerly course. At 2247 U 126 requested
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. beacon signals. At 2306 U 79 reported "Yes". U 68 was given freedom of
attack as from 2400 but was to report further contact and send out beacon
signals.
It is intended to send out air reconnaissance again in the area of the
convoy tomorrow morning at 1000.

The difference between the position reported by air reconnaissance and The boats which were in the northern patrol line did not report any
that calculated on the bearings of the boats by B.d.U., amounted to 215 contact with the enemy. There was no point in leaving them any longer in
miles. This very great difference in fix can only be attributed to a the patrol line. They were, therefore, ordered into new operational areas
fundamental fault in navigation or in deciphering by the aircraft. The according to their probable fuel supplies. These will be taken up as
position calculated by B.d.U., must be assumed to be the more accurate, as follows:
there could not have been the same fault in bearing from so many boats. 1) U 74, 95, 97 the E.W. patrol line ordered for them on 22 July.
Since, however, during the next few hours none of the boats made contact, 2) U 372, 431, 565 and 401 the square AK 9455, spacing 400 miles.
although 7 boats must have been quite close to the convoy, there arose 3) U 205 - AJ 6250 and U 204 - AK 4554, spacing 150 miles.
doubts on the part of the Control whether the beacon signals heard were in
fact heard from the contacting machine. It is possible that the enemy had
sent out beacon signals, through a detached destroyer in this area, which
were then D/F'd by the boats while the convoy in reality deviated on U 95 reported return passage, no success, nothing sighted.
another course and then was detected by air reconnaissance further to the
west. Further air reconnaissance in the afternoon brought no result. U 46 and U 559 put out from St. Nazaire.
At 1750 U 68, however, made contact with the enemy in BE 5838. The
enemy was proceeding on a south-westerly course. Doubts regarding the U 83 put out from Kiel.
accuracy of the position calculated on the bearings, were therefore
removed, because the position reported by U 68 agreed according to dead
reckoning and time with the one calculated. The inaccuracy in the position - 119 -
of the convoy given by the aircraft was, therefore, proved but is still
341

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
27.7. U 68 had contact with the south-bound convoy. U 79 reported
"Yes".
In the course of the night the following also made contact: U 561, 203,
and 126. U 331 reported the convoy in BE 8565, course 1350, perhaps a
part of the convoy first detected. U 68 was driven off by destroyers at
0257 and lost contact. At 0740 U 126 reported contact again with the
convoy in BE 8642, course S.E. U 331 also reported the convoy. U 126
was set aside as the actual shadower and the other boats were ordered to
attack.
U 371 reported at 0945 a further convoy in BE 8811, course south. It
could not be seen whether this was a new convoy or whether the first one
had divided. The latter seemed probable. In any case U 371 was given
freedom of attack. The remaining boats were to operate on the reports of
contact from U 126.
U 371 reported twice more. At 1103 from BE 8818 and at 1406 from
BE 8738. There were no further reports of contact after that.
Air reconnaissance also reported from 2 machines, 2 convoys in BE
8567 and BE 8853. There were again considerable differences in fixes to
the corresponding reports of the U-boats.
342
U 126 kept further contact with the first convoy and gave reports of
contact.
U 562 reported at 1330 from BE 59 and U 561 at 1003 from BE 8340
that they had been driven off, depth-charged and were pressing on.
Before dark the following radio message was sent to the boats: "U 126
freedom of attack from fall of darkness. All boats off the convoy to utilize
any chances of attack.If no good chances beforehand, attempt as from
0200 to attack simultaneously. Split up escorts. Escorts probably weaker
than in previous night. Continue to report contact, send beacon signals.
Bring other boats up, attack yourselves. Press on".
The last report of contact was given by U 126 at 2231 from CF 3152.
U 562 reported having broken off pursuit, as her starboard Diesel
coupling was out of order. She started return from BE 67. UA also could
not continue operations against the convoy owing to fuel shortage.
In the Northern area operational areas for U 74 and 97 were extended on
to the patrol line of U 95 which was returning.
According to intercept messages there was presumably a convoy in AM
2628 at 2000 with course 253. The boats were informed accordingly.
OPerations against this convoy, however, will hardly be possible for the
boats.
U 564 put into Brest.
- 120 -
 U 141 reported at 2120: "at 0300 on 26th July outward-bound convoy
in AM 5275, speed 8 knots, course 270. 40 ships, strong escort. Pursued
Date Position, Wind, Weather and depth-charged for 20 hours. 3 steamers sunk, 21,000 GRT. Returning
and Sea State, Illumination, Events owing to engine trouble".
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The following boats have been ordered into operational areas:
U 565 - AL 7761 U 401 - BD 2942
U 372 - AK 9876 U 431 - BD 3941

All 150 miles spacing.

28.7. The last report of contact from U 126 was at 2231 on the 27th July
in CF 3152. At 0125 and 0126 U 79 and U 68 requested beacon signals. The Southern boats were sent the report of a returning Italian vessel
U 126 then reported the last convoy position observed by her at 2400 in which had observed heavy traffic at 240 W. between 2 and 270 N.
CF 3182. She lost contact in the fog after an attack.
There were further reports on the convoy, one from U 561 at 0528 in CF The Commanding Officer of U 564, Lt. Suhren, came in to give his
3513, course 1500, and one from U 331 in CF 3735. Air reconnaissance report. This was his first operation as Commanding Officer on his boat.
reported the convoy in CF 3519 at 1030. The bearings this time were He carried it out with skill and courage and sank 4 ships, 21,500 GRT.
unfavorable, converging at a sharp angle, so that it could be seen only that
the convoy had dispersed into several part-convoys. One of these was U 125 put into Lorient.
reported by U 331 at 1000 in CF 3735 and one by U 561 last at 0528 in CF
3513 and later confirmed by aircraft report and bearing. U 371 lost the
convoy which was proceeding further to the west, at 0100 in CF 2539 and - 121 -
did not contact it again until 1600 in CF 5139. The convoy was
proceeding on a south-westerly course. U 126 made contact at 1213 in CF
3585. At 1414 U 79 reported a Q ship in CF 3719. She sank at 0025 on
the 27th July 3 vessels, 17,000 GRT. That was the first success reported
from this long convoy pursuit. No reports of torpedoing have been given
up to now by intercept messages.
U 126 maintained contact and reported having torpedoed on the 27th
July in CF 3180 4 vessels, 19,000 GRT. She also reported having sunk a
corvette. Date Position, Wind, Weather
The boats were instructed to report their position. They were notified and Sea State, Illumination, Events
regarding refueling facilities in Cadiz and were to report as soon as it was Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
seen to be impossible to pursue the convoy any further owing to their fuel
situation if returning to western France.
343
 July in square CG 81, if no contact had by then been made with the
convoy.

29.7. Following on instructions to report their position, U 68 reported in
CF 3996, U 79 in CF 6173. U 203 reported at 2324 on the 28th July
having sunk 5 vessels, 31,000 GRT, and having probably sunk one
destroyer. Position CG 1781. U 561 reported at 0230 returning. She sank
a freighter and torpedoed a large tanker and left it burning. Total result
16,000 GRT. Position CF 39.
U 126 was at 0357 in CG 4128.
U 68 is returning.
At 1330 U 79 reported surprisingly from CF 5941. She had apparently
been pursuing a Q ship and had, therefore, come so far away from the
convoy. She reported apart from the 3 vessels already known to have been
sunk, 2 vessels torpedoed. She was ordered to take up position in CG 74 if
possible by 2000 on the 30th July, so that she might also go into operation
against the outward-bound convoy. For the intended patrol line there were
available then only U 126 and the 3 Italian boats I 1, I 11 and I 15. U 126
was ordered to take up position in CG 7665 as from 0800 on the 30th July.
The Italian boats were to take up positions CG 8157, CG 8412 and CG
7685.

U 331 reported last position of convoy observed at 0200 in CG 4121, Our own air reconnaissance was to operate in the area as from 0900.
course S.E. Air reconnaissance was again sent in. One machine detected
the convoy and reported it at 0905 in CG 4162, course 2300. It added: At 2200 I 11 contacted the south-bound convoy in CG 4671, course
position uncertain. Only one bearing was reported from U 126 which, 1800. She was, however, driven off and lost contact.
however, was taking a bearing opposed by almost 180 to the reported
convoy position. The course only, from the aircraft report was, therefore,
certain to some extent and this was given to the boats. - 122 -

U 331 reported returning.

U 371 was still maintaining contact with the south-bound convoy. She
reported it at 1200 in CF 7324 and enquired whether she should give
reports of contact for other boats. Since all other boats were operating
against the Gibraltar-bound convoy, she was ordered to attack.

According to an intercept message a convoy left Gibraltar on the 28th Date Position, Wind, Weather
July. According to dead reckoning this may be approximately in the area and Sea State, Illumination, Events
of the boats operating against the Gibraltar-bound convoy on the 30th July. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
As at the time none of the boats had made contact, a patrol line was
planned which lay at once in the supposed direction of advance of the
convoy proceeding to Gibraltar and also of the convoy proceeding out of
Gibraltar. The boats were ordered to assemble by the morning of the 30th
344
 the area of the air reconnaissance with the intention of attacking in great
U 331 requested refueling in Cadiz, which was arranged for the 31st strength convoys detected by air reconnaissance.
July. The following will be taken up:
U 83 - AL 5222 U 559 - AL 6258
U 371 reported at 1745 the S.W. bound part convoy once again in CF U 74 - AL 6333 U 205 - AL 5568
7624, course 2000. After that no further reports of contact. U 46 - AM 4277 U 204 - AL 5777
U 558 - AL 6837 U 97 - AM 4748
From the Southern boats U 109 and U 123 reported. Both apparently U 565 - AL 8255 U 75 - AL 9292
had observed no traffic. U 372 - AL 8722 U 401 - BE 1341
U 431 - AL 9726 U 73 - AL 9919
U 66 reported from CG 77. She had, therefore, proceeded very quickly
to the north and could still be sent in to operate in the patrol line off
Gibraltar. She was ordered to make for square CG 7915. U 562 was fired upon by a submarine when approaching the coast in BF
6476. In the Southern area the four boats cruising south still did not
The Commanding Officer of U 125, Lt. Kuhnke, again encountered encounter any enemy traffic. The traffic, was quite definitely proceeding,
numerous drifting mines en route from Kiel to Lorient north of the Faroes. according to intercept message, and the present negative result in the
The boats were informed accordingly. Southern operational area, further west than 300

U 75 and U 73 put out from St. Nazaire.

- 123 -
30.7. U 371 reported at 0128 the last position of the convoy observed in
CF 7869, course 200. She pursued up to DG 3569, where the convoy
apparently had dispersed. She reported 15,000 tons sunk.

Since none of the boats in the patrol line made contact, it must be
assumed that both convoys passed by the patrol line. A new patrol line
was ordered, in which the boats were to take up the following positions:
U 79 - CG 7816 U 126 - CG 7876
U 66 - DH 3349 Italian boats: Date Position, Wind, Weather
I 15 - CG 7546 I 12 - CG 7276. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 66 reported that she could not carry out the operational order owing
to fuel supplies.

New operational areas have been ordered for boats in the North Atlantic
and those newly arriving. The boats will be disposed in mass formation in
345
 West, that is in an area which has not been opened by the Naval War
Staff for operations by U-boats even though once more requested and
which cannot be opened even though repeatedly applied for.
It is senseless to have the boats operate further in the Southern area in
view of this knowledge. I have decided to have them operate off Gibraltar
where there is certainly traffic and where the Italians have had success just
lately. The boats have been ordered to return and to proceed to the north
in rake formation with a day's run of 180 miles.
UA and 562 put into Lorient.
The great convoy battle of the last few days can be considered as
concluded. This was the first case of successful cooperation between
Intercept Service, air reconnaissance and U-boats. Air reconnaissance sent
in on a report by the Intercept Service detected the convoy continually
through 5 days and was able to guide the boats by means of reports of
position and beacon signals.All the boats operating against the convoy
were inexperienced boats on their first or second enemy operation. The
success reported in spite of strong defence and escorts can be taken as a
proof that methods of training in use are right.
Important conclusions on this operation are as follows:
1) Cooperation with aircraft in this area promises, contrary to earlier
experiences, success provided that the boats are so located that a position
can be obtained from bearings of the aircraft. Heavy radio traffic must,
however, be taken into account.
2) The Commanding Officers, most of whom were inexperienced, proved
themselves under difficult conditions. Of course, continual instructions on
maintaining and reporting contact, sending beacon signals and tactical
procedure were necessary. This could hardly be otherwise. It is not
possible to obtain in 3 weeks tactical training which requires 2 years in
peacetime. The importance of tactical training, however, is emphasized.
Its deficiency
- 124 -

Summarizing, the following reported:

U 79 - 3 vessels sunk (17,000 GRT) 2 vessels torpedoed.
U 126 - 4 vessels (19,000 GRT)
U 68 - 1 corvette
U 203 - 5 vessels (31,000 GRT) 1 destroyer probably sunk. Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 561 - 1 freighter, 1 large tanker (16,000 GRT) and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 371 - 15,000 GRT. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

19 ships, approximately 108,000 GRT and 2 escort vessels from this

convoy, therefore, were torpedoes or sunk. The strong escort and certain
later statements by various Commanding Officers indicate that this convoy
was not a normal Gibraltar convoy with small vessels but an important
transport with large ships, which is perhaps connected with great activity in view of the Baltic situation will certainly have a very bad effect.
by the British in the Mediterranean.
346
3) Most important conclusion: Attacks on convoys promise success even drew the escorts away and handled the resultant difficulties calmly and
under present conditions and it is only by means of these attacks that decisively.
enemy traffic can be hit with any effect, while single traffic is decreasing
more and more.The problem in U-boat warfare is that of finding traffic.
This can only be solved by large numbers of boats. (Signed): DÖNITZ.
4) Location defence and a new torpedo must facilitate the work of the U-
boats.

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

UA put into Lorient. 1 - 15 August 1941

U 562 put into Lorient. PG30294

31.7. U 371 has been assigned, as operational area DH 3349. U 66 is to

return according to fuel situation.

U 73 reported returning owing to engine trouble. Date Position, Wind, Weather

and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 563 put out from Bergen. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

U 95 and U 203 put into St. Nazaire.

The Commanding Officers of UA and U 562 came in to give their

reports.
1.8. Positions:
The Commanding Officer of US, Lt. Cdr. Eckermann, did not have any 1) In the operations area west of the North Channel:
success from the 3 months operation in the South Atlantic. On the whole U 74 - AM 4111, U 46 - AM 4511,
trip he only sighted enemy vessels a few times which agrees with the last U 97 - AM 4748, U 559 - AL 6876,
experiences regarding routes of enemy vessels. As a result of this the boats U 205 - AL 5568, U 204 - AL 5777,
now proceeding to the south have been stopped and will be sent in to U 565 - AL 8255, U 372 - AL 8722,
operate against the Gibraltar traffic. U 431 - AL 9726 U 401 - BE 1341,
U 558 - BE 3185, U 75 BE 6621.
The Commanding Officer of U 562, Lt. Kollmann, was on his first 2) In the operations area west of Gibraltar:
operation as Commanding Officer on his boat. In the case of 2 convoys he U 331 - CG 91, U 79 - CG 7816,
U 126 - CG 7876, U 109 - DG 87,
347
 U 94 - DG 85, U 93 - DG 84,
U 124 - DG 95.
3) West of Freetown:
U 123 - EH 67.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
Outward bound: U 83 - AE 85; UU 563 - AF 87. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Returning to base: U 73 - BF 44; U 561 - off Brest; U 68 and U 141 - Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
off Lorient; U 66 - CG 78.

In Lorient: U 105, 43, 38, 101, 106, 557, 125, 111, 108, 562, 107, 103,
UA.
In St. Nazaire: U 751, 77, 96, 71, 553, 552, 98, 69, 95, 203.
In Brest: U 202, 201, 564.
In Kiel: U 143.
In Trondheim: U 568, 567, 206.
In Horten: U 129.
On 30th July, the 4 submarines, "U 109, 94, 93 and 124", which were
originally allocated to the Southern area, turned round, and proceeded
northwards. As they should end up off Gibraltar, I arranged for them to
proceed there by Aruba/Gibraltar route. On 3.8., the submarines received
orders to form a reconnaissance line from DG 6835 to DG 3835, and at
0800, to proceed on course 750 at a day's run of 180 miles. The Naval
War Staff cancelled the restrictions on attacking en route Bruno, until the
6.8, as none of our ships will be in the area during this period.
U 371 in CF 7355, U 126 in CF 8565 and U 79 in CF 9855 were
allocated new areas for attack until the arrival of the four southern boats.
Width 150 miles.
According to a radio intercept, a convoy approaching on course 10 at 6
knots, was in BE 4875 at 2200 on 31.7. I decided to operate against it.
"U 558, 559, 204, 431, 372, 401" immediately received orders to
operate against this convoy, at full speed ahead. In a second W/T message,
they were disposed in 5 degree sectors from 3500 to 200, for the approach
to the convoy route, and to make a search in these sectors, assuming that
the convoy was proceeding between 4.5 and 7.5 knots.
Air reconnaissance was proposed for the 2.8, and U 75 received orders
to act as radio beacon for the aircraft, and from 0900 on 2.8, to transmit
beacon signals on the Bordeaux route - the suspected convoy route.
U 46, 74 and 205 were moved nearer the convoy.
U 205 reported a surfaced enemy submarine in both AL 6722 and AL
5835.

U 561 put in at Brest. U 141 put in at Lorient. U 68 put in at Lorient.

- 126 -
The Captains of U 203 and U 95 put in for reports. Lt.(s.g.)
Muetzelburg, the Captain of U 203, operated against the Gibraltar convoy,
and sank 5 ships totaling 31,000 GRT, against overwhelming odds.

348
 Lt.(s.g.) Schreiber, the Captain of U 95, operated in the Northern area
and was finally in the patrol line waiting for the north-going SL convoy.
He saw nothing apart from a very fast ship, and achieved nothing.
2.8. U 331 refueled in Cadiz, and was allotted CG 57 as attacking area,
width 160 miles, with orders to operate against traffic putting into and out
from Lisbon.
At 1645 U 204 contacted the convoy in BE 1813, on course 3500. She
immediately received orders to transmit beacon signals and not to attack.
The remaining boats were to report "Yes" on establishing contact.
U 204 made shadower reports, but added that this depended entirely on
hydrophone watches as the visibility in the operational area was 1/2 mile,
owing to fog. At 2020, U 559 reported the convoy in BE 1529, course
N.E.
U 372 requested beacon signals, and must therefore be in the vicinity.
It is not quite clear why the boats established no visual contact in spite
of continuous hydrophone observations. Moreover, according to
information received from radio intercepts and dead reckoning based on
the first shadower report, the convoy speed increased considerably. Thus,
the suspicion arose that the boats might have been mistaken with their
hydrophone observation, and that in reality, have contacted a faster A/s
band or something similar. U 204 received orders to make every effort to
obtain visual contact. The most
- 127 -
349
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
recent position of the convoy reported by U 204 is BE 1531, course
N.E. U 123 reported no traffic in the Southern area, and moved her
operational area to DG.
U 71, 77, 96, 751 put out from St. Nazaire.
U 43 put out from Lorient.
The Captains of U 561 and 141 put in to make reports.
Lt Bartels, the Captain of U 561, sank 2 ships, including one large
tanker, in the Gibraltar convoy, 16,000 GRT in all. This was the first time
U 561 had gone into action against the enemy.
Lt. Schueler operated very skillfully in the action off the Scilly Isles
and in the North Channel. After sinking 3 ships totaling 21,000 GRT, he
escaped a severe depth charge attack by his correct and skillful conduct.
3.8. At 0130 hours, U 204 reported the convoy in BE 1298 and
transmitted continuous shadower reports until 0625. U 431, 205 and 558
reported "Yes", i.e. they have established contact. U 75 requested beacon
signals. U 205 reported 4 A/s ships in BE 1383 at 0955.
The latest shadower reports were made during the early hours. Thus
contact has apparently ceased, as the boats are making no reports in spite
of ordered to report immediately on establishing visual or hydrophone
contact with the enemy.
 At 1142, U 558 again reported the convoy in BE 2412, course N.E. If
this report is correct, the convoy must be further south than was calculated
from the last hydrophone observations. From this it looks as though U 204
had been taken in by an A/s group.
submarine warfare, namely, to locate and attack convoys.
After 1400, U 372, U 401, U 565 and U 559 reported "Yes", and have
consequently established contact with the convoy. Further shadower reports came in from U 204 and U 558. Later, U 204
was driven off, U 372 requested beacon signals, U 46 reported "Yes".
Air reconnaissance contacted the convoy at 1510, and transmitted
beacon signals. The fix variations are again very considerable (Air The following W/T message was transmitted to these boats at midnight.
position, AL 8884). "This night is decisive, go in and attack! You are more numerous and
stronger than the enemy. Always report contact".
U 558 made two more shadower reports, according to which, the enemy
was in BE 2188 at 1450. U 105 put out from Lorient.

At 1550, U 565 reported the convoy in BE 2184, course 800. U 97 had U 568 and U 129 put out from Trondheim.
to stop following the convoy and return to base owing to lack of fuel. The
boat arrived without incident and without sighting any traffic. This shows 4.8. At 0312, U 204 reported patrol forces in AL 9875. No further
that English single ship traffic has decreased again during recent weeks shadower reports have been received, and contact appears to have ceased.
and has been amalgamated into convoys. Stress must again be laid on the The boats were ordered to transmit position reports.
ultimate aim of The following reported:
U 558, 431, 559, 75, 83. U 204 and U 74 added a weather report. Rain
over the area, visibility 100 meters. U 565 requested permission to return
- 128 - to base owing to loud noises and because she was only partly clear for
submerging.
At 0700, U 204 again contacted the convoy in AL 9818, course 600.
Contact was maintained during the entire day, and shadower reports were
transmitted by various boats. The Air Reconnaissance contacted the
convoy at 1258. At 1851, U 431 reported the convoy in AL 9668, and
almost at once U 372 transmitted a shadower report in AL 9623. It is
impossible to judge whether this means a mistake has been made with the
bearing or whether the convoy has split up. At the same time, U 565 while
Date Position, Wind, Weather returning to base, as she was not clear for submerging, reported another
and Sea State, Illumination, Events convoy in BE 2269, course N.N.W. U 71, 77, 96, 751 and 43, which had
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. put out on 2.8, were in a very favorable position to attack this convoy. U
350
565 received orders to make every effort to remain and report contacts.
The Air Reconnaissance was allocated to this convoy on 5.8. At 1818 U
565 reported that she had been forced to submerge by patrol vessels, one
Diesel had been out of action for 14 hours, and she was returning to base.
No further messages were received concerning either the former or the
latter convoy.
U 126 reported no traffic.
As, according to a radio intercept, we must reckon with a convoy
putting out from Gibraltar within the next few days, boats to the west of
Gibraltar received orders to proceed eastwards at cruising speed. U 124 to
U 109 should increase their day's run to 240 miles in order to arrive off
Gibraltar at the given time.
- 129 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
351
5.8. U 431 reported that both her Diesels were out of order, and that she
had succeeded in repairing one but not the other. No contact. She was
ordered to return to base.
At 0500, U 83 made contact with the convoy in AM 7185. The sea area
through which the convoy is now proceeding is becoming more and more
unfavorable for the submarines owing to the proximity of the coast.
Constant air patrols by shore-based aircraft must be expected during clear
moonlit nights and sometimes even during normal nights.
G.A.F. Listening Service showed that several formations were flown.
Boats in unfavorable positions and which have no contact should proceed
towards the west. The boats were requested to give positions, results, state
of fuel and torpedoes, in order to give a rough impression of the existing
position.
The following information was gained from reports received:
U 372 - 1 steamer, 5,000 GRT, sunk.
1 steamer, 7,500 GRT, burnt out.
1 steamer, unconfirmed.
U 204 - 1 steamer, 14,000 GRT, direct hit.
U 74 - 1 steamer, 8,000 GRT, torpedoed.
3 steamers each 8,000 - 10,000 GRT, hit.
U 75 - 2 steamers, 12,000 GRT, sunk.
These sinking reports are not entirely reliable. Further observations
were apparently impossible, as the enemy defences came into action. We
can calculate that: 4 steamers, 24,500 GRT were sunk, 6 steamers were
torpedoed.
The actual results can only be obtained when the boats return to base.
The other boats, U 558, 83, 46, 559, 431, 205 were beaten off and
forced to submerge, by the strong patrol and destroyer escort and by the air
escort attached to the convoy at night. They reported no results. U 401
has not reported since 1429 on 3.8.
 The operation against this convoy can be considered as ended. It shows The following attacking areas were allocated to the boats west of
that although most of the boats were quite inexperienced they achieved Gibraltar, until the convoy expected puts out:
successes, in spite of very heavy escort by surface forces and aircraft, and U 371 - CG 4633, U 124 - CG 4833.
in spite of the unfavorable sea area (close off shore) and poor weather. U 79 - CG 5572, U 331 - CG 5755.
The probable loss of one boat (401) is inevitable in an operation such as U 93 - CG 8464, U 94 - CG 8858.
this. U 126 - DJ 1239, U 109 - DJ 1542.

According to a priority radio intercept message, the north-going convoy Width 60 miles.
was in BE 7925 at 2000 on 4.8.
I decided to operate against it, and for this purpose, concentrated all the U 558 was ordered to return to base to disembark a very ill man.
available boats in the northerly area into the northern half of grid square
BE. Air reconnaissance for the next day is to be allocated to the suspected U 66 put into Lorient.
convoy position. Further, operational orders can only be issued when
position and course data has been confirmed by the Air Forces. U 206 put out from Trondheim.

U 567 put out from Trondheim.

- 130 -
6.8. U 43, 71, 77, 96, 751, 83, 75, 46, 205, 559, 204 were disposed in a
double patrol line on about 490 N. from 160 - 220 W., to intercept the
convoy.

U 401 and U 372 remained north of this attacking area but with no other
limits.

The convoy expected from Gibraltar was in a position 440 N., 210 W. at
Date Position, Wind, Weather 2000 on 4.8. The boats were informed of this. We must now wait for one
and Sea State, Illumination, Events of the boats to make contact.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The following attacking areas were allocated to boats recently arrived in
the operational area:
U 129 - AL 2682)
U 206 - AL 1356) width, 100 miles
U 567 - AE 7777)
U 563 and 568, outward bound from home bases are to be kept back in
the area south of Iceland, until further operations are clear.

352
 Boats west of Gibraltar were ordered to occupy the following attacking at cruising speed, should no contact be made with the enemy. U 74 and U
areas on receipt of the codeword "Advance". 372 were allowed freedom to maneuver owing to the state of their fuel.
U 93 - CG 8665, U 94 - CG 8965.
U 75 - CG 8295, U 371 - CG 5755. U 401 was again requested for a position report.
U 124 - CG 8198, U 331 - CG 8815.
U 126 - DJ 1239, U 109 - DJ 2125. U 75 and U 205 are to proceed towards ship 36 and accompany her until
she is taken over by the destroyer escort. They were given orders to wait
Width 40 miles. for ship 36 in CD 68 and CE 11, as from the 15.8.
From that time on, freedom to attack was only given for convoys and
particularly valuable single ships. U 558 put into Brest.
U 501 put out from Trondheim.
U 565 put into Brest. U 553 and U 73 put out from St. Nazaire.
U 38 put out from Lorient. U 101 put out from Lorient.

8.8. According to priority radio intercept, a convoy in AL 9223 or AL

- 131 - 9132 was proceeding between course 1400 and 2000, at 2000 on 7.8. Her
speed was estimated at 6 knots. I decided to put the boats now en route for
the N.W. into operation against this convoy.

U 43, 71, 77, 96, 751, 83, 105, 46, 372, 559, 204 and 38 received orders
to operate against the convoy in NS patrols of equal width, between
longitudes 220 W. and 160 W. The submarines are to begin the search for
the convoy position, if possible at the first light, assuming that the convoy
is proceeding at 7 knots, and then proceed on a northerly course towards
Date Position, Wind, Weather the position the convoy would occupy if proceeding at 4 knots. They are
and Sea State, Illumination, Events then to search back to the south.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Air reconnaissance was proposed for the 9.8., for the sea area in
question, and 4 FW 200 were allocated. At 1945, U 93 reported a battle
cruiser, a troop transport and 2 destroyers in CG 8423, on W. course. At
2025 she lost sight of the enemy, then proceeding on N.W. course.

7.8. None of the boats in BE have established contact with the north- U 97 put in to St. Nazaire.
going convoy. According to dead reckoning, the convoy must have passed
our disposition. Consequently all boats in BE, except U 372, 74, 401, 75
and 205, received orders to proceed northwards after dark on course 3050,
353
 9.8. During the afternoon information was received from the German
agent in Gibraltar, via the G.I.S. head station at Paris, that the convoy
started to sail at 1500. At 1600, the last ship had passed Europa Point.
As the convoy put out during the afternoon, and not in the morning as
had been expected, the attacking areas of some of the boats had
- 132 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
to be correspondingly altered, to enable them to attack the convoy
during the hours of daylight.
U 79 to occupy CG 8688, U 93 - CG 8935, U 94 - CG 8993, U 109 - DJ
2215.
The submarines must reach the areas by the first light.
U 371 is allocated CG 8251 as attacking area.
The two Italian submarines, I 7 and I 2 are in grid squares CG 8544 and
DJ 1389.
354
No messages were received from the boats which are waiting in patrol
lines for the south-going convoy, and the Air Reconnaissance has observed
nothing owing to fog in the area. The boats are now proceeding in their
patrol lines with the south-going convoy. We must hope to make contact
with better visibility.
The Captains of U 97, 558 and 565 put in to make reports.
Lt.(s.g.) Heilmann, the Captain of U 97, did not locate anything in his
operational area, and did not make any contact with the enemy while
occupying the positions laid down in the orders, in the various patrol lines.
Lt.(s.g.) Krech, the Captain of U 558, was forced to break off the
operation early on, in order to disembark a midshipman (j.g.) who was
very ill. He had established contact with the north-going convoy, but was
unable to achieve anything, owing to the strong escort forces.
Lt.(j.g.) Jebsen, the Captain of U 565, made his first patrol with this
boat. Apart from one steamer, he did not observe any single ship traffic in
his operational area. He had no success against the north-going convoy
because of its strong escort, or against the convoy he himself reported, as
one of his engines was out of order.
U 84 put out from Bergen.
10.8. None of the boats operating against the south-going convoy, made
any contact. I decided on a submarine disposition in the North area, as we
have had no boats there on active service for some time, and have obtained
information of various convoys in this area through radio intercepts.
All the boats subsequently received orders to proceed on course 3350 at
cruising speed.
U 372 was allowed freedom to maneuver.
 At 1417, U 79 reported the convoy coming from Gibraltar, in CG
8661, and was ordered to report contact but not to attack. At 1500 she
reported the convoy in CG 8626, course 2900, speed 6 knots, and at 1510
she reported that destroyers had forced her away.
- 133 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The Air Reconnaissance in this area consisting of 2 aircraft, has seen
nothing in spite of good visibility.
As neither U 79 nor any of the other boats made any contact during the
afternoon, the boats were disposed in single sectors to search for the
convoy.
Boats are operating against the convoy on the following courses:
I 7 and U 93 on 3180 to 3040; U 331 and U 94 on 3040 to 2900; U 124
and U 109 on 2900 to 2760; U 126 and U 72 on 2760 to 2620.
The boats are to get to their sectors as quickly as possible and should
wait in the area which the convoy will reach if proceeding at 8 knots. The
boats are then to proceed towards the convoy searching in legs.
355
U 371 should be in a position between CG 5843 and Cape Espichel, by
the first light.
Tomorrow's Air Reconnaissance will be in the operational area at 1000.
11.8. U 501 which is en route for the operational area from home,
reported a north-going convoy in AE 8782. As no further messages were
received and we have no boats in the vicinity, it is impossible to operate
against this convoy.
U 563 reported damage to engines, in AL 17. No traffic observed.
At 0030, U 93 reported searching for the convoy on mean courses 2400
to 2900 without success.
At 1136 she reported that at 0800 the convoy was in CG 8226 enroute
for Lisbon. The submarine herself had been forced to submerge for the
last 4 hours by an A/s group.
The boats received orders to operate against this convoy at full speed
ahead.
At 1200, the Air Reconnaissance reported a convoy in CG 8511 on
course 3000, and added: position very rough.
This bearing varied by 57 miles from the one reported by U 93, and it
was therefore assumed that the convoy had split up. At 1400 U 331
reported that she had proceeded on course 2100 from CG 8132, following
information on the convoy route transmitted by a Condor aircraft. In this
case the aircraft would have had to have transmitted a message and a
beacon signal. As this did not occur, we assume the aircraft flew over the
submarine by chance and that this was misconstrued by the submarine. U
331 received orders to operate against the convoy contacted by U 94.
- 134 -

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
At 151, U 94 made contact in CG 5876. The convoy was proceeding on
a westerly course at slow speed.
U 79 again reported at 1532 from CG 8480, and is comparatively clear
for action again after a heavy depth charge attack. Oil tracks. The Captain
must decide for himself if it is necessary to return to base.
At 1703, U 94 reported another shadower message from CG 5871,
course 2950.
At 1805, from the Northern area, U 568 reported a convoy in AE 8753
on N.W. course, medium speed. This is probably the same convoy which
U 501 has already reported this morning. U 568 was given freedom to
attack and ordered to maintain further contact. At 2005 she again reported
the convoy in AE 8725. The following revised attacking areas were
allocated: U 559 - AL 6250, U 83 - AL 6550, U 204 - AL 6850, width 54
miles.
There are no restrictions on attacks in an easterly direction beyond the
attacking areas. U 501 - AD 8889, U 84 - AK 3267, width 40 miles.
356
Boats west of Gibraltar received orders that if no contact was made
with the enemy, to remain in a certain area which the convoy would reach
about dawn, if proceeding at about 8 knots from the last position reported.
This area lies on both sides of the former mean course of the enemy, 3100
(from 2800 - 3400).
2 Italian submarines were sent out as reinforcements. The boats are to
proceed towards the convoy searching in their sectors.
U 569 and U 82 put out from Trondheim.
U 202 put out from Brest.
U 106 put out from Lorient.
U 431 put in to St. Nazaire.
12.8. U 568 sank a corvette, maintained contact until 1840 and then lost
it altogether.
At 0100, U 331 sighted the Gibraltar convoy in CG 5712, maintained
contact until 0410 and then lost apparently because of decreasing
visibility. The boats were then ordered to push on, and to operate, acting
on the last report on the enemy. As however, contact was not resumed
after daylight, a new diverging search patrol was sent out.
The afternoon air reconnaissance, contacted the convoy at 1830, and
according to cross bearings of their beacon signals, the convoy was in CG
4556, course 3000. Various boats were in the immediate vicinity. At
1219, U 123 reported the convoy in CG 4551. The next day showed that
this submarine came up from the Southern area and joined in with the
Gibraltar operation. She had observed nothing during recent weeks in the
Southern area, and hoped to achieve something here.
- 135 -

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
At 0754, U 129 sighted a convoy in AL 2219, course west. U 206, 563
and 567, which were in the vicinity, were ordered to operate against it.
The group of 10 boats in the south, which were proceeding N.W. at
economical cruising speed, were told to increase speed. Further operations
depend on contact and maintaining contact with the convoy. When U 129
lost contact at 1319, the 4 boats operating against the convoy were
deflected away on a S.W. mean course.
Just before midnight last night, U 206 contacted another convoy in AL
1311, course west.She soon lost contact, however, and received orders to
operate on the enemy report sent by U 129 (see above). Thus 4 convoys
were being attacked at the same time by submarines, although at times
only only one submarine was operating against 3 of them. As, at the end
of the second year of war, conditions in shadowing convoys have become
more difficult, a state of affairs not improved by the inexperience of our
many young Captains, there seems little chance of our maintaining contact
long enough to make an attack possible. 3-4 times the number of
submarines that there were a year ago, are necessary now owing to the far
stronger air and surface escorts.
The location of 4 convoys at one time in different areas on the same day,
illustrates the volume of English traffic and also proves the necessity of
the greatest possible concentration of forces. In spite of the large number
of submarines there are today, there are too few to scatter around, and one
357
is liable not to be able to maintain contacts if more are made than such
weak forces are able to cope with.
The Captain of U 431 put in to make a report.
First operation. Fired at and missed two fast ships. Took part in an
attack against a convoy (SL convoy on 2-5 August), otherwise nothing was
observed. The way in which the Captain tackled his job, leads one to
expect more success from his next operation.
Outward bound for the operational area:
U 125 from Lorient.
Returning to base: U 94.
U 123 was driven off by destroyers. Another diverging search patrol
was detailed for the second half of the night in case contact was entirely
broken off.
U 74 put in to St. Nazaire.
U 125 put out from Lorient.
13.8. U 123 reported at 0000: driven off again by the destroyers.
Pressed on. At 0115 an Italian submarine sighted the convoy in CG 4439,
course 3000. On receipt of this information, the diverging search patrol
was detailed to this position and narrowed down to 2900 - 3100. U 331
made visual contact with the enemy in CG 4155, course 3100 at 0638, and
then at 1002, reported
- 136 -
 escort is guarding the convoy particularly skillfully. We must try and first
attack the escort itself. The boats were give orders on no account to spare
Date Position, Wind, Weather the torpedoes, and in spite of meager chances of success, to try and attack
and Sea State, Illumination, Events the escort itself with fan shots. If possible a simultaneous attack by
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. several boats would be the best way to split up the escort. If it does not
seem possible to conduct the tactics of such an attack from here, at least
the seeds of success can be sewn from here, by stipulating a certain time
on which the communal attack should be made. Orders were issued for
the attempt to be made on the following night.

that she had been driven under water from 0730 to 0930, but was An Italian submarine reported, somewhat delayed, the convoy position
pressing on now. for 2000. No further messages were received.

Although we succeeded this time in closing in on the enemy, no more U 331 and 109 returned to base.
reports were received until the afternoon, in spite of the fact that several
boats must have been in the immediate vicinity this time. We must take A new diverging search patrol was to go out from the last enemy
into consideration the possibility of the enemy being in possession of position.
surface location apparatus, which enable them to send out destroyers to
drive off submarines approaching the convoy before these have made The boats operating against the convoy located by U 129, received
contact. The submarines were given instructions on how best to avoid this orders to search the area in which it should be according to dead
surface location. reckoning, each within a certain radius from their own positions. If this
According to air reconnaissance reports, there was a cruiser among the operation met with success by the evening of the 14th a new allocation of
units escorting the convoy, perhaps for this purpose. There was certainly a attacking areas south of Iceland and east of Greenland, will be made. As
general impression that there were heavy difficulties in the way of the northerly traffic has not been attacked for some time, I intend to
establishing contact with this convoy. concentrate all the available boats in this area. The exact positions of the
At 1230, a message was received from an Italian submarine, that she attacking areas will be fixed, bearing in mind the visibility conditions
had lost visual contact with the convoy at 1230 in CG 4172. Last course, between Iceland and Greenland.
3200.
At 1630, the Air Reconnaissance made contact. Bearings were received U 372 put into Brest.
from 3 boats, which placed the convoy in CF 6322. No reports were
received from the other 4 boats, which must all be in the vicinity of the
convoy, and they have apparently been forced to submerge. 2 of the boats - 137 -
which took the bearings on the aircraft beacon signals, are in the
immediate vicinity. None of them succeeded in making contact. The two
boats soon reported that they had been driven off by destroyers. No
messages were received from the third submarine. It looks as though the
358
 To B.d.U.
Condor gave away the convoy position to the submarines, by circling
round the escort. Decoy for the destroyers. Both Diesels temporarily out
of order. Leakage of lubricating oil. CF 3976.
Date Position, Wind, Weather Hardegen.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. These messages show how difficult it must have been for the
submarines to operate. The picture is completed by the messages
transmitted previously by U 109 and 331, which are as follows:

14.8. The convoy was again reported in CF 3943, by an Italian
submarine, and then contacted continually all day either by aircraft or
submarines.
U 123 and 124 reported the convoy position on W/T. THe W/T
messages were as follows:
To B.d.U.
At 2000, the convoy was on course 300, in CF 3986, with escorts close
in and at a distance, by day and by night. The enemy also have
searchlights in blacked out search positions, to orientate the outer
destroyers and mislead the submarines, as when these had been
transmitted, destroyers went out on exploratory sweeps. No contact in
grid square 3966. Lä 1-2 70 cubic meters. Sighted Sunderland attached to
convoy.
U 124
To B.d.U.
Returning to base. Thick trails of oil, and, when submerged, air
bubbles, increasing daily. Individual tank H.P. blow valve 8 and 1, and
exhaust conduit not working. Both hydrophone gears out of action. 70
cubic meters, all torpedoes.
U 109
To B.d.U.
Returning to base, grid square CG 4141, 20 cubic meters. Electric
compressor working "Junkers" out of action. No contact. Driven off 3
times. "Condor" bearing 3090 at 1617. North to east 4, cloudy, visibility
good, 1025 millibars.
U 331
The air reconnaissance only sighted one single steamer, which was
attacked from the air, reported name and position. She belongs to the
convoy outward bound from Gibraltar. It seems likely that she dropped
out, and that the convoy itself is not far off.

To B.d.U.
Convoy sighted at 1645 in grid square CF 6327, good fix obtained by - 138 -
Condor to the north of convoy according to morse message. 4 hours heavy
depth charge activity. Am able to proceed at 15 knots, pressing on, CF
3987.
Hardegen.

359

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
As the position of this ship is the only one we have, diverging search
patrols were sent out between 2800 and 3400, starting from there, and air
reconnaissance for the 15.8 is detailed to cover the same area. U 93 and U
123 broke off, owing to a temporary engine breakdown. U 371, U 126 and
U 124 also took a part periodically in the search for the convoy. The
following boats put out to search for the enemy: U 111 from Lorient; U
201 from Brest.
Report made by the Captain of U 74:
For several weeks, the boat was in various attacking areas in the central
North Atlantic, without seeing anything. She then gradually proceeded
further east via various dispositions, and took part in the attack on 2
August against the SL convoy reported by a radio intercept.In this attack,
the submarine definitely torpedoed one 8,000 GRT steamer, and probably
torpedoed 3 others.
Report made by the Captain of U 431:
First operation of both submarine and the Captain. Spent several weeks
in the central North Atlantic area, mainly south east of Greenland,
occupying attacking areas, often with very poor visibility. Altogether saw
only two fast single ships. Then proceeded further east, where she took
part in several operations against convoys. She only actually sighted one
convoy and did not fire. Engines several times out of order.
Report made by the Captain of U 371:
360
First operation of both the submarine and the Captain. Several weeks in
the central North Atlantic, without sighting any enemy traffic. Visibility
often poor. At the beginning of August, took part in several operations in
the area S.W. of the Porcupine Bank. Made contacts with the SL convoy
from 3 - 5.8. Destroyed 2 steamers totaling 12,500 GRT in a well-
designed and skillful night attack.
All three reports show clearly the altered state of traffic in the
operational area during recent months. Scarcity of single ship traffic,
exceptions proceeding very fast. Convoys very heavily escorted with
heavy air patrols escorting them as far out as possible.
U 111 put out from Lorient.
U 201 put out from Brest.
15.8. The new measures taken against the Gibraltar convoys were a
failure. Even the air reconnaissance achieved no results. Presumably the
convoy did not proceed on mean course N.W., but either went N. or far off
to the W.
In the first instance, it is hopeless for the boats to operate
- 139 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 because of the width of the area in which the convoy might be, and the 16.8. Positions at 0800:
distance the boats would have to cross to its possible position. On the U 84 - AD 87 U 96 - AK 37
other hand, it might be possible to attack if it has gone to the west. While U 38 - AK 21 U 71 - AK 38
U 93, returning to base because of damage caused by an aircraft bomb, U 501 - AK 22 U 73 - AL 17
was reporting, the other 4 boats were disposed in line from CF 2725 to CF U 553 - AK 24 U 46 - AK 02
2245 for the afternoon, and in line from CF 1623 - CE 3692 for the 16.8. U 105 - AK 33 U 77 - AK 03
If the convoy is not contacted by these boats, the operation is to be broken U 567 - AK 34 U 751 - AL 19
off, as the state of fuel of all the boats, except U 124, is insufficient for U 568 - AL 13 U 101 - AL 01
further operations. U 129 - AK 35 U 559 - AL 62
U 563 - AK 36 U 83 - AL 65
U 371 also returned to base, and her place was taken by an Italian U 43 - AL 15 U 204 - AL 68
submarine. A second boat was detailed to proceed to the S.W. to elongate U 206 - AL 16 U 75 - CD 68
the patrol line. U 205 - CE 11
Outward bound: U 124 - CE 36
U 202 - AL 55 U 126 - CF 15
(signed): DÖNITZ. U 82 - AD 89 U 123 - CF 16
U 569 - AL 11
U 106 - BE 29
U 201 - BF 41
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log U 111 - BF 76
U 125 - CG 14
16 - 31 August 1941
Returning to base:
PG30295 U 371 - CF 23
U 93 - CF 31
U 109 - BF 75
U 331 - BF 73
U 94 - BF 64
Date Position, Wind, Weather U 79 - BF 64.
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
361
 Ready for operations by 31 August:
U 108, 141, 562, 66, 552, 95, 98, 69, 561, 558, 143, 752, 571.
The convoy from Gibraltar has not been contacted again. The boats
allocated were given freedom to maneuver in relation to the state of their
fuel. They were ordered to operate against the Lisbon traffic of whose
movements we were well informed by the Communications Service.
U 331, 109 and 123 are returning to base. U 124 and 126 remain in the
area.
U 79 put in to Lorient, U 94 to St. Nazaire.
U 565 is outward bound for the operational area, from Brest.
17.8. U 109 put into Lorient.
- 141 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 143 put out from Kiel for a long distance cruise.
362
At 1100, the Air Reconnaissance assigned to the N.W. area for the
immediate future, reported a convoy on course 2700, west of the
Porcupine Bank. After receiving several bearings on beacon signals from
submarines, the convoy position at 1200 was calculated as AM 7143.
The aircraft observed yet another alteration of course to 2300 and then
had to return to base. The observation post suspects a Gibraltar convoy.
While the boats S.E. of Greenland (the Greenland Group) received orders
to remain where they were, the remaining boats were ordered to operate
against the convoy if within range. They consisted of: U 201, 204, 106,
564. U 201 established contact in AL 9379 at 2131.
18.8. U 201 maintained contact until 0203 in AL 9537, but at 0330
reported: "contact lost". Mean course is S.W.
At 1115, the Air Reconnaissance established contact, and reported the
convoy in BE 3143. At 1200, bearings were received from U 106, 201,
204, and 559, and according to a good cross bearing, the convoy was in
AL 9893, proceeding at 8 knots, by dead reckoning. The boats have ben
operating against a supposed south-westerly course, whereas the convoy
was actually proceeding south, 40 - 100 miles off. The Reconnaissance,
consisting of several Junkers 88, reported the convoy in BE 2265 at 1735
and sent beacon signals which could only be used as an indication because
of the sharp angle if intersection.
U 552 put out from St. Nazaire on a long distance cruise.
At 1808, U 201 established contact.
19.8. U 201 maintained contact until 0055, and then was driven off. At
0055, U 204 reported the convoy in BE 2644, at 0608, U 559 reported it in
BE 2914 and at 0728 in BE 2944. The bearings from the boats are
obviously different.
At 0925, U 201 again established contact, maintained it until 1658 in
BE 5345 and was then driven off. At 1740, the submarine reported the
enemy in BE 5349. The Air Reconnaissance flew over the area, and one
of the G.A.F. aircraft, reconnoitering for the planned operation, transmitted
beacon signals, the directions of which were reported by U 123.
U 204 reported that she was returning to base because of lack of fuel.
1 Afridi class destroyer and 2 steamers totaling 14,000 GRT were sunk
from this convoy, and on 5.8., 2 direct hits were scored on a 14,000 GRT
passenger ship.
- 142 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 559 reported 4 direct hits on 3 steamers in the convoy. At 2126, U
201 again established contact in BE 5631, course 1600, and at 2258
reported the convoy in BE 5657. Then contact was broken off. U 106 lost
sight of the enemy at 2215. If the independent searches made by the boats
meet with no success, a diverging search patrol consisting of U 201, 564
and 559 is to be made in sector 160 as far as 2200.
363
Report made by the Captain of U 79: Length of trip: 21.7 to 16.8.
Operated against the convoy proceeding to Gibraltar, as from 24.7, and
torpedoed 5 steamers in this convoy, 3 of which were definitely sunk.
Then took part in the operation against the convoy outward bound from
Gibraltar. Was the first to report the convoy. She was attacked with depth
charges and developed oil traces which made it necessary for her to return
to base. An exceptionally well organized and successful cruise.
Reports made by the Captain of U 94: Length of cruise: 12.7 - 16.8.
The boat was detailed first to the Southern area, where she observed
nothing, and was then ordered to proceed off Gibraltar where she took part
in an attack on an outgoing convoy. No successes, as she was driven off
almost immediately by destroyers. Impossible to push on, owing to lack
of fuel.
Report made by the Captain of U 109: Allocated first to the Azores
area, then after refueling at Gata, was sent to the Southern area. She was
recalled from there, as the enemy are obviously avoiding this area for the
time being, and she was finally sent to the Gibraltar convoy route. Ceased
operating because she developed oil traces, and other damage. No
successes.
20.8. The search for the south going convoy, in the sectors laid down,
met with no result. U 559 reported that she was returning to base from BE
9110 and abandoning further action against the convoy.
One aircraft of the Air Reconnaissance contacted the convoy again at
1359, and transmitted beacon signals. All boats within range of the
convoy are taking bearings and reporting. All the same, the D/F bearings
did not produce any useful position. The aircraft itself reported the convoy
in BE 8326 on course 2250, speed 8 knots.
As Operational Control was unable to form any clear picture from this
information, the position reported by the aircraft was considered as
doubtful. The convoy might easily be to the south of this position. As no
contact has been made up till 1900, the boats received orders that if they
met with no result from individual searches, to make a further search in
this order: U 201, 564, 106, starting from the given position in BE 5990 at
1500 and working out in sector 160 as far as 2000. U 124 and U 126 were
given freedom to maneuver within this sector.
At 1956, U 106 reported as follows: The following boats are
proceeding at 13 knots from the rendezvous to BE 8364. U 126 - 1000, U
564 - 1200, U 106 - 1400, U 201 - 1600,
- 143 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
from 1800 until 2100.
The boats have collected at this point from the south and north, so the
convoy cannot be in this area. According to this message, the boats are
searching further to the S.E. If this is unsuccessful as well, the convoy can
only be to the north which means it must have been proceeding slower
than was estimated. The boats were ordered to make a further search after
364
2100, in the sector ordered by B.d.U. We must now reckon with a convoy
speed of less than 7 knots.
Radio Intelligence confirmed an air escort over a submarine in AK
2221, a sign that someone is proceeding in that area. Boats in the vicinity
were ordered to operate on that area, but met with no success.
21.8. Our boats did not contact the south going Gibraltar convoy. The
only clue to the existence of the convoy in the area is the message
transmitted by U 564, of a Sunderland in BE 9718.
The Air Reconnaissance on its return flight contacted the convoy at
1730. Operational Control only received the message at 1850, because of
a W/T delay, so there was no point in getting a bearing from the
submarine. The aircraft reported the convoy in BE 9585, course 1500, at
11730. The boats received orders to operate against the convoy at full
speed ahead, report position, and if further operations became impossible,
to report "No". According to these messages, the following boats are
operating against the convoy:
U 201, 552, 106, 564, U 108 recently joined.
U 126 and U 75 report "No". U 124 started to return to base and has so
far met with no success. At 1750, the boats were disposed in order U 108,
201, 564, 106, 552 in BE 9585 on the mean course 1500 to 1900, going
out from the convoy position. At the first light, these boats should be on
the arc which the enemy would reach if proceeding at 9 knots. The boats
should then advance towards the convoy.
Air Reconnaissance is to fly over the area from 1000 on 22.8.
No contact with the enemy has been made in the area occupied by the
Greenland Group. Presumably traffic must have ceased in this area,
otherwise at least one contact would have been made, with such a large
number of boats in the area. It looks as if the enemy were by-passing us,
by using a type of far reaching location gear. This is not very likely,
however, as with the extraordinarily good visibility there is at the moment,
the boats would have at least observed mast-tops of the first ships and the
destroyers. I decided to transfer the entire group to the east, to have a
disposition to the south and the southeast of Iceland in case no contact was
made with the enemy.
The boats were ordered to proceed on course 700 with a day's run of
150 miles, as from 1800 on 21.8. U 75 reported from BF 9747, that she
had observed ship 36, but had been unable to maintain
- 144 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
contact, as her engines were damaged. She reported that she would
arrive in BF 85 on 22.8. U 75 is operating against the south going convoy.
The Captains of U 371 and U 331 put in to make reports.
Lt.(s.g.) Driver, the Captain of U 371 has operated recently against the
north going and the south going Gibraltar convoys, and has sunk 2 ships
totaling 14,500 GRT.
365
Lt.(j.g.) von Thiesenhausen, the Captain of U 331, met with no success
in this first trip made by the boat. He made several mistakes while
operating against the north going Gibraltar convoy reported by U 79. The
mistakes can be put down to his inexperience. We hope he will meet with
the necessary success when he has more experience.
22.8. No contact was made with the enemy during the night. At about
0130, U 75 and U 552, reported having seen star shells in CG 1110. This
was quite probably an attempt made by the enemy to mislead us, so only
these two boats are to operate, as boats are only to operate, as ordered, on
10 degrees higher mean courses.
U 126 reported that she was returning to base.
The Air Reconnaissance again made contact with the convoy at 1050,
and transmitted beacon signals. U 564, 552, 75, 108, 557, 106 took
bearings and reported, placing the convoy in CG 1380. The convoy
therefore must have proceeded even further to the S.E., and thus further
into the area under German Air Reconnaissance. The star shells probably
were fired by the enemy in order to mislead us.
C.-in-C. G.A.F. Atlantic is organizing the detailing of fighter bombers.
An aircraft which had made contact, transmitted continuous beacon
signals. The D/F bearings reported hourly by the boats, enable us to
calculate a new position every time.
At 1130, aircraft reported the convoy in CG 1357, course 170 degrees,
and at 1230, an alteration of course to 1400. At 1520, U 564 made contact
with the convoy in CG 1645 and continuously transmitted shadower
messages according to which the convoy was proceeding southwards on
course 1400.
23.8. At 0122, U 552 reported that her port Diesel had been out of order
for 8 hours, and it would take 2 days to repair it. In these circumstances,
there was obviously no point in her continuing to operate. She was
therefore ordered to proceed to the north, where we intend to allocate her
an attacking area within the Northern group. At 0115, the shadower
messages from U 564 ceased. The boats were ordered to press on.
- 145 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
At 0447, U 201 reported 6 steamers totaling 37,000 GRT, including one
12,000 GRT and one 8,000 GRT tanker. Submarine requested permission
to return to base, as her Junkers compressor was out of order.
At 0530, we received a W/T message from U 564: 11 hits with single
torpedoes, of which 8 were direct hits. 4 craft, probably including a
destroyer observed to sink. Returned to base.
U 201 was forced to return to base as her compressor was out of order.
U 564 was ordered to press on, and U 106, 75 and 108 were ordered to try
and make contact again.
At 0918, U 108 made contact with the convoy in CG 5137, and
reported that the enemy was making for the Portuguese coast, as her ships
were damaged by the sea. At 1852, the submarine had observed 8 partly
366
damaged ships. We requested position reports from all the boats operating
against this convoy, and judging from these, it was useless to continue
operating, as the convoy had reached the Lisbon territorial waters before
the arrival of the submarines.
At 1853, U 552 reported: "have sunk steamer "Spind" (2,129 GRT)
from the convoy, by gunfire.
U 75 and U 564 returned. U 108 proceeded to the south. U 106 was
ordered to proceed into the Azores operational area.
The following report was made on the total of ships sunk and damaged:
U 559 2 ships sunk 17,000 GRT
204 2 ships sunk 14,000 GRT
201 6 ships sunk 37,000 GRT
564 4 ships sunk 20,000 GRT
552 1 ship sunk 2,129 GRT
Total 15 ships sunk 90,129 GRT
U 204 and U 564 also sank a destroyer each.
As well as above, the following were damaged:
U 564 4 ship 20,000 GRT
559 1 ship 9,000 GRT
The totals estimated by Captains cannot be regarded as completely
reliable, as some of them were made by night from considerable distances.
The group of Greenland boats, were detailed into a loose disposition
from AE 72/73 to AL 15/16, consisting of lines about 100 miles wide.
The Captains of U 93, 204 and 559 put in to make reports. U 93 -
Lt.(s.g.) Korth began operating in the south and was then ordered back and
detailed off Gibraltar, because of the nonexistence of enemy traffic. She
met with no success. The Captain, who had
 until 6.9, and then return to base if she has not contacted the motor vessel
by then.
- 146 -
U 552 was unable to repair her engine trouble on board, and was
ordered to return to base at St. Nazaire.

25.8. U 570 and U 652, recently arrived in the operational area, were
incorporated in the disposition S.E. of Iceland.

New attacking areas to the W. of the North Channel, were allocated to

the following boats:
Date Position, Wind, Weather U 101 - AM 19; U 751 - AL 03; U 561 - AM 42; U 557 - AL 66; U
and Sea State, Illumination, Events 69 - AM 44; U 95 - AM 45.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 141 and U 83 had no restrictions in attacking areas to the west of the
North Channel, but the focal point was in the east.

U 129 and U 69 received orders to return to base at full speed ahead, as

one man in U 129 and the Captain of U 69 were very ill. Diphtheria was
formerly been considered very capable, gave the impression of being suspected in U 129, and there was consequently danger of infection.
run down, and was relieved.
U 652 reported an enemy band in AE 5995 consisting of one auxiliary
U 204 (Lt.(s.g.) Kell), and U 559 (Lt.(j.g.) Heidtmann) operated in the cruiser, one cruiser and 2 destroyers, on course S.E.
North Atlantic. They both operated against a south-going Gibraltar
convoy, and made successful attacks. U 204 sank 2 ships totaling 14,000 The Captains of U 123, U 126, U 124 and U 205 put in to make reports.
GRT from the convoy, and one single ship of 14,000 GRT, as well as
Afridi class destroyer. U 559 sank two ships totaling 17,000 GRT from Lt.(s.g.) Hardegen, the Captain of U 123 operated in the south. He first
the convoy, and damaged one ship of 7,000 GRT. attacked a convoy and sank an auxiliary cruiser and 3 ships. Later he sank
a single ship and observed heavy neutral traffic off Freetown.The Captain
24.8. U 125, 111 and 108 en route for the south, received orders to behaved very skillfully throughout the operation and used his
occupy DG 57, DG 58 and DG 63 on the 27.8. They are then detailed opportunities for attacks to the utmost.
from there to the sea area west of 300 West, which the Naval War Staff
have allocated for submarine warfare.
- 147 -
U 106 was sent to grid square 68 to intercept the motor vessel
Anneliese Essberger on the 3.9. The submarine is to wait in that square
367

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
He sank one auxiliary cruiser, one tanker and four ships, totaling 33,866
GRT.
Lt.(s.g.) Bauer, (the Captain of U 126) has recently arrived from a home
base. He was thoroughly successful in making contact with and attacking
the enemy, and sank 4 ships and one sailing vessel, totaling 22,171 tons.
U 124 (Lt.(s.g.) Schulz, William) started on the Southern operation, but
ceased owing to the cessation of enemy traffic. The submarine met with
no success west of Gibraltar, while following the Gibraltar convoy which
put out on 9.8.
U 205 (Lt.(s.g.) Reschke) was detailed to pick up ship 36, after a short
operation in the North Atlantic, and concluded this escort duty.
U 124 put into Lorient, U 75 to St. Nazaire, U 201 to Brest.
U 558 put out from Brest, U 562 from Lorient, U 433 from Bergen, U
432 from Trondheim.
26.8. U 207 took over from U 129, the attacking area in the North area,
with freedom to attack.
368
At 1555, U 141 contacted a convoy in AM 4796, proceeding on course
2700 at 7 knots. Boats west of the North Channel received orders to
operate against it. Boats north of 580 N. are to maintain their position. At
1756, U 141 lost contact in AM 4878 and was attacked by aircraft.
U 557 made contact at 1907 with the destroyer escort in AM 4785, and
then with the convoy itself, and maintained this contact. To prevent this
area from being deserted, as the boats west of the North Channel were
operating against this convoy, the boats north of 580 N. were told to
proceed on course 1900 to this area. As past experience shows, if one
convoy passes through an area, it is usually followed by a second or a
third.
The boats operating in the south received the following W/T message:
As from 28.8, boats in the area south of 300 N., between 300 and 350 W.,
are given freedom to attack. In this line, the following are operating to the
south: U 125 in the west, U 111 in the east, U 108 in the center, behind
them both.
It has so far been impossible to make the area west of 300 W. free for
attack, for submarines owing to our own and Italian traffic. It looks as
though even heavier traffic is proceeding through this area, since enemy
traffic was transferred from the Freetown area.
U 552 put in to St. Nazaire.
- 148 -
 Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
27.8. According to a Radio Intercept, an incoming convoy was in AE
7590 at 1719 on 26.8. Boats north of 580 N. received orders to stop
proceeding south and to operate against the convoy. They should proceed
at about 5 - 8 knots and search on the following convoy routes.
U 570, U 38, U 82, U 202, U 652, from 600 - 900;
U 501, U 569, U 84, U 567, U 553, U 207 on 900 - 1200;
U 452, U 105, U 96, U 563, U 568 from 1200 - 1500.
The remaining boats are free to maneuver.
At 1357, U 570 made the following wireless message in plain language:
Am not clear to dive and am being attacked by aircraft. AE 7698. The
boat has interference in the reception, and it is therefore impossible to
communicate with her. Boats in the vicinity were ordered to help her.
No further messages were received from the Northern area, and none of
the boats made contact with the convoy. Presumably the information
received from radio intercepts, was inaccurate, and the boats sent out must
have passed by the convoy. Boats north of 580 N. (except U 143) received
orders to proceed S.W. if they had made no contact with the enemy by
dark. I intend to move them later to an attacking area S.W. of Iceland.
In the areas occupied until now, the air patrols proved stronger than we
had thought, and numerous submarine warnings ensued. Freedom of
operation was an impossibility. U 557 made further contact with the
convoy, to the west of Iceland. The convoy is now proceeding on 2400. U
557 reported sinking 4 steamers totaling 17,000 GRT, one a possibility.
369
Air Reconnaissance contacted the convoy at 1052, and transmitted
radio beacons.
Judging from the messages received from U 577 and U 571, the convoy
was proceeding on a more southerly course, and there was probably
another convoy en route for Gibraltar.
The Captains of U 75, U 564, U 201, U 552 put in to make reports.
U 75 (Lt.(j.g.) Ringelmann) sank 2 ships totaling 12,000 GRT from the
north going Gibraltar convoy, on 5.8. She was then ordered to escort Ship
36.
U 201 (Lt.(j.g.) Schnee) and U 564 (Lt.(j.g.) Suhren) operated against a
south going Gibraltar convoy soon after putting out. They inflicted heavy
damage on the enemy convoy in skillful, short operations lasting 11 and 12
days. U 201 sank 4 ships totaling 20,000 GRT and torpedoed 3 ships
totaling 20,000 GRT. U 564 sank 3 ships and a corvette or small steamer
and torpedoed 4 ships.
U 552 (Lt.(j.g.) Topp) also operated against the convoy which U 564
and U 201 attacked, but was unsuccessful owing to engine trouble, and
had to break off the operation early on.
U 564 and U 69 put in to St. Nazaire. U 81 put out from Trondheim.
- 149 -

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
28.8. During the night, U 557 reported further shadower messages, the
last at 0336 in AL 9374, according to which the convoy was proceeding on
course 2500. Air Reconnaissance was detailed for this area for 0930. The
convoy was not contacted in spite of good visibility. Boats operating
against the convoy reported their positions in brief signals, by order. The
search for the various routes is to be continued in the sectors as ordered.
At 1714, U 71 reported the convoy on course 2700, in AL 9561. U 577
reported destroyers twice, and at 2333 reported an acoustic bearing on
2600, from AL 9557. Contact was not re-established during the night. Air
reconnaissance tomorrow is to consist of 4 aircraft.
The following new attacking areas are allocated to the boats in the
Northern group:
U 652 - AD 8539 U 452 - AL 1189
U 105 - AD 8589 U 43 - AL 1258
U 432 - AD 8679 U 202 - AL 1444
U 38 - AD 8892 U 82 - AL 1439
U 84 - AD 8959 U 207 - AL 1621
U 81 - AL 1142 U 569 - AL 2388
U 501 - AL 1214 U 433 - AL 1696
U 501 and U 73 were both attacked and bombed by aircraft. U 73 was
so heavily damaged that she was forced to return to base. U 206 reported
taking on board 2 officers and 4 Petty Officers from an English aircraft.
She reported that several low flying aircraft were searching.
370
U 82 has not succeeded in finding U 570, and reported:"Air patrols
flying over all day".
U 85 put out from Trondheim.
29.8. The outgoing convoy was not contacted again. Air
Reconnaissance confirmed an incoming convoy on course 600 about 100
miles to the west of the southern most point of Iceland (HG 71 according
to later information from Radio Intercepts). It was impossible to detail
submarines against this convoy owing to its distance, and the area.
The submarines were ordered to make a further search in a S.W.
direction for the outgoing convoy, in patrol lines from AL 8591 to BE
2239. At the same time Air Reconnaissance is to fly over the area in
which the enemy should be if proceeding on a mean course south.
U 67 put in to Lorient.
30.8. The outgoing convoy was not contacted.
As there seemed to be no point in operating further against this convoy
without locations, I decided to break off the operation at dark,
- 150 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

and detail the boats to proceed northwards in order to divide them up

between Groups Kurfuerst and Markgraf, according to the state of their
fuel.

At 2300, U 143 reported that at 1710 she had sighted a convoy in AM 1.9. Positions of boats on 1.9:
3551, proceeding west, but was then forced to submerge for several hours. One group of boats S.W. of Iceland in following position order:
U 652 - AD 8539, U 105 - AD 8589
31.8. U 101, from BE 2458, reported an acoustic bearing of 1650 on a U 432 - AD 8679, U 38 - AD 8892
convoy, and at 1505, from BE 2486, a bearing of 1800. The convoy was U 84 - AD 8859, U 501 - AL 1214
probably steering a southerly course. U 101 has engine trouble and has to U 43 - AL 1258, U 452 - AL 1189
return to base. No further messages were received from the operation U 202 - AL 1444, U 82 - AL 1439
area. U 207 - AL 1621, U 569 - AL 2388
U 433 - AL 1696.
U 98 put out from St. Nazaire.
The following are en route to this position:
U 85 - AL 2260, U 81 - AL 2230
(Signed): DÖNITZ. U 143 - AM 3320, U 141 - AM 5450.

The following boats are west of the North Channel:

U 77 - AL 0397, U 568 - AL 6226
U 553 - AL 6512, U 206 - AL 6616
U 567 - AL 6449, U 563 - AL 6823
U 96 - AM 4478.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
The boats which operated against the convoy reported by U 141 are
1 - 15 September 1941 proceeding to the east in a patrol line and according to dead reckoning are
in the following positions:
PG30296 U 71 - AL 9760, U 557 - AL 9840
U 561 - AL 9870, U 95 - AL 9880
U 751 - BE 2230, U 83 - BE 2310
U 562 - BE 2350, U 558 - BE 2740.
371
 U 106 is in the Azores operational area.
U 108, U 125, U 111 are proceeding in a southerly direction in DS 52,
DS 76 and DS 86.
Homeward bound: U 101 - BE 6190, U 73 - BE 3950.
been ordered to proceed north on a course of 3400, in order to attack
this convoy.
U 85 has been allocated an attack area within the Northern Commitment
in AD 8545, and U 81 in AL 1143.

Outward bound: U 98 - BF 5450, U 66 - BF 1710.
The following should be operationally ready by 15.9:
From the ports of Western France: U 94, 552, 107, 68, 97, 74, 103,
372, 431, 79, 201, 564.
From Trondheim: U 373.
Air reconnaissance reported a convoy on a course of 2600 at 0830 in
AM 4531.
The plane stated that position was inexact, fog prevented further
shadowing and sending of beacon signals. Group "Bosemueller" has
- 152 -
U 106 has been given radio instructions on escorting the motor vessel
"Anneliese Essberger". The boat is to be at the rendezvous in CD 68 from
3.9.
U 143 reported that she was returning because of engine trouble. She
sank a 6,000 GRT steamer belonging to the convoy that she reported on
3.9.
U 73, who is on a protracted homeward course, established contact at
1150 with an inward bound convoy in BD 3945. She reported 20 steamers
3 escorts, course 400, speed 7 knots. Boats of the group "Bosemueller"
will attack this convoy. As U 73 is maintaining contact, the boats can
proceed at maximum speed and so reach the convoy as quickly as
possible. They have been ordered to search the sector from 3500 to 700
from the last reported convoy position tomorrow if contact is lost.

After dark, U 73 lost contact in thick fog. She reported last convoy
position at 0016 as BD 3661.

U 572 left Trondheim, U 565 Brest and U 69 St. Nazaire.

2.9. Contact with convoy reported by U 73 was not re-established

Date Position, Wind, Weather during the night. It must be assumed that the boats are stalking the convoy
and Sea State, Illumination, Events within the sectors ordered. At 1143 U 557 reported: Suddenly came upon
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. convoy in fog and rain. Be 1159, course 400. Shortly afterwards U 83
reported a corvette in the same grid square. Hence, both of these boats
must have been very close to the convoy. Apparently the thick weather

372
prevented further shadowing. At 1633 U 557 reported that she had not re-
established contact.
Air reconnaissance was again sent out to locate the convoy reported
yesterday. Plane made contact and sent beacon signals which were
reported by some boats. A reliable position was not obtained. G.A.F. next
reported convoy position as AL 6586, later corrected this to AL 9289 (120
miles further south). Boats were ordered to proceed to this position. As
no convoy was detected by evening, I decided to direct both groups
"Bosemueller" and "Kurfuerst" to attack the convoy reported by U 73.
Reasons were as follows:
1) The most recent and reliable position report is available for the
convoy reported by U 73.
2) The position of the convoy reported by Air Reconnaissance is very
vague.
- 153 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
373
3) Air Reconnaissance may very probably pick up the inward convoy
again during the next few days, but will hardly do so in the case of the
outward one.
4) As they belong to an "SL" convoy, the ships in the convoy reported by
U 73 are probably more valuable than the ships in the outward convoy
bound for Gibraltar.
Both groups have been combined to form Group "Seewolf".
U 94 has left St. Nazaire.
3.9. Weather in the convoy area is still very thick. The convoy has not
been found. However, at 1640 U 98, outward bound, contacted an
outward bound convoy in AL 9656. Course 2400. It is probably the "OG"
convoy that was inadequately reported by the G.A.F. on 2.9. At that time
Group "Seewolf" was supposed to be about 100 to 180 miles W.S.W. of
the convoy. Visibility remained poor. The boat was only able to
distinguish a cruiser and 8 steamers. However, we have at least an exact
enemy position to work on again.Data on inward convoys are old (in BD
3661 at 0016 on 2.9.).Even if we still succeed in picking up the convoy,
little time will remain for attacking, as it is already in the rendezvous area.
Weather and especially visibility, is expected to be more favorable in the
south than in the north during the next few days. I, therefore, decided to
give up all idea of attacking the inward bound convoy and to commit all
boats in an operation against the outward convoy.
U 98 lost contact at dusk.
U 562 entered Brest.
4.9. Neither G.A.F. nor submarines succeeded in finding the convoy.
The search is being continued in the sector from 1800 to 2200 based on the
last known enemy position. Two boats are being allocated to each sector.

U 751 has turned back.
The attack areas for Group "Markgraf" have been moved 150 miles to
the west. U 141 has moved her operational area to the northern part of
AM.
U 552 has left St. Nazaire, U 373 Trondheim, for the North Atlantic
operational area.
U 101 has entered St. Nazaire, U 148 Bergen.
- 154 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
5.9. Search for the convoy is continuing. Boats have orders to continue
operations in the north to south patrol line between 150 and 230 West.
The U.S.A. destroyer "Geer" reported that she was unsuccessfully
attacked with torpedoes by a submarine at noon on 4th September. A
query put to the most likely submarines elicited that U 652 had
374
encountered the destroyer and had been attacked with 3 depth charges.
She reported that she had been forced to sheer of. Double miss observed.
Moderate depth charge pursuit.
U 38 has turned back. Sank one steamer (6,000 GRT). Group
"Markgraf" has been given new attack areas, embracing the zone between
Greenland and Iceland as far as about 400 miles south of the Islands.
U 101 entered St. Nazaire.
6.9. A final attempt was made to pick up the Gibraltar convoy. The
boats continued stalking in a wide patrol line, G.A.F. used all available
planes for spotting. No success. Probably because visibility remained
unfavorable, and probably because the convoy is still farther to the west,
after all. If the search were continued now, the submarines would have to
cruise as far as off Gibraltar, and that even if they contacted the convoy,
the width of the search patrol in which the boats are operating would
permit only some of them to get to grips as the convoy is already too close
to its port of destination.
I decided to cancel the operation.
Group "Seewolf" was ordered to move away to the north.
U 83 has turned back.
7.9. U 206, 563, 568 and 77 (the whole of Group "Seewolf") have
reported that they are returning.
In accordance with orders from Naval War Staff, preparations are to be
made immediately to send German submarines into the Mediterranean. 6
boats are envisaged for a start, they are to operate from the base at Salmis
against enemy supply lines, especially those to the coast of North Africa.
Operational control is to be in the hands of Naval Group Command South.
U 73, U 71 have entered St. Nazaire.
 U 94 has left St. Nazaire, U 372 Trondheim. U 751 has entered St.
- 155 - Nazaire.

9.9. New attack areas have been ordered for the boats belonging to
Group "Seewolf", they lie west of Iceland between 510 and 550 N. and
between 150 and 200 W. The change has been made to enable co-
operation with air reconnaissance from this area.

At 1430, U 85 contacted a convoy in AD 9259. Convoy was on a

northerly course, proceeding at 7 knots. Group "Markgraf" was instructed
Date Position, Wind, Weather to stalk this convoy. At 1730 U 85 made another shadower report from
and Sea State, Illumination, Events AD 9262 and at 2357 from AD 6881.
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 141 reported that she is on her homeward voyage. She is going to
Bergen to replenish and has apparently sunk 2 patrol vessels.

U 83 has entered Brest.

8.9. The boats in the South have been ordered to operate in area ER and 10.9. At 0501 U 81 picked up the convoy and reported it in AD 6835 on
EQ east of 400 West. a northerly course. Later U 432 took over the shadower reports, observed
the change of course to N.E. and finally reported from AD 6624 at 2103.
No special events in the Northern area.
U 567 reported that she was returning. She sank an independent "Fort
The Commanders of boats U 101, 751, 71 and 73 appeared to make Richepanse" (3,485 GRT).
their reports.
The boats sighted little or nothing. The general impression obtained U 372 left Brest. U 206, U 77, U 568 entered St. Nazaire. U 563
was that there are no longer any independents other than a few, very fast entered Brest.
large steamers. The enemy appears to have gathered all shipping together
in convoys. In addition to close escort with the convoys, long-range
escorts or chaser groups were observed, which rendered shadowing or - 156 -
undetected approach extremely difficult. In addition the long-range escort
appeared to carry out decoy maneuvers by firing starshell, using search-
lights etc.
It seems that the boats will have to fire at long range at the very first
opportunity, they have been given appropriate orders.
375

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
11.9. U 432 continued to shadow the convoy picked up east of
Greenland for the rest of the day and finally reported it in AD 4882 at
2331. Reports of successes were received from the following boats.
1) At 0150 U 81 reported: 31,000 GRT, 1 independent, 4 steamers
belonging to convoy. 2 of them from the convoy torpedoed (11,000 GRT).
Boat still has a stern torpedo left and has turned back.
2) U 652 also reported that she had turned back. She later amplified this
message, stating that she had been held off since 9.9 and had sunk 3
steamers totaling 20,000 GRT (2 of these probables).
3) U 82 sank 5 steamers belonging to the convoy, total tonnage 31,000
GRT (2 of them probables). She has fired all torpedoes and is returning.
4) U 432 reported between her shadower reports that she had sunk 5
steamers totaling 25,000 GRT.
5) U 85, who first sighted the convoy, apparently drew most of the escorts
to herself, for she reported from AD 9393 that she had suffered damage to
her engines from depth charges and that her diving capacity was limited.
However, she had sunk 3 steamers belonging to the convoy (total 15,000
GRT). She is returning to port.
U 433 reported "Q" ship in the convoy, fired 3 misses, depth charged.
Air patrols also at night.
376
According to a report from U 432 there were still 25 ships in the
convoy, 2 destroyers, 5 corvettes astern. Flying boats.
U 569 requested beacon signals from shadower, must, therefore, have
been in the vicinity of the convoy.
U 575 who has recently entered the operational area, has been ordered
to stalk the convoy.
U 558, belonging to Group "Seewolf" has reported that she is returning
home. She sank a 7,000 GRT steamer belonging to the convoy reported by
U 141.
The attack area of Group "Seewolf", consisting of U 69, 94, 557, 561,
565, 95, and 98, has been slightly extended to the north and N.E., as
according to several aircraft sighting reports the enemy is aware of the
patrol line and can avoid it. The boats are now between Ireland and 200
West from 530 to 560 North.
The 3 southern boats, U 125, U 108 and U 111, have been requested to
report shipping activity, and their fuel reserves. So far U 125 and U 108
have observed no traffic. U 111 sank a 10,000 GRT steamer yesterday in
FB 3354. Shipping appears to pass farther to the south, in fact, vessels
coming from St. Helena
- 157 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. U 84 has turned back because of lack of fuel. She sank a 7,000 GRT
steamer.

U 96 and U 567 have entered St. Nazaire.

U 141 has entered Bergen.

probably use the American 300 mile zone! The boats have been ordered
to operate in the whole of the area that was previously sanctioned, in large
grid squares, FC and FD.
U 562 left Brest.
13.9. During the night, contact with the east bound convoy was lost. The
boats reported fog and poor visibility. When B.d.U. enquired which boats
were stalking the convoy, U 433, 572, 552, 373 and 575 reported. The
boats were ordered to continue searching.

U 106 entered Lorient. While on return voyage, U 652 reported a convoy making to the S.W.
in AK 6196. However, she soon lost contact again in the fog. As no boats
12.9. The convoy was shadowed all day. First U 432 contacted the are available, this operation cannot be continued. U 652 was ordered to
convoy, then U 373 was guided in by beacon signals and she maintained continue homewards.
contact. Later U 433 took over shadowing, she observed the convoy on a
southerly course, later on one of 1100. Mean course may now be taken as U 553 reported that she was returning, nothing sighted, no successes.
1100, i.e. the convoy is proceeding towards the northern tip of the
Herbrides. Owing to the return of many boats, the patrol line in the Northern area
has been thinned.It is intended to form a Group S.E. of
U 105 reported that she is returning because of engine trouble. She
sank a steamer (5,000 GRT) belonging to the convoy.
- 158 -
U 43 has also turned back. She reported later that she had fired 6
torpedoes at the convoy, four of them turned out to be surface runners. No
successes. On 14.8 she sighted 4 large U.S.A. steamers with the battleship
"Mississippi" and strong escort in AK 57. Course 2100. North of 590
North she sighted planes each day.

U 202 is returning. She reported 5 inexplicable misses. She sank 1

steamer (2,000 GRT) and 1 escort belonging to the convoy.
Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 569 also stalked the convoy. She reported: contact lost, diving and Sea State, Illumination, Events
capacity limited, returning. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
377
 14.9. Further reports on the east bound convoy in the No0rth area were
received as follows: U 433 searched as far as AD 5213 to the north and
N.E. and found nothing.

U 552 reported at 1813: Convoy probably in AE 7590.

Greenland and for some boats to enter the area between the Faroes and
Herbrides during the new moon period now commencing, to stalk the
enemy shipping so often reported there.
For this reason U 94 and U 69 (formerly with Group "Seewolf") have
been instructed to make for AK 01. The following attack areas have been
allocated to Group "Seewolf":
U 95, U 565, U 557 are to stalk enemy shipping which is believed to
proceed from AM 3280 in the direction of 3150 to 2750. U 98 and U 561
are to stalk enemy shipping going from AM 3650 in the direction of 2850
to 2700. Most important area in the east.
U 557 had not sufficient fuel to carry out her orders to attack. She has
been given a freehand in the old attack area.
She later added that she had sighted smoke, destroyers and escort planes
in the square already reported. She lost contact again in the fog.
Further operations against this convoy appeared fruitless. U 432 was
ordered to turn back. U 433 was to continue searching in the direction of
probable advance course of the convoy, as she was to be committed in this
area in any case. The remaining boats, U 373, U 572, U 575, U 552 are to
move away to the S.W. in the direction of AK 30. They are to be
committed S.W. of Greenland in an attack line.
- 159 -

In the Southern area the outward bound boats U 103 and U 68 have
been ordered to proceed via squares DT 55 and DK 68.

The Naval War Staff has sanctioned the request made by B.d.U. to
extend the Southern operational area to 00 in the south and as far as as the
American 300 mile zone to the west. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Attack areas have been allocated: Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 111 - CF as far as the American 300 mile zone.
U 108 - FD, with emphasis on S.W. part.
U 125 - FK, with emphasis on N.E. part.

U 431 has left St. Nazaire

U 452, U 501 and U 207 have not reported since the convoy action.
U 38 has entered Lorient. They were asked to report position. No reply. U 561 was bombed and
reported engine trouble, returning. Air Reconnaissance spotted a convoy.
378
According to a cross bearing from the submarines, it was in AM 7980 at (Signed): DÖNITZ.
1330. Course about 500. U 558 and U 557, who were in the vicinity, were
ordered to stalk this convoy. It was not possible to direct other boats to
attack.

At 1910 U 565 reported a convoy on a westerly course in AM 2752. F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
But she lost contact again in the fog. U 95 and U 98 have been ordered to
stalk this convoy. Air Reconnaissance will patrol this area tomorrow 16 - 30 September 1941
morning. Air Reconnaissance is being used for this convoy instead of the
one reported by the reconnaissance plane, as the position of the convoy PG30297
sighted by the G.A.F. is very vague and too close to the coast of Ireland,
giving rise to the suspicion that the convoy is entering the British Channel.

U 558 was therefore ordered to continue her homeward voyage, U 557

was given a free hand. Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
U 85 reported that she was returning as she had been badly damaged by Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
bombs and was leaving an oil trace.

U 201 entered Brest.

15.9. While patrolling area in which U 565 yesterday reported a convoy,

the air reconnaissance spotted nothing. U 98 and U 565 were ordered to
continue searching for the convoy. Air Reconnaissance is to go out again
on 17.9. to search for it.
U 433 has been given a free hand in the northern half of AM.
U 94 reported that she had sunk the steamer "Newbury" (5,102 GRT).
The Commanders of U 38, U 96 and U 567 appeared to make their
reports. All 3 boats were operating in the North Atlantic. U 38 (Lt. Cdr.
Schuch) and U 567 (Lt.(s.g.) Fahr) each sank a steamer, but sighted
nothing else. U 96 (Lt.(s.g.) Lehmann) sighted nothing during the whole
voyage.
379
19.9. U 94, on the outward passage, reported the sinking of two steamers
of 11,375 GRT in AK 6761. 3 isolated steamers have been sunk in the
same area within two days therefore. The boat reported in this connection
that all the steamers steered the same general course (SW). It appears that
there are still outward bound convoys which disperse after passing the
narrow rendezvous area.
As the attack on U 85's convoy must be considered at an end, it is
intended to form a new concentration with the boats still able to remain in
the operational area for a time, and the outward bound boats, in the area
S.E. of Greenland.
U 74, U 94, U 576, U 372, U 373, U 552, U 69, U 562 and U 572
received orders to form a patrol channel from AD 9564 to AJ 3986.
 These boats are to patrol up and down in these lines at economical
cruising speed. The disposition is planned for the 18 to 19 September. - 163 -

Although previous attempts to intercept the enemy by means of shore

controlled U-boat operations has in many cases been unsuccessful, and
judging from experience alone, by far the greatest number of convoys are
sighted more or less accidentally by boats in passage. This fact can on no
account be considered a hard and fast rule. The reasons for non-
interception and non-sighting of the convoy from fixed dispositions, must
be presumed to lie in the fact that the enemy has information on the areas
of these dispositions, obtained by methods as yet undiscovered by us. Date Position, Wind, Weather
There is not a shadow of a doubt that such fixed dispositions of U-boats and Sea State, Illumination, Events
provide the best conditions, both for the fixing and the actual attacking of Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
the enemy, providing the areas of those dispositions are kept secret from
him.

The measures recently put into operation for this purpose, i.e.,
restrictions in the number of personnel informed of U-boat operations, as
far as is practicable. Cyphering of the grid indicators and the limiting of
knowledge of the key to departments to which this knowledge is
indispensable, justify the assumption that the enemy is unable to gain any
information on U-boat dispositions from the Communications Service. I
have decided this time also, therefore, to form the available boats into a
group, and to dispose them in pre-arranged positions in a narrow area.
With regard to the choice of area, considerable attention must be paid to
possible enemy air reconnaissance. Areas usually covered by them, are
less suited to the formation of U-boat concentrations, in that the enemy has
the possibility of by-passing them. Only short-term concentrations have
any point in such areas, and then only when a certain enemy target is
expected. If a fairly long waiting period is anticipated, it appears
advisable to withdraw to areas so far away that even in the event of a long
wait there is no danger of being discovered by the enemy himself. The
areas S.E. of Greenland appears particularly favorable for this purpose.
U 564 put out of Brest, U 124 put out of Lorient, on operations.
380
U 371 put out of Brest for the Mediterranean.
U 553 put into St. Nazaire and U 558 put into Brest.
17.9. U 98 gained contact with a homeward bound convoy in AM 2476
at 0008. The boat sank two steamers sailing in it and then lost contact in
the fog. Pursuit was without success. Otherwise nothing of interest.
U 202 put into Brest.
18.9. U 66 - South boat - reported absence of traffic in the grid EQ 37.
The report implied that the boat had sighted nothing on its entire outward
passage between 30 and 400 West. The remaining South boats apparently
also saw nothing of the enemy. In order to settle the question as to
whether the enemy has transferred his traffic to the Pan-American zone, U
66 has been given the task of reconnoitering as far as the South American
coast.
 According to Radio Intercept Service and aerial reconnaissance, there
was an outward bound convoy in AM 4593 at 1015.
Operations did not appear promising owing to the long range, probably
only one boat is in a position to operate. The boats were therefore only
given general instructions.
U 201 has put out of Brest.
U 79, U 82, U 652 have put into Lorient, U 85 has put into St. Nazaire.
19.9. U 565 and U 98 have been in operation against the convoy reported
yesterday by aerial reconnaissance. Neither contacted it. U 98 began the
return passage owing to the fuel situation.
U 564 encountered a group of 6 escort vessels on a course of 1800 in
AL 9374. A sign that the English also navigate this area. U 443 reports
return passage. Apart from traffic in Swedish waters, nothing was sighted.
U 371 on the outward passage to the Mediterranean, encountered the
north bound convoy reported by Italian U-boats, in CG 7645. No further
messages have been received from this area. U 371 has been ordered not to
undertake any protracted operations in the Atlantic.
U 557 has put into Lorient, U 81 and U 432 into Brest.
20.9. U 565 is assigned the northern half of the grid AM concentrating
on the east.
- 164 -
381
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 124 established contact with a south bound convoy in BE 1553 at
0920. Unfortunately, with the exception of U 124 there are no other boats
in the vicinity. U 124 continued to maintain continuous contact and
reported this for the last time at 2253 in BE 1897 on a course of 1500.
Aerial reconnaissance is arranged for this convoy tomorrow.
Towards evening, U 74, which belongs to the group "Brandenburg"
reported in a fairly long wireless message, that it had been in contact with
a convoy since 18.9 and from AD 9781. The boat assumed the convoy's
position to be AD 7827 at 0400 this morning. As all its torpedoes have
been expended, the boat is on the return passage and reported from a
position 590 22' N. that it had no W/T contact with the Control Station.
Contact had been handed over to other boats, and four ships from the
convoy of altogether about 26,000 GRT, had been sunk. At present, it is
not clear which of the boats are operating, or have operated on the convoy.
U 74 has assumed the duties of relay, and the boats concerned have been
requested to report the last observation and position. U 111 sank the
steamer "Cingalese Prince" of 8474 GRT, in FD 45.
U 203 put out of St. Nazaire, U 204 put out of Brest for the North
Atlantic, U 559 and U 97 put out of St. Nazaire en route for the
Mediterranean. U 561, U 105 and U 95 have put into Lorient.
 21.9. The following boats have reported from U 74's convoy: U 373,
which is unable to continue operations owing to fuel shortage, U 94,
requesting contact reports, and U 562, which reported that there had been
no further contact reports from the boats.
Boats belonging to the Group "Brandenburg" have been ordered to
continue the search if they are sufficiently near to the convoy to make it
worth while. The remaining boats are to return to their operational areas.
U 552 reported having discontinued the search after 30 hours, that it
had sunk a freighter and two tankers of altogether 22,000 GRT another
was probably sunk. The boat has freedom of movement. The area
between the Herbrides and Faroes is given as promising.
U 124 has so far sunk 2 tankers sailing in the south bound Gibraltar
convoy. It reported the convoy at 0000 in BE 4232 on an easterly course.
Later contact was lost. Aerial reconnaissance detailed for operations
against this convoy, attacked isolated tankers sailing in BE 4566 and 4529.
The convoy had apparently dispersed. U 201 also reported being in
contact with four craft, course 1800, in BE 4863. At 0807 U 107 gained
contact with a convoy on a course of 350, in DT 5618. This consisted of 8
steamers and 4 destroyers. The three boats U 67, U 68 and U 103 reported
their position on request. Only U 68 in DT 32 is fairly near the convoy.
The other two boats are further to the north. U 107 sent further contact
reports and at 2157 U 68 reported "am attacking convoy".
U 569 put into St. Nazaire.
- 165 -
382
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
22.9. Towards 0050, U 201 reported sinking three of the four steamers of
altogether 14,000 GRT reported yesterday, from U 124's convoy. One
steamer and one escort vessel escaped. U 124 reported later having
maintained contact with the group of steamers shot up by U 201, the
convoy is now considered to have dispersed.
Both boats have received instructions to proceed further to the south at
economical cruising speed in order to be in a position to operate on the
north bound convoy reported by the Italian boats. None of the Italian boats
are in contact at present. It was assumed, however, that the air
reconnaissance again intercepted the convoy. As it transpired during the
day that the aircraft had not rediscovered the convoy, both boats were
ordered to return to the north, as operations on this convoy were unlikely
to succeed without a contact report.
Contact with the north-bound convoy reported by U 107 was maintained
by U 68, U 107 and later by U 103. U 107 reported 4 misses, this boat
withdrew slightly in order to carry out the necessary engine repairs. At
1545, U 68 reported having sunk two steamers in the convoy of altogether
15,000 GRT and damaged one of 6,000 GRT.
The last contact report from U 103 was at 2000 from the grid DG 9951,
325 degrees.
Boats belonging to the Group "Brandenburg" were disposed in a patrol
channel extending from the southern tip of Greenland in a south-easterly
direction. The boats then, are stationed in positions from AD 95 to AD 89
and are to patrol these lines according to instructions. The following boats
belong to this group:
U 94, 372, 562, 431, 564, 575, 69, 373, 572.
According to reckoning, U 371 should pass through the Straits of
Gibraltar today.
U 84 has put into Lorient.
23.9. At 1000, the Italian U-boat I 8 reestablished contact with the north
bound convoy and sent continuous contact messages. U 201 and U 124
are both to operate on this convoy. Aerial reconnaissance for the area in
question, is planned for tomorrow.
U 204 and U 109 were detailed to act as escort for the outward bound
steamer "Rio Grande". U 109 was forced to put in again owing to engine
trouble. U 204 met the "Rio Grande" and accompanied this vessel on the
outward passage.
Contact with the convoy west of Africa is still being maintained. U 103
reports having sunk a 7,000 GRT steamer, 2 further steamers of altogether
11,000 GRT were possibly sunk, and a 6,000 GRT steamer
- 166 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
383
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
was torpedoed. 4 escorted steamers disappeared from sight to the west.
U 68 missed with a double spread fired at a destroyer and there after
concentrated on a damaged freighter. On the way to this the boat sighted a
tanker in DG 9925, but was not able to remain in the area owing to the
necessity of recharging the batteries. U 67 established contact with the
convoy at 1400, and sent continuous contact messages which later were
also picked up by U 107. The convoy proceeded on courses between 0
and 450 to the north. According to U 67's report it consists of three to four
escorted steamers.
U 205 put out of Lorient.
U 43 put into Lorient.
24.9. The north bound convoy was intercepted by aerial reconnaissance
at 1345, and reported as being in BE 7648. Two sinking, and one burning
merchant ship were observed. Up to this time, only one Italian boat can
have fired, as our own boats were not as far as this, obvious from D/f
bearings. U 124, U 201 and U 203 obtained bearings on the aircraft in
contact with the convoy, from this, the convoy's position was presumed to
be in BE 7550. The boats continued operations on the convoy. U 203,
which is proceeding to the north, reported that it also was engaged in
operations on the convoy. Air reconnaissance too, is to take part on the
25.9.THe convoy west of Africa was attacked by U 67, and U 107 during
the night.
U 67 sank a freighter of 7,000 GRT, but was then beaten off and had
various engine troubles.
 U 107 reported having sunk a tanker of 13,000 GRT and possibly sank
2 ships of 8,000 likewise 5,000 GRT. A small steamer escaped with the
escort (4 destroyers, 3 escort vessels).
Operations on this convoy may therefore be considered at an end. Four
boats attacked, and altogether the following ships were sunk:
5 ships - 42000 GRT - sunk for certain.
4 ships - 24,000 GRT - possibly sunk.
2 ships - 12,000 GRT - damaged.
With the exception of the small steamer observed by U 107 then, the
entire convoy was wiped out.
The boats in the Southern area were allocated new operational areas: U
103, U 107, U 66 and U 125 were disposed in E.W. channels between 3
and 110 N.W. of Freetown, with concentration in the east. U 108 received
a line from Cape Verde to St. Pauls Rocks. This disposition was decided
upon as a result of a radio intercept report, according to which enemy
merchant shipping (isolated vessels sailing at a speed of over 11 knots) has
been ordered to proceed to the north and south between Cape Verde and
St. Pauls Rocks. Ships sailing at a speed of less than 11 knots are to make
for Freetown in order to join a convoy there.
- 167 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
384
U 67 and U 68 are assigned the operational area around St. Helen at a
depth of 400 sea miles. At the suggestion of U 68, the acoustic torpedoes
on board the homeward bound U 111, are to be transferred to the former.
Assembly point should be in grid EJ 1696 on 27.9.
U 559 and U 97 should pass through the Straits of Gibraltar during the
night of the 27.9 according to plan.
U 126 has put out of Lorient for the Atlantic, U 331 en route for the
Mediterranean.
25.9. U 124 contacted a cruiser at 0453 and reported the north-bound
convoy in BE 4782 at 0800, on a course of 315 degrees. A tanker of
12,000 GRT was sunk. U 203 requested bearing beacon signals. U 124
and later U 203 sent continuous contact messages. Last convoy position
was given at 2115 in BE 4184, course 100.
Aerial reconnaissance for this area is to be put into operation tomorrow.
U 565 reported bombs and location from AM 1421. Nothing sighted
except patrol. U 69, 572, and U 373, all of which belong to the group
"Brandenburg", report having started the return passage.
U 433 has put into St. Nazaire.
26.9. Two reports of successes were received towards morning from the
boats operating on the Gibraltar convoy. U 124 sank two freighters of
11,000 GRT. U 203 a tanker of 12,000 GRT, and one freighter of 8,000
GRT. Two further torpedo hits were observed.
Contact was lost towards morning.
 U 205, proceeding to Group "Brandenburg", was also detailed to
operate on this convoy.
Air reconnaissance intercepted the convoy and sent bearing signals.
According to the bearings reported by the boats, the convoy position
was presumed to be in BE 4320 at 1500. Aircraft reported in this
connection: course 900. U 203 reestablished contact at 1625 and shortly
afterwards U 124 also. U 205 requested beacon signals from the contact
boat, but must also have been in the immediate vicinity. The last convoy
position was given by U 124 at 2359 in BE 2715, the course was still East.
Presumably the convoy was making for the southern tip of Ireland, bound
for the St. Georges Channel. U 124 added that it had sunk a 3,000 GRT
steamer. Aerial reconnaissance is again planned for early tomorrow
morning against this convoy.
The patrol line S.E. of Greenland has become considerably shorter as
many boats have begun the return passage, and the boats intended as
reinforcement are retarded by the Gibraltar convoy. This attenuated
formation promises only small likelihood of success.
- 168 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
385
a deeper disposition of the few boats, with greater freedom of
movement to the north and south, appears more favorable.
The Group "Brandenburg", consisting of the following boats U 94, U
372, U 562, U 431, U 564 and U 575 were ordered to occupy the north-
south lines from approximately 450 West to 340 West. The southerly
boundary is the latitude 540 North. There is no northerly boundary.
U 74 and U 98 have put into St. Nazaire.
27.9. Contact was still being maintained with the Gibraltar convoy.
Both U 203 and 124 reported having expended their torpedoes. They were
instructed to remain with the convoy in order to keep in contact for U 205.
U 201 sank 2 freighter of altogether 8,000 GRT, an escort vessel was
probably sunk. At 1059, U 205 also established contact and reported the
convoy in BE 2812. The air reconnaissance also sent beacon signals but
these however, did not need to be checked as the boats themselves were in
contact. Further contact messages were also received. U 203 and U 205
had been forced to submerge some time previously. U 201 sent the last
message, in which this boat reported having sunk two more ships of
altogether 8,000 GRT. At 2344 the convoy was in BE 2379, course 60. U
201 had also used all its torpedoes. Six steamers and six escort vessels
were observed as the remnants of the convoy.
The boats belonging to Group "Goben" (Mediterranean boats), were
informed of various enemy shipping movements in the Mediterranean.
U 66 reported having sunk a 12,000 GRT tanker in FK.
U 573 put out of Kiel, U 129 out of Lorient.
U 75 has put out of St. Nazaire for the Mediterranean.
 28.9. U 124 and U 203 continued to maintain contact with the convoy.
U 201 must also have been in the vicinity. None of these boats have any
torpedoes left. One boat is sufficient to maintain contact for U 205, U 203
is detailed for this task.
U 124 and U 201 were ordered to return. Both boats reported the total
results of their operations. U 124: 3 tankers, 3 steamers - 44,000 GRT, 1
steamer - 5,000 GRT possibly sunk. U 201: 10 hits, 7 steamers - 30,000
GRT, 1 escort craft possibly sunk. U 124 put out on 16.9 and U 201 on
18.9. These boats have therefore achieved great success in a short time.
Air reconnaissance intercepted the convoy towards midday and sent
beacon signals. Only U 201 reported bearing. According to an aircraft
report at 1346 the convoy position was in BE 3199.
- 169 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 203 reestablished contact at 1632.
386
There was no confirmation from U 205 of being in the convoy area. As
this was the last night on which the convoy could be attacked, orders were
given to break off operations at dawn. U 203 was to begin the return
passage, U 205 was to make for grid AK 58.
U 552 reported from grid AM 3380 that there was no traffic and that it
was returning via the North Channel.
U 67, which is on the way to an assembly point for the purpose of
transferring a sick man to U 111, reported hearing two explosions in EJ
1695, close to the ordered meeting place in the Tarafal Bay, at 0630. U-
boat, presumably English, was rammed, U 67 remained undamaged.
Instructions regarding the meeting were requested. The following was
B.d.U.'s intention: U 68 was to be supplied with torpedoes by U 111
during the night of 27/28.9 in Tarafal Bay in the Cape Verde Islands. In
the following night the sick man was to be put aboard U 111 from U 67. It
was not clear why U 67 was already at the assembly point on the first
night. In any case, the two explosions heard gave rise to great anxiety on
behalf of both U 111 and U 68. The following wireless message was sent
in this connection: "Warning of U-boats. Withdraw to the open sea. U 68
and U 111 are to send position reports." A message was received from U
111 at 1139 as follows: English U-boat "Clyde" or "Triton" and a
silhouette in the left center of EJ 1696, after observed handing over of
torpedoes. Forced to submerge, two torpedo detonations heard. Request
return passage without sick man."
The boat was instructed to begin the return passage immediately.
At 1256, U 67 reported: "Nose buckled, bow-caps 1-3 out of action".
The boat was unable to effect repairs with the available materials, and was
therefore ordered to return. Both boats (U 67 and U 111), were instructed
to give details of the meeting with the English boat, and of the last sighting
of U 67. U 68 also reported eventually requested replenishment of
supplies from U 67 and suggested the right edge of grid EK 70, for this.
The fear therefore, that one of the German boats had been torpedoed by
the English submarine, proved groundless. It is more likely that our
cypher material is compromised or that there has been a breach of security.
It appears improbable that an English submarine would be in such an
isolated area by accident. The Naval War Staff is therefore taking the
necessary steps to safeguard cypher material.
Grid DU 8769 was ordered as rendezvous for U 67 and U 68.
The boats were requested to report the possible time.
U 79 has put out of Lorient for the Mediterranean.
29.9. U 205 did not again approach the convoy. The boat was bombed
and was forced to withdraw to the west to carry out repairs. An aircraft
with American markings was observed with the convoy. Engine trouble
- 170 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
was later reported, and permission was requested and granted for the
return passage. Operations on this convoy may therefore be considered at
an end.
The boats U 124, U 201, 203 together achieved the following:
18 ships of altogether 62,000 GRT were sunk.
387
1 escort vessel was probably sunk.
2 ships were damaged.
The estimated tonnage will have to be checked with the Commanders,
as it does not agree with the size of the ships sailing in this convoy
according to radio intercept messages however, is not entirely conclusive,
as it must be assumed that the enemy does not allow the particularly
valuable ships, tankers transport ships etc, to wait at the general assembly
point, but that they join the convoy at the last moment, and therefore, do
not appear in the radio intercept messages.
U 94 (from Group "Brandenburg") reports return passage. This boat is
proceeding to home waters for a complete overhaul.
The 2nd October has been ordered for the rendezvous U 67/U 68.
U 71 has put out of St. Nazaire, U 374, U 208, U 502 have put out of
Kiel.
30.9. The few boats belonging to the Group "Brandenburg" have been in
the area S.E. of Greenland since 22 September without having sighted
anything. I have therefore decided to change the operational area and to
dispose the boats in the area to the west of Ireland.
The operational areas to the south and southeast of Greenland are not to
be reoccupied until the arrival of numerous boats on about the 10 October.
U 372, proceeding in this operational area, gained contact with a S.W.
bound convoy in AJ 6567. This was the most westerly boat in the group,
and therefore very unfavorably placed. The other boats were ordered to
report their position if operations appeared promising. Only U 431
reported from AK 48. U 372 sent further contact messages but contact
was lost during the night. This convoy therefore sailed through the area
previously occupied by the boats. Proof that only chance encounters are
possible with six boats in such an extensive area.
 U 331 must have passed through the Straits of Gibraltar last night.
There are now 4 boats in the Mediterranean: U 371, already in the
operational area, U 97 and U 559 in the Straits of Messina, and U 331
which must have by now passed through the Straits of Gibraltar.
U 201 and U 206 have put into Brest. U 206 has put out of St. Nazaire.
(Signed): DÖNITZ.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 October 1941
PG30298
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
1. October The following boats are in the North Atlantic:
U 4431, U 562, U 564, U 575, U 83, U 71.
En route there:
U 206 in the Bay of Biscay. U 374, U 208, U 502 coming from home.
U 204, U 129 and U 79 on escort duties in the Mid-Atlantic. After
carrying out these tasks, U 204 is to go to the north, U 129 into the
Southern area, and U 79 to the Mediterranean.
388
The following are on the way back: U 372, U 94, U 565, U 556, U 205,
U 373, U 572.
In the South, the following boats are in the operational area west of
Freetown: U 107, U 108, U 66, U 68, U 125, U 103. On the way out: U
126, and on the way back: U 67 and U 111.
The following are operating in the Mediterranean: U 371, U 559, U 97,
U 331, U 75.
U 372 made contact again with a convoy steering S.W., but then it lost
the convoy, had to break off pursuit towards evening on account of lack of
fuel, and had to start the return journey.
U 565 reported that it was returning, no traffic (between the Herbrides
and the Faroes).
U 124 entered Lorient. U 69 entered St. Nazaire.
2. October U 94 reported that she had sunk the tanker "San Florentino"
(12,000 GRT) in AK 8429. Air reconnaissance found a convoy steering
2700 at 1240 in AL 6262. The aircraft reported about 20 steamers from
10,000 to 20,000 GRT, 6 guard boats, 4 destroyers. It appeared at first as
if this convoy were going to America and not Gibraltar, on account of the
size of the ships and the courses observed. On its return flight a second
aircraft picked up the convoy again at 1500 and reported it in AL 6283
with course 2000. Both positions have been given to the boats, which
received orders to operate on this convoy. Air reconnaissance has been
detailed for tomorrow in the area concerned.
U 572, U 205 have entered Lorient. U 373 has entered Brest.
3. October THe convoy was picked up again by air reconnaissance
towards midday. D/F bearings were reported from 7 boats, which gave a
fairly exact position for the convoy in AL 8240 at 1200. Mean course
since yesterday is S.W. U 83 is fairly close to the convoy position and can
still keep contact today.
 According to an aircraft report the convoy consists of 25 merchant
ships, 4 guard boats, 4 destroyers, 1 cruiser and 1 aircraft carrier. Air
reconnaissance is again detailed for the 4th October.
- 172 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 431 sank steamer 5,000 GRT in AJ 9683.
U 67 reported that it had carried out the refueling of U 68. It continues
its return passage.
4. October During the night no contact was made with the convoy going
to the south. Air reconnaissance picked up the convoy again and reported
its position in AL 8836 at 1500.
5 boats are now operating on the convoy. They were instructed to
search in different sectors, on courses of 1700 to 2200 from the position of
the convoy reported from the air. Renewed air reconnaissance is fixed for
the 5th October.
389
U 129, which was an escort for the U-boat supply ship "Kota Pinang"
and which was cruising in the Atlantic together with this ship, reported
that the "Kota Pinang" was sunk from a distance by shell-fire from a
cruiser of the Belfast Class in BE 7722. It has saved the entire crew (119
men) and has started on return to base. Its diving capacity is restricted by
this additional load of men. It has been arranged with the Naval War Staff
to hand over this crew in Ferrol, as it is not justifiable for U 129 to pass
through the Bay of Biscay under the circumstances. U 129 received orders
to do this.
U 101 left St. Nazaire. U 563 left Brest.
5. October U 431 made contact with an enemy convoy consisting of 2
ships escorted by 3 destroyers on a S.W. course, in BD 2647 at 0130. U
372 is in the neighborhood and requests a beacon signal.
U 431 continues to give further shadowing reports.
The operation against the convoy going to Gibraltar is being continued.
U 204, which reported that it had carried out a special task (convoy Rio
Grande) has been included in this operation, as it reported its position as
being in the neighborhood in which the convoy is supposed to be. The
operation against the formation of transport ships which was reported by U
431, ended unsuccessfully, as U 431 as well as U 372 had to set out for
base on account of fuel. U 562's limited supply of fuel did not permit a
commitment against the convoy. It receives freedom of action in AM,
with orders to carry out attacks near the northwest coast of Ireland, where,
on account of certain observations, enemy traffic is suspected.
U 552 entered St. Nazaire. U 109 left Lorient.
6. October The operation against the convoy going south is continuing.
Air reconnaissance, however, has still produced no results.
- 173 -
 8. October In order to pick up the convoy going south, the boats
committed to the task are to be disposed at the first light on a front which
corresponds to the position of the convoy, if it is assumed that its highest
speed is 5.5 knots (about 430 N.). The boats received orders to run
counter to the convoy, in lines, on a zig-zag course. Before this came into
complete effect the convoy was picked up by air reconnaissance.
According to the cross bearing of the beacon signals, the result is a
position a little north of the center of U-boat positions in BE 7689. U 83
Date Position, Wind, Weather made contact at 1750 and reported the convoy in BE 7919 on a southerly
and Sea State, Illumination, Events course. The contact was lost when darkness fell, on account of thick
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. squalls and hail. According to messages coming in, 3 more boats were in
the immediate neighborhood. One of them, U 71 glimpsed it about
midnight.

U 129 entered Lorient.

The boats received orders in the afternoon to continue to operate against
the convoy, whose speed of advance was from 4 to 6 knots. The boats
were to be evenly spread in N.S. lines between 180 and 230 West.
U 129 reported that it had handed over the ship-wrecked men of the
"Kota Pinang" to a Spanish tug.
U 101 put into St. Nazaire because its W/T gear was out of order.
9. October The operation against the south-bound convoy is continuing.
The air reconnaissance committed to the task had no successes on account
of the very unfavorable weather conditions. As from 0900 hours on the
10th October, the boats received orders to be in the sector 1300 to 1800
from the last certain enemy position, which was in BE 7976 at 0100 hours
on the 9th October. They were to be on the arc that would be reached by
the enemy traveling at speed of 5.5 knots, and they were to run counter to
the convoy.

U 553 left St. Nazaire. U 126 made contact for a short time with one of the groups of 4
steamers protected by destroyers. It lost them when darkness fell.
7. October Search for the south-bound convoy continues. According to a still unconfirmed report, 44 men of a German U-boat crew
have been landed in
A former Norwegian whaler "Svend Fogn" was torpedoed in AL 2129.

U 68 received orders to proceed to St. Helena via Ascension Island, and - 174 -
to operate there.

U 565 entered Lorient.

390

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
Gibraltar. They are said to belong to a large U-boat which was sunk by
a trawler. It is not out of the question that this is U 111.
UA put in to Lorient on account of an oil trace.
U 575 entered St. Nazaire.
U 94 entered Bergen.
U 568 left St. Nazaire.
10. October An aircraft made contact with a south-bound convoy at
1305 and sent beacon signals. According to the pilot it must be assumed
that the position of the convoy at 1330 was in the northern half of CF
3810. That means the convoy has proceeded from the last reported
position on a more easterly course, and at a greater speed than was
supposed.
The boats, which were in various sectors and had been assigned to
attack the convoy, are west of it at a distance of 100 miles or more. Latest
bearings give a further position in CF 3819 at 1515.
The boats have been advised to reckon that the mean course of the
convoy is 1200 and the speed of advance is 5 to 6.5 knots. According to
391
this they are to be from 0900 on the 11th October, on a line (CG 4113 to
CF 6392), which is as far as the convoy could have reached at a speed of
6.5 knots. If the convoy has not been picked up by then, the boats are to
continue the search on courses of 1100 to 1350 after the key-word has
been passed. Our own air reconnaissance will be in the area of the convoy
from 1000.
According to the requirements of the Naval War Staff, it is ordered that
U 564 is to be refueled by "Gata" on or after the 13th October.
U 83 reported in the evening that it had sunk a large floating crane. In
any case it was a very important vessel to the enemy.
U 573, U 374, U 208 which were in the North Atlantic were ordered to
operate in the attacking areas southeast of Greenland.
U 502, U 109, U 553 and U 568 received orders to steer to AK 43, in
order to be able to join up later with this disposition.
U 126 sank a steamer of 8,000 GRT in the convoy which it reported.
U 67 and U 111 were asked to report position.
U 67 reported that it was in the same square as the south-bound
convoy, it has therefore apparently operated on it. U 111 did not report.
There must be some
- 175 -

Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
connection between this and yesterday's radio intercept report about the
destruction of a U-boat, and part of the crew being taken prisoner. It must
be considered lost.
The traffic situation in the operational area west of Africa is extremely
confused and unsatisfactory. After the U-boat successes in the Freetown
area in Spring, the English have apparently moved their traffic to another
route to the west. Having regard to our own ships and forces, the U-boats
were not given permission to operate there at first. Even after permission
was granted to 4 boats, they only had very slight success - 2 steamers. The
Naval War Staff assumes that the only passage for all fast ships from the
south is still through the West Atlantic. But as the large area offered so
many possibilities, which the English utilized fully for evasion and for
changing their routes, it appears that it is hardly possible to pick up these
single fast ships. (It is forbidden to attack in the American Safety Zone).
Sending the boats to the east has also brought no results. The traffic
situation must have completely changed. A convoy is believed to be
leaving Freetown between the 12th and 14th October. If the attempt to
pick it up also brings no results, then consideration will be given to the
breaking off of operations in the south. The boats which are being used
there are badly needed in the north, all the more so because boats have
also been taken away from there for other theaters of operation. At the
beginning of October the actual situation was as follows:
There were:
4 boats in the area of operations in the North Atlantic
9 boats in the area of operations in the South Atlantic
392
As opposed to that there were:
9 boats returning to base
4 boats approaching the area
3 boats on convoy tasks
6 boats in the Mediterranean
3 boats in the North Sea
This splitting up of forces has made it obvious that it is scarcely
possible to find targets with only a few boats in the North Atlantic.
There are no possibilities of counter balancing this by operations in the
Mediterranean and the North Sea. In both these areas the traffic is made up
of the smallest types of craft, which are difficult to attack and to hit.
Success is accordingly slight. It must be emphasized repeatedly that the
enemy today can no longer be found and successfully attacked by small
numbers of boats. In September, on the contrary, there was a weakening
instead of a strengthening of forces in the main operational area: The
effect of sending 5 new boats to the front was nullified by the fact that 3
were lost and 2 small boats were given over for training purposes. The
transfer of boats to the Mediterranean and the North Sea therefore only
took place at the expense of operations in the Atlantic. U 371 reported that
it had been hit in a gunnery action, and had sustained losses and damage.
- 176 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 line from CG 8371 to CG 8812 (in a southwesterly direction from Cape St.
Vincent) and they are to await the convoy there.

It set out on return to base. A German boat entered Salamis for the first
time.
11. October Neither the air reconnaissance nor any of the boats made
contact with the Gibraltar convoy. From 1200 hours boats of the "Breslau"
group proceeded on courses between 110 and 135 in order to continue the
search for the convoy. According to several reports U 83 suspected the
convoy to be in the NO. It heard depth charges exploding there, and
sighted aircraft. U 206 as well suspected that the convoy was in the NO.
At 1705 U 563 made contact with the convoy in CG 5514. It was
however forced under water by an aircraft, so that it lost sight of the
convoy to the south.
The three boats U 563, U 564, U 206 searched to the south parallel to
the coast at distances of 10, 20 and 30 miles from the coast. The other
boats received corresponding orders to join in and take part. In case this
search is also unsuccessful, a patrol line is to be made from CG 8347 to
CG 8573.

By reason of these reports I decided to dispose the boats for tomorrow U 83 sank the Portuguese steamer "Cortereal" (2,044 GRT) which was
morning in a patrol line (CG 5118 to CG 4683) which will pick up the loaded with contraband goods.
enemy on an easterly course. Renewed air reconnaissance is to be
expected in the area from 1100. U 431 entered St. Nazaire.

U 331 entered Salamis. U 569 left St. Nazaire.

U 751, U 191, U 77, U 73 left St. Nazaire. U 432, U 558 left Brest.
- 177 -
12. October U 562 reported that it was returning to base. It had
freedom of action west of the North Channel at the end of the operation,
but it did not locate any traffic. It sank a ship of 5,000 GRT in AD 78, and
in AK 27 it sank a ship of 10,000 GRT with catapult aircraft.

No contact has been made yet with the convoy steering to Gibraltar. It
has not been picked up by air reconnaissance either.

The boats received orders to proceed to the S.E. at cruising speed from Date Position, Wind, Weather
1100 hours. As no contact was made, even by taking these measures, I and Sea State, Illumination, Events
decided to allow the boats to proceed to the south at a high cruising speed, Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
to a line from CG 8134 to CG 7665, in order, by so doing, to cut the
possible convoy course. Tomorrow morning they are then to be in a patrol

393

13. October The operations on the convoy which were assigned during
the day met with no success. An aircraft carrier with 2 destroyers, course
1850, was sighted in CG 8347. At 1005 U 563 made contact with a
convoy in CG 8296. U 206 reported Portuguese steam trawlers in the
same area. This gives rise to a doubt as to the accuracy of the report from
U 563.
U 563 in reply to a query referring to this, reported that it had seen 12
clouds of smoke. Moreover it shares the suspicion of U 204, based on
traffic observed in the territorial waters, that the convoy had dispersed and
that the ships were continuing their journey in territorial waters. However,
all this is merely conjecture, with no verification. Air reconnaissance also
has no success. It is only possible to operate on the convoy now if it is
still in the open sea. The boats have been allotted the attacking areas west
of Gibraltar, in which they are to be from 0900 on the 14th October. U
564 broke off the operation on account of lack of fuel. It has gone to be
refueled from "Gata".
The boats U 109 and U 502, which have recently come into the
operational area, have been included in the attacking disposition S.E. of
Greenland.
U 559 (a Mediterranean boat) reported in answer to a request for the
situation in the operational area. On two nights it sighted traffic in the
square CO 6779, it fired 7 shots which missed, and was bombed by a
German aircraft.
A boat in the South (signature not decipherable) reported a convoy,
course 170, speed 10 knots in ET 1330. The boat itself has been driven off
by an attack by destroyers. This convoy was apparently making for
Freetown. The boats which are there have a chance to attack.
U 85 entered St. Nazaire, U 372 entered Brest.
394
14. October According to a radio intercept message, the convoy, on
which we have been operating since the 2nd October, has entered
Gibraltar. According to this reliable report the convoy must have traveled
at 7.8 knots since the last time it was picked up by a boat - by U 71 at 0100
on the 9th October. This speed does not agree with the speed calculated up
to now, which was about 5 knots. As all the operations on the convoy
were not calculated for such an unusually high speed, the boats were, in
fact, traveling behind the convoy.
The boats are now west of the Straits of Gibraltar. It is not possible on
account of fuel to send the boats which are now off Gibraltar to another
operational area. I intend to have them operate on the convoy leaving
Gibraltar on or after the 17th October. The boats received orders to move
away. U 71 and U 83 are to operate during this period on the traffic along
the
- 178 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
African coast, U 204 is to operate on the traffic in the direction of
Madeira, U 206 and U 563 have been allotted the area round Cape Vincent
as an attacking area, U 564 is to remain off Huewa and likewise to operate
on traffic in the direction of Madeira. In reply to a query from U 204, its
refueling from "Gata" has been fixed for the 15/16 October.
U 206 reported that it had sunk a large English destroyer in CG 9593,
therefore it must have been right in the Straits of Gibraltar. U 83 reported
A/s hunt by destroyers and aircraft. Probably as a result of sinking the
destroyer. U 553 and U 568 have been assigned as attacking areas AK 55
and AK 59, which is the area inside the patrol lines S.E. of Greenland.
After applying to the Naval War Staff, U 68 was permitted to extend its
attacking area round St. Helena to a width of 400 miles, as, according to
radio intercept reports, steamers have had directions to go on courses
which lie outside the present attacking area (a width of 200 miles).
U 123, U 38, U 82 have left Lorient.
U 432 or U 558 are the only boats which are in this area and could be
concerned.
The traffic situation in the Southern area is not clear. The convoy
which was expected to leave Freetown has not been picked up. The boats
are now searching to the west as ordered, in an attempt to find the traffic.
U 126, which has recently come into the operational area, received
orders to operate west of Freetown, and to push on to the east along the
African coast to Takoradi and Lagos.
U 562 entered Brest.
(Signed): DÖNITZ.

15. October U 564 reported: Refueling from "Gata" has been carried
out. F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

U 553 was at the southerly wing of the patrol line which was disposed 16 - 31 October 1941
to the S.E. of Greenland. At 0830 it made contact with a convoy entering
the area. It reported the convoy with course 700, speed 7 knots. 28 ships. PG30299
U 568 was in the immediate vicinity of the position from which this
message was sent, U 502 to the north, and U 432 and U 558 to the south.
The boats could be at the convoy within 24 hours. They received orders to
operate on the convoy. The boats U 77, U 101, U 751, U 73, which were
enroute to the operational area were ordered at first to proceed to the north Date Position, Wind, Weather
at a low cruising speed, but then, when U 553 and later U 568 as well and Sea State, Illumination, Events
continued to maintain contact, they were likewise set on to the convoy at Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
high speed. U 553 sent a report in addition to a shadowing report that it
had already sunk 2 freighters totaling 11,000 GRT and had probably sunk
another ship (4,000 GRT). Contact was maintained during the whole day.
The convoy proceeded east after that with a mean course of 400.

According to a radio intercept report, a steamer (9,179 GRT) formerly 16.10. The following boats are in the attacking areas southeast of
called "Weser" now called "Vancouver Island" was hit by two torpedoes. Greenland:
395
 U 573, U 374, U 208, U 109.
Boats in AK and AL which are operating on returning convoys:
U 553, U 568, U 502, U 432, U 558, U 77, U 751, U 73, U 101. - 180 -
Boats en route to the operational area:
U 569, U 123, U 38, U 82.
West of Gibraltar:
U 204, U 564, U 563, U 206, U 83, U 71.
In the operational area west of Africa:
U 103, U 107, U 125, U 66, U 126.
Off St. Helena: U 68.
On the way back north of the Canaries: U 108, off Lorient: U 67.
The following boats are in the operational area in the Mediterranean: Date Position, Wind, Weather
U 559, U 79, U 97, U 371, U 75. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
U 204 reported that refueling from "Gata" had been carried out. After
this no further refueling was possible from "Gata" on account of lack of
supplies.

There are still only 4 boats at present off the southern tip of Greenland -
a very small number for the size of the area. With such small numbers
they can only obtain hits by luck. Therefore these boats are to carry out a
reconnaissance off the Belle Isle Straits, a plan which has been under
consideration for a long time. Boats U 573, U 374, U 208 and U 109
received orders to steer to square AJ 71, day's run 120 miles. After
making a request to the Naval War Staff, permission to attack, as is general
outside the blockade area, was granted in this area.
U 568 gave a shadowing report at 0204 in AK 6649 on the returning
convoy, which was picked up yesterday by U 553, and reported the sinking
of a steamer of 4,000 GRT in the convoy. It continued to maintain contact,
U 502 and U 558 likewise reported the convoy. U 553 made contact again
at 1637 and reported the convoy in AL 4152. The differences in reckoning
of the boats are partly due to the bad weather conditions. Orders were
given that the reckoning of U 553 was to be used as a basis, when making
shadowing reports and so on. At 1744, U 553 reported the first
Sunderland attached to the convoy. It was then at about 260 West.
396
From then on U 553 gave exact shadowing reports, according to which
the convoy was steering on a mean course of 300. The last report on this
day was at 2355 in AL 1965, course 900. The boat added that there were
at least 10 tankers, of medium and large size, in the convoy, therefore there
must be a strong escort.
U 125 and U 107 have sent situation reports from the Southern area,
according to which they have not picked up any traffic round, or west of
Freetown. U 125 requested permission to return. I decided that all the
boats with about the same fuel reserve should proceed to the north in a
patrol line, in order to increase the possibility of picking up convoy traffic.
U 103, U 107, U 66 and U 125 received orders to return to base slowly on
a line between 180 30' W., and 220 10' W.
It has not paid to send these boats into the Southern area. So long as the
possibilities for refueling restrict the sending of several boats into the
Southern area (Capetown), this area should only be patrolled by single
boats.
Vice-Admiral Fuchs, head of K Department, was present at the
Headquarters conference on the question of dockyards and dockyard
workers. These questions are among those which are causing the most
trouble at the present time. New construction has been somewhat
restricted (Wilhelmshaven, Kiel) because dockers have been taken away
for U-boat repairs (Western France, Salamis, Norway) and other tasks. In
spite of this, construction in repair dockyards only keeps pace with
difficulty, as the numbers of front line boats are increasing. The danger
has arisen that some time the output of larger numbers of new boats will
be reduced because of the extended period required by repairs. This has
already happened to some extent. It has become necessary to request that
all operational boats should only be repaired in Western France and
Norway. The requisitions have been listed again by C.-in-C. U-boats, and
given to the Naval War Staff.
U 67 entered Lorient. U 85 left St. Nazaire. U 202 left Brest. U 84 left
Lorient.
17.10. U 553 gave a shadowing report at 0143 from square AL 1966 on
a returning convoy. It had sunk a tanker of 6,000 GRT, and had observed
the light of another tanker. U 568 gave another shadowing report and
added: 1 destroyer sunk.
U 553 has expended all torpedoes and requests that another boat should
take over and keep contact.It sank altogether 3 freighters and 1 tanker,
totaling 21,000 GRT. It received orders to remain with the convoy and
make contacting reports for the other boats.
U 558 made contact with a group of stragglers. Up to then it had sunk
the single ship "Vancouver Island", a tanker and a freighter; another
freighter probably sunk.
397
- 181 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
The boat was bombed and has only a limited diving capacity. This boat
received orders to remain close to the convoy, and to make contacting
reports. It gave the last shadowing report at 1930 that the convoy was in
square AL 0272 on an easterly course. After that, contact with the convoy
was broken off. U 568 lost sight of it in AL 0249 and U 101 reported
smoke plumes in AL 0245. U 558, U 553 set out for base. An attempt
must now be made to find the convoy again, by planning an operation.
The boats received orders, in case no contact had been established before
darkness, to continue the search in the sector 750 - 1050, starting at the last
reported enemy position. They were then to go to the west on a wide-zig-
zag course to meet the convoy, starting from the 7.5 miles point. U 502
reported that it could not carry out this disposition order because it was too
far away. It had been driven off by aircraft and was in square AL 5137.
On the 7th October it succeeded in hitting the "Svend Fogn" (14,795
GRT).
The next Gibraltar convoy was expected to leave port on the 17th
October. I decided not only to await the convoy during the course of the
first day, but also to carry out an attack with all boats directly after the
convoy has passed Tarifa. I ordered that the area S.E. of Cape Trafalgar
was to be the waiting position for U 206, U 563, and U 564, and Cape
Spartel the waiting position for U 204, U 71 and U 83. The boats received
orders to try to remain unnoticed when approaching, and to be submerged
by day in the waiting position. If the boats succeed in remaining
unnoticed, it will be easy to succeed in picking up the convoy in the night
directly after it has left port - perhaps thereby the boats can take full
advantage of the carelessness in the convoy during the first hours and the
fact that it would not be properly organized.
18.10. U 101 reported escort vessels and destroyers at 0235 in AL 3942
and later in AL 3951. It is possible that this is the rear escort of the
convoy, which is apparently running on a straight course to the North
Channel. The boat added that it had sunk a destroyer and had been driven
off.
U 432 reported at 0132 from square AL 2755. It had therefore likewise
moved away and could not reach the ordered position in it sector. It sank 3
ships in the convoy totaling 25,000 GRT, among them 1 tanker of 12,000
GRT.
The report from U 101 was the last clue to the position of the convoy.
The boats received orders to continue the search from square AL 3951 in
the sector 700 to 1100.
At 1130 U 77 made contact with a convoy group in AL 0353, course
1000, a little later (14.46 hours) U 432 likewise reported a group in AL
3955, which however was established as a patrol group, according to later
reports from U 558 and U 751 which agreed. The
- 182 -
398
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
boats received orders not to attack this patrol group. U 77 was driven
off from this group which was reported and lost contact.
Apart from the fact that the increased enemy traffic as a result of better
weather was perhaps not taken sufficiently into consideration, even the
increase in air reconnaissance has now become very noticeable when
approaching England. Obviously it is not yet possible for boats to
maintain contact for long.
According to American press reports, the American destroyer
"Knarnley" (Kearney) was torpedoed on the forenoon of the 17th October
in the area where the convoy battle took place. On orders from the Naval
War Staff, the boats which sank or attacked the destroyer were requested
to report whether it could have been an American destroyer. According to
reports from the boats it was a British destroyer. A reply containing this
information (B.d.U. G 5662, Iu.II Ang) was sent to the Naval War Staff.
Because of the present situation it is not out of the question however
that changes will be made even in the strictest orders and executive
regulations. U 108 (on its way back from the Southern area, in DJ 10
approximately) received orders to operate on the Gibraltar convoy which
was expected, if its fuel supply permitted.
 U 559 (Mediterranean boat) reported that it was on its way back. It has
expended all torpedoes, 1 vessel was sunk, 1 monitor (according to the
Radio Intercept Service it was probably a gun boat) was damaged by a
torpedo.
U 571 left Kiel. U 93 left St. Nazaire. U 203 left Brest.
19.10. Contact was not made again with the convoy west of the North
Channel. The boats received orders to move away to the west, and to
report what fuel and torpedoes they had remaining. According to reports
all the boats in this Group, except U 553 and U 558 which are returning,
still have sufficient fuel and torpedoes to be able to be included in a
disposition for the next attack. The operation against this convoy can be
considered as finished. 9 boats were set onto the convoy. Of these, 5
boats were successful, the other 4 were driven off by the escorts. These 5
boats sank 6 freighters, 3 tankers, and 2 destroyers. 2 freighters were
torpedoed.
Of the boats which are operating at the moment in the North Atlantic, 3
groups will be formed into a new disposition.
1st Group, consisting of 4 boats, which were told to proceed to approach
square AJ 71 (Belle Isle Straits) on the 16th October, and did not operate
on the convoy shadowed by U 553, like the rest of the patrol line S.E. of
Greenland. They now remain approximately in the vicinity of this square.
2nd Group, boats which have recently come into the operational area.
- 183 -
399
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
3rd Group, consisting of boats which fought the convoy shadowed by U
553.
I decided on the following disposition:
Group 1 (cover name: Group "Mordbrenner" - consisting of boats U
374, U 573, U 208, U 109) is directly off the Belle Isle Straits in order to
pick up an enemy passing through as quickly as possible.
Groups 2 and 3 (cover names Group "Schlagetod" with boats U 569, U
123, U 38, U 82, U 202, U 84, U 203, U 93, U 85 and Group "Reissewolf"
with boats: U 77, U 73, U 75, U 568, U 502, U 101, U 432) in an
approximately S.E. direction between Greenland and Newfoundland. In
this area favorable weather conditions should prevail at this season. Group
2 is to take up position from AJ 5195 to AJ 6915, it therefore cuts the
steamer route from Cape Race to the southern tip of Greenland. Group 3
is to take up position from AK 4875 to AK 8745, cutting the Great Circle
from Cape Race to the North Channel, a route which, according to the
latest observations, was used frequently by single ships and convoys.
By disposing 4 boats directly at the entrance of the Belle Isle Straits, I
hope to avoid allowing traffic to go from there directly to the north,
without being picked up. I also hope to be able to act with the boats of
Group 2 on reports from Group 1, and think I can keep an eye on a
relatively large area with Groups 2 and 3.
Again today the Gibraltar convoy did not leave port. U 206 sank a
6,000 GRT steamer in CG 9567, therefore it must have been right in the
Straits of Gibraltar. It reported also that large fires were observed to the
west. According to this another boat must have shot and hit a vessel.
Gratifying as this success was, it naturally made trouble in the area
through which the convoy must pass when leaving port. The order to
"remain unnoticed" was not successfully carried out because of the
sinkings which took place there during the last few days. It would not
have been justified to forbid attacks on the convoy altogether, because of
possible future successes. This sinking, and other sinkings of a destroyer
and a patrol vessel during the preceding days proved, however, that boats
can still operate right in the immediate vicinity of the Straits.
20.10. While en route to the new attacking area, U 84 made contact with
a convoy course N.E. in BE 1556 at 1601. Then it reported a little later
that only 4 very fast vessels were concerned. In that case, it would not pay
to allow both Groups (Reissewolf and Schlagetod) to operate on it. The
boats of Group Schlagetod received orders to operate on the formation
only if they were in a position where they had a good chance of success.
The remaining boats were to continue to proceed to the ordered patrol
lines.
U 71 (off Gibraltar) has moved away to the S.W. on account of an A/s
hunt. Again the Gibraltar convoy did not leave port during the course of
today. The
- 184 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
400
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
boats are still remaining in their waiting positions. They are to move
away to the S.W. as far as necessary, in the case of heavy A/s activities. U
206 received orders to carry out refueling from "Gata" on the night of 21st
to 22nd October.
According to a Radio Intercept report, the British tanker "British
Mariner" (6,996 GRT) was torpedoed in square ET 61 off Freetown. This
could only concern U 126, which must have been in this area.
U 559 entered Salamis.
U 577 left Kiel.
21.10. U 84 lost contact with the formation which it reported yesterday.
It reported the last convoy position as BE 2168 at 0257. It fired a three-
fan shot, one of which possibly hit a vessel. U 123 sighted the formation
again about 0500, was driven off, made contact again with the convoy, and
sank the British transport ship "Aurania" (13,984 GRT). The boat took
one prisoner. The boats continued their passage to the west.
U 123 made contact with another convoy, course 30, in BE 2123 at
1624. It consisted of 22 ships and 3 destroyers. Speed 7 knots.
Group "Schlagetod" (new group of boats) received orders to operate on
this convoy. Group "Reissewolf" (boats from the convoy shadowed by U
553) is to proceed to the ordered patrol lines, U 85 and U 93 (on the way
out) are to operate on the convoy if they are in a favorable position.
U 203 requested a beacon signal, and soon after at 1830 reported the
convoy in AL 9791. Contact was maintained right up to midnight and was
then broken off. The last convoy position was reported by U 82 at 2351 in
AL 9816.
 The boats received orders to continue to operate on the convoy in the
mean line of advance. G.A.F. reconnaissance against the convoy has been
detailed for the 22nd October.
According to a Radio Intercept report, the ships in Gibraltar have been
forbidden to leave port on account of danger from U-boats. U 83 reported
that it saw 2 aircraft carriers and several destroyers, course N.W. in CG
9495. It added: 1 hit probable. It is not clear from this whether it
succeeded in hitting an aircraft carrier or a destroyer.
U 79 reported from the Mediterranean that it was on its way back as it
had expended all torpedoes. Apparently (the W/T message was picked up
slightly corrupt) it torpedoed the monitor "Terror" in square CP 6797,
besides that it sank another vessel. It reported: otherwise all shots missed.
According to this report and the short reports which have been
submitted by U 331 and U 559 the situation in the
- 185 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
401
Mediterranean seems to be somewhat as follows: The supplies to
Tobruk were carried out by vessels with a very shallow draught (lighters,
dumb barges, etc.), which were escorted by torpedo boats and escort
vessels. It is not possible to torpedo vessels like these with the torpedoes
which are available (except when shooting with surface runners).
It seems questionable whether the aim of the operation, namely stopping
supply traffic to Tobruk, will be accomplished in this manner, and whether
it would not be more efficacious to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean
off Alexandria, Beirut, etc. (see B.d.U. Gkdos 2950 of 15/10/41) with all
boats (at present there are 2 boats off Alexandria.
U 126 reported that it torpedoed in ET 6111 one of the 2 tankers which
were sighted. The torpedoes fired at the 2nd tanker were failures (this
report must concern the torpedoing of the "British Mariner". This had
already been learned yesterday in a Radio Intercept report). The boat also
reported heavy traffic in the Freetown area.
In a second W/T/ message U 126 reported sinking an American steamer
of 7,500 GRT. THe steamer was steering on a zig-zag course, and was
proceeding direct to Freetown. The American markings were only
recognized after the torpedo was fired.
U 108 entered Lorient.
U 106 left Lorient.
UA left Lorient for the Southern area.
22.10. The convoy reported yesterday by U 123, was picked up towards
midday by air reconnaissance. The aircraft reported it in AL 9599 and
gave beacon signals. The plotting of these beacon signals did not give the
convoy's position clearly. The boats received the message - position at
1400 approximately AL 9930 or AL 9960, course E.
The beacon signal reports improved later, so that a position could be
taken for 1730 hours in the lower half of AL 9930.
 The convoy had therefore changed its course which was determined
yesterday, and making use of the bad weather which was prevailing in the
area, (wind S.E. strength 7) had apparently turned off in order to escape
the boats. U 85 and U 203 reported that they had moved away to the west
on account of the weather, as they considered it hopeless to push on. U
202 suspected that the enemy was on a northeasterly course and gave
chase.
As no contact had been made by evening, the boats were permitted to
move away to the west, and continue their passage to the previously
ordered patrol lines.
- 186 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
According to an Intelligence report the expected Gibraltar convoy was
starting about 1600. It was to pass Tarifa about 1945, and Cape Spartel
about 2025. The boats of the Breslau group were informed of this by
codeword. This serves to call attention to the excellent work of the
Commanding Officer in Spain. A direct attack on this convoy was only
possible because of the certainty that I had received reliable reports on the
time the convoy was leaving port, what ships it consisted of, and when it
402
was to pass Tarifa. Today again, as is the rule, these reports came in
prompt and complete.
U 129 had to turn back and put into Lorient again, because of damage to
coupling.
U 68 reported (on request) from the Southern area, that it had not found
any traffic round Ascension or on the way to St. Helena. It sank a steamer
8,000 GRT off St. Helena last night. The boat is permitted to operate as
far as the Whale Bay area, as far as remaining fuel allows, but has been
ordered not to cross the 250 South line.
U 371 reported that it was returning from the Mediterranean, no
successes.
U 553 entered St. Nazaire
U 74 left St. Nazaire.
U 113 left Kiel.
23.10. The rest of the boats have also moved away from the convoy
which was steering from the west of Ireland on the way home. The boats
are proceeding to the west to the ordered patrol lines, except U 432, which
cannot proceed further to the west on account of the fuel situation and the
state of its engines. It received orders to proceed to the south and, as far as
possible, to operate on the convoy leaving Gibraltar.
U 82 sank 2 ships in the convoy totaling 10,000 GRT.
The result of the operation on this convoy was disappointing, as it
seemed to be very promising at the beginning. The reason seemed to lie in
the bad weather conditions.
U 71 made contact at 0030 in CG 9585 with the convoy which left
Gibraltar yesterday afternoon. A little later U 564 and U 206 also reported
it.The convoy was steering on a mean course of approximately 2700. The
boats maintained contact during the whole day. This was a noteworthy
performance, not to be expected in this area which is within the range of
aircraft operating from Gibraltar, and in face of a strong convoy escort (10
escort vessels, 3 destroyers).
The last position report on that day came from U 564, CG 8835, at
2114. Air reconnaissance did not find the convoy in spite of the several
shadowing reports which were transmitted by the U-boats. This fact is in
- 187 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
opposition to past experience, where it has often been found that aircraft
are more reliable in finding a convoy in a large area. It shows however
how dependent air reconnaissance is on the weather for results.
U 129 entered port again because of damage to its diesel engine.
U 79 entered Salamis.
403
24.10. U 71 reported the Gibraltar convoy on a northerly course at 0151
in CG 8827. First, U 564 reported the convoy again in CG 8492 at 0659.
Then shortly after that it reported that it had fired all torpedoes, and had
scored 5 hits on a steamer of about 5,000 GRT. U 563 also reported that it
had sunk a steamer in the convoy.
After these reports were sent, contact was broken off. Reconnaissance
aircraft were the first to pick up the convoy again and it was reported at
1110 in CG 7699 or CG 8444 (reported by a second aircraft).
The D/F bearings which were reported were hardly any use.
U 564 reported at 1432 that it agreed with the statement of the aircraft
and with its bearing on the convoy position in CG 8456 at 1300. At 1632
it reported that the convoy position at 1530 was in CG 7398, but that it
was not exact.
As no boat had made contact, the boats received orders to continue the
search in the sector from 2950 to 3250, starting from the position reported
at 1300 by U 564.
The three Italian boats which were in the vicinity were included in the
searching operation in this area.
U 71 reported an escorting destroyer in CG 7359 at 2314, a clue that
the convoy was probably inside the sector where the search was ordered.
A special W/T organization came into force from 0800 on the 25th
October for Mediterranean boats. At the same time the boats were to
change over to the operational command of the 23rd U-boat Flotilla, which
directs the operations in the Mediterranean under the directions of Group
Command South. The events in the Mediterranean will no longer be dealt
with in the War Diary of the C-in-C U-boats.
The Admiral second-in-command U-boats announced that in the future
the fact must be taken into account that boats which have been newly
commissioned are only to come to the front 4 months after commissioning
(up to now the average was 3 months). Two main reasons have influenced
the making of this decision:
1) The fact that the boats which are being completed now are no longer
as well-built as they were formerly, and that therefore, longer periods will
be necessary for the final work; but this cannot be executed with
satisfactory speed because of dockers proves to be a
- 188 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
quite vital factor in the conducting of submarine warfare, and a source
of danger to the effectiveness of this warfare.
2) Of the thousand torpedo recovery vessels, which are nominally at our
disposal, actually only about 1/3 are seaworthy, because they are old and
out of date. This difficult situation in connection with the torpedo
recovery vessels means that, in training flotillas, the gunnery training of
the men qualifying as Commanding Officers will have to be substantially
shortened, and therefore the final shooting practice of new boats cannot be
executed in the desired short space of time.
404
25.10. U 204 (Breslau Group) did not report, though it was called several
times. It was in the waiting position off Cape Spartel, in an area where,
according to reports from U 71 and U 83, an A/S hunt was being carried
out. It must be considered lost.
The Gibraltar convoy was picked up by air reconnaissance. According
to the report of the aircraft and the plotting of the bearings, it was in square
CG 7150 at 1500 on a westerly to northwesterly course. The convoy has
therefore been steering since yesterday on a more southerly course than
was supposed, so that the boats are to the north of it. It is hardly possible
to make contact before dark.
U 71 reported an escorting Sunderland flying over square CG 4788 at
1854. The convoy must be in the vicinity.
As no contact was made before dark, the boats received orders to
continue the search in the sector 2800 - 3300, starting from the convoy
position at 1500 in square CG 7155.
The patrol line S.E. of Greenland, formed by Group "Reissewolf", has
been moved a little to the S.E. (from AK 7296 to BD 1325). It is intended
thereby to pick up the ON-convoy which according to Radio Intercept
reports, is supposed to be in this area.
U 558 entered Brest. U 552 left St. Nazaire. U 567 left St. Nazaire.
26.10. U 83 made contact at 0037 with 3 destroyers in CF 6959. At
0115 it reported the convoy in CF 6958. U 83 continued to maintain
contact and reported at 0530 that it had sunk 1 passenger steamer and 2
freighters in the convoy. She had expended all torpedoes, but still stayed
near the convoy, as long as the state of fuel permitted.
At 0553 U 563 requested a beacon signal and reported at 0839, that it
had sunk a destroyer of the AJ class in CF 6918.
 U 564 continued to maintain contact with the convoy. The last report
was at 2331 in square CF 6174, course 3400. It added that the convoy had
made no headway for 70 minutes.
- 189 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
About 1500 U 83 and U 71 reported that they were on the way back.
The latter was depth-charged for 7 hours after a four fan shot on a
destroyer which missed. The boat had no success.
Boats in the North Atlantic continued in their attempt to pick up the
outward bound ON-convoy. For this purpose the patrol lines (Group
"Reissewolf") were moved 60 miles in the direction 1450, in order still to
be able to pick up the convoy on a more southerly course. In order to
prevent the convoy from getting through during the night, the boats are to
set out, when it gets dark on a course of 2150, speed, as far as weather
conditions permit, up to 7 knots, and so run along the same route it is
presumed the convoy will take. On the 27th October after it gets light, the
boats are then to return to the positions from which they started.
405
In the Southern area boats U 103, 107, 66 and 125, which were on their
way back to the north, received orders to dispose their reconnaissance
lines 50 miles further to the west. The boats will thus get further into the
area in which, according to radio intercept reports, the last observations
were made, and through which the course instructions led.
U 402 left Kiel.
27.10. The boats continued to operate on the Gibraltar convoy. U 564
reported the convoy at 0025 in CF 6171 course N., and led U 563 to it by
beacon signals. U 563 went into action and scored 3 hits on 2 steamers. It
gave continuous shadowing reports, the last one at 2300 in CF 2841. U
4564 reloaded 1 upper deck torpedo and scored another hit with that on a
steamer, the sinking of which was confirmed by U 563. U 432 requested a
beacon signal from the shadower, therefore it must be close to the convoy.
At 1704 U 74 made contact with a convoy steering on a S.W. course in
AL 7473. It was not clear which convoy this concerned. It could have
been an OS-convoy, likewise however it could have been the expected
ON-convoy, which then, it is true, must have been 3 days late, and must
have steered quite far to the south. U 74 continued to maintain contact till
about 2300, then it lost contact.
Group "Reissewolf" was ordered to operate on this convoy. After
contact was broken off the boats were told to carry on the search, starting
from the last reported enemy position (at 2255 in AL 7473) on the mean
course of the convoy from 2050 to 2750. The operation of this convoy did
not appear very promising at first. THe convoy was proceeding at a
relatively high speed, the boats were far off, the weather was unfavorable.
In spite of that the operation had to be attempted. In view of the small
number of targets which were available, the operation could not be given
up on account of unfavorable conditions, which might have changed for
the better at any time.
U 129 left LOrient for the Southern area.
 U 96 left St. Nazaire.
- 190 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
28.10. U 432, which was coming from the north, was also led up to the
convoy by U 564 and 563, which were still shadowing the convoy
tenaciously. This action led to the sinking of 2 ships.
Therefore the boats which were near the convoy besides U 564, which
however, had no more torpedoes, were U 563 with an air-driven torpedo
and U 432 with 3 electric torpedoes.
Last shadowing report was from U 564 at 2323 in BE 7945.
The convoy which was reported yesterday by U 74 was picked up again
by U 568 in square BD 2682 at 2043. The convoy was steering 240. U 77
and U 73 requested beacon signals, which however did not result in any
successes, as at 2115 contact had already been broken again in a visibility
of 500 meters.The boats received orders to continue the search in the
sector 2100 - 2550 from the last enemy position.
406
The attacking disposition of the 4 boats of the "Mordbrenner" Group
has not brought any results. Apparently no traffic was running through the
Belle Isle Straits. I decided to move the boats a little further to the south.
They received orders to steer for square BC 47.
U 206 entered St. Nazaire.
29.10. The boats continued to maintain contact with the Gibraltar
convoy. U 432 and U 563 attacked, unfortunately without success. By
then all three boats had expended all torpedoes. They received orders to
set out on return to base.
The boats shadowed the convoy tenaciously in dogged pursuit, and this,
together with the air reconnaissance which always managed to pick up the
convoy again, has meant that all the boats which were at my disposal came
to the attack.
The reports of the boats on this convoy comprised:
U 564 - 6 hits on 6 steamers
U 563 - 1 steamer and 1 destroyer sunk
- 3 hits on 2 steamers
U 83 - 1 passenger steamer and 2 freighters sunk
U 432 - 2 steamers sunk.
U 206 and U 71 had to break off early in the operation on account of
lack of fuel.
U 204 is missing.
At 1020 U 77 made contact in BD 2758 with the westward bound
convoy. The convoy was steering on a S.W. course. U 77 received orders
to make shadowing reports but not to attack; the convoy was picked up by
the most westerly boat of the "Reissewolf" Group, so the rest of the boats
needed a longer time to approach, considering the high speed of advance
of the convoy of from 10 to 12 knots, and contact had to be safely
maintained till then.
- 191 -
 U 77 and later U 74 once again maintained contact during the whole
day. The convoy was steering on a course of 2500 with a speed of 10-12
knots. U 74 reported 4 destroyers acting as escorts. It heard depth-charges
exploding continuously. In the course of the late afternoon and evening U
568, U 751, U 106, U 73, U 77 and U 502 made reports. U 568 could not
continue the pursuit any longer on account of lack of fuel and had to set
out on return to base. The rest of the boats reported that they had been
Date Position, Wind, Weather forced under water because they were being hunted with hydrophones, and
and Sea State, Illumination, Events depth-charged. Therefore the escort of the convoy must have been
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. considerably stronger than 4, which was the number of destroyers
reported. U 106 and U 73 received orders to push on, taking into
consideration their position and the state of their fuel. U 751 and U 77
because of the state of their fuel and their position astern of the convoy
were no longer in the position to make contact again, as the speed of
advance of the convoy was 10-12 knots. They were assigned attacking
The convoy consists of 20 large ships, nothing is known as yet of the areas in BD 1418 and BD 1482, as an extension to the patrol lines ordered
escort. for the "Stosstrupp" Group.
Contact was maintained by U 77 during the whole day. U 73 and U 751
likewise approached the convoy about 2000. The boats received U 502 requested permission to return on account of damage to its diesel
permission to attack. engine and unexplained loss of fuel.

As no traffic had been observed off the Belle Isle Straits, according to U 106 sank a tanker in the convoy, the only boat to achieve success. It
the situation report of the boats, the 4 boats of the "Mordbrenner" Group also sank a single ship, altogether
were ordered to the following new attacking areas:
U 573 - BC 4485, U 208 - BB 6665,
U 374 - BB 6368, U 109 - BB 6955, - 192 -

All 80 miles wide.

Permission to attack in these areas south of the Newfoundland Bank
was requested, and the Naval War Staff granted permission.

U 201 left Brest.

U 98 left St. Nazaire.

Date Position, Wind, Weather
30.10. At 0015 U 106 also made contact with the westbound convoy. and Sea State, Illumination, Events
407
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
13,000 GRT. At 2235 U 74 was driven off from the convoy in BC 6582
but pressed on.
Group "Schlagetod" received orders to proceed to the south and to form
a new patrol line from AJ 8115 to AJ 9571. U 123 was released and was
sent to patrol the Belle Isle Straits in the square AH 9820. U 571, U 577
and U 123, which were among the boats coming from home, and U 567, U
552 and U 96 from among the boats leaving ports in Western France, were
formed into a new patrol line (Group "Stosstrupp"), which lay to the S.E.
at an obtuse angle to the other patrol line of Group "Schlagetod" (from AJ
9821 to BC 3395). These measures were intended to have the following
effect:
1) Pick up traffic running further to the south. Also by stationing U 123
in the Belle Isle Straits and the "Mordbrenner" Group east of Cape Race
and Cape St. Johns, the possibility of going round the patrol line in the
north appeared to be lessened.
2) Pick up traffic closer to the suspected area of concentration.
3) The boats could work together with the "Mordbrenner" Group.
At 1830 U 81, which was in BF 1887 on its way out, reported that it was
returning as it was unable to dive. At 1559 it was attacked by British
aircraft. Messages by the British aircraft about U 81 were picked up by
the Radio Intercepting Service. The attempt to get fighter protection for U
81 dod not come off, as the distance was too great for fighter aircraft.
There was not a single heavy fighter at my disposal on the whole coast of
Western France. The only help came from the boats U 201 and U 98
which were in the vicinity and were ordered to go to U 81. U 81
408
succeeded in escaping and doing repairs which made it capable of diving
again. It received orders to put into Brest.
As therefore no help could be given to this boat, it only escaped further
aircraft attacks through luck and quick repairs on board. This state of
affairs must be altered, especially as aircraft attacks on outward and
inward bound U-boats have greatly increased during the last period. This
U-boat route must be actually attracting the British aircraft.An
improvement in the situation can be achieved through heavy fighter
aircraft, whose removal to the west coast has been proposed by the Naval
War Staff.
U 103, U 107, U 66 and U 125 which were coming to the Northern area
from the south, received N.S. lines in the attacking area in the latitude of
the northern third of DH along square DG 36, DH 14, DH 15 and DH 16.
They were to wait there for the SL-convoy which was expected in about 5
days, also they were to operate on the tanker traffic from Gibraltar to
Central America.
U 69 left St. Nazaire.
U 124 left Lorient.
U 572 left Lorient.
U 373 left Brest.
U 332 left Kiel.
- 193 -
Date Position, Wind, Weather
and Sea State, Illumination, Events U 552 maintained contact till about 1800. From 1858 U 567 gave
Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc. shadowing reports, according to which the convoy was proceeding on a
course of 900 at about 2100. It was therefore running into range of our air
reconnaissance, which will be set on to this convoy on the 1st November.

While operating on the convoy shadowed by U 552, U 96 picked up

another convoy in AL 7898 which was steering on a course of 2400. No
31.10. U 74 made contact again in BC 5961 at 1025 with the convoy U-boats, except 3 Italian ones, were in the vicinity of this convoy. At that
steering west. time U 568 and U 502, which were both on the way back to base, were the
As the convoy had kept to its course of 250, the boats of the only ships which were in its estimated direction of advance. U 77 and U
"Mordbrenner" Group came into a favorable position. They received 751 were somewhat to the north of it. These 4 boats received orders to
orders to form a patrol line from BC 7555 to BC 4885, in order to wait for operate on the convoy, provided however that U 96 could maintain
the convoy there. contact.
U 74 maintained contact during the whole day (it has already followed
the convoy for over 1,000 miles). Under these circumstances there is the
chance (if U 74 can maintain contact during the night also) of bringing the
4 "Mordbrenner" boats up to the convoy during the coming night. The - 194 -
boats received orders to operate directly on the convoy.
Shortly after that U 73 reported its position in BC 5919, about 100 miles
behind the present convoy position. It had pursued a fast single ship and
therefore had not advanced. It was hopeless for the boat to go on. It
received orders to return. U 106 also reported its position quite near U 73.
It received an approach square in the vicinity of the "Stosstrupp" Group in
order to join the group there.

U 74 and the 4 boats of the "Mordbrenner" Group were now the only Date Position, Wind, Weather
ones which were still operating on the convoy. U 74 reported at 2340: and Sea State, Illumination, Events
Contact has been broken, but the boat is pressing on. Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
All 5 boats received orders to operate at first on a mean course of 2500.
If this brought no results, they were to continue the search in the sectors
from 2400 to 2600.

At 0534 U 552 reported a convoy in AK 9973, which was running on a

northerly course with a speed of 10 knots. U 567, U 96 and U 101 (which An Italian submarine, J 15, likewise made contact with a convoy in AL
was on the way back) were in the vicinity. They were ordered to operate 8744 at 2100. This must be the convoy picked up by U 96, therefore one
on the convoy. or other of the submarines must have made an error in fixing the position.
409
 U 81, which was attacked by British aircraft while it was in the Bay of
Biscay yesterday and unable to dive, reported at 0100 that it was able to
dive again.
U 125 - a boat from the Southern area - reported that it was returning on
account of lack of provisions. The boat operated in Mid-Atlantic between
South America and Freetown, at a time when there was very little traffic,
and it found none. It returned from an almost 90 day long cruise without
having had any success.
U 81 entered Brest again on account of damage to the motor.
U 83 entered Brest.
U 71 entered St. Nazaire.
On orders from Naval War Staff, another boat - U 578 which was on its
way out - had to be detailed for an operation in the North Sea. As a result
of this 4 boats at the present time have been nominated for this area - U
132, 576, 578, 752 - boats which are very much needed in the Atlantic, as
well as those which were formerly operating there and are now being
repaired.
(Signed): DÖNITZ.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 November 1941
PG30300a
410
1. November 1941.
I. U 38 - Op(AJ 81) U 98 - BF U 201 - BE 61 U 564 - BF 60
66 - Op(DH 15) 101 - AL 01 202 - Op(AJ 82) 567 - AL 71
68 - Op(St.Hel.) 103 - Op(DG 36) 203 - Op(AJ 86) 568 - BD 61
69 - BF 44 106 - BC 56 208 - BC 70 569 - Op(AJ 81)
73 - BC 59 107 - Op(DH 14) 332 - AF 87 571 - AK 47
74 - BC 70 109 - BC 70 373 - BE 38 572 - BF 47
77 - BD 15 123 - AJ 74 374 - BC 70 573 - BC 70
82 - Op(AJ 82) 124 - BF 402 - AF 87 577 - AK 51
84 - Op(AJ 86) 125 - CF 90 432 - BF 60 751 - BD 15
85 - Op(AJ 95) 126 - EU 502 - BD 57 A - CD
93 - Op(AJ 94) 129 - CF 52 552 - AL 50
96 - BD 33 133 - AK 64 563 - BF 50
On Return Passage: U 125 - 564 - 502 - 563 - 568 - 101 - 73.
Entered Port: U 564 - Lorient; U 563 - Brest.
Sailed: U 561 - 652 Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Target convoy No. 8 in area west of Ireland.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) See paragraph IVa for convoys Nos. 7, 8 and 9.
2) At 1500 U 374 sighted a convoy in BC 4172, course 500 (Convoy
No. 10). For further details see para. IVa.
3) At 1827 U 106 reported convoy in BC 5645, 3200, and at 2105 that
she had lost contact and had sighted only one destroyer and 2 vessels.
(Boat was directed to stalk Convoy No. 10).
b) G.A.F. picked up outward convoy in AL 5549 and sent beacon
signals. Not heard by any of the boats.
c) None.
d) Scheduled convoy left Gibraltar at 1600.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 7: (First detected by U 74 at 1704 on 27th October in AL
7473.)
At 1150 U 74 reported that her search had been fruitless so far and was
following up in the direction of 2300. At 1352 U 208 sighted two sharply
zigging steamers in BC 7539, course west. At 1804 boat reported that the
steamers sighted were Portuguese. U 74, 208, 573 and 109 are still
stalking the convoy. These boats have now been given permission to
attack in the area west of 550 West and south of 430 South, as far as 600
West.
Contact was not established again, visibility 2 miles, wind N.E. 3-4. U
74 is stalking Convoy No. 10, remaining boats have been given a free
hand within the limitations of their fuel reserves. The chase is now
abandoned.
Total success: 1 tanker.
- 195 -
Convoy No. 8: (First detected by U 552 at 0534 on 31.10 in AK
9973.)
At 0932 U 552 reported contact in AL 5743, course 300. At 1142 U 567
reported a chaser group 20 miles astern of the convoy. Contact was then
interrupted and was not reestablished by morning. Air reconnaissance also
had no success in finding the convoy.
Results to date:
U 552 - 1 destroyer sunk.
- 1 steamer torpedoed.
U 567 - 2 steamers, hits probable.
411
Convoy No. 9: (First detected by U 96 at 2124 on 31.10 in AL 7898.)
At 1121 U 96 sighted the convoy in BD 3636, course 1700, and reported
at 1230 that it consisted merely of 2 detached steamers with destroyer
escort. The whole convoy came in to sight at 1402 in BD 3933 on a
southerly course. Contact was maintained until 2001, when it was lost in
BE 1774. Boat followed up on different courses without success. At 0256
she reported very lights in a bearing on 1200, in BD 6328. Searched till
morning without success.
Weather: S.E. 1-2, visibility over 10 miles.
At 1630 U 502 reported operation against convoy given up because of
loss of fuel. U 572 reported that she was stalking this convoy.
The following outward bound boats have also been committed: U 201,
98 and 373. In addition, U 103, 107 and 66, coming from the south.
The following boats are now stalking the convoy: U 96, 77, 751, 568,
98, 201, 373, 103, 107 and 66. Air reconnaissance has been ordered for
2.11.
Convoy No. 10:
U 374 (committed to Convoy No. 7) sighted a convoy at 1500 in BC
4172, course 500. Boat was forbidden to attack and ordered to shadow the
convoy. U 569, 38, 82, 202, 84, 203, 93 and 85 belonging to Group
"Schlagetot", were instructed to operate against the convoy, as were U 123
and U 106. These boats were combined to form Group "Raubritter".
Order given: Search sector 200 to 700, starting from position in BC 4172
at 1500.
Sequence from the north: U 123, 569, 38, 82, 202, 84, 203, 93, 85. U
374 was given a free hand, as was U 74, who had also hoped to join in the
convoy attack. U 106 was requested to report her intentions in connection
with the attack. At 2001 U 374 reported convoy in BC 4191 course 500,
speed 9 knots. Contact was lost, at 0300 again restored in BC 4133,
course 200, then once more interrupted. Shadower forced to submerge.
Radio communication was extremely poor. Reports were not received
here until hours later. U 203 also reported no reception on Greenland
radio service. No further reports had come in by the morning.
- 196 -
b) None.
c) Escort task UA completed.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 96 - 1 passenger steamer (8,000 GRT) belonging to Convoy No. 9
(burnt out).
1 steamer (5,000 GRT) belonging to Convoy No. 9, sunk.
U 552 - 1 destroyer belonging to Convoy No. 8, sunk.
1 steamer belonging to Convoy NO. 8, torpedoed.
U 567 - 2 steamers hit, probably belonging to Convoy No. 8.
VI. General:
Naval War Staff has requested 6 submarines for escort duties during
November. These tasks demand boats with good stocks of fuel, as they
must proceed at high sped for long distances. It will be possible only in
exceptional cases to detail boats from the operational area that still have
sufficient fuel, in the majority of cases fresh boats will have to be detailed.
Hence, in November the demands made on submarines for special tasks
will reach a pitch never before known. 4 boats will have to be detailed for
the reconnaissance demanded for special purposes in the north, and they
will hardly be available during November for other duties, 6 boats are
needed for escort duties, 4 boats are in northern waters.By far, the greatest
number of the boats in the North Atlantic operational area will have to
break off by mid NOvember, hence from this time onwards submarine
warfare will practically have to cease, especially as further boats will have
to be detailed for operations instructed in Naval War Staff Ia 1791/41
412
dated 29.10.41. It appears doubtful to me whether these special duties
(escorts, reconnaissance in the Northern area) are sufficiently vital to
warrant interference with submarine warfare, for since the British
organized the convoy system, successes in submarine warfare can only be
achieved if there is sufficient reconnaissance to detect convoys.
This reconnaissance must of necessity be carried out by the boats
themselves, hence, it demands large numbers of boats and makes it
necessary to concentrate our slight submarine resources.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------------
- 197 -
2. November 1941
I. U 38 - BC 13 U 98 - BE 58 U 201 - BE 46 U 567 - AL 60
66 - CF 84 101 - AL 37 202 - BC 16 568 - BE 41
68 - Op(St.Hel.) 103 - CF 75 203 - BC 24 569 - BC 12
69 - BE 65 106 - BC 27 208 - BC 70 571 - AJ 95
73 - BC 69 107 - CF 76 332 - AN 29 572 - BE 68
74 - BC 20 109 - BC 70 373 - BE 55 573 - BC 70
77 - BD 55 123 - BC 12 374 - BC 10 577 - AK 48
82 - BC 12 124 - CG 16 402 - AF 75 652 - BF
84 - BC 16 125 - CF 65 432 - BF 751 - BD 51
 85 - BC 24 126 - EU 502 - BD 61 A - DF 38
93 - BC 24 129 - CF 42 552 - AL 60
96 - BD 60 133 - AK 01 561 - BF

On Return Passage: U 125 - 502 - 568 - 101 - 73 - 432.

Entered Port: U 432 - Brest.
Sailed: U 434 - Kristiansand.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Target Convoy No. 9.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) See paragraph IVa for Convoys No. 8, 9 and 10.
2) Report from U 573 covering last few days in BC 73: Only fishing
vessels and aircraft, 1 destroyer.
3) U 208 reported 1 ship (6,000 GRT) sunk in BC 72.
4) U 109 reported strong patrolling by aircraft and destroyers in BC 75
and 78. 1 tanker sighted, course S.E.
b) Convoy No. 9 picked up by aircraft at 1700 (paragraph IVa).
c) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 8: At 1238 U 552 made contact with escorts in AL 6261,
at 1300 she picked up the convoy in AL 6236 and shadowed it with some
interruptions until 0330 when she lost the convoy in AL 4212 and broke
off pursuit. U 567 twice requested beacon signals during the night,
apparently obtained contact, reported 5 inexplicable misses at 0630, then
also gave up the chase.
Weather at 0200 - wind E, cloudless. Visibility 10 miles. Operation
completed.
Total successes: 1 destroyer sunk, 1 steamer torpedoed, 2 steamers
probably hit.
- 198 -
Convoy No. 9: Air reconnaissance reported position of convoy at 1630
as BE 4921. According to cross bearing at 1700 convoy was in BE 4848.
U 98 was in the immediate vicinity. At 1845 boat made contact in BE
4799 and maintained it until 2053 in BE 7136. Then forced to sheer off.
Last course S.E. By first light U 96, 201, 98, 69, 373, and 572 should
certainly have made contact, and probably U 77 and 751. Owing to a
breakdown the order to continue the search in the sector 200 - 1300 was
not transmitted. Hence the search was carried on during the night without
any order to attack. Weather: very favorable at first. gradually worsening.
Wind freshening to S. 5-6, thus the convoy was expected to be making
only slight progress. Visibility remained good.
Convoy No. 10:
At 1000 the sector to be searched was increased by 300 to the west (350
- 650). Weather: very good visibility, sea slight. At 1729 U 123 contacted
and shadowed the convoy until 0213 in AJ 7873. In the meantime U 38,
569, 82 and 202 reported that they were in pursuit. U 203 reported at 0415
and 0530. No further contact. U 106 and U 571 are also being committed
against this convoy.
b) U 208, 374 and 573, belonging to Group "Mordbrenner" (S.E. of
Greenland) reported return because of lack of fuel. U 109 moved away to
CC 39 to effect minor repairs, she intended further operations in CC 60.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 374 - 1 ship - 6,000 (GRT) (Independent)
U 208 - 1 ship - 6,000 (GRT) (Independent)

413
---------------------------------------------------
---------------------
3. November 1941.
I. U 38 - AJ 70 U 98 - BE 70 U 201 - BE 70 U 567 - AM 01
66 - CF 46 101 - AM 15 202 - AJ 70 568 - BE 46
68 - Op(St.Hel.) 103 - CF 45 203 - AJ 70 569 - AJ 70
69 - BE 70 106 - AJ 76 208 - BC 44 571 - AJ 85
73 - BD 48 107 - CF 46 332 - AF 73 572 - BE 70
74 - BC 10 109 - CD 30 373 - BE 70 573 - BC 79
77 - BE 70 123 - AJ 70 374 - BC 27 577 - AJ 95
82 - AJ 70 124 - CG 42 402 - AE 93 652 - BF 48
84 - AJ 70 125 - CG 17 434 - AF 79 751 - BE 70
85 - AJ 70 126 - EU 502 - BD 63 A - DF/DG
93 - AJ 70 129 - Azoren 552 - AM 43
96 - BE 70 133 - AK 44 561 - BF 44
On Return Passage: U 125 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 568 - 101 - 73.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 565 - 205 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Target, Convoy No. 9 in BE 70.
- 199 -
414
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) For convoys No. 9 and 10 see paragraph IVa.
2) At 1529 U 74 sighted convoy in AJ 7693. See paragraph IVa for
further details.
3) U 374 reported results of reconnaissance in area Belle Isle Straits and
St. Johns: Normal peacetime activity, lights showing, no patrolling.
Independents cruising with lights.
4) U 126 sighted one independent steamer in EV 91.
b) Convoy not found (owing to breakdown of one engine it was not
possible to catch up).
c) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 9: In view of air reconnaissance further search was
carried on during the day without at first any specific distribution. Then
after the receipt of the position report at 2130, the order was given to
continue searching between 107, 96, 572, 69, 373, 201, 103). U 751 and
U 66 are returning because of lack of fuel. U 77 is bound for Vigo to
replenish. Weather: S.E. 5-6 freshening, visibility over 10 miles.
Convoy No. 10: Search was continued without distribution because:
1) Radio communication with the boats was extremely unreliable and it
was certain that some reports had never reached Operational Control,
hence the situation on the spot could not be gauged properly.
2) As numerous boats were in the immediate vicinity (6 of them
definitely had contact) and the visibility was very variable the possibility
existed of the enemy coming into sight when actually in the submarine
area.
Successes:
U 202 - 3 steamers sunk.
U 569 - 2 steamers hit.
Requests to the boats to give their position and a report on the situation
did not bring any clarification.
At 1200 the order was given to continue searching the whole sector
(without specific distribution) between 330 and 400. At 1530 U 203 made
contact in AJ 7924, course 3100, speed 8 knots, but after a successful
attack was lost again in fog through depth charging. According to
hydrophone bearing, boat calculated course to be 2700 (in Belle Isle
Straits). Operational Control assumed that further operations against
Convoy No. 10 were useless because of fog and the proximity of Belle Isle
Straits. All boats were directed to stalk Convoy No. 11.
- 200 -
Convoy No. 11: At 1529 U 74 made contact with the convoy in AJ
7693 (while searching for Convoy No. 10), course 500, moderate speed
(over 11 knots). At 1955 she lost contact and calculated convoy course at
20 - 300. Boats were distributed according to their reported or estimated
positions to Convoys No, 10 and 11, or according to their "short signal"
reports stating which they were attacking. Weather: foggy patches,
visibility up to 8 miles between them. At 2130 order was given to
continue search in sector 10 to 500 (U 84, 74, 106, 557). U 571, 577 and
133 were outward bound and were also committed to attack the convoy.
b) - c) None.
d) U 77 (committed against Convoy No. 9) requested permission to refuel
at Vigo. Refueling was sanctioned so that the boat can be set onto the
outward bound Gibraltar convoy during the next few days. The attack is
to be carried out on 6th - 7th November.
V. Reports of Success:
U 202 - 3 steamers totaling 13,000 GRT sunk (belonging to Convoy No.
10)
415
U 569 - hits on 2 steamers belonging to Convoy No. 10.
VI. General:
After explaining the probable developments in the number of submarines
operating in the North Atlantic, I have requested Naval War Staff to
reconsider their decision on the escort tasks ordered on 1.11. (See War
Diary for 1.11)
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
4. November 1941.
I. U 38 - AJ 70 U 98 - CF 10 U 201 - CF 20 U 561 - BE 61
66 - CF 20 101 - AM 24 202 - AJ 70 565 - BF
68 - Op(St.Hel.) 103 - CF 20 203 - AJ 70 567 - AL 62
69 - CF 10 106 - AJ 80 205 - BF 568 - BE 54
73 - BD 46 107 - CF 10 208 - BC 54 569 - AJ 87
74 - AJ 80 109 - CC 60 332 - AF 47 571 - AJ 70
77 - CF 20 123 - AJ 70 373 - CF 10 572 - CF 10
82 - AJ 70 124 - CG 74 374 - BC 37 573 - BC 58
84 - AJ 80 125 - BF 70 402 - AE 86 577 - AJ 80
85 - AJ 80 126 - EV 90 434 - AF 75 652 - BE 65
93 - AJ 70 129 - Azoren 502 - BE 43 751 - CF 20
96 - CF 10 133 - AJ 59 552 - AL 66
A - DF 95
On Return Passage: U 125 - 66 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 568 - 751 - 101
- 73.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 433 - St. Nazaire. U 81 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Plane did not take off because of fog on the
airfield.

- 201 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) At 1742 U 502 sighted convoy in BE 4298, southerly course, high
speed (No. 12). See paragraph IVa for further details.
b) None.
c) At 0730 on 3.11 the steamer "De Braaf" was torpedoed in 220 50'.
South longitude (?). Assumed to be U 68.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 9: Search continued until dark. Air reconnaissance
rendered impossible by fog on flying field. Weather: S.E. 5 - 6, probably
good visibility. Operation discontinued at 2100 in order to stalk a convoy
which had left Gibraltar on the evening of 1.11. (Convoy No. 13) She
was expected to be in CF 68 or 69 by the morning of 5.11. Group
"Stoertebecker" U 96, 98, 69, 201, 103, 107, 373 and 572 were ordered to
operate in this direction as their fuel supply and position allowed. As no
enemy contact was expected on 5.11, while the weather continued
unfavorable the main task on 5th November would be the picking up of
the enemy by the Air Force and by the submarines taking bearings.
Convoy No. 12: U 502 (returning because of lack of fuel) picked up the
convoy at 1742 in BE 4298, southerly course 10-12 miles. Shadowed until
1900 to 4615, contact was then lost. Returning. She did not attack the
convoy as:
1) Contact could not be maintained.
416
2) Group "Stoertebecker" could not have contacted the convoy until the
evening of 5th.
3) Enemy speed was too high to permit any attacks on the convoy
(Prospects were diminished by the weather situation).
Convoy No. 11: Search during the day was unsuccessful. Weather:
East 3 - 4, fog or visibility up to 2 miles. As the prospects of picking up
the convoy, which had been reported proceeding at moderate speed (11 -
17 knots) were very poor after the contact had been lost, it was decided to
discontinue the operation and take up the patrol line from AD 9561 to AJ
3667 at cruising speed.
U 203, 202, 84 and 93 are making a protracted return voyage because of
lack of fuel. They have been ordered to proceed past St. Johns and Cape
Race if possible. U 74 has been given a free hand. Group "Raubritter"
still contains U 123, 38, 577, 106, 571, 133, 82 and 85. No sinkings have
been achieved in this convoy.
b) None.
c) U 109, who is at present believed to be in CD 60, has been selected
for the task of escorting the prize "Silvaplana" back to port.This vessel will
pass CD 37 between 7th and 11th November.
- 202 -
d) 1) Special task for Naval Group North:
This consists of the following during the early part of November.
1) Investigation of icing in the Denmark Straits (U 332 has been
allocated this task).
2) Undetected reconnaissance in the area in the southwestern part of AE.
To begin with, it is intended to retain all the submarines coming from the
North Sea in this area for 4 days each. At present, U 402 and 434 are On Return Passage: U 125 - 66 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 568 - 751 - 101
outward bound and they have been given the task of reconnoitering. - 73 - 569 - 565 - 81.
3) Later several boats will carry out stationary reconnaissance in this area. Entered Port: U 125 - 565 Lorient.
Sailed: U 81 - Brest.

2) Special tasks in the Mediterranean: II. Air Reconnaissance: Four planes searched for a convoy (No. 13)
(previous correspondence "C.O. only" !) leaving Gibraltar.
On account of the order to increase commitments in the
Mediterranean, U 205, 433, 81, 565 (all outward bound into the North - 203 -
Atlantic) have been recalled if their charts were not adequate, or if their
equipment was sufficient they have been sent direct to the Mediterranean.

V. Reports of Success:
U 203 - sank 2 ships and torpedoed 2 ships. Convoy No. 10.

---------------------------------------------------
--------------
5. November 1941.
I. U 38 - AJ 50 U 98 - CF 50 U 202 - AJ 48 U 565 - BF
66 - BE 88 101 - AM 32 203 - AJ 85 567 - AL 67
68 - FU 103 - CF 50 205 - BF 48 568 - BE 64
69 - CF 50 106 - AJ 50 208 - BC 56 569 - AJ 87
73 - BD 64 107 - CF 19 332 - AE 61 571 - AJ 50
74 - AJ 61 109 - CC 60 373 - CF 50 572 - CF 19
77 - CF 31 123 - AJ 50 374 - C 39 573 - BC 68
81 - BF 124 - DH 34 402 - AE 84 577 - AJ 50
82 - AJ 50 125 - BF 433 - BF 652 - BE 54
84 - AJ 50 126 - EV 434 - AE 93 751 - BE 85
85 - AJ 50 129 - Azoren 502 - BE 52 A - DS 12
93 - AJ 81 133 - AJ 65 552 - AL 67
96 - CF 50 201 - CF 50 561 - BE 27
417
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 124 sighted a fast convoy at 0204 - 2 steamers and 2 destroyers -
in CF 6189, course E.S.E.
b) Convoy not picked up. Nothing seen.
c) Admiralty instructions on 3.11: Steer zig-zag course between 100
West and 200 East as far as 350 South.
d) The destroyer sunk by U 83 on 21.10 was the "Cossack" (attack on
aircraft carrier "Eagle").
IV. Reports of Success: None.
V. General:
a) It has been learned after the event from English newspaper reports on
the loss of U 570 on 27.8 that the Commander (Lt.(s.g.) Rahmlow) was
supposed to have suffered from gas poisoning. The depressing occurrence
may therefore be explained partially by the fact that the Commander was
temporarily unable to control the situation and the decision to surrender
was taken and carried out by the first Watch Officer, Lt.(j.g.) Berndt. He
was later shot while trying to escape in England. Probably the full
significance of his behavior did not dawn on him until he was a prisoner,
when he preferred death while trying to escape to all else. However, this
matter cannot be cleared up until reports from the men concerned are
available.
b) Naval War Staff has limited the order for convoy escort tasks (see 1.11
and 4.11) to the extent of saying that as a general rule they are only to be
carried out if they do not entail the sacrifice of more than about half the
operation. However, such opportunities will be exceptions.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
- 204 -
6. November 1941.
I. U 38 - AJ 29 U 98 - CF 51 U 203 - AJ 96 U 567 - AL 82
66 - BE 97 101 - AF 70 205 - BE 99 568 - BF 48
68 - Op(St.Hel.) 103 - CF 38 208 - BC 66 569 - AJ 97
69 - CF 28 106 - AJ 29 332 - N. of Iceland 571 - AJ 29
73 - BE 44 107 - CF 51 373 - CF 60 572 - CF 52
74 - AK 41 109 - CD 51 374 - BD 51 573 - CF 29
77 - CG 11 123 - AJ 29 402 - Op(AE 73/76) 577 - AJ 61
81 - BF 124 - CF 67 433 - BF 60 652 - BE 42
418
82 - AJ 61 126 - EV 434 - AE 84/85 751 - BE 94
84 - AJ 87 129 - CF 94 502 - BE 64 A - DS 51
85 - AJ 62 133 - AJ 34 552 - AL 81
93 - AJ 86 201 - CF 29 561 - BE 14
96 - CF 52 202 - AJ 82
On Return Passage: U 66 - 103 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 568 - 751 - 101
- 73 - 569 - 202 - 84 - 203 - 93 - 433 - 74.
Entered Port: U 433 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: Convoy No. 13 not spotted.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Southern area: U 68 made a situation report. No shipping sighted on
a sweep into Whale Bay. On 28.10. independent "S" sunk in CG 2637.
1.11. independent "N" sunk in GH 2638.
b) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 13: Despite use of 6 planes and generally still favorable
visibility, no success obtained from air reconnaissance. Order was given
to move away after dark and take up a fresh patrol line from CF 1873 to
CF 2468 by 0709.
Future intentions: As neither Air Force nor submarines have detected
the enemy and air reconnaissance gives reason to suppose that he is farther
to the west (No. 13), the patrol lines are to be moved in that direction.
Besides the possibility of still finding No. 13 there, the boats will be in an
area where, according to the schedule established by dead reckoning, there
should be an "SL" convoy (91) - No. 14 - and an "OG" convoy. (The
presence of "SL" has been confirmed by an aircraft warning). U 107 is
returning. Group "Stoertebecker" still consists of 6 boats.
b) - c) None.
d) 1) Submarine warning covering AE 97 shows that the enemy suspects
boats to be in the Shetland - Iceland area. Apparently they are not ours,
however, in view of the special task for Naval Group North the
information is valuable.
2) As our own blockade runner (Portland) will be passing, the
operational area for submarines in the Southern area will be limited to the
S.W. until 11th November by a line from ES 15 to ES 95.
- 205 -
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
7. November 1941.
I. U 38 - Op(AD 96) U 98 - CF 18 U 202 - AJ 98 U 567 - AL 88
66 - BE 96 101 - to Bergen 203 - BD 12 568 - BF
68 - CH 24 103 - CG 11 205 - CG 19 569 - BD 23
69 - CF 19 106 - Op(AJ 32) 208 - BD 45 571 - Op(AJ 32)
73 - BE 54 107 - CF 53 332 - N. of Iceland 572 - CF 19
74 - AK 55 109 - CD 37 373 - CF 24 573 - BD 57
77 - CG 20 123 - Op(AD 95) 374 - BD 38 577 - Op(AJ 31)
81 - BE 69 124 - CF 81 402 - Op(AE 73) 652 - BD 38
82 - Op(AJ 36) 126 - EV 434 - Op(AE 84) 751 - BF 40
84 - BC 15 129 - DG 26 502 - BE 66 A - DS 81
419
85 - Op(AJ 36) 133 - Op(AJ 32) 552 - AL 87
93 - BC 16 201 - CF 24 561 - BD 35
96 - CF 19
On Return Passage: U 66 - 107 - 103 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 568 - 751
- 101 - 73 - 569 - 202 - 84 - 203 - 93 - 74.
Entered Port: U 568 St. Nazaire; U 101 Bergen
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None owing to lack of machines and unfavorable
weather.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - b) None.
c) 1) At 2142 steamer Nottingham (Dutch - 399 GRT?) torpedoed in AK
8351.
2) (Priority Radio Intercept). Information on position of SL 91 on 1.11
(set on to Group "Stoertebecker").
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Group "Stoertebecker" did not contact the enemy by dark. They are
now committed mainly against "SL 91" (No. 14). Further stalking of No.
13 ("HG") has been given up as the convoy has apparently already slipped
through or taken evasive action far to the west. The information gained
from a priority radio intercept on the position and course of "SL 91" on
1.11. indicated that the convoy passed east of the Azores, a mean course of
about 210 W. was estimated.
- 206 -
 93 - BC 41 202 - AK 97 569 - BD 33
96 - CF 19 203 - BD 28 571 - Op(AJ 32)

It may have been delayed by the long spell of bad weather.The order On Return Passage: U 107 - 66 - 103 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 751 - 73
has been given to take up a new patrol line from CF 1974 to CF 2894 after - 569 - 202 - 84 - 203 - 93 - 74.
dark and at 0900 on 8.11 to proceed from this area in a reconnaissance line Entered Port: U 751 - St. Nazaire.
with mean course "S" to meet the convoy. Sailed: U 105 - 565 - Lorient; U 433 - St. Nazaire; U 574 - Kiel.
b) Patrol line "Raubritter" (SE of Greenland) has presumably been taken
up by all boats during the night of 7th to 8th November. They have been II. Air Reconnaissance: 4 plus 2 machines seeking Convoy "SL 91" (No.
ordered to cruise to and fro. 14) in area CF 20 and 50.
c) - d) None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
V. Reports of Success: a) None.
U 68 sank 1 steamer of "Clan MacArthur" class (10,000 GRT) - b) One plane spotted convoy in approximately CF 5261.
independent, and 1 steamer "Bradford City" (4,953 GRT) - independent. c) - d) None.

VI. General: None. - 207 -

---------------------------------------------------
--------------

8. November 1941.

I. U 38 - Op(AD 96) U 98 - CF 19 U 205 - CG 49 U 572 - CF 27

66 - BF 70 103 - BF 70 208 - BD 55 573 - BD 67
68 - Op(GH) 106 - Op(AJ 32) 332 - AD 52 577 - Op(AJ 31) IV. Current Operations:
69 - CF 27 107 - CF 36 373 - CF 28 652 - BD 25 a) Group "Stoertebecker" did not contact the enemy. The air
73 - BE 52 109 - CD/CE 374 - BE 18 751 - BF reconnaissance spotted Convoy No. 14, but only one plane. Beacon
74 - AK 91 123 - Op(AD 95) 402 - Op(AE 73) A - DS 89 signals were sent for only a very short time (plane was overdue), hence,
77 - CG 124 - CF 78 434 - Op(AE 84) only one submarine heard them. Boat was ordered to operate on the D/F
81 - CG 13 126 - EV/EU 502 - BF 46 bearing. The other boats continued searching until it was necessary to
82 - Op(AJ 36) 129 - DG 56 552 - BE 15 move away into new patrol line. Assuming that the bearing taken by the
84 - BB 63 133 - Op(AJ 32) 561 - BD 25 submarine was correct and that the convoy was maintaining mean course
85 - Op(AJ 36) 201 - CF 28 567 - BE 16 "N", the order has been given to the boats to take up reconnaissance patrol
420
from CF 1366 to CF 2346 at 1000 on 9.11. They are then to search at the
convoy's speed of advance, i.e. 7 knots.
b) U 652 and 561 have been detailed as escort for "Ship 45" which is
expected in CD 37 on 17.11. Until that time the boats are to operate as
follows: U U652 in BC 30, U 561 in BD 10.
c) U 77 reported from CG that she had replenished at Vigo. UA reported
from ES 34 that she had completed her task on 29.10 in CD 91 (escort of
Motor Vessel "Portland")
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
Report made by B.d.U. to C-in-C Navy in Berlin.
1) Situation report on Conditions in the Atlantic.
Now that independent shipping movements have ceased and shipping is
proceeding in convoys which are difficult to detect, more frequent attacks
on convoys can be made only if large numbers of submarines are
available, as this ensures more frequent detection of convoys. s
considerable numbers of submarines have to enter the Mediterranean for
political and strategic reasons, which are of paramount importance, B.d.U.
requested that further dispersal of submarines for secondary duties should
be avoided. These tasks are certainly excellent in themselves but
compared with the gaps they cause in the Atlantic battle, are most
injurious to our cause.
2) The lack of repair workers is already being felt: the long periods
required for carrying out final tasks are delaying the operational readiness
of submarine new constructions; operational submarines require
disproportionately long repair periods. Some remedy must be found, as
when the number of operational boats increases greatly in the near future
the demands for repairs will increase sharply. A mobile dockyard worker
unit was suggested, this could be employed to relieve any dockyard that
was overburdened with work. It was requested that an investigation
should be made to find out whether workers for submarine repairs could
not be drawn from other Navy repair yards. C-in-C Navy informed B.d.U.
421
that he intended raising the question of labor during a conference with the
Fuehrer in the coming week.
- 811 -
3) The delay in the operational readiness of new constructions - from 3
to practically 4 months after they are commissioned - is partly due to the
inadequacy of recovery vessels. The number of recovery vessels quoted as
being in the Firing Flotillas is purely theoretical, as on account of age and
breakdowns on an average only about 30% of the recovery vessels are i a
state of readiness. This has resulted in holding up the newly constructed
boats with the 25th Submarine Flotilla. At present there are 11 submarines
with this Flotilla, which has only 2 recovery boats available (instead of 5
or 6). The number of torpedoes fired has been reduced from 43 to 26.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
9. November 1941.
I. U 38 - Op(AD 96) U 98 - CF 13 U 203 - BD 61 U 567 - BE 43
68 - GG 105 - BF 205 - CG 85 569 - BE 12
69 - CF 22 106 - Op(AJ 32) 208 - BD 64 571 - Op(AJ 32)
73 - BE 62 107 - BE 96 332 - AD 82 572 - CF 21
74 - BE 11 109 - CD 30 373 - CF 22 573 - BD 69
77 - CG 123 - Op(AD 95) 374 - BE 27 574 - AO
 81 - CG 43 124 - DG 39 402 - Op(AE 84) 577 - Op(AJ 31)
82 - Op(AJ 36) 126 - EU 433 - BF 652 - BD 16
84 - BC 47 129 - DG 83 434 - Op(AE 84) A - ES 34
85 - Op(AJ 36) 133 - Op(AJ 32) 552 - BE 42
93 - BB 69 201 - CF 23 561 - Op(BD 10)
96 - CF 21 202 - BD 32 565 - BF
On Return Passage: U 107 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 73 - 569 - 202 - 84 - 203
- 93 - 74.
Entered Port: U 103 - 66 - 502 Lorient.
Sailed: U 575 St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Target "SL 91" (Convoy No. 14) 4 machines
taking part.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 69 reported 1 destroyer at 0208 in BE 7698, course "N", 10 knots.
b) Nothing sighted.
c) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 14:
As contact was not re-established by the boats nor the air
reconnaissance, Group "Stoertebecker" (reinforced by U 552 and 567 in
the west and U 77 in the east) was ordered to take up position in
reconnaissance line from BE 7252 to BE 8163 by 1000 on 10.11. Mean
course "N" was taken to be set, speed of advance 7 knots. It was planned
to pick up the convoy again by air reconnaissance. Boats were to search in
their patrol line. A very definite depression in the vicinity hampered
operations. Weather: NW 7 - 8 cloudy, rain, poor visibility, variable.
- 209 -
422
b) None.
c) U 109 escort duty carried out according to plan.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
10. November 1941.
I. U 38 - Op(AD 96) U 98 - BE 73 U 203 - BE 41 U 567 - BE 72
68 - St. Helena 105 - BF 41 205 - CG 90 569 - BE 25
69 - BE 73 106 - Op(AJ 32) 208 - BF 40 571 - Op(AJ 32)
73 - BF 40 107 - BF 70 332 - AL 12 572 - BE 43
74 - BE 24 109 - CD 30 373 - BE 81 573 - BE 49
77 - BE 85 123 - Op(AD 95) 374 - BF 40 574 - AN 30
81 - CG 81 124 - DG 66 402 - AL 31 575 - BF
82 - Op(AJ 36) 126 - EV 433 - BF 73 577 - Op(AJ 31)
84 - BC 49 129 - DT 12 434 - Op(AE 84) 652 - BC 36
85 - Op(AJ 36) 133 - Op(AJ 32) 552 - BE 72 A - ES 62
93 - BC 48 201 - BE 81 561 - Op(BD 10)
96 - BE 73 202 - BE 14 565 - BF 72
On Return Passage: U 107 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 73 - 569 - 202 -84 - 203 -
93 - 74.
 Entered Port: - . - In order to reconnoiter enemy shipping the following areas were
Sailed: U 43 Lorient. allocated.
U 105 - AE 84 right half and 85
II. Air Reconnaissance: Target "SL 91 (Convoy No. 14) in area BE 40 - U 402 - AE 89
70. U 434 - AE 76 northern half and 73.
3) Group "Raubritter", in position S.E. of Greenland, was given orders
III. Reports on the Enemy: to set course 1300, daily coverage 100 miles. This change of position was
a) U 123 reported from the area SE of Greenland that she had sighted made because the boats had not contacted the enemy for days and shipping
nothing for 4 days, no patrols. was believed to be farther south. U 123 reported that she was returning.
b) Nothing seen. The group still consists of U 38, 577, 106, 571, 133, 82, 85.
c) - d) None. c) U 109 carried out her escort task according to plan.
d) U 68 was ordered to refuel from ship 16 on 13.11 in CF 29, center.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 14: Neither planes nor submarines made contact during V. Reports of Success: None.
10.11. As it was possible that the convoy was farther south than the
submarines, they were ordered to remain stationary in a patrol line when VI. General:
they reached the line BE 4582 to BE 5493. U 77 reported that she was In connection with the 4 boats already carrying out reconnaissance duties
returning because of engine trouble. Her position is remaining in the North, Naval War Staff has now requested 4 more boats for weather
unoccupied. reports, including 1 boat off Jan Mayen if possible combined with
b) 1) Mediterranean - Special Operation: submarine operations. So once again the departure of one ship will
During the operation ordered the following attack areas were allocated: interfere with submarine warfare. No less than 8 submarines have already
U 205 and U 81 large grid square CH east of 10 55' W. been diverted to this task before the ship has even left port. Considering
how fears for this ship have increased since preparations were first begun,
- 210 - so that demands on submarines have grown greater than those originally
intended, the present situation in the Atlantic and the "Bismark" episode
must, of necessity, increase still further the fears for the safety of this ship,
if indeed this task is ever carried out at all. Initialed for SK1 Naval War
Staff).
(Trans: note - manuscript note in the margin dealing with the part
underlined, reads: "Fears have not increased in the meantime. The
measures ordered were planned from the very beginning!" Initialed for
SK1 Naval War Staff).
It it thus to be feared that the task of escorting this ship will be an ever
2) Special task for Naval Group North: widening circle and demand more and more naval forces, which will be
See paragraph IVd on 4.11. diverted from their own proper tasks.

423
 If this does occur, the sending off of the ship will not lift a burden from ---------------------------------------------------
the submarine, and give power to submarine warfare, on the contrary, it --------------
will be detrimental. It can hardly be hoped that this detrimental effect will
be off-set by comparatively large successes being scored by the ship. The 11. November 1941.
weakening of the submarine war through detailing boats for special tasks
can certainly not be measured in terms of the successes which might have
been gained by the boats detached, the detachment of one boat has far I. U 38 - AD 96 U 96 - BE 46 U 202 - BE 27 U 565 - CG 21
greater repercussions. 43 - BF 98 - BE 46 203 - BF 40 567 - BE 45
The loss of one boat from a reconnaissance patrol entails a smaller 68 - GG 20 105 - BF 41 205 - CH 70 569 - BF 40
reconnaissance area for the lot and less chance of finding anything - and 69 - BE 54 106 - AJ 32 208 - BF 571 - AJ 32
finding the enemy is the most difficult of all the problems in submarine 73 - BF 107 - BF 332 - AL 10 572 - BE 46
warfare. 74 - BF 40 109 - CD 30 373 - BE 54 573 - BE 57
77 - BE 54 123 - AD 96 374 - BF 574 - AN 20
81 - CG 90 124 - DG 95 402 - AK 46 575 - BF
- 211 - 82 - AJ 36 126 - FF 24 433 - CG 21 577 - AJ 31
84 - AL 78 129 - DS 63 434 - Op(AE 76/73) 652 - Op(BC 30)
93 - BC 58 133 - AJ 36 552 - BE 45 A - ET
85 - AK 17 201 - BE 54 561 - BD 16

On Return Passage: U 107 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 77 - 569 - 73 - 202 - 84 -

203 - 93 - 74 - 123.
Entered Port: U 107 Lorient; U 73 St. Nazaire; U 374 Brest.
Sailed: - . -
Once the enemy has been found the lack of one boat reduces the
likelihood of maintaining contact or of re-establishing it after it has been II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
interrupted. When actually attacking, the chances for each individual boat
boat are increased in ratio to the number of boats taking part, i.e. in ratio to III. Reports on the Enemy:
the degree in which the enemy escort is split up. a) 1) Situation report by U 93 on Cape Race: Beacons as in peacetime,
Summarized this means: That boats detailed for special tasks sacrifice patrols, fishing vessels, lights darkened; no other shipping.
not only their own chances of success, but also those of the boats 2) Situation report by U 434 (special task in north) from Iceland/Faroes
remaining for submarine operations proper are considerably reduced. area: Average visibility 2 miles, no shipping, no patrolling. Task carried
It is impossible to set out in cold figures the extent to which the chances out without being spotted.
of success will be reduced if, as at present envisaged, 8 boats are b) Nothing sighted.
withdrawn from submarine operations. c) None.

424
 d) USA vessels are to make for MONROVIA, unload here, English
vessels will carry cargo further, course at first 3150.
- 212 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 14:
Further pursuit appears useless now. Operation discontinued. Order to
Group "Stoertebecker" to take up positions in a patrol line from AK 9522
to BD 3399. It is expected that this line will be manned by the morning of
14.11.
b) 1) It is planned to form loosely knit long patrol lines with Groups
"Stoertebecker" and "Raubritter" on each side of the great circle Cape
Race - North Channel on about 530 30' N. by about 14th November. The
order was passed to "Raubritter" on 10.11 and to "Stoertebecker" on 11.11.
2) Mediterranean: To commence with it is proposed to send 6 boats on
operations in the western Mediterranean. Owing to the urgency of this
task, some of the boats already outward bound in the North Atlantic have
been diverted.
Situation on 12.11: According to dead reckoning U 205 and U 81 are
already east of Gibraltar. Provisional allocation to attack areas east of
Gibraltar, north or south of the latitude of it. U 565 and U 433 are outward
bound somewhere west of Lisbon. U 431 and U 95 are still in their bases
but are to be committed to the Mediterranean. They will be operationally
ready on 15th and 19 November 1941 respectively. Until further orders,
B.d.U. has operational control in the Western Mediterranean. The first
operational area proposed lies west of 30 East. Operational Order No. 48.
425
c) U 109 operated according to plan. The air reconnaissance sent out
picked up the ship.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
A review of the organization of Operational Control in the Mediterranean
resulted in the following decisions:
1) Submarine Operational Control must be carried out from Rome, as this
is the only way of ensuring sufficiently close cooperation with the other
operational H.Q.s.
2) Submarine Operational Control in Rome must also take over control of
the submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean if large scale operations
render this imperative.
3) The difficulty of the task demands not only a personality with special
qualifications but also that he must be given a sufficiently responsible
position.
4) A fully equipped base with a flotilla organization must be created for
the boats operating in the Western Mediterranean.
In accordance with these views, Naval War Staff has been requested:
- 213 -
a) To create "F.d.U. ("S.O. Submarines") Mediterranean on the staff of
German Admiral Rome", military subordinate to B.d.U. and operationally
subordinate to the German Admiral.
 b) The following are to come under the command of "F.d.U.
Mediterranean":
23rd Submarine Flotilla, Salamis, which will retain tactical control in
the Eastern Mediterranean so long as the task remains a local one in the
Tobruk - Alexandria area.
29th Submarine Flotilla, Spezia (to be newly formed).
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
12. November 1941.
I. U 38 - AJ 36 U 98 - BE 42 U 205 - CH 70 U 571 - AK 19
43 - BF 46 105 - BE 31 208 - BF 572 - BE 45
68 - GG 10 106 - AK 19 332 - AL 573 - BE 67
69 - BE 45 109 - CF 21 373 - BE 46 574 - AF 76
74 - BF 123 - AK 17 402 - AK 39 575 - BF 44
77 - BF 40 124 - DT 18 433 - CG 50 577 - AJ 36
81 - CH 70 126 - FF 42 434 - AM 13 652 - BC 38
82 - AK 01 129 - DS 95 552 - BE 41 A - ET
84 - BD 32 133 - AK 19 561 - Op(BD 10)
85 - AK 51 201 - BE 46 565 - CG 43
93 - BC 67 202 - BF 40 567 - BE 41
96 - BE 45 203 - BF 569 - BF
On Return Passage: U 573 - 208 - 77 - 569 - 123 - 202 - 84 - 203 - 93 -
74.
Entered Port: U 208 - 203 Brest; U 569 - 74 St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 375 - 453 Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None, owing to lack of planes.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
426
a) At 0506 U 205 sighted formation of British warships in CH 7623,
course W. (See paragraph IVb).
b) None.
c) 1) Northern area: According to a high priority Radio Intercept the
"ONS 33" was in AL 41 at 1500 on 11.11. (See paragraph IV).
2) Southern area: On 3.11. auxiliary cruiser "Asturia" or an unidentified
unit received orders to patrol in area FG and north to northeast of it. An
earlier high priority Radio Intercept suggested that the enemy suspected a
submarine supply vessel and submarines in this area.At 1930 British
steamer reported submarine in FE 3618 (U 126). A submarine warning
was issued.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
- 214 -
b) 1) Northern area: After high priority Radio Intercept report on "ONS
33" had been received, Group "Raubritter" was ordered to operate on mean
course "S" as fuel supplies permitted.
Situation: Data for interception of convoy very unreliable. Assumed
to be on a S.W. course, speed 6 knots.
It is planned to draw the boats to the south so that they will be on the
assumed advance route of the convoy.
2) Mediterranean: At 1500 Italian plane spotted a formation of
battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers in CH 9148, course
"W". U 81 was ordered to take up position with U 205 in the area south of
Cape de Gata. At 0506 U 205 sighted the formation.
 c) U 652 and 561 were ordered to escort auxiliary cruiser "Ship 45" in to
port, for this purpose they are to take up position from 0800 on 17.11 until II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
2400 on 21.11 at the rendezvous in CD 86 or 38.
d) U 332 reported the results of her ice reconnaissance in the Straits of - 215 -
Denmark for special operation of Navy Group North. This completes the
task set out in paragraph IVd) 1 and 2 on 4.1.41. The stationary
reconnaissance proposed in paragraph IV d) 3 is to be as follows: from 15
- 21.11. U 332 is to be somewhere near AD 53, U 434 about AD 73, U 105
about AE 85, U 402 about AE 89 to carry out undetected reconnaissance.

V. Reports of Success:
U 74 sank "Nottingham" (5,400 GRT) on 7.11. Radio Intercept Service
reported her as being 399 GRT.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
--------------------------------------------------- a) - b) None.
-------------- c) According to Radio Intercept Intelligence the R.A.F. was set onto a
submarine waiting position 120 miles E. of Gibraltar (U 81 or U 205).
13. November 1941. d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

I. U 38 - AK 19 U 98 - BD 36 U 205 - CH 70 U 567 - BD 36
43 - BE 62 105 - AM 71 332 - AD 89 571 - AK 51
68 - CF 29 106 - AK 01 373 - BE 17 572 - BE 14
69 - BE 14 109 - BF 80 375 - AO 573 - BE
77 - BF 55 123 - AK 29 402 - AL 18 574 - AN 11
81 - CH 70 124 - DT 71 433 - CG 85 575 - BE 67
82 - AK 52 126 - FE 36 434 - AL 30 577 - AK 19
84 - BE 15 129 - EH 34 453 - AO 652 - BC 34
85 - AK 56 133 - AK 52 552 - BD 36 A - ET
93 - BD 47 201 - BE 17 561 - BD 10
96 - BD 36 202 - BF 50 565 - CG 81
On Return Passage: U 573 - 77 - 123 - 202 - 84 - 93.
Entered Port: U 77 Lorient; U 202 Brest.
Sailed: U 372 Brest.
427
a) Convoy "ONS 33" (No. 15):
Boats of the "Raubritter" are still stalking Convoy NO. 15 with
southerly courses, according to dead reckoning they are abreast of the 6
knot position. U 38 is returning.
b) 1) Special operation for Naval Group NOrth (see paragraph IVd) on
4th and 12th November 1941) is not being carried out and has thus been
cancelled for the submarines. The 4 boats already detailed have thus
become available for other duties.
2) U 105, 575, 574, 43, 434 have been ordered to make for BC 47. It is
intended to set up a patrol round Cape Race. U 332 and 402 have been
given AK 92 as approach point. These boats are to extend the Group
"Stoertebecker" patrol.
c) U 109, 652, 561 carried out special task according to plan.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
The views expressed on 10.11 on the special operation for Naval Group
North have now lost their point. (See IVb). The submarine arm has now
been spared a considerable dissipation of its strength over an indefinite
period.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
14. November 1941.
I. U 38 - AK 17 U 105 - AM 17 U 372 - BF U 571 - AK 59
43 - BE 29 106 - AK 59 373 - BD 33 572 - AK 99
68 - CF 29 109 - BF 91 375 - AN 30 573 - BF 40
69 - BD 33 123 - AK 67 402 - AL 35 574 - AM 22
81 - Op(CH 70) 124 - EH 33 433 - CG 98 575 - BE 29
82 - AK 91 126 - FE 61 434 - AL 30 577 - AK 55
84 - BE 28 129 - EH 64 453 - AN 30 652 - BC 64
85 - AK 91 133 - AK 67 552 - AK 95 A - ET 60
93 - BD 49 201 - BD 33 561 - Op(BD 10)
96 - AK 99 205 - Op(CH 70) 565 - CG 94
98 - AK 96 332 - AD 59 567 - AK 95
On Return Passage: U 573 - 123 - 93 - 84 - 38.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
- 216 -
428
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Northern area: U 106 reported a destroyer in BD 1425, course S.W.
(probably part of the escort for Convoy No. 15). U 561 reported that she
had sunk 2 independents totaling 12,000 GRT in BD 42.
2) Mediterranean: U 205 reported 3 torpedo hits on an aircraft carrier
("Ark Royal") and a destroyer.
U 81 reported a fan of four at a battleship ("Malaya") and at "Ark
Royal". 1 probable hit on the battleship, 2 hits with uncertain target.
b) None.
c) 1) Aircraft carrier "Ark Royal" sunk, battleship "Malaya" badly
damaged, towed into Gibraltar.
2) 11.11 convoy (probably outward bound "OS" in AM 5187.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Northern area: Group "Stoertebecker" was ordered to move patrol
line to AK 6784 - AK 9993. More frequent inward and outward convoy
traffic is suspected in this area again.
U 332 and 402 have therefore been allocated AK 59 as approach
square. These boats are to extend the patrol line manned by Group
"Stoertebecker".
2) Convoy No. 15: OPerational Control suspected convoy in the
vicinity of the destroyer reported by U 106 in BD 1425. Convoy's speed
of advance was estimated at 7 knots. Boats were ordered to continue
searching.
U 82 is returning because of lack of fuel.
b) U 81, 565 and 205 have been ordered to take up position in attack
area east of Gibraltar, north of 350 55' N. U 443 to take up position south
of this latitude with main emphasis on the area off Melilla. Eastern
boundary formed by a line from Cape de Gata to Cape Ferral.
 c) U 109, 561, 652 carried out escort duty according to plan.
V. Reports of Success:
U 561 sank 2 vessels (12,000 GRT).
VI. General:
The reports made by the two boats in the Mediterranean, the Admiralty
announcement of the sinking of the "Ark Royal" and the German
Intelligence report that "Malaya" had been taken to Gibraltar have not yet
provided a clear account of how U 205 and U 81 achieved this success,
nor of the events leading up to it.
- 217 -
However, with this success the boats have made an even better and
quicker start in their task of relieving the situation in the Mediterranean
than could reasonably have been hoped.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
15. November 1941.
I. U 38 - AK 28 U 105 - AL 72 U 372 - BE 64 U 571 - BD 14
43 - BE 46 106 - BD 14 373 - AK 99 572 - AK 95
68 - GF 109 - BE 375 - AO 574 - AM 16
429
69 - AK 96 123 - AL 74 402 - AL 19 575 - BE 13
81 - Op(CH 70) 124 - EH 65
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
16 - 30 November 1941
PG30300b
16. November 1941.
I. U 38 - AL 16 U 98 - AK 99 U 205 - Op(CH 70) U 561 - BD 78
43 - BE 44 105 - AK 97 332 - AK 39 565 - Op(CH 70)
68 - FU 87 106 - BD 18 372 - BE 51 567 - AK 99
69 - BE 14 109 - BE 373 - BE 14 571 - BD 18
81 - Op(CH 70) 123 - BE 12 375 - AO 572 - BD 33
82 - BE 21 124 - EH 97 402 - AK 93 574 - AM 15
84 - BE 126 - FE 50 433 - Op(CH 70) 575 - BD 63
85 - BD 34 129 - ER 22 434 - AL 29 577 - BD 18
93 - BE 47 133 - BD 18 453 - AO 652 - CD 52
96 - BD 33 201 - BE 14 552 - AK 96 A - ET 30
On Return Passage: U 123 - 82 - 38 - 84 - 93 - 106.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 654 Kiel; U 431 St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) None.
b) Convoy No. 16 not found.
 c) 1) British aircraft sighted a U-boat in AE 7197.
2) American coastal patrol cruiser reported a U-boat in BE 78
(erroneous observation as there were none of our boats in these areas).
d) Convoy left Gibraltar westward bound at 1630. (Only 6 vessels).
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 16: Since by 2200 there was no contact with the enemy,
Group "Stoertebecker" proceeded on to the next patrol line. (See Section
IVa 1 of 15.11). U 575 reported at 1400 bearing 80 from BD 3258. This
must have been an erroneous bearing since the convoy had not been
detected by either aircraft or own boats. U 332 and 402 were given as
their new objective BD 35. The intention was to extend the patrol line to
the N.W. with these boats. U 373 returning owing to fuel shortage. U 372
will join Group "Stoertebecker" and will take up in the patrol line the
position of U 373.
b) With the remaining boats of Group "Raubritter" it is intended to
operate against Convoy No. 16. (Boats are low in fuel).
c) 1) Escort duties of U 109 according to plan. "Isar" was detected in BF
by our own aircraft.
2) U 561 - 652 are in rendezvous position for escort duty.
d) 1) U 68 reported refueling carried out and that refuelling is possible
for U 126 on the 22nd November at the point ordered. The boat intends,
on return passage, to pass Bahia and Freetown.
- 222 -
430
2) U 126 requested return passage after refueling, as her Diesel engine
is in a bad condition (smoking heavily) and taking on of supplies is
probably not possible.
3) Refueling rendezvous for U 124 and U 129 moved to a position 35
miles north of point Fachinger. After refueling the boats are to withdraw
400 miles to the east, report there, and proceed over ET to area
"Kleiderstoffe".
4) The Southern boats will be informed of orders forbidding attacks on
single vessels S.W. of the line ER 61 to FD 37 (area through which our
own ships pass).
V. Reports of Success:
U 752 - sank a steamer of 4,000 GRT with cargo of wood and 1 escort
in the Arctic.
VI. General:
The Naval Liaison Staff in Rome has informed me that preparations for
the attack on Tobruk on the 26th November are being concluded. It wa
apparently not yet known that this attack was being prepared when I was
in Berlin consulting with the Naval War Staff on the 8th November,
otherwise this would have come out in discussions regarding operations in
the Mediterranean.
This attack will occasion considerable movements by the British
Alexandria forces, but no more than 2 boats of the 23rd U-Flotilla could be
in position on the 26th November off Alexandria-Tobruk.
I have, therefore, proposed to the Naval War Staff that 3 boats be sent at
once from the Western Mediterranean, thereby taking into account that the
number of boats in the Western Mediterranean will be temporarily
reduced.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
17. November 1941.
 I. U 38 - AL 16 U 105 - BD 13 U 372 - BE 42 U 565 - Op(CH 70)
43 - BD 64 106 - BD 52 373 - BE 24 567 - BD 36
68 - FU 59 109 - BF 70 375 - AN 20 571 - BD 29
69 - BE 18 123 - BE 27 402 - BD 32 572 - BE 17
81 - Op(CH 70) 124 - ER 37 431 - BF 574 - AL 02
82 - BE 38 126 - FE 32 433 - Op(CH 70) 575 - BD 35
84 - BF 40 129 - ER 28 434 - AL 44 577 - BD 29
85 - BD 39 133 - BD 28 453 - AN 20 652 - CD 86
93 - BE 49 201 - BE 42 552 - BD 33 654 - AO
96 - BE 14 205 - Op(CH 70) 561 - CD 38 A - ET 30
98 - BD 36 332 - AK 68
On Return Passage: U 109 - 123 - 82 - 38 - 84 - 93 - 106 - 373.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 562 Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: On outward OG-convoy.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 109 reported U-boat in BF 5826 (type not recognized).
b) Without successes.
- 223 -
c) The convoy, outward-bound from Gibraltar on the 16th November
and consisting of 6 ships, has returned to Gibraltar.
d) None.
431
IV. Current Operations:
a) Group "Stoertebecker": The boats were ordered, after reaching the
patrol line, to cruise to and fro. U 332 and U 402 were ordered to join the
group and thereby extend the patrol line to the N.W. Boats of the former
Group "Raubritter" - U 85, 133, 571, 577 - will join Group "Stoertebecker"
and will be assigned positions for extending the patrol line to the S.E. up
to BE 8152.
b) In order to clear up any obscurities in view of U 575's one bearing, U
574, 575, 105, 434 and 43 were ordered to continue passage to the square
ordered (BC 47). The boats will be called Group "Steuben".
c) Escort duties "Isar" carried out by U 109 according to plan and
concluded. U 652 - 561 apparently according to plan.
d) According to reports from U 68, refueling for U 126 is planned on
22nd November in FE 7555.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
18. November 1941.
I. U 38 - AL 33 U 105 - BD 14 U 372 - BE 42 U 565 - Op(CH 70)
43 - BD 54 106 - BD 62 373 - BE 29 567 - BD 36
68 - FU 60 109 - BF 61 375 - AF 77 571 - BD 65
69 - BE 41 123 - BE 19 402 - BD 35 572 - BE 41
81 - Op(CH 70) 124 - ER 50 431 - BF 49 574 - AL 45
82 - BF 40 126 - FE 20 433 - Op(CH 70) 575 - BD 28
84 - BF 50 129 - ER 50 434 - AK 91 577 - BD 68
85 - BE 45 133 - BD 64 453 - AF 78 652 - CD 86
93 - BE 59 201 - BE 45 552 - BD 36 654 - AN 30
96 - BE 17 205 - Op(CH 70) 561 - CD 38 A - ET
98 - BD 39 332 - AK 99 562 - BF

On Return Passage: U 109 - 123 - 82 - 38 - 84 - 93 - 106 - 373.
Entered Port: U 109 Lorient; U 84 Brest.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - b) None.
c) 1) British aircraft suspected U-boat in AL 2155 (possibly U 38).
- 224 -
2) British aircraft reported, together with a M.T.B., chase of an enemy
U-boat in CG 9645 (U 81?).
d) Number of ships in Gibraltar - 32 freighters and 9 tankers.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Group "Stoertebecker" will remain in patrol line. Air reconnaissance
in this area is planned on the Gibraltar convoy for the 19th November.
b) Group Arnauld: U 565 and 205 will be sent to new operational area
off Tobruk, in order to strengthen our own position in this area for special
operation planned. The boats have been ordered to reach the area off
Tobruk by 25th November (Of the 23rd U-Flotilla only 2 boats could be in
this area at the time).
In order to strengthen the area east of Gibraltar, 2 further boats - U 562
and 577 - will be withdrawn for this purpose. In this way there will
probably be 6 boats in the area east of Gibraltar on the 26th November.
432
c) Escort duties U 652 - 561 apparently according to plan.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
On the orders of the Naval War Staff there must be 4 boats as from 26th
November in the area Alexandria-Tobruk, and 6 in the Western
Mediterranean. This is in connection with increased numbers required to
deal with British movements expected during the attack on Tobruk.
There are some difficulties with regard to equipment of the boats
provided for this purpose according to IVb. U 562, destined for the
Atlantic and already put out, will be recalled to Lorient to fit out there, and
the other boats will receive the necessary data on passing the Messina
Straits.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
19. November 1941.
I. U 38 - AM 13 U 106 - BE 42 U 375 - AM 31 U 571 - BE 41
43 - BD 44 123 - BE 52 402 - BD 35 572 - AK 6
68 - FU 69 124 - ER 11 431 - BF 75 574 - AL 45
69 - BE 41 126 - FE 54 433 - Op(CH 70) 575 - BD 17
81 - Op(CH 70) 129 - ER 11 434 - AK 87 577 - BE 47
82 - BF 57 133 - BE 44 453 - AM 32 652 - CD 86
85 - BE 46 201 - BE 45 552 - BD 36 654 - AN 31
93 - BE 69 205 - CH 59 561 - CD 38 A - ET
96 - BE 17 332 - BD 32 562 - BF 50
98 - BD 39 372 - BE 42 565 - CH 81
105 - BC 61 373 - BE 63 567 - BD 36
On Return Passage: U 123 - 82 - 38 - 93 - 106 - 373 - 562 - 567.
 Entered Port: U 82 La Pallice; U 562 Lorient. The orders are to approach ordered operational areas even if fuel
Sailed: U 95 - 557 Lorient. supplies probably do not permit taking up position in the areas. U 372 will
join Group Steuben and has been assigned as her objective BC 47.
- 225 - U 567 will not be able to carry out operational orders owing to fuel and
is returning.
2) U 375 and U 453 have been assigned to AK 59.
c) Escort duties U 652 - 561 apparently according to plan.
d) U 654 put into Stavanger owing to suspected scarlet fever.
Quarantine. (Probably lasting 8 days).

V. Reports of Success: None.

II. Air Reconnaissance: In area of Group "Stoertebecker". VI. General:

The patrol line sent in to operate in the last few days against the OG
III. Reports on the Enemy: convoy, and also on an expected SL convoy, has had no success and has
a) None. been dispersed (see under IVb).
b) Without result. Theoretically speaking, it would appear that a close patrol line must
c) None. have better prospects of detecting enemy traffic than a loose disposition of
d) While sinking the "Ark Royal", escort boat "Lady Glacis" also sunk. individual boats.

IV. Current Operations: - 226 -

a) None.
b) 1) Group Stoertebecker": Since the 4th patrol line of the Group has
had no success up to now, the boats will be divided into 3 groups and
ordered into the following operational areas:
Group Godecke: U 98 - AJ 9355; U 69 - AJ 9545;
201 - AJ 5955; 572 - AK 7455.
Group Benecke: U 332 - AK 5985; U 402 - AK 8525;
567 - AK 8955; 96 - AK 9845;
552 - AK 9275.
Group Stoertebecker: U 85 - AL 8456; U 133 - AL 9455; In practice, however, experience shows that individual boats find
571 - BE 1155; 577 - BE 1355. convoys but that, with one exception, convoys have never been detected
by a patrol line, unless there were a previous report on the enemy by an
Spacing 80 miles. individual boat.

433
 The reason for this is not yet clear. Coincidence it cannot be - so that when one boat of a Group makes contact the other boats are able to
coincidence cannot always be on one side, and experiences extend over 3 come up comparatively quickly and, in addition, cooperation of the
to 4 years. Groups amongst each other is still possible. I intend that these Groups
A likely explanation would be that the British, from some source or other, shall not remain stationary but that they shall be continually on the move
gain knowledge of our concentrated dispositions and deviate thereby in order to make it more difficult for the enemy to deviate.
encountering perhaps boats proceeding singly. This knowledge could be
gained by the enemy:
1) By disclosure. Everything that can be done has been, by disguise of - 227 -
squares, limitation of radio personnel and our own U-boat codes. The
circle of personnel "in the know" is so small that there can be hardly any
possibility of disclosure.
2) By deciphering our radio messages. This matter is being continually
examined by the Naval War Staff and is considered as out of the question.
3) By a combination of radio traffic and reports of sightings. This
possibility can, of course, not be investigated as it is not known what
information can be gained by the enemy from sighting reports and radio
traffic (particularly accuracy in bearing). This question forms the basis of 20. November 1941.
continual discussions with B.d.U. In many cases it has been shown that
the enemy has not drawn the conclusions to be expected from data which
certainly became known to him. This may be due to the fact that the I. U 38 - AM 24 U 106 - BE 64 U 375 - AM 13 U 567 - BE 14
slowness of a huge organization does not permit of rapid action, as well as 43 - BC 64 123 - BE 65 402 - BD 31 571 - BE 49
the fact that he may have, apart from that known to us, further information 68 - FV 40 124 - ER 21 431 - CG 16 572 - BD 39
which influences his decisions. In any case, it has not been possible up to 69 - BE 41 126 - FE 57 433 - Op(CH 70) 574 - AK 93
now to see into his train of ideas and the conclusions arrived at. Attempts 81 - Op(CH 70) 129 - EH 88 434 - AK 81 575 - BC 61
to do this constitute a continual problem. 85 - BE 46 133 - BE 46 453 - AM 23 577 - BE 57
In order to deal with this problem, a closer cooperation with the 93 - BF 40 201 - BE 44 552 - BD 32 652 - CE 12
Intercept Service may perhaps help. I intend, to this end, to request the 95 - BF 205 - CH 93 557 - BF A - ET
trial posting of an experienced Intercept Service Officer to the Staff of 96 - BD 39 332 - BD 31 561 - CD 38
B.d.U., which should serve generally to investigate further possibilities of 98 - BD 39 372 - BE 44 565 - CH 91
gaining intelligence on enemy measures, particularly of convoy control. 105 - BD 15 373 - BE 65
4) By location (DeTe = radar) and consequent deviation. There is no
evidence on this up to now.
All these possibilities do not suffice, however, at present to explain the On Return Passage: U 123 - 38 - 93 - 106 - 567 - 373.
lack of success by concentrated disposition, as proved by experience.This Entered Port: U 654 Stavanger.
experience, however, must be taken into account. Therefore, loose Sailed: U 562 Lorient.
dispositions will be adopted, in which the boats are assembled in Groups
434
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - c) None.
d) "Malaya" said to be completely operational.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 105 and U 43 have been ordered to attack simultaneously and by
surprise in the night of 25-26th November the anchorages off St. Johns
and the ore ships' loading pier in Conception Bay (East side of Belle Is.).
In order not to betray the presence of these two boats in this area too soon,
other boats of Group "Steuben" have been ordered not to pass over
longitude 500 W before the 25th. Subsequently it is intended that Group
"Steuben" shall operate in proximity to the coast of squares BB 63 and 66,
with freedom of action. The boats will be permitted to withdraw to the
east, after the situation near the coast has been exactly ascertained. Any
contacts with the enemy occurring before these operations and promising
success should be utilized even if the appointed time has expired or has to
be postponed. Western boundary 540 45' W., southern boundary 430 N.
2) U 81 and U 433 have also been ordered to proceed immediately into
the operational area off Tobruk (in accordance with Order for special
operations in the Mediterranean).
c) 1) U 561 has been ordered, if the ship has not been met within the
provided time to withdraw 250 miles to the N.W., to report by means of a
short signal and to take up position from 0800 on the 26th November in
CD 56, middle, in order to take over escort of the blockade runner
"Burgenland".
2) U 652 and U 561 according to plan.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
- 228 -
435
VI. General:
1) The Naval War Staff has ordered that further boats be sent into the
eastern Mediterranean (see IV b2). The reason for this is that in North
Africa the British have started an offensive on the whole front.
2) According to reports by agents and intercept messages 1 U-boat was
sunk west and one east of Gibraltar. Which boats these are is at present
not certain. At the time in question (17th November) U 433 and U 565
may still have been west of Gibraltar, U 81 and U 205 east of Gibraltar.
West of Gibraltar this loss may have occurred in a convoy attack said to
have been observed from the Portuguese coast according to a press report,
on which there are no reports from boats.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
21. November 1941.
I. U 38 - AN 24 U 106 - BE U 375 - AL 35 U 567 - BE 19
43 - BC 57 123 - BF 40 402 - AK 97 571 - BE 42
68 - FV 50 124 - ER 34 431 - CG 49 572 - BD 37
69 - BD 38 126 - FE 70 433 - CH 75 574 - AK 86
81 - CH 75 129 - EH 98 434 - AK 77 575 - BC 55
85 - BE 15 133 - BE 27 453 - AL 36 577 - BE 43
93 - BF 201 - BD 62 552 - AK 95 652 - BD 97
95 - BF 48 205 - CJ 76 557 - BF 48 A - ET
96 - BD 32 332 - AK 94 561 - CD?
98 - BD 26 372 - BD 64 562 - BF
105 - BC 38 373 - BF 565 - CJ 76

On Return Passage: U 123 - 38 - 93 - 106 - 567 - 373.
Entered Port: U 93 St. Nazaire; U 373 Lorient; U 38 Bergen.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: In the area of present Group "Stoertebecker".
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) None.
b) Without result.
c) 1) According to a report 40 German prisoners were landed in Gibraltar
on the 17th November from the gunboat "Spirea" - coming from the west.
(No information on this. Possibly U 433).
2) The British Admiralty gave out that a German U-boat had been
destroyed in the area in which the "Ark Royal" was sunk. (Both boats
taking part have reported since the time they were reported to have been
destroyed).
3) According to an unconfirmed report by an eyewitness from "Villa
Real", a U-boat attacked a convoy on the morning of the 18th November
and sank 2 vessels (see C 1??).
d) None.
- 229 -
b) 1) Group "Steuben": U 43 and U 105 were not able to carry out their
special operation owing to lack of charts; further, U 43 was not able to
reach the operational area at the time ordered.
U 575 will take over U 43's operation. U 105 will operate according to
general orders for boats of "Steuben" Group and has been assigned, as her
main area, that in the outlet of Conception Bay.
2) U 375 reported from her original square AE 79. The boat, contrary to
new "Standing War Order" switched on the Ireland frequency. She has
been assigned her new objective in AD 96.
c) Escort duties "Ship 46" carried out according to plan. The ship was
detected by air reconnaissance in BE 9620.
d) U 129 reported from ER 3769 refueling carried out. "Python" will be
in the area of "Kleiderstoffe" on the 28th November.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
a) According to information from the German Naval Command in Italy,
landings by the British are expected in Algiers and Oran. It is not known
how reliable this information is. The general situation in the
Mediterranean appears to indicate that such operations are not out of the
question. A further strengthening of U-boats in the Mediterranean is,
however, not possible just now, without having recourse to those already
operating in the Atlantic.
b) Supply ship "Python" has up to now done well. The intended
operation by 4 boats in the area around Capetown seems, therefore, to be
more likely.

---------------------------------------------------
-------------

22. November 1941.

IV. Current Operations:

a) None. I. U 43 - BD 41 U 123 - BF 50 U 402 - Op(AK 85) U 567 - BE 53
68 - EV 65 124 - ER 29 431 - CG 85 571 - BE 14
436
 69 - BD 29 126 - FE 45 433 - CH 58 572 - BD 25 3) According to the latest intercept report, the convoy which left
81 - CH 82 129 - ER 69 434 - BC 31 574 - BD 12 Gibraltar on the 16th must have put out to the east, since it returned owing
85 - AL 87 133 - BE 21 453 - AL 27 575 - BC 56 to danger of U-boats near Melilla into its port of departure.
95 - BE 96 201 - BD 29 552 - Op(AK 92) 577 - BE 13 The stated sinking of 2 U-boats in connection with this convoy cannot
96 - Op(AK 98) 205 - CJ 97 557 - BF 77 652 - BE 71 be correct, as apart from U 433 (from which no report can be expected
98 - BD 21 332 - Op(AK 59) 561 - CD ? A - ET 90 before the 23rd November) all boats reported after the time in question.
105 - BC 39 372 - BD 72 562 - BF 48 d) None.
106 - BF 50 375 - AL 21 565 - CJ 97
IV. Current Operations:
b) Special Operations in the Mediterranean:
On Return Passage: U 123 - 106 - 567. 1) On the orders of the Naval War Staff regarding special operations in
Entered Port: U 123 - U 106 Lorient. the Mediterranean, a new disposition of all operational boats is necessary
Sailed: - . - in the Mediterranean. U 453 and U 375 have been ordered to proceed at
cruising speed to CG 89. U 552 - 85 - 133 - 571 - 577 have been ordered
- 230 - to return to Western France. (For short term new fitting). U 96 - 98 - 201
- 332 are also to operate in the Mediterranean after previously refuelling in
Gata or Bernardo. After U 98 and 201 had reported that return passage to
Western France was not ensured if refueling failed, they were assigned
operational areas as follows until their fuel was exhausted: U 98 in AK
7960 and U 201 in AK 8880. In view of their low fuel supplies, the
following were also assigned: U 69 - AK 7360 and U 402 - AK 8520,
spacing 80 miles. U 431 was ordered, after passing Gibraltar, to continue
passage immediately to the east. U 205 was to refuel in Messina if
absolutely necessary. U 98 reported return passage.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. 2) Southern area: In order to ensure 2nd refueling (on 5th December),
U 124 and U 129 will be ordered to proceed on a direct course to the area
III. Reports on the Enemy: of "Kleiderstoffe". After it had at first been planned that the boats should
a) 1) U 124 reported: "USA cruiser "Memphis Class" in ER 3527. Mean operate in the area round Gibraltar owing to the state of emergency in the
course W.N.W." Mediterranean, Control has now decided, in view of the already great
2) U 126 see IV d. distance, that both boats should continue
b) None.
c) 1) An American convoy, with American escort forces, is expected
shortly in Gibraltar. - 231 -
2) A part-convoy coming from Gibraltar was, on the 6th November, at
380 13' N. and 240 12' W. and was to advance on the 8th November at 400
N 250 W. to SL 91.
437
 ---------------------------------------------------
-------------

23. November 1941.

I. U 43 - BC 61 U 126 - FE 70 U 433 - CH 92 U 572 - BD 24

special operations in the Southern area. After report had been 68 - FW 25 129 - ER 74 434 - BC 24 574 - BC 36
received from U 126 (see IV d), U 124 and U 129 were ordered to proceed 69 - BD 24 133 - AL 98 453 - AL 48 575 - BC 51
to a point of rendezvous with U 126. 81 - CJ 76 201 - BD 29 552 - AK 99 577 - BE 24
c) Escort duties for :Ship 46" according to plan. The ship was detected 85 - AL 88 205 - CO 11 557 - Cg 16 652 - BF
by aircraft in BF. 95 - CG 15 332 - AK 91 561 - CD ? A - FE 39
d) 1) U 124 reported refueling carried out. 96 - BD 32 372 - BC 92 562 - BE 96
2) U 126 reported Ship 16 sunk at refueling rendezvous by a British 98 - AK 87 375 - AL 13 565 - CO 11
cruiser. The boat is attempting to reach the South American coast with 105 - BC 29 402 - AK 92 567 - BE 62
lifeboats. Refueling is necessary for return to Western France. As a 124 - ER 39 431 - CG 94 571 - BE 15
preliminary measure U 124 and U 129 were ordered to U 126. Whether
the nearby "Python" is to be sent in to take over the 305 survivors of "Ship
16" must be decided by the Naval War Staff. On Return Passage: U 85 - 571 - 577 - 133 - 552 - 567 - 98 - 572.
Entered Port: - . -
V. Reports of Success: None. Sailed: - . -

VI. General: II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

a) U-boat warfare in the Atlantic has practically ceased owing to the
concentrations in the Mediterranean; the only boats from which any result III. Reports on the Enemy:
may be expected are the boats of Group "Steuben" which are to operate off a) - b) None.
Newfoundland. Although this fact is regrettable, it is nevertheless
necessary of course to put every effort into dealing with the dangerous - 232 -
situation in the Mediterranean.
b) The sinking of "Ship 16" proves once more what difficulties and
dangers are entailed in conducting surface warfare and the refueling of U-
boats. The construction of U-boat tankers started at the beginning of the
war and the conversion of Dutch boats to torpedo transport boats will
shortly probably constitute the sole refueling facilities.

438
 2) The second refueling for U 68 is planned in GP 13. It is intended that
c) 1) British cruiser presumably "Devonshire" reported at 1140 on the the boat, together with UA, U 124 and U 129, shall be sent in to operate
22nd November unknown merchant ship in FE 75. (Sinking of supply off Capetown. U 68 will be instructed to report whether the operation can
ship 16). See report U 126 of 23rd November 1941. been carried out.
d) From the latest reconnaissance line reports it appears that the Straits 3) UA reported her position from FU 44. This boat, therefore, started
of Gibraltar are protected by 3 patrol lines. passage earlier than necessary from the Freetown area to the refueling area
1st line: Ceuta-Cape Spartel, 2nd line: Ceuta - Europa Point, 3rd line: of "Kleiderstoffe".
Ceuta-Tarifa. The strongest patrol is on the middle line.
V. Reports of Success: None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Group Steuben has been ordered to break off earlier operation. New
objective CG 90. (In connection with special operations - 233 -
"Mediterranean"). Since U 561 has reported for herself and U 652 from
BF that escort duties have been carried out, it is intended that these two
boats also shall be sent in for special operation "Mediterranean" and they
have been ordered to carry out refueling from Gata in the night of 27-28th
or 28-29th November. U 561 reported that she could not carry out the
operation owing to bad engine trouble and she has been ordered to return.
b) Mediterranean: Refueling planned for U 81 in Messina, if this is
possible without delay. THe boat will be temporarily assigned to the 23rd
U-Flotilla after passing Messina. VI. General:
U 205 and 565 have been assigned by Senior Officer of 23 U-Flotilla The decision to send in also the "Steuben" boats to operate in the Straits
operational area in CP 47 - 71 up the African coast, concentrating in 7160 - of Gibraltar means a complete cessation of U-boat warfare in the Atlantic.
7190 and 7430 or CO 69 - 93, concentrating in 9320 - 50 - 80. This must be accepted.
c) 1) Southern area, see IV d.
2) Escort duties of U 561 and 652 carried out and concluded. ---------------------------------------------------
d) 1) Southern area: U 126 was ordered to proceed to f = 40 30' S., -------------
course "W". "Python" is around this latitude for taking over survivors. It
is planned that she shall do this on about the 24th or 25th November. U 24. November 1941.
126 is to refuel from "Python" as far as is necessary for return passage and
return after taking over an Officer from Ship 16. She is to report that this
has been carried out 300 miles away from point of rendezvous. U 124 and I. U 43 - DC 65 U 124 - ER 69 U 402 - AK 83 U 565 - Co 27
U 129 are free after giving over survivors to "Python" or upon receipt of 68 - FO 68 126 - FD 96 431 - CG 96 567 - BE
message from U 126. They are to continue special operation off 69 - AK 87 129 - FD 14 433 - CH ? 571 - BE 51
Capetown. 81 - CJ 86 133 - BE 34 434 - BC 52 572 - BD 37
85 - BE 25 201 - BD 21 453 - AL 97 574 - BC 39
439
 95 - CG 49 205 - CO 27 552 - BE 11 575 - BC 57
96 - BE 17 332 - BD 31 557 - BE 46 577 - BE 37
98 - BD 22 372 - BC 96 561 - BF 48 652 - BF 76
105 - BC 64 375 - AL 18 562 - CG 16 A - FU 48

On Return Passage: U 85 - 571 - 577 - 133 - 552 - 567 - 98 - 572 - 561.

Entered Port: - . - 25. November 1941.
Sailed: U 558 Brest.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. I. U 43 - BD 44 U 126 - FD 94 U 433 - Med. ? U 571 - BF 40

III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 124 reported sinking a British cruiser of D-class in ES 79.
b) None.
c) According to an unconfirmed report a convoy (12 vessels) passed
Gibraltar to the east on the night of 23rd November.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
c) U 96 will refuel in "Bernardo" in the night of 27-28 NOvember. U
652 in "Gata" on 27-28 November.
d) 1) U 126 was ordered to send a beacon signal for "Python" since the
ship was instructed to search only up to the evening of the 25th November.
2) U 68 reported that further operations (special operation Capetown)
were possible if refueling were effected.
68 - FU 129 - FD 57 434 - BC 64 572 - BE 45
69 - Op(AK 73) 133 - BF 40 453 - BE 28 574 - BD 45
81 - CO 11 201 - Op(AK 88) 552 - BF 40 575 - BC 83
85 - BE 38 205 - CO 64 557 - CG 81 577 - BF 40
95 - CG 81 332 - BD 39 558 - BF 652 - CG 24
96 - BE 54 372 - BD 78 561 - BF 40 A - FU
98 - BD 35 375 - AL 67 562 - CG 46
105 - BC 69 402 - Op(AK 85) 565 - CO 52
124 - FD 16 431 - CH 75 567 - BE
On Return Passage: U 85 - 571 - 577 - 133 - 552 - 567 - 98 - 572 - 561.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 451 Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

V. Reports of Success: III. Reports on the Enemy:

U 124 - 1 D-class cruiser sunk. a) - b) None.
c) Aircraft depot ship "Unicorn" with 2 escort vessels left Gibraltar at
VI. General: None. 1045, E-bound.
d) None.
- 234 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
440
 b) The boats still in the operational area have been ordered to proceed to 69 - AK 81 332 - BE 73 558 - BE 96
the following squares: 85 - BF 40 372 - CF 15 562 - CG 86
U 69 - AL 02; U 402 - AL 63; U 210 - AL 69. Day's run 120 miles. 95 - CH 74 375 - BE 28 572 - BE 64
c) Refueling "Gata" and "Bernardo" as planned. 96 - BE 99 402 - AK 83 574 - BD 86
d) 1) U 126 reported at 2153 operation carried out and returning. 98 - BE 52 431 - CH 93 575 - BD 77
Therefore, "Python" will have taken on board the crew of "Ship 16". U 105 - BD 43 433 - ? 652 - CG 80
124 and U 129 were ordered to proceed as planned to the area 124 - FD 73 434 - BC 98
"Kleiderstoffe".
2) Several boats on return passage reported enemy aircraft attacks in BF
40. Patrols in the Biscay are seem to have been particularly strong on this On Return Passage: U 126 - 85 - 571 - 577 - 133 - 552 - 567 - 98 - 572
day. - 561.
3) After passing the Straits of Messina, until further notice, the boats Entered Port: U 577 - 133 - 552 - 567 St. Nazaire; U 561 Brest; U 571
ordered to that area in the course of special operations "Mediterranean" La Pallice.
will be operationally under the command of the 23rd U-Flotilla. Sailed: U 67 Lorient.
Therefore, up to the date the following have newly joined the 23rd U-
Flotilla: U 205, U 565 and U 81. II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

V. Reports of Success: None. III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) - d) None.

- 235 - IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
b) 1) U 69 - 402 - 201 were ordered to take up position as from the
evening of the 30th November in the following operational areas: U 69 -
BE 1280; U 402 - BE 1620; U 201 - BE 2460, spacing 40 miles.
The object of this is to detect the convoy OG 79, which will put out on
the 26th November according to schedule, with aircraft cover. The
decision to operate against this convoy was made in spite of the low fuel
supplies of the boats, since B.d.U. suspects important supplies in the
convoy for the Mediterranean.
26. November 1941. 2) The following have been assigned, as operational areas: U 95 and U
557, squares CG 96 - CG - CG 70 north of 360 N; U 562 south of this
latitude. The boats will be permitted temporarily withdrawal, in case of
I. U 43 - BD 88 U 126 - FL 16 U 451 - AO strong defence up to 30 East.
68 - FV 25 129 - FL 15 453 - BE 94 c) 1) Refueling "Gata" or "Bernardo" is planned for 27th - 28th
A - CF 34 201 - BD 89 557 - CH 74 November.
441
 2) UA - 124 - 129 - 68 have been ordered to attempt refuelling from
"Python" in square GF 9634 at the following times:
UA on 30th November, U 68 on 1st December, U 124 and U 129 on
5th December.
Refueling must be carried out by all boats by the 8th December.
- 236 -
time only "Argus" of the large ships can be ready for action - so that any
large-scale operations are hardly likely.
I have, therefore, proposed to the Naval War Staff that 2 further boats - U
95 and U 557 - should be sent from the Western into the Eastern
Mediterranean, taking into account a temporary reduction in the number of
U-boats in the Western Mediterranean.

---------------------------------------------------
-------------

27. November 1941.

I. U 43 - BD 88 U 105 - BD 55 U 402 - AK 92 U 562 - CG 86

67 - BF 54 124 - FD 73 431 - CJ 85 572 - BE 64
Radio traffic and attacks are prohibited for 400 miles round the 68 - FV 51 126 - FD 57 433 - ? 574 - BD 59
refueling point of rendezvous. 69 - AK 83 129 - Fl 15 434 - BC 98 575 - BC 96
d) None. 85 - BF 50 201 - AK 98 451 - AO 652 - CG 80
95 - CH 74 332 - BE 73 453 - BE 94 A - GF 34
V. Reports of Success: 96 - BE 99 372 - CF 15 557 - CH 74
U 331 - 1 battleship torpedoed in the Eastern Mediterranean. A very 98 - BE 62 375 - BE 28 558 - BE 96
satisfactory result.

VI. General: On Return Passage: U 126 - 85 - 98 - 572.

Re Mediterranean Situation: Entered Port: U 85 Lorient.
I regard the main center of U-boat activity in the Mediterranean as still in Sailed: U 131 - 584 Kiel.
the east. British supplies by sea for the African front as well as British
attacks on our own supplies to Africa can be of decisive importance on II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
developments in the situation on land. Both offer favorable targets for
attack by U-boats. III. Reports on the Enemy:
Information regarding British intentions to attack Oran and Algiers, on a) - c) None.
the other hand, appears hardly feasible. It is also not proven that a steady
flow of supplies is going from Gibraltar to Malta and further to the east. - 237 -
In addition there is the fact that through the loss of "Ark Royal" and the
"Malaya" the forces at Gibraltar are considerably weakened - at the present
442
 must unfortunately be sent up there from home waters (U 584 - see under
IV d, U 134 and U 454) which will be ready on the 1st December. This is
of particular significance in view of the lack of boats in the Atlantic and
the slight chances of success in Northern waters.

---------------------------------------------------
-------------
d) 1) There are about 50 ships in the harbor or Bay of Gibraltar.
According to schedule, an H.G. convoy should put out on the 1st - 238 -
December.
2) At 1600 8 destroyers and a cruiser took up formation with the convoy
off Cape Spartel. There is no further information regarding course and
position.

IV. Current Operations:

a) - b) None.
c) U 652 reported refueling "Gata" carried out according to plan.
d) 1) U 584 is destined for operations in North Norway and has,
therefore, been assigned operationally to the command of Group North. 28. November 1942.
2) U 431 has passed the Straits of Messina and, therefore, has come
under the command of the 23rd U-Flotilla for operations.
3) U 433 has not reported in spite of instructions to do so. Her last I. U 43 - CE 21 U 124 - FL 19 U 402 - AL 77 U 572 - BF 40
report was on the 9th November from BF 54. It is assumed that the boat 67 - BF 47 126 - FD 27 431 - CN 23 574 - BD 92
was destroyed on about the 17th November off Gibraltar. A large number 68 - FV 49 129 - FL 58 434 - CD 32 575 - BD 78
of the crew appear to have been rescued. 69 - AK 95 131 - AO 451 - AO 652 - CG 90
95 - E. of Gib. 201 - BE 14 453 - CG 14 A - GF 65
V. Reports of Success: 96 - CG 23 332 - BE 87 557 - E. of Gib.
U 559 reported the sinking of a destroyer of the Jervis class. 98 - BF 40 372 - CF 27 558 - CG 16
105 - BD 91 375 - BE 59 562 - CG 96
VI. General:
a) The Naval War Staff has refused the sending of 2 U-boats from the
Western into the Eastern Mediterranean (see 26th November) since On Return Passage: U 126 - 98 - 572.
information regarding intention to attack Oran and Algiers is considered Entered Port: - . -
by them more seriously. Sailed: - . -
b) In Northern waters at present there are no operational boats. In order
to meet the earlier requirement for 3 operational boats in this area, 3 boats II. Air Reconnaissance: On OG 79 in area west of the North Channel.
443
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 43 reported at 0418 convoy (No. 17) in CE 2294.
b) Aircraft detected at 1030 outward-bound convoy (probably OG 79) in
AM 4982. At 1039 other machines detected an incoming convoy
(probably SC) in AM 4982.
c) The convoy detected by aircraft and assumed to be OG 79 is probably
OG 77, which, according to schedule, was due to leave already on the 12th
November.
d) The 8 destroyers and a cruiser stated on the 27th November to be
proceeding as a convoy escort, are, according to a later report, serving as a
heavier patrol of the Straits of Gibraltar.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 17: U 43 sighted at 0330 in CE 2294 a convoy, course
south, speed slow. Control decided to have the boats of former Group
"Steuben" - U 105 - 372 - 434 - 575 - 574 - 43 - which were under way to
the Straits of Gibraltar, operate against this convoy. The first boats would
be able to reach the convoy during the day of the 29th, the others early on
the 30th. Up to morning there had been no further reports of contact.
OG Convoy: As the convoy was further to the south than anticipated, U
69 - 201 - 402 were ordered to take up the ordered operational areas by
1000 on the 30th November. Air reconnaissance is planned for the next
few days.
b) U 652 has been assigned, as operational area, squares CH 75 and 76
(east of Gibraltar).
c) U 96 reported refueling "Bernardo" carried out according to plan.
d) 1) For U 124 and U 129 the supply ship will be in a position, as from
4th December, 10 to the south and 20 to the west of Batist.
2) As from midnight on the 29th November, German recognition signals
will be in force west of longitude 20 East.
- 239 -
444
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
Naval War Staff has ordered the following regarding the U-boats in the
Mediterranean: The Eastern Mediterranean is to be patrolled continually
in the operational area by 10, and the Western Mediterranean (including
the area west of Gibraltar) by 15 boats. Until these numbers are reached a
corresponding ratio in numbers is to be maintained. There are at present in
the Eastern Mediterranean 7 boats (U 81, 205, 331, 559, 565, 431, 79). In
the Western Mediterranean: U 95, 562, 557, 652, in addition thereto U 96
and U 558, and west of Gibraltar U 332, 375, 372, 453, 67.
It is planned to strengthen the Eastern Mediterranean with U 206, 71,
563, which will put out on the 29th November, while 5 boats of Group
"Steuben" will also be sent to the Gibraltar area: these are at present
operating against convoy No. 17 (see IVa) in the Azores area.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
29. November 1941.
I. U 43 - CE 25 U 105 - CF 43 U 372 - CF 53 U 558 - CG 54
67 - BE 99 124 - FL 58 375 - BE 94 562 - E. of Gib.
68 - FV 77 126 - ES 87 402 - BE 15 572 - BF
69 - BD 33 129 - FL 97 434 - CE 15 574 - BE 77
95 - E. of Gib. 131 - AN 36 451 - AN 36 575 - BD 88
96 - CG 52 201 - BE 24 453 - CG 42 652 - E. of Gib.
98 - BF 332 - CF 37 557 - E. of Gib. A - GF 69

On Return Passage: U 126 - 98 - 572.
Entered Port: U 98 St. Nazaire; U 572 Brest.
Sailed: U 127 Kiel; U 563 Brest; U 71 - 206 St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: In the area west of Ireland on the OG convoy.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) See Convoy No. 17.
b) No result.
c) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 17: U 43 reported at 1011 that she had sunk a large
ammunition vessel in the course of the night. She was subsequently
chased and depth-charged for 3 hours. The correct position of the convoy
at 0420 was CE 2526, course south, speed 7 knots, 20 ships in V-
formation. She made contact at 1819 in CE 2897, but was driven off by
destroyers. The course of the convoy was approximately S.S.E. U 434
reported the position of the convoy at 0408 in CE 5621, searching course
1800,
- 240 -
speed 12 knots, (fuel) 43 cbm. U 574 reported at 0530 position CE
6117, nothing to be seen.
445
The 1st Naval War Staff ordered that the boats proceed further in the
direction of Gibraltar if contact was lost. This was probably a WS convoy.
This is indicated by the presence of an ammunition vessel.
OG Convoy: Was not detected by air reconnaissance. The boats are
proceeding to the operational areas.
b) Boats off Gibraltar have been assigned the following operational
areas:
U 96 - CH 84 and lower and middle third of CH 81,
U 558 - CH 82,
U 332 and 453 - CG 8520 and CG 8550,
U 375 and 372 - CG 8580 and 8820.
Patrol to the east in area of these squares. Concentration in the east.
The eastern boundary is square CG 9593. U 67 has been given freedom of
action in CG 95 and west thereof. Therefore, there will be on about the
2nd December, 6 boats east and 5 boats west of Gibraltar. The ratio
required by the Naval War Staff - Eastern Mediterranean: Gibraltar as 2.3
is, therefore, established. (7 boats Eastern Mediterranean and 11 boats
around Gibraltar).
c) None.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 43 - 1 ammunition vessel sunk.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
30. November 1941.
I. U 43 - CE 50 U 124 - FS 32 U 372 - CF 68 U 562 - E. of Gib.
67 - CG 19 126 - ES 57 375 - CG 14 563 - BF
68 - CG 45 127 - AO 402 - Op(BE 16) 574 - CE 50
69 - Op(BE 12) 129 - FS 39 434 - CE 50 575 - CE 50
71 - BF 131 - AN 31 451 - AN 31 652 - E. of Gib.
95 - E. of Gib. 201 - Op(BE 24) 453 - CG 81 A - GF 96
 96 - CG 82 206 - BF 557 - E. of Gib. U 434 - CE 67 - 40 cbm.
105 - CE 50 332 - CF 66 558 - CG 84
At 1449 the following order was given: Group "Steuben" to take up
position at 1000 on the 1st December in patrol line from CE 7968 to 8988,
On Return Passage: U 126 if no contact made before this. U 43 reported at 1536 a vessel in CE 5858,
Entered Port: - . - course south. At 1733 there was a report of contact from U 575, convoy in
Sailed: - . - CE 5954, course S.E. At 1809 U 574 reported contact in CE 5983. At
2138 the following order was given. If contact is broken off continue
II. Air Reconnaissance: No machine available for reconnaissance on OG search in equal sections between 180 and 1200, proceeding from the last
79. position of the enemy. At 1000 on the 1st December be on the arc which
the enemy could have reached at 8 knots. At 2209 U 43 reported having
III. Reports on the Enemy: sunk a vessel, with course 1600, in CE 8238. Towards 2400 U 574
a) Convoy No. 17 see IV a. reported contact lost and U 575 reported that she had contacted at 1830 in
b) None. CE 5986 a single vessel, course 900, and was driven off by a destroyer.
Depth-charges. At 0227 U 575 reported that the convoy at 1630 (1830?)
- 241 - was probably identical with this single vessel.
It is not clear whether these ships belonged to the Convoy of U 43. As
the mean course of the convoy was 1800, the patrol line was extended by
40 miles to the west, in order to take in this mean course.
Order: Group "Steuben" to take up position at 1200 on the 1st
December on an 8 miles arc, in sector 140 - 1950.
2) OG Convoy: U 69 - 201 - 402 will be termed "Letzte Ritter" and
have been ordered to proceed as from 1200, course south, speed 6 knots.
It is assumed that air reconnaissance is possible in this area on the 1st
December.
c) (Special report) British flyer reported attack on German U-boat in b) - c) None.
BE 46 or 49. No result observed. d) UA - 68 - 124 - 129 have been ordered to withdraw to the east, after
Further British reports regarding U-boats in CG 9587 and CG 5869 and refueling has been carried out, and not to pass over latitude of rendezvous
warning for are CE 8323. with UA to the south.
d) None. Reason: In order to avoid widening of the area by single boats, since
operations at the same time are intended off Capetown.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 17: On instructions the following boats reported their V. Reports of Success:
position and fuel supplies: U 43 - 1 ship sunk.
U 574 - CE 56 - 42 cbm. U 575 - CE 5915 - 45 cbm.
U 105 - CE 55 - 70 cbm. U 43 - CE 5829 - 85 cbm.
446
 (Signed): DÖNITZ
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 17: U 105 reported at 0857 from CE 9441 a steamer,
with lights, accompanied by 2 destroyers with lights dimmed. Course
2700, speed 18 knots. The boat was not able to maintain contact. U 43
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log sighted at 1145 from CE 8689 clouds of smoke in direction 900. Wind
was North, strength 5, with drizzle, otherwise good visibility.
1 - 15 December 1941
Situation: B.d.U. assumes that the convoy has been finally lost - since
PG30301A even at a speed of 6 knots it must have passed the patrol line - and that
reports from the boats regarding single vessels have led to
misunderstandings regarding the actual course of the convoy. Pursuit has
been given up. B.d.U. expects to achieve success with a reconnaissance
1. December 1941. patrol, which will detect routes from America to Gibraltar and will at the
same time, therefore, have an influence on supplies for the Mediterranean.
I. U 43 - CE 80 U 124 - FT 42 U 332 - CG 72 U 558 - CG 94 Order: Boats are to take up position at midnight on the 3rd December in
67 - CG 46 126 - ES 28 372 - CG 75 562 - E. of Gibr. their old sequence in the reconnaissance patrol from CF 7877 to CF 7271,
68 - CG 71 127 - AN 31 175 - CG 45 563 - BF 42 course 900, speed of advance 6 knots. Until then freedom of action.
69 - BE 42 129 - FT 46 402 - BE 43 574 - CE 90
71 - BF 47 131 - AF 78 434 - CE 90 575 - CF 90 2) CG Convoy: Group "Letzte Ritter" will continue on course South,
95 - E. of Gibr. 201 - BE 51 451 - AF 77 652 - CH 75-Op speed 6 knots. Air reconnaissance was without success.
96 - CG 94 206 - BF 47 453 - Op(CG 80) A - GF 96
105 - CF 80 557 - E. of Gibr.

- 243 -

On Return Passage: U 126.

Sailed: U 130 - Kiel Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: In areas BE 40 and 50.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) Convoy No. 17 see IVa.
2) U 453 reported from CG 9456 large steamer with Sunderland. Course
East, speed 12 knots. b) None.
3) For sinking of "Python" see IV d. c) None.
447
 d) 1) UA reported at 0015 on the 2nd December from GF 9367 that 95 - E. of Gibr. 131 - AM 32 451 - AM 32 652 - Op(CH 75)
"Python" was sunk by a heavy British cruiser at the supply point of 96 - CG 99 201 - BE 81 453 - Op(CG 85) A - GF 96
rendezvous. Therefore, within 10 days 2 ships of this type have been lost. 105 - CE 98 206 BE 99 557 - E. of Gibr.
UA also reported that, together with U 68, 2 tow groups have been
formed. Course 3300, speed 5 knots. Fuel will be sufficient in the case of
both boats to reach Western France. U 124 and U 129 have been ordered
to report their position and fuel supplies.
2) U 563 reported at 2000, that she was quite unable to dive owing to
damage by aircraft bombs. Position BF 4711 course 70, speed 8 knots. U
71 and U 206 were ordered to go to U 563. The Air Corps will provide - 244 -
close and remote air escort by fighter-bombers for the morning of the 2nd
December. Group West has been requested to provide surface forces and
has ordered the 3rd defence Division to send three M-boats to meet the U
563.

V. Reports of sinkings: - . -

VI. General:
In view of the sinking of "Python" every possibility of refuelling in the
Atlantic has been eliminated now. It will hardly be possible to resume On Return Passage: U 126 - U 563
refuelling on the surface - the time for such undertakings is past. Sailed: - . - Entered Port: U 563 - Lorient.

(Pencil note: IF it is assumed that "Ship 16" and "Python" were victims II. Air Reconnaissance:
of a planned search by the enemy, yes. Up to now, however, the reasons On convoy CG 79
cannot be definitely established.)
III. Reports on the Enemy:
--------------------------------------------------- a) 1) U 453 reported from CG 9449 destroyer and depth-charges.
--------------- 2) U 96 was bombed in the night of 30th November to 1st December by
a bi-plane. She is able to dive to a short depth and is returning. The
2. December 1941. Commanding Officer considered operations East of Gibraltar in light
moonlight nights as hopeless owing to strong air patrols.
I. U 43 - CE 98 U 124 - FT 83 U 332 - Op(CG 80) U 558 - CG 99 b) No result.
67 - CG 84 126 - ES 23 372 - Op(CG 80) 562 - E. of Gibr. c) - d): None.
68 - CF 96 127 - AN 30 375 - CG 81 563 - BF 71
69 - BE 48 129 - FT 96 402 - BE 73 574 - CE 98 IV. Current Operations:
71 - BF 48 130 - AO 434 - CE 95 575 - CE 95
448
 a) CG 79: Group proceeding further South. Reconnaissance brought no
result. Fresh reconnaissance is planned.
b) At the orders of the Naval War Staff, 4 further boats were sent into the
Eastern Mediterranean.
U 95 - 557 - 562 - 558, which were already East of Gibraltar, were
given orders to this effect. The operational area in the West Mediterranean
will at present be patrolled only by one boat - U 652, since boats on their
first operational trip are not entrusted to proceed through the Straits of
Gibraltar.
c) None.
d) All southern boats have sufficient fuel for:
1) Passage home. They have been ordered to take over survivors in
groups and to return home at maximum possible speed. It has been
arranged that large Italian U-boats shall be sent to meet them.
2) refuelling may only be effected at present in "Gata", on orders of
Naval War Staff, in cases of emergency.
V. Reports of Sinkings: - . -
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 245 -
I. U 43 - CF 78 U 126 - EJ 95 U 332 - Op(CG 85) U 562 - CH 76
67 - Op(CG 95) 127 - AF 78 372 - OP(CG 85) 566 - AO
68 - CF 61 129 - GF 22 375 - OP(CG 85) 574 - CF 75
69 - BE 78 130 - AN 36 402 - BE 79 575 - CF 75
71 - BF 73 131 - AM 33 434 - CF 72 652 - Op(E. of Gibr.)
95 - CH 70 201 - BE 87 451 - AM 24 A - GF 61
96 - CG 54 206 - BF 75 453 - Op(CG 85)
105 - CF 78 557 - CH 84
124 - FT 99 558 - CH 75
On Return Passage: U 126 - U 96 - 124 - 129 - 68 - UA
Sailed: U 566 - Kiel Entered Port: - . -
U 208 - Brest
II. Air Reconnaissance: On CG 79 in area BE.
III. Reports on the enemy:
a) 1) U 453 reported at 0216, 2 destroyers in CG 8647, course 600. In
the operational area West of Gibraltar extensive neutral traffic, no action.
2) U 558 reported at 1116 that she had been damaged in 2 aircraft night
attacks and subsequent depth-charge chase by destroyer. Returning.
3) U 96 stopped the Spanish vessel "Cabe de Hornos" and, on enquiry,
received instructions to let her proceed.
4) U 124 sank in FU 7887 an American vessel "Sagadahoc". This ship
had no neutral marks and was proceeding with lights dimmed.
b) Without result.
c) Survivors of the vessel "Fjord" torpedoed by a U-boat were landed on
the 3rd of December in Estepona.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations: a) -d): None.

3. December 1941. V. Reports of sinkings:

U 124 - 1 ship ("Sagadahoc") sunk.
449
 a) 1) U 562 reported ore ship sunk off Melilla.
--------------------------------------------------- 2) U 557 sank vessel "Fjord" East of Gibraltar.
--------------- b) None.
c) According to an intercept message a transport was sunk on the 12th
November between Iceland and Ireland.
- 246 - d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

4. December 1941.
I. U 43 - CF 88 U 124 - GF 25 U 332 - Op(CG 85) U 127 - AM
32
67 - Op(CG 95) 126 - EJ 66 372 - Op(CG 85) 558 - CG 81
68 - CF 29 129 - GF 29 375 - Op(CG85+88) 562 - CH 59
69 - CF 21 130 - AN 31 402 - CF 24 566 - AO
71 - BF 50 131 - AM 27 434 - CF 82 574 - CF 85
95 - CH 59 201 - CF 26 452 - AM 18 575 - CF 85
96 - CG 24 206 - BF ? 453 - CG 90 652 - Op(CH75/76)
105 - DH 13 208 BF 557 - CM 59 A CF 29
a) - c) None.
d) 1) The convoy reported by an Italian U-boat on the 4th December at
0200 in CF 1288 was probably the SL 93, which must have left, therefore,
6 days late according to schedule. Since other SL convoys have been
observed also to have been late, it is assumed from now on that there is a
new schedule.
2) Patrol of the area West of Gibraltar has lately been extended. At
present there are always 8 gunboats and 3 destroyers there on patrol.
Between Cape Trafalgar and Scartel there is now a new patrol line. In the
harbor of Gibraltar there are at present about 55 ships. It is expected,
therefore, that the HG convoy, which has been due since the 1st December,
will put out very shortly. Particularly strong air cover at present seems to
confirm this.
3) U 206 - outward-bound - has not reported in spite of twice being
instructed to do so. It is not probable that this boat was sunk by aircraft,
since at the time in question no attacks took place on U-boats, according
- 247 -

On Return Passage: U 68 - 124 - 129 - UA - 96 - 69 - 558 - 71 - 126.

Sailed: U 568 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

450
 To an intercept message. It is most likely, therefore, that the boat ran Sailed: - . - Entered Port: U 71 - St. Nazaire.
on to mines. See under VI.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
V. Reports of Sinkings:
U 562 - 1 ore ship sunk III. Reports on the Enemy:
U 557 - 1 vessel "Fjord" sunk a) 1) U 434 reported single vessel in CF 9252, course 250.
U 205 - 1 hit on destroyer probable. 2) Situation report: U 375 reported from area around CG 9482: By day
(Mediterranean). strong patrols by flying boats, by night destroyers. Small isolated neutral
vessels.
VI. General: b) None.
The loss of U 206 has caused considerable anxiety regarding the mine c) 1) At 1830 a large troop transport with 3 destroyers put out from
situation. Only occasional exploratory sweeps can be carried out outside Gibraltar to the West.
the prescribed approach routes by Western defences, and outside the outer 2) The British Admiralty gave a U-boat warning for CG 9822.
approach points no searches can be made at all. An increase in the d) None.
Western defence forces has, therefore, been requested, but from where
they can be taken is not sure.
- 248 -
--------------------------------------------------
----------------

5. December 1941.

I. U 43 - CF 97 U 126 - EJ 39 U 375 - Op(CG 85) U 568 - BF 50

67 - Op(CG 95) 127 - AM 23 402 - CF 34 574 - CF 97
68 - FU 74 129 - FU 74 434 - CF 91 575 - CF 94
69 - BE 88 130 - AF 79 451 - AL 33 652 - Op(CH 75)
71 - BF 50 131 - AM 41 453 - Op(CG 85) A - FU 78 IV. Current Operations:
95 - CJ 84 201 - CF 32 557 - CH 58 a) It is intended to operate with Group "Steuben" and the boats West of
96 - BF 75 208 - BF 48 558 - CG 51 Gibraltar against the awaited HG convoy.
105 - DH 22 332 - Op(CG 85) 562 - CJ 84 b) None.
124 FU 74 372 - Op(CG 85) 566 AN 35 c) refuelling "Bernardo" is planned for U 575 from the 11th to the 12th
December.
d) According to a report of U 68 all 4 southern boats have met in FU7486
and are returning each with 104 survivors their fuel supplies being as
On Return Passage: U 68 - 126 - 129 - 124 - 96 - 71 - 201 - 69 - 402 - follows:
558 - UA. U 124 - 140 cbm. U 129 - 125 cbm.
451
U 68 - 160 cbm. U A - 190 cbm. a) 1) U 126 reported in DH 6115 a large tanker escorted by 2 destroyers,
Course N.E. The boat broke off pursuit since she had only 1 Diesel in
The boats have been ordered to proceed to square EJ 40. It is planned action for half speed.
that 260 survivors in all shall be taken over there by Italian U-boats in the 2) U 332 was bombed by a Sunderland in CG 8298 and subsequently
period from 15th to 17th December. pursued by destroyers.

V. Reports of Sinkings:
U 81 (Mediterranean) - 1 hit each on tanker and freighter probable, 1 - 249 -
destroyer apparently heavily damaged.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

6. December 1941.

I. U 43 - CG 77 U 127 - AM 18 U 402 - CF 33 U 574 - CG 77 b) None.

67 - Op(CG 95) 129 - FU 74 434 - CF 92 575 - CG 74 c) Gibraltar gave a U-boat warning for area CG 8643.
68 - FU 74 130 - AN 11 451 - AL 39 652 - Op(CG 75) d) Apparently a U-boat chase is being carried out in area CG 9586 by 2
69 - BE 95 131 - Al 69 453 - Op(CG 85) A - FU 74 groups of minesweepers with the aid of aircraft. During the day both
95 - CJ 75 201 - BE 98 557 - CJ 76 groups operate separately and join together at night.
96 - BF 50 208 - BE 96 558 - CG 21
105 - DH 32 332 - Op(CG 85) 562 - CJ 95 IV. Current Operations:
124 - FU 74 372 - Op(CG 85) 566 - Kr-sand a) None.
126 - DT 99 375 - Op(CG 85) 568 - BF 48 b) Former Group "Steuben" has been assigned the following operational
areas off Gibraltar:
U 43 - CG 81 and 82 and 83 West third.
U 574 and 434 - CG 57 - 58 and 59, concentrating in the East.
On Return Passage: U 126 - 129 - UA - U 68 - 69 - 402 - 96 - 201 - 558 U 105 patrol line in area of squares CG 8740 and 8770 to the East up to
- 124. longitude of CG 9855.
Sailed: U 374 - Brest Entered Port: U 96 - St. Nazaire. B.d.U. has decided to send 4 further boats through the Straits of
Gibraltar, in spite of the fact that some of the boats are on their first
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. operational run or have only a limited number of charts on board.
U 208 and 568 have been ordered to proceed at fast cruising speed to
III. Reports on the Enemy: area CG.
452
 U 372 and U 375 have been assigned new operational areas East of
Gibraltar up to CH 76, right edge. The boats will be permitted to
withdraw, if defence forces are strong, up to 30 East.
U 453 will take up the operational area of U 372 and U 375, i.e. patrol
line in area of squares CG 8580 and 8820.
c) U 434 and U 574 requested, upon enquiry, refuelling in Bernardo.
d) 1) U 68 reported transfer of survivors unnecessary, since boats are able
to dive and provisions will suffice until they reach base. Since B.d.U.
wishes to ensure the possibility of a longer surface run (Biscay) it has been
ordered that the transfer be carried out as planned.
2) U 562 has passed the Straits of Messina and, therefore, come
operationally under the command of the Senior Officer, U-boats, Italy.
V. Reports of Sinkings: - . -
- 250 -
7. December 1941.
I. U 43 - CG 76 U 127 - AM 45 U 374 - BF 50 U 566 - Kr-sand
67 - Op(CG 95) 129 - FT 37 375 - Op(CG 85) 568 - CG 13
68 - FT 37 130 - AM 33 402 - BE 574 - CG 73
69 - BF 40 131 - AL 99 434 - CG 72 575 - CG 48
95 - CJ ? 201 - BE 451 - AL 65 652 - Op(CH 75)
105 - CG 79 208 - CG 19 453 - Op(CG 85) A - FT 37
124 - FT 37 332 - Op(CG 85) 557 - CJ 86 -
126 - DH-37 372 - Op(CG 85) 558 - BF 50
453
On Return Passage: U 68 - 126 - 124 - 129 - UA - 402 - 201 - 69 - 558.
Sailed: U 573 - St. Nazaire. Entered Port: U 558 - Brest.
U 654 - Bergen
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 375 reported from CG 9476 aircraft bombs, hydrophone hunt and
passage through the Straits of Gibraltar not successful. The boat is waiting
to make a fresh attempt on a more favorable night.
b) None.
c) (Special) The British Admiralty informed merchant vessels that
survivors of the steamer sunk on the 1st December in R = 030 55' W. L =
270 53' S., are in about 15 lifeboats, possibly armed and escorted by U-
boats. The boats are to be give a very wide berth and reported at once.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) 3 further boats, i.e. U 652 - 573 - 374 will be withdrawn for the
Eastern Mediterranean. They have been ordered to proceed to square CO.
refuelling is planned in Messina.
2) U 453 has been assigned as operational area that East of Gibraltar
following motions U 372 and 375.
3) U 67 will take up, as operational area, patrol line in the area of
squares 8580 and 8820 to the East up to longitude of CG 9590.
c) For the following boats refuelling is planned in Bernardo:
U 575 in the night of 11th to 12th December.
U 434 in the night of 12th to 13th December.
- 251 -
 ---------------------------------------------------
---------------

- 252 -
U 332 in the night of 13th to 14th December.
U 574 in the night of 14 to 15th December.
The boats have been instructed that return to Western France must be
ensured even if refuelling fails.
d) As from 1200 on the 8th December operational control of U-boats in
Western Mediterranean will be taken over by Senior Officer U-boats, Italy.
Line of division: Straits of Gibraltar. 8. December 1941
Therefore, the following will be newly transferred to him:
U 652 and U 557. In the Eastern Mediterranean the 23rd U-Flotilla will I. U 43 - Op(CG81-82) U 127 - AM 75 U 374 - BF 45 U 568 - CG
maintain control for the present. 49
U 95 has not reported in spite of repeated instructions. It must, 67 - CG 94 129 - FM 87 375 - CG 97 573 - BF 50
therefore, be assumed that the boat was probably destroyed in the Straits 68 - FM 87 130 - AM 18 402 - BF 49 574 - Op(CG57-58)
of Gibraltar. 69 - BF 50 131 - AL 90 434 - Op(CG57-58) 575 - CG 40
86 - AO 201 - BF 46 451 - AL 95 652 - CH 81
V. Reports of Sinkings: None. 105 - Op(CG 80) 208 - CG 84 453 - CG 90 654 - AF 75
124 - FM 87 332 - Op(CG 85) 557 - Str.v.Mess. A - FM 87
VI. General: 126 - DH 31 372 CG 96 556 - Kr-sand
Patrol of the Mediterranean by U-boats at present is again quite
unsatisfactory. There are:
in the eastern Mediterranean, U 431, 565
in the western Mediterranean, U 652 On Return Passage: U 68 - 126 - UA - 129 - 124 - 402 - 201 - 69 - 105.
underway from the western to the eastern Mediterranean, U 557, 562. Sailed: None.
Seven of the boats scheduled are out of action: Entered Port: U 69 - St. Nazaire.
U 95, 206, 433 certainly or probably lost.
U 71, 96, 558 and 563 have had to turn back owing to engine trouble or II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
damage by aircraft bombs. For other boats there has been a delay owing
to the increased patrols in the Straits of Gibraltar. Attempts are being III. Reports on the Enemy:
made to increase the numbers in the Mediterranean as soon as possible, a) 1) Convoy No. 18, see IVa.
thereby taking into account that boats on their first operational run must be 2) U 131 reported on the 6th December in AL 2830 a single ship of
expected to pass the Straits of Gibraltar. 6,000 GRT sunk. Fuel supply 165 cbm, 9 torpedoes left.
454
 b) None.
c) Several U-boat warnings West of Gibraltar.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 18: U 130 - at present proceeding to operational area -
sighted at 1225 in AM 1472 a convoy, course West. Since there are no
boats in the direct vicinity and, for the others, operations in the
Mediterranean appeared to be more necessary, U 130 was given freedom
of attack and ordered not to give any continuous reports of contact. At
2045 the boat reported pursuit broken off owing to deterioration in
weather conditions and that she was continuing passage into the
operational area. The convoy consisted of 2 steamers and 3 corvettes, last
course N.W.
b) None.
c) U 574 reported fuel supply 16 cbm, and requested earlier refuelling. U
332 still has 20 cbm, and intends to return on the 10th December.
Contrary to the previous refuelling schedule ordered, this will be laid on
for U 574 in the night of 11th to 12th December and for U 575 in the
following night. Further refuelling appears questionable. A decision
regarding this is awaited by the evening of the 10th December.
d) U 654 reported from AF 78 main periscope swamped. The boat is
returning to Bergen. U 573 also reported return passage
- 253 -
since tube 5 is leaking through forward mine securing pin.
Therefore, a further Mediterranean boat (the eighth) has been delayed.
V. Reports of Sinkings:
U 131 - 1 ship of 6,000 GRT sunk
VI. General:
Japan has started hostilities against England and USA - an event of great
importance which must also, in a very short time, affect the former
restriction of U-boat warfare in the Atlantic.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
9. December 1941.
I. U 43 - Op(CG81-82) U 129 - FM 48 U 375 - CG 90 U 574 -
Op(CG57-58)
67 - Op(CG 85) 130 - AM 15 402 - BF 50 575 - CG 43
68 - FM 48 131 - AL 88 434 - Op(CG57-58) 654 - v.Bergen
86 - Kr'sand 201 - BF 50 451 - BE 26 A - FM 48
105 - CG 84 208 - CG 86 453 - CG 90
124 - FM 48 332 - Op(CG 85) 566 - Kr'sand
126 - CF 93 372 - CG 90 568 - CG 85
127 - AM 70 374 - BE 93 573 - BF 50

On Return Passage: U 68 - 126 - UA - 129 - 124 - 402 - 201 - 69 - 105 -

573 - 654.
Sailed: U 128 - Kiel
U 108 - Lorient
U 74 - St. Nazaire
Entered Port: U 402 - U 573 = St. Nazaire
U 201 = Brest
455
 U 654 = Bergen d) 1) U 453 - 372 - 375 reported passing the Straits of Gibraltar. They
have, therefore come operationally under the command of Senior Officer,
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. U-boats, Italy.
2) Boats have been instructed by Standing Order No. 14 regarding
III. Reports on the Enemy: unrestricted action against the U.S.A. and those countries adhering to the
a) U 332 reported damage from aircraft bombs. She is returning as no conduct of the U.S.A. towards Germany.
longer fully operational.
b) None. V. Reports of Sinkings:
c) The Admiralty gave a U-boat warning for area FM 19. (This was in U 652 (Mediterranean) - 1 ship "St. Denis" sunk (Pencil note:
connection with one of the southern boats on return passage). unfortunately a mistake as she was a French vessel).
d) None.
VI. General:
IV. Current Operations: The lifting of all restrictions regarding U.S.A. ships and the so-called
a) None. Pan-American safety zone has been ordered by the Führer. Therefore, the
whole area of the American coasts will become open for operations by U-
boats, an area in which the assembly of ships takes place in single traffic at
- 254 - the few points of departure of Atlantic convoys. There is an opportunity
here, therefore, of intercepting enemy merchant ships under conditions
which have ceased almost completely for some time. Further, there will
hardly be any question of an efficient patrol in the American coastal area,
at least of a patrol used to U-boats. Attempts must be made to utilize as
quickly as possible these advantages, which will disappear very shortly,
and to achieve a "spectacular success" on the American coast.
The following come into question as the main points of attack for such
U-boat operations:
Sydney Roads 2,200 miles
b) U 451 - on outward passage from Kiel - reported upon passing 510 N Halifax 2,400 miles
that she only had 71 cbm. of fuel left and was ordered, therefore, to put Bermudas 3,000 miles
into Lorient for quick refuelling. New York 3,000 miles
c) According to a report of the Naval Staff 4 boats ca refuel in Bernardo: Galveston 4,600 miles
Order: U 575 will refuel in the night of 11/12 December. Aruba 4,000 miles
U 574 will refuel in the night of 12/13 December. Trinidad 3,600 miles (approach point for single traffic coming from
U 332 will refuel in the night of 13/14 December. South and bunkering station).
U 434 will refuel in the night of 14/15 December.
(refuelling for U 332 will not take place as the boat is returning).
Other times remain the same.
456
 I. U 43 - Op(CG81-82) U 124 - FL 36 U 208 - CG 90 U 574 - CG
- 255 - 50
67 - Op(CG 85) 126 - CG 41 332 - CG 80 575 - CG 50
68 - FL 36 127 - BE 23 374 - CG 12 A - FL 36
74 - BF 50 128 - AO 434 - Op(CG 57)
86 - AN 28 129 - FL 36 451 - BE 61
105 - CG 49 130 - AL 37 566 - AN 29
108 - BF 50 131 - BE 24 568 - CG 90

Boats of Type IX will have available, when operating in these areas,

approximately the following fuel supplies actually in the operational area.
On Return Passage: U 68 - 126 - 129 - 124 - UA - 105 - 332 - 451.
at a distance of IXB IXC Sailed: U 107 - 77 Lorient
U 432 - 569 St. Nazaire.
2,200 miles (Sydney) 90 cbm 140 cbm Entered Port: - . -
3,000 miles (New York) 60 cbm 110 cbm
4,000 miles (Aruba) 25 cbm 65 cbm II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
4,600 miles (Galveston) - 40 cbm
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Convoy No. 19 see IVa.
Operations by Type IXB boats, therefore, are not advisable at all the b) None.
points mentioned. c) 1) British U-boat "Regent" is to pass on one of the next few days at
I have requested from the Naval War Staff release of 12 boats type IX for 1000 or 1100 square BF 7795, middle of lower edge.
such undertakings, since these boats are anyway not so suited for the 2) According to unconfirmed reports the aircraft carrier "Victorious" is
Mediterranean, Gibraltar area and also for attacking the Gibraltar convoys, to proceed to Gibraltar as a replacement for the sunk aircraft carrier "Ark
which are the most strongly escorted, and since for this purpose a Royal".
considerable number of medium-sized boats will be ready for operations d) None.
shortly.

---------------------------------------------------
--------------- - 256 -

10. December 1941.

457

V. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 19: U 130 made contact at 1900 with an eastward-bound
convoy, but lost contact after 2 hours on account of unfavorable weather
conditions. After making contact again the boat was driven off at 0155 by
destroyers and proceeded on return passage to Lorient - as ordered before
sighting the convoy.
Result: 1 freighter of 7,000 GRT sunk, and 2 hits obtained on a tanker.
No other boats were in the vicinity for operations; owing to operations
in the Mediterranean this was also not intended.
b) U 43 following departure of U 332, has been assigned operational area
in a patrol line in area of squares CG 8520 and 8550 to the East up to
longitude of CG 9560.
The following are now still West of Gibraltar: U 67 - 434 - 43. Since
departure of the last two is expected soon owing to fuel supplies, U 108 -
131 - 127 have been ordered to proceed at high cruising speed to square
CG 84, since medium-sized boats are not available to reinforce this area
according to the orders of the Naval War Staff.
The urgent need to provide the number of boats ordered for the
Mediterranean and Gibraltar area, entails operations by boats which are
only suited for this to a certain extent in view of type and capacity.
U 130 is scheduled for operations in the area round Newfoundland and
will proceed at maximum cruising speed to Lorient for refuelling.
c) In order to intercept the British U-boat "Regent" (see intercept
message III c), boats in the vicinity were requested to report their position.
These were as follows: U 105 in BF 79; U 574 - CG 25; U 332 - CG 28.
Since U-105 was in a favorable position and was also on return passage,
she was ordered to operate against the British U-boat. The remaining
boats are to by-pass the waiting position of U-105 in a radius of 30 miles.
U 105 reported at 0113 that the operation could not be carried out owing to
fuel supplies. THereupon U 332 was ordered to carry it out.
V. Reports of Sinkings:
458
U 130 - 1 freighter of 7,000 GRT sunk
U 130 - 1 tanker - 2 hits.
VI. General:
The Naval War Staff has released for operations off the American coasts
only 6 large boats - since reduction in the
- 257 -
Mediterranean and Gibraltar area in spite of only limited suitability of
the large boats for this, does not appear to Naval War Staff to be advisable.
The following points should be considered for operations by these boats -
they will be ready for operations between 16th and 25th December in
France.
Their object must be to intercept single vessels and to make use of the
enemy's inexperience and the fact that they are not used to operations by
U-boats. For this purpose operations must not and cannot be too massed,
rather the boats should spread to such an extent that good prospects of
success are ensured at one point; they may not however, spread out to such
an extent that the one boat may achieve good success but that, considered
as a whole, the area is spoiled for operations in a wide radius without
chances of success having been exhausted. Since there are only 6 boats
available, all places mentioned cannot be patrolled in any case. If the first
operations by these boats are made only in the North, i.e. from Halifax to
New York, there is a prospect that in the area in the South, i.e. Aruba-
Trinidad the conditions will remain unaltered and will promise success at a
later date.
 On the other hand, if operations were carried out in the South the
northern area, which lies closer to the German departure bases, would - 258 -
certainly also be spoiled.
The decision must, therefore, be made in favor of operations in the
northern area, where 3 boats can be sent in, both off Halifax and New
York. It is only regrettable that there are not sufficient boats available to
strike a truly "spectacular blow".

---------------------------------------------------
---------------
III. Reports on the Enemy:
11. December 1941. a) 1) Convoy No. 20 see IVa.
2) U 374 requested immediate aircraft aid, as she was being chased in
CH 7441 by 4 destroyers. U 374 later sank 2 escorts in the Ceuta area.
I. U 43 - Op(CG 85) U 107 - BF U 130 - AL 39 U 451 - BF 40 (Aircraft aid was not possible in CH).
67 - Op(CG 85) 108 - BF 74 131 - BE 55 566 - AN 20 b) None.
68 - FE 71 124 - FE 71 208 - CG 90 568 - CG 90 c) 1) The American vessel "Exambion" will be ready for departure in
74 - BF 48 126 - CG 12 332 - CG 25 569 - BF Lisbon on the 11th.
77 - BF 127 - BE 61 374 - CG 42 574 - CG 22 2) According to an Admiralty report the SC 48 (convoy No. 3 was
86 - AN 20 128 - AN 30 432 - BF 575 - CG 27 attacked on the 16th October five times. At least 8 ships were sunk.
105 - BF 76 129 - FE 71 434 - Op(CG 57) A - FE 71 3) On the 14th December a large British convoy is expected to arrive in
Portugal from Gibraltar.
d) None.

On Return Passage: U 68 - UA - 126 - 124 - 129 - 332 - 105 - 451 - IV. Current Operations:
130. a) Convoy No. 20:
Sailed: U 83 - Brest Entered Port: - . - U 434 sighted at 0958 in CG 5588 a convoy, course 1600, speed 6
U 573 - St. Nazaire knots, consisting of 25 vessels with strong escort forces.
U 576 - Bergen The boat was ordered to remain up to the convoy as far as possible and
to guide U 43 and U 67 which were in the vicinity. COntact was
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. maintained with breaks until 2200. The boat reported at 2212: Am close
behind the convoy in square CG 8262 - fuel 1 cbm. Since "Gata" was not
available the boat was reminded, in view of low fuel supplies, that return
to "Bernardo" had to be ensured.

459
 U 434 suspected course to be South since fall of darkness, by-passed the
escort and took up waiting position in CG 8268. U 43 suspected at 2118
in CG 8229 forward escorts. She fired a torpedo on a destroyer which
failed. This boat had only one torpedo left and started on return passage
towards morning, owing to fuel supplies.
From U 67 there have been no reports. Since there were no other boats
available and the convoy was very close to Gibraltar, further contact with
the enemy was not expected.
b) In order to strengthen the area off Tobruck and Alexandria, U 74 - 569
- 432 - 77 were ordered to proceed at fast cruising speed to square CO.
refuelling is planned in Messina.
U 107 was assigned to square CG 84.
c) refuelling in Bernardo apparently according to plan.
- 259 -
d) 1) U 568 and U 374 have passed the Straits of Gibraltar and have,
therefore come operationally under the command of Senior Officer, U-
boats, Italy.
2) UA was ordered to report her position, day's run, and arrival in EJ 40,
and also whether all 4 boats were proceeding together. The boat reported
her position in ES 83, day's run 300 miles and time of arrival midnight on
the 14th December.
UA was proceeding alone and gave the estimated day's run of the
others as at least 260 miles.
V. Reports of Sinkings:
U 374 - 2 escorts sunk.
460
U 43 - 3 ships (2 known) = 25,000 GRT sunk, of these 2 already reported
earlier.
VI. General:
a) The heavy concentration of ships in Gibraltar seems to indicate that a
convoy will very soon put out bound for England (2 have already been
cancelled).
For attacks on this one there is only one boat available, in view of the
return of U 43 and 434. Further boats - 127, 131, 108, 574 - will not reach
the area for a few days. The small number of boats here is certainly also
the reason why no success was achieved against Convoy No. 20.
b) I have stated my views on the present situation as follows to the Naval
War Staff:
1) The main task is to increase the number of U-boats in the area
Tobruck-Alexandria.
2) As regards the Gibraltar area, I consider the main task that of
attacking HG and OG convoys, since British operations against Algiers,
etc. seems to me at present hardly likely.
3) Boats type IX are not very suited to operations in the Mediterranean
and Gibraltar area; they are more easily located than Type VII, more
complex in design and, therefore, less able to stand up to depth charge
pursuit than these and more unwieldy in depth-keeping. Their main
advantage, that of larger fuel supplies, on the other hand is not suited to
the Mediterranean and Gibraltar area.
--------------------------------------------------
----------------
- 260 -
 12. December 1941.
I. U 43 - CG 80 U 107 - BF 49 U 131 - BE 95 U 573 - BF
67 - CG 80 108 - CG 16 208 - CH ? 574 - Vigo
68 - FD 38 124 - FD 38 332 - CG 20 575 - CG 28
74 - BF 77 126 - BE 432 - BF 48 576 - AN 20
77 - BF 40 127 - BE 95 434 - CG 80 A - ES 59
83 - BF 128 - AN 31 451 - BF 50
86 - AF 78 129 - FD 38 566 - AN
105 - BF 80 130 - AL 65 569 - BF 81
b) 1) U 574 - 575 - 434 were ordered, after refuelling, to proceed at fast
cruising speed to CG 84. The intention is to attack the awaited HG convoy
with strongest possible forces.
2) U 67 and 208 were requested to give their position.
Report of U 67, see IIIa.
c) U 574 - 575 reported refuelling Bernardo carried out.
U 575 will have to return owing to damage sustained during depth
charge pursuit on the 9th December.
d) U 129 reported, on instructions, position in ES 8834, day's run 252
miles. U 68 was in ES 5695, day's run 270 miles.

- 261 -
On Return Passage: U 124 - 126 - 129 - UA - 68 - 332 - 105 - 451 - 130
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 451 - Lorient.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) U 574 reported unknown U-boat in CG 2374, probably U 575.
2) U 67 reported in the night of 11/12 in CG 8292, 2 destroyers, 1
escort, 1 M.T.B. Misfire on destroyer, no steamers. In CG 84, 86, 89 and
eastward therefrom strong escorts. Considerable numbers of small
steamers, neutral marks, course 200.
b) None.
c) The escorts sunk by U 374 have been confirmed by an intercept
message.
d) Number of ships in Gibraltar: 64. The ships forming the convoy are
coaling. The convoy may be expected, therefore, to leave in the near
future.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
The following order was given to the southern boats:
Point of rendezvous UA with "Torelli" on 14th December as from 1400
in EJ 14. The following rendezvous are also planned:
U 129 with "Finzi" at midday on the 15th in latitude of EJ 14.
U 68 with Tazolli" on the morning of the 16th in latitude of DT 78.
U 124 with "Calvi" on the morning of the 16th in latitude of DT 76.
Transfer of survivors:
UA 50 men, other boats 70 men each.
Carrying out of undertaking to be reported upon passing latitude of DT
25.
In case the boats have not met 48 hours after the time laid down, beacon
signals are to be sent out at various wave lengths.

V. Reports of Sinkings: None.

461
---------------------------------------------------
---------------

13. December 1941.

I. 43 - CG 51 U 107 - BF 78 U 131 - CG 84 U 574 - CG 51 2) British U-boat "Regent" should already have put into Gibraltar.
67 - CG 80 108 - CG 49 208 - CH ? 575 - CG 22 3) 10 ships put into Lisbon on the 11th December. These were probably
68 - ES 52 124 - ES 43 332 - BF 84 576 - AF 78 part of the convoy (No. 20) reported by U 434 on the 11th December.
74 - CG 27 126 - BF 50 432 - BF 77 A - EJ 79 d) None.
77 - BF 77 127 - CG 19 434 - CG 80 -
83 - BF 48 128 - AF 79 566 - AF 78 - IV. Current Operations:
86 - AM 32 129 - ES 43 569 - BF 71 - a) None.
105 - BF 50 130 - AL 99 573 - BF 73 b) 1) Boats newly arriving off Gibraltar have been ordered to the
following operational areas: U 574 - patrol line in area of square CG 8520
and 8550 to the East up to longitude of CG 9550. U 108 - square CG 87;
U 131 - CG 84; U 127 - CG 81.
On Return Passage: U 68 - 126 - 129 - UA - 124 - 332 - 105 - 575 - 43 - 2) U 332 was ordered to continue return passage. ("Regent" already put
130. into Gibraltar according to intercept message).
Sailed: U 202 - Brest c) None.
U 581 - Kiel d) 1) Since U 129 reported a lower supply of fuel than assumed and the
Entered Port: U 105 - 126 = Lorient. Italian U-boat "Calvi" could not be at the appointed rendezvous until
evening on the 16th owing to engine trouble, the following order was
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. given: U 129 rendezvous with "Finzi" as from 1000 on the 16th in square
EH 66 middle. If technically possible take over fuel from "Finzi". U 124
III. Reports on the Enemy: and "Calvi" do not need to reach the latitude ordered until 1000 on the
a) None. 17th December.
b) None. 2) U 208 has not reported in spite of several instructions to do so. This
c) 1) British aircraft reported at 1300: "Am over enemy U-boat in CH boat must be assumed lost. There is at present no information regarding
7539". destruction.

V. Reports of Sinkings:
- 262 - U 431 (Eastern Mediterranean) 1 tanker torpedoed.
U 453 (Western Mediterranean) 1 ship (Badalona) sunk.

462
VI. General:
With the probable loss of U 208, passage through the Straits of Gibraltar
or operations in the Mediterranean have already cost 3 boats (U 433, 95,
208), regarding which it must be assumed that they were lost, in or in the
vicinity of the Straits of Gibraltar. As was anticipated, conditions there
have become very difficult and emphasis is therefore laid on the necessity
for repair facilities in Italy, as required by B.d.U. in letter Group
Command 645/41 Secret of the 5th November 1941, in order to avoid the
dangerous return through the Straits of Gibraltar for repairs in French
harbors.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 263 -
14. December 1941.
I. U 43 - CG 27 U 107 - CG 27 U 131 - Op(CG 84) U 573 - BF
77
67 - Op(CG 85) 108 - Op(CG 87) 202 - BF 50 574 - Op(CG 85)
68 - EJ 79 124 - ES 12 332 - BF 78 575 - BF 70
74 - CG 57 127 - Op(CG 81) 432 - CG 51 576 - AM 31
77 - CG 51 128 - AF 77 434 - CG 25 581 - AO
83 - BE 77 129 - EJ 75 566 - AM 31 A - EJ 41
86 - AM 24 130 - BE 39 569 - CG 19
On Return Passage: U 68 - UA - 129 - 124 - 332 - 575 - 43 - 130
463
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Convoy No. 21 and report of U 77 on 4 tankers and 2 destroyers, see
IVa.
b) None.
c) 1) In view of several U-boat sightings by British aircraft the British
Admiralty gave out U-boat warnings for area West of Gibraltar. In CH
7612 also a U-boat was sighted.
2) The British tanker "British Confidence" was said to have been
attacked in AL 1848 by a surfaced U-boat. If the position is correct, this
could not have been a German boat. U 86 was at the time in question in
approximately the same latitude but 100 further East.
d) Convoy HG 77 passed Europa Point at 1825 and Tarifa at 2045. It
consisted of the following: 32 freighters, 1 aircraft depot ship "Unicorn",
3 destroyers, several corvettes and 1 submarine.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 21. Upon receipt of the first report of departure the
following boats were sent in to operate and assembled into Group
"Seeräuber": U 67 - 108 - 131 - 127 - 574 and 107.
Order: Group "Seeräuber", if no contact made up then, to take up a
patrol line at 1700 on the 15th December from CG 8375 to CG 8948.
Sequence: U 107 - 127 - 574 - 67 - 108. Until then freedom of action.
With this patrol line the convoy could be intercepted, with a speed of
only 7 knots, shortly before darkness fell. Attempts to approach nearer to
Gibraltar were not made since:
- 264 -
 ---------------------------------------------------
---------------

15. December 1941.

I. U 43 - BF 49 U 107 - CG 80 U 131 - CG 80 U 573 - CG 51

1) It was not certain whether the boats could arrive there. 67 - CG 80 108 - CG 80 202 - BF 45 574 - CG 80
2) According to a report from U 67 operations could hardly be carried 68 - EJ 45 124 - EJ 49 332 - BF 81 575 - BF 81
out there owing to patrols being too strong. 74 - CG 90 127 - CG 80 432 - CG 82 576 - AM 25
3) Even if the convoy were intercepted in the morning nearer to 77 - CG 90 128 - AM 31 434 - CG 20 581 - AN 36
Gibraltar, the boats would be forced to submerge and by dark would have 83 - CG 27 129 - EH 93 566 - AM 23 A - EJ 10
dropped far astern. 86 - AM 18 130 - BF 46 569 - CG 54
At 2305 U 74 - under way to CH - sighted the convoy in CG 9581, course
West, speed slow. No further reports were received.
U 77 reported at 0305 on the 15th December 4 tankers and 2 destroyers
in CG 9824, course S.W., speed 10 knots. On Return Passage: U 124 - 129 - 68 - UA - 43 - 130 - 332 - 575
Both boats were ordered to utilize the slightest chances of attack, to Sailed: U 451 - Lorient
withdraw at latest before dawn and to proceed further to CH. U 654 - Bergen
U 77 attacked at 0430, sank a freighter of 5,000 GRT and twice Entered Port: - . -
torpedoed a tanker of 9,000 GRT. Position CG 9843. There was air cover
over the convoy. Last course, West. The boat proceeded to CH. II. Air Reconnaissance: On convoy No. 21 in area West of Gibraltar.
It is not assumed that the two sightings reported concerned only one
convoy, since, firstly, positions and times differed very much and
secondly, it appeared from an intercept message regarding number of ships - 265 -
in the harbor of Gibraltar that, apart from the convoy, 4 further ships must
have put out.
b) None.
c) No report yet regarding refuelling carried out by U 434.
d) 1) The following final rendezvous were arranged:
U 68 with "Tazzoli" as from 1000 on the 16th December in DT 78,
middle, U 124 with "Calvi" as from 1000 on the 17th December in DT 76,
middle.
2) U 453 reported returning. There is, therefore, only one boat left - U
375 - East of Gibraltar. Further boats are approaching. III. Reports on the Enemy:

464
 a) U 566 sighted at 1218 in AE 9777 2 large vessels, course 3300, speed
6 knots. After pursuit lasting four hours, contact was lost. Weather: wind
West-South-West 8, seaway 7. F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
b) The convoy being searched for was not found. At 1945 in CG 9476: 3
tankers, 4 guardships, course 2100, speed slow. Visibility 100 hm. 15 - 31 December 1941
c) A British steamer reported from AL 5229, leak in engine room, ship
sinking. The leak was probably caused by the seaway, since there were PG30301B
none of our boats in the vicinity.
d) Italian observer in Tangiers stated that Convoy (No. 21) had returned
in the night of 14th - 15th December and was passing through the Straits 16. December 1941.
with course East. Up to now there is no confirmation of this, but it is very
unlikely according to the number of ships in the harbor and the situation. I. U 43 - BF 50 U 108 - CG 80 U 332 - BF 50 575 - BF 81
67 - CG 80 124 - EJ 16 432 - CG 90 576 - AM 14
IV. Current Operations: 68 - DT 78 127 - CG 80 434 - CG 54 581 - AN 31
a) Convoy: No reports of sightings were received from the boats. The 74 - CG 90 128 - AM 25 451 - BF 50 654 - AF 78
air reconnaissance sent out has achieved nothing. Control considers the 77 - CG 90 129 - EH 66 566 - AM 12 A - DT 74
reconnaissance line report (see IIId) as very unlikely. The operation 83 - CG 81 130 - BF 50 569 - CG 90
against the convoy is being continued. U 434 will join Group "Seeräuber". 86 - AM 42 131 - CG 80 573 - CG 81
In order to have boats in the area of the air reconnaissance planned for the 107 - CG 80 202 - BF 69 574 - CG 80
16th December and in order to prevent them falling behind the convoy a
patrol line has been ordered for 0900 on the 16th December from CG 8171
to 8744. Sequence: U 434 - 107 - 127 - 574 - 131 - 67 - 108. 7.5 knots
has been laid down as the maximum possible speed of advance. On Return Passage: U 68 - UA - 129 - 124 - 332 - 575 - 43 - 130.
b) U 573 was ordered to proceed at high cruising speed to the area East Sailed: U 133 - 577 - 751 - St Nazaire.
of Gibraltar. U 653 - Kiel.
c) U 434 reported refuelling carried out according to plan in Bernardo. Entered Port: U 43 - 130 Lorient. U 332 - La Pallice.
d) None.
II. Air Reconnaissance: On Convoy No. 21 in area 300 miles West-South-
V. Reports of Sinkings: West of Gibraltar.
U 557 1 cruiser sunk
U 77 1 freighter (5,000 GRT) sunk III. Reports on the Enemy:
U 77 1 tanker (9,000 GRT) torpedoed. a) 1) Convoy No. 21 see IVa.
2) U 108 reported sinking a freighter with lights, without flag and ship's
side markings in CG 8778 on the 14th December: The boat believed that
she was not observed.
(Signed) DÖNITZ. b) Convoy detected at 1115 in DJ 1317.
465
 c) British aircraft reported German U-boats in BF 6478, CG 9588 and
CH 7668.
d) 1) According to a report from Madrid Convoy No. 21 did not return to
Gibraltar.
2) The Captain of the vessel "Giudad-Valencia" observed a convoy (No.
21) at 1600 on the 15th December in DJ 2139.
3) Various survivors were landed in Gibraltar from 3 sunk freighters,
apparently out of Convoy No. 21. Therefore, it is to be assumed that U 74
attacked the convoy and achieved success. No report has been received
from the boat.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 21: The air reconnaissance sent out sighted the convoy at
1115 in DJ 1317. The machine returned immediately owing to fuel
supplies but gave no beacon signal. A report regarding course of the
convoy - 2700 to 2900 - was not received until 1630.
After receipt of the first aircraft report Group Seeräuber" was ordered to
proceed at maximum speed on course 1700. Subsequently, U 574 - 131 -
67 - 108, which should have been closest and able to reach the convoy still
before dark, were
- 267 -
ordered to operate in equal sectors between 300 - 2400 starting from
the convoy position reported by aircraft. Enemy speed assumed 6 - 7
knots. The remaining boats were given freedom of action in the whole
sector.
466
U 108 made contact at 1731 with the convoy in DJ 1245. Course
North-West. The boat was forced to submerge and sighted at 1920 in DJ
1212, to starboard, destroyers, course 3500, and presumed the convoy to
be in DJ 1160 at 2042.
The plan for the night was to have boats operate freely, even if they had
no contact, against the convoy. Speed of advance 6 - 7 knots is assumed.
U 67 reported at 2030 hydrophone fix in 2000 from square DJ 1211.
Direct contact with the convoy was not made again during the night of
16th to 17th December. U 131 of course had continual contact with
destroyers and other escort forces but was not successful in breaking
through and finding the convoy. At 0645 the boat was driven off. Last
enemy position was DH 3369, mean course 2700, speed 6 knots.
b) None.
c) UA reported secondary operation carried out, i.e. 50 survivors given
over to Italian U-boats "Torelli".
V. Reports of Sinkings:
U 108 - 1 freighter (7,000 GRT) sunk on the 14th December.
VI. General:
As a result of the continuing lack of repair workers, Admiral Second in
Command U-boats reported regarding the completion of work on new
boats as follows: The time taken for completion work on new boats at
home, before they go into operation, has been extended as a result of
shortage of workers in such a way that an average of 6 - 8 weeks, as
against 3 - 4 weeks before, must be expected for the work. Owing to the
continual stream of new boats the dockyards are becoming increasingly
blocked, as few are sent away, and the consequence will be a serious delay
in operations.
At the present there are 24 U-boats being completed, of which only two
will be ready on the 20th December and at this date there will be 10 more
new ones for completion, and then every 14 days 10 further new U-boats.
In order to alleviate these impossible conditions, I have made the
following 4 proposals to the Naval High Command:
1) Increasing the number of workers by shutting down to a great extent
repairs on surface ships.
 2) No further transfers of experienced repair workers for special
purposes of Army and Air Force. (Pencil note: Calling-up and therefore
reduction unavoidable, but Naval Staff U is attempting to amend this as
soon as possible.)
- 268 -
3) U-boats to be completed by their own constructional dockyard, as
these are more interested in the boat than any other yards. Thereby
postponement of any repairs to surface ships at those construction yards.
(Pencil note: This will not do, as new U-boat constructions will be
reduced too much, particularly in the present situation.)
4) If necessary decrease in new U-boat constructions at individual yards
until lack of workers for repairs to boats is alleviated there, or
concentrating at new-construction dockyards with good outputs in such a
way that new constructions at small yards are transferred with a certain
number of workers to the larger yards.
This proposal disagrees with an order of the Naval High Command on
the same question, which orders acceleration of the completion work
primarily at the expense of U-boat new constructions; only if there is no
completion work to be done may further new constructions be carried out.
There is no doubt that it is really practical to employ repair workers
only for ships which are definitely necessary to win this war; since the
main point of German naval warfare in this war can only center on U-boat
warfare it should, in my opinion, be investigated from which surface ships
repair workers can be spared. However desirable the repair of surface
ships may be, no restriction or delay in U-boat operations must be allowed
to arise through it.
467
Any measures at the expense of future new U-boat constructions should,
in my opinion therefore, only be carried out as a last resort.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
17. December 1941.
I. U 67 - CG 70 U 124 - DT 76 U 432 - CH 575 - BF 81
68 - EH 66 127 - CG 70 434 - CG 70 576 - AM 14
74 - CH 128 - AM 41 451 - BF 49 577 - BF 50
77 - CH 129 - EH 66 566 - AM 12 581 - AN 20
83 - CG 86 131 - CG 70 569 - CH 653 - Brunsbüttel
86 - AM 75 133 - BF 50 573 - CG 86 654 - AF 78
107 - CG 70 202 - BF 69 574 - CG 70 A - DT 25
108 - CG 70 751 - BF 50
On Return Passage: U 68 - 124 - 129 - UA - 575 - 751
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 575 - 751 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: On Convoy No. 21 in area CF 90.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Convoy No. 21 see IVa.
b) Convoy not detected.
- 269 -
 ---------------------------------------------------
--------------

18. December 1941.

c) 1) British escort aircraft reported: 1800 surfaced U-boat in DH 33 (U

131?) I. U 67 - CF 90 U 129 - EH 33 U 573 - CG 90
2) British aircraft sighted at 1720 an oil trace in AM 5436 (U 566?) 68 - DT 45 131 - CF 90 574 - CF 90
3) Two further enemy aircraft reports at 1120 and 1520 with position not 83 - CG 90 133 - BF 48 576 - AM 47
clear. (Probably sightings off Convoy No. 21.) 86 - AM 78 202 - CG 42 577 - CF 60
d) None. 107 - CF 90 432 - CH 581 - AN 20
108 - CF 90 434 - CF 90 653 - AN 93
IV. Current Operations: 124 - DT 76 451 - CG 16 654 - AM 23
a) Convoy No. 21: At 1008 U 108 contacted the convoy in DH 3324 and 127 - CF 90 566 AL 95 A - DH 48
maintained contact until dark. At 1347 U 107 reported the convoy. 128 - AM 71 569 CH
Contact was maintained until 0051 on the 18th, when U 107 last reported
the enemy in CF 9929. Group "Seeräuber" was then ordered to continue
operations independently at dawn because it must have been in the direct
vicinity of the convoy and most probably the convoy would be quickly
found by such a concentration of boats. At 1212 U 131 reported that she
was unable to dive and was being pursued by 4 destroyers in DH 33. The
boat was instructed that aid was not possible and that she should scuttle - 270 -
herself, if there was no other alternative.
At 1640 U 434 reported that she had observed at 1400 in DH 3341
artillery firing and an aircraft with three destroyers.
No further reports have been received from U 131 or regarding her.
b) None.
c) U 68 reported at 0300 on the 18th December secondary operations
carried out, i.e. "Tazzoli" had taken over from U 68 70 men and given the
German boat provisions accordingly.
d) None.
On Return Passage: U 68 - 124 - 128 - 129 - 432 - 569 - UA
V. Reports of Sinkings: Sailed: U 71 - 125 - 502 - 567 - 751
1 vessel from Convoy No. 21 torpedoed (by U 108) Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance:

468
 On Convoy No. 21 in area CF 60.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Convoy No. 21 see IVa.
b) Convoy detected at 1200 in square CF 9354, at 1225 in CF 9653, at
1501 in CF 9342, at 1530 in CF 9623.
c) Unknown unit reported at 1000 surfaced U-boat in CF 9625.
According to an intercept message, and unknown British unit reported
that the "131 U-boat" was sunk on the 17th December by gunfire and 44
prisoners taken. Probably this was the U 131.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) At 1200 on the 18th the convoy was detected by our own aircraft in CF
9354. Further reports of sightings from aircraft were received at 1225 in
9653, at 1450 in 9618, at 1501 in 9342. The fixes indicated the convoy in
9290 at 1300. The second fix gave a position in 9231 at 1600. Both
bearings were sent to the boats. According to dead reckoning on these the
enemy's mean course was about 3400. At 2000 U 107 made contact in
9225. The boats of Group Seeräuber" were ordered to operate on the basis
of this report, mean course then being 3300, enemy speed approximately 6
- 8 knots. According to a report at 2111 U 107 was driven off again
immediately after sighting the convoy. At 0315 on the 19th December U
574 made contact. At 0455 U 108 came up to the convoy in square CF
6815. At 0759 U 108 reported last convoy position in 6815 at 0620 course
3400, speed 7 knots and a further ship sunk, a third probably sunk. Since
then there has been no contact. Although all her torpedoes were expended
U 108 was ordered to maintain contact. At 1526 U 127 and 434 were
asked for their position. No report up to now.
b) U 451, U 133 were ordered to proceed to the Eastern Mediterranean.
c) U 124 reported at 0136 on the 19th December, secondary operation
carried out, i.e. "Calvi" took over from U 124 70 men and gave the
German boat provisions accordingly.
V. Reports of Sinkings:
U 108 from the convoy 1 ship sunk.
469
1 ship probably sunk.
- 271 -
VI. General:
a) Convoy.
All reports received from boats and aircraft up to now indicate that this
is an extremely strongly escorted convoy. Escorts consist of an aircraft
carrier ("Unicorn") with fighter planes, cruisers, destroyers, corvettes and
large motorboats, which can operate in present continually good weather
conditions. These good conditions, which are favorable for location and
hydrophone have probably led to the loss of 3 boats, namely U 131, U
127, U 434.
b) Mediterranean.
In considering the present U-boat situation in the Mediterranean and the
intended further increase in numbers of U-boats there, it must be clearly
seen that most of the experienced U-boat Commanders and crews of
German U-boats are in the Mediterranean, or must proceed thence.
Regarding passage through the Straits of Gibraltar the following are my
views:
1) Passage through the Straits of Gibraltar has become more difficult
following the sinking of the "Ark Royal" owing to increased patrol lines
and particularly to air patrol, which extends far to the East and West and
also goes out at night. In view of the latter, surface passage is made more
difficult owing to the distance to be covered; when there is a full moon,
passage submerged and on the surface has become impossible.
 19 boats have passed Gibraltar, 11 of these after the sinking of the 107 - CF 60 202 - CG 49 574 - CF 68
"Ark Royal". 3 boats were lost in passage, 3 were damaged by aircraft 108 - CF 68 432 - Gibral. 576 - AM 77
bombs and had to return to Western France. 124 - DT 54 434 - CF 60 577 - BF 77
2) Passage through the Straits of Gibraltar to the West is considerably 125 - BE 50 451 - CG 48 581 - AN 20
more difficult since it is against the current. When, after completion of
operations in the Mediterranean, most of the U-boats will return into the
Atlantic, considerably stronger patrols off Gibraltar are probable.
Extensive losses will probably result. On Return Passage: U 68 - 124 - 128 - 129 - 432 - 569 - UA
3) Operations by U-boats in the Mediterranean are at the moment Sailed: - . - Entered Port: - . -
absolutely necessary. However, there is danger that the U-boats may
become trapped there one day and excluded from the battle of the Atlantic. II. Air Reconnaissance:
A solution of this question must, however, be held up pending further On Convoy No. 21 in area CF 60
developments.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
--------------------------------------------------- a) Convoy No. 21 see IVa.
-------------- b) At 1330 on the 10th December the convoy was detected by air
reconnaissance in CF 6245.
c) 1) British patrol vessel reported at 1000 a surfaced U-boat in CF 9625.
2) At 0330 on the 17th December a British aircraft was ordered to attack
a U-boat in BF 67 (U 133, U 577?)
d) None.

- 272 - IV Current Operations:

19. December 1941.
I. U 67 - CF 60 U 127 - ? U 502 - BE 50 U 653 - AN 37
68 - DH 48 128 - BE 32 566 - AL 96 654 - AM 17
71 - BE 50 129 - DT 48 567 - BE 50 751 - BF 50
83 - Gibral. 131 - ? 569 - CG 81 A - DH 13
86 - AM 70 133 - BE 99 573 - Gibral.
470
a) The position calculated from bearings of U-boats indicated the convoy
to be in 6430 at 1400. At 1725 an aircraft reported a convoy bound for
Gibraltar. Boats were instructed not to operate against it but to attack if
they were in a favorable position for firing. The objective of the operation
remained the North-bound convoy. At 1653 U 107 reported the convoy in
6419.
At 1900 the same boat reported the enemy in 6417, speed 8 knots,
course 2700. It was to be assumed that this position was correct according
to dead reckoning, since the enemy was attempting to avoid the area
covered by our air reconnaissance. The last position of the convoy was
reported at 0700 on the 20th in CF 5353, course 00, by U 107. The
situation report requested from U 108 showed that contact was being
maintained best on remote escorts. At night the remote escorts were 3-5
miles around the convoy. If possible a break was to be made through from
a forward position. Firing possible only at a distance of 2,000 meters
outside the strong close escort and at fine angle on the bow, as otherwise
surprise by rear remote escort.
- 273 -
In reply to request for position from U 574 and 67, only U 67 has
reported up to now - at 1735 in 6167.
U 567, U 71 and U 751 were ordered to operate against this convoy. I
have confidence in entrusting to these experienced U-boat Commanders
the difficult operations against this convoy.
b) U 577, U 133 were ordered to proceed at high cruising speed to the
Eastern Mediterranean.
U 128, which is at present West of Ireland under way to the area West of
Gibraltar, has been ordered to proceed at maximum cruising speed to
Lorient.
Even though the numbers of boats required by the Naval War Staff have
hitherto forced me - in view of the lack of other boats - to send in large U-
boats also off Gibraltar, it is nevertheless necessary to release these as
soon as possible. This is now possible with medium sized boats. U 128's
assignment to Group "Paukenschlag" is intended after she has refueled.
c) U 129 reported operation carried out, 70 men transferred to "Finzi".
Fuel supplies 59 cbm, day's run 250 miles.
d) None.
V. Reports of Sinkings: None.
471
VI. General:
The situation report from U 108 confirms the impression of very strong
escorts. It also shows, however, that it is quite possible for an experienced
Commanding Officer to come up to the convoy. A fourth U-boat, U 574,
seems to have been lost. The reasons for these sudden great losses are not
quite clear. The weather which was favorable for location purposes, as
well as the presence of the aircraft carrier with very fast machines will
have had some bearing on this. Certainly, however, the losses prove that
an attack on this very strongly escorted Gibraltar convoy was a very
difficult task. New boats with inexperienced Commanding Officers are,
therefore, not at all a match for these convoys and for the defence forces
West of Gibraltar. Therefore, I shall send in no further boats from home
waters for operations against H.G. and O.G. convoys or in the Gibraltar
area amongst the numbers of boats ordered by the Naval War Staff.
Fulfillment of the required numbers must accordingly be delayed.
My views regarding imminent U-boat operations have been submitted as
follows to the Naval War Staff:
In order to put into effect the Order of 1. Naval War Staff 1 U 2042/41,
Secret regarding U-boat operations in the Mediterranean, and in view of
the operational capacity of new boats and inexperienced Commanding
Officers or large U-boats, the following operations are planned:
- 274 -
1) The following will be sent into the Mediterranean after the full-
moon period: U 83, U 451, U 202, U 133, U 577. There will then be 25
U-boats in the Mediterranean.
 2) 5 further U-boats will be sent at the full-moon period in the middle of 86 - BE 62 202 - Cg 85 576 - AM 78
January, and in February there will follow 4 further boats. 107 - CF 53 432 - CG 42 577 - CG 27
In view of this distribution, reference is made to the dockyard output in 108 - CF 53 434 - ? 581 - AM 24
the Mediterranean reported in Teleprinter Message of German Naval 124 - DH 77 451 - CG 84 653 - AN 29
Command Italy, 8193/41, Group Command. (Dockyard output by 15th 125 - BF 40 502 - BF 40 654 - AL 34
January = 13 boats, by February 15 boats, later 20 boats). 127 - ? 566 - BE 29 751 - BF 44
In this way, therefore, the most efficient of the U-boats are in the
Mediterranean.
3) The following will be sent out for operations West of Gibraltar: 8 U-
boats putting out in December from French harbors.
4) One U-boat escort for the Dogger Bank. - 275 -
5) Apart from the 6 large boats already made available for operation
"Paukenschlag" on the American coast, U 107, U 108 and U 67 will
proceed, after completing the present operation against the H.G. convoy, to
Lorient and subsequently to operations on the American coast. Further
boats becoming available will also be sent into this area.
6) New, medium-sized boats with young and inexperienced
Commanding Officers coming out from home waters will proceed, until
further notice, for refuelling in French harbors and subsequently to
operations in the Western Atlantic, probably off the Newfoundland Bank.
Reason for 6) On Return Passage: U 68 - 86 - 124 - 128 - 129 - 432 - 566 - 569 - 576
As regards defence forces the area off Gibraltar is at present the most - UA - 502.
difficult, and the H.G. convoys the most strongly escorted. The new boats Sailed: U 582 Entered Port: - . -
are not a match for either of these, and operations by them are not
possible, therefore, in this area. II. Air Reconnaissance:
On Convoy No. 21 in area CF 20.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------- III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) See Convoy
20. December 1941. b) See Convoy
c) 1) Unknown British unit reported at 1155 a U-boat in BE 2932.
2) British aircraft reported at 0420 on the 21st a U-boat in CG 9588.
I. U 67 - CF 53 U 128 - BE 39 U 567 - BF 45 UA - CF 67 3) According to a subsequent intelligence report 2 U-boats were sighted
68 - CF 53 129 - DT 49 569 - CG 43 in the Gibraltar area in the night of 18/19. One attacked the British vessel
71 - BF 47 131 - ? 573 - Gibral. "Dynamo", subsequently U-boat pursuit.
83 - Gibral. 133 - Cg 43 574 - CF 43 d) None.
472
 107 - CF 24 432 - BE 99 577 - CG 84
IV. Current Operations: 108 - CF 25 434 - ? 581 - AM 41
a) Muller (U 67) reported at 1120 a convoy in square 2965. At the same 124 - DH 49 451 - CG 97 582 - AN 96
time Scholtz (U 108) and Gelhaus (U 107) also reported the convoy in 125 - BE 93 502 - BF 45 653 - AF 76
sight. Last report of contact from U 108 was at 2029, convoy being in 127 - ? 566 - BE 33 654 - AL 03
square 2832, course N.E. At 2230 U 107 reported contact lost, she 128 - BF 42 567 - BE 83 751 - BE 82
suspected northerly course of the convoy since she passed 2 escorts at
2118, course North, in square 2576. No further contact up to the morning.
b) U 576 - 566 - 86 were ordered to proceed at high cruising speed to
harbor in Western France. Purpose, refuelling, also repairs to U 576. On Return Passage: U 68 - 86 - 124 - 128 - 129 - 432 - 502 - 566 - 569
c) None. - 576 - 581 - 654 - UA.
d) U 502 reported large oil trace and probably losing oil. She was Sailed: U 84 - 571
ordered to put into Lorient. Entered Port: - . -
U 83 reported her position from the Mediterranean and has, therefore,
come under the command of Senior Officer, U-boats, Italy. II. Air Reconnaissance:
On Convoy No. 21 in area CF 20 - BE 80
V. Reports of Sinking:
U 562 reported sinking a Russian tanker (camouflaged as "Dogen") of III. Reports on the Enemy:
7,000 GRT in square CK 9284. a) See Convoy No. 21 under IVa.
b) Air reconnaissance sent out detected convoy at 1300 in CF 2313.
VI. General: None. c - d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

- 276 -
21. December 1941.
I. U 67 - CF 24 U 129 - DT 25 U 569 - BE 99
68 - CF 87 131 - ? 573 - CH 75
71 - BE 85 133 - CG 84 574 - CF 68
86 - BF 43 202 - CG 94 576 - BE 36
a) Contact was again made by U 108 at 1254 (21st December). At 1352
U 67 also reported the convoy in BE 8788. Contact made by U-boats
made calculation of the position reported by aircraft unnecessary. The
position, in CF 2235, subsequently reported by U 108 appeared unlikely
since, according to this, the speed of advance of the enemy would only
have been 5.4 knots. It was not necessary to work on this, as there was
contact. Requests for position check showed that U 108 confirmed the
position and suspected the possibility of a part-convoy. At 1740 U 567
sighted the convoy in 8755, last report was at 1908, square 8728, course
UA - CF 36 200. At 1600 U 67 was forced by an aircraft to submerge, subsequently
depth charge pursuit by destroyer, type "Eskimo".
At 0256 U 751 reported that she had made 3 hits on an aircraft carrier of
the "Formidable" Class at 2300. This was probably sunk, last observed
473
with: stern high, bow flooded. U 67 attacked at 0023 an aircraft depot ship
twice without result.
b) UA and U 68 reported: Putting into St. Nazaire on the 24th December.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Sinkings:
U 751 reported 3 hits on aircraft carrier. Sinking probable.
- 277 -
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
22. December 1941.
I. U 67 - BE 81 U 129 - DH 73 U 569 - BF 75
68 - CG 14 131 - ? 571 - BE 84 A - BF 82
71 - BE 81 133 - CG 96 573 - CH 75
84 - BF 202 - CG 82 574 - ?
86 - BF 432 - BF 72 576 - BF 41
107 - BE 84 434 - ? 577 - CG 94
108 - BE 84 451 - Gibral. 581 - AM 74
124 - DH 23 502 - BF 582 - AN 66
125 - BE 91 566 - BF 653 - AN/AF
127 - ? 567 - BE 73 654 - AL 88
128 - BF
On Return Passage: U 68 - 108 - 124 - 128 - 129 - 202 - 432 - 566 - 569
- 576 - 581 - 654 - UA.
Sailed: - . - Entered Port: U 86 - 502
II. Air Reconnaissance:
On Convoy No. 21 in area BE 20 - 80
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) See Convoy No. 21 under IVa.
b) Air reconnaissance sent out detected the convoy at 130 in BE 8142.
c) British aircraft reported U-boat in BE 2155 (operational area).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Aircraft detected the convoy at 1230 in BE 8142. Bearing of the
aircraft showed position to be in BE 8120 South half and 8150 North half.
At 1626 U 71 reported the convoy in square 8110, course North. At 1942
U 125 reported clouds of smoke and escorts in sight, square 5758. U 125
was ordered to proceed further to the West. During the night there were no
reports of contact being maintained. U 751 fired, in square 5475, a four-
fan torpedo which failed on a destroyer group, was then driven off and
started on return passage, as all torpedoes expended. U 567 (Endrass)
U 751 - BE 57 which was instructed at 1530 to report her position has not done so.
At 0818 the operation against the convoy was broken off.
b) U 67, 107 were ordered to return to Lorient, as fast as possible. U 71,
U 567 to proceed into the area West of Gibraltar.
c - d) None.
- 278 -
474
 128 - BF 569 - BF 751 - BE 55

On Return Passage: U 68 - 107 - 108 - 124 - 128 - 129 - 202 - 581 - 654
- 751 - UA.
Sailed: U 93 - 123 Entered Port: U 432 - 566 - 569 - 576.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

V. Reports of Sinkings: None.
VI. General:
The success achieved from the convoy up to now is slight. One aircraft
carrier, 3 ships, also 2 tankers, which, however, were shot up in the first
night from a group separated from the convoy. As against this, the loss of
4, possibly 5 boats (567 - Endrass). The weather conditions are also very
unfavorable; very little wind (east 1/2) no seaway therefore favorable
conditions for location. The chances of losses are greater than the
prospects of success. No contact with the convoy. Therefore the decision
has been made to break off operations.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
23. December 1941.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 84 reported at 1830 a destroyer in square BE 6891, course 1000,
very high speed.
b) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) German tanker damaged at 1148 in BE 6994 by bomb hits, course
1600, speed 8 knots. U 84 and U 108 were ordered to go to its aid, and to
proceed on her course at dark. U 84 report: see IIIa. Upon receipt of new
position of the tanker U 571, 30 miles behind the tanker, was ordered to go
to her aid and to remain in the vicinity until further orders can be given
after the tanker has put into Spanish territorial waters.
b) U 133 - 573 and 577 have passed Gibraltar and, therefore, come under
the command of the Senior Officer, U-boats, Italy.
c) None.

I. U 67 - BE 54 U 129 - DH 27 U 571 - BF UA - BF - 279 -

68 - BF 74 131 - ? 573 - CH 58
71 - BE 54 133 - CH 81 574 - ?
84 - BF 202 - CG 51 576 - BF
107 - BE 55 432 - BF 577 - CH 59
108 - BF 47 434 - ? 581 - BE 32
124 - CF 92 451 - Gibral. 582 - AN 37
125 - BE 48 566 BF 653 - AM 22
127 - ? 567 - ? 654 - BE 26
475

d) Upon request for a weather report, U 567 did not reply today either;
she must be assumed lost.
V. Reports of Sinkings:
U 573 sank on 21st December an escorted transport (8,000 GRT) off
Gibraltar (Mediterranean)
VI. General:
Experiences of late have led me to submit to the Naval War Staff the
following considerations on the situation:
1) The British have detected the complete withdrawal of German U-boats
from the Atlantic, the U-boat concentrations West of Gibraltar and the
continual passage of U-boats through the Straits of Gibraltar into the
Mediterranean.
They have pursued this German concentration of U-boats off Gibraltar
with their defence forces. The scarcity of U-boats in the Atlantic has
enabled him to withdraw considerable numbers of escort forces from there
into the Gibraltar area.
Escorts of MG 77 were very strong. They caused the loss, during
operations, of 4 or 5 U-boats, weather conditions being favorable. As
against this, are the loss of the aircraft carrier and, as far as known, the
slight success of 2 tankers and 3 steamers sunk.
2) In order to prevent further withdrawal of escort forces from the
Atlantic into the Gibraltar area, I intend before the end of December to
send in a U-boat, which is having to proceed to home waters for basic
overhaul, for radio decoy purposes in the North Atlantic.
3) I consider it necessary to investigate whether the operations ordered by
the Naval War Staff, by U-boats West of Gibraltar are still appropriate.
a) They were made in order to intercept at this point British forces
making for the Mediterranean theatre of war.
The boats were not sent in to operate in view of the war against
merchant shipping - see recalling of the U-boats of Group "Steuben" off
Newfoundland from attacks on merchant shipping.
476
b) The anticipated flow of British forces through the Straits of Gibraltar
into the Mediterranean has not occurred up to now, or the U-boats have not
been able to detect it.
c) The consequences of this was the use of these U-boats again in the
war against merchant shipping by attacks on the H.G. convoy. Actually, I
am not in agreement with attacking H.G. convoys as they are strongly
escorted and the ships are small. They have been attacked before only
when U-boats had been operating against a South-bound convoy or were
coming out of the South Atlantic and were compelled to be in the Gibraltar
area.
- 280 -
d) The area West of Gibraltar is very heavily patrolled up to West of
Vincent. The U-boats will be able to fulfil their tasks according to 3 a),
detection of East-bound British supplies, in the coming full-moon period
only in exceptional cases. Losses are to be expected which will not be
worth the success.
e) I consider, therefore, that more will be achieved by using the 8 U-
boats outward-bound for the area West of Gibraltar in the area off the
Azores, since besides West to East traffic here also North to South traffic
(W.S. convoys) can be intercepted and I propose, therefore, that they
should be used for this. It would also serve to quiet down the Gibraltar
area, which would be of advantage to the passage of U-boats into the
Mediterranean during the next new moon period.
f) If necessary return into the area West of Gibraltar if the situation
alters, or in the new moon period.
4) I request agreement on this, having regard to letter Sk1.Ref. No. I and
2042/41 op.Secret.
--------------------------------------------------- - 281 -
--------------

24. December 1941.

I. U 67 - BE 62 U 127 - ? U 581 - BP
68 - BF 128 - BF 582 - AN 123
71 - BE 82 129 - BE 98 653 - AM 17
84 - BF 71 131 - ? 654 - BE 62
93 - BF 202 - BE 99 751 - BE 64 d) Since there has been no radio traffic for several days with U 127 -
107 - BF 65 434 - ? A - BF 131 - 434 - 567 and 574 these boats are not being considered in connection
108 - BF 49 451 - Gibraltar with coming operations and must be assumed lost.
123 - BF 567 - ?
124 - CF 39 571 - BF 86 V. Reports of Sinkings:
125 - BD 68 574 - ? U 559 in the Mediterranean 1 steamer sunk, 1 steamer torpedoed.
U 562 in the Mediterranean 1 steamer, hit probable.
U 568 in the Mediterranean 1 destroyer sunk.

On Return Passage: U 107 - 108 - 124 - 128 - 129 - 202 - 654 - 751 - VI. General:
UA. The Naval War Staff has agreed, in letter Sk1 2183/44 Gkdos, Secret, to
Sailed: U 87 - 135 - 156 - 753. withdrawal in the direction of the Azores of the boats bound for
Entered Port: U 68 - 128 - 581 - UA. operational area West of Gibraltar. It must be ensured that the Western
Mediterranean is continually patrolled by a few boats. This must be
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. effected by Mediterranean boats on the orders of Senior Officer, U-boats,
Italy.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - d) None. ---------------------------------------------------
--------------
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None. 25. December 1941.
c) See IVa of 23rd December 1941. U 571 broke off search at 2030 for
the tanker and continued her passage into the operational area.
I. U 67 - BF 42 U 135 - Brunsbüttel
71 - CF 21 156 - "
477
 84 - BE 89 202 - BF 72
87 - Brunsbüttel 451 - Gibraltar ??
93 - BF 571 - BF 75
107 - BF 45 582 - AN 23
123 - BF 653 - AM 74 IV. Current Operations:
124 - BE 96 751 - BF 44 a)- c) None.
125 - BD 58 753 - AN d) 1) U 582 was ordered to proceed to Trondheim at once in order to
129 - BF 72 replace stud-bolts of exhaust valves.
2) U 653 was assigned special operation. It is planned to form a radio
decoy with this boat which will give the impression of the presence of a
large number of U-boats in the Atlantic.
On Return Passage: U 107 - 124 - 129 - 202 - 582 - 751. 3) According to a report from Group West, the German tanker was sunk
Sailed: U 66 - 203 - 373 - 552. in Spanish territorial waters, off Cape Ortegal, by British bomber and
Entered Port: U 108 - 654. torpedo aircraft.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. ---------------------------------------------------

--------------
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 658 reported at 2354 from AL 6443 having pursued, without result, 26. December 1941.
two fast transports (17 knots). She was forced to submerge by oncoming
escorts and lost contact thereby.
b) None. I. U 66 - BF U 124 - BF 74 U 451 - Gibraltar
c) According to intercept messages the British gunboat K 196 was 67 - BF 125 - BD 57 552 - BF
damaged by ramming a German U-boat at 1000 on the 22nd December in 71 - CF 19 129 - BF 72 571 - CG 12
the Straits of Gibraltar. (May have been U 451). 84 - CF 26 135 - AN 582 - AF
d) None. 87 - AN 156 - AN 653 - AL 67
93 - BF 96 202 - BF 48 751 - BF
107 - BF 203 - BF 753 - AN
123 - BE 61 373 - BF

- 282 -

On Return Passage: U 124 - 129 - 202 - 582.

Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 67 - 107 - 751.

478
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
---------------------------------------------------
III. Reports on the Enemy: --------------
a) - d) None.
27. December 1941.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) Operational areas: Group "Seydlitz" I. U 66 - BF 40 U 135 - AN 34 U 653 - BF 15
U 84 square - CE 46, 54, 55, 56. 71 - CE 68 156 - AN 46 753 - AN 34
U 71 patrol line in area of squares CE 5870, 8210, 8240 to the East up 84 - CF 46 202 - BF
to square 91 right edge. U 552 patrol line in same area to the East and up 87 - AN 46 203 - BF 65
to 93 right edge. Point of concentration square 6972. 93 - CF 33 373 - BF 68
U 203 patrol line in area of squares 7370, 76 to the East up to square 85, 123 - BE 51 451 - ?
right edge. U 373 square EE 48, 49. U 93 squares CF 48, 49, 57. U 571 124 - BF 40 552 - BF 70
squares CF 72, 75, 78. 125 - BD 47 571 - CF 38
c) - d) None. 129 - BF 582 - AF 59

V. Reports of Sinkings: None.

On Return Passage: U 124 - 753.

- 283 - Sailed: U 86 - 109 - 130 - 333 - 701.
Entered Port: U 202 - 129.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) - d): None.

IV. Current Operations:

VI. General Situation:
The new operational areas off the Azores extend into the area prohibited
for U-boat attacks on account of our own merchant ships and auxiliary
cruisers West of 320. After consultation with the Naval War Staff this area
was opened for the operations planned. The area between 32 and 420
North and 36 and 40 West is prohibited as a pursuit area for U-boats.
479
a) None.
b) According to a report from Group North, British landings have been
made at Aelesund and Nordfjord.
U 156, 87, 135, also U 582 which has put into Trondheim in the
meantime have been ordered to proceed as quickly as possible to square
AF 8490. Operational areas: U 156 square 8486, U 87 square 8723, U
135 squares 8492, 8495, U 582 squares 8516, 8519.
 c) None. 109 - BF 50 333 - Br'büttel 753 - AN 91
d) U 753 reported cylinder cover cracks in both Diesels. She was ordered 123 - BE 41 373 - BE 86
to return to Kiel.

V. Reports of Sinkings:
After return of U 108, U 107, U 67 and U 751 it appears from reports of On Return Passage: U 753.
the Commanding Officers that 4 further ships were probably sunk from the Sailed: - . - Entered Port: U 124.
HG 77, these being:
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

- 284 - III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) - d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
b) U 84 and U 71 have reached their operational area (see IVb of 26th
December 1941).
c) After consultation with Group North, U 161, 135, 87 and 582 have
been released and ordered to continue their passage into the Atlantic. U
582 is to return to Trondheim to carry out repairs planned. U 653 for
U 574 - 1 tanker, 2 steamers) special operation.
) both U-boats lost. d) None.
U 567 - 1 steamer )
V. Reports of Sinkings: None.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------- ---------------------------------------------------
--------------
28. December 1941.

29. December 1941.

I. U 66 - BF 64 U 124 - BE 50 U 451 - ?
71 - CE 83 (Op.Geb.) 125 - BC 67 552 - CG 11 I. U 66 - BF 49 U 130 - BF 40 U 582 - Trondheim
84 - CE 54 (Op.Geb.) 130 - BF 50 571 - CF 56 71 - CE 83 (Op.Geb.) 135 - AF 78 653 - AK 82
86 - BF 50 135 - AE 87 582 - AF 82 ? 84 - CE 54 ( " " ) 156 - AF 77 701 - AN 66
87 - AE 87 156 - AE 87 653 - AL 74 86 - BF 40 203 - CF 21 753 - AN 95
93 - CF 29 203 - BE 83 701 - Br'büttel 87 - AE 75 333 - AN 66
480
 93 - CF 54 ( " " ) 373 - CF 21 VI. General:
109 - BF 40 451 - ? Group North has requested permanent disposition of 3 U-boats for
123 - BD 38 552 - CF 37 protection of the Norwegian coast between Bergen and Stadlandet. Flag
125 - BC 84 571 - CF 84 (Op.Geb.) Officer, U-boats, has the following objections to this step:
All such requirements (operations in secondary theaters of war, escorts,
reconnaissance) overlook the decisive point of view, in my opinion, that
the U-boat is the only weapon with which we can conduct naval warfare
against England on the offensive. If one considers the battle against
- 285 - Britain as decisive for the outcome of the war, then the U-boats must be
given no tasks which divert them from the main theaters of this battle.
The war in the Atlantic has been suspended for weeks now - the first
objective must be to resume it with new forces as soon and thoroughly as
possible.

---------------------------------------------------
--------------
On Return Passage: U 753.
Sailed: - . - 30. December 1941.
Entered Port: U 124.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. I. U 66 - BE 47 U 125 - BC 77 U 552 - CF 54 (Op.Geb.)

71 - CE 83 (Op.Geb.) 130 - BE 670 571 - CF 75 ( " " )
III. Reports on the Enemy: 84 - CE 54 ( " " ) 135 - AM 33 582 - Trondheim
a) - c) None. 86 - BE 61 156 - AM 31 653 - AK 67
d) At 0600 on the 30th December a convoy is expected by reconnaissance 87 - AM 33 203 - CF 42 701 - AN 34
line to leave from Gibraltar. 93 - CF 49 ( " " ) 333 - AN 34
109 - BF 373 - CE 39
IV. Current Operations: 123 - BD 52 451 - ?
a) None.
b) U 93 and U 571 have reached their operational area.
c) U 653 special operation.
d) U 124, the last boat in the rescue action "Python", has reached St. On Return Passage: - . -
Nazaire. This special operation is therefore, concluded. Sailed: U 43 - 754 Entered Port: U 753.

V. Reports of Sinkings: None. - 286 -

481

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 552 has reached operational area.
c) U 653 according to plan. U 43 continuing return passage home.
d) Since there has been no report on passage through the Straits of
Gibraltar from U 451, which left sixteen days ago, this boat must be
assumed lost (see III c of 25th December 1941).
V. Reports of Sinkings: None.
VI. General:
My views regarding further operations in the Mediterranean and the
distribution of boats which become available, have been forwarded to
Naval Staff as follows, in letter Gkdos, Secret 783:
1) In Naval War Staff letter Secret 2024 orders were given for operations
simultaneously by 10 U-boats in the Eastern Mediterranean and 15 West
and East of the Straits of Gibraltar, divided approximately into half. This
entails sending about 34 boats into the Mediterranean.
2) At present there are 22 U-boats in the Mediterranean. Therefore, 11
more must be sent into the Mediterranean. This number is higher than that
given in letter B.d.U. Ref .No. 2047 Group Command, Secret, to make
good any losses sustained.
482
3) Up to now passage through the Straits of Gibraltar, after sinking of the
"Ark Royal" has cost 33% losses. From 24 U-boats which were sent into
the Mediterranean after the sinking of the "Ark Royal", 4 were lost in the
Straits of Gibraltar, 4 turned back owing to bomb damage and only 16 got
through into the Mediterranean. The transfer of 11 further boats into the
Mediterranean, therefore, entails sending 17 U-boats for this purpose,
since 5 U-boats must be expected to be lost or damaged in the passage
through the Straits.
4) The simultaneous operation, as ordered, by 7 U-boats West of the
Straits of Gibraltar also entails about 10 U-boats being available for this
purpose since even in the new moon period loss must be expected in this
very heavily patrolled area.
5) It should, therefore, be investigated whether the value of operations in
the Mediterranean and off Gibraltar and prospects of successes by U-boats
outweigh those high losses.
- 287 -
a) Operations by U-boats in the Eastern Mediterranean have up to now
had an adverse effect on the African campaign. If we succeed in putting
out of action in that area a big ship our own transport facilities to Africa
will be considerably improved. Up to now anti-U-boat activity has been
very weak in this area but, on the other hand, enemy traffic has been
heavy. THerefore, U-boat operations in the Eastern Mediterranean are
justified. There are chances of success and losses up to now have been
slight.
b) In the area West and East of Gibraltar there are strong defence forces.
Aircraft, even by night, at full moon. Enemy traffic to the East up to now
slight. During the passage of the military transports or targets suspected
by the Naval War Staff, for the attacks on which boats have been disposed
in the Gibraltar area, particularly heavy escorts are certain. Prospects of - 288 -
success, therefore, are slight and very difficult. Attacks can only be made
with heavy losses.
6) B.d.U. is, therefore, of opinion that operations simultaneously by as
high a number as 15 boats, as ordered, in the Gibraltar area are not
economical. B.d.U. considers (see proposal letter B.d.U. Group Command
736 Secret) disposition of about 2 - 3 boats East and West of the Straits of
Gibraltar for patrol, with sweeps to the Straits if necessary, to be justified.
7) He proposes, therefore: 31. December 1941.
a) Sending of 2 - 3 further U-boats into the Mediterranean. Therefore,
sending of U-boats into the Mediterranean temporarily concluded. B.d.U.
does not reckon on return of these boats into the Atlantic in the near future I. U 43 - BF 50 U 125 - CG 21 U 571 - CF 75(Op.Geb.)
(see also regarding passage through the Straits of Gibraltar to the West, 66 - BD 65 130 - BE 57 582 - Trondheim
letter B.d.U. Ref. No. Group Command 763 Secret). 71 - CE 93(Op.Geb.) 135 - AM 16 653 - AK 63
b) Disposition simultaneously of only 3 boats West of Gibraltar. 84 - CE 54(Op.Geb.) 156 - AM 14 701 - AF 78
8) The proposal under 7) will also have a good effect on the resumption 86 - BE 51 203 - CE 67 754 - Brunsbüttel
of the conduct of the war in the Atlantic. For this reason also B.d.U. 87 - AM 25 333 - AF 79
considers that forces should not be kept in the Gibraltar area if this is not 93 - CF 49(Op.Geb.) 373 - CE 52
economical and larger numbers should not be sent into the Mediterranean 109 - BE 58 552 - CD 92(Op.Geb.)
than absolutely necessary, since this means that the best U-boat 123 - BD 44
Commanders and crews are no longer to be reckoned with for the Battle of
the Atlantic.
9) A decision is requested so that B.d.U. may appropriately dispose the
boats now becoming available. On Return Passage: - . -
Sailed: U 553 Entered Port: - . -
---------------------------------------------------
-------------- II. Air Reconnaissance: - . -

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) - b) None.
c) The British tanker "Cardita" was sunk in AM 1483 by a U-boat (U
135, 156, 87?).
d) Gibraltar convoy passed Tarifa at 1945 (13 ships, 3 destroyers, 2
corvettes, and 6 further escort vessels).
483
IV. Current Operations: Remarks regarding VI of 16.12.1941:
a) None. The question of accelerating completion work on U-boats was dealt
b) With U 203 and 373 Group "Seydlitz" is now complete in the with in KV Tr No. 19572/41 Secret of the 31st December 1941.
operational area. The following views are now given regarding the 4 proposals of Flag
c) 1) U 653 special operation. Officer, U-boats:
2) U 156 according to orders from the 5th U-Flotilla, will lay Re 1) The withdrawal of workers from repairs to surface ships is not
meteorological buoys on Rockall and Porcupine Bank. permissible.
d) None. Re 2) As far as withdrawals can be avoided the necessary arrangements
V. Reports of Successes: None. have been made.
Re 3) The completion work on U-boats is effected to a great extent at the
VI. General: dockyards of the U-boats in question.
No operations will be made against the Gibraltar convoy. According to Re 4) The question of transferring new constructions from smaller
experiences with the last Gibraltar convoy, operations do not justify the dockyards to larger ones has been thoroughly investigated and, up to now,
result. The "Seydlitz" boats, off the Azores, are also not to be considered found to be impractical. However, so far as restriction on new U-boat
for operations in the Mediterranean, i.e. their work does not include constructions is necessary owing to shortage of raw material, these will be
operations against H.G. convoys. restricted primarily at dockyards with a smaller output.

(Signed) DÖNITZ.

- 289 -
1942
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 January 1942

PG30302

484
 V. Reports of Success:
None.
1.January 1942.
VI. General:
I. U 43 - BF 40 U 130 - BE 48 U 582 - Trondheim Situation of U-boats on 1 January 1942:
66 - BD 58 135 - AL 63 653 - AK 49 I. Total in Commission (Exclusive of boats sailing) on 1 December 1941:
71 - CE 88(Op.Geb.) 156 - AL 39 701 - AM 22 236
84 - CE 54(" " ) 203 - CE 84(Op.Geb.) 754 - AN 63 Commissioned in December 21
86 - BE 44 333 - AN 11 - 257
87 - AM 41 373 - CE 49(Op.Geb.) Losses in December 9
93 - CF 49 552 - CE 92(" " ) 248
109 - BE 48 553 - BF 50
123 - BC 91 571 - CF 75(Op.Geb.)
125 - CG 21 U 95 - traveling alone, presumed sunk about 7 December 1942, near
Straits of Gibraltar. Nothing more is known.
U 127 - First operation. Last report 10 December west of Ireland.
Nothing more was heard 17 December. Should have gone to area west of
On Return Passage: - . - Sailed: - . - Entered Port: - . - Gibraltar.
U 131 - First operation. Reported on 17 December she was unable
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. to dive due to damage by 4 destroyers off Gibraltar. Nothing more heard.

III. Reports on the Enemy: -1-

a) None.
b) None.
c) Ship Algonquin (Tanker, passenger ship?) was attacked by a U-boat on
2 January at 0515 hours in area AM 2613.

IV. Current Operations:

a) U 135 and U 57 received orders to steer course through areas AK 69,
AK 88, BD 17 and BC 54.
b) U 373 received orders to take position in CD 3155 at 0800 on 4
January (convoy for incoming steamer). Hence this boat belongs to U 206 - After sailing alone from St. Nazaire on 29 November,
Seydlitz Group no longer. nothing was heard. Presumably mined or torpedoed in the Bay of Biscay.
c) U 156 and U 653 according to plan. U 208 - Sailed alone on 2 December for the Mediterranean.
d) Nothing. Assumed lost near Gibraltar. No more information available.

485
 U 434 - First operation. Last reported on Gibraltar convoy west of Arctic 1
Gibraltar on 17 December. Presumed destroyed by the convoy. No further
information available. 3) On return cruise from
U 557 - Rammed and sunk at night on 16 December by an Italian N. Atlantic 3
torpedo boat near Crete. Total loss. S. Atlantic -
U 567 - Lt. Endrass, sunk about 12 December while operating Mediterranean 1
against a Gibraltar convoy. No further information available. Arctic 1

II. Disposition of Boats as follows: Total at sea 37 boats

II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c Xb XIV Total
On patrol - - 71 - 19 - - plus UA=91
On test - - 64 1) 4 27 2) 3 2 100
Training 40 4 12 - 2 - - 58
Total 40 4 147 4 48 3 2 248
-2-
1) U 101 and U 403 for training.
2) U 38.

III. In the course of December:

Total number of boats has increased to 12
" " combat boats " 2
" " boats testing " 10 b) Under repairs at base 54 boats
c) 1) 6 boats under a)1) are treated as boats westward of Gibraltar,
standing off the Azores area during the new moon period.
IV. Of 91 combat boats on 1 January 1942: 2) The 13 boats named under 2) include 5 new boats sailing from
a) In operational areas Germany, 1 boat on convoy exercises and 7 boats sailing for the American
1) N. Atlantic 6 coast. These 7 boats are the first in 6 weeks to repeat a cruise to an
S. Atlantic - Atlantic area. The North Atlantic has been practically clear for 2 months.
Mediterranean 9 The 5 boats from Germany are free to attack targets of opportunity.
Arctic 3

2) Sailing for V. Estimate of daily average of combat boats at sea in December:

N. Atlantic 13 a) Per day at 14.3 boats
S. Atlantic - On return cruise per day 5.5
Mediterranean 1 b) Total putting out in December 39
486
 From Germany 14
" Western France 25
Resulting daily average 1.26 boats
c) Total returning boats in December 28
Average per day 0.9 2.January 1942.
d) 1) The smallest number of boats at sea was on December 25 with 17
boats; of which the following put out, 7 boats; of which the following put I. U 43 - BF 36 U 130 - BD 95 653 - AK 42
in, 10 boats. Boats in operational areas 0. 66 - BD 72 135 - AL 67 701 - AM 24
Boats remaining were as follows: 71 - CE 88(Op.Geb.) 156 - AM 45 754 - AN 34
3 boats from position West of Gibraltar 84 - CE 54( " " ) 203 - CE 84(Op.Geb.)
2 boats from rescue action "Python" 86 - BD 67 333 - AM 24
1 boat due to damage at sea, returning to Kiel 87 - AL 93 373 - CE 49(Op.Geb.)
1 boat due to damage at sea returning to Trondheim 93 - CF 49 552 - CE 92(Op.Geb.)
7 boats 109 - BD 92 553 - BF 50
123 - BC 84 571 - CF 75(Op.Geb.)
The boats putting out were as follows 125 - CG 21 582 - Trondheim
4 boats for Gibraltar area
3 boats for Brunsbüttel with sailing orders for Gibraltar area
2 boats for the American coast
1 boat for special radio exercise On Return Passage: - . - Sailed: - . - Entered Port: - . -
10 boats
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
2) The greatest number of boats at sea was on 31 December. The numbers
and ratios compare with those of 1 January 1942. See IV a to c. It must III. Reports on the Enemy:
be stated therefore that boats should sail for the American coast rather than a) U 701 reported enemy convoy at 1045 hours in AM 3377 on SE course
Gibraltar. at low speed.
b) None.
c) English patrol boat sighted surfaced U-boat at 0948 hours in AM 2633
VI. In the course of the month of December the tendency of the number (U-333?)
of boats in the Atlantic was at first great, then fell steadily. d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

-3- a) No orders were given regarding convoy reported by U-701: reasons:
1) In this area there are heavy air patrols and air cover.
2) It is an incoming convoy which would be off the coast by dusk.

487
 3) U 701 and U 333 are fresh from training and have insufficient
experience to operate long in this area.
b) 1) After U 333 was attacked by a patrol boat and U 701 had fired a
spread shot which missed, both boats received orders to sail for CB 54 via
AL26, AK 27 and AJ 96. Operation planned off Newfoundland.
2) U 123 and U 66 were informed, according to supplementary orders
on operational orders to sail for area CB 50. U 109 and U 130 held 450
west as their limit.
3) U 552, U 203 and U 84 were ordered to steer for BC 70 for
operations off Newfoundland. Therefore these boats belong to group
"Seydlitz" no longer. U 571 occupied area hitherto taken by U 552 (Ponta
Delgada!)
4) U 123 is to make for Greek "Dimitros-Inglessis" in the event she is
not more than 150 miles away. This ship requested aid from tugs on the
evening of 1 January in area BU 4335, because of rudder damage.
c) U 156 and U 653 according to plan. U 373 same.
-4-
d) U 701 reported man overboard at 1849 hours (2nd watch officer Lt.
Weinitschke).
V. Reports of Success:
U 134 sank a ship sailing alone in AB 6337.
VI. General:
a) The demand of Group North for positions of 3 U-boats (see 29 Dec.
1941) was refused by Naval High Command.
488
b) In connection with further operations in the Mediterranean, High
Command ordered the following on 29 December along the lines of my
request (secret order 2220):
1) To send only 2-3 more boats to the Mediterranean. Therewith further
commitments in the Mediterranean are finished.
2) Prime area of the Mediterranean is the east. Only 2-3 boats are to
operate in the west.
3) 3 boats are committed to the area West of Gibraltar. Commitment of
boats around Azores still in effect.
With this decree the end of further commitments in the Mediterranean
and corresponding increase of Atlantic activity gives evidence that the
situation has become more practical.
The renewal of the U-boat war in the Atlantic will have to be
considered on the following points:
a) The number of combat boats, which are to carry the load, is smaller
than before the Atlantic battle. Before the beginning of the Mediterranean
campaign the number of combat boats was 73. Today, without the 25
boats in the Mediterranean and perhaps 2 more, the figure today is 65, of
which 3 are in the rich area West of Gibraltar.
b) The entrance of America into the war has provided the commanders
with areas which are not hemmed in by defenses and which offer much
better chances for success.
c) How far these areas offer compensation for decreased numbers of boats
is yet to be shown. In retrospect, the defenses of these areas are unknown.
They will undoubtedly offer better prospects than the English, who are
experienced by their 2 years at war. Reduction of American warships by
transfer from the Atlantic to the Pacific is still not established.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------------
3.January 1942.
I. U 43 - BE 27 U 123 - BC 85 U 552 - CE 65
 66 - BC 95 125 - CC 15 553 - BF 40 a) - b) None.
71 - CE 88(Op.Geb.) 130 - BD 85 571 - CE 92(Op.Geb.) c) U 156 and U 653 according to plan. U 373 has information on picking
up ships transmission and use of radio.
d) None.

-5- V. Reports of Success: None.

VI. General: None.

---------------------------------------------------
-------------

4.January 1942.

I. U 43 - AL 76 U 123 - BC 78 U 553 - BE 57
84 - CE 51 135 - AK 69 582 - Trondheim 66 - BC 88 125 - CC 21 561 - BF 50
86 - BD 57 156 - AM 70 653 - AJ 39 71 - CE 88(Ops.Geb.) 130 - BD 75 571 - CE 92(Op.Geb.)
87 - AL 95 203 - CE 73 701 - AM 16 84 - CE 17 135 - AK 94 582 - AE 81
93 - CF 49 333 - AM 16 754 - AF 79 86 - BD 44 156 - AM 70 653 - AK 27
109 - BD 81 373 - CD 63 87 - AK 69 161 - Br'Büttel 654 BF 50
93 - CE 49(Ops.Geb.) 203 - CD 69 701 AL 26
103 - BF 50 333 - Al 35 754 AM 32
106 - BF 50 373 - CD 34
On Return Passage: - . - 109 - BD 74 552 CE 54
Sailed: U 103, 106, 161, 561, 654 Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. On Return Passage: - . - Sailed: U 73 Entered Port: - . -

III. Reports on the Enemy: II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

a) - b) None.
c) On the afternoon of 5 January Bergung's convoy is to move to III. Reports on the Enemy:
"Dimitrios Inglenis" (See figure IV b 4 from 2 Jan.) Reported this to U- a) - d) None.
123 by radio.
d) None. IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
IV. Current Operations:
489
 b) Entrance into operational areas according to plan (see figure IV b 2) 66 - CC 31 123 - CC 24 553 - BE 58
and 3) from 2 Jan.). 71 - CE 88(Ops.Geb.) 125 - CC 21 561 - BE 10
73 - BE 50 130 - BC 97 571 - CE 92(Op.Geb.)
-6- 84 - CD 37 135 - BD 13 582 - AF 77
86 - BC 56 156 - AM 653 - AK 39
87 - AK 89 161 - AN 66 654 - BE 10
93 - CF 49(Op.Geb.) 203 - CD 53 701 - AL 16
103 - BE 40 333 - AL 25 754 - AM 23
106 - BE 40 373 - CD 31

On Return Passage: - . -
c) 1) U 653 and parallel exercise U 123 same orders. Sailed: - . - Entered Port: - . -
2) According to request, U 156 reported that weather buoys had not
been put out because of the bad weather. Boat was ordered to carry out the II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
exercise in 2-3 days after weather improved, until then she has freedom of
movement. III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
IV. Current Operations:
VI. General: a) - b) None.
Officer in charge of the German Navy in Italy withdrew his request c) U 653 and U 156 according to plan.
for 2-3 more boats for the Mediterranean because of the decree of the High d) Positions of U 123 - 66 - 130 - 109 and 86 should be 250 miles farther
Command of 2 January. to the east. Speed was estimated too great.
In teletype correspondence with officer commanding U-boats in
Italy (of which High Command was informed), I again set forth the V. Reports of Success: None.
principal points of my views on the subject.
VI. General: None.

--------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------
------------- -------------

5.January 1942. 6.January 1942.

I. U 43 - AK 92 U 109 - BC 86 U 552 - CE 41 I. U 43 - AK 67 U 103 - BF U 161 - AN 43 U 582 - AM 24

490
 66 - CD 13 106 - BF 203 - CD 28 653 - AL 57
71 - Op(CE 88) 109 - BD 74 333 - AK 36 654 - BE 29
73 - BF 49 123 - CC 32 373 - CD 31 701 - AK 35
-7-
b) 1) U 653 occupied areas AL 44 and 45 until her fuel was used up.
2) Group "Seydlitz" (boats U 71, 93 and 571) is operating in area
between Azores and Gibraltar. Width of the area about 40 miles. Boats
ordered to move toward Gibraltar due to moon and defense conditions.
3) U-161 has AF 8750 and 8720 as operational areas for the purpose of
attacking British warships, identified along the Norwegian coast by Group
North.
c) U 156 and 373 same orders.
d) None.

V. Reports of Success: None.

VI. General:
According to reports from the 2nd Admiral, many workers from the
various yards have been conscripted, results being that completion dates
for new construction is indefinite. Estimates on the growth in numbers of
combat boats is therefore impossible.

---------------------------------------------------
84 - CD 25 125 - CC 21 552 - CD 37 754 - AL 28 -------------
86 - BC 69 130 - BC 96 553 - BE 49
87 - BD 16 135 - BD 17 561 - BE 67 7.January 1942.
93 - Op(CP 49) 156 - AL 99 571 - Op(CE 92)
I. U 43 - AK 62 U 103 - BE 92 U 161 - AN 20 U 571 - Op(Azor.-
Gibr.)
66 - CC 36 106 - BE 68 203 - CD 16 582 - AM 16
On Return Passage: - . - 71 - Op(zw.Azor.-Gibr.) 109 - BC 94 333 - AK 28 653 - AL
Sailed: U 504 - Kiel Entered Port: - . - 44(Op.G.)
73 - BF 74 123 - CC 26 373 - CD 31 654 - BE 43
II. Air Reconnaissance: - . - 84 - CD 13 125 - CC 20 504 - Br'büttel 701 - AK 27
86 - BC 64 130 - BC 86 552 - CD 28 754 - AL 01
III. Reports on the Enemy: 87 - BD 14 135 - BC 38 553 - BE 47
a) - d) None. 93 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.) 156 - AM 71 561 - BE 89

IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
491
 On Return Passage: U 653 3) Convoy exercise of U 373 evidently according to plan.
Sailed: U 107 - Lorient; U 562 - Brest d) None.
Entered Port: - . -
V. Reports of Success: None.
-8-
VI. General: None.

---------------------------------------------------
-------------

8.January 1942.

I. U 43 - AK 35 U 103 - BE 83 U 156 - AM 10 U 561 - CF 34

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. 66 - CC 37 106 - BE 59 161 - AF 78 571 - Op(Str.zw.Azo.-Gibr.)
71 - Op(zw.Azor.-Gibr.) 107 - BF 50 203 - CD 11 572 - BF 50
III. Reports on the Enemy: 73 - CG 11 109 - BC 85 333 - AK 01 582 - AL 38
a) d) None. 84 - BC 87 123 - CC 28 373 - BD 76 653 - AL 48
86 - BC 55 125 - CC 15 504 - AN 63 654 - BE 17
IV. Current Operations: 87 - BC 62 130 - BC 85 552 - CD 16 701 - AK 43
a) None. 93 - Op(Str.zw.Azor.-Gibr.) 135 - BC 56 553 - BD 67 754 - AK 66
b) 1) Operational areas for Group Ziethen:
U 86 - BB 63 and 66: U 203 - BB 68 and 69
U 84 - BB 92 and 91: U 135 - BB 95 and 96
U 87 - BB 98 and 99. On Return Passage: U 653
Sailed: U 587 - 588 = Kiel; U 108 - 128 - 85 = Lorient
U 552 had freedom of movement in this area. Reference for U 86 that Entered Port: U 85 - Lorient.
convoy assembly point was evidently off St. Johns.
U 109 - BC 47 and 71; U 130 - BC 74 and 77. Operations planned off -9-
Halifax for both these boats.
2) After position report from 161 and answer from Group North, 161
received orders to set out for combined operation area.
c) 1) U 156 reported operation (Porcupine Bank) completed. Ordered to
return to Lorient after completing Exercise #1 (Rockall Bank).
2) U 653 began return cruise due to fuel shortage. Therefore radio
exercise cannot be carried out.
492
 9.January 1942.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. I. U 43 - AK 31 U 106 - BE 57 U 161 - AM 32 U 582 - AL 02

66 - CC 52 107 - BF 40 203 - BC 79 587 - Br'büttel
III. Reports on the Enemy: 71 - Op(Str.Azor.Gibr.) 108 - BF 50 333 - AK 46 588 - "
a) U-571 reports at least two steamers at the mole of Ponta Delgada on 6 73 - CF 38 109 - BC 73 373 - BD 91 653 - AL 87
January, of which one is armed. 84 - BC 75 123 - CC 43 504 - AN 40 654 - BD 38
b) - d) None. 86 - BB 45 125 - CB 62 552 - CD 11 701 - AK 48
87 - BC 59 128 - BF 50 553 - BD 58 754 - AK 67
IV. Current Operations: 93 - Op(Str.Azor.Gibr.) 130 Op(BC 70) 561 CF 56
a) - b) None. 103 - BE 81 135 - BC 58 571 - CF 81
c) 1) U 156 reported completion of supplementary operation (Rockall 156 - BF 42 572 - BF 40
Bank). Boat is returning to Lorient at full speed.
2) Convoy operation of U 373 evidently going according to plan.
d) According to weather report from U 156 from area BF 17, she must
have completed her supplementary operation 1 (Rockall Bank) against our On Return Passage: U 653 - 156
own signals. Sailed: - . - Entered Port: - . -

V. Reports of Success: None. - 10 -

VI. General:
Re-call of U 161 reflects proposed use of type IXc boats. Boats of
this type which are ready by mid-January are to carry out a surprise attack
in the Aruba-Curacao-Trinidad area. Trinidad is the focal point for all ship
movement to the south, and so far as can be established, Aruba and
Curacao the principal oil ports. This area does not fall into the same
category as the coast of the U.S.A., in which place the boats failed. If the
large boats are ready by mid-January we shall have the opportunity to
carry out a surprise attack during the new moon period in February before II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
anti-U-boat activities are organized to any great extent.
Boats proposed for this operation are U 156, 67, 502, 161 and 129. III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - b) None.
--------------------------------------------------- c) 1) Entrances to Portland and Boston have been mined.
------------- 2) 13 U.S.A. harbors have been designated as defense areas, among
which are New York, San Francisco, Boston and Norfolk.

493
 d) A convoy outbound from England was expected in Gibraltar (this
convoy does not appear on our plan).
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Distribution of attack areas off the American coast:
U 66 - CA 79, 97, DC 12-13; U 123 - CA 28, 29, 52, 53
U 125 - CA 38, 59, 62, 63; U 109 area between points BA 9633 - CB
1577 - BB 7355 - BB 8575.
U 130 - BB51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58. This boat will be assumed to be in
her area on 13 January.
Designation: Group Paukenschlag.
2) U 73 - 572 - 561 have orders to pass through Straits of Gibraltar in
the next new moon period. Until then they have freedom of action West of
the Straits.
c) Convoy operation of U-373 evidently going according to plan.
d) U 108 which put out on the evening of 8 January started return cruise
because of damage to her diesels.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
10.January 1942.
I. U 43 - AL 11 U 106 - BE 72 U 156 - BF 50 U 571 -
Op(Str.Azor.Gibr.)
66 - CC 45 107 - BF 161 - AM 01 572 - BF
71 - Op(Str.Azor.Gibr.) 108 - BF 203 - BC 75 582 - AL 45
73 - CF 60 109 - Op(BC 47) 333 - AK 48 587 - AN 60
84 - Op(BB 90) 123 - CB 62 373 - BE 44 588 - AN 60
86 - Op(BB 60) 125 - CB 52 504 - AN 20 653 - BE 22
494
87 - BC 84 128 - BF 552 - CC 32 654 - BD 29
93 - Op(Str.Azor.Gibr.) 130 - Op(BB 50) 553 - BD 49 701 - AK 71
103 - BE 75 135 - BC 73 561 - CF 90 754 - AK 82
On Return Passage: U 108 - 161 - 156 - 653.
Sailed: U 85 - Lorient. Entered Port: U 156 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 11 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a)- b) None
c) 1) Yugoslav steamer "Nikolina Matkovic", urgently requested help due
to loss of her rudder. AJ 92.
2) Unknown steamer sunk in BB 7690.
3) Unknown ship in danger in BC 5850.
4) According to English reports 3 German U-boats were sunk by a
Gibraltar convoy on 17 December, since men of three separate crews were
landed in Gibraltar.
d) 1) Further reports, founded on rumors, state that another German and
even an Italian U-boat was towed into Gibraltar.
2) An English gunboat checked up on what was evidently the Spanish
steamer Lola off Melilla. Lola was alleged to be supplying German U-
boats.
3) Harbor situation Gibraltar: 35 ships - 14 patrol craft.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
c) Convoy operation of U 373 evidently going according to plan.
V. Reports of Success:
U 584 sank a U-boat in the Arctic Ocean.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
11.January 1942.
I. U 43 - AL 22 U 103 - BD 96 U 161 - AM 19 U 572 - BF 9
66 - CB 83 106 - BD 94 203 - Op(BB 60) 582 - AK 62
71 - Op(Azor.Gibr.) 107 - BE 59 333 - AJ 96 587 - AN 43
73 - CG 70 108 - BF 50 373 - BE 56 588 - AN 23
84 - Op(BB 90) 109 - BB 94 504 - AF 75 653 - BE 35
85 - BF 50 123 - CB 51 552 - Op(südl.Neufl.) 654 - BD 51
86 - Op(BB 60) 125 - CB 43 553 - BC 69 701 - BC 31
87 - BC 77 128 - BF 561 - CG 70 754 - AK 76
93 - Op(Azor.Gibr.) 130 - BB 92 571 - Op(Azor.Gibr.)
135 - Op(BB 90)
On Return Passage: U 108 - 161 - 653
Sailed: U 82 La Pallice. U 402 - 581 St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: U 108 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 12 -
495
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy number 2 see figure IV a.
2) U 43 reports convoy in AL 0336 spread over a wide area, steaming
south into the sea at 10-12 knots. Use of weapons impossible because of
high seas.
b) None.
c) 1) English steamer "Cyclops" (9076 BRT) torpedoed in CB 2420.
Disabled steamer in AJ 5950.
d) Westbound convoy passed Tarifa at 1845 hours. 11 ships, 4
destroyers.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy Number 2.
Group Seydlitz moved against westbound convoy "HE 78" with U
93 - 71 - 571. U 93 made contact in CG 9468 0655/12, course 2700, speed
5-7 knots. Contact will be kept.
b) 1) U 85 - destined for the Mediterranean is to remain in the Atlantic
and received orders to make for BC 87.
2) Operation for U 587 and %88 is foreseen in top third of AM. Due to
floating mines etc, boats are to follow courses:
U 557 AF 7460 - AM 3281 - AM 2420
U 588 AF 7580 - AN 3284 - AM 2490.
c) English aircraft reported enemy merchant ship and U-boat in BF 7571.
This is believed to be U 373 with "Essberger". Boat received orders to
report position in case she was sighted by aircraft. U 373 confirmed
aircraft attack. "Else Essberger" thereupon received orders via U 373 to
make for El Ferrol. The U-boat to wait outside the territorial waters.
 d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
1) Enemy situation off the East coast of America was reported as follows:
a) Along the coast of the USA and to the south still heavy single ship
movements. Fuel points New York, Baltimore etc., Straits of Florida,
Aruba, Trinidad.
b) Also heavy single ship movements after waiting for activity at the
assembly points on the Halifax - Sydney Line. Only sparse movements to
Bermuda. Assembly and organization of convoys in USA harbors possible
but not yet noticeable.
c) Enemy air patrols heavy but not dangerous because of inexperience.
4) My observations are as follows:
a) Commitment of 5 boats in area from Sydney to Cape Hatteras.
b) Commitment of the next 4 boats type IXc to Trinidad and Aruba.
c) For experience further commitment of type IXb boats in area 4a, type
IXc in area IVb.
d) Experience will be gained for later operations. As long as the ratio is
extant, the east coast of America is to be considered the most successful
area for large boats.
e) Use of torpedo mines not contemplated since success will result only
from large numbers.
f) Use of VIIc boats in the area South of Newfoundland where we can
expect greatest traffic and least defense of enemy ships.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------

- 13 -
12.January 1942.

I. U 43 - AL 03 U 103 - BD 86 U 203 - Op(BB 60) U 581 - BF

66 - CB 77 106 - BD 84 333 - AK 49 582 - AK 59
71 - CG 107 - BE 57 373 - BE 49 587 - AK 79
73 - CG 80 109 - BB 86 402 - BF 588 - AF 77
82 - BF 123 - CB 66 504 - AM 32 653 - BF 40
84 - Op(BB 90) 125 - CB 42 552 - Op(südl.Neuf.) 654 - BD 41
85 - BF 40 128 - BF 553 - BC 64 701 - BC 28
d) Activity similar to that in English waters during the 1st 2 years of 86 - Op(BB 60) 130 - BE 59 561 - CG 80 754 - BC 33
war. 87 - Op(BB 90) 135 - Op(BB 90) 571 - CG
2) Our own situation is marked by removal of bases and rich reserves of 93 - CG 89 161 - AL 97 572 - CG 17
boats for operations:
a) Type VIIc boats in Scotland area.
b) Type IXb boats in Straits of Florida.
c) Type IXc boats from Trinidad to Aruba. On Return Passage: U 161 - 653
3) We must take advantage of the situation before changes are made. Sailed: U 108 - Lorient ; U 586 - 94 Kiel
Principal attacks must be on single ships so that no mass movements will Entered Port: - . -
be possible.
496
- 14 - U 588 E-W strip AM 11 and lower half of 43.
c) Sailing date of "Elsa Essberger" is proposed for 13 January. U 373
still remains outside the territorial waters off El Ferrol.

V. Reports of Success:
U 77 reports torpedoing a Jervis class destroyer and ripping off the stern.
According to an Italian report she was evidently later sunk.
U 43 and U 701 reported sinking 1 steamer each in the Atlantic.

VI. General: None.

II. Air reconnaissance: None.
---------------------------------------------------
III. Reports on the Enemy: -------------
a) 1) Convoy number 2 see figure IVa.
2) U 43 reports sinking 1 steamer.
3) U 701 the same. 13.January 1942.
4) U 130 reports area SW Newfoundland has heavy air patrols. Boats
believes it has been seen. I. U 43 - AM U 103 - ED 86 U 203 - Op(BB 60) U 582 - AK 81
b) None. 66 - CA 97 106 - BD 75 333 - AK 74 586 - Br'büttel
c) Disabled ship in AJ 8563. 71 - CG 107 - BE 72 373 - BF 80 587 - AF 77
d) English Admiralty reports sinking of corvette "Salvia" (evidently in
the Mediterranean).

IV. Current Operation:

a) Convoy number 2: U 93 keeping further contact and reports convoy - 15 -
at 0918 hours in CG 9473, speed 8-10 knots. Last report 1030 hours CG
9478. At 1330, U-571 had contact in CG 8937 and held steady contact
until 1800 hours. Boat had to submerge and reported at 2318 hours that
the convoy was in CG 8947 at 1756 hours.
U 73 believed she had sound bearing in CG 8862 at 2032 hours. No
final action ordered for the night. B.d.U. estimated convoy at 0900 hours
on the 13th at about DJ 11-12, perhaps farther north. Contact will not be
made again until morning. Air recce expected for 13 January.
b) 1) Following boats dispatched for action against single ships in the
area NW of the Hebrides.
U 587 E-W strip AM 11 and top half of 43.
497
 I. 73 - CG 108 - BF 50 402 - BF 588 - AM 35 c) Convoy operation of U 373 called off. Boat returning to La Pallice.
82 - BF 109 - Op(süedl Nova Scotia) 504 - AM 21 653 - BF 50 d) None.
84 - Op(BB 90) 123 - Op(CA 20/50) 552 - Op(süedl Neuf.) 654 - BC 62
85 - BF 125 - Op(CA 20/50) 553 - BC 55 701 - BC 54 V. Reports of Success:
86 - Op(BB 60) 128 - BE 58 561 - CG 754 - BC 37 U 43 reported sinking 4 steamers totaling 21,000 BRT from convoy, of
87 - Op(BB 90) 130 - BB 50 571 - CG which 1 had already been reported on 12 January.
93 - CG 135 - Op(BB 90) 572 - CG
94 - Br'büttel 161 - BE 25 581 - BF - 16 -

On Return Passage: U 504 - 161 - 653

Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 653 Brest.

II. Air Reconnaissance:

None due to bad weather.
U 552 sank the British steamer Dayrose, 4113 BRT.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 43 reported from AL 2659 the sinking of 4 steamers, 21,000 BRT, VI. General: None.
supposedly from convoy number 3.
2) Convoy number 2 see section IVa. ---------------------------------------------------
b) None. -------------
c) Admiralty gives U-boat warning for EU 8190 (none of our boats).
d) None. 14.January 1942.

IV. Current Operations:

a) Convoy number 2: was not again contacted by our boats. Air recce
failed because of bad weather. Convoy steered south and B.d.U. believes
it followed the same coastal course as convoy number 1. Estimating speed
as 8.5 knots, the following patrol line was established: CF 9356 to CF
9676. U 71 - 93 and 571 in line. In this way the boats will be in the same
area covered by proposed air recce on 14 January.
b) Attack areas:
1) U 701 - BB 63 and 66 (U 86 in same area)
2) U 754 - BC 47 and 71.
498
I. U 43 - AL 26 U 103 - BD 85 U 203 - Op(BB 60) U 582 - AK 78
66 - Op(CA 70-80) 106 - BD 77 333 - AJ 99 586 - AN 63
DC 10 107 - BD 93 373 - BF 80 587 - Op(AM 11+13)
71 - CG 108 - BF 49 402 - BF 588 - Op(AM 13+15)
73 - CG 90 109 - Op(südl. Nova Scotia) 504 - AM 20 654 - BC 59
82 - BE 65 123 - Op(CA 20+50) 552 - Op(südl. Neufundland) 701 - AJ
93
84 - Op(BB 90) 125 - Op(CA 30-60) 553 - BC 73 754 - BC 53
85 - BF 128 - BE 57 561 - CG 90
 86 - Op(BB 60) 130 - Op(BB 50) 571 - CG
87 - Op(BB 90) 135 - Op(BB 90) 572 - CG 90
93 - CG 161 - BF 40 581 - BF
94 - AN 63

On Return Passage: U 504 - 161 - 43 - 373.

Sailed: U 751 - 575 St Nazaire.
Entered Port: - . - enough. U 71 presumed convoy on sound bearing CE 7177 at 0120
hours. No further contact reports. Air observation expected for the 15th
II. Air Reconnaissance: January.
Convoy number 2 in area CG 70. b) - d) None.

III. Reports on the Enemy: V. Reports of Success: None.

a) 1) Convoy number 2 see IVa.
2) U 552 reports sinking steamer "Dayrose" south of Cape Race.
b) Aircraft picked up convoy in CG 7721.
c) 1) U-boat sighting in BK 4560. (none of our boats).
2) "Dayrose" torpedoed off Cape Race (U 552).
3) Numerous troop transports off St. Johns.
4) Tanker in sinking condition at 1530 14 January in area DC 6770 (U
123?).
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy Number 2: Aircraft picked up convoy at 1804 hours in CG
7721.
Bearing signals were given for a very short time only and were
evidently not heard by the boats. Air position again given to the boats. U
93 made contact at 2357 hours in CF 9665, course NW, speed 6 knots.
Orders: U 93 send bearing signal, the rest of the boats act on U 93's
reports. According to later report of U 571 (had been forced to submerge)
the position of the convoy at 2200 hours was CG 7471. Thereafter air
observation was
- 17 -
499
VI. General:
Sinking of "Dayrose" (see IIIa) and the tanker (see IIIc) are the first
reports of success from the boats in the west.
The result is not yet established. Conjectures are as follows:
a) It is not known whether the boats have reached their positions off the
coast of USA. It is possible that they will arrive later than the estimated
time because of bad weather.
b) U 552 reports bad weather south of Newfoundland so that boats must
be having difficulty taking position, to say nothing of attack.
---------------------------------------------------
-------------
15.January 1942.
I. U 43 - AM 14 U 103 - BD 76 U 203 - Op(BB 60) U 581 - BF
66 - Op(CA-DC) 106 - BC 98 333 - BC 31 582 - BC 32
71 - CF 90 107 - BD 95 373 - BF 67 586 - AN 43
73 - CG 90 108 - BE 92 402 - BE 59 587 - Op(AM 10)
 82 - BE 56 109 - Op(südl. Nova Scotia) 504 - AM 47 588 - Op(AM 10)
84 - Op(BB 90) 123 - Op(CA) 552 - Cape Race-Op. 654 - BC 82
85 - BE 57 125 - Op(CA) 553 - BC 78 701 - AJ 97
86 - Op(BB 60) 128 - BE 72 561 - CG 90 751 - BF 50
87 Op(BB 90) 130 Op(BB 50) 571 CF 90 754 - BC 54
93 CF 90 135 Op(BB 90) 572 CG 90
94 AN 43 161 Bf 50 575 BF 50
On Return Passage: U 504 - 161 - 373 - 43.
Sailed: U 566 - Lorient; U 132 - Trondheim; U 455 - 191 - 352 - 656 -
578 - Kiel.
Entered Port: U 161 - Lorient; U 373 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance:
Convoy number 2 in area 500 miles west of Gibraltar.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Convoy number 2, see IVa.
b) Aircraft picked up convoy in CF 6893.
c) 1) Unknown ship reports suspicious craft in BA 9846.
2) U-boat warning given on 12 January for area 40 miles SW Cape
Palmas.
- 18 -
d) None.
500
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy number 2: After contact was broken off during the night, U
71 sighted a destroyer at 1045 hours in CF 6987 on NW course.
At 1114 hours U 571 reported convoy in CF 6977 on NW course. Boat
had interrupted contact until 1500 hours and then broke off. Weather: SW
6, rain squalls. Air recce sighted the convoy in CF 6893 at 1550 hours.
Bearing signal was picked up and reported only by U 71 but she was
unable to hold contact. If the boats did not make contact as result of air
observation by Group West on 16 January, the boats received orders to
continue during the night and if still contact had been made by dawn they
were to report position and fuel status and return to their operational area
between the Azores and Gibraltar. Main point being to the east (see IVb of
6 January 1942). No reports received up until 0800.
b) 1) Operational areas:
U 586 E - W strip in AM 11-31
U 587 " " AM 13-33
U 588 " " AM 15-65
U 94 has freedom of movement in this area.
2) U 333 area BC 74 and 77
U 582 " CC 13 and 21
3) Due to entrance of our warships to Trondheim, U 94 - 586 - 132
eastward of our own minefields were ordered not to fire at warships and to
remain W. of 30 40 minutes.
c) - d) None.
VI. General:
The situation in the Aruba, Curacao and Trinidad areas were
discussed by 2 merchant ship captains who have good knowledge (Lt.Cdr.
Kregohl of the Supply Group West and Capt. Struewing of KMD
Hamburg).
As a result operational possibilities are given as: 1 boat for Aruba,
1 boat for the route from Maracaibo to Aruba and 1 boat for Curacao.
Most of the boats ready (U 502 - 156 - 67) are destined for this operation
and will begin during the period of the new moon in February. They
should leave about 19 and 20 January.
 III. Reports on the Enemy:
Dönitz a) Convoy number 2 and 4 see IV a 1 and 2
b) None.
c) 1) British steamer "Llangibby Castle" bombed by a German plane in
BE 5779 (evidently after being torpedoed by U-402).
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log 2) 1 steamer (call letters MPAQ) sent SOS. Call given from Cape Race
(Presumable therefore, American area).
16 - 31 January 1942 3) 10 transports sailed from Reykjavik at 0800 on 16 January for
Aberdeen. (see IVa)
PG30303 4) At 1558 hours a British steamer was attacked by a U-boat in AM
1557 (U 588?).
5) U-boat sighted on westerly course in BB 7528 at 1326 hours (U
109?).
16.January 1942. 6) Floating wreck at CA 2945 (U 123?).
d) None.

I. U 43 - AM 24 U 106 - CD 12 U 352 - AD 40 U 582 - BC 26 IV. Current Operations:

66 - Op(CA/DC) 107 - BD 86 402 - BE 57 586 - AN 20
71 - CF 60 108 - BE 83 455 - AO 40 587 - Op(AM 10)
73 - CG 90 109 - Op(südl. Nova Scotia) 504 - AM 77 588 - Op(AM 10)
82 - BE 54 123 - Op(CA 20-50) 552 - Op(südl. Neufundl.) 591 AO 40
84 - Op(BB 90) 125 - Op(CA 30-60) 553 - BB 99 654 BC 75
85 - BE 72 130 - Op(BB 50) 561 - CG 90 656 AO 40
86 - Op(BB 60) 132 - AF 48 566 - BF 50 701 BC 21
87 - Op(BB 90) 135 - Op(BB 90) 571 - CF 60 751 BF 40
93 - CF 60 203 - Op(BB 60) 572 - CG 90 754 Op(BC 47-71)
94 - AF 75 333 - BC 29 578 - AO 40 575 BF 40
103 - BD 77 581 - BF
a) 1) Convoy number 2: No further reports received. Boats to go to their
operational areas. U 93, whose last report came from CF 9665 at 2357
hours on 15 January, has made no further reports in spite of numerous
opportunities.
2) Convoy number 4: As a result of U 402's convoy report, U 581 - 85
and 82 were sent out. Remaining boats are to sail westward. U 402
reports 5 steamers and 1 destroyer
- 20 -

On Return Passage: U 504 - 43

Sailed: - . - Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

501
 in BE 5924 on SW course. According to observation control U 402
gave convoy position at 1400 as BE 5716. Air cover for ship 10 gave
convoy position as BE 5924 at 1345 hours. Convoy was made up of 19
ships and 5 destroyers. U 402 lost contact at 1515 because she submerged
to avoid aircraft, but made contact on enemy destroyer again at 2015 in BE
4955. Then no further contact. U 402 evidently scored 2 hits on a 2 stack
passenger steamer.
Boats were ordered to operate against the convoy further during the
night and then to follow a southerly course for action against the possible
Gibraltar convoy. Our own air recce was announced for 17 January at
1100 hours. U 71, on return cruise, was ordered to move against the
convoy since she had plenty of fuel.
b) 1) Action against the 10 transport convoy outbound from Reykjavik is
foreseen in enemy shipping lanes (see IIIc 3). In this connection U 94 and
U 586 were ordered to sail for AM 12 at high speed. From here both boats
will operate with U 587 and 588.
2) U 128 ordered to Bermuda area to prey on British shipping and to
remain outside the 200 meter line because of mines.
c) Special operation (Göttingen) of U 564 was called off again.
d) 1 U 73 reported passing 00 at 1120 hours. 12 hours later the boat
entered the area under the Italian U-boat command.
V. Reports of Success:
U 402 reported 2 hits, evidently on the Llangibby Castle (British) 11,951
BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
17.January 1942.
I. U 43 - AF 77 U 107 - BD 84 U 402 - BE 70 U 582 - BC 52
66 - Op(CA/DC) 108 - BE 81 453 - AN 30 586 - AM 32
502
71 - CF 53 109 - Op(südl. Nova Scotia) 504 - AL 93 587 - Op(AM
upper 3rd)
82 - BE 70 123 - Op(CA 20-50) 552 - Op(südl. Neufundl.) 588 - Op( "
" )
84 - Op(BB 90) 125 - Op(CA 30-60) 553 - BB 97 591 - AN 30
85 - BE 70 128 - BD 94 561 - CG 90 654 - BC 74
86 - Op(BB 60) 130 - Op(BB 50) 566 - BF 40 656 - AN 30
87 - Op(BB 90) 132 - AF 69 571 - Op(Azor.-Gibraltar) 701 - BC 18
93 - Op(between Azor.-Gibr.) 135 - Op(BB 90) 572 - CG 90 751 - BF
40
94 - AM 31 203 - Op(BB 60) 575 - BF 754 Op(BC 47+71)
103 - BC 97 333 - BC 54 578 - AN 30
106 - CC 36 352 - AN 30 581 - BE 70
- 21 -
II. Air Reconnaissance:
Convoy number 4 in area BE 70-80.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 87 reported sinking two tankers totaling 51,200 ton in BB 9871.
U 87 shot up and returning, fuel 47 cubic meters.
2) Situation report: U 123: operational area at first normal then after
sinkings, lights extinguished and movements ceased. Area free of mines
up to line CA 2793 to 5849, although area CA 54 has medium air and
destroyer patrols. Still has 5 electric torpedoes, 90 cubic meters of fuel.
Position CA 8145. - 22 -
3) Convoy number 4 - see section IV a.
b) Convoy was not picked up.
c) 1) U-boat sightings reported in BC 1860 and BB 7528.
2) Steamers steaming along the coast for ports north of New York are to
steer for Cape Hatteras. In case this is not possible, steer as close to the
coast as navigation will permit.
3) A request for help but no position was given by the Greek steamer
"Dimitrios Thermiotis" on 18 January at 0619 hours.
d) None.
d) U 561 reported position at 2118 as CH 8183. Boat will be in
IV. Current Operations: Mediterranean U-boat Command area in 12 hours.
a) Convoy number 4: Air recce did not pick up the convoy. Orders to
the boats: In case no contact made by evening, U 82 and 85 to sail V. Reports of Success:
westward, U 402 and 581 to steer for area CF 92. U 71 to turn back. U 87 reports sinking 2 tankers of 15,200 BRT. One was Cardit 8200
Since no reports are forthcoming from the boats, the operations against BRT, the other a new tanker of 7000 BRT.
this convoy are finished.
After 24 hours no further contact was made and no promise of success VI. General:
from the few boats was evident. Due to bad visibility no air recce is a) Operation of U 132 off Reykjavik will offer information on the
expected in the morning. situation there. The question is open, as to whether new boats fresh from
b) 1) U 588 - 587 - 94 - 586 received orders to take up patrol positions on the homeland are to be sent to a definite area or just to the middle of the
18 January at 1200 hours from AM 2176 to AE 9774. Purpose: Attack the North Atlantic. Sizable attacks will not be afforded in these great empty
10 transport ships already sailing from Reykjavik. stretches at the time.
2) U 333 joined group Ziethen and took up area BB 98 and 99 as attack b) Reports from the coast of USA and Canada show that activities of U-
area. boats can be successful much longer than was expected. Reports from U
3) U 132 assigned area west of Reykjavik for attack on ships moving 123 point out that this boat has had success far above its expectations.
eastward.
4) U 123 - 109 - 87 ordered to report position. U 203 given freedom of ---------------------------------------------------
movement in same area as Group Ziethen., that is to say, south of --------------
Newfoundland. Former area BB 68 and 69 taken by U 754. Boats of
Group "Paukenschlag" to follow order 46 in case ship movement or 18.January 1942.
defense necessitate this action. In this case U 130 is to take up attack area
between U 123 and U 66 (CA 50 and 80).
c) None. I. U 43 - AF 79 U 109 - Op(südl. Nova Scotia) U 504 - BF 41 U 591
- AN 23
503
 66 - Op(CA/DC) 123 - CH 80 Op 552 - Op(südl. Neufl. 654 - BB 97
71 - CF 22 125 - Op(CA 30-60) 553 - BB 87 656 - AN 20
82 - BE 70 128 - BD 85 566 - BF 701 - Op(BB 60)
84 - Op(BB 92+93) 130 - Op(BD 50) 571 - Op(Az.-Gibr.) 751 - BE 67
85 - BD 99 132 - AE 59 572 - Gibr. 753 - AO
86 - Op(BB 63+66) 135 - Op(BB 90) 575 - BE 69 754 - Op(BB 60)
87 - BB 70 203 - Op(südl. Neufl.) 578 - AN 20
94 - Op(AM 20) 333 - BC 73 581 - CF 26
103 - CD 11 352 - AN 20 582 - BC 49
106 - CC 34 402 - CF 26 586 - Op(AM upper 3rd)
107 - BD 75 404 - AO 587 - Op(dto.)
108 - BE 72 455 AN 20 588 - Op( " )
3) Situation report U 86: 16 January torpedoed tanker. "Dimitrios
Thermiotis" sunk on 18 January at 0615 hours. Steamer was steering for
BC 4110. Assembly point for convoys (St. Johns - Conception Bay?) - no
movement up until 16 January (8 torpedoes, 80 cubic meters of fuel).
Since U 552 and 86 both claim sinking the same steamer, arrival of boats
must be awaited for clarification of this matter. Evidently evidently each
sank a steamer and both heard the same SOS.
b) - d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
On Return Passage: U 504 - 43 - 71 - 87. b) 1) The patrol line has had no success in picking up the 10 ships from
Sailed: U 564 - La Pallice; U 98 - 69 - St. Nazaire. Reykjavik.
Entered Port: - . - 2) U 701 has transferred the upper deck torpedoes and has taken up
areas BB 63 and 66.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. 3) U 84 had freedom of movement in the area of Group Ziethen (S.
Newfoundland). After release of several boats from Group Ziethen, empty
III. Reports on the Enemy: areas were filled as follows:
a) 1) U 87 reports single steamer in BC 7942 on general course 3200 U 135 area BB 92 and 93
speed 10 knots, zigzagging sharply. U 333 " BB 95 and 96
2) Situation report U 552: Heavy ship movements off the coast and St. U 582 " BB 98 and 99
Johns in area BB 66. Air and destroyer patrols. 56 cubic meters of fuel, 5 U 553 and U 654 area BB 50 for CA 54 and 57. Boat still has 145
misses, causes unknown. "Dimitrios Thermiotis" sunk. Boat is returning cubic meters of fuel.
to port, since heavy weather and icing prevent unloading of deck c) - d) None.
torpedoes.
V. Reports of Success:
- 23 - U 552 and U 86 reported sinking Greek steamer "Dimitrios Thermiotis",
U 86 reported torpedoing a tanker.

VI. General: None.

504
---------------------------------------------------
-------------- On Return Passage: U 552 - 504 - 87 - 71 - 43
Sailed: U 505 - Kiel
19.January 1942. Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

I. U 43 - AN 23 U 107 - BC 98 U 402 - CF 61 U 582 - BC 74
66 - CA/DC/Op. 108 - BD 93 404 - Kr'sand 586 - Op(AM upper 3rd)
69 - BF 50 109 - Op(südl. Nova Scotia) 455 - AN 587 - dto.
71 - BF 77 123 - Op(CA 20-50) 504 - BF 45 588 - dto.
82 - BD 97 125 - Op(CA 30-60) 552 - BC 70 591 - AF 75
84 - Op(südl. Neufundl.) 128 - BD 78 553 - Op(BB 70) 654 - BB 88
85 - BD 64 130 - BD 85 (Op) 564 - BF 50 656 - AN
86 - Op(BB 63+66) 132 - AE 73 566 - BF 40 701 - Op(BB 60)
87 - BC 87 135 - Op(BB 90) 571 - Op(SW. Azor. Gibr.) 751 - BE 58
94 - Op(AM upper 3rd) 203 - Op(südl. Neufundl.) 572 - Gibraltar 753 -
Kr'sand
98 - BF 50 333 - BC 74 575 - BE 59 754 - Op(BB 60)
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 572 reported failure to pass through Straits of Gibraltar because
of bad weather and heavy defenses.
2) U 135 (in area S. Newfoundland) reported return cruise because of
fuel supply.
b) None.
c) 1) The Norwegian whale ship "Kosmos II" (16,966 BRT) sent "SSS"
from area 30 miles NE Cape Hatteras. (U 66 or 123).
2) The American tanker "Malay" (8207 BRT) was fired on by a U-boat
(U 66) and was afire aft - 20 miles NE of Cape Hatteras.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
- 24 - b) 1) U 582 - U 402 - U 571 occupy attack area between Azores and
Gibraltar in a strip 40 miles wide. Boats may move eastward due to moon
and defense conditions.
2) U 572 ordered to attempt new breakthrough of Straits of Gibraltar.
3) Since the patrol group has had no luck, U 586 - 587 - 588 - 94
proceed to attack area as previously ordered (see IVb of 15 January).

V. Reports of Success: None.

VI. General: None.

103 - CC 32 352 - vor Bergen 578 - AF 75 ---------------------------------------------------

106 - CC 27 581 - CF 37 --------------

20.January 1942.
505

I. U 43 - AN 43 U 106 - CC 18 U 352 - Bergen U 575 - BE 57
66 - Op(CA/DC) 107 - CD 13 402 - CF 68 578 - AM 32
67 - BF 50 108 - BD 91 404 - AF 87 581 - CF 69
- 25 -
69 - BF 40 109 - Op(südl. Nova Scotia) 455 - AN 582 - Op(BB 90)
71 - BF 73 123 - Op(CA 20-50) 502 - BF 50 586 - Op(AM upper 3rd)
82 - BD 88 125 - Op(CA 30-60) 504 - BF 50 587 - Op(dto.)
84 - Op(südl. Neufundl.) 128 - BC 99 505 - Br-Büttel 588 - Op( " "
)
85 - BD 58 130 - CB 23 552 - BC 58 591 - AE 92
86 - Op(BB 63+66) 132 - AE 71 553 - Op(BB 70) 654 - Op(BB 70)
87 - BC 99 135 - BB 90 564 - BF 40 656 - AN
94 - Op(AM upper 3rd) 156 - BF 50 566 - BE 67 701 - Op(BB 60)
98 - BF 40 203 - Op(südl. Neufundl.) 571 - Op(Azor.-Gibraltar) 751 - BE
47
103 - CC 25 333 - Op(BB 90) 572 - DJ 13 754 - Op(BB 60)
753 - AF 79
On Return Passage: U 43 - 552 - 87 - 135 - 71.
Sailed: U 435 - Kiel; U 576 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: U 504 - Lorient.
506
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Situation and success reports of U 123: Area CA 7965 has very
heavy single ship movements. Sank 3 tankers and 5 freighters totaling
53,360 BRT. Ships lie in 7-11 meters of water. U 123 returning to port.
2) Situation report of U 66: In area (CA 79 - 87, DC 12-13).
Everything dimmed out. Movements same as U 123. Fuel 135 cubic
meters. Position DC 13. Have sunk 18,000 BRT.
b) None.
c) 1) American reports give i steamer abandoned in CA 7695.
2) English U-boat in BF 5539 on 19 January.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 106 and U 103 steering for new area CA 69.
2) U 106 - 109 - 125 ordered to report position, situation and success.
c) Exercise Göttingen begins in the morning of 21 January. U 432 has
left on corresponding orders.
V. Reports of Success:
U 123 reports sinking "Cyclops" - 9076 BRT, tanker "Norness" - 9577
BRT, tanker "Malay" - 8207 BRT and 5 other ships totaling 26,500 BRT,
altogether 8 ships of 53,000 BRT total.
U 66 reports sinking 18,000 BRT.
- 26 -

VI. General:
The success of U 123 and 66 justifies sending boats to this area and the
future is hopeful for other boats.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
21.January 1942.
I. U 43 - AN 69 U 107 - CC 35 U 404 - AM 39 U 581 - Op(Azor.-
Gibraltar)
66 - Op(CA/DC) 108 - BD 76 435 - AN 63 582 - Op(BB 90)
67 - BF 40 109 - Op(südl. Nova Scotia) 455 - AM 586 - Op(AM upper
3rd)
69 - BF 40 123 - CA 90 502 - BF 40 587 - Op(dto.)
71 - BF 50 125 - Op(CA 30-60) 505 - AN 37 588 - Op( " " )
82 - BD 71 128 - CD 43 552 - BC 69 591 - Al 36
84 - Op(südl. Neufundl.) 130 - CB 18 553 - Op(amerik. Küste) 654 -
Op(amerik. Küste)
85 - BD 71 132 - Op(westl. Reykjavik) 564 - BE 60 656 - AM
86 - Op(BB 60) 135 - BC 81 566 - BE 48 701 - Op(BB 60)
87 - BD 74 156 - BF 40 571 - Op(Azor. Gibraltar) 751 - BD 59
94 - Op(AM upper 3rd) 203 - Op(südl. Neufundl.) 572 - Gibraltar 753 -
AE 92
98 - BE 60 333 - Op(BB 90) 575 - BD 69 754 - Op(BB 60)
103 - CC 17 352 - AF 76 576 - BF 49
106 - CB 53 402 - Op(Azor. Gibraltar) 578 - AM 18
On Return Passage: U 43 - 552 - 87 - 135 - 123 - 71.
Sailed: U 563 - Lorient; U 432 - La Pallice.
Entered Port: U 71 - St. Nazaire.
507
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Situation report U 109: Boat has been in area 4 since 16 January,
unable to use weapons because of bad weather. Fair amount of ship
activity close to the coast. Ships sailing alone are dimmed out. Coastal
lights burning. 100 cubic meters of fuel. Still no activity in area 5. Why
the boat has had no success in this are remains to be seen.
2) U 203 has sunk 3 ships totaling 18,000 BRT. 1 patrol boat evidently
sunk due to accidental shot. Success off Cape Race. Use of weapons
hindered by bad weather. Air and destroyer patrols. On return cruise.
b) None.
c) 1) Norwegian ship "Alexandria Hoegh" (8248 BRT) sunk in CB 1831
(U 130?).
2) Unknown ship torpedoed in BB 6670 (U 84 - 86 - 701??).
3) Norwegian ship "William Hansen" (1344 BRT) torpedoed in BB
6620 (U 84 - 86 - 701?).
4) "Georgian" reported contact with a U-boat (Position unknown).
- 27 -
d) English destroyer "Hesperus" collided with a German U-boat on 16
January off Gibraltar while convoying 37 ships. Destroyer has ramming
damage. Evidently approached from the east, if from west, however, U-
boat was possibly U 93.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
 b) 1) Newfoundland: After U 135 began return cruise, new positions
were ordered. In attack area BB 68 - 69 - 92 - 93 - 95 - 96 - 98 - 99, U 754
has upper third. I. U 43 - AN 90 U 108 - BD 76 U 404 - AM 39 U 576 - BF 49
U 333 middle third and U 582 the lower third. U 86 and 701 have BB 66 - Op(CA/DC) 109 - Op(Nova Scotia) 432 - BF 80 578 - AM 18
63 - 66 as operational areas and U 84 freedom of movement in the above 67 - BF 40 123 - CA 92 435 - AN 63 581 - Op(Azoren-Gibraltar)
named areas. 69 - BE 67 125 - Op(CA 30-60) 455 - AM 582 - Op(BB 90)
U 553 - 654 have freedom of movement in the same coastal area with 82 - BD 71 128 - CD 43 502 - BF 40 586 - Op(AM upper 3rd)
CA 7960 as the southern limit. 84 - Op(Neufundl.) 130 - CB 18 505 - AN 37 587 - Op(dto.)
2) Area West of Herbrides: Following boats received orders to occupy 85 - BD 71 132 - Op(Reykjavik) 552 - BC 69 588 - Op( " " )
attack areas as follows: U 352 - AL 24-33-34; U 753 - AL 26-35-36; U 86 - Op(BB 60) 553 - Op(amerik. Küste)
591 - AL 28-37-38; U 404 - AL 02-39-03; U 578 - AL 61-62-63. 87 - BD 74
After sending position report U 572 took up AL 64-65-66 as attack
area.
3) After an unsuccessful attempt to pass through Straits of Gibraltar, U
572 took up attack area from U 571 (Azores-Gibraltar). U 571 received - 28 -
orders to return to port.
c) Operations of U 432 against convoy evidently going according to
plan.
d) None.

V. Reports of Success:
U 203 reported sinking: 3 ships total 18,000 BRT; 1 patrol craft
evidently sunk.

VI. General:
Boats fresh from Germany (see IV b 2) will not go to area off
Reykjavik but will be placed in upper area of the mid-Atlantic. Very light
ship movements in both areas. Disadvantages of operations off Reykjavik
are: long periods of darkness, close quarters limiting action against
convoys, heavy defenses etc, all of which make operations further
southward more feasible.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
22.January 1942.
508
94 - Op(AM upper 3rd) 135 - BC 81 563 - BF 50 591 - AL 36
98 - BE 64 156 - BF 40 564 - BE 60 654 - Op(AM upper 3rd)
103 - CC 17 203 - Op(Neufundl.) 566 - BE 48 656 - AM 24
106 - CB 53 333 - Op(BB 90) 571 - CF 60 701 - Op(BB 60)
107 - CC 35 352 - AE 93 572 - v.Gibr. 751 - BD 59
402 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.) 575 - BD 69 753 - AE 92
754 - Op(BB 60)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 552 - 87 - 135 - 123 - 571 - 203.
Sailed: U 136 - Kiel.
 Entered Port: U 43 - Kiel
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 85 reported sinking of a steamer of 9000 BRT. Position of U 85
BD 8777, 81 cubic meters of fuel.
2) U 84 reports "no activity in old area BB 6739. Two torpedo spread
shot missed, 1 torpedo broached. Heavy air patrols and air bombs. 8
torpedoes in the boat, one in deck container, 43 cubic meters of fuel.
3) U 123 has passed Bermuda on her return cruise and gives position as
DD 25. City and harbor dimmed out. Lights extinguished even to single
buoys. Searchlight defenses on harbor entrances. No mine defenses, no
patrols or ship movements observed.
4) U 82 sank tanker "Athelcrown" (11,999 BRT) in approximate
position BC 22.
5) U 553 was hunted for 2 hours by a destroyer. U 553 sank a tanker,
type W.B. Walther (10,000 BRT) in ballast on 16 January BC 85.
b) None.
c) 1) British motor tanker"Athelcrown" sunk by U 82 in BC 9250.
British Admiralty sent U-boat warning for this area.
2) American steamer torpedoed in BB 6676 reported she was still afloat
and attempting to reach the nearest port.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) In order to give boats more freedom south of Newfoundland Group
Ziethen U 86 - 701 - 84 - 754 - 333 - 582 given freedom of movement in
all operational areas.
2) U 125 left her operational area for area DC, because of lack of ship
movement.
3) In order to use less fuel, U 82 - 85 - 751 - 575 - 566 - 564 - 98 and 69
ordered to operate in coastal areas CA and BB.
- 29 -
509
After U 82 and 85 reported 85 and 81 cubic meters (convoy pursuit)
these boats received orders to steer for BB 63 and 66 (St. Johns and
Conception Bay areas).
4) U 455 reports she is out of order (as in U 656). Ordered to take
station in areas AL 22 - 31 - 32.
c) Convoy action by U 432 going according to plan.
d) The sinking of a ship by U 85 in "Anton course" emphasizes the
necessity of establishing the character of a ship before attacking.
V. Reports of Success:
U 85 sank a steamer of 9000 BRT.
U 553 sank a tanker type W.B. Walther 10,000 BRT.
U 82 sank a tanker "Athelcrown" 11,999 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
23.January 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(CA/DC) U 109 - Op(südl. Nova Scotia) U 432 - BE 83 U
581 - Op(Azor.-Gibraltar)
67 - BE 96 123 - DD 25 455 - Op(AL 20/30) 582 - Op(BB 90)
69 - BE 67 125 - Op(DC) 502 - BE 92 586 - Op(AM 11-31)
82 - BC 92 128 - CC 68 505 - AN 20 587 - Op(AM 13-33)
 84 - BB 60 130 - Op(CA 50) 552 - BD 58 588 - Op(AM 15-35)
85 - BD 78 132 - Op(Reykjavik) 553 - CB 23 591 - Op(AL 20/30)
86 - Op(BB 60) 135 - BC 93 563 - BF 73 654 - Op(CA-DC)
87 - BD 83 136 - AO 564 - BE 77 656 - Op(AL 60)
94 - Op(AM upper 3rd) 156 - BE 97 566 - BD 67 701 - Op(BB 60)
98 - Be 46 203 - BC 59 571 - CG 12 751 - BD 48
103 - CB 56 333 - Op(BB 90) 572 - Op(Azor.-Gibraltar) 753 - AM 11
106 - CB 47 352 - AE 87 575 - BD 58 754 - Op(BB 60)
107 - CC 19 402 - Op(Azor.-Gibraltar) 576 - BE 435 - AN 20
108 - BC 98 404 - AM 18 578 - Op(AL 60)
On Return Passage: U 552 - 87 - 135 - 123 - 571 - 203.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 85 reported sinking of steamer i.r. BD 8793. Attack followed
order number 50 figure 23 b (sinking of ship sailing alone screened by
destroyer).
2) U 203, on return cruise, sighted a large freighter in BC 5435, course
SW, speed 12 knots. Boat gave situation report later in Cape Race area.
Lights burning. Ship
- 30 -
510
movements close to coast. Ships blacked out for the most part.
3) U 553 reports torpedoes all fired, returning to port. Results: 2
tankers (16,000 BRT) sunk. Ships taking outer coastal route, about 100
miles east of Cape Hatteras - Cape Race line, steering for convoy
assembly point.
b) None.
c) 1) Position of U 132 reported in AE 47.
2) English aircraft reported enemy U-boat in CG 8628 (U 402).
3) British merchant ships received U-boat warning in BC 83 (torpedoing
of Norwegian tanker "Leisten" and an unknown ship).
4) U-boat warning in DB 6410. Aircraft attack on U-boats in AL 18 and
27.
5) Empire Wildebeeste (5631 BRT) torpedoed in CB 6188 and an
American tanker "Venore" (14,305 gross tons) torpedoed in CA 79.
6) Spanish steamer "Navemar" (5473 BRT) torpedoed by a U-boat in
CF 9273 (not a German U-boat).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 106 assigned CA and DC coastal areas as attack area. Freedom of
movement in that area.
c) Convoy operation by U 432 going according to plan.
d) U 69 reports turning back because of heavy oil leakage. Cause
unknown.
V. Reports of Success:
New report from U 553: Sank tanker of 6000 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
24.January 1942.
 I. U 66 - Op(CA-DC) U 109 - Op(südl. Nova Scotia U 432 - BE 83 U On Return Passage: U 69 - 553 - 203 - 552 - 87 - 135 - 123 - 571.
578 - Op(AL 60) Sailed: U 161 - Lorient; U 213 - Kiel.
67 - BE 97 123 - BD 32 435 - AN 20 581 - Op(Azor.-Gibraltar) Entered Port: - . -
69 - BE 67 125 - Op(CA-DC) 455 - Op(AN) 582 - Op(Neufl.)
82 - BC 82 128 - CC 68 502 - BE 89 586 - Op(AM upper 3rd) II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
84 - Op(Neufundl.) 130 - Op(CA 50) 505 - AF 87 587 - Op(AM upper
3rd) III. Reports on the Enemy:
85 - BC 96 132 - Op(Reykjavik) 552 - BD 58 588 - Op(AM upper 3rd) a) 1) U 352 reports on "Oslo Route": no air recce; 1 patrol boat sighted.
86 - Op(Neufundl.) 135 - BC 93 553 - CB 32 2) U 94 and U 586 report no ship movements and negligible patrols in
87 - BD 83 136 - AO 563 - BF 73 area west of the Hebrides. Just off the coast (along the 200 meter line) air
94 - Op(AM upper 3rd) 564 - BD 95 patrols reported by U 94.
566 - BD 68 3) U 581 reports sinking corvette on 19 January.
4) U 66 reports total sinkings 5 ships 50,000 BRT of which 2 tankers, 1
auxiliary and 1 ore ship. Heavy ship movements from the south to Cape
Hatteras.
- 31 - 5) U 333 reports sinking three ships from 18-24 January of which was
"Burdpan" 26,000 BRT. Single ship movements, air patrols and great deal
of heavy weather.
b) None.
c) Greek ship "Mount Kitheron" sent SSS off Newfoundland. English
aircraft reported attack on U-boat in CG 8610. Unsuccessful.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
b) 1) U 94 - 586 - 587 - 588 make up Group Robbe. These boats and U
98 - BE 46 156 - CF 32 571 - CG 12 591 - Op(AL) 505 - 455 - 352 - 753 - 581 - 404 - 578 - and 656 are to return to western
103 - CB 56 203 - BC 66 572 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.) 654 - Op(amerik. France (see VI).
Küste) 2) Group Ziethen (U84 - 86 - 701 - 754 - 333 - 582) received orders to
106 - CB 47 333 - Op(Neufundl.) 575 - BD 58 656 - Op(AL) return to port in case their area was no longer productive. Thereupon ship
107 - CC 19 352 - AE 87 576 - BE 68 701 - Neufundl. movements were reported from 16 - 22 January in the middle part of area
108 - BC 98 402 - Op(Azor.-Gibraltar) 751 - BD 48 BC.
404 - AM 18 753 - AM 11 U 82 and U 85 given freedom of movement in BB and BC.
754 - Op(Neufundl.)
511
 3) U 402 ordered to Horta, since the "Llangibby Castle" lay off that
point and other transports were expected to transfer 2000 soldiers.
- 32 -
c) 1) Convoy operations of U 432 going as planned.As special operation
U 575 was ordered to convoy a German steamer home. She is to be at CD
3155 on 29 January for this operation. Until then she has freedom of
movement. Operational order number 50 section 1 to be used.
d) 1) Regarding the question of sinking of Spanish steamer "Navamar", U
571 reports Italian U-boat in area 100 miles from the sinking position.
Italian U-boat command confirms sinking attributable to this boat.
2) U 445 reports transmitter breakdown from AL 31. (see IVb 4 of 22
January).
V. Reports of Success:
U 581 reports sinking a corvette.
U 66 reports sinking 5 ships total 50,000 BRT of which 18,000 BRT is
already known.
U 333 reports sinking 3 ships, total 26,000 BRT.
VI. General:
The re-call of boats west of England is based on the following:
a) Attack possibilities of the North American and Canadian coasts are
very favorable as is shown by success reports of the boats both in single
ship movements and paucity of defense. This situation must be taken
advantage of with as many boats as possible before defense measures are
strengthened and convoy systems are taken up.
512
b) Bad weather conditions in the area west of England lessen the
possibilities of success.
c) The yard situation in western France is such that, because of ample
space, these boats can be made ready before the large numbers of
American boats put back in.
d) The area west of England can easily be filled by boats direct from
Germany should the need arise. U 132 still remains on observation duty in
the Reykjavik area.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
25.January 1942.
I. U 66 - CA 88 U 109 - Op(Nova Scotia) U 404 - AL 62 U 578 - AL
65
67 - CF 37 123 - CC 79 432 - BE 46 581 - Op(Aroren-Gibraltar)
69 - BF 47 125 - Op(DC) 435 - AN 20 582 - Op(Neufundl.)
82 - BC 49 (Op) 128 - CC 83 455 - AL 33 586 - Op(AM upper 3rd)
84 - Op(Neufundl.) 130 - Op(CA 50) 502 - CF 31 587 - AM 15
85 - BC 86(Op) 132 - Op(Reykjavik) 505 - AF 74 588 - AM 17
86 - Op(Neufundl.) 135 - BD 72 552 - BD 67 591 - AL 39
87 - BD 92 136 - Kr'sand 553 - CC 11 654 - Op(amerik. Küste)
94 - AM 33 156 - CF 29 563 - BF 40 656 - AL 68
98 - BE 44 161 - BF 40 564 - BD 86 701 Op(Neufundl.)
103 - CB 54 203 - BD 45 566 - BD 59 751 BC 69
106 - Op(CA-DC) 571 - CG 24
107 - CC 42 572 - CG 75
575 - BD 49
- 33 -

108 - CD 12 213 - Br'büttel 576 - BE 59 753 - Op(AM upper 3rd)
333 - Op(Neufundl.) 754 - Op(Neufundl.)
352 - AL 31
402 - CF 98
On Return Passage: U 505 - 69 - 404 - 591 - 656 - 578 - 94 - 588 - 587
- 553 - 333 - 66 - 203 - 552 - 87 - 135 - 123 - 571 - 701.
Sailed: U 105 - 129 - 504 Lorient.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 591 - on return course "Copenhagen" reported a patrol boat in AE
9448 but no other movements whatsoever.
2) U 701 sank steamer ("Baron Haig") (3391 BRT). U 701 had 2 pistol
failures and 3 undetermined misses. Movements in Cape Race area nil.
Patrols and various scatter bombings.
3) U 85 sighted a brightly lighted steamer and blacked out destroyer in
BC 4831 sailing westward.
4) U 123 sank armed steamer "Culebra" after a gun battle in CC 79.
Ship was loaded with aircraft parts. (3044 BRT).
5) U 333 sighted freighter (7000 BRT) in BC 5755, in company with a
destroyer. Suspected U-boat trap (possibly identical to U 85 report).
6) U 66 sank altogether: 1 tanker 9200 BRT, 1 freighter-passenger 9000
BRT, 1 freighter 7500 BRT, 1 tanker "Charles Black" (14,000 BRT), 1 ore
513
steamer 10,000 BRT, total tonnage 50,000 BRT. 3 undetermined misses
on 3 other tankers.
7) U 130 reports sinking 3 fully loaded tankers and 1 empty freighter.
Total: 30,748 BRT. Slight ship movements, medium patrols in area BB
50. Bays believed mined. Movements for Sydney steer for Skatar and
then along the coast.
b) None.
c) 1) 1 U-boat sighting in BC 83.
2) American steamer "Mae" (5607 BRT) sent "SSS" from DC 1280 (no
German U-boat there).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
- 34 -
b) 1) U 66 ordered not to pass Bermuda in order to make use of a
fruitful area. Boat still has 2 torpedoes.
2) U 103 ordered to steer for CA 38-39-62-63. In case there are no ship
movements there she is to take up coastal area to the west and search to
south of Cape Hatteras.
3) Contrary to former orders U 352 and U 455 are ordered to Iceland
and are steering for area AE 55. (Seydisfiord evidently assembly point for
Murmansk convoy). U 586 and 753 to remain in north section of AM.
c) 1) Convoy operation of U 432 going according to plan.
2) U 575 received new orders: boat to take position in middle of CD 37
for "Spreewald" operation. She waited there until 1 February at 2400
hours, set out for BC 80 and finally reported 200 miles from proposed
meeting point.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 130 reports sinking 4 ships total 30,748 BRT.
U 123 reports sinking steamer "Culebra" 3044 BRT.
VI. General:
New orders for boats west of England (see IV b 3) are for 8 boats
to remain in Iceland-Faroes-Scotland area. In this connection U 132 for
area west of Reykjavik, U 352, 455, 435 east of Iceland off Seydisfiord, U
586 and 753 west of Faroes-Hebrides, U 136 in Cristiansand and U 213 in
Heligoland. These latter two will reach their areas in a few days. THe
purpose of these boats is the defense of Norway and will be pulled in to
make full complement if necessary.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
26.January 1942.
I. U 66 - CA 98 U 123 - CC 85 U 432 - BD 65 U 578 - AL 96
67 - CF 53 125 - Op(DC) 435 - AN 20 581 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
69 - BF 50 128 - CC 84 455 - AE 87 582 - Op(Neufundl.)
82 - Op(BB/BC) 129 - BF 50 502 - CF 29 586 - Op(AM upper 3rd)
84 - BC 40 130 - CA 54 504 - BF 50 587 - AM 41
85 - BC 82 132 - Op(Reykjavik) 505 - AM 33 588 - AM 45
86 - Op(Neufundl.) 135 - BD 81 552 - BF 40 591 - AL 69
87 - BE 73 136 - AN 30 553 - BB 99 654 - Op(amerik. Küste)
94 - AM 27 156 - CF 51 563 - BF 656 - AM 77
98 - BD 65 161 - BF 40 564 - BD 84 701 - BC 49
103 - CB 44 203 - BD 55 566 - BD 57 751 - BC 67
105 - BF 50 213 - AN 95 571 - BF 70 753 - Op(AM northern part)
106 - BF 50 333 - BC 58 572 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.) 754 - Op(Neufundl.)
514
107 - Op(CA/DC) 352 - AM 11 575 - BD 70
108 - CB 63 402 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.) 576 - BE 57
109 CC 33 404 - AM 47
- 35 -
On Return Passage: U 505 - 69 - 404 - 591 - 656 - 578 - 94 - 588 - 587
- 553 - 333 - 66 - 203 - 552 - 87 - 135 - 123 - 84 - 571 - 701.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 69 St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy number 5, see IV a.
2) U 123 sank "Pan Norway" (9231 BRT) in CC 86 as a result of an
artillery engagement.
3) U 109 reported situation south of NOva Scotia. More active air and
destroyer patrols since sinking Greek steamer "Anyceas". Sub chasers
near the coast. No ship movements seen off Cape Sable.
4) U 135 reports no movement in BB 90 or on return cruise. She sank a
5000 ton freighter in BC 9167 on 22 January.
5) U 582 reports sinking a tanker of 6000 BRT in CC 21.
6) U 588 sank a steamer of 6000 BRT in AM 3555.
b) None.
 c) 1) USA tanker "Gulfqueen" (6599 BRT) sent SSS and sighted 2) Attack areas:
periscope. Another U-boat sighting and SSS report in BC 7437. Steamer U 103 - 108 in coastal area of CA, in the northern part of CA's lower
"Mariposa" sighted U-boat in CC 22 and attacked it (U 552). corner.
2) Spanish tanker "Campomanes" sighted unknown U-boat off Gibraltar U 107 - 106 to operate south of that area.
on northerly course. In case situation fruitless, expansion of areas was optional
d) None. c) Convoy operation of U 432 going according to plan. U 575 was
informed of course and appearance of the Spreewald.
IV. Current Operations: d) None.
a) Convoy number 5:
At 1426 hours U 753 reported small convoy of 5 ships in AM 4641, V. Reports of Success:
course 2300, speed 5-7 knots. Boat had contact until 1931 hours. Last U 588 reports sinking 1 ship 6000 BRT
report from AM 4927, course south, speed 10 knots. Numerous seaplanes U 109 " " D. Anyceas
by day. U 592 " " 1 tanker 6000 BRT
At 1st report U 753 received orders to attack convoy insofar as was U 135 " " 1 freighter 5000 BRT
possible and to relay orders to boats in the neighborhood. She signaled U U 123 " " tanker Pan Norway 9231 BRT.
591 in AM 76, U 656 in BE 35, U 587 in AM 44, U 94 in AM 44, U 404 in
AM 47 and U 505 in AM 23. All boats were on return cruises. U 656 VI. General: None.
received orders to set out, while U 591 alone could operate against the
convoy since she was on southerly course. Attack was immediately made ---------------------------------------------------
optional to all boats. Boat keeping contact was to report every hour. U 94 --------------
was required to give bearing signal at 1906 and 2008 hours. Since no
contact was reported after 1931 hours and U 753 did not report, all boats 27.January 1942.
were ordered to continue return voyage if no contact was made by dawn.

- 36 - I. U 66 - CB 75 U 123 - CC 86 U 402 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.) U 578 - BF

40
b) 1) U 402 received message that damaged troop transport was
reckoned to be sailing from Horta in about 6 days.
515
67 - CF 54 125 - Op(DC) 404 - AM 70 581 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
82 - Op(BB/BC) 128 - CC 78 432 - BD 50 582 - CC 22
84 - BC 51 129 - BF 40 435 - AF 70 586 - Op(AM)
85 - Op(BB/BC) 130 - Op(CA) 455 - AE 85 587 - AM 70
86 - Op(Neufundl.) 132 - Op(Reykjavik) 502 - CF 51 588 - AM 70
87 - BE 58 135 - BE 42 504 - BF 40 591 - AM 70
94 - AM 70 136 - AN 20 505 - AM 27 654 - Op(amerik. Küste)
98 - BD 56 156 - CE 49 552 - BF 50 656 - BF 42
103 - Op(CA) 161 - BF 553 - BC 78 701 - BC 58
105 - BF 40 203 - BD 64 563 - BE 61 751 - BC 58
 106 - Op(CA) 213 - AN 93 564 - BD 72 753 - AM 70 Op
107 - CB 61 333 - BC 67 566 - BD 48 754 - Op(Neufundl.)
108 - CC 34 352 - AE 85 571 - BF 50
109 - BB 70 572 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
575 - BD 70
576 - BE 47
On Return Passage: U 552 - 571 - 505 - 404 - 591 - 656 - 578 - 94 - 587
- 588 - 553 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 203 - 87 - 135 - 123 - 84.
Sailed: U 332 La Pallice.
Entered Port: U 552 St. Nazaire; U 571 La Pallice.
- 37 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 130 torpedoed a tanker of 7500 BRT in CA 5443. Ship broke up.
2) U 754 reports sinking: 4 ships 16,876 BRT total. Situation report
from area BB 60; lighthouses alight from St. Marys to Baccalieu since 24
January but some are weak. No ship movements by day, but heavy the 1st
night. After sinking 2 steamers movements stopped. 3 torpedo boats
operating as a patrol group seen thrice.
3) U 125 reports situation:
I) Area 3 (see order number 50) no movement up until 21 January,
light air patrols. Light ships just like peace time.
516
II) CA 58-88 very heavy movements, mostly N-S. Many tankers. Various
neutral ships. No Patrols.
III) 3 bow tubes out of order, stern tube empty. Wind NE 3, visibility
medium.
IV) Sank a 7000 ton freighter in CA 8797 on 26 January. One hit scored
on tanker on 25 January, 6 misses, cause of 2 undetermined. 6 torpedoes
left.
4) U 753 reports contact with convoy number 5 lost on 26 January. 2
depth charges from destroyer in the evening. Ran over us as we dived,
damaging top deck, all antennae and starboard exhaust caps damaged,
interior of boat not in order.
Fired on tanker having air cover but missed (27 January).
5) U 572 reported being shot up by attack on troop transport 0000 hours
in CF 7357. Depth charges also.
6) U 505 and reported regarding "Rotterdam" route: No movements, no
patrols. Distant scatter bombing some distance away during the day.
7) U 440 bombed by aircraft in AM 4496. Attack periscope knocked
out.
b) None.
c) 1) Wreck with bow sticking up in CA 5430 on 25 January (U 130?).
2) Steamer "Hado" attacked by U-boat in CA 7952.
3) American "Pan Maine" sent "SSS" in CA 7350 on 28 January.
d) Sailing of "Malaya" from Gibraltar (repairs in England? Torpedoed by
U 81 on 14 November 1941).
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
- 38 -

b) 1) At request of U 109, fuel will be transferred to her from U 130 on
night of 29 January in CA 4845. U 109 freedom of attack in same coastal
area.
2) Attack area for U 571 and U 566 is BB 70 and farther southwest. U
564 - 98 have freedom to move as far west as possible, giving situation
reports on the boats.
3) U 85 and 82 given liberty to extend their attack areas to the south in
case weather or cold makes their operational areas unfavorable.
4) U 432 assigned area off Cape Hatteras after completing special
operation and following refueling. In case refueling is impossible she is to
have freedom of movement according to fuel situation.
Iceland area:
U 435 - 455 - 352 took positions in sectors off Seydisfjord between
300 and 1800. Fjord is suspected assembly place for N. Atlantic (Russia)
convoy.
c) 1) Convoy operation of U 432 going according to plan.
2) U 575 reports air recce on 2 and 3 February by Condor and Heinkel
115. Picked up just outside territorial waters by 2 sweepers.
d) U 123 requests transfer of her wounded to the Spreewald. Received
orders to steer for middle of CD 37 (meeting point of U 575 and
Spreewald). Further directions from High Command.
V. Reports of Success:
U 130 reported sinking 1 tanker 7,500 BRT.
U 754 " " 4 ships total 16,876 BRT.
U 125 " " 1 freighter 7,000 BRT.
Sinking of 4,000 BRT ship not reported previously was claimed by U
553.
VI. General: None.
517
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
28.January 1942.
I. U 66 - CB 82 U 123 - CD 71 U 402 - Op(Azor. Gibral.) U 578 - BF
50
67 - CF 49 125 - CA 83 404 - BE 32 581 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
82 - Op(BB/BC) 128 - BD 35 432 - BD 72 582 - Op(Neufundl.)
84 - BC 61 129 - BF 71 435 - AE 55 586 - Op(AM)
85 - Op(BB/BC) 130 - CA 64 455 - AE 55 587 - BE 30
86 - Op(Neufundl.) 132 - Op(Reykjavik) 502 - CF 46 588 - BE 30
87 - BF 40 135 - BE 54 504 - BF 40 591 - BE 30
94 - BE 30 136 - AN 20 505 - AM 20 654 - CB 51
98 - BD57 156 - CE 93 553 - BC 88 656 - BF 50
103 - CA 56 161 - BE 99 563 - BE 25 701 - BC 68
105 - BE 203 - BF 45
- 39 -
106 - Op(CA) 213 - AN 34 564 - BC 93 751 - BC 57
107 - CB 54 332 - BF 50 566 - BC 68 753 - AM 40
108 - CG 24 333 - BD 47 572 - CF 73 754 - BC 47
109 - Op(Nova Scotia 352 - AE 55 575 - CD 30
576 - BD 68
 boat is to wait until 1 February at 2400 hours and in case ship is not found,
On Return Passage: U 505 - 404 - 501 - 656 - 578 - 94 - 588 - 587 - will proceed.
654 - 553 - 754 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 203 - 87 - 135 - 123 - 84.
Sailed: -.- V. Reports of Success: None.
Entered Port: U 656 - Brest; U 578 - St. Nazaire.
VI. General: None.
II Air Reconnaissance:
- 40 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 654 reports situation from area BB 70: Boat saw nothing on
outbound voyage. Sub chaser activity near the coast, evidently a U-boat
trap in BB 99. Total of 9 misses, of which 3 were on a freighter lying hove
to. 4 torpedoes and 65 cubic meters of fuel left. Returning to port.
2) U 132 reported situation in area west of Reykjavik: Medium air
patrols, heavy patrol activities. Gaps in mine defenses in AE 4764. So far
no ship movement. Limited use of weapons because of weather.Sea 7,
wind NE 7-8, high swells.
b) None. 29.January 1942.
c) 1) Abandoned ship reported in CA 57.
2) Abandoned tanker "Onley" (7294 BRT) stalked by U-boat in CA
5740 as well as American steamer "Serva la Bari" and English tanker I. U 66 - CB 67 U 123 - CD 55 U 402 - Op(Azor. Gibr.) U 581 -
"British Corfòral" (6972 BRT) in BB 5890. Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
d) None. 67 - CA 95 125 - CA 93 404 - BE 582 - BB 90
82 - Op(BC/BB) 128 - DD 25 432 - CE 47 586 - Op(AM northern part)
IV. Current Operations: 84 - BD 41 129 - CG 11 435 - Op(AE 50) 587 - BE 10
a) None. 85 - Op(BC/BB) 130 - CA 60 502 - CE 92 588 - BF 40
b) 1) U 125 received orders to return to port, reloading from deck 86 - Op(Neufundl.) 132 - AE 47(OP) 504 - BE 591 - AM 78
containers to be attempted. 87 - BF 50 135 - BE 60 505 - AM 42 654 - CB 61
2) The impression is, that U 753 is unseaworthy due to damage and on 94 - BF 40 136 - Bergen 553 - BC 94 701 - BD 48
these grounds she was ordered to return to western France. 98 - BD 48 156 - CE 86 563 - BE 22 751 - BC 71
c) Convoy operation of U 432 going according to plan. U 575 is at 103 - Op(CA) 161 - CF 33 564 - BC 83 753 - AM 74
Spreewald rendezvous point. 105 - BE 203 - BF 50 566 - BC 59 754 - BC 48
d) U 123 received new information regarding meeting of "Spreewald". 106 - Op(CA) 213 - AN 20 572 - Op(Azor. Gibr.)
In case the ship has not passed the meeting place she has taken course so 107 - CB 45 332 - BF 40 575 - CD 30
that she will reach the point not earlier than the morning of 30 January. U- 108 - CC 18 333 - BD 57 576 - BD 59
109 - CB 40 352 - Op(AE 50)
518
 On Return Passage: U 505 - 404 - 753 - 94 - 588 - 587 - 654 - 553 - 754
- 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 87 - 203 - 135 - 123 - 84 - 582 - 125.
Sailed: - . - 2) U 654, returning with 65 cubic meters of fuel, ordered to move at
Entered Port: U 87 - La Pallice; U 203 - Brest. will in areas BB-BC-CD as fuel permits.
c) Convoy operation of U 432 and 575 evidently going according to plan.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 84 reports from BC 89: VI. General:
Three torpedo spread and other shots missed "Alpera" - reason The first reports of boats operating off the American coast embrace a
undetermined. Firing data perfect. Quiet sea. After spread shot fired number of faulty shots as follows: U 553 - 7 misses on a tanker of 8,000
while submerged 2 distinct blows were heard. tons, U 701 2 pistol failures, 3 undetermined misses, U 84 heard 2 impact
2) U 753 gives situation report from Rockall area: No constant air or noises among a number of faulty shots. U 654 reports 7 out of 9 misses on
sea patrols. Fast convoy with aircraft and destroyer protection in AM 45 targets lying motionless gave torpedo noises normal for running course of
on 26 January. On 27 January a tanker and airplane in AM 4483. 1000 meters. According to positions in which the faulty shots occurred
Westerly course. and the fact that they were fired in different areas all along the coast, the
b) None. influence of the cold cannot be the explanation. Reports by the boats will
c) 1) U-boats were sighted and reported: be relayed to torpedo testing stations so that a rigid test can be made upon
AM 7645 - AM 1881. DA 9947 (not ours) CB 1466. their return to port. Following was reported: U 203 fired 3 undetermined
2) USA tanker "Gulfstar" sent "SSS" from CA 5740. misses on what appeared to be a U-boat trap, a ship of 6,000 tons, hove
to.As a result a patrol craft near by was hit although it was not fired at. It
d) None. is not certain whether it was a ship of especially shallow draft or not;
moreover the torpedoes were set very shallow.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None. U 552 had 5 unexplained misses which are of undetermined nature
b) 1) Operation for U 504 planned in Straits of Florida. are; according to observations of boats which have put in and from
Boat received new course for DB 98. statements of U 654, faulty depth settings which cause wide variations
when operating in heavy seas or high swells. On 31 January U 94 reported
- 41 - that ventilation of G7e builds up an excessive pressure on the depth setting
gear reaching 0.5 kg. per square centimeter in 2 days, the pressure building
up from the battery compartment because of bad torpedo bulkheads.
Henceforth ventilation and heating of G7e torpedoes is forbidden. The
fault is not totally due to this however, since a great number of boats have

519
not ventilated their torpedoes. The current problem will have to be solved
by torpedo tests.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------
30.January 1942.
I. U 66 - CC 44 U 123 - CD 37 U 402 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.) U 576 - BD
57
67 - CE 89 125 - CB 49 404 - BE 30 581 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
82 - Op(BB/BC) 128 - DD 19 432 - CD 90 582 - BC 76
84 - BD 47 129 - CF 35 435 - Op(AE 50) 586 - Op(AM)
85 - Op(BC/BB) 130 - CB 48 455 - Op(AE 50) 587 - BF
86 - Neufundland 132 - Op(Reykjavik) 502 - CE 86 588 - BF 50
94 - BF 50 135 - BF 504 - CG 11 591 - AM 47
98 - BC 69 136 - AN 21 505 - AL 96 654 - CC 41
103 - Op(CA 50 156 - DG 13 553 - BC 85 701 - BD 41
105 - BE 56 161 - CF 34 563 - AL 92 751 - BB 92
106 - Op(CA 50) 213 - AM 11 564 - BC 81 753 - AM 77
107 - CA 68 332 - BF 40 566 - BC 57 754 - BC 59
108 - CB 38 333 - BD 81 572 - Op(Azor. Gibr.)
109 - CB 48 352 - Op(AE 50) 575 - CD 37
- 42 -
520
On Return Passage: U 505 - 404 - 753 - 94 - 588 - 587 - 654 - 553 - 754
- 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 135 - 123 - 84 - 582 - 125.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 94 - St. Nazaire; U 588 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance:
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 82 off Cape Race on 26 January and in BB 87 on 29 January
reports little activity, much bad weather, no air or sea patrols. Has sunk 2
ships ("Athel Brown" and "Leisten") total 18,117 BRT.
2) U 132 (West of Reykjavik) began return cruise to western France,
diesel compressor out of order and other damage unable to be repaired.
Boat attacked convoy on 29 January, consisting of 1 steamer (3,000 tons),
2 destroyers, 1 sweeper, 2 patrol craft and 1 escort ship. Detonation heard
as result of 4 torpedo spread shot at destroyer.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boats sighted in DB 6178 - CA 81 - CA 3850 - CA 7486.
2) In approximate position CA 73 a floating wreck was reported. Bow
stuck out of water about 30 meters.
3) USA tanker Rochester (6,836 tons) sent "SSS" from CA 8163. USA
tanker "Vacumn" was torpedoed in the same position (7,020 tons).
USA tanker "Yankee" (8,046 tons) reported attack by submarine CA
5198.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
c) Convoy operation of U 432 and 575 evidently going according to plan.
d)
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 February 1942
PG30304a

1.February 1942.
I. U 66 - CC 61 U 109 - CB 49 U 402 - Op(Azor.-Gibraltar) U 575 -
CD 30
67 - DG 41 123 - CD 30 404 - BF 50 576 - BC 68
69 - BF 50 125 - CB 63 432 - CD 90 581 - Op(Az.-Gibr.)
82 - CC 13/Op 128 - Bermudas 435 - Op(AE 56) 582 - BD 52
84 - BD 59 129 - CF 46 455 - Op(AE 50) 586 - Op(AM)
85 - Op(BB-BC) 130 - CB 48 456 - Br'büttel 591 - Op(AM)
86 - Op(Neufundl.) 132 - AL 12 502 - DF 39 653 - BF 50
96 - BF 50 136 - AF 504 - CF 52 654 - CC 13
98 - BC 57 156 - DF 62 505 - BE 701 - BD 28
103 - Op(CA) 161 - CF 48 553 - BE 66 751 - Op(BB 70)
105 - BE 40 213 - AM 33 563 - AM 14 753 - BF 50
106 - Op(CA) 332 - BE 86 564 - BB 93 754 - BD 48
107 - Op(CA) 333 - BE 70 566 - BB 92
108 - CB 51 352 - Op(AE 50) 572 - Op(CF 72)
On Return Passage: U 505 - 132 - 654 - 553 - 754 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66
- 123 - 84 - 582 - 125 - 404 - 753.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 753 - St. Nazaire; U 404 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Searching for "Spreewald".
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Operation U 82 see No. IV a.
2) U 402 sighted a destroyer in square CE 5682. Fired spread of three,
missed.
b) Nothing seen.
521
c) Submarines reported in squares: BE 6654 - AM 53 - CF 4626 - BE
1945 - AE 55 - CA 6897 - BB 76 - CB 1466 - CA 5745-8163-5199 - DB
3854.
Enemy submarine reports showed: tanker "Esso-Williamburg" (11,400
BRT) in square CA 7332; tanker "Niobe" (7550 BRT) in CA 5215; tanker
"Gulfwing" (10,208 BRT) CA 7332; tanker "Lusiana" in DC 1222.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy U 82: U 82 maintained contact and reported at 1600 from
square CC 2734. At 1730 U 566 was still some 130 miles away favorable
weather conditions.
U 82 gave further shadower reports, and transmitted beacon signals
during the night for U 566. No more reports after 0200 presumed contact
temporarily lost.
b) U 136 joined group "Schlei" and was allocated attack area in square
AL 30. U 213 was already in the same area.
c) U 432 probably carried out convoy duty according to plan. U 130 and
109 were waiting for an improvement in weather to carry out refueling in
square CB 4965.
- 46 -
d) 1) When crossing 400 west U 156, U 67 and U 502 sent passage
report as instructed. All boats have 190-200 cbm. fuel.
2) Sinking of steamer "Spreewald"
At 1700 on 31:1 report of torpedoing of English steamer "Brittany in
square BE 7142. 1744 SOS in German by German steamer "Spreewald"
in same square. Steamer radioed: "Have British prisoners on board, ship
sinking and on fire." Message was repeated by Landsend. (British
Wireless station) As torpedoing took place on the German prize route U-
boats were ordered at 1854 to report immediately who had torpedoed a
ship in BE 7140 giving fuller details.
At 1851 U 575, who was to convoy steamer home, should report
situation if enemy was encountered.
At 1921 U 701, U 84, U 333 were ordered to make for square BE 7141
immediately.
At 2120 all boats in square BE left half and BD right half were ordered
to report position. As no reports were received by then. U-boats were
informed of the sinking of the German steamer ("Spreewald" and
"Brittany" were one and the same).
At 2214 U 333 reported with T.O.O. 1907 that he had just sunk a
passenger-freighter in square BD 33. Appearance similar to "Spreewald".
Commander reported that torpedo was fired at 350 m. range "to be quite
certain of enemy character".
The garbled position reported by U 333 was 270 nm. to the north. To
make certain U 333 was again requested at 0137 to report time and
position of sinking in a straight message according to Naval grid square.
At 0217 U 333 reported his position in BE 7230 making for BE 7142.
It was then clear that U 333 sunk the steamer and had wrongly
encoded his position in the first report. The following submarines were
ordered to go to the scene of the sinking: U 333, U 105, U 84, U 701, U
582, and during the morning U 332 as well.
At present it is quite impossible to understand how the commander of
the U 333 did not realize until so late that he had sunk the "Spreewald".
It is intended to search for and rescue the crew and the prisoners with
every possible means.
Cremer (Cdr. of U 333) was at the scene of the sinking at 1100. It was
marked by a large patch of oil but no wreckage. He reported that no boats
were lowered at the first hit and that fog prevented him seeing anything at
the second hit. However, he assumed that the crew was able to leave the
ship, as it did not sink for some time. During the day he continued to
search
522
- 47 -
for survivors. No trace of survivors was found to the south, on a
sweep to the southeast and up to the north, or from north to west. At 1742
while searching in BE 7121 he sighted a destroyer proceeding at high
speed on a westerly course about 6 nautical miles from the scene of the
sinking. During the night he searched in the direction of 1000 on the
assumption that the life boats would set sail for Cape Ortegal. The other
submarines already reported their arrival.
U 105 at 2200 on 1.2.
U 84 " 0900 on 2.2.
U 701 " 2000 on 2.2.
U 582 " 1600 on 2.2.
U 332 " in the morning.
They were set to search for lifeboats as follows:
1) Assuming that the rescue boats were drifting without sails (wind S
3-4). U 105 made long sweeps from east to west from the scene of the
sinking to the north.
2) Assuming that the boats were sailing east. Search in sectors from the
place of sinking: U 84 sector 80-900, U 333 sector 90-1000, U 332 sector
100-1150.
After first light C.O. Atlantic Air Force was to send 5 FW-200 to
search the same area.
V. Report of Success: None.
VI. General: II. Boats distributed as follows:
Submarines at 1.2.1942 (type) II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c Xb XIV
I) Total in service (without foreign boats):
at 1.1.1942 248 On active service - - 77 1 22 - - 100 plus UA=101
Commissioned in January 15
263 On trials - - 63 4 26 3 3 99

Losses in January plus) 05 Training Crew 40 4 13 - 2 - - 59

Numbers on 1.2.1942 258 i.e. 10 more than on 1.1.1942.
40 4 153 5 50 3 3 258
plus) losses in January:

U 75 - Lieut. Ringelmann, tested boat, last message on 27.12.1941 III. During January
while attacking convoy off the Lybian coast. Total number of boats increased by 10 boats
U 79 - Lieut. Kaufmann, tested boat, left Salamis 21.12.41. Cause of Number of boats on active service increased by 10 boats
loss unknown. " " " on trials decreased by 1 boat
U 374 - Lieut.(jg) v. Fischel, tested but comparatively new boat. Last Number of training boats increased by 1 boat.
report on 7.1.42 in the Mediterranean. Probably destroyed on 13.1.42
when attacking destroyers east of Sollum. One destroyer was possibly IV. Of 101 boats on active service at 12.42:
sunk. a) 1) In operation area
Northern Atlantic 16 boats
Southern Atlantic -
- 48 - Mediterranean 6 "
Arctic 3 "

2) En route to operations area

Northern Atlantic 22 boats
Southern Atlantic -
Mediterranean 1 boat
Arctic -

U 93 - Lieut.(jg) Elfe, tested boat. Destroyed on 15.1.42 in attack west 3) Returning from
of Portugal on Gibraltar convoy sailing on northerly course. Northern Atlantic 15 boats
According to English reports numerous prisoners have been taken from Southern Atlantic -
U-boats in the Mediterranean. Details not yet available. Mediterranean 1 boat
Arctic 1 "
523
 2 boats (1 type IXb, 1 type VIIc) trying to pick up survivors of
4) Special duty (convoy) 1 " "Spreewald".
Thus for the time being 9 boats are available for the operation planned to
Total at sea 66 boats take place off the coast of the U.S.A., only one IXc boat for Cape Hatteras.
including Mediterranean and Arctic
V. Calculation of Average number of boats operating daily during the
b) In port for repairs: 35 boats. month of January in the Atlantic:
c) 1) Of the 15 boats named under a) 1) as being in operations area, 7 a) At sea each day an average of 41.5 boats
are on Norwegian operations and lie off Seydisfjord or Reykjavik and Returning each day an average of 6.4 boats.
northwest of b) Total of boats that left port during January: 53
of these, from home ports: 19
of these, from western France: 34
gives a daily average of: 1.7 boats.
- 49 -
c) The lowest number of boats at sea was on January 1: 22 boats
of these on return voyage: 3 "
of these on outward voyage: 13 "
gives in operational area: 6 "

1) These 6 boats in the operations area are operating west of Gibraltar,

during the new moon period they were in the Azores area.
2) The 13 boats on outward voyage consisted of 5 coming out from home
the Hebrides, 3 boats are operating in the Mediterranean west of waters, 1 boat carrying out convoy duties, and 7 boats approaching
Gibraltar, and 6 boats operating off the coast of America. American coast. (see IV c) 2) in summary for 1st January).
2) Of the 22 boats given under a) 2) as en route to the North Atlantic the
distribution is as follows: d) Greatest number of boats at sea was from 25th to 27th January: 60
5 boats proceeding to Aruba-Trinidad area in accordance with operational boats
order 51, 2 boats en route for Straits of Florida, 2 boats moving to a fresh of these; on homeward voyage: 20 "
field of attack in the operational area off the coast of the U.S.A., 1 boat of these; on outward voyage: 20 "
from home waters in area northwest of the Hebrides, 12 boats (1 type IXb, entered port: 5 "
1 type IXc, 10 type VIIc) as second wave in the attack area St. Johns, leaves in operational area: 15 "
Halifax or, with the type IX boats as far as Cape Hatteras.
Of these 12 boats 3 further boats cannot take part in the operation
planned:
1 boat (Type VIIc) for a convoy duty

524
- 50 -
1) The 15 boats in the operational area consisted of 3 boats in
Azores area, 2 boats northwest of the Herbrides, 1 boat off Reykjavik and
9 boats in St. Johns area (Newfoundland) as far as Cape Hatteras.
2) The 20 boats on outward voyage consist of 12 boats leaving home
waters at intervals to take up positions around Iceland (3 boats off the
Seydisfjord) or northwest of the Herbrides, 2 boats detailed for convoy
duties, and only 6 boats approaching the American area.
e) The lowest number of boats in the operations area was from 3rd to 9th
January: 3 boats.
These are the boats lying between the Azores and Gibraltar in connection
with the Mediterranean operation.
f) The highest number of boats in the operations area was on 23rd and 24th
January: 22 boats.
10 boats were in American area (St. Johns to Cape Hatteras), 8 boats
northwest of the Herbrides, 3 boats between Azores and 1 boat off
Reykjavik.
VI. After suspending sending boats to the Mediterranean (apart from 3
supply boats) the number of boats in the Atlantic again showed a constant
increase.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
2.February 1942.
525
I. U 66 - CC 39 U 109 - CB 49 U 402 - CB 56 U 576 - BC 83
67 - DF 50 123 - CE 15 432 - CD 581 - Op(Azor.-Gibraltar)
69 - BF 40 125 - CC 42 435 - Op(AE 50) 582 - BD 65
82 - Op(CC 34) 128 - DC 64 455 - Op(AE 50) 586 - Op(AM)
84 - BE 70 129 - CF 48 456 - Helgoland 591 - Op(AM)
85 - Op(BB-BC) 130 - CB 49 502 - DF 50 653 - BF 40
86 - Op(BC) 132 - AL 25 504 - CF 49 654 - CC 22
96 - BF 40 136 - AM 16 505 - BF 40 701 - BD 61
98 - BC 72 156 - DF 50 553 - BF 40 751 - Op(BB 70)
103 - Op(CA 50) 161 - CE 69 563 - AF 78 754 - BD 52
105 - BE 70 213 - AM 25 564 - BB 93
106 - Op(CA 50) 332 - BE 72 566 - CC 30
107 - Op(CA) 333 - BE 70 572 - Op(Azor.-Gibraltar)
108 - CB 41 352 - Op(AE 50) 575 - CD 24
On Return Passage: U 505 - 132 - 654 - 553 - 754 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66
- 123 - 84 - 582 - 125.
Sailed: U 436 - Kiel; U 156 - Wilhelmshaven; U 126 - Lorient.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) On request U 86 reported situation in operations area:
Traffic Cape Race to Cape Francis stopped. Since 25.1 in area BC 50-
60-80-90. No shipping. boat then
- 51 -

operating against convoy U 82.
2) For convoy U 82 and U 402 see paragraph IVa (1 and 2).
b) None.
c) 1) Submarine warning for CA 5597. In square DC 27 unidentified
steamer gave submarine report. Ship sank.
2) The Dutch tanker "Corilla" (8096) was torpedoed in square BB 7383,
and the unregistered steamer "Carriria" in BD 71. Possibly both ships are
the same, as the message intercepted from the latter was very fragmentary.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy U 82: When U 566 enquired situation, U 82 reported at
1103: enemy in CC 3518, speed 14 km., course 800. Boat maintained
contact and reported enemy almost hourly. According to this information
the convoy route runs CC 3621 - CD 1423 - CD 1292 - 1351 - 1363.
Transports sailing in line abreast, destroyers sweeping ahead. Convoy
zigzags slightly on a mean easterly course. U 566 requested beacon signal
at 2000, but reported at 1628 that further operations were without a chance
of success because of new enemy position in CC 3322. Boat continued on
"west" course. In answer to question: which boats were operating against
convoy U 82, U 86 and U 575 reported. The latter was in CD 16 and was
capable of 13 km. U 86 requested beacon signals at 2000 and picked it up
at 0234 somewhere about CD 1347. At 0625 U 575 requested further
beacon signals and was thus also in the vicinity. Last convoy report from
U 82 at 0803 from CD 2127 on an easterly course.
Convoy U 402: At 1853 U 402 reported that "Langibby Castle", 2
destroyers and 1 corvette had left Horta at 1615. Easterly course, speed 9
km, sharp zigzags. As boat maintained contact, U 572 was ordered to
operate against this convoy. At 2100 enemy was in CE 6487 (contrary to
German Intelligence report, she was not in tow), U 402 was forced to
submerge, depth charges were dropped, later boat followed up. Contacted
convoy again and reported firing a spread at the destroyer, which missed.
At 0730 convoy was in CE 6588 on a mean course of 950, speed 10 knots.
Submarine was forced to submerge and followed convoy.
526
b) None.
c) U 432 probably carried out convoy task according to plan.
d) See rescue attempts "Spreewald".
e) Rescue attempts "Spreewald":
During the day U 582 was put on to searching west and north of the
place of sinking.
- 52 -
Although the search to the east by Condors was fruitless, about 2100 U
105 sighted:
3 boats and 3 rafts with 24 Germans and 58 prisoners in BE 4720,
about 40 sea miles north of the scene of sinking, and picked them up. One
boat was still missing. The captain of the steamer was in her and she was
stated to be somewhere in the vicinity. Boats were ordered to collect
round U 105 by using beacon signals. U 105 was put in charge of further
search.
0442 - U 105 instructed the submarines to make for square 4787 and to
search from first light in the sector 20-1200. According to survivor's
statements the Captain sailed away from the other boats in an easterly
direction with about 20 men on the evening of 1 February.
U 84 had to turn back to port because of lack of fuel.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
3.February 1942.
I. U 66 - CD 25 U 109 - CB 49 U 333 - BE 70 U 566 - BC 79(Op)
67 - DF 75 123 - BD 89 352 - Op(AE 50) 572 - Op(Azor.Gibr.)
69 - BF 40 125 - CC 52 402 - CE 65(Op) 575 - CD 21(op)
82 - CD 21(op) 126 - BF 50 432 - CD 576 - BC 81
84 - BE 70 128 - DC 59 435 - Op(AE 50) 581 - Op(Azor.Gibr.)
85 - Op(BB-BC) 129 - CE 95 436 - Br'büttel 582 - BE 40
86 - CD 21(op) 130 - CB 49 455 - Op(AE 50) 586 - Op(AM)
96 - BF 40 132 - AL 52 456 - AN 37 591 - Op(AM)
98 - BB 90 136 - Op(AL 30) 502 - DF 48 653 - BE 63
103 - Op(CA) 156 - DE 72 504 - CE 92 654 - BC
105 - BE 40 158 - Helgo. 505 - BF 50 701 - BE 40
106 - Op(CA) 161 - CE 87 553 - BF 50 751 - Op(BB 70)
107 - Op(CA) 213 - Op(AL 30) 563 - v. Bergen 754 - BD 65
108 - Op(CA) 332 - BE 70 564 - Op(amer.Küste)
On Return Passage: U 132 - 654 - 754 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84
- 582 - 125 - 553 - 505 - 553.
Sailed: U 578 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: U 563 - Bergen; U 505 - Lorient; U 553 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy U 82 and 402, see IVa (1 and 2).
2) U 106 made situation report: Strong American traffic north-south
from 30.1. Ships darkened in CA 58 - 81 - 82 - 84 and 85. Sharp zigzags,
moderate air reconnaissance. English shipping routes for single
unescorted ships leading to the assembly areas off Hatteras and south
America converge in CB 50. English steamers dropped
527
- 53 -
depth charges. Sunk: "Empire Wildebest" (6,000 BRT) in CB 6192;
"Traveler" in CB 5172; "Rochester" in CA 8241; "Americaland" in CA
8458 = 32,154 BRT. 3 duds amongst 5 misses, one definitely pistol. 87
cbm. Returning.
b) None.
c) 1) British motor ship "Silverey" (4,535 BRT) torpedoed in BB 7495
(submarine warning sent out).
2) Panama steamer "San Gil" (3,627 BRT) torpedoed and sunk in CA
5751.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy U 82: Contact unbroken. 0800 U 86 fired spread of three. 2
explosions after 10 minutes, probably end-of-run detonator. At 1000 U 82
reported that convoy in CD 2136 was zigzagging at 900. U 82 sent beacon
signals until 1200. U 575 made an unsuccessful underwater attack then
continued on a westerly course because of compressor trouble. From 1300
the convoy steered a mean course of 800, from 1800 of 900. Favorable
weather conditions, wind SW 1-2. Towards evening poor visibility in
patches because of fog. Again beacon signals for U 86, then at 2320
contact broken in BD 7786. U 82 followed up on a mean course of 800.
No further reports.
Convoy U 402: At 1200 U 402 again sighted the convoy in CE 6590,
on SE course, 10 km. Weather moderate, wind SE 2-3, varying visibility
because of rain. When requested, U 572 reported from CF 7323. Boat
was some 80 miles ahead of convoy. U 402 was again forced away and
pursued. but maintained contact. At 1930 fresh mean course of 1400,
speed 8 knots, freshening SE 4.
b) None.
c) U 432 reported from CC 90 that supply task had been completed.
Was proceeding to operational area via Cape Hatteras.
d) Rescue attempt "Spreewald" see 4.2.42.
V. Reports of Success:
U 106 reported 4 ships totaling 32,154 BRT sunk.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
4.February 1942.
I. U 66 - CD 35 U 109 - CB 49 U 333 - BE 48 U576 - BC 72
67 - DA 32 123 - BE 47 352 - Op(AE 50) 578 - BF 50
69 - BE 67 125 - CC 37 402 - CF 57 581 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
82 - BD 78 126 - BF 70 432 - CC 86
- 54 -
84 - BE 82 128 - DC 13 435 - Op(AE 50) 591 - Op(AM
528
85 - Op(BB-BC) 129 - CE 88 436 - Helgol. 653 - BE 64
86 - BC 90 130 - CB 49 455 - Op(AE 50) 654 - BC
96 - BE 61 132 - AL 91 456 - AN 34 701 - BE 40
98 - Op(Küste) 136 - Op(AL 30) 502 - DA 32 751 - Op(ameri.K.)
103 - Op(CA) 156 - DA 32 504 - CA 82 754 - BE 40
105 - BE 40 158 - Helgol. 564 - Op(Amerik. Küste)
106 - CA 96/Op 161 - CE 87 566 - BB 99
107 - Op(CA) 213 - Op(AL 30) 572 - CF 82
108 - Op(CA) 332 - BE 72 575 - BC(Op)
On Return Passage: U 132 - 654 - 754 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84
- 582 - 125 - 106.
Sailed: U 752 - Kiel; U 656 - Brest. Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy U 402 see No. IVa.
2) U 109 sank British tanker "Trontolite" (7,115 BRT) in CB 9713.
3) U 136 reported at 0700 enemy convoy (No. 6) in AL 0389 on
westerly course. (17 vessels)
b) None.
c) American freighter "Collamer" (5, 112 BRT) shadowed by submarine
in DC 9936, also USA tanker "W.W. Bruce" (6,728 BRT) in DB 3660.
Steamer "Sinclaire" made submarine warning in DB 3568. Ship on fire,
hit by torpedo.
British tanker "Trontolite" was torpedoed in CB 9750. Submarine
warning for this area.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy U 402: At 1030 U 402 reported convoy in CF 5791 on
easterly course, 10 knots. Subsequently U 402 was forced to submerge
and lost contact. Had 21 cbm. fuel left. Impossible to refuel, so ordered to
return home.
 No report received from U 572. Doubtful whether the boat was
attacking convoy or had even found it.
U 581, which had also an attack area around Azores - Gibraltar, was not
directed to this convoy, as reports of air attacks immediately west of
Gibraltar showed that boat was there, i.e. was too far away.
Operation was therefore finished, as lack of fuel prevented the decisive
boat from continuing the pursuit.
- 55 -
Convoy U 82: At 1356 U 82 reported fruitless search. Probably due to
wide zigzagging of convoy. The high speed of the enemy ruled out a
follow up. Boats U 575 and U 86, that were operating against the same
target, also broke off the search. U 82 had one damaged torpedo aft and
26 cbm. fuel, so turned for home from BD 8746. Operation in this area
finished. Result: 1 destroyer sunk by U 82.
This result shows once again, how difficult it is to score successes
against fast convoys: It is all out of proportion much harder to maintain
contact, and above all to re-establish it, than with normal convoys sailing
8-10 sea miles; and yet in several cases successes have been achieved
against fast convoys. In connection with them, it is always debatable
whether the small chances of success warrant the very high fuel
consumption on the chase.
b) 1) U 86 ordered to operate in square BC according to fuel situation;
subsequently return north of German steamer route (4730 'N).
2) U 576 ordered to operate as far west as possible (American coast).
3) U 156, U 67, U 502 given coded order "Neuland 176" in accordance
with Operational Order 51, No. 10, i.e. simultaneous surprise attack before
sunrise on 16th February.
529
4) U 352 ordered to take up attack position off Reykjavik. U 435 and
455 were in the northern and southern half of the sector off Seydisfjord.
c) None.
d) Rescue attempt "Spreewald":
The search by sectors on 3.2 brought no success. U 105 ordered the
search to be carried out up to the limits of a 140 nautical mile circle round
the place of sinking. Boats then to form up in the order U 754, 123, 701,
105, 333, 332 into a reconnaissance strip from square BE 1994 to 7364
and sail east in longlegged zigzags.
U 582 turned homewards because of lack of fuel. 4 February from a
coded radio conversation with U 105 it transpired:
1) that survivors stated the missing lifeboat was well equipped,
2) that it was possible it was picked up by the steamer sighted on 1
February,
3) that all survivors are on board the U 105.
In the evening all boats were told to return, U 105 at full speed.
U 96, U 653, U 69, which were on outward voyage, were ordered to
search squares BE 58, 82, 85 on 5.2. If nothing sighted, to continue course
westwards.
- 56 -
A Dornier 24 of the Brest Sea Rescue Unit was instructed to pick up on
6.2 one of the German survivors on U 105, who was suffering from blood
poisoning.
V. Reports of Success:
U 109 reported sinking of tanker "Trontolite" (7,115 BRT).
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
5.February 1942.
I. U 66 - BD 96 U 109 - CB 97 U 333 - BE 40 U 576 - BB 95
67 - DQ 28 123 - BE 57 352 - AE 58 578 - BF 40
69 - BE 58 125 - CD 14 402 - CF 56 581 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
82 - BD 89 126 - BF 40 432 - CC 582 - BE 56
84 - BE 68 128 - DC 74 435 - Op(AE 50) 586 - Op(AM)
85 - Op(BB) 129 - DG 11 436 - AN 60 591 - Op(AM)
86 - Op(BC) 130 - CB 97 455 - Op(AE 50) 653 - BE 55
96 - BE 52 132 - AL 98 456 - AN 20 654 - BC 89
98 - Op(amerik. Küste) 136 - Op(AL 30) 502 - DQ 28 656 - BF 10
103 - Op(CA) 156 - DA 28 504 - CE 75 701 - BE 40
105 - BE 59 158 - Helgol. 564 - Op(amerik. Küste) 751 - Op(BB 70)
106 - CB 73 161 - DG 11 566 - Op(BB 70) 752 - Br-büttel
107 - Op(CA) 213 - Op(AL 30) 572 - Azor.-Gibr. 754 - BE 43
108 - Op(CA) 332 - BE 40 575 - Op(BB-CC)
On Return Passage: U 132 - 654 - 754 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84
- 582 - 125 - 106 - 82 - 109.
Sailed: -.-
Entered Port: -.-
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 6 see No. IVa.
2) At 0940 U 586 reported a heavy cruiser and 1 destroyer in AM 4310.
Westerly course, medium speed; contact lost at 1400. Enemy was then on
a southerly course, speed 16 knots.
530
3) U 103 reported: From 2.2. - 5.2. operated in CA 50 (south of New
York) and sank 3 tankers and 1 freighter, totaling 26,539 BRT. 4
unexplained misses. Brisk north-bound traffic in CA 55 to 59. (rest of
radio message fragmentary, repeat requested)
b) None.
c) 1) Steamer "Sixaola" (4,693 BRT) was pursued by submarine in DC
1440. Same message from unidentified steamer in DC 3510.
2) Motor tanker "Stillmann" (1,306 BRT) in CA 7622, and tanker
"Niobe" (7,153 BRT) made submarine warnings.
- 57 -
Plane sighted submarine and dropped 3 depth charges. Oil on
surface.
3) Steamer "Halcyan" fired at in DD 3165 by submarine.
4) English plane reported submarine diving in AM 1967 (U-586).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 6: U 591 was operating against this convoy and at 0830
reported position in AM 13. U 136 maintained contact, was forced to
submerge at 1130 and at 1648 established contact in AL 6215, course
2600, 10 knots. At 1830 U 591 requested beacon signals. Patches of fog
rendered it difficult to maintain contact. 0342 U 136 reported sinking of a
two-funelled destroyer and that contact had been lost thereby. U 591 must
have been somewhere in the vicinity. Both boats followed up in the
direction of the main course.
b) - c) None.
 d) Rescue attempt "Spreewald":
Attempt to take over survivor failed. Dornier 24 snapped a wing when
alighting. Crew taken over by U 105.
V. Reports of Success:
U 103 reported sinking 4 ships totaling 26,539 BRT.
U 136 reported sinking 1 destroyer.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
6.February 1942.
I. U 66 - BE 76 U 109 - CB 96 U 333 - BE 91 U 576 - BB 80
67 - DQ 43 123 - BE 68 352 - AE 72 578 - BF 40
69 - BE 76 125 - CD 20 402 - CF 38 581 - Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
82 - BD 95 126 - BE 94 432 - CC 84 582 - BF 40
84 - BF 40 128 - DB 90 435 - Op(AE 50) 586 - AM 41(Op)
85 - Op(BB 97) 129 - DF 38 436 - AN 34 591 - Op(AM)
86 - Op(BC) 130 - CB 96 455 - Op(AE 50) 653 - BE 73
96 - BE 49 132 - BE 34 456 - AE 87 654 - BC 89
98 - Op(amerik. Küste) 136 - AL 51(Op) 502 - DQ 54 656 - BF 10
103 - CA 50 156 - DQ 43 504 - CD 96 701 - BE 65
105 - BE 60 158 - AN 63 564 - Op(amerik. Küste) 751 - Op(amerik.
Küste)
106 - CB 72 161 - DF 38 566 - Op(Amerik. Küste) 752 - AN 66
107 - Op(CA) 213 - Op(AL 30) 572 - CF 93 754 - BE 38
108 - Op(CA) 332 - BE 96 575 - Op(BC/CC)
On Return Passage: U 352 - 105 - 132 - 82 - 402 - 572 - 106 - 654 - 754
- 109 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84 - 582 - 125.
Sailed: -.-
531
Entered Port: -.-
- 58 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 6 see No. IVa 1.
2) Convoy U 82 (No. 7).
3) U 106 reported passenger freighter (8,000 BRT) sunk with last
electric torpedo and gunfire in CB 5682. Course 200.
4) U 564 Situation Report: No shipping in BB, poor visibility, heavy
icing. Air reconnaissance. 85 cbm. If necessary would request fuel from
U 103.
5) U 98 Situation Report: En route to BC 40-50-60 and BB no
shipping. Cape Race light burning as in peacetime. Slight air and sea
patrolling off Sable Island. Reconnoitered as far as 75 miles SE Cape
Sable. No shipping anywhere. If necessary would request fuel. Still 73
cbm.
U 109 Situation Report: Fuel taken over from U 130. 6.2 "Halcyan"
sunk in DD 3174 gunfire after 2 misses with torpedoes. Total success 4
steamers totaling 29,330 BRT. On homeward cruise.
6) U 402 Situation Report: Summary of details already reported.
Uselessness of this report pointed out to boat.
b) None.
c) 1) Motor tanker "Pomella" (6766 BRT) reported surfaced submarine in
CB 9477. British Admiralty issued submarine warning for area.
2) "Empire Sun" torpedoed in BB 7494.
 d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 6: Hydrophone bearing reported by U 136 probably
meant that U 591 was being listened to. U 136 suspected enemy to the
south on a course of 2400. At 1950 faint hydrophone bearing in AL 4731.
As prospects were slight and the boats were getting farther and farther
away from their operational area, around Iceland-Herbrides, they were
ordered to return to their attack positions. When U 136 reported smoke in
AK 6855 at 2103, the boats were instructed to remain and attack if contact
could be established. At 0341 U 591 reported no success, on homeward
journey.
2) Convoy No. 7: At 1305 U 82 reported convoy (20 steamers) on
southerly course in BE 7429. For the time being it was not clear whether
it was a Gibraltar convoy. If it was, no attack should be made because of
the small ships and recent experiences. To clear the matter up, U 82 was
asked the strength of the escorting forces and
- 59 -
his own fuel reserves. At the same time the position compared with
previous experiences and the rhythm of the Gibraltar convoys show that it
could not be one of these. Naval War Staff was of the same opinion. In
answer U 82 reported that he had enough fuel to enable him to maintain
contact for 36 hours. Only corvettes had been observed as escort. It was
probably a very valuable south-bound convoy that was obviously weakly
defended and worth attacking by the submarines intended for the west. U
82 should maintain contact until the other boats come up. Thus the U 69,
532
96, 653 should operate against this convoy. At 1529 U 82 reported from
BE 7491 that enemy's course was 1600, 7 knots. Varying visibility 3-6
miles.
At 0300 U 69 reported a destroyer in BE 7724. At 2035 a boat
reported without signature that for 5 hours no shadower reports had been
received; one engine faulty for some time. It was assumed that this report
was from U 96 and it was instructed to proceeds towards America.
b) None.
c) 1) In accordance with Naval War Staff order on the protection of the
coast of Norway by submarines (see No. IV) U 435 - 436 - 456 were
ordered to proceed at once to Kirkenes at a distance of 30-80 miles from
the coast of Norway. Boats listed would then come under the authority of
Group North or Admiral Arctic.
2) U 103 and 564 were instructed to carry out the fuel transfer in square
CB 7355 during the night of 9.2.
V. Reports of Success:
U 106 reported sinking a passenger freighter of 8,000 BRT.
U 109 reported sinking "Halcyan" (3,531 BRT).
VI. General:
a) In accordance with a Hitler directive the number of submarines in the
Norway area was to be considerably strengthened as follows:
a) The boats in the Arctic (4 at the time) were to be increased to 6, of
these, 2 boats to be kept in a state of readiness in Narvik or Trondheim.
b) 2 boats were to be kept ready in both Trondheim and Bergen.
c) 8 boats should still remain in the Iceland-Herbrides area. To fulfil
these requirements boats from home waters were to be stationed as
follows:
a) Arctic:
1) U 134, 584, 585 already in area.
- 60 -
2) U 435, 436, 456 of the boats at sea would be sent there.
3) About the middle of February U 592 and U 77 would follow from
home waters.
b) Trondheim: U 454 (at the time undergoing repairs), and in mid-
February U 403 from home waters.
Bergen: U 589 and 593 from home waters at the end of February.
c) Iceland-Herbrides area: at the time occupied by U 455, 352, 213, 586,
136, 591 and 435, which would have to go to the Arctic and would be
relieved by U 752 (leaving Heligoland on 7.2). U 405 would join them
from home waters at the end of February.
Naval War Staff at first wished to transfer some submarine training to
Norway in order to have the necessary boats there without harming
Atlantic operations.
However, B.d.U. had to point out:
1) Tactical training was quite impossible in Norway as free, safe sea area
was not available. There was no room in the fjords, and outside the fjords
was an operational area.
2) Gunnery practice could be carried out in Norway only on a very
limited scale, and as the events of the summer showed, was insufficient. It
is limited by the question of space, which allows only shoots on a par with
the earlier torpedo boat shoots in Geltinger Bay, and by the daylight
situation, which in summer permits hardly any but day shoots and in
winter, night shoots. Boats which were trained in this way in gunnery
would not be ready for active service and would have to return to the
Baltic for thorough training.
533
3) Diving training by the front line training group would be possible in
theory, but would be ruled out by the fact that the boats requiring training
in diving could not make their way through the operational area, as they
would have to because of icing in the Baltic approaches. (In summary it
would be a different matter).
4) Recovery boats could not be brought through the western Baltic and
the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal (Kiel) because of the icing -- they would not be
capable of making the voyage.
5) It is basically correct to utilize the training facilities in the Baltic as
long as possible, then when icing starts to do outstanding jobs and
overhaul training gear - ships and recovery vessels, so that training can
recommence immediately once the Baltic is open again.
- 61 -
Naval War Staff had to admit the correctness of these views and
sanctioned the plans set out at first. Thus it appears that the strengthening
of the positions in Norway will be at the expense of Atlantic warfare. But
this assumption is not correct. For even if the transfer of training were
possible, the delays and deterioration of the training under such conditions
would have a bad effect on Atlantic operations.
b) The drawbacks caused by recently worsening ice conditions for
training in the Baltic have been reduced to a minimum. Boats which have
finished or nearly finished their training, are taken to Kiel to complete
outstanding jobs. Thus, providing the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal and the Elbe
are navigable, they can be sent on operations, even if not quite fully
trained. Boats remaining in the eastern Baltic can continue Gunnery and
diving practice and complete any odd jobs.
The main drawbacks of the cold period are:
1) that a series of boats must be sent on operations without full training
(lack of tactical training);
2) that the odd jobs take longer than usual because of the cold and an
accumulation of boats;
3) that putting into operation of boats that have been completed by the
yard is delayed, because equipping takes twice as long as usual and the
boats also have to run out to Heligoland to carry out trimming
experiments, compensation etc. and make good the damage caused by ice
when passing through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
7.February 1942.
I. U 66 - BE 83 U 109 - CB 77 U 333 - BE U 582 - BF 50
67 - DF 66 123 - BE 352 - Op(Reykjavik) 586 - Op(AM)
69 - CF 10 125 - BD 77 402 - CG 12 591 - AL 40
82 - CF 12 126 - BE 88 432 - CC 75 653 - CF 10
84 - BF 50 128 - Op(Florida) 455 - Op(AE 50) 654 - BC 86
85 - Op(BB-BC) 129 - DF 56 502 - DQ 48 656 - BE 61
86 - BD 19 130 - CB 77 504 - CD 87 701 - BE
96 - BE 71 132 - BF 40 564 - CB 50(Op) 751 - Op(amerik. Küste)
98 - Op(CB 24) 136 - AK 60 566 - Op(amerik. Küste) 752 - Heligoland
103 - CA 65 156 - DP 63 572 - CG 41 754 - BE
105 - BF 40 158 - Heligo. 575 - Op(BC-CC)
106 - CB 65 161 - DF 55 576 - BB 80
107 - Op(CA) 213 - Op(AL 30) 578 - BE 67
108 - Op(CA) 332 - BF 40 581 - Op(Azor. Gibralt.)
534
On Return Passage: U 332 - 105 - 132 - 82 - 402 - 572 - 103 - 106 - 654
- 754 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84 - 582 - 125.
Sailed: U 154 - 155 - 162 - Kiel.
Entered Port: U 84 - 582 - Brest.
- 62 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy Nos. 6 and 7 see No. IVa.
2) U 352 made report: Boat had investigated inner fjords around
Seydisfjord. No barrages, no defenses, no ships. Air patrol twice daily.
Fire extinguished after 4.2 No shipping observed to date in AE 47.
3) U 751 made report from sea area round Nova Scotia: Steamer traffic
of entire east runs on a 90 m. depth of water parallel to the coast. By day
slight, at night sometimes brisker independently routed shipping
movements. Moderate destroyer and patrol activity. Air patrols also at
night.
Successes: tanker "Silveray", freighter "Empire Sun" sunk. Tanker
"Corilla" torpedoed. All torpedoes fired. Returning.
b) None.
c) British steamer "Atlantian" fired at by submarine in BB 7581.
Submarines were sighted: by American steamer "Ameriham Anrom" in
CA 7686, by the American steamer "Zacapa" in unknown position and by
USA tanker "Van Dyke" in DC 1253.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 6: At 1203 U 136 reported from AK 9196 that contact
had been lost, cruising in attack area. At 1355 boat sighted a destroyer on
a course of 2200 in AK 9277 and again took up the pursuit. Order to
return to attack area was not effective, as U 136 picked up the convoy at
1255 in AK 9432. Boat was given permission for unrestricted attack only
on favorable occasions. U 213 also operated against convoy and closed in
at 1510 when weather was misty. Submarine forces to submerge and
pursued until 2000 with depth charges. Contact lost. U 213 was ordered
to return to attack area. U 136 reported last position of convoy at 1715 in
AK 9424, course 2600. Miss fired at destroyer, contact lost, returned to
attack area. Operation closed. As it was probably a Halifax convoy, it
might be possible to pick it up again in the sea area south of
Newfoundland.
2) Convoy No. 7: As contact had not been re-established by morning,
the boats were ordered to continue cruising. Despite repeated requests, U
82 had not reported.
b) U 591 and U 352 were detailed to make the weather reports from
certain sea areas requested by Naval War Staff. These boats were
allocated squares AL 50 or AE 70 as attack areas. Order: Until rescinded,
make short weather report three times daily. Begin at 0200 on 9.2 change
position within attack area designated.
- 63 -
c) None.
d) 1) Fuel transfer from U 103 to U 564 has been fixed for 8.2 because of
present favorable weather.
535
2) Assuming that U 125 had sufficient fuel to be able to spare some, the
boat was requested to report position and amount of fuel.In reply U 125
stated he was in CD 48 and had 56 cbm. He intended giving some to U
69.
3) U 161 (West Indies boat) made passage report from DF 84 - 190 cbm.
V. Reports of Success:
U 751 sank tanker "Silveray" 4,535 BRT.
U 751 sank "Empire Sun".
U 751 torpedoes tanker "Corilla" 8,096 BRT.
VI. General:
The weather reports requested by Naval War Staff affect a most
important operation and are therefore essential. It makes little difference
to U 352 that was to have operated off Reykjavik and must now report
from the area south of Iceland, the boat is in any case able to carry out its
tasks in the weather report room too.
U 591 must certainly leave its area (Iceland-Herbrides), but WSW
of Rockall Bank may well be quite favorable for attacks on merchant
shipping.
Weather reports from the Bay of Biscay will have to be dealt with
by boats passing through.
Even though in this case the prejudicing of submarine warfare is
only slight, the demands demonstrate the calls that must be made on
submarines to carry out operations with other forces.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
8.February 1942.
I. U 66 - BF 40 U 125 - CD 49 U 352 - Op(AE 71) U 591 - AL 50 Op.
67 - DP 67 126 - CF 21 402 - BE 653 - CE 32
69 - CE 32 128 - Op(Florida) 432 - CB 96 654 - BC 96
82 - BE 70 129 - DF 81 455 - Op(AE 50) 656 - BE 52
 85 - Op(BB-BC) 130 - CC 84 502 - DP 92 701 - BF 40
86 - BD 29 132 - BF 50 504 - DF 11 751 - BB 70
96 - BD 92 136 - AK 92 564 - CB 50 752 - AN 66
98 - Op(amerik. Küste) 154 - Br'büttel 566 - Op(Küste) 754 - BF 10
103 - CB 71 155 - dto. 572 - CG 15
106 - CC 41 156 - DP 64 575 - Op(BB-CC)
107 - Op(CA) 158 - AN 66 576 - Op(amerik. Küste)
105 - BF 50 161 - DF 81 578 - BE 58
108 - Op(CA) 162 - Br'büttel 581 - Op(Azor.-Gibraltar)
109 - CC 73 213 - AK 93 586 - AM(Op)
123 - BF 40 332 - BF 50
333 - BF 40
- 64 -
On Return Passage: U 82 - 402 - 572 - 103 - 106 - 656 - 754 - 86 - 109
- 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 125 - 751 - 105 - 132 - 332.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 105 - Lorient; U 132 - 332 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 576 reported single ships at irregular intervals from northeast to
southwest. Mainly very fast independent ships. Slight air patrols. A
spread of 4 was fired at a vessel of "Lady Nelson" class, but it missed. 3
536
inexplicable dud shots. Still 5 and 2 torpedoes, 72 cbm. Heavy formation
of drift ice from BB 5878 to the west.
2) On 7.2, U 566 fired a spread of three at a large freighter belonging to
a convoy in BB 8785. Hard explosion after the interval estimated for
running. Hit not observed. Fired other misfires in BB 8715 in spite of
precise preparation. Range up to 400 m., SE 7, sea 4, fog-rain.
3) U 108 made report: Nothing seen during approach. A great deal of
bad weather. No traffic in CA 38; nothing encountered in CA 57-58
excepting steam trawler showing lights. Slight air patrol. On 6.2 a dud
spread of two and an air-driven torpedo failure were fired at a steamer on a
southerly course. On 8.2 "Ocean Venture" was sunk in CA 8112.
4) U 107 found busy traffic in CA 80, no air patrol. On 7.2 a destroyer
was sighted.
Sunk: 31.1 in CB 5478 "San Arcadio" (7,419 BRT);
6.2 in DC 2134 freighter (4,500 BRT). West 5.
5) U 586 scored two hits on an 8,000 BRT tanker in AM 2252. Ship
was burning, submarine forced to sheer off by escort.
6) Convoy U 654 (No. 8) see No. IVa.
b) None.
c) 1) Submarine warning for area CA 51. Sighting report of submarine in
DC 1252 made by USA tanker "J.W. Van Dyke" (11,651 BRT). Other
submarine sightings in DO 7733 were unlikely.
2) USA tanker "Cities Service Koolmotor" (6,762 BRT) reported pursuit
by submarine in DM 1470 (U 128?)
3) Steamer "Ocean Venture" sank in CB 7265 (U 108!)
4) On 1.2. American merchant vessel in the Atlantic was instructed to
hug the coast from Key West to Cape Hatteras. Set course so that Wimble
Shoals, Winter Quarter Shoals and Diamond could be navigated by day.
During the day and in bright moonlight to steer a
- 65 -
 c) None.
d) 1) U 103 had not yet transferred fuel to U 564.
2) U 125 was ordered to carry out fuel transfer to U 69 in the evening of
11.2 in CE 4184.
zig-zag course. In answer to query U 125 reported that he could spare 10 cbm.
Mona Passage was to be avoided because of submarine sighting report. 3) U 129 (West Indies boat) reported position DF 8243 (passage report
(Submarines were informed accordingly) 400 west).
d) None.

IV. Current Operations: - 66 -

a) 1) Convoy No. 6 (U 136!): U 575 and U 85 were informed that on 9.2
the convoy would probably be in BC 3867 at 1500 or on 10.2 somewhere
about BC 5858. Dispersal possible in BC.
2) Convoy No. 8: At 1645 U 654 sighted a convoy on southerly course
in BC 5939. Steamers were proceeding at distant intervals, according to a
later report on a course of 2100, 8 knots.
Poor visibility. Wind SSW 2. Swell 1. U 575 and U 85, who were
supposed to be in the same area where asked to give their positions. U 575
was in CC 24 and U 85 in BC 80. U 654 maintained contact. Boat was 4) Despite repeated calls U 82 and U 581 have not reported. It must be
free to attack and reported at 1927 and 2141 that the convoy had dispersed. assumed that U 82 was destroyed in attacking convoy (No. 7).
Steamers were steering a southwesterly course independently. Position
BC 5991. V. Reports of Success:
2343 U 85 requested beacon signals. U 654 still maintained contact U 566 hit on freighter.
and at 0413 reported a formation of 10 steamers in BC 5894. U 85 had not U 108 sank "Ocean Venture".
succeeded in establishing U 107 sank "San Arcadio" 7,419 BRT.
U 654 had fired all torpedoes. Successes: 1 corvette sunk, 1 steamer U 107 sank freighter 4,500 BRT.
torpedoed. Remaining with convoy for U 85. U 586 torpedoed tanker 8,000 BRT
b) 1) U 96, U 578, and U 653 were allocated lower half of square BB and U 654 hit on freighter.
square CB as attack area. Boats were directed against east to west and U 654 sank a corvette.
coastal traffic in BB and against north to south traffic in CB.
2) The boats were ordered to run on the great circle when crossing the VI. General:
Atlantic, in order to save fuel. This is usually automatic, but cannot be (Situation off coast of America according to report K.U. 123)
expected of inexperienced commanders as a matter of course. a) Lieut.(s.g.) Hardegen, commander of U 123, being the first
3) U 129, U 504, U 161 were forbidden to attack independently routed commander to return from the east coast of America, made a report on his
ships between longitude 300 and 450 because the blockade runners experiences in this previously unknown area. The expectation of
"Osorno" and "Pietro Orseolo" were expected. encountering many independently routed ships, clumsy handling of ships,
537
slight, inexperienced sea and air patrols and defenses was so truly fulfilled
that conditions had to be described as almost completely of peacetime
standards. Independent operations by submarines were therefore correct.
The commander found such an abundance of opportunities for attack in
the sea area south of New York to Cape Hatteras that he could not possibly
utilize them all:
At times there were as many as 10 ships in sight that were sailing with
lights on peacetime courses. Thus there were numerous opportunities for
2 or even 3 boats to attack at one spot alone.
The commander's report showed clearly that the initial attack could have
been much stronger if instead of only 6 it had been possible at the time to
release to B.d.U. the 12 large boats he had requested. The opportunity,
which will not occur again, was certainly utilized and brought satisfactory
successes, but it was impossible to really make the most of it.
It was obvious from the start that such favorable conditions would soon
cease -- they already seem very different.
b) Repeated messages about brisk traffic in Freetown area again suggest
that further attacks should be launched there. Further support is given by
the following:
1) Agent's reports and radio intercepts show more traffic in the area
again, also that the English do not suspect the presence of submarines in
the area at the present.
- 67 -
2) After America's entry into the war the American safety zone no
longer protects the enemy and so no longer invites the transfer of shipping
movements to this area as observed during the summer.
538
3) The appearance of German submarines off the east coast of America
and their anticipated appearance after 16.2 in the Aruba-Trinidad area are
further reasons for the enemy not to shift his traffic to the western Atlantic,
more especially because nothing has happened for a long time in the
Freetown area.
4) During the last appearance of submarines in this area, they were
subject to many restrictions where American ships were concerned. THese
restrictions no longer exist - the American supplies going to Freetown-
Bathurst-Monrovia-Lagos-Takaradi which were observed at that time and
also confirmed by numerous reports, are now free for attack.
I therefore suggested to Naval War Staff that 2 boats due to become
available in the west - U 68 and U 505 - should again be sent to the
Freetown area, whilst the new large boats coming from home should go
direct to the east coast of North America.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
9.February 1942.
I. U 66 - BF 50 U 123 - BF 50 U 213 - AL 48 U 578 - BE 72
67 - DP 82 125 - CD 55 333 - BF 50 586 - Op(AM 22)
69 - CE 25 126 - CF 15 352 - Op(AE 70) 591 - Op(AL 58)
85 - Op(BC 80) 128 - Op(Florida) 402 - BF 653 - CE 23
86 - BD 29 129 - DF 79 432 - CB 86 654 - BC 80
96 - BD 84 130 - CC 83 455 - Op(AE 50) 656 - BE 45
98 - Op(amerik. Küste) 136 - AL 47 502 - DP 86 701 - BF 50
103 - CB 73 154 - Helgoland 504 - DE 35 751 - BB 89
106 - CC 51 155 - dto. 564 - CB 73 752 - AN 37
107 - Op(CA 85) 156 - DP 57 566 - Op(CB 21) 754 - BF 50
108 - Op(CA 81) 158 - AN 37 572 - BF 40
109 - CC 58 161 - DF 79 575 - Op(BC-CC)
162 - Helgol. 576 - Op(BB 86)
 IV. Current Operations:
On Return Passage: U 751 - 402 - 572 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 754 - 86 - 109 a) Convoy No. 8: U 654 maintained contact. Attempted to direct U 85 to
- 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 125. the enemy by beacon signals. Not successful. The reverse was also
Sailed: -.- attempted by U 654 taking bearings on U 85, but U 85 could not make
Entered Port: U 123 - Lorient; U 333 - La Pallice; U 701 - Nazaire; U contact with the enemy. Reasons for this could not be ascertained until the
754 - Brest. boats were back in port. 1503 U 654 reported the steamers (probably 10
vessels) in BC 8190, course 2300. Speed 8 knots, 34 cbm. Boat had to
II. Air Reconnaissance: give up pursuit about 2400 hours because of lack of fuel. Last enemy
report at 1953 from BC 8510.
III. Reports on the Enemy: At 2317 U 85 also turned back because of lack of fuel. This operation
a) 1) Convoy No. 8 see No. IVa. against this convoy was thus closed.
2) In AM 23 U 586 again attacked the tanker which was torpedoed on Successes: 1 corvette sunk, 1 steamer (7,000 BRT) torpedoed.
8.2. Two impacts heard. Ship was not b) U 98 could not depend on refueling. Was allotted squares BB, lower
half, and square CB as attack area.
- 68 - c) None.
d) 1) U 752 and U 158 were ordered to enter Bergen because of damage
to bow-caps and sounding set respectively.
2) U 103 reported that fuel could not be transferred because of
weather.Only 4 cbm. could be spared. As it seemed pointless to keep the
boats waiting longer, U 103 was ordered to continue on his homeward
voyage. U 564 unrestricted action in whole sea area.

V. Reports of Success: None.

seen to sink. All torpedoes fired, on return voyage to Bergen, 38 cbm.
On 5.2 boat fired a dud spread of four at a cruiser and 4 misses at 3 patrol
vessels.
b) None.
c) British turbine vessel "City of Capetown" sighted a torpedo track in
ET 2990 (Freetown area). (This was unlikely, as none of our own
submarines were in this area.)
d) On 2.2 a submarine was sunk by ramming 1 to 5 sea miles south of
Pico Island (Azores). This was U 581. The second watch officer of this
boat swam to the island. 4 other ratings were supposed to have been
picked up by the English.
539
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
10.February 1942.
I. U66 - BF 50 U 125 - CD 62 U352 - Op(AE 78) U 586 - AM 24
67 - DP 78 126 - CE 63 402 - BF 591 - Op(AL 55)
69 - CE 18 128 - Op(Florida) 432 - CB 84 653 - CE 21
85 - BC 80 129 - DA 33 455 - Op(AE 50) 654 - BC 80
 86 - BE 17 130 - CC 68 502 - EE 13 656 - BD 69
96 - BD 76 136 - AL 54 504 - DE 29 751 - BB 99
98 - Op(BB-CB) 154 - AN 66 564 - Op(Küste) 752 - AN 43
103 - CB 73 155 - AN 66 566 - Op(amerik Küste)
106 - CC 61 156 - AN 43
- 69 -
107 - Op(CA) 158 - AN 43 572 - BF 20
108 - Op(CA) 161 - DA 36 575 - Op(BC-CC)
109 - CC 68 162 - AN 62 576 - Op(amerik. Küste)
213 - AL 55 578 - BD 93
3) Report from U 85: No traffic in BB, poor visibility bad icing.
Nothing seen in CB 31-37, mainly heavy weather. Much air activity in BB
80-90, isolated planes in left half of BC.
Total successes: 2 ships - 15,000 BRT.
On return journey 2 plus 5 torpedoes, 29 cbm.
b) None.
c) 1) Submarines sighted:
CA 5444
ET 67(?)
CA 8267
DC 1187
2) American motor tanker"Australia" (11,628 BRT) reported from DC
1192, that she was being hunted by a suspicious looking vessel.
3) Submarine warning by American tanker "Thermo" (4,487 BRT) from
CA 49.
4) British motor tanker"Victolite" (11,410 BRT) was torpedoed in CB
7456.
d) Spanish ship's officer (Naval Reserve Officer) reported on harbors in
Curacao: open, not mined, no black-out. Large stores of petroleum on
shore. 20-25 large tankers, mainly enemy, always there.
Trinidad: again no black-out, no mines. As many as 25 ships in harbor,
brisk coming and going of shipping, including transports.

On Return Passage: U 751 - 566 - 402 - 85 - 572 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 86 IV. Current Operations:
- 109 - 130 - 125 - 66. a) Convoy No. 9: At 1930 U 591 sighted convoy (15 ships) on easterly
Sailed: 558 - Brest. course, speed 8-10 knots. Boat had operational freedom and orders to
Entered Port: U 66 - Lorient; U 572 - Brest. continue reporting contact.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. - 70 -

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) Convoy No. 9 (U 591) see No. IVa.
2) U 586 reported situation in area around Rockall:
Only air patrols, no sea patrols. No planes north of 590. Patrols in
AM 21.

540
 V. Reports of Success:
U 136 and 213 were put on to convoy. As they were inexperienced U 85 sank 1 ship 6,000 BRT in BC 8179
boats and the area was very strongly patrolled and also because it had been U 591 sank 1 ship, 8-10,000 BRT in AL 6121
arranged with Group North (Norwegian operations) that single boats U 591 torpedoed 2 freighters in AL 6121
should always operate there, they were ordered to return if enemy U 136 sank 1 corvette in AL 5235
countermeasures in the attack area were very strong. Reports from U 591 U 136 torpedoed 2 steamers in AL 5235.
stated that convoy had steered a course AL 5132-5214-5216. At 2250 U
136 requested beacon signals, 0135 he attacked in AL 5235, sank a VI. General:
corvette and scored hits on 2 steamers. Boat reported strong defenses Following on the return of the commander of U 333, who sank the
between the vessels, forced to sheer off! At 0445 convoy was in AL 6121. "Spreewald", it appeared appropriate to tighten up the attack restrictions
U 591 also attacked, sank an 8-10,000 ton tanker and torpedoed 2 etc. in "Way Anton". With the new wording (see under
freighters. U 213 reported on request that his position was AL 3812, so he
was still about 120 sea miles off. U 591 still had 39 cbm., had fired all
torpedoes and had to reload. Requested that shadowing should be taken
over. As it appeared unlikely because of the nearness of the coast and the - 71 -
strong defenses based there, that it would be possible to launch another
attack the following night, the order was given to break off and return to
the attack areas if air patrols were strong. U 591 was to reload, but only in
darkness.
b) 1) U 136 and U 213 were given the northern half of AM as a new
attack area.
2) From the present date boats are absolutely forbidden to attack in sea
area "Way Anton" and in the area whose eastern boundary runs from CE
2289 and western boundary from CD 4139 to the south. Exceptions: IVb 2) any misinterpretations, which really were hardly possible before,
convoys outside BF, warships, and enemy independently routed ships are now obviated in such a manner that greater security could not even be
outside BF, providing these are closely escorted by destroyers. achieved by forbidding all attacks.
c) 1) Contrary to order of 6.2 U 656 was ordered to take up his position It now remains to fix afresh the western limits of the attack
by 14.2 in CD 6555 to carry out a special task. Return route via BD 77, restrictions; for the time being the western boundary has been fixed at 450
BE 54 and BF 79. and a final ruling has been requested from SKL.
d) At the same time U 125 and 69 were ordered to maintain complete The details of the "Spreewald" sinking are reported elsewhere.
radio silence within a radius of 400 miles from rendezvous CE 4184.
(Fuel transfer from U 125 to U 69). No beacon signals were permitted. If ---------------------------------------------------
the boats had not met by the night of 12.2, U 125 was to continue on ---------------
homeward voyage. U 69 was to proceed to operational area in southern
half of BB and in CC. Shipping situation was pointed out. 11.February 1942.
541
 AH 4210. As weather took a turn for the worst and boats had only a little
fuel, the order was given at 0600 to the convoy submarines to break off
I. U 67 - ED 33 U 125 - CE 41 U 162 - AN 30 U 575 - Op(BC-CC) pursuit before first light and move away: U 213 to go to fresh attack area
69 - CE 41 126 - CE 68 213 - AL 38 576 - Op(BC-CC) AL 50 (to take over weather reporting from U 591), U 136 to go to
85 - BC 67 128 - Op(Florida) 352 - Op(AE 70) 578 - BD 83 northern half of AM, U 591 to go to northern half of AM subsequently,
86 - BE 52 129 - DQ 29 432 - CB 75 586 - AF 77 according to fuel supplies, to proceed to Bergen.
96 - BD 74 130 - CD 45 455 - Op(AE 50) 591 - AL 62(Op)
98 - BC 99 136 - AL 62-Op 502 - ED 36 653 - CE 12 - 72 -
103 - CB 59 154 - AN 30 504 - DE 51 654 - BC 92
106 - CD 17 155 - AN 30 402 - BF 50 656 - BD 94
107 - Op(CA) 156 - ED 32 558 - BF 10 751 - BC 75
108 - Op(CA) 158 - Bergen 564 - Op(amerik. Küste) 751 - BC 75
109 - CD 44 161 - DQ 61 566 - Op(amerik. Küste) 752 - Bergen

On Return Passage: U 751 - 586 - 402 - 85 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 86 - 109

- 130 - 125.
Sailed: U 505 - 68 - Lorient. b) None.
Entered Port: U 402 - St. Nazaire. c) U 656 approaching area for convoy duty.
d) No report of fuel transfer from U 125 to U 69.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 9 (U 591) see No. IVa. VI. General:
b)- d) None. Following the sanction of Naval War Staff, U 505 and U 68 have
left for the Freetown area. (see 8.2)
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 9: As no radio message was received from U 136 and U ---------------------------------------------------
213 in answer to the request that they should take over shadowing, these ---------------
two boats were requested to proceed to position, in order to get some idea
of the situation by the convoy. At 1037 U 591 was forced by a search 12.February 1942.
group to sheer off and lost contact. Final position at 0900 was AL 6212.
Easterly course. U 591 was in pursuit. Weather favorable, west 3, sea 2,
cloudy, visibility 12 miles. At 1230 U 591 again picked up the convoy in I. U 67 - ED 61 U 109 - CE 51 U 161 - DQ 54 U 566 - Op(amerik.
AL 6232. Flying boats as air escorts! At 1823 U 591 was forced by Küste)
Sunderland to submerge and did not get contact again until 0313 (12.2) in 68 - BF 50 125 - CE 41 162 - AF 79 575 - Op(BC-CC)
542
 69 - CE 41 126 - CE 83 213 - AM 10(Op) 576 - Op(amerik Küste) PG30304b
85 - BD 47 128 - Op(Florida) 352 - Op(AE 70) 578 - BD 84
86 - BE 62 129 - DQ 43 432 - CA 95 586 - AN 23
96 - BC 97 130 - CD 52 455 - Op(AE 50) 591 - AM 42
98 - Op(BB-CB) 136 - AM 42 502 - ED 53 653 - CD 33 16.February 1942.
103 - BC 66 154 - AN 24 504 - DE 45 654 - BD 71
106 - CD 27 155 - AF 87 505 - BF 50 656 - CE 16
107 - Op(CA) 156 - ED 29 558 - BF 19 751 - BC 84 I. U 67 - Op(EC 90) U 128 - DD 70? U 404 - BF 40 U 578 - BC 75
108 - Op(CA) 158 - AN 23 564 - Op(amerik. Küste) 752 - Bergen 68 - CF 38 129 - EE 15 432 - Op(CA) 587 - BE 67
69 - CD 17 130 - CE 35 455 - Op(AL 50) 588 - BE 90
85 - BE 42 136 - Op(AM) 502 - Op(EC 90) 591 - AM 25
On Return Passage: U 591 - 751 - 586 - 85 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 86 - 109 94 - BE 90 154 - AM 77 503 - Br'buttel 653 - CC 31
- 130 - 125. 96 - Op(BB-CB) 155 - AM 17 504 - DD 71 654 - BE 37
Sailed: U 94 - 587 - St. Nazaire; U 588 - Lorient. 98 - CD 21 156 - Op(EC 90) 505 - CF 39 656 - BD 77
Entered Port: U 586 Bergen. Boat is entering Trondheim on 20.2 103 - CC 67 158 - AM 17 558 - BD 39 751 - BE 74
because of dockyard difficulties. 106 - BD 98 161 - EE 19 564 - CA 93 752 - AM 31
107 - CA 93 162 - AM 18 566 - Op(amerik. Küste)
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. 108 - Op(CA 50) 213 - AL 31(Op) 575 - BC 68
109 - CE 31 352 - Op(Reykjavik) 576 - Op(amerik. Küste)
III. Reports on the Enemy: 125 - CF 21
a) - b) None. 126 - DF 24
c) 1) English plane sighted a submarine in BF 4226. (U 558, searching
for crew of plane).
2) Steamer "Jamaica Producer" (5,464 GRT) reported submarine in AM On Return Passage: U 564 - 591 - 751 - 575 - 85 - 107 - 103 - 106 - 654
4621. - 109 - 130 - 98.
d) None. Sailed: -.-
Entered Port: -.-
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None. II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
c)
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 576 reported: No shipping in BB 58-59-81-83. A/S hunt. 8,000
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log BRT freighter sunk in BB 8851. On return voyage.
2) U 564 reported tanker "Opalia" in CB 4798. Gun duel, only 3 hits,
16 - 28 February 1942 tanker escaped.

543
 3) As leader of Group "Neuland", U 156 reported 2 tankers 5,800 BRT
sunk off Aruba. Only A/S defenses searchlights, plane, 1 patrol boat.
b) None.
c) Report of appearance of German submarines off Curacao and Aruba.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 161 and U 129 in area north of Trinidad were given operational
freedom.
2) U 502 and U 67 ("Neuland" group) were ordered to shell the tank
installations on Aruba and Curacao.
3) U 732 was allotted northern half of AM as attack area.
4) Attack area of U 96 - 69 - 578 - 653 unlimited to the west.
5) U 558 - 587 - 588 - 94 - 404 were given area CB-CA to operate in U
126 - to attack in area Straits of Florida
- 79 -
or north and south of them.
c) U 656 probably carried out convoy duty according to plan.
d) 1) U 564 and 107 intend to carry out fuel transfer.
2) U 587 and 751 were to be in BE 8132 at 1100 on 17th to take over
the 5 men rescued from the FW-200. U 751 - on return journey - was to
take them on board.
3) U 156 had 2 men wounded by a barrel premature while shelling
Curacao. Naval War Staff gave permission to enter Martinique.
544
V. Reports of Success:
U 156 reported sinking 2 tankers (5,800 BRT).
VI. General:
a) The only report to hand from the Aruba area claims only an
unsatisfactory success. Even though the indirect success may be great, the
primary aim of the operation must be to inflict direct damage on the
enemy.
This is best effected by destroying enemy shipping, only after all
possible opportunities for this had been seized should the tank installations
on land have been shelled.
Apparently U 156 acted in this way, but the shelling, presumably
because of the barrel premature, did not have the desired effect.
About 1500 a teleprint arrived from Naval War Staff: C-in-C Navy
wishes the submarine operations in this area to be opened by shelling the
tank installations.
But the use of guns was sanctioned by operational order from 0800 (5
hours before dawn at that place). In accordance with the order from C-in-
C Navy, U 502 was sent to Aruba as U 156 had a breakdown. When off
Curacao U 502 and U 67 were ordered to use guns against tank
installations, if possible.
I had decided against issuing an order to commence submarine
operations by shelling the tank installations, as there was a danger that
such shelling, which might or might not be successful, would do away
with the element of surprise and spoil chances of sinkings.
b) The barrel premature on U 156 gives rise to the fear that similar runs
of misfires may occur, as with the "South" boats in the Spring.But
according to information from Navy High Command-Gunnery- (Captain v.
Goetze) the ammunition that contained so many duds is no longer in use
so that it may be expected that this is an isolated case.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
17.February 1942.

- 80 -
I. U 67 - Op(EC 90) U 125 - BE 88 U 213 - Op(AM) U 575 - BD 45
68 - CF 68 126 - DF 18 352 - Op(Reykjavik) 576 - BB 99
69 - CC 37 128 - DC 90? 404 - BF 47 578 - Op(amerik. Küste)
85 - BE 51 129 - ED 63 432 - Op(CA) 587 - BE 82
94 - BE 81 130 - CF 16 455 - Op(AE 50) 588 - BE 81
96 - Op(BB 88) 136 - Op(AM) 502 - Op(EC 90) 591 - AM 23
98 - CD 31 154 - AM 32 503 - Helgoland 653 - CC 21
103 - CD 48 155 - AL 39 504 - DC 95 654 - BE 63
106 - BE 79 156 - Op(EC 90) 505 - CF 68 656 - BD 86
107 - CB 49 158 - AL 62 558 - BD 37 751 - BE 81
108 - Op(CA 50) 161 - ED 66 564 - CB 49 752 - Op(AM)
109 - CF 13 162 - AL 03 566 - Op(amerik. Küste)
On Return Passage: U 576 - 98 - 564 - 591 - 751 - 575 - 85 - 107 - 103
- 106 - 654 - 109 - 130 - 125.
Sailed: U 332 - La Pallice.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 752 reported "Q" ships in AM 33.
2) Report from U 108: Traffic to America stopped excepting close
inshore. Moderate northeast traffic in DC 12-21 and south of it. (English)
545
Night route for traffic to America via shallow water. Sunk: 4 freighters
totaling 22,000 BRT. Protracted return voyage. 3 torpedoes, 65 cbm. fuel.
3) On 16.2 U 502 (Neuland boat) sank 2 tankers totaling 3,300 tons off
the northwest coast of Paraguana, and scored 2 hits on a 1500 ton tanker.
On 17th Nicolaashaven (Aruba) was completely blacked out, 3 patrol
boats, no traffic. Air patrol by day. Impossible to use ship's guns. 145
cbm. fuel.
b) None.
c) 1) Finnish steamer "Modesta" sighted a submarine in DC 53(?), and
the American steamer "Montosa" a suspicious vessel in DB 59.
2) English plane attacked submarine in AM 3645.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 455 ordered to include AE 5564 in its patrol area.
2) U 504 was allotted the same attack area as U 129, i.e. DB 90 and
north or south of it.
- 81 -
3) Apparently U 128 was on the wrong operations area and will arrive
on 19.2 in the attack area ordered - "Straits of Florida".
c) Apparently U 656 carried out convoy duty as planned.
d) 1) No report on transfer of fuel from U 564 to U 107.
2) U 587 and U 751 did not meet. Boats continued outward or
homeward voyage respectively.
 3) U 130 (on homeward trip) arranged rendezvous with U 587 for 18.2
at 1500 in BE 7265 (to take over aircrew).
4) Boats were directed against Mexican and South American ships
under strict observance of prize regulations.
V. Reports of Success:
U 108 made a fresh report of 3 freighters, totaling 17,000 BRT, sunk.
U 502 reported 2 tankers totaling 3,300 BRT sunk and 1 tanker totaling
1,500 BRT torpedoed.
VI General:
Further details of the convoy U 402 ("Llangibby Castle") 2-4
February were given in the oral report of Lieut.(s.g.) Hirsacker,
Commander of U 572, and of v. Forstner, Commander of U 402:
a) U 572 operated against convoy but had to make a temporary change
of course because of a message and when he later returned to the correct
position could no longer get near.
b) As previous reports of his sinking showed, U 581 was also
immediately off Horta and made arrangements to meet U 402 there. It
would have been correct for U 402 to report this as well.
The foregoing shows, how easily one can miscalculate the position
of a submarine, when no definite reports are available. It was assumed
here, because of the English aircraft report that U 581 was off Gibraltar.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
18.February 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(EC 90) U 125 - BE 98 U 213 - Op(AM) U 566 -
Op(amerik. Küste)
68 - CF 94 126 - DE 38 332 - BF 58 575 - BD 29
69 - CC 28 128 - DC 70 352 - AE 47-Op 576 - BC 79
85 - BE 53 129 - Op(ED 98-99) 404 - BE 58 578 - Op(amerik. Küste)
94 - BE 72 130 - BE 72 432 - Op(CA) 587 - BE 49
546
96 - Op(amerik. Küste) 136 - Op(AM) 455 - Op(AE 50) 588 - BE 75
98 - CE 11 154 - AM 26 502 - EC 91-Op 591 - AM 24
103 - CD 54 155 - AL 51 503 - Helgol. 653 - BB 89
106 - BE 86 156 - ED 82 504 - DC 85 654 - BF 40
107 - CB 58 158 - AL 54 505 - CF 94 656 - BE 46
108 - DD 13 161 - Op(ED 98-99) 558 - BD 52 751 - BE 59
109 - CF 22 162 - AL 61 564 - CB 58 752 - AM 33-Op
On Return Passage: U 576 - 98 - 564 - 591 - 575 - 751 - 108 - 85 - 107
- 103 - 106 - 654 - 109 - 130 - 125.
- 82 -
Sailed: -.-
Entered Port: -.-
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 154 reported light or no air patrol in AM 10, moderate traffic.
183 cbm. fuel.
2) Report from U 352 in sea area west of Reykjavik. Numerous air
patrols, lights burning. No patrol vessels outside barrage. No steamer
traffic. No offensive action because of weather. Returning, no successes.
3) U 156 reported many independently routed ships in ED, center, and
upper right hand corner; mostly radiating from Trinidad. Usually 2-4 large
tankers in main harbor, shipping leaving port took on the whole a
northwest course towards the north. Shelling of land installations had little
effect. Boat steered for "Fort de France".
b) None.
c) 1) Submarine was bombed by plane in BE 5878 (U 404).
2) Submarine warning by American tanker "Vacuum". Was followed by
suspicious looking vessel. 19.February 1942.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 69 reported patch of oil, impossible to disperse it. Boat was
accordingly directed to more distant operational area in BC 5797. 300
miles deep.
2) As Associated Press reported that transport of petroleum from
Venezuela had been stopped for the time being U 502 was ordered to
operate against east-west traffic north of Maracaibo Bay until transport
was recommended.
3) After transferring wounded U 156 was to be free to attack at
discretion. Instructed to concentrate on Mona Passage and Windward
Passage.
c) U 656 believed to have carried out convoy duty as ordered.
d) 1) U 130 took over air-crew from U 587.
2) U 564 and U 107 continued homeward trip.
3) U 68 and U 505 were directed to attack French convoy traffic along
the coast of Africa.
V. Reports of Success: None.
I. U 67 - Op(EC 90) U 125 - BF 74 U 213 - Op(AM) U 566 - Op(BB
87)
68 - DH 16 126 - DE 52 332 - BF 42 575 - BD 39
69 - CC 31 128 - Op(Florida) 352 - AE 72 576 - BC 88
85 - BE 63 129 - Op(ED 98-99) 404 - BE 46 578 - Op(amerik. Küste)
94 - BD 93 130 - BE 81 432 - Op(CA) 587 - BE 71
96 - Op(amerik. Küste) 136 - AM 15(op) 455 - Op(AE 50) 588 - BD 96
98 - CE 21 154 - AM 15 502 - Op(EC 90) 591 - AF 77
103 - CD 64 155 - AL 44 503 - Helgol. 653 - Op(amerik. Küste)
106 - BE 94 156 - ED 55-Op 504 - DC 75 654 - BF 50
107 - CB 66 161 - Op(ED 98-99) 505 - DH 14 656 - BE 91
108 - CB 89 162 - AL 52 558 - BD 43 751 - BE 69
109 - BE 89 564 - CC 17 752 - Op(AM)
On Return Passage: U 576 - 98 - 564 - 591 - 352 - 751 - 575 - 108 - 85
- 107 - 103 - 106 - 109 - 130 - 125 - 654.
Sailed: U 592 left Hamburg to join command of Admiral Arctic.
Entered Port: U 654 - Brest.

VI. General: None. II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

- 83 - III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) At 1156 U 136 sighted convoy (No. 11) in AM 1326, course
southeast, speed 8 knots. Submarine was forced to sheer off. As all
torpedoes below decks had been fired, boat was ordered to move away to
the west and reload, if it was not possible to press on.
No further reports of convoys.
547
 On 17.2 U 136 sank a freighter (8,000 BRT). It is surprising how
many convoys have been picked up recently in the operational area
northwest of the North Channel by the few submarines stationed there.
2) U 352 reported enemy submarine in AE 75.
3) On 18.2 U 108 sank English steamer "Somme" (5,265 BRT) in CB
8926. 19.2 dud shot fired at steamer in CB 9711. Both steamers
belonging to convoy that had been dispersed in the area east of
Newfoundland.
4) U 161 reported that he had penetrated the Gulf of Paria between
Trinidad and Venezuela and sank 1 tanker (4,000 BRT) and 1 freighter
(6,000 BRT) in 11 meters of water, probably off Port of Spain. The
narrow entrance to the Gulf was protected by 4 searchlights and patrol
vessels. Much east-west traffic under cover of the coast. Concentrated air
patrolling. In view of the shallow water and narrow entrance, this boat's
operation was extremely creditable.
5) U 67, whose attack area lay around Curacao, reported that he sank a
tanker of the "Rosalia" class (5,100 BRT) on 16.2. From then on, lights on
land were doused and traffic ceased. Bombed! U 67 also had 4
unexplained
- 84 -
dud torpedoes, some fired at stationary targets at short range.
Attempts to shell the island were twice prevented by patrol vessels.
b) None.
c) 1) United Press "Maracaibo" reported the names of 6 tankers sunk by
submarines:
"Pedernales" (3,945 BRT)
548
"Oranjestad" (2,396 BRT)
"San Nicolas" (3,191 BRT) (was towed to Aruba)
"Tijuana" (2,395 BRT)
"Monagast" (2,650 BRT)
"Rafaelita" (3,177 BRT)
"Akanias"
There was no news of three others.
2) Reuter reported: 14.2 Brazilian steamer "Barque" (5,152 BRT)
torpedoes and sunk. (Sinking must have occurred off the coast of
America. The boats in the Caribbean were not given permission to attack
until 16.2.)
3) USA ships were instructed:
1) Not to leave important Caribbean harbors except by day.
2) To blackout when sailing at night. (boats have been informed).
4) Report of being torpedoed by "Empire Seal" (7,964 BRT) in BB
7758; "Scottish Star" in EF 4960 (longitude of scene of torpedoing
probably wrong, no German submarine in that area). Also "Elizabeth
Massey" (4,323 BRT) in DB 9460.
5) Submarine warning from tanker "Eagle" (6,003 BRT) in DB 3780
and "Oklahomann" (5,508 BRT) in DC 12.
6) Submarine sightings. English plane sighted submarine in AM 1217.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 154 instructed to make for Cape Hatteras.
c) U 656 reported from CD 29 that "Osorno" had not been met. Still 92
cbm. fuel (submarine ordered to move away to northwest and report, if
not encountered by 2400 on 18.2).
d) U 68 and U 505 were informed that the German tanker "Charlotte
Schliemann" would leave Las Palmas between 21 and 23.2.
V. Reports of Success:
U 136 reported sinking of 1 freighter (8,000 BRT).

- 85 -
U 108 reported sinking of steamer "Somme" (5,265 BRT)
U 161 " " " 2 ships (10,000 BRT)
U 67 " " " 1 tanker (3,100 BRT)
VI. General:
The submarine situation in Norwegian waters demands the use of
boats from Atlantic ports. After exhausting their offensive powers, boats
have turned homewards earlier than expected, and on the other hand
delays have been caused in the dates for homebased boats to leave port
because of the worsening icing conditions.
The present situation and intended operations are as follows:
1) Admiral Arctic Command including Narvik-Tromsoe demands:
6 plus submarines.
U 584, U 585, U 134, U 456, U 436, U 435 are available.
The last boat must return to Trondheim for periscope repairs.
En route to Narvik: U 377 in northern North Sea, U 592 will leave
Heligoland somewhere about 22.2. U 584, U 134, U 585 have been in
northern waters since the beginning of December. It is intended to relieve
them as soon as new boats are available from home.
2) Trondheim:
Requirements: 2 serviceable boats. U 454 now in Trondheim will be
ready for operations from 21.2. The boat will be relieved by 403, which
will leave Kiel on 23.2. It will then operate in the Iceland-England area.
It is not intended to use it again in the northern area.
549
U 586, at present undergoing repair in Trondheim yard. Should be
ready for operations about 15.3.
3) Bergen:
Requirements: 2 serviceable boats. U 591 undergoing repairs since
20.2. U 593, U 589 leaving Heligoland about 1.3.
4) Hebrides-Iceland area:
Requirements: 8 boats.
In operational area: U 455, U 136, U 213, U 752; on return journey to
western France U 352.
U 155, U 158, U 154, U 162 (type IXc boats) passed through this area
en route for America. No more boats will pass through for a fortnight.
To bring the submarines up to the number required, the next boats that
become ready for action will be sent from Atlantic ports to the operational
area, as follows:
U 87 on 22.2; U 135 on 22.2; U 553 on 24.2; U 701 on 26.2.
U 405 will be the next boat to leave from home waters and will sail
from Heligoland about 5.3.
- 86 -
20.February 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(EC 90) U 125 - BF 40 U 213 - Op(AM) U 566 -
Op(Küste amerik.)
68 - DH 46 126 - DE 45 332 - BF 47 575 - BE 18
69 - Op(amerik. Küste) 128 - Op(Florida) 352 - AL 22 576 - BC 97
85 - BF 42 129 - Op(ED 98-99) 404 - BE 44 578 - Op(amerik Küste)
 94 - BD 91 130 - BE 83 432 - Op(CA) 587 - BD 67
96 - Op(amerik. Küste) 136 - AM 13 455 - Op(AE 50) 588 - BD 94
98 - BD 97 154 - AL 39 502 - Op(EC 90) 591 - AN 24
103 - CD 63 155 - AK 92 503 - AN 93 653 - Op(amerik Küste)
106 - BE 98 156 - Op(Caribbean Sea) 504 - Op(DB 90) 656 - CD 29
107 - CC 18 158 - AK 93 505 - DH 44 751 - BF 48
108 - CC 74 161 - Op(ED 98-99) 558 - BD 44 752 - Op(AM)
109 - BE 95 162 - AL 48 564 - CB 63
5) U 129: one report from attack area northeast Trinidad. East of
Trinidad no traffic, nor off the main harbors on the north. Little air
activity. Freighter (5,500 BRT) on a course of 2900 sunk in EO 1527.
Intended operating in area southeast Trinidad.
b) None.
- 87 -

On Return Passage: U 576 - 98 - 564 - 591 - 352 - 751 - 575 - 108 - 85

- 107 - 103 - 106 - 109 - 130 - 125.
Sailed: -.-
Entered Port: U 591 - Bergen.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

c) 1) William C Atwater (2,450 BRT) reported sighting of suspicious
III. Reports on the Enemy: looking vessel in DB 9790.
a) 1) U 96 reported: North-south traffic off southeast coast of Nova 2) American tanker "Swiftsure" (8,207 BRT) sent submarine warning in
Scotia. Much driving snow and icing. 20.2, 2 freighters sunk 8,000 BRT CA 5470.
(probably "Empire Seal" and 6,000 BRT). 3) USA ships were warned of mine barrage off Chesapeake Bay.
2) U 566 reported convoy and single-ship traffic south of Sable Island to 4) American tankers instructed to anchor in DM 2710 (north of Key
the coast of Nova Scotia at 3000. On 15.2 9,000 BRT freighter torpedoed West) and await further orders. Boats were duly informed.
in BB 7544 (south of Halifax). Probably sunk, but not observed, as
submarine was forced to sheer off. A great deal of heavy weather, driving IV. Current Operations:
snow (weather and icing conditions will shortly prevent operations in this a) None.
area, which is still good). b) U 656 was allotted large square CB.
3) U 432 made a fragmentary report: Moderate north-south traffic in c) - d) None.
area New York-Cape Hatteras. Much careless air patrolling. 4 freighters
totaling 20,000 BRT sunk, amongst them "Olinda". V. Reports of Success:
4) Caribbean: U 156 reported that wounded were duly landed at U 96 reported sinking of 2 freighters totaling 14,000 BRT.
Martinique, one wounded man died on board. On 19.2, 2 misses fired in U 566 " probable sinking of 1 freighter 9,000 BRT.
ED 55 against freighter in ballast depth setting 3 and 2 meters with certain U 432 " sinking of 4 ships totaling 20,000 BRT.
firing data. U 156 " 2 hits on freighter 4,000 BRT.
20.2, 2 hits and 3 misses fired at stationary freighter (4,000 BRT) in U 129 " sinking 1 freighter 5,500 BRT.
ED 65. Sinking not observed because of flying boat.
550
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
21.February 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(EC 90) U 125 - BF 46 U 213 - AM 15-Op U 566 - BB
88
68 - DH 76 126 - DD 69 332 - BE 86 575 - BE 55
69 - Op(BC) 128 - Op(Florida) 352 - AL 35 576 - BC 99
85 - BF 40 129 - ED 90 Op 404 - BD 65 578 - CB 23
94 - BD 82 130 - BE 92 432 - CA 58-Op 587 - BD 58
96 - Op(amerik. Küste) 136 - Op(AM) 455 - Op(AE 50) 588 - BD 84
98 - BD 99 154 - AL 51 502 - Op(Aruba) 653 - Op(amerik. Küste)
103 - CE 42 155 - AK 86 503 - vor Bergen 656 - CD 15
106 - BF 70 156 - ED 60 Op 504 - Op(DB 90) 751 - BF 40
107 - CC 24 158 - AK 94 505 - DH 74 752 - Op(AM)
108 - CC 73 161 - ED 98-99-Op 558 - BC 68
109 - BF 70 162 - AK 93 564 - CC 24
On Return Passage: U 576 - 98 - 564 - 566 - 352 - 751 - 575 - 108 - 85
- 107 - 103 - 106 - 109 - 130 - 125.
Sailed: U 124 - UA - Lorient.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) At 1130 U 107 scored hit on tanker in CC 2723 with last torpedo.
Tanker was at first on a course of 2350, after the hit 3400.
- 88 -
551
2) At 1800 U 564 reported a tanker on a course of 2800 in CC 2543, at
1700 a tanker in CC 2526, course southwest. At the same time U 107
reported 5 tankers in CC 2490, widely scattered, on southwest course.
Doubtless ships belonging to a dispersed convoy. Probably ONS. It was
regrettable that two submarines that had fired all torpedoes should happen
upon this convoy. The nearest boat was on its homeward way - some 200
miles northwest of the position reported.
b) None.
c) 1) At 1110 steamer "JSMD" reported that it had been torpedoed in CC
2493, at 1410 tanker "Enleina" (6,207 BRT) reported the same from CC
2439. According to T.O.O. and call-sign they were two different vessels,
but as no other submarine was in the vicinity, it had to be assumed that in
each case it was the tanker that had been torpedoed by U 107.
2) Tanker "Circle Shell" (8,207 BRT) reported that it had been
torpedoed in ED 95 (operational area of U 161).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 107 reported 1 hit on tanker.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
22.February 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(EC 90) U 124 - BF 55 U 162 - AK 94 U 564 - CC 31
68 - DT 36 125 - BF 64 213 - Op(AM) 566 - BB 97
69 - BC 84 126 - DD 59 332 - BE 84 575 - BE 64
85 - BF 40 128 - Op(Florida) 352 - AL 62 576 - BD 78
94 - BD 72 129 - Op(BD 98-99) 404 - BD 56 578 - Op(amerik. Küste)
96 - Op(amerik. Küste) 130 - BE 69 432 - Op(CA) 587 - BD 49
98 - BE 78 154 - Op(AM) 455 - Op(AE 50) 588 - BD 75
103 - CE 27 155 - BD 14 502 - Op(Aruba) 653 - Op(amerik. Küste)
106 - BF 64 156 - Op(EC 90) 503 - v.Bergen 656 - CC 36
107 - CC 31 158 - BD 15 504 - Op(DB 90) 751 - BF 40
108 - CC 82 161 - Op(ED 98-99) 505 - DT 26 752 - Op(AM)
109 - BF 40 558 - BC 83 A - BF 50
On Return Passage: U 576 - 98 - 564 - 566 - 352 - 751 - 575 - 108 - 85
- 107 - 103 - 109 - 130 - UA - 125 - 106.
Sailed: U 135 - St. Nazaire; U 87 - La Pallice.
Entered Port: UA - 106 - 124 - Lorient; U 503 - Bergen.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 89 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
552
a) 1) At 0600 U 155 sighted a convoy on a southwest course, low speed,
in BD 1428 (No. 12). This may be ONS 67, which according to our data
should be somewhere in this area. U 158 was in the vicinity and U 587,
588, 594 and U 69 some 200-300 miles south of the convoy. U 155 was
ordered to report contact every 4 hours until the other boats operating
against the convoy requested more frequent shadower reports. At 0828 U
155 reported that he had sunk a tanker (9,000 BRT), and a freighter (6,000
BRT). Boat was forced to submerge and depth charges were dropped. For
a time contact was lost. Convoy consisted of about 5 steamers and 3
escorts. U 158 was south of the convoy following a searching course. At
1553 U 155 reported that he had been forced by destroyers to submerge for
a short time. Position of convoy at 1500 was BC 3955. U 158 requested
beacon signals several times during the day.
2) At 1220 U 154 sighted a convoy in AK 6823 (No. 13). Easterly
course in direction of North Channel, 9 knots. Boat maintained contact.
At 0535 on 23.2 he reported firing a total of 10 misses based on good
firing data during 3 night attacks on a convoy of 16 steamers and 3
destroyers. Boat was forced to sheer off, contact was lost. Last position at
0625 was AL 4522, course 700, 9 knots. Only U 752 was favorably placed
for attack on convoy. He was about 250 miles to the east and made for the
convoy.
3) U 128 reported from operational area in Straits of Florida that he had
sunk a tanker (3,000 BRT) in DB 9546 on 19.2, and a fully loaded tanker
(12,000 BRT) in DB 9439 on 22.2. Peacetime lights, no air patrol, only
destroyers in DB.
b) None.
c) Reports of torpedoing:
1) American steamer "Lihue" (7,000 BRT) torpedoed in ED 5540
(Caribbean) sinking!
2) Unidentified torpedoing. Steamer in EO 15 (submarine warning was
given as a result).
3) Report from radio "Louisburg". Submarine sighted in BB 7551 (30
miles southeast Halifax), a merchant ship torpedoed.
4) American steamer reported: Saw a ship blow up 10 miles west of
Rapid-Jupiter (Straits of Florida) probably hit by torpedo.
d) None.
 96 - Op(amerik. Küste) 136 - Op(AM) 455 - Op(AE 50) 588 - BC 97
IV. Current Operations: 98 - BE 18 154 - AL 40 502 - Op(EC 90) 653 - Op(amerik Küste)
a) See IIIa 1 and 2. 103 - CE 34 155 - BD 60 504 - Op(DB 90) 656 - CC 29
b) - c) None 107 - BC 79 156 - Op(EC 90) 505 - DT 56 751 - BF 60
d) U 564 and U 107 arranged new rendezvous for 23.2 to carry 108 - CD 68 158 - BC 60 558 - BC 75 752 - Op(AM 19)
109 - BF 50 161 - Op(ED 98-99)

- 90 -
On Return Passage: U 576 - 98 - 107 - 564 - 566 - 751 - 575 - 108 - 85
- 103 - 109 - 352.
Sailed: U 71 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: U 109 - Lorient; U 85 - 751 - St. Nazaire.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

out fuel transfer. At 1200 in BC 7963.
V. Reports of Success:
U 155 reported sinking 2 ships totaling 15,000 BRT.
U 128 " " " 2 tankers totaling 15,000 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
23.February 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(EC 90) U 124 - BF 48 U 162 - BD 13 U 564 - BC 79
68 - DT 66 126 - DD 49 213 - Op(AM) 566 - BC 77
69 - Op(BC) 128 - DB 90 332 - BE 75 575 - BF 44
85 - BF 60 129 - Op(ED 98-99) 352 - AL 93 576 - BD 88
87 - BF 57 130 - BF 45 404 - ED 46 578 - Op(amerik. Küste)
94 - BC 69 135 - BF 54 432 - Op(CA 90) 587 - BC 69
553
a) 1) Convoys No. 12 and 13 see No. IVa.
2) U 504 reported situation from operational area in Straits of Florida:
Much traffic within the 20 meter line. Hence, no day attacks. Single large
ships at night within the 200 meter line. Moderate destroyer and air
patrols since first attack. Good chances for attack, but strong patrolling in
DB 9790.
Sunk: Tanker (6,000 BRT), gasoline tanker ("Gulfpride" class) 12, 510
BRT (probably the "EM-Plum" mentioned in the press). Four masted
freighter ("Cambridge" class) 10,846 BRT.
3) U 352 reported destroyer in BE 3251, easterly course, high speed.
Fired dud spread of four.
b) None.
c) 1) Latvian steamer "Everagra" (3,702 BRT) shadowed by submarine in
DC 1210.
2) The unidentified steamer reported under IIIc 2 on 22.2 was the
American "West-Zeda" (5,658 BRT).
- 91 -

d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 12: Contact was not re-established until 1300 on 23.2 by
U 587 in BD 6859. According to new report, convoy consisted of about 4
destroyers and 16 steamers. Contact was maintained until 2230, when U
587 was forced to sheer off by destroyers. Last position BC 9287. U 587
had final contact with the leading destroyer escort. It appears that U 587
was deliberately drawn off from the convoy on a southeast direction by the
destroyer escort.
At 0200 U 558 reported the convoy in BC 9426 and maintained contact
till morning. Apparently another submarine had attacked, for U 558
reported at 0700 that convoy was firing star shell in BC 8932. The
following boats must have been in the immediate vicinity of the convoy:
U 158 - 155 - 587. It was also to be assumed that U 558 - 94 - 404 - and U
69 which had made a weather report from that area, were operating against
the convoy.
U 587 sent warning of "Q" ship and 2 patrol vessels in BC 9424
(behind the convoy). "Q" ship had cable laying gear (Kabellegersteven)
and dim side-lights. She has already been reported several times from this
area. Apparently she is fitted with torpedo nets, as a torpedo hit aft by U
587 had no effect.
Convoy No. 13: At 1954 U 136 contacted the convoy in AL 0273.
During the day A/S defense was given by long-range reconnaissance land
planes and advanced destroyer escort. Contact was maintained during the
night. U 136 had 2 dud shots and U 154 4 on tankers during attacks. U
154 was instructed to return immediately to Lorient, U 136 to continue
reporting contact for U 752 and U 213. According to his own report the
latter was very close to the convoy.
554
b) U 502 and U 67 were given a free hand in the Caribbean.
c) None.
d) U 564 reported sinking 3 ships totaling 29,356 BRT.
VI. General:
The number of misses reported is again unusually high, certainly at
least some are caused by failures. In the meantime the investigation of the
possibilities of failures yielded the following information:
Because of a report from U 94 that at times considerable excess
pressure existed in the depth gear pockets, a number of torpedoes were
examined by the Inspectorate of Torpedoes. It was established that faulty
assembly and insufficient greasing by the automatic grease cup 6.1% of
the depth gear pockets had not the required pressure-tightness and were,
- 92 -
therefore, inclined to run too deep. Previous methods of testing had
not shown up this source of failures. Even though this small percentage
does not explain all unaccountable misses, this office considers that a most
important source of failures has been discovered. The Inspectorate of
Torpedoes has therefore tightened up the testing methods, it has also
issued instructions on filling the grease cup and the type of grease to be
used. These instructions were to be passed immediately to submarines out
on patrol, who were to act on them, so that those torpedoes that could no
longer be overhauled by the fitting out depots, would be handled correctly.
Special emphasis was laid on the need to vent the depth-gear pocket with
normal pressure in the boat.This case again shows that the operational
personnel's suspicions as to the cause of failures were in the main, correct.
Again this proves how difficult it is despite complicated tests to discover
the causes of failures, as it is almost impossible to re-construct actual
operational conditions at such trials. Therefore B.d.U. agrees with the
Inspectorate of Torpedoes that the fullest possible tests and trials must be
carried out for the sake of the efficiency of operational torpedoes.
B.d.U. has requested a more speedy development of a depth gear that is
completely unaffected by excess pressure in the torpedo. In the meantime
C-in-C Navy has ordered its immediate construction.
It is hoped that failures caused by pistol failures will be still further
reduced by the Pi G7h pistol which is now coming into use.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
24.February 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(EC 90) U 126 - DD 71 U 213 - AL 03-Op U 566 - BC 87
68 - DT 93 128 - Op(DB 90) 332 - BD 96 575 - BF 46
69 - Op(BC 89) 129 - Op(ED-EO) 352 - BE 39 576 - BD 97
71 - BF 58 130 - BF 50 404 - BC 90 578 - Op(amerik. Küste)
87 - BF 46 135 - BF 49 432 - Op(CA) 587 - BC 89
94 - BC 90 136 - AL 39-Op 455 - Op(AE 50) 588 - BC 90
96 - Op(amerik. Küste) 154 - AL 39 502 - Op(EC-BD) 653 - Op(CB 86)
98 - BE 27 155 - BC 89 504 - DB 96(Op) 656 - CC 19
103 - CF 12 156 - Op(ED-EC) 505 - DT 83 752 - AL 03(Op)
107 - BC 85 158 - BC 90 558 - BC 89
108 - CB 48 161 - Op(ED) 564 - BC 88
124 - BE 69 162 - BD 17
On Return Passage: U 576 - 98 - 564 - 566 - 352 - 575 - 108 - 107 - 103
- 130.
Sailed: U 403 - 589 - Kiel; U 160 - W'haven; U 553 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: - . -
555
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy's No. 12 and 13 see No. IVa.
- 93 -
2) At 2140 U 505 contacted a fast convoy in DT 3490, southerly
course 15 knots. Air escort. Submarine was forced to sheer off several
times and finally lost contact about 0100. At first light it followed up and
if it could not sight the enemy, would continue on southerly route. Last
position of convoy at 0100 in DT 3790, southeast course, 15 knots.
3) U 502 reported on behalf of U 67 fast steamer in EC 6869,
zigzagging on mean course of 1100, 14 knots. After U 502 had made an
unsuccessful gun attack, steamer set a roughly northerly course.
Submarine lost contact.
4) U 161 reported from Caribbean: 21.2 fired dud spread of two at a
tanker (3,000 BRT) just off the main harbor (Port of Spain). Sank tanker
(5,000 BRT) in ED 9739.
23.2 torpedoed "Lihue" in ED 5955. Boat suspected "Q" ship. Moved
away to northwest because of planes. Noticed by 2 steamers.
For the moment there was still much traffic approaching the main
harbor from northwest. It was supposed that shipping left by the
southeast. Strong air patrol off Port of Spain. Still 4 plus 4 torpedoes.
135 cbm.
b) None.
c) (X) U.S.A. shipping was given following instructions:
 Shipping proceeding to Aruba and Curacao is to arrange course so that
last 50 miles are covered by day.
Because of submarines, it is suggested that ships proceeding from or to
Trinidad should not use the eastern Caribbean, but keep close inshore on
the eastern side of the chain of islands.
After navigating the Mona Passage the course is as follows:
65 deg. 21 min. W. - 16 deg. (minutes missing) N. and
62 deg. 40 min. W. - 13 deg. 30 min. N., then as ordered.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 12: At 0918 shadower report from U 558 in BC 8925. U
158 reported one hit on tanker (10,000 BRT), and 1 hit heard on tanker
(4,000 BRT). At 1549 U 155 contacted convoy in BC 8935. Course 2200,
9 knots. Visibility changeable, some fog. The convoy was far behind and
its position tallied with that of U 558 at 0918. U 155 moved course
towards west to improve its position. At 1610 U 107, which was on its
return voyage, reported the convoy in BC 8592 on a course of 2300. This
report placed convoy 50 miles farther west than did that of U 155. It
agrees with the position reported by U 558. Because of lack of fuel, U 107
could not maintain contact. At 2000 U 155 was forced right away from
the convoy by destroyers and reported the latest exact position of the
convoy at 1830 in BC 8595, roughly the same position that was reported
by U 107 at 1610. From this time on contact was
- 94 -
556
interrupted and was not picked up again by the morning. The
supposition that the convoy had split into one fast and one slow formation,
seemed correct. However, it was possible that the varying positions given
for the convoy were caused by poor fixes by the submarines.
Further events: U 587 reported that a torpedo hit was scored amidships
on a tanker (10,000 BRT) by U 158, which set it on fire and aleak by
gunfire. Left in sinking condition.
U 558 reported: 2 hits scored on each of 2 freighters (7,000 BRT and
5,000 BRT) probably sunk. 1, 5,000 BRT freighters were torpedoed, and 1
9,000 BRT tanker. The tanker "Eidanger" (9,432 BRT) was fired at and
broke up with the finishing shot. Set on fire fore and aft by shelling. It
was not possible to plan operations for the boats during the night, as their
positions in relation to the convoy were unknown, and when requested
were not received in time. Also the number of boats available to cover a
sector from 1800 - 2900 was not sufficient for a convoy, whose speed had
been gauged at 9-10 knots.
Convoy No. 13: U 136 maintained contact with slight interruptions
until 0412 on 25th. As the position of the convoy was then only about 90
miles from the North Channel, the submarine was instructed to give up the
chase and return immediately to western France.
U 213 had given up pursuit of the convoy at 2100, as he was probably
forced by the convoy's air escort to submerge. U 752, who was requested
at 000 on 25th to report whether attack could be made during darkness
could not pass his message until 0648 to say that he had broken off pursuit
at 2400.
Result: 4 submarines took part in the operation. U 154 fired 14 misses;
U 136 2 misses; U 752, 2 misses and 2 hits. Explanation of the misses
fired by U 154 cannot be given until the commander returns to base.
b) None.
c) None.
d) U 558 reported: In convoy No. 12 two tankers with antisubmarine
nets were observed. Reports from U 558 and 587 (see Convoy No. 12),
and the oral report by the commander of U 654, have strengthened the
suspicion that the English are using torpedo nets to deflect torpedo attacks.
Submarines have been instructed to look out for this and report
immediately. The (Torpedo Experimental Establishment) ("Tewa") has
been informed of the necessity of developing a countermeasure against
anti-torpedo nets.
V. Reports of Success:
U 587 reported torpedoing and shelling of 1 tanker (10,000 BRT).
U 158 reported a hit on a tanker of 10,000 BRT and on one of 4,000 BRT.
- 95 -
U 558 reported sinking 3 ships totaling 21,432 BRT, and torpedoing 3
ships totaling 19,000 BRT.
U 161 reported sinking 2 ships totaling 12,000 BRT.
U 752 reported 2 hits.
IV. General:
Position in Northern Waters: As Naval War Staff has requested the
speediest possible closing of the gaps which have occurred all over the
Norway area (including Iceland), it has been necessary to make certain
alterations in the plan made on 19th February.
1) Northern Waters: U 456, 436, 585, and 435, which will be available at
Trondheim on 2.3. Also U 377, 454 at present in sea area off Trondheim.
U 403, U 589 to leave Heligoland about 2.3. U 134, U 584 returning
home for overhaul in dockyard.
2) Trondheim: U 586, ready 10.3. U 405 ready to leave Heligoland
about 2.3.
3) Bergen: U 591 ready for operations 8.3. U 593, ready to leave base
6.3.
4) Iceland Area: In operational area: U 752, U 213.
557
En route there: U 87, U 135, 553 from Atlantic harbors.
Also: U 701, U 753, U 569 from Atlantic harbors.
Returning to base: U 455, U 136.
Reserve: U 592 in Heligoland, operational readiness not yet known.
In all 24 submarines have so far been set aside for the Norway area. As
time goes on this number will be considerably increased.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
25.February 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 124 - BE 83 U 161 - ED 55-Op U 505 -
DT 61
68 - BJ 33 126 - DC 91 162 - BC 67 553 - BF 50
69 - BC 87-Op 128 - Op(Florida) 213 - AL 38-Op 558 - BC 87
71 - BF 40 129 - Op(Karib Meer) 332 - BD 84 564 - BC 97
87 - BF 45 130 - BF 50 352 - BF 50 566 - BC 86
94 - BC 80 135 - BF 48 403 - Br-buttel 575 - BF 50
96 - Op(amerik. Kuste) 136 - AM 46-Op 404 - BC 80 576 - BD 96
98 - BE 53 154 - AL 91 432 - Op(CA) 578 - Op(amerik Kuste)
103 - CF 21 155 - BC 87 455 - Op(AE 50) 587 - BC 87
107 - BC 94 156 - Op(Karib. Meer) 502 - BC 68 588 - BC 80
108 - CD 55 158 - BC 87 504 - Op(DB 90) 589 - Br-buttel
653 - Op(amerik. Kuste) 160 - Helgol. 752 - AM 01-Op
656 - BC 87
On Return Passage: U 130 - 154 - 136 - 98 - 576 - 564 - 566 - 352 - 575
- 108 - 107 - 103.
Sailed: U 105 - Lorient; U 373 - La Pallice.
Entered Port: U 130 - Lorient.
- 96 -
 messages it was established that the tanker "Eidanger" reported by U 558
and the 10,000 ton tanker reported by U 587 are the same. U 155 reported
that he was probably the first to torpedo this tanker. From a new report
made by U 158 his torpedoed tanker (10,000 BRT) probably sank.
Total result:
U 155 - 2 ships - 15,000 BRT sunk
U 158 - 1 ship - 10,000 BRT sunk
1 ship - 4,000 BRT torpedoed
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. U 94 - 1 ship - 7,005 BRT sunk
U 558 - 2 ships - 12,000 BRT sunk and
III. Reports on the Enemy: 3 ships - 19,000 BRT torpedoed
a) 1) Convoy No. 12: see No. IVa. U 587 and U 558 together sank one tanker (10,000 BRT).
2) Situation report from U 129: The results from this convoy are particularly satisfactory.
Proceeded to EO 55, as it was not possible to haul ahead during the 1) as pure sinking,
day, because of observation from land and air. Brisk traffic between 15 2) because they show that even amoung the young, newly
and 30 miles north of 200 meter line until 22.2. Ships steered course of commissioned commanders there are men who are capable
3150. No ships on reciprocal course. Traffic now reversed.
Intended observation: To make sorties along the coas, if not
successful, to operate in EO 60 or EP 40. (To pick up the traffic via - 97 -
"Barbados"). New success: 3 freighters totalling 18,400 BRT; 10
torpedoes, 132 cbm.
3) I) U 502 reported: Sunk, tanker "Greta Field" class (10,191 BRT) in
EC 8279. Tanker "Thaila" (8,329 BRT) in EC 9153. Hit on tanker (6,000
BRT) in EC 9217. Total: 26,900 BRT sunk. 6,000 BRT torpedoed.
II) Much independently routed traffic windward - Aruba in EC 67.
Returning from Mona cruise.

of the difficult task of pursuing a convoy,

b) None. 3) because the English have been dealt another heavy blow.
c) (X) British steamer "La Carriere" (5,685 BRT) torpedoed and sunk at The contradictions in positions, (which were caused either by variations
0600 on 25.2 in ED 1587. in fixes or by the convoy dividing) cannot be cleared up until the
d) None. commanders return.
b) New attack areas for boats that were following convoy No. 12:
IV. Current Operations: U 158 - 155 - 162 to make for CA 79 (Cape Hatteras).
a) Convoy No. 12: No further contact with convoy. Submarines were U 558 to freelance.
instructed to return to attack areas after dusk. After exchanging radio U 69 former attack area.
558
 U 404 - U 588 - 94 square CB and north of it as far as the coast (Nova
Scotia).
U 587 - 656 to BB, eastern third and BC (Newfoundland and east
thereof). If weather becomes foul, south of this entire area.
c) None.
d) U 455 has not yet answered after several requests to do so. Right at
the beginning of its trip this bosat had a transmitter breakdown lasting
several days, so it is assumed that this is again the case. Boat has been
instructed to make for Bergen and to be there on 1.3 ready to be escorted
back.
V. Reports of Success:
U 94 reported sinking "Empire Hail" (7,005 BRT)
U 129 " " 3 freighters totalling 18,400 BRT.
U 502 " torpedoing 2 ships totalling 18,520 BRT and 1 ship of
6,000 BRT.
VI. General:
The convoy success also gives rise to the following deductions:
It shows that such successes are still quite possible. However, the
greatest possible number of boats is required, both to pick up the enemy
and successfully attack him. These numbers are not available, as the
following submarines have to be set aside for essential duties outside the
war on merchant shipping:
21 boats in the Meditterranean (besides the boats loast there, or while en
route there).
24 boats to protect Norway, of which some will leave port shortly.
However, in my opinion, it is well worth considering whether the
protection of Norway cannot be achieved indirectly by using submarines
against merchant shipping.
An operation against Norway is for England and America mainly a
question of shipping space and escort vessels. The more shipping is sunk
on any spot and the more the threat to vital imports via the Atlantic draws
off escort forces, the less opportunity the enemy has of earmarking
shipping and escorts for a landing operation,
559
- 98 -
which without sufficient re-inforcements is doomed in advance. The
greater our submarine success in the Atlantic, the less the enemy will even
be able to think about preparing such operations.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
26.February 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 126 - DC 81 U 213 - Op(AM 19) U 566 -
BC 99
68 - DT 63 128 - Op(Florida) 332 - BD 79 564 - BD 75
69 - CC 31 129 - Op(EO 55) 352 - BF 64 575 - BF 64
71 - BE 69 135 - BE 63 373 - BF 58 576 - BE 66
87 - BE 39 136 - AM 73 403 - Br'buttel 578 - Op(CA 50)
94 - CC 31 154 - BE 31 404 - CC 31 587 - CC 20
96 - Op(amerik. Kuste) 155 - CC 31 432 - Op(CA) 588 - BC 79
98 - BF 46 156 - Op(Karib. Meer) 455 - AE 56 589 - Br'buttel
103 - BE 88 158 - CC 31 502 - EC 60 653 - Op(amerik. Kuste)
105 - BF 58 160 - Helgol. 504 - Op(DB 90) 656 - CC 31
107 - BD 74 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 505 - DT 91 752 - Op(AM)
108 - CD 61 162 - BC 85 553 - BF 57
124 - BE 94 558 - CC 20(op)
 On Return Passage: U 373 - 154 - 576 - 502 - 98 - 564 - 455 - 566 - 352 27.February 1942.
- 575 - 108 - 107 - 103.
Sailed: U 405 - Kiel; U 569 - 701 - 753 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: U 373 - La Pallice; U 575 - 352 - St. Nazaire. I. U 67 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 126 - DC 72 U 332 - BD 77 U 569 - BF
50
II. Air Reconnaissance: 68 - BJ 93 128 - Op(Florida) 403 - Helgol. 576 - BF 40
69 - Op(BC) 129 - Op(Karib. Meer) 404 - BC 75 578 - Op(amerik.
III. Reports on the Enemy: Kuste)
a) - b) None. 71 - BE 67 135 - BE 29 405 - Br'buttel 587 - Op(BB-CB)
c) 1) Abandoned steamer drifting in BB 7555. 87 - BE 35 136 - BE 36 432 - Op(CA) 588 - BC 84
2) Submarines sighted in CA 9714 and DC 1218. 94 - BC 77 154 - 455 - AF 75 589 - Helgol.
3) USA patrol plane attacked submarine on 26.2 in ED 83. 96 - Op(amerik. Kuste) 155 - CC 27 502 - EC 36 653 - Op(BB.CB)
d) None. 98 - BF 64 156 - Op(Karib. Meer) 504 - Op(DB 90) 656 - Op(BB-BC)
103 - BE 94 158 - CC 27 505 - BJ 31 701 - BF 50
IV. Current Operations: 105 - BF 48 160 - Helgol. 553 - BE 63 752 - AM 19-Op
a) None. 107 - BD 76 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 558 - Op(CC-BC) 753 - BF 50
b) U 155 allotted attack area off coast north of Cape Hatteras, 108 - CE 41 162 - BC 87 564 - BD 49
U 162 and U 158 south of it. 124 - BE 71 213 - Op(AM) 566 - BD 78
These boats, also U 587 - 656 - 94 - 404 - 588 were informed of the
shipping movements in their operational area.
c) - d) None. On Return Passage: U 154 - 136 - 576 - 502 - 98 - 564 - 455 - 566 - 108
- 107 - 103.
V. Reports of Success: None. Sailed: -.-
Entered Port: U 98 - St. Nazaire.
VI. General: None.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 99 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 558 reported protracted return trip from CC 29 via BC 35. Still 55
cbm. fuel.
b) None.
c) 1) Submarine reported in sea area round Cape Hatteras.
2) British "orali" sighted torpedo in CC 2553.
3) The wreck of a steamer - well above water - reported in DB 36.
d) None.

560
IV. Current Operations:
a) - c) None.
d) 1) Submarines warned of three-masted sailing ship, that has already
appeared several times in BE. Sailing ship has powerful camulflaged A/A/
armament. Apparently aircraft and submarine decoy.
(Report of rescued air crew)
e) U 592, formerly attached to Group North and recently operationally
unserviceable because of damage from ice, will be ready to leave port on
28.2. It has been instructed to relieve U 593 at Trondheim. U 593 will
then join the reserve. U 403 and 589 come under the command of Group
North from 27.2.
- 100 -
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
The report made by the Commander of U 575, Lieut.(s.g.)
Heydemann, gave the following information:
The submarine was to wait for "Spreewald" from 28th January in CB 37.
On 30th January it transpired that the submarine was some 30 miles off
position, as during the previous days no fix had been possible. But
"Spreewald" has probably already passed the rendezvous on 29.1.
If the submarine had used its radio (say, to send beacon signals
every 4 hours on long wave) a meeting might have been brought about,
and the sinking of the ship which occurred later might have been avoided.
I believe that the use of radio on short waves tends to put the enemy
off rather than attract him; if any fixes are made they cannot be exact
561
enough to permit a submarine chase, even if forces are within attacking
distance.Even if the enemy should be able to make any deductions from
such bearings these would force the ships to reverse routes, and this could
only be welcomed.
The enemy can pick up long wave beacons only if within range and
monitoring these frequencies.
To sum up, I consider:
1) The use of short waves by a submarine will not mitigate against an
encounter on the contrary, a diversionary effect may be expected, at any
rate in an area where submarine radio traffic is no exception.
2) The use of long waves has some dangers, but they are very slight and
must be accepted, if a boat is uncertain of a fix -- providing, that the
submarine allows for the encounter and the convoy.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
28.February 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 128 - Op(Florida) U 404 - CC 22 U 576
- BF 50
68 - Op(Freetown) 129 - Op(Karib. Meer) 405 - Helgol. 578 - Op(BB-
CB)
69 - Op(BC) 135 - AL 99 432 - Op(CA) 587 - Op(BB-BC)
71 - BE 58 136 - BF 40 455 - AN 24 588 - BC 78
87 - AM 77 154 - BF 40 502 - DO 78 592 - Heligoland
94 - CC 13 155 - CC 41 504 - Op(DB 90) 653 - Op(CA 99)
96 - Op(amerik. Kuste) 156 - Op(Karib. Meer) 505 - EJ 61 656 -
Op(BB-BC)
103 - BF 40 158 - CC 42 553 - BE 32 701 - BF 40
105 - BE 69 160 - Helgol. 558 - CC 34 752 - Op(AM)
107 - BD 57 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 564 - BD 58 753 - BF 40
108 - CE 24 162 - CC 32 566 - BD 87
124 - BD 92 213 - Op(AM 17) 569 - BF 40
126 - Op(DB 90) 332 - BC 98
 Sunk: "La Carriere" (5,685 BRT) in ED 15.
Sunk by gunfire, freighter (2,500 BRT) north of Haiti, tanker (4,500
On Return Passage: U 558 - 154 - 136 - 576 - 502 - 564 - 455 - 566 - BRT) in DO 71. Gun barrel that was damaged by barrel premature was
108 - 107 - 103. again rendered servicable by sawing off 40 cm.
b) None.
- 101 - c) Syl vom-Arroe (Silver Arrow?) (7,790 BRT) reported suspicious
vessel in ED 99. Steamer Glenbey (9,146 BRT) reported being pursued by
suspicious vessel in BD 4920.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
b) U 129 was directed to attack Bauxite export from Georgetown in
British Guiana and Paramaribo in Dutch Guiana. Submarine was to
operate off these harbors as long as shipping warrents it.
Sailed: U 503 - Bergen. c) None.
Entered Port: U 576 - St. Nazaire; U 455 - Bergen. d) 1) The still ample fuel reserves of U 578 and U 96, which are at
present operating off New York, show that it is feasible for type VIIc boats
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. to operate immediately off the American coast. As long as the shipping
situation
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 96 reported further successes: steamer "Torungen" (1,948 BRT)
and "Kars" (8,888 BRT were sunk in BB 7746 and 7557 respectively. - 102 -
Increased air and sea patrols in Nova Scotia sea area. No traffic observed
as far as Nantucket Lightship since 26th. Still 60 cbm.
2) U 432 reported further successes: Ore ship (10,000 BRT) sunk in CA
7936 (Cape Hatteras). Busy north-south traffic - also at night - via CA
7992. Moderate air patrolling by day.
3) U 578 sank tanker (10,000 BRT) in CA 5211 (off New York), and a
warship with four funnels in CA 5458 with spread of 2. Some doubt
whether "Memphis" class or destroyer. Latter improbable, as torpedoes
struck though set at 3 meters. permits these boats to achieve good successes in a very short time
Situation: Brisk single ship movement on 20 meter line, north-south in (without long hunting), it will be worthwhhile operating in this area.
CA 50. Moderate air patrolling. Still 64 cbm. 2) This hunting close inshore when anti-submarine measures are still
4) U 156 reported much traffic in Mona Passage. Concentrated air only moderately effective, is an excellent schooling for the actions they
activity, probably a great deal of civilian traffic. will later have to fight against convoys.
562

V. Reports of Success:
U 96 reported 2 ships, totalling 10,836 BRT, sunk.
U 432 reported 1 ship, 10,000 BRT sunk.
U 578 reported 1 ship, 10,000 BRT and 1 warship sunk.
U 156 reported 3 ships, totalling 12,685 BRT, sunk.
(signed) Dönitz
COPY OF COMMENTS BY NAVAL WAR STAFF ON B.d.U. WAR
DIARY
(16 - 28.2.1942)
1) 25th February, Para. VI General:
There is no doubt that every ton of shipping sunk reduces the ene,y's
chance of launching overseas operations. But Naval War Staff considers
that despite the sinking of enemy merchant shipping already achieved, he
still has sufficient tonnage to invade Norway. To transport some 100,000
men of all branches for this task would require about one and a quarter
million BRT. The re-inforcements and supplies would require about 20 to
50,000 BRT per month.
As all enemy shipping is taken up by civilian and military duties,
fresh demands for shipping space can be met only by diverting it from
other tasks.
If the enemy considers a landing operation has good chance of
succeeding he will accept a temporary reduction in civilian shipping
movements. Thus, even if heavy sinkings continue off the coast of
America, he will still be able to operate against Norway, unless he feels
constrained to use all available tonnage for other military needs, such as
reinforcements for the Near and Far Middle East.
2) 27th February, Para. VI General:
563
a) It may well be that a submarine can cause convoys, single ship, or
even naval forces, to veer off, if it sends radio messages, but there is, as
yet, no evidence for this assertation. If, for example, the enemy did not
attack submarines that used their radio while following courses off the
convoy routes, it may be that he did not whish to scatter his escort forces.
Previous experiences show that the enemy probably gains information
about refueling positions or rendezvous from messages passed by
submarines in areas with little traffic. It is not certain that the enemy
makes such deductions, possibly a striking radio silence in certain sea
areas may lead to the same result.
- 103 -
Until this matter is cleared up, submarines returning should use their
radio as little as possible.
b) D/F traffic between blockade runners and submarines should not be
carried out for the following reasons:
1) Blockade-runner's radio ooperator lacks experience of sending
wartime D/F; if D/F-ing is essential, only the submarine should transmit.
2) If the blockade-runner sends D/F signals this is very noticeable, as
the long-wave transmitter of a steamer is limited to a range from 585 to
825 meters.
3) If the submarine sends signals, this may also attract the enemy's
attention.
Very often it is better for blockade-runner and submarine to risk missing
the rendezvous than to transmit D/F signals.
If D/F signals must be sent, the submarine must always transmit.
 The control station on land is responsible for deciding whether D/F shall
be used to bring about a meeting.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 March 1942
PG30305a
1.March 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 128 - Op(Florida) U 404 - CC 12 U 587 -
Op(BB-BC)
68 - Op(Freetown) 129 - Op(Karib. Meer) 405 - Helgol. 588 - BB 99
69 - Op(BC) 135 - AL 69 432 - CB 71 592 - Helgol.
71 - BE 49 136 - BF 60 502 - DO 81 653 - Op(BB-CB)
87 - AL 69 154 - BF 60 503 - AF 87 656 - Op(BB-BC)
94 - CB 33 155 - CB 64 504 - Op(DB 90) 701 - BE 62
96 - CB 15(Op) 156 - DO 49 505 - EJ 92 752 - Op(AM 19
103 - BF 60 158 - CB 62 553 - AM 74 753 - BF 40
105 - BE 91 160 - Helgol. 558 - CC 33
107 - BD 59 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 564 - BD 67
108 - CE 26 162 - CC 19 566 - BD 97
124 - BD 83 213 - Op(AM) 569 - BE 62
126 - Op(DB 90) 332 - BC 89 578 - CA 58(Op)
On Return Passage: U 558 - 154 - 136 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 564 - 566 -
108 - 107 - 103.
Sailed: U 202 Brest; U 373 La Pallice.
Entered Port: U 154 - 103 - Lorient; U 136 - St. Nazaire.
564
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy by U 135 (No. 14) see para. IVa.
2) U 213 reports: On 1.3 in AM 1970 submerged submarine sighted
(Possibly U 752).
3) U 158 sank 8,000 BRT tanker by gunfire after 2 misses and 2 hits in
CB 66.
4) U 129 reported in reply to yesterday's order concerning operation off
Georgetown and Paramaribo that boat had already been in position for 3
nights, but considered the peculiarities of the inshore waters unfavorable
for operations.
On 28.1 in EO 2991 sank freighter of 4,000 BRT. 8 torpedoes left, 112
cbm.
5) U 128 position off Bermudas middle of February out of range of
observation or searchlight. No day or night traffic for 3 days in this area.
b) None.
c) 1) English aircraft reported attack on submarine in BE 3826 claimed 2
possible hits.
2) Submarine warning (American) for DN 95.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 16: At 1555 hours U 135 sighted convoy in AL 6862 on
westerly course, speed 8 knots. Conditions were favorable for an
operation on this convoy: U 87 - 553
- 105 -
 U 581 Lt.(s.g.) Pfeifer, 2nd operation, rammed by destroyer off Horta after
and further away U 753 - 701 and 569. As all these boats were en the boat had been forced to the surface by a long hunt. Lt.(jg) Sitek was
route for the Iceland-Norway area would necessarily be diverted by an saved by swimming ashore, the rest of the crew were probably lost.
operation on the convoy a general attack was out of the question. But in U 82 Lt.(s.g.) Rollmann, experienced boat, probably lost while hunting a
order to give each boat a chance in case they happened to be in the convoy west of Finnisterre. Fate of crew not yet known.
immediate vicinity, they received permission to attack if given favorable
opportunity. They were to break off before daylight and continue journey II. Boats distributed as follows: (boats in Heligoland included under
northwards. operational)
U 135 was shadowing and reported heavy decline in weather conditions.
In spite of the bad weather an attack was made in the evening, a 4 spread
which missed. As no further attack was possible resumed journey - 106 -
northwards (southeast 8, sea 7).
b) U 332 received attacking area CA 50 (off New York).
c) None.
d) U 564 reports conditions:
Favorable speed for type VIIe with (GW) - motors 240 revolutions or
150 as the case may be. Daily fuel consumption in floating condition and
average day's run 134 miles on westward passage is 2.02 cbm. On
eastward passage, day's run of 150 miles 1.8 cbm. Prevailing wind SW to
NW. III. (type) II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXD2 Xb XIV

V. Success Reports: Op. - - 81 1 28 - - - 110 plus UA

U 158 reports 1 ship of 8,000 BRT sunk. Trials - - 70 5 22 1 3 3 104
U 129 reports 1 ship 4,000 BRT sunk. Training 40 4 11 - 2 - - - 57

VI. General: 40 4 162 6 52 1 3 3 271

Submarines on 1.3.1942
I. Total number in service (German):
On 1.2.1942 256 (incorrectly given as 258 on 1.2) In February
Put into service in February 17 (One of these on 31.1.1942) total number of boats increased by 15 boats
273 number of operational boats " 10 "
Losses in February plus 2 Number of boats on trials 5 "
Total 1.3.1942 271 boats i.e. 15 more than in previous month plus)
losses in February.

565
IV. Number of boats in training remained the same. On 1.2 it was - 107 -
incorrectly given as 59 instead of 57, of which 11 boats were type VIIb/c
instead of 13. Of the 111 operational boats on 1.3.1942 there were:
a) 1) In operation area
North Atlantic 14 boats
South Atlantic 1 boat
Mediterranean 2 boats
Arctic 2 "

2) En route to operations area 3 boats lay in Heligoland, 2 of which were detailed for duty in the
North Atlantic 23 Arctic,
South Atlantic 1 1 boat was still outward bound in the North Sea,
Mediterranean 0 1 boat was en route for area off Freetown,
Arctic 4 6 boats en route for operations area northwest or east, according to
circumstance, off the Herbrides under Command of Special Operations
3) Returning from Group North.
North Atlantic 11
South Atlantic 0
Mediterranean 2
Arctic 0 V. Estimate on daily average, of boats in Atlantic during month of
February:
4) Total number at sea 60 boats, including Mediterranean and Arctic. a) Average at sea each day 50 boats
" on return " 13.6 "
In dock for repairs 51 boats. " in ops. area each day 13.8 "

b) Total number of sailings in February 36 boats

b) 1) The 23 boats mentioned in a) 2) en route for the North Atlantic are
as follows: From Mother country 13 "
12 boats en route for the North American coast, of which 3 type IXc and west coast of France 23 "
1 type VIIc have just carried through an operation on a convoy during 1.3 boats
which 50% of their torpedoes were fired, and the scope of attack in the
west is also limited by fuel supplies. c) Days with the lowest number of boats at sea were 10th and 11th
February with 45 boats of
which: 13 were on return journey
20 outward bound
1 on escort duty
566
 leaving 11 in operational duty.
1) of the 11 boats mentioned in operational area above 8 were off the
American coast between Florida and St. Johns, among them 3 type IX's; 2
south and east of Iceland and one in AL 55.
2) Of the 13 returning boats 11 were from the American area and 2 from
the Azores.
3) The 20 outward bound were as follows: 9 boats; 4 type IXc among
them, en route for coast of North America (Cape Hatteras to St. Johns) the
4 type IXc were still in the North Sea and 2 of these out of order, one boat
for escort duty and one for convoy operation west of the Herbrides (U 154
100% misfires on account of deficient fire control system) leaving 7 for
above-mentioned operational area:
5 type IXc boats en route for Caribbean Sea
2 type IXc boats en route for Florida Straits
3 type VIIc and 1 type VIId (U 213) en route for operational area
northwest of Herbrides under command of Special Operations Group
North.
d) The day with the highest number of boats at sea was 3rd February
with 56 boats of which:
15 were on return journey
22 were outward bound leaving
19 on operational duty.
1) Of the 19 boats in operational area mentioned above:
9 were off the east coast of North America, some at a distance of 1,200
miles on account of fuel supplies.
- 108 -
567
4 northwest of the Herbrides and
3 east of Iceland under command of Special Operations Group North;
3 in the Azores, placed under Mediterranean command by order of
German Naval Staff.
2) 22 outward bound boats were as follows:
5 en route for Caribbean Sea;
3 en route for Florida Straits;
2 en route for area northwest of Herbrides, of which one was still in
Brunsbüttel;
12 en route for coast of North America, among them one type IXc and
2 type IXb, one again of which was still in Heligoland.
e) Day with lowest number of boats on operational duty was 14th
February with 8 boats.
5 of these were type VIIc off coast of North America,
2 a good way off on account of fuel supplies;
1 type IXc off Florida Straits
1 type VIIc northwest of Herbrides
1 type VIIc east of Iceland.
f) The highest number of boats on operational duty was on 3rd February
with 19 -- see para. d)1).
VI. 1) The total number of boats at sea and on operational duty remained
on the whole unchanged for the month of February. See para. Va.
2) The ratio of 60 boats at sea to 51 in port under para. IVa is under the
desirable ratio of 74 at sea to 37 in port. The reason for this lies in the
limited capacities of Mediterranean docks.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
2.March 1942.
 torpedoes ready in stern. 120 cbm. Boat sank fast 4 mast freighter over
I. U 67 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 128 - DB 68 U 373 - BF 50 U 569 - BE 8,000 BRT ("Astronomer" class) in grid position BD 41.
31 b) None.
68 - Freetown(Op) 129 - EO 62(Op) 404 - Op(CB) 578 - Op(BB-CB) c) Swedish ship "Sveadrott" (position according to dead reckoning DC
69 - Op(BC) 135 - AL 65 405 - AN 66 587 - Op(BB-BC) 30) picked up 10 survivors from Norwegian motor vessel "Lief" (1,582
71 - BD 69 155 - CB 58 432 - CB 49 588 - BB 97 tons).
87 - AL 60 156 - DO 52 502 - DO 67 592 - Helgoland d) None.
94 - Op(CB) 158 - CB 64 503 - AF 75 653 - Op(BB-CB)
96 - BB-CB 160 - AN 66 504 - Op(DB 90) 656 - BB-BC(Op) IV. Current Operations:
105 - BE 58 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 505 - Op(Freetown) 701 - BE 24 a) None.
107 - BD 68 162 - CC 41 553 - AL 60 752 - Op(AM) b) 1) In carrying out orders of German Naval Staff to the effect that 8
108 - BF 72 202 - BF 50 558 - BC 89 753 - BE 35 boats should always be stationed in area between Norway and Iceland the
124 - BD 81 213 - Op(AM 15) 564 - BE 45 following re-distribution has been ordered:
126 - Op(DB 90) 332 - CC 33 566 - BD 96 U 135 in AE 93 and AF 71 as well as area southwards as far as latitude
of AM 3655. Focal point in south.
U 701 in AE 50 and 60 with occasional advances inshore.
U 87 east-west strip in latitude AM 11
- 109 - U 569 " " " " AM 13
U 213 " " " " AM 15
U 752 " " " " AM 17
U 753 " " " " AM 19
U 553 free to operate in entire area.
These boats together form Group "Westwall". W/T silence to be
maintained.
2) U 162 was detailed to attacking area grid position CB 60 and 90.
On Return Passage: U 558 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 566 - 108 - 107. c) - d) None.
Sailed: U 123 - Lorient; U 593 - Kiel; U 506 - Hamburg.
Entered Port: - . - V. Reports of Success:
U 162 reports sinking ship of 8,000 BRT.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
VI. General: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 162 reports broken shutters on tubes 1 and 2. Firing field of all - 110 -
bow tubes at present obscured. Proposes to remove the shutters as soon as
possible. Requests CB 60 and 90 for operational area. 5 electric

568

3.March 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 123 - DC 44 U 404 - BB 77 U 578 -
Op(BB-CB)
68 - Op(Freetown) 129 - Op(Karib. Meer) 405 - AN 34 587 - BB/BC-
Op
69 - Op(BC) 135 - AM 19 432 - CB 64 588 - CB 89-Op
71 - BD 67 155 - CB 72 502 - DP 47 592 - Helgol.
87 - AL 36 156 - DO 38 503 - AM 32 593 - Br'büttel
94 - Op(CB) 158 - CB 57 504 - Op(DB 90) 653 - Op(BB-CB)
96 - Op(amerik. Küste) 160 - AN 34 505 - Op(Freetown) 656 - Op(BB-
BC)
105 - BE 87 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 506 - Br'büttel 701 - AL 95
107 - BE 48 162 - CC 18 553 - AL 03 752 - Op(AM 17)
108 - BF 50 202 - BF 48 558 - BC 67 753 - AM 74
124 - BD 75 213 - Op(AM 15) 564 - BE 55
123 - BF 50 332 - CC 23 566 - BE 73
126 - Op(DB 90) 373 - BE 69 569 - AL 99
a) 1) U 432, homeward bound sighted a freighter on northeasterly course
at 1442 hours in CB 6934. U 162 asked for D/F bearings. Last position
CB 6931 at 1530 hours, sharply zigzagging 14-16 knots. U 432 followed
in pursuit until 2100. Lost touch.
2) U 161 reported on demand position off Aruba. On 25.2 2 spread at
freighter missed. Bombs, practically no damage. Made off to re-load on
account of weather. Back in area 200 miles northwest of main port.
Operations in the vicinity of the island not possible at present on account
of the moon. Traffic seems to lie further to the east. 6 plus 0 torpedoes,
115 cbm.
b) None.
c) British steamer "Beaconsfield" sighted submarine in ET 66 (U 68 or
505)
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
c) U 162 received orders to make for CD 66 immediately on special duty
(convoy Osorno) and to lie there on 7.3 0800 hours.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
- 111 -

On Return Passage: U 558 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 564 - 566 - 108 - 128 -
107.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

4.March 1942.
569
 account of weather. Operating in EC 67. (Attacking activity of boats in
Caribbean Sea is apparently suffering on account of moonlight)
I. U 67 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 128 - DC 43 U 404 - Op(CB) U 578 - c) American passenger steamer "Yarmouth" (5,043 BRT) sighted a
Op(BB-CB) submarine in CA 9965 and sent SSS.
68 - Op(Freetown) 129 - Op(Karib. Meer) 405 - AF 84 587 - BB 63-Op d) None.
69 - Op(BC) 135 - AM 16 432 - CC 42 588 - Op(CB)
71 - BD 58 155 - CA 99 502 - DP 43 592 - AN 66 IV. Current Operations:
87 - Op(AM 11) 156 - DP 11 503 - AM 24 593 - Helgol. a) - b) None.
94 - Op(CB) 158 - CB 74 504 - Op(DB 90) 653 - Helgol. c) U 162 reports earliest time of arrival at meeting point as hour ordered
96 - Op(amerik. Küste) 160 - AN 28 505 - Freetown-Op 656 - BC 48 - 7.3 0800. All torpedo tubes ready except 1 and 2 and boat in order for
105 - BE 75 161 - Kar.Meer(Op) 506 - Helgol. 701 - AL 68 diving to all depths. 11 torpedoes, 115 cbm.
107 - BE 57 162 - CC 42 553 - Op(AM) 752 - Op(AM 17) d) None.
108 - BF 60 202 - BE 69 558 - BD 51 753 - AM 44
123 - BF 49 213 - Op(AM 15) 564 - BE 64 - 112 -
124 - BC 98 332 - CC 13 566 - BE 83
126 - Op(DB 90) 373 - BE 67 569 - AL 69

On Return Passage: U 558 - 432 - 502 - 107 - 564 - 128 - 566 - 156 -
108.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 108 - Lorient.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. V. Reports of Success:

U 67 reports one ship or 9,600 BRT sunk.
III. Reports on the Enemy: U 587 reports 2 hits on shipping in St. Johns Harbor.
a) Position report U 587:
2 torpedo hits heard among shipping in inner harbor St. Johns. Nothing VI. General: None.
observed on account of defense. No traffic observed on route BC 78 - 74 -
BB 96 - 92 to 66 and close inshore. Strong sea and air reconnaissance ---------------------------------------------------
especially south of Cape Race. No fishing boats. Main radio beacon and - ---------------
as in peacetime. Ice only north of BB 66. Plan: Operations in BB 67 and
then CC 20. 5.March 1942.
b) On demand U 67 reports position:
On 21.2 sank armed Norwegian ship of "Bralanta" class (9,699 BRT).
Otherwise no traffic, in EC 78 practically no traffic. No attack made on I. U 67 - EC 67 Op U 128 - DC 28 U 373 - BE 65 U 566 - BE 53
570
 68 - Freetown(Op) 129 - Op(Karib. Meer) 404 - Op(CB) 569 - AL 03 2) English patrol boat sighted submarine in ET 6619.
69 - Op(BC) 135 - AM 24 405 - AF 83 578 - Op(BB-CB) d) None.
71 - BD 73 155 - Op(CA) 432 - CC 52 587 - BB 68-Op
87 - Op(AM 11) 156 - DP 21 502 - DP 29 588 - Op(CB) - 113 -
94 - Op(CB) 158 - Op(CA) 503 - AM 16 592 - AN 34
96 - Op(BB-CB) 160 - AF 76 504 - Op(DB 90) 593 - AN 93
105 - BD 96 161 - ED 50-Op 505 - Op(Freetown) 653 - Op(BB-CB)
107 - BE 65 162 - CC 62 506 - AN 93 656 - Op(BB-BC)
123 - BF 48 202 - BE 68 553 - Op(AM) 701 - AL 03
124 - BC 81 213 - Op(AM 15) 558 - BD 62 752 - Op(AM 17)
126 - Op(DB 90) 332 - CC 15 564 - BF 46 753 -

On Return Passage: U 558 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 564 - 566 - 128 - 107. IV. Current Operations:
Sailed: -.- a) None.
Entered Port: U 405 - Drontheim. b) 1) U 160 and 506 detailed to new position grid CA 79.
2) As fuel supply of U 332 (85 cbm.) was proportionally low, boat
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. detailed to new area in CB and northwards to the coast. Free to operate in
CA according to fuel situation.
III. Reports on the Enemy: 3) In order to get a picture of traffic in area south of Nova Scotia, U 94
a) 1) U 213 sighted a large transport with 1 destroyer in AM 1558 at 1416 and 404 were asked to report.
hours. Course 1100, low speed. Boat not able to shadow on account of c) U 162 received precise instructions for convoy "Osorno".
heavy sea (ESE 7, sea force 7 short and high). d) None.
2) U 69 heard a number of propeller noises at 1030 in CC 3556, course
2700. Followed in pursuit, sighted steamer at 1330 speed 6 knots, but lost V. Reports of Success:
contact and bearing in fog. U 504 reports 1 tanker of 7,000 BRT sunk.
3) U 94 reports from CB 4535 nothing seen since 25.2. Plan to operate
in CA 50. VI. General: None.
4) U 504 reports position: sank petrol tanker of 7,000 BRT in DC 7210
on 26.2. On 4.3 a spread which missed at 4,000 BRT freighter, probably ---------------------------------------------------
submarine decoy ship (?). Operations inshore not at the moment possible ---------------
on account of the bright nights. Traffic between Florida-Bermuda
confirmed. A lot of bad weather. Postponed return passage on account of 6.March 1942.
damage. 3 plus torpedoes, 119 cbm.
b) None.
c) 1) Torpedoing report from ET 59.
571
 I. U 67 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 128 - DC 23 U 373 - BE 59 U 569 -
Op(AM 13)
68 - Freetown(Op) 129 - Op(Karib. Meer) 404 - Op(CB) 578 - Op(BB-
CB)
69 - CC 35-Op 135 - Op(AE-AF) 432 - CC 38 587 - Op(BB-BC)
71 - BC 93 155 - Op(CA) 502 - DQ 14 588 - Op(CB)
87 - Op(AM 11) 156 - DE 75 503 - AL 03 592 - AN 24
94 - CB 45(Op) 158 - Op(CA) 504 - DC 72 593 - AN 31
96 - Op(BB-CB) 160 - AN 11 505 - Op(Freetown) 653 - Op(BB-CB)
105 - ED 98 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 506 - Helgol. 656 - Op(BB-BC)
107 - BF 46 162 - CD 54 553 - Op(AM) 701 - AL 34
123 - BE 64 202 - BE 56 558 - BE 42 752 - Op(AM 17)
124 - CC 22 213 - AM 15-Op 564 - BF 60 753 - Op(AM 19)
126 - Op(DB 90) 332 - Op(CB) 566 - BE 62
On Return Passage: U 558 - 504 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 564 - 566 - 128 -
107.
Sailed: -.-
Entered Port: U 564 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Position report U 404: coast of Nova Scotia medium air activity, off
Halifax
- 114 -
572
a little traffic, apparently sporadic. A great deal of fog, freighter
"Collamer" (5,190) sunk off Halifax.
2) U 578 - area off New York - on 1.3. observed furious anti-submarine
hunt. Off Hatteras from 4. - 6.3. up to 20 meter line in good weather no
traffic, only fishing boats.
3) U 128: grid DM 33 lights burning as in peace. Sunk tanker "O.A.
Knudsen" (11,517 BRT) all torpedoes fired, return passage. Total: 26,517
BRT sunk.
4) U 68 fired a spread which missed at destroyer on 7.2. On 15.2 in CD
43 freighter left steering course 1500 after 7 hours of shadowing.
Otherwise no traffic. No successes, return passage.
b) None.
c) 1) Submarines reported in EC 5560 - DN 1160.
2) Dutch motor vessel "Brastagi" attacked without success in EC 5530.
3) American tanker sent SSS from area 10 miles east of Georgtown
Lighthouse.
4) Unknown steamer called for immediate help. Position DT 9828.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
c) 1) U 202 received order to be in position CD 36 on 10.3 at 1000 hours
in order to escort homeward bound German steamer.
2) U 162 en route for meeting point.
d) On demand of Group North U 405 (boat in readiness at Drontheim)
and U 592 (boat in readiness entering Bergen) are immediately placed
under Group North for operational disposal. (According to General
Instructions of German Naval Staff Book Number 417/42.
Admiral Arctic has ordered a pack of submarines for convoy sighted in
area around Jan Mayen, in which the two boats U 134 and U 584 on return
passage are taking part. Altogether therefore at the present time 10 boats
are at the disposal of Admiral Arctic, a 2 Group North.
V. Reports of Success:
U 404 reports steamer "Collamer" (5,112 BRT) sunk.
U 128 reports tanker "O.A. Knudsen" 11,007 BRT sunk.
 Entered Port: U 107 - Lorient.
VI. General: None.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

- 115 - III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) U 67 reports position:
EC 55 right half and 56 left half traffic junctions Yucatah-Aruba-
Windward, Colan-Mona. Heavy traffic, no defense, 6 misses at 2 ships, 3
inexplicable, 1 failure. Postponed return passage via ED 60.
b) None.
c) 1) English aircraft reported and attacked subs in BF 5441 (U 156) and
AL 3876.
2) Dutch ship "Bodegraven" (5,593 BRT) sent SSS and reported sub in
7.March 1942. ET 69.
3) USA turbine ship "Cardonia" (5,104 BRT) was hunted by submarine
in Windward Passage and fired on.
I. U 67 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 128 - DC 85 U 373 - BE 57 U 578 - CA d) None.
86
68 - Op(Freetown) 129 - Op(Karib. Meer) 404 - CB 14-Op 587 - IV. Current Operations:
Op(BB-BC) a) - b) None.
69 - CD 12 135 - Op(AE-AF) 432 - CD 18 588 - Op(CB) c) 1) Convoy U 162 probably according to plan.
71 - BD 71 155 - Op(CA) 502 - DE 88 593 - AF 79 2) U 202 received more precise instructions for escort on homeward
87 - Op(AM 11) 156 - DE 49 503 - AL 64 653 - Op(BB-CB) passage of tanker "Germania". Boat does not need to be in CD 3646 lower
94 - Op(CB) 158 - Op(CA) 504 - DC 72 656 - Op(BB-BC) right hand corner until 12.3 1000 hours.
96 - Op(BB-CB) 160 - AM 33 505 - Op(Freetown) 701 - AE 85 d) 1) Consider refuelling of U 332 by U 128 will not be possible on
105 - BD 89 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 506 - Heligol.Op(AM) 752 - account of U 128's short food supply.
Op(AM 17)
107 - BF 50 162 - CD 66 553 - BE 51 753 - Op(AM 19) - 116 -
123 - BE 55 202 - BE 49 558 - BF 42
124 - CC 16 213 - Op(AM 15) 566 - BF 42
126 - Op(DB 90) 332 - Op(CB) 569 - Op(AM 13)

On Return Passage: U 558 - 578 - 69 - 504 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 566 - 128
- 107.
Sailed: U 507 - Hamburg; U 552 - Nazaire; U 754 - Brest.
573

2) No reply from U 656 in area south east of Newfoundland, after 5
calls to report position and weather. As there are no known proofs of a
submarine sinking it is possible that U 656 is at the time unable to
transmit, or unable to get through on account of bad radio conditions.
Loss of the boat is however, not out of the question.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
Operations of boats on the coast of N. America are considerably
hindered at present by weather conditions. In the area east and south of
Newfoundland as far as coast of Nova Scotia very low temperatures
prevail which at times lead to heavy icing-up of submarines. Visibility is
bad on the whole, with a lot of fog and stormy weather.
Along the coastal area between New York and Hatteras stormy
weather has been reported. The traffic, which at first continued to proceed
regularly along the American coast and adjacent stretch of sea regardless
of sinkings, now seems to stop at intervals. The outlook for success of the
medium boats (type VIIc) in American operations area is limited by these
two facts, but is improving again now as the presence of a submarine
tanker will enable them to remain longer close to the coast in exact
operational area.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
8.March 1942.
I. U 67 - EC 64 U 129 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 404 - Op(CB) U 569 -
Op(AM 13)
68 - Op(Freetown) 135 - Op(AE-AF) 432 - CD 25 578 - CA 95
69 - BC 98 155 - Op(CA) 502 - DE 94 587 - Op(BB-BC)
71 - BC 95 156 - DE 55 503 - AL 48 588 - Op(CB)
87 - Op(AM 11) 158 - Op(CA) 504 - DC 58 593 - AF 79
574
94 - Op(CB) 160 - AM 16 505 - Op(Freetown) 653 - Op(BB-CB)
96 - Op(BB-CB) 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 506 - Helgol. 701 - Op(AE)
105 - CE 12 162 - CE 18 553 - Op(AM) 752 - Op(AM 17)
123 - BE 45 202 - BD 93 558 - BF 40 753 - Op(AM 19)
124 - CB 39 213 - Op(AM 15) 566 - BF 50 754 - BF 50
126 - Op(DB 90) 332 - CB 55-Op
128 - DC 58 373 - BD 63
On Return Passage: U 558 - 752 - 578 - 69 - 504 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 67
- 566 - 128.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Position reports: U 587 west of Newfoundland, sighted destroyers
and patrol vessels 10 times in 9 days, but no steamers. On 6.3 sank
- 117 -
Greenland ship "Hawse-Guda"(?). Probably camouflaged patrol boat.
U 96 in operations area south and southeast of NOva Scotia since 4.3.
Traffic apparently very spread out. Much fog and bad weather. 5 torpedo
shots missed, one air driven torpedo a circle-runner, 3 electric torpedo with
depth settings of 2, 1.5. and 1 meter at laden ship of 5,000 BRT. Misses in
spite of exact firing data. Impact of third torpedo heard after 25 seconds. 94 - Op(CB) 160 - AL 39 505 - Op(Freetown) 653 - Op(BB-CB)
Return passage. 96 - BB 78 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 506 - Heligoland 701 - Op(AE)
Sunk by U 129: Tanker "Mary" (5,104 BRT) in EO 3655 tanker "Steel 103 - BD 77 162 - BD 85 507 - dto. 752 - AM 47
Age" (6,188 BRT) in EO 6625. Very little traffic, obviously only coaling 123 - BD 66 202 - BD 98 552 - BF 40 753 - Op(AM 19)
ships en route for Trinidad. Weather report: stiff trade wind, strong 124 - CB 61 213 - Op(AM 15) 553 - Op(AM) 754 BF 40
westward current, day's run 48 miles. 126 - Op(DB 90) 332 - Op(CB) 558 - BF 40
b) None. 128 - DD 51 373 - BD 53 566 - BF 60
c) Submarines reported in AE 8298 - BB 7577 (U 96 and Windward
Passage).
d) None. On Return Passage: U 558 - 752 - 578 - 96 - 504 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 67
- 566 - 128.
IV. Current Operations: Sailed: -.-
a) - b) None. Entered Port: U 566 - Brest.
c) 1) Escort duty of U 162 probably according to plan.
2) U 202 en route for meeting point. - 118 -
d) None.

V. Reports of Success:
U 587 Hawse Guda (?) unknown
U 129 tanker Mary USA 5,104 BRT
" " Steel Age 6,188 "

VI. General: None.

--------------------------------------------------- II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

---------------
9.March 1942.
I. U 67 - ED 42 U 129 - Op(ED 66) U 404 - Op(CB) U 569 - Op(AM
13)
68 - Op(Freetown) 135 - Op(AE-AF) 432 - CD 31 578 - CB 48
69 - BD 74 155 - Op(CA) 502 - DP 71 587 - Op(BB 91)
71 - BC 91 156 - DE 62 503 - AL 71 588 - Op(CB)
87 - Op(AM 11) 158 - Op(CA) 504 - DC 56 593 - AE 99
575
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Position reports: U 126 in Windward Passage - heavy traffic.
Traffic proceeding via junctions Cape Maisi and Cape Dumelo close
inshore on zigzag course at high speed. Only small escort, no air. Traffic
ascertained in DN 50 and 60. Steamers steering course 3100. Boat
continuing to operate in DN 70. 1 plus 4 torpedoes, 125 cbm.
2) Sea area around Freetown: U 68 in operations area since 27.2. No
traffic west and south of Freetown, medium traffic entering and leaving
port from the southeast up to 200 meter line and close inshore. Heavy
neutral traffic 60 miles from Cape Palmas, course 1100. Plan to operate in
EU 70 and 80.
Sunk: On 2.3 in ET 6685 "Blue Funnel" freighter 6,000 BRT and on
8.3 in EU 8192 "Beluchistan" (6,992 BRT). 2 spread miss at submarine
decoy ship and small tanker, 142 cbm, 7 air driven and 3 electric
torpedoes.
3) U 505 operating since 4.3 in ET 50-60-80 has sunk in ET 6480 on 5.3
"Benmohr" (5,920 BRT), on 6.3 in ET 8320 a petrol tanker (8,000 BRT) of
"British Confidence" class, laden en route for Freetown. Otherwise no U 505 reports 2 ships together 13,920 BRT sunk.
traffic. Presume that steamer route to Freetown from the south runs via
ET 83, as regular air patrol of medium strength is carried out there by VI. General: None.
flying boats. Boat operated a few days in ET 90. 10 plus 4 torpedoes, 155
cbm. ---------------------------------------------------
The supposition that the submarine attacks in the former Pan- ---------------
American safety zone would lead to the return of single-ship traffic, which
used to go via Freetown from Capetown to America, to this area and via 10.March 1942.
this port from the coast of South America, has been confirmed.
Presumably further successes will be scored here.
b) None. I. U 67 - ED 41 U 129 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 404 - Op(CB) U 578 -
c) 1) Unknown steamer sighted submarine in CA 5973 and sent SSS. CB 39
2) Steamer "Charles Racine" (9,957 BRT) torpedoed twice in DO 63 68 - EU 85-Op 135 - Op(AE-AF) 432 - BD 79 587 - Op(BB-BC)
(Italian?). Submarine warning for this area. 69 - BD 55 155 - Op(CA) 502 - DF 57 588 - Op(CB)
3) A submarine penetrated Castries Harbor (St. Lucia/English) and 71 - BC 79 156 - DF 18 503 - AK 76 593 - AL 24
torpedoed shipping lying there. (U 161)? 87 - Op(AM 11) 158 - Op(CA) 504 - DC 63 653 - Op(BB-CB)
d) None. 94 - Op(CB) 160 - AL 55 505 - ET 88-Op 701 - Op(AE 50-60)
96 - BB 88 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 506 - AN 91 752 - BE 63
IV. Current Operations: 105 - CD 22 162 - BE 47 507 - Helgol. 753 - Op(AM 19)
a) - b) None. 123 - BD 56 202 - CE 22 552 - BE 65 754 - BE 66
c) 1) Escort duty U 152 probably according to plan. 124 - CB 57 213 - Op(AM 15) 553 - Op(AM)
2) U 202 en route for meeting point. 126 - DN 40-Op 332 - Op(CB) 558 - BF 50
128 - DD 61 373 - BD 51 569 - Op(AM 13)
V. Reports of Success:
U 68 reports 2 ships together 12,992 BRT sunk.
On Return Passage: U 558 - 752 - 578 - 96 - 69 - 504 - 432 - 502 - 156
- 67 - 128.
- 119 - Sailed: U 571 - La Pallice.
576
 Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy: IV. Current Operations:

a) Position reports: a) None.
Area CA and CB: from shipping reports of 3 boats the supposed traffic b) Sighting reports of heavy English fleet units north east of the Faroes
situation off New York and Newfoundland area has been confirmed. and Norwegian area compel the stationing of submarines in Shetlands-
Sinkings: Faroes area:
U 653 on 28.2 in CA 9971 freighter of 7,000 BRT. Attacking areas: U 569 - AE 99; U 553 - AF 77 and AF 78, westerly
U 587 on 2.3 in BB 8382 sub-chaser with cruiser stern 9.3 in BB 9812 third.
freighter of 5,800 BRT. c) Escort duty U 162 probably according to plan. U 202 en route for
U 588 on 1.3 in CC 41 "Carperley" of 4,890 BRT. 2.3 CB 62 meeting point.
"Consuela" of 4,847 BRT. 10.3 CA 5765 petrol tanker "Canadolite" class d) Brazilian steamer sunk by U 94 was probably that announced in the
11,300 BRT. press as "Arabutan" (7,878 BRT). According to submarine's report
U 94 on 7.3 CB 4498 freighter of 6,000 BRT. 9.3 CA 5654 Brazilian steamer was cruising without lights and steering zigzag course. Sinking
freighter (see para. IVd). 11.3 CA CA 54 89 freighter of 5,000 BRT. was therefore made without warning and rightly so.
West Indies: U 161 sank ammunition freighter of 6,000 BRT on 7.3 in
ED 6891. On 10.3 boat penetrated inner harbor of Port Castries (British V. Reports of Success:
island of St. Lucia) and torpedoed a passenger freighter of 8,000 BRT and U 161 reports 3 ships together 19,000 BRT sunk.
another freighter of 5,000 BRT. Steamers lay alongside jetty in 9-10 U 94 " 2 ships " 11,000 " sunk, as well as one ship
meters of water. Detailed observation was not possible on account of without tonnage report.
machine gun fire. On last sighting both ships were on fire and under water U 587 reports sub chaser as well as one ship of 5,800 BRT sunk.
astern. Total loss probable. U 588 reports 3 ships together 21,046 BRT sunk.
b) None. U 653 reports 1 ship of 7,000 BRT sunk.
c) 1) SSS report from English motor vessel "Orari" (10,350 BRT) in EE
5884 (U 161?). VI. General: None.
2) Submarine sighting by aircraft in AE 5560 off Seydisfjord (U 701).
d) None. ---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 120 -
11.March 1942.

I. U 67 - ED 55 U 129 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 404 - Op(CB) U 571 - BF

50
577
 68 - Op(Freetown) 135 - Op(AE/AF) 432 - BD 99 578 - CC 16
69 - BD 61 155 - Op(CA) 502 - BD 99 587 - CC 16(Op)
71 - BC 77 156 - DF 24 503 - AK 77 588 - CA 61
87 - Op(AM 11) 158 - Op(CA) 504 - DD 42 593 - Op(AM 18)
94 - CA 57-Op 160 - AK 86 505 - Op(Freetown) 653 - CC 74
96 - BB 97 161 - ED 60-Op 506 - AN 34 701 - Op(AE 50u.60)
105 - CD 12 162 - BE 48 507 - Helgol. 752 - BF 46
123 - BD 57 202 - CE 12 552 - BE 55 753 - Op(AM 19)
124 - CB 72 213 - Op(AM 15) 553 - AM 33 754 - BE 65
126 - Op(Karib. Meer) 332 - Op(CB) 558 - BF 52
128 - DE 14 373 - BD 45 569 - AM 31
On Return Passage: U 588 - 558 - 752 - 578 - 96 - 653 - 69 - 504 - 432
- 502 - 156 - 67 - 128.
Sailed: U 154 - Lorient; U 209 - 376 - 378 - 655 - Kiel.
Entered Port: U 558 - Brest.
- 121 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 593 reports convoy No. 15 on northerly course in AM 2734 at
2120. As boat was on first war cruise, and had had no tactical training in
home waters on account of ice conditions, he received orders to attack
when given favorable opportunity and to break off engagement before
dawn. Operation on convoy with other boats not possible for reasons
578
given para. IVd. Boat was contacted by red search light (see para. IVd),
forced off and depth charged. Last position of convoy AM 2734 at 2130,
course 3000, medium speed. Convoy consisted of 14 steamers and 5
destroyers. At 0230 submarine reported from AM 2587 bearing on 2400,
rain showers, visibility 1000 meters.
Position reports:
U 155: Cape Hatteras position as reported by U 578 on 6.3. On 10.3
First Watch Officer Lt.(j.g.) Oentrop washed overboard and drowned. On
11.3 2 spread miss at freighter. 3 bombs dropped in spite of pitch
darkness. Freighter and aircraft worked together by means of blue signal
lights. Believed to have been submarine decoy ship. Sank freighter of
6,000 BRT on 7.3 in CA 8786.
U 578 reports having been bombed (light caliber) on 7.3 and sighting
vessel about an hour later (Probable identical with submarine decoy of U
155). (For details see IVd).
U 588 sighted fast tanker with 2 destroyers at 1530 in CA 63, course
1800.
U 96 sank Norwegian ship "Tye" in BB 7965, 4,265 BRT. Total
sinkings: 29,101 BRT.
U 432 sighted smoke clouds and destroyer at 1536 in BE 7818 and
7841. Course 2000, 8 knots. 1803 smoke clouds in BE 7847. Probably
convoy with escort some distance ahead. Boat had to continue homeward
passage on account of fuel supply.
b) None.
c) 1) Admiralty submarine warning for AM 2734 (U 593).
2) SSS report by USA cargo ship "Parismina" (4,732 BRT) in CA 5425.
An interrupted message later indicated that ship was being attacked.
Torpedoing reports:
Steamer "Destro" 3,553 BRT in DN 4440
" "Texan" 7,005 BRT in DN 4770. Both reports north of Cuba
(U 126).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
- 122 -
c) 1) U 162 reports no meeting with "Osorno". Return passage.
2) U 202 at meeting point for tanker "Germania".
d) U 593 requested to give details about red searchlight (possibly infra
red rays). The great number of reports recently of submarine decoy ships
must be treated with great reserve. These reports have been made in most
cases by commanders with little operational experience, who suspect any
vessel behaving in an unusual manor of being a submarine decoy ship.
Ensuing defensive measures and miss fires are not in most cases
attributable to the special observance and expedients of submarine decoy
ships, but to their own clumsy tactics and lack of firing dexterity. It is
scarcely to be expected that the enemy who is so short of shipping should
employ vessels which must be valuable to him as submarine decoy ships,
especially so as the chances of success for these craft in this war have
shown themselves to be very small. Submarine commanders are requested
to take note of this.
V. Reports of Success:
U 155 reports 1 ship of 6,000 BRT sunk.
U 96 reports 1 ship of 4,265 BRT sunk.
VI. General:
According to German Naval Staff Book No. 570, Most Secret, S.O.
only, the 8 boats in Iceland-Herbrides area, U 701 - 135 - 87 - 213 - 753 -
553 - 569 - 593 are transferred to command of Group North.
Reason: In order to attack enemy fleet units operating in the
Arctic, and to cover the movements of "Tirpitz".
579
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
12.March 1942.
I. U 67 - ED 62 U 154 - BF 58 U 376 - Br'büttel U 571 - BF 49
68 - Op(Freetown) 155 - CB 45 378 - dto. 578 - CC 25
69 - BD 63 156 - CE 31? 404 - Op(CB) 587 - Op(BB-BC)
71 - CC 13 158 - Op(CA) 432 - BE 76 588 - CB 42
87 - Op(AM 11) 160 - BD 21 502 - BD 99 593 - Op(AM 25)
94 - Op(CB) 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 503 - BC 38 653 - CC 46
96 - BC 78 162 - CE 53 504 - DD 28 655 - Br'büttel
105 - CD 51 202 - CD 36 505 - Op(Freetown) 752 - BF 50
123 - BD 48 209 - Br'büttel 506 - AN 28 753 - Op(AM 16)
124 - CA 98 213 - AM 19 507 - AN 66 754 - BE 56
126 - Op(DB 90) 332 - Op(CB) 552 - BE 42
128 - DE 16 373 - BC 66
129 - CC 32
On Return Passage: U 588 - 162 - 155 - 752 - 578 - 96 - 653 - 69 - 504
- 129 - 213 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 67 - 128.
Sailed: U 203 - Brest.
Entered Port: - . -
- 123 -
 Norwegian ship "Gunny" (23,602 BRT)
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. USA "Mariana" 3,110 BRT.
freighter of 8,000 BRT.
III. Reports on the Enemy: USA "Hanseat" 7,932 BRT.
a) 1) U 578 reports 2 spread fired at 2,000 BRT freighter. 1 hit heard. USA "Texan" 7,005 BRT.
Position CC 2645. Target continued passage at reduced speed. Another USA "Olga" 2,496 BRT.
submerged attack was frustrated by heavy swell. (NW 8). Probably sunk:
2) Position and success report of U 126: Total sinkings - 9 ships, freighter of 5,500 BRT.
together 52,312 BRT in following positions: USA "Esso Bolivia" 10,389 BRT.
DO 12 - DN 56 - DN 84 - DN 84 - DN 79 - DN 73 - DN 47 - DM 69 - USA "Colabee" 5,518 BRT.
DA 55. U 578 reports one hit on freighter of 2,000 BRT.
For names of ships see para. V. Sinking of 3 of the ships not observed,
but total loss very probable. Calm weather on the whole, medium
visibility. Transmitting and receiving conditions very bad inshore. All - 124 -
torpedoes fired, 115 cbm. Homeward bound.
b) None.
c) 1) American steamer "Marjory" sent SSS in vicinity of Cape Hatteras.
2) Submarine sighting report by aircraft in AM 1681. Aircraft had
attacked submarine, and probably scored one hit. (U 593?).
3) Submarine warning for area DB 3636.
d) Between 14.3 and 19.3, 26-30 steamers sailed in convoy from
Chesapeake Bay to Panama.
Escorting vessels (probably South American) arrived at Baltimore on VI. General:
10.3. Group North has asked for the 4 boats U 135, 701, 553, 569 placed
under his command according to German Naval Staff 572 Most Secret,
IV. Current Operations: S.O. only, and stationed them in area between the Shetlands and Faroes. U
a) None. 753, U 593 and U 87 remain for the time being west of the Herbrides.
b) U 124 freedom of action in entire coastal area from CA 50 - DM 29.
c) Escort duty U 202 probably according to plan. ---------------------------------------------------
d) Report from U 593: Contacted by bright red light at range of 4,000 ---------------
meters. Accurate gunfire at range of 2,000 meters. It was probably only a
colored searchlight. A more detailed explanation must wait till return of 13.March 1942.
the commander.

V. Reports of Success: I. U 67 - EE 61 U 155 - CB 57 U 378 - Helgol. U 588 - CB 27

U 126 reports as sunk: 68 - Op(Freetown) 156 - CF 13 404 - Op(CB) 653 - CC 53
580
 69 - BE 42 158 - Op(CA) 432 - BE 86 655 - Helgol.
71 - CB 36 160 - BD 18 502 - BE 79 752 - BF 60
94 - Op(CB) 161 - Op(Karib. Meer) 503 - BC 64 753 - Op(AM 19)
96 - BC 87 162 - CF 15 504 - DD 32 754 - BE 54
105 - CD 41 202 - BD 87 505 - Op(Freetown) 593 - Op(AM 18)
123 - BC 93 203 - BF 50 506 - AF 77 587 - Op(AM 11)
124 - Op(CA) 209 - Helgol. 507 - AN 93
126 - DM 65 213 - AM 01 552 - BD 63
128 - DE 23 332 - Op(CB) 571 - BF 47
129 - EE 86 373 - BC 91 578 - CC 34
154 - BF 46 376 - Helgol. 587 - Op(BB-BC)
On Return Passage: U 588 - 162 - 155 - 752 - 578 - 126 - 96 - 653 - 69
- 504 - 129 - 213 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 67 - 128.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 752 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 161 sank tanker of 5,000 BRT with last torpedo. Heavy shipping
in spurts since 13.3 in area around Trinidad. Promises success as a
permanent operations area for submarine up to distance of 500 miles from
Port of Spain. Homeward bound.
2) U 67 sank armed tanker "Penelope" (6,559 BRT) in ED 5345. All
torpedoes fired. Homeward bound.
3) U 404 reports sinking of 6,000 BRT freighter in CA 5242. Ship was
darkened and zigzagging sharply. Lit up after being hit, and illuminated
Chilean colors on ship's side. Probable cargo cellulose.
b) None.
c) 1) Submarines reported by ships or aircraft in AM 1471 - AM 1166 -
AM 7645 - ED 69 - DB 3636.
2) USA tanker "Esso Bayonne" (7,698 BRT) sent SSS in DN 81.
Likewise an unknown steamer in DM 48.
581
3) USA tanker "Mecury Sun" reported exploding ship in DC 2443
(probably another ship).
- 125 -
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 124 detailed to convoy (see para. IIId on 12.3).
c) Escort duty U 202 according to plan.
d) None.
VI. General:
a) Situation in Norwegian area: The sighting of further English
formations in Norwegian area and the necessity of supporting land
operations in north Norway by increased attack on the England-
Murmansk-Arkangel convoy route lead to German Naval Command's
order for 4 boats formerly belonging to Iceland group to be placed under
command of Admiral Arctic. Other boats concerned are those west of
Herbrides, as these are next available - U 87 - 753 - 593 - (U 213 on return
passage). Nevertheless it would not be practical to send these boats to the
Arctic for the following reasons:
a) Boats have no Arctic equipment
b) None of the ciphers
c) and their equipment in French ports.
The following is therefore planned: U 378, U 209, U 376 ready to sail
Heligoland 14.3. U 655 ready to sail Heligoland 15.3. These will be sent
to Arctic and placed under command of Group North. These boats possess
Arctic equipment. In order to clear up conditions in Norwegian area and
hasten readiness for operational duty of four boats in Trondheim and
Bergen (at present U 405 - 592 - 591 - 586) it is proposed to place them
permanently under command of Group North, German Naval Command.
b) American area:
After exactly 2 1/2 months of submarine warfare in American waters,
the following picture presents itself:
1) Sea defense measures so far met with (except area off Halifax and
Cape Race) are small, badly organized and untrained.
2) Air defense in many areas (Aruba, Hatteras and Halifax) is there in
sufficient strength it is true, but inexperienced, and in comparison to the
English air escort service can only be described as bad.
3) There can be no question of a closely knit, well considered
organization of merchant shipping, able to make allowance and
adjustments according to the prevailing submarine operations. Now and
then certainly a stoppage of
- 126 -
shipping was observed after submarine successes (Aruba, Port of
Spain, Hatteras - Florida Straits), and yet one got the impression this was
the result of momentary fright rather than a considered defense measure.
Examples of this are partly contradictory instructions to merchant
shipping in the Caribbean Sea.
4) Even in grid square CB on e continually meets with single ship
traffic. This is an indication that even in this area which comes directly in
the main line of communications between England and America, the allies
582
find it impossible to organize a regular escort service embracing all
shipping on account of lack of material.
5) The enormous number of tankers employed in purely American
import traffic remains surprising. It is an indication of the extent of
America's own oil requirements, and gives some idea of the difficulties
confronting American shipping according to foreign reports in the matter
of giving up oil shipping space to England.
6) On the whole operation in American waters has become more
difficult. These difficulties however, would be raised immediately by the
presence of a submarine tanker. This would make possible:
a) Simultaneous attack on a number of busy focal points of shipping.
b) Quicker removal of boats to an especially favorable shipping junction at
any given time. (for example, Mona-Windward-Antilles Straits -Florida
Straits.)
c) Extending of attack to the furthermost areas in Middle and South
America, not only by large, but also by the medium-sized boats, and
thereby enabling surface and special operations.
The formation of convoys as a defense measure is to be expected
sooner or later. Even so, apart from already mentioned reasons, the length
and disparity of the shipping lanes to be protected, as well as lack of
suitable escort craft will not permit a really workable safeguard for some
time to come.
c) The verbal report of the commander of U 558 on his return confirmed
his message concerning presence of anti-torpedo nets. During attack on
convoy he distinguished without doubt in the light of illuminating rockets
A/T nets on steamer and tanker, which were hung from thick poles 10-15
meters in length and wide in diameter. It is an astounding fact that these
ships were making 10 knots with lowered nets, even though the weather
was good. It is a matter of doubt whether it would be possible to construct
a corresponding torpedo head with net cutter to counter this defense
measure. But a panacea even in this case would be a working non-contact
pistol!
- 127 -
14.March 1942.
I. U 67 - ED 61 U 129 - BE 82 U 332 - Op(CB) U 552 - BD 37
68 - Op(Freetown) 154 - BF 44 373 - BC 84 571 - BE 67
69 - BE 52 155 - CB 65 404 - Op(CA 55) 578 - CD 14
71 - CB 36 156 - BE 88 432 - BE 92 587 - CC 25
87 - Op(AM 11) 158 - Op(CA) 502 - BE 86 588 - CB 37
94 - Op(CB) 160 - BC 63 503 - BC 82 593 - Op(AM 18)
96 - BC 89 161 - ED 88 504 - CC 79 653 - CC 63
105 - CC 62 162 - CF 25 505 - Op(Freetown) 753 - Op(AM 19)
123 - BC 94 202 - BD 91 506 - AF 77 754 - BD 63
124 - Op(CA) 203 - BF 57 507 - AN 34
126 - DN 45 213 - AM 48
128 - CD 77
On Return Passage: U 588 - 162 - 578 - 126 - 96 - 653 - 69 - 504 - 129
- 213 - 161 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 67 - 128.
Sailed: U 594 - Kiel; U 572 - Brest; UA - Lorient.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Situation reports:
583
1) From U 94 off New York: Shipping inside 200 meter line and about
50 miles eastwards of it. Only fishing boats on 200 meter line. Medium
air defense made up of large and slow land machines.In area CA 50 inside
40 meter line reconnaissance duty by airship in cooperation with patrol
vessels. Was hunted effectually for 3 hours by such a formation. Air
patrol only off Cape Hatteras.
2) Freetown: U 68: No shipping for a week. Requests operational area
FC 70 and 80 (north of Pernambuco)
U 505 4 days from 7.3 in ET 80 and 4 days ET 90. No shipping, no air
activity. Boats will receive instructions.
U 68 on lookout for eastbound traffic on Guinea coast. Focal points
Lagos and Tocaradi.
U 505 to close further into Freetown on lookout for shipping. A
removal of attacking area to waters off the Brazilian coast would not be
practical because fuel consumption would be too high (a passage of 1,300
miles, 66 miles of which lies on route "A" - attacking operations
forbidden) as well as on account of the long return passage against strong
trade wind and unfavorable currents. It must also be realized that after 8
days observation in a certain limited area, one still possesses no clear
picture of the shipping situation in this important port.
b) None.
c) 1) Tanker "British Resource" (7,209 BRT) sent SSS from CB 7567.
- 128 -
2) Aircraft sighting report from AE 7249. (Not one of our boats,
probably English).
(X) 3) Attacking report in DN 71 (possibly Italian submarine).
 4) Warning of 2 enemy submarines vicinity of Nantucket Lightship
during night 13.-14.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
c) Escort duty U 202 according to plan.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
15.March 1942.
I. U 67 - EE 11 U 128 - CD 52 U 213 - AM 79 U 552 - BD 45
68 - EU 85(Op) 129 - EE 19 332 - Op(CB) 571 - BE 58
69 - BE 61 154 - BE 93 373 - BC 75 572 - BF 50
71 - CB 26 155 - CC 41 404 - Op(CB) 578 - BC 95
87 - Op(AM 11) 156 - BE 97 432 - BF 57 587 - Op(BB-BC)
94 - CA 86 158 - Op(CA) 502 - BF 57 588 - CC 14
96 - BC 96 160 - BC 68 503 - BC 87 593 - Op(AM 18)
105 - CC 53 161 - ED 62 504 - CC 89 594 - Br'büttel
123 - BC 88 162 - CF 32 505 - EU 74-Op 653 - CD 18
124 - Op(CA) 202 - BE 47 506 - AM 31 753 - Op(AM 19)
126 - DN 52 203 - BF 48 507 - AN 23 754 - BD 61
A - BF 50
On Return Passage: U 94 - 588 - 162 - 155 - 578 - 126 - 96 - 653 - 69 -
504 - 129 - 213 - 161 - 432 - 502 - 156 - 67 - 128.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: - . -
584
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Situation reports:
U 158, Hatteras Lighthouse functioning as usual.
Favorable attacking area between CA 39 and DB 61. Heavy shipping
traffic on 20 meter line. Mainly tankers medium patrol activity, small
unnoticeable air activity up to 200 meter line, flares at night. On return
passage.
Sunk:
11.3 coastal patrol vessel in DC 1136.
13.3 petrol tanker 12,000 BRT in DB 3399 (exploded)
15.3 "Olean" 7,118 BRT in DC 1146
15.3 "Ario" 6,952 BRT in DC 1159 (see "intercept" reports.)
U 504: On strength of report from U 126 proceeded from DN 51 to DO
47. Fast freighter hunted 3 times without success. Otherwise nothing
sighted.
- 129 -
U 161: sunk "Acadia" on 15.3 in ED 2955 by gunfire.
U 753 reports from west of Herbrides by short signal: No shipping,
patrol only.
b) None.
c) 1) Torpedoing reports of "Ario" and "Acacia" (see report of U 158).
2) Submarine warning for CA 54.(Submarine sighting by "Sachario"
and "Berwindglen"). Submarine warning CB 7583 and DN 1130.
 d) None. 105 - CC 67 162 - BE 99 506 - AM 25 754 - BD 53
123 - CC 33 202 - BE 82 507 - AF 78 A - BF 49
IV. Current Operations: 124 - Op(CA) 203 - BE 67 552 - BD 47
a) None. 126 - DN 36 213 - BE 39 571 - BE 49
b) U 71 given freedom of movement to attack in coastal area CA 50-CA 128 - CD 38 332 - Op(CB) 572 - BF 49
79.
c) Escort duty U 202 according to plan.
d) None. On Return Passage: U 94 - 588 - 162 - 155 - 578 - 158 - 126 - 96 - 653.
Sailed: - . -
V. Reports of Success: Entered Port: U 502 - Lorient; U 432 - La Pallice.
U 158 3 ships 26,070 BRT sunk.
U 158 1 coastal patrol vessel sunk. II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
U 161 "Acacia" 1,130? BRT sunk.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
VI. General: None. a) U 404 sighted auxiliary cruiser and large tanker at 2200 in CA 8266 on
course 800, speed 8 knots. Sank tanker but lost contact with cruiser. (see
"intercept" reports).
U 504 sank armed freighter of 7,000 BRT in DO 54. Ship exploded.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log On examination of wreckage discovered ship was carrying ammunition,
trucks and aircraft parts destined for Bombay.
16 - 31 March 1942 U 753 examined "Iren Irishwillor" (1,000 BRT) in AL 6677. Ship was
in ballast bound from Dublin to St. Johns via Ardrossan. Boat received
PG30305b instructions not to sink ship, though by all the rules of merchant warfare
this would not have been out of order.
b) None.
c) Sighting reports from CB 4094 - DC 4963 - CA 8144 - CB 4894 - CA
16.March 1942. 5225. Most of these reports can probably be attributed to a state of
nervous tension. Torpedoing reports:
Tanker "San Demetrio" (8,073 BRT) in CA 8244 (U 404)
I. U 67 - DP 75 U 129 - EE 12 U 373 - BB 99 U 578 - BD 74 Tanker "Austrailia" (11,628 BRT) in CA 7991 (U 124)
68 - Op(Freetown) 154 - BE 98 404 - Op(CB) 587 - Op(BB-BC) d) None.
69 - BF 48 155 - CC 51 432 - BF 60 588 - CC 24
71 - CB 27 156 - BF 48 502 - BF 60 593 - Op(AM 18) IV. Current Operations:
87 - Op(AM 11) 158 - CA 89 503 - CC 34 594 - Helgoland a) None.
94 - CA 96 160 - BC 86 504 - DO 48 653 - CD 28 b) As U 209 - 655 - 378 - 376 - are en route for Arctic, the 3 boats
96 - BD 75 161 - ED 37 505 - Op(Freetown) 753 - Op(AM 19) stationed in Herbrides-Iceland area, U 87 - 593 - 753 are permitted to
585
operate freely. They are given freedom of movement in whole area AM
north of latitude 550 N. I. U 67 - DP 48 U 129 - DO 88 U 373 - BB 99 U 588 - CC 26
c) Escort duty U 202 according to plan. 68 - Op(EV) 154 - CF 32 404 - CA 83 OP 593 - Op(AM)
69 - BF 67 155 - CC 61 503 - CC 27 594 - Helgoland
- 131 - 71 - CB 17 156 - BF 67 504 - DO 54 653 - CE 11
87 - Op(AM) 158 - CA 96 505 - Op(Freetown) 753 - AL 66 Op
94 - CB 58 160 - BC 84 506 - AM 19 754 - BD 46
96 - CB 81 161 - ED 32 507 - AM 11 A - BF 44
105 - CC 72 162 - BF 49 552 - BC 68
123 - CC 62 202 - BE 96 571 - BE 47
124 - Op(CA) 203 - BE 58 572 - BF 48
126 - DO 16 213 - BF 42 578 - BD 76
128 - CE 16 332 - Op(CB) 587 - Op(BB-BC)

d) None.
On Return Passage: U 94 - 588 - 162 - 155 - 653 - 69 - 578 - 158 - 126
V. Reports of Success: - 96 - 504 - 129 - 213 - 161.
U 404 reports 1 ship sunk. Sailed: U 84 - Lorient.
U 504 reports 1 ship 7,000 BRT sunk. Entered Port: U 156 - Lorient; U 69 - St. Nazaire.

VI. General: II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

In American waters at present there is a great scarcity of
submarines. In operations area there is only U 124 - 404 - 332 - 71. In the
next 7-10 days U 373 - 105 - 503 - 123 - and 160 are due to arrive. This
scarcity is due to withdrawal of U 87 - 753 - 593 - 569 - 135 - 701 and 553
to Iceland-Herbrides area to cover the drop in numbers there. This
removal is the more regrettable as the boats in question would have been
in operations area at the new moon period. Full moon period is
unfavorable for necessary surface operations in an area where there is also
night air patrol.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 158 sighted aircraft carrier in CB 7272 at 1440, course 400, speed
16 knots. No further report.
Situation U 404: In CB 63 - 61, CA 86 - 88, CA 87 - 53 no shipping on
200 meter line. From CA 77 - 73 in vicinity of 20 meter line, medium
traffic, ships well darkened; ceased for a while after sinkings. Neutral
traffic continued as usual. One destroyer distinguished. Single depth
charges dropped regularly after noon each day. Fishing boats fitted with
small cannons. On 12.3 ore steamer sunk in CA 5186. 17.3 tanker"San
Demetrio" sunk in CA 8163. Protracted return passage with 51 cbm.
b) None.

17.March 1942. - 132 -

586
 84 - BF 50 158 - CB 73 505 - Op(Freetown) 753 - Op(AM)
87 - Op(AM) 160 - CC 28 506 - AL 62 754 - BD 45
94 - CB 64 161 - DO 96 507 - AM 26 A - BE 65
96 - BD 83 162 - BF 60 552 - BC 83
105 - CB 93 202 - CD 28 571 - BD 68
123 - CC 53 203 - BE 49 572 - BE 69
124 - Op(CA) 213 - BF 46 578 - BD 58
c) 1) USA tanker"Acme" 6,878 BRT torpedoes off Diamond Shoals. 128 - CE 23 332 - Op(CB) 587 - Op(BB-BC)
2) Submarine sightings: 126 - DO 23 373 - CB 35 588 - CC 36
a) by USA tanker "Gulfwave" in CA 7991 (Cape Hatteras).
b) by unknown ship in CA 53.
d) None. On Return Passage: U 94 - 588 - 155 - 578 - 158 - 126 - 96 - 653 - 504
- 129 - 213 - 161 - 156 - 67 - 128 - 404 - 162.
IV. Current Operations: Sailed: U 334 - Kiel.
a) None. Entered Port: U 162 - Lorient.
b) 1) U 202 freedom of action in CB and CC. Indication of possible
refueling by "UA" (see para. IVc). II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
2) U 506 and U 507 received orders to proceed Lorient with all speed.
c) U 202 reports failure to meet homeward-bound "Germania". Strong III. Reports on the Enemy:
westerly gale raged for four days at meeting point. a) 1) U 507 reports 0810 convoy No. 16 in sight position AM 4525, south
d) Nothing. westerly course, slow speed. (see para. IVa)
2) Situation report U 68: Heavy traffic at intervals yesterday entering
V. Reports of Success: "Palmas" close inshore. At the beginning
U 404 reports 2 ships of 14,073 BRT sunk.
- 133 -
VI. General: None.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

18.March 1942.

I. U 67 - DP 19 U 129 - EE 22 U 404 - CA 68 U 593 - Op(AM)

68 - Op(EV) 154 - CF 53 503 - CC 42 594 - AN 93 of every second week apparently a convoy assembly. Fast land-based
71 - Op(CA) 155 - CD 17 504 - DO 37 653 - CE 21 machines off "Palmas".
587
 Successes: 17th March, EU 8143 freighter, EU 8511 "Ile de Batx", EU 19.March 1942.
8513 "Scottish Prince", EU 8523 "Allende" sunk. All ships returning from
India. 120 cbm., 1 air driven, 2 electric torpedoes. It has therefore paid to
keep the boats (U 505 and 68) in this area. I. U 67 - EP 23 U 129 - DO 92 U 503 - CB 63 U 594 - AN 34
b) None. 68 - Op(EV) 154 - CF 51 504 - DP 11 653 - BD 98
c) Submarine sightings: 71 - Op(CA) 155 - CD 24 505 - Op(Freetown) 753 - AL 92
1) CA 53 (U 332 - 71?) 84 - BF 49 158 - CB 59 506 - AM 71 754 - BC 64
2) CA 79 (U 124?) 87 - Op(AM) 160 - CC 19 507 - AM 69 A - BE 59
3) CA 5169 (U 332 - 71?) 94 - CC 41 161 - DP 49 552 - BC 87
Submarine warnings: 96 - BE 48 202 - CD 18 571 - BD 59
4) For area around "Cape Palmas" (sinkings of U 68) 105 - CB 91 203 - BE 47
5) DC 1160
6) English aircraft sighted suspicious patch of oil in AM 19 (U 87 -
593?) - 134 -
7) English aircraft together with destroyer ordered to attack submerged
submarine in AL 6947 (U 507 - 753?)
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) Convoy No. 16: Convoy sighting report from U 507 was first
received at 1613 hours. The boat was contacted during attack, and hunted
with depth charges. U 507 picked up contact again at 1924 in position AM
4723, course 2000, speed 7 knots. U 507 then received orders to attack
convoy, having reported his own position at 1756 hours as AM 4647. At 123 - CC 54 213 - BF 60 572 - BE 91
0307 U 753 asked for D/F bearings. U 507 continued to shadow until 124 - Op(CA) 332 - Op(CB) 578 - BD 65
0516 hours. 126 - DD 85 373 - CB 28 587 - Op(BB-BC)
b)- d) None. 128 - BD 99 334 - Brunsbüttel 588 - CD 36
404 - CB 47 593 - Op(AM)
V. Reports of Success:
U 68 reports 4 ships sunk, together 26,753 BRT.
On Return Passage: U 94 - 588 - 155 - 213 - 578 - 158 - 126 - 96 - 653
VI. General: None. - 504 - 129 - 161 - 156 - 67 - 128 - 404.
Sailed: U 582 - Brest.
--------------------------------------------------- Entered Port: U 213 - Lorient.
---------------
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
588
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 129 reports large 2 funnel steamer in DC 9642 at 1224, 3200, 19
knots.
2) Convoy "U 507" see para. IVa.
b) None. 20.March 1942.
c) 1) Torpedoing or attacking reports
USA tanker "W.E. Hutton" DC 1160. Submarine warning.
Steamer "Liberator" CA 7968. Submarine warning. I. U 67 - DE 86 U 129 - DO 96 U 503 - CB 64 U 593 - Op(AL)
Tanker "Gulf of Mexico" DC 1160, tanker "Mercury Sun" DC 1160. 68 - Op(EV) 154 - CF 47 504 - DD 94 594 - AN 28
2) Submarine sighting reports: 71 - Op(CA) 155 - BD 76 505 - Op(Freetown) 653 - CE 13
Steamer "City of Exeter" EU 48 (U 505) 84 - BF 47 158 - Cb 65 506 - AL 97 753 - AL 82
Tanker "Chester Sun" CA 7938 87 - Op(AM) 160 - CC 41 507 - AL 98 754 - BC 58
USA freighter CA 7991 94 - CC 19 161 - DP 51 552 - BC 18 A - BE 42
Steamer "Argon" DB 3390. 96 - BE 58 202 - Op(CB-CC) 571 - BD 57
d) None. 105 - CB 85 203 - BD 68 572 - BE 82
123 - CC 48 332 - Op(CB) 578 - BE 45
IV. Current Operations: 124 - Op(CA) 373 - Op(AM) 582 - BF 50
a) Convoy No. 16: U 506 - 507 - 753 searched in vain on west and 126 - DD 91 334 - Helgoland 587 - Op(BB-BC)
southwest courses. Position reports show that boats were proceeding at 128 - BE 59 404 - CB 57 588 - BC 86
only about 5 knots. They were given order to search on general course
and at enemy speed up to 8 knots, U 753 on 2500, U 507 on 2250 and U
506 on 2000. U 593 reported position AL 9617. Contrary to original plan On Return Passage: U 94 - 588 - 155 - 578 - 158 - 126 - 96 - 653 - 504
to break off operations on the evening of 19th, the four boats received - 129 - 161 - 156 - 67 - 128 - 404.
orders to continue search until after dark on 20.3. Sailed: - . -
b) - d) None. Entered Port: - . -

V. Reports of Success: None. II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

VI. General: None. III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) - b) None.
- 135 - c) 1) Submarine sighting reports:
USA tanker "Argon" in DB 3390.
2) Submarine warning in area CA 9619.
3) Torpedo - distress - attacking reports:
English tanker "Dairla" in CB 9144.
589
 "Monisa" in CA 4950.
4) American Navy Office instructed all north and southbound shipping
along the American coast to pass east of Diamond Shoals lightship at a
distance of 15 miles, and to leave the coast at Cape Lookout and return at
Wimble Shoals, and vice versa. A minefield is probably suspected off
Diamond Shoals.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Boats operating on Convoy No. 16 received orders to break off at dusk
if no contact or information about enemy position. U 593 in previous
operations area, U 506 - 507 - and U 753 return passage to western France.
At 2337 U 507 reported six torpedoes fired at convoy, four probable hits.
b) - c) None.
d) U 67 reports hole, hitherto unexplainable, in pressure hull caused by
corrosion, bilges, battery II. After sealing able to dive to 30 meters.
- 161 - 156 - 67 - 128 - 404 - 506 - 507.
- 136 -
U 657 - 702 - 703 - Hamburg; U 455 - Bergen
I. U 67 - DE 68 U 129 - DO 36 U 503 - CB 58 U 593 - Op(AM)
68 - Op(EV) 154 - CE 68 504 - DD 69 594 - AF 70
71 - Op(CA) 155 - BD 83 505 - Op(Freetown) 653 - BD 97
84 - BE 68 158 - CC 42 506 - AL 77 753 - Op(AM)
87 - Op(AM) 160 - CB 62 507 - AL 78 754 - BC 73
94 - CC 26 161 - DE 88 552 - BB 98 A - BD 62
96 - BE 68 202 - CC 29 571 - BD 72
105 - CB 76 203 - BD 58 572 - BE 49
123 - CB 69 332 - Op(CB) 578 - BE 54
124 - Op(CA) 334 - Helgoland 582 - BF 50
126 - DD 65 373 - Op(AM) 587 - Op(BB-BC)
128 - BE 69 404 - CB 69 588 - BC 93
On Return Passage: U 94 - 588 - 155 - 158 - 126 - 96 - 653 - 504 - 129
Sailed: U 66 - Lorient; U 85 - St. Nazaire; U 459 - Kiel; U 654 - Brest;
Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) Situation U 587: operated from 11-17.3 in CC 20 and 30, passage over
BC 80, 92 to 60 from 18-21.3. Nothing sighted. 34 cbm. On return
V. Reports of Success: passage.
U 507 reports 4 probable hits on convoy. b) None.
c) 1) Torpedoing reports:
VI. General: None. Tanker "Atlantic Sun" (11,600 tons) in DC 1460
Unknown ship in CC 5456 (submarine warning).
--------------------------------------------------- d) None.
---------------
IV. Current Operations:
21.March 1942. a) - c) None.

590
 d) No report from U 503 since 10.3 in spite of repeated calls. The loss
of this boat must be reckoned with.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
- 137 -
22.March 1942.
I. U 66 - BF 50 U 126 - DE 17 U 404 - CC 43 U 587 - BC 69
67 - DF 41 128 - BF 49 455 - AN 23 588 - BD 49
68 - Op(Freetown) 129 - DD 86 459 - Br'büttel 593 - Op(AM)
71 - Op(CA) 154 - CE 83 504 - DE 42 594 - AF 77
84 - BE 59 155 - BD 93 505 - Op(Freetown) 653 - BD 96
85 - BF 50 158 - CC 25 506 - BE 37 654 - BF 60
87 - Op(AM) 160 - CB 56 507 - BE 25 657 - Helgoland
94 - BC 87 161 - DE 79 552 - CC 11 702 - "
96 - BF 47 202 - CC 51 571 - BC 98 703 - " IV. Current Operations:
105 - CA 99 203 - BD 73 572 - BD 69 753 - BE 13
123 - CB 93 332 - Op(CA) 578 - BE 64 754 - BC 47
124 - Op(CA) 334 - AN 95 582 - BF 49 A - BD 53
373 - Op(CA)
591
On Return Passage: U 507 - 506 - 753 - 653 - 404 - 587 - 94 - 588 - 155
- 578 - 158 - 126 - 96 - 504 - 129 - 161 - 67 - 128.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Situation report U 332: Heavy coastal shipping from Cape Hatteras.
Medium sea and air patrol. Shipping following new route since 22.3.
Sunk: 4 mast schooner carrying dynamite on 13.3 in CA 86, also
"Trepca" (5,042 BRT).
16.3 tanker "Gallia" class (9,970 BRT) off Hatteras.
19.3 freighter. both ships attacked during day. Finally hunted with
hydrophone and depth charges.
22.3, 3 misses on tanker with sea way 5-6.
Total of 22,016 BRT.
2) U 404: Homeward bound, sighted convoy No. 17 at 1500 in CC
5119, consisting of 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, and 5 other large ships.
Course 2300, speed 12 knots. Cruisers belonging to "Boise" class with 3
legged mast. 2 thuds heard after 52 seconds. No explosions, probably
pistol failures. Continued passage on account of fuel supply.
b) None.
c) SSS report from "John Cabot" (939 BRT) in CA 4997, "Ohio" (9,625
BRT) in DC 1160, "Peter Hurll" (10,871 BRT) in DC 83.
Attacking report: "Pan Amoco" (9,862 BRT) in DB 97.
d) None.
a) None.
b) U 505 freedom of action in area Lagos-Tacoradi.
c) - d) None.
- 138 -

V. Reports of Success:
U 332 - 4 ships - 22,016 BRT sunk.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
23.March 1942.
I. U 66 - BF 49 U 126 - DE 16 U 373 - Op(CA) U 582 - BF 47
67 - DF 16 128 - BF 60 404 - CC 28 587 - BD 49
68 - Op(Freetown) 129 - DD 93 455 - AF 77 588 - BD 58
71 - Op(CA) 154 - DC 21 459 - Helgoland 593 - Op(AM)
84 - BE 57 155 - BE 72 504 - DE 27 594 - AM 33
85 - BF 49 158 - CC 32 505 - Op(Freetown) 653 - BE 75
87 - Op(AM) 160 - CB 72 506 - BF 41 654 - BF 54
94 - BC 87 161 - BE 93 507 - BE 38 657 - Helgoland
96 - BF 60 202 - CC 42(Op) 552 - CB 31 702 - Helgoland
105 - Op(CA) 203 - BC 59 571 - BC 88 703 - Helgoland
123 - CB 83 332 - BC 69 572 - BD 67 753 - BE 29
124 - Op(CA) 334 - AN 34 578 - BE 66 754 - BB 90
A - BD 45
On Return Passage: U 506 - 753 - 332 - 404 - 587 - 94 - 588 - 155 - 578
- 158 - 126 - 96 - 653 - 504 - 129 - 161 - 67 - 128 - 507.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 128 - Lorient; U 96 - St. Nazaire.
592
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 552 sighted convoy in CB 2984 at 0130 (Convoy No. 18) steering
course 3000, then 2700 and last 2500, speed 12-14 knots heading into sea.
Boat had to break off pursuit in CB 5232.
2) Situation report U 124:
Heavy traffic off Hatteras, a number of tankers at intervals in mornings
and evenings. Night stretch from Hatteras to Cape Fear. No night
shipping between Cape Fear and Charleston. Ships steering straight
course from buoy to buoy. No mines off Hatteras, so diversion is probably
on account of wrecks or because the Americans suspect German mines.
Single destroyers occasionally patrol shipping route, air patrol towards
evening.
Sunk:
14.3 tanker "British Resource" (7,209 BRT) in CB 7593.
17.3 freighter "Ceiba" (1,698 BRT) in CA 8585. One freighter of
3,000 BRT in CA 7893.
18.3 freighter of 3,000 BRT in CA 7891.
19.3 tanker "Papoose" (5,939 BRT) in CD 1168, tanker "W.E. Hutton"
(7,076 BRT) in DC 1183.
- 139 -
21.3 tanker "Gulfring" class (10,208 BRT) in DC 1418. Tanker
"Atlantic Sun" (11,615 BRT) torpedoed.
23.3 tanker (7,000 BRT) sunk in DC 1189.
 All torpedoes fired - on return passage. VI. General: None.
3) U 105 can reach operations area by 27.3 at the earliest, with 73 cbm.
High fuel consumption on account of continuous bad weather. Use of ---------------------------------------------------
electric diesels limited on account of high temperatures of batteries. ---------------
Operated twice on neutral shipping. (Judging by the weather reports, boat
sailed for Hatteras on a course about 600 south of the great circle. 24.March 1942.
Contrary to previous experience he found prevailing westerly winds in this
area in January and February, and therefore consumed considerably more
fuel than U 552 and 754, who in circle sailing met with very much better I. U 66 - BF 47 U 129 - DE 48 U 455 - AM 32 U 588 - BD 91
weather.) 67 - DF 22 154 - DG 14 459 - Helgoland 593 - AM 72
b) None. 68 - Op(Freetown) 155 - BE 57 504 - DE 34 594 - AM 27
c) Torpedoing reports: 158 - CD 12 653 - BE 85
"Peter Bogen" (not indexed) in DP 19 (Italian?).
"Empire Steel" (8,150 BRT) in CB 8412 (U 123?).
"Bayou-Chico" (5,401 BRT) in BB 90. - 140 -
Life boat and crew in BB 9114 (U 754?).
Submarine sighting report from English aircraft in AM 0289 (U 87).
Boats have received instructions concerning convoy which sailed from
Halifax on 21.3 on following route: BB 8748 - BB 8842 - BB 6695.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
b) 1) U 105 - 123 - 160 given freedom of action along entire coastal area 71 - Op(CA) 160 - Op(am. Küste) 505 - Op(Freetown) 654 - BE 66
from New York to Florida Straits. 84 - BE 48 161 - DF 48 506 - BF 50 657 - Helgoland
2) U 455 and 594 received orders to sail for west coast of France with 85 - BE 68 202 - Op(CB) 507 - BF 50 702 - Helgoland
all speed, and will be detailed to American coastal areas as soon as 87 - AM 43 203 - BC 94 552 - CB 26 703 - Helgoland
possible. 94 - BC 97 332 - CA 99 571 - BC 79 753 - BE 38
c) First refueling operation of UA is planned for U 203 at 1300/29.3 in 105 - DC 33 334 - AN 23 572 - BD 58 754 - BB 85
BC 9455. 123 - CB 81 373 - Op(CA) 578 - BF 50 A - BC 94
d) None. 124 - DC 21 404 - CC 38 582 - BE 65
126 - DE 22 587 - BD 58
V. Reports of Success:
U 124 9 ships sunk, totaling 53,130 BRT
" 1 ship torpedoed, 11,615 BRT. On Return Passage: U 455 - 594 - 507 - 506 - 753 - 87 - 332 - 404 - 587
- 94 - 588 - 155 - 578 - 158 - 126 - 653 - 504 - 129 - 161 - 67 - 124.
593
 Sailed: U 201 - Brest; U 136 - 575 - St. Nazaire; U 130 - Lorient.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 19 see para. IVa.
2) U 202 reports up to the present 1 tanker (10,000 BRT) sunk. 9
torpedoes left. Position CC 52. Refueling from UA has been provided for.
3) U 587 sank drifting tanker of 12,000 BRT (of "Tanker Press" type
without foremast) in BD 4226.
Tanker had a large hole in the stern, perhaps caused by ramming. Boat
continued return passage, 1 air driven torpedo left.
b) None.
c) Submarine warnings: EU 86 - EV 74 - EU 48 - EL 12(?).
SSS reports from "Edward A. Messeck" in DC 11.
USA tanker "Pan Rhode Island" (7,699 BRT) in DC 11.
Torpedoing reports from English tanker "Narragansett" (10, 309 BRT)
in DO 3345.
On 23.3 English tanker "Athel Viking" (8,779 BRT) was probably in
tow by an American unit.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 19: At 2230 U 94 sighted a convoy on southerly course
and low speed in BC 6564. On account of fuel supply boat could only
shadow until 0600 hours. Received orders to keep contact with convoy for
U 203 which lay in the vicinity. Eventual refuelling from UA arranged for.
Convoy consisted of 25 steamers in wide formation escorted by 5
destroyers .Course 220-2400, speed 8-9 knots. U 94 attacked towards
0600 hours but was forced to retire, regaining contact about one hour later.
Last position BC 6768 at 0750 hours.
This convoy was probably "ONS 77" which according to dead
reckoning should also have been in this position. It is
- 141 -
594
striking that each of the 4 last ONS-convoys have followed exactly the
same route, employing circle-sailing.
On an average the escort of these convoys has been 4-5 destroyers.
b) 1) U 202 detailed operations area CC 10-20-40-50. (Further see para.
IVc).
2) U 105 remained stationary in CA 79 in order to conserve fuel, lying
on the bottom during the day.
c) Refueling operation between UA and 203 completed. U 202 to be
refueled next in CC 40.
V. Reports of Success:
U 202 1 ship sunk 19,000 BRT.
U 587 1 ship sunk 12,000 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
25.March 1942.
I. U 66 - CF 30 U 130 - BF 50 U 404 - CD 15 U 587 - BD 34
67 - BD 99 136 - BF 50 455 - AM 26 588 - BE 56
68 - Op(Freetown) 154 - DF 62 459 - Helgoland 593 - AM 79
71 - Op(CA) 155 - BE 67 504 - CE 26 594 - AM 42
84 - BD 69 158 - BC 98 505 - Op(Freetown) 653 - BE 92
 85 - BE 59 160 - Op(am. Küste) 506 - BF 60 654 - BF 61
87 - AM 72 161 - CD 69 507 - BF 60 657 - Helgoland
94 - BC 67 201 - vor Lorient 552 - CB 42 702 - Helgoland
105 - DC 31 202 - Op(CC) 571 - CC 21 703 - Helgoland
123 - CB 74 203 - BC 67 572 - BD 49 753 - BF 46
124 - CA 97 332 - CB 57 573 - BF 50 754 - BB 87
126 - BE 71 334 - AF 79 578 - BF 60 A - BC 86
129 - CD 86 373 - Op(CA) 582 - BE 56
On Return Passage: U 455 - 594 - 507 - 506 - 593 - 753 - 87 - 124 - 332
- 404 - 587 - 94 - 588 - 155 - 578 - 158 - 126 - 653 - 504 - 129 - 161 - 67.
Sailed: U 86 - Brest; U 109 - Lorient.
Entered Port: U 507 - 506 - Lorient; U 578 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 19 see para. IVa.
2) Situation "U 71":
Hatteras light out, stationary patrol. Groups of ships in mornings and
evenings with destroyer escort. Medium active air patrol.
- 142 -
Sunk:
17.3 petrol tanker type "British Fidelity" (8,465 BRT) in CB 4941.
20.3 USA "Oakmar" (5,766 BRT) in CA 9618.
595
7 plus 2 torpedoes.
3) U 332 - all torpedoes expended, sighted armed Russian (1,500 BRT)
course 1850, 6 knots.
4) U 68 reports convoy in EV 7533, consisting of 5 freighters, 3 escorts,
course 200. Spotted by land aircraft during submerged attack, and
straddled with smoke bombs. Forced to remain under water for 5 hours,
but no depth charges. (It was possibly an unreported French convoy.
Boats are aware nevertheless that French traffic is always to be expected in
this area).
5) U 455 on passage between Shetlands and Faroes reports nothing
sighted in AM 31 apart from land-based aircraft.
b) None.
c) SSS report from motor tanker "Ocona" (6,256 BRT) in CB 1362;
"Empire Piet" in BB 7773; unknown ship in CA 7399.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 19: U 94 lost contact towards 1000 hours. U 203 had
arrived in the meanwhile and reported 1009 convoy in sight. U 94
received orders to continue return passage, having only 2 stern torpedoes
and short fuel supply. Following ships sunk: 1 tanker (9,000 BRT) i
freighter 8,000 BRT. At 1140 U 203 reported convoy in BC 6785, speed 8
knots, course 2250; shadowed till 1715 in BC 9114. Boat was forced off
before attack, accurately contacted on hydrophones and received well
aimed depth charges. Contact lost and cannot be renewed until morning.
Boat in pursuit.
b) None.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 471 - 2 ships sunk together 14,231 BRT.
VI. General:
It is planned to relieve four boats belonging to Group York (U 701,
U 135, U 569, U 552) by 4 from home i.e. U 334, U 657, U 702 and U
703. The first to be replaced was U 135 by U 334, and has commenced
return passage to west of France.
Altogether 20 submarines are under command of Group North. On
review, the following picture of entire submarine situation presents itself:
Operational boats: total 124
Atlantic: 84
Mediterranean: 20
Arctic area: 20
- 143 -
That means 84 boats in the Atlantic. During this month these
boats have accounted for 520,000 BRT. If one were able to include boats
set aside for work in auxiliary theaters of war in the Atlantic, sinkings
would reach at least the 800,000 ton mark. Considering the fact that
nearly all experienced commanders are at present operating in the
Mediterranean one can reckon with a still higher figure.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
26.March 1942.
I. U 66 - CF 53 U 126 - BE 81 U 332 - CB 59 U 582 - BE 49
67 - BE 78 129 - CE 69 373 - Op(CA) 587 - BD 36
596
68 - EV 70-Op 130 - BF 49 404 - CD 25 588 - BE 65
71 - Op(CA 79) 135 - AM 32 455 - AM 18 593 - BF 42
84 - BD 64 136 - BF 49 459 - Helgoland 594 - AM 25
85 - BE 57 154 - DF 56 504 - CF 12 653 - BF 57
86 - v. Lorient 155 - BF 50 505 - Op(Freetown) 654 - BE 55
87 - BF 50 158 - BD 77 552 - CA 63 701 - AE 50
94 - BB 71 160 - Op(am. Küste) 553 - AF 77 753 - BF 60
105 - Op(CA) 161 - CE 43 569 - AE 99 754 - CB 21
109 - BF 60 201 - BF 60 571 - CC 12 A - CC 35
123 - CA 98 202 - CC 54-Op 572 - CD 28
124 - CA 97 203 - BC 80 575 - BF 81
On Return Passage: U 135 - 455 - 594 - 701 - 569 - 553 - 593 - 753 - 87
- 124 - 332 - 404 - 587 - 94 - 588 - 155 - 158 - 126 - 653 - 504 - 129 - 161
- 67.
Sailed: U 252 - Kiel; U 402 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: U 753 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 587 heard a fast convoy in BE 1970 on course 2000, and came in
sight of same at 0800 in BE 4612. Course south, speed 13 knots.
2) U 701, up till now a member of Group York, reports strong sea and
air patrol in area AE 50 (off Seydisfjord). Probably unloading place in
Fjord.
Sunk: 1 freighter of 1,500 BRT, 1 patrol vessel, 2 A/S vessels.
Nothing sighted in Shetlands-Faroes area, numerous drifting mines.
3) U 594 heard under-water explosions singly and in progression
between 12-2100 on 25.3 in AM 24.
b) None.
c) SOS from steamer "Carolyn" (3,209 BRT) in CA 9573. Fore part of
ship ablaze, torpedo attack completed.
SSS from "Hamlin F. McCormick" (3,337 BRT) in CA 7695.
- 144 -
---------------------------------------------------
---------------

27.March 1942.

I. U 66 - CF 54 U 130 - BF 72 U 504 - BE 87 U 701 - AE 86

67 - BE 87 135 - AM 42 505 - Op(Freetown) 754 - CB 27
68 - EU 90 154 - DF 84 552 - CA 67 A - CC 52
IV. Current Operations: 71 - CA 79 155 - BF 60 553 - AM 32 402 - BF 60
a) None. 84 - BD 85 158 - BD 48 569 - AM 25
b) As U 203 established no contact with convoy, received orders to 85 - BE 48 160 - Op 571 - CB 65
continue passage for operations area. 86 - BF 57 161 - CE 37 572 - CC 39
c) Refueling of U 202 by UA arranged for 28.3 at 1230 hours in CC 87 - BF 60 201 - BF 49 575 - BF 49
4955. 94 - BD 49 202 - CC 49 582 - BE 47
d) U 552 - 701 - 569 (boats belonging to Group York) received orders for 105 - Op 203 - BC 76 587 - BD 46
return passage to west of France with all speed. 109 - BF 81 252 - Br'büttel 588 - BF 60
123 - CA 88 338 - CB 66 593 - BF 57
V. Reports of Success: 124 - CB 74 373 - Op 594 - AM 18
U 701, 1 freighter sunk - 1,500 BRT. 126 - BF 47 402 - BF 50 653 - BF 17
1 patrol ship - 2 A/S boats sunk. 129 - EE 49 404 - BD 57 654 - BE 43
455 - AM 45
VI. General: 459 - Helgoland
The Hitler decree that all submarine control stations shall occupy
positions from which they will be able to direct forces under their control
under any circumstances, means that our own control station will have to On Return Passage: U 135 - 455 - 594 - 701 - 569 - 553 - 593 - 753 - 87
move. Removal to station being prepared in Paris will be arranged. - 124 - 332 - 404 - 587 - 94 - 588 - 155 - 158 - 126 - 653 - 504 - 129 - 161
This regrettable step back where administration is concerned, since - 67.
the direct contact with the front, that is, the personal touch between
Commanding Officer and his operational boats and crews, will not be - 145 -
possible to anything like the same extent from Paris.
I intend to find out immediately which area can be considered
sufficiently secure and as soon as possible fit up and occupy a control
station as far forward as possible; at the moment I am considering area
around Angers.
597

Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 87 - Brest; U 588 - St. Nazaire; U 155 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Situation report U 373: No shipping observed in EA. On passage
out no patrol, on return both sea and air patrol confirmed.
Sunk:
17.3 in CB 3818 freighter of 5,000 BRT.
22.3 in CA 6593 "Thursa Bank" 5,570 BRT.
2) U 68 Guinea coast area. Apart from convoy reported (see 25.3 IIIa 4)
no traffic.
3) U 505, 15-19.3 in EU 40 and ET 60 right half. Medium air activity.
16.3 2 shots missed at freighter in ET 6690. 2 patrol vessels in (SU)
(probably EU) 4730. 20-25.3 in ET 20 no traffic. Plan to operate in EU
80.
4) U 503 reports 3 English destroyers and 10 MTBs in BF 5468 on
westerly course at 0720. It is probable that this formation was returning
from a mine-laying expedition off the French-Biscay coast.
b) None.
c) SSS and submarine sighting reports in DC 5334, CA 7381, and DB 98.
Addition to last report: submarine leaving long trail of oil (probably none
of our own boats in this square). At 1325 English aircraft was sent on to
submarine, which had been reported at 0906 in BE 4616.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy U 587: Boat received orders to shadow as long as possible.
Other boats in favorable position for this fast convoy to operate and report
so doing by short position signal. No reports were received. U 587 was
asked for position report during night. No reply.
b) - c) None.
d) Attack on St. Nazaire.
598
0250 28.3 - St. Nazaire reported by telephone landing operations by 20
enemy cruisers and destroyers.
0254 - St. Nazaire lay under heavy gun fire, under impression enemy
was about to carry out still larger operations with heavy units.
0331 - W/T message to all boats east of 290 west. Make for St. Nazaire
with all speed, enemy landing in progress.
- 146 -
Orders addressed for 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th and 10th submarine
flotillas.
Proceed according to instructions given in B.d.U.'s Most Secret 1035 of
14.3.1942. (Flotillas state readiness. Boats ready for departure to put to
sea immediately for battle in coastal waters; take measures to prevent
boats falling into enemy hands, if necessary sink them. Remove secret
document or arrange for their destruction as the case may be.) S.O. 7th
Submarine Flotilla reported soldiers of the 7th and 10th Submarine
Flotillas on way from La La Baule to La Rochebernard with all secret
documents belonging to all boats in the flotilla. Town in enemy hands.
Fighting in the harbor.
Received orders to get through to the submarine pens and organize a
defense.
From reports received later it became apparent it was only a raid
carried out by light forces.
Our own air reconnaissance was due to fly at dawn. Only single light
units were sighted.
 U 109, 130, 654, 85 and 582 immediately received orders to continue
westward passage, and at 0930 after conference with Group West this
order was extended to all outward bound boats. - 147 -
So far as can be assessed no damage was done to the working of the 7th
and 10th submarine flotillas. No losses, no boats damaged.
This attack on St. Nazaire underlines the necessity of removing the
B.d.U. control station to a less dangerous position. Certainly the control
station has been safeguarded in the same way as a base for some time,
with barbed wire, light weapons and attached (local defense) company, but
in spite of this it would not have been equal to a raid carried out with
similar strength as that on St. Nazaire.
The removal to Paris will be hastened accordingly. 126 - BF 55 373 - CB 44 653 - BF 54
129 - CE 53 404 - BD 55 654 - BE 41
V. Reports of Success: 130 - BF 95 455 - AM 78 701 - AM 12
U 373 2 ships sunk, together 10,570 BRT. 459 - Helgoland
504 - BE 89
VI. General: None.

--------------------------------------------------- On Return Passage: U 373 - 124 - 332 - 129 - 161 - 158 - 94 - 404 - 587
--------------- - 504 - 67 - 653 - 126 - 593 - 455 - 135 - 594 - 569 - 701 - 553.
Sailed: U 593 - St. Nazaire.
28.March 1942. Entered Port: U 752 - La Pallice.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

I. U 66 - CF 72 U 135 - AM 48 U 505 - Op(Freetown) U 754 - CB 17
67 - BE 89 136 - BE 62 552 - Op area A - CC 49 III. Reports on the Enemy:
68 - EU 90 154 - BF 78 553 - AM 26 402 - BF 58 a) U 71 petrol tanker of 7,000 BRT sunk in CA 7992 on 26.3.
71 - CA 79 158 - BD 57 569 - AM 17 U 160 sank armed coastal freighter or patrol boat of 1,500 BRT in CA
84 - BD 37 160 - Op area 571 - CB 55 8454 on 27.3.
85 - BD 69 161 - BE 89 572 - CC 29 U 105 sank tanker "Narragansett" 10,389 BRT in CB 7779 on 24.3.
86 - BF 45 201 - BF 47 575 - BE 92 Tanker of 7,000 BRT, probably "Scott Isle" class on 26.3. Also freighter
94 - BD 58 202 - CC 49 582 - BD 68 of 4,000 BRT in DC 3126, though sinking a matter of doubt.
105 - Op(CA) 203 - BC 77 587 - BD 46 ? U 754 tanker of 10,000 BRT sunk in BB 8631 on 23.3. Tanker was on
109 - BF 71 252 - Helgoland 593 - BF 60 course for Cape Race.
123 - Op area 332 - CC 46 594 - AM 42 U 553 Situation report: In AM strong sea and air patrol only on 11.3,
124 - CB 84 otherwise nothing sighted in vicinity of coast. In area AF 17 between 12
599
and 26.3 medium air activity, drifting mines. Bad weather, no fix for 12
days. ---------------------------------------------------
---------------
b) None.
c) SSS report from cable ship "Worseman" 1,844 BRT in DO 69 (not a 29.March 1942.
German submarine).
SSS from unknown ship in DB 3660.
Submarine warning: according to American report "Ocana" drifting in I. U 66 - CE 98 U 126 - BF 60 U 332 - CC 55 U 572 - CC 27
CB 2441 (boats received report). 67 - BF 49 129 - CE 39 373 - CB 54 575 - BE 59
d) None. 68 - EU 86 130 - CF 36 402 - BF 49 582 - BD 83
71 - CA 76 135 - BE 33 404 - BD 69 587 - BE 56
IV. Current Operations: 84 - CD 76 136 - BE 62 455 - BF 67 594 - BF 57
a) - b) None. 85 - BD 85 154 - DQ 35 459 - Helgoland 653 - BF 60
c) U 582 received detailed instructions for homeward escort of "Rio 86 - BE 69 158 - BF 54 504 - BE 96 654 - BD 63
Grande" meeting point CD 6579 on 3.4. Boat to wait there until 7.4. 94 - BD 92 160 - Op(CA 81) 505 - Op(Freetown) 701 - AM 01
d) None. 105 - CA 99 161 - CF 22 552 - Op(CA 57) 752 - BF 67
109 - BE 92 201 - BE 65 553 - AM 74 754 - CA 67
V. Reports of Success: 123 - CA 87 202 - CC 49 569 - AM 48 A - CC 49
U 71 petrol tanker 7,000 BRT sunk. 124 - CB 91 203 - CC 11 571 - CB 46
252 - Helgoland
- 148 -

On Return Passage: U 373 - 124 - 332 - 129 - 161 - 158 - 94 - 404 - 587
- 504 - 67 - 455 - 135 - 594 - 569 - 701 - 553.
Sailed: U 576 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: U 126 - Lorient.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

U 160 armed coastal freighter 1,500 BRT sunk. a) - b) None.
U 105 2 ships 17,309 BRT sunk. c) Submarine sighted in ET 68 and CA 84. Unknown ship sent SSS in
U 105 1 ship 4,000 BRT, sinking doubtful. CA 84, also English steamer "Hertford" (11,785 tons); ship was torpedoed
U 754 1 ship 10,000 BRT sunk. in CB 27.
d) None.
VI. General: None.
600
IV. Current Operations: 30.March 1942.
a) - c) None.
d) Boats received details of areas endangered by mines, caused by the
exploding of an English destroyer off St. Nazaire with captured material I. U 66 - CF 95 U 129 - CF 22 U 332 - CC 65 U 575 - BE 94
aboard. 67 - BF 64 130 - CF 37 373 - CB 64 576 - BF 64
Area 1: 68 - EU 86 135 - BF 41 402 - BF 47 582 - BD 88
Between 470 N - 50 30 mins. W, 71 - CA 76 136 - BE 53 404 - BE 48 587 - BE 66
470 30 mins. N - 50 30 mins. W, 84 - CC 66 154 - DQ 53 455 - BF 60 654 - BD 53
470 40 mins. - 70 20 mins. W, 85 - BD 75 158 - BF 45 459 - AN 93 701 - AM 48
480 20 mins. N - 70 20 mins. W 86 - BE 67 160 - CA 84 504 - BF 73 594 - BF 60
94 - BE 47 161 - BE 97 505 - EU 71 653 - Lorient
- 149 - 105 - CA 99 201 - BE 56 552 - CA 57 752 - BF 57
109 - BE 83 202 - CC 49 553 - BE 33 754 - CA 54
123 - CA 87 203 - CB 31 569 - AM 78 A - CC 49
124 - 252 - 571 -
572 -

On Return Passage: U 373 - 124 - 332 - 129 - 161 - 158 - 94 - 404 - 587
- 504 - 67 - 135 - 569 - 701 - 553.
Sailed: U 108 - Lorient; U 333 - La Pallice.
Area 2: Entered Port: U 655 - Brest; 455 - 594 - St. Nazaire; U 67 - Lorient.
Between 480 N - 90 W
490 N - 100 W II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

V. Reports of Success: None. III. Reports on the Enemy:

VI. General:
From 29.3 in the morning onwards control station in Paris will be
ready to take over control with Chief of Operational Division, 2 staff
officers and after transference of practically all material. Switch-over is
scheduled for 1000 hours on 30.3.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
a) 1) U 105, CA 98 and 99 and DC 31 and 32 crossroads of medium
sometimes heavy shipping traffic proceeding in SW-NE and SE-NW
directions.
2) U 372 reports tanker in CC 4671, course 900, speed 17 knots.
3) U 68 sighted convoy at 1000, 5 steamers, speed 9 knots. Convoy
dispersed at 1330 in ET 9683, and proceeded on individual courses to
Capetown.
b) None.
c) Radio intercept reports:

601
 American tanker "Mana" reported submarine attack, probably in AC 68
(Arctic).
SSS from British "Sarpedon" 11,321 BRT in DC 1137.
d) None.
- 150 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) - c) None.
d) 1) U 202 received 30 cbm oil and 2 weeks provisions from UA.
2) Boats have been warned of increased danger from English
submarines and English minefields in the Bay of Biscay - information
found aboard an English destroyer.
V. Reports of Success:
U 68 "Muncaster Castle" - 5,880 BRT.
VI. General:
From 1000 hours Paris took over control, Commanding Officer
arrived in Paris in the evening after visiting St. Nazaire.
The transfer took place quickly and without a hitch, it could not
even have been noticed by the boats at sea. B.d.U.'s control W/T station
remained in Kernevel. The delay in radio messages caused by teleprinter
transmission runs at about 10 minutes, and will be reduced asa soon as the
order transmission system has been worked in.
602
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
31.March 1942.
I. U 66 - CE 89 U 124 - CC 93 U 252 - AN 34 U 571 - Op(CA 50)
68 - ET 96 129 - BE 89 332 - CD 18 572 - CC 46
71 - Op(amerikan Küste) 130 - CF 55 333 - BF 67 575 - BE 85
84 - CC 65 135 - BF 40 373 - CB 64 576 - BF 57
85 - BC 96 136 - BE 51 402 - BF 68 582 - CE 15
86 - BE 58 154 - DE 79 404 - BE 47 654 - BD 78
94 - BE 49 158 - BF 64 459 - AN 34 701 - BF 40
105 - CB 79 160 - Op(am. Küste) 504
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 April 1942
PG30306a
1.April 1942.
I. U 66 - DG 16 U 124 - CD 81 U 252 - AN 23 U 571 - Op(CA 50)
68 - ET 82 129 - BE 94 332 - CD 23 572 - CB 66
71 - Op(am. Küste) 130 - CF 73 333 - BF 57 575 - BE 76
84 - CC 58 135 - BF 54 373 - BC 44 576 - BF 48
85 - BC 97 136 - BE 51 402 - BE 59 582 - CE 17
86 - BE 49 154 - DP 34 404 - BF 44 654 - CD 31
94 - BF 54 160 - Op(am. Küste) 459 - AN 28 701 - BF 60
98 - BF 67 161 - BF 54 504 - BF 64 752 - DE 69
105 - CB 89 201 - BE 45 505 - Op(Freetown) 754 - Op(CA 50)
 108 - BF 57 202 - CB 65 552 - Op(CA 50) A - CC 48 -1-
109 - BE 73 203 - CB 15 553 - BF 64
123 - Op(am. Küste 569 - BF 57

On Return Passage: U 94 - 105 - 124 - 129 - 135 - 161 - 332 - 373 - 404
- 504 - 553 - 569 - 701.
Sailed: U 701 - Brest; U 553 - St. Nazaire; U 504 - Lorient.
Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. I. Total number in commission (excluding foreign boats):
On 1.3.1942 271
III. Reports on the Enemy: Commissioned in March 17
a) - b) None. 288
c) 1) Position of tanker "Ocama" (6,256 BRT) in CB 1699. S.S. Losses in March 4
"Goderich" searching in the same area. Ship is to be towed to 284
"Shelburne". *Losses in March:
2) Torpedo report from "Loch Don" (5,400 BRT) in CB 8345. U 133 Mohr, experienced boat with new C.O. Hit own minefield off
3) SSS reports in CA 8148 and CA 7698 (tanker "Albert E. Watts" Salmis. Total loss.
(7,138 BRT). Tanker "Liebre" fired on by U-boat in DC 1130. U 656 Kroening, new boat, last report 24.2 west Atlantic, nothing known
4) Warning to shipping: There are obstructions at the entrances to St. of cause of loss.
Thomas. Ships are to enter only by day. U 587 Borcherdt, lost presumably at the end of March in the central
d) None. Atlantic during a convoy attack.
U 503 Gericke, last report 10.3 from central Atlantic (damage to upper
IV. Current Operations: deck), nothing known of cause of loss.
a) None.
b) U 154 operations area: St. Thomas - Mona - Windwards Passage.
c) U 582 at rendezvous for convoy duty.
d) None. II. Boats are distributed as follows: (boats in Heligoland counted as front-
line):
V. Reports of Success: None. II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXD Xb XIV

VI. General Situation: Front-line: - - 89 1 29 - - 1 120 plus UA

Trials: - - 70 5 23 1 3 3 107
U-boats as of 1.4.1942 Training: 40 4 11 - 2 - - - 57

603
 40 4 170 6 54 1 3 4 284
2.April 1942.

III. During March:

total number of boats increased by 13 boats I. U 66 - DG 42 U 124 - CD 83 U 332 - CD 32 U 576 - BE 69
number of front-line boats increased by 9 " 68 - ET 51 129 - BF 71 333 - BF 48 582 - CD 68
Number of boats on trials increased by 4 " 71 - Op(am. Küste) 130 - CF 78 373 - CC 54 654 - CD 22
The number of training boats etc. has remained the same. 84 - CC 48 135 - BF 50 402 - BE 81 752 - BE 67
85 - CD 21 136 - BE 42 404 - BF 49 754 - Op(CA 50)
86 - BE 47 154 - DP 52 459 - AF 79 A - CC 48
IV. The front-line boats were distributed as follows on 1.4.42: 94 - BF 50 160 - Op(am. Küste) 505 - Op(Freetown)
Atlantic 80 98 - BF 49 161 - BF 50 552 - Op(CA 50)
Mediterranean 20 105 - CB 99 201 - BD 66 569 - BF 50
Norway area 20 108 - BF 48 202 - CB 58 571 - Op(CA 50)
109 - BE 71 203 - CA 39 572 - CB 91
123 - Op(am. Küste) 252 - AF 71 575 - BD 83
V. During March in the Atlantic:
There was a daily average of 47.7 boats at sea, of which 9 were
operational in operations areas. On Return Passage: U 373 - 161 - 129 - 68 - 94 - 404 - 332 - 124 - 135
34.7 on their way out . - 105 - 569.
20.3 on return passage. Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 161 - Lorient; U 94 - St. Nazaire; U 569 - La Pallice.
VI. During March the following boats put to sea:
From home: 14 boats II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
From western France 28 boats
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 402 reported at 2130 2 destroyers on a NE course at high speed in
BE 7652.
-2- b) None.
c) 1) SSS from British S.S. "Foundation Aranmore" from CB 12, from
S.S. "Brilliant" (9,132 BRT) in CA 7985, "Esso Augusta" (11,650 BRT) in
CA 79, "Walter Jennings" (9,564 BRT) in CA 8173, "Atwater" (2,438
BRT) off Cape Henery, "Nevada" (1,685 BRT) in CA 7349 (being fired
on).

604
 2) Admiralty warning for CB 8343. A/c attacked U-boat with D/C's at 109 - BD 99 203 - Op(CA 50) 575 - BD 84
1640. No exact position. SSS from S.S. David in CA 5564. Being 123 - Op(am. Küste) 252 - AE 69 576 - BE 64
attacked by U-boat. 332 - CE 12
d) None.

IV. Current Operations: On Return Passage: U 373 - 105 - 124 - 332 - 404 - 68 - 129.
a) - b) None. Sailed: - . -
c) U 582's convoy operation probably according to plan. Entered Port: U 135 - Brest; U 404 - St. Nazaire.
d) None.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
VI. General: None. a) 1) U 108 sighted a light cruiser at 1738 in BE 94, course 00, high
speed.
-3- 2) Situation report from U 552:
No traffic for 3 days off Cape Cod. Very heavy traffic by day between
Cape May and Cape Henery along the buoys, stopped at night. Effective
sea and air patrol. High pressure weather conditions for 8 days. 25.3
"Ocana" (6,256 BRT) torpedoed in CB 1363. Ship burnt out. 3.4 sank
"Atwater" (2,438 BRT) in CA 5714 by gunfire.
U 71 sank a tanker of 8,000 BRT 31.3 in CA 6995 and a freighter of
6,000 BRT in CA 6997. Total sunk: 35,200 BRT.
U 373 reported an unsuccessful attack on a tanker in CC 6229.
b) None.
3.April 1942. c) Admiralty warning for CE 4784.
SSS: Motor tanker "Ensis" (6,207 BRT) in CB 7588, S.S. "Delsud"
(4,982 BRT) in CA 7625. SOS from S.S. "Otho" (4,839 BRT). Torpedoed
I. U 66 - DF 69 U 124 - CD 93 U 333 - BE 92 U 582 - CD 65 in CA 8619. Warning for this square. "Esso Augusta" (11,237 BRT)
68 - ET 15 129 - BF 57 373 - CC 54 654 - CD 15 attacked by U-boat in CA 76. SSS: tanker "Ohio" (9,625 BRT) in CA
71 - Op(CA) 130 - DG 34 402 - BE 76 752 - BE 58 5747, "Craiglea" (?) in CB 75.
84 - CC 84 135 - BF 60 404 - BF 64 754 - Op(CA 50) English a/c attacked a U-boat with D/C's in BF 57 (U 129).
85 - CD 14 136 - BD 63 459 - AF 78 A - CC 48
86 - BD 68 154 - DP 49 505 - Op(Freetown) IV. Current Operations:
98 - BF 48 160 - Op(am. Küste) 552 - Op(CA 50) a) - b) None.
105 - CC 76 201 - BD 64 571 - Op(CA 50) c) U 582's convoy operation probably according to plan.
108 - BF 92 202 - CB 79 572 - CB 81
605
-4- 108 - BE 86 202 - CA 99 571 - Op(CA 50)
109 - BD 97 203 - Op(CA 50) 572 - CB 72

On Return Passage: U A - 373 - 129 - 105 - 71 - 124 - 332 - 68.

Sailed: U 125 - 507 - Lorient; U 406 - 437 - 590 - Kiel; U 564 - Brest.
Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

d) 1) U 252 on a special operation (Landing and agent in Iceland). Has III. Reports on the Enemy:
been ordered to proceed through Denmark Straits afterwards. a) Situation from U 571:
2) UA has delivered 20 cbm. fuel to U 84 and is starting on a protracted Multi-unit hydrophones bad, strong spontaneous noises. Operation
return passage to Bergen. therefore difficult in shallow water. Requests attacking area CA 98-99 and
DC 31-32.
V. Reports of Success: Sunk: "Hertford", 11,800 BRT, in CB 2753, cargo of meat and butter.
U 552 - 1 ship - 6,256 BRT - burnt out b) None.
U 552 - 1 ship - 2,438 BRT - sunk c) "Ensis" fired on by U-boat in CB 7985. "Argen", 6,952 BRT, chased
U 71 - 2 ships - 14,000 BRT - sunk. by U-boat in DC 1251. SSS from "Chester Sun", 9,097 BRT, in DC 1253.
"Maunacca", 6,064 BRT, CA 5191, "Rhode Island", 8,562 BRT, in DC
VI. General: None. 1528.
Torpedoed: "Evelyn", 3,141 BRT, in CA 7653, "Westermore", 5,775
--------------------------------------------------- BRT, in FF 3150.
--------------- SSS: U-boat warnings for CA 51 - CA 76 - DC 12.
d) None.
4.April 1942.
-5-

I. U 66 - DF 91 U 123 - Op(am. Küste) U 252 - AF 47 U 575 - BD 72

68 - EK 71 124 - CE 73 332 - CE 22 576 - BE 55
71 - CA 99 129 - BE 50 333 - BE 83 582 - CD 65
84 - CC 48 130 - DG 29 373 - CC 38 654 - CC 39
85 - CC 34 136 - BD 61 402 - BE 74 752 - BE 49
86 - BD 59 154 - DP 74 459 - AM 32 754 - Op(CA 50)
98 - BE 67 160 - Op(am. Küste) 505 - Op(Freetown) A - CC 48
105 - CC 86 201 - BE 58 552 - CA 73(Op)
606
 IV. Current Operations:
a) None. III. Reports on the Enemy:
b) U 572 given freedom of action. a) U 505 reports situation:
c) U 582's convoy operation probably according to plan. Medium amount of traffic from and to east and south round Cape
d) None. Palmas, much dispersed, at a distance of 150 sea miles on 28.3. A/c
bombs in ET 9152. D/C hunt on 29.3.
V. Reports of Success: Successes: 3.4 in EU 9781 2 hits on escorted freighter "Westermore",
U 571 - 1 ship - 11,800 BRT - sunk. 5,775 BRT. Probably sunk. 4.4 in FF 2245 "Alpacca", 5,759 BRT. Total:
25,454 BRT.
VI. General: None. U 123 situation report (badly distorted W/T message):
In CB 60 and 80, CA 90 medium amount of single ship traffic, course
--------------------------------------------------- NE and SW. CA 79 - 88 single ship traffic in a westerly direction.
--------------- Operation difficult owing to bright moonlight nights. After torpedoing her,
surprised by U-boat decoy ship in CA 9578 with D/C's and gunfire.
5.April 1942. Decoy ship sank after second hit. Midshipman Holza dead.
b) A/c sighted 3 English torpedo boats and 4 lighters in BF 8699, course
3100, 15 knots.
I. U 66 - DF 85 U 123 - Op(am. Küste) U 203 - Op(CA 50) U 507 -
BF 60 -6-
68 - EJ 63 124 - CE 55 252 - AE 29 552 - Op(CA 50)
71 - CB 79 125 - BF 50 332 - CE 32 564 - off Lorient
84 - CB 67 129 - BF 60 333 - BE 81 571 - Op(CA 50)
85 - CC 25 130 - DG 51 373 - CD 17 572 - Op(CA)
86 - BD 58 136 - BD 52 402 - BD 95 575 - BC 96
98 - BE 58 154 - ED 32 406 - Br'buttel 576 - BE 46
105 - BC 73 160 - Op(am. Küste) 437 - " 582 - CE 15
108 - BE 84 201 - BD 57 459 - AM 24 590 - Br'buttel
109 - BD 88 202 - Op(am. Küste) 505 - Op(Freetown) 654 - CC 39
- 752 - BE 47 754 - Op(CA 50) U A - CC 51 c) "Catahoula", 5,030 BRT, torpedoed in DC 7470. Torpedoed ship in
CA 7653.
SSS: from unidentified unit in CA 9599, CA 6472, DC 1253,
On Return Passage: U A - 373 - 129 - 105 - 71 - 124 - 332 - 68. "Phoenix", 5,731 BRT in CA 7582.
Sailed: - . - d) None.
Entered Port: U 129 - Lorient.
IV. Current Operations:
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. a) - b) None.
607
 c) U 582's convoy operation probably according to plan.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 505 - 2 ships of 11,534 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
6.April 1942.
I. U 66 - DR 21 U 124 - CE 63 U 333 - BE 72 U 572 - Op(CA)
68 - EK 11 125 - BF 49 373 - CD 17 575 - BC 97
71 - DB 86 130 - DG 48 402 - BD 86 576 - BE 44
84 - CB 58 136 - BC 92 406 - Helgoland 582 - BD 97
85 - CB 38 154 - DG 32 437 - Helgoland 590 - AN 91
86 - BD 73 160 - Op(am. Küste) 459 - AM 16 654 - CC 38
98 - BE 49 201 - BD 48 505 - Op(Freetown) 752 - BD 68
105 - BC 73 202 - Op(am. Küste) 507 - BF 49 754 - Op(CA 50)
108 - CF 21 203 - Op(CA 50) 552 - Op(CA 50) A - CC 51
109 - BD 79 252 - AE 27 564 - BF 50 -
123 - Op(am. Küste) 332 - CF 13 571 - Op(CA 50) -
On Return Passage: U A - 373 - 105 - 71 - 124 - 332 - 68.
Sailed: U 506 - Lorient.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 108 reported 2 steamships, 1 destroyer at 1557 CF 1398, convoy
of several steamships and destroyers at 1843 in CF 1392, northerly course,
608
speed 6 knots. Did not attack because of weather. There are about 3 boats
in favorable positions for an attack on this convoy. As experience has
shown that operations with small numbers of boats are impractical,
uneconomical and dangerous for individual attacking boats, U 108 and
nearby boats were ordered to proceed on their westward passage.
2) Situation report from U 754:
Conditions S. of New York unfavorable for operations owing to
windless bright full-moon nights. Further successes:
-7-
31.3 CA 4997 tug with 3 lighters. 1.4 CA 7381 freighter of 7,000
BRT. 3.4 CA 6818 freighter 5,000 BRT. 6.4 large tanker (call-sign
BMFW), estimated 10,000 BRT.
3) U 202 reported submerged submarine in CA 98. Did not behave like
one of our own. Triple miss at tanker. Pistol failed.
b) None.
c) SSS: in CA 5741, DC 1253, CA 5741. S.S. "Cripnessen" in DC 1232.
Unidentified steamship fired on with M/G by U-boat in CB 9567.
"Delwalle" 5,032 BRT torpedoed in CA 9984.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
c) U 582's convoy operation probably according to plan.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
 U 754: 1 tug with 3 lighters sunk -8-
3 ships 22,000 BRT.

VI. General: None.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

7.April 1942.

damaged by gunfire. Foredeck on fire. No further observation made

I. U 66 - DQ 53 U 124 - CE 63 U 333 - BD 93 U 571 - Op(CA 50) on account of D/C's from S/M chaser.
68 - EK 11 125 - BF 71 373 - CD 28 572 - Op(CA) U 84 sank "Nemanja", 5,226 BRT, in CB 43 on 8.4.
71 - CB 96 130 - BF 96 402 - BD 84 575 - BC 88 U 202 sank a freighter of 6,000 BRT on 1.4 in CB 93. Probably
84 - CB 72 136 - BC 92 406 - AN 91 576 - BD 65 "Lochden", 5,400 BRT.
85 - CB 28 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 437 - AN 91 582 - BE 48 b) None.
86 - BD 84 160 - Op(am. Küste) 459 - AM 17 590 - AN 34 c) SSS: for CA 9967. From "Steel Worker", 5,687 BRT in CA 2934.
98 - BE 47 201 - BC 69 505 - Op(Freetown) 654 - CC 28 Admiralty warning for CA 7932, DC 3226, CA 9987.
105 - BC 73 202 - CA 98 506 - BF 60 752 - BD 59 Tanker torpedoed in CA 7930.
108 - CF 13 203 - Op(CA 50) 507 - BF 71 754 - CA 98(Op) "St. Zeno", 608 BRT, attacking U-boat.
109 - CD 32 252 - AE 27 552 - Op(CA 50) UA - CC 37 All U.S.A. war ships in the vicinity are to support the attack.
123 - DB 64(Op) 332 - CF 22 564 - BF 57 - d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

On Return Passage: U A - 373 - 105 - 71 - 124 - 332 - 68. a) None.
Sailed: U 162 - Lorient; U 352 - St. Nazaire. b) U 66 allocated attacking area ED, eastern third, and EE, western third
Entered Port: - . - and an area ranging 200 sea miles around Port of Spain.
U 130 the area ranging 200 sea miles around Curacao. Tank
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. installations are to be bombarded as soon as possible.
c) U 582's convoy operation probably according to plan.
III. Reports on the Enemy: d) None.
a) U 571 sank tanker "Koll", 10,044 BRT, on 6.4 in CA 9992. Medium
air in that area. V. Reports of Success:
U 123 sank "Muskogee", 7,034 BRT, tanker "Empire Steel", 8,150 BRT. U 571 1 ship 10,0044 BRT sunk
"Libere", 7,000 BRT, heavily U 123 2 ships 15,184 BRT sunk, 1 tanker damaged.
U 202 1 ship 5,249 BRT sunk
609
U 84 1 ship 5,226 BRT sunk
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
8.April 1942.
I. U 66 - DO 54 U 125 - BE 95 U 352 - BF 50 U 572 - Op(CB)
68 - DT 69 130 - DF 97 373 - CD 38 575 - CC 31
71 - CC 76 136 - BC 83 402 - BD 75 576 - BD 56
84 - CB 43 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 406 - AN 31 582 - BE 86
85 - CB 52 160 - Op(am. Küste) 437 - AN 31 590 - AN 22
86 - BD 75 162 - BF 50 459 - AL 39 654 - CC 19
98 - BD 68 201 - BC 67 505 - Op(Freetown) 752 - BD 87
105 - BC 82 202 - DC 32 Op 506 - BF 54 754 - Op(CA 50)
108 - CE 32 203 - Op(CA 50) 507 - BE 95 A - CD 14
109 - CD 23 252 - AD 29 552 - Op(CA 50)
123 - Op(am. Küste) 332 - BF 44 564 - BF 45
124 - CE 63 333 - BD 94 571 - Op(CB 77)
On Return Passage: U A - 373 - 105 - 71 - 124 - 332 - 68.
Sailed: U 566 - Brest.
-9-
610
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 202 reported miss on a tanker in DC 23. Starting return passage.
2) U 154 sank a 4,000 tonner in DO 72 on 4.4, a 6,000 tonner in DO 74
on 5.4 (Catokula, 5,030 BRT). Both auxiliary war ships or transports.
Strong air patrol in Mona Passage. Intends to operate in Windward
Passage.
b) None.
c) U-boat warning for CB 41.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Square of approach for U 507 and U 125 is DD 85. It is intended to
operate these boats from the Florida Straits north of Cuba to Windward
Passage. On their way there, boats are to observe density of traffic in DD
and DC.
2) Boats in the American coast area are to have freedom of action
according to fuel and state of defense.
In order to make full use of the present favorable conditions for attack
(new moon) they are ordered to start their return passage without fuel
reserves. In emergency they can be supplied from tanker - 459.
c) U 582 reported from CD 57: Rio Grande not encountered. Am
proceeding westward.
This is the third time that a U-boat has failed to contact a blockade
breaker. This is the more regrettable as the fighting power of the boat for
further operations has been weakened considerably, and in most cases
completely reduced owing to consumption of fuel and provision.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
 U 154 - 2 ships - 10,000 BRT

VI. General: None. On Return Passage: U A - 202 - 373 - 105 - 71 - 124 - 332 - 68.
Sailed: - . -
--------------------------------------------------- Entered Port: - . -
---------------
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
9.April 1942.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 754 encountered strong opposition from the air in CA 99 on 7.4.
I. U 66 - DQ 47 U 125 - CG 14 U 352 - BF 57 U 571 - Op(CA 50) A/c bombs. Total: 35,000 BRT. Starting return passage.
68 - DT 39 130 - DR 22 373 - CE 18 572 - Op(CA) b) None.
71 - CC 83 136 - BC 84 402 - BC 96 575 - CC 24 c) U-boat warnings: CA 9399 - DB 56 - DB 6467 - CB 4141 - DC 1211 -
84 - Op(CA) 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 406 - AN 28 576 - BD 85 CB 7177.
85 - CB 42 160 - Op(am. Küste) 437 - AN 23 582 - CD 48 "Esparta", 3,365 BRT, torpedoed in DB 64. "Albert E. Watts", 7,138
86 - BC 99 162 - BF 54 459 - AL 57 590 - AF 77 BRT, DC 1214. Ship on fire.
98 - BD 59 201 - BC 58 505 - Op(Freetown) 654 - CB 63 SSS: "Carcabulle", 5,030 BRT, in DB 5665.
105 - BC 91 506 - BF 72 752 - BD 78 d) None.
108 - BE 97 754 - Op(CA 50)
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 564 - 566 - 352 - are to supply. Boats to steer for CB 99.
- 10 - 2) U 582 given attack area CB 80-90.
c) - d) None.

V. Reports of Success: None.

VI. General: None.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------
109 - CD 11 202 - DC 31 507 - BE 95 A - BC 89
123 - Op(am. Küste) 203 - Op(am. Küste) 552 - Op(CA 50) 10.April 1942.
124 - BF 50 252 - AD 82 564 - BE 67
332 - BF 50 566 - v. Lorient
333 - BD 85 I. U 66 - DP 91 U 125 - CF 37 U 352 - BF 48 U 571 - CB 74
611
 68 - DH 76 130 - DR 15 373 - CE 27 572 - Op(CA)
71 - CC 93 136 - BB 97 402 - BC 94 575 - CC 15
84 - Op(CA) 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 406 - AF 75 576 - BD 76
85 - Op(CA) 160 - DC 12 437 - AF 76 582 - CC 93
86 - BC 97 162 - BF 48 459 - AK 93 590 - AF 75
98 - BD 94 201 - BC 73 505 - Op(Freetown) 654 - CB 61
105 - BC 93 202 - DD 11 506 - BE 93 752 - BC 99
108 - BD 87 203 - Op(am. Küste) 507 - BE 89 754 - CB 69
109 - CC 31 252 - AL 13 552 - Op(CA) A - AK 49
123 - Op(am. Küste) 332 - BF 60 564 - BE 82
124 - BF 60 333 - BD 76 566 - BF 55
- 11 -
On Return Passage: U A - 754 - 202 - 373 - 105 - 71 - 124 - 332 - 68.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 124 - Lorient; U 332 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 552 situation: Heavy traffic from Cape Henery to Lookout.
Branching off from Hatteras from SE to SSE. Favorable attacking
position: "Wimbel Shoals" and "Raleigh Bay". Important coastal traffic
escorted by escort vessels (without Asdic).
Further successes: 5.4 CA 7652 tanker 10,000 BRT, full. 7.4 CA 7959
"British Splendor", 7,138 BRT, 9.4 DC 1163 tanker 8,000 BRT, full. 10.4
612
DC 1245 tanker 10,000 BRT full. 7.4 CA 7991 freighter 14,000 BRT
torpedoed, inside explosion heard soon after. Sinking not observed. All
ships escorted.
Total: 43,832 BRT sunk, plus 14,000 BRT torpedoed.
2) U 160 situation: Little different from U 552.
Further successes: 14.3 CA 8781 freighter 4,500 BRT. 1.4 CA 8776
freighter 6,000 BRT. 6.4 DC 1246 petrol tanker type "Gulf Pride", 12,510
BRT, blew up. 9.4 DC 1227 freighter 6,000 BRT
b) None.
c) SSS: in BB 79 - BB 76 - CA 76 - CA 3244 - CA 31 - DB 9140 - DB
4995 - DB 9182 - DC 1214 - CA 7931 (Garnet-Hulling 7,030 BRT)
Attack report CA 7933 - DC 1243. Burning ships sighted DC 11-12.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
c) It is intended to supply U 108 - 98 with fuel from U 459 in CB 90
about 20.4. U 459 has reported stocks of fuel to be delivered at this time:
500 cbm., own fuel stocks: 140 cbm.
V. Reports of Success:
U 552 - 4 ships - 35,138 BRT sunk, 1 ship - 14,000 BRT torpedoed.
U 160 - 4 ships - 29,010 BRT sunk.
VI. General: None.
- 12 -
 11.April 1942. c) SSS: in CA 34 - CA 79 - DC 22 - DC 1256 - EC 2588 - EC 24 - DB
67 - DB 36.
Tanker on fire in DC 1217. Sinking report from Dutch steamer "Hebe"
I. U 66 - DP 85 U 130 - DP 52 U 402 - BC 88 U 575 - CB 38 in DB 3681, unidentified ship in about EU 40, American tanker
68 - DH 57 136 - CB 32 406 - AN 11 576 - BD 77 "Teimuse", 6,403 BRT, in DC 1162 (blew up). Torpedo report from
71 - CD 49 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 437 - AN 11 582 - CC 83 "Ulysses", 14,647 BRT in DC 1256.
84 - Op(CA) 160 - DC 13 459 - BD 97 590 - AE 99 d) None.
85 - Op(CA) 162 - BE 93 505 - Op(Freetown) 654 - CB 54
86 - CD 11 201 - BC 74 506 - BE 94 752 - CD 21 IV. Current Operations:
98 - BD 85 202 - CB 88 507 - CF 23 754 - CC 45 a) None.
105 - BD 73 203 - Op(am. Küste) 552 - DC 13 A - AK 58 b) U 333 is given new approach square CB 90. It is intended to supply
108 - CE 18 252 - AL 16 564 - BE 81 her from tanker.
109 - CD 48 333 - BD 74 566 - BF 50
123 - Op(am. Küste) 352 - BE 65 571 - Op(CA) - 13 -
125 - CF 52 373 - BE 48 572 - Op(CA)

On Return Passage: U A - 754 - 552 - 202 - 373 - 105 - 71 - 68.

Sailed: U 594 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy: c) - d) None.

a) 1) U 160 situation: Passenger freighter type "Antinore" 11,370 BRT
sunk. Left sinking after 3 hits, owing to a/c. (Probably "Ulysses", 14,400 V. Reports of Success:
BRT). Starting return passage. U 160 - 1 ship - 14,647 BRT sunk.
U 252 reported operation "Dana" (landing an agent in Iceland) carried U 252 - 1 ship - 2,000 BRT sunk.
out. North coast of Iceland free of ice, ice boundary in AD 2911.
Freighter 2,000 BRT sunk in AE 4112. VI. General: None.
UA has steered searching courses through CC 60 - BC 50 - AK 71.
Nothing seen. Returning to Bergen. ---------------------------------------------------
U 571 has had no traffic since 6.4 in CA 90 and CB 70. Intend to ---------------
supply with 25 cbm. and provisions for 2 weeks.
b) None. 12.April 1942.

613

I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 130 - DP 56 U 402 - CC 32 U 575 - CB 54
68 - BF 82 136 - CB 26 406 - AM 33 576 - CD 22
71 - CD 56 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 437 - AM 33 582 - CC 81
84 - Op(CA) 160 - DC 13 459 - BD 21 590 - AM 27
85 - Op(CA) 162 - CG 11 505 - Op(Freetown) 594 - BF 60
86 - CC 31 201 - BC 74 506 - BE 89 654 - CB 48
98 - BD 78 202 - CB 94 507 - CF 24 752 - CC 11
105 - BD 58 203 - Op(am. Küste) 552 - DC 31 754 - CC 43
108 - CD 38 252 - AK 62 564 - BE 72 A - AK 69
109 - CC 68 333 - BC 98 566 - BF 47
123 - Op(am. Küste) 352 - BE 59 571 - CB 71
125 - CF 49 373 - BE 57 572 - Op(CA)
On Return Passage: U A - 754 - 552 - 202 - 373 - 105 - 160 - 71 - 68.
Sailed: U 558 - Brest, U 69 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 203 situation: Off Hatteras heavy traffic, strong air patrol,
medium sea patrol.
Sunk: 3 tankers, 1 freighter - 36,000 BRT.
2) U 437 has observed destroyers patrolling in AE 9992.
b) None.
c) 1) SSS: DB 3652 - CB 17 - DB 97 - EC 2589 - CA 2699 - FB 58 - EC
25 - EC 24.
U-boat attack in DP 47 and FB 5865. "Stanvac-Melbourne" 10,444
BRT torpedoed (mine hit?) near DB 6361.
2) Attention of boats has been called to loading of troop transports and
war material in St. Juan and St. Thomas.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
614
U 203 - 4 ships - 36,000 BRT sunk.
- 14 -
VI. General:
The following situation in the American area emerges from U-boat
W/T messages and reports from C.O.'s who have returned:
Anti-S/M activity immediately under the coast has increased.
Destroyers, Coast Guard ships and escort vessels are patrolling the steamer
routes, sometimes ships are escorted by escort vessels in particularly
endangered areas (Hatteras). In spite of these measures, the successes of
U-boats have so far remained at the same level. Before the U-boat attack
on America was begun it was suspected that American anti-S/M activity
would be weak and inexperienced; this conjecture has been fully
confirmed. Anti-S/M vessels have no Asdic, some are equipped with
hydrophones. The crews are careless, inexperienced and little persevering
in a hunt. In several cases escort vessels, Coast Guard ships and
destroyers, having established the presence of a U-boat, made off instead
of attacking her. This can only be the only explanation of the fact that so
far no losses have occurred from D/C hunts in shallow water (20 meters).
Air activity has also increased considerably. Boats are forced by it
to remain submerged by day near the coast. On full-moon nights it is
dangerous owing to the numbers of aircraft involved and boats are forced
to transfer their attacking areas further out to sea.
On the whole however, the boat's successes are so great, that their
operation near the coast is further justified and will continue.
With regard to disposition on the coast, so far the boats have been
given freedom of action in all areas which their fuel stocks will allow them
to reach. With the appearance of the first U-tanker (U 459) the range and
operational endurance of the boats will be extended when they have been
supplied and the number of boats in operational areas will increase. This
will inevitably mean new allocation of attacking areas. If the stretches of
coast which the Americans have to defend are extended, they will need to
increase the number of anti-S/M vessels considerably. These anti-S/M
vessels cannot be raised as fast as all that, there will continue to be
particularly favorable points for attack and from time to time anti-S/M
vessels will of necessity have to be withdrawn from coastal stretches
which are specially defended. At least anti-S/M activity will not be
increased in the latter areas.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
13.April 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 125 - CE 93 U 373 - BE 65 U 571 -
Op(CA)
68 - BF 60 130 - DP 81 402 - CC 22 572 - Op(CA)
69 - BF 58 136 - CB 43 406 - AM 42 575 - CB 48
71 - CD 62 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 437 - AM 17 576 - CD 13
84 - Op(CA) 160 - CA 97 459 - BD 18 582 - CC 72
85 - CA 162 - CF 34 505 - Op(Freetown) 590 - AM 48
86 - CC 25 201 - CC 24 506 - CF 26 594 - BF 57
98 - CD 31 202 - CC 58 507 - CF 42 654 - CA 19
105 - BD 68 203 - CA 88 552 - CB 75 752 - CC 35
108 - CD 61 252 - AL 48 558 - off Lorient 754 - CC 29
109 - CC 83 333 - BC 89 564 - BD 92 A - AL 51
123 - Op(am. Küste) 352 - BE 57 566 - BE 68
- 15 -
615
On Return Passage: U 406 - 590 - 437 - 252 - UA - 754 - 552 - 202 -
373 - 105 - 160 - 71 - 68.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 68 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 123's situation report:
Form "Canaveral" to "Hatteras" all lights as in peace-time. Heavy
traffic in spurts. South-going traffic close under land inside the 20 meter
line, following the bays south of Cape Fear. North-bound traffic proceeds
5 sea miles east of a line Hetzel Shoals - St. John's lightship - Savannah
lightship and Frying Pan Shoals direct. There is an airfield near the south
mole of St. John's River. A lot of air activity here, with and without lights.
At night flares along steamer routes, good cooperation with destroyers by
means of searchlights. During a D/C hunt by destroyers, the enemy did
not stick with it and made off too soon. No Asdic, good listening
conditions. Boat is conditionally fit for return passage.
Further successes:
Off Jacksonville Beach full tanker"Schehezerade", 12,500 BRT, off
Brunswick buoy tanker type "Esso Balboa", 9,554 BRT, tanker type "W.B.
Walker", 10,468 BRT, off Hetzel Shoals buoy tanker 8,000 BRT. All
tankers full. As we were in shallow water, parts sticking up out of the
water were destroyed by gunfire. In addition, "Esparta" 3,365 BRT and a
passenger freighter 5,500 BRT. Total: 74,837 BRT sunk.
b) A/c sighted convoy consisting of 17 merchant ships and 2 destroyers in
AM 4965, course 600, medium speed.
 c) SSS: "Christobal", 10,021 BRT, in CA 9787 - DB 6747 further in CB
1735 - CA 6634.
Torpedo report: "Empire Progress", 5,249 BRT in CD 4320; "Zoeller
Lykes", 6,870 BRT in DP 47, ship on fire; "Delewalle" 5,032 BRT in EC
22, needs immediate assistance.
U-boat attack in DB 94 and DP 7147.
105 - BF 40 203 - CA 98 552 - CB 66 752 - CC 26
108 - CD 52 252 - AL 85 558 - BF 58 754 - CC 39
109 - CC 81 333 - CC 33 564 - BD 83 A - AL 02
123 - DB 66 352 - BD 48 566 - BE 5
125 - CE 83 373 - BF 44 571 - Op(CA)

IV. Current Operations: On Return Passage: U 406 - 590 - 437 - 252 - UA - 754 - 552 - 123 -
a) - d) None. 202 - 373 - 105 - 160 - 71.
Sailed: - . -
V. Reports of Success: Entered Port: - . -
U 123 - 6 ships - 49,387 BRT.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
VI. General: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
- 16 - a) 1) U 402 sank "Empire Progress" 5,249 BRT on 14.4 in square CC
2834.
2) U 505 situation: No traffic since 6.4 in EU and under the coast.
Neutrals only. Slow progress back to the north.
3) U 123 sighted several large tankers in DB 6336 with destroyer escort,
course 400, 12 knots.
4) U 572 fired 3 misses on 4.4 at tanker "Ensis". Tanker slightly
damaged in gun action. Boat driven off by air escort. Intends to operate
off Hatteras if it is possible to supply.
5) U 203 reported positions of sinkings:
14.April 1942. 10.4 CA 2938 tanker type "Schehezerade" 8,482 BRT with petrol.
11.4 DC 1175 "Delwalle" 5,032 BRT, DC 1177 "Stalvac-Melbourne"
10,440 BRT.
I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 130 - DO 99 U 402 - CC 16 U 572 - Fresh success 14.4 freighter of 5,000 BRT in CA 7968.
Op(CA) 6) U 252 sighted convoy of 5-10 vessels in BE 5584, 2 escort vessels
69 - BF 49 136 - CB 44 406 - AM 72 575 - CA 69 observed; course south, speed 10 knots. Boat was given freedom of action
71 - CE 27 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 437 - AM 44 576 - CD 11 for attack if conditions are favorable and is to move off before first light.
84 - Op(CA) 160 - CB 77 459 - BC 69 582 - CB 95 It is not intended to operate other boats against the convoy.
85 - Op(CA) 162 - CF 51 505 - Op(Freetown) 590 - BE 39 b) None.
86 - CC 16 201 - CC 14 506 - CF 19 594 - BF 48
98 - CD 22 202 - CC 67 507 - CE 67 654 - Op(CA) - 17 -
616
 I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 130 - ED 22 U 402 - CC 41 U 572 - CA
99(Op)
69 - BF 47 136 - CA 68 406 - BE 32 575 - Op(CA)
71 - CE 34 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 437 - BF 40 576 - CC 35
85 - Op(CA) 160 - Cb 76 459 - BC 94 582 - Op(CB)
86 - CC 17 162 - CF 45 505 - Op(ET 58) 590 - BF 40
98 - CD 13 201 - CB 38 506 - CE 63 594 - BE 69
105 - BF 60 202 - CD 44 507 - CE 82 654 - Op(CA)
c) SSS: in DB 9186 - CB 4414, DC 6212 - DB 6774 - DC 1138 - BA 108 - CD 46 203 - CA 87 552 - CC 42 752 - CC 38
9733. 109 - CC 75 252 - BF 50 558 - BF 57 754 - CD 15
Attack in about CA 79. 123 - DC 41 333 - CC 31 564 - BD 81 A - AM 17
A/c attacks on U-boat in BE 3923 (U 590). 125 - CE 84 352 - BD 69 566 - BE 59 -
d) None. 84 - Op(CA) 373 - BF 40 571 - Op(CA) -

IV. Current Operations:

a) None. On Return Passage: U 406 - 590 - 437 - 252 - UA - 754 - 552 - 123 -
b) U 109 in DB 60. U 108 in Florida Straits area after supplying. 202 - 373 - 105 - 160 - 71.
c) 1) First supply from U-tanker: U 108 on 18.4 in CC 5555. Second Sailed: U 103 - 106 - Lorient; U 751 - St. Nazaire.
with U 333 on 19.4 in CC 5743. Entered Port: U 105 - Lorient.
2) U 116 reported operation (laying experimental minefield in the
Skagerrak) carried out. Boat will proceed into the Atlantic after supplying II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
at Bergen, to deliver 200 cbm as tanker.
d) U 590 reported fairly heavy damage from a/c bomb hits in BE 3953. III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Situation report U 203 off Hatteras:
V. Reports of Success:
U 402 - 1 ship - 5,249 BRT. - 18 -
U 203 - freighter - 5,000 BRT.

VI. General: None.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

15.April 1942.

617
 Heavy traffic, mostly making for the bays, behind the 25 meter line. V. Reports of Success:
Usually pass the Capes in daylight. Approach buoys lit up, guarded by U 654 - 1 ship - 7,000 BRT.
anti-S/M vessels. Diamond Buoy is rounded very closely or passed on the
inside. Patrol numerically strong but entirely unpracticed. No (radar) VI. General:
location observed. A/c day and night, destroyers, fishing smacks. S/M On 15.4 3 months have elapsed since U-boats made their first
chaser type PC 451 has an unpleasant, flat silhouette. Valuable targets appearance on the east coast of America and since the weight of all U-boat
have air escort. Deterrent D/C's and a/c bombs, on one occasion flares. activity was transferred to that area.
Listening conditions very variable, but always greater range than through During this time 229 ships of 1,521,000 BRT have been reported
periscope. On account of murky water, a/c can hardly be seen at periscope sunk and 23 ships of 82,506 BRT damaged in the NOrth Atlantic alone, i.e.
depth. excluding sinkings in northern waters, in the Mediterranean and on
Situation report U 654:
Net barrage off Hatteras along 100 meter line from 35 degree north to
30 sea miles to the north. An extension to the south seems intended.
Black buoys and barrels. D/C's from escort vessel while submerging. - 19 -
Empire Lightening 7,000 BRT sunk.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: S.S. Greylock, 7,460 BRT in DC 27; further in DB
61 - CA 81 - DB 91 - CA 73 - DC 12 - CA 81 - DB 36 - ED 62.
SSS report: S.S. "Jean" 4,902 BRT in DB 91 further from DC 12 - BA
97.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) - c) None.
d) U 252 has been ordered to make a situation report, has not replied. It
is feared that the boat may have been lost at the convoy in BE 55.
Circumstances here were similar to these in the loss of U 82: the same sea
area, a south-bound convoy with apparently weak escort (5-10 vessels, 2
escort vessels identified), favorable weather conditions (new moon). Boat
was on return passage, this time with ample supplies of fuel and torpedoes. Missing Page
She had permission to attack only if conditions favorable, (to move off
before first light), and yet another boat is lost. I think it is possible that, in
this area, trough which a stream of west-bound U-boats passes, the English
sail a dummy convoy of special anti-S/M vessels. I have therefore
forbidden attacks on convoys in this area for the present.

618
 F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 30 April 1942

PG30306b

16.April 1942.

I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 125 - CE 77 U 373 - BF 57 UA - AM 23

69 - BE 92 130 - ED 19 402 - CB 65 571 - Op(CA)
71 - CF 12 136 - Op(CA) 406 - BE 63 572 - Op(CA)
84 - Op(CA) 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 437 - BF 60 575 - Op(CA)
85 - Op(CA) 160 - CB 59CE 68 459 - CC 33 576 - CC 26
86 - CB 38 162 - CB 55 505 - Op(Freetown) 582 - CB 95
- 20 - 98 - CC 33 201 - CD 19 506 - CE 67 590 - BF 60
103 - BF 58 202 - CA 97 507 - CE 76 594 - BE 94
106 - BF 58 203 - CA 97 552 - CC 28 654 - Op(CA)
108 - CD 47 252 - BE 65 558 - BF 57 751 - BF 58
109 - CB 95 333 - CC 28 564 - BF 79 752 - CC 28
123 - DC 25 352 - BD 67 566 - BE 58 754 - CD 22

On Return Passage: U 406 - 590 - 437 - 252 - UA - 754 - 552 - 123 -

c) that U-boat warfare must continue to be concentrated on the east 202 - 373 - 160 - 71.
coast of America as long as conditions of anti-S/M activity and Sailed: U 455 - St. Nazaire.
possibilities of successes remain at all the same as they are at present. Entered Port: U 437 - St. Nazaire.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

(signed): Dönitz III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) Situation report U 154:
Strong air patrol in Mona Passage. EC 11-13 little traffic, weak air
patrol. Traffic appears to proceed from Jucatan south of Jamaica to
619
Anegada or Trinidad. Single ships, steering zig-zag courses, without
escort. San Juan lit up. No traffic at night, single ships by day. All lights
as in peace time.
Further successes: 12.4 EC 2586 freighter 8,300 BRT (presumably
Wel Basil). 13.4 EC 1299 tanker 12,000 BRT 105 cbm. left, 1 plus 6
torpedoes.
2) U 123 reports heavy intersecting traffic in CA 98-99 and DC 31-32.
(See U 105's report on 30.3). Sank S.S. "Pointbrava" (4,834 BRT) in DC
31 with last ammunition. Total success: 11 ships 79,649 BRT.
3) U 58 avoided a plain four-fan from a S/M in CB 9142 on 16.4. Saw
nothing except a Swiss freighter proceeding east. All torpedoes. 75 cbm.
4) U 84 has observed no night traffic for 2 days at buoys off Hatteras to
Henry. Situation otherwise as previously reported.
b) None.
c) SSS: S.S. "Graylock" in DC 1368. "Benjamin (T)? Homson" CA
3473. U-boat sightings in CA 8431 - DO 7976 - DB 3663 - DB 66 - DC
1392 - DB 64 - DC 27.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
- 22 -
c) It is intended to supply U 98 from U-tanker in CC 70 0n 20.4.
V. Reports of Success:
U 154 - 2 ships - 20,300 BRT.
620
U 123 - 1 ship - 4,834 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
17.April 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 130 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 406 - BF 54 U 575
- Op(CA)
69 - BE 86 136 - Op(CA) 455 - BF 58 576 - CB 15
71 - BE 76 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 459 - CC 37 582 - Op(CB)
84 - Op(CA) 160 - CB 66 505 - Op(Freetown) 590 - BF 60
85 - Op(CA) 162 - CE 82 506 - CE 81 594 - BE 85
86 - CB 53 201 - CB 49 507 - CD 99 654 - Op(CA)
98 - CC 34 202 - CD 39 552 - CC 34 751 - BF 49
103 - BF 49 203 - CB 74 558 - BE 91 752 - CB 17
106 - BF 49 252 - BF 45 564 - BD 77 754 - BD 77
108 - CC 65 333 - CC 54 566 - BE 48 A - AM 32
109 - CB 98 352 - BD 73 571 - Op(CA)
123 - CA 99 373 - BF 60 572 - Op(CA)
125 - CD 98 402 - CB 56
On Return Passage: U 406 - 590 - 252 - UA - 754 - 552 - 123 - 202 -
375 - 160 - 71.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 590 - St. Nazaire; U 373 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 754 sighted a steamer on a southerly course in BD 7691. Has
been ordered not to attack, as this is route A.
 2) U 201 attacked a 10,000 ton tanker in CA 9375 and scored a hit with
2 underwater shots at twilight. No effect observed. Boat suspects that
nets were streamed. After surfacing, blue-white-blue colors on the ship's
side were visible in the dark. She had not previously been recognizable as
a neutral. Course for New York. Boat ordered not to attack again. U 203
sighted large freighter with destroyer in CB 5687, southwest course,
medium speed (boat has used all her torpedoes).
U 654 situation: No traffic, no patrol off Cape Lookout on 17.4.
Strong current, strong ground swell. Suspects that traffic is being diverted
seawards.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sighting reports: CA 89 - CA 34 - AM 4241 (no boat).
2) Sighting by a/c: Oil patch in AM 4211 (no boat).
- 23 -
3) Attack report from "Columbus Star" (8,293 BRT) in AL 6341 (not
one of our boats).
4) A/c reported attack on U-boat in about AL 40.
5) U-boat attacks in CA 7686 - CA 9379 - CA 8966. S.S. Alcoa Glide"
(4,830 BRT) fired on by U-boat in CA 8963. Crew took to the boats.
6) Tanker "Heinrich Riedemann" (11,020 BRT) torpedoed in ED 8642.
7) SSS from CA 34.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - d) None.
621
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
18.April 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 125 - DF 21 U 402 - CB 49 U 572 -
Op(CA)
69 - BE 84 130 - Op(Kar. Meer) 406 - BF 60 575 - Op(CA)
71 - BE 83 136 - Op(CA) 455 - BF 49 576 - CB 39
84 - Op(CA) 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 459 - CC 55 582 - Op(CB)
85 - Op(CA) 160 - CC 43 505 - Op(Freetown) 594 - BE 76
86 - CB 54 162 - CE 76 506 - CE 78 654 - Op(CA 79)
98 - CC 59 201 - CA 93 507 - DF 22 751 - BF 47
103 - BE 69 202 - CE 13 552 - CD 11 752 - CB 62
106 - BE 69 203 - CB 64 558 - BE 82 754 - BD 85
108 - CC 55 252 - BF 50 564 - CD 22 A - AF 79
109 - CB 89 333 - CC 55 566 - BD 92
123 - CB 76 352 - BC 96 571 - Op(CA)
On Return Passage: U 406 - 252 - 754 - UA - 552 - 123 - 202 - 160 -
71.
Sailed: U 88 - 251 - Kiel.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 66 sank "Corinthian" (3,122 BRT), tanker of 8,000 BRT,
"Heinrich Riedemann" (11,020 BRT) in sea area ED.
 2) U 571 reported situation off Hatteras as before. Saw air ships twice.
14.4 sank a freighter of 8,000 BRT in CA 8757. Starting return passage.
b) None.
- 24 -
c) SSS in CA 7688 - CA 5472 - CA 54 - CA 7347 - DC 1643 - CA 73 -
DC 16 - DM 2841 - CA 7923 - CA 9616 - DN 33 - DM 27 - CA 5472.
U-boat attacks in CA 79 - CA 9379 - CA 7689.
Underwater shipping obstruction in CA 76.
A/c attack on U-boat in BF 44 (U 71).
(X) U.S. Steamer "Merimack" is said to be going to be in position 1830
N and 6120 W on 20.4 at 0900. Boats will be radioed.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 654 is operating along a line joining Savannah - Bermuda Is.
Attack area for U 654 and 201 is south of the latitude of Cape Hatteras.
U 402 is to be given freedom of action and her attention called to focal
point of traffic in CA 98-99.
c) U 459 reports that supply of U 108 cannot yet be carried out owing to
weather conditions.
d) U 252 has not reported again, despite repeated calls. She must have
been destroyed by anti-S/M activity from the convoy which she reported.
V. Reports of Success:
U 66 - 3 ships - 22,142 BRT.
622
U 571 - 1 ship - 8,000 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
19.April 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(ED 43) U 125 - DF 15 U 402 - CA 69 U 572 - Op(CA)
69 - BE 75 130 - Op(Kar. Meer) 406 - BF 65 575 - Op(CA)
71 - BF 57 136 - Op(CA) 455 - BF 47 576 - CB 61
84 - Op(CA) 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 459 - CC 57 582 - Op(CB)
85 - Op(CA) 160 - CC 26 505 - ET 14 594 - BE 74
86 - CB 45 162 - CD 99 506 - DF 35 654 - Op(DC 24)
88 - AO 201 - Op(DC) 507 - DF 16 751 - BE 83
98 - CC 82 202 - CE 34 552 - BD 71 752 - CB 53
103 - BE 67 203 - CC 41 558 - BE 73 754 - BD 95
106 - BE 91 251 - AO 564 - CD 13 A - off Bergen
108 - CC 57 252 - BF 58 566 - BD 83
109 - CB 79 333 - CC 55 571 - DC 23
123 - CB 84 352 - BC 98
On Return Passage: U 406 - 252 - UA - 754 - 552 - 123 - 202 - 160 -
71.
- 25 -
 convoys sighted in BE. It is suspected that the English sail especially
well-escorted convoys, perhaps even a kind of U-boat decoy convoy, along
the routes which he knows to be used by U-boats on their way out and
Sailed: U 588 - 552 - St. Nazaire. back.
Entered Port: U 406 - St. Nazaire. Boats are therefore ordered not to attack when they sight a convoy
in BE, but to move off and then report. It is wrong to risk boats in side
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. operations where chances of success are doubtful, when at the same time
the favorable conditions of the American area give great chances of
III. Reports on the Enemy: success at less risk.
a) 1) U 572 reports a freighter of 5,000 BRT sunk in CA 8915 on 16.4
and freighter of 10,000 BRT in DC 3248 on 20.4. - 26 -
2) U 654 sank a large American freighter of 7,000 BRT in DC 26 on
20.4. General course 1000.
3) U 109 sank an ammunition freighter of 7,000 BRT in DC 3233 on
20.4. General course 1000.
4) U 575 sank a freighter type "Baron Inchape" (7,005 BRT) in CB 44
on 16.4.
5) U 136 torpedoes a freighter or tanker of 6,000 BRT in CA 79 on 19.4
large fire, total loss probable.
6) U 130 situation: Bombarded oil depot in Bullen Bay on Curacao in
the morning of 19.4. Some visible results. Rapid defense from shore. V. Reports of Success:
Settlement very well camouflaged. U 572 - 2 ships - 15,000 BRT.
Sunk: 11.4 DP 5418 "Grenanger" (5,393 BRT), course 3300. 12.4 DP U 654 - 1 ship - 10,000 BRT.
4754 "Esso Boston" (7,699 BRT), course 3400. No traffic from Anegada U 109 - 1 ship - 7,000 BRT.
to Curacao. U 575 - 1 ship - 7,005 BRT.
b) None. U 136 - 1 ship - 6,000 BRT.
c) SSS in CA 7656 - EC 9624 - CA 3756 - DN 1247; further in EC 96 - U 130 - 2 ships - 13,092 BRT.
DB 56. "Brittannia" (9,967 BRT) in DB 5932.
d) None. VI. General: None.

IV. Current Operations: ---------------------------------------------------

a) - b) None. ---------------
c) In area BE 3 boats (U 82 - 587 - 252) have been lost during the last
three weeks while attacking south-bound convoys. During the same 20.April 1942.
period heavily escorted convoys in the area AM and AL have been
successfully attacked by single boats, and losses have only occurred at
623
 I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 123 - CB 59 U 352 - BC 89 U 571 - CA 96
69 - BD 16 125 - DE 68 402 - CA 91 572 - DC 31(Op) - 27 -
71 - BF 60 130 - Op(EC) 455 - BE 91 575 - CA 95(Op)
84 - Op(CA) 136 - Op(CA 79) 459 - CC 50 576 - CB 58
85 - Op(CA) 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 505 - EK 70 582 - Op(CB)
86 - CA 69 160 - BD 74 506 - DF 28 588 - BF 50
88 - AN 30 162 - DF 33 507 - DE 35 594 - BD 05
98 - CC 50 201 - Op(DC) 552 - BD 57 654 - DC 26(Op)
103 - BE 82 202 - BE 77 553 - BF 50 751 - BE 81
106 - BE 82 203 - CC 27 558 - BE 71 752 - CB 57
108 - CC 50 251 - AN 30 564 - CC 33 754 - BE 75
109 - DC 32 333 - CC 50 566 - BD 81 A - AN 20 40 cbm in 10 minutes. U-tankers stocks: 460 cbm, provisions for 60
days. U 98 and U 333 are lying off the tanker for the next supply.
d) U 251 and U 68 are being subordinated to Group North at once for
On Return Passage: UA - 203 - 571 - 754 - 552 - 123 - 202 - 160 - 71 - operation in northern waters to replace U 655 - 585 - 702, which have
505. been lost.
Sailed: U 155 - Lorient; U 592 - St. Nazaire. U 85 has not replied to repeated calls to report position and situation.
Entered Port: U 71 - La Pallice. Her loss must be taken into account. This is the first boat which has
probably been lost immediately under the American coast. There are no
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. clues as to place and circumstances of sinking.

III. Reports on the Enemy: V. Reports of Success:

a) 1) U 654 sank "Arga" (4,569 BRT) in CA 98, course 1500. U 654 - 1 ship - 4,569 BRT.
2) U 86 reports U-boat decoy in CA 9913. Looks like a whale-catcher.
Making a lot of smoke. Works together with a launched motor boat. VI. General: None.
b) None.
c) 1) SSS: DB 5698 - DB 9730 - CA 3828 - BB 8850 - DB 5399 - CA ---------------------------------------------------
3750 - CA 5471 - BA 9866 - DB 5935 - CA 7353. ---------------
2) U-boat attack in CB 1586.
d) None. 21.April 1942.

IV. Current Operations:

a) None. I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 136 - Op(CA) U 459 - CC 57 U 576 - CB
b) U 506 and 507 have been ordered to steer for BA 90 (Gulf of 48
Mexico). 69 - BD 94 154 - Op(Kar. Meer) 505 - EJ 81 582 - Op(CB)
c) 1) Supply of U 108 from U 459 has been carried out. 84 - Op(CA) 155 - BF 58 506 - DE 93 588 - BF 49
624
 86 - CA 98(Op) 160 - BD 82 507 - DE 28 593 - BF 58
98 - CC 57 162 - DF 16 552 - BD 64 594 - BD 86
103 - BE 73 201 - Op(DC) 553 - BF 49 654 - CA 98(Op)
106 - BE 73 202 - BE 84 558 - BD 92 751 - BE 72 d) None.
108 - CC 72 203 - CC 34 564 - CC 35 752 - CB 45
109 - DC 29 333 - CC 57 566 - BD 72 754 - BE 85 IV. Current Operations:
123 - CB 66 352 - CC 56 571 - CB 73 A - AN 31 a) None.
125 - DE 83 402 - Op(CA) 572 - Op(CA) b) U 552's attack area: DC 23 - 26 - 29 and sea area west of this as far as
130 - Op(Kar. Meer) 455 - BE 82 575 - Op(CA) the coast. To concentrate under the coast.
U 564 attack area: Florida Straits.
U 752 and 576 attack area: CA 20 - 30 - 50 - 60.
On Return Passage: UA - 203 - 571 - 754 - 552 - 123 - 202 - 160 - 505. U 333 attack area: Florida Straits.
Sailed: U 107 - Lorient. U 98 attack area: DB 60.
Entered Port: - . - c) U 459 reported refueling was not possible on account of weather. She
has been ordered to remain at rendezvous with U 582 in CC 7555 and
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. there to supply U 98 - 333 - 582 - 352 - 564 - 571 - in succession. This
accumulation of boats could not be foreseen and will be avoided in the
III. Reports on the Enemy: future. Boats which are not supplying should move off to the limit of
a) 1) U 507 sighted 2 Zeppelins in DE 2942 course 6650. signal range and act as outer defense.
2) U 86 chased a steamer course 1700 speed 16 knots for 2 hours in vain U 455 - 553 - 588 - 593 have been informed that they cannot count on
in DC 3177. being supplied.
3) U 154 fired a miss at a freighter on 16.4 in DC 7987. Pistol failed.
Sank a freighter (3,500 BRT), course 1300, in DN 5816 on 20.4. Medium V. Reports of Success:
amount of traffic between St. Juan and DN 50. U 154 - 1 ship - 3,500 BRT.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings in CA 87 - ED 22 - CA 7330 - CA 5492. VI. General: None.
"Pipestone County" (5,102 BRT) torpedoed in CB 4881. A/c sighted
suspicious oil patch in BF 4981. ---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 28 -
22.April 1942.

I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 130 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 455 - BE 73 U 575

- Op(CA)
69 - BD 85 136 - Op(CA) 459 - CC 59 576 - CB 47
625
 84 - Op(CA) 154 - DN 56(Op) 505 - EJ 51 582 - CC 75
86 - DC 34(Op) 155 - BF 49 506 - DE 86 588 - BF 47
98 - CC 75 160 - BD 68 507 - DE 46 593 - BF 49
103 - BE 71 162 - DF 47 552 - BE 44 594 - CD 33
106 - BD 95 201 - Op(DC) 553 - BF 47 654 - Op(DC)
107 - BF 58 202 - BE 94 558 - BD 33 751 - BD 93
108 - CB 96 203 - CD 32 564 - CC 76 752 - CB 41
109 - DC 19 333 - CC 75 566 - BC 93 754 - BE 92
123 - CC 43 352 - CC 76 571 - CB 96 A - AN 35
125 - DE 49 402 - Op(CA) 572 - Op(CA)
Sighted a 4 funnel ship type "Aquitania" in DC 6155, course north,
speed 20 knots.
U 203 sighted a freighter type "Beaverford" in CE 1122, course 3000,
15 knots.
b) None.
c) SSS: CA 5168 - CA 7689 - CA 8447 - CA 5491 SOS, (probably from
Jacinto, 6,069 BRT) in DC 5929. Lifeboats with women, children and
passengers. English a/c reported suspicious oil patch in BF 4689 and
sighted a U-boat in BF 4588.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

On Return Passage: U 154 - A - 203 - 571 - 754 - 552 - 123 - 202 - 160 a) None.
- 505 b) Attack areas:
Sailed: U 172 - 159 - Kiel; U 753 - La Pallice; U 502 - 156 - Lorient. U 125 Yucatan Straits (Caribbean).
Entered Port: - . - U 162 area east of Port of Spain and Lesser Antilles, concentrating on
traffic to Port of Spain from the southeast.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. U 108 to proceed to sea area of small Bahama Channel via Bermuda Is.,
Windward Passage, because U 108 is returning.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 201 situation report: Heavy traffic in CA 90 - DC 20 - 30 - 50 - 60 V. Reports of Success:
on 18-22.4. Freighter of 4,000 BRT sunk on 21.4 U 201 - 3 ships - 20,000 BRT.

VI. General: None.

- 29 -
---------------------------------------------------
---------------

23.April 1942.

I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 136 - Op(CA) U 402 - Op(Kar. Meer) U

572 - Op(CA)
69 - CD 62 154 - DN 38 455 - BE 71 575 - Op(CA)
in DC 3452, and a ship of 6,700 BRT, type "Zealandia" on 22.4 in DC 84 - Op(CA) 155 - BF 47 459 - CC 75 576 - Op(CA)
5631. 22.4 DC 6178, 9,500-tonner type "Empire Rowan", course 1300. 86 - Op(CA) 156 - BF 58 502 - BF 58 582 - CC 75
626
 98 - CC 75 159 - AO 505 - EJ 24 588 - BE 68
103 - BD 97 160 - BE 48 506 - DQ 11 593 - BF 48 IV. Current Operations:
106 - BD 86 162 - DE 95 507 - DE 47 594 - DC 31 a) None.
107 - BE 57 172 - AO 552 - BE 58 654 - Op(DC) b) U 155 and 156 have been allocated as attacking area the whole sea
108 - DD 23 201 - Op(DC 61) 553 - BE 67 751 - BD 91 area off Colon (Panama Canal).
109 - DC 19 202 - BF 71 558 - BD 81 752 - Op(CA) c) None.
123 - CC 33 203 - CE 12 564 - CC 75 753 - BF 58 d) Attack on single ships will be permitted on route A north of 380 N. and
125 - DE 74 333 - CC 75 566 - BC 86 754 - BF 57 west of 100 W. from 1200/24/4 to 2400/1/5. Permission to attack as for
130 - Op(Kar. Meer) 352 - CC 75 571 - CC 75 A - AO areas outside blockade area.

V. Reports of Success: None.

On Return Passage: UA - 203 - 154 - 571 - 754 - 552 - 123 - 202 - 160 -
505. VI. General: None.
Sailed: U 213 - Brest; U 96 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: - . - ---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 30 -
24.April 1942.

I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 130 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 333 - CC 75 U 566

- CC 62
69 - CD 53 136 - Op(CA) 352 - CC 75 571 - CC 75
84 - Op(CA) 154 - DC 99 402 - Op(DC) 572 - DC 36
86 - Op(CA) 155 - BE 95 455 - BD 97 575 - Op(CA)
98 - CC 75 156 - BF 81 459 - CC 75 576 - Op(CA)
II. Air Reconnaissance: 103 - BD 88 159 - AN 35 502 - BF 81 582 - CC 75
106 - BD 84 160 - BE 59 505 - DT 87 588 - BE 55
III. Reports on the Enemy: 107 - BF 48 162 - DQ 25 506 - DP 31 593 - BE 64
a) - b) None. 108 - DD 28 172 - AN 35 507 - DD 92 594 - CD 22
c) SSS: DB 9112 - DB 6778 - DD 4741 - DC 33 - CA 53 - DB 97 - CA 109 - DC 41 201 - Op(DC) 552 - BE 69 654 - Op(DC)
8713 - CA 56 - DC 59. 123 - BC 97 202 - BF 49 553 - BE 57 751 - BD 82
S.S. Beacon" (10,388 BRT) chased by a U-boat in DC 89. 125 - DD 98 203 - BD 94 558 - BD 72 752 - Op(CA)
"Bradburn" (4,736 BRT) sighted a U-boat in CA 6777. 213 - BF 60 564 - CC 75 753 - BF 49
"Reinholt" (4,799 BRT) on fire in CA 52. A blimp has contact. 754 - BF 60
d) None. A - AO
627
 U-boat warnings for CA 6411 - CA 9928.
U-boat attack in CA 39.
On Return Passage: U 572 - 203 - 154 - 571 - 754 - 552 - 123 - 202 - d) None.
160 - 505 - UA.
Sailed: - . - IV. Current Operations:
Entered Port: UA - Kiel. a) - b) None.
c) The following have supplied from U-tanker: U 108 - 35 cbm and
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. provisions for 12 days. U 333 - 40 cbm and provisions for 14 days. U 564
approximately 25 cbm and provisions for 10 days.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 553 sighted a convoy (21) at 1817 in BE 7317, d) None.

- 31 - VI. General: None.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

25.April 1942.

I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 130 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 333 - BD 98 U 566

- CC 56
course 200, 8 knots, 12 ships, so far 2 destroyers distinguished. Boat 69 - CD 51 136 - Op(CA) 352 - CC 75 571 - CC 75
has been ordered not to attack and to continue her outward passage. 84 - Op(CA 98) 154 - DD 76 402 - Op(Kar. Meer) 572 - DD 13
2) Situation report from U 84: 86 - Op(CA) 155 - CF 33 455 - CE 13 575 - DC 32
No traffic off Cape Lookout on 18th and 19th, no patrol. CA 9506 96 - BF 49 156 - BF 75 459 - CC 75 576 - Op(CA)
steamer, 3200, 16 knots. Sunk: 21.4 in DC 1314 freighter of 4,000 BRT 98 - DD 97 159 - AN 28 502 - BF 75 582 - CC 75
course for Hatteras. 103 - CE 11 160 - BE 69 505 - DT 57 588 - BE 45
3) U 575 situation: 106 - BD 78 162 - DQ 18 506 - DP 21 593 - BE 55
CA 90 slight air and sea patrol. 18.4 fan miss on small freight steamer 107 - BE 69 172 - AN 28 507 - DD 85 594 - CD 12
of 2,000 BRT, 3500, 15-16 knots. 19.4 CA 95 let a steamer type "Hope 108 - DD 18 201 - Op(DC) 552 - BF 48 654 - Op(DC)
Castle" go, as she had Swiss markings. 109 - Op(DB 60) 202 - BF 50 553 - BE 71 751 - BD 76
b) None. 123 - Op(Kar. Meer) 203 - BE 74 558 - CD 52 752 - Op(CA)
c) U-boats were sighted in: CA 3986 - CB 1123 - CB 14 - DB 9726 - CA 125 - DP 11 213 - Lorient 564 - CB 97 753 - BF 48
3332. 754 - BF 60
Radio D/F bearing in CA 8975.
628
 V. Reports of Success: None.
- 32 -
VI. General: None.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

26.April 1942.

On Return Passage: U 572 - 203 - 154 - 571 - 754 - 552 - 123 - 202 - I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 126 - BF 58 U 213 - BF 58 U 566 - CC 81
160 - 505. 69 - CD 44 128 - BF 58 333 - DD 21 571 - CC 91
Sailed: U 126 - 128 - Lorient; U 653 - Brest; U 116 - Bergen. 84 - Op(CA) 130 - Op(Kar. Meer) 352 - CC 75 572 - CB 97
Entered Port: U 754 - Brest. 86 - Op(CA) 136 - Op(CA) 402 - DC 65 575 - Op(CA)
96 - BF 72 154 - DD 82 455 - CF 11 576 - Op(CA)
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. 98 - CB 88 155 - CF 34 459 - CC 75 582 - CB 98
103 - CD 32 156 - BF 99 502 - BE 99 588 - BD 66
III. Reports on the Enemy: 106 - CD 31 159 - AN 23 505 - DT 27 593 - BE 46
a) 1) U 402 has had no traffic since 19.4 in CA 98 and 99 and south of 107 - BE 59 160 - BF 48 506 - DP 14 594 - CC 37
this. Slight air patrol observed. 108 - DD 44 162 - DP 66 507 - DD 76 653 - off Lorient
2) U 582 in CB 80 and 90 from 14-22.4. Non traffic. 21.4 in CB 8252 109 - Op(DB 60) 172 - AF 77 552 - BF 60 654 - DC(Op)
Portuguese ship, course west. 116 - AN 23 201 - Op(DC) 553 - BD 92 751 - BD 74
b) None. 123 - BD 84 202 - off Brest 558 - CD 45 752 - Op(CA)
c) U-boat sightings in: CA 7950 - DC 12 - CA 34 - CA 38 - CA 54 - CA 125 - DO 34 203 - BE 84 564 - DD 21 753 - BE 93
53 - CA 79 - CB 21 - CA 33 - CA 39 - CA 76.
U-boat attack reported in DC 14.
A/c attacked U-boat in BE 6512 and probably scored 1 hit. - 33 -
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
b) Attention of U 506 and U 507 has been called to traffic situation in the
Gulf of Mexico.
c) U 582 has supplied with provisions for 18 days and 55 cbm fuel from
tanker.

629
 On Return Passage: U 572 - 203 - 154 - 571 - 552 - 123 - 202 - 160 - U 136 - 1 ship
505.
Sailed: U 135 - Brest. VI. General: None.
Entered Port: U 202 - Brest.
---------------------------------------------------
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. ---------------

III. Reports on the Enemy: 27.April 1942.

a) 1) Situation reports:
U 109: 23-25.4 between Lookout and Frying Pan no traffic except 2
destroyers and 1 patrol vessel. 25.4 double shot at destroyer type I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 126 - BF 81 U 213 - BF 81 U 566 - CC
"Flusser"; surface-runner gave us away. D/C hunt, no Asdic. Hampered 73
by heavy oil trace. 69 - CC 68 128 - BF 81 333 - DD 19 571 - CD 47
2) U 136: 20.4 double fan miss at "Agra", 25.4 in CA 9521, sank new- 84 - Op(CA) 130 - EC 53(Op) 352 - CB 98 572 - CC 74
type Empire freighter, course 1350. 86 - DC 22(Op) 135 - BF 60 402 - Op(CA) 575 - Op(CA)
U 130: Little traffic in EC 55 - 56 - 64, no air patrol. No traffic in EC 136 - CA 53(Op) 455 - CD 31 576 - Op(CA)
85. Intend to operate in DO. 25.4 torpedo shot at freighter, failure of
pistol certain.
U 86 sighted a tanker in DC 2199 on a main course of 1400, speed 16
knots. - 34 -
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings in: CA 35 - CA 79 - CA 5139 - CA 51.
U-boat sighted by a/c in AM 2189 (U 172).

IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
b) U 582 has been allocated attack area in the sea area around Hatteras, U
588 the sea area off Halifax and Cape Sable.
If weather conditions are unfavorable freedom of action to the 96 - BE 93 154 - DD 67 459 - CC 73 582 - CB 88
southwest. 98 - DD 12 155 - CF 27 502 - CG 11 588 - BD 67
c) The following have supplied : 103 - CD 85 156 - CG 14 505 - DT 21 593 - BE 47
U 571 = 20 cbm. U 352 = 40 cbm. 106 - CD 28 159 - AM 32 506 - DO 24 594 - CC 52
Further supplying is intended: for U 566 on 27.4 in CC 7325. For U 107 - BE 81 160 - BF 57 507 - DD 74 653 - BF 58
572 and 594 on 28.4. For U 69 - 588 - on 29.4. 108 - DC 93 162 - DP 92 552 - BF 60 654 - Op(DC)
109 - DC 41(Op) 172 - AM 31 553 - BD 85 751 - BC 98
V. Reports of Success: 116 - AF 77 201 - Op(DC) 558 - CC 69 752 - Op(CA)
630
 123 - BD 94 203 - BE 69 564 - DD 15 753 - BE 88 I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 126 - BF 75 U 213 - BF 72 U 571 - CD
125 - DO 27 57
69 - CC 59 128 - BF 75 333 - DD 41 572 - CC 73
84 - Op(CA) 130 - Op(Kar. Meer) 352 - CB 88 575 - Op(CA)
On Return Passage: U 572 - 203 - 154 - 571 - 552 - 123 - 160 - 505. 86 - Op(CA) 135 - BF 58 402 - Op(CA) 576 - Op(CA)
Sailed: - . - 96 - BE 67 136 - Op(CA) 455 - CD 22 582 - CB 79
Entered Port: U 552 - St. Nazaire. 98 - DC 36 154 - CD 22 459 - CC 73 583 - BD 58
103 - CD 54 155 - CC 73 502 - CF 26 593 - BD 55
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. 106 - CD 18 156 - CF 38 505 - DG 93 594 - CC 73
107 - BE 72 159 - AM 01 506 - DO 24 653 - BF 81
III. Reports on the Enemy: 108 - DC 97 160 - BF 60 507 - DC 95 654 - Op(DC)
a) - d) None. 109 - Op(DB 60) 162 - BE 31 553 - BD 79 751 - CD 13
116 - AM 33 172 - AM 16 558 - CC 67 752 - Op(CA)
IV. Current Operations: 123 - BE 72 201 - Op(DC) 564 - DC 39 753 - BE 79
a) - b) None. 125 - DO 45 203 - BF 50 566 - CC 73
c) 1) U 159 reported special operation No. 1 (laying a weather buoy on
Rockall Bank) completed.
2) U 96 has been ordered to be in DB 79 at 1000/3/5 for a special
operation. - 35 -
Operation: to escort blockade-breaker "Portland" home.
U 96 has been forbidden to attack within a radius of 200 sea miles of
the rendezvous or to radio except for messages important to the blockade-
breaker.
d) None.

V. Reports of Success: None.

VI. General: None. On Return Passage: U 572 - 203 - 154 - 571 - 160 - 505.
Sailed: U 161 - Lorient.
-------------------------------------------------- Entered Port: U 160 - Lorient.
----------------
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
28.April 1942.
III. Reports on the Enemy:

631
 a) 1) U 201's situation report: On 28.4 on the coast of Cape Hatteras
traffic in spurts along the 40 meter line with destroyer and strong air
escort.
Constant high pressure weather conditions.
2) Situation U 752: CA 53 and 64 medium amount of single ship
traffic, course 3000, strong air and sea patrol. 29.April 1942.
CA 51 and 54 so far no traffic.
3) U 84 sighted a steamer with illuminated Swiss markings in CB 8165.
Course 100. I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 126 - BE 86 U 213 - BE 93 U 571 - CD 61
b) None. 69 - CC 57 128 - BE 99 333 - DC 65 572 - CC 73
c) U-boats were sighted: EO 5144 - EE 56. 84 - CB 82 130 - Op(Kar. Meer) 352 - DD 12 575 - Op(CA)
SSS: in EC 96. U-boat warning for BA 9883. 86 - Op(CA) 135 - BF 49 402 - Op(CA) 576 - Op(CA)
English a/c reported U-boats in AM 1712 and AM 1727. 96 - BE 81 136 - Op(CA) 455 - CD 13 582 - DC 38
U-boat attack in DO 16 on American tanker "Mobiloil" (9925). 98 - DC 37 154 - DE 19 459 - CC 73 588 - BD 73
103 - CC 45 155 - CE 66 502 - CF 27 593 - BD 49
IV. Current Operations: 106 - CC 63 156 - CF 52 505 - DG 66 594 - CC 73
a) None. 107 - BE 71 159 - AM 72 506 - DD 14 653 - BF 72
b) U 130 has been ordered to skirt San Juan (Puerto Rico), as there is 108 - DN(Op) 161 - BF 58 507 - DC 89 654 - Op(DC)
possibly a convoy assembly point there. 109 - Op(DB) 162 - Op(EO) 553 - BC 77 751 - CD 44
c) 1) U 159 reported weather buoy laid on Porcupine Bank. 116 - AM 25 172 - AL 03 558 - CC 57 752 - CA 53(Op)
2) U 566 has supplied from U-tanker 123 - BE 82 201 - (CA 79)Op 564 - DC 61 753 - CE 32
Taken over: 36 cbm, provisions for 7 days. 125 - DN 68 203 - off Lorient 566 - CB 93
Tanker's stocks: To deliver: 205 cbm, provisions for 30 days.
Own: 115 cbm, provisions for 30 days.
3) U 96 has been given exact rendezvous with "Portland" as square CE On Return Passage: U 572 - 203 - 154 - 571 - 123 - 505 - 84.
1133. Boat will remain there from 1200/3/5 to first light on 7.5. Sailed: U 437 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: - . -
V. Reports of Success: None.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
VI. General: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
- 36 - a) Situation reports:
1) U 136: Off New York day and night traffic close under land along 10
meter line. Strong sea patrol, medium air patrol. 28.6 steamers putting to
sea on east and southeast courses. Torpedoed steamer of 5,000 BRT.
Probably sunk.
632
 2) U 576: No traffic off Nantucket - Cape Cod - Cape Anne.
Sunk: 21.4 in CB 4849 Estone County (5,102 BRT)
23.4 in CA 3975 1 5,000 tonner torpedoed, pistol failed.
3) U 201: Traffic off Hatteras. Could not proceed on the surface day or
night because of strong air patrol and bright full-moon nights.
4) U 108: 9.4 in CE 28 unsuccessful attack on 2 small passenger
freighters, course 1800. 25.4 sank "Modesta" (3,830 BRT) in DO 13,
course 1450.
No traffic off Bermuda. Air patrol by shore based a/c. U 575 sighted
an American S/M type R-1 in CB 4975. S/M dived when approached.
b) None.
c) SSS: in DC 1165 - ED 9390 - ED 66.
U-boat attack in DO 13 (U 108) and in ED 9872.
d) None.
- 37 -
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
30.April 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(Kar. Meer) U 126 - BE 87 U 213 - BE 55 U 566 - CB
83
69 - CC 49 128 - CF 33 333 - DC 83 571 - CE 17
84 - CB 65 130 - Op(Kar. Meer) 352 - DC 32 572 - CC 73
86 - Op(CA) 135 - BF 47 402 - Op(CA) 575 - CB 55
96 - BD 93 136 - Op(CA) 437 - BF 49 576 - Op(CA)
98 - DC 52 154 - DE 23 455 - CC 33 582 - CA 95
103 - CC 69 155 - CE 83 459 - CC 73 588 - BC 99
106 - CC 64 156 - CF 46 502 - CF 45 593 - BD 47
107 - BD 94 159 - BE 35 505 - CF 94 594 - CB 93
108 - Op(DN) 161 - BF 49 506 - DN 37 653 - BE 93
109 - Op(DB 60) 162 - Op(EO) 507 - DN 21 654 - Op(DC)
116 - AL 61 172 - AL 95 553 - BC 98 751 - CC 68
123 - BE 68 201 - Op(DC) 558 - CC 73 752 - Op(CA)
125 - DN 83 203 - off Brest 564 - DC 56 753 - CE 26

IV. Current Operations:

a) - b) None. On Return Passage: U 116 - 159 - 172 - 575 - 84 - 572 - 154 - 571 - 123
c) Supply of U 594 completed. 35 cbm and provisions for 7 days taken - 505.
over. Sailed: U 157 - Kiel; U 432 - La Pallice.
d) None. Entered Port: U 203 - Brest.

V. Reports of Success: II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

U 136 - 1 steamer - 5,000 BRT probably sunk.
U 576 - 1 ship - 5,102 BRT sunk III. Reports on the Enemy:
1 ship - 5,000 BRT torpedoed. a) 1) U 126 reported a convoy at 1915 in BE 76, course 200. 8 steamers
U 108 - 2 ships - 13,755 BRT sunk. and 3 destroyers distinguished. Moved off as ordered. At 0145 the same
633
boat sighted a convoy in BE 78, 4 vessels making heavy smoke, course torn away. Jumping-wire torn away. Constant inrush of water through
northeast. The former convoy may possibly be identical with SL 107 conning tower. After repairs, intends to operate away from the coast.
(though nevertheless there are remarkably few vessels), but the second b) None.
cannot be identified on the schedule known the suspicion, already c) 1) SSS: "Solon Turman" (7,000 BRT) in DM 26, further SSS in DC
mentioned, that special anti-S/M convoys are being sailed in area BE, is 1352 - CA 32 - DC 1360.
further confirmed by these reports. U-boat attack in ED 1659 - DN 71 - ED 19 (double attack on one
2) U 576 reported a convoy in CA 3354, 10 steamers, course 2700, she vessel).
probably scored 4 hits. Boat suspects supply traffic to Boston proceeds 2) American warning to shipping for sea area around Hatteras.
via CB 14 - 11 - 12 and CA 33. Boat intends to operate in BC 10. 30.4
sank freighter of 5,000 BRT in CA 33. IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
- 38 - b) Attack areas allocated:
U 566 in CA 20 - 30 - 50 - 60.
U 558 and U 106 sea area around Hatteras.
U 594 square DN.
U 69 - DO 70 - 80 - 90 and ED 10 - 20 - 30.
c) 1) The following have supplied from U-tanker: U 558 - 35 cbm. U 69
- 35 cbm. U 572 - 25 cbm and provisions for 14 days.
Further supply intended: U 751 in CC 8155 on 1.5.
2) U 437 has been ordered to escort S.S. "Munsterland" home.
Rendezvous 9.5 CD 3670.
3) U 654's situation: since 21.4 no traffic from DC 20 via DD 18 to d) None.
CA 90. D/C damage following a hunt in shallow water. Starting return
passage because of provisions. V. Reports of Success:
4) U 752 sank "West Imboden" (5,750 BRT) in CB 1836 on 21.4, course U 576 - 1 ship - 5,000 BRT sunk.
3500.
5) U 402's situation: Approached Lookout from the southeast. Traffic VI. General:
in both directions. 30.4 miss at patrol boat and freighter. According to 1) Situation in the American Area:
hydrophone bearings, both torpedoes became ground-runners at 30 meters When sinking declines after 21 April, this at first gave the
of water. impression that traffic conditions on the American coast had
Sunk: DC 1193 freighter at 19 meters with stern aground.
6) U 566 chased a fast freighter unsuccessfully for 9 hours in CB 8137,
course 3000. - 39 -
7) U 333 fired 3 misses at a tanker by day. Seen and rammed during a
night attack. Ability to dive is impaired. Bows rammed away. Conning
tower plating, bearing gear of U-boat aiming sight and forward periscope
634

changed and that the constant stream of independently-routed ships and
ships in convoy had ceased. This impression was confirmed by the
decline in the numbers of SSS and attack reports received from the Radio
Intelligence Service. But during the last days more frequent reports form
boats, which had lain right under the coast despite bright full-moon nights,
have shown this view to be false.
As last month, the decline in sinking figures is attributable to
unfavorable conditions for attack during full-moon and high pressure
weather. Boats cannot operate on the traffic routes right under land
because they are constantly forced under water by the numerous sea and
air patrols and have no chance to operate on the surface and charge their
batteries.
The U-boats fighting superiority over the anti-S/M defenses, which
has so far always been proved, cannot be exploited in moon and weather
conditions such as this.
Verbal reports from returned C.O.'s gives the same picture again
and again.
Attacking conditions in the American area continue to be very
good. Anti-S/M activity has increased, but its fighting power, its
concentration, its determination to attack and destroy are small. "Those
who fight are not sailors, but people who are being paid for their presence
in the area endangered by U-boats." C.O.'s are all of the same opinion,
namely that the American area will remain a highly favorable area for
attacks for some months to come and that a high percentage of successes
can be scored with very few losses.
In order to decide whether the battle in the remote American
operations area, with the long passages there and back, is still worthwhile
(even with total number of successes rising), it is necessary to compare the
sinkings per boat per day at sea.
This gives the following result:
Sunk per boat per day at sea in January 1942 209 BRT
635
February 378 BRT
March 409 BRT
April 412 BRT
This shows that, in spite of the increased anti-S/M activity and
America's greater concentration on the U-boat war, the boat's successes
have risen. Their operation in the American area is therefore further
indicated.
2) The present large number of boats which are in full fighting trim as
far as fuel goes (6 type IXc and 11 fully supplied type VII c) permits the
whole coastal area from Cape Sable to Cape West, the Gulf of Mexico and
the Caribbean to be occupied. The enemy will find it impossible to avoid
the U-boats by re-routing his traffic. These boats will reach their
operations areas at the most favorable time, on May 8, one week before
new moon.
3) Supplying from the first U-tanker has gone off excellently.
Altogether 10 boats have supplied on the way out, 2 on the way back, all
in 10 days weather conditions admittedly being good. The value of these
supply operations can only be completely assessed when all the boats have
completed patrols.
- 40 -
Mine Situation in Biscay:
I. The charts captured in Nazaire in the English destroyer Campbelltown,
with the mined areas entered, confirm the necessity of abandoning the
approach routes to Brest (Sternbild and Rippenbruch). This had been done
some time before. The arrangement of the minefields also gives rise to the
suspicion that the enemy had begun to cut off the Biscay methodically,
starting from the north, by minefields along the 200 meter line. As the
northern approach routes to Lorient (Jugend Liebe and Bogenlampe) had
been closed owing to enemy mines laid closer to the coast, the Brest boats
had:
1) to use the south route to Lorient (Cedernland) and then proceed along
the coast on route Rosa, i.e. cover a longer distance through inshore waters
endangered by mines and S/M's and
2) to put into Lorient as an intermediate port, so that the additional
danger from a/c was eliminated. During daylight they lay in Lorient and
continued their passage to Brest during darkness. The consequent loss of
half a day, outward and inward bound, had to be accepted.
II. All U-boat traffic was now crowded onto the 2 routes Tannennadol
and Uhunest, which lie close together and lead to the center of the Biscay
coast, as the routes south of these, leading to Pallice and to the Gironde
could not be constantly checked for mines, owing to F.O.I.C. Western
Defenses' lack of forces, and were therefore closed. This restriction to 2
routes means:
1) A longer passage in inshore waters for all boats which belong to
Brest, Pallice and Bordeaux.
2) Crowding together makes things easer for enemy S/M's and a/c and
raises the effectiveness of mining operations there.
3) The basic principle, to allow only incoming or only outgoing U-boats
or only minesweepers along one route at night, has in some cases to be
disregarded, which means danger for the U-boats.
4) If the principle in para. 3) is adhered to, which is essential on dark
nights, then F.O.I.C. Western Defenses' few forces are further restricted in
their movements, to the disadvantage of the safety of the U-boats.
5) There is danger that the enemy will lay minefields in inshore waters
which are not checked by us without our noticing it. It is only a short step
from there to closing the comparatively narrow checked emergency route
in the center and Biscay suddenly being really cut off.
III. On 20 April route Burggraf was declared in use, and this meant a
certain relief of the 2 central routes, as the italian boats were now given a
direct route and Pallice boats could be escorted along this. They still had
636
to go out of their way slightly compared with the original direct approach
route to Pallice
This relief, which was comparatively slight, was more than cancelled
out on 26.4 by the closing of route Tannennadel, which included
Cedernland almost all the Atlantic boats, i.e. Brest, Lorient, and Nazaire
boats, were now directed to route Uhanenst,
- 41 -
which, apart from anything else, is a long way round to Brest and
Lorient. This intolerable state of affairs was considerably eased on 30.4
when route Bogenlampe came into use.
IV. Present Situation:
1) There are direct approach routes to: Lorient, Nazaire, Bordeaux.
Boats which are arriving at or leaving Brest go to Lorient as hitherto and
leave there on the evening of the day they arrived. Pallice boats have to be
escorted either via Burggraf, 25 sea miles out of their way, or via Uhunest,
50 sea miles out of their way.
2) Because of the few approach routes traffic along them is very dense,
encounters cannot always be avoided. If one of those routes, which lie far
apart, comes into disuse it will mean a very long way around for some of
the boats.
3) F.O.I.C. Western Defenses' forces are at present just adequate to
check the 3 routes. They are not sufficient to clear the minefields already
known, nor to search over other routes which may be free of mines, nor to
clear the existing routes if these should be closed or fouled by the enemy.
This means that any minelaying by the enemy, which is most likely, would
cause a very serious situation in U-boat traffic in inshore waters.
This lack of forces is the reason why already now U-boats are in many
cases forced to remain in inshore waters for a disproportionate length of
time, instead of being able to cover this dangerous zone as quickly as
possible, at right angles to the coast. It thus endangers the whole offensive
conduct of the U-boat war and can gradually stop it altogether unless
assistance is provided.
V. Attention has again been called to the intolerable state of affairs
described above, by telephone from B.d.U. to Naval War Staff and by T/P
from Group West.
(signed): Dönitz
(MS page).
via lu (one or 2 words and figures illegible)
To 19.IV. para IV.
One of the reasons which led to the U-boats' no longer being
operated methodically against convoys, is the fact that it was and is hardly
possible to find the convoys with our inadequate means. When a convoy
has been found in my opinion the (one word illegible) should be realized,
or it should be decided only from case to case, but not in principle to break
off operations.
Convoy escort is mostly likely to be very strong in BE because this
is near to the Mother country and to Gibraltar, and will force breaking-off
the attack early on, especially in the case of north-bound convoys. But we
are surely agreed that the sinking of a steamer near English ports is of
great importance. So the expression "side" operation for an attack on a
convoy in BE is, in my opinion, ill chosen.
(initials illegible)
637
- 42 -
(still MS)
As long as there is any suspicion that anti-S/M convoys may be
expected in BE it is undoubtedly right to avoid attacking convoys in this
sea area. I also regard the expression "side operation" as wrong.
(initials illegible)
S.O. Only Berlin, May 31, '42
By hand of officer
via Ia
To be submitted to Head of Naval War Staff (first division).
(MS note): Nevertheless the expression is open to criticism.
1) The designation of such attacks as "Side operations" is in my opinion
to be interpreted in the sense that in area BE they have no actual
connection with the present main U-boat operations (American coast).
2) The greatest difficulty undoubtedly lies in finding the convoys.
When a convoy has been found, an attack is in my opinion worth while, if
several boats can be operated at the same time.
(MS note): The order that single U-boats are not to attack such strongly
escorted convoys cannot be questioned, the more so as it is suspected that
they are "U-boat decoy" convoys.
(initials illegible)
 The convoys encountered in BE are known from experience to be
strongly escorted and are only found by chance by U-boats on their way
out or way home. So, as long as several boats cannot attack
simultaneously, the damage to be expected must be greater than the
possible advantages to be gained. For this reason B.d.U. has ordered all
further pursuit of such convoys to be abandoned. Our experience of these
convoys has, in my opinion, proved this order to be right. Lately we have
lost several boats operating singly against such convoys, without the
smallest success, even though they went to it with a will.
Iu (initials illegible).
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 May 1942
PG30307a
1.May 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 126 - BE 77 U 213 - BE 46 U 564 - DC
81
69 - CC 73 128 - BE 88 333 - DC 85 566 - CB 73
84 - CC 41 130 - Op(Karib. Meer) 352 - Op(DC) 571 - CE 24
86 - Op(CA) 135 - BE 68 402 - Op(CA) 572 - CC 73
96 - BD 94 136 - Op(CA) 432 - BF 58 575 - CB 63
98 - DC 43 154 - CD 74 437 - BF 49 576 - CA 33-Op
103 - CC 91 155 - CE 96 455 - CC 31 582 - Op(CA)
106 - CC 58 156 - CE 92 459 - CC 73 588 - CD 13
107 - BD 87 157 - AO 502 - CE 68 593 - BC 91
638
108 - Op(DN) 159 - BF 40 505 - CF 68 594 - CB 98
109 - Op(DB 60) 161 - BF 47 506 - DN 51 653 - BE 91
116 - AL 92 162 - Op(EO) 507 - DM 36 654 - CA 96
123 - BF 48 172 - BF 23 553 - CD 27 751 - CC 81
125 - DN 81 201 - Op(DC) 558 - CC 73 752 - CA 56-Op
753 - CE 24
On Return Passage: U 116 - 159 - 172 - 575 - 654 - 84 - 572 - 154 - 571
- 123 - 505.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 162 sank "Athel Empress" (8,941 BRT) on 30.4 in EE 8226,
course 2450, on 1.5 the Brazilian "Parnahyba" (6,692 BRT) in EO 2121.
Ship was armed, painted grey-green, no flag, no neutral markings. After
she had been torpedoed her name and home port "Rio" were distinguished
in small letters on bows and stern. Course 3320 no zigzags.
2) U 575 reports several steamers on a W. course in CB 1143.
b) None.
c) U-boat attack in DB 94 - EO 21 (U 162) - DN 2120. SSS in DN 7778
- CA 98 - CA - 3250 - DB 67 - DM 6292 - DC 22 - CA 61 - DM 65.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) U 576 reported at 2130 7 troop transports, strongly escorted, in CB
1155, course 800, medium speed. The boat reported further: convoy
consists of 1 a/c carrier, 1 battleship, many destroyers, 7 large passenger
steamers. Boat was in firing position without torpedoes. Could not
shadow, as one Diesel was defective. Further reports from CB 1156 and a
hydrophone bearing in CB 1270. Strong air patrol. The following boats
are in favorable positions to operate against the unit: U 553 - 588 - 593 -
455 at a distance of 600 to 1000 sea miles east of the convoy.
- 44 - I. Total in commission:
at 1.4.42 284
commissioned in April 16
300

Losses in April* 5
295
Paid off 3 type II for Black Sea.
as of 1.5.1942 292

An operation at this distance, with quite indefinite data and without

shadowing does not give much hope of success, especially as the patrol
line will have to be formed in an area where fog conditions are very
unfavorable, on Newfoundland Bank, in shallow water.
But in view of the valuable targets, the operation will have to be carried
out. Boats have been ordered to form a patrol line at 2100/3/5 from BB
6981 to BB 9695 in the order:U 455 - 593 - 533 and 588. This patrol line
should still be able to pick up the unit if its speed of advance is 14 knots.
U 576 is to try all means for regaining contact.
b) None.
c) U 751 has taken over 30 cbm and provisions for 5 days from U-tanker.
Supply is intended for U 108 on 2.5.
d) U 333 reports: after repairs boat is fit for attack depth and up to 100
meters diving depth for a short time. Bottoming not possible, 3 tubes
serviceable. Boat has been given freedom of action according to what she
is capable of diving.
*Losses in April: 5, of which 3 in the Northern Area.
U 85, Greger, experienced boat, last report 8.4 from the West Atlantic,
no clue as to cause of loss.
U 252, Lerchen, first patrol. Last report 14.4 at a convoy west of
Biscay. It is suspected that decoy convoys sail in this area. of. loss of U
82 in February.
U 585, Lohse, on Kirkenes on 29.3. Non clue as to cause of loss.
U 655, Dumrese, first patrol, last report 21.3 when passing 670 north.
Possible destroyed in attack on a Murmansk convoy.
U 702, von Rabenau, first patrol. 31.3 parted from escort off Heligoland.
Possible a mine or action with a formation of English warships west of
Norway.
- 45 -

V. Reports of Success:
U 162 2 ships 15,633 BRT.

U-boats as of 1 May 1942

(excluding foreign boats and after UA has been withdrawn from active
service). II. Boats are distributed as follows:
639
Type II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXD Xb XIV
2.May 1942.
Front-line: - - 89 1 32 - 1 1 124
Trials: - - 76 5 22 3 3 5 114
Training: 37 4 11 - 2 - - - 54 I. U 66 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 128 - CF 21 U 333 - DG 71 U 566 - CB
71
37 4 176 6 56 3 4 6 292 69 - DD 23 130 - Op(Karib. Meer) 352 - Op(DC) 571 - CE 31
84 - CC 27 135 - BE 59 402 - DC 15 572 - CC 64
86 - Op(CA) 136 - Op(CA) 432 - BF 49 575 - CC 19
III. During April: 96 - BD 88 154 - CD 92 437 - BF 47 576 - BB 77
The total number of boats increased by 8 98 - Op(DB 60) 155 - DF 33 455 - CC 22 582 - Op(CA)
The number of front-line boats " 4 103 - CC 81 156 - CE 85 459 - CC 81 588 - CD 11
The number of boats on trials " 7 106 - CB 93 157 - AN 36 502 - CE 82 593 - BC 82
The number of training boats decreased by 3 107 - CD 33 159 - BF 58 505 - CF 39 594 - DD 22
108 - Op(DN) 161 - CG 11 506 - DN 41 653 - BE 82
109 - Op(DB 60) 162 - EO 22(Op) 507 - DM 34 654 - CB 49
IV. Front-line boats were distributed as follows at 1.5.1942: 116 - BE 23 172 - BF 58 553 - CD 18 751 - CC 72
Atlantic 85 boats 123 - CE 33 201 - Op(DC) 558 - CB 91 752 - Op(CA)
Mediterranean 20 " 125 - DN 78 213 - BD 68 564 - DC 75 753 - CE 18
Norway Area 19 " 126 - CE 33

V. In the Atlantic during April:

Daily average of boats at sea 48.8 - 46 -
of which in operations areas 9.87
On outward passage 38.47
On return passage 9.43

VI. The following sailed during April:

From home 9 boats
From western France 32 boats
On Return Passage: U 116 - 159 - 172 - 575 - 654 - 84 - 572 - 154 - 571
- 123 - 505 - 402 - 576.
--------------------------------------------------- Sailed: U 504 - Lorient.
--------------- Entered Port: U 123 - Lorient.
640
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. - 47 -

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) U 116 reported the position of the convoy, which U 126 sighted at
0145/1/5 in BE 78, in BE 57 at 1600. According to this report, the convoy
must have made straight for St. Georges Channel at a speed of about 6
knots. Boat heard Asdic noises.
2) U 402 sank patrol yacht "Cythera" in DC 1591. Starting return
passage with 2 prisoners, owing to fuel.
3) U 86 situation: Report does not add anything to information on the
traffic situation north and south of Hatteras. Boat will operate against d) None.
NW-bound traffic to Hatteras and later in Onslow and Long Bay. 9
torpedoes, 67 cbm left. V. Reports of Success:
b) None. U 402 1 ship 830 BRT.
c) U-boat sightings in CA 5223 - DC 14; further from a/c in BF 5411 and
BE 9311. VI. General: None.
American S.S. "Alcoa Skipper" (5,491 BRT) sighted U-boat in ED 53.
Torpedo report from tanker British Workman (6,994 BRT) in BC 7440. ---------------------------------------------------
d) None. ---------------

IV. Current Operations: 3.May 1942.

a) U 576 had hydrophone bearings of the unit of 200 true from BB 1321
at 0905 and 50 at 1220 from BB 7769. Estimated enemy speed 12 knots,
course NE. Boat had contact with rear air escort and reported at 1847 that
she was forced to submerge for half hour or an hour at a time by strong air
patrol. She suspects the convoy's route lies along the coast. She has been
ordered to do her utmost to get contact and keep it.
b) U 751 has been allocated an attack area the sea area around Cape
Hatteras, concentrating there.
c) 1) U 96's escort duty probably according to plan.
2) U 103 has taken over 30 cbm from U-tanker. Tanker can still deliver
20 cbm and some provisions. Starting return passage.
A last supply from U-tanker is intended for U 753 at 1000/5/5 in CD
4635.
641
I. U 66 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 128 - CF 15 U 333 - Op(DB 90) U 564
- Op(DB)
69 - DD 29 130 - Op(Karib. Meer) 352 - Op(DC) 566 - Op(CA)
84 - CC 37 135 - BE 57 402 - DC 22 571 - BE 77
86 - DC 21-Op 136 - Op(CA) 432 - BE 68 572 - CD 41
96 - CE 12 154 - CE 45 437 - BE 91 575 - CC 29
98 - Op(DB 60) 155 - DF 26 455 - BB 96 576 - BB 77
103 - CC 72 156 - DG 12 459 - CC 82 582 - Op(CA 79)
106 - CB 83 157 - AN 28 502 - CE 79 588 - BC 79
107 - CD 31 159 - BF 60 504 - BF 58 593 - BC 72
108 - Op(DN) 161 - CG 11 505 - CG 14 594 - DD 27
109 - Op(DB 60) 162 - Op(EO 22) 506 - DM 61 653 - BE 73
 116 - BF 40 172 - BF 60 507 - DM 27 654 - CB 83
125 - DM 98 201 - Op(DC) 553 - CC 32 751 - CB 93
126 - CE 34 213 - BD 59 558 - CB 82 752 - Op(CA)
753 - CD 38
On Return Passage: U 172 - 159 - 116 - 575 - 654 - 459 - 84 - 572 - 154
- 571 - 505 - 402 - 576.
Sailed: U 590 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: U 172 - 159 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 109's situation report: Submerged by day. Reception only on
Afrika from 0300-1100. Am in DB 92. Successes: on 1.5 off Canaveral
inside 20 meter line "Lapaz" (6,548 BRT), sinking not observed, stern
probably aground.
Motor lighter "Worden" (433 BRT) sunk. 3.5 fast freighter type "City
of Manchester" (9,050 BRT) sunk. All ships course S.
2) U 594 sighted a motor vessel of 3-4,000 BRT in CB 7882, 3300, 15
knots. Enemy speed too high. Boat continued on passage.
3) U 654 reported submerged enemy S/M in CB 6799.
b) None.
c) U-boats sighted: EB 2765 - DM 2560 - CA 8470 - BB 93.
Sighted further by a/c: BE 5869 and BB 6980.
U-boat attacks in ED 98 - DB 94 - DM 52.
d) None.
- 48 -
642
IV. Current Operations:
a) According to reports received so far from U 576 the unit appears to
intend to break through as close as possible under the coast, especially as it
must know of the presence of the U-boats from attack and sighting reports.
Orders to the boats: Transfer the patrol line in its present direction30 sea
miles to the north. Make absolutely certain that the area is patrolled.
b) U 103's operations area has been extended to the Florida Straits.
c) U 96's convoy duty probably according to plan. U 437 on her way to
rendezvous.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 109 3 ships 15,981 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
4.May 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(Karib. Meer) U 128 - CE 38 U 402 - CA 99 U 572 - CD
28
69 - DD 55 130 - Op(Karib. Meer) 432 - BE 59 575 - CD 14
84 - CD 14 135 - BE 48 437 - BE 85 576 - BB 68
86 - Op(CA) 154 - CE 19 455 - BB 69 582 - Op(CA)
96 - CE 12 155 - DF 27 459 - CD 47 588 - BB 96
98 - Op(DB 60) 156 - DF 36 502 - DG 14 590 - BF 58
103 - CB 96 157 - AF 77 504 - BF 49 593 - BB 69
106 - CB 86 161 - CF 29 505 - BE 98 594 - DC 36
107 - CD 25 162 - Op(EO) 506 - DM 27 653 - BE 71
108 - Op(DN) 201 - Op(DC) 507 - DM 14 654 - CC 47
 109 - Op(DB 60) 213 - BD 57 553 - BB 93 751 - CB 91 Sighted in addition: 8.4 DR 4231 freighter 3400. 14.4 ED 9619 tanker
116 - BF 58 333 - Op(DB 90) 558 - CB 73 752 - Op(CA) 1900. 28.4 in ED 8694 tanker 2700. 4.5 2 tankers in EE 72. Course 3200
125 - DM 85 352 - Op(DC) 564 - Op(DB) 753 - CD 53 and 3400.
126 - CE 37 566 - Op(CA) 2) U 130 situation:
571 - BE 84 No traffic off St. Juan since 2.5. Operating further through DN 52 -
DO 20 - 30 - 70 - 80.
3) U 455 sank tanker "British Workman" (6,499 BRT) on 3.5 in BB
On Return Passage: U 590 - 116 - 576 - 575 - 402 - 654 - 459 - 84 - 572 9663. Course 2100.
- 154 - 571 - 505. 4) U 136 has seen no air patrol in CA 50, much fog. Torpedoed
Sailed: U 158 - 124 - Lorient; U 94 - St. Nazaire; U 569 - La Pallice. "Schodack" (5,041 BRT) on 1.5 in CA 5364. Starting return passage.
Entered Port: - . - 5) U 432 sighted a convoy on a northerly course on 3.5 in BE 5931.
While skirting it, bombs from a Sunderland. Slight casualties. A/c bombs
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. on 2 May in BE 6399.
b) None.
III. Reports on the Enemy: c) Sighting reports in CA 87. Attack in DM 25. "Mokihana" (6,460
a) 1) U 66's situation and success report: BRT) torpedoed in ED 27. Ship abandoned, sinking. "Joseph M. Cudahy"
Heavy traffic along the 200 meter line in the sea area west of Trinidad. (6,950 BRT) in DM 15.
Slight NS traffic in the islands. No sea patrol outside. Many fast tankers. d) None.
Sunk: 14.4 ED 9619 "Corinthian" (3,122 BRT), course 100. 16.4 in
ED 9454 tanker (8,000 BRT) 1200. IV. Current Operations:
a) U 576 in waiting position in BB 6850, reported search in vain. Boats
- 49 - have been ordered to continue passage west at 2200. By this time the unit,
at a speed of 9 knots, should have passed the patrol line.
b) 1) U 126 - 128 - 161 have been ordered to steer for CF 70. Boats are
to proceed south along 25-280 W. and cross route A at shortest distance.
Permission to attack has been requested.
2) U 553 will be given freedom of action from Nova Scotia to New
York.

c) U 96's escort duty probably according to plan. U 437 on her way to

rendezvous.
17.4 in ED 8617 "Heinrich Riedemann" (11,000 BRT), 2850. 26.4 in d) None.
ED 4793 ship type "Gleniffer" (9,560 BRT) 3000. 2.5 ED 9645 "Sandan"
(7,624 BRT) 700. Torpedoed and damaged on 3.5. "Geo. W. McKnight" V. Reports of Success:
(12,500 BRT) 2050. U 66 3 ships 27,537 BRT
1 ship 12,502 BRT torpedoed
643
 U 136 1 ship 5,040 BRT torpedoed.
VI. General: None.
- 50 -
5.May 1942.
I. U 66 - EE 73 U 126 - CE 55 U 352 - Op(DC) U 569 - BF 58
69 - DD 81 128 - CE 68 402 - CB 73 571 - BE 88
84 - CD 21 130 - DO 74-Op 432 - BE 46 572 - CD 35
86 - Op(CA) 135 - BD 69 437 - BE 78 575 - CD 21
94 - BF 81 136 - CA 93 455 - BB 68 576 - BB 69
96 - CE 11 154 - CE 29 459 - CD 46 582 - Op(CA 79)
98 - Op(DB 60) 155 - DE 69 502 - DF 37 588 - BB 95
103 - CB 97 156 - DF 61 504 - BF 47 593 - BB 92
106 - CB 76 157 - AM 33 505 - BF 75 594 - DC 63
107 - CD 18 158 - BF 58 506 - DM 14 653 - BD 92
108 - Op(DN) 161 - CF 54 507 - DL 32 654 - CC 54
109 - Op(DB 60) 162 - Op(EO-EE) 553 - BB 95 751 - CB 81
116 - BF 60 201 - Op(DC) 558 - BB 95 752 - Op(CA)
124 - BF 58 213 - BC 98 564 - Op(DB 90) 753 - CD 46
125 - Op(DL-DM) 333 - Op(DB 90) 566 - Op(CA) 590 - BD 60
On Return Passage: U 590 - 116 - 576 - 402 - 130 - 575 - 136 - 654 -
459 - 84 - 572 - 154 - 571 - 505.
644
Sailed: U 590 - 406 - St. Nazaire; U 584 - Kiel.
Entered Port: U 590 - St. Nazaire; U 116 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - b) None.
c) U-boat attacks in DB 97 - DL 3660 - DL 3620 - EO 4394 .
American S.S. "Afoundria" (5,010 BRT) torpedoed in EC 12.
English a/c reported enemy U-boat in BF 7293.
U-boats sighted in: DB 9119 - DC 14 - CA 8144.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 124 and U 107 have been ordered to steer for CA 79.
2) Operation off Panama Canal is to be postponed, because of
unfavorable moon period and good prospects in other areas. Boats
intended for this have been allotted new operations areas as follows: U
155 and 156 sea area within a range of 300 sea miles from Trinidad. U
502 same area around Curacao.
c) 1) U 753 has taken over 20 cbm and 2 tons provisions from U-tanker.
The tanker has now sold out and is starting a rapid return passage to
Lorient.
2) U 437 has been given further details as to route and escort home of
blockade-breaker "Muensterland".
d) None.
- 51 -

V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
6.May 1942.
I. U 66 - EE 56 U 128 - CE 98 U 402 - CB 86 U 569 - BF 81
69 - DO 23 130 - Op(Karib. Meer) 406 - BF 56 571 - BF 82
84 - BD 74 135 - BD 67 432 - BE 44 572 - CD 12
86 - Op(CA) 136 - CB 57 437 - BD 98 575 - BC 96
94 - BF 49 154 - CF 12 455 - BE 83 576 - BC 49
96 - BE 55 155 - DE 91 459 - CD 55 582 - Op(CA)
98 - Op(DB 60) 156 - DF 55 502 - DF 56 584 - AO 47
103 - DD 13 157 - AM 16 504 - BE 94 588 - BB 86
106 - CB 74 158 - BF 49 505 - BF 82 590 - BF 58
107 - CC 63 161 - CF 75 506 - DL 31 593 - BB 86
108 - Op(DN) 162 - Op(EO-EE) 507 - DA 99 594 - DC 68
109 - Op(DB 60) 201 - DC 21 553 - BB 89 653 - BD 83
124 - BF 49 213 - BC 89 558 - CA 94 654 - CC 61
125 - Op(Karib. Meer) 333 - Op(DB) 564 - Op(DB) 751 - CB 72
126 - CE 86 352 - Op(DC) 566 - Op(CA) 752 - Op(CA)
753 - CD 45
On Return Passage: U 157 - 576 - 402 - 130 - 575 - 136 - 201 - 654 -
459 - 66 - 84 - 572 - 154 - 571 - 505.
Sailed: U 404 - Brest.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
645
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 103 sank "Stanbank" (8,000 BRT), 1500, in DD 2265 on 5.5.
2) U 108 sank an American freighter of 5,500 BRT in DN 8440 on 5.5,
and on 6.5 in DN 8430 a freighter of 5,000 BRT, course 400.
3) U 106 sank "Lady Drake" (7,985 BRT) in CB 7922, course 0000.
4) U 752 stopped an armed motor vessel (7,000 BRT) in flames on 23.4.
CA 5394. Driven off by group of destroyers. Total loss possible. 1.5 sank
"Bidewind" (4,956 BRT) in CA 5265. Both ships course 3000. Approach
route to New York course 3000 via CA 5380. Line of buoys from CA
7877 to Ambrose lightship.
5) U 564 sank a freighter of 600 BRT, course 3500 on 3.5 in DB 9434.
4.5 DM 2318 tanker of 7,000 BRT, course 1800. 5.5 in DB 9762 freighter
of 4,000 BRT. Course 1600. Heavy S-bound traffic on the west side of
Florida Straits along 20 meter line. No traffic on the east side. Strong air
slight sea patrol.
b) None.
- 52 -
c) U-boat sightings: DC 7669 - CA 4980 - CA 73 - CA 76 - DB 94.
U-boat attack: DM 7950 - DA 93 - DB 97 - DN 84.
Torpedoed: "Empire Buffalo" (6,404 BRT) in DM 75.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 98 and U 109 are being given freedom of action to the south.
 2) Radio intelligence reports of the last months show that the convoys
proceed mainly along the great circle between the Northern Channel and
Newfoundland. So far these convoys have not been attacked, because
operation in the American area was more worthwhile. As at present 8
boats have sailed within 5 days, of which 3 C.O.'s are experienced in
convoy operation, it is intended to rake the North American convoy route
with these boats, in patrol line from AK 60 to BB 90. If this yields no
results, it is intended to supply the boats in CB from U 116 and operate
them in the American area. Boats will be ordered to keep radio silence
north of 490 N.
c) U 96's escort duty probably according to plan.
U 437 on her way to rendezvous.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 103 1 ship 8,000 BRT
108 - 2 ships 10,500 BRT
752 - 2 ships 11,956 BRT
100 - 1 ship 7,958 BRT
564 - 3 ships 17,000 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
7.May 1942.
I. U 66 - BE 34 U 128 - DG 34 U 402 - CB 92 U 566 - Op(CA)
69 - DO 28 130 - Op(Karib. Meer) 404 - BF 58 569 - BF 48
84 - BD 84 135 - BD 58 406 - BF 49 571 - BF 60
86 - Op(CA) 136 - CB 66 432 - BD 65 572 - BD 89
94 - BF 44 154 - BF 40 437 - CE 21 575 - BD 57
96 - BE 93 155 - DE 89 455 - BB 84 576 - BC 58
98 - Op(DB 60) 156 - DQ 38 459 - CD 63 582 - Op(CA)
646
103 - DC 35 157 - AM 41 502 - DE 93 584 - AN 36
106 - CA 89-Op 158 - BF 47 504 - BF 89 588 - Op(BB)
107 - CC 64 161 - DG 32 505 - BF 60 590 - BF 49
108 - DN 80-Op 162 - Op(EO/EE) 506 - Op(Golf) 593 - BB 84
109 - Op(DB) 201 - CA 31 507 - Op(Golf) 594 - DC 94
124 - BF 45 213 - BC 87 553 - BB 87 653 - BD 84
125 - Op(DL/DM) 333 - Op(DB 90) 558 - Op(CA) 654 - CD 17
126 - DG 22 352 - Op(DC) 564 - Op(DB) 751 - CA 93
752 - CB 19
753 - CC 66
- 53 -
On Return Passage: U 157 - 576 - 752 - 402 - 130 - 575 - 136 - 201 -
654 - 459 - 66 - 84 - 572 - 154 - 571 - 505.
Sailed: U 578 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: U 505 - Lorient; U 571 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 98 situation: Nothing seen from 1st - 4th in area DB 67 - 64 - 61
and on the line joining Savannah and the Bermuda Is. Moonlight nights as
bright as day. 5.5 DB 9111 four-fan miss at destroyer. Heavy D/C's at 18
meters without Asdic. Enemy did not stick it. Am again conditionally fit
for service.
 2) U 507 situation: No traffic as far as Caicos Passage. Live traffic of
small steamers in the old Bahama Channel and Nicolas Channel. Strong
air patrol by day, no air patrol at night, and in the Florida Straits none by
day on Sundays. Heavy steamer and tanker traffic west of Tortuga, course
1350. Sunk: 30.4 DM 1731 "Federad" (2,900 BRT). 4.5 DM 1739
freighter "Olanehe" (2,600 BRT). 5.5 DM 1467 large tanker 9,900 BRT,
probably Sun type, DM 1453 "Joseph M. Cudahy" 6,950 BRT. 7.5 DB
7426 "Antonaio" (5,225 BRT) by gunfire. Misses at ships in DM 6413 -
5222 - 5249 - 4329.
3) U 162 situation: No bauxite or coal traffic observed either off the
coast of Guiana or within the 200 meter line. Apparently nothing entering
or leaving bauxite ports. Lights out.
Sunk: 7.5 "Runciman" (7,000 BRT) in EO 5668, bound for Trinidad
with bauxite. 4.5 in EO 4391 freighter of 3,000 BRT. EO 1999 three-
masted, schooner "Florence M. Douglas Demarara".
4) U 582 fired a triple miss on 28.4 in DD 19 at a fast passenger
steamer. No traffic off Boddy Island up to 7.5. One hydrophone and radar
hunt. Starting return passage, on account of provisions and engines.
5) Submerged S/M fired a four-fan at U 157 in BE 3424.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings in CA 7380 - DN 8476 - CB 3159. Attack in DM
1497.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
c) 1) U 96's escort duty probably according to plan.
2) U 437 on her way to rendezvous.
d) None.
- 54 -
647
V. Reports of Success:
U 507 6 ships 34,344 BRT
U 162 3 ships 10,500 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
8.May 1942.
I. U 66 - EE 36 U 128 - DG 64 U 402 - CC 48 U 569 - BE 61
69 - DO 58 130 - Op(Karib. Meer) 404 - BF 58 572 - BD 99
84 - BD 94 135 - BD 74 406 - BF 44 575 - BD 59
86 - Op(CA) 136 - CC 42 432 - BD 56 576 - BC 68
94 - BE 37 154 - BF 81 437 - CE 14 578 - BF 58
96 - BE 93 155 - DQ 15 455 - BE 78 582 - Op(CA)
98 - Op(DB 60) 156 - DQ 56 459 - CE 27 584 - AN 31
103 - DC 35 157 - AM 71 502 - DE 97 588 - Op(BB)
106 - Op(DC) 158 - BE 86 504 - BE 78 590 - BF 44
107 - CC 58 161 - DG 38 506 - Op(Golf) 593 - CB 21
108 - Op(DN) 162 - Op(EO) 507 - Op(Golf) 594 - Op(DN)
109 - Op(DB 60) 201 - CB 78 553 - Op(BB) 653 - CD 32
124 - BE 64 213 - BC 78 558 - Op(Hatteras) 654 - CD 24
125 - Op(DL) 332 - Op(DB) 564 - Op(DB) 751 - Op(Hatteras)
126 - DG 52 352 - Op(DC) 566 - Op(CA) 752 - CB 25
753 - CC 64
On Return Passage: U 157 - 576 - 752 - 402 - 130 - 575 - 136 - 201 -
654 - 459 - 66 - 84 - 572 - 154 - 582.
Sailed: - . -
 Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 507 sank "Torny" (2,424 BRT) in DB 7885 on 8.5.
2) U 86 chased a steamer, course 3200, in vain in DC 1661 on 4.5. 6.5
no traffic in Cape Fear. 7th and 8th no traffic in Lookout.
3) U 566 saw nothing up to 7.5 in CA 69-53.
4) U 69 sighted a Coast Guard cruiser in ED 1816, course 1650.
5) U 103 chased a fast motor vessel in vain in DC 64, course 3000.
6) U 162 sank "Mont Louis" (1,905 BRT) on 8.5 in EO 1973.
7) U 125 reports heavy NW and SE-bound traffic in the Yucatan Straits.
8) U 333 heavy NS and SN traffic along the east coast of Florida. 6.5 in
the morning sank tanker type "Gulfpride" (12,500 BRT), freighter of 6,000
BRT and tanker type "W.B. Walker" (10,468 BRT) D/C's for 6 hours at 20-
30 meters from 3 destroyers with location gear. Ability to dive reduced.
Protracted return passage.
- 55 -
9) U 352 in DC 23-26-29 and patrolling as far as the coast. Medium
air patrol. 6-8.5 saw a freighter in Onslow Bay along the 25 meter line.
Carefully escorted by S/M chaser(s) and destroyer(s). 9.5 fired a single
and a double miss at a Coast Guard cruiser.
b) None.
c) U-boat sighting DB 9436 - CA 8476 - DB 9847 - CA 2699 - DB 97.
SSS from "Greylock" (7,460 BRT). Attack report from same position.
648
A/c attacked U-boat in BF 4159. Believes a hit scored.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 590 - 569 - 406 - 94 - 124 - 578 - 404 are to form group Hecht.
Boats have been ordered to form a patrol line in that order on 14.5 from
AK 6155 to 9311. Course 2400, speed of advance 5 knots. (See War Log
of 6.5) U 96 will join them as a new boat and take up position AK 6112.
c) U 96 reports S.S. "Portland" not found. This makes the sixth time that
a homeward-bound steamer has been missed at the rendezvous, whereas
the encounter has only succeeded 3 times altogether. It is very difficult to
find them, because:
1) Weather conditions are nearly always very unfavorable (in this case
NW 6).
2) Ships have orders not to search, but just to cross the rendezvous and
proceed at once if they miss.
3) It is forbidden to use beacon signals to facilitate meeting. In practice,
boats which are detached for these duties, are out of operations. For
instance, U 382 (escort boat for Rio Grande) had to leave her operations
area on the American coast after only 8 days, although she had afterward
supplied from U 459, because the condition of her engines and her
provision made it necessary for her to return.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 507 1 ship 2,424 BRT
U 162 1 ship 1,905 BRT
U 333 3 ships 28,500 BRT.
VI. General: None.
- 56 -

9.May 1942.
I. U 66 - BF 12 U 128 - DG 97 U 402 - CC 62 U 569 - BE 16
69 - ED 18 130 - Op(DC) 404 - BF 47 572 - BE 85
84 - BE 75 135 - BC 86 406 - BE 37 575 - BE 48
86 - DC 81 136 - CC 38 432 - BD 47 576 - BD 68
94 - BE 13 154 - BF 60 437 - CD 36 578 - BF 47
96 - CD 37 155 - DP 59 455 - CA 39 582 - CB 43
98 - Op(DB) 156 - DP 96 459 - CE 32 584 - AF 76
103 - DC 52 157 - BF 40 502 - DP 39 588 - Op(BB 70)
106 - Op(Hatteras) 158 - CF 13 504 - CE 26 590 - BE 65
107 - CB 87 161 - DG 98 506 - Op(Golf) 593 - CA 39
108 - Op(DN) 162 - EO 19-Op 507 - Op(Golf) 594 - Op(DN)
109 - Op(DB) 201 - CB 91 553 - Op(CA) 653 - CD 13
124 - BE 13 213 - BB 97 558 - Op(Hatteras) 654 - BD 79
125 - DM 70-Op 333 - DC 47 564 - Op(DB) 751 - Op(Hatteras)
126 - DG 88 352 - DC 14-Op 566 - Op(CA 50) 752 - CC 12
753 - CC 48
On Return Passage: U 157 - 576 - 752 - 402 - 86 - 130 - 575 - 136 - 201
- 654 - 459 - 66 - 582 - 84 - 572 - 154.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 154 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
649
a) 1) U 558 sighted a convoy in CA 7978 (Cape Hatteras 20 meter line),
consisting of a Coast Guard cruiser, 2 gunboats, 4 tankers, 3 steamers,
course 2200, 8 knots. Boat lost contact in the fog. This is the first convoy
to be sighted on the American coast. These are probably convoys which
only round the dangerous area around Hatteras and then dispense again.
2) U 125 sank a freighter of 4,000 BRT on 23.4 in DD 9589, course
3100. 3.5 DM 8998 "San Rafael" (1,973 BRT), course 1150. 4.5 in EB
2128 "Tuscaloosa City" (5,687 BRT), course 3100. 6.5 DM 8797 freighter
of 1,200 BRT, course 1350. 6.5 DM 7937 "Empire Buffalo" (6,404 BRT)
3150. 9.5 "Calgarolite" (11,941 BRT), course 1300 in DM 7919.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings CA 7961 - DB 94 - CA 3470 - CA 2690.
Attack in DM 23 and DB 94.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 69 has been given freedom of action in EC according to fuel
situation.
- 57 -
c) U 437, contrary to orders, reported that she had taken blockade
runner "Muensterland" under escort.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 125 6 ships 31,205 BRT.

VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
10.May 1942.
I. U 66 - EF 12 U 128 - DG 97 U 404 - BF 47 U 572 - BE 86
69 - Op(DO) 130 - Op(DO) 406 - BE 24 575 - BE 48
84 - BE 75 135 - BC 86 432 - BD 47 576 - BD 68
86 - CA 56 136 - CC 38 437 - CD 36 578 - BF 47
94 - BE 13 155 - DP 59 455 - CA 39 582 - CB 45
96 - BD 77 156 - DP 96 459 - BE 79 584 - AM 33
98 - Op(DB) 157 - BF 57 502 - DP 39 588 - Op(BB)
103 - DC 81 158 - CF 13 504 - CE 26 590 - BE 28
106 - Op(DC) 161 - DG 98 506 - Golf-Op 593 - CA 39
107 - CB 67 162 - Op(EE) 507 - Golf-Op 594 - Op(DN)
108 - Op(DN) 201 - CB 91 553 - Op(DB) 653 - CD 13
109 - Op(DB) 213 - BB 97 558 - CA 79 654 - BD 79
124 - BE 13 333 - DC 49 564 - Op(DB) 751 - Op(DC)
125 - DM 80 352 - Op(DC) 566 - Op(CA) 752 - CC 12
126 - DG 88 402 - CC 62 569 - BE 16 753 - CC 48
On Return Passage: U 157 - 576 - 752 - 402 - 86 - 130 - 575 - 136 - 201
- 654 - 459 - 582 - 66 - 84 - 572.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 157 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 333 sank a freighter of 6,000 BRT on 10.5 in DC 6111.
650
2) U 109 situation report: On the coast of Florida further NS traffic in
spurts, little SN traffic. Strong air patrol.
3) U 108 situation: Medium traffic in Windward Passage since 5.5 by
day close under Cape Dumole from and to Caicos Passage. 7.5
unsuccessful attack on passenger freighter. No traffic since then.
4) U 506 has seen nothing in the Gulf of Mexico. Sunk: DM
2650freighter of 3,500 BRT, course 3450. 10.5 "Aurora" (7,050 BRT) in
DA 9288 course 2700.
5) U 69 sank "James E. Newson" by gunfire on 1.5 in CB 94. Course
50.
No traffic in Mona Passage. Misses on 9.5 at Coast Guard cruiser, on
11.5 at freighter in EC 6337. Intends to operate in area around Trinidad.
- 58 -
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings DB 47 - DC 1160 - CA 5470 - DC 1741 - EB 8997 -
BB 1852.
U-boat attack in DC 11 and DA 9280.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 558 and 106 have been given freedom of action from Hatteras south.
U 753 not Hatteras area, but Florida Straits.
c) U 437's escort duty according to plan.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: On Return Passage: U 752 - 402 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 575 - 136 - 201 - 654
U 333 1 ship 6,000 BRT - 459 - 66 - 582 - 84 - 572.
U 506 2 ships 10,500 BRT Sailed: U 172 - Lorient.
U 69 1 ship 671 BRT Entered Port: - . -

- 59 -
Draft signed: Dönitz
(Signature illegible)
Sub-Lieut. and Adjutant

VI. General: None.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

11.May 1942. II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

I. U 66 - DQ 79 U 128 - DT 18 U 406 - BE 13 U 575 - BE 58
69 - OP(EC 63) 130 - DO 10 432 - BC 68 576 - BE 48
84 - BE 82 135 - BC 84 437 - BD 86 578 - BE 29
86 - CB 72 136 - CD 15 455 - CA 61 582 - CB 52
94 - AL 87 155 - DP 84 459 - BE 91 584 - AM 27
96 - BD 48 156 - DQ 79 502 - DP 56 588 - Op(BB)
98 - Op(DB) 158 - CE 35 504 - CE 19 590 - BE 13
103 - DC 78 161 - DT 24 506 - DB 77(Op) 593 - CA 63
106 - Op(DC) 162 - Op(EO) 507 - Op(Golf) 594 - BE 91
107 - CB 82 201 - CC 47 553 - CA 30-Op 653 - CC 33
108 - DN 80(Op) 213 - CB 26 558 - DB 36-Op 654 - BD 82
109 - DB 93 333 - DC 52 564 - Op(DB) 751 - Op(DC)
124 - Op(DN) 352 - Op(DC) 566 - Op(CA) 752 - BC 77
125 - Op(DL) 402 - CD 18 569 - AL 87 753 - CB 91
126 - DS 36 404 - BE 61 572 - BE 93
a) 1) For convoy No. 22 see IVa.
2) U 128 sighted convoy No. 23 at 1930 in DT 7821, NW course. Boat
driven off by 2 escort vessels, and reported last position as DT 7544.
There was no contact up to 0800/12/5 (convoy No. 23).
3) U 136 fired a miss at a 3 masted schooner on 8.5 in CC 4227,
afterwards sank ship by gunfire.
4) U 66 sighted a steamer on 8.5 in EE 3925 and 3695 on a SE course,
in EF 1434 on a SW course.
5) U 566 reported a fast multi-propeller ship in CA 5370 course 1200,
strong air escort with air ship.
b) None.
c) U-boat sighting in CA 5197, DC 1110, DB 74 left center.
Torpedoed: "Cape of Good Hope" (4,950 BRT) in DP 46, "Nicoya"
(5,364 BRT) in BB 1416. St. Lawrence River??
d) None.

IV. Convoy Operations:

a) Convoy No. 22.
651
 U 569, a boat belonging to Group Hecht, on its way to patrol line in VI. General: None.
AK, sighted a convoy at 1149 in AK 9334, course 2700, 8 knots. U 124
and U 94 gained contact at 1259 and 1758 respectively. Contact was ---------------------------------------------------
maintained uninterruptedly until 0430, when it was lost. Up to then the ---------------
following were sunk from the convoy:
By U 124 5 steamers 19,000 BRT 12.May 1942.
1 steamer torpedoed
94 1 steamer 7,000 BRT
569 1 steamer 5,000 BRT I. U 66 - DQ 56 U 128 - EJ 70 U 404

Escort does not seem to be very strong.

Apart from the boats mentioned, U 406, 590 and 96 are operating F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
against the convoy. U 578, 404, also Group Hecht boats, have been
ordered to proceed west at most economical speed, as they are too far off 16 - 31 May 1942
to attack.
b) None. PG30307b
c) U 437's escort duty according to plan.
d) None.

V. Reports of Success: 16.May 1942.

U 136 3 masted schooner 500 BRT assumed
124 5 steamers 19,000 BRT
124 1 steamer 3,000 BRT torpedoed I. U 66 - DF 49 U 126 - DS 66 U 352 - Op(DC) U 569 - AK 71
94 1 steamer 7,000 BRT sunk 68 - BF 49 128 - DS 65 402 - CF 21 576 - BF 68
569 1 steamer 5,000 BRT sunk. 69 - Op(ED) 130 - DP 47 404 - BD 43 578 - BD 43
86 - BC 56 135 - CB 61 406 - AK 78 582 - BD 44
89 - AN 35 136 - BE 75 432 - CB 35 584 - BF 60
- 60 - 94 - BD 12 155 - Op(EE) 437 - BF 85 588 - BB 77
96 - AK 78 156 - EE 65-Op 455 - CA 54-Op 590 - AK 75
98 - Op(DB) 158 - CD 94 502 - Op(EC) 593 - CA 58-Op
103 - Op(DM) 159 - BF 49 504 - CD 78 594 - Op(DN)
106 - Op(DM) 161 - DS 64 506 - DA 94-Op 653 - CB 53
107 - Op(CA) 162 - Op(EO) 507 - DL 23 654 - BA 44
108 - Op(DN) 172 - BE 92 553 - BE 14 751 - Op(DB)
109 - CE 79 201 - BD 77 558 - DC 58 752 - BD 98
124 - AK 74 213 - BA 99 564 - Op(DB) 753 - DC 59
652
 125 - Op(DL) 333 - CB 68 566 - Op(CA)
On Return Passage: U 576 - 437 - 584 - 654 - 136 - 402 - 752 - 201 -
582 - 86 - 333 - 109 - 66 - 507.
Sailed: U 116 - 123 - Lorient.
Entered Port: U 576 - St. Nazaire; U 584 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Situation Reports:
U 162: Nothing in the main harbor and roads of Barbados Island.
Lights out. North half of the island has lights as in peacetime.
U 108: 13.5 DN 5214 double spread by day at an escorted steamer.
Possibly 1 hit. Suspected surface-runner. D/C's after firing torpedoes.
Starting return passage.
U 130: Have been in DO 26, DD 80-70 and DC 90 since 9.5. No
traffic. Suspect traffic has been diverted westwards from the open sea area
with air patrol from the Bahamas and Antilles. Starting return passage.
U 135: Sank freighter Type "Perseus", 10,000 BRT, course north CB
5156.
U 98: Nothing seen in DB 69-66-63. Starting return passage because of
provisions and fuel.
U 103: Nothing seen from Caicos to EB 25. In EB 1930 sank
American SS "Ruthlykes" (2,612 BRT) by gunfire. Course 3300.
U 566: 16.5 DA 9521 double miss at tanker "Daylight", hit forward on
older type 8,000 ton tanker. Little effect. Sank modern tanker of 9,000
BRT. All tankers course W. 17.5 DA 9561 sank loaded tanker of 7,000
BRT. Course 1100.
U 155: Boat lay off Port of Spain for 4 days. During the first days
heavy outward and inward-bound traffic along
- 69 -
653
the routes to Mona, Barbados and Testigos. Last days no traffic day or
night. Strong, but careless air patrol. No methodical sea patrol. No lights.
Sunk: fast freighter of 5,000 BRT.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 9813 - BB 1793 - BB 1474 - DB 5960 - CA
3264 - CB 5272 - DM 1950.
U-boat attack in DA 92. SSS in DN 86, a/c sighted U-boat in BF 9716
and AM 55/58 (not one of ours).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 103 has been ordered to operate in the sea area off New Orleans. U
125 (operations area till now Yucatan Straits) has been given freedom of
action to the N. U 106 same operations area as U 103.
U 432 is operating in the sea area north of 410 and west of 610.
c) 1) U 437's special operation is completed. Boat is putting into St.
Nazaire.
2) U 126 and 128 will meet at 2030 in DS 6961 to deliver spheres for
compasses.
3) U 213 reports special operation carried out (landing an agent).
d) U 68 requests to put into a Spanish port to repair exhaust conduit.
After consultation with Berlin, boat has been ordered to approach El Ferrol
between 0700 and 0800, report a case of distress at sea and try to sail again
within 24 hours.
With immediate effect attack without warning is permitted on all
recognizably armed ships of S. American states including Mexico and
excluding the Argentine and Chile.
V. Reports of Success:
U 507 freighter 10,000 BRT sunk
103 " 2,612 BRT sunk
506 tanker 8,000 BRT 1 hit
506 2 tankers 16,000 BRT sunk
155 - freighter 5,000 BRT sunk.
VI. General: None.
- 70 -
17.May 1942.
I. U 66 - DF 56 U 124 - AK 74 U 213 - BA 90 U 564 - Op(DB)
68 - BF 79 125 - Op(DL) 333 - CC 48 566 - Op(CA)
69 - Op(ED) 126 - DS 95 352 - Op(DC) 569 - AK 71
86 - BC 65 128 - DS 95 402 - BE 88 578 - BC 66
89 - AN 23 130 - DC 91 404 - BD 41 582 - BD 54
94 - BD 12 135 - CB 51 406 - AK 78 588 - Op(BB 70)
96 - AK 78 136 - BE 65 432 - Op(BB) 590 - AK 75
98 - DC 41 155 - ED 98-Op 437 - BF 58 593 - Op(CA)
103 - EB 12-Op 156 - Op(EE) 455 - Op(CA) 594 - Op(DN)
106 - DM 29 158 - CD 87 502 - Op(EC) 653 - CB 57
107 - Op(CA) 159 - BE 47 504 - DE 31 654 - BF 55
108 - DD 78 161 - DS 94 506 - DA 94-Op 751 - Op(DC)
109 - CB 86 162 - EO 13-Op 507 - DL 36 752 - BE 77
116 - BF 58 172 - BE 86 553 - Op(BB) 753 - DC 81
654
123 - BF 58 201 - BE 94 558 - Op(DN)
On Return Passage: U 437 - 507 - 98 - 333 - 108 - 402 - 86 - 109 - 130
- 136 - 201 - 654 - 66 - 582.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 162 has sunk motor vessel "Belt" (6,852 BRT) in EE 7338. Is
proceeding to EE 30, with one air-driven torpedo left. Thinks that a check
of the routes in EE 30-60-70 and EO 10 by 2-3 boats would be worth
while.
U 653 sank a freighter (4,500 BRT) in CB 7230. Course 100. Saw a
freighter on a course of 100 in the same position.
U 107 saw nothing on outward passage via DC 2287 and in CA 8440
and 7600, except a Coast Guard cruiser with 2 patrol vessels in CA 7637.
Submerged by day.
U 156 sank "Barrdale" (5,072 BRT) in EE 63, course 1650 with a/c and
mixed cargo from New York to Basra.
U 507 sighted 3 steamers course E. in DM 1893, one on course W. Boat
was later hunted with D/C's and forced under water by a/c until dark.
U 155 sank a large full tanker with 2 masts course E, left "Challenger"
(7,667 BRT) in a sinking condition in ED 9576 after 2 torpedo hits. Boat
intends to operate on the tanker route along the N. coast of Venezuela
during the full moon period. In reply to query, has been ordered to
observe the 3 mile limit.
Port of Spain suitable for mining operations, as mine hits would be
thought to be torpedo hits.
b) None.
c) U-boat sighting in CA 84 - ED 91 - DC 11 - ED 9193.
SSS from "Fort Binger" (5,250 BRT) in BA 9974.
d) None.
- 71 - organized that so far the boats have not been able to pick it up. A complete
cessation, even for a short time, is unthinkable, as America could not stand
the loss. Most of the sinkings this month have been in the Caribbean, the
Gulf of Mexico and the Florida Straits.
2) Sinkings will be less in June than in May, because of the fewer boats at
sea. In May actually the majority of front-line boats were at sea, owing to
good dockyard conditions (altogether about 70-80% instead of the usual
55%). Now the lack of the boats, detached to the Norway area and of
those whose front-line operation has been delayed by ice conditions in the
Baltic, is making itself felt. The variations in numbers of boats at sea will
IV. Current Operations: not improve until the steady reinforcement of 18-20 boats from home has
a) Group Hecht has been ordered to move off at 1200/18/5 and to be in set in.
the position line of square BC 1891 to 5479 at 1200/22/5 in the same
order. Day's run about 120 sea miles. The reconnaissance line will comb ---------------------------------------------------
the route of the homeward bound convoys. ---------------
As soon as the position line is reached the course of the reconnaissance
will be altered more to the south by a new position line in CC 40, where 18.May 1942.
boats are to supply later on, and will lead through the route of the outward
bound convoys.
b) U 213 has been allocated the same operations area as U 432, i.e. N. of I. U 66 - DF 38 U 124 - AK 74 U 213 - Op(CB) U 564 - Op(DM)
410 and W. of 610. 68 - BF 79 125 - Op(DL) 333 - CD 61 566 - Op(CA)
c) None. 69 - Op(ED) 126 - EH 35 352 - Op(DC) 569 - AK 71
d) Naval Attache reports that U 68 entered El Ferrol at 1000 and left 86 - BD 78 128 - EH 34 402 - BF 73 578 - BC 64
again at 2100. 89 - AF 77 130 - DD 44 404 - BC 61 582 - BD 56
94 - BD 12 135 - CB 44 406 - AK 78 588 - Op(BB)
V. Reports of Success: 96 - AK 78 136 - BF 73 432 - Op(CB) 590 - AK 75
U 162 motor vessel 6,852 BRT sunk
653 freighter 4,500 " "
156 " 5,072 " "
155 2 ships 15,667 " " - 72 -

VI. General:
1) Attacking conditions on the N. coast of America from Cape Fear to
New York have been extremely unfavorable since 20.4. Boats which are
lying immediately under the coast and off the main ports report no traffic.
It appears as if the traffic has temporarily ceased or has been so re-
655

98 - DC 27 155 - Op(EE) 437 - BF 60 593 - Op(CA)
103 - Op(Golf) 156 - EE 66-Op 455 - Op(CA) 594 - Op(DN)
106 - Op(DM) 158 - DF 11 502 - Op(EC) 653 - CB 72
107 - CA 73-Op 159 - BE 87 504 - DF 24 654 - v. Lorient
108 - DD 81 161 - EH 26 506 - Op(Golf) 751 - Op(DC)
109 - CB 98 162 - EE 73-Op 507 - DM 28 752 - BE 92
116 - BF 49 172 - BE 87 553 - Op(CA) 753 - DM 26-Op
123 - BF 44 201 - BF 73 558 - Op(DN)
On Return Passage: U 507 - 98 - 333 - 108 - 752 - 402 - 86 - 109 - 130
- 136 - 201 - 654 - 66 - 582 - 437.
Sailed: U 157 - Lorient; U 134 - 153 - 214 - Kiel.
Entered Port: U 437 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Situation Reports:
U 588 sank a freighter (7,000 BRT) escorted by a flying boat on 17.5 in
BA 98, course 850. 17.5 double miss at "Fort Binger" in BA 99, course
2650 (probably a pistol failure, as steamer reported being torpedoed). Got
away in bad visibility after a gun action.
U 566: Medium single-ship traffic from Boston to Cape Sable. 17.5
double miss at small freighter in CB 1145. Impact heard. (Pistol failure).
Much fog.
U 125: Since 17.5 again heavy traffic in the Yucatan Straits in both
directions. Little sea and air patrol. On the E. coast of Yucatan medium
small coastal steamer traffic.
Sunk: 15.5 DM 8727 "Cayuga" (2,196 BRT), course 700. 18.5 DM
9633 loaded tanker of 9,000 BRT, course 1350. 18.5 DM 7466 "William
J. Salman" (2,618 BRT), course 1350. Total: 9 steamers totaling 44,993
BRT. Starting return passage.
656
U 455: 12.5 heard 2 steamers in fog in CA 65. No traffic in CA 5160
via 5430 from 15-18th. Little patrol; air patrol. 18.5 four-fan at passenger
freighter (12,000 BRT) escorted by 2 a/c in CA 5479, course 200. One
loud explosion heard.
U 502 reports convoy of 2 tankers, 1 freighter, 1 Dutch destroyer in EC
9664, course 1400, 10 knots. Situation: 11.5 DP 46 sank "Cape of Good
Hope" (4,963 BRT), carrying armored cars, a/c fuselages, mines and
ammunition. From New York to Capetown. Nothing seen as far as
Curacao. No traffic at night, by day only convoy reported seen. Suspects
E-bound traffic under the coast.
b) None.
c) Sightings in DA 92 - CA 79 - CA 8447 - CA 7288 - DM 23 - DM 26 -
CA 49 - DB 91.
Torpedoings: "San Ellisec" (8,042 BRT) in EE 8310.
- 73 -
"Ben Lawers" (5,943 BRT) in EE 56. Brazil. Ship in FC 4975
(Italian). U-boat warning for ED 11. (X) American S/M S-20 will be in
BA 9822 on 19.5 speed 8 knots, course unknown (U 566 will operate
against her).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 753 has a new attack area in DA 90. Supply is intended.
U 502 has freedom of action to the E. if own traffic situation is
unfavorable.
 U 156 has been ordered to Martinique. Operation:
1) Attack on American patrol forces.
2) Reconnaissance of harbors and anchorages.
3) Destruction of French warships and merchant vessels putting to sea
so that they won't fall into French hands.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 588 1 freighter 7,000 BRT sunk
125 3 ships 13,814 BRT sunk
502 1 ship 4,963 BRT sunk.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
19.May 1942.
I. U 66 - DG 22 U 125 - DM 72 U 201 - BF 55 U 564 - Op(DB)
68 - CG 15 126 - EH 64 213 - Op(CB-BB) 566 - Op(CA 22)
69 - Op(ED) 128 - EH 56 214 - AO 569 - AJ 95
86 - BD 88 130 - DD 54 333 - CE 17 578 - BC 23
89 - AM 26 134 - AO 352 - Op(DC) 582 - BE 44
94 - BC 36 135 - CA 65 402 - BF 67 588 - Op(BA 99)
96 - BC 32 136 - BF 67 404 - BC 55 590 - AJ 99
98 - DC 31 153 - AO 406 - BC 33 593 - Op(CA)
103 - Op(EB) 155 - Op(EE) 432 - Op(CB) 594 - Op(DN)
106 - Op(DA) 156 - Op(EE) 455 - Op(CA 54) 653 - CA 69
107 - Op(CA) 157 - BF 57 502 - Op(EC 92) 654 - Op(DN)
108 - DD 67 158 - DE 51 504 - DE 18 751 - CA 69
109 - CB 68 159 - CF 12 506 - Op(Golf) 752 - BF 48
116 - BE 69 161 - EH 55 507 - DM 33 753 - DM 19
123 - BE 31 162 - Op(EO) 553 - Op(BB)
124 - AJ 99 172 - CE 21 558 - Op(DN)
657
On Return Passage: U 125 - 507 - 98 - 333 - 108 - 752 - 402 - 86 - 109
- 130 - 136 - 201 - 66 - 582 - 654.
Sailed: U 701 - Brest; U 373 - 87 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: U 654 - Brest.
- 74 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 86 sighted a 2 funneled steamer in 8519, course 3300, high speed.
U 156 sank "Quaker City" (4,961 BRT) in EE 62, course 3100. 4 hits
scored on tanker in EE 5647. Still proceeding at 7 knots.
U 106 has been close under land from Charleston to Key West since
12.5. Traffic completely stopped. Entrance to Palm Beach and Miami
patrolled. Proceeding to DA 90.
U 753 reports a convoy of 24 steamers, escorted by air and sea, DM
2843, course W. Boat driven off by a/c. Last position DM 2769. Course
2500, 8 knots.
U 107 saw nothing in CA 8721 via 8181 to 7366. Freedom of action to
the south.
U 564 situation: Single-ship traffic in the Florida Straits at the
beginning of May. N and S close under the west coast. After the
appearance of U-boats, spasmodically in groups. 14.5 4 ships, 1 destroyer
in DM 2682 N-bound. Traffic stopped for 4 days. 18.5 14 ships 4
destroyers DB 9874 via DM 2682 to the west.
 Opposition: Medium sea patrol, good hydrophones, no Asdic. Strong 3 type VII boats are sailing today for the east coast of the U.S. for a
air patrol. mining operation: U 87 to the entrance to New York, U 373 to the
U 588 sank "Towa" (5,419 BRT), course 500, in DN 5825. Making for entrance to Delaware Bay, U 701 to the entrance to Chesapeake Bay.
DL 60. When the U.S. entered the war the question of whether and where
b) None. mine-laying would be possible on the U.S. coast was considered and it was
c) U-boat sightings: DA 9688 - DC 1119 - DN 8456 - CA 9525 - ED seen that along the whole coast from Fire Island light ship (E. of New
9582 - BB 74. York) to Cape Canaveral there are two strips, divided by a channel of
"Commandate Lyra" (5,052 BRT) torpedoed in ER 79 (Italian). water depth 35-50 meters, which are suitable for mining: a 10 to, in
Attack report: CA 9525. places, 40 mile wide strip immediately along the coast for ground mines
d) None. and another, remote one, parallel to the inner strip, of strongly varying
breadth, for SMA's (S/M-laid shaft mines). Practically all the large ports
IV. Current Operations: on the U.S. E. coast are in this sector of the coast, so that a mining
a) None. operation here is not only possible, but also promises good results.
b) U 588 - 594 new operations area Yucatan Straits. Supply intended. U After the first mine-laying U-boats (for SMA) were ready,
653 - 135 freedom of action in CA, concentrating under the coast. operational use of SMA's was forbidden, so that only TM's (torpedo tube
c) None. mines) could be considered. So far these have not been used. As it was
d) None. more worth while to use the normal (torpedo) U-boats as torpedo carriers.
Now that individual boats, especially off the coast north of Hatteras, have
V. Reports of Success: little success, while a far greater number of U-boats have been operating
U 156 1 ship 4,961 BRT sunk off and south of Hatteras with great success, it seems reasonable to attack
156 tanker 4 hits enemy traffic in the north coastal sector as well. Even a few mines laid
558 ship 5,419 BRT sunk. immediately off the busy entrances to New York (Delaware Bay,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk) are likely to lead to
- 75 - success, as mine-countermeasures are sure to be few, and will also cause a
splitting-up of enemy forces which in some cases will help the torpedo U-
boats.
Subsequent torpedo operations in these areas will not be prejudiced,
firstly because the mines are to be laid in shallow water immediately off
the entrances, where torpedo attacks are unlikely, and secondly because
mines become inactive after 2 months.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------
VI. General:
Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote 12. May 1942

658
Reg. No. Most Secret 1927 A2 c) In all circumstances the Captain is to do his utmost to lay the mines as
far inshore as possible, where they are most likely to be effective i.e. in
"Ambrose Place". The alternative or outer area is only to be fouled when
Most Secret ! all attempts to lay in the area further inshore have failed and further
_______________________ attempts appear useless.
Copy No. ___5___
II. a) "Ambrose Place" lies within the following points:
Mine-laying order "New York" 400 27' N 730 55' W 400 27' N 730 49' W
for U 87 400 28' N 730 45' W 400 23' N 730 54' W
_______________________
b) The boundaries of "Alternative Ambrose Place" are E and S the
MS note: Later Naval War Staff (1st Div.) would not approve this, as circumference of a circle having its center off light and bell buoy 2A (400
diplomatic ships were still sailing. "Boston" was the alternative. 30' N 730 56' W), NW a line from Long Beach off 730 41' W and a
point on the coast from New Jersey off 400 23' N.
c) "New York Outer Place" lies within the circumferences of circles and
I. a) "Ambrose Place" is to be extensively fouled with mines. If this is not 22 sea miles from light and bell buoy 2A.
possible "Alternative Ambrose Place" is to be fouled. If, after repeated
efforts, even this latter cannot be done, fouling is to be done in "New York III. Material: 10 TMC, time setting 60 days, delay clockwork 2 days,
Outer Place" (see diagram). sensitivity 10 milliorsteds, to fire at first crossing, 5 mines with "BIK rot"
(magnetic firing unit, south polarity), 5 mines with BIK blau (magnetic
firing unit with North polarity). Mines should be laid at a depth of 20-30
- 76 - meters, minimum distance apart 1000 meters.

IV. a) Chart D 455 is to be taken.

b) See Standing War Order 492, para 2.

V. A report is to be made as soon as possible after laying, but from at least

50 sea miles away from the place of laying, by short signal. The following
groups to be used:
LTIQ = "Ambrose Place" fouled
b) Enemy traffic is to be observed before the mines are laid, so that, LTGO: = "Alternative Ambrose Place" fouled
within the area ordered, they can be laid at points where greatest success LTJR = "New York Outer Place" fouled.
can be expected. If it is not possible to observe the traffic, or if such
observation does not yield any clues, aim at fouling the area around
Ambrose Lightship and south of this. (signed): JODL
Chief of Operations Department
659
 for B.d.U. II. a) "Overfalls Place" lies within the points:
380 45' N 750 02' W 380 48' N 740 57' W
--------------------------------------------------- 380 45' N 740 53' W 380 42' N 740 59' W
---------------
b) "Alternative Overfalls Place" is bounded: In the NW and N by a line
Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote 12. May 1942 from Rehoboth through a point 380 51' N 740 52.3' W to a point 380 51'
N 740 47' W, in the E and S by the circumference of a circle of 15 sea
Reg. No. Most Secret 1926 A2 miles diameter, having as its center Cape Henlope (380 47.8' N 750
05.5' W).
c) "Outer Delaware Place" lies between the circumferences of circles of
Most Secret ! 15 and 23 sea miles diameter around Cape Henlope. The N. limit is
_______________________ latitude 380 51' N.
Copy No. ___5___
III. Material: 15 TMB, time setting 60 days, delay clockwork 2 days,
Mine-laying order "Overfalls" sensitivity 20 milliorsteds, to fire at first crossing, about half the mines
for U 373 with "BIK rot", the rest with "BIK blau".
_______________________ Mines should be laid at depth of 15-22 meters. Minimum distance apart
1000 meters.
I. a) "Overfalls Place" is to be extensively fouled by mines.
IV. Chart D 457 is to be taken. See Standing War Order 491, para. 3.

- 77 - V. (See page 18 V. For "Ambrose Place" read "Overfalls Place" for New
York Outer Place" read "Alternative Delaware Place".)

(signed): JODL
Chief of Operations Department
for B.d.U.

---------------------------------------------------
If this is not possible "Alternative Overfalls Place" is to be fouled. If, ---------------
after repeated efforts, even this latter cannot be done, fouling is to be done
in "Delaware Outer Place". (see diagram). Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote 12. May 1942
b) (See page 16 I b).
c) (See page 16 I c. for "Ambrose Place" read "Overfalls Place".) Reg. No. Most Secret 1925 A2

660
 III. Material: 15 TMB, time setting 60 days, delay clockwork 2 days,
Most Secret ! sensitivity 20 milliorsteds, to fire at first crossing, about half the mines
_______________________ with "BIK rot", the remainder "BIK blau".
Copy No. ___5___ Mines should be laid at depth of 12-20 meters. Minimum distance apart
1000 meters.
Mine-laying order "Chesapeake"
for U 701 IV. a) Charts D 464, D 458 are to be taken.
_______________________ b) See Standing War Order 491 paras. 16-18 and 492 para 6.

I. a) (See page 16 I a V. (See page 18 V. For "Ambrose Place" read "Chesapeake Place", for
for "Ambrose Place" read "Alternative Chesapeake Place" "Alternative Ambrose Place" read "Alternative Chesapeake Place", for
for "New York Outer Place" read "Baltimore Outer Place".) "Outer New York Place" read "Outer Baltimore Place".)
b) (See place 16 I b)
c) (See page 16 I c. For "Ambrose Place" read "Chesapeake Place".)
(signed): JODL
Chief of Operations Department
- 78 - for B.d.U.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

20.May 1942.

I. U 66 - DG 34 U 124 - BC 23 U 172 - CE 14 U 558 - DN 84-Op

II. a) "Chesapeake Place" lies within the following points:
360 53' N 750 56' W 360 57' N 750 51' W
360 55' N 750 45' W 360 48' N 750 53' W
b) "Alternative Chesapeake Place" is bounded: in the NW by a line
joining the N. tip of Smith Island and a point on the coast 360 45' N, in the
E. and S. by the circumference of a circle of 18 sea miles diameter around
a point 370 N 760 W.
c) "Baltimore Outer Place" lies within the circumferences of circles of 18
and 25 sea miles diameter around a point 370 N 760 W.
661
68 - CF 38 125 - DM 94 201 - v. Lorient 564 - DB 98
69 - Op(ED) 126 - EH 86 213 - CB 24-Op 566 - Op(CA)
86 - BD 94 128 - EH 88 214 - AO 569 - AJ 89
87 - BF 67 130 - DD 61 333 - CE 28 578 - BC 76
89 - AM 19 134 - AO 352 - Op(DC) 582 - BE 54
94 - BC 37 135 - Op(CA) 373 - BF 67 588 - Op(BB)
96 - BC 34 136 - BF 60 404 - BC 49 590 - BC 23
98 - CB 78 153 - AO 406 - BC 34 593 - Op(CA)
103 - Op(DL) 155 - Op(EE) 402 - BF 60 594 - DC 18-Op
106 - DM 42-Op 156 - EE 46-Op 432 - Op(CB) 653 - Op(CA)
107 - CA 81-Op 157 - BF 73 455 - Op(CA) 701 - v. Lorient
 108 - DD 66 158 - DE 44 502 - Op(BC) 751 - Op(BB)
109 - CC 46 159 - CE 34 506 - Op(Golf) 752 - BF 58
116 - BE 82 161 - EH 87 504 - DD 63 753 - DM 43-Op
123 - AM 47 162 - Op(EE) 507 - DC 87
553 - Op(BB)
On Return Passage: U 125 - 564 - 507 - 98 - 333 - 108 - 752 - 86 - 109
- 130 - 201 - 66 - 582 - 136 - 402.
Sailed: U 129 - 67 - Lorient.
Entered Port: U 136 - 402 - St. Nazaire.
- 79 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Situation reports:
Convoy No. 24: see para. IVa.
U 566: 20.5 sighted about 3 ships out of range, in CA 3293. No traffic
in CA 3512. Boat thinks it useless to remain in the area because of
frequent fog. Proceeding to CA 50 and 60.
U 103: Sank "Ogontz" (5,028 BRT) on 19.5 in DL 6271, course 00.
21.5 DM 4748 "Clare" (3,372 BRT) and "Elizabeth" (4,727 BRT) course
1100 sunk. 20.5 heavy traffic in the Yucatan Straits around Antonic to
1600-1300.
U 506: Continued heavy single-ship traffic off Mississippi. Would be
worthwhile for more boats. Constant air patrol. No sea patrol seen. Sunk:
662
19.5 DA 90 fast armed passenger freighter (type Mexico) at 25 meters of
water. 20.5 DA 9553 loaded tanker of 8000 BRT, course 90 deg. DA 9561
miss at 2 freighters on a westerly course. No torpedoes left. All torpedoes
ran well. Total: 8 ships totaling 52,700 BRT, sunk, 1 tanker damaged.
U 108: 21.5 DD 6632 sank tanker "Norlys" (8-9,000 BRT) with last
torpedo and gunfire. 18.5 DD 8614 chased a steamer course 3200, 18
knots in vain.
U 582: Reports a submarine with a surface vessel (not one of our own)
in BE 6189.
U 135: Chased 2 fast tankers, course 320 deg., for 6 hours at full speed
in vain in CA 5926.
U 455: Sighted a fast steamer, 260 deg., 20 knots in CA 6411.
U 588: Am in CB 17. Constant fog in operations area south of Nova
Scotia. Protracted return passage. Am hauling out to the south.
U 98: 19.5 DC 3546 2 freighters, 1 Coast Guard cruiser, 1 patrol vessel,
1 S/M chaser, main course 105 deg., 11 knots. Single shot at Coast Guard
cruiser, tube-runner. Double miss at freighter, of which 1 shot was a
surface runner. Subsequently forced by patrol vessel to submerge until
dark. A few DC's.
U 553: 12.5 BB 1475 sank 2 freighters, together 11,000 BRT.
Torpedoed one 3,000-tonner. Sinking can be assumed. Stood on and off
from BB 1730 to BA 3670. No traffic. Submerged by day. Very careful
air patrol. Sea patrol by a patrol boat type "Rayle". Intend to operate in
BB 75.
U 158: Sank "Carina" (3,303 BRT) in DE 7227.
U 155: 20.5 picked up large convoy off Testigos. Driven off during
night attack. ED 9817 sank ship type "Macubs" (8,400 BRT) in a day
attack by hydrophone data. Torpedo fired at the second tanker probably
failed. 19.5 double
- 80 -
 V. Reports of Success:
U 103 3 ships 13,127 BRT sunk
506 2 ships 13,200 BRT sunk
miss at loaded freighter. Subsequently sea and air reconnaissance. 108 tanker 8-9,000 BRT sunk
Chased for 2 hours by a 4 funneled destroyer and patrol vessel. Am going 553 2 freighters 11,000 BRT sunk
into EE 70 in the moon period. 553 1 freighter 3,000 BRT torpedoed
U 69 reports convoy in ED 9497, course for Trinidad. Boat is on her 158 1 ship 6,303 BRT sunk
way to Martinique, to operate there same as U 156. 155 1 ship 8,400 BRT sunk.
U 159 sighted enemy convoy No. 25 in CF 7385, course 180 deg., speed
8 knots. Boat has received permission to attack if favorable occasion VI. General: None.
arises. To continue on passage at first light and report position. Large-
scale operation not intended.
b) None. - 81 -
c) U-boat sightings: DB 9180, by a/c in AM 1769. U-boat attack in CA
51, "Norland" in DE 4174. SOS from S.S. "Elizabeth" (4,727 BRT) in DL
69.

IV. Current Operations:

a) Convoy No. 24: U 406 sighted a convoy in BC 5321 at 1630, course
west, 8 knots, about 10 ships. Group Hecht was ordered to attack, as at
least 2 boats of the Group must be in the immediate vicinity and the others
can come up in at most 5 hours. The shadower is not to attack until a
second boat has arrived.
U 96 reported at 1800 fog and visibility less than 100 meters. This
makes it very difficult to get the boats up to the convoy. The shadower
was therefore given leave to attack, so that at least such opportunities as
there were would be made use of. At 2053 U 406 reported that she had
been forced to submerge by an a/c and a destroyer. COnvoy's last position
at 1847 in BC 5314, course 240 deg. Convoy in a fog bank. Group Hecht
received orders to continue searching independently and if no contact was
made, to break off searching in time to reach a new patrol line from BC
5144 to 5732 by 0900/21/5. Encounter with a convoy bound for England
is possible. If contact is made, to operate against it. No further sighting
reports were received by morning.
b) - d) None.
663
21.May 1942.
I. U 66 - CF 79 U 123 - AM 17 U 162 - Op(EO) U 553 - Op(BB 14)
67 - BF 55 124 - BC 24 172 - CD 37 558 - DN 77
68 - CF 28 125 - DN 78 201 - v. Brest 564 - DC 75
69 - ED 68-Op 126 - ER 27 213 - Op(CB) 566 - Op(CA 32)
86 - BE 74 128 - ER 19 214 - AN 34 569 - BC 24
87 - BF 73 129 - BF 55 333 - CE 35 578 - BC 77
89 - AM 47 130 - DE 17 352 - Op(DC) 582 - BF 49
94 - BC 53 134 - AN 34 373 - BF 49 588 - CB 17
96 - BC 54 135 - Op(CA 59) 404 - BB 93 590 - BC 27
98 - CB 73 153 - AN 34 406 - BC 52 593 - Op(CA)
103 - Op(DL 65) 155 - ED 98 432 - Op(CB) 594 - DN 65
 106 - DL 62 156 - Op(EE) 455 - CA 64-Op 653 - Op(CA)
107 - Op(DC) 157 - BF 74 502 - Op(EC) 701 - BF 55
108 - BE 41 158 - DE 74 504 - DD 56 751 - Op(CA 79)
109 - CC 29 159 - CF 75 506 - DB 77 752 - BF 60
116 - BE 74 161 - ER 19 507 - DC 67 753 - DL 39

On Return Passage: U 89 - 588 - 506 - 125 - 564 - 507 - 98 - 335 - 108

- 86 - 109 - 130 - 66 - 582.
Sailed: U 408 - Kiel. Sunk: 16.5 freighter course N. 19.5 EC 13 freighter course 1100.
Entered Port: U 201 - Brest; U 752 - St. Nazaire. Total 10,000 BRT. Intend to operate from the north coast of Venezuela
eastwards.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. b) None.
c) English a/c reported attacking a U-boat in AM 2771.
III. Reports on the Enemy: U-boat sightings: DB 97 - CA 54 - CA 66.
a) U 107 requests EB 20 as attack area, if supply is possible. U-boat attack in CA 6641.
U 753 is proceeding via DM 18 to DA 92. Requests supply. d) Canadian and American Fleet Air Arm intends to carry out exercises
U 156 situation: W. bays of Martinique from Precheur-Perle to roads of with S/M's on 25.5.
main harbor well darkened. Nothing is to be distinguished. In Fort de
France: "Bearn", 5 tankers, 3 passenger freighters. Sank "Presidente IV. Current Operations:
Trugille" (1,600 BRT) 310 deg. off the entrance. No U.S. ships seen. a) Convoy No. 24 has not been picked up again. OPeration is being
U 159 reports successes from convoy No. 25. 5 hits on 4 steamers. 3 broken off.
steamers left sinking, fourth steamer probably sunk. Total: about 14- b) 1) U 107 has been ordered to proceed to operations area DM 70-80-90
18,000 BRT. D/C's. Boat continuing on passage. via DM 60-DN 76. Supply is intended.
U 172 sighted 2 independent ships in CE 5783. Course SE. Boat's 2) New attack areas: U 751 operations area as reported. U 352 sea area
intention has been called to ban on attacks in Route A. around Hatteras, U 432 CB 45-54. U 213 CB 47-49. U 566 CA 93 - CB
U 588 sank "Plow of Citty" (6,000 BRT) on 21.5 in CA 65. Course 72. U 653 CA 95 - CB 74. U 455 CA 97 - CA 99. U 135 DC 22 - DC 31.
Trinidad-New York. Boats will form Group Pfadfinder.
U 432 sank fishing vessel "Foam" (308 BRT) with gunfire on 17.5 in c) - d) None.
BB78. Found nothing right up to the coast, except motor fishing vessels.
Radio beacons as in peacetime since 17.5. High pressure weather V. Reports of Success:
conditions with constant fog. U 159 3 ships sunk
U 751: no traffic CA 79 to DN 16. Non traffic in Crooked Passage. 159 1 ship left sinking = 14-18,00 BRT.
Little sea and air patrol. 588 1 ship 6,000 BRT.
432 1 ship 308 BRT.
- 82 - 751 2 ships 10,000 BRT .
664
 156 1 ship 16,000 BRT.
VI. General:
The impression that the traffic situation in the area N. of the
Florida Straits (of 17.5) has altered has been further confirmed within the
last few days.
a) Convoys, admittedly so far only a few small ones, have been observed
off Cape Hatteras and along the route to the Bermuda Islands.
b) Hardly any traffic at all has been observed along the coast, and even
off the ports and bays only a few single ships.
c) Foreign press reports talk of a complete stoppage of traffic between
North and South America, though this can hardly be considered possible.
At all events recent efforts to find traffic in this area have met with
no success. The newly set up group "Pfadfinder" (see IV b 2) is therefore
intended to establish whether traffic from North American ports from and
to Central and South America is sailing further out to sea. Boats which
have so far had little success off
- 83 -
the coast of Nova Scotia on account of very frequent fog, have been
used for this.
It will not be possible to cover all routes leading from Trinidad to
Halifax or from Pernambuco to Chesapeake Bay. For this the group will if
necessary have to be redistributes later on.
--------------------------------------------------
----------------
665
22.May 1942.
I. U 66 - CF 59 U 123 - AM 31 U 162 - Op(BE) U 553 - Op(BB)
67 - BF 49 124 - BC 57 172 - CD 55 558 - Op(DN)
68 - CF 42 125 - DN 81 213 - CB 18 564 - DC 57
69 - Op(BD) 126 - ER 57 214 - AN 23 566 - Op(CA)
86 - BE 64 128 - ER 49 333 - CF 13 569 - BC 54
87 - BF 71 129 - BF 45 352 - Op(CA) 578 - CC 19
89 - BE 31 130 - CC 87 373 - BF 47 582 - BF 58
94 - BC 81 134 - AN 23 404 - BB 97 588 - CA 66
96 - BC 57 135 - Op (CA) 406 - BC 81 590 - BC 57
98 - CB 58 153 - AF 79 408 - AO 72 593 - Op(CA)
103 - Op(DL) 155 - Op(EE) 432 - CB 15 594 - Op(DN
106 - DL 22 156 - ED 65-Op 455 - Op(CA) 653 - CA-Op
107 - DC 46 157 - BE 98 502 - Op(EC) 701 - BF 49
108 - DE 13 158 - DD 94 504 - DD 57 751 - EC 75-Op
109 - CD 17 159 - CE 97 506 - DL 35 753 - Op(DL)
116 - BD 86 161 - ER 72 507 - DC 63
On Return Passage: U 89 - 588 - 506 - 125 - 564 - 507 - 98 - 333 - 108
- 86 - 109 - 130 - 66 - 582.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 588 reported firing at a tanker in EB 3819. No torpedoes left, gun
unserviceable.
U 432 sank "Zurichmoor" (4,455 BRT) in CB 1928, course 1650.
U 158 reported sinking "F.B. Baird" (1,276 BRT) by gunfire. Cargo of
bauxite for Canada. Chased a freighter type "Talaboot", 1500, in vain.
U 566 sighted a destroyer, course 700, 15 knots in CA 6614.
 U 69 reported her intention to dive in the S. sector of "Fort de France".
21.5 sank "Torondoc" (1,927 BRT) in ED 68, course 1100. I. U 66 - CF 61 U 123 - AF 77 U 162 - Op(EO) U 553 - Op(BB)
b) None. 67 - BF 47 124 - BC 76 172 - CE 75 558 - EB 37-Op
c) U-boat sightings: DN 7660 - DA 91 - EB 3855 - DB 64 - DA 91. 68 - CE 68 125 - DN 56 213 - CB 45 564 - DC 53
SSS from American "S.S. Wm. Boyce Thompson" (7,061 BRT) in EB 69 - Op(ED) 126 - FC 21 214 - AF 74 566 - CA 93-Op
38. 86 - BF 44 128 - ER 78 333 - BE 92 569 - BC 73
87 - BE 92 129 - BE 66 352 - Op(CA) 578 - CC 17
- 84 - 89 - BE 63 130 - CC 71 373 - BE 68 582 - v. Lorient
94 - BC 87 134 - AF 75 404 - CB 65 588 - CB 43
96 - BC 87 135 - CA 86 406 - BC 87 590 - BC 76
98 - CB 64 153 - AF 77 408 - AO 36 593 - Op(CA)
103 - Op(DL) 155 - Op(EE) 432 - CB 19 594 - Op(DL)
106 - Op(DA) 156 - Op(EE) 455 - CA 91 653 - CA 67
107 - DC 74 157 - CF 37 502 - Op(EC) 701 - BE 91
108 - CC 86 158 - DD 88 504 - DD 72 751 - Op(ED)
109 - CD 16 159 - DG 24 506 - DM 18 753 - Op(DA)
116 - BD 78 161 - FC 11 507 - DD 18
English destroyer reported oil patch in BB 9395.
A/c sighted U-boats in AF 7556 - AM 3192.
U-boat attack in DN 84. On Return Passage: U 582 - 89 - 123 - 588 - 506 - 125 - 564 - 507 - 98
- 333 - 108 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 66.
IV. Current Operations: Sailed: - . -
a) - d) None. Entered Port: - . -

V. Reports of Success: II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

U 455 1 ship 4,455 BRT sunk
158 1 ship 1,276 BRT sunk III. Reports on the Enemy:
69 1 ship 1,927 BRT sunk. a) Situation reports:
1) U 69: fired on off "Fort de France" by an incoming freighter. Fired a
VI. General: None. single miss. U 69 and U 156 have again been reminded that their main
task is to attack U.S. warships and steamers putting to sea.
--------------------------------------------------- 2) U 106: single-ships traffic "San Antonio-Florida" Straits. Lively air
--------------- activity up to 50 miles off the coast. Sea patrol along the coast. 21.5 DM
4157 "Faja de Oro" (6,067 BRT). 23.5 double miss at escorted whale-
23.May 1942. factory ship. Proceeding to DA 93.
3) U 162: Unexplained miss at tanker in EE 9233. Course
666
 c) Group Hecht boats have been ordered to supply with fuel from U 116
- 85 - from 1000/26/5 in CC 6555. Boats are to leave the patrol line in time to
ensure their arriving there then.
d) None.

V. Reports of Success:
U 106 1 ship 6,067 BRT sunk
155 1 ship 3,000 BRT sunk
588 1 ship 4,545 BRT sunk.

VI. General: None.

1000, 8 knots. Am in contact.
4) U 155 reported sinking a 3,000 BRT freighter in ED 9314, course ---------------------------------------------------
SW. Kingstown roads (St. Vincent) empty. ---------------
5) U 593: Slight traffic off Ambrose lightship, incoming in the evening,
outgoing in the morning. No traffic, no patrol at night. 19.5 double miss 24.May 1942.
at a passenger freighter in CA 2874, coming in from the south. Upper
deck compartments crushed by D/C's.
6) U 588 sank "Margot" (4,545 BRT) with her last air-driven torpedo I. U 66 - CF 36 U 123 - AF 79 U 162 - BE 92-Op U 553 - Op(CA)
and gunfire, course 120 deg. to Capetown. Starting return passage. 67 - BE 95 124 - BC 79 172 - DF 31 558 - EB 23
7) U 333 sighted in BF 7433 periscope of foreign S/M. 68 - CF 82 125 - DN 38 213 - Op(CB) 564 - DC 38
b) None. 69 - ED 93-Op 126 - FC 43 214 - AM 32 566 - Op(CA)
c) U-boats were sighted in CA 5716 - CA 57 - DN 72. By a/c in AM 86 - BF 49 128 - FC 17 333 - BF 73 569 - BC 76
3384. 87 - BE 83 129 - BE 97 352 - Op(CA) 578 - CB 63
d) None. 89 - BF 49 130 - CC 49 373 - BE 67 588 - CB 48
94 - CC 33 134 - AM 32 404 - CB 53 590 - BC 79
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 161 - 128 - 126 are being allocated as attack areas strips of equal
width NNE of the coast between points FB 49 and FB 99. To search for - 86 -
traffic close up to the coast. Operation permitted up to 250 miles to
seaward. There are 4 Italian U-boats to the SE.
2) U 404 is joining Group Pfadfinder and has been allocated squares CB
45 - 51 - 52 as operations area.

667

96 - BC 87 135 - Op(DC) 406 - CC 33 593 - CA 29-Op
98 - CB 63 153 - AM 32 408 - AN 31 594 - DM 99
103 - Op(DL) 155 - BD 93-Op 432 - Op(CB) 653 - Op(CA)
106 - DA 95-Op 156 - Op(EE) 455 - Op(CA) 701 - BE 83
107 - DN 33 157 - CF 52 502 - Op(EC) 751 - Op(ED)
108 - CD 76 158 - DO 23 504 - DC 96 753 - Op(DA)
109 - CD 31 159 - DG 14 506 - DM 28 582 - v. Brest
116 - CD 34 161 - FB 63 507 - DD 24
On Return Passage: U 89 - 588 - 558 - 506 - 125 - 564 - 507 - 98 - 333
- 108 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 66.
Sailed: U 332 - La Pallice.
Entered Port: U 582 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 162 situation: No traffic for 5 days in EE 30 and 60. EE 7160
appears to be a focal point which ships reach at first light. From there
traffic fans out to Gibraltar, Freetown and to the SE. Incoming ships are
probably in the same area at dusk. EO 18 seems a good place to pick up
Guiana coastal traffic. Starting return passage.
2) U 432 sighted a freighter, course 1900, 9 knots in CB 5777. Lost
contact through a Diesel defect.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings in: CA 79 - DB 4480 - EC 26. Attack in DM 8158.
SSS from American S.S. "Beatrice" (3,451 BRT) in EC 14. Ship
requests assistance from a/c as quickly as possible. Torpedo report from
Norwegian tanker "Haaken Hauan" (6,582 BRT) in DA 92.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
668
a) None.
b) U 578 will join group Pfadfinder and operate E. of the disposition
ordered as far as the longitude of CB 5333.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
- 87 -
25.May 1942.
I. U 66 - BF 49 U 123 - Bergen U 162 - EF 45 U 507 - DD 23
67 - CF 32 124 - CC 35 172 - DF 28 553 - Op(BB)
68 - CE 76 125 - DO 14 213 - Op(CB) 558 - DM 99
69 - Op(ED) 126 - Op(FB) 214 - AM 23 564 - DD 15
86 - BF 60 128 - Op(FB) 332 - BF 50 566 - Op(CA)
87 - BE 57 129 - CF 31 333 - BF 90 569 - CC 35
89 - BF 50 130 - CC 52 352 - Op(CA) 578 - Op(CB)
94 - CC 39 134 - AM 23 373 - BE 58 588 - CB 55
96 - CC 38 135 - Op(DC) 404 - Op(CB) 590 - CC 38
98 - CC 24 153 - AM 25 406 - CC 38 593 - Op(CA)
103 - Op(DL) 155 - Op(EE) 408 - AE 99 594 - DM 94
106 - Op(DA) 156 - Op(EE) 432 - CB 54 653 - Op(CA)
107 - DN 39 157 - CF 72 455 - Op(CA) 701 - BE 81
108 - CD 59 158 - DD 16 502 - Op(EC) 751 - Op(ED)
 109 - BD 79 159 - DF 38 504 - DC 97 753 - Op(DA)
116 - CD 43 161 Op(FB) 506 DM 34
On Return Passage: U 89 - 123 - 588 - 162 - 506 - 125 - 564 - 507 - 98
- 333 - 108 - 86 - 109 - 130.
Sailed: U 584 - Brest.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: - . -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 156 torpedoed an old U.S. destroyer off Fort de France. Foredeck
torn away, destroyer got away into the inner harbor. No net barrage
observed. It is possible to push forward to the main target on a bright
night.
Boat has been advised that ships in the main harbor may not be
attacked.
U 502 situation: No traffic in the area EC 96 - ED 74 and 77. 22.5
neutral illuminated tanker in EC 9351. Course for Aruba. Sunk: 24.5
"Goncalves Dias" (4,996 BRT), armed, without markings, in EC 6148,
course 3100. No traffic via EC 37 to 66. Am proceeding to Trinidad area.
U 753: Florida Straits: Nothing on the E. side. DM 2615 U-boat hunt
with Asdic, a few D/C's. Traffic is being held back, going over to
convoys. 19.5 convoy in DM 2841. False approach.
Gulf: DM 18 - DA 93 slight air activity. In DM 1799 gunboat, air
activity and an escorted steamer, course S. off New Orleans outward
bound traffic in bunches by day, mainly W-bound. Medium air activity,
slight sea patrol. Sunk: 20.5 DL 6639 "George Calvert" (6,000 BRT),
course 2300. British schooner (326 BRT) blew up. 25.5 hit on tanker
"Haaken Hauan". Got away onto the beach, as boat was driven off by S/M
chaser. Intend to operate in DA 91.
U 103: Heavy spasmodic traffic DM 70-80. Course 110-1300. Sunk:
"Samuel Brown" (6,625 BRT). 24.5 "Hector" (1,828 BRT) DM 8421.
26.5 "Alco Carrier" (7,000 BRT) in EB 3121.
669
- 88 -
b) None.
c) U-boat sighting: CA 54 - DB 3367 - DB 3360 - CA 8493.
U-boat attack: CA 51 - DA 9282 - ED 6645.
Coast Guard vessel "General" reported action with U-boat in CA 3590.
SSS in EC 2172 from "Governor John Lind" (3,431 BRT). English a/c
reported U-boat in AN 13.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 159 and U 68 have been allocated the sea area off Colon as attack
area, concentrating close up to the coast. Boats will arrive there about 2-3
days before new moon.
2) Group Hecht:
The group will supply from U 116 from 26.5. It is intended (contrary
to original plans) to operate this group against convoys again after it has
supplied, as the traffic situation in the area Newfoundland to Florida
Straits is still not clear and chances of success are few in this area because
of fog conditions and limited stocks of fuel.
The best disposition for this group will be in the area AK 50-90,
because, according to radio intelligence reports during the last 4 months,
inward and outward bound convoys overlap here.
On their way to this area the boats will proceed along the England-
Halifax convoy route running S. of the great circle. It might be possible to
pick up an outward bound convoy here. Group has received the following
orders: After supplying, move off, one boat at a time, and form a patrol
line in this order from BC 7559 to CC 3372. The last boat is to report by 89 - v. Lorient 130 - CC 63 352 - Op(CA) 578 - CB 58-Op
short signal 12 hours before reaching position. When this report has been 94 - CC 65 134 - AM 42 373 - BE 73 584 - v. Lorient
received boats will be ordered to move off and rake to the NE. 96 - CC 65 135 - Op(DC) 404 - Op(CB) 588 - CB 62
c) Group Hecht, comprising U 590 - 406 - 94 - 124 - 569 - 96 and U 116 98 - CC 34 153 - AL 38 406 - CC 65 590 - CC 65
will be in CA 65 at 1000/26/5. Boats will receive further details for 103 - EB 31-Op 155 - Op(BE) 408 - AM 26 593 - Op(CA)
supplying with fuel. 106 - Op(DA) 156 - ED 62-Op 432 - Op(CB) 594 - Op(DL)
d) None. 107 - DN 49 157 - CE 95 455 - Op(CA) 653 - Op(CB)
108 - CE 17 158 - DN 36 502 - EC 93-Op 701 - BE 71
V. Reports of Success: 109 - BD 88 159 - DF 28 504 - DN 22 751 - Op(ED)
U 156 destroyer torpedoed 116 - CC 65 161 - Op(FB) 506 - DN 12 753 - DA 94-Op
502 1 ship 4,996 BRT
753 2 ships 6,326 BRT
753 1 ship 6,582 BRT torpedoed On Return Passage: U 214 - 123 - 89 - 588 - 558 - 162 - 506 - 125 - 564
103 3 ships 15,453 BRT. - 507 - 98 - 333 - 108 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 66.
Sailed: - . -
VI. General: None. Entered Port: U 333 - La Pallice; U 86 - Brest.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

- 89 -
26.May 1942.
I. U 66 - BF 55 U 123 - AN 31 U 162 - BF 27 U 507 - CC 77
67 - CF 25 124 - CC 65 172 - DF 43 553 - Op(CA)
68 - CD 99 125 - DO 22 213 - Op(CB) 558 - DN 84
69 - Op(ED) 126 - Op(FB) 214 - AM 15 564 - DD 22
86 - v. Brest 128 - Op(FB) 332 - BF 81 566 - Op(CA)
87 - BE 73 129 - CF 24 333 - BF 68 569 - CC 65
670
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 578 reports sinking "Polyphemus" (6,269 BRT), course N. in CB
5731. Cargo of wheat from Panama via Halifax to England.
In CB 5768 lost sight of a ship, showing lights, in rain gusts. Course
NW.
U 213 fired a 3 fan miss at a vessel type "Seastas" in CA 6645, course
3000, after chasing her for 8 hours. Line of sight transmission failed.
U 404 in reply to a query, reported no traffic, no fog.
U 593 situation: New Jersey coast very heavy spasmodic traffic by day
along the 10 meter line, with strong air and slight sea escort. 25.5 CA
5165 5 misses at a bunch of tankers, due to a failure in the fire-control
system. Double hit on a tanker of 6,000 BRT. Probably sunk. Boat
further reported at 2140 1 carrier and 2 destroyers in CA 5931, course W.,
medium speed. Lost contact at 0142 owing to high enemy speed. Main
course about 2400, strong air escort. Starting protracted return passage.
U 594 situation: 22.5 lively air activity by sea planes. No sea patrol.
EB 30, 20, 10 slight to medium traffic. No patrol. 25.5 EB 37 one double
and 4 single misses at a tanker (7,000 BRT), good data, at times minimum V. Reports of Success:
range. Broke off gun action because of seaway. 26.5 EB 1311 2 single U 578 1 ship 6,269 BRT
misses, one a tube-runner, at "Alcoa Cutter", range 300 meters. U 593 1 ship 6,000 BRT.

- 90 - VI. General:
Special operation U 202 and U 584:
Boats have orders to land 4 or 5 agents each on the American coast.
See Appendix: Orders for special operation.
Duties of this group are:
1) Sabotage attacks on targets of economic importance for the war.
2) To stir up discontent and lower fighting resistance.
3) To recruit fresh forces for these duties.
4) To re-establish disconnected communications.
5) To obtain information.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DC 1220 - CA 54 - CA 38 - CA 56-10 - CA 3785 - ---------------------------------------------------
EL 26 - CA 5189 - CA 54 - ED 66. ---------------
SSS from unidentified ship in EC 24.
American S.S. "Atena" (4,639 BRT) torpedoed in DL 25. Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote 23. May 1942
d) None.
Reg. No. Most Secret 2090 A2
IV. Current Operations:
a) None. Most Secret !
b) New attack areas: U 576 - CB 45 - 46 - 54. U 404 and U 432 strips
of equal breadth from CB 43 and 51 lower edge respectively up to the fog Copy No. ___ ___
boundary.
c) Group Hecht supplying from U 116. Order
d) On the orders of Naval War Staff (First Division) 2 more boats are
being detached to the Norway area, because of enemy operations to be
expected there. Now that U 134 has requested to enter a dockyard to - 91 -
repair a/c bomb damage.
U 214 and 408 remain available. U 214 is a mine-laying boat and had
been earmarked for a torpedo operation in the American area, use of
SMA's not being permitted. Both boats had been ordered to make for
Narvik at high cruising speed.

671
 MOST SECRET

for Special Operation "U 202, U 584".
1) The special operation is the landing, unnoticed, of agents.
2) For point at which agents are to be landed see appendix 1a for "U. . . . . .
. .", 1b for "U. . . . . . . . ".
3) Time of landing is a new moon night in the middle of June. The special
operation is therefore to be carried out first. Opportunities of attack on the
way out are however to be taken.
4) "U 202" will land group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"U 584" will land group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5) After completing the special operation boat is to move away 100 miles
and report: "Special operation completed," by a short signal in accordance
with appendix 1a or 1b.
Appendix 1a to B.d.U.'s Most Secret 2090 23.5.42
Appendix 1a to Order for Special Operation "U 202, U 584"
for "U. . . . . . . ."
1) Agents are to be landed at one of the following points:
a) On the coast of New Jersey S. of Seaside Park at 390 54' N 740 05' W.
Short signal: UDZI.
b) On the coast of Long Island off Easthampton at 400 57' N 720 09.5'
W. Short signal: UDYH.
c) On the coast of New Jersey off Peck Beach (near Ocean City) at 390
15' N 740 36' W. Short signal: UDWF.
2) 1) b) seems the best place, 1) c) the worst.

Distribution:
(signed): JODL B.d.U. Copy No. 1
Chief of Operations Department 10th U-Flotilla " No. 2-3
Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote Reserve " No. 4

Distribution: ---------------------------------------------------
B.d.U. Copy No. 1 ---------------
10th U-Flotilla " Nos 3-4
Spare " No. 5 Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote
Log " No. 2
Annex to Reg. No. Most Secret 2090 A2

--------------------------------------------------- MOST SECRET

---------------
Appendix 1b to B.d.U.'s Most Secret 2090 23.5.42
Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote Appendix 1a to Order for Special Operation "U 202, U 584"

Annex to Reg. No. Most Secret 2090 A2

- 92 -
672
 96 - CC 65 135 - Op(DC) 432 - Op(CB) 594 - EB 13-Op
98 - CD 16 153 - AM 47 455 - Op(CA) 653 - Op(CA)
103 - Op(DM) 155 - Op(ED) 502 - Op(ED) 701 - BD 93
106 - Op(DA) 156 - Op(ED) 504 - DN 15 751 - Op(ED)
107 - DN 79 157 - CE 88 506 - DC 89 753 - Op(DA)
108 - CB 24 158 - DN 29 507 - CC 84
109 - BD 98 159 - DF 45 553 - Op(BB)
116 - CC 65 161 - Op(FB) 558 - DN 67
for "U. . . . . . . ." 123 - AO 44 162 - EF 32 564 - CC 41

1) Agents are to be landed at one of the following points:

a) On the coast of S. Georgia off Jacksonville Beach at 300 14' N 810 22' On Return Passage: U 134 - 123 - 588 - 162 - 506 - 125 - 564 - 507 - 98
W. Short signal: UDYH. - 108 - 109 - 130 - 66 - 89 - 153.
b) On the coast of North Carolina off South Port at 330 54' N 780 05' W. Sailed: U 202 - Brest.
Short signal: UDZI. Entered Port: U 66 - Lorient; U 89 - Brest.
2) 1a appears to be better than 1b.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
Distribution:
B.d.U. Copy No. 1 III. Reports on the Enemy:
10th U-Flotilla " No. 2-3 a) 1) U 134 sighted a convoy from AL 96 on a W. course at low speed at
Reserve " No. 4 1111. 11-15 steamers. Boat was ordered not to take action but to continue
passage to W. France; U 153, who asked for the enemy's course at 1228,
received the same order.THe convoy is very near square BE, where U-
--------------------------------------------------- boats are forbidden to attack as Q ship convoys are suspected.
--------------- U 506 sank loaded armed freighter "York Moor" (4,457 BRT) in DC
5844 by gunfire. Course 340 deg., destined for New York. U 135 has seen
27.May 1942. nothing since 21.5.
U 653 no traffic CA 7660 and 90. Careful air patrol at night, patrol
vessels with Asdic by day.
I. U 66 - BF 61 U 124 - CC 65 U 172 - DE 66 U 566 - Op(CA) U 455 CA 56 single
67 - CF 19 125 - DD 88 213 - CA 66-Op 569 - CC 65
68 - DF 23 126 - Op(FB) 332 - BF 71 578 - CB 54-Op - 93 -
69 - Op(ED) 128 - Op(FB) 352 - Op(CA) 584 - BF 55
87 - BF 71 129 - CF 18 373 - BE 71 588 - CC 18
89 - v. Brest 130 - CD 43 404 - Op(CB) 590 - CC 65
94 - CC 65 134 - AL 92 406 - CC 65 593 - CA 59
673

miss at vessel type "Strathallan". 27.5 CA 89 1 destroyer and 1
neutral seen.
U 751: no traffic on the coast EC 78 to EC 91. Little air activity. ED
14-16 chased a zigzagging fast freighter in vain. Starting return passage.
U 155: sank a loaded freighter of 5,000 BRT in EE 46. Otherwise, no
traffic. Operating in the open sea area as compass is out of order. So far
39,916 BRT.
U 753: Gulf worthwhile because of main tanker route. Little seen
from DA 9344 south. Fast tanker traffic to the W. All large ships have air
escort. Zig-zagging in legs of 15 nm. 25.5 only 2 small steamers seen in
DA 9347. 26.5 single miss at tanker.
b)
None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 6933 - CA 9938 - DA 9837 - CA 2695 - CA
6654 - DN 76/81 - DM 2749.
Attack in ED 69 left top - CA 29 right top - DA 94.
SSS from U.S. freighter "Exhibitor" (6,736 BRT) in CA 6912.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) The following will occupy attack area as shown: U 161 square FB
64 - 65 - 66 and a strip to the south, concentrating on the coast. U 128
square FC 40. U 126 strip from FC 54 - 55 - 56 along the coast to the
north as far as the new boundary, i.e. 400 miles along the Brazilian coast.
2) Group Pfadfinder is being dissolved and distributed over the
following attack areas:
U 455 - 566 - 593 square CB 48 - 49 - 57 - 72 - 73 - 81.
U 352 and 136 strip from the right edge of the squares CA 85-88 and
DC 21 to the coast.
U 578 - 213 - 653 sectors of equal size E to S of New york.
674
The disposition of Group Pfadfinder did not give any fresh information
on the traffic situation. It confirmed that traffic which proceeds to Cape
Sable from the south comes from South African ports and from Colon, as
does also traffic approaching New York on 300-3200.
U 593's report of very heavy spasmodic traffic on the coast of New
Jersey indicates that the Americans have apparently ended their temporary
stoppage of traffic. Because of fuel it is necessary to get the boats as
quickly as possible into the busy area along the coast, as soon as moon
conditions permit them to come close up (full moon 30.5).
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 June 1942
PG30308a
1.June 1942.
I. U 67 - CD 93 U 126 - Op(FC) U 202 - BE 67 U 564 - BD 76
68 - DP 24 128 - Op(FC) 213 - Op(CA) 566 - Op(CB)
69 - Op(ED) 129 - DF 23 214 - BE 38 569 - BC 86(Op)
87 - BC 92 130 - BE 74 332 - CE 32 578 - Op(CA)
94 - BC 82(Op) 134 - BF 60 373 - BC 68 584 - BE 54
96 - BC 85(Op) 135 - Op(DC) 404 - CA 89 588 - BD 84
98 - BE 71 155 - DQ 71 406 - BC 57(Op) 590 - BC 82(Op)
103 - DN 57 156 - Op(EE) 432 - Op(CB) 593 - Op(CB)
106 - Op(DA) 157 - DE 36 455 - CB 65 594 - Op(DL)
107 - Op(DM) 158 - DM 15 502 - Op(ED) 653 - Op(CA)
108 - BF 60 159 - DP 28 504 - DL 53 701 - BC 91
109 - BF 49 161 - Op(FB) 506 - DD 38 751 - DP 23
116 - CE 11 162 - DF 39 507 - BE 59 753 - DC 75
124 - BC 85(Op) 166 - AN 30 553 - Op(CA)
 125 - DE 36 172 - DP 84 558 - DO 61
On Return Passage: U 753 - 593 - 155 - 588 - 455 - 103 - 130 - 751 -
558 - 162 - 506 - 125 - 564 - 507 - 98 - 108 - 109 - 214 - 134 - 116.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 108 - Lorient; U 134 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy: See under IVa.
2) U 753 sighted in DM 6866 convoy of 7 freighters, 1 destroyer, 3 S/M
chasers, course 1100, 6 knots. This is the first convoy to be sighted N. of
Cuba.
3) U 751 examined the Swedish ship Etna, with a cargo for Brazil and
the Argentine. Etna was dismissed.
4) U 553 sank "Mattawin", 6,916 BRT, course 1100, in CB 1885.
5) U 566 sank "Westmoreland", 8,967 BRT, 00, on 1.6 in CB 8466. CB
7390 sighted freighter, 1500.
6) U 213 reported a triple miss at a destroyer and 5 single misses at a
fast freighter in CA 6649, course 3000.
7) U 558 sank "Triton" 2,078 BRT in DP 1430, course 00, cargo of
aluminum.
8) U 578 sighted a zig-zagging freighter on 2.6 in CA 6553, course
3300.
9) U 594 did not manage to fire at a steamer, course 900 in CB 2113 on
27.5. 29.5 EB 3754 a fan miss and 2 single misses at a passenger steamer.
10) U 432 fired a triple miss at a sighted passenger freighter on 30.5 in
BA 9996. 1.6 CA 3261 escorted steamer, 800, 18 knots.
- 101 -
675
Sunk: 31.5 BA 9978 "Liverpool Racker", about 3,000 BRT.
11) U 332 sighted a fast freighter in CE 2697, course N.
b) Attack report: DA 92, CB 84, DL 6651.
Torpedoed: "Knoxville City", 5,686 BRT in DM 47, unidentified unit in
ED 68.
SSS: "Mattarin" CB 1888.
Sightings: DL 5660, DB 45, DC 11, DM 64, DM 88.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 24:
U 590 gained contact, was driven off twice and depth charged.
At 1735 U 590 reported: sea 6, visibility 7-8. No offensive action. As
the weather is likely to get worse, an above-water night attack is not
possible because of the moon, and on 2.6 the convoy will already be on the
Newfoundland Bank in a heavy swell with strong air patrol, Group Hecht
has been ordered, to break off the operation and to be in reconnaissance
line from BC 5783 to 8675 at 1600/2/6, course 50 deg., day's run 120
miles. U 590's last report: Weather and visibility getting worse, sea 7,
maximum speed 7 knots.
b)- c) None.
d) Boats have been informed of Mexico's entry into the war.
V. Reports of Success:
U 566 1 ship 8,967 BRT
432 1 ship 3,000 BRT
558 1 ship 2,078 BRT
553 1 ship 6,916 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------- 37 4 190 6 59 1 4 6 311

U-boats as of 1.6.1942 * of which 4 temporarily detached.

(without foreign boats)
III. During May:
I. Total in Commission: The total number of boats increased by 19
at 1.5.42 292 The number of front-line boats increased by 4
commissioned in May* 21 The number of boats on trials increased by 14
313 The number of training boats increased by 1

Losses in May** 2
311 IV. Front-line boats were distributed as follows on 1.6.1942:
Atlantic 88 boats
* Including U 579's second commissioning after repairing fire damage. Mediterranean 19 boats
** Losses in May: 2, of which 1 in the Mediterranean. U U74, Norway Area 21 boats
Friedrich, experienced boat with new C.O., W. Mediterranean no clue. U
352, Rathke, on active service since 15.1.1942. Off the American coast,
presumably near Hatteras. No clue. V. During May in the Atlantic there were:
A daily average of 61.1 boats at sea of which 18 were in operations
areas
- 102 - 42 on the way out
14.8 on the way back

VI. Sailings in May:

From home 4 boats
From western France 24 boats

---------------------------------------------------
II. Boats are distributed as follows: ---------------
Type II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXD Xb XIV
2.June 1942.
Frontline - - 90 2 34 - 1 1 128
Trials - - 84 4 23 1 3 5 124
Training 37 4 16* - 2 - - - 59 I. U 67 - CD 85 U 126 - EQ 76(Op) U 202 - BE 57 U 558 - DP 12
676
 68 - DP 17 128 - FA 33(Op) 213 - Op(CA) 564 - BD 86
69 - Op(ED) 129 - DF 16 214 - BF 61 566 - Op(CB)
87 - BC 83 130 - BE 57 332 - CE 25 569 - BC 80(Op)
94 - BC 80(Op) 135 - Op(DC) 373 - BC 59 578 - Op(CA)
96 - BC 80(Op) 155 - DQ 46 404 - DC 24 584 - BE 45
98 - BE 87 156 - Op(EE) 406 - BC 80(Op) 588 - BD 86
103 - DN 53 157 - DE 53 432 - Op(CB) 590 - Op(CA)
106 - Op(DA) 158 - DL 33 455 - CC 42 593 - CB 59
107 - Op(DM) 159 - DP 45 502 - Op(ED) 594 - Op(EC)
109 - BF 50 161 - FA 26(Op) 504 - Op(DA) 653 - Op(CA)
116 - BD 89 162 - DG 12 506 - DE 11 701 - BC 80(Op)
124 - BC 80(Op) 166 - AF 71 507 - BE 69 751 - DE 75
125 - CD 85 172 - EE 11 553 - Op(CA) 753 - DN 41
On Return Passage: U 753 - 593 - 155 - 588 - 455 - 103 - 751 - 558 -
594 - 162 - 506 - 125 - 564 - 507 - 98 - 109 - 214 - 116 - 130.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 214 - Lorient.
- 103 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 404 fired on "Westnotus", 5,492 BRT, 3300, with guns on 1.6 in
DC 3212. Burnt out. Left ship after the demolition charge fixed had
exploded, as "Anna" 1,345 BRT was in sight, 1250. After 2 unexplained
677
misses, fired at her with guns and set her on fire, then identified neutral
markings. Ship was darkened and was zig-zagging.
2) U 578 sank "Bergenger", 6,826 BRT, 3000, in CB 1287 on 2.6.
Carrying cotton from Santos to Boston.
3) U 159 sank a freighter of 6,200 BRT, 3100 on 2.6 in DO 63.
4) U 69 sighted 1 freighter, 1 tanker, S-bound, in ED 66 on 31.5.
Intends to operate in EE 20 and 30 with last fuel.
5) U 558 2.6 sighted a freighter, course SSE, DP 1268. (Boat has no
torpedoes left).
b) U-boat attack: CA 62 (U 578), DM 69.
Sighting: DN 47, DC 22, DB 7239, DC 41, BB 65, BA 9971.
c) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) So far U 128, U 126, U 161, in line along the N. coast of Brazil,
have reported no traffic. There seems no point in their going on.
Collected recent sighting reports show that traffic is particularly dense in
an area EE and ED. The following disposition has been ordered: U 128,
U 126 to occupy the area between a line joining EE 29 via EE 92, EF 52,
DQ 79, U 126 the E., U 128 the W. half. U 161 Trinidad sea area. Boats
will reach their operations areas with fuel stocks of about 100-105 cbm. If
they refuel, as planned, in CC, they can remain in their operations area for
about another 20 days.
2) U 594 has been ordered to return at once. No supply.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 404 2 ships 6,837 BRT
578 1 ship 6,826 BRT
159 1 ship 6,200 BRT
502 1 ship 6,750 BRT
VI. General: None.
- 104 -

3.June 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(ED) U 126 - EQ 44 U 202 - BE 48 U 558 - DD 56
68 - DO 65 128 - EP 91 213 - Op(CA) 564 - BD 93
69 - Op(ED) 129 - CD 16 332 - CE 16 566 - Op(CB)
87 - BC 81 130 - BE 59 373 - BC 57 569 - BC 80(Op)
94 - BC 50(Op) 135 - Op(DC) 404 - DC 28 578 - Op(CB)
96 - BC 80 155 - DQ 27 406 - BC 50(Op) 584 - BD 91
98 - BE 83 156 - Op(EE) 432 - Op(CB) 588 - BD 96
103 - DN 36 157 - DE 48 455 - CC 28 590 - Op(CA)
106 - Op(DA) 158 - Op(DA) 502 - Op(ED) 593 - CB 66
107 - Op(DM) 159 - DO 59 504 - Op(DA) 594 - DN 82
109 - BF 60 161 - EP 85 506 - CC 87 653 - Op(CA)
116 - BD 90 162 - CE 85 507 - BF 50 701 - BC 80(Op)
124 - BC 80(Op) 166 - AF 71 553 - Op(CA) 751 - DE 57
125 - CD 91 172 - DO 79 753 - DM 69
On Return Passage: U 753 - 593 - 155 - 588 - 455 - 103 - 751 - 558 -
594 - 162 - 506 - 125 - 564 - 507 - 98 - 109 - 116 - 130.
Sailed: U 203 - Brest.
Entered Port: U 109 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
678
a) 1) U 172 sighted: 28.5 DQ 25 1 fast freighter, course 700. 2.6 DO 96
steamer, 3450. Sunk: 3.6 DO 6724, freighter, 5,000 BRT, 3350. One
definite pistol failure.
2) U 432 sighted: In BA 9976 convoy of 4 ships, 2900, making long
legs. Chased it in vain. Driven off by strong air escort. A/c bombs. In
9896 sank 2 fishing smacks by gunfire.
3) U 126 sank Norwegian tanker "Hoeggiant", 10,999 BRT in EP 6343.
4) U 106 reports small fast convoys between Key West and San
Antonio. Medium amount of single-ship traffic from DL 20 to 68. 30.5 in
4411 one freighter, one tanker, one destroyer, 2400. 1.6 in 6371 fast
freighter 600. Center of Florida Straits only air activity and 1 destroyer.
1.6 sank S.S. "Hampton Roads", 2,698 BRT in DL 6538. Starting return
passage.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings:CA 6990, ED 6744, DC 2262, EC 7633, DC 41, CA
6968.
U-boat attack: In ED 86.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
- 105 -
b) 1) U 502 has been ordered to go close up to the coast of Trinidad
during the new moon period.
2) U 67 has been allocated operations area off New Orleans, passing
through the Florida Straits.
 3) U 129 to steer for Windward Passage.
4) U 653 has been given freedom of action in the area of traffic from
and to New York, on the basis of situation report for the last few days.
V. Reports of Success:
U 166 1 ship 2,689 BRT
432 2 fishing smacks
172 1 ship 5,000 BRT
126 1 ship 10,999 BRT.
VI. General:
A) Reports from boats in the last days show that the traffic situation
in the area CA has changed and become more favorable again. The
disposition ordered on 27.5, based on the assumption that there was a focal
point of traffic in CB 72, 73, 81, has proved right. Boat's reports indicate
clearly a line of traffic from New York via CB 71 to EE 50, though mainly
fast ships are involved. Traffic in both directions between Boston and
Halifax, also traffic approaching Halifax from the S. General traffic
situation is set out in Appendix 1.
B) As has already been shown in the War Log on 17.5, sinking rates
for the month of June cannot be as great as those for the month of May. It
now turns out that the figures for supplies of boats previously estimated
for May and June, after ice has stopped, cannot after all be adhered to.
The reason for this however, is the dockyard bottleneck which has arisen
owing to a sudden rush of boats after final training.
From the meager supply of 7 boats type VIIC from home altogether
5 boats should be sent to Northern Waters between 5.4 and 5.6. There is a
possibility that more and more boats will have to be sent there to bring up
the numbers and this fact has given me occasion to submit my views on
the operation of U-boats in the Northern area to Naval War Staff as
follows:
The task of U-boats in the Northern area is:
a) Operation against the England-Murmansk convoy traffic.
b) Immediate action in the event of an enemy landing.
679
I. to a) My opinion as to the small chances of success for U-boats against
convoys during the Northern Summer, which I have already explained by
T/P, has been confirmed by experience with PQ 16. Owing to the difficult
conditions for attack (constant light, very variable weather and visibility,
abnormally strong convoy escort, clever handling of the convoy,
appearance of Russian a/c, forcing the U-boats to dive on sighting our own
a/c as well) the result, in spite of shadowing and a determined set-to by the
boats, has been 1 steamer sunk and 4 probable hits. This must be
accounted
- 106 -
a failure when compared with the results of the anti-S/M activity for
the boats operating.
According to reports from boats: U 436, U 703 have D/C damage, unfit
to dive to greater depths. Three more boats have slight D/C damage the
effects of which, from experience, will probably mean some considerable
time in the dockyard.
II. This success of the anti-S/M forces is the more serious in the light of
the bad dockyard situation in Norway and at home and it will probably
mean that ordinarily far more than 50% of all the boats detached to the
Northern area will be unfit for service if further operation against PQ
convoys is undertaken. This however, implies a restriction for b)
"Readiness for immediate action against enemy landings", which cannot
be accepted.
III. If the requirements, i.e.
 a) continued operation against convoys as hitherto
b) a sufficient number of boats ready to defend an enemy landing.
are to be fulfilled, it will mean:
Constantly sending boats from home, as they are ready, to the Northern
area, more and more overcrowding of the Norway and home dockyards.
Altogether a cost to U-boat warfare in the Atlantic as a whole, which
cannot be justified even if the tonnage sunk from PQ convoys is valued at
a maximum. In support of this, it is submitted:
1) in the first place, owing to bottlenecks, only 6 boats became
operational in May instead of 10 and it is expected that in June there will
be only 11 instead of 22.
2) During the period 5.4 to 5.6 of the 7 boats type VIIC which became
operational, 5 had to be sent to the Northern area.
3) that the Atlantic war has so far lost 26 boats (23 to Northern waters, 3
lost in the Northern area).
IV. The successes of the boats in Northern waters will not increase as
experience is gained, but losses are rather to be expected in further convoy
operations. Altering the attacking tactics, and operating in 2 groups, one
shadowing while the other hauls ahead out of sight, promises only slightly
more success and would require considerably more boats.
Apart from a large number of boats, these tactics would depend on:
a) exact fixes, which can never be counted on in this area, because there
are no fixes by the stars, the height of the sun is extremely low, visibility is
variable and there is mist over the surface.
b) no major avoiding action by the enemy. Even if these conditions are
fulfilled, in practice it would be
- 107 -
680
necessary to set up patrol lines repeatedly ahead of the enemy's
course, which would have to dive in time for the boats not to be seen by
the enemy even if visibility suddenly improved and therefore before they
themselves had sighted the enemy.
At the best perhaps 2 boats out of such a patrol line would reach a
position enabling them to attack. Then however both these boats have to
deal with the actual difficulties of an attack, which have been shown to be
particularly great in this area and in most cases frustrate the success of the
attack.
The improvement in the chances of successes would therefore, in
B.d.U.'s opinion, not stand in any acceptable relation to the number of
boats required.
V. The G.A.F. would seem to be a better means of attacking convoys in
the north in the summer. As there is constant light, there would be no need
of support from shadowing U-boats. B.d.U. therefore suggests that these
facts be taken into account rather more than they have been hitherto when
U-boat operations in the north are planned.
C) The possibility that Brazil may soon enter the war requires that a
quick and effective operation of U-boats against and off Brazilian ports be
considered in advance.
1) I consider that a quick operation off Brazilian ports would have a good
chance of success, because,
a) Heavy traffic and very slight anti-S/M activity is to be expected off
the ports of Santos, Rio de Janeiro, Recife, Bahia Natal.
b) the type of coastline permits operation close inshore.
2) I don't think that the operation would be worthwhile as long as Brazil
is neutral for the following reasons: As long as there is no U-tanker in the
south, the amount of fuel which type IXc boats have to use in their
operations area is very small, because outward passages are so long. THey
would have to use all their torpedoes in the shortest possible space of time,
which is not possible because:
a) there are limits to unrestricted attack on ships
 b) they are not permitted to operate in territorial waters and immediately
off the ports, i.e. in areas where there is allot of traffic. Their fighting
power cannot therefore be used to the full.
3) It would be ill-advised to make for Brazil before war is declared
because, if it is not declared while boats are on their way,
a) it would not be worthwhile to divert them to another operations area,
the approach routes to these areas being too long.
- 108 -
b) Operation in the strip where attack is allowed and in the open sea
area does not promise much success, as U 126, U 128 and U 161's
operation showed.
4) The first operation should be a torpedo operation, because it can be
expected that anti-S/M activity will permit boats to penetrate the bays and
harbors and a torpedo operation has a greater surprise value than a
combined torpedo-mining operation. Mine-laying will certainly be
possible in later undertakings and promises good success.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
Most Secret
Appendix to B.d.U.'s Most Secret 2253
of 6.6.42
Traffic situation in the American Area, according to U-boats' Reports
681
(New supplementary order 7 to Ops. Order No. 50)
Apart from the traffic lines mentioned, there is slight dispersed
traffic over the whole area.
BB 40, BB 60, 80, 90 no fresh reports because of fog. Convoy
traffic.
Halifax is approached from the south and Boston via Cape Sable.
Halifax is a convoy assembly point.
Little traffic from New York to Nantucket. Situation along the
coastal route to Hatteras at present not clear, but heavy spasmodic traffic is
suspected. Heavy traffic in both directions along the line New York CB
72, 73, 81. From square 72 via DD 50, DP 10, EE 60, EF 40. This line of
traffic crosses ships approaching Halifax in the south in CB 72, 73, 81.
Direction of traffic in DO 60 and EE 60 points to the conclusion that a few
ships still approach Hatteras from the SE. Situation on the coast between
Hatteras and the Florida Straits not clear.
No traffic reported, seems improbable. So far 2 convoys sighted in
the Florida Straits. Traffic on the W. side of the Florida Straits hugs the
coast.
4) From Florida Straits to DA 92, 83. From square 92 south via DL 21,
65, DM 70. From Key West to Antonio small fast convoys.
6) From DM 70 to Colon, also N. and S. of Jamaica to Windward or via
ED 10, ED 60 to 98. Traffic situation off Curacao at present not clear.
Traffic between Curacao and Trinidad close inshore.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
4.June 1942.

I. U 67 - DF 11 U 126 - EP 63 U 202 - BD 69 U 558 - DE 72
68 - DO 59 128 - EP 55 203 - Brest 564 - BE 58
69 - Op(ED) 129 - DE 33 213 - Op(CA) 566 - Op(CB)
- 109 -
87 - CC 31 130 - BE 69 332 - CD 36 569 - BC 90(Op)
94 - BC 60(Op) 135 - Op(DC) 373 - BC 78 578 - Op(CA)
96 - BC 60(Op) 155 - DQ 31 404 - DC 46 584 - BD 82
98 - BE 93 156 - Op(EE) 406 - BC 60 588 - BE 67
103 - DD 77 157 - DD 96 432 - Op(CB) 590 - BC 60(Op)
106 - Op(DB) 158 - Op(DA) 455 - CC 35 593 - CC 43
107 - Op(DM) 159 - DO 81 502 - Op(ED) 594 - DN 65
116 - BE 84 161 - EP 48 504 - Op(DA) 653 - Op(CA)
124 - BC 60(Op) 162 - CE 91 506 - DE 42 701 - CC 22
125 - CE 42 166 - AE 94 507 - BF 60 751 - DE 53
172 - DO 84 553 - Op(CA) 753 - DN 43
On Return Passage: U 753 - 593 - 155 - 588 - 455 - 103 - 751 - 558 -
594 - 162 - 506 - 125 - 564 - 507 - 98 - 116 - 130 - 106.
Sailed: U 507 - Lorient.
Entered Port: U 154 - Lorient; U 71 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
682
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 751 reported a submerged submarine in DE 3361.
2) U 569 sighted a large freighter, course 3000, in CB 5782.
3) U 653 saw nothing from 31.5 - 3.6 from CA 55 - 5490 to 82 - 8150.
Hydrophones picked up a steamer once in 82. Strong patrol there by day,
with Asdic. PC-boats three times during the night.
4) U 213: traffic proceeding from CB 4730 via 4470 to CA 6640.
Making for Ambrose. Fast ships. Careless patrol here from 31.5 by
destroyers and a/c. In CB 4730 hydrophones picked up a steamer with
destroyer, W. course, high speed.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: in BA 9584, CA 3125, CA 58.
U-boat attacks in ES 7855, DO 4586.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Group Hecht still in patrol line cruising NE along the Great Circle.
b) On the basis of her situation report, U 404 has been given freedom of
action in the traffic area reported (DC 30, CA 90, CB 70).
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
- 110 -
5.June 1942.

I. U 67 - DE 34 U 126 - EP 34 U 172 - ED 11 U 558 - DE 57
68 - DO 84 128 - EP 24 202 - BD 67 564 - BF 60
69 - Op(ED) 129 - DE 26 203 - BF 58 569 - BC 60(Op)
71 - BF 50 130 - BF 50 213 - Op(CB) 566 - Op(CB)
87 - CC 24 135 - Op(DC) 332 - CD 34 578 - Op(CA)
94 - BC 60(Op) 154 - BF 50 373 - CC 21 584 - BD 83
96 - BC 60(Op) 155 - DE 96 404 - DC 32 588 - BF 50
98 - BF 50 156 - Op(EE) 406 - BC 37(Op) 590 - BC 60(Op)
103 - DD 81 157 - DD 97 432 - Op(CB) 593 - CC 29
106 - DC 75 158 - Op(CA) 455 - CD 12 594 - DO 17
107 - Op(DM) 159 - DO 78 502 - Op(ED) 653 - Op(CA)
116 - BE 91 161 - EO 66 504 - Op(DL) 701 - CC 15
124 - BC 60(Op) 162 - CE 66 506 - DF 22 751 - DF 11
125 - CE 26 166 - AM 11 553 - Op(CA) 753 DN 26
On Return Passage: U 213 - 753 - 593 - 155 - 588 - 455 - 103 - 106 -
751 - 558 - 594 - 162 - 506 - 125 - 564 - 507 - 98 - 130 - 116.
Sailed: U 564 - Lorient.
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance:
Reconnaissance for U 71, damaged.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 159: EC 3811 4 passenger steamers, 2 destroyers, 1200, 12
knots, no contact because of Diesel defect.
2) U 553: Stood on and off at the fog boundary. 4.6 CA 6191 destroyer,
600, high speed, otherwise nothing seen. 6 and 7.5 D/C's and a/c bombs,
severe casualties. Starting return passage because of provisions.
3) U 158: Strong air activity in Windward Passage, also at night. A/c
bombs. Medium traffic and air activity in Yucatan. Sunk: 2.6 DM 7132
freighter, 6,000 BRT, 1000. 4.6 DL 9331 freighter 4,000 BRT, 1900. 5.6
DL 6796 freighter, 4,000 BRT, 1550. Sighted: DL 6560 fast passenger
freighter, 2400.
683
4) U 107: sighted 4 passenger freighters, 2 destroyers, flying boat,
1200, 14 knots in EB 2113. 4.6 DM 7141 passenger ship, 3250, 16 knots.
Sunk: 1.6 EB 2119 passenger freighter, 7,000 BRT, 3200. 2 flying boats
daily.
5) U 68: No air activity off Anegada. Sunk: ED 1749 petrol tanker,
8,000 BRT, 190, tanker 12,000 BRT, 100, later 2700, in ED 1414.
6) U 135 reported 15 ships, 2 destroyers, 2200, 8 knots in DC 1433, (see
para. IVa).
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 8741, BF 5760 (see para. IVa), CA 86, CA
6637. U-boat warnings: DO 7522 (U 68).
- 111 -
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) U 135's convoy: Boat was ordered to attack. No shadower's reports,
as there were no other boats in the vicinity. Situation report was asked for
and showed: Contact lost after a 7 hour hunt by a/c and S/M chasers.
Convoy was steering exactly along the 200 meter line.
b) U 135 was ordered to make sweeps in shallow water (Hatteras-
Lookout). Her attention was called to heavy traffic inside the 200 meter
line. Situation report showed no traffic, no patrol, no air activity on 4 and
5.6, off Lookout and Onslow Bay to close inshore.
c) None.
d) 1) U 71 reported at 1601 that she was in BF 9442, unable to dive after
an attack by a/c. She was immediately asked for course and speed and
told that there would be a Condor a/c in the area from 1930. Enemy 107 - Op(DM) 159 - EC 29 502 - Op(ED) 701 - CB 36
Sunderland was shadowing the boat. From 1636 boat was fit to dive to a 116 - BF 71 161 - EO 53 504 - Op(DA) 751 - CD 87
certain extent. 2 M-boats left Royan at 1930 on a course for 9442, 14 124 - BD 10(Op) 162 - BF 84 506 - CE 17 753 - DN 32
knots, to pick her up. U 71 could be expected to be at point 36 at 125 - CE 33 166 - AL 39 553 - Op(CB)
0700/6/6. M-boats were directed accordingly. They picked her up at
0325. Additional: An FW-200 involved the enemy Sunderland in an air
action lasting 3/4 hour and scored hits in the starboard outer engine and
the fuselage. Sunderland turned away to the north. Losses 1 N.C.O. - 112 -
2) Instruction to all boats: Captains of all ships sunk are to be taken on
board as prisoners, with the ship's papers, provided getting them aboard
does not endanger the boat or reduce her fighting power by raising the
consumption of provisions.

V. Reports of Success:
U 67 1 ship 7,000 BRT
158 3 ships 14,000 BRT
68 2 ships 21,000 BRT. On Return Passage: U 213 - 753 - 593 - 155 - 588 - 455 - 103 - 106 -
751 - 558 - 594 - 162 - 506 - 125 - 507 - 98 - 130 - 116.
VI. General: None. Sailed: U 98 - St. Nazaire; U 130 - Lorient; U 71 - La Pallice.
Entered Port: U 459 - 437 - St. Nazaire; U 153 - Lorient; U 89 - Brest.
---------------------------------------------------
--------------- II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

6.June 1942. III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) U 172 reported a convoy in ED 1423 at 1032, M. course, high
speed.
I. U 67 - DE 42 U 126 - EF 89 U 172 - EC 35 U 558 - DE 61 2) U 502: Sunk: 3.6 "Elliott" (6,940 BRT) in DE 8642, course 1100.
68 - DO 78 128 - EP 12 202 - BD 58 566 - Op(CB) b) None.
69 - EE 51 129 - DE 27 203 - BF 49 569 - DD 40(Op) c) 1) U-boat sightings: BB 4629, EC 9613, BF 8248.
71 - BF 93 130 - v. Lorient 213 - CB 61 578 - Op(CA) 2) U-boat attacks: DB 36, CA 99.
87 - CC 18 154 - BF 49 332 - CD 42 584 - BD 81 3) Torpedoings: FS 3615.
94 - BC 30(Op) 135 - Op(DC) 373 - CC 15 588 - BF 58 4) 2 passenger steamers, sinking, sighted by enemy a/c in DC 62.
96 - BD 19(Op) 155 - CE 68 404 - Op(DM) 590 - BC 30(Op) d) None.
98 - v. Nazaire 156 - Op(EE) 406 - BC 30(Op) 593 - CC 36
103 - DD 91 157 - DO 32 432 - Op(CB) 594 - DO 16 IV. Current Operations:
106 - CC 57 158 - Op(DL) 455 - BC 98 653 - Op(CA) a) None.
684
 c) U 135 has been given freedom of action in the sea area off New York
where inward and outward bound traffic is to be found.
V. Reports of Success:
U 502 1 ship 6,940 BRT.
VI. General:
I. Preliminary consideration of a sudden operation of 10-15 boats
off Brazilian ports, planned by Naval War Staff, led to the following
conclusions which have been reported to Naval War Staff:
The execution of the operation depends on:
a) the presence of a U-tanker in the southern area
b) a number of U-boats sailing at approximately the same time.
1) to a)
At present there is no U-tanker available. U 459 is sailing on
6.6, 80% of her stocks are already allocated to boats in operations area,
some of which cannot reach W. France unless they are supplied. U 460
leaving Kiel on 7.6, will be off Biscay 18.6; it would be inadvisable for
her to put into St. Nazaire as,
- 113 -
apart from the danger from a/c in Biscay, it would entail a delay of 12-14
days. She will be in the equator area 8-10.7 and will have stocks for at
most 10 boats owing to the long outward passage.
2) to a)
U-boat situation in W. France is as follows:
685
Ready to sail during the period 6-16.6: 11 type VIIc, 3 type IXc,
1 type IXb. Boats cannot be considered for the operation, as it is not
certain that the tanker from home will reach her operations area.
During the period 22.6 - 4.7 2 type IX, 8 type VIIc will be ready
to sail. Boats can be considered for the operation as soon as the tanker has
reached the open Atlantic.
II. Execution:
Boats which sail first will operate first in the area between 9 and
100 S and will refuel if possible. All boats to operate sometime between 3
and 8.8 at a given time against shipping targets in and immediately off the
ports, if possible bombarding likely targets on shore at the same time.
Only particularly valuable targets to be attacked after leaving the waiting
area until coming off the ports. It would seem possible to mine the harbors
with 2-3 mines each.
III. If the task is carried out as suggested it will be at considerable
cost to the rest of the Atlantic warfare, because:
a) the lack of about 10 boats will make itself particularly felt with the
fewer boats sailing from W. France in June and only 8-10 type VIIc and 5-
7 type IXc boats can be counted on in the rest of the Atlantic area between
8th and 25th July.
b) the plan to send boats which sail from home during June straight to
the American operations area and thus make good the small number of
boats in the operations area by the beginning or middle of July, will
probably have to be abandoned, as these boats will not be able to supply
from U-tanker U 460 as intended.
If U 460 is not available for this latter task, the arrival of 12 home-
based boats in the American operations area will be delayed by at least 3
weeks (transfer to W. France 12 days plus at least 8 days in port).
IV. If it is politically possible, it would be desirable to carry out the
operation at a later date. U-tanker U 461 will be operational on 21.6 and
there will be a constant flow of new boats from home 25.7, so that it
would then have no unfavorable effect on the Atlantic war.
--------------------------------------------------- Sailed: U 508 - St. Nazaire.
--------------- Entered Port: U 105 - 505 - Lorient; U 460 - Kiel.

7.June 1942. II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

I. U 67 - DD 66 U 128 - EF 71 U 202 - BD 49 U 553 - CB 22
68 - Op(EL) 129 - DE 45 203 - BF 47 558 - DE 39
69 - Op(EE) 135 - DC 21 213 - CC 41 566 - Op(CB)
87 - CB 62 153 - BF 50 332 - CC 62 569 - BD 10(Op)
89 - Lorient 154 - BF 74 373 - CB 35 578 - Op(CA)
- 114 -
a) 1) U 701 sighted a fast freighter in CB 4931, main course 600, 18
knots.
2) U 653 sank a Naval tanker of 3,000 BRT in CB 7970, course S.,
escort by a destroyer and escort vessel. 2 misses at the escort vessel.
3) U 135 sank "Pleasantville" 4,590 BRT, in DC 3164, 1200, from New
York to Capetown.
4) U 404 sighted a fast passenger freighter on 6.6 in DC 3330, course
1250. Driven off by destroyer, D/C's.
b) 1) U-boat sightings: DD 11, CA 61, CB 2416, CH 34.
c) None.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations: None.

V. Reports of Success:
U 653 1 ship 3,000 BRT
135 1 ship 4,549 BRT.
94 - BD 10(Op) 155 - CC 62 404 - Op(DM) 584 - BD 72
96 - BD 10(Op) 156 - Op(EE) 406 - AK 78(Op) 588 - BF 60 VI. General: None.
103 - DD 66 157 - DO 29 432 - Op(CB) 590 - BD 10(Op)
106 - DC 67 158 - Op(DA) 437 - BF 50 593 - CD 13 ---------------------------------------------------
107 - Op(DM) 159 - EC 54 455 - BD 78 594 - DD 79 ---------------
116 - BF 40 161 - EO 24 459 - BF 50 653 - Op(CA)
124 - BD 10(Op) 162 - BF 58 502 - ED 86 701 - CB 55 8.June 1942.
125 - CF 22 166 - AL 68 504 - Op(DA) 751 - CD 63
126 - EF 58 172 - EC 25 506 - CA 24 753 - DC 99
I. U 67 - DD 67 U 128 - Op(EF) U 203 - BE 83 U 506 - CE 34
68 - Op(EL) 129 - DD 69 213 - CC 27 553 - CB 32
On Return Passage: U 213 - 753 - 593 - 155 - 553 - 588 - 455 - 103 - 69 - OP(EE) 135 - DC 31 332 - CC 53 558 - CD 75
106 - 751 - 69 - 558 - 162 - 506 - 125 - 116 - 166. 87 - CB 54 153 - BF 49 373 - CB 27 566 - Op(CB)
686
 89 - BF 50 154 - BE 98 404 - Op(DM) 569 - BD 21(Op)
- 115 -
94 - AK 80(Op) 155 - CE 34 406 - Op(CA) 578 - Op(CA)
96 - AK(Op) 156 - Op(EE) 432 - AK 80(Op) 584 - BC 93
103 - AK(Op) 157 - DO 43 437 - BF 49 590 - AK 80(Op)
105 - BF 50 158 - Op(DA) 455 - BD 85 593 - BC 99
106 - DC 69 159 - EC 47 459 - BF 49 594 - DD 85
107 - Op(DM) 161 - Op(ED) 460 - AO 70 653 - CB 84
116 - BF 50 162 - BF 60 502 - Op(ED) 701 - CB 46
124 - BD 21(Op) 166 - BF 50 504 - Op(DA) 751 - CE 24
125 - BE 89 172 - EG 12 505 - BF 50 753 - DD 72
126 - Op(EF) 202 - BD 71
On Return Passage: U 213 - 753 - 593 - 155 - 553 - 455 - 103 - 106 -
751 - 69 - 558 - 594 - 162 - 125 - 506 - 166 - 116.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 584: sighted large fast steamer in CC 5256, course 800.
2) U 128: sank motor tanker "South Africa" 9,234 BRT in EF 73, 1200.
687
3) U 156: sank "Allegrete" 5,970 BRT, on 2.6 in ED 68, course 2750.
In EE 71 sailing vessel, 150 BRT course for Trinidad. Medium traffic W.
of Lucia.
4) U 653: sighted a Naval tanker on 6.6 in CB 4,880, one destroyer and
one large escort vessel, deceptive courses. In 7970 sank a tender (3,000
BRT). One hit on patrol vessel.
5) U 161: 7.6 freighter sighted zig-zagging in EO 1984 1500, 8.6
freighter in EO 1466, about 1500. Regular air patrol off the coast of
Guiana.
6) U 578: Much fog in attack area, spasmodic air activity.
7) U 504: Heavy single-ship traffic from DL 91 to EB 14, no sea patrol,
isolated air patrol. Sunk: 8.6 passenger freighter EA 3320, 8,000 BRT,
1400, DL 9980 freighter, 3,000 BRT, course 3300.
b) 1) U-boat sightings: BA 9576, DD 48, CA 51, CA 61, BC 4891, BB
46, DB 61.
2) U-boat attacks: ED 84, DD 48, 56, DL 99.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 27: U 124, belonging to Group Hecht, made contact at
2157 with a convoy in AK 9424, course WSW, slow speed. Group Hecht
was ordered to operate against this convoy. U 569 made contact at 0050.
After requesting beacon-signals, U 94 sighted the convoy at 0720 in 8913.
U 569 lost contact for a time. U 124 reported at 0415 one 2 funneled
destroyer sunk.
Convoy's main course about 2450. 7.5 knots.
- 116 -
 b) 1) U 578 and U 432 have been given freedom of action (SE traffic to
New York).
c) U 373, 87, 701 have been ordered to carry out their mining operation On Return Passage: U 213 - 753 - 593 - 155 - 553 - 455 - 103 - 106 -
at earliest during the night 10/11.6. 751 - 69 - 558 - 594 - 506 - 125 - 126 - 116.
d) None. Sailed: U 116 - Lorient.
Entered Port: U 215 - Kiel; U 552 - St. Nazaire.
V. Reports of Success:
U 128 1 ship 9,234 BRT II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
156 2 ships 6,120 BRT
653 1 patrol vessel torpedoed III. Reports on the Enemy:
504 2 ships 11,000 BRT a) 1) Convoy No. 27 see para. IVa.
124 1 destroyer. 2) U 502: ED 8499 2 freighters, 1 tanker, 1 destroyer, course 2600.
Another convoy of the same size, which she attacked by day. Hits on a
VI. General: None. freighter of 7,000 BRT and a tanker of 6,000 BRT. Both ships presumably
sank. Well-placed D/C's (Asdic).
--------------------------------------------------- 3) U 69: Nothing seen in EE 20-30, DP 90 since 3.6. 5.6 sank a small
--------------- abandoned tug.
b) U-boat sightings: AM 5521, BA 97, CA 26, DM 1977, ED 1578, DN
9.June 1942. 58, EB 86.

- 117 -
I. U 67 - DD 86 U 128 - Op(EF) U 213 - CC 34 U 553 - CC 12
68 - Op(EC) 129 - DD 94 332 - CC 43 558 - CD 82
69 - Op(EP) 135 - Op(DC) 373 - CB 45 566 - Op(CB)
87 - CA 36 153 - BF 47 404 - Op(DD) 569 - AK 80(Op)
89 - BF 49 154 - CF 32 406 - AK 80(op) 578 - Op(CB)
94 - AK 80(Op) 155 - CE 36 432 - Op(CB) 584 - CC 42
96 - AK 80(Op) 156 - Op(EE) 437 - BF 71 590 - AK 80(Op)
103 - DE 25 157 - DN 66 455 - BD 94 593 - BD 79
105 - BF 73 158 - Op(DL) 459 - BE 68 594 - DD 67
106 - DD 46 159 - EB 95 460 - AN 36 653 - Op(CB) U-boat attacks: DL 95, CA 33, EB 84.
107 - Op(DM) 161 - Op(ED) 502 - Op(ED) 701 - CA 65 c) - d) None.
116 - BF 64 166 - BF 57 504 - Op(DM) 751 - CE 31
124 - AK 80(Op) 172 - DM 97 505 - BF 49 753 - DD 57 IV. Current Operations:
125 - BE 95 202 - BC 92 506 - CE 33 a) 1) All 6 boats made contact with the convoy in the course of the day.
126 - Op(EF) 203 BE 81 Individual boats lost the convoy for a time. U 96 and 406 were unable to
688
follow the convoy for several hours on account of repairs to Diesels.
Weather SE 3-4, visibility 10 sea miles. Rain towards evening. As there
was reason to suppose that the U-boat beacon wave had been discovered
by the enemy, it was changed at 0200/10/6 and a further change planned.
After dark visibility deteriorated badly (3,000 meters) because of rain and
fog gradually coming up. U 590 had to abandon shadowing because of
repairs to Diesels. Towards 0300 no boat was in contact with the convoy.
U 94 sank 2 ships, totaling 11,000 BRT. Very thick fog at dawn.
The busy sea area off the Mississippi Delta is unoccupied, owing to the
transfer of U 504 and U 158 south to the Yucatan Straits, which had not
previously been intended. U 157 and U 129 have therefore been allocated
DA 90 as their new operations area.
Mining operation off New York cannot be carried out, as diplomatic
ships, which have not yet sailed, have to be considered. U 87 has been
ordered to lay mines close off Boston harbor.
V. Reports of Success:
U 502 2 ships 13,000 BRT
94 2 ships 11,000 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
10.June 1942.
I. U 67 - DD 79 U 129 - DD 88 U 332 - CB 62 U 553 - BB 95
68 - Op(EC) 135 - Op(DC) 373 - CA 60 558 - CD 61
69 - DP 62 153 - CF 36 404 - Op(DC) 566 - Op(CB)
87 - CA 37 154 - CF 51 406 - BD 10(Op) 569 - BD 10(Op)
89 - BE 65 155 - CF 22 432 - Op(CB) 578 - Op(CB)
94 - AK 70(Op) 156 - Op(EE) 437 - BE 94 584 - CB 62
96 - AK 70(Op) 157 - DN 48 455 - BE 74 590 - BD 10(Op)
103 - CD 99 158 - Op(DL) 459 - BE 95 593 - BD 85
689
105 - BF 77 159 - Op(EL) 460 - AN 30 594 - DE 41
106 - DD 73 161 - Op(ED) 502 - Op(ED) 653 - Op(CB)
107 - Op(DM) 166 - BF 60 504 - Op(DM) 701 - CA 56
124 - AK 70(Op) 172 - Op(ED) 505 - BF 74 751 - CF 12
125 - BF 73 202 - CB 29 506 - BE 79 753 - DD 61
126 - Op(EF) 203 - BE 72 552 - BF 50
128 - Op(EF) 213 - CC 65
215 - AO 40
On Return Passage: U 213 - 753 - 593 - 155 - 553 - 588 - 455 - 103 -
106 - 751 - 69 - 558 - 594 - 162 - 506 - 125 - 166.
Sailed: U 166 - Lorient.
Entered Port: U 84 - Brest; U 132 - La Pallice; U 575 - St. Nazaire.
- 118 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 27 see para. IVa.
2) U 68: Sunk: "Surrey", 8,581 BRT in EB 8294 and "Ardenrohr" 5,095
BRT in EB 8294 and "Port Montreal", 5,882 BRT in EB 8526. Cargo:
tanks, guns, ammunition, a/c. Damage by underwater explosion of first
ship.
3) U 578: sighted armed freighter in CB 7344, chased her in vain to
4543. 6 misses, presumably some anti-torpedo device.
4) U 504 sank "Van Dyek" 13,000 BRT, 3400.
 b) U-boat sightings: EC 31, AF 87
Torpedoed: Dutch motor vessel "Alioth" in FM 47 (Italian U-boat).
American tanker "Hagen" in DM 68-69 (U 157?).
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) The operation against the convoy was continued, as an improvement
in visibility was to be expected during the day. U 590 reported Diesel
damage, thus at present only 3 boats with serviceable engines (U 124, 94,
569). Boats were instructed to steer searching courses from their own
data, counting on a speed of advance of 8 knots. Towards 1800 visibility
was 6 NM, improving steadily. After the U-boats' positions for 2000 had
been received, searching sectors were ordered from 270-2400 in the order
U 569 - 96 - 590 - 406. U 94 and U 124 south of this, as the convoy might
make an evasive, leg to the south. During the night visibility deteriorated
again to 3 miles owing to constant rain. 0400 order to Group Hecht:
1) Defective boats to stop
2) Remaining boats to continue searching. If no contact before first
light, break off and proceed E at cruising speed.
b) 1) U 558 ordered to supply from U 459 at 1200/13/6 in BD 8942. U
459 will make for CD 45 when this is completed.
2) U 203 and 552 to make for DE 10. It is intended to operate these
boats in the Caribbean. Supply intended.
3) In reply to a query, U 455 was given permission to attack an enemy
tanker in BE 4546 (Route A), 1900, 9 knots. At 0550 the boat reported the
tanker sunk.
c) None.
d) 1) With immediate independently routed ships may for the present be
attacked in Route A N. of 350 N and W. of 100 W. Instructions for
operation outside the blockade area apply.
2) Instruction:
- 119 -
690
1) Never undertake angled-shot settings with the gyro started up. If
there is the slightest movement of the setting gear, the setting spindle will
not reengage after the gyroscope air has been turned off.
2) Every time the gyroscope has been started up, see whether the gyro
righting gear has righted completely. If 1. and 2. are disregarded there will
be serious gyroscope failure.
V. Reports of Success:
U 68 3 ships 19,263 BRT
455 1 ship 8,670 BRT
504 1 ship 13,000 BRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
11.June 1942.
I. U 67 - DO 21 U 128 - Op(EE) U 213 - CD 27 U 552 - BF 49
68 - EB 82 129 - DO 23 215 - AN 30 553 - BC 75
69 - DQ 15 132 - BF 58 332 - CB 52 558 - CD 39
84 - Lorient 135 - Op(DC) 373 - CA 55 566 - CB 91
87 - Op(CA) 153 - CF 37 404 - Op(DD) 569 - BC 30(Op)
89 - BE 56 154 - CF 45 406 - BC 30(Op) 575 - BF 58
94 - BC 30(Op) 155 - BE 89 432 - Op(CB) 578 - Op(CB)
96 - BC 30(Op) 156 - DQ 70 437 - BE 85 584 - CB 53
103 - CD 72 157 - DM 69 455 - BE 46 590 - BC 30(Op)
105 - BE 99 158 - Op(DA) 459 - BE 88 593 - BD 98
106 - DD 38 159 - Op(EB) 460 - AF 72 594 - DE 13
 107 - Op 161 - Op(ED) 502 - Op(ED) 653 - Op(CB)
124 - BC 30(Op) 172 - Op(DM) 504 - Op(EB) 701 - Op(CA)
125 - BF 50 202 - CB 27 505 - BE 95 751 - BE 87
126 - Op(EF) 203 - BD 96 506 - BE 94 753 - DD 39
On Return Passage: U 213 - 753 - 593 - 155 - 553 - 455 - 103 - 106 -
751 - 69 - 558 - 594 - 566 - 506 - 125.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 134 - 71 - 571 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 27 see para. IVa.
2) U 159 sank a cargo sailing vessel, 300 BRT, in EC 3593 a cargo
sailing vessel, 150 BRT, in EC 3811 on 5.6. 7.6 "Edith", 3,382 BRT in EC
4644, 900. 11.6 2 steamers, escorted by destroyer(s), totaling 17,000 BRT
in EL 2262, 3100. Sighted: 2 steamers, 1 gunboat, 1900 in EB 9448 and
EL 2326. Increased air activity in Mona Passage.
3) U 432: 9.6 convoy of 12 ships, 2 destroyers, 2 corvettes, airship in
CB 1122, 800. Two hits on 8,000 BRT freighter. 12.6 convoy of 30 ships
in CB 1331, 2600, thick fog. Only 1 independently routed ship in the area
west and north of CB 2199. Since 17.5 nothing seen
- 120 -
691
right up to the coast. Heavy convoy traffic between BA 9990, CA
3150, very strong air activity.
4) U 161: Suspects traffic close inshore along the coast of Guiana.
5) U 172: 5.6 strong air activity in Mona. Sunk: 5.6 "Delfina", 3,480
BRT in DO 7436, 3300. 8.6 "Sichlien" 1,654 BRT, 750 in EC 3198.
6) U 504: 11.6 "American", 4,846 BRT, 2900 sunk on 11.6 in EB 1140.
7) U 459 reported at 0630/12/6 convoy of 10 steamers, course S., in BE
7744.
b) U-boat sightings: BF 49, BB 53, BB 73, EC 31, CA 54, EB 11, EC 44,
BC 49.
U-boat attacks: EB 16, EL 23, CA 79.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 27:
U 96 reported at 0730 convoy in BC 3288, course WSW, 7 knots. On
the basis of this report all boats, including those with defective Diesels,
were ordered to press on. U 94 sighted a ship alone in BC 3199, course
2800. Both boats first attacked these two steamers, which had probably
got detached from the convoy in the fog, and later reported them sunk. U
96, which could only make 9.5 knots, maintained intermittent contact and
sent beacon signals currently to bring up other boats. It must be
remembered here that the boats had had no exact fix for 3 days owing to
poor visibility.
While pressing on, U 590 was fired upon by a corvette at great range,
forced to dive and depth-charged. U 94 gained contact for a short time at
0245 and U 406 at 0255. Shortly afterwards U 94 reported that she had
been driven off.
0552 U 124 reported that she had made contact and sunk a freighter of
7,000 BRT. Boat was driven off again, owing to changing visibility. In
the course of the morning the weather deteriorated again badly. NW 7,
rain, visibility 1-2 miles. As the boats have already reached the area of
constant Newfoundland fog and visibility is not therefore likely to
improve, and, with their low fuel stocks, they cannot give further chase to
the west, the order was given: break off operation, course E. Results of
this convoy operation, affected particularly by bad visibility conditions:
sunk: 1 destroyer, 5 steamers, no loss.
 b) 1) U 161 and U 172 have been allocated an operations area in the sea
area off Panama.
2) U 126 and U 128 freedom of action in the sea area around Trinidad,
their attention being called to situation reports from U 502, 156, 68, return
passages to be started with 40 cbm, as they will be supplied.
- 121 -
3) When they have completed their mining operations, U 373 and 701
will both be given freedom of action off Hatteras and NW of this.
Important to establish the traffic situation, especially close inshore.
c) 1) See para. IV b 3).
d) 1) Permission to attack on Route A has been extended to 300 N, W of
100 W.
2) Strip for attack on the Brazilian coast has been widened to 600 miles,
N of 180 S.
3) Swedish ships which have not been notified are almost without
exception in enemy service. It is desirable that they be stopped if this is
possible without danger (to the boat). If the ships definitely behave in a
suspicious manner, are obviously zig-zagging etc., they are to be sunk
without warning. Report if the ships have an English or American escort
officer (or) "Ships Warrant" on board.
It is very desirable to examine Portuguese ships in accordance with
prize law. They are to be sunk only if prize law warrants it without any
doubt whatsoever.
4) U 105 reported that she had been attacked by enemy a/c and was
unable to dive. Position at 0935 DE 9945. Boat leaking badly. She was
ordered to make for El Ferrol. Towards 1130 U 105 reported that she was
692
being shadowed by an enemy a/c and requested fighter protection, which
could not however be provided. As she had not reported again by 2400, U
506, U 155, U 505, U 751 were ordered to make for BE 9945 and search
for her as soon as it was light. After U 105 had reported that she was
immediately off the coast, the other boats were ordered to continue on
their passage. U 105 put into El Ferrol in the morning of 12.6
V. Reports of Success:
U 159 5 ships 20,832 BRT
432 1 ship 8,000 BRT
172 2 ships 5,134 BRT
504 1 ship 4,846 BRT
124 1 ship 7,000 BRT
94 1 ship 4,458 BRT
569 1 ship 6,000 BRT.
VI. General:
The attack on U 105 has shown once more the great dangers to
which U-boats are exposed on their passage through Biscay. As there is no
defense against Sunderlands and heavy bombers, Biscay has become the
playground of English a/c, where, according to G.O.C. Atlantic Air Forces,
even the most ancient types of Sunderland can be used. As the English a/c
Radar set is developed further, the boats will be more and more
endangered, damage will be on a larger scale and the result will be total
losses of boats. It is sad and very depressing for the U-boat crews that
there are no forces whatever available to protect a U-boat, which is unable
to dive owing to a/c bombs and therefore
- 122 -

a few long-range destroyers or modern bombers would be sufficient to
drive off the sea patrol a/c, which at present fly right up to the French
Biscay coast without fighter escort, or at least these a/c could escort a
damaged U-boat until she has reached the area patrolled by M/S and patrol
vessels.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
12.June 1942.
I. U 67 - DN 13 U 128 - EE 59 U 213 - CD 35 U 553 - BC 84
68 - Op(EB) 129 - DN 24 215 - AN 30 558 - CF 13
69 - DE 89 132 - BF 49 332 - CB 43 566 - CB 93
71 - BF 80 134 - BF 80 373 - Op(CA) 569 - CB 29(Op)
84 - BF 50 135 - Op(CA) 404 - Op(DD) 571 - BF 91
87 - Op(CA) 153 - CF 55 406 - BC 30(Op) 575 - BF 49
89 - BE 54 154 - CE 92 432 - Op(CB) 578 - Op(CB)
94 - BC 53(Op) 155 - BF 77 437 - BE 76 584 - CB 54
96 - BC 30(Op) 156 - Op(DQ) 455 - BE 56 590 - BC 39(Op)
103 - CD 58 157 - DM 52 459 - BE 77 593 - BE 75
105 - BF 78 158 - Op(DA) 460 - AE 92 594 - DE 97
106 - DE 14 159 - Op(EB) 502 - Op(ED) 653 - Op(CB)
107 - Op(DM) 161 - Op(EN) 504 - Op(EB) 701 - Op(CA)
124 - BC 53(Op) 172 - Op(EB) 505 - BF 77 751 - BE 96
125 - BF 50 202 - CB 18 506 - BF 77 753 - CC 91
126 - EF 41 203 - BD 94 552 - BF 47
On Return Passage: U 213 - 753 - 593 - 155 - 553 - 455 - 103 - 106 -
751 - 69 - 558 - 594 - 566 - 506 - 125 - 432.
Sailed: U 105 - El Ferrol.
Entered Port: - . -
693
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 129: sighted 8.6 fast freighter in DD 9128, 3100, 11 knots.
Sunk: 10.6 DD 8754 "L.A. Christensen" 4,362 BRT, 2900, 10 knots. 12.6
DD 2713 "Hardwicke Grange", 9,005 BRT, 1200, 14 knots.
2) U 107: sighted 8.6 DL 9552, freighter, 2250. Driven off by corvette
and flying boats. Sunk: 7.6 DL 7287 "Gastille", 3,910 BRT, 1250. 8.6
DL 9635 "Surid", 3,249 BRT, 3000, 10 knots. 10.6 DL 9567 freighter
(U.Y.R.), ? BRT, 1800.
3) U 159: sunk: 13.6 EL 2184 "Sixaola", 4,693 BRT, 2700.
b) U-boat sightings: CA 87.
U-boat warnings: EB 6673.
Torpedoed: BB 16-24 Dutch steamer 4,282 BRT.
c) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Group Hecht, U 404, 569, 96, 590, 124, 94 were ordered to be in
reconnaissance line from square BC 2383 to 3882,
- 123 -
course 550, day's run 130 miles, from 2400/13/6 in the order named.
Intention: to sweep as far as AK 65 to search for enemy convoy traffic
along the great circle route and, if necessary, to operate, according to
stocks of fuel and torpedoes. From there, return to W. France.
 2) An operation is planned against a convoy which, according to a G.I.S.
report, left Gibraltar 9.6, and was picked up by an air reconnaissance on
11.6. U 89, 437, 552, 132, 575 have been ordered to be in patrol line from
CF 3184 to CF 3394, depth 20 miles, at 0800/14/6.
c) U 87 reported N. approach to Boston fouled with mines.
V. Reports of Success:
U 129 2 ships 13,362 BRT
107 3 ships 10,159 BRT
159 1 ship 4,693 BRT.
VI. General:
The following considerations have led to the operation against the
Gibraltar convoy:
1) Agent's reports during the last few weeks all agree that Gibraltar
convoys have only weak escorts, as these convoys have not been attacked
for months. These reports were confirmed, as far as this convoy is
concerned, by G.I.S. and a/c reports.
2) It is possible to use a lot of boats, without reducing their fighting
power to any extent by high consumption of fuel on a long outward
passage. Even if this operation fails, it will still be quite possible to use
them on the England-America convoy route.
3) It is necessary to attack enemy convoys on all sea routes, so as not to
allow the enemy to concentrate his anti-S/M and escort forces only in the
areas which at present represent the main centers of U-boat attack.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
13.June 1942.
I. U 67 - DN 17 U 129 - DN 39 U 215 - AN U 553 - BC 55
68 -
694
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
16 - 30 June 1942
PG30308b
16.June 1942.
I. U 67 - DM 18 U 129 - DM 63 U 213 - BE 84 U 552 - Op(BE)
68 - Op(EB) 132 - Op(BE) 214 - BE 57 553 - BD 54
69 - DF 27 134 - Op(BE) 215 - AE 85 558 - BD 95
71 - Op(BE) 135 - Op(CB) 332 - Op(CA) 566 - CD 44
84 - Op(BE) 153 - CE 87 373 - Op(CA) 569 - Op(BD)
87 - Op(CA) 154 - DF 25 404 - Op(DC) 571 - Op(BD)
89 - Op(BE) 156 - DQ 43 406 - CC 44 575 - Op(BD)
94 - Op(BD) 157 - Op(DA) 432 - CC 44 578 - Op(CB)
96 - Op(BD) 158 - Op(DA) 437 - Op(BE) 584 - OP(CA)
103 - CF 65 159 - EC 47 455 - BF 60 590 - Op(BD)
106 - CC 94 161 - Op(ED) 459 - CD 36 593 - BF 81
107 - Op(EC) 172 - Op(EB) 460 - AK 66 594 - CD 39
124 - Op(BD) 173 - AO 40 502 - Op(ED) 653 - Op(CB)
126 - Op(ED) 202 - Op(CA) 504 - DM 79 701 - Op(CA)
128 - Op(ED) 203 CD 40 505 CE 49 753 - CC 37
On Return Passage: U 504 - 432 - 135 - 213 - 156 - 753 - 502 - 107 -
593 - 553 - 103 - 106 - 69 - 558 - 594 - 566 - 455 - 214 - 71 - 455.
Sailed: U 455 - St. Nazaire.
Entered Port: U 402 - St Nazaire; U 576 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
Reconnaissance of convoy No. 28.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys No. 28 and No. 30 see para. IVa.
2) U 701 sighted: 3 destroyers in company and one buoy-layer. One
searching destroyer in position. Isolated D/C's. Main periscope out of
action from a/c bombs.
3) U 502 sighted: 13.6 fast convoy, 2 passenger ships, 2 destroyers,
3300 in ED 9823. In 9589 tanker, 2000. 16.6 freighter, 2250 in 9592.
12.6 freighter, camouflaged patrol vessel in 9829, after firing a miss, 2 PC-
boats. Sunk: 15.6 freighter 6,500 BRT in 9471, freighter 6,000 BRT in
9447, freighter 5,500 BRT in 8669. All ships course 1150.
b) Convoy No. 28 picked up several times.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: DD 49, CA 84, ED 85, DL 64, DD 49, CA 52,
CD 43.
2) U-boat attacks: CA 32-33, ED 86.
3) Torpedo report: DF 84.
SOS: EQ 51 (J31).
IV. Current Operations:
Convoy No. 28: U 571 made contact at 1007 in BE 5679, course
NE, broad formation. Air reconnaissance sent out also picked up the
convoy soon after and made beacon-signals. As weather conditions
- 130 -
(wind and sea 0) were very unfavorable for U-boat attacks and the
convoy was continuously escorted by day by a/c, including land-based
bombers, orders were given to break off the operation and continue
passage to the W. U 71 is returning because of DC damage. Air
695
reconnaissance shows that there are only 17 ships left. It can therefore be
assumed that the 5 ships torpedoed by U 552 have sunk. Result: 5 ships
sunk, 1 tanker torpedoed.
Convoy No. 30: U 94 reported a convoy at 0900 in AK 8717,
course SW. Boats were ordered to operate. Fuel supply for return passage
is intended. U 590, 406 and 96 also made contact and U 124 and 569
reported contact with the escort forces. Reports showed that the convoy
has a double long-range escort force. Boats were constantly forced to
submerge. U 94 and U 590 were depth charged for 7 and 9 hours
respectively and are returning because of damage and casualties. U 406
fired a miss from the stern tube at a destroyer during the night. A four-fan
was seen by the destroyer owing to phosphorescent sea and evaded. Boat
was then driven off and lost contact, as did also U 124.
V. Reports of Success:
U 502 3 ships 18,000 BRT
701 1 ship 5,000 BRT. Mine hit.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
17.June 1942.
I. U 67 - DL 32 U 129 - DM 53 U 213 - BE 83 U 552 - BE 65
68 - Op(EB) 132 - BE 55 214 - BF 60 553 - BD 57
69 - DF 26 134 - BE 54 215 - AE 87 558 - BD 93
71 - BE 65 135 - CB 81 332 - Op(CA) 566 - CD 54
84 - BE 54 153 - DF 33 373 - CA 67 569 - Op(BC)
87 - Op(CA) 154 - DE 18 402 - BF 50 571 - BE 55
89 - BE 84 156 - DQ 23 404 - Op(DC) 575 - BE 54
94 - Op(BC) 157 - Op(DA) 406 - Op(BC) 576 - BF 50
96 - Op(BC) 158 - Op(DA) 432 - CC 44 578 - Op(CB)
103 - CF 43 159 - EC 73 437 - BE 55 584 - Op(CA)
 106 - CC 93 161 - EC 93 459 - CD 36 590 - Op(BC)
107 - DN 76 172 - Op(EB) 460 - AK 93 593 - BF 50
124 - Op(BC) 173 - AO 30 502 - Op(EE) 594 - CE 16
126 - Op(ED) 202 - Op(CA) 504 - Op(ED) 653 - CB 91
128 - Op(ED) 203 - CD 50 505 - CE 93 701 - Op(CA)
753 - CE 14
On Return Passage: U 71 - 552 - 373 - 159 - 590 - 94 - 504 - 432 - 135
- 653 - 213 - 156 - 753 - 502 - 107 - 593 - 553 - 103 - 106 - 69 - 558.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 171 - Kiel; U 166 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 30 see para. IVa.
- 131 -
2) Situation reports: U 87 CA 3515-19 no traffic. Much fog. Convoys
steer 3000. 12.6 sank 2 steamers 14,000 BRT, from a convoy. Since today
strong anti-S/M activity off Boston.
3) U 578: Nothing seen since 11.6 in CB 72-73-81 except 1 destroyer.
Air reconnaissance as far as CB 73. Starting return passage.
4) U 653: chased an armed 4,000 BRT freighter from CB 6895-6535. 3
single misses, of which one was a failure.
696
5) U 68: Nothing seen in EB 50 and 80 and EC 77-82. 1 patrol vessel
in EC 66. Sunk: "Frimaire" (9,242 BRT) in EC 8445. Course for
Panama.
b) None.
c) Attack reports in EL 2244 - DC 2328 (motor vessel "Braga" 1,671
BRT).
U-boat sightings: EN 3327 - DM 26 - BB 46 - DC 1120.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 30: Contact was not regained in the course of the day.
After an exchange of radio messages with U 124 to clarify the situation,
further pursuit was ordered until dark. After that, operation was not
hopeful, as, according to U 124, the cold water zone had been reached and
Newfoundland fogs were to be expected. Up to the time of breaking off,
boats had searched along all convoy courses from 220-2700. U 590 has
reported that she suspects escort forces are using Radar, but it will not be
possible to pronounce on this until the matter has been discussed with the
C.O.'s. U 124, on her way home, came upon a convoy at dawn on the
18th. It comprised of 18 large ships, 4 destroyers and several corvettes.
Boat attacked and sank 2 freighters, totaling 13,000 BRT and torpedoed 1
freighter of 6,000 BRT. After being hunted with D/C's, U 124 continued
on her homeward passage. Operation thus completed.
Total results: 2 ships - 13,000 BRT sunk, 1 ship - 6,000 BRT
torpedoed.
b) U 701 has been given freedom of action on the American coast, to
move away as necessary.
U 571, 84, 575, 437, 134 are now to steer for CC 91, there to supply
from U 459. Subsequently operation in the Caribbean is intended.
U 89 and 132 are making for BD 62 to supply from U 460. Subsequent
operation in CA planned.
c) U 584 reported secondary operation I (landing of agents) completed.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 87 2 ships 14,000 BRT
68 1 ship 9,242 BRT
 124 2 ships 13,000 BRT
124 1 ship 6,000 BRT torpedoed.
- 132 -
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
18.June 1942.
I. U 67 - Op U 132 - BE 51 U 213 - BF 48 U 553 - BD 59
68 - EC 66(Op) 134 - BE 72 214 - BF 60 558 - BE 58
69 - DF 32 135 - CB 81 215 - AL 24 566 - CD 55
71 - BF 49 153 - DF 34 332 - Op 569 - Op
84 - BE 73 154 - DE 39 373 - CB 47 571 - BE 49
87 - CB 11 156 - DE 99 402 - BF 40 575 - BE 72
89 - BE 73 157 - Op 404 - Op 576 - BF 40
94 - BD 22 158 - Op 406 - Op 578 - CB 58
96 - Op 159 - EC 85 432 - CC 56 584 - Op
103 - CF 26 161 - EC 85 437 - BE 73 590 - BD 22
106 - CD 48 166 - BF 50 459 - CD 53 594 - BD 97
107 - DN 59 171 - AO 460 - BD 32 653 - CB 66
124 - Op 172 - Op 502 - EE 54 701 - Op
126 - Op 173 - AN 20 504 - DN 77 753 - CE 21
128 - Op 202 - Op 505 - CE 86 593 - BF 60
697
129 - DM 19 203 - CD 55 552 - BF 57
On Return Passage: U 593 - 214 - 71 - 552 - 373 - 159 - 578 - 406 - 590
- 569 - 124 - 94 - 504 - 432 - 135 - 653 - 213 - 96 - 156 - 753 - 502 - 107 -
553 - 103 - 106 - 69 - 558 - 594 - 566.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 593 - St. Nazaire; U 214 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 153: sighted a large freighter, course 2300, 15 knots, in DF 3542.
Boat could not pursue because of damage to Diesel.
U 89: reports from BD 69 illuminated Portuguese ship on a course of
3100.
U 161: chased a tanker in EC 8528, which afterwards turned out to be
the Spanish "Zorroza".
U 126: sunk: 15.6 ED 69 9414 freighter 7,000 BRT, 2900. ED 9413
American tanker "Kahuku", 6,062 BRT, 1100. Sinking of freighter not
observed, but probable. According to statements by survivors, Trinidad is
used as a coaling station for New York-Capetown and vice-versa traffic.
No sea patrol, strong air patrol also at night. Boat intended to push
forward to Curacao, has been ordered to remain in her present operations
area.
U 128 situation: EE 60 and 30 no traffic. Suspect focal point of NS and
EW traffic id further S. Am now in EE 90 and EF 70.
- 133 -

U 129: sighted a convoy in DM 1988, 5 ships, course 3200, 10 knots.
Further in DM 1975 convoy of 20 ships, course 900. Boat has been
ordered to take every opportunity to attack. If other boats are in the
vicinity, they should request shadower's report. At 0500 U 129 report that
the W-bound convoy had turned away to the E. Forced to submerge by a/c
and approaching ships. Not possible to join on again before first light.
Continuing westward passage.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 32 - EL 31 - BA 0974 - DO 73 - ED 92 - DC
2324.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) New attack areas: U 129 DK center and lower thirds, concentrating
off Tampico. U 154 sea area 200 miles around DL 68 (Yucatan Straits). U
203 and 153 EB lower third and S. of this, concentrating off Colon. U 584
freedom of action in area CA 20-30-50-60, concentrating off New York.
U 332 freedom to attack to the N. in U 87's area. U 576 and 402 to
make for CA 50.
U 215 has been ordered to proceed via BC 77 - BB 82 - BB 77 to CA 50
at economical cruising speed.
c) - d) None.
I. U 67 - Op U 132 - BD 66 U 213 - BF 49 U 558 - BF 49
68 - Op 134 - BD 96 215 - AL 18 566 - CD 55
69 - CE 78 135 - CC 55 332 - Op 569 - BC 36
71 - BF 50 153 - DF 34 373 - CB 54 571 - BE 71
84 - BD 96 154 - DE 61 402 - BE 69 575 - BD 95
87 - Op(BA) 156 - DF 74 406 - BC 14 576 - BE 69
89 - BE 47 157 - Op 404 - Op(DC) 578 - CB 68
94 - BD 34 158 - Op(DA) 432 - CC 36 584 - Op
96 - BC 36 159 - EC 437 - BE 74 594 - BD 99
103 - CF 32 161 - EC 80(Op) 459 - CD 55 590 - BD 38
106 - CD 55 166 - BF 40 460 - BD 62 653 - CC 46
107 - DN 63 171 - AN 30 502 - EE 29 701 - Op(CA)
124 - BC 36 172 - Op 504 - DN 76 753 - BD 98
126 - EO 75(Op) 173 - AF 75 505 - CE 87
128 - EE 85 202 - Op(CA) 552 - BF 60
129 - DM 19 203 - CD 55 553 - BD 69
- 134 -

V. Reports of Success:
U 126 3 ships 13,362 BRT.

VI General: None. On Return Passage: U 71 - 373 - 159 - 552 - 578 - 406 - 590 - 569 - 124
- 94 - 504 - 432 - 135 - 653 - 213 - 96 - 156 - 753 - 502 - 107 - 553 - 103 -
--------------------------------------------------- 106 - 69 - 558 - 594 - 566.
--------------- Sailed: U 754 - Brest.
Entered Port: U 552 - St. Nazaire.
19.June 1942.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
698
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 701 situation: Spasmodic traffic off Hatteras, no longer daily. Far
away from shore, 10 miles off Diamond. Surprised by patrol boat in mist,
Sank her after a gun action lasting 1 1/2 hours.
U 158: Sunk: 17.6 DK 3445 fast freighter 6,800 BRT, 1150. DK 2566
"Moire" (1,560 BRT), course 1700. Afterwards very strong air patrol.
Except for steamers sunk, nothing seen as far as the 20 meter line. Since
15.6 lights on the coast as in peacetime.
U 172: Sunk: 14.6 EB 8281 "Sebore" (8,289 BRT), 1750. 15.6 EB 20.June 1942.
8741 "Bennestvet" (2,438 BRT), 1400. 18.6 EL 2214 petrol tanker 3,500
BRT, said to be "Motorese", 1200. All ships bound for Colon. Medium
air activity. 17.6 Puerto Simon harbor empty, lights out. 18.6 destroyer in I. U 67 - Op U 134 - CE 23 U 332 - Op U 575 - BD 89
EL 31 standing on and off. 68 - Op 135 - CC 64 373 - CC 44 576 - BE 91
b) None. 69 - CE 85 153 - DF 28 402 - BE 67 578 - CC 45
c) U-boats sighted: ED 9276 - DB 5669 - EC 96 - BA 97 - CA 64 - ED 71 - BF 60 154 - DF 55 404 - Op 584 - Op
11 - AF 7735 - BF 8331 - EC 6619. 84 - BD 97 156 - DF 49 406 - BD 19 590 - BE 91
U-boat attacks: Ca 79 - BB 94 - EC 8517. 87 - Op(BA) 157 - Op 432 - CC 66 594 - BE 76
d) None. 89 - BD 65 158 - DL 52 437 - BD 98 653 - CC 56
94 - BD 39 159 - EC 85 459 - CD 50 701 - CA 87(Op)
IV. Current Operations: 96 - BD 18 161 - EC 85(Op) 460 - BD 65 753 - BE 78
a) - b) None. 103 - BE 98 166 - BF 71 502 - EE 32 754 - Lorient
c) U 106 - 566 - 203 have completed supply from U-tanker 459. 106 - CD 53 171 - AN 30 504 - DN 59
d) U 68 reports the following on the subject of the sinking of the French 107 - DO 18 172 - EB 98(Op) 505 - DG 11
ship "Frimaire" (chartered by Portugal): Contrary to regulations, the ship 124 - BD 19 173 - AE 93 553 - BE 72
was not wearing yellow Vichy markings. It was therefore assumed that 126 - Op(ED) 202 - Op(CA) 558 - BF 50
she was in enemy service and camouflaged as a French ship. 128 - EE 75 203 - CD 54 566 - CD 61
129 - DL 39 213 - BF 60 569 - BD 19
V. Reports of Success: 132 - BD 65 215 - AK 83 571 - BD 98
U 701 1 patrol vessel
158 2 ships 8,360 BRT
172 3 ships 14,227 BRT. On Return Passage: U 71 - 373 - 159 - 578 - 406 - 590 - 569 - 124 - 94
- 504 - 432 - 135 - 653 - 213 - 96 - 156 - 753 - 502 - 107 - 553 - 103 - 106
VI. General: None. - 69 - 558 - 594 - 566.
Sailed: U 160 - Lorient.
- 135 - Entered Port: U 71 - St. Nazaire.
699
 d) Extension of the present blockade area in the Atlantic comes into force
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. on 27.6.
U-boats will be informed of new boundaries.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 96: sighted an auxiliary cruiser in BD 1614, course NE, speed 8 V. Reports of Success:
knots. One four-fan missed, reason not known. U 159 2 ships 8,261 BRT
U 437: sighted an armed steamer, 10,000 BRT, in BD 7983, course E, 161 1 sailing vessel.
speed 16 to 18 knots. One miss.
U 159: sank: 18.6 EC 8553 "Flomar" (5,551 BRT), 800. 19.6 EC VI. General:
8524 "Antemaskovio" (2,710 BRT), 700. Both by gunfire. Sighted U-boat operations against Brazil (see War Log 6.6, para. VI) have
further EC 8524 tanker, 800. been ordered.
U 161: sank small sailing vessel EC 6993.
b) None. (MS note): Was later
c) 1) Entrance to Chesapeake and Delaware Bays are mined and closed cancelled by Naval War Staff.
for the present. (Results of own mine-laying).
2) U-boat sightings: CO 94(?) - ED 1131 - CA 6443. ---------------------------------------------------
U-boat attacks in EE 57. SSS report from DC 11. ---------------
d) None.
21.June 1942.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) Attention of U-boats in the North American coast area has been called I. U 67 - Op(DA) U 135 - CC 64 U 332 - Op(CA) U 575 - CE 16
to present favorable traffic situation in CA 79 and CA 5132 and 33. 68 - Op(EC) 153 - DF 46 373 - CC 51 576 - BE 80
69 - CE 91 154 - DE 48 402 - BE 83 578 - CC 52
- 136 - 84 - CE 24 156 - DF 52 404 - Op(DC) 584 - DC 19(Op)
87 - Op(BA) 157 - Op(DA) 406 - BD 55 590 - BE 53
89 - BD 65 158 - DL 432 - CD 45 594 - BE 85
94 - BE 42 159 - EC 85 437 - BD 79 653 - CC 65
96 - BD 54 161 - EC 85(Op) 459 - CD 46 701 - Op(DC)
103 - BF 58 160 - BF 50 460 - BD 65 753 - BE 84
106 - CD 63 166 - BE 95 502 - DP 93 754 - BF 50
107 - DC 22 171 - AN 23 504 - DN 63
124 - BD 53 172 - Op(EL) 505 - DF 34
126 - Op(ED) 173 - AE 91 553 - BE 81
c) U 161 has taken over 20 cbm fuel and provisions from U 159 who is 128 - Op(ED) 202 - Op(CA) 558 - v. Brest
on her way back. 129 - DL 53 203 - CD 72 566 - CE 17
700
 132 - BD 58 213 - v. Brest 569 - BD 52 days' provisions, and U 89 with 44 cbm heavy Diesel oil, and 10 days'
134 - CE 16 215 - AK 64 571 - CE 21 provisions. U 460 observed constant traffic in BD 50 while supplying.
d) None.

On Return Passage: U 373 - 159 - 578 - 406 - 590 - 569 - 124 - 94 -504 V. Reports of Success: None.
- 432 - 135 - 653 - 96 - 156 - 753 - 502 - 107 - 553 - 103 - 106 - 69 - 594 -
566. VI. General:
Sailed: U 461 - 458 - Kiel. The Fuehrer has ordered that an operational U-boat group be held
Entered Port: U 213 - 558 - Brest. ready against a possible landing on Madeira and the Azores. This makes
heavy demands on the conduct of the U-boat war. I have expressed my
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. views on the matter to Naval War Staff as follows:
I. 1) The most important and, in my opinion, the decisive function of the
III. Reports on the Enemy: U-boats is to sink enemy tonnage and, in view of the enemy's vastly
a) U 135 chased a steamer in vain in CC 59. increased new construction program for the next year, to sink enemy
U 156 has been searching for traffic as far as DQ 29 without result. tonnage quickly.
b) None. 2) All other requirements, should, unless it is a question of overcoming
an acute danger, which might involve the loss of the war, be subordinated
- 137 - to operations as under 1. They can only be met if the number of boats and
the situation in general permits the withdrawal of U-boats without serious
consequences to the war on merchant shipping.
II. It is assumed that an operational group of U-boats to act as defense
against enemy operations against Madeira and the Azores has been asked
for in ignorance of the present U-boat situation, and the U-boat situation as
at 24.6 is therefore reported as follows:

U-boat situation as at 24.6

c) U-boats sighted: BF 19 - CA 32 - DB 6793 - AJ 1233(?) - DB 72. In operations areas:

American ship "West Ira" (5,681 BRT) torpedoed in EE 81. Caribbean 4 - 5 boats
d) None. N. American 4 - 5 boats
Total 8 - 10 boats
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 202 and 584 have been ordered to operate in CA 79. On the way out from W. France, arriving about 10.7: 17 boats
c) U 432 reports supply from U 459 completed. U 460 has supplied U From home, arriving about 18.7 (provided tanker is available): 4 boats
132, with 40 cbm of heavy Diesel oil, 2 cbm of lubricating oil, and 10 Total: 21 boats
701
On return passage: 28 boats
- 138 -
To leave W. France by 24.7 and arrive in operations area about 20.8:
18 boats, of which 10 are to be detached for special operation "Brazil".
Total: 8.
Arriving in operation area from home (only if tanker available) by the
end of August: 16 boats.
There will therefore be particularly few U-boats in the operations area
from the middle of June to the middle of July. The large number of U-
boats out in May will probably not be reached again until September.
III. With so few boats available, it would be particularly serious to
withdraw any at present, because attacking conditions in the Caribbean, at
the moment very good, will deteriorate in the near future, when traffic will
be stopped and diverted, assembled into convoys and anti-S/M activity
will be strengthened. This means that successes achieved now with a few
boats will not be equaled later on with more boats. The watchword is
therefore: "Strike at once with every available means."
On the other hand, considering the chances of success even of a
detached operational group of U-boats, it can be said:
a) Chances of success against the first landing fleet are few, because the
enemy decides the time and place of landing and boats will most probably
get there too late.
b) Operations against subsequent supply transports seen to be
promising. In the case of a landing on the Azores or Madeira, in my
702
opinion, a quick landing is to be expected and little supply transport which
would make a U-boat operation worth while, because the area to be
occupied is small and the Portuguese have little war material and few
fighting qualities.
c) With luck the U-boats could damage the landing, but they could
never prevent it.
IV. a) Further to your para. 2 b):
It is not intended to dispose boats in patrol line to pick up convoys in
the immediate future because there are not enough boats available.
b) Further to your para. 2 a):
If there are any boats on their way out they can be sent to the Azores or
Madeira in a very short time at high speed. The fact that replacement
figures are very low at the moment (see II) must however, be taken into
account.
c) Further to your para. 3) b):
To hold serviceable boats in readiness amounts in effect to the same
thing as withdrawing an operational group.
V. Therefore as long as the number of boats actually available for
operations is so low, the detachment of a protective group for Madeira
would mean a very great decrease in the vital sinking figures, which will
decrease anyway in the coming period when fewer boats are at the enemy.
These operational needs and wishes always demand an increase in the
numbers of operational U-boats at sea. There are 2 basic ways in which
this can be attained:
- 139 -
 A) By increasing the number of workmen in the U-boat repair
dockyards at home so that less time will be taken on items of work
outstanding in newly-commissioned boats before they become operational.
This is the only way to deal with the bottleneck of U-boats at home.At
present, of the 138 front-line boats recently commissioned, 63 are still at
home 4 months after commissioning. They should already have been
operational. If there is sufficient dockyard labor, time taken for items of
work outstanding can be reduced to 2-3 weeks, and boats can go into
operation at latest 3 1/2 months after commissioning.
B) By keeping the strength of dockyard personnel in W. France
dockyards at its present level. For the first time now U-boats are not
obliged to stay in port longer than necessary for the crew to recuperate.
This fact contributed materially to the large number of boats at sea in May
and the consequent good results. But this good proportion of dockyard to
sea time has only been attained at present because the dockyard labor
intended for 71 boats under repair has only had to cope with an average of
25 boats. This shows that actually the dockyard labor only suffices for this
small number of boats, if an economical operational use is to be made of
the large number of U-boats built, and that therefore dockyard periods will
become longer as soon as supplies of U-boats start to arrive from home.
Thus a proportion of the coming boats will again be lost to operational use.
It is therefore urgently necessary to increase the number of workmen
in the W. France dockyards as soon as more boats reach the west. Only
thus can full operational use be made of the U-boats which are coming, the
number of boats on operations be increased and more results obtained.
B.d.U. considers that the solution of this labor question is of the
greatest importance for the Navy if a large number of U-boats are to be at
sea on operations in a short space of time and great and decisive successes
achieved.
B.d.U. also considers that it is extremely urgent to solve the labor
question quickly, because it is important to sink in 1942 before the enemy
increases his defenses and his new construction of shipping and reduces
the effect of the U-boat war.
(MS page to face page 15f)
703
Naval War Staff supports the view that the formation of an
operational U-boats group by holding serviceable boats in readiness in W.
France would be too much to the disadvantage of the war against merchant
shipping. It would be possible to form an operational group quickly at any
time from boats on outward passage, and boats disposed in patrol in the N.
Atlantic (as the number of front-line boats increases there will be more
boats in patrol line). CinC Navy will report to the Fuehrer in this sense at
the next opportunity.
B.d.U.'s remarks on the subject were requested. They do not throw any
fresh light. The labor question raised in para. V will be considered
separately by Naval War Staff (Fourth Division).
- 140 -
22.June 1942.
I. U 67 - Op(DA) U 132 - BD 48 U 202 - Op(CA) U 505 - DF 25
68 - Op(EC) 134 - CE 14 203 - CC 99 553 - BE 83
69 - CE 69 135 - CC 66 215 - AK 82 566 - CE 19
84 - CE 18 153 - DF 77 332 - Op(CA) 569 - BD 62
87 - Op(BA) 154 - DD 93 373 - CC 62 571 - CE 15
89 - BD 46 156 - DQ 29 402 - BE 81 575 - CD 39
94 - BF 50 157 - Op(DA) 404 - BD 56 576 - BE 73
96 - BD 55 158 - DL 66 406 - BD 56 578 - CC 65
103 - BF 64 159 - EC 51 432 - CD 54 584 - Op(CA)
 106 - CE 19 160 - BF 49 437 - CD 34 590 - BE 63 c) U-boat attacks: CA 56 - ED 41 - DA 95. SSS report from ED.
107 - DO 32 161 - EC 76 458 - AO 594 - BE 95 U-boat sightings: DN 3871 - DB 94 - CA 32 - DC 94 - ED 41 - CA 87
124 - BD 63 166 - BE 97 459 - CD 46 653 - CD 46 - CA 8476 - DO 6867 - DB 9198.
126 - Op(ED) 171 - AF 48 460 - BD 64 701 - Op(DC) d) None.
128 - Op(ED) 172 - Op(EB) 461 - AO 753 - BE 86
129 - DL 46 173 - AE 88 502 - DQ 49 754 - BF 19 - 141 -
504 - DO 43

On Return Passage: U 373 - 159 - 578 - 406 - 590 - 569 - 124 - 94 - 504
- 432 - 135 - 653 - 96 - 156 - 753 - 502 - 107 - 553 - 103 - 106 - 69 - 594 -
566.
Sailed: U 582 - Brest.
Entered Port: U 103 - Lorient.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
III. Reports on the Enemy: b) 1) U 505 new approach point ED 11.
a) U 202 situation: No traffic as far as close up to the coast. Medium air 2) On account of U 460's situation report, U 402 and 576 have been
activity, no sea patrol. ordered to proceed via BD 50, right half and 60 left half and remain there
22.6 sunk: Argentine "Rio Tercero" ex-"Fortunstella" (4,864 BRT), for 2 days.
without flag or neutrality markings. Shuttle service New York-Buenos c) 1) U 406 and 653 report supply from U 460 and U 459 respectively
Aires. completed.
U 584: 21.6 chased a large tanker from DC 1362 to CA 8437. Got 2) U 156 has completed delivering fuel to U 562.
away, because boat's Diesel defective. 22.6 CA 8435 triple miss and 3 dud d) None.
shots at 6,000 BRT tanker. Course 3400, later 1200.
U 67: DM 1980 sighted 2 fast ships, course 3000. No traffic from V. Reports of Success:
Tortugas to operations area off New Orleans. 20.6 torpedoed a large fast U 202 1 ship 4,864 BRT
tanker in DA 9296, 2500, 2 duds. Night traffic DA 9350 via DB 70 67 1 ship torpedoed
followed the 200 meter line. Normal air activity, little sea patrol. 179 1 ship 9,639 BRT.
U 172: Nothing seen for 4 days EB 70-90. Use of armament restricted
by weather. VI. General: None.
U 159: fired on the loaded tanker "E.J. Sadler" (9,639 BRT) in ED
4161 with 37mm gun and set her on fire. As she had not sunk after 4 ---------------------------------------------------
hours, tanker was blown up and sunk(sic). ---------------
b) None.
704
23.June 1942.
I. U 67 - DA 95(Op) U 135 - CC 69 U 332 - Op(CA 79) U 569 - BE
44
68 - Op(EC) 153 - DE 95 373 - CD 17 571 - CD 39
69 - CF 51 154 - DD 94 402 - BE 72 575 - CD 61
84 - CD 62 156 - DQ 52 404 - Op(CA) 576 - BE 71
87 - Op(BA) 157 - Op(DA) 406 - BD 44 578 - CD 42
89 - BD 47 158 - DL(Op) 432 - CD 53 582 - v. Lorient
94 - BF 60 159 - ED 18 437 - CD 28 584 - DC 13(Op)
96 - BD 77 160 - BF 71 458 - AN 30 590 - BF 45
106 - CE 25 161 - Op(EB) 459 - CD 47 594 - BF 49
107 - DD 94 166 - CF 34 460 - BD 64 653 - CD 62
124 - BE 46 171 - AE 68 461 - AN 30 701 - CA 87(Op)
126 - Op(ED) 172 - EB 89(Op) 502 - DQ 51 753 - BF 49
128 - Op(ED) 173 - AL 34 504 - DO 26 754 - BF 47
129 - Op(DK) 202 - CA 59(Op) 505 - DF 19
132 - BC 93 203 - DE 26 553 - BF 58
134 - CD 37 215 - BD 12 566 - BE 75
On Return Passage: U 373 - 159 - 578 - 406 - 590 - 569 - 124 - 94 - 504
- 432 - 135 - 653 - 96 - 156 - 753 - 502 - 107 - 553 - 106 - 69 - 594 - 566.
Sailed: - . -
Entered Port: U 94 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 701 situation: Hatteras traffic only in daylight parallel to a line
Diamond-Lookout. Widely dispersed.
- 143 -
705
Sighted a large tanker without escort 21.6. Course N. No chance to
fire.
2) U 502 reported 1 steamer, course 3100, 10 knots in DQ 2873. U 153
and 156, which were in the vicinity, are operating on this report and
requesting beacon-signals. So far no success.
3) U 404: 17.6 DC 2390 chased Norwegian "Bnaga" in vain. Smoke
bombs. No traffic in CA 8770 since 22.6, air activity only.
4) On the subject of the sinking of "Rio Tercero", U 202 reports:
Steamer was steering a course of 1350 without zig-zagging. Good
visibility, misty horizon. The identity of the ship was discovered after she
had been sunk, by statements from the Captain. Steamer was sailing
without any markings.
5) U 84 sank S.S. "Torvanger" (6,568 BRT) on 23.6 in CD 5194; cargo
of a/c parts from New York to Capetown.
6) U 68 sank U.S. tanker "Arriggia" (5,000 BRT) 24.6 in EC 8233,
course 1100. Request return passage via DP 10.
7) U 158 sank "Henry Gibbons" (5,000 BRT) on 23.6 in DL 2918,
course 3300.
U 154 reported a passenger freighter with destroyers, course 1300, 17
knots in DO 63. Chase abandoned because of speed too high.
8) U 332 was surprised by an a/c in CA 8468 and bombed. Damaged.
Boat continuing operation in CB 70.
9) U 159 sighted 3 tankers, 1 destroyer, course 2100, 8 knots in ED
1978. Boat cannot maintain contact on account of fuel.
b) None.
c) U-boat attacks: DB 47 - EE 73 - DL 29.
U-boat sightings: BF 4897 - BE 6546 - BB 76 - BB 51 - BE 6546. A/c
attack on U-boat in BF 8136 (U 753).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations: ---------------------------------------------------
a) None. ---------------
b) 1) New approach point for U 171 and 173 is DE 10.
2) Because of report of traffic off Hatteras boats have been re- 24.June 1942.
distributed as follows: U 202 and 332 N, U 701 584, 404 S. of the latitude
of CA 7950.
c) U 96 reports supply from U 460 completed. U 135 has supplied from I. U 67 - Op(DA) U 153 - DE 89 U 402 - BD 69 U 576 - BD 68
U 459. 68 - EC 59 154 - DP 41 404 - CA 87(Op) 578 - CD 28
69 - BF 58 156 - DQ 10 406 - BE 46 582 - BF 50
84 - CD 46 157 - Op(DA) 432 - CD 36 584 - Op(CA)
- 143 - 87 - Op(DA) 158 - DL 37 437 - CD 46 590 - BF 58
89 - BC 92 159 - ED 25 458 - AN 30 594 - BF 58
96 - BD 64 160 - BE 88 459 - CC 47 653 - CE 14
106 - BE 75 161 - Op(EB) 460 - BD 80 701 - Op(CA)
107 - DD 68 166 - CF 27 461 - AN 30 753 - BF 58
124 - BE 64 171 - AE 83 502 - DQ 10 754 - BE 67
126 - Op(ED) 172 - EL(Op) 504 - DO 33
128 - Op(ED) 173 - AL 42 505 - DE 55
129 - Op(DK) 202 - Op(CA) 553 - BF 60
d) U 753 was attacked by an English a/c at 1615 in BF 8125 and badly 132 - BC 94 203 - DE 51 566 - BE 84
damaged. The boat was temporarily unable to dive and could not move 134 - CD 52 215 - BC 36 569 - BE 46
because of her Diesels were out of action. Boats in the vicinity have been 135 - CC 47 332 - CA 85(Op) 571 - CD 53
ordered to go to her assistance. A chain of JU-88s has been sent to render 373 - CD 24 575 - CD 54
assistance, and at the same time 3 new type MS-boats have left the mouth
of the Gironde. In the evening U 69 reported the radio message, probably
made by U 753 by emergency transmitter, which showed that the boat was On Return Passage: U 159 - 553 - 68 - 578 - 406 - 590 - 569 - 158 - 124
able to dive to a limited extent. U 753 will have air escort by JU-88 at - 504 - 432 - 135 - 653 - 96 - 156 - 753 - 502 - 107 - 106 - 69 - 594 - 566.
0730/24/6. Sailed: U 66 - Lorient.
Entered Port: U 553 - St. Nazaire.
V. Reports of Success:
U 84 1 ship 6,568 BRT II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
68 1 ship 5,000 BRT assumed
158 1 ship 5,000 BRT assumed. III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 84 reported the Portuguese ship "Mirandella" in CD 4839, course
VI. General: None. 850, 10 knots.
706
 U 202 sighted a passenger steamer with Portuguese markings in CA
9510.
U 87 situation: visibility very variable in operations area, much fog.
18.6 single miss in fog at small fast freighter, 00. Bombed by a/c.
Returning because of damage.
U 404 sighted a convoy of 14 ships, 2 escort vessels off Hatteras just
outside the 200 meter line. Course SW.
- 144 -
24.6 in the afternoon in the same position convoy of 9 ships and 3
escort vessels, course NE. Sunk: 24.6 freighter 6,000 BRT, N. course. 3
masted freighter 10,000 BRT. Tanker 7,000 BRT. Probably sunk. So far
total: 6: 35,328 BRT.
U 156 reports the sinking of S.S. "Willie Mantic" (first reported by U
502), proceeding in ballast from Capetown to Charlestown. Total: 10
freighters, 1 sailing vessel - 48,991 BRT sunk, 1 destroyer and 1 tanker
8,000 BRT torpedoed.
U 128 situation: Lively single-ship traffic on an E-W course along
latitude 120 N. Sunk: "West Ira" (5,681 BRT) EE 81. Naval tanker
14,000 BRT in EE 74. Chasing fast tanker in EE 8553.
b) None.
c) U-boat attacks: DC 1250 and DC 1240.
U-boat sightings: CA 79 - BC 41 - BF 6730 - EC 4193 - DB 94 - DC
1244 - ED 98.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
707
a) - c) None.
d) 1) U 753 was picked up by air escort at about 0900 and escorted home
by the M/S boats.
2) All C.O.'s have once more received detailed instructions on conduct
towards Neutrals.
3) Because of very great danger from the air, boats have been ordered to
proceed submerged day and night in Biscay and to surface only to charge
batteries.
V. Reports of Success:
U 404 3 ships 23,000 BRT
156 1 ship 5,000 BRT assumed.
128 2 ships 19, 681 BRT
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
25.June 1942.
I. U 66 - BF 50 U 135 - CD 55 U 332 - Op(CA) U 571 - CD 46
67 - Op(DA) 153 - DP 39 373 - CD 34 575 - CD 47
68 - EC 66 154 - DO 53 402 - Op(BD) 576 - Op(BD)
69 - BF 60 156 - DE 89 404 - DC 12(Op) 578 - CD 34
84 - CD 47 157 - Op(DA) 406 - BE 56 582 - BF 50
87 - Op(CB) 158 - DL 39 432 - CE 16 584 - Op(CA)
89 - BC 85 159 - DO 98 437 - CC 69 590 - BF 60
96 - BF 47 160 - CF 24 458 - AF 48 594 - BF 60
106 - BE 85 161 - Op(EB) 459 - CC 91 653 - CE 21
107 - DE 41 166 - CE 63 460 - BD 89 701 - Op(CA)
124 - BF 49 171 - AE 84 461 - AF 80 753 - BF 60
126 - ED(Op) 172 - Op(EB) 502 - DE 99 754 - BE 59
128 - Op(EE) 173 - AK 68 504 - DD 97
129 - Op(DK) 202 - Op(CA) 505 - DE 72
 132 - CD 14 203 - DE 48 566 - BE 59 b) None.
134 - CD 45 215 - BC 61 569 - BE 59 c) Norwegian "Tamesis" (7,256 BRT) torpedoed N. of Hatteras.
U-boat sightings: EC 4446 - BB 6382 - ED 9865 - BB 57 - ED 2746 -
CA 5166 - CA 7999 - EB 86 - BA 99 - DC 13 - DC 12.
(x) "Manuela" and "Nordau" torpedoed off Hatteras (probably U 404).
- 145 - d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

On Return Passage: U 582 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 578 - 406 - 569
- 158 - 124 - 504 - 432 - 135 - 653 - 96 - 156 - 502 - 107 - 106 - 566 - 69 -
594 - 590.
Sailed: U 379 - 596 - 508 - 509 - Kiel.
Entered Port: U 69 - 590 - 594 - St. Nazaire; U 753 - La Pallice.
a) None.
b) 1) U 332 operating against traffic in CB 70.
2) U 107, on return passage, will remain in DD for 2 days.
3) U 158 will make for CC 90.
c) None.
d) U 124 reports: cannot dive because stern heavy, reason unknown.
Boat is continuing on her way at high speed will have air escort from
0830. 2 patrol vessels are also being sent to meet her.
- 146 -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) U 158: reported a double miss at a freighter in DL 6369. 1 shot a
gyro-failure.
U 107: quadruple miss at ship type "Torens", 2950, 17 knots.
U 153: sank "Anglo-Canadian" (5,268 BRT), from Capetown to
Baltimore, in DP 2655. V. Reports of Success:
U 126 situation: No traffic along the route ED 74-75-72-73-81-82-83- U 153 1 ship 5,268 BRT
91, ,nor in area ED 98 since 21.6. On 20.6 sighted a gunboat with radar, 1 67 1 ship 8,621 BRT.
patrol vessel on 22 and 25.6 respectively. Operations area very
unfavorable at present. Am going to EE during the full moon period. VI. General: None.
U 67 situation: No traffic S. of 200 meter line. Moved off because of
moonlight nights as bright as day and sea as smooth as oil. Intend to ---------------------------------------------------
operate in DB 49 or 47. Off South Pass sank a ship type "Ahome" (8,621 ---------------
BRT), 600.
708
26.June 1942.
I. U 66 - BF 48 U 153 - DP 51 U 373 - CE 11 U 571 - CC 93
67 - DB 72 (Op) 154 - DO 43 379 - AO 40 575 - CC 91
68 - ED 18 156 - DE 96 402 - Op(BD60) 576 - Op(BD 50)
84 - CC 92 157 - Op(DA) 404 - CA 89 578 - BD 84
87 - CC 11 158 - DM 42 406 - BE 66 582 - BF 60
89 - BC 79 159 - DP 71 432 - BD 97 584 - Op(CA)
96 - BE 97 160 - CE 63 437 - CC 87 508 - AO 40
106 - BE 91 161 - Op(EB) 458 - AE 69 509 - AO 40
107 - DE 12 166 - CE 67 459 - CC 87 596 - AO 40
124 - BF 50 171 - AL 21 460 - CE 28 653 - BD 98
126 - ED 98(Op) 172 - EC 71 461 - AE 61 701 - Op(CA 79)
128 - Op(ED) 173 - AK 85 502 - DF 75 754 - BE 73
129 - Op(DK) 202 - CA 80(Op) 504 - DD 93
132 - CC 34 203 - DD 96 505 - DO 99
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 July 1942
PG30309a
1.July 1942.
I. U 66 - CF 27 U 136 - BF 50 U 203 - Op(EB) U 505 - DO 94
67 - Op(DA) 153 - DO 95 215 - Op(BB) 508 - AE 91
68 - DE 84 154 - BC 28 332 - Op(CB) 509 - AE 93
84 - DD 58 156 - CE 79 373 - BE 81 571 - DD 57
87 - BC 74 157 - Op(DA) 379 - AE 91 572 - BF 90
709
89 - CB 46 158 - DC 64 402 - BC 95 575 - DD 67
90 - AO 40 159 - DE 89 404 - CB 48 576 - BC 95
96 - off Nazaire 160 - DF 26 406 - off Nazaire 578 - BE 69
107 - CD 46 161 - Op(EB) 432 - BF 47 582 - CF 32
116 - BE 92 166 - DF 43 437 - DD 76 584 - Op(CA)
126 - Op(ED) 171 - AK 77 458 - AL 42 596 - AN 30
128 - EF 41 172 - ED 23 459 - CC 57 597 - Bergen
129 - Op(DL) 173 - BC 95 460 - BC 95 653 - BF 40
132 - BB 18 201 - BE 92 461 - AL 18 701 - Op(CA)
134 - DD 56 202 - Op(CA) 502 - CE 88 704 - AO 40
135 - BE 86 504 - CE 24 754 - CB 99
On Return Passage: U 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 578 - 404 - 158 - 504
- 432 - 135 - 653 - 128 - 156 - 502 - 107 - 596.
Entered Port: U 96 - 406 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 171 position: 28.6. AK 61 2 mast top sighted, probably destroyer.
Course NE 29.6. freighter in AK 58. Course east, 18 knots. Ak 82
smoke.
U 584 position 28.6. DC 1323 via CA 8729 in westerly direction high
speed convoy. 2 steamers and 2 destroyers.
30.6. CA 8773 to DC 1525. Convoy consisting of 3 steamers and 2
destroyers. In DC 1528 heavily armed freighter on northerly course. 1.7.
in DC 1336, freighter of 8,000 GRT on northerly course. Strong aerial
protection.
U 67 On 29.6. sank motorboat type "British Unity" in DB 4987 (8,407
GRT) 1100.
Spasmodic traffic on 25m line in the Cape vicinity. Number of fishing
craft - isolated patrols, at night occasional air activity. Intention - to
proceed to DA 93 via DA 47. Further report see cypher IV d).
b) None.
 c) U-boat sightings: DA 7568 - CA 2696 - DO 85/86 - ED 1595 - DC 13
- DM 16 - BB 76 - DC 11 - DA 75 - DC 1237 - DB 8134 - CA 34 - DC ---------------------------------------------------
1147 - ED 15 - DF 45. ---------------
d) Nothing.

IV. Current operations: U-boats as of 1st July 1942.

a) None.
b) New course U 379, U 509 in CC 30. U 509 same grid after I. In operation 1.6 1) 313
Commissioned in June 21
-1- 334
Losses in June 2) 3
In service 1.7 331

1) In the summaries not so far received (in error): U 412 reported in

service in April, U 706 in March.
2) U 573 (Heinsohn) (CO) sold to Spain. U 568 (Preuss) veteran ship
24.5.42. not reported to have put out of Messina 2.6. No information U
652 (Fraatz) veteran ship 26.42 to Fliebos, eastern Mediterranean.
Scuttled.
execution of special task. (laying of weather buoys).
c) 1) Took supplies on board from U 460:
U 576 - 32 cubic m - 8 days provisions II. Distribution:
U 173 - 52 cubic m II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXD1 IXD2 XB XIV
U 402 - 34 cubic m.
In action: - - 95 3 38 - - 1 3 140
Capacity of tanker: total, 430 cubic m. and 157 days provisions. Trials: - - 94 3 23 1 5 3 3 132
d) U 67 in operational area DB on 24.6. heard one U-boat twice during Training: 37 4 16 - 2 - - - - 59
the day and on the night of 28.6., sighted one U-boat. This was probably
U 157, which has not reported since 9.6., but whose presence is presumed 37 4 205 6 63 1 5 4 6 331
on account of several action and sighting reports. W/T equipment
probably out of action.
III. In June:
with reference to c) 2) U 404 took supplies from U 459 on board. Became operational : + 12
Total number increased by: + 18 (plus two losses at the beginning of the
V. Reports of Success: month)
U 67 sank one ship of 8,407 GRT.
710
Number of boats on trials increased by: + 6 (plus two losses at the
beginning of the month)
Number of training boats unchanged: +/- 0

IV. Operational U-boats were distributed as follows on 1.7.42:

Atlantic 101 boats
Mediterranean 16 boats
Norway area 23 boats
140 boats.

-2-

-3-

V. In June in Atlantic:
Daily average at sea: 59.2 boats.
Of these, in operations area: 18.7 "
Proceeding to Op. area: 43.3 "
Proceeding from Op. area: 19.7 "
2.July 1942.

VI. Put out in June:

From home waters 13 boats. I. U 66 - CF 45 U 153 - DO 89 U 332 - Op(CB 70) U 571 - DD 71
From W. France 30 boats. 67 - DB 73-Op 154 - BC 15 373 - BE 83 572 - BF 80
68 - DE 59 156 - CE 83 379 - AE 88 575 - DD 86
84 - DD 73 157 - Op(DA) 402 - BC 89 576 - CC 33
87 - BD 93 158 - DD 17 404 - CC 57 578 - BF 50
711
 89 - CB 47 159 - DE 68 432 - BF 60 582 - CF 37
90 - AN 30 160 - DF 51 437 - DO 21 584 - CA 81-Op
107 - CD 29 161 - Op(EB) 458 - AL 68 596 - AO 70
116 - BE 97 166 - DE 66 459 - CC 57 597 - AF 70
126 - Op(ED) 171 - BC 39 460 - CD 13 653 - BF 48
128 - BF 12 172 - DO 96 461 - AK 63 701 - Op(CA)
129 - Op(DL) 173 - CD 15 502 - CE 68 704 - AN 30
132 - Op(BB 10) 201 - BE 97 504 - CE 31 754 - CD 16
134 - DD 49 202 - Op(CA) 505 - ED 12
135 - BF 71 203 - Op(EB) 508 - AE 85
136 - BF 40 215 - BE 70 509 - AE 86
On Return Passage: U 596 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 578 - 404 - 158
- 504 - 432 - 135 - 653 - 128 - 156 - 502 - 107.
Entered Port: U 432 - La Pallice; U 596 - Kiel.
Sailed: U 752 - St. Nazaire; U 86 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 160 reports from DE 2947. No traffic sighted.
2) U 215 position: BB 70 no traffic. Off Halifax a/c and escort. Lights
as in peace time.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sighted in CA 73 - DM 61 - BB 63.
2) U-boat attack in EL 12.
3) SOS from American tanker "Gulfbelle" (7,104 GRT) in ED 96 (U
126?).
4) According to Intelligence reports the northern approaches to the Gulf
of Paria (Trinidad) are mined.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) - d) None.
712
V. Reports of Success:
VI. General:
A. The presence of U-boat tankers (U 459, U 116) in the operational area
has largely contributed to success. For the first time - in spite of the long
lines of approach - it has become possible to retain a large number of boats
in this area until their supplies of torpedoes and munitions are exhausted.
Supplies could be handed over
-4-
according to position, on the outward, as well as on the homeward
journey.
An attempt is to be made as far as possible, to carry out the supplying of
boats on the outward voyage. This eliminates the danger of several boats
having insufficient fuel for the homeward voyage, should a U-boat tanker
not show up owing to engine trouble or enemy action. However, taking
June into account with the arrival of the next two U-boat tankers (U 460
and 461) since the middle of June., the supplying has been in practice
increased. The failure of the operation "Brasil" and the fact that U 460
was available for operations in the Atlantic made the following possible:
1) The continuation of operations (3 boats were supplied on homeward
voyage) by the Group "Hecht"; and, on the 16.6. the convoy sighted by U
94 in grid AK 8717 proceeding in a south-westerly course, was contacted,
and resulted in the sinking of 2 ships of 13,000 GRT and the torpedoing of
a ship of 6,000 GRT.
 2) The entire supplying of the Group "Endrass" (the group operating operations again with medium forces. The traffic situation must be
against the Gibraltar convoys) resulting in uncurtailed operations after exploited as long as it yields
escort duties in the Caribbean and North American area.
3) The supplying of outward bound vessels resulting in the use of U-
boat type VIIc in North America, U-boat type IXc, in the Caribbean area. -5-
This meant a time saving of altogether 3 weeks for each boat in
comparison to the time previously needed for the outward voyage - (Kiel-
Western France-Op. Area). U 116 put out 27.6. Is detailed for the
supplying of a group of 5 type VIIc U-boats proceeding southward. It is
necessary to make sure that the U-boat tanker reaches the area of
operations at the right time. Before America's entry into the war the U-
boat's sphere of action was sufficient (with regard to Pan-American
security boundaries). After America's entry in to the war U-boats operated
in the North American area which yields good results, isolated boats of
type IXc in the Caribbean area. The traffic situation in North American numerous isolated successes with the minimum number of losses.
coastal waters began to deteriorate at the end of April 1942. At this time Furthermore attention is drawn to the fact that operations in coastal waters
the first taking on of supplies could be carried out from U 459 and thereby with for the most part strong aerial protection and medium, if
the range of action for boats type VIIc and IXb also increased: still more inexperienced sea defense is an excellent training for anti-convoy
boats will be sent to waters as yet untried and plentiful in traffic. operations.

B. On examination of the question as to whether the system used in the C. In order to provide reinforcements against the increasingly strong
last few months is the right one, the following evaluation of the potential English air protection in the Bay of Biscay I had a conference on 2.7. in
will be apparent: the Luftwaffe High Command Operational H.Q. and with Goering. I
Sunk per boat in the sea day. reported the enemy's position in the air in the Biscay area; that having
January 1942 209 GRT attained complete protection from bombing in port and built U-boat
February 1942 378 GRT facilities, he has transferred his attacks to the waters off the coast and
March 1942 409 GRT therefore made the surface passage of U-boats by day and night a risky
April 1942 412 GRT proceeding as English a/c are equipped with D/F apparatus.
May 1942 426 GRT The U-boat Arm has suffered considerably from losses and damage in the
June 1942 404 GRT Biscay area - as much as the enemy himself. English a/c meet absolutely
no opposition in the Biscay area, reinforcements are urgently needed.
Here, the fact must be taken into account that the figures for June are The Chief of General Staff has approved the dispatch of more Junkers
adversely effected by the large number of returning boats (about 30) and a 88's.
medium number of outward bound boats which have a fairly long voyage As a result of this conference 24 more Junkers 88's have been designated
to their field of operations. The potential was in fact as high as that of to the Luftwaffe Atlantic Command for the war in the Biscay area.
May if not higher. It would still be wrong then, to start purely anti-convoy
713
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
3.July 1942.
I. U 66 - CE 91 U 136 - BF 40 U 215 - CB 12 U 509 - AE 87
67 - Op(DA) 153 - ED 24 332 - Op(CB 70) 571 - DC 98
68 - DE 65 154 - EB 24 373 - BE 69 572 - BF 70
84 - DC 96 156 - EB 35 379 - AL 31 575 - DO 31
86 - off Lorient 157 - Op(DA) 402 - BC 85 576 - CC 29
87 - BE 72 158 - DD 22 404 - CC 64 578 - off Nazaire
89 - Op(CA 50) 159 - DF 45 437 - DO 17 582 - CF 58
90 - AN 30 160 - DE 52 458 - AK 86 584 - Op(CA)
107 - CD 36 161 - Op(BE) 459 - CC 57 597 - AF 72
116 - CF 35 166 - DE 67 460 - BC 95 653 - BF 40
126 - Op-ED 171 - BC 64 461 - AK 67 701 - Op(CA 79)
128 - DQ 73 172 - DP 49 502 - BE 85 704 - AN 30
129 - Op(DL) 173 - BC 97 504 - BE 77 752 - BF 50
132 - Op(BA) 201 - CF 37 505 - ED 16 754 - CC 63
134 - DD 71 202 - Op(CA) 508 - AL 32
135 - BF 73 203 - Op(EB)
On Return Passage: U 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158 - 504 - 135
- 653 - 128 - 156 - 502 - 107 - 578.
Entered Port: U 578 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 126 position: Traffic sighted in ED 96-98-99.
-6-
714
Steamers approaching from Caribbean Sea and east, making for
Granada. Strong traffic junction in ED 9650 - day and night strong air,
slight sea protection. The area around Trinidad is suitable as an
operational area for several boats. Stiff Trade winds by day.
Sunk: 29.6. small sailing vessel left as wreck.
1.7. on voyage - 7,000 GRT freighter.
3.7. "Gulfbelle" - 7,104 GRT in ED 9691 with last torpedo. Course 2700.
Left it unmaneuverable condition, drifting with a strong stern list.
Total tonnage including torpedoing: 48,253 GRT.
U 172: 23.6. small sailing vessel sunk in EB 8234 27.6 steamer sighted in
EC 4555, course 1600. Mainly stiff to stormy Trade winds. 2 torpedoes
left. Intended to operate on return voyage about DR-DQ.
U 202: Double and single miss on large freighter type "Brastagi" -
northerly course - 15 knots in CA 8469.
U 159 sighted in CD 9155 large passenger steamer - course 00 - doing
16 knots.
b) None.
c) American U-boat patrolling in DD 18. U-boats sighted: DO 97 - DA
8442 - DB 1517 - CA 87 - CA 7338.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) According to assignment Group North received the following action
areas of U-boats on the outward voyage:
U 597 grid AE 93.
U 90 grid AE 99.
 U 704 grid AF 74.
Dispositions are intended to be kept for 24 hours. The passage of
heavy English units through this area is expected.
2) U 89 is to be given the waters off New York as sphere of action.
Nucleus there.
3) U 582 - 201 - 572 - 136 - 752 are to be incorporated into Group
"Hai". It is intended to form these boats into a reconnaissance line from
CF 7250 to 8150 patrolling on a course of 1850 to the south to the latitude
of EJ 95. The aim is to enclose the convoy routes and isolated traffic.
Lines to the west will be extended by U 116. A boat will escort the group
as tanker. Final operation is planned between Freetown and FC 30 fueling
in grid ER.
The following disposition is ordered until all boats have reached the
line of reconnaissance:
U 582 - CF 72 - 75 - 78; U 201 - CF 210 - CF 46 - 49 - 73; U 116 -
CE 98 - 99.
d) None.
-7-
The following inferences may be made from the convoy operations to the
months of May and June - after the return of the boats and conference with
the Commanding Officers.
1) Anti-convoy operations are still possible. The conditions of defense
have changed slightly in comparison with those of Autumn 1941.
2) Presence of (enemy) surface Radar has not yet been absolutely
confirmed. The sighting and beating off of boats by the enemy can in
many cases be traced to the rash behavior of young boats inexperienced in
convoy work.
The older boats keeping in touch are also forced to dive in sympathy,
owing to this behavior.
3) Veteran boats have launched attacks. This will also be possible for
new boats in later convoy operations as soon as the number of attacking
boats causes a splitting up of the defense forces.
4) All convoy duties are greatly influenced by adverse weather conditions
(ONS convoys experienced stormy, variable weather, fog; Gibraltar
convoy calm on 2nd day, seaway 0)
5) Results of 4 operations (ONS) of Group "Hecht" - 17 ships, 1
destroyer, 1 ship torpedoed (no losses); Group "Endrass", 1 operation
against HG resulted in 5 ships, 1 ship torpedoed, no losses.
6) The tactical experience derived from these convoy operations with
special regard to the behavior of the boats in the convoy, has been passed
to Training Flotillas, U-boat instructional Divisions.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

4.July 1942.

V. Reports of Success:
U 126 - 1 sailing vessel, 1 freighter (7,000 GRT) 1 ship (7,410 GRT) I. U 66 - CE 73 U 136 - BE 90 U 215 - Op(CA) U 571 - DN 31
torpedoed. 67 - Op(DA) 153 - ED 41 332 - Op(CB) 572 - BE 90
U 172 - 1 sailing vessel. 68 - DF 18 154 - DM 88 373 - BF 48 575 - DO 28
84 - DC 97 156 - BE 93 379 - AL 26 576 - CC 19
VI. General: 86 - BF 50 157 - Op(DA) 402 - BC 79 582 - CF 87
87 - BE 82 158 - CC 74 404 - CD 17 584 - CA 97
715
 89 - Op(CA) 159 - CD 69 437 - DN 62 597 - AE 93
90 - AF 75 160 - DE 57 458 - BD 13 653 - BF 54
107 - CE 13 161 - Op(EB) 459 - CC 57 701 - Op(CA)
116 - CF 64 166 - DE 73 460 - CD 13 704 - AN 30
126 - Op(ED) 171 - BC 85 461 - AK 88 752 - BF 40
128 - DQ 43 172 - DO 95 502 - BE 91 754 - CC 56
129 - Op(DK) 173 - CD 13 504 - BE 84
132 - Op(BA) 201 - CF 56 505 - EC 39
134 - DC 95 202 - CA 85 508 - AM 17
135 - BF 60 203 - Op(EB) 509 - AL 24
-8-
On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158
- 504 - 135 - 653 - 128 - 156 - 502 - 107.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 43 - 454 - Kiel; U 71 - 552 - St. Nazaire; U 507 - 130 -
Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 161 position: Traffic searched for in lower third of EB and upper
third of EL. I EL 2318 on 28.6. craft probably escort vessel sighted. In
EL 2316 freighter 1900. Otherwise no traffic. Bad visibility until 1.7. On
4.7. just off Colon steamer with a/c escort sighted. Course 1600. Heavy
716
a/c protection, several escort vessels. Sank "Sampablo" (3,305 GRT) by
pier with 2 torpedoes in Puerto Simon. No defense.
U 458 Sank on 30.6. in AL 4224 steamer "Mosfruit" (2,714 GRT)
course 750. Otherwise nothing sighted on trip.
U 136 at 1700 in CG 1160, 2 destroyers very far apart from one another
and a long way off to the west of them smoke trails sighted. Course NW.
This refers to a HG convoy already contacted in the morning by a/c in CG
15. U 136 received orders not to operate and to continue on her westerly
course.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AM 4275 - DB 97 - DL 68 - DC 14 - BC 2974 - DD
49 - DC 14.
(X) A/c attacked U-boat with depth charges in AE 9994.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 508 received order to steer on a course CC 70 after execution of
special task.
U 172 is to endeavor to carry out return voyage if possible without
reinforcements. Will be directed to traffic in DP and DQ.
In the event of ships being sighted operate without regard to fuel
situation.
New areas of Attack:
U 203 and 575 operate according to situation report of U 126 of 3.7.
(area around Trinidad).
U 134 The coast of Florida to the south to approximately 240 N.
U 571 in DA 90 according to situation report of U 67.
U 437 south of Yucatan. Channel between 16 and 210 North and 760
30' and 870 West.
-9-

U 84 The left half of DM.
U 597 - 709 - 90 receive orders to proceed on the course ordered in the
Atlantic. (see cypher IV b) 1) of 3.7.42)
c) None.
d) 1) Boats will be informed of the identification signs of Argentinean
Merchant ships.
2) With immediate effect: Armed attacks without warning may be made
against:
1) All Brazilian merchant ships, that means also against unarmed and
all shipping identified as Brazilian.
2) Brazilian warships, only if they show fight or are engaged on convoy
escort work for shipping not confirmed as Brazilian.
V. Reports of Success:
U 161 - 3,305 GRT
458 - 2,714 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
5.July 1942.
I. U 66 - CD 96 U 134 - DC 89 U 203 - Op(ED ) U 509 - AL 18
43 - AO 40 135 - BF 60 215 - Op(CA) 552 - BF 50
67 - Op(DA) 136 - CF 36 332 - Op(CB) 571 - DN 24
68 - CE 88 153 - EC 64 373 - BF 40 572 - CG 12
71 - BF 50 154 - Op(DL) 379 - AL 01 575 - DO 49
84 - DN 22 156 - BF 49 402 - CC 22 576 - CC 41
717
86 - BF 40 157 - Op(DA) 404 - CD 24 582 - Op(CF)
87 - BE 67 158 - CC 57 437 - DN 59 584 - CB 71
89 - Op(CA) 159 - CE 43 458 - BD 44 597 - Op(AE 93)
90 - Op(AE 99) 160 - DE 78 459 - CC 57 653 - BF 60
107 - BD 94 161 - Op(EB 89) 460 - CC 36 701 - Op(CA)
116 - CF 81 166 - DE 74 461 - BD 15 704 - AF 75
126 - EE 18 171 - CC 36 502 - BF 71 752 - BF 70
128 - DQ 24 172 - DP 47 504 - BE 86 754 - CC 57
129 - Op(DK) 173 - CD 17 505 - EC 56 454 - AO 40
130 - BF 50 201 - Op(CF 40) 507 - BF 50
132 - Op(BA) 202 - CA 92 508 - AM 72
On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158
- 504 - 135 - 653 - 128 - 126 - 502 - 107.
Entered Port: U 135 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 701 position: increased sea and air vigilance since 28.6. On 2.7.
freighter (2,000 GRT) sighted with 3 suspicious escort craft. Probably trap
(Q-ships). Otherwise, no traffic out or inside 200m line.
2) U 373 was taken by surprise by enemy a/c in BF 8256. No damage.
- 10 -
 3) U 134 sighted Swedish steamer "Vehezia" in DC 4951. Course 150. 128 - DE 86 173 - CC 68 504 - BF 54 653 - off Brest
Boat received orders to sink ship. 129 - Op(DK) 201 - Op(CF) 505 - EC 49
b) None. 130 - BF 48 202 - CB 48 507 - BF 48
c) U-boat sightings: DD 49 - DL 6865 - EL 2312 - DL 69 - DK 57 - DB 132 - Op(BA) 203 - Op(ED) 508 - AL 88
5938 - DC 11 - DA 81 - DK 5579 - EC 83.
A/c sighting: BF 4864 - BF 8251 - BF 4933.
d) None. On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158
- 504 - 128 - 126 - 156 - 502 - 107.
IV. Current Operations: Entered Port: U 653 - Brest.
a) None. Sailed: - . -
b) 1) U 160 received orders to proceed to field of operations via western
half of EE according to situation report. - 11 -
U 126 (Trinidad waters) to proceed.
2) U 754 to proceed to operational area round Hatteras after taking on
supplies.
c) - d) None.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

6.July 1942.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

I. U 43 - AO 30 U 134 - DC 49 U 215 - Op(CA) U 509 - AK 63 III. Reports on the Enemy:

66 - DF 31 136 - CF 37 332 - Op(CB) 552 - BF 81
67 - Op(DA) 153 - EC 91 373 - BF 82 571 - DM 33
68 - CE 67 154 - Op(DL) 379 - AK 65 572 - CF 38
71 - BF 81 156 - BF 49 402 - CC 15 575 - DO 75
84 - DN 12 157 - Op(DA) 404 - CD 31 576 - CB 64
86 - BF 72 158 - CC 57 437 - DN 76 582 - Op(CF)
87 - BF 81 159 - CE 29 454 - AO 30 584 - CB 84
89 - Op(CA) 160 - DP 26 458 - BC 92 597 - AE 91
90 - AM 31 161 - Op(EB) 459 - CC 59 701 - DC 12-Op
107 - BD 93 166 - DD 98 460 - CC 36 704 - AE 93
116 - Op(CE) 171 - CC 68 461 - BC 63 752 - BE 98
126 - EE 21 172 - DP 54 502 - BF 49 754 - CC 57
718
a) 1) U 332 position: In course sector 3150 since 28.6. No traffic from
Hatteras.
2) U 701 sighted convoy consisting of 4 destroyers 5 steamers in CA
8740. Course SW medium speed. Patrol of area decreasing.
3) U 402 reports presence of Portuguese ship "Thamelisboa" in CC
4230. Course 900. Boat received orders not to attack.
4) U 379 sighted corvette in AK 8195. On north-easterly course. No
opportunity to attack.
5) U 154 position: small freighter hunted from DL 9199 to 9723.
Otherwise no traffic. No surface but strong a/c patrol. On 6.7. fishing
vessel sunk in DL 6471. Plan to operate in southern half of DL. Received
orders to remain in the straits.
 b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 73 - DM 31 - DB 9973 - DD 4591 - DA 9228 - of 50 South is given.
DK 54 - EC 5837 - DB 98 - DD 48. The boundary between 00 and 50 South is near 200 West.
A/c reports U-boat in AM 2463.
d) None. V. Reports of Success:
U 154 - 1 fishing craft.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None. ---------------------------------------------------
b) U 86, 552, 71, 90, 704, 597 received orders to steer a course to AK 69. ---------------
U 379 is to occupy AK 80 as area of attack until the arrival of the
previously mentioned boats. It is intended to form a sweep with these 7.July 1942.
vessels in the reconnaissance lines to the SW on the England-America
convoy route. Later this is to be extended and eventually operations in
North American area are planned. I. U 43 - AO 30 U 134 - DC 74 U 215 - Op(CA) U 509 - AK 59
c) 1) U 508 has carried out special assignment (laying of weather buoys). 66 - DF 28 136 - CF 50 332 - DC 28-Op 552 - BF 40
2) Taking on of supplies carried out. 67 - Op(DA) 153 - EC 75 373 - BF 571 - DM 26
U 754 from U 459. Fuel situation altogether 93 cubic m. 68 - CF 42 154 - Op(DL) 379 - AK 82 572 - CF 50
Provisions for 30 days. 71 - BF 40 156 - BF 402 - CC 42 575 - ED 14
3) U 171 from U 460. Fuel situation altogether 342 cubic m. 84 - DM 35 157 - Op(DA) 404 - BD 86 576 - CB 58
Provisions for 125 days. 86 - BE 60 158 - CC 57 437 - Op(DM) 582 - Op(CF)
d) 1) As U 158 has not arrived at the supplying position, U 459 is to 87 - BF 159 - CE 35 454 - AO 30 584 - CB 94
transmit a D/F signal. 89 - Op(CA) 160 - DP 51 458 - BC 89 597 - AE 88
The ordered position report still stands. 90 - AM 15 161 - EB 83 459 - CC 59 701 - DC 12-Op
As this is the fifth time U 158 has not reported the loss of the boat must 107 - BE 81 166 - DD 88 460 - CC 36 704 - AE 86
be presumed eventually. 116 - Op(CE) 171 - CC 64 461 - BC 91 752 - CF 32
2) Permission to attack isolated craft on Route A north 126 - DP 82 172 - DP 37 502 - BF 754 - CC 48
128 - DE 56 173 - CC 83 504 - BF 60
- 12 - 129 - Op(DK) 201 - Op(CF) 505 - EB 93
130 - BF 40 202 - CB 86 507 - BF 70
132 - Op(BA) 203 - Op(ED) 508 - AL 94

On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158

- 504 - 128 - 126 - 156 - 502 - 107.
Entered Port: U 504 - 156 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 162 - Lorient; U 510 - 598 - 658 - Kiel.
719
 U-boat attacks: DM 2533 - DM 28.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. d) None.

III. Reports on the Enemy: IV. Current Operations:

a) U 84 unsuccessful attempt since 5.7. to pass through DM 23. a) None.
Continually forced beneath surface by strong air and surface patrol and b) 1) New positions received: U 130 and U 507 = FC 50; U 171 = DN
Radar suspected at night. A/c with search light sighted. Boat received 84.
orders to carry on according to circumstances. No confirmation of Radar 2) Order received by Group "Hai" (see IV b) 3) of 3.7.) for the boats U
on American coast. 582 - 201 - 136 - 571 - 752 to remain in turn in reconnaissance channel on
U 129 sank "Cadmus" (1,855 GRT) on 1.7. in DK 6636, "Gundersen" 10.7. at 0400. From CF 7255 to 8245 course 1850. Days reckoning 150
(1,841 GRT) in DL 4146 on 2.7. Both vessels on course 3000 from Belize sea miles. U 116 to extend patrol strip to the W. To occupy the following
to Galvestone. Sank "Tuapse" (6,326 GRT) in DL 6575 on 4.7. Course as operational area until 10.7.:
3450. Very strong air patrol from 5.7. U 136 the grids CF 54 - 57 - 81
U 571 sank freighter (10,000 GRT) from northward bound convoy in U 572 the grids CF 55 - 58 - 82.
DM 2646 on 7.7. Sighted American ship "J.A. Mofet" (9,788 GRT) on c) - d) None.
southerly course in DM 2824 on 8.7.
U 67 position: No traffic on line DB 4972 to 4732. Traffic (bunches of V. Reports of Success:
ships) in both directions in DA 6997. Strong air patrol by day, slight U 129 - 3 ships 10,022 GRT
surface patrol at night sank freighter (4,000 GRT) 300 in DA 9326 on 6.7. U 571 - 2 ships 19,788 GRT
Sank American ship "Harwood" (6,610 GRT) course 2150 in DA 6997 on U 67 - 2 ships 10,610 GRT.
7.7. Boat reports possible presence of U 157 as U-boat sighting
intercepted on 7.7 and torpedo detonation heard. ---------------------------------------------------
b) None. ---------------

- 13 - 8.July 1942.

I. U 43 - AF 72 U 134 - Op(DM) U 215 - Op(CA) U 509 - AK 84

c) U-boat sightings: DB 78 - CA 34 - BA 36 - DB 82 - DB 91 - DM 26
- CB 3471 - DD 51 - EB 67 - DK 5481 - DN 35 - DA 93.
720
66 - DF 46 136 - Op(CF) 332 - Op(CB) 510 - AO
67 - Op(DA) 153 - Op(EB) 373 - BF 60 552 - BE 29
68 - CF 25 154 - Op(DL) 379 - Op(AK) 571 - DM 19
71 - BE 65 157 - Op(DA) 402 - CB 65 572 - Op(CF)
84 - DB 94 158 - CC 57 404 - BD 96 575 - ED 46
86 - BE 65 159 - CF 21 437 - Op(DM) 576 - CB 72
87 - BF 60 160 - DP 72 454 - AF 72 582 - Op(CF)
89 - Op(CA) 161 - EB 69 458 - CC 36 584 - CC 87
 90 - AL 39 162 - BF 50 459 - CC 57 597 - AL 31
107 - BE 91 166 - DC 93 460 - CC 36 598 - AO
116 - Op(CE) 171 - CC 82 461 - CD 10 658 - AO
126 - DP 64 172 - DP 36 502 - BF 40 701 - Op(CA)
128 - CC 88 173 - CC 87 505 - Op(EB) 704 - AL 32
129 - DL 92 - Op 201 - Op(CF) 507 - BE 99 752 - CF 37
130 - BE 96 202 - CB 69 508 - BE 12 754 - CB 92
132 - Op(BA) 203 - Op(ED)
On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 87 - 373 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 158
- 161 - 126 - 128 - 502 - 107.
Entered Port: U 87 - St. Nazaire; U 373 - La Pallice.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 203 position: Proceeding from "Anegada" via DP 79 to Trinidad
since 28.6. Nothing sighted in these waters for three days except neutral
vessels. Request free hand for voyage along coast. Boat received orders
to remain in Operational Area round Trinidad - more important coaling
station and therefore more traffic. A lull of several days is thought
probable.
- 14 -
721
2) U 437 sighted U-boat on northerly course in DL 9459. Probably U
129.
b) None.
c) U-boat sighted in DM 31 - DB 47 - DM 31 - DL 32 - DD 51.
Unidentified ship torpedoed in unconfirmed position. American motor
tanker "Moffert" (9,788 GRT) torpedoed in DM 28. U-boat attack in ED
96.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 571 freedom of movement in Caribbean Sea.
c) 1) U 86 reports heavy bombers 5th July, only one torpedo tube
partially in action. Bombardment in Biscay area.
2) U 458 reports provisions taken on board from U 460. State of fuel:
298 cubic m. Provisions for 190 days.
d) 1) The following order is given on the supposition that U 158 has an
engine and W/T breakdown and to ensure the possibility of a meeting in
the event of her eventual presence.
U 461 is to remain every second day from 1500 for 4 hours in grid CD
1777. No D/F signal.
2) U 173 sighted green star shells in DE 1274. Search so far
unsuccessful. It is unlikely however, that U 158 is in this area, but the
boat received ordered nevertheless to continue the search throughout the
day. Warning will be given of enemy U-boats.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
9.July 1942.
I. U 43 - AE 93 U 134 - Op(DM) U 215 - Op(CA) U 510 - AN 30
66 - DF 71 136 - Op(CF) 332 - Op(CB) 552 - BE 24
67 - Op(DA) 153 - Op(EB) 379 - Op(AK) 571 - DM 11
 68 - CF 31 154 - Op(DL) 402 - CB 59 572 - Op(CF)
71 - BE 29 157 - Op(DA) 404 - BE 82 575 - Op(ED)
84 - DN 20 158 - CC 437 - Op(DL) 576 - CA 96
86 - BE 64 159 - BE 88 454 - AE 93 582 - Op(CF)
89 - Op(CA) 160 - DO 99 458 - CC 37 584 - CC 43
90 - AL 51 161 - EC 43 459 - CC 88 597 - AL 25
107 - BE 93 162 - BF 40 460 - CC 36 598 - AN 30
116 - Op(CE) 166 - DC 97 461 - CD 12 658 - AN 30
126 - DP 36 171 - CC 79 502 - BF 40 701 - Op(CA)
128 - CC 88 172 - DP 26 505 - Op(EB) 704 - AL 24
129 - Op(DK) 173 - DE 13 507 - BE 97 752 - CF 58
130 - CG 10 201 - Op(CF) 508 - BD 35 754 - CB 82
132 - Op(BA) 202 - CC 54 509 - BD 11
203 - Op(ED)
On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 161 - 126 - 128
- 502 - 107 - 459.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 564 - 654 - Brest; U 155 - Lorient; U 607 - Kiel.
- 15 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 201 reports sinking of English refrigerator ship "Avila Star" (14,443
GRT) in CF 4953. Course 200 speed 16 knots.
722
U 172 sank in DF 2367 American ship "Santa Rita" (8,400 GRT) course
2600, speed 16.5 knots. (Enemy ship) proceeding from Port Said via Cape
Town to Boston. Cargo: gold and copper ore, captured German tanks
among other things. Extensive chart and map material taken on board U-
boat.
U 90 sighted enemy convoy (No. 31) in AL 1967 at 0547. Easterly
course, speed 14 knots. Convoy comprised of 5 freighters, 2 light cruisers,
8 destroyers. U 704 and 597 received orders to operate on convoy - U 379
only under favorable conditions. Continuation 10.7.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 7356 - ED 1211 - DM 43 - CA 73 - DB 81 - CA
52 - ED 12.
U-boat attack in DA 92.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 704, 71, 597, 552, 90, 379, 86 incorporated in Group "Wolf" and
receive orders to remain in reconnaissance channel from AK 3947-6955.
Course 2400, days reckoning 130 sea miles on 13.7. at 1600. Boats
arriving previously are to occupy ordered positions as patrol lines at a
depth of 30 sea miles until departure.
c) None.
d) U 173 reports search for U 158 broken off. No success.
V. Reports of Success:
U 201 - 1 ship 14,443 GRT.
U 172 - 1 ship 8,400 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
10.July 1942.
I. U 43 - AE 86 U 153 - Op(EB) U 379 - Op(AK) U 571 - Op(DA)
 66 - DE 98 154 - Op(DL) 402 - CB 49 572 - CF 81
67 - Op(DA) 155 - BF 57 404 - BF 91 575 - Op(ED)
68 - BF 55 157 - Op(DA) 437 - Op(DM) 576 - Op(CA)
71 - BE 24 158 - CC 454 - AE 86 582 - CF 72
84 - Op(DM) 159 - BE 96 458 - CC 28 584 - CC 29
86 - BE 52 160 - BE 17 459 - CD 71 587 - AL 19
89 - Op(CA) 161 - EC 29 460 - CC 29 598 - AN 30
90 - AL 19 162 - BF 47 461 - CD 17 607 - AO
107 - BF 55 166 - DN 22 502 - BF 654 - BF 61
116 - CE 93 171 - DD 39 505 - Op(EB) 658 - AN 30
126 - DE 84 172 - DE 79 507 - CF 32 701 - Op(CA)
128 - CD 74 173 - DE 14 508 - BD 26 704 - AL 18
- 16 -
U 129 - Op(DK) U 201 - CF 73 U 509 - BE 39 U 752 - CF 82
130 - CF 37 202 - CC 29 510 - AN 30 754 - CB 76
132 - Op(BA) 203 - Op(ED) 552 - AL 37
134 - Op(DM) 215 - Op(CA) 564 - BF 61
136 - CF 73 332 - Op(CB)
On Return Passage: U 202 - 584 - 159 - 68 - 172 - 404 - 161 - 126 - 128
- 502 - 107 - 459.
Entered Port: U 68 - Lorient.
Sailed: - . -
723
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 31 see cypher IV a).
2) U 166 sighted small convoy in DO 7185 consisting of 2 steamers and
2 destroyers. General course 1700. 6 misses.
3) U 89 position: Bottoming by day since July 6th in CA 2878 to 5229
by night from 2799 to 5217. No traffic inside 20 m. line for 4 nights.
Deep channel traffic - only neutral vessels.
Strong seaway, slight air patrol.
4) U 507 sighted loaded freighter (5,000 GRT) with escort in CF 3423.
Course 1300, 14 knots. Beaten off on attacking. Depth charges.
Proceeded.
5) U 129 nothing sighted since 8.7 from DL 9459 to DM 7223.
Operated to the SE.
6) U 437 nothing sighted since 8.7 in DL 97 to EA 37 and 39.
Operating as far as EB 39 then to the NW.
7) U 571 sank "Micholascuneo" (1,051 GRT) with gunfire on 9.7 in DM
4328. Strong aerial defense on the coast from DM 32-18. Medium
isolated traffic.
8) U 172 reports results of the sighting material "Santa Rita".
In Cape Town 40 - 50 ships.
Course from Cape Town on major arc via DQ 2391 - DN 1111 to
Charleston. Continuing along coast to Chesapeake Bay. Ships are only to
ply between Norfolk, New York and Hatteras during the day - to anchor in
Chesapeake Bay or Delaware Bay if necessary. Barrage regulations for
Cape Town, Boston and New York. Warning of mines off Chesapeake
Bay. Area round Wimble Shoal whistling buoy and Diamond Shoal
lightship is only to be navigated by day.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DB 47 - DB 91 - BB 63 - DA 9247 - CA 81 - CA 52.
Aircraft reports U-boat in BE 9370 - BE 9386.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
 a) Convoy No. 21:
- 17 -
U 90 maintains contact. The convoy has long-range protection by a/c
and destroyers. Owing to the high speed - 16 knots - it is impossible to
come up to it. Order received at 1330 to break off operations and to
proceed to patrol channel. Last position 1425 in AL 0245. Course east,
speed 16 knots. U 90 missed four times owing to excessive distance.
b) U 43 and 454 are assigned to Group "Wolf". Steering orders AK 02,
day's reckoning 150 miles. U 89 is allowed freedom of movement to the
south as a result of her traffic report.
c) Have carried out supply: U 202, 31 cubic m. fuel, provisions for 14
days. Remaining on tanker 228 cubic m. provisions for 83 days.
d) U 502 reported for the last time from BE 85 on 3.7. According to
schedule the latest date for putting in was 8.7. Loss as a result of depth
charges must be presumed.
V. Reports of Success:
U 571 - 1 ship 1,051 GRT.
VI. General:
It would seem from the boat's reports that traffic in the American area
has considerably diminished since about 3rd July; the probable reason
being the heavy losses sustained at the end of June. The decrease to traffic
greatly aggravates the entire American shipping position although it is
unavoidable on account of the otherwise unpreventable losses. For the
prosecution of the U-boat war this means a falling off to the numbers of
724
sinkings. Now it is possible to see yet another great advantage in being
able to supply U-boats from U-tankers. The boats can out last the lull to
traffic and take advantage of the ensuing spate which is sure to follow -
until their torpedoes etc. are exhausted.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
11.July 1942.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
16 - 31 July 1942
PG30309b
16.July 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(AK) U 154 - Op(DB) U 254 - AN 30 U 564 - BE 78
66 - EE 47 155 - CF 42 332 - CB 86 571 - Op(DM)
67 - DM 51 157 - Op(DA) 379 - Op(AK) 572 - Op(DT)
71 - Op(AK) 160 - Op(ED) 402 - Op(DC) 575 - Op(ED)
84 - Op(DM) 161 - DP 21 437 - Op(DM) 576 - Op(CA)
86 - Op(AK) 162 - CE 66 454 - Op(AK) 582 - Op(DT)
89 - Op(CA) 166 - DM 98 458 - CA 95 584 - BD 68
90 - Op(AK) 171 - DN 61 459 - BE 81 597 - Op(AK)
98 - BF 49 172 - CD 99 460 - CC 97 598 - AL 25
108 - BE 94 173 - DN 62 461 - CC 65 600 - AN 30
116 - DT 56 201 - Op(DT) 463 - AE 92 607 - AE 93
126 - CD 59 202 - BD 91 505 - Op(EB) 654 - BE 72
128 - CE 23 203 - DQ 77 507 - Op(DG) 658 - AL 23
129 - Op(EB) 217 - AN 30 508 - CC 68 704 - Op(AK)
130 - DG 30 509 - CC 97 751 - BF 73
 132 - Op(BA) 510 - AL 27 752 - Op(DT)
134 - Op(DA) 552 - Op(AK) 754 - Op(CA)

On Return Passage: U 459 - 203 - 202 - 584 - 332 - 67 - 172 - 161 - 126
- 128.
Entered Port: - . - 5) Group "Wolf" received orders to patrol on a line from AK 4375 -
Sailed: U 511 - 609 - Kiel. AK 8567, lying in wait for an in-coming convoy reported by Radio
Intercept Service.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. c) - d) None.

III. Reports on the Enemy: V. Reports of Success:

a) 1) U 160 reports sinking of petrol tanker "Gallia" (9,974 BRT) in ED
9946.
2) U 84 sighted convoy in DM 1896, course 320, speed 8 knots, air
patrol 1.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings in CA 56 - CA 52 - DN 84 - DN 91 - DD 85 - DD 18
- DC 15 - DD 78 - BB 79.
U-boat attack in DM 16/24 - DC 12 - DD 78.
English aircraft sighted U-boat in BF 75 - 72.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 171 and U 173 proceeding through Windward Passage - DL 60 to
DA 80 and 90. Focal point off Galveston.
2) U 402 new operational area CA 98 - 99 and DC 31 and 32.
3) U 129 protracted passage through DL 69 to DM 19 or 43, there to
operate on enemy shipping. Refuelling arranged for.
4) U 509 ordered to proceed DN 76; U 508 - DM 31.
U 160 - 1 ship 9,974 GRT.
VI. General:
Increased danger from the air in the Bay of Biscay makes an alteration of
orders for procedure on approach routes necessary. Danger of mines in
waters less than 200 meters in depth is to be regarded as greater than
danger from the air as before, boats must therefore remain on the surface.
But as the danger of unexpected attack from radar-equipped aircraft is
greater by night than by day, in future boats shall proceed by day, and
submerged only in the extreme sections when daylight is not sufficient for
the whole journey. Increased danger from submarines must be reduced by
steering zigzag course, and on the whole taken into account, as also the
growing danger as our routes become known to aircraft and submarine.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
17.July 1942.

- 32 - I. U 43 - Op(AK) U 154 - Op(DB) U 402 - Op(CA) U 572 - Op(DT)

66 - ED 98 155 - CE 68 437 - Op(DN) 575 - Op(ED)
67 - DM 34 157 - Op(DA) 454 - Op(AK) 576 - Op(CA)
71 - Op(AK) 160 - Op(EE 74) 458 - Op(CA) 582 - Op(DT)
725
 84 - Op(DM) 161 - DD 79 459 - BE 91 584 - BE 47
86 - Op(AK) 162 - CE 91 460 - CC 97 597 - Op(AK)
89 - Op(CA) 166 - DM 85 461 - CC 83 598 - AL 17
90 - Op(AK) 171 - DN 82 463 - AE 82 600 - AN 30
98 - BF 47 172 - CE 34 505 - Op(EB) 607 - AE 83
108 - CF 23 173 - DN 83 507 - DG 67 609 - AO
116 - Op(DT) 201 - DT 90 508 - CC 97 654 - BD 96
126 - CE 17 202 - BD 93 509 - DE 27 658 - AL 17
128 - BE 82 203 - DQ 48 510 - AK 63 704 - Op(AK)
129 - Op(DM) 217 - AN 30 511 - AO 751 - BF 71
130 - DG 68 254 - AN 30 552 - Op(AK) 752 - Op(DT)
132 - Op(BA) 332 - CB 93 564 - BD 99 754 - Op(CA)
134 - Op(DA) 379 - Op(AK) 571 - DM 52
On Return Passage: U 459 - 203 - 202 - 584 - 332 - 67 - 172 - 161 - 126
- 128.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 437 sighted convoy in DN 8177 at 1426 consisting of 4 steamers
and 3 destroyers with air escort. Boat was forced to retire by destroyer
and flying boa, then went in pursuit. Last position 1600 hours in DN
8189.
- 33 -
726
Easterly course.
2) U 161 came on convoy at 1600 while engaged on diving exercises.
Course 1700, speed 10 knots. Sighted 8 - 10 steamers and 3 destroyers.
Boat attacked and scored 2 hits on 9,000 ton tanker causing heavy
explosions. Sinking probable; further hit was heard on a 2nd freighter.
Finally boat was depth-charged for 9 hours, causing considerable damage.
Return passage continued.
3) Situation U 154: Proceeding from DM 18 - DB 81 encountered
heavy air patrol, no shipping.
4) Situation U 89: CA 6993 - 7225 nothing sighted. Slight single-ship
traffic off New York detected on hydrophones. Very active sea and air
patrol.
5) U 552 reports of Group "Wolf" area, roughly AK 50, 50% fog over a
period of 6 days.
6) Convoy No. 35 see para IV a).
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 34 - CA 5380 - DC 11 - DM 26 - DB 62.
Aircraft reported submarine in BE 9328.
Submarine attack in DM 1639.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 35:
At 2146 U 202 reported convoy in BD 6979, course 2150, medium
speed. As boat was on return passage and short of fuel, he received orders
to shadow. Refueling to be arranged for. U 564 and 654 were detailed to
operate on convoy. Later U 162 and 108 reported they were also operating
on convoy. At 2300 convoy steering 2100, and later to the south on 1300.
At 0006 U 202 was forced off by destroyers. Last position of convoy BD
9327, course 1300, speed 8 knots. Contact received at 0400 led to
conclusion that convoy was again steering on its original course of 2150.
Operation was continued in spite of contact having been broken. By dawn
U 202 had the convoy again in sight, course 2100, position BD 9563.
 b) In order to avoid passage of convoy (reported by radio intercept)
during night, Group "Wolf" received orders on 17.7., 2400 to proceed on
course 600, speed 7 knots as reconnaissance line, and from 18.7. 0800
patrol between AK 5119 and AK 8632.
c) U 508 reported having taken over 25 cbm and 3 week's provisions
from U 460. Tanker reserves: 71 cbm and 20 day's provisions. Return
passage.
d) None.
- 34 -
V. Reports of Success:
U 161 1 ship 9,000 BRT torpedoed.
1 ship torpedoed.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
18.July 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(AL) U 154 - Op(DA) U 402 - Op(DC) U 572 - Op(EK)
66 - Op(ED) 155 - CE 85 437 - Op(DN) 575 - Op(ED)
67 - DC 78 157 - DM 454 - Op(AL) 576 - Op(CA)
71 - Op(CB) 160 - Op(ED) 458 - Op(CA) 582 - Op(EJ)
84 - Op(DM) 161 - DD 57 459 - BF 47 584 - BE 57
727
86 - Op(AK) 162 - CE 84 460 - CC 97 597 - Op(AK)
89 - Op(CA) 166 - DM 71 461 - CC 81 598 - AK 65
90 - Op(AK) 171 - DN 78 463 - AE 87 600 - AF 79
98 - BE 86 172 - CF 12 505 - Op(EB) 607 - AE 87
108 - CF 24 173 - DN 79 507 - DG 97 609 - AN 30
116 - Op(EJ) 201 - Op(EJ) 508 - DE 21 654 - BD 97
126 - CE 16 202 - BD 93 509 - DE 42 658 - AK 62
128 - BE 92 203 - DQ 51 510 - AK 59 704 - Op(AK)
129 - Op(DL) 217 - AF 79 511 - AN 30 751 - BE 92
130 - DG 98 254 - AF 79 552 - Op(CB) 752 - Op(EK)
132 - Op(BA) 332 - CC 84 564 - CE 23 754 - Op(CA)
134 - Op(DB) 379 - Op(AK) 571 - DM 32
On Return Passage: U 459 - 202 - 203 - 584 - 332 - 67 - 172 - 161 - 126
- 128 - 571 - 460 - 157.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 164 - 210 - Kiel; U 109 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 160 sank freighter of 8,000 GRT in ED 9865 on 18.7. Westerly
course.
2) Situation U 575: 3 days north of Tobago - no shipping. On morning
of 17.7. 5 single ships seen entering passage, one patrol boat. Fired 2
misses, one unexplained. Sunk: 18.7. "San Gaspar" (12,910 GRT) in EE
7778, bound from Trinidad to Freetown. 2 sailing ships "Glacier" and
"Comrade" sunk by gun-fire in EE 78 and 75. Return passage.
3) Situation U 437: Hunted small fast freighter from DN 7861 to 7559
without success. On 17. reported convoy consisted of 3 steamers, 3-4
destroyers escorted by flying boat, course 190, speed 18 knots. 2-spread
long range shot with data exact at 2 10,000 ton steamers. Was finally
forced to submerge. Heard loud explosions. One steamer probably left
sinking but this was not observed. Lost contact.
 4) U 582 sighted patrol boat in EJ 6363. Boat was observed and fired CE 3343; attacked at 0230, torpedoed 4 ships and was then forced off.
on with tracer. Messages received later, at 0352 from U 654 in CE 3375 and at 0500 from
b) None. U 126 in CE 3391, led to the conclusion that the convoy separated. It is
more probable though that there was a large error in estimated position
- 35 - between the two boats. In that case convoy would have taken up S.
easterly course once more. One after another all boats were forced to
retire. Contact was finally lost. Boats continued to search on probable
courses. Towards morning U 108 reported having fired one 4-spread and
one 2-spread and hearing 5 explosions. No further observations. Finally
hunted by destroyers. Operation continues.
b) 1) Group "Wolf" received orders at 1200 to proceed on reconnaissance
strip course 2400, speed 7 knots, and to patrol between AK 4532 and AK
8585 at 2400, so as not to miss the expected convoy (reported by radio
intercept) during night.
c) U-boat sightings: BA 93 - ED 9947 - DB 9532 - DM 2759 - DL 6674 2) U 89 operating on shipping proceeding from Boston via CB 1110 -
- DN 8639 - DD 57 - CA 34 - BB 55 - CA 86 - DN 95 - DB 94 - DB 6282. BB 7770 and BB 7760. Mainly convoys.
Aircraft reported submarine in BE 41 - 42. c) U 161 and U 508 scheduled to meet for handing over of torpedoes in
Submarine attack in ED 99. DD 3385 on 21.7.
d) None. d) None.

IV. Current Operations: V. Reports of Success:

a) Convoy No. 35: U 160 1 ship 8,000 GRT
Contact was maintained. Apart from U 162, which lay too far off, all 575 1 " 12,910 " 2 sailing ships
boats made contact with convoy. At 1157 U 126 reported same in BD 437 1 " 10,000 "
9591. Boat was on return passage, short of fuel and all torpedoes 564 4 " 's 23,000 "
expended. He received orders to shadow convoy without consideration for 108 3 " 15,000 " presumed.
fuel supply. Convoy position report from U 126 at 1355: BD 9831,
course 1300, speed 7 knots. Convoy then zigzagged sharply to the S. east.
Further shadowing reports received: 1520 from U 564 BD 9839, 1835 ---------------------------------------------------
from U 108 BD 9942. U 654 made contact at about 1900. U 202 was ---------------
attacked by corvette with gun fire and lay 30 miles astern of the convoy.
Boat received orders for return passage, as this was possible without
refueling. According to reports at 2135 convoy was steering 1600 and
finally on southerly course. Flying boats and sometimes night bombers - 36 -
often forced the boats to submerge and withdraw from the convoy. But
they always managed to regain contact. At 0017 U 564 reported convoy in
728

19.July 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(AL) U 154 - Op(DA) U 379 - Op(AK) U 572 - Op(EK)
66 - Op(ED) 155 - CD 89 402 - Op(CA) 575 - EE 76
67 - DC 85 157 - DM 32 437 - Op(DN) 576 - Op(CA)
71 - Op(CB) 160 - Op(ED) 454 - Op(AL) 582 - Op(EJ)
84 - Op(DM) 161 - DD 53 458 - Op(CA) 584 - BE 59
86 - Op(AK) 162 - CE 20 459 - BF 597 - Op(AK)
89 - Op(CA) 164 - AO 460 - CD 74 598 - AK 83
90 - Op(AK) 166 - DL 65 461 - CC 84 600 - AF 47
98 - BE 92 171 - DM 97 463 - AL 26 607 - AL 35
108 - CE 30 172 - BE 79 505 - Op(EB) 609 - AN 28
109 - BF 50 173 - DM 99 507 - DT 15 654 - CE 30
116 - Op(EJ) 201 - Op(EJ) 508 - DE 12 658 - AK 50
126 - CE 30 202 - CE 30 509 - DD 68 704 - Op(AK)
128 - BF 40 203 - DQ 26 510 - AK 84 751 - BE 83
129 - Op(DL) 210 - AO 511 - AN 20 752 - Op(EK)
130 - DT 16 217 - AF 47 552 - Op(CB) 754 - Op(CA)
132 - Op(BA) 254 - AE 93 564 - CE 30
134 - Op(DA) 332 - CC 84 571 - DC 78
On Return Passage: U 571 - 460 - 459 - 203 - 202 - 584 - 332 - 67 - 172
- 161 - 126 - 128 - 157.
Entered Port: U 459 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 588 - 553 - St. Nazaire; U 213 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
729
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 203 reports one vessel and 2 escorts in DF 8942, northerly course,
medium speed.
2) U 607 sighted trawler while en route for AE 8769, otherwise no
patrol. Considers operation on convoy reported by Radio Intercept
Service at 0400 in AL 6318 on course for North Channel hopeless on
account of bad visibility and insufficient data.
3) U 332 sighted Portuguese ship "San Miguel" in CC 8210 on course
2400. Received orders to let ship proceed. On 19.7. sank "Leonidas"
(4,573 GRT) while on course 3100. Took captain and engineer officer on
board.
4) U 461 outward bound on 28.6. sighted only one patrol ship on a S.W.
course.
5) U 402 started return passage on account of heavy damage to
batteries.
6) Situation U 84: Heavy traffic from DM 1919 over 16 and 13 along
20 meter line. Mainly during day. Strong air, medium sea patrol. Sank
freighter of 6,500 tons on 19.7. on course 1850, position DM 1651.
7) U 154 cannot remove oil track, and requests permission to operate in
DO on that account. Present position DK 6878, no traffic.
b) None.
- 37 -
c) U-boat sightings: ED 8780 - CA 8748 - DM 2384 - DM 19 - DM
9587 - DM 98.
Aircraft sighted submarine in BF 4591.
 d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 35:
U 108 and 564 searched sectors between 210 - 1400 without success.
As it was probable that the convoy was continuing on a S.E. course and
boats lay in a favorable position for combined attack they received orders
to operate from their own positions on convoy courses between S. and S.E.
commencing from convoy position CE 3354 at 0200. At 1257 U 126
sighted a mast for a short time in CE 3639, but could distinguish nothing
further on account of bad visibility. At 1335 U 108 sighted convoy in CF
1529 on S.E. course, but was seen by 2 corvettes and forced to retire. U
126 commenced return passage towards evening as this was still possible
without refueling. U 564 reported, on demand, formation of convoy
during previous night. 3 columns in line ahead, tightly formed, no long-
range, and only slight close escort. No organized patrol for the night was
ordered. Boats merely received orders to continue search in sectors
between 180 - 1500, commencing from convoy position CE 1561 at 1430.
Only after U 654 and 564 had reported, asking for permission to continue
search on 170 or 2100 according to circumstances, was the following
distribution decided upon. U 564 - 162 and 654 were to operate in
succession from west to east in a given sector with enemy speed 7.5 - 9
knots. U 108 was given freedom of movement. Reasons for orders to
continue search were as follows:
1) Favorable positions of the boats.
2) Presumption that convoy was not making for Gibraltar and would
proceed on southerly course, as position at the time was well off the
Azores. Operation continues. U 108 was subjected to long and heavy
depth charging.
b) U 509 was detailed to new position ED 11, and U 463 and 607 to CC
80. U 154 to operational area ED 90.
U 437 operating between DN 95 and 47, focal point off Windward
Passage.
At 1130 Group "Wolf" received orders to take up new patrol position
between AK 5792 and AK 8997. From 0800/20. to proceed on
730
reconnaissance strip course 500, speed 6 knots in order to pick up
westbound convoy reported by Radio Intercept Service.
c) 1) U 66 reported special duty completed (minelaying off Castries, St.
Lucia).
2) U 332 refueled from U 461. Took over 35 cbm and 14 day's
provisions.
Tanker reserves: 628 cbm. 1653 sets of provisions.
d) None.
- 38 -
V. Reports of Success:
U 84 - 1 ship 6,500 GRT
U 332 - 1 ship 4,573 "
VI. General:
a) Operations of Group "Wolf" are heavily dependent on weather
situation (continuous bad visibility). After experiences of Group "Hecht"
in June, and radio intercept reports, according to which the main route of
convoys on the whole still seems to follow the Great Circle path, it can be
presumed that had the weather been more favorable, the group would have
found targets for attack.
A change in the general weather situation with promise of better
visibility cannot yet be foreseen. I therefore intend if the present operation
on convoy reported by Radio Intercept Service comes to nothing, to draw
the boats across the convoy route off to the south, to re-fuel, and
afterwards, according to weather conditions, to place them either in area
northeast of the Antilles and Caribbean Sea as far as that is possible, or
back in the Northern area. In any case the result will be a fairly long
operation.
b) Situation reports from boats in the American area show the following:
1) In the sea area off Hatteras successes have dropped considerably.
This is due to a drop in the traffic (formation of convoys) and increased
defence measures. Of the boats stationed there in the recent period only
two, U 754 and U 701 have had successes. On the other hand U 701 and
U 215 have apparently been lost, and U 402 and 576 badly damaged by
depth charges or bombs. This state of things is not justified by the amount on course 170 might be an indication of this. The focal points of
of success achieved. The two remaining boats (U 754 and 458) will attack in this area for the time being are the points where the heaviest
therefore be removed. With this development has set in which might have single-ship traffic has been observed and can continue to be expected, that
been expected earlier. is, north of the Gulf ports and off Trinidad.
For occasional operations by single boats and minelaying operations in Operations in the Gulf itself and in the Caribbean Sea must also be taken
harbor entrances, areas along the east coast of America will come under into consideration, since single-ship traffic is still to be expected there,
consideration as before. especially at the exits to the Caribbean Sea.
2) Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea:
Along the Antilles from Key West to Trinidad the formation of smaller
convoys has been confirmed, as also in the Yucatan Straits. These
observations are confirmed by the announcement of the American ---------------------------------------------------
Secretary of the Navy that the convoy system has been introduced in the ---------------
Caribbean Sea but not in the Gulf. Single ship traffic was observed in July
off the Mississippi, western entrance to the Florida Straits and around 20.July 1942.
Trinidad, while U 505 reported scarcely any traffic off the Panama Canal.
On the whole therefore traffic seems to have decreased, though for the
time being this must be considered as temporary. Explanation as follows: I. U 43 - Op(AK) U 154 - Op(DK) U 332 - CC 59 U 571 - DC 85
a) by the formation of convoys 66 - Op(ED) 155 - DE 16 379 - Op(AK) 572 - Op(ET)
b) possibly by the taking off non-vital, internal American traffic, which 67 - DC 67 157 - DC 78 402 - Op(CA) 575 - EE 55
must also have felt the effects of the loss of 500 ships since January and 71 - AK 85 160 - Op(ED) 437 - Op(DN) 576 - Op(CA)
c) possibly by the removal of traffic routes further cut to sea under convoy. 84 - Op(DM) 161 - DD 38 454 - Op(AK) 582 - Op(EK)
The sighting of a convoy in DD 78 86 - Op(BD) 162 - CE 30 458 - Op(CA) 584 - BE 68
89 - Op(CA) 164 - AN 30 460 - CD 81 588 - BF 50
90 - Op(AK) 166 - DL 26 461 - CC 84 597 - Op(AK)
98 - BE 82 171 - DM 84 463 - AL 01 598 - AK 87
108 - CE 30 172 - BE 86 505 - Op(EB) 600 - AE 68
- 39 - 109 - BF 40 173 - DM 86 507 - DT 45 607 - AL 25
731
 116 - Op(CE) 201 - Op(EJ) 508 - DD 11 609 - AF 76
126 - Op(CE) 202 - BE 76 509 - DD 86 654 - Op(CE)
128 - BF 40 203 - DF 94 510 - BD 14 658 - AK 87
129 - Op(DM) 210 - AN 30 511 - AF 76 704 - Op(AK)
130 - DT 46 213 - Lorient 552 - Op(AK) 751 - BE 90
132 - Op(BA) 217 - AE 92 553 - BF 50 752 - (EK)
134 - Op(DA) 254 - AE 91 564 - Op(CF) 754 - Op(CA)
On Return Passage: U 402 - 571 - 575 - 460 - 437 - 203 - 202 - 584 -
332 - 67 - 172 - 161 - 126 - 128.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 126 sighted heavily smoking convoy in BE 7924, northerly
course. Boat withdrew according to orders.
2) U 571 reported large 2-funnel passenger ship in DO 4295, course
NNW. No contact was made on account of her fast speed.
3) Situation U 67: From DA 98 via DL 61 - 63, nothing sighted of
Bahamas and Caicos Passage. DM 41 - 51 strong air patrol during day,
weaker at night.
4) U 173 was bombed by aircraft in DM 87. Both periscopes put out of
order. Repair improbable. Nothing observed while proceeding to Caicos
and Windward Passage. Boat received orders to take up position in Attack
area DO 30 and DP 10 if periscope could not be repaired.
- 40 -
732
5) Situation U 437: On 20.7 dived to avoid flying boat in DN 8199,
and contacted 15,000 ton freighter (President class) while so doing. Fired
3-spread and heard hits, and finally observed ship with a list to port. 4
single shots in DN 9439, all misses. Torpedoes ran in the opposite
direction.
6) Situation U 132: Since 3.7 in the mouth of the St. Lawrence. Heavy
in-and -out-going traffic, partly made up of smaller convoys consisting of
5-12 ships. Medium sea and air patrol. Some of the convoys were
probably proceeding through the Belle Isle Straits.
On 6.7. in BA 3587 torpedoed 3 steamers in convoy, another explosion
heard, and two single shots missed. Was finally accurately depth charged
by 2 escort vessels which resulted in considerable damage.
On 20.7. in BB 1475 torpedoed 4,500 ton freighter in another convoy.
Ship was towed ashore. Impossible to approach by day on account of
aircraft and vicinity of coast. Withdrawal at the full moon.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EO 8790 - BB 4333 - EC 93 - CA 54 - DL 69 - BB
1998 - DM 8791 - CA 5191 - DL 6928 - DM 87 - AE 9977.
Submarine attack in BB 1470.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 35:
As search for convoy proved unsuccessful the operation was broken off.
U 162 and U 108 were detailed to new operational area ED 81. U 564 and
U 654 were to operate for the present around the Azores until further
orders. Refueling from "Lima" has been arranged for both boats. U 564
reports sinking of 4 ships he torpedoed. Total about 23,000 GRT. At 0834
on 21. U 654 sighted convoy in his sector CF 8272, on southerly course
and medium speed. According to dead reckoning this could have been the
one we had lost, U 564 and U 162 received orders to operate on it. U 108
continued passage for op. area. Operation continues.
 b) 1) Group "Wolf" received orders to proceed immediately on course
320 speed 7 knots. Aim was to contact a westbound convoy which
according to radio intercept report lay in position AK 6455 at 2200/19/7.
speed 6.5 - 7 knots. At 0100 on 21.7. Group proceeded from
reconnaissance strip AK 5415 - AK 8641 on course 2500 and speed 7
knots, in order to patrol between AK 4645 - 8573 from 0800 onwards.
Fog conditions in this area persist.
- 41 -
2) U 754 and U 458 detailed to Op. area CA 97 - 99 and DC 23 - 32
(754 west half - U 458 east half).
3) U 154 received orders to proceed via DM 70 to DO 60 and DP 40.
4) U 66 Op. area ED 90 according to earlier report.
5) Group "Hai":
Reconnaissance strip completed 0800/21/7. (U 582 see para?)
Operational areas: U 201 waters off Freetown. U 572 circle with 90
mile radius around ET 5711. U 752 similar circle around ET 8611. In the
case of U 752 and 572 finding no shipping in attacking area, freedom of
action in direction of Freetown.
c) 1300/23/7 U 582 and 116 to complete refueling in ES 5855.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 132 3 ships 15,000 GRT probable
1 ship 4,500 GRT torpedoed.
733
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
21.July 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(AK) U 154 - Op(DL) U 379 - Op(AK) U 572 - Op(ET)
66 - Op(ED) 155 - DF 44 402 - CB 74 575 - EE 37
67 - DO 43 157 - DC 82 437 - Op(DN) 576 - Op(CA)
71 - Op(AK) 160 - Op(EE) 454 - Op(AK) 582 - Op(ET)
84 - Op(DM) 161 - DD 33 458 - Op(CA) 584 - BF 40
86 - Op(AK) 162 - CF 84 460 - CD 59 588 - BF 40
89 - Op(CA) 164 - AN 28 461 - CC 84 597 - Op(AK)
90 - Op(AK) 166 - DA 96 463 - AK 66 598 - BD 14
98 - BE 76 171 - DM 71 505 - Op(EB) 600 - AE 86
108 - CF 49 172 - off Lorient 507 - DT 75 607 - AL 19
109 - CE 38 173 - DM 88 508 - DD 33 609 - AF 71
116 - Op(ES) 201 - Op(ET) 509 - DO 32 654 - CF 84
126 - BE 85 202 - BE 86 510 - BC 63 658 - BD 14
128 - BF 50 203 - DF 69 511 - AF 71 704 - Op(AK)
129 - Op(DM) 210 - AN 23 552 - Op(AK) 751 - BE 80
130 - DT 76 213 - Lorient 553 - BF 80 752 - ET 16
132 - Op(BB) 217 - AE 86 564 - CF 48 754 - Op(DC)
134 - Op(DA) 254 - AE 85 571 - DO 42
332 - CC 69
On Return Passage: U 402 - 571 - 575 - 460 - 437 - 203 - 202 - 584 -
332 - 67 - 161 - 126 - 128.
Entered Port: U 172 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 163 - 176 - Kiel.
- 42 -
 b) 1) Group "Wolf" received orders to leave patrol position at 0100 22.7.
and proceed on reconnaissance strip 2350, days journey 150 miles.
Refueling provided for.
2) U 463 - 510 - 607 - 598 - 658 - 217 - 254 - 600 received new
positions in DD 90 for purpose of refueling.
c) U 161 handed over one torpedo to U 508 in DD 3385.
d) None.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
V. Reports of Success:
III. Reports on the Enemy: U 160 - 1 ship 8,150 GRT.
a) U 458 reports fast convoy in CA 8773, southerly course, sharp zigzags
to starboard, no contact. VI. General:
Situation U 505: Hunted traffic EB 70 - 86 - 99 - 88 - 89 - EL 32 - 22, a) Operation on Convoy No. 35, with 4 ships sunk and 5 hits, was
nothing sighted. Strong patrol by land-based aircraft in EL 22 and EB 85 - crowned with success. The successes were scored by the veteran boats as
86. in the North Atlantic. Of the others, 2
Situation U 160: In and out-going traffic Port of Spain only during day.
Ships clear Tobago Passage 2 hours before dawn, and are then taken under - 43 -
sea or air escort. 21.7. heavy inward bound traffic, sank: 21.7. ED 9945
tanker "Donovania" (8,150 GRT), west course.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 98 - DM 28 - DB 77 - EC 9385 - CA 5431 - BA
93.96 - DN 72.
Aircraft attacked sub without success in AF 8454.
Sub. attack in ED 99 - DM 1985 - DT 2980 - DN 94.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations: (U 126 and U 202) were on return passage and therefore no longer
a) Convoy No. 35: fully prepared for attack. U 162 not able to get within range of convoy
At 1350 U 654 reported that sighting was not convoy but 3 heavily from such a great distance, and U 654 got no chance to attack. Operation
smoking vessels (trawler type) and one destroyer, on easterly course. was effected from time to time by rapidly altering visibility.
Operations finally broken off. b) According to orders of OKM-K in a number of IXc boats centrifugal
As proposed refueling from Lima could no longer take place, U 654 and blowers have been fitted instead of the 9 cylinder MAN motors made by
564 ordered to DD 90. Here refueling was arranged from U 463. U 162 Bueschi, because the Bueschi installations at first caused trouble in the
received Op. areas EE and EO. workings.
B.d.U. for his part tried as soon as possible to break off this replacement
as soon as the cause had been removed, in order to keep the Bueschi
734
blowers, whose working was certainly more dependable. As the Entered Port: U 128 - Lorient; U 584 - Brest.
discontinuation of this arrangement was not effected, or could not be in the Sailed: U 593 - St. Nazaire.
opinion of OKM-K, considerable misgiving was expressed with regard to
the reliable working of these machines, especially in view of disorders II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
caused by the new centrifugal blowers. Danger exists that the operational
efficiency of the boats will be impaired. III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Report from U 564 see para. IV a).
---------------------------------------------------
--------------- - 44 -

22.July 1942.

I. U 43 - Op(AK) U 154 - DL 56 U 254 - AL 31 U 564 - CF 95

66 - Op(ED 90) 155 - DE 92 332 - CD 65 571 - DO 27
67 - DO 29 157 - DC 67 379 - Op(AK 84) 572 - Op(ET)
71 - Op(AK) 160 - Op(ED 80) 402 - CB 81 575 - EE 33
84 - DM 47-Op 161 - DD 33 437 - DN 65 576 - Op(CA)
86 - AK-Op 162 - CE 95 454 - Op(AK) 582 - ES 62
89 - Op(CA) 163 - AO 40 458 - CA-Op 584 - off Brest
90 - AK 94-Op 164 - AF 75 460 - CD 63 588 - BF 40
98 - BE 74 166 - Op(DA) 461 - CC 84 597 - AK 73-Op
108 - CE 55 171 - DL 65 463 - AK 91 598 - BC 63
109 - BE 68 173 - DM 98 505 - Op(EB 90) 600 - AL 32
116 - ES 61 176 - AO 40 507 - EJ 15 607 - AK 65
126 - BE 94 201 - Op(Freetown) 508 - DD 33 609 - AE 91
128 - off Lorient 202 - BE 92 509 - DO 29 654 - CF 79
129 - Op(DM) 203 - DG 42 510 - BC 91 658 - BC 62
130 - EJ 16 210 - AF 75 511 - AE 91 704 - AK 48-Op
132 - Op(BA) 213 - Lorient 552 - Op(AK 76) 751 - BE
134 - Op(DA 90) 217 - AM 11 553 - BF 70 752 - ET 50-Op
754 - Op(CA/DC)
On Return Passage: U 402 - 571 - 575 - 460 - 437 - 203 - 202 - 332 -
161- 126 - 128 - 584.
735
2) U 509 sighted sub. conning tower in DO 6416 (possibly one of our
own).
3) U 582 sank American ship "Honolulan" (7,493 GRT) in ES 3457.
Course 3200, speed 8 knots.
4) U 609 reports convoy in AE 8812 at 0656, consisting of about 5
steamers (No. 36).
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 4581 - CA 7988 - DA 93 - BB 4576 - DC 12 -
DM 51 - EO 1271 - DO 7889 - DB 7747 - DM 2873 - DM 7228 - ED
9829 - DC 11.
Submarine was attacked by army aircraft in DO 78. SSS report from
ED 98.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) U 564 sighted 2 battleships at 0932 in CF 7875, course 3250, speed 17
knots. Boat was ordered to give shadowing reports for benefit of other
boats in the vicinity. According to dead reckoning U 162 ought to have
been in position suitable for operating but after position report lay in fact
too far off. U 654 in CE 9889 attempted to reach the enemy. U 564
reported enemy in CF 7844 at 1115, course 00, speed 15 knots, and in CF
7577 at 1254, main course north, speed 15.5 knots. 3 destroyers formed
part of the force. Boat dropped astern. When U 654 also reported having
no extra speed, he received orders to continue passage, as also U 564, if no
contact was made. Formation disappeared from sight at 1346. Battleships
were "Ramilles" class.
b Group "Wolf" received orders to proceed in search of traffic from EL
25, close in shore eastwards to ED 90. Operate there according to
previous situation reports.
c) None.
d) 1) On 14.7. U 751 sailed from St. Nazaire, and up till now has made
neither "passing" report nor answered numerous calls. A number of
sighting and attacking reports from English aircraft lead to conclusion that
boat was destroyed by them. The loss cannot be attributed to a mine since
the route in question was run over on 10.7. and 15.7. without result. Loss
of boat must be reckoned with.
2) U 576 reported bomb damage to shutter of main ballast tank on 13.5.
According to a further report from CA 8836 on 14.5. repair is impossible.
Boat proceeding with ballast tank 5 flooded. Since then no reply has been
received from U 576 in spite of numerous calls. No attack reports from
American aircraft or surface forces have been received, so no grounds
exist for considering it lost. There is always the possibility that the boat
with flooded main ballast tank cut under at high speed (while being hunted
by fast ship for instance).
- 45 -
736
V. Reports of Success:
U 582 - 1 ship 7,493 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
23.July 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(AK) U 155 - DE 89 U 332 - CD 29 U 571 - DO 37
66 - Op(ED 90) 157 - DC 66 379 - Op(AK) 572 - Op(ET)
67 - DO 36 160 - Op(ED 80) 402 - CB 65 575 - DQ 75
71 - Op(AK) 161 - CC 84 437 - DO 49 582 - ES 58
84 - Op(DM) 162 - DG 37 454 - Op(AK) 588 - BE 93
86 - Op(AK) 163 - AN 30 458 - Op(CA) 593 - BF 50
89 - Op(CA) 164 - AE 93 460 - CE 19 597 - AK-Op
90 - Op(AK) 166 - Op(DA) 461 - CC 84 598 - BC 92
98 - BD 86 171 - DL 28 463 - AK 88 600 - AL 18
108 - CE 73 173 - DN 75 505 - Op(EL 30) 607 - AK 83
109 - BE 83 176 - AN 30 507 - EJ 45 609 - AL 84
116 - ES 58 201 - Op(off Freetown) 508 - DD 29 654 - DG 25
126 - BF 71 202 - BF 40 509 - DO 58 658 - BC 67
129 - Op(DM) 203 - DG 26 510 - BC 89 704 - AK-Op
130 - EJ 46 210 - AE 93 511 - AE 88 752 - Op(ET)
132 - Op(BA) 213 - Lorient 552 - Op(AK) 754 - Op(CA)
134 - Op(DA 90) 217 - AL 35 553 - BE 91
154 - DL 69 254 - AL 25 564 - DG 34
On Return Passage: U 402 - 571 -575 - 460 - 437 - 203 - 202 - 332 - 67
- 161 - 126.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 462 - 595 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 36 and 37 see para. IV a).
2) Situation U 84: DM 1919 - junction for heavy convoy and single
ship traffic to north, south and east. On 21.7. in DM 1994 one freighter of
12,000 GRT torpedoed, out of a convoy on 3200, speed 8 knots. Was
forced off. Protracted return passage.
3) U 508 reported from DD 3799, having fired 3 spread miss at tanker
on easterly course. While continuing hunt, ship was seen to switch on
navigation lights at dusk. It was probably a neutral ship already reported.
Boat was referred to previous orders.
4) U 510 reported freighter in CD 16, southerly course, high speed,
contact lost. Patrol boat sighted while proceeding through Iceland
Passage, and 2 enemy submarines in AF 49.
5) Situation U 89: Hunted convoy on hydrophones from CB 1234 -
1723, consisting of 3-5 steamers, course 2100, speed 12 knots. In thick
fog attack on large tanker was ruined by a destroyer, 2 spread then fired on
latter. While diving 2 loud explosions were heard. Gunfire before-hand
- 46 -
at 200 meter range. No contact.
6) U 129 sank "Port Antonio" (1,266 GRT) on 19.7. in DM 4152, course
550. On 24.7. sank freighter of 4,000 GRT in DM 6464, course 3000.
Otherwise situation as reported. Protracted return passage via DN 80 and
DO 20.
b) None.
737
c) 1) English aircraft attacked submarine in AE 8712 and reported 1 hit
(U 609).
2) U-boat sightings: BB 52 - DB 5669 - AH 9819 - EB 25 - AK 7519 -
DC 5532 - CB 17 - CG 85 - DA 9344.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 36:
0900 U 600 reported operation on convoy in progress. As boat lay 350
miles to the southwest of it, was ordered to continue passage. A short
while after U 254 asked for bearings and sighted convoy in AE 76 at 1507.
U 609 was bombed and forced to submerge. U 254 continued to shadow.
Convoy then steered on general course 2950, speed 9 - 10 knots, consisted
of at least 8-10 steamers, air escort provided by 2 Catalinas. U 511
requested permission to operate at 1949 from AL 33, but was ordered to
continue passage. U 609 attempted to approach again from favorable
position. At 2230 convoy position AE 7294. U 254 continued to report
shadowing every 2 hours, but could not get in an attack. Towards 0900/24
convoy in AE 7294 disappeared from sight. Boat presumed destination of
convoy to be Reykjavik. Operation was therefore over. Not a single boat
made an attack. The conduct of the boats will be examined on return.
Convoy No. 37:
U 552 a member of Group "Wolf", sighted convoy at 2106 in AE 7831
on course 2400. Almost immediately U 379 reported convoy in AK 7823,
medium speed. Group "Wolf" received orders to attack, as also U 609 if
position was favorable. U 90 made contact with destroyer in AK 7585 at
2120. Further shadowing reports from U 597 at 2320 in AK 7854, and U
379 at 2330 in AK 7819. U 552 reported convoy in AK 7827 at 2225,
course 2300, long range escort. Boat's port engine out of order, and could
only do 9 - 10 knots. This was especially regrettable since it was the only
boat with convoy experience. Soon afterwards contact was lost. As all the
boats must have been in the vicinity, idea of combined attack was given
up. U 704 and U 379 reported search in directions 2350 and 2400
respectively. Nevertheless convoy remained unsighted until morning.
 b) 1) U 132 requested protracted return passage via CE 55; received
orders to operate in BB. It was impressed upon him to keep away from the 24.July 1942.
coast.
2) U 173 operating in DO 30 and DP 10 on account of damaged
periscope. I. U 43 - AK-Op U 154 - DM 72 U 254 - AE 71 U 553 - BE 83
66 - ED-Op 155 - DQ 13 332 - CD 38 564 - DG 24
67 - DP 12 157 - DD 45 379 - AK-Op 571 - DO 36
- 47 - 71 - AK-Op 160 - ED-Op 402 - CC 49 572 - ES-Op
84 - DB 96-Op 161 - CC 91 437 - DO 58 575 - DQ 81
86 - BC 50-Op 162 - DG 28 454 - AK-Op 582 - ES 58
89 - CB 17 163 - AN 23 458 - CA-Op 588 - BE 86
90 - AK 90 164 - AE 91 460 - CE 26 593 - BF 49
98 - BD 84 166 - DA-Op 461 - CC 83 595 - AO
108 - CE 75 171 - DL 24 462 - AO 597 - AK-Op
109 - BE 84 173 - DM 99 463 - BD 14 598 - BC 86
116 - ES 58 176 - AN 23 505 - EL 31-Op 600 - AK 63
126 - BF 57 201 - ES-Op 507 - EJ 48 607 - AK 88
3) U 509 proceeding via Mona Passage and DE 60 to DM 10 and 20. 129 - DM 65-Op 202 - BF 57 508 - BE 83 609 - AE 72
4) U 507 and 130 after refueling took up position in Op. area FC upper 130 - EJ 49 203 - CF 75 509 - DO 81 654 - DG 16
and middle third, or ES lower and FD upper third. 132 - BB 58-Op 210 - AE 91 510 - CD 17 658 - BC 86
5) Operation is planned for U 553 - 588 - and 593 in Belle Isle Straits. 134 - DB-Op 213 - BF 54 511 - AL 31 704 - AK-Op
For this new position AH 98. 217 - AL 27 552 - AK-Op 752 - ES-Op
c) 1) U 203 took over invalid from U 564. 754 - CA-Op
2) U 161 completed refueling from U 462.
Tanker reserves: 558 cubic m. 153 days' provisions.
d) None. On Return Passage: U 67 - 126 - 161 - 302 - 203 - 402 - 437 - 460 -
571.
V. Reports of Success: Entered Port: - . -
U 84 1 ship 9,000 GRT Sailed: - . -
1 ship 12,000 GRT torpedoed
U 129 2 ships 4,266 GRT II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
U 89 1 destroyer torpedoed.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 658 sighted patrol vessel while proceeding through Iceland
--------------------------------------------------- Passage AE 8735, course southeast, as well as (English submarine in AF
--------------- 4991 on southwest course).
738

- 48 -
2) U 510 fired 4 torpedoes at supposed sub. decoy ship which probably
ran underneath. Reliable data. Position CC 6662, east course.
3) Situation U 134: Sea and air patrol along east and south coast of
Florida as reported earlier. On 19.7. in DM 2770 one destroyer and a
number of patrol vessels patrolling up and down. Between 21 and 24.7. in
DA 93 and DB 47, great air activity, no shipping. Withdrew on account
bright moonlit nights. Plan to proceed via DM 65 to DO 20.
4) Situation U 754: Shot which missed at 4,000 ton freighter in CA
9482, course 3500, speed 18 knots. Probably a new ship camouflaged.
Otherwise no traffic. Small to medium air activity.
b) U-boat sightings: CC 66 - BC 38 - EQ 21 - CC 6929 - BC 6283 - CA
32 - CA 94 - DB 59 - EE 72 - CA 3974 - CB 15.
Submarine attack on American steamer in CC 6652.
Submarine fired on patrol boats off Hatteras.
c) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 37:
Since none of the boats had made contact Group "Wolf" received
orders to take up patrol position at 1700 between AJ 9882 and BC 3597 in
previous order of succession. Convoy courses between 270 and 210
would pass through this line. Enemy speed assumed to be 8 knots. Before
this order could be carried out convoy was again sighted by U 552 in BC
3387 at 1057/24. Weather: Slight cloud, visibility over 10 miles, slight
swell from the northwest. U 552 shadowed and reported position of
739
convoy every hour. Position at 2100 BC 3872. After this general course
southwest speed 10 - 12 knots. One after another 6 further boats reported
contact with convoy, i.e., U 71 at 1707; U 704 at 1722; U 454 at 1747; U
86 at 1800; U 597 at 2232; and U 379 at 2236. Current convoy position
reports gave no clear indication of what further course was to be. Boats'
dead reckoning estimations differed up to 30 miles.
At 2357 U 552 reported that convoy in gusts of rain had zig-zagged and
was now on a northerly course in BC 3841. Further reports (one from U
379 that convoy disappeared from view at 0001 on course 1500, and U
454 which reported convoy on westerly course at 0048 in BC 3813)
suggest that convoy divided during the gusts of rain. At 0340 U 552
reported convoy position BC 3828, course 1600, speed 9 knots. The
convoy had therefore first steered a northerly and then an easterly course,
and it is impossible that a part of the same had remained on a westerly
course.
U 552 attacked and sank 2 ships, total tonnage 16,000 GRT. Was
forced to submerge by gunfire during attack and lost contact. Rising sea
(6.7) as well as bad visibility made pursuit seem hopeless. Boat reported
last position of convoy as BC 3853 at 0500, course south. None of the
other
- 49 -
boats were successful. Operation continues. Convoy was still
uncontacted by morning.
b) U 754 and 458 received orders to operate on traffic running from
Boston through CB 1110, BB 7770 and 7760. Mainly convoys.
 U 254 and U 609 received waters off Reykjavik as attacking area.
Shipping expected from SE, S and SW. Attention is drawn to barrage. U
511 new position DD 90.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 522 - 2 ships 16,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
25.July 1942.
I. U 43 - BC 50-Op U 155 - DP 63 U 332 - CE 15 U 564 - DG 18
66 - ED-Op 157 - DD 52 379 - BC 50-Op 571 - DD 98
67 - DD 99 160 - ED-Op 402 - CC 55 572 - ES-Op
71 - BC 50-Op 161 - CD 44 437 - DO 62 575 - DQ 64
84 - DC 70 162 - DC 46 454 - BC 50-Op 582 - ES 65
86 - BC 50 163 - AF 75 458 - CA 93 588 - BE 81
89 - CD 52 164 - AE 88 460 - CE 32 593 - BF 40
90 - BC 50-Op 166 - DA-Op 461 - CC 60 595 - AN 35
98 - BD 78 171 - DL 11 462 - AN 36 597 - BC 50-Op
108 - DF 32 173 - DN 76 463 - BC 63 598 - CD 14
109 - CF 15 176 - Bergen 505 - EC-Op 600 - AK 67
116 - ES 50 201 - ES-Op 507 - ES-Op 607 - BD 15
126 - BF 40 202 - BF 50 508 - DC 49 609 - AE-Op
129 - DN 48 203 - CF 57 509 - DO 78 654 - DF 39
130 - ES-Op 210 - AE 88 510 - CC 86 658 - CC 86
132 - BB-Op 213 - BF 46 511 - AL 19 704 - BC 50-Op
134 - DB 72 217 - AL 41 552 - BC 50-Op 752 - ES-Op
154 - DM 85 254 - Op 553 - BE 48 754 - CA 91-Op
On Return Passage: U 67 - 126 - 161 - 202 - 203 - 402 - 437 - 460 -
571.
740
Entered Port: U 126 - Lorient; U 202 - Brest.
Sailed: U 596 - 660 - Kiel; U 106 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 37 see para. IV a).
2) U 160 sank freighter of 7,500 GRT out of bunch of steamers in ED
1424 on course 3100 (submerged attack by moonlight).
3) U 129 sighted 11 ships on westerly course in DN 4754, low speed.
No contact.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BC 62 - CA 54 - BB 63 - CC 6685 - CD 42 - BC 38.
Submarine attack in AJ 5550 - BC 3838; SSS from ES 3219.
Aircraft sighted submarines in AD 85/86 and AL 3150 respectively, and
attacked. Latter presumed 2 hits with depth charges.
- 50 -
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 37:
Group "Wolf" proceeded on general course 2100, with the object of
winning as much ground to the south as possible. A more detailed plan
was not possible under the prevailing weather conditions. An encyphered
exchange of signals between Command and C.O. of U 552 showed that
attack would be very difficult on account of strong defense measures, and
that the convoy was making full use of the sudden bad weather for U 132 was informed of convoy traffic south of Newfoundland and
alterations of course. This would probably cause a number of the boats to Nova Scotia.
lose contact. U 86 while proceeding on southerly course as ordered c) - d) None.
sighted destroyer at 1346 in BC 6213 on course 1800, and convoy itself at
1754 in BC 6259, course 2200, speed 8 knots.
Weather: Wind SW 5-6, medium swell from the west. - 51 -
Shadowing was continued until next morning without a break, the
following position reports being made: U 451 at 2108 in BC 6288; U 86
at 2304 in BC 6513; U 379 at 0343/26 in BC 6423; U 71 at 0415 in 6425
and U 379 once again at 0652 in BC 6417. At 2115 U 704 sighted 2
freighters on SW course in 6436, but soon lost contact. U 454 was forced
off after shadowing report at 2108, and came across single ship at 0103 in
BC 6561 which he recognized later as a neutral. U 607 commenced
operations immediately after first contact report from U 86, and sighted
convoy at 2333 in BC 6517. At the same time U 597 came upon convoy
in same grid position. Differences in position estimations from the other V. Reports of Success:
boats ranged up to 12 miles. U 597 reported convoy proceeding in 2 U 160 1 ship 7,5000 GRT
columns, consisting of 12-14 steamers, and 1 corvette to starboard. 607 1 ship 8,000 GRT 1 hit
Submerged attack unsuccessful. U 552 asked for bearings several times
during the night, but did not make contact with the convoy. U 43 attacked
at 0300, but was forced off by destroyers and depth charged. U 607 Appendix to 25th July 1942
attacked at 0757 in BC 5693 and scored 2 hits on 8,000 GRT freighter as
well as one hit on unknown target; was finally forced to withdraw. Donitz here, how are weather conditions? What speed can boats make on
Convoy last reported steering 2300 degrees, speed according to dead general course 2150?
reckoning 10-12 knots.
Operation continues. Topp here, W.S.W. 8, sea 7, cyclones, visibility about 400, slow speed one
The interchange of cypher messages between 1145 and 1300 has again engine. 122.
proved an excellent medium for detailed information, and established
clarity conditions on the spot. What was defense like? In what other ways was attack on convoy
Under difficult conditions it was again only the veteran boats that difficult?
managed a successful attack. Nevertheless the carrying out of convoy
operations without the help of inexperienced boats is unavoidable. We Strong escort, attack was rendered more difficult by sudden blowing up
cannot alter the fact that the difficult school of convoy attack cannot be of bad weather. Convoy made most of this in alterations of course up to
completed at home, but first of all when in direct contact with the enemy. 3600. This caused number of boats to lose contact.
b) U 134 received orders to proceed via DM 52 to DN 70 and 80.

741
What is your view on the likelihood of making further contact with
convoy, separate single ships for instance?
Convoy keeping excellent station even in bad weather, consider possibility
of regaining contact under these conditions, that is under the average bad
weather conditions in this area, extremely small.
Do you think the boat could proceed on southerly course, and if so
would this course bring them nearer to conjectured position of convoy?
Slightly more to the south; presume convoy will alter course to the S.W.
at dawn as on previous day.
Well done Topp, the weather at any rate will settle the account of your two
steamers, good luck.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
26.July 1942.
I. U 43 - BC-Op U 157 - DD 37 U 402 - CC 42 U 572 - ES-Op
66 - ED-Op 160 - ED 12 437 - DP 15 575 - DQ 39
67 - DE 72 161 - CD 46 454 - BC-Op 582 - ET 42
71 - BC-Op 162 - DF 69 458 - CB 44 588 - BE 48
84 - DC 84 163 - AE 93 460 - BE 78 593 - BE 68
86 - BC-Op 164 - AL 33 461 - CD 44 595 - AN 30
89 - CB 10-Op 166 - DA 90-Op 462 - AN 30 596 - AO 72
90 - BC-Op 171 - DA 80-Op
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 August 1942
742
PG30310a
Comments by Naval War Staff on War Diary of B.d.U.
for 11.8.42 on paragraph "Operation Cape Town"
1) Naval War Staff expects excellent strategic results on the vital South
Atlantic - Indian Ocean traffic from the projected Cape Town Operation.
It should throw the whole South Africa traffic in confusion and have
repercussions on reinforcements for the land fighting in the Near East.
When the enemy has to divert traffic to S.E. African harbors, e.g. Port
Elizabeth, Durban etc., this will have an adverse effect on all supplies for
the Indian Area, as these harbors are already over filled since the Japanese
commenced operating. It is clear that the less time the enemy is given to
organize counter measures, the greater will be our strategic success.
2) It has been proved that the enemy can obtain a pretty good idea of the
positions of our submarines from their radio traffic. Attacks by the boats,
i.e. reports made by steamers when attacked, complete this picture. If our
submarines appear in the South Atlantic on their way to Cape Town, or if
they send radio messages, it must be assumed that the enemy will deduce
that the submarine is on a southerly course. Thus it may well be that he
will recognize Cape Town as the goal before the attack is launched and
that both traffic and defense measures will react accordingly. This would
reduce the strategic effect desired by us.
It may also be, if things go badly, as they did when our submarines
operated south of St. Helena, against Cape Town traffic, that no damage
can be inflicted on this same traffic at the present time. Conditions have
also changed somewhat, as it must be assumed that the enemy is aware of
the presence of our submarine tankers. Therefore, he will be prepared for
a long-distance attack in the vital Cape Town area. This is, of course all
assumption, but in the opinion of Naval War Staff it is better not to count
on the enemy being dim-witted.
3) The reasons given in paras. 1 and 2 have caused the Naval War Staff to
forbid the submarines to attack while en route beyond the equator. They
must also maintain complete radio silence. Only attacks on battleships and
aircraft carriers are permitted - providing firing data is certain. Naval War
Staff does not consider that this will reduce the sinkings carried out by the
submarines, as the approach route runs through an area where there is little
movement, and the chances of success off Cape Town will probably be
increased if the boats are not expected.
4) The statement in No. 3) of the preceding document shows that the
Naval War Staff was misunderstood:
" if the main importance of such an operation is considered to lie in its
strategic pressure and if this is achieved by attacking south of the Equator
to 150 South, it is unnecessary to proceed to Cape Town".
THe exact contrary is correct, for Naval War Staff considers that the
sooner the enemy recognizes our intention, the less the strategic effect, for
the enemy will be able to carry out an orderly transfer of traffic to
alternative harbors.
(Signed): FRICKE.
- 64 -
1.August 1942.
743
I. U 43 - CD 40-Op U 160 - ET-Op U 402 - BE 76 U 572 - ET-Op
66 - ET-Op 161 - BE 76 437 - CD 40-Op 575 - DC 22
67 - CD 66 162 - BF 62 454 - CD 40-Op 582 - EJ 32
71 - CD 40-Op 163 - AK 83 458 - CB 10-Op 588 - BC 93-Op
84 - CE 8h 164 - BC 68-Op 461 - CD 40-Op 593 - BD 24
86 - CD 40 166 - DA 90-Op 462 - AL 21 595 - AL 27
89 - CB 10-Op 171 - DA 92-Op 463 - DE 11 597 - CD 40-Op
98 - CB 97 173 - DO 30-Op 505 - ED 75 598 - DD 60-Op
108 - DB 63 174 - AN 36 506 - BE 96 600 - CC 68
109 - DF 68 176 - AL 41 507 - FC 30-Op 605 - Bergen
116 - ES-Op 201 - EK 11 508 - DM 80-Op 607 - CD 40-Op
125 - CF 33 210 - BC 13-Op 509 - DL 69 609 - AL 21
129 - DO 33 213 - CF 79-Op 510 - DD 80-Op 654 - DP 20
130 - ES-Op 217 - BC 68-Op 511 - DL 69 658 - DO 90-Op
132 - CB 12 254 - AD 83 552 - DD 80-Op 660 - AE 83
134 - DN 80-Op 256 - AF 76 553 - BC 64-Op 704 - CD 40
154 - DO 60-Op 332 - BF 61 558 - BF 57 752 - ET-Op
155 - ET-Op 335 - AN 35 564 - DE 70-Op 754 - CB 10-Op
157 - CD 56 379 - CD 42-Op 571 - DE 65
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 129 - 132 - 161 - 201 - 402 - 437 - 505
- 571 - 575 - 582.
Entered Port: U 332 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 438 - 705 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 155 sank: British ship "Clan Macnaughtor" (6,088 GRT) in EE 94,
and a "Dallington Court" class ship (6,889 GRT) in EE 86, both ships on a
course of 2600.
U 510 sighted a loaded Greek freighter in DD 8485, on course of 3100,
showing navigation and flag lights. Submarine was instructed to sink the
ship providing there was no possibility of confusing it with Argentine,
Swiss or Portuguese ship.
U 89 situation report: sought from BA 9969 to BB 7844 without
success. Underwater bearings taken 9 times in 7 days.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CG 4854 - DA 91 - BB 46 - DR 68 - DB 98 - CA
26 - DN 9176 - CA 7326.
Sighted by plane: BE 6585. Attacked by plane in CB 1193 - BF 4936
(probably one hit) and EE 77.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 38:
At 1630 U 511 sighted destroyer on westerly course in BC 6584. Boat
was forced to submerge. Convoy itself was not found. As no further
shadower reports were received by evening and as according to
calculations the convoy must have passed the patrol strip at about 1000,
the search was abandoned. See No. IV b) for order given to boats.
- 65 -
b) 1) U 553 and 588 were approaching DD 90 to take on supplies and
subsequently attack in the Caribbean.
2) U 43 - 217 - 511 - 164 proceeding to DO 50.
3) At 0800 on 6 August U 216 - 607 - 454 - 552 - 71 - 597 - 704 - 379
were on patrol stations from AJ 1411 to BC 5465. Boats form new Group
"Steinbrink".
744
4) Because of major damage U 26 requested DD 60 - 80 as attack area.
Boat was allotted the area round CB 7255 for operations. Width 400
miles. Directed to attack N.W. or N. S. traffic.
c) 12 cb.m. of fuel was transferred from U 463 to U 84.
Tanker reserves: 647 cb.m. fuel 187 days supplies.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 154 - 2 ships 12,977 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
Submarines on 1.8.1942.
I. In service on 1 June 331
Commissioned during July 21
352
Losses *) 10 (5 not yet * accounted for)
342
U 158, Rostin, second trip, last report 29.6. from Atlantic while
returning from Gulf of Mexico. No clue to loss.
U 502, von Rosenstiel, experienced boat, last report on homeward course
west of Biscay on 3.7. Probably bombed by plane.
U 157, Henne, first trip, last report on 10.6. from Windward Passage.
Probably sank steamer on 11.6. in Bahama Channel. No other clue.
U 701, Degen, experienced boat, last report 7.7.42. off Hatteras.
U 751, Bigalk, experienced boat, did not report after leaving port 14.7.
Probably bombed by plane in Biscay.
U 153, Reichmann, first trip, last report on 30.6. N.E. Puerto Rico,
otherwise no clue. Was to have gone to Panama Canal.
U 136, Zimmermann, experienced boat, last report 5.7. about convoy 200
miles W. Finisterre. Probably rammed by destroyer.
U 90, Oldeorp, first trip, no more reports after attacking convoy east of
Newfoundland Bank on 28.7.42.
U 576, Heinicke, experienced boat, no further message after reporting IV. Boats on active service as distributed on 1.8.42:
damage from bomb off Hatteras on 23.7.42. Atlantic 113 boats
Mediterranean 16 "
Norway area 23 "
152 "
- 66 -

V. During July following left port:

Average daily number at sea: 69.6 boats.
Of these, in operational area: 21.7 "
En route to Op. area: 48.2 "
Returning from Op. area: 12.3 "

VI. During July following left port:

U 215, Hoeckner, first trip, last message sent 3.7.42. south of Cape From home ports 24 boats.
Sable. Was to proceed to Hatteras, no clue. From W. France 23 "

II. Distribution: ---------------------------------------------------

II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXD1 IXD2 XB XIV ---------------

On active service : - - 103 3 40 - - 1 5 152 2.August 1942.

On trials: - - 97 2 22 1 5 3 1 131
Training: 37 4 16 - 2 - - - - 59
I. U 43 - BC 85-Op U 157 - CD 63 U 402 - BE 82 U 571 - DF 41
37 4 216 5 64 1 5 4 6 342 66 - ET-Op 160 - EO 18-Op 437 - CD 45 572 - ES 92-Op
67 - CE 17 161 - BE 87 438 - AO 72 575 - CE 99
71 - BC 91 162 - EG 14 454 - BC 56 582 - DT 92-Op
III. During July: 84 - CC 94 163 - AK 84 458 - CB-Op 588 - BC 97
Total number increased by: + 11 86 - BC 89 164 - BC 83-Op 461 - CD 43 593 - AK 78
Boats on active service increased: + 12 89 - CB 16-Op 166 - DA 90-Op 462 - AL 21 595 - AL 03
Boats on trial reduced by: - 1 98 - DD 13 171 - DA 90-Op 463 - DD 66 597 - BC 83
Training boats: +/- 0 108 - DP 91 173 - DO 30-Op 505 - ED 51 598 - DD 60-Op
745
 109 - DS 14 174 - AN 29 506 - BE 91 600 - CC 86
116 - ES-Op 176 - AK 67 507 - FC-Op 605 - AF 72
125 - CF 35 201 - DU 71 508 - DM 10-Op 607 - BC 67
129 - DD 89 210 - BC 56 509 - DM 50-Op 609 - AL 16
- 67 -
130 - ES-Op 213 - CF 78-Op 510 - DD 84-Op 654 - DE 74
132 - CB 22 217 - BC 58-Op 511 - BC 11-Op 658 - DO 30-Op
134 - DN 80-Op 254 - AD 83-Op 552 - BC 67 660 - EE 87
154 - DO 76-Op 256 - AF 71 553 - BC 86-Op 704 - BC 94
155 - EE-Op 335 - AN 28 558 - BE 68 705 - AO 72
379 - CD 18 564 - DD 99 752 - ET-Op
754 - CA 32-Op
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 129 - 132 - 161 - 201 - 402 - 437 - 505
- 571 - 575 - 582.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 94 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
746
a) 1) U 132 sighted in CB 3119 2 steamers, 1 destroyer, course 2700,
speed 8 knots. Boat had fired all torpedoes and was returning.
2) U 660 saw several patrols in AE 86 and 88 while proceeding through
Iceland Passage.
3) U 508 situation report: On 29.7. in DN 3126 triple and single miss
on "Mormacstar" (8,000 GRT), course 3500, 17 knots. Good data. No
traffic by day in Crooked Passage, no patrols. On 1.8. in 6919
"California" class battleship with 3 destroyers sighted, course 1300, high
speed submarine forced to sheer off!
4) U 134 situation report: On 29.7. convoy in DM 6439, 8 ships, 2
destroyers, 4 planes, westerly course forced to sheer off by planes.
Nothing seen in DN 72-83 and 86. Strong air patrols, probably location at
night.
5) U 509 was attacked with depth charges in DM 1732. Necessary to
retire for repairs.
6) U 160 situation report: No traffic for 3 nights in EO 10 and 40, no
chance of attacking by day.
2.8. "Treminnard" (4,694 GRT) sunk in EE 8783, course 270.
Submarine sighted 0020/3 in EE 8782 six to eight large steamers with air
protection, was forced to submerge. Followed convoy, but could not get
contact again. U 155 reported that he was stalking large formation of
steamers.
7) U 155 situation report: According to own experience and statements
made by captain, brisk tanker traffic in sea area east of Trinidad.
Approach routes change at least once a week (lack of oil in South
American and probably West African parts). Oil for Brazil via Straits of
Magellan (Magelhanstrasse). West-East tanker traffic and return to
Freetown. Former neutral ships are allowed little oil in port to prevent
them from returning to Europe.
- 68 -
 U 552 lost contact in fog. Last position at 0603 in BC 4969, course
2700. Boat had attacked during the night and sunk 2 freighters (16,000
GRT). U 210 again requested beacon signals. Contact again entirely
interrupted through continued poor visibility, not restored. As the convoy
Based on Port of Spain 1 old cruiser, 2 destroyers, about 6 patrol had then reached the Newfoundland Banks, an area of constant thick fog,
boats. there was no chance of finding it again. Operation was therefore broken
b) None. off. Boats were given fresh orders (see War Diary of 3.8.42.)
c) U-boat sightings: DC 11 - DM 51 - DM 25 - EO 21 - EE 8778 - DA b) U 754 was directed to make a practice shoot in the Cape Cod Bay.
9196 - BB 7926 - ED 99 - DM 15 - AH 34 - DM 28. U 609 and 254 were to try to pick up a convoy in AD 53 - 59. Convoy
d) None. was to leave Reykjavik for the north during the first week in August.
c) U 609 transferred sick man to U 462.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 38:
At 0859, U 552 sighted convoy on westerly course in BC 5952. Boat - 69 -
attacked immediately, was forced to submerge and follow convoy. 0910
contact was restored in BC 5955. Boats formerly belonging to Groups
"Wolf" and "Pirat" were ordered to stalk convoy. This convoy was ON
115 (No. 38), which was last reported at 0507 on 31.7. in BD 1284.
According to this information speed of advance must be 7 to 8 knots,
instead of the formerly calculated speed of 10 to 11 knots. Thus convoy
had slowed down or made a large zig-zag. U 552 maintained contact in
BC 4969 until 0520. Convoy course was S.W. in BC 8223 until 1701,
after attack by U 552 or U 71 was west in BC 5777 until 0347, then N.W.
U 704 was the first boat to get contact at 1325, reported positions several U 437 refueled from U 461.
times and was forced to sheer off at 1637. d) None.
At 1414 U 71 requested beacon signal, attacked at 1918 in BC 5887.
He probably scored one hit in an underwater attack. After 1600 visibility V. Reports of Success:
became worse, so that location and shadowing were very difficult. 1846, U 552 2 freighters 16,000 GRT
U 217 got close to the convoy in BC 5884, was forced to move away and 553 1 freighter 7,000 GRT
was chased by destroyers. At 1700 U 597 sighted 2 destroyers in BC 160 1 ship 4,694 GRT
5898, probably rearguard, depth charges were dropped. 71 1 hit probably
2226 U 553 made contact in BC 5798, lost it in BC 5772 and followed
up star shell fire from west-south; again contacted in BC 5771, and at 0400
sank a freighter (7,000 GRT). 5 hours dogged pursuit with depth charges; VI. General:
only hydrophone hunt, no Asdic. Successful attacks on convoys east of the Newfoundland Bank were
again mainly carried out by experienced commanders (Topp, Mengersen).
747
 It has again been proved that the weather situation, which is affected by
seasonal and local conditions, permits only chance successes. These
conditions were known, but it was necessary to carry attacks into this area
in order to re-establish contact with convoys, and as temporary
improvements in visibility made successes seem possible, (they were
indeed scored) so that the chase could not be broken off.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
3.August 1942.
I. U 43 - BC 80-Op U 160 - ED 21-Op U 437 - CD 52 U 572 - ES-
Op
66 - ED-Op 161 - BE 86 438 - AN 36 575 - CF 73
67 - CE 24 162 - EQ 21 454 - BC 80-Op 582 - DT 63
71 - BC 80-Op 163 - BD 11 458 - BB 77-Op 588 - BC 80-Op
84 - CD 71 164 - BC 80-Op 461 - CD 19 593 - AJ 99
86 - CD 19 166 - DA 90-Op 462 - AL 17 595 - AK 64
89 - CB-Op 171 - DM 90-Op 463 - DD 94 597 - BC 80-Op
94 - BF 58 173 - DP 10-Op 505 - ED 22 598 - DD 94
98 - DD 14 174 - AF 87 506 - CF 32 600 - DE 13
108 - DP 88 176 - AK 82 507 - FC-Op 605 - AE 69
109 - DS 44 201 - DU 41 508 - DM 51 607 - BC 80-Op
116 - ES-Op 210 - BC 80-Op 509 - DM 17-Op 609 - AL 12
125 - CF 53 213 - CF 78-Op 510 - DM 40-Op 654 - DD 94
129 - DD 94 217 - BC 80-Op 511 - DD 94 658 - DD 94
130 - ES-Op 254 - AD 83-Op 552 - BC 80-Op 660 - AL 61
132 - BB 89 256 - AE 67 553 - BC 80-Op 704 - BC 80-Op
134 - DN 82-Op 335 - AF 76 558 - BE 57 705 - AN 36
154 - EE 76 379 - CD 19 564 - DD 94 752 - ET-Op
155 - EO-Op 402 - BE 92 571 - DF 16 754 - CA 32-Op
157 - CE 19
748
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 129 - 132 - 161 - 201 - 402 - 437 - 505
- 571 - 575 - 582.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 71 reported "Iren" in BC 4989 on a course of 2400.
- 70 -
2) U 552 suddenly encountered destroyer in fog. Air intake and
exhaust shaft holed by gunfire, stern periscope only limitedly serviceable.
Position BC 5772.
3) U 125 sighted two-funelled steamer and 1 destroyer in CF 1937,
course 00, speed over 16 knots. No contact.
4) U 43: Both compressors broken down, 2 bow caps half open,
through depth charge attack. Necessary to return home.
5) U 108 situation report: 3.8. in BE 9475 tanker sighted on course of
2700, 13 knots, also freighter and tanker on course of 800. Probably
convoy assembly point.
Sunk: tanker (10,000 GRT).
6) U 607 sank stationary tanker (8,000 GRT) in BC 5746. After stalking
a hydrophone bearing moving east for eleven hours, located by a
submarine while listening. After surfacing definitely saw a thin periscope.
 7) U 458 situation report: No traffic sighted. In BB 76 only air activity,
in BB 77 and CB 12 a great deal of air patrolling, moderate sea patrol,
frequent fog.
8) U 509 situation: Nothing seen in EC 2890 - EB 3847 - DM 7179.
Air patrols day and night in DM 1732. Searchlights, flares, impossible to
disperse oil trace.
9) U 160 sank Norwegian "Havsten" (6,161 GRT) on course of 3000, in
EE 8915. Ship had been ordered to make for EE 8766 from Freetown.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DM 51 - AJ 4656 - EF 2899 - CA 35 - DB 36 - BC
7395 - BC 49 - FE 4344 - DC 1137 - ED 9920.
By planes: BF 8343 - BE 8958 (attack) - AE 4777.
Submarine attacks: BC 72 - EE 97 - EE 94 - EC 77.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 134's attack area was extended along the coast to the north as far
as DM 64.
2) Group "Steinbrink" (U 210 - 607 - 454 - 593 - 71 - 597 - 704 - 379)
were ordered to take up patrol stations from AJ 9411 to BC 3465 at 1200
on 7 August.
U 553 and 508 again steering for DD 90 to refuel.
U 164 - 511 - 43 - 217 approaching DO 50.
c) U 553 took over fuel from U 552 in BC 7638. U 564 carried out
refueling from U 463. Requested torpedoes from U 154, who was on
return journey. U 162 requested
- 71 -
749
fuel from U 160.
U 379 carried out refueling from U 461. Tanker reserve: 59 cbm. 22
days' provisions.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 108 tanker 10,000 GRT
607 freighter 8,000 GRT
160 ship 6,161 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
4.August 1942.
I. U 43 - BC 84 U 160 - EE 88-Op U 437 - CD 34 U 372 - ES-Op
66 - DO-Op 161 - BE 95 438 - AN 28 575 - CF 55
67 - BE 98 162 - EP 22 454 - BC 46 582 - DT 33
71 - BC 55 163 - BC 69 458 - CB 22-Op 588 - CC 31
84 - CD 49 164 - BC 77 461 - CD 34 593 - AJ 99
86 - CC 61 166 - DA 90-Op 462 - AK 62 595 - AK 85
89 - CB-Op 171 - DA 80-Op 463 - DD 94 597 - BC 47
94 - BF 91 173 - DO 30-Op 505 - DO 62 598 - DD 94
98 - DC 38 174 - AF 72 506 - CF 37 600 - DE 42
108 - EE 95 176 - BD 12 507 - ES 10-Op 605 - AE 86
109 - DS 72 201 - DU 11 508 - DM 50-Op 607 - BC 54
116 - ES-Op 210 - BC 51 509 - DM 17-Op 609 - AE 71-Op
125 - CF 42 213 - CF 78-Op 510 - DD 94 654 - DD 94
129 - DD 94 217 - BC 74 511 - BC 79 658 - DD 94
130 - ES-Op 254 - AD-Op 552 - BC 83 660 - AK 66
132 - BB 99 256 - AE 85 553 - BC 76 704 - BC 55
 134 - DN 70-Op 335 - AF 71 558 - BE 72 705 - AN 29
154 - DD 62 379 - BC 83 564 - DD 94 752 - ET-Op
155 - EE 70-Op 402 - BF 71 571 - CD 89 754 - CA 32-Op
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 129 - 161 - 201 - 402 - 437 - 505 - 552
- 571 - 575 - 582.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 604 - 755 - 464 - 380 - Kiel; U 569 - La Pallice; U 594 - St.
Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 39 see No. IVa.
2) U 505 situation report: From EC 84 via 96 to ED 76 and ED 63, no
shipping seen, little air activity. On 3.8. hospital ship on course of 1400 in
ED 5926.
U 155 sank "Empire Arnold" (7,049 GRT) in EF 77, ship was from a
dispersed convoy. Course east. Cargo of tanks and planes for Alexandria
via Cape Town. On 4.8. pistol dud fired at tanker in EE 97.
U 176 sank English "Richmond Castle" (7,798 GRT) 4.8. in BD 1387,
course 300, 15 knots.
U 597 made under water attack on independent freighter, course 2500.
Explained double miss. Pursuit
- 72 -
750
given up because of enemy's high speed and fog.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 8713 - EE 79 - DM 43 - DB 98 - CB 21 - BB
8684 - BB 78 - CA 54 - BA 97 - DB 62.
By planes: AD 83 - AE 7144.
Submarine attack in EE 9144.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 39:
At 1615 U 704 sighted a convoy on S.W. course in BC 2998, speed 8
knots, air escort.
Group "Steinbrink" was ordered to attack only if visibility was good.
Boats proceeding south continued their voyage. U 704 maintained contact
in steadily worsening visibility until 2105 in BC 5321, at 2231 in BC 5319
he was forced by destroyer to fall back and lost convoy completely in the
fog that then gathered. Shortly afterwards U 454 sighted the convoy again
in BC 5345 but soon lost it again in poor visibility. At 1940 U 210
reported that he, too, was stalking the convoy. As contact was interrupted
and all boats reported fog or poor visibility, control decided to break off
the chase and leave the fog belt.
Group "Steinbrink" was ordered to continue voyage to patrol area
designated. 0300 U 607 came upon 2 destroyers in BC 5294, probably
part of the convoy's escort. Attempt to attack failed because of thundery
showers. Operation against convoy was closed.
Operation against convoy was closed.
b) 1) New positions: U 595 and 600 - AH 96; U 125 - CF 79; U 462 -
DD 60.
2) U 458 to operate until return in BB 6670 and 6380.
3) Attack area: U 564 - EE and EO in accordance with latest situation
reports. U 509 and 173 - southern third of EE, and EO. U 162 same area.
U 6554 - lower third of EB and south to the coast. Main attack area there.
Move away if defenses and shipping situation make it necessary. U 589
and 658 - DN 80, 70 and S.W. part of 40, also DM 60. Main attack area
for U 598 - DM 65, for U 658 - DN 76 and 84. U 510 to proceed via DN
78 to sea area within a radius of 100 miles of DL 6855.
c) U 552 transferred 40 cbm fuel to U 553 in BC 8442.
 d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
5.August 1942.
I. U 43 - CD 21 U 161 - BF 71 U 454 - BC 29 U 582 - DH 76
66 - DO 70-Op 162 - EP 12 458 - BB 88 588 - CC 28
67 - BF 74 163 - BC 94 461 - CD 22 593 - AJ 99
- 73 -
71 - BC 51 164 - CC 24 462 - AK 96 594 - BF 58
84 - CD 56 166 - DA 90-Op 463 - DD 90 595 - MJ 99
86 - CC 51 171 - DA 80-Op 464 - MO 71 597 - BC 27
89 - CB-Op 173 - DO 84 505 - EE 14 598 - DD 90
94 - BF 82 174 - AE 69 506 - CF 81 600 - DD 69
98 - BB 78 176 - BD 18 507 - ES-Op 604 - AO 72
108 - EE 80-Op 201 - DH 84 508 - DM 50-Op 605 - AM 11
109 - EH 13 210 - BC 22 509 - DL 66 607 - BC 52
116 - ES-Op 213 - CF 78-Op 510 - DD 90 609 - AE 71-Op
125 - CF 94 217 - CC 24 511 - CC 29 654 - DD 90
751
129 - DD 90 254 - AD 90 552 - BC 85 658 - DD 90
130 - ES-Op 256 - AL 32 553 - CC 35 660 - AK 59
132 - BC 75 335 - AE 68 558 - BD 96 704 - BC 29
134 - DN 70-Op 379 - BC 61 564 - DP 15 705 - Bergen
154 - DP 14 380 - AO 72 569 - BF 83 752 - ES-Op
155 - EE 76-Op 402 - BF 83 571 - CD 96 754 - CA 32-Op
157 - CE 32 437 - CE 11 572 - ES-Op 755 - AO 72
160 - EE 99 438 - AF 87 575 - CF 37
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 43 - 129 - 132 - 160 - 161 - 201 - 437 -
505 - 552 - 571 - 575 - 582.
Entered Port: U 402 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 653 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 40 see No. IVa.
2) U 254 situation report: In AE 7120 forced to submerge for 20 hours,
depth charges dropped 3 times, major damage. At first unable to dive,
escaped in fog. In AK 3230 again partly able to dive. Went to AK 28 for
repairs.
2.8. sank freighter (4,500 GRT) in AE 7664, course 1300, 12 knots.
3) U 217 reported large fast ship, a destroyer, in CC 5146, course 100.
4) U 510 sank "Uruguayer" (5,300 GRT) on 2.8. in DD 8485 according
to prize decree. Ship was carrying corned beef from Montevideo to New
York. Because of faulty listening gear requested area EO-EP and south
therefrom.
5) U 66 situation report: No traffic between Grenada - Trinidad and
Tobago. Strong air patrols at night in Passage. Assumed that radar
location was used.
4.8. miss fired at freighter in EE 950, course 2900. Boat requested EE
70 and 80 as Ops. area.
 6) U 116 situation report: 22.7. single miss fired at medium sized
freighter in ES 5359. Course 3000, 10 knots. 27.7. sighted tanker in ES
5850, course 800.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 7886 - DN 71 - BB 8284 - DA 96 - DM 43 - ED
35 - EC 36 - CA 5483.
English plane reported submerging submarine in BF 5589.
Submarine attacks: DM 51 - AJ 94.
- 74 -
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 40:
U 593 - one of the "Steinbrink" Group - sighted a convoy on N.E.
course at 1510 in AJ 9178 in the patrol band of this group. The other
submarines were still some 250-350 miles behind the position reported, as
they had been delayed by the attack on the S.W. convoy the previous day.
Orders to stalk the convoy were given to: Group "Steinbrink", U 660 - 116
and 595, also on request U 379 from BC 3772, U 256 from AL 26 and U
605 from AL 3322. The last two boats approached the convoy on a SW
course at cruising speed. 1654 U 593 reported convoy in AJ 9776, course
400, 7 knots. Visibility 12 miles. Boat attacked and sank freighter (5,000
GRT) in AJ 9191, another explosion was heard. Last sighting - 5 steamers,
2 escorts, course 800. Contact was interrupted by hydrophone pursuit
lasting 5 hours. 2208 U 595 reported the convoy in AJ 9169, was forced
away when he tried to attack at 0040, depth charges were dropped.
752
Position AJ 9273, course 400, 7 knots. 23 steamers escorted by corvettes.
Visibility was spoilt by drizzle and contact was not reestablished until the
morning.
The operation continued.
b) U 125 and 506 patrolled from CF 7977 to 7999 on 6.8. after 2200,
course 1750, day's run 150 miles.
U 256 and 605 were allotted AK 60 as temporary attack area.
c) U 116 transferred fuel and provisions to U 752 and 572 in ES 9277.
U 461 handed over "Junkers" compressor to U 43. He still had 18 cbm
to transfer.
U 154 transferred torpedoes to U 564.
d) 1) U 213, en route to south, last reported on 31.7. from CF 7390, that
he had been hunted by corvettes for 5 hours.
Despite repeated call-up, the boat did not answer any more. Its loss
must be assumed.
2) U 588 combined with Group "Pirat" in attacking a S.W. bound
convoy (No. 38). He reported 0037/31.7. that he had contact with convoy.
Position approx. AK 7989. Boat sent no further radio message. No reply
to request for position. Loss must be assumed.
V. Reports of Success:
U 254 freighter 4,500 GRT
510 " 5,300 GRT
593 " 5,000 GRT
593 1 explosion heard.
- 75 -

6.August 1942.
I. U 43 - CD 20 U 161 - BF 57 U 458 - EB 94 U 593 - AJ 91
66 - EE 75-Op 162 - EP 10 461 - CD 23 594 - BF 49
67 - BF 73 163 - CD 12 462 - BF 23 595 - AJ 69
71 - BC 26 164 - CC 45 463 - DD 94 597 - BC 23
84 - CD 62 166 - DA 90 464 - AN 36 598 - DD 94
86 - CC 44 171 - DA 90 505 - DP 74 600 - DD 94
89 - BB 87 173 - DO 97 506 - CF 79 604 - AN 36
94 - BE 83 174 - AE 83 507 - FD + FC-Op 605 - AL 26
98 - DC 46 176 - BC 33 508 - DM 50-Op 607 - BC 31
108 - EE-Op 201 - DH 55 509 - DM 71 609 - AD 83
109 - DR 79 210 - AJ 97 510 - DO 31 653 - BF 54
116 - ES 53 217 - CC 46 511 - CC 54 654 - DD 94
125 - CF 72 254 - AK 35 552 - BC 94 658 - DD 94
129 - DD 94 256 - AL 25 553 - CC 26 606 - AK 49
130 - ES-Op 335 - AE 83 558 - CE 23 704 - BC 31
132 - BC 85 379 - BC 35 564 - DP 14 705 - AF 72
134 - DN-Op 380 - AN 66 569 - DF 81 752 - ET 71
154 - DD 97 437 - CE 32 571 - BF 83 754 - CA 32-Op
155 - EE-Op 438 - AF 72 572 - ES-Op 755 - AN 36
157 - BE 77 454 - BC 23 575 - BF 83
582 - DH 54 -
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 84 - 129 - 132 - 157 - 160 - 161 - 201 -
437 - 505 - 552 - 571 - 575 - 582.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 566 - Brest; U 578 - St. Nazaire; U 373 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
753
a) 1) Convoy No. 40 see No. IVa.
2) U 752 situation: sighted large steamer with destroyer on 4.8. in ES
9727. 16 knots, 700. Otherwise no traffic. Slight air activity in ET 84
and 85.
3) U 162 reported 2 funneled vessel in EE 9769, course 2450, 15 knots.
U 66 then requested beacon signals. Boat was in EE 8774. U 162 lost the
steamer at 1930 in EE 8988. 2300 U 108 got contact in EO 2266. No
further reports.
4) U 134 sank destroyer "Erar" (Gleavest class) on 4.8. in DN 7550.
Otherwise nothing seen. Return was necessary because of sickness of
commander.
5) U 572 sighted: 26 - 31.7. in ET 7250 3 steamers, course 3000, speed
16 knots. 7.8. in ES 5466 large ammunition freighter (8,000 GRT) sunk.
Course 1300, 10 knots.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 5344 - EB 67 - EC 69 - EC 9376 - CA 32 - DC
1245 - AJ 6962 - DM 2779 - DM 51.
Planes sighted submarines in BF 4288 and BF 5877.
Submarine attack in EE 97.
d) None.
- 76 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 40:
1115 U 704 reported the convoy in AJ 6989 on a course of 80. Contact
was shortly afterwards lost with 500 meters visibility. At 1144 U 595
sighted convoy in AJ 6988, about 20 steamers. 1330 was shelled by
destroyer and then pursued with depth charges. Visibility changeable 2-8
miles misty. U 660, 176 and 595 joined Group "Steinbrink". At 1452 U
607 sighted enemy at 1751 U 454 also spotted him. 1817 U 660 reported
enemy position in AK 4719. Contact again reported by 607 and 454.
0120 U 660 suddenly came across the convoy in fog in AK 4571,
immediately lost contact again. All boats that had so far made contact,
were forced by destroyers to sheer off in fog. Some were pursued with
numerous depth charges. U 595 had to move away to make repairs. U
454 was temporarily only partially able to dive in AK 4495, and had to
turn back. U 176 reported at 0501 that he had been followed with depth
charges for five hours in AK 4490. Constantly recurring fog rendered
continuous shadowing or attack almost impossible. Boats suddenly came
upon enemy in poor visibility, and were usually spotted immediately and
forced to make off. Destroyers had excellent opportunities to use their
depth charges. No submarine was able to attack during the night. As there
were prospects of improving visibility next day, the operation was
continued.
b) U 108 was given a free hand in southern half of EE and in EO.
Attack areas: U 510 - EO to EP and south of them. U 66 as requested
EE 70 and 80.
U 600 to proceed via DN 78 to sea area in 100 mile radius of DL 6855.
U 609 was ordered to continue operations, as instructed on 24.7.
Convoy that was reported has left port.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 134 1 destroyer sunk
572 ammunition freighter 8,000 GRT sunk
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
7.August 1942.
754
I. U 43 - BD 79 U 162 - EO 31-Op U 461 - CE 36 U 593 - AK 40
66 - EO 21-Op 163 - CC 63 462 - BD 27 594 - BF 47
67 - BF 40 164 - CC 71 463 - DD 94 595 - AK 48-Op
71 - AK 42-Op 166 - DA 90-Op 464 - AN 30 597 - AK 40
84 - CE 18 171 - DA 90-Op 505 - DP 15 598 - DO 23
86 - CB 68 173 - EE 14 506 - DA 14 600 - DD 94
89 - BB 97 174 - AE 87 507 - FD + FC-Op 604 - AN 30
94 - BE 76 176 - AK 19-Op 508 - DM 50-Op 605 - AL 19
- 77 -
98 - DC 44 201 - BF 54 509 - EB 87 607 - AK 42-Op
108 - EO 22-Op 210 - AJ 69-Op 510 - DO 38 609 - AE-Op
109 - EG 38 217 - AK 40 511 - CC 72 653 - BF 48
116 - ES 31 254 - CC 71 552 - BD 71 654 - DO 25
125 - DH 14 256 - AK 28 553 - CC 51 658 - DO 24
129 - DE 45 335 - AE 87 558 - CE 22 660 - AK 45-Op
130 - ES-Op 373 - BF 91 564 - DP 48 704 - AK 46-Op
132 - BC 94 379 - AK 49-Op 566 - BF 54 705 - AE 69
134 - DN 56-Op 380 - AN 30 569 - BF 72 752 - ET 71-Op
154 - DD 94 437 - BE 78 572 - ES 54-Op 754 - CA-Op
155 - EE-Op 438 - AE 68 578 - BF 83 755 - AN 30
157 - BE 84 454 - AK 45-Op 582 - BF 77 575 - off St. Nazaire
160 - EF 57 458 - BB 69 161 - off Lorient 571 - off La Pallice
 On Return Passage: U 43 - 454 - 552 - 582 - 201 - 132 - 505 - 89 - 437
- 67 - 84 - 461 - 116 - 129 - 154 - 134 -160
Entered Port: U 575 - St. Nazaire; U 571 - La Pallice; U 161 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 165 - 513 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 40 see No. IVa.
2) U 507 situation report: 23.7. - 7.8. patrolled from ES 50 to FB 93
and back to FC 33, nothing sighted. Request for free hand off coast of
Brazil.
3) U 508 situation report: 3 and 4.8. nothing seen off Havana. 5.8. 4
ships, 3 planes in DM 4338. Making for harbor; evening 20 ships seen in
periscope, 4 destroyers, 3 planes, mean course easterly. Attack made, 1
definite hit, 1 probable. Subsequently depth charges and bombs were
dropped. Strong air but no sea patrols.
4) U 132 reported single ship in BD 7575, course 1800, 12 knots.
5) U 171 situation report: During the day brisk shipping movements
within the 20 meter line in DA 90. Strong air patrols, no chance to attack.
Nothing sighted at night. Nothing in DA 94 - 84, and from 4 - 7.8. nothing
in DA 81.
6) U 254 fired a spread of four at a destroyer in AE 7137 on 1.8. 2 hits
probable.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 7743 - BB 7734 - CA 58 - DC 14 - EB 6737.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 40:
Group "Steinbrink" continued to stalk in direction of mean advance
course. At 1010 convoy was picked up by U 176 in AK 4259. Course
300. U 593 requested beacon signals. About 1200 contact lost in fog.
Last position AK 4264, course 300. Once again the fog pretty well put the
boats off
755
- 78 -
the scent. As they had not picked the convoy up again by 1900, the
boats were ordered to report their position after dark. It was intended that
they should patrol the next day. However, U 176 again sighted the convoy
at 2125 in AK 9199. Contact was maintained until the morning. At 0108
convoy was in AK 0179, at 0331 in AK 0183, at 0742 in AK 2973. U 176,
607, 379 and 704 reported. U 256 requested beacon signals.
U 606 reported in the evening that he had contact at 1725 in AK 1978
and had attacked. Quadruple and single miss at extreme range. Boat
again reported at 0510 that he had not been able to engage because of fog
and squalls of rain. On starboard side 2 corvettes; 1 destroyer as remote
escort. No submarine managed to attack during the night. Time and again
in poor visibility that occasionally improved for a spell, they suddenly
came upon escort forces and were forced to withdraw. Thus no successes
were scored.
U 254 reported that he was stalking a convoy from AK 3713. U 174
and 335, which had reached AL 20 on their outward journey, were given
AL 15 as a temporary attack area and were instructed to stalk the convoy
later from that position. Pursuit of convoy was continued.
b) U 164 and 217 were making for DD 9455 to refuel.
c) None.
d) Because traffic on route "Antar" is about to recommence, attacks on
unescorted single ships are forbidden from 10th August in the area through
which the route runs north of 200 North. From 16th August at 0000 the
same applies to the area through which the route runs south of 200 North.
The following areas remain unrestricted for attacks on unescorted
independent ships: area in a radius of 200 miles from Ascension and St.
Helena; a strip 400 miles wide along the coast of Brazil; and a strip 300
miles wide along the coast of Africa.
V. Reports of Success:
U 254 - 2 hits on destroyer.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
8.August 1942.
I. U 43 - BD 86 U 162 - EE-Op U 454 - AK 81 U 578 - BF 40
66 - EE 70-Op 163 - CC 67 458 - CB 76-Op 582 - BF 75
67 - BF 60 164 - DE 11 461 - CF 16 593 - AK 51
71 - AK 51-Op 165 - AO 40 462 - BD 45 594 - BE 67
84 - CE 22 166 - DA-Op 463 - DP 595 - AK 52
86 - CB CA-Op 171 - DA 84 464 - AN 23 597 - AK 02
89 - BB 95 173 - EE 46-Op 505 - DD 94 598 - DO 16
94 - BD 96 174 - AL 23 506 - DH 45 600 - DO 89
98 - DB 64 176 - AK 29 507 - ES 11-Op 604 - AN 20
108 - EE EO-Op 201 - BE 60 508 - DL 39-Op 605 - AK 28
109 - EG 69 210 - AK-Op 509 - EB 34 607 - AK 02
116 - EJ 92 217 - DE 12 510 - DO 69 609 - AE 4720-Op
125 - DH 44 254 - AK 28 511 - CC 79 653 - BF 70
129 - DE 28 256 - AK 29 513 - AO 40 654 - DD 43
130 - ET 90 335 - AL 24 552 - BD 81 658 - DO 42
132 - DB 74 373 - BF 80 553 - CC 48 660 - AK 02
134 - DN 63 379 - AK 29 558 - CE 16 704 - AK 01
154 - DD 92 380 - AN 20 564 - DP 79 705 - AE 83
- 79 -
756
155 - EO-Op 437 - BF 85 566 - BF 40 752 - ET 86-Op
157 - BE 83 438 - AF 83 569 - BF 60 754 - CH 31-Op
160 - EF 61 572 - ET 57 755 - AN 20
On Return Passage: U 43 - 454 - 552 - 582 - 132 - 505 - 89 - 437 - 64 -
461 - 116 - 157 - 129 - 154 - 505 - 134 - 160.
Entered Port: U 201 - Brest; U 67 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 517 - 211 - Kiel; U 135 - St. Nazaire; U 596 - Bergen.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 155 sank tanker (9,000 GRT) in EO 61 course east. 5.8. sank
Dutch ship "Dreco" (389 GRT) by gunfire in EE 98.
6.8. gunfight with small armed freighter in EE 98. Both ships were on
a course of 3000.
2) U 173 double miss in EE 1640 on passenger freighter with a course
of 2550, speed 13 knots.
3) U 109 unsuccessfully chased a fast freighter ship on 5.8. in EH 4230.
Course 3000, 18-20 knots. 8.8. sank armed tanker "Arthur W. Seewall"
(6,030 GRT) on 8.8. in ER 1839, course 2600, 9 knots. Boat requested a
free hand in the coastal area FC and FJ; was instructed to operate in
accordance with para. IVb (Freetown).
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DB 6359 - DC 87 - AK 02.
Attack report: AK 2991.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 40:
U 164 and 335 were instructed to stalk the convoy. At 1159 U 176
reported position of convoy in Ak 2964, course 800. U 256 requested
beacon signals shortly afterwards. During the day and following night
more shadower reports were sent by U 593, U 607 and U 595. Because of
continuous poor visibility differences in fixes occur among the boats. So
that positions are somewhat scattered. At 0540 the convoy was in AK
3928. At 0530 on 8.8. U 704 fired a quadruple miss, followed by a single
shot on a seven thousand tonner. Detonation heard. At 1200 U 597
sighted a single ship with a destroyer in AK 2954, course 600, high speed.
At 1305 U 605 fired several single misses at what was probably the same
single ship in AK 2952. U 704 turned back because of damage from depth
charges, also U 71 because of damage and illness of Engineering Officer.
About 0200 U 595 fired triple miss at a destroyer, but probably scored one
hit on a second destroyer.
U 176 a still inexperienced boat - distinguished itself by its excellent
shadowing of the convoy and by its determined follow-up when contact
was lost. At 1518 it made an underwater attack and sank 2 ships totaling
15,000 GRT, and torpedoed a four thousand tonner, probably the same that
it contacted again in the morning in the same position and sank. Ship was
7,000 GRT. Convoy was sailing in 4 columns of 5
- 80 -
to 6 steamers in each, with a leading ship ahead. At 0540 U 607 also
attacked. Spread of three missed because enemy turned away. During the
757
night visibility was greatly limited by drizzle, it varied from 1-5 miles.
Although there was no prospect of an improvement in the weather, the
operation was continued.
b) 1) U 171 was given a free hand east of DA 90 and 69. Boat was to
attempt to pick up the night run of the traffic.
2) U 507 was given a free hand off the Brazilian coast.
3) U 109 was ordered to make zig-zags via EH70 to ES 50.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 155 tanker 9,000 GRT sunk
155 freighter 389 GRT sunk
109 tanker 6,030 sunk
176 3 ships 22,000 sunk
704 ship 7,000 explosion heard
95 destroyer probable hit
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
9.August 1942.
I. U 43 - CE 22 U 163 - CC 85 U 462 - BC 93 U 594 - BE 82
66 - EE-Op 164 - DD 63 463 - DD 94 595 - AK 35-Op
71 - AK 67 165 - AN 30 464 - AN 24 Bergen 596 - AN 20
84 - BE 67 166 - DA-Op 505 - DD 90 597 - AK 37-Op
86 - CB-Op 171 - DA-Op 506 - DA 72 598 - DN 63
89 - BC 71 173 - EE 16-Op 507 - EC-Op 600 - DO 26
94 - BD 89 174 - AK 38 508 - DM-Op 604 - AF 70
98 - BB 60-Op 176 - AK 39-Op 509 - EB 39 605 - AK 37-Op
108 - EE-Op 210 - AK-Op 510 - DP 77 607 - AK 03-Op
109 - ER 46 211 - AO 40 511 - DD 36 609 - AE-Op
116 - EJ 62 217 - DD 41 513 - AN 30 653 - BE 92
125 - DH 71 254 - AK 20-Op 517 - AO 40 654 - DN 66
 129 - DE 34 256 - AK-Op 552 - BD 91 658 - DN 68
130 - ET-Op 335 - AK 38 553 - CB 99 660 - AK-Op
132 - BD 84 373 - BF 40 558 - CE 17 704 - AK 03-Op
134 - DO 19 379 - AK-Op 564 - CE 17 705 - AE 87
135 - BF 50 380 - AF 80 566 - BF 70 752 - ET-Op
154 - DE 47 437 - BE 94 569 - BE 64 754 - CH-Op
155 - EO 64-Op 438 - AE 87 572 - ET-Op 755 - AF 79
157 - BE 93 454 - AK 90 578 - BF 40
160 - EF 36 458 - CB 76-Op 582 - BF 80
162 - EE-Op 461 - CE 24 593 - AK 37-Op
On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 84 - 89 - 109 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 -
154 - 160 - 437 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 552 - 582 - 704.
Entered Port: U 211 - Arendal.
Sailed: U 406 - St. Nazaire; U 214 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 130 sank "Malmanger" (7,078 GRT) in ES 5144, course 900.
Bound for Caboon.
- 81 -
2) U 704 fired 2 singles at a vessel of "Ormonde" class, course 2700.
Probable hit shelled.
b) None.
758
c) U-boat sightings: AL 1959 - AK 0258 - DC 8711 - ED 3997 - BB
7299 - FS 44 - EB 37.
Sighted by plane: AL 1399.
BE 9625 (Probably 2 hits).
BF 4814 - BE 9620 - BF 4757.
Submarine warnings by unidentified ship in AL 1488 - AL 4771.
Submarine attack in EO 36, EO 61.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 40:
U 607 reported it at 1115 in AK 0344. At 1334 U 174 requested beacon
signals. According to later reports, convoy steered a due easterly course,
speed about 7-8 knots. Contact was announced by U 597 - 605 - 205 - 174
and 256. For the first time planes also appeared, some of them land
planes. Boats were thus constantly forced to withdraw and submerge.
LAst convoy position at 2000 was in AK 0365. Contact was then
interrupted and was not reestablished by the morning. From 1800 U 705
and U 438 were also stalking the convoy from AL 20. Group "Steinbrink"
was ordered to continue the chase without worrying about fuel reserves.
At 1610 U 254 fired 3 single misses at short range with exact data at the
middle column. Commander of boat thought that torpedoes may have bee
affected by depth charge explosions. Convoy was sailing in wide
formation. At 2000 U 607 gave the following situation report:
So far, convoy has not made any large zig-zags at dusk. At dust the
escort made fast sweeps well away from the convoy. Yesterday at this
time fireworks 20 miles north of the convoy. Corvettes were supplied by
day from steamers as far as 25 miles behind the convoy. Both stationary
for a time, closed up at dusk. Submarine began return journey with one air
driven torpedo.
U 595 turned back because of major damage, in AK 6169 he sighted a
large steamer on a course of 700, 15 knots and chased it unsuccessfully as
far as AK 6239.
The convoy was also attacked by U 256 at 2100 in AK 0362, when he
fired a triple miss at "Jervis" destroyer, and by U 174 at 1752 in AK 0365
with an accountable triple miss at the main convoy. No further reports
received. Operation was continued.
b) Contrary to previous orders U 564 went to ED 90 and attacked east-
west traffic during the new moon period off and west of Port of Spain.
c) 1) U 98 reported special task carried out. (Minelaying Jacksonville -
Inner area).
2) U 564 - 654 - 658 - 510 - 598 - 600 - 129 - 154 - 209 were supplied
by U 463. Tanker reserves 150 cbm., 96 days' provisions.
- 82 -
d) 1) Contrary to previous orders, it was forbidden to attack independent
ships on route "Antar" north of 200 North from then on, and south of 200
North from 14.8. at 0000.
2) Boats were informed that the blockade runner "Uckermark" had left
port. On 10.8. at 1400 vessel was approx. in BF 8475.
3) According to reliable reports, Georgetown is the port where convoys
bunker when proceeding to or from New York - Freetown. It was
suggested that submarines in the vicinity should operate against these
convoys.
4) U 166 - a boat making its first trip in enemy waters - was ordered to
lay mines in the Mississippi Estuary. At 0030 on 27.7. he reported task
completed, also gave situation report. Since then the boat has not replied
to repeated calls. No clues are available to suggest that he had been sunk.
Loss must be assumed.
V. Reports of Success:
759
U 130 - 1 ship 7,078 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
10.August 1942.
I. U 43 - BD 99 U 163 - DE 13 U 461 - CE 31 U 593 - Op(AL 17
66 - Op(EE) 164 - DD 68 462 - CD 24 594 - BE 76
71 - AK 96 165 - AN 23 463 - DD 94 595 - Op(AL)
84 - BE 69 166 - Op(DA) 464 - Bergen 596 - AF 48
86 - Op(CB) 171 - Op(DB) 505 - DE 72 597 - Op(AL 18)
89 - Op(EE) 173 - EE 54 506 - DT 32 598 - DN 56
94 - CE 16 174 - Op(AL) 507 - Op(ES) 600 - DO 43
98 - Op(DB) 176 - Op(AL 17) 508 - Op(DM) 604 - AF 72
108 - Op(EE) 210 - Op(AL) 509 - EC 43 605 - Op(AL 01)
109 - ER 76 214 - BF 40 510 - EE 18 607 - AL 47
116 - EJ 33 217 - DD 68 511 - DD 65 609 - Op(AE)
125 - DT 31 254 - Op(AL 18) 513 - AN 20 653 - BE 83
129 - CD 64 256 - Op(AL 01) 517 - AN 30 654 - DN 83
130 - Op(ES 46) 335 - Op(AL) 552 - BD 69 658 - Op(DN)
132 - BD 91 373 - DE 68 553 - DD 34 660 - Op(AL 01)
134 - DO 29 379 - Op(AL) 558 - CD 64 704 - AL 47
135 - BF 40 380 - AF 73 564 - EE 44 705 - Op(AL 18)
154 - DE 46 406 - BF 40 566 - BE 91 752 - Op(ET)
155 - Op(EO) 437 - BE 93 569 - BE 28 754 - Op(CA)
157 - BF 47 438 - AL 24 572 - Op(ET) 755 - AF 71
160 - DR 75 454 - BD 36 578 - BE 65
162 - Op(EE) 458 - Op(CB) 582 - BF 54
On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 84 - 89 - 109 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 -
154 - 160 - 437 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 552 - 582 - 595 - 607 - 704.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 594 sighted armed freighter on a suspiciously varying course in
BE 7642. Boat was given a free hand as he requested.
2) U 552 was bombed by a plane at 1700 in BE 66566
- 83 -
3) U 752 sank Dutch vessel, formerly the "Cassel" (6,047 GRT) on 9.8.
in ET 7383. Course 1400, 12 knots. Ship was carrying planes and
locomotives from New York to Alexandria.
4) U 510 sank a tanker (14,000 GRT) on 10.8. Gun defenses, course
west, 15 knots.
5) U 108 sank Norwegian "Nrinas" (2,687 GRT) in EO 2276. Course
2450 from Merakao to New York, otherwise nothing seen.
6) U 704 reported much traffic. In 24 hours boat saw 4 single ships and
1 destroyer on a course to east and to west between AL 47 and BE 11.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings:
EC 18 - DN 4 - DM 1860 - DN 96 - CA 73 - ED 3696 - DM 23.
Sighted by planes: AL 2850 (attack with depth charges) - AL 0135 - AL
2893 - BE 6955 - BF 4950.
Submarine attacks: EO 61 - ED 62.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
760
a) Convoy No. 40:
At dawn U 597 attacked in AL 0155 and scored in all 3 hits on 2
steamers (each 8,000 GRT).
During the night escort closes right up and makes no zig-zags. During
the day the constantly increasing air patrols give the boats a lot of trouble.
U 597 was hunted with depth charges for 3 hours, subsequently
requested permission to return because of damage. Boat had also used up
all fuel.
U 593 moved away because of a crack in the cylinder block. Towards
evening Group "Steinbrink" was given the following order: Continue
operation if boats can catch up with convoy by 11.8., at any rate stand east
of it. After taking all the opportunities for attack that the convoy offers, or
if it is impossible to catch up or get in position, boats are to break off
immediately and run south at an economical speed.
U 705 reported convoy position at 1900 in AL 2928, course east 7
knots. Lost contact. 2205 boat believed convoy on N.E. course in AL
2935, as flying boats are constantly visible there.
Later reports showed that U 660 attacked at 1230 in AL 2913 and
torpedoed 4 ships. In approximately the same position U 438 scored hit on
a ship (5,000 GRT), and at 1629 sank a stationary steamer (6,000 GRT).
Boat suspected "Q" ship, as after the second finishing shot depth charges
and bombs were dropped. (Possibly one of the 4 ships torpedoed by U
660). U 254 had only one air driven torpedo and was turning back with a
sick man. U 597 reported that before attacking on 10.8. he definitely
observed 19 steamers and 1 leading ship. Earlier reports from the boats
(once 23 ships, another time 5 ships)
- 84 -
 71 - BE 11 165 - AF 73 463 - DD 89 594 - BE 74
84 - BF 40 171 - Op(DB) 464 - Bergen 595 - AL 72
were too uncertain to be used in gauging the success achieved. Further 86 - Op(CB) 173 - Op(EO) 505 - DE 54 596 - AE 68
reports of attacks were not received. Boats operated until the morning 89 - BC 56 174 - Op(AL) 506 - DT 62 597 - AL 52
according to orders. 94 - CD 63 176 - Op(AL) 507 - Op(ES) 598 - Op(DN)
For summing up see War Diary for 11.8.42. 98 - Op(CA) 210 - Op(AL) 508 - Op(DM) 600 - DN 69
b) 1) DN 84 is the new operation area for U 553 - 511 - 163. 108 - Op(EE) 214 - BF 40 509 - EC 56 604 - AE 69
2) U 98 was given a free hand in the area between the latitude of square 109 - ER 81 217 - DD 97 510 - Op(EE) 605 - Op(AL 02)
CA 8455 and DM 2989. (Between Hatteras and Florida). Last traffic seen 116 - DU 71 254 - Op(AL 51) 511 - DD 83 607 - AL 72
there was on the 200 meter line. 125 - DT 61 256 - Op(AL 52) 513 - AF 73 609 - Op(AE)
c) None. 129 - CD 63 335 - Op(AL) 517 - AN 40 653 - BE 85
d) In future a passage report when boats leave the North Sea is to be 130 - Op(ES) 373 - BE 64 552 - BF 44 654 - DN 84
made only on request, instead of being automatic. 132 - BE 71 379 - Op(AL) 553 - DD 56 658 - Op(DN)
The reason for this is that boats now have a very much shorter run alone 134 - DO 34 380 - AF 59 558 - CD 58 660 - Op(AL 01)
through the North Sea, as they are convoyed as far up as Bergen 135 - BF 40 406 - BF 50 564 - Op(EE) 704 - AL 78
154 - DE 29 437 - BF 70 566 - BE 85 705 - Op(AL)
V. Reports of Success: 155 - Op(EO) 438 - Op(AL 42) 569 - BE 13 752 - Op(ET 73)
U 752 1 ship 6,047 GRT sunk 157 - BF 454 - BF 18 572 - Op(ET) 754 - Op(CA)
510 tanker 14,000 GRT " 160 - DE 54 458 - Op(CB) 578 - BE 53 755 - AE 68
108 ship 2,687 GRT " 162 - Op(EE)
597 1 ship 8,000 GRT "
597 1 ship 8,000 GRT 1 hit
660 4 ships torpedoed On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 84 - 89 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 1134 - 154 -
438 1 ship 5,000 GRT hit 160 - 254 - 437 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 552 - 582 - 595 - 597 - 607 - 704.
438 1 ship 6,000 GRT sunk Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 333 - La Pallice; U 590 - St. Nazaire.
(Last probably one of the ships torpedoed by U 660)
- 85 -
---------------------------------------------------
---------------

11.August 1942.

I. U 43 - BE 79 U 163 - DE 17 U 461 - BE 77 U 582 - BF 54

66 - Op(EE) 164 - DD 97 462 - CD 42 593 - Op(AL 01)
761
 III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 40 see No. IVa.
2) U 607 sighted two funneled boat (Bretanic class) in BE 1279, 200 ,
18 knots.
3) U 130 sank Norwegian vessel "Mirlo" (7,455 GRT) in ES 5198,
course 1100 , from Trinidad to Freetown.
4) U 109 sank English vessel "Vimeira" (5,728 GRT) in ER 3611,
course 1100, 10 knots.
5) U 373 was bombed by a Sunderland in BE 5296. No damage.
6) U 595 had to break off pursuit of two funneled steamer in AL 8448
because of speed restriction - 10 knots.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DO 7889 - DB 9799 - CC 5556 - EE 4744 - CA 86.
Plane attacked submarine with depth charges in BF 4960. Probably no
hits.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 40:
During the morning all boats took the southerly course ordered. None
was able to make further attacks. U 660 reported that before he attacked
in poor visibility he made out about 15 ships. The convoy operation was
then wound up. Group "Steinbrink" was dissolved. Those boats that were
still operationally serviceable joined Group "Loss" (see under b) for orders
for this group).
For summing up of the convoy operation see para VI.
b) 1) U 594 - 653 - 214 - 135 - 406 - 566 were given square CF 84 as
operational area. These boats are to rake the area to the south. Target:
picking up the "SL" or "OS" convoys.
2) U 593 - 660 - 605 - 176 - 705 - 438 - 174 - 569 - 256 - 578 - 373,
forming Group "Loss", were ordered to proceed at economical cruising
speed, in the order given, to occupy the patrol strip from AL 1955 to AL
8165, width 12 miles. They were to attack convoys between England and
America.
c) - d) None.
762
V. Reports of Success:
U 130 1 ship 7,455 GRT sunk
109 1 ship 5,728 GRT "
VI. General:
Summing up of Convoy No. 40:
At first 9 boats took part in the convoy attack. ( U 210 - 607
- 86 -
454 - 593 - 71 - 597 - 704 - 379 - 595). In the course of the operation
another 8 boats joined in.
1) The following are believed lost:
U 210, last report 6.8. Requested beacon signals from shadower.
U 379, last report 8.8. "Am being forced away by destroyer".
U 335, nothing known of participation of U 335. Boat was probably
sunk by bomb hit when navigating the Straits of Iceland.
U 210, U 379 were lost at a time when fog and heavy squalls of rain
made operations very difficult. Constant changes in visibility bring the
danger of sudden surprise and such rapid use of depth charges that the
submarine cannot always submerge deep enough in time. Several boats
reported fierce depth charge attacks after suddenly being surprised.
2) The following were damaged by depth charges and had to turn back:
U 454, ran into a corvette in fog damage from depth charges prevented
it from deep diving.
U 704, oil bunker leaking inwardly.
 U 595, steering gear sticking at 15 on top.
Slight damage was suffered by: U 176, 607, 597, 593.
3) These losses are off-set by success as follows:
Lost: 2 or 3 boats, they sank 6 ships totaling 41,000 GRT;
Damaged: 3 boats, which torpedoed 4 ships and 1 destroyer.
Slightly damaged, 5 boats.
The sinkings reported are not absolutely certain; they are probably
actually higher as only in a few cases could the boats remain close enough
to observe sinkings. At first sight this result appears poor, as a loss of
three boats is not tolerable for such sinkings. However, the following
must be taken into account:
a) With the exception of one boat (U 607) only young commanders with
no experience of convoy attacks operated against the convoy.
b) Unfavorable weather for the first 3 days.
c) More powerful escort than usual, partly strong air escort.
d) 9 boats attacked. Accountable misses (probably fire control mistakes
and other miscalculations caused by the excitement of the first attack)
prevented greater success:
The fact that boats were able to press home the attack
- 87 -
despite powerful escorts should be taken into account when assessing
further convoy attacks.
Another important fact has been established - that several boats
successfully carried out an attack by day.
763
Cape Town Operation:
U 68, U 504, U 172, U 156 will leave in the period 16-19.8. for an
operation in company with U 459 (Submarine tanker) off Cape Town.
(See operational order "Eisbar"). Permission to attack merchant shipping
in Southern Atlantic to 150 was considered necessary, but Naval War Staff
feared that such attacks would ruin the chances of a surprise attack off
Cape Town. Thus, permission was not requested by B.d.U.
B.d.U. holds the following views:
1) Strategic pressure alone is not sufficient, only sinkings count.
2) Contrary to Naval War Staff, B.d.U. does not consider that the
appearance of submarines as far south as the St. Helena area (150 South)
would cause the English to suspect an attack off Cape Town and therefore,
stiffen their A/S defenses.
a) Submarines have already operated off St. Helena.
b) Distance from St. Helena to Cape Town is about 1,700 miles, the
distance from Madeira to Freetown.
c) B.d.U. considers that previous experience shows that the enemy does
not change his routes much because of submarine attacks. Also he will not
be able to find an alternative for Cape Town as bunkering station at short
notice.
3) If it is considered that strategic pressure is the main end of submarine
operations and if attacks south of the Equator to 150 South achieve this
end, there is no point in going to Cape Town at all.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
12.August 1942.
I. U 43 - BE 85 U 163 - DD 65 U 461 - BE 84 U 582 - Off Brest
66 - EE-Op 164 - DO 33 462 - CC 92 590 - BF 50
71 - BE 24 165 - AE 47 463 - DO 33 593 - AL 42
84 - BF 40 171 - DB-Op 464 - Bergen 594 - BD 98
86 - CB CA-Op 173 - EC plus 505 - DE 53 595 - AL 88
89 - BD 44 174 - AE 40 50 506 - DT 92 596 - AE 83
 94 - CD 56 176 - AL 52 507 - FC 55 597 - AL 21
98 - DB 39-Op 210 - AL 40 50 508 - DM 90 598 - DN-Op
108 - EE EO-Op 214 - BE 95 509 - EC 69 600 - DN 91
109 - ES 39-Op 217 - DO 33 510 - EO EP-Op 604 - AE 83
116 - DU 41 254 - AL 91 511 - DO 32 605 - AL 52
125 - DT 91 256 - AL 40 50 513 - AE 47 607 - AL 88
129 - CE 19 333 - BF 99 517 - AN 20 609 - AE-Op
130 - ES 46-Op 335 - AL 40 50 552 - BF 40 653 - BE 97
132 - BE 73 373 - BE 27 553 - DD 81 654 - ES 12
134 - DO 33 379 - AL 40 50 558 - CD 75 658 - DN-Op
135 - BE 90 406 - BF 72 564 - EE plus 660 - AL 44
154 - DF 14 437 - St. Nazaire 566 - BE 79 704 - BE 16
- 88 -
155 - BO-Op 438 - AL 45 569 - BE 18 705 - AL 51
157 - BF 454 - BE 54 572 - ET 57-Op 752 - ET-Op
160 - DR 29 458 - AL 40 50 578 - BE 25 754 - CA-Op
162 - EE EO-Op 755 - AE 83
On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 84 - 89 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 - 154 -
160 - 254 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 552 - 593 - 595 - 507 - 607 - 704.
Entered Port: U 582 - Brest; U 437 - St. Nazaire; U 380 - Trondheim.
Sailed: U 515 - 92 - 514 - 516 - Kiel.
764
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 437 reported thick periscope (enemy) sighted in BF 6497.
2) U 505 - returning - sighted a passenger freighter in DE 3583, course
00, 18 knots.
3) U 86: On 6.8. left auxiliary sailing vessel "Gawaloma" on fire and
sinking in CC 45. Nothing else sighted except neutral ships.
4) U 609 situation report: Nothing seen from AD 5990 to AE 4753
other than 2 patrol vessels and 1 motor torpedo boat. Much fog. Was
moving operational area to AE 7130, as observed in old area.
5) U 593 turned back because of breakdown of port Diesel.
6) U 66 sank "Rosewie" (766 GRT) on 6.8. in EE 8717, course 3050
from Trinidad to New York. Armament, 3 machine guns, 15 cm cannon.
On 7.8. sighted "Rio Primero" in EE 8738, course 1200. Nothing more
seen.
7) U 509 situation report: Traffic at intervals suspected from DL 68 via
DM 79 to the Windward Passage. Nothing seen in EB 21 and 37 up to EC
44 and 54. N-S and E-W traffic through the center of the Caribbean
unlikely.
8) Convoy No. 41:
U 658 sighted convoy in DN 7656, varying course, speed 8 knots, 24
ships. Boat suspected convoy assembly point, sank tanker (9,000 GRT)
and scored another hit.
U 600 reported that he was stalking convoy.
9) U 155 sank Dutch vessel "Curacao" (383 GRT) by gunfire on 10.8.
in EO 62, course west. Boat accounted for two previously reported pistol
failures and assumed a two acute angle of impact, as enemy turned away
after torpedo was fired.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DM 61 - DN 47 - DC 1225 - ED 59 - ED 94 - DD
88.
Sighted by planes: BF 4324 - BF 5710.
- 89 -
 658 1 ship (10,000 GRT)
658 one hit (later sunk, see War Diary for 13.8.
155 sank 1 ship (383 GRT).

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

Plane reported: "Am watching dingy in BF 4320 or BF 1926". 13.August 1942.

Submarine attack in DM 27.
d) None.
I. U 43 - BE 92 U 160 - DR 33 U 463 - DO 30 U 578 - BE 20
IV. Current Operations: 66 - Op(EE) 162 - Op(EE) 464 - Bergen 590 - BF 80
a) None. 71 - BE 53 163 - DD 83 505 - DF 14 593 - AL 48
b) 1) U 596 - 604 - 755 were given new area AK 03. Boats to extend 84 - BF 164 - DO 30 506 - EJ 33 594 - CF 18
previous patrol strips to the north on 11.8. 86 - Op(CA) 165 - AE 91 507 - Op 595 - BE 25
2) For the present the position in the patrol strip left empty by the return 89 - BD 46 171 - Op(DA) 508 - Op(DM) 596 - AE 87
of U 593 will remain unmanned. 92 - AO 40 173 - Op(EO) 509 - EC 68 597 - AL 98
3) U 135 and 333 were also ordered to make for AK 96; U 590 for CE 94 - CD 73 174 - Op(AL) 510 - Op(EO) 598 - Op(DM)
84; U 164 and 217 to ED 11 after being supplied. 98 - Op(DM) 176 - Op(AL) 511 - DO 30 600 - DN 82
4) U 508 was given a free hand (formerly Straits of Florida). 108 - Op(EE) 214 - CF 23 513 - AE 91 604 - AE 88
5) U 98 was ordered to remain off Hatteras outside the 200 meter line. 109 - Op(DF) 217 - DO 30 514 - AO 40 605 - Op(AL)
c) None.
d) 1) Area in a radius of 9 miles from DB 5697 upper right hand corner is
barred because of own mines.
2) For loss of U 210 - 335 - 379 see summary "Convoy No. 40" on 11.8. - 90 -
para VI.
3) Former cancellation of permission to attack single ships in area
"Route Anton" south of 200 North is no longer valid. "See War Diary of
9.8. para IVd1).
It is still permissible to attack south of 200 North to 50 South. Eastern
boundary between 0 and 50 South is 200 West.

V. Reports of Success:
U 86 sank one auxiliary sailing vessel
66 " 1 ship (7,66 GRT) 116 - DT 11 254 - BE 22 515 - AO 40 607 - BE 26
765
 125 - EJ 32 256 - Op(AL) 516 - AO 40 609 - Op(AE)
129 - CE 23 333 - BF 80 517 - AF 72 653 - CF 34
130 - Op(ET) 373 - AL 88 552 - BF 654 - EB 63
132 - BE 92 406 - BE 90 553 - DD 78 658 - Op(DN)
134 - DD 89 438 - Op(AL) 558 - CC 99 660 - Op(AL)
135 - BE 64 454 - BE 83 564 - Op(EE) 704 - BE 29
154 - CD 88 458 - Op(CB) 566 - CF 28 705 - Op(AL)
155 - Op(ED) 461 - BE 83 569 - AL 87 752 - Op(DH)
157 - BF 462 - CC 89 572 - Op(ET) 754 - Op(CA)
755 - AK 03
On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 89 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 - 154 - 160 -
254 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 593 - 595 - 597 - 607 - 704 - 84 - 552.
Entered Port: U 84 - Brest; U 552 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 41 see para. IVa.
2) U 162 situation report: Nothing sighted in sector EE 79 - ED 99 - EE
71 including Passage, except strong air patrols between ED 99 and EE 71.
Change of route assumed. Intended operating in northern sector round ED
98.
3) U 508 situation report: Brisk convoy traffic west and south in DM
1866 - 2755 moderate seas, strong air patrols. On 12.8. day attack made in
DM 2748 on convoy of 4 ships, 3 destroyers and 2 flying boats, course
2200, 8 knots. Hits certain on 2 ships. Heard to sink. 1 miss, 1 barrel
dud. "Bolde" (Trans. radar decoy) used with success when chased.
4) U 171 sank tanker (11,000 GRT) in DA 9192, course 2600.
5) U 600 sank English cargo sailing ship on 10.8. in DN 6937 with
gunfire.
6) U 98 situation report: 10.8. destroyer, 2 patrols, in DB 6467 on
southerly course.
766
13.8. convoy seen through periscope at dusk in DB 3689. 6 steamers,
a destroyer astern, southerly course, 6-8 knots, contact lost in darkness.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 31 - DD 8846 - DA 76 - DM 19 - ED 94.
Sighted by planes: DE 9234 - AL 9152. Plane attacked.
Submarine in DN 8280. Submarine attacks: DA 91 - DN 84 - DN 76.
Steamer "California" (5,441 GRT) shelled by submarine in ER 24.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 41:
- 91 -
At 1058 U 598 requested details of convoy. 1300 U 658 lost contact
and reported convoy scattered. When closing for attack forced off by
corvette. One hit observed. Hit reported yesterday on 8,000 GRT
freighter probably sank vessel. U 600 came upon convoy in DN 7663,
sank 2 freighters (14,000 GRT) also observed one hit, one explosion heard.
Subsequently forced to submerge by destroyers and air escort, contact lost.
Boat followed up and requested instructions whether search should be
continued during darkness. Immediately afterwards U 598 sighted the
convoy at 0100 in DN 7376, course 300. Last shadower report from DN
7231 at 0523. Enemy steered zig-zag course of 2900. Pursuit continued.
b) Group "Loss" According to a high grade Radio Intercept a convoy on
a westerly course was in AL 5112 at 1200. Patrol strips were narrowed to
pick it up. U 438 - 174 - 256 proceeded to N.W. and manned gaps in strips
between U 660 - 605 - 176 and 705. Operation was carried out on the
assumption that the radio intercept was completely reliable. As convoy
was not picked up by 2400, Group "Loss" moved away on a course of
2600 8 knots to prevent convoy passing the patrol strip during the night.
From 0800 on 14.8. boats remained in the patrol area. U 569 and U 373
extended the strip to the south.
c) U 217 - 164 - 134 refueled from U 463. U 511 took Junkers
compressor section 2 and 3 on board.
d) 1) Kingston is the assembly area for ships forming a subsidiary convoy
to join the main Florida-Trinidad convoy. Boats have been informed.
2) U 157 last reported his position in DN 73 on 10.6.42. Boat was
operating off New Orleans. As several submarines and submarine attacks
have been reported in this area and U 67 suspected the presence of another
boat (see War Diary for 1.7.42.) it is quite possible that his radio has
broken down. U 157 was therefore considered to be operating until fuel
and provisions were calculated to be exhausted. Boat had not reported
again. It must be presumed lost.
V. Reports of Success:
U 508 2 ships 1,500 GRT, 1800 (Press report) sunk
171 1 tanker 11,000 GRT sunk
658 1 ship 8,000 GRT probably sunk
600 1 aux. sailing ship sunk
600 2 freighters 14,000 GRT sunk
600 1 hit, 1 detonation heard
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
14.August 1942.
I. U 43 - BF 49 U 163 - DD 87 U 464 - Bergen U 593 - AL 97
66 - Op(EE) 164 - DO 56 505 - DF 13 594 - CF 49
71 - BE 65 165 - AE 85 506 - DJ 63 595 - BE 61
86 - Op(CB) 171 - Op(DB) 507 - Op(FC) 596 - AL 24
767
89 - BD 56 173 - Op(EO) 508 - Op(DM) 597 - BE 35
92 - AN 30 174 - Op(AL) 509 - ED 48 598 - Op(DN)
94 - CD 74 176 - Op(AL) 510 - Op(EO) 600 - Op(DN 84)
98 - Op(DB) 214 - CF 37 511 - DO 33 604 - AL 24
108 - Op(EE) 217 - DO 64 513 - AE 85 605 - Op(AL)
109 - Op(ES) 254 - BE 29 514 - AN 30 607 - BE 62
116 - DH 81 256 - Op(AL) 515 - AN 30 609 - Op(AE)
125 - EJ 62 333 - BF 48 516 - AN 30 653 - CF 53
129 - CE 33 373 - Op(AL) 517 - AE 69 654 - Op(EB)
- 92 -
130 - Op(ET) 406 - CC 11 553 - DO 12 658 - Op(DN)
132 - BF 40 438 - Op(AL) 558 - DE 43 660 - Op(AL)
134 - DD 95 454 - BE 93 564 - Op(EE) 704 - BE 69
135 - BE 29 458 - Op(BB) 566 - CF 57 705 - Op(AL)
154 - CD 94 461 - BE 93 569 - Op(AL) 752 - Op(ET)
155 - Op(EO) 462 - DE 16 572 - Op(ET) 754 - Op(CA)
160 - DF 93 463 - DO 33 578 - BE 25 755 - AL 22
162 - Op(EE) 590 - BF 76
On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 89 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 - 154 - 160 -
254 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 593 - 595 - 597 - 607 - 704.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 41 or 42 see para IVa.
2) U 458 situation report: Coastal tanker (3,000 GRT) sunk on 5.8. in
BB 8682, course 255. Nothing sighted on cruise from Cape Spear on
southerly course along the coast, steamer convoy heard, returning home.
3) U 43 reported periscope in BF 4964, and U 132 reported a thick
periscope in BF 7376.
4) U 154 sighted aircraft on westerly course in CD 6912.
5) U 165 was attacked with bombs in AL 3182, no damage.
6) U 511 requested southern half of EB 49. Slight damage from depth
charges.
7) U 135 attacked by plane in BF 49. Slight damage from depth
charges. 2 men killed by gunfire.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AL 5748 - BB 4265 - DM 19 - AL 81 - BB 5482 -
DA 7668.
Plane reports: AE 7221 - AL 3254 - AL 8111.
Submarine attack: DN 47.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 41: At 1315 U 658 requested beacon signals from DN
4795. As no boat had reported contact, it was possible that a radio
message to this effect was not heard here. U 658 was picked up by
destroyers and hunted for 3 hours. At 1540 he supposed convoy to be on a
course of 2800 according to hydrophone bearing. When he requested
instructions, he was told to continue pursuit as long as the sea and air
escort permitted any opportunity of getting ahead and attacking. At 1200
U 598 attacked convoy in DD 4781 and in a surface attack scored 2 hits on
a ship of "San Melito" class. Then forced to submerge for 8 hours.
Convoy was on a course of 2900. Besides
- 93 -
768
other ships, there were 15 tankers. At dusk U 658 decided that
further searching was useless and broke off pursuit; in DN 4781 sighted
patches of oil and bits of wreckage. It could therefore be assumed that the
boat torpedoed by U 598 sank.
2) Convoy No. 42: While en route to the new patrol strip (see para.
IVb) U 705 sighted an enemy convoy on N.W. course in AL 4812, but he
later reported that it consisted of a cruiser and 4 destroyers. The
assumption that this was the expected convoy "ONS 120" was not borne
out by later reports from the boats. 0106 U 705 reported several
silhouettes in AL 4548 on a N.E. course. Immediately afterwards U 256
sighted the convoy on N.W. course in AL 4493. Group "Loss" and U 596,
755, 604 were ordered to stalk it. Convoy consisted of 4 to 6 steamers, so
far only 1 destroyer distinguished. 0358 U 705 sighted a convoy on a N.E.
course in AL 4527 and was able to distinguish about 4 steamers as well as
4 destroyers. Submarine fired spread of two at a large freighter, 2 hits
observed. Contact was lost after this attack. Both reports must refer to the
same convoy which was making large zig-zags to the north.
U 373, which was also stalking the convoy, was forced to submerge by
a corvette at 2131 in AL 8126. 2330 U 569 reported a large two funneled
passenger vessel with 2 destroyers in AL 4549, course 100, high speed.
Probably not part of the convoy. U 438 contacted the enemy in AL 4543
but was forced to move away. U 605 fired a single miss at a 2,000 tonner
that was zig-zagging. It was co-operating with small vessels. The
operation was continued.
b) 1) Before Group "Loss" contacted the convoy, it had been ordered to
proceed in the following order: U 660 - 438 - 605 - 174 - 176 - 256 - 705 -
569 - 373 - 135, at cruising speed to take up patrol positions from AL 1994
to AL 8165.
2) U 594 - 566 - 653 - 214 - 406 - 590 were collected together to make
Group "Bluecher". It is intended that these boats shall man a patrol strip
to the south to intercept single ships and convoys, more submarines are to
join the group later.
Until the last boat arrives the attack areas will be a distributed as
follows: U 594 - CE 93 - 96; U 566 - CF 72 and 75; U 653 - CF 73 and
76; U 214 - CF 81 and 84; U 406 - CF 82 and 85.
3) U 507 was directed to attack shipping off Georgetown. This harbor is
reported to be a bunker station and convoy assembly point for convoys and
independent ships proceeding from Trinidad to Cape Town.
c) None.
d) 1) Several sighting reports give rise to the suspicion that enemy
submarine activity in the Bay of Biscay is increasing. Boats are warned to
take special care.
2) U 578 left St. Nazaire on 6.8. and was convoyed as far as point
"Morgen". Since then the boat has not made a passage
- 94 -
report as ordered, nor answered to several calls. Loss must be
assumed. No clue is available to show whether it was destroyed by a
plane or submarine. It is presumed that it was sunk by bombing.
V. Reports of Success:
U 458 tanker 3,000 GRT sunk
769
598 ship (2 hits) 12,286 GRT sunk
705 freighter (2 hits) 8,000 GRT sunk
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
15.August 1942.
I. U 43 - BF 43 U 163 - DO 24 U 464 - AF 72 U 593 - BE 17
66 - Op(EE) 164 - DO 57 505 - CD 86 594 - Op(CF)
71 - BF 60 165 - AL 24 506 - EJ 69 595 - BE 66
86 - Op(CB) 171 - Op(DB) 507 - Op(FC) 596 - AL 41
89 - BD 65 173 - Op(EO) 508 - Op(DM) 597 - BE 66
92 - AN 20 174 - Op(AL) 509 - ED 82 598 - Op(DM)
94 - DE 31 176 - Op(AL) 510 - Op(EO) 600 - Op(DL)
98 - Op(CA) 214 - CF 58 511 - DO 28 604 - AL 18
108 - Op(EE) 217 - DO 58 513 - AL 32 605 - Op(AL)
109 - Op(ES) 254 - BE 64 514 - AN 20 607 - BF 44
116 - DH 52 256 - Op(AL) 515 - AN 20 609 - Op(AE)
125 - EJ 68 333 - CF 30 516 - AN 20 653 - Op(CF)
129 - BE 79 373 - Op(AL) 517 - AE 83 654 - Op(EB)
130 - Op(ET) 406 - CF 30 553 - DN 39 658 - Op(DM)
132 - BF 73 438 - Op(AL) 558 - DE 43 660 - Op(AL)
134 - DE 71 454 - BF 40 564 - Op(EO) 704 - BE 69
135 - BE 16 458 - Op(CB) 566 - Op(CF) 705 - Op(AL)
154 - CE 44 461 - BF 70 569 - Op(AL) 752 - Op(ET)
155 - Op(EO) 462 - DE 18 572 - Op(ET) 754 - Op(CA)
160 - DC 48 463 - DE 95 590 - BF 70 755 - AL 18
162 - Op(EE)
On Return Passage: U 89 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 254 - 454
- 461 - 505 - 593 - 595 - 597 - 607 - 704.
Entered Port: U 71 - St. Nazaire; U 43 - Lorient.
 Sailed: U 659 - 407 - 512 - 756 - 179 - 91 - 175 - Kiel; U 107 - Lorient; Further reports from boats in this area mention only single ships. 1153
U 432 - La Pallice. U 256 stalked 1 ship in AL 4271, course 00, large zig-zags.
U 605 reported steamer taking bearings in AL 4169 on a course of
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. 3400; "Sperrbrecher" class. As no further convoy reports were received
the operation was broken off about 1800. Group "Loss" returned to patrol
III. Reports on the Enemy: strip ordered on 14.8. In addition, attack areas with a width of 25 miles
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 41 and 42 see para. IVa. were manned as follows: U 604 - AK 6915; U 755 - AK 6935; U 596 -
2) U 164 situation report: Little air patrolling in Mona Passage, light AK 6995.
burning. No shipping in EC 3957. At 1904 report was received that U 176 had been in contact since 1645
3) U 163 attacked by flying boats on 12 and 13 August in DD 88 and in AL 0141 with a steamer and destroyer; course 00, low speed. Boat was
DO 23. ordered to continue stalking, but lost contact in dusk and heavy seas and
4) U 108 15.8. 34 bombs in EO tanker on westerly course seen in EO after searching in vain continued on its way to patrol area.
37; air patrolling. b) Attack areas were ordered for following boats:
5) U 173 in EE 82, 83, 85 and 86 for 4 days but nothing sighted. 15.8. U 164 - area in a 150 mile radius round Aruba. Most important area
slight air activity in EE 87. Intended operating from EO 21 to EE 88. there and Curacao.
b) None. U 125 - square EV. Main emphasis on 7310 and 6566.
c) Submarine sightings: EO 34 - ED 98 - DA 92 - DM 13 - DM 1968. U 506 - sea area within a line from EU 73 via FF 11 - FF 27 to EU 92.
d) None. A free hand is given for a short operation off Freetown.
U 600 - DM 10 and 20 and south of them, in accordance with situation
- 95 - report from 508.
U 511 - EB 30 and EC 10.
c) New areas: U 165 and U 513 - DE 10; U 217 - EC 96.
d) None.

V. Reports of Success: None.

(Signed): DÖNITZ.

IV. Current Operations: ---------------------------------------------------

a) 1) Convoy No. 41: ---------------
U 598 was the only boat still stalking the convoy 2000 contacted
destroyer in DM 5371, and at 0130 suspected starboard side escort in DM B.d.U. 1 August 1942
5246, course 2900. No further reports were received by morning. Ref. No.GKdos/3181/A2
2) Convoy No. 42:

770
Top Secret! American units have been observed all over the area. Their presence is
also connected with important convoys.
Supplementary Order "Eisbär" for Operational Order No. 52 Recently only 2 auxiliary cruisers have been observed as naval patrols.
6) Enemy Merchant Shipping in Cape Town - Freetown area.
A) U 68, U 156, U 172, U 504 form Group "Eisbär". U 459 is to be Enemy tonnage in this area:
attached to Group "Eisbär". Cape Town - Freetown direct:
143 ships totaling 935,000 GRT.
via Gulf of Guinea:
- 96 - 54 ships totaling 239,000 GRT.
Freetown shipping volume:
About 106 ships pass monthly from both directions.
Cape Town shipping volume:
About 201 ships in each direction.
Apart from valuable transport convoys single ships run between Cape
Town and Freetown.
Ships sailing to England are made up into convoys in Freetown,
convoys coming from England are mostly dispersed there.
Single ships follow widely scattered courses. No convergence has been
observed, other than just outside the
B) Task:
1) Surprise attack on enemy shipping off Cape Town.
2) While en route between Biscay and Cape Town area attacks to be - 97 -
made on enemy merchant and naval vessels.
3) Behavior as set out in standing orders and special instructions from
B.d.U.
4) Left free.

C) Information about the Enemy:

5) English warships in West African area between Cape Town and
Freetown.
In Freetown area: 4 cruisers, 3 auxiliary cruisers, 4 destroyers
In Cape area: 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, several gun goats and A/S vessels. harbor.
A few of the routes used by single ships plying between South Africa
Battleships, aircraft carriers and other escort vessels must also be and America lie inside the line Cape Town - Freetown.
expected in conjunction with important transport convoys that use this Besides Cape Town and Freetown the following may also be regarded
route. as important harbors in this area:
771
 Lagos Takoradi - 98 -
Lobito Matadi
Point Noire Whole Bay
Duala

There is no information available about the shipping volume in these

harbors.
Point Noire has often been named as terminal harbor for American
convoys.
Captured documents show that enemy merchant shipping make for a
point 340 14' 12" South, 170 38' 12" East when entering Cape Town, from through this sea area must be taken into account.
there it continues on a course of 600 via a swept channel to 330 53' 00"
South, 180 22' 00" East, then 900 to 330 53' 00" South, 180 25' 40" East, D) Mines:
then 1400 to 330 54' 00" South, 180 26' 40" East. 7) Own mines off Cape Town inside points:
These routing instructions also state that enemy mines lie on either side a) 330 48' S, 170 33.8' E.
of the swept channel, and that enemy mines are known to be in the area in b) 330 40' S, 170 49.4' E.
a 20 mile radius from Dassen Island Lighthouse. c) 330 40' S, 180 01.6' E.
All lights, light buoys and radio beacons will be downed without d) 330 57' S, 180 04.5' E.
warning when there is imminent danger. e) 340 11' S, 170 59.4' E.
According to an Italian report, convoys and single ships proceeding f) 340 20.2' S, 170 47.7' E.
from Cape Town to the Indian Ocean are to use Route "R 6" which was 8) According to information given June 1940 enemy mines lie off Cape
established at the end of May 1942. It runs over the following points: Town:
340 10' S, 180 00' E; 370 (35 or 40') S, 190 45' E; East of long. 180 10' E.
370 (35 or 40') S, 21 50' E; 340 00' S, 280 50' E; North of lat. 330 49.3' N.
310 50 S, 310 35' E; 300 50' S, 310 45' E. so that Robden Island lies in this minefield.
9) Before mines were laid in the area as stated in para. 7, there was a
Defenses: channel from point 330 54' S, 180 26.7 E in direction 3200, 1.3 miles.
According to an agent's report, patrolling in Cape Town area is carried From here in the direction 2700 22.5 miles to point 330 53' S, 170 59' E.
out by 6 destroyers and several guard boats. This information is Width of lane 2 miles.
unconfirmed. 10) Own mines off Cape Agulhas inside the points:
Air and sea patrols must be expected off the entire coast of West Africa. a) 330 47' S, 190 14' E.
Enemy Submarines: b) 360 58' S, 200 18' E.
Submarine bases in this area are not known and very probably do not c) 360 21' S, 220 23' E.
exist. The presence of enemy submarines passing d) 350 10' S, 210 20' E.
and north from these points as far as the coast between long. 190 49' E
and 200 30' E.
772
 11) Left free.
E) Execution after approach and refueling is to begin with a surprise
attack by U 156 and U 172 on the roadsteads off Cape Town. Boats will
be guided largely by their own observations. Orders for the period
following the commencement of the campaign cannot be given because of
lack of information.
Special Instructions:
12) Boats are all to enter the patrol strip to the south together as ordered
by radio. U 459 as look-out; boat is not to shadow enemy, is to make off if
enemy is contacted, and is to continue on its way.
- 99 -
13) While approaching 200 South there are no restrictions on attack
excepting such as apply to Route "A", or are laid down in standing orders.
If appropriate, attacks on single ships on Route "A", or outside the 300
mile coastal zone, will be sanctioned by radio.
14) Beyond 200 south until the first attack as set out in para. 19, only
battleships; aircraft carriers and troop transports of over 20,000 GRT may
be attacked.
For the same period: RADIO SILENCE!
15) Submarines will refuel from U 459 in Naval Grid Square GG 1999.
Time will be fixed by radio message. Beacon signals are permitted only if
boats do not succeed in finding the rendezvous within 3 days of the time
ordered. U 459 will supply fuel etc. in equal quantities to all boats and
will retain only sufficient for his own return journey. He will then make
773
for home and will report the reserves of the boats when 500 miles from the
refueling point. U 459 will then return to home port.
16) If possible, U 156 and U 172 will be the first to refuel. They will
arrange the time for the first attack on Capetown roadsteads. The other
two boats must be informed of this time. No radio may be used.
17) After refueling, boats will proceed singly to the attack area off Cape
Town. The success of the attack on the roadsteads depends on remaining
undetected. Attack is therefore, permitted only in accordance with para.
14.
18) Left free.
F) 19) Orders for the first attack on Cape Town Roadsteads by U 156 and
U 172.
a) After previous reconnaissance, the boats are to move up to the
roadsteads at the appointed time. Up to 50 ships lie there at anchor at the
same time.
b) If the attack does not succeed at the time fixed, it is to be repeated 24
hours later. If it still does not succeed, both boats are free to make further
attempts or to move away to the attack areas according to para. 20b).
c) For 30 hours after the time fixed, both parts are free to attack only on
Cape Town Roadstead or targets as specified in para. 14. After these 30
hours attack is unrestricted.
d) Successful attacks on Cape Town Roadsteads are to be reported
immediately by radio. These reports give the other boats permission to
attack.
- 100 -

20) Orders for the first attack by U 68 and U 504.
a) Until the first report or observation of an attack on the Capetown
Roadsteads or for 30 hours after the time set for an attack on Cape Town
Roadsteads attack is permitted only according to para. 14! Subsequently
attack is unrestricted. Use of time before attack is allowed for observation.
Remain undetected!
b) First attack areas:
U 68 S.W., S.E. of own mined area as given in para. 7. Main area is
off the approach point 340 14' 02" S, 170 38' 02" E, also between the Cape
and the southern point of the mined area.
U 504 N.E., N. of this mined area. Concentration point for supposed
traffic between minefields as given in paras. 7. and 8.
c) Report situation as soon as definitely detected through attacks, or if
attacks by U 156 and 172 are observed or reported.
21) Further Behavior:
a) U 156 and U 172 will first proceed to the attack area as given in para.
20.6. once the attack on the roadsteads has succeeded or failed.
U 156 to go to attack area for U 68.
U 172 to go to attack area for U 504.
b) If after several days observation these areas promise no success, all
boats have a free hand as far as and including the Cape Agulhas area.
22) Return home when situation demands. Refueling can be reckoned on
only after it has been requested and confirmed.
Miscellaneous:
23) It is intended to use type IXD 2 boats off the east coast of Africa.
They will be supplied with this order.
G) Communications instructions:
24) The instructions and hints given in Operational Order No. 52 para.
27 - 31 apply so far as they do not clash with the instructions about radio
silence etc. given in the supplementary order.
25) A few weeks after the requirements in regard to gear and personnel
have been organized the "Africa" service will come into operation for
communicating with boats operating in the South Atlantic. The rough
774
draft of the order is enclosed. Any alterations that become necessary will
be ordered by radio.
- 101 -
26) Little experience has been had in radio communications with
submarines in the Southern Atlantic. Therefore the cooperation of the
boats is very necessary:
a) They should do everything possible to receive all messages sent.
b) Radio service "Bruno" and alternative frequencies should be used to
transmit radio messages, especially if there is no communication on the
"Africa" service frequencies.
c) Radio link service and the use of the possibilities for this provided by
the Submarine-Group-Service (Standing Order No. 207) must be carried
out. Radio traffic on Submarine-Group-Service is only a makeshift,
attempts must always be made to communicate with home and pass
reports to Operational Control.
d) Experience of reception conditions are exceptionally important to
assist the control station in passing and repeating radio messages, thus,
when sending messages report observations, or use short signals for this
purpose. Such data is also important for making any necessary
improvements in the "Africa" service.
27) Cypher material must be carried to cover the longest possibly
operational period, also extracts from frequency plane "Anton" to
"Caesar", January 1942 edition.
28) Attention is drawn to the exchange of recognition signals outside the
European area according to Recognition Signal Regulation para. 110, and
also to the extract from Recognition Signal Instructions for Overseas
(Standing Order No. 222). wave. The same communications with the same series number will be
29) When operating in shallow water the destruction of confidential transmitted on all waves of the service.
books must be prepared documents printed with soluble ink must be stored (Division of communications on "Africa 1" and "Africa 2" from time to
so that water can penetrate. (See also Standing Order No. 231, para. B). time is not intended for the present).
All current short waves of the "Africa" service may be used as
transmitting wave lengths by all boats at sea.
(Signed): DÖNITZ.
3) Wavelengths and Routing Times:
--------------------------------------------------- a) Short waves: see schedule enclosure 1.
--------------- b) Very long wave: Bordeaux: 19,150 meters - 15.66 kc/s
Reserve Paris 1: 19,710 meters - 15.22 kc/s.
Draft for Enclosure for Supplementary Order for "Eisbär". Routing Times:
0500 - 0600
Standing Order from B.d.U. No. 204 0900 - 1000
1130 - 1200
Communications Instructions 1400 - 1500
1700 - 1800
Submarine Atlantic Service 3 2300 - 0100 - Nightcall
("Atlantic" Service)
All messages sent during the past 24 hours will be repeated at night-call.
1) "Africa" service is intended for radio traffic between Operational
Control and boats operating in the Southern Atlantic 4) Series Nos. 401 - 500.

2) "Africa" Service comprises 2 short waves and 1 long 5) Routine acknowledgement of short signals and short weather reports
by repeating the signal proceeded by the time of intercept.

- 102 -
(Signed): DÖNITZ.

775
 10 - 11 - 13,767 Kc/s
11 - 12
12 - 13
13 - 14
- 103 -
14 - 15
15 - 16 i q - 15,45 m s o - 19,16 m
16 - 17 - 19,420 Kc/s - 15,655 Kc/s
17 - 18

18 - 19
19 - 20
20 - 21 c g - 21,79 m c b - 27,73 m
21 - 22 - 13,767 Kc/s - 10,817 Kc/s
CONFIDENTIAL 22 - 23
23 - 24
Enclosure 1 for Standing Order No. 204

Shortwave schedule for submarine Atlantic Service 3. Control: Naval Radio Station Villecresnes.
(Service "Africa") Following are keeping receiving watch:

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

German Standard Time Africa 1 Africa 2
16 - 31 August 1942
00 - 01
01 - 02 PG30310b
02 - 03 r a - 38,24 m
03 - 04 - 7845 Kc/s
04 - 05
05 - 06 16.August 1942.
c b - 27,73 m
06 - 07 - 10,818 Kc/s
07 - 08 I. U 66 - Op(EE) U 164 - EC 62 U 463 - DE 71 U 593 - BE 52
08 - 09 86 - Op(CA) 165 - AL 27 464 - AE 69 594 - Op(CF)
09 - 10 c g - 21,79 m 89 - BE 18 171 - Op(DB) 505 - CE 74 595 - BF 50
776
 91 - AO 40 173 - Op(EO) 506 - EK 77 596 - AL 44
92 - AF 80 174 - AL 45-Op 507 - Op(FC) 597 - BF 50
94 - DE 25 175 - AO 40 508 - Op(DM) 598 - Op(DM)
98 - Op(CA) 176 - AL 18-Op 509 - ED 92 600 - Op(DM)
107 - BF 50 179 - AO 40 510 - Op(EO) 604 - AL 41
108 - Op(EE) 214 - Op(CF) 511 - DO 45 605 - AL 42-Op
109 - Op(DF) 217 - DO 76 512 - AO 40 607 - BF 60
116 - DH 22 254 - BF 40 513 - AL 27 609 - Op(AE)
125 - EJ 99 256 - AL 45-Op 514 - AF 80 653 - Op(CF)
129 - BE 94 333 - BE 62 515 - AF 80 654 - Op(EB)
130 - Op(ET) 373 - Op(AL) 516 - AF 80 658 - Op(DN)
132 - BF 90 406 - CF 56 517 - AE 84 659 - AO 40
134 - DE 57 407 - AO 40 553 - DN 64 660 - Op(AL)
135 - AL 78 432 - BF 30 558 - DD 63 704 - BE 60
154 - CE 43 438 - Op(AL) 564 - Op(EE) 705 - Op(AL)
155 - Op(EO) 454 - BF 57 566 - Op(CF) 752 - Op(ET)
160 - DG 51 458 - BC 46 569 - AL 54-Op 754 - Op(CA)
162 - Op(EE) 461 - BF 40 572 - Op(ET) 755 - AL 41
163 - DN 69 462 - DD 63 590 - BE 94 756 - AD 40
On Return Passage: U 89 - 116 - 129 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 254 - 454 - 458
- 505 - 593 - 595 - 132 - 461 - 607 - 704 - 597.
Entered Port: U 132 - La Pallice; U 461 - 607 - 704 - St. Nazaire; U
597 - Brest; U 516 - Bergen.
Sailed: U 69 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 41 no further reports. Operation is completed.
2) Convoys Nos. 42 and 43 see para. IVa.
3) U 569 sank the Swedish ship "Suecia" (730 GRT) in AL 4189. Cargo
from Baltimore to Liverpool.
4) U 89 sighted several clouds of smoke in BE 1895 at 0932 and
reported at 0600/17 that she had been forced to dive 4 times by air and sea
777
patrol. No contact since 1030. Convoy's course possibly south, 8 clouds
of smoke. Boat was ordered to continue on her passage.
5) U 752 sank an 8,000-tonner on 13.8. in ET 7317, course 1300, 10
knots.
6) U 109 has sighted nothing in the sea area ES since 11.8. Bad
visibility at times owing to frequent showers of rain.
7) U 654 situation: nothing sighted in the area off Colon, though lay
immediately off the harbor for 2 nights. No sea or air patrol. Calm,
visibility good. Lightening without thunder.
- 105 -
8) U 564 situation: Since 12.8. nothing sighted in area between ED
9417 - 9527 - 9883 - 8992, concentration off Port of Spain, except medium
air patrol. Boat also reports that, except for the third turret, the battleships
sighted on 22.7. might have been "Nelson" and "Rodney".
9) U 510 sighted a large freighter in EO 3858, course NW, medium
speed. Lost contact.
10) U 600 reported 2 tankers, 3 escort vessels, course 400, in DM 5158.
11) U 658 attacked convoy No. 44 in DN 7895, 15 ships medium escort,
course 300, 8 knots. 2 freighters of 8,000 and 6,000 GRT respectively,
sunk in a surface attack.
12) U 155: no traffic in the W. sector of EE 90, air activity once.
Requests attack area off EP 72, because of damage, as traffic along the
coast is suspected there.
13) U 254 evaded a triple fan in BE 6686.
b) None.
 c) 1) U-boat sightings: AM 4277 - EO 38/62 - DM 51 - EE 44 - DN 76 -
EB 91 - AL 4531.
Sighting by a/c: BF 1922 - BE 6934 - BF 4660 - BF 1450.
2) A/c attacking U-boat with d/c's in BF 8488.
Further attacks in BF 5477 - BE 5137.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 42:
At 0820 U 174 reported that the enemy unit reported by U 176 consisted
of 2 steamers and 1 destroyer. Boat was driven off, pressed on, but did not
regain contact. Last position AL 4529, course N.E. Boat asks if this could
be a special group intended to draw U-boats to itself.
U 605 was chased by destroyers in AL 4284 and reported at 1115 that
there was probably a convoy in AL 4521, course E. 3 smoke clouds were
sighted at the same time with an aircraft flying over them. Group "Lohs"
was ordered to take action. As no further shadower's report had been
received by about 1800 and U 605 had been driven off, the operation was
broken off. Reasons: 1) Contact lost. 2) Uncertainty as to whether there
really was a convoy. 3) Boats can only operate on E-bound convoys for
tonight.
Group "Lohs"will join a new patrol line from AK 6344 to AL 7436. U
604 attack area AK 9125. U 755 - AK 9215. U 596 - AK 9275. Depth 25
miles. U 605 reported at 2400 that she had seen nothing, except one patrol
vessel as far as AL 5270. Was chased S.E. by a destroyer, as was also U
174 in AL 5413.
- 106 -
778
U 256 sighted a thick smoke plume twice by day, but could not make
contact even at maximum speed. She also assumed that there was a group
of destroyers and fast ships steering varying courses to shake off U-boats.
Operation against this convoy is thus ended.
Convoy No. 43:
U 653 sighted several smoke clouds at 1710 in CF 7357, N. course.
Boat driven off to the N.E. According to dead reckoning, this could be an
SL convoy and Group "Blucher" was therefore ordered to take action. U
333 joined this group and was directed against the convoy. U 653
maintained contact. The convoy's route was via CF 7319 and 4987. At
0310, U 594 reported 2 destroyers in CF 4951 and flares. U 566 requested
beacon signals at 0345. At 0337, U 653 reported that her only contact was
with the W. escort forces in CF 4927. Subsequently contact was lost
altogether. No further reports were received by morning. The operation is
being continued.
b) New attack areas:
U 553 between DM 10 - DM 60 and DN 80 including (Windward
Passage).
U 163 area round DL 6855. Depth 150 miles.
U 217 ED, lower third. There are small convoys with weak escort
between EC 9280 and ED 9890.
U 155 EP 72.
U 108 sea area off EO 4620.
U 155 and 173 area S. of the latitude of ED 9930. To patrol the
approaches to ED 9950 and EN 3340 and 70.
U 509, 66, 510 N. of the latitude of ED 9930. To patrol the approach to
ED 96.
U 162 and 564 W. of the longitude of ED 9880.
c) None.
d) 1) With immediate effect it is forbidden to attack sailing vessels up to
about 50 GRT in the sea area E. of 300 W and S of 480 N, including
Biscay. The reason is an important undertaking of our own by a sailing
vessel.
 2) A Radio Intelligence report gives rise to the suspicion that English
aircraft cooperate with submarines. For instance, a unit was located in BE
6945 in a position about 10 miles W. of a German U-boat reported by an
English aircraft. In addition there are several sighting reports of English
submarines from areas in which aircraft are constantly observed.
V. Reports of Success:
U 596 1 ship 3,730 GRT Sunk
U 752 1 ship 8,000 GRT Sunk
U 658 2 ships 14,000 GRT Sunk
VI. General: None.
- 107 -
17.August 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(ED) U 163 - DN 91 U 462 - DD 63 U 590 - CF 34
69 - BF 80 164 - Op(ED) 463 - DE 57 593 - BE 64
86 - Op(CA) 165 - AK 03 464 - AE 83 594 - Op(CF)
89 - BE 51 171 - Op(DA) 505 - CE 57 595 - BF 50
91 - AN 30 173 - Op(ED) 506 - ET 16 596 - AK 68
92 - AF 72 174 - Op(AL) 507 - Op(EJ) 598 - Op(DN)
94 - DE 43 175 - AN 35 508 - Op(DM) 600 - Op(DM)
98 - Op(CA) 176 - Op(AL) 509 - Op(ED) 604 - AK 69
779
107 - BF 40 179 - AN 30 510 - Op(EO) 605 - Op(AL)
108 - Op(ED) 214 - Op(CF) 511 - DN 68 609 - Op(AE)
109 - Op(ES) 217 - ED 48 512 - AN 30 653 - Op(CF)
116 - CF 95 254 - BF 48 513 - AK 03 654 - Op(EB)
125 - ET 14 256 - Op(AL) 514 - AF 72 658 - Op(DN)
129 - BE 93 333 - BE 85 515 - AF 73 659 - AN 30
130 - Op(ET) 373 - Op(AL) 517 - AL 33 660 - Op(AL)
134 - DE 56 406 - Op(CF) 553 - DN 54 705 - Op(AL)
135 - Op(AL) 407 - AN 30 558 - DD 63 752 - Op(ET)
154 - CE 29 432 - BF 80 564 - Op(ED) 754 - Op(CA)
155 - Op(EP) 438 - Op(AL) 566 - Op(CF) 755 - Op(CA)
160 - DG 34 454 - BF 60 569 - Op(AL) 756 - AN 30
162 - Op(ED) 458 - BC 68 572 - Op(ET)
On Return Passage: U 89 - 116 - 129 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 254 - 454 - 458
- 463 - 505 - 593 - 595.
Entered Port: U 454 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 165 sighted searchlights, red light, tracer firing at 0400 in AL
5117, apparently destroyers hunting U-boats.
2) U 173 reported a steamer, course 2900, 12 knots, short legs in EO
2163.
3) U 108 sank petrol tanker "Louisiana", 8,587 GRT, main course 1200,
in EP 4410. Heavy NW - SE traffic on the latitudes of EO 35 and 38.
Frequent air activity.
4) U 507 sank a passenger freighter of 6,000 GRT and a freighter of
3,500 GRT on 16.8. in FJ 8288, a passenger freighter of 5,000 GRT in FJ
8495, all course 350. Ships were showing navigation lights. 17.8. sank 2
freighters totaling 3,000 GRT, in FJ 8749, course 100. Brazilian coastal
traffic.
5) U 116 reported 6 vessels on a N. course, medium speed in CF 6158.
 6) U 333 was forced to dive in BE 8522 by 3 destroyers and was chased
with d/c's for 10 hours.
7) U 658 again attacked Convoy No. 44 and probably scored a hit on a
corvette. Lost contact, pressed on. Dived at 2124 in DN 7668 because of
an escorting destroyer on a SW course, 12-15 knots. Boat requested to
return, but
- 108 -
was ordered to re-load and remain in operation's area. U 598 reported
that she was on her way to DM 65 to pick up the convoy.
8) Convoy No. 45 see IVa.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DM 43, EP 1444, DA 9191, CA 2847, EB 8369, ED
69, EO 63, EE 76, CH 5893, DN 78, EO 3675.
Sighting by aircraft: BF 4674.
U-boat attack: DN 78, EP 41, EO 36, DN 79, EG 3913, EP 4266.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 43:
At 1120 U 594 reported the convoy in CF 4617, course N, 7-8 knots,
high smoke clouds. At the same time U 214 made contact and was driven
off by destroyers. Contact was maintained until 2200 in CF 5141. The
following reported: U 594 at 1300 in 4611. U 406 at 1350 in 4376. U
653 at 2200 in 5141. At 1745 U 566 attacked and sank the Norwegian
ship "Triton", 6,710 GRT, and 1 5000-tonner in CF 4353. Boat was depth
charged, driven off and pressed on. Convoy consists of about 21 merchant
780
ships, 1 auxiliary cruiser and 3 destroyers. One after the other all boats
were driven off, contact was lost. Long-range escort again proved very
effective. At 0450 U 214 again sighted flares in CF 2844 at 0819. The
operation is continuing.
2) Convoy No. 45:
U 553 sighted a convoy on a W. course at 2300 in DN 7571, 8 knots.
Constant strong air escort. Boat attacked in DN 7472 and sank 3 freighters
and 1 tanker totaling 22,000 GRT. Convoy was in DN 7471 at 0715,
course 2800, 7 knots, consisting of over 20 ships, 2 destroyers, and 2
corvettes. At 0505, U 163 reported that she was operating against the
convoy from DN 7682.
b) 1) U 130, U 109, U 752 and U 572 have been ordered to look for
traffic off Freetown if there is none in their present operations area.
2) U 517 to steer for AH 96 (Belle Isle Straits).
3) U 755, U 596, U 604 are to extend Group "Loss" 's patrol to the south
as far as AL 7853, in the order named.
4) U 94 and U 558 to make for DN 79 after supplying.
5) U 462 to wait in about DE 40 after supplying.
- 109 -
V. Reports of Success:
U 108 Tanker 8,557 GRT Sunk
U 507 5 ships 19,200 GRT Sunk
U 658 Corvette Probably hit
U 566 2 ships 11,710 GRT Sunk
U 553 4 ships 22,000 GRT Sunk

VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
18.August 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(ED) U 163 - DN 99 U 462 - DD 63 U 590 - CF 10
69 - BF 80 164 - Op(ED) 463 - DE 53 593 - BF 57
86 - Op(CB) 165 - AL 65 464 - AE 84 594 - Op(CF)
89 - BE 61 171 - Op(DB) 505 - CE 52 595 - BF 40
91 - AN 28 173 - Op(EO) 506 - ET 55 596 - AL 74
92 - AE 69 174 - Op(AL) 507 - FJ 88-Op 598 - Op(DM)
94 - DD 63 175 - AN 28 508 - Op(DM) 600 - Op(DN)
98 - Op(CA) 176 - Op(AL) 509 - Op(ED) 604 - Op(AL)
107 - BE 60 179 - AN 28 510 - Op(ED) 605 - Op(AL)
108 - EP 41 214 - Op(CF) 511 - DN 82 609 - Op(AE)
109 - Op(ES) 217 - Op(ED) 512 - AN 28 653 - Op(CF)
116 - CF 61 254 - BF 40 513 - AL 61 654 - Op(EB)
125 - ET 54 256 - Op(AL) 514 - AE 69 658 - Op(DN)
129 - BF 70 333 - BE 87 515 - AE 69 659 - AN 28
130 - Op(ET) 373 - Op(AL) 517 - AE 69 660 - Op(AL)
134 - DE 38 406 - Op(CF) 553 - Op(DM) 705 - Op(AL)
135 - Op(AL) 407 - AN 28 558 - DD 91 752 - Op(ET)
154 - CE 35 432 - BF 70 564 - Op(ED) 754 - Op(CA)
155 - Op(EP) 438 - Op(AL) 566 - Op(CF) 755 - AL 74
160 - CF 78 458 - BD 48 569 - Op(AL) 756 - AN 28
162 - Op(ED) 572 - Op(ET)
On Return Passage: U 89 - 108 - 160 - 116 - 129 - 134 - 154 - 254 - 454
- 458 - 463 - 505 - 593 - 595.
Entered Port: U 595 - Brest.
781
Sailed: U 411 - 409 - 606 - Kiel; U 459 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Convoy No. 43 and 45 see para. IVa.
1) U 508 made contact on 18.8. with a convoy in DM 2747, course W,
about 20 ships. Attacked and heard 2 hits. Forced to submerge by aircraft.
2) U 510 situation: heavy steamer traffic east and west from EO 3942
to EP 5217. 4 misses at a fast freighter in EP 5213, course east, good data.
3) U 162 sighted a convoy No. 46 at 0330 in ED 9468, course north-
west, slow speed. At 0505 she reported a last hydrophone bearing in ED
9464. U 564 is in the same area and made contact at 0720 in ED 9452.
Enemy steering 3200. Chase is being continued.
b) None.
- 110 -
c) U-boat sightings: DN 7475, EB 32, FQ 21.
Aircraft attacked U-boat in CG 1427 with d/c's and reported a hit, boat
badly damaged (U 653 in CF 2614).
U-boat attack: DM 9680 and attack on a ship at the entrance to
Willemstad (Curacao), which failed.
S.O.S. and torpedo report from "West-Felma" in ED 94.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 43:
 At 0900 convoy altered course to 450. U 214 maintained contact until
1518 in CF 2529. Further reports from other boats point to considerable
errors in estimated position. U 566 sighted the convoy at 1135 in 2591.
At 1350, U 406 requested beacon signals. At 1735, U 214 reported a new
convoy position in CF 2592. U 566 was fired on in CF 2280 and driven
off. In her place U 594 came up to the convoy at 2345 in CF 2624.
Course approximately 300. Weather: variable visibility, rain showers. U
214 attacked in CF 2569 and, in a daylight attack, sank 4 steamers totaling c) - d) None.
22,000 GRT. At 0237, U 406 sighted several flares in CF 2633. Then
contact was lost, no further boats came up. Reason: bad visibility and V. Reports of Success:
probably inexact convoy positions. U 508 2 hits heard
U 653 was attacked by aircraft at 1942 in CF 2614 and reported U 214 4 ships 22,000 GRT
considerable damage. The operation is continuing. U 553 3 freighters 16,000 GRT
Convoy No. 45:
U 553 reported the convoy's last position at 0930 in DM 9691, course
2700, 7 knots. In a second attack the boat sank a further 3 freighters, VI. General: None.
totaling 16,000 GRT. After that she was forced under water by destroyers.
Convoy had night air escort. At 2255, U 163 sighted the convoy in DM ---------------------------------------------------
9456 on a westerly course. U 553 reported her experiences on this ---------------
convoy: Air escort was numerous and assiduous but little effective. Night
air escort is not dangerous if the proper action is taken. It is best to steer 19.August 1942.
the same course as the convoy at low speed, and not to alter course or
speed if aircraft are near or approaching. There is no evidence of radar
location by air or sea escort. The convoy stopped off Santiago and waited I. U 66 - Op(ED) U 164 - Op(ED) U 464 - AL 24 U 596 - Op(AL)
2 hours for a part convoy coming from there, apparently ore ships. 69 - BF 70 165 - AK 55 505 - CE 35 598 - Op(DN)
b) 1) U 533 has been given freedom of action. Boat is at present in DM. 86 - Op(CB) 171 - Op(DB) 506 - ET 68 600 - Op(DN)
2) Boats in the sea area off Trinidad are free to operate against traffic 89 - BE 65 173 - Op(DB) 507 - Op(EJ) 604 - Op(AL)
reported by U 108 on 17.8. 91 - AF 80 174 - Op(AL) 508 - Op(DM) 605 - Op(AL)
3) Group "Loss" have received orders to move off at 2400, course 2600 92 - AE 83 175 - AF 80 509 - Op(ED) 606 - AO 48
and speed of advance 7 knots, and to be in patrol line from AK 6271 to AL 94 - DD 66 176 - Op(AL) 510 - Op(ED) 609 - Op(AE)
7759. At 1908 west-bound convoy is expected. 98 - Op(CA) 179 - AF 80 511 - Op(EC) 653 - Op(CF)
107 - BE 65 214 - Op(CE) 512 - AF 80 654 - Op(EB)
108 - EP 11 217 - Op(ED) 513 - AK 54 658 - Op(DN)
- 111 - 109 - Op(DF) 254 - BF 50 514 - AE 91 659 - Bergen
116 - CG 12 256 - Op(AL) 515 - AE 83 660 - Op(AL)
125 - ET 59 333 - Op(AL) 517 - AK 37 705 - Op(AL)
782
 129 - BF 40 373 - Op(AL) 553 - Op(DM) 752 - Op(AL)
130 - Op(ET) 406 - OP(CF) 558 - DD 85 754 - Op(CA)
134 - CD 72 407 - AF 80 564 - Op(ED) 755 - Op(AK)
135 - Op(AL) 409 - AD 48 566 - Op(CF) 756 - AF 80 c) U-boat sightings: DM 65, DM 26, ED 74, ED 59-67, DM 43, CA
154 - CF 13 411 - AD 48 569 - Op(AL) 3551, CA 54, CA 29, EO 6639, DM 8541, EP 44.
155 - Op(EP) 432 - BE 69 572 - Op(ET) Sighting by aircraft: ED 74, (bombed), BE 9467, BE 9673, BE 7850,
160 - CF 81 438 - Op(AL) 590 - Op(CF) BE 8840 and a further 3 reports from BE with uncertain data.
162 - Op(ED) 458 - BD 57 593 - BF 60 U-boat attack: ED 94 9459.
163 - Op(DM) 459 - BF 50 594 - Op(CF) d) None.
462 - DE 40
463 - DE 39 IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 43:
At 0817, U 214 reported the convoy in CF 3171, course 700, air escort,
On Return Passage: U 89 - 108 - 116 - 129 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 458 - 463 good visibility. U 406 sighted several smoke clouds at 1215 in CF 3163
- 505 - 593 - 254 - 454. and an hour later reported the convoy in CF 3217, course 600, 8 knots.
Entered Port: U 593 - St. Nazaire; U 254 - Brest. Boat's starboard Diesel is unserviceable and she can only make 10 knots.
Sailed: U 504 - 172 - Lorient; U 516 - Bergen. Towards 1500, U 214 reported that she had been prevented from hauling
ahead by a Sunderland and a Liberator. U 566 was located by 2 shore-
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. based aircraft and attacked with bombs. Slight damage, pressed on. U
590 picked up the last shadower's report with a defective radio set at
III. Reports on the Enemy: 2333/18/8 and at 1035 was forced to dive in BE 8843 by destroyers. Boat
a) 1) Convoy Nos. 43, 45 and 46 see para. IVa. reported towards evening that her radio set could not be repaired on board.
2) U 510 sank a steamer type "Orthum Berlam", 11,600 GRT, in EP Was ordered to continue the convoy operation. Very long wave is working
6162, course east. Heavy traffic continues, little air activity. Moving off day and night. Reception with D/F set, short wave with Radione. At
to repair aircraft bomb damage. Has been ordered to remain in the present 1809, U 594 made contact with smoke clouds in CF 2158 and at 1950 in
area after reloading. CF 2156 sighted the convoy, course northeast, 8 knots. Was driven off by
3) U 155 was bombed twice in EP 41. One rating overboard. destroyers and at 2215 reported new position in CF 2244, course east.
b) None. Shortly afterwards she was fired on and again firmly driven off. It was
first assumed that there was a mistake in the square in U 594's report, but
- 112 - this proved wrong, and it is to be assumed that the convoy divided in about
CF 2580 and this western part was picked up by U 594. U 594 is only
partially fit to dive, as she has only 100 KG air left and the electric
compressor is out of order. Boat was ordered to move away to the west.
U 214, equipped with Radar interception gear, dived after she had picked
up a radar location transmission, without having seen the aircraft. She was
attacked with well-aimed aircraft bombs at 60 meters (sic). Tolerable
783
damage. Impossible to haul ahead by day or night owing to location by
aircraft. U 333 also reported at 0107 that she could not press forward
owing to aircraft and destroyers. Boat is returning home because 1) she is
heavily damaged and 2) she can no longer catch up with the convoy as her
speed is too slow. During the night U 406 reported that she had attacked at
1620 in BE 8977 and torpedoed a 6,000-tonner. Convoy consisted of 15-
20 steamers. There were destroyers ahead of the convoy and 2 more
acting as long range escort. Afterwards she was hunted and severely
depth-charged. Damage and casualties. As the boat's chances of success
are small at present owing the the strong air activity and the convoy will
be too far inshore tomorrow, Group "Blucher" received the following
order: Boats which have not been able to attack by first light, break off
operation and steer for CF 84.
- 113 -
2) Convoy No. 45:
U 163 lost contact at 0300 in DM 9457, course north, driven off by
destroyer. Is searching on in the general direction of Yucatan.
3) Convoy No. 46:
U 162 was constantly forced to submerge by aircraft. Lost contact,
pressed on. At 0437 attacked in ED 9467 and sank a freighter of 6,000
GRT. At 0952 U 564 reported the convoy in ED 9427, course 3150, speed
7 knots. Torpedoed 2 tankers and 2 large freighters. Of these 2 sank and 2
had heavy lists, altogether 28,000 GRT. Subsequently hunted by destroyer
and aircraft. U 164 and 214 were given permission to operate against the
convoy at their own discretion. U 564 regained contact. Attacked by day
784
and 2 of her shots were unmistakable pistol failures. Hits heard in the
conning tower and control room, torpedo's run interrupted from 2 places,
consistent with estimated range. Convoy's last position at 1600 in ED
8392, course 3150, speed 7 knots. 11 ships are left.
U 464 has been allocated square AJ 60, upper third, as a waiting
position for the supply of group "Loss".
b) - c) None.
d) 1) 3 boats on their way out were directed against the English landing
attempt near Dieppe. U 107, U 69 and U 432 were ordered to make for BF
19 at maximum speed. In general it must be noted that the use of boats in
areas endangered by mines and in this case heavily patrolled by aircraft
can only be considered in cases of extreme urgency, as for instance a
major landing. Towards 1600 the order was cancelled, as the landing had
been definitely beaten off.
2) Mines are suspected in the area off Hatteras. Boats have been
warned accordingly.
3) U 754 last reported on 31.7 from BB 7775. She had sunk a modern
trawler by gunfire on 28.7. in BB 7768. On 31.7. she was ordered to
operate in the sea area off Boston. It is not known whether she even
reached this area. The boat has not reported again since then, although
ordered. Several sighting reports point to her having been seen. Her loss
must be accepted. There are no clues.
V. Reports of Success:
U 510 1 ship 11,600 GRT Sunk
U 406 1 ship 6,000 GRT Torpedoed
U 162 1 freighter 6,000 GRT Sunk
U 564 2 tankers & 28,000 GRT Sunk
2 freighters
VI. General: None.
- 114 -

20.August 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(ED) U 164 - Op(ED) U 459 - BF 40 U 569 - Op(AK)
69 - BE 90 165 - AK 48 462 - DE 46 572 - Op(ET)
86 - Op(CB) 171 - Op(DA) 463 - DF 15 590 - Op(CF)
89 - BF 40 172 - BF 40 464 - AL 16 594 - Op(CF)
91 - BF 75 173 - Op(ED) 504 - BF 40 596 - Op(AL)
92 - AE 87 174 - Op(AK) 505 - CF 13 598 - Op(DN)
94 - DD 91 175 - AF 72 506 - EU 71 600 - Op(DN)
98 - Op(CA) 176 - Op(AK) 507 - Op(FJ) 604 - Op(AL)
107 - BE 94 179 - AF 79 508 - DM 32 605 - Op(AK)
108 - EF 71 214 - Op(BE) 509 - Op(ED) 606 - AN 30
109 - Op(DF) 217 - Op(ED) 510 - Op(EP) 609 - Op(AE)
116 - BF 74 256 - Op(AK) 511 - Op(EC) 653 - Op(CF)
125 - ET 96 333 - BE 89 512 - AF 75 654 - Op(EB)
129 - BF 40 373 - Op(AK) 513 - AK 47 658 - Op(DN)
130 - Op(ES) 406 - Op(BE) 514 - AE 88 659 - Bergen
134 - CD 54 407 - AF 72 515 - AE 87 660 - Op(AK)
135 - Op(AL) 409 - AN 30 516 - AF 75 705 - Op(AK)
154 - BE 87 411 - AN 30 517 - AK 29 752 - Op(DH)
155 - Op(EP) 432 - BE 60 553 - Op(DM) 755 - Op(AL)
160 - CF 56 438 - Op(AK) 558 - DO 22 756 - AF 75
162 - Op(ED) 458 - BD 67 564 - Op(ED)
163 - DM 86 566 - Op(BE)
785
On Return Passage: U 89 - 108 - 116 - 129 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 333 - 458
- 463 - 505 - 508 - 572 - 752.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 608 - Kiel; U 68 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No 43 see para. IVa.
U 162 is continuing to operate along Convoy No. 46's last observed
northern course. No further report. Convoy is probably proceeding via
Windward Passage. Boat has been ordered to press on only if prospects
seem good.
U 163 did not pick up Convoy No. 45 again and has broken off the
search. Returning home as evaporating plant is out of action and stocks of
drinking water are low.
U 217 situation: A few large tankers with fast escort off Willemstad
(Curacao) by day. Constant air activity. 18.8. probably sank tanker (8,000
GRT) off the harbor entrance. 19.8. destroyed a British cargo sailing
vessel (150 GRT) by gunfire in ED 75. Working together with aircraft. 50
troops on board. Moved off to repair bomb and d/c damage.
U 511 sighted a convoy in EC 1561 at 2130, course west, 12 knots,
about 5-6 steamers. Boat forced to submerge by flying boat and lost
contact. It was useless to press on.
U 654 situation: Nothing seen for 10 days in operation's area (off
Colon) except fast motor vessel in EL 3410. Medium air activity.
- 115 -

U 66 operated against the line of traffic to Trinidad reported by U
108. Nothing seen in EE 79 except a Vichy-French ship.
U 558 requested operation's area EE, lower third during full moon
period. HAs been ordered to continue passage to Windward Passage.
U 164 situation: 17.8. 2 tankers in Oranjestad harbor. 18.8. traffic of
medium-sized tankers by day from Cape Roman to Curacao and
presumably Aruba. 19.8. nothing seen. Submerged by day on account of
strong air activity. Operating against convoy No. 46.
U 506 sighted a fast convoy with 2 destroyers and a large vessel in ET
6114. Possibly cruiser or battleship. Main course 305, 16 knots, contact
lost.
U 155 ability to dive reduced because of damage to battery. Requests
a rendezvous with U 510 to take over a bridging cable. Rendezvous fixed
for 21.8. in EP 26.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 3249, EO 62, DM 19, ED 5991, DN 5259, CA
2953, DM 6594.
Sighting by aircraft: AE 7343, AE 8843. D/c attack in AL 2953 and AL
2282.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 43:
No boat was able to attack again. In the course of the morning all boats
reported their damage and stocks of fuel, from which the situation
emerged as follows:
U 566 85 cbm 9 + 2 torpedoes - fully operationally effective
U 214 140 cbm 7 + 2 torpedoes - fully operationally effective
U 406 95 cbm 11 + 2 torpedoes - fully operationally effective from 2108,
after repairing certain damage
U 594 73 cbm 12 + 2 torpedoes - will be ready again about 30.8., when
electric compressor has been repaired (spare parts coming by boat from
home.
U 590 returning home owing to break-down of radio (not enemy action)
786
U 333 returning home as starboard Diesel out of action (not enemy action
from convoy)
U 653 90 cbm - returning home because of bomb damage.
Results from this convoy can be regarded as good. 5 boats made
contact with the enemy. 2 boats (U 333 and U 590) were operationally
defective before they reached the convoy. 3 boats attacked and scored
successes, i.e. U 566 - 2 ships totaling 20,000 GRT sunk, U 406 - 1 ship
6,000 GRT torpedoed. Only one
- 116 -
boat was so badly damaged that she had to return.
This boat will proceed via CF 1825 and will there deliver her remaining
fuel to U 566 and 406, both of which will then be fit for distant operation.
b) None.
c) The following have supplied from U 462:
U 94 - 57 cbm - 10 days' provisions
U 558 - 43 cbm - 10 days' provisions
Tanker's stocks: 485 cbm, 156 days, 4 torpedoes.
d) U 107 reports her experiences with Radar interception gear:
According to it, boat was located 4 times by day and twice by night.
Tuning 400 - 169 cm. wavelength (T.N. note: sic). Dived for every
location transmission and was not attacked the whole way. A very
satisfactory result.
V. Reports of Success:
 U 217 Tanker 8,000 GRT Probably sunk
U 217 Cargo sailing vessel 150 GRT Sunk
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
21.August 1942.
I. U 66 - EO 39 U 162 - Op(ED) U 458 - BD 69 U 564 - Op(ED)
68 - BF 58 163 - DM 77 459 - BF 71 566 - CF 25
69 - BE 83 164 - Op(EC) 462 - DE 46 569 - Op(AL)
86 - Op(CB) 165 - AJ 92 463 - CD 88 572 - ES 35
89 - BF 60 171 - Op(DB) 464 - AK 37 590 - BE 95
91 - AE 93 172 - BF 80 504 - BF 80 594 - CF 10
92 - AL 33 173 - Op(ED) 505 - BE 87 596 - Op(AL)
94 - DD 85 174 - Op(AL) 506 - Op(ET) 598 - Op(DN)
98 - Op(CA) 175 - AE 69 507 - Op(FJ) 600 - Op(DN)
107 - BE 89 176 - CF 30 508 - DN 12 604 - Op(AL)
108 - EF 41 179 - Op(ED) 509 - Op(ED) 605 - Op(AK)
109 - Op(DF) 214 - Op(AL) 510 - Op(ED) 606 - v. Bergen
116 - BF 70 217 - BE 95 511 - Op(EC) 608 - AO 48
125 - EN 79 256 - Op(AL) 512 - AE 69 609 - Op(AE)
129 - BF 40 333 - BE 95 513 - AJ 91 653 - CF 49
130 - Op(ET) 373 - Op(AL) 514 - AL 33 654 - EB 45
134 - CD 62 406 - CF 30 515 - AL 33 658 - Op(DN)
135 - Op(AL) 407 - AE 69 516 - AE 93 659 - Bergen
154 - BE 86 409 - AN 30 517 - AK 42 660 - Op(AK)
155 - Op(EP) 411 - AN 30 553 - EB 38 705 - Op(AK)
156 - BF 58 432 - BE 53 558 - DN 66 752 - ET 43
160 - BE 89 438 - Op(AL) 755 - Op(AL)
756 - AE 68
787
On Return Passage: U 89 - 108 - 116 - 129 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 333 - 458
- 463 - 505 - 508 - 572 - 752 - 155 - 163 - 590 - 653.
Entered Port: U 89 - Brest; U 129 - Lorient; U 606 - Bergen.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 117 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 658: Sighted a single ship on a northern course, medium speed in
DN 5746. As she was behaving in an obvious manner, a trap was
suspected. Requests protracted return passage via DO 90 and EE 30.
Reloading as soon as possible.
U 598: Submarine hunt in DM 64 and 65 on 18 and 19.8. by aircraft.
21.8. DN 84 bombs and d/c's. Damage to periscope and Diesels.
U 98 situation: 14.8. convoy in DC 1423, course 2300. Was located
before attack, forced to dive by sea escort and strong air activity. Suspects
south-bound convoys between 40 and 200 meter lines. Only 2 patrol
vessels seen off Hatteras since 19.8. outside the 200 meter line.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 2965, EE 71, GA 8492 (?), DN 8448, AH 5963,
BB 41/42, DM 6582, CA 73, DM 18, DN 84, DC 12, DM 65.
Sighting by aircraft: AL 2393, AE 7249.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
 a) Convoy No. 46: No further report.
b) 1) U 654 has encountered no further traffic off Colon. She has been
given EB 30, EC 10 and the sea area north of this as new operations area.
Other attack areas:
2) U 558 - area around DL 6855. Depth 120 miles. (Yucatan Straits).
3) U 165 - AH 9596, concentrating between AH 9585 and 9594.
4) U 513 - AH 9899 concentrating in AH 9830.
5) U 517 - freedom of action in the area named (off Belle-Isle Straits).
Outward bound traffic of independently-routed ships and small convoys is
suspected here.
6) Group "Loss" has been ordered to form a new patrol line from AK
3927 to AL 7423, at cruising speed. Reason: SC and ON(S) convoys are
probably diverted northwards.
c) U 155 has taken over the bridging cable requested from U 510 in EP
26. As further cells have become defective she is still unable to dive. Has
been ordered to return home in company with U 510. Spare parts for
battery will be brought by a boat putting to sea.
d) 1) U 69 has had the same good experience with her Radar interception
gear as U 107. Boat also dived every time a location transmission was
picked up and avoided all attacks. The set also picked up dashes of 6 to 10
- 118 -
seconds duration, pitch 800. VH/F or surface (radar) transmission
suspected.
2) From 0000/22/8 until further notice attack on single ships in route A
will also be permitted north of 200 N.
788
3) U 464 (U-tanker) left Kiel on 4.8. for her first enemy patrol and on
9.8. put into Drontheim to repair a trace of oil. Apart from a report saying
she had sailed, no further radio message has been received from the boat,
in spite of several calls. Several radio intelligence reports have been
received of aircraft attacks in the Iceland Passage and it is suspected that
the boat was destroyed there. There are no exact details as yet. Her loss
must be accepted.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
a) The following must be made on the subject of the enemy air situation
in the East Atlantic:
Number of enemy aircraft have increased, a great variety of aircraft
types have appeared, aircraft are equipped with an excellent Radar set
against U-boats: all these factors have made the conduct of the U-boat
war in the East Atlantic very difficult. Outward and inward-bound boats
in the North Sea and Biscay are exposed to grave danger by daily, even
hourly, hunts by aircraft. Apart from heavy losses (total losses from
aircraft in the approach routes in July and August probably 4 boats so far),
several boats have suffered severe damage and an number slight damage.
The enemy's daily reconnaissance covers as far as about 200 West and U-
boat dispositions have therefore to be made far out to the center of the
Atlantic, as, if the dispositions were discovered, the convoys would be re-
routed. Besides daily air reconnaissance, it is now known that there are
some types of aircraft of particularly long range which are used for convoy
escort. Air escort has been flown over convoys chased by U-boats nearly
800 miles away from English bases and England itself. As the War Log of
20.7. shows, this has made the operation of boats very difficult and in
some cases no longer worth while. If development continues at the
present rate these problems will lead to irreparable losses, to a decline in
successes and consequently to a decline in the chances of success of the U-
boat war as a whole.
In view of this situation, I must once more demand the use of the only
aircraft which has a range and fighting power capable of combating the
enemy aircraft (HE 177) in Biscay and in the Atlantic against convoys.
 As a defensive measure against enemy Radar, the fitting of Radar
interception gear seems to be successful, as far as can be seen at present.
Further experiences will however have to be collected.
b) In a general view of the operation against Convoy No. 40, radio
messages received from U-boats show positively that convoy operations
are perfectly possible even against heavily escorted convoys in the Atlantic
and a verbal discussion with several C.O.'s who took part has confirmed
this to the full.
- 119 -
It appears that weather conditions (fog, poor visibility, at times very
variable visibility) present the greatest difficulty and, as already suspected,
led to severe d/c hunts. Nevertheless most of the boats managed to attack
once. If the success was not really great, it was because false settings were
sometimes made in the excitement of the first attack. All the boats learnt a
lot and from personal impressions of C.O.'s and crews, it can be expected
that the new boats will be quite capable of dealing with the situation in
another convoy operation.
All C.O.'s and crews give the same impression: "In spite of very heavy
depth-charging, morale is determined and assured and confidence in
victory is unshakable".
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
22.August 1942.
789
I. U 66 - Op(ED) U 165 - AJ 82 U 462 - DE 46 U 572 - EJ 94
68 - BF 80 171 - Op(DB) 463 - CD 92 590 - BF 40
69 - BE 81 172 - BF 70 504 - BF 70 594 - CE 34
86 - Op(CB) 173 - Op(ED) 505 - BE 86 596 - Op(AL)
91 - AE 83 174 - Op(AK) 506 - Op(EN) 598 - Op(DN)
92 - AL 18 175 - AE 83 507 - Op(FJ) 600 - Op(DN)
94 - DD 23 176 - Op(AK) 508 - DC 88 604 - Op(AL)
98 - Op(DC) 179 - AE 59 509 - Op(ED) 605 - Op(AK)
107 - CF 37 214 - CF 56 510 - Op(EP) 608 - AN 30
108 - EF 11 217 - Op(EC) 511 - Op(EC) 609 - Op(AE)
109 - Op(DF) 256 - Op(AK) 512 - AE 91 653 - CF 18
116 - BF 40 333 - BF 70 513 - AJ 81 654 - EB 92
125 - EU 79 373 - Op(AK) 514 - AL 25 658 - Op(DN)
130 - Op(ET) 406 - CF 18 515 - AL 25 659 - AF 71
134 - CD 41 407 - AE 91 516 - AE 91 660 - Op(AK)
135 - Op(AL) 409 - AE 80 517 - AJ 66 705 - Op(AK)
154 - BF 57 411 - AF 80 553 - Op(DM) 752 - ET 12
155 - Op(EP) 432 - BE 27 558 - DN 63 755 - Op(AK)
156 - BF 80 438 - Op(AK) 564 - Op(ED) 756 - AE 83
160 - BE 96 458 - BE 58 566 - CF 18
162 - Op(ED) 459 - CE 34 569 - Op(AK)
163 - DN 79
164 - Op(ED)
On Return Passage: U 108 - 116 - 134 - 154 - 155 - 160 - 163 - 333 -
458 - 463 - 505 - 508 - 510 - 572 - 590 - 653 - 752.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 380 - Drontheim; U 455 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 47 see IVa.
 2) U 508 hunted in DM 60 by constant aircraft. Bombs and d/c's.
Return passage via DN 58.
3) U 506 in addition to fast convoy reported, sighted a freighter on 21.8.
in ET 5360 and in ET 5328 sank a freighter of 7,000 GRT. Both ships
main course 450.
- 120 -
furthest boat was about 300 miles away from the convoy. At 2355 the
convoy was in AK 9641, course west, 8 knots, about 15 ships. Misty
weather and drizzle made shadowing extremely difficult. Convoy's last
position reported AK 9592 at 0330, course southwest. After that contact
was lost and was not regained by morning. The southwest course is very
bad for the boats which are such a long way away. They were ordered to
continue the operation, regardless of fuel.
b) 1) U 658 is to start protracted return passage as requested.
2) After supplying, U 406 and 566 will make for CF 84.
3) According to our traffic chart, the La Plata - Freetown traffic is
concentrated in about FK 30, right half, and FL 10, left half. U 507 is
permitted to attack as far as 100 South, east limit 200 West.
c) U 406 and 566 have refueled from U 653.
d) Boats have been informed of the sailing of a Japanese U-boat (cover
name Kirsch-Blute).

D/c's and bombs from surface craft and aircraft. V. Reports of Success:
b) None. U 506 Freighter 7,000 GRT Sunk
c) U-boat sightings: CE 32, EB 86, DM 45, DB 9766, ED 9957, DM
4135, CA 7384.
d) None. VI. General: None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) 1) Convoy No. 46: No fresh reports. Operation is concluded. - 121 -
2) Convoy No. 47: U 135 sighted several smoke clouds at 1700 in AK
9683. She made contact with a corvette and was driven off to the
southwest. Unfortunately, owing to a cyphering error on the part of the
boat, the report was not received by control until the second transmission
at about 2000. Group "Loss" was ordered not to take action on the convoy
report for the present, as details did not seen sufficient and besides the
expected ON (S) 122, according to experience so far, would be steering
further to the north. At 2250, U 135 reported the convoy in AK 9654 on a
westerly course, medium speed. As this could only be the expected
convoy and for reasons unknown it had skirted the patrol line to the south 23.August 1942.
and was only picked up because one boat was outside the line, Group
"Loss" received the order: "at 'em", operate on U 135's report. The
790
 I. U 66 - Op(EE) U 164 - Op(FC) U 455 - BF 50 U 566 - CF 10
68 - BF 70 165 - AJ 75 458 - BE 67 569 - Op(AK)
69 - BE 72 171 - Op(DA) 459 - CF 35 572 - EJ 66
86 - Op(CB) 172 - BE 95 462 - DE 46 590 - BF 50
91 - AE 88 173 - Op(EE) 463 - CE 47 594 - CE 30
92 - AK 03 174 - Op(AK) 504 - BE 90 596 - Op(AK)
94 - DO 19 175 - AE 87 505 - BE 92 598 - Op(DN)
98 - Op(CA) 176 - Op(AK) 506 - ET 65 600 - Op(DN)
107 - CF 58 179 - AE 85 507 - Op(FJ) 604 - Op(AK)
108 - DQ 71 214 - Op(CF) 508 - DN 81 605 - Op(AK)
109 - Op(ES) 217 - EC 61 509 - Op(EE) 608 - AN 30
116 - BF 50 256 - Op(AK) 510 - EF 96 609 - Op(AE)
125 - EU 89 333 - BF 70 511 - Op(EC) 653 - CF 16
130 - Op(ET) 373 - Op(AK) 512 - AE 88 654 - Op(EB)
134 - CE 24 380 - AF 57 513 - AJ 74 658 - DN 56
135 - Op(AK) 406 - CF 10 514 - AL 19 659 - AE 68
154 - BF 50 407 - AE 85 515 - AL 19 660 - Op(AK)
155 - EF 96 409 - AF 72 516 - AE 88 705 - Op(AK)
156 - BF 50 411 - AF 72 517 - AJ 59 752 - EK 72
160 - BF 70 432 - BE 11 553 - Op(DN) 755 - Op(AK)
162 - Op(ED) 438 - Op(AK) 558 - DN 59 756 - AE 87
163 - DN 83 564 - Op(ED)
On Return Passage: U 108 - 116 - 134 - 154 - 155 - 160 - 163 - 214 -
333 - 458 - 463 - 505 - 508 - 510 - 572 - 590 - 653 - 658 - 752.
Entered Port: U 154 - Lorient; U 590 - St. Nazaire; U 116 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 404 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 47 see para IVa.
2) U 752 reported a convoy in DT 9439, course 1700, speed 10 knots.
Although her fuel stocks are low, boat was ordered to take action, as was
also U 572 which should have been in the vicinity according to dead
791
reckoning. When told however she reported her position as DT 4728,
about 360 miles further west. An operation by this boat is therefore out of
the question. U 752 attacked a searching group by day in DT 9891 in vain
and reported towards 2400 that the convoy now only consisted of several
corvettes and escort vessels. Contact lost, returning home.
3) U 507 sank the Brazilian cargo sailing vessel "Jacyra" (150 GRT) on
19.8. in FQ 1330 and on 23.8. in FJ 8710 a freighter of 6,000 GRT.
4) U 600 situation: Nothing seen 15 - 17.8. except a small convoy.
Strong air activity, no sea patrol. 18 - 21.8. off Havana - one fast
independently-routed ship, 1080. On 21.8. a tanker in DM 1954,
otherwise nothing. According to experience, aircraft locate with accuracy
at night, by day aircraft and destroyers work together, very good asdic,
accurate d/c's. Considerable damage,
- 122 -
which cannot be repaired, make it necessary to return home.
5) U 572 sighted a ship type "Monarch of Bermuda" in DT 6476, main
course 200, 18 knots, no contact.
6) U 164 saw nothing in EC 64 and 61 except a motor vessel, course
3150 on 21.8. (probably neutral).
7) U 506 sank a loaded English freighter of 5,000 GRT in ET 5973,
course 350. Boat is continuing to operate against La Plata - Freetown
traffic.
8) U 98 situation: Came upon a convoy in DC 1352 on 22.8., a bright
moonless night. Course northeast, 10 knots. Driven off by destroyers and
night air escort and could not get near again. Boat suspects north-bound
traffic in the Gulf Stream. Moved away, as the battery temperature was
too high.
9) U 86 situation: Nothing seen since 13.8. in DC 30, CB 70, CA 60
and 90 except a Portuguese ship and on 20.8. in CB 72 a destroyer, course
south, high speed.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 8741, FG 43, DM 4277, AK 9697.
Aircraft sighted a U-boat diving in BE 9873.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 47:
U 432 reported from BE 15, that she too was operating against the
convoy. Weather reports received showed very variable visibility and fog
in patches. At 2059, U 705 sighted a destroyer, course 3200, in AK 9771
and soon after reported that so far she had seen one steamer and one
destroyer, course west, 7 knots. According to dead reckoning this must be
the convoy. At 2302, U 705 sighted it in AK 8993, course 2300, 7 knots.
U 373 saw flares and tracer shots in AK 8998 at 0020 - 0055, and again at
0153 in BD 2235. Boat suspected destroyers were hunting U 705. At
0321, U 596 requested beacon signals. By morning however no further
shadowers' reports had been received. Visibility was good in the
beginning of the night, but very soon deteriorated to 2 miles. Operation is
being continued.
b) 1) U 214, U 107, U 566 and U 406 will form a new group, "Blucher",
and have been ordered to be in reconnaissance line from CF 7655 to CF
8656 at 2000/24/8, course 180, day's run 150 miles. Purpose: To move
south to pick up an SL-convoy. Later individual operation off Freetown
and refueling.
2) U 92 will occupy squares AK 62 and 63 as a temporary attack area.
- 123 -
792
3) New approach points: U 175, U 512, U 516 - DE 50.
U 91, U 756, U 407 and U 659 - AK 39.
c) None.
d) We are at war with Brazil since 22.8. In order to clear up various
points U 507 has been told, by order of Naval War Staff, to report further
details on the sinking of the Brazilian ships. The report showed that all the
ships were sunk outside the territorial waters and the C.O. had acted only
in accordance with orders received.
As the Brazilian declaration of war has had a very unfavorable effect on
the attitude of the Argentine and Chile. Boats have been instructed to
avoid incidents with ships belonging to these countries at all costs. All
measures of war as applicable to the other enemy states are permitted
against Brazil and Uruguay.
V. Reports of Success:
U 507 Cargo sailing vessel 150 GRT Sunk
U 507 Freighter 6,000 GRT Sunk
U 506 Freighter 5,000 GRT Sunk
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
24.August 1942.
I. U 66 - EE 99 U 165 - Op(AH) U 455 - BF 49 U 564 - Op(ED)
68 - CG 16 171 - Op(DB) 458 - BF 47 566 - CF 49
 69 - BD 95 172 - CF 36 459 - CF 56 569 - Op(AK)
86 - Op(BC) 173 - Op(ED) 462 - DE 46 572 - DT 17
91 - AL 14 174 - Op(ED) 463 - CE 43 594 - CE 34
92 - AK 02 175 - AL 24 504 - BE 98 596 - Op(BD)
94 - DN 66 176 - Op(AL) 505 - BF 50 598 - DO 58
98 - Op(DC) 179 - AL 31 506 - ET 91 600 - DL 63
107 - Op(CF) 214 - Op(CF) 507 - FK 86 604 - Op(AK)
108 - DQ 41 217 - Op(ED) 508 - DN 67 605 - Op(AK)
109 - ES 53 256 - Op(AK) 509 - Op(EE) 608 - AF 87
125 - EU 98 333 - BF 60 510 - EG 48 609 - Op(AE)
130 - ES 46 373 - Op(RD) 511 - Op(EC) 653 - CF 23
134 - CE 31 380 - AF 48 512 - AL 33 654 - Op(DN)
135 - Op(BD) 404 - BF 50 513 - Op(AH) 658 - DN 69
155 - EG 47 406 - CF 49 514 - AK 64 659 - AE 83
156 - BE 99 407 - AL 33 515 - AK 65 660 - Op(AK)
160 - BF 50 409 - AE 69 516 - AL 33 705 - Op(BD)
162 - Op(ED) 411 - AE 69 517 - AJ 54 752 - DT 95
163 - DN 68 432 - Op(BD) 553 - Op(DN) 755 - Op(BD)
164 - Op(EC) 438 - Op(AK) 558 - DN 76 756 - AL 24
On Return Passage: U 86 - 108 - 134 - 155 - 160 - 163 - 333 - 458 - 463
- 505 - 508 - 510 - 572 - 598 - 600 - 653 - 658 - 752 - 171.
Entered Port: U 160 - Lorient; U 333 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 584 - Brest; U 159 - Lorient; U 96 St. Nazaire.
- 124 -
793
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 47 see para. IVa.
2) U 175, on her way out, sighted a patrol vessel, 3 trawlers and
altogether 5 aircraft in AL 2329.
3) U 657 sighted a chain of patrol vessels with aircraft in AE 87, east
half, on her passage through Iceland Passage. North-south courses.
4) U 515 sighted a 2-funneled ship in AL 7780, course 600, 19-20 knots.
5) U 509 situation: 15.8. thick periscope seen in ED 5625. Air patrol in
EE 41 - 81 on 17 and 18.8., in EE 88 on 19.8. and in EO on 20.8. Since
20.8., boat has been operating on the line of traffic between 8 and 10 North
as far as EP 52. Bombs and d/c's.
6) U 162 sank a steamer, estimated at 5,000 GRT, northeast course, in
EE 5745. Probably a transport, as 6 overcrowded life-boats were seen.
Subsequently air activity. Heavy northeast to southwest traffic passes
through a line EE 72 - 82.
7) U 217 is transferring to operations area ED 90 (west of Trinidad).
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EO 11, BD 22, ED 68 - 92, EG 3663, EP 42, DN 78,
EC 96, DO 77, BD 1398, BD 1637, EL 33, EM 11, GA 82 (?).
English aircraft sighted a U-boat diving in AE 8331.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 47:
U 705 reported at 0915 that at 2400/23 she had shadowed the convoy
in BD 2222, course 2300, speed 7 knots. The boat should have reported
this as soon as possible, as her previous radio message did not make it
clear that the enemy unit reported was the convoy. At 0940, U 660 sighted
the convoy in BD 2433. As the weather was clear, it was possible to
shadow it without gaps of any length until 0100. The convoy was in BD
2455 at 1458, BD 1636 at 1755, BD 1673 at 0016 and BD 1671 at 0105.
The following boats reported the convoy's position, or that they were
shadowing it:
1458 - U 605, 1641 - U 569, 1646 - U 438, 1615 - U 176,
1640 - U 373, 1940 - U 755, 1945 - U 596 , 2130 - U 174,
2302 - U 705.
U 256 requested beacon signals at 1918. One after the other several
boats were driven off by the apparently
- 125 -
very strong escort. At 2230, U 755 was observed and lost contact. U
256 was depth-charged at 0105 and had to move away to repair damage in
several quarters. U 373 was forced to submerge at 0213 by destroyers,
and pressed on. U 596 was depth-charged for a short time at 0313. U 174
was also driven off at 0208.
U 135 reported that she had been located at 0130 in BD 2297 by a
group of destroyers probably with Radar and seen by the light of flares.
Subsequently fired on by Flak guns and heavily depth-charged. Necessary
to move away to repair damage.
U 438 attacked at 0145 in BD 1672 and sank a freighter of 7,000 GRT,
also scored a hit each on a freighter of 6,000 and one of 3,000 GRT.
Afterward chased for a short time by a destroyer with red searchlight. U
605, which is also operating against the convoy, reported from AK 9454
one independently-routed ship (12,000 GRT) sunk, course 800, 16 knots.
Boat was ordered to cease operation against the convoy, to make for AK
39.
As no reports of shadowing had been received for some hours, Group
"Loss" was ordered to report the convoy's position. Short weather reports
asked for show that visibility had deteriorated again and there was fog.
794
This explains why contact was lost entirely and not re-established by
morning. The operation is continuing.
b) 1) U 86 protracted return passage via DC 20, 50, 90 and DC 70 - 80
and 90.
2) U 94 has been allocated an operations area between 16 and 270 North
and 71 to 890 West.
3) U 164 freedom of action via EC 14 to DL 68.
4) Attention of U 109 and U 130 has been called to the traffic reported
by U 506.
5) U 462 is making for CD 4655 at economical speed to supply Group
"Loss".
6) Group "Blucher" has been ordered to be in reconnaissance line from
CF 8774 to 8975, course 1800, day's run 150 miles, at 0800/25/8. A north-
bound convoy is expected.
c) 1) U 462 reports total stocks 510.5 cbm (of which 25 cbm cannot be
reached). Lubricating oil 14.98 cbm, 4 torpedoes, 150 days' provisions.
2) U 516 has laid weather buoy in north position (Rockall Bank).
d) 1) As we are not yet at war with Uruguay, ships flying this flag are not
to be treated as enemy.
2) For political reasons, U 507 is still forbidden to penetrate Brazilian
harbors or bombard them.
- 126 -
V. Reports of Success:
U 162 1 ship 5,000 GRT Sunk
438 1 ship 7,000 GRT Sunk
438 1 ship 6,000 GRT 1 hit
438 1 ship 3,000 GRT Sunk (assumed)
604 1 ship 12,000 GRT Sunk
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
25.August 1942.
I. U 66 - EE 99 U 164 - Op(EC) U 455 - BF 70 U 566 - Op(CF)
68 - CG 41 165 - Op(AH) 458 - BF 46 569 - Op(BD)
69 - BD 86 171 - Op(DB) 459 - CF 82 572 - DT 12
86 - CB 74 172 - CF 61 462 - DE 28 584 - BE 54
91 - AK 38 173 - Op(ED) 463 - CE 29 594 - CE 34
92 - Op(AK) 174 - Op(BD) 504 - CF 34 596 - Op(BD)
94 - DN 59 175 - AK 38 505 - BF 50 598 - DO 64
96 - BF 83 176 - Op(BD) 506 - EU 74 600 - DM 73
98 - DC 67 179 - AL 02 507 - Op(FJ) 604 - Op(AK)
107 - Op(CF) 214 - Op(CF) 508 - DO 44 605 - Op(BD)
108 - DQ 71 217 - Op(ED) 509 - Op(EP) 608 - AE 72
109 - Op(DF) 256 - Op(BD) 510 - EG 51 609 - Op(AE)
125 - Op(EU) 373 - Op(BD) 511 - Op(EC) 653 - BE 97
130 - Op(ET) 380 - AE 68 512 - AL 17 654 - Op(EB)
134 - BE 77 404 - BF 80 513 - Op(AH) 658 - DO 73
135 - Op(BD) 406 - Op(CF) 514 - AK 83 559 - AE 79
155 - EG 51 407 - AE 79 515 - AL 77 660 - Op(BD)
156 - CF 63 409 - AE 91 516 - AL 63 705 - Op(BD)
159 - BF 57 411 - AE 94 517 - AJ 72 752 - DT 68
162 - Op(EE) 432 - Op(AK) 553 - Op(DM) 755 - Op(BD)
163 - DO 45 438 - Op(BD) 558 - DN 77 756 - AL 23
564 - Op(ED)
795
On Return Passage: U 86 - 108 - 134 - 155 - 163 - 256 - 458 - 463 - 505
- 508 - 510 - 572 - 598 - 600 - 653 - 658 - 752 - 98.
Entered Port: U 218 - Kiel.
Sailed: U 505 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy Nos. 47 and 48 see para. IVa.
2) U 162 reports persistent heavy traffic in EE 57, 73 and 81. 25.8.
chased 2 fast ships on a southwest course, in vain.
3) U 98 saw nothing in DC 28, 29, 52 and 53 since 23.8. 25 cbm
remaining. Boat has been ordered to return.
4) U 511 intended to operate in ED, north third. Has been ordered to
remain in present operations area.
- 127 -
5) U 130 sank S.S. "Viking Star" (6,445 GRT), course 100, in ET
6446.
6) U 509 is returning, as the C.O. is ill.
7) U 609 situation: Nothing seen in AE 4797 up to 22.8., except a
convoy of small vessels, course 170. Increased night patrol by aircraft,
destroyers and MTB's.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EE 4983, EC 14, EC 27, ED 9641, CC 56, CA 63,
EE 74.
 U-boat attack: ED 14, EC 2761.
"Empire Breeze" (7,457 GRT) reported from BD 1642 that the crew
were taking to the boats. (Ship belongs to convoy No. 47).
English aircraft reported U-boat in AE 8557.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 47:
In the course of the morning reports of attacks and successes during
the previous night were received from several boats. U 605 fired 5 single
shots, each at one medium-sized tanker, at 0140 in BD 1676. Three hits
were observed, one explosion heard. One steamer observed to sink.
Convoy was proceeding in double line abreast, about 15 steamers, 2
destroyers on the starboard wing. Boat was picked up by Radar by
destroyers and depth-charged U 373 reported the convoy's last position at
0214 in BD 1676, course 2300. U 605 ran up against a destroyer in the
fog and received bursts of fire from all guns. Coning tower shot through,
boat is no longer operationally efficient.
U 176 also attacked and scored hits with a double fan at a 6,000-
tonner. 2 explosions heard. Single miss from the stern tube at a destroyer.
Subsequently d/c's. U 438 was forced to dive, while pressing on, at 0710
in BD 1586 by destroyers. Unable to dive for 6 hours because of damage.
Moved away to make repairs. Weather continues misty and foggy. As
however there was a chance that it would improve, Group "Loss" was
ordered to stick with it and continue the operation. At 1112, U 705 sighted
several independent ships in DB 1578 and 1576. She suspected that the
convoy had scattered. Above-water attack in fog failed. U 174 was
picked up by hydrophone in BD 1677, probably by a stationary escort
vessel, and fired on at minimum range with machine guns. Afterwards
hydrophone hunt for 5 hours and well-placed d/c's. Boat reported
considerable damage and was given freedom to attack at her own
discretion. U 605 is returning via BD 15 and 16 as soon as she is ready
and has been ordered to search the area for torpedoed steamers. Damaged
as she is, it will not be worthwhile for U 438 to continue operating and
then refuel. She is returning. U 432 reported a radio message, not
repeated, from U 705 at 0922, according to which the convoy was in
796
- 128 -
BD 78 at this time, course 2300, speed 9 knots. Contrary to the
forecast, bad visibility continued. Odd boats kept coming up against
destroyers in the fog and were fired on with guns and machine guns and
then depth-charged. At 2400, U 705 reported several casualties. It is
intended to let the boats continue the operation tonight and wait and see
how visibility conditions are on the following day. No further shadowing
reports were received by morning.
Convoy No. 48:
U 214, a Group "Bluecher" boat, on her way south, sighted the
expected convoy, SL 119, at 1908 in DH 1543. Group "Bluecher" was
ordered to take action. U 172 reported it in CF 56. At 2105, U 107 in DH
1523 also made contact and then operations' control decided to direct
Group "Eisbär", stationed in the vicinity, against the convoy as well.
Convoy was steering 450, 9 knots. It consisted of 3 destroyers and about
15 steamers. At 0030, U 566 made contact in DH 1292, also U 406 in DH
1291, both boats were driven off after about an hour. Convoy altered
course to 750. From this it would seem that it was trying to get near its
own air reconnaissance as quickly as possible, or it might be making for
Gibraltar. No clear idea of its course could be formed, owing to
inaccuracies in boats' estimated positions. U 214 was shadowing the
whole time, but was driven off to the north. Towards 0300 and at 0322
reported the convoy out of sight in DH 1622, southeast course. Contact
was thus lost and was not regained by morning. Operation is continuing
with both groups.
 b) 1) U 125 and U 506 were directed to suspected supply traffic of small 26.August. 1942.
convoys close inshore in the Gulf of Guinea.
2) U 459, U 504, U 172, U 156, U 68 form Group "Eisbär". Boats will
proceed in that order in reconnaissance line from CF 7645 to 8566 on I. U 66 - Op(ED) U 165 - Op(AH) U 455 - BE 90 U 569 - Op(BC)
27.8., course 1800, day's run 150 miles. (This order is cancelled by 68 - CF 68 171 - Op(DB) 458 - BF 90 572 - DG 92
operation against the convoy). 69 - BD 87 172 - Op(CF) 459 - CF 82 584 - BF 40
3) U 604, U 92, U 91, U 756, U 407, U 659, U 409 and U 411 form 86 - DC 34 173 - Op(EE) 462 - DE 34 594 - CE 30
Group "Vorwaerts". They have been ordered to take up a patrol line in that 91 - AK 39 174 - Op(BD) 463 - CE 32 596 - Op(BC)
order at economical speed from AK 3765 to AK 6629, depth 20 miles. 92 - Op(AK) 175 - AK 61 504 - CF 55 598 - DP 17
Purpose: to take to the west to pick up England-America convoy traffic. 94 - Op(DN) 176 - Op(BC) 506 - Op(EO) 600 - DM 88
c) - d) None. 96 - BF 80 179 - AL 93 507 - Op(EJ) 604 - AK 67
98 - DC 28 214 - Op(CF) 508 - DO 43 605 - Op(BD)
V. Reports of Success: 107 - Op(CF) 217 - Op(ED) 509 - Op(EP) 608 - AE 69
U 130 1 ship 6,445 GRT Sunk 108 - DQ 46 218 - AO 40 510 - EG 26 609 - Op(AD)
U 605 1 ship 5,000 GRT Sunk 109 - Op(ES) 256 - BD 52 511 - Op(EC) 653 - BF 70
U 605 1 ship 5,000 GRT 125 - Op(EV) 373 - Op(BC) 512 - AK 62 654 - Op(EC)
U 605 2 ships Torpedoed 130 - Op(ET) 380 - AE 83 513 - Op(AH) 658 - DO 86
U 176 1 ship 7,454 GRT Presumed sunk. 134 - BE 76 404 - BF 72 514 - AK 79 659 - AL 23
135 - Op(BD) 406 - Op(CF) 515 - BD 34 660 - Op(BC)
155 - EG 26 407 - AL 23 516 - Al 67 705 - Op(BC)
VI. General: None. 156 - CF 67 409 - AE 91 517 - Op(AH) 752 - DT 38
159 - BF 40 411 - AE 88 553 - Op(EB) 755 - Op(BD)
162 - Op(EE) 432 - Op(BC) 558 - DM 97 756 - AL 17
163 - DO 52 438 - Op(BD) 564 - Op(ED)
164 - EB 36 566 - Op(CF)

- 129 -
On Return Passage: U 86 - 98 - 108 - 109 - 134 - 155 - 163 - 438 - 458
- 463 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 572 - 598 - 600 - 605 - 653 - 658 - 752.
Entered Port: U 458 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 211 - Bergen.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) Convoy Nos. 47 and 48 see para. IVa.
797
 2) U 411 was bombed by aircraft in AE 8535 on 25.8. and subsequently
sighted 2 patrol vessels working together with aircraft.
3) U 658 is starting on direct return passage owing to fuel.
4) U 109 has observed no traffic in the sea area off Freetown. Only 2
Italian tankers sighted. Intended to return on account of fuel. Boat was
promised supply and ordered to remain in her operations area.
5) U 510 sighted a large passenger freighter in DR 5475, course north,
high speed. No attack as boat was not able to haul ahead.
6) U 130 sank "Beechwood", with a cargo of potash from Lourenco-
Marques, in ET 6715, course 100. Heavy traffic in ET 6467, left third, on
northern courses. Slight air activity. Boat has used all her torpedoes, total:
7 ships, 51,718 GRT.
Secret instructions for "Beechwood" show the following route for
Capetown - Freetown: from CR 6748 - 4868 -
- 130 -
GH 3519 - FO 6999 - FG 9669 - FF 3757. From here to FE 3153
during the period 21.8. - 30.8., between 30.8. and 9.9. to FF 1166, then on
to port.
7) U 156 sank "Clammac Whirter" (5,941 GRT), course 350.
8) U 558 was depth-charged and bombed on 24.8. in DN 7825 by a
fighter group with flying boat and destroyer(s). In EC 1196 sank a
freighter of 3,500 GRT, course west.
9) U 171 situation: 17.8. sighted a small convoy with strong escort.
Since 15.8. nothing at night. Traffic apparently little and far between.
10) U 162 sank a tanker of 10,000 GRT in EE 7312, course 1400.
798
11) U 516 fired a quadruple fan miss at S.S. "Port Jackson", 9,687 GRT,
and in a subsequent gun action scored 2 hits, steamer returned fire. Got
away in the fog, course 700, speed 19 knots.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 63 - EE 49 - DD 79 - CA 33 - EE 77 - BB 53 -
CD 35 - EC 1961 - BC 1488 - DC 3167 - FB 95.
SSS - report from English motor vessel "Port Jackson" (U 516).
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 47:
Towards 1000 U 176 reported fog, visibility 200 meters, no
hydrophone bearing. U 755 had also been in fog since 2400. Operations'
Control then decided to break off the operation. Boats were told to report
position and fuel. Supply order see para IVb. General remarks on convoy
see para. VI. U 605, which had been ordered to proceed via BD 15 and
16, reported wreckage in square 1670, heard propeller noises at times in
the hydrophones and heard 3 series of d/c's at some distance. Boat is
remaining in the area until visibility improves.
Operation against this convoy is thus completed.
2) Convoy No. 48:
U 566 sighted the convoy again at 1000 in DH 1338, course northeast,
speed 9 knots. Boat reported that she was shadowing constantly until
2140 in CF 8686. Convoy was steering via CF 8835 and 8922. Group
"Eisbär" was ordered towards 1500 to continue the operation only if
conditions were favorable, and not to press on to the north, to report
position as soon as they were starting south. By about 0200 all boats had
reported and the operation was thus broken off. Positions showed that all
4 boats had been immediately ahead of the convoy. The convoy made a
sharp leg to the east and prevented an attack.
Order for Group "Eisbär" see para. IVb.
U 406 encountered a destroyer at 1530, was forced to submerge and
was subjected to a minor d/c hunt for 2 hours.
- 131 -

Misty weather again made it difficult to find the convoy. U 506 was
driven off to the north at 2325. At 2400 U 107 reported that she had been
hunted with d/c's and hydrophones for 8 hours in DH 2110. Boat repaired
her damage and pressed on. Contact seemed lost for good. It was not
until 0703 that U 406 reported smoke clouds and a destroyer in CF 8664;
at 0825 she reported the convoy in CF 8638, course 200, speed 9 knots.
The operation is continuing.
b) 1) Group "Eisbär" received orders to form a reconnaissance line,
which is to proceed from DH 1444 to 1664 at 0800/28/8, course south,
day's run 150 miles. Order: U 459, 172, 68, 156 and 504.
U 609 will join Group "Vorwaerts" and will occupy AK 3734 at
cruising speed, depth 20 miles.
2) U 511 and U 654 have been given freedom of action within a radius
of 300 miles of Kingston.
3) The following boats are to make for the following squares:
U 514 and U 175 - DN 76, U 515 and 512 - ED 90.
4) U 509, U 98, U 108, U 598 and U 600 return passage via supply
square CD 80. U 154 return passage via CE 40.
c) U 432 and U 660 will supply from U 174 in BD 7355 from 28.8., the
remaining boats of Group "Loss" will proceed to CD 5155 to supply from
U 462.
d) None.
VI. General:
Review of Convoy operation No. 47:
In the disposition of the boats of Group "Loss", the disadvantages of
having such a long line of 13 boats (300 miles) without any depth were
realized and accepted. Their main task first of all was to find an ON or
ONS convoy; it was known from Radio Intelligence reports that these
convoys had been re-routed to the north or to the south after the last U-
boat attacks. The convoy was picked up south of the patrol line by a boat
which was not in her correct position owing to an error. Although the
furthest boats of Group "Loss" were over 300 miles away from the convoy,
the whole group was given the order: "at 'em".
U 660, which was furthest away, regained the broken contact after a 33
hour passage at maximum speed.
Boats have reported total results as follows:
Sunk: 5 ships totaling about 26,000 GRT
Torpedoed: 3 ships
To balance this, the losses were nil.
- 132 -

V. Reports of Success: Damaged: U 256 return passage necessary

U 130 1 ship 4,897 GRT Sunk U 605 slight damage which would not have necessitated returning (lack
U 156 1 ship 5,941 GRT Sunk of fuel)
U 558 1 ship 3,500 GRT Sunk U 438 " " " " " " " " " " "
U 162 1 ship 10,000 GRT Sunk "
799

Temporary damage in 5 boats.
The results look small by comparison with number of boats which took
part. But it must be remembered that the fog which came up during the
night 24/25.8., just at the moment when 9 boats were shadowing, spoilt the
best chances of success.
Again the fog meant:
a) Defeat of the U-boat attacks
b) Loss of contact
c) Serious danger to boats continuing the operation.
Several boats were fired upon by guns out of the fog, which points to
the fact that the English destroyers used their (Radar) location gear to hunt
U-boats in the fog. As long as the U-boats have no Radar sets themselves
they will be at a disadvantage in fog against enemy units equipped with
radar or even with a good listening set. In this convoy operation again the
boats were heavily depth-charged as soon as bad visibility set in and the
damage cited was thus caused. Moral of this convoy: the experience, that
convoy operations are still possible as long as enemy aircraft are not
constantly flying escort, is confirmed.
Requirement: Equipment of the U-boats as soon as possible with a
combined Radar and Radar interception set.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
27.August 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(ED) U 165 - Op(AH) U 455 - BF 64 U 572 - DG 66
68 - CF 92 171 - DA 84 459 - DH 12 584 - BE 93
69 - BD 77 172 - CF 92 462 - CD 77 594 - CE 33
86 - DC 52 173 - Op(ED) 463 - CF 12 596 - BC 92
91 - Op(AK) 174 - BD 49 504 - CF 92 598 - DP 24
92 - Op(AK) 175 - AK 58 506 - Op(EU) 600 - DM 98
94 - Op(DN) 176 - BC 68 507 - Op(FJ) 604 - AK 39
96 - BF 72 179 - AL 94 508 - DO 29 605 - BD 15
800
98 - DC 38 211 - AF 87 509 - EF 98 608 - AE 91
107 - Op(CF) 214 - Op(CF) 510 - DR 55 609 - Op(AK)
108 - DO 28 217 - Op(ED) 511 - Op(EC) 653 - BF 73
109 - Op(ET) 218 - AN 36 512 - AK 83 654 - Op(EB)
125 - Op(EU) 256 - BD 62 513 - Op(AH) 658 - DS 47
130 - ET 51 373 - BC 95 514 - BD 14 659 - AL 18
134 - BE 82 380 - AE 87 515 - BD 64 660 - BD 41
135 - BC 68 404 - BE 96 516 - AL 88 705 - BC 68
155 - DR 52 406 - Op(CF) 517 - Op(AH) 752 - DH 78
156 - CF 92 407 - AL 17 553 - Op(DM) 755 - BC 95
159 - BF 74 409 - AL 33 558 - Op(EB) 756 - Op(AK)
162 - Op(EE) 411 - AL 35 564 - Op(ED)
163 - DO 37 432 - BD 44 566 - Op(CF)
164 - Op(ED) 438 - BD 29 569 - BC 92
On Return Passage: U 653 - 705 - 256 - 163 - 109 - 98 - 600 - 108 - 463
- 155 - 658 - 510 - 598 - 130 - 86 - 752 - 572 - 508 - 509 - 134.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: UD 5 - 410 - Kiel; U 203 - Brest; U 460 - 590 - St. Nazaire.
- 133 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 48 see para. IVa.
 2) U 553 situation: Nothing seen from 21 - 25.8. in EC 10 and 20. Also
nothing in DO 78 - 97. Constant air activity in Mona Passage by day.
Return passage without refueling.
3) U 507 has encountered no further traffic except neutrals. Constant
air activity by day, patrolling destroyers off "Pernambuco". Protracted
return passage via sea area off "Freetown".
4) U 165 sighted a small convoy of 3 steamers and 4 destroyers in AH
9823, course 200. Boat attacked and fired a four-fan and a double fan. 3
explosions were seen in 2 steamers each of 5,000 GRT and altogether 5
explosions were heard. Boat then forced to submerge. Sinking not
observed.
5) U 94 made contact at 2030 with a convoy in EC 1927, course 3300,
slow speed. Flying-boat escort. At 2215 convoy was in EC 1912, at 2358
in EC 71 and at 0432 in EC 1614, course 00, speed 11 knots.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 54, EO 62, DA 91, BB 42, EC 16, EB 36, EO
3799, EO 3519, CA 32, BB 48.
English aircraft reported U-boat in AL 3430.
An unidentified vessel reported from about 40 miles northeast of
Trinidad that she had sighted a U-boat and attacked with d/c's.
U-boat attack: AH 95 and AH 9831.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 48:
U 406 continued to shadow and at 0914 reported the convoy in CF
8633. Course 400, 9 knots. Boat's lubricating oil is badly contaminated
and can only make half speed. At 1145 the convoy was steering 00. U
214 also gained contact at 1130 in CF 6778, but was driven off during an
attack. Convoy then zig-zagged away and steered 00, changed to 200
again at 1430 and, according to U 406, was in CF 6786 at 1505. U 406
moved away to discover the reason for contamination of her lubricating
oil. At 1701 she reported that the enemy unit was undoubtedly the convoy,
as 12 silhouettes and 2 destroyers were seen at dawn. Boat was still
shadowing smoke clouds. Convoy was then in CF 6792, main course 500.
U 107 was ready for action again and pressed on. U 214 had lost contact.
801
U 566 was forced to submerge by air escort and hunted with hydrophones
for 2 hours. Pressed on. Convoy's position at 1930 was CF 6763, speed
10 knots. U 406 tried an underwater attack towards 2400, but was
- 134 -
located. The convoy again zig-zagged away to 00. Composition:
about 20 steamers in double line ahead. Position at 2130 CF 6842. Boat
moved away to the west. Contact was then lost. U 107 reported at 0445
that she had been shadowing a destroyer in CF 6565 for 1 1/2 hours.
Suspects this is the port outer escort. Boat had apparently a leak in her
port compensating tank and moved off to investigate. No further reports
were received by 0800. The operation is continuing.
b) U 404, 594, 584, 96, 308 and 608 are to steer for AL 74. It is planned
to form a patrol line with these boats at about the level of the square to be
steered for. U 159 is to make for ET 50 via CF 70 - DG 90, U 516 for ED
98.
U 171 has been given freedom of action via DK 50 or DL 68, EB 30
and DN 84.
c) U 516 reported the firing data for the unexplained fan-miss in her
attack on "Port Jackson". Boat estimated the range at 1500 meters. After
the safety range had been covered the bridge watch observed a column of
water 2 - 3 meters high on the bow. Presumably the pistol fired and the
torpedo did not explode.
V. Reports of Success:
U 165 2 ships 10,000 GRT Sunk
U 165 1 ship Torpedoed.

VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
28.August 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(ED) U 165 - Op(AH) U 432 - BD 73 U 564 - Op(ED)
68 - DH 15 171 - Op(DA) 438 - BD 65 566 - Op(CF)
69 - CD 22 172 - DH 17 455 - BE 55 569 - CD 22
86 - DC 59 173 - Op(ED) 459 - DH 14 572 - DG 36
91 - Op(AK) 174 - BD 73 460 - BF 91 584 - BE 91
92 - Op(AK) 175 - AK 76 462 - CD 72 590 - BF 91
94 - EC 13 176 - BC 98 463 - BE 79 594 - BE 74
96 - BE 92 179 - AL 87 504 - DH 19 596 - CD 21
98 - DD 14 203 - BF 50 506 - Op(EU) 598 - DP 23
107 - CF 62 211 - AF 72 507 - Op(FJ) 599 - AD 87
108 - DF 31 214 - Op(CF) 508 - DO 36 600 - DN 78
109 - Op(ES) 217 - Op(ED) 509 - EF 69 604 - Op(AK)
125 - Op(EU) 218 - AN 28 510 - DR 31 605 - BD 16
130 - ET 16 256 - BE 44 511 - Op(EC) 608 - AE 88
134 - BE 91 373 - CD 24 512 - AK 84 609 - AK 34
135 - BC 98 380 - AL 35 513 - Op(AH) 653 - BF 80
155 - DR 26 404 - BE 82 514 - BC 63 654 - Op(EB)
156 - DH 19 406 - Op(CF) 515 - BD 82 658 - DP 54
159 - BE 98 407 - Op(AK) 516 - BE 14 659 - Op(AK)
162 - Op(ED) 409 - AL 28 517 - Op(AH) 660 - BD 48
163 - DO 36 410 - AO 47 553 - Op(DO) 705 - BD 47
164 - Op(ED) 411 - AL 29 558 - Op(DM) 752 - DH 49
D 5 - AD 47 756 - Op(AK) 755 - CD 21
802
- 135 -
On Return Passage: U 86 - 98 - 109 - 134 - 155 - 163 - 256 - 438 - 463
- 507 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 572 - 598 - 600 - 605 - 653 - 658 - 705 - 752.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 48 see para. IVa.
2) U 511 gained contact with U 94's convoy at 0615/28 in EC 1298.
Boat attacked and scored 5 hits. An 8,000-tonner seen to sink. Tanker of
9,000 GRT was hit twice, sinking probable. After surfacing boat driven
off and lost contact. Moved away to EC 1679 to repair damage.
3) U 108 sighted a passenger freighter zig-zagging around 3000 in DE
8315, speed 15 knots. Fired a miss, lost contact.
4) U 173 situation: Nothing seen in 9 days in EO 20 and 30. Bombs on
27th in EO 36. 4 deck containers with torpedoes smashed. 5 torpedo
tubes and one periscope also unserviceable. Moving away to repair.
5) U 564 encountered no traffic in EE 73. Is proceeding to ED 90 to
search for a new line.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EN 33, BA 9793, CA 87, DN 84, ED 21, CA 3775,
DN 79, CA 32, ED 9853, EC 1370 (U-boat, probably U 94, attacked by
escort ship).
English aircraft reported a U-boat in BF 4646 and AF 7660. A ship
torpedoed in AH 98 was reported sunk. Italian tanker "Alcolo" had taken
survivors from a steamer belonging to the "Larinaga" shipping company,
on board and had seen 2 more boats drifting in ER 21.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 48:
1) U 214 was forced to submerge the whole night long by aircraft with
radar. She was in CF 6831 and was pressing on.
2) U 107 had a loud knocking noise in her port compensating tank
above 300 revolutions. No leak was found and she pressed on. As contact
had been completely lost and, according to dead reckoning, the boats must
have been about 80 miles in the rear of the convoy, Operations Control
decided to break off the operation. Boats were ordered to move away to
the west, unless they were in a favorable position.
- 136 -
At 1659 however U 566 sighted the convoy again in CF 6343,
northeast course, speed 10 knots. The convoy must therefore either not
have maintained its previous speed or have made a long leg to the
southeast. U 566 and U 107 were to continue the operation, also U 214 if
in a favorable position. The latter boat however reported her position in
CF 6484 and could not carry out the order. U 159 was operating against
this convoy from CF 3534. U 406 sighted a destroyer in CF 5677 and
several smoke clouds, but soon lost contact again as visibility deteriorated.
She and U 214 were ordered to remain in their present areas. U 566
attacked at 1900 in CF 6315 and sank a 7,000-tonner. A ship of 5,000
GRT was torpedoed. Boat was depth-charged and rammed. She moved
803
off to the southwest and reported the following damage: Bridge rammed
away as far as the pressure hull, forward periscope, d/f gear and U-boat
aiming sight torn away. Attack periscope entirely unserviceable, bent
backwards at an angle of 600. As there was no further contact, U 159 was
ordered to continue on her outward passage. U 107 reported that she was
fully operationally effective. The following are therefore still
operationally effective: U 214, 107, 406. U 406 is probably restricted, as
the cause of contamination of the lubricating oil has not yet been
discovered. U 566 is returning.
Operation against this convoy is now closed.
b) Boats will proceed as follows after supplying: U 432 - AJ 94. Group
"Loss", with U 373, 755, 596, 569, 176 and 135, also AJ 94.
c) U 508 delivered 1.5 cbm of drinking water to U 163 and took over 20
cbm fuel from her.
d) An east or west-bound convoy is expected in Group "Vorwaerts" area,
i.e. about AK 30 and 60, on 29.8.
V. Reports of Success:
U 511 2 ships 17,000 GRT Sunk
U 566 2 ships 11,000 GRT Sunk.
VI General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 137 -

29.August 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(ED) U 171 - Op(DA) U 455 - BE 55 U 572 - CF 79
68 - DH 55 172 - DH 44 459 - DH 44 584 - BE 61
69 - CD 16 173 - EF 75 460 - BE 91 590 - BF 82
86 - DC 95 174 - BD 73 462 - CD 51 594 - BD 66
91 - Op(AK) 175 - AK 79 463 - BE 81 596 - CD 51
92 - Op(AK) 176 - CD 27 504 - DH 46 598 - DE 79
94 - Op(DM) 179 - BE 84 506 - Op(EU) 599 - AL 36
96 - BE 67 203 - BF 46 507 - Op(FK) 600 - DN 82
98 - DD 24 211 - AF 47 508 - DO 36 604 - Op(AK)
107 - Op(CF) 214 - Op(CF) 509 - EG 14 605 - BD 29
108 - DE 34 217 - Op(ED) 510 - DF 94 608 - AL 28
109 - Op(ET) 218 - AF 87 511 - Op(EC) 609 - Op(AK)
125 - Op(EU) 256 - BE 54 512 - BD 15 653 - BF 80
130 - EK 71 373 - CD 51 513 - Op(AH) 654 - Op(EB)
134 - BF 71 380 - AL 02 514 - BC 57 658 - DP 61
135 - CD 27 404 - BE 54 515 - CE 41 659 - Op(AK)
155 - DF 94 406 - Op(CF) 516 - BD 62 660 - BD 73
156 - DH 46 407 - Op(AK) 517 - Op(AH) 705 - BD 49
159 - CF 33 409 - Op(AK) 553 - DP 72 752 - DH 19
162 - Op(ED) 410 - AN 36 558 - Op(DM) 755 - CD 51
163 - DO 36 411 - Op(AK) 564 - Op(EE) 756 - Op(AK)
164 - Op(EC) 432 - BD 73 566 - Op(CF) D 5 - AL 36
165 - Op(AH) 438 - BE 45 569 - CD 51
804
On Return Passage: U 86 - 98 - 108 - 109 - 134 - 155 - 163 - 256 - 438
- 463 - 507 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 553 - 572 - 598 - 600 - 605 - 653 - 658 -
705 - 752.
Entered Port: U 460 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 216 - 617 - 259 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 164 sank a freighter of 6,000 GRT in EC 2728, course 1100.
Boat's cooling-water pump is damaged and cannot be repaired with own
resources.
2) U 509 fired a quadruple miss at a Q ship. Depth 2 meters, good data,
suspects that torpedo ran under.
3) U 66 situation: Nothing seen along the shipping route to Trinidad
reported by U 108. Persistent air activity in EO 38. 29.8. sank the
American "Topa-Topa" (5,356 GRT), carrying petrol, aircraft and motor
cars from Trinidad to Freetown.
4) U 564 attacked a tanker with torpedoes and gunfire in ED 9923. Left
her on fire and sinking. Course 2300, speed 12 knots. Total sunk: 9
ships, 60,000 GRT. Return passage.
5) U 517 sank an auxiliary ship of 3,000 GRT in AH 9823 on 27.8. and
on 28.8. a freighter already hit by U 165. Little traffic in operations area.
Air and sea patrol. Boat requests permission to proceed on through the
Belle Isle Straits to BB 20.
b) None.
- 138 -
 c) U-boat sightings: EC 15, CA 33, EE 7755, DN 7916, CA 73, AH 62,
EE 81, BB 17/41, AH 9764, DN 5884.
Sighting by aircraft in BE 6983, attack with d/c's in AF 7296.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 608, U 594, U 380, U 404, U 584 and U 96 were ordered to take
up positions in patrol line at cruising speed from AL 7128 to AL 7851,
depth 15 miles. Boats will form Group "Stier".
2) Group "Eisbär" will make a day's run of 190 miles from 2000/29/8.
3) Group "Vorwaerts" will proceed in reconnaissance line, course 2500
and day's run of 120 miles from 2400.
4) U 155 and U 510 are waiting in CD 60 for a boat which has sailed
with spare parts for U 155.
c) U 174 has delivered fuel to U 432 and U 660.
d) For political reasons, actions are forbidden for the present inside a
strip 20 miles wide off the Brazilian coast.
I. U 66 - Op(EO) U 172 - DH 74 U 462 - CD 51 U 596 - CD 51
68 - DH 75 173 - Op(EF) 463 - BE 95 598 - DE 81
69 - CC 38 174 - BD 82 504 - DH 76 599 - AN 31
86 - DD 74 175 - BD 14 506 - Op(EU) 600 - DN 92
91 - Op(AK) 176 - CD 51 507 - Op(FK) 604 - Op(AK)
92 - Op(AK) 179 - CF 24 508 - DP 21 605 - BD 39
94 - Op(DN) 203 - BF 46 509 - DQ 68 608 - AL 54
96 - BE 52 211 - AE 92 510 - DF 64 609 - Op(AK)
98 - DD 23 214 - CF-Op 511 - Op(EC) 653 - BF 54
107 - CF-Op 217 - Op(EC) 512 - BD 95 654 - Op(EB)
108 - DE 36 218 - AF 72 513 - Op(AH) 658 - DP 39
109 - Op(ET) 256 - BE 65 514 - BC 76 659 - Op(AK)
125 - Op(EU) 373 - CD 51 515 - CD 68 660 - BD 82
130 - EK 41 380 - AL 54 516 - BD 60 705 - BD 59
134 - BF 73 404 - BE 15 517 - Op(AH) 752 - CF 88
135 - CD 51 406 - CF 55 553 - DP 88 755 - CD 51
155 - DF 64 407 - Op(AK) 558 - Op(DL) 756 - Op(AK)

V. Reports of Success:
U 164 Freighter 6,000 GRT - 139 -
U 564 Ship 9,000 GRT
U 517 2 ships 5,500 GRT
U 66 1 ship 5,356 GRT
U 701 3 ships 15,000 GRT (Mining result, as known from later
information. Tonnage assumed).

VI. General: None.

--------------------------------------------------- 156 - DH 76 409 - Op(AK) 564 - Op(ED) D 5 - AN 31

--------------- 159 - CF 59 410 - AN 31 566 - CF 39 216 - AO 70
162 - Op(ED) 411 - AN 31 569 - CD 51 259 - AO 70
30.August 1942. 163 - DD 98 432 - BD 48 572 - CF 57 617 - AO 70
164 - Op(EB) 438 - BE 54 584 - BE 28
805
 165 - Op(AH) 455 - BD 44 590 - BE 92
171 - Op(DL) 459 - DH 74 594 - BD 39
On Return Passage: U 86 - 98 - 108 - 134 - 155 - 163 - 174 - 256 - 438
- 463 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 553 - 564 - 566 - 572 - 598 - 600 - 605 - 653 -
658 - 705 - 752.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 66 has apparently discovered a new traffic line via Trinidad. She
sank "Sir Juan", 5,200 GRT, towards 1000 in EE 9840, proceeding from
Australia to Trinidad via Capetown, course 2700, and about 2000 in EE
9586 a freighter of 4,500 GRT. Is operating against further smoke plumes
in 9820.
2) U 508 sighted a large independently-routed ship in DE 4726. Main
course 3100, 18 - 20 knots. Did not shadow.
3) U 162 sank a modern three-masted
4) U 173: Both periscopes unserviceable due to aircraft bombs. Not fit
for deep diving. Has been ordered to make a protracted return passage
according to fuel situation.
5) U 514, on her way through Iceland Passage, sighted a gunboat and
fishing vessels in AE 8816 and 8812. 21.8. sky-search periscope
unserviceable owing to aircraft d/c's.
6) U 705 fired a quadruple fan in BD 6852 at a large tanker with 2 guns.
Main course 2100, 16 knots. 1 explosion heard. No effect observed on
tanker.
7) U 516, which was in the vicinity, operated against the ship reported
and sank her after chasing her for 18 hours in CE 2695, main course 1900,
15 knots. Ship was tanker "Jack Carnes", 10,600 GRT, was proceeding in
ballast and sank after 7 finishing shots.
Situation in the Caribbean: In reply to a query, boats reported.
806
8) U 553: Area south of Cuba and Jamaica continues to be promising in
the present state of anti-submarine activity.
- 140 -
Odd fast land-based aircraft. PC-boats are numerous and a nuisance,
but no danger if a good look-out is kept. Suspects traffic through
Windward Passage only.
9) U 558: Caribbean empty because of compulsory convoy system,
anti-submarine activity centered on convoy routes, not dangerous if care is
taken. West coast of Yucatan no traffic, no patrol, land-based aircraft on
east side. Disposition in Straits unfavorable. Suggests sweeping the
convoy routes with small groups in loose formation.
10) U 564: Traffic always via "Port of Spain", in convoys in the
Caribbean. Independently-routes ships still to be found east of Trinidad,
west of this convoys of 16 - 20 ships every 6 days.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DM 71, BB 42, BB 1795.
U-boat attack: In EE 97. SSS report from tanker "Jack Carnes" BD
6768 and CE 2646.
English aircraft reported U-boats in BE 6718, BE 9243 and AE 9893.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 179 has been ordered to continue via CF 70, DG 90, EH 30, FE
50, to GR.
 2) U 590, U 209 are making for CF 85, U 214, U 107 for CG 5580. U
406 has been allocated CF 76 - 84 - 85 as temporary attack area.
It is planned to form a reconnaissance line with these boats and 3 more
which are sailing on 1st September, to proceed south from CF 80. Until
then U 214 and U 107 will operate off Lisbon. Ships go in and out here
alone or in small part convoys with a corvette. 3 mile zone is to be
observed.
3) U 517 is permitted to enter the Belle Isle Straits if the moon is
favorable. According to U 132 and U 553, there are promising operations
areas in BB 14 and the squares joining it in the west and southeast. U 513
will continue to operate in her present area. If the traffic situation there is
not favorable, she is to go to Conception Bay. There are anchorages here
east of Bell Island and a loading jetty for ore ships on the east side of the
Island.
c) U 516 has laid a weather buoy in the south position.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 66 2 ships 9,700 GRT
U 162 1 ship 7,735 GRT
- 141 -
U 705 1 ship Torpedoed
U 516 1 ship 10,600 GRT
807
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
31.August 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(EE) U 172 - DT 26 U 455 - BD 67 U 590 - BE 89
68 - DT 34 173 - Op(EE) 459 - DT 26 594 - BD 39
69 - CC 28 174 - BD 91 462 - CD 51 596 - CD 51
86 - DD 76 175 - BC 65 463 - BF 74 598 - DE 56
91 - Op(AK) 176 - CD 51 504 - DT 36 599 - AF 87
92 - Op(AK) 179 - CF 51 506 - Op(EU) 600 - DO 44
94 - Op(DN) 203 - BE 59 507 - Op(FK) 604 - Op(AK)
96 - BE 52 211 - AF 86 508 - DE 77 605 - BD 39
98 - DD 32 214 - CF 66 509 - DQ 63 608 - Op(AL)
107 - CF 66 216 - AN 36 510 - DF 37 609 - Op(AK)
108 - CD 79 217 - Op(ED) 511 - Op(EC) 617 - AN 36
109 - Op(ET) 218 - AE 69 512 - CE 22 653 - BF 50
125 - Op(EU) 256 - BF 47 513 - Op(AH) 654 - Op(EB)
130 - EJ 33 259 - AN 36 514 - BC 77 658 - DQ 16
134 - BE 82 373 - CD 51 515 - CD 86 659 - Op(AK)
135 - CD 51 380 - Op(AL) 516 - CF 26 660 - BD 91
155 - CF 31 404 - Op(AL) 517 - Op(AH) 705 - BE 47
156 - DT 35 406 - Op(CF) 553 - EE 35 752 - CF 67
159 - CF 76 407 - Op(AK) 558 - Op(DL) 755 - CD 51
162 - Op(EE) 409 - Op(AK) 564 - EE 49 756 - Op(AK)
163 - DE 71 410 - AF 87 566 - CG 13 D 5 - AF 87
164 - Op(EB) 411 - Op(AK) 569 - CD 51
165 - Op(AH) 432 - BC 63 572 - CF 53
171 - Op(DL) 438 - BE 64 584 - BE 16
 On Return Passage: U 86 - 89 - 108 - 130 - 134 - 155 - 163 - 173 - 174
- 256 - 438 - 463 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 553 - 564 - 566 - 572 - 598 - 600 -
605 - 658 - 705 - 752 - 653.
Entered Port: U 653 - Brest.
Sailed: U 87 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 49 see para. IVa.
2) U 511 situation: Fast land-based aircraft in Windward Passage as far
as Nawassa. Southeast of this slight to heavy air activity according to
traffic. Convoy routes changed frequently. No enemy independently-
routed ships. Air escort with convoys.
3) U 600 sighted a freighter, course 3200 in DO 1582 (on the Spanish
route), navigation lights, no markings. In reply to her query, she was
ordered to sink the ship only if there were quite definitely no neutrality
markings.
4) U 66 sank a tanker of 7,000 GRT, course 450, in EE 9590.
- 142 -
5) U 217 situation: Lively neutral traffic along a line from the main
ports of Curacao and Aruba, and north and south of the Archipelago.
Slight air activity.
6) U 125 encountered no traffic in EV 70. Slight sea and air patrol.
Boat is continuing operation in EV 60.
808
7) U 513 reports medium air patrol, no sea patrol off the Belle Isle
Straits. Boat is proceeding to the operations area allocated to her
yesterday.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 5182, BB 83, DL 93.
English aircraft was flying over a diving U-boat in BF 4560.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 49:
U 609 reported a convoy in AK 2914 at 0755/31. Group "Vorwaerts"
was ordered to operate against it. As, according to dead reckoning, there
should be an HX convoy in this area, boats were informed that the
convoy's course was probably east. At 1234 U 92 gained contact in AK
2933. She reported 18 smoke clouds, course 700, speed 9 knots. Contact
was maintained. From about 1500 - 1600 the convoy steered 200 and after
that 700 as before. At 1755 it was in AK 2868 on a main course of 500. U
609 attacked as soon as the convoy was in sight and sank 2 steamers
totaling 8,000 GRT. Strength of convoy 30 - 40 ships, escort all round. At
1738 U 91 gained contact. At 1728 U 756 reported smoke clouds in AK
0213 and attacked at 2104 in AK 2686. At 2208 U 91 was driven off and
lost contact. U 407 and U 409 requested beacon signals at 0229 and 0556
respectively. U 756 was driven off by a destroyer while making a day
attack. Convoy steered a main course of 700 until 2400, speed 7 knots,
about 20 steamers, 8 destroyers and escort vessels. U 609 also regained
contact in the course of the night. She fired 2 single shots at the convoy in
AK 3729 at 0600. One probable hit. Convoy steered approximately via
AK 2868 - AK 3743 and was in 3737 at 0800. The convoy seemed to
have separated into a fast and a slow group, which were proceeding
approximately along the same route at 8 - 9 and 6 - 7 knots respectively. It
is still being shadowed. The operation continues.
b) U 217 has been given permission to operate against the line of traffic
reported in the sea area off Trinidad if prospects are not good in her
present operations area (between Aruba and Curacao). The same order
applied to U 654 according to fuel situation. U 558 has also been ordered
to proceed to the area off Trinidad via EC 10 and ED 40.
 c) None.
d) U 94, an old experienced boat, sighted a convoy, course 3300 at F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
2030/27 in EC 1927. Escort by flying-boat. She reported it for the last
time at 0432/28 in EC 1614. After that the 1 - 15 September 1942

PG30311
- 143 -

1.September 1942.

I. U 66 - Op(EE) U 171 - Op(DL) U 438 - BE 66 U 572 - CF 35

68 - DT 67 172 - DT 59 455 - BD 58 584 - Op(AL)
69 - CC 18 173 - EF 79 459 - DT 59 590 - CF 34
86 - DO 86 174 - BE 71 462 - CD 50 594 - AL 77
boat did not reply to repeated calls. An American broadcast report 87 - BF 91 175 - BC 91 463 - BF 73 596 - CD 46
says that 2 German U-boats were sunk on 29.8. on the west coast of Cuba. 91 - Op(AK) 176 - CD 50 504 - DT 69 598 - DE 31
2 members of the crews are said to have been saved. These must be U 94 92 - Op(AK) 179 - CF 73 506 - Op(ET) 599 - AF 76
and U 654. U 654's last report was on 21.8. As the boat was near the 96 - BE 16 203 - BE 85 507 - Op(AK) 600 - DO 16
convoy, she will have operated against it and been lost. 98 - DE 12 211 - AL 26 508 - DE 45 604 - AK 30
There are no further clues. The loss of both boats must be accepted. 107 - Op(DK) 214 - CG 45 509 - DR 11 605 - BE 52
108 - CD 84 216 - AN 28 510 - CE 75 608 - Op(AL)
V. Reports of Success: 109 - Op(ET) 217 - Op(ED) 511 - Op(EC) 609 - Op(AK)
U 66 1 ship 7,000 GRT 125 - Op(EV) 218 - AE 83 512 - CE 16 617 - AN 28
U 609 2 ships 8,000 GRT 130 - DT 22 256 - BF 54 513 - Op(AH) 658 - DE 98
1 ship 1 probable hit. 134 - BF 68 259 - AN 28 514 - CC 16 659 - Op(AK)
135 - CD 50 373 - CD 50 515 - DF 13 660 - BE 71
155 - CE 74 380 - Op(AL) 516 - CE 51 705 - BE 57
VI. General: None. 156 - DT 68 404 - Op(AL) 517 - Op(AH) 752 - CF 62
159 - DG 36 406 - Op(CF) 553 - BF 11 755 - CD 55
162 - Op(EE) 407 - AK 30 558 - Op(DM) 756 - Op(AK)
(Signed): DÖNITZ. 163 - DE 49 409 - AK 30 564 - EE 46 D 5 - AF 76
164 - Op(DM) 410 - AF 76 566 - BF 75
165 - Op(BB) 411 - AK 30 569 - CD 50
432 - BC 35
809
 On Return Passage: U 86 - 98 - 108 - 130 - 134 - 155 - 163 - 173 - 174
- 256 - 438 - 463 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 553 - 564 - 566 - 572 - 598 - 600 -
605 - 658 - 660 - 705 - 752
Entered Port: U 134 - La Pallice. positions: U 609, which acted as shadower proper after she had fixed
Sailed: U 753 - 333 La Pallice; U 618 - 440 - 258 - 221 - Kiel; U 460 - all her torpedoes, also U 407, U 411, U 409, U 92, U 659 and U 91. The
St. Nazaire. following attacked: U 604 at 0733/1 in about 3729. She scored a probable
hit at a 5,000 tonner. U 659's attack was frustrated by the convoy's making
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. a leg just beforehand. Shortly before that U 409 was picked up by an
escort vessel for a short time and depth-charged. Both periscopes out of
III. Reports on the Enemy: order. U 407 tried a night attack at 0350. We could not fire as the enemy
a) 1) Convoy No. 49 see para. IVa. again made a sharp leg. U 91 fired a quadruple miss at dawn. The convoy
2) U 69 reported a two-funneled ship at 1000 in CC 1777, course 500, proceeded via the following points: AK 3677 - 3683, AL 1716 (1945)
20 knots. 1735 (2320), 1845 (0345).
U 175 is operating against this ship from BC 7686. In the morning U 211 was also ordered to operate against the convoy.
3) U 96 was forced to submerge in BE 1957 by a destroyer and patrol She is outward-bound from home and was in about AL 10. At 0850 U 407
vessel. reported a Sunderland in AK 3726 and another one at 1153 in AK 3765.
4) U 600 fired 2 single misses at the freighter she reported yesterday, From then on the convoy had continuous air escort, and boats were
course 3200, 12 knots. Faultless data. Returning home because of fuel. constantly forced to submerge.
Convoy No. 50 and 51 see para. IVa. U 91 reported that she was forced to dive once or twice every hour by
b) None. a/c. This made hauling ahead very difficult and practically impossible for
c) U-boat sightings: BB 5158, ED 98, DO 9223, CA 57, DA 91, EC 28, boats which were astern of the convoy. Ops. Control recommended the
GA 36(?), FJ 87, ED 91, DM 4440. boats try a night attack and, if this proved impossible, to haul ahead so that
A/c reports: AL 17, AL 15, CG 4719. a day attack could be made after first light. At 0123 the first shore-based
d) None. a/c was reported in AK 3829. As experience had shown that further
operation in the area under constant air patrol was useless, Ops. Control
IV. Current Operations: decided to break off the operation after first light. Boats which were in a
a) 1) Convoy No. 49: position make an underwater attack at this time were to take their chance
Shadowing continued. The following boats reported convoy's and then move away to the west. No successes were scored during the
night. The following boats are returning: U 609 because of fuel, U 409
- 147 - because both her periscopes are out of order, and U 604 because her
electric and Junkers compressors are out of order. For summary see War
Log of 2.9.
2) Convoy No. 50:

810
 U 174 sighted a convoy on a south course at low speed in BE 7235 at U 604 1 ship 5,000 GRT Torpedoed.
1910. U 203 and U 590 were ordered to take action. U 174 lost contact at
2035 and started on return passage because of fuel. Last position BE
7228, 5 vessels seen for certain. Weather: north 9, heavy sea. As U 203 VI. General:
and U 590 were in a favorable position they will continue to operate at I. In commission on 1.8.: 342
cruising speed on a course in accordance with the seaway and, if they have Commissioned in August 21
not sighted anything after crossing the enemy's course, will continue their Lost in August 363
passage south. In commission on 1.9.42 13
3) Convoy No. 51: Plus foreign boats: UA, UC2, UD 1,3,4,5 6
U 404 reported at 0130 a small convoy with 6 destroyers in AL 5683, 356
course west, 8 knots. Group "Stier" was ordered to take action. At 0408 U
404 lost contact and suspected that the convoy had turned south. She saw
about 8 steamers and 4 destroyers for certain. The operation continues.
b) 1) As traffic off Trinidad continues heavy, 2 further II. Losses in August (Only those underlined have already been declared
missing):
U 213, von Varendorff, on active service since January. Chased by
- 149 - corvettes on 1.8. E. of the Azores.
U 588, Vogel, on active service since January, 1st report 31.7. from
convoy in the North Atlantic. Sank 1 ship according to other boat's
observations.
U 612, Siegmann, rammed 6.8.42. while training in the Baltic and sank.
U 210, Lempke, first patrol, last report 6.8. at convoy in the NOrth
Atlantic. 16 prisoners in America.
U 335, Pelkra, first patrol, last report 8.8. convoy North Atlantic.
U 379, Kettner, first patrol, last report 8.8. convoy North Atlantic.
U 754, Oestermann, experienced boat, last report 31.7. east of Boston.
boats, U 175 and 514, were ordered to that area. U 578, Rehwinkel, experienced boat, left Nazaire 6.8. Presumably bomb
2) U 511 has been given freedom of action in the Caribbean according or mine in Biscay.
to her fuel situation. U 372, Neumann, experienced boat, early August in East Mediterranean.
3) Group "Eisbär" will move off from 2400/1/9, boat by boat. Boats are U 464, Harms, first patrol, no report since leaving Drontheim for the
to report position and fuel between 0 and 50 N. Atlantic.
c) The following have supplied from U 462: U 373 - 569 - 176 - 755 - U 166, Kuhlmann, first patrol, last report 27.7.42. in Gulf of Mexico.
596 - 135. Tanker's stocks: 185 cbm, 85 days' provisions. U 94, Ites, experienced boat, last report 21.8.42., attacking convoy north
d) None. of Jamaica.

V. Reports of Success:
811
 U 654, Forster, experienced boat, last report 21.8.42., did not report 2.9., Norway area 23 boats
possibly lost with U 94 on 28.8.42. in the convoy operation off Jamaica. 171 boats
American broadcasters say that 2 boats were sunk.

VI. During August in the Atlantic:

Daily average of boats at sea: 86.4
Of which in Ops. area: 30.9
- 149 - Of which on passage: 55.5
(of which 17.5 on return passage)

VII. Sailed in August:

From home 32 boats.
From West France 29 boats.

---------------------------------------------------
III. Distribution: ---------------
II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXd1 IXD2 Xb XIV Total Foreign Sum
2.September 1942.
Front-line: - - 113 4 47 - 1 1 5 171 1 172
Trials: - - 95 - 17 1 4 3 - 120 2 122
Training: 37 4 16 - 2 - - - - 59 3 62 I. U 66 - Op(EE) U 173 - EF 35 U 438 - BF 52 U 572 - BE 98
68 - DT 97 174 - BE 73 440 - AO 584 - Op(AL)
37 4 224 4 66 1 5 4 5 350 69 - CB 39 175 - BC 79 455 - BD 79 590 - BE 78
86 - DD 95 176 - Op(CD) 459 - DT 87 594 - Op(AL)
87 - BF 81 179 - CF 78 460 - BF 91 596 - Op(CD)
IV. In August (excluding foreigners): 91 - AL 15 203 - CF 26 462 - Op(CD) 598 - CD 78
Total number increased by: + 8 92 - AL 16 211 - AL 10 463 - BF 83 599 - AF 48
Number of front-line boats increased by: + 19 96 - BE 15 214 - Op(CG) 504 - DT 98 600 - DO 26
Number of boats on trial decreased by: - 11 98 - CC 88 216 - AF 87 506 - Op(ET) 604 - AL 10
107 - Op(GG) 217 - Op(ED) 507 - Op(FD) 605 - BE 62
108 - CD 66 218 - AE 85 508 - DE 52 608 - Op(AL)
V. Front-line boats were distributed as follows on 1.9.42: 109 - Op(ET) 221 - AO 48 509 - DF 43 609 - AL 18
Atlantic (without foreigners) 133 boats 125 - Op(EV) 256 - BF 52 510 - CD 66 617 - AF 87
Mediterranean 15 boats 130 - DT 62 258 - AO 48 511 - Op(EC) 618 - AO
812
 135 - Op(CD) 259 - AF 87 512 - CE 41 658 - DF 74
155 - CD 66 333 - BF 92 513 - Op(BB) 659 - AL 16
156 - DT 98 373 - Op(CD) 514 - CC 45 660 - BE 49
159 - DG 62 380 - Op(AL) 515 - DF 15 705 - BE 56
162 - Op(EE) 404 - Op(AL) 516 - CD 69 752 - CG 14
163 - DE 55 406 - Op(CF) 517 - Op(BB) 753 - BF 92
164 - Op(EB) 407 - AL 18 553 - DQ 87 755 - Op(CD)
165 - Op(BB) 409 - AL 14 558 - Op(DM) 756 - AL 10
171 - Op(DL) 410 - AF 48 564 - EE 52 UD 5 - AF 48
172 - DT 89 411 - AL 15 566 - BF 81
432 - AJ 97 569 - Op(CD)
- 150 -
On Return Passage: U 86 - 98 - 108 - 130 - 155 - 163 - 173 - 174 - 256
- 438 - 463 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 553 - 564 - 566 - 572 - 598 - 600 - 605 -
609 - 658 - 660 - 705 - 752.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 49, 50, 51 see para. IVa.
813
2) U 517 reported a small convoy on a NE course, speed 8 knots in BB
2475. She was ordered not to make any further shadower's reports unless
U 165, nearby, requested them.
3) U 173 sighted a two-funneled vessel, course 00, 20 knots, small zig-
zags, in DQ 9681.
4) U 175 broke off her search for the ship reported yesterday by U 96,
without result.
5) U 109 sank "Ocean Night", estimated at 10,000 GRT, in FF 3650,
after chasing her for 22 hours. Main course 105, zig-zags from 350 to
1600. Boat is searching for traffic between FF 3757 and 1166.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 32, DM 44, GB 1526, DC 1569, AH 96, BB 25,
EB 22/25, DM 64, EB 8539, EB 53.
Aircraft reported U-boat in AF 4829.
U-boat attack in BA 38 (U 165).
SSS report from S.S. "Ocean Night" in FF 36 (U-boat warning).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 49:
U 91 attacked at dawn and fired a quadruple miss. Convoy's last
position at 0830 was AL 1824, course 600, speed 8 knots. U 211 dived
away from a vessel at 0900 and picked up convoy by hydrophone. Depth-
charged while attacking a destroyer. Except for U 756, all boats reported
their position and fuel as ordered and moved away to the S.W. New
approach point is AL 47. U 756 was ordered to report her position.
Operation against this convoy is now concluded.
2) Convoy No. 50:
U 203 made contact with the convoy, 5 smoke clouds at 1727 in CF
2871, course S., medium speed. Lost sight of convoy at 1914 in CF 5211
because of too great speed. OPeration broken off.
3) Convoy No. 51:
U 404 pressed on at 2500 and could not regain contact because of very
bad visibility. After an exchange of radio messages with the C.O. at 2100,
Operations Control decided to break off the operation. C.O. reported that
there was little hope of picking up the convoy again because of rough seas,
and that according to dead reckoning the convoy's position should be
about 40 miles ahead of his own. SW 9, sea 7-8.
b) U 432 will occupy AJ 90 as temporary attack area. U 590 will occupy
CF 82, 85, 88. U 203, 81, 84, 87. U 406, 73, 76, 79.
After breaking off operations against U 404's convoy, Group "Stier"
was dissolved. Boats will join Group "Vorwärts". This group has been
ordered to form a patrol line from AK 0391 to AL 7284 in the order: U
756 - 92 - 411 - 659 - 91 - 404 - 407 - 380 - 584 - 608 and 690. Purpose:
to pick up an England - America convoy expected to pass on 4.9.
- 151 -
c) None.
d) At 0940 a radio message was received from U 438, stating that U 256
was in position 470 02' North and 050 07' West, unable to dive or proceed.
Measures were taken immediately for her protection. F.O.I.C. West
Defences sent 2 M-boats to meet her, which could not however leave until
1330 and should reach the rendezvous at 2000. When they arrive U 256
will be towed into Lorient. U 438 is putting into Brest.
According to a report from the C.O., U 256 was surprised and bombed
by aircraft.
V. Reports of Success:
U 109 1 ship 10,000 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
814
3.September 1942.
I. U 66 - Op(EE) U 172 - EJ 37 U 438 - v. Brest U 584 - AK 90
68 - EJ 38 173 - DR 48 440 - AN 36 590 - CF 50
69 - CB 53 174 - BE 83 455 - CD 31 594 - AK 90
86 - DE 71 175 - CC 29 459 - EJ 18 596 - BC 97
87 - BF 72 176 - BC 94 460 - BF 81 598 - CD 87
91 - Op(AL) 179 - DG 38 462 - CD 81 599 - AE 69
92 - Op(AL) 203 - CF 50 463 - BF 64 600 - DD 88
96 - Op(AK) 211 - AL 91 504 - EJ 39 604 - AL 58
98 - CC 96 214 - Op(CG) 506 - Op(ET) 605 - BF 54
107 - Op(CG) 216 - AF 72 507 - Op(FE) 608 - AK 90
108 - OD 66 217 - Op(ED) 508 - DE 37 609 - AL 58
109 - Op(FF) 318 - AL 31 509 - CD 88 617 - AF 72
125 - Op(EV) 221 - AN 36 510 - CD 66 618 - AN 36
130 - DT 33 256 - v. Lorient 511 - Op(EC) 658 - DF 49
135 - CD 21 258 - AN 36 512 - CD 68 659 - AL 41
155 - CD 66 259 - AF 72 513 - Op(BB) 660 - BF 44
156 - EJ 38 333 - BF 83 514 - CC 71 705 - BE 55
159 - DG 92 373 - BC 94 515 - DE 63 752 - BF 74
162 - Op(EE) 380 - AK 90 516 - CD 67 753 - BF 82
163 - DE 35 404 - AK 90 517 - Op(BB) 755 - BC 97
164 - Op(EB) 406 - Op(CF) 553 - DQ 94 756 - ?
165 - Op(BB) 407 - Op(AL) 558 - Op(DL) D 5 - AE 69
171 - Op(DL 56) 409 - AL 42 564 - EE 38
410 - AE 69 566 - BF 83
411 - Op(AL) 569 - BC 94
432 - Op(AJ) 572 - BF 83
On Return Passage: U 66, 86, 98, 130, 155, 163, 173, 174, 409, 463,
508, 509, 510, 553, 564, 566, 572, 598, 600, 604, 605, 609, 658, 660, 705,
752.
 Entered Port: U 256 - Lorient; U 438 - Brest; U 462 - St. Nazaire; U
572 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 356 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 152 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 517 sank a steamer of 11,500 GRT in BB 2258.
2) U 203 sighted the Portuguese ship "Sines" in her operations area,
carrying coal from Norfolk to Lisbon. In reply to a query, boat was
ordered to treat the ship according to prize regulations, i.e. let her go.
3) U 108 reported a destroyer on a west course, high speed, in CE 4199.
4) U 165 lost contact with the convoy in BA 3834.
5) U 553 chased a ship type "Australia Star" in DQ 5238, making long
legs about an east course. speed 17 knots. Ship lost sight of at 2200 in
DQ 6175, general course 1700. Boat continuing on her return passage.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 3279, DM 61, EB 86, AH 97, BB 23, DM 6147.
Aircraft sighted U-boat in BF 4448 and BF 4160.
U-boat attack: in BB 2270 (U 157).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
815
b) 1) U 125 has been given freedom of action to the east and west of the
Prime Meridian.
U 108 and 598 have refueled from U 155 and U 509 respectively.
Now that the list of all Swedish ships sailing in the Göteburg traffic
has been amended, boats have been ordered to sink all ships not listed
without warning in the blockade area and outside the blockade area, as
soon as the crew has left the ship.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 517 2 ships 11,500 GRT.
VI. General:
The early appearance of enemy aircraft to protect their convoys has
had a restricting effect on convoy operations and this fact forced me again
to demand an effective aircraft to combat the enemy air force protecting
convoys.
This demand has been made to Naval War Staff, giving the
following reasons:
The use of enemy aircraft to escort convoys has again severely
restricted convoy operations and caused the total failure of the operation
against Convoy No. 49.
The convoy was picked up on 31 August in AK 2914 on an east
course and during the first day 2 ships were sunk and 2 others torpedoed.
Air escort appeared over the convoy already at 0900/1/9 in AK
3726 (800 miles from England, 450 miles from Iceland). Air escort was
reinforced towards evening. By systematically forcing the U-boats to
submerge, it made them lose contact at evening twilight and thus spoilt all
the boats' best chances to attack during the first four moonless hours of the
night. The enemy made clever use of the boats loss of contact to make a
sharp leg, so that contact was not regained until 0300 and it was no longer
possible to get the boats of the Group (except 2) near to the convoy. The
convoy operation has to be broken off on 2.9. in the morning, as it no
longer seemed possible for them to haul ahead in the face of the strong
enemy air activity expected and in view of poor visibility, they were also
exposed to too great a risk from aircraft with radar. Altogether 3 boats had
been more or less severely bombed on 1.9.
As the attached diagram shows, the English have succeeded in
gaining air control of a large sector of the North Atlantic by increasing the
ranges of their shore based aircraft and have thus narrowed down very
much the area in which U-boats can operate without danger from the air.
In this connection it has been noticed so far that air patrol is stronger in
- 153 -
measures can be taken prospects of success of U-boats will be reduced to
an unjustifiable extent.
The urgent need of counteracting enemy aircraft protecting
convoys must therefore be emphasized once more. Aircraft used for this
would have to fulfill the following conditions:
a) Very great range (aircraft must be able to remain over the convoy for
some time).
b) Fighting power (must be superior to enemy flying boats and 4-
engined land-based aircraft in speed and armament).
In my opinion these conditions are not entirely fulfilled by the He
177, because, as far as I know, the range of this aircraft is only 2,200 km.
B.d.U. therefore requests that every emphasis be laid on the
development of an effective aircraft with long range, in the interests of a
continued effective U-boat warfare.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

the east half of the Atlantic than in the west. Reasons for this are
probably the small number of air bases in Newfoundland and Greenland
and the fact that fewer U-boats have operated in this area. It is to be
expected however, that, if U-boats were transferred to the West Atlantic,
there would shortly be a stronger air patrol there and conditions would
become the same as in the East North Atlantic.
Apart from the serious effects enemy aircraft have so far had on U-
boat warfare, i.e.: - 154 -
a) Total losses and the large number of boats badly and slightly
damaged.
b) Re-enforced shifting of U-boat operations far into the Atlantic and
the consequent higher fuel consumption and short operational periods.
(Final result: fewer U-boats in operations areas).
c) Greater difficulty in finding the enemy in the open Atlantic.
B.d.U. is gravely concerned at the prospect of the same unfavorable air
situation over the convoys extending to almost all parts of the North
Atlantic, the main battleground of U-boats; this will undoubtedly be the
case if things develop at their present rate. Unless suitable counter- 4.September 1942.
816

I. U 66 - EF 47 U 172 - EJ 67 U 411 - Op(AK) U 569 - BC 67
68 - EJ 67 173 - DR 42 432 - Op(AJ) 584 - Op(AK)
69 - CB 43 174 - BE 92 440 - AN 28 590 - Op(CF)
86 - DE 27 175 - CC 51 455 - CD 22 594 - AL 71
87 - BE 93 176 - BC 67 459 - EJ 49 596 - BC 91
91 - Op(AL) 179 - DG 68 460 - BF 72 598 - CD 85
92 - Op(AK) 203 - Op(CF) 462 - CD 81 599 - AE 83
96 - Op(AL) 211 - Op(AL) 504 - EJ 69 600 - DD 83
98 - CD 76 214 - Op(CG) 506 - Op(ET) 604 - AL 94
107 - Op(CG) 216 - AE 69 507 - Op(FE) 605 - BF 62
108 - CE 43 217 - Op(EE) 508 - DF 14 608 - AL 71
109 - Op(FC) 218 - AL 25 509 - CD 85 609 - AL 94
125 - Op(EV) 221 - AN 28 510 - CD 66 617 - AE 69
130 - DH 81 258 - AN 29 511 - Op(BN) 618 - AN 29
135 - BC 91 259 - AE 69 512 - CD 86 658 - DF 54
155 - CD 66 333 - BF 73 513 - Op(BB) 659 - Op(AL)
156 - EJ 68 356 - AO 514 - DD 35 660 - BF 46
159 - DT 21 373 - BC 67 515 - DE 67 705 - BF 54
162 - Op(EE) 380 - AL 47 516 - CD 82 752 - BF 90
163 - CD 79 404 - AL 47 517 - AH 97(Op) 753 - BF 68
164 - Op(EC) 406 - Op(CF) 553 - DQ 62 755 - BC 91
165 - BA 38(Op) 407 - Op(AL) 558 - Op(DM) 756 - ?
171 - Op(DL) 409 - AL 82 564 - EF 14 D 5 - AE 83
410 - AE 83 566 - BF 54
On Return Passage: U 66 - 98 - 86 - 108 - 130 - 155 - 163 - 173 - 174
-409 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 553 - 554 - 566 - 598 - 600 - 604 - 605 - 609 - 658
- 660 - 705 - 752.
Entered Port: U 605 - Brest; U 752 - 753 - La Pallice.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
817
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 125 sank a coastal freighter type "The Baron" (820 GRT) on 1.9.
in EV 8123, course 2700. Since then no traffic, strong air activity. Boat is
operating on in FG, upper third.
2) U 564 sighted a single ship (type "Australia Star", 12,614 GRT) in
DQ 7213, course 2800, speed of advance 14 knots.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EE 7772, BB 4271, BA 97, EC 4190, AH 97, DM
79, DO 78, EC 9285.
Aircraft sighted U-boat in BF 4651.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) In order to prevent the expected convoy passing the patrol line by
night, Group "Vorwärts was ordered to proceed in reconnaissance line,
course 2500, speed 6 knots, from 2200 and to stop as patrol line at
0930/5/9. Visibility is very poor at the moment in the sea area, 3 -5 miles.
U 218 will take up the most northerly position in the patrol line in place of
U 756, probably lost.
2) U 87 is to steer for CF 86.
c) U 155 and U 460 will rendezvous in BD 9855 after 2000/7/9 to hand
over the spare parts brought out from port by U 460.
d) U 756 on her first enemy patrol, was operating against Convoy No. 49
as part of Group "Vorwärts". She last reported at 0115/1/9: Driven
- 155 -
 off by destroyer while making attack, depth-charged, no damaged,
pressing on. Since then the boat has not replied to calls. There is no
information on her sinking. She must be assumed loss.

V. Reports of Success: 5.September 1942.

U 125 1 ship 820 GRT.

I. U 66 - EF 43 U 171 - Op(DM) U 409 - AL 98 U 558 - Op(DM)

--------------------------------------------------- 68 - ES 98 172 - EJ 97 410 - AE 85 564 - DQ 49
--------------- 69 - CB 41 173 - DR 12 411 - Op(AK) 566 - BF 52
86 - DE 26 174 - BF 54 432 - Op(AJ) 569 - BC 29
87 - BE 89 175 - CC 49 440 - AF 84 584 - Op(AK)
91 - Op(AK) 176 - BC 29 455 - CD 15 590 - Op(CF)
92 - Op(AK) 179 - DG 98 459 - EJ 87 594 - Op(AK)
96 - Op(AK) 203 - Op(CF) 460 - BE 91 596 - BC 53
98 - CD 83 211 - Op(AK) 462 - CD 81 598 - CD 44
107 - Op(CG) 214 - Op(CG) 504 - EK 77 599 - AE 85
108 - CE 29 216 - AE 83 506 - Op(ET) 600 - DD 69
109 - Op(FG) 217 - Op(EE) 507 - Op(ET) 604 - BE 23
125 - Op(EV) 218 - AL 18 508 - DF 13 608 - Op(AK)
130 - DH 52 221 - AF 84 509 - CD 68 609 - BE 23
135 - BC 53 258 - AF 84 510 - CD 60 617 - AE 91
155 - CD 60 259 - AE 83 511 - Op(EC) 618 - AF 84
156 - EJ 99 333 - BF 71 512 - CF 81 658 - DF 37
159 - DT 51 356 - AN 36 513 - Op(BB) 659 - Op(AK)
162 - Op(EE) 373 - BC 29 514 - DD 65 660 - BF 52
163 - CD 83 380 - Op(AK) 515 - DE 86 705 - BF 52
164 - Op(EC) 404 - Op(AK) 516 - CF 81 755 - BC 53
165 - Op(BB) 406 - Op(CF) 517 - Op(BB) D 5 - AE 84
407 - Op(AK) 553 - DR 80
- 156 -

On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 98 - 108 - 130 - 155 - 163 - 173 - 174 -

409 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 553 - 564 - 566 - 598 - 600 - 604 - 609 - 658 - 660
- 705.
Entered Port: U 660 - 566 - Brest.
818
 Sailed: U 615 - 661 - Kiel; U 332 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 513 carried out a surprise attack on the ore port of Wabana in
Conception Bay and sank two ore freighters totaling 18,500 GRT. Coning
tower damaged as a result of ramming. After repairing boat intends to
operate off St. Johns.
2) U 171 sank a tanker type "Cadillac" (12,062 GRT) in DK 5165.
Return passage. Supply is planned.
3) U 506 situation: Sighted a large 2-funneled steamer on 31.8. in FF
2550, main course 3000, speed 14 knots. Otherwise no traffic up to 4.9. in
ET 50, 80, 90 and FF 10 and 20. Slight air activity. From 4 -5.9. chased
convoy of 3 freighters and 1 destroyer from FF 2543 to 2938. Course
1200, 10 knots. Hit on freighter of 6,000 GRT. Sinking probable.
Operation in FF 11 is intended.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DM 75, EO 16, ED 9843.
U-boat attack in BB 63 (U 513).
English aircraft reported U-boat in AE 87.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 373, 569, 176, 432, 755, 596, 135 to form a patrol line from AJ
8815 to BC 2279. Boats will constitute Group "Loss". Plan: to operate
against England - America convoys. U 159 and U 179 are proceeding to
their operation areas via FD 10 and 20.
- 157 -
819
It is suspected that south and north-bound single-ship traffic collects
between 100-200 and 200-300 miles E of St. Paul's Rock.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 506 1 ship 6,000 GRT probably sunk
171 1 ship 12,000 GRT
513 2 ships 18,500 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
6.September 1942.
I. U 66 - EF 25 U 171 - Op(DK) U 407 - Op(AK) U 553 - DF 79
68 - ES 38 172 - ES 37 409 - BE 34 558 - Op(EB)
69 - CA 61 173 - DF 48 410 - AL 31 564 - DQ 52
86 - DE 32 174 - BF 55 411 - Op(AK) 569 - BC 21
87 - CF 37 175 - CC 78 432 - AJ 89 584 - Op(AK)
91 - Op(AK) 176 - BC 22 440 - AF 48 590 - Op(CF)
92 - Op(AK) 179 - DT 18 455 - CD 17 594 - Op(AK)
96 - Op(AK) 203 - Op(CF) 459 - ES 29 596 - BC 25
98 - CD 81 211 - Op(AK) 460 - BE 84 598 - CE 51
107 - Op(CG) 214 - Op(CG) 462 - CD 81 599 - AL 33
108 - CF 13 216 - AE 88 504 - ET 17 600 - DE 42
109 - Op(FF) 217 - Op(ED) 506 - Op(ET) 604 - BE 25
125 - Op(EV) 218 - Op(AK) 507 - Op(ET) 608 - Op(AK)
130 - DH 23 221 - AF 48 508 - CD 97 609 - BE 25
135 - BC 25 258 - AF 48 509 - CE 44 615 - AO
155 - CE 19 259 - AE 82 510 - CE 19 617 - AE 85
 156 - ES 38 332 - BE 92 511 - Op(EC) 618 - AF 48
159 - DT 81 333 - BE 94 512 - CD 81 658 - DF 33
162 - Op(EE) 356 - AN 29 513 - Op(BC) 659 - Op(AK)
163 - CD 81 373 - BC 21 514 - DD 94 661 - AO
164 - Op(EC) 380 - Op(AK) 515 - DQ 14 705 - BF
165 - Op(BA) 404 - Op(AK) 516 - CD 81 755 - BC 22
406 - Op(CF) 517 - Op(BB) D 5 - AL 33
On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 98 - 108 - 130 - 155 - 163 - 173 - 174 -
409 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 553 - 564 - 598 - 600 - 604 - 609 - 658 - 705.
Entered Port: U 174 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 201 - 202 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Reports from U 608 and 594 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 217 found no traffic in the area of Trinidad.
3) U 507 also found nothing on her passage from the Brazilian coast to
FE 37.
4) U 109 sank the British "Tuscan Star" (11,449 GRT) in FF 1149,
course 600, speed 14 knots. Returning because of fuel.
5) U 165 sighted a convoy of 5 steamers, course 700, 7 knots in BA
3836. She attacked and scored 2 hits each on 3 steamers totaling 19,000
GRT. Sinking not seen but probable.
6) U 164 observed no traffic on the route CE 55 to DL 93 and back.
Sank a coastal freighter of 2,000 GRT in EC 56, course 550.
7) U 107 sighted 4 unescorted steamers in GG 5941 (off Lisbon), course
south, and sank 2 totaling 8,500 GRT. Otherwise only
- 158 -
820
neutral ships and fishing vessels seen except for 1 patrol boat.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DM 26, EC 94, DM 7529, BA 89, ED 8344, EO 38.
U-boat attack: in EC 94 (U 104?).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) U 608 reported 2 destroyers in AK 9399 at 0959, course 2200. As
these may be part of the expected convoy, which according to dead
reckoning should be nearby, U 584, 594 and 96 were ordered to act on this
report. At 1042 U 594 also sighted a destroyer in AK 9369, which, from
its position, could have been part of the starboard outer screen. Operations
Control then decided to operate the whole of Group "Vorwärts" and gave
orders accordingly. U 594 could not shadow for long in the rain and bad
visibility (about 1 mile). The last position of the destroyers reported was
at 1550 in AK 9616 according to hydrophone bearing. U 608 also reported
rain and fog, visibility 500 meters. At 1035 she was forced to submerge in
AK 6675 by destroyers and at 1420 picked up one steamer and 2
destroyers, course 2500, speed 8 knots, by hydrophone in AK 9625. As
visibility deteriorated the boat did not succeed in shadowing. Last
hydrophone bearing at 0500 from AK 9468. Group "Vorwärts" has so far
continued to operate against the suspected convoy as visibility is expected
to improve and there should be a W-bound convoy in this area. It is
intended to break off the operation after sunrise if no contact is made by
then.
b) 1) U 590, 87, 333, 107 and 214 will join Group "Iltis". They have
been ordered to form a patrol line from CF 7556 to 8654. From 2000/9/9
course south, day's run of 160 miles. Individual operation intended after
supply in the south.
2) Group "Lohs" will form a new patrol line from AJ 8631 to 9796 in
their old order at cruising speed.
 3) U 356, 618, 661 are to proceed to the Atlantic via AM 32.
c) U 163 has delivered 6 torpedoes to U 516 and taken over distilled
water from U 462.
d) 1) Southern boats, including Group "Eisbär", have permission to attack
as far as latitude 50 South.
2) U 705, on her way into port, was expected at the escort rendezvous
off Brest at 1800/5/9. The boat had not arrived there by today. She last
reported on 3.9. that she was 48 hours off the port. It must be assumed
that U 705 was lost by air attack, as English aircraft reported a U-boat in
BF 4448 on 3.9. and in BF 4651 on 4.9. and they are sure to have attacked.
The boat must be presumed lost. G.O.C. Atlantic Air Forces flew
reconnaissance along the boat's supposed approach route without result.
V. Reports of Success:
U 109 1 ship 11,449 GRT
U 164 1 ship 2,000 GRT
U 107 2 ships 8,500 GRT
U 165 3 ships 19,000 GRT probably sunk.
- 159 -
7.September 1942.
I. U 66 - DQ 84 U 172 - ES 68 U 407 - Op(AK) U 553 - DF 82
68 - ES 68 173 - DF 42 409 - BE 46 558 - Op(EC)
821
69 - CA 50 175 - DD 36 410 - AL 20 564 - DQ 34
86 - CD 78 176 - Op(AJ) 411 - Op(AK) 569 - Op(AJ)
87 - CF 55 179 - DT 48 432 - AJ 584 - Op(AK)
91 - Op(AK) 201 - BF 55 440 - AE 69 590 - Op(CF)
92 - Op(AK) 202 - BF 55 455 - CC 38 594 - Op(AK)
96 - Op(AK) 203 - Op(CF) 459 - ES 59 596 - Op(AJ)
98 - CD 81 211 - Op(AK) 460 - BE 77 598 - CE 29
107 - CG 58 214 - Op(AK) 462 - CD 81 599 - AL 25
108 - BE 87 216 - AE 88 504 - ET 47 600 - DE 28
109 - Op(FF) 217 - Op(ED) 506 - Op(FF) 604 - BE 61
125 - Op(FG) 218 - Op(AK) 507 - Op(FE) 608 - Op(AK)
130 - DH 22 221 - AE 69 508 - CD 96 609 - BE 61
135 - Op(AJ) 258 - AE 69 509 - CE 52 615 - AN 36
155 - CE 23 259 - AL 24 510 - CE 23 617 - AE 87
156 - ES 69 332 - BF 85 511 - Op(EC) 618 - AE 69
159 - EJ 13 333 - CF 32 512 - CD 81 658 - CE 76
162 - Op(EE) 356 - AF 79 513 - Op(BB) 659 - Op(AK)
163 - CD 65 373 - Op(AJ) 514 - DP 12 661 - AN 36
164 - Op(EC) 380 - Op(AK) 515 - DP 62 755 - Op(AJ)
165 - Op(BA) 404 - Op(AK) 516 - CD 81 D 5 - AL 25
171 - DL 42 406 - Op(CF) 517 - Op(BB)
On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 98 - 108 - 130 - 155 - 163 - 171 - 409 -
508 - 509 - 510 - 553 - 564 - 598 - 600 - 604 - 609 - 658 - 173.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 461 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) For reports from U 608 and on U 658's convoy, see paragraph IVb.
2) U 517 reported a convoy in BB 1485, course 1260, speed 8 knots at
1716. She attacked in BB 1842, and torpedoed 3 steamers totaling 18,000
GRT. Sinking heard.
b) None.
 c) U-boat sightings: BB 74, BB 45.
U-boat attack: BB 39 and BB 18.
SSS reports from American S.S. "Pennmar" (5,868 GRT) (?).
English aircraft reported U-boats in BF 4568, BF 4610 and CG 1273 (U
130).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Contact as not regained with the destroyers, nor was the convoy
found. In reply to a query U 404 reported visibility was 600 meters.
Operation was broken off as intended. Group "Vorwärts" was ordered to
take up positions in patrol line from AK 6664 to AL 7854, in their old
order. On her way there U 608 sighted a destroyer in AK 9813, course
2900. As there may be local patrol of this area, and further search was not
hopeful in bad visibility, boats continued on their passage as ordered. The
next convoy is expected on about 9.9.
2) U 658, on return passage, sighted a convoy on a north course,
medium speed at 0947 in CF 6192. Boat was ordered to shadow for U
333, which was nearby. U 658 was chased north by a cruiser and forced to
submerge until 2100. Depth-charges and hydrophone hunt. She lost
contact and started on return passage because of fuel.
- 160 -
U 333 encountered the cruiser at 2000 and fired a miss at 1000
meters. The cruiser was a decoy and was towing a motor cutter. Changing
course all the time from 90 - 2700, changing speed from 0 - 1- knots. Boat
822
suspected an anti-submarine group. This appears to confirm Operations
Control's view that there are always anti-submarine groups in this area
disguised as convoys.
b) 1) U 599, 259, 617 and 216 are to make for AJ 83 via AK 65.
2) UD 5 is proceeding to ES 50 via AL 70, CF 40, ES 30. Independent
ships have several times been sighted along this route.
3) U 159 is to continue from FD 10 and 20 to sea area around FH 9670
(Pointe-Noire). She may not go further S. than 50 S.
c) 1) U 130 was bombed by a Boeing in CG 1233. Slight damage.
2) U 128 has been ordered to escort U 108 through Biscay with radar
interception gear. It is intended in future to provide such escort for
damaged boats not equipped with radar interception gear.
d) From 0000/8/9 independently-routed ships may not be attacked in
route A north of 200 North. Boats have been informed of the sailing of
"Weserland".
V. Reports of Success:
U 517 2 ships 12,000 GRT presumed sunk
U 517 1 ship 6,000 GRT torpedoed.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
8.September 1942.
I. U 66 - DO 56 U 173 - DF 13 U 409 - BE 65 U 553 - DF 64
68 - ET 77 175 - DD 65 410 - AL 31 558 - EC 27
69 - CA 50 176 - Op(AJ) 411 - Op(AK) 564 - DF 77
86 - CD 85 179 - DS 99 432 - Op(AJ) 569 - Op(AJ)
87 - Op(CF) 201 - BF 49 440 - AE 59 584 - Op(AK)
91 - Op(AK) 202 - BF 49 455 - CC 53 590 - Op(CF)
92 - Op(AK) 203 - Op(CF) 459 - ES 97 594 - Op(AK)
96 - Op(AK) 211 - Op(AK) 460 - DD 98 596 - Op(AJ)
98 - CD 81 214 - CG 48 461 - BF 91 598 - CF 12
 107 - CG 48 216 - AL 33 462 - CD 81 599 - AL 01
108 - BE 93 217 - Op(ED) 504 - ET 79 600 - DE 34
109 - ET 97 218 - Op(AK) 506 - Op(FF) 604 - BF 50
125 - Op(FF) 221 - AE 59 507 - Op(FE) 608 - Op(AK)
130 - BE 99 258 - AE 59 508 - CE 49 609 - BF 44
135 - Op(AJ) 259 - AL 27 509 - CE 35 615 - AN 31
155 - BD 98 332 - BF 76 510 - BD 98 617 - AL 33
156 - ET 77 333 - CF 29 511 - Op(EC) 618 - AE 59
159 - EJ 42 356 - AF 77 512 - CD 81 658 - CF 36
162 - Op(ED) 373 - Op(AJ) 513 - Op(BC) 659 - Op(AK)
163 - CE 42 380 - Op(AK) 514 - DP 42 661 - AN 31
164 - Op(EC) 404 - Op(AK) 515 - DP 59 755 - Op(AJ)
165 - Op(BA) 406 - Op(CF) 516 - CD 81 D 5 - AL 01
171 - DL 56 407 - Op(AK) 517 - Op(BB)
172 - ES 99
On Return Passage: U 66, 86, 98, 109, 130, 155, 163, 171, 173, 409,
508, 509, 510, 553, 564, 598, 600, 604, 609, 658.
Entered Port: U 604 - Brest.
Sailed: U 261 - 262 - 178 - Kiel; U 607 - St. Nazaire
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 161 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
823
a) 1) U 214 situation: fog and mist in the area off Lisbon, no definite
patrol, several neutrals daily. Otherwise nothing.
2) U 202 bombed on her way through Biscay, damaging 2 torpedoes.
3) U 617 sank a freighter of 1,500 GRT, course 3200, speed 10 knots on
7.9. in AE 7672.
4) U 163 reported an independently-routed ship in CE 1694 (Route A),
course NE, zig-zagging, speed 13 knots. In reply to query boat was told to
sink the ship. Contact was lost.
5) U 511 sighted nothing along the route EC 28 via ED 14 and 38 to 32.
Chased U.S. tanker "Brazos" in vain in DO 8969.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EG 67, CB 3886, FJ 8773, BB 28, CA 8534, BB
1427, BB 76.
U-boat attack: In DD 18/19.
English aircraft reported U-boats in BF 4567, 4568 and AE 7113.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 69 to have freedom of action after carrying out special operation
(mine-laying in Chesapeake Bay on the American coast).
2) U 410 is to make for AK 65 via AJ 83.
3) U 615 has been ordered to proceed into the Atlantic via AM 32.
c) As all boats of Group "Eisbär" have reported their positions, the time
for supplying has been fixed at from 1000/20/9. U 462 has delivered fuel
to U 98, U 512 and U 516 and distilled water to U 163. Also 2 torpedoes
to U 516.
d) U-boats have been informed of the sailing of U 905 - "Spichern" and
U 906 - "Uckermark".
V. Reports of Success:
U 617 1 ship 1,500 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
9.September 1942.
I. U 66 - DO 38 U 173 - CD 81 U 406 - Op(CF) U 517 - Op(BB)
68 - FE 39 175 - DD 92 407 - Op(AL) 553 - DF 39
69 - CA 70 176 - Op(AJ) 409 - BF 55 558 - Op(EC)
86 - CD 91 178 - AO 40 410 - AL 25 564 - DF 81
87 - Op(CF) 179 - EH 39 411 - Op(AL) 569 - Op(AJ)
91 - Op(AL) 201 - BE 94 432 - Op(AJ) 584 - Op(AL)
92 - Op(AL) 202 - BF 47 440 - AE 84 590 - Op(CF)
96 - Op(AL) 203 - Op(CF) 455 - CC 55 594 - Op(AL)
98 - CD 81 311 - Op(AL) 459 - FD 36 596 - Op(AJ)
107 - CF 92 214 - Op(CF) 460 - CE 24 598 - BE 85
108 - BF 71 216 - AL 25 461 - BF 81 599 - AK 63
109 - ET 85 217 - Op(EE) 462 - CD 81 600 - CD 77
125 - Op(FG) 218 - Op(AL) 504 - FE 27 607 - BF 91
130 - BF 76 221 - AE 84 506 - Op(FF) 608 - Op(AL)
135 - Op(AJ) 258 - AE 84 507 - Op(FF) 609 - BF 46
155 - BE 84 259 - AL 19 508 - CF 36 615 - AF 79
156 - FE 26 261 - AO 40 509 - BE 91 617 - AL 14
159 - EJ 72 262 - AO 40 510 - BE 84 618 - AE 84
162 - Op(EE) 332 - BE 94 511 - DO 95 658 - BE 98
163 - CE 29 333 - CF 58 512 - CD 81 659 - Op(AL)
164 - Op(ED) 356 - AL 31 513 - Op(BC) 661 - AF 79
- 162 -
824
165 - Op(BA) 373 - Op(AJ) 514 - DP 71 755 - Op(AJ)
171 - DL 69 380 - Op(AL) 515 - DP 84 D 5 - AL 48
172 - FE 41 404 - Op(AL) 516 - DF 14
On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 98 - 108 - 109 - 130 - 155 - 163 - 171 -
173 - 409 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 511 - 553 - 564 - 598 - 600 - 609 - 658 - 462.
Entered Port: U 409 - Brest.
Sailed: U 595 - Brest; U 704 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 50 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 173 operated against a steamer on a west course in CD 5992.
Portuguese flag recognized before the attack.
3) U 109 chased in vain a ship type "Duchess of Bedford", 3500, speed
18 knots.
4) U 507 came upon a probable ship in FF 1161. Bridge, funnel and
mast at the top, making smoke spasmodically, steering slowly to the
northeast.
5) U 510 sighted a destroyer and a smoke cloud in BE 7923 on an east
course. Boat suspects anti-submarine group.
6) U 755 sank an American auxiliary cruiser of 3,000 GRT, course 2300,
speed 10 knots in AJ 9727 with a triple fan.
7) U 66 sank the Swedish
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DC 1124, CA 51/52, BA 3853.
English aircraft reported a U-boat in BF 7891 and 4890.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 50:
 U 584, belonging to Group "Vorwärts", sighted a convoy of 11-15
steamers in AL 7463 at 2029. It was ON 127, which was expected at this
time by dead reckoning. Group "Vorwärts" was ordered to operate against
it. At 2146 U 584 confirmed that course and speed were as suspected, i.e.
W 2200, 5-7 knots. Visibility was again very bad in this area, only 1000-
900 meters during showery weather. This made it extremely difficult for
U 584 to shadow. She lost contact at about 2230 in AL 7461, but came up
to the convoy again and reported at 0151 convoy in AL 7458, course 2300,
speed 7 knots. An unidentified boat requested beacon signals. Contact
was finally lost at 0230 and was not regained by morning. Group
"Vorwärts" is continuing to operate on a southwest course. U 599 and 259,
in the vicinity, were also directed against the convoy. Later, however, they
were ordered to continue their passage to AJ 83, because of stormy
southerly winds (wind force 8-9 and corresponding seaway).
b) 1) U 514 and 515 have been given freedom of action in the area east of
Trinidad. Their attention has been called to medium to strong air activity.
2) U 202, 210 and 332 are to steer for DF 10. After supplying it is
intended to operate them in the Caribbean.
c) U 462 has sold out and is returning. Last supply: U 173 starboard
compressor, U 98 and 600 each about 30 cbm of fuel.
- 163 -
V. Reports of Success:
U 755 1 ship 3,000 GRT
66 1 ship 6,390 GRT.
825
VI. General:
Group "Vorwärts" was disposed on the basis of radio intelligence reports
and experience available, which together showed that the route of ON-
convoys had been diverted south. It is astonishing with what persistence
the English have plied the routes immediately north and south of the Great
Circle during the last few months in spite of several large-scale attacks by
U-boats. For several weeks boats have been disposed in the same area
each time to pick up west-bound convoys. Nevertheless, the English have
stayed on their old route and this time they were picked up in exactly the
position plotted by dead reckoning.
If this convoy operation should take the boats far to the west, it is
intended to refuel them in square BC and then operate them NE of
Newfoundland.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
10.September 1942.
I. U 66 - DQ 24 U 173 - CD 68 U 406 - Op(CF) U 553 - DG 12
68 - FF 44 175 - DP 13 407 - Op(AL) 558 - Op(ED)
69 - Op(CA) 176 - Op(AJ) 410 - AL 19 564 - DF 56
86 - CE 13 178 - AN 36 411 - Op(AL) 569 - Op(AJ)
87 - Op(CA) 179 - EH 69 432 - Op(AJ) 584 - Op(AK 77)
91 - Op(AL) 201 - BD 79 440 - AE 79 590 - Op(CF)
92 - Op(AL) 202 - BE 88 455 - CC 45 594 - Op(AK 99)
96 - Op(AL) 203 - Op(CF) 459 - FE 54 595 - BF 50
98 - BE 77 211 - Op(AL) 460 - CE 42 596 - Op(AJ)
107 - Op(CF) 214 - Op(CF) 461 - BF 72 598 - BE 94
108 - BF 50 216 - AL 19 462 - CD 80 599 - AK 65
109 - ET 97 217 - Op(EE) 504 - FE 55 600 - CD 80
125 - Op(FG) 218 - Op(AL) 506 - Op(FF) 607 - BF 81
130 - BF 82 221 - AE 79 507 - Op(FF 13) 608 - AL(Op)
135 - Op(AJ) 258 - AE 79 508 - CF 13 609 - BF 47
155 - BE 86 259 - AK 65 509 - BE 93 615 - AF 77
 156 - FE 64 261 - AN 36 510 - BE 85 617 - AL 13
159 - ES 15 262 - AN 36 511 - ET 97 618 - AE 79
162 - Op(EE) 332 - BE 88 512 - DE 65 658 - BF 74
163 - BD 99 333 - Op(CF) 513 - Op(BC) 659 - Op(AL)
164 - Op(ED) 356 - AM 23 514 - EE 11 661 - AF 77
165 - Op(BA) 373 - Op(AJ) 515 - EE 24 704 - BF 82
171 - DM 73 380 - Op(AL) 516 - DE 62 755 - Op(AJ)
172 - FE 49 404 - Op(AL) 517 - Op(BB) D 5 - AL 77
On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 98 - 109 - 108 - 130 - 155 - 163 - 171 -
173 - 508 - 509 - 510 - 511 - 553 - 564 - 598 - 600 - 609 - 658 - 462.
Entered Port: U 108 - Lorient; U 609 - St. NAzaire.
Sailed: U 552 - St. Nazaire, U 619 - 260 - 382 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 164 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 50 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 512 chased a ship type "Africa Star" for 15 hours, main course
3050. 2 unsuccessful attacks.
3) U 513 sighted a convoy of 2 destroyers and 2 steamers at 2346 in BB
6333, course 1900. Transport of 7,000 GRT sunk by 2 hits. Strong air
patrol in the area.
4) U 217 has observed no traffic in ED 90, S. third since 1.9.
b) None.
826
c) U-boat sightings: CA 28, ED 44/47, BB 3458.
U-boat attack: In AK 9868.
English aircraft report U-boats in BE 9666, BF 71 and AE 4784 (4 hits
suspected in a depth charge attack?).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 50:
U 594 regained contact at 1106 in AK 9699. Course reported as 2400.
As the weather cleared up and visibility was up to 10 miles, all boats
succeeded in getting onto the convoy in the course of the day. The
following made contact: U 584 at 1000, U 608 at 1345, U 380 at 1450, U
404 at 1437, U 96 at 1455, U 407 at 1509, U 659 at 1522, U 92 at 1731, U
411 at 1822, U 91 at 1906, U 218 at 0008. U 211 requested beacon signals
at 0024. The convoy steered a main course of 235 - 2400 making long
legs to both sides. According to U 91, its position at 0209 was AK 9887.
After dark all boats were driven off. Contact was lost and was not
reestablished by morning. Several boats managed to attack and successes
were scored.
U 96 attacked at 1630 and sank 3 steamers totaling 16,000 GRT, was
then forced to submerge until 2300 and pressed on. U 407 could not fire
by day as the convoy was zig-zagging so sharply. U 659 torpedoed a
freighter at 0154 and sank a tanker of 8,000 GRT. During the subsequent
depth-charge hunt the pressure-tight cover of No. 3 main ballast tank was
torn off at No. 15 manhole. Further damage to the Junkers compressor and
loud knocking noises forced the boat to start home. U 91 reported at 0209
that the convoy and the surrounding sea were brightly lit by flares which
were being fired constantly. U 584 was driven off while making a day
attack and, while pressing on, she encountered a detached 9,000-ton tanker
which she sank. U 608 torpedoed a steamer of 5,000 GRT in AK 9885.
Afterwards she was attacked by destroyers with gunfire and depth-charges.
U 411 was sighted when about to make a night attack and forced to
submerge. The last boat to attack was U 218, which sank a 5,000-tonner
and probably also a 3000-tonner. Altogether therefore, 7 ships totaling
41,000 GRT were sunk and 3 ships totaling about 14,000 GRT torpedoed.
 b) U 595, 607, 704, 356, 221, 440, 258 and 618 are to steer for AL 72.
Having carried out her special operation, U 69 will operate in DC 12.
c) U 69 has carried out her mine-laying.
V. Reports of Success:
U 513 1 ship 7,000 GRT
U 96 3 ships 16,000 GRT
U 659 1 ship 8,000 GRT
1 ship Torpedoed.
U 584 1 ship 9,000 GRT
U 218 2 ships 8,000 GRT.
- 165 -
11.September 1942.
I. U 66 - DE 98 U 176 - Op(AJ) U 407 - Op(BD) U 558 - Op(ED)
68 - FF 75 178 - AN 28 410 - AK 65 564 - DF 38
69 - Op(CA) 179 - EJ 77 411 - Op(AL) 569 - Op(AJ)
86 - BD 89 201 - CE 36 432 - Op(AJ) 584 - Op(BD)
87 - DH 18 202 - BD 96 440 - AL 25 590 - Op(DH)
91 - Op(BD) 203 - CE 98 455 - CB 65 594 - Op(AK)
92 - Op(BD) 211 - Op(AK) 459 - FE 85 595 - BF 46
96 - Op(BD) 214 - DH 27 460 - CD 69 596 - Op(AJ)
98 - BE 79 216 - AK 66 461 - BE 93 598 - BE 96
107 - DH 19 217 - Op(ED) 462 - CD 93 599 - AK 56
827
109 - ET 82 218 - Op(AK) 504 - FE 89 600 - CD 65
125 - Op(FG) 221 - AL 34 506 - Op(FF) 607 - BF 72
130 - BF 54 258 - AL 24 507 - Op(FF) 608 - Op(AK)
135 - Op(AJ) 259 - AK 59 508 - BE 87 615 - AM 32
155 - BE 95 260 - AO 509 - BE 48 617 - AK 03
156 - FE 93 261 - AN 28 510 - BE 95 618 - AL 25
159 - ES 45 262 - AN 28 511 - DP 62 619 - AO
162 - Op(EE) 332 - CF 22 512 - DE 85 658 - BF 73
163 - BE 79 333 - CH 19 513 - Op(BC) 659 - BD 32
164 - Op(ED) 356 - AM 15 514 - Op(EE) 661 - AM 32
165 - Op(BA) 373 - Op(AJ) 515 - Op(EE) 704 - BF 67
171 - DM 86 380 - Op(AK) 516 - DE 67 755 - Op(AJ)
172 - FE 88 382 - AO 517 - Op(BB) D 5 - BE 17
173 - CE 42 404 - Op(AK) 552 - BF 67
175 - DP 43 405 - DG 39 553 - CE 37
On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 98 - 109 - 130 - 155 - 163 - 171 - 173 -
508 - 509 - 510 - 511 - 553 - 564 - 598 - 600 - 658 - 659 - 462.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 50 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 514 sank the schooner "Helen Forsey" by gunfire on 6.9. in DD
9282, course SW, and on 11.9. in EE 7135 (off Barbados) 2 steamers
totaling 12,000 GRT. Ships are aground in 13 meters of water. Otherwise
nothing sighted.
3) U 69 situation: Sighted 2 convoys off Hatteras, course 190 and 3500
respectively, about 18 ships, speed 10 knots. Could not get close because
of airship.
4) U 333, on her way south with Group "Iltis", reported an English
escort vessel at 1849 in DH 4354, course 600, 10 knots. According to our
dead reckoning the expected SL convoy could not be anywhere near, boats
therefore continued on their southward passage as ordered.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 2871, EE 47, BB 2224, BD 2548, BB 63, DN
78, DN 99, CA 2877, BA 39.
U-boat attack: EE 71 (U 514(, BD 27 (convoy).
English aircraft reported U-boats in CG 8394 (attack with depth
charges).
d) None.
- 166 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) Immediately after sunrise, about 0930, U 407 sighted the convoy in
BD 2382; shortly after U 92 also sighted it and reported its course as 1800.
This was clearly the morning zig-zag, because afterwards the enemy again
steered a west course and subsequently a southwest course as hitherto. At
about 1000 its position was BD 2388, at 1300 - 2299, at 2130 - 2732 and
at 0136, BD 2756.
From various boats' reports it seemed possible that the convoy is
proceeding in 2 groups each at same distance from the other. This was
confirmed next morning by U 404, which had sighted 2 main groups and
now counted about 18 steamers. It must therefore have been a very large
convoy.
All boats made contact in the course of the day and night and many of
them attacked and scored successes. U 92 attacked the convoy on its
morning zig-zag and torpedoed a 4000-tonner. Boat was temporarily only
able to make 10 knots, as her port engine was out of order; she repaired the
828
damage by about 1800 and attacked again at 2300 in BD 2488, but could
not fire as the enemy was zig-zagging. U 594 fired an unexplained
quadruple fan miss at a large tanker in a night attack and was depth-
charged by day by a corvette. The boat's operation is restricted owing to
shortage of fuel (25 cbm). U 96 was driven off to the east by a motor
sailing vessel and sank the vessel by gunfire in BD 2394. Towards
evening she reported her starboard diesel unserviceable and requested
freedom of action. She was ordered to follow up in the convoy's course
and sink any damaged ships encountered. U 91 was driven off while
making an underwater attack and pressed on. U 380 fired a quadruple fan
at 0021 at a 9,000-ton tanker and 2 ships of 5000 tons. 4 explosions heard
without doubt. U 584 scored 2 hits on a 4-masted motor vessel of 9,000
GRT. Ship burnt out and sank. U 211 attacked at 0105 and scored 4 hits
with a quadruple fan at a 2-funnelled destroyer and heard 2 definite
explosions. Sinking not observed. U 608 was driven off by a destroyer
while making a night attack and depth-charged. While pressing on she
sank 3 stragglers of 10,000, 5,000 and 9,000 GRT. Boat reports the ship of
5,000 GRT torpedoed yesterday now sunk. The weather was good the
whole time, wind southeast to southwest 0 - 4, visibility 10 miles. Good
weather conditions favored the operation in every way, and led to success.
So far 12 ships have been sunk altogether and 9 ships and 1 destroyer
torpedoed. The operation continues
b) U 461 (tanker) is now to make for BC 93. She has been ordered to
increase her day's run to 240 miles, as Group "Vorwärts" needs to be
supplied.
c) U 155 is unable to crash-dive and is to have radar interception gear
escort by U 704.
d) 1) Boats have been informed of the sailing of U 907 (Brake).
2) Lieut.(s.g.) Mutzelburg, C.O. of U 203, died at sea on 11.9. of serious
internal injuries and concussion. After the first report of rendezvous was
arranged with a boat with M.O. the C.O. died before medical aid could
reach him. In him the U-boat arm has lost one of its best captains.
- 167 -
 109 - ET 54 218 - Op(BD) 504 - FM 22 600 - CE 41
125 - Op(FG) 221 - AL 28 506 - Op(FF) 607 - BE 69
130 - BF 61 258 - AL 29 507 - Op(FF) 608 - Op(BD)
135 - Op(AJ) 259 - AK 73 508 - BE 86 615 - AM 24
155 - BE 93 260 - AN 36 509 - BF 61 617 - AK 53
156 - FM 31 261 - AF 79 510 - BF 71 618 - AL 29
159 - ES 75 262 - AF 79 511 - DQ 18 619 - AN 36
162 - Op(EE) 332 - CF 15 512 - DQ 14 658 - BF 64
V. Reports of Success: 163 - BE 85 333 - Op(DH 40) 513 - Op(BB) 659 - BE 14
U 514 1 sailing ship 12,000 GRT 164 - Op(EE) 356 - AM 23 514 - Op(EE) 661 - AM 24
514 2 ships 4,000 GRT torpedoed 165 - Op(AB) 373 - Op(AJ) 515 - Op(EE) 704 - BE 93
U 92 1 ship 171 - DN 77 380 - Op(BD) 516 - DE 86 755 - Op(AJ)
U 96 1 motor sailing vessel 172 - FM 24 382 - AN 36 517 - Op(BB) D 5 - BE 42
U 380 4 explosions - 3 hits assumed 173 - CE 27 404 - Op(BD) 552 - BF 82
U 584 1 ship 9,000 GRT 175 - DP 73 406 - Op(DH 40) 553 - CE 36
U 211 4 ships torpedoed
U 92 1 destroyer torpedoed presumed sunk
U 608 4 ships 33,800 GRT. On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 98 - 109 - 130 - 155 - 163 - 171 - 173 -
508 - 509 - 510 - 511 - 553 - 564 - 598 - 600 - 658 - 659 - 462.
Entered Port: U 130 - 509 - Lorient; U 658 - St. Nazaire; U 262 -
--------------------------------------------------- Bergen
--------------- Sailed: U 181 - 620 - 610 - 253 - Kiel.

12.September 1942. II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

I. U 66 - DF 71 U 176 - Op(AJ) U 407 - Op(BD) U 558 - Op(ED)
68 - FN 11 178 - AF 79 410 - AK 56 564 - DG 11
69 - Op(DG) 179 - ES 17 411 - Op(BD) 569 - Op(AJ)
86 - BD 99 201 - CE 37 432 - Op(AJ) 584 - Op(BD)
87 - Op(DH 40) 202 - BD 98 440 - AL 29 590 - DH 40
91 - Op(BD) 203 - CE 84 455 - CB 56 594 - Op(BD)
92 - Op(BD) 211 - Op(BD) 459 - FM 24 595 - BE 65
96 - Op(BD) 214 - Op(DH 40) 460 - CD 95 596 - Op(AJ)
98 - BE 86 216 - AK 56 461 - BE 58 598 - BF 76
107 - Op(DH 40) 217 - Op(ED) 462 - CE 84 599 - AK 49
829
a) 1) Convoy No. 50 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 558 sighted convoy No. 51 at 0535 in ED 8622, course 2800, low
speed. At 0651 is was in ED 8378, speed 9 knots. U 558 is pursuing.
3) For U 156's report see paragraph IVd.
4) U 173 reported a U-boat in CE 2667. Probably one of our own.
5) U 506 sank the Swedish ship "Sima" (5,244 GRT) in EU 7870,
course 2900.
- 168 -

6) U 87 sighted a destroyer on her own at 1600 in DH 7237, course
300, speed 10 knots. No operation by Group "Iltis".
7) U 512 sank the American tanker "Patrick J. Huley" (10,600 GRT) by
gunfire in DQ 6417. Previously she had made day torpedo attacks and
fired unexplained misses. Boat suspected an anti-torpedo net, because the
hydrophone bearing of the torpedo at the end of its run was the same as the
hydrophone bearing of the tanker. This view is not accepted.
8) U 515 sank the tanker "Stanbeck Melbourne" (or some similar name),
on her way from Para to Trinidad, and "Respect", both courses 3100,
10,444 GRT and 4,668 GRT respectively.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: DQ 5620, EC 41, EB 36, BD 42, BB 15, BB 66,
AM 5394.
2) U-boat attack: In ED 86, BD 27, EE 71.
3) Aircraft reported U-boats: AM 3151, AM 3532, AM 1962.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 50:
U 218 also attacked last night, but was driven off by destroyers and
depth-charged. At 0700/12/9 U 404 regained contact. The boat sank a
tanker of 6,000 GRT at night on 10.9., observed a further hit and fired
three single shots at 2 6,000-tonners and one 5,000-tonner on 12.9.
Sinking of 2 ships heard for certain in hydrophones. Contact was
maintained except for short breaks. The convoy was in BD 4337 at 1044,
then steered southwest to BD 4355 and from there west to BD 4149 at
0401. Contact was then lost. Convoy was again reported by U 407 at
0801 in BC 6359, course 2700, speed 7 knots. U 91 was fired on by a
destroyer at 1040/12 and afterwards hunted with hydrophones and depth-
830
charges. Slight damage. U 380 damaged her starboard diesel while
chasing a straggler and could not repair the damage with her own
resources. Boat was ordered to search the convoy's route for stragglers.
Almost all boats succeeded in close to the convoy during the day. Contact
was lost at twilight, but at 0401 U 407 sighted the convoy again. In reply
to a query U 608 reported that the stragglers sunk were all undamaged and
that the 9,000-tonner reported sunk was "Hectoria", London (13,800
GRT). U 218 and 94 each sighted a group of 5 ships, which were probably
one and the same. U 411 sighted another group of 15 ships. Weather was
good again, visibility averaged 5 - 10 miles. Boats have not so far
reported any further successes. The operation continues.
b) 1) Group "Iltis" has closed up, leaving 30 miles between boats and at
1400 was in reconnaissance line from DH 7148 to 7358. Day's run 160
miles. At 2000 the Group was ordered to halt and remain stationary in
patrol line, a N-bound SL convoy was expected. If no contact had been
made with the enemy by 1000/13/9 boats were to continue on a S. course,
speed 7 knots, to halt again at 2100 and remain in patrol line.
2) U 615 - 661 - 356 - 221 - 618 - 440 - 607 - 258 and 595 will form
Group "Pfeil" and will take up position in patrol line from AL 4745 to AL
7816 at cruising speed.
c) 1) U 156 sank the British "Laconia" (19,695 GRT) at 0110 in FF 7721,
course 3100. After torpedoing her, boat discovered that the ship had 1500
Italian prisoners of war on board. Group "Eisbär", including U 459 and U
506
- 169 -
 and 507 were ordered to proceed to the scene at once at high speed. 98 - BE 95 216 - AK 49 461 - BE 48 599 - AK 71
An Italian boat in the vicinity was also directed there. It is intended to 107 - Op(DH) 217 - Op(ED) 462 - CE 80 600 - CE 27
make for "Bingerville" (French Ivory Coast) in the first place with the 109 - ET 18 218 - Op(BD) 504 - FM 37 607 - BE 56
survivors. Meanwhile U 93 had taken 193 persons on board, including 21 125 - Op(FG) 221 - AL 51 506 - Op(FF) 608 - Op(BD)
British. Further orders will be given. 135 - Op(AJ) 253 - AO 507 - Op(ET) 610 - AO
2) From 2000/13/9 attack is forbidden in the whole of Route A, 155 - BF 73 258 - AL 54 508 - BE 96 615 - AM 16
including south of 200 North. 156 - FF 77 259 - AK 71 510 - BF 60 617 - AK 54
3) U 162, commanded by Commander Wattenberg, an experienced boat, 159 - Op(FD) 260 - AN 29 511 - DQ 21 618 - AL 29
has not reported since 1.9.42. She was lost operating in the area off 163 - BE 94 261 - AF 77 512 - DQ 56 619 - AN 29
Trinidad and was probably destroyed there by aircraft. Nothing further is 164 - Op(EE) 332 - CE 37 513 - Op(BB) 620 - AO
known. Boat must be presumed lost. 165 - Op(BA) 333 - Op(DH) 514 - Op(EE) 659 - BE 62
171 - DN 84 356 - AM 15 515 - Op(EO) 661 - AM 16
V. Reports of Success: 172 - FM 53 373 - Op(AJ) 516 - DQ 12 704 - BF 73
U 506 1 ship 5,244 GRT 173 - CE 35 380 - Op(BD) 517 - Op(BB) 755 - Op(AJ)
512 1 ship 10,600 GRT 175 - EE 13 382 - AN 29 552 - BF 72 D 5 - BE 47
515 2 ships 15,112 GRT 176 - Op(AJ) 404 - Op(BD) 553 - CF 21
404 3 ships 17,000 GRT 406 - Op(DH) 558 - Op(ED)
404 2 ships torpedoed
608 4,800 GRT (difference for Hectoria)
156 1 ship 19,695 GRT On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 98 - 109 - 155 - 163 - 171 - 173 - 203 -
508 - 511 - 510 - 553 - 564 - 598 - 600 - 659 - 462.
Entered Port: U 598 - St. Nazaire; U 510 - Lorient.
--------------------------------------------------- Sailed: - . -
---------------
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
13.September 1942.
- 170 -

I. U 66 - DF 27 U 178 - AF 77 U 407 - Op(BD) U 564 - CE 85

68 - FN 41 179 - ES 47 410 - AK 49 569 - Op(AJ)
69 - Op(DC) 181 - AO 411 - Op(BD) 584 - Op(BD)
86 - BE 78 201 - CE 51 432 - Op(AJ) 590 - Op(DH)
87 - Op(DH) 202 - CE 25 440 - AL 45 594 - Op(BD)
91 - Op(BD) 203 - CE 83 455 - CB 84 595 - BE 53
92 - Op(BD) 211 - Op(BD) 459 - FM 52 596 - Op(AJ)
96 - Op(BD) 214 - Op(DH) 460 - DF 23 598 - BF 60
831
 III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 50 and 52, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 558 attacked Convoy No. 51 in EE 8299 and sank 2 freighters of
7,000 and 8,000 GRT, and 1 freighter each of 5,000 and 7,000 tons.
Afterwards she was driven off. She could not give chase because of
destroyers and night aircraft. Pursuit abandoned.
3) U 164 sighted a large motor freighter in EC 6538 on 7.9., course
2000. Otherwise no traffic from EC 66 via ED 52 - EE 45 to EE 94. Fuel
tank damaged by bombs.
4) U 217 situation: No traffic in the sea area west of Trinidad from 1 -
11.9. Intends to operate in EE.
5) U 600 reported an independent ship zig-zagging on a northwest
course in CE 2861. She was not permitted to attack, as the ship may be
one of our own.
6) U 68 sank the British "Trevilley", 5,296 GRT, in FF 8588.
7) U 704 avoided a quadruple fan in BF 7239 and saw a periscope.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 5136, EC 2859, BC 53, ED 65, AK 56, DB 59,
BC 63.
English aircraft reported U-boats in BF 7283, AL 2928, AF 7141, and
AF 7731 (depth-charge attack). Attack with bombs probable in AL.
Aircraft suspected 2 hits.
U-boat attack in EO 12. Three over-crowded life boats sighted NE of
Trinidad. Norfolk harbor has been closed for the present on account of
mines.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 50:
U 584 reported the convoy in BC 6355 at 1147. At about the same
time U 96 was in BC 6356 between 2 sections of the convoy. The smaller
section, on a southwest course, was on her port bow, the larger with about
12 smoke clouds on a west course, on her starboard quarter. Other boats'
reports also showed that the convoy had divided. The north section was
steering via BC 6316 to 6135 and southwest to about BC 5393. The south
section was reported in BC 6359 - 6375 via BC 6511. In the course of the
832
day U 407, U 411, U 404, U 91 and U 92 made contact. At 1825 U 96 was
forced to submerge in BC 6314 by an aircraft. This position is about 550
miles east of St. Johns. U 380 and 584 also reported that they had been
driven off by aircraft while shadowing. So far in previous operations
aircraft have not appeared in this remote area. Long-range English aircraft
must therefore recently have been stationed in Newfoundland.
U 407 fired 4 single shots at the convoy and heard 3 explosions. U
594 sank the American "Stonesteet" (6,131 GRT) at 1500. According to
the captain 11 of the 35 ships in the convoy had been sunk by the evening
of 12.9., 2 tankers had been slightly damaged and 1 badly. One corvette
was missing. U 92 scored 3 hits at 3 steamers totaling 17,000 GRT at
0300 in BC 6145. Sinking not observed. U 91 torpedoed a 2-funneled
destroyer and a heavy fire broke out. She scored a hit amidships on a
second destroyer coming alongside. Destroyer sank at once. Sinking of
burning destroyer not observed.
It is intended to continue the operation. There has only been slight fog
so far. Boats are to break off the pursuit when they have just enough fuel
left to allow them to reach the supply point with a small reserve.
2) Convoy No. 52:
U 216 came upon an E-bound convoy in AK 64 and was apparently
forced to submerge at once. The first report was not received by control.
At 1430 U 216 reported the convoy's last position at 1030 in AK 6427. U
617 reported at once that she was
- 171 -
operating against the convoy. U 440, 221, 258 and 618 were ordered
to do the same. U 356, 615 and 661 were making for the convoy at
maximum speed. U 216 continued to shadow for the present. Convoy
consisted of at least 30 steamers with destroyer escort. Position at 1853
was AK 6160, course NE, speed 10 knots. At 2230 U 216 was forced to
submerge by 3 destroyers and lost contact. Weather: rain, visibility 1
mile, West 7. U 599, 410, 259 which were about 200 miles to the west,
reported in the course of the day that they wanted to operate against the
convoy. They were ordered to continue on their way to the patrol line as
ordered, also U 595 which was in BG 16. The convoy had not been
picked up by morning. The operation continues.
b) Group "Loss", acting on fresh orders, is in patrol line from AJ 8314 to
9796, with U 259, U 410, U 599, U 373, U 569, U 176, U 432, U 755, U
596 and U 135.
c) None.
d) U 156 has been ordered to remain at the position of the sinking. U
506 and 507 are making for there at maximum speed to take over
survivors. Fast French ships have left Bingerville and Dakar to take over
survivors which are in the U-boats or still in lifeboats. Remaining boats of
Group "Eisbär" are continuing their passage south.
(add to b)
2) U 382, U 260 and U 619 are to make for AE 64. It is intended to
operate against a QP convoy which is at sea, with these and further boats.
V. Reports of Success:
U 558 2 ships 15,000 GRT
558 2 ships torpedoed
68 1 ship 5,296 GRT
407 3 hits
594 1 ship 6,131 GRT
92 3 ships 17,000 GRT torpedoed
91 1 destroyer sunk
91 1 destroyer torpedoed presumed sunk.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
833
14.September 1942.
I. U 66 - DF 27 U 178 - AM 32 U 406 - Op(DT) U 558 - Op(ED)
68 - FM 66 179 - ES 78 407 - Op(BC) 564 - CE 91
69 - Op(DC) 181 - AN 35 410 - AK 54 569 - Op(AJ)
86 - BE 84 201 - CE 48 411 - Op(BC) 584 - Op(BC)
87 - Op(DT) 202 - CE 43 432 - Op(AJ) 590 - Op(DT)
91 - Op(BC) 203 - CE 66 440 - AK 60 594 - BC 65
92 - Op(BC) 211 - Op(BC) 455 - GB 74 595 - BE 12
96 - Op(BC) 214 - Op(DT) 459 - FM 69 596 - Op(AJ)
98 - BF 64 216 - AK 63 460 - DF 27 599 - Op(AJ 69)
107 - Op(DT) 217 - Op(EE) 461 - BD 67 600 - CF 34
109 - EJ 97 218 - Op(BC) 462 - CE 68 607 - BF 27
125 - Op(FG) 221 - AK 60 504 - FM 64 608 - Op(BC)
135 - Op(AJ) 253 - AN 35 506 - FF 44 610 - AN 35
155 - BF 57 258 - AK 60 507 - FE 37 615 - AL 36
156 - FF 47 259 - Op(AJ) 508 - BF 72 617 - AL 41
159 - FD 27 260 - AF 76 511 - DE 95 618 - AK 60
163 - BF 74 261 - AM 32 512 - DQ 81 619 - AF 79
164 - Op(EE) 332 - CE 55 513 - Op(BB) 620 - AO
165 - Op(BA) 333 - Op(DT) 514 - Op(EE) 659 - BF 44
- 172 -
 171 - DN 67 356 - AL 28 515 - Op(EE) 661 - AL 38
172 - FM 62 373 - Op(AJ) 516 - DP 63 704 - BF 49
173 - CF 12 380 - Op(BC) 517 - Op(BB) 755 - Op(AJ)
175 - EE 43 382 - AF 76 552 - BE 96 D 5 - BE 77
176 - Op(AJ) 404 - Op(BC) 553 - BE 88
On Return Passage: U 66, 86, 98, 109, 155, 163, 171, 173, 203, 508,
511, 553, 564, 600, 659, 704, 440, 462.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 582 - Brest; U 128 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 50 and 52 see para. IVa.
2) U 202 reported an independent ship on a south course in CD 9611. It
might have been one of our own, therefore boat was not allowed to attack.
3) U 68 reported S.S. "Breedijk" (6,861 GRT) darkened and armed in
FF 8479. Ship was sunk after boat requested permission to attack in the
south area of Route A.
4) U 203 sighted a periscope in BE 8818.
5) U 175 has so far found no traffic off Barbados and Trinidad. Strong
air activity.
6) U 515 sank "Ocean Vanguard" (8,000 GRT) in EE 7770, also a
3,500-tonner.
7) U 125 has seen nothing in FG, center and northern thirds. She is
continuing to operate in the northern third of FF.
8) U 615 passed unobserved between the Shetlands and the Faroes in
her outward passage.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 87, EL 26, DM 27.
Aircraft reports of U-boats: BE 9177, BF 4319, AF 7569, AL 0224.
English aircraft attacked a U-boat with depth-charges in about AL 30.
d) None.
834
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 50:
Contact was only established temporarily with escort vessels. Thus U
92 reported 2 destroyers in BC 5393 ar 1142. U 608 and 380 were forced
to submerge by a corvette and a destroyer respectively. Dull
Newfoundland weather was already setting in. Visibility deteriorated
partly to 300 meters. Operations Control decided to break off the
operation, if contact had not been made by dark. Towards afternoon the
boats reported constant fog. Experience has shown that it is useless to
operate against convoys in these conditions and only means danger for the
boars; the pursuit was therefore abandoned. Boats are to proceed to BC 93
to supply from U 461. Final comments on the convoy see paragraph VI.
2) Convoy No. 52:
U 258 reported at 1005 a corvette in AL 1985, and U 617 reported a
destroyer at 1507 in AL 4136. U 440 was in AL 1959 at 1537 unable to
dive. During hydrophone hunt 7 screws fixing the foot of the depth-
charge gear to the 3 main ballast tank had been torn off. Later the boat
was again able to dive to 20 meters and assistance was no longer required.
Operation was broken off at dark, because the
- 173 -
convoy was already in the area of enemy aircraft patrol and the boats
would not have reached it at its speed of 10 knots. All boats taking part
reported their positions except U 661 and steered for CA 72. U 440
returning to West France.
 b) 1) Group "Iltis" will proceed south in reconnaissance line from
0900/15/9, speed 7 knots. From 2100 boats will remain stationary as
patrol line.
c) None.
d) It has again been pointed out to boats in the south that permission to
attack south of 00 is cancelled by the ban on attack in Route A. Attack is
only permitted in the strip along the African and Brazilian coasts as
hitherto.
again and again should be mentioned. Only someone who has served in a
U-boat himself can asses the demands made on C.O. and crew.
It is regrettable that torpedoes with impact firing still have such small
effect.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------

V. Reports of Success:
U 68 1 ship 6,861 GRT
U 515 2 ships 11,500 GRT.

VI. General: - 174 -

Final remarks on Convoy No. 50:
Good weather and corresponding visibility conditions favored the
operation against the convoy. 13 boats took part, of which 8 were on their
first patrol with the exception of one boat, the C.O. of which was ill, all
scored successes against the convoy, i.e. sunk: 15 ships, 2 destroyers, 1
corvette; torpedo hits: 17. According to a captain taken prisoner the
convoy originally consisted of 35 ships. According to boats' reports on
13.9., there were only 18 ships left, of which 2 were sunk during the night
13/14.
As it is certain that many of the ships were hit once or twice, the results 15.September 1942.
reported by the U-boats have been boiled down. 19 ships are regarded as
sunk and 6 torpedoed. It is probably however that the losses of the convoy
were higher. No attacking boats were lost. One boat only received slight I. U 66 - DF 20 U 176 - Op(AJ) U 404 - Op(BC) U 553 - BE 94
damage, which could not be repaired at sea and made it necessary for her 68 - FF 87 178 - AM 24 406 - Op(DT 20) 558 - Op(ED)
to return. 69 - Op(DC) 179 - Op(FD) 407 - Op(BC) 564 - BE 87
This is a very good result. It shows once more that convoy operations 86 - BE 94 181 - AN 28 410 - AK 47 569 - Op(AJ)
are still possible and can be successful outside the range of enemy air 87 - Op(DT) 201 - CD 96 411 - Op(BC) 582 - BF 55
force, provided a sufficient number of boats are used and the weather is 91 - Op(BC) 202 - CD 95 432 - OP(AJ) 584 - Op(BC)
fair. The work of C.O.'s is deserving of special recognition; 75% of the 92 - Op(BC) 203 - BE 86 440 - AK 63 590 - Op(DT 20)
C.O.'s were on their first patrols in command. Apart from their efficiency, 96 - Op(BC) 211 - Op(BC) 455 - CA 94 594 - EC 93
the tenacity with which they pursued the convoy for 5 days and attacked 98 - BF 81 214 - Op(DT 30) 459 - FM 65 595 - Op(AL)
835
 107 - Op(DT) 217 - Op(EE) 460 - DF 27 596 - Op(AJ)
109 - EJ 57 218 - Op(BC) 461 - BD 73 599 - Op(AJ)
125 - Op(FG) 221 - AL 51 462 - CF 43 600 - CF 33
128 - BF 55 253 - AN 28 504 - FM 64 607 - BD 37
135 - Op(AJ) 258 - AL 42 506 - FF 77 608 - Op(BC)
155 - BF 60 259 - Op(AJ) 507 - FE 69 610 - AN 28
156 - FF 77 260 - AF 72 508 - BF 55 615 - AL 27
159 - FD 69 261 - AM 24 511 - DF 47 617 - AL 42
163 - BF 48 332 - CE 75 512 - DQ 74 618 - AL 44
164 - Op(EE) 333 - Op(DT) 513 - Op(BB) 619 - AF 72
165 - Op(BB) 356 - AL 29 514 - Op(EE) 620 - AN 28
171 - DO 44 373 - Op(AJ) 515 - Op(EE) 659 - BF 40
172 - FM 65 380 - Op(BC) 516 - DP 67 661 - AL 02
173 - BE 79 382 - AF 72 517 - Op(BB) 704 - BF 60
175 - Op(ED) 216 - AL 42 552 - CG 16 755 - Op(AJ)
D 5 - CF 18
On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 98 - 109 - 155 - 163 - 171 - 173 - 440 -
462 - 203 - 508 - 511 - 553 - 564 - 600 - 659 - 704.
Entered Port: U 155 - 108 - Lorient; U 704 - St Nazaire.
Sailed: U 757 - 257 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 53 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 66 reported an independent ship in CD 9881, southerly course,
medium speed. As this is probably one of our own ships, boats have once
again been ordered in future not to attack independent ships in Route A nor
even to report them.
3) U 515 continues to find heavy traffic off Trinidad, making for the
main harbor on a northwest course. She sank a British 6,000-tonner on
14.9. in EE 7776 and on 15.9. the Norwegian "Soerhold" (4,801 GRT).
Both ships were loaded and on their way to New York via Trinidad.
836
4) U 514 scored 2 hits on the British S.S. "Kioto" (3,297 GRT) in ED
9929. Ship had 5 hatches and a crew of 80. She was estimated much
larger than she really was. The wreckage was washed ashore by the
current in ED 9952 and set on fire by gunfire at night.
Boat suspects that the 2 transports sank on 11.9. were destined for that
base.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DN 74, BB 19, BB 45, BA 97, BB 99, CG 9551.
U-boat attack: ED 99, BB 17, and CC 45.
SSS report from CC 4810 from "Santa Cecilia".
Further sightings: AM 2424, AF 7976 and CG 9554 (?)
Depth-charge attack in unknown position.
d) None.
- 175 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 53:
U 221 reported a west-bound convoy at 1909 in AL 4567. According to
dead reckoning it was the expected ON 129 against which it was intended
to operate Group "Pfeil". There were 6 boats in the vicinity 2 more
southwest of these and 100 and 200 miles away. 9 boats would therefore
operate against the convoy. Its position at 1932 was Al 4582, course 2400,
about 11 - 15 steamers. U 221 was ordered not to attack until another boat
had reported contact. This was necessary because of the prevailing bad
visibility, about 500 meters, in order not to lose the convoy again at once.
As however, in the course of the evening, several boats reported fog, U
221 was given permission to attack if sudden chances presented
themselves. At 2120 U 216 requested beacon-signals. Shortly afterwards (Signed): DÖNITZ.
U 221 reported that she had lost contact in the fog, no hydrophone bearing.
Last definite position at 2000 in AL 4582. As bad visibility was probably
only temporary only temporary boats were ordered to proceed on a course
of 2400 assuming enemy speed about 7 knots. The convoy was not found
again by morning.
b) 1) U 382 and 619 are to make for AL 27. Choice of route into the
Atlantic at their own discretion. U 610, 620 and 253 are to make for AE
29. An operation is planned against the QP convoy with these and other
boats.
2) U 661, U 615, U 635, U 216, U 221, U 617, U 607, U 258, U 618 and - 176 -
595 will take up positions in patrol line from AL 4714 to 7816 at cruising
speed. Boats will form Group "Pfeil". (Patrol line was not formed, as the
expected convoy was picked up beforehand, see paragraph IVa.)
3) U 517 and U 615 have been given permission to leave their present
operations area at discretion, if anti-submarine activity makes further
operation impossible.
4) U 159 will join Group "Eisbär" instead of U 156. Its intended to
supply this group in CG 1999 from 22.9.
c) 1) U 218 is returning on account of damage and will proceed via the --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
point at which Group "Vorwärts" is supplying and there deliver 75 cbm
fuel to U 91.
2) U 66 reports supplying from U 460 completed.
3) U 382 was seen by an aircraft in AF and bombed. She will have to Click the icons to view the associated records
return to Bergen for repairs. U 506 and 507 have taken over survivors
from U 516 and have lifeboats in tow, including some Englishmen and
Poles. Boats were ordered to cut the lifeboats with the Englishmen and Return to the B.d.U. KTB/War Standing Orders page
Poles loose. A position check showed that AF 7752 was the point where
"Laconia" sank. New rendezvous with French ships in FE 9695 on 17.9.

V. Reports of Success:
U 515 2 ships 10,801 GRT
U 514 1 ship 5,000 GRT (tonnage assumed by B.d.U.)

837
 Distributed over individual ports:

Lourenco Marques Beira Mozambique

March 56 ships 29 ships 5 ships
April 51 ships 36 ships 3 ships
May 67 ships 28 ships 9 ships

With the closing of Durban traffic may be expected to increase,

especially in Lourenco Marques.
Traffic from these ports mainly goes to England, U.S.A. and India.
In addition lively coaling traffic has been observed between these ports.
- 144 - Because of the Japanese offensive in the Indian Ocean the enemy powers
have been forced to station fairly strong units of warships in the East
African coast to protect their supply traffic. In previous months traffic had
consisted mainly of independently-routed ships, but now it is mainly
composed of convoys. The routes they use are not known. So far as has
been observed, independently-routed ships steered comparatively close
inshore.
There are large convoys in this area, carrying troops and war material to
India, Australia and the Suez Canal. They are escorted mainly by heavy
units and destroyers. There seems to be fairly heavy traffic in the
B.d.U. 6 August 1942. Mozambique Channel.

Most Secret 3219 A3 Copy No. 5. Harbor traffic Mombassa - Kenya.

There is no detailed information as to the amount of traffic. The English
plan to store material from India in these ports and to transport it away as
Enemy situation in East Africa. required, making the best use of shipping space.

I. Merchant Shipping. There is no precise information on traffic in East London, Port

Lourenco Marques, Durban, Beira and Mozambique are the most Elizabeth, Dar-Es-Salam and Zanzibar.
important ports on the East African coast. Of these Durban is said to be
closed as a war-time port for merchant shipping. Traffic in the ports of II. Defences.
Lourenco Marques, Beira and Mozambique amounted during the period Nothing is known of the strength of sea and air patrol. Barrages are likely
beginning of March to end of May 1942 to 284 ships totaling 1,641,231 immediately off the individual ports, and may be assumed for certain off
GRT. Durban, Lourenco Marques and Beira.
838
 (Signed): GODT. 16.September 1942.
Chief of Operations
Department
for B.d.U. I. U 66 - CE 74 U 179 - Op(FD) U 407 - BC 92 U 569 - Op(AJ)
68 - FN 17 181 - AF 79 410 - AJ 91 582 - CF 46
69 - Op(DC) 201 - DF 23 411 - BC 93 584 - BC 92
- 145 - 86 - BE 93 202 - DF 23 432 - Op(AJ) 590 - Op(DT)
87 - Op(DT) 203 - BE 96 440 - AL 75 594 - BC 93
91 - BC 93 211 - BC 93 455 - CA 85 595 - Op(AL)
92 - BC 92 214 - Op(DT) 459 - FM 69 596 - Op(AJ)
96 - BC 93 216 - Op(AL) 460 - DF 27 599 - Op(AJ)
98 - BF 60 217 - Op(EE) 461 - BC 93 600 - BE 79
107 - Op(DT) 218 - BC 93 462 - CF 31 607 - BD 36
109 - EJ 18 221 - Op(AK) 504 - FM 92 608 - BD 41
125 - Op(FG) 253 - AF 79 506 - FE 71 610 - AF 79
128 - BE 48 257 - AO 507 - FF 71 615 - Op(AL)
Distribution. 135 - Op(AJ) 258 - Op(AL) 511 - DF 43 617 - Op(AL)
156 - FE 74 259 - Op(AJ) 512 - EE 35 618 - Op(AL)
U 179 Copy No. 1 159 - FD 23 260 - AE 69 513 - Op(BB) 619 - AE 69
177 2 163 - BF 50 261 - AM 15 514 - Op(EE) 620 - AF 79
189 3 164 - EE 66 332 - CD 99 515 - Op(EE) 659 - BF 50
5th U-Flotilla 4 165 - Op(BB) 333 - Op(DT) 516 - DP 89 661 - Op(AL)
War Log 5-8 171 - DO 27 356 - Op(AL) 517 - Op(BB) 755 - Op(AJ)
Spares 9 - 10 172 - FM 93 373 - Op(AJ) 552 - Op(CG) 757 - AO
173 - BE 89 380 - BC 93 553 - BE 96 D 5 - CF 48
175 - Op(ED) 382 - AF 87 558 - Op(ED)
176 - Op(AJ) 404 - BC 93 564 - BE 86
178 - AM 15 406 - Op(DT)
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 30 September 1942 On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 92 - 98 - 109 - 163 - 171 - 173 - 203 -

218 - 411 - 511 - 553 - 564 - 594 - 600 - 608 - 659 - 440 - 462.
PG32014 Entered Port: U 659 - Brest; U 163 - Lorient; U 98 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 67 - Lorient; U 597 - Brest.
839
 U 221 sighted the convoy again at 0851 in AK 6938. Shortly
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. afterwards U 356 also sighted it in AL 4714. The two boats had slight
variations in their fix. About 1100 U 221 was forced to move away to the
III. Reports on the Enemy: north by "Q" ship and lost contact. Visibility cleared temporarily and U
a) 1) Convoy No. 53 see paragraph IVa. 356 kept with the convoy. At 1047 she reported it in AL 4741, course
2) U 171 report on situation: No shipping anywhere on route DK 52 - southwest, low speed. Boat then lost contact because she had to dive as
DL 29 - EB 37 - EC 39 via Mona Passage. Only air patrolling. there were patrols on a course of 2300. She sighted nothing further
3) U 558 sank coastal freighter (2,000 GRT) in ED 9995, course 2700. excepting a thick cloud of smoke at 1300 in AK 6991, course south. This
4) U 165 attacked westbound convoy in BA 3833 and sank freighter was probably made by vessels who had been given the task of drawing
(6,000 GRT) by underwater attack. Boat has fired all torpedoes and is submarines away from the convoy. U 216 and U 615 requested beacon
returning. signals at 1256 and 1715 respectively. At 1500 U 617 reported a corvette
5) U 553 sighted 4 darkened steam trawlers on a changing course in BF in AK 6947 and destroyers in AK 9313 on a southerly course. From dead
6775, when proceeding through Biscay. Three recognition signal reckoning, the patrols produced the smoke reported by U 356. During the
challenges met with no response. afternoon and night, visibility worsened to 2 miles.
b) None. At 2030 U 615 sighted large smoke plume in AK 6920 steering varied
c) U-boat sightings: CA 5458, CA 37, CB 11, ED 69, BE 76, BB 14, EE courses. No other sighting during the night. Group "Pfeil" was ordered to
77, EL 22?, DN 7495. assume that the position of the convoy at 0851 in AK 6938 was correct and
U-boat attacks: BC 41, EE 77. to continue to search on a mean course of 2400 at 7 1/2 knots.
An unidentified ship reported that she had been torpedoed in BA 3836. b) 1) After carrying out a special task U 455 has been given a free hand in
Steamer "Alexander Stephan" reported torpedo track in FS 1970. the American area.
English plane was ordered to attack a submarine in AF 7245. 2) New approach point for U 261 is AL 72.
d) None. 3) From 2400 on 17.9. Group "Iltis" will cruise in the patrol strip with a
southerly course with speed 7 knots.
- 177 - c) None.
d) Despite large Red Cross flag U 156 was bombed five times by an
American "Liberator" type plane while towing 4 full life boats. Both
periscopes temporarily out of order. Submarine stopped rescue work and
transferred all survivors to the boats. She was ordered to render no further
assistance in any rescue attempts. Once again all submarines have been
told that the safety of our own boats must not be endangered in any
circumstances. If necessary, take any steps, even breaking off all rescue
work. Only Italians are to be taken on board and they are to be handed
over to the French at a pre-arranged rendezvous. As shown by the report
IV. Current Operations: from U 156, the Commanding Officer did not believe that the enemy
a) Convoy No. 53: would attack when he saw the Red Cross flag and the rescue attempts.

840
This opinion is hard to understand. It must be assumed that he was 69 - Op(DC) 202 - DF 27 411 - BC 93 584 - BC 93
influenced by seeing hundreds of survivors fighting for their lives. 86 - BF 73 203 - BF 58 432 - Op(AJ) 590 - Op(DT)
87 - Op(DT) 211 - BC 93 440 - BE 17 594 - BC 93
V. Reports of Success: 91 - BC 93 214 - Op(DT) 455 - Op(CA) 595 - Op(PK)
U 558 1 ship 2,000 GRT 92 - BC 93 216 - Op(AK) 459 - FN 77 596 - Op(AJ)
U 165 1 ship 6,000 GRT. 96 - BC 93 217 - Op(EE) 460 - DF 27 597 - BF 50
107 - Op(DT) 218 - BC 93 461 - BC 93 599 - Op(AJ)
109 - EH 36 221 - Op(AK) 462 - BE 98 600 - BE 89
--------------------------------------------------- 125 - Op(FG) 253 - AF 72 504 - FN 77 607 - Op(AK)
--------------- 128 - BF 71 257 - AN 36 506 - FF 74 608 - BD 54
135 - Op(AJ) 258 - Op(AK) 507 - FE 95 610 - AF 72
156 - FE 96 259 - Op(AJ) 511 - DF 27 615 - Op(AK)
159 - FL 32 260 - AE 91 512 - Op(EE) 617 - Op(AK)
164 - EF 14 261 - AL 37 513 - Op(BC) 618 - Op(AK)
165 - Op(BA) 332 - DF 27 514 - Op(EE) 619 - AE 91
171 - DO 34 333 - Op(DT) 515 - Op(FE) 620 - AF 72
172 - FN 78 356 - Op(AK) 516 - EE 25 661 - AL
173 - BE 95 373 - OP(AJ) 517 - Op(BB) 755 - Op(AJ)
175 - Op(ED) 380 - BC 93 552 - Op(CG) 757 - AN 36
176 - Op(AJ) 382 - v. Bergen 553 - BF 67 D 5 - CF 78
- 178 - 178 - AL 37 404 - BC 93 558 - Op(ED)

On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 92 - 109 - 171 - 173 - 203 - 208 - 411 -

440 - 462 - 511 - 553 - 564 - 594 - 600 - 608.
Entered Port: U 553 - St. Nazaire; U 382 - Bergen.
Sailed: U 437 - St. Nazaire; U 177 - 441 - 442 - Kiel.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

17.September 1942. III. Reports on the Enemy:

I. U 66 - CE 73 U 179 - FD 29 U 406 - Op(DT) U 564 - BE 96
67 - BF 50 181 - AF 77 407 - BC 93 569 - OP(AJ)
68 - FN 48 201 - DF 27 410 - OP(AJ) 582 - BF 47
841
a) 1) Convoy No. 53 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 515 sank freighter "Mary" (7,000 GRT) in EO 4326, course 1400,
11 knots. Fast land-based planes in EO 1552.
3) U 87 examined the Portuguese vessel "Lobito - Loanda" in DT 6233,
she was enroute to Lisbon from Angola.
 4) U 109 sank British vessel "Peterten" (5,221 GRT) in EH 5258. She
was carrying coal from Hull to Buenos Aires.
5) U 165 situation report. Irregular convoys along the coast from BB
1485 to BA 3835. Difficult to contact them in BB 18 and 19 because of
air patrols. Position in BA 3835 favorable, submerged during the day.
Patrolling only before convoy passed.
6) U 517 sank an English auxiliary war ship (3,500 GRT) on 11.9. in BA
3911. On 15.9. in BB 1763 a steamer (5,500 GRT) was sunk of a convoy
of 21 steamers and 7 escorts. One hit was also probable. Regular convoys
via BB 1840 to 1730 and 1470, BA 368 to 3910, outward bound only via
BB 20 and AH 9580. At present the use of two submarines when weather
is favorable should bring successes.
7) U 179 sighted no shipping in DF 10 and 20.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: Ca 29, Ca 51, BB 63, BB 34, EE 7480 (depth-
charges dropped in this position) and FC 74.
U-boat attack in EO 43.
English planes sighted submarines in BE 8690, BE 9185, BF 4698, BE
3762, BE 6129.
d) None.
- 179 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 53:
Although visibility improved to about 15 miles the convoy was not
sighted again. Operational Control decided to break off the operation if
contact was not established by dusk. As there was no further contact,
842
Group "Pfeil" was ordered to take up station in the patrol strip from AK
5966 to 9814 by 18.9. at 2000. Boats were to be in the following order: U
216 - 615 - 356 - 618 - 607 - 258 - 595 - 221 - 617, course 650, speed 6
knots. At 0900 on 19.9. boats are expected to remain stationary in the
patrol strip from AK 6589 to 9654. A west-bound convoy is expected here
on 19.9. This completes the operation.
b) 1) The patrol strip for Group "Loss" is being moved to the east,
because a convoy was reported by Radio Intercept Service on 16.9. in BC
3819. At 1000 on 18.9. boats will be on station in the new strip from AJ
9125 to 9975.
2) Because of poor visibility the spacing between boats of Group "Iltis"
has again been reduced. At 2400 Group was in its new strip from DT 5619
to 6619.
c) The following refueled from U 460: U 201 - U 511 - U 332.
Stocks on tanker: 477 cbm fuel, 158 provisions.
d) 1) U 506 and U 507 transferred survivors to the French vessel
"Annamite". U 507 is returning on 17.9. U 506 was bombed at mid-day
by a heavy seaplane. Boat is operationally serviceable and is continuing to
operate in the same area.
2) All Commanding Officers are again reminded that attempts to rescue
the crews of ships sunk are in direct contradiction to the most primitive
rules of warfare after sinking enemy ships and their crews. Orders dealing
with bringing captains and chief engineers back remain unchanged.
V. Reports of Success:
U 515 1 ship 7,000 GRT
U 109 1 ship 5,221 GRT
U 517 2 ships 9,000 GRT and 1 probable hit.
VI. General:
Operations against convoy No. 53 were unsuccessful because of
unusually unfavorable visibility.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------

18.September 1942.
I. U 66 - CE 55 U 178 - AL 92 U 406 - Op(DT) U 552 - Op(CG)
67 - BF 49 179 - FD 86 407 - BC 90 558 - Op(ED)
68 - FN 79 181 - AM 32 410 - Op(AJ) 564 - BF 73
69 - Op(DC) 201 - DF 40 411 - BC 90 569 - Op(AJ)
86 - BF 50 202 - DF 40 432 - Op(AJ) 582 - BE 64
87 - Op(DT) 203 - BF 50 437 - BF 67 584 - BC 90
91 - BC 90 211 - BC 90 440 - BE 64 590 - Op(DT)
92 - BC 90 214 - Op(DT) 441 - AO 594 - BC 90
96 - BC 90 216 - AK 80 442 - AO 595 - AK 86
107 - Op(DT) 217 - Op(EE) 455 - Op(CA) 596 - Op(AJ)
109 - DS 95 218 - BC 90 459 - FU 19 597 - BF 49
125 - Op(FF) 221 - AK 80 460 - DF 52 599 - Op(AJ)
128 - BE 95 253 - AE 66 461 - BC 90 600 - BE 95
135 - Op(AJ) 257 - AN 31 462 - BF 74 607 - AK 94
- 180 -
156 - FE 258 - AK 80 504 - FU 18 608 - BD 53
159 - FM 41 259 - Op(AJ) 506 - FE 96 610 - AE 66
164 - DQ 75 260 - AE 85 507 - FE 90 615 - AK 80
165 - BB 19 261 - AK 30 511 - DF 20 617 - AK 80
171 - DO 58 332 - DF 20 512 - Op(EE) 618 - AK 80
843
172 - FU 27 333 - Op(DT) 513 - Op(BB) 619 - AE 85
173 - BF 75 356 - AK 80 514 - Op(EE) 620 - AE 66
175 - Op(ED) 373 - Op(AJ) 515 - Op(EO) 661 - Op(AL)
176 - Op(AJ) 380 - BC 90 516 - Op(EE) 755 - Op(AJ)
177 - AO 404 - BC 90 517 - Op(BB) 757 - AN 28
D 5 - DG 91
On Return Passage: U 66 - 86 - 92 - 109 - 165 - 171 - 173 - 203 - 218 -
411 - 507 - 511 - 564 - 594 - 600 - 608 - 440 - 462.
Entered Port: U 203 - 86 - 564 - Brest; U 257 - 757 - Bergen.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 54 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 462 reported definite sighting of a thick periscope in BE 9895.
3) U 619 met neither air nor sea patrol while proceeding through the
Iceland Passage.
4) U 69 situation report: Apart from convoys reported in CA 7690 and
7990, no shipping. Boat suspected that convoys sail via DC 40 and CA
7990 on the coastal route to CA 7340, then proceed from there singly on
the 20 meter line. Much air patrolling, little sea. Constant location,
probably from shore stations.
5) U 516 reported convoy in ED 9398, course southwest. Forced to
submerge by land plane. Contact lost.
6) U 175 attacked a suspicious looking steamer in EO 1816. ("Q"-ship).
Low flying planes flew round the ship. When submarine made underwater
attack the ship remained at an angle of 00 on the bow. In EO 1815 boat
sank tanker of 3,000 GRT, course 3000.
7) U 514 was forced by a flying boat to submerge on 16.9. in EE 7715,
bombs were dropped. Boat was stalking a fast transport on a westerly
course. Later a destroyer dropped depth-charges. 17.9. fruitless chase of a
ship on a westerly course in EE 7759. Boat moved away to make repairs.
b) None.
 c) U-boat sightings: BB 3423, ED 93, EO 27, EE 71.
U-boat attack in EC 17.
English planes reported submarines in BF 4588, BF 7373, AN 1172,
AM 3160. Another plane suspected scoring a hit with a depth-charge in an
unspecified position.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 54
1751 U 599 reported convoy "SC 100" in AJ 9187 as had been
expected. Composed of about 10 steamers, course 400, speed 7-8 knots.
Group "Loss" was ordered to attack. At 1945 convoy was in AJ 9159, at
2345 in AJ 9217 and at 0145 in AJ 9221. Course 500. At 0430 U 599
reported contact lost, last hydrophone bearing true course 21 in AJ 6876.
- 181 -
At 2235 U 373 made contact in AJ 9184, at 2141 U 410 in AJ 9156.
There were slight differences in the fixes of the individual boats. At dusk
both boats lost sight of the convoy. Contact was not reestablished by the
morning. Weather: Wind West 2, some showers, otherwise good
visibility. Enemy must have shaken off the boats by making a cleaver
alteration of course after dusk.
b) 1) The following temporary attack areas have been allotted: U 620 -
AE 12, U 253 - AE 14, U 610 - AE 13.
2) New approach point for U 582, U 597, U 437 = AL 71.
3) At 1400 Group "Loss" cruised in the patrol strip, course 2900, speed
7 knots. (expected convoy was contacted by U 599, see paragraph IVa.
844
c) None.
d) The following additional area has been sanctioned at request of Naval
War Staff for attacks on single ships by submarines operating in the
Freetown area. For the present the eastern boundary of Route "Anton" is:
The Spanish coast as far as the coast of Africa. From there in 300 mile
wide strips to the south.
V. Reports of Success:
U 175 1 ship 3,000 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
19.September 1942.
I. U 66 - CE 38 U 179 - FE 47 U 411 - BC 90 U 582 - BE 51
67 - BF 47 181 - AM 24 432 - Op(AJ) 584 - BC 60
68 - FU 28 201 - DE 95 437 - BF 57 590 - Op(DT)
69 - Op(CA) 202 - DE 92 440 - BF 44 594 - BC 90
87 - Op(DT) 211 - BC 60 441 - AN 35 595 - Op(AK)
91 - BC 60 214 - Op(DT) 442 - AN 35 596 - Op(AJ)
92 - BC 90 216 - Op(AK) 455 - Op(CA) 597 - BF 44
96 - BC 60 217 - Op(EE) 459 - FU 55 599 - Op(AJ)
107 - Op(DT) 218 - BC 90 460 - DF 83 600 - BF 74
109 - DS 83 221 - Op(AK) 461 - BC 90 607 - Op(AJ)
125 - Op(FF) 253 - AE 61 462 - BF 74 608 - BD 63
128 - CF 33 258 - Op(AK) 504 - FU 54 610 - AE 61
135 - Op(AJ) 259 - Op(AJ) 506 - Op(FE) 615 - Op(AK)
156 - FE 73 260 - AL 32 507 - FE 59 617 - Op(AK)
159 - FM 57 261 - AL 511 - CD 99 618 - Op(AK)
164 - DQ 46 332 - DF 47 512 - Op(EE) 619 - AL 31
165 - BB 55 333 - Op(DT) 513 - Op(BB) 620 - AE 61
171 - DO 62 356 - Op(AK) 514 - Op(FE) 661 - Op(AK)
172 - FU 55 373 - Op(AJ) 515 - Op(EE) 755 - Op(AJ)
 173 - BF 81 380 - BC 60 516 - Op(EE) D 5 - DT 11 4) U 217 has achieved no more successes and has turned back to the
175 - Op(EO) 404 - BC 60 517 - Op(BB) refueling area.
176 - Op(AJ) 406 - Op(DT) 552 - Op(CG) 5) U 156 sank British ship "Quebec City" (4,745 GRT) in FE 49.
177 - AN 35 407 - BC 60 558 - Op(ED) 6) U 513 situation report: Movement of escorted ore-steamers from
178 - BE 24 410 - Op(AJ) 569 - Op(AJ) Wabana (Belle ISle) to St. Johns. From here single ships and small
convoys to the south and 2 miles from the coast.
7) U 109 found confidential instructions giving details of the route from
On Return Passage: U 66 - 92 - 109 - 164 - 165 - 171 - 173 - 218 - 411 Freetown to Lagos and Tacoradi on board the steamer "Peterton".
- 440 - 462 - 507 - 511 - 594 - 600 - 608. According to this information, ships set course from ET 6165 via 6411 -
Entered Port: - . - 9963 - FF 2231 - EV 7634.
Sailed: U 382 - Bergen; U 161 - 126 - Lorient; U 575 - St. Nazaire; U 8) U 552 has so far observed only neutral shipping in the operational
183 - 118 - Kiel. area off Lisbon. No definite patrolling. 19.9. patrol vessel sunk in CG
5832 (according to Radio Intercept Service it was an English corvette).
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DB 56, DC 21, CA 2987, AJ 6912.
- 182 - SOS by an unidentified ship in CD 8780.
Planes reported submarines in BF 2296 and a suspicious patch of oil in
AM 5562.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 54 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 87 reported the Swedish vessel "Colombia" from DT 6428. Ship
was on a course from Lisbon to Buenos Aries. In reply to enquiry, boat
was ordered not to sink the vessel. This order was given after discussion
with Naval War Staff in order to avoid possible diplomatic difficulties with
Argentina.
3) U 516 was again bombed by fast land-based plane when moving
away in EE 7176. She reported further details on situation, saying that
convoys ran on the Atlantic side of Trinidad too strong air patrols. In EE
7544 boat sank single ship (6,000 GRT) course 2200, 12 knots.
845
a) Convoy No. 54:
At 0705 U 599 sighted the convoy in AJ 6855 on a course of 600. U
96, U 755 and U 259 also made contact. All except U 755 immediately
lost contact in fog. When making an underwater attack U 259 was
rammed. Slight damage. U 176, U 259 and U 596 were caught unawares
in the fog by a destroyer who dropped depth charges. During the
afternoon U 569 and U 373 contacted, but lost it finally about 2300 in high
seas during a storm from northwest. At 2300 U 373 sighted a second
convoy on a westerly course. Boats were instructed to continue operating
against the eastbound convoy. As an improvement can be expected in the
weather, there is a good chance of finding the convoy again during the day.
b) 1) AL 71 is the new approach point for U 619, 260, 382, and 261.
2) U 128 is proceeding south via CF 20, 40, DG 90, EH 90, ES 50 to
ET.
 3) It is intended that U 610, 620, 253 shall operate later somewhere
about AE 1737 and AD 29 against the south-bound Murmansk convoy that
is expected around 22.9.
4) U 69 and U 67 are making for BB 18 as their attack area.
Attention is drawn to the detailed situation reports made by U 517 and
U 165.
5) Group "Pfeil" has been ordered to steer a course of 2450, speed 7
knots from 2300.
- 183 -
The following plans for the use of SMA (submarine-laid shaft mines)
have been submitted to Naval War Staff.
I. The size and cruising range of the minelaying submarines suitable for
carrying submarine-laid shaft mines make them well-adapted in the main
for operations in remote areas - thus, the chances of operating off the
coasts of America and Africa must be considered first. Apart from mining
activity in these waters, mines could also be laid on occasion in the areas
round Iceland and England without wasting much time. An opinion on the
conditions in Northern Waters can best be given by the authorities
responsible for this area.

On 20.9. at 100 they are to turn back on a course of 650, speed 6
knots.
c) U 594 refueled from U 461.
d) U 261 left Kiel on 8.9. on her first operational trip. Since then she has
not replied to repeated calls. Several reports of attacks by English planes
in AN, AF and AM make it appear that the boat has been sunk by them.
No details are known, the boat must be considered lost.
II. Suitable areas for laying SMA (submarine-laid shaft mines) are:
a) Off the coasts of America:
1) Areas between Boston and Cape Sable, off Halifax, off Sydney, off
Cape Race as far as St. Johns. Depths of water, shipping movements and
distance from the coast of the areas of a suitable depth are all equally
favorable in these places, whilst the mine barrages or mines can be so laid
everywhere that the use of Torpedo carrying submarines need not be
affected.
2) The Mississippi Delta, but as so close inshore and under constant patrol,
a more powerful attack would be necessary.
3) Cabot Straits, St. Lawrence, Belle Isle Straits, Old Bahama Channel,
area round Trinidad. However, these areas will be reserved for torpedo
carrying submarines as long as there are opportunities for them there.

V. Reports of Success: b) Off the coasts of Africa:

U 516 1 ship 6,000 GRT 1) Outside the South African ports, Durban, East London, Port
I 156 1 ship 4,745 GRT Elizabeth, Capetown.
U 552 1 patrol ship 2) In the Gulf of Guinea off the Congo, Point Noire, Libreville, Lagos and
U 98 1 ship 5,000 GRT) assumed to be mines. Tacoradi.
U 69 1 ship 5,000 GRT) 3) Bathurst, Freetown, Monrovia, Duala, Port Harcourt and Calabar are
less favorable. In the last three places, Spanish traffic to Fernando Po must
be allowed for.
VI. General:
846

III. Apart from purely geographical possibilities, shipping, and the anti-
submarine defences influence. The use of submarine-laid shaft mines.
a) Shipping:
1) The greatest amount of shipping may be expected in American
waters, this traffic is also the most important, as it consists of supplies for
the European out-posts of our enemy, England. Important supplies for
Russia via Iceland also commence their voyage here.
- 184 -
2) The strategically important traffic round the Cape (of Good Hope)
to the African Theater of war is probably considerably less.
3) Although the shipping in Freetown is important it is less accessible to
minelaying than the areas given in paragraphs 1 and 2 because of the depth
of water.
4) Ports in the Gulf of Guinea are less important.
5) There is little chance of observing the exact traffic lanes before laying
S.M.A. mines, because the areas of suitable depth are mostly too far from
the coast in an area where shipping can scatter.
b) Anti-submarine Defences:
847
1) It is possible to carry out mining in all the areas named, so far as
anti-submarine defences are concerned.
2) It will be far easier for the enemy to take measures against mine-laying
in the American area than in the African.
3) Further strengthening of general anti-submarine defences must be
expected in the American zone. This may well make it more difficult and
risky to carry out mine-laying at a later date.
IV. After due consideration, B.d.U. suggests that once submarine laid
shaft mines have been released, the first shall be laid off the coasts of
America, because:
1) There are many opportunities there in important areas with busy
shipping where torpedo-carrying submarines have little chance of success.
2) The general anti-submarine defences will render mine-laying
increasingly difficult.
3) The sewing of submarine mines in American waters will probably
have no immediate effect on anti-submarine measures in the important
African zones which lie much farther from submarine jumping-off bases.
On the other hand, the enemy must always be prepared for submarine-laid
mines off the coast of America once he knows they have been laid off
South African ports.
V. Finally, B.d.U. considers the most important argument in favor of
minelaying is the chance of gaining immediate successes, by not only
causing sinkings but also probably closing harbors, even though this may
be only temporary. The prospect of splitting up defence forces and
causing alarm in other areas is of only secondary importance.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------

- 185 -
20.September 1942.
I. U 66 - CF 15 U 177 - AN 28 U 406 - Op(DT) U 558 - Op(ED)
67 - BE 68 178 - BE 43 407 - BC 60 569 - Op(AK)
68 - FU 79 179 - FE 79 410 - Op(AK) 582 - BE 15
69 - Op(CA) 181 - AM 15 411 - BC 90 584 - BC 93
87 - Op(DT) 183 - AO 432 - Op(AK) 590 - Op(DT)
91 - BC 60 201 - DE 89 437 - BF 48 594 - BD 67
92 - BC 90 202 - DE 89 440 - Op(AK) 595 - Op(AK)
96 - BC 60 211 - BC 60 441 - AN 28 596 - Op(AK)
107 - Op(DT) 214 - Op(DT) 442 - AN 28 597 - BE 65
109 - DS 58 216 - Op(AK) 455 - Op(DC) 599 - Op(AK)
118 - AO 217 - Op(EE) 459 - FU 86 600 - BF 81
125 - Op(FF) 218 - BC 90 460 - DS 11 607 - Op(AK)
126 - BF 50 221 - Op(AK) 461 - BC 90 608 - BE 42
128 - CF 34 253 - AE 27 462 - BF 50 610 - BE 24
135 - Op(AJ) 258 - Op(AK) 504 - FU 95 615 - Op(AK)
156 - Op(EE) 259 - Op(AK) 506 - Op(FE 52) 617 - Op(AK)
159 - FM 97 260 - AL 29 507 - FE 27 618 - Op(AK)
848
161 - BF 50 332 - DE 95 511 - CE 72 619 - AL 51
164 - DO 27 333 - Op(DT) 512 - Op(EE) 620 - AE 25
165 - BC 57 356 - Op(AK) 513 - Op(BB) 661 - Op(AK)
171 - DP 15 373 - Op(AK) 514 - Op(EE) 755 - Op(AK)
172 - FU 94 380 - BC 60 515 - Op(EE) D 5 - DS 62
173 - BF 80 382 - AF 87 516 - Op(EE) 575 - BF 60
175 - BF 80 404 - BC 93 517 - Op(BB)
176 - Op(AK) 552 - Op(CG)
On Return Passage: U 66 - 92 - 109 - 164 - 165 - 171 - 173 - 218 - 411
- 440 - 462 - 507 - 511 - 594 - 600 - 608.
Entered Port: U 173 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 753 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 54 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 514, after making repairs she moved away to operate against
northwest traffic between EO 65 and 15.
3) U 202 chased a large single ship in DE 9271, course 800, speed 15
knots. Boat gave up the chase because starboard blower broke down.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 1763, EE 8810, EE 87, DM 26, CA 52.
U-boat attack: AJ 3989.
S.O.S. sent by unidentified steamer in DF 13.
American steamer "Petrofuel" reported that it had been torpedoed in CA
8153. (probably mine).
English plane reported submarine in BE 6190.
d) None.
- 186 -
 the boats all lost contact one by one. The last contact with the enemy was
at 0520 in AK 1874, where U 561 sighted a destroyer. The operation is
being continued. U 260 and U 619 are also proceeding at full speed
towards the convoy.
b) 1) U 382, 641 and 442 have been ordered to go via AE 9635 to AE 76
at highest possible cruising speed. The heavy naval escorts of a
IV. Current Operations: Murmansk convoy are expected on the homeward voyage.
a) Convoy No. 54: 2) From today an "SL" convoy is expected to pass through the strip
At 1107 U 596 again picked up the convoy in AK 4168. Enemy was on where Group "Iltis" is stationed. If no contact is established by 2100 on
a course of 500. In reply to question whether there was any likelihood that 21.9. the boats are to cruise in the patrol strip on a northerly course, speed
the second convoy sighted was the same as the one first trailed, U 373 7 knots. At 0900 on 22.9. they will remain in the patrol strip reached and
replied that she did not think it probable. About 1400, Operational Control each boat will patrol her own reconnaissance area by steaming to and fro.
decided to direct the 9 boats of Group "Pfeil", which were stationed in AL c) 1) U 594, 92, 411, 218, 96, 380, 91, 211, 407 and 584 refueled from U
40 - 70, to attack this convoy too. 461. Tanker still has 267 cbm of fuel and 90 day's provisions.
Proceeding at full speed they should reach the convoy within 20 - 40 2) U 109 refueled for her return voyage from U 460.
hours. The decision to throw in this group was taken because: 1) the
convoy for which this group was waiting must have passed the patrol strip
already, 2) the only contact we have with the enemy at the moment must
be followed up. - 187 -
At 1230 U 373 sighted the convoy in AK 4217. U 259 an hour later in
AK 4166. U 176 also made contact, but was soon forced to move away.
In a day attack U 596 scored 2 hits on 2 freighters. She was hunted with
depth-charges. At 1356 U 373 was forced to submerge because of bad
visibility caused by rain and fog. At 1510 she fired a spread of three in
AK 4215, she heard a hit and then a steamer sinking. At 1800, U 432
reported convoy in AJ 3991, course 500, speed 7 knots, long range escort a
long way off. About 3 miles ahead of the convoy a search group of 4
corvettes and destroyers in line abreast; listening sweep! At 1530 U 410
also came up on the convoy in AK 4216 and was forced to submerge by a d) U 68 is taking over from U 156 in Group "Eisbär". U 68 will be
destroyer dropping depth-charges. Boat sighted several patches of replaced by U 159, a new boat joining the group! The boats have been
wreckage in AK 4218. Judging by reports from different boats it was informed.
assumed for a time that the convoy had divided into one fast and one slow
group. V. Reports of Success:
However, after several boats had completed their fixes, it was U 596 2 ships 10,000 GRT.
discovered that the convoy was still sailing in the same close order.
During the afternoon visibility worsened through rain and fog. After dusk
849
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
21.September 1942.
I. U 66 - BE 79 U 178 - BE 76 U 407 - BC 60 U 569 - Op(AK)
67 - BE 59 179 - FM 15 410 - Op(AK) 575 - BF 82
68 - FU 98 181 - AL 28 411 - BC 90 582 - AL 78
69 - CA 95 183 - AN 36 432 - Op(AK) 584 - BC 60
87 - Op(DT) 201 - DQ 14 437 - BE 64 590 - Op(DT)
91 - BC 60 202 - DE 89 440 - BF 50 594 - BE 47
92 - BE 81 211 - BC 69 441 - AF 79 595 - Op(AK)
96 - BD 17 214 - Op(DT) 442 - AF 79 596 - Op(AK)
107 - Op(DT) 216 - Op(AK) 455 - Op(DC) 597 - BE 53
109 - DS 13 217 - EE 62 459 - CG 12 599 - Op(AK)
118 - AN 36 218 - BC 90 460 - DS 54 600 - BF 80
125 - Op(FF) 221 - Op(AK) 461 - BC 99 607 - Op(AK)
126 - BF 49 253 - Op(AE 14) 462 - BF 60 608 - BE 55
128 - CF 52 258 - Op(AK) 504 - CG 13 610 - Op(AE 15)
135 - AK 73 259 - Op(AK) 506 - FE 43 615 - Op(AK)
156 - FE 43 260 - AK 30 507 - FE 11 617 - Op(AK)
159 - FU 14 332 - DQ 21 511 - CE 52 618 - Op(AK)
161 - BF 49 333 - Op(DT) 512 - Op(EO) 619 - AK 30
164 - DE 94 356 - Op(AK) 513 - Op(BB) 620 - Op(AE 12)
165 - BC 68 373 - Op(AK) 514 - EO 34 661 - Op(AK)
171 - DD 99 380 - BC 60 515 - Op(EO) 753 - BF 91
172 - CG 12 382 - AF 75 516 - Op(EE) 755 - Op(AK)
175 - Op(EO) 404 - BC 60 517 - Op(BB) D 5 - DS 91
176 - Op(AJ) 406 - Op(DT) 552 - Op(CG)
177 - AF 79 558 - Op(ED)
On Return Passage:
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
850
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 54 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 175 sank a freighter (6,000 GRT) in EO 1865, course 1880, speed
8 knots.
3) U 608 was bombed by a "Catalina" when on her return voyage in BE
6617, no damage.
- 188 -
4) U 211 reported tanker with flag in BC 6539, course 200. She was
ordered to sink the vessel unless it was recognized as Irish.
5) U 87, belonging to Group "Iltis", sighted 4 silhouettes in DT 6159 at
0300. Boat was chased away by a destroyer and lost contact. Has been
searching since then on northerly courses without success. According to
own dead reckoning "SL 122" must be in the vicinity, so Group "Iltis" has
been ordered to operate in accordance with report from U 87. So far
contact has not been re-established.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 33, ED 94, BD 61, FM 2471, DO 79, ED 13,
AK 16.
U-boat attack: BB 78.
English planes reported submarines in AB 4174, AE 1569, BE 3787.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
 a) Convoy No. 54:
In the past night U 599 was shelled in AK 1794. It was foggy. Boat
assumed radar location. At 1338 U 596 again made contact in AK 1843,
course 500. At 1412 it picked up a destroyer in AK 1823 and at 1837 was
chased away by her. Contact was lost in rain and poor visibility. U 755
sighted a destroyer for a short time, U 615 was passed over in succession
by two when in AK 1668. The weather had meantime grown so bad that
the boats had to cruise and it was impossible to use any weapons.
Southwest - west storm or hurricane was reported. During the day, U 373,
U 176 and U 569 turned back because of lack of fuel. At 1615, U 259
reported 3 "Consolidated" in AK 2711, which was some 340 West. During
the afternoon U 432 and U 595 also reported flying boats. By morning no
other contact with the enemy had been made. It is intended to ride out the
storm and then continue operations against the convoy.
b) 1) U 178 is cruising farther via CF 70, DG 95, EH 90, to GH 80.
2) U 514 is only partly serviceable and is operating east of the left edge
of EP.
3) Group "Vorwärts" has refueled and is manning a patrol strip from BC
3143 to 3851 in the following order: U 96, 380, 91, 404, 211, 407, 594.
An east-bound convoy is expected.
4) New approach points have been allotted for the following boats: U
575, 753, 254 = AL 91; U 106 - BB 18; U 161 and 126 = FP 23.
Temporary attack area for U 582 = AL 71. Depth 100 miles.
5) U 201, 202 and 332 have been given a free hand off Trinidad and east
of it. Boats have been informed of previous situation report.
According to U 564 the position is as follows.
- 189 -
851
I. In the area 180 miles round ED 98 dived during the day as a matter
of principle. Danger from small, fast, land-based bombers. If submarine
is sighted shipping takes a different course.
II. The shipping discovered generally runs for 5 days on a narrow route.
Other boats will only be successful if they arrive very quickly.
III. So far no night air patrols excepting when escorting a convoy. No
location noticed.
c) U 506 took over 30 cbm from U 156.
d) The number of cases of boats leaving home ports and having to put in
to Bergen for repairs has increased recently. This means that these boats
do not reach the operational area for 3 or 4 days. Yards in the home area
have had this unsatisfactory state of affairs pointed out to them.
V. Reports of Success:
U 175 1 ship 6,000 GRT
VI. General:
The following report has been made to Naval War Staff on the
operational use of submarine type IX D2 and the Italian submarine-cruiser
"Cagni":
1) En route to the operations area U 179 is about at the Equator, U 178
west of Biscay, U 181 west of Scotland.
2) B.d.U. intends to use the boats in the area off Cape Town and off the
coast of East Africa up to the Madagascar area. They will attack shipping
sailing to and from Eastern Asia and North Africa, and if the occasion
arises, against supplies from Madagascar.
3) The Italian F.d.U. at Bordeaux informed us that the Italian submarine
"Cagni" should pass Gibraltar about 15:10, and is to operate in that area.
Boat has a cruising range of 25,000 miles and caries 42 torpedoes. B.d.U.
has no objection to the Italian plan. The Italians have not been informed
of the plan set out in B.d.U. communication, S.O. only No. 372 of 20.9.
 4) It is assumed that in accordance with the German-Japanese
OPerational boundary 700 East, no Japanese forces are in the area
mentioned.
5) It must, however, be stated that according to information from the
Italian F.d.U., the Italians have approached the Japanese about using the
cruiser "Eritrea", now in Japan, as a supply ship for "Cagni". Apparently
the Japanese are not at all inclined to do this and stated that they intended
operating very shortly in the East Africa-Madagascar area with 40 to 50
submarines. It is requested that this point shall be cleared up. However,
the Italian B.d.U. requested that no mention should be made of Italian -
Japanese negotiations when so doing.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 190 -
22.September 1942.
I. U 66 - BE 92 U 178 - CF 24 U 406 - Op(DT) U 575 - BF 48
67 - BE 67 179 - FM 53 407 - Op(BC) 582 - AL 70
68 - CG 16 181 - AL 55 410 - Op(AK) 584 - Op(BC)
69 - CB 44 183 - AN 29 411 - BE 47 590 - Op(DT)
87 - DT 38 201 - DQ 35 432 - Op(AK) 594 - BE 49
91 - Op(BC) 202 - DQ 15 437 - BE 52 595 - Op(AK)
92 - BE 58 211 - BC 38 441 - AE 96 596 - Op(AK)
852
96 - Op(BC) 214 - Op(DT) 442 - AE 96 597 - BE 55
107 - Op(DT) 216 - Op(AK) 455 - Op(DC) 599 - Op(AK)
109 - DG 76 217 - EE 38 459 - CG 19 607 - Op(AK)
118 - AN 28 218 - BD 68 460 - DS 82 608 - BE 65
125 - Op(FF) 221 - Op(AK) 461 - CD 25 610 - Op(AE 15)
126 - BE 71 253 - Op(AE 14) 504 - CG 19 615 - Op(AK)
128 - CF 49 254 - BF 54 506 - Op(FE 50) 617 - Op(AK)
135 - AK 85 257 - AF 76 507 - ES 94 618 - Op(AK)
156 - Op(FE 50) 258 - Op(AK) 511 - CE 38 619 - Op(AK)
159 - FU 51 259 - Op(AK) 512 - Op(EE) 620 - Op(AE 12)
161 - BF 71 260 - Op(AK) 513 - Op(BB) 661 - Op(AK)
164 - DE 65 332 - DQ 15 514 - Op(EP) 753 - BF 82
165 - BD 43 333 - Op(DT) 515 - Op(EE) 755 - Op(AK)
171 - DE 72 356 - Op(AK) 516 - Op(EE) D 5 - DS 86
172 - CG 19 373 - AK 58 517 - Op(BB) 600 - v. La Pallice
175 - Op(EO) 380 - Op(BC) 552 - Op(CG)
176 - AK 56 382 - AE 93 558 - Op(ED)
177 - AF 71 404 - Op(BC) 569 - Op(AK)
On Return Passage: U 66 - 92 - 109 - 164 - 165 - 171 - 176 - 217 - 218
- 373 - 411 - 507 - 511 - 569 - 594 - 608.
Entered Port: U 256 transferred to Brest from Lorient; U 600 - La
Pallice.
Sailed: U 116 - Lorient; U 662, 353, 706 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 54 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 600 reported damage from mine explosion in BF 9321 (Route
"Herz"). Boat was escorted to La Pallice by 2 patrol vessels. Probably
ground-mine with acoustic firing laid by plane.
3) U 211 scored 2 hits on a fast tanker (10,000 GRT) when she fired a
spread of 2 in AK 7712. Boat continued the chase and sank the tanker at
0030 in AK 7114.
 4) U 582 sank the Norwegian vessel "Vibran" (2,993 GRT?) in BD
5959, course 2600, speed 16 knots.
5) U 380 chased a single ship in BC 3145 without success. It was not
possible to use guns because of heavy swell. While still stalking, the boat
came upon a destroyer and was forced to move away. Contact was lost.
The vessel stalked was "Mathilda". On 18.9. the boat sank the Norwegian
vessel "Olaf Fostenes" (2,994 GRT?) in BC 9277, course 2800, speed 16
knots, from Liverpool to Halifax.
- 191 -
6) No further reports have been received from U 87 (Group "Iltis".
(See paragraph IVb).
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DC 21, DM 43, BB 1810, EO 1610.
U-boat attack: AK 25 and AJ 97 (Norwegian "Mathilda").
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 54:
The requested weather reports show that the storm has not abated. It
was not possible to use weapons today again. During the day several
flying boats were reported by the submarines. As the storm center is also
slowly moving east, the boats have not yet been able to attack, and as they
are probably already far astern of the convoy, Operational Control has
decided to break off the operation. Boats have been ordered to leave the
area so that they are stationed in the new patrol strip (see paragraph IV 6)
by 2400 on 25.9. While enroute U 617 sighted the convoy at 2400 in AK
853
3955 on easterly course, speed 8 knots. Boat attacked and torpedoed a
tanker of 9 - 10,000 GRT. It was definitely heard to sink on the
hydrophones. Then the boat was forced to dive by a destroyer. When boat
surfaced again, she sank a straggler (5,500 GRT). Contact was lost and
not established again by morning. The report made by the boat was not at
first heard by Control and was not received here until 1230 on 23rd.
Further operations by the boats at this stage and with present weather
conditions are not worth while. The order to man the patrol strip still
stands.
b) 1) New approach points have been allocated: U 67 = EE 70; U 569
homeward bound = BE 40.
2) U 552 has left operational area off Lisbon and is proceeding via DG
90 to DS 90.
3) In order to pick up the supposed convoy reported by U 87, Group
"Iltis" has been ordered to be in the patrol strip from DH 7484 to 7694 by
0900 on 23.9. They are to maintain previous sequence. Then they are to
proceed towards the convoy on a southerly course with a speed of 6 knots.
If the convoy is not found, Group "Iltis" is to refuel and then operate in
ET.
4) U 404 is taking over U 211's position in the patrol strip manned by
Group "Vorwärts". All boats stationed north of U 404 are to move down.
U 211 will later man the most northerly position.
5) U 382 will take AE 5610 as attack area; U 441 = AE 5310; U 442 -
AE 5640. Heavy naval forces which until now have been escorting the
"QP 18" convoy must be expected to pass; they may enter Seydis or Reyda
Fjord. From 000 on 25.9. boats are to be south of an area which is closed
because of our own minefields, this is bounded by the horizontals of
squares AE 5350 upper edge and AE 5680 lower edge, as well as west of
the horizontal of AE 5680 right edge.
- 192 -

6) In order to pick up the Murmansk - Reykjavik Convoy "QP 18"
which was in AA 9685 at 1300 on 22.9., the following attack areas have
been occupied: U 253 = AD 2960; U 620 = AE 1740; U 610 = AE 1770.
About 2400 these boats were ordered to operate against the convoy as
submarines in Northern Waters had established contact. While the convoy
hunt lasts U 253, 610 and 620 are operationally attached to "Group North".
7) When the hunt for Convoy No. 54 was broken off, those boats that
still had sufficient fuel to operate were combined to form Group "Blitz".
They were ordered to be on station from AK 0317 to AL 7559 by 2400 on
25.9. in the following sequence: U 259 - 599 - 410 - 216 - 595 - 260 - 617
- 258 - 607 - 619 - 356 - 618 - 221 - 615 - 582 - 437 - 597. U 661 and 755
were to take up their position west of the center of the patrol strip.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 211 1 ship 10,000 GRT
U 582 1 ship 2,993 GRT
U 380 1 ship 2,994 GRT
U 617 2 ships 14,500 GRT
- 193 -
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
23.September 1942.
I. U 66 - BF 70 U 177 - AE 68 U 404 - Op(BC) U 569 - AK 61
67 - BE 82 178 - CF 46 406 - Op(DH) 575 - BE 60
68 - CG 20 179 - FM 91 407 - Op(BC) 582 - AL 70
69 - CB 43 181 - AL 84 410 - Op(AK) 584 - Op(BC)
854
87 - Op(DH) 183 - AN 24 411 - BE 49 590 - Op(DH)
91 - Op(BC) 201 - DP 56 432 - Op(AK) 594 - BE 59
92 - BE 67 202 - DQ 41 437 - BE 16 595 - Op(AK)
96 - Op(BC) 211 - Op(AK 70) 441 - BE 49 596 - AK 02
107 - Op(DH) 214 - Op(DH) 442 - AE 64 597 - BE 19
109 - DG 57 216 - Op(AK) 455 - AE 64 599 - Op(AK)
116 - BF 50 217 - DQ 71 459 - CG 20 607 - Op(AK)
118 - AF 80 218 - BE 48 460 - DS 86 608 - BF 50
125 - Op(FF) 221 - Op(AK) 461 - CD 46 610 - Op(AE 15)
126 - BE 90 253 - Op(AE 14) 504 - CG 20 615 - Op(AK)
128 - CF 78 254 - BF 40 506 - Op(FE) 617 - Op(AK)
135 - BD 23 257 - AE 47 507 - ES 58 618 - Op(AK)
156 - Op(FE) 258 - Op(AK) 511 - CF 13 619 - Op(AK)
159 - FU 83 259 - Op(AK) 512 - Op(EE) 620 - Op(AE 12)
161 - BE 90 260 - Op(AK) 513 - Op(BB 30) 661 - Op(AK)
164 - DE 35 332 - DP 66 514 - Op(EP) 662 - AO 40
165 - BD 55 333 - Op(DH) 515 - Op(EE) 706 - AO 40
171 - DE 83 353 - AO 40 516 - Op(EE) 753 - BF 70
172 - CG 20 356 - Op(AK) 517 - Op(BB 10) 755 - Op(AK)
175 - Op(EO) 373 - AK 94 552 - CG 84 D 5 - DS 86
176 - AK 92 380 - Op(BC) 558 - Op(ED)
382 - AE 56
 On Return Passage: U 66, 92, 109, 164, 165, 171, 176, 217, 218, 373,
411, 507, 511, 569, 594, 596, 608.
Entered Port: U 183 - Bergen.
Sailed: U 43 - 160 - 106 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 54 and 55 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 407 had trouble with both compressors, moved away to southeast
to make repairs.
3) U 455 reported completion of secondary task (Minelaying off
Charleston). 19.9. steamer sighted in DB 38, course north.
4) U 515 reported busy traffic in both directions in EO 1440 and 1490.
5) U 125 reported she had sunk "Bruyere" (5,335 GRT) on course 200
in ET 7333.
6) U 512 sank ship of 7,500 GRT on 19.9. in EE 4423. Searched
Spanish vessel "Campuzano" in EE 4284. Electric compressor out of
order.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AE 9162, AN 1316, BA 9719, AK 2592, BD 9793,
DE 3823, ET 7336, AJ 3173.
U-boat attacks: EO 14, AK 2592.
Torpedoings: AK 1820 (Pennmar).
d) See appendix on operations off the coast of Brazil.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 54:
The boats of Group "Blitz" which were enroute to the patrol strip, were
informed at 1830 that the order to man the strip was cancelled. They were
then ordered to operate at cruising speed against a convoy sighted by U
380 in square BC 3421. But at 2212 U 258 again sighted Convoy No. 54
in AK 3555, course 700. According to this, the convoy must have hove to
for a long time during the heavy storm. U 258 scored 3 hits on a group of
steamers, then lost contact. During the night U 221 and U 755 maintained
855
contact. The latter fired 4 misses at first light. Boats, which can manage
to reach convoy by the evening of 24.9. are to continue the operation.
2) Convoy No. 55:
U 380, a boat belonging to Group "Vorwärts", sighted a fast convoy at
1146 in BC 3421, mean course 600, 10 to 11 knots. Two two-funneled
steamers were distinguished in the convoy. It is probably a special troop
transport convoy. U 91 also made contact. But both boats lost it again at
0100 and 0230 respectively. On account of the great value of such a
convoy, the boats of Group "Blitz" which were over 700 miles northeast
- 194 -
were ordered to cruise in search of it, although a normal attack is
extremely difficult against such a very fast convoy.
b) 1) U 382 - 441 - 442 were informed of the latest position of the
Murmansk - Iceland convoy at 1351 in AE 2674, course 200. Boats were
ordered to remain in the attack area.
2) The patrol strop of Group "Iltis" was dissolved at dusk. U 406 turned
back to refuel, U 87 - 333 - 107 - 590 are to operate in the Freetown area
after they have refueled. U 214 has been ordered to return and is to
operate off Lisbon if her fuel stocks permit.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 125 1 ship 5,335 GRT
U 512 1 ship 7,500 GRT
U 258 1 ship 5,000 GRT) assumed torpedoed by B.d.U.
U 258 1 ship )

---------------------------------------------------
---------------
24.September 1942.
I. U 43 - BF 50 U 176 - BD 32 U 404 - Op(BC) U 575 - BE 60
66 - BF 70 177 - AE 83 406 - DT 23 582 - Op(AL)
67 - BE 79 178 - CF 75 407 - BC 60 584 - Op(BC)
68 - GG 10 179 - FN 77 410 - Op(AK) 590 - Op(DH 70)
69 - CB 25 181 - BE 16 411 - BE 58 594 - BE 68
87 - Op(DH 70) 201 - DP 91 432 - AK 61 595 - Op(AK)
91 - Op(AK) 202 - DP 93 437 - AL 87 596 - AK 68
92 - BE 69 211 - Op(BC) 441 - Op(AE) 597 - BE 12
96 - Op(BC) 214 - Op(DH 70) 442 - Op(AE) 599 - Op(AK)
107 - Op(DT) 216 - Op(AK) 455 - Op(DC) 607 - Op(AK)
109 - DG 55 217 - EE 32 459 - GG 10 608 - BF 60
116 - BF 40 218 - BE 57 460 - DS 80 610 - Op(AE 10)
118 - AF 72 221 - Op(AK) 461 - CD 75 615 - Op(AL)
125 - ET 81 253 - Op(AE 15) 504 - GG 10 617 - Op(AK)
126 - CG 11 254 - BE 60 506 - Op(FE) 618 - Op(AK)
128 - DG 39 257 - AE 92 507 - ES 27 619 - Op(AK)
135 - BD 35 258 - Op(AK) 511 - BE 32 620 - Op(AE 19)
156 - Op(FE) 259 - Op(AK) 512 - Op(EE) 661 - Op(AK)
159 - GG 12 260 - Op(AK) 513 - Op(BB 60) 662 - AN 30
160 - BF 50 332 - DP 92 514 - Op(EP) 706 - AN 30
161 - CG 11 333 - Op(DH 70) 515 - Op(EO) 753 - BF 40
164 - DE 33 353 - AN 30 516 - Op(EE) 755 - Op(AK)
165 - BD 65 356 - Op(AK) 517 - Op(BB 10) D 5 - DS 80
171 - DE 35 373 - BD 32 552 - DH 33 106 - BF 50
172 - GG 10 380 - Op(AJ) 558 - Op(EE)
175 - Op(EO) 382 - Op(AE) 569 - AK 92
856
On Return Passage: U 66 - 92 - 109 - 164 - 165 - 171 - 176 - 214 - 217
- 218 - 373 - 411 - 432 - 507 - 511 - 569 - 594 - 596 - 608.
Entered Port: U 608 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 262 - Bergen.
- 195 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 54 and 55 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 617 sank "Roumanie" (3,563 GRT), course 300, speed 8 knots in
AK 2251. Engineer officer taken on board. Plane in AK 2271.
3) U 356 sank single ship in AK 2864. Operated against convoy being
hunted by Group "Vorwärts".
4) U 128 chased ship with 2 funnels, speed 18 knots, zigs of 200, as far
as DG 6536 without success.
5) U 610 reported 4 steamers at 2100 on easterly course in AE 1718.
6) U 512 sank a vessel of 8,000 GRT, course 3350, in EO 1419.
7) U 515 sank "Redpool" (4,838 GRT), course 3100, in EO 2470 on
21.9. 23.9. sank "Lindvangen" (2,412 GRT), course 3000, in EO 1440.
American fruit steamer (4,500 GRT) course 1300, speed 13 knots, left
sinking in EO 1496.
8) U 619 attacked single ship in AK 6224. Westerly course, 8,000 GRT,
equipped with torpedo nets. After 5 hits broke in two in 6119. Remains
destroyed by cannon fire.
9a) U 559 sighted 2 single ships in AK 0244 and 2977, one course west,
the other east.
 9b) At 2305 came upon convoy in AK 5537, course 2500, speed 10
knots. 12 steamers, 8 escorts. Forced to retire after a triple miss. Contact
lost.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AK 36, AK 53, CA 6531, AL 2649, AL 2477, AK
3478, AK 5623, BA 3641, AK 3624, AJ 3173, BF 5470, BA 6534.
U-boat attacks: EO 4310, EO 1410.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 54:
U 755 reported the convoy at 1200. Formation of 3 columns in line
abreast with several close and remote escorts ahead and on each side.
Later, flying boats and anti-submarine groups appeared near the convoy
and by good cooperation forced the boats to submerge. U 755 had to dive
at 1618 and was pursued with depth charges and hydrophones by the
destroyer formation for 9 hours. As contact was broken and constant air
patrol prevented the submarine hauling ahead, the operation is to be
broken off at mid-day on 25.9.
- 196 -
2) Convoy No. 55:
During the day the following established contact with the convoy: U
96, U 584, U 404, U 260, U 607, U 407, U 211, U 410.
U 91 was forced to submerge and lost contact. U 96 and U 380 were
not able to haul ahead of the fast convoy because of engine trouble.
857
U 584 was forced away by a destroyer. U 260 lost contact after an
unsuccessful attack.
U 211 fired a double miss at a 2-funneled steamer.
U 410 was forced away by destroyer.
U 607 made an underwater attack and was picked up and rammed by a
destroyer. Depth charges were dropped.
These reports show how very difficult it is to get ahead because of the
enemy's high speed. When submarines are forced to submerge by
destroyers, contact is lost for a long time. Only the large number of boats
attacking the convoy prevented the contact being definitely lost. Boats
formerly belonging to Group "Blitz" and "Pfeil" which are stalking the
convoy from N.E. have no speed restriction after the morning of 24.9.
b) 1) U 620 and 253 have been ordered to operate against the ships
reported by U 610 (see paragraph IIIa) 5)).
2) U 455 is to operate in the sea area off Cape Race, approach point BB
69.
c) 1) U 217 took over sick man from U 201.
2) U 171 and U 164 refueled from U 461.
3) U 441 has been ordered to enter Drontheim because a member of the
crew is seriously ill.
d) See enclosure for submarine position and intended operations.
V. Reports of Success:
U 617 1 ship 3,563 GRT
U 356 1 ship 5,000 GRT (tonnage assumed by B.d.U.)
U 512 2 ships 8,000 GRT
U 515 3 ships 11,750 GRT
U 619 1 ship 8,000 GRT
VI. General:
The operation against the "SC" convoy contacted by Group "Loss" was
hampered from the very beginning by bad visibility and changeable
weather.
However, weather reports gave no reason to suppose that conditions
would deteriorate still further. Thus, on 20.9. the order was given to
Group "Pfeil" to operate. This group was in patrol strips AL 40 to 70.
When the storm rose - which for some hours actually reached hurricane
force - a promising operation with a maximum of 23 boats was broken up.
It later transpired that the convoy hove to for some time in square AJ 30.
Thus, the submarines passed by the convoy during the storm when
visibility was bad, as they expected it to be farther to the east.
- 197 -
While en route to the new patrol strip in square AL 40 on 22.9. , U 617
picked up the convoy for a time and sank 2 ships. However, atmospherics
prevented her radioing the position report. On 23.9. when the weather
improved U 258 suddenly came upon the convoy again and was able to
score 3 hits. Boats were again instructed to continue stalking the convoy,
but could only hope for slight success as the convoy had already reached
the area where air patrolling was concentrated and convoys had air escorts.
These air escorts caused contact to be lost on 24.9. and so the operation
was broken off.
Results: 4 ships sunk
3 ships torpedoed.
No losses, 1 boat was damaged by bombs on 24.9. and forced to return.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
25.September 1942.
858
I. U 43 - BF40 U 176 - BD 38 U 382 - Op(AE 50) U 569 - BD 33
66 - BF 78 177 - AL 32 404 - Op(AK) 575 - BE 61
67 - CF 15 178 - DG 36 406 - DT 17 582 - Op(AL 47)
68 - GG 20 179 - FU 19 407 - Op(AK) 584 - Op(AK)
69 - BB 87 181 - BE 15 410 - Op(AK) 590 - Op(DT 20)
87 - Op(DT 20) 201 - DP 95 411 - BE 68 594 - BF 40
91 - Op(AK) 202 - EE 32 432 - BD 69 595 - Op(AK)
92 - BF 50 211 - Op(AK) 437 - Op(AL 71) 597 - Op(AL 74)
96 - Op(AK) 214 - DH 55 441 - Op(AL) 599 - Op(AK)
107 - Op(DT 20) 216 - Op(AL) 442 - Op(AE) 607 - Op(AK)
109 - DG 29 217 - DP 95 455 - DC 16 610 - AE 14
116 - BE 60 218 - BE 67 459 - GG 20 615 - Op(AL)
118 - AE 69 221 - Op(AL) 460 - DT 43 617 - Op(AK)
125 - Op(ET) 253 - AD 26 461 - DE 36 618 - Op(AK)
126 - CG 48 254 - BE 67 504 - GG 20 619 - Op(AK)
128 - DG 63 257 - AE 85 506 - Op(FE) 620 - AD 26
135 - BD 64 258 - Op(AL) 507 - ES 13 661 - Op(AK)
156 - Op(FE) 259 - Op(AL) 511 - BE 98 662 - AN 20
159 - GG 20 260 - Op(AK) 512 - Op(EO) 706 - AN 20
160 - BF 40 262 - AF 70 513 - Op(BB 60) 753 - BE 92
161 - BE 97 332 - EE 23 514 - Op(EP) 755 - Op(AL)
164 - DE 33 333 - DT 27 515 - Op(EO) D 5 - EH 38
165 - BE 44 353 - AN 20 516 - Op(EE) 106 - BF 41
171 - DE 33 356 - Op(AK) 517 - Op(BB 10) 596 - AK
172 - GG 20 373 - BD 38 552 - DH 23
175 - Op(EO) 380 - Op(AK) 558 - Op(EE)
On Return Passage: U 66 - 92 - 109 - 164 - 165 - 171 - 176 - 214 - 217
- 218 - 373 - 411 - 432 - 507 - 511 - 569 - 594 - 596.
Entered Port: U 92 - Brest.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
 During the day the following reported contact: U 211, U 595, U 356, U
III. Reports on the Enemy: 96, U 216, U 619, U 607, U 410, U 91, U 260, U 582, U 407, U 584, U
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 54 and 55 see paragraph IVa. 618. Contact was maintained until 0158, when the wind freshened and
visibility worsened (1 - 2 miles) it was interrupted and not established
- 198 - again.
Individual reports from the boats:
U 404 made an underwater attack at night without success.
U 607, U 584, U 618, U 407, U 595, U 91 did not manage to fire when
making an underwater attack because the convoy made a wide zig.
U 356 was about to fire when a destroyer dropped depth charges.
U 216 sank a 2-funneled vessel of the "Viceroy of India" class at 1636
in square AK 6656 with three hits out of a spread of four.
At 2357 U 96 sank a steamer of "Reina del Pacifico" class with 2 hits in
AL 4479. Ship exploded. Probably carrying a cargo of ammunition.
2) U 662 requested permission to enter Stavanger because of damage; In AL 4710 U 410 fired a triple and a single miss at a steamer with a
was ordered to go to Bergen. strikingly high, thick funnel, who sailed at night at a distance from the
3) U 181 sighted convoy ("OS" ?) in BE 1861, course 2200. Moved convoy. Steamer out maneuvered torpedoes. U 91 scored a hit on a
away as ordered. steamer (5,000 GRT) at 0125 in AL 4499. U 356 fired a triple miss at a
4) U 432 sank "Penmar" (5,868 GRT) in AL 2721. fast single ship near the convoy.
5) U 259 carried out temporary repairs and is continuing to stalk b) 1) U D5 was allocated ES 10 and 50 as her operational area. She is to
Convoy No. 55. operate against east - west and NW - SE traffic between ER 36 and ES 55.
6) U 177 on 23.9. 1 P.O. overboard. The present distribution of the
main ballast tanks causes the boat to have a decided tendency to dip into
the swell. - 199 -
7) U 513 reported convoy at 0535 in BC 4414, course N., slow speed.
Boat was alone in the area attack sanctioned.
8) U 517 reported from BB 10 - 40 one convoy in each direction every
week. Permanent air patrol constantly strengthened.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 4253, BB 1455, AK 57, BB 1794, BD 6376, CA
59, AM 2333.
U-boat attacks: AK 69, AL 48, AE 2192.
d) None.
2) U 599 was to occupy AK 91 as temporary attack area if she had not
IV. Current Operations: established contact with the SW convoy by 2000.
a) Convoy No. 55: 3) U 617 was given AK 63 as attack area for the time being.
859
 4) U 253, 610, 620 who were returning from Northern Iceland were 118 - AE 91 221 - Op(AL) 459 - GG 607 - Op(AL)
given AK 30 as approach point. It is intended to form a new group with 125 - Op(ET) 253 - AD 55 460 - DT 27 610 - AD 58
these boats. 126 - CF 96 254 - BE 29 461 - DE 64 615 - AL 19
c) None. 128 - DG 92 257 - AL 32 504 - DG 59 617 - Op(AK)
d) U 512 reported that "Monte Gorbea" was recognized as a neutral 135 - BD 65 258 - AK 41 506 - Op(EE) 618 - Op(AL)
vessel before she was torpedoed. Reasons for suspecting that she was a 156 - Op(FD) 259 - Op(AL) 507 - EJ 72 619 - Op(AL)
camouflaged English vessel were insufficient to warrant sinking. The 159 - GG 61 260 - Op(AL) 511 - BF 75 620 - AD 55
Commanding Officer will have to face a court martial. All boats at sea 160 - BF 70 262 - AF 75 512 - Op(EO) 681 - Op(AL)
have been informed. 161 - CF 37 332 - Op(EE) 513 - Op(BC) 662 - AN 20
164 - CD 82 333 - DT 27 515 - EE 88 706 - AN 20
V. Reports of Success: 165 - BE 54 353 - AN 20 514 - Op(EP) 753 - EE 59
U 432 1 ship 5,868 GRT 171 - CD 84 356 - Op(AL) 516 - Op(EE) 755 - AL 42
U 216 1 ship 19,000 GRT 172 - GG 55 373 - BD 64 517 - Op(BB 10) D 5 - EH 69
U 96 1 ship 17,000 GRT 175 - Op(EO)
U 91 1 ship 5,000 GRT torpedoed.

On Return Passage: U 66 - 109 - 164 - 165 - 171 - 176 - 214 - 217 - 218
- 373 - 380 - 411 - 432 - 507 - 511 - 515 - 558 - 569 - 594 - 596 - 755.
--------------------------------------------------- Entered Port: U 662 - Bergen.
--------------- Sailed: U 454 - St. Nazaire; U 518 - 602 - Kiel; U 757 - 183 - Bergen.

26.September 1942. - 200 -

I. U 43 - BF 70 U 176 - BD 65 U 380 - Op(AK) U 552 - DH 16

66 - BF 77 177 - AL 39 382 - AE 87 558 - EE 84
67 - CE 38 178 - DG 65 404 - Op(AL 40) 569 - BE 17
68 - GG 64 179 - FU 55 406 - DT 27 575 - BE 26
69 - BB 82 181 - BE 46 407 - Op(AL 40) 582 - Op(AL)
87 - DT 27 201 - Op(EE) 410 - Op(AL) 584 - Op(AL)
91 - Op(AL) 202 - Op(EE) 411 - BF 47 590 - DT 27
96 - Op(AL) 211 - Op(AL) 432 - BE 13 594 - BF 48 III. Reports on the Enemy:
106 - BF 70 214 - DH 61 437 - Op(AL 40) 595 - Op(AL) a) 1) Convoy No. 56 see paragraph IVa.
107 - DT 27 216 - Op(AL 40) 441 - AE 60 596 - BE 15 2) U 516 reported damage repaired, intended to operate against coastal
109 - DG 32 217 - DQ 18 442 - AE 79 597 - Op(AL 74) shipping in EO.
116 - BE 90 218 - BF 69 455 - CA 98 599 - Op(AK 50)
860
 3) U 442 sank an unidentified steamer on 25.9. in AE 8519. Steamer
was one of a convoy of 3, course 3000, 9 knots.
4) U 596 gave unsuccessful chase to a single ship on a course of 100 in
BE 1379.
5) U 69 sighted a convoy in BB 8868, course 2900, 7 knots. Boat was
alone in the area. Attack sanctioned.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AE 8823, CF 8872, AF 7366, AF 5754, AF 4960,
CA 5211, EE 1860, DN 7550, AK 6639, BB 6381, BB 52, DN 75, EE 18,
AF 4862.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 55:
As further pursuit of the fast convoy when contact had been broken
and the weather was deteriorating promised little chance of success, the
order was given that all boats who were not in a favorable position should
break off the pursuit.
At 1036 U 404 came upon a convoy group of 3 steamers and 1
destroyer in AL 5473. U 404 sank the destroyer with 2 hits, scored other
hits on large freighter, which from hydrophone observation probably sank.
U 619 sank a passenger steamer (about 10,000 GRT) of the
"Derbyshire" class at 2325 in AL 6527, probably a straggler from a
convoy.
This completed the convoy operation.
This unscheduled convoy again shows how difficult it is to attack a
fast formation. Our boats have a maximum continuous speed of about 14
knots., but this does not often give them sufficient superiority to get ahead
of the enemy and take up an attack position.
Underwater attack is also very difficult as it is only rarely possible to
get into a favorable position for firing at a target that keeps making wide
zigs, especially as the destroyer escort and its location gear force the
submarines to take avoiding action underwater.
Despite the lack of success during the first 2 days, the operation was
continued without considering the large consumption of fuel, and finally a
real success was achieved. In all, the following were sunk:
861
1 steamer of "Reina del Pacifico" class 17,702 GRT
1 steamer of "Viceroy of India" class 19,627 GRT
1 steamer of "Derbyshire" class 11,660 GRT.
1 steamer (5,000 GRT) and 1 other steamer were torpedoed.
- 201 -
No losses, no major damage. On 27.9. planes were busy seeking
survivors and this suggests that the steamers sunk were troop transports.
2) Convoy No. 56:
U 617, a boat that was cruising S. after operating against Convoy No.
54, sighted a convoy at 1354 in AK 6382, course 230. This was probably
the "ONS" convoy which it was expected to catch on 26.9. by Group
"Blitz" in the new position intended for it.
Those boats of Group "Vorwärts" and "Blitz" who had remained
behind began to stalk the convoy.
At 1516 U 617 torpedoed a steamer of 5,000 GRT and another of 3,000
GRT in AK 6388. Defences prevented boat observing any sinking.
A strong westerly wind then sprang up, at time reaching gale force, and
contact was lost. The boats operating against this convoy form Group
"Tiger". They are: U 410, U 617, U 515, U 597, U 407, U 599, U 618, U
615, U 260, U 434, U 221, U 356, U 582, U 607, U 258.
b) 1) U 333, 590, 107, 87 were ordered to continue to cruise to the S.
after refueling. It is intended that these boats shall operate in the Freetown
area.
2) U 257, 382, 442, 620, 610, 253 have been given AL 47 as their new
approach point (New convoy group).
 3) U 216 has approach point AL 44.
4) As no reports have been received from U 615, 619, 404, 258, 661, 27.September 1942.
these boats have been ordered to make for AK 60 if they are not operating
against Convoy No. 55. (Group "Tiger").
c) None. I. U 43 - BE 90 U 177 - AL 67 U 382 - AL 24 U 552 - DG 68
d) U 107, 333, 406, 87, 590 have refueled from U 460. 66 - BF 70 178 - DG 94 404 - Op(AL) 558 - EE 53
67 - CE 52 179 - FU 94 406 - DT 20 569 - BE 48
V. Reports of Success: 68 - GG 90 181 - BE 73 407 - Op(AK) 575 - BE 16
U 404 1 destroyer sunk 69 - BB 88 183 - ? 410 - Op(AL) 582 - Op(AK)
U 404 1 ship torpedoed 87 - DT 20 201 - Op(EE) 411 - BF 40 584 - Op(AK)
U 619 1 ship 11,000 GRT 91 - Op(AL) 202 - Op(EE) 432 - BE 27 590 - DT 20
U 442 1 ship 5,000 GRT 96 - Op(AL) 211 - Op(AL) 437 - Op(AK) 594 - BF 40
U 617 2 ships 8,000 GRT torpedoed. 106 - BE 92 214 - DH 32 441 - AF 80 595 - Op(AK)
107 - DT 54 216 - Op(AK) 442 - AL 24 596 - BE 27
109 - CF 76 217 - DE 86 454 - BF 50 597 - Op(AK 40)
--------------------------------------------------- 116 - BE 83 218 - BF 40 455 - CB 71 599 - Op(AK)
--------------- 118 - AE 85 221 - Op(AK) 459 - FU 54 602 - AO 40
125 - Op(EE) 253 - AD 85 460 - DT 43 607 - Op(AK)
126 - CF 91 254 - BE 48 461 - DE 89 610 - AD 85
128 - DT 13 257 - AL 37 504 - CQ 22 615 - Op(AK)
135 - BE 47 258 - AK 66 506 - Op(FE) 617 - Op(AK)
156 - Op(FE) 259 - Op(AL) 507 - DT 74 618 - Op(AK)
159 - GG 60 260 - Op(AK) 511 - BF 40 619 - Op(AL)
160 - BE 92 262 - AE 69 512 - Op(EE) 620 - AD 85
161 - CF 59 332 - Op(EE) 513 - Op(BB) 661 - Op(AL)
164 - CD 64 333 - DT 81 514 - Op(EO) 706 - AE 70
165 - BE 56 353 - AE 70 515 - EF 19 753 - BE 51
- 202 - 171 - CD 67 356 - Op(AK) 516 - Op(EO) 755 - AL 75
172 - GG 90 373 - BE 44 517 - Op(BB 40) 757 - AF 70
175 - Op(EO) 380 - AL 78 518 - AN 30 D 5 - EJ 78
176 - BE 45

On Return Passage: U 66 - 91 - 96 - 109 - 135 - 164 - 165 - 171 - 176 -

211 - 214 - 217 - 218 - 259 - 262 - 373 - 380 - 406 - 411 - 432 - 507 - 511 -
515 - 558 - 569 - 594 - 596 - 755.
862
 Entered Port: - . - IV. Current Operations:
Sailed: U 662 - Bergen. a) Convoy No. 56:
In a stormy westerly wind the boats looked for the convoy on its mean
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. course of 2400. A systematic search was not possible because of the bad
weather which caused unreliable fixes. No contact. U 221 sighted a
III. Reports on the Enemy: seaplane in AK 6758.
a) 1) Convoy No. 56 see paragraph IVa. b) U 253 - 620 - 610 - 442 - 619 - 382 - 404 - 257 - 216 - 575 - 584 - 753
2) U 262 bombs dropped in AF 4799. Proceeding to Bergen because of - 254 have been combined to form Group "Luchs". The group is to make a
damage. patrol strip from AK 6653 to AL 7894 in the above order. U 661 (unable
3) U 513: Convoy reported consisted of about 61 (doubtful) steamers, 6 to transmit radio signals) has been given a waiting position W. of the strip,
destroyers; it made zigs between 25 and 850, speed 7 knots. Air escort if not with Group "Tiger". Intended operation: To pick up the "ON"
while making a daylight attack in BC 4128 submarine was picked up; convoy about 30.9.
depth charges were dropped. c) None.
4) U 177: 26.9. anti-submarine group in AL 6540, fast single ship, d) Radio message to all boats:
camouflaged super-structure, destroyers in quarter-line on either side. C-in-C Navy has again issued a personal and definite order that all
Ships were well handled, no chance to attack. submarine commanders are to conform most carefully with the orders for
5) U 552 reported several patrol vessels in CG 58, some showing lights the treatment of neutral ships. Infringement of these orders will lead to
like neutrals. At night continuous horizontal locating (horizontally unforeseeable political repercussions. This order is to be brought
polarized radar transmissions). immediately to the notice of each and every Commander.
6) U 514 sighted convoy at 0010 in FA 2948, 4 vessels on a northerly
course. Submarine sank 2 freighters of 4,000 and 6,000 tons. Forced to V. Reports of Success:
move away. U 514 2 ships 10,000 GRT.
b) None.
c) U-boat attack: GD 6160, FC 71, ED 78.
d) None. ---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 203 -
28.September 1942.

I. U 43 - BE 94 U 178 - DT 14 U 406 - DH 71 U 575 - AL 78

66 - BF 80 179 - GG 16 407 - AK 80 582 - AK 80
67 - CE 49 181 - BE 73 410 - AK 80 584 - AL 47
68 - GH 78 183 - AF 72 411 - BF 40 590 - DF 86
69 - Op(BB) 201 - Op(EE) 432 - BE 64 594 - BF 60
87 - DT 79 202 - Op(EE) 437 - AK 94 595 - AK 80
863
 91 - AL 95 211 - AL 88 441 - Drontheim 596 - BE 56
96 - AL 67 214 - GG 76 442 - AL 27 597 - AK 86
106 - BE 58 216 - AL 44 454 - BE 40 599 - AK 80
107 - DT 89 217 - DE 94 455 - CB 57 602 - AN 30
109 - CF 51 218 - BF 40 459 - FU 54 607 - AK 82
116 - BE 73 221 - AK 82 460 - DT 72 610 - AK 34
118 - AL 32 253 - AK 32 461 - DE 89 615 - AK 80
125 - Op(FE) 254 - BE 17 504 - CQ 22 617 - AK 80
126 - CF 89 257 - AL 51 506 - Op(FE) 618 - AK 80
128 - DT 42 258 - AK 18 507 - DT 74 619 - AL 47
135 - BE 58 259 - AL 88 511 - BF 57 620 - AK 32
156 - Op(FE) 260 - AK 80 512 - Op(EE) 661 - AK 60
159 - GH 72 262 - AN 28 513 - Op(BB) 662 - AF 79
160 - BE 85 332 - Op(EE) 514 - Op(FA) 706 - AF 72
161 - CF 88 333 - EJ 12 515 - EF 19 753 - BE 13
164 - CD 68 353 - AF 72 516 - Op(EO) 755 - BE 12
171 - CD 66 356 - AK 80 517 - Op(BB 40) 757 - AF 72
172 - GH 74 373 - BE 49 518 - AN 30 D 5 - Op(ES)
175 - Op(EO) 380 - BE 18 552 - DG 68 165 - BF
176 - BE 54 382 - AL 27 558 - EE 34
177 - AE 13 404 - AK 60 569 - BE 73
- 204 -
864
On Return Passage: U 66 - 91 - 96 - 109 - 135 - 164 - 171 - 176 - 211 -
214 - 217 - 218 - 259 - 262 - 373 - 380 - 406 - 411 - 432 - 507 - 511 - 515 -
558 - 569 - 594 - 596 - 617 - 755.
Entered Port: U 594 - St. Nazaire; U 262 - Bergen.
Sailed: U 129 - Lorient; U 463 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 56 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 404 sighted flying boat on westerly course in AK 6692.
3) U 216 reported 2 destroyers in AK 9238, course W. Pursued with
depth charges, break-downs of moderate nature.
4) U 259 sighted destroyer on easterly course in AL 7567.
5) U 407: Both Diesels again in order. 1 destroyer, 3 patrol vessels on
easterly course in AK 9237. Boat was ordered to return because fuel and
in unfavorable position to convoy.
6) U 512 intended operating at some distance from land because she
was not completely serviceable.
7) U 175 had slight damage. Sank: 24.9. in EO 1396 ship of 6,000
GRT, course 1000; 26.9. in EO 1497 ship of 3,500 GRT, course 2900;
28.9. in EO 1416 ship of 4,500 GRT, course 1300.
8) U 332: 29.9. sank "Registan" (5,886 GRT) in EE 8184, course 2800.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AK 9443, BB 6355.
U-boat attacks: EO 14, FA 29.
S.O.S. messages: AE 7582, DG 1714.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 56:
Still no contact, wind strong westerly, visibility poor. In the evening,
boats were ordered to continue to stalk as far as AK 70 at low speed and to
remain there cruising at the lowest possible speed. It is assumed that the
convoy is still to the E.
U 260 was bombed by a Liberator in AK 9519.
 U 595 sighted a destroyer and detected location by means of her radar 87 - EJ 15 181 - BE 73 410 - Op(AK) 575 - Op(AL 70)
interception gear. 91 - BE 26 183 - AE 68 411 - BF 40 582 - Op(AK 70)
b) 1) U 410: According to latest position report this boat is still astern of 96 - BE 37 201 - Op(EE) 432 - BE 69 584 - Op(AL 70)
the convoy. She has therefore been given AK 93 as attack area and 106 - BE 48 202 - Op(EE) 437 - Op(AK 70) 590 - EJ 26
attached to Group "Luchs". 107 - EJ 37 211 - BE 24 441 - Drontheim 595 - BD 23
109 - CF 26 214 - Op(CG 50) 442 - AL 45 596 - BE 68
- 205 - 116 - BE 73 216 - Op(AL) 454 - BF 47 597 - Op(AK 70)
118 - AL 26 217 - DE 80 455 - CB 53 599 - Op(AK)
125 - Op(ET) 218 - BF 50 459 - FU 15 602 - AN 30
126 - DH 19 221 - Op(AK) 460 - DT 70 607 - Op(AK 70)
128 - DT 71 253 - AK 03 461 - DE 80 610 - AK 03
129 - BF 50 254 - Op(AL 70) 463 - BF 50 615 - Op(AK)
135 - BE 67 257 - AL 78 504 - CQ 34 617 - AK 94
156 - Op(FE) 258 - Op(AK 70) 506 - Op(FE) 618 - Op(AK 70)
159 - CH 88 259 - BE 19 507 - DT 70 619 - Op(AL 40)
160 - BE 76 260 - Op(AK) 511 - BF 50 620 - AK 38
2) U 160 has been given ED 98 as approach point. It is intended that 161 - DH 15 332 - Op(EE) 512 - Op(EE) 661 - Op(AK-AL)
she shall operate in the area round Trinidad. 164 - CE 41 333 - EJ 41 513 - Op(BB 60) 662 - AF 72
c) - d) None. 165 - BF 353 - AE 69 514 - Op(FA) 706 - AE 69
171 - CE 42 356 - Op(AK 70 515 - EF 22 753 - Op(AL 70)
V. Reports of Success: 172 - GQ 23 373 - BE 59 516 - Op(EO) 755 - BE 27
U 175 3 ships 14,000 GRT D 5 - Op(ES) 757 - AE 69
U 332 1 ship 5,886 GRT

On Return Passage: U 66 - 91 - 96 - 109 - 135 - 164 - 171 - 176 - 211 -

--------------------------------------------------- 214 - 217 - 218 - 259 - 373 - 380 - 406 - 407 - 411 - 432 - 507 - 511 - 515 -
--------------- 558 - 569 - 595 - 596 - 617 - 755 - 165.
Entered Port: U 218 - Brest; U 511 - 66 - Lorient.
29.September 1942. Sailed: U 84 - Brest; U 621 - Kiel.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

I. U 43 - BE 84 U 175 - Op(EO) U 380 - BE 46 U 517 - Op(BB 40) a) In the area round Route "Kernleder". Searching for missing men from
66 - BF 50 176 - BE 65 382 - AL 45 518 - AN 30 U 165.
67 - CE 74 177 - BE 16 404 - Op(AL 70) 552 - DG 66
68 - CQ 31 178 - DS 66 406 - DH 46 558 - DQ 47 III. Reports on the Enemy:
69 - BB 82 179 - CG 56 407 - Op(AK) 569 - BE 73 a) 1) Convoy No. 57 see paragraph IVa.
865

- 206 -
2) U 202: Spread missed a large tanker in ED 9839. Detonation
against own side, probably an explosive float. At night bombs were
dropped, cooperation suspected, moderate damage.
3) U 442: Destroyer on easterly course in AL 4544.
4) U 610 freighter (4,000 GRT) sunk in AL 4240, course 750, speed 9
knots.
5) U 125 sank "Baron Ogiloy" (3,391 GRT) in ET 8986 and "Cotati"
(5,963 GRT) in ET 9439, 450.
6) U D5 fast modern passenger ship with 3 funnels, speed 19 knots, 250
in ES 5192, contact lost. 28.9. neutral steamer in ES 4322.
7) U 595 destroyer in BD 3543, course 450.
8) U 516 27.9. sank a freighter (1,500 GRT) in EO 6595, course 3200, 8
knots; 30.9. sank a freighter (5,000 GRT) in EO 5367, course 2700,
changing speed, 8 - 13 knots.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BE 6956, AL 2613, EE 77, AL 2564, BB 18, ER
4310, ED 9670, EE 7760, BB 1844, EP 16, DN 84.
U-boat attacks: EO 14, BB 66.
Torpedo attack: ET 6890.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 57:
U 118 while approaching BD 7355 sighted a convoy on westerly course
in AL 2641 at 1900. As it was probably the "ON" convoy expected by
866
Group "Luchs", the group was ordered to man the patrol strip from square
AK 2449 to 3959 on 1.10. U 410, U 404, U 216, U 584 who have not
sufficient fuel to move to this patrol area are to remain in the patrol strip
from square AL 7157 to 7468 under the name of Group "Letzte Ritter".
If the convoy sighted by U 118 really turns out to be the "ON" convoy,
the English have taken a fresh route much farther N. for the first time in
six months.
b) 1) U 356, 221, 258, 618 no longer belong to Group "Tiger" (607, 599,
615, 260, 597, 437, 582) are searching independently for the convoy in AK
70 until they receive orders to leave the area. It is supposed that the
convoy is sailing at only 5 knots because of the weather.
2) U 177 and 181 have been given GR 80 as approach point. It is
intended that they shall operate in the area E. of the Cape of Good Hope.
3) Distribution of attack areas for new boats arriving in the Freetown
area is as follows:
Sectors with reference point Freetown: U 87, 145 - 800; U 333 80 -
300; U 107 30 - 3300. U 590 in
- 207 -
ET 7235 to a depth of 400 miles.
c) 1) U 217 refueled in DE 8299 sufficiently to return at economy speed.
2) U 507 did likewise in DT 74.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 610 1 ship 4,000 GRT
U 125 2 ships 9,354 GRT
U 516 2 ships 6,500 GRT
On Return Passage: U 91 - 96 - 109 - 135 - 164 - 171 - 176 - 211 - 217
- 259 - 373 - 380 - 406 - 432 - 459 - 460 - 507 - 515 - 558 - 569 - 595 -
--------------------------------------------------- 596 - 617 - 755.
--------------- Entered Port: U 411 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
30.September 1942.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

I. U 43 - BE 75 U 176 - BF 40 U 404 - Op(AL) U 558 - DQ 18 III. Reports on the Enemy:

67 - CD 91 177 - BE 45 406 - DH 24 569 - BE 73 a) 1) No report on Convoy No. 57:
68 - GQ 36 178 - DS 95 407 - BE 11 575 - Op(AL 75)
69 - BB 55 179 - GG 95 410 - Op(AK 93) 582 - Op(AK 70) - 208 -
84 - BF 50 181 - CF 16 411 - BF 50 584 - Op(AL 75)
87 - EJ 44 183 - AE 83 432 - BF 40 590 - EJ 62
91 - BE 61 201 - Op(EE) 437 - AK 70 595 - BD 36
96 - BE 63 202 - Op(EE) 441 - Drontheim 596 - BF 40
106 - BE 48 211 - BE 53 442 - Op(AL) 597 - Op(AK 70)
107 - EJ 68 214 - CG 50 454 - BE 64 599 - Op(AK 70)
109 - CF 32 216 - Op(AL 74) 455 - CB 35 602 - AL 77
116 - BD 93 217 - DE 80 459 - FN 77 607 - Op(AK)
118 - AL 18 221 - Op(AK 70) 460 - DT 70 610 - Op(AK)
125 - Op(ET) 253 - Op(AK 66) 461 - DE 89 615 - Op(AK 70) 2) U 513 sank an ore steamer (6,000 GRT) in BB 6386, course 2700.
126 - DH 49 254 - Op(AL 78) 463 - BF 40 617 - AL 77 3) U 382 fired a miss at a single ship in AK 6345 on westerly course.
128 - EH 33 257 - Op(AL 71) 504 - GQ 63 618 - Op(AK 70) 4) U 506 sank "Siam" (6,637 GRT) in ET 8831, course 2800.
129 - BF 40 258 - Op(AK 70) 506 - Op(FE) 619 - Op(AL 47) 5) U 513: Report from BB 6381 Wabana - (Conception Bay) to St.
135 - BE 69 259 - BE 52 507 - DT 70 620 - Op(AK 66) Johns, escorted single ore ship by day. Patrolling by 1-2 vessels. Mines
156 - Op(ET) 260 - Op(AK 70) 512 - Op(EE) 621 - AO 48 suspected off St. Johns as inward course is always 10 miles 2700 from sea.
159 - GQ 33 332 - Op(EE) 513 - Op(BB 60) 661 - Op(AK 60-90) 12 foggy days. Only limited chances for an isolated boat.
160 - BE 77 333 - EJ 71 514 - Op(EP) 662 - AE 68 6) U 582 chased "Oregon Express" in AJ 9983, course 2400, 15 knots.
161 - DH 45 353 - AE 83 515 - DQ 95 706 - AE 91 Forced to sheer off by 2 destroyers that met the steamer.
164 - CE 27 356 - Op(AK 70) 516 - Op(EO) 753 - Op(AL 78) 7) U 454 sighted an anti-submarine group in BE 5572, 4 units with
171 - CE 25 373 - BF 47 517 - Op(BB 40) 755 - BE 53 changing course.
172 - GQ 35 380 - BE 73 518 - AF 87 757 - AE 83 b) None.
175 - Op(EO) 382 - Op(AL 71) 552 - DG 92 D 5 - Op(ES)
867
 c) U-boat sightings: BF 4819, BE 9922, AK 7480, BF 4557, ET 8837,
AJ 99, EO 2219.
Torpedo attack: "Siam" in ET 8580 (U 506).
d) None. V. Reports of Success:
U 513 1 ship 6,000 GRT
IV. Current Operations: U 506 1 ship 6,637 GRT
a) None.
b) 1) Group "Tiger" has been disbanded. U 597, 260, 437, 582 have been
ordered to make for AK 18 at economical cruising speed. Attacks on
convoys intended. U 615, 599, 607 are to remain in AK 70 until refueling (Signed): DÖNITZ.
begins.
2) U 202 has been ordered to operate E. of 520 W. off Trinidad, as
electric compressor has broken down.
3) U 455 has been allocated the sea area round St. Johns, with
instructions to look out for coastal traffic in BB 63 and 66.
4) Group "Eisbär" (U 68, 172, 159, 504) U 179 and U 178 have been
given operational freedom in the area bounded as follows, once the first
surprise attack has been carried out:
FE 9179 - GZ 1599 - coast of Africa. Southern boundary 400 S. U
179 has been ordered to wait in left half of GR 40 until attack is
sanctioned.
c) U 558 refueled from U 461.
d) Although U 165 announced that she was entering on 28.9., she has not
yet arrived. Air reconnaissance yielded no information. The loss of the
boat must be assumed, probably through bombing attack. There was a
reliable sounding radio announcement of submarine sinking by the R.A.F.
in the Bay of Biscay.

- 209 -

- 210 -

868

Submarine situation and intended operations.
Note: Submarine situation reports will be sent to Naval War Staff at
intervals of about --- (unreadable). They will set out a summarized
assessment of the situation and the intentions of B.d.U.
1) Convoy situation in the North Atlantic:
Contrary to convoy methods during the first six months of 1942,
convoys are no scattered over a wider area. Even so, the spacing out is not
nearly so great as in Autumn 1941, and remain within certain limits on
either side of the Great Circle. Information gathered through Radio
Intercept Intelligence and experienced gained on the timing of convoys
have made it possible to track down convoys, especially when westbound.
Prospects are still considered favorable on this respect. The successes
scored against the convoy from 9-13.9. and the failure from 20-22.9.
clearly show the decisive role played by the weather. When operating
against North Atlantic convoys the medium sized submarines have the
advantage.
2) St. Lawrence and Belle Isle Straits:
The operations carried out by 3 boats have been very successful.
Defences proved comparatively weak and were limited to direct convoy
escorts. Further boats are to be sent out to make the most of this situation.
3) East coast of North America:
OPerations --- (unreadable) --- for some time --- busy shipping well
defended convoys close inshore in shallow water --- successes, but also
caused several losses. Air patrolling is particularly strong.
But when occasion arises it is planned that single boats shall lay mines.
869
4) Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea:
--- (unreadable photo copy) --- comparatively high losses have been
suffered, probably through air attacks.
Radar interception gear can certainly protect the boats at night, but it
cannot facilitate attack. Thus it is intended to station at most single boats
in this area if the occasion offers. The area concerned is that of Old
Bahama Channel - Windward Passage - Jamaica, where the majority of
convoys pass through. Climatic conditions and the necessity for lengthy
submersion result in strain for the crew, so that a lengthy stay offers little
chance of success.
5) Area round Trinidad:
West of Trinidad the conditions are rather similar to the above. The
likelihood of contacting convoys is of course, greater near the port of
departure.
On the other hand, the area E. of Trinidad has proved exceptionally
favorable. Convoys have not yet been observed here, air patrolling is less,
naval anti-submarine measures (destroyers) have been observed for the
first time recently. The difficulty lies in
- 211 -
picking up the obviously frequently varied approach courses of the
single ships, and this accounts for the patchy nature of successes.
It is striking that so far only a little eastbound shipping has been
contacted. It is possible that this is only exceptionally routed via Trinidad.
 With the Freetown area, the area E. of Trinidad will continue to be the
focal point for large submarines. Medium sized boats can and will be
employed there, provided previous refueling from submarine tankers is
possible.
6) North - South Convoy Route: ("SL" and "OS" convoys)
It has been repeatedly possible to pick up "SL" convoys according to
plan, though admittedly so far north pursuit could not be continued very
long because of the appearance of air escorts. The drawback of operating
against these convoys is that when a convoy has been missed the next one
does not pass for about 10 days.
Thus these operations are worth while only when carried out by
submarines en route for the Freetown area, i.e. for medium sized boats
only if they can be refueled.
Accordingly Group "Iltis", which is at present operating here, is to
proceed farther into the Freetown area after refueling.
7) Freetown area:
has again proved very fruitful. Despite numerous successes, a major
change of the shipping route or a soft-laid reaction by the enemy in reply
to the sinkings has not been noticed. A major change of route would not
be possible either here or in Trinidad.
It is intended that Group "Iltis" shall operate after refueling with other
large boats.
8) Harbors in the Gulf of Guinea:
No experience is yet available for these harbors. 2 large boats have left
for this area, two Italian boats will also operate.
9) Intended operations for Cape Town and East Africa:
are given separately, also opinion on sanctioning attacks on the coast of
Brazil.
10) Off Iceland:
at present the first attempt to operate with submarines against
Murmansk convoys. Light nights and powerful air patrolling prevent
870
successful operations here during the summer. Despite this, it has been
possible for single ships to remain off Reykjavik for a long time.
It is intended to send out single boats here when there is an opportunity
during the new moon period. When more reliable news that a "PQ"
convoy will shortly leave port, several boats should also be available,
providing they put out from home waters.
11) The situation in Coastal Waters and in the Bay of Biscay, is governed
as before by the danger of air attacks and mines. The repeated requests
regarding the air forces and the naval forces under Admiral Western
Defences can merely be emphasized once again.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 October 1942
PG30312a
1.October 1942.
I. U 43 - BD 92 U 175 - Op(EO) U 380 - BE 70 U 518 - EF 72
67 - DF 25 176 - BF 40 382 - Op(AK) 552 - DG 85
68 - GR 18 177 - BE 75 404 - Op(AL 71) 558 - DQ 13
69 - Op(BB) 178 - EH 35 406 - CF 98 569 - BE 70
84 - BF 40 179 - CQ 22 407 - BE 16 575 - Op(AK 37)
87 - EJ 81 181 - CF 46 410 - Op(AL 71) 582 - AK 57
91 - BE 66 183 - AE 87 432 - BF 40 584 - Op(AL 74)
96 - BF 40 201 - Op(EE) 437 - AK 49 590 - EJ 93
106 - BD 68 202 - Op(EO) 441 - Drontheim 595 - BE 19
107 - EJ 96 211 - BE 65 442 - Op(AK 26) 596 - BF 40
109 - BE 98 214 - CG 50 454 - BE 54 597 - AK 54
116 - BD 86 216 - Op(AL 74) 455 - BB 97 599 - Op(AK 70)
118 - AK 63 217 - DE 65 459 - FM 68 602 - AF 72
125 - Op(FE) 221 - BD 55 460 - DT 46 507 - Op(AK 70)
 126 - DH 76 253 - Op(AK 24) 461 - DQ 13 610 - Op(AK 26)
128 - EH 63 254 - Op(AK 39) 463 - BF 40 615 - Op(AK 70)
129 - BF 40 257 - Op(AK) 504 - GR 42 617 - BE 15
135 - BF 40 258 - BD 45 506 - Op(ET) 618 - BD 45
156 - Op(FE) 259 - BE 56 507 - DT 43 619 - AK 28
159 - GR 15 260 - AK 34 512 - Op(EE) 620 - Op(KK 24)
160 - CE 34 332 - Op(EE) 513 - Op(BB) 621 - AN 30
161 - DH 75 333 - EJ 84 514 - Op(FA) 661 - Op(AK 60-90)
164 - CE 26 353 - AE 87 515 - DQ 69 662 - AE 86
171 - CE 32 356 - BD 45 516 - Op(EO) 706 - AE 88
172 - GR 17 373 - BF 40 517 - Op(BB 40) 753 - Op(AK 39)
D 5 - Op(ES) 755 - BE 66 757 - AE 88
On Return Passage: U 91 - 96 - 109 - 135 - 164 - 171 - 176 - 211 - 217
- 259 - 373 - 380 - 406 - 407 - 432 - 459 - 460 - 461 - 507 - 515 - 558 -
569 - 595 - 596 - 617 - 755.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 605 - Brest; U 625 - 611 - 563 - 381 - 301 - 443 - Kiel; U 441
- Drontheim; U 458 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 57 see para. IVa.
2) U 407 reported a large 3-funnelled passenger steamer, course
northeast, 18 - 20 knots, in BD 3386. Fired a quadruple miss.
3) U 597 reported a 4-masted fore and aft schooner in AK 5741. Later
Portuguese ship "Jose Alberto".
4) U 607 reported large fast ship, 2000, 18 knots in AK 79 - 51. Chased
her in vain.
5) U 125 sank "Kumsang", 5,447 tons, 00 on 30.9. in ET 9434.
6) U 599 reported a group of patrol vessels in AK 7894, course east.
-1-
871
7) U 202 sank an independently-routed ship of 3,000 GRT in EO 1465,
course 3000.
1.10. slow aircraft on a west course in EO 1432. Boat is proceeding to
EP 47.
8) U 175 bombed in EO 1485. No casualties.
9) U 584 dived in AL 7498 because of a destroyer. Radar observed.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BF 4748, BF 4691, EE 47, AH 9867, BF 4692, CB
23, BB 63.
U-boat attack: EO 14.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) The convoy expected to be in the area of patrol line Group "Luchs" in
the morning has not turned up. The patrol line is remaining, as the
convoy's speed may have been reduced because of bad weather. U 260, U
437, U 597 and U 582 joined Group "Luchs" and extended the patrol line
to the south as far as square AK 6461.
b) 1) U 607, U 599 and U 615 have been ordered to supply and will
therefore leave their operations area.
2) Group "Letzte Ritter" has been dissolved. U 404, U 584 have been
given freedom of action in area BD 33 until fuel is used up. U 410 and U
216 are going to supply.
3) It is intended to operate U 183 and U 518 off the Belle Isle Straits
and they have been ordered to make for AH 96 via AD 96, to see if there is
any single-ship traffic from Newfoundland via Greenland to Iceland.
4) U 353, U 757, U 706, U 662, U 602 and U 441 are to make for AK
65. It is planned to form a new group with these boats.
 c) U 569 has supplied from U 380. Losses in September (Only those underlined have been declared
d) U 253 has not reported despite several calls. She may be lost. Boat missing):
made her last report north of Iceland on 24.9. She was then ordered to U 756, Harney, first patrol, last report 1.9., onto a convoy in the North
make for the Atlantic via the Denmark Straits in deep water. Nothing is Atlantic.
known of the cause of her loss. U 705, Horn, first patrol, did not enter port although she was announced
for 5.9., presumably aircraft attack in Biscay.
V. Reports of Success: U 162, Wattenberg, second patrol, rendezvoused 1.9. with U 564 east of
U 125 1 ship 5,447 GRT Trinidad. No information.
U 202 1 ship 3,000 GRT. U 88, Bohmann, experienced boat, onto a convoy about 19.9.
U 589, Horrer, as U 88.
U 457, Brandenburg, as U 88.
VI. General: None. U 261, Lange, first patrol, left Kiel 8.9., no report since leaving
Kristiansand.
U 446, Richard, sank off Danzig 9.9.42. after striking a mine. Part of
-2- crew saved.
U 165, Hoffmann Eberhard, did not enter port after having announced
herself for Lorient 28.9.42.
U 222, Jessen, rammed and sunk 2.9.42. during exercises in the Baltic.

II. Distribution:
II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXd1 IXd2 Xb XIV Total Foreign Sum

U-boats as of 1 October 1942. Front-line: - - 132 4 47 - 4 3 5 195 1 196

Trials: - - 80 - 20 2 2 1 - 105 2 107
I. In commission on 1.9.1942: 350 Training: 37 4 16 - 2 - - - - 59 3 62
Commissioned in September 19
369 37 4 228 4 69 2 6 4 5 359
Lost in September 10 (of which 2 at home)
In commission on 1.10.1942 359
Add foreign boats: 6 III. In September (excluding foreign boats):
365 Total number of boats increased by: + 9
Number of front-line boats increased by: + 24
Number of boats on trial decreased by: - 15
Number of training boats remained unchanged.
872
 68 - GR 51 181 - CF 76 437 - BF 40 590 - ES 33
69 - Op(BB) 183 - AL 33 441 - AK 01 595 - BE 56
IV. Distribution of front-line boats as of 1.10.1942: 84 - BF 66 201 - Op(EE) 442 - Op(AK) 596 - BF 40
Atlantic (without foreign boats) 160 boats 87 - EJ 97 202 - Op(EO) 443 - AO 40 597 - AK 64
Mediterranean 15 boats 91 - BF 45 211 - BE 40 454 - BE 18 599 - Op(A 70)
Northern Waters 20 boats 96 - BF 46 214 - Op(CG) 455 - Op(BB 60) 602 - AE 69
106 - BD 59 216 - Op(AL 44) 458 - BF 50 605 - BF 50
107 - ET 12 217 - DF 41 459 - FM 29 607 - Op(AK 40)
V. During September in the Atlantic: 109 - BF 70 221 - BD 75 460 - DT 25 610 - Op(AK 26)
Daily average at sea 99.7 116 - BD 15 254 - Op(AK 39) 461 - DQ 92 611 - AO 40
Of which in Operations area 37.6 118 - AK 91 257 - Op(AK 02) 463 - BF 60 615 - Op(AK 70)
on outward passage 60.2 125 - Op(ET) 258 - BD 75 504 - GH 54 617 - BE 51
on return passage 22.1 126 - DT 36 259 - BE 65 506 - Op(ET) 618 - BD 75
128 - EH 95 260 - AK 48 507 - DT 24 619 - Op(AK 28)
129 - BF 60 301 - AO 40 512 - Op(EO) 620 - OP(AK 24)
VI. Sailed in September: 135 - BF 40 352 - Op(EE) 513 - Op(BB 60) 621 - AN 20
From home 32 boats. 156 - Op(EE) 333 - ES 23 514 - Op(EP) 625 - AO 40
From West France 31 boats. 159 - CH 27 353 - AL 33 515 - DR 43 661 - Op(AK)
160 - CE 28 356 - BD 75 516 - Op(EO) 662 - AE 11
161 - DT 34 373 - BF 45 517 - Op(BB) 706 - AF 41
164 - CE 33 380 - BE 58 518 - AE 69 753 - Op(AK 02
-3- 171 - BE 75 381 - AO 40 552 - DS 36 755 - BE 40
172 - GH 46 382 - Op(AK 27) 558 - DE 95 757 - AL 96
175 - Op(EO) 404 - AL 71 563 - AO 40 D 5 - Op(ES)
176 - BF 50 406 - CF 58 569 - BE 82
177 - CF 19 407 - BE 18 575 - Op(AK 02)

On Return Passage: U 91 - 96 - 109 - 135 - 164 - 171 - 176 - 211 - 217

- 259 - 373 - 380 - 406 - 407 - 432 - 459 - 460 - 461 - 507 - 515 - 558 -
569 - 595 - 596 - 617 - 755.
2.October 1942. Entered Port: U 176 - Lorient.
Sailed: - . -

I. U 43 - BD 83 U 178 - EH 68 U 410 - BE 18 U 582 - AK 64 II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

67 - DF 43 179 - GQ 37 432 - Op(AL 71) 584 - Op(BD)
873
III. Reports on the Enemy: c) - d) None.
a) 1) Convoy No. 57 see para. IVa.
2) U 406 sighted a destroyer, course 800, in CF 5838. V. Reports of Success: None.
3) U 69 gained contact with a convoy in BD 5437, 2100, low speed.
Contact lost after the convoy had zig-zagged away in BB 5497. VI. General:
4) U 160 reported defects in her Junkers compressor, will receive Convoy action in the North Atlantic:
replacement from U 461. a) Anti-submarine conditions being as they are (large number of enemy
b) None. destroyers and corvettes, surface radar sets) and our own developments not
c) U-boat sightings: DD 83, Ca 36, BB 63, EO 14, EO 56, CB 41, BE keeping apace, it is essential to have the necessary large number of U-
6593, BB 73. boats onto the convoys, if effective action is to be taken, enemy anti-
d) None. submarine forces split up and continuous shadowing maintained. The
convoy routes are uncertain, the sea areas are so extensive that the few
-4- boats which are still all that are available, have to be disposed in lines of
no depth at all, so that, the weather conditions being bad on average, it
takes a very long time before remaining boats have come up to the convoy
on the basis of a sighting report. This means:
First requirement:
Convoy operations lasting several days must be possible.
b) Experience of several convoys has shown that a successful action can
only be fought as a rule in sea area outside the range of the enemy air
force.
Second requirement:
IV. Current Operations: Action in sea area without enemy air escort.
a) Group "Luchs" has been ordered to proceed at 2000/2/10 in c) Both requirements combined show that the most important condition
reconnaissance line via the following position lines, which must be is: To pick up the convoy early on the side of the Atlantic from which it
reached in each case by 2000: starts (i.e. ON and ONS convoys in AL, HX and SC convoys in BB and
3.10. Square AK 1758 to 5867 AJ, lower third).
4.10. Square AK 4122 to 7395 d) The boats have so far been disposed to meet this requirement and they
5.10. Square AJ 6553 to AK 7811 will continue to be so disposed. It has been found best to form U-boats
6.10. Square AJ 5967 to BC 3219. leaving home ports and Western France at once into a disposition against
ON convoys; after picking up a convoy they then proceed southwest,
b) 1) U 618, 356, 221, 258 have been given the following order: After operating against it, and, after breaking off the operation (in the area of the
supplying, form a patrol line from BC 3257 to 3591. Tactical order in the Newfoundland Bank), the boats supply in about DC 90. This supply is
order of leaving the supply rendezvous. It is intended to extend Group necessary, because the boats' fuel stocks after the first operation would not
"Luchs" to the south with these boats on about 6.10. When Group "Luchs" permit a second operation. These refueled boats then form a patrol line
will be in this area. northeast of the
874

-5-
Newfoundland Bank, the distance off the Bank being determined by
fog conditions, to pick up SC or HX convoys.
e) U-tankers alone have made this procedure, which has already been
used several times, possible. In practice a few U-tankers mean the same as
considerably more U-boats.
Mediterranean:
The general situation in the Mediterranean has again made it necessary to
send U-boats from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean to bring up the
reduced numbers. Altogether 6 boats are to break through into the
Mediterranean (U 438, U 660, U 605, U 89, U 593, U 458). They are to
pass through the Straits of Gibraltar during the new moon period in
October. (see operations order "Tümmler" attached).
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
3.October 1942.
I. U 43 - BD 73 U 179 - GR 44 U 432 - BF 40 U 584 - Op(BD 30)
67 - DF 47 181 - DG 36 437 - Op(AK) 590 - Op(ET 40)
68 - Op(GR) 183 - AL 14 441 - AF 47 595 - BF 65
69 - Op(BB) 201 - Op(EE) 442 - Op(AK) 596 - BF 60
84 - BE 65 202 - Op(EO) 443 - AN 30 597 - Op(AK)
875
87 - Op(ET) 211 - BF 40 454 - BE 46 599 - BD 15
91 - BF 40 214 - Op(CG 50) 455 - Op(BB 60) 602 - AE 91
96 - BF 40 216 - BD 28 458 - BF 40 605 - BF 40
106 - BD 49 217 - DF 16 459 - FM 22 607 - BD 15
107 - Op(ET) 221 - BD 75 460 - DH 77 610 - Op(AK)
109 - BF 81 254 - Op(AK) 461 - DF 73 611 - AN 30
116 - BD 75 257 - Op(AK) 463 - BE 60 615 - BD 16
118 - BD 22 258 - BD 75 504 - Op(GR) 617 - BE 53
125 - Op(ET) 259 - BF 40 506 - Op(FE) 618 - BD 75
126 - DT 66 260 - Op(AK) 507 - DG 96 619 - Op(AK)
128 - ER 33 301 - AN 30 512 - Op(EO) 620 - Op(AK)
129 - BE 67 332 - Op(EE) 513 - Op(BB 60) 621 - AF 87
135 - BF 40 333 - ES 38 514 - Op(EP) 625 - AN 30
156 - Op(ET) 353 - AL 27 515 - DR 29 661 - AK
159 - Op(GR) 356 - BD 75 516 - Op(EO) 662 - AL 33
160 - CE 75 373 - BF 83 517 - Op(BB 40) 706 - AL 26
161 - DT 64 380 - BE 68 518 - AE 91 753 - Op(AK)
164 - BE 21 381 - AN 30 552 - DS 63 755 - BF 40
171 - BE 85 382 - Op(AK) 558 - DF 47 757 - AL 20
172 - Op(GR) 404 - Op(BD 30) 563 - AN 30 D 5 - Op(ES)
175 - Op(ET) 406 - CF 61 569 - BE 92
177 - CF 49 407 - BE 52 575 - Op(AK)
178 - EH 98 410 - BD 25 582 - Op(AK)
On Return Passage: U 91 - 96 - 109 - 164 - 171 - 211 - 217 - 259 - 373
- 380 - 406 - 407 - 432 - 459 - 460 - 461 - 507 - 515 - 558 - 569 - 595 -
617 - 755.
Entered Port: U 135 - 596 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 660 - Brest; U 593 - St. Nazaire; U 571 - La Pallice; U 520 -
521 - D 3 - Kiel; U 262 - Bergen.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
-6-
 c) With the arrival of U 459, Group "Eisbär" (U 68 - 159 - 172 - 504) is
up to strength. The boat sighted single-ship traffic in FU 24, course 1200,
GG 16, course 1200, FU 82, 3100, FU 82, 3200, FM 91, 1400.
d) Group "Eisbär" intends to make the first attack early on 8.10. in
accordance with operations order.

V. Reports of Success:
U 201 1 ship 3,000 GRT.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 57 see para IVa ("Luchs").
2) U 201 has so far sunk a steamer of 3,000 GRT in EO 1472. Course VI. General: None.
1360, speed 7 knots. Boat was depth charged in shallow water when she
made another attack. Strong night air activity, (radar) location probable in ---------------------------------------------------
one case. ---------------
3) U 214 reports that 3 escort vessels and 4 steamers have left Lisbon.
Boat was located and fired on. Contact lost.
4) U 183 was bombed by an aircraft in AL 3373.
b) None. -7-
c) U-boat sightings: EO 1350.
English aircraft reported a U-boat in about AL (probably U 183).
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) Convoy No. 57 ("Luchs"):
U 610 sighted the convoy in AK 1796 at 1241, course 500. It was an
HK convoy, which, according to dead reckoning, should have been in this
area. Boat shadowed until 2000. At 2200 and 0304 U 442 reported
contact. The weather deteriorated to wind force 7 in the course of the day. 4.October 1942.
Aurora-borealis affected radio communications very badly during the
night and at times made it impossible.
The convoy consisted of 15 vessels and steered a main course of 500 I. U 43 - BD 71 U 181 - DG 66 U 437 - Op(AK 50) U 575 - Op(AK
until 0300 in AK 2475, then altered to a west course and was in AK 2484 40)
at 0624. Operation is continuing. 67 - BE 95 183 - AL 24 441 - AE 68 582 - Op(AK)
b) U 129 is to make for ED 98, U 84 for AK 69. 68 - Op(GR) 201 - Op(EO) 442 - Op(AK 27) 584 - Op(BD 30)
69 - Op(BB 50) 202 - Op(EO) 443 - AN 20 590 - Op(ET)
84 - BE 52 211 - BF 40 454 - BE 18 593 - BF 50
876
 87 - Op(ET) 214 - Op(CG 50) 455 - Op(BB) 595 - BF 44
91 - BF 46 216 - BD 43 458 - BF 40 597 - Op(AK 50)
96 - BF 60 217 - DF 22 459 - FE 85 599 - BD 43
106 - BD 47 221 - BD 70 460 - DH 48 602 - AE 88
107 - Op(ET) 254 - Op(AK 40) 461 - DF 58 605 - BE 98
109 - BF 80 257 - Op(AK 40) 463 - BE 58 607 - BD 43
116 - BD 70 258 - BD 70 504 - Op(GR) 610 - Op(AK 18)
118 - BD 43 259 - BF 60 506 - Op(FE) 611 - AN 20
125 - Op(FE) 260 - Op(AK 50) 507 - DH 48 615 - BD 43
126 - DT 96 262 - AF 70 512 - Op(EO) 617 - BE 66
128 - ES 18 301 - AN 20 513 - Op(BB 16) 618 - BD 70
129 - BE 81 332 - Op(EE) 514 - Op(EP) 619 - Op(AK 40)
156 - Op(FE) 333 - Op(ET) 515 - DR 32 620 - Op(AJ 39)
159 - Op(GR) 353 - AL 41 516 - Op(EO) 621 - AF 73
160 - DF 35 356 - BD 70 517 - Op(BB 40) 625 - AN 20
161 - DT 94 373 - BF 60 518 - AE 84 660 - BF 50
164 - BE 88 380 - BF 47 520 - AE 40 661 - AK(Op)
171 - BE 95 381 - AN 20 521 - AO 40 662 - AL 32
172 - Op(GR) 382 - Op(AK 40) 552 - DS 93 706 - AL 19
175 - Op(EO) 404 - Op(BD 30) 558 - DF 46 753 - Op(AK 27)
177 - CF 78 406 - CF 36 563 - AN 20 755 - BF 40
179 - GR 40 407 - BE 64 569 - BF 71 757 - AL 42
178 - ES 14 410 - BD 43 571 - BF 90 D 5 - Op(ES)
432 - BF 60 D 3 - AO 40
On Return Passage: U 91 - 96 - 109 - 164 - 171 - 211 - 217 - 259 - 273
- 380 - 406 - 407 - 432 - 459 - 460 - 461 - 507 - 515 - 558 - 569 - 584 -
595 - 617 - 755.
Entered Port: U 373 - 432 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 89 - Brest; U 505 - Lorient; U 402 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
877
a) 1) U 513 fired a triple miss at a coastal freighter in BB 3916. Gyro-
failure.
2) Sightings:
U 584 - 2 destroyers, course east, in BD 3631.
U 454 - 2 corvettes on a northeast course in BE 1182.
U 460 - fast independent ship, type "Orcades" in DH 1676, course
3200, speed 18 knots.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 7893 - DC 11 - ED 7117 - BB 7593 - AJ 95.
d) None.
-8-
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 57:
U 382 made contact last night in AK 2484, but was forced to submerge
by a destroyer.
At 0805 U 260 sighted a destroyer and 3 small silhouettes in AK 3371,
course east. Contact was lost again in a hailstorm. At 1030 the boat
reported several smoke clouds in AK 3371. No contact. The following
boats also had sight of the convoy for a short time, without being able to
maneuver into a firing position: U 619 at 1419, U 382 at 1615, U 582 at
1620, U 706 at 1831. The convoy steered an east course until 1615 in AK
3476, then continued via AK 3498 and, according to dead reckoning, was
in about AL 1631 at 0800. Positions based on boats' reports differed
considerably, so that Operations Control decided to take that reported by U
619 at 1900 in AK 3498 as correct. At 1830 flying boats appeared for the
first time and provided continuous escort; they drove the boats off
constantly. U 620 and U 254 requested beacon signals in the course of the
evening. Apparently all boats had been driven off by aircraft or destroyers
and could not get near the convoy. Contact was not reestablished by
morning. This time again boats' operations were severely restricted by bad
weather: northwest 8, high swell, hailstorms and moderate visibility.
U 437 reported at 1040 that she had sighted the convoy at 0230 in AK
2986, course 2400, speed 6 knots. Boat was constantly forced to
submerge and finally driven off in AK 5213. Aurora-borealis made it
impossible to make radio messages at once, and thus a promising convoy
operation came to nothing.
U 254 sank an abandoned tanker of 8,000 GRT in AK 5561. This
confirms the view that the English often just give up badly damaged ships
without attempting to tow them in, as was the case in the Autumn of 1941.
The operation is continuing. U 188, which is in the vicinity, is also
operating against the convoy.
b) U 618 - 258 - 356 and 221 are to make for AJ 88. The order for a
patrol line is thus cancelled. U 463 is to make for BC 69, U 410 - 607 -
216 - 559 - 615 for AK 96 after refueling from U 118 in AK 96.
c) U 618 - 258 - 356 - 221 have supplied from U 116. U 116 returning.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 254 1 ship 8,000 GRT.
VI. General: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
-9-
878
5.October 1942.
I. U 43 - BC 92 U 181 - DG 95 U 441 - AE 83 U 582 - AK 36
67 - DQ 21 183 - AL 10 442 - AK 35 584 - BE 19
68 - Op(GR) 201 - Op(EO) 443 - AF 79 590 - Op(ET)
69 - Op(BB) 202 - Op(EP) 454 - BD 33 593 - BF 81
84 - BE 16 211 - BF 54 455 - Op(BB) 595 - BF 55
87 - Op(ET) 214 - Op(CG) 458 - BE 93 597 - AL 10
89 - BF 55 216 - BD 43 459 - FE 49 599 - BD 43
91 - BF 54 217 - CD 95 460 - DH 13 602 - AL 33
96 - BF 64 221 - BD 70 461 - DF 53 605 - BE 89
106 - BC 68 254 - AL 15 463 - BE 47 607 - BD 43
107 - Op(ET) 257 - AL 10 504 - Op(GR) 610 - AK 38
109 - BF 258 - BD 70 505 - BF 55 611 - AF 79
116 - BD 73 259 - BF 68 506 - Op(FE) 615 - BD 43
118 - BD 43 260 - AK 14 507 - DH 18 617 - BF 55
125 - Op(FE) 262 - AF 27 512 - Op(EO) 618 - BD 17
126 - EJ 36 301 - AF 79 513 - BB 39 619 - AK 34
128 - ES 55 332 - Op(EE) 514 - Op(EP) 620 - AL 13
129 - BE 77 333 - Op(ET) 515 - DF 96 621 - AF 47
156 - Op(FE) 353 - AK 63 516 - Op(EO) 625 - AF 79
159 - Op(GR) 356 - BD 17 517 - Op(BB) 660 - BF 48
160 - DF 53 380 - BF 40 518 - AE 78 661 - Op(AK)
161 - EJ 34 381 - AF 79 520 - AN 30 662 - AL 35
164 - BE 95 382 - AL 25 521 - AN 30 706 - AL 15
171 - BF 71 402 - BF 92 552 - EH 33 753 - AK 14
172 - Op(GR) 404 - Op(BD 30) 558 - DF 28 755 - BF 52
175 - Op(EO) 406 - BE 99 563 - AF 79 757 - AL 13
177 - DG 39 407 - BE 66 569 - BF 73 D 3 - AN 36
178 - ES 46 410 - BD 43 571 - BF 82 D 5 - Op(ES)
 179 - Op(GR 40) 437 - AK 54 575 - AL 13 English aircraft several times reported attacks or sightings of German
U-boats in probably AL 10 and 20 as well as in Biscay. Positions were not
resolved, as the code for latitude and longitude data has changed.
On Return Passage: U 91 - 96 - 109 - 118 - 164 - 171 - 211 - 214 - 217 - d) None.
259 - 380 - 406 - 407 - 459 - 460 - 461 - 507 - 515 - 558 - 569 - 584 - 595
- 617 - 755. IV. Current Positions:
Entered Port: U 755 - Brest; U 96 - St. Nazaire; U 259 - La Pallice. a) Convoy No. 57:
Sailed: U 704 - 71 - St. Nazaire. The operation continued to be seriously affected by bad weather, wind
force up to 9 and a heavy west swell. It was very difficult for boats to haul
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. ahead and shadow and the appearance of flying boats made it practically
impossible. The order was therefore given for boats which did not
III. Reports on the Enemy: manage to attack during the night to break off and proceed westwards to a
a) 1) U 356 sighted a tanker on a west course in BC 6232 while on her new patrol line. Thereupon, one after the other, the following boats broke
way to the patrol line. Boat gave chase. off and proceeded as ordered: U 260 - 706 - 757 - 597 - 753 - 442 - 254 -
2) U 69 pursued the convoy reported on 2.10. Convoy's position at 575 - 183 - 257. The weather did not improve as expected and towards
1600 BB 1447, course 1050, low speed. Boat broke off operations and is evening it was even reported that the wind was again rising to west 8. At
proceeding to BA 3830. 1005 U 382 sighted the convoy, course east, in AL 2524. Speed 10 knots.
3) U D5 reported Q ship in ES 5114. The description fits a Q ship At 1534 U 619 also gained contact in AL 2565. Shortly afterwards U 620
previously sighted in this area. Boat was apparently picked up by reported the convoy in AL 2674, course 1100. Fix certain. Speed was
hydrophones while making an underwater attack. No D/C's. now about 7 knots. The boat shadowed until 2013 in AL 2685 ands then
b) None. lost contact when visibility deteriorated. At 2105 she again sighted 1
c) U-boat sightings: DC 12, BB 4136, BB 5129. steamer and 1 destroyer in AL 2689. She pressed on without success.
Later U 602 reported that she had seen plumes of smoke at 1900 in AL
- 10 - 2683. No further contact was made with the enemy. The convoy had
strong escort the whole day. U 620 - 183 - 602 and 257 were bombed and
U 257 suffered temporary damage. Boats still onto the convoy were
ordered to break off the operation at first light.
U 437 also did not regain contact with the westbound convoy and is
now making for her position in the patrol line.
b) 1) U 618 - 258 - 356 - 221 - 410 - 615 - 607 - 599 and 216 will form
Group "Wotan" and take up a patrol line from AJ 8255 to BC 4315 at
0800/8/10. An eastbound convoy is expected at about 1200/8/10.
2) After Group "Luchs" convoy operation has been broken off it is
U-boat attack: EO 17. planned to form a patrol line with these and a few additional boats from
AK 3675 to AL 7555, by 0800/7/10. For further details see War Log of
6.10. para IVa.
879
 c) 1) U 461 has delivered the Junkers Compressor parts to U 160.
2) U 410 and 607 have supplied from U 118. Further supply has been
broken off on account of a south storm.
3) U 661 whose main transmitter has been out of action for some time,
is now fully operationally effective. Refueling is intended from U 463.
d) 3 more boats sailing from home, U 662 0 663 and 354, have been
detailed for Northern Waters, to reinforce the group there and compensate
for losses at the last PQ convoy.
- 11 -
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General: None.
Final review of Convoy No. 57 see War Log of 6.10.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
6.October 1942.
I. U 43 - BC 83 U 181 - DT 15 U 442 - Op(AL) U 584 - BE 52
67 - DQ 15 183 - Op(AL) 443 - AF 72 590 - Op(ET)
68 - Op(GR) 201 - Op(EO) 454 - AK 93 593 - BE 99
69 - Op(BB) 202 - Op(EP) 455 - Op(BB 60) 595 - BF 50
880
71 - BF 50 211 - BF 50 458 - BE 97 597 - Op(AL)
84 - AL 78 214 - CG 21 459 - FD 66 599 - BD 43
87 - Op(ET) 216 - BD 43 460 - CF 94 602 - AL 36
89 - BF 40 217 - CE 48 461 - DF 53 605 - BE 79
91 - BF 50 221 - BC 65 463 - BD 65 607 - BD 43
106 - BC 59 254 - Op(AL) 504 - Op(GR) 610 - Op(AK)
107 - Op(ET) 257 - Op(AL) 505 - BF 40 611 - AF 72
109 - BF 60 258 - BC 62 506 - Op(FE) 615 - BD 43
116 - BD 82 260 - Op(AL 30) 507 - CF 94 617 - BF 40
118 - BD 43 262 - AE 69 512 - Op(EO) 618 - BC 62
125 - Op(FE) 301 - AF 72 513 - Op(BB 30) 619 - Op(AL)
126 - EJ 66 332 - Op(EE) 514 - Op(EP) 620 - Op(AL)
128 - ES 88 333 - Op(ET) 515 - DG 48 621 - AE 67
129 - CE 31 353 - AL 44 516 - Op(EP) 625 - AF 72
156 - Op(FE) 356 - BC 62 517 - OP(BB 10) 660 - BE 90
159 - Op(GR) 380 - BF 40 518 - AE 78 661 - AK 88
160 - EJ 64 381 - AF 72 520 - AN 20 662 - AL 01
161 - BE 90 382 - Op(AL) 521 - AN 20 704 - BF 50
164 - BE 90 402 - BF 80 552 - EH 62 706 - Op(AL)
171 - BF 70 404 - Op(BD 30) 558 - DF 31 753 - Op(AL 30)
172 - Op(GR) 406 - BF 70 563 - AF 72 757 - Op(AL)
175 - Op(EO) 407 - BF 40 569 - BF 40 D 3 - AN 20
177 - DG 68 410 - BD 17 571 - BF 70 D 5 - ES 52
178 - ES 86 437 - Op(AK) 575 - Op(AL)
179 - GR 40 441 - AE 87 582 - Op(AL 30)
On Return Passage: U 91 - 109 - 118 - 164 - 171 - 211 -214 - 217 - 380
- 405 - 406 - 407 - 459 - 460 - 461 - 507 - 515 - 569 - 558 - 584 - 595 -
617.
Entered Port: U 91 - 211 - 595 - Brest; U 109 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 438 - Brest; U 609 - 658 - St. Nazaire; U 132 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
 a) 1) U 67 chased a large tanker in vain in DQ 7913, course 450, speed
15 knots.
2) U 202 sank the large freighter "John Carter Rose" in EP 1347, course
1000, 14 knots. Sinking heard in hydrophones. (Estimated 7,000 GRT).
(Ship was sunk by U 201. See War Log of 8.10.).
3) U 175: Sink on 1.10. in EO 1452 freighter of 6,000 GRT ("Empire
Tennessee" or similar vessel), course 3100.
- 12 -
2.10. EO 1824 freighter 4,500 GRT, course 3100
4.10. EO 1852 freighter 3,500 GRT, course 1400
5.10. EO 1493 freighter 4,000 GRT, left on fire and sinking, course
3100.
All torpedoes used, starting return passage.
4) U 514 sighted nothing in FA 3180 to FB 5830 from 29.9. to 2.10. and
again nothing on 5.10. in FB 5840. Boat suspects traffic from FC 78 to
ED 99, away from the coast outside the 200 meter line.
5) U 517 situation: only inward and outward-bound convoys in the St.
Lawrence River area, escorted by a destroyer, corvettes, and escort
vessels. Aircraft by day and night. Lively traffic probably in BA 36 - BB
42 - 46 - 49 or 54, nothing seen in BB 43 and 51. No radar, only
hydrophone hunts, which are impeded by density layering.
6) U 156 encountered no traffic in the sea area around FE.
7) U 167 chased 2 steamers from ET 8179 via 5730 to 5560 and there
sank "Andalusia Star" (14,943 GRT).
8) U 459 sighted a light carrier-borne aircraft in FD 6463.
881
9) U 333 was located by a corvette in about ET 2989 and fired on with
guns and machine guns at ranges from 1500 - 0 meters. 1 officer and 3
ratings killed, 1 petty officer missing, C.O. and First Watchkeeping Officer
wounded. Boat badly damaged, but can dive. A rendezvous is being
arranged with U 459, which is nearby (M.O. on board).
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DN 46, FP 12, FD 33, BA 3725.
U-boat attack: BB 8721 (English "Milerest" 5,283 GRT).
English aircraft reported U-boats in about AL 26, AN 5730, AM 5473
and in 2 more unresolved positions.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 57:
After first light the convoy operation was finally broken off. U 619,
620, 582, 602, 662 and 382, which had not yet reported were told to make
their positions. Boats are to steer for AK 38 for the present. All boats
reported in the course of the day except U 582 and U 619. The former had
trouble with the transmitter and possibly cannot get a report through on her
emergency transmitter in this bad weather. U 619 last had contact with the
convoy in AL 2565, U 257 had to start on return passage because of bomb
damage. The remaining boats and a few additional ones are to be formed
into Group "Panther" and were ordered to be in patrol line from AK 3819
to AL 7555 from 0800/7/10 in the order U 582 - 441 - 662 - 620 - 382 -
602 - 575 - 735 - 254 - 353 - 437 - 442 - 597 - 610 - 706 - 260 - 757 - 454
- and 84. Several boats reported that they could not take up their positions
until 9.10. owing to weather conditions. It is necessary to extend this
patrol line over such a large area, as latterly the convoys have not followed
the Great Circle, but apparently made a long detour to the N.
b) 1) Owing to the strong S.W. gale U 410 and 607 have been ordered to
proceed to Group "Wotan's" patrol line at cruising speed only.
2) As the next PQ convoy is expected to sail within the next
- 13 -
 0000/8/10. The chances of a big surprise coup are very much reduced now
that the roads are empty. Possibly the appearance of Japanese U-boats off
Madagascar and in the Atlantic has contributed towards the evacuation and
defence of Capetown Roads.

V. Reports of Success:
U 175 4 ships 18,000 GRT
U 107 1 ship 14,943 GRT
few days U 262, U 611 and U 625 have been ordered to Narvik at U 201 1 ship 10,000 GRT.
increased cruising speed. After refueling boats will remain there at
readiness to operate on the Murmansk convoy. It is intended to operate
them in the Atlantic again as soon as U 622, 663 and 345, which are VI. General:
leaving Kiel, arrive (See War Log of 5.10 paragraph IVd). Final reviews of Convoy No. 57:
c) U 216 has taken over 20 cbm from U 118. The course of the operation again went to prove how difficult it is to fight
d) U 172 reported at 2219 that Capetown Roads were empty when she convoy actions in area of strong air patrol. The early appearance of enemy
reconnoited them. Boat requested freedom of action. It is assumed that aircraft points to there now being air bases in Greenland. It is only to be
this absence of shipping is only temporary and, as it is hoped to heighten hoped that as the winter goes on and the Greenland coast ices up, the
the effect of operation "Eisbär" as a whole by a surprise coup against flying boats will not be able to take off, and the U-boats will once more
Capetown Roads, the time for attack was postponed from 10th to the 11th have an area further E. without enemy aircraft. The results of the convoy
October. operation confirm the opinion expressed in the War Log of 2.10. i.e. that
U 68 also penetrated as far as the roads and reported a searchlight convoys must be picked up on the side of the Atlantic from which they
barrage. Success in the roads very doubtful. Heavy transit traffic. Boat start. Admittedly the particularly bad weather conditions contributed very
suggests attack at discretion from 0000/8/10. largely to the failure
Facts are as follows:
1) Capetown is empty and it is not certain that the roads will be
occupied within the next few days. - 14 -
2) Even if they were occupied, prospects of success are doubtful, on
account of searchlight barrage.
3) Submerged attack not possible because of shallow water.
4) In the circumstances the boats would be running to great risk.
5) Reports show that both C.O.'s, after their first reconnaissance regard
success as doubtful, and think an attack at discretion would be better.
Both C.O.'s are fully aware of the "strategic, propaganda and prestige"
effect that the first attack on Capetown Roads was intended to create, and
they are in the best position to judge the situation, it was decided to accept
their views and they received the order: Attack at discretion from of the convoy operation.
882
 Result: Sunk: Nil.
Result: Sunk: Nil.
Losses: U 619, U 582?
Damaged: U 257
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
7.October 1942.
I. U 43 - BC 81 U 183 - AK 35 U 442 - Op(AL) U 584 - BE 56
67 - Op(EF) 201 - Op(EO) 443 - AM 32 590 - Op(ET)
68 - Op(GR) 202 - Op(EP) 454 - Op(AL) 593 - BE 89
69 - Op(BA) 214 - BF 75 455 - Op(BB) 597 - Op(AL)
71 - BF 49 216 - BD 43 458 - BE 87 599 - BD 43
84 - Op(AL) 217 - CE 54 459 - FD 29 602 - AK 63
87 - Op(ET) 221 - Op(AJ) 460 - CF 64 605 - BE 77
89 - BE 96 254 - Op(AK) 461 - DF 36 607 - BC 32
106 - BC 73 257 - Op(AL) 463 - BD 27 609 - BF 67
107 - Op(ET) 258 - Op(AJ) 504 - Op(GR) 610 - Op(AL)
116 - BD 92 260 - Op(AL) 505 - BF 47 615 - BD 43
118 - BD 43 301 - AM 32 506 - Op(FE) 617 - BF 60
125 - Op(FE) 332 - Op(EE) 507 - CF 64 618 - Op(AJ)
126 - EJ 96 333 - Op(ET) 512 - Op(EO) 619 - AL 20
128 - Op(ET) 353 - Op(AL) 513 - Op(BB) 620 - AL 01
129 - CE 27 356 - BC 20 514 - Op(FB) 621 - AE 82
132 - BF 92 380 - BF 60 515 - AL 11 658 - BF 91
156 - Op(FE) 381 - AM 32 516 - Op(EO) 660 - BE 87
159 - Op(GR) 382 - AK 03 517 - Op(BB) 661 - BD 27
160 - DF 57 402 - BF 73 518 - AL 11 662 - AL 18
161 - EJ 94 404 - Op(BD) 520 - AF 79 704 - BF 49
164 - BF 73 406 - BF 53 521 - AN 28 706 - Op(AL)
171 - BF 49 407 - BF 49 552 - AN 93 753 - Op(AL)
172 - Op(GR) 410 - BC 33 558 - CE 77 757 - Op(AL)
883
175 - Op(EE) 436 - AO 40 563 - AM 32 D 3 - AF 79
177 - DG 98 437 - Op(AL) 569 - BF 91 D 5 - Op(ES)
178 - FD 34 438 - BF 55 571 - BF 47
179 - Op(GR) 441 - AL 22 575 - Op(AL)
181 - DT 45 582 - AL 20
On Return Passage: U 116 - 118 - 164 - 171 - 175 - 214 - 217 - 257 -
333 - 380 - 404 - 406 - 407 - 459 - 460 - 461 - 507 - 515 - 517 - 558 - 569
- 584 - 617.
Entered Port: U 164 - Lorient; U 617 - 380 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 172 reports: nothing seen in the North for 2 days. Considerable
traffic along the route through German mines. Shore-based radar.
2) U 356 lost sight of the tanker reported in a rainstorm on 5.7. while
chasing her. Searched in vain. No action because of bad weather.
3) U 332 situation: nothing seen from 2.10.-7.10. in EO 5681 via 6482 -
3651 and 6965. Slight air activity. Without good reason the boat operated
too far off the point at which she was ordered to concentrate. She should
have searched for the line of traffic which U 175 has reported constantly
for 10 days.
4) U 202 fired a double miss at an independent ship in EP 1465 course
2800. All torpedoes used. Return passage.
b) None.
- 15 -

c) U-boat sightings: BB 4197.
SOS from English S.S. "Milerest" in BB 7681, also from S.S. "John
Carter Rose" in EP 12.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 505 to make for ED 99, U 571 - 89 - 402 - 704 - 71 - 658 - 609
and 132 for AK 93.
2) After refueling U 661 will join Group "Wotan" and take up positions
in the patrol lines in BC 2354.
3) As U 333 is returning, U 87 will occupy this boat's sector.
4) According to a Radio Intelligence report there was an English aircraft
in about AL 2623 at 0800 in radio communications with a west-bound
convoy. It was assumed that this was the expected ON 135, which had
made a detour to the north, as expected, and the order was given to extend
the patrol line by about 160 miles in the direction of 3400. Group
"Panther" was ordered to form a patrol line from AK 3644 to AL 4723 by
1200/8/10 with U 602 - 575 - 753 - 254 - 353 - 437 - 442 - 597 - 610 - 706
- 260 - 454 - 84 - 757. U 518 and U 183 will extend the line to the north
as far as AK 3536. U 441 - 620 - 382 - 662 and 582 will make for AK
6630 which is the center of the patrol line.
c) 1) U 216 has taken over fuel from U 643 and handed over one sick
man. Is now making for Group "Wotan's" patrol line.
2) U 615 and 599 have refueled from U 118. They are also joining
Group "Wotan".
3) U 89's special operation is cancelled as radar interception gear is out
of order.
4) Lieutenant (s.g.) Kasch will take command of U 333 on her return
passage.
d) 1) There is permission to attack in the following area from 0000/8/10
until further notice: east of the line FE 91 left lower edge to GZ 16 left
884
lower edge. The south boundary is 400 South. The east boundary is 2700
East.
2) See appendix U-boat situation and intentions.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
8.October 1942.
I. U 43 - BC 72 U 183 - Op(AK) U 443 - AM 23 U 584 - BE 66
67 - EE 62 201 - Op(EO) 454 - Op(AL 44) 590 - Op(ET)
68 - Op(GR) 202 - Op(EP) 455 - Op(BB) 593 - BE 87
69 - Op(BA) 214 - BF 54 458 - BE 78 597 - Op(AK 30)
71 - BF 47 216 - BD 27 459 - ES 92 599 - BD 49
84 - Op(AL) 217 - CE 29 460 - CF 65 602 - AK 30(Op)
87 - Op(ET) 221 - Op(AJ) 461 - CE 79 605 - BE 77
89 - BE 91 254 - Op(AK 30) 463 - BD 27 607 - AJ 97
106 - BC 47 257 - AL 58 504 - Op(GR) 609 - BF 82
107 - ES 91 258 - Op(AJ) 505 - BF 92 610 - Op(AK 63)
116 - BE 72 260 - Op(AL 44) 506 - Op(FE) 615 - BD 49
118 - BD 81 301 - AM 23 507 - CF 65 618 - Op(AJ)
125 - Op(FE) 332 - Op(EP) 512 - Op(EO) 619 - AL
126 - ET 43 333 - ES 92 513 - Op(BB) 620 - AL 01
128 - Op(ET) 353 - Op(AK 30) 514 - Op(EB) 661 - BD 27
129 - CE 45 356 - Op(AL 03) 515 - DG 25 621 - AE 79
132 - BF 82 381 - AM 23 516 - Op(EO) 658 - BF 49
156 - Op(FE) 382 - AL 01 517 - BB 55 660 - BE 79
159 - Op(GR) 402 - BE 69 518 - Op(AK 35) 662 - AL 01
160 - DF 75 404 - BE 16 520 - AF 74 704 - BF 47
161 - ET 54 406 - BF 64 521 - AN 79 706 - Op(AL 41)
- 16 -
171 - BF 172 407 - BF 58 552 - ER 33 753 - Op(AK 30)
172 - Op(GR) 410 - BC 31 558 - CE 73 757 - Op(AL)
175 - EE 68 436 - AN 35 563 - AM 23 D 5 - Op(ES)
177 - DT 16 437 - Op(AK 30) 569 - BF 53 D 3 - AF 74
178 - FD 63 438 - BF 49 571 - BE 55
179 - Op(GR) 441 - AL 16 575 - Op(AK 30)
181 - DT 84 442 - Op(AK) 582 - AL 18
On Return Passage: U 116 - 118 - 171 - 175 - 214 - 217 - 257 - 333 -
404 - 406 - 407 - 459 - 460 - 461 - 507 - 515 - 517 - 558 - 569 - 584.
Entered Port: U 406 - St. Nazaire; U 569 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 174 - Lorient; U 522 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 404 (on return passage because of fuel) sighted a convoy of 6-10
steamers and 4 destroyers, course 200, speed 8 knots at 1230 in BE 22.
Boat lost contact and continued on her passage. There will be no
operation against this convoy.
2) U 201 sank "John Carter Rose" course 800, speed 12 knots in EF
9795. According to the crew this is a ship of 10,800 GRT cargo of 7
aircraft, bombs and petrol. This ship was therefore not sunk by U 202 as
reported. (see War Log of 6.10) as the C.O. based his sinking report on
sinking noises only.
885
3) U 161 sighted a hovering corvette in ET 5813 with an aircraft. No
location.
4) U 125 sunk the English S.S. "Glendere" 4,412 GRT, course 500,
proceeding from Buenos Aires to Freetown in ET 7357.
5) U 159 reported her first successes off Capetown. She sank 8.10. in
GR 5881 "Salandia" 8,482 GRT, course 2400 and in GF 5852 a freighter
of 5,300 GRT course 400. Heavy southwest bound traffic, medium air
activity.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DN 75, FB 49, CA 76, 84, CA 54, ET 52.
English aircraft (presumably with SL 120) reported surfaced U-boat (U
404?).
SOS from U.S.S. "Swiftsure" (8,207 GRT) in GR 5636. British "Welsh
Trader" (4,947 GRT), was being chased by a U-boat in ET 5295.
Torpedo reports: from "City of Athewa" (6,558 tons) in GR 52.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Group "Wotan" has been ordered to keep radio silent except for
messages of tactical importance.
2) Group "Eisbär" and U 179 have been given freedom of action in the
- 17 -
sea area of Capetown.
3) In Group "Panther" U 183 and U 518 are changing positions in the
patrol line.
 4) U 621 is now to steer for AK 3530 and change with U 183. 159 - Op(GR) 404 - BE 28 552 - ES 42 D 5 - Op(ES)
5) U 506 is steering for DC 70 to refuel. 160 - DQ 32 407 - BF 52 558 - CE 55
6) U 590 has been given freedom of action in the sea area off Freetown. 161 - ET 83 410 - Op(AJ) 563 - AM 15
c) None. 171 - BF 64 436 - AN 28 571 - BE 43
d) U 441 and U 621 had to heave to for 1 to 2 days in about AL 30 on 172 - Op(GR) 437 - Op(AK) 575 - Op(AK 30)
account of the heavy gale. 174 - BF 55 438 - CG 16 582 - Op(AL 40)
175 - BF 41 441 - Op(AL) 584 - BF 57
V. Reports of Success: 177 - DT 45 442 - Op(AK) 590 - Op(ET)
U 125 1 ship 4,412 GRT 178 - FE 57 443 - AM 15 593 - BE 78
U 159 2 ships 13,782 GRT. 179 - Op(GR) 454 - Op(AL 46) 597 - Op(AK 30)
181 - EH 36 455 - Op(BB) 599 - BC 63
183 - Op(AK) 458 - BD 86 602 - Op(AK 30)
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
On Return Passage: U 116 - 118 - 125 - 171 - 175 - 202 - 214 - 217 -
9.October 1942. 257 - 333 - 404 - 459 - 460 - 461 - 506 - 507 - 515 - 517 - 558 - 584 - 407.
Entered Port: U 214 - 407 - Brest.

I. U 43 - BB 93 U 201 - Op(EP) U 459 - ES 92 U 605 - BD 88 - 18 -

67 - Op(EE) 202 - EF 84 460 - BE 91 607 - Op(AJ 80)
68 - Op(GR) 214 - BF 52 461 - CE 82 609 - BF 48
69 - Op(BA) 216 - BD 14 463 - BD 27 610 - Op(AK 30)
71 - BF 65 217 - CE 36 504 - Op(GR) 615 - BC 63
84 - Op(AL) 221 - Op(AJ) 505 - BE 86 618 - Op(AJ 80)
87 - Op(ET) 254 - Op(AK) 506 - ET 78 619 - AL
89 - BE 58 257 - AL 81 507 - BE 91 620 - Op(AL 40)
106 - BB 68 258 - Op(AJ) 512 - Op(EO) 621 - AL 24
107 - ES 92 260 - Op(AK) 513 - Op(BB) 658 - BF 47
116 - BE 81 301 - AM 15 514 - Op(FA) 660 - BD 96 Sailed: - . -
118 - BD 59 332 - Op(EO) 515 - CE 98 661 - BD 27
125 - Op(ET) 333 - ES 29 516 - Op(EO) 662 - Op(AL 40) II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
126 - ET 58 353 - Op(AK) 517 - BB 67 704 - BF 65
128 - Op(ET) 356 - Op(AJ) 518 - Op(AK 26) 706 - Op(AL 40) III. Reports on the Enemy:
129 - CD 93 381 - AM 15 520 - AM 32 753 - Op(AK 30) a) 1) For U 753's report see paragraph IVa.
132 - BF 48 382 - Op(AL) 521 - AF 75 757 - Op(AL 40) 2) U 332 was bombed by fast shore-based aircraft in EO 5181. Attack
156 - Op(FE) 402 - BE 55 522 - AO D 3 - AN 32 periscope out of order.
886
 3) U 254 sank a steamer of 6,000 GRT in AK 3589.
4) U 201 attacked a British ship type "Astroma" 8,401 GRT, in EP 3132
and reported a clean case of pistol failure. She pressed on and sank the
ship in EF 9773. Boat suspects from the way the steamer behaved that she
was a Q ship.
5) U 69 torpedoed a freighter of 4,000 GRT in BA 3845, ship broke up,
sinking certain. More hits probable. On 27.9. the boat attacked a straggler
of 3,000 GRT from the convoy reported. She fired one surface and one
submerged miss with good data.
6) Sinkings off Capetown:
U 159 on 9.10. in GR 8144, "Colorandan" (6,575 GRT), course 2600.
U 172 GR 5593 "Chichasaw City" (6,196 GRT) course 2700. GR
5671 "Firethory" (6,000 GRT) course 900. GR 5648 freighter of 3,500
GRT, course 2600. Boat reports air and sea patrol from 8.10., was depth-
charged in GR 5650, hunted for 28 hours with hydrophones and Asdic, no
damage.
U 68 reported heavy inward and outward-bound traffic day and night
between the Cape and the mined area, course 160 or 3200. On 8.10. she
sank a freighter of 8,000 GRT, a freighter of 6,000 GRT, and the American
"Swiftsure" (8,207 GRT). On 9.10. the American "Examlea" (4,981 GRT)
and a freighter of 6,000 GRT.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EO 5190, EO 5270.
By an American aircraft in ED 92.
Attack and/or torpedo reports: Unidentified ship (probably "New
Hellas") in ES 96. British "Oronsay" 20,043 GRT in ES 92.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) U 753 in Group "Panther's" patrol line, sighted several silhouettes on a
northwest course at 1424 in AK 3824 in a rain storm. As, from dead
reckoning, this could be the expected convoy, the north wing of Group
"Panther" with 8 boats, was ordered to take action on this report. They
steered searching courses of 290 - 2300, enemy speed 5-8 knots. So that
the south wing should not be too far
887
- 19 -
behind when the convoy was found, it was ordered to proceed on a
west course at a speed of advance 7 knots. Towards 1600 U 753 lost sight
of the enemy in AK 3824. She pressed on on a course of 2900 and at 1828
reported contact lost. 2 steamers without escort were sighted. Boat
thought they might have been independently-routed ships. Operations
Control decided to continue the operation until dusk and then ordered
Group "Panther" to return to the old patrol line. At 2210 U 254 sighted 2
independent ships in AK 3589 on a southwest course and sank one of
6,000 GRT. According to dead reckoning this was probably the enemy
unit reported by U 753. Group "Panther" reformed the patrol line.
b) 1) U 621 will make for AK 35, U 543, 381, 301 and 563 for AL 41.
After refueling U 661, U 463 will wait in BD 57.
2) U 620, 382 and 662 will join Group "Panther" and occupy positions
in the patrol lines from AK 6339 to AL 4413. U 610 and 757 will cruise
south in the direction of the patrol line and take up positions from AL 4451
- 7211.
3) U 582 will occupy AK 63 as attack area.
4) U 177 will proceed to GR via FM 90, FU 50 and GG 10.
c) U 333 is being brought home by Lieutenant (s.g.) Kasch. Boat is
damaged, but is able to crash dive. The C.O. and First Watchkeeping
Officer are not on the danger list.
d) 1) With immediate effect, at B.d.U.'s request, permission to attack is
granted in the following extended sea area: east of the line FE 8910 via
FM 4954 to GY 3598, south boundary 400 South, east boundary 270 East.
2) U 619 on her first enemy patrol, was operating against Convoy No.
57 as part of Group "Luchs". She last reported the convoy in AL 2565 at
1834/5/10. Since then the boat not yet replied to several calls. She may
have been sunk by an escort vessel or an aircraft. There is no further
information. (Sinking by bombs very probable, 4 reports of attacks.)
3) U 582 was also shadowing Convoy No. 57 and reported at 1016/5/10
that her transmitter was out of action. As the boat may not, for this reason,
have been able to radio, she is not yet regarded as missing.
4) U 171 was to have been at point L2 at 1600/9/10 to pick up escort.
The boat arrived too soon, and towards 1400 she sank 3 miles northeast of
L2 after an explosion. Probably hit by a magnetic or acoustic mine. 30
members of the crew were saved, including all officers.
5) U 438 will not carry out special operation as radar interception gear
is not working. She will now steer for AK 93.
V. Reports of Success:
U 254 1 ship 6,000 GRT
U 201 1 ship 8,400 GRT.
- 20 -
U 69 1 ship 4,000 GRT
1 hit
U 159 1 ship 6,557 GRT
U 68 6 ships 38,188 GRT
U 172 3 ships 15,696 GRT
888
VI. General:
Loss of U 171:
Re loss of U 171 off Lorient near point L2 in about 37 meters of water
shows that U-boats even at greater depths than 25 to 30 meters, are in
grave danger from ground mines. It is not known whether in this case a
magnetic or an acoustic mine was responsible. At all events acoustic
mines must be expected, and nothing certain is known as to the range at
which mines fire and over which they are effective. For this reason and in
order not to endanger U-boats which have missed their escort, or are
waiting for it and therefore standing off and on at the rendezvous, the U-
boats have been ordered not to cross the 50 meter line without ground
mine escort. Accordingly, in agreement with F.O. Western Defences, the
rendezvous with escorts have been transferred further out to depths over
50 meters, except for Brest, where the old rendezvous (B7) fulfils the new
requirements. "Laterne" was decided on as a rendezvous for Lorient point
438 for St. Nazaire and "Gabel" for La Pallice and the Gironde.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
10.October 1942.
I. U 43 - BE 67 U 181 - EH 66 U 454 - Op(AL) U 584 - vor Brest
67 - Op(EE) 183 - Op(AK) 455 - Op(BB 60) 590 - Op(LT)
68 - Op(GR) 201 - EF 67 458 - BD 84 593 - BD 98
69 - BA 36 202 - EF 58 459 - ES 92 597 - Op(AK)
71 - BE 56 216 - BC 31 460 - BE 90 599 - BC 34
84 - Op(AL) 217 - CF 21 461 - CE 68 602 - Op(AK)
87 - Op(ET) 221 - Op(AJ) 463 - BD 27 605 - BD 79
89 - BE 43 254 - Op(AK) 504 - Op(GR) 607 - Op(AJ)
106 - BB 59 257 - BE 97 505 - BE 80 609 - BE 60
107 - Op(ET) 258 - Op(AJ) 506 - ES 96 610 - Op(AL)
116 - BE 67 260 - Op(AL) 507 - BE 90 615 - BC 34
118 - BD 69 301 - AL 37 512 - Op(EO) 618 - Op(AJ)
 125 - ES 69 332 - Op(EO) 513 - Op(BB 60) 620 - Op(AK)
126 - ET 94 333 - ES 92 514 - OP(EP) 621 - AL 74
128 - Op(ET) 353 - Op(AK) 515 - CF 72 658 - BE 60
129 - CD 94 356 - Op(AJ) 516 - Op(EO) 660 - BD 86
132 - BE 60 381 - AL 28 517 - BB 47 661 - BD 27
156 - Op(FE) 382 - Op(AL) 518 - Op(AK) 662 - Op(AL)
159 - Op(GR) 402 - BE 19 520 - AM 24 704 - BE 56
160 - DQ 26 404 - BE 63 521 - AE 93 706 - Op(AL)
161 - ET 96 410 - Op(AJ) 522 - AN 30 753 - Op(AK)
172 - Op(GR) 436 - AF 87 552 - ES 54 757 - Op(AL)
174 - BF 40 437 - Op(AK) 558 - CE 61 D 3 - AN 24
175 - EF 24 438 - BE 97 563 - AL 37 D 5 - Op(ES)
177 - DT 74 441 - AL 13 571 - BE 14
178 - FE 94 442 - Op(AK) 575 - Op(AK)
179 - Op(GR) 443 - AL 37 582 - Op(AK)
On Return Passage: U 116 - 118 - 125 - 175 - 201 - 202 - 217 - 257 -
333 - 404 - 459 - 460 - 461 - 506 - 507 - 515 - 517 - 558.
Entered Port: U 584 - Brest.
- 21 -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
889
a) 1) U 513 situation: No more traffic by day from Habana to St. Johns.
Airfields observed at 470 N 420 43' W. Aircraft with searchlights defend
the coast at night.
2) U 753 in Group "Panther's" patrol line, sighted a seaplane and U 437
a fast independent ship in AK 0331, course northwest. Lost sight in a gust
of rain.
3) U 126 sighted a small convoy escorted by destroyers in EU 7440.
Boat has been ordered to continue on her passage, as this is a French
convoy.
4) U 590 chased a 3,000 GRT freighter in vain from ET 5777 to 5812,
course 400. Apparently working together with aircraft.
5) U 333 reported a vessel in ES 2649, course 2600, 14 knots.
6) U 506 sighted a freighter, course 500, on 9.10. in ET 7519, and lost
her in a rainstorm. 10.10. in ET 4876
7) U 172 sank the British "Orcades" (23,456 GRT) course 2800 in GR
7339.
8) U 178 sank the British "Dutchess of Atholl" (20,119 GRT) in FM
3734 proceeding from Capetown to England.
9) U 177 sighted an American battleship with close destroyer screen in
EH 3820, course 3300, 16 knots, after a 5 hour chase boat was picked up
by searchlight shortly before the attack and forced to submerge.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 98 and EH 38.
English aircraft five times reported German U-boats in unidentified
position, probably AL and east of this.
SSS - report from ES 9293 also SOS from English S.S. "Shworton" in
the Bristol Channel. Ship was abandoned.
British S.S. "Agapenor" 7,392 GRT, torpedoed in ET 5611, also British
"Dutchess of Atholl" 20,119 GRT (U 178) and British "Orcades" 23,456
GRT (U 172).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Group "Wotan's" patrol line will be formed by 0800/11/10.
- 22 - 67 - Op(EE) 183 - AK 35 455 - Op(BB) 593 - BD 89
68 - Op(GR) 201 - EF 63 458 - BD 75 597 - Op(AK)
69 - Op(BA) 202 - EF 37 459 - ES 58 599 - Op(AJ)
71 - BE 24 216 - Op(EC) 460 - BF 90 602 - Op(AK)
84 - Op(AL) 217 - BE 88 461 - CF 43 605 - BD 99
87 - Op(ET) 221 - Op(AJ) 463 - BD 57 607 - Op(AJ)
89 - BE 12 254 - Op(AK) 504 - Op(GR) 609 - BE 60
106 - BB 51 257 - BE 26 505 - CF 21 610 - Op(AL)
107 - Op(ET) 258 - Op(AJ) 506 - ET 44 615 - Op(AJ)
116 - BE 60 260 - Op(AL) 507 - BF 40 618 - Op(AJ)
According to dead reckoning there is an east-bound convoy in the 118 - BE 49 301 - AL 52 512 - Op(EO) 620 - Op(AK)
vicinity. 125 - ES 60 332 - Op(EO) 513 - BC 43 621 - Op(AK)
2) U 520 and U 521 are proceeding to AN 96 via AD 95 (North entrance 126 - EU 75 333 - ES 31 514 - Op(EP) 624 - AO 40
to Belle Isle Straits). 128 - Op(ET) 353 - Op(AK) 515 - CF 54 658 - BE 60
3) Group "Panther's" patrol line is being extended to AL 7276 by U 571, 129 - DF 21 356 - Op(AJ) 516 - Op(EO) 660 - BD 84
402, and 99. 132 - BE 60 381 - AL 29 517 - BC 55 661 - BD 14
4) U 441 is taking up U 183's position, AK 3536, U 621, U 518's 156 - Op(FE) 382 - Op(AK) 518 - AK 33 662 - Op(AL)
position, AK 3395. U 757 (Diesel damage) will steer for BD 6468 as soon 159 - Op(GR) 402 - AL 87 520 - AM 16 704 - BE 43
as U 571 arrives. 160 - DQ 46 404 - BE 60 521 - AE 67 706 - Op(AL)
5) UD 5 has been given freedom of action in the sea area off Freetown. 161 - EF 13 410 - Op(AJ) 522 - AN 20 753 - Op(AK)
6) U 661 has supplied from U 463, also U 552 from U 459. 172 - Op(GR) 436 - AF 72 552 - AN 20 757 - Op(AL)
d) U-boats have been informed of the sailing of "Burgenland", 174 - BF 40 437 - Op(AK) 558 - CF 53 D 3 - AM 16
"Spichern" and "Rio Grande". 175 - DQ 89 438 - BE 83 563 - AL 28 D 5 - Op(ES)
177 - EH 38 441 - AK 35 571 - AL 75
V. Reports of Success: 178 - FM 61 442 - Op(AK) 575 - Op(AK)
U 172 1 ship 23,456 GRT 179 - Op(GR) 443 - AL 37 582 - Op(AK)
U 178 1 ship 20,119 GRT.

On Return Passage: U 116 - 118 - 125 - 175 - 217 - 201 - 202 - 257 -
--------------------------------------------------- 333 - 459 - 460 - 461 - 506 - 507 - 515 - 517 - 558 - 404.
---------------
- 23 -
11.October 1942.

I. U 43 - BB 55 U 181 - EH 98 U 454 - Op(AL) U 590 - Op(ET)

890

Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) For U 620's report see paragraph IVa.
2) U 516 situation: Nothing sighted until today in EO 68, 61, 53, 52,
27, and 19 except the 2 steamers and destroyers reported sunk.
3) U 87 sank the British "Agapenor" 7,392 GRT, in ET 5535, course
400.
4) U 607 chased an independently routed ship in AJ 8968.
5) U 615 sank the English "Ellare", 4,655 GRT, in AJ 8898, in ballast
from Iceland to New York. Captain and Chief Engineer on board.
6) U 514 sank the American "Steel Scientist", 5,688 GRT in EP 4761,
course W.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DN 7133, AN 9564, BA 9356, DN 8546, DN 8229,
ED 9899.
English aircraft: Reported 3 U-boats sighted, one attacked with D/C's.
U-boat attack in BB 5437
d) In BB 1738 or 1761 probably anti-S/M station with constant patrol of
the surrounding area.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Report from U 620:
The boat sighted 3 large steamers and 1 destroyer at 2030 in AK 6332,
course 2600, speed 5 knots. As the convoy may still be expected, in view
of the continued bad weather during the last few days, 4 more boats (U
382, 662, 597, 442) were ordered to take action. U 620 lost contact at
2230, pressed on and sighted the enemy again at 2345 in AK 6323. She
891
reported that an attack was impossible in present weather conditions (W
10), but that the speed could be maintained. The boats were nevertheless
ordered to continue the operation. U 620 shadowed until 0305. The boat
suspected, from a hydrophone bearing, that the convoy was in AK 6312 at
0330. U 597 was in contact with the enemy at 2240 in AK 6321 and fired
a quadruple fan at a 7,000 tonner. Two hits and sinking noises heard for
certain. U 442 could not operate as ordered as her position was incorrect
and the weather was too bad.
b) 1) U 563, 443, 381 will join Group "Panther" and relieve U 620, 382
and 260 in that order. The latter 3 will make for BD 57 when relieved or
at 0800/13/10. U 301 will also join
- 24 -
Group "Panther" and occupy AK 39 and 83, W. half as attack area. U
71 and 704 will occupy AL 7524 and 7555 in the line. Group "Panther"
will then be in patrol line from AK 3395 to AL 7555 in the following
order: U 621 - 441 - 602 - 575 - 753 - 257 - 353 - 437 - 442 - 597 - 563 -
443 - 662 - 610 - 706 - 381 - 454 - 84 - 571 - 402 - 89 - 71 - 704.
2) After refueling U 125 and 552 will be given freedom of action in the
Freetown area according to traffic situation.
3) U 106 and U 43 have been given freedom of action in BB, N.W.
sector (St. Lawrence River).
c) U 125 has taken over 20 cbm from U 459.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 87 1 ship 7,392 GRT
U 615 1 ship 4,655 GRT
U 514 1 ship 5,688 GRT
U 597 1 ship 7,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
12.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 179 - Op(GR) U 442 - Op(AK) U 571 - Op(AL)
67 - Op(EE) 181 - ES 17 443 - Op(AL) 575 - Op(AK)
68 - Op(GR) 183 - AK 30 454 - OP(AL) 582 - Op(AK)
69 - Op(BA) 201 - BF 33 455 - Op(BB) 590 - Op(ET)
71 - BE 13 202 - EF 32 458 - BC 98 593 - BD 79
84 - Op(AL) 216 - Op(BC) 459 - ES 50 597 - Op(AK)
87 - Op(ET) 217 - BE 97 460 - BF 91 599 - OP(AJ)
89 - Op(AL) 221 - Op(AJ) 461 - CF 28 602 - OP(AK)
106 - Op(BB) 254 - Op(AK) 463 - BD 57 605 - BC 80
107 - Op(ET) 257 - BE 61 504 - Op(GR) 607 - Op(AJ)
116 - BF 47 258 - Op(AJ) 505 - CE 32 609 - BE 16
118 - BE 59 260 - Op(AL) 506 - ES 36 610 - Op(AL)
125 - Op(ES) 301 - Op(AK) 507 - BF 91 615 - Op(AJ)
126 - FT 21 332 - Op(EO) 512 - Op(EO) 618 - Op(AJ)
128 - Op(ET) 333 - EJ 68 513 - BC 64 620 - Op(AK)
129 - DF 18 353 - Op(AK) 514 - Op(EP) 621 - Op(AK)
132 - BE 61 356 - Op(AJ) 515 - CF 34 624 - AM 35
156 - Op(FE) 381 - Op(AL) 516 - Op(EO) 658 - BE 24
159 - Op(GR) 382 - Op(AK) 517 - BC 66 660 - BC 99
160 - DQ 47 402 - Op(AL) 518 - AK 14 661 - Op(AK)
161 - FF 26 404 - BF 57 520 - AM 33 662 - OP(AL)
172 - Op(GR) 410 - Op(AJ) 521 - AM 12 704 - BE 13
174 - BE 93 436 - AE 69 522 - AF 79 706 - Op(AL)
175 - DQ 96 437 - Op(AK) 552 - Op(LT) 753 - Op(AK)
177 - EH 93 438 - BE 28 558 - BE 50 757 - Op(AL)
892
178 - FN 71 441 - Op(AL) 563 - Op(AL) D 3 - AL 39
D 5 - Op(ES)
On Return Passage: U 116 - 118 - 175 - 201 - 202 - 217 - 333 - 404 -
459 - 461 - 506 - 515 - 517 - 558 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 507 - Lorient; U 460 - St. Nazaire.
- 24a -
Sailed: U 154 - Lorient; U 572 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy Nos. 58 and 59 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 504 situation: 28.9. sighted freighter, course 1400 in GH. No
traffic between GR 5320 and 5620. Freighter which she was attacking in
GR 5612 on 8.10. was sunk by another boat. Subsequently destroyers,
A/C, D/C's.
UD 5 has so far encountered no traffic in ES 9840.
U 706 torpedoed "Stornest"4,265 GRT in AK 4477 course 2500.
Probably sunk.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 8619, BA 38, BA 36.
English aircraft: reported U-boats 3 times in about AL, one of which
was attacked with D/C's, one hit probable.
 Torpedo report: from British S.S. "Stornest" 4,265 GRT in AK 6915 (U
706).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 58:
U 597 made contact with steamer and destroyers at 0918 in AK 6311,
course 2900. During the previous night, towards 0130, she had fired 3
single misses at an independent ship. Boat shadowed until 1145 in AK
3999. At 1142 U 620 sighted a convoy of 2 destroyers, 1 corvette and 5
steamers in AK 6222. From several sightings of single ships it seemed
possible that the expected convoy had been dispersed in the gales and was
proceeding in groups. U 254 - 353 - 437 and 442 were ordered to take
action on the reports of U 597 and 620 if this was possible in present
weather conditions. U 620 was attacking but did not manage to fire as the
enemy was zig-zagging. She reported the convoy in AK 5156 at 1842 and
towards 2000 was forced to submerge by a group of destroyers and depth-
charged for 6 hours. Boat broke off the pursuit on account of low fuel
stocks.
U 597 also lost contact at 1200.
At 1421 U 382 reported 4 steamers in AK 3988. She attacked in AK
6211 at 1640 and fired a triple fan at a destroyer, probable hit. Contact
was lost. Convoy's last course was 2600, speed 6 knots. 3 of the boat's
bow tubes were out of action, apparently bent by bombs. Boat pressed on
as ordered. The operation is continuing.
- 25 -
893
2) Convoy No. 59:
U 258 of Group "Wotan" shadowed escort vessels in a N.E. course for
1700 - 2300/11/10. Last position AJ 8521. Radio message was not clearly
received by control station until the morning of the 12th. Probably
because of disturbances caused by the earth's magnetism. As SC 104 is at
present expected in this area Group "Wotan" was ordered to take action on
U 258's report. Contact was regained at 1215 in AK 8373. Corvette was
steering 600 and then zig-zagged to E. The convoy was not sighted
despite a long search.
At 1330 U 356 sighted a large steamer and several smoke clouds in AK
8355, course W. As the expected E-bound convoy had not been found by
about 2000, the operation was broken off. Boats were to operate on U
356's report if their positions were not too unfavorable, otherwise reform
the old patrol line. U 356 was forced to submerge by a corvette and lost
contact, but U 221 sighted the E-bound convoy in AJ 8358 at 0155. Group
"Wotan" was ordered to operate on the basis of this report. Apparently
several radio messages were not received by the control station. Weather:
N W 7, sea 5, visibility 2 miles. U 221 seems to have maintained contact
during the night. She reported the convoy in AJ 9145, course 750 at 0703.
Boat attacked and so far has sunk 4 steamers totaling 20,000 GRT and left
one of them in flames.
c) U 174 is to steer for ED 98.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 706 1 ship 4,265 GRT
U 382 destroyer Probably hit
U 221 4 ships 20,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
13.October 1942.
 I. U 43 - BB10 U 178 - FN 79 U 441 - Op(AK) U 572 - BF 90
67 - Op(EE) 179 - Op(GR) 442 - Op(AL) 575 - Op(AK)
68 - Op(GR) 181 - ES 46 443 - Op(AL) 582 - Op(AK)
69 - Op(BA 30) 183 - AK 23 454 - Op(AL) 590 - Op(ET)
71 - Op(AL) 201 - DR 76 455 - Op(BB 60) 593 - BD 77
84 - Op(AL) 202 - DR 74 458 - BC 98 597 - Op(AK)
87 - Op(ET) 216 - Op(BC) 459 - ES 50 599 - Op(AJ 80)
89 - Op(AL) 217 - BE 92 461 - CF 31 602 - Op(AK)
106 - Op(BB 10) 221 - Op(AJ) 463 - BD 57 605 - CC 33
107 - Op(ET) 254 - Op(AK) 504 - Op(GR) 607 - Op(AJ)
116 - BF 40 257 - BF 40 505 - CE 29 609 - AL 78
118 - BE 67 258 - Op(AJ) 506 - EJ 96 610 - Op(AL)
125 - ES 50 260 - Op(AL) 512 - Op(LO) 615 - Op(AJ)
126 - FF 34 301 - Op(AK) 513 - BC 66 618 - Op(AJ)
128 - Op(ET) 332 - Op(EO) 514 - Op(EP) 620 - Op(AK)
129 - DE 66 333 - EJ 38 515 - CF 33 621 - Op(AK)
132 - BE 19 353 - Op(AK) 516 - Op(EO) 624 - AN 20
154 - BF 50 356 - Op(AJ) 517 - BD 27 658 - BE 17
- 26 -
156 - Op(FE) 381 - Op(AL) 518 - AD 99 660 - BC 98
159 - Op(GR) 382 - Op(AK) 520 - AL 33 661 - BC
160 - DP 95 402 - Op(AL) 521 - AL 31 662 - Op(AK)
161 - FF 38 404 - BF 60 522 - AF 72 704 - Op(AL)
172 - Op(GR) 410 - Op(AJ) 552 - Op(EO) 706 - Op(AL)
894
174 - BE 87 436 - AE 67 558 - BE 92 757 - Op(AL)
175 - DR 48 437 - Op(AK) 563 - Op(AL) 753 - Op(AK)
177 - EH 99 438 - BE 15 571 - Op(AL) D 3 - AM 15
D 5 - Op(ES)
On Return Passage: U 116 - 118 - 175 - 201 - 202 - 217 - 333 - 382 -
404 - 459 - 506 - 513 - 515 - 517 - 558 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 404 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 409 - 659 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 58 and 59 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 159 sank the British "Empire Nomad" 10,000 GRT in GR 8996 on
13.10. On her way out the boat sighted a freighter course 1800 in FU 4119
on 21.9, 2.10. GQ 6392 freighter course 1100. 11.10. GR 8248 2
destroyers course 2800.
3) U 126 was forced to submerge by an aircraft when hauling ahead of a
small convoy in EU 8596 on 12.10. Later was located by 2 destroyers
while attacking. Heavy D/C's. Got away after dark considerable damage.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 56, EO 17, EO 12, AK 62.
Torpedo report from S.S. "Bjoa" in AK 6683 (Possibly "Stornest").
S.S. "Irischbeech" going to her assistance. "Bjoa" had a list and was out of
control.
U-boat attacks: EO 18, AK 69, AJ 69.
U-boat was attacked in AJ 9173.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 58:
The boats continued to operate along the convoy's supposed course,
weather remained bad. U 382 started for the supply point because of
shortage of fuel. At 1522 U 254 sighted the convoy (8 steamers) in AK
5516 course SW. Boat reported that the speed could not be maintained at
wind force SW 9. Nevertheless Group "Leopard" was ordered to carry on,
even if the contact was lost for a time. It is intended to operate these boats
against the oncoming convoy No. 59, if occasion arises. Convoy No. 58
was in AK 5541 at 1800. It made a sharp leg to the S. and U 254 lost
contact towards 1900. It was not regained by morning. Weather
continued bad WSN 8, moderate visibility, heavy rain and hailstorm. The
operation continues. The following boats belong to Group "Leopard": U
254 - 437 - 597 - 662 - 353.
2) Convoy No. 59:
U 221 continued to shadow. According to dead reckoning, the
- 27 -
convoy was steering a main course E, making long legs. At 1302 1st
position was AJ 9241, course 750 speed 7 knots. 15 steamers and a whale-
factory ship were sighted. At 1538 U 599 requested beacon signals. The
boat had shadowed an escort vessel during the previous night in AJ 9146.
At 1206 U 216 reported a destroyer in AJ 9162. U 221 regarded prospects
of attack as favorable for the night NW 5. U 607 also made contact at
2110 in AJ 9318. U 258 was driven off in AJ 9338 by a destroyer. She
sighted rocket flares at short range. At 0004 U 221 attacked and sank the
whale-factory ship "Vesthold" 14,547 GRT, and freighter of 6,000 GRT,
4,000 GRT, and 3,000 GRT. This boat has thus sunk 47,547 GRT from the
convoy. U 615 reported in AJ 9330 that the convoy was heavily escorted.
She had been driven off and was pressing on. U 618 also attacked at 0430
and sank a freighter of 6,000 GRT in AJ 6997. Another 5,000 tonner
895
probably sunk, also 1 hit scored. No further reports were received, the
operation continues.
b) 1) U 174 is to make for ED 98.
U 67 has been allocated the sea area off Trinidad as attack area.
2) U 438 - 658 - 132 will also join Group "Panther". This group's patrol
line now runs from AK 3395 to AL 7524 in the following order: U 621 -
441 - 602 - 575 - 753 - 301 - 563 - 443 - 610 - 706 - 381 - 454 - 84 - 571 -
402 - 89 - 71 - 704 - 609 - 430 - 658 - 132.
c) None.
d) 1) U 512 has not so far reported despite several calls. Her last
message was on 29.9. and mentioned damage to her Junkers and electric
compressors. Boat intended to operate in a remote area. She may be lost.
There is no information on the subject.
2) No radio message has yet been received from U 528 (See War Log of
9.10. paragraph IVd). If the boat's transmitter had been completely out of
action she would certainly have tried to reach another nearby boat. She
must be presumed lost.
3) Detachment of further U-boats for the Mediterranean, U 89 and U
438, which were intended for Mediterranean were ordered to remain in the
Atlantic when their radar interception dear failed. U 605 - 660 - 458 - 593
- passed through the Straits of Gibraltar on the 10th and 11th 10 without
particular difficulty and are at present on their way to La Spezia. The
positions given for these boats in the War Log are not their actual ones by
dead reckoning (disguised until they had passed through the Straits of
Gibraltar).
V. Reports of Success:
U 159 1 ship 10,000 GRT
U 221 4 ships 27,547 GRT
U 618 2 ships 11,000 GRT
1 ship Probable hit.
- 28 -
 177 - ES 18 441 - Op(AK) 597 - Op(AK 50)
178 - FU 25 442 - Op(AK)

On Return Passage: U 116 - 118 - 175 - 210 - 202 - 217 - 333 - 382 -
459 - 461 - 506 - 513 - 517 - 558 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 515 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 604 - Brest; U 510 - Lorient.
14.October 1942.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

I. U 43 - Op(BC) U 159 - Op(GR) U 443 - Op(AK) U 599 - Op(AJ) III. Reports on the Enemy:
67 - Op(EE) 181 - ES 85 454 - Op(AL) 602 - Op(AK 30) a) 1) Convoys Nos. 58 and 59 see paragraph IVa.
68 - Op(GR) 183 - AK 13 455 - Op(BB) 607 - Op(AJ) 2) U 332 has observed no traffic since 9.10. in EO 18-14. Very heavy
69 - Op(BA) 201 - DR 58 459 - BJ 83 609 - Op(AL 40) air activity at night at times. Boat is continuing to operate along the
71 - Op(AL) 202 - DR 49 461 - BE 97 610 - Op(AK 03) Capetown-Trinidad route discovered by Radio Intelligence.
84 - Op(AL) 216 - Op(AJ) 463 - BD 57 615 - Op(AJ) 3) U 516 was chased by 2 S/M chasers, type PC 451 with D/C's on
87 - Op(ET) 217 - BE 69 504 - Op(GR) 618 - Op(AJ) 13.10. in EO 1490. No radar observed. Intends to operate against the
89 - Op(AL) 221 - Op(AJ) 505 - CE 54 620 - AK 23 same traffic as U 332 on her way back.
106 - Op(BB) 254 - Op(AK) 506 - EJ 67 621 - Op(AK 30) 4) U 455 chased a fast tanker in vain on 2.10. in CB 36. Lay close
107 - Op(ET) 257 - BF 45 513 - BD 54 624 - AF 87 inshore S. of St. John's for 9 days. Slight sea and air patrol. Searchlight
116 - BF 50 258 - Op(AJ) 514 - Op(EP) 658 - BD 33 barrage off the main harbor. Altogether only 1 steamer and 1 tanker
118 - BE 69 260 - BD 34 515 - BE 50 659 - BF 54 sighted. Moved away, as Gyro was out of order. Boat has been ordered to
125 - Op(ET) 301 - Op(AK) 516 - Op(EO) 661 - Op(AJ 60) return.
126 - EU 89 332 - Op(EO) 517 - BD 61 662 - Op(AK 50) 5) U 126's engines are in working order and she is able to
128 - Op(ET) 333 - DT 98 518 - AD 97 704 - Op(AL 40)
129 - DE 92 353 - Op(AK) 520 - AL 23 706 - Op(AK 03) - 29 -
132 - BE 11 356 - Op(AJ) 521 - AL 23 753 - Op(AK 30)
154 - BF 49 381 - Op(AK) 522 - AF 47 757 - BD 38
156 - Op(FE) 382 - Op(AK) 552 - Op(ET) D 3 - AL 03
159 - Op(GR) 402 - Op(AL) 558 - BE 69 D 5 - Op(ES)
160 - EE 26 409 - BF 54 563 - Op(AK 30)
161 - EG 17 410 - Op(AJ) 571 - Op(AL 40)
172 - Op(GR) 436 - AE 85 572 - BF 82
174 - CF 13 437 - Op(AK) 575 - Op(AK 30)
175 - DR 51 438 - AL 75 590 - Op(ET)
896
 dive. She is making for the point ordered (FP 23). b) U 174 is proceeding via DS 3955 to deliver fuel and spare parts for
6) U 590 was hunted by a solitary patrol boat with hydrophones in ET radar interception gear to U 506 and U 459.
7354. c) - d) None.
7) U 620 examined the Irish ship "Irish Pine" in AK 9583. Ship is
continuing on her way to Dublin. V. Reports of Success:
b) None. U 607 1 ship 7,000 GRT.
c) U-boat sightings: EO 14, ET 2464, AK 47, BB 7981.
U-boat attack: AJ 9311, BB 5511.
SSS report from unidentified ship, probably in convoy No. 59. An
unidentified American steamer sighted a U-boat in ET 2464 and opened - 30 -
fire.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) 1) Convoy No. 58:
The boats continued to operate on a SW course but did not make
contact. They may encounter Convoy No. 59 in the course of today.
Operation against convoy No. 58 is at an end.
2) Convoy No. 59:
U 607 also attacked last night and sank a steamer of 7,000 GRT in AJ
9321. She was forced to submerge by a destroyer and heavily depth
charged while diving. U 216 regained contact at 1155 in AK 4765. It
appeared from boats' reports that the convoy was in 2 groups. Main
course of both groups was E. U 661, 258 and 599 also made contact. The
last certain report of the convoy was from U 661 in AK 4895 at 2100. U
410, U 615 and U 607 requested beacon signals. U 221 is returning, as she
is unable to reload torpedoes. Towards evening both groups, which came
closer and closer to each other during the day, were out of sight. Boats
were constantly forced to submerge by destroyers. It is possible that this
convoy took over additional escort forces from No. 58. U 661 was fired
on with machine guns by a destroyer and a corvette at 0032/15, U 607 was
forced to submerge at 0110 by 3 escort vessels. There was no further
action. The operation is continuing.
U 258 chased a 3-4,000 tonner, making smoke, from 1030, but was
driven off towards 20,000.
897
15.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 178 - FU 65 U 441 - Op(AK 30) U 590 - Op(ET)
67 - Op(EE) 179 - Op(GR) 442 - Op(AK) 597 - Op(AK 40)
68 - Op(GR) 181 - FD 32 443 - Op(AK 03) 599 - Op(AK)
69 - Op(BA) 183 - AD 96 454 - Op(AL 40) 602 - Op(AK 30)
71 - Op(AL 40) 201 - DQ 77 455 - BC 46 604 - BF 55
84 - Op(AL 40) 202 - DR 35 459 - EJ 61 607 - Op(AK)
87 - Op(ET) 216 - Op(AK 40) 461 - BF 50 609 - Op(AL 71)
89 - Op(AL 40) 217 - BF 50 463 - BD 57 610 - Op(AK 03)
106 - Op(BB) 221 - Op(AK) 504 - Op(GR) 615 - Op(AK 40)
107 - Op(ET) 254 - Op(AK) 505 - CE 72 618 - Op(AK)
116 - BE 50 257 - BF 57 506 - EJ 19 620 - AK 98
118 - BF 50 258 - Op(AK) 510 - BF 55 621 - Op(AK 30)
125 - Op(ET) 260 - BD 31 513 - BD 67 624 - AF 72
126 - FG 24 301 - Op(AK 30) 514 - Op(EO) 658 - Op(AL 70)
 128 - Op(ET) 332 - Op(EO) 516 - Op(EO) 659 - BF 46
129 - DQ 21 333 - DT 38 517 - BD 63 661 - Op(AK)
132 - Op(AL 57) 353 - Op(AK) 518 - AD 95 662 - Op(AK)
154 - BF 47 356 - Op(AK) 520 - AK 34 704 - Op(AL 40)
156 - Op(FE) 381 - Op(AK 63) 521 - AL 24 706 - Op(AK 03)
159 - Op(GR) 382 - AK 22 522 - AE 91 753 - Op(AK 30)
160 - EE 52 402 - Op(AL 40) 552 - Op(ET) 757 - BD 64
161 - FG 51 409 - BF 46 558 - BF 50 D 3 - AL 63
172 - Op(GR) 410 - Op(AK) 563 - Op(AK 30) D 5 - Op(ET)
174 - CE 72 436 - AE 71 571 - Op(AL 40)
175 - Op(DR) 437 - Op(AK 54) 572 - BF 72
177 - ES 57 438 - Op(AL 40) 575 - Op(AK 30)
On Return Passage: U 116 - 118 - 175 - 201 - 202 - 217 - 221 - 254 -
257 - 333 - 382 - 455 - 459 - 461 - 506 - 513 - 517 - 558 - 757 - D 3.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 203 - Brest; U 509 - Lorient; U 134 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 67 situation: 11.10. EO 1975 sighted freighter, course SE, 10
knots, EO 4352 via 1816 to 1422 nothing except 3 freighters of up to
4,000 GRT, course 3100, 9 knots. Subsequently 2 patrol vessels, severe
bombing in EO 1816.
2) U 514: nothing sighted in EP 4920 to 70 up to 13.10. also nothing in
EP 2560-2370.
3) U 156 operated without result in the area of Ascension. Airfield on
the island, and strong air activity.
4) U 69 sank a 6,500-GRT passenger ship escorted by a destroyer in BB
5190, course 400. Boat suspects outward-bound convoys through the
Canso Straits, and a further route for small convoys via BB 5450 to 5130.
After a steamer had been sunk, strong sea patrol and constant patrol by
aircraft with radar in BA 36, BB 14, 18.
898
- 31 -
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 92, ED 95, BB 63.
Aircraft reported U-boats 3 times probably in AK.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 59:
U 254 was in contact with the convoy at 0500 in AK 4989. While
attacking she was forced to submerge 3 times by destroyers and damaged
by D/C's. Return passage necessary.
U 410 sank a damaged independent ship of 3,000 GRT in AK 5733 at
1330. U 258 encountered in AK 8131 the same anti-S/M group as
yesterday as did U 599 at 1935. At 1530 U 442 sighted the convoy again
in AK 8126, but was driven off at once. Contact was lost and was
reestablished for a short time at 0500 by U 353 in AK 9112. Boat was
forced to submerge and depth-charged. Afterwards the convoy was not
found again.
Towards evening a/c appeared for the first time in this area. U 615 was
bombed by a Liberator in AK 5846 and U 437 was forced to submerge by
a seaplane in AK 5825.
U 607 reported D/C damage which she could not repair and which
would force her to return home.
Operation against the convoy is continuing.
b) 1) U 572, 203, 134, 659, 604 and 409 are to make for CF 84.
2) U 160 has been allocated an ops. area off Trinidad.
c) U 513 has completed refueling from U 757.
 d) None. (Group "Tümmler")

V. Reports of Success: I. Operation:

U 69 1 ship 6,500 GRT To penetrate through the Straits of Gibraltar to the Mediterranean during
U 410 1 ship 3,500 GRT. the new moon period in the middle of October. Further operation in the
Mediterranean according to F.O. (U-boats) Italy's Ops. Order.
The operation is only to be abandoned:
1) In case of engine trouble necessitating return.
(Signed): DÖNITZ. 2) In case of failure of radar interception gear.
3) If several attempts to break through fail (See paragraph III 5).
---------------------------------------------------
--------------- II. General:
Passage through the Straits of Gibraltar can only be made without a hitch
if the enemy remains ignorant of the intention to break through, therefore:
1) Strictest secrecy on the part of officers and ratings until passage report
has been made (especially within the flotilla).
2) Remain unseen in the area of Gibraltar at all costs (Sea area (S of 430
- 32 - N.).

III. Execution:
1) Boats to sail between 1 and 3 October.
2) Make passage report N of 420 N.
3) Between 420 N and 390 N.
a) Radio silence except for messages of tactical importance or
concerning the operation.
b) General permission to attack, but no convoy operation. Just take
advantage of any chances of firing which offer.
B.d.U. 4) S of 390 N. between 150 W. and 00 E.
Most Secret 392 S.O. only. Headquarters, 28.9.42 a) Radio silence except for damage signals if boat has been observed,
and situation report if this is important for other boats.
b) Only battleships and A/C carriers may be attacked.
Most Secret. S.O. only By hand of Officer. 5) All boats are to pass through the Straits in one night, probably the
night 9/10 October. The order to pass
Additional Order to Ops. Order No. 53.

U 605, U 438, U 660, U 458, U 593, U 89. - 33 -

899
 (Signed): Demmler
Lieut. (j.g.) and Adjutant.

through will be given about 2 days beforehand under the order "Carry
out operation........" plus a double figure which, divided by 2, will give the
date of the day on the evening of which boats are to pass through the
Straits. E.G. "Carry out Operation No. 36" would mean: break through on
the night 18/19 October. - 34 -
If for special reasons a postponement is necessary, the order will be
given "New operation......" plus a double figure, which should be divided
by 3. E.g. "New operation 60" would mean: break through in the night of
20/21 October.
In order to insure reception on the day before the night of the break
through, boats will switch to very long wave reception, from midday on
this day as far as possible for the first 15 minutes after every hour, i.e.
1200 - 1215, 1400 - 1415. German summertime est.
If the break-through does not succeed in the first night, it is to be
attempted the next night. If it again fails, move away to the W. Fresh Supreme Command of the Navy Berlin 30 October 1942.
attempt on the 5th night.
If the operation should be broken off prematurely, by failure of radar Naval War Staff (1st Div) Reg. No. Most Secret S.O. only 2200/42
interception gear, or after the third attempt, boats will move away to the
W, and report by radio message when they have passed 150 W. MOST SECRET. S.O. ONLY
Boats which have to return are not to report before they reach 430 N. BY HAND OF OFFICER.

To: B.d.U. Copy No. 4.

(Signed): GODT.
Chief of Ops. Department. Information: Naval War Staff (1st Div)
for B.d.U.
Subject: Remarks on B.d.U.'s Most Secret S.O. only No. 407 of 7.10.42.
Copy certified correct 15.10.1942.
900
1) to 1 B and C.
Convoy Situation in the N. Atlantic:
If pressure from U-boats continues, it is to be expected that convoys on
the N. Atlantic route will in principle adopt a more scattered formation by
comparison with their present sailing directions on this traffic route, but
such a formation has not been observed so far.
If 2 W-bound convoys (probably ON 131 and 133) were encountered in
September much further N than hitherto mentioned in the previous
reference, this is probably due to the fact that from the middle of
September (starting with ON 131) the center of ON traffic was transferred
N.
Nevertheless, after this, of 11 convoys picked up, 3 still used the S.
sector of the N. Atlantic route. It cannot yet be seen whether this is the
beginning of wide scattering of the whole of ON traffic or whether the
enemy is routing this traffic according to an unknown plan (perhaps based
on speed or time of sailing) in order to have a part in the N. and a part in
the S. sector of the main route.
E-bound convoys however, have not been diverted N. of the routes
established in June and July, and wider scattering than hitherto, in the
formation of these convoys has not been observed.
2) To 9.
B.d.U.'s view, based on a sighting report from U 459 on the route
Freetown-Capetown, that the appearance of an auxiliary cruiser has not
apparently affected enemy traffic or forced it to hug the coast, it is not
shared by Naval War Staff (3rd Div).
Enemy traffic situation in the S. Atlantic has developed as follows since
the middle of July of this year:
a) At the end of July and beginning of August, single ship traffic, which
had hitherto sailed through the areas in the S. Atlantic adjoining S.
America and W. Africa (Picked up by radio interception in the form of
general sailing directions for the S. Atlantic.). The Capetown - Freetown
traffic was thus diverted to the sea area within 600 miles
- 35 -
901
of the African coast. In the middle of August this area was narrowed
down to 300 miles off the African coast (see Naval War Staff (3rd Div) FH
(b) Most Secret No. 2160/42 of 12.9.42.).
It is not known for certain if this re-routing applied at the time to the
whole of single ship traffic in the S. Atlantic, including fast troop
transports, as the directions were only incompletely received. It is quite
possible that fast troop transports on their way back to England in the S.
Atlantic were allowed to use the direct Capetown - Freetown route, while
all other independently-routed ships were bound by the new regulations.
b) The regulations in force at the beginning of August for traffic between
S. Africa and the W. Indies are still unchanged, as far as can be gathered
from sailing directions picked up in the meanwhile. (2 diversions from
these regulations have so far been observed, but they occurred at such a
time that they can only be explained as exceptions.)
For Capetown - Freetown traffic however, traffic regulations seem to
have been relaxed to a certain extent since about the middle of September,
as was seen from results of radio intelligence which were received later.
The relaxation was first observed in the second half of September when
sailing instructions for unidentified ships were picked up (left Durban
16.9., due Freetown 29.9.) (see Appendix). THis showed that the
Freetown area could be approached directly from about 150 S., whereas
previous instructions had been to sail right round the Gulf of Guinea,
making for a point 30 S., 30 30' E.
Directions from regulations hitherto in force were shown more clearly
in the passage of the 2 English ships, S.S. Nestor" and S.S. "Troilus"
which left Freetown for Capetown on 2.10. and were picked up by radio
interception on 6.10. about 50 miles N. of Ascension. These ships were
clearly to sail from Freetown straight through the Ascension - St. Helena
area to Capetown (see Appendix).
From both observations it can be deduced that the regulations made for
Freetown - Capetown traffic at the beginning of August were wholly or
partly altered in the second half of September or early October.
c) The traffic observed in the S. Atlantic in the direct Freetown -
Capetown route by U 459 and one other boat confirms this deduction as
far as the ships sighted were normal freighters and not troop transports.
The alterations were probably as follows:
From the middle of September direct Freetown - Capetown traffic was
all routed directly via Ascension and St. Helena, while ships which called
at S.W. African ports as a rule probably still sail according to previous
instructions.
d) Within about 6 weeks the enemy twice re-routed his Freetown -
Capetown traffic. The most probable reason for the first re-routing, which
involved considerable detours along the coast, was German activity on the
direct Freetown - Capetown route. This route was threatened at the
- 36 -
time by an auxiliary cruiser. There does not appear to be a similar
reason applicable to the sea area used meanwhile, for transferring shipping
back to the old route in the middle of September. It seems most probable
therefore, that this was done because there was no more activity by
German auxiliary cruisers or U-boats in the E sector of the S. Atlantic for
4-6 weeks after the first re-routing, and no German activity of any kind
902
was observed on direct Freetown - Capetown route (U-boats on their way
to Capetown kept their radio silence.)
e) Naval War Staff (3rd Div) therefore consider that the further use,
whole or partial of the direct route from Freetown to Capetown, confirmed
by U-boat sightings, is proof of the fact that the enemy first re-routed his
traffic at the beginning of August, because of the activities of the auxiliary
cruiser.
(Signed): PRAUSE.
Of Naval War Staff (3rd Div).
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
(CHART)
Erfasste Feindl. Einzelschiffahit vom 15 Sept - 15 Okt 1942.
= Enemy single-ship traffic picked up 15th September - 15th October
1942.
Erfasste Keuse = courses picked up
" Standard = Positions picked up.
Meldungen = Reports.
Geleitsug = Convoy.
Seegebeit für Einzelverkehn zwischen Kapstadt u. Freetown
= Sea area for single-ship traffic between Capetown and Freetown
Sonderbestiminugen für Einzelfahen seit Ende Jul.
= Special directions for independently-routed ships since the end of
July.
 Unbek Dpfr. 16 9. ab Durban nach Freetown 29.9. au
= Unidentified ship, left Durban 16.9, due Freetown 29.9.
Unbek Dpfr. 11.10. ab Kapstadt nach Freetown 2.11. au
= Unidentified ship left Capetown 11.10, due Freetown 2.11.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
16 - 31 October 1942
PG30312b
16.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 179 - Op(GR) U 443 - Op(AK 30) U 602 -
Op(AK 30)
67 - Op(EE 71) 181 - FE 42 454 - Op(AK 40) 604 - BF 46
68 - Op(GR) 183 - AJ 22 455 - BC 51 607 - Op(AK)
69 - Op(BB 58) 201 - DF 73 459 - DT 22 609 - Op(AL 70)
71 - Op(AL 90) 202 - DF 92 461 - BF 67 610 - Op(AK 03)
84 - Op(AL 40) 203 - BF 50 463 - BD 57 615 - Op(AK)
87 - Op(ET) 216 - Op(AK) 504 - Op(GR) 618 - Op(AK)
89 - Op(AL 40) 217 - BF 55 505 - CD 96 620 - BD 25
106 - Op(BB) 221 - AK 91 506 - DT 78 621 - Op(AK 30)
107 - Op(ET) 254 - Op(AK) 509 - BF 50 624 - AE 69
116 - BF 50 257 - BF 73 510 - BF 49 627 - AO
118 - BF 60 258 - Op(AK) 513 - BD 60 658 - Op(AL 70)
125 - Op(ET) 260 - BD 28 514 - Op(LP 24) 659 - BF 47
126 - FG 37 301 - Op(AK 30) 516 - Op(EO) 661 - Op(AK 50)
128 - Op(ET) 332 - Op(EO) 517 - BE 43 662 - Op(AK)
129 - DQ 14 333 - DH 79 518 - AJ 16 704 - Op(AL 40)
903
132 - Op(AL 70) 353 - Op(AK) 520 - AK 24 706 - Op(AK 03)
134 - BF 91 356 - Op(AK) 521 - AL 30 753 - Op(AK 30)
154 - BE 92 381 - Op(AK 63) 522 - AE 86 757 - BD 60
156 - FE 54 382 - BD 27 552 - Op(ET) D 3 - AL 92
159 - Op(GR) 402 - Op(AL 40) 558 - BF 52 D 5 - Op(ET)
160 - Op(EE) 409 - BF 47 563 - Op(AK 30)
161 - FG 64 410 - Op(AK) 571 - Op(AL 40)
172 - Op(GR) 436 - AL 23 572 - BE 96
174 - CE 92 437 - Op(AK) 575 - Op(AK 30)
175 - DF 59 438 - Op(AL 70) 590 - Op(ET)
177 - DF 59 441 - Op(AK 30) 597 - Op(AK 50)
178 - FU 97 442 - Op(AK) 599 - Op(AK)
On Return Passage: U 116 - 118 - 156 - 175 - 201 - 217 - 221 - 254 -
257 - 333 - 382 - 455 - 459 - 461 - 506 - 513 - 517 - 558 - 757 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 258 - 217 - Brest; U 118 - Lorient.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 59 and 60 see paragraph IVa.
2) From patrol line of Group Panther U 602 - 563 - 610 - 301 and 575
report large numbers of aircraft. Line seems to have been observed and
will be shifted.
3) U 160 sighted convoy of 14 ships at 2100 in ED 9954, course 900,
speed 8 knots. Sea and air patrol. Boat attacked and scored one hit apiece
on 4,000 and 6,000 tonner. Sinking not confirmed on account of defence
measures. Hunt still in progress.
4) U 333 sighted unknown submarine in DH 1392. Italian according to
dead reckoning.
5) U 129 sank Norwegian ship "Trafalgar" (5,542 GRT) on 16.10. in
DQ 1153, carrying mixed cargo from Buenos Aires to New York.
6) U 69 sighted small convoy in BB 5686 with small escort, course
- 38 -
3100, low speed.
7) Position reports:
U 107: Since 12.10. from ET 4645 - 8251 - EU 7341 - ET 6641
nothing sighted. Frequent bad visibility caused by rain.
U 128: Up to the present ET 56, now ET 70, no shipping sighted.
8) U 441 leaving large oil tracks caused by leaking emergency end seals
and slide valves of ventilators. Boat ordered to blow starboard main
ballast tank and report operational readiness.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AK 69 - ED 96 - EC 64 - EO 14.
U-boat attacks: ED 99 and BB 5511 on English steamer "Carbon".
English aircraft reported submarines in AK 3644 - AE 7774 - AK 5999
and 4 others in unknown positions, one depth charge attack.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 59:
At 1000 U 258 sighted a part of convoy consisting of 5 steamers in AK
5999, course 900. It was immediately forced to submerge by aircraft, and
reported last position of convoy on hydrophones AK 9124 at 1300.
Contact finally lost on account of air patrol. Towards 2200 U 571 came on
convoy again in AK 6977. Sighted 2 destroyers and 5 steamers on course
900, was damaged by bombs and depth charges and could not report
sighting until 13 hours later. Before U 258 sighted convoy again in the
morning, another submarine sighted westbound convoy in AL 4799.
Groups "Wotan" and "Leopard" were ordered to break off operations on
904
Convoy No. 59 and operate on fresh reports. Reasons for this were as
follows:
I. No contact for six hours and
II. entry of enemy into area of continuous air patrol.
With this operation on Convoy No. 59 was over. Boats making contact
by accident should make the most of any opportunity that offered... for
complete survey see paragraph VI.
2) Convoy No. 60:
At 1002 U 704 reported enemy in sight AL 4799 on westerly course,
speed 12 knots. Boat lay in southern half of Group "Panther" patrol line.
16 boats of Group "Panther" as well as boats of Group "Leopard" and
"Wotan" were ordered to operate. The rest of the "Panther" boats were
formed into Group "Puma" and detailed to new patrol line. (See IVb) At
1043 U 609 sighted convoy in AL 7136. Retained contact until 1345 in
AL 7156. General course of convoy 2200, with temporary alterations of
course to the south. Speed 8 - 10 knots according to dead reckoning.
U 704 attacked at 1330 in AL 7129 and scored 2 hits on 5,000 ton ship.
Sinking certain. Convoy consisted of about 20 steamers. Visibility
worsened during course of the morning
- 39 -
south 2, and rain to the point of fog. During submerged attack in fog
U 609 was depth-charged at 13 meters. Damage received forced boat to
commence return passage. Convoy remained uncontacted on account of
continuous bad visibility. Boats operating independently on convoy
courses between 200 and 2500, speed 8 - 10 knots. Operation continues.
b) 1) Group "Puma" with U 621 - 436 - 602 - 753 - 575 - 301 - 563 - 443
took up patrol line between AK 6247 - 6977 at cruising speed.
2) U 436 took up position in patrol line instead of U 441 which fell out,
and thus has therefore joined Group "Puma".
3) U 610 position BD 57 for refueling.
c) None.
d) 1) According to 1/Sk1 IK 2055/42 2 boats have been detailed to escort
"M.S. Tannenfels". U 105 position CD 95 at midday on 21.10. and U 382
after completing refueling in BD 57 to proceed on southerly course with
210 miles day's run to meet ship.
2) U 216 was on return passage and last reported short weather signal
on 6.10. from BD 8286. Since then neither weather nor sighting report
received. Loss of boat must be reckoned with since boat is already 3 days
overdue in port.
3) U 597 operated with Group "Leopard" on Convoy No. 58. Reported
same at 1145/12/10 in AK 3999. Last radio message stated boat had lost
contact 1200. Since then no reply has been received in spite of repeated
calls. Loss must be reckoned with.
V. Reports of Success:
U 160 2 ships torpedoed
U 129 1 ship 5,542 GRT
U 704 1 ship 5,000 GRT.
VI. General:
General Survey of Convoy No. 59:
Operation on SC convoy was strongly effected by 2 factors,
1) Scattered position of boats at time of first sighting,
2) Bad weather from the W during first 2 days.
Contact at first was kept by U 221 above, which in 2 night attacks in bad
weather sank a total of 8 ships. In spite of the fact that calmer weather set
in on the 3rd day, and all boats of the patrol line came within range of the
convoy, no further success was scored during the operation.
905
Radio messages from the boats show reasons for this:
1) Increased escort, A/S units and single destroyers, probably transferred
from ON-convoy which was hunted in vain.
2) Outstanding performance of radar apparatus probable. It is striking
that boats were not able to shadow for any length of
- 40 -
time without being forced to submerge. At times they were not even
able to make first contact report. Successes scored by U 221, 607 and 618
during 1st and 2nd night were made in heavy sea, and therefore under
difficult conditions for successful operation of enemy radar apparatus.
3) Great differences in estimated positions from the various boats due to
bad weather and visibility.
4) Early appearance of air escort already in AK 80 although this convoy
passage must be a small catastrophe for the enemy (11 ships lost out of
19), the course of the operation was a disappointment for our boats also.
Here again is clearly shown how much more difficult convoy battles have
become, and how immensely important and decisive is the development of
our own weapons (combined radar and radar intercept equipment, heavier
flak armament, improved torpedoes) for the future prosecution of
submarine warfare.
Results: 11 ships sunk, one submarine (U 661) probably lost, and one
submarine (U 607) damaged.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
 Entered Port: U 461 - St Nazaire.
17.October 1942. Sailed: U 163 - 508 - Lorient; U 519 - 224 - 383 - 412 - Kiel; U 606 -
Bergen.

I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 179 - Op(GR) U 442 - Op(AK 60) U 599 -
Op(AK 60)
67 - Op(EE) 181 - FE 57 443 - Op(AK 03) 602 - Op(AK)
68 - Op(GR) 183 - AJ 16 454 - Op(AK 90) 604 - BF 47
69 - Op(BB) 201 - DF 55 455 - BC 65 607 - AK 98
71 - Op(AK 90) 202 - DF 69 459 - DT 76 609 - Op(AK 90)
84 - Op(AK 90) 203 - BF 46 461 - BF 50 610 - AK 68
87 - Op(ET) 216 - Op(AK 60) 504 - Op(GR) 615 - Op(AK 60)
89 - Op(AK 90) 221 - Op(AK 90) 505 - DF 23 618 - Op(AK 60)
106 - Op(BB) 254 - BD 32 506 - DS 96 620 - BD 54
107 - Op(ET) 257 - BF 91 509 - BF 49 621 - Op(AK 37)
125 - Op(ET) 258 - Op(AK 60) 510 - BF 47 624 - AE 91
126 - FG 66 260 - BD 57 513 - BE 44 627 - AN 36
128 - Op(ET) 301 - Op(AK) 514 - Op(EP) 658 - Op(AK 90)
129 - DQ 42 332 - Op(EE) 516 - Op(EO) 659 - BE 95
132 - Op(AK 90) 333 - CF 89 517 - BE 56 661 - Op(AK 60)
134 - BF 82 353 - Op(AK 60) 518 - AJ 17 662 - Op(AK 60)
154 - CF 21 356 - OP(AK 60) 520 - AK 13 704 - Op(AK 90)
156 - FE 16 381 - Op(AK 90) 521 - AK 24 706 - Op(AK 90)
159 - Op(GR) 382 - BD 57 522 - AE 87 753 - Op(AK 03)
160 - Op(EE) 402 - Op(AK 90) 552 - Op(ET) 757 - BE 44
161 - FH 47 409 - BE 83 563 - Op(AK) D 3 - AL 99
172 - Op(GR) 410 - Op(AK) 571 - Op(AK 90) D 5 - Op(ET)
174 - DG 23 463 - BD 57 572 - BE 98
175 - DF 62 436 - AL 17 575 - Op(AK 39)
177 - FD 35 437 - Op(AK 40) 590 - Op(ET)
178 - GG 24 438 - Op(AK 90)
441 - Op(AK)
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 41 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 60 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 183 sighted nothing while proceeding through Iceland Passage and
southern tip of Greenland as far as AJ 46.
3) U 160 continued hunt for convoy reported on previous day. At 1130
it lay in EE 7858, course 900, speed 8 knots. U 67 continued to operate
and for a time also U 332 but latter soon had to break off engagement on
account of a temporary attack of giddiness of its Commander. Boats were
continually forced to submerge by strong air patrol and lost contact
towards evening. U 160 presumed convoy had broken up into single
groups and at 1702 sighted 2 large steamers in EO 1236. No successes
were scored.
b) None.
c) Submarine sightings: EO 12 - EE 78 - ED 95 - ED 52 and 1
submarine in a convoy.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

On Return Passage: U 156 - 175 - 201 - 202 - 221 - 254 - 257 - 333 - a) Convoy No. 60:
382 - 455 - 459 - 461 - 506 - 513 - 517 - 757 - D 3.
906
 In spite of the fact that a large number of boats must have been in the
area where convoy was supposed to be, convoy itself remained
uncontacted. At 1512 U 258 sighted destroyer in BD 3258. U 356 came
upon corvette in AK 9769 and in the same area U 381 sighted a destroyer.
At 152- U 71 was contacted, crossed over by a destroyer, and heard east
bound convoy. Gave chase without success. In course of the evening
weather worsened to S.W. 10-11, variable visibility, fierce showers of rain
and hail. Boats reported they could only make slow speed in present sea.
At 0336 U 618 came upon single ship, type "Waroonga" (9,365 GRT)
escorted by destroyer and on westerly course. Boat attacked and
torpedoed ship in roughly BD 3441. Sinking was heard. Command
conjectured convoy would be between BD 21 - AK 89 - BD 29 and 34 by
dawn. Apart from a number of patrol vessels in BD 2330 at 0400 on S.W.
course according to hydrophone bearings, boats sighted nothing further.
Operation continues.
No further refueling is planned for former Group "Wotan" following
boats therefore broke off engagement: U 216 - 410 - 258 - 618 and 356.
b) 1) U 441 blew main ballast tank and is again at full operational
readiness. Boat joined Group "Puma" and lengthened patrol line to AK
6139 on the N.
2) Following attack areas occupied:
U 518 squares AH 95 and 96 with focal points AH 9586 and 9594.
U 183 square AH 98 and 99 with focal point AH 9830.
Operation view for next new period in BB 10 and 40.
- 42 -
c) U 609 took over radar intercept escort for U 254.
907
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 618 1 ship 9,365 GRT sunk.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
18.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 179 - Op(GR) U 441 - Op(AK) U 590 - Op(ET)
67 - Op(EO) 181 - FE 94 442 - Op(BD) 599 - BD-Op
68 - Op(GR) 183 - AJ 71 443 - Op(AK 60) 602 - Op(AK 60)
69 - Op(BB) 201 - DF 37 454 - Op(BB 20) 604 - BE 96
71 - Op(AK) 202 - DG 18 455 - BD 47 606 - AF 87
84 - Op(BD 20) 203 - BF 47 459 - ET 72 607 - BE 11
87 - Op(ET) 216 - AL 77 463 - BD 57 609 - BE 21
89 - Op(BD 20) 221 - BE 12 504 - Op(GR) 610 - AL 97
106 - Op(BB) 224 - AO 505 - DF 27 615 - Op(BD)
107 - Op(ET) 254 - BE 14 506 - DS 93 618 - BD 26
125 - ET 41 257 - BF 68 508 - BF 55 620 - BD 57
126 - FH 73 258 - Op(BD) 509 - BF 71 621 - Op(AK 60)
128 - Op(ET) 260 - BD 57 510 - BE 92 624 - AE 86
129 - DP 69 301 - Op(AK 60) 513 - BE 54 627 - AN 28
132 - Op(BD) 332 - Op(EE) 514 - Op(EP) 658 - Op(BD 20)
134 - BF 73 333 - CF 67 516 - Op(EO) 659 - CG 17
154 - CE 39 353 - Op(BD) 517 - BE 66 661 - Op(BD 20)
156 - ET 79 356 - BD 23 518 - AJ 47 662 - Op(BD)
159 - Op(GR) 381 - Op(BD) 519 - AO 704 - Op(BD 20)
160 - Op(EO) 382 - BD 57 520 - AD 97 706 - Op(BD 20)
161 - FH 73 383 - AO 521 - AK 24 753 - Op(AK 60)
163 - BF 55 402 - Op(BD) 522 - AE 86 757 - BE 46
172 - Op(GR) 409 - BE 87 552 - AL 22 D 3 - BE 37
174 - DG 51 410 - BD 32 563 - Op(ET) D 5 - Op(ET)
 175 - DG 14 412 - AO 571 - Op(BD) U 68: Worst weather possible since 10.10. On penetrating to the east
177 - FE 41 436 - Op(AK 60) 572 - CF 39 as far as KY 62 came upon heavy westbound traffic proceeding through
178 - GG 69 437 - Op(BD) 575 - Op(AK 60) own minefield on account of weather. Heavy air activity.
438 - Op(BD 20) U 172: Nothing sighted in GR 40-42 and 89, apart from one freighter.
2 shots missed. Air patrol. Boat presumed traffic stoppage.
U 504: Sank "Empire Jaguar" (5,186 GRT) in JJ 1313 on 17.10.,
On Return Passage: U 125 - 156 - 175 - 201 - 216 - 221 - 254 - 257 - course 2300, heavily armed. Otherwise nothing sighted.
258 - 333 - 356 - 382 - 410 - 455 - 459 - 506 - 513 - 517 - 607 - 618 - 757 b) None.
- D 3. c) U-boat sightings: ED 75, GR 25 from British steamer "Bentinnes"
Entered Port: U 257 - La Pallice. U-boat attack in BD 2654.
Sailed: U 462 - St. Nazaire. SOS report from American steamer "Ozark", 2689 GRT in AD 9232.
d) None.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
IV. Current Operations:
III. Reports on the Enemy: a) Convoy No. 60:
a) 1) Convoy No. 60 see paragraph IVa. In continuous stormy weather boats continued search independently.
2) U 160 and U 67 have broken off unsuccessful operation and during Organized search on sector system or the like pointless, as positions of
full moon period are operating apart in waters east of Trinidad. boats too uncertain. U 89 sighted smoke clouds at 1130 in BD 2221,
3) U 658 reported single ship in BD 2373 on course 2100. Received probably hove to. By morning no further contact with enemy was made.
orders to sink it unless it was recognized as Irish or Swedish. b) New positions for U 509 and U 510 CF 84 southward passage and
operation on "SL" convoy in view.
- 43 - c) - d) None.

V. Reports of Success:
U 504 1 ship 5,186 GRT.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

19.October 1942.
4) Further U 620 sighted ship sailing independently in BD 7791 course
700, speed 15 knots. As ship was 15 miles inside Route A and one of our
own ships was expected, boat was ordered not to attack. I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 179 - Op(GR) U 441 - Op(AK 60) U 575 - Op(AK
5) Situation report Capetown Area: 60)
67 - Op(EO) 181 - FM 23 442 - Op(AK) 590 - Op(ET)
908
 68 - Op(GR) 183 - Op(AH 90) 443 - Op(AK 60) 599 - Op(BD)
69 - Op(BB 56) 201 - DF 35 454 - Op(AK) 602 - Op(AK 60)
71 - Op(BD 20) 202 - DG 13 455 - BD 57 604 - BE 97
- 44 -
84 - Op(BD) 203 - BE 96 559 - DT 47 606 - AF 72
87 - Op(ET) 216 - BE 14 462 - BF 67 607 - BF 19
89 - Op(AK) 221 - BE 27 463 - BD 57 609 - BE 28
106 - Op(BB) 224 - AN 36 504 - Op(KY) 610 - BD 25
107 - Op(ET) 254 - BE 43 505 - DF 44 615 - Op(BD 20)
125 - ES 36 258 - BD 53 506 - DS 69 618 - BD 39
126 - FH 88 260 - BD 57 508 - BF 46 620 - BD 57
128 - Op(ET) 301 - Op(AK 60) 509 - BE 92 621 - Op(AK 60)
129 - DP 94 332 - Op(EE) 510 - CF 26 624 - AF 85
132 - Op(BB 20) 333 - CF 38 513 - BF 56 627 - AN 28
134 - BF 74 353 - Op(BD 20) 514 - Op(EP) 658 - Op(BD)
154 - CE 53 356 - BD 26 516 - Op(EO) 659 - CF 65
156 - ET 75 381 - Op(BD 20) 517 - BF 58 661 - Op(BD 20)
159 - GQ 95-Op 382 - BD 57 518 - Op(AH 96) 662 - Op(BD 20)
160 - Op(EO) 383 - AN 36 519 - AN 36 704 - Op(BD 20)
161 - FH 89 402 - Op(BD 20) 520 - BD 57 706 - Op(AK)
163 - BF 46 409 - CF 25 521 - AK 13 753 - Op(AK 60)
172 - Op(GR) 410 - BE 17 522 - AF 87 757 - BE 56
174 - DG 83 412 - AN 36 552 - Op(ET) D 3 - BE 66
175 - CE 79 436 - Op(AK 60) 563 - Op(AK 60) D 5 - Op(ET)
909
177 - FE 73 437 - Op(BD 20) 571 - AK 86
178 - GH 76 438 - Op(AK) 572 - CF 61
On Return Passage: U 125 - 156 - 175 - 201 - 202 - 216 - 221 - 254 -
258 - 333 - 356 - 382 - 410 - 454 - 459 - 506 - 513 - 517 - 607 - 609 - 618
- 757 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 517 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 440 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 60 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 332 sank English ship "Rothley" in EE 6702, general course 2900.
3) U 409 was attacked by "Catalina" without identification marks in CF
2794. Machine-guns defence; no damage.
4) U 258 sighted steamer with black and white camouflage in BD 3986,
course east and later S.W. boat had to break off chase on account of fuel
supply.
5) U 610, en route for refuel in BD 2862, sank American ship "Steel
Navigator" (5,719 GRT) course 2600, speed 11 knots.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: GR 53, from steamer "Nester".
2) English aircraft attacked submarine in CF 2796.
3) U-boat attacks: "Steel Navigator" in BD 2562 (SOS). American ship
"Stephan A. Douglas" 6,800 GRT in GR 7530
d) None.
- 45 -

IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 60:
Boats received orders to continue search on S.W. course and economic
speed. Boats short of fuel to make for refueling point (U 437 - 662 - 442 -
U 353). At 1405 U 381 sighted fast single ship in BD 2556 on S.W.
course. As convoy had not been contacted by dusk Command decided to
break off operation. U 661 and U 705 were refueled, U 599 and U 615
commence return passage as soon as fuel supply made this necessary.
Until then they have freedom of action.
The rest of the boats were formed into Group "Veilchen" and took up
new patrol line from AJ 8181 to BC 2279 order of succession as follows:
U 71 - 438 - 84 - 89 - 704 - 381 - 658 - 402 - 571 - 454 and U 132. Boats
expected to be in position early on 24.10. See paragraph IV for general
survey.
b) 1) U 520 and 521 received orders to go close inshore while passing
south tip of Greenland, as traffic was to be expected there.
2) New position for U 522 BB 63 (St. Johns).
3) For clearing up of traffic situation off Freetown boats detailed to take
up attack positions in following sector with apex ET 20: U 87 and U 552
sector 80 - 300, U 128 and 107 the sector to the south and U 590 sector to
the north of it, up to the coast from time to time.
U D 5 freedom of action.
c) U 154 in position CD 9255 at 1400/21/10 for rendezvous with
returning "Tannenfels". Note to follow.
d) Boat's attention is drawn to the fact that enemy is using submarines
with surface silhouette similar to that of a German as decoy.
V. Reports of Success:
U 332 1 ship 4,996 GRT
U 610 1 ship 5,719 GRT.
VI. General:
910
General Survey of Convoy No. 60:
1) Operation on ON-convoy turned out total failure on account of bad
weather. The fog which gathered 3 hours after first sighting lead to loss of
contact and bad damage to U 609 which was engaged on submerged attack
when fog came down.
Continuous fog and heavy westerly storm with wind up to strength 11
made organized search impossible and hindered a successful operation on
the part of 25 boats.
U 353 was probably lost in this action. It is probable that on the night
of 17.10 boat suddenly found itself among the convoy in the fog (radio
intercept report: submarine in convoy) and was destroyed.
With unusually bad visibility conditions in the Atlantic and the
extensive equipping if enemy escort with (F.U.M.C.) equipment of our
own boats with combined radar and radar intercept is more urgent than
ever.
Results: 1 ship sunk
1 boat (U 353) lost.
2) Situation Survey to German Naval Staff, see Appendix.
- 46 -
20.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 179 - Op(GR) U 440 - BF 55 U 575 - Op(AK 60)
67 - Op(EO) 181 - FM 62 441 - Op(AK 60) 590 - Op(ET)
68 - Op(GP) 183 - Op(AH) 442 - BD 52 599 - BD 24
 69 - Op(BB) 201 - CE 76 443 - Op(AK 69) 602 - Op(AK 60)
71 - BD 13 202 - CE 85 454 - BD 16 604 - CF 53
84 - BD 16 203 - CF 34 455 - BD 59 606 - AF 47
87 - Op(ET) 216 - BE 27 459 - DS 66 607 - BE 51
89 - BD 16 221 - BE 29 462 - BF 57 609 - BE 61
106 - Op(BB) 224 - AN 31 463 - BD 57 610 - BD 52
107 - Op(ET) 254 - BE 51 504 - Op(GR) 615 - BD 16
125 - EJ 95 258 - BD 66 505 - DE 92 618 - BE 42
126 - FP 20 260 - BD 57 506 - DS 66 620 - BD 57
128 - Op(ET) 301 - Op(AK 60) 508 - BF 47 621 - Op(AK 60)
129 - EE 22 332 - Op(EE) 509 - CF 32 624 - AE 79
132 - BD 16 333 - BE 99 510 - CF 52 627 - AF 79
134 - CG 14 353 - BD 20 513 - Op(EP 31) 658 - BD 24
154 - CF 49 356 - BD 55 514 - Op(EP) 659 - CF 58
156 - ET 41 381 - BD 24 516 - Op(EO) 661 - BD 20
159 - Op(GQ) 382 - BD 57 518 - Op(AH) 662 - BD 57
160 - Op(EO) 383 - AN 31 519 - AN 31 704 - BD 16
161 - FP 20 402 - BD 27 520 - AD 90 706 - BD 27
163 - BF 47 409 - CF 54 521 - AD 97 753 - Op(AK 60)
172 - Op(GR) 410 - BE 17 522 - AL 21 757 - BE 65
174 - DS 36 412 - AN 37 552 - Op(ET) D 3 - BF 54
175 - CE 96 436 - Op(AK 60) 563 - Op(AK 60) D 5 - Op(ET)
177 - FE 88 437 - BD 54 571 - BD 13
178 - GQ 32 438 - BD 16 572 - CF 58
On Return Passage: U 125 - 156 - 175 - 201 - 202 - 216 - 221 - 254 -
258 - 333 - 356 - 410 - 455 - 459 - 506 - 513 - 607 - 609 - 618 - 757 - D 3
- 382.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 608 - St. Nazaire; U 664 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
911
a) 1) U 514 shot missed a freighter, course 2900, in EF 9452. Gun fight
broken off on account of defence and bright moonlight.
2) U 658 made submerged attacks on ship reported on 18.10. which
proved fruitless on account of seaway, and lost contact in fog during night.
3) U 69 fired stern shot which missed, at English ship "Rose Castle" in
BB 6497, course 950. Strong suspicion of pistol failure. Boat reported
further experiences of aircraft radar. Return passage on account of fuel
supply.
4) U 618 reported slight stationary patrol in BE 5491.
5) At 1046 U 437 reported a destroyer on southerly course in BD 4395.
As it was possible that messages from Supply Group "Wolfbauer" had
been D/F'd and destroyer was operating on same, U 463 received orders to
refuel only boats with shortest supply, and to suggest new rendezvous 100
miles to the west.
- 47 -
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EE 85, BB 8587.
SSS reports from steamer "Rose Castle" in BB 6730.
English aircraft reported submarines in BE 8398, BE 6476. Further
aircraft attacked submarines in BE 2797 and probably scored 6 hits.
Aircraft's own tail plane ripped away by depth charge explosion.
According to dead reckoning this could have been U 216. Boat was asked
for position report.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
 a) None. 106 - Op(BB) 224 - AF 87 463 - BD 57 610 - BD 57
b) 1) New position for U 508 and U 163 is EU 99. 107 - Op(ET) 254 - BE 64 504 - Op(GR) 615 - Op(BD
2) It is planned to commence southerly passage with following boats 125 - EJ 65 258 - BE 45 505 - DQ 93 618 - BE 55
first in deep, then in wide formation in order to cut off north-bound SL
convoy. Refuel and employment in the south planned later.
U 409 will therefore take up patrol line from CF 8885 - 8985 with U
659 and 572: U 510 - CF 8831, U 604 - 8913, U 203, 134 and 509 - CF - 48 -
8528 to 8625. From 23.10. 0800, course 1800, 170 miles. It is planned to
replace U 510 and U 509 by 440 and U 752 on arrival.
3) U 178 received freedom of action in whole area mentioned under IV
d). Search for shipping off the important ports.
c) 1) U 154 received more details concerning rendezvous with
"Tannenfels". According to this boat was to be in following positions
1400, 21.10 - CD 9255, 22.10. - CD 9755, 23.10. - DF 2555. Transmitter
of important radio messages to be made about 300 miles west of
rendezvous.
2) U 609 took over radar intercept escort for U 254. 126 - Op(FP) 260 - BD 57 506 - DS 66 620 - BD 57
d) Eastwards boundary now running from point 400 South and 400 East 128 - Op(ET) 301 - Op(AK 60) 508 - BE 88 621 - Op(AK 60)
across southern tip of Madagascar to the west as far as African coast. 129 - EE 43 332 - Op(EE) 509 - CF 38 624 - AL 31
132 - BD 18 333 - BF 75 510 - CF 82 627 - AF 72
V. Reports of Success: None. 134 - CF 65 353 - BD 513 - BF 44 658 - BD 19
154 - CD 92 356 - BD 57 514 - EF 67 659 - BE 80
--------------------------------------------------- 156 - ES 36 381 - BD 15 516 - Op(EO) 661 - BD
--------------- 159 - GQ 92-Op 382 - BD 57 518 - Op(AH) 662 - BD 57
160 - Op(EO) 383 - AN 23 519 - AF 87 664 - AO
21.October 1942. 161 - Op(FP) 402 - BD 15 520 - AD 90 704 - BD 14
163 - BE 96 409 - CF 85 521 - AD 90 706 - BD 54
172 - Op(GR) 410 - BE 66 522 - AL 18 753 - Op(AK 60)
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 179 - Op(GR) U 440 - BF 46 U 575 - AK 60 174 - DS 66 412 - AF 87 552 - Op(ET 81) 757 - BF 47
67 - Op(EO) 181 - FN 48 441 - Op(AK 60) 590 - Op(ET) 175 - CF 49 436 - Op(AK 60) 563 - Op(AK 60) D 3 - BF 61
68 - Op(GR) 183 - Op(AH) 442 - BD 57 599 - Op(BD 53) 177 - FM 25 437 - BD 57 571 - BD 11 D 5 - Op(ET)
69 - BB 69 201 - CE 83 443 - Op(AK 60) 602 - Op(AK 60) 178 - GQ 38 438 - BD 11 572 - CF 80 608 - BF 91
71 - BD 11 202 - CE 92 454 - BD 14 604 - CF 59
84 - BD 11 203 - CF 56 455 - BE 42 606 - AE 68
87 - Op(ET) 216 - BE 53 459 - DS 66 607 - BE 64 On Return Passage: U 125 - 156 - 175 - 201 - 216 - 221 - 254 - 258 -
89 - BD 11 221 - BF 91 462 - BF 48 609 - BF 58 333 - 356 - 382 - 410 - 459 - 506 - 513 - 514 - 607 - 609 - 618 - 757 - D 3.
912
 Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 103 - Lorient.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) UD 3 reported destroyer in BF 5551. Boat in position entering
Route "Kernleder".
2) U 333 avoided spread in BF 8438 at 1809.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: BB 1647, BC 48.
2) American steamer "Mathew Lukenbach" 5,848 GRT sent SOS from
BB 7643.
3) English aircraft reported submarines in AL 1824 and AF 7561. Latter
attacked with depth charges.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) In order to control ON-convoy Group "Puma" received orders to
take up new patrol line from AK 9261 - 9975 at cruising speed in previous
order of succession. Line must be established by 23.10. 0800 hours.
2) New position for U 624 is AK 93.
3) During full moon period U 129 operating apart, was off Trinidad. U
505 proceeding southwards to EF 90 and then making long legs, to waters
off Trinidad.
4) U 175 southward passage after meeting with U 506 and 559.
5) After return of U 517 following experiences were communicated to
boats: special convoy assembly point BB 1730. Escort still very
- 49 -
inexperienced. Listening and Asdic conditions made very bad by
heavy density of layering. From time to time heavy continuous air
activity.
6) Boats on return passage are warned of increased danger from
submarines in Bay of Biscay.
c) 1) U 410 reports radar intercept escort taken over for U 258.
2) U 174 supplied U 506 on return passage with 15 cbm, fuel oil, and U
459 with spare parts for radar intercept equipment.
d) 1) U 352 operated with Group "Leopard" on Convoy No. 58 and
finally Group "Wotan" on Convoy No. 59. Boat reported this at 0500/16
in AK 9112. After breaking off engagement boat was detailed to
westbound Convoy (No. 60).
No further position reports were received. According to a radio
intercept report at 1851/17/10 a unit sent SSS, and sighted submarine in
convoy. It is possible that this was U 353 and was destroyed. Loss must
be reckoned with.
2) U 661 operated with Group "Wotan" on Convoy No. 59. According
to last radio message it was fired on with machine guns by a corvette and
destroyed in AK 4975. According to radio intercept report of 15.10. a
further ship in the convoy was torpedoed, as yet unclaimed by any of our
boats. Possibly this was U 661, which was finally destroyed. Loss is
probable.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------

22.October 1942.

I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 179 - Op(GR) U 442 - BD 57 U 602 - Op(AK 60)

913
 67 - Op(EO) 181 - FN 79 443 - Op(AK 60) 604 - Op(CF 80)
68 - Op(GR) 183 - Op(AH 90) 454 - BC 32 606 - AE 83
69 - BC 48 201 - CE 65 455 - BE 54 607 - BE 66
71 - AJ 98 202 - CF 37 459 - DS 66 608 - BF 82
84 - BC 32 203 - CF 80 462 - BE 97 609 - BF 64
87 - Op(ET) 216 - BE 66 463 - BD 57 610 - BD 57
89 - AJ 98 221 - BF 64 504 - Op(GR) 615 - Op(BD)
103 - BF 55 224 - AF 76 505 - BF 32 618 - BE 64
106 - Op(BB) 254 - BF 66 506 - DT 41 620 - BD 57
107 - Op(ET) 258 - BE 46 508 - CF 24 621 - Op(AK 60)
125 - DJ 35 260 - BD 57 509 - CF 59 624 - AL 18
126 - Op(FP) 301 - Op(AK 60) 510 - CF 80 627 - AF 47
128 - Op(ET) 332 - Op(EE) 513 - BF 61 658 - BC 36
129 - Op(BE) 333 - BF 85 514 - BF 38 659 - CF 80
132 - BC 36 356 - BD 57 516 - Op(EO) 662 - BD 57
134 - CF 80 381 - BC 32 518 - Op(AH 90) 664 - AN 36
154 - CD 97 382 - BD 57 519 - AF 73 704 - BC 32
156 - BJ 96 383 - AF 76 520 - AD 95 706 - BD 57
159 - GQ 68 402 - BC 32 521 - AD 95 753 - Op(AK 60)
160 - Op(EO) 409 - CF 80 522 - AL 41 757 - BF 49
161 - Op(EP) 410 - BE 54 552 - Op(ET) D 3 - BF 61
163 - CF 25 412 - AF 76 563 - Op(AK 60) D 5 - Op(ET)
172 - Op(GR) 436 - Op(AK 60) 571 - AJ 31
174 - DS 66 437 - BD 57 572 - CF 80
175 - CF 52 438 - AJ 98 575 - Op(AK 60)
- 50 -
914
177 - FM 61 440 - BF 47 590 - Op(ET)
178 - GQ 68 441 - Op(AK 60) 599 - BD 65
On Return Passage: U 69 - 125 - 156 - 175 - 201 - 202 - 216 - 221 - 254
- 258 - 333 - 356 - 382 - 410 - 455 - 459 - 506 - 514 - 599 - 607 - 610 -
618 - 757 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 254 - Brest; D 3 - 513 - Lorient; U 609 - 221 - St.
Nazaire.
Sailed: U 98 - St. Nazaire; U 752 - La Pallice; U 184 - 413 - 613 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 61 see paragraph IVa.
2) Position reports:
U 516: from 16. 18.10. operated on Convoy U 160. No contact made.
On 21. and 22.10. patrolled between EF 83 and 85, sighting nothing.
U 87: since 12.10. no shipping in ET 55, 56 and 84. No air, slight sea
patrol. Much bad visibility on account of rain.
U 552: nothing sighted since 24.9. Boat making long legs in allocated
sector en route for Freetown.
U 106 set apart from BA 35 and 38 on account of bright moon, in BB
50. Nothing sighted in BA. Heavy defence since 16.10. On 11.10. sank
one steamer of 5,000 GRT in S.W. bound convoy in BB 5438.
3) U 462 reported single ship in CF 3312 on S.W. course in CF 3312,
speed 12 - 15 knots.
4) U 410 sighted darkened ship in BE 6735.
5) U 621 sank single ship of 5,600 GRT course 900, 8 knots. Ship of
"Empire" class.
b) None.
c) U-boat attack: SOS and sinking report from unknown steamer in EE
6444. Further attack in BB 3371. Torpedo report from unknown steamer,
probably in Convoy No 61 (U 443).
 d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 61:
U 443 reported convoy in BD 3255 at 1630 on course 2200. Group
"Puma" and U 615 received orders to operate on it. U 443 only to attack
when another had made contact. 3 single funnel steamers were sighted
and later 5 - 10 steamers with weak escort, course 2000.
As no refuel was possible for Group "Puma" U 575 and U 753 could not
carry out order to operate. Therefore remaining in previous Op. area.
Towards 1830 U 443 reported intention to attack in BD 3274. As
command
- 51 -
was not clear as to speed of convoy, although it was apparently very
high, boat received order only to attack if speed was over 11 knots.
Reasons for this were as follows:
1) If convoy speed was high then chances were, no second boat would
be able to get in an attack and
2) The possibility of prolonged shadowing by a single boat extremely
small.
Finally boat reported convoy's speed as 12 knots. After that no report
from U 443. It was planned to continue operation until daylight and then
to detail boats which had been refueled in time to U 463, and thereby in a
favorable position, to operate on convoy.
U 443 reported at 0800 that it had attacked convoy at 2200 in BD 3544
and scored hit on ship, class "Clan Mac Arthur" (10,500 GRT), and
915
observed explosion and fire break out on 8,000 ton tanker. Was finally
depth charged for a number of hours. Convoy last seen steering course
2100, speed 12 knots. Boat pressed after. Operation continues.
b) New position for U 440 - CF 86.
c) U 514 took over engineer officer from U 505.
d) U 154 received order stating if no meeting with "Tannenfels" by
morning of 24.10. to report "No" by short signal.
V. Reports of Success:
U 106 1 ship 5,000 GRT
U 621 1 ship 5,600 GRT
U 443 2 ships 18,500 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
23.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 178 - Op(GQ 68) U 440 - BE 59 U 590 - Op(ET)
67 - Op(EO) 179 - Op(GR) 441 - Op(BD 30) 599 - BE 46
68 - Op(GR) 181 - FU 26 442 - BD 57 602 - Op(BD 30)
69 - BC 59 183 - Op(AH 90) 443 - Op(BD 35) 604 - Op(CF 89)
71 - AJ 83 184 - AO 454 - BC 22 606 - AE 84
84 - AJ 97 201 - CF 39 455 - BF 64 607 - BF 65
87 - ET 53 202 - CF 33 459 - DT 12 608 - BE 72
89 - AJ 89 203 - Op(CF 85) 462 - CF 37 610 - BD 57
98 - BF 67 216 - BF 45 463 - BD 57 613 - AO
103 - BF 49 224 - AF 47 504 - Op(GR) 615 - Op(BD)
106 - Op(BB) 258 - BE 64 505 - EF 35 618 - Op(BE 69)
107 - Op(ET) 260 - BD 57 506 - DT 12 620 - BD 57
125 - DT 89 301 - Op(BD) 508 - CF 42 621 - Op(AK)
126 - Op(EP) 332 - Op(EE) 509 - Op(CF 85) 624 - AL 41
128 - Op(ET) 333 - BF 93 510 - Op(CF 88) 627 - AE 68
129 - Op(EE) 356 - BD 57 514 - EF 35 658 - BC 31
 132 - BC 34 381 - AJ 97 516 - Op(EF) 659 - Op(CF 89)
134 - Op(CF 86) 382 - BD 57 518 - Op(AH 90) 662 - BD 57
154 - CF 25 383 - AF 48 519 - AF 47 664 - AN 31
156 - EJ 68 402 - AJ 97 520 - AJ 24 704 - AJ 97
159 - GQ 69 409 - Op(CF 88) 521 - AJ 22 706 - BD 57
160 - Op(EO) 410 - BE 65 522 - AK 68 752 - BF 92
161 - Op(FP) 412 - AF 47 552 - Op(ET) 753 - Op(BD 30)
163 - CF 43 413 - AO 563 - Op(AL) 757 - BF 91
172 - Op(GR) 436 - Op(AK 97) 571 - BC 22 D 5 - Op(ET)
- 52 -
174 - DS 96 437 - BD 57 572 - Op(CF 89)
175 - CF 36 438 - AJ 86 575 - Op(AK)
177 - FN 71
On Return Passage: U 69 - 125 - 156 - 175 - 201 - 202 - 216 - 258 - 333
- 356 - 382 - 410 - 455 - 459 - 506 - 514 - 599 - 607 - 610 - 618 - 757.
Entered Port: U 607 - St. Nazaire; U 333 - La Pallice.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 61 see paragraph IVa.
916
2) U 87 fired 3 spread which missed at unknown 4,000 tonner in ET
5241, possibly dummy warship, course 1000, low speed. Probable pistol
failure.
3) U D 5 sighted no traffic in western sector of ET, commenced return
passage on account of fuel supply.
4) U D 5 reported heavy air patrol by sea planes and land-based aircraft
in CF 6181.
5) U 615 sank English ship "Empire Star (12,656 GRT) in BD 3984, on
S course, speed 14 knots.
6) U 441 sighted independent ship in AK 6577 on 22.10. By attack at
dusk (Trans. note: or dawn, not indicated) 2 spread fired, which missed
also 2 single shots. Another submarine in the vicinity, behaving very
suspiciously.
7) U 129 sank American ship "Reuben Tipton" in EE 5627, carrying
mixed cargo from Capetown to Trinidad, course 2900 degrees. In FE 5654
2 shots missed at ballaster on W. course.
8) U 332 lay in the same area as U 129 and also operated on "Reuben
Tipton".
9) Situation U 161: On 20.10. in FP 2362 nothing sighted. U 126 also
operating there. On morning of 23.10. torpedoed destroyer of "Balch"
class, hit below bridge. Nothing further observed on account of defence.
Cabinda harbor greatly enlarged. At present 5 steamers along jetty.
Probable formation of enemy convoy since arrival of 2 destroyers.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 94 - CF 61 - and another in unknown position.
SOS sent by "Reuben Tipton" (6,870 GRT) in EE 6440 and "Empire
Star" (12,656 GRT in BD 6311).
Submarine warning for EH 3895.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 61:
Boats of Group "Puma" which lay in favorable position for operation
on convoy received orders to report position. Other boats being supplied
at the time in the vicinity should, if possible, also attack
- 53 -
convoy by day, and those not yet supplied if they had enough fuel.
According to reports following boats were operating on convoy: U 443,
620, 260, 662, 706 and 301. At 1735 U 706 sighted a number of smoke
clouds in BD 5885 and a short time later, convoy in BD 5879 on course
2400 and speed 12 knots. Weather: NW 3 - 4, medium swell, visibility
over 10 miles. At 2215 U 706 attacked unsuccessfully in BD 8244.
Convoy consisted of 21 steamers and 4 - 6 escort vessels. At 0456 U 260
made contact in BD 8458, U 301 towards 0800. At this time convoy lay in
BD 8712, general course steered up to date was 2100. It was not out of the
question that the convoy had separated into one fast group with speed of
15 knots and a slower one with speed of 10 - 11 knots. At the time we
were in contact with the slower group. Operation continues.
b) 1) Patrol line of Group "Puma" had to be moved 50 miles to the west
on account of the boat's belated arrival and now lay in order of succession
as follows: U 624 - 441 - 621 - 436 - 602 - 575 - 753 - 563 and 443. U
624 was a fresh arrival. With exception of U 443 patrol line should be
established by evening of 24.10. For lengthening of same U 606 and 627
to take up position in AK 67.
2) New position for U 752 and U 103 is CF 86. Southward passage and
operations on SL-convoys in view.
3) U 516 on passage through DS 30 for refueling from U 462.
4) U 163 and U 508 received orders to operate in waters off Porto
Delgada with focal point off that port, on account of frequent use made of
it by enemy merchant ships: Period of about 3 days, though if traffic
situation proves favorable for longer. Attention drawn to presence of
neutral shipping.
917
c) None.
d) U 154 picked up returning "Tannenfels" according to plan at arranged
meeting place CD 9755 at 1400 on 22.10 and sent message from DF 1229
as ordered by German Naval Staff.
V. Reports of Success:
U 615 1 ship 12,696 GRT sunk
U 129 1 ship 6,870 sunk
U 161 1 destroyer torpedoed sinking probable.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
24.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 175 - BE 99 U 437 - DD 63 U 571 - Op(BC 20)
67 - Op(EO) 177 - FN 79 438 - Op(AJ 80) 572 - Op(DH 51)
68 - Op(GR) 178 - Op(GQ) 440 - BE 85 575 - Op(AK 90)
69 - BC 68 179 - Op(GR) 441 - Op(AK) 590 - Op(ET)
71 - Op(AJ 80) 181 - FU 65 442 - BD 57 599 - BE 55
84 - Op(AJ 80) 183 - Op(AH 90) 443 - BD 50 602 - AK 95
87 - Op(ET) 184 - AN 36 454 - Op(BC 20) 604 - Op(DH 27)
89 - Op(AJ 80) 201 - BE 99 455 - BE 66 606 - AE 79
98 - BF 81 202 - BE 99 459 - DG 91 608 - BE 93
103 - BF 47 203 - Op(DH 16) 462 - CF 55 610 - BD 57
106 - Op(BB) 216 - BF 54 463 - BD 57 613 - AN 36
107 - Op(ET) 224 - AE 68 504 - Op(GR) 615 - BD 30
125 - DT 57 258 - BF 47 505 - EF 90 618 - BF 48
126 - Op(FP) 260 - BD 87 506 - DG 91 620 - BD 88
128 - Op(ET) 301 - Op(BD) 508 - Op(CE 60) 621 - Op(AL 90)
- 54 -

129 - Op(EE) 332 - EE-Op 509 - Op(DH) 624 - AK 69
132 - Op(BC 20) 356 - BD 57 510 - Op(DH 19) 627 - AE 83
134 - Op(DH 24) 381 - Op(AJ 80) 514 - DR 75 658 - Op(AJ 80)
154 - DF 20 382 - BD 68 516 - BF 68 659 - DH 43
156 - EJ 38 383 - AE 68 518 - Op(AH 99) 662 - BD 88
159 - Op(GQ) 402 - Op(AJ 80) 519 - AE 68 664 - AF 87
160 - Op(EO) 409 - DH 43 520 - AJ 18 704 - Op(AJ 80)
161 - Op(FP) 410 - BF 47 521 - AJ 28 706 - BD 87
163 - Op(CE 60) 412 - AE 68 522 - AK 58 752 - BF 82
172 - Op(GR) 413 - AN 33 552 - ET-Op 753 - Op(AK 90)
174 - EH 36 436 - AK 98 563 - Op(AK 99) 757 - BF 64
D 5 - ES 63
On Return Passage: U 69 - 156 - 175 - 201 - 202 - 216 - 258 - 356 - 382
- 410 - 459 - 506 - 514 - 516 - 599 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 757 - D 5 - 125 -
455.
Entered Port: U 757 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 92 - Brest; U 511 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 61 see paragraph IVa.
2) Situation U 67: No shipping sighted in EE 80. Boat operated on
traffic between EF 82 and EE 65 since 22.10.
918
3) U 518 fired 4 spread miss on destroyer, which was probably picked
up on hydrophones and out maneuvered.
4) U 606 sighted 2 single destroyer masts in AK 0377, and presumed an
A/S patrol.
5) U 516 sank steamer "Holmpark" 5,780 GRT in EF 8331, bound from
Capetown to Trinidad in ballast, course 3000, speed 10 knots.
6) U 161 during night attack on vessels on course 320 in FH 9593 on
24.10. was forced off by destroyer. Destroyer was apparently operating on
200 meter line, and boat presumed traffic to be proceeding close inshore.
7) U 132 in patrol line of Group "Veilchen" reported bearing increasing
in signal strength in BC 2275, and later a number of bearings over whole
scale. Boat heard pistons and turbines passing overhead on two occasions.
Retired in S.E. direction. As no convoy lay in the vicinity according to
own dead reckoning estimations Group "Veilchen" received orders to
continue patrol. U 132 was left free to pursue.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BD 7872, EE 89, BB 52, and one unknown position.
Sightings by aircraft: BF 5965 (depth charge attack, probably 2 hits)
and AF 72.
d) None.
- 55 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 61:
Contact was maintained with short interruptions. 3 further boats joined
operations, U 508, 163 from CE 69 and U 154 from DF 20. According to
dead reckoning boats ought to establish contact in 30- 36 hours. In course
of day following boats made contact with convoy: U 260 - 662 - 620 -
706. U 433 lay far astern and commended patrol. Convoy proceeding in
extended formation, speed 3 - 4 knots, 2 destroyers ahead and stern. U
260 while avoiding a ship proceeding independently in BD 59 (possibly
one of our own) was forced to submerge by destroyer. U 620 attempted to
attack in BD 8982 but was contacted by long-range escort ahead and
heavily depth charged. Convoy steered course of roughly 2250 sharply
zigzagging, speed 10 - 11 knots. At 1600 position CE 1123 and at 0130
CD 3397. One after another submarines were forced off, and towards
0200 contact was finally lost and not regained by morning. No successes
were scored. Operation continues. Boats operating on this convoy were
formed into Group "Südwärts".
b) 1) New attack areas for U 520 and U 521 - BB 30 and 60 and BC 10
and 40, left third. Focal point for U 521 Conception Bay and U 520 off
coast BB 6620.
2) Group "Streitaxt" at 1600 on 25.10. lay in order of succession as
follows: U 510 - 203 - 409 - 509 - 659 - 134 - 604 and 572.
Reconnaissance line from DH 4714 to 7526, course 1800, day's run 170
miles.
c) Following completed refueling from U 463: U 620 - 382 - 260 and
662.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 516 1 ship 5,780 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
25.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 175 - BF 75 U 438 - Op(AJ 80) U 572 - DH 81
67 - Op(EE) 177 - FU 28 440 - CF 34 575 - Op(AK 90)
68 - Op(GR) 178 - Op(GQ) 441 - Op(AK 90) 590 - Op(ET)
919
69 - BD 48 179 - Op(GR) 442 - BD 57 599 - BF 64
71 - Op(AJ 80) 181 - FV 74 443 - BD 34 602 - Op(AK 90)
84 - Op(AJ 80) 183 - Op(AH 90) 454 - Op(BC 20) 604 - DH 57
87 - Op(ET) 184 - AN 31 455 - BF 45 606 - AK 62
89 - Op(AJ 80) 201 - BF 72 459 - DG 61 608 - BF 91
92 - BF 15 202 - BF 52 462 - CF 73 610 - BD 66
98 - BF 72 203 - DH 49 463 - BD 57 613 - AN 31
103 - BE 92 216 - BF 504 - Op(GR) 615 - BE 43
106 - Op(BB) 224 - AE 86 505 - EF 86 618 - BF 57
107 - Op(ET) 258 - BF 49 506 - DG 62 620 - CD 38
125 - DT 19 260 - CD 38 508 - CE 81 621 - Op(AK 90)
126 - Op(FP) 301 - CD 31 509 - DH 57 624 - Op(AK 59)
128 - Op(ET) 332 - Op(EE) 510 - DH 49 627 - AF 85
129 - Op(EE) 356 - BD 57 511 - BF 55 658 - Op(AJ 80)
132 - Op(BC) 381 - Op(AJ 80) 514 - DR 57 659 - DH 81
- 56 -
134 - DH 58 382 - BE 47 516 - EF 66 662 - CD 39
154 - CB 86 383 - AE 83 518 - Op(AH 90) 664 - AF 76
156 - DT 97 402 - Op(AJ 80) 519 - AE 83 704 - Op(AJ 80)
159 - Op(GQ) 409 - DH 73 520 - AJ 47 706 - BD 78
160 - Op(EO) 410 - BF 57 521 - AJ 54 752 - BF 73
161 - Op(FP) 412 - AE 83 522 - AK 73 753 - Op(AK 90)
163 - CE 49 413 - Kristiansand 552 - Op(ET) D 5 - ES 32
172 - Op(GR) 436 - Op(AK 90) 563 - Op(AK 90)
 174 - EH 66 437 - BD 57 571 - Op(BC 21) Plan to continue operation until daylight and if no contact made by then, to
break off.

On Return Passage: U 69 - 125 - 175 - 201 - 202 - 216 - 258 - 356 - 382 - 57 -
- 410 - 455 - 459 - 506 - 514 - 516 - 599 - 610 - 615 - 618 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 202 - Brest.
Sailed: U 218 - Brest; U 108 - Lorient.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) Situation reports:
U 590 in ET 2187 - no shipping.
U 156 on look out for E.W.-bound traffic in ES 26.
U 172 nothing sighted from GR 27 via 81, 42, 12 to GJ 81 - 88. Port
Nolloth empty.
U 68 fired 2 spread which missed for reason not apparent on freighter
of 5,000 GRT on course of 55. In very good visibility west of Capetown
to GJ 72 nothing sighted.
U 174 plans operating in FE 11 and finally ET 73.
2) Convoy No. 61 see paragraph IVa.
3) U 383 sank Icelander of 1,500 GRT in AE 8449 on 24.10.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 34 - BA 36 - EO 51 - EO 1147 - EO 8410.
Aircraft reported submarine in BF 5534.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 61:
As up to date no contact had been made with enemy, boats were asked
for reports of last position of convoy. According to this U 662 had contact
at 0130 in CD 3397 and U 301 at 0200 in CD 3379. Working on this last
position boats received orders to steer on searching courses between 180
and 2200 in following sequence: U 620 - 662 - 260 - 301 - 154. Presumed
speed of convoy 8 - 11 knots. Convoy remained uncontacted however.
920
b) 1) Group "Veilchen" was warned of expected passage of east bound
convoy. U 704 sighted sea plane inside patrol area in AJ 8811. U 132
reported destroyer in BC 2239, which later turned out to be ship sailing
independently on general course 200.
2) According to Radio Intercept report on ON(S) convoy should be in
position AL 2814 at 2100 on 22.10 course 2400, speed 6 knots. It is
possible that destroyer masts sighted on previous day belonged to this
convoy. For the purpose of contacting same, Group "Puma" including the
two boats short of fuel U 575 and U 753 received orders to take up patrol
line between AK 5517 and 8379 with all speed. U 606 to operate
independently. Plan was to pick up convoy by this patrol line. As
however, 2 of the boats U 436 and 563 were not able to take up position
immediately, Group proceeded on reconnaissance line at 2400 and took up
patrol line between AK 4687 and 8459 as from 1100/26/10. U 436 and
563 were also able to reach this line. Convoy was expected to pass shortly
after dawn. U 606 joined patrol line to the north.
3) Group "Streitaxt":
U 510 sighted passenger steamer in DH 4573 on northerly course,
speed 16 knots ("California" class). Boat pursued steamer as far as DH
1181 without success and then returned to patrol line. U 659 was forced to
submerge by two destroyers and was depth charged.
At 2115 U 203 reported 3 steamers on easterly course in DH 4788. As
the sighting was exactly on a level with patrol line the whole of Group
"Streitaxt" was put on to it. U 203 attacked enemy in DH 4791, consisting
of one tanker and 2 destroyers, and was forced to submerge by destroyer.
Broke off pursuit later on account of damaged diesels. Group was ordered - 58 -
to continue operations as long as possibility of success existed. Boats
which broke off pursuit were for the time being to take up 0800 position of
reconnaissance line as patrol line.
c) Following refueled from U 463: U 610 - 442 - 437 and 356.
d) None.

V. Reports of Success:
U 383 1 ship 1,500 GRT.

128 - Op(ET) 332 - Op(EE) 510 - DH 11 627 - AE 79

---------------------------------------------------
---------------
26.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BA) U 174 - ER 33 U 437 - BD 57 U 571 - Op(BC 20)
67 - Op(EE) 175 - BF 82 438 - Op(AJ 80) 572 - DH 81
68 - Op(GH) 177 - FU 92 440 - CF 56 575 - Op(AK 50)
69 - BD 57 178 - Op(GQ) 441 - Op(AK 50) 590 - Op(ET)
71 - Op(AJ) 179 - Op(GR) 442 - BD 57 599 - BE 66
84 - Op(AJ 80) 181 - GG 34 443 - Op(AK 80) 602 - Op(AK 80)
87 - Op(ET) 183 - Op(AH 90) 454 - Op(BC 20) 604 - DH 81
89 - Op(AJ 80) 184 - AN 24 455 - BF 57 606 - Op(AK)
92 - BF 49 201 - BF 52 459 - DG 32 608 - BE 56
98 - BF 68 203 - DH 71 462 - DG 32 610 - BE 45
103 - CF 61 216 - BF 463 - BD 57 613 - AN 23
106 - Op(BB) 218 - BF 54 504 - Op(GR) 615 - BE 55
107 - Op(ET) 224 - AE 85 505 - Op(EF) 618 - BF 64
108 - BF 55 258 - BF 91 506 - DG 32 620 - Op(CD 90)
125 - DT 12 260 - Op(CD) 508 - Op(CD) 621 - Op(AK 50)
126 - Op(FP) 301 - Op(CD) 509 - DH 72 624 - Op(AK 50)
129 - Op(EE) 356 - BD 67 511 - BF 46 658 - Op(AJ 80)
132 - Op(BC) 381 - Op(AJ) 514 - DR 37 659 - DH 73
134 - DH 74 382 - BE 49 516 - EG 42 662 - Op(CD)
154 - Op(CD) 383 - AE 85 518 - Op(AH 90) 664 - AF 48
156 - ES 26 402 - Op(AJ 80) 519 - AE 84 704 - Op(AJ 80)
159 - Op(GQ) 409 - DH 72 520 - AJ 74 706 - BD 81
160 - Op(EE) 410 - BF 58 521 - AJ 73 752 - BF 74
161 - Op(FP) 412 - AE 85 522 - AK 74 753 - Op(AK 80)
163 - Op(CD) 413 - AN 36 552 - Op(ET) D 5 - EJ 94
172 - Op(GR) 436 - Op(AK) 563 - Op(AK)
On Return Passage: U 125 - 156 - 175 - 201 - 216 - 258 - 301 - 356 -
382 - 410 - 455 - 459 - 506 - 514 - 516 - 599 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 753 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 201 - Brest
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 61 see final survey paragraph VI.
2) Convoy No. 62 see paragraph IVa.

921
 3) U 260 reported armed 2-funneller on course 700 and speed 13 knots
in CD 6857 Route A. As some of our own ships lay in the vicinity and
there was a possibility of 2-funnel camouflage, order was given to break
off pursuit.
4) In BE 4929 U 608 sighted American battleship with destroyer escort
course 2400, medium speed. Contact was almost immediately lost
apparently.
5) U 606 reports English periscope in AK 4664 (boat operating on
Convoy No. 61).
6) With short signal U 224 reported enemy in sight in AK 3622 was
probably forced to submerge at once since no further message was
received.
7) In BB 6396 U 520 came on brightly illuminated ship sailing
independently, course 800, speed 8 knots. As it could only have been Irish
ship boat ordered not to attack if ship could be distinguished as enemy in
spite illumination.
8) On 23.10. U 504 sank City of Johannesburg" 5,662 GRT in KZ 1972,
course 2800.
On 26.10. 3 mast passenger freighter 12,000 GRT course 2300, speed
14 knots.
9) Situation U 167: Sighted patrol vessel in EU 4832 on 23.10. and
Spanish ship in 4720 on course 300.
On 24.10. dummy warship in ET 6920 on course 1100, speed 12 knots
was observed during attack.
In middle and southern third of ET 60 as well as EU 4748 nothing
sighted. Return passage.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: Submarine sighted in GA 36 (not one of our own)
Aircraft reported submarines in BF 5530 and BF 7211.
- 59 -
922
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 62:
U 436 reported convoy in AK 8116 at 2100 on N.E. course. Boat was
roughly in center position of Group "Puma" patrol line. With wind N.W. 7
and medium swell, it was possible that all boats of the group would have
come up by daylight. Contact was maintained with interruptions at
irregular intervals. At 0252 convoy was in AK 5849 and at 0752 in AK
5942. Convoy was proceeding in double line abreast with 5 destroyers in
semi-circle ahead. 16 vessels sighted, speed 8 - 9 knots according to D/R.
U 443 and U 575 asked for bearings. U 621 was only boat to maintain
contact. No attack was made. Operation continues. U 224 and 384 also
to operate on convoy providing they had no enemy contact of their own.
b) 1) U 103 and 440 commenced southward passage via DT 60 and ET.
2) Group "Streitaxt" proceeded in former sequence at 0800/27/10 from
narrow patrol line between DH 7428 to 8419, S. course, day's run 170
miles.
3) New position for U 383 - 627 - 224 and 412 - AK 64. Join up with
Group "Puma" in view.
4) Op. area for U 174 a 400 mile wide strip along Brazilian coast.
Western boundary 390 W., southern 100 S. Attention drawn to
convergence of Capetown - Trinidad traffic in FE 50.
5) Group "Südwärts" broke off operations against Convoy No. 61. U
301 commenced return passage without refueling. Position for U 508 - 163
and 154 ED 98. U 620 in waters of Huelva. (See War Diary of 27.10) U
260 and 662 operating off Ponta Delgada, (Trans. note: Horta Delgada?)
U 260 in the west and U 662 in the east.
c) 1) U 506 and U 69 completed refueling from U 462 and 463.
2) Refueling arranged for in DS for U 504 and U 159 operating in
Capetown area (about 30 - 40 cbm).
 d) In order to provide wing protection for 3 returning ships, which are
due to cross line of longitude 220 W. early on the 29th at one day's
distance following positions to be temporarily occupied: U 92 - BE 55, U
218 - BE 65, U 752 - BE 87; U 356 and 664 return passage on 440 N.
V. Reports of Success:
U 504 2 ships 17,669 GRT.
VI. General:
Final survey of Convoy No. 61:
Convoy was sighted at 1630/22/10 by U 443 in BD 3255. Contact was
lost at 2200 after attack had been made. Convoy was sighted by U 706
(refueling from sub. tanker U 462) on 23.10. in BD 5879 on same course
as convoy sighted and reported on previous day. Could not have been
identical one, as to get to second position convoy must have traveled at a
speed of 15 knots. It must therefore be presumed they were two different
convoys i.e.
- 60 -
a) Convoy sighted by U 443 ON 139
b) Convoy " " U 706 convoy with unknown destiny.
This conclusion was confirmed by Radio Intercept report of 25.10.
according to which position of ON 139 should have been BD 5633 at
1600/23/10. Comparison of two positions BD 3255 and BD 5633 gives
923
estimated speed of 9 knots, which ties up with speed reported by U 443
and speed of an ON convoy.
Comparison between positions of convoy under b) and that of an OS
convoy (reliable statement made by navigation officer of "Laconia" sunk
by U 156) on OS convoy route shows striking conformity of an American-
bound convoy diverging so far to the south (apart from 2 very fast TA
convoys) and on the other, conformed so closely to route of OS convoy,
one was forced to conclude this to be an OS convoy (route AM 4437, BD
8159, DF 6927). According to this, on loss of contact, searching
operations should have been ordered on southerly direction. As only 4
boats were available for this total sector of search was 180 - 2200 and
precluded and search in westerly direction.
That the convoy was not found was no proof that this was not an OS
convoy. A small evasive action to east or west, a decrease of speed for just
a few hours would have sufficed to bring about total loss of contact with
the number of submarines so small. It is concluded as before that this was
a south-bound convoy.
Results of the operation were unsatisfactory. In spite of favorable
weather conditions and clear visibility no hit was scored. The very calm
sea made it more difficult and it was to be concluded that the 4 boats, all of
them on their first war cruise, were not equal to a submerged attack under
a smooth surface and the attendant good locating conditions.
Loss of contact is all the more regrettable since neither air nor sea patrol
had to be reckoned with, and a further 3 other boats U 508, U 154 and U
163 were expected to make contact on the 26th.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
27.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BA) U 174 - ER 39 U 438 - Op(AJ 80) U 572 - DH 84-
Op
67 - Op(EE) 175 - BF 55 440 - CF 86 575 - Op(AK 80)
68 - Op(GR) 177 - FV 77 441 - Op(AK 40) 590 - Op(ET)
 69 - BD 68 178 - Op(JJ) 442 - BC 38 599 - BF 48
71 - Op(AJ 80) 179 - Op(GR) 443 - Op(AK 80) 602 - Op(AK 80
84 - Op(AJ 80) 181 - CG 63 454 - BC 20 604 - Op(DM 70)
87 - Op(ET) 183 - Op(AH 90) 455 - BF 58 606 - Op(AK 55)
89 - Op(AK 80) 184 - AN 24 459 - DG 33 608 - BE 72
92 - BF 47 203 - Op(DH 70) 462 - DG 35 610 - BE 54
98 - BE 59 216 - BF 463 - BD 57 613 - AF 76
103 - CF 83 218 - BF 46 564 - Op(KZ) 615 - BE 64
106 - Op(BD) 224 - AK 36 505 - Op(EE) 618 - BF 64
107 - Op(ET) 258 - BF 68 506 - DG 33 620 - CE 71
108 - BF 48 260 - CD 47 508 - DF 21 621 - Op(AK)
125 - DG 38 301 - CD 66 509 - Op(DH 70) 624 - Op(AK 40)
126 - Op(FP) 332 - Op(EE) 510 - Op(DH) 627 - AL 14
128 - Op(ET) 356 - BE 47 511 - BF 47 658 - Op(AJ 80)
129 - Op(EE) 381 - Op(AJ 80) 514 - DR 33 659 - Op(DH 70)
132 - Op(BC 20) 382 - BE 59 516 - EG 25 662 - Op(CD)
134 - Op(DH 70) 383 - AK 30 518 - Op(AH 90) 664 - AE 59
154 - DF 88 402 - Op(AJ 80) 519 - AL 22 704 - Op(AJ 80)
156 - Op(ES) 409 - Op(DH 70) 520 - Op(BB) 706 - BD 57
159 - Op(GQ) 410 - BF 64 521 - AJ 78 752 - BE 98
- 61 -
160 - Op(EE) 412 - AL 22 522 - AJ 97 753 - Op(AK 80)
161 - Op(FH) 413 - AN 36 552 - Op(ET) D 5 - EJ 57
163 - CD 79 436 - Op(AK 56) 563 - Op(AK 86)
924
172 - Op(GR) 437 - BC 39 571 - Op(BC 20)
On Return Passage: U 69 - 107 - 125 - 156 - 175 - 216 - 258 - 301 - 382
- 410 - 455 - 459 - 506 - 514 - 516 - 599 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 706 - 753 - D
5.
Entered Port: U 175 - Lorient; U 258 - La Pallice; U 618 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 653 - 564 - Brest; U 185 - 263 - Kiel; U 184 - Bergen.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy Nos. 62 and 63 see paragraph IVa.
2) At 0325/27 U 627 sighted convoy in AL 2559 on E. course and low
speed. By comparison with enemy report from U 224 on 26.7. and an
earlier intercept radio report this would seem to be an SC-convoy, one part
bound for Reykjavik (compare report from U 224 on 27.10. Boat pursued
same as far as AK 3467 and was then forced off).
3) U 134 chased single ship on general N.E. course in DH 7650, which
was later reported as sunk in DH 8574 by U 604 (7,705 ton tanker).
4) During attack on freighter of 5,000 GRT course 3000, speed 10 knots,
U 67 was rammed. Beforehand boat scored two hits and sank the ship
entirely during the night. One pistol failure and one electric torpedo
explosion while underway. One sailor killed by explosion caused while
opening upper deck container. Moved off in order to repair damage.
5) U 154 sighted probable enemy submarine in DF 1374 on westerly
course (could have been friendly).
6) U 128 sighted nothing in EO 70 and in 73 - 81 over period of several
days.
Also no traffic sighted by U 160 from EO 25 via EE 68, 59, 55 and 72,
and U 590 in sector off Freetown. On return passage on account of fuel
supply.
27.7 active air patrol in ET 29 upper half.
7) U 183 reported on emergency transmitter: for 10 days stationed off
northern exit to Belle-Isle-Straits - completely dead area. Straits
presumably mined.
 b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AK 65, DC 1198, EH 9560, AK 6728, DD 4597.
English aircraft reported submarine in AL 1499 and AL 2527.
SSS report from British tanker "Anglo Maersk" (7,705 GRT) in DH
8443 (U 604).
2 further torpedoing reports from unknown positions, probably Convoy
No. 62.
d) None.
- 62 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 62:
U 224 and 383 reported also operating on convoy. Total number of
boats was therefore 11, 2 of which had to commence return passage during
the day on account of fuel shortage (U 575 and U 753). Contact was
maintained by U 436. Convoy steering on general easterly course. The
bearings which were continuously transmitted by boat were unfortunately
not heard by others lying in the vicinity, probably on account of the bad
weather (N.W. 7). The following boats requested bearings: U 443 - 441 -
624 - 563 - 602. Only U 602 and U 383 made contact, in AK 5695 and
AK 5960 respectively. In spite of bad weather 2 boats made successful
attacks. The first submerged attack made by U 436 in AK 5952 was foiled
by a sharp zigzag. In a second attack boat fired 5 single shots and
observed 4 hits. 2 steamers sank at once, on an ammunition ship. Position
AK 6725. U 621 reported 2 probable hits in AK 6733. A number of other
boats were observed by destroyers first and forced off. Convoy steered
AK 5838 - 5928 - 6724 - 6499 and at 0800 according to D/R lay in AK
925
6582. Large differences in D/R estimations among the boats were
unavoidable on account of bad weather. Operation continues.
2) Convoy No. 63:
At 0928 U 409 reported mastheads in DH 7530 and shortly afterwards
convoy on N.E. course with low to medium speed. Weather: N.N.W. 2,
good visibility, brief showers of rain. Group "Streitaxt" on reconnaissance
line to southward was ordered to operate. U 409 shadowed until 1708 and
was then relieved by U 203, which continued to report convoy positions
with short irregular interruptions. Apart from this U 659 made contact at
2305 and U 509 at 0750. 3 other boats were operating on tanker reported
by U 134 and sunk by U 604, and would not arrive until day of 28.10. U
409 intended to attack in DH 7269, but was apparently forced to retire. In
DH 4987 U 203 fired 4 spread miss on 3 steamers overlapping one
another. On account of bright moonlight he decided not to renew attack
until daylight. Convoy was probably SL, proceeding close inshore on
general course of 300, and embraced a number of ships possibly destined
for Gibraltar. Positions were: 1440 : DH 7294, 2302 : 4987 and 0700 :
7694. Pursuit of convoy continues.
b) 1) U 442 and 437 joined Group "Veilchen" and occupy positions BC
2528 and 2567 in order to lengthen patrol line.
2) Position for U 98 : AK 92, for U 108 : ED 99.
3) U 511 commenced southward passage via D 770. Operation off
Brazilian coast in view.
4) U 462 en route for DS 58 as next refueling place.
5) U 67 detailed to EE 68 as attack area.
6) Contrary to previous order U 620 to operate in new operations area
off Lisbon and southwards. Attention drawn to special focal points of
traffic.
c) U 462 supplied following boats with fuel: U 459 : 26 cbm; U 506 : 30
cbm; U 125 : 37 cbm. Own reserves 610 cbm fuel oil and 184 days'
provisions.
- 63 -

d) U 216 has not reported in spite of repeated calls. According to D/R
and last position report it should have entered port 2 days ago. According
to Radio Intercept report of 20.10. an English aircraft attacked a submarine
in BE 2797 and scored 6 probable hits. This could only have been U 216
as there was no other boat in the vicinity. Loss must be reckoned with.
V. Reports of Success:
U 67 1 ship 5,000 GRT sunk
U 621 2 hits probable
U 436 4 ships 25,000 GRT sunk
U 604 1 ship 7,705 GRT sunk.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
28.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BA) U 177 - GG 34 U 442 - Op(BC 20) U 599 - BF 54
67 - Op(EE 66) 178 - Op(JJ) 443 - Op(AK 62) 602 - Op(AK 68)
68 - Op(GH) 179 - Op(GR) 454 - Op(BC 20) 604 - Op(DH 58)
69 - BE 48 181 - GH 49 455 - BF 64 606 - Op(AK 60)
71 - Op(AJ 80) 183 - Op(AH 99) 459 - CF 81 608 - BD 92
84 - Op(AJ 80) 185 - AO 462 - DG 62 610 - BE 64
87 - Op(ET) 203 - Op(DH 45) 463 - BD 57 613 - AF 47
89 - Op(AJ 80) 218 - BF 44 504 - Op 615 - BF 47
92 - BE 68 224 - Op(AK 63) 505 - Op(EE) 620 - CE 57
98 - BE 42 260 - CE 57 506 - CF 58 621 - Op(AK 63)
926
103 - CF 88 263 - AO 508 - DF 18 624 - Op(AK 60)
106 - Op(BB) 301 - CE 42 509 - Op(DH 54) 627 - AL 20
107 - ET 19 332 - Op(EE) 510 - Op(DH 40) 653 - BF 55
108 - BF 93 356 - BE 49 511 - BE 92 658 - Op(AJ 80)
125 - DG 38 381 - Op(AJ 80) 514 - DR 96 659 - Op(DH 40)
126 - Op(EP) 382 - BE 68 516 - DR 98 662 - CE 71
128 - Op(EU 81) 383 - Op(AK 65) 518 - Op(AH 90) 664 - AE 67
129 - Op(EE) 402 - Op(AJ 80) 519 - AM 10 704 - Op(AJ 80)
132 - Op(BC 20) 409 - Op(DH 58) 520 - Op(BD 60) 706 - BD 57
134 - Op(DH 55) 410 - BF 521 - Op(BB) 752 - BE 89
154 - DF 15 412 - AL 18 522 - BC 24 753 - Op(AK 60)
156 - Op(ES) 413 - AN 29 552 - Op(ET) D 5 - EJ 43
159 - Op(GQ) 436 - Op(AK 65) 563 - Op(AK 65)
160 - Op(EE 72) 437 - Op(BC 37) 564 - BF 54
161 - Op(FH) 438 - Op(AJ 80) 571 - Op(BC 20)
163 - DE 36 440 - DH 13 572 - Op(DH 40)
172 - Op(GR) 441 - Op(AK 65) 575 - BD 23
174 - ER 68 590 - Op(ET)
On Return Passage: U 107 - 69 - 125 - 156 - 301 - 382 - 455 - 459 - 506
- 514 - 516 - 599 - 610 - 615 - 706 - 753 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 566 - Brest
Sailed: U 410 - 455 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy Nos. 62 and 63 see paragraph IVa.
- 64 -

2) On 23.10. U 126 sighted Portuguese ship entering port off Banana
and on 25.10. a 2 funnel steamer flying flag close inshore. During day
boat operated within sight of the coast and at night at mouth of estuary.
3) U 159 sighted nothing since 18.10. from GQ 60 - JJ 21. Plans
passage to KZ 41 and GR 57 by new moon. Heavy north and southwest
storms since 13.10.
b) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 62:
Contact was maintained with interruptions. 1130 U 602 reported
convoy in AK 6569, course 700, speed 8 - 9 knots. Weather N.N.W. 6,
changing visibility. In course of day following boats came up to convoy:
U 443 - 606 - 624 - 441 - 436. At 1630 in AK 6663 air patrol was reported
for first time, and occasionally carrier-borne aircraft. After this boats were
often forced to retire and submerge. Individual reports from boats. At
0806 U 563 fired spread which missed in AK 6582 and was forced to
submerge by destroyer. Operated later on single ship in direction of
convoy. U 606 sank steamer of 6,000 GRT and scored further hit on
12,000 tonner. Explosion and large large tongue of flame observed. Ship
burned for 2 hours and then probably sank. After burning of tanker U 624
was forced to submerge by destroyer. At 1509 convoy lay in AK 6627 and
finally steered easterly course. Last of all U 624 reported same at 0554 in
AL 5443. After this contact was lost and by morning had not been
regained. It is intended to break off operation next day on account of
vicinity of coast and strong air patrol.
2) Convoy No. 63:
Contact was maintained by U 203 who reported convoy in DH 4691 at
0947 on course 450. Some 11 - 15 steamers were sighted. Following
boats came up to convoy: U 409 - 1252; U 659 - 1414; U 509 - 1703.
Contact was temporarily lost on account of gusts of rain and bad visibility.
Boats were ordered to continue search on N. and N.E. courses. At 2259 U
927
510 reported flares over convoy in DH 5155. U 604 managed to re-
establish contact by this, but incorrectly omitted to report same. Boat was
forced off about 0430. At this time convoy was steering on N.E. course in
DH 5131, speed 7 knots. Weather N.W. 5 - 6, showers, medium visibility.
Varying D/R estimations from boats gave rise to suspicion that convoy had
split up into a number of smaller groups, but this was not confirmed.
During day U 203 made several attempts to attack but was not successful.
With U 103 and U 440, which had approached convoy from the north,
total number of boats operating were now 10. Operation continues.
According to Radio Intercept reports just received, boats seem to have
achieved some success. No reports have yet been received.
3) U 552 in previous position of U 107 off Freetown (S. sector). U 552
detailed to operation area N. of 410 N. and W. of 590 30' W focal point off
Halifax. Attention drawn to traffic situation.
According to report from Commander of U 217, operations by 1 - 2
boats off Curacao and Aruba during new moon period promise success. U
129 will therefore take up position in EC 96 with waning moon, focal
points off Curacao. Free to fire on oil installations. If no
- 65 -
traffic met with, there operation in Aruba area on cargo traffic from
Maracaibo. U 154 operating in same area. Route via Mona Passage.
c) None.
d) U 599 has not yet made message concerning entry into port which is
now several days overdue. According to Radio Intercept report of 24.10. a
submarine was attacked by English aircraft in BE 5965 and bombed.
Aircraft presumed 2 hits. According to dead reckoning this must have 161 - Op(FH) 438 - Op(AJ 80) 571 - Op(BC 20)
been U 599. Loss must be reckoned with. 163 - DE 62 440 - Op(DH 54) 572 - Op(DH 20)
172 - Op(GR) 441 - Op(AL 54) 575 - BD 29
V. Reports of Success:
U 606 2 ships 18,000 GRT.
On Return Passage: U 69 - 107 - 125 - 156 - 301 - 356 - 382 - 459 - 506
--------------------------------------------------- - 514 - 516 - 575 - 590 - 602 - 610 - 615 - 621 - 706 - 753 - D 5.
--------------- Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 130 - Lorient; U 465 - Kiel.
29.October 1942.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

I. U 43 - Op(BA) U 174 - ER 86 U 442 - Op(BC 20) U 590 - ET 12 - 66 -

67 - Op(EE) 177 - GH 41 443 - Op(AL 51) 602 - Op(AL 47)
68 - Op(GH) 178 - Op(JJ) 454 - Op(BC 20) 604 - Op(DH 20)
69 - BE 84 179 - Op(GR) 459 - CF 55 606 - Op(AL 52)
71 - Op(AJ 80) 181 - CH 85 462 - DG 86 608 - BD 83
84 - Op(AJ 80) 183 - Op(AH 90) 463 - BD 57 610 - BE 69
87 - Op(ET) 185 - AN 36 504 - Op(KZ) 613 - AE 83
89 - Op(AJ 80) 203 - Op(DH 28) 505 - Op(EE) 615 - BF 92
92 - BE 92 218 - BE 65 506 - CF 53 620 - CE 87
98 - BD 36 224 - Op(AL 55) 508 - DE 66 621 - AL 81
103 - Op(DH 24) 260 - CE 67 509 - Op(DH 16) 624 - Op(AL 54) III. Reports on the Enemy:
106 - Op(BB) 263 - AN 36 510 - Op(DH 16) 627 - Op(AL 40) a) 1) Convoy Nos. 62 and 63 see paragraph IVa.
107 - ES 33 301 - CE 28 511 - CF 31 653 - BF 46 2) U 437 stationary in S. position of Group "Veilchen" patrol line,
108 - BE 94 332 - Op(EF) 514 - DG 48 658 - Op(AJ 80) sighted convoy at 1914 in BC 2591, on S.W. course. As an operation of
125 - CF 84 356 - BE 85 516 - DS 71 659 - Op(DH 29) group to the southwest did not seem worth while on account of vicinity of
126 - Op(FP) 381 - Op(AJ 80) 518 - Op(AH 90) 662 - CE 67 coast, it was ordered to remain on patrol line. U 437 was left free to
128 - Op(ET) 382 - BF 47 519 - AM 10 664 - AE 85 pursue convoy.
129 - Op(EE) 383 - Op(AL 54) 520 - Op(BB) 704 - Op(AJ 80) 3) U 575 reported single ship in BD 2932 on N.E. course and sank same
132 - Op(BC 20) 402 - Op(AJ 80) 521 - Op(BB) 706 - BD 57 about 0100. Short signals report 5,000 GRT.
134 - Op(DH 20) 409 - Op(DH 19) 522 - BC 42 752 - BE 87 4) Destroyers were sighted by: U 752 in BF 87 on course 2200. U 463
154 - DE 66 412 - AL 50 552 - Op(ET) 753 - BD 26 in BD 8313 on course 2700, U 624 in AL 5481 on course 900.
156 - Op(ES) 413 - AF 87 563 - Op(AL 51) D 5 - EJ 11 5) U 87 commenced return passage on account of short fuel supply.
159 - Op(JJ 21) 436 - Op(AL 54) 564 - BF 46 Sighted dummy warship reported on 28.10. again. Nothing in ET 53.
160 - Op(EE) 437 - Op(BC 20) 566 - BF 55
928
 6) steamer "Ross" 4,978 GRT on return passage sank British ship
"Primrose Hill" 7,600 GRT in DS 9835, course 1500, carrying aircraft
from England to Freetown.
7) U 129 sank American ship "Westkebar" 5,620 GRT in ET 6413
carrying Manganese ore from Tokoradi to New York. According to
statement of Captain 5 - 6 ships leave Tokoradi every day for England or
N. America via Freetown. Captain receives no sailing orders.
8) U 159 sank steamer "Ross" 4,978 GRT on 29.10. in JJ 2511 and
steamer "La Place" 7,327 GRT in JJ 2795 on course 1800.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 66, JJ 43, AL 5410, AL 4529.
Submarine warning: JJ 1857.
Torpedoing report: English ship "La Place" in JJ 27.
U-boat attack: ED 2583.
SSS report from British freighter in AL 4529.
According to a broadcast a German submarine is supposed to have been
sunk by gun fire by a Brazilian steamer "Pio Branco" off San-Vicente
about 2 months ago. No conformation of this.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 62:
As for the present no further contact reports were received, operation
to be broken off at daylight. Boats then still in favorable position for
attack to make the most of opportunity. U 441 - 563 - 443 to commence
return passage on account of fuel supply. Rest of the boats to make for AK
90. At 0830 U 624 lost sight of convoy in AL 5459, course 700, speed 5
knots. Pursuit impossible on account of weather. Boat fired 5 single
shots, scoring one hit on tanker of "Vestfold" type, and one probable hit on
5,000 ton tanker. Loss of "Vestfold" probable on account of fire. At 0620
sank straggler of 4,000 GRT. U 443 maintained contact until 1600 in AL
5462. Attack no longer possible on account of heavy sea and shortage of
fuel. On route for new position U 436 sighted single ship and sank it in
AL 5482. Tonnage estimated at
- 67 -
929
7,000 or 8,000 GRT. Operation on Convoy No. 62 then over. It
showed that boats were capable of fighting quite well in fairly heavy
weather and had an easier time with the escort. Successes confirm this. A
total of 9 ships were sunk, making 68,500 GRT and 3 further hits scored.
12 boats were engaged, two of which U 412 and U 627 never came in
contact.
No boat was damaged and none were lost. Loss of U 412 and U 627
certainly did not occur on account of convoy.
2) Convoy No. 63:
After contact had been lost at 0500, U 134 reported convoy again in
DH 2762 at 1300. U 103, 509, 510 and 603 came up to the convoy during
course of day with aid of bearings. Contact was maintained throughout
next day and night in spite of bad weather conditions. N.W. wind and sea
6, visibility variable with heavy showers of rain. General course of enemy
remained 20 - 250. Rate of progress 6 knots. U 604 reported at most 11
ships in convoy. Reported:
1) 1110 - U 203 - freighter of 6,000 GRT sunk.
2) 1033 - U 509 - 2 freighters of 7,000 and 6,500 GRT sunk on 27.10. and
2 freighters of 7,000 and 5,000 GRT sunk on 28.10.
3) 0624/30 - U 509 - 2 ships of 10,000 and 8,000 GRT sunk.
Operation continues as contact is being maintained with convoy in DH
2315.
b) 1) U 183 occupying same area as U 522 (see Diary of 28.10) Boat free
to penetrate St. Lawrence River during new moon period.
 2) As no traffic seen in area off Banana up to date; U 161 and 126
commenced northward passage to operate in waters off Takoradi and
Lagos.
3) Patrol line of Group "Veilchen" removed 40 miles to the S.E. lay new
in old sequence from AJ 8461 - BC 2917.
4) Waiting positions occupied temporarily (see Diary of 26.10.) U 108 -
BE 87; U 564 - BE 55; U 653 - BE 65. The following will be relieved:
U 752 on 30.10., 2000, U 92 at 12/1/11; U 218 at 0800/31/10.
c) 1) U 706 completed refuel from U 463.
2) U 621 took over radar intercept for U 602.
d) U 179 the first IX D 2 boat, was ordered to operate off Capetown.
Last report received from FD 10 on 18.10., after which in spite of repeated
calls no further report was received. A Radio Intercept report states that on
21.9. a German submarine was sighted off Ascension. Boat was probably
sunk off Capetown as according to broadcast some of the crew of a
German submarine landed there. All other boats operating there have
reported up to date so this could only be the crew of U 179. Loss of boat
must be reckoned with.
V. Reports of Success:
U 575 1 ship 5,000 GRT U D 5 1 ship 7,600 GRT
U 129 1 ship 5,620 GRT U 159 2 ships 12,290 GRT.
U 624 1 ship 14,000 GRT
- 68 -
930
U 624 1 ship torpedoed.
U 224 1 ship 4,000 GRT
U 436 1 ship 7,500 GRT
U 203 1 ship 6,000 GRT
U 509 6 ships 45,500 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
30.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BA) U 163 - DE 83 U 440 - Op(DH 20) U 566 - BF 46
67 - Op(EE) 172 - Op(GR) 441 - AL 50 571 - Op(BC 20)
68 - Op(GR) 174 - FC 25 442 - Op(BC 20) 572 - Op(DA)
69 - BE 86 177 - GH 49 443 - AL 50 575 - BD 64
71 - Op(AJ 80) 178 - Op(GR) 454 - Op(BC 20) 590 - EJ 98
84 - Op(AJ 80) 181 - Op(GR) 459 - CF 34 602 - AL 85
87 - Op(ET) 183 - Op(BB 30) 462 - DS 36 604 - Op(CF)
89 - Op(AJ 80) 185 - AN 29 463 - BD 53 606 - AL 47
92 - BE 55 218 - BE 65 504 - Op(KZ) 608 - BD 76
98 - Op(AL) 224 - AL 44 465 - AO 610 - BF 48
103 - Op(DH) 260 - Op(CE) 505 - Op(EE) 613 - AE 84
106 - Op(BB) 263 - AN 31 506 - CF 35 615 - BF 93
107 - EJ 97 301 - CE 34 508 - DE 91 620 - CE 69
108 - BE 98 332 - Op(EE) 509 - Op(CF) 621 - AL 85
125 - CF 59 356 - BE 94 510 - Op(DH) 624 - AL 48
126 - Op(FH) 381 - Op(AJ 80) 511 - CF 29 627 - AL 50
128 - Op(ET) 382 - BF 58 514 - DG 24 653 - BF 44
129 - Op(EE) 383 - AL 71 516 - DS 49 658 - Op(AJ)
130 - BF 55 402 - Op(AJ 80) 518 - Op(AH 90) 659 - Op(DH 20)
132 - Op(BC 20) 409 - Op(DH) 519 - AM 662 - CE 69-Op
134 - Op(CG) 412 - AL 50 520 - Op(BB) 664 - BE 66
203 - Op(DH 20) 413 - AF 87 521 - Op(BB) 704 - Op(AJ 80)
154 - BE 67 436 - AL 48 522 - BC 44 706 - BD 50
 156 - Op(ES) 437 - Op(BC) 552 - Op(ET) 752 - BE 87 6) In reply to question U 402 reported amount of fog in past 6 days as
159 - Op(JJ) 438 - Op(AJ 80) 563 - AL 81 753 - BD 64 25%.
160 - Op(EE) 564 - BF 44 D 5 - DS 68 b) None.
161 - Op(FH) c) U-boat sightings: BC 42, BB 69, BC 21.
SOS sent by unknown ship in CF 9857.
American aircraft attacked submarine with depth charges in unknown
On Return Passage: U 68 - 69 - 87 - 107 - 125 - 156 - 301 - 356 - 382 - position and saw oil bubbles appear on surface.
441 - 443 - 459 - 506 - 514 - 516 - 563 - 575 - 590 - 602 - 610 - 615 - 621 d) None.
- 706 - 753 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 615 - La Pallice IV. Current Operations:
Sailed: - . - a) 1) Convoy No. 63:
With northwesterly wind decreasing and sea strength 4, conditions for
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. attack were unusually good. U 509 and U 604 shadowed convoy for
whole day, in the course of which they managed to bring up all the rest of
III. Reports on the Enemy: the boats except U 134, U 572 and U 440. They all got in an attack.
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 63 and 64 see paragraph IVa. 1) U 409 1 freighter 8,000 GRT sunk
2) U 161 was sighted by aircraft in FH 9141 and forced to submerge. In 2) U 659 2 freighters 17,000 GRT sunk
doing so heard convoy on course 2900, speed 8 knots. 2 spread which 3) U 203 1 freighter (Corinaldo) 7,131 GRT sunk
missed at steamer in FH 5826, course 3250. Phosphorescence gave boat 4) U 604 1 passenger steamer 11,000 GRT sunk
away during attack, and it received flares and depth charges. 1 freighter 5,000 GRT sunk
3) U 174 sank British ship "Marylyn" 4,555 GRT in FC 5125, course 5) U 510 1 freighter 6,000 GRT sunk
3200. 6) U 409 1 freighter 6,500 GRT sunk
4) U 518 has sighted nothing off N. exit of Belle Isle Straits up to date. 1 possible hit
7) U 103 1 tanker 9,000 GRT sunk
- 69 - 1 tanker 6,000 GRT sunk
8) U 659 1 freighter 6,000 GRT sunk.

U 203 was ordered to commence return passage, and U 659 left free to
return, as boat was badly damaged by depth charges.
Boats still operating as follows: U 103 - 409 - 510 - 604 - 134 - 440 -
509 - 572.
2) Convoy No. 64:
At 1624 U 522 sighted convoy in BB 6822 on course 800 and speed 7
knots. Boats ordered to give shadowing reports every two hours. U 520
5) U 437 searched convoy courses between 220 - 2400 convoy was not and U 521 operating with full speed against enemy. Group "Veilchen"
found. Boat returned to patrol line. remained on patrol line for time being as only slight move to the west was
931
possible on account of fog. According to radio intercept convoy probably
steering via BB 6659 and then on course 45. U 522 was forced off by
destroyer at 2140, but attacked and torpedoed it. At 1710 convoy lay in
BB 6924 and at 0503 in BC 4411 by hydrophone bearing. Apart from U
521 which was forced to submerge by destroyer in BC 4185 and picked up
a number of steamers while doing so, no contact was made during night.
Operation continues.
b) 1) U 224 - 436 - 624 - 606 - 383 and U 98 took up patrol line in above
order between AK 6531 and AK 6983 at cruising speed. Boats form
- 70 -
Group "Natter".
2) After leaving waiting position, position for U 92 and U 218 - AK 93.
U 752 proceeding via ET to DT 60. Boat left left to operate on Convoy
No. 63.
3) U 128 and 552 given freedom of action in waters off Freetown.
4) U 177 and U 181 - 2 IXD2 boats fresh from home given freedom of
action in area off Capetown and eastwards to 170 30' E.
c) 1) U 753 completed refuel from U 463.
2) Boats belonging to Group "Veilchen" which are short of fuel to be
supplied in BD 50.
3) In answer to question regarding operational readiness and possible
operation off Dakar, U 500 reported full mechanical readiness, but
provision for only 2 - 3 weeks.
932
U 87 no longer serviceable and on return voyage.
4) U 156 has small inaccessible leak in pressure hull in region of battery
room. Boat only able to dive to shallow depth. On return passage.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 174 1 ship 4,555 GRT U 103 2 ships 15,000 GRT
U 409 1 ship 6,000 GRT U 659 1 ship 6,000 GRT
U 659 2 ships 17,000 GRT U 522 1 destroyer torpedoed.
U 203 1 ship 7,131 GRT
U 604 2 ships 16,000 GRT
U 510 1 ship 6,000 GRT
U 409 1 ship 6,500 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
31.October 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 161 - FH 54 U 438 - Op(AJ 80) U 564 - BE 64
67 - Op(EE) 163 - DE 84 440 - Op(CG 73) 566 - BF 44
68 - GQ 92 172 - Op(GR) 441 - BE 12 571 - Op(BC 20)
69 - BE 95 174 - Op(FC) 442 - Op(BC 20) 572 - CF 90
71 - Op(AJ 80) 177 - Op(GH) 443 - AL 98 575 - BD 67
84 - Op(AJ 80) 178 - Op(GR) 454 - Op(BC 20) 590 - EJ 85
87 - ES 36 181 - Op(GR) 459 - CF 33 602 - BE 15
89 - Op(AJ 80) 183 - Op(BB) 462 - DS 38 604 - Op(CF 94)
92 - BE 55 185 - AF 87 463 - BD 67 606 - Op(AK 69)
98 - AK 96 203 - Op(CF 90) 465 - AN 36 608 - BC 99
103 - Op(CF 96) 218 - BE 65 504 - Op(KZ) 610 - BF 67
106 - Op(BB) 224 - Op(AK 60) 505 - Op(EE) 613 - AL 26
107 - EJ 81 260 - Op(CE 69) 506 - BE 97 620 - CF 57
108 - BE 87 263 - AF 87 508 - BE 88 621 - BE 15
117 - AK 32 301 - CF 12 509 - Op(CF 93) 624 - Op(AK 60)
 125 - CF 61 332 - Op(EE) 510 - Op(CG 74) 627 - AL 50
126 - FH 54 356 - BE 96 511 - CF 54 653 - BE 65
128 - Op(ET) 381 - Op(AJ 80) 514 - DG 23 658 - Op(BC 22)
- 71 -
129 - Op(EE) 382 - BF 58 516 - DS 29 659 - Op(CF 94)
130 - BF 49 383 - Op(AK 60) 518 - Op(AH) 662 - Op(CE)
132 - Op(BC 20) 402 - Op(BC 20) 519 - AL 03 664 - AL 27
134 - Op(CG 48) 409 - Op(CF 93) 520 - Op(BB) 704 - Op(AJ 80)
154 - DE 81 412 - AL 50 521 - Op(BB) 706 - BD 68
156 - Op(EJ 72) 413 - AF 73 522 - Op(BC 44) 752 - CF 26
159 - Op(JJ) 436 - Op(AK 60) 552 - Op(ET) 753 - BD 68
160 - Op(EE 49) 437 - Op(BC 29) 563 - BE 13 D 5 - DS 62
On Return Passage: U 68 - 69 - 87 - 107 - 125 - 156 - 172 - 301 - 441 -
443 - 459 - 506 - 514 - 663 - 575 - 590 - 602 - 610 - 621 - 706 - 753 - D 5
- 516.
Entered Port: U 595 - 86 - Brest.
Sailed: U 610 - 382 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 63 and 64 see paragraph IVa.
933
2) U 443 sighted 2 large steamers and 1 destroyer in AL 9825, course
S.W. speed 14 knots. Boat on return passage.
3) U 43 in BA 30 for 17 days and operated on 2 convoys without
success. Sea escort in cooperation with air on larger scale.
4) U 504 sank "Empire Guiger" 8,000 GRT on 31.10. in KP 9787,
course 900. Ship carrying war material from Durban to Egypt. Also
steamer "Reynolds" 5,113 GRT in KP 9843 on way from Durban to India.
Tanker sighted in KZ 2672 on 29.10. on course 700. Also 2 destroyers in
KZ 2633 course 2200. On 31.10. passenger freighter on course 900,
hunted in vain.
5) U 172 on return passage sank British ship "Aldintong Court" 4,891 in
GP 3211, course 620 bound from Philadelphia to Capetown via Trinidad.
Course steered up- till then FD 3578 - FU 4963 - GP 2442 and from their
according to instructions received on 30.10. course 620 until within 50
miles of coast, and then southerly course to Capetown.
b) Friendly aircraft sighted 2 aircraft carriers at 1115 with 1 cruiser and 3
destroyers on course 1800.
c) U-boat sightings: EO 4310.
English aircraft sighted submarine in AL 3376 and another in unknown
position.
SSS report from English steamer "Aldington Court" in GP 32.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 63:
On morning of 31.10. convoy lay in CF 96 with NNE course and speed
7 knots. Convoy appeared to pass Gibraltar and continued northwards.
With wind dropping from west and sea strength 3 - 4 contact was
maintained by U 604 and U 509. By the afternoon six boats of the group
had come up to the convoy. In the morning U 509 and U 604 had reported
that all that remained of convoy was 4 - 5 ships. In the afternoon.
- 72 -

U 604 reported there were certainly 12. It therefore looked as though
two groups had joined up in the afternoon while up to date very little had
been reported about escort, and also no air patrol seemed to be present,
suddenly from 1800 onwards all boats were driven off by heavy air
activity and large destroyer escort. A number of boats reported aircraft
contacts.
As rest of convoy route lay more and more within range of enemy air
support, operation was broken off at daylight on 1.11. in CF 69. For
further operation of boats see Diary of 1.11. paragraph IV 5)...
In a tough four day battle with convoy under favorable weather
conditions and not too strong an escort 7 boats out of strong groups of 10
attacked successfully and sank a total of 18 ships together 133,131 GRT
without a single loss.
2) Convoy No. 64:
No further report was received of convoy. U 183 ordered to attack if
given favorable opportunity. Group "Veilchen" was established in closer
formation between AJ 7938 and BC 2814, as course of enemy was known
by radio intercept report and it was intended to prevent its running through
patrol lines unnoticed in bad visibility.
b) 1) U 753 given freedom of action in northern section of BD until fuel
supply gives out.
2) U 117 after completion of special duty (minelaying off Reykjavik -
group north) to rejoin Atlantic boats. Proceeding to BD 50 at cruising
speed. Supplying of Group "Veilchen" in view.
3) Boats off Trinidad impressed with necessity of operating closer to
focal point during new moon period. From time to time boats to penetrate
to the S.W. as far as coast.
4) U 664 and 613 joined Group "Natter" and occupy position AK 6286
and 6254, lengthening patrol line.
934
5) New position for U 566 - AK 93, U 130 commenced southward
passage via DT 60.
6) U 518 advised to try and reach BA during new moon period. If no
traffic there as well as in BB 10 - 40, boat to operate off Halifax.
7) On account of situation report U 43 left free to remove to BB.
c) U 519 completed secondary duty 1 (Met Buoy Rockall). U D 5
completed refueling from U 462.
d) U 412 and U 627 were both detailed to operate on Convoy no. 63, but
neither made contact. After close of operation no reports were received in
spite of many calls. It is possible that U 412 was destroyed by English
aircraft on the outward journey, since it had not reported since sailing.
Radio intercept report concerning aircraft attack received. On 27.10 U
627 reported convoy in AL 2559 at 0325 on easterly course and gave chase
after which no further report was received. Loss of both must be reckoned
with.
- 73 -
V. Reports of Success:
U 504 2 ships 13,113 GRT sunk
U 172 1 ship 4,891 GRT sunk.
VI. General:
a) Submarine operation on aircraft carrier formation picked up by
friendly air reconnaissance (strip reconnaissance for homeward bound
blockade runners) was not carried out as further shadowing and
reconnaissance aircraft absolutely necessary for the operation were not
available. The insufficient number of FW 200 at our disposal were no
longer suitable for the task as they are too easily shot down by enemy
fighter aircraft.
The want of aircraft was all the more regrettable since it would have
been possible to put 12 submarines which lay in the area CF against the
formation. Operation was not carried out as it was better to work with
Group "Streitaxt" (10 boats) on convoy bound for England, instead of
operating at a distance of 360 miles on the basis of a single doubtful
reconnaissance report. The presence of HE 177's would have made
continuous shadowing and reconnaissance possible and lead to submarine
operation under cover of current enemy operation.
The fact that on the grounds of insufficient air support it is not possible
to shadow such an important warship formation in our own outer
foreshore, let alone attack it, is extremely regrettable. Making the most of
this weakness the English can sail their heavy forces and convoys
westwards of 130 W without danger, and operate with submarine chaser
units (destroyers, A/S units, sub decoy ships and patrol vessels) in this
area, even as far as 90 W. Out own submarines are not able to operate in
this area on account of strong enemy radar-equipped air patrol. Here once
more an urgent demand: bringing into operation of HE 177's as soon as
possible along Atlantic coast.
b) Operations of submarines off Freetown, Trinidad, and Cape Town in
second half of October brought little success. This is probably due to
removal or alteration of single ship traffic between these ports. In detail as
follows.
Freetown:
In period 1 - 11.10. a total of 7 ships, mostly entering Freetown were
sighted or sunk, and since 12.10. no further sightings reported even though
5 boats were on patrol in this sector. This is the more extraordinary since a
number of agent reports speak of unusually large troop and cargo
transports, and the occupation of Liberia by the U.S.A. It is to be
concluded that the English have at last managed to include this big port to
a large extent in their convoy system, which, after the large number of
sinkings from July 1942 onwards was only to be expected. Attacks on
convoys off Freetown are extremely difficult on account of sea and air
935
patrol, which prevent ant near approach to convoys on account of shallow
depth and unusually calm sea.
Further occupation of this area will depend on sinking successes of the 2
boats still stationed there.
- 74 -
Trinidad: The heavy, mostly incoming traffic of September and
beginning of October has considerably decreased since 11.10. Between
1.10. and 11.10., 12 ships were sunk or sighted E. of harbor and since
12.10. only 7 ships and one convoy. Attack on convoy was not possible on
account of strong air escort and full moon. Very heavy traffic along
Guiana coast has stopped, and routing of single ship traffic removed
further out to sea. After receipt of a few routing instructions (Radio
Intercept Service) via EP 90 and EE 50 boats were transferred to this area
as from 13.10. and here they succeeded in picking up 7 ships.
Capetown:
After sudden big success between 8.10. and 13.10. traffic seemed to dry
up. Heavy storms and bad visibility in period up till about 20.10. were the
cause of absence of further sinkings and reason for present uncertainty on
traffic situation. The boats were given freedom of action, a measure which
in most cases, had led to success when experienced Commanders were
concerned. From course instructions to incoming ships a sector containing
maximum convergence of traffic leaving Capetown (GR 4650, GQ 6390,
GQ 3780) was detailed to boats.
U 68 and 172 operated in sector 240 - 3400 without sighting anything,
so that they finally concluded traffic to be routed along African coast N. of
Capetown. Boats lying S.E. of the port sank a total of 6 ships between 25
and 31.10. and sighted 2 others. Unusual fact was that courses of these
steamers in JJ 10 and 20 lay to S. and S.W.
c) Operations of U 161 and U 128 off mouth of Congo, Banana, Loange,
Cabrinda and Point Noire brought no success. It was established because
a number of reports from German Intelligence Section H.Q. concerning
troop and cargo transports to these ports. These reports of heavy traffic
were not confirmed by boats, so on 29.10. both were ordered to take up
new position in waters off Lagos and Takoradi.
(Signed): DÖNITZ.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 75 -
Submarine Situation on 19.10.
1) Convoys in North Atlantic:
936
a) By means of a long patrol line, we succeeded in picking up 2
westbound convoys which were not sailing far outside the long known
route along the Great Circle. An east-bound convoy also used this well-
known route. There are therefore no fresh reasons for assuming a
spreading of convoy routes.
b) Successes against west-bound convoys were hindered by unusually
bad weather. After initial successes on east-bound convoys, boats for the
first time were hindered to a large extent by radar-equipped destroyers in
temporary good weather. This specially underlines the necessity of getting
an effective torpedo as countermeasure against destroyers as soon as
possible.
c) Enemy air activity was observed in areas where is had up to the
present not been met with. Improved A.A. weapons are on the way. At
the same time Air Forces which can fight in convoy areas must still be
pressed for. Interference from aircraft is the greatest danger to successful
submarine warfare.
d) The extremely bad weather conditions prevailing at the time in the
Atlantic were most unusual. The heaviest storms in the N. Atlantic are in
the months of December and January while October is on the whole a
comparatively favorable month. A removal of now current operations
should have been planned and started back in September. Under ordinary
weather conditions this would have been wrong and will still be wrong in
the future as the development of the weather cannot possibly be forecast so
long ahead. The possibility alone that at some future date bad weather was
to be expected would never justify the decision to leave the N. Atlantic,
the are of heaviest traffic.
Apart from which, a removal of operations to the south is not possible
for the following reasons:
1) In the adjacent southerly areas used by convoys (Gibraltar-England)
convoy attack promises no successes on account of enemy air activity.
2) In the more distant areas (Canaries-Cape Verde) or combined
operation in other areas (for example, Freetown, Trinidad) the sufficient
refueling and supply possibilities for type VII boats are lacking, without
which they cannot operate. Taking into account the long outward and
return passage the economy of such an operation is certainly not greater
than that in the Atlantic.
 3) The infrequent SL convoys at 10 day intervals only justify submarine
operation when, failing the convoy, boats can be refueled and detailed to
waters off Freetown.
e) It has also been tested whether the situation can be improved by
reinforced attacks against east-bound convoys which can be fought during
overpowering westerly weather conditions.
Better weather conditions speak for this, and the possibility of easier
tracking down of convoys.
But these advantages do not outweigh the disadvantages, namely:
1) The dead approach as far as Newfoundland Bank.
2) The fact that in general each boat can only make one convoy
- 76 -
operation on account of fuel limitations, whereas if the first attack is
made in the E. boats will then be able to make an attack first on W. bound
and then E. bound convoys without refueling and under any
circumstances.
2) St. Lawrence River and Belle Isle Straits have brought further
successes. New boats are on the way.
3) North coast of East America: On 20.10. U 608 sailed for mining
operations off New York.
4) Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea:
937
For time being no operations in view. When occasion offers during new
moon period, one of the Trinidad boats will be sent to Aruba-Curacao area
where conditions are not unfavorable according to report of a recently
returned boat.
5) Trinidad:
Continued to pick up spasmodic traffic. 2 fresh boats have arrived. 2
further boats are on the way.
6) North-south convoy route:
SL-convoy was picked up by a group in process of building up off the
Azores consisting of 2 large and 6-8 medium sized boats. Refuel in view
for medium sized boats and later operations off Freetown. These boats are
also prepared for eventuality of operations against Dakar. According to
press reports and observations made by boats (2 American battleships and
transport traffic) this is not an improbability.
7) Gulf of Guinea:
Boats detailed to this area have just arrived. It remains to be seen
whether their successes will confirm reports concerning unloading of
troops and material. If this is the case, it will mean an easing up on the N.
African front, which is ostensibly supplied from here.
8) Capetown:
Initial successes scored here. Along with exploitation of strategic unrest
of the enemy and the possible splitting up of defence forces one must keep
one's eye on the fact whether the sinking successes justify the operation,
since in opinion B.d.U. sinking successes must be valued above all else.
The decrease after beginning can be at least partially explained by the
disproportionately bad weather for the time of the year.
9) Of the two boats destined for the E. coast of Africa, the loss of U 179
(Sobe) must be reckoned with. The second boat is still in Capetown area.
The new operational boundaries include all the S. African ports. Promises
of success judged to be favorable.
10) Of 6 boats destined for the Mediterranean 2 fell out prematurely.
Passing through Gibraltar Straits presented no difficulty, 2 further boats in
view for the next new moon period.
- 77 -
12.10.42.
New York Minelaying orders for U 608.
I. Task:
a) Extensive mining of area "Ambrose". If this is impossible, mining to
be carried out in "Alternative area Ambrose". If no success with latter in
spite of repeated attempts, mining to be completed in "Outer area New
York" (See sketch).
b) Enemy traffic is to be observed beforehand, so that mines can be laid
inside specified area where greatest success can be expected. If
observation is impossible of provides no information, mining to be carried
out around "Ambrose Lightship" and S.W. of it.
c) The commander is, under all circumstances to try with tenacity and
energy to lay the mines as far in as possible where they promise most
success, i.e. in "Ambrose" area. The alternative or outer areas are only to
be mined when all attempts on the inner one have been smashed and
further attempts to mine seem hopeless.
II. Geographical boundaries:
a) Area "Ambrose" lays within following degrees:
938
400 27' N. 730 55' W. 40 30' N. 730 49' W.
400 28' N. 730 45' W. 40 23' N. 730 54' W.
b) "Alternative area Ambrose" is bound on east and south by
circumference of circle whose center is by light bell buoy 2A (400 30' N.
730 65' W.) and on the N.W. by a line from Long Beach (730 41' W.) and
from point on Jersey coast (400 23' N.).
c) "Outer area New York" lies between circles drawn from light bell buoy
2A with radius of 13 and 22 miles respectively.
III. Mine Material: 10 TM C mines.
Settings - Period of effectiveness 60 days, period of delay 2 days,
sensitivity 10 meters, 5 mines set to go off first run over 5 at fourth. 5
mines with red field, 5 with blue field. Mines set to fall to depth between
20 - 33 meters, minimum range 1,000 meters.
IV. a) Map D 455 to be employed.
b) Black and green painted wreck buoy marked 3" in position 400 25.4'
N. 730 52.1 W.
c) See Standing Operational Orders 492 paragraph 2; 495 paragraph 2
"Operational Intelligence for Navigators" 687 - 42: 688 - 42.
d) See Appendix.
V. Reports to be made as soon as possible after mining completed, by short
signal, but at least 50 miles from mined area.
Following code to be used:
LT IQ = Mining of "Ambrose Area" completed.
LT GO = Mining of "Alternative area Ambrose" completed.
LT JR = Mining of "Outer area New York" completed.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 November 1942
PG30313A

1.November 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB 43) U 160 - Op(EE) U 438 - Op(AJ 70) U 564 - BE
55
67 - Op(EE) 161 - FH 16 440 - Op(CF 92) 566 - BE 65
68 - GQ 83 163 - DP 35 441 - BE 27 571 - Op(BC 24)
69 - BF 75 172 - GP 31 442 - Op(BC 20) 572 - Op(CF 99)
71 - Op(AJ 70) 174 - Op(FC) 443 - BE 25 575 - BD 60
84 - Op(AJ 70) 177 - Op(GR) 454 - Op(BC 20) 590 - EJ 46
86 - BF 55 178 - Op(GR) 459 - BE 95 595 - BF 55
87 - EJ 89 181 - Op(GR) 462 - DC 538 602 - BE 27
89 - Op(BC 10) 183 - Op(BC 41) 463 - BD 60 604 - Op(CF 69)
92 - BE 55 185 - AF 73 465 - AO 606 - Op(AK 60)
98 - Op(AK 60) 203 - CF 63 504 - Op(KZ) 608 - CD 13
103 - Op(CF 93) 218 - BE 53 505 - Op(EE) 613 - AL 18
106 - Op(BB 55) 224 - Op(AK 60) 506 - BE 90 620 - CF 59
107 - EJ 45 260 - CE 90-Op 508 - DP 39 621 - BE 27
108 - BE 87 263 - AF 73 509 - Op(CF 95) 624 - Op(AK 60)
117 - AK 38 301 - BE 87 510 - Op(CF 69) 627 - AL
125 - CF 36 332 - Op(EE) 511 - CF 81 653 - BE 65
126 - FH 18 356 - BF 75 514 - CE 96 658 - Op(BC 20)
128 - Op(ET) 381 - Op(BC 20) 516 - DS 38 659 - Op(CF 69)
129 - Op(ED) 383 - Op(AK 60) 518 - Op(AH 90) 662 - Op(CE 90)
130 - BF 71 402 - Op(BC 20) 519 - AL 28 664 - AL 19
132 - Op(BC 20) 409 - Op(CF 99) 520 - Op(BC 16) 704 - Op(AJ 10)
134 - Op(CF 96) 412 - AL 521 - Op(BC) 706 - BE 48
154 - DE 78 413 - AF 47 522 - Op(BC 19) 752 - CF 56
156 - EH 66 436 - Op(AK 60) 552 - Op(ET) 753 - Op(BD 62)
159 - Op(JJ) 437 - Op(BC 20) 563 - BE 28 D 5 - DS 32
939
On Return Passage: U 68 - 69 - 87 - 107 - 125 - 156 - 172 - 203 - 301 -
356 - 409 - 441 - 443 - 459 - 506 - 509 - 514 - 516 - 563 - 575 - 590 - 602
- 604 - 621 - 659 - 706 - 753 - D 5.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 91 - 755 - Brest; U 173 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 64, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 563 reports ship traveling alone in BE 2647 on course 00. Pursuit
was broken off because of excessive use of lubricating oil.
U 463 reports convoy in BD 6815, which steered course 2700 at first
and then changed to 1800.
3) U 664 was heavily attacked by aircraft in approximately AL 10 and
has to return to port. (Possibly air cover for an E. bound convoy).
4) U 575 reports in connection with sinking of 29 October that the ship
formerly described as a freighter was actually a troop ship transport of the
"Abosso" type (11,330 T). At the point where she sank there are about 10
cutters and many rafts full of soldiers. Boat sighted 3 steamers and 1
destroyer at 1329 1 November in BD 6859, sailing on S. course. She is
returning to base.
- 79 -
5) U 332 situation: nothing further seen in areas EE 60, EF 80 and EP
20 since 23 January.
6) U D 5 sighted destroyer in DG 8143, course 00.
 b) Aircraft reported convoy in BE 9755 at 1155, consisting of 10 VI. General:
merchant ships, and 3 patrol boats on N. course at low speed. (Evidently U-boats as of 1 November 1942.
the rest of SL 125.
c) U-boat sightings: BC 12.
Sightings by aircraft: BC 1258, AL 0134, AL 1834, CH 5896, BE 6178, - 80 -
AL 1938, BF 7381.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) Convoy No. 64:
At 1454 hours the convoy was contacted as planned in patrol area by U
381. In good visibility with wind N.W. 5 - 6 and sea 2, contact was made
by boats U 704 - 402 - 71 - 89 - 522 and U 132, all members of the 16 boat
group. The convoy was steaming on course 400 at speed of 7 knots. U
552 reported 20 steamers. According to intercepts there are 27 ships in I. In commission on 1 October 1942: 359
convoy. U 438 reports miss on a straggler. U 89's reports of star shells Commissioned in October 25
indicated an attack during the night. (2nd commissioning Black Sea) 384
b) 1) U 572 occupies area off Lisbon and to the S. of that area. Lost in October 14
2) U 440 is sailing at high speed to CG 75 to intercept the reported 370
carrier group. After breaking off action on Convoy No. 63, Group Decommissioned (for Black Sea) 2
"Streitaxt", the remainder of the boats of the group took up search for the In service on 1 November. 368
carrier group reported by air observation on 31 October in BE 1944. Just Add foreign boats: 6
in case this convoy is making for Gibraltar, these boats were ordered to 374
take up positions as follows:
U 510 - CG 72; U 103 - CC 76; U 134 - CC 84; U 409 - CC 75. All
other boats which did not have to return, received orders to sail SE at high
speed (toward Gibraltar). Losses in October (Those not underlined not yet confirmed):
3) U 566 relieved U 653 in area BE 65. U 653 then sailed to AK 93.
c) 1) U 463 carried out transfer of supplies and is returning to port. Type VIIC
2) U 516 took on provisions for 10 days from U 462. Tanker situation: U 253 - Freidricks, 1st operation, evidently sunk end of September N.W.
555 cubic meters fuel oil; 8 cubic meters of motor oil; 169 day supply of of Iceland by aircraft.
provisions and 4 torpedoes.
d) None. U 353 - Roemer, 1st operation, last report 14 October 1942, evidently N.
Atlantic by convoy.
V. Reports of Success: None.

940
 U 412 - Jahrmärker, 1st operation. Nothing heard since she left
Germany 17 October. Possible aircraft attack in N. Sea. -3-

U 582 - Schulte W., experienced boat, last report 5 September

(transmitter break-down) possibly by N. Atlantic convoy.

U 597 - Bopst, 2nd operation, last report 12 October, evidently sunk by

convoy.

U 599 - Breithaupt, 1st operation, last report 23 October while on return

voyage. Evidently attacked by plane W. Bay of Biscay.

U 619 - Makowski, 1st operation, last report 5 October. Convoy in N.

Atlantic. II. Distribution:
II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXd1 IXd2 Xb XIV Total Foreign
U 627 - Kindelbacher, 1st operation, last report 27 October. N. Atlantic
convoy. Combat: 2 - 141 3 51 - 3 2 5 207 2
Testing: - - 76 - 17 2 3 1 - 99 1
U 661 - von Lillienfeld, 1st operation, last report 10 October N. Atlantic School: 35 4 21* - 2 - - - - 62 3
convoy.
37 4 238 3 70 2 6 3 5 368
Type IXC
U 171 - Pfeffer, 1st operation, sunk by mine on 9 October off Lorient. * Instead of 4, there are 9 boats training personnel.

U 512 - Schultze, Wolfgang, last report 28 September E. Trinidad, no III. In September (without foreign boats):
clue. Possible air attack. Total increase: + 9
Combat boat increase: + 12
Type IX D2 Test boat decrease: - 6
U 179 - Sobe, 1st operation, last report 18 September from mid Atlantic, School boat increase: + 3
no clue.

Type XB IV. Combat boat distribution 1 November 1942:

U 116 - Grimme, experienced boat with new Captain. Last report 6 Atlantic (without foreign boats) 160 plus 2 foreign boats.
October on return voyage. Evidently air attack W. Bay of Biscay. Mediterranean 19
North Sea 26 of which 3 were transferred.
Black Sea 2
941
 117 - AK 65 263 - AE 69 510 - Op(CF) 624 - Op(AK 60)

V. In October in the Atlantic:

Daily average at sea 105.4 boats
In Operations area 44.7 " - 82 -
Outward bound 60.6 "
Returning to port 21.3 "

VI. In October boats putting out:

From Germany 27 boats.
From West France 43 boats.

--------------------------------------------------- 125 - BE 99 301 - BE 94 511 - DH 12 653 - BE 53

---------------
2.November 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 159 - Op(GR) U 437 - Op(AJ 80) U 552 - Op(ET)
67 - Op(EE) 160 - Op(ED) 438 - Op(AJ 80) 563 - BE 37
68 - GQ 49 161 - Op(EV) 440 - Op(CG 75) 564 - BE 55
69 - BF 81 163 - DP 64 441 - BE 29 566 - BE 65
71 - Op(AJ 89) 172 - GG 74 442 - Op(AJ 80) 571 - Op(AJ 80)
84 - Op(AJ 80) 173 - BF 55 443 - BE 61 572 - CG 48
86 - BF 46 174 - Op(FC) 454 - Op(AJ 80) 575 - BE 47
87 - EJ 84 177 - Op(GR) 459 - BF 74 590 - EH 39
89 - Op(AJ 89) 178 - Op(GR) 462 - DS 60 595 - BF 46
91 - BF 55 181 - Op(GR) 463 - BE 47 602 - BE 29
92 - BE 43 183 - Op(BC) 465 - AN 36 604 - CG 41
98 - Op(AK 60) 185 - AF 47 504 - KZ 28 606 - Op(AK 60)
103 - Op(CG 76) 203 - CG 47 505 - Op(ED) 608 - CC 36
106 - Op(BB) 218 - BE 27 506 - BF 74 613 - Op(AK 60)
107 - EH 39 224 - Op(AK 60) 508 - DP 64 620 - CF 69
108 - BE 87 260 - CE 90 509 - Op(CF 86) 621 - BE 29
942
126 - Op(EV) 332 - Op(EF 81) 514 - CF 49 658 - Op(AJ 80)
128 - Op(ET) 356 - BE 82 516 - DS 33 659 - CG 18
129 - Op(ED) 381 - Op(AJ 97) 518 - Op(BB) 662 - Op(CE 90)
130 - BE 97 383 - Op(AK 60) 519 - AL 44 664 - Op(AL 15)
132 - Op(AJ 80) 402 - Op(AJ 89) 520 - Op(AJ 80) 704 - Op(AJ 89)
134 - Op(CG 84) 409 - CG 44 521 - Op(AJ 86) 706 - BE 57
154 - DP 21 413 - AE 68 522 - Op(AJ 89) 752 - CF 86
156 - EH 38 436 - Op(AK 60) D 5 - DG 94 753 - Op(BD 53)
755 - BF 55
On Return Passage: U 68 - 69 - 87 - 107 - 125 - 156 - 172 - 203 - 301 -
356 - 409 - 441 - 443 - 459 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 514 - 516 - 563 - 575 - 590
- 602 - 604 - 621 - 659 - 664 - 706 - D 5.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 617 - St. Nazaire; U 407 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 64, see paragraph IVa.
 2) U 160 sighted a convoy W. of Trinidad in ED 9429 on course W.
speed 8 knots. Pursuit carried out and reported position at 0504 in ED
8636, about 20 ships.
3) U 514 reported 7 large ships and a destroyer in CF 4399 on E. course.
U 514 was forced to submerge at once by aircraft and lost contact. Since
this convoy was possibly a troop or equipment transport group for
Gibraltar, orders were given U 130 - 620 - 572 and U 103 to operate on
supposed course to Gibraltar. Convoy sailed at estimated speed of 10
knots. Of the boats mentioned, U 620 has a damaged rudder, U 103 has
difficulty submerging and U 440 needs repairs on her stern tube. No
further reports came in on the enemy.
4) U 440 operated against single ship on courses in CG 7535 at 1418
hours. No attack because of high speed.
5) U 606 missed shot on single ship in AK 6839, course 2200, speed 16
knots.
6) U 172 sank British "Clandillo" (4,966 T) on course 900 from
Trinidad to Cape Town.
7) U 178 sank British "Laurentic" (18,742 T) on 1 November, course
2300, position JJ 8530. Light air and sea patrols in the area.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 5530.
Sightings by aircraft: CG 7349, CG 9551, BE 3747 (Depth-charge
attack, no hits).
U-boat attacks: BB 63, also unknown position near Trinidad. "SSS"
report: "Empire Rennie" 4,835 T in FC 52; English "Karlack" 1,837 T in
BE 6523; unknown steamer in FG 2780.
d) None.
- 83 -
943
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 64:
Contact kept on the convoy by U 132 and U 522 as long as weather
remained good but by 1800 hours contact was lost because of fog. Ceiling
reported zero over the convoy. U 552 reported in the evening that convoy
consists of 9 ships and 2 destroyers. According to intercepts convoy is
steering for known point AJ 6855. Speed remains 7 knots. In the course
of the day the following success reports were received:
U 402 - 4 steamers hit, i munitions steamer 7,000 T sinking, 1 freighter
8,000 T heard sinking, 1 freighter 5,500 T left burning. 2 steamers 5,500 T
each one sank, the other probably sank.
U 522 - 2 tankers, 1 munitions ship, 4 freighter torpedoed of which 6
steamers of total 38,000 T were observed sinking. 1 freighter heard
sinking.
2 freighters of 3,000 T each were sunk.
U 381 - 2 hits observed on a ship. One ship heard sinking.
U 438 - 1 hit on disabled 4,000 T freighter.
U 84 - 1 freighter of 8,000 T sunk as she lay hove to.
U 521 - 1 freighter of 8,000 T sunk as she lay hove to. Evidently one hit
on a corvette.
Total - 16 ships of 94,000 T sunk. 4 ships and 1 corvette torpedoed.
Apparently the signals emanated from the two ships sunk by U 84 and U
521.
b) 1) Patrol strip of Group Natter from AK 9245 to BE 1144 is made up
of U 613 - 224 - 436 - 624 - 606 - 383 - 98 - 218 - 92 - 564 - 653 and 566.
Area will be occupied at 0400 on 5 November, waiting for ON convoy.
2) Operations on carrier force broken off. U 510 and 134 sailing S. to
DT 50. Supply activity by U 462 forthcoming. U 103 and 440 to meet U
509 on 6 November in DG 3355 to take on about 60 cubic meters of fuel
each. Both boats to continue southward.
c) U 463 took over radar interception escort for U 575.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: 91 - BF 45 183 - Op(BC) 465 - AN 30 608 - CC 28
U 172 1 ship 4,966 T. 92 - BE 14 185 - AE 91 504 - KZ 49 613 - Op(AK 60)
178 1 ship 18,742 T. 98 - OP(AK 90) 203 - CG 18 505 - Op(EE) 617 - BF 67
402 4 ships 26,000 T. 2 ships hit. 103 - CF 77 218 - BE 14 506 - BF 73 620 - CG 71
522 9 ships 49,000 T. 106 - Op(BB) 224 - Op(AK 90) 508 - DP 86 621 - BE 66
381 1 ship 5,000 T. 1 ship hit. 107 - EH 31 260 - Op(CE 90) 509 - CF 79 624 - Op(AK 90)
438 1 ship hit. 108 - CE 24 263 - AE 67 510 - CG 75 653 - BE 19
84 1 ship 8,000 T. 117 - BD 83 301 - BE 96 511 - DH 42 658 - Op(AJ 60)
521 1 ship 6,000 T. 1 corvette hit. 125 - BF 75 332 - Op(EF) 514 - CF 28 659 - CG 13
126 - Op(EV) 356 - BF 91 516 - DG 91 662 - Op(CE 90)
128 - Op(ET) 381 - Op(AJ 60) 518 - Op(BB) 664 - AL 41
129 - Op(ED) 383 - Op(AK 90) 519 - AK 65 704 - Op(AJ 93)
130 - CF 38 402 - Op(AJ 65) 520 - Op(AJ 60) 706 - BE 67
- 84 - 132 - Op(AJ 92) 407 - BF 55 521 - Op(AJ 94) 752 - DH 24
134 - CG 78 409 - CG 18 522 - Op(AJ 60) 753 - Op(BD 56)
154 - DP 18 413 - AE 83 552 - Op(ET) 755 - BF 46
156 - DS 31 436 - Op(AK 90) 563 - BE 66 D 5 - DG 65
159 - Op(KY) 437 - Op(AJ 94) 564 - BE 43

On Return Passage: U 68 - 69 - 87 - - 107 - 125 - 156 - 172 - 203 - 301

- 356 - 409 - 441 - 443 - 459 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 514 - 516 - 563 - 575 -
590 - 602 - 604 - 621 - 659 - 664 - 706 - D 5.
3.November 1942. Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: D 3 - Lorient; U 454 - 264 - Kiel.

I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 160 - Op(ED 86) U 438 - Op(AJ 65) U 566 - BE
55
67 - Op(EE) 161 - Op(EV) 440 - CB 99 571 - Op(AJ 93)
68 - CQ 44 163 - DP 82 441 - BE 61 572 - Op(CG 50)
69 - BF 75 172 - CF 68 442 - Op(AJ 93) 575 - BE 48
71 - Op(AJ 60) 173 - BF 48 443 - BF 54 590 - EH 31
84 - Op(AJ 96) 174 - Op(FC) 454 - Op(AJ 96) 595 - BF 44
86 - BF 44 177 - Op(GR) 459 - BF 73 602 - BE 62
87 - EJ 44 178 - Op(JJ 55) 462 - DS 94 604 - CG 15
89 - Op(AJ 92) 181 - Op(GR) 463 - BE 49 606 - Op(AK 68)
944
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 64, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 160 followed convoy through ED 8378 until 1130 when she lost
contact in ED 8298 after a daylight attack. Report of end results: 3
November sank freighter of 7,500 T and left a 5,000 tonner sinking. 2 hits
on tanker of 8,000 T. and 1 hit on an ore ship of 5,000 T during the day.
Did not see them sink but likely that they did. Sighted "Concord" type
cruiser on 29 October in ED 9816, on course 1600 and in ED 9818 a
convoy, course 3100. No movements off Port of Spain.
3) U 440 sighted 2 destroyers on E. course at 1035 in CG 7454 and
reported at 0130 a convoy in CF 9595, course E. OPeration impossible
because of condition of the boat. Looks like the same group that was
reported by U 514 on 2 November in CF 4399. Operation was not
possible since no boats are in the area.
4) U 383 fired 4 double misses at single ship on course 2200 in AK
9722.
- 85 -
5) U 117 sighted two-stack steamers in AK 8926, course 400, speed 14
knots.
6) U 662 situation: Medium freighter in Ponta Delgada. Forced to
submerge outside the harbor on 31 October by 2 destroyers.
7) U 518 sank 2 ore ships 14,000 T in the roads off Wabana Island
(Conception Bay).
8) U 159 fired two misses at passenger freighter course 3300.
Returning to port from KY 9937.
9) U 504 on her return cruise sank Brazilian "Porto Alegre" 5,187 T in
KZ 4589, loaded with wood and cellulose from Capetown to Durban.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 5285, ED 8830, FC 52, BB 69, ED 85, BB 52.
Sightings by aircraft: CH 8214, BB 6930, BE 3675.
Planes received orders to attack boats in unknown positions.
U-warning for area KY 9929 and KZ 7110.
945
U-boat attack in ED 8630. "Empire Guider" reported she had been
torpedoed in unknown position.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 64:
Contact was kept on convoy all day and all night due to moderate
weather and good visibility. Before darkness fell, U 402, 84, 381, 571, 71,
704, 521, 522 as well as U 438 the contact keeper, came up to the convoy.
It appears that after the heavy losses of last night the convoy screen has
been strengthened. U 381, U 402, U 521 and U 522 report depth charges.
Wide variations in reports regarding the convoy. One boat reports 4 to 6
steamers and 4 destroyers. Another reported 26 units at 0600 this
morning. It is conceivable that part of the convoy has separated from the
rest.
Reported:
U 521: 1 tanker sunk type "Trowolite" 7,115 T. 2 hits evidently on a
freighter.
U 89: sank freighter of 5,000 T.
A total of 18 ships of 106,000 tons have been sunk from this convoy in
AK 41. Operations on the convoy are continuing.
b) 1) Group "Natter" was ordered to action at full speed in order to move
against the convoy as soon as possible.
2) New course for U 413 is AK 91.
3) U 172 and U 68 will have freedom of movement in GF, since
movements there are favorable from time to time.
4) Following orders were given for Special Operation: U 407 and U
617 steer for CG 61. U 662 make for U 509 in DG 3355 and take on 30
cubic meters of fuel. U 440 is to report as soon as boat is repaired. More
follows.
- 86 -
 107 - DS 97 263 - AE 82 509 - DG 33 653 - BE 11
108 - CF 42 264 - AO 510 - DH 34 658 - Op(AK 40)
117 - AK 89 301 - BF 72 511 - DH 48 659 - BF 58
125 - BF 81 332 - Op(EE) 514 - CF 35 662 - DG 33
126 - Op(EV) 356 - BF 64 516 - DG 63 664 - AL 74
128 - Op(ET) 381 - Op(AK) 518 - Op(BB) 704 - Op(AK)
c) - d) None. 129 - Op(ED) 383 - Op(AK) 519 - AK 58 706 - BE 69
130 - CF 65 402 - Op(AJ) 520 - Op(AK 40) 752 - DH 46
V. Reports of Success: 132 - Op(AK 40) 407 - BF 49 521 - Op(AJ) 753 - BD 25
U 160 5 ships 31,500 tons. 134 - DH 35 409 - BF 75 522 - Op(AK) 755 - BE 98
518 3 ships 14,000 tons. 154 - DQ 62 413 - AL 26 552 - Op(ET) D 3 - BF 55
504 1 ship 5,184 tons. 156 - DS 97 436 - Op(AK 90) 563 - BF 45 D 5 - DG 36
521 1 ship 7,100 tons. 1 ship hit. 159 - Op(KY) 437 - BD 11 564 - BE 11
89 1 ship 5,000 tons. 160 - Op(ED) 438 - Op(AK) 566 - BE 11

--------------------------------------------------- On Return Passage: U 68 - 69 - 87 - 107 - 125 - 156 - 172 - 203 - 301 -

--------------- 356 - 409 - 437 - 441 - 443 - 459 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 514 - 516 - 563 - 575
- 590 - 602 - 604 - 621 - 659 - 664 - 706 - D 5.
4.November 1942. Entered Port: U 443 - Brest; U 459 - 356 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 596 - St. Nazaire.

I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 161 - Op(EV) U 440 - CF 97 U 571 - Op(AJ) II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
67 - Op(EE) 163 - Op(EE) 441 - BF 44 572 - CF 68
68 - GP 38 172 - JF 64 442 - Op(AK 40) 575 - BE 58 III. Reports on the Enemy:
69 - BF 81 173 - BF 47 443 - BF 52 590 - DS 97 a) 1) Convoys Nos. 64 and 65, see paragraph IVa.
71 - Op(AK) 174 - Op(FC) 445 - AO 595 - CF 33 2) Sinkings:
84 - Op(AK) 177 - Op(GR) 454 - AK 75 602 - BF 45 U 181 sank "East Indian" (8,159 T.) with ore for New York. Ship had
86 - BE 64 178 - Op(KP) 459 - BF 65 604 - BF 77 orders to steer S.W. course 500 miles from GR 56, then to Trinidad.
87 - EH 38 181 - Op(GR) 462 - DS 97 606 - Op(AK 90)
89 - Op(AK 40) 183 - Op(BC) 463 - BE 58 608 - CC 43 - 87 -
91 - BE 66 185 - AE 82 465 - AN 30 613 - Op(AK 90)
92 - Op(AL) 203 - BF 77 504 - KY 69 617 - BF 57
98 - Op(AK 90) 218 - Op(AK 90) 505 - Op(EE) 620 - CG 40
103 - CF 97 224 - OP(AK 90) 506 - BF 57 621 - BF 45
106 - Op(BB) 260 - Op(CE 90) 508 - Op(EE) 624 - Op(AK 90)
946

U 177 sank munitions ship 8,000 T. on 2 November in GR 1715.
Course 1300.
U 174 sank "Elmdale" on 1 November in FC 1855. 4920 tons carrying
cargo of mixed freight. On 2 November in FB 3622 she sank Dutch
steamer "Zaandam" 10,909 tons, course 3500. Cargo copra and vegetable
oil. Light air activity in the area.
U 437 sank a modern ship sailing alone in BD 4145, course 2200,
speed 15 knots, 7 - 8,000 tons.
3) U 557 reports convoy in BE 5983 on S. course. Pursuit made. U 263
sighted convoy in AE 7963, course 1300, speed 8 - 10 knots. Boat lost
contact and was ordered to proceed on course as ordered.
4) U 128 found no activity off Freetown and is presently operating in
approximate position ES 62. (Operation off Brazilian coast in view).
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 9190, DN 8480, EE 7420, DB 6170, ED 6870,
ED 91, EE 70.
U-boat attack in BD 41.
"SSS" report from AC 1681.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 64:
The group is operating further against the convoy, aided by good
weather and visibility. Convoy is now in AK 42. At 0700 this morning
contact was lost. The boats took position near the escorts and reported
various patrol craft. In the evening at 2144 hours, U 89 again reported
contact but lost it again later. Success during the night of 3 - 4 November
is:
1) U 442 - 1 freighter 7,000 tons sunk.
2) U 71 - 1 freighter 5,000 tons sunk.
U 71 observed a hit by another U-boat, evidently U 132, not yet
reported.
947
3) U 381 - 2 freighters, one 6,000 tons the other 7,000 tons sunk.
Also another hit.
4) U 89 - 1 freighter 5,000 tons sunk.
So far 23 ships have been sunk from this convoy - 136,115 tons.
Operations are continuing.
Convoy No. 65:
U 92 sighted a convoy at 2140 in AL 7788 on S.W. course. It appears
to be ON 143, which we are expecting. Group "Natter" ordered to take
action on this report at high speed. U 92 was
- 88 -
forced under by a corvette and hunted. Convoy was last heard at 0230
hours in BD 3383, speed at least 10 knots. Only 4 ships could be seen.
Aside from U 466, which is carrying out listening duty against the convoy,
no other boat reported contact. Operation continued.
b) 1) U 332 returning to port via DS 89 (supplies to be given her by
Vowe).
2) Destination for U 413 is AK 91, for U 263 and U 185 AK 92. U 103
sailed S. via DT 60 to take on fuel from U 509. U 620 and U 572 taking
up areas off Lisbon as previously ordered.
3) U 662 - 444 - 617 - 407 and 596 make up Group Delphin (see
paragraph VI. General).
c) None.
d) Boats will again be informed regarding enemy air activity.
V. Reports of Success:
 U 181 1 ship 8,159 tons.
177 1 ship 8,000 tons.
174 2 ships 15,829 tons. - 89 -
437 1 ship 7,000 tons.
442 1 ship 7,000 tons.
71 1 ship 5,000 tons.
381 2 ships 13,000 tons. 1 ship hit.
89 1 ship 5,000 tons.

VI. General:
a) Due to the increasing acuteness of the Mediterranean situation, High
Command ordered 4 more boats to that area, besides U 755 and U 595.
Since breaking through the Straits of Gibraltar should meet with success,
U 662 and U 440 both of which have been at sea a long time already, and
U 617, U 407 and U 596 will be sent. Captains who have had experience
against convoys in the Atlantic are thought best for operations in the
Mediterranean by B.d.U.
These boats make up Group "Delphin". In view of the great amount of
ships and heavy patrols, breaking through the Straits will evidently be
difficult this time. We must count on some losses.
b) As far as can be determined, operations in the Mediterranean will find
large and worthwhile targets. It is imperative to use the 39 H type pistol as
soon as it has been properly proved in combat.
In this regard:
Message to: Naval Command
Torpedo Development Division,
and information to: 1st Naval Command
German U-boat Commander Italy.
1. The situation in the Mediterranean makes use of Pistol 39 H
extremely important to Mediterranean boats. Reasons:
a) Principal targets are battleships, aircraft carriers and large transports.
Greatest damage possible is desired
from single shots.
b) According to air observation the worthwhile targets in the
Mediterranean are protected by anti-torpedo nets. The only workable
solution is use of the 39 H pistol.
c) This would also dispense with premature ignition and faulty shots in
an area where not only do we find high seas and heavy swells but also
ships of deep draught.
d) Operational torpedoes of greater destructive power are more urgent in
the Mediterranean than in the Atlantic because of the intense situation in
Africa.
2. B.d.U. has ordered the 1st consignment of 50 39 H type pistols for the
Mediterranean, also is trying to speed up the delay in their operation in the
Atlantic.
B.d.U. Secret 4733 A 4.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
5.November 1942.

I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 161 - Op(EV) U 441 - BF 45 U 590 - DS 90

948
 67 - Op(EE) 163 - Op(ED) 442 - AK 57 595 - CF 31
68 - GF 172 - Op(GP) 445 - AN 36 596 - BF 47
69 - BF 52 173 - BE 92 454 - BD 21 602 - BF 55
71 - Op(AK 18) 174 - Op(FC 15) 462 - DS 97 604 - BF 52
84 - Op(AK 29) 177 - Op(GR 81) 463 - BE 68 606 - Op(AK 90)
86 - BE 52 178 - Op(KP) 465 - AN 30 608 - CB 63
87 - EH 31 181 - Op(GR 97) 504 - KY 91 613 - Op(AK 90)
89 - Op(AK 18) 183 - Op(BC) 505 - Op(EE) 617 - BF 72
91 - BE 62 185 - AL 31 506 - BF 40 620 - CG 70
92 - Op(BD 33) 203 - BF 76 508 - Op(EE) 621 - BF 55
98 - Op(AK 90) 218 - Op(AK 90) 509 - DG 33 624 - Op(AK 90)
103 - DH 12 224 - Op(AK 90) 510 - DH 55 653 - Op(BD 30)
106 - Op(BB) 260 - Op(CE 90) 511 - DH 78 658 - Op(AK 20)
107 - DS 90 263 - AE 87 514 - CG 11 659 - BF 52
108 - CE 68 264 - AN 36 516 - DH 14 662 - DG 33
117 - BD 21 301 - BF 55 518 - Op(BB) 664 - BE 14
125 - BF 40 332 - EF 53 519 - AK 28 704 - Op(AK 20)
126 - Op(EV) 381 - Op(AK 27) 520 - Op(BC) 706 - BF 48
128 - Op(ET) 383 - Op(AK 90) 521 - Op(AK 18) 752 - DH 75
129 - Op(ED) 402 - Op(AK 01) 522 - Op(AK 20) 753 - BD 21
130 - CF 95 407 - BF 47 552 - Op(ET) 755 - CG 15
132 - Op(AK 20) 409 - BF 52 563 - BF 54 D 3 - BF 45
134 - DH 56 413 - AL 01 564 - Op(BD 33) D 5 - CF 84
154 - DO 58 436 - Op(AK 90) 566 - Op(BD 33)
156 - DS 90 437 - BD 42 571 - Op(AK 54)
159 - JJ 21 438 - Op(AK 20) 572 - CG 40
160 - Op(ED) 440 - CF 90 575 - BE 68
On Return Passage: U 68 - 69 - 87 - 107 - 125 - 156 - 172 - 203 - 301 -
409 - 437 - 441 - 463 - 506 - 514 - 516 - 563 - 575 - 590 - 602 - 604 - 621
- 659 - 664 - 706 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 621 - 409 - 659 - 604 - Brest; U 69 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 380 - St. Nazaire; U 259 - La Pallice; U 623 - 603 - Kiel.
- 90 -
949
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 64 and 65, see paragraph IVa.
2) In convoy reported yesterday, U 263 estimates a search group of 2
small ships and 3 trawlers. She fired a two shot spread and 3 single shots,
all of which missed. She then moved on.
3) U 620 reports heavy movements in CG 57, neutral insignia shown.
4) U 260 began return cruise. 2 freighters and 1 patrol craft in Ponta
Delgada on 4 November.
5) U 552 has seen nothing so far in ET 50, 60, 90 as well as EU 70.
Medium air patrols, weak sea patrols in the area.
U 126 sank a three masted steamer on 1 November in FH 5578, name,
"Helma", 8,297 tons, course 1300. The steamer had escort. In addition,
she sank "Quedgrou" on 4 November in EW 7531, course 1250 and "New
Toronto" on 5 November in EV 6734, 6,568 tons, course 600, zig-zagging
and escorted.
U 129 moved against a convoy on 5 November during the night in EC
9296. 15 large and a number of small ships, course 3100, speed 8 knots.
She sank a freighter of 4,000 tons, tankers of 9,000, 6,000 and 7,000 tons,
besides getting a hit on a freighter of 5,000 tons. Contact lost. According
to sound bearings the convoy put back into Aruba. Nothing seen in EC 63,
66, 69.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 38.
U-boat attack: EC 92.
 Sightings by aircraft: AF 79, AK 2732 (depth-charge attack), 2 attacks
in unknown position, evidently in area AK 20.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 65:
Group "Natter" searched S.W. area without finding the convoy. U 92
reports horizontal radar transmissions in BD 3548 and BD 3496, where the
convoy might possibly be. No contact has been made up to this morning.
Operation is still underway.
2) Convoy No. 64:
U 521 made contact for a short time again at 1000 hours but could not
keep it. Due to air patrols over the convoy none of the 7 boats operating
against it were able to approach. All other boats were either returning to
port or moving toward refueling points. Since visibility was so good
during the day and surprise attacks by aircraft were likely, boats were
- 91 -
ordered to attack only at night when in favorable positions and to
cease the operation at daybreak.
A number of boats reported damage due to aircraft bombs.
No further success reported. Hence the operation ended in the
morning of 6 November with the following successes:
23 ships sunk, 136,115 tons.
1 destroyer and 1 corvette torpedoed and 5 other hits scored on ships.
Evidently only U 132 was sunk on this entire operation.
950
b) 1) U 108 and U 103 took on fuel from U 509 and sailed southward. U
128 and U 511 made for FC 50 after being supplied by U 462.
2) Courses: U 86 - U 91 - AK 66; U 413 - 185 - 263 - AK 03; U 522 -
AK 65.
3) U 440 and 622 were unable to break through Straits of Gibraltar
because of engine trouble. U 380 and 259 are considered as substitutes.
c) U 462 has supplied: U 156, 107, 590 and U 87.
Tanker situation: 415 cubic meters of fuel oil, provisions for 136 days,
and 4 torpedoes.
d) During the past few days the following boats have not reported in spite
of many requests and must be considered lost:
U 132 operated against Convoy No. 64 and last reported from AJ 91 on
3 November. According to observations of other boats she may have been
destroyed when she torpedoed a munitions ship.
U 658 and U 520 both operated against Convoy No. 64. The last reports
were 20 October for U 658 and 27 October for U 520. It is believed that
both boats were destroyed by aircraft.
V. Reports of Success:
U 126 3 ships 15,668 tons.
U 129 4 ships 26,000 tons.
1 ship 5,000 tons torpedoed.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
6.November 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 161 - Op(EV) U 438 - Op(AK) U 571 - AK 59
67 - Op(EE) 163 - Op(EE) 440 - CF 82 572 - Op(CG 50)
68 - GF 68 172 - GF 68 441 - BF 50 575 - BF 47
71 - Op(AK 20) 173 - BE 89 442 - AK 83 590 - DS 90
84 - Op(AK) 174 - Op(FC) 445 - AN 43 595 - CG 84
86 - BE 24 177 - Op(GR) 454 - BD 22 596 - BF 82
 87 - DS 65 178 - Op(KP) 462 - DS 30 603 - AO
89 - Op(AK) 181 - Op(GR) 463 - BE 68 606 - Op(BD 20)
91 - BE 52 183 - Op(BC) 465 - AN 30 608 - CB 53
92 - Op(BD) 185 - AL 18 504 - GR 94 613 - Op(BD 20)
98 - Op(BD 20) 203 - BF 505 - Op(EE) 617 - CG 15
103 - DG 33 218 - Op(BD 20) 506 - BF 620 - Op(CG)
106 - Op(BB) 224 - Op(BD 20) 508 - Op(EE) 623 - AO
107 - DS 90 249 - BF 52 509 - DG 33 624 - Op(BD 20)
- 92 -
108 - DH 11 260 - Op(CF) 510 - DH 73 653 - Op(BD)
117 - BD 21 263 - AL 24 511 - DT 18 662 - CF 84
125 - BF 264 - AN 28 514 - BF 77 664 - BE 51
126 - Op(EV) 301 - BF 516 - CF 85 704 - Op(AK)
128 - ES 25 332 - BF 63 518 - Op(BB) 706 - BF 49
129 - Op(EC) 380 - BF 67 519 - Op(AK 20) 752 - DT 25
130 - DH 25 381 - AK 55 521 - AK 28 753 - BD 21
134 - DH 73 383 - Op(BD 20) 522 - Op(AK) 755 - CG 72
154 - DO 99 402 - AK 55 552 - Op(ET) D 3 - BF 71
156 - DS 90 407 - CG 15 563 - BF D 5 - CF 58
159 - GR 59 413 - AL 19 564 - Op(BD 20) 602 - BF
160 - Op(ED) 436 - Op(BD) 566 - Op(BD)
437 - BD 55
951
On Return Passage: U 68 - 87 - 107 - 156 - 159 - 172 - 381 - 402 - 437
- 441 - 442 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 514 - 516 - 571 - 575 - 590 - 664 - 706 - D
5.
Entered Port: U 563 - 301 - Brest; U 602 - 203 - 125 - Lorient.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 65, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 508 sighted a convoy at 0135 hours in ED 97, course 3000, speed 9
knots. She sank a freighter of 9,000 tons. Convoy was in ED 8759 at
0710 on course 2700, speed 9 knots. Pursuit taken up.
3) In the same area U 160 reports eastbound convoy of 8 freighters, 2
destroyers and 2 patrol boats. She attacked and scored hits on freighters of
7,000 and 6,000 tons. Neither ship seen to sink. No contact. So far no
single ship movements off Port of Spain. Outbound ships sailing with
escort on courses 3100 and 900. Air patrols far and wide. (One of the
torpedoed ships sank, according to radio intercepts).
4) U 163 sank British "Cordeillera" in EE 7337, 6,865 tons, course
2450, speed 12 knots.
5) U 161 situation: sighted 2 steamers on 5 November in EV 7321 on
course 2600 and on 6 November 1 steamer course 90. Both put into
Takoradi. Because of heavy seas and strong easterly currents, shallow
water operations are pointless.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 6130, BA 96, KY 64.
U-boat attacks: ED 99, ED 86.
Sightings by aircraft: U-boats sighted and attacked in CH 81 and 82.
Heavy sub-chasing activities in CA 38, boat evidently damaged and
unable to move.
d) None.
- 93 -
 ---------------------------------------------------
---------------

IV. Current Operations:

a) Convoy No. 65:
Since it was impossible to make contact during the course of the day,
the operation was broken off. No success.
b) 1) Following boats presently belonging to Group "Natter" and are - 94 -
sailing for AK 9245 to BE 1173 as patrol area at cruising speed: U 218,
653, 566, 613, 98, 564, 92, 86, 91, 383, 224, 624 and 606.
2) After completion of operation on Convoy No. 64 Group "Veilchen"
was dissolved. A patrol strip was organized with the rest of the boats from
AK 3793 to 6378, to pick up an ON(S) convoy. Order: U 84, 521, 519,
704, 413 and 185. According to later report U 521 cannot carry out orders
because of engine trouble. Her position taken by U 263.
3) New course for U 173 is ED 99.
4) U 163 made for area between Aruba and Curacao.
5) U 154 has freedom of action in EE, EF and to the S. thereof. 7.November 1942.
6) Taking on of supplies will be carried out later for U 161 and 126 in
approximate area DS.
c) U 440 took over radar interception escort for U 516. I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 172 - GF U 454 - BD 21 U 606 - BD 38
d) 1) U-boats were informed of the sailing of our own ships and 67 - Op(EE) 173 - CF 21 462 - EH 60 608 - CB 54
instructed regarding the exact limits of operational areas. 68 - GF 174 - Op(FC) 463 - BF 47 613 - BD 29
2) Liberty to attack single ships given in area Route Anton between 300 71 - AK 62 177 - Op(GR) 465 - AN 30 617 - CG 48
N. and 100 S. 84 - Op(AK) 178 - Op(KP) 504 - GZ 33 620 - Op(CG 50)
86 - BE 12 181 - Op(KY) 505 - Op(EE) 623 - AN 36
V. Reports of Success: 87 - DT 15 183 - Op(BB) 506 - BF 61 624 - BD 38
U 508 1 ship 9,000 tons sunk 89 - AK 35 185 - Op(AK 30) 508 - Op(ED) 653 - BD 28
160 1 ship 7,000 tons sunk 91 - BE 46 218 - BD 26 509 - DG 33 662 - CF 82
1 ship 6,000 tons hit 92 - BD 37 224 - BD 37 510 - DH 77 664 - BE 56
163 1 ship 6,865 tons sunk. 98 - BD 34 259 - BF 82 511 - DT 71 704 - Op(AK)
103 - DG 33 260 - CF 52 514 - BF 73 706 - BF 68
952
 106 - Op(BB) 263 - Op(AL 16) 516 - CF 59 752 - DT 46
107 - DG 97 264 - AF 79 518 - Op(BB 10) 753 - BD 21
108 - DG 33 332 - EG 52 519 - Op(AK) 755 - CG 86
117 - BD 21 380 - BF 81 521 - Op(AK) D 3 - BE 95
126 - Op(EV) 381 - AK 85 522 - AK 83 D 5 - CF 61
128 - EH 96 383 - BD 37 552 - Op(ET)
129 - Op(EC) 402 - AK 85 564 - BD 37
130 - DH 43 407 - CG 45 566 - BD 26
134 - DT 31 413 - Op(AK 30) 571 - BD 95
154 - EE 13 436 - BE 44 572 - CG 50
156 - DG 95 437 - BD 64 575 - BF 47
159 - GQ 87 438 - AK 58 590 - DT 12
160 - Op(ED) 440 - CF 59 595 - CG 86
161 - Op(EV) 441 - BF 52 596 - CG 15
163 - Op(ED) 442 - BD 98 603 - AN 36
445 - AF 79
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 87 - 89 - 156 - 107 - 172 - 159 - 260 -
332 - 381 - 402 - 436 - 437 - 438 - 440 - 442 - 463 - 509 - 514 - 516 - 571
- 575 - 590 - 662 - 664 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 441 - Brest; U 506 - Lorient; U 411 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 155 - 515 - Lorient; U 411 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 462 reports ship sailing alone in EH 6199 on S. Westerly course.
She was given orders to keep contact for U 128 which is nearby. At 2016
hours the ship was in EH 6461. No further reports.
2) U 508 sighted a Spanish ship in ED 8531. Strangely enough the U-
boat requested permission to sink her. She was reminded of standing
orders. Later U 508 sank a freighter of 8,000 tons from a convoy. Was
forced to sheer off by a destroyer. Latest convoy position was ED 8667,
course W.
953
3) U 43 situation: No movements or defenses in BA 38 up to 25
October. Boat given freedom of movement in BA 38. Refueling foreseen.
4) U 620 has been standing off Lisbon on the 3 mile limit for 3 days.
Sightings: 8 - 10 neutral ships per day, each having a red cross insignia
but no flag. Clarification of this unusual procedure will be requested from
France.
- 95 -
5) U 566 sank the English ship "Glenlea" 4,252 tons, loaded with coal
and dye from Cardiff to Capetown. According to the Captain's statements
the ship was in convoy up to AK 98 and then separated.
6) U 613 sank a ship sailing alone, 4,500 tons, course 2250.
7) Convoy No. 65, see paragraph IVa.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 3971, EC 1280, EC 91, EP 71, BB 4244, BB 39,
EV 58.
Sightings by aircraft: CH 5927, CH 8276, CH 5928, CH 8272, CH
8433, CG 84.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 65:
U 117 sighted the convoy at 1726 in BD 2567, course 2500, speed 5 - 7
knots. This must be Convoy No. 65 which was attacked by Group
"Natter" All boats of this group were ordered to act on report by U 117.
This boat was forced to submerge by a patrol boat at 1940 in BD 2582 and
as a result lost contact. Orders were given to take up pursuit and to
replenish the supplies of boats low on fuel in BD 2835. Boats too far
behind to be of any use were ordered to give their positions. Boats in
favorable position were U 566 - 653 - 624 and 753. These boats pursued
the convoy further, which was not picked up by morning however. All
boats not involved were turned loose in an area 100 miles S. of the strip
used for patrol up until now.
b) 1) Rather than to worry about the former area, which was at best
unproductive, U 161 and 126 moved E. and W. (Former area off Lagos
and Takoradi).
2) In order to lengthen the patrol line to the S. U 552 took up position
AK 6651.
3) New course for U D 3 is DT 10.
c) U 116 finished transfer of supplies to U 753.
d) In view of the situation in the Mediterranean, Group Delphin U 755
and U 595 were ordered to try and break through the Straits of Gibraltar as
soon as possible. Boats are to sail course 50 W. without further orders on
Mediterranean band and come under Officer Commanding U-boats
Mediterranean.
V. Reports of Success:
U 508 1 ship 8,000 tons sunk
566 1 ship 4,252 tons sunk
613 1 ship 4,500 tons sunk.
- 96 -
954
VI. General:
Mediterranean Operation:
Reports of giant massing of forces for landing operations in the Western
Mediterranean led to the following decree of Naval High Command:
1) Immediate investigation and reports, how many more boats for
Mediterranean and when.
a) From operational areas.
b) From harbors of W. France. Available by the end of November.
2) All boats in question are to be equipped for Mediterranean operations
when they put out.
Naval High Command 2271/42 Secret
The teletype reply after consideration of these questions to Naval High
Command on 7 November.
I. Only type VIIC will be committed for operations in the Mediterranean.
The following boats of this type will be off Gibraltar at the time in
question:
a) U 259 ready as reserve boat in area AM on 12 November, U 411
(C.O. on first war cruise). On 16 November, U 91, 86, 566, 693, 92, 752
and 134, of which U 98 and U 564 have Captains on first war cruise. U
613, 413 and 623, (all have had one war cruise), on 23 November U 264,
445, 623 and 603 (all one war cruise). All other boats of type VIIC in
operational areas are either returning, damaged or short of fuel and are
destined to go back to Spezia.
b) For the following period, boats from harbors of W. France will be off
Gibraltar: On 22 November U 553, 600, 257. Between 26 and 28
November, U 373, 432, 254 and U 221. Between 29 November and 1
December, U 610, 757, 455, 569 and 615.
II. Boats of type IX (not considered suitable at present).
a) From operational area on 13 November, U 510, 130, 173, 103, 108,
155 and 515. On 15 November, U 519, U 185 (first war cruise).
b) From harbors of W. France on 17 November U 66, 176 and 164. On
3- November, U 513, 507 and 517.

III In connection with I and II, it is noticed that none of the boats are
equipped with charts of the Mediterranean, recognition signals etc., which
would not hamper operations in open sea areas. The time of the proposed
breakthrough of the Straits, 15 November is very unfavorable due to the
phase of the moon, not only for the actual passage through the Straits but
also the approaches thereto. The English are aware of the passage of U
755 - 595 - 617 - 407 - 596 and 380 through the Straits and defences are
bound to be strengthened. High percentage of losses must be reckoned on.
- 97 -
In consideration of the high number of misfortunes in the Atlantic War
on the one side and the possibilities of success in connection with large
numbers of boats in the Mediterranean on the other hand, German High
Command received the following statement on 7 November.
U-boat situation 7 November:
a) Transfer of more boats to the Mediterranean: The effect of English
activities in the Mediterranean are easily noticeable in the Atlantic.
Defences of the convoys most recently attacked were mush weaker than
before, evidently because of greater escort power in the Mediterranean.
Numerous slow ships sailing alone, lead us to believe that this is the case.
The same can be applied to ships in the North Sea. B.d.U. believes
therefore that greater prospects of success are in view in the Atlantic due
to the decrease in number of screening vessels.
955
b) A great number of boats had to return to port after the last convoy
action. Boats putting out at the time can go prepared to the Mediterranean.
A great number of boats will be ready to sail from W. France on 20
November since many boats already at sea are low on fuel, the number of
boats in the N. Atlantic will shrink, even though no more are sent to the
Mediterranean. The favorable character of this area cannot therefore be
answered by desired strength at this time.
c) Wariness of the English will already be sharpened in the Straits of
Gibraltar by former operations. It can no longer be assumed that all the
single ships, which pass through the Straits one after the other, will be
unnoticed. The result will be increased watchfulness which will probably
lead to losses of ships which are passing through, especially when the
boats happen to pass through at an unfavorable phase of the moon. Heavy
air patrols will limit freedom of movement of the boats. Warships and
transports are unusually strongly protected and the possibility of losses is
correspondingly high.
d) It appears that the prospects of success in the Mediterranean are
slight.
e) In considering the transfer of more boats to the Mediterranean, the
past situation must be regarded and prospects of small successes in the
Mediterranean must be weighed against the more favorable chances in the
N. Atlantic, keeping in mind the overall situation. Transfer of boats to the
Mediterranean is justified only if small success and heavy losses in the
Mediterranean can be seen to offset decrease in the tonnage of ships sunk
in the Atlantic.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 98 -
 436 - BE 54
437 - BD 86

On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 87 - 89 - 107 - 156 - 159 - 172 - 260 -

332 - 381 - 402 - 436 - 437 - 438 - 440 - 442 - 463 - 509 - 514 - 516 - 571
- 575 - 590 - 662 - 664 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 575 - Lorient.
8.November 1942. Sailed: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 160 - Op(ED) U 438 - AK 85 U 572 - Op(CG 50)
67 - Op(EE) 161 - Op(EV) 440 - CF 38 575 - BF 61 III. Reports on the Enemy:
68 - GF 163 - Op(ED 93) 442 - BD 33 590 - DG 95 a) 1) Convoy No. 65, see paragraph IVa.
71 - AL 47 172 - GF 445 - AK 72 595 - CG 90 2) U 462 sighted her steamer again during the afternoon in EH 6857.
84 - Op(AK 30) 173 - CF 42 454 - BD 29 596 - CG 73 She kept contact for U 128, which sank the ship in approximately EJ 7434.
86 - Op(BE) 174 - Op(FC) 462 - EH 67 603 - AN 31 Size 4,000 tons.
87 - DG 95 177 - Op(GR) 463 - BF 49 606 - Op(ED) 3) U 218 reported fast ship sailing alone in AK 9549, which disappeared
89 - AK 85 178 - Op(KP) 465 - AN 30 608 - CB 41 after being followed for a while.
91 - BE 17 181 - Op(KV) 504 - GR 78 613 - BD 27 4) U 160 is in position EP 7650 and intends to go from EO to EE 77 via
92 - BD 31 183 - OP(BB) 505 - Op(EE 72) 617 - CG 80 the coastal route.
98 - AK 98 185 - Op(AK 60) 508 - Op(ED) 620 - Op(CG 50) 5) U 174 has seen nothing in the upper half of FB since 3 November.
103 - DG 33 218 - AK 98 509 - DG 33 623 - AN 31 She believes dearth of ship movements due to change in routes on veering
106 - Op(BB) 224 - BD 37 510 - DT 27 624 - BD 33 off to the south and requests freedom of movement in areas ER 70 and 50.
107 - DG 92 259 - BF 72 511 - EH 33 653 - AK 95 6) U 181 sank a 6,000 tonner in KY 6982 on course 2800.
108 - DG 33 260 - CF 37 514 - BF 54 662 - CF 61 U 159 sank a munitions ship of 8,500 tons in GR 7,599, course 450.
117 - BD 28 263 - AK 03 515 - BF 55 664 - BE 66
126 - Op(EV) 264 - AF 72 516 - CF 38 704 - AK 60 - 99 -
128 - EH 69 332 - EG 38 518 - Op(BB) 752 - DS 93
129 - Op(EC) 380 - BF 74 519 - Op(AK 30) 753 - BD 51
130 - DH 72 381 - BD 21 521 - AK 60 755 - DG 90
134 - DT 28 383 - BD 35 522 - Op(ET) D 3 - BE 32
154 - Op(EE) 402 - BD 21 552 - Op(ET) D 5 - CF 33
155 - BF 50 407 - CG 80 564 - BD 28
156 - DG 66 411 - BF 67 566 - BD 28
159 - GR 74 413 - Op(AK 60) 571 - AL 78
956
 d) U 595 has passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and now comes
7) U 68 sank "City of Cairo" on 6 November in GF 3811, 8,034 tons, under the command of Officer Commanding U-boats in the
course 2900, sailing from Capetown to England via Pernambuco. 125 Mediterranean.
passengers on board. Boat will probably return to port slowly via Anton
route via FL. V. Success Reports:
b) None. U 128 1 ship 4,000 tons.
c) U-boat sightings: EV 7277, ED 6650, DK 2910(?), ET 2340, DB U 181 1 ship 6,000 tons.
6148, AB 8884, BC 22. U 159 1 ship 8,500 tons.
U-boat attacks: EC 68 and EV 72. U 68 1 ship 8,034 tons.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) Convoy No. 65:
b) 1) Due to the landing of Americans in French Morocco, U 155 - 515 - - 100 -
103 - 411 - 572 - 108 - 173 and U 130 received orders to set course for DJ
19 at top speed. U 510 - 752 - 511 - 185 - 519 - 91 and U 86 also
approached the areas sailing 200 miles during the 24 hour period. The
following boats were sent southwards on course for CG 87: U 413 - 263 -
98 - 218 - 92 - 566 - 564 - 653 and U 613. Group Delphin, composed of U
595 - 755 - 407 - 596 - 259 - 617 and U 380 steered for CH 8477 at
highest speed possible. U 572 received later orders to go to DJ 2524
(Fedala). See VI.
2) U 509 has transferred torpedoes and is sailing for DJ 19.
3) Boats remaining in N. Atlantic are making for the following areas at VI. General:
cruising speed: U 521 - AK 83; U 84 - AK 91; U 704 - AK 94; U 624 - North African Operations:
AK 95; U 753 - AK 98; U 224 - AK 99; U 383 - BD 32; U 606 - BD 33; A. At 0630 the head of Naval High Command was informed by B.d.U. of
U 454 - BD 31. In order to extend the operation, it is proposed to refuel the large scale of the landing operations underway on the Moroccan Coast
the boats which need it from U 460 on 17 November. by the Americans.
4) U 552 left the area off Freetown because of slight ship movement and Estimate of the situation: The invasion of the Algerian and Moroccan
was ordered to prey on S.W. bound shipping across E 46 and EJ 70 (See coasts must be treated as a large scale operation, for which the enemy will
III a 2). need an enormous amount of supplies. Operations of U-boats began too
5) U 68 and U 172 received orders to stay in their area another 4 days, late for the first landings, since the U-boats will not appear on the scene
since recurrent ship movements have been established there. until 9 to 11 November. U-boat activities can indeed make serious inroads
6) U 174 has freedom of movement as requested. on shipment of supplies. Prospects of success should not be regarded too
c) U 103 and U 108 have been supplied by U 509. highly for the following reasons:

957
 a) Boats must operate in water of less than 50 meters depth when
attacking troop transports and warships.
b) Heavy aircraft operations from Gibraltar using long range planes,
carrier borne aircraft. Operations of fast bombers is expected from air
fields installed in the meantime.
c) Heavier destroyer and corvette patrols must be reckoned with.
U-boats can make only stationary attacks. U-boat activities can be
regarded as favorable by the enemy as regards their course. Each attack
therefore means complete operation. Nevertheless the importance of these
supply trains calls for all-out U-boat operations. Hence: B.d.U. has
ordered the following, without advice of Naval High Command. U 155 -
515 - 103 - 108 - 411 - 572 - 173 - 130 to proceed at high speed and U 510
- 752 - 511 - 185 - 519 - 91 and U 86 to average 200 miles per day and to
steer for DJ 19.
An order for full speed is pointless due to heavy seas and the fact that
the large consumption of fuel would limit later activities of the boats.
Incoming message No. 2291/42 Secret from Naval High Command.
1) On the basis of present situation the focal point of action for U-boats
is the landing of the enemy and supply trains for which the enemy is
waiting.
A) The Casablanca area, Safi and Port Lyautey being the most
important harbors for flanking action. According to reports received, the
enemy attack on Casablanca ia already underway.
B) Traffic from England and America to the Mediterranean comes through
the Azores - Gibraltar area where boats are being sent as fast as possible.
Intentions are reported with the numbers of the boats.
2) It is not contemplated sending more boats to the Mediterranean after
Group Delphin has been sent in, at least not for the time being. Further
operations will depend on the development of the situation.
- 101 -
958
Radio order:
1) U 413 - 263 - 98 - 218 - 92 - 566 - 564 - 653 - 613 ordered to make
for CG 87, averaging 200 miles per day.
2) Action discontinued on Neumann convoy.
Purpose: To employ a large number of boats first against landing
operations on the Moroccan coast. Later to attack ships W. of Gibraltar as
they approach the Mediterranean with supplies.
Atlantic Situation
B. Withdrawal of a total of 31 boats (U 755 - 595 - 617 - 407 - 380 - 259
- 155 - 515 - 103 - 108 - 411 - 572 - 173 - 130 - 510 - 572 - 511 - 185 - 519
- 91 - 86 - 413 - 263 - 98 - 218 - 92 - 566 - 564 - 653 - 613) present the
following situation in the Atlantic.
1) Operation of U-boats against convoys has ceased.
a) South of the Great Circle route on the England - American convoy
path there are 9 boats in AK 90 and BD 30, (521 - 522 - 84 - 624 - 704 -
224 - 454 - 383 - 606) which cannot be sent to CG 87 because of fuel
shortage, damage and lack of torpedoes. No further convoy attacks can be
carried out by these boats, in fact it would be difficult for them to find a
convoy.
Purpose: After these boats have been supplied and refueled by a U-
tanker between 7 and 20 November, at least one group will be available
for action against convoys. Until then they will be spread out in their
operational areas in AK 90 and BD 30 as Group "Kreuzotter". Some
success is expected against ships sailing alone and targets of opportunity.
b) Further present in the N. Atlantic: Newfoundland and Nova Scotia
areas - U 518 - 106 and 43. New York area - U 406. 3 outgoing boats in
the North Sea.

2) Middle Atlantic:
a) Trinidad area: 7 boats (129 - 163 - 508 - 505 - 160 - 67 - 154).
b) Coast of Brazil and Cape Verde areas: 4 boats (U 174 - 562 - 134 -
128).
c) Guiana coast: 2 boats (U 161 - 126).
3) Cape Town area: 3 boats (U 177 - 178 - 181).
Total of 29 boats.
The situation will become even less favorable since some boats will
have to return to port soon for supplies - also there are fewer boats in
Germany. The withdrawal from operational areas will be especially large.
A total of 9 boats of type IXC which were on their way southward,
received orders to go to DJ 19. Some of these boats were S. of the
- 102 -
Canaries and one boat moreover was already off Cape Verde. Due to
modification of the orders of earlier operations, the actions off Morocco
and Gibraltar - which could not be anticipated - the effect on the general
Atlantic U-boat warfare was great since most of the boats are far from
their normal operational areas with depleted fuel supplies and long
voyages before them.
C. Enemy supply movements are to be anticipated on a great scale in the
Western Mediterranean. I therefore consider it imperative that
959
Mediterranean boats, as far as possible, be equipped with type G 7a F.A.T.
torpedoes.
Report of German Naval Command, Torpedo Station:
1) B.d.U. considers use of G 7a F.A.T. on boats in the mediterranean as
pressing and important due to heavy protection of warships and transport
groups. In many cases the firing possibilities are limited to excessive
ranges.
2) Use of F.A.T. torpedoes has promise in the case of groups of ships at
long range. (Supply convoys and gatherings of ships in the roads off
landing areas).
3) The question of F.A.T. used with G 7a being practical only on night
operations is answered by the mixed charges of G 7a and G 7e which is
favorable for both day and night operations.
4) According to establishment of possibilities at hand, B.d.U. sets forth
the following:
a) Immediate designation of 24 F.A.T. torpedoes lying ready in Kiel. 6
for Pola and 18 for Spezia.
b) To send out working groups from Kiel to adapt the tubes of the
following boats: U 375 Pola 17 November, U 562 Spezia 22 November, U
453 Spezia 28 November, U 83 Spezia 29 November. Adaptation of 2
tubes on each boat considered enough, in case no more work can be done
because of time.
c) To send out instruction groups from the torpedo testing stations to Italy
for the purpose of instructions the Commandant regarding use of F.A.T.
5) Boats will carry 6 G 7a F.A.T. type torpedo the rest G 7e with 39
pistol. Daytime for bow tubes: 3 G 7e, 1 G 7a F.A.T. Nighttime for bow
tubes 2 G 7a F.A.T. and 2 G 7e with 39 pistol. Different loadings are
indeed decided by the situation.
6) Use of F.A.T. for Western boats is not foreseen because of the former
mode of action.
7) Details of all action in the area must be cleared with Officer
Commanding U-boats Italy.
- 103 -
9.November 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 160 - Op(EP) U 436 - BE 56 U 566 - BD 58
67 - Op(EE) 161 - Op(EV) 437 - BD 95 571 - BE 16
68 - FU 41 163 - Op(ED) 438 - BD 25 572 - DJ 12
71 - AL 84 172 - FT 23 440 - CG 11 590 - DG 66
84 - Op(AK 30) 173 - CF 58 442 - BE 19 595 - CG 90
86 - BE 42 174 - Op(FB) 445 - AN 23 596 - CG 86
87 - DG 66 177 - Op(KZ) 454 - BD 28 603 - Kristiansand
89 - BD 25 178 - Op(KP) 462 - EH 68 606 - BD 30
91 - BE 48 181 - Op(KY) 463 - BF 50 608 - CA 61
92 - BD 35 183 - Op(BB) 465 - AN 30 613 - BD 37
98 - BD 35 185 - AL 74 504 - CG 93 617 - CG 90
103 - DH 24 218 - RD 34 505 - Op(EE) 620 - CG 27
106 - Op(BB 83) 224 - BD 30 508 - Op(ED) 623 - AN 23
107 - DG 63 259 - CG 48 509 - DH 10 624 - BD 20
108 - DH 24 260 - BD 97 510 - DT 32 653 - BD 37
117 - BD 28 263 - AK 66 511 - DT 78 662 - CF 39
126 - Op(EV) 264 - AE 69 514 - BD 61 664 - BF 54
128 - EH 93 332 - EH 19 515 - CF 72 704 - Op(AK 60)
129 - Op(EC) 380 - CG 16 516 - CG 11 752 - DT 54
130 - DH 56 381 - BD 28 518 - Op(BE) 753 - Op(BD 20)
134 - DT 46 383 - BD 30 519 - AK 96 755 - CG 90
154 - Op(EE) 402 - BD 28 521 - AK 60 D 3 - CF 26
155 - BF 72 407 - BD 25 522 - Op(AK 60) D 5 - BE 98
960
156 - DH 14 411 - BF 72 552 - Op(ET)
159 - GQ 95 413 - AL 69 564 - BD 38
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 87 - 89 - 107 - 156 - 159 - 172 - 260 -
332 - 381 - 402 - 436 - 437 - 438 - 440 - 442 - 463 - 504 - 509 - 514 - 516
- 571 - 590 - 620 - 662 - 664 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 514 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 184 - Bergen; U 66 - 176 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 704 fired a 4 torpedo spread at a ship presumed to be "Queen
Elizabeth" class at 1300 in AK 6553. One hit for certain - sharp
detonation heard. After 15 minutes the ship made off on a course 2500.
Pursuit impossible because of high seas. She is believed to be a battleship.
2) U 522 sighted a two-funneled passenger steamer in AK 6652 on
course 1800. Pursuit was discontinued because speed of ship was too
great. The same ship was possibly sighted by U 263 in AL 4177 on course
2500.
3) U 462 again sighted a large tanker on S.E. course in EH 6851.
4) U 128 sank a ship of 10,000 tons in EH 6969 and is evidently hunting
another steamer.
5) On the night of 8 November U 161 sank two ships out of convoy in
EV 7278, 5,000 and 7,000 tons, convoy course 700, speed 9 knots.
Average air patrols in the area.
- 104 -
 2) I expect the same from boats off Morocco and Gibraltar. We must
relentlessly carry out the Fuehrer's will with our tested brutal methods of
6) U 67 situation: Nothing seen on coastal route in EO. Freighter of attack. The sinking of transports will have great significance for the
4,000 tons torpedoed in ED 9944. Sank a 6,000 ton freighter on 9 American attack and the French defence.
November in ED 9644. 3 patrol boats encountered in Tobago Passage. Commander-in-Chief.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: FB 2711, FK 1162, CA 3794.
Sightings by aircraft: in BF 4832.
SOS message from Norwegian tanker "South Africa" (9,234 tons) in V. Reports of Success:
DQ 3750. U 704 1 ship torpedoed
SSS message from unknown steamer in KZ 4612. U 128 1 ship 10,000 tons sunk
Report of torpedoing British steamer "Cerion" (2,588 tons) in KY 6963. U 161 2 ships 12,000 tons sunk
d) None. U 67 1 ship 6,000 tons sunk
1 ship 4,000 tons torpedoed
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) The boats remaining in the N. Atlantic were joined together to make
Group "Kreuzotter" (U 521 - 522 - 84 - 704 - 624 - 753 - 224 - 454 - 383 - 105 -
and 606).
2) U 172 and U 68 to operate on shipping in ER 70 and 50, which was
reported by U 174. Boats had been ordered to return previously.
3) Because of heavy S.E. shipping in EH 60 and 90 as well as EJ 40 and
70, U 128 received orders to operate in these areas after being supplied
from Vowe In case heavy shipping continues as was first established by U
462, it is planned to send U 134 to this area.
4) U 155 - 515 - 103 - 108 - 411 - 572 - 173 and 130 make up Group
"Schlagtot" and are making for DJ 25 at highest possible continuous
speed. U 572, as the first boat, is operating against transports in DJ 2524. 10.November 1942.
c) U 519 has laid weather buoys in A 9755.
d) 1) U 407, 596 and 617 have passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and
are now under the jurisdiction of the Mediterranean U-boat command. I. U 43 - Op(BB 68) U 156 - CF 84 U 383 - Op(BD 32) U 521 -
2) The boats operating in the Gibraltar and Morocco areas have received Op(BD 25)
the following radio message: 66 - BF 55 159 - GQ 59 402 - BD 20 522 - Op(AK 83)
1) The Fuehrer sends to boats in the Mediterranean "I expect a 67 - Op(EE 74) 160 - Op(EP) 411 - BE 98 552 - ES 60
completely victorious operation." 68 - FT 38 161 - Op(EV) 413 - AL 78 564 - BD 69
71 - BE 13 163 - Op(ED) 436 - BE 66 566 - BD 95
961
 84 - Op(AK 91) 172 - FM 84 437 - BE 75 571 - BE 28
86 - BE 73 173 - CF 99 438 - BD 20 572 - DJ 20
87 - DH 17 174 - Op(FB) 440 - BE 96 590 - DH 14
89 - BD 20 176 - BF 55 442 - BE 72 603 - Kristiansand
91 - BE 87 177 - Op(KZ) 445 - AF 76 606 - Op(BD 33)
92 - BD 69 178 - Op(KP) 454 - BD 20 608 - CA 20
98 - BE 71 181 - Op(KY) 462 - EJ 72 613 - BD 69
103 - DH 35 183 - Op(BB) 463 - BF 65 620 - CG 21
106 - BD 29 184 - AF 72 465 - AO 40 623 - AF 76
107 - DH 12 185 - BE 15 504 - GQ 56 624 - BD 25
108 - DH 35 218 - BD 63 505 - Op(EE) 653 - BD 95
117 - BD 29 224 - Op(AK 99) 508 - Op(ED) 662 - CG 12
126 - Op(EV) 259 - CG 85 509 - DH 26 664 - BF 52
128 - EJ 73 260 - BF 74 510 - DH 82 704 - Op(AK 94)
129 - Op(EC) 263 - AL 74 511 - DT 58 752 - DT 34
130 - DJ 17 264 - AE 91 515 - CG 12 753 - Op(BD 98)
134 - DT 64 332 - EH 29 516 - BE 96 755 - CG 90
154 - Op(EE) 380 - CG 49 518 - Op(BB) D 3 - CF 28
155 - CG 15 381 - BD 20 519 - BD 34 D 5 - DF 74
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 87 - 89 - 107 - 156 - 159 - 172 - 260 -
332 - 381 - 402 - 436 - 437 - 438 - 504 - 440 - 442 - 463 - 509 - 516 - 571
- 590 - 620 - 662 - 664 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 664 - Brest.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 128 sank 3 ships the last of which was the British "Start Point"
(5,293 BRT) in this area. All on course 1200.
2) U 183 situation: Single ship and convoy movements in BB 8175.
On 6 November U 183 torpedoed a tanker of 6,000 tons in BB 8146. She
was hit by a two torpedo spread shot while sailing in strongly protected
convoy. Due to destroyer activity, she could not observe the sinking.
962
3) U 178 sank a passenger freighter of 4,000 tons and "Trektive" 5,244
tons on 4 November in KP 53. Nothing sighted in KQ 50 from 7 to 10
November. Ship reported sunk on 1 November was not the "Laurentic"
but "Talma Class". According to intercepts "Mandoza" 8,199 tons was
sunk.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 72, EE 48, EE 7840, CH 8395.
Aircraft sighted U-boats in CH 7623 and BF 7923.
Torpedoing report from "Viceroy of India" in CH 8449. SOS message
from KZ 46.
d) None.
- 106 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) As attack areas: U 130 - 173 - 108 and 509 have sector off Fedala
and Casablanca, U 103 off Safi. Attacks ordered on all types of transports
and warships and in still water complete action.
2) As compensation for boats drawn from the mid-Atlantic areas for the
N. African operation, 2 boats were turned back from their homeward
cruise to take positions in EH 60 and EJ 70. These two boats are U 332
and U 552 whose cruises can be extended since they have recently been
refueled (boats have already been at sea 69 and 64 days).
3) U 611, 262 and 663, until now under the command of Admiral Arctic
have been ordered to AK 03 via AD 50. It is proposed to have these boats
operate against N. Atlantic shipping in the area of Group "Kreuzotter".
 c) 1) U 66 was bombed in BF 4998 by an English airplane on her
outward bound voyage. She was unable to dive and returned to Lorient by
"Kernleder" route. The plane followed the boat until about 0300 hours.
Security Division sent 3 trawlers and 2 JU 88 which picked up U 66 at
Point Kern and convoyed her home. By morning she was again
seaworthy.
2) The blockade runner "Spichern" was in BF 7642 at 0200 hours and
sailed for El Ferrol at a speed of 6 knots. The ship was heavily bombed by
an English plane. Boats nearby were ordered to spread out to pick up any
of the crew who might have gone overboard.
3) U 608 completed her mining operation according to orders. (New
York).
4) Due to unfavorable weather, transfer of supplies from "Neumann"
were put off. U 454 was the second boat to carry out the transfer.
d) 1) The temporary attack permission on "Anton" route between 300 N.,
and 100 S. was lifted by degrees: Restrictions from 11 November at 0000
to 200 N. From 13 November at 0000 restrictions to 100 N. and from 14
November attack is forbidden on "Anton" route. Captains are required to
obey these orders to the letter.
2) U 259 has passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and is therefore
under jurisdiction of U-boat Commander of the Mediterranean.
V. Reports of Success:
U 128 1 ship 5,293 tons.
U 183 1 ship 6,000 tons.
U 178 2 ships 9,244 tons.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 107 -
963
11.November 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 156 - CF 56 U 383 - Op(BD 32) U 521 - BD 20
67 - Op(EE) 159 - GQ 54 402 - BD 20 522 - Op(AK 83)
68 - FT 22 160 - Op(EP) 411 - CG 46 524 - AO 40
71 - BE 23 161 - Op(EV) 412 - BE 72 552 - ES 32
84 - Op(AK 91) 163 - Op(ED) 436 - BF 67 564 - CF 21
86 - CF 23 172 - FM 47 437 - BE 84 566 - CF 15
87 - CE 88 173 - Op(DJ 12) 438 - BD 20 571 - BE 65
89 - BD 20 174 - Op(ER) 440 - BF 75 572 - Op(DJ 20)
91 - CE 38 176 - BF 49 442 - BE 81 590 - CF 85
92 - BE 78 177 - Op(KZ) 445 - AF 47 603 - Kristiansand
98 - CF 21 178 - Op(KQ) 454 - BD 20 606 - Op(BD)
103 - Op(DJ 19) 181 - Op(KZ) 462 - EJ 70 608 - Op(CA 20)
106 - Op(BB) 183 - Op(BB) 463 - BF 62 611 - AD 20
107 - CF 85 184 - AF 47 465 - AD 40 613 - CF 13
108 - Op(DJ 16) 185 - BE 54 504 - GQ 24 620 - BF 85
117 - BD 28 218 - BE 75 505 - Op(EE) 623 - AF 47
126 - Op(EV) 224 - Op(AK 99 508 - Op(ED) 624 - BD 20
128 - EH 69 260 - BF 73 509 - DJ 14 653 - CF 15
129 - Op(EC) 262 - AD 20 510 - DH 64 662 - BF 72
130 - Op(DJ 20) 263 - BE 15 511 - DT 38 663 - AD 20
134 - EH 36 264 - AM 13 515 - CG 57 704 - Op(AK 94)
154 - Op(EE) 332 - EH 37 516 - BF 75 752 - DH 87
155 - CG 43 380 - CG 89 518 - Op(BB) 753 - Op(AK 98)
381 - BD 20 519 - BE 71 755 - CG 90
D 3 - CF 57
D 5 - BF 73

On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 87 - 89 - 107 - 156 - 159 - 172 - 260 -
332 - 381 - 402 - 436 - 437 - 438 - 442 - 463 - 504 - 509 - 516 - 571 - 590
- 620 - 662 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 463 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 460 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 106 situation: Only 1 steamer sighted in BB. Heavy sea patrols
both by single ships and groups, medium air patrols. Boat operating
further in BB and CB 20.
2) U 173 sighted a strongly protected convoy in DJ 2519 - 2 battleships,
1 transport, about 10 freighters entering Casablanca. 3 detonations were
heard as she attacked, one hit scored on a freighter for sure. Aircraft and
destroyer groups working together off the harbor.
3) U 160 sank "City of Rippen" in EO 1574, 6,368 tons, course 2900.
4) U 174 saw nothing in ER 50 and returned to FC and FB.
5) U 505 was bombed in EE 8468 and has only limited diving ability.
Doctor's help is seriously needed. Boat received orders to sail for EH 60
where U 462 is waiting with a doctor on board.
6) U 704 reported that the ship torpedoed was not a battleship but the
fast steamer "Queen Elizabeth".
b) None.
- 108 -
964
c) U-boat sightings: BB 4141, ER 9552, ED 7243.
Air observation reported U-boats in BF 1427, BF 81, (unsuccessful
depth charges) and CG 7931.
U-boat warning for KZ 46.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) New course for U 455 - 264 - 623 and 184 is AK 93. Action on
convoys is foreseen for these boats.
2) U 174 returned to areas FC and EB. According to report of Italian U-
boat "J 8" ships are moving through this area again.
3) U 608 given freedom of movement along the whole American coast
to Newfoundland. Refueling and supplying is foreseen.
c) U 117 has supplied U 402 and U 381 for return cruises and U 454 for
further operations.
d) U 755 and 380 have passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and are
under jurisdiction of Commanding Officer Submarines Mediterranean. All
boats have now entered the Mediterranean as planned.
V. Reports of Success:
U 173 1 ship torpedoed
U 160 1 ship sunk 6,368 tons.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
12.November 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BC 40) U 159 - GQ 14 U 402 - BD 28 U 522 - Op(AK
83)
67 - Op(EE) 160 - Op(EO) 411 - CG 84 524 - AN 36
68 - FM 76 161 - Op(EV) 413 - BE 55 552 - ES 23
71 - BE 55 163 - Op(EC) 436 - BF 52 564 - CF 52
 84 - Op(AK 91) 172 - FL 62 437 - BE 96 566 - CF 52
86 - CF 63 173 - Op(DJ 25) 438 - BD 28 571 - BF 44
87 - CF 59 174 - Op(ER) 440 - BF 81 572 - DJ 20-Op
89 - BD 28 176 - BE 99 442 - BE 91 590 - CF 67
91 - CG 47 177 - Op(KZ) 445 - AE 68 603 - Kristiansand
92 - CF 29 178 - Op(KQ) 454 - BD 31 606 - Op(BD 33)
98 - CF 61 181 - Op(KZ) 460 - BF 58 608 - Op(CA)
103 - Op(DJ 10) 183 - Op(BB) 462 - EH 65 611 - AD 50
106 - Op(BB) 184 - AE 68 465 - AO 613 - CF 28
107 - CF 37 185 - BE 88 504 - GQ 11 620 - BF 93
108 - Op(DJ 16) 218 - CF 25 505 - Op(EE) 623 - AE 68
117 - BD 28 224 - Op(AK 99 508 - Op(ED) 624 - BD 28
126 - Op(EW) 260 - DF 81 509 - Op(DJ 10) 653 - CF 53
128 - EH 65 262 - AD 50 510 - DJ 17 662 - BF 81
129 - Op(EC) 263 - BE 54 511 - DH 88 663 - AD 50
130 - Op(DJ 20) 264 - AL 36 515 - Op(CG 19) 704 - AK 94
134 - EH 63 332 - EH 65 516 - BF 81 752 - DH 59
154 - Op(EF) 381 - BD 37 518 - Op(BB) 753 - Op(AK 98)
155 - CG 87 383 - Op(BD 32) 519 - CF 21 D 3 - CF 87
156 - CF 38 521 - BD 20 D 5 - BF 52
- 109 -
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 87 - 89 - 107 - 156 - 159 - 172 - 260 -
332 - 381 - 402 - 436 - 437 - 438 - 440 - 442 - 504 - 509 - 516 - 571 - 590
- 620 - 662 - 704 - D 5.
965
Entered Port: U 436 - D 5 - Lorient; U 620 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 118 - Lorient; U 439 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 505 sank a freighter of 5,500 tons in EO 1122 on 7 November,
course 3200. Addition to yesterday's damage report: After gun bombed
by aircraft on 10 November. Plane shot down.
2) U 108 situation: Nothing seen from 11 to 12 November while en
route to Casablanca on "Cape Caetin" coastal area. Lengthy depth charge
attack by search group in DJ 2281.
3) U 173 sighted a convoy in DJ 2218 at 2332 hours, course 3000, speed
15 knots. She followed but was unable to attack because of fast screening
vessels. Last position 0250 DJ 2132.
4) U 130 sank 2 transports off Fedala in a daylight attack. A third was
possibly sunk. Total 22,500 tons. Situation: about 20 freighters off
Fedala also 1 carrier. Heavy sea patrols, especially at night. Heavy air
patrols during the day. Ships moving only during the day in water of 30
meters depth.
5) U 515 fired 4 torpedoes at a "Birmingham" type cruiser - a fifth hit
was heard. K class destroyer evidently sunk.
6) U 572 situation: heavy destroyer patrols 30 miles off the coast.
Forced to submerge every night by destroyers.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BD 63, EC 41, EC 96, BB 66, BA 9739.
English aircraft report U-boats in AL 85, CG 8691, AN 1629.
U-boat attack in FD 95/96 and EC 96.
SSS report from English "Ascanius" (100,048 tons) in KY 56.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Boats in CG moved against convoy reported by U 173. Boats in DJ are
to operate only if they are in position ahead after night attack so that
daylight attack can be carried on. Due to U 173 losing contact and high
speed of the convoy no other boats approached it.
 b) 1) U 704 has sick aboard and has begun return cruise. U 521 took
inner position of Group "Kreuzotter", area (AK 94).
2) U 172 requested permission to return via FK and FC and to operate in
FC 50 for a few days.
- 110 -
U 68 also given permission for freedom of action on her return cruise
because of Italian U-boat's report of ship movements in the area.
3) Following boats took position on E. - W. routes: U 411 - CG 8640;
U 155 and 86 - CG 8671 and CG 8674; U 515 and U 91 - CG 8677, 8911,
8914. Eastern focal point is Gibraltar. U 510 is operating in area DJ 1992.
U 98, 564, 653, 566, 613, 92, 218, 519, 185, 413 and U 273 are sailing at
top speed for CG 89. U 752 and 511 - DJ 21.
c) 1) U 117 has supplied U 438, 89 and 624.
2) U 413 transferred her sick to U 71.
d) 1) Experienced captains who have returned give the following advice
to the boats: Dive to 80 meters when in danger of aircraft attacks. Go to
shallower water only when you are sure you have not been seen or when it
is appropriate because of bearings. Go only as far as periscope depth if
you are not seen, since it is easier to resurface from there.
2) In order to intercept traffic moving along the Brazilian coast at this
time in FC - FB, B.d.U. change the route "Anton" as follows: Western
limit: 470 30' N. - 020 40' W. over 470 30' N. - 300 W. over 400 N. - 450
W. south to 50 N. - 450 W. to 10 N. - 290 W. to 150 S. - 290 W. and a 400
miles strip along the coast.
966
Eastern limit: Spanish coast to 420 N. over 420 N. - 300 W. to S. and
130 N. - 300 W. to 50 S. - 140 W. to 400 S. - 50 E. (Changed later - see
War Diary of 17 November).
V. Reports of Success:
U 505 1 ship 5,500 tons
U 130 3 ships 22,500 tons
U 515 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer sunk.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
13.November 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BC) U 159 - GG 79 U 413 - BE 89 U 564 - CG 71
67 - Op(EE) 160 - Op(EO) 437 - BE 72 566 - CF 69
68 - FL 69 161 - Op(EV) 438 - BD 39 571 - BF 92
71 - BE 94 163 - Op(EC) 439 - AO 572 - Op(DJ 20)
84 - Op(AK 94) 172 - FL 51 440 - BF 52 590 - CF 38
86 - Op(CG 73) 173 - Op(DJ 20) 442 - BE 93 603 - Kristiansand
87 - CF 38 174 - Op(ER) 454 - Op(BD 31) 606 - BD 33
89 - BD 20 176 - CG 14 445 - AE 86 608 - Op(CA)
91 - Op(CG 80) 177 - Op(KZ) 460 - BE 49 611 - AD 80
92 - CF 69 178 - Op(KP 80) 462 - EH 60 613 - CF 69
98 - CG 71 181 - Op(KZ) 465 - AO 623 - AE 86
103 - Op(DJ 10) 183 - Op(BB) 504 - GG 79 624 - BD 23
106 - Op(BB) 184 - AE 86 505 - EE 91 653 - CF 64
107 - CG 11 185 - CG 41 508 - Op(ED) 662 - BF 57
108 - Op(DJ 20) 218 - CF 66 509 - Op(DJ 20) 663 - AD 80
117 - BB 20 224 - Op(AK 99) 510 - Op(DJ 10) 704 - BD 32
118 - BF 55 260 - BF 59 511 - DH 64 752 - DJ 41
- 111 - 3) U 185 sighted convoy of large, many funneled steamers and a
London type cruiser in CF 6226, course 3350. Could not approach
because of high speed of the convoy.
4) U 438 lost contact on a steamer in BD 3853, two stacks, course
northward, speed 16 knots.
5) U 89 reported sinking a ship on 4 November and 2 further
detonations although other ships were not seen to sink.
6) U 224 sank "New Cannes", 7,000 tons on 12 November in AL 7481.
Course 600.
7) U 181 sank "Meldahl" on 10 November in KZ 4681, 3,799 tons,
126 - Op(EV) 262 - AD 80 515 - Op(CG 18) 753 - AK 98-Op course S.E., underway from Capetown to Bombay. On 13 November she
128 - EH 60 263 - BE 98 516 - BF 61 D 3 - DH 14 sank "Exelli" in KZ 1914, 4,969 tons, course 2350, underway from Suez to
129 - Op(EC) 264 - AL 28 518 - Op(BB) Capetown.
130 - Op(DJ 20) 332 - EH 60 519 - CF 61 8) U 159 on 13 November sank the six masted schooner "Star of
134 - EH 60 381 - BD 39 521 - BD 20 Scotland", 2,290 tons, underway from Capetown to Paranagua, loaded
154 - Op(EP) 383 - Op(BD 32) 522 - Op(AK 83) with artillery.
155 - Op(CG 80) 402 - BE 41 524 - AF 28 9) U 154 on 8 November, sank a freighter of 7,000 tons in EE 5386
156 - BE 98 411 - Op(CG 80) 552 - EJ 76 course 2400.
U 505 situation: Ships entering Port of Spain are doing so during the
day via EO 1510 and 1120. Two shots missed on a freighter, course 3200.
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 87 - 89 - 107 - 156 - 159 - 172 - 260 - 10) U 129 has encountered convoy movements in EC 9610 and 9270
332 - 381 - 402 - 437 - 440 - 442 - 504 - 509 - 516 - 571 - 590 - 662 - 704. since 5 November. On 13 November she sighted a convoy in EC 9533 on
Entered Port: U 440 - Brest. course 3100, speed 8 knots. Additional convoys
Sailed: - . -
- 112 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) U 103 saw no ships either in area from DJ 1995 - 1965 or in the
roads. Strong destroyer screen in front of the harbor.
2) U 510 sighted two smoke plumes in DJ 1977 which she established
as patrol craft.
U 509 reported tow mine detonated under her stern in DJ 2522. She
was hunted by a destroyer. Water depth 60 m. B.d.U. discredits this mine
report - considers it unlikely.

967
 leave Curacao at dawn via EC 9227 and 9521. Movements in
opposite direction at dusk. Medium to heavy patrols by land based
aircraft.
11) U 163 encountered a convoy forming at 1900 in EC 9628 and sank a
freighter of 6,000 tons. More hits were heard on a freighter of 5,000 tons.
2 hits scored on a destroyer, which was left in a burning and sinking
condition.
12) 1st Officer of the "Start Point" sunk by U 128 has revealed the
following courses: ships leaving N. Channel sail to 300 W., the S. to EH
61, then follow course 1250.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 63, EC 9232, CG 8558, BB 66, BA 97, FB
9830, BB 41.
U-boat attacks: in ED 9430 and KZ 28.
d) None.
613 - 8614; U 218 - 8671; U 519 - 9817; U 413 - 8971; U 108 - DJ
2117; U 185 - 2135; U 263 - 2184. Boats were free to move out to sea
because of strong static defences. U 511 occupied area off Mogador and
Agadir. In case there is no activity there, she is to go to AJ 21. U 509 sails
today for Mehdia, since troop transports are evidently in that area. U 752
and 510 are in areas off Casablanca and Fedala.
c) U 505 and U 154 have transferred morphium in EE 60.
d) None.
- 113 -

IV. Current Operations:

a) None.
b) 1) Group "Kreuzotter" received orders to take position in order: U
264, 522, 521, 624, 753, 454, 224, 606, 383. Boats to take up patrol area
from AK 3946 to AK 8686 on 15 November. S.W. bound convoy is V. Reports of Success:
expected on 15 November according to our own data. This convoy U 224 1 ship 7,000 tons sunk
operation is possible due to refueling of U 624, 454, 606 by U 117 and the U 159 1 ship 2,290 tons sunk
return of U 264. A U-tanker is underway to aid (U 84 - 224 - 383 - 606) U 163 1 ship 6,000 tons 1 destroyer sunk
who are all low on fuel. To strengthen the group the following boats are 1 ship 5,000 tons torpedoed
sailing from Germany at top speed for AK 55 (U 611 - 262 - 363 - 445 - U 181 2 ships 8,768 tons sunk
184 and 623). U 154 2 ships 13,000 tons sunk.
2) Due to the imminent return of a number of boats operating in the
south, U 176 is sailing via CF 70 and DS 90 to FC, the area where greatest
concentration of ships from Capetown to Trinidad is found. ---------------------------------------------------
3) In case U 128 is not in her operational area at the end of 3 days, she ---------------
will be ordered to FC 50 for further operations.
4) New course for U 118 is DS 90, for U 460 is BD 65. 14.November 1942.
5) The following are taking positions in area of 25 meters depth: U 92 -
CG 9431; U 411 - 9464; U 155 - 9494; U 515 - 9737; U 91 - 9795; U
98 - 8665; U 86 - 8698; U 564 - 8965; U 653 - 8268; U 566 - 9376; U I. U 43 - Op(BC) U 156 - BF 45 U 402 - BE 43 U 524 - Kristiansand
968
 67 - Op(EE) 159 - CG 42 411 - Op(CG 90) 552 - EH 93
68 - FL 64 160 - Op(EO) 413 - CG 42 564 - Op(CG 85)
71 - BE 66 161 - Op(EV) 437 - BF 67 566 - CG 81
84 - BD 31 163 - Op(EC 59) 438 - BE 17 571 - BF 68
86 - Op(CG 90) 172 - FL 17 439 - AN 36 572 - Op(DJ 20)
87 - CG 12 173 - Op(DJ 20) 442 - BF 67 590 - CG 11
89 - BE 17 174 - Op(FC) 445 - AE 83 603 - AN 28
91 - Op(CG 90) 176 - CF 30 454 - Op(BD 31) 606 - Op(BD 33)
92 - CG 82 177 - Op(KZ) 460 - BF 71 608 - Op(CA)
98 - Op(CG 85) 178 - Op(KP) 462 - EH 60 611 - AD 86
103 - Op(DJ 19) 181 - Op(KZ) 465 - AO 613 - CG 81
106 - Op(BB) 183 - Op(BB) 504 - CG 48 623 - AE 94
107 - BE 99 184 - AL 37 505 - EV 45 624 - Op(AK 95)
108 - Op(DJ 20) 185 - CG 48 508 - Op(ED) 653 - CG 48
117 - Op(BD 35) 218 - CG 81 509 - DJ 20 662 - BE 93
118 - BF 48 224 - Op(AK) 510 - DJ 19 663 - AD 80
126 - Op(EV) 260 - BF 55 511 - Op(DJ 40) 704 - BE 15
128 - EH 60 262 - AD 80 515 - Op(CG 90) 752 - Op(DJ 20)
129 - Op(EC) 263 - CG 42 516 - BF 55 753 - Op(AK)
130 - Op(DJ 20) 264 - AL 01 518 - Op(BB) D 3 - DG 66
134 - EH 60 332 - EH 60 519 - CG 72
154 - Op(EE) 381 - BE 43 521 - Op(AK 94
155 - Op(CG 90) 383 - Op(BD 32) 522 - Op(AK 83
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 87 - 89 - 107 - 156 - 159 - 172 - 260 -
332 - 381 - 404 - 437 - 438 - 442 - 504 - 509 - 516 - 571 - 590 - 662 - 704.
Entered Port: U 516 - Lorient; U 571 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 758 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 508 reports convoy of 16 to 20 steamers in ED 9497, course
3100, speed 9 knots. She was forced to sheer off by aircraft and suspected
that the convoy veered sharply on bearing 200. Contact was lost because
969
of showers. Convoy course is evidently N.W., last position was at 0513 in
ED 9188.
U 163 operated against the convoy in EC 6835. Boat was repeatedly
attacked by land based bombers during the night because her Radar
Interception gear was out of order. Heavy air activity during the day
without location.
- 114 -
2) U 134 requested permission to attack steamer in EH 9551, (E.
corner route "Anton") on W. course, approaching from the E. After
clearing with Naval High Command, permission was granted and the ship,
Scapa Flow", of 7,000 tons, was sunk. Course 2900.
3) U 413 made contact on convoy at 0900 in CG 4556. Convoy
included a carrier, course N, speed 10 knots. She sank the troop transport
"Warwick Castle", 20,107 tons. Further action was impossible because of
the weather situation.
4) U 185 sighted a corvette in CG 7397 on course 00.
5) U 155 scored hits on 3 large transports in CG 8665. Boat was forced
to submerge after the attack and was not able to make further observations.
6) U 564 reported enemy in sight in CG 8543. 4 large transports with 2
patrol craft were seen. Contact was lost due to trouble with the starboard
diesel. According to sound bearings, convoy course is N.E., last bearing
from CG 8527 lay in direction 800. At 0642 she sighted another enemy
group on course 2300, speed 14 knots.
7) U 108 plans to repair her diving gear in DH 29 or 26.
8) U 509 situation: No activity observed on 13 November either day or
night up to the 100 meter line. Mine detonation is considered to have been
an antenna mine, as opposed to former conjectures. Dragging noises could
be heard the entire length of the hull. Detonation blossom was 10 meters
high.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: EC 75, EC 93, EC 96, BB 6375, ET 75.
Aircraft reported U-boats in CG 8489, CG 8674 (depth charge attack).
Torpedo reports from British "Advertiser" 6,348 tons in KZ 3441 and
"Warwick Castle" 20,107 tons in CG 4524.
U-boat warning for KZ 27 and KY 9234.
2) Sailing report of a convoy for 14 November consisted of 1 carrier
(converted type), 2 raiders, 2 destroyers, 5 corvettes and 5 large transports.
Sailing from Gibraltar toward the Atlantic.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 572 went to Mazagan and U 91 to Mehdia to sound out the harbor
and roads of these ports.
U 518 given permission to go to BB 70 in case there is no activity in
her old area (BA).
U 445 and U 653 are sailing at cruising speed for the area as ordered,
as opposed to yesterday's plan. Position of the boats was farther eastward
than supposed and it was pointless to wait for the expected convoy.
- 115 -
970
2) U 154 was ordered to EO, or in case this was not possible, to EP, for
operation against ships believed moving through these areas, as related by
intercepts. Course of the 2 steamers is available. Boats will be informed.
c) U 332 and 134 have been supplied by U 462.
d) 1) Boats were forbidden to attack sailing vessels of about 50 tons in
area E. of 450 W. and S. of 480 N. in the Bay of Biscay. Reason being that
some of our own craft of this size are carrying out a very important
operation.
2) According to experienced captains who have returned, it is better to
cruise with Radar Interceptor gear turned off during clear weather. Boats
have been given a corresponding order.
V. Reports of Success:
U 134 1 ship 7,000 tons
U 413 1 ship 20,107 tons
U 155 3 ships torpedoed.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
15.November 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BC) U 159 - CF 36 U 413 - Op(CG 84) U 572 - Op(DJ
20)
67 - Op(EE) 160 - Op(EO) 437 - BF 65 590 - BF 77
68 - FL 51 161 - Op(EV) 438 - BE 51 603 - AF 87
71 - BF 48 163 - Op(EC) 439 - AN 31 606 - Op(AK)
84 - AK 93 172 - FK 35 442 - BF 67 608 - Op(BB)
86 - Op(DG 80) 173 - Op(DJ 20) 445 - AE 87 611 - AK 24
87 - BF 77 174 - Op(FC) 454 - Op(AK 60) 613 - Op(DG 80)
89 - BE 51 176 - CF 83 460 - BE 95 623 - AE 94
91 - Op(DJ 20) 177 - Op(KZ) 462 - EH 60 624 - Op(AK 60)
92 - Op(DG 90) 178 - Op(KZ) 465 - AO 653 - Op(CG 80)
98 - Op(DG 80) 181 - Op(KZ) 504 - CF 62 662 - BF 72
 103 - Op(DJ 10) 183 - Op(CB 20) 505 - EF 64 663 - AK 27
106 - Op(CB) 184 - AL 01 508 - Op(ED) 704 - BE 57
107 - BF 75 185 - Op(DJ 20) 509 - Op(DJ 20) 752 - Op(DJ 20)
108 - Op(DJ 20) 218 - Op(CG 80) 510 - Op(DJ 20) 753 - Op(AK)
117 - BE 14 224 - Op(AK 60) 511 - Op(DJ 40) 758 - AO
118 - BE 93 260 - BF 61 515 - Op(DG 90) D 3 - DT 12
126 - Op(EW) 262 - AK 23 518 - Op(BB)
128 - Op(EH 90) 263 - Op(DJ 20) 519 - Op(CG 80)
129 - Op(EC) 264 - Op(AK 30) 521 - Op(AK)
130 - Op(DJ 20) 332 - Op(EH) 522 - OP(AK 60)
134 - EH 97 381 - BE 58 524 - Kristiansand
154 - Op(EE) 383 - Op(AK 60) 552 - Op(EH 60)
155 - Op(DG 90) 402 - BE 53 564 - Op(DG 80)
156 - BF 57 411 - Op(DG 90) 566 - Op(DG 80)
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 87 - 89 - 107 - 156 - 159 - 172 - 260 -
332 - 381 - 402 - 437 - 438 - 442 - 504 - 509 - 590 - 662 - 704.
Entered Port: U 260 - Lorient; U 437 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 116 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 66, see paragraph IVa.
2) Situation and sighting reports:
971
U 171 in KY 6968, ship "Cerion", sailing empty was engaged by
artillery over a period of 2 days and nights in heavy swells, course 2400.
Artillery action broken off due to failure of U-boat gun. 15 November
ship "California" pursued in vain. Course 2700, speed 16 knots. Coastal
movements from East London to Durban along 200 meter line.
U 126 reports no activity from EV 59 over 69 to EW 47, 75 and 84. 2
Spanish ships seen in area EW 80. Off the entrance to Duals there are
standing patrols on the 40 meter line, otherwise no activity and no air
patrols.
U 504 FU 8788 supply ship, course S.E. speed 16 knots.
U 160 15 November an empty freighter in EO 1568, course 3100.
Began gradual return to port. Boat received orders to remain in
operational area. Refueling and supplying is foreseen.
3) U 67 sighted "Rio Diamante" on 14 November in EE 7758 and sank
"King Arthur" (5,224 tons) on 15 November in EO 7788, course 2950.
4) U 608 sank 5,00 ton freighter in BB 8898 on course 1600.
5) Situation report - Moroccan Coast:
U 173 - harbor of Fedala empty. 3 freighters beached in Bouznicha
Roads (U 130). Cruiser with screen entered Casablanca on 14 November.
On 15 November a heavily protected convoy sailed over DJ 2259, 2326
and 5519. Battle group consisted of 2 battleships, 1 carrier and 2
transports. Daily sea and air patrols off Casablanca Roads in 25 - 30 meter
area. Periodic locations during the night. Hit scored on passenger steamer
with air cover. 6,000 tons, course 2250, speed 15 knots.
U 218 was picked up by destroyer while attacking the carrier escort.
Due to heavy air and surface depth charging she was damaged and ordered
home.
U 510 sighted a battleship in DJ 2173 also carriers, transports and 10
destroyers, course W., medium speed. 3 misses on battleship from
extreme range. Heavy air patrols. Pursuit was without success.
U 752 damaged by depth charges in DJ 2192.
U 509 forced to submerge (on 14 and 15 November in DJ 2250 and
2220) during the day by aircraft. Heavy air and sea depth charging due to
oil track. Forced to sheer off at night by patrol vessel. Damage negligible.
U 511 Agidir Roads clear on 14 November, no patrols. Nothing seen
off Mogador 15 November.
 c) - d) None.

- 117 - V. Reports of Success:

U 67 1 ship 5,224 tons.
U 608 1 ship 5,000 tons.
U 173 1 ship 6,000 tons torpedoed.

(Signed): DÖNITZ

U 572 made off from land because of faulty Radar Interception gear.
Boat ordered to return because of depleted fuel supply.
U 130 sighted patrol craft off Mehdia Roads.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EC 7530, AL 2640, CG 8963, CG 7398, BE 9438, - 118 -
CG 7659, EC 7520.
Depth charge attacks by aircraft: CG 8175 and 8422.
British ship "Advertiser" reported being torpedoed in KZ 3441.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

a) Convoy No. 66:
U 521 reported at 2327 expecting convoy of 20 ships in AK 6136, speed
7 knots. Boat had trouble with radio and must use emergency transmitter.
Group "Kreuzotter" received orders to act on Bargsten's report 28 October 1942.
immediately.
b) 1) Before sighting the convoy U 611, 262, 663 received orders to join Additional Order to Operational
Group "Kreuzotter" and lengthen the patrol line to AK 2866 in the N. U Order No. 53 for "U 595" and "U 755"
184 took up the position of U 624. This boat and all others S. thereof are
taking positions in the S. I. Operation: To sail through Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean
2) U 163 is operating in area E. of Trinidad because of Radar Interceptor during the new moon period in the first half of November. Further
failure. operations in the Mediterranean comes under F.d.U. Italy.
3) Due to return cruise of U 218, U 613 took position in CG 8671, U Operation to be given up only:
566 in CG 8614 and U 92 in CG 9476. 1) If mechanical damage necessitates return.
972
 2) Failure of Radar Interceptor. - 119 -
3) In case repeated attempts to break through meet with failure. (See III
5)

II. General: Breakthrough will succeed without trouble only if the enemy
has no forewarning of the attempt, therefore:
1) Strictest secrecy must be maintained by Officers and men until report
is given that they have passed through.
2) Boat must remain unseen when in the Gibraltar area.

III. Operational Plan:
1) Boats to put out between 30 October and 1 November.
2) Report passing N. of 420 N.
3) Between 420 N. and 390 N.,
a) Radio limited only to matters of tactical importance.
b) General freedom for attack, but no convoy operation or requests for
attack clearance.
4) S. of 390 N. between 150 W. and 00 E.,
a) Radio silence except for danger reports. Situation report only in case
it is important for other boats.
b) Liberty to attack only battleships and carriers.
5) Both boats to break through in one night, according to plan on 9
November. Report of breakthrough to be given "Operation . . . . . . . .
carried out" with 2 digit number, whereby the number divided by 2 gives
the evening during which the breakthrough was carried out.
Example: "Operation 36 carried out" means: Breakthrough
accomplished on night of 18-19 November. In case another attempt is
necessary a 2 digit number will be given which when divided by 3 will
give the date. Example: "New operation 60" means: Breakthrough
accomplished on 20-21 November.
In order to receive messages on the day before the attempt is made,
boats are to switch to the longest wave length possible at mid-day and
listen for the first 15 minutes of each hour, that is 1200 - 1215, 1400 -
1415 German Standard time, etc.
In case operation is unsuccessful the first night, another attempt will be
made the next night. In case this also fails, boats will sail westward and
try again on the 5th night.
IV. Experience gained from the last breakthrough in October 1942:
Course followed was between middle of the Straits and the 200 meter line
along the African side. Patrol boats unable to be seen. Searchlights from
Gibraltar from time to time. Due to continuous air patrols Enge sailed
through submerged.
V. In case the operation fails because of Radar Interceptor breakdown or
3 unsuccessful attempts have been made, boats are to sail westward and
report after passing 150 W. On return cruise boats must report first when
N. of 430 N.
For the Officer Commanding U-
boats
Chief of Operations Division.

973

- 120 -
Estimate of U-boat Situation
18 November 1942.
1) The U-boat operation in the Mediterranean has met with the following
success since 8 November: 100,000 tons of merchant shipping sunk,
including the presumed "Viceroy of India". 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1
escort boat. Damaged were: 1 carrier, 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 corvette.
Against this we have losses and damage to 19 U-boats. 5 boats evidently
lost (U 259 - 331 - 595 - 605 - 660). 8 boats heavily damaged and no
longer seaworthy. 3 boats lightly damaged. That is to say, within 10 days
2/3 of the boats have either been destroyed or put out of action. These
heavy losses must be attributed to attack of the first line of the enemy
forces during the landing operations.
2) Estimations of the prospects for the future are as follows:
974
a) The large umber of targets, which has resulted in our successes to date,
will fall off after the main landing operation has been completed. Current
supplies will be brought in with smaller but more heavily protected
convoys. Possibilities of success will therefore fall off. Chance for
success against ships in the roads is no longer to be expected, after the
enemy has taken possession of the harbors.
b) Losses to date have been attributable to air attacks. The air situation
will however, become worse, rather than better after the enemy has taken
over air fields and put them into operation. Already the boats must attack
from set positions. F.d.U. Italy requires boats to send their positions. That
is indeed a misfortune. That is to say that the boats will continually be
under the eye of the enemy air force from the time they leave port until
they reach their targets.
c) The experience gained from the operation so far indicates that U-boats
have not hindered enemy operations where all safety precautions;
including heavy air patrols, were used. This also applies to future landing
activities of the enemy and attacks we make on him. The U-boat is
destined for this operation and there is no way out.
3) Operations of 22 boats W. of Gibraltar and Morocco resulted in: 54,000
tons of merchant shipping, 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer sunk. Damaged were:
6 merchant ships. One U-boat was badly damaged and 3 had superficial
damage. It has not been yet established whether any boats were lost.
Almost half of the damage was done by one attack on the ships in the
roads as they lay motionless. Success and losses were smaller in
proportion to boats in the Mediterranean in view of large number of boats
and the short time the action lasted.
Prospects for the future (as under 2) in the Mediterranean is just as valid
in the battle against the supply lines of U.S.A. and England coming to
Gibraltar area between or immediately W. of the St. Vincent - Casablanca
line.
a) Good prospects of success can be seen only in areas outside the realm
of air patrols. Such an area cannot be found on the route from England to
Gibraltar. That we have learned from experience in our action against
convoys.
 b) Action against convoys from U.S.A. outside air patrol areas, that is,
W. of the Azores, holds no promise either, since the enemy can
- 121 -
scarcely be found in such a large area. The ratio here is fundamentally
different than in the case of convoy attacks in the N. Atlantic, where
current information regarding time and course of convoy movements and
establishment of intercept service, makes for successful operation on even
single convoys in spite of the expanse of the area.
c) The area to the E. of the Azores would perhaps make possible more
freedom for operation than the St. Vincent - Casablanca area if air patrols
and air cover were less intense. Time and space do not suffice to offer
large success against E. bound targets before they reach the coastal areas
and nothing can be expected from W. bound convoys save occasional
individual sinkings. These however are easier in other areas.
4) Action near the entrance to the Mediterranean can therefore be carried
out only W. of the Gibraltar corner. Moreover small prospects of success
and large possibilities of losses must be considered here as well as in the
Mediterranean, for U-boat warfare has not been thought feasible in this
area for the past 2 years, due to the proximity of the coast.
5) In summary, B.d.U. regards further operations against the supply of
Africa in the light of high losses and small success. No comparison can be
drawn to the proportion of high success at the outset and the special course
975
of the enemy operations, and no weight can be placed on future enemy
plans.
6) This operation of U-boats was decisive moreover in the course of the
war on tonnage in the Atlantic in which B.d.U. indulged as the principal
U-boat action. The war on tonnage was perhaps the decisive contribution
of the U-boats at the start of the war. The enemy has made clear to us that
his principal worry is the battle in the Atlantic even today, that is to say,
the continual weakening of his power through sinkings by U-boats. As
already reported, B.d.U. believes that the unusually high sinkings recently
in the Atlantic has some bearing in connection with the African invasion.
If these sinkings are accepted because U-boats have been withdrawn for
action in the Gibraltar area and Mediterranean then the enemy must be
right and must feel the ultimate outcome will be a strengthening rather
than a weakening of his power. Similar comparisons have been set forth at
the time of withdrawal of boats for the N. Atlantic and the first Gibraltar
operation at the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942. B.d.U. is convinced
that the sinking results which these boats found in the favorable American
situation was even more important than the undisputed success in the
Arctic, while the same sort of operation W. of Gibraltar has met with
almost nothing but losses.
7) The management of the war in the Atlantis will be as follows:
a) In the Mediterranean there are presently 20 boats. Up to the new
moon period in December there will probably be further losses so that in
order to have 24 boats, about 6 - 8 will have to be sent into the
Mediterranean. Full use of 24 boats will not be possible because of the
situation which finds improvements on the bases going slowly.
b) In order to keep 20 boats in the Gibraltar area about 6 boats must be
sent there on 1 December and about 8 on 15 December.
c) Without considering losses and damage, there will be about 30 boats in
area outside the Mediterranean, the Arctic and Gibraltar, by 1 December.
On 15 December there will be about 40 boats, which will be spread out in
areas from Iceland to Capetown.
 - 122-
d) Without considering the coming and going or long periods of boats
in the yards due to bomb damage, 20 boats in the Gibraltar area represent
1/3 of all available Atlantic combat boats. (60).
e) Out of 20 boats in the Gibraltar area about 30 will be at sea for this
operation when we consider those underway to and from port. U-boats in
the Atlantic have sunk 200 tons per boat per day at sea during the last
month and during the last week the figure has doubled. Therefore the
operation will at least reach 30 x 30 x 200 or 189,000 tons, perhaps more
as a result of recent experiences and this cannot be outweighed by any
possible success in the Gibraltar area. Decrease in sinkings due to
withdrawal of boats to the Mediterranean is not once considered in this
case.
8) According to the opinion of B.d.U. this is a question of widest scope to
consider. B.d.U. is clearly convinced that the weight of the U-boat war
must be carried out in the Atlantic, that only war against tonnage will be
effective in the overall war and that any deviation from these fundamental
concepts will only lead to damage of the total war effort. B.d.U. requests
that orders be modified to permit new revisions on the grounds of the
above consideration.
B.d.U. Secret 508.
976
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
16 - 30 November 1942
PG30313b
16.November 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BC) U 155 - Op(CG 90) U 383 - Op(AK 60) U 524 - AF
87
67 - Op(EE) 156 - BF 50 402 - BE 65 552 - EH 60
68 - FL 14 159 - FU 84 411 - Op(CG 90) 564 - Op(CG 20)
71 - BF 50 160 - Op(EO) 413 - Op(CG 80) 566 - Op(CG 80)
84 - Op(AK 60) 161 - Op(EV) 438 - BE 56 572 - Op(DJ 20)
86 - Op(CG 80) 163 - Op(ED) 439 - AF 87 590 - BF 76
87 - BF 76 172 - FC 98 442 - BF 64 603 - AF 24
89 - BE 64 173 - Op(DJ 22) 445 - AL 23 606 - Op(AK 60)
91 - Op(DJ 20) 174 - Op(EC) 454 - Op(AK 60) 608 - Op(BB)
92 - Op(CG 90) 176 - CF 87 460 - BE 49 611 - Op(AK 30)
98 - Op(CG 80) 177 - Op(KP) 462 - EH 60 613 - Op(CG 80)
103 - Op(DJ 10) 178 - Op(KP) 465 - AO 623 - AL 31
106 - Op(BB) 181 - Op(KZ) 504 - FU 49 624 - Op(AK 60)
107 - BF 81 183 - Op(BB) 505 - EG 54 653 - Op(CG 80)
108 - DH 26 184 - Op(AK 60) 508 - Op(ED) 662 - BF 81
117 - BE 43 185 - Op(DJ 20) 509 - Op(CG 20) 663 - Op(AK 20)
 118 - BE 95 218 - CG 49 510 - Op(DJ) 704 - BE 67
126 - Op(EW) 224 - Op(AK 60) 511 - Op(DJ 40) 752 - Op(DJ 20)
128 - Op(EH) 262 - Op(AK 20) 515 - Op(CG 90) 753 - Op(AK 60)
129 - Op(ED) 263 - Op(DJ 20) 518 - Op(BB) 758 - AN 36
130 - Op(DJ 20) 264 - Op(AK 30) 519 - Op(CG 20) D 3 - DT 16
134 - Op(EH) 332 - Op(EH) 521 - Op(AK)
154 - Op(EE) 381 - BE 67 522 - Op(AK 30)
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 87 - 89 - 107 - 117 - 156 - 159 - 172 -
218 - 332 - 381 - 402 - 438 - 442 - 460 - 504 - 509 - 590 - 662 - 704.
Entered Port: U 156 - Lorient; U 442 - St. Nazaire; U 603 - Bergen.
Sailed: U 211 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 66, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 381 dived in BE 5966 as approached by fast 2 stack steamer with
patrol boat escort. Patrol boat had camouflage sail (this is unlikely) course
W. No attack.
3) U 43 forced to veer off by plane in BC 4434 as she was attacking 2
steamers, course 220. Plane came directly out of clouds and was not
picked up by anti-Radar gear. Gear is in order.
4) According to damage report U 505, further operation is impossible.
After refueling from tanker, boat will return.
5) U 92 sank ship sailing alone, 12,000 tons, course 3000, speed 11
knots.
6) U 103 saw nothing in DJ 1997 to 67 or the area off Safi. Numerous
contacts with destroyer groups. Light air patrols.
7) U 130 reports: Fedala Roads empty except for patrol boats. Heavy
day air patrols. No coastal movements.
8) U 515 reports enemy convoy in CG 9440, course 1000, speed 9
knots. No further enemy reports. Boat was evidently forced under while
sending message.
977
- 124 -
9) U 566 forced to submerge by aircraft and was followed by a search
group of 2 Jervis destroyers. Air and surface craft bombs.
10) U 91 No movements from DJ 2310 to 2290. Harbor and roads of
Mehdia and Rabat empty. Heavy air patrols.
11) U 108 has damage partly repaired. Boat ordered back due to diving
delay, and possible diving misfortunes.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CG 8645, CG 9474, CG 8922, CG 9444.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 66:
U 521 held contact on convoy in AK 6132 until morning of 16
November. She sighted this convoy on 15 November. Since only the
emergency transmitter was in order, bearing signals could not be given to
summon other boats to the spot. On the morning of 16 November, contact
was lost because of fog. Visibility was 2 - 4 miles all day. Short contact
was made at 1952 by U 611 but no further report was made on the convoy.
Contact had not been reestablished up until the morning of 17 November.
U 521 reports 1 medium freighter sunk and 2 hits on 2 steamers. These
two ships are considered sunk in view of the heavy seas. Total 15,000 tons
for the 3 ships.
b) 1) U 445 and 623 steered for AK 66 for the setting up of the next
patrol strip, planned for 8 boats, U 623 is some distance astern the convoy
of Group "Kreuzotter" and operated in AK 63. She did not receive orders
to join Group "Kreuzotter" because she was switched to wrong band
 2) U 462 waited to meet U 505 and U D 3 in supply area.
3) U 511 occupied DJ 2117 as attack area. U 103 goes first to Mazagan
and then to DJ 2168 in case there is no activity.
4) U 128 had seen nothing in 3 days in EH and is moving to FC.
c) U 462 has supplied U 552. Tanker situation 140 cubic meters,
provisions for 44 days.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 92 1 ship 12,000 T.
U 521 3 ships 15,000 T.
VI. General:
A. Coast of Morocco:
Boats operated first off Fedala, Casablanca and Fedala, the principle
enemy landing place. Boats ordered to make for shallow waters just off
the coast and attack shipping entering the harbors. The attack
- 125 -
conditions (shallow water, heavy air and sea patrols with destroyer and
land detection gear) made stationary positions just off the harbor
untenable. Only quick thrusts by day or night were possible, followed by
a quick withdrawal to deeper water. On 11 November U 173 attacked a
heavily guarded convoy off Casablanca harbor and scored 3 hits. On 12
November U 130 sank 3 freighters in Fedala Roads and reported about 20
978
freighters near the harbor. While operating in shallow water near
Casablanca during the night of 13 November U 509 reported a mine
explosion. Since a minefield N. of Casablanca is unlikely and since good
opportunities were available only just off Casablanca boats received orders
to operate in their designated positions. At the time of the next strike on
13 November no movements were seen off Casablanca and Fedala up to
the 100 meter line and no ships were to be found in the Roads. Survey of
the harbor of Safi on 12 November revealed no ships either in harbor or in
the Roads, although there was a strong destroyer screen round the harbor.
On 15 November U 173 reported an outgoing group consisting of 1
carrier, 2 battleships and transports in DJ 2273 on course 300 high speed.
Adir - Mogador and Mehdia Roads were proved to be empty offering no
chance of success.
Overall situation on 16 November:
Landing operations finished in the West between 11 and 13 November.
Attacks possible on 11 and 12 November only on ships at anchor in Fedala
Roads. After the harbor of Casablanca and other small harbors were taken,
only incoming and outgoing convoys offered targets. Attacks on these
convoys would necessitate operations of boats in less than 50 meters of
water. It is impossible to stay in this depth for any length of time because
of the heavy destroyer and air patrols.
Purpose: Placement of boats somewhat removed from land in deep
water. As far as possible according to numbers to join boats to Gibraltar
area patrols so that a virtual blockade of the harbor of Casablanca is
imposed. Strikes were possible near land in order to control harbors and
roads.
B. Gibraltar area:
Due to heavy air and sea patrols in the sector west of Gibraltar we can
reckon on no daylight attacks and only small night attacks. Placement
must therefore be made in deepest water possible (depending on the
number of boats). Boats will be placed in checkerboard fashion
completely plastering the area, so that at least one boat will be in firing
position either by day or by night. The 16 boats so disposed will be
insufficient for the accomplishment of this task since the area between the
boats are so great that convoys can move to and fro without being sighted
by the boats.
 Successes:
12 November - 1 Birmingham class cruiser and 1 destroyer sunk.
14 November - 3 torpedo hits on 3 large transports in CG 8665, course
W.
16 November - ship sailing alone sunk (12,000 T) in CG 9457 course
3000.
Therefore no success against supply convoys.
C. In the same area from 12 - 16 November 11 attacks by English aircraft
in the Gibraltar and Morocco area. U-boat reported "Very heavy air and
destroyer patrols, aircraft and surface vessels depth charges". A number of
boats report damage by aircraft (U 509 - 752 - 218 - 108).
- 126 -
U 218 returning to port since operations of boats close to land will
become increasingly more dangerous. With the brightening of the moon a
move to the west is imperative.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
17.November 1942.
I. U 43 - Op(BB) U 154 - Op(EE) U 332 - Op(EJ) U 521 - Op(AK 40)
67 - Op(EF) 155 - Op(CG 90) 381 - BE 69 522 - Op(AK)
68 - FD 78 159 - FU 45 383 - Op(AK 50) 524 - AF 73
979
71 - BF 64 160 - Op(EO) 402 - BF 45 552 - EH 60
84 - Op(AK 50) 161 - Op(EV) 411 - Op(CG 90) 564 - Op(CG 80)
86 - Op(CG 80) 163 - Op(ED) 413 - Op(CG) 566 - Op(CG)
87 - BF 80 172 - FC 80 438 - BE 66 572 - Op(DJ)
89 - BF 66 173 - Op(DJ) 439 - AF 73 590 - BF 80
91 - Op(DJ) 174 - Op(FC) 445 - AL 24 606 - Op(AK 50)
92 - Op(CG 90) 176 - DH 17 454 - Op(AK 50) 608 - Op(BB)
98 - Op(CG 80) 177 - Op(KP) 460 - BD 65 611 - Op(AK 50)
103 - Op(DJ) 178 - Op(KP) 462 - EH 60 613 - Op(CG 80)
106 - Op(BB) 181 - Op(KZ) 465 - AO 623 - AL 25
107 - BF 50 183 - Op(BB) 504 - FU 48 624 - Op(AK 50)
108 - DH 35 184 - Op(AK 50) 505 - EG 46 653 - Op(CG 80)
117 - BE 33 185 - Op(DJ 20) 508 - Op(ED) 662 - BF 80
118 - CF 61 211 - BF 55 509 - Op(CG) 663 - Op(AK 60)
126 - Op(EW) 218 - CG 18 510 - Op(DJ) 704 - BE 69
128 - ER 65 224 - Op(AK 50) 511 - Op(DJ) 752 - Op(DJ 20)
129 - Op(ED) 262 - Op(AK 40) 515 - Op(CG) 753 - Op(AK 50)
130 - Op(DJ) 263 - Op(DJ 20) 518 - Op(BB) 758 - AN 31
134 - Op(EJ) 264 - Op(AK 50) 519 - Op(CG 80) D 3 - DS 69
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 89 - 107 - 117 - 159 - 172 - 218 - 332 -
381 - 402 - 438 - 504 - 505 - 509 - 572 - 590 - 662 - 704 - 87.
Entered Port: U 71 - St Nazaire.
Sailed: U 517 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 66, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 752 has repaired her damage and has taken up position as ordered.
U 566 has been bombed repeatedly because of oil leaks. She is
moving on according to orders.
3) U 86 reports enemy convoy at 1817 on W. course, high speed.
Contact lost immediately. This is possibly the convoy which was left after
having been sighted off Gibraltar at 0300 by our boats.
 4) U 564 sighted a second convoy at 2115 in CG 8966, course W. speed
up to 14 knots, 3 steamers and 2 patrol boats were seen. Boats in the
Gibraltar area are to operate against this convoy during the night or early
in the morning if they can get into position. U 86 and 155 - 511 reported
on the convoy. U 413 requested bearing signal. Besides U 155 and 511
both of which fired double shot misses, no other boat has approached
because of high speed of the convoy. Pursuit was given up and boats
returned to their area.
- 127 -
Last convoy position was DJ 1311 at 0325, speed 16 knots, general
course 2600. At 0407, U 86 sighted a pair of destroyers on course 900 in
CG 8570.
5) U 103 and 108 encountered only a patrol boat in DJ 2163, off
Mazagan.
6) U 155 situation: Strong air patrols of all types in Gibraltar area.
Single destroyers and trawlers. During the night heavy air and surface
bearing searches with D/C's dropped at random. Small prospects for
attacks, ships well protected at night. Boat requests freedom of
movements in CG 80.
7) U 43 reports convoy in BC 1964 at 1230 and in BC 2714 at 1800.
Forced to veer off by constant air patrols. According to our own data this
is convoy HX 215. Boat carries on pursuit.
8) U 518 completed operation (putting spy ashore) on 9 November. She
has operated in BB 17 - 18 since the operation and has seen only
occasional single ships sailing close to land. Slight surface patrols, no
980
night air patrols. Meager prospects of success. According to previous
orders boat is operating further in BB 70 (Halifax).
9) U 178 sank "Louise Moller" (3,674 tons) on 13 November in KP
9885 and torpedoed a 6,000 ton freighter in KZ 2628 on 15 november.
After she was hit twice amidships the crew abandoned her. Sinking not
observed because of air patrols. Heavy air activities in KP 80 and KZ 20.
Many D/C's heard on 15 November at some distance. East west shipping
"Durban" via KP 97.
10) U 161 reports on 12 November convoy putting in EV 7832, 3
steamers and 2 patrol craft. First on course 900 then N. speed 12 knots.
Air cover during the day. Ships enter Takoradi only by day. A passenger
steamer sighted on 17 November in EV 7775, course 2600, speed 15
knots. No activity along the Ivory Coast.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 6457, BC 4343, CB 2453, BC 1919, DJ 2221,
CG 7921, ED 6940, EE 4422.
Aircraft D/C attacks in CG 8777 and DJ 2281.
U-boat warning in KZ 83.
U-boat attack in ED 9947, SSS message in DJ 2281.
d) none.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 66:
Towards noon on 17 November the weather improved in the
neighborhood of the convoy. S.W. wind of force 2 - 4 and good visibility
reported. At 1130 the convoy seen in AK 4695 by U 521, somewhat later
sighted by U 184. The latter boat can summon about 6 more U-boats to
the scene by using her bearing signals. The convoy steered S.W. course at
7 knots. Contact was not lost again, thanks to good visibility. In the
course of the night all boats of the Group came on the scene, except U 383
which last reported on 7 November. U 521 - 224 and 454 broke off
operations against the convoy because torpedoes were used up and fuel
was low. Reports of success up to 18 November as follows:
1) U 264 3 hits on 2 overlapping freighters, 4,000 and 6,000 tons.
 - 128 - hours per day due to heavy air, destroyer and patrol craft activity, so that
recharging of batteries was virtually impossible.
2) It is more evident that possibilities of success are even more meager.
Lowest speed so far of the convoy is between 10 and 12 knots. The
screening craft are destroyers of special skill, and experience so that the
boats cannot get near enough for firing. The report of U 155 (experienced,
bold Captain with Knight's Cross) is: small possibilities of attack, due to
night shipping being screened by sonic gear.

---------------------------------------------------
Sank 1 ship of 4,000 tons and torpedoed 1 of 6,000 tons. ---------------
2) U 184 - sank a freighter of 5,000 tons
Evidently sank 2 freighters of 5 and 8,000 tons. 18.November 1942.
18,000 tons.
Total 4 ships of 22,000 tons sunk 1 ship of 6,000 tons torpedoed.
The operation against the convoy continues. I. U 43 - Op(BC 20) U 181 - Op(KZ) U 510 - Op(DJ 20)
b) 1) Definite attack sectors were ordered for boats in the Casablanca 67 - Op(EE) 183 - Op(BB) 511 - Op(DJ)
area. See War Diary of 16 November, VIa. 68 - FC 90 184 - Op(AK 40) 515 - Op(CG)
U 130 - DJ 2254; U 510 - DJ 2419; U 130 - 103 - 263 and 510 84 - Op(AK 40) 185 - Op(DJ) 517 - BF 54
making sorties of opportunity on Casablanca and near coast. U 752 and U 86 - Op(CG) 211 - BF 48 518 - Op(BB)
173 occupying CG 8585 and CG 9719 respectively for repairs. 87 - BF 83 218 - CG 13 519 - Op(CG 80)
2) U 118 is waiting to refuel Morocco boats in DH 10. 89 - BF 48 224 - Op(AK 40) 521 - Op(AK 40)
c) None. 91 - Op(DJ 20) 262 - Op(AK 40) 522 - Op(AK 40)

V. Reports of Success:
U 178 2 ships 10,112 tons.
264 1 ship 4,000 tons. - 129 -
1 ship torpedoed.
U 184 3 ships 18,000 tons.

VI. General:
1) The opinion as set forth in War Diary of 16 November, that an
operation just W. of Gibraltar would be impossible in a few days was
confirmed by report from U 155. Boat was forced to stay submerged 20

981
 92 - Op(CG 90) 263 - Op(DJ 20) 524 - AF 47 a) 1) U 752 operated against the same convoy as U 564 and presumably
98 - Op(CG 80) 264 - Op(AK 40) 552 - Op(EH) scored a hit in CG 8879. Contact then lost.
103 - Op(DJ) 332 - OP(EH) 564 - Op(DJ) 2) U 511 had to sail westward due to illness of the Captain.
106 - Op(BB) 381 - BF 48 566 - Op(CG) 3) U 613 reported from CG 8764 at 1159 hours. Unable to dive, hunted
107 - BF 61 383 - Op(AK 40) 572 - CG 71 by aircraft U 413 - 564 - 566 - and 509, boats in the neighborhood tried to
108 - CG 74 402 - BF 49 590 - BF 83 help U 613 but ceased their attempts when U 613 reported she had started
117 - BE 65 411 - Op(AK 40) 606 - Op(AK 40) return cruise at 2300.
118 - CF 58 413 - BF 49 608 - CC 42 4) U 566 established the fact that the convoy of U 86 had been
126 - Op(EW) 438 - Op(CG 90) 611 - Op(AK 40) considered Spanish, ships on course 2600, speed 14.
128 - ER 95 439 - AF 47 613 - OP(CG 80) 5) U 91 was followed and heavily damaged in DJ 2216 by a search
129 - Op(ED) 445 - AL 18 623 - AL 25 group. Heavy oil leaks. Withdrew for repairs.
130 - Op(DJ 20) 454 - Op(AK 40) 624 - Op(AK 40) 6) U 515 missed two shots on a "Dido" class cruiser, torpedoes arched.
134 - Op(EH) 460 - BD 55 653 - Op(CG 80) Machine gun fire observed in CG 7990, 1 cruiser 2 destroyers seen.
154 - Op(EO) 462 - EH 65 662 - BF 50 7) U 566 observed a destroyer in CG 7963 at 2320. Destroyer fired
155 - Op(CG) 465 - AN 31 663 - Op(AK 60) green flares.
159 - FT 39 504 - FT 62 704 - BF 48 8) U 510 situation: Nothing seen off Casablanca except single
160 - Op(EO) 505 - EG 56 752 - CG 12
161 - Op(EU) 508 - Op(ED) 753 - Op(AK 40) - 130 -
163 - Op(ED) 509 - Op(DJ 20) 758 - AN 31
172 - FC 56 D 3 - DS 99
173 - Op(DJ 20)
174 - Op(EC)
176 - DG 69
177 - Op(KP)
178 - Op(KZ)

On Return Passage: U 68 - 87 - 89 - 107 - 108 - 117 - 159 - 172 - 218 - and grouped patrol craft. Forced to submerge by search signals.
332 - 381 - 402 - 438 - 504 - 505 - 509 - 572 - 590 - 704. Heavy air patrols up to 100 miles from the coast.
Entered Port: U 107 - 662 - Lorient. 9) U 413 heard 6 bomb explosions on her hydrophones at 1300 in S.
Sailed: - . - part of CG 8751.
10) U 183 has seen nothing in BB 75 - 74 and 77 since 10 November.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. 11) U 43 made new contact on the convoy and sank a munitions ship
and a freighter (total 10,000 tons) as well as a tanker torpedoed. Was
III. Reports on the Enemy: finally forced to submerge. Convoy position was BC 2214 at 1000, course
350, speed 7 knots. Pursuit taken up by the U-boat.
982
 12) U 67 sighted the Argentine "Rio Dallegos" on 16 November in EE
8844 and sank the Norwegian "Tortugas" 4,697 tons in EE 6722. Course
3000, loaded with sand, underway from Capetown to Trinidad.
13) U 172 sighted a flight of 6 bombers on E. course in FK 26 on 15
November. Presumed underway to Africa via Ascension. A similar group
was sighted on 12 September. 2 patrol craft sighted in FK 12 on 17
November, course N.
14) U 118 In CF 5787 a single stack steamer was established as
Portuguese while under attack. Other Portuguese ships unmolested.
15) Convoy No. 66 see IV a.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 6380, EE 4248, DJ 22 (attack), EE 15.
Sightings by planes in CH 5995, CG 7969 (heavy D/C attacks on U
613).
SOS messages without further details.
d) Done.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 66:
Contact was kept due to favorable weather conditions and convoy is
now in AK 4870. In spite of numerous attacks during the previous night
the convoy kept on course 2250 at barely 7 knots. U 184 took up contact
again at noon on 18 November and directed 2 more boats to the convoy in
the course of the day. On the morning of 18 November most of the boats
were forced to submerge by destroyers. A number of boats were attacked
by D/C's and gun fire but the screen was unable to keep the U-boats from
following.
During the day the following reports were sent regarding sinkings
during the night of 17 - 18 November:
U 554 1 ship 5,000 tons sunk
U 521 1 ship 6,000 tons sunk 2 more hits
U 262 2 destroyers sunk 1 hit on 7,000 ton
U 624 freighter "Yanka" 5,432 tons sunk; corvette sunk, 1 ship
torpedoed
U 522 1 ship 4,500 tons sunk and 1 ship 6,00 tons
U 264 1 ship 4,000 tons sunk
983
Sunk 6 ships 30,932 tons sunk
- 131 -
5 ships torpedoed.
The convoy operation continues with 4 boats, U 264 - U 184 - U 262
and U 611. The other boats either because of lack of torpedoes or fuel
have either begun to return to port, or to rendezvous with supply boats.
Contact is still held on the convoy.
b) 1) U 161 and U 126, both boats off the Guinea Coast, were given
freedom of movement according to their own judgment and fuel situation.
The shipping situation in this area is not at all clear at this time and can be
determined neither by intelligence nor deciphering. Redistribution of
attack areas is impossible because of fuel situation.
2) Before setting up the next patrol band the boats have the following
temporary attack areas: U 445 - AK 66 and U 623 - AK 69.
3) Two boats of the Gibraltar Group which have been requested to
report positions have not reported (U 98 - U 411). U 613 was heavily
damaged by plane attack U 91 damaged by D/C attack. Boats operating
off Gibraltar and Morocco have met with no special success so far, rather
they have met with misfortune for the most part. The boats have been
assigned new operational areas for that reason. The new placement in a
semi-circle running from Cape Vincent to Safi closes Casablanca Bay to
some degree. It is yet to be seen whether this will be successful and
thereby less dangerous for the boats. The following are occupying attack
area as shown, the depth of the area being 25 miles:
 U 653 - 8255; U 613 - 8295; U 509 - 8287; U 411 - 8433; U 263 -
8452; U 92 - 8556;
U 185 - 8485; U 519 - 8571; U 515 - 8823; U 86 - 8817; U 511 -
8752; U 566 - 8872;
U 98 - 8859; U 155 - 8788. All areas above in square CG
U 413 - 1324; U 564 - 1235; U 752 - 1269; U 102 - 1367; U 91 - VI. General:
2175; U 130 - 1387; The order was given (2412 Secret) to bring number of boats in the
U 173 - 2416; U 510 - 1662. All above in square DH. Mediterranean to 24 (at least 4 more boats) and to keep the strength in the
c) U 151 returning to port via BD 45 yo transfer remaining fuel to U- Gibraltar-Morocco area at 20. Since this mode of action has considerable
tanker. meaning to the overall war in the Atlantic, I have reported my criticisms as
d) None. follows: See U-boat situation of 18 November. B.d.U. Secret 508 of 18
November 1942 should be shown with War Diary of B.d.U. 1 - 15
V. Reports of Success: November 1942.

U 752 1 ship torpedoed ---------------------------------------------------

43 2 ships 10,000 tons ---------------
1 ship torpedoed
67 1 ship 4,967 tons 19.November 1942.
454 1 ship 5,000 tons
521 1 ship 6,000 tons
2 other hits I. U 43 - Op(BC) U 155 - Op(CG 80) U 381 - BF 50 U 521 - AK 75
262 2 destroyers sunk 67 - Op(EE) 159 - FM 97 383 - Op(AJ 90) 522 - Op(AJ 90)
1 ship torpedoed 68 - ES 91 160 - Op(EO) 402 - BF 92 524 - AE 68
624 1 ship 5,432 tons 84 - Op(BC 31) 161 - Op(EU) 411 - Op(CG 80) 552 - Op(EJ 78)
1 corvette sunk 86 - Op(CG 80) 163 - Op(ED) 413 - Op(DJ 10) 564 - Op(DJ)
1 ship torpedoed 87 - BF 60 172 - FC 59 438 - BF 62 566 - Op(CG)
522 2 ships 10,500 tons 89 - BF 62 173 - Op(DJ 10) 439 - AE 68 572 - CG 42
264 1 ship 4,000 tons. 91 - Op(DJ 10) 174 - Op(EC 15) 445 - AL 19 590 - BF 80
92 - Op(CG 80) 176 - DG 98 454 - Op(AK 74) 606 - Op(AK 74)
98 - Op(CG 80) 177 - Op(KZ) 460 - BD 45 608 - CC 25
103 - Op(DC 10) 178 - Op(KP) 462 - EH 64 611 - Op(AJ 90)
- 132 - 106 - Op(BB) 181 - Op(KZ) 465 - AF 87 613 - Op(CG 73)
108 - CG 48 183 - Op(CB 24) 504 - FT 26 623 - AL 17
117 - BF 44 184 - Op(AJ 90) 505 - EH 44 624 - Op(AK 77)
118 - CF 84 185 - Op(CG 80) 508 - Op(ED) 653 - Op(CG)
126 - Op(EV) 211 - BE 69 509 - Op(CG 72) 663 - Op(AK 60)
984
 128 - Op(ER 63) 218 - BF 49 510 - Op(DJ) 704 - BF 50
129 - Op(EE) 224 - AK 76 511 - Op(CG) 752 - Op(DJ 10)
130 - Op(DJ 10) 262 - Op(AJ 90) 515 - Op(CG) 753 - Op(AJ 98)
134 - Op(EH 69) 263 - Op(CJ) 517 - BF 48 758 - AF 87
154 - Op(EO) 264 - Op(AJ 90) 518 - Op(BB) D 3 - EH 35
332 - Op(EH 67) 519 - Op(CG 80)
On Return Passage: U 68 - 87 - 108 - 117 - 159 - 172 - 218 - 224 - 332
- 381 - 383 - 402 - 454 - 504 - 505 - 509 - 521 - 572 - 590 - 606 - 624 -
704.
Entered Port: U 438 - 89 - Brest.
Sailed: U 461 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 66 and 67, see IVa.
U 413 was on return voyage because of periscope damage due to
aircraft bombs when she sighted a convoy in CG 8454, course S.E. speed
15 knots. She followed until 0715 reaching CG 8843, about 15 ships.
Shortly after U 413 reported, U 519 likewise reported convoy of about 6 -
10 steamers in CG 7682, course 1100. Boats of the Gibraltar Group
received orders to attack either of the two convoys. U 519 was forced to
submerge by destroyers in CG 8447 at 0727. Last course 1000, speed 12
knots. None of the boats which set out to attack the convoy has contacted
it so far. Evidently boats have been
- 133 -
985
hindered by being forced to cruise submerged due to continuous air
activity (see C). The operation continues.
2) U 91 has only one torpedo in firing condition due to aircraft bombs.
3) U 518 sighted a brightly lighted steamer on 19 November in BB
8827. Her lights could be seen at a great distance. When approached
lights were extinguished suddenly and horizontal search signals were
given out (radar). Evidently a trap.
4) U 608 and 106 reported operationally ready after being supplied.
Operations against convoy movements are foreseen.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CG 7925, DB 3795, DN 8231, ED 5275, DB 3879,
CG 7931, KP 97.
Gibraltar planes reported many U-boats after dark in CG 7873 and CG
8725.
U-boat warnings for KP 97 and KP 37. Greek "Corinthiakos" reported
she was torpedoed - position unknown (3,562 tons).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 66:
The convoy action continues in good visibility, N.E. wind 4 - 5 and
medium swells. At 0800 this morning the convoy was in AJ 9839.
Contact was kept by U 184 and U 753 to 1430. She was then picked up
again at 0300 by U 184 and contact was kept by U 184 and U 264. U 753
reported that the convoy consisted of 6 - 10 steamers, a number of boats
reported gun fire and depth charges upon attempting to attack.
Success reports:
U 184 3 double shots on 3 6 - 8,000 ton steamers, 1 7,000 tons sunk
2 hits observed, 3 heard. Due to counter activities 1 7,000 ton torpedoed.
U 753 One ship damaged by the sea sunk (3,000 ton) 1 3,000 ton sunk.
2 ships 10,000 ton sunk.
1 ship 7,000 ton torpedoed.
Convoy No. 67:
 U 43 is still operating against the convoy. She picked up contact again
in the morning of 19 November only to lose it again at 2200 in AJ 6490.
Next morning she reported fog and visibility 1 mile. She is continuing
operations and U 522 has been ordered to move against the convoy and to
take over the contact. From the east U 663, 623 and U 545 are moving
toward the convoy at cruising speed.
b) 1) New courses: U 518 - BC 22; U 517 - ED 99; U 211 - AK 69; U
106 and 608 are steering from BD 4555 to be refueled and supplied.
- 134 -
2) In order to clarify amount of ship movements between Freetown
and Trinidad the following attack areas were ordered:
U 332 - EH 66, 69 and 93, also EJ 4447 and 71; U 552 - EJ 72, 73, 75,
76, 78 and 79; U 134 - ES 20.
3) U 174, U 128 and U 172 operating in the meantime N. of 30 S.
Limits to the N. and E. is route "Anton". After release from route "Anton"
(about 24 November) occupation of this area is foreseen.
4) U D 3 sailed from Vowe (U 462) via ES 55 and FC 26 refueling
operation - same area as 3.
c) 1) U 509 took over anti-radar escort for U 613.
2) First refueling and supply of U 460 is foreseen on 21 November in
the afternoon.
d) None.
IV. Reports of Success:
U 184 1 ship 7,000 tons sunk
986
1 ship torpedoed
U 753 1 ship 3,300 tons sunk.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
20.November 1942.
I. U 43 - AJ 67 U 159 - FM 59 U 381 - BF 67 U 519 - Op(CG 70)
67 - Op(EE) 160 - Op(EO) 383 - BD 79 521 - BD 15
68 - ES 55 161 - Op(EN) 402 - BF 68 522 - AJ 63
84 - BC 36 163 - Op(ED) 411 - Op(CG 80) 524 - AE 83
86 - Op(CG 80) 172 - FC 53 413 - CG 88 552 - Op(EJ)
87 - BF 52 173 - Op(DJ 10) 439 - AE 83 564 - Op(DJ 10)
91 - Op(DJ) 174 - Op(FC) 445 - Op(AK 60) 566 - Op(CG 80)
92 - Op(CG 80) 176 - DT 17 454 - BD 14 572 - CG 15
98 - Op(CG 80) 177 - Op(KZ) 460 - BD 45 590 - BE 93
103 - Op(DJ 10) 178 - Op(KP) 461 - BF 67 606 - BD 14
106 - CB 35 181 - Op(KZ) 462 - EH 60 608 - BC 92
108 - CC 18 183 - CC 14 465 - AF 76 611 - BC 20
117 - BF 46 184 - Op(BC 20) 504 - FM 85 613 - CG 45
118 - DH 10 185 - Op(CG 80) 505 - EH 46 623 - Op(AK 60)
126 - Op(EW) 211 - BE 64 508 - Op(ED) 624 - BD 14
128 - Op(ER 95) 218 - BF 55 509 - CG 45 653 - Op(CG 80)
129 - Op(EE) 224 - BD 15 510 - Op(DJ 10) 663 - Op(AK 50)
130 - Op(DJ 10) 262 - BC 20 511 - Op(CG 80) 704 - BF 80
134 - Op(EH) 263 - Op(CG 80) 515 - Op(CG 80) 752 - Op(DJ 10)
154 - Op(EO) 264 - Op(AJ 20) 517 - BE 93 753 - AJ 35
155 - Op(DJ) 332 - Op(EH) 518 - BD 91 758 - AF 76
D 3 - EH 60
On Return Passage: U 68 - 87 - 108 - 117 - 159 - 218 - 224 - 332 - 381
- 383 - 402 - 454 - 504 - 505 - 509 - 521 - 572 - 590 - 606 - 624 - 704.
 Entered Port: U 87 - Brest; U 402 - La Pallice.
Sailed: - . -
- 135 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 66 and 67, see IVa.
2) U 177 sank a tanker of 10,000 tons in KP 978 on 19 November,
course 2700 and on 20 November in KP 0910 sank the American "Pierce
Butler" 7,191 tons course 600, loaded with piece goods from Capetown to
Aden.
3) U 154 situation: Heavy single ship movements in EP 50 and 20,
sailing W. and N.W. After a 24 hour pursuit on 18 November in EP 5423
an 8,000 ton fast freighter was sunk, course 2700. On 19 November an
unsuccessful attack was made on a ship of 5,000 tons course 2600.
4) U 552 was attacked by a submarine in EJ 7323 and avoided a surface
runner (torpedo). Another submarine was reported by U D 3 in EH 6941.
5) U 518 reports enemy in sight in BB 9519 at 0355, course 3000, speed
8 knots. Boat received orders to attack.
6) U 183 reports she is not in a condition for convoy operations because
of excessive mechanical noises of her own, making her sound gear
ineffective.
7) U 263 attacked the convoy which was reported yesterday by U 519
and has sunk 2 ships of 5,000 tons each in CG 8731. Another steamer of
the same size in a sinking condition and on fire and a medium sized
steamer torpedoed. She was later picked up by enemy sound gear, and
987
radar and attacked by 119 D/C's. Considerable damage. Ships all had war
materials and landing craft on board. U 103 likewise made contact but
was forced to submerge by aircraft.
8) U 86 was forced to veer off from U 413's convoy by A/C and search
groups, just before attacking. She was hunted for 7 hours. No damage. U
413 likewise attacked but had no success. After 7 hour pursuit she began
return cruise.
9) U 92 sighted 2 smoke plumes at 1650 hours in CG 8586 on E. course.
She broke off pursuit after losing contact at 0215.
10) U 519 and U 185 were hunted by search group and attacked by
D/C's. U 185 observed A/C shot down after scoring a hit on a steamer in
convoy.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BC 25, BC 2810, CG 7873, CA 76.
U-boat attacks: CC 5130 on an unknown American steamer.
SSS reports: "Pierce Butler" KP 9670.
U-boat warnings: for KP 98 and KZ 18.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 66:
- 136 -
Contact on the convoy, which was in AJ 2586 at 0800 was kept by U
184 until noon. Contact was then lost and none of the last 4 boats of the
Group picked it up again. All boats reported that they were forced to veer
off by destroyers and corvettes and as they were about to attack on the
night of 19/20 November the sea was flat, highly phosphorescent and the ---------------------------------------------------
moon was shining brightly. The operation was nevertheless continued in ---------------
the hope that the night of 20/21 November would be more favorable.
Contact was not established again however, and the operation was broken 21.November 1942.
off, on the morning of 21 November. Our own losses were nil. The
enemy losses as follows:
Sunk: 15 ships total 77,932 tons. I. U 43 - AK 44 U 160 - Op(EO) U 383 - BD 18 U 522 - AK 51
2 destroyers and 1 corvette. 67 - Op(EE) 161 - Op(EU) 411 - Op(CG 80) 524 - AE 83
68 - ES 21 163 - Op(EE) 413 - CG 57 552 - Op(EJ)
Torpedoed: 6 ships. 84 - BD 41 172 - Op(FC) 439 - AE 87 564 - Op(DJ 10)
Of the 13 boats in the group, 8 boats met with success, 3 boats fired 86 - Op(CG) 173 - Op(DJ 10) 445 - AK 19 566 - Op(CG 80)
torpedoes and missed, whereas 2 boats did not come within firing range of 91 - Op(DJ) 174 - Op(FC) 454 - BD 45 572 - BE 74
the convoy. 92 - Op(CG) 176 - DT 47 460 - BD 45 590 - BF 73
2) Convoy No. 67: 98 - Op(CG 80) 177 - Op(KP) 461 - BF 82 606 - BD 42
Contact was not reestablished with this convoy. Since the chance of
finding the convoy was small due to fog, boats received the orders to
discontinue the search unless they happened to pick up the convoy on the
course they were following. - 137 -
b) Next patrol line for picking up the SC convoy expected on morning of
24 November was approximately BC 24. U 518 and 623 were already
underway for this area. U 184 and 262 would be after breaking off convoy
action and U 611 and 608 after being supplied.
c) 1) U 462 transferred 55 cubic meters of fuel to U D 3.
2) U 155 sailed for meeting point of U 118 to repair oil pump on her
Junkers compressor. U 551 needs doctor's help for her Captain.
d) Boats were instructed that application of Prize Law was permissible in
the case of French Merchant Ships sailing in the service of the enemy
without sanction of the German and Italian Government. 103 - Op(DJ 10) 178 - Op(KZ) 462 - EH 60 608 - BD 45
106 - CC 13 181 - Op(KZ) 465 - AF 47 611 - BC 51
V. Reports of Success: 108 - CG 13 183 - CG 13 504 - FM 53 613 - CG 18
U 177 2 ships 17,191 tons sunk 117 - BF 55 184 - BC 14 505 - EH 56 623 - Op(AK 44)
U 154 1 ship 8,000 tons sunk 118 - DH 24 185 - Op(CG 80) 508 - Op(ED) 624 - Op(AK 40)
U 263 3 ships 15,000 tons sunk 126 - Op(EU) 211 - BE 52 509 - CG 18 653 - Op(CG 80)
1 ship torpedoed. 128 - Op(ER) 218 - BF 52 510 - Op(DJ 10) 663 - AK 40
129 - Op(EE) 224 - BD 42 511 - DH 24 704 - BF 80
130 - Op(DJ 10) 262 - BC 27 515 - Op(CG 80) 752 - Op(DJ 10)
988
 134 - Op(EJ) 263 - Op(CG) 517 - BE 97 753 - BD 17
154 - Op(EP 32) 264 - BC 53 518 - BB 95 758 - AF 47
155 - Op(DJ) 332 - Op(EH) 519 - Op(CF 98) D 3 - EH 68
159 - FM 51 381 - BF 64 521 - BD 40
On Return Passage: U 68 - 108 - 117 - 159 - 218 - 224 - 332 - 381 - 383
- 413 - 454 - 504 - 505 - 509 - 521 - 572 - 590 - 606 - 613 - 624 - 704 -
753.
Entered Port: U 381 - St. Nazaire; U 218 - Brest.
Sailed: U 254 - Brest; U 513 - Lorient; U 1325 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 67, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 508 sank a freighter of 5,500 tons in ED 9949 on 17 November
course 2600. Fired 3 shots spread which missed "Raley" type ship on
course 3100.
3) U 174 has seen nothing so far in areas FB and FC.
4) U 160 sank a freighter of 5,000 tons in EO 3364 on 21 November
general course 2450. In EF 7715 she fired too low in a freighter on course
3200. On return cruise.
5) U 163 pursued a tanker unsuccessfully in EE 4423, course N.E. She
sank "Empire Starling" 6,060 tons in EE 8229, loaded with piece goods
from Buenos Aires to Trinidad.
6) U 518 attacked convoy reported yesterday in BB 9515 at 0415 and
sank a special ship of 10,000 tons as well as a tanker of 8,000 tons which
evidently sank. Subsequently forced to submerge by gun fire then
attacked by D/C's. Boat is scarcely able to dive and requests permission to
return to port gradually. She received orders to return via BC 80 and BD
30.
7) Boats of Gibraltar Group reporting damage due to enemy
countermeasures are: U 263, 91, 752 and 510. U 566 as well as U 519
was heavily damaged by an air attack on a convoy, she remained however,
as did the boats named above, after damage had been partly repaired.
989
Shortly before firing at convoy of U 519, U 564 was sighted by a 4 stack
destroyer which dropped D/C's (1210 in CG 8758). Convoy composed of
about 30 freighters of 5 - 6,000 GRT. U 515 picked up airplane radar
bearing 500 miles W. of Gibraltar.
- 138 -
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: DJ 16, DT 2299.
2) Sightings by aircraft: In BF 5775.
3) U-boat attacks: In BB 94.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 67:
Boats have seen nothing on search course and are sailing for BC 24 for
new patrol positions. U 522 returning to port.
b) 1) Trinidad boats ordered to operate according to situation as reported
by U 154.
2) On 25 November at 0000 boats will be free to attack single ships for
a period of 3 weeks in the area along "Anton" route between 250 and 50 S.
U 174 and 128 176 - 332 - 552 - 134 - U D 3 - 161 and 126 are considered
for action against ships sailing from America and England to Capetown.
U 161 and 126 are on corresponding courses.
3) The heavy countermeasures against boats of the Gibraltar Group even
in seaward areas necessitates a move even further westward. Placement
from England and America. Boats in attack area of 25 miles depth:
 U 92 - 495?; U 752 - 7311; U 653 - 4891; U 185 - 4796; U 86 -
7243; U 515 - 7291;
U 510 - 7551; U 173 - 7199; U 103 - 7179; U 564 - 7465; U 263 -
7499; U 130 - 7444;
U 566 - 7716; U 91 - 7758; U 519 - 7153. All of the above in CG.
Boats will make up the Group "Westwall".
U 511 on return voyage. Further operation impossible according to the
doctor's opinion.
c) U 155 took spare parts on board from U 118.
d) U 517 bombed and heavily damaged by aircraft in BE 5945. At 1135
hours she reported in open text: Vent knocked out and boat is sinking
rapidly. U 211 which was near by, given orders to make for the spot and
expects to be there about 1900. 2 FW 200 type planes from the Air-Sea
Rescue Group were sent out and will be at the attack area by dawn on 22
November.
V. Reports of Success:
U 508 1 ship 5,500 tons sunk
U 160 1 ship 5,000 tons sunk
U 163 1 ship 6,060 tons sunk
U 518 2 ships 18,000 tons sunk
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
22.November 1942.
I. U 43 - AK 75 U 159 - FM 15 U 383 - BD 45 U 521 - BD 45
67 - Op(EE) 160 - EF 72 411 - CG 80 522 - AK 53
68 - EJ 84 161 - Op(EU) 413 - CG 54 524 - AE 85
84 - BD 45 163 - Op(EE) 439 - AE 85 552 - Op(EJ)
86 - Op(CG 70) 172 - Op(FC) 445 - AJ 69 564 - Op(CG 70)
91 - Op(CG 70) 173 - Op(CG 70) 454 - BD 45 566 - Op(CG 70)
92 - Op(CG 40) 174 - Op(FC) 460 - BD 45 572 - BF 68
98 - Op(CG 80) 176 - EH 99 461 - BF 71 590 - BF 82
103 - Op(CG 70) 177 - Op(KZ) 462 - EH 60 606 - BD 45
106 - BC 77 178 - Op(KZ) 465 - AE 69 608 - BD 72
108 - BF 75 181 - Op(KZ) 504 - FM 15 611 - Op(BC 24)
117 - BF 61 183 - Op(DB) 505 - EH 60 613 - BF 77
118 - DH 15 184 - BC 10 508 - Op(EO) 623 - AJ 92
126 - Op(EU) 185 - Op(CG 40) 509 - BF 77 624 - BD 34
128 - Op(FC) 211 - BE 59 510 - Op(CG 70) 653 - Op(CG 40)
129 - Op(EE) 224 - BD 45 511 - DH 20 663 - AJ 68
130 - Op(CG 70) 254 - BF 55 513 - BF 54 704 - BF 18
134 - Op(ES) 262 - Op(BC 24) 515 - Op(CG 70) 752 - Op(CG 70)
135 - BF 91 263 - Op(CG 70) 517 - BE 59 753 - BD 45
154 - Op(EP) 264 - BC 37 518 - BB 99 758 - AE 69
155 - DH 20 332 - Op(EH) 519 - Op(CG 70) D 3 - ES

- 139 - On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 108 - 117 - 159 - 224 - 332 - 383 - 413
- 454 - 504 - 505 - 509 - 521 - 572 - 590 - 606 - 613 - 624 - 704 - 753.
Entered Port: U 117 - Lorient; U 572 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 610 - St. Nazaire; U 373 - 600 - La Pallice.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

990

III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 611 and U 262 were forced to submerge by remote screening
ships, i.e. sub-chasers in BC 24 (top of the patrol line). Since knowledge
of these boats may lead to rerouting the convoy, it is proposed to delay
commitment of the boats until 23 November.
2) U 624 sighted 3 destroyers on S.W. course at 1000 in BD 2269.
Since this course leads across the refueling point in BD 45 boats standing
by tanker are ordered to take a turn in semi-circle from 00 to 1800 along
the vision boundary of the area and to report on enemy sightings by short
signal. Destroyers evidently belong to an "ON" convoy in BD 30
according to own data.
3) Upon asking returning "Polar Bear Boats" whether they had enough
fuel and torpedoes and whether personnel and machinery were in
condition for further operations, U 159 and U 504 reported they would be
ready after taking on fuel provisions and torpedoes. U 159 was ordered to
take on torpedoes and fuel from U D 3 in ES 75. U 504 is returning to
port since she has only enough provisions for 15 days and she cannot be
re-supplied in so short a time.
4) U 92 was depth charged by a search group in CG 8287. U 566
cannot repair oil leaks and is returning.
b) 1) Search without success.
2) In BF 9573 2 U-boats were sighted at 1630. Presumed to be English.
- 140 -
c) U-boat sightings: BC 2716, KY 62, BF 5775 (aircraft attack).
U-boat attack: DJ 2126.
991
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) In order to intercept SL convoys of 25 November, the patrol line
from AJ 8789 to BC 2571 was ordered to set up in the following order:
U 663 - 445 - 623 - 262 - 611 and 184. Boats to comprise Group
"Drachen".
2) Since ship movements supposed to be active in FB 91 (according to
intercept reports) U 174 ordered to operate closer to land.
3) U 155 took up position of U 91 - CG 7758. U 91 operating in N.W.
group of "Westwall".
4) U 118 is in DH 10 for the purpose of refueling members of Group
"Westwall".
c) 1) U 608 is to look for rendezvous point where air torpedoes can be
taken from boats returning to port.
2) U 462 completed re-supply of U 505 and is returning because her
stocks are used up.
3) U 454 has taken on provisions from U 460. Oil transfer impossible at
the time because of heavy seas.
d) 1) U 211 has had no success so far in her search for U 517. The 3 "FW
200" airplanes have likewise seen nothing. We must consider the boat
lost. Another airplane is scheduled for 23 November to exhaust all
possibilities.
2) U 98 and U 411 must be considered lost in the area W. of Gibraltar.
Both boats last reported on 10 November farther N.W. their meeting in CG
is regarded with greatest skepticism. They are considered to have been
sunk by aircraft.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
23.November 1942.
 I. U 43 - BD 14 U 161 - Op(EU 77) U 413 - BF 54 U 552 - Op(EJ)
67 - Op(EE) 163 - Op(EE) 439 - AL 33 564 - Op(CG 70)
68 - EJ 65 172 - Op(FC) 445 - AJ 94 566 - Op(CG 47)
84 - BD 42 173 - Op(CG 70) 454 - BD 45 590 - BF 67
86 - Op(CG 70) 174 - Op(FC) 460 - BD 45 600 - BF 91
91 - Op(CG 70) 176 - EH 38 461 - BE 11 606 - BD 45
92 - Op(CG 40) 177 - Op(KZ) 462 - EH 60 608 - BD 45
103 - Op(CG 70) 178 - Op(KP) 465 - AE 67 610 - BF 58
106 - BC 76 181 - Op(KZ) 504 - FD 83 611 - Op(BC 24)
108 - BF 84 183 - Op(BB) 505 - EH 60 613 - BF 76
118 - DH 15 184 - BC 40 508 - Op(EE) 623 - AJ 89
126 - Op(EV 79) 185 - Op(CG 40) 509 - BF 76 624 - BD 38
- 141 -
128 - Op(FC) 211 - BE 59 510 - Op(CG 70) 653 - CG 40
129 - Op(EE) 224 - BD 45 511 - CF 65 663 - AF 94
130 - Op(CG 70) 254 - BF 49 513 - BF 48 704 - BF 93
134 - Op(ES) 262 - Op(BC 20) 515 - Op(CG 70) 752 - Op(CG 70)
135 - BF 81 263 - Op(CG 70) 518 - BC 78 753 - BD 45
154 - Op(EP) 264 - BD 45 519 - Op(CG 70) 759 - AE 67
155 - Op(CG 70) 332 - Op(EH) 521 - BD 45 D 3 - ES 16
159 - FD 89 373 - BF 91 522 - AE 19
160 - EF 58 383 - BD 42 524 - AE 79
992
On Return Passage: U 43 - 68 - 84 - 108 - 159 - 224 - 264 - 332 - 383 -
413 - 454 - 504 - 505 - 509 - 511 - 518 - 521 - 522 - 566 - 590 - 606 - 613 -
624 - 704 - 752 - 753 - 160.
Entered Port: U 704 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 603 - Bergen; U 552 - St Nazaire; U 105 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 183 sighted warship group at 0248 in CB 2245 on 23 November
course 2800.
2) U 552 was attacked in ES 1221 by an enemy U-boat.
3) U 332 returning to port because of fuel supply.
4) U 172 sank "Benlomend" 6,630 tons in FC 1138. General course
2750 in ballast from Bombay to Capetown. Boat saw nothing in EC 3517
and requested EC 21 - 36 as operational area.
5) U 518 sank tanker "Caddo" on 23 November in CC 3215 (10,172
tons) course 300 speed 15 knots. Captain and 1st Officer taken on board,
"Caddo" was first commissioned 5 months ago.
6) U 519 reports brightly lighted steamer in CG 7111 and requests
permission to attack. Since there is heavy neutral ship movements in this
area orders were given to break off pursuit. It does not seem likely that the
enemy would illuminate single ships for the purpose of avoiding direct
attack.
7) U 752 requested more remote area due to oil leaks resulting from
aircraft attacks.
b) Nothing seen.
c) U-boat sightings: DP 46, CG 7142.
A Dutch steamer "Kota Tjandi" reports being attacked in EH 1617.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
 b) 1) Proposed delay in establishing patrol line of Group "Drachen"
accomplished on 24 November at 0800 the group was in the old position
from AJ 8845 to BC 2529.
- 142 -
2) Regarding IV b of 21 November the following attack areas were
occupied in order to intercept the convoy in route "Anton" on 25
November:
U 174 - FB 60 and S. to the coast; U 128 - FC 41 and 46: in case there
is no activity she is to take the same area as U 172 - FC 21 and 36.
U 159 - FC 23 and 31; U 176 - ER 97 and 98; U 134 - 95 and 96.
U D 3 - ER 93 and ES 71; U 552 - ER 37 and 38.
For U 161 and 126 areas will be assigned later.
3) In order to intercept the ON convoy expected on 29 November, U
135, 254, 610, 373, 600, 523 and 221 are ordered to AK 69 and U 758 and
465 to AK 81. Boats are to be in their designated areas at 1400 on 29
November. Until contact is made U 524 is to occupy AK 61 and U 439
AK 65 as provisional areas. Group "Westwall".
4) By waning moon and more hours of darkness the boats have an
opportunity to push E. The following boats to occupy these areas:
U 263 - CG 8140; U 564 - 8170; U 103 - 8410; U 92 and 515 - 8440;
U 653 and 155 - 8479; U 185 - 8710; U 519 - 8740; U 510 - 8770. All in
CG.
U 86 and 130 are operating in top sections of DJ 12 1510 and 1540.
They are to approach the harbors as closely as possible according to
shipping and defence measures. U 752 moved westward because of the
conditions of the boat.
993
c) U 211 has broken off search for the crew of U 517. In BE 5839 she
sighted an empty, overturned rubber boat with German identification
marks. The "FW 200" planes have likewise seen nothing. It cannot be
established whether the crew was lost or picked up by English patrol boat.
V. Reports of Success:
U 172 1 ship 6,630 tons sunk
U 518 1 ship 10,272 tons sunk.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
24.November 1942.
I. U 43 - BD 42 U 160 - EF 62 U 373 - BF 82 U 522 - AL 54
67 - Op(EE) 161 - ET 86 383 - BD 45 524 - AL 26
68 - EJ 35 163 - Op(EE) 413 - BF 52 552 - ES 12
84 - BD 45 172 - Op(FC) 439 - AL 27 553 - BF 58
86 - Op(CG 80) 173 - Op(CG 70) 445 - Op(BC 10) 564 - Op(CG 80)
91 - Op(CG 70) 174 - Op(FB) 454 - BD 56 566 - CG 80
92 - Op(CG 80) 176 - EH 67 460 - BD 45 590 - BF 64
103 - Op(CG 80) 177 - Op(KP) 461 - CF 39 600 - BF 82
105 - BF 54 178 - Op(KP) 462 - EH 31 606 - BD 45
106 - BC 85 181 - Op(KZ) 465 - AE 87 608 - BD 45
108 - BF 57 183 - Op(BB) 504 - FD 29 610 - BF 49
118 - DH 10 184 - BC 20 505 - EH 38 611 - Op(BC 20)
126 - EU 99 185 - Op(CG 80) 508 - Op(EE) 613 - BF 76
128 - Op(FC) 211 - BE 50 509 - BF 76 623 - Op(BC 20)
129 - Op(EE) 221 - BF 67 510 - Op(CG 80) 624 - BE 14
130 - Op(CG 80) 224 - BD 45 511 - CG 14 653 - Op(CG 80)
134 - Op(ES) 254 - BF 47 513 - BE 93 663 - Op(AJ 80)
135 - BF 48 262 - Op(BC 20) 515 - Op(CG 80) 752 - Op(CG 80)
154 - Op(EP) 263 - Op(CG 80) 518 - BC 85 753 - BD 45
155 - Op(CG 80) 264 - BD 45 519 - CG 80 758 - AE 83
 159 - FD 58 332 - Op(EH) 521 - BD 45 D 3 - Op(ES)
- 143 -
On Return Passage: U 43 - 68 - 84 - 108 - 159 - 160 - 224 - 264 - 332 -
383 - 413 - 454 - 504 - 505 - 509 - 511 - 518 - 521 - 522 - 566 - 590 - 606 -
613 - 624 - 753.
Entered Port: U 590 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 217 - Brest; U 455 - St. Nazaire; U 626 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 504 sighted a freighter in FD 2733 on S.E. course, likewise U 462
sighted a steamer in DT 7138 with running lights, course S.
2) U 505 attacked a fast freighter in EH 3773 on 24 November and in
DT 9787 and 9785 on 25 November, course S.E. Impossible to close with
her because of speed limitations due to faulty diesel. Ship was evidently a
member of convoy which had broken up.
3) U 611 was seen by enemy aircraft in BC 2279 (patrol line of Group
"Drachen").
4) The request for situation reports of attack possibilities and
countermeasures in the Gibraltar area reveals the following:
U 130: No possibility of attack near the coast because of constant air
patrols. Contact on convoys impossible to keep due to screening vessels
by night and heavy air patrols by day. Boat believes it best to stay outside
994
the area of air patrols in order to attack convoys reported from other
sources.
5) U 155 has established nothing outside presence of patrol craft and
radar. Strong air and sea patrols up to 500 miles from the coast. In the
present position she has been forced to submerge by day and has been
subject to Radar by night. This boat also considers operation outside air
patrol area as essential for successful attacks.
6) U 185 is sailing W. because of heavy damage and is ordered to go to
U-tanker to carry out repairs.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DQ 7171, EH 8954, ED 99, DO 9560, CB 2160, EE
9916, EE 9960.
Reports by aircraft: CG 8521, CG 7389, CG 7623 (D/C attack). Plane
reports row boat with survivors in CG 8522.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) U 118 designated as tanker for Group "Westwall" received orders to
take operational areas CF 70 and 80 and DH 10 and 40. As her first
supply operation boat is to operate with Gibraltar area craft.
c) 1) U 263 a boat of Group "Westwall" was bombed by a plane in CG
7294 at 1145 and is unable to dive. Boats nearby ordered to go to her
assistance.
- 144 -
 About 0200 she was bombed again and was unable to fight the plane
off without damage to herself. After the boat had been made dive worthy
the others were ordered back to their sectors. Joint return through Bay of
Biscay was agreed upon with U 511.
2) According to previous Radio Intercept an enemy plane scored a bomb
hit on a U-boat in BF 5282. It was believed to be U 413 and a light
sweeper flotilla was sent at high speed toward the point. Of the boats in
question, U 413 - 507 - 217, U 217 has not yet reported. We await further
reports. U 413 and 507 are moving on.
d) 1) U 173 belongs to Group "Westwall" and last reported on 16 October
from about DJ 2284. Further radio messages have not been received in
spite of repeated requests to do so. According to Radio Intercepts a U-boat
was attacked in DJ 22 on 18 November and believed destroyed. Possibly
U 173 was sunk in this engagement. We must consider her lost.
2) U 184 was operating against Convoy No. 66 and on 20 November in
BC 28 she was forced to veer off by far ranging screening vessels. Boats
involved were ordered to the attack. U 184 has not reported since. Her
loss is probable.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
25.November 1942.
I. U 43 - BD 45 U 161 - ET 79 U 439 - AL 19 U 553 - BF 49
67 - Op(EE) 163 - Op(EE) 445 - Op(AJ 80) 564 - Op(CG 80)
68 - DT 92 172 - Op(FC) 454 - BD 65 566 - BE 99
84 - BD 45 174 - Op(FB) 455 - BF 69 600 - BF 72
86 - Op(CG 80) 176 - EH 97 460 - BD 48 603 - AF 72
91 - Op(CG 70) 177 - Op(KP) 461 - CF 67 606 - BD 45
92 - Op(CG 80) 178 - Op(KP) 462 - DS 92 608 - BD 45
103 - Op(CG 80) 181 - Op(KZ) 465 - AL 87 610 - BF 47
105 - BF 48 183 - Op(BB) 504 - FD 22 611 - Op(BC 20)
995
106 - BC 68 185 - Op(CG 80) 505 - DS 98 613 - BF 82
108 - BF 50 211 - BE 43 508 - Op(EE) 623 - Op(BC 20)
118 - DH 10 217 - BF 54 509 - BF 57 624 - BE 19
126 - EU 89 221 - BF 81 510 - Op(CG 80) 626 - AO
128 - Op(FC) 224 - BD 45 511 - BF 77 653 - Op(CG 80)
129 - Op(EE) 254 - BE 64 513 - BE 97 663 - Op(AJ 80)
130 - Op(CG 80) 262 - Op(BC 20) 515 - CF 92 752 - Op(CG 70)
134 - Op(ER) 263 - Op(CG 80) 518 - BC 91 753 - BD 45
135 - BE 68 264 - BD 45 519 - CF 92 758 - AE 87
154 - Op(EP) 332 - EH 39 521 - BD 45 D 3 - Op(ES)
155 - Op(CG 80) 373 - BF 72 522 - AL 91
159 - FD 19 383 - BD 45 524 - AL 18
160 - EG 15 413 - BF 52 552 - Op(ER)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 68 - 84 - 108 - 159 - 160 - 224 - 264 - 332 -
383 - 413 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 509 - 511 - 521 - 522 - 566 - 606 - 613 -
624 - 753.
Entered Port: U 413 - Brest.
Sailed: U 124 - Lorient; U 618 - St. Nazaire; U 569 - 615 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 145 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 159 sighted a freighter in FD 1613 on course 3050. Although she
was shot up she is keeping contact for D 3 who is in position to the north.
At 0509 the freighter was in FD 1134 speed about 9 knots. Further reports
on ships sailing along U 172 in ED 88. U 61 in ET 7679, on course 00
speed 16 knots escorted by single motored seaplanes, U 126 in BD 2999
course 400, speed 12 knots.
2) U 67 followed the Danish ship "Abwina" from EP 1332 to EE 9993
missed a double shot at 500 meters. Believed to be one pistol failure.
There after no possibility of attacking because of sharp zig-zagging. Boat
has only one torpedo (aft) and was ordered to return.
3) U 128 has seen nothing in her area so far and is operating farther in
FC 21 - 26.
U 126 considers further operations out of the question unless they are
of prime importance since her sound gear is broken down completely. It is
observed that operations in open sea areas are quite possible without sound
gear.
4) U 510 reports: heavy air patrols in attack area during the day, radar
at night. Boat has serious oil track due to plane bombs and requests
permission to return without being re-supplied.
5) U 92 was bombed by a "Catalina" in CG 8455, no damage. Boat has
seen 4 unsuspected neutral ships.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DB 64, BB 61, DJ 24, CG 7379, CG 8438, CG
1679, DJ 2461, AL 1823 (D/C attack by plane).
Attack report: Dutch "Polydorus" 5,922 tons in ES 1874. Small
freighter reported she was torpedoed in CA 29 (None of our own boats in
the neighborhood).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 332 was given clearance to operate against shipping as reported
by U 505. She now requests permission to return.
2) New course for U 126 is ES 40.
3) Operation for Group "Westwall" contemplated in patrol lines west of
CE 29 (see IV) U 103 - 130 - 515 - 155 - 91 and 185 comprise patrol line
from CF 6518 to 9189 and are sailing on 27 November at 2000 as
observation line course 2950 speed 150 miles every 24 hours.
996
U 91 is only partly seaworthy as is to be used only for observation.
The rest of the "Westwall" boats U 564 - 653 - 86 - 92 and 519 are to take
on 90 to 100 cbm fuel from U 118 on 28 November at 1000 in DH 144
sailing finally to CE 19. From this point all boats will sail together toward
the west in line for observation purposes. U 510 will not be re-supplied
because of heavy oil leaks. She is to operate in the Gibraltar area until her
fuel is used up and then return to port.
- 146 -
c) U 213 can no longer sail submerged. She was ordered to sail for El
Ferrol and send distress signals since the boat can cruise at 14.5 knots and
will be fairly dive-worthy later, her captain is attempting to reach La
Pallice, by sailing at high speed along Spanish territorial waters. U 511 is
to remain near to her as possible in order to give aid if she needs it.
Western Security Section and Air Corps command expect to pick her up
for escort at about noon on 27 November in position 030 25' West. More
follows.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
Gibraltar situation - Morocco area:
1) In an effort to completely intercept the stream of shipping to Gibraltar
from England and America as well as the southwest, the first placements
of boats in areas CG 90, 80, DJ 10 and 20 was made close to the coast. On
18 November heavy defences and countermeasures close to the coast made
it necessary to move farther from shore in area CG 80. On 20 November
the limit had to be extended to CG 70. As a result a wide gap was made
west of Cape Vincent, through which shipping from England could pass
without being attacked. Similarly shipping from the S.W. would not be
apprehended.
Since this disposition brought no success, placements along an E-W
line was ordered on 23 November. In this way a final attempt was made to
intercept traffic through the "Hole". On the other hand, boats were given
the option of operating freely in case of countermeasures became to strong
close to Gibraltar and Morocco. This new disposition of craft brought no
success. Whether because of intercepts, or reports, from Gibraltar many
convoys must have passed through this area and not one was seen, an
indication that countermeasures were successful in keeping boats
submerged day and night at some distance.
2) For the purpose of clearing up the situation, 2 well known captains (U
155 - U 130) were requested to give their opinions of the possibilities for
success and the anti-submarine situation in the last operational area.
According to the reports of the two captains and previous reports of other
boats, the following situation is presented:
Since the enemy has gained a foothold in Morocco his anti-submarine
measures have strengthened greatly. Heavy air patrols day and night
ranging 300 miles from land, patrol craft and destroyer search groups
divided among the area, make even one's presence in these areas difficult
and dangerous. With one exception (ship alone sunk by U 92) convoys are
strongly protected and air patrols are rapidly making attack area untenable.
The U-boat should not be committed in areas close to land since it is not
able to take evasive measures.
Example: Attacks on convoys in the North Channel have been
considered impossible for the past 1 1/2 years, and in this connection it is
worthy of notice that defences in that area were never so strong as those of
Gibraltar are today, surface and aircraft radar and patrols not considered.
3) Since 20 November there has been no further success reported,
- 147 -
997
so that the total in the Gibraltar - Morocco area remains at the
following level:
Date Place Ship Boat
12 Nov. DJ 2519 3 explosions, 1 hit seen on freighter. U 173
13 Nov. CG 8830 4 hits on Birmingham type cruiser, 1 DD probably
sunk. U 515
14 Nov. Fedala Roads 2 transports sunk, 1 probably sunk. Total 22,500
tons. U 130
14 Nov. CG 4556 "Warwick Castle". U 413
15 Nov CG 8665 3 hits on 3 large transports. U 155
16 Nov DJ 2284 Hit on 6,000 tonner. U 173
16 Nov CG 9457 Ship 12,000 tons sunk. U 92
20 Nov. CG 8731 3 steamers 15,000 tons sunk, 1 steamer torpedo. U 263
The transport "Warwick Castle" was sunk W. of Lisbon by a boat
returning to port.
Therefore in the last 5 days: 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer and 5 ships were
sunk 7 ships torpedoed.
In the next 4 days: 3 ships sunk, 1 ship torpedoed and no further
sinkings since 21 November.
Against this we suffered the following losses and damage out of total of
23 boats.
Total loss: 3 boats U 411 - 98 - 173.
Badly damaged so that immediate return was ordered: U 218 - 613 -
413 - 566 - 263.
A number of boats suffered minor damage from plane bombs of D/C's.
Deductions: Attack of supply shipping in the usual stationary manner
no longer possible within 500 miles of Gibraltar. Further delay does not
indicate losses. Without corresponding compensating possibilities of
success.
Conclusions: Attacks on supply shipping must be carried out beyond
the range of enemy air patrols, since it then can be treated as a pure
convoy action this must be begun on the "Starting side of the Atlantic" so
far from Gibraltar that attack is possible for several days.
4) From the data at hand (U-boat sightings intercepts, intelligence
reports) is is decided that evidently a larger part of ships used in the
African landing, especially troop transports from England and a few
convoys from America came from the N.W.
a) There are only small prospects of success in operations against
shipping from England since there are constant English air patrols in the
area. Running attack is therefore impossible and the prospects for
stationary attacks are bad since the area to be occupied between 11 and
240 is too large. Convoys can be cut up by incoming and outgoing boats
and short operations are possible by these boats and can be carried out if
the convoys are sighted.
- 148 -
b) Attack on the America - Gibraltar supply traffic: Only 2 reports
given along the enemy route: Convoy in CF 4399, course E. on 2
November (sighting report of U 514) convoy N. of Azores course E. on 16
November (Spy). The entire Great Circle route between Norfolk and
Boston on one side and Gibraltar on the other side lies N. of the Azores
between 39 and 42 N. and this offers promise for a fair amount of success
to operations in that area.
998
Aims: Boats of Group "Westwall" which have sufficient fuel are to take
position in observation line from CF 6518 to 9189 and sail westward
toward the presumed convoy route. Boats which are low on fuel are to
refuel at once and join the group in order to broaden the observation strip.
Boats to sail together westward to about CD 20. From here attacks can be
carried out without the presence of enemy aircraft from the east. If no
convoys are sighted this operation will be considered a failure. On the
other hand, interception of only one convoy will result in greater success
than Group "Westwall" has had thus far.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
26.November 1942.
I. U 43 - BD 45 U 160 - DR 87 U 439 - AK 65 U 553 - BF 44
67 - Op(EF 75) 161 - ET 96 445 - Op(AJ 80) 564 - Op(CG 70)
68 - DT 61 163 - Op(EE) 454 - BD 45 566 - BE 98
84 - BD 45 172 - Op(FC) 455 - BF 81 569 - BF 91
86 - Op(DH 32) 174 - Op(FB) 460 - BD 45 600 - BE 65
91 - Op(CG 70) 176 - Op(ER) 461 - CF 91 603 - AF 47
92 - Op(CG 77) 177 - Op(KB) 462 - DS 63 606 - BD 45
103 - Op(CG 72) 178 - Op(KP) 465 - AL 21 608 - BD 45
105 - BE 69 181 - Op(KZ) 504 - ES 57 610 - BE 65
106 - BC 65 183 - Op(BB) 505 - DS 68 611 - Op(BC 20)
108 - BF 61 185 - CF 91 508 - Op(EE) 613 - BF 80
118 - DH 10 211 - BE 14 509 - CF 83 615 - BF 91
124 - BE 55 217 - BF 46 510 - DH 32 618 - BF 58
126 - FF 16 221 - BF 47 511 - BF 78 623 - Op(BC 20)
128 - Op(FC) 224 - BD 45 513 - CF 32 624 - BE 53
129 - Op(EP) 254 - BE 24 515 - CF 91 626 - AN 36
130 - Op(CG 70) 262 - Op(BC 20) 518 - BC 65 653 - Op(CG 78)
134 - Op(ES) 263 - BF 76 519 - CF 31 663 - Op(AJ 88)
135 - BE 43 264 - BD 38 521 - BD 45 752 - CG 70
154 - Op(EP) 332 - EH 30 522 - BE 22 753 - BD 45
 155 - Op(CG 70) 373 - BE 65 524 - AL 15 758 - AL 22
159 - FD 11 383 - BD 45 552 - Op(ER) D 3 - ES 75
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 108 - 160 - 224 - 263 - 264 -
332 - 338 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 509 - 511 - 518 - 521 - 522 - 566 -
606 - 613 - 624 - 752 - 753.
Entered Port: U 108 - 509 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 604 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 149 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 445 and U 611, in patrol line of Group "Drachen" report
numerous corvettes and destroyers in AJ 8887 as well as BC 2279. U 262
sank a ship of 6,000 tons in BC 7217, course 2000.
2) U 134 stalked a motorship without success in ER 9894 on course
900. U 67 missed a single shot at the British "Wanderer" in EF 7544.
3) U 176 followed Dutch ship "Polydorus" 5,922 tons for over 50 hours,
from EH 97 via ER 38 and finally sank her in ES 1659. One premature
explosion from a spread shot of 3 torpedoes.
4) After joint pursuit with U 159, U D 3 sank Norwegian ship "India"
5,041 tons in ER 9833, course 3100.
5) U 178 has seen nothing since 26 November in area KY 95 to JJ 15.
Fired a 2 shot spread which missed a freighter on 21 November in KY
9693, course 700. Boat on return cruise.
999
6) U 181 sank a freighter of 2,000 tons in KP 53, also the steamer
"Corinthiakos" (3,562 tons) as well as the "Alcoa Pathfinder", 6,900 tons.
No ships have left Lourenco Marques since 20 November. Shipping from
the N.E. very hard to intercept because the N.E. border of the area is too
near. Further sinkings were: "Mounthelmos" 6,481 tons in KP 6465,
enroute Suez to Capetown and "Dorington Court" (5,281 tons) in KP 6158,
course 2900.
7) U 608 one of the boats short of fuel near U 460, sighted a steamer in
BD 7590 on course 1900 and 2 hours later 3 smoke plumes on estimated
N. course. Pursuit impossible because of lack of fuel.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 6458, EE 7131, BC 4433, CA 54, BC 22.
U-boat attack in ES 1790 (Freighter "Polydorus") also in BC 22.
English aircraft attacked U-boat with D/C's in BC 1871.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 161 is occupying ES 40 as attack area. U 461 is designated as
refueling boat for other boats in this area. Rendezvous is planned for 9
days hence.
2) On the basis of apparent stationary counter patrols, Group "Drachen"
received orders to sail on course 1600, covering 120 miles in a 24 hour
period. Placement between BC 86 and CD 21 is in view for the purpose of
intercepting single ships en route to England. After being supplied, boats
in the same area are contemplated being sent against convoys enroute from
America to Gibraltar. U 262 has fired all her torpedoes and is returning to
port.
- 150 -

c) 1) Since the weather has improved, re-supplying will begin today by
Schnorr. Heavy weather has prevented this operation up to date. The
boats have been cruising about for 6 days near the tanker and some have
no fuel at all. This is even more unpleasant since a number of ships and
destroyers have been encountered nearby, which must have come from
convoys which have been broken up. Warning has been issued to these
boats to give assistance to each other.
2) U 461 gave anti-radar gear cables to U 519 and U 515 as well as
Junkers spare parts to U 185. U 461 is moving southward.
3) U 263 is sailing through Bay of Biscay according to plan and was in
position BF 9716 at 0900 on 27 November.
d) 1) A number of attack reports from ships as well as sighting reports by
aircraft gives indication of the presence of a U-boat in BC and CC. It is
possible that this boat is U 520 which is believed lost but which may be
unable to report because of breakdown of her radio gear. We must await
further developments.
2) According to the proposal of B.d.U., boats are free to attack single
ships in the area of route "Anton", N. of 250 N. and W. of 200 W.,
effective at once.
V. Reports of Success:
U 262 1 ship 6,000 tons sunk
U 176 1 ship 5,922 tons sunk
U D 3 1 ship 5,041 tons sunk
U 181 5 ships 24,224 tons sunk.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
27.November 1942.
1000
I. U 43 - BD 45 U 161 - ES 83 U 445 - Op(AJ) U 566 - BF 74
67 - EF 73 163 - Op(EE) 454 - BD 45 569 - BF 82
68 - DT 31 172 - Op(FC) 455 - BF 71 600 - BE 52
84 - BD 45 174 - Op(FB) 460 - BD 45 603 - AE 68
86 - DH 26 176 - Op(ER) 461 - CF 80 604 - BF 55
91 - Op(CF 90) 177 - Op(KP) 462 - DT 11 606 - BD 45
92 - DH 16 178 - Op(KY) 465 - AL 14 608 - BD 75
103 - CF 66 181 - Op(KZ) 504 - ES 27 610 - BE 27
105 - BE 94 183 - Op(BB) 505 - DS 66 611 - Op(BC)
106 - BD 45 185 - Op(CF 90) 508 - Op(EO) 613 - BF 68
118 - DH 10 211 - AK 96 510 - Op(CG 70) 615 - BF 82
124 - BF 45 217 - BF 47 511 - BF 81 618 - BF 81
126 - FE 33 221 - BE 65 513 - CF 34 623 - Op(BC 20)
128 - Op(FC) 224 - BD 45 515 - CF 60 624 - BE 65
129 - Op(EP) 254 - AL 75 518 - CD 15 626 - AN 31
130 - CF 69 262 - Op(BC) 519 - CF 80 653 - DH 23
134 - Op(ER 99) 263 - BF 98 521 - BD 75 663 - Op(AJ 80)
135 - BE 11 264 - BE 41 522 - AL 98 752 - CG 45
154 - Op(EP) 332 - DT 77 524 - AK 03 753 - BD 45
155 - CF 92 373 - BE 52 552 - Op(ER) 758 - AL 38
159 - ES 74 383 - BD 45 553 - BE 65 D 3 - Op(ER)
160 - DR 91 439 - Op(AK 66) 564 - DH 22
- 151 -
 On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 224 - 262 - 263 - 2) Additional routings: U 553 - 221 - 569 - 455 - 618 and 615 to AK 92.
264 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 511 - 518 - 521 - 522 - 566 - It is planned to place these boats in about AK 90 as patrol line for action
606 - 624 - 752 - 753. against ON convoy. U 217 is considered for operations in the Trinidad
Entered Port: U 613 - La Pallice. area.
Sailed: - . - 3) Numerous sighting reports for the past 2 days indicates heaviest

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. - 152 -

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) Sighting reports:
U 176: Spanish tanker type "Campas" in DG 3378 on course 650,
sighted on 17 November.
U 172 stalked steamer on course 3000, speed 14 knots. Another
steamer on S.E. course. Both were in ER 9159.
U 43 saw large two stacker in BD 4514, course S.W., high speed.
U 623 destroyer sighted hove to here and there in BC 2464.
2) U 663 sank a steamer in AJ 8844, type "Clan Maquarry" (6,000 tons). shipping in approximate area BC 20. On the basis of this, orders
Deck load consisted of aircraft and landing barges. sending boats of Group "Drachen" have been lifted. Boats given freedom
3) U 129 has seen nothing since 25 November in EP 24 - 34 and 37. of action in above named areas. In case nothing is seen after 3 to 4 days
4) U 174 situation: Inner roads of "Fortaleza" empty. Lights operations according to War Diary 26 November figure IV b is foreseen.
extinguished along harbor but city was lit up. Shelling possible, no air c) 1) So far U 461 has supplied U 84 - 753 and 606. U 608 which was
patrols. Nothing seen in FB 60 and 91. Boat received FB 21 - 36 as new drifting and entirely out of fuel, was picked up by U 521 and will be
operational area since attacks on the harbor have not yet been authorized. refueled when the weather permits.
b) None. 2) The former Spanish route was abolished because of the U.S. port of
c) U-boat sightings: CA 55, BF 2477, EO 1836 and BF 9818. Baltimore and Norfolk are closed to neutral shipping. Ships now sail from
Unknown steamer reports being torpedoed in JJ 2810. entrance point CE 4956 to 380 N. westwards to the coast. Only goal is
SOS from British steamer "Blairatholl" 3,319 tons in AJ 8754. Philadelphia.
(Possibly identical with U 663 sinking report). 3) Attack area in the Mozambique route will immediately be broadened
d) None. to 200 S.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None. V. Reports of Success:
b) 1) U 465 - 758 - 524 439 - 211 - 254and 135 ordered to take up patrol U 663 1 ship 6,000 tons sunk.
positions on 29 November at 0800, from AK 0263 to AK 6813 in order to
intercept convoy ONS. Boats U 610 - 373 and 600 are sailing 180 miles
per day toward AK 65 to operate later against the convoy.
1001
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
28.November 1942.
I. U 43 - BD 45 U 160 - DS 44 U 383 - BD 45 U 553 - BE 16
67 - EF 82 161 - Op(ES) 439 - Op(AK 60) 564 - DH 15
68 - DG 53 163 - Op(EE) 445 - Op(BC 20) 566 - BF 73
84 - BC 70 172 - Op(ER 83) 454 - BD 45 569 - BF 72
86 - DH 15 174 - Op(FB 63) 455 - BE 65 600 - BE 13
91 - Op(CF 50) 176 - Op(ES 17) 460 - BD 45 603 - AL 22
92 - DH 14 177 - Op(KP) 461 - DH 15 604 - BF 46
103 - Op(CF 50) 178 - CR 82 462 - DG 92 606 - BD 56
105 - BE 87 181 - Op(KZ) 465 - AK 38 608 - BD 70
106 - BD 45 183 - Op(BB) 504 - EJ 89 610 - BE 11
118 - DH 14 185 - Op(CF 80) 505 - DT 15 611 - Op(BC 37)
124 - BE 93 211 - Op(AK 60) 508 - Op(EO) 615 - BF 72
126 - ET 89 217 - BE 28 510 - Op(CG 70) 618 - BF 47
128 - Op(FC) 221 - BE 52 511 - BF 61 623 - Op(BC 24)
129 - Op(EP 28) 224 - BD 45 513 - CE 38 624 - BF 44
130 - Op(CF 50) 254 - AK 69 515 - Op(CF 50) 626 - AN 23
134 - Op(ER) 262 - BC 32 518 - BC 98 653 - DH 16
135 - AK 93 263 - BF 90 519 - DH 14 663 - Op(AJ 88)
154 - Op(EP) 264 - BE 51 521 - BD 75 752 - CG 18
155 - Op(CF 50) 332 - DT 47 522 - BE 26 753 - BD 57
159 - Op(ES) 373 - BE 14 524 - Op(AK 60) 758 - Op(AK 30)
552 - Op(ER) D 3 - Op(ER 96)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 224 - 262 - 263 - 264 -
332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 511 - 518 - 521 - 522 - 566 - 603 -
624 - 606 - 752 - 753.
Entered Port: U 511 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 109 - 507 - Lorient; U 628 - 336 - Kiel.
1002
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 167 sighted "Empire Glade" in EF 2463 course 310. U-boat
scored a number of hits during an artillery engagement but stopped pursuit
at dawn.
- 153 -
2) Sinkings:
U 172 sank American ship "Alaskan" in ER 9427 course 315 enroute
Capetown to New York via Trinidad.
U 163 sank a Brazilian freighter of about 4,000 T. on 22 November
loaded with coffee from Para to Trinidad. According to the crew, the name
possibly was Atlanta 5555 tons. Nothing seen since in EP 12, 28 or 56. It
is proposed to have U 163 operate in EP 26, EF 70 and EE 60.
U 161 sank Dutch "Tojileboot", 5,760 T. in ES 7633 on 29 November.
She blew up as she was torpedoed - no survivors.
U 177 sank English auxiliary "Nova Scotia" cruiser (6,796 tons) in KP
8325, carrying over 1000 Italian internees from Massana. Two survivors
taken on board and about 400 in lifeboats and rafts. Had to leave because
of air patrols. Rescue activities impossible by U-boat traveling alone.
Request orders regarding operations.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 96, DN 7556, ED 9928, EF 2463, ES 5751 (U
161) and EF 2540 (U 67).
U-boat attack in EG 3444.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Single ships on the S. African - W. Indies route sometimes follow a
course 75 miles wide from Capetown along the coast to 200 S., then
spread out toward St. Helena - Ascension St. Paul Rocks. U 178 ordered
to intercept this activity on her return cruise.
2) U 552 is to operate off Dakar as fuel permits since Free French
merchant and warships are believed to be operating with the enemy in that
area, receiving information from the Guallists. U 552 reports however that
neither the fuel supply or the condition of the crew permits any further
operation. U 552 is returning to port.
3) U 106 is free to move about in BD 45 after being refueled. This is
according to last sighting reports.
4) New course for U 604 is AK 92.
5) Because of especially heavy supply shipping and presence of 30 - 40
ships in Fedala and Casablanca (spy reports) U 618 ordered there at high
speed.
c) 1) U 224 has been re-supplied by U 460.
2) U D 3 has transferred a total of 8 air torpedoes to U 159.
d) U-boats were informed of the departure of the Italian blockade runner
"Cortellazzo".
- 154 -
V. Reports of Success:
U 67 1 ship hit by gunfire
1003
U 172 1 ship 5,364 GRT
U 163 1 ship 5,555 GRT
U 161 1 ship 5,760 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
29.November 1942.
I. U 43 - BD 45 U 160 - DS 15 U 383 - BD 45 U 553 - BE 12
67 - DQ 89 161 - Op(ES 73) 439 - Op(AK) 564 - DH 14
68 - DG 26 163 - Op(EP 53) 445 - Op(BC 20) 566 - BF 57
84 - BD 59 172 - Op(ER) 454 - BD 45 569 - BE 69
86 - DH 14 174 - Op(FB) 455 - BE 27 600 - AL 77
91 - Op(CF) 176 - Op(ES) 460 - BD 45 603 - AL 55
92 - DH 14 177 - Op(KP) 461 - DH 41 604 - BF 47
103 - Op(CF 50) 178 - GR 76 462 - DG 66 606 - BD 66
105 - CF 24 181 - Op(KZ) 465 - Op(AK) 608 - BD 70
106 - BD 45 183 - Op(BB) 504 - EJ 57 610 - AL 96
109 - BF 54 185 - CF 50-Op 505 - DG 94 611 - BC 30
118 - DH 14 211 - Op(AK) 507 - BF 54 615 - BE 93
124 - BE 97 217 - BE 82 508 - Op(EO) 618 - BE 99
126 - ET 76 221 - BE 16 510 - CG 623 - Op(BC 20)
128 - Op(FC) 224 - BD 59 513 - CE 65 624 - BF 49
129 - Op(EP) 254 - Op(AK) 515 - Op(CF 50) 626 - AF 79
130 - Op(CF 50) 262 - BD 15 518 - BD 77 628 - AO
134 - Op(ER) 263 - BF 93 519 - DH 14 653 - DH 14
135 - Op(AK) 264 - BE 56 521 - BD 70 663 - Op(BC 20)
154 - Op(EP) 332 - DT 18 522 - BE 63 752 - CG 42
155 - Op(CF) 336 - AO 524 - Op(AK) 753 - BD 59
159 - Op(ER) 373 - BE 55 552 - Op(EH 83) 758 - Op(AK)
D 3 - Op(ER 94)
 On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 224 - 262 - 263 -
264 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 518 - 521 - 522 - 566 - 603
- 606 - 624 - 752 - 753.
Entered Port: U 263 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 443 - Brest; U 164 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) For report of U 603 and Group "Panzer" see section IV a.
2) U 172 stalked a new type C2 ship for 8 hours, speed 17 knots, course
2600. She later pursued a steamer in FC 3136 on course E. Ship was later
established as being Spanish.
3) U 604 reported (0216) Dutch cruiser "De Ruyter" in BE 6745 on
N.E. course. U 615 reported a warship group in BE 5920 at 0500, course
300, speed 15 knots. Both reports possibly identical.
4) Sinkings:
U 181 sank a freighter (4,500 tons) on 28 November in KP 3742 with
torpedoes and gun fire. Portuguese "Inharrime" sighted in the same area,
her
- 155 -
flag and insignia were not illuminated.
U 178 on 27 November sank American new ship "Jeremia Wadsworth"
8,000 tons in JJ 2557 course 00. Allegedly enroute from New Orleans to
Bombay.
1004
U 508 on 27 November in EO 1431 sank armed freighter of 6,000 tons
course 3200. On 28 November in EO 1596 sank "Empire Cromwell" 7090
course 3100 loaded with ore from Capetown to New York via Port of
Spain.
U 177 situation since the last sinking the E. sector off Durban has been
quiet for 5 days. Great deal of shipping seen from 30 - 500 over RP 8530.
Standing sea patrols. Raider sunk on 28 November was steering 210 at 14
knots. According to statement of the crew voyage from Aden to Durban
lasted 9 1/2 days. Medium enemy activity under way.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 84, AL 4867.
U-boat in EP 11 according to D/F unknown ship saw explosion in ES
7563.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) U 603 dived at 1033 in AL 8133 because of sea-plane and picked up
numerous screw noises to the S. and S.W. She immediately followed to
make contact. Since, according to our own data, ON 151 must be in this
area and since an operation against this convoy was not planned with too
few boats, U 610 - 600 - 373 - 553 - 221 and 445 of Group "Draufgänger"
received orders on 30 November at 0800 to take up patrol strip from AK
4866 to BD 3397. At a speed of 9 knots, the convoy must pass the strip
about 1000.
2) Group "Panzer": Since the expected convoy was not intercepted
during the day, boats set off in observation formation at 2000 on course
2600, speed 7 knots. Object is to move against the convoy again on 30
November at 1200 in order to hinder them passing during the night. About
0500 a message was received from U 465 that she had picked up noises at
1800 in AK 3941, bearing 3500, without making contact, however. U 465
is in the farthest N. position of the patrol strip. At 0545, U 455 picked up a
Dete-bearing in AK 6724 and heard single screw noises in bearing 2450.
Group "Panzer" received orders to steer course 250 at 10 knots because of
poor visibility in order to be in position ahead of the expected convoy
when visibility improved.
b) U 126 was given freedom of action in ES 45.
 c) U 608 had taken on 7 cubic meters from U 521 and is sailing for U
460. U 460 has supplied U 43 and U 106.
- 156 -
d) 1) Due to departure of the Italian blockade runner, the N. section of
route "Anton" was closed by order and on 30 November at 1200 the
following limitations lifted: area to E. from 300 West and on 2 December
to N. of 350 North.
2) French merchant and warships are to be sunk at once unless they
have been especially reported as such. All Swedish ships not in
Goeteborge traffic which are inside blockade area are to be sunk, after
being stopped and after the crew has abandoned ship.
3) U 553 is the first boat to put out equipped with F.A.T. torpedoes.
Boats at sea were instructed to act accordingly during combined attacks.
Further equipping of boats follows according to yard capabilities.
V. Reports of Success:
U 181 1 ship 4,500 tons sunk
U 178 1 ship 8,000 tons sunk
U 508 2 ships 13,090 tons sunk.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
30.November 1942.
1005
I. U 43 - BD 45 U 160 - DG 75 U 383 - BD 45 U 553 - Op(BD 30)
67 - DQ 67 161 - Op(ES) 439 - Op(AK 60) 564 - DH 14
68 - CE 95 163 - Op(ER) 443 - BF 55 566 - BF 54
84 - BD 69 164 - BF 54 445 - Op(BC 20) 569 - BE 52
86 - DH 14 172 - Op(ER) 454 - BD 56 600 - Op(AK 99)
91 - Op(CF 40) 174 - Op(FC) 455 - Op(BD 33) 603 - AL 84
92 - DH 14 176 - Op(ER) 460 - BD 45 604 - BE 59
103 - Op(CF 10) 177 - Op(KP) 461 - DG 68 606 - BD 45
105 - CF 46 178 - GR 84 462 - DH 14 608 - BD 45
106 - BD 45 181 - Op(KP) 465 - Op(AK 02) 610 - Op(AK 99)
109 - BF 45 183 - Op(BB) 504 - EJ 18 611 - Op(BD 42)
118 - DH 14 185 - Op(CF 40) 505 - DG 68 615 - Op(BE 59)
124 - CF 36 211 - Op(AK 60) 507 - BF 49 618 - CF 38
126 - ES 92 217 - BE 79 508 - Op(EO 13) 623 - Op(BC 20)
128 - Op(FC) 221 - Op(BD 30) 510 - CG 70 624 - BF 50
129 - Op(EP) 224 - BD 69 513 - CE 92 626 - AF 79
130 - Op(CF 40) 254 - Op(AK 60) 515 - Op(CF 40) 628 - AN 36
134 - Op(ER) 262 - BD 24 518 - BD 53 653 - DH 14
135 - Op(AK 60) 264 - BE 66 519 - DH 14 663 - BD 16
154 - Op(EP) 332 - DG 98 521 - BD 58 752 - CG 13
155 - Op(CF 40) 336 - AN 36 522 - BF 45 753 - BD 68
159 - Op(ER) 373 - Op(BD 30) 524 - Op(AK 60) 758 - Op(AK 30)
552 - EH 61 D 3 - Op(ER)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 224 - 262 - 264 -
332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 518 - 521 - 522 - 566 - 603 - 606
- 608 - 624 - 752 - 753.
Entered Port: U 626 - Bergen.
Sailed: U 214 - Brest; U 609 - St. Nazaire; U 432 - La Pallice; U 435 -
Bergen.
- 157 -
 leaving Bergen. After losing contact, the convoy was picked up anew on
the hydrophones at about 2200. Bearing signals were not picked up by
any of the boats so that only general position of the boat must be reckoned
with. Direct contact had not been established up until morning. It is not
definite, that U 603 saw a patrol group rather than the convoy.
Nevertheless "Draufgänger" boats received orders to search farther on
general course 2200, considering enemy speed at 6 - 9 knots. It is
proposed to break off the operation by darkness in case nothing further is
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. found.
2) Group "Panzer":
III. Reports on the Enemy: Since nothing developed from further pursuit and bad visibility (fog)
a) 1) See IV a for reports of Group "Draufgänger" and "Panzer". held little promise, the operation was broken off. In order to intercept a
2) Sightings: north bound convoy on 4 December the group sailed on in observation
U 214 6 small screened vessels off Penmarch, course E. (Our own formation and on 1 December passed base line from AK 4295 to AK 2362,
patrol craft). on 2 December the base line AJ 6679 to AK 7457, on 3 December base
U 211 followed a 4 master on N.E. course in BD 3342. Later she was line 8338 to AJ 9799 and on 4 December are
found to be Irish.
U 663: Nothing seen in area N. of Newfoundland Bank from 27 to 30 - 158 -
November.
U 174 missed two shots on the C2 type ship as reported by U 172
course 2600, speed 17 knots, heavily armed. Possible pistol failure.
3) Sinkings:
U 177 sank English "Llandaff Castle" 10,786 tons in KP 5925, course
2050.
U 181 sank Greek "Cleathis" 4,153 tons in KP 3525 with gunfire, ship
was armed.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DM 9270, BF 5447, ED 69, EN 33, B? 4653 in patrol position from AJ 8482 to BC 2432.
U-boat attack: ED 6979. b) 1) Group "Westwall" set off on westward course at 2000 in CE 36 - 62
making 150 miles per day.
IV. Current Operations: 2) Course for U 435 (former Arctic boat) is AK 60.
a) 1) Group "Draufgänger": 3) U 663 - 623 - 445 are sailing to be supplied by Schneer in BD 7415.
At 1401 U 603 reported convoy in AL 7725 on S.W. course. The boat Combined activity is proposed with Group "Westwall" on the American -
observed 4 craft in this group at 1230 and is keeping contact through Gibraltar convoy routes.
hydrophones. Group "Draufgänger" received orders to make every effort U 618 and U 432 are underway to DJ 20. Boats have orders to carry
to establish contact. U 603 has made no instrument observations since out short surprise attacks against harbors of Mehdia, Casablanca, and
1006
Mazagan and to act according to enemy counter attacks. These harbors, (Signed): DÖNITZ.
according to most recent information are debarkation ports for troops and
material.
c) 1) U 513 has taken on pumps and nozzles from U 68.
2) U 118 has supplied U 564 - 519 - 86 - 92 and 653.
3) U 461 and U 505 have met in DG 92 for transfer of anti-radar gear
cable and a sick man.
d) Attack on single ships along route "Anton" has been further prohibited - 159 -
as follows: From 2 December at 0000 N. of 350 N. from 4 December
0000 N. of 150 N. Complete prohibition is planned by about 8 December.

V. Reports of Success:
U 177 1 ship 10,786 tons
U 181 1 ship 4,153 tons.

VI. General:
The verbal reports of the Captains of U 263 and U 613 completely back
up the accuracy of the resolution to move westward from the Gibraltar
area. Both Captains' reports are in agreement regarding the very strong
and dangerous air patrols which forced boats to remain submerged for
excessive lengths of time. The fact that both boats returned to W. France
in spite of heavy damage is on the one side, due to the outstanding quality
of German U-boats, on the other side, due to the aggressive and
unshakeable character of the crews, especially the Captains. As long as
such crews (both boats on 1st war cruise) come from the homeland, one
need have no misgivings regarding the future of the U-boat war. Also if
the war becomes more difficult, these men will meet it with still greater
fortitude.
In spite of these difficult circumstances which made the operations of
larger numbers of U-boats W. of Gibraltar useless, 2 have closed the
Moroccan harbors, through use of U 618 and U 432. The possibility to
gain something by sending single boats close to the coast must at least be
attempted.
U-boat Success in November 1942.
1) U-boat success in November reached a new high and will probably
mount to 900,000 T. The time has come to regard these results in a true
light and to give propaganda proper guidance in this connection.
2) Merchant ship sinkings, losses and serious damage to U-boats, which
will not be changed appreciably amount to: in N. Atlantic: 300,000 T. 5
lost, 1 badly damaged. Remainder of the Atlantic except Gibraltar area:
360,000 T. none lost, one heavily damaged. Gibraltar - Morocco area:
70,000 T., 3 lost, 5 badly damaged. Mediterranean: 100,000 T., 5 lost, 8
badly damaged. Arctic: 35,000 T. none lost or damaged.
3) The evaluation of these figures is as follows:
a) A good three quarters of the sinkings were in the open Atlantic a great
preponderance at the beginning of the month, before the beginning of the
African operation. Success fell off appreciably after withdrawal of boats
for the Gibraltar area. As already reported in the opinion of B.d.U. the

1007
initial success in the Atlantic was conditioned by lack of counter measures
in connection with the African landings.
Losses in the Atlantic maintained themselves in normal times, namely
one boat for each 130,000 tons.
b) The success in operations against the enemy in the approaches to
Africa west of Gibraltar-Morocco and in the Mediterranean comprise only
one fifth of the total results. It must be pointed out that the firm position
of the enemy at the time of the landing resulted in the heaviest losses,
namely 1 boat for every 20,000 tons sunk and in addition a much higher
percentage of boats heavily damaged. The losses in this area are therefore
percentage wise more than six times as high as those in the entire Atlantic,
about the North Atlantic. The average operational time of the 19 boats
was only 8 days and of these boats none was in action 13 days after the
beginning of the operation.
c) Results in the Arctic are of no numerical importance.
4) The outlook for December is unfavorable. According to the record
month of November the smallest results are to be expected because:
a) The favorable conditions in the Atlantic cannot be taken advantage of
because of withdrawal of boats to the Mediterranean and the Gibraltar-
Morocco area.
b) In the Capetown area there are only 2 boats, which will probably have
fired all their torpedoes in the course of the month.
c) The counter measures off Gibraltar in spite of aggressive operations,
have succeeded and attacks in this area can expect only losses without the
corresponding possibilities of success. That prospects in intercepting the
enemy in the approaches are smaller, has already been reported.
- 160 -
1008
d) Fewer targets can be expected in the Mediterranean after the first
stream of shipping has ceased, the number of boats was raised 50% more
during November and the defences remained the same.
5) Conclusions in brief:
a) Success in November have no connection with operations against
African shipping. The prospects of these operations are meager. The
opposition propaganda in the press will make false reports and will wreck
damage in the long run.
b) After the record month of November, December must fall off
perceptibly.
6) U-boat command and U-boats are ready and willing to fight under most
difficult conditions. B.d.U. however, is of the opinion that the command
must make a clear picture so that the relationship between losses and
success is factual. The foregoing situation report alone serves this point.
The U-boat arm will also fight in the future under the most difficult
conditions wherever they may be committed.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 December 1942
PG30314a
1.December 1942.
I. U 43 - BD 56 U 161 - Op(ES) U 432 - BF 91 U 552 - EH 32
 67 - DQ 38 163 - OP(EP) 435 - AN 23 553 - Op(BE 30)
68 - CE 90 164 - BF 48 439 - Op(? 50) 564 - CE 82
84 - BE 48 172 - Op(ER) 443 - BF 49 566 - BF 52
86 - DH 14 174 - EC 14 445 - BC 23 569 - BE 16
91 - CE 20 176 - Op(ER) 454 - BD 65 600 - BD 30-Op
92 - DH 14 177 - Op(KP) 455 - Op(BD 30) 603 - BD 32
103 - CE 30 178 - GR 72 460 - BD 45 604 - BE 19
105 - CF 75 181 - Op(KP) 461 - DG 90 606 - BE 55
106 - Op(BD 40) 183 - Op(BB) 462 - CF 87 608 - BD 40
109 - BE 69 185 - CE 50 465 - Op(AK 40) 609 - BF 67
118 - DG 35 211 - Op(AK 50) 504 - DT 77 610 - Op(BD 30)
124 - CF 52 214 - BF 55 505 - DG 60 611 - BD 70
126 - ES 59 217 - BD 91 507 - BF 71 615 - BE 51
128 - Op(FC) 221 - Op(B? 38) 508 - Op(EO) 618 - CG 72
129 - Op(EP) 224 - BE 48 510 - Op(CG 70) 623 - BC 29
130 - CE 30 254 - Op(AK 40) 513 - CE 90 624 - BF 56
134 - Op(ER) 262 - BD 37 515 - CE 30 628 - AN 38
135 - Op(AK 70) 264 - BF 45 518 - BD 62 653 - DH 14
154 - Op(EP) 332 - DG 69 519 - CE 82 663 - BC 51
155 - CE 30 336 - AN 31 521 - BD 68 752 - BF 75
159 - Op(FC) 373 - Op(BD 30) 522 - BF 54 753 - BE 48
160 - DG 55 383 - BD 40 524 - Op(A? 50) 758 - Op(AK 50)
D 3 - Op(ER)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 224 - 262 - 264 -
332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 518 - 521 - 522 - 552 - 566 - 606
- 603 - 608 - 624 - 752 - 753.
Entered Port: U 566 - Brest.
Sailed: U 591 - Bergen; U 175 - 602 - Lorient; U 167 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Group "Draufgänger's" operation cancelled.
2) Sightings:
1009
U 564 in CE 8822 large two-funnel type ship similar to "Duchess of
York". Course at first 3300, later 00, speed 15 - 17 knots. Pursued until
2000 without success - then broke off.
U 510: nothing sighted apart from neutral shipping.
U 129: no traffic encountered in EP 62, 91 - 8820.
U 109: attack on group of enemy warships in BE 9489 at 2240.
Course N.E. full speed ahead. Forced to submerge by destroyers. Depth
charge attack.
U 183: 29.11. 4 misses on 2 overlapping vessels in BB 8212. Forced
to submerge by destroyers. 30.11. small convoy sighted in BB 8412 in
shallow water. Nothing seen or heard at convoy assembly point. Boat
received orders to return. Reinforcements intended in BD 80.
- 162 -
U 508 sank British ship "Trevalgan" of 5,299 GRT also "City of
Bath" of 5,079 GRT. Both ships in EO 1270. Course 3100.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 9514, BF 3967, BB 8289, ED 69, DM 9270, BF
4653, EN 33, CH 5959.
U-boat attack in ED 6979.
Report of torpedoing from English passenger steamer "Llandaff Castle"
(10,640 GRT) in KP 56 (U 177).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
 b) 1) As the convoy was not found and the visibility was only 2 sea miles
the Group "Draufgänger" received orders to break off operations and to
proceed northwards. After the group has been reinforced by three boats,
reconnaissance lines from AL 1728 - AL 4194 will be occupied until 5.12.
at 2000 to intercept an ON(S) convoy expected on 6.12. in the following
order: U 604 - 600 - 610 - 569 - 553 - 615 - 221 - and U 455. U 373 VI. General:
which originally belonged to Group "Draufgänger" is proceeding to BD
7415 to the M.O.'s ship as the First Watch Keeping Officer is ill. U-boats on 1 December 1942.
2) After supplying U 564 - 519 - 86 - 92 - 653 orders are to occupy the
intended reconnaissance lines to cover the America - Gibraltar convoy I. In service on 1 November 1942: 368
traffic. U 106 has recently joined Group "Westwall". Boats received In service in November 23
orders to patrol in reconnaissance channels from CE 1363 - CE 4966 on 391
3.12. at 0800, course W., daily reckoning 160 miles in the following order: Lost in November: 15
U 106 - 103 - 130 - 515 - 155 - 91 - 185 - 564 - 519 - 86 - 92 and 653. Temporarily out of order: 1
3) U 435 - 336 and U 628 proceed to ordered position via AM 32. 375
c) U 608 and U 383 have received a reinforcement U 460.
d) Italian blockade runner "Cortelazzo" was attacked by an English Foreign U-boats 7
cruiser in BE 8481 at 1600 and was scuttled by the crew. Returning boats 382
received orders, as far as fuel situation allows, to proceed at high speed to
scene of the action and to take the crew on board. The first 5 boats can be
in position after about 26 hours - 3 more with course of the 3rd and three Losses in November (those not underlined have not yet been declared
more in the morning of the 4th/12. A U-boat coming from the E. goes to missing)
meet a life boat sailing to Spain. On assembly the boats are to begin the Atlantic 3 (98, 411, 173)
search according to weather conditions and drift. It is intended to use 3 Otherwise in Atlantic 5 (132, 658, 520, 184, 517)
Condor (rec. planes) on the 2nd. Mediterranean 6 (660, 605, 595, 559, 331, 259)
In Training 1 (272)
V. Reports of Success:
U 508 2 ships 10,378 BRT.
Consisting of:
Type VIIC
U 98 Eichmann. Experienced boat. New Commander. Middle of
- 163 - November W. of Gibraltar. No information.
U 132 Vogelsang. Veteran boat. At the beginning of November in action
with a convoy in N. Atlantic.
U 259 Köpke. Second trip. Middle November. Mediterranean.
U 272 Hepp. On 12.11. during training in the Baltic. Rammed and sunk.
1010
U 411 Spindlegger. Second trip. New Commander. In the middle of
November W. of Gibraltar.
U 559 Heidtmann. Veteran boat. At the end of October in Eastern
Mediterranean. Part of the crew taken prisoner.
U 595 Quaet - Faslem. Second trip. Bombed in the middle of the
Mediterranean, later presumably scuttled off the coast of Africa. Part of
crew taken prisoner.
U 605 Schutze. Second trip. Middle of November. Mediterranean.
U 658 Senkl. Second trip. Last message 20.11. May have been lost to
convoy in North Atlantic.
U 660 Baur. Second trip. Middle of November. In Mediterranean. Crew
for the most part taken prisoner.
U 331 von Tiesenhausen. Middle of November. Mediterranean.
II. Distribution:
II VIIa VIIb VIId IXb/c IXD1 IXD2 XB XIV Total Foreign
In action : 2 - 140 3 48 - 3 2 5 203 2***
On trials: - - 82 - 20 2 5 1 - 110 2
In training: 35 4 21** - 2 - - - - 62 3
37* 4 243 3 70 2 8 3 5 375 7
* 3 other type IIs are temporarily out of action for the Black Sea.
** 9 of these boats are temporarily in training for operations.
*** Foreign ships in action or intended for action to train as their use
cannot be relied on for technical reasons.

- 164 - III. In November (without foreign ships):

Total added + 7
Number of boats in action deducted - 4
Number of trial boats added + 11

IV. Number of boats in action on 1 December 1942:

Atlantic (without foreign boats) 154 plus 2 foreign ships.
Mediterranean (including 4 proceeding from the Atlantic to the
Mediterranean 24
Type IXC the North Sea 23
U 173 Schweichel. Second Trip. New Commander. Middle of Black Sea 2
November. West of Gibraltar.
U 184 Dangschat. First trip, experienced Commander. Middle of The number of boats in action in the Atlantic has decreased to 6, owing
November to convoy in North Atlantic. to losses and boats being sent to the Mediterranean.
U 517 Hatwig. Second trip. On outward voyage west of Biscay. Air
attack. V. Number of boats in the Atlantic in November:
U 520 Schwarzkopf. First trip. Last message 27.10. E. of Newfoundland. On an average, at sea during the day 94.9 boats
Of these, in the Op. area 38.2 "
By far the most sinkings can presumably be attributed to air attacks. Of these, outward bound 56.7 "
1011
Of these, returning to base 24.5 " 118 - DG 35 183 - BB 76 465 - Op(AJ 60) 609 - BF 81
VI. Number of boats which put out in November:
From home bases 11 boats.
From Western France 42 "
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 165 -
2.December 1942.
I. U 43 - BD 66 U 161 - Op(ES) U 383 - BD 55 U 603 - BE 15
67 - DF 84 163 - Op(EP) 432 - BF 82 552 - DS 92
68 - CF 48 164 - BE 93 435 - AF 75 553 - AL 77
84 - BE 87 176 - Op(ER) 439 - Op(AJ 90) 564 - Op(CE 81)
86 - Op(CE 50) 167 - AO 443 - CG 43 569 - BE 12
91 - Op(CE 20) 172 - Op(ER) 445 - BC 61 591 - AF 87
92 - Op(CE 50) 174 - Op(FC) 454 - BE 45 600 - AL 77
103 - Op(CE 20) 175 - BF 54 455 - AL 77 602 - BF 55
105 - DG 30 177 - Op(KP) 460 - BD 71 604 - BE 13
106 - Op(BD 76) 178 - GQ 65 461 - DT 17 606 - BE 65
109 - BE 97 181 - Op(KP) 462 - CF 22 608 - BD 55
1012
124 - CF 70 185 - Op(CE 20) 504 - DT 41 610 - AL 77
126 - Op(ES) 211 - Op(AK 70) 505 - DG 36 611 - BC 93
128 - Op(FC) 214 - BF 49 507 - BE 89 615 - AL 88
129 - Op(EP) 217 - BD 88 508 - Op(EO) 618 - CG 84
130 - Op(CE 20) 221 - AL 77 510 - Op(CF 84) 623 - BC 65
134 - Op(ER) 224 - BE 57 513 - DG 13 624 - BF 50
135 - Op(AK 70) 354 - Op(AK 70) 515 - Op(CE 20) 628 - AN 23
154 - Op(EP) 262 - BD 63 518 - BE 45 653 - Op(CE 50)
155 - Op(CE 20) 264 - BF 49 519 - Op(CE 50) 663 - BC 56
159 - Op(FC) 332 - DH 17 521 - BE 76 752 - BF 82
160 - DG 35 336 - AN 63 522 - BF 61 753 - BE 48
373 - BD 34 524 - Op(AJ 60) 758 - AJ 60-Op
D 3 - Op(ER)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 183 - 224 - 262 -
264 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 507 - 518 - 521 - 552 - 603 - 606
- 608 - 624 - 752 - 753.
Entered Port: U 522 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 258 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: For the crew of "Cortellazzo".
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Sightings:
U 67 sighted the Portuguese tanker "Sambras", in DF 8175 proceeding
from Lisbon to Curacao. No papers on board. Submarine received orders
to act according to laws and allow the ship to proceed.
U 177: advancing to attack on "Dorsetshire", but she was recognized
as a hospital ship shortly before firing.
U 224: triple miss on large two-funnel vessel in BD 6367 southerly
course, speed 20 knots.
U 610 reported sound of propellers in AK 6965. Pursuit discontinued
because of Diesel breakdown. Sounds lost.
2) Sinkings:
 U 604: Large passenger steamer - possibly troop transport in BE 1739. 4) Supply is planned to take place in about CD 20 for Trinidad boats.
General course 1800, speed 17 knots. Return voyage must take place with 40 cubic meters fuel on board.
c) 1) U 504 has supplemented provisions from U 461.
- 166 - 2) Supply from U-boat tanker is intended for U 128 - 174 - 172 - 159 -
126 - 161 and perhaps U 134 in ER 5555 from 8.12. Except for U 134
boats can remain in the operational area for another 14 days.
d) 1) Rescue action "Cortellazzo":
U-boats and Condors have so far discovered nothing. Inasfar as the
fuel situation allows boats are to search in a southwesterly and westerly
direction and later to proceeds towards the North Spanish coast with large
sweeps as it is possible that lifeboats are trying to reach there.
2) From now on, attacks on isolated ships on the whole of Route
"Anton" as far as 50 S. are allowed.
Tonnage according to survivors' statements 16,000 GRT.
U 552: British steamer "Wallsend" (3,157 GRT) carrying planes from V. Reports of Success:
Liverpool to Freetown in DT 8416. U 604 1 ship 16,000 BRT
U 174: British ship "Besholt" (4,977 GRT) carrying tn and copper U 552 1 ship 3,157 BRT
pyrites from Lobito to Trinidad. Ship has 6 American sailors taken on U 174 1 ship 4,977 BRT.
board from a previously sunk steamer "George Pecher". According to
statement ships steer a course of 3140 to FC 3296 from there on a course
of 299 degrees. ---------------------------------------------------
b) Search for crew of Cortellazzo unsuccessful. ---------------
c) U-boat sightings: DN 9519, ED 71.
U-boat warning for KP 96.
d) None.
- 167 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Instead of that given in earlier order, the day's reckoning for Group
"Westwall" is 140 miles.
2) U 604 is to occupy the most southerly position in reconnaissance
channel of Group "Draufgänger". All other boats are to occupy a position
to the N.
3) New courses: U 109 to ED 99, U 105 and U 124 same grid after
supply, U 164 and U 507 to EH 60, U 214 and U 175 to CF 70. U 591
proceeds to AK 60 via AM 32. 3.December 1942.
1013

I. U 43 - BE 72 U 163 - Op(EP) U 383 - BD 65 U 553 - AL 71
67 - DF 55 164 - CF 31 432 - BF 72 564 - Op(CE 40)
68 - CF 52 167 - AN 36 435 - AE 99 569 - AL 48
84 - BE 80 172 - Op(ER) 439 - Op(AJ 80) 591 - AF 75
86 - Op(CE 40) 174 - Op(ER) 473 - CG 82 600 - AL 71
91 - Op(CE 10) 175 - BF 48 445 - BC 68 602 - BF 49
92 - Op(CE 40) 176 - Op(ER) 454 - BE 86 603 - BE 81
103 - OP(CE 20) 177 - Op(KP) 455 - AL 71 604 - BE 11
105 - DG 45 178 - GQ 29 460 - BD 75 606 - BF 47
106 - Op(CE 20) 181 - Op(KP) 461 - DT 71 608 - BD 69
109 - CF 34 183 - BB 97 462 - BE 86 609 - BF 72
118 - DG 35 185 - Op(CE 40) 465 - Op(AJ 80) 610 - AK 69
124 - CF 76 211 - OP(AJ 90) 504 - DT 10 611 - BD 74
126 - Op(ES) 214 - BE 69 505 - CF 79 615 - AL 72
128 - Op(FC) 217 - CE 15 507 - BE 84 618 - Op(DJ 20)
129 - Op(EP) 221 - AL 47 508 - Op(EO) 623 - BC 93
130 - Op(CE 20) 224 - BE 45 510 - Op(CF 80) 624 - BF 50
134 - Op(ER) 254 - Op(AJ 90) 513 - DG 17 628 - AF 75
135 - Op(AJ 90) 258 - BF 91 515 - Op(CE 10) 653 - Op(CE 40)
154 - Op(EP) 262 - BE 80 518 - BE 45 663 - BC 92
155 - Op(CE 10) 264 - BF 50 519 - Op(CE 40) 753 - BE 84
159 - Op(FC) 332 - CF 87 521 - BE 86 752 - BF 93
160 - DG 35 336 - AF 76 524 - Op(AJ 80) 758 - Op(AJ 90)
161 - Op(ES 41) 373 - BD 54 552 - DT 71 D 3 - Op(ER)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 183 - 224 - 264 -
262 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 518 - 521 - 552 - 603 - 606
- 608 - 624 - 752 - 753.
Entered Port: U 752 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 301 - Brest; U 410 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
1014
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Sightings:
U 758: One destroyer in AJ 8385, course 2700, speed 8 knots. After
contact had been lost, ordered to break off search and occupy
reconnaissance channel. It is possible, according to dead reckoning, that
the destroyer belongs to the ON(S) (convoy) in the vicinity. The entire
Group "Panzer" could not be employed in searching owing to the
proximity of the coast and the expected eastward-bound convoy.
U 608: In DE 4858 a two funnel passenger steamer on a course of 500
was trailed without success for 6 hours.
U D 3: A Spanish vessel on a course of 300 in ER 9366.
U 161: On 1.12. in ES 4291 a Spanish ship "Aolo" on a course of 300,
speed 9 knots. On 3.12. "Monte Oip" in ES 4269 on a course of 2000
proceeding from Barcelona to Buenos Aires. The boat is again fit for
action.
U 128: Neutral shipping sighted in FC 3262 on 2.12. Presumably
hunting for "Besholt" (Translator's note: B sunk). Operations possible for
a further three weeks.
- 168 -
2) U 183 sank "Empire Dashick" (6,000 GRT) in BB 8896, course
2500.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DB 5935, ED 9953.
Submarine message from BB 8895 (U 183).
English aircraft reports U-boat in BF 7869.
IV. Current Operations:
a) According to dead reckoning, and "SC" convoy is expected from 5.12.
at dawn in the patrol channel covered by Group "Panzer". The boats
received instruction to report all sightings at once and to maintain watch
on the reconnaissance area according to visibility and weather conditions
with increased speed also submerging and listening.
b) 1) In accordance with the last traffic report, boats in ER and ES are to
have freedom of movement until the start of supplying.
2) U 663 - 623 - 445 and U 611 are to proceed, contrary to previous
orders on a course to grid BC 31, after being reinforced by "Schnoor"
attachment to Group "Panzer" and operations on the awaited convoy are
intended.
c) 1) U 552 has taken on 10 cubic meters from U 461.
U 623 has taken on 55 cubic meters from U 460.
2) U 513 has to start the homeward trip owing to chemically faulty fuel.
Resination and corrosion have led to a considerable number of fuel pump
and valve breakdowns. The causes are explained by the Lorient shipyards.
d) 1) Rescue action "Cortellazzo":
U 603 sighted several pieces of wreckage and drifting empty lifeboats
in BE 8455. It is therefore possible that the crew has been picked up by an
English warship.
There are no sighting reports from the other U-boats. It is intended to
discontinue the search at nightfall on 4.12.
2) Following the putting out of U 258 the ordered number of 4 boats by
the Naval War Staff 2412 Secret Order (Gkdos) S.O. only message,
consisting of U 443 - 301 - 602 and 258. The breakthrough the Straits of
Gibraltar is to take place in the new moon period on about 8.12. (See
Operational Order Group "Taucher")
V. Reports of Success:
U 183 1 ship 6,000 BRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
1015
- 169 -
4.December 1942.
I. U 43 - BE 84 U 163 - Op(EP) U 373 - BD 72 U 524 - Op(AJ 80)
67 - DF 26 164 - CF 29 383 - BE 48 552 - DT 45
68 - BF 49 167 - AN 36 410 - BF 67 553 - Op(AL 40)
84 - BE 94 172 - Op(ER) 432 - BE 99 564 - Op(CE 40)
86 - Op(CE 40) 174 - Op(ER) 435 - AM 32 569 - Op(AL 40)
91 - Op(CE 10) 175 - BE 93 439 - Op(AJ 80) 591 - AE 99
92 - Op(CE 40) 176 - ES 71 443 - Op(DJ 20) 600 - Op(AL 40)
103 - Op(CE 10) 177 - Op(KP) 445 - BD 74 602 - BF 71
105 - DG 35 178 - CQ 13 454 - BE 92 603 - BE 84
106 - Op(CE 10) 181 - Op(KP) 455 - AL 40 604 - AL 72
109 - CF 27 183 - BB 90 460 - BD 74 606 - BE 49
118 - DG 35 185 - Op(CE 10) 461 - DT 70 609 - BE 64
124 - DG 30 211 - Op(BC 20) 462 - BE 96 608 - BE 56
126 - ES 45 214 - BE 94 465 - Op(AJ 80) 610 - Op(AL 40)
128 - Op(FC 33) 217 - CD 63 504 - DG 92 611 - BD 74
129 - Op(EP) 221 - AL 40 505 - CF 58 615 - Op(AL 40)
130 - Op(CE 10) 224 - BE 84 507 - CF 21 618 - Op(DJ 20)
134 - Op(ER) 254 - Op(BC 20) 508 - Op(ED) 623 - BD 74
135 - Op(BC 20) 258 - BF 82 510 - Op(CF 82) 624 - BF 64
154 - Op(EP) 262 - BE 86 513 - DF 64 628 - AF 77
155 - Op(CE 10) 264 - BF 64 515 - Op(CE 10) 653 - Op(CE 40)
 159 - Op(FC) 301 - BF 55 518 - BD 24 663 - BD 74
160 - DG 35 332 - CF 82 519 - Op(CE 40) 753 - BE 94
161 - Op(ES) 336 - AF 77 521 - BE 96 758 - Op(AJ 80)
D 3 - Op(ER)

On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 183 - 224 - 262 - b) None.

264 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 521 - 552 - 603 c) English aircraft attacked submerged U-boat with depth charges in AM
- 606 - 608 - 624 - 753. 3282.
Entered Port: U 624 - 264 - St. Nazaire d) None.
Sailed: - . -
IV. Current Operations:
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. a) 1) Convoy sighted by U 603:
U 603, on the return trip owing to the illness of the Commander,
III. Reports on the Enemy: sighted a southward bound convoy at 1836 in BE 9826. Boats favorably
a) 1) See paragraph IVa for report on convoy sighted by U 603. disposed for operations on this convoy shall proceed full speed ahead for
2) Sightings: operations after reporting their position. This applies to U 175 - 602 - 214
U 615: Triple miss on isolated ship on general course W. and speed 18 and U 432 which should be able to be in position in the course of the night
knots in AL 4559. Zig-zagged off after fire. or the following day. U 603 was beaten off to the N. by destroyers and
U D 3: Spanish ship "Montepynegro" on course of 2200 speed 9 knots received a two hour depth charge bombardment at 2350 in pursuit. U 602
in ES 7187. next boat onto the convoy was located at 2330 in CG 1224 beaten off an
U 163: One cruiser, one destroyer in EO 2998 on a westerly course, hour later and hunted by hydrophone and depth charges for a long time.
speed 20 knots. No further messages were received. The operation continues.
U 177: Cruiser proceeding at high speed on course 2200 in KP 5960 2) U 524, a member of the Group "Panzer" covered coded English R/T
on 3.12. Hunted steamer to KP 8310 on 4.12. Recognized in the darkness from 1800 - 2000 in AJ 8766. There were 10 participants. No visual or
as Swedish vessel "Gilimmaren". hydrophone bearing. As, according to dead reckoning the expected
3) U 159 has loaded torpedoes and is ready for further action after convoy must be somewhere in this region, Group "Panzer" received
supplementing furl supply. instructions to proceed on a course of 500 at high speed and to patrol from
4) U 181 sank Panama steamer "Amarylis" on a course of 2000 in KP AJ 8321 - 9762 on 5.12. at 1100 in the patrol channels.
3583 on 2.12. Total number of ships sunk: 12 with a total tonnage of According to this the boats are almost certainly ahead of the convoy. It
57,500 GRT. Delayed return trip. is intended to intercept it during the day in order to avoid a night
encounter. It is possible that the R/T traffic originated from a group at
- 170 - some distance as the range of the waves, and Direction Finding is not yet
possible.
b) None.

1016
 c) 1) U 118 has supplied the boats U 124 - 105 and U 160 and begins the
return voyage.
2) U 611 has taken 70 cubic meters of fuel on board from U 460.
d) 1) U 258 is on the return voyage owing to the illness of the
Commander. The boat has been destined for the Mediterranean. U 257
has been ordered to take her place.
2) U 181 reports that the hydrophone gear installed in type IXD2 is very
bad in seaway 4 in swell. It is suggested that at least in the newly
constructed boats large hydrophone deep steering rudders should be fitted.
V. Reports of Success:
U 181 1 ship 4,328 BRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 171 -
5.December 1942.
I. U 43 - BE 67 U 163 - Op(EO) U 383 - BE 57 U 552 - DT 16
67 - CE 47 164 - CF 57 410 - BF 81 553 - Op(AL 40)
68 - BF 55 167 - AN 28 432 - CG 14 564 - Op(CD 60)
84 - BF 71 172 - Op(ER) 435 - AM 22 569 - Op(AL 40)
1017
86 - Op(CD 60) 174 - Op(ER) 439 - Op(AJ 80) 591 - AM 22
91 - Op(CD 30) 175 - CG 13 443 - CG 90 600 - Op(AL 40)
92 - Op(CD 60) 176 - Op(ES) 445 - BD 47 602 - CG 12
103 - Op(CD 30) 177 - Op(KP) 454 - BF 72 603 - CG 12
105 - DG 57 178 - CG 85 455 - Op(AL 40) 604 - Op(AL 40)
106 - Op(CD 30) 181 - Op(KP) 460 - BD 74 606 - BF 52
109 - CE 66 183 - BC 77 461 - FH 62 608 - BE 59
118 - CF 78 185 - Op(CD 60) 462 - BF 73 609 - BE 25
124 - DG 30 211 - Op(BC 20) 465 - Op(AJ 80) 610 - Op(AL 40)
126 - Op(ES) 214 - CG 12 504 - DG 36 611 - BC 69
128 - Op(ER) 217 - CD 59 505 - CF 32 615 - Op(AL 10)
129 - Op(EP) 221 - Op(AL 40) 507 - CF 42 618 - Op(DJ 20)
130 - Op(CD 30) 224 - BE 91 508 - Op(ED) 623 - BC 63
134 - Op(ER) 254 - Op(BC 20) 510 - CF 82 628 - AM 31
135 - Op(BC 20) 258 - BF 99 513 - DG 43 653 - Op(CD 60)
154 - Op(EP) 262 - BE 93 515 - Op(CG 30) 663 - BD 74
155 - CD 30 301 - BF 48 518 - BD 34 753 - BE 96
159 - Op(ER) 332 - BF 92 519 - Op(CD 60) 758 - Op(AJ 80)
160 - CF 79 336 - AM 31 521 - BF 72 D 3 - Op(ES)
171 - Op(ES) 373 - BD 74 524 - AJ 83
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 224 -
262 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 521 - 552 - 603
- 606 - 608 - 753.
Entered Port: U 606 - Brest.
Sailed: U 664 - 621 - Brest; U 356 - St. Nazaire; U 225 - 123 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy U 603, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 591 was bombed in AM 5253 and sustained damage to electrical
engine. Boat remains fir for action.
3) U 154 has not encountered traffic in EP since 21.11.
4) U 134 is ready for 3 more weeks operations after refueling.
 5) U 129 hunted steamer with course 1200 in EP 5272 and finally
identified it as being of Argentinean nationality.
6) U 128 sank British steamer "Teesbank" (5,136 GRT) in ER 9817
sailing in ballast from Port Elizabeth to Demarara.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BE2955, BF 4521, EC 9183, CA 98, DB 6875, EC
9150, BC 1346, BD 67.
d) None.
- 172 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy U 603:
U 602 reports smoke trails and Sunderland aircraft at 1800 in CG
1890, course S. Shortly after this she was forced to submerge owing to air
activity and lost contact. The same thing happened to U 175. As the
possibilities of success appear negligible only the southward bound boats
are to continue the operation. U 603 received orders to return as a result of
the illness of the Commander. U 214 is proceeding to the ordered
operational area. U 432 is far to the W. and has so far not been in action
against the convoy. Up to the morning there have been no further signals.
U 175 - 432 and U 602 are also detailed for this operation.
2) Group "Panzer" approaches the expected convoy from 1100 with a
course 2300, speed 6 knots. The convoy should again be intercepted in the
reconnaissance channels from AJ 5992 to 9812 from 1200 on 6.12. U 623
and 611 also join this group and occupy position AJ 9852 and AJ 9811 in
the given reconnaissance channels.
1018
b) 1) Group "Westwall" remains as patrol from CD 2243 to 5846 from
6.12. The point of intersection of the great circle America - Gibraltar and
the route for ON convoys lies here.
2) New position for U 214 in ED 99.
c) U 443 has passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and therefore comes
under the F.O. U-boats, Mediterranean.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
U 128 1 ship 5,136 BRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
6.December 1942.
I. U 43 - BE 69 U 164 - CF 75 U 373 - BD 74 U 552 - DG 95
67 - Op(CE) 167 - Kristiansand 383 - BE 67 553 - Op(AL 10)
68 - BF 61 172 - Op(ER) 410 - BF 48 564 - Op(CD 20)
84 - BF 48 174 - Op(ER) 432 - CF 67 569 - Op(AL 10)
86 - Op(CD 20) 175 - CG 42 435 - AM 13 591 - AM 15
91 - Op(CD 20) 176 - Op(ER) 439 - Op(AJ 80) 600 - Op(AL 10)
92 - Op(CD 20) 177 - Op(KP) 443 - CG 90 602 - CG 42
103 - Op(CD 20) 178 - CG 48 445 - BD 75 603 - BF 77
105 - DG 78 181 - KZ 25 454 - BF 57 604 - Op(AL 40)
106 - Op(CD 20) 183 - BC 88 455 - Op(AL 40) 608 - BE 69
109 - CE 91 185 - Op(CD 25) 460 - BD 74 609 - AL 87
118 - CF 81 211 - Op(AJ 80) 461 - EH 91 610 - Op(AL 10)
123 - AO 214 - CF 62 462 - BF 57 611 - BC 38
124 - DG 52 217 - CD 84 465 - Op(AJ 80) 615 - Op(AL 10)
126 - Op(ES) 221 - Op(AL 40) 504 - CF 84 618 - Op(DJ 20)
128 - Op(ER) 224 - BE 93 505 - BE 99 621 - BF 55
129 - Op(EP 22) 225 - AO 507 - CF 72 623 - BC 32
130 - Op(CD 20) 254 - Op(AJ 80) 508 - Op(ED) 628 - AM 23

- 173 -
134 - Op(ER) 258 - BF 93 510 - CF 64 653 - Op(CD 20)
135 - Op(AJ 90) 262 - BF 73 513 - DG 22 663 - BD 74
154 - Op(EE) 301 - BE 93 515 - Op(CD 20) 664 - BF 55
155 - Op(CD 20) 332 - BF 93 518 - BD 36 753 - BF 73
159 - Op(FC) 336 - AM 23 519 - Op(CD 20) 758 - Op(AJ 80)
160 - CF 58 356 - BF 57 521 - BF 49 D 3 - Op(ER)
161 - Op(ES) 524 - Op(AJ 80)
163 - Op(EO)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 118 - 160 - 178 - 181 - 183 -
224 - 262 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 521 - 552
- 603 - 608 - 753.
Entered Port: U 68 - Lorient; U 332 - 258 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 463 - Brest; U 203 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) For report on Convoy No. 68 and U 603's convoy report, see
paragraph IVa.
2) Sightings:
U 106: In CD 2242 small armed steamer, course 1200, speed 18 knots.
1019
U 163: Triple miss at range limit on cruiser of type "Marblehead".
U 301: Single and double miss on destroyer group using hydrophone
and radar. Torpedoes were dodged.
3) Sinkings:
U 515 sank troop transport "Ceramic" (18,713 GRT) in CD 2927.
Course 1100, speed 16 knots.
U 155 sank freighter of 7,000 GRT, course 1400 in CD 2858.
U 103 sank "Henery Stanley" (5,026 GRT) carrying dynamite from
Liverpool to Freetown in CD 2611. All sinkings therefore in patrol
channel of Group "Westwall". It is likely that both freighters belonged to
an "ON" convoy and were making the attempt to reach Freetown
unescorted. This would be a confirmation of the fact that the traffic of SL
convoys has been discontinued. (Pencil note: but not very likely on 400
W.)
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AJ 6870.
U-boat attack: CD 5250.
d) None.
- 174 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) U 603 convoy report:
Contact was not re-established. Owing to leaking exhaust plates, U
175 is only provisionally in a condition to submerge and is proceeding
westward. U 602 and U 432 received instructions to carry out their duties.
The operation is therefore broken off.
2) Convoy No. 68:
 Group "Panzer" consisting of U 135, 211, 254, 439, 465, 524, 758,
which was joined by 2 more boats, U 611 and U 623 from a southerly
supply point, intercepted through U 524 the expected SC convoy in AJ
9119 at 1200 on 6.12. Four more boats belonging to this group established
contact in improved weather conditions, wind N.W. strength 2, and good
visibility, but lost it again in the evening owing to visibility decreasing to 2
sea miles. Contact was not resumed during the night. 2 boats report flares
- probably decoy flares. Several boats report hydrophone contact with the
convoy but are unable to establish contact. It may be presumed however,
that the boats will not be far from the convoy at dawn. The operation
continues.
b) U 609 joins Group "Draufgänger" and occupies position AL 4437 to
extend the patrol channel to the S. As the expected convoy will not be in
the patrol area of Group "Draufgänger until darkness falls, the Group will
proceed in reconnaissance lines on a westerly course, speed 7 knots from
1900. In daylight the convoy will again be intercepted at 1100 on an
easterly course.
c) None.
d) U 443 has passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and therefore comes
under F.O. U-boats, Mediterranean.
V. Reports of Success:
U 515 1 ship 18,173 BRT
U 155 1 ship 7,000 BRT
U 103 1 ship 5,026 BRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 175 -
1020
7.December 1942.
I. U 43 - BF 48 U 172 - Op(ER) U 373 - BD 74 U 552 - DG 66
67 - BD 87 163 - Op(EF 47) 383 - BE 69 553 - Op(AL 10)
84 - BF 52 164 - DG 35 410 - BE 69 564 - Op(CD 50)
86 - CD 50-Op 167 - AN 67 432 - CG 74 569 - Op(AL 10)
91 - Op(CD 20) 174 - Op(ER) 435 - AL 37 591 - AL 37
92 - Op(CD 50) 175 - CF 93 439 - Op(AK 40) 600 - Op(AL 10)
103 - Op(CD 20) 177 - Op(KP) 445 - BD 77 602 - CG 84
105 - DS 14 176 - Op(ER) 454 - BF 64 603 - BF 76
106 - Op(CD 20) 178 - GF 63 455 - AL 40 604 - AL 40
109 - CE 88 181 - KZ 51 463 - BD 74 608 - BF 47
118 - CF 81 183 - BC 99 466 - ER 23 609 - AL 75
123 - AN 36 185 - Op(CD 20) 461 - BF 64 610 - Op(AL 10)
124 - DG 48 203 - BF 54 462 - BF 52 611 - Op(AJ 93)
126 - Op(ES) 211 - Op(AJ 60) 465 - Op(AJ 60) 615 - Op(AL 10)
128 - Op(ER) 214 - CF 59 504 - CF 61 618 - Op(DJ 20)
129 - EF 91 217 - DF 11 505 - BF 75 621 - BF 49
130 - Op(CD 20) 221 - Op(AL 14) 507 - DG 32 623 - Op(AJ 60)
134 - Op(ER) 224 - BF 73 508 - Op(ED) 628 - AL 36
135 - Op(AJ 60) 225 - AN 36 510 - CF 31 653 - Op(CD 50)
154 - Op(EE) 254 - Op(AJ 60) 513 - CF 75 663 - BD 74
155 - Op(CD 20) 262 - BF 82 515 - Op(CD 20) 664 - BF 46
159 - Op(FC) 301 - CG 82 518 - BE 15 753 - BF 92
160 - CF 35 336 - AM 15 519 - Op(CD 50) 758 - Op(AJ 60)
161 - Op(ES) 356 - BF 82 521 - BF 50 D 3 - Op(ER)
 524 - Op(AJ 60) While in the morning of the 7th the weather conditions in the convoy
area were still favorable with a slight south westerly wind and good
visibility, in the afternoon and towards evening it deteriorated
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 160 - 163 - 172 - considerably. The boats reported very variable visibility up to 500 meters
178 - 181 - 183 - 224 - 262 - 383 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 521 - 552 and strong rain showers and snow gusts.
- 603 - 608 - 753. U 524 re-established contact with the convoy at 1000 a.m. in AK 4417,
Entered Port: U 84 - Brest; U 462 - 454 - St. Nazaire. and in the course of the day four more U-boats (U 254, 465, 439 and 135)
Sailed: U 409 - 441 - St. Nazaire; U 257 - La Pallice. approached the convoy. The boats continually lost it in the afternoon
owing to the variable visibility but found it again. In the night 5 boats, U
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. 254, 524, 465, 623, 758 also came up to the convoy
U 524 reported that the convoy consists of 10 ships in line ahead and 10
III. Reports on the Enemy: destroyers. The control is unable to form any clear picture of the defence
a) 1) For report on Convoy No. 68 see paragraph IVa. as for one thing, scarcely a boat is in action and for another, only a few
2) U 600 hunted the four masted freighter "James McGee" (?) of 9,000 boats report being beaten off by destroyers. U 135 reports horizontal
GRT from AK 3817 and sank her in AL 1861. location. The convoy, steered a course of 45 - 500, speed, according to
3) U 185 sank the English ship "Peter Maersk" of 5,476 GRT, course dead reckoning, 10 knots. Considering the high speed, this does not
1500, speed 14 knots, in CD 5283. appear to refer to the expected SC convoy, but to a fast section of it. U
4) U 515 reports that the sunk transport "Ceramic" was laden with 254 reports single miss at range limit at 2300 on the 7th.
troops. U 524 reports:
b) None. 1) On the 7th 5 misses 1 probable hit.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 9842. 2) On 8th 1 freighter of 5,000 GRT sunk.
Aircraft report U-boats in CG 8625, CG 8375, BF 7886. 1 tanker of 8,000 GRT sunk.
d) None. 1 freighter and 1 destroyer torpedoed.
The convoy operation continues.
- 176 - b) 1) To occupy as temporary attack area:
U 435, upper third of AL 19
U 491, lower third of AL 17
U 628, middle third of AL 17
U 336, upper third of AL 17, if necessary, intended to operate on
Convoy No. 68.
2) As the expected westbound convoy was not located the Group
"Draufgänger" received the order at dusk, to operate on Convoy No. 68.
For further information see paragraph IVa of 8.12.
3) According to a Radio Intelligence Report (X) proceeding from
IV. Current Operations: America to Capetown. Traffic mainly W. and E. of St. Paul's Rocks.
a) Convoy No. 68: After taking on supplies therefore, the following dispositions are ordered:
1021
U 174 - 3437; U 128 - 3453; U 161 - 3275; U 126 - 3237. All grids in
FC. U 159 - ER 9949 and U 134 - ER 9932. Depth for all boats id 40 sea
miles. U 176 occupies waters off Pernambucco. Boats may use territorial
waters, but entrance to harbors and roads is forbidden however. U D 3
operates in area EH 98 and EJ 55. Spasmodic northwest - southeast and
east west traffic is expected here.
4) New position for outbound boats U 410, 664, 621, 203, 409 and 356
is AK 60. Formation of patrol channel is planned here.
5) U 175 proceeds southwards to operate for several days in the waters
of Dakar. Traffic entering or leaving port is counted on here.
- 177 -
6) U 91 begins her homeward voyage from the patrol channel of Group
"Westwall". Boats to the N. of this move in to a southerly position. U 463
has put out for CD 30 to refuel this group.
c) 1) Supplied from U 460: U 373, 445 and 663.
2) U 510, 504 and U 257 patrol the waters N. of El Ferrol via BF 75
(upper third) to intercept the tanker "Antarktis" putting out from there on
8.12.
d) According to Radio Intelligence Report (X) the appearance of a former
German U-boat type VIIc (570) captured by the British is to be expected
any time now. Boats are again warned to be especially careful when
meeting and passing other boats.
V. Reports of Success:
U 600 1 ship 9,000 BRT
1022
U 185 1 ship 5,476 BRT
U 524 2 ships 13,000 BRT
U 524 1 ship, 1 destroyer torpedoed, 1 further ship hit.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
8.December 1942.
I. U 43 - BF 51 U 164 - DG 65 U 383 - BF 46 U 569 - Op(AL 10)
67 - BD 87 167 - AN 30 409 - BF 54 591 - AL 18
86 - Op(CD 50) 172 - Op(ER) 410 - BE 67 600 - Op(AL 10)
91 - Op(CD 30) 174 - Op(ER) 432 - Op(DJ) 602 - CG 90
92 - Op(CD 50) 175 - CF 97 435 - Op(AK) 603 - BF 50
103 - Op(CD 20) 176 - Op(ER) 439 - Op(AK 10) 604 - Op(AL 40)
105 - DR 38 177 - Op(KP) 441 - BF 46 608 - BF 50
106 - Op(CD 20) 178 - GF 31 445 - BC 69 609 - Op(AK)
109 - DG 15 181 - KZ 47 455 - Op(AL 40) 610 - Op(AL 10)
118 - CF 37 183 - BD 79 460 - BD 69 611 - Op(AK 10)
123 - AN 34 185 - Op(CD 60) 461 - ER 29 615 - Op(AL 10)
124 - DF 93 203 - BF 45 463 - BE 48 618 - Op(DJ 20)
126 - Op(ES) 211 - Op(AK 10) 465 - Op(AK 10) 621 - BE 69
128 - Op(ER) 214 - CF 84 504 - CG 11 623 - Op(AK 10)
129 - EF 62 217 - DE 62 505 - BF 50 628 - Op(AL)
130 - Op(CD 20) 221 - Op(AL 40) 507 - DG 64 653 - Op(CD 50)
134 - Op(ER) 224 - BF 57 508 - Op(ED) 663 - BD 71
135 - Op(AK 10) 225 - AN 34 510 - BE 98 664 - BF 44
154 - Op(EE) 254 - Op(AK 10) 513 - CF 75 753 - BF 90
155 - Op(CD 20) 257 - BF 91 515 - Op(CD 20) 758 - Op(AJ 60)
159 - Op(FC) 262 - BF 67 518 - BE 51 D 3 - Op(ER 50)
160 - BE 96 301 - CG 85 519 - Op(CD 50)
161 - Op(ES) 336 - AL 18 521 - BF 50
163 - Op(EO) 356 - BE 68 524 - Op(AK 10)
373 - BD 47 552 - DH 15
 553 - Op(AL 10)
564 - Op(CD 50)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 160 - 163 - 172 -
178 - 181 - 183 - 224 - 262 - 383 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 521 - 552
- 603 - 608 - 753.
Entered Port: U 521 - Lorient; U 753 - La Pallice; U 167 - Bergen.
Sailed: U 706 - La Pallice; U 626 - Bergen.
- 178 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) For report on convoy No. 68 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 178 had a circle runner and a miss on a freighter of 5,000 GRT,
course 600 in CQ 5129 on 4.12.
3) U 224 sighted (prematurely) a silhouette in BF 6779 which did not
reply to request for recognition signal. U 224 presumed it to be a German
low speed U-boat type. According to wireless bearing an English unit -
probably a U-boat was in BF 9440 at 1849.
b) None.
c) Aircraft U-boat sightings: In AK 01, AK 1869, AK 2728 and 2592
(attack with aircraft armament), AK 1735, AK 2685, AK 2667, AK 2598,
AK 1890 (depth charge attack), AK 2547, AK 2729 (presumably 9 hits
with cannon).
U-boat attack in EO 52.
1023
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 68:
The operation on this convoy continues in a north-easterly wind strength
5 to 6 freshening, and medium visibility. The convoy steers a course of
500 and still proceeds with a speed of 9 knots. Contact was lost in the
course of the afternoon by all 5 boats and was not reestablished until 1500
by U 610 in AK 1696 and at 1800 by U 553.
Both boats are from Group "Draufgänger", which is further to the E. and
is also put onto this convoy. The 9 boats are U 610, 609, 604, 600, 615,
569, 553, 221, 455.
Contact was reported once by U 610 and U 553.
Further reports have not been received. The boats do not appear to
have been in contact with the convoy throughout the night either. The
Command takes it that owing to bad wireless conditions the W/T of the
boats near this convoy dips, and the Command does not receive a clear
picture of operations.
Several boats reported air activity on the convoy on the afternoon of the
8th. Altogether 11 Radio Intelligence reports were received during the
night from which it appears that the boats were sighted by aircraft and
variously attacked with depth charges and aircraft armament. In addition,
5 boats reported being beaten off by the convoy protection. There were no
reports of successes. U 221 reported ramming U 254 at 2225 in AK 2551
and having taken survivors on board. It continued the search and intended
to begin the return voyage after daylight. No more survivors were found.
U 221 began her homeward voyage after dawn.
- 179 -

b) 1) After refueling U 373, 445 and 663 steered a course for AJ 90 at
economical cruising speed. There, with other boats they plan a patrol to
intercept an HX convoy expected on the 12th.
2) According to a Radio Intelligence report (X), an English unit or
convoy is proceeding with an advancing speed of 7.3 to 10 knots via ES
3690, ER 1510, EO 1320 to Trinidad and should arrive there in the
afternoon of 19.12. U 172 and U D 3 received orders to operate on the
line of route. U D 3 intends to await the reported unit in ER 16.
c) None.
d) 1) Boats will be notified of the putting out of the tanker "Antarktis".
2) In connection with the hydrophone gear U 178 had the same
experience as U 181. (See K.T.B. of 4.12. paragraph IVd.) The boat
reports the following as the possible causes:
a) Greater length of boat - therefore less favorable reaction to length of
seaway;
b) Very sensitive balance results in less transverse stability;
c) Difficulty, above all in banking with and against the sea. An effective
solution by an adjustment of the hydroplanes can only be expected, if there
is a great enlargement and higher hydroplane speed. Better conditions
have been confirmed as a result of increasing attack depth to one meter.
3) U 254 was rammed by U 221 and was sunk. For further information
see report on convoy No. 68.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
For the first time during a convoy operation a ramming has taken place
between two U-boats, and thereby caused the loss of one of them. As far
as can be seen here, this accident took place on a dark night and in a rough
sea, so that the ramming boat cannot be blamed. The presence of so many
U-boats on convoy operations has for a long time made this kind of
damage a possibility. Reflection on this matter shows that generally
speaking, it is not practicable to have more than 13 to 15 boats on to one
1024
convoy. Any tactical limitations in connection with the number of
attacking boats, the time of the attack, the disposition for attack, by which
such collisions could be avoided will be refused, as it is wrong with the
difficulties of convoy warfare to apply even the smallest conditions. With
the difficulties of convoy warfare every chance of attack must be exploited
to the utmost and the maxim impressed again and again on the boats, "on
to the target as quickly as possible, attack as often as possible, utilize every
chance of attack at once", may not be repudiated on the grounds of
security.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 180 -
9.December 1942.
I. U 43 - BF 61 U 164 - DG 94 U 409 - BE 48 U 564 - Op(CD 50)
67 - BD 87 172 - ER 55 410 - BE 55 569 - Op(AK 20)
86 - Op(CD 50) 174 - Op(ER 50) 432 - Op(DJ 20) 591 - Op(AK 17)
91 - CE 12 175 - DH 24 435 - Op(AK 90) 600 - Op(AK 20)
92 - Op(CD 50) 176 - Op(ER 50) 439 - Op(AK 20) 602 - CG 90
103 - Op(CD 20) 177 - Op(KP) 441 - BF 45 603 - BF 52
105 - DR 49 178 - FU 71 445 - BC 63 604 - Op(AK 20)
106 - Op(CD 20) 181 - KY 91 455 - Op(AK 20) 608 - BF 65
109 - DF 63 183 - BD 87 460 - BD 87 609 - Op(AK 20)
 118 - CF 38 185 - Op(CD 20) 461 - ER 55 610 - Op(AK 20)
123 - AN 28 203 - BE 69 463 - BE 93 611 - Op(AK 20)
124 - DF 97 211 - Op(AK 20) 465 - Op(AK 20) 615 - Op(AK 20)
126 - Op(ER 50) 214 - DG 32 504 - BF 74 618 - Op(DJ 20)
128 - Op(ER 50) 217 - DE 58 505 - BF 50 621 - BE 64
129 - EF 33 ) 221 - Op(AK 20) 507 - DG 83 623 - Op(AK 20)
130 - Op(CD 20) 224 - BF 64 508 - Op(ED) 628 - Op(AK 20)
134 - Op(ER 50) 225 - AN 28 510 - BE 96 653 - Op(CD 50)
135 - Op(AK 20) 257 - BF 85 513 - BF 57 663 - BC 63
154 - DQ 84 262 - BE 68 515 - Op(CD 20) 664 - BE 65
155 - Op(CD 20) 301 - CG 90 518 - BE 64 706 - BF 91
159 - Op(ER 50) 336 - Op(AL 17) 519 - Op(CD 50) 758 - Op(AK 20)
160 - BF 61 356 - BE 55 524 - Op(AK 20) D 3 - Op(ER 50)
161 - Op(ER 50) 373 - BC 63 552 - CF 85 626 - AF 79
163 - DQ 88 383 - BF 52 553 - Op(AK 20)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 160 - 163 - 172 -
178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 224 - 262 - 383 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 552
- 603 - 608.
Entered Port: U 383 - 603 - Brest; U 43 - 160 - Lorient; U 608 - 224 -
St. Nazaire; U 262 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 563 - Brest; U 514 - 125 - Lorient; U 182 - Horten.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) For report on convoy No. 68 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 508 Position: Heavy isolated cargo traffic to Trinidad passes EO
5220 on a general course of 3100 so that ED 9950 will be reached at about
1200. No surface, medium aerial activity, small amount of radar. Sighted:
Argentinean tanker on course of 2600 in 1694 on 2.12. Ship "Cabo
Huertas" on course of 2900 in EO 2888 on 3.12. Sunk: "Solon 2" of
4,561 GRT carrying ore from Turkey, course 3000 in EO 5225 on 3.12.
"Nigerian" of 5,423 GRT carrying palm oil and nuts from Lagos, course
3100 on 9.12. 4 English officers were taken prisoner.
1025
3) U 519 had a double miss on a fast isolated ship zig-zagging strongly
with a general course of 2700 in CD 5557. Contact was lost in rain gusts
and strong sea.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BC 44, CG 9555, BF 8423.
d) None.
- 181 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 68:
In a northwesterly wind strength 5 to 6. Seaway 4 to 5 and medium
visibility up to 6 sea miles, the operation continues on this convoy now in
AK 3515 at 1042. In addition, the following 4 boats from the E., U 435,
628, 591, 336 are in action against the convoy. U 553 again reported the
convoy at 0927, after the night of the 9th, during which the boats were
unable to contact the Command, apparently owing to W/T difficulties.
Four more boats established contact with the convoy during the afternoon.
Either the reporting discipline of the 20 boat strong group is bad or the
signals did not reach the Command. A significant warning W/T message
will be sent to the boats. U 553 reported this morning re the convoy that it
consists of 40 ships including many tankers sailing far apart from one
another. This report appears to apply to the actual SC convoy, previously
there was contact with a faster convoy section. The supposition is
confirmed by a report from U 615, who reports having been passed over
by 2 different groups within an interval of 2 hours between each. It is not
possible to obtain a perfect fix of both groups, as the boats have an
especially great difference in position. The convoy's defence appears
proportionally strong but ineffectual. A number of boats report being
beaten off by destroyers but without effective following up with depth
charges. In contrast to the preceding day, on the 9th the convoy had no
aerial protection.
Success reported:
1) On the 9th at 0927, U 553 sank tanker of 7,000 GRT
2) On the 9th at 2001, U 758 sank a ship of 5,000 GRT (2 hits probably
sank)
3) On the 10th at 0747, U 758 4 hits on motor ship 8,600 GRT
on hit 5,000 GRT
on hit 7,000 GRT torpedoed
Total: 4 ships of 25,600 GRT
1 ship of 7,000 GRT torpedoed
The convoy operation continues with 19 boats.
b) 1) The previously received course directions for the Trinidad positions
from Radio Intelligence Reports (X) result in the following disposition
instructions:
The boats U 105, 124 and U 109 proceeding from Western France are
to operate during the full moon period in channels S. of the upper edge of
EE 90 and EF 70 as far as the coast and are to approach Trinidad more
closely with the waning moon.
The traffic artery presumably runs via FB 50, EP 29 and 53 along the
coast to ED 99.
- 182 -
1026
2) As side protection for the German tanker "Germania" which is
putting out on 11.12., the following waiting areas are ordered:
U 563, in BE 6899 from dawn on 13.12.; U 706 in BE 9596; U 409 in
BE 5766 and U 513 in BE 3574 from dawn on the 14th. Depth 40 sea
miles.
U 125 and U 514 both of which put out today are to be in BE 9580 and
BE 6880 on the morning of 13.12. and to remain there until it is dark. U
460, 67, 183 and U 91 are returning to support the tanker on (pencil query)
440 30' N.
c) The following have taken on supplies from U 461: U 172 for return
voyage, and U 161 and U 159 for continuation of operations.
d) 1) Attacks on isolated traffic in the "Route Anton" area from the S. is
forbidden as follows:
S. of 00 from 12.12; S. of 100 N. from 14.12; S. of 200 N. from
16.12; S. of 300 N. from 19.12, closed completely from 22.12. In effect
from 0000.
Closing of the northerly section of "Route Anton" owing to the putting
out of our own tankers is to be expected sooner.
2) U-boats will again be advised on the procedure to be adopted in the
patrol channels.
3) U 602 has passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and therefore comes
under F.O. U-boats, Mediterranean.
V. Reports of Success:
U 508 2 ships 9,984 BRT
U 553 1 ship 7,000 BRT
U 758 2 ships 13,600 BRT
2 ships torpedoed.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
10.December 1942.
 I. U 67 - BD 87 U 164 - DT 14 U 410 - BE 46 U 553 - Op(AL)
86 - Op(CD 20) 172 - ER 24 432 - Op(DJ 20) 563 - BF 55
91 - CE 22 174 - Op(ER 50) 435 - Op(AK 14) 564 - Op(CD 20)
92 - Op(CD 50) 175 - DH 57 439 - Op(AL 10) 569 - Op(AL)
103 - Op(CD 20) 176 - Op(ER 50) 441 - BE 69 591 - Op(AL 14)
105 - DR 74 177 - Op(KP) 445 - BC 35 600 - Op(AL 10)
106 - Op(CD 20) 178 - FU 76 455 - Op(AL) 604 - Op(AL)
109 - DF 67 181 - JJ 13 460 - BD 87 609 - Op(AL 10)
118 - CG 11 182 - AN 31 461 - ER 50 610 - Op(AL)
123 - AF 79 183 - BD 87 463 - BE 91 611 - Op(AL 10)
124 - DR 28 185 - Op(CD 20) 465 - Op(AL) 615 - Op(AL)
125 - BF 54 203 - BE 64 504 - BF 73 618 - Op(DJ)
126 - Op(ER 50) 211 - Op(AL 10) 505 - BF 61 621 - BE 54
128 - Op(ER 50) 214 - DG 28 507 - DS 33 623 - Op(AL 10)
129 - DR 71 217 - DE 84 508 - Op(EO) 626 - AF 72
130 - Op(CD) 221 - AK 39 510 - BF 72 628 - Op(AL 10)
134 - Op(ER 50) 225 - AF 79 513 - CF 28 653 - Op(CD 50)
135 - Op(AL 10) 257 - BF 75 514 - BF 54 663 - BC 32
154 - DQ 59 301 - CG 90 515 - Op(CD 20) 664 - BE 16
155 - Op(CD 20) 336 - Op(AL 10) 518 - BE 66 706 - BF 82
159 - Op(ER 50) 356 - BE 19 519 - Op(CD) 758 - AL 15
161 - Op(ER 50) 473 - BC 35 524 - Op(AL) D 3 - Op(ER 50)
163 - DQ 67 409 - BE 66 552 - CF 62
- 183 -
1027
On Return Passage: U 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183
- 221 - 504 - 505 - 508 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 758.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) For Convoy No. 68 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 618 situation report: Very heavy air activity in DH 30. Auxiliary
cruisers (Bewacher) and patrol groups off Casablanca - no traffic. Mehdia
Roads empty. Continual air activity during the day by Catalina, ineffective
vertical Radar at night. In view of its presence being known and the
defence situation operations did not promise much success. U 432 was
asked for report on situation. This boat has the same assignments as U 618.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sighting by aircraft: AL 2578, CH 7391, AL 1823, CG 88,
AL 2570.
2) U-boat attack in DM 1931.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 68:
The weather conditions remain proportionally favorable in the convoy
area. The boats report north westerly wind, strength 3 to 4, medium swell
and clear visibility during the day. Wind freshening at night to strength 5
to 6. Visibility variable. The general course of the convoy is 100 to 1100,
speed 8 knots. At 1000 in the morning the convoy was in AL 1671.
Contact was reestablished by U 628. U 610, 615, 623 also came up during
the day.
Towards the afternoon all the boats again lost touch. In the evening at
2348 U 628 resumed contact and maintained it until morning. Another
boat reported contact during the night. It appears from the boats' reports
that the convoy has strong aerial protection and the boats are continually
forced to submerge. Many boats were beaten off by the escort without
sustaining serious damage from depth charges. It also appears from the
boats' reports that the convoy consists of 2 groups. Apart from this,
various boats report they have no W/T contact during the two preceding
nights from 2300 to 0600, which makes it more difficult for the Command
to obtain a survey of the convoy operation. As a result of the strong aerial
activity on the 10th and the anticipated aerial activity owing to the
proximating of the coast, the boats received orders to break off at dawn on
the 11th.
- 184 -
Final summing up:
The operation on the convoy from 6.12. to 11.12., from Grid AJ 91 to
Grid AL 37 did not lead to the desired successful conclusion. In all 22
boats were operating against the convoy, and for the most part there were 5
to 6 boats in contact with it by night and day. In spite of this in the entire
time only 6 ships with a total tonnage of 36,600 GRT were sunk, and 3
ships and one destroyer torpedoed. The reason for the proportionately
small success was probably due to the numerically strong defence, which
was however of little use to direct U-boat warfare. Probably not one boat
was lost through enemy action. U 254 was rammed and sunk by U 221 on
a dark night in the convoy area. The convoy consisted of 2 different
groups, a fact that was several times reported by the boats. It was
impossible to obtain a perfect navigational division between the two
groups owing to the boats' unreliable fixes.
b) 1) The operational area for boats approaching the Trinidad area (see
K.T.B. of 9.12. paragraph IV b1) will be extended westward according to
1028
the situation report of U 508. The boats U 214 and U 217 who are also
outward bound are to be assigned the same action area.
2) As a result of the probable change in the former traffic line (cancelled
in decyphered course instructions for merchant ships) the following new
attack areas are to be occupied at economical cruising speed:
U 174 - 7971; U 128 - 7923; U 161 - 8442; U 126 - 8152; U 159 -
5872; U 134 - 5599. Depth 40 sea miles. All grids in FC.
3) As the Group "Draufgänger" did not intercept the convoy expected
on 6.12., 3 boats that were to have been assigned to this group are alone in
area AJ 90. These boats are to be detailed for operations on a convoy
given in a Radio Intelligence Report (X) and have received orders to take
up position in the following order: U 663, U 373, U 445 in patrol channel
from AJ 9274 to AJ 9538 at 0800 on 13.12. It is estimated that the convoy
will pass through this area after midday on 13.12.
4) New position for U 463 is CD 90.
c) None.
d) U 301 had passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and is therefore
under F.O. U-boats, Mediterranean.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
B.d.U. stated the following in his report at the Naval High Command on
8.12. in Berlin:
From 1.1 to 30.11.1942 the boats in action in the North Sea have sunk
altogether 262,614 GRT. These boats could certainly have sunk about
910,000 GRT in the Atlantic in the same period. The grounds for the
assumption are: the number of boats assigned to the North Sea the degree
of effectiveness in the individual months for the boats in the Atlantic, a
proportion of 50:50 time in port to time at sea which is in fact more
favorable to time at sea.
- 185 -
 carried out in such a way as to assure deployment in the Norway Area if
necessary, as the task of U-boats in this area also consists of coastal
protection against enemy operations. Interchange of boats, in some cases
substitution by boats from home is left to B.d.U.
3) The Naval War Staff (message also to Group "Nord") are to be
continually notified in detail according to 2.) b) of the permanent numbers
and alterations of the 11 U-boats held in readiness.
Use of the North Sea boats in the Atlantic then could have brought an Naval War Staff Operations. Iu 2636/42 Most Secret. S.O. Only.
increase in tonnage sunk to 650,000 GRT, an amount that would have Suggested by Group "Nord" for operations in the North Atlantic:
weighed heavily against the enemy. U 209, 334, 355, 376, 377, 403, 405, 456, 586, 601 which will be ready
B.d.U. again expressed the view that the tonnage war must be considered for deployment on 25.12. B.d.U. is in agreement but proposes 592 instead
the main task of the U-boats, but that this tonnage war suffers heavy losses of 355, as this boat has been deployed in the North Sea considerably
with the deployment of boats in the Mediterranean, the North Sea and longer than U 355.
attacks on the Gibraltar supply route (Group "Westwall") as the the North Pencil note: Naval War Staff Communications concurs.
Sea example shows.
The Naval High Command has already ordered the examination of the
question of the North Sea boats and states that he will order a detachment
of the North Sea boats for the prosecution of the war in the Atlantic.
In an order issued by the Naval War Staff Iu 2636/42 of 9.12.:
1) Concerning: U-boats for the North Sea. As the time of year makes - 186 -
expectations of successes slight, further, ice conditions caused the
increased narrowing of the navigatable area Spitzbergen - North Cape and
reports indicate the possible curtailment of enemy supplies to Russia as a
result of the Africa operations, easing up of the deployment of U-boats in
the North Sea is permissible. Conditions for convoy warfare in the North
Atlantic are at the moment particularly favorable, as convoy protection is
weaker following withdrawal of forces for the African undertaking. There
are not enough U-boats available, however, to exploit this position. On the
other hand, dislocation of enemy supplies to Russia can be achieved
directly by attacking convoys in the North Atlantic. 11.December 1942.
2) The following orders are therefore given:
As previously, Group "Nord" will be designated 23 boats. Of these
boats, until further notice, 11 will be released for use by B.d.U. in the I. U 67 - BD 87 U 163 - DQ 38 U 409 - BE 67 U 552 - CG 14
North Atlantic with these measures, that A) Of the remaining 12 boats, 6 86 - Op(CD 20) 164 - DS 66 410 - BE 17 553 - Op(AL)
are to be ready for action and available (in the operational area) at any 91 - BD 98 172 - ER 10 432 - Op(DJ 20) 563 - BF 49
given time for Group "Nord". B) That the control in the North Atlantic is 92 - Op(CD 50) 174 - Op(ER 50) 435 - Op(AL) 564 - Op(CD 20)
1029
 103 - Op(CD 20) 175 - DH 87 439 - Op(AL) 569 - Op(AL)
105 - EF 32 176 - Op(ER 50) 441 - BF 52 591 - Op(AL)
106 - Op(CD 20) 177 - Op(KP) 445 - AJ 90 600 - Op(AL)
109 - DF 85 178 - FU 44 455 - Op(AL 20) 604 - Op(AL)
118 - BF 74 181 - GR 85 460 - BD 87 609 - Op(AL 20)
123 - AN 23 182 - AF 87 461 - ER 50 610 - Op(AL)
124 - DR 45 183 - BD 87 463 - BE 84 611 - Op(AL 20)
125 - BF 73 185 - Op(CD 20) 465 - Op(AL) 615 - Op(AL)
126 - Op(FC) 203 - BE 52 504 - BF 61 618 - Op(DJ 12)
128 - Op(ER 50) 211 - Op(AL) 505 - DS 63 621 - BE 18
129 - DR 42 221 - AL 45 507 - EE 94 623 - Op(AL)
130 - Op(CD 20) 214 - DG 46 508 - BF 55 626 - AF 47
134 - Op(ER 50) 217 - DP 32 510 - CF 25 628 - Op(AL)
135 - Op(AL) 225 - AN 23 513 - BF 48 653 - Op(CD 50)
154 - DQ 37 257 - CG 12 514 - Op(CD 20) 663 - AJ 90
155 - Op(CD 20) 336 - Op(AL) 515 - BF 45 664 - AL 78
159 - Op(FC) 356 - BE 11 518 - Op(CD 20) 706 - BF 75
161 - Op(FC) 373 - AJ 99 519 - Op(CD 20) 758 - AL 41
524 - Op(AL) D 3 - Op(ER)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181
- 183 - 221 - 504 - 505 - 508 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 758.
Entered Port: U 441 - Brest; U 504 - Lorient.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Operation on Convoy No. 68 discontinued.
2) U 172 reports enemy convoy in ER 2422 on westerly course, speed
10 knots. The convoy is probably the unit reported in K.T.B. of 8.12.
under paragraph IVb 2), which has followed exactly the route given there.
U 172 received instructions to exploit chances of attack until 13.12., and
then to continue the return voyage. The boat attacked during the dusk and
hit steamers of 8,000 and 4,000 with her two last torpedoes. From the
1030
noise is it probable that they were sunk. Depth charges: no damage. Last
position of convoy at 0020 in ER 2421, course 273, speed 10 knots. The
boats U 105 and U 124 bound for the Trinidad area, are informed of
another point of passage, through EP 1329, which should be reached on
the evening of the 15th. If the position appears favorable she is to operate.
3) U 177: Nothing sighted off Lourenco for 4 days. Town lit up, light
blacked out. "Saronikos" of 3,548 sunk in KP 61. Course W. Delayed
return voyage.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: FC 81, AL 0192, AL 0226, AL 1498.
d) None.
- 187 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) As, apart from the three ships previously sunk in the patrol channel
of Group "Westwall", no further contact with enemy has taken place, and
the boats are so low in fuel that they must begin the return voyage in the
next few days, the Group has received orders to proceed in lines of
reconnaissance on an easterly course, days reckoning 140 miles at 2400
from 11.12. A later deployment of the boats still fit for action in the north
half of CF and for operations on the England - Gibraltar traffic is intended.
Further refueling is not possible owing to the shortage of tankers.
2) The following waiting positions are to be occupied with a depth of 4
sea miles for protection and area reconnaissance for the tanker "Germania"
putting out on 12.12.: U 514 - BE 9326; U 125 - BE 9629; U 563 - BF
7116; U 706 - BF 7442.
 3) The following boats are attached to the Group "Ungestüm" and
distributed over the patrol channel from AL 1543 to AL 4446 in order to
intercept an "ONS" convoy which according to its own dead reckoning is
expected on 14.12.; U 336, 628, 591, 455, 435, 569, 615, 524, 610, 611,
604, 623. Positions must be occupied until 2000, 13.12.
Another Group will be detailed to intercept an "ON" convoy expected
on 15.12., in patrol channels from AL 4482 to 8584. In the following
order: U 135, 600, 211, 465, 439, 609, 664, 356, 410, 621, 203, 409. The
boats from Group "Raufbold" and are to be in the ordered position at
14.12. at 0800.
c) 1) U 460 has delivered the last of her fuel to U 67 and U 183 and
begins her return voyage.
2) Supplied from U 461: U 126 - 174 - 128 - 134 and U 176. Tanker
homeward bound.
d) 1) U 553 reports strong spray formation and difficulty in depth
maintenance as a result of the construction of the new 2 cm "trough".
(Translator's note: word given was Wanne - does this mean breakwater for
streamlining?) The boat was seen continually during an attack on a
convoy and thereby deprived of success. U 553 has been ordered to return
at maximum speed and the adaptation of further boats discontinued in all
shipyards.
2) On the return of U 160, information will be given to the boats by the
Commander, on the available experiences in the Trinidad area.
V. Reports of Success:
U 172 2 ships 12,000 BRT
U 177 1 ship 3,548 BRT.
VI. General:
The deployment of the Group "Westwall" (see IVb, 1.) has not led to
satisfactory results, as the sinking of 4 ships cannot be regarded as such.
As warfare directly west of Gibraltar was no longer promising, there were
no possibilities of intercepting English -
1031
- 188 -
American supplies to Gibraltar and morocco.
a) Deployment W. of Portugal: Successful convoy warfare could not be
expected here, as the entire area in question lies within range of enemy air
activity. Isolated successes remained possible but depend a great deal on
luck and opportunity.
b) Operations moved to area free of air activity against American
supplies, which is presumed to be on the Great Circle America - Gibraltar.
B.d.U. is in favor of the second possibility. This deployment could be
quite successful even if only one convoy was intercepted. That did not in
fact happen. Radio Intelligence reports show rather that the enemy has
used a route far more to the S., whereby it is difficult to see whether he
uses it principally or exploits it in order to spread out as much as possible.
The former is possible. The available "Westwall" boats cannot, however
be used anymore on the southerly route, owing to insufficient fuel supply,
and they are numerically too weak to be used for a search in other areas. It
therefore only remains to test the possibilities given under a) and to use the
"Westwall" boats for this. They are unequipped for cold areas which cuts
out the possibility of sending these boats to the Newfoundland area and
putting boats from Western France in the area W. of Portugal.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
12.December 1942.
 I. U 67 - BD 97 U 163 - DF 87 U 409 - BE 59 U 553 - Op(AK)
86 - Op(CD 50) 164 - EH 39 410 - AL 87 563 - BF 71
91 - CF 13 172 - ER 13 432 - Op(DJ 20) 574 - Op(CD 50)
92 - Op(CD 20) 174 - Op(ER 80) 435 - Op(AL) 569 - Op(AL)
103 - Op(CD 20) 175 - DT 39 439 - Op(AL) 591 - Op(AL)
105 - EF 25 176 - Op(ER 80) 445 - Op(AJ 90) 600 - Op(AL)
106 - Op(CD 20) 177 - Op(KP) 455 - Op(AL) 604 - Op(AL)
109 - DR 16 178 - FT 37 460 - BD 97 609 - Op(AL)
118 - BF 73 181 - CF 84 461 - ER 50 610 - Op(AL)
123 - AF 76 182 - AN 23 463 - CF 21 611 - Op(AL)
124 - DQ 92 183 - BD 97 465 - Op(AL) 615 - Op(AL)
125 - BE 96 185 - Op(CD) 505 - BF 61 618 - OP(DJ 20)
126 - Op(FC) 203 - BF 24 507 - DS 92 621 - AL 87
128 - Op(ER 80) 211 - Op(AL) 508 - EE 66 623 - Op(AL)
129 - DR 12 214 - DG 71 510 - BF 61 626 - AE 68
130 - Op(CD 20) 217 - DP 61 513 - BE 89 628 - Op(AL)
134 - Op(ER 80) 221 - AL 77 514 - BE 93 653 - Op(CD 50)
135 - Op(AL) 225 - AF 76 515 - Op(CD 20) 663 - Op(AJ 90)
154 - DF 74 257 - CG 17 518 - BF 46 664 - Op(AL 80)
155 - Op(CD 20) 336 - Op(AL) 519 - Op(CD 50) 706 - BF 74
159 - Op(FC) 356 - Op(AL) 524 - Op(AL) 758 - AL 71
161 - Op(FC) 373 - Op(AJ 90) 552 - BF 99 D 3 - Op(ER)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181
- 183 - 221 - 505 - 508 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 758.
Entered Port: U 505 - 510 - Brest.
Sailed: U 440 - 659 - Brest; U 757 - St. Nazaire; U 384 - Kiel.
- 189 -
1032
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 465 was attacked with depth charges in AL 5185 and left the
patrol channel of the "Raufbold" Group on the return voyage owing to
damage. The boats to the S. therefore move up one position to the N.
2) U 432 like U 618 sighted nothing off Mehdia. She has moved off
and is exploring new fields for reconnaissance off Casablanca.
3) U 161 sank a British ship "Ripley" of 4,997 GRT, course 2250, in FC
5247. The steamer steered a southerly course from Takoradi, then along
the equator to the coast of South America, and further at a distance of 200
sea miles from the coast, to Trinidad.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AL 0251, AL 0261, CA 87, AL 0228, CA 34, FC
8193, CA 8479, DB 7814, AL 5142, ED 6972.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Group "Ungestüm" is to be distributed in the ordered patrol
channels in former disposition without U 553.
2) Owing to the imminent closing of "Route Anton" in order to pass the
area as soon as possible, U 507 and U 164 are making for grid FC 70 via
ES 50. U 175 received further orders for operations in the waters off
Dakar. As until now, no U-boats have approached this area and the boat
has permission to attack French merchant and warships, there is possibility
of initial success.
U 155 requests freedom of movement in DG owing to adequate fuel
supply and the breakdown of the "Q" tank. She has received orders to
remain in the reconnaissance channels of Group "Westwall" as 1) As
nothing has been experienced in this area and 2) The operations of an
isolated boat does not promise success.
 3) The following protection is ordered for the outward bound tanker
"Germania": U 514 and U 125 are to take up a position at dawn on the
14th, 30 seamiles ahead to port and starboard of the position of the tanker
by dead reckoning in DF 71. U 563 and U 706 close up at dawn and
proceed ahead during the day, at night astern at the limit of certain visual
signaling contact. Task for U-boats on passing 30 W. cancelled. Finally,
U 125 and U 514 are to proceed to DG 80, U 563 and U 706 to BD 20.
c) None.
- 190 -
d) U 257 has entered on the return voyage owing to the illness of the
Engineer Officer and the leakage of the stuffing box. The boat was
destined for the Mediterranean area. Deployment and breakthrough by a
substitute boat is not possible until the next new moon period.
Remark on K.T.B. of B.d.U. of 12.12.42 paragraph VI "General" by Iu.
For the outward voyage of the "Germania" for long-range protection on
the route Anton from about 100 W to 300 W, the Naval War Staff have
ordered 2 U-boats on both the northern and southern limits and further
units to join forces with Group West. Group West has in this connection
requested the following disposition: "Please dispose the four escort U-
boats so that they have carried out an adequate reconnaissance on both
sides of the route in area a) (see chart - daily distance) 24 hours before the
entrance of the blockade runner into this area, and on the entrance of this
1033
ship into the area , to allocate 2 boats to it which will accompany it within
visual signaling distance, while the other two boats patrol in a partial
screen about 30 sea miles ahead."
To this B.d.U. gives the opinion expressed in paragraph VI of his K.T.B.
The Naval War Staff have made their stand point on this matter known to
Group West and B.d.U., that close-range U-boat protection of a blockade
runner as requested by Group West does not insure success. Even if
contact is maintained with the ship, the only use it could be put to would
be the possible rescue of the crew after an attack. If a suitable course was
followed by homeward and outward bound boats on both sides of the
incoming route, the same result could be achieved with the advantage that
a special disposition of U-boats can then be avoided.
Also it is unlikely that U-boat long range protection would be able to
hinder an attack of enemy forces on the blockade runner. The
effectiveness of this long range protection lies in the fact that it would be
possible to give timely warning of enemy forces - in other words, in
reconnaissance.
The disposition of the boats must take account of this task, and they must
be so far forward as to be able to give timely reconnaissance reports so
that practical alternative movements can be carried out.
Delays due to transmission are to be taken into account.
V. Reports of Success:
U 161 1 ship 4,997 GRT.
VI. General:
Re blockade breaker "Germania" (see IVb 3). The ordered disposition
was carried out at the request of Group West. This is in
 d) According to previous experience the enemy carries out attacks on
such ships at long range, probably because he reckons on U-boat escort.
- 191 - The chances of the U-boat being able to attack are therefore nil.
There remains the possibility of rescue by the escorting U-boats of the
crew after an attack.
These views have been formed before from experience of similar
operations. They have been repeatedly confirmed and have resulted in the
present loose protection ordered by the Naval War Staff. In spite of this
B.d.U. have again attempted close range protection at the request of the
Group.
It must again be stressed that all special duties for U-boats detracts from
their main object, the war on tonnage, and are therefore, on the whole,
addition to the protection measures ordered by the Naval War Staff. prejudicial to the prosecution of the war.
The Naval War Staff had only covered the deployment of 2 boats N. of the
ship's route between 1- and 300 W. This demand could be carried out with Pencil note: The 8,000 tons of rubber or fodder delivered, means more
changing boats without noticeable time and therefore sinking loss. The to the prosecution of the war than the same amount of enemy tonnage
requested close range escort, on the other hand, has already cost several sunk. 1/SKL 1 K.
days in loss of time.
B.d.U. though, does not consider the requested close range protection ---------------------------------------------------
practical, as: ---------------
a) In bad visibility and the small differences in fixes, a meeting does not
come into the question, especially as the speed of the ship can only be
incorrectly estimated and position reports from our own aircraft have
proved from experience to be unreliable. D/F signals are out of the - 192 -
question in this area. It is therefore uncertain as to whether the boats
concerned will find the ship.
b) The U-boats must submerge at the approach of the first enemy aircraft.
The ship cannot return to the submerge point as is intended in far away
areas, but must continue or return. The contact is therefore lost. A re-
establishing of contact can only depend on an accident, owing to the
deflection of the ship's movement.
c) The distance of 30 sea miles is too small. With a speed of 10 knots
and only 10 knots enemy speed, at the most there are 1 1/2 hours in which
the ship must carry out evasive action. This timing is insufficient in which 13.December 1942.
to establish W/T communication to code, send, intercept, decode and
visual signaling from contacting U-boats to the ship.
1034
 I. U 67 - BD 99 U 172 - EH 57 U 435 - Op(AL) U 609 - Op(AL)
86 - Op(CD) 174 - Op(FC) 439 - Op(AL) 610 - Op(AL)
91 - CF 21 175 - DT 69 440 - BF 55 611 - Op(AL)
92 - Op(CD 60) 176 - Op(FC) 445 - Op(AJ 90) 615 - Op(AL)
103 - Op(CD 15) 177 - KZ 23 455 - Op(AL) 618 - Op(DJ)
105 - EF 57 178 - FM 89 460 - BD 99 621 - Op(AL)
106 - Op(CD 20) 181 - GR 48 461 - ER 22 623 - Op(AL)
109 - DR 41 182 - AF 76 463 - CE 21 626 - AE 83
118 - BF 61 183 - CE 33 465 - Op(AL) 628 - Op(AL)
123 - AF 47 185 - Op(CD 60) 507 - EH 38 653 - Op(CD 60)
124 - EF 31 203 - BE 13 508 - EF 14 659 - BF 55
125 - BE 96 211 - Op(AL) 513 - BE 95 663 - Op(AJ 90)
126 - Op(FC) 214 - DF 98 514 - BE 93 664 - Op(AL)
128 - Op(FC) 217 - DP 85 515 - Op(CD 30) 706 - BF 74
129 - DF 81 221 - BD 33 518 - Op(DJ) 757 - BF 65
130 - Op(CD 20) 225 - AF 47 519 - Op(CD 60) 758 - AL 77
134 - Op(FC) 257 - BF 94 524 - Op(AL) D 3 - Op(EH)
135 - Op(AL) 336 - Op(AL) 552 - BF 72
154 - DF 48 356 - Op(AL) 553 - AL 45
155 - Op(CD) 373 - Op(AJ 90) 563 - BE 71
159 - Op(FC) 384 - AO 564 - Op(CD 60)
161 - Op(FC) 409 - BE 24 569 - Op(AL)
163 - DF 49 410 - Op(AL) 591 - Op(AL)
164 - EH 93 432 - Op(CG 87) 600 - Op(AL)
604 - Op(AL)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181
- 183 - 221 - 508 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 758.
Entered Port: U 118 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 441 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 69, see paragraph IVa.
1035
2) U 432 requests permission to attack large tanker with navigation light
but without neutral identification in CG 8871. Course 750. As according
to report the Spanish tanker "Campoamor" is in this area, U 432 was
forbidden to attack. The Naval War Staff is requested to be circumspect
owing to visible identity of Spanish ships.
3) U 126 was attacked with depth charges in FC 5768 and confirmed
radar at night.
4) Sinkings:
U 159 sank the tanker "City of Bombay" of 7,140 GRT after a hunt
lasting 18 hours and an inexplicable triple spread. Course 1200. Carrying
armament and aircraft from New York to Capetown.
U 177 sank British ship "Empire Gull" of 6408 GRT in KP 61 with
torpedo and gunfire. The ship steered a course of 2000 to KP 6257, then
westwards.
U 176 sank Swedish vessel "Scania" of 1,980 GRT in 2515. Carrying
skins and hides from Montevideo to Philadelphia.
- 193 -
The sinking took place after the crew had left it.
U 103 achieved a hit on a large isolated unit in CE 1521. Starting
course 150, speed 16 knots. After hit, course to Horta presumed contact
lost.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EH 5983, DC 3760, FP 4513, EB 36, FC 5799.
Report of torpedoing: from CE 1180 (U 103).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations: U 177 1 ship 6,408 BRT
a) Convoy No. 69: U 159 1 ship 7,140 BRT
The "HX" convoy was expected in Group "Büffet" consisting of the 3 U 176 1 ship 1,980 BRT.
boats U 373, 663 and U 445 at midday on the 13th. Punctually at 1106 it
was reported in AJ 9278 from U 373 stationed in the center. U 373
maintained contact with the convoy until 1500 in a north-westerly wind, ---------------------------------------------------
strength 6 and good visibility, but was then beaten off by 2 destroyers. U ---------------
663 established contact at 1832 and maintained it until 0300. She was
beaten off by a destroyer, attacked with depth charges and was forced to
return owing to considerable damage. Contact with the convoy was lost. - 194 -
According to dead reckoning the convoy proceeded at 7 knots and
appeared to sail exactly over the assembly points deduced by the (X)
Radio Intelligence Service. These were known to the boats. As the
convoy route is most likely known, in spite of the slight chance of the 3
boats maintaining contact with the convoy, the Group "Ungestüm" which
is stationed on the west edge of AL, was sent to intercept the convoy. That
means the 9 boats U 336 - 628 - 591 - 455 - 435 - 569 - 615 - 524 - 604.
They should intercept in a restricted reconnaissance channel - distance
between boats 10 sea miles - on their daily patrol on the 15th in AK 01.
b) After deployment of Group "Ungestüm" on Convoy No. 69, the boats 14.December 1942.
low in fuel, U 611, 623, 610 join Group "Raufbold". This group is now
stationed in patrol channels from AL 4454 to AL 8831, in the following
order: U 611 - 623 - 610 - 135 - 600 - 211 - 439 - 609 - 664 - 356 - 410 - I. U 67 - BE 75 U 172 - EH 25 U 432 - CG 88 U 569 - Op(AL)
621 - 203 and U 409. 86 - Op(CD 40) 174 - Op(FC) 435 - Op(AL) 591 - Op(AL)
c) Owing to the continually bad weather conditions (wind strength 9 to 91 - CF 21 175 - EK 11 439 - Op(AL) 600 - Op(AL)
10) the ordered supplying of U 91, 183 and U 758 is momentarily 92 - Op(CD 40) 176 - Op(FC) 440 - BF 45 604 - Op(AL)
impracticable. The boat has received instructions to remain stationary 103 - Op(CE) 177 - KP 86 441 - BF 55 609 - Op(AL)
using the smallest possible amount of fuel in its present position. The 105 - EF 19 178 - FM 57 445 - Op(AJ) 610 - Op(AL)
supplying of several boats in the Trinidad area and on the return voyage in 106 - Op(CD 10) 181 - GQ 62 455 - Op(AL) 611 - Op(AL)
ED 90 is therefore delayed for several days. 109 - DQ 92 182 - AF 48 460 - BE 78 615 - Op(AL)
d) Attacks on isolated vessels in the northern section of "Route Anton" 123 - AE 68 183 - CE 12 461 - EH 58 618 - Op(DJ)
will not be permitted in the following sections at 0000: from 14.12. E of 124 - EF 52 185 - Op(CD 40) 463 - CF 21 621 - Op(AL)
300 W.; from 17.12. N. of 350 N.; from 19.12. complete closing of "Route 125 - BE 74 203 - Op(AL) 465 - Op(AL) 623 - Op(AL)
Anton". 126 - Op(FC) 211 - Op(AL) 507 - EH 93 626 - AL 24
128 - Op(FC) 214 - DR 26 508 - DQ 84 628 - Op(AL)
V. Reports of Success: 129 - DQ 28 217 - EE 24 513 - BE 94 653 - Op(CD 60)
1036
 130 - Op(CD 10) 221 - BD 36 514 - BE 93 659 - BF 46
134 - Op(FC) 225 - AE 68 515 - Op(CD 40) 663 - Op(AJ)
135 - Op(AL) 257 - BF 90 518 - Op(DJ) 664 - Op(AL)
154 - DF 49 336 - Op(AL) 519 - Op(CD 40) 706 - BF 79
155 - Op(CD 10) 356 - Op(AL) 524 - Op(AL) 757 - BF 57
159 - Op(EC 61) 373 - Op(AJ) 552 - BF 91 758 - BD 36
161 - Op(FC) 384 - AN 30 553 - AL 84 D 3 - Op(EJ)
163 - DF 27 409 - BE 51 563 - BF 71
164 - ES 12 410 - Op(AL) 564 - Op(CD 40)
d) None.

On Return Passage: U 67 - 91 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 IV. Current Operations:
- 221 - 460 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 553 - 663 - 758. a) Convoy No. 69:
Entered Port: U 257 - La Pallice. Contact with the convoy was not reestablished. Orders were received
Sailed: U 506 - 260 - Lorient; U 406 - St. Nazaire. by U 445 and U 373 to continue the search as it is planned to deploy
Group "Ungestüm". Both boats report depth charge attacks, and U 445
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. was forced by destroyers to submerge, which proves that the boats are in
the vicinity of the convoy. The operation against the convoy continues.
III. Reports on the Enemy: b) 1) New position for U 626 is AK 28. Operation on Convoy No. 69 is
a) 1) Convoy No. 69 see paragraph IVa. intended.
2) U 161 hunted freighter from FC 8715 to 7648. Beginning course 2) The boats off the Brazilian coast are to be redistributed owing to the
3000, later change to 1700. Well placed depth charges in FC 7675. No probable direction of traffic to the S.W. They are at present disposed in
contact. the following order: U 135, 159, 126, 161, 128, 174 in patrol channels
3) Sinkings: from FC 3471 to 7336. Depth 60 sea miles.
British ship "Orfor" of 6,578 GRT by U 105 after two misses in EF c) U 91 is stationed in CF 2167 and owing to damage incurred earlier and
6824, in EF 1952. Course 3100. the momentary bad weather conditions and is greatly endangered when
U 174 ship of type "Baron Belhaven" of 6,500 GRT course 1200 in FC submerging. She is making for CE 63 for repairs and refueling from U
8185. Presumably carrying munitions. A number of depth charges were 155.
dropped after the torpedoing. d) The first of 4 U-boats of type IXc intended for renewed activity in the
U 177 British ship "Sawahloento: of 3,085 GRT, course 3100 Cape Town area, U 506 has put out. For further information see
proceeding from Beira to Durban, in KP 8990. Shot up, homeward bound. Operational Order "Seehund" (Appendix).
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: FC 7356, FC 7732, AK 4512, AK 4519, CG 7941, V. Reports of Success:
AK 4424. U 105 1 ship 6,578 BRT sunk
U-boat attack: FC 7350 - FC 7730. U 177 1 ship 3,085 BRT sunk
- 195 - U 174 1 ship 6,500 BRT sunk.
1037

VI. General:
The adaptation of the first 10 boats for the use of the "F.A.T." torpedo
also equipped with combined Radar/Radar detector has been proceeding
since the middle of November. For the most part there have been
numerous unsupportable postponements in fitting the boats for action
resulting from inadequate supply of constructional parts, so that the final
completion of all 10 boats is not yet in sight.
With reference to this question B.d.U. Most Secret 5552 to OKM Head
of K and OKM. Head of MND reports:
1) The fitting out of 10 U-boats with Radar/Radar detector was requested
in writing after a previous discussion with the Head of MND on 19.10.
2) Although the time limit for construction was fixed for 14 days during
the verbal discussion and the shipyard limit at the time of the
constructional agreement lay between the 11th and 20th of November, the
shipyard limit was fixed for up to 14 days later owing to the installation of
the Radar/Radar detector apparatus. At the time B.d.U. concurred with
this delay.
- 196 -
3) Owing to the delay in the supply of structural parts, above all and the
knock out blow, the electrical parts, the completion of the boats was
delayed for a further 10 - 20 days. The delay lasted then for only a few
days and B.d.U. was only informed at short notice through the shipyard
and flotilla reports. These postponements are operationally insupportable
1038
and the disposition of the command impossible. Difficulties in the
disposal of the crew and completion of other boats are other
accompanying results.
4) Enquiries into this matter can only lead to partial and unsatisfactory
revelations, as there is no actual department absolutely responsible for the
execution of these measures. The results of the telephone and written
enquires were for this reason worthless to the practical administration.
5) B.d.U. requests a single department and a single person to be
responsible for the execution of this fitting out, concerned with all isolated
details including ship construction, Radar and the supplying of individual
ports and the name of the person concerned is to be made known to them.
6) As a result of these arrangements not being kept, U-boats ready for
action have been frozen and our Naval Command thereby caused painful
losses in the sinking of enemy tonnage. This is, from this stand point,
irresponsible and insufferable. C-in-C U-boats Most Secret 5552.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
15.December 1942.
I. U 67 - BE 85 U 172 - DS 86 U 410 - Op(AL) U 563 - BE 83
86 - Op(CE 50) 174 - Op(FC) 432 - Op(DJ 20) 564 - Op(CE 50)
91 - CE 19 175 - Op(EK) 435 - Op(AK 10) 569 - Op(AK 10)
92 - Op(CE 50) 176 - Op(FJ) 439 - Op(AL) 591 - Op(AK 10)
103 - Op(CE) 177 - KP 25 440 - BE 69 600 - Op(AL)
105 - Op(EF 43) 178 - FM 19 441 - BF 49 604 - Op(AK 10)
106 - Op(CE 20) 181 - GQ 29 445 - Op(AK 40) 609 - Op(AL)
109 - DR 16 182 - AE 68 455 - Op(AK 10) 610 - Op(AL)
123 - AE 83 183 - CF 21 460 - BE 88 611 - Op(AL)
124 - Op(EF) 185 - Op(CE 50) 461 - EH 53 615 - Op(AK 10)
125 - BE 83 203 - Op(AL) 463 - CF 21 618 - Op(DJ 20)
126 - Op(FC) 211 - Op(AL) 465 - BE 21 621 - Op(AL)
128 - Op(FC) 214 - DR 54 506 - BF 54 623 - Op(AL)
129 - DE 99 217 - EE 57 507 - ES 12 626 - AL 18
 130 - Op(CE 20) 221 - BD 66 508 - DQ 56 628 - Op(AK 10)
134 - Op(FC) 225 - AE 83 513 - BF 72 653 - Op(CE 50)
135 - Op(AL) 260 - BF 54 514 - BE 83 659 - BF 47
154 - DF 27 336 - Op(AK 10) 515 - Op(CE 20) 663 - AJ 75
155 - Op(CE 20) 356 - Op(AL) 518 - BF 61 664 - Op(AL)
159 - (FC)-Op 373 - Op(AK 40) 519 - Op(CE 50) 706 - BE 83
161 - Op(FC) 384 - AN 31 524 - Op(AK 10) 757 - BF 72
163 - DF 25 406 - BF 67 552 - BF 65 758 - BD 68
164 - ES 51 409 - BE 16 553 - BE 29 D 3 - Op(EJ)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 91 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183
- 221 - 460 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 553 - 663 - 758.
Entered Port: U 518 - Lorient; U 552 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 525 - 357 - Kiel.
- 197 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 69 and 70 see paragraph IVa.
2) U D 3 hunted strongly zig-zagging tanker on a general course of
1400 speed 12 knots, from EH 9984 to EH 3681. Contact lost after triple
miss.
3) U 124 sighted the convoy intercepted by U 172 on 12.12. in EP 2163.
Beginning course W., later a S.W. convoy turned on a course of 2500.
1039
Boats according to dead reckoning in the vicinity, U 105 and U 217
had already received orders to operate if possible. At 0500 the convoy was
in EP 2187.
4) U 159 sank "Star of Suez" of 4,999 GRT course 1200 in FC 3725.
Carrying motorcars and aircraft parts from New York to Alexandria. This
confirms the supposition that the traffic at the moment runs, greatly spread
out over the area between St. Paul's Rocks and the Brazilian coast.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AK 2959, AK 5190, FC 71, ER 7162, CB 8954, ED
6295, KZ 2250.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 69:
The Group "Ungestüm" ran into the convoy with a speed of 9 knots,
course 2380 during the day on the 15th. Distance between the boats is 10
sea miles as it is presumed that the route of the convoy is known (Radio
Intelligence Service (X)) from the assembly points. All the boats stationed
in the southern half report heavy air activity in the afternoon. Also, U 604
reported being forced to submerge at 1930. It is obvious from this that the
expected convoy passed by the boats to the S. For this reason the Group
received orders to proceeds eastwards at high speed at nightfall and to take
up a position at dawn the new patrol channels from AK 2842 - AK 6434
on the 16th. The Group were to try to intercept the convoy in the new
patrol channels at dawn on the 16th. U 373 and U 445 joined Group
Ungestüm". The entire Group now consists of 11 boats, of which 10
should be in the patrol channels on the 16th. Only U 604, continued the
search in the area from which she reported destroyers and screw noises,
probably originating from the convoy.
2) Convoy No. 70:
The awaited "ON" convoy was intercepted by U 609 which was in a
position in the center of the Group "Raufbold" at 1353 at midday on the
15th. The Group consisted of the 13 boats U 609, 621, 439, 611, 600, 623,
135, 610, 410, 211, 356, 203, 664. It received orders to operate on the
convoy at high speed. Contact was maintained until the following
morning in a
 With reference to the escort of "Germania" (see IVd) 1)):
- 198 - Of the boats detailed for the protection of the "Germania" one was near
the ship. The sinking though, as anticipated, could not be prevented. How
the other 3 ships were placed in relation to the ship is not known. In any
case they were useless. A real support for a blockade runner could only be
formed by an all round screen at a distance of 50 - 60 sea miles from the
ship. With a range of visibility of 10 sea miles - a favorable supposition -
15 boats would be needed during the day, a number by no means available.
But even this protection is theoretical, as, owing to the necessity of
submerging in the event of aircraft, differences in fixes, deterioration of
visibility, the possibility of not being able to report the sighted enemy
southeasterly wind strength 9, rain and mist. The convoy's general before submerging, and other incidents, the position could be changed
course was 1900, speed 7 knots. U 621, U 356 and U 664 also came up to entirely.
the convoy. U 609 reports that the convoy consists of 16 - 20 steamers.
Operations on the convoy, which was in AL 7837 on the morning of the
16th, continue. (Signed): DÖNITZ.
b) None.
c) The supply situation is at the moment very tense, owing to the scarcity
of tankers and the bad weather conditions. Boats are warned that supplies
can only be expected on the express orders of the Command.
d) 1) The outward bound steamer "Germania" escorted by 4 U-boats ran
into a northward bound convoy towards 1400 in about BE 9166. As
escape was not possible, the ship was scuttled by the crew of the escorting
boats. U 706 was in contact last. Measures for the rescue of the crew are - 199 -
ordered. Success, however, is questionable, owing to the weather
predominating at the moment. 5 boats are searching the place of sinking
for survivors.
2) As there is no possibility of our own traffic being encountered in the
northern section of "Route Anton" permission for attacks on isolated
vessels N. of 300 N. is given, until 0000 on 19.12.

V. Reports of Success:
U 159 1 ship 4,999 BRT sunk.
Appendix to K.T.B. B.d.U. Most Secret
from 1-15.12.1942
VI. General:
1040
 20 meters with a speed of 3 - 4 knots into the Mediterranean. Look out for
Operational orders for U-boats in the Straits.
U 443, U 621, U 602, U 301, U 258
Group "Taucher" V. After changing over to the Mediterranean system the boats are under
C.O. U-boats, Italy. The receive W/T instructions for the first operational
I. Assignment: area on the Irish and Mediterranean system.
Penetration to the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar in the
new moon period in the first half of December. Finally further
deployment in the Mediterranean. This task is only to be abandoned: - 200 -
1) In the event of engine trouble necessitating a return voyage.
2) Breakdown of Radar equipment.
3) If penetration is not achieved.
U 258 is the reserve boat and received definite orders on putting out to
break through.

II. General:
Greatest secrecy is to be observed before officers and ratings especially
in Flotilla circles until after the message containing the report of the
breakthrough has been sent. Chart equipment B 3 U from the Flotilla.
III. Execution:
1) Put out according to K.B. by the shortest route to Gibraltar regardless
of fuel consumption. The time of the breakthrough is left to the boat.
2) Breakthrough signal to be sent on 420 N. No wireless restrictions, as
the presence of our own boats W. and E. of the Straits is known. After the
breakthrough switch over to Mediterranean system on reaching 50 W., the
report of the breakthrough is to be sent from 10 W. by sending the short
signal "Yes".
3) Permission to attack everywhere, also in the Straits of Gibraltar.
a) Neutral traffic in the Mediterranean will be previously informed if
possible. Spanish and Red Cross vessels must be reckoned with.
b) Heavy enemy traffic on the routes from Gibraltar to the E., as there is
continuous traffic between Gibraltar and Malta, also the enemy's North
African coast.
c) The boats will be notified of the entrance points by W/T by the C.O.
U-boats, Italy, before putting into Spezia and Messina.
d) Particulars of recognition signals of the Italian Navy for three months
and W/T instructions for the Mediterranean are attached as an appendix.
VI. All details according to verbal discussion with B.d.U.

IV. Information for the breakthrough of the Straits:

According to experience the route between the center of the Straits of (Signed): DÖNITZ.
Gibraltar and the 200 meter line are the quietest. From time to time there a
searchlight passes over the Straits from Gibraltar. Medium amount of air
activity, mostly with lights. Pass through the Straits submerged in
continual aircraft and land radar. Current is noticeable to a depth of A plus
1041
 against this traffic on the eastern side of South Africa to the latitude of
Madagascar.

- 201 -
Additional instructions to Operational Order No. 53
"S E E H U N D"
for U 509, U 516, U 506, U 511, comprising the Group "Seehund". U 459
attached to the Group.
Assignment
The dislocation of important supply traffic to Egypt, the Near East and
India. The interception of supply traffic in South Atlantic, and in the area
round Cape Town outward and homeward bound. Main operational area
Execution
1. The boats are to put out according to K.B. in the 2nd half of
December. To proceed at economical cruising speed via DT 10 to GG 50,
where supplies are to be taken on from U 459. After supplying the Group
U 459 is to proceed northwards. Group "Seehund" to area Cape Town.
U 506 is to remain in the area ER ES, owing to earlier sailing and to
operate there according to the traffic situation. (See paragraph 3, c)
U 511 is to proceed as the last boat, by the shortest route to the South
Atlantic and will be the last boat to be supplied by the northward bound U
459.
After operating in the appointed operational area in the Cape Town area
the entire group is to return, according to the fuel situation, as no
supplying is anticipated on the homeward voyage. Supplying in Grid EH
at the earliest, if necessary.
2. Permission for attack in all areas except on isolated vessels in "Route
Anton". Permission to attack only given here if no sailing orders or by
W/T, freedom to attack is given for a section of the route.
In the Cape Town area attacks may be made inside the following
boundaries:
From 50 E. and 400 S. via 400 E. and 400 S. as far as the southern tip
of Madagascar. In the Mozambique Channel as far as 200 S.
3. Traffic situation for the Southern Atlantic and the Cape Town area:
a) Since about the 20th October to the end of November 1942 from
Cape Town to about 200 S. in approximately 75 sea miles wide coastal
channels to the N., then in a wide spread over the Atlantic S. and W. of the
line from FN 30 to ES 20.
b) Since the middle of October to the beginning of November 1942 also
evasive movements from Cape Town to the S. (in one case as far as about
440 S.).
c) Since the beginning of November, Freetown traffic in area EG 20 to
EJ 20 as far as ER 20 to ES 20.

1042
 - 202 -
d) In the second half of November heavy traffic on the south coast of
South Africa in Grid KP 50, 60, 80, 90 and KZ 20 and 30. The traffic sails
from Cape Town to Suez, to the Near East and to India.
Coastal traffic between Cape Town, East London and Durban is
presumably along the coast on the 200 meter line.
4. Defence situation
Slight surface patrol will be encountered in the whole of the South
Atlantic, especially in the area round Freetown and Cape Town. Aerial
patrol in the vicinity of Freetown, near Ascension and Cape Town. There
is a well manned airfield. As a result of the sinkings in the waters of KP
50, 60, 80, 90 and KZ 20 and 30 strong air activity may be anticipated. In
general, up to now, the air and surface patrol in the entire South Area is
unpractical and ineffective.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
Appendix to Extra-Operational Order No. 53.
Most Secret
A. Intelligence of the Enemy:
1) There are warships in the West African area between Cape Town and
Freetown.
In the Freetown area: 4 cruisers, 3 auxiliary cruisers, 4 destroyers.
1043
In the Cape Town area: 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, several gun boats and
U-boat chasers.
The presence of Battleships, Aircraft Carriers and other escort craft
must be expected. This depends on important transport convoys which
pass through this area.
Only patrol boats may be expected to be stationed off the remaining
harbors.
The presence of American units has been confirmed in the whole area.
These also are connected with important convoys.
Only 2 auxiliary cruisers have been lately confirmed as surface patrol.
2) Enemy merchant shipping in the Cape Town - Freetown area.
Enemy tonnage in this area:
Cape Town - Freetown direct: 143 ships with a total of 935,000 GRT.
Through the Gulf of Guinea: 54 ships with a total of 239,000 GRT.
Density of Freetown traffic: Monthly passage in each of both
directions approximately 106 ships.
Density of Cape Town traffic: About 201 ships in each of both
directions.
Apart from the valuable transport convoys, the traffic between Cape
Town and Freetown consists of isolated vessels.
Ships bound for England are formed into convoys in Freetown, those
coming from England are mostly dispersed there.
- 203 -
The courses of isolated vessels proceeding from South Africa to
America and back, lie to a small extent also inside the line of
communication Cape Town - Freetown. In this area, apart from Cape d) 330 57' S 180 04.5' E.
Town and Freetown, the following may be considered important ports: e) 340 15' S 180 00' E.
Lagos, Tacordi, Lobito, Matadi, Point Noire, Duala, Whale Bay, there is no f) 340 20.2' S 170 47.7' E.
information regarding the density of traffic in these ports.
Point Noire is said to be the port for American convoys. 2) According to a report of June 1940 enemy mines off Cape Town lie:
3) It appears from captured material, that when putting in to Cape Town, Eastwards Longitude 180 10' E.
enemy merchant ships steer a course to a point on 340 14' 12" S., 170 38' North of Latitude 330 49.3' N. so that Robben Island lies in this
E., from there on, with a course of 600 via a looked for route to 330 53' minefield.
00" S., 180 22' 00" E., further on a course of 900 to 330 53' 00" S., 180 25' 3) Before the laying mines in the area according to paragraph 7 a route
40" E., from there on a course of 1400 to 330 54' 00" S., 180 26' 40" E. led from point 330 54' S., 180 26.7' E. in the direction of 3200 1.3 sea
This direction shows that enemy mines are present on both sides of this miles. From here in the direction 2700 22.5 sea miles to point 330 53' S.,
looked for route, apart from which enemy mines are known to exist in the 170 59' E. Latitude of the route 2 sea miles.
area 20 sea miles in circumference from Island Lighthouse.
All lights, light buoys and D/F'ing is discontinued without warning in
an emergency. According to an Italian report, the Route "R6" which has - 204 -
been in operation since the end of May 1942 has been ordered for the
convoys and isolated traffic proceeding from Cape Town to the South
Seas, and this runs through the following points: 340 10' S., 180 00' E.,
370 35' 40" S., 190 45' E., 370 35' 40" S., 210 50' E., 340 00' S., 280 50'
E., 310 50' S., 310 35' E., 300 50' S., 310 45' E. The reverse convoys are
to proceed in the Durban - Cape Town sector on the unknown "Route R5".
Defence:
According to an agent's report, patrol duties are carried out by 6
destroyers and several patrol boats in the Cape Town area. This
information is unconfirmed. 4) Our own mines lie near Cape Agulhas with the points:
Aerial and surface patrol must be expected along the entire west African a) 350 47' S 190 14' E.
coast. b) 360 58' S 200 18' E.
Enemy U-boats: c) 360 21' S 220 23' E.
The U-boat bases in this area are unknown and most probably d) 350 10' S 210 20' E.
unavailable.
The passing of enemy U-boats in this area is likely. and northwards to the coast between the longitudes 190 49' E and 200
30' E.
B. 1) Our own mines off Cape Town within points:
a) 330 48' S 170 33.8' E.
b) 330 40' S 170 49.5' E.
c) 330 40' S 180 01.6' E.
1044
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
16 - 31 December 1942
PG30314b
16.December 1942.
I. U 67 - BE 94 U 172 - DS 65 U 410 - Op(AL 70) U 563 - BE 91
86 - Op(CE 60) 174 - Op(FC) 432 - Op(DJ) 564 - Op(CE 60)
91 - CF 19 175 - Op(EK) 435 - Op(AK) 569 - Op(AK)
92 - Op(CE 60) 176 - Op(FC) 439 - Op(AL 87) 591 - Op(AK 10)
103 - Op(CE 60) 177 - KZ 43 440 - BE 67 600 - Op(AL 70)
105 - Op(EE) 178 - FE 59 441 - BF 47 604 - Op(AK)
106 - CE 30 181 - GJ 79 445 - Op(AK) 609 - Op(AL)
109 - DR 44 182 - AE 83 455 - Op(AK 10) 610 - Op(AL 70)
123 - AL 32 183 - CF 21 460 - BE 95 611 - Op(AL 70)
124 - Op(EP 22) 185 - Op(CE 60) 461 - EH 31 615 - Op(AK)
125 - BE 94 203 - Op(AL) 463 - CF 21 618 - Op(DJ)
126 - Op(FC) 211 - Op(AL) 465 - BE 37 621 - Op(AL)
128 - Op(FC) 214 - DR 72 506 - BF 48 623 - Op(AL 70)
129 - DF 71 217 - Op(EE) 507 - ES 51 626 - AK 37
130 - Op(CE 34) 221 - BE 44 508 - DQ 37 628 - Op(AK 10)
134 - Op(FC) 225 - AE 84 513 - BF 49 653 - Op(CE 60)
154 - Op(AL 70) 260 - BF 45 514 - BE 97 659 - BE 68
135 - CD 23 336 - Op(AK 10) 515 - Op(CE 30) 663 - Op(AK 87)
155 - Op(CE 61) 356 - Op(AL) 519 - Op(CE 60) 664 - Op(AL)
159 - Op(FC 35) 357 - AD 524 - Op(AK) 706 - BE 91
161 - Op(FC) 373 - Op(AK) 525 - AO 757 - BE 69
163 - CD 90 384 - AF 87 553 - BE 65 758 - BE 44
164 - ES 49 406 - BF 57 D 3 - Op(EH 77)
409 - BE 15
1045
On Return Passage: U 67 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221
- 460 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 513 - 552 - 553 - 663 - 758.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69 - 70, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 178 sighted 2 steamers on course 0f 2400 and 220 in FL 53. Boat
was on return journey and had no torpedoes left.
3) U 217 contacted at 0930 in EP 1359 the convoy reported on the
previous day by U 124, but was soon forced off again. U 124 made an
attack in EP 2177 and sank 2 tankers in ballast and 5 destroyers. Contact
lost. Last course 2900, speed 11 knots.
4) Further sinkings:
U 176 sank English ship "Observer" (5,881 GRT) in FC 8474, carrying
iron from Capetown to Trinidad, course 3000.
U 159 sank the English ship "East Wales" (4,358 GRT) in FC 2911,
carrying war material from Trinidad to Alexandria. Submarine sank a total
of 7,372 GRT on this trip.
5) Air escorted convoy - see paragraph IVa.
b) None.
- 206 -
 c) Two reports of torpedoing from unidentified position. Probably
Convoy No. 70.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) The G.A.F. sighted a convoy with aircraft carrier at 1415 in BE
8368, course 2100, high speed, while searching for survivors of the tanker
"Germania". Search for "Germania" was immediately broken off, as there
was no prospect of success. The boats that had been told off for this task -
U 514 - 125 - 563 - 706 were instructed to attack the convoy. U 563
reported that weather prevented his carrying out the order. No further
message was received by the morning. Operation was continued.
2) Convoy No. 69:
The weather situation in the area where the convoy was, made the
operation very difficult. During the morning visibility was still good, but
by the afternoon it worsened and the boats reported some fog visibility
varying up to 2 miles, wind N.W. 8 - 9, freshening.
At 1047 on 16.12. U 373 sighted a convoy on S.W. course. It was not
an HX convoy, but an ONS convoy running S.W. Chances of attacking it
seemed better than the HX. Boats were ordered to stalk it at highest speed.
During the day and night another 3 boats contacted the convoy. From
reports from the submarines it appeared that there were 2 different convoy
groups: The second group, which U 524 and U 615 had contacted, was
sailing 45 miles behind the first, which U 373 and U 445 had contacted. U
524 reported that he thought his group was a dummy convoy, consisting of
a steamer and several patrol vessels. During the day he had seen 5 patches
of smoke and some mast heads. No remote escort. Worsening visibility
on the evening of 16.12. caused all boats to lose the convoy and they did
not pick her up again by the morning of 17.12.
No air escort for the convoy. 2 boats reported that they had been
forced off by a destroyer. The operation continued. Convoy must have
been somewhere in AK 58 on the morning of 17.12.
3) Convoy No. 70:
Weather also affected this operation. At mid-day the boats reported
SW6, seaway 5, good visibility. Towards evening W 9 - 10 was reported,
one boat reported "no action taken".
1046
U 609 maintained contact with the convoy until the evening of 16.
Another 4 boats came up with the convoy. All boats lost contact by the
morning of 17.12.
Heavy weather from the W. prevented the convoy making more than 5
knots and during the afternoon it ran towards the W., probably because the
tempest was veering from S.W. to W. No reports were made about the
escort of the convoy. One boat reported merely that it had to submerge
when sighted by a destroyer.
- 207 -
Following successes were reported:
1) U 610 - 1 tanker "Briligh Confidence" class (8,449 GRT) sunk.
1 freighter (5,000 GRT) sunk.
2) U 356 - 1 tanker (5,000 GRT) sunk.
3) U 621 - 1 freighter (5,000 GRT) 2 explosions observed.
4) U 664 - 1 freighter (4,000 GRT) probable hit, definite noise of sinking
after 15 minutes.
5) U 211 - 1 2-funnelled destroyer sunk.
All ships may be assumed sunk, as in such a storm and high seas any
ship that had been hit would not have stood a chance.
Convoy was in BE 1115 on evening of 16th and operation was
continued.
b) 1) In order to build up a new patrol strip AL 72 has been given as new
area for U 440 - 659 - 757 - 441 - 260 - 406 - 123 - 225.
 2) Following order was given to Group "Westwall", which is calculated
to be E. of the Azores: U 103 - 653 - 91 - 92 - 130 to proceed to CE 6355
to take over radar interception gear or fuel from U 463. U 155 and U 91
were to meet in CF 2711 to transfer fuel. The other boats of the group
were ordered to new attack areas:
U 106 to CF 35 and 36; U 183 to CF 37 and 38; U 155 to CF 53 and
61; U 519 to CF 62 and 63; U 564 to CG 14 and 15; U 515 to CF 39 and
CG 17; U 86 to CF 66 and CG 44.
3) U 625 occupied square AK 3574 as according to a high grade radio
intercept convoy No. 69 was expected in that position.
c) None.
d) Boats in the area of Route "Anton" have again been informed that it is
restricted as the "Rhakotis" (Trans: blockade runner) was expected to pass
the Equator about 16.12 on its way to the North.
V. Reports of Success:
U 124 2 tankers 14,000 GRT sunk
U 176 1 ship 5,881 GRT sunk
U 159 1 ship 4,358 GRT sunk
U 610 2 ships 13,494 GRT sunk
U 356 1 tanker 5,000 GRT sunk
U 621 1 ship 5,000 GRT sunk
U 664 1 ship 4,000 GRT sunk
U 211 1 destroyer sunk.
VI. General:
Operations against both convoys were badly affected by bad weather.
The weather alone made very heavy demands on the boats. As successes
were scored despite this weather, the crews are to be highly commended.
The strength of the defences cannot be judged in the conditions obtaining.
- 208 -
17.December 1942.
I. U 67 - BE 96 U 172 - DS 36 U 409 - Op(BD) U 563 - Op(CF)
86 - Op(CE 20) 174 - FC 40 410 - Op(BD) 564 - Op(CE 60)
91 - CF 20 175 - Op(EK) 432 - DJ-Op 569 - Op(AK 50)
92 - Op(CE 60) 176 - Op(FC) 435 - Op(AK 50) 591 - Op(AK 50)
103 - CE 63 177 - KZ 47 439 - BE 16 600 - Op(BD 30)
105 - Op(EF) 178 - FE 51 440 - BE 55 604 - Op(AK 50)
106 - Op(CE 36) 181 - GH 93 441 - BE 67 609 - Op(BD)
109 - DQ 92 182 - AE 88 445 - Op(AK 50) 610 - Op(BD)
123 - AL 26 183 - CF 21 455 - Op(AK 50) 611 - AL
124 - Op(EP) 185 - Op(CE 39) 460 - BF 71 615 - Op(AK 50)
125 - Op(CF) 203 - Op(BD 30) 461 - DS 92 618 - Op(DJ)
126 - Op(FC) 211 - Op(BD) 463 - CF 21 621 - Op(BD)
128 - Op(FC) 214 - EF 32 465 - BE 66 623 - Op(BD)
129 - DF 46 217 - Op(EP) 506 - BE 93 626 - Op(AK 50)
130 - CE 63 221 - BE 44 507 - ES 48 628 - Op(AK)
134 - Op(FC) 225 - AL 33 508 - DF 77 653 - CE 63
135 - Op(BD 30) 260 - BE 66 513 - BF 55 659 - BE 56
154 - CD 90 336 - Op(AK 50) 514 - Op(CF 30) 663 - BD 25
155 - Op(CF) 356 - Op(BD) 515 - Op(CE 30) 626 - Op(BD)
159 - Op(FC) 357 - AN 36 519 - CE 66 706 - Op(CF 30)
161 - Op(FC) 373 - Op(AK 50) 524 - Op(AK 50) 757 - BE 67
163 - CD 90 384 - AF 79 525 - AN 36 758 - BE 44
164 - ES 77 406 - BF 48 553 - BF 40 D 3 - Op(EJ)

1047
 On Return Passage: U 67 - 91 - 103 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178
- 181 - 183 - 221 - 439 - 460 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 513 - 519 - 553 - 653 -
663 - 758. to search on south to southwesterly courses, as Operational Control
Entered Port: - . - suspected that the convoy was farther S., somewhere around AK 84 or 85.
Sailed: U 436 - 575 - Lorient; U 444 - Kiel. 2) Convoy No. 70:
Even in BD the weather was most unfavorable for an attack on the
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. S.W. bound "ON" convoy. Boats reported westerly wind up to 9, variable
visibility and some fog. Reports made by boats gave the impression that
III. Reports on the Enemy: the convoy had somewhat scattered because of the weather situation. All
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69 and 70, see paragraph IVa; air escorted convoy day long U 609 kept reporting that he had contact first with 2, then with 3
paragraph IVb. steamers. He reported them at mid-day in BD 3346 on a course of 2600,
2) To date U 128 had seen nothing in that part of the patrol strip NE with a speed of 4 knots. No other boat sighted this group. U 609 reported
Natal. that he had fired 6 unaccountable misses despite perfect firing data. 5
b) None. boats of the group reported air escort by Catalina and Consolidated flying
c) 1) U-boat sightings: BE 1148, DB 3628, DA 82, DO 69, FC 55, ED 95 boats. The operation against the convoy was continued as Operational
- 98, FJ 3360, EO 6949, FJ 3629. Control assumed that the convoy had largely scattered, thus giving the
2) U-boat attack in EE 6349. boats a chance to pick up single ships in the convoy area.
d) None. b) 1) As the convoy reported by plane had not been found and it was
calculated that the boats set to look for it must be far astern and the heavy
IV. Current Operations: seas rendered a follow-up useless, the pursuit was given up. U 125 and U
a) 1) Convoy No. 69: 514 made for DG 80. U 563 took CF 14 and 15 as attack area; U 706
Weather in convoy area remained very stormy on the 17th - 18th with took CG 91 and 92. Thus in about 2 days this area would be manned by 9
S.W. wind up to force 12. Contact with convoy was not reestablished. boats. It was intended to attack the traffic running between England -
After all boats had reported their positions, it was obvious that all boats Gibraltar which should run through this area.
that had proceeded at low speed of 4 - 5 knots on account of the weather, 2) After U 159 returns to base, its position on the patrol strip N.E.
and on the S.W. course taken by the convoy. On evening of the 17th they Natal, which was fixed on 14.12., is to be taken by U 507. U 164 was to
were ordered to continue extend the strip to the coast on the S.W.
So far the attack positions in this area have been very profitable, thus,
- 209 - it seems right to use new boats there. A group of 6 medium-sized boats
with one tanker are shortly to leave port for this purpose.
c) None.
d) 1) Boats have been informed that the enemy uses his location gear
very cautiously and when he picks up a target he gradually reduces his
signal strength to mask his approach.
2) U 611 operated within Group "Panzer" against Convoy No. 68. Last
report on 9.11. from about AK 20. Convoy was followed for another 2
1048
days, and after the operation was broken off the boats were requested to
report their positions. U 611 did not report. Later calls were also
unsuccessful. Boat must be considered lost.
V. Reports of Success: None.
- 210 -
18.December 1942.
I. U 67 - BF 72 U 172 - DG 94 U 409 - Op(BD 30) U 553 - BF 64
86 - CE 63 174 - Op(FC) 410 - Op(BD 30) 563 - BE 97
91 - CF 20 175 - Op(EK) 432 - Op(GJ) 564 - CF 50
92 - CE 60 176 - Op(FC) 435 - Op(AK) 569 - Op(AK)
103 - CE 60 177 - KY 86 436 - BF 54 575 - BF 54
105 - Op(EP) 178 - FD 93 439 - BE 28 591 - Op(AK 70)
106 - CF 24 181 - GH 56 440 - BE 51 600 - Op(BD)
109 - EF 23 182 - AL 32 441 - Op(AK) 604 - Op(AK)
123 - AL 29 183 - CF 21 444 - AO 609 - Op(BD)
124 - Op(EP) 185 - CF 20 445 - Op(AK 70) 610 - Op(BD)
125 - CF 31 203 - Op(BD) 455 - Op(AK) 615 - Op(AK 70)
126 - Op(FC) 211 - Op(BD 30) 460 - BF 67 618 - Op(DJ)
128 - Op(FC) 214 - EF 29 461 - DT 41 621 - Op(BD)
129 - DF 27 217 - Op(EP) 463 - GF 21 623 - Op(BD)
130 - CE 60 221 - BE 44 465 - BF 44 626 - AK 60
134 - Op(FC) 225 - AL 29 506 - BE 94 628 - Op(AK)
1049
135 - Op(BD) 260 - BE 61 507 - ER 99 653 - CE 60
154 - DF 27 336 - Op(AK 70) 508 - DF 49 659 - BE 51
155 - CE 60 356 - Op(BD 30) 513 - BF 61 663 - BD 37
159 - Op(FC) 357 - AN 31 514 - CF 31 664 - Op(BD 30)
161 - Op(FC 28) 373 - Op(AK) 515 - CF 20 706 - CG 14
163 - CD 90 384 - AF 79 519 - CF 50 757 - BE 57
164 - Op(FC) 406 - BE 68 524 - Op(AK) 758 - BE 47
525 - AN 31 D 3 - Op(EJ)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 91 - 103 - 159 - 130 - 154 - 161 - 163 - 172
- 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 439 - 460 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 513 - 519 - 553 -
653 - 663 - 758.
Entered Port: U 513 - Lorient; U 553 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69, 70 and 71, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 432 situation report: No shipping in DJ 20 Roadstead and harbor
of Casablanca, Mehdia and Fedala empty. No signs of landing of troops or
material. Busy neutral traffic between CG 9591 and DJ 1630. Sunk:
steam trawler (500 GRT). Boat requested a freehand to the W.
3) U 563 sank a single ship "Cape St. Andrew" class (5,094 GRT) in BE
8691, course 200. Subsequently submerged because of destroyer. Several
unaccountable misses at different depths. Probably "Pi 39" pistol duds.
4) U 175 was detailed to reconnoiter the Dakar area. He reported no
shipping in EJ 6960. As this position was about 180 miles W. of the
harbor, boat was requested to give further details.
5) U 176 was bombed by a Consolidated when it surfaced in FJ 3632.
Boat was temporarily unable to dive because of empty batteries, and
moved away from land at full speed. Boat would soon be ready again for
operations outside coastal waters. Moderate seas in area and land-based
plane reconnaissance to 150 miles from the
- 211 -
mainland. Location at night.
6) U 217 sank Swedish vessel "Etna" (2,619 GRT) in EF 35, course
1450, from New York to Monte Video. Concentrated location by day and
night since 16.12., but no planes sighted. As area was from the coast and
this frequent location appeared doubtful, the boat was informed that
different electrically driven gear on board cause noises similar to location.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EE 71, AK 1229, FJ 3288, BE 6165, BE 3762.
U-boat warning: for EE 72.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 71:
At 1326 U 441, which was on its outward journey, reported a convoy
of 6 - 10 steamers in BE 5613, southerly course. Boats in CF, CG and BE
were ordered to stalk it. But as no further shadower reports were received
by 2000, the boats of Group "Westwall" which were in CF and U 514 -
125 - 563 - 766 were told to continue to operate, but the boats that are en
route for AL to form a patrol strip there continued to that area. The
operation was continued with 10 boats. At 2200 U 441 reported that he had
been forced to submerge from 1400 until dark. No contact existed. U 432
was directed to follow up from DJ 20, and therefore set course for CG 47.
2) Convoy No. 69:
Weather was still bad on 18.12. in the convoy area. Boats reported
wind S.W. 11 - 12, visibility up to 2 miles. No other reports on the convoy
were made by the boats. No air or sea patrols sighted. Operational
1050
Control was of the opinion that owing to weather conditions the convoy
would hardly move and that some vessels would probably be hove to far
astern. On the evening of 18.12. boats were instructed to heave to for the
night and at dawn on 19.12. search for stragglers so far as the weather
permitted. Position of convoy was completely unknown as no contact had
been established after the afternoon of 16.12.
3) Convoy No. 70:
Operations against the southbound convoy were greatly hampered by
the stormy weather. At 1300 U 621 reported the convoy in BD 3453, but
again lost contact at 1425 in BD 3455. Another boat U 609, reported at
1400 that he had contacted 4 steamers, at 1500 he again reported a
steamer, but lost contact again at 1630. On the morning of 19.12., U 621
again established contact with the convoy in BD 2668, but lost it at 0700.
Thus, convoy had not even made 3 miles progress. 4 boats of Group U
600 - 609 - 610 and U 623 had to turn back because of lack of fuel. 3
other boats, U 409 - 410 and U 621 were ordered to break off
- 212 -
operation as they were to convoy a homeward bound vessel (Trans:
blockade runner). U 621 was again ordered to continue stalking the
convoy which he had again picked up on the morning of 19.12. 6 boats
were still stalking the convoy.
b) Until more boats reach the area to man the patrol strip, U 123 has
been allocated AL 48 as temporary attack area, and U 225 AL 31. U 128
was given the same attack area as U 507 in the patrol strip of the Natal
boats, i.e. square FC 2950.
 c) U 183 took over fuel from U 463 and continued homeward journey. U
463 proceeded to CF 5121 to hand over radar intercept cable.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 432 1 steam trawler sunk
U 563 1 ship 5,094 GRT sunk
U 217 1 ship 2,619 GRT sunk.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
19.December 1942.
I. U 67 - BF 49 U 172 - DG 62 U 409 - Op(BD) U 563 - BE 86
86 - CE 60 174 - Op(FC) 410 - Op(BD) 564 - CF 37
91 - CF 51 175 - Op(EK) 432 - Op(DJ) 569 - Op(AK 70)
92 - CE 60 176 - Op(FK) 435 - OP(AK 70) 575 - BF 46
103 - CE 60 177 - JJ 12 436 - BF 48 591 - Op(AK 70)
105 - (EP)-Op 178 - FD 62 439 - BE 61 600 - BD 39
106 - CF 34 181 - GH 27 440 - BE 52 604 - Op(AK 70)
109 - EF 27 182 - AL 33 441 - BE 28 609 - Op(BD)
123 - AL 54 183 - CF 21 444 - AN 36 610 - AL 78
124 - Op(EP) 185 - Op(CF 30) 445 - Op(AK 70) 615 - Op(AK 70)
125 - BE 80 203 - Op(BD) 455 - Op(AK 75) 618 - Op(DJ 20)
126 - Op(FC) 211 - Op(BD) 460 - BF 64 621 - Op(BD)
128 - Op(FC) 214 - Op(EF) 461 - DT 12 623 - Op(BD 20)
129 - CD 97 217 - Op(EF) 463 - CF 19 626 - AK 30
130 - CE 60 221 - BE 47 465 - BF 49 628 - Op(AK 70)
134 - Op(FC) 225 - AL 48 506 - CG 80 653 - CE 60
135 - Op(BD) 260 - BE 38 507 - Op(FC) 659 - BE 27
154 - CD 90 336 - Op(AK) 508 - DF 51 663 - BE 41
155 - CF 51 356 - Op(BD 20) 514 - BE 80 664 - Op(BD 20)
159 - ER 64 357 - AN 23 515 - CF 37 706 - BE 80
1051
161 - ER 89 373 - Op(AK) 519 - CF 61 757 - BE 80
163 - CA 90 384 - AF 72 524 - Op(AK) 758 - BE 47
164 - Op(FC) 406 - BE 80 525 - AN 23 D 3 - Op(EJ)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 91 - 103 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161
- 163 - 172 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 439 - 460 - 461 - 465 - 600 -
609 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 758.
Entered Port: U 460 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 662 - 381 - St. Nazaire; U 620 - La Pallice; U 631 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 213 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69, 70 and 71, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 175 reported when asked that he had encountered no shipping
since 16.12. in squares EJ 6560, 6950, 9670, 9690, 6990 and 6530. He
intended to operate closer to the coast when the moon is waning. As the
squares named were some 200 miles W. of Dakar, the boat was instructed
to search nearer in-shore at once. Boat had not operated as ordered.
3) Of the Natal boats, U 126 and U 174 had to turn back because of lack
of fuel. 5 boats remained in the area, but 2 had little fuel and another had
been damaged.
b) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
 a) 1) Convoy No. 69:
No further reports were made on the convoy. On evening of 18.12.
boats were ordered to heave to in the area where they were, in order to try
to pick up the convoy again. On the evening of 19.12. the boats were
informed that B.d.U. expected the convoy to be somewhere in the squares
AK 74, 75, 77, 78, BC 33, BD 11 on the afternoon of 20.12. thus, as there
was still a chance of picking up the convoy or parts of it the operation was
not closed despite rough weather from the W. Boats were again reminded
of daylight underwater attacks, which in some cases would be possible
because of the enemy's low speed.
2) Convoy No. 70:
Weather still very unfavorable on 19.12. During the afternoon wind
force 11 - 12 was reported, poor visibility and very heavy swell. On the
morning of 20.12. a boat reported when requested that wind was 1 - 2,
visibility over 10 miles.
Convoy was reported in BD 2668 at 0500 on 19.12.by U 621, course
2400. Boat lost contact again at 0700, at 1100 reported convoy again in
BD 2691. Boat intended breaking off pursuit as it had been directed to a
new area in the meantime. But an order was issued to maintain contact
with the convoy, as it appeared to be the only boat stalking it. At 2000
contact was made again in BD 2688. Boat reported course of convoy 2200
and stated that vessels were sailing as much as 9 miles apart. No other
boat picked up the convoy, probably because of the lack of fixes.
On the morning of 20.12. when weather improved, the boats were
ordered to continue searching and attempt to get fixes. Above all Krushka
was to correct latest enemy position by means of the new fix. Operation
was continued because of the improved weather.
- 214 -
1052
U 135 turned back because of lack of fuel. 5 boats were still stalking
the convoy - U 621 - 356 - 211 - 203 and U 664.
3) Convoy No. 71:
About 2000 U 106 heard rapid screw noises in CF 3619, in a direction
of 3400. Boat followed up, but did not establish contact. If convoy was
traveling at 10.5 knots, it might be the one that was reported on 19.12. by
U 441. But as this speed was unlikely in bad weather, the position could
not be used as a basis for a directed operation. The boats continued to
search.
b) U 182 was proceeding to the S. outside the enemy air patrol area via
CF 40, EJ 40, FM 20. Operations in Capetown area were intended.
c) U 221 refueled U 758. Both boats continued on homeward journey.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
The enclosed situation report was given to Naval War Staff. It shows
the results of Mediterranean and Morocco operations, the position of boats
for convoy duties, and the situation at the time. (Trans: see appendix).
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
20.December 1942.
I. U 67 - BF 50 U 174 - Op(FC) U 410 - Op(BD) U 575 - BF 47
86 - CE 63 175 - Op(EJ) 432 - CG 72 591 - Op(AK 70)
91 - CF 27 176 - Op(FC) 435 - Op(AK 70) 600 - BE 42
92 - CE 63 177 - GR 87 436 - BE 69 604 - Op(AK)
103 - CE 63 178 - FD 23 439 - BF 44 609 - BE 39
105 - Op(EP) 181 - GH 11 440 - BE 16 610 - Op(BD)
106 - Op(CF) 182 - AL 29 441 - BE 24 615 - Op(BD)
 109 - Op(EF) 183 - BE 88 444 - AN 31 618 - Op(DJ 20)
123 - Op(AL 48) 185 - Op(CF 30) 445 - Op(AK 70) 620 - BF 91
124 - Op(EP) 203 - Op(BD 20) 455 - Op(AK 70) 621 - Op(BD)
125 - Op(BE 80) 211 - Op(BD 20) 461 - DG 92 623 - Op(BD)
126 - Op(FC) 214 - Op(EF) 463 - CF 27 626 - AK
128 - Op(FC) 217 - Op(EP) 465 - BF 91 628 - Op(AK 70)
129 - CD 90 221 - BE 49 506 - Op(CF 30) 631 - AO
130 - CE 63 225 - Op(AL 81) 507 - Op(FC) 653 - CE 63
134 - Op(FC) 260 - BE 25 508 - DF 23 659 - BE 13
135 - Op(BD 20) 336 - Op(AK 70) 514 - Op(BE 80) 662 - BF 24
154 - CD 90 356 - Op(BD 20) 515 - Op(CF 30) 663 - BE 46
155 - CF 27 357 - AF 76 519 - Op(CF 30) 664 - Op(BD 20)
159 - ER 34 373 - Op(BD) 524 - Op(AK 70) 706 - Op(BE 80)
161 - ER 67 381 - BF 58 525 - AF 76 757 - BE 24
163 - CD 90 384 - AF 47 563 - Op(BE 80) 758 - BE 47
164 - Op(FC) 406 - BE 24 564 - Op(CF 30) D 3 - EJ 17
172 - DH 11 409 - Op(BD) 569 - Op(AK 70)
- 215 -
On Return Passage: U 67 - 91 - 103 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161
- 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 439 - 461 - 465 - 508 -
519 - 600 - 609 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 758 - D 3.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 459 - 442 - St. Nazaire; U 333 - La Pallice.
1053
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 70 and 71, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 465 reported submarine in BF 6729 i.e. Route "Morgengebet".
Possibly it was one of our own outward bound boats.
3) U 618 had again made a sortie to Casablanca. No shipping, situation
unaltered. Boat was allotted CG 47 as new area. It was intended that he
should work with Group "Westwall".
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DB 56.
Submarine warnings and reports of torpedoing: DB 6417, BD 5183,
AK 4243, BD 4243, BD 1149, BD 5183.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 69:
Boats remained during 20.12. in the area reached the previous day, to
try to pick up the scattered convoy. Weather remained rough with wind up
to 6 and poor visibility because of hail and snow showers.
B.D.U.'s assumption was correct. At 1200 U 336 reported a single
ship with S.W. course in AK 7945. At 1600 he contacted 2 ships in AK
7974 - again on a S.W. course. He lost them again at 2000 through hail
and driving snow.
At 0400 on 21.12. U 591 reported that he had sunk "Montreal City"
(3,066 GRT) in BD 1167.
It certainly appears that the convoy had scattered during the bad
weather and that the individual ships are only now entering the
submarines' patrol area. As there is a chance of contacting even more
ships, the operation will continue.
2) Convoy No. 70:
Good weather was reported on the morning of 20.12. in the area where
the convoy was: Wind 1 - 2 good visibility over 10 miles. Boats were
instructed to search at higher speed while the sea was smoother. It was
pointed out that exact fixes when searching were most important. At 1100
on 20.12. U 621 sighted a single tanker on a course of 2400, speed 4 knots,
probably a straggler from the convoy. Next morning he reported that he
had sunk the vessel at 2030
- 216 -
on 20.12. in square BD 5262. It was the tanker "Empire Brouce"
(8,142 GRT).
No further reports have been received. The operation against the
convoy is being continued, as there is still a chance of meeting single
ships. 4 boats are still stalking, as U 621 has been told to break off the
search and make for CD 33 to pick up the homeward bound vessel.
3) Convoy No. 71:
Direct contact with the convoy has not been established. U 185
sighted single ships in CF 3886 and hunted them via CF 6223 to CF 6883.
He scored one hit there after a double and a triple miss. No effect
observed. Freighter was "Mekambo" class (4,996 GRT). U 706 reported
one destroyer in CF 3519 and one in CF 3597. Both on a S.E. course.
Possibly these were scattered members of a convoy. No further details
known. Operation is continuing.
b) New attack positions have been ordered for the "ON" convoy
expected on 23.12. U 123 - 225 - 659 - 440 - 260 - 406 - 441 and U 757
form Group "Spitz" and at 0000 23.12. were on the patrol strip from AL
4845 to 8541.
c) U 91 took over fuel from U 155 and radar interception cable from U
463 and is now continuing his homeward journey.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
1054
U 185 1 ship 1 hit
U 591 1 ship 3,066 GRT sunk
U 621 1 tanker 8,142 GRT sunk.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
21.December 1942.
I. U 67 - BF 61 U 174 - FC 25 U 409 - BD 53 U 564 - Op(CF 30)
86 - CE 63 175 - Op(EK) 410 - BD 28 569 - Op(BD)
91 - CF 51 176 - Op(FK) 432 - Op(CF 66) 575 - BE 95
92 - CE 63 177 - GR 75 435 - Op(BD 11) 591 - Op(BD 11)
103 - CE 63 178 - ES 82 436 - BE 92 600 - BE 51
105 - Op(EE) 181 - FV 84 439 - BE 69 604 - Op(AK 11)
106 - Op(CF 30) 182 - AL 54 440 - AL 88 609 - BE 42
109 - Op(EE) 183 - BE 94 441 - AL 97 610 - BF 24
123 - Op(AK 48) 185 - Op(CF 63) 442 - BF 67 615 - Op(BD 11)
124 - Op(EE) 203 - Op(BD 28) 444 - AN 23 618 - Op(DJ 21)
125 - Op(CF 30) 211 - Op(BD 52) 445 - Op(BD 11) 620 - BF 82
126 - ER 88 214 - Op(EE) 455 - Op(BD 11) 621 - Op(BD 53)
128 - Op(FC) 217 - Op(EE) 459 - BF 58 623 - BE 42
129 - CD 90 221 - BE 58 561 - DG 61 626 - AK
130 - CE 63 225 - Op(AL 81) 463 - CF 43 628 - Op(BD 11)
134 - Op(FC) 260 - AL 88 465 - BF 64 631 - AN 36
135 - BD 62 333 - BF 91 506 - CF 31 653 - CE 63
154 - CD 90 336 - Op(AK 79) 507 - Op(FC) 659 - AL 88
155 - CF 51 356 - Op(BD 52) 508 - CD 90 662 - BF 49
159 - EH 95 357 - AF 48 514 - Op(CF 30) 663 - BE 55
161 - ER 38 373 - Op(AK 77) 515 - Op(CF 30) 664 - Op(BD 52)
- 217 -

163 - CD 90 381 - BF 81 519 - Op(CF 30) 706 - Op(CF 35)
164 - Op(FC) 384 - AE 68 524 - Op(BD 11) 757 - BE 11
172 - CF 81 406 - BE 52 525 - AF 48 758 - BE 58
563 - Op(CF 30) D 3 - DT 78
On Return Passage: U 67 - 91 - 103 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161
- 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 439 - 461 - 465 - 508 -
519 - 600 - 609 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 758 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 67 - Lorient; U 465 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U D 5 - Lorient; U 404 - St. Nazaire; U 167 - Bergen.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69, 70 and 71, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 176 sighted a single destroyer in FK 3146 on 19.12., mean course
2400, speed 12 knots. Boat had repaired the damage caused by bombs and
was again serviceable. He was given a free hand in FK as requested.
3) U 508 reported heavily armed freighter on course of 900, speed 12
knots, in DF 2556. Boat had fired all torpedoes and was on its homeward
voyage. U 506, U 125 and U 514 which were in CF and making for the
southwest, were ordered to stalk the ship that had been reported. They
were to proceed at cruising speed without consuming large quantities of
fuel.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CF 3849, EE 7423.
1055
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 69:
Group was still searching for the convoy or single ships on 21.12.
westerly wind up to force 8, snow and hail. At 1500 U 591 sighted a
single steamer in BD 1424, course 2000, low speed. At 1730 he reported
that he had lost contact in snow squalls. He made no further reports about
the steamer. At 2000 U 569 also sighted a steamer in BD 1179, course
700. He chased her as far as BD 1219, then lost her. This steamer, with a
course of 700, probably did not belong to the convoy.
No further reports of the convoy were received. It was therefore
decided to break off the operation on 22.12. For summing up see 23.12.
2) Convoy No. 70:
At 2200 on 21.12. the operation was broken off as there was little
chance of picking up the convoy with only 4 submarines. Also these boats
were urgently required for operations against the next ON convoy, for
which only 8 boats were so far available.
- 218 -
Summing-up - Convoy No. 70:
In all, 13 boats were stalking the convoy. Convoy was contacted
according to plan in the center of the patrol strip at the expected time on
15.12. The operation was hampered by the bad weather. The boats had no
fixes and finding and directing other boats was therefore considerably
more difficult. Contact with the convoy was maintained without a break
only during the first two days. After that, the convoy or single ships were requests. The possibility of loss through sea damage exists. No details are
reported only for short periods, mainly because of bad visibility. yet known.
No new information was gained about the convoy's defences. The
naval escort was not able to attack the boats effectively because of the V. Reports of Success: None.
weather. Unfortunately, the submarines could not profit as the seaway was
too heavy to permit firing torpedoes.
On 16.12. Consolidated and Catalina flying boats provided a strong air - 219 -
escort for the convoy. The planes could not attack the submarines either,
but their presence made shadowing more difficult. 6 0f the 14 submarines
attacked the convoy and all were able to fire. One boat had no success. 6
ships totaling 35,836 GRT and 1 twin-funneled destroyer were sunk of the
convoy which had been reported as consisting of 16 - 20 steamers.
No losses, no damage.
3) Convoy No. 71:
Apart from a steamer in CG 4186, course 140, and a destroyer almost
out of sight, nothing was found by the submarines. It is intended to break
off the operation after first light on 22.12. U 125 and U 514 are to operate 22.December 1942.
off Trinidad and are already proceeding to that area.
b) 1) U 86 was ordered to proceed at high cruising speed to CE 5186 and
attack a large steamer that had been damaged. According to a radio I. U 86 - CE 63 U 175 - Op(EK) U 410 - BD 57 U 571 - BF 80
intercept it was anchored half a mile off Flores. It may be the single ship 91 - CF 31 176 - Op(FK 23) 432 - Op(CG 40) 575 - BE 97
that was torpedoed by U 103 on 13.12. in CE 1521. U 86 is to try to send 92 - CE 63 177 - GQ 68 435 - Op(BC 30) 591 - Op(BC 36)
a dinghy alongside the ship in the dark without being observed, break the 103 - CE 63 178 - ES 43 436 - BE 97 600 - BE 56
anchor chain and sink the ship after it has drifted outside the territorial 105 - Op(EP) 181 - FV 47 439 - BF 48 604 - Op(BC 30)
waters. 106 - Op(CG 40) 182 - AL 72 440 - Op(AL 80) 609 - BE 55
2) It is intended that U 436 - 575 - 381 - 620 and U 442 shall operate 109 - Op(EE) 183 - BF 67 441 - Op(AL 80) 610 - BE 29
N.E. Natal. For the time being they are to make for CF 78. They will be 123 - Op(AL 48) 185 - Op(CG 40) 442 - BF 81 615 - Op(BC 30)
refueled by U 463 in the vicinity of ER. 124 - Op(EO) 203 - Op(BD 50) 444 - DH 14 618 - CG 87
3) The boats U 164 - 128 - 134 and U 507 at present in patrol area, have 125 - CF 52 211 - Op(BD 50) 445 - Op(BD 30) 620 - BF 73
a free hand outside Route "Anton" up to the coast of Brazil. 126 - ER 56 214 - Op(BD 54) 455 - Op(BC 30) 621 - BD 73
c) None. 128 - Op(FC) 217 - Op(EP) 459 - BF 81 623 - BE 55
d) U 626 - a boat on its first operational trip, last reported on 14.12. from 129 - BE 55 221 - BE 68 461 - DH 14 628 - Op(BC 30)
AL 26. The boat was then directed to attack a N.E. bound convoy, which, 130 - CE 63 225 - Op(AL 40) 463 - CE 63 631 - AN 31
according to calculations it could hardly have reached. The request for a 134 - Op(FC) 260 - Op(AL 80) 506 - CH 61 653 - CE 63
position report on 16.12. remained unanswered, as have all subsequent 135 - BE 55 333 - BF 82 507 - Op(FC) 659 - Op(AL 40)
154 - CD 90 336 - Op(BC 30) 508 - DF 32 662 - BF 71
1056
 155 - Op(CF) 356 - Op(BD 27) 514 - CF 67 663 - BE 65
159 - EJ 41 357 - AE 69 515 - Op(CG 40) 664 - Op(BD 51)
161 - EH 99 373 - Op(BC 30) 519 - Op(CG 40) 706 - Op(CG 44)
163 - CD 90 381 - BF 72 524 - Op(BC 39) 757 - BE 20
164 - Op(FC) 384 - AE 83 525 - AE 69 758 - BE 68
167 - AF 79 404 - BF 58 563 - Op(CG 48) D 3 - DT 49
172 - CF 53 406 - BE 24 564 - Op(CG 40) D 5 - BF 54
174 - ER 86 409 - BD 83 569 - Op(BD 13)
On Return Passage: U 91 - 103 - 106 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161
- 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 211 - 221 - 439 - 461 - 508 - 519
- 524 - 529 - 600 - 604 - 609 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 758 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 571 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 257 - La Pallice; U 266 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69 and 71, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 161 - homeward bound, in EH 9654 - reported at 1344 convoy
with westerly course. Because of considerable damage from bombs, the
boat was ordered to attack according to capability and if possible to
ascertain the rate of progress of the convoy as a guide in directing the
boats of the Trinidad area.
U 161 attacked at dusk and fired a single miss at a destroyer. Convoy
consisted of about 6 steamers and 2 escorts. After dark, course N.W.,
speed 8 - 5 knots. Submarine was continuing on its homeward voyage.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: FC 6210, BF 4558, BE 9142.
U-boat attack in EH 95.
d) None.
- 220 -
1057
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 69:
As no further sightings have been made in the convoy area, the
operation will be closed on the morning of 22.12., as planned.
Summing-up - Convoy No. 69:
On 13.12. the operation against the expected "HX" convoy was begun
with 3 boats. The convoy was picked up according to plan at mid-day on
13.12. in AJ 9278. Owing to the few boats participating, contact was
maintained only until the evening of 13.12. The approach points for the
convoy were known through high priority radio intercept, so despite the
vagueness of contact with the convoy, 9 more boats, Group "Ungestüm"
approaching from the E., were directed to the convoy. They were to pick it
up on 15.12. in a narrowed patrol strip. The convoy was not located. But
U 173 reported a S.W. bound convoy, probably an "ONS", at mid-day on
16.12., in AK 6421. All boats were directed to it. On 16.12. two separate
groups of this convoy were reported 45 miles apart. Contact was
maintained only during this day. The rest of the operation suffered from
the heavy weather. After 17.12., the convoy was not picked up again.
Searching was continued as it was assumed that the convoy was further
astern because of the bad weather, also the possibility of its being scattered
had to be allowed for. Later several single ships were reported that
probably belonged to the convoy. Unfortunately almost all were lost
because of poor visibility. The only sinking was:
1 freighter (3,066 GRT) "Montreal City".
Operational Control was unable to get any idea of the convoy's
defences, as they hardly came into play. None of the 12 boats was lost,
nor did any report major damage.
2) Convoy No. 71:
 As further search was fruitless, operation is being closed as intended.
For further operations of boats, see paragraph IVb.
b) 1) After the attacks on Convoys 69, 70 and 71 had been broken off, the
following orders were issued: U 356 - 203 and U 664 joined Group
"Spitz". Until 0800 24.12. they manned the patrol strip from BD 3396 to
BE 1451 in the given order.
Group "Ungestüm" was on the patrol strip from BD 2271 to BD 5334
at 0800 on 25.12. Order: U 591 - 336 - 455 - 445 - 435 - 373 - 524 - 628
and U 615. Both patrol strips were arranged as intercept position for a
S.W. bound convoy expected on 23.12. somewhere about AL 40 - 80.
Several boats were short of fuel and could be used only as spotters.
The following boats now belong to Group "Westwall", and they are
distributed over the following attack areas: U 563 - squares 35 and 36; U
185 - squares 37 and 38; U 155 squares 53 and 61; U 519 - squares 62
and 63; all CF. U 564 - squares 14 and 15; U 706 - squares 41 and 42
both CG. U 515 - squares 39 and 17; U 432 - squares 66 and 44, both CF
or CG.
- 221 -
2) U 618 was operating against enemy traffic in sea area off Lisbon.
Boat is being kept informed of the present situation and attention drawn to
neutral shipping.
Because of possible diplomatic repercussions Naval War Staff has
forbidden U 86 to penetrate the territorial waters of the Portuguese Island
of "Flores". If the ship is observed and shows signs of preparing to leave
1058
port, the boat is to wait outside the 3 -mile limit and close with the ship
after she has left the restricted area.
c) U 92 has taken over radar interception parts from U 463 and has
commenced homeward voyage.
d) As the convoy reported by U 161 is the second westbound one in this
area, it must be investigated whether the single ships coming from the S.
assemble in Freetown and continue in convoy to Trinidad. This
arrangement would have a bad effect on future successes in comparison
with former high sinkings in the Trinidad area.
Further details must however be awaited.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
23.December 1942.
I. U 86 - CE 51 U 175 - Op(EK) U 406 - Op(AL) U 564 - Op(CG 10)
91 - BE 96 176 - Op(FK) 409 - BD 87 569 - BD 22
92 - CE 63 177 - GQ 53 410 - BD 76 575 - BE 89
103 - CE 63 178 - ES 12 432 - Op(CF 66) 591 - BD 15
105 - Op(EP) 181 - FU 37 435 - BD 17 600 - BE 66
106 - CG 13 182 - BE 11 436 - CF 23 604 - BD 19
109 - Op(EE) 183 - BF 61 439 - BF 55 609 - BE 64
123 - Op(AL 48) 185 - Op(CF 62) 440 - Op(AL 80) 610 - BE 62
124 - Op(EO) 203 - BD 37 441 - Op(AL 80) 615 - BD 17
125 - CF 58 211 - BD 64 442 - BF 72 618 - CG 57
126 - ER 34 214 - Op(EE) 444 - AF 48 620 - BE 96
128 - Op(FC) 217 - Op(EP) 445 - BD 18 621 - BD 78
129 - DF 23 221 - BD 65 455 - BD 15 623 - BE 64
130 - CF 19 225 - Op(AL 40) 459 - BF 71 628 - BD 17
134 - Op(FC) 257 - BF 91 461 - CF 84 631 - AN 23
135 - BE 64 260 - Op(AL 80) 463 - CE 63 653 - CE 63
154 - CD 90 266 - AO 506 - CF 83 659 - Op(AL 40)
 155 - Op(CF 53) 333 - BF 72 507 - Op(FC) 662 - BE 68
159 - DT 48 336 - BD 15 508 - CD 90 663 - BF 44
161 - EH 91 356 - BD 34 514 - CF 86 664 - BD 37
163 - CD 90 357 - AE 91 515 - Op(CG 17) 706 - Op(CG 41)
164 - Op(FC) 373 - BD 17 519 - Op(CG 60) 757 - BF 57
167 - AF 48 381 - BE 95 524 - BD 19 758 - BF 48
172 - CF 68 384 - AE 87 525 - AE 91 D 3 - DT 27
174 - ER 64 404 - BF 81 563 - Op(CG 30) D 5 - BF 48
On Return Passage: U 91 - 92 - 103 - 106 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159
- 161 - 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 211 - 221 - 439 - 461 - 508
- 519 - 524 - 569 - 600 - 604 - 609 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 757 - 758 - D
3.
Entered Port: U 183 - Lorient; U 221 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 516 - 509 - Lorient; U 71 - St. Nazaire; U 572 - La Pallice.
- 222 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CG 4651, CG 4181, ED 65.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
1059
b) 1) As the expected "ON" convoy had not been found by dusk and
visibility was very bad and it was wished to avoid the convoy passing
undetected during the night, Group "Spitz", less U 356 - 203 and U 664,
has been ordered to leave the area at 1900, course 2220, speed 5 knots. At
1100 on 24.12. they are to remain in the new patrol area from AL 7145 to
7835.
2) Now that the order for permanent operations by 12 boats against
reinforcements for North Africa has been cancelled by Naval War Staff,
the two boats with the most fuel are to be sent N. They are to approach
AL 88 at economical cruising speed. U 432 is to operate off Huelva. All
other boats of Group "Westwall" will remain in the previous area until fuel
is exhausted.
3) Trinidad boats have been ordered to push closer inshore as soon as
possible when the moon begins to wane. No details available about
shipping in the area.
c) U 130 - 103 and U 653 have taken over fuel or radar parts.
d) 1) As the rendezvous with the homeward bound "Rhakotis" (Trans:
blockade runner) has been moved 200 miles farther E., the boats detailed
to form the convoy escort - U 410, 621 and 409 - have been ordered to be
at the new position - CE 1388 - by 0800 on 26.12.
2) U 435 and U 181 will take part in the Christmas greeting program of
the German Radio. Positions: BD 20 and FN. If situation permits, boats
will send short non-confidential text.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
The cancellation of the order reserving boats to attack the Gibraltar
reinforcements, will free boats from a rather thankless task for attacks in
the North Atlantic. This arrangement will take time to take effect as the
boats at present attacking have almost finished their task. Until it is
actually finished they are to continue to operate there.
- 223 -
 On Return Passage: U 91 - 92 - 103 - 106 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159
- 161 - 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 439 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524
- 569 - 600 - 604 - 610 - 623 - 663 - 757 - 758 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 439 - Brest; U 758 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 373 - 632 - Kiel; U 117 - Lorient.
24.December 1942.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

I. U 71 - BF 58 U 174 - ER 34 U 409 - CD 33 U 564 - Op(CG 10) III. Reports on the Enemy:

86 - CE 53 175 - Op(EK) 410 - CD 33 569 - BD 39 a) U 461 reported convoy of about 10 steamers on S.E. course in DG
91 - BE 96 176 - Op(FK) 432 - Op(CG 76) 571 - BF 84 3677 at 2340.
92 - CF 22 177 - GQ 24 435 - BD 27 572 - BF 91 U 506 and U 514 were in the vicinity and were ordered to attack it. U
103 - CE 63 178 - EJ 71 436 - CF 25 575 - CF 23 461 continued to U 125 to hand over engine parts. No further reports were
105 - Op(EP) 181 - FN 88 439 - BF 52 591 - Op(BD 22) received.
106 - BF 74 182 - BE 71 440 - Op(AL 81) 600 - BF 45 b) None.
109 - Op(EE) 185 - Op(CF 30) 441 - Op(AL 84) 604 - BD 29 c) U-boat sightings: EE 85, EO 56, CA 6111, EO 5623, FC 7793, BF
123 - Op(AL) 203 - Op(BE 14) 442 - BE 95 610 - BF 44 5767, DN 9172, BB 73, FJ 38, BB 63.
124 - Op(EO) 211 - BE 44 444 - AE 69 615 - BD 52 U-boat attack: EE 8590.
125 - CF 79 214 - Op(EF) 445 - BD 27 618 - Op(CG 55) d) None.
126 - EH 94 217 - Op(EF) 455 - Op(BD 24) 620 - BE 97
128 - Op(FC) 225 - Op(AL 48) 459 - BE 95 621 - CD 33 IV. Current Operations:
129 - CD 90 257 - BF 82 461 - DG 39 623 - BF 47 a) None.
130 - CE 18 260 - Op(AL 81) 463 - CE 63 628 - BD 28 b) Now that Route "Anton" is unrestricted, the boats U 128 - 176 and U
134 - Op(FC) 266 - AN 36 506 - CF 87 631 - AF 76 134, who have little fuel, have been given a free hand in
135 - BF 44 333 - BE 69 507 - Op(FC) 653 - CE 63
154 - CD 90 336 - Op(BD 25) 508 - CD 90 659 - Op(AL) - 224 -
155 - Op(CF 53) 356 - Op(BD 33) 509 - BF 54 662 - BE 56
159 - DT 24 357 - AE 85 514 - DH 12 663 - BF 49
161 - EH 62 373 - BD 27 515 - Op(CG 17) 664 - Op(BE 14)
163 - CD 90 381 - BE 97 516 - BF 54 706 - Op(CG 41)
164 - Op(FC) 384 - AE 32 519 - Op(CF 60) 757 - BF 67
167 - AE 69 404 - BF 47 524 - BD 28 758 - BF 64
172 - CG 39 406 - Op(AL 81) 525 - AE 85 D 3 - DG 96
563 - Op(FC 30) D 5 - BE 69
1060
 From 26.12. as far as 300 N.
ER 50 - 80 - 60 - 90 and EC 40 and 70. Area N. of this area to remain closed for the time being.
U 164 and U 507 will move closer to the Brazilian coast when the moon 2) U 410 - 621 and U 409 have been issued with more precise
wanes, and will search for shipping. At present no details are known of instructions for the convoying lane of the blockade runner "Rhakotis".
the shipping in the area between Natal and Freetown. Hence, order for all
ships still in the area about unrestricted hunting in the new areas. ---------------------------------------------------
---------------
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Restriction on Route "Anton" being lifted, boats with little fuel have - 225 -
been given a free hand as follows: U 128 - 176 and U 134 in ER 50 - 80 -
60 - 90 and ES 40 and 70.
When the moon begins to wane, U 164 and U 507 will move closer to
the coast of Brazil to seek for shipping. For the present no details of
shipping movements between Natal and Freetown. Therefore, order for
free-lance operation in the newly designated areas for all boats still in the
area.
2) After taking over a radar interception cable from U 463, U 86
operated off Ponta Delgada. Although earlier commitment of boats was
unsuccessful, another attempt is being made because it is suspected that 25.December 1942.
there is some enemy traffic and that the harbor is being used as base for
escort vessels.
3) U 432 was on its way to Huelva and was to attack ore steamer traffic I. U 71 - BF 81 U 174 - EH 91 U 409 - CD 13 U 569 - BE 19
using that port. 86 - CE 60 175 - Op(EK) 410 - CD 13 571 - BF 75
4) In order to form a new patrol strip and to operate against an "ONS" 91 - BF 73 176 - Op(FK) 432 - CG 49 572 - BF 82
convoy, U 662 - 333 - 404 - 384 - 357 and U 525 were en route to AL 48. 92 - BE 86 177 - GG 97 435 - Op(BD 25) 575 - CF 28
5) As the expected convoy was not discovered and it was assumed that 103 - CF 22 178 - EJ 17 436 - CF 54 591 - Op(BD 22)
the convoy had been delayed by heavy weather, Group "Spitz" moved 105 - Op(EP) 181 - FN 73 440 - Op(AL 70) 600 - BF 49
away from the patrol strip at 1900 on a course of 2220, speed 6 knots. 106 - BF 73 182 - AE 15 441 - Op(AL 70) 604 - BD 39
At 1100 on 25 December the whole group of 11 boats will move out 109 - Op(EE) 185 - Op(CF 30) 442 - CF 33 610 - BF 67
patrol strip from AK 9671 to BE 1451 on a course of 400, speed 5 knots to 125 - DG 32 203 - Op(BE 14) 444 - AE 91 615 - Op(BD 53)
meet the convoy. 123 - Op(AL 70) 211 - BE 58 445 - Op(BD 25) 618 - CG 50
c) U 86 took over radar interception cable from U 463. 124 - Op(EO) 214 - Op(EF) 455 - Op(BD 25) 620 - CG 17
d) 1) Route "Anton" has been released for attacks on single ships from 126 - EH 65 217 - Op(EF) 459 - BE 89 621 - CD 13
south to north as follows: 128 - Op(FC) 225 - Op(AL 40) 461 - DG 33 623 - BF 49
From 24.12. as far as 150 N. 129 - CD 90 257 - BF 72 463 - CE 56 628 - Op(BD 29)
1061
 130 - CF 21 260 - Op(AL 70) 506 - DH 17 631 - AF 48 d) None.
134 - Op(FC) 266 - AN 31 507 - Op(FC) 632 - AO
135 - BF 64 333 - BE 59 508 - CD 90 653 - CF 21 - 226 -
154 - CD 90 336 - Op(BD 25) 509 - BF 84 659 - Op(AL 70)
155 - Op(CF 53) 337 - AO 514 - DG 38 662 - BE 51
159 - DG 96 356 - Op(BD 33) 515 - Op(CG 17) 663 - BF 49
161 - EH 33 357 - AL 31 516 - BF 48 664 - Op(BE 14)
163 - CD 90 373 - Op(BD 29) 519 - Op(CF 60) 706 - BE 89
164 - Op(FC) 381 - CF 30 524 - Op(BD 29) 757 - BF 64
167 - AE 91 384 - AL 37 525 - AL 32 D 3 - DH 47
172 - BE 99 404 - BE 68 563 - BE 81 D 5 - BE 64
406 - Op(AL 70) 564 - Op(CG 14) 117 - BE 54
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
On Return Passage: U 91 - 92 - 103 - 106 - 126 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 b) As it is still hoped that the expected convoy will be picked up from
- 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 569 - 600 - 604 1200 on 25.12., Group "Ungestüm" is to patrol on a course of 200, speed 4
- 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 757 - D 3. knots. As U 445 is returning home, the strip will be narrowed by one
Entered Port: U 757 - 135 - St. Nazaire; position towards evening.
Sailed: - . - Group "Spitz" which had gone out on a course of 400 at a speed of 5
knots to meet the convoy, reversed course about 1900 to 2000, speed 7
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. knots. Thus both groups overlap so as to cover an area of 300 miles, an if
the convoy is still E. of the patrol strip, it should be contacted.
III. Reports on the Enemy: c) U 125 transferred supernumerary Engineer Officer to U 461.
a) 1) U 514 and U 506, who were set onto a convoy reported by U 461, d) None.
found nothing despite careful search on different courses. They continued
to the approach points as ordered. V. Reports of Success: None.
2) U 92 sighted a destroyer and steamer on southerly course at high
speed in BE 9738. Boat was homeward bound. ---------------------------------------------------
3) U 515 requested a free hand in area CG 88 to DH 34. As ---------------
commitment further afield was not possible because of lack of fuel, boat
was given a free hand for the area requested. U 155 was given the same 26.December 1942.
permission.
4) U 175 found no shipping off Dakar, moderate air patrolling, location
observed once at night. I. U 71 - BF 72 U 174 - EH 62 U 406 - Op(BD 35) U 563 - BE 43
b) None. 86 - Op(CE 69) 175 - Op(EK 45) 409 - CD 13 564 - Op(CF 30)
c) U-boat sightings: EO 9333, ED 87, FK 3177, KK 2369. 91 - BF 52 176 - Op(FC) 410 - CD 13 569 - BE 53
1062
 92 - BE 98 177 - GG 81 432 - CG 82 571 - CF 39
103 - BE 85 178 - DT 77 435 - Op(BD 23) 572 - BF 72
105 - Op(EP) 181 - FM 66 436 - CF 73 575 - CF 57
106 - BF 61 182 - BE 42 440 - Op(BD 32) 591 - Op(AK 89)
109 - Op(EE) 185 - Op(CF 30) 441 - Op(BD 36) 600 - BF 40
117 - BF 48 203 - Op(BD 39) 442 - CF 53 604 - BE 42
123 - Op(AK 98) 211 - BE 67 444 - AE 85 610 - BE 64
124 - Op(EO) 214 - Op(EF) 445 - BD 39 615 - Op(BD 26)
125 - DG 30 217 - Op(EF) 455 - Op(AK 39) 618 - Op(CG 50)
126 - EH 36 225 - Op(AK 98) 459 - CF 31 620 - CF 64
128 - Op(ER) 257 - BE 69 461 - DG 30 621 - CD 13
129 - CD 90 260 - Op(BD 32) 463 - CE 48 623 - BF 64
130 - BE 85 266 - AN 23 506 - DG 69 628 - Op(BD 26)
134 - Op(ER) 333 - BE 28 507 - Op(FC) 631 - AE 69
154 - CD 90 336 - Op(AK 99) 508 - CD 90 632 - AN 30
155 - Op(CF) 337 - AN 30 509 - BE 93 653 - BE 85
159 - DG 76 356 - Op(BD 36) 514 - DG 68 659 - Op(BD 32)
161 - DT 48 357 - AL 26 515 - Op(CG 44) 662 - BE 16
163 - CD 90 373 - Op(BD 23) 516 - BE 93 663 - BF 40
164 - Op(FC) 381 - CF 30 519 - CG 11 664 - Op(BD 39)
167 - AE 85 384 - AL 52 524 - Op(BD 23) 706 - BE 58
172 - BF 72 404 - BE 53 525 - AL 33 D 3 - DT 14
D 5 - BE 27
On Return Passage: U 91 - 106 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163
- 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 569 - 600
- 604 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - U D 3.
Entered Port: U 91 - Brest; U 106 - Lorient; U 610 - 623 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 598 - 96 - St. Nazaire.
- 227 -
1063
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa.
2) Sightings: U 604 observed single ship, course 700, speed 17 knots in
BE 4816. No chance to attack. Same vessel was later reported by U 333
in BE 2481.
U 260 observed smoke for a short time in BD 3641. Nothing sighted
when boat followed-up, probably single ship.
U D 3 sighted corvette in DS 3650, course 100, speed 8 knots.
3) U 109: Between 1930 on 25.12. until 1000 on 26.12. U 109 fired
double miss, single miss and triple miss in EP 2476 and EP 1559 at an
armed independent ship (4 - 5,000 GRT). About 10 minutes after each
torpedo attack vessel dropped 1 to 3 depth charges. Boat suspected "Q"
ship. Commander requested permission to return home because of his own
nervous state. Was ordered to carry out operation whatever happened.
4) U 463 sighted convoy of about 5 steamers in CE 7154, course 450.
As no attack-boats were in the vicinity, boat was ordered to proceed to
supply point ordered.
5) U 357 outward bound from home, reported poorly defended convoy
on easterly course in AL 3874. U 384 and U 525, who were near, were
stalking the convoy off their own bat. All boats were given a free hand.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BE 5767, BE 1662, AL 3898, BE 1838.
Unidentified convoy unit: was in exactly located somewhere about AM
1980 - 1990.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 72:
 The expected "ON" convoy was picked-up during the afternoon of
26.12. This delay must have been caused by late departure from port as
well as by the bad weather. The day the convoy was contacted the weather
was favorable; wind S. 1, long swell, visibility 8 miles. At 1732 U 664
reported the convoy on a southerly course in BE 4131. Thus the convoy
had passed through 50 miles S. of the most southerly position of the patrol
strip. Both Groups, "Spitz" and Ungestüm" totaling 18 submarines, were
directed to the convoy. Contact was maintained until the next morning.
Besides U 664, U 662 reported sighting a convoy in broad formation at
1512, but had to submerge because of plane escort, so lost contact. At
0044 on 27.12. U 356 reported that he had contacted the convoy. At 0400
U 441 also reported contact, but placed the convoy about 30 miles farther
to the N.W., probably a very inexact fix. 0700 on 27.12. U 664 reported
convoy in BE 4445. Convoy
- 228 -
was once reported to consist of 10 steamers, once 6 - 10 steamers.
Until midnight course was exactly 1800, then farther S.W. about 220 -
2400. This change of course to the W. had previously been given to the
boats as a probability. The convoy operation is being continued.
b) 1) As U 175 had sighted nothing off Dakar, he was ordered to proceed
S. and search the sea area off Freetown for shipping.
2) In order to get some idea of the hitherto completely unknown
Trinidad traffic, the boats in the area have been newly distributed. In the
sector between the lines from ED 9855 to DP 9855 to ED 9955 to EP
1755, U 105 is to patrol the northern, U 214 the southern sector. The
1064
sector N. of U 105 will be occupied by U 109, the sector S. of U 214 will
be taken by U 124.
U 217 has been given a free hand in the area round Aruba and
Curacao.
3) The submarines U 381 - 571 - 442 - 620 - 575 - 436, en route to the
S. to undertake operations close inshore along the coast of Brazil, have
been given the title Group "Delphin" and ordered to remain in square DH
10. They have been ordered to be in the patrol strip from CF 7958 to DH
1755 by 1200 on 29.12., course 2800, speed 7 knots. They are being
committed in this area because traffic on the Great Circle between New
York and the Canaries is suspected, this supposition is also supported by
high-grade radio intercept intelligence.
c) U 564 took over radar interception spare parts from U 459.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
Naval War Staff agreed in the main with the opinion of B.d.U. on the
subject of convoys for blockade runners (see War Diary of 12.12.). Naval
War Staff has therefore ordered that in future escort shall be carried out
merely by having two boats available on each side of Route "Anton". This
will avoid the scattering of submarines which would have occurred if the
far more extensive wishes of Group West had been complied with.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 229 -
 On Return Passage: U 92 - 103 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163
- 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 569 - 600
- 604 - 653 - 663 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 172 - Lorient; U 600 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 413 - Brest.

27.December 1942. II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

I. U 71 - BE 68 U 176 - Op(FC 38) U 410 - CD 13 U 569 - BE 65 a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa.
86 - Op(CE 69) 177 - CG 41 432 - Op(CG 91) 571 - CF 64 2) U 164 observed a leak in the pressure hull under battery I, probably
92 - BF 71 178 - DT 48 435 - Op(BD 23) 572 - BE 69 caused by corrosion. Battery bilge made 1 1/2 tons water in 24 hours. It
103 - BF 55 181 - FM 34 436 - DG 33 575 - CF 75 was not possible to repair the damage with materials available on board,
105 - Op(EE) 182 - BE 72 440 - Op(BD 30) 591 - Op(BD 34) boat was no longer capable of deep diving. Boat was ordered to operate in
109 - Op(EP 19) 185 - Op(CF) 441 - Op(BE) 598 - BF 91 remote areas, if capable of so doing, U 134 was given the same orders.
117 - BE 69 203 - Op(BE) 442 - CF 82 600 - BE 60 3) U 507 sank British "Oakbank" (5,154 GRT) in ballast from Suez to
123 - Op(BD 30) 211 - BE 69 444 - AE 79 604 - BE 49 Georgetown.
124 - Op(EE) 214 - Op(EE) 445 - BE 45 615 - Op(BD 62) 4) U 384 and U 525, which had been stalking the convoy reported by U
125 - DG 53 217 - Op(EE) 455 - Op(AK 47) 618 - Op(CG 55) 357 did not sight it and proceeded to the approach point ordered. So far, no
126 - DT 45 225 - AL 17 459 - CF 31 620 - CF 83 further reports have been received from U 357.
128 - Op(ER) 257 - BE 64 461 - CF 49 621 - CD 13 b) None.
129 - CD 95 260 - Op(BD 66) 463 - CE 95 628 - Op(BD 62) c) U-boat sightings: EE 8799, EB 9398, EO 2130.
130 - BE 96 266 - AF 72 506 - DH 74 631 - AE 91 U-boat attack: EE 8780.
134 - Op(ER) 333 - BE 24 507 - Op(FC) 632 - AN 29
154 - CD 95 336 - Op(AK 80) 508 - CD 95 653 - BE 92 - 230 -
155 - Op(CF) 337 - AN 29 509 - CF 36 659 - Op(BD 30)
159 - DG 54 356 - Op(BE) 514 - DG 83 662 - BE 44
161 - DT 43 357 - AL 19 515 - Op(CG) 663 - BF 40
163 - CD 95 373 - Op(BD 23) 516 - BE 98 664 - Op(BE)
164 - Op(FC) 381 - CF 61 519 - BF 74 706 - BE 27
167 - AE 87 384 - AL 19 524 - Op(BD 23) D 3 - DS 89
172 - BF 81 404 - BE 24 525 - AL 29 D 5 - AL 97
174 - EJ 11 406 - Op(BD 30) 563 - BE 16 96 - BE 91
175 - Op(EK) 409 - CD 13 564 - CF 31
d) None.
1065
IV. Current Operations: ---------------------------------------------------
a) Convoy No. 72: ---------------
Weather in the convoy area on the morning of 27.12. was reported as:
Wind S.S.W. 5, misty, visibility up to 2 miles. It was misty all day and the
convoy was not reported until the morning of 28.12. Visibility 5 miles.
Until the night of 27.12. convoy maintained its S.W. course. It was
reported again for the first time at 1435 by U 225 in BD 6645, course
2600. The same boat kept reporting the convoy until 2124. He then
reported that he intended attacking the convoy from this time as no proper - 231 -
shadower reports were received. Between 2200 or 2300 2 boats reported
flares, one boat reported hydrophone location, group noises. The starshell
appeared to be a result of an attack by U 225. At 2400, 0200 and 0400
hydrophone bearings were reported, all showing a southerly course for the
convoy. This caused Operational Control to suspect that boats had
contacted a formation, either a smaller convoy formation or an anti-
submarine formation, and that the convoy proper had maintained its
southwesterly course since U 225's last report. This possibility was
pointed out to the boats. In order to try to carry out an organized search
next day at dawn, all boats were requested to report their position. 28.December 1942.
0700 U 260 reported the convoy again in BD 9347. He reported 6
silhouettes. This report did not make it clear whether it was the real
convoy or only a dummy formation. I. U 71 - BE 53 U 175 - Op(ET) U 406 - Op(BD 60) U 524 - Op(BD
Successes reported: 60)
U 441 sank damaged ship (5,000 GRT) 86 - Op(CE 69) 176 - Op(FC) 409 - CD 13 525 - AL 63
U 225 scored a hit on tanker (8,000 GRT) 92 - BF 52 177 - GF 35 410 - CD 13 563 - AL 87
The convoy hunt was continued. 96 - BF 81 178 - DS 99 413 - BF 55 564 - BE 96
b) None. 103 - BF 55 181 - FE 98 432 - Op(CG 91) 569 - BF 93
c) 1) U 459 handed over radar interception spare parts to U 185. 105 - Op(EE) 182 - CF 13 435 - Op(BD 90) 571 - CF 86
2) U 159 and U 125 carried out their rendezvous to take over oil filter 109 - Op(EP) 185 - Op(CF) 436 - Op(DH) 572 - BE 61
parts. 117 - BE 59 203 - Op(BD 60) 440 - Op(BD 90) 575 - Op(DH)
d) None. 123 - Op(BD 60) 211 - BF 54 441 - Op(BD 60) 591 - Op(BD 60)
124 - Op(EE) 214 - Op(EE) 442 - CF 87 598 - BF 81
V. Reports of Success: 125 - DG 81 217 - Op(ED) 444 - AL 24 604 - BE 56
U 507 1 ship 5,154 GRT sunk. 126 - DT 49 225 - Op(BD 60) 445 - BE 45 615 - Op(BD 60)
128 - Op(ER 55) 257 - BE 54 455 - Op(BD 60) 618 - Op(CG 56)
1066
 129 - CD 95 260 - Op(BD 60) 459 - CF 55 620 - CF 88
130 - BF 70 266 - AE 89 461 - CF 55 621 - CD 13
134 - Op(ER) 333 - AL 88 463 - CD 90 628 - Op(BD 60)
155 - CG 12 336 - Op(BD 60) 506 - DT 29 631 - AE 85
154 - CD 95 337 - AF 87 507 - Op(FB 66) 632 - AF 79
159 - DG 58 356 - Op(BD 90) 508 - CD 95 653 - BF 54
161 - DT 21 357 - AM 10 509 - CF 65 659 - Op(BD 60)
163 - CD 95 373 - BE 17 514 - DG 87 662 - Op(BD 60)
164 - Op(FC 35) 381 - Op(CF 79) 515 - Op(CG) 663 - BF 40
167 - AL 22 384 - AL 39 516 - CF 36 664 - Op(BD 60)
174 - DT 72 404 - AL 87 519 - BF 70 706 - BE 13
D 3 - DG 91
D 5 - AL 68
On Return Passage: U 103 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 -
163 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 373 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 604 -
653 - 663 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 92 - Brest; U 569 - La Pallice.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 86 situation report: 23.12. north, east and south coast of Flores
thoroughly searched for torpedoed steamer. Apart from the gunboat
"Velho" nothing was sighted. From 25 -28.12. submarine was on the
boundary of the territorial waters Ponta Delgada. Sighted: 1 steamer on
course of 1700, 2 coastal freighters entering port and 4 Swedish Red Cross
ships.
Boat requested permission for protracted return voyage. He was
ordered to start back via BD 98 and search the area for torpedoed vessels
that have had to fall out of convoy. Continue voyage according to fuel
position.
1067
3) U 129 sighted large single ship with S.W. course, high speed, in CE
4884. No contact.
4) U 124 reported a small convoy of 2 tankers and 1 destroyer in ED
9689, course 500, speed 9 knots.
- 232 -
5) U 217 sank 6,000 ton steamer on 20.12. in EF 89, course 3500. On
29.12. he scored 2 hits on a vessel of "Martarva" class (12,390 GRT)
course 3300, speed 15 knots.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: FC 6850, ED 96, EG 9379.
1 submarine warning from unidentified position (probably Convoy No.
72).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 72:
Weather on the morning of 28.12. was still unfavorable, wind only S.W.
2 - 3, but very hazy. Fog was reported until nearly 1400. It cleared up
about 1600 and visibility became very good. Boats were able to get fixes,
which later enabled many boats to find the convoy. On the morning of
28.12. the convoy was in BD 9347. From 0700 U 260 kept reporting
contact with the convoy. At midday he was able to pick it up only by
hydrophone bearings. Then when it cleared during the afternoon, U 260
along with 9 other boats was able to maintain contact until dark. The 9
boats were: U 336 - 203 - 615 - 123 - 406 - 591 - 664 - 225 - 440. During
the night U 435 - 662 - 628 also picked up the convoy. Until about 2200
the convoy maintained its course of 1800, with speed of 8 to 9 knots
according to dead reckoning. Then after the first attacks at dusk, it had
apparently again divided into 2 formations, one on a westerly course, one
on a southerly. According to reports made on the morning of 29.12. the The great success achieved during the past night may be ascribed to
convoy appeared to have scattered by the submarines. Several times the following circumstances:
single ships were reported. During the foggy weather the strong group of 18 submarines was not
Successes: able to achieve any great success. But as one boat was able to make
Sunk Torpedoed constant shadower reports from the morning of 28.12. despite the cover of
1) U 260 2 ships 9,000 GRT 1 ship 4,000 GRT the fog. After the fog lifted at about 1600 the boats had still 3 hours to
2) U 225 3 ships 19,000 GRT 3 ships 12,000 GRT pick up the convoy. About 1730 the new boats were able to make a real
1 ship 7,000 GRT surprise attack, and as the enemy escorts were operating at a great distance
3) U 591 1 damaged vessel 5,000 GRT 1 ship 5,000 GRT as remote escort, they had little time before darkness to attack the
sinking not observed because of defences submarines effectively, or even to find them. As none of the boats
4) U 435 1 destroyer reported being forced away from the convoy, they appeared to have
5) U 628 1 damaged ship 5,000 GRT penetrated the remote escort. During the night itself the close defences
1 corvette appeared to be as good as useless because of the surprising mass attack
6) U 406 2 ships 11,000 GRT 1 ship made by the boats, and they were greatly hampered in their defensive
1 ship left sinking 6,889 GRT capacity by the continual rescue attempts they had to make.
7) U 123 1 damaged ship 5,000 GRT 1 ship 9,419 GRT The convoy was in BD 9778 on the morning of 29.12. The hunt
torpedoed by U 435 continues.
(later sunk by another boat with gunfire) b) 1) Group "Falke", composed of the following boats, were on the
lookout for an "ON" convoy expected on 31.12. From 0400 on 31.12.
After comparing times and grid square details for the sinkings, and after they manned the patrol strip AL 4882 to 9785, in the following order: U
making allowances for the torpedoed vessels and the damaged ships sunk, 357 - 444 - 167 - 384 - 525 - 563 - 404 - 333 - 706 - 257 - 71 - 572 - 441.
the total number of ships in the convoy which have been sunk so far 2) U 177 was making for square CE 20 to refuel Group "Spitz".
amounts to 15 ships (totaling 84,000 GRT), 1 destroyer and 1 corvette, and c) The boats which had been waiting some 10 days in CD 90 for supplies,
3 vessels torpedoed. i.e. U 508 - 154 - 163 - 129 refueled from U 463 and are continuing their
homeward voyage.
d) The homeward bound "Rhakotis" (Trans: Blockade runner) was
- 233 - picked up at 0900 in CE 1388 by the submarines U 410 - 409 - 621, who
were waiting there. Because of the nearby convoy the ship took a
northerly course until 0400, then steered for point "Raummass". For some
inexplicable reason U 409 reported about 1900 that he had given up the
convoy duty because of complete breakdown of radar interception gear
and was operating against Convoy No. 72. The commander will have to
account for this arbitrary behavior on his return. U 659 was ordered to act
1068
as substitute, but could not reach the homeward bound vessel during the
night.
V. Reports of Success:
U 217 1 ship 6,000 GRT sunk 1 ship 12,390 GRT torpedoed
U 260 2 ships 9,000 GRT sunk 1 ship 4,000 GRT torpedoed
U 225 4 ships 26,000 GRT sunk 3 ships 12,000 GRT torpedoed
U 511 1 ship 5,000 GRT sunk 1 ship 5,000 GRT torpedoed
U 435 1 destroyer sunk
U 628 1 ship 5,000 GRT sunk
1 corvette sunk
U 406 3 ships 17,889 GRT sunk 1 ship torpedoed
U 123 1 ship 5,000 GRT sunk 1 ship 9,419 GRT torpedoed.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 234 -
I. U 71 - BE 25 U 176 - Op(ER) U 406 - Op(CE 30) U 524 - Op(BD
90)
86 - Op(CE 69) 177 - FU 96 409 - CE 25 525 - AL 67
96 - BF 48 178 - DT 47 410 - BD 83 563 - AL 80
103 - BF 60 181 - FE 59 413 - BF 48 564 - BF 94
105 - Op(EE) 182 - CF 43 432 - CG 91 571 - Op(DH)
109 - Op(EE) 185 - BE 97 435 - Op(BD 90) 572 - BE 55
117 - BE 57 201 - BF 50 436 - Op(DH) 575 - Op(DH)
123 - Op(BD 90) 203 - Op(BD 90) 440 - Op(BD 90) 591 - Op(CE 30)
124 - Op(ED) 211 - BF 52 441 - BE 18 598 - BF 47
125 - DG 88 214 - Op(EE) 442 - Op(DH) 604 - BE 65
126 - DT 27 217 - Op(EO) 444 - AL 51 615 - Op(BD 90)
128 - ER 29 225 - Op(BD 90) 445 - BE 55 618 - Op(CG 56)
129 - CE 48 257 - BE 16 455 - Op(BD 90) 620 - Op(DH)
130 - BF 40 260 - Op(BD 90) 459 - CF 84 621 - BD 58
134 - Op(ER) 266 - AE 91 461 - CF 73 628 - Op(BD 90)
154 - CE 47 333 - AL 80 463 - DF 22 631 - AL 33
155 - BF 74 336 - Op(BD 90) 506 - DT 56 632 - Kristiansand
159 - DG 34 337 - AF 72 507 - Op(FB) 653 - BF 50
161 - DS 33 356 - Op(BD 90) 508 - CE 48 659 - Op(BD 90)
163 - CE 71 357 - AL 61 509 - CF 58 662 - Op(BD 90)
164 - Op(ER) 373 - BE 51 514 - DS 24 663 - BF 50
167 - AL 28 381 - Op(CF) 515 - Op(CG 70) 664 - Op(BD 90)
174 - DT 46 384 - AL 55 516 - CF 61 706 - Op(AL 30)
175 - Op(ET) 404 - AL 80 519 - BF 60 D 3 - DG 63
D 5 - AL 27

On Return Passage: U 103 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 130 - 174 - 154 - 159 -
161 - 163 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 373 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 -
604 - 653 - 663 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 653 - 201 - 211 - Brest; U 519 - 108 - Lorient.
29.December 1942. Sailed: - . -

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

1069
III. Reports on the Enemy: reported several times. Probably the flares were dropped by escort planes
a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa. at some distance in order to mislead the submarines.
2) U 631 reported single ship (4,000 GRT) sunk in AL 2357, course Further successes:
2900. U 225 torpedoed tanker "President Francqui", ship was then sunk by U
3) U 124 tanker convoy last position ED 9694 at 0800 29.12., course 336 with a finishing shot.
700, 11 knots. Misses fired, contact lost when forced by plane to U 435 sank single ship (6,000 GRT).
submerge. No air or sea patrol in Tabaca. Freighter entering port sunk in U 225 reported miss fire at "Q-ship" with plane on board.
ED 9964 (4,000 GRT). U 615 fired 5 single shots at the same ship with no effect, torpedo nets
b) None. presumed. Ship employed plane and worked at night with a shallow
c) U-boat sightings: ED 9680, ED 59, ED 9968, AL 7559. M.T.B.
d) None. Convoy hunt was continued.
b) 1) U 681 joined Group "Falke" and was allocated the position AL 4882
IV. Current Operations: in place of U 357.
a) Convoy No. 72: 2) U 86 was ordered to make a protracted return via BD 98. (Position of
Further successes on night of 27 - 28.12 : sinking by Group "Spitz").
c) U 659 - 410 - 621 operated according to plan.
- 235 - d) The loss of U 357 (last attacking homeward bound convoy in AM) and
of U 356 (last attacking Convoy No. 72, Group "Spitz") must be assumed.
Boats have not replied to repeated call-ups.

V. Reports of Success:
U 631 1 ship 4,000 GRT
U 124 1 ship 4,000 GRT
U 435 1 ship 7,000 GRT
U 662 2 ships 10,000 GRT
U 260 1 ship 4,000 GRT
Sunk: U 225) 1 ship 5,000 GRT
U 435 "Empire Spackletor" 7,000 GRT U 336)
U 662 1 ship 5,000 GRT U 435 1 ship 6,000 GRT.
1 ship 2 hits probably sunk
U 260 1 ship 4,000 GRT probably sunk (reported as torpedoed 28.12.)
---------------------------------------------------
Contact was maintained. Convoy was reported as 10 steamers in ---------------
double line abreast. U 260 was detected during a day attack. U 455 fired
a double miss. U 591 was forced to move away. Last report at 1830.
Contact was lost through bad visibility. During the night flares were
1070
 174 - DT 24 406 - Op(CE 10) 516 - CF 59 D 3 - DH 14
- 236 - 524 - Op(BD 90) D 5 - AL 33

On Return Passage: U 86 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163
- 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 185 - 225 - 373 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 524 - 604 -
615 - 663 - D 3 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 130 - 155 - Lorient; U 564 -Brest.
Sailed: U 584 - Brest; U 594 - St. Nazaire.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

30.December 1942.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa.
I. U 71 - BE 25 U 175 - Op(ET) U 409 - Op(CE 10) U 525 - Op(AL 2) U 214 sank 6,000 tonner in ED 9993, course 3300.
80) 3) U 71 fired 2 single misses at tanker in BE 2289, course 500, 9 knots.
86 - Op(AL 90) 176 - Op(ER) 410 - BD 47 563 - Op(AL 80) Unsuccessful follow-up.
96 - BE 60 177 - FU 44 413 - BE 60 564 - BF 52 4) U 217 Radar interception gear faulty, boat received the requested
105 - Op(EE) 178 - DT 18 432 - Op(CG 91) 571 - Op(CE 90) operational area EO 30 - 90.
109 - Op(EE) 181 - FE 27 435 - Op(CE 20) 572 - BE 24 5) U 109 Commander no longer fully fit for duty. Was ordered to
117 - BD 69 182 - CF 48 436 - Op(DG 30) 575 - Op(CG 30) continue operation. If necessary to hand over the command to the 1st
123 - Op(CE 10) 185 - BE 96 440 - Op(CE 10) 591 - Op(BD 80) Watch Keeping Officer.
124 - Op(ED) 203 - Op(CE 10) 441 - BE 12 598 - BE 60 b) None.
125 - DS 30 214 - Op(EE) 442 - Op(CE 10) 604 - BF 55 c) U-boat sightings: BE 75, EE 7744, ED 99.
126 - DT 22 217 - EO 19 444 - Op(AL 48) 615 - Op(CE 20) d) None.
128 - EH 97 225 - BD 98 445 - BE 67 618 - Op(CG 55)
129 - CE 55 257 - AL 88 455 - Op(CE 20) 620 - Op(DG 30) - 237 -
130 - BF 61 260 - Op(CE 10) 459 - DH 15 621 - BE 47
134 - Op(ER) 266 - AE 88 461 - BE 97 628 - Op(CE 20)
154 - CE 51 333 - Op(AL 80) 463 - DF 20 631 - AL 25
155 - BF 61 336 - Op(CE 20) 506 - DT 85 632 - AN 28
159 - CF 78 337 - AE 69 507 - Op(FB) 659 - BE 47
161 - DG 83 373 - BE 56 508 - CE 55 662 - Op(CE 20)
163 - CE 54 381 - Op(CE 90) 509 - CF 87 663 - BF 55
164 - Op(ER) 384 - Op(AL 81) 514 - DS 17 664 - Op(CE 10)
167 - AL 54 404 - Op(AL 80) 515 - Op(CG) 706 - Op(AL 80)
1071
 IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 72:
At 1229 U 455 sighted the convoy in CE 1211. At 1850 boat reported it
in BD 7956 and finally at 2100 in BD 7943. Contact was then lost for
good. The other boats did not pick it up, as they were operating on the
more southerly course of the convoy. At 0510 U 455 reported from BD
7878 a wide range hydrophone bearing in 2300. Follow up had no results.
The hunt continued.
U 435 sank the "Q" ship in CE 3178. It had already been
unsuccessfully attacked by U 225 and U 615 and was probably the "rescue
ship" (Trans: English used in the original) of the convoy. It was somewhat
of the "Waldemar Kophamel" class, carrying a seaplane, strong armament
and depth charge throwers. Some 300 to 400 survivors (probably from
steamers in the convoy that had been sunk) were drifting on overloaded
rafts and in the water. On account of the worsening weather conditions it
must be assumed that a great many were lost.
b) U 598 - 96 - 413 have been ordered to proceed to AJ 88 (Patrol strip
off Newfoundland planned in cooperation with the boats of Group "Blitz"
which are up to strength again).
c) U 659 - 410 - 621 operated according to plan.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 214 1 ship 6,000 GRT
U 435 1 ship 5,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
31.December 1942.
I. U 71 - Op(AL 88) U 177 - FT 39 U 413 - BE 64 U 563 - Op(AL)
86 - BD 98 178 - DG 91 432 - CG 46 571 - Op(CE 80)
96 - BE 59 181 - ET 78 435 - BD 94 572 - Op(AL 97)
1072
105 - Op(EE) 182 - CF 78 436 - Op(DG 20) 575 - Op(DG 20)
109 - Op(EE) 185 - BF 50 440 - Op(CD 30) 584 - BF 54
117 - BD 94 203 - CE 24 441 - Op(AL 97) 591 - BD 94
123 - Op(BD 70) 214 - Op(ED) 442 - Op(CE 80) 594 - BF 91
124 - Op(ED) 217 - Op(EO) 444 - Op(AL) 598 - BE 46
125 - DS 27 225 - CE 23 445 - BF 47 604 - BF 50
126 - DH 79 257 - Op(AL) 455 - Op(BD 70) 615 - CE 23
128 - EH 68 260 - Op(CD 30) 459 - DH 44 618 - Op(CG 55)
129 - CE 37 266 - AL 31 461 - BF 71 620 - Op(DG 20)
134 - Op(ER) 333 - Op(AL) 463 - DF 20 621 - BE 57
154 - CE 34 336 - BD 94 506 - EJ 18 628 - BD 94
159 - CF 81 337 - AE 83 507 - Op(FB) 631 - AL 42
161 - DG 65 373 - BE 66 508 - CE 38 632 - AN 26
163 - CE 36 381 - Op(CE 80) 509 - DH 14 659 - BE 57
164 - Op(ER) 384 - Op(AL) 514 - DR 65 662 - CD 33
167 - Op(AL) 404 - Op(AL) 515 - Op(CG) 663 - BF 50
174 - DG 96 406 - Op(CE 10) 516 - CF 88 664 - Op(CE 10)
175 - Op(ET) 409 - BD 97 524 - BD 94 706 - Op(AL)
176 - Op(ER) 410 - BE 57 525 - Op(AL) D 3 - CF 84
D 5 - AM
- 238 -
On Return Passage: U 86 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 174
- 177 - 178 - 181 - 185 - 203 - 225 - 373 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 524 - 604 -
615 - 663 - D 3 - D 5.
 Entered Port: U 604 - 663 - Brest. d) None.
Sailed: U 438 - Brest; U 511 - 522 - Lorient; U 226 - 303 - 186 - Kiel.
V. Reports of Success: None.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy: (Signed): DÖNITZ.

a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 174 sighted neutral Spanish vessel in DT 1134, course S.W., 9-10
knots. - 239 -
3) U 257 reported bombs in AL 8598 (area of patrol strip of Group
"Falke").
4) U 175 reported situation in ET 3710 - 40. Single ship sighted in
3715, 900. When attack was made on a single destroyer boat was followed
for 7 hours with hydrophones and Asdic. No depth charges dropped.
b) Air reconnaissance for homeward bound blockade runner "Rhakotis".
c) U-boat sightings: EN 33, ED 99, AL 8867.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations: Enclosure in War Diary.

a) Convoy No. 72:
Contact was not reestablished during the day. As only 5 boats still had
sufficient fuel to continue operating the convoy hunt was broken off at
dusk. Intended schedule: U 117 is to refuel the 5 boats with the most fuel
in the sea area reached. Later they are to operate in AJ with 3 boats en
route to the area from Western France in order to pick up an "SC" convoy.
For summing up see War Diary for 28.12.1942.
No further information.
b) 1) U 217 has been allocated operational area EO 10 - 60 as requested
because of Radar interception gear breakdown. U 214 has taken over
"Reichenbach's" task, i.e. a sortie to Aruba.
2) As the outward bound convoy was not picked up at the right moment,
Group "Falke" was ordered to cruise in the patrol area from 1900, speed 7
knots, course 2250.
Overlapping night formation. From 1.1.1943 at 1030 proceed on
reversed course, 7 knots.
c) U 621 - 410 - 659 operated according to plan.
1073
Situation Report 19.12.1942.
1) As anticipated and already set out in the report dated 27.11., submarine
successes during December have very slightly fallen off. B.d.U. considers
this fact and its causes of fundamental importance.
2) In addition to the effect of conditions in theaters of war on "tonnage
war", the special tasks which submarines have been called upon to fulfil
have decisively limited submarine successes.
a) Mediterranean: The situation has developed as anticipated in B.d.U.'s
situation reports of 18.11 and 26.11. Total successes since 26.11 amount
to one cruiser, two destroyers and only one transport, also one possible
destroyer. Yet the submarines have done their utmost. A report made by
one of the best and most experienced Commanders sums up the matter:
"In the Western Mediterranean it is hardly possible to exist". Thus it can
be said that the extra boats sent to the Mediterranean served no purpose
there, but dealt a heavy blow at the "tonnage war" in the Atlantic,
especially because the boats handed over for Mediterranean operations
were all commanded by exceptionally able men. B.d.U. therefore requests
that the order to send another boat there at the January new moon shall be
cancelled.
b) Attacks on supply lines to Gibraltar and Morocco: Submarines first
fought under very bad conditions immediately W. of Gibraltar and
Morocco because they knew how vital the matter was. But the enemy's
defences forced them to leave the area. Reports by Commanders who
have returned confirm the necessity for this moving out of the area, the
number of losses was entirely disproportionate to the successes. The
attempt to achieve success with single boats immediately outside the
harbors was unsuccessful. This was again only to be expected. Despite
the sinking of 4 ships the operation W. of the Azores by Group "Westwall"
is not considered a success. Only chance successes may be expected from
the intended operation W. of Portugal. The tying down of the "Westwall"
boats for this operation has had a very bad effect on the "tonnage war" in
the Atlantic and off Trinidad.
c) The effect of the Mediterranean and Gibraltar operation on the enemy
can be summed up as follows in the view of B.d.U.:
The enemy has lost some 160,000 GRT in this area. But to offset this,
he has gained to the extent of the fall in sinkings in the main theaters of
naval war. This gain can be assumed as the difference between a normal
monthly sinking figure to be expected for December, i.e. at least 300,000
GRT. Thus the enemy has gained a considerable amount of tonnage which
he can use to strengthen the African front.
d) Some easing of the situation in Northern Waters has been ordered, but
this will not become apparent until the beginning of January, as the boats
which have been released must undergo a dockyard period.
- 240 -
1074
e) As an addition to duties for which boats are diverted from the main
theatres, convoy escorting is increasing, which if case "Elfenbein" should
arise, would demand more boats than originally laid down by Naval War
Staff. (Ref: IK 2666). Attention is drawn to the assessment of the value
of submarines for escort duties, which has already been submitted.
Effective use would certainly be achieved by submarines at a distance of
about 50-60 miles. This would require 15 boats if visibility was 10 miles.
Even this reconnaissance would not suffice at night, it would be useless as
soon as the boats were forced to submerge by planes. Then more boats
would be needed for close escort, although it is highly improbable that
they would be able to carry out these duties if need arose. It is quite
obvious that such a number of submarines cannot be supplied. If numbers
are less, the chances of success are practically nil. Even a few submarines
represent a loss for the war on merchant shipping. ("tonnage war"). One
convoy duty from Point "Trosse" usually represents almost an entire
commitment for each submarine that takes part, the flank defences on
Route "Anton" cause considerable delays because of the uncertainty of
times of the homeward or outward voyage. Even if these duties occur
"only two or three times a month", they represent a constant drain of 3 - 4
boats from operations, and yet this is not compensated for by a really
efficient convoy for the ship. Submarines are not capable of providing
sufficient protection; there is no other protection. Thus B.d.U. considers
that the present situation for blockade runners is similar to that for surface
supply at the time of the Bismark undertaking.
3) All these duties make inroads on the submarine's main task: war on
merchant shipping. The weather during December has also had a bad
effect. The weather renders refueling in the North Atlantic almost
impossible at this season. It is all the more necessary to put more boats
into the "tonnage war", now that most of the boats out in the North
Atlantic will shortly have to return to base, although there are not
sufficient reinforcements and although bad gaps have occurred and will
occur in the successful areas off Trinidad and the coast of Brazil because
of lack of boats.
As an example of the effect caused by boats being withdrawn, only 3
boats could at first be sent on to the convoy "HX219", about which
excellent radio intercept intelligence was available. Had more boats been
on hand successes would have been far greater.
4) The "tonnage war" is the main task for submarines, probably the
decisive contribution of submarines to winning the war. This war on
merchant shipping must be carried out where the greatest successes can be
achieved with the smallest losses.
In order to achieve this, the present situation must be accepted with open
eyes and determined efforts made to concentrate everything possible on
the main task, while accepting the gaps and disadvantages this will cause
elsewhere.
1943
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 January 1943
PG30315
1. January 1943.
I. U 71 - Op(AL 80) U 177 - FM 94 U 406 - Op(CD 20) U 514 - DR
82
86 - BD 90 178 - DG 65 409 - BE 77 515 - Op(CG 70)
96 - BE 82 181 - ET 47 410 - BE 92 516 - DH 18
1075
105 - Op(EE) 182 - DG 30 413 - BE 52 522 - BF 58
109 - Op(EE) 185 - BF 61 432 - CG 16 524 - BD 94
117 - BD 94 186 - AO 70 435 - BD 94 525 - Op(AL 80)
123 - Op(CD 20) 203 - CE 34 436 - Op(DG 10) D 5 - AE 86
124 - Op(EE) 214 - Op(ED 80) 438 - BF 54 563 - Op(AL 80)
125 - DS 42 217 - Op(EO) 440 - Op(CD 20) 571 - Op(CE 70)
126 - DH 42 225 - CF 23 441 - OP(AL 90) 572 - OP(AL 90)
128 - EH 38 226 - AO 70 D 3 - CF 54 575 - Op(DG 10)
129 - CF 15 257 - Op(BE 12) 442 - Op(CE 76) 584 - BF 48
134 - Op(ER) 260 - Op(BC 90) 444 - OP(AL 90) 591 - BD 94
154 - CF 12 266 - AL 28 445 - CD 30 594 - BF 81
159 - CF 56 303 - AO 70 455 - Op(CD 30) 598 - BD 63
161 - DH 14 333 - Op(AL 80) 459 - DG 98 615 - BD 97
163 - CF 13 336 - BD 94 461 - BF 81 618 - Op(CG 55)
164 - Op(ER) 337 - AE 85 463 - DF 20 620 - Op(CE 70)
167 - Op(AL 70) 373 - BF 40 506 - EJ 48 621 - BE 92
174 - DG 92 381 - Op(CE 70) 507 - Op(FB-FC) 628 - BD 94
175 - Op(ET) 384 - Op(AL 80) 508 - CF 19 631 - Op(AL 48)
176 - OP(ER) 404 - Op(AL 80) 509 - DH 44 632 - AF 76
664 - Op(CD 30) 706 - Op(AL 80) 511 - BF 58 659 - BE 92
662 - Op(CD 30)
On Return Passage: U 86 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 174
- 177 - 178 - 181 - 185 - 203 - 225 - 336 - 373 - 409 - 410 - 432 - 435 -
445 - 461 - 508 - 524 - 591 - 615 - 621 - 628 - 629 - D 3 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 185 - Lorient.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 164 reported: Sank Swedish vessel "Brageland" (2,608 tons) in
conformity with prize regulations course 3200 (in FB 3815).
2) U 438 is returning after intake of water in air supply trunk when
making a trial dive at A plus 40.
 b) Air reconnaissance for "Rhakotis". (Trans. Blockade-runner from
Japan to Europe)
c) Submarine sightings: None.
Attack by submarine: EO 29 (U 217?).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) According to their fuel reserves homeward bound boats were
instructed to stalk the convoy sighted by FW 200 at 1500 in BE 5942,
course 2400, speed 8 knots. If these boats made contact, it was intended
that battle-worthy boats lying farther off should be guided in. Correction
of position showed that the enemy was in BE 9218 at 1625.
-1-
c) 1) U 628 refueled from U 117 in BD 9489. U 117 will supply U 524,
591, 435, 336, 225, 615 according to plan.
2) "Rhakotis" was in action with an English destroyer in BF 7157 and
scuttled herself at 1700, her escort submarines were then detailed to search
for survivors.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 164 - 1 ship - 2,608 GRT.
VI. General:
The case of "Rhakotis" has again showed that submarines are unable to
protect blockade runners or carry out reconnaissance for them. Attention
is again drawn to repeated situation reports on this subject.The misleading
character of remote reconnaissance is shown by the fact that U 410
thought she was 40 miles off the vessel she was protecting and when she
unintentionally came up with "Rhakotis", reported her as an enemy
merchant ship.

Submarine situation at
1st January 1943.
Thus it was very probably a Gibraltar convoy, and so the presence of
cruisers was to be expected.As no operationally ready submarines were I. In commission on 1.12.1942: 375
available for this area, the operation was broken off. Commissioned during December (Including one Type II for the Black Sea)
b) 1) Since the expected "ON" convoy has not yet been picked up, Group 24
"Falke" has been given the following instructions to cover the night's run: 399
at 1830 course to be steered 2000, 7 knots, from 1030 on 2 January course Lost during December 6
200, 7 knots. The convoy may have been delayed by S.W. wind. 393
2) After the operation against convoy No. 72 had been broken off Plus foreign submarines 7
temporary attack areas were allocated as follows: U 260 in BC 98, U 123
in CD 23, U 440 in CD 26, U 662 in CD 37, U 664 in CD 38. It is In commission on 1.1.43. 400
intended to supply these boats so that they may be detailed for operations
NE of Newfoundland.
-2-
1076
 400
* also 2 temporarily transferred to Black Sea
** 9 of them temporarily laid up

III. During December:

Total number increased by plus 18
Number of operational boats increased by plus 9
Number of boats on trial increased by plus 9
Losses during December (those not underlined not yet announced as Training boats increased or decreased minus or plus 0
missing).

Type VII - C IV. Number of operational boats at 1.1.1943:

U 408 von Hymmen - well-proved boat. I Northern Waters at the Atlantic 164
beginning of December. Mediterranean 24 (including one boat now en route to the Mediterranean)
U 254 Gilardone - Well-proved boat. 8.12.42. rammed and sunk by Northern Waters 21
another submarine when attacking a convoy in the North Atlantic. Black Sea 3
U 611 von Jakobs - First operation. I North Atlantic mid-December 1942,
doubtful whether while attacking convoy.
U 626 Bade - First operation. In North Atlantic mid-December 1942, V. During December following were in the Atlantic:
doubtful whether while attacking convoy. Daily average at sea 97.2 boats
U 356 Ruppelt - Second operation, new Commander. Attacked a convoy of these, in operational area 38.6 boats
north of the Azores at the end of December. cruising 58.6 boats
U 357 Kellner - First operation, attacked a convoy near Rockall Bank at of these, on homeward cruise 25.2 boats
the end of December.

II. Distribution: -3-

II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXD1 IXD2 XB XIV Total

On operations 3 - 144 3 29 - 4 2 5 212

On Trials - - 89 - 23 2 5 2 1 119
Training 35 4 21** - 2 - - - - 62

38* 4 254 3 54 2 9 4 6 393

Also 7 foreign boats 7
1077
 VI. During December following left port:
from Home bases 14 boats
from W. France 19 "
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
2. January 1943.
I. U 71 - Op(BE 10) U 178 - DG 35 U 413 - BD 42 U 524 - BD 94
86 - BE 78 181 - ES 39 432 - BF 77 525 - Op(AL 70)
96 - BE 84 182 - DG 35 435 - BD 94 563 - Op(BD 33)
105 - Op(EE) 186 - AN 35 436 - Op(DF 30) 571 - Op(CD 90)
109 - Op(EE) 203 - CF 12 438 - BF 572 - Op(BE 10)
117 - BD 94 214 - Op(ED 90) 440 - Op(CD 26) 575 - Op(CD 90)
123 - Op(CD 23) 217 - Op(EO) 441 - Op(BE 10) 584 - BF 47
124 - Op(EE) 225 - BD 94 442 - Op(CD 90) 591 - BD 94
125 - DR 60 226 - AN 35 444 - Op(AK 90) 594 - BF 81
126 - DH 13 257 - Op(BE 10) 445 - BF 49 598 - BD 37
128 - DS 99 260 - OP(BC 98) 455 - CD 32 615 - BD 94
129 - CF 22 266 - AL 51 459 - DT 22 618 - Op(CG 55)
134 - Op(ER) 303 - AN 35 461 - BF 50 620 - Op(CD 90)
154 - BE 87 333 - Op(BE 10) 463 - DF 20 621 - BF 81
159 - BE 98 336 - BD 94 506 - EJ 77 628 - BD 96
161 - CF 88 337 - AL 31 507 - Op(FB) 631 - Op(AK 90)
163 - BE 75 373 - BF 50 508 - CF 23 632 - AF 71
164 - Op(ER) 381 - Op(CD 90) 509 - DH 75 659 - BF 84
167 - Op(AL 70) 384 - Op(BD 33) 511 - BF 48 662 - Op(CD 37)
174 - DG 66 404 - Op(BE 11) 514 - DR 78 664 - Op(CD 38)
175 - Op(ET 30) 406 - CD 32 515 - Op(CG 70) 706 - Op(BE 10)
176 - Op(ER) 409 - BE 75 516 - DH 48 D 3 - CF 29
177 - FM 58 410 - BF 84 522 - BF 73 D 5 - AE 92
1078
On Return Passage: 86 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 174 - 177 -
178 - 181 - 203 - 225 - 336 - 409 - 410 - 432 - 435 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 524
- 591 - 615 - 621 - 628 - 659 - D 3 - 163.
Entered Port: U 438 Brest.
Sailed: U 69 Lorient; U 607 St. Nazaire; U 268 Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 620 27.12 definitely established "Q" ship working with patrol
vessels in CF 8325. Double miss fired.
2) U 124: No shipping on any steamer routes regular day
reconnaissance up to 400 miles from Trinidad no location. Bombs
b) 1) Air reconnaissance for survivors of "RHAKOTIS".
c) Submarine sightings: ED 8713, ED 9946, BE 3818.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Group "FALKE" has been given orders to cruise on a course of
2000, 7 knots from 1830, and 200, 7 knots on 3.1.
2) Former reconnaissance tasking by Group "DELPHIN" of the
supposed east-west shipping route south of the Azores in CD 90, has been
broken off, as no success was scored.
-4-
 Group including U 463 has been instructed to cruise to the south at
the same distance apart between longitude 350 West and 420 West. After
being refueled later, the Group is to operate off Natal.
3) U 266 and U 337 have been given new approach point AJ 89. New
stations for convoy group.
4) As U 109 is returning, U 105 is going to occupy her sector. (N.N.E.
of Trinidad).
c) 1) U 659 and U 621 are continuing the search. U 410 has begun her
homeward journey with 80 survivors.
d) 1) Attack is sanctioned for the whole of route "Anton" north of 50
South.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
3. January 1943.
161 - CF 83 336 - BE 75 507 - Op(FB) 628 - BE 75
163 - BE 79 337 - AE 85 508 - BE 59 631 - Op(AK 10)
164 - Op(FB) 373 - BF 68 509 - DT 22 632 - AE 91
167 - Op(AK) 381 - CD 80 511 - BE 96 659 - BF 70
174 - DH 15 384 - Op(AK) 514 - EF 32 662 - Op(AK 10)
175 - Op(ET) 404 - Op(BE) 515 - CG 51 664 - Op(CD 38)
176 - Op(ER) 406 - CD 32 516 - DH 74
177 - FM 24 409 - BE 79 522 - BE 96
On Return Passage: U 86 - 109 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 134 - 154 - 159 - 161
- 163 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 203 - 225 - 336 - 406 - 409 - 410 - 432 -
435 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 515 - 524 - 591 - 615 - 621 - 628 - 659 - D 3 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 445 - 461 - St. Nazaire; U 373 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 201 - Brest; U 224 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:

I. U 69 - BF 54 U 178 - DG 39 U 410 - BF 70 U 524 - BD 94 -5-

71 - Op(BE) 181 - EJ 98 413 - BD 39 525 - Op(BE)
86 - BE 85 182 - DG 35 432 - BF 49 706 - Op(AK)
96 - BE 79 186 - AN 28 435 - BD 94 563 - Op(BE)
105 - Op(EE) 203 - BE 88 436 - Op(CD 80) 571 - Op(CD 80)
109 - EF 17 214 - Op(ED 75) 440 - Op(DC 26) 572 - Op(BE)
117 - BD 94 217 - Op(EO) 441 - AL 71 575 - Op(CD 80)
123 - CD 32 225 - BD 94 D 3 - CF 32 584 - BE 64
124 - Op(EO) 226 - AN 28 442 - Op(CD 80) 591 - BD 94
125 - DR 82 257 - Op(BE) 444 - Op(AK) 594 - BF 47
126 - CF 86 260 - Op(BC 98) 445 - BF 64 598 - BD 27 a) 1) U 507 reported that she had sunk "Baron Dechmont" (3,675 GRT)
128 - DT 47 266 - AK 66 455 - CD 32 607 - BF 59 in FB 9141 course 1200, speed 9 knots. Captain taken on board.
129 - BE 89 D 5 - AN 24 459 - DT 18 615 - BD 94 2) U 105 in sector ordered since 28.12. Nothing seen except patrols in
134 - ER 33 268 - AO 461 - BF 64 618 - CG 55 ED 9836 and destroyer in 9658, 550, moderate air patrolling by day,
154 - BE 86 303 - AN 28 463 - DF 29 620 - DF 31 nothing seen at night, no location.
159 - BF 71 333 - Op(BE) 506 - Op(ES 14) 621 - BF 70
1079
 3) U 176 from FK 23 to 49 and ER 97 to 63 and ES 40 nothing seen
excepting land-based plane once in FK 54 and 23.12. 13 of 20 cells in the
after-battery compartment faulty operationally ready.
4) U 175 found dogged air patrolling off Freetown. Bombs,
searchlights. Kept under water 32 hours by location. Systematic air
operation tried to starve boat out. Operations close inshore brought little
success. Moved away because of high battery temperature and faulty
Junkers compressor.
5) U 706 (Group "FALKE") chased independent on course 2300 speed
13 knots for 5 hours. Despite highest possible speed boat lost contact.
Returned to station.
6) U 333 (Group "FALKE") reported 1427 chasing passenger steamer
SW speed 13 knots. 1945 recognized as English hospital ship. Boat
returned to station. (Probably the same vessel as one sighted by U 706).
7) U 618 reported lighted freighter without any neutrality markings
proceeding from CG 5839 to 5559 going north. Boat was ordered to leave
ship alone.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: ED 75, (U 214?) BF 5877.
2) Submarine attack: DQ 9353, sunk ship in EO 11.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 1:
At 1624 U 514 reported convoy in DQ 9288 course 900. U 125 was
ordered to proceed at maximum speed. Group "DELPHIN" at high
cruising speed, course 1700, and to attack this convoy. Convoy of some
10 ships was in DQ 9297 at 1730, course 70, speed 9 knots. Destroyers
ahead and on each side. Contact was lost at 2250 in DQ 9325 after U 514
had sunk a whale factory ship, of the KOSMOS II type (16,966 GRT).
Boat followed up in direction of mean course.
2) Convoy No. 2:
At 2127 U 182 sighted a convoy of 11-15 steamers in DG 6225 on a
westerly course, speed 8-10 knots. As conditions were more favorable,
Group "DELPHIN" was instructed to attack this convoy, despite previous
1080
attack instructions (see para IVa 1). At 2345 U 182 reported enemy's
course as 3200. After 2353 no further shadower reports were received.
b) 1) Group "FALKE" turned back at 1900, course 2000, speed 7 knots.
-6-
At 1100 on 4.1 course 3400, speed 6 knots. Planned to transfer patrol
strip for Group "Falke" to AK 30-60, in readiness for the outward bound
convoy expected there on the 7th according to dead reckoning.
2) U 584 was given AK 66 as approach point. (Patrol strip for Group
"Falke").
3) U 594 was given AJ 89 as new approach point (new Newfoundland
group).
c) 1) U 225 and U 615 carried out replenishment, on return voyage.
2) U 406 took over a sick man from U 123 and gave fuel to U 455, on
return voyage.
3) U 163 took over a sick man from U 96 and radar interceptor escort
from U 409.
d) U 659 and U 621 broke off search for "Rhakotis".
V. Reports of Success:
U 507 - 1 ship 3,675 GRT.
U 514 - 1 ship 17,000 GRT.
VI. General:
Remarks on Convoys 1 and 2:
 The convoy sighted in DQ 93 by U 514 is probably one formed of
tankers proceeding from Trinidad to Gibraltar. Although Group "Delphin"
was almost 900 miles from the convoy and there was little chance of -7-
maintaining contact until the Group arrived, the order was given to stalk
the convoy at maximum continuous speed, because of the pressing need to
attack tanker traffic to Gibraltar. After the westbound convoy had been
picked up in DG 38 by U 182, the first order for Group "Delphin" was
cancelled and the boats were instructed to stalk the convoy contacted by U
182. Conditions were considerably more favorable where this was
concerned. The center boat of Group "Delphin" was about 360 miles
away, all boats were in a westerly position, i.e. ahead of the convoy. It
was calculated that the first boat would reach the convoy in about 20
hours. If the convoy sighted by U 182 could not be contacted, there was
still a possibility of the boats moving away to the south to continue U 134 - EH 96 U 260 - Op(BC 98) U 463 - DF 59 U 620 - Op(CD
stalking the convoy reported by U 514. 80)
154 - BE 69 266 - Op(AL 65) 506 - ES 19 621 - BF 54
--------------------------------------------------- 159 - BF 54 668 - AN 35 507 - Op(FC 71) 628 - BE 82
--------------- 161 - CF 65 303 - AF 79 508 - BF 49 631 - Op(AK)
163 - BE 85 333 - Op(BD 33) 509 - DT 72 632 - AE 85
4. January 1943. 164 - Op(FB) 336 - BE 81 511 - CG 11 659 - BF 58
167 - Op(AK) 337 - AE 79 514 - DQ 95 662 - Op(CD 37)
174 - CF 85 381 - Op(CD 80) 515 - CG 51 664 - Op(CD 38)
I. U 69 - BF 44 U 177 - FE 89 U 406 - CE 11 U 524 - BD 94 175 - Op(FT 13) 384 - Op(AK) 516 - DT 25 706 - Op(BD 36)
71 - Op(BE) 178 - DG 12 409 - BE 85 525 - Op(BD) 176 - Op(ES 72) 404 - Op(BD) 522 - CF 39 D 3 - BE 98
86 - BE 91 181 - EJ 68 410 - BF 64 563 - Op(BD) D 5 - Bergen
96 - BE 75 182 - DG 62 413 - AK 88 571 - Op(CD 80)
105 - Op(ED 93) 186 - AF 79 432 - BF 91 572 - Op(BE)
109 - EF 21 201 - BF 57 435 - BD 94 575 - Op(CD 80) On Return Passage: U 86 - 109 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 134 - 154 - 159 - 161
117 - BD 94 203 - BE 94 436 - Op(CD 81) 584 - BE 27 - 163 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 203 - 225 - 336 - 406 - 409 - 410 - 432 -
123 - Op(CD 23) 214 - Op(EC 90) 440 - Op(CD 26) 591 - BD 94 508 - 515 - 524 - 591 - 615 - 621.
124 - Op(EO) 217 - Op(EO) 441 - Op(AK) 594 - BE 51 Entered Port: U 410 - St. Nazaire.
125 - DR 72 224 - BF 91 442 - Op(CD 80) 598 - BD 15 Sailed: U 606 - Brest.
126 - CF 68 225 - BE 72 444 - Op(AK) 607 - BF 48
128 - DT 42 226 - AF 79 455 - CD 32 615 - BE 74 II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
129 - BE 95 257 - Op(BE) 459 - DT 72 618 - CG 55
III. Reports on the Enemy:
1081
 a) 1) U 404 sighted destroyer in BE 1747 course S.W. Tried to catch up
with her, unsuccessful, returned to station.
2) U 71 BE 4132 surprised by single destroyer, course N.E. depth
charged.
b) None.
c) Submarine sightings: ED 94, ET 16, EC 92, EC 93, ED 99.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 1:
U 125, 514, are still stalking convoy, but have not established contact.
2) Convoy No. 2:
At 0014 on 4.1. U 182 was forced to dive after she had been fired at.
She was then depth charged. On re-surfacing she was immediately picked
up by radar on 141 cm and again doggedly pursued with depth charges for
7 hours. Last course observed was 3200. As the boat was about 110 miles
behind the convoy, she was ordered to continue her cruise to Capetown.
After contact had been lost Group "DELPHIN" was ordered to man the
patrol strip from CE 8716 to DG 1527 by 1000 on 5.1., course 1050, speed
7 knots. This strip would cover enemy courses of 290 - 3000, speed 7 - 10
1/2 knots (The mean course of 2950 represents the Great Circle route to
New York and the course of a Gibraltar-America convoy that was picked
up earlier by special radio intelligence). At 0328 on 5.1 U 575 came upon
a convoy in DG 1462: convoy's course was 2500, speed 11 knots: boat was
depth charged. Despite this sighting report, Group "DELPHIN" was
-8-
1082
ordered not to stalk this convoy for the following reasons:
I) If it was the convoy reported by U 182, according to perfect dead
reckoning her speed was 14 1/2 knots. It was useless to attack such a
convoy as the submarines did not possess sufficient superiority of speed.
II) If it was a fresh convoy proceeding at 11 knots, an operation against it
offered little chance of success as according to dead reckoning the other
boats were at least 30 miles behind, hence with a speed approximately 3
knots above that of the convoy, they would take some 10 hours to catch up
with it. Very unfavorable weather (wind S.W. 1, calm sea) rendered
location easer and in conjunction with the poor position of the boats ruled
out a successful operation.
After the order not to stalk the convoy had been transmitted, U 620,
442 and later U 436 reported that they had come upon the convoy or a
destroyer and had been forced to submerge at once. These reports bore out
the views expressed in paragraph II).
b) 1) Group "Falke" has ceased to man its patrol strip as the convoy can
no longer be expected. Because of lack of fuel U 706 has been withdrawn
and detailed for another operation. Fresh boats U 632 and U 584 have
joined the group. Order has been given to the Group to man a patrol strip
from AK 3832 to AK 6995 by 1600 on 7.1.
Their order is as follows: U 632 - 441 - 631 - 444 - 167 - 384 - 525 -
563 - 404 - 333 - 584 - 257 - 71 - 572. They are to operate against a west-
bound "ONS" England-America convoy that is expected according to dead
reckoning.
2) U 706 has been instructed to make for BD 77. After she has
replenished, she is to operate with the remaining boats of former group
"Spitz" N.E. of Newfoundland.
3) U 618 was given a radio message about the probable departure of the
enemy ships "Shetland" and "Castilian" from Lisbon.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
5. January 1943.
I. U 69 - BE 62 U 177 - FE 57 U 406 - BD 88 U 525 - Op(BD 30)
71 - Op(BE 17) 178 - CF 83 409 - BE 94 563 - Op(BD 33)
86 - BE 93 181 - EJ 49 413 - AK 78 584 - BE 13)
96 - BD 93 182 - DG 25 432 - BF 68 571 - Op(CE 70)
105 - Op(ED) 186 - AF 72 435 - BD 96 572 - Op(BE 10)
109 - DQ 58 201 - BF 48 436 - Op(DG 14) 575 - Op(DG 10)
117 - BD 94 203 - BF 72 440 - Op(CD 26) 591 - BD 94
123 - Op(CD 23) 214 - Op(EC 90) 441 - Op(AK 90) 594 - BE 17
124 - Op(EO) 217 - Op(EO) 442 - Op(DG 10) 598 - BC 36
125 - DR 53 224 - BF 81 444 - OP(AK 90) 606 - BF 54
126 - CF 39 225 - BE 82 455 - CE 12 607 - BE 66
-9-
U 128 - DT 21 U 226 - AF 72 U 459 - EH 32 U 615 - BE 81
129 - BF 71 257 - Op(BE 10) 463 - DF 50 618 - CG 55
134 - EJ 44 260 - Op(BC 98) 506 - ES 620 - Op(DG 10)
154 - BF 72 266 - AK 58 507 - Op(FC) 621 - BF 52
159 - BF 61 268 - AN 38 508 - BF 55 628 - BE 91
1083
161 - CG 14 303 - AF 72 509 - EJ 11 631 - Op(AK 90)
163 - BE 94 333 - Op(BD 30) 511 - CF 53 662 - Op(CD 37)
164 - Op(FB) 336 - BE 83 514 - Op(DR 53) 632 - Op(AL 31)
167 - Op(AK 90) 337 - AL 14 516 - DT 54 659 - BF 52
174 - CF 77 381 - Op(CE 70) 515 - CG 21 664 - Op(CD 38)
175 - Op(ET) 384 - Op(AK 90) 522 - CF 64 706 - Op(BD 30)
176 - Op(ER) 404 - Op(BD 36) 524 - BD 94 D 3 - BF 75
D 5 - Bergen
On Return Passage: U 86 - 109 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 134 - 154 - 159 - 161
- 163 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 628 - 181 - 203 - 225 - 336 - 406 - 409 - 432 -
435 - 455 - 508 - 515 - 524 - 591 - 615 - 621 - 659 - U D 3.
Entered Port: U 621 - 659 - Brest; U 159 - Lorient; U 432 - La Pallice.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Convoys No. 1 and 2 see paragraph IVa.
b) None.
c) Submarine sightings: BF 7221, EV 4947, BE 6870, FB 93.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 1: Although they still had no contact with the convoy,
boats of Group "Delphin" were put on to the convoy reports by U 514
(after breaking off the operation against the convoy reported by U 182).
For the present, U 514 and U 125 are to operate independently on courses
of 60 - 650 and 65 - 750, then on 7.1 they are to man patrol strip from
square DG 7635 to DS 3524, course 2450, speed 7 knots, in company with
the "Delphin" boats. They will be stationed in the following order: U 514
- 381 - 571 - 442 - 620 - 575 - 436 - 125.
2) Convoy No. 2: OPeration against convoy was broken off at dusk,
and the boats were put into the convoy reported by U 514.
 b) 1) After carrying out refueling as instructed, U 123, 706, 440, 260 and
662 were instructed to make for BC 22. For operations N.E. of
Newfoundland.
2) U 563 has been told to drop out of Group "Falke" because of lack of
fuel and has been given attack area BD 30 until her fuel is exhausted. The
gap thus caused in the patrol strip has been
- 10 -
closed by the boats stationed to the south moving up.
3) U 607, 69, 201 have been given AK 99 as approach point. They are
to operate according to the situation.
4) Boats arriving N.E. of Newfoundland have been allotted temporary
attack areas as follows until the patrol strip planned can be arranged:
U 598 - BC 22; U 413 - AJ 89; U 266 - BC 26.
c) 1) U 591 refueled from U 117.
2) U 664 refueled for return voyage from U 662.
d) 1) In order to carry out some degree of flank reconnaissance for the
vessel "Spichern" that is be escorted back to Brest from El Ferrol
homeward bound boats have been ordered to proceed via BF 74 - 76 or 77
- 75 - 76.
2) On instructions from Naval War Staff boats have been given the
following order:
"French Antilles and French Guyana are loyal to Vichy. Ships
"Angaulema", "Guadaloupe", "Due Daumal", "San Domingo" and the
tanker "Bourgogne" are thus again to be permitted to carry supplies to
these possessions from the American area. Today or tomorrow the first
vessels will leave the Antilles. Do not molest them".
1084
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
6. January 1943.
I. U 69 - BE 28 U 177 - FE 18 U 404 - AK 96 U 524 - BE 72
71 - AL 77 178 - CF 65 406 - BD 95 525 - AL 71
86 - BF 48 181 - EJ 18 409 - BF 52 563 - AL 71
96 - BD 67 182 - DG 58 413 - AJ 98 571 - Op(CE 70)
105 - Op(ED) 186 - AE 68 435 - BE 75 572 - AL 77
109 - DQ 64 201 - BE 66 436 - Op(DG 10) 575 - Op(DG 10)
117 - BD 88 203 - BF 54 440 - Op(CD 26) 584 - AL 75
123 - Op(BC 90) 214 - Op(EC) 441 - AK 69 591 - BD 96
124 - Op(EO) 217 - Op(EO) 442 - Op(DG 10) 594 - BD 35
125 - DR 36 224 - BF 74 444 - AK 66 598 - BC 23
126 - CG 12 225 - BE 67 455 - CD 32 606 - BF 40
128 - DH 74 226 - AE 68 459 - EH 65 607 - BE 61
129 - BF 61 257 - AL 74 463 - DF 69 615 - BE 67
134 - EJ 14 260 - BC 99 506 - Op(ES) 618 - Op(CG 50)
154 - BF 40 266 - AK 72 507 - Op(FC) 620 - Op(DG 10)
161 - BE 99 268 - Stavanger 508 - BF 63 628 - BE 69
163 - BF 61 303 - AE 69 509 - EJ 41 631 - AK 69
164 - Op(FB) 333 - AL 74 511 - CF 54 632 - AL 16
167 - AK 93 336 - BE 69 514 - DR 39 662 - Op(CD 37)
174 - CF 63 337 - AK 36 515 - BF 61 664 - Op(CD 38)
175 - Op(EO) 381 - Op(CE 70) 516 - DT 76 706 - BD 59
176 - Op(ES) 384 - AK 93 522 - CF 82 D 3 - BF 54
D 5 - AN 34
On Return Passage: U 86 - 109 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 134 - 154 - 161 - 163
- 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 203 - 336 - 225 - 406 - 409 - 435 - 455 - 455 -
508 - 515 - 524 - 591 - 615 - 628 - 664 - D 3 - D 5 .
Entered Port: U 409 - Brest; U 508 - 163 - 129 - 515 - Lorient.
 Sailed: U 383 - Brest; U 66 - 160 - Lorient. a) Convoy No. 2:
Boats belonging to Group "DELPHIN" en route to new patrol strip.
- 11 - b) U 511 has been allotted Trinidad as approach point.
c) U 459 has been given FD 2555 as rendezvous to supply the Italian
submarine "CAGNI" as planned.
d) None.

V. Reports of Success: None.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. 7. January 1943.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) Convoy No. 2 see para. IVa.
2) U 214 sighted 3 tankers, 3 patrol boats, in ED (square garbled) course
S.W. Forced away from convoy by strong land-based air patrols. BOmbs
and flares, submarine submerged during the day.No shipping in EC 90.
Very strong land-based air activity. Moved away to the north because of
breakdown of gyro.
3) U 134 sighted a corvette in DS 6670 at 1400 on northerly course
location.
4) U 224 reported that Warrant Quartermaster was sick. After
conversation with doctor she was ordered to carry out her special task
(break through at Gibraltar).
5) U 618 reported: Brightly illuminated steamer, similar to the English
steamer announced to be leaving Lisbon. She proceeded south within
territorial waters south of Lisbon. This strengthened the assumption that
enemy shipping between Lisbon and Gibraltar sailed within territorial
waters camouflaged as neutral.
b) None.
c) Submarine sightings: FC 8231.
d) None.
I. U 66 - BF 58 U 177 - ES 99 U 384 - Op(AK 30) U 563 - Op(BD
30)
69 - BE 16 178 - BE 99 404 - Op(AK 60) 571 - Op(DG 34)
71 - Op(AK 60) 181 - DT 78 406 - BE 74 572 - Op(AK 60)
86 - BF 52 182 - DG 88 413 - Op(AJ 89) 575 - Op(DS 32)
96 - BD 54 186 - AE 83 435 - BE 82 584 - Op(AK 60)
105 - Op(ED) 201 - BE 29 436 - Op(DS 32) 591 - BE 72
109 - DR 17 203 - BF 52 440 - BD 77 594 - BD 22
117 - BD 78 214 - Op(EC) 441 - Op(AK 30) 598 - Op(BC 22)
123 - BD 77 217 - Op(EO) 442 - Op(DG 87) 606 - BE 65
124 - Op(EO) 224 - CG 54 444 - Op(AK 30) 607 - BE 28
125 - DR 52 225 - BF 54 455 - BD 77 615 - BE 69
126 - BF 61 226 - AE 86 459 - EH 68 618 - Op(CG 55)
128 - DH 48 257 - Op(AK 60) 463 - DG 48 620 - Op(DG 87)
- 12 -

IV. Current Operations:

1085

U 134 - DS 63 U 260 - BD 77 U 506 - Op(ES) U 628 - BF 48
154 - BF 61 266 - AJ 99 507 - Op(FB) 631 - Op(AK 30)
160 - BF 58 268 - Stavanger 509 - EJ 71 632 - Op(AK 30)
161 - BE 73 303 - AE 91 511 - CF 75 662 - BD 77
164 - Op(FB) 333 - Op(AK 60) 514 - DB 61 664 - CE 13
167 - Op(AK 30) 336 - BF 54 516 - EJ 15 706 - BD 73
174 - CG 12 337 - AK 29 522 - CF 87 D 3 - BF 61
175 - Op(ET) 381 - Op(DG 84) 524 - BE 81 D 5 - AN 36
176 - Op(DS) 383 - BF 54 525 - Op(AK 60)
On Return Passage: U 86 - 109 - 126 - 128 - 134 - 154 - 161 - 174 - 177
- 178 - 181 - 203 - 225 - 336 - 406 - 435 - 455 - 524 - 591 - 628 - 664 - D
3 - D 5 - 615.
Entered Port: U 203 - 86 - Brest; U 154 - 126 - D 3 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 218 - Brest; U 521 - Lorient; U 624 - St. Nazaire; U 704 - La
Pallice; U 414 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 406 reported fast independent in BF 7375, 300. Pursuit was
broken off after 5 hours.
2) U 105 No shipping off Port of Spain between 5th and 8th January.
b) None.
c) Submarine sightings: AK 6879, AK 4786.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 2:
1086
At 0209 U 436 fired triple and single miss in DG 8144, at 0400 fired
another triple miss at a fast freighter in DG 4995. Boat suspected "Q"
ship. 0430 U 381 sighted a destroyer in DG 8111. As U 436, U 381 and U
442 had been delayed, Group "DELPHIN" was ordered not to move off
the patrol strip until 1400. The patrol which was running out to encounter
the convoy on its supposed mean course, would cover the convoy's degree
of speed 10 or 9 knots during daylight. At 2030 the patrol would proceed
at a speed of 9 knots, mean course 650, covering the night delay.
b) 1) U 175 had been ordered to operate off Freetown on the convoy
routes to Trinidad, as established by Radio reconnaissance. Convoy's run
at intervals of about 10 or 11 days.
2) AL 47 has been allotted as new approach point for U 126 - 186 - 303
- 606.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 13 -
8. January 1943.
I. U 66 - BF 48 U 181 - DT 48 U 406 - BE 81 U 563 - BE 14
69 - BE 12 182 - DT 41 413 - Op(AJ 89) 571 - DG 80
71 - Op(AK 30) 186 - AE 88 414 - AO 48 572 - Op(AK 30)
 96 - BD 42 201 - BE 24 435 - BE 91 575 - DG 80 3) U 167 (Group "FALKE") reported Warrant Quartermaster overboard
105 - Op(ED) 214 - Op(EC) 436 - DG 88 584 - Op(AK 30) and Commander badly injured during heavy storms. Boat has been
109 - DR 24 217 - Op(EO) 440 - BD 77 591 - BE 82 instructed to return.
117 - BD 77 218 - BF 54 441 - Op(AK 30) 594 - BD 22 b) None.
123 - BD 77 224 - CG 85 442 - DG 80 598 - Op(BC 22) c) Submarine sightings: AF 7221.
124 - Op(EO) 225 - BF 52 444 - Op(AK 30) 606 - BE 55 d) None.
125 - DR 35 226 - AE 87 455 - BD 77 607 - BE 16
128 - DH 19 257 - Op(AK 30) 459 - EH 99 615 - BF 58 IV. Current Operations:
134 - DT 15 260 - BD 77 463 - DG 50 618 - Op(CG 58) a) Convoy No. 2:
160 - BF 73 266 - Op(BC 26) 506 - Op(FS) 620 - DG 80 Group "DELPHIN" moved up towards the convoy at 1000. At 1600 U
161 - BF 85 303 - AE 88 507 - Op(FB) 624 - BF 83 381 sighted the convoy in DG 8495. U 511 and 522, who were outward
164 - Op(FB) 333 - OP(AK 30) 509 - ES 12 628 - BF 52 bound, and U 181 and 134, who were homeward bound were also put onto
167 - Op(AK 30) 336 - BF 52 511 - CE 98 631 - Op(AK 30) the convoy along with Group "DELPHIN"
174 - BF 55 337 - AK 43 514 - DR 62 632 - Op(AK 30)
175 - Op(ET) 381 - DG 80 516 - EJ 45 662 - BD 77 - 14 -
176 - Op(ES) 383 - BF 44 521 - BF 57 664 - CE 34
177 - ES 67 384 - Op(AK 30) 522 - DH 17 704 - BF 91
178 - BE 99 404 - Op(AK 30) 524 - BE 67 706 - BD 77
- - 525 - Op(AK 30) D 5 - AO 72

On Return Passage: U 109 - 128 - 134 - 161 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 -
225 - 336 - 406 - 435 - 455 - 524 - 591 - 615 - 628 - 664 - D 5.
Entered Port: U 628 - 225 - 336 - Brest
Sailed: - . - During the night U 571, 575, 442, 436, 522 contacted the convoy.
At 2237 U 436 torpedoed 3 large tankers in DG 8565, very heavy
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. explosion; no further observation possible because of anti-submarine
measures.
III. Reports on the Enemy: At 0003 U 575 scored 3 hits in line abreast. 0636 one hit, 0638 3 hits
a) 1) Convoy No. 2: see para IVa. on 3 tankers. No sinkings observed. U 571 was forced to submerge when
2) On 8.1 U 507 reported that she had sunk "YORKWOOD" (5,401 she attacked, she was depth-charged. Operation continues.
tons) course 2700, speed 10 knots in FC 7416. In ballast from Durban to b) 1) As 167 has returned those boats of Group "Falke" that were south of
Trinidad. Captain taken on board. Moderate air activity during the day, U 167 have been ordered to move up one station to the north.
location at night. 2) In order to lengthen the patrol strip of Group "Falke" to the S.E. later
on, or to pick up the "ON" convoy traffic, the boats now approaching have
been given the following attack areas: U 69 - AL 7159, U 607 - AL 4514,
1087
U 201 - AL 7558, U 606 - AL 7599. To a depth of 30 miles. For the same sufficient to track down the convoy when data was scanty. The convoy
reason boats still in Biscay have been told to make for AL 87. may have passed the patrol
3) U 506, which was previously waiting in ER and ES and intended for
operations in Capetown, has been ordered to continue cruising to the south - 15 -
after U 509, 459 and 516 have closed up a little.
4) U 105 and U 214 have been ordered to return to their former attack
ares (U 214 Curacao, U 105 Trinidad) after they have met and transferred
gyro-sphere. They are to operate off these harbors according to the moon.
They have been informed of convoy traffic and favorable possibilities of
night attacks because of inexperienced patrolling.
c) U 182 is to meet U 177 on 11.1 in EJ 2225. U 177 is homeward
bound and will inform U 182 of conditions in the Capetown operational
area and hand over "Eisbär" order.
d) The escort of "Spichern" from El Ferrol to Brest is being prepared for strip to the east or northwest, or it may even have sailed right through
9.1.43 as ordered by key-word. the patrol during the bad weather between 31.12.42 and 2.1.43 without
being sighted.
V. Reports of Success: Since this failure to contact the convoy there is more uncertainty than
U 507 - 1 ship 5,401 GRT ever about the route taken. This point can be cleared up only if more boats
U 436 - 3 ships torpedoed. are available so that the patrol strip can be extended and the boats can be
U 575 - 7 hits. stationed closer together.Time will show whether the 13 boats will succeed
in tracking down the "ONS" convoy expected between January 7th and
9th. On this occasion it is not possible for the boats to cruise to the west
VI. General: each night to cover the night-run as this would leave the boats insufficient
At present the submarine situation in the North Atlantic is far from space for attack in the west.
satisfactory. At the moment the 13 boats of Group "Falke" form the only
operational group in the area. A second group ("Jaguar") consisting of 11 ---------------------------------------------------
submarines is being built up in the area AJ, BC. However, bad weather ---------------
conditions at the supply rendezvous area for 5 of these submarines has
greatly delayed this building up. As there is great uncertainty about the 9. January 1943.
dates of departure and routes of "ON" and "ONS" convoys at present,
(lack of high priority radio intercept intelligence) it is difficult to pick up
one of these convoys with only one group of submarines operating in the I. U 66 - BE 96 U 181 - DT 27 U 414 - AO 30 U 571 - Op(DG 80)
eastern area of the Atlantic. Since hardly any independents are to be met 69 - AL 75 182 - DS 71 435 - BF 47 572 - Op(AK 69)
with in the North Atlantic now, the fact that "ON" convoy was missed 71 - Op(AK 60) 186 - AL 33 436 - Op(DG 80) 575 - Op(DG 80)
(31.12 - 2.1.1943) means no successes for 8 days. 13 boats were not 96 - BD 14 201 - AL 87 440 - BD 77 584 - Op(AK 60)
105 - Op(ED) 214 - Op(ED) 441 - Op(AK 30) 591 - BE 67
1088
 109 - DR 34 217 - Op(EO) 442 - OP(DG 80) 594 - BD 13
117 - BD 77 218 - BF 72 444 - OP(AK 30) 598 - Op(BC 22) - 16 -
123 - BD 77 224 - CG 94 455 - BD 77 606 - BE 24
124 - OP(EO) 226 - AL 24 459 - ES 18 607 - AL 75
125 - DS 15 257 - Op(AK 60) 463 - DG 50 615 - BF 68
128 - CF 89 260 - BD 77 506 - Op(ES 56) 618 - Op(CG 58)
134 - Op(DG 90) 266 - Op(BC 26) 507 - Op(FB 93) 620 - Op(DG 80)
160 - BE 96 303 - AL 31 509 - ES 51 624 - BF 73
161 - BF 61 333 - Op(AK 60) 511 - DG 29 631 - Op(AK 30)
164 - Op(FB) 337 - AJ 69 514 - DS 18 632 - OP(AK 30)
167 - Op(AL 41) 381 - Op(DG 80) 516 - EJ 75 662 - BD 77
174 - BF 61 383 - BE 62 521 - BF 73 664 - BE 77 IV. Current Operations:
175 - Op(ET) 384 - Op(AK 30) 522 - DG 67 704 - BF 81 a) Convoy No. 2:
176 - Op(ER 85) 404 - Op(AL 60) 524 - BF 64 706 - BD 77 After temporary loss of contact U 181 sighted convoy of 3 tankers in
177 - EJ 61 406 - BE 94 525 - Op(AK 60) D 5 - AO 77 DG 9517 at 1320. Last report from U 134 at 1530 from DG 9278.
178 - BF 93 413 - Op(AJ 89) 563 - BE 27 Following reports of success have been received:
U 522 sank 2 tankers 16,000 GRT
probably sank 1 tanker 8,000 GRT
On Return Passage: U 109 - 128 - 134 - 161 - 167 - 174 - 177 - 178 - U 436 torpedoed tankers on 8.1, 3 were sunk 31,000 GRT
181 - 406 - 435 - 455 - 524 - 563 - 591 - 615 - 664 - D 5. U 511 sank "William Wilberforce" in DG 9116 (ship was not part of
Entered Port: U 174 - 161 - 524 - Lorient; U 615 - La Pallice; U D 5 - convoy) 5,004 GRT
Kiel; U 178 - Bordeaux. U 442 sank 1 large tanker )
Sailed: U 87 - 438 - 558 - Lorient; U 752 - 613 - St. Nazaire; U 614 -
Kiel; U 403 - Bergen. heard to sink )
sank 1 large fleet tanker ) 28,000 GRT
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. sank 1 abandoned tanker ) both tankers probably torpedoes by U 575
saw 1 tanker sink )
III. Reports on the Enemy: U 134 sank 1 tanker with 3 hits at 1533. Tanker was in convoy. 8,000
a) 1) Convoy No. 2 see paragraph IVa. GRT
2) U 124 reported that she had contact with the convoy from 0300 to
0600, 9 ships, 4 destroyers from EO 5235 to 5269, 1600, 8 knots. She The last convoy formation is still being stalked (it probably consists of 2
sank 1 tanker and 4 freighters, totaling 28,000 GRT. convoy formations of 3 tankers each).
3) U 441 - sank independent (6,000 GRT) in AL 1628 speed 13 knots. b) 1) At 1752 U 632 reported convoy in AK 3838, course 150. Later she
4) U 384 sighted a steamer on easterly course in AL 1941. was recognized as a passenger ship.When U 632 reported a convoy U 441,
b) None. 631, 303, 186, 226 had been detailed to attack, but after the vessels had
c) Submarine sightings: EO 53, AL 2545, GR 6747.
1089
been recognized, they were ordered to return to their patrol strip or to
continue on their course as previously ordered.
2) U 176 was given a free hand after she had regained her operational
readiness. Supplies for her homeward voyage have been arranged.
3) U 217 has been ordered to search for shipping along the 200 meter
line.
4) U 69, 607, 201, 606 have joined Group "Falke" and extended the
patrol strip to the south as far as AK 9392.
V. Reports of Success:
U 124 - 5 ships - 28,000 GRT
U 441 - 1 ship - 6,000 GRT
U 552 - 3 ships - 24,000 GRT
U 436 - 3 ships - 31,000 GRT
U 511 - 1 ship - 5,004 GRT
U 442 - 3 ships - 28,000 GRT (tonnage assumed by B.d.U.)
U 134 - 1 ship - 8,000 GRT (tonnage assumed by B.d.U.)
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
66 - CG 15 186 - AL 27 435 - BF 62 571 - Op(DG 90)
69 - Op(AK 60) 201 - Op(AK 90) 436 - Op(DG) 572 - Op(DG)
71 - Op(AK 60) 214 - Op(ED) 438 - BF 54 575 - Op(DG)
87 - BF 54 217 - Op(EO) 440 - BD 77 584 - Op(AK 60)
96 - BC 31 218 - BE 96 441 - Op(AL 30) 591 - BE 47
105 - OP(ED) 224 - CG 90 442 - Op(DG) 594 - Op(AK 77)
109 - DF 93 226 - AL 29 444 - Op(AK 30) 598 - Op(BC 22)
117 - BD 77 257 - Op(AK 60) 455 - BD 77 606 - BE 22
123 - BD 77 260 - BD 77 459 - ES 48 607 - Op(AL 74)
124 - EO 29 266 - Op(BC 26) 463 - DG 50 613 - BF 91
125 - DS 21 303 - AL 34 506 - ES 94 614 - AO 48
128 - CF 31 333 - Op(AK 60) 507 - Op(FB) 618 - Op(CG 58)
134 - Op(GG) 337 - AJ 94 509 - ES 83 620 - Op(DG)
160 - CG 15 381 - Op(DG) 511 - Op(DG) 624 - BE 66
164 - Op(FB) 383 - BE 29 514 - DS 25 631 - Op(AK 30)
167 - AL 72 384 - Op(AL 30) 516 - ES 24 632 - Op(AK 30)
175 - Op(ET) 403 - AF 76 521 - BF 77 662 - BD 77
176 - Op(ER) 404 - Op(AK 60) 522 - Op(DG) 664 - BF 84
177 - EJ 34 406 - BE 69 525 - Op(AK 30) 704 - BF 47
181 - Op(DG) 413 - Op(AJ 89) 558 - BF 54 706 - BD 77
752 - BF 91

- 17 - On Return Passage: U 109 - 128 - 134 - 167 - 177 - 181 - 406 - 455 -
463 - 591 - 664 - 435.
Entered Port: U 435 - Brest.
Sailed: U 264 - St. Nazaire; U 258 - La Pallice; U 268 - Bergen.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) 1) Convoy No. 2 see para IVa.
2) U 186 reported sinking independent (6,000 GRT) in AL 2882 on
10. January 1943. easterly course.
3) U 632 reported hit on eastward bound 10,000 ton tanker in AL 1725.
Lost contact in heavy squall of rain.
I. U 43 - BF 58 U 182 - DT 88 U 414 - AN 28 U 563 - BE 64 b) None.
1090
 c) Submarine sightings: DN 7647, AL 4190, AK 3832.
Submarine attack: AL 0222 (sunk by U 186).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 2:
At 1254 U 620 picked up a convoy formation. During the day U 571
and U 522 also contacted the convoy. At 2015 U 620 scored 2 hits on 2
tankers in staggered formation during an underwater attack at dusk. The
same boat scored one hit in DH 5119 on a damaged tanker, she then shot
the boat to pieces with gunfire.
- 18 -
U 571 fired a miss from stern tube at a patrol vessel and probably
scored 2 hits on a tanker (9,000 GRT). U 522 sank a tanker (9,000 GRT)
and torpedoed a large tanker. Although 2 tankers had definitely been sunk,
probably even 3, U 511 reported in the morning that the remaining convoy
formation consisted of 2 tankers, 2 submarines also agree with supposition
that 2 convoy formations had been attacked. Two submarines continued
the operation. The remaining boats had lagged behind after being depth-
charged or after making attacks and they are proceeding to the supply
rendezvous in DG 50.
b) 1) U 337, 413, 598, 594, 96 and 266 have arrived N.E. of
Newfoundland. They have been gathered together as Group "Jaguar" and
are manning patrol strip AJ 8799 to BC 2531.
2) U 521, 160, 218 to cruise along approximately longitude 250, 260,
270 West, and have been given DG 42 as temporary approach point.
1091
3) Following order was issued to Group "Falke" - At 1900 patrol to
cruise in 2500, speed 7 knots, at 1030 on 11.1 to turn, course 700, 4 knots
to bridge the night relay of the expected convoy.
4) Group "Habicht" made up of U 226, 186, 383, 303, 624, 704 has
been ordered to man patrol strip from AK 7411 to 7849. This extends the
patrol strip manned by Group "Falke" to the S.E.
V. Reports of Success:
U 620 - 2 hits
U 620 - 1 ship 8,000 GRT (tonnage assumed by B.d.U.)
U 632 - 1 ship 10,000 GRT torpedoed.
U 186 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT
U 522 - 1 ship 9,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
U 571 - 1 ship torpedoed.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
11. January 1943.
I. U 43 - BF 45 U 186 - AL 29 U 413 - Op(BC 21) U 571 - Op(DH)
66 - CG 45 201 - Op(AK 90) 414 - AN 20 572 - Op(AK 60)
69 - Op(AK 90) 217 - Op(EO) 436 - Op(DH) 575 - Op(DG 90)
71 - Op(AK 60) 214 - Op(ED) 438 - BF 44 584 - Op(AK 60)
87 - BF 44 218 - CG 14 440 - BD 77 591 - BF 50
96 - Op(BC 24) 224 - CH 70 441 - Op(AK 30) 594 - Op(BC 23)
105 - Op(ED) 226 - AL 45 442 - Op(DG 90) 598 - Op(BC 21)
109 - DG 49 257 - Op(AK 60) 444 - Op(AK 30) 606 - Op(AK 93)
117 - BD 77 258 - BF 83 455 - BD 77 607 - Op(AK 90)
123 - BD 77 260 - BD 77 459 - ES 87 613 - BF 81
124 - Op(EO) 264 - BF 50 463 - DG 54 614 - AO 30
125 - Op(DG 80) 266 - Op(BC 25) 506 - FD 36 618 - Op(CG 58)
128 - BE 95 268 - AF 79 507 - Op(FB) 620 - Op(DH)
134 - DG 63 303 - AL 28 509 - FD 32 624 - BE 61
160 - CF 38 333 - Op(AK 66) 511 - Op(DH) 631 - Op(AK 30)
 164 - Op(FB) 337 - Op(AJ 87) 514 - Op(DG 80) 632 - Op(AL 60) c) 1) Submarine sightings: CG 5589 (U 618).
167 - BE 52 381 - Op(DH) 516 - ES 55 662 - BD 77 2) Submarine attacks: EP 7210 (U 124?) EO 66 (U 124).
175 - Op(ET) 383 - BE 24 521 - CG 13 664 - BE 86 3) Torpedoing: EK 8890 (U 175?).
176 - Op(ER) 384 - Op(AK 30) 522 - Op(DH) 704 - BE 62 d) None.
177 - EJ 31 403 - AF 71 525 - Op(AK 30) 706 - BD 77
181 - DH 21 404 - Op(AK 60) 558 - BF 47 752 - BF 81 IV. Current Operations:
182 - EJ 31 406 - BF 50 563 - BE 66 a) Convoy No. 2: U 511 was forced by a Sunderland to submerge during
the morning, and at 1609 by 2 Corvettes, so that she lagged behind. As the
2 remaining tankers proceeded at a speed of about 12 to 13 knots and the
submarines would have caught up with them until the next day at the
- 19 - earliest, when they would have reached the area of regular air patrols. The
attack on the convoy was broken off.
FINAL REMARKS.
The operation begun at 1600 on 3.1.1943 took the desired course. The
Group "DELPHIN" patrol picked up the convoy on 8.1. 116 hours after U
514 sent her last shadower report. The convoy continues somewhat south
of the Great Circle, without altering its mean course. The convoy escort,
which consisted mainly of fairly old gun boats and Corvettes, was
inexperienced and not very dogged. Despite excellent hydrophone and
Asdic conditions with very calm weather and sea, it did not succeed in
On Return Passage: U 109 - 128 - 134 - 167 - 177 - 181 - 406 - 455 - badly damaging a single boat, let alone sinking one. Surface location was
563 - 591 - 664. not observed. On the whole the results can be described as very good and
Entered Port: - . - particularly satisfactory for Operational Control, who with great good
Sailed: U 518 - Lorient. fortune were justified in making their hard decisions on 4.1. to desert the
fast convoy proceeding to America which had been contacted once in
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. favor of a convoy which could not be picked up for over 100 hours. 15
tankers totaling about 141,000 GRT were sunk. No submarines were
III. Reports on the Enemy: damaged.
a) 1) Convoy No. 2 see para IVa. b 1) After U 404 had made a report Group "FALKE" was instructed to
2) U 124 11.1. stalked freighter "Angle Indian" in EO 6616, course remain in the position line already reached. U 404, 333, and 584 were
3000, 10 knots. Double miss, torpedoes set too deep, observed before boat then to stalk the ships reported until they had been clearly recognized.
was forced to submerge by air patrol. After they had established that the vessels were Swedish. Group
3) U 404 (Group "Falke") sighted 3 steamers on course of 2000 in AK "FALKE"
6199. Ships were later recognized as the Swedish "FALSTER BOHUES"
and "TUNAHOLM" (see para IV 6.1). - 20 -
b) None.
1092
 be very different if the submarines did not have to seek and find the enemy
for themselves; they are totally unfitted for this task, for it requires large
numbers of boats, it also causes long, wasteful, fruitless waiting.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

12. January 1943.

was ordered to cruise from its position line at 1900 AK 3759 to AK
9525 in patrol strip on a course of 2500, speed 6 knots.At 1030 on 12.1 to
proceed on a course of 700, speed 4 knots.
2) U 438, 752, 613 have joined Group "Habicht" and have instructions
to proceed at cruising speed to extend the patrol strip from AL 7885 to BE
1241.
3) U 558, 87 have been ordered to proceed to DG 50. It is intended to
form a new group to operate against convoys from Trinidad to North
Africa (see convoy No. 2).
c) 1) U 177 passed on her experiences to U 182 and handed over "Eisbär"
order.
2) So far, because of bad weather, only U 662 has refueled from U 117.
This rules out the possibility of detailing the remaining boats of former
Group "Spitz" (U 123, 260, 440, 706, 662) and Group "Jaguar" to attack
the expected northeast convoy (HX or SC) N.E. of Newfoundland.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
The setting-up of Group "Falke" was not successful, the "ONS" convoy
was not contacted. The two unsuccessful operations prove the crying need
for more submarines. The longer the patrol strip and the closer the boats,
the greater the chance of contacting a convoy. Present lack of submarines
prevents the setting-up of several patrols with sufficient boats (as already
shown on 9.1. in the War Diary). As long as reinforcements from home
remain as weak as during the last few months, conditions will not improve.
This once again emphasizes the great draw back of our naval warfare: the
lack of all air reconnaissance. The effect of our submarine warfare would
1093
I. U 43 - BE 63 U 186 - AL 48 U 413 - Op(BC 21) U 563 - BF 40
66 - CG 76 201 - Op(AK 90) 414 - AN 20 571 - Op(DH)
69 - Op(AK 60) 214 - Op(ED) 436 - DG 50 572 - Op(AK 60)
71 - Op(AK 60) 217 - Op(EO) 438 - BE 62 575 - DG 50
87 - BE 93 218 - CF 65 440 - BD 77 584 - Op(AK 60)
96 - Op(BC 24) 224 - CH 70 441 - Op(AK 30) 591 - BF 52
105 - Op(ED) 226 - AL 74 442 - DG 50 594 - Op(BC 21)
109 - DG 50 257 - Op(AK 60) 444 - Op(AK 30) 598 - Op(BC 21)
117 - BD 77 258 - BF 43 455 - BD 77 606 - Op(AK 90)
123 - BD 77 260 - BD 77 459 - FD 25 607 - Op(AK 90)
124 - Op(EO 65) 264 - BF 49 463 - DG 54 613 - BF 47
125 - Op(DG 90) 266 - Op(BC 25) 506 - FE 45 614 - AN 26
128 - BE 92 268 - AF 71 507 - Op(FB) 618 - Op(CG 58)
134 - CF 12 303 - AL 51 509 - FD 36 620 - Op(DG)
160 - CF 56 333 - Op(AK 60) 511 - DH 50 624 - BE 62
164 - Op(FB) 337 - Op(AJ 87) 514 - Op(DG) 631 - Op(AK 30)
167 - BE 68 381 - DG 68 516 - ES 90 632 - Op(AK 30)
175 - Op(ET) 383 - AL 87 518 - BF 57 662 - BC 89
176 - Op(ER) 384 - Op(AK 30) 521 - CG 17 664 - BE 93
177 - EJ 31 403 - AE 68 522 - Op(DH) 704 - BE 29
181 - CF 13 404 - Op(AK 50) 525 - Op(AK 30) 706 - BD 77
182 - EJ 31 406 - BF 64 558 - BF 47 752 - BF 47
- 21 -

On Return Passage: U 109 - 128 - 134 - 167 - 177 - 181 - 406 - 455 -
563 - 591 - 664.
Entered Port: U 591 - Brest; U 406 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 202 - Brest; U 187 - 707 - 466 - 358 - 223 - 267 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - b) None.
c) Submarine sightings: EV 72 (no boat), ED 24, EO 60.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Group "JAGUAR" was ordered to steer a course of 2000, speed 6
knots from 1200 in the patrol strip. At 2100 to turn and go on a course of
500, speed 9 knots. At 1200 on 13.1. to turn and go on a course of 2300,
speed 4 knots. These movements are intended to ensure that the middle
boats of the patrol should contact the expected "HX" convoy, whose
position on 10.1. was known from high priority Radio Intercept
Intelligence, during daylight today.
2) Group "FALKE" was ordered to remain on the position line from AK
2898 to AK 9457 reached at 1900, and form a patrol strip there. This
Group is to be detailed to attack the convoy group assigned to Group
"JAGUAR" if it is contacted, or to join Group "HABICHT" to pick up a
westbound convoy that is expected.
3) Group "DELPHIN" (U 514 - 125 - 522 - 511 - 442 - 575 - 436 - 381 -
620 - 571) have been ordered to stand-by in patrol strip from CE 8434 to
DG 1961 by 0000 on 16.1. to carry out partial refueling. It is planned to
1094
operate against a convoy reported by high priority Radio Intercept
intelligence to be sailing on a new convoy route (Great Circle New York-
Canaries).
4) U 160 has replaced U 522 in Group "SEEHUND" and has been
ordered to make for GG 10 (Capetown).
c) U 459 reported that 2 destroyers were waiting in the rendezvous square
FD 25 where she was to meet the Italian submarine J 28. Rendezvous was
moved to FD 34.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
- 22 -
13. January 1943.
I. U 43 - CG 12 U 187 - AO 70 U 404 - Op(AK 50) U 558 - BE 69
66 - DJ 12 201 - Op(AK 90) 413 - Op(BC 21) 563 - BF 55
69 - Op(AK 50) 202 - BF 54 414 - Stavanger 571 - DG 65
71 - Op(AK 50) 214 - Op(ED) 436 - DG 54 572 - Op(AK 50)
87 - BE 97 217 - Op(EO) 438 - BE 37 575 - DG 54
96 - Op(BC 24) 218 - CG 17 440 - BD 77 584 - Op(AK 50)
105 - Op(ED) 223 - AO 70 441 - Op(AK 20) 594 - Op(BC 21)
109 - DG 50 226 - AL 74 442 - DG 54 598 - Op(BC 21)
117 - BD 77 257 - Op(AK 50) 444 - Op(AK 20) 606 - Op(AK 90)
123 - BD 77 258 - BF 44 455 - BD 77 607 - Op(AK 90)
124 - Op(EO) 260 - BD 77 459 - FD 31 613 - BE 65
 125 - DG 52 264 - BF 44 463 - DG 54 614 - AF 79 a) None.
128 - BF 70 266 - Op(BC 25) 466 - AO 70 618 - Op(CG 58) b) 1) U 662 joined Group "Jaguar" and was ordered to extend the patrol
134 - CF 85 267 - AO 70 506 - FE 85 620 - DG 64 strip to the southeast by one station.
160 - CF 82 268 - AE 68 507 - Op(FB) 624 - BE 53
164 - Op(FB) 303 - AL 72 509 - FE 45 631 - Op(AK 20) - 23 -
167 - BF 47 333 - Op(AK 50) 511 - DH 42 632 - Op(AK 20)
175 - Op(ET) 337 - Op(AJ 87) 514 - DG 52 662 - BC 37
176 - Op(ER) 358 - AO 70 516 - ES 90 664 - BF 68
177 - DT 67 381 - DG 54 518 - BF 70 704 - BE 25
181 - CF 86 383 - BE 24 521 - CF 66 706 - BD 77
182 - EJ 67 384 - Op(AK 50) 522 - DG 39 707 - AO 70
186 - Op(AL 74) 403 - AE 83 525 - AK 50 752 - BE 65

On Return Passage: U 109 - 128 - 134 - 167 - 177 - 181 - 455 - 563 - 2) Group "Jaguar" was ordered to halt at 2030 and move its position in
618 - 664. the direction of the patrol strip by 30 miles to the N.W. and man the newly
Entered Port: U 664 - La Pallice. reached position line from AJ 8829 to BC 2531 as a patrol strip. If they do
Sailed: U 456 - Bergen. not establish any contact during the night, they are to proceed in the patrol
strip on a course of 2300, speed 4 knots at 1200 on 14.1. The patrol strip
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. has been shifted so that according to previously ascertained passage points
the boats shall be more favorably placed to intercept the slow "SC" convoy
III. Reports on the Enemy: as well.
a) 1) U 507 reported convoy in FB 5643, course 1150, speed 8 knots. 3) Approach points:
Boat was ordered to attack. a) U 264, 202, 258 = DG 25. Now disposition of a group S. of the
2) U 403 reported patrol formation, 4 steam trawlers making a great Azores.
deal of smoke, hove to in AE 38. b) U 268 and U 403 to AL 16 as reinforcements for previous Group
3) U 124 reported regular naval air patrols from EO 66 to EP 47 "Falke" - "Habicht", or for a new disposition.
observed from 11.1.
b) None.
c) 1) Submarine sightings: FB 55 (U 507?), EP 47, ER 58. c) After U 66 has carried out her special task (landing an agent in
2) According to a radio broadcast, an American bomber has sunk a Morocco), she is to operate in DT 40 if situation permits.
German submarine in the Bay of Biscay. There is no evidence that it was d) U 459 and J 28 carried out refueling.
one of our boats. e) None.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
IV. Current Operations:
1095
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
14. January 1943.
I. U 43 - CG 21 U 187 - AN 30 U 404 - Op(AK 60) U 525 - Op(AK
60)
66 - DJ 201 - Op(AK 90) 413 - Op(AJ 80) 558 - BE 95
69 - Op(AK 90) 202 - BF 40 414 - Stavanger 563 - BF 52
71 - Op(AK 60) 214 - Op(EC) 436 - DG 54 571 - DG 54
87 - CF 35 217 - Op(EO) 438 - BE 25 572 - Op(AK 90)
96 - Op(BC 20) 218 - CF 68 440 - BD 77 575 - DG 54
105 - Op(ED) 223 - AN 30 441 - Op(AK 20) 584 - Op(AK 60)
109 - DG 55 226 - AL 74 442 - DG 54 594 - Op(BC 20)
117 - BD 77 257 - Op(AK 60) 444 - Op(AK 20) 598 - Op(BC 20)
123 - BC 65 258 - BE 93 455 - BD 77 606 - Op(AK 90)
125 - EP 41 260 - BD 70 456 - AF 79 607 - Op(AK 90)
124 - DG 24 264 - BE 93 459 - FD 34 613 - BE 53
128 - BF 58 266 - Op(BC 20) 463 - DG 54 614 - AF 72
134 - CF 67 267 - AN 30 466 - AN 30 618 - BF 77
160 - DH 11 268 - AE 83 506 - FM 16 620 - DG 54
164 - Op(FB) 303 - Op(AL 74) 507 - Op(FB 56) 624 - BE 59
167 - BF 40 333 - OP(AK 60) 509 - FE 73 631 - Op(AK 20)
175 - Op(ET) 337 - Op(AJ 80) 511 - DG 35 632 - Op(AK 20)
176 - Op(ER) 358 - AN 30 514 - DG 22 662 - Op(BC 20)
177 - DT 37 381 - DG 54 516 - FD 33 704 - BE 13
181 - CG 41 383 - AL 87 518 - BF 40 706 - BD 77
182 - EJ 92 384 - AK 60 521 - CF 31 707 - AN 30
186 - Op(AL 74) 403 - AE 88 522 - DG 34 752 - BE 53
On Return Passage: U 109 - 124 - 128 - 134 - 167 - 177 - 181 - 455 -
563 - 618.
Entered Port: U 563 - Brest.
Sailed: U 402 - La Pallice.
1096
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
- 24 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 217 reported: No shipping yet met with in EO.
2) U 618 reported: On 11.1. depth charged by destroyer in CG 5831.
Otherwise only neutral shipping.
3) U 134 sighted a convoy at 2300 in CF 3545 on a southerly course, no
contact established. As the boats proceeding south were far behind the
convoy, it was useless to try to launch an attack.
4) U 444 sighted a seaplane in AK 6114.
5) U 441 reported moderate air patrolling in AK 37 - 38.
6) U 333 reported land-based plane in AK 6.
b) None.
c) 1) Submarine sightings: BF 4735.
2) Submarine attack: CA 50 (none of our boats there).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) U 403 has joined Group "Falke" in place of U 441.U 441 is
returning.
2) Group "Falke" was ordered to man a new patrol strip from AL 1367
to 4732 by 0800 on 16.1.
3) Group "Habicht" was ordered to take up new positions from AL 4841
to 8489. This patrol strip joins that of Group "Falke". An outbound
"ONS" convoy is expected from 16.1. in the area covered by paragraphs 2
and 3.
4) U 123 has joined Group "Jaguar" and extended the patrol strip by one
position to the southeast.
5) Group "Jaguar" was ordered to man the position line reached at 2030
as a patrol strip.
c) Boats of Group "Delphin" (U 442, 436, 575, 571, 620) have refueled
and replenished torpedoes from U 463 and U 109; they are now
proceeding according to instructions to the new patrol strip.
V. Reports of Success: None.
- 25 -
15. January 1943.
I. U 43 - CG 17 U 187 - AN 20 U 403 - AL 24 U 522 - CE 88
66 - DJ 201 - Op(AK 90) 404 - Op(AK 60) 525 - Op(AK 60)
69 - Op(AK 90) 202 - BF 70 413 - Op(AJ 80) 558 - BE 97
71 - Op(AK 60) 214 - Op(EC) 414 - AE 85 571 - DG 54
87 - CF 23 217 - Op(EO) 436 - DG 54 572 - Op(AK 90)
96 - Op(BC 20) 218 - CF 94 438 - BE 21 575 - DG 54
105 - Op(ED) 223 - AN 20 440 - BD 77 584 - OP(AK 60)
109 - DG 54 226 - Op(AL 74) 441 - AK 62 594 - BC 20
117 - BD 77 257 - Op(AK 60) 442 - DG 54 598 - Op(AJ 80)
123 - Op(BC 25) 258 - BE 96 444 - Op(AK 30) 606 - Op(AK 90)
1097
124 - EP 15 260 - BD 77 455 - BD 77 607 - Op(AK 90)
125 - CE 84 264 - BE 98 456 - AF 56 613 - BE 64
128 - BF 61 266 - Op(BC 20) 459 - FE 47 614 - AE 68
134 - CF 33 267 - AN 20 463 - DG 53 618 - BF 74
160 - DH 41 268 - AE 87 466 - AN 20 620 - DG 54
164 - Op(FB) 303 - Op(AL 74) 506 - FM 51 624 - BE 54
167 - BF 55 333 - Op(AK 60) 507 - Op(FB) 631 - Op(AK 30)
175 - Op(ET) 337 - Op(AJ 80) 509 - FM 12 632 - Op(AK 30)
176 - Op(ER) 358 - AN 20 511 - DG 22 662 - Op(BC 20)
177 - DH 78 381 - DG 54 514 - CE 84 704 - AL 87
181 - CG 12 383 - AL 74 516 - FE 41 706 - BD 77
182 - ES 37 384 - Op(AK 60) 518 - BE 70 707 - AN 20
186 - Op(AL 74) 402 - BF 91 521 - CF 88 752 - BE 64
On Return Passage: U 109 - 124 - 128 - 134 - 167 - 177 - 181 - 441 -
455 - 463 - 618.
Entered Port: U 128 - Lorient.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - b) None.
c) Submarine sightings: BF 6817, AK 3847, AL 3726, AK 66.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) After they had carried out refueling the order of Group "Delphin"
from north to south was as follows: U 514, 125, 522, 511, 442, 436, 575,
381, 571, 620. The Group has been ordered to cruise on a course of 2850,
speed 6 knots in the patrol strip from 1100 on 16.1, in order to gain more
space to the west for fighting.
 2) After reception of position reports from Group "Habicht" the order of
the patrol strip from N.W. to S.E. has been altered as follows: U 226, 186,
383, 303, 704, 438, 624, 613, 752.
3) U 268 and U 414 have joined Group "Falke" and lengthened the
patrol strip to the north.
- 26 -
4) Temporary attack areas have been allocated as follows: U 521 - DG
65 and 68; UU 218 - DG 69 and 93. U 43 and U 518 have been given DG
92 as approach point. It is intended at a later date to rake to the south with
these boats and attack convoy traffic from Trinidad to Freetown or the
coast of Brazil.
5) U 175 has been given a free hand to the west as far as off Freetown in
the S.E.
6) U 105, 214, 217 have been given freedom of maneuver until they
begin their return voyage.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
Neither the "SC" nor the "HX" convoy (Group "Jaguar") were
contacted. Unfortunately delays in refueling reduced Group "Jaguar" to 6
boats. Probably "SC" and "HX" passed to the north of the submarine
disposition.
These two convoys bring the total up to four that have been missed since
31.12. It must be assumed that the enemy has left the convoy routes that
1098
he has been sailing for nearly 5 months and is again scattering his convoy
routes.This development is a great drawback to attacks by our boat, but
was only to be expected. As has already been emphasized in this War
Diary, it was quite inexplicable why the English stuck so stubbornly to
almost the same convoy routes for six months, which greatly simplified
finding the convoys.
Probably the convoy routes to the north have been moved into the patrol
areas of the Greenland and Iceland units. The next step for us to take is to
make long dispositions with numerous boats so as to find out exactly what
detours the enemy is making. Groups "Falke" and "Habicht" have been
given a disposition for 16.1 against the "ONS" convoy with this end in
view. If this operation is again unsuccessful, it will be necessary to patrol
farther to the north, preferably in the area S.E. of Greenland.
(Signed): DÖNITZ
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
16 - 31 January 1943
PG30316
16.January 1943.
I. U 43 - CF 65 U 201 - Op(AL 40) U 404 - Op(AL 10) U 525 -
Op(AL 10)
66 - DJ 202 - BE 99 413 - Op(AJ 80) 558 - CF 25
69 - Op(AL 40) 214 - Op(EC) 414 - AE 79 571 - Op(DG 10)
71 - Op(AL 40) 217 - Op(EO) 436 - Op(DG 10) 572 - Op(AL 40)
87 - CF 52 218 - DH 13 438 - Op(AL 84) 575 - Op(DG 10)
96 - Op(BC 20) 223 - AN 20 440 - BD 77 584 - Op(AL 10)
 105 - Op(ED) 226 - Op(AL 40) 441 - AK 47 594 - Op(BC 20) a) None.
109 - CE 65 257 - Op(AL 10) 442 - Op(CE 80) 598 - Op(BC 20) b) 1) New position U 87, 558, 258, 202 and 264 = DF 33. Intended
117 - ED 77 258 - BE 98 444 - Op(AL 10) 606 - Op(AL 40) detachment in group "Delphin".
123 - Op(BC 20) 260 - BD 77 455 - BD 85 607 - Op(AL 40) U 614 and 456 proceed to AL 17.
124 - EF 97 264 - BE 96 456 - AF 41 613 - BE 25 2) Groups "Falke" and "Habicht" received orders to steer on a course of
125 - Op(CE 80) 266 - Op(BC 20) 459 - FE 75 614 - AE 83 3300 at a speed of 6 knots on 1100, and to occupy the position lines
134 - BE 98 267 - AF 76 463 - DG 35 618 - BF 73 "Falke" from AD 8835 to AK 6362; "Habicht" from AL 4171 to 7229 at
160 - DH 47 268 - AL 21 466 - AN 20 620 - Op(DG 10) 0430 on 17.1 as patrol channels.
164 - Op(FB) 303 - Op(AL 70) 506 - FM 58 624 - BF 13
167 - BF 64 333 - Op(AL 10) 507 - Op(FB) 631 - Op(AL 10) - 28 -
175 - Op(ET) 337 - Op(AJ 80) 509 - FM 19 632 - Op(AL 10)
176 - Op(ER) 358 - AN 28 511 - Op(DG 10) 662 - Op(BC 20)
177 - DH 72 381 - Op(DG 10) 514 - Op(CE 80) 704 - Op(AL 70)
181 - BF 74 383 - Op(AL 40) 516 - FE 49 706 - BD 77
182 - ES 68 384 - Op(AK) 518 - CG 12 707 - AN 20
186 - Op(AL 40) 402 - BF 80 521 - DH 18 752 - BE 28
187 - AF 79 403 - Op(AL 10) 522 - Op(CE 80)

On Return Passage: U 109 - 124 - 134 - 167 - 177 - 181 - 441 - 455 - U 414 and 268 exchange positions owing to reversed times of arrival.
463 - 618. This move to the N.W. follows a Radio Intelligence report, according to
Entered Port: U 167 - Lorient. which the last ONS convoy apparently deviated far to the N. as far as the
Sailed: U 510 - 156 - Lorient; U 609 - 465 - St. Nazaire; U 553 - 262 - new patrolled area.
La Pallice. 3) As, according to Radio Intelligence report (special) the convoy New
York/Gibraltar has been delayed for 6 days. Group "Delphin" received
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. orders to proceed on a course of 2850 at a speed of 6 knots by day and to
remain in patrol channels at night. Intention: Perfect patrol of occupied
III. Reports on the Enemy: channels and area gain for actions.
a) U 214 sighted 8 tankers putting out in EC 92 easterly course, speed 12 4) As it may be presumed with certainty that the expected HX and SC
knots. Betrayed by splash of torpedo discharge during daylight attack. No (convoy) passed imperceived, the boats of Group "Jaguar" are allocated
contact. the following operation areas until planned arrival of next convoys: In AJ:
b) None. U 337 = 7655, U 413 = 7963, U 598 = 8491, U 594 = 8792, U 96 = 8887,
c) U-boat sightings: AL 1413, AL 1442. U 123 = 8982, - In BC: U 266 = 2126, U 662 = 2257. This should ensure
d) None. a further if not infallible patrol of this area used by the enemy for
Greenland and Iceland convoys.
IV. Current Operations: c) - d) None.
1099
 On Return Passage: U 109 - 124 - 134 - 177 - 181 - 441 - 455 - 463 -
V. Reports of Success: None. 618.
Entered Port: - . -
--------------------------------------------------- Sailed: - . -
---------------
- 29 -
17. January 1943.

I. U 43 - CF 91 U 202 - CG 11 U 413 - Op(AJ 79) U 525 - Op(AK 30)

66 - DJ 214 - Op(EC) 414 - Op(AD 80) 553 - BF 91
69 - Op(AK 30) 217 - Op(EO) 436 - Op(DG 10) 558 - CF 53
71 - Op(AK 30) 218 - DH 41 438 - Op(AL 40) 571 - Op(DG 10)
87 - CF 49 223 - AF 79 440 - BD 77 572 - Op(AK 30)
96 - Op(AJ 20) 226 - Op(AL 40) 441 - AL 78 575 - Op(DG 10)
105 - Op(ED) 257 - Op(AK 30) 442 - Op(CE 70) 584 - Op(AK 30)
109 - CF 43 258 - CF 33 444 - Op(AK 30) 594 - Op(AJ 87)
117 - BD 77 260 - BD 77 455 - BD 94 598 - Op(AJ 84)
123 - Op(AJ 89) 262 - BF 91 456 - AE 91 606 - Op(AK 60)
124 - EF 59 264 - BE 98 459 - FM 11 607 - AK 60
125 - Op(CE 70) 266 - Op(BC 21) 463 - CF 79 609 - BF 58
134 - BF 71 267 - AF 71 465 - BF 58 613 - AL 88
156 - BF 54 268 - Op(AD 80) 466 - AF 79 614 - AE 85
160 - DH 77 303 - Op(AL 40) 506 - FM 94 618 - BF 58
164 - Op(FB) 333 - Op(AK 30) 507 - Op(FB) 620 - Op(DG 10)
175 - Op(ET) 337 - Op(AJ 76) 509 - FM 54 624 - AL 72
176 - Op(ER) 358 - AF 79 510 - BF 54 632 - Op(AD 80)
177 - DH 43 381 - Op(DG 10) 511 - Op(CE 70) 631 - Op(AK 30)
181 - BF 91 383 - Op(AL 40) 514 - Op(CE 70) 662 - Op(BC 22)
182 - ES 99 384 - Op(AK 30) 516 - FE 87 704 - Op(AL 40)
186 - Op(AL 40) 402 - BF 70 518 - CG 17 706 - BD 77
187 - HF 71 403 - Op(AK 30) 521 - DG 66 707 - AF 79
201 - Op(AK 30) 404 - Op(AK 30) 522 - Op(CE 70) 752 - AL 88
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Escort report from U 268 and operation of Group "Falke" see
paragraph IVa.
2) U 66 sighted 2 heavy cruisers and 4 destroyers on a course of 650 in
DH 7297, speed 20 knots. Contact lost short time afterwards.
3) U 105 Situation: Nothing sighted for 8 days, apart from a destroyer,
in area of Tobago Passage. Regular traffic to Port of Spain is therefore
unlikely through this way. Boat sank a freighter in ED 5956. Night aerial
activity experienced once without radar in ED 8653. Otherwise nothing
confirmed. Return passage owing to fuel situation.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: BF 9211, ER 4910, EO 5586, AL 1178, AD 8928,
BB 8816.
2) U-boat attack in AD 8917.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:

1100
 a) As it is presumed that the boats belonging to Group "Falke" and
"Habicht" are W. of the expected convoys, both groups proceeded on an
easterly course with a speed of 6 knots at 1300.
U 414 and 631 were attacked several times in the course of the
afternoon by enemy wheeled aircraft and search groups. As up to dusk the
convoy had not been found, both groups turned on a course of 2700 with
speed of 6 knots at 1900. In this way the convoy was to be prevented from
passing through imperceived by night. At 2136 U 268 reported (T.O.O.
1600) a large convoy on a northwesterly course in AD 8947. Boat
attacked and sank large tanker. Subsequently forced to submerge for 6
hours by aircraft and destroyers. According to boats estimate this was
connected with a HX convoy. As U 268 was about 55 miles astern and
contact was lost - also as Group "Falke" could not have reached the
convoy until the next day in an area of heavy enemy air protection it was
not detailed for action. Instead the boats U 614 and 456 coming from the
east and in approximately AE 70 were assigned for this task. "Falke" and
"Habicht" also U 268 proceeded further to the W. and on 18.1 at dawn
return back from reached AD 8735 to AK 1262 also AK 1371 to AL 2129
to 900 at a speed of 6 knots.
U 632 fired 2 misses at an escort vessel in AD 8974. U 631 sighted
unidentified craft on westerly course in AK 3267. No further contact with
the enemy. Whether this refers to an escort craft has not been ascertained.
b) 1) New position for U 402, 609, 465, 553 and 262 = AJ 90. A
reinforcement of Group "Jaguar" is intended with this boat.
2) U 66 proceeds to EH 90 on completion of special duties.
- 30 -
1101
3) U 706 has taken on supplies from U 117 and occupies BC 2318,
depth 40 seamiles as action area.
4) Group "Delphin" remains at 2030 in the patrol channels reached up to
now, convoy has not yet been intercepted.
c) Further supplying from U 117 was not possible up to now owing to
bad weather conditions. U 260 and U 440 still expect replenishment of
supplies. Latter received ordered to return owing to the small amount on
the tanker.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 105 - 1 sailing ship
U 268 - 1 ship 14,000 GRT (presumed by B.d.U.)
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
18. January 1943.
I. U 43 - DH 13 U 202 - CF 52 U 413 - Op(AJ 79) U 525 - Op(AK
30)
66 - DH 84 214 - Op(EC) 414 - Op(AD 80) 553 - BF 49
69 - Op(AK 30) 217 - Op(EO) 436 - Op(DG 10) 558 - CF 29
71 - Op(AK 30) 218 - Op(DG 60) 438 - Op(AK 60) 571 - Op(DG 10)
87 - CE 92 223 - AF 71 440 - BD 78 572 - Op(AK 30)
96 - Op(AJ 80) 226 - Op(AK 60) 441 - BE 29 575 - Op(DG 10)
105 - EE 58 257 - Op(AK 30) 442 - Op(CE 70) 584 - Op(AK 30)
109 - CF 29 258 - BE 87 444 - Op(AK 30) 594 - Op(AJ 87)
117 - BD 77 260 - BD 77 455 - BE 71 598 - Op(AJ 84)
123 - Op(AJ 89) 262 - BF 82 456 - AE 85 606 - Op(AK 60)
124 - EF 62 264 - CF 36 459 - FM 14 607 - Op(AK 60)
125 - Op(CE 70) 266 - Op(BC 21) 463 - CF 49 609 - BF 49
134 - BF 92 267 - AE 68 465 - BF 49 613 - Op(AL 47)
156 - BF 48 268 - Op(AD 80) 466 - AF 71 614 - AE 78
 160 - DT 28 303 - Op(AK 60) 506 - FT 33 618 - BF 64
164 - Op(FB) 333 - Op(AK 30) 507 - Op(FB) 620 - Op(DG 10)
175 - Op(ET) 337 - Op(AJ 76) 509 - FM 94 624 - Op(AK 60)
176 - Op(ER) 358 - AF 79 510 - BF 48 631 - Op(AK 30)
177 - DH 21 381 - Op(DG 10) 511 - Op(CE 70) 632 - Op(AD 80)
181 - BF 93 383 - Op(AK 60) 514 - Op(CE 70) 662 - Op(BC 22)
182 - FE 15 384 - Op(AK 80) 516 - FM 19 704 - Op(AK 60)
186 - Op(AK 60) 402 - BE 92 518 - CF 22 706 - Op(BC 23)
187 - AE 69 403 - Op(AK 30) 521 - Op(DG 60) 707 - AF 48
201 - Op(AK 30) 404 - Op(AK 30) 522 - Op(CE 70) 752 - Op(AL 70)
On Return Passage: U 105 - 109 - 124 - 134 - 177 - 181 - 441 - 455 -
463 - 618.
Entered Port: U 618 - St. Nazaire; U 181 - Bordeaux.
Sailed: U 454 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 175 has been in west - northwest sector off Freetown since 8.1.
- 31 -
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 6467, EO 5586, AL 1178, AD 8928, AL 2189.
U-boat attack in AD 8917.
d) None.
1102
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) From 1030 groups "Falke" and Habicht" approached the convoy at
1030 at a speed of 4 knots in bad weather conditions and remained in
position line reached at 1400 as patrol lines. U 594 and 226 were attacked
in the afternoon by "Consolidated" (Trans: flying boat?) and wheeled
aircraft.
At sunset both groups again proceeded at a speed of 6 knots to the W.
and slow up at 1130 in patrol lines from AD 7926 to AK 6142 also AK
6181 to AK 9317. If the convoy has not yet passed the lines, a one to one
and a half days postponement must have taken place. It is intended to
remain in patrol lines during the day and if the convoy is then not
intercepted to be redisposed in another area.
2) U 614 and 456 who were both detailed to operate on the HX convoy
broke off operations at dawn and steered a course for AL 94 at economical
cruising speed.
3) Group "Delphin" proceeded on a course of 2850, with a speed of 6
knots at 1100 and remained as patrol from CE 7162 to DF 3669 at 2030.
Passage further to the W. is not intended. The passing of the convoy can
still be expected.
4) In order to intercept another convoy expected on 20.1 and yet another
on 21.1 Group "Jaguar" is to take up the following patrol lines from AJ
7915 to BC 2135. Order: U 337 - 413 - 598 - 594 - 96 - 266 - 123 - 706
and 622.
5) U 43 is to occupy DG 64 and 67 as operations area until an intended
reconnaissance line is disposed to the S.
6) In contrast to the disposition in AJ 9 intended previously, the
following boats from Western France receive AJ 97 as new position. U
553, 609, 465, 262 and 402.
c) - d) None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 32 - 201 - Op(AK 30) 404 - Op(AK 30) 521 - DG 60 752 - Op(AK 93)
202 - CF 49 413 - Op(AJ 70) 522 - Op(CE 70)

On Return Passage: U 105 - 109 - 124 - 134 - 177 - 440 - 441 - 455 -
463.
Entered Port: U 134 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 504 - Lorient.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

19. January 1943.
I. U 43 - DH 17 U 214 - Op(EC) U 414 - Op(AD 80) U 525 - Op(AK
30)
66 - DH 12 217 - Op(EO) 436 - Op(DF 30) 553 - BE 60
69 - Op(AK 30) 218 - DG 60 438 - Op(AK 60) 558 - CF 29
71 - Op(AK 30) 223 - AE 65 440 - BD 88 571 - Op(DF 30)
87 - CE 89 226 - Op(AK 60) 441 - BE 62 572 - Op(AK 30)
96 - Op(AJ 80) 257 - Op(AK 30) 442 - Op(CE 70) 575 - Op(DF 30)
105 - EE 64 258 - CF 28 444 - Op(AK 30) 584 - Op(AK 30)
109 - CF 29 260 - BD 77 454 - BF 67 594 - Op(AJ 70)
117 - BD 77 262 - BF 42 455 - BE 73 598 - Op(AJ 80)
123 - Op(AJ 80) 264 - CF 53 456 - AL 34 606 - Op(AK 60)
124 - EG 11 266 - Op(AJ 80) 459 - FM 58 607 - Op(AK 61)
125 - Op(CE 70) 267 - AE 83 463 - CF 28 609 - BE 69
134 - BF 68 268 - Op(AD 80) 465 - BE 60 613 - Op(AK 60)
156 - BE 96 303 - Op(AK 60) 466 - AE 65 614 - Op(AL 30)
160 - DT 59 333 - Op(AK 30) 506 - FU 18 620 - Op(DF 30)
164 - Op(FB) 337 - OP(AJ 70) 507 - Op(FB) 624 - Op(AK 60)
175 - Op(ET) 358 - AF 72 509 - FT 33 631 - Op(AK 30)
176 - Op(ER) 381 - Op(DF 30) 510 - BE 93 632 - Op(AD 30)
177 - CF 67 383 - Op(AK 60) 511 - Op(CE 70) 662 - Op(BC 20)
182 - FE 51 384 - Op(AK 30) 514 - Op(CE 70) 704 - Op(AK 60)
186 - Op(AK 60) 402 - BE 55 516 - FM 55 706 - Op(AJ 80)
187 - AE 67 403 - Op(AK 30) 518 - CF 27 707 - AE 69
1103
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - b) None.
c) U-boat sightings in EP 44.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) As the expected convoy was not found during the day, its
appearance must no longer be anticipated. The groups "Falke" and
Habicht" will be relieved of their duties and each redistributed according
to their fuel supply.
U 414, 268, 403, 525, 69, 201, 606, 226, 186, 383, 303, 438, 607, 624,
704, 613, 752 received orders to take up reconnaissance lines from AJ
3141 to AK 4691 at 1300 on 22.1. course 2100. Passage speed 5 knots.
The boats form the group "Haudegen".
Boats with less fuel will be disposed in reconnaissance lines from AL
4447 to BE 2136. Order: U 187 - 267 - 632 - 631 - 444 - 384 - 404 - 456 -
333 - 614 - 584 - 257 - 71 - 572 - 402 - 465 - 553 - 609 and 262.
Southwestward bound convoy
- 33 -
 31.7.1942 ON "Falke" 13
8.1.1943 ONS "Falke" 14
12/13.1.1943 HX, SC. "Jaguar" 6
16.1.1943 ONS "Falke-Hadicht" 27

is expected on 24.1. Boats arriving early in position are to submerge Altogether only one convoy (HX) was intercepted for a short period on
during the day in order to avoid interception by English air 17.1.1943 and an operation was not possible.
reconnaissance. For remarks on the ordered disposition see paragraph IV. 2. The non-interception of the last ONS is a further confirmation of the
2) According to a Radio Intelligence report received a north bound conjecture that the English have begun to spread out their convoys and
convoy close to the Newfoundland coast is expected sooner than was first possibly deflected their routes considerably to the N. This evasive
presumed. Group "Jaguar", therefore received orders to take up position movement can at the most only be out-maneuvered by a long disposition
in new reconnaissance lines from AJ 7561 to AJ 8827 at 0000 on 20.1. in the area S.E. of Cape Farewell. It is possible here to fight to the S.W.
From 1200 on 20.1. to proceed at a speed of 4 knots on a reconnaissance and N.E. with some chance of success and to bring pressure to bear on
line, course 2000. The strip from AJ 7565 to AJ 8818 is to be narrowed ON, ONS, HX and SC convoys.
owing to the temporary breakdown of U 96.
3) New positions for U 707, 358, 223 and 466 is AK 38: for U 267 and
U 187, AL 44. The last two boats must have reached the ordered grid by - 34 -
0000 on 24.1 owing to the waited convoy.
4) U 43, 521, 218 and 518 proceed at economical cruising speed to DU
72. U 66 is to occupy grid DU 72 and 73 as temporary operations area
after execution of the special duties. According to agents reports there is
strong north-south traffic in this area. For this reason the boats are not
taking up the intended reconnaissance channels to the S.
c) U 109 has taken the Warrant Quartermaster from U 558 on board and
continues the return passage.
d) U 507 reported convoy in FB 5643 on 13.1. It received orders to
attack. In spite of repeated requests boat has not reported since then. It 3. The next operations possible are on HX, SC (convoys) on 20/21.1
must be presumed to have been sunk by the convoy escort, and considered and ON (convoy) on 24.1. It is possible to operate on all these convoys
lost. with the number of boats now available. (See under IV paragraph B 1). It
is not, however, possible to reinforce the group "Jaguar" (North of
V. Reports of Success: None. Newfoundland Bank) within the time limit. The group will be entirely
disposed to the W., according to the information obtained by the
VI. General: decyphering section on the positions of the lost HX convoy.
1. The following operations in the North Atlantic have not been
successful: ---------------------------------------------------
Date Convoy to be intercepted Group No. of Boats. ---------------
1104
 III. Reports on the Enemy:
20. January 1943. a) 1) U 176 searched from 9 - 12.1 in the lower half of ER 80 with long
legs on the Equator to the E. and also on the way to FD 25.
2) U 182 sank ship type "Clan Macnat" of 6,000 GRT in EJ 8994 on
I. U 43 - DH 44 U 217 - Op(EO) U 436 - Op(DF 30) U 553 - BF 61 15.1 Course 2800, speed 10 knots. (Pencil note: Br. S.S. Ocean Courage).
66 - DU 43 218 - DH 77 438 - AK 56 558 - CF 29 3) U 177 sighted unidentified U-boat in BF 7692. According to dead
69 - AK 29 223 - AE 83 440 - BD 98 571 - Op(DF 80) reckoning not one of ours.
71 - AK 39 226 - AK 52 441 - BF 40 572 - AK 39 b) None.
87 - DG 13 257 - AK 39 442 - Op(CE 70) 575 - Op(DF 30) c) U-boat sighting in ET 26.
96 - AJ 85 258 - CF 28 444 - AK 26 584 - AK 39 d) None.
105 - EE 36 260 - BD 77 454 - BF 81 594 - Op(AJ 70)
109 - CF 29 262 - BE 65 455 - BE 83 598 - Op(AJ 70) - 35 -
117 - DD 75 264 - CF 57 456 - AL 28 606 - AK 29
123 - Op(AJ 80) 266 - Op(AJ 80) 459 - FM 94 607 - AK 52
124 - DR 72 267 - AE 87 463 - CF 28 609 - BE 65
125 - Op(CE 70) 268 - AK 12 465 - BE 60 613 - AK 67
156 - BE 98 303 - AK 56 466 - AE 83 614 - Op(AL 80)
160 - DT 89 333 - AK 37 504 - BF 54 620 - Op(DF 30)
164 - Op(FB) 337 - Op(AJ 70) 506 - FU 54 624 - AK 67
175 - Op(ET) 358 - AE 69 509 - FU 18 631 - AK 24
176 - Op(ER) 381 - Op(DF 30) 510 - BE 97 632 - AK 24
177 - CF 62 383 - AK 56 511 - Op(CE 70) 662 - Op(AJ 80) IV. Current Operations:
182 - FE 83 384 - AK 35 514 - Op(CE 70) 704 - AK 56 a) None.
186 - AK 53 402 - BE 25 516 - FM 94 706 - Op(AJ 80) b) 1) Group "Jaguar" remains in the position reached at 2100 from AJ
187 - AE 85 403 - AK 12 518 - CE 57 707 - AE 67 7822 to AJ 8796 (Patrol channel).
201 - AK 29 404 - AK 37 521 - DG 99 752 - AK 67 2) U 87 and 202 are to join Group "Delphin" to extend their patrol
202 - CE 96 413 - Op(AJ 70) 522 - Op(CE 70) channels, and occupy the positions DF 3933 and DF 3969. U 454 joins
214 - Op(EC) 414 - AD 78 525 - AK 16 Group "Landsknecht" and occupies position BE 2244, which must be
reached by 0800 on 24.1.
c) U 553 handed over a Nautical Year Book to U 465.
On Return Passage: U 105 - 109 - 124 - 177 - 440 - 441 - 455 - 463. d) None.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 108 - Lorient; U 608 - St. Nazaire. V. Reports of Success:
U 182 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

1105
--------------------------------------------------- II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
---------------
III. Reports on the Enemy:
21. January 1943. a) - b) None.

I. U 43 - DH 75 U 214 - Op(EC) U 414 - AD 98 U 525 - AJ 33
66 - Op(DU) 217 - Op(EO) 436 - Op(CE 70) 553 - BE 26
69 - AJ 33 218 - DT 35 438 - AK 51 558 - CF 49
71 - AK 66 223 - AE 85 440 - BE 75 707 - AE 85
87 - DG 17 226 - AK 19 441 - BF 55 571 - Op(DF 30)
96 - Op(AJ 88) 257 - AK 66 442 - Op(CE 70) 572 - AL 44
105 - DQ 75 258 - CF 28 444 - AK 03 575 - Op(DF 30)
108 - BF 55 260 - BD 77 454 - BF 47 584 - AK 60
109 - BE 97 262 - BE 29 455 - BE 92 594 - Op(AJ 70)
117 - BD 77 264 - CF 72 456 - AL 52 598 - Op(AJ 70)
123 - Op(AJ 80) 266 - Op(AJ 70) 459 - FT 33 606 - AJ 39
124 - DR 46 267 - AL 33 463 - CF 28 607 - AJ 39
125 - Op(CE 70) 268 - AD 98 465 - BE 20 608 - BF 67
156 - CF 36 303 - AK 43 466 - AE 84 609 - BE 29
160 - EJ 37 333 - AK 63 504 - BF 48 613 - AK 54
164 - Op(FB) 337 - Op(AJ 70) 506 - FU 86 614 - AL 51
175 - Op(ET) 358 - AE 91 509 - FU 49 620 - Op(DF 30)
176 - Op(FD 25) 381 - Op(DF 30) 510 - CF 35 624 - AK 54
177 - CG 11 383 - AK 43 511 - Op(CE 70) 631 - AK 39
182 - FE 56 384 - AK 03 514 - Op(CE 70) 632 - AK 37
186 - AK 43 402 - AL 88 516 - FU 11 662 - Op(AJ 80)
187 - AL 32 403 - AJ 33 518 - CF 87 704 - AK 46
201 - AJ 36 404 - AK 63 521 - DT 26 706 - Op(AJ 80)
202 - CE 97 413 - AJ 70 522 - Op(CE 70) 752 - AK 54
On Return Passage: U 105 - 109 - 124 - 177 - 440 - 441 - 455 - 463.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 265 - Kiel.
- 36 -
c) U-boat sightings: ED 9590.
Warning of U-boats: for ET 2627.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) In order to intercept the north-south bound convoys and isolated
traffic 5 boats are to be disposed in a 30 sea mile wide strip as far as 120
sea miles W. of Cape Blanco in N/S strips of equal width. Order from the
west: U 518, 43, 218, 521, 66. Warfare against the traffic is considered of
utmost importance to the African Front.
c) 1) Replenishment of supplies from U 459 is to take place early on 29.1
in CG 5455.
U 506 will take on 140 cubic meters, U 509 and 516 100 cubic meters
each. Fuel replenishment of U 160 (still behind) follows later.
2) Meeting of U 463 and 258 for the handing over of an Fu.M.B. Cable
has taken place.
3) In a S.W. wind, strength 10 and heavy sea the supplying of U 260
(intended for the last 10 days) is still impossible.

1106
 d) U 96 is not absolutely ready for action owing to breakdown of
forward hydroplane. The boat is ordered to return to Bergen owing to
inability to submerge entirely. Further use as training ship is proposed.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
22. January 1943.
I. U 43 - DT 36 U 217 - Op(EO) U 436 - Op(CE 70) U 553 - Op(AL
90)
66 - DU 218 - DU 44 438 - Op(AK 40) 707 - AE 79
69 - Op(AJ 30) 223 - AE 79 440 - BE 84 558 - CE 96
71 - Op(AL 72) 226 - Op(AJ 30) 441 - BF 52 571 - Op(DF 30)
87 - Op(DF 30) 257 - Op(AL 48) 442 - Op(CE 70) 572 - Op(AL 81)
96 - Op(AJ 80) 258 - CF 54 444 - Op(AL 44) 575 - Op(DF 30)
105 - DQ 54 260 - BD 77 454 - BE 53 584 - Op(AL 48)
108 - BF 48 262 - BE 20 706 - Op(AJ 80) 594 - Op(AJ 70)
109 - BE 95 264 - CE 98 455 - BF 72 598 - Op(AJ 70)
117 - CD 34 265 - AO 456 - AL 57 606 - Op(AJ 30)
123 - Op(AJ 80) 266 - Op(AJ 70) 459 - FU 42 607 - Op(AJ 30)
124 - DR 24 267 - AM 35 463 - CF 31 608 - BF 57
125 - Op(CE 70) 268 - Op(AJ 30) 465 - BE 22 609 - BE 22
156 - CF 30 303 - Op(AK 40) 466 - AL 22 613 - Op(AK 40)
160 - EJ 67 333 - Op(AL 48) 504 - BF 71 614 - Op(AL 57)
164 - Op(FB) 337 - Op(AJ 70) 506 - CG 14 620 - Op(DF 30)
175 - Op(EU) 358 - AE 85 509 - FU 85 624 - Op(AK 40)
176 - Op(FD 20) 381 - Op(DF 30) 510 - CF 28 631 - Op(AL 44)
177 - BF 68 383 - Op(AJ 30) 511 - Op(CE 70) 632 - AK 63
182 - FE 94 384 - Op(AL 44) 514 - Op(CE 70) 662 - Op(AJ 80)
186 - Op(AJ 30) 402 - AL 80 516 - FU 19 704 - Op(AK 40)
187 - AL 34 403 - Op(AJ 30) 518 - DH 18 752 - Op(AK 40)
1107
- 37 -
201 - Op(AJ 30) 404 - Op(AL 48) 521 - DT 63
202 - DG 21 413 - Op(AJ 70) 522 - Op(CE 70)
214 - Op(EC) 414 - Op(AJ 30) 525 - Op(AJ 30)
On Return Passage: U 96 - 105 - 109 - 124 - 177 - 440 - 441 - 455 -
463.
Entered Port: U 177 - Bordeaux; U 441 - Brest.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) For reports on U 69 and U 96 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 358 encountered a convoy in AE 8575 on a course of 3100, speed 8
knots and sank a freighter of 3,500 GRT. Contact was apparently lost in
bad visibility and rain, and could not be reestablished until the afternoon.
Boat therefore continued passage to ordered position.
3) U 66 has only encountered Spanish coastal sailing vessels within the
40 sea mile line of DU 57 since 20.1.
4) U 175 sank "Benjamin Smith" (7,000 GRT), course 900, speed 12
knots in EU 8531. Return passage owing to fuel situation.
b) - d) None.

IV. Current Operations:
a) U 69 a boat belonging to Group "Haudegen" heard several spreading
noises with north-easterly deviations since 0600 on 22.1. According to fix
at 0800 last bearing lay in AJ 3449. The boat is following this up in the
direction of 200 in good visibility. The boats U 525, U 201, north and
south of U 69 have also received instructions to steer on searching course,
as the presence of an HX convoy must be presumed. This must have
passed the patrol channels of Group "Jaguar" unobserved and proceeded at
a very high speed.
U 96 on the return passage, reported a convoy in AK 7422 at 1315 and
after several hours confirmed an isolated search group on a southerly
course. As such an isolated group is unlikely in this area, the possible
presence of a convoy must be presumed. Whether it is an HX or an SC
convoy remains to be seen. In any case on receipt of U 96's message
Group "Haudegen" (not U 69, 525 and 201) were ordered to proceed to the
S.W. at a speed of 10 knots and ordered to take up position in
reconnaissance channels from AK 4313 to 8394 for 1200 on 23.1. Course
2350, speed 6 knots. U 96 continues return passage.
- 38 -
U 69, 525 and 201 pursued until darkness fell without establishing
contact. They are now proceeding on a course of 2100, cruising speed to
the S. to reinforce Group "Jaguar". According to a Radio Intelligence
report (special) received, the course of the awaited convoy leads through
the middle of the channels occupied by Group "Delphin". As its arrival
can take place from today, Group "Delphin" is to proceed on a course of
1108
900, speed 8 knots at 2030, as reconnaissance channel. On 23.1 at 1000 to
turn back on a course of 2800, speed 4 knots. The boats U 264, 258 and
558 coming up, are making for approximately the center of the channel.
c) U 66 has carried out a special task. (landing of an agent on the African
Coast). Two sailors did not return to the boat after the successful landing.
Heavy surf since then.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 358 - 1 ship 3,500 GRT
U 175 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
23. January 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DU) U 217 - Op(EE) U 414 - Op(AJ 30) U 553 - Op(AL
80)
66 - Op(DU 70) 218 - Op(DU 70) 436 - Op(CE 70) 558 - DG 23
69 - Op(AL 32) 223 - AL 14 438 - Op(AK 40) 571 - Op(DG 10)
71 - Op(AL 80) 226 - Op(AJ 30) 440 - BE 94 572 - Op(AL 80)
87 - Op(DG 10) 257 - Op(AL 80) 442 - Op(CE 70) 575 - Op(DG 10)
96 - AK 72 258 - CF 72 444 - Op(AL 48) 584 - Op(AL 80)
105 - DQ 28 260 - CD 38 454 - BE 25 594 - Op(AL 80)
108 - BE 93 262 - Op(BE 20) 455 - BF 67 598 - Op(AJ 70)
109 - BF 61 264 - DG 22 456 - Op(AL 80) 606 - Op(AJ 30)
117 - CD 30 265 - AN 36 459 - FU 54 607 - Op(AJ 30)
123 - Op(AJ 80) 266 - Op(AJ 70) 463 - BE 94 608 - BF 47
124 - DQ 74 267 - AL 29 465 - Op(AL 80) 609 - Op(AL 40)
125 - Op(CE 70) 268 - Op(AJ 30) 466 - AL 14 613 - Op(AK 40)
156 - CF 59 303 - Op(AK 40) 504 - BE 98 614 - Op(AL 80)
160 - EJ 99 333 - Op(AL 80) 506 - CG 19 620 - Op(DG 10)
164 - Op(FB) 337 - Op(AJ 70) 509 - CG 11 624 - Op(AK 40)
175 - Op(EU 81) 358 - AE 79 510 - GF 54 631 - Op(AL 40)
 176 - Op(FD) 381 - Op(DG 10) 511 - Op(CE 70) 632 - Op(AL 40)
182 - FM 22 383 - Op(AJ 30) 514 - Op(CE 70) 662 - Op(AJ 80)
186 - Op(AJ 30) 384 - Op(AL 40) 516 - FU 54 704 - Op(AK 40)
187 - AL 29 402 - Op(AL 80) 518 - DH 49 706 - Op(AJ 80)
201 - Op(AJ 30) 403 - Op(AJ 30) 521 - Op(DU 70) 707 - AL 14
202 - Op(DG 18) 404 - Op(AL 70) 522 - Op(CE 70) 752 - Op(AK 40)
214 - Op(ED) 413 - Op(AJ 70) 525 - Op(AJ 30)
On Return Passage: U 96 - 105 - 109 - 124 - 175 - 440 - 455 - 463 -
662.
Entered Port: U 109 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 526 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: 3 aircraft in AL 90 and 60 to intercept an expected
ON convoy.
- 39 -
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 214 situation: 19 days in the Caribbean, submerged by day. No
traffic in EC 90 at night, tanker escorts from Aruba only at dawn. It is
only possible to stay there a short time owing to the strong current.
U-boat chaser activity at night in EC 60 large craft radar small craft
then attacked. Continue to search for traffic from DP 75 via EO 52 to EE
60.
2) FOr report on Convoy No. 3 see paragraph IVa.
b) Operations without success.
1109
c) U-boat sightings in AJ 94, ED 5650, EC 7816.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 3: The following W/T with T.O.O. 0850 was received
from U 413 at 1142: Contact with escort in AJ 7267. As according to the
text of this message other message must have been already sent, and also
U 598 had not reported contact at 1500 from AJ 4971, the boats of Group
"Jaguar" are requested to send a short situation summary. It can be seen
from the messages received that U 413 sighted a convoy on a course of
200 at 1714 on 22.1. in AJ 7855, and that it reported the same at 2240 in
AJ 7592 and at 0545 in AJ 7291. Also the boat sank a straggler of 5,000
GRT in AJ 7592. Unfortunately these W/T messages were not picked up
by the control station owing to interference presumably caused by the
northern lights, and this had a particularly adverse effect on the operations
decided for Groups "Jaguar" and Haudegen". As it is likely that at the
moment there is no contact, the group "Haudegen" will be at once
disposed on receipt of the first situation report, on a course of 3000, speed
9 knots. Disposition of a patrol channel is planned for the forenoon of
24.1, if no contact has been established by then. Group "Jaguar" received
ordered to continue the search, U 525, 69 and 201 are to operate at
cruising speed on the information contained in U 413's report. U 268
reporting from N.W. of the Group "Haudegen" and 358 on the outward
passage in A 30 are to be diverted to AJ 25. A W/T received from U 413 at
0117 reports that the boat lost contact at 0900 in AJ 7267. Last course
doubtful, NE, speed 9 knots. Convoy drawn out, about 20 ships. Weather:
variable visibility, wind N.N.W., freshening to 10-11. It does not appear
from the number of ships involved to be the expected SC convoy. The
operation continues.
b) 1) Group "Delphin" turned back at 2030 on an easterly course, speed 7
knots. After addition of U 264 and 558, the group was disposed at 1030
on 24.1 as in the following order: U 514, 125, 522, 511, 442, 436, 575,
381, 571, 620, 87, 202, 264 and 558, in patrol channels from CE 8156 to
DG 1937. The convoy may still be expected.
2) New position for U 156, 510 and 504 is DT 60. Operations intended
either in DU or further south.
 3) U 175 received instructions to return via DU 70. It is to
- 40-
search for further traffic there, and not leave the position to replenish
supplies until there is only 20 cu. mtrs. of fuel left.
c) Owing to the return of U 462, U 105 and 124 received orders to remain
in DF 50 using as little fuel as possible until the arrival of the next tanker
(about 9.2).
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 598 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
24. January 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DU 70) U 226 - OP(AK 50) U 444 - Op(AL 40) U 594 -
Op(AJ 40)
66 - Op(DU 70) 257 - Op(AL 80) 454 - Op(BE 20) 598 - Op(AJ 40)
69 - AJ 29 258 - CE 98 455 - BF 64 606 - Op(AK 40)
71 - Op(AL 80) 260 - CE 14 456 - Op(AL 80) 607 - Op(AK 50)
87 - Op(DG 10) 262 - Op(BE 20) 459 - FU 85 608 - BE 68
96 - AK 54 264 - Op(DG 10) 463 - BF 75 609 - Op(AL 90)
1110
105 - DQ 31 265 - AN 31 465 - Op(AL 90) 613 - Op(AK 80)
108 - BE 98 266 - Op(AJ 40) 466 - AL 15 614 - Op(AL 80)
117 - CD 36 267 - Op(AJ 40) 504 - CF 38 620 - Op(DG 10)
123 - Op(AJ 40) 268 - Op(AJ 34) 506 - GG 54 624 - Op(AK 50)
124 - DF 72 303 - Op(AK 80) 509 - GG 18 631 - Op(AL 40)
125 - Op(CE 80) 333 - Op(AL 80) 510 - CF 84 632 - Op(AL 40)
156 - CF 86 337 - Op(AJ 40) 511 - Op(CE 80) 662 - BD 42
160 - ET 17 358 - AL 12 514 - Op(CE 80) 704 - Op(AK 80)
164 - Op(FB) 381 - Op(DG 10) 516 - FU 86 706 - Op(AJ 40)
175 - EU 71 383 - Op(AK 50) 518 - DH 76 707 - AK 38
176 - Op(FD) 384 - Op(AL 40) 521 - Op(DU 70) 752 - Op(AK 81)
182 - FM 61 402 - Op(AL 80) 522 - Op(CE 80)
186 - Op(AK 50) 403 - Op(AJ 33) 525 - AJ 52
187 - Op(AL 40) 404 - Op(AL 70) 526 - AO
201 - AJ 24 413 - Op(AJ 40) 553 - Op(AL 90)
202 - OP(DG 10) 414 - Op(AJ 30) 558 - DG 27
214 - Op(DP 75) 436 - Op(CE 80) 571 - Op(DG 10)
217 - ED 24 438 - Op(AK 50) 572 - Op(AL 80)
218 - Op(DU 70) 440 - BE 93 575 - Op(DG 10)
223 - AK 39 442 - Op(CE 80) 584 - Op(Al 80)
On Return Passage: U 96 - 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 217 - 260 - 440
- 455 - 463 - 662 - 706.
Entered Port: U 455 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 89 - Brest; U 135 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
Convoy No. 3, see paragraph IVa.
a) 1) U 105 sank a tanker of 10,000 GRT which was lying for no apparent
reason with engines stopped about 60 sea miles S. of the isolated traffic
route confirmed by Radio Intelligence report (special) in DQ 2347. It was
carrying Benzene. (Note in pencil:"The British Viligence" which had been
hit by U 514 on January 3rd and abandoned.

- 41 -
A flying boat was sighted at 2115 circling over the sinking area.
2) U 217 situation: From 26 - 29.12 and 10 - 23.1. only passenger
steamer on a course of 3300 encountered from EO 52 to EP 48 on the 200
meter line and a hydrophone bearing in EO 5252 with southerly deflection.
Systematic aerial activity by "Consolidated" type flying boat as far as 200
sea miles from the Guiana Coast.
3) U 609 in position in southern section of Group "Landsknecht" 's
patrol channel, sighted an isolated vessel on a course of 2250 at 1834 in
AL 9786. The boat received orders to pursue the steamer. U 609's area
was divided between the two boats occupying adjacent positions. After
losing contact U 609 returned to its position. Further U 262 reported
following a large 3-funnel vessel on a course of 2200. Both messages
probably refer to the same ship. No further reports has been received from
U 262.
b) None.
c) U-boat warning for EU 7341.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 3:
Wireless conditions are still bad and make escort duties impossible for
Group "Jaguar". According to U 594 report U 706 fired a quadruple miss
at a destroyer on 23.1. and U 598 sighted a suspicious looking isolated
vessel in AJ 7972 and smoke trails in AJ 7974. U 706 and U 123 searched
in the direction of 200, also 600 and began their return passage in the
1111
course of 24.1. owing to fuel shortage. Group "Haudegen" received orders
to take up position in patrol channels with 15 boats at 1100 on 24.1 from
ÄA 0389 (pencil note: AD? 3989) to AK 4178. With a cruising speed of 8
knots the convoy should reach the channels at about 1130. Owing to
heavy north-westerly storms the boats could only cover a distance of 4 sea
miles and were unable to occupy the channels at the time decided upon.
As, however, U 266 confirmed with certainty a broad hydrophone bearing
in 800 at 0130 from AJ 2745 and a strong noise band of 2100 - 2650 from
AJ 2746, it may be presumed that the convoy is further astern than
previously supposed and the boats must have occupied the channels before
it passed through. Group "Jaguar" and U 525 and 201 are operating on the
hydrophone bearing obtained by U 266. No further messages were
received up till morning. The operation continues.
b) 1) Group "Delphin" proceeded on a westerly course, speed 4 knots at
1100 from its previous patrol channel and remained in a position from CE
8144 to DG 1918 reached at 1900. U 258 joined the group and occupied
the position DG 1972 to extend the channel. A west and eastbound convoy
are expected.
2) New position for U 608 is AK 95. Deployment on convoy intended.
- 42 -
c) U 260 replenished supplies from U 117 and began return passage.
d) U 164 operated off the Brazilian Coast and sank a steamer after
examination of the cargo on 2.1. in FB 3815 (Pencil note: Swedish
Brazaland). In spite of repeated requests the boat has not since reported.
According to an earlier W/T message, U 164 had a leak in the pressure
tanks, that was effectively mended. It is likely that the leak sprang up
again on a deep dive and caused the destruction of the boat. (Pencil note:
U 164 was sunk on Jan. 6th)
187 - Op(AL 40) 402 - Op(AL 80) 521 - Op(DN 70) 706 - AJ 83
201 - Op(AJ 50) 403 - Op(AJ 30) 522 - Op(CE 80) 707 - AK 27
202 - Op(DG 10) 404 - Op(AL 70) 525 - Op(AJ 52) 752 - Op(AK 40)
214 - Op(EE) 413 - Op(AJ 50) 526 - AN 36

V. Reports of Success: On Return Passage: U 96 - 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 217 - 260 - 440
U 105 - 1 ship 10,000 GRT. - 463 - 662 - 706.
Entered Port: - . -
--------------------------------------------------- Sailed: U 118 - Brest.
---------------
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
25. January 1943.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 3 see paragraph IVa.
I. U 43 - Op(DU 40) U 217 - EF 88 U 414 - Op(AJ 31) U 553 - 2) U 223 pursued an isolated vessel of 6,000 GRT on a course of 800
Op(AL 90) with a speed of 16 knots in AK 0137 without success.
66 - Op(DU 70) 218 - Op(DN 70) 436 - Op(CE 80) 558 - Op(DG 10) 3) U 624 sank an isolated vessel of 6,000 GRT on a course of 950 in AK
69 - Op(AJ 20) 223 - AK 01 438 - Op(AK 40) 571 - Op(DG 10) 4557.
71 - Op(AL 80) 226 - Op(AJ 30) 440 - BF 72 572 - Op(AL 80)
87 - Op(DG 10) 257 - Op(AL 80) 442 - Op(CE 80) 575 - Op(CE 80) - 43 -
89 - BF 84 258 - DG 22 444 - Op(AL 40) 584 - Op(AL 80)
96 - AK 39 260 - CE 21 454 - Op(BE 20) 594 - Op(AJ 53)
105 - DQ 57 262 - Op(BE 21) 456 - Op(AL 80) 598 - Op(AJ 50)
108 - CF 23 264 - Op(DG 10) 459 - GG 11 606 - Op(AJ 30)
117 - CD 13 265 - AN 28 463 - BF 73 607 - Op(AJ 30)
123 - AJ 91 266 - Op(AJ 20) 465 - Op(AL 90) 608 - BE 56
124 - DF 50 267 - Op(AL 40) 466 - AK 27 609 - Op(AL 90)
125 - Op(CE 80) 268 - Op(AJ 20) 504 - CF 64 613 - Op(AK 40)
135 - BF 67 303 - OP(AK 41) 506 - GG 12 614 - Op(AL 80)
156 - DH 16 333 - Op(AL 80) 509 - GG 43 620 - Op(DG 10) 4) U 575 (in patrol channel of group "Delphin") sank a large 10,000
160 - ET 48 337 - Op(AJ 52) 510 - DH 15 624 - Op(AK 40) ton vessel on a course of 1200, speed 12 knots in DG 1326.
175 - ET 59 358 - AL 34 511 - Op(CE 80) 631 - Op(AL 40) According to P.O.W. reports the ship belonged to the expected convoy
176 - Op(FD) 381 - Op(DG 10) 514 - Op(CE 80) 632 - Op(AL 40) which put out of New York for Casablanca on 13.1 and which dispersed
182 - FM 92 383 - Op(AJ 60) 516 - GG 12 662 - BD 51 owing to bad weather on 22.1. It can, therefore, be presumed that still
186 - Op(AJ 30) 384 - Op(AL 40) 518 - DN 14 704 - Op(AK 40)
1112
further isolated vessels will pass the patrol channels. "Delphin" boats have boat. U 504 received orders to proceed to DP 3755 and carry out
received directions to report every ship sighted isolated. replenishment of supplies. Later replenishment of this boat by U 118 is
b) None. intended.
c) U-boat sightings: None.
d) None. V. Reports of Success:
U 624 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT
IV. Current Operations: U 575 - 1 ship 10,000 GRT.
a) Convoy No. 3:
Boat of the "Haudegen" group reported on request, that owing to
persistent N.W. storms their passage speed still only amounts to 4 knots. - 44 -
This means that the channels previously ordered cannot be occupied
before 0800 on 26.1. In order to intercept the convoy with certainty,
Group "Haudegen" received orders to take up position in new patrol
channels from AD 9533 to AK 4183. Further, boats are directed to operate
at their own discretion and without orders from Command on receipt of
convoy contact messages. U 266 presumes convoy to be in AJ 2755 as
two perfect hydrophone observations were obtained at 0300 on 25.1. in
this area. No further messages received. Group "Jaguar" maintains an
independent search from NE to E. Several boats are so low in fuel that
they will have to start the return passage within 24 hours. Lack of 26. January 1943.
sufficient tankers is now uncomfortably noticeable. The operation
continues.
b) 1) Owing to U 384's necessary return, the Channel occupied by Group I. U 43 - Op(DU 70) U 214 - Op(EE) U 413 - Op(AJ 26) U 526 - AN
"Landsknecht" will be narrowed by one position on 1200 on 26.1 and will 31
then extend from AL 4447 to BE 2138. According to present reckoning 66 - Op(DU 70) 217 - EF 81 414 - Op(AD 90) 553 - Op(AL 90)
the arrival of the expected convoy cannot be expected until after today as 69 - Op(AD 90) 218 - Op(DU 70) 436 - Op(CE 80) 558 - Op(DG 10)
the leaving times of the ON convoys has probably been postponed for 2 or 71 - Op(AL 80) 223 - AK 19 438 - Op(AJ 30) 571 - Op(DG 10)
3 days. 87 - Op(GD 10) 226 - Op(AJ 30) 440 - BF 52 572 - Op(AL 80)
2) U 214 which was originally to have searched for traffic in DP 70, has 89 - BF 45 257 - Op(AL 80) 442 - Op(CE 80) 575 - Op(DG 10)
received orders to proceed with small steps via DQ 70 to DR 55 and to 96 - AK 35 258 - Op(DG 10) 444 - OP(AL 40) 584 - Op(AL 80)
operate there according to fuel supply. The grid mentioned is 105 - DQ 52 260 - BD 97 454 - Op(BE 20) 594 - Op(AJ 20)
approximately the intersection point of the Trinidad/North Africa tanker 108 - CF 28 262 - OP(BE 20) 456 - Op(AL 80) 598 - Op(AJ 28)
convoy route and according to Radio Intelligence Report (special) a 117 - BD 86 264 - Op(DG 10) 459 - GG 14 606 - Op(AJ 30)
confirmed straggler route. 118 - BF 54 265 - Bergen 463 - BF 64 607 - Op(AJ 30)
c) Owing to the temporary breakdown of U 462 the replenishment of 123 - AK 72 266 - Op(AJ 37) 465 - Op(AL 90) 608 - BE 51
supplies by U 124 and U 105, in DF 50, must be carried out by a type IXc 124 - DF 50 267 - Op(AL 40) 466 - AK 43 609 - Op(AL 90)
1113
 125 - Op(CF 80) 268 - Op(AD 90) 504 - CF 57 613 - Op(AK 40)
135 - BF 49 303 - Op(AJ 30) 506 - GG 50 614 - Op(AL 80)
156 - DH 46 333 - Op(AL 80) 509 - GG 50 620 - Op(DG 10)
160 - ET 79 337 - Op(AJ 20) 510 - DH 45 624 - Op(AJ 90)
175 - ET 51 358 - AK 25 511 - Op(CE 80) 631 - Op(AL 40)
176 - ES 84 381 - Op(DG 10) 514 - Op(CE 80) 632 - Op(AL 40)
182 - FN 77 383 - Op(AJ 30) 516 - GG 19 662 - BD 67
186 - Op(AJ 30) 384 - Op(AL 40) 518 - DU 41 704 - Op(AK 40)
187 - Op(AL 40) 402 - Op(AL 80) 521 - Op(DU 70) 706 - AK 77
201 - Op(AJ 26) 403 - Op(AJ 30) 522 - Op(CE 80) 707 - AK 17
202 - Op(DG 10) 404 - Op(AL 70) 525 - Op(AJ 20) 752 - Op(AK 40)
On Return Passage: U 96 - 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 260
- 384 - 440 - 444 - 463 - 662 - 706.
Entered Port: U 440 - Brest; U 463 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 3 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 358 sank a fully loaded tanker of type "Nordatlantic" of 10,000
GRT, on a course of 900, speed 11 knots in AK 2550.
3) U 594 encountered wreck of tanker "Kollbjoerg-Oslo" in AJ 3284
while operating on Convoy No. 3, and sank it.
b) None.
c) U-boat sighting: AJ 3850, AJ 3451, EG 8599.
A sunk ship still sticking out of the water in FB 9119.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) As no contact messages were received up to nightfall, the convoy must
according to dead reckoning, have passed the channels. U 384, 525, 707,
223 and 466 were to allocate
1114
- 45 -
to the Group "Haudegen" and if there was not contact, ordered to
proceed to the S.W. at 0800 on 27th. If however, the convoy was still W.
of the group it would have been intercepted during the night. Disposition
in about AK 50 and 80 was intended for Group "Jaguar" until the low fuel
supply was exhausted. None of these orders were put into effect as the
group had been operating on destroyer sightings and hydrophone bearings
of several boats, since 1900. The relevant W/T messages could not be
picked up by the control station until 2400. Subsequently U 266 and U
383 sighted a destroyer on an eastward course in AJ 3450 at 1800. U 466
reported a broad listening band from 260 to 290 from AJ 35 at 2120 and at
0237 destroyer and steamer noises were confirmed with certainty.
According to further hydrophone bearings the boats must be on either side
of the convoy. Both groups are operating at high speed. Direct sighting
reports were, however, not received up to morning. The large number of
boats coming up from all sides ensures the interception of the convoy at
dawn.
b) 1) U 444 has begun the return passage owing to fuel shortage. Patrol
channels occupied by Group "Landsknecht" are therefore shortened by one
position to the southeast.
2) U 156, U 510 and U 108 are detained in area DH 40 and 10 in order
to intercept the isolated vessels on the dissolution of the expected convoy.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 358 - 1 ship 10,000 GRT
594 - 1 ship 8,259 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
27. January 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DU 70) U 202 - Op(DG 10) U 403 - Op(AJ 30) U 525 -
Op(AJ 30)
66 - Op(DU 70) 214 - DP 97 404 - Op(AL 70) 526 - AN 20
69 - Op(AJ 90) 217 - EF 52 413 - Op(AJ 13) 553 - Op(AL 90)
71 - Op(AL 80) 218 - Op(DU 70) 414 - Op(AD 91) 558 - Op(DG 10)
87 - Op(DG 10) 223 - Op(AJ 30) 436 - Op(CE 80) 571 - Op(DG 10)
89 - BE 66 226 - Op(AJ 31) 438 - Op(AJ 30) 572 - Op(AL 80)
96 - AE 79 257 - Op(AL 80) 442 - Op(CE 80) 575 - Op(CE 80)
105 - DQ 31 258 - Op(DG 10) 444 - AL 85 584 - Op(AL 80)
108 - CF 57 260 - BE 78 454 - Op(BE 20) 594 - Op(AJ 32)
117 - BD 68 262 - Op(BE 20) 456 - Op(AL 70) 598 - AJ 38
118 - BF 49 264 - Op(DG 10) 459 - GG 18 606 - Op(AJ 30)
123 - AK 87 265 - Bergen 465 - Op(AL 80) 607 - Op(AJ 30)
124 - DF 50 266 - Op(AJ 32) 466 - Op(AJ 32) 608 - BD 33
125 - Op(CE 80) 267 - Op(AL 40) 504 - CF 75 609 - Op(AL 90)
135 - BE 47 268 - Op(AD 90) 506 - GG 50 613 - Op(AK 40)
156 - DH 66 303 - Op(AJ 30) 509 - GG 50 614 - Op(AL 80)
160 - FE 28 333 - Op(AL 70) 510 - DH 75 620 - Op(DG 10)
175 - ET 15 337 - Op(AJ 13) 511 - Op(CE 80) 624 - Op(AJ 30)
176 - ES 46 358 - Op(AK 15) 514 - Op(CE 80) 631 - Op(AL 40)
182 - FU 18 381 - Op(DG 10) 516 - GG 50 632 - Op(AL 40)
186 - Op(AJ 30) 383 - Op(AJ 30) 518 - Op(DU 70) 662 - BD 68
187 - Op(AL 40) 384 - AL 85 521 - Op(DU 70) 704 - Op(AK 40)
- 46 -
1115
201 - Op(AJ 30) 402 - Op(AL 80) 522 - Op(CE 80) 706 - BD 13
707 - Op(AJ 30)
752 - Op(AK 40)
On Return Passage: U 96 - 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 260
- 384 - 444 - 598 - 662 - 706.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
For report on Convoy No. 3 see paragraph IVa.
a) 1) U 442 and 514 each sighted a steamer on an easterly course in CE
8487 and CE 8157, in the patrol channels of Group "Delphin". The latter
was left sinking by U 514 in CE 8198 (American ship "Charles C.
Pinkney" of 6,800 GRT). Speed 14 knots, zig-zagging strongly. Ship was
heavily armed.
2) U 105 sank new American motor ship "Cape Indecision" of 8,000
GRT carrying aircraft parts and casked benzene from Charleston to Africa.
General course 1250, speed 15 knots. Position of the sinking lies about 40
miles north of the straggler route confirmed by Radio Intelligence reports.
3) U 607 sank a tanker wreck in AJ 30 with 2 finishing shots.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BB 6522, FB 99.
U-boat attacked by torpedo aircraft in AF 8717 (U 376).
There was a report of torpedoing from an unidentified American
steamer in CE 8198 (U 514).
 d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 3:
In spite of the fact that the boats operated from all quarters on the last
reliable hydrophone bearings and destroyer sightings there were therefore
the most favorable conditions possible for the interception of the convoy,
but no contact was established. In general from messages received one
has the impression that for the most part the inexperienced boats were
chasing phantoms owing to certain listeners lacking practice. This is also
confirmed by a message from U 201, who, after hydrophone search lasting
hours, discovered the source of the bearing to be an extensive school of
whales. In any case there is the possibility that the two destroyers sighted
were merely a decoy and the convoy passed to the N. or S. As the
hydrophone bearing from U 266 on 25.1 was, however, the only
information, and was reported as reliable, this possibility must be
exploited and the channels moved to the N. The operation was broken off
at nightfall. Group "Jaguar" received orders to proceed to BD 60 at
economical cruising speed.
- 47 -
Group "Haudegen" is to be reformed and is to take up position in the
following order at 1200 on 30.1 in patrol channels from AJ 2442 to AK
7132: U 233 - 358 - 466 - 707 - 186 - 268 - 69 - 414 - 201 - 403 - 525 -
606 - 607 - 226 - 383 - 303 - 438 - 624 - 704 - 613 and 752. A N.E. bound
convoy is expected to pass at 30.1.
1116
b) 1) According to recently acquired information from Special Radio
Intelligence reports, the Trinidad-Gibraltar convoy, coming from the
Caribbean steers a course first, north of Cape Blanco along the African
coast.
The boats operating in DU 70 are therefore too far to the S. and have
received orders (in order to intercept regular traffic on this route) to
proceed to the N. of the present operations area with a daily reckoning of
150 sea miles, via the first position of DU 4351 to 5185 and further via the
second position from DU 2231 to 2365. Subsequently the following
operations areas are to be occupied at a depth of 15 sea miles: U 518 =
DH 9595, U 43 = 9912, U 218 = 9566, U 521 = 9672, U 66 = 9687.
Convoy traffic may be expected in a NE/SW direction. The boats form the
Group "Rochen".
2) As a result of the sightings reported by U 514 and 442 the Group
"Delphin" is to be split up to the N. and S. and will then be in patrol
channels from CE 5774 to DG 4342. The boats received orders to cover as
much sea as possible to the E. from 0600 to dawn in order to reach the
anticipated isolated traffic.
3) New positions for U 608, 89 and U 135 = AJ 89. A new disposition
of another patrol channel with the boats of Group "Landsknecht" still
having adequate fuel supplies, is planned for the 5.2 in this area.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 514 - 1 ship 6,800 GRT
105 - 1 ship 8,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
28. January 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DU 70) U 202 - Op(DG 10) U 403 - Op(AK 10) U 525 -
Op(AK 10)
66 - Op(DU 70) 214 - DQ 74 404 - Op(AL 70) 526 - Bergen
 69 - Op(AK 10) 217 - EF 23 413 - Op(AK 10) 553 - Op(AL 90)
71 - Op(AL 80) 218 - Op(DU 70) 414 - Op(AK 10) 558 - Op(DG 10)
87 - Op(DG 10) 223 - Op(AJ 33) 436 - Op(CE 80) 571 - Op(DG 10)
89 - BE 64 226 - Op(AK 17) 438 - Op(AK 10) 572 - Op(AL 80)
96 - AE 82 257 - Op(AL 80) 442 - Op(CE 87) 575 - Op(CE 80)
105 - DF 77 258 - Op(DG 10) 444 - AL 98 584 - Op(AL 80)
108 - CF 84 260 - BE 76 454 - Op(BE 20) 594 - AK 17
117 - BD 60 262 - Op(BE 20) 456 - Op(AL 70) 598 - AK 17
118 - CG 24 264 - Op(DG 10) 459 - GG 50 606 - Op(AK 10)
123 - BD 22 265 - AF 79 465 - Op(AL 80) 607 - Op(AJ 39)
124 - DF 37 266 - AJ 18 466 - Op(AJ 32) 608 - AK 99
125 - Op(CE 80) 267 - Op(AL 40) 504 - DG 98 609 - Op(AL 90)
- 48 -
135 - BE 68 268 - Op(AK 10) 506 - GG 50 613 - Op(AK 10)
156 - Op(DH 40) 303 - Op(AK 10) 509 - GG 50 614 - Op(AL 80)
160 - FE 59 333 - Op(AL 70) 510 - Op(DA 40) 620 - Op(DG 10)
175 - EK 74 337 - Op(AK 10) 511 - Op(CE 80) 624 - Op(AK 10)
176 - ES 15 358 - Op(AJ 36) 514 - Op(CE 50) 631 - Op(AL 40)
182 - FU 46 381 - Op(DG 10) 516 - GG 50 632 - Op(AL 40)
186 - Op(AK 10) 383 - Op(AK 10) 518 - Op(DU 70) 662 - BD 60
187 - Op(AL 40) 384 - AL 98 521 - Op(DU 70) 704 - Op(AJ 36)
201 - Op(AK 10) 402 - Op(AL 80) 522 - Op(CE 80) 706 - BD 25
707 - Op(AK 10)
752 - Op(AK 10)
1117
On Return Passage: U 96 - 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 260
- 266 - 337
Entered Port: U 526 - Bergen.
Sailed: U 653 - 439 - Brest; U 332 - 753 - La Pallice; U 468 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 442 sank the ship reported on 27.1 in CE 8763. Confirmed as
American ship "J. W. Gaves" carrying 36 tanks, 6 railway tank cars and 15
lorries.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: In AE 4741 (possibly attack by aircraft).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) As the expected ON convoy was also not intercepted this time,
Command has decided to dispose the boats with a plentiful supply of fuel
and several boats recently arrived, E. of Newfoundland. Group
"Landsknecht" is disbanded.
U 187, 267, 456, 553, 609, 262, 614, 402, 465 and 454 are to proceed
at economical cruising speed to BC 21.
The boats with less fuel are to be disposed in the present area and
receive the following grids as operations area.
U 632 = AL 47, U 257 = AL 71, U 71 = AL 75, U 572 = AL 87.
U 631 and 333 are to return. U 404 and 584 are to undertake special
duties. They are to make a surprise appearance off the coast near the
Scilly Islands - U 404 in BF 7510 and 584 in BF 2190. There, they are to
carry out short, sudden attacks on the convoy traffic (every two days) (see
operations order Lands End).
2) The impression is gained from U-boat situation reports received, that
the enemy is aware of the disposition of the Group "Delphin". It appears
from a Special Radio Intelligence Report that the anticipated convoy went
round the channels to the N. and a new disposition is therefore necessary.
The group is to occupy a patrol channel from CF 7397 to DH 5879
- 49 -
at economical cruising speed in the following order: U 125 - 522 -
511 - 442 - 436 - 575 - 381 - 571 - 620 - 87 - 202 - 264 - 558 and 258. In
conjunction with Group "Rochen" therefore, the entire area between the
Azores, the Canaries and the African Mainland will be to some extent
patrolled. Normally, apart from North American supplies, also those from
Trinidad and West Africa to Gibraltar are expected in this area.
3) U 156 and 510 continue the uninterrupted southward passage to EJ
70. U 108 joins Group "Rochen" and occupies U 518's position. The
latter (having more fuel than U 108) is also proceeding southwards to
position EJ 70)
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
29. January 1943.
I. U 43 - DU 19 U 217 - DQ 91 U 332 - BF 91 U 571 - DG 25
66 - DU 28 218 - DU 27 436 - CE 88 572 - Op(AL 87)
69 - AJ 37 223 - AJ 31 438 - AK 41 575 - DG 22
71 - Op(AL 75) 226 - AJ 63 439 - BF 54 584 - AL 85
87 - DG 25 257 - Op(AL 72) 442 - CE 89 594 - AK 51
89 - BE 52 258 - DQ 52 444 - BE 26 598 - AK 54
1118
96 - AE 68 260 - BE 82 454 - BE 13 606 - AJ 63
105 - DQ 33 262 - BE 62 456 - AL 71 607 - AJ 63
108 - DH 15 264 - DG 28 459 - CG 50 608 - AK 89
117 - BD 68 265 - AF 72 465 - AL 87 609 - BE 12
118 - CG 81 266 - AK 54 466 - AJ 26 613 - AK 44
123 - BD 32 267 - AK 69 468 - AO 614 - AL 71
124 - DF 37 268 - AJ 34 504 - DG 21 620 - DG 25
125 - CE 82 303 - AK 41 506 - GG 50 624 - AK 41
135 - BE 56 333 - AL 85 509 - GG 50 631 - AL 81
156 - DH 45 337 - AK 54 510 - DH 44 632 - Op(AL 47)
160 - FE 98 358 - AJ 34 511 - CE 85 653 - BF 54
175 - EK 40 381 - DG 21 514 - CE 58 662 - BD 68
176 - EJ 74 383 - AJ 63 516 - GG 50 704 - AK 41
182 - FU 85 384 - BE 25 518 - DU 19 706 - BD 61
186 - AJ 34 402 - AL 87 521 - DU 27 707 - AJ 34
187 - AK 69 403 - AJ 37 522 - CE 82 752 - AK 41
201 - AJ 37 404 - AL 81 525 - AJ 37 753 - BF 91
202 - DG 28 413 - AK 54 553 - AL 87
214 - DQ 73 414 - AJ 37 558 - DG 52
On Return Passage: U 96 - 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 260
- 266 - 333 - 337 - 384 - 413 - 444 - 466 - 594 - 598 - 631 - 662 - 706.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 381 sighted sea plane in CE 9748 while en route to new "Delphin"
patrol channels.
b) - d) None.
- 50 -
 again requested to report on 24.1., but no reply was received. Information
of the loss - place and time is not available. As in spite of repeated
requests no position report has been received, the loss of this boat must be
presumed.

V. Reports of Success: None.

IV. Current Operations: ---------------------------------------------------

a) None. ---------------
b) 1) With the return of U 466 20 boats of Group "Haudegen" are now
distributed in the patrol channels ordered earlier, from AJ 2442 to AK
7132. - 51 -
2) To occupy as temporary operations areas: U 594 = AK 49, U 413 =
AK 81. Both boats reported their fuel situation and should be able to
remain in the ordered areas for 5 - 7 days. In this way the area S.E. of the
"Haudegen" channels will be simultaneously patrolled.
3) Position for U 118 is DH 21 after execution of the special duties. The
supplying of the "Delphin" boats is intended here.
4) Owing to the necessary return passage of U 460 of the second needed
tanker - the supply situation is at the moment very unfavorable. Fuel
delivery to U 664 to U 117 could not be carried out in the bad weather
conditions. U 466 on return passage with about 70 cubic meters of fuel is 30. January 1943.
to be used as a tanker and has arrived in AK 86 with U 266. Further U 598
and U 175 received orders to carry out return passage if possible without
fuel replenishment. The supplying of U 706 awash in BD 67 is to take I. U 43 - DU 21 U 214 - Op(DQ 59) U 413 - AK 81 U 553 - AK 99
place from the outward bound U 439. 66 - DU 23 217 - DQ 69 414 - Op(AJ 20) 558 - DG 64
All boats are again reminded to proceed at economical cruising speed 69 - Op(AJ 20) 218 - DU 22 436 - CE 98 571 - DG 34
during bad weather and in the operations area. 71 - Op(AL 75) 223 - Op(AJ 20) 438 - Op(AJ 60) 572 - Op(AL 87)
c) Owing to the return of a blockade breaker Route Anton is to be closed 87 - DG 37 226 - Op(AJ 60) 439 - BF 48 575 - DG 31
as follows: From 1.2 to 13.2 inclusive between 50 S., 150 N. From 8.2 to 89 - BE 43 257 - Op(AL 71) 442 - CE 98 584 - AL 86
17.2 between 150 N. and 300 N. From 14.2 entire northern section N. of 96 - AF 72 258 - DG 64 444 - BE 38 594 - Op(AK 49)
300 N. Apart from this the eastern boundary of route Anton is transferred 105 - DF 76 260 - BE 92 454 - BE 11 598 - AK 82
200 sea miles to the E. between 30 S. and 130 N. 108 - DH 55 262 - BD 33 456 - AK 91 606 - Op(AJ 60)
This is only in connection with the present closing of the route. 117 - BD 68 264 - DG 61 459 - CG 50 607 - AJ 60
d) U 337 has up to now operated in the Group "Jaguar". It last reported 118 - CG 81 265 - AF 59 465 - AK 99 608 - AK 87
a short weather report from AE 83 on 3.1. Subsequently the boats were 123 - BE 14 266 - AK 86 466 - AK 46 609 - BD 33
1119
 124 - DF 37 267 - AK 91 468 - AO 36 613 - Op(AK 40)
125 - CE 92 268 - Op(AJ 20) 504 - DG 15 614 - AK 95
135 - BE 55 303 - Op(AJ 60) 506 - GG 50 620 - DG 37
156 - DH 75 332 - BF 81 509 - GG 50 624 - Op(AJ 60)
160 - FM 26 333 - AL 97 510 - DH 74 631 - AL 97
175 - EK 14 358 - Op(AJ 20) 511 - CE 95 632 - Op(AK 47)
176 - EJ 44 381 - Op(DG 34) 514 - Op(CE 60) 653 - BF 45
182 - FU 97 383 - Op(AJ 60) 516 - GG 50 662 - BD 91
186 - Op(AJ 20) 384 - BE 37 518 - DT 99 704 - Op(AK 40)
187 - AK 83 402 - AK 99 521 - DU 22 706 - BD 67
201 - AJ 60 403 - Op(AJ 60) 522 - CE 95 707 - Op(AJ 20)
202 - DG 61 404 - AL 97 525 - Op(AJ 60) 752 - Op(AK 40)
753 - BF 81
On Return Passage: U 96 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 260 - 266
- 333 - 337 - 384 - 413 - 444 - 466 - 594 - 598 - 631 - 662 - 706.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) The following area are to be occupied after replenishing supplies from
U 459:
U 506 and 509 are to operate in grid GR with directions to proceed near
to Cape Town for the time being, to intercept traffic routes. U 516 is to
operate with Port Elizabeth as center point. If the boats do not find traffic
in the areas indicated, U 506 and 509 have freedom of movement to both
sides. U 182 on its first operational trip, and also making for the southern
tip of Africa, is to occupy the area Mozambique Channel between 200 and
310 S. Boats are reminded of circumspect, sparing use of torpedoes.
1120
- 52 -
c) 1) U 459 has filled up the boats detailed for operations in Africa U
506, 509 and 516 in GG 54. Assembly point for U 160 also detailed for
this area is FU 44 on 4.2.
2) U 117 has supplied U 662, U 333 has handed over "Bolde" (decoy) to
U 404.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
31. January 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DH 90) U 214 - Op(DQ 69) U 413 - Op(AK 81) U 529 -
AO
66 - Op(DH 90) 217 - DR 15 414 - Op(AJ 20) 553 - BD 23
69 - Op(AJ 20) 218 - Op(DH 90) 436 - Op(DG 30) 558 - Op(DG 60)
71 - Op(AL 75) 223 - Op(AJ 20) 438 - Op(AJ 60) 571 - Op(DG 30)
87 - Op(DG 80) 226 - OP(AJ 60) 439 - BE 69 572 - Op(AL 87)
89 - BE 17 257 - Op(AL 71) 442 - Op(CF 70) 575 - Op(DG 30)
96 - AN 24 258 - Op(DG 60) 444 - BE 66 584 - AM 78
105 - DF 57 260 - BF 47 448 - AO 594 - Op(AK 49)
107 - BF 54 262 - BD 33 454 - BD 32 598 - AK 97
 108 - DH 81 264 - Op(DG 60) 456 - AK 85 606 - Op(AJ 60)
117 - BD 91 265 - AE 67 459 - GG 50 607 - Op(AJ 60)
118 - CG 85 266 - AK 86 465 - AK 97 608 - AK 78
123 - BE 12 267 - AK 85 466 - AK 82 609 - BD 23
124 - BF 37 268 - Op(AJ 20) 468 - AN 30 613 - Op(AK 40)
125 - Op(CF 70) 303 - Op(AJ 60) 504 - DF 39 614 - AK 94
135 - BF 43 332 - BF 72 506 - GG 50 620 - Op(DG 30)
156 - DT 34 333 - AL 97 509 - GG 50 624 - Op(AJ 60)
160 - FL 48 358 - Op(AJ 20) 510 - DT 23 631 - BE 34 IV. Current Operations:
175 - DU 74 376 - AF 79 511 - Op(CF 70) 632 - Op(AL 47) a) None.
176 - EJ 14 377 - AF 79 514 - Op(CE 69) 653 - BE 66 b) 1) New position for U 439, 653 and 332 = BD 24, for U 265 = AK 02.
182 - GG 19 381 - Op(DG 30) 516 - GG 50 662 - BD 91 Operations on convoys are intended with these boats.
183 - BF 54 383 - Op(AJ 60) 518 - EJ 35 704 - Op(AK 40) 2) U 584 has broken off the ordered special duty (attack on convoy
186 - Op(AJ 28) 384 - BE 66 519 - BF 54 706 - BD 67 traffic in BF 2190) owing to own strong noise interference. Instead, U 71
187 - AK 84 402 - AK 98 521 - Op(DM 90) 707 - Op(AJ 20) with a relatively large amount of fuel - 44 cubic meters - is detailed for this
201 - Op(AJ 60) 403 - Op(AJ 60) 522 - Op(CF 70) 752 - Op(AK 40) task.
202 - Op(DG 60) 404 - AL 97 525 - Op(AJ 60) 753 - BF 71 c) U 376 lost the Warrant Quartermaster overboard. After relief procured
in Hellisoc passage continued.
d) U 553 has been requested repeatedly since 28.1 to send position report
On Return Passage: U 96 - 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 260 without, however, an answer being received. The last W/T message dated
- 266 - 333 - 384 - 413 - 444 - 466 - 494 - 498 - 631 - 662 - 706. 20.1 was from BE 6113.
Entered Port: - . - Subsequently, the boat was ordered to join "Landsknecht" and disposed
Sailed: U 460 - 590 - St. Nazaire. in a patrol channel. When and how U 553 was lost is not known.
Its loss must be presumed.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) U 187 reported suspicious looking isolated vessels on a course of 50
in AK 8922. No contact. The boat is reminded in this connection that the
presence of "Q-boats" in the open sea is unlikely. (Signed): Godt.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AM 25.
d) None.

- 53 -

1121
 2) Passage report to be sent after putting out and after execution of deep
diving trial. A situation report should be sent as soon as observed (by the
enemy).

3) Mining situation:
a) There is a mine-field between Lands End (via the Scillys) and the
Bishop's Rock, according to old reports. If mines are actually in this
position there is a gap on the line 50 47' W. through which enemy traffic
- 54 - sails.
b) For information on the declared area St. Georges Channel and barrier
gaps see Standing Operational Orders No. 481 C II.
c) Our own mines in the waters round Cornwall are only on the south
coast, east of Lizard Head (see Standing Operational Order No. 461 B 5).

4) There is no information of a shipping route free of mines or marked by

buoys in the waters round Lands End.

5) Traffic: Convoys proceeding from Milford Haven to Portsmouth and

26. January 1943. from Portsmouth to Milford Haven may be expected to sail in a two day
cycle. The convoys putting out of Milford Haven on even days will be in
F.O. U-boats the area Hartland Point at 2000 on the same day and pass Lands End
towards 0600 on the following day. Convoys sailing from Portsmouth on
Most Secret ! uneven days are near St. Albans Head at 2000 on the same day, and pass
the Lands End area at 2000 on the following day. According to this, there
Additional Order "Lands End" is an east-bound convoy at 0600 on every uneven day and a west-bound
for U . . . . . convoy at 2000 on every even day, in the Lands End area.

1) The traffic between the Bristol Channel and the Channel is to be For F.O. U-boats
attacked in the area round Lands End during the new moon period. There
have been no U-boat operations here since June 1941, so that a surprise - Head of Ops. Section -
appearance should have good results; for this reason, the boat must at all
costs remain unobserved until the initial attack. Withdrawal to open sea in GODT
between each attack according to existing circumstances.
Distribution:
Copy No. 1 U . . . . .
2 . . . . . U-FLotilla
1122
 3-6 F.O. U-boats
7-8 Reserve copies.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 February 1943
PG30317
1. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DH 90) U 214 - Op(DR 40) U 413 - AK 81 U 525 -
Op(AJ 60)
66 - Op(DH 90) 217 - DQ 94 414 - Op(AJ 20) 529 - AN 36
69 - Op(AJ 20) 218 - Op(DH 90) 436 - Op(DH 12) 553 - BD 22
71 - AL 87 223 - Op(AJ 20) 438 - Op(AJ 60) 558 - Op(DH 45)
87 - Op(DH 42) 226 - Op(AJ 60) 439 - BF 54 571 - Op(DH 18)
89 - BD 37 257 - Op(AL 71) 442 - Op(CF 87) 572 - AL 87
96 - AN 20 258 - Op(DH 48) 444 - BF 45 575 - Op(DH 15)
105 - DF 63 260 - BF 49 448 - AN 36 584 - BE 33
107 - BF 48 262 - BD 31 454 - BD 23 590 - BF 58
108 - DT 33 264 - Op(DH 45) 456 - AK 79 594 - Op(AK 49)
117 - BE 72 265 - AE 82 459 - GG 17 598 - AK 99
118 - CG 89 266 - AK 85 460 - BF 58 606 - Op(AJ 60)
123 - BE 24 267 - AK 76 465 - AK 89 607 - AJ 60
124 - DF 37 268 - Op(AJ 20) 466 - AK 88 608 - BD 11
125 - Op(CF 73) 303 - Op(AJ 60) 468 - AN 20 609 - BD 22
135 - BE 42 332 - BE 93 504 - DF 38 613 - Op(AK 40)
156 - DT 52 333 - BE 26 506 - GG 97 614 - AK 85
1123
160 - FM 84 358 - Op(AJ 20) 509 - GG 95 620 - Op(DH 18)
175 - DU 44 376 - AF 74 510 - DT 52 624 - Op(AJ 60)
176 - DT 75 377 - AN 40 511 - Op(CF 87) 631 - BE 38
182 - GG 55 381 - DH 15 514 - Op(CE 69) 632 - Op(AL 47)
183 - BE 48 383 - Op(AJ 60) 516 - GG 92 653 - BE 64
186 - Op(AJ 20) 384 - BF 45 518 - EJ 64 662 - BE 71
187 - AK 85 402 - AK 89 519 - BF 49 704 - Op(AK 40)
201 - Op(AJ 60) 403 - Op(AJ 60) 521 - Op(DH 90) 706 - BD 67
202 - Op(DH 42) 404 - BE 31 522 - CF 76 707 - Op(AJ 20)
752 - Op(AK 70)
753 - BE 92
On Return Passage: U 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 260 -
266 - 333 - 384 - 413 - 439 - 444 - 466 - 584 - 594 - 598 - 631 - 662 - 706.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 621 - 628 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 4 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 175 heavily depth-charged by aircraft in EJ 9677 on 30.1. Heavy
loss of fuel, ability to dive restricted. Early refuelling from U 118 planed.
3) U 377 is on her way to Peterhead and reports constant unmistakable
radar location transmission from shore (AN 1616). She is moving away to
the E.Boat has been informed that she is unlikely to be picked up by shore
radar at such long range.
b) None.
c) Torpedo report from DH 4218 (Group "Delphin").
d) None.
- 56 -

IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 4:
At 1231/1/2 U 456 reported a convoy on a N. course in AK 9117. The
former "Landsknecht" boats proceeding W. should already have been a
long way astern of the convoy and all "Landsknecht" boats were therefore
ordered to report by short signal if they were operating against convoy
Teichert. 3 boats reported and of these only U 614 was detailed. The 2
others were hopelessly far astern and will join Group "Pfeil", which is
being disposed along the course of this convoy, as it is believed that this is
the HX and that the SC convoy may be astern of the HX on the same
route. Besides U 615, U 632 and U 257 were also detailed against the
convoy.
U 456 shadowed constantly until morning. The convoy was steering a
main course of 10 to 150 and was making about 8 knots. At 0344 U 456
reported that she has sunk an 8,000 GRT freighter. The convoy was in AK
6271 at 0200/2 and the operation continues.
b) 1) U 584 reported that she was still fit for operations and was allocated
square AL 84 as temporary attack area.
2) It is intended to operate against an HG convoy expected on about 6.2,
with 6 boats coming from W. France. Until a patrol line is formed, boats
will occupy the following areas:
U 653 : BE 54 U 753 : BE 55 U 332 : BE 56
U 183 : BE 59 U 519 : BE 67 U 107 : BE 58
3) Group "Haudegen" will proceed as patrol line from 1200 at a speed
of advance of 3 knots and will pass the position line from AJ 1956 to 9633
on 2.2 and the position line from AJ 4381 to AJ 911 on 3.2. If the
expected convoys are not intercepted, it is intended to form a patrol line as
close as possible to the Newfoundland Bank to cover all convoy courses
from north to east.
1124
4) It is expected that the SG convoy will take approximately the same
route as the HX reported by U 456; as soon as he notices U-boats
shadowing the convoy, the enemy will assume, with some justification,
that the convoy route astern of the convoy is free of U-boats. A new patrol
line is therefore being formed in this area with the former "Landsknecht"
boats proceeding west. Order: U 594, 413, 267, 187, 465, 402, 609, 262,
454 and 89 to form Group "Pfeil" and form a patrol line at maximum
speed from AK 8421 to BD 2316.
5) According to agent's and Radio Intelligence reports, a convoy passed
Group "Rochen" on 31.1 and another one on 1.2 on N. and S. courses
respectively. Boats have once more been reminded to keep a sharp
lookout.
6) U 518 is to be detailed against the Brazilian coastal traffic.New
approach point is FJ 30.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 456 - 1 ship 8,000 GRT.
- 56a -
B.d.U.
Reg. No. Most Secret 53/43 S.O. only.
4 February 1943.
U-boats as at 1 February 1943.
I. In commission on 1.1.43: 393 III. In January:
Commissioned in January 21 Became operational 15
414 Total number increased by + 16
Lost during January 5 Number of operational boats increased by + 10
409 Number of boats on trials increased by + 6
Plus foreign submarines 7 Number of school boats unchanged + 0
416

Losses in January (those not underlined have not yet been declared
missing). - 57 -
VIIc U 224 - Kosbadt - second patrol. Succeeded in passing Gibraltar
Straits.Did not report again from the W. Mediterranean.
337 - Ruwiedel - First patrol. Did not report after end of January.
Presumably convoy N. of Newfoundland.
553 - Thurmann - experienced boat. Did not report end of January from
N. Atlantic . Loss not yet certain.
IXc U 164 - Fechner - experienced boat. Has not reported since 2.1
operations area off Brazilian coast. Presumably by air attack.
507 - Schacht - experienced boat. Did not report after middle of January.
Presumably convoy off Brazilian coast. IV. Distribution of operational boats on 1.2.1943:
Atlantic 178
Mediterranean 23
II. Distribution: North Sea 18
II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXD1 IXD2 XB XIV Total Black Sea 3

Operational 3 - 153 3 52 - 4 2 5 222

Trials - - 93 - 21 2 6 2 1 125 V. In the Atlantic in January:
Training 35 4 21** - 2 - - - - 62 Daily average at sea 91.5 boats
of which in operations area 42.3 boats
38* 4 267 3 75 2 10 4 6 409 on passage 49.02 boats
Also 7 foreign boats 7 of these on return passage 16.4 boats
416
* 2 temporarily paid off for Black Sea
** 9 temporarily detached. VI. Sailed during January:
From home ports 14 boats
1125
From W. France 45 boats 214 - Op(DK 50) 414 - Op(AJ 50) 753 - BE 59

--------------------------------------------------- On Return Passage: U 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 260 -
--------------- 266 - 333 - 384 - 413 - 439 - 466 - 444 - 584 - 594 - 598 - 631 - 662 - 706.
Entered Port: U 439 - Brest.
2. February 1943. Sailed: U 225 - Brest; U 623 - Nazaire; U 759 - Kiel.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

I. U 43 - Op(DH 90) U 217 - DQ 68 U 436 - Op(DH 10) U 558 -
Op(DH 50) - 58 -
66 - Op(DH 90) 218 - Op(DH 90) 438 - Op(AJ 90) 571 - Op(DH 10)
69 - Op(AJ 50) 223 - Op(AJ 10) 439 - BF 52 572 - Op(AL 87)
71 - BE 13 226 - Op(AJ 60) 442 - Op(CF 80) 575 - Op(DH 10)
87 - Op(DH 50) 257 - AK 66 444 - BF 40 584 - AL 84
89 - Op(BD 34) 258 - Op(DH 50) 448 - AN 30 590 - BF 57
96 - AN 40 260 - BF 40 454 - Op(AK 98) 594 - AK 81
105 - DF 37 262 - Op(BD 23) 456 - AK 62 598 - BE 13
107 - BE 93 264 - Op(DH 50) 459 - FU 32 606 - Op(AJ 60)
108 - Op(DJ 90) 265 - AE 76 460 - BF 49 607 - Op(AJ 60)
117 - BE 81 266 - BE 22 465 - Op(AK 88) 608 - Op(AK 84) III. Reports on the Enemy:
118 - DH 20 267 - Op(AK 85) 466 - BD 22 609 - Op(AK 89) a) 1) Convoy No. 4 and 5 see paragraph IVa.
123 - BE 29 268 - Op(AJ 50) 468 - AN 31 613 - Op(AK 70) 2) U 514 was off Ponte Delgada and sighted a tanker with destroyers in
124 - DF 37 303 - Op(AJ 60) 504 - DF 37 614 - Op(AK 65) territorial waters, outward bound on an E. course. She could not give
125 - Op(CF 73) 332 - BE 67 506 - GQ 21 620 - Op(DH 20) chase owing to damage to a flange which was causing a leak.
135 - BD 63 333 - BE 62 509 - GH 78 621 - BF 54 3) U 404 situation: 1 steamer, 2 small craft on a S.E. course heard in
156 - DT 58 358 - Op(AJ 10) 510 - DT 57 624 - Op(AJ 90) hydrophones P.M. 2.1 in BF 2432. Did not manage to attack. No convoy
160 - FM 89 376 - AF 75 511 - Op(CF 80) 628 - BF 54 seen. After simultaneous location by 8 shore stations, 3 aircraft searched
175 - EJ 38 377 - Op(AN 16) 514 - Op(CE 69) 631 - BF 44 with searchlights. Radar range as far as BF 2425. Return passage, as
176 - DT 48 381 - Op(DH 10) 516 - GQ 22 632 - Op(AK 60) forward hydroplane out of action due to striking a rock.
182 - GG 91 383 - Op(AJ 60) 518 - EJ 82 653 - BE 55 b) None.
183 - BF 47 384 - BF 40 519 - BF 71 662 - BE 57 c) Torpedo report from unidentified position, possibly AL 19. (U 456)
186 - Op(AJ 20) 402 - Op(AK 88) 521 - Op(DH 90) 704 - Op(AJ 90) d) None.
187 - AK 88 403 - Op(AJ 50) 522 - Op(CF 80) 706 - BD 60
201 - Op(AJ 50) 404 - BE 33 525 - Op(AJ 60) 707 - Op(AJ 20) IV. Current Operations:
202 - Op(DH 50) 413 - Op(AK 84) 529 - AN 30 752 - Op(AJ 70) a) Convoy No. 4:
1126
 In heavy weather. W 8, sea 7 and variable visibility the boats continued
to operate against the convoy which was in AK 6271 at 0800/2/2. The
convoy was making nearly 9 knots, which confirms that it is the HX. It
maintained its NNE course on the 2nd, and then changed to an E. course
during the night and made for the direction of the North Channel. The
convoy was shadowed continuously by U 456, except for short intervals.
A.M. on the 2nd U 632 made contact and remained in the vicinity of the
convoy until A.M. on the 3rd. She then had to break off owing to lack of
fuel. U 257 also reported that she was starting on her return passage. She
was informed of the possibility of refueling. U 265, coming from home,
was detailed against the convoy. 4 boats are therefore still operating: U
456, 265, 614 and 257.
U 456 reported sinking a 7,000 GRT tanker. The convoy was in AL
0189 at 0700/3/2.
Convoy No. 5:
At 1408/2/2 U 223, the most northerly boat of Group "Haudegen",
sighted a convoy, course 100. A further 9 boats, the northern half of
Group "Haudegen", were detailed to operate against it and U 223 was
ordered to report strength of the convoy, as it may be a Greenland convoy.
She reported 5 steamers, which fact made it clear that it was the suspected
Greenland convoy. Only 5 boats were therefore operated against it: U
223, 358, 707, 268 and 186.
U 223 shadowed until AM 3/2 and was then driven off by escort
vessels. U 358 was also shadowing. At 0600/3 U 223 reported that she
had fired 5 single shots at 0452, scored 3 hits and sunk a 6-7,000 GRT ship
for certain. The convoy was in AA 3852 at 0500/3 and the operation
continues.
- 59 -
1127
b) 1) As, according to an agent's report, the HG convoy may arrive
earlier than expected, the boats detailed for this will form a patrol line
immediately. U 584, 572, 653, 753, 332, 107, 183, 519, 590, 621 and 628
will form Group "Hartherz" and set up a patrol line at high cruising speed
from BE 5813 - BE 6822.
2) Group "Pfeil" will proceed in patrol line from 1200 on a course of
2150 and with a speed of advance of 3 knots. U 89 is still too far off and
will therefore make for BC 29 at most economical speed with U 135.
3) Group "Haudegen", now consisting of U 69, 414, 201, 403, 525, 606,
607, 226, 383, 303, 438, 624, 704, 613 and 752, is continuing passage in
patrol line and will pass the position line from AJ 5774 to 9879 at
1200/4/2. Boats which had previously been operating against Convoy No.
5, and were then ordered back, will join the patrol line at economical
cruising speed.
4) The German Consul has reported that a convoy on a N. course was
sighted in the area of Group "Rochen" off Santa Cruz and the following
new attack areas have therefore been ordered: U 218 : DH 9445, U 66 :
DH 9548, depth 30 miles. U 43 : DH 9684, U 521 : DH 9672, U 108 :
DH 9644, depth 15 miles.
5) The special operation (off Peterhead) ordered for U 377 has been
transferred to U 376. The boat has been informed by radio. U 377 is
proceeding to the Atlantic.
c) 1) The following have refueled: U 125 from U 504, U 266 from U
466.
2) U 118 reported the Straits of Gibraltar fouled as ordered on 2.2.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 456 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT
U 223 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT, 1 ship torpedoed.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
3. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DH 90) U 217 - DQ 63 U 436 - Op(DH 10) U 571 -
Op(DH 10)
66 - Op(DH 90) 218 - Op(DH 90) 438 - Op(AJ 92) 572 - BE 24
69 - Op(AJ 54) 223 - Op(AA 33) 442 - Op(CF 70) 575 - Op(DH 10)
71 - BE 13 225 - BF 54 444 - BF 68 584 - BE 24
87 - Op(DH 50) 226 - Op(AJ 91) 448 - AN 30 590 - BF 47
89 - BD 25 257 - Op(AL 10) 454 - Op(BD 20) 594 - Op(AK 70)
96 - AN 30 258 - Op(DH 50) 456 - Op(AL 01) 598 - AE 13
105 - DF 37 260 - BF 64 459 - FU 76 606 - Op(AJ 59)
107 - BE 68 262 - Op(BD 20) 460 - BF 47 607 - Op(AJ 59)
108 - Op(DH 90) 264 - Op(DH 50) 465 - Op(BD 20) 608 - Op(AK 80)
117 - BE 91 265 - AL 27 466 - BD 23 609 - Op(BD 20)
118 - DJ 10 266 - BD 22 468 - AN 20 613 - Op(AJ 95)
123 - BE 61 267 - Op(AK 80) 504 - DF 37 614 - Op(AL 10)
124 - DF 37 268 - Op(AJ 13) 506 - GQ 24 620 - Op(DH 10)
125 - Op(CF 70) 303 - Op(AJ 91) 509 - GQ 31 621 - BF 45
- 60 -
135 - BD 37 332 - Op(BE 59) 510 - DT 79 623 - BF 58
1128
156 - DT 87 333 - BF 44 511 - Op(CF 70) 624 - Op(AJ 95
160 - FT 38 358 - Op(AA 33) 514 - Op(CE 69) 628 - BF 49
175 - DT 98 376 - AF 76 516 - GQ 34 631 - BF 40
176 - DT 19 381 - AN 27 518 - ES 21 632 - Op(AL 42)
182 - GH 77 383 - Op(DH 10) 519 - BE 68 653 - Op(BE 53)
183 - BE 68 384 - Op(AJ 91) 521 - Op(DH 90) 662 - BE 67
186 - Op(AJ 13) 402 - BF 68 522 - CF 70 704 - Op(AJ 95)
187 - Op(AK 80) 403 - Op(AJ 56) 525 - Op(AJ 56) 706 - BD 60
201 - Op(AJ 52) 404 - BF 15 529 - AN 43 707 - Op(AJ 13)
202 - Op(DH 50) 413 - Op(AK 80) 558 - Op(DH 50) 752 - Op(AJ 90)
214 - Op(DR 50) 414 - Op(AJ 52) 753 - Op(BE 59)
759 - AO
377 - Op(AN 10)
On Return Passage: U 96 - 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 260
- 226 - 333 - 384 - 404 - 413 - 444 - 466 - 584 - 594 - 598 - 631 - 632 -
662 - 706.
Entered Port: U 260 - St. Nazaire; U 384 - 444 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 68 - Lorient; U 437 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: For an expected HG convoy in the area of Group
"Hartherz".
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 4 and 5 paragraph IVa.
2) U 214 encountered no traffic on her way to DQ 50 via DQ 70.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BE 5693, BF 4567, BB 6376, BB 6376, AL 2974
and 2 more in unidentified positions, including one depth-charge attack by
aircraft.
U-boat attack: AA 3930, AA 0382.
Torpedo report from DR 1713.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
 a) Convoy No. 4:
The remaining 4 boats continued the operation in favorable, calm S.W.
weather. The convoy was clearly making for the North Channel at 9 knots.
U 456 and U 614 continued to shadow. Towards midnight contact was
lost, after U 456 had last reported the convoy in AL 6133 at 2030. Contact
was not regained.
U 632 reported at 1400 that she was chasing an independent tanker on
an E. course, 12 knots, in AL 59. At 2200 she reported the tanker
Cordelia, 8,190 GRT, sunk.
- 61 -
U 257 reported that she was returning owing to lack of fuel. A.M. on
the 4th operations against the convoy were broken off. There was no boat
shadowing and U 456 reported that she was 30 miles astern. The
remaining 3 boats were therefore directed against a NE-bound convoy
picked up A.M. on 4/2 in BD 10. In conclusion: It is thanks to U 456's
excellent shadowing from midday on the 1st until the 3rd that such a small
group of boats were able to operate against the convoy over this long
stretch. Of 5 boats, 3 made contact. Unfortunately only U 456 was able to
fire.
Altogether 2 tankers and a freighter, totaling 23,190 GRT were sunk. U
265 was probably lost in this operation. There is a report of an attack by
an English aircraft with bombs on a U-boat N. of the convoy. Otherwise
no losses or damage.
Convoy No. 5:
1129
No further reports were received of the convoy, and it can be assumed
that the boats have not been able to get their radio messages through
owing to the well-known difficulties arising off Greenland. According to
dead reckoning the convoy should reach a port on the SW coast of
Greenland on the 3rd. Boats were therefore ordered to press on to the
coast and, if conditions were favorable, to penetrate into the fjord.
Operations control does not know if boats are even in contact. The convoy
cannot be discussed further until reports have been received from Group
"Nordsturm".
b) 1) In order to close the wide gap between Group "Haudegen" and
Group "Pfeil", Group "Pfeil" is now proceeding on a course of 2500, speed
5 knots. It is intended to form an extensive patrol line with both Groups
off the Newfoundland Bank.
2) Following U 404's report of 3.2, the special operation ordered for U
71 has been broken off. U 71 will join Group "Hartherz" and will occupy
U 107's position in the patrol line (BE 5933), making a day's run of 180
miles. U 107 will extend the patrol line to the E. as far as BE 6832.
3) U 156 and U 510 are proceeding to ED 90 via EG 30. Operation here
must be attempted at all costs, as there has ben no boat there for a fortnight
and the area was always a good hunting ground so far.
c) 1) U 105 has supplied from U 504.
2) Boats have again been reminded of the closing of Route A in stages.
The homeward bound ship is the tanker "Hohenfriedber" ex-"Herburg".
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 632 - 1 ship 8,190 GRT.
- 62 -

4. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DH 90) U 214 - DR 61 U 436 - Op(DH 12) U 572 -
Op(BE 59)
66 - Op(DH 90) 217 - DR 14 437 - BF 58 575 - Op(DH 15)
68 - BF 54 218 - Op(DH 90) 438 - Op(AJ 94) 584 - Op(BE 58)
69 - Op(AJ 57) 223 - Op(AA 33) 442 - Op(CF 87) 590 - BE 68
71 - BE 61 225 - BF 45 448 - AN 30 594 - BD 21
87 - Op(DH 51) 226 - Op(AJ 83) 454 - Op(BD 10) 598 - BE 29
89 - BD 27 257 - Op(AL 39) 456 - Op(AL 39) 606 - Op(AJ 82)
96 - AO 258 - Op(DH 58) 459 - FU 44 607 - Op(AJ 83)
105 - DF 37 262 - Op(BD 10) 460 - BE 68 608 - Op(BD 10)
107 - BF 71 264 - Op(DH 54) 465 - Op(BD 10) 609 - Op(BD 10)
108 - Op(DH 90) 265 - Op(AL 39) 466 - BD 36 613 - Op(AJ 98)
117 - BE 93 266 - BD 36 468 - AF 87 614 - Op(AL 39)
118 - DH 33 267 - Op(BD 10) 504 - DF 37 620 - Op(DH 19)
123 - BE 66 268 - Op(AA 33) 506 - GQ 38 621 - BE 66
124 - CE 78 303 - Op(AJ 94) 509 - GQ 36 623 - BF 49
125 - Op(CF 73) 332 - Op(BE 59) 510 - EJ 11 624 - Op(AJ 94)
135 - BD 28 333 - BF 40 511 - Op(CF 87) 628 - BE 68
156 - EJ 12 358 - Op(AA 33) 514 - Op(CE 69) 632 - AL 40
160 - FU 44 376 - AN 27 516 - GQ 63 653 - Op(BE 58)
175 - DT 91 377 - AF 79 518 - ES 19 662 - BE 69
176 - DT 21 381 - Op(DH 16) 519 - Op(BE 67) 704 - Op(AJ 97)
182 - GQ 26 383 - Op(AJ 86) 521 - Op(DH 90) 706 - BD 65
183 - Op(BE 64) 402 - Op(BD 10) 522 - Op(CF 84) 707 - Op(AA 33)
186 - Op(AA 33) 403 - Op(AJ 58) 525 - Op(AJ 58) 752 - Op(AJ 98)
187 - Op(BD 10) 404 - BF 41 529 - AF 87 753 - Op(BE 59)
201 - Op(AJ 58) 413 - BD 22 558 - Op(DH 57) 759 - AN 36
202 - Op(DH 54) 414 - Op(AJ 57) 571 - Op(DH 19) 631 - BF 60
1130
On Return Passage: U 96 - 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 257
- 266 - 333 - 404 - 413 - 448 - 466 - 584 - 594 - 598 - 632 - 662 - 706.
Entered Port: U 631 - Brest.
Sailed: U 230 - 359 - 638 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance:
By 5 aircraft in the area between 130 to 190 W and 470 to 490 N
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 5 and 6 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 217 sank the British "Rhexenor", 7,957 GRT, from Freetown to St.
Johns, on 3.2 in DR 14. One officer taken on board.
3) U 414 was attacked by seaplanes and slightly damaged on her way to
Group "Haudegen" 's patrol line.
4) U 632 reports, that according to statements by a prisoner, that
Convoy No. 4 is to be followed by another large convoy from Halifax,
making 6 knots, on the same route. Destination North Channel. Traffic
from Curacao via New York to Halifax is to follow the shortest route.
5) From Group "Haudegen" 's patrol line U 753 reported a corvette and
an aircraft in BE 5915, on a S. course and U 575 a single corvette in BE
5825 at 1630, course SW. Air reconnaissance reported a steamer in BE
6432 and another in BE 2955, both also on a S. course. Boats operated
against these sightings without intercepting the expected convoy or
scoring successes against the independently-routed ships.
- 63 -
 b) The expected convoy was not found. Individual sighting see
paragraph a) 5).
c) U-boat sightings: BC 19, AJ 49, AJ 73, BE 9316.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 5:
No further reports were received.As the convoy must by now have
reached its port of destination, the operation is regarded as concluded. U
268, 707, 223 and 186 have moved away, as ordered, and are making for
AJ 56. U 186 sighted a Q-ship of 200 GRT in AA 3861, camouflaged as a
Danish fishing smack. She fired on her without hitting. There is no report
from U 358 yet.
2) Convoy No. 6:
At 1108/4/2 U 187, of Group "Pfeil", sighted a large convoy on a NE
course in broad formation in BD 1199. Operations Control was therefore
right in disposing a group on the route of the HX convoy on the
assumption that the SC convoy would follow the same course. As U 187
reported that the convoy was very large, it was assumed that it was the one
reported by Radio Intelligence Service which left New York on 24.1. U
632, which sank a tanker from the preceding HX convoy, reported that an
officer of this tanker had said that a large convoy was to follow. It is an
important convoy, part of which, according to Radio Intelligence, is
destined for Murmansk. As many boats as possible were therefore detailed
against it. First of all, all boats of Group "Pfeil" and other boats in the
vicinity. These were the following 13: U 187, 402, 262, 609, 454, 135,
413, 266, 594, 608, 267, 465, 98. Then also 5 boats from group
"Haudegen", U 438, 624, 704, 613 and 752. Operations against the
"Teichers" convoy were broken off and the boats U 614 and U 456 were
also sent to meet the convoy. Altogether 20 boats were therefore operating
against this convoy.
In the course of the afternoon U 402, U 608 and U 267 made contact,
and U 609 during the night. U 608 and U 609 both reported flares over the
convoy. From the beginning individual boats only shadowed for short
periods at a time, as they were constantly driven off and depth-charged by
escort forces. At 0736/5 U 262 reported the convoy in 8442.
1131
According to shadowers' reports the convoy was making about 7 knots.
At first it steered 40 degrees along the route followed by its predecessor
and in the course of the afternoon altered to 100 probably by way of
evasive action.
The fact that the boats were constantly driven off can only be
explained by unfavorable weather. The escort forces probably had good
Asdic results in the calm west weather conditions and therefore had the
advantage over the U-boats.
b) 1) As Group "Delphin" has found nothing in its present patrol line, the
boats are being disposed in an angular formation
- 64 -
to intercept traffic approaching from the N. and W. The large
distances apart of about 35 miles, which are necessary for this, will have to
be accepted. The new line runs in the same order from CG 4655 via CF
9264 to DH 2556.
2) After the boats best off for fuel have been detailed against Convoy
No. 6, the remaining 10 boats of Group "Haudegen" have been ordered to
occupy the following attack areas a economical cruising speed: U 69 :
1189, U 414 : 1444, U 403 : 1737, U 201 : 1548, U 525 : 1883, U 606 :
1598, U 607 : 4347, U 226 : 1982, U 383 : 4682, U 303 : 4399. All BC.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 217 - 1 ship 7,957 GRT.
 759 - AN 30
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
On Return Passage: U 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 257 -
5. February 1943. 266 - 404 - 413 - 448 - 466 - 514 - 584 - 594 - 598 - 632 - 662 - 706.
Entered Port: U 333 - La Pallice; U 96 - Kiel.
Sailed: - . -
I. U 43 - Op(DH 90) U 214 - DS 17 U 413 - Op(AK 88) U 558 -
Op(DH) - 65 -
66 - Op(DH 90) 217 - DF 81 414 - Op(AJ 76) 571 - DH 25
68 - BF 49 218 - Op(DH 90) 436 - CF 89 572 - Op(BE 58)
69 - AJ 76 223 - Op(AA 30) 437 - BF 57 575 - DH 21
71 - Op(BE 59) 225 - BE 66 438 - Op(AK 86) 584 - Op(BE 59)
87 - DH 25 226 - Op(AJ 88) 442 - CF 88 590 - Op(BE 67
89 - Op(AK 88) 230 - AO 448 - AN 24 594 - Op(AK 88)
96 - AO 257 - AL 71 454 - Op(AK 88) 598 - BE 66
105 - CE 78 258 - DH 55 456 - AL 45 606 - Op(AJ 87)
107 - Op(BE 68 262 - Op(AK 84) 459 - FU 44 607 - Op(AJ 88)
108 - Op(DH 99) 264 - DH 28 460 - BE 64 608 - Op(AK 81) II. Air Reconnaissance:
117 - BF 48 265 - AL 45 465 - Op(AK 84) 609 - Op(AK 85) In the same area as yesterday for the expected HG convoy.
118 - DH 26 266 - Op(AK 89) 466 - BE 18 613 - Op(AK 76)
123 - BF 58 267 - Op(AK 85) 468 - AF 47 614 - Op(AL 44) III. Reports on the Enemy:
124 - CE 84 268 - Op(AA 30) 504 - DF 82 620 - DH 25 a) 1) Convoy No. 6 see paragraph IVa.
125 - CF 82 303 - Op(BC 22) 506 - Op(GR 40) 621 - Op(BE 67) 2) U 66 sank a coastal steamer of 500 GRT by gunfire on 1.2 in DH
135 - Op(AK 86) 332 - Op(BE 89) 509 - Op(GR 40) 623 - BF 47 9665. So far only neutral shipping sighted. Medium enemy and neutral
156 - EH 34 333 - BF 93 510 - EH 31 624 - Op(AK 76) air activity. Machine gun C/38 proved satisfactory.
160 - FU 44 358 - Op(AA 30) 511 - CF 85 628 - Op(BE 67) 3) U 590 has been ordered to return, as both her Diesels were out of
175 - DT 91 359 - AO 514 - CE 98 632 - AL 81 action owing to corrosion of 4 fuel pumps. After repairs 1 Diesel with 5
176 - DG 99 376 - AN 40 516 - Op(GR 40) 638 - AO cylinders was serviceable again. The cause of corrosion cannot be
182 - GQ 62 377 - AF 72 518 - ER 69 653 - Op(BE 59) discovered until tests have been made on the test bench.
183 - Op(BE 67) 381 - DH 21 519 - Op(BE 67) 662 - BF 48 b) No sightings.
186 - Op(AA 21) 383 - Op(AJ 83) 521 - Op(DH 90) 704 - Op(AK 70) c) U-boat attack on unidentified American steamer in AK 8291, further
187 - Op(AK 82) 402 - Op(AK 85) 522 - CF 85 706 - BD 63 attack doubtful in FJ 6285.
201 - Op(AJ 84) 403 - Op(AJ 84) 525 - Op(AJ 87) 707 - Op(AJ 24) d) None.
202 - DH 28 404 - BF 40 529 - AF 75 752 - Op(AK 82)
753 - Op(BE 59) IV. Current Operations:
1132
 a) Convoy No. 6:
Weather conditions A.M. on the 5th were reported as west 2-3, sea 2,
visibility good. Wind freshened to W. 8. in the afternoon, heavy seas,
snow and hail. Weather in the afternoon made it very difficult to find the
convoy, and weather conditions were also largely responsible for the fact
that the convoy was not attacked during the night 5/6.
At 1025 U 609 reported a steamer and a corvette in AK 8425. The
same boat then found the convoy again at 1245 in 8193. She reported later
that it consisted of 8 steamers, in wide formation. At 1423 she reported
contact lost. As, according to 3 reports from this boat, the convoy was
making 12 knots. Operations Control assumed that a small group of a few
ships had succeeded in attracting the boats to itself while the large, slow
section turned E.S. of this. U 609 reported only 8 ships and it was known
from Radio Intelligence that the convoy was to proceed at 7.5 knots. At
2018 U 609 found the larger, slow section of the convoy in AK 8261,
which had, as suspected, apparently turned E and was now going back to
the convoy route proper. The boat reported 28 ships. She was seen while
making an unsuccessful submerged attack. She shadowed until 0400.
During the night she had contact only by hydrophone bearing. According
to reports the convoy was making nearly 8 knots and steering 30 - 400.
Operations Control failed to understand why no other boats reached the
convoy. It is true that various boats reported that they had been driven off
by destroyers and depth-charged, but of the 16 boats which should have
been in the vicinity, others should at least have sighted the convoy,
especially as there was no air escort as yet.
- 66 -
1133
U 262 reported that she had sunk a 12,000 - GRT tanker with 3 hits at
0655/5. U 413 reported that she had sunk a straggling 5000 GRT steamer
at 1707/5. The convoy was in AK 6488 at 1100/6 and the operation
continues.
b) 1) After all boats of Group "Nordsturm" had reported their fuel a new
disposition was ordered for Group "Haudegen". The following squares are
to be occupied as attack areas:
U 358 : AJ 58, U 186 : AJ 59, U 223 : AJ 83, U 707 : AJ 81, U 268 : AJ
95. From here the boats can operate as an attacking group against convoys
which may be reported by "Haudegen" or against SW-bound convoys for
another 2 days.
2) U 623, 225 and 437 have been ordered to steer for AK 68.
3) U 529, 759 and 638 will proceed via squares AE 65 - 67 and 69 to
reconnoiter the sea area between Iceland and the Faroes.
4) U 518 has been give freedom of action from Cape St. Roque south
along the Brazilian coast to Bahia. She is free to enter territorial waters,
but forbidden to penetrate into harbors or bombard them.
c) 1) U 460 has made her passage report and it is intended to supply U
706 and U 632, from 7.2 in BD 6325. Subsequently boats of Group
"Pfeil" which are short of fuel are to replenish in AK 89.
2) UU 459 has supplied U 160, the last boat intended for the Africa
operation, and is starting her return passage.
d) U 96 entered Kiel and will now be used as a training boat.
V. Reports of Success:
U 66 - 1 ship 500 GRT
U 262 - 1 ship 12,000 GRT
U 413 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
6. February 1943.
 I. U 43 - Op(DH 90) U 217 - DF 81 U 436 - Op(CF 95) U 572 -
Op(BE 59
66 - Op(DH 90) 218 - Op(DH 90) 437 - BF 48 575 - Op(CF 94)
68 - BE 93 223 - AJ 52 438 - Op(AK 56) 584 - Op(BE 59)
69 - Op(BC 11) 225 - BE 56 442 - Op(CF 94) 590 - Op(BE 67)
71 - Op(BE 59) 226 - Op(BC 19) 448 - AN 24 594 - Op(AK 56)
87 - Op(CF 97) 230 - AN 30 454 - Op(AK 56) 598 - BF 45
89 - Op(AK 56) 257 - BE 25 456 - Op(AK 60) 606 - Op(BC 16)
105 - CE 81 258 - Op(DH 25) 459 - FU 44 607 - Op(BC 16)
107 - Op(BE 68) 262 - Op(AK 56) 460 - BE 51 608 - Op(AK 56)
108 - Op(DH 90) 264 - Op(DH 22) 465 - Op(AK 56) 609 - Op(AK 53)
117 - BF 40 265 - Op(AK 60) 466 - BE 54 613 - Op(AK 56)
118 - DH 51 266 - Op(AK 56) 468 - AE 68 614 - Op(AK 60)
123 - BF 61 267 - Op(AK 56) 504 - DF 81 620 - Op(CF 97)
124 - CE 59 268 - AJ 56 506 - Op(GR 50) 621 - Op(BE 67)
125 - Op(CF 67) 303 - Op(BC 27) 509 - Op(GR 50) 623 - BE 68
135 - Op(AK 56) 332 - Op(BE 59) 510 - EH 16 624 - Op(AK 56)
156 - EH 24 358 - AA 30 511 - Op(CF 91) 628 - Op(BE 67)
160 - FU 44 359 - AN 30 514 - CF 52 632 - AL 78
- 67 -
175 - DT 61 376 - Op(AN) 516 - Op(GR 50) 638 - AN 30
176 - DH 74 377 - AE 69 518 - ER 94 653 - Op(BE 59)
182 - GR 44 381 - Op(CF 95) 519 - Op(BE 67) 662 - BF 40
183 - Op(BE 67) 383 - Op(BC 27) 521 - Op(DH 90) 704 - Op(AK 91)
1134
186 - AJ 52 402 - Op(AK 56) 522 - Op(CF 91) 706 - BD 63
187 - Op(AK 60) 403 - Op(BC 12) 525 - Op(BC 15) 707 - AJ 52
201 - Op(BC 12) 404 - BF 64 529 - AF 47 752 - Op(AK 56)
202 - Op(CF 98) 413 - Op(AK 56) 558 - DH 22 753 - Op(BE 59)
214 - DS 18 414 - Op(BC 11) 571 - Op(CF 95) 759 - AN 23
On Return Passage: U 105 - 117 - 123 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 257 -
266 - 404 - 413 - 448 - 466 - 514 - 584 - 594 - 598 - 632 - 662 - 706.
Entered Port: U 123 - Lorient; U 404 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 92 - 566 - Brest; U 119 - 228 - 616 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 6 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 71 fired a triple fan at an independent corvette, course 180 degrees
in BE 5963. Corvette evaded the fan, contact lost. Expected convoy not
found.
3) There is strong air activity with Radar at present in Group
"Haudegen" 's area. U 414 is returning owing to considerable bomb
damage. U 403 was also bombed and pursued by a searching group.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AK 6581, BE 5655, BE 8317, BE 5675, AK 6483,
BE 5233, BE 5960, AK 5986, AK 5995.
U-boats were attacked in FJ 6285, BC 1811, and BC 1571.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 6:
Weather conditions were calm, visibility, good again on the 6th. At
1146 U 609 reported the convoy in AK 6488. The boat shadowed until
1445, lost contact for a time and found the convoy again towards 1900.
Three other boats then came up to the convoy before dark, U 438, U 262
and U 456. U 262 acted as shadower for the night.At 0230 U 402 also
made contact.
 The convoy was steering a main course of 70 and making a bare 8
knots. Conditions were easy again for the anti-submarine forces. Several
boats were driven off by destroyers. U 262 and U 267 were damaged by
depth charges and had to move off for repairs.But the particularly strong
air escort was far more unpleasant for the boats. 11 boats reported aircraft.
4 were bombed and U 465 had to move off owing to considerable damage.
- 68 -
U 454, 438 and 135 were driven off when starting to attack and
afterwards did not manage to fire again.
The following successes were reported:
U 266 straggler Polyktor 4,077 GRT sunk
U 402 2 large tankers and 4 freighters totaling: 45,000 GRT sunk
U 262 1 large tanker of 9,000 GRT sunk
and a freighter of 6,000 GRT sunk
U 614 1 large tanker, estimated 8,000 GRT sunk
Operation against the convoy is continuing. It was in AL 4416 at
0700/7.
Of the boats detailed only 11 are left fit to operate against the convoy, U
454, 613, 402, 135, 614, 438, 608, 624, 456, 609 and 89. Several of these
have only few torpedoes left.
6 boats have started their return passage or are proceeding to supply: U
262, 266, 752, 413, 594 and 704. 2 boats, U 465 and 267 have moved
away because of damage. U 187 has not reported since she made her first
report of the convoy. U 265, which was previously operating against the
1135
"Teichert" convoy, has also not reported again and did not reach this
convoy.
b) Group "Hartherz" is remaining in its present patrol line.
c) None.
d) 1) Changes in closing of Route A. Attack on independently-routed
ships is forbidden: between 50 S and 100 N up to 10.2. From 100 N to
350 N from 7 - 23.2. From 350 N, up to the north and east from 19.2 until
further notice. Present conditions do not justify allowing all independent
ships in Route A to pass unhindered and boas have therefore been ordered
to stick to any ships which from its type and course is probably enemy, to
report and to wait for permission to attack.
2) U 265, on her first patrol, last made a short weather report on 2.2
from AL 26. As she was in a favorable position she was ordered to operate
against Convoy No. 4. On her way there she was attacked by an aircraft,
probably in AL 29. She has not replied to several orders to report her
position. Her loss must be presumed.
V. Reports of Success:
U 266 - 1 ship 4,077 GRT
U 402 - 6 ships 45,000 GRT
U 262 - 2 ships 15,000 GRT
U 614 - 1 ship 8,000 GRT
VI. General:
Situation in the N. Atlantic:
In a few days time the number of boats operating in the North Atlantic
will be considerably reduced. An attempt was made to facilitate the
finding of convoys by having as many boats as
- 69 -

possible and boats were therefore ordered to defer their return passage
until they had only the minimum possible fuel left or to remain in their
operations area and refuel on the way back. These boats will now shortly
be forced to return owing to lack of fuel.
Then Group "Pfeil" 's operation is ended there will only be a few boats
left with enough fuel for further operations.
The situation is:
Group "Haudegen" : 9 boats very short of fuel.
Group "Nordsturm" : 4 boats with medium stocks 1 short
Group "Pfeil" : 3 - 4 boats with medium stocks (after completion of the
operation).
and the aim of sinking as much enemy tonnage as possible much more
likely to be achieved. On the other hand our own situation in North Africa
is dangerous, it is particularly important to take action against the African
supply traffic and it is necessary to have the boats ready for quick
operation in case of an enemy attack in the Iberian Peninsular. It is
therefore intended to refuel U-boats in the Africa Azores are with the next
U-tanker to sail and so extend their operational endurance for as long as
possible and, after forming 2 strong groups in Northern Waters, to send
further boats to the Azores area to relieve "Delphin" boats which have to
return owing to lack of fuel.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------

This means that, in a few days, group operation against convoys will in
practice no longer be possible unless a corresponding number of fresh - 70 -
boats are sent out from home and Western France. It will therefore be
necessary to send all Type VIIc boats sailing in the near future to the North
Atlantic, as well as the boats from Group "Hartherz", so that there will be
at least 1 or 2 strong groups. Reinforcement of Group "Delphin"
(operating against African supply) will have to be cancelled for the
present. In this area (sea area between 43 to 280 N and 300 W to the
African coast) the enemy has great opportunities to take avoiding action.
In order to have an effective disposition to intercept convoys a lot of boats
are required. U-boat operations on a large scale both in the North Atlantic
against America - England traffic and in the area of the Azores against 7. February 1943.
America - Africa traffic are not possible.
When considering the advantages of one area over the other, it must be
remembered that there is much more traffic in the area of England - I. U 43 - Op(DH 90) U 217 - DF 80 U 437 - BE 68 U 575 - Op(CF 69)
America shipping. There are for certain about 16 convoys per month here, 66 - Op(DH 90) 218 - Op(DH 90) 438 - Op(AL 40) 584 - BE 59
while in the Azores area only 3 per month may be expected. Chances of 68 - BE 95 223 - Op(AJ 83) 442 - Op(CG 47) 590 - BE 69
intercepting convoys are also better in the N. Atlantic N of 43 N as the 69 - Op(BC 11) 225 - BE 27 448 - AF 79 594 - AK 85
area is smaller. Seen as a whole therefore the prospects of picking up 71 - Op(BE 59) 226 - BC 19 454 - Op(AL 40) 598 - BF 40
convoys are much better in the sea area of the England - America convoys 87 - CF 95 228 - AO 456 - Op(AL 40) 606 - Op(BC 15)
1136
 89 - Op(AL 40) 230 - AN 30 459 - FT 31 607 - BC 43
92 - BF 54 257 - BE 61 460 - BD 63 608 - Op(AL 40)
105 - CE 67 258 - Op(DH 25) 465 - Op(AL 40) 609 - Op(AL 40)
107 - BE 67 262 - Op(AL 40) 466 - BE 56 613 - Op(AL 40)
108 - Op(DH 90) 264 - Op(DH 22) 468 - AE 83 614 - Op(AL 40)
117 - BF 61 265 - Op(AL 40) 504 - DF 80 616 - AO
118 - DH 47 266 - AK 86 506 - Op(GR 50) 620 - Op(CF 95)
119 - AO 267 - Op(AL 40) 509 - Op(GR 50) 621 - BE 64
124 - CE 65 268 - Op(AJ 95) 510 - FG 36 623 - BE 56
125 - Op(CG 47) 303 - Op(BC 43) 511 - Op(CG 47) 624 - Op(AL 40)
135 - Op(AL 40) 332 - BE 55 514 - CF 31 628 - BE 64
156 - EH 14 358 - Op(AJ 58) 516 - Op(GR 40) 632 - BD 65
160 - FU 85 359 - AN 30 518 - FC 23 638 - AN 30
175 - DT 34 376 - Op(AN 18) 519 - BE 59 653 - BE 55
176 - DH 47 377 - AE 67 521 - Op(DH 90) 662 - BF 65
182 - Op(GR 50) 381 - Op(CF 93) 522 - Op(CG 47) 704 - AK 96
183 - BE 59 383 - Op(BC 46) 525 - Op(BC 18) 706 - BD 63
186 - AJ 59 402 - Op(AL 40) 529 - AE 65 707 - Op(AJ 91)
187 - Op(AL 40) 403 - Op(BC 15) 558 - Op(DH 22) 752 - AK 68
201 - Op(BC 15) 413 - AK 67 566 - BF 54 753 - BE 55
202 - Op(CF 98) 414 - BC 13 571 - Op(CF 92) 759 - AF 76
214 - DS 96 436 - Op(CF 69) 572 - BE 59
On Return Passage: U 71 - 105 - 117 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 217 - 257 - 266
- 413 - 414 - 448 - 459 - 466 - 514 - 572 - 584 - 590 - 594 - 598 - 632 -
704 - 706 - 752.
Entered Port: U 117 - Lorient; U 662 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 603 - Brest; U 103 - Lorient; U 445 - St. Nazaire; U 405 -
Bergen.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 6 and 7 see paragraph IVa.
1137
2) U 628 sighted the hospital ship "New Foundland" in BE 6588, course
S., 13 knots. Boat continued on her outward passage.
3) U 511 reported 2 escort vessels on a main course of 1200 in CG
4826. U 202 also sighted a corvette, 950, in DH 3146.
4) U 183 heard weak sounds bearing 600 from BE 6712. Noise at first
approached, then hydrophone bearing lost. Constant air patrol.
b) None.
- 71 -
c) U-boat sightings: BE 4563 - BC 1514 - AK 6295 - BE 5655 - AM
1710.
Several SSS and torpedo reports from an unidentified position.
Probably from Convoy No. 6.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 6:
Weather in the convoy area on the 7th was reported as WSW 4 - 5,
good visibility deteriorating at times owing to showers. According to
boats' reports the convoy was making 7.5 knots, and changing course more
and more to the E. in the direction of the North Channel. Contact with the
convoy was not regained until 1544 in AL 4273 by U 456. She lost
contact an hour later and U 402 found the convoy again at 1730. She too
lost contact at 1900 shortly before dark. U 456 and U 402 both regained
contact at 2310 and 0215 respectively. The convoy was held until 0700,
when it was reported in AL 5221. Besides these 2 boats only U 608 came
up to the convoy. U 456 was picked up by the escort twice before
attacking and did not manage to fire.
U 402 reported an 8,000 GRT freighter sunk with her last electric
torpedo.
U 605 reported a 12,000 GRT tanker sunk.
The enemy's air escort did not appear until towards evening on the 7th,
whereas on the previous day there had been far more aircraft with the
convoy. Although the boats must be exhausted after 4 days, the operation
is being continued as 8 boats still have torpedoes left and U 402 can still
give valuable service as shadower. U 456 has broken off owing to lack of
fuel, and U 438 owing to damage, apparently not due to enemy action. U
454, 613, 402, 135, 614, 608, 624, 609, and 89 are still operating.
2) Convoy No. 7:
U 218 sighted a small convoy in DH 9473 at 0820, consisting of about
3 steamers and 3 escort vessels, course N, speed 10 knots. The first report
of this was not received by control until 1230. The convoy was then on a
NE course.
Group "Rochen" and 5 boats of Group "Delphin", which are well off
for fuel (U 87 - 202 - 264 - 558 - 258) were ordered to operate against the
reported enemy. The 5 "Delphin" boats could arrive by 8.2. Owing to
strong air patrol U 218 was constantly forced to dive and lost contact at
1523 in DH 9188 main course 450, speed 8 knots. The following were
identified 2 freighters, 1 tanker, 1 destroyer and 2 corvettes. The boats
then continued to search independently along an enemy course of 45 - 550.
At 2130 U 66 located the convoy in DH 9244. Towards 0200 U 43 took
over a shadower and shadowed until morning. Convoy's last position at
0643 was DH 6885. No successes were scored. The operation is
continuing.
- 72 -
1138
b) As the expected Gibraltar convoy has not turned up and air
reconnaissance on previous days was without result, group "Hartherz" is
being dissolved. U 753, 653, 628, 621 and 332 are making for AK 92 and
will operate against convoys from there. U 183, 590 and 107 are to make
for CF 73. U 572, 71 and 584 are short of fuel and starting on their return
passage.
c) U 465 and U 262 have had to break off pursuit of the convoy owing to
damage and return. As both have fuel to spare they have been ordered to
rendezvous with U 413, U 266 and U 594 in AK 9442.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 402 - 1 ship 8,000 GRT
U 608 - 1 ship 12,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
8. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DH 68) U 217 - DF 81 U 437 - BE 59 U 571 - Op(CF 92)
66 - Op(DH 68) 218 - Op(DH 68) 438 - Op(AL 52) 572 - BE 68
68 - CF 32 223 - Op(AJ 83) 442 - Op(CG 47) 575 - Op(CF 69)
69 - Op(BC 11) 225 - BE 15 445 - BF 58 584 - BE 67
71 - BE 68 226 - Op(BC 19) 448 - AF 72 590 - BF 48
87 - Op(DH 60) 228 - AN 36 454 - Op(AL 52) 594 - AK 94
89 - Op(AL 52) 230 - AN 31 456 - Op(AL 02) 598 - BF 64
92 - BF 45 257 - BE 66 459 - FM 82 603 - BF 54
103 - BF 54 258 - Op(DH 60) 460 - BD 63 606 - Op(BC 15)
105 - CF 48 262 - AK 94 465 - AK 94 607 - Op(BC 43)
107 - BE 91 264 - Op(DH 60) 466 - BE 69 608 - Op(AL 50)
 108 - Op(DH 68) 266 - AK 94 468 - AE 84 609 - Op(AL 54)
118 - DH 47 267 - AK 63 504 - DF 81 613 - Op(AL 52)
119 - AN 36 268 - Op(AJ 95) 506 - Op(GR 19) 614 - Op(AL 50)
124 - CF 54 303 - Op(BC 43) 509 - Op(GR 90) 616 - AN 36
125 - Op(CG 47) 332 - BE 54 510 - EG 29 620 - Op(CF 95)
135 - Op(AL 52) 358 - Op(AJ 58) 511 - Op(CG 45) 621 - BE 56
156 - EG 34 359 - AN 31 514 - BF 97 623 - BE 51
160 - GG 14 376 - Op(AN 18) 516 - Op(GR 90) 624 - Op(AL 52)
175 - DT 31 377 - AE 85 518 - FC 51 628 - BE 64
176 - DH 47 381 - Op(CF 93) 519 - BE 83 632 - BD 63
182 - Op(GR 83) 383 - Op(BC 46) 521 - Op(DH 68 638 - AN 31
183 - BE 83 402 - Op(AL 61) 522 - Op(CG 47) 653 - BE 51
186 - Op(AJ 59) 403 - Op(BC 17) 525 - Op(BC 18) 704 - AL 78
187 - Op(AL 52) 405 - AF 79 529 - AE 83 706 - BD 93
201 - Op(BC 15) 413 - AK 94 558 - Op(DH 60) 707 - Op(AJ 91)
202 - Op(DH 60) 414 - BC 21 566 - BF 45 752 - AL 75
214 - DG 79 436 - Op(CF 69) 569 - BF 91 753 - BE 51
759 - AF 47
On Return Passage: U 71 - 105 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 214 - 217 - 257 - 266
- 413 - 414 - 448 - 459 - 466 - 514 - 572 - 584 - 590 - 594 - 598 - 632 -
704 - 706 - 752.
Entered Port: U 598 - St. Nazaire.
- 73 -
1139
Sailed: U 604 - 659 - Brest; U 185 - 155 - Lorient; U 382 - St.
Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 6 and 7 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 69 has probably been observed.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AL 3975.
An enemy aircraft attacked a U-boat with depth-charges in an
unidentified position, probably however with Convoy No. 7.
d) Reports have been received from Ceuta and Tarifa of the sailing of a
Gibraltar convoy. Further details see paragraph IV.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 7:
Strong air activity continued. Ar 0800 U 108 believed the convoy to
be in DH 6864 according to hydrophone bearing. Contact was then lost
and reestablished by U 202 at 1745 in DH 6667. Convoy was zig-zagging
around 500. Close escort of 2 aircraft.
Boats were ordered to haul as far ahead as possible during the day so
as to be able to attack at night. Boats which could not reach the convoy
before first light were to break off then and move away to the W. At 1902
the convoy was in DH 6666. Visibility deteriorated badly and contact was
lost, and was only regained for a short time by U 87 in DJ 4446 and at
0625 by U 264 in DJ 4194. U 264 fired 3 single misses at a corvette and
was then driven off. According to reports received later U 43 fired a
double miss at 800 meters with good data. U 521 attacked before first
light on the 8th and sank a tanker of 10,000 GRT and a corvette in DH
6863 also torpedoed a freighter of 8,000 GRT, probably sunk. The
operation was broken off at dawn as intended.By then all boats had
reported and moved away to the W. No boat was lost, damage was slight,
so that all boats are still fit for operations.
2 ships totaling 18,000 GRT and a corvette were sunk. The operation
has shown that extensive action in the area N. of the Canary Islands is no
longer possible owing to strong air patrol by land-based aircraft (altogether
44 planes, according to radio interception).
2) Convoy No. 6:
The last report of this convoy was from U 402 at 1100/8 in AL 5236.
After that it was not sighted again. Boats were constantly forced to dive
by strong air activity by land-based planes, and could not get ahead. The
operation was
- 74 -
nevertheless continued during the night 8/9, as there was a chance
that the boats might come upon the convoy in the dark. But as it was not
sighted again and no boat appeared to be in the vicinity, the boats were
ordered to move away from the convoy by first light on the 9th, as air
activity by land-based planes was likely to be very strong off the North
Channel.
U 135 reported that she had been surprised by an aircraft that had 22
bombs. She reported further damage and broke off on the evening of the
8th. U 402 also had to break off prematurely owing to lack of fuel.
Conclusion:
Operations Control knew that this was a particularly important convoy,
a part of which was destined for Murmansk. There are said to have been
56 ships, almost all above normal size, including 12 tankers. A captured
ship's officer from the HX convoy which crossed some days before this
one had stated, that this convoy was to follow the same route as the
preceding one. Operations Control had already suspected this and Group
"Pfeil" had been disposed along the route of the HX convoy. This group
picked up the convoy, 2 days behind schedule, but it was known
1140
afterwards from Radio Intelligence that this actually was the scheduled
SC.
Because of the size and importance of the convoy all possible boats
were operated against it, altogether 21. Due to this large number, contact
was maintained from the start of the operation on the 4th until midday on
the 8th, although during the first night the enemy succeeded in turning the
boats away from the slow main body of the convoy by branching off a fast
group. The boats operated against this fast group which had diverted them
to the N. during the 5th, but in the evening of that day they found the slow
main section again which, after steering and E. course at first, soon
changed to the northeast. After that the slow section was not lost again
until midday on the 8th.
The escort was unusually strong, in accordance with the importance of
the convoy. During the first 2 days the boats had a difficult task with the
destroyers, which were giving close and long range escort. Only a few
boats got anywhere near the convoy. The unusually calm weather
certainly made things easy for the enemy vessels, as it favored surface and
underwater location. By the 6th the convoy had a strong air escort.
Several boats were attacked and damaged by bombs. Above all, the boats
could not get ahead as they constantly had to dive. On the 7th there were
fewer aircraft with the convoy and only towards evening were planes
reported in any numbers. But boats' reports showed that the air escort had
given them a lot of trouble. On the 8th land-based aircraft picked up the
convoy and finally drove the boats off. These difficult conditions account
for the fact that so many boats achieved such little success, and always the
same ones.
Only experienced boats could succeed against this convoy. There were
U 402 and 268 in the first place. U 609 also shadowed excellently and
thus played a large part towards the total success.
- 75 -

Total Successes: 14 ships totaling 109,077 GRT.
Losses: 3 boats, U 187, U 609 and U 624.
Heavily damaged: 2 boats by depth charges, U 267 and U 262
2 boats by bombs, U 465 and U 135.
b) 1) In order to reinforce Group "Haudegen", which is in about BC 10,
Group "Nordsturm" will leave its present position on a course of 2250 at
economical speed.
2) According to observations from Ceuta and Tangier a convoy started
to put to sea during the night as there are about 20 loaded ships with the
convoy, this section may be destined for Casablanca. But there are also
ships coming from Spain assembling there, which are presumably destined
for England. On the assumption that at least a large section is going to
England, Group "Delphin" has been ordered to form a new patrol line
from CG 4652 to CF 9665. Order: U 125, 522, 511, 436, 442, 575, 381,
571, 620. The convoy is expected to arrive in the course of February 10th.
Owing to low fuel stocks, this will probably be the Group's last operation,
which they could only carry out on a homeward course.
c) 1) U 706 has supplied from U 460 and is starting her return passage.
2) U 217's supply from U 504 has so far been interrupted twice owing to
bad weather. Both boats are now in DF 6456 with course 650.
3) U 176 has been ordered to take over 2 Metox (Trans: radar
interception) sets from U 118 and deliver them to U 571 and U 620 on her
return passage.
d) U 187, on her first enemy patrol, sighted a large convoy (No. 6) at
1108/4/2 in BD 1199 and reported it again at 1144. Since then the boat has
not replied to several signals. She may have been sunk by escort forces.
V. Reports of Success:
U 571 - 2 ships 18,000 GRT - 1 corvette
1141
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 76 -
9. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DJ 17) U 202 - Op(DJ 17) U 405 - AE 72 U 525 - Op(BC
18)
66 - Op(DJ 17) 114 - DG 84 413 - AK 94 529 - AE 87
68 - CF 30 117 - DF 81 414 - BC 32 558 - Op(DJ 17)
69 - Op(BC 11) 118 - Op(DJ 17) 436 - Op(CF 69) 566 - BE 66
71 - BF 47 123 - Op(AJ 85) 437 - BE 73 569 - BF 82
87 - Op(DJ 17) 225 - AL 77 438 - AL 64 571 - Op(CF 92)
89 - AL 61 226 - Op(BC 19) 442 - Op(CG 47) 572 - BF 72
92 - BE 66 228 - Op(AJ 97) 445 - BF 81 752 - BE 16
103 - BF 48 230 - AF 87 448 - AE 69 575 - Op(CF 69)
105 - CF 23 257 - BF 45 454 - Op(AL 61) 584 - BE 69
107 - BE 88 258 - Op(DJ 17) 456 - AL 37 590 - BF 57
108 - Op(DJ 17) 262 - AK 94 459 - FM 54 594 - AK 94
118 - DH 47 264 - Op(DJ 17) 460 - BD 63 603 - BF 45
119 - AN 36 266 - AK 94 707 - Op(AJ 86) 604 - BF 59
124 - CF 29 267 - AL 77 465 - AK 94 606 - Op(BC 15)
125 - Op(CG 47) 268 - Op(AJ 97) 466 - BF 48 607 - Op(BC 43)
135 - AL 29 303 - Op(BC 43) 468 - AL 22 608 - AL 42
 155 - BF 54 332 - BE 18 504 - DF 64 609 - Op(AL 60)
156 - EG 24 706 - BE 42 506 - Op(GR 50) 613 - AL 64
160 - GG 43 358 - Op(AJ 81) 509 - Op(GR 50) 614 - Op(AL 29)
175 - BD 77 359 - AF 87 510 - EG 19 616 - AN 31
176 - DH 47 376 - Op(AN 18) 511 - Op(CG 47) 620 - Op(CF 95)
704 - BE 21 377 - AE 87 514 - BE 71 621 - BE 27
182 - GR 90 381 - Op(CF 93) 516 - Op(GR 90) 623 - BE 16
183 - CF 23 382 - BF 58 518 - FG 73 624 - Op(AL 60)
185 - BF 54 383 - Op(BC 46) 519 - BE 88 628 - BE 52
186 - Op(AJ 82) 402 - AL 55 521 - Op(DJ 17) 632 - BD 63
201 - Op(BC 15) 403 - Op(BC 24) 522 - Op(CG 47) 638 - AF 87
659 - BF 54 753 - BE 18 759 - AE 65 653 - BE 18
On Return Passage: U 71 - 105 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 114 - 117 - 257 - 262
- 266 - 267 - 402 - 413 - 414 - 438 - 456 - 459 - 465 - 466 - 514 - 572 -
584 - 590 - 594 - 613 - 632 - 704 - 706 - 752.
Entered Port: U 230 - Bergen.
Sailed: U 527 - 180 - 523 - 634 - Kiel; U 410 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 614 was attacked by aircraft in AL 5293 when surfacing and
received 4 well-placed bombs. Considerable damage, ability to dive
restricted. Return necessary after refueling from U-tanker.
2) U 752 reported a large independently-routed ship in BE 1685, course
450, speed 12 knots. Boat was ordered to attack.
3) U 442 sighted a solitary destroyer in CG 4861. No further contact
was made with the enemy. According to our reckoning no convoy is
expected at the moment.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AJ 4869, AL 5237, BE 5412, BE 5291, AF 4712.
Aircraft attacks on U-boats in DJ 4416, DH 3861, AL 5237 (U 614).
d) None.
1142
- 77 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Group "Nordsturm" is being dissolved. These boats will reinforce
Group "Haudegen" and occupy the following positions, depth 40 miles: U
358 : AJ 78, U 186 : AJ 7972, U 223 : BC 1255, U 707 : BC 1384. U 268
is returning owing to lack of fuel. According to a report from U 607 there
has been fog in this sea area for 3 days. As a depression is passing and
visibility may be expected to improve, the boats have been left in their
positions. A convoy can be expected to pass any time after today.
2) After operations against Convoy No. 7 had been broken off Group
"Rochen" received orders to be in patrol line from DH 2333 to DH 5639,
course 270, speed of advance 6 knots at 1200/11/2. Order: U 66 - 521 -
108 - 218 - 43 - 264 - 258 - 558 - 202 and 87.
The latter 5 boats are to supply from U 118 in about DH 45.
Subsequently all boats will operate against America - North Africa convoy
traffic.
3) U 68 and U 183 are to operate in the Windward Passage sea area.
There have been no boats there for some time. They are to make for DN
60.
4) U 92 and U 566 are proceeding to AK 96.
c) 1) U 632 has supplied from U 460 and is returning.
2) A Chief Engineer has transshipped from U 183 to U 105.
d) U 609 and U 624 both operated against Convoy No. 6 and made
contact. They last reported on 6.2. from AK 65 and on 7.2. from AK 66
respectively. It can therefore be assumed for certain that they were lost
due to convoy escort or aircraft.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
10. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DH 61) U 214 - DG 91 U 436 - Op(CG 48) U 566 - BE
64
66 - Op(DH 61) 217 - DF 60 437 - BE 71 569 - BF 72
68 - CF 87 218 - Op(DH 61) 438 - AL 85 571 - Op(CG 74)
69 - Op(BC 11) 223 - Op(BC 12) 442 - Op(CG 48) 572 - BF 40
71 - BF 40 225 - AK 93 445 - BF 72 575 - Op(CG 71)
87 - Op(DH 65) 226 - Op(BC 19) 448 - AE 59 584 - BF 55
89 - AL 45 228 - AN 20 454 - AL 51 590 - BF 67
92 - BE 64 257 - BF 40 456 - AM 15 594 - AK 94
103 - BF 74 258 - Op(DH 61) 459 - FM 16 603 - BE 66
105 - CF 23 262 - AK 94 460 - BD 23 604 - BF 54
107 - CF 26 264 - Op(DH 61) 465 - AK 94 606 - Op(BC 15)
108 - DH 37 266 - AK 94 466 - BF 40 607 - Op(BC 43)
118 - Op(DH 47) 267 - BF 14 468 - AL 33 608 - AL 44
119 - AN 20 268 - Op(BC 24) 504 - DG 41 613 - AL 92
124 - BE 97 303 - Op(BC 43) 506 - Op(GR 50) 614 - AL 54
- 78 -
1143
125 - Op(CG 46) 332 - BD 33 509 - Op(GR 50) 616 - AN 29
135 - AL 45 358 - Op(AJ 78) 510 - EF 39 620 - Op(CF 96)
155 - BF 48 359 - AF 75 511 - Op(CG 48) 621 - BE 15
156 - EG 14 376 - AN 18 514 - BF 70 623 - BE 13
160 - GG 59 377 - AL 22 516 - Op(GR 60) 628 - BE 16
175 - Op(DH 71) 381 - Op(CG 71) 518 - Op(FC 70) 632 - BE 51
176 - Op(DH 40) 382 - BF 81 519 - CF 24 634 - AO
180 - AO 383 - Op(BC 46) 521 - Op(DH 37) 638 - AF 72
182 - Op(KY 90) 402 - AL 48 522 - Op(CG 46) 653 - BD 33
183 - CF 23 403 - Op(BC 17) 523 - AO 659 - BF 45
185 - BF 48 405 - AE 69 525 - Op(BC 18) 704 - BE 26
186 - Op(AJ 49) 410 - BF 58 527 - AO 706 - BE 52
201 - Op(BC 15) 413 - AK 94 529 - AE 84 707 - Op(BC 13)
202 - Op(DH 27) 414 - BD 21 558 - Op(DH 61) 752 - BE 16
753 - BE 14
759 - AE 59
On Return Passage: U 71 - 105 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 214 - 217 - 257 - 262
- 266 - 267 - 402 - 413 - 414 - 438 - 456 - 459 - 465 - 466 - 514 - 572 -
584 - 590 - 594 - 613 - 632 - 704 - 706 - 752.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U D 3 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) For reports from "Rochen" and "Haudegen" boats see paragraph
IVa.
2) U 376 tried several times to reach Peterhead in bad weather. There
were constant location transmissions from AN 1633 onwards. Doubtful
whether she was picked up. From 7.2. heard several explosions in the area
by day.
b) None.
 c) U-boat sightings: Be 5543 - BE 6164.
Depth charge attack by aircraft in DJ 3748.
Torpedo report from an unidentified steamer from an area 10 miles S.
of Cape Francis (Capetown).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Group "Haudegen":
The group proceeded at economical speed, course 700 from 1030, in
order to get away from the prevailing fog and prevent the expected convoy
passing unnoticed. Towards 1100 U 606 sighted a destroyer, course 2400
(400 according to a later report) in BC 1912. U 707, which was nearby,
was ordered to take action. The remaining boats were now steering the
convoy's expected course 450, speed 7 knots.At 1907 U 707 also sighted a
destroyer in BC 2145. Course at first 1700, then N.E. It seemed more and
more likely that the
- 79 -
forces reported were only carrying out a local reconnaissance. As
both boats lost contact and no other sighting reports were received from
the others, Group "Haudegen" was ordered to proceed at economical
cruising speed. At 1200/11/2 the group remained in the area then reached.
Nothing was seen of the convoy. Radio Intelligence (X) reports and
bearings from the G.A.F. D/F Station confirm that the schedule of HX
convoys is as hitherto assumed; the next one may therefore be expected to
appear in about 3 days' time.
2) Group "Rochen":
1144
At 0930 U 108 sighted smoke clouds and the mast-heads of a large
steamer with air escort in DH 3748, course believed E. Group "Rochen"
boats which could reach this ship during the night were ordered to operate
at maximum speed. U 66, 202, 558, 258, 264, 521 and 43 were in
favorable positions. U 176, on her return passage, also endeavored to
make contact. At 1430 U 108 reported the enemy in DH 3747 on a N.W.
course. The boat was then apparently forced to dive and did not report
until 2245 from DH 3747 that she had sighted 8 smoke clouds on a N.W.
course at 1430 and had been driven off by a corvette. Shortly before U 43
encountered a searching group. This boat also sighted a small vessel with
high masts in DH 3775 and 2 escort vessels making smoke. Contact was
lost and the boats continued to search in a N.W. direction. Nothing further
was found. This appears to confirm U 43's assumption that is was a group
of escort vessels. It was intended to break off the operation by midday if
by then no further contact was made with the enemy.
b) So that there will be U-boats in the vicinity in case of an American and
English invasion of Portugal, Group "Delphin" has been ordered to take up
a new disposition W. of Lisbon. Attack areas, depth 60 miles: U 575 : CF
6626, U 571 : CF 6862, U 620 : CF 9345, U 436 : CG 4515, U 125 : CG
4624, U 5522 : CG 4718, U 511 : CG 4829, U 381 : CG 7165, U 422 : CG
7354. Several of these boats are already so short of fuel that they will
have to return very soon and U 107, 103, 445, 569, 382 and 410 are
intended to replace them and have been directed to CG 44.
c) U 465 has refueled U 266 and 413.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 80-
 186 - Op(AJ 84) 413 - AK 94 558 - Op(DH 20) 753 - BE 14
201 - Op(BC 13) 414 - AK 89 566 - BE 53 759 - AE 82
202 - Op(DH 20) 436 - Op(CG 45) 569 - BE 96 D 3 - BF 54
214 - DG 93 437 - BD 66 571 - Op(CF 68)

On Return Passage: U 71 - 105 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 214 - 217 - 257 - 262
11. February 1943. - 266 - 267 - 268 - 402 - 413 - 414 - 438 - 456 - 459 - 465 - 466 - 514 -
572 - 584 - 590 - 594 - 613 - 614 - 632 - 704 - 705 - 752.
Entered Port: U 584 - Brest; U 590 - St. Nazaire; U 572 - 466 - La
I. U 43 - Op(DH 20) U 217 - DG 17 U 438 - BE 21 U 572 - BF 93 Pallice.
66 - Op(DH 20) 218 - Op(DH 20) 442 - Op(CG 73) 575 - Op(CF 66) Sailed: U 600 - Brest; U 91 - St. Nazaire; U 526 - 230 - Bergen.
68 - CF 78 223 - Op(AJ 87) 445 - BE 96 584 - BF 52
69 - Op(AJ 87) 225 - Op(AK 68) 448 - AE 82 590 - BF 64 II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
71 - BF 40 226 - Op(BC 25) 454 - AL 44 594 - AK 89
87 - Op(DH 20) 228 - AF 79 456 - AL 29 603 - BE 64 III. Reports on the Enemy:
89 - AK 89 257 - BF 92 459 - FE 87 604 - BE 66 a) 1) U 155, on her way out, sighted several destroyers and small vessels
92 - BE 28 258 - Op(DH 20) 460 - AK 89 606 - Op(BC 21) in BE 9945. According to our reckoning, they probably belonged to a N-
103 - CG 11 262 - BD 36 465 - AK 94 607 - Op(BC 27) bound Gibraltar convoy and boats in favorable positions were ordered to
105 - BE 95 264 - Op(DH 20) 466 - BF 93 608 - AK 92 make use of opportunities to attack. For reasons unknown, U 155
107 - CF 29 266 - AK 94 468 - AL 25 613 - BE 12 continued on her outward passage as soon as she had made her report.
108 - Op(DH 20) 267 - BD 36 504 - EG 18 614 - AL 47 There is therefore no contact. As visibility is poor and there is strong air
118 - Op(DH 20) 268 - BC 36 506 - Op(GR 50) 616 - AF 79 reconnaissance in this area a controlled operation of several boats does not
119 - AF 79 303 - Op(BC 23) 509 - Op(GR 50) 620 - Op(CF 93) seem promising, especially as there is at most one night left for attack.
124 - BE 96 332 - BE 14 510 - AF 53 621 - BE 11
125 - Op(CG 46) 358 - Op(AJ 76) 511 - Op(CG 48) 623 - AL 78 - 81 -
135 - AK 69 359 - AF 47 514 - BF 55 628 - AL 87
155 - BE 93 376 - AF 75 516 - Op(GR 60) 632 - BE 56
156 - EF 61 377 - AL 25 518 - Op(FJ 30) 634 - AN 35
160 - GG 95 381 - Op(CG 71) 519 - CF 20 638 - AF 47
175 - DH 47 382 - BE 72 521 - Op(DH 20) 653 - AK 99
176 - Op(DH 20) 383 - Op(BC 51) 522 - Op(CG 44) 659 - BE 66
180 - AN 30 402 - AK 93 523 - AN 30 704 - BE 61
182 - Op(KY 90) 403 - Op(BC 13) 525 - Op(BC 24) 706 - BE 64
183 - CF 16 405 - AE 67 527 - AN 35 707 - Op(BC 88)
185 - BE 93 410 - BF 73 529 - AE 79 752 - BE 67
1145
 2) U 223 was observed in AJ 8489 by an independent destroyer, course d) U 519 has not reported since she sailed on 30.1. There have been
2200, high speed.She lost contact after surfacing. several attack reports in BF and BE during the last few days and she may
3) U 510 has requested squares EO and EP as attack area, because of an have been sunk by English aircraft. Her loss must be presumed.
oil trace.
b) None. V. Reports of Success: None.
c) U-boat sightings: BE 5345.
d) None.
- 82 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) As no further reports were received from Group "Rochen", the
operation was broken off at 1200. U 87, 202, 264, 558 and 258 are
proceeding to DH 4755 to supply from U 118. The remaining boats will
occupy the following attack areas for the time being: U 521 squares CF 76
and 84, U 108 : CF 79 and 87, U 66 : DH 11 and 12, U 218 : DH 14 and
15, U 43 : DH 17 and 18.
2) Group "Haudegen" is now in the following positions:
U 358 : AJ 7574, U 223 : AJ 7685 U 186 : AJ 7838, 12. February 1943.
U 69 : AJ 7985, U 201 : AJ 8764 U 403 : BC 1356,
U 707 : BC 2156, U 606 : BC 2419 U 226 : BC 2549,
U 525 : BC 2725, U 303 : BC 2848 U 607 : BC 5152, I. U 43 - DH 27 U 214 - DH 47 U 437 - BD 39 U 575 - Op(CF 66)
U 383 : BC 5514, 66 - DH 24 217 - CE 88 438 - BE 28 594 - AK 89
68 - DG 23 218 - DH 54 442 - Op(CG 73 600 - BF 54
3) U 103 will occupy position CG 4624, U 107 CG 4515, depth 60 69 - Op(AJ 79) 223 - Op(AJ 76) 445 - BE 98 603 - BE 61
miles, as reliefs for U 125 and U 436 which are short of fuel. These boats 71 - BF 64 225 - AK 62 448 - AE 84 604 - BE 64
will join Group "Delphin". 87 - DH 51 226 - Op(BC 25) 454 - AK 93 606 - Op(BC 24)
4) In order to intercept convoy traffic to and from England on the 89 - AK 95 228 - AF 72 456 - AL 44 607 - Op(BC 51)
southern route a patrol line has been ordered which will leave AK 3784 for 91 - BF 58 257 - BF 93 459 - FE 72 608 - AK 94
AL 4711 at 1200/14/2, course 2350, speed 5 knots. Order U 529 - 468 - 92 - BE 13 258 - DH 51 460 - AK 89 613 - BE 12
377 - 225 - 653 - 628 - 623 - 621 - 753 - 332 and 92. 103 - CG 17 262 - BE 19 465 - BE 11 614 - AK 92
These boats will form Group "Ritter" 105 - BF 48 264 - DH 51 468 - AL 18 616 - AF 72
107 - CF 62 266 - BE 11 504 - DG 19 620 - Op(CF 93)
c) U 460 will start to supply in AK 8985 from today. 5 boats will refuel 108 - DH 21 267 - BD 36 506 - Op(GR 50) 621 - AL 74
for return passage at economical speed, 4 boats for further operation on the 118 - DH 47 268 - BD 16 509 - Op(GR 50) 623 - AL 71
northerly convoy route. 119 - AF 72 303 - Op(BC 28) 510 - EF 46 628 - AL 71
124 - BF 55 332 - BE 14 511 - Op(CG 48) 632 - BE 65
1146
 125 - Op(CG 46) 358 - Op(AJ 75) 514 - BF 61 634 - AN 31
135 - AK 94 359 - AE 65 516 - Op(GR 90) 638 - AE 65
155 - BE 95 376 - AF 47 518 - Op(FJ) 653 - AK 93
156 - EF 51 377 - AL 17 521 - DH 21 659 - BE 61
160 - GQ 22 381 - Op(CG 71) 522 - Op(CG 47) 704 - BF 64
175 - DH 47 382 - BE 96 523 - AN 31 706 - BF 64
176 - CF 93 383 - Op(BC 54) 525 - Op(BC 27) 707 - Op(BC 21)
180 - AN 31 402 - AK 97 526 - AF 79 752 - BF 47
182 - Op(KZ 40) 403 - Op(BC 13) 527 - AN 31 753 - BE 14
183 - CE 35 405 - AE 82 529 - AL 21 759 - AE 79
185 - BE 94 410 - BE 96 558 - DH 51 D 3 - BF 48
186 - Op(AJ 78) 413 - BE 12 566 - BE 28 230 - AF 79
210 - Op(AJ 87) 414 - AK 89 569 - BE 98
202 - DH 54 436 - Op(CG 45) 571 - Op(CF 68)
On Return Passage: U 71 - 105 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 114 - 117 - 257 - 262
- 266 - 267 - 268 - 402 - 413 - 414 - 438 - 456 - 459 - 465 - 514 - 594 -
613 - 614 - 632 - 704 - 706 - 752.
Entered Port: U 71 - 704 - St. Nazaire; U 257 - 514 - Lorient.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 8 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 603 has broken off her search for the convoy reported yesterday by
U 155. This operation is thus ended.
3) U 436 reported strong air activity in CG 45, bombs; no damage,
returning because of fuel.
4) U 620 sighted 2 destroyers, course 2250, in CF 9266. No further
contact with the enemy.
- 83 -
1147
5) U 108 was bombed on 10.2 at great depth. Bow tubes probably out
of action.She is testing her operational fitness.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BF 4981, CG 4989 (Depth charge attack), CG
4545, CF 7153.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 8:
U 569 sighted several smoke clouds at 1323 in BE 9815 disappearing
S. According to our reckoning there should be a Gibraltar-bound convoy
in this area. Group "Delphin", including U 107 and U 103 and U 410,
382, 445, 155 and 185, on outward passage, were ordered to operate on U
569's report. At 1600 the enemy was in BE 9873. Towards 2000 U 185
reported that she had sighted 5 steamers, 3 of them passenger ships, on a
main course of 1600, speed 16 knots, in CG 1559 and had fired a miss at
an "Arundel Castle" type. She was then driven off by aircraft and
destroyers.It appeared therefore that there was a fast and slow section of
the convoy. This was quite possible, as radio intelligence (X) and agent's
reports had stated that material and personnel were often convoyed to
Gibraltar in separate groups. The boats were ordered to operate against
one of these 2 convoys on a main course of 160 - 1800, according to the
situation. Meanwhile U 569 had also been forced to dive and contact was
lost. Convoy's last position at 1730 was in CG 9892. The boat sighted
several single destroyers during the night, but was constantly driven off in
varying visibility, as was U 185, which also sighted destroyers several
times in CG 1537. Contact had not been regained by morning. The fast
group must have got through and can probably no longer be reached.
Operation continues against the slow section.
 b) 1) Attack areas: U 510 : EO 60, evading N and E. U 156 : EO 50 and
20 westwards to Georgetown. Both boats are to operate as close to the
coast as possible. Freedom of action as far as the sea area off Trinidad
during the next new moon period.
2) U 566, 659, 604 and 603 are to steer for AK 65, U 638 and U 359 for
AK 32. These boats are to operate against convoy traffic
c) U 594 and 414 have supplied from U 460.
d) Boats in the Capetown area have been informed that Saldanhab Bay is
probably an assembly point for convoys and is mainly approached by
independent ships from Capetown.
V. Reports of Success: None.
- 84 -
13. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DH 48) U 202 - DH 47 U 414 - AK 89 U 566 - BE 12
66 - DH 12 214 - DH 47 436 - Op(CG 17) 569 - CG 11
68 - DG 13 217 - CE 94 437 - BD 59 571 - CF 93
69 - Op(AJ 79) 218 - Op(DH 15) 438 - BE 61 575 - Op(CG 17)
87 - DH 47 223 - AJ 76 442 - Op(CG 17) 594 - AK 89
89 - AK 61 225 - Op(AK 39) 445 - Op(BE 94) 600 - BF 45
91 - BF 81 226 - Op(BC 25) 448 - AE 78 603 - BE 28
92 - AL 78 228 - AF 72 454 - AK 94 604 - BE 55
103 - Op(CG 17) 258 - DH 47 456 - AK 68 606 - Op(BC 24)
1148
105 - BF 40 262 - BE 52 459 - FE 44 607 - Op(BC 51)
107 - Op(CG 17) 264 - DH 47 460 - AK 89 608 - AK 89
108 - Op(CF 87) 266 - BE 19 465 - BE 19 613 - BE 27
118 - DH 44 267 - BE 18 468 - Op(AK 38) 614 - AK 86
119 - AF 72 268 - BD 25 504 - DG 53 616 - AF 72
124 - BF 61 303 - Op(BC 28) 506 - Op(GR 50) 620 - CF 69
125 - Op(CG 17) 332 - AK 93 509 - GR 50 621 - AK 69
135 - AK 89 358 - Op(AJ 75) 510 - EF 40 623 - AK 66
155 - Op(CG 17) 359 - AE 59 511 - Op(CG 17) 628 - AK 66
156 - Op(EF 40) 376 - AE 65 516 - Op(GR 90) 632 - BF 55
160 - GQ 37 377 - Op(AK 39) 518 - Op(FJ 30) 634 - AN 23
175 - DH 48 381 - Op(CF 63) 521 - Op(CF 84) 638 - AE 59
176 - CF 93 382 - Op(CG 16) 522 - Op(CG 17) 653 - AK 94
180 - AN 23 383 - Op(BC 54) 523 - AN 23 659 - BE 27
182 - Op(KZ) 402 - AK 89 525 - Op(BC 27) 707 - Op(BC 21)
183 - CE 28 403 - Op(BC 13) 526 - AF 72 752 - BF 40
185 - Op(CG 16) 405 - AE 84 527 - AN 23 753 - AL 77
186 - Op(AJ 78) 410 - Op(CG 17) 529 - AL 13 759 - AE 76
201 - AJ 87 413 - BE 19 558 - DH 47 D 3 - BE 69
- 230 - AF 72 - 706 - BE 64
On Return Passage: U 105 - 124 - 175 - 176 - 214 - 217 - 262 - 266 -
267 - 268 - 402 - 413 - 414 - 438 - 456 - 459 - 465 - 594 - 613 - 614 - 632
- 706 - 752.
Entered Port: U 124 - Lorient; U 706 - La Pallice; U 634 - Bergen.
Sailed: U 211 - Brest; U 709 - Kiel; U 461 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 8 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 108 is starting on her return passage. All her bow tubes are
unserviceable. It is intended for her to deliver fuel to U 511.
 3) U 437 discovered another large crack in the flange when trying to
repair her exhaust conduit. Repairs cannot be carried out. Further
operation only possible in a less endangered area.
4) U 606 sighted a destroyer with high speed, zig-zagging around a
course of 2250 in BC 2433. No contact.
5) U 516 is the first of the African boats to score a success. She sank a
ship of 6,000 GRT, course 2650, speed 10 knots in KY 6267. No zig-zags.
Much air activity day and night, with
- 85 -
lights, in KY 6310. Probably training.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CG 5416, depth charge attack by aircraft in CG
4396 and CG 5178. U-boat attacking in DM 2890. No boat of ours in the
vicinity.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 8:
U 185 sighted smoke clouds at 1005 in CG 1911 and shortly afterwards
made contact with a steamer and a destroyer. The enemy was only in sight
intermittently owing to bad visibility. U 511 reported the same forces at
1615 in CG 1968, was soon forced to dive by an escort vessel and depth
charged. Aircraft were located constantly and no further direct contact was
made. Boats were ordered to continue provided positions for attack could
be reached by first light. During the night U 569 and U 511 broke off and
1149
proceeded W. U 511 had some depth charge damage. U 381 started on
her return passage because of lack of fuel and bomb damage.
b) 1) The following temporary attack areas will be occupied until a patrol
line is formed: U 448 : AK 34, U 759 : AK 31, U 405 : AK 32.
2) According to recent reckoning, a NE-bound convoy is expected in
Group "Haudegen" 's area from 15.2. The group's disposition has
therefore been narrowed. Boats are now in the following position, depth
30 miles: U 358 : AJ 7574, U 186 : AJ 7595, U 223 : AJ 7685, U 69 : AJ
8715, U 201 : AJ 8764, U 403 : AJ 8887, U 707 : BC 2156, U 606 : BC
2199, U 226 : BC 2549, U 525 : BC 2813, U 303 : BC 2848, U 607 : BC
5218, U 383 : BC 5514.
3) A convoy coming from America may be expected in the Azores area
on about 17.2 and Group "Rochen" has therefore been ordered to proceed
W. immediately, making a day's run of 140 miles. U 108 has been ordered
to return. "Rochen" boats now supplying will join the most southerly boat
of the N. group at economical cruising speed in the order in which they
leave. It is intended to form a patrol line with all boats from CE 8380 to
DG 2820.
c) 1) The following have supplied: U 175 from U 118, U 608 and 135
from U 460.
2) U 175 has delivered a METOX set each to U 571 and U 620.
d) Boat's attention has again been called to the closing of Route A.
V. Reports of Success:
U 516 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT.
- 86 -

VI. General:
Concluding remarks on Convoy No. 8:
The convoy operation showed again that flexible operation against a
convoy in an area close to the coast and covered by air forces is no longer
possible with the present state of enemy aircraft and surface radar.
The operation was ill-fated from the beginning. The boats which were
well off for fuel were astern of the convoy, on their way out, submerged
and received their orders so late that it was hopeless for them to operate.
Particularly bad visibility with fog in parts made it difficult for the boats
approaching from the south, with little fuel, to find the convoy. Strong
enemy air activity ahead of the convoy, and later close air escort forced the
boats to submerge constantly and made it impossible for them to get close
up. In less than 3 hours, 3 attacks were made on U-boats, as is shown in
radio intelligence reports of aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
14. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DH 77) U 211 - BF 54 U 436 - CG 12 U 566 - AL 78
66 - Op(DH 77) 214 - DH 47 437 - BD 91 569 - Op(CG 43)
68 - DG 11 217 - CE 93 438 - BF 44 571 - CG 45
69 - Op(AJ 79) 218 - Op(DH 15) 442 - Op(CG 40) 575 - BE 99
87 - DH 47 223 - Op(AJ 76) 445 - Op(CG 14) 594 - BE 16
89 - AK 83 225 - Op(AK 38) 448 - AL 23 600 - BF 72
91 - BF 44 226 - Op(BC 25) 454 - AK 98 603 - BE 24
92 - Op(AL 47) 228 - AE 69 456 - AK 89 604 - BE 53
103 - Op(CG 40) 258 - DH 47 459 - FD 36 606 - Op(BC 22)
105 - BF 61 262 - BF 91 460 - AK 89 607 - Op(BC 51)
107 - Op(CG 40) 264 - DH 47 461 - BF 58 608 - AK 89
108 - CF 81 266 - BE 53 465 - BE 52 613 - BE 61
118 - DH 47 267 - BE 61 468 - Op(AK 38) 614 - AK 89
119 - AE 66 268 - BD 63 504 - DG 65 616 - AE 69
1150
125 - Op(CG 40) 303 - Op(BC 28) 506 - Op(GR 59) 620 - CG 45
135 - AK 89 332 - Op(AK 66) 509 - Op(GR 59) 621 - Op(AK 63)
155 - CF 52 358 - Op(AJ 75) 510 - Op(EE 99) 623 - Op(AK 63)
156 - Op(EE 91) 359 - AE 84 511 - Op(CG 42) 628 - Op(AK 63)
160 - Op(GR 44) 376 - AE 59 516 - Op(KY 65) 632 - BF 52
175 - CF 97 377 - Op(AK 38) 518 - Op(FJ 30) 638 - AE 84
176 - CG 14 381 - Op(CG 27) 521 - Op(CF 84) 654 - Op(AK 62)
180 - AF 76 382 - Op(CG 18) 522 - Op(KG 54) 659 - BE 13
182 - Op(KP) 383 - Op(BC 54) 523 - AF 76 707 - Op(BC 21)
183 - CE 19 402 - AK 89 525 - Op(BC 27) 709 - AO
185 - Op(CG 43) 403 - Op(BC 13) 526 - AE 69 752 - BF 50
186 - Op(AJ 78) 405 - AE 78 527 - AF 76 753 - Op(AK 66)
201 - Op(AJ 87) 410 - Op(CG 40) 529 - Op(AK 37) 759 - AE 78
202 - DH 47 413 - BE 38 558 - DH 47 D 3 - BE 64
414 - BE 27 230 - AE 69
On Return Passage: U 105 - 108 - 125 - 175 - 176 - 214 - 217 - 262 -
266 - 267 - 268 - 381 - 402 - 413 - 414 - 436 - 438 - 442 - 456 - 459 - 465
- 571 - 575 - 594 - 613 - 614 - 620 - 632 - 752.
Entered Port: U 632 - Brest; U 105 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 758 - St Nazaire; U 432 - 664 - La Pallice; U 409 - Brest.
- 87 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
 a) Convoy No. 8 see paragraph IVa.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BF 7224, BE 3587, FJ 68.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Operation against Convoy No. 8 was broken off. U 620, 571, 125 and
442, which are short of fuel, are returning, U 103, 107, 185, 382, 410 and
445 are moving away to the west. U 522 is waiting in CF 50 to supply
from U 161. The last hydrophone bearing of the convoy was from CG
5473 bearing 2100 at 0800.
b) 1) After the "Rochen" boats had supplied from U 118, the group will
receive orders to be in patrol line from CE 8285 to DG 2785 at 1200/16/2.
Course 285, day's run 150 miles. Order: U 521 - 66 - 218 - 43 - 218 - 43 -
558 - 258 - 202 - 87 - 267 and 504. A convoy from America is expected
on 17.2. As there is no information on the convoy's probable course, it is
intended to form an extended line N. of the Azores. U 410, 445, 382, 569,
107 and 103 are to make for CE 39, U 437 for CE 32.
2) Because of bad weather (west 9) a day's run of 60 miles has been
ordered for Group "Ritter".
3) It is intended to operate one boat in the Hatteras sea area and one in
the Florida Straits area, as there have been no U-boats there for some time.
Heavy traffic may be expected and success is likely if the U-boats appear
suddenly and the Commanding Officers make intelligent use of their
opportunities. U 155 is making for DN 30. She is free to proceed via
Windward Passage. U 185 will go to CA 87 and have freedom of action to
the N. and S.
4) Group "Seehund" has been given freedom of action to the S. as far as
the boundary of the operations area if no traffic is found inshore.
c) The following have supplied from U 118: U 214 on 12.2, U 558, 258,
202 on 13.2, U 82, 264 and 514 on 14.2. The tanker is now sold out and
returning.
V. Reports of Success: None.
1151
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 88 -
15. February 1943.
I. U 43 - DG 31 U 217 - CF 48 U 436 - BF 74 U 569 - CF 63
66 - CE 98 218 - CE 98 437 - BD 92 571 - CG 18
68 - DF 34 223 - Op(AJ 76) 438 - BF 55 575 - BF 71
69 - Op(AJ 87) 225 - Op(AK 61) 442 - CG 18 594 - BE 28
87 - DG 65 226 - Op(BC 25) 445 - CF 35 600 - BE 93
89 - AK 83 228 - AE 67 448 - Op(AK 34) 603 - BE 10
91 - BE 65 258 - DG 64 454 - AK 98 604 - BE 43
92 - Op(AK 69) 262 - BF 68 456 - AK 94 606 - Op(BC 21)
103 - CF 65 264 - DG 61 459 - ES 97 607 - Op(BC 52)
107 - CG 44 266 - BE 65 460 - AK 89 608 - AK 62
108 - CF 55 267 - BF 44 461 - BF 73 613 - BE 66
118 - DH 42 268 - BE 15 465 - BE 61 614 - AK 89
119 - AE 60 303 - Op(BC 28) 468 - Op(AK 02) 616 - AE 64
125 - CG 19 332 - Op(AK 66) 504 - DG 64 620 - CG 19
135 - AK 62 358 - Op(AJ 75) 506 - Op(GR 99) 621 - Op(AK 65)
155 - CF 46 359 - AE 76 509 - Op(CR) 623 - Op(AK 65)
156 - Op(CE 89) 376 - AE 84 510 - Op(EO 30) 628 - Op(AK 65)
160 - Op(GR 49) 377 - Op(AK 39) 511 - CF 62 638 - AE 75
175 - CF 68 381 - CG 13 516 - Op(KY 65) 653 - Op(AK 62)
 176 - BF 99 382 - CF 38 518 - Op(FJ 30) 659 - AL 78
180 - AF 72 383 - Op(BC 55) 521 - CE 95 664 - BF 91
182 - Op(KP) 402 - AK 89 522 - CG 45 707 - Op(BC 21)
183 - CD 63 403 - Op(AJ 88) 523 - AF 72 709 - AN 36
185 - CG 41 405 - AL 12 525 - Op(BC 28) 752 - BF 64
186 - Op(AJ 78) 409 - BF 54 526 - AE 64 753 - Op(AK 60
201 - Op(AJ 87) 410 - CF 32 527 - AF 72 758 - BF 58
202 - DG 64 413 - BF 44 529 - Op(AK 02) 759 - AL 11
211 - BF 45 414 - BE 53 558 - DH 64 D 3 - BE 51
214 - DH 16 432 - BF 91 566 - AK 93 230 - AE 67
On Return Passage: U 108 - 125 - 175 - 176 - 214 - 217 - 262 - 266 -
267 - 268 - 381 - 402 - 413 - 414 - 436 - 438 - 442 - 456 - 459 - 465 - 571
- 575 - 613 - 614 - 620 - 752.
Entered Port: U 752 - St. Nazaire; U 262 - La Pallice.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 607 sank "Atlantic Sun", 11,355 GRT in BC 5163, course 2200,
16 knots. According to statements made by prisoners the ship belonged to
a convoy which it lost a few nights earlier in a fog. Presumably this was a
extra-schedule fast convoy.
2) U 509 encountered spasmodic traffic off Capetown, partly strongly
escorted, leaving and entering the harbor on the 100 meter line. No night
air activity. Good cooperation between land-based radar and sea patrol.
Boat sank a 5,000 GRT ship on 10.2 in GR 6844.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BE 7285, BE 6353, AK 91.
d) According to an agent's report an American convoy of 27 steamers
- 89 -
1152
is said to be leaving Capetown for Australia on 15.2.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Following the new disposition of Group "Rochen" (see War Log
14.2 paragraph IVb1) U 437, 410, 445, 382, 511, 569, 107 and 103 are
being formed into Group "Robbe". They have been ordered to be in
reconnaissance line at 1200/17/2 from CF 1671 to CF 4575, course 2900,
day's run 140 miles.
2) Except for 5, all the Group "Haudegen" boats must now have less
than 30 cbm fuel. This means that they could not operate even if a convoy
is intercepted. Group "Haudegen" is therefore being dissolved. U 606, 69,
201, 226, 525, 303, 383 and 607 have been ordered to return. If these
boats require to refuel this can be done in BD 51 from U 460. The
remaining boats will stay in the sea area around Newfoundland and
occupy the following attack areas: U 358 : AJ 87, U 186 : AJ 88, U 223 :
BC 21, U 403 : BC 22, U 707 : BC 25. The Group will be called "Taifun".
3) At present there is no information as to what convoy routes are being
used and several radio intelligence (X) reports show that the enemy is
dispersed over the whole N. Atlantic and several patrol lines are being
formed to pick up the convoys.
In addition to Group "Ritter", which proceeded as reconnaissance line
from AK 3784 to AL 4711 at 1200/14/2, course 2350, day's run 60 miles,
U 759, 405, 448, 638, 359, 135, 608, 376, 566 and 659 have been ordered
to form a new reconnaissance line from AD 3718 to AK 3497 at
2000/18/2, course 2350, day's run 100 miles. These boats will form Group
"Neptun". U 659 will not take up her position until 19 or 20/2, as she is
too far away. These 2 lines overlap and should rake an area of about 450
miles. The disposition has the further advantage that it is unlikely to be 69 - AJ 88 225 - Op(AK 53) 442 - CG 13 594 - BE 62
detected by enemy aircraft. 87 - Op(DG 24) 226 - BC 26 445 - CF 28 600 - BE 67
c) 1) U 155 had delivered a METOX set to U 217. 89 - AK 89 228 - AE 83 448 - Op(AK 34) 603 - AL 71
2) The rendezvous of U 511 and U 108 in CF 5275 will have to be 91 - BE 54 230 - AE 83 454 - AK 89 604 - BE 14
transferred to CF 5171 owing to strong air activity in the former area. 92 - Op(AK 92) 258 - Op(DG 21) 456 - AK 89 606 - BC 26
d) None. 103 - CF 56 264 - Op(DG 24) 459 - ES 59 607 - BC 52
107 - CF 56 266 - BF 67 460 - AK 89 608 - AK 37
V. Reports of Success: 108 - CF 52 267 - BF 40 461 - BF 71 613 - BF 40
U 607 - 1 ship 11,355 GRT 118 - Op(DH 19) 268 - BE 29 465 - BE 66 614 - AK 89
U 509 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT 119 - AE 90 303 - BC 29 468 - Op(AK 53) 616 - AE 83
125 - CG 13 332 - Op(AK 68) 504 - Op(DG 27) 620 - BE 99
135 - AK 35 358 - Op(AJ 87) 506 - Op(GR 50) 621 - Op(AK 64)
155 - CE 68 359 - AE 77 509 - Op(GR 53) 623 - Op(AK 64)
156 - Op(EO 20) 376 - AE 87 510 - Op(EO 60) 628 - Op(AK 64)
(Signed): GODT 160 - Op(GR) 377 - Op(AK 53 511 - CF 51 638 - AE 77
Chief of Operations Department 175 - CF 39 381 - BF 74 516 - Op(KY) 653 - Op(AK 61)
for B.d.U. 176 - BF 72 382 - CF 28 518 - Op(FJ 30) 659 - AL 71
180 - AE 69 383 - BC 53 521 - Op(CE 82) 664 - BF 81
182 - Op(KP) 402 - AK 89 522 - CF 65 707 - Op(BC 25)
183 - CD 64 403 - Op(BC 22) 523 - AE 69 709 - AN 30
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log 185 - CF 62 405 - AL 11 525 - BC 29 753 - Op(AK 68)
186 - Op(AJ 88) 409 - BF 54 526 - AE 83 758 - BF 49
16 - 28 February 1943 201 - BC 22 410 - CF 25 527 - AE 69 759 - Op(AK 31)
202 - Op(DG 24) 413 - BF 40 529 - Op(AK 53) D 3 - BE 18
PG30318 211 - BE 69 414 - BE 63 558 - Op(DG 21)
214 - CF 61 432 - BF 82 566 - AK 66

On Return Passage: U 108 - 118 - 125 - 175 - 176 - 214 - 217 - 266 -
267 - 268 - 381 - 402 - 413 - 414 - 436 - 438 - 442 - 456 - 459 - 465 - 571
16. February 1943. - 575 - 594 - 613 - 614 - 620.
Entered Port: U 438 - Brest.
Sailed: - . -
I. U 43 - Op(CE 88 U 217 - CF 28 U 436 - BF 73 U 569 - CF 53
66 - Op(CE 85) 218 - Op(CE 88) 437 - BD 98 571 - BE 99 II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
68 - DF 25 223 - Op(BC 21) 438 - BF 52 575 - BF 73
1153
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) - b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: SOS from American steamer "Deer Lodge" (6,781
GRT) in KZ 4140 (U 516). Further SOS from CG 5811 (no German boat
near).
d) According to special intercept message HX No. 226 was in BC 1176
at 2000 on the 14th February.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) In view of special intercept message (No.IIId) Group "Ritter" has
orders to proceed to the N.W. and at 2200 on the 17th February to take up
patrol line, with U 454, from AK 1677 to AK 5646. According to dead
reckoning, the convoy could pass the patrol line at the earliest during the
course of the night.
- 91 -
If no contact is established by 1100 on the 18th February, the boats
are to proceed, as reconnaissance patrol, with course 2350 and daily run 80
miles. The extent of the patrol line corresponds approximately to the
courses of HX convoys previously intercepted.
2) In order to ensure a better watch by hydrophone etc. during the night,
Group "Rochen" is to remain stationary at 2100 in a patrol line already
reached from CE 8156 to DG 1959, proceeding as from 0930 on the 17th
February with course 2850, daily run 150 miles.
3) After refueling, U 460 is to proceed to BD 52 as the next supply
rendezvous.
1154
4) After return of U 124 the reports of the Commanding Officer will be
communicated to boats U 156 and 510 now operating in the Trinidad area.
c) U 402 and 454 refueled from U 460 on the 15th February.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
17. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(CE 87) U 217 - CF 31 U 436 - BF 80 U 571 - BF 74
66 - Op(CE 87) 218 - Op(CE 84) 437 - CF 16 575 - BF 80
68 - DF 19BC 31 223 - Op(BC 21) 442 - BF 41 594 - BF 67
69 - Op(DG 16) 225 - Op(AK 55) 445 - CF 18 600 - BE 53
87 - AK 89 226 - BC 39 448 - Op(AD 87) 603 - AK 65
89 - BE 43 228 - AE 84 454 - AK 59 604 - AK 69
91 - Op(AK 83) 230 - AE 84 456 - AK 89 606 - BC 38
92 - CF 45 258 - Op(DG 13) 459 - ES 29 607 - BC 61
103 - CF 45 264 - Op(DG 16) 460 - AK 89 608 - Op(AK 34)
107 - CF 27 266 - BF 67 461 - BE 92 613 - BF 54
108 - CF 89 267 - BF 49 465 - BF 67 614 - AK 89
118 - Island 268 - BE 62 468 - Op(AK 52) 616 - AE 84
119 - BF 72 303 - BC 39 506 - Op(GR 50) 620 - BF 72
125 - BF 72 332 - Op(AK 83) 504 - Op(DG 19) 621 - Op(AK 59)
135 - Op(AK 31) 358 - Op(AJ 87) 509 - Op(GR 50) 623 - Op(AK 59)
155 - CE 83 359 - AK 32 510 - Op(EO 60) 628 - Op(AK 56)
156 - Op(EO 20) 376 - AE 78 511 - CF 42 638 - AD 88
160 - Op(GR) 377 - Op(AK 52) 516 - Op(GR) 653 - Op(AK 55)
175 - BE 98 381 - BF 13 518 - Op(FJ 30) 659 - AK 65
176 - BF 40 382 - CF 42 521 - Op(CE 81) 664 - BF 72
180 - AE 65 383 - BC 62 522 - BC 38 707 - Op(BC 25)
182 - Op(KP) 402 - BD 36 523 - AE 67 709 - AN 31
183 - CD 58 403 - Op(BC 22) 525 - BC 39 753 - Op(AK 83)
 185 - CF 52 405 - Op(AD 87) 526 - AE 84 758 - BF 47
186 - Op(AJ 88) 409 - BE 66 527 - AE 87 759 - Op(AD 87)
201 - BC 31 410 - CF 18 529 - Op(AK 52) D 3 - BD 33
202 - Op(DG 13) 413 - BF 52 558 - Op(CE 87)
211 - BE 67 414 - BF 45 566 - AK 03
214 - CF 36 432 - BF 72 569 - CF 45
On Return Passage: U 69 - 108 - 118 - 125 - 175 - 176 - 201 - 214 - 217
- 226 - 267 - 268 - 303 - 381 - 383 - 402 - 414 - 436 - 442 - 456 - 459 -
465 - 525 - 571 - 575 - 594 - 606 - 607 - 613 - 614 - 620.
- 92 -
Entered Port: U 413 - Brest; U 266 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 591 - 84 - Brest; U 106 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Convoy No. 9 and Convoy report of U 522 (see No. IVa).
U 525 reported a steamer sighted by two destroyers in BD 4112, course
2000. Contact lost owing to poor visibility. (2 miles)
U 606 sighted for a short time in BC 3899 vessel with course 2150,
speed 15 knots, fog.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 9590 - SOS from unit "OBZEA" from CG
2822.
1155
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 9:
On the return passage U 69 sighted a convoy with course 2250 in AJ
9982. Since the convoy was about 500 miles from the coast so that there
was sufficient area for operations, Group "Taifun" as well as the returning
"Haudegen" boats received orders to attack the convoy as far as fuel
supplies permitted. Since all the boats were comparatively low (in fuel)
refueling facilities were provided in BD 42. The convoy consisted of 20
steamers proceeding in open formation without remote escort. Position at
1701 was AJ 9988, course 2150, speed 9 knots. U 201 made contact also
at 2000 and reported last at 2207 from BC 3136 then both boats lost
contact. U 607 must have been quite near as she requested D/F signal but
she also did not sight the convoy. In order to reestablish the convoy by
conducted action (search sectors etc.) all boats were instructed to give their
positions. The reports of positions were so irregular that the plan could
not be carried out. U 201 - 69 and 223 have not reported up to now. The
operation is being continued.
2) Convoy Report U 522:
The above boat sighted at 0836 in CF 5872 a small convoy of 5
steamers and 3 escorts, course 1500, speed 12 knots. Action by Group
"ROBBE" was impossible because of insufficient speed superiority. The
boats would only have reached the convoy in an area where air cover was
strong and continuous. U 522 herself had only 17 cbm of fuel left.
She was ordered to continue pursuit as long as possible with this. With
visibility variable contact was lost towards 1600. U 522 suspected zig on
to course 900 and proceeded in this direction, however, without finding the
convoy again. The last hydrophone fix was at 2000 from CF 9177 in
direction 1100. Towards 0500 the operation was broken off in CF 9567,
fuel being at 7 cbm. No sinkings.
b) 1) Since it was impossible that the convoy had already passed the
patrol, the boats of Group "NEPTUN" were ordered to take up their
positions in the patrol at once. In spite of orders: in good time U 638, was
not able to take up her position promptly in the patrol. The following new
sequence was therefore ordered: U 759 - 405 - 448 - 359 - 135 - 608 - 638
- 376 - 566 - 659.
- 93 -
All groups were ordered, so as to avoid location of the patrol line by
enemy aircraft, to man their radar interception service as far as possible
and in case enemy aircraft were established, to dive at once and remain
submerged for about 30 minutes.
2) As a result of faulty W/T of the boat, U 92 was not, as ordered, in the
patrol line of the Group "Ritter". U 603 joined this Group in her place and
took up the south position in the patrol. U 92 took up AK 65 as temporary
attack sector, U 604 - AK 66, U 91 - AK 69. U 526 - 616 - 228 - 527 - 523
- 600 and 211 proceeded to AK 03. It was intended to set up a further
reconnaissance patrol in the said area with these boats.
3) Group "Rochen" remained as from 2100 in the position line reached
and proceeded at 1000 on 18th February with old course and day's run.
The convoy must have already passed the patrol at 9 knots. Since,
however, speed was not known exactly and unfavorable weather
conditions are of great significance in the long convoy run, an encounter
with the convoy can still be anticipated.
4) U 409 is to proceed to CE 38 to supplement Group "Robbe", U 460
to BD 42 to supply the "Haudegen" boats, contrary to previous order.
c) None.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
1156
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
18. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(CE 76) U 202 - Op(DG 12) U 414 - BF 40 U 558 -
Op(CE 79)
66 - Op(CE 73 211 - BE 52 432 - BE 69 566 - Op(AK 34)
68 - DE 63 214 - BE 98 436 - BF 58 659 - Op(CE 62)
69 - Op(AJ 99) 217 - BE 94 437 - Op(CE 32) 571 - BF 91
84 - Op(BF 46) 218 - Op(CE 76) 442 - BF 49 575 - BF 64
87 - Op(DG 12) 223 - Op(BC 23) 445 - Op(CE 35) 591 - BF 46
89 - AK 89 225 - Op(AK 18) 448 - Op(AD 87) 594 - BF 64
91 - BE 14 226 - Op(BC 37) 454 - Op(AK 56) 600 - BE 21
92 - Op(AK 93) 228 - AE 79 456 - AK 89 603 - AK 65
103 - Op(CE 65) 230 - AE 79 459 - AJ 87 604 - AK 66
106 - BF 54 258 - Op(CE 19) 460 - AK 89 606 - Op(BC 39)
107 - Op(CE 62) 264 - Op(DG 15) 461 - CF 33 607 - Op(BC 32)
108 - CF 23 267 - BF 64 465 - BF 64 608 - Op(AK 34)
118 - CF 59 268 - BF 47 468 - Op(AK 18) 613 - BF 28
119 - Island 303 - Op(BC 34) 504 - Op(DG 18) 614 - AK 89
125 - BF 49 332 - Op(AK 52) 506 - Op(GR) 616 - AE 79
135 - Op(AK 31) 358 - Op(BC 25) 509 - Op(GR) 620 - BF 81
155 - CE 81 359 - Op(AK 31) 510 - Op(ED) 621 - Op(AK 52)
156 - Op(EO) 376 - AL 13 511 - Op(CE 30) 623 - Op(AK 01)
160 - Op(GR) 377 - Op(AK 18) 516 - Op(GR) 628 - Op(AL 12)
175 - BF 74 381 - BF 67 518 - Op(FJ 30) 638 - Op(AL 12)
176 - BF 61 382 - Op(CE 38) 521 - Op(CE 79) 653 - Op(AK 01)
180 - AE 83 383 - Op(BD 41) 522 - CF 95 659 - Op(AK 34)
182 - Op(KP) 402 - BE 19 523 - AE 83 664 - BE 93
183 - CD 72 403 - Op(BC 34) 525 - Op(BD 41) 707 - Op(BC 25)
185 - CF 45 405 - Op(AD 87) 526 - AE 78 709 - AN 24
186 - Op(BC 34) 409 - BE 56 527 - AE 83 753 - Op(AK 52)
201 - Op(AJ 98) 410 - Op(CE 35) 529 - Op(AK 16) 758 - BE 68
- - D 3 - AL 57 759 - Op(AD 87)

- 94 -
On Return Passage: U 69 - 108 - 118 - 125 - 175 - 176 - 201 - 214 - 217
- 226 - 267 - 268 - 303 - 381 - 383 - 402 - 414 - 436 - 442 - 456 - 459 -
465 - 525 - 571 - 575 - 594 - 606 - 607 - 613 - 614 - 620.
Entered Port: U 613 - Brest; U 176 - Lorient; U 575 - 267 - 465 - 594 -
St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 435 - Brest; U 615 - La Pallice; U 634 - Bergen.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 9 see No. IVa.
2) U 506 situation: Up to 13th nothing found in vicinity of Capetown.
Likewise in southern sector of operational area no traffic.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BF 5462, FK 3179, ED 9486, BF 8374, U-boats
were attacked in BC 3276.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 9:
The weather situation was particularly unfavorable for operations in the
area of the convoy on 18th February. At midday southwest wind 9 with
slight visibility, after passing storm depression. At 1716 U 403 again
1157
contacted the convoy in BC 3473. The boats reported continuous contact
until the next morning. According to dead reckoning, the enemy was
proceeding at less than 5 knots with westerly course. In addition to this
boat U 266 reported at 0257 on the morning of 19th February contacting
the convoy in BC 3794. Since this report differed by 70 miles from the
reports of U 403, it is assumed that the boats have very great deviations in
fix, which is possible in view of the unfavorable current conditions in this
area owing to the meeting of the Gulf Stream and Labrador Current. No
further boats encountered the convoy. U 403 reported in BC 2676 an
8,000 ton steamer sunk. U 383, 226, 303, 403 and 607 had to break off
operations owing to shortage of fuel.
Operations against the convoy were continued with boats U 525, 186,
223, 358 and 707. Position of the convoy at 0953 on the 19th February
was BC 2674.
b) 1) According to locations made by the Air Force Intercept Unit an
outgoing convoy was approximately in AL 39 - 62 at 1400. It was
assumed to be the ONS 167 in this area in view of our own dead
reckoning. Groups "Ritter" and "Neptun" in area AK will be detailed to
intercept this convoy and disposed in a long north-south patrol line.
Contrary to previous orders Group "Neptun" will occupy a new patrol line
from AK 2438 to AK 0269 as from midnight on the 20th. Group "Ritter"
will close in to the south and be in patrol line from AK 0299 to AK 9423 at
0800 on the 20th February. In addition U 92 - 604 - 91 and 600 in the
vicinity will join Group "Knappen" and also be disposed in a patrol line
from AK 9293 to AK 9684. According to dead reckoning the arrival of the
convoy may be expected in one of these patrol lines during the 20th
February.
- 95 -

2) Group "ROCHEN" will remain this evening in position line from
CE 4875 to DG 1475 as a patrol line. It is not intended to proceed further
west.
3) Group "ROBBE" will make for the position line from CE 3147 to CE
6164 and will proceed further, as a reconnaissance patrol, at 0900 on the
19th February with course 2800 and day's run 140 miles. The convoy
coming from America, awaited by both Groups will certainly be through,
even proceeding at 8 knots. It is therefore intended to leave the Group
also as a patrol line as from the evening on 19th February.
4) U 160 will have freedom of action in the whole Capetown area up to
and including KP.
5) New objectives for U 432, 758 and 664 will be AK 95. Operation
against convoys intended.
c) 1) U 522 will rendezvous with U 461 in CF 8155 for refueling,
thereafter making for: U 461 - DG 23, U 522 CE 92.
2) U 108 supplied U 511 with fuel.
3) Refueled from U 460: U 89 on the 16th February, U 614 on the 17th
February. Tanker capacity 364 cbm provisions for 93 days.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 403 - 1 ship 8,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
19. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(CE 75) U 211 - BE 57 U 435 - BF 54 U 569 - Op(CE 34)
66 - Op(CE 72) 214 - BE 71 436 - BF 64 571 - BF 68
68 - DE 56 217 - BE 93 437 - Op(CE 31) 591 - BF 44
69 - Op(BC 25) 218 - Op(CE 72) 442 - BF 57 600 - BE 12
84 - BF 44 223 - Op(BC 25) 445 - Op(CE 34) 603 - Op(AK 66)
1158
87 - Op(DG 11) 225 - Op(AK 18) 448 - Op(AD 87) 604 - Op(AK 66)
89 - AK 89 226 - Op(BC 38) 454 - Op(AK 56) 606 - Op(BD 43)
91 - AK 96 228 - AE 78 456 - AK 89 607 - Op(BC 28)
92 - Op(AK 65) 230 - AE 78 549 - EJ 49 608 - Op(AK 34)
103 - Op(CE 51) 258 - Op(CE 78) 460 - AK 89 614 - AK 89
106 - BF 48 264 - Op(DG 11) 461 - CF 37 615 - BF 91
107 - Op(CE 61) 268 - BF 52 468 - Op(AK 18) 616 - AE 78
108 - CF 30 303 - Op(BC 25) 504 - Op(DG 17) 620 - BF 80
118 - CF 37 332 - Op(AK 52) 506 - Op(KZ) 621 - Op(AK 52)
119 - Island 358 - Op(BC 25) 509 - Op(GR) 623 - Op(AK 01)
125 - BF 61 359 - Op(AK 31) 510 - Op(EO) 628 - Op(AK 21)
135 - Op(AK 31) 376 - Op(AK 34) 511 - Op(CE 31) 634 - AF 79
155 - CE 74 377 - Op(AK 18) 516 - Op(GR) 638 - Op(AK 34)
156 - Op(EO) 381 - DF 64 518 - Op(FJ 30) 653 - BE 69
160 - Op(GR) 382 - Op(CE 34) 521 - Op(CE 48) 659 - Op(AK 34)
175 - BF 73 383 - Op(BC 38) 522 - CF 86 664 - BE 69
180 - AE 84 402 - BE 28 523 - AE 84 707 - Op(BC 25)
182 - Op(KP) 403 - Op(BC 25) 525 - BD 42 709 - AF 79
183 - CC 96 405 - Op(AD 87) 526 - AE 79 753 - Op(AK 52)
185 - CE 61 409 - BE 57 527 - AE 84 758 - BE 56
- 96 -
U 186 - Op(BC 25) U 410 - Op(CE 31) U 529 - Op(AK 16) U 759 -
Op(AD 87)
201 - Op(BC 25) 414 - BF 64 558 - Op(CE 78) D 3 - AL 29
 202 - DG 11 432 - BE 51 566 - Op(AK 34)
On Return Passage: U 69 - 108 - 118 - 125 - 175 - 201 - 214 - 217 - 226
- 268 - 303 - 381 - 383 - 402 - 414 - 436 - 442 - 456 - 459 - 525 - 571 -
606 - 607 - 614 - 620.
Entered Port: U 125 - Lorient; U 436 - 414 - 381 - St. Nazaire; U 571 -
La Pallice.
Sailed: U 462 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 9 - see No. IVa.
2) U 182 has been in the Cape Town area for 14 days. She sank the
English steamer "Blanashe" 4,836 GRT, on the 17th February in KZ 42,
course 2850. No other traffic observed the whole time.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: FJ 8460, FJ 8740, EO 5398, EO 56, FJ 85.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 9:
On the 19th also the weather situation was extremely unfavorable in the
convoy area. Wind was S.E. 7 at midday, with low visibility from 2 - 3
miles. In the afternoon at 1554 U 525 again contacted the convoy. The
boat reported up to 5 steamers in BC 2939. According to two later reports
of contact it was not 2938 but 2638. U 525 reported at 1950 for the last
time the enemy in BC 2652 course 240 speed 4 knots. At the same time
the boat fired a three-fan torpedo which missed.
U 707 (Gretschel) reported two destroyers at 1730 in BC 2595 with
course N.E. convoy suspected there. Further reports on the convoy have
not been received. Owing to fuel shortage of the boats the operation
against the convoy was broken off at dawn on the morning of the 20th.
U 525 reported having sunk a single vessel of 6,000 GRT at 0508. This
was probably a steamer separated from the convoy, since it was assumed
1159
that the convoy could not keep together owing to the continuously bad
weather situation.
For this reason the boats were to patrol the area astern the convoy again
in daylight, on the way to the supply rendezvous, in order to search out
further solitary vessels.
Final Survey of Convoy No. 9 - The operation on the convoy was begun
with 12 boats of which half were very low in fuel from the start and not
able to carry out a long operation. The area was also unfavorable, in
which the convoy was detected. The boats only had a small area for
operations.
The bad conditions of weather and current in this area did not permit a
successful operation. In spite of the fact that there was continuous contact
with the convoy by U 525 from the afternoon of the 18th up to the
morning of the 19th at 1000,
- 97 -
it was not possible to bring up more boats. The reasons were the
facilities lacking for fixes by the boats on account of low visibility and a
continual heavy sea in an area where unfavorable current conditions must
result in great deviation in fixes of the boats. The operation was being
carried on in that area in which the Gulf Stream and Labrador Stream meet
and, therefore, result in inestimable current conditions. The only possible
means of counteracting these differences in fixes, i.e. by sending out
beacon signals, was not successful although U 525 continually sent out
signals from the convoy location. The signals were probably either not
heard or only faintly heard by the other boats on account of the rough
weather.
 Sunk: 2 ships from this convoy, together 14,000 GRT.
Out of the 12 boats of this Group, 5 boats were up to the convoy. Two
boats attacked the convoy, one boat hit a single vessel separated from the
convoy.
U 201 and U 69 which were both up to the convoy at the beginning of
the operation, have not reported any more since then.They may be
assumed lost. No damage by enemy action was reported by the boats.
b) 1) U 89 will occupy as an operational area grid square connecting the
two Groups "Ritter" and "Neptun" - AK 39. Since a new fix of the Air
Force Intercept Unit in AL 5277 indicates a south-westerly course by the
convoy "Neptun and "Ritter" will proceed at 1000 on the 20th February on
reconnaissance patrol with course 1300, "Knappen" with course 900,
speed for all 6 knots.
2) Group "Robbe" will remain in patrol line this evening, after reaching
position line from CE 2261 to CE 5267. It is not intended to proceed
further west.
It is no longer anticipated that the convoy will arrive.
c) U 456 refueled from U 460. Tanker will be ready for supplying Group
"Taifun" in BC 42 on 21st February at 1100.
d) U 268 was due to come into Brest on the morning of the 19th
February. Boat has not yet arrived; orders to report on position not yet
answered. In view of report on sighting by British aircraft from BF 5462
an attack is presumed, sub-chasers sent out to search, air force intends to
send out 2 machines. No result yet.
V. Reports of Success:
U 182 - 1 ship 4,836 GRT.
U 525 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 98 -
1160
20. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(CE 75) U 214 - BF 70 U 448 - Op(AK 24) U 603 - Op(AK
94)
66 - Op(CE 72) 217 - BF 70 454 - Op(AK 91) 604 - Op(AK 96)
68 - DE 57 218 - Op(CE 72) 456 - BD 35 606 - BD 42
69 - Op(BC 34) 223 - Op(BC 26) 459 - EJ 42 607 - BC 38
84 - BE 60 225 - Op(AK 64) 460 - BD 19 608 - Op(AK 28)
87 - Op(DG 11) 226 - BD 40 461 - CF 81 614 - BE 18
89 - AK 39 228 - AL 14 462 - BF 80 615 - BF 80
91 - Op(AK 96) 230 - AL 14 468 - Op(AK 61) 616 - AL 14
92 - Op(AK 92) 258 - Op(CE 78) 504 - Op(DG 17) 620 - BF 50
103 - Op(CE 52) 264 - Op(DG 11) 506 - Op(KZ) 621 - Op(AK 67)
106 - BF 70 303 - BC 63 509 - Op(GR) 623 - Op(AK 67)
107 - Op(CE 52) 332 - Op(AK 91) 510 - Op(EO) 628 - Op(AK 64)
108 - BF 70 358 - Op(BC 29) 511 - Op(CE 28) 634 - AF 72
118 - CF 33 359 - Op(AK 26) 516 - Op(GR) 638 - Op(AK 28)
119 - Island 376 - Op(AK 28) 518 - Op(FJ) 653 - OP(AK 64)
135 - Op(AK 26) 377 - Op(AK 61) 521 - Op(CE 48) 659 - Op(AK 02)
155 - CD 98 382 - Op(CE 25) 522 - CF 81 664 - BE 28
156 - Op(EO) 383 - BD 41 523 - AE 98 707 - Op(BC 26)
160 - Op(GR) 402 - BE 61 525 - BC 34 709 - AF 75
175 - BF 40 403 - BD 41 526 - AL 23 753 - Op(AK 67)
180 - AL 31 405 - Op(AK 24) 527 - AL 22 758 - BE 52
182 - Op(KP) 409 - BE 75 529 - Op(AK 02) 759 - AK 24
183 - BE 23 410 - Op(CE 22) 558 - Op(CE 78) D 3 - AL 26
185 - CE 55 432 - BE 19 566 - Op(AK 02)
186 - Op(BC 20) 435 - BF 40 569 - Op(CE 28)
 201 - Op(BC) 437 - Op(CE 22) 268 - BF 52
202 - Op(DG 11) 442 - BF 50 591 - BE 37
211 - BE 43 445 - Op(CE 25) 600 - Op(AK 96)
On Return Passage: U 69 - 108 - 118 - 175 - 201 - 214 - 217 - 226 - 303
- 383 - 402 - 403 - 442 - 456 - 459 - 525 - 571 - 606 - 607 - 614 - 620.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 513 - Lorient; U 447 - 633 - 530 - 190 - 229 - 665 - 641 - 642
- Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) No more reports received on Convoy No. 9. Operation therefore
concluded.
2) Convoy No. 10 - see IVa.
3) U 516 sank the American tanker"Deer Lodge" 6,187 GRT course
600, on the 17th February in KZ 4113. The boat had been patrolling from
the 10 - 17 February in KY 6263 - 6566 and KZ 4110 and sighted 3 ships
in all. No increased or regular east-west traffic observed.
4) Situation U 518: has been in the operational area off the Brazilian
coast for 8 days. Only single escorted and unescorted vessels sighted
along the 200 m. line. Neutral traffic continuing. Modern freighter of
8,000 GRT course 2200 speed 13 knots sunk on the 18th February in FJ
8577. Air cover in the area strong, continual in some parts. After the
sinking, location of aircraft by night.
5) U 106 reported a convoy of over 20 steamers at 2318 in BE 98 course
1500. Since there were no boats in the vicinity U 106 had freedom of
action. She was however, forced to dive,
- 99 -
1161
owing apparently to the strong defence of the convoy, and lost
contact.
6) U 504 dived in DG 1487 in view of single corvette with mean course
500. Since this was possibly an escort vessel and, in this case, there might
be other ships in the vicinity U 504 received orders to pursue. The
remaining boats of Group "Rochen" excluding U 258 and 264 proceeded
immediately on course 1200, speed 7 knots. No further reports received.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: in EC 35 and BE 1671.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 10:
On the 20th February, 1055, U 604 reported a hydrophone fix, wide
spread. So that it was assumed that this was the expected S.W. bound
convoy. When, an hour later, the boat reported a steamer with 3 corvettes
it was safe to order further boats to operate against the convoy.
Operational orders were given to U 600, 91, 92, 603, 454, 332, 753, 621,
623, 628, 653, 225, 377 and 468 16 boats in all, therefore. At 1347 U 604
reported the convoy in AK 9618. She maintained contact, with two short
intervals, until 0324 on the 21st February. She was forced off by
destroyers and was depth-charged. The convoy was again reported by U
332, according to hydrophone fix, to be in BD 3172 at 0740.
The convoy then proceeded on an initial south-westerly course and later
on a straight southerly course and, according to dead reckoning, had a
speed of almost 8 knots, which indicates an ON convoy. 16-20 steamers
were reported by U 604.
On the 20th February no further boats approached the convoy in spite of
continuous contact by U 604, probably on account of the fog by day and
constantly changing visibility at night.
The operation on the convoy is continuing.
 b) 1) On account of bad weather Group "Neptun", "Ritter" and
"Knappen" contrary to previous orders, will remain in the position lines
ordered as a patrol.
Since "Ritter" and "Knappen" are operating against Convoy No. 10 the
disposition of Group "Neptun" as a patrol line in the present area has no
purpose according to latest aircraft location reports. "Neptun", therefore,
will proceed as from 2200 as a reconnaissance patrol with course 2600
speed 3 knots. U 89 and 529 will join her and will extend the patrol to the
south in that order. The whole Group will pass a position line from AK
2355 to AK 5346 at 2200 and the position line from AK 1479 to AK 5199
at midnight 23 February.
2) The operations of boats off the Azores, which have for some time
been unsuccessful, and the necessity of intercepting supplies to Africa or
Gibraltar at some point again necessitates disposition close to the coast.
Group "Robbe" therefore, will proceed as from 0200 on the 21 February at
slow speed and course 1050 to CG 80 or DJ 10.
3) In order to escort a blockade runner home U 258, 264 and 437 are
ordered to proceed to CE 1380 and to reach there at midday on the 23rd
February.
- 100 -
4) Operation in the Mozambique Channel - U 128 north of latitude 280
South, U 160 southwards from this point to 320 South.
c) 1) U 522 refueled from U 461.
2) U 211 was heavily bombed by aircraft in BE 1658 and is returning in
view of reduced diving capacity.
1162
d) 1) There is no further news from U 268. The boat was not found by
air units and sub-chasers and must be assumed lost.
2) U 201 and 69 last reported on the evening of the 17th February near
Convoy No. 9. The boats reported contacts from BC 3136 or BC 3252.
Since there are no reports of aircraft, loss by action of escort units
probable.
V. Reports of sinkings:
U 516 - 1 ship 6,187 GRT
U 518 - 1 ship 8,000 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
21. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(CE 70) U 217 - BF 40 U 447 - AO 40 U 591 - BE 25
66 - Op(CE 70) 218 - Op(CE 70) 448 - Op(AK 20) 600 - Op(AK 90)
68 - DE 75 223 - BC 38 454 - Op(AK 90) 603 - Op(AK 90)
84 - BE 28 225 - Op(AK 90) 456 - BE 18 604 - Op(AK 90)
87 - Op(DG 10) 226 - BD 40 459 - DT 85 606 - BD 40
89 - Op(AK 30) 228 - AL 18 460 - BD 42 607 - Op(BC 42)
91 - Op(AK 90) 230 - AL 18 461 - CF 81 608 - Op(AK 20)
92 - Op(AK 90) 229 - AO 40 462 - BF 81 614 - BE 29
103 - Op(CE 52) 258 - Op(CE 48) 468 - Op(AK 90) 615 - BF 48
106 - BE 95 264 - Op(DG 10) 504 - Op(D 12) 616 - AL 16
107 - Op(CE 52) 303 - BD 40 506 - Op(KZ) 620 - BF 80
108 - BE 93 332 - Op(AK 90) 509 - Op(GR) 621 - Op(AK 90)
118 - BE 96 358 - BC 38 510 - Op(EO) 623 - Op(AK 90)
119 - Island 359 - Op(AK 29) 511 - Op(CE 28) 628 - Op(AK 90)
135 - Op(AK 26) 376 - Op(AK 20) 513 - BF 50 633 - AO 40
155 - DF 22 377 - Op(AK 90) 516 - Op(KZ) 634 - AE 69
156 - Op(EO) 382 - Op(CE 25) 518 - Op(FJ 30) 638 - Op(AK 20)
160 - Op(GR) 383 - BD 40 521 - Op(CE 40) 641 - AO 40
175 - BF 57 402 - BE 66 522 - CF 81 642 - AO 40
 180 - AL 24 403 - BD 40 523 - AL 21 653 - Op(AK 90)
182 - Op(KP) 405 - Op(AK 20) 525 - BD 40 659 - Op(AK 20)
183 - DE 24 409 - CE 33 526 - Al 16 664 - BE 16
185 - CE 48 410 - Op(CE 22) 527 - AL 24 665 - AO 40
186 - BC 34 432 - CF 31 529 - Op(AK 60) 707 - BC 62
190 - AO 40 435 - BE 63 530 - AO 40 709 - AE 93
202 - Op(CE 48) 437 - Op(CF 22) 558 - Op(CE 70) 753 - Op(AK 90)
211 - BE 27 442 - BF 50 566 - Op(AK 20) 758 - BE 19
214 - BE 80 445 - Op(CE 25) 569 - Op(CE 28) 759 - Op(AK 20)
D 3 - AL 32
On Return Passage: U 108 - 118 - 175 - 186 - 211 - 214 - 217 - 223 -
226 - 303 - 358 - 402 - 403 - 442 - 456 - 459 - 525 - 606 - 607 - 614 - 620
- 707 - D 3 - 483.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 515 - 172 - Lorient; U 618 - St. Nazaire.
- 101 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys No. 10 and 11 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 106 was detected in the attack, in spite of minimum use of
periscope, and subsequently pursued for a long time. Since there was no
contact she proceeded on her outward passage.
3) U 230 unsuccessfully pursued a single vessel, course 700 in AL 3190.
1163
4) U 460 reported an enemy U-boat in BD 42.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BD 6115, DN 4212.
U-boat attacked and was attacked in BD 53.
d) 1) According to a report from the German Consul in Laurenco
Marques, a convoy of 20 - 30 ships is to leave Capetown on its way to
India on the 23rd February.
2) From Cape Jubi 9 ships were sighted northward bound.
IV. Current Operations:
Convoy No. 10:
The weather situation in the area of the convoy was wind W. 3. It
moderated further during the course of the day and at 2300 there was dead
calm in the area of the convoy. U 332 contacted a tanker in BD 3417 at
1100. U 753 reported a single vessel in ED 2633 probably the same one.
At 1408 U 454 then contacted the convoy again in BD 3457.
At 1610 she was again driven off. At 2050 U 92 again detected the
convoy and reported on it continuously until the next morning. At 0800
she was driven off in BD 3285. In addition to these two boats U 753 came
up to the convoy in BD 2969 at 2000 but has ceased to report since then.
U 91 contacted the convoy at 2000 on the 21st February but was driven off
by a flying boat and heavily depth-charged.She was forced to leave the
convoy for repairs.
There have been four reports of aircraft from the boats, apparently only
flying boats escorting the convoy.
The convoy proceeded on its south to south-easterly course up to the
night of 21st then turned to course 2500 towards midnight. Speed 8.3
knots according to data.
Sinkings: Assumed sinkings:
U 603 reported 1705 in 2925 Manstein tanker Stigstad 5,964 GRT sunk.
1/5,964 GRT tanker sunk.
U 92 reported 2230 in BD 5326 a 7,000 GRT ship sunk. 1/7,000 GRT
sunk
U 92 reported 0436 in BD 5266 1/5,000 GRT freighter sunk 1/5,000
GRT sunk
1/6,000 GRT freighter left burning. 1/6,000 GRT sunk
 4/23,964 GRT.
- 102 -
The operation on the convoy which was in BD 5285 at 0740 on the
22nd is being continued.
U 377 is not to operate against the convoy as it is too far away.
A group of boats which is refueling further west will also be operating
against the convoy if possible. U 303 and 606 report from this group that
they are operating against the convoy.
Convoy No. 11:
At 1850 on the 21st, U 664 sighted a convoy on a southward bound
course in BE 1152. 4 boats in the vicinity, U 758 - 591 - 84 and 432 were
sent into operation following this report. After taking on supplies U 409
further to the south, was also to operate against the convoy.
The convoy was reported by U 664 to consist of 10 steamers.
Presumably this was the ONS convoy expected according to dead
reckoning, which, however was not confirmed in view of the speed of 9
knots estimated. It might equally well be a small part of a convoy.
Contact with the convoy was maintained up to 2135 by U 664 which
reported continuously. At 0337 on the 22nd February U 758 the next boat
in line, then contacted the convoy and reported it for the last time at 0510
as being in BD 3654.
Sinkings Assumed:
U 664 reported at 2135 in BE 1171
1164
1/5,000 GRT sunk 1/5,000 GRT
1/8,000 tanker left burning 1/8,000 GRT tank
In all: 2/13,000 GRT
The operation on the convoy, which was in BD 3568 at 0945 on a S.W.
course, is being continued. It is important for control purposes that contact
be maintained with the convoy in order that further boats from the
Höltring convoy (No. 10) may be sent later to operate against it.
V. Reports of Success:
U 603 - 1 ship 5,964 GRT
92 - 3 ships 18,000 GRT
664 - 2 ships 13,000 GRT.
IV. (Continued)
b) 1) The boats of Group "Robbe" will be disposed in the following
areas: U 107 - CG 49, 73 and 76, U 103 - CG 81 and 84, U 511 - CG 82
and 85, U 410 - CG 83 and 86. U 455 west half of CG 91, 94, 97 and DJ
22. U 382 east half of these squares. U 569 freedom of action eastward
80 West with main area in the east. U 382 and 569 will proceed first for
supplies and to take over spare parts.
2) New objectives for U 522 will be DH 96. Operation intended in that
area. Latest report from Cape Jubi confirms assumption regarding future
traffic.
3) U 377 according to location report, is too far behind Convoy No. 10
so that operations are not probable. She will, therefore, join Group
"Neptun" and proceed to AK 5295.
- 103 -

4) The patrol lines of Group "Rochen" will be broken up. The boats
will refuel as from 23 February from U 461 in DG 3155.
5) Rendezvous of supply Group "Schnoor" will be moved to BD 4595
in view of enemy U-boat sighted.
6) U 523 - 228 - 527 - 616 - 526 - 664 - 758 - 591 and 84 will join
Group "Burggraf" and will take up position at 0800 on the 24th February
in the above sequence in the reconnaissance patrol line from AK 6237 to
AL 7142, course 2350, speed 4 knots. After detecting Convoy No. 11 U
664 - 758 - 591 - and 84 will leave the Group. New disposition will be
necessary.
c) 1) U 409 supplied U 437 with spare parts.
2) U 606 and 303 refueled from U 460.
d) U 437, 258 and 264 will receive further instructions on escorting the
blockade runner "Hohenfriedberg" home.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
22. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DG 26) U 217 - BF 28 U 448 - Op(AK 20) U 600 -
Op(BD 20)
66 - CE 80 218 - Op(DG 20) 454 - Op(BD 55) 603 - Op(BD 56)
68 - DD 99 223 - BD 42 456 - BE 52 604 - Op(BD 56)
84 - BE 21 225 - Op(BD 20) 459 - DT 55 606 - BD 42
87 - Op(DG 20) 226 - BD 42 460 - BD 42 607 - BD 42
89 - Op(AK 20) 228 - AK 63 461 - CE 99 608 - Op(AK 20)
91 - Op(BD 56) 229 - AN 35 462 - BE 92 614 - BE 65
92 - Op(BD 55) 230 - AL 24 468 - Op(AK 56) 615 - BE 67
103 - Op(CF 40) 258 - CE 42 504 - Op(DG 20) 616 - AL 19
106 - BE 89 264 - CE 42 506 - Op(KZ) 618 - BF 58
107 - Op(CF 40) 303 - BD 54 509 - Op(GR) 620 - BF
1165
108 - BE 72 332 - Op(BD 56) 510 - Op(EO) 621 - Op(BD 20)
118 - BF 73 358 - BD 42 511 - Op(CF 40) 623 - Op(BD 20)
119 - Island 359 - Op(AK 20) 513 - BF 40 628 - Op(BD 55)
135 - Op(AK 20) 376 - Op(AK 20) 515 - BF 54 633 - AN 35
155 - DF 15 377 - Op(AK 55) 516 - Op(GR) 634 - AE 67
156 - Op(EO) 382 - Op(CF 40) 518 - Op(FJ 96) 638 - Op(AK 20)
160 - Op(GR) 383 - BD 42 521 - Op(CE 80) 641 - AN 35
172 - BF 54 402 - BF 90 522 - CF 88 642 - AN 35
175 - BF 403 - BD 42 523 - AL 15 653 - Op(BD 55)
180 - AL 24 405 - Op(AK 20) 525 - Op(AK 20) 659 - Op(AK 20)
182 - Op(KP) 409 - CE 31 526 - AL 27 664 - BD 36
183 - DE 42 410 - Op(CF 10) 527 - AL 16 665 - AN 35
185 - CD 92 432 - BE 72 529 - Op(AK 20) 707 - BD 43
186 - BD 42 435 - BE 26 530 - AN 35 709 - AE 68
190 - AN 35 437 - CE 42 558 - Op(DG 20) 753 - Op(BD 56)
202 - Op(DG 20) 442 - BF 566 - Op(AK 20) 758 - BD 35
211 - BE 53 445 - CF 10 569 - Op(CF 40) 759 - Op(AK 20)
214 - BF 447 - AN 35 591 - BE 13 D 3 - AE 86
On Return Passage: U 108 - 118 - 175 - 186 - 211 - 214 - 217 - 223 -
226 - 303 - 358 - 402 - 403 - 456 - 459 - 525 - 606 - 607 - 614 - 707 - D 3.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 439 - Brest; U 508 - Lorient; U 590 - 757 - 406 - St. Nazaire.
- 104 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 10, 11 and 12 - see paragraph IVa.
2) U 107 sank, in the Azores Group - CE 6837, British refrigerator ship - 105 -
"Roxburgh Castle", 7,801 GRT, course 2100, speed 16.5 knots.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: FJ 93, EC 36, CG 9588, DS 4231.
U-boats were attacked in BE 5383 and BD 5336.
U-boat attack in EC 3651.
2) A report on torpedoing of a destroyer in the vicinity of Cape Spartel
indicates a new sinking through the mines laid by U 118, since no German
boat was operating in this area at the time.
d) None.
The operation on the convoy is being continued. 5 boats from the
IV. Current Operations: supply group will also operate against the convoy, i.e. U 358, 707, 223,
a) Convoy No. 10: 186 and 403.
The weather situation in the area of the convoy was wind W. 4, sea 3
and variable visibility at midday on the 22nd February. Towards evening Convoy No. 11:
wind was S.W. 7. Last contact report came from U 662: 0945 enemy in BD 3568. No
The contact with the convoy was not broken. At 1025 U 606 detected further contact.
the convoy again in BD 5551. U 603 also contacted it at 1035 and U 628 Boats operating in this area will form Group "Sturmbock". Operational
at 1601 in BD 5458. In the course of the night U 92, 358, 223 and 186 orders, course 230 - 2500, enemy speed 7 - 9 knots. Indications of convoy
also came up to the convoy. At 0738 U 628 reported it in BD 4564. route: U 403 reported at 0128 on 23rd single destroyer BD 6116, 2360,
According to the reports of the boats it was proceeding at 8 knots and speed slow. U 753 reported at 0510 destroyer in BD 5238, no hydrophone
maintaining its mean course of 250 - 2600. fix. According to this the convoy is following Convoy No. 11.
Few reports were received regarding enemy escort. No air cover at all
was reported. U 753 reported having been depth-charged, one Diesel Convoy No. 12:
being out of action for 20 hours and main periscope and stern tube being U 522 reported at 1413 convoy in DH 1165. The following were sent
faulty. She received orders to operate against the subsequent Graef into operation Group "Rochen" including U 66, 521, 43, 218, 504, 558, 87
convoy after repairs. 5 boats reported being driven off by destroyers. and 202. In addition U 107, 382, 569 of Group "Robbe". U 522 reported
Sinkings: Admitted: continuous contact until 2016. Mean course of the convoy 2350, speed 10
U 753 reported 1330 in BD 5265 knots. After losing contact the boats were ordered to search in the sector
escorted 5,000 GRT freighter sunk 5,000 GRT from 280 - 2300, 2 boats each in a 100 sector, one boat at enemy speed 11
U 604 reported 0341 in BD 4633 knots, the other 9 knots. U 107 broke off operations as she was too far
passenger freighter 7,000 GRT sunk 7,000 GRT away. U 522 freedom of action.
2/12,000 GRT
1166
 At 0740 U 522 again contacted the convoy in DG 6239. Group
"Rochen" was sent in.
Sinkings:
U 522: 0741 2 hits on a large tanker, left sinking.
b) 1) Boats of Group "Robbe" will calculate their speed so that the
operational area is reached by the 28th February. Earlier arrival and
operation would be too dangerous, in view of the unfavorable phase of the
moon and strength of night fighter activities, and at the same time there
would be only slight prospects of attack.
2) Group "Neptun" will proceed further west and at midnight on the
24th February will pass position line from AJ 3364 to AK 4688 and at
midnight on the 25th February the position line from AJ 3588 to AK 4845.
U 377 will have the most southerly position in this patrol line.
3) Rendezvous of supply Group "Schnoor" will be revised to BD 4355
in view of the direct westerly course of the convoy. The boats there are
ordered to operate against Convoy No. 10 or, if refueling later, against
Convoy No. 11. Further refueling is permitted. For this reason U 462 (U-
tanker) is ordered to proceed to BD 81 at high speed.
4) Since Group "Rochen" has been ordered to operate against Convoy
No. 12, refueling from U 461 has been temporarily suspended. U 461
will, therefore, arrive at 1600 on the 23rd February in CF 7355 with U 511
to carry out refueling and to supply a Radar intercept antenna.
Subsequently U 461 will proceed at slow speed behind the convoy, U 511
will cover the operational area ordered off Gibraltar.
c) None.
- 106 -
1167
d) 1) Further orders to U 258, 437 and 264 upon sighting blockade
runner. Boats will approach the ship to request from the Captain
information on speed and intentions and will then take up positions: U
437 right ahead of the ship, U 264 - 450 to port, U 258 - 450 to starboard.
Distance apart 40 miles. Since the ship's route runs south of the lower line
of Route A, the area between 400 20' N and 420 N eastwards up the coast
will also be prohibited for attacks on single vessels.
2) U 620 and 442 have not replied in spite of repeated orders to report.
U 442 last reported on the 9th February a destroyer in CG 4861 and U 620
on the 12th February two destroyers in CF 9266. Both boats had been
ordered to return, but up to now have not arrived in their port of
destination. They were probably lost on operations on the south-bound
Gibraltar convoy, sighted by U 569 on the 12th or 13 February in area CG
40. On the night of the 13th February several U-boats were attacked by
aircraft (British Intelligence reports).
V. Reports of Success:
U 107 - 1 ship 7,801 GRT
753 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT
604 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT
522 - 1 ship 8,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
23. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DG 30) U 218 - Op(DG 30) U 454 - Op(BD 40) U 600 -
BD 47
66 - Op(DG 30) 223 - Op(BD 40) 456 - BE 69 603 - Op(BD 40)
68 - DP 12 225 - Op(BD 40) 459 - DT 28 604 - Op(BD 40)
84 - Op(BD 60) 226 - BD 42 460 - BD 42 606 - Op(BD 40)
87 - Op(DG 30) 228 - AL 15 461 - CF 73 607 - BD 42
89 - Op(AK 51) 229 - AN 30 462 - BE 97 608 - Op(AK 10)
 91 - Op(BD 40) 230 - AL 18 468 - Op(BD 40) 614 - BF 44
92 - Op(BD 40) 258 - CE 16 504 - Op(DG 30) 615 - BE 52
103 - CF 58 264 - CE 13 506 - Op(KZ) 616 - AK 66
106 - CF 61 303 - Op(BD 40) 508 - BF 54 618 - BF 49
107 - CF 49 332 - BD 52 509 - Op(GR) 621 - Op(BD 40)
108 - BF 49 358 - Op(BD 40) 510 - Op(EO) 623 - Op(BD 40)
118 - BF 49 359 - Op(AK 10) 511 - CF 73 628 - Op(BD 40)
119 - Island 376 - Op(AK 10) 513 - BF 71 633 - AN 30
135 - Op(AK 10) 377 - Op(AK 50) 515 - BF 72 634 - AE 83
155 - DE 39 382 - DG 33 516 - Op(GR) 638 - Op(AK 10)
156 - Op(EO) 383 - BD 42 518 - Op(FJ) 641 - AN 30
160 - Op(GR) 402 - BF 68 521 - Op(DG 30) 642 - AN 30
172 - BF 49 403 - BD 43 522 - DG 38 653 - BD 48
175 - BF 55 405 - Op(AK 10) 523 - AK 03 659 - Op(AK 50)
180 - AL 01 409 - BD 56 525 - BD 42 664 - BD 55
182 - Op(KP) 410 - CF 52 526 - AL 44 665 - AN 30
183 - DD 66 432 - BD 65 527 - AL 18 707 - BD 42
185 - CD 83 435 - BE 21 529 - Op(AK 50) 709 - AE 83
186 - Op(BD 40) 437 - CE 13 530 - AN 30 753 - BD 55
190 - AN 30 406 - BF 58 558 - Op(DG 30) 757 - BF 58
202 - Op(DG 30) 439 - BF 54 566 - Op(AK 50) 758 - BD 56
211 - BE 65 445 - CF 55 569 - FG 32 759 - Op(AK 10)
214 - BF 52 447 - AN 30 590 - BF 58 D 3 - AE 91
217 - BF 52 448 - Op(AK 10) 591 - Op(BD 60)
- 107 -
1168
On Return Passage: U 108 - 118 - 175 - 186 - 211 - 214 - 223 - 226 -
303 - 358 - 383 - 403 - 454 - 456 - 459 - 525 - 606 - 607 - 614 - 707 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 217 - Brest; U 402 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 338 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Convoys Nos. 10, 11 and 12 see IVa.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: EE 4877, EE 4799, EC 9271. Reports of attacks
from DN 7388 and EC 6697. Report of torpedoing of two ships of a
convoy. Position unknown.
d) None.
IV. Current Operation:
a) Convoy No. 10:
The weather situation in the area of the convoy was wind W. 2, sea 3 on
the 23rd February midday. Towards evening it freshened to west south
west 5, sea 4. At 1030 U 707 contacted the convoy and reported it
continuously until 0110 on the 24th. Besides this boat the following also
approached the convoy, U 621, 358, 653, 468, 92, 600 and 628. On the
morning of the 24th U 628 reported the convoy in BC 9361.
According to data, the convoy had maintained its mean course of 2500
until 0200 on the 24th. According to the latest report of U 628 it was
proceeding at 8 knots.
There was no air cover with the convoy on the 23rd. 4 boats reported
being depth-charged, U 454 with serious damage, so that the boats had to
turn back. U 303, 223, 186 and 358 also broke off the operation in order
to refuel.
The operation against the convoy is being continued.
Sinkings: Assumed:
Sunk Torpedoed.
U 303 reported at 0245 in BD 4654 5,000 GRT freighter sunk in flames
after a hit 5,000 GRT
U 303 reported at 0331 damaged 4,000 GRT tanker sunk (probably According to aircraft locations, the convoy is about in the same latitude.
without firing) 4,000 GRT A patrol line has been ordered from BC 3995 to BD 4755.
U 606 in BD 4583 6,000 GRT sunk out of a convoy 6,000 GRT In operation: U 758, 664, 591, 84, 432, 409, 753, 332, 383, 226, 607.
U 186 in BD 4835 freighter 7,000 GRT sunk 7,000 GRT The location reports received from the boats show that the majority are
in BD 4835 freighter 6,000 GRT probably sunk 6,000 GRT probably already behind the convoy.
The convoy is awaited towards 1800 on the 25th February in the area of
the patrol line.
- 109 -
Convoy No. 12:
Contact constantly by U 522, which dived for attack at 1540. Since
then contact by U 202 until 2220, then by U 87 until 0820. Convoy route
DG 6239, squares 6191, 5624, 5812.
All the boats contacted the convoy which consisted of 16 large ships in
two lines abreast, with 2 destroyers each as remote escort fore and aft, two
destroyers and two corvettes as close escort. Speed of convoy was 10
knots. Probably convoy bound from Gibraltar to America.
Weather: wind S.E. 2-3, sea 1 - 2, 1/10 - 3/10 clouded, good visibility.
Sinkings: Assumed: In the course of night attacks 5 boats were seen by escorts and attacked
Sunk Torpedoed. with depth charges.
Hits on 2 further vessels of which the same boat reports at 1547 damaged Sinkings:
tanker Eulima 6,207 GRT sunk 6,207 1 torpedoed U 382 2214 1 "Falke" on a bunch of steamers, hits not observed, since
U 223 At 0951 in BD 4559 tanker 6,000 GRT 6,000 submerged. 1 single F.A.T. and a two-fan on 2/8,000 tonners, 3 hits heard.
U 628 0714 in 4564 medium freighter sunk out of convoy 5,000 Sinkings probable.
tanker torpedoed 1 torpedoed
U 621 At 2021 in 4716 3-fan torpedo on type Dalgonia 5,953, hit probable
1 torpedoed
U 707 At 0121 in BC 9328 6,000 GRT ship sunk 6,000 - 109 -
1 steamer torpedoed 1 torpedoed
U 653 At 0116 in BC 6956 4-fan torpedo 1/6,000 GRT sunk 6,000
1/5,000 GRT left burning 5,000
2 further hits heard 1 torpedoed
In all: 11 ships 62,207 GRT 5 ships torpedoed.

Convoy No. 11:

No contact.
1169
 U 202 At 2220 in CG 5624 1 tanker, 1 steamer each 6,000 GRT sunk 2 653 2 ships 11,000 GRT 2 hits
further hits probable. 382 1 ship 8,000 GRT
U 569 At 2230 3 hits on large tanker, effect not observed, since she dived 202 2 ships 12,000 GRT 2 hits
on account of destroyers. 569 1 ship 8,000 GRT

b) 1) Group "Burggraf" will be newly assembled. U 228 - 527 - 230 -

523 - 526 - 616 - 435 and 615 will form a reconnaissance line from AK ---------------------------------------------------
6289 to AK 9398, course 2400, day's run 90 miles, at 0800 on the 25th ---------------
February. Boats arriving earlier have freedom of action outside the patrol
line up to the time of departure. U 615 will, on account of her great 24. February 1943.
distance away, only arrive during the course of the 25th. The group will
cover the area south of Group "Neptun" which is cruising about 300 miles
further in the west. I. U 43 - Op(DG 50) U 218 - Op(DG 52) U 448 - Op(AJ 30) U 591 -
2) Group "Robbe" will be instructed regarding convoy movements and Op(BD 40)
action in the area off Gibraltar. 66 - Op(DG 50) 223 - BD 43 454 - BD 81 600 - Op(BC 93)
3) Boats cruising in the American and Caribbean area will receive 68 - DO 38 225 - Op(BC 60) 456 - BF 40 603 - BC 93
instructions regarding the traffic situation and escorts. They will be 84 - Op(BD 40) 226 - BD 43 459 - DT 63 604 - Op(BC 60)
disposed in the following operational areas: U 183 - DL 60, 90, DM 40 87 - Op(DG 50) 228 - AK 03 460 - BD 43 606 - Op(BC 60)
and 70. Route to these areas permitted through the Florida Straits. U 155 89 - Op(AK 40) 229 - AN 20 461 - CF 73 607 - BD 43
- DM middle and north third. U 68 - DN 70, 80, DM 90, EB 30, EC 10. 91 - BC 93 230 - AL 41 462 - BE 88 608 - Op(AJ 30)
U 185 - CA 87. If the traffic situation is unfavorable, freedom of action to 92 - Op(BC 93) 258 - CE 13 468 - Op(BC 93) 614 - BF 40
northeast and southwest. 103 - CF 92 264 - CE 13 504 - Op(DG 50) 615 - BE 16
4) U 180 will proceed over BD 80 and is to take over there from U 462, 106 - CF 58 303 - BD 43 506 - Op(KZ) 616 - AK 60
60 cbm. fuel and the casks for special purposes. 107 - CF 83 332 - Op(BD 40) 508 - BF 48 618 - BF 40
c) 1) Rendezvous U 461 and 511 for handing over of Radar interception 108 - BF 61 338 - AD 70 509 - Op(GR) 621 - Op(BC 93)
cables carried out.
2) U 403, 525, 607, 226, 283 refueled from U 460.
d) None.
- 110 -
V. Reports of Success:
U 303 2 ships 9,00 GRT
603 1 ship 6,000 GRT
186 2 ships 13,000 GRT 2 hits
223 2 ships 12,207 GRT
628 1 ship 5,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed
701 1 ship 6,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed
1170

U 118 - BF 40 U 358 - BD 43 U 510 - Op(EO) U 623 - Op(BC 60)
119 - Island 359 - Op(AJ 30) 511 - CF 73 628 - Op(BC 60)
135 - Op(AJ 30) 376 - Op(AK 40) 513 - CF 37 633 - AN 20
155 - DE 61 377 - Op(AK 40) 515 - BF 70 634 - AE 84
156 - Op(EO) 382 - Op(DG 50) 516 - Op(GR) 638 - Op(AK 40)
160 - Op(GR) 383 - BD 43 518 - Op(FJ) 641 - AN 20
172 - BF 70 403 - BD 43 521 - Op(DG 50) 642 - AN 20
175 - BF 61 405 - AJ 30 522 - Op(DG 50) 653 - Op(BC 93)
180 - AL 44 406 - BF 81 523 - AK 60 659 - Op(AK 40)
182 - Op(KP) 409 - Op(BD 40) 525 - BD 43 664 - Op(BD 40)
183 - BD 91 410 - CF 64 526 - AK 60 665 - AN 20
185 - CD 76 432 - Op(BC 40) 527 - AL 45 707 - Op(BC 93)
186 - BD 43 435 - AL 84 529 - Op(AL 40) 753 - Op(BD 14)
190 - AN 20 437 - CE 13 530 - AN 20 757 - BF 80
202 - Op(DG 50) 439 - BF 40 558 - Op(DG 50) 758 - Op(BD 40)
211 - BF 40 445 - CF 67 566 - Op(AK 40) 759 - Op(AJ 30)
214 - BF 52 447 - AN 20 569 - Op(DG 50) D 3 - AF 72
590 - BF 40
On Return Passage: U 108 - 118 - 175 - 186 - 211 - 214 - 223 - 226 -
303 - 358 - 383 - 403 - 454 - 456 - 459 - 525 - 606 - 607 - 614 - 707 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 214 - Brest; U 108 - 175 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 86 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 10, 11 and 12 see No. IVa.
2) U 160 has been in the Capetown area since the 14th February and, in
this area as well as cruising from GQ 55 over GQ 93 to GR 95, found no
traffic. Boat sank the steamer "Roger P. Taney, 6,800 GRT in GF 2224 on
the 8th February, course 2500 from Capetown to New York.
1171
3) U 513 sighted a hospital ship on the 22nd February with course 1600
in BE 9681 and single vessels with south-easterly course in BE 9599.
Further, U 462 reported a single vessel in BD 9359 with southerly course.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CF 6564, FC 85, BF 5518, CJ 7729.
U-boats were attacked in BC 9248, BC 9253.
U-boat attack in CD 1496, BC 9350.
Aircraft reported eddy effect in BF 4756 and further eddy with
periscope in BF 4515.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Italian U-boat reported convoy in CG 1778 with course 3400, speed
12 knots. German boats were ordered to operate against it as far as
possible but not to pursue it.
- 111 -
2) Convoy No. 10:
In the area of the convoy on the 24th the weather situation by day was
particularly calm, wind N.E. 1, visibility 10 miles. It was particularly dark
before the moon rose which made contact with the convoy very difficult,
then there was bright moonlight towards 0300. By day, contact was
maintained by U 603 and was reported by this boat, at 2124 for the last
time in BC 9186. Before darkness U 621, U 600 and U 628 also came up
to the convoy, only U 628 of these being able to maintain contact. At 0639
U 628 reported the convoy in BC 5987. U 91 also contacted the convoy at
0414 in 9175. In the first half of the night contact was maintained for the
most part only by hydrophone fixes, but after the moon rose the convoy
was again sighted. According to reports from U 628, which reported the
convoy further to the N.W. than the other boats, it appeared that there were
two separate convoy groups. This was confirmed by two reports from U
603 which assumed the convoy to be divided. U 603 reported at midday
on the 24th a bunch of 7 steamers while U 92 had definitely seen during
underwater attack a bunch of 5 steamers. The two groups could not be
distinguished exactly according to dead reckoning. On the 24th by day
and in the night of the 25th, there were reports of air cover with the
convoy. One boat was attacked by aircraft. 4 boats reported being
pursued and depth-charged. U 604 being obliged to retire for repairs
owing to considerable depth-charge damage.
Sinkings: Sunk Torpedoed
U 600 reported at 0735 in BC 9359 hit on medium freighter
torpedoed
U 628 reported at 0813 4-fan and stern
2 hits on large 3-masted freighter 7,000 GRT
2 hits on medium freighter 4,000
1 hit on medium freighter 1 torpedoed
U 92 reported at 1050 in BC 9375
passenger freighter 8,000 GRT sunk 8,000
U 621 reported at 1930 2 hits observed on steamer (probably another boat)
5,000
4/24,000 2 torpedoed
U 603, 628, 468, 600, 653, 621 and U 91 are operating now against the
rest of the convoy. The convoy was, at 0639 on the 25th February, in BC
5987.
3) Convoy No. 11:
Since it is assumed that the convoy will deviate to the north in order to
avoid the area of the boats operating against Convoy No. 10, the patrol
line will be moved northward, that is from BC 3685 to BC 6935. The
boats will take up positions in the following sequence: U 332, 432, 753,
226, 383, 758, 607, 664, 84, 409, 591.
- 112 -
4) Convoy No. 12:
In spite of avoiding movements to the south, contact was maintained
1 by U 521, 202, 504, 66 until 0216. Convoy route DG 5812, 5713, 4922,
4892. Mean course of the convoy 2500 cruising speed 10 knots. Course
leads on to the Windward Passage.
U 558 reported, in 5389 at 2345 on the 23rd February, a damaged
freighter sighted and a stopped tanker sunk, 9,000 GRT.
U 87 broke off operations owing to shortage of lubricating oil.
U 522 has not reported since underwater attack, in spite of orders to do
so.
U 382, 218, 43, 558 were attacked by night, detected by destroyers and
attacked with depth-charges. U 382 heavily damaged, withdrew for
repairs.
Further boats were driven off by destroyers. U 202 and U 521 fired
but unsuccessfully.
Weather: Wind east southeast 3, sea 2, 3/4 clouded, good visibility.
Conditions for detection by destroyers were apparently particularly
favorable.
Sinkings:
U 558 reported later: On 23rd February at 2345 a damaged steamer
sighted and a stopped tanker of 9,000 GRT sunk. DG 5385.
b) 1) Owing to the late arrival of U 230 Group "Burggraf" will only take
up the ordered reconnaissance patrol at 0800 on the 26th February.
2) Group "Neptun" is proceeding and will pass position line from AJ
3742 to AJ 9367 on the 26th February, and position line from AJ 5331 to
1172
9515 on the 27th. According to their dead reckoning a convoy may be
expected about the 25th February in the patrol line.
3) U 106 will proceed to DF 60 at slow speed. After refueling from U
461 operations in the American area are intended.
4) U 513 will temporarily patrol area DH 12, 15 and 18 until operations
are decided upon.
5) As several boats in the Gibraltar disposition are operating against
Convoy No. 12, a new distribution is ordered, as follows: U 107 - CG 81
and 84, U 511 - CG 82 and 85. U 410 - CG 83 and 86. U 103 - CG 89, DJ
21 and 24. U 445 - CG 91, 94, 97, DJ 22 and eastward up to own
minefield. (Western line of this minefield lies 1.5 miles eastward CG
9585).
c) None.
d) 1) The "Hohenfriedberg" which is expected home was sighted by U
437 at 0940 in CE 1629. Since U 264 reported that she could only proceed
for another 10 miles, U 437 and 258 took up position 30 degrees to port
and starboard. U 264 remaining close to the ship. The following boats
took up their position as a stationary wing protection with the order to
report immediately on all enemy sightings and any substantial air
reconnaissance: U 515 - CG 1421,
- 113 -
U 172 - CG 8965 and U 508 - CG 9488. Depth 30 miles.
2) In Route A the area between 50 South and 400 North now open for
attack on single vessels.
1173
V. Reports of Success:
U 160 1 ship 6,800 GRT
600 1 ship torpedoed
628 2 ships 11,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed
92 1 ship 8,000 GRT
? 2 hits
558 1 ship 9,000 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
25. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DG 40) U 225 - Op(BC 91) U 456 - BF 50 U 600 -
Op(BC 83)
66 - Op(DG 48) 226 - Op(BC 39) 459 - DH 72 603 - Op(BC 59)
68 - DO 44 228 - Op(AK 62) 460 - BD 43 604 - Op(BC 67)
84 - Op(BC 66) 229 - AF 76 461 - DG 26 606 - Op(BC 91)
86 - BF 50 230 - AL 01 462 - BD 81 607 - Op(BC 63)
87 - Op(DG 51) 258 - CE 32 468 - Op(BC 82) 608 - Op(AJ 41)
89 - Op(AK 47) 264 - CE 34 504 - Op(DG 48) 614 - BF 50
91 - Op(BC 58) 303 - BD 81 506 - Op(KZ) 615 - AL 77
92 - Op(BC 67) 332 - Op(BC 36) 508 - BF 71 616 - Op(AK 93)
103 - CF 90 338 - AN 36 509 - Op(GR) 618 - BE 60
106 - CF 76 358 - BD 73 510 - Op(EO) 621 - Op(BC 58)
107 - CF 80 359 - Op(AJ 38) 511 - CF 80 623 - Op(BC 91)
118 - BF 50 376 - Op(AK 44) 513 - CF 56 628 - Op(BC 59)
119 - Island 377 - Op(AK 71) 515 - BE 99 633 - AF 79
135 - Op(AJ 63) 382 - Op(DG 48) 516 - Op(KP) 634 - AE 85
155 - DE 49 383 - Op(BD 63) 518 - Op(FJ) 638 - Op(AK 41)
156 - Op(EO) 403 - BD 64 521 - Op(DG 48) 641 - AF 76
160 - BD 43 405 - Op(AJ 38) 522 - Op(DG 40) 642 - AF 78
172 - BE 96 406 - BF 40 523 - Op(AK 69) 653 - Op(BC 86)
180 - AK 96 409 - Op(BC 66) 525 - BD 56 659 - Op(AK 47)
 182 - Op(KP) 410 - CF 60 526 - Op(AK 69) 664 - Op(BC 66)
183 - DO 17 432 - Op(BC 39) 527 - Op(AK 65) 665 - AF 79
185 - CD 74 435 - Op(AK 93 529 - Op(AK 47) 707 - BC 93
186 - BD 73 437 - CE 35 530 - AF 75 709 - AE 87
190 - Op(DG 48) 439 - BE 60 558 - Op(DG 48) 753 - Op(BC 39)
202 - Op(DG 72) 445 - CF 60 566 - Op(AK 44) 757 - BF 40
211 - BF 52 447 - AF 79 569 - Op(DG 48) 758 - Op(BC 63)
218 - Op(DG 48) 448 - Op(AJ 38) 590 - BF 48 759 - Op(AJ 35)
223 - BD 43 454 - BD 73 591 - Op(BC 69) D 3 - AF 79
On Return Passage: U 118 - 186 - 211 - 223 - 226 - 303 - 358 - 383 -
403 - 454 - 456 - 459 - 525 - 606 - 607 - 614 - 707 - D 3.
Entered Port: U 211 - Brest.
Sailed: U 373 - La Pallice; U 666 - 306 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 10, 11 and 12 see IVa.
2) U 410 lost contact, after a 12-hour chase, of a large vessel with two
funnels when the weather suddenly deteriorated. The steamer was
proceeding on a course of 150, speed 16 knots. Last position CF 3549.
- 114 -
3) Situation of U 509: Only one steamer with course 1600 sighted
from 15/21 February in area GR 2948 - 5358. Moderate sea patrol. In
1174
view of own minefield, a nearer approach to the harbor to determine
number of ships and their courses was not possible. Further operations
intended in GR 6477 to 6763.
b) None.
c) U-boat in BC 91 attacked by aircraft (621).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 10:
Weather situation in the area of the convoy was extremely unfavorable
for operations on the 25th and in the night of the 26th. The visibility was
generally less than 300 meters owing to thick fog, sea calm, it only
freshened towards evening to wind S.E. 5. At 1127 on the morning of the
25th U 468 contacted the convoy in BC 8239 and reported on it
continually until 2130. It was also possible to maintain contact by
hydrophone fix, when darkness fell, however, contact was lost in view of
an especially dark night. U 600 and U 621 also came up to the convoy for
a short time.
U 468 reported on the morning of the 25th that the convoy still
consisted of 26 large steamers and tankers, while U 600 reported 4 more
steamers. Possibly this was a new convoy which had joined the one
already attacked.
Sinkings: Assumed Sunk
U 600 reported 4 firings on convoy, 3 detonations heard, no effect
observed.
1 steamer of 5,000 GRT assumed sunk 5,000 GRT
U 628 reports 2 hits obtained, 1 ship of 5,000 GRT assumed sunk 5,000
GRT
1/10,000 GRT
The operation was broken off on the morning of the 26th, upon
reaching the 100 m. line off Newfoundland.
Final Review on Convoy No. 10:
The convoy operation lasted from the 20 - 26 February 1943 over 1,100
miles from AK 96 up to the 100 m. line of the Newfoundland Bank. 19
boats in all were in operation, of which over half only took part in the
operation for about 3 days, since part of them had first to come up from
the north at the beginning of the operation, and another part only arrived
from the west later, coming from supply rendezvous.
The boats succeeded in maintaining contact with the convoy from the
20th onwards, in spite of a comparatively high average speed on a mean
course of 8.2 knots. The operation was made difficult in the last two days
by very poor visibility, with partial fog. During the whole operation the
weather was comparatively calm, so that the convoy on one occasion was
able to get away and, also, conditions were favorable for locations by the
escort. Nothing definite can be stated regarding the size of the convoy.
There seems, according to various reports from the boats and also
according to various locations at the end of the operation, to have
definitely been 2 convoys. The convoy attacked, which must have
comprised about 25 - 30 ships, was reported at the end only to consist of 4
steamers. It is particularly pleasing in connection with this convoy
operation that 13 of the 19 boats operating fired successfully.
- 115 -
Therefore, over half of the boats participated equally in the sinkings.
23 ships in all were sunk, with 132,171 GRT, and a further 7 ships were
torpedoed.
One boat, the U 606 was lost in the operation.At 2000 on the 22nd the
boat reported for the last time in BD 5441, no further reports being
received. It is to be assumed that the boat attacked and made hits since U
303 reported having sighted a tanker and a freighter, both probably having
been fired on, on the morning of the 23rd. Since no other boats had fired
1175
or none can have scored hits at this time they must have been steamers
fired on by U 606. 10 boats were depth-charged by escorts 4 boats of
which had to break off operations on the convoy on account of repairs.
Summarizing, it may be said that this convoy operation was particularly
successful in view of the participation of 13 boats in the direct success. In
spite of normally strong escort and unfavorable conditions for the boats,
success was made possible by stubborn shadowing and continued pursuit
of the convoy. Demands made on the boats were particularly high.
However, the Commanding Officers were for the most part experienced
older men.
Convoy No. 11:
Apart from destroyers reported by U 664 and U 607 nothing was sighted
in the patrol line. On the 26th February at 1034 Group "Sturmbock" was
dispersed. Convoy operation concluded.
Convoy No. 12:
Contact was again made by U 202 in DF 7134 at 0912, which was
maintained until 2118 by U 202, 66, 558, and 504. Convoy route DF
7121, 9345, 9264. At 0430 the convoy was again detected in DF 9124 by
U 558, and reported on until 0820. Position of convoy at 0820 by U 558,
DF 8365.
The following broke off operations: U 218 owing to rudder damage, U
382 owing to heavy damage from depth-charges. U 202, U 43 owing to
fuel shortage.
The question of approach is becoming increasingly difficult in view of
very watchful, numerous and scattered escorts.
Sinkings:
U 66 at 2118 on the 25th February in DF 9264 1 certain hit on destroyer,
3 probable hits on convoy.
b) 1) U 68 was withdrawn, in view of faulty radar intercept gear, from the
Windward Passage area where the air cover is very strong, and will
proceed to DN 30 and DO, upper third, as a temporary operational area.
Later operations with additional boats in the outer area of the American
coast are intended. U 185, which was originally to have operated off
Hatteras, will be ordered to the Windward Passage in place of U 68 in
order to keep the former operational area clear before the arrival of a
group of U-boats.
2) U 119 carried out special task of laying a minefield off Reykjavik and
will now proceed to BD 42 to give up her remaining fuel.
c) U 460 has supplied U 223 and 186 the last boats, and will now return.
The whole conduct of supply operations by U 460 was excellent.
- 116 -
d) 1) In view of strong pressure by the Americans on the commander of
the Vichy-controlled Islands in the Caribbean, boats are instructed not to
approach these in cases of emergency owing to danger of internment.
2) U 606 - 225 and U 623 were operating against Convoy 10 and have
not reported up to now in spite of repeated orders to do so. While U 606
certainly reached the convoy and, according to a report from U 92, at 2222
on the 22nd February after successfully attacking, was probably machine-
gunned and subsequently pursued and depth-charged, it is not certain that
the other two boats contacted the convoy at all. They were ordered to
report on the weather for the first time on the 22nd but did not reply.
Since boats generally report on contacts at once, their loss must have
occurred earlier unless the circumstances are exceptional. 3 boats are
considered lost.
3) U 522 was operating against Convoy No. 12 and reported it last at
1536 on the 23rd February as being in DG 6158. The boat then dived for
daylight attack. She has not reported again although repeatedly ordered to
do so. Loss is probable.
1176
V. Reports of Success:
U 600 1 ship 5,000 GRT
628 1 ship 5,000 GRT
66 1 ship 5,000 GRT
1 destroyer.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
26. February 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DF 90) U 228 - Op(AK 62) U 456 - BF 52 U 600 -
Op(BC 85)
66 - DF 59 229 - AF 75 459 - DG 42 603 - Op(BC 85)
68 - DN 67 230 - AK 66 460 - BD 52 604 - Op(BC 84)
84 - Op(BC 66) 258 - CF 21 461 - DG 27 607 - BC 42
86 - BF 45 264 - CF 21 462 - BD 81 608 - Op(AJ 65)
87 - DG 27 303 - BD 49 468 - Op(BC 75) 614 - BF 64
89 - Op(AJ 93) 306 - AO 40 504 - Op(DF 59) 615 - Op(AK 93)
91 - BC 91 332 - Op(BC 36) 506 - Op(KZ) 616 - Op(AK 93)
92 - Op(BD 71) 338 - AN 31 508 - Op(BE 94) 618 - BE 64
103 - CG 74 358 - BD 73 509 - GR 83 621 - Op(BC 73)
106 - CE 99 359 - Op(AJ 62) 510 - Op(EO) 628 - BC 67
107 - CF 95 373 - BF 91 511 - CF 96 633 - AF 75
118 - BF 52 376 - Op(AJ 68) 513 - CF 85 634 - AE 87
119 - AK 03 377 - AJ 93 515 - Op(CG 14) 638 - Op(AJ 65
135 - Op(AJ 65) 382 - Op(DG 88) 516 - Op(KZ) 641 - AF 71
155 - DE 47 383 - Op(BC 63) 518 - FJ 69 642 - AF 74
156 - Op(EO) 403 - BE 44 521 - Op(DG 90) 653 - Op(BC 76)
160 - Op(KY) 405 - Op(AJ 29) 523 - Op(AK 69) 659 - Op(AJ 69)
172 - Op(BE 89) 406 - BE 69 525 - BE 74 664 - Op(BC 66)
180 - AL 93 409 - Op(BC 66) 526 - Op(AK 69) 665 - AF 75
182 - Op(KP) 410 - CF 39 527 - Op(AK 65) 666 - AO 40
183 - DN 65 432 - Op(BC 39) 529 - Op(AJ 93) 707 - BD 72
 185 - CC 97 435 - Op(AK 93) 530 - AF 71 709 - AL 31
186 - BD 13 437 - CF 24 558 - Op(DF 67) 753 - Op(BC 39)
190 - AF 71 439 - BE 27 566 - Op(AJ 68) 757 - BE 61
202 - Op(DF 59) 445 - CG 75 569 - Op(DF 67) 758 - Op(BC 63)
218 - Op(DG 47) 447 - AF 75 590 - BE 59 759 - Op(AJ 29)
223 - BD 43 448 - Op(AJ 62) 591 - Op(BC 69) D 3 - KF 70
226 - Op(BC 39) 454 - BD 81
- 117 -
On Return Passage: U 43 - 87 - 92 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 258 -
264 - 303 - 358 - 382 - 383 - 403 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 525 - 558 - 569
- 604 - 607 - 628 - 707 - 753.
Entered Port: U 456 - Brest; U 614 - St. Nazaire; U 118 - La Pallice.
Sailed: - . -
a) Convoy No. 12:
At 1350 U 504 reported in DF 8354 contacting an escort far ahead. At
1625 U 569 was driven off by starboard remote escorts and at 1755
reported last enemy position as in DF 8292.
U 504 diving for underwater attack, reported at 2032 no intercept.
Contact was therefore broken off and not found again.
U 569 damaged by depth-charges, broke off operations owing to fuel
shortage.
The following are now operating: U 66, 504, 521. At 1731 on the 27th
February U 66 reported sinking a single vessel on south-westerly course,
in DF 7587. This vessel was apparently separated from the convoy. U
504 reported a destroyer in DR 1111, course 250 at 2028, and at 2121 she
was driven off after several hours' pursuit with hydrophone contact. U 66
withdrew to take on torpedoes and for repairs.
U 521 reported faulty port Diesel maximum speed 11 knots, U 504 fuel
19 cbm. Convoy operation broken off owing to poor prospects of success.
The strong and efficient remote escort of the convoy made operations by
the boats difficult. On account of particularly good radar location by
destroyers, conditions were most unfavorable. The following report was
made by radio "Group Rochen". 1 destroyer and 8 steamers of the convoy
were sunk and further hits made on the units in tenacious and difficult
attacks - escorts were strong and efficient, stormy conditions favored
defense. This success proves that the U-boat can win against all odds
when commanded by an efficient officer and a good crew. The fight was
hard.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. - 118 -

III. Reports on the Enemy:

a) Convoy No. 12 see IVa.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DF 99
SSS reported from a convoy in unknown position.
d) None.

IV. Current Operations:

1177
 This convoy operation is concluded with the order to boats to refuel U 66 - 1 ship 4,312 GRT.
from U 461.
b) 1) The boats received the following orders upon conclusion of ---------------------------------------------------
operations against Convoy No. 10: U 468 - 653 - 91 - 600 - 603 - 332 - ---------------
753 - 621 - will refuel from U 461 and then go into operation again. U
607 - 226 - 383 - 358 - 454 and 707 will refuel for economical return
speed.
2) U 604 and 753 will also have to return owing to extensive damage. - 119 -
3) Boats U 382 - 558 - 202 - 43 and 569, breaking off operations against
Convoy No. 12, will refuel from U 461 in DF 6928.
4) There is a convoy expected in the patrol line of Group "Neptun"
during the day, according to special intercept message. The Group will
remain as a patrol line in position line from AJ 2985 to AJ 9377. In order
to intercept the convoy a higher speed is permitted.
5) Group "Sturmbock" has waited in vain for Convoy No. 11 in patrol
line. The boats needing fuel will proceed via U 462 home, U 432 - 758 -
664 - 84 - 409 and 591 will form Group "Wildfang" and, at economical
cruising speed, take up patrol line from AJ 9856 to BC 3562. 27. February 1943.
6) U 513 will proceed to CA 50 after rendezvous with U 459.
c) U 382 and 87 have refueled from U 461 and will return.
d) 1) Blockade runner "Hohenfriedberg" which was escorted by 3 U- I. U 43 - DF 91 U 228 - Op(AK 64) U 448 - Op(AJ 61) U 590 - BE
boats was detected by a British aircraft at 0945 in CF 2467, and according 51
to report by U 264, sunk by a heavy cruiser of the "London" class at 1750 66 - Op(DF 82) 229 - AF 71 454 - BD 81 591 - Op(BC 38)
in 2433. U 264 had before this attacked the cruiser with a 4-fan torpedo 68 - DN 14 230 - Op(AK 67) 459 - DH 12 600 - BC 92
but without success. The boat took on all the crew and is returning. U 258 84 - Op(PC 38) 258 - CF 32 460 - BD 61 603 - BC 92
and 437 will remain in the vicinity on return in order to be able to give 86 - BE 60 264 - CF 33 461 - DG 27 604 - BD 81
help in an emergency. Boats U 172 - 515 and 508, which comprised a 87 - DG 27 303 - BD 81 462 - BD 81 607 - BD 81
wing protection, are now free and will proceed to CA 50. 89 - Op(AJ 92) 306 - AN 30 468 - BD 75 608 - Op(AJ 65)
2) U 508 reported towards 1800 having been bombed by a British 91 - BC 93 332 - BD 18 504 - Op(DF 82) 615 - Op(AK 95
aircraft and being unable to dive though able to remain afloat. Pressure 92 - BD 81 338 - AN 20 506 - Op(KZ) 616 - Op(AK 95)
hull has 3 cracks apart from much other damage. Boat is proceeding a 103 - CG 87 358 - BD 81 508 - Op(BE 94) 618 - BE 27
maximum speed to the west. I 525 - 172 - 406 and 590, as medical boat, 106 - DG 25 359 - Op(AJ 64) 509 - Op(GR) 621 - BC 83
have been ordered to go to U 508 to render assistance or to take over the 107 - CG 75 373 - BF 80 510 - Op(EO) 628 - BC 93
crew. 119 - AK 65 276 - Op(AJ 68) 511 - CG 76 633 - AF 71
135 - Op(AJ 64 377 - Op(AJ 96) 513 - Op(DH 10) 634 - AL 24
V. Reports of Success: 155 - DD 92 382 - DG 51 515 - Op(CG 14) 638 - AJ 65
1178
 156 - Op(EO) 383 - BD 81 516 - Op(KZ) 641 - AE 69
160 - Op(KY) 403 - BE 43 518 - Op(FJ) 642 - AE 93
172 - BE 88 405 - Op(AJ 61) 521 - Op(DF 81) 653 - BC 88
180 - AK 98 406 - BE 85 523 - Op(AK 91) 659 - Op(AJ 92)
182 - Op(KP) 409 - Op(BC 38) 525 - BE 73 664 - Op(BC 35)
183 - DN 58 410 - CG 49 526 - Op(AK 91) 665 - AF 71
185 - BE 21 432 - Op(AJ 99) 527 - Op(AK 67) 666 - AN 30
186 - BD 56 435 - Op(AK 95) 529 - Op(AJ 92) 707 - BD 81
190 - AE 68 437 - CF 36 530 - AE 69 709 - AL 23
202 - Op(DF 58) 439 - BE 17 558 - DF 67 753 - BC 41
218 - DG 46 445 - CG 85 566 - Op(AJ 68) 757 - BE 27
223 - BD 62 447 - AF 71 569 - DF 83 758 - Op(BC 35)
226 - BD 1 759 - Op(AJ 29)
D 3 - AN
On Return Passage: U 43 - 87 - 92 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 258 -
264 - 303 -358 - 382 - 383 - 403 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 525 - 558 - 569 -
604 - 607 - 628 - 707 - 753.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 441 - 440 - Brest; U 167 - 221 - St. Nazaire; U 305 - 415 -
Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 13 see IVa:
2) U 607 reported at 1414, 3 destroyers in BD 4533, 2250 speed slow.
At 2100 boat lost contact in BD 4525.
3) U 182 reported: for 3 days in KP 53 at night off harbor entrances 5
Portuguese vessels bound to and from the north. Boat operating up to 35
and 38.
4) U 156 did not encounter any traffic. Moving operational area to ED.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: None.
1179
d) West bound convoy was in DH 4979 at 2000 on the 26th February
course 2600, speed 8 knots.
- 120 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 13 (Group "Neptun"):
Information was only received by Control at 1700, owing to radio
interference in the Greenland area, through a radio repeat by U 405, that U
759 had detected a convoy at 0300, and lost it at 1100 in AJ 2839, 300, 7
knots. Boats were on the group frequency provided for this contingency,
communications within the Group at least being guaranteed by this. In
order to clarify the situation, the boats were radioed that Control was
assuming that all "Neptun" boats would operate against this convoy. U
529 and 664 were detailed to repeat radio messages so that Control might
receive information on the course of the operation even, if possible, during
combat. At 1740 U 405 reported destroyers in AJ 2650. According to a
delayed message from U 759 the convoy consisted of numerous steamers
in three wide columns. "Neptun" later received orders that only boats in a
favorable position as regards distance were to continue the operation, and
were to report on this, giving position. The following will definitely be
operating at present: U 759 - 405 - 376 - 608. Probably U 448 - 359 and
135. Owing to unfavorable position, U 638 received orders to break off
operations. Last report at 0618 from U 405: 1 steamer, 3 destroyers
course 600 in AJ 2057 (?) weather, wind S.E. 5, sea 4, snow showers.
b) 1) Group "Neptun" has received orders to continue to take up
reconnaissance patrol and should therefore pass the following position
lines at midnight in each case: 28th February AJ 2977 to 9525, 1st March
from AJ 5523 to 9572, 2nd March from 5728 to 9735.
2) Group "Burggraf" is to pass at 0800 on the 28th February position
line from AK 5855 to 8965.
3) After refueling from U 461 operations are intended, with Group
"Rochen" on the convoy detected by special intercept message.
c) U 513 rendezvous with U 459 carried out.
d) U 508 will be in BD 9595 with U 172, as from 1200 on the 28th for
rendezvous with U 590. All remaining boats operating under U 508 will
be ordered to continue outward passage also U 172 after rendezvous with
U 590.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
The importance of the Tunisian campaign makes it imperative to do
everything possible to interrupt enemy supplies to North Africa.
Operations up to now in the Atlantic to this end have only led initially to
satisfactory results. Later operations off Gibraltar west of the Iberian
Peninsular and further north and south of the Azores have led only to
slight successes. Reasons for this have been set out earlier.
- 121 -
On the orders of the Naval High Command attempts are now to be made
with large boats to intercept supplies off American harbors i.e. off New
York primarily. Prospects of success for this are not particularly favorable
1180
in view of the scarcity of the traffic and the vastness of the area not
covered by air escort and reconnaissance. In spite of this it also must be
attempted.
U 106 - 172 and 513 will proceed to the area off New York as the first
boats on these operations.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
28. February 1943.
I. U 43 - DF 69 U 226 - BD 81 U 441 - BF 54 U 569 - DF 69
66 - DF 73 228 - Op(AK 58) 445 - Op(CG 97) 590 - BE 70
68 - Op(DO) 229 - AE 92 447 - AE 68 591 - Op(AJ 35)
84 - Op(AJ 32) 230 - Op(AK 82) 448 - Op(AJ 53) 600 - BD 72
86 - BE 61 258 - BE 97 454 - BD 81 603 - BD 71
87 - DG 31 264 - BE 97 459 - DH 12 604 - BD 81
89 - Op(AJ 92) 303 - BD 81 460 - BE 44 607 - BD 46
91 - ED 73 305 - AO 40 461 - DF 69 608 - Op(AJ 60)
92 - BD 81 306 - AN 43 462 - BD 81 615 - Op(AK 89)
103 - CG 89 332 - BD 49 468 - DF 73 616 - Op(AK 86)
106 - DG 19 338 - AF 79 504 - DF 73 618 - BE 27
107 - Op(CG 84) 358 - BD 81 506 - Op(KZ) 621 - BC 92
119 - AK 64 359 - Op(AJ 64) 508 - BE 70 628 - BD 72
135 - Op(AJ 64) 373 - BF 72 509 - Op(GR) 633 - AE 92
155 - DD 85 376 - Op(AJ 67) 510 - Op(EO) 634 - AL 18
156 - Op(EO) 377 - Op(AJ 95) 511 - Op(CG 81) 638 - Op(AJ 67)
160 - Op(KY) 382 - DG 26 513 - Op(DH 12) 641 - AE 91
167 - BF 91 383 - BD 81 515 - CF 25 642 - AN 91
172 - BE 70 403 - BE 56 516 - Op(KZ) 653 - BC 94
180 - BD 26 405 - Op(AJ 53) 518 - Op(FJ) 659 - Op(AJ 91
182 - Op(KP) 406 - BE 70 521 - DE 93 664 - Op(AJ 32)
183 - DN 84 409 - Op(AJ 32) 523 - Op(AK 83) 665 - AE 68
185 - DE 18 410 - Op(CG 86) 525 - BE 85 666 - AN 43
186 - BD 69 415 - AO 40 526 - Op(AK 86) 707 - BD 81
 190 - AE 8 432 - Op(AJ 98) 527 - Op(AK 53) 709 - AL 18
202 - DF 69 435 - Op(AK 89) 529 - Op(AJ 95) 753 - BD 49 IV. Current Operations:
218 - DG 28 437 - BE 97 530 - AE 91 757 - BE 12 a) Convoy No. 13:
221 - BF 91 439 - AL 77 558 - DF 69 758 - Op(AJ 98) U 566 reported several hydrophone fixes: 1230 AD 9771 - 3300, 1530 -
223 - BE 44 440 - BF 54 566 - Op(AJ 91) 759 - Op(AJ 53) AD 9751 - 2600, 1815 in 9721 - 00. At 0130 fix on a underwater
D 3 - AN telegraphy. Weather sea 5, misty, wind southeast 5-6. U 405 contacted 5
steamers in AJ 3341 900.
Control considers that reports from U 566 concern the main convoy and
On Return Passage: U 43 - 87 - 92 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 258 - that the 5 steamers reported by U 405 are part of a convoy. At midnight U
264 - 303 - 358 - 382 - 383 - 403 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 525 - 558 - 569 405 reported part of a convoy dispersed with course 600, 11 knots. One
- 604 - 607 - 628 - 707 - 753. steamer was hit twice and left burning. At 1045 on the 1st March U 759
Entered Port: - . - reported unescorted steamer in AK 1132, course northeast probably part of
Sailed: U 130 - Lorient. the convoy. U 709 and 634 were also ordered to operate against the
convoy. The following are returning: U 135 owing to damage and fuel, U
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. 376 owing to serious defects and fuel. At the present there is only contact
with single vessels presumably separated.
III. Reports on the Enemy: b) 1) U 448 - 359 - 638 - 89 - 529 will join Group "WILDFANG" (432 -
a) 1) Convoy No. 13 - see IVa. 758 - 664 - 84 - 409 - 591). The Group is ordered to take up patrol line at
2) U 757 reported a large freighter at 16 knots at 1930 in BE 1991 0800 on the 3rd March from AJ 4686 to 9112. If U 448 - 359 - 529 are,
probable hit by F.A.T. torpedo. however, operating against Convoy No. 13 they should continue the
operation.
- 122 - 2) Group "BURGGRAF" will take up a new patrol line from AJ 9125 to
9687 at 0800 on the 1st March.
3) New objective for U 119 is BD 36.
c) U 358 - 707 - 303 - 604 - 454 have refueled as ordered for return.
d) None.

V. Reports of Success: None.

for Flag Officer Commanding U-

3) U 435 starboard thrust bearing burnt out, repairs 48 hours. On the boats.
20th February group of patrol vessels with aircraft in BF 4234. Chief of Operations.
b) None. (Signed): GODT.
c) U-boat sightings: AL 9885.
d) None.
1181

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 March 1943
PG30319
1. March 1943.
I. U 43 - DF 69 U 223 - BE 54 U 440 - BF 40 U 569 - DG 43
66 - DF 82 226 - BD 81 441 - BF 40 590 - BD 95
68 - Op(DO) 228 - Op(AK 81) 445 - Op(CG 97) 591 - Op(AJ 35)
84 - Op(AJ 32) 229 - AE 91 447 - AE 91 600 - BD 81
86 - BE 28 230 - Op(AK 84) 448 - Op(AJ,AK) 603 - BD 81
87 - CF 75 258 - BD 81 554 - BD 83 604 - BD 68
89 - Op(AJ, AK) 264 - BF 70 459 - CF 91 607 - BD 56
91 - BD 81 303 - BD 81 460 - BE 54 608 - Op(AK 10)
92 - BD 81 305 - AN 30 461 - DR 69 615 - Op(BD 21)
103 - Op(CG 89) 306 - AF 87 462 - BD 81 616 - Op(AK 88)
106 - DG 41 332 - BD 81 468 - BD 81 618 - BE 12
107 - Op(CG 84) 338 - AF 72 504 - DF 82 621 - BD 71
119 - AK 83 358 - BF 70 506 - Op(KZ) 628 - BD 81
130 - BF 50 359 - Op(AJ,AK) 508 - BD 95 633 - AE 83
135 - Op(AJ,AK) 373 - BE 60 509 - Op(GR) 634 - AL 19
155 - DD 79 376 - Op(AK 10) 510 - Op(EO) 638 - Op(AJ 60)
156 - Op(EO) 377 - Op(AK 10) 511 - Op(CG 86) 641 - AE 81
160 - Op(KY) 382 - CE 99 513 - Op(DH 10) 642 - AE 85
167 - BF 80 383 - BD 81 515 - CE 63 653 - BD 71
172 - BD 95 403 - BF 54 516 - Op(KZ) 659 - Op(AJ,AK)
180 - BD 54 405 - Op(AK 10) 518 - Op(FJ) 664 - Op(AJ 32)
182 - Op(KP) 406 - BD 66 521 - DF 73 665 - AE 83
1182
183 - DN 78 409 - Op(AJ 32) 523 - Op(AK 84) 666 - AF 87
185 - DD 63 410 - Op(CG 86) 525 - BF 91 707 - BD 81
186 - BE 49 415 - AN 30 526 - Op(AK 88) 709 - AK 63
190 - AE 85 432 - Op(AJ 98) 527 - Op(AK 81) 753 - BD 81
202 - DF 69 435 - Op(BD 13) 529 - Op(AJ,AK) 757 - AL 97
218 - DG 31 437 - BF 70 530 - AE 85 758 - Op(AJ 98)
221 BF 80 439 AL 71 558 - DF 69 D 3 - AO
566 - Op(AK 10) 759 - Op(AK 10)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 87 - 92 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 258 -
264 - 303 - 358 - 382 - 383 - 403 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 525 - 558 - 569
- 604 - 607 - 628 - 707 - 753.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 444 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 13 see para IVa.
2) U 510 reports absence of traffic from area EO 66 to EP 73, and slight
air activity. Owing to the breakdown of "Metox" the intended operations
in the lower section of ED are doubtful. The oil track experienced earlier
has not yet been eliminated.
3) U 218 - on the return passage owing to rudder breakdown - sighted
an eastbound convoy at 1527, speed 8-10 knots in CE 8688. Shortly
afterwards the boat was beaten off and at 1800 lost sight of the convoy
during a squall. Two steamer masts were sighted, a smoke trail and a light
grey two-funnel destroyer.
U 513 presumably had contact with the same group at 1230
- 124 -

on CE 8989 and also lost it. Both boats continue their passage.
Operation was not possible as there were no other boats in the vicinity.
4) U 511 reported convoy on a course of 3100 in CG 8433 at 2352.
Boats of the Group "Robbe" who should have been able to attack the same
night were ordered to operate. U 511 was fired at from smoke cover in
CG 8433. Contact was lost in the subsequent hydrophone activity. No
further reports were received from any of the boats. The operation was
broken off.
5) U 406 pursued an isolated vessel on a course of 2000, speed 15 knots
in BD 3938. Contact was lost after an eight hour chase.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 9319, AK 3162, LK 5440, BE 5560, BE 8452,
BE 5553, FJ 85.
SOS from unidentified American steamer in AD 8548 (U 634)
reporting U-boat attack in FJ 8563.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 13:
Isolated messages: U 405 sank a motorship of 9,000 GRT similar to
type Perthshire, at 0039 on 1.3 in AK 1385. It subsequently sighted
another steamer with destroyers in AK 1383, very low speed, and at 1355
a suspected "Q-boat" on a variable course of 00 - 2700. Further the boat
chased 2 large steamers on a course of 2500 at 1900 in AK 1442, one of
which sank at 2056 suddenly without an explosion. The pursuit of the
second ship continues.
U 759 chased large steamer on a course of approx. 600 and speed 11
knots at 1150 from AK 1133 to AD 7859. After a single miss is broke off
operations owing to Diesel damage. U 634 operated on this ship from AK
3171 and sank it in AD 8264 after three hits. According to call sign the
"Mary Weather Sayis" of 6,800 GRT.
1183
U 566 did not establish contact in spite of the previous hydrophone
bearings and continued further operations on presumed convoy course of
900.
At 1321, U 608 encountered a westbound convoy in AK 1328. At the
same time, U 376 chased a tanker on a westerly course in AK 1191 and
sighted in the meantime another steamer group in AK 1319. The boat
presumes this to be the southerly part of U 608's convoy. The general
course is 250, speed 8 knots.The Command conjectures that these are 2
different convoy sections. "Neptun" boats have received orders to operate
on the target at the most favorable range. Both boats have apparently great
differences in positions. U 608 pursued its group via AK 1347 to AD 9861
and was beaten off by destroyers at 2230 in AD 9852. The last course was
west.
According to a possible new fix, U 376's convoy was in AK 1324 on a
southwesterly course at 2100. This is a fast group of 10 steamers who
made a strong deviation to the north as far as AK 1172 at night ad then
proceeded to the southwest. The boat was beaten off by the apparent
extremely strong and constantly attacking escort.
At 0230 contact was finally lost and was not re-established
- 125 -
until morning.
b) 1) On the supposition that the replenishing of supplies from U 461 was
carried out before the evening of 2.3, U 504, 66, 43, 202, 558, 106 and U
521 are incorporated in Group "Tümmler" and disposed in patrol channels
from DF 6899 to DS 1125 at 0000 on 3.3. Interception of the convoy
made known on 27.2 in a Radio Intelligence report (special). The boat
was directed to maintain strict wireless silence, also the Group "Wildfang"
and "Bürggraf".
2) U 68 received the ops. area center and eastern third of grid EC after
repairs to its "Metox" apparatus have been carried out.
3) U 439 is operating temporarily in grid AK 62 until the arrival of
further boats and the disposition of a patrol channel.
c) None.
d) U D 3 is detailed as training ship for the home front.
V. Reports of Success:
U 405 - 2 ships 18,000 GRT
U 634 - 1 ship 6,800 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
2. March 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DF 92) U 223 - BE 64 U 440 - BE 65 U 558 - Op(DF 95)
66 - DF 91 226 - BD 81 441 - BE 66 566 - Op(AK 10)
68 - Op(DO 45) 228 - Op(AK 71) 444 - BF 91 569 - DG 25
84 - Op(AJ 86) 229 - AE 88 445 - Op(CG 97) 590 - BD 95
86 - BE 13 230 - Op(AK 74) 447 - AE 84 591 - Op(AJ 94)
87 - CF 57 258 - BF 80 448 - Op(AJ) 600 - BD 81
89 - AJ 55 264 - BF 80 454 - BD 93 603 - BD 81
91 - BD 81 303 - BD 93 459 - CF 62 604 - BE 47
92 - BE 61 305 - AN 31 460 - BE 59 607 - BD 65
103 - Op(CG 89) 306 - AF 75 461 - DF 91 608 - Op(AK 10)
106 - Op(DF 96) 332 - BD 81 462 - BD 81 615 - Op(AK 78)
107 - Op(CG 87) 338 - AF 47 759 - Op(AK 10) 616 - Op(AK 74)
119 - BD 31 358 - BD 93 468 - BD 81 618 - AL 75
130 - BF 40 359 - Op(AK 10) 504 - DF 91 621 - BD 81
135 - AK 29 373 - BE 56 506 - Op(KZ) 628 - BD 21
155 - DO 13 376 - AK 14 508 - BD 95 633 - AE 85
1184
156 - Op(ED 99) 377 - Op(AK 10) 509 - Op(GR) 634 - AK 35Op
160 - Op(KY) 758 - OP(AJ 82) 510 - Op(EO) 638 - Op(AJ 50)
176 - BF 70 382 - CF 73 511 - Op(CG 86) 641 - AE 87
172 - BD 95 383 - BD 81 513 - Op(DH 10) 642 - AE 87
180 - BD 81 403 - BF 52 515 - CE 26 653 - BD 81
182 - Op(KP) 405 - Op(AK 10) 516 - Op(KZ) 659 - Op(AK 10)
183 - DM 98 406 - BD 36 518 - Op(FJ) 664 - Op(AJ 83)
757 - AL 84 409 - Op(AJ 86) 521 - Op(DF 97) 665 - AE 87
185 - DD 67 410 - Op(CG 86) 523 - Op(AK 74) 666 - AF 76
186 - BE 58 415 - AN 43 525 - BF 54 707 - BD 93
190 - AE 79 432 - Op(AJ 82) 526 - Op(AK 74) 709 - AK 35
202 - Op(DF 96) 435 - Op(AK 78) 527 - Op(AK 71) 753 - BD 81
218 - CF 75 437 - BF 80 529 - Op(AJ)
221 - BF 70 439 - AK 66 530 - AE 79
- 126 -
On Return Passage: U 43 - 87 - 92 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 258 -
264 - 303 - 358 - 382 - 383 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 525 - 558 - 569 - 604
- 607 - 628 - 707 - 753.
Entered Port: U 403 - Brest.
Sailed: U 336 - Brest; U 333 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
 a) 1) Convoy No. 13 see para IVa.
2) U 518 sighted a convoy on an easterly course, speed 8 knots in FJ
8719 at 1400 on 28.2. All together 18 empty steamers, 5 escort vessels.
The boat attacked and sank a freighter of 7,000 GRT in FJ 9411. In other
attacks with 14 electrical torpedoes, under good firing conditions there
were 8 failures owing to erratic depth keeping. Set depth 2 and 3 inches,
seaway 1, slight swell.
In the course of 2.3. U 518 was continually forced to submerge by
non-stop air activity, and broke off the pursuit owing to the hopeless
position.
Situation:
No traffic was confirmed apart from the reported convoy during a 7
day search in FJ 80. There was a slight surface but strong systematic air
patrol. Radar activity off Bahia. Further operations are intended in FJ 30.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BF 5537 (U 525) and ED 97. U-boat was attacked
in ED 98.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 13:
In order to obtain a clear picture of the intentions of the boats, they
were requested to send a situation report. Subsequently they received the
following orders: U 634 and 566 were to make for AJ 69 at economical
cruising speed. Both boats are so far astern that pursuit of the convoy was
pointless. U 448, 359, and 659 continued to operate on a convoy course of
2300 and 2500 with a passage speed of 7 to 10 knots. U 608 and 377
broke off ops owing to fuel shortage, without having established contact,
and are proceeding to supply point, U 376 to Western France without
replenishment. U 405 also had no contact. A clear report of the numbers
and size of the ships sunk is requested. Search for the convoy continues.
No new sightings up to morning. U 709's wireless transmitter has broken
down and it operates independently from now on (confirmed subsequently
from report of 5.3.).
- 127 -
1185
b) 1) Owing to the deployment of U 448 and 359 on the convoy
operation, Group "Wildfang" is distributed to new patrol channels from AJ
5713 to AJ 9112. Order: U 638, 89, 529, 432, 758, 664, 84, 409, and 591.
2) U 332 and 603 have taken on supplies. They are to join the Group
"Bürggraf" and extend the patrol channel as far as AJ 9966.
3) New position for boats supplied by U 461 for further operations is
BC 33. Reinforcing of Group "Bürggraf" is proposed.
4) To be occupied as temporary ops. area: U 618 = AK 65, U 757 = AK
69. The disposition of a channel in AK 66 is proposed with the following
boats also: U 373, 190, 530, 642, 641, 665, 447, 633 and U 229.
c) The following have taken on supplies from U 462, U 332, 603, U 628
(Fu.M.B.) on 28.2., U 383, 753, 226 and 91 on 1.3. Amount in tanker 384
cubic meters, provisions for 102 days, 4 torpedoes.
d) 1) U 590 is near U 508 and remains there to assist until it has decided
whether the boat is able to submerge or not. U 172 has filled up and is
now proceeding to the ordered position = CA 50.
2) U 525 was bombed by an a/c in BF 5546 and is unable to submerge.
It proceeded at a speed of 9 knots on the approach to Lorient. 3 fishing
steamers and 2 Junkers 88 were sent to render assistance. The boat put in
to Lorient without further incident.
V. Reports of Success:
U 518 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
3. March 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DF 92) U 226 - BD 81 U 441 - BE 55 U 569 - DG 31
66 - DF 91 228 - Op(AJ 91) 444 - BF 30 590 - BD 95
68 - DO 72 229 - AL 31 445 - CF 10 591 - Op(AJ 91)
84 - Op(AJ 59) 230 - Op(AJ 92) 447 - AE 79 600 - BD 81
86 - BE 11 258 - BF 58 448 - AJ 30 603 - BC 33
87 - CF 53 264 - BF 80 454 - BE 72 604 - BE 73
89 - Op(AJ 57) 303 - BE 49 459 - CG 14 607 - BE 48
91 - BD 41 305 - AF 87 460 - BF 81 608 - AK 17
92 - BE 65 306 - AF 76 461 - DF 91 615 - Op(AJ 96)
103 - Op(CG 89) 332 - BC 35 462 - BD 81 616 - Op(AJ 95)
106 - Op(DF 96) 333 - BF 91 468 - BD 81 618 - AL 47
107 - Op(CG 81) 336 - BF 54 504 - DF 91 621 - BP 81
119 - BD 36 338 - AE 91 506 - Op(KZ) 628 - BD 69
130 - BF 48 358 - BE 72 508 - BD 95 633 - AL 31
135 - AK 58 359 - AJ 34 509 - Op(GR) 634 - AK 31
155 - DN 36 373 - BE 51 510 - Op(EO) 638 - Op(AJ 57)
156 - Op(ED 90) 376 - AK 29 511 - Op(CG 86) 641 - AL 22
160 - Op(KY) 377 - AK 19 513 - CE 75 642 - AL 24
167 - BE 98 382 - CF 55 515 - CE 16 653 - BD 81
- 128 -
3.March 1943. (continued)
1186
I. U 172 - BD 79 U 383 - BD 81 U 516 - Op(KZ) U 659 - AJ 38
180 - BD 81 405 - AJ 32 518 - Op(FJ 84) 664 - Op(AJ 59)
182 - Op(KP) 406 - AK 99 521 - Op(DF 97) 665 - AL 22
183 - DM 89 409 - Op(AJ 59) 523 - Op(AJ 92) 666 - AF 71
185 - DD 85 410 - Op(CG 86) 525 - BF 55 707 - BE 72
186 - BE 68 415 - AF 79 526 - Op(AJ 95) 709 - AK 20
190 - AL 21 432 - Op(AJ 58) 527 - Op(AJ 91) 753 - BD 81
202 - Op(DF 96) 435 - Op(AJ 96) 529 - Op(AJ 58) 757 - AL 47
218 - CF 48 437 - BF 80 530 - AE 87 758 - Op(AJ 58)
221 - BE 92 439 - Op(AK 60) 558 - Op(DF 95) 759 - AK 28
223 - BE 68 440 - BE 50 566 - AK 16
On Return Passage: U 43 - 87 - 92 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 258 -
264 - 303 - 358 - 382 - 383 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 525 - 558 - 569 - 604
- 607 - 628 - 707 - 753.
Entered Port: U 552 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 67 - 524 - Lorient; U 109 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 13:
As contact was not reestablished before nightfall the boats
discontinued the pursuit. See para IVb for the new operations areas.
2) U 373 chased an isolated vessel in EB 1356 on a course of 300, speed
17 knots.
3) U 607 attacked a large northbound isolated freighter, speed 17 knots,
in BE 4564. An acoustic torpedo triple spread was evaded.
4) U 119 was attacked by destroyers in BD 3655, and the wire jumper
was carried away.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: CC 54, CG 4512, ED 9845, BE 5460.
 2) According to reports from Cape Town an unidentified steamer
broadcast a torpedoing report (U 160).
3) "SSS" report from steamer in convoy in unknown position (U 160).
4) Unknown unit reported a/c contact in about CG 4512 and CG 4432
near an escort group.
d) The convoy expected to reach Group "Wildfang" and "Bürggraf's"
patrol channels on 5.3., will probably proceed via the following grids
according to a special Radio Intelligence Report: CA 5227 - 6222 - CB
1585 - 2214 - BB 9565 - AJ 9885.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
- 129 -
b) 1) The following ops areas were occupied after breaking off convoy
operations. U 359 = AJ 53, U 448 = AJ 64, U 659 = AJ 62, U 405 = AJ 66.
The boats are therefore astern of the "Wildfang" channels as pick up
groups and are to operate against the anticipated convoy.
2) U 91 joins Group "Bürggraf" and occupies the position AK 7773 in
the patrol channel. The group therefore consists of 11 boats in the area
extending from AJ 9125 to AK 7773.
3) U 119 is proceeding to BD 29 for the proposed supplying of U 377
and U 608.
4) As the convoy intercepted as a result of special Radio Intelligence
should, at a speed of 8 knots have reached Group "Tümmler's" patrol
channel today, the latter was to proceed at 1200 on a course of 900, speed
6 knots in order to reach the convoy if possible by day. As, however, it
1187
was not intercepted by day, they turned back at 2100 on a course of 2700,
speed 7 knots. With a speed of 6 knots, the convoy should be again
encountered at 1000 on 4.3.
5) A new channel is to be disposed, composed of boats from home and
Western France, to intercept other ON, HX and SC convoys. U 447, 229,
665, 633, 641, 190, 530, 642, 439, 618, 757, 406, 86, 373, 441, 440 and
221 form Group "Neuland" and are to take up position at 1200 on 7.3.
from AK 6685 to BE 1521, course 2400, speed 5 knots. Boats able to
reach their position sooner, have freedom of movement outside the
position.
c) The following have taken on supplies for further ops. from U 462 = U
653, 621, 600 and 468. U 182 took fuel and trunks on board for execution
of special duties.
d) In order to obtain a survey of defence and mining conditions in the
Iceland Passage, the 10 last boats from home to arrive in this area were
requested to send a situation report. From this it can be seen that aerial
reconnaissance is to be expected in the entire area; although some boats
have made no mention of the fact. Mines and surface patrols were only
occasionally encountered.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
4. March 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DF 95) U 221 - BE 52 U 439 - Op(AK 60) U 558 - Op(DF
98)
66 - Op(DF 92) 223 - BF 40 440 - BE 51 566 - AK 19
67 - BF 57 226 - BD 92 441 - BE 19 569 - CF 75
68 - DO 77 228 - Op(AJ 91) 444 - BF 70 590 - BD 95
84 - Op(AJ 59) 229 - AL 25 445 - Op(CG 91) 591 - Op(AJ 91)
86 - Op(AL 70) 230 - Op(AJ 92) 447 - AL 24 600 - BD 17
87 - CF 38 258 - BF 50 448 - Op(AJ 64) 603 - Op(AJ 99)
 89 - Op(AJ 57) 264 - BF 58 454 - BE 81 604 - BE 82
91 - BC 36 303 - BE 58 459 - BE 99 607 - BE 54
92 - BF 50 305 - AF 76 460 - BF 91 608 - AK 54
103 - Op(CG 89) 306 - AN 24 461 - DF 90 615 - Op(AJ 96)
- 130 -
I. U 106 - Op(DF 89) U 332 - Op(AJ 99) U 462 - BD 81 U 616 - Op(AJ
95)
107 - Op(CG 81) 333 - BF 80 468 - BD 81 618 - Op(AL 70)
109 - BF 83 336 - BF 40 504 - BD 81 621 - BD 81
119 - BD 29 338 - AE 83 506 - Op(KZ) 628 - BE 48
130 - BE 83 358 - BE 81 508 - BD 95 633 - AL 26
135 - AK 94 359 - Op(AJ 53) 509 - Op(GR) 634 - AK 25
155 - DN 26 373 - BE 15 510 - Op(EO) 638 - Op(AJ 57)
156 - Op(ED 90) 376 - AK 64 511 - CG 54 641 - AL 25
160 - Op(KY) 377 - AK 57 513 - CD 95 642 - AL 27
167 - CF 33 382 - CF 37 515 - CD 36 653 - BD 81
172 - CD 32 383 - BD 68 516 - Op(KZ) 659 - Op(AJ 62)
180 - BD 81 405 - AJ 63 518 - Op(FJ) 664 - Op(AJ 59)
182 - Op(KP) 406 - Op(AL 70) 521 - Op(DS 11) 665 - AL 24
183 - Op(DM 89) 409 - Op(AJ 59) 523 - Op(AJ 92) 666 - AE 68
185 - DD 79 410 - Op(CG 86) 524 - BF 54 707 - BE 82
186 - BF 55 415 - AN 24 526 - Op(AJ 95) 709 - AK 25
190 - AL 16 432 - Op(AJ 58) 527 - Op(AJ 91) 753 - BD 92
202 - Op(DF 95) 435 - Op(AJ 96) 529 - Op(AJ 58) 757 - Op(AL 70)
1188
218 - CF 54 437 - BF 58 530 - AL 24 758 - AK 25
759 - AK 25
On Return Passage: U 43 - 87 - 92 - 135 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 -
264 - 303 - 306 - 358 - 376 - 377 - 382 - 383 - 415 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460
- 462 - 511 - 521 - 558 - 569 - 604 - 607 - 608 - 628 - 707 - 753 - 759.
Entered Port: U 306 - 415 - Bergen; U 258 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 663 - Brest; U 159 - Lorient; U 463 - St. Nazaire; U 188 -
Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Area CG for Gibraltar convoys.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Sink in about the same area while proceeding to American coast:
By U 515, the British ship "California Star" on a course of 45, speed 15
knots in CD 3245, carry butter and meat from New Zealand to England.
By U 172 a steamer of 9,000 GRT carrying ammunition on a course of
100, speed 16 knots in CD 3239.
2) U 160 sighted a convoy on the night of 3.3. composed of 10 steamers
and three escort vessels on a southeast course. The boat pursued it from
KZ 1336 to 2442 and sank a tanker and 4 freighters of 32,000 GRT. Two
freighters were left sinking. All the ships were fully laden.
Situation: There has been daylight traffic by fast isolated vessels and
small escort vessels south of Durban since 1.3. The traffic puts in with
surface and air escort from the 200 meter line, and on the outward passage
as far as KZ 1336, then it spreads out to sea. There is strong aerial activity
by day and land radar off the harbor.
3) U 506 reports approx. 4 freighters with destroyer and air escort at
0800 in KY 5640, on a westerly course. Otherwise nothing was sighted
from GR 80 via 90 to KY 53.
- 131 -

b) At 1130 aircraft sighted a convoy of 50 merchant ships, one cruiser
and several escort vessels in CG 1294, southerly course, slow speed; and
at 1250 a second convoy in CG 1453, northerly course, slow speed,
consisting of 20 merchant ships.
c) U-boat sightings: DN 75, CG 9438, EP 7977, BE 6489, CG 8211, CG
57, CG 8136, CG 8669, CG 5871, CG 9575.
Attacks on U-boats in CG 9497 and CH 8290.
d) An American convoy is expected to put out of Cape Town for the
Persian Gulf on about 5.3.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Group "Tümmler" - apart from U 106 and 521, continue their
eastward bound passage at economical cruising speed. As the expected
convoy was not intercepted, there was no point in staying any longer in
this area. Disposition is intended in the area between the Canaries and the
mainland. According to sighting reports intensive north-south traffic
should be here. U 106 and 521 have replenished supplies from U 461 and
begun their westward and return passage respectively.
2) U 566 occupies AJ 69 as temporary ops. area to intercept the
expected convoy.
3) U 653, 621, 600 and 468 join Group "Bürggraf" and extend the patrol
channels to the southeast. The group therefore extends from AJ 9125 to
BD 1187 with 15 boats.
4) U 185 received the following grids as ops. area in the Caribbean:
DM 80 and 90, DN 70, EB 20 and 30 and EC 10: U 68's area is extended
by EC 10. 5 boats, therefore, including U 156 operating near Trinidad, are
in the Caribbean area.
5) Owing to especially strong aerial reconnaissance boats belonging to
Group "Robbe" are free to withdraw to the west or southwest.
1189
c) According to message from U 634, U 709 has had main transmitter
breakdown since 24.2. The boat is working with emergency transmitter.
d) 1) The ops. area near Cape Town is to be extended immediately to the
south as far as the latitude 450 S. The eastern and western boundaries are
as formerly - 50 and 400 E. The new southerly boundaries may on no
account be passed owing to the presence of our own ships.
2) If possible without danger to ourselves, U-boats are to stop
Portuguese ships, and search for members of enemy states of military age.
If these are particularly suitable they are to be taken on board.
V. Reports of Success:
U 515 - 1 ship 8,300 GRT
172 - 1 ship 9,000 GRT
160 - 7 ships 48,000 GRT.
- 132 -
5.March 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DG 74) U 218 - CF 37 U 444 - BE 55 U 590 - BD 95
66 - Op(DG 71) 221 - BE 19 445 - Op(CG 91) 591 - Op(AJ 91)
67 - BF 48 223 - BF 49 447 - AL 27 600 - Op(BD 11)
68 - Op(EC) 226 - BE 75 448 - Op(AJ 64) 603 - Op(AJ 99)
84 - Op(AJ 59) 228 - Op(AJ 91) 454 - BE 94 604 - BE 92
86 - AL 77 229 - AL 19 459 - BF 75 607 - BE 56
87 - CG 11 230 - Op(AJ 92) 460 - BF 60 608 - AK 82
 89 - Op(AJ 57) 264 - BF 50 461 - DF 95 615 - Op(AJ 96)
91 - Op(AK 77) 303 - BE 67 462 - BD 67 616 - Op(AJ 95)
92 - BF 50 305 - AF 71 463 - BF 58 618 - AL 72
103 - Op(CG 89) 332 - Op(AJ 99) 468 - BD 18 621 - Op(BC 33)
106 - Op(DF 99) 333 - BF 81 504 - Op(DG 71) 628 - BE 58
107 - Op(CG 81) 336 - BE 66 506 - Op(KY) 633 - AL 29
109 - BF 81 338 - AE 84 508 - BD 95 634 - AK 25
119 - BD 29 358 - BE 91 509 - Op(GR 50) 638 - Op(AJ 57)
130 - BE 88 359 - Op(AJ 53) 510 - Op(EO) 641 - AL 01
135 - BD 32 373 - BE 14 511 - CG 24 642 - AE 67
155 - DN 26 376 - AK 93 513 - CD 83 653 - BE 91
156 - Op(ED) 377 - AK 83 515 - CD 31 659 - AK 27
159 - BF 58 382 - CF 33 516 - Op(KZ) 663 - BF 54
160 - Op(KZ) 383 - BE 48 518 - Op(FJ) 664 - Op(AJ 59)
167 - CF 23 405 - Op(AJ 66) 521 - DF 99 665 - AL 01
172 - CD 23 406 - AL 74 523 - Op(AJ 92) 666 - AE 97
180 - CE 16 409 - Op(AJ 59) 524 - BF 45 707 - BE 91
182 - Op(KP) 410 - Op(CG 83) 526 - Op(AJ 95) 709 - AK 27
183 - Op(DM 75) 432 - Op(AJ 58) 527 - Op(AJ 91) 753 - BE 58
185 - DO 16 435 - Op(AJ 96) 529 - Op(AJ 58) 757 - AL 72
186 - BF 50 437 - BF 60 530 - AL 01 758 - Op(AJ 58)
188 - AO 48 439 - AK 93 558 - Op(GD 77) 759 - AK 25
190 - AL 01 440 - BE 18 566 - Op(AK 44)
202 - Op(DG 74) 441 - BE 13 569 - CF 57
On Return Passage: U 43 - 87 - 92 - 135 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 -
264 - 303 - 358 - 376 - 382 - 383 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 462 - 511 - 558 -
569 - 604 - 607 - 608 - 628 - 707 - 753.
Entered Port: U 92 - Brest; U 186 - Lorient; U 264 - 437 - Nazaire; U
460 - Bordeaux.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: Active against Gibraltar convoys.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
1190
a) 1) Convoy No. 14 (see par IVa).
2) U 333 was attacked by enemy aircraft at night without previous radar
in BF 5897. Slight damage. Aircraft was shot down in flames.
3) U 445 sighted outward bound convoy at 1215 in CG 9577. Contact
was lost after hydrophone activity accompanied by bombs and depth
charges lasting 12 hours. Very heavy air and surface reconnaissance in the
area off Gibraltar.
- 133 -
4) U 183 reported Swedish steamer showing lights on a course of 700
in DM 7527. In spite of clear orders the boat requested permission to
attack. It wa accordingly corrected.The ship was later confirmed to be an
Argentinean vessel.
5) Situation Cape Town:
U 509 confirmed westbound traffic during the day and on moonlit
nights in GR 6720. Slight possibilities for action, owing to air and land
observation. Triple and single miss on steamers of 7,000 and 2,000 GRT.
Subsequent passage to KY 4350.
U 516: Nothing sighted in KZ 43 and 19 or from KZ 1781 to 1591
during a stay of several days. A modern passenger steamer, protected by
corvettes, course 2400 was sunk in KZ 1791 at 27.2. Size 10,000 GRT.
Aerial activity up to 100 sea miles from land. Pieces of wreckage were
rammed during patrol in KZ 1690 and KZ 2470. Withdrawn at the
moment owing to oil tracks.
b) Our own aircraft sighted Gibraltar convoy at 1830 in CG 4611, course
600, speed 7.5 knots.
 c) U-boat sightings: BC 44, DC 1234, BB 65, DE 12. Aircraft attack in
ED 98.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 14:
The convoy confirmed by aircraft yesterday was intercepted by U 130
at 1030 in BE 9764. 16-20 ships were reported on a course of 20, speed 5-
7 knots. As maneuverable and systematic operations are difficult in the
narrow land bound area, outward bound boats also those on the return
passage (if they have enough fuel) are to operate on the convoy. U 130
followed up the convoy, which consisted of 3 columns each containing 7
steamers proceeding apparently with weak escort, via BE 9498 and 9495.
The boat attacked here at 1745 and scored 5 hits. 2 steamers, each of
2,500 GRT were sunk. 2 other ships of 5 and 3,000 GRT respectively
were not observed sinking. One of them was burning. Other boats did not
come up to the convoy. U 130 was beaten off and lost contact. The
operation is therefore, broken off. Absence of enemy air escort
contributed largely to the successes.
b) 1) As the convoy had not arrived by night fall, the Groups "Wildfang
and Bürggraf" proceeded at 2300 on a course of 450, speed 6 knots. This
way an unobserved passage during the night was to be avoided. The
Groups turned back at 1000 on 6.3 and were again in the old patrol
channels at 2100.
2) U 444 joins Group "Neuland" and occupies the southernmost position
in the patrol channels = BE 1552. Channels are to be patrolled at 1200 on
7.3 course 2400, speed 5 knots.
- 134 -
1191
3) As more boats are to operate simultaneously in the area off the
American coast, U 172, 515 and 513 already in CD are to be retained and
distributed in the following order to the temporary ops. area CD 20, CD 30
and CD 40. As soon as the boats, also intended for this, arrive further
movement is to take place. U 130 and 159 are to make for CA 50 also U
106 is to replenish supplies from U 461. 6 boats, therefore, are disposed
for this operation. U 521 is also to take on supplies from U 461 and
proceed to the east to reinforce the Group "Tümmler".
4) U 709 is to occupy AK 71 as temporary ops. area and is to operate on
the expected convoy later.
c) U 461 has given U 106 180 cubic meters of fuel and U 521 102 cubic
meters. The tanker is empty and is on the return passage.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 333 - 1 aircraft
U 516 - 1 ship 10,000 GRT
U 130 - 3 ships 8,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
VI. General:
1) A) 1) The systematic evaluation of the English U-boat situation for the
month of January and the beginning of February is reassuring, in view of
the strong suspicion that the enemy had broken down our codes or
otherwise obtained exceptional knowledge of our operations. (compare the
English estimates of U-boat positions, confirmation of the facts accessible
to the English, wireless bearings, sightings, U -boat attacks, a/s radar, also
information obtained after the return of a number of U-boats.)
Except in the case of 2 - 3 unexplained incidents, English information
from the facts accessible to him of U-boat positions, and plots of the boats,
can throughout be traced to an explicable combination of facts. The most
important revelation - confirmed almost without a doubt - was, that the
enemy was able, with the help of a/c radar, to intercept U-boat dispositions
with great accuracy - adequate for the successful evasive action of his
convoys. As always, our countermeasures limp several weeks behind this
kind of new enemy practice because:
a) His evasive measures are obvious, only after constant use, partly
after receipt of English wireless messages (Special Radio Intelligence
messages) not solved for weeks afterwards.
b) Reports of confirmed wireless location of U-boat dispositions, are
rarely received by W/T, their use is not apparent until the operational
survey and Commander's oral report.
c) The technical possibilities of "ASV" location (simultaneous
confirmation of several targets at long range and thereby the simultaneous
interception of several boats in one disposition) was still unknown.
- 135 -
2) The fact perfectly corroborated by the increasing appearance of the
additional word "radio located" in English U-boat situation (reports) of
confirmation of U-boat dispositions by a/c radio location, meant an
uncomfortable complication of the method used up to now, of intercepting
convoys by patrol channels. As, in many cases, the inadequate number of
U-boats in the patrol channels cannot be dispensed with.
a) The boats are ordered to submerge for about 30 minutes on
confirmation of a/c radar. (Stipulation for the effective execution of this
measure is the presence of a constantly used Fu.M.B. in good working
order. The Fu.M.B. aerials at present in use in the ops. areas are however
not practicable in all weather conditions. An alteration will not be made
1192
until the beginning of March, the time of the equipping of boats with fixed
Fu.M.B. cable and round dipole.)
b) Avoid all unnecessary waiting in patrol channels before the presumed
convoy passage time. (Disposition of the groups: "Neptun", "Ritter",
"Burggraf", "Neuland"). These groups were to proceed on a westerly to
southwesterly course on the convoy routes as far as the area of
Newfoundland Bank "Harken". The passage speed was for the most part
very small in the bad weather conditions generally prevailing; the
disposition could almost be considered stationary in view of the long range
of the "ASV" apparatus and the high speed and radius of action of English
a/c. Up to now no better method has been tried. All other dispositions, i.e.
the indiscriminate, unsystematic spreading out of boats in a certain area,
("castor sugar") have the disadvantage of too large spaces between the
individual boats. After the non-interception of a convoy by such a
disposition there is always the riddle what's to be done. The required
certainty is lacking in a clear lineal disposition in any case up to a certain
point (adverse weather conditions, periods of fog excepted), that the
convoy has not sailed through the disposition area, that then, an alteration
of the area and method is necessary.
B) 1) Warfare against the African supplies from North America in the
area north and south of the Azores has led to failure. Neither a U.G.S. or
G.U.S. convoy has been intercepted by means of a patrol or
reconnaissance channels ("Rochen, Robbe"). The enemy's possibility of
taking evasive action north or south of the Great Circle are very great -
owing to the great length of the entire route without any significant
extension of the convoy route.
2) The tricky situation of the forces defending the bridgehead Tunis,
forces action against African supply lines. As, for one thing, the attacking
of the convoys in the area of the Gibraltar lines is unpropitious owing to
strong defence, for another, as described in 1), the interception of convoys
halfway is pointless in view of the size of the area, the following is the
remaining possibility:
Deployment of U-boats off the North American departure ports.
Interception here and pursuit to open sea.

- 136 -
It must be ascertained in this connection:
a) The aerial defences off the coast is apparently very strong,
disposition must therefore be stationary.
b) Facts of ports of departure and times of leaving are unpredictable
therefore a certain number of boats are necessary
c) Defences, taken as a whole, mean a withdrawal to outside the coastal
area during the full moon period. Consideration of these facts leads to the
demand for an adequate number of boats, some of which would act as
reconnaissance units stationed directly in front of the harbor, the others
further out to act as "pick-up" groups able to operate on the reconnaissance
groups reports. Owing to the length of the approach route, only a small
percentage of U-boats (at the moment type IXc) come into the question.
The following boats originally intended for deployment in the Cape Town
area were distributed for this: U 172, U 515, U 513, also U 167, U 130, U
106, U 159 (See KTB of 27.2 also).
2) The reports from U 333 of 5.3 and U 156 of 6.3 confirm the conjecture
of several weeks that the enemy was using new methods of locating which
could not be picked up by Fu.M.B. equipment. Reports from both boats at
sea and Commander's interrogations revealed occasionally at first, then
more often, that they had been attacked by a/c at night (mostly in the
Biscay and Trinidad areas) without previous appearance of an a/c
searchlight in the vicinity, or radar activity being confirmed. The
1193
following new methods of locating appear possible according to
observations and deliberations.
A) The enemy is working with either very high or very low, and
therefore scarcely a completely inaudible frequency impulse. This
possibility is strengthened by the observations of U 214 from the
Caribbean Sea. The P.O. Telegraphist Bruster, on confirming scarcely
audible impulse frequencies, installed the magic eye of the wireless
receiver Ela 10.12 in the Metox receiver in order to make visible the
inaudible impulse frequencies. In this way apparently, a location wa once
confirmed.
Magic eyes are to be installed in the receivers of all outward bound
boats, after P.O. Tel. Bruster's report to the S.O. Naval Signals and
Communications Equipment Command. Apart from this, on 6.3 a number
of oscillographs were sent by courier to the western area to be added to the
Metox receiver in order to ascertain as soon as possible whether the enemy
is in fact, working with inaudible impulse frequencies.
Boats at sea have received instructions to send observations if
necessary.
B) The enemy is working on carrier frequencies outside the frequency
range of the present Fu.M.B. receivers. The shooting down, over Holland
of an enemy a/c apparently carrying an apparatus with a frequency of 5.7
centimeters is the only indication at present of this possibility. It is
possible that the enemy is attempting to escape from the frequency range
of our Fu.M.B. which indicates the knowledge of this and the introduction
of countermeasures.
- 137 -

C) The enemy uses his search and locating apparatus for a very short
space of time (2 to 3 secs). This method is a development and perfecting
of the economical use of locating already observed. It would be very
difficulty and almost only occasionally possible for an Fu.M.B. observer
to confirm a location with the Fu.M.B. equipment at present in use.
Theoretically it appears desirable to counter all these three possibilities in
the following way:
Use of an aperiodic, untuned receiver with optical sight indicator, in
which every location will be immediately seen, whether carrier or impulse
frequency. It remains to be seen whether this possibility is technically
practicable. Further information in this connection is to be requested
directly from the appropriate departments.
3) The Naval C.-in-C. decided on 20.2.43 that after the transference of the
boats U 377, 592, 403, 405, 209, 376 and 334 from the North Sea to the
Atlantic - the amount of North Sea boats will be supplemented from the
boats from home - U 644, 467, 639, 711, 269, 339, 304, 636, 646 - 23
boats.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
6. March 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DG 84) U 221 - BE 19 U 447 - AL 01 U 600 - Op(BD
11)
66 - Op(GD 81) 223 - BF 64 448 - Op(AJ 64) 603 - Op(AJ 99)
67 - BE 90 226 - BE 83 454 - BF 82 604 - BF 40
68 - Op(EC) 228 - Op(AJ 91) 459 - BF 91 607 - BE 60
84 - Op(AJ 59) 229 - AL 41 461 - DF 90 608 - BD 22
86 - AL 77 230 - Op(AJ 92) 462 - BE 47 615 - Op(AJ 96)
87 - BE 90 303 - BF 40 463 - BF 40 616 - Op(AJ 95)
89 - Op(AJ 57) 305 - AE 68 468 - Op(BD 11) 618 - AL 72
91 - Op(AK 77 332 - Op(AJ 99) 504 - Op(DG 81) 621 - Op(BC 33)
103 - Op(CG 89) 333 - BF 73 506 - Op(KZ) 628 - BE 67
1194
106 - Op(DF 99) 336 - BE 60 508 - BD 95 633 - AL 45
107 - Op(CG 81) 338 - AL 31 509 - Op(KY 53) 634 - AK 19
109 - BF 70 358 - BE 90 510 - Op(EP) 638 - Op(AJ 57)
119 - BD 29 359 - Op(AJ 53) 511 - BF 70 641 - AL 45
130 - BE 94 373 - BE 14 513 - Op(CD 40) 642 - AL 48
135 - BE 14 376 - AL 78 515 - Op(CD 30) 653 - Op(BC 33)
155 - DM 19 377 - AK 97 516 - Op(KZ 29) 659 - Op(AJ 66)
156 - Op(ED) 382 - BE 90 518 - Op(FJ) 663 - BF 52
159 - BF 40 383 - BE 59 521 - DF 96 664 - Op(AJ 59)
160 - Op(KP) 405 - Op(AJ 66) 532 - Op(AJ 92) 665 - AL 44
167 - CF 27 406 - AL 77 524 - BE 90 666 - AE 83
172 - Op(CD 20) 409 - Op(AJ 59) 526 - Op(AJ 95) 707 - BF 40
180 - CE 43 410 - Op(CG 83) 527 - Op(AJ 91) 709 - AK 46
182 - Op(KP) 432 - Op(AJ 58) 529 - Op(AJ 58) 753 - BE 67
183 - Op(DM 75) 435 - Op(AJ 96) 530 - AL 48 757 - AL 72
185 - DO 17 439 - AK 93 558 - Op(DG 79) 758 - Op(AJ 58)
188 - AN 30 440 - BE 18 566 - Op(AJ 69) 759 - AK 02
190 - AL 45 441 - BE 13 569 - CF 19
202 - Op(GD 79 444 - BE 19 590 - BD 95
218 - CF 33 445 - Op(CG 91) 591 - Op(AJ 91)
On Return Passage: U 87 - 135 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 303 - 358 - 376 - 377
- 382 - 303 - 454 - 459 - 461 - 462 - 511 - 604 - 607 - 608 - 628 - 707 - 753
- 759.
Entered Port: U 663 - Brest; U 223 - St. Nazaire.
- 138 -

Sailed: U 631 - Brest; U 598 - St. Nazaire; U 384 - 134 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 15 see para. IVa.
2) The convoy reported by a/c on 5.3 in CG 1288 was intercepted by U
107 at 0930 on 6.3 in CG 8134. The boat was forced to submerge owing
to aerial activity and lost contact. U 410 encountered the convoy
consisting of 25 ships and several destroyers at 15.20 in CG 8511 and
torpedoed 2 freighters of 6 and 7,000 GRT. Another hit is possible. The
sinking was not observed owing to the defence, loud sinking noises were
audible however. The boat withdrew to the west owing to depth charge
damage.
3) U 172 sank a Norwegian ship "Thorstrand" in CD 1675, of 3,041
GRT carrying piece goods from Liverpool to St. Johns. The large detour
made by the ship in order to reach her port of discharge is significant.
4) U 156 situation report: Off the Port of Spain as far as Grenada very
strong continuous air activity with a new type of location which can not be
picked up by "Metox" - Precise attacks without search lights - convoy sail
to and from Testigos. Operations there impossible. The boat presumes
from a/c courses - that there is E/W traffic in EE 45 and intends to operate
there.
5) U 182 reports absence of traffic in KP 35 and 38. Nothing sighted on
passage to west coast of Madagascar. The boat considers operations in KQ
60 and 90 propitious. It presumes that there is traffic passing through the
Mozambique Channel, but if not, along the west coast of Madagascar.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BE 9122, FA 3957, AJ 8346, AL 19.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 15:
U 405 reported a convoy on a northwesterly course in AJ at 1056 on the
6th. As the boat was stationed exactly in the middle of the channels
1195
"Wildfang" and Burggraf" about 90 sea miles off - it must be presumed
that the expected convoy passed the patrol channels in the previous day.
According to dead reckoning this applies to the expected SC convoy. In
all 17 boats - those in the patrol channel and those north of it - were in
operation on the convoy. These boats form the Group "Westmark". 10 of
the boats of the Group "Neuland" in the east were withdrawn and sent to
intercept the convoy, with the intention of taking up position in a patrol
channel
- 139 -
for the morning of the 8th on the presumed convoy route, if contact
was not established.This group received the name "Ostmark".
Westmark: U 405, 409, 591, 230, 228, 566, 616, 448, 526, 634, 527,
659, 523, 709, 359, 332.
Ostmark: U 229, 665, 633, 641, 447, 190, 4439, 530, 618, 642 See
paragraph IVb.
Weather conditions considerably influenced the beginning of the
operations. The boats experienced continuous poor visibility - 2 sea miles
at the most, wind W 7-8 with snow and hail squalls. U 405 maintained
contact with the convoy until 1800, was then forced to submerge, attacked
with depth charges without sustaining any great damage. U 566 was able
to contact the convoy from 0100 to 0200 on the morning of the 7th. U 230
reported having run into the convoy at 0200 in a snow storm in AK 4234.
At 0530, U 228 reported from 1972 that the convoy was on a true
course of 400 hydrophone bearing. Also at night - visibility was so
variable that it was impossible to maintain continuous contact.
 Up to now there have been few reports of the convoy's defences. 2
boats were forced to submerge by destroyers, one boat reported being
searched for by an escort vessel with a red searchlight and a boat sighted
an a/c in AJ 6726 - type unknown.
The convoy operation continues.
b) 1) After sections of the Group "Wildfang", "Burggraf" and "Neuland"
were detailed to operate on Convoy No. 15, the remaining boats of both
Groups were newly disposed. U 638, 89, 529, 758, 664, 84, 615, 435, 603,
91, 653, 621, 600 and 468 occupied the new patrol channels, AJ 5982 to
AK 7775, at economical cruising speed. Boats form the Group
"Raubgraf".
It is presumed that the following HX convoy - which must be in the
channels in the course of 7.3, will proceed on the same route as the SC
convoy at present intercepted.
Group "Neuland", now consisting of 8 boats is to proceed at 1200 on
7.3 to a line from AL 7813 to BE 1552 in a patrol channel on a course of
2650 speed 5 knots. U 608, 590 and 336 join the Group and enter the
reconnaissance channel at cruising speed. U 608 extends this by 20 sea
miles to the northwest, U 336 and 590 each extend the channel 20 sea
miles to the southwest.
2) The 7th boat U 167 intended for deployment in CA proceeded to CA
50.
c) None.
d) U 508 bombed by a/c on 26.2.43 is again able to submerge to some
extent, and is returning from BD 94 on 9.3. U 590 proceed as ordered.
V. Reports of Success:
U 410 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT 2 ships torpedoed
U 172 - 1 ship 3,041 GRT
- 140 -
1196
7.March 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DG 86) U 218 - BE 95 U 445 - Op(DG 86) U 591 -
Op(AK 43)
66 - Op(DG 83) 221 - Op(BE 15) 447 - Op(AK 03) 598 - BF 91
67 - BE 97 226 - BE 92 448 - Op(AK 42) 600 - Op(AK 77)
68 - Op(EC) 228 - Op(AK 19) 454 - BF 67 603 - Op(AJ 95)
84 - Op(AJ 91) 229 - Op(AK 39) 459 - BF 98 604 - BF 49
86 - Op(AL 78 230 - Op(AK 43) 461 - DG 45 607 - BF 48
87 - BF 73 303 - BF 55 462 - BE 81 608 - BD 29
89 - Op(AJ 59) 305 - AE 59 463 - BF 47 615 - Op(AJ 95)
91 - Op(AJ 96) 332 - Op(AK 45) 468 - Op(AK 77) 616 - Op(AK 43)
103 - Op(CG 89) 333 - BE 93 504 - Op(CG 83) 618 - Op(AK 65)
106 - Op(DF 82) 336 - BE 46 506 - Op(GR) 621 - Op(AJ 99)
107 - Op(CG 58) 338 - AL 23 508 - BD 95 628 - BF 69
109 - BE 98 358 - BF 65 509 - Op(KY) 631 - BF 54
119 - BD 29 359 - Op(AK 43) 510 - Op(ED) 633 - Op(AK 62)
130 - BE 85 373 - Op(BE 11) 511 - BF 55 634 - Op(AK 43)
134 - BF 91 376 - BE 21 513 - Op(CD 40) 638 - Op(AJ 59)
135 - BE 27 377 - BD 29 515 - Op(CD 30) 641 - Op(AK 63)
155 - Op(DM 39) 382 - BF 67 516 - Op(KZ) 642 - Op(AK 65)
156 - Op(ED) 383 - BE 68 518 - Op(FJ) 653 - Op(AJ 99)
159 - BE 69 384 - BF 91 521 - Op(DG 76) 659 - Op(AK 43)
160 - Op(KP) 405 - Op(AJ 39) 523 - Op(AK 43) 664 - Op(AJ 91)
167 - CF 46 406 - Op(AL 78) 524 - BE 97 665 - Op(AK 39)
172 - CD 16 409 - Op(AK 19) 526 - Op(AK 43) 666 - AE 84
180 - CE 73 410 - Op(CG 86) 527 - Op(AK 43) 707 - BF 91
182 - Op(KQ 65) 432 - Op(AK 45) 529 - Op(AJ 59) 709 - Op(AK 43)
183 - Op(DM 75) 435 - Op(AK 43) 530 - Op(AK 65) 753 - BF 47
185 - DN 64 439 - Op(AK 65) 558 - Op(DG 89) 757 - Op(AL 78)
 188 - AN 30 440 - Op(BE 12) 566 - Op(AK 43) 758 - Op(AJ 91)
190 - Op(AK 65) 441 - Op(BE 12) 569 - CF 26 759 - AK 66
202 - Op(DG 88) 444 - Op(BE 15 590 - BD 83
On Return Passage: U 87 - 135 - 218 - 226 - 303 - 358 - 376 - 377 - 382
- 383 - 454 - 459 - 461 - 462 - 511 - 569 - 604 - 607 - 608 - 628 - 707 - 753
- 759.
Entered Port: U 459 - Bordeaux.
Sailed: U 415 - Bergen.
2) U-boat attack in AJ 5892 and AK 4223.
3) A British unit presumably belonging to a convoy was located in AE
7930. Also an a/c in AL 51 and AL 17 and 19.
d) The last observations of the rhythm of the England/America and
America/England convoys, indicate a 10 day rhythm, which has been in
operation since the middle of February according to available special
Radio Intelligence reports. The enemy had been sailing at intervals of 8
days up to the beginning of January; from this date a change was
noticeable, which, according to our observations, lasted until about the
middle of February, and then changed to the 10 day rhythm mentioned.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None. IV. Current Operations:

III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 15 see para. IVa.
2) U 376 chased fast isolated vessel on a westerly course, with high
speed in BE 1337. The boat has been assured of fuel replenishment owing
to small fuel supply.In bad weather conditions and strong enemy zig-
zagging contact was lost, however, at 1430 in BE 1437.
3) U 631 fired a triple and single miss on a freighter of about 5,000 GRT
in AJ 5897. "Q Boats" are possible here.
4) U 641 was bombed by a/c in AK 3964. Damage was repaired at sea.
- 141 -
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: CG 753, CG 8937, AL 1919, DH 15, AK 19, AL
32, AK 18.
1197
a) Convoy No. 15:
Convoy operations were considerably influenced on the day of the 7th
and the night of 7/8 by particularly unfavorable and difficult weather
conditions, wind strength up to 10 with continuously changing visibility
between 100 to 5000 meters owing to snow and hail storms. Maintaining
contact was therefore out of the question. Altogether 6 boats sighted the
convoy. At 0930, U 230 reported the convoy in grid AK 1954, at 0942, U
409 reported it in AK 1916 and U 591 reported it at 0906 in AK 1929. At
1507, U 409 reported an isolated vessel on an easterly course in AK 1797
but lost her at 2032 in AK 1872 in a snow squall. The same boat reported
that the convoy was presumed to be about to disband. It is possible,
considering messages received later, that the convoy was actually split up
and partly spread out owing to the adverse weather conditions. A part of
the convoy appeared to have maintained the old general course of about
50. This can be seen from U 526's report, of having run into the convoy in
a snow storm at 1600 in AK 1847 and then lost contact. 3 reports from
single destroyers also corvettes substantiate the general course theory.
Another section of the convoy was reported by U 634. After the boat had
heard the convoy at 1226 on a true course of 280 from AK 1935, it
reported smoke trails at 1625 in AK 0143. Also, U 228 confirmed from a
convoy message at 2025 in AK 0161, that s section of the convoy deviated
sharply to the east. Further reports of convoy contact reports were not
received.
 The Group "Ostmark", consisting of 10 boats, is to be disposed in a
patrol channel for the morning of the 8th in front of the convoy, 50-90 are
estimated to be the boundaries of the convoy's course.3 boats have
reported not being able to reach the ordered position in time owing to
weather conditions. U 448 and 659 have broken off operations owing to
temporary Diesel breakdown and proceed to the supply position.
Result:
U 230 reported a 5,000 ton freighter from convoy at 0210 (W/T
message is not clear. Command presumes sinking as according to a Radio
Intelligence Report a steamer was torpedoed in this area).
- 142 -
U 591 reported sinking an 8,000 GRT ammunition freighter at 0906 in
AK 1929. Operations on the convoy continue.
b) - c) None.
d) According to directions from the Naval War Staff, Chilean ships are
not to be attacked, in spite of the breaking off of relations, and contrary to
the general directions, on political grounds, even if these ships are
obviously armed. Boats are to report when Chilean vessels are armed,
insufficiently identified or sailing in convoy.
V. Reports of Success:
U 230 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT
U 591 - 1 ship 8,000 GRT
1198
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
8. March 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DG 95) U 218 - BF 70 U 444 - Op(BD 36) U 591 -
Op(AK 27)
66 - Op(DG 92) 221 - Op(BD 36) 445 - Op(CG 80) 598 - BF 80
67 - CF 35 226 - BF 40 447 - AK 25 600 - Op(AJ 99)
68 - Op(EC) 228 - Op(AK 27) 448 - AK 01 603 - Op(AJ 95)
84 - Op(AJ 91) 229 - AK 25 454 - BF 64 604 - BF 40
86 - Op(AK 99) 230 - Op(AK 27) 461 - DG 27 607 - BF 58
87 - BF 40 303 - BF 61 462 - BE 83 608 - BD 29
89 - Op(AJ 59) 305 - AE 85 463 - BE 60 615 - Op(AJ 95)
91 - Op(AJ 96) 332 - Op(AK 27) 468 - Op(AK 77) 616 - Op(AK 20)
103 - Op(CG 89) 333 - BE 64 504 - Op(DG 92) 618 - Op(AK 39)
106 - DF 49 336 - BD 66 506 - Op(GR) 621 - Op(AJ 99)
107 - Op(CG 80) 338 - AL 15 508 - BD 90 628 - BF 51
109 - CF 35 358 - BF 64 509 - Op(KY) 631 - BF 40
119 - BD 29 359 - Op(AK 18) 510 - OP(FA) 633 - AK 20
130 - CF 16 373 - Op(AK 99) 511 - BF 61 634 - Op(AK 27)
134 - BF 80 376 - BE 42 513 - Op(CD 40) 638 - Op(AJ 59)
135 - BE 53 377 - BD 29 515 - Op(CD 30) 641 - AK 28
155 - Op(DM 50) 382 - BF 61 516 - Op(KZ) 642 - AK 28
156 - Op(EE) 383 - BF 45 518 - Op(FJ) 653 - Op(AJ 99)
159 - BE 91 384 - BF 80 521 - Op(DG 85) 659 - AK 01
160 - Op(KP) 405 - Op(AK 27) 523 - Op(AK 20) 664 - Op(AJ 91)
167 - CF 95 406 - Op(AK 99) 524 - CF 39 665 - AL 22
172 - Op(CD 10) 409 - Op(AK 27) 526 - Op(AK 27) 666 - AL 22
180 - DG 12 410 - Op(CG 85) 527 - Op(AK 20) 707 - BF 64
182 - Op(KP) 415 - AF 76 529 - Op(AJ 91) 709 - Op(AK 20)
183 - Op(DM 70) 432 - Op(AK 20) 530 - AK 28 753 - BF 40
185 - Op(DM 70) 435 - Op(AJ 95) 558 - Op(DG 98) 757 - Op(AK 99)
188 - AN 23 439 - AK 27 566 - Op(AK 27) 758 - Op(AJ 91)
190 - Op(AK 28) 440 - Op(BD 36) 569 - Op(BE 89) 759 - AL 72
 202 - Op(DG 98) 441 - Op(BD 33) 590 - BD 37
On Return Passage: U 87 - 135 - 218 - 178 - 226 - 303 - 358 - 359 - 376
- 377 - 382 - 383 - 405 - 432 - 448 - 454 - 461 - 462 - 508 - 511 - 569 - 604
- 607 - 608 - 628 - 659 - 707 - 753 - 759.
Entered Port: U 610 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 511 - 382 - 303 - Lorient; U 454 - 707 - 358 - St. Nazaire.
- 143 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 15, see para IVa.
2) U 510 reported a convoy consisting of 11-15 steamers on a course of
3100 in EP 4540. As the next boat was about 600 sea miles to the north, U
510 was ordered to attack without giving contact reports. U 156 was to
operate according to circumstances and of necessary request reports.
3) U 130 was approached by a/c at 0500 in CF 1560 while proceeding to
the American coast. The boats confirmed a convoy on a northerly course
after submerging and obtaining a hydrophone bearing. The boat pursued
without success as far as CF 1596 and then continued its westward
passage.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: ED 9587, BB 8163, EP 49, EE 91, AK 3561, AK
2647.
1199
2) There were reports of torpedoing and SOS messages from the
Yugoslavian steamer "Vojvoda Putnik" of 5,876 GRT in AK 2643, steamer
"Amsterdam" on 580 42' N. an unknown steamer in AK 1833 and a
sinking report from an unidentified convoy vessel.
3) U-boat attack in EO 63.
4) A convoy consisting of 23 freighters, 11 transport vessels, 4
destroyers and 5 escort U-boats, passed through the Straits of Gibraltar at
1730 on 8.3 on a course for the Atlantic. Convoys of the type previously
confirmed, proceed at a speed of 7.5 knots via the points CG 8550 and CG
8150.
d) 1) According to Radio Intelligence Reports 6 apparently small coastal
convoys put out of Cape Town in the period between 2nd - 8th.3, which
are to disband according to previous information, somewhere in the
vicinity of Port Nolloth, and leave the steamers to proceed by themselves,
as far as 180 and 240 S. and to the west. At the same time, according to
this report, steamers destined for Cape Town are to be picked up near Port
Nolloth and escorted in convoy to the south.
2) Of the convoy traffic from America to North Africa with a 4 week
rhythm - the slower part had already put out on 4.3 - 2 days earlier than
anticipated - and the faster section on 5/6.3.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 15:
The weather conditions were not improved to any extent on the 8th.
The visibility remained poor, and owing to snow and hail squalls, variable.
Wind was west from strength 5 to 6.
The assumption that the convoy had split in to two parts was not
confirmed. U 526 re-established contact at 1132 in the morning in AK
2691. The convoy had remained on his general course from 500 to 600.
No reports of a more southerly course
- 144 -

were received. Up to the hours of darkness 3 other boats had arrived
at the northerly section, all of which however including U 526, had lost
contact with the convoy at dusk. U 566 established temporary contact at
0500 on the 9th in AK 3662, but was forced to submerge and were then
passed over by the convoy. The convoy consists, according to a message,
of 5 ships and has a flying boat for protection and escort vessels reputed to
be southeast of the convoy.
The assumption that owing to the bad and difficult weather conditions
of the last days a large part of the convoy had been split up, has been
confirmed. Several boats reported isolated vessels from the area astern of
the convoy.
Owing to the variable weather the various boats ran into destroyers and
had depth charge attacks. Boats received serious damage.
U 359 reported a triple miss on a freighter on the 7th in AK 1871.
U 527 reported a quadruple miss on a tanker in AK 2787 and E-miss on
a freighter in AK 2783 on the morning of the 8th.
Successes: Presumed:
U 527 1834 in AK 2842 isolated vessel of 6,000 GRT sunk. 6,000 GRT
U 190 2158 in AK 3814 isolated vessel of 6,500 GRT sunk. 6,500 GRT
U 591 in AK 3594 damaged 7,000 GRT freighter sunk 7,000 GRT
U 642 2230 in AK 3857 isolated vessel of 3,500 GRT sunk. 3,500 GRT
4 ships/23,000 GRT sunk
In the areas mentioned there is busy north/south traffic of small
convoys according to special Radio Intelligence reports and agent's
reports.
Boats are to remain unobserved if possible, and to maintain wireless
silence.
Replenishment of fuel supplies is not anticipated.
2) If the boats do not sight traffic in their present area, U 506 is to
occupy the area south of Cape Town and to operate on traffic according to
para. III d 1). U 182 has complete freedom of movement to the east as far
as the boundary of the ops. area.
3) U 463 is to proceed to BD 24 and supply boats having to break off
convoy ops. owing to fuel shortage.
c) The area of Route "A" east of Cape Town is to be extended
immediately as follows: The boundary now runs from FM 4957 via GZ
7644, JK 8254, JC 1432 and KG 6876 then to the west as far as the
African coast.
- 145 -

4 boats broke off operations on the convoy owing to fuel shortage - U V. Reports of Success:
432, 359, 405, 566. U 527 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT
b) 1) As intended, the area between the Canaries, the islands and the U 190 - 1 ship 6,500 GRT
mainland is again occupied by boats. The following ops. areas are U 591 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT
allocated: U 66 between Palma and Tenerife, U 521 between Tenerife and U 642 - 1 ship 3,500 GRT
Gran-Canaria, U 504 between Gran-Canaria and Fuerteneventura.
Further, to occupy positions at a depth of 20 sea miles; U 202 = DH ---------------------------------------------------
6444, U 43 = DH 9649, U 548 = DH 9684. ---------------
1200
9. March 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DG 74) U 202 - Op(DH 77) U 445 - Op(CG 86) U 603 -
Op(AJ 95)
66 - Op(DH 71) 218 - BF 54 447 - Op(AK 34) 604 - BF 52
67 - CF 64 221 - Op(BD 34) 448 - AK 58 607 - BF 64
68 - Op(EC) 226 - BF 58 461 - DG 26 608 - BD 29
84 - Op(AJ 91) 228 - Op(AK 33) 462 - BE 93 610 - BF 58
86 - Op(BD 23) 229 - Op(AL 15) 463 - BE 64 615 - Op(AJ 95)
87 - BF 40 230 - Op(AK 30) 468 - Op(AK 77) 616 - Op(AK 30)
89 - Op(AJ 59) 305 - AE 85 504 - Op(DH 71) 618 - Op(AK 30)
91 - Op(AJ 96) 332 - Op(AK 34) 506 - Op(GR) 621 - Op(AJ 99)
103 - Op(CG 89) 333 - BE 51 508 - BE 99 628 - BF 52
106 - DF 44 336 - Op(BD 58) 509 - Op(KY) 631 - BE 60
107 - Op(CG 80) 338 - Op(AK 30) 510 - EP 45 633 - Op(AK 30)
109 - CF 53 359 - AK 02 513 - Op(CD 40) 634 - Op(AK 34)
119 - BD 29 373 - Op(BD 31) 515 - Op(CD 30) 638 - Op(AK 30)
130 - CF 35 376 - BE 57 516 - Op(KZ) 641 - Op(AK 30)
134 - BF 70 377 - BD 29 518 - Op(FJ) 642 - Op(AL 13)
135 - BF 58 383 - BF 54 521 - Op(DG 94) 653 - Op(AJ 99)
155 - Op(DM 50) 384 - BF 70 523 - Op(AK 30) 659 - AK 59
156 - Op(EE) 405 - AK 36 524 - CF 68 664 - Op(AJ 91)
159 - CF 31 406 - Op(AK 97) 526 - Op(AK 34) 665 - Op(AK 34)
160 - Op(KP) 409 - Op(AK 30) 527 - Op(AK 34) 666 - AL 22
167 - CD 86 410 - Op(CG 85) 529 - Op(AJ 83) 709 - Op(AK 30)
172 - Op(CD 20) 415 - AF 72 530 - Op(AK 30) 753 - BF 91
180 - DG 42 532 - AK 61 558 - Op(DH 77) 757 - Op(AK 95)
182 - Op(KP) 435 - Op(AJ 95) 566 - AK 36 758 - Op(AJ 91)
183 - Op(DM 70) 439 - Op(AK 34) 569 - BE 95 759 - BE 13
185 - Op(DN 70) 440 - Op(BD 34) 590 - BD 38
188 - AF 87 441 - Op(BD 31) 591 - Op(AK 34)
190 - Op(AL 13) 444 - Op(BD 34) 598 - BF 70
600 - Op(AJ 99)
1201
On Return Passage: U 87 - 135 - 218 - 226 - 359 - 376 - 377 - 383 - 405
- 432 - 448 - 461 - 462 - 508 - 569 - 604 - 607 - 608 - 628 - 659 - 753 -
759.
Entered Port: U 607 - St. Nazaire; U 604 - 628 - Brest.
Sailed: U 168 - 198 - Kiel; U 306 - 592 - Bergen.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 15 see para IVa.
2) U 107 reported a convoy in CG 8185 on a course of 2700 speed 12
knots at 1800. The boat was not in contact and pursued it. As the
"Robben" boats have received instructions in the meantime to withdraw,
and their fuel supply is adequate for an operation to the north, they have
been
- 146 -
informed by the Command that the convoy is assumed to be making
for England and that they are free to operate accordingly. Just before
0100, U 107 reported that is had searched on a north and northwesterly
course without success, and that the convoy had presumably made off at a
high speed. Contact was not re-established and the operation is therefore
ended.
3) U 150 chased the convoy reported - which consisted of 15 loaded
vessels as well as 4 destroyers and 3 escort vessels in daily and continuous
air activity, from EP 73 to EP 41. The boat sank a passenger freighter of
10,000 GRT, 2 freighters of 14,000 GRT, 2 ammunition steamers of
12,000 GRT and 1 tanker of 8,000. One steamer of 5,000 GRT was left
sinking and one other steamer of 6,000 GRT was torpedoed. The boat
withdrew to EP 43 to recharge the batteries and to escape interference.
The boat is assured of a supply of 3 + 8 torpedoes.
4) U 506 sank a loaded 6,000 GRT freighter in KY 5399, course west.
While at periscope depth the boat came into collision with an unidentified
object whereby the air target periscope was knocked off and the port shaft
was jammed. Proceeded to the south for repairs. On 9.3 the boat sank
"Pearl Moor" of 4,581 GRT on a northwesterly course from Aden to Cape
Town in KY 9415.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: CG 8518, CG 8372, BB 64, ED 9587, AK 3945,
BB 8160.
Reports of attacks and torpedoing: In AE 3746 (American steamer
WKYL), ship in a convoy on about 530 N and in ED 6368.
d) 1) The last part of the ordered route for fast escort groups which put
out on 5/6.3 is given in a special Radio Intelligence Report. The positions
are: DG 3977, DH 3153, CG 8827, DJ 2199. Simultaneously the entire
route for the stragglers of this convoy are given in the following passage
points: DE 1597, DF 1459, DF 3938, DG 5266, DH 3432, DJ 1324. This
refers to the convoy UG F 6.
2) An eastbound convoy (probably HX 228) was in BC 3610 at 2000 on
8.3. For measures to intercept both these convoys see para IV b).
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 15 9/10.3
Convoy operations were again influenced by adverse weather
conditions. It was difficult to maintain contact with the convoy with wind
strength 8-9, poor visibility of 2-3 sea miles and hail and snow squalls. U
229 established contact at 1105 in AL 1557 with the convoy consisting of
4-5 steamers - reported it frequently before losing touch at 1900 when the
boat was forced to submerge by corvettes.
3 other boats came up temporarily in the course of the day; U 409, U
447 and U 641. U 332 and 230 sighted the convoy in the night of the 10th
but could not maintain contact owing to poor visibility.
1202
U 405 reported contact with 2 steamers at 1732 in AK 3863. At 1910,
U 665 reported a large freighter with torpedo nets in AL 1694.
- 147 -
Defence activity was more in evidence than on previous days. 6 boats
reported a/c. 3 boats were attacked by depth charges without sustaining
serious damage. One boat reported that after there had been explosive
soundings 40 bombs were dropped. There was no hydrophone bearing.
Numerous boats were intercepted by surface escorts.4 boats were attacked
by depth charges. One boat was pursued by a U-boat chaser group, and
reported that the enemy was working with red and white searchlights.
Successes: Assumed:
U 230 reported another 5,000 GRT freighter sunk on 7th. 5,000 GRT
sinking not observed in W/S 8-9
U 530 At 2136 in AL 1763 isolated vessel of 6,000 GRT sunk. 6,000 GRT
U 405 At 2235 in AL 1753 freighter of 6,000 GRT sunk. 6,000 GRT
U 229 At 0116 in AL 2519, 2 hits on convoy. 2 hits
3 ships of 17,000 GRT sunk and 2 hits scored.
At 0846 on the morning of the 10th, U 229 reported a convoy in AL
2612. Boats within operational distance of the convoy are to continue
operations, the other boats on the other hand are to withdraw in order to
meet the isolated vessels following on. As increasing air and surface
defence activity must be expected owing to the proximity of the coast - it
is intended to break off operations after loss of contact.
 b) 1) Group "Robbe" has been in the intensively air patrolled area of
Gibraltar for about 10 days, and is therefore ordered to withdraw to the
west. With the exception of U 103 all boats are so low in fuel that they
cannot undertake large operations. For this reason, the following
operational areas are ordered: U 445 = CF 35, U 103 = CF 36, U 410 =
CG 14, U 107 = CG 15. Only through England/Gibraltar traffic will be in
the area.
2) Group "Raubgraf" will proceed on a course of 3450, speed 6 knots at
1900 in patrol channels. The boat intends to intercept - according to its
own dead reckoning on 10.3 approx. - the expected ON 171 convoy.
3) In order to intercept the fast America convoy confirmed from special
Radio Intelligence Reports, which should be in about DF 10 on 12.3
(working from the known end points), U 172, 515, 513, 167 and 130 are
ordered to proceed to DF 24, daily reckoning 180 sea miles. U 106 is to
remain in the area reached: DF 10.
4) Group "Neuland" with the boats U 608, 757, 406, 86, 373, 441, 440,
221, 444, 336 and 590 are to be deployed against the convoy confirmed
from special Radio Intelligence Reports to be in BC 36 on 8.3. The former
channels had to be transferred to the north and the enemy is expected to
divert traffic in that direction. The Group receives orders to take up
position in reconnaissance channels from AK 8319 to BD 2375 at 0900 on
10.3, and to approach the convoy on a course of 2600, speed 4 knots - U
659 and U 44 enroute for supplies, are to extend the channel to the north
for reconnaissance purposes.
- 148 -
1203
5) U 333's new position is AL 71. If necessary the boat can still be
detailed to operate on the convoy.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 510 - 7 ships 49,000 GRT - 1 ship torpedoed
U 506 - 2 ships 10,581 GRT
U 230 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT
U 530 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT
U 405 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT
U 229 - 2 hits.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
10. March 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(DH 84) U 190 - Op(AL 20) U 440 - Op(AK 89) U 590 -
Op(BD 23)
66 - Op(DH 76) 198 - AO 441 - Op(AK 89) 591 - Op(AL 20)
67 - CF 83 202 - Op(DH 79) 444 - Op(AK 97) 592 - AF 79
68 - Op(EC) 218 - BF 52 445 - Op(CG 71) 598 - BE 92
84 - Op(AJ 67) 221 - Op(AK 89) 447 - Op(AL 20) 600 - Op(AJ 96)
86 - Op(AK 80) 226 - BF 60 448 - AK 59 603 - Op(AJ 92)
87 - BF 50 228 - Op(AL 20) 461 - CF 99 608 - Op(AK 83)
89 - Op(AJ 56) 229 - Op(AL 20) 462 - BF 48 610 - BF 73
91 - Op(AJ 92) 230 - Op(AL 20) 463 - BE 54 615 - Op(AJ 67)
103 - Op(CG 84) 305 - AE 87 468 - Op(AJ 96) 616 - Op(AL 20)
106 - CF 14 306 - AF 79 504 - Op(DH 81) 618 - Op(AL 20)
107 - Op(CG 49) 332 - Op(AL 20) 506 - Op(JJ 26) 621 - Op(AJ 93)
109 - CF 83 333 - BE 52 508 - BE 75 631 - BE 56
119 - BD 29 336 - Op(BD 23) 509 - Op(KY) 633 - Op(AL 25)
130 - CE 28 338 - Op(AL 25) 510 - Op(EP 43) 634 - Op(AL 20)
134 - BE 92 359 - AK 64 513 - Op(CD 45) 638 - Op(AJ 55)
 135 - BE 61 373 - Op(AK 86) 515 - Op(CD 31) 641 - Op(AL 20)
155 - Op(DM 50) 376 - BE 59 516 - Op(KZ) 642 - Op(AL 20)
156 - Op(EE) 377 - BD 29 518 - Op(FJ) 653 - Op(AJ 92)
159 - CF 21 383 - BF 52 521 - Op(DH 74) 659 - AK 59
160 - Op(KP) 384 - BE 92 523 - Op(AL 30) 664 - Op(AJ 67)
167 - CE 76 405 - Op(AL 20) 524 - CE 86 665 - Op(AL 20)
168 - AO 406 - Op(AK 83) 526 - Op(AL 20) 666 - Op(AL 25)
172 - Op(CD 24) 409 - Op(AL 20) 527 - Op(AL 25) 709 - Op(AL 25)
180 - DG 72 410 - Op(CG 44) 529 - Op(AL 56) 753 - BF 60
182 - Op(KQ 65) 415 - AE 69 530 - Op(AL 20) 757 - Op(AK 83)
183 - Op(DM 70) 432 - AK 91 558 - Op(DH 79) 758 - Op(AJ 50)
185 - Op(DM 70) 435 - Op(AJ 92) 566 - Op(AL 20) 759 - BE 24
188 - AF 72 439 - Op(AL 20) 569 - BF 71
On Return Passage: U 87 - 135 - 218 - 226 - 350 - 376 - 377 - 383 - 405
- 432 - 448 - 461 - 462 - 508 - 566 - 569 - 608 - 659 - 753 - 759.
Entered Port: U 218 - 383 - Brest; U 135 - 226 - Lorient; U 753 - La
Pallice.
Sailed: U 663 - Brest; U 572 - Lorient; U 163 - La Pallice.
- 149 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 15 and 16 see para IV a).
1204
2) U 221 sank the steamer "Jamaica" of 4,500 GRT, course 2100 speed
16 knots in BE 1571 on 7.3. On 8.3 the boat fired a single miss of a ship
type "City of Calcutta" in DD 3586.
3) U 621 sighted an isolated vessel on a southerly course in AJ 9319
while proceeding to the new patrol channels. Report of success has not yet
been received.
4) U 202 reported 2 steamers in DH 9764 and DH 9737 respectively on
a northwesterly course. It received orders to attack and boats in this area
are to operate on this report. U 202 confirmed the neutrality of the vessels
after dark. Boats took up their previous positions.
5) U 105 situation report: Have been in DM 76 since 9.3. Daylight air
activity by all types of a/c, slight surface patrol at night. Encountered
convoy consisting of 6 steamers and 4 radar locating escort vessels on 10.3
morning. Sank tanker of type "British Confidence" and ammunition ship
of 8,000 GRT. The convoy was enroute from Windward Passage to
Guantanamo. At 1500 another convoy consisting of 30 steamers, course
900, speed 7.5 knots, was confirmed emerging from the port mentioned.
Forces to submerge by escort, contact lost. Withdrew to charge batteries
and assess damage after depth charge attack.
6) U 160 had temporary contact with a small convoy on a course of 500,
speed 10 knots in KP 8294. Beaten off by air radar.
7) U 516 has withdrawn owing to the Commander's stomach pains.
Boat requests ops. area of "Port Nolloth" (see KTB of 8.3 para III d) 1)
before return passage. The Commander is presumably all right again for
the time being.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: DN 73, AK 89, KZ 21, AL 2857 and a sighting in
unknown position.
2) U-boat attack: In DN 7685 (U 185). There was a sinking report from
an American steamer with the C/S "KENZ" in AE 2851. A further torpedo
report from the British steamer "Rosewood" of 5,989 GRT in AL 2558,
from an unknown position, possibly from convoy.
3) Unknown craft (JV 52) sent an SSS report adding that it had rammed
U-boat.
d) The favorable conditions prevailing at the moment in special Radio
Intelligence matters has led to quick research into the plans for the slow
section of the American convoy. According to this it proceeds via CB
7129, DD 2241, CC 7689, CD 9698, CE 9541. The stragglers are given
the following routes: DD 2436, CC 7975, DE 3233, CD 9695, CE 9814,
DH 2245, DJ 2199.
- 150 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 15:
Weather conditions in the convoy area were reported as follows: wind
strength up to 10, poor visibility, snow and hail.
U 229 reported the convoy in AL 2612 at 0846, but lost contact again
at 1130. U 634 sighted the convoy at 1700 in AL 3511 and lost contact at
dusk. The number of craft in the convoy is not apparent from the report.
From messages received on previous days, however, it cannot be a large
convoy. Proof of this lies in 2 messages from U 523 and U 642, both of
which report an isolated vessel with numerous escort vessels. The convoy
has therefore probably been disbanded.
U 409 reported searching activity by escort craft with red searchlights,
and U 332 reported that after being located by explosive charges similar to
explosive soundings, it was attacked with depth charges at long intervals.
Successes:
U 229 reported with reference to his report of the 10th that on the
morning of the 10th the boat scored a hit on a freighter of 2/5,000 GRT, on
a 3,500 GRT freighter and a further hit on one of the two first 5,000 GRT
freighters.
Two ships were left sinking.
2/10,000 GRT vessels presumed sunk,
1205
1/3,500 GRT vessel presumed torpedoed.
U 409 reported one hit on a 5,000 GRT freighter, an 8,000 GRT tanker
and an 8,000 GRT tanker at 2213 on 9th.
1/5,000 GRT ship presumed sunk,
2/16,000 GRT ship presumed torpedoed.
U 616 reported torpedoing a 1/5,000 GRT vessel at 1500 in AL 2496.
Probably sunk.
Operations were broken off at dawn on the 11th owing to the proximity
of the coast and anticipated air activity. Apart from this, according to all
reports, another group comprising several vessels cannot be expected.
Final Summary Convoy No. 15:
Operations against the SC-convoy bound for England lasted 5 days
from 6.3 to 11.3.43 and extended over a distance of nearly 800 sea miles.
Operations were adversely affected throughout by the very strong westerly
winds and poor visibility, which was on an average never more than 1-2
sea miles owing to hail, snow and fog. This had the result of splitting up
the convoy (with the exception of 4 or 5 steamers) on the first day, and the
ships proceeded independently to the east on the convoy route. It is owing
to the fact that a large number of boats were detailed for this operation,
that a proportionally large number were sunk. 17 boats were operating on
the 6th and 7th and they were joined by 10 more boats on the 8th. On the
average about 15 boats operated on the convoy, the remainder were either
approaching or on the return passage. 10 boats attacked with success,
sinking for the most part isolated vessels. Without a doubt there would
have been greater chances of success had the convoy remained intact, as
more than one ship could have been torpedoed in one attack.
- 151 -

13 ships of altogether 73,000 GRT and 3 ships of altogether 19,500
GRT were torpedoed, and possibly sunk. A ship damaged by a torpedo hit
could scarcely survive in a seaway of 6 to 8.
Enemy defences were unable to cope with the boats attack, either by
means of underwater or surface location. In the poor visibility boats often
ran into convoy escort vessels and received depth charge attacks. 7 boats
reported depth charge activity and 4 boats were bombed. None of the
boats sustained serious damage. Presumably no boat was lost to the
convoy.
2 boats reported that the enemy was using red searchlights as a defence
measure also variously observed to have taken place in the case of
previous convoys. It does not appear from the boats messages that the
enemy has had any success as a result of this method. Apart from this two
boats reported being attacked by depth charges at long intervals after
previous location by explosive charges similar to explosive soundings.
The possibility of locating a U-boat underwater by an a/c appears unlikely.
2) Convoy No. 16:
U 336 southernmost boat of the Group "Neuland" reported a convoy at
1335 on 10.3 in BD 2268. The Group "Neuland" was at once detailed to
operate on this convoy at high speed, including U 333 leaving the area, but
still in the vicinity. U 432, 405, 566 and U 359 were given freedom of
movement.
U 444 obtained contact at 1657 and reported the convoy's course as 60,
speed 10 to 12 knots. Altogether 9 boats coming up during the night
maintained contact until 0725. Convoy route BD 2268, 2354, 2333, AK
9884, 9862.
U 221 sank 3 steamers carrying ammunition at 2126 in BD 3115. The
boat withdrew for repairs as a result of damage caused by the explosions
and subsequent depth charges.
Reports of U 86 and U 406's intention to attack with F.A.T. were
received. Further reports of success were however not received up to
0800.
A Radio Intelligence Report mentions the torpedoing of a steamer
sailing in convoy at 0200.
1206
Successes:
U 221: sank 3 ammunition ships of the type "Port Wyndam",
"Hertford" and "Kent" (of 8,580, 10,923, 8,697 = 28,200 GRT)
The convoy intercepted is HX 228.
b) 1) The Command decided contrary to the orders of the previous day, to
operate on the slower convoy group - by reason of the new, good special
Radio Intelligence conditions. According to dead reckoning the convoy
should be approximately, with a speed of 9 knots, in CD 85 on 12.3.
U 130, 515, 172, 513 and 106 also 167 received orders to take up
position in patrol channels from CD 8381 to DF 2221 on a course of 270,
speed 5 knots, at 1000 on 12.3.
In order not to compromise the channel the boats are not to occupy
their positions before the ordered time.
Position CE 86 is ordered for the boats disposed further afield: U 159,
67, 109, 521, 524 and 103. Another channel is to be disposed here in the
course of 13.3.
U 103 was formerly underway to CF 36. Owing to its large fuel
supply it was also drawn into the convoy operations.
U 445 occupied its operations area.
- 152 -
2) Group "Raubgraf" takes up position this evening in the patrol
channels from AJ 5268 to 9383, as the convoy is not expected to haul off
further to the west. Delay, due to bad weather must be expected.
3) U 305, 631, 384, 598, 135, 610 and 260 are to proceed to AK 69 to
take up position in new patrol channels.
 c) None. 109 - CF 73 336 - Op(AK 99) 509 - Op(KY) 621 - AJ 92
d) 1) U 180 reported on request average daily reckoning as 140 sea miles 119 - BD 29 338 - AL 36 510 - Op(EP) 631 - BE 27
to the ordered assembly point = JA 24. Sailing time about 45 days. The 130 - CE 47 359 - AK 94 513 - CD 85 633 - AL 32
boats received permission to attack only unescorted isolated vessels, as 134 - BE 58 373 - Op(AK 99) 515 - CD 59 634 - AL 25
execution of the special task must be insured. 155 - Op(DM 30) 376 - BE 69 516 - Op(KZ) 638 - Op(AJ 52)
2) U 87 replenished supplies from U 461 on 26.2 in DG 2792 and 156 - Op(EE) 377 - BD 29 518 - Op(FJ) 641 - AL 35
subsequently turned back as ordered. There have been no messages from 159 - CF 43 384 - BE 53 521 - DG 69 642 - AL 35
the boat since then, so that its loss must be presumed. There is no 160 - Op(KP) 405 - AK 69 523 - AL 35 653 - BF 54
information. 163 - BF 54 406 - Op(AK 99) 524 - CF 76 659 - AK 86
167 - CD 99 409 - AL 18 526 - AL 26 663 - BF 54
V. Reports of Success: 168 - AN 36 410 - CG 14 527 - AL 34 664 - Op(AJ 64)
U 221 - 1 ship 3,500 GRT 172 - CD 59 415 - AE 68 529 - Op(AJ 56) 665 - AL 16
U 185 - 2 ships 16,000 GRT 180 - DG 79 432 - AK 94 530 - AL 18 666 - AL 26
U 229 - 2 ships 10,000 GRT 182 - Op(KQ) 435 - Op(AJ 68) 558 - Op(DH 88) 709 - AL 38
U 409 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT 2 ships torpedoed 183 - Op(DM 70) 439 - AL 24 566 - AK 66 757 - Op(AK 99)
U 616 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT 185 - Op(DN 81) 440 - Op(AK 99) 569 - BF 49 758 - Op(AJ 56)
U 221 - 3 ships 20,200 GRT 188 - AF 47 441 - Op(AK 99) 572 - BF 91 759 - BE 53

---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 153 -
11. March 1943.

I. U 43 - Op(DH 86) U 190 - AL 16 U 444 - Op(AK 99) U 590 -

Op(AK 99)
66 - Op(DH 85) 198 - AN 36 445 - CF 63 591 - AL 27
67 - CF 76 202 - DH 97 447 - AL 37 592 - AF 72
68 - Op(EC 20) 221 - Op(AK 99) 448 - AK 86 598 - BE 59
84 - Op(AJ 64) 228 - AL 27 461 - CF 72 600 - Op(AJ 93)
86 - Op(AK 99) 229 - AL 35 462 - BF 68 603 - AJ 67 On Return Passage: U 359 - 376 - 377 - 405 - 432 - 448 - 461 - 462 -
89 - Op(AJ 53) 230 - AL 28 463 - CF 72 608 - Op(AK 99) 508 - 566 - 569 - 608 - 659 - 759.
91 - Op(AJ 68) 305 - AL 22 468 - Op(AJ 93) 610 - BF 47 Entered Port: U 462 - Bordeaux.
103 - CG 74 306 - AF 52 504 - Op(DH 85) 615 - Op(AJ 67) Sailed: U 564 - Brest; U 129 - Lorient; U 191 - Kiel.
106 - DF 21 332 - AL 25 506 - Op(JJ) 616 - AL 27
107 - CG 18 333 - AL 77 508 - BE 84 618 - AL 16 II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
1207

III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 16 see para IVa.
2) U 621 fired a triple miss on the reported isolated vessel and later
possibly scored a hit. After temporary losing contact, the boat sank the
steamer in AK 7174. Tonnage 6,000 GRT.
3) U 615 in the channel belonging to the Group "Raubgraf", observed a
stationary escort vessel in AJ 6715 for several hours and sighted a
destroyer on a southerly course at high speed in AJ 6741. Search for the
presumed convoy was broken off without success. The boat returned to its
position.
4) U 634 encountered a southward bound isolated vessel in AL 2654. It
was soon invisible owing to snow gusts. Subsequently the boat
experienced hydrophone activity by a corvette.
5) U 506 intends to carry out repairs off the coast and will withdraw in
the full moon period to GH 70.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: DL 6598, AK 9647, AM 1812, AK 96 and 2 other
boats in 520 N, and unknown longitude.
2) U-boat attack in DM 7673.
3) Report of torpedoing from British steamer with call sign BFYF in DL
6921.
d) According to special Radio Intelligence Report ONS 169 was in AJ
3710 on the forenoon of 9.3. Course 2600 and speed 2 knots. The
convoy's position is further back than reckoned owing to bad storms.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 16:
There was no more contact with the convoy after dawn of 11.3. U 406
reported it at 1158 in AK 9921 and U 359 which had chased an isolated
vessel to the north, reported being passed over at 1600 in AK 9625 by the
southeastward bound convoy.
Apart from the isolated vessels already mentioned U 359 sighted 2
isolated vessels on a course of 50 at 2324 in AK 9681. U 440 reported
chasing an isolated vessel in AL 74.
1208
U 580 reported hydrophone bearing in true course of 1150 from AL
7158 at 0057 on 12.3.; 405 at 2320 on 113. No hydrophone bearing.
Other messages which might have shed light on the convoys position have
not been received.
- 154 -
Defence: It is apparent from messages subsequently received that
surface force defence is normal. 3 boats report having been beaten off by
destroyers followed by hydrophone searching.
Heavy air activity was noticeable by day, and this greatly hindered the
boats operations. According to Radio Intelligence there are numerous
aircraft attacks from the convoy area
U 359 broke off operations owing to fuel shortage; U 757 which was
seriously damaged as a result of the explosion of a torpedoed ammunition
ship, will be accompanied together with the Medical Officer's boat.
Successes:
U 336 At 2332 on 10.3 double spread on steamer hit possible.
U 757 "William Palmer" of 7,602 GRT sunk.
U 590 At 0215 on 12.3 one steamer of 6,000 GRT sunk, one other hit on
steamer possible.
U 86 At 0510 on 11.3 tanker of 8,000 GRT sunk, 2 hits on another
steamer.
U 406 At 0725 at 11.3 hits on tanker of 8,000 GRT heard.
U 359 At 1112 on 11.3 one hit on isolated vessel ( steamer)
U 440 2 hits on isolated vessels possible.
 b) 1) As the position of the "ONS" 169 convoy given in a special Radio
Intelligence report is further west than previously supposed, Group
"Raubgraf" is to proceed to reconnaissance channels on a course of 2700
degrees, speed 5 knots at 1000 and will remain in position reached from
AJ 5159 to 9282 as patrol line. Owing to U 621's return passage, U 608
and 468 are to move up one position to the N.W.
2) Groups "Ostmark" and Westmark" were disbanded after breaking off
operations on Convoy 15. The boats with an adequate supply of fuel are d) U 180's Commander requests a speeding up of the passage to the
to be incorporated in a new group "Sturmer" and are to take up position in intended meeting place, on account of the passenger (?) on board. After a
the following order in reconnaissance lines from AK 0371 to AL 728, discussion with the Naval War Staff the boat received orders to proceed at
course 240, cruising speed 5 knots at 2000 on 15.3. U 305 - 527 - 666 - a speed necessary to ensure a meeting on 23.4.
523 - 229 - 526 - 642 - 439 - 338 - 641 - 565 - 618 - 190 and 530.
Positions are not to be occupied before the ordered time. V. Reports of Success:
Of the remaining boats in operation against the convoy, U 332 has U 621 1 ship 6,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
freedom of movement to the west, as stragglers are presumed. U 634 - U 757 1 ship 7,602 GRT
409 - 591 - 228 - 616 and 230 are proceeding at economical cruising speed U 590 1 ship 6,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
to supply position BD 2455 and is to replenish supplies there from U 463 U 86 1 ship 8,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
for further operations. U 406 1 ship 8,000 GRT
U 709 is on the return passage owing to complete transmitter U 359 1 ship torpedoed.
breakdown. It will attempt to send a situation report with the emergency U 440 1 ship torpedoed.
transmitter via another boat.
c) 1) U 119 has up to now supplied U 608 for further deployment and U
377 for return passage. ---------------------------------------------------
2) U 757 was seriously damaged by the explosion of an ammunition ---------------
ship it had torpedoed. Both batteries and starboard Diesel were put out of
action. The boat cannot submerge but it is still afloat. The boat requests 12. March 1943.
medical assistance. U 119 received orders to arrange a meeting in BD
3477 on 12.3. U 659 - 448 - 432 - 405 - 566 and 359 are to replenish fuel
supplies in the same position. U 228 is to receive the entire remaining I. U 43 - Op(DH 90) U 190 - AL 42 U 444 - Op(AL 70) U 590 -
quantity for further operations. The boat first ready for the return passage Op(AK 70)
is to remain by U 757 until this boat is again sea-worthy. 66 - Op(DH 85) 191 - AO 47 445 - Op(CF 36) 591 - AL 42
67 - CF 96 198 - AN 43 447 - AL 64 592 - AF 47
68 - Op(EC 20) 202 - Op(DH 90) 448 - BD 26 598 - BE 15
- 155 - 84 - Op(AJ 59) 221 - Op(AL 70) 461 - CF 54 600 - Op(AJ 92)
86 - AK 78 228 - AL 42 463 - BD 38 603 - Op(AJ 67)
89 - Op(AJ 54) 229 - AL 28 468 - Op(AJ 92) 608 - Op(AL 70)
1209
 91 - Op(AJ 91) 230 - AL 51 504 - Op(DH 90) 610 - BE 56
103 - CF 86 305 - AL 20 506 - KZ 88 615 - Op(AJ 67)
106 - Op(CD 89) 306 - AF 47 508 - BE 92 616 - AL 42
107 - Op(CG 15) 332 - AL 20 509 - Op(KY) 618 - AL 10
109 - CF 96 333 - Op(AL 70) 510 - Op(EP) 621 - AK 74
119 - BD 29 336 - Op(AL 70) 513 - Op(CD 89) 631 - BF 12
129 - BF 54 338 - AL 30 515 - Op(CD 86) 633 - AL
130 - Op(CD 83) 359 - AK 77 516 - Op(KZ) 634 - AL 26
134 - BE 51 373 - Op(AL 70) 518 - Op(FJ) 638 - Op(AJ 51)
155 - Op(DM 30) 376 - BF 91 521 - DG 61 641 - AL 20
156 - Op(EE) 377 - BE 45 523 - AL 27 642 - AL 20
159 - CF 66 384 - BE 24 524 - CF 96 653 - Op(AJ 92)
160 - Op(KP) 405 - AK 95 526 - AL 20 659 - BD 26
163 - BF 40 406 - Op(AL 70) 527 - AL 20 663 - BF 40
167 - Op(DF 22) 409 - AL 44 529 - Op(AJ 55) 664 - Op(AJ 58)
168 - AN 43 410 - Op(CG 14) 530 - AL 50 665 - AL 10
172 - Op(CD 86) 415 - AE 83 558 - Op(DH 90) 666 - AL 20
180 - DS 53 432 - BD 23 654 - BF 54 709 - AL 65
182 - Op(KQ) 435 - Op(AJ 67) 566 - AK 95 757 - BD 34
183 - Op(DM 70) 439 - AL 20 569 - BF 91 758 - Op(AJ 58)
185 - Op(DN 80) 440 - Op(AL 70) 572 - BF 80 759 - BE 65
188 - AE 68 441 - Op(AL 70)
On Return Passage: U 228 - 230 - 359 - 376 - 377 - 405 - 432 - 447 -
448 - 461 - 508 - 566 - 569 - 591 - 608 - 616 - 621 - 659 - 709 - 759.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 260 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Gibraltar convoys in the area west of Portugal.
- 156 -
1210
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 16 and convoy report U 43, see para IV a.
2) U 448 established contact with an isolated vessel on a general course
southwest, speed 14 knots in BD 5133 at 1814. After a high speed chase
lasting several hours the steamer disappeared in the darkness owing to the
U-boat's inability to overhaul her.
3) U 468 chased a large tanker of the type "Cadillac" of 12,062 GRT on
a southerly course, as far as AJ 9585 and sank her there with 3 torpedo
hits. Estimated at 10,000 GRT.
4) U 91 fired a triple miss in spite of precise preparation, at a suspicious
looking steamer of 15,000 GRT. Depth charges were dropped afterwards
and the boat suspected it of being a "Q ship".
5) U 260 reported while underway in BF 6492, 2 silhouettes without
lights the size of trawlers.
6) U 183 situation report: Continuous location while proceeding
through Windward Passage in DN 8550. There is only daylight air activity
in the present operational area. An Argentinean vessel on an easterly
course, was confirmed on the 6th, 7th and 8.3. A freighter of 7,000 GRT
course 400, speed 15 knots was sunk in DL 6921 on 11.3.
b) The aerial reconnaissance sighted a northward bound convoy in CG
1276, and a convoy consisting of 47 ships and 6 escort vessels on a course
of 1800, medium speed, in BE 9284.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: DH 95, FJ 82, CA 3742, DN 7567, EF 8680, CH
8291, BF 4535.
2) The convoy intercept by a/c refers apparently to a convoy using a
cover name used earlier presumably OS 44. The previous OS convoy was
intercepted on 25.2, so that the time interval amounts to 3 weeks according
to reckoning.
- 157 -

From this, it appears that the England-Freetown convoy traffic is
again sailing at regular intervals.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy report U 43:
The boat sighted a small convoy of 4 steamers and 3 escort craft on a
southwesterly course at 1450 in DH 9646. It was apparently at once
forced to submerge and lost contact. Later at 1900 U 504 reported the
convoy on a course of 225, speed about 15 knots in H 9853. Depth
charges were dropped very close to the boat and there was machine gun
fire which necessitated withdrawal to ascertain the extent of the damage.
Boats near the Canaries were ordered to operate on the convoy in spite of
the enemy's high speed. As, however, no more contact messages were
received and in the meantime the America convoy expected by the other
boats and of the utmost importance for the Africa supplies, had been
intercepted in CD 80; only boats in a favorable position were left to
operate on the southward bound convoy. The remaining boats operated at
maximum cruising speed on the America convoy. Before morning all boats
had broken off the pursuit and proceeded to the west. There were no
successes.
Merely U 43 subsequently reported having sunk a large passenger
steamer of the "Blue Star" Line, on a northerly course, speed 13 knots; in
DF 9329 on 3.3.
2) Convoy No. 17:
Before the interception of the America convoy, the boats detailed for
this operation received the following order:
I) U 130, 515, 122, 513, 106 and 167 form the Group "Unverzagt". If
there is no previous contact boats in reconnaissance channels ordered for
1211
12.3 at 1000 for this group are to turn back on a course of 900, speed 8
knots. In this way an unobserved passage during the night is to be
avoided. At a speed of 8 knots the convoy should be in the vicinity of the
channel towards evening, according to reckoning.
II) U 159, 109, 524, 67, 521 and 103 are to take up position in
reconnaissance channels from CE 8272 to 8878 at 0900 on 14.3 as the
Group "Wohlgemut". The channels are on the latitude of the route given
in the special Radio Intelligence Report.
U 130 reported a destroyer in CD 8256 on a course of 900 at 1841, and
presumed that the convoy would be in CD 8272 at about 2000. Course
750, speed 7 to 8 knots according to the new position. The Group
"Unverzagt" received orders to operate on this. U 130 is not to attack until
another boat has reported contact. Further, the Group "Wohlgemut" was
detailed to operate at high speed. The convoy was in CD 6258, course
800, speed 8 knots, at 2300. U 515 requested D/F signal at 2300. Contact
was subsequently broken off. U 172 was chased by a destroyer and forced
to submerge at 0500 in CD 8316. The boat observed the firing of star
shells and heard depth charges. Further reports have not been received. It
is intended to allow the boats to search independently by day in the
prevailing good visibility, and if the convoy is not found, to dispose both
groups early on 14.3 in a channel.
- 158 -
3) Convoy No. 16:
 No convoy messages have been received. As it may be assumed that
the enemy has diverged to the north, the boats have been ordered to
operate on the enemy course 10 - 500.
Subsequently U 590 reported the last hydrophone bearing - true course
850 at 0800 on 12.3 in AL 7265.
Two boats reported being forced to remain submerged by a/c.
As no contact was established during the day, the boats received
instructions to continue operations until dawn on 13.3 and then if contact
has not been obtained, to break off. The boats are informed that according
to the reckoning of the Naval War Staff the convoy should be in the
channel area from AL 2950 to AL 6810 at 0800 on 13.3.
No messages were received up to 0800 on 13.3.
Final summing up:
Convoy 16, (HX 228) was intercepted at 1335 on 10.3 by U 336 the
most southerly boat of the Group "Neuland", and 26 hours later, at 1600
on 11.3, reported by U 359 for the last time. There was continuous contact
during the night but this was interrupted at dawn apparently, owing to air
patrols and only temporary re-established by U 406 at 1158 and U 359 at
1600.
The Command informed the boats after the first breaking off of
contact, of their supposition that the convoy would probably steer a
general course of 55 to 700 after a large zig zag to the north at night and
proceed at a speed of 8 to 10 knots.
On receipt of U 359's convoy report of 1600, 11.3, the boats received
orders to operate on the enemy course of 40-700, speed 8-10 knots.
As there was no indication of the convoy position up to 1000 on 12.3,
it was presumed the enemy had again deviated to the south. The boats
received instructions to operate at high speed on the enemy course of 10-
500.
In order to exhaust all possibilities, the operation was continued in
spite of unsuccessful searching in the course of the 12.3 to daylight in
13.3. If there was no enemy contact the boats were to withdraw to the
west. Nothing was sighted before daylight. The convoy operation was
therefore broken off.
The surface craft defences must be considered to have been normal.
The strong air patrols by fast land a/c, which began to operate on 11.3
1212
complicated matters considerably and led to the breaking off of contact
and the inability to reestablish it.
U 444 which maintained good contact to begin with reported for the
last time at 0029 on 11.3 and did not reply to repeated requests. The loss
of this boat must be presumed. (see under IVd).
Weather conditions were normal. The prevailing wind was NW,
between strength 5 and 7, seaway 4 to 6. An average visibility was 10 sea
miles, often affected by snow gusts. Cloud 7/10.
After the discontinuation of contact messages by U 444, the reports of
the convoy were spasmodic and often very belated. Although the boats
were expressly instructed on the necessity of quick transmission of
complete enemy contact
- 159 -
messages also of information on the enemy this did not improve. As
far as can be seen at present, cooperation between the boats could have
been better.
The following results were achieved:
6 steamers (including one tanker) were sunk altogether 49,802 GRT.
1 tanker (8,000 GRT) and 1 steamer each hit by 2 torpedoes.
The sinking of both units may be presumed. 4 other steamers were
probably torpedoed.
b) 1) The Command decided to operate on the intercepted HX 229 on the
strength of the special Radio Intelligence Reports received. Group
"Raubgraf" remains in the former channel. The convoy ONS 169 expected
by the boats must have already passed through. Group "Sturmer" is to be V. Reports of Success:
reinforced and will take up position at 2000 on 14.3 with the boats U 305, U 468 - 1 ship 10,000 GRT
527, 666, 523, 229, 526, 642, 439, 338, 641, 665, 618, 190, 530, 631, 598, U 183 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT
384 and 134 in reconnaissance channels from AK 3563 to AL 7215 on a U 43 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT
course of 260, cruising speed 5 knots.
A disposition further north is not considered necessary, as in the event
of the enemy proceeding on a course far to the north Group "Raubgraf" - 160 -
would be in a position to intercept it.
2) U 221 has carried out repairs and is waiting in AL 70.Disposition in a
new patrol line with additional boats is planned.
3) U 445, 610 and 107 are operating on the southbound convoy reported
by a/c in BE 9284.
c) None.
d) 1) In order to facilitate the transmission of closed areas within Route
"A" to boats these will be divided into the following sections.
Section "A" extends from W. France to 300 W.
" "B" " " 300 W. to the south to 300 N. 13.March 1943.
" "C" " " 300 N. to 150 N.
" "D" " " 150 N. to 050 S.
With the immediate closing of section "B" until further notice, only I. U 43 - DH 95 U 190 - AL 48 U 445 - Op(CG 12) U 598 - AL 78
section "A" is open for attacks on isolated vessels. 66 - Op(DH 85) 191 - AN 36 447 - AL 92 600 - Op(AJ 91)
67 - CE 97 198 - AN 28 448 - BD 29 603 - Op(AJ 59)
68 - Op(EC 20) 202 - Op(DH 90) 461 - CF 29 608 - Op(AL 55)
2) According to an English radio report, a/c observed a German U-boat 84 - Op(AJ 56) 221 - Op(AL 77) 463 - BD 29 610 - BE 51
hit a mine and sink - after a large explosion, shortly before the attack on it. 86 - AL 48 228 - AL 47 468 - Op(AJ 92) 615 - Op(AJ 56)
This was probably U 87. 89 - Op(AJ 52) 229 - AL 01 504 - DH 97 616 - AK 69
3) U 633 reported for the last time on 3.3 from about AL 30, on patrols 91 - Op(AJ 67) 230 - AL 47 506 - Op(JJ) 618 - AL 42
encountered in the Iceland Passage. Subsequently the boat was detailed to 103 - CF 76 260 - BF 58 508 - BF 72 621 - BD 12
operate on Convoy No. 15 on 6.3. It is not known whether it established 106 - Op(CD 89) 305 - AL 15 509 - Op(KY) 631 - AL 78
contact as no convoy message was received. Numerous requests remained 107 - Op(CG 12) 306 - AE 68 510 - Op(EP) 634 - AL 01
unanswered. Its loss must be presumed. 109 - CE 86 332 - AL 19 513 - Op(CD 89) 638 - Op(AJ 51)
4) U 444 operated within the Group "Neuland" on Convoy No. 16 and 119 - BD 37 333 - Op(AL 55) 515 - Op(CD 86) 641 - AL 45
last reported it in AK 9877 on 11.3. The boat did not afterwards answer. U 129 - BF 48 336 - AL 55 516 - Op(KZ) 642 - AL 51
441 observed an a/c attack on U-boat in AK 96 at 1009 on 11.3. This was 130 - CD 83 338 - AL 51 518 - Op(FJ) 653 - Op(AJ 67)
probably U 444 and the loss of this boat must be presumed. 134 - BE 12 359 - BD 34 521 - DG 26 659 - BD 34
1213
 155 - Op(DM 30) 373 - Op(AL 48) 523 - AL 19 663 - BE 66
156 - Op(EE) 376 - BF 64 524 - CE 97 664 - Op(AJ 55)
159 - CE 91 377 - BE 51 526 - AL 19 665 - AL 45
160 - Op(KP) 384 - BE 12 527 - AL 18 666 - AL 01
163 - BF 96 405 - BD 34 529 - Op(AJ 55) 709 - AL 93
167 - Op(CD 89) 406 - Op(AL 57) 530 - AL 48 757 - BD 34
168 - AN 28 409 - AK 69 558 - Op(DH 90) 758 - Op(AJ 55)
172 - Op(CD 86) 410 - Op(CG 12) 564 - BF 44 759 - BF 59
180 - DS 91 415 - AE 85 566 - BD 34 -
182 - Op(KQ) 432 - BD 34 569 - BF 64 -
183 - Op(DN 70) 435 - Op(AJ 59) 572 - BF 71 -
185 - Op(DN 80) 439 - AL 42 590 - Op(AL 57) -
188 - AE 59 440 - AL 84 591 - AL 19 -
441 - Op(AL 55) 592 - AE 68 -
On Return Passage: U 228 - 230 - 359 - 376 - 377 - 405 - 432 - 447 -
448 - 461 - 508 - 566 - 569 - 591 - 608 - 616 - 621 - 659 - 709 - 759.
Entered Port: U 376 - 569 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 123 - 161 - Lorient; U 196 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Against Gibraltar traffic in the area west of
Portugal.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy Nos. 17 and 18 see para IVa.
2) The boats U 445, 410 and 107 operate off the convoy reported by a/c.
The latter attacked in CG 1218 and scored 6 hits. An ammunition ship
exploded after 2 hits, otherwise, owing to defence activity and bad
visibility no observation was possible. Subsequent hydrophone and depth
charge activity.
U 410 was continually forced to submerge by a/c in CG 1943 at about
2400. After the breakdown of the attack periscope and restricted maximum
speed the boat broke off operations. No report from U 445.
- 161 -
1214
3) Situation reports:
U 68 sighted a convoy of 20 freighters and tankers on a course of 2350
in EC 1637 on 9.3. Intercepted by search gear, subsequent depth charges
and continuous air activity ship of type "American Dunker", 7,886 GRT
and "Cities Service Missouri" 7,506 GRT from a similar convoy in EC
were left sinking on 13.3. Submerged owing to a/c and destroyers.
Medium daylight air activity occasional radar activity at night on the
convoy route.
U 187: Nothing sighted off Laurenco Marques. Began eastward
passage to area east and south of Madagascar. Sank steamer "Spaight" of
10,000 GRT on a course of 2400 in KP 6827 on 10.3.
U 509: Nothing sighted since the 4.3 between KY 5673, 6465 and the
coast with the exception of a small convoy on a westerly course in KY
5665 on 11.3. As the boat still has 18 torpedoes and will have to return
unless supplies are replenished, fuel replenishment is planned.
4) U 653 sank a freighter of 4,000 GRT in AJ 9154 on 12.3. Course
southwest.
b) A/c intercepted convoy consisting of 32 merchant ships and 9 escort
vessels in BE 9728 at 0930.
c) 1) According to a Radio Intelligence report the southbound convoy
"OS 44" was in CG 1521, course 145, speed 8 knots at 1126. The
suggested course makes it possible this convoy, like the convoy "OS 43"
proceeded close to Gibraltar and then along the African coast.
2) U-boat sightings: AJ 5960.
Depth charge attack by a/c possibly in area DH. No exact position.
Torpedoing report from FF 4611. 2 heavy explosions were heard in
DN by a U.S.A. warship. (Possibly an attack by U 185).
 3) A/c listening regiment obtained a bearing on a convoy in AM 1540 at
1214 and presumed this to be the "ON 172" convoy by reason of a similar
cover name, according to this the convoy must have put out 2 days earlier
than was expected from the timetable.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 18:
U 603 in Group "Raubgraf's" patrol channel reported a convoy on a
southwesterly course in AJ 6747 at 1238. According to U 603's reckoning
this refers to the convoy ON 170 that may have been delayed for two days
owing to the bad weather conditions prevailing up to now. Group
"Raubgraf" was detailed to operate on the convoy at high speed. U 435
and 468 contacted destroyers temporarily. U 615 requested D/F signals. U
600 reported the convoy consisting of 16-20 steamers at 1843
- 162 -
on a course of 2250 in AJ 8328.Contact was soon lost in snow drifts.
Visibility was on average 1 to 2 miles which greatly restricted operations.
U 468 was the last boat to establish contact at 2300 in AJ 8378. It was,
however, immediately forced to submerge and was attacked for four hours
with depth charges. The convoy was not found again, in spite of several
hydrophone bearings. The boats continued operations on a southerly
course. Star shells were sighted by U 435 in 2860 from AJ 8583. No
further messages have been received. Operations continued as in spite of
1215
the persistently bad weather conditions, rain snow drifts and partial fog,
isolated successes are possible.
2) Convoy No. 17:
U 513 again found the convoy at 1230 on 13.3 in grid CD 9111, and
contact was maintained until 1926 in grid CD 6795. U 167 and U 172 are
according to reports in the vicinity of the convoy.
U 172 reported a northeastward bound isolated vessel and sank it in
grid CD 6825.
In order to intercept the convoy again, a patrol channel from CD 6385
via CE 4743 to CE 7414 is ordered, for 14.3 at 0900.
b) Group "Neuland" has broken off operations on Convoy No. 16. The
boats are still so well supplied with fuel that they could be disposed
without further replenishment. It is intended to use them for a sweep on
the southern North Atlantic traffic route. Order: U 373, 86, 336, 440, 590,
441, 406, 600, 333, 221 and 610 are to take up positions in reconnaissance
channels from AL 4887 to BE 1255 on a course of 2600, speed 5 knots at
0800 on 15.3
c) 1) U 591 has handed over 6 telescopes to U 523.
2) U 757 is unable to repair its batteries satisfactorily and it is intended
to return at high speed and skeleton crew. One of the boats on a return
passage is to take sufficient fuel on board (from U 119) to escort U 757 at
high speed.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 107 2 ships 12,000 GRT
U 68 2 ships 15,500 GRT
U 182 1 ship 10,000 GRT
U 653 1 ship 4,000 GRT
U 172 1 ship 5,565 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
14. March 1943.

I. U 43 - DH 83 U 185 - Op(DN 70) U 439 - Op(AK 63) U 590 -
Op(AL 81)
66 - DH 49 188 - AE 85 440 - Op(AL 82) 591 - AL 47
67 - Op(CE 72) 190 - Op(AL 44) 441 - Op(AL 85) 592 - AE 91
68 - EC 53 191 - Kristiansand 445 - Op(BE 90) 598 - Op(AL 47)
84 - Op(AJ 89) 196 - AO 40 447 - AL 91 600 - Op(AJ 88)
86 - Op(AL 81) 198 - AF 79 448 - BD 34 603 - Op(AJ 88)
89 - Op(AJ 80) 202 - DM 73 461 - CF 81 608 - Op(AJ 88)
91 - Op(AJ 88) 221 - Op(AL 75) 463 - BD 24 610 - BE 16
103 - Op(EC 95) 228 - AK 96 468 - Op(AJ 88) 615 - Op(AJ 88)
106 - Op(CD 66) 229 - Op(AK 38) 504 - DH 58 616 - AK 94
- 163 -
U 107 - CG 42 U 230 - AK 95 U 506 - Op(KY) U 618 - Op(AL 44)
109 - Op(CE 72) 260 - BF 40 508 - BF 55 621 - BD 24
119 - BD 34 305 - Op(AK 35) 509 - Op(KY 65) 631 - Op(AL 47)
123 - BF 50 306 - AE 91 510 - Op(EP) 634 - AL 44
129 - BE 93 332 - AL 513 - Op(CD 66) 638 - AJ 69
130 - Op(CD 80) 333 - AL 75 515 - Op(CD 90) 641 - Op(AL 41)
134 - Op(AL 72) 336 - Op(AL 57) 516 - Op(KZ) 642 - Op(AJ 88)
155 - Op(DM 20) 338 - Op(AK 63) 518 - Op(FJ) 653 - BD 34
156 - Op(EE) 359 - BD 34 521 - Op(CE 87) 659 - BE 56
159 - Op(CE 72) 373 - Op(AL 48) 523 - AL 01 663 - BE 56
1216
160 - Op(KP) 377 - BE 64 524 - Op(CE 24) 664 - Op(AJ 80)
161 - BF 50 384 - Op(AL 48) 526 - Op(AK 03) 665 - Op(AL 41)
163 - BE 94 405 - BD 34 527 - Op(AK 36) 666 - Op(AK 38)
167 - Op(CD 63) 406 - AL 81 529 - Op(AJ 80) 709 - BE 23
168 - AF 79 409 - AK 98 530 - Op(AL 44) 757 - BD 34
172 - Op(CD 66) 410 - CG 19 558 - DH 81 758 - Op(AJ 80)
180 - EH 32 415 - AL 31 564 - BE 65 759 - BF 61
182 - Op(KQ 45) 432 - BD 34 566 - BD 34
183 - Op(DM 70) 435 - Op(AJ 88) 572 - BE 68
On Return Passage: U 89 - 228 - 230 - 332 - 359 - 377 - 405 - 409 - 432
- 447 - 448 - 461 - 508 - 566 - 591 - 608 - 616 - 621 - 634 - 638 - 653 -
659 - 709 - 757 - 759.
Entered Port: U 759 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 704 -St. Nazaire; U 257 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 17 and 18 see para IVa.
2) U 107 again intercepted the OS 44 convoy in CG 4639 at 1200. The
boat was however picked up by a/c and continually forced to submerge. 3
steamers were presumably sunk in yesterday's attack. Several life boats
and wreckage was observed. As there is no longer any contact U 410, 405
and 107 were ordered to turn back to the former attack area in order to
operate there until the fuel supply is exhausted.
3) U 160 sank a loaded freighter of 6,000 GRT in KP 9174 on 8.3 and
the American ship "Aryan" of 6,452 GRT in KP 9178 at 11.3.Return
passage with 3 torpedoes as a withdrawal from the coastal area is
necessary during the full moon period.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: AJ 8755, BE 5321, BE 6169, EL 3113, EC 58,
DN 7661, BC 1433, BE 2922, AL 8865.
 U-boats were attacked in AL 1939 and BC 2516. Torpedo report from
American steamer "Keystone" of 5565 GRT in CD 6845. A report of
attack from AJ 87.
2) English convoy unit reported a/c contact in BE 6498 at 1015. Own
course, 60, speed 3 knots.
- 164 -
d) 1) Convoy SC 122, sailing in 14 columns with 49 ships, received
instructions at 2000 on 13.3 to proceed from BC 2752 on a course of 670.
2) According to a new order, the convoy HX 229 is now to proceed on a
course of 88 from BC 7518 from the evening of 13.3. The attack on
Convoy No. 18 is the apparent reason for this new diversion.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 18:
The boats continued the search on a southerly course without
establishing contact.
Heavy air activity was experienced in the afternoon in the lower third
of AJ and upper third of BC.
For further deployment see para b 1).
U 653 and 89 begin their return passage owing to engine damage.
2) Convoy No. 17:
At 0910 U 513 reported several smoke trails in CE 4476 which were
later confirmed as a convoy and contact was maintained via CE 4464, CE
4274 to CE 4273 at 1949. U 167 and U 106 were in the vicinity. At 2000
U 513 was beaten off to the south, U 167 to the west and contact was
thereby lost.
1217
The boats, which had been instructed to push ahead with loose contact
in order to be able to attack as simultaneously as possible before night fall,
received orders to close in with determination. At 0240 U 515 again found
the convoy in CE 4321 and reported it for the last time in CE 442 at
0415.Contact was then lost for the rest of the night.
According to messages received U 515, 524, 172, 513, 167 and 106
were in the vicinity of the convoy. None of the boats were able to attack
as they had already been observed by the escort and beaten off. U 515 was
damaged by depth charges but continued operations.
A patrol channel was not ordered so that boats in a favorable position
should not be withdrawn from the convoy. The boats were informed that
the convoy was bound for Gibraltar and would presumably pass north of
the Azores.
b) 1) Operations on Convoy No. 18 were broken off on receipt of the
special Radio Intelligence report on convoy SC 122 as there had been no
contact for some time. All boats ready for action are to be detailed to
intercept convoy SC 122. U 468, 435, 603, 615, 600, 458, 664, 84 and 91
are to take up patrol lines from AJ 9945 to BC 3566 on 1600 on 15.3. If
the convoy sails on the ordered route he should be near the lines towards
evening.
The Groups "Sturmer" and Dranger" are also directed to the south,
they are to proceed on a course of 2350 at 0800 on 15.3.
2) According to KTB of 8.3 para III U 509 was detailed to operate on
traffic in the area north of Cape Town and received freedom of movement
for this purpose.
- 165 -

Supplying of "Seehund" boats is planned to take place in
approximately lower third of DG. The Commander will decide whether
the return passage is to take place with or without replenishment,
according to the number of torpedoes and the traffic situation.
3) U 572, 415, 260, 592, 306, 564, 663, 188 proceed to AK 83 for
disposition in a new channel.
c) 1) To replenish from U 463 on 15.3., U 409, 591, 616 and contrary to
previous instructions U 228 for further operations. U 634 and 230 are to
return without replenishment.
2) U 359 and 659 have replenished supplies from U 119 for the return
passage.
3) U 359 (escort) and U 757 are proceeding via BE 94 to Western
France at a speed of 14 knots. They will arrive in our own air patrol area
at approximately midday on 17.3.
d) U 529 last reported from AE 78 on 12.2. The boat is to be
subsequently allocated to Group "Ritter". It was therefore in various
patrol channels so that there was no reason to request (a report). U 529
was repeatedly requested to send a position report during ops on Convoy
No. 18 but did not reply. Its loss must therefore be presumed. It is
probable though, that this would have been received earlier, as in the long
interval there must have been a reason for sending a message.
V. Reports of Success:
U 107 - 1 ship5,000 GRT
U 160 - 2 ships 10,452 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
14. March 1943.
I. U 43 - DH 52 U 183 - Op(DM 70) U 415 - AL 14 U 564 - BE 56
66 - DH 17 185 - Op(DN 70) 432 - BD 34 566 - BD 34
67 - Op(CE 51) 188 - AE 79 435 - Op(AJ 98) 572 - BE 54
1218
68 - Op(EC 50) 190 - Op(AK 66) 439 - Op(AK 39) 590 - Op(AL 75)
84 - Op(BC 24) 191 - Bergen 440 - Op(AL 72) 591 - AK 92
86 - Op(AL 70) 196 - AN 30 441 - Op(AL 75) 592 - AE 85
89 - BC 22 198 - AF 73 445 - CG 42 598 - Op(AK 69)
91 - Op(BC 34) 202 - CF 79 447 - BE 21 600 - Op(BC 31)
103 - CF 69 221 - Op(BE 12) 448 - BD 34 603 - Op(BC 31)
106 - Op(CE 27) 228 - BD 22 461 - CF 55 608 - Op(AL 87)
107 - Op(CG 43) 229 - Op(AK 37) 463 - BD 24 610 - Op(BE 12)
109 - Op(CE 51) 230 - BD 31 468 - Op(AJ 97) 615 - Op(BC 24)
119 - BD 34 257 - BF 91 504 - DH 27 616 - BD 21
123 - BF 48 260 - BF 47 506 - Op(KY) 618 - Op(AK 61)
129 - BE 91 305 - Op(AK 26) 508 - BF 52 621 - BD 24
130 - Op(CE 51) 306 - AE 85 509 - Op(GR) 631 - Op(AK 69)
134 - Op(AL 71) 332 - AL 84 510 - Op(EP) 634 - AL 81
155 - Op(DM 50) 333 - Op(AL 87) 513 - Op(CE 27) 638 - AJ 97
156 - Op(EE) 336 - Op(AL 72) 515 - Op(CE 27) 641 - Op(AK 62)
159 - Op(CE 51) 338 - Op(AK 62) 516 - Op(KZ) 642 - Op(AK 39)
160 - Op(KP 95) 359 - BE 17 518 - Op(FJ) 653 - Op(BC 24)
161 - BF 48 373 - Op(AL 72) 521 - Op(CE 51) 659 - BE 18
163 - BE 87 377 - BE 66 523 - Op(AK 37) 663 - BE 27
167 - Op(CE 27) 384 - Op(AK 69) 524 - Op(CE 27) 664 - BC 34
168 - AF 76 405 - BD 34 526 - Op(AK 39) 665 - Op(AK 63)
- 166 -
U 172 - Op(CE 15) U 406 - Op(AL 87) U 527 - AK 35 U 666 -
Op(AK 37)
 180 - EH 63 409 - BD 24 530 - Op(AK 69) 704 - BF 58
182 - Op(KQ) 410 - Op(GG 14) 558 - DH 43 709 - BE 61
757 - BD 34
758 - Op(BC 24)
On Return Passage: U 89 - 160 - 228 - 230 - 332 - 359 - 377 - 405 - 409
- 432 - 447 - 448 - 461 - 508 - 566 - 591 - 608 - 616 - 621 - 634 - 638 -
653 - 659 - 709 - 757.
Entered Port: U 508 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 706 - La Pallice; U 632 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) For Convoy No. 17 and Group "Raubgraf's" ops see para IVa.
2) U 447 was bombed by English a/c in AL 8836 at 14.3. It continued
its southern passage in spite of slight damage and attacked an isolated
vessel on an easterly course in BE 1691 on 15.3 without success. Contact
lost.
3) U 415 encountered neither defences or patrols while underway
through the Iceland Passage.
4) U 510 situation report: Nothing sighted from EP 41 to FB 19. Intend
further ops in EP 40. Unable to eliminate oil track.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: FC 79, FC 84, SSS message from CE 5469.
d) 730 has been ordered as new course for the SC 122 convoy.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Owing to alteration of the convoy course to 73 the patrol channel of
Group "Raubgraf" has been moved 15 miles to the south. It is intended to
follow up during the night and run across the convoy during the day.
U 91 sighted a destroyer in BC 3559 at 2000 on a northeasterly course.
It presumes this to be the convoy.
Weather condition: wind W. 10, seaway 9, visibility 500 meters.
1219
The 3 most southerly boats U 758, 664 and 84 were deployed on
receipt of this message, the remaining "Raubgrafen" boats at once made
off to the east at a speed of 7 knots. If contact is not reestablished by the
scattered boats during the night, the entire group is to take up position in
patrol channels from AK 7791 to BD 1485 at 1000 on 16.3.
Apart from a report from U 91 of a wide signal spread from 3500 to
2400, there was no contact with the enemy up to morning. The operation
continues.
2) Convoy No. 17:
At 0929 U 524 sighted smoke trails in CE 5132, which was later
confirmed to be the convoy. Contact was maintained at 1448 in CE 5223
and at 1607 in CE 5236 up
- 167 -
to 2100 in CE 5326. The convoy consisted of over 40 ships,
passenger freighters and tankers and was strongly protected by long and
short range escort. According to reports U 524, 172, 521, 167, 159, 67 and
109 were in the vicinity of the convoy.
Most of the boats were beaten off by the convoy's long range escort
before the beginning of the attack. U 159 attempted a daylight attack, but
could not fire owing to a strong zig zag on the part of the enemy. U 524
was observed during an under water attack - it was able to fire, however,
and sank a passenger freighter in CE 5326 at 2100.
There were no convoy messages received after 2100.
Result:
U 524: At 2100 on 15.3 passenger freighter of 6,000 GRT sunk in CE
5326.
 b) Boats operating in the Caribbean may withdraw to the east or west Naval War Staff (2nd Div.) B.d.U. Op.
during the full moon period at their own discretion. Reg. No. Most Secret 103 S.O. Only.
c) U 709 received orders to put in with U 659, if, owing to transmitter
trouble it is not possible to announce an escort assembly point. Both boats U-boats as of 1.March 1943.
are expected off Brest on about 20.3.
d) As a result of "Doggerbanks" putting in an additional 200 sea mile I. In commission on 1.2.43: 409
wide area will be closed for attacks on isolated vessels (in addition to the Commissioned in February 21
previous closed area in route A) the centerline of which runs through CE 430
88, CF 82, CG 49, CG 25. Lost in February 19 (incl. 1 at home)
The area west of 19 W. will be closed at 000 on 16.3, the area east of 411
this at 000 on 18.3. Plus foreign submarines 7
in commission on 1 March: 418
V. Reports of Success:
U 524 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT.
Losses in February:
In the Atlantic: Type VIIc: U 69, 201, 225, 265, 268, 442, 606, 609,
(Signed): GODT 620, 623, 624 = 11
Type IX: U 187, 519, 522 = 3
In the Mediterranean: Type VII: U 205, 443, 562, 301 = 4
At home: Type VII: U 649 = 1
19

Details:
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log VIIc U 69 - Graef Experienced boat, last report 17.1. Presumably
convoy E. of Newfoundland.
16 - 31 March 1943 U 201 - Rosenberg Experienced boat, Commanding Officer's second
patrol. Last report 17.2. Presumably convoy E. of Newfoundland.
PG30320 U 255 - Leimkuehler Second patrol. Last report 7.2. W. of Ireland.
Possibly convoy.
U 265 - Aufhammer First patrol. Last report 2.2 S. of Iceland. Possibly
convoy.
U 268 - Heydemann First patrol. Last report 18.2 Biscay, presumably by
air attack.
10.March 1943. U 606 - Dohler Second patrol. Last report 18.2. Presumably convoy N.
of Azores.
Supreme Command of the Navy
1220
 U 609 - Rudloff Experienced boat. Last report 6.2. Presumably convoy
S.E. of Greenland. Operational 3 - 157 3 53 1 4 3 5 229
U 620 - Stein Second patrol. Last report 12.2 W. of Gibraltar. Trials - - 89** - 20 1 7 1 2 120
Presumably convoy. Training 35 4 21 - 2 - - - - 62
U 623 - Schroeder Second patrol. Last report 9.2. W. of France, perhaps
convoy. 38* 4 267 3 75 2 11 4 7 411
U 624 - von Soden Second patrol. Last report 7.2. S.E. of Greenland. * 2 temporarily paid off for Black Sea
Presumably convoy. ** 9 temporarily detached.
IX U 187 - Muennich First patrol. Last report 4.2 S. of Greenland,
presumably convoy.
III. In February:
Became operational 25
Total number increased by + 2
Number of operational boats increased by + 7
- 169 - Number of boats on trials decreased by - 5
Number of school boats unchanged + 0

IV. Distribution of operational boats on 1.3.1943:

Atlantic 193
Mediterranean 19
Northern Waters 14 (to be raised to 23 during March)
Black Sea 3

U 519 - Eppen Second patrol. No report.

U 522 - Schneider Second patrol.Last report 232 S. of the Azores.
Presumably convoy. - 170 -
U 205 - Buergel Experienced boat. No report.
U 562 - Hamm Experienced boat. No report.
U 443 - von Puttkammer Experienced boat. No report.
U 301 - Koerner Experienced boat. No report.
U 649 - Tiesler 24.2 rammed in the Baltic.

II. Distribution:
II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXD1 IXD2 XB XIV Total
1221
 V. During the Atlantic in February: 155 - Op(DM 50) 359 - BE 46 524 - Op(CE 62) 664 - Op(BC 35)
Daily average at sea 116 boats 156 - Op(EE) 373 - Op(AK 96) 523 - Op(AK 29) 665 - Op(AK 64)
of which in operations area 48 boats 159 - Op(CE 62) 377 - BF 40 526 - Op(AK 52) 666 - Op(AK 29)
on passage 68 boats 160 - KZ 26 384 - Op(AK 96) 527 - Op(AK 27) 704 - BF 47
of these on return passage 24.3 boats 161 - BE 90 405 - BD 34 530 - Op(AK 92) 706 - BF 91
163 - BE 78 406 - Op(BD 33) 558 - DH 12 709 - BE 60
167 - Op(CE 62) 409 - BD 24 564 - BE 19 757 - BE 46
VI. Sailed in February : 168 - AF 47 410 - Op(CG 14) 566 - BD 34 758 - Op(BC 22)
From home 26, 1 of which for N. Waters 172 - Op(CE 62) 415 - AK 38 572 - BE 18 632 - BF 54
From W. France 48 180 - EJ 71 432 - BD 34 590 - Op(AK 77)
182 - Op(KQ) 435 - Op(AJ 99) 591 - AK 89
183 - Op(DM 70) 439 - Op(AK 53) 592 - AE 87
--------------------------------------------------- 185 - Op(DN 70)
--------------- 188 - AL 22

16. March 1943.

On Return Passage: U 89 - 160 - 228 - 230 - 332 - 359 - 377 - 405 - 409
- 432 - 447 - 448 - 461 - 566 - 591 - 608 - 616 - 621 - 634 - 638 - 653 -
I. U 43 - CF 88 U 190 - Op(AK 68) U 440 - Op(AK 99) U 598 - 659 - 709 - 757.
Op(AK 93) Entered Port: - . -
66 - CF 75 191 - Bergen 441 - Op(BD 33) 600 - Op(BC 32) Sailed: U 469 - 635 Kiel; U 105 - Lorient.
67 - Op(CE 62) 196 - AN 30 445 - Op(CF 36) 603 - Op(BC 32)
68 - Op(EC 50) 198 - AF 47 447 - BE 19 608 - Op(BD 33) II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
84 - Op(BC 35) 202 - CF 48 448 - BD 34 610 - Op(BD 36)
86 - Op(AK 96) 221 - Op(BD 36) 461 - CF 37 615 - Op(BC 32) III. Reports on the Enemy:
89 - BC 35 228 - Op(BD 22) 463 - BD 24 616 - BD 24 a) 1) Convoy Nos. 17 and 19 see paragraph IVa).
91 - Op(BD 14) 229 - Op(AK 29) 468 - Op(AJ 99) 618 - Op(AK 67) 2) U 518 situation: In FJ 30 and FC 70, concentrating in square 75,
103 - Op(CE 62) 230 - BD 34 504 - CF 87 621 - BD 24 since 5.3. No enemy sightings, except one independently routed ship,
106 - Op(CE 60) 257 - BF 72 506 - Op(KY) 631 - Op(AK 92) course N., 16 knots on 13.3. in FC 7855.
107 - Op(CG 15) 260 - BE 60 509 - Op(GR) 634 - AL 88
109 - Op(CE 62) 305 - Op(AK 27) 510 - OP(EP) 638 - BC 33 - 171 -
119 - BD 34 306 - AE 87 513 - OP(CE 60) 641 - Op(AK 38)
123 - BE 60 332 - BE 13 515 - Op(CF 62) 642 - Op(AK 53)
129 - BE 88 333 - Op(BD 36) 516 - Op(KZ) 653 - BD 15
139 - Op(CE 60) 336 - Op(AK 96) 518 - Op(FJ) 659 - BE 54
134 - Op(AL 95) 338 - Op(AK 56) 521 - Op(CE 62) 663 - BE 15
1222

Argentinean traffic on S and N courses at times, perfect markings.
Location transmissions picked up several times at night.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DN 7655, EC 51, FC 74.
Presumed U-boat attack in FK 25.
4 torpedo reports and one SSS, position not given, but probably from
Convoy No. 19.
d) According to an earlier Radio Intelligence (X) report, HX 229 was to
have steered a course of 890 from BC 7518 at 2000/13/3 and an operation
by Group "Draenger" was intended. According to a report received today,
however, it was in BC 1240 at 2000/15/3. The convoy was steering 3500
and was to change to 00 from 510 5' N. Reasons for rerouting are not
disclosed. It is possible that the enemy issued a U-boat situation report for
the previous area, which was not intercepted here. On the last course
ordered the area between 50 - 540 N and 43 - 490 W is skirted. 12 U-
boats were believed to be there.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 17:
U 106 picked up the convoy at 1233 in CF 6269 and, together with U
103 and U 558, reported it until 0738 in square CF 4694. U 106, 202, 103,
558, 521, 167, 66, 504 and 524 are in the vicinity of the convoy.
Several boats were observed before they could fire. U 524 made an
unsuccessful submerged attack, but at the same time heard several torpedo
detonations from another boat and sinking noises. U 103 also reported
torpedo explosions and gunfire and flares at the same time.
Convoy No. 19:
At 0825/16 U 653 reported a convoy in BD 1491, course 700. 8 boats
of Group "Raubgraf" were detailed against it and 2 others coming up from
supply; altogether: U 91, 84, 664, 758, 600, 615, 603, 435, 616 and 229.
In addition, by A.M. on 17th 11 boats of Group "Stürmer" can reach the
1223
convoy, by P.M. 17th 6 boats of Group "Dränger" and 11 others. A total of
38 boats will therefore operate against the convoy.
This is the scheduled SC convoy, which consist of 49 ships according
to Radio Intelligence. During the night 15/16 the weather in the convoy's
area was reported as west 10, sea 9, visibility 500 meters and it was
therefore to be expected that several ships had become detached from the
convoy. P.M. on the 16th 6 independent ships on a N.E. course were
reported. Contact was maintained with the convoy and during the day and
the following night 8 more boats came up. At 0630/17 it was in BD 1361.
The convoy was steering a main course of 600, making 6.5 knots. 2
boats reported 20 steamers, weak escort. There was no air escort on the
first day. 5 boats out of 8 managed to fire during the night.
- 172 -
Successes:
Assumed
Boat Time Square Report Sunk Torpedoed.
U 603 2300/16 BD 1539 One 5,000 GRT ship torpedoed 1/5,000 GRT
1 probable hit 1 hit
U 435 0122/17 BD 1379 2 FAT hits at 7,000 GRT tanker 1/7,000
U 91 0407/17 BD 1353 One 10,000 GRT freighter sunk 1/10,000 GRT
One 8,000 GRT freighter sunk 1/8,000 GRT
U 758 0407/17 BD 1353 One 6,000 GRT freighter sunk 1/6,000 GRT
One 7,000 GRT freighter sunk 1/7,000 GRT
One 8,000 GRT freighter sunk 1/8,000 GRT
 One 4,000 GRT freighter torpedoed sinking noises heard 1/4,000 GRT
U 435 0330/17 BD 1386 One FAT hit after 8 mins. 19 secs. 1 hit
One FAT hit after 8 mins. 19 secs. 1 hit
0332 1 Pi2 hit at 6,000 GRT, left sinking 1/6,000 GRT
0333 1 hit on 4,500 GRT sinking not observed 1/4,500 GRT
0335 1 Pi2 hit on 7,000 GRT tanker. Sank after 1 min. 1/7,000 GRT
U 600 0630/17 BD 1361 7,000 GRT sunk 1/7,000 GRT
5,000 GRT sunk 1/5,000 GRT
5,000 GRT left sinking 1/5,000 GRT
1 hit at medium sized freighter 1 hit
Total: 12 ships 77,500 GRT sunk.
6 ships torpedoed
The operation is continuing.
b) 1) U 229 has been dismissed from Group "Stürmer" and given
freedom of action in AD 90. From here she is to report the weather twice
daily and reconnoiter the area for homeward bound blockade breakers.
- 173 -
2) After the sighting report of Convoy No. 19 was received, the 11
most southerly "Stürmer" boats were detailed to operate against it
immediately. The northerly boats of the Group were at first to proceed on
a course of 1600 at 11 knots, so that, if contact was lost, they would be
ahead of the convoy and could be disposed in patrol line, or operate
1224
against HX 229, which was then still expected. Group "Dränger" was
proceeding on its original course to pick up HX 229. When the Radio
Intelligence report of the re-routing of the HX convoy was received, this
group was also ordered to operate against Convoy No. 19 and to proceed
at such a speed as to reach the convoy P.M. of 17.3.
3) U 161 is now making for square CD 33 to carry out U 163's special
operation (rendezvous with homeward-bound REGENSPURG).
c) U 757 and 359 were approached several times by a Consolidated at
1744 in BE 9281. The a/c turned away when both boats fired. No damage
to boats.
d) 1) U 163 has not reported since she left Lorient. She must be
presumed lost. It is not known whether the loss was due to the strong air
patrol operating at the time or to mines.
2) U 130 was operating against Convoy No. 17 and last reported it at
2300/12/3 in CD 8258. At 0100 U 172 saw several flares in CD 8262 and
heard several D/C's. It is possible that U 130 was attacked and sunk. She
has not replied to several orders to give her position. She must be
presumed lost.
IV. Reports of Success:
U 603 2 ships torpedoed.
U 435 1 ship "
U 91 2 ships 18,000 GRT
U 758 4 ships 25,000 GRT
U 435 3 ships 17,500 GRT
U 600 3 ships 17,000 GRT
U 600 1 hit.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
17. March 1943.
I. U 43 - Op(CF 51) U 188 - AL 24 U 439 - Op(BD 21) U 591 - BD 21
 66 - Op(CF 27) 190 - Op(BD 21) 440 - Op(BD 31) 592 - AL 22
67 - Op(CF 54) 191 - AF 79 441 - Op(BD 34) 598 - Op(BD 21)
68 - Op(EC 53) 196 - AF 79 445 - Op(CF 36) 600 - Op(BD 13)
84 - Op(BD 13) 198 - AE 68 447 - BE 53 603 - Op(BD 13)
86 - Op(AK 97) 202 - Op(CF 54) 448 - BD 34 608 - Op(BD 37)
89 - BD 15 221 - Op(BD 37) 461 - CF 31 610 - Op(BD 67)
91 - Op(BD 13) 228 - Op(BD 13) 463 - BD 24 615 - Op(BD 13)
103 - Op(CF 54) 229 - Op(AK 16) 468 - Op(BD 13) 616 - Op(BD 13)
105 - BF 54 230 - BD 26 469 - AO 618 - Op(BD 21)
106 - Op(CF 54) 257 - BE 93 504 - Op(CF 54) 621 - BD 38
107 - Op(CG 15) 260 - BE 55 506 - Op(KY 67) 631 - Op(BD 21)
109 - Op(CF 54) 305 - Op(AK 59) 509 - Op(GR 82) 632 - BF 45
119 - BD 34 306 - AL 22 510 - Op(FB) 634 - BE 28
123 - BE 91 332 - BE 28 513 - Op(CF 46) 635 - AO
129 - CF 25 333 - Op(BD 37) 515 - Op(CF 54) 638 - BD 15
134 - Op(BD 21) 336 - Op(BD 31) 516 - Op(KZ) 641 - Op(BD 21)
155 - Op(DM 50) 338 - Op(BD 13) 518 - Op(FJ 69) 642 - Op(AK 94)
156 - Op(EE) 359 - BF 73 521 - Op(CF 54) 653 - Op(BD 13)
159 - Op(CF 46) 373 - Op(AK 97) 523 - Op(AK 91) 659 - BE 64
- 174 -
U 160 - (KZ 51) U 377 - BF 54 U 524 - Op(CF 54) U 663 - BD 33
161 - BE 83 384 - Op(BD 21) 526 - Op(AK 94) 664 - Op(BD 13)
167 - Op(CF 54) 405 - BD 34 527 - OP(AK 59) 665 - Op(BD 21)
168 - AE 68 406 - Op(BD 34) 530 - Op(BD 22) 666 - Op(AK 83)
1225
172 - Op(CF 46) 409 - BD 24 558 - Op(CF 54) 704 - BF 47
180 - ES 12 410 - Op(CG 14) 564 - BE 14 706 - BF 81
182 - Op(KQ 65) 415 - BE 14 566 - BD 34 709 - BE 66
183 - Op(DM 70) 432 - BD 34 572 - BD 33 757 - BF 51
185 - Op(DN 70) 435 - Op(BD 13) 590 - Op(BD 34) 758 - Op(BD 13)
On Return Passage: U 66 - 89 - 91 - 160 - 228 - 332 - 359 - 377 - 405 -
415 - 435 - 447 - 448 - 461 - 468 - 566 - 603 - 608 - 616 - 621 - 634 - 638
- 653 - 659 - 664 - 709 - 757 - 758.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 17 and 19 see paragraph IVa).
2) U 123 sighted 2 destroyers on a S. course, medium speed in CG
1413. She reported later that the destroyers were standing on and off in
the area mentioned. Boat continues on her outward passage.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: BF 4711, BE 8475, DN 7656, AK 95, ED 96, AK
9758, AK 9782, AK 89, AK 9766, AK 9749, AM 7615, AN 9198.
U-boat attack: AK 8847, AK 8657, AK 8878, CE 16, AK 89, AK 8648.
SSS or torpedo reports from 7 ships probably in convoy No. 19
d) There is now a Radio Intelligence (X) report on the small convoy,
consisting of 4 ships and 3 escort vessels, which U 43 reported on 12.3. It
is probably the TO 2, which is proceeding via EG 1145 - EF 4176 and EE
7476 at 13 knots and should reach Trinidad on 21.3.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 17:
The convoy was picked up again towards 1300 in CF 5496 and held.
The boats shadowed smoke clouds and locations at a distance, as ordered,
hauled ahead and tried to make submerged attacks. According to reports,
U 558, 167, 524, 202, 521, 504, 106, 103 and 43, were in the vicinity of
the convoy.
U 172 later reported that she had made a submerged attack at the same
time as another boat and 2 passenger freighters and 2 freighters, totaling
30,000 GRT had been sunk. She heard at least 4 hits from attacks by other
boats and made out sinking noises from 3 other ships in her listening gear.
U 167 torpedoed a freighter of 8,000 GRT in CF 5592 at 2034 and heard
sinking noises. U 521 sank a stationary freighter of 7,000 GRT at 0600 in
square CF 5675. U 558 attacked at 0638 in CF 6719 and probably scored
one hit. She reported at the same time that she had probably scored 2 hits
during her attack at 0738/17/3 in square CF 4694.
- 175 -
Later in the afternoon air escort arrived and was gradually reinforced.
Several boats moved away for a time for repairs. U 66 started on her
return passage.
Successes:
U 172 2048/16/3 CF 4525 2 passenger freighters, 10,000 and 8,000
GRT, 2 freighters each of 6,000 GRT sunk.
U 558 0738/17/3 CF 4694 2 hits probable
U 521 0600/18/3 CF 5675 Stationary freighter, 7,000 GRT sunk.
In addition, probably 4 more hits sinking noises of 3 more steamers as
the result of an attack by a boat at 2050/16/3 in CF 4525. This boat's own
report is still outstanding.
2) Convoy No. 19:
1226
Weather in the convoy area was reported as WSW 2 and medium
visibility at midday on the 17th. During the night wind freshened to NNW
7. According to boat's reports there were definitely 2 separate convoys.
The convoy which has so far been pursued by Group "Raubgraf", was
making about 8 knots on a main course of 450, whereas 120 miles ahead
there was a convoy making 6.5 knots on a main course of 700.
Possibly the first part was still the HX convoy, and the second
scheduled SC.
The convoy which has so far been pursued, was reported in BD 2112 at
0900/17. During the day 6 boats came up. At 1730 U 600 reported the
convoy in AK 8943, lost contact and no further shadower's reports were
received during the night except 3 uncertain hydrophone bearings.
Contact was also maintained all day with the slow section ahead. The
boats had been told that this was possibly a separate convoy. The northern
boats of Group "Stürmer" and boats of Group "Dränger" which were
within reasonable range were ordered to operate. This convoy was
pursued from 0900 in AK 8655 until 2300 in AK 9529 and then lost.
The fact that contact was lost with both sections in spite of the many
boats is due to the very strong air activity by day on the 17th. Several
boats were bombed and probably lagged further and further astern owing
to constant air patrol. Radio Intelligence received 8 U-boat sightings on
that day.
5 boats made submerged attacks by day. The following successes were
scored:
Assumed
Boat Time Square Report Sunk Torpedoed
U 91 0905/17 BD 1334 1 hit at a damaged ship of 6,000 GRT sunk. 6,000
GRT
Damaged ship of 6,000 GRT blew up of its own accord. 6,000 GRT
1608/17 BD 1334 1 hit on a 4,000 GRT damaged ship sunk 4,000 GRT
1 hit on a 7,000 GRT damaged ship 7,000 GRT
- 176 -
 reconnaissance line. U 564, 572, and 663 are in the vicinity of convoy No.
19 but they are not to operate against it, as there are already too many
boats and are only to make use of any opportunity arising and then
proceed on their way to the line ordered.
c) U 405, 448 and 566 have refueled from U 119 for return passage at
economical speed.
d) None.

V. Reports of success:
U 91 1406/17 AK 8877 Tanker of 7,000 GRT sunk 7,000 GRT U 172 4 ships 30,000 GRT
U 384 1405/17 AK 8867 6,000 GRT torpedoed 1 ship 6,000 GRT U 558 3 hits
4,000 GRT torpedoed 4,000 GRT U 167 1 ship 8,000 GRT
Sinking noises heard U 521 1 ship 7,000 GRT
2,500 GRT torpedoed 2,500 GRT U 91 4 ships 23,000 GRT
Sinking noises heard U 631 1 ship 7,000 GRT
U 228 1658/17 BD 2142 Double fan at 6,000 GRT, 2 explosions probable U 384 1 ship torpedoed
1 ship 6,000 GRT 2 ships 6,500 GRT
U 338 2215/17 BD 2131 5,000 GRT sunk with 3 single shots 5,000 GRT U 228 2 hits
1 single shot at 10,000 GRT 1 ship 10,000 GRT U 358 1 ship 5,000 GRT
U 665 1157/17 BD 2113 Double fan, 1 explosion 1 hit U 665 1 ship torpedoed
1 ship torpedoed.

8 ships totaling 41,500 GRT sunk

4 ships torpedoed. - 177 -

Operation is continuing against both convoys. So far the following

have broken off: U 468, 91, 435, 638, 653, 89, 758, 664, 603, 665, 616,
600, 6 of these because of lack of fuel.
b) U 306, 592, 181, 415, 663, 572, 564 and 260 have been ordered to be
in patrol line from AK 3152 to 3671, as Group "Seeteufel", at first light on
21/3. Boats are not to take up their positions earlier than ordered in order
to prevent their being detected prematurely by enemy aircraft; until then
they have freedom of action. U 260 is further off and will therefore reach
the line later. It is intended to operate the group against the ONS expected 18.March 1943.
on 22.3 and if this is not intercepted, they will proceed S.W. as
1227

I. U 43 - Op(CF 83) U 188 - AL 18 U 439 - Op(AK 92) U 591 - BD
27
66 - CF 23 190 - BD 21 440 - Op(AK 94) 592 - AL 14
67 - Op(CE 64) 191 - AF 72 441 - Op(AK 94) 598 - Op(AK 92)
68 - Op(EC 50) 196 - AF 72 445 - Op(CF 36) 600 - BD 23
84 - Op(AK 92) 198 - AE 59 447 - BE 57 603 - BD 34
86 - Op(AK 94) 202 - Op(CF 68) 448 - BD 34 608 - Op(AK 94)
89 - BD 27 221 - Op(AK 92) 461 - BE 96 610 - Op(AK 92)
91 - BD 27 228 - Op(AK 92) 463 - BD 24 615 - Op(AK 92)
103 - Op(CF 68) 229 - Op(AD 98) 468 - BD 21 616 - BD 34
105 - BF 48 230 - Op(AK 92) 469 - AN 30 618 - Op(AK 92)
106 - Op(CF 68) 257 - BE 67 504 - Op(CF 68) 621 - Op(AK 92)
107 - Op(CE 15) 260 - BE 19 506 - Op(GR 90) 631 - Op(AK 92)
109 - Op(CE 61) 305 - Op(AK 92) 509 - Op(GR 50) 632 - BE 66
119 - BD 34 306 - AL 14 510 - Op(EQ 70) 634 - BE 59
123 - CF 39 332 - BE 61 513 - Op(CF 42) 635 - AN 30
129 - CF 27 333 - Op(AK 94) 515 - Op(CF 83) 638 - BD 34
134 - Op(AK 92) 336 - Op(AK 94) 516 - Op(KY) 641 - Op(AK 94)
155 - Op(DN 70) 338 - Op(AK 92) 518 - Op(FJ 60) 642 - Op(AK 92)
156 - Op(EE 40) 359 - BF 52 521 - Op(CF 68) 653 - BD 27
159 - Op(CF 68) 373 - Op(AK 92) 523 - Op(AK 92) 659 - BE 69
160 - (KZ 48) 377 - BF 52 524 - Op(CF 68) 663 - AK 95
161 - BE 84 384 - Op(AK 92) 526 - Op(AK 92) 664 - BD 27
167 - Op(CF 68) 405 - BD 43 527 - Op(AK 92) 665 - BD 23
168 - AE 59 406 - Op(AK 92) 530 - Op(AK 92) 666 - Op(AL 69)
172 - Op(CF 45) 409 - BD 24 558 - Op(CF 68) 704 - BE 68
180 - ES 61 410 - Op(CG 14) 564 - AK 99 706 - BF 47
182 - Op(KQ 60) 415 - AK 63 566 - BD 34 709 - BF 40
183 - Op(DM 70) 432 - BD 34 572 - AK 99 757 - BF 52
185 - Op(DN 70) 435 - BD 21 590 - Op(AK 94) 758 - BD 27
On Return Passage: U 66 - 89 - 91 - 160 - 228 - 332 - 359 - 377 - 405 -
432 - 435 - 447 - 448 - 461 - 468 - 566 - 603 - 608 - 616 - 621 - 634 - 638
- 653 - 659 - 664 - 709 - 757 - 758.
1228
Entered Port: U 337 - 709 - Brest; U 359 - 757 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 174 - Lorient; U 630 - 169 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy Nos. 17 and 19 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 621 on her way home comparatively well off for fuel, reported a
convoy in BE 6134 at 2100, course 1900, speed 8 knots. Boats in the
vicinity were ordered to make for the convoy at maximum speed, provided
they could reach it during the night. U 634 then reported her position,
which was near the convoy. U 632 also tried to get there, but was several
times forced to dive by aircraft and then continued on her outward
passage. U 621 continued to pursue the convoy through BE 6156, BE
6455 and lost contact at 0530 in BE 6482. Last course 1800, speed 11
knots.No further reports were received.
3) U 188 was pursued for 9 hours by destroyers with depth charges in
AE 8367 on her way through the Iceland Passage. U 592 sighted 3 aircraft
on the same route and twice observed Radar location transmission from
shore.
- 178 -
4) U 155 has so far not encountered any traffic in the sea area of the
Florida Straits. She will continue to operate in the center of the Gulf of
Mexico during the full moon period.
b) No convoys detected.
 c) 1) U-boat sightings: AK 8948, BF 4653, AL 7148, AK 9320, AK
9310.
2) SSS report from FO 8140 (probably attack by an Italian U-boat).
3) 2 SSS and one attack report from Convoy No. 19.
4) American steamer reported an aircraft attack in BE 9783 and later in
CG 112.
d) 1) The convoy picked up by U 621 is KMS 111.
2) According to Radio Intelligence (X) reports several convoys (SC 123
- HX 229 - ON 171) have sailed 2 days earlier than expected. There seems
therefore to have been another general alteration in the cycle.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 17:
During the course of the day the convoy was picked up by U 524. She
shadowed until 1800. Strong air escort forced her to remain at a great
distance. Although she was 25 miles off, she was constantly approached
by aircraft and forced to dive. She reported that she was able to shadow
by location transmissions from air and surface escort forces, but could not
approach the convoy. Last hydrophone bearing in CF 9345, constant night
air activity.
As the boats cannot attack any more and are so exhausted after 6 days
that the reinforced air escort would have good prospects of success, it was
decided to break off the operation A.M. on 19th March.
Convoy's last position at 1130/19/3 was in CG 7286
2) Convoy No. 19:
Weather in the convoy area was reported as NNW 6, snow, visibility
varying between 500 and 5000 meters, at midday on the 18th. The night
was particularly light, owing to the moon, which made it difficult for the
boats to make night attacks.At 0900 U 610 gained contact with the main
convoy in AK 9165. Owing to the changing visibility contact could only
be maintained by hydrophone bearings. 9 more boats came up to the
convoy in the evening and during the night.
Contact was regained at 0200 in AL 4872 with the SC convoy, ahead
of this faster HX. It was lost at 0645 in AL 4867. 1 other boat reported
contact with this convoy during the night.
1229
Escort forces with the SC convoy, against which most boats were
operating, appeared to have been considerably reinforced on the 18th.
Many boats were detected by destroyers and depth-charged. The very
strong air escort made it very difficult for the boats to get ahead. Although
several boats got close up to the convoy during the night, no satisfactory
results were achieved, probably.
- 179 -
mainly because of the light night. Nearly all boats were driven off by
destroyers when approaching to attack.
U 134 last reported contact with the main section at 0510 in AL 4741.
U 230, 86 and 228 broke off operations. It is intended to continue the
operation until A.M. 20th despite the strong air activity expected by day on
the 19th.
Successes:
Assumed
Boat Time Square Report Sunk Torpedoed
U 305 2300/17 AK 9529 3 hits. Results not observed.
1 damaged ship, 8,222 GRT, sunk with finishing shot. 8,222
U 338 0255/18 AK 9284 Finishing shot at damaged ship 5,000
U 221 1643/18 AK 6897 Ship type Clan MacDougal sunk 6,843
Ship type Salacia sunk 5,495
U 666 0117/19 AK 4867 Probable hit 1 hit
0645 7,000 GRT sunk 7,000
2 hits at 4,000 GRT 4,000
 2 hits at 4,000 GRT 4,000

7 ships totaling 40,560 GRT sunk 19.March 1943.

2 further hits scored.

I. U 43 - Op(CG 47) U 191 - AF 47 U 468 - Op(AK 98) U 631 -
b) 1) U 107, 445 and 410 are free to operate against the steamer attacked Op(AL 44)
by aircraft. 66 - BE 86 196 - AF 47 469 - AN 30 632 - BE 56
2) U 229 has been allocate squares AD 94 and 98 as new reconnaissance 67 - CE 69 198 - AE 85 504 - Op(CF 73) 634 - BF 44
area and for weather reporting. 68 - Op(EC 50) 202 - CF 66 506 - Op(GR 80) 635 - AN 30
3) U 129 has been ordered to the Caribbean and is making for DP 70. 84 - Op(AK 92) 221 - Op(AL 57) 509 - Op(GR 10) 638 - BD 34
4) It is intended to operate U 123 off Dakar, as so far only one boat has 86 - Op(AL 48) 228 - Op(AK 92) 510 - Op(EP 40) 641 - Op(AL 48)
been there for a short time and, according to Radio Intelligence reports, 89 - BD 27 229 - Op(AD 90) 513 - Op(CF 42) 642 - Op(AL 48)
heavy coastal and E-W traffic may be expected. Success is possible if a 91 - BD 24 230 - Op(AK 95) 515 - Op(CG 71) 653 - BD 27
boat appears suddenly and undetected. 103 - Op(CF 64) 257 - BE 81 516 - Op(KY 93) 659 - BF 54
c) U 180 is meeting an Italian boat on 20.3 in FD 3155 for medical 105 - BE 93 260 - BE 14 518 - Op(FJ 60) 663 - AK 69
assistance. 106 - Op(CF 69) 305 - Op(AL 57) 521 - Op(CG 47) 664 - BD 27
d) Boats have again been reminded of the closing of the 200 mile wide 107 - Op(CG 15) 306 - AK 32 523 - Op(AL 44) 665 - BD 36
strip, as "Doggerbank" is about to enter port. 109 - CF 19 332 - BE 66 524 - Op(CF 93) 666 - Op(AL 48)
119 - BD 34 333 - Op(AL 48) 526 - Op(AL 48) 704 - BE 56
V. Reports of Success: 123 - CF 64 336 - Op(AL 48) 527 - OP(AL 48) 706 - BF 68
U 305 1 ship 8,222 GRT 3 hits 129 - CF 45 338 - Op(AL 48) 530 - Op(AL 44) 758 - BD 27
U 338 1 ship 5,000 GRT 134 - Op(AL 48) 373 - Op(AL 44) 558 - Op(CF 69)
U 221 2 ships 12,338 GRT 155 - Op(DM 25) 384 - Op(AL 48) 564 - AK 69
U 666 2 ships 15,000 GRT 1 hit. 156 - Op(EE 40) 405 - BE 19 566 - BE 18
159 - Op(CF 57) 406 - Op(AL 48) 572 - AK 69
161 - BD 98 409 - BD 27 590 - Op(AL 45)
160 - KY 93 410 - Op(CG 14) 591 - BD 27
- 180 - 167 - Op(CF 71) 415 - AK 38 592 - AL 11
169 - AO 432 - BD 34 598 - Op(AL 44)
168 - AE 82 435 - Op(AK 97) 600 - BD 36
172 - Op(CF 57) 439 - Op(AL 48) 603 - BD 34
174 - BF 54 440 - Op(AL 44) 608 - Op(AL 44)
180 - ES 91 441 - Op(AL 44) 610 - Op(AK 99)
182 - Op(KQ 60) 445 - Op(CF 36) 615 - Op(AL 44)
1230
 183 - Op(DM 70) 447 - BE 81 616 - BD 34
185 - Op(DN 70) 448 - BE 18 618 - Op(AL 48)
188 - AL 15 461 - BF 72 621 - Op(AL 44)
190 - Op(AL 44) 463 - BD 27 630 - AO
On Return Passage: U 43 - 66 - 89 - 91 - 109 - 160 - 202 - 221 - 228 -
230 - 332 - 405 - 432 - 435 - 447 - 448 - 461 - 468 - 504 - 521 - 634 - 638
- 653 - 659 - 664 - 665 - 758.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: For a Gibraltar convoy in West Biscay.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy Nos. 17 and 19, see para IVa).
2) At 0830 U 621 found the convoy again in BE 6737, course 1700,
speed 9 knots. In the course of the day the boat was driven off by aircraft.
Contact was maintained intermittently until 1913 in BE 9431.
With 17 cbm of fuel U 332 operated for a time against convoy without
any success.
U 504, 521 and 103 on their return passage and probably in about CG
when operation against Convoy No. 17 is broken off, are to operate against
the convoy as far as fuel stocks permit, without pursuing, as they cannot
refuel. The same order goes for U 445, 107 and 410, which are in the N.
third of CG. None of these boats got near the convoy however.
- 181 -
1231
U 621 broke off at dark and started for home. There was no contact
at the time.
3) U 665 reported towards 2000 a steamer, course 2400, speed 14 knots,
in BE 1693 and later recognized her as a Red Cross ship, probably
"Solace". At 2250 the boat was located by the hospital ship on 140 cms
(wave length) and immediately chased by 3 submarine chasers. She
managed to get away at full speed.
4) U 564 dived at 1035 in AK 6968 because of a flying boat. She
observed a surfaced submarine using echo-ranging gear. She surfaced
again and made the R/S challenge, receiving no reply. The submarine
looked like a type VIIc, without the 2 cm (wave length) platform and
without (venturi tube? Windduese).
5) Sightings: U 603, illuminated steamer in BD 3993, course 2700,
apparently neutral.
U 172 in CF 5755 independently-routed ship on a W. course, slow
speed.
U 129 in CE 6598 fast destroyer on a S.W. course.
6) Situation reports: U 67, off Ponte Delgada, sighted nothing except 3
Portuguese ships close inshore on E and W courses. U 506 is starting her
return passage via GH 70. Commanding Officer does not consider the
area promising at present. A fast freighter on a N.W. course was sighted in
KY 5930 on 15.3 and a good hydrophone bearing of a steamer was
obtained on 16.3 in about the same position.
b) The convoy reported by U 621 was picked up by aircraft in BE 67.
c) U-boat sightings: AL 5718, AJ 18, AL 5851, EE 7471, EP 4448. AL
5758, AL 4893, AL 4723, AL 4490, AK 9360. Depth-charge attack by an
aircraft in AL 4488 and in a position not known.
d) According to Radio Intelligence (X) reports, the last HX convoy
proceeded in two groups. The north route mentioned in the War Log on
12.3 was for HX 229a, while HX 229 kept to the south route and was there
also picked up by U-boats.
IV. Current Operations:
 a) 1) Final remarks on Convoy No. 17:
Convoy No. 17 was UGS 6, comprising 45 ships, and was picked up at
2001/12/3 by U 130 about 60 miles north of the expected route.
Group "Unverzagt", Group "Wohlgemut" and the remaining boats of
Group "Tümmler", which were already short of fuel, took part in the
operation, a total of 17 boats.
Good weather, wind force between 1 and 3, sea between 1 and 3, i.e.
very good location conditions, favored anti-submarine activity.
There was strong, well-trained anti-submarine activity by the surface
forces. Again there was an efficient, long-range remote escort, which
made it very difficult for the boats to shadow and attack. Air escort
appeared for the first time at about 1700/17/3 in the area of square CF 59
and was reinforced from then on.
The convoy often evaded far to the N. to shake off the boats, passed N.
of the Azores and then slowly changed back to a course for Gibraltar.
- 182 -
During the first days the boats were detected prematurely when
making night attacks and did not achieve any success and contact was
frequently lost because the shadowers were forced to dive by
destroyers.The boats were then ordered to switch on their radio
interception gear, to make contact through this and haul ahead and to
prefer an underwater attack in order to avoid detection by radar. Later
they were ordered to haul ahead outside visual range of the escort forces.
This procedure, used here for the first time, was successful after the
first days without result and should be used again in similar conditions.
1232
The disadvantage is that the boats lose their opportunity to attack when the
enemy zigzags away, but this is preferable to their being constantly driven
off when hauling ahead closer to the enemy and when attempting night
attacks.
With the exception of the independent ship sunk by U 172 at
2158/13/3, which was probably a straggler from the convoy, all the
successes were scored in underwater attacks.
Successes in this convoy were: Sunk: 8 ships, totaling 56,565 GRT,
torpedoed, 5 ships, losses 1 boat, U 130.
Apart from the determined perseverance of the boats taking part in
difficult conditions, these successes are to be attributed to the fact that the
Radio Intelligence Service was able to provide information in such good
time that it was possible to detail boats on their way to the E. coast of N.
America. The value of the successes is the greater in that the convoy was
carrying supplies for the African front.
2) Convoy No. 19:
Weather was particularly calm in the convoy area on the 19th, boats
reported W 2, sea 2, good visibility. Bright moonlight night with a smooth
sea surface.
Contact was lost with the main convoy at 1230 in AL 4755. At 2150 U
631 reported a destroyer and hydrophone bearing 600 true at 0600/20 in
AL 5528. No further reports were received of this convoy. After U 666's
attack at 0600/19 in AL 4867, contact was also lost with the SC convoy.
At 1930 U 642 reported smoke clouds again in AL 5852. No further
reports were received.
Many boats were bombed on the 19th and some depth-charged for a
long time and it is probable therefore that more escort forces joined the
convoy after the first big coup in the night 16/17 and above all it was
surrounded by a very strong air escort. Operation by day on the 20th
would already bring the boats too far into the area covered by English
shore-based aircraft, they were ordered to break off at first light on the
20th. Any opportunity to make a day submerged attack after dawn was to
be taken and the boats were then to move off to the S.W. in case there
should be stragglers and damaged ships left on the convoy route.
 - 183 - 2) U 191 is proceeding to AE 2233 at high cruising speed. From there
she is to obtain information on the ice boundary north of Iceland and in the
Denmark Straits. She is to report on this at the latest by 26.3 south of 610
N. She is to remain unobserved as far as possible and is forbidden to
attack any ships except troop transports and cruisers and above.
c) 1) The following have refueled: U 603, 638 and 616 for return passage
at economical speed from U 119. U 409 for further operations from U
463.
2) U 257 has delivered a Metox set to U 447.
d) None.
Successes:
Assumed V. Reports of Success:
Boat Time Square Report Sunk Torpedoed U 663 1 ship 6,000 GRT
U 441 2 ships 12,000 GRT 2 hits.
U 663 1540/19 AK 9655 6,000 GRT sunk 6,000 U 608 1 destroyer
U 441 0600/19 AL 4716 7,000 GRT passenger freighter sunk 7,000 U 527 1 ship 5,000 GRT
5,000 GRT ship left on fire and sinking 5,000 U 333 1 ship 5,000 GRT
2 hits (1 heard, 1 seen) 2 hits
U 608 0806/19 AL 4746 1 D-class destroyer sunk 1 destroyer
U 527 1047/19 AL 4935 hit on 5,000 GRT. Sunk by 523 with finishing ---------------------------------------------------
shot 5,000 ---------------
U 333 2118/19 AL 4854 5,000 GRT damaged ship sunk 5,000

5 ships totaling 28,000 GRT sunk

1 destroyer, 2 other ships torpedoed. - 184 -

b) 1) Group "Unverzagt" was broken up at the conclusion of operations

against Convoy No. 17. U 504, 521, 43, 558, 202 and 103 are starting for
home, owing to shortage of fuel. Of these, U 202, 558 and 43 will first
refuel from U 109. U 103, 504 and 521 will try and make contact with the
S-bound Gibraltar convoy. U 167, 524, 67, 513, 515, 172 and 109 are to
make for DH 87. These boats are to operate against traffic in the Canary
Islands area. They are all well enough off for fuel to carry out a long
convoy operation. U 106 will deliver her remaining fuel to U 109 and U
515 and then proceed home. 20.March 1943.

1233

I. U 43 - CF 68 U 183 - Op(DM 70) U 439 - AL 57 U 591 - Op(AL
55)
66 - BE 96 185 - Op(DN 70) 440 - Op(AL 45) 592 - Op(AK 33)
67 - CE 93 188 - Op(AK 33) 441 - Op(AL 52) 598 - Op(AL 55)
68 - Op(DN 70) 190 - Op(AL 57) 445 - BE 98 600 - BE 16
84 - AK 95 191 - AE 65 447 - BE 81 603 - BD 34
86 - Op(AL 47) 196 - AE 65 448 - BE 52 608 - AK 96
89 - BD 27 198 - AE 76 461 - BF 49 610 - Op(AL 52)
91 - BD 27 202 - CF 53 463 - BD 27 615 - AL 47
103 - CF 39 221 - AL 77 468 - AL 48 616 - BD 34
105 - BE 91 228 - AL 75 469 - AL 48 618 - Op(AL 52)
106 - CF 86 229 - Op(AD 99) 504 - CF 59 621 - BF 49
107 - BE 97 230 - AK 97 506 - GR 58 630 - AN 35
109 - CF 19 257 - BE 81 509 - Op(GR 10) 631 - Op(AL 55)
119 - BD 34 260 - BE 49 510 - Op(EP 80) 632 - BE 54
123 - CF 92 305 - Op(AL 55) 513 - CF 73 634 - BF 45
129 - CE 68 306 - Op(AK 31) 515 - CF 94 635 - AN 23
134 - Op(AK 69) 332 - BE 97 516 - Op(KY 80) 638 - BD 34
155 - Op(DL 10) 333 - Op(AL 64) 518 - Op(FJ 60) 641 - Op(AL 55)
156 - Op(EE 40) 336 - Op(AL 55) 521 - CG 14 642 - Op(AL 58)
159 - CF 57 338 - AL 87 523 - Op(AL 55) 653 - BD 27
160 - (KY 91) 373 - Op(AL 14) 524 - CF 99 659 - BF 52
161 - CD 12 384 - Op(AL 55) 526 - Op(AL 48) 663 - Op(AK 66)
167 - CF 99 405 - BE 52 527 - Op(AL 54) 664 - BD 27
168 - AE 76 406 - AL 77 530 - AK 96 665 - BE 28
169 - AN 36 409 - BD 27 558 - CF 64 666 - Op(AL 55)
172 - CF 57 410 - BE 97 564 - AK 62 704 - BE 51
174 - BF 48 415 - Op(AK 33) 566 - BE 52 706 - BE 61
180 - FD 31 432 - BD 34 572 - AK 63 758 - BD 27
182 - Op(KQ 60) 435 - AL 75 590 - Op(AL 55)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 66 - 89 - 91 - 103 - 109 - 160 - 202 - 221 -
228 - 230 - 332 - 405 - 432 - 435 - 447 - 448 - 461 - 468 - 504 - 521 - 558
- 566 - 600 - 603 - 608 - 616 - 621 - 634 - 638 - 653 - 659 - 664 - 665.
1234
Entered Port: U 659 - Brest.
Sailed: U 154 - 126 - Lorient; U 195 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Convoys W. of Portugal.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 19 see paragraph IVa).
2) Contact was not regained with U 621's convoy. U 107 and 445
started on their return passage because of fuel. U 410 will be able to
operate for one more day with her stocks. She is waiting for the N-bound
convoy in BE 9230 reported by aircraft.
3) U 119 sighted a small steamer in BD 3477, the neutrality markings of
which were not recognizable. U 638 took action and later identified the
Irish "Irish Beech". After establishing the name of the ship, the boat heard
a lot of ciphered radio traffic on 600 meters wavelength.
4) In spite of heavy damage, U 338 chased a NE-bound ship, escorted
by a destroyer, in BE 2164. She could not haul ahead even at emergency
full speed as the enemy's speed was too high.
- 185 -
5) U 603 sighted a W-bound illuminated steamer in BD 3993. She lost
contact in a rainstorm after chasing for several hours as far as BD 6233,
and continued on her return passage.
6) U 198 observed a group of patrol vessels in AE 8538 while on her
way through the Iceland Passage from AE 67 to AL 32.
7) U 631 and 441 were attacked by aircraft in AL 57 and bombed.
Slight damage.
 b) Our own aircraft sighted a S-bound convoy of 55 merchant ships at
1442 in CF 3337 and at 1400 in CG 1255 2 large ships on a course of
1800, with strong escort, also 2 N-bound convoys in CF 3633 and CG
4564 comprising 38 and 16 merchant ships respectively.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 6270, CG 1123, AL 4578, AL 6728, AL 5476,
EC 32, FC 68, AL 5839, AL 6197.
English aircraft attacked a U-boat in AL 5410 and believed it had
scored 2 hits.
d) 1) According to a Radio Intelligence (X) report, the Iceland section of
ONS 1 was ordered at 0900/21/3 in AL 2125 to join the main convoy. A
new numbering must have come into force for ONS convoys, as according
to previous reckoning, this should have been 173.
2) The SC was in BB 7959 on 18.3 and may be expected in about AK
78 at 0800/25/3.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Final remarks on Convoy No. 19: The operation against the HX
convoy bound for England lasted 4 days from 16.3 - 20.3.1943. The
convoy was picked up in very heavy weather A.M. on the 16th in BC
1491. As it was picked up so early in the day nearly all the "Burggraf"
boats were able to reach it by the evening of the same day and make
surprise attacks. As in so many convoy operations, this surprise attack by
many boats in the first night was the most successful. Altogether 38 boats
were detailed, all of which could have reached the convoy on the second
day or during the second night. Counting boats approaching and leaving
there could have been on average of about 20 boats per day in the vicinity
of the convoy.
On the second day the operation was affected by the bad visibility so
that unfortunately at the beginning of the second night there were only a
few boats near the convoy. At 0300 on the second day a second convoy,
probably the SC, which was in the same sea area only 120 miles ahead
was picked up. As Operations Control could not know the exact positions
of the boats, individual boats were given freedom of action to operate
against the convoy nearest to them. This meant that some of the boats
were withdrawn from the main convoy and operated against the new
convoy.
1235
Contact was maintained, with only short interruptions, with both
convoys. But already on the second day there was a very considerable
activity from land-based aircraft and seaplanes. Surface escort forces were
also reinforced, so that the boats had a hard fight from the second day on.
The particularly calm weather conditions on the last 2 days made things
even more difficult for them. In spite of these difficulties however,
- 186 -
further successes continued to be scored, some of them in underwater
attacks by day.
Altogether 32 ships, totaling 186,000 GRT, and 1 destroyer were sunk
and 9 other ships were hit. This is so far the best result obtained in a
convoy battle and nearly 50% shared in them.
After the first surprise coup the enemy increased his anti-submarine
forces constantly, but probably no boat was lost. Possibly U 384 may have
been picked up by enemy aircraft after operations were broken off. She
has not reported since then. 2 boats were heavily damaged by aircraft
bombs, so that they had to break off. Nearly all the boats were bombed or
depth-charged but without serious consequences except for the above 2.
b) 1) To pick up the ONS convoy, which, according to a Radio
Intelligence (X) report, is expected A.M. 22.3, U 306, 592, 188, 415, 663,
527, 564, 610, 134, 526, 523 and 598 are being formed into Group
"Seeteufel" and will be in patrol line from AD 8769 to AK 3867 from
0800/22.3.
 U 260 will also join this group and will make for AK 01 at economical
cruising speed. U 168 is coming from home and is to be in AL 2125 at
0900/21/3 and to try and pick up the expected convoy there. (See para.
IIId). If the convoy is sighted, this boat is to shadow for Group
"Seeteufel" without attacking.
2) The remaining boats which have operated against Convoy No. 19 and
are still comparatively well off for fuel, are moving away to the west and
will form another patrol line, with some other boats, from AK 4179 to BD
1348 from 0800/25/3. Order: U 305 - 591 - 631 - 86 - 384 - 666 - 618 -
336 - 333 - 530 - 527 - 440 - 373 - 441 - 590 - 641 - 642 and 257. These
boats will form Group "Seewolf". SC 123 is expected from 25.3 (See
para. IIId).
3) U 409 will occupy BC 30 as attack area. She is to make weather
reports twice daily from there, so that information may be given to an
expected homeward-bound blockade runner.
4) U 704, 706 and 632 are to steer for AJ 39. They will operate against
one of the 2 convoys mentioned above.
c) The following have supplied from U 463: U 591 for further
operations, U 89, 758, 664 for return passage. U 653 took over a Metox.
d) Because of the homeward-bound blockade runners "Regensburg" and
"Karin" attack on unescorted independent ships is forbidden with
immediate effect within a 200-mile wide strip, 100 miles either side of a
line from CD 32 to AK 13. All independent ships encountered within this
strip are to be reported immediately. Further areas will be closed in due
course.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 187 -
1236
21.March 1943.
I. U 43 - CF 55 U 182 - Op(KQ 65) U 435 - BE 13 U 572 - Op(AK
35)
66 - BF 72 183 - Op(DM 70) 439 - AL 88 590 - AL 48
67 - DG 33 185 - Op(DN 70) 440 - AK 69 591 - AK 81
68 - Op(EC 50) 188 - Op(AK 33) 441 - AL 48 592 - Op(AK 31)
84 - AK 97 190 - AL 78 445 - BF 74 598 - AL 42
86 - AK 97 191 - AE 26 447 - BE 67 600 - BE 28
89 - BD 63 195 - AO 448 - BE 64 603 - BE 18
91 - BD 27 196 - AE 59 461 - BF 67 608 - AL 78
103 - CG 12 198 - AL 39 463 - BD 27 610 - AK 63
105 - CF 23 202 - CF 19 468 - BE 12 615 - AK 95
106 - CF 87 221 - BD 33 469 - AF 79 616 - AL 77
107 - BF 74 228 - BE 13 504 - BE 94 618 - AK 68
109 - CF 19 229 - Op(AD 98) 506 - GR 73 621 - BF 54
119 - BD 34 230 - BD 25 509 - Op(GJ 70) 630 - AN 31
123 - DH 23 257 - BD 66 510 - Op(EP 40) 631 - AL 48
126 - BF 54 260 - AK 92 513 - CF 79 632 - BF 48
129 - CE 82 305 - AL 44 515 - DH 25 634 - (BF 40)
134 - AK 63 306 - Op(AK 31) 516 - Op(GR 90) 635 - AF 79
154 - BF 54 332 - BF 48 518 - Op(FJ 60) 638 - BE 41
155 - Op(DL 10) 333 - AK 69 521 - CG 12 641 - AL 47
156 - Op(EE 40) 336 - AL 47 523 - AL 15 642 - AL 48
159 - CF 57 338 - BE 22 524 - DH 28 653 - BD 62
160 - GR 90 373 - AK 68 526 - AL 41 663 - AK 33
161 - CD 32 384 - AL 54 527 - AL 48 664 - BD 37
167 - DH 25 405 - BE 65 530 - AK 91 665 - BE 62
168 - AE 78 406 - BD 33 558 - CF 52 666 - AL 48
 169 - AN 31 409 - BD 12 564 - Op(AK 35) 704 - BE 18
172 - DH 15 410 - CG 10 566 - BE 64 706 - BE 28 6) U 182 operated on a zigzag course as far as KQ 49 and found no
174 - BE 93 415 - Op(AK 33) 758 - BD 38 traffic there or in KZ 40. In KP 67 individual destroyers were sighted.
180 - FD 30 432 - BD 34 Boat is continuing to search in the area between KZ 74 - KQ 66.
b) Aircraft reported a convoy of 40 merchant ships, course 3600, speed 8
knots, in BE 9717. Two further convoys in CG.
On Return Passage: U 43 - 66 - 84 - 89 - 91 - 103 - 106 - 107 - 109 - c) U-boat sightings: DN 8879, EE 8869, BF 7258, BF 4683, BF 7338,
160 - 190 - 202 - 221 - 228 - 230 - 332 - 338 - 405 - 406 - 410 - 432 - 435 BF 4571, BF 8139. Depth charge attack by an aircraft on BF 32.
- 439 - 445 - 447 - 448 - 461 - 468 - 504 - 506 - 521 - 558 - 566 - 600 - d) According to a new Radio Intelligence (X) report, SC 123 was in BC
603 - 608 - 616 - 621 - 634 - 638 - 653 - 664 - 665 - 758. 4564 at 1100/21/3.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 404 - St. Nazaire; U 563 - Brest. IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Gibraltar convoys W. of Biscay. c) 1) U 180 could not find the Italian U-boat "J 9" although her position
was certain, and she is proceeding on her passage south.
III. Reports on the Enemy: 2) U 91 has supplied from U 463 for her return passage.
a) 1) U 373 reported a destroyer, course 700, in AK 9177. U 618 sighted d) 1) As the blockade-breaker "Doggerbank" is taking avoiding action,
the same ship 1 hour later in about the same position. attack is forbidden with immediate effect, on independent ships in CF 30,
2) U 591 was chased in AK 8442 by a destroyer with location gear. 60, 90 and in large square CG.
3) U 758 encountered an independent ship steering S.W. in BD 6168 2) U 432 was on her way to supply, as she was short of fuel. When
and afterwards identified her as Irish. U 638 examined the "Irish Elm" in Convoy No. 19 was picked up, she proposed to operate against it, as she
BD 6442 and let her go. could have reached it with about 15 cbm fuel remaining. She was
4) U 523 sank a damaged freighter at 2000/19/3 in AL 4838. nevertheless ordered to proceed on her way to supply. She did not
5) U 332 urgently requested aircraft assistance in BF 81. She was rendezvous with U 119 and has not reported despite several orders to do
attacked there, presumably by English aircraft. 4 Ju 88's were sent out, 2 so. She must be presumed lost.
of which were shot down by Beaufighters.
V. Reports of Success:
- 188 - U 523 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT

---------------------------------------------------
---------------

22. March 1943.

I. U 43 - CF 26 U 182 - Op(KZ 49) U 435 - BE 25 U 590 - AL 74

1237
 66 - BF 46 183 - Op(DM 70) 439 - BE 22 591 - AK 73
67 - Op(DH 18) 185 - Op(DN 70) 440 - AK 67 592 - Op(AK 31)
68 - Op(EC 50) 188 - OP(AK 33) 441 - AK 69 598 - Op(AK 38)
84 - BD 31 190 - BE 13 445 - BF 72 600 - BE 61
86 - AK 58 191 - AE 21 447 - BE 69 603 - BE 51
89 - BE 42 195 - (AN 30) 448 - BE 66 608 - BE 27
91 - BD 62 196 - AE 81 461 - BF 64 610 - Op(AK 36)
103 - BE 90 198 - AL 55 463 - BD 27 615 - BD 22
105 - CF 27 202 - CF 26 468 - BE 24 616 - BE 43
106 - CF 87 221 - BE 15 469 - AF 73 618 - AK 85
107 - BF 48 228 - BE 25 504 - BE 90 621 - BE 51
- 189 -
109 - CF 26 229 - Op(AD 98) 506 - GR 47 630 - AN 23
119 - BD 31 230 - BD 27 509 - Op(GJ 40) 631 - AK 69
123 - DH 53 257 - BD 64 510 - Op(EP) 632 - BE 17
126 - BF 49 260 - AK 56 513 - DH 18 634 - BF 55
129 - CF 79 305 - AK 64 515 - CF 87 635 - AF 73
134 - Op(AK 36) 306 - Op(AD 87) 516 - Op(GR 90) 638 - BE 43
154 - BF 48 332 - BF 48 518 - Op(FJ 60) 641 - AK 95
155 - Op(DL 10) 333 - AK 83 521 - BE (90) 642 - AK 93
156 - Op(EE) 336 - AK 68 523 - Op(AK 38) 653 - BE 42
159 - CF 87 338 - BE 38 524 - DH 58 663 - Op(AK 34)
160 - GR 97 373 - AK 86 526 - Op(AK 36) 664 - BE 41
161 - CD 32 384 - AL 47 527 - AK (68) 665 - BE 65
1238
167 - DH 56 404 - BF 58 530 - AK 82 666 - AK 69
168 - AK 30 405 - BF 44 558 - CF 26 704 - BE 54
169 - AN 23 406 - BD 33 563 - BF 54 706 - BE 18
172 - DH 43 409 - BD 35 564 - Op(AK 34) 758 - BD 62
174 - BF 91 410 - BE 90 566 - BE 66
180 - FD 35 415 - Op(AK 33) 572 - Op(AK 34)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 66 - 84 - 89 - 91 - 103 - 106 - 107 - 109 -
160 - 190 - 202 - 221 - 228 - 230 - 332 - 338 - 405 - 406 - 410 - 435 - 439
- 440 - 445 - 447 - 448 - 461 - 468 - 504 - 506 - 521 - 558 - 566 - 591 -
600 - 603 - 608 - 616 - 621 - 634 - 638 - 653 - 664 - 665 - 758.
Entered Port: U 461 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: In the sea area W. of Biscay.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 634 sighted a darkened vessel in BF 5546. As there was no ship
of our own in the vicinity, this may have been a French trawler.
2) U 338 shot down a 4-engined Halifax bomber in BE 6281 and took
one prisoner.
3) U 332 is able to dive again, though to a restricted extent, after an
aircraft attack and is continuing her homeward passage through Biscay
without fighter escort.
b) Our own Air Force sighted: 2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer and 2
merchant ships, course 1600, high speed, at 1309 in BE 3554.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: BF 4547, BF 7399, BF 4139, BF 7325, BF 4561,
BF 4597, AF 7122, DH 5821, EV 7687, FJ 8733.
2) Distress report from FF 2880.
3) Allied unit was located in BF 8250 at 0934.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
 b) 1) As the expected ONS had not been picked up by evening, Group
"Seeteufel" proceeded in reconnaissance line from 2100, course 2500,
speed 7 knots. U 168 joined the Group and extended the line to the north,
U 260 extended it to the south. The whole Group,
- 190 -
14 boats, remained in patrol line in the position line from AD 7986 to
AK 3955 reached at 0900/23. If the Radio Intelligence report is correct
the convoy should pass this line during the day.
2) U 384 having fallen out, the "Seewolf" patrol line ordered for
0800/25/3 will be shortened and will now consist of 17 boats from AK
4428 to BD 1358.
3) The boats intended for operation in the Canary Islands during the full
moon period will occupy the following attack areas for the time being:
U 159 - DH 44 U 515 - DH 48 U 67 - DH 73 U 513 - DH 84
U 172 - DH 88 U 167 - DU 13 U 524 - DU 21
Boats have been reminded of enemy air reconnaissance.
4) U 105 is to steer for DH 70.
c) None.
d) 1) U 161, which has not so far encountered the ship, has been ordered
to operate in the area around BC 96 when "Regensburg" has made her
report as ordered. The boat is to be in CD 3733 left bottom A.M. on 26.3.
to rendezvous with the Italian homeward-bound blockade runner
"PEITRO ORSEOLO".
1239
After she had been asked to give her maximum continuous speed, the
state of her engines and other important details, she moved 150 miles to
the west and reported. She then continued west.
2) Route A Sector D is open for attack on independent ships until 24/3
inclusive. From 25.3 to 15.4. inclusive this sector will again be closed.
V. Reports of Success:
U 338 - 1 Halifax.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
23. March 1943.
I. U 43 - CF 19 U 180 - FE 44 U 410 - BF 48 U 566 - BF 45
66 - BF 40 182 - Op(KZ 40) 435 - BE 53 572 - Op(AK 24)
67 - DH 45 183 - Op(AM 40) 415 - Op(AK 22) 590 - BD 31
68 - Op(EC 50) 185 - Op(DN 70) 439 - BE 53 591 - Op(AK 41)
84 - BD 25 188 - Op(AK 22) 440 - AK 82 592 - Op(AK 22)
86 - AK 49 190 - BD 25 441 - AK 83 598 - Op(AK 39)
89 - BE 52 191 - AE 17 445 - BF 40 600 - BE 66
91 - BE 42 195 - AN 30 447 - BF 54 603 - BE 56
103 - BF 72 196 - AE 76 448 - BF 45 608 - BE 61
105 - CF 57 198 - BE 13 463 - BD 25 610 - Op(AK 26)
106 - CF 87 202 - CF 19 468 - BE 52 615 - BD 25
107 - BF 40 221 - BE 39 469 - AF 48 616 - BE 53
109 - CF 19 228 - BE 53 504 - BF 72 618 - AK 73
119 - BD 31 229 - Op(AD 94) 506 - CQ 66 621 - BF 28
123 - Op(DH 83) 230 - BD 25 509 - Op(GJ 40) 630 - AF 76
126 - BF 47 257 - BD 52 510 - Op(EP 40) 631 - AK 56
129 - DF 33 260 - AK (39) 513 - Op(DH 46) 632 - BD 31
134 - Op(AK 28) 305 - AK 54 515 - CF 87 634 - BF 61
154 - BF 47 306 - Op(AK 22) 516 - Op(GR 90) 635 - AF 48
155 - Op(DL 10) 332 - BF 91 518 - Op(FJ 60) 638 - BE 42

- 191 -
156 - Op(EE) 333 - AK 81 521 - BF 72 641 - AK 86
159 - CF 87 336 - AK 82 523 - Op(AK 39) 642 - AK 86
160 - GR 88 338 - BF 46 524 - Op(DH 85) 653 - BE 52
161 - CD 30 373 - AK 76 526 - Op(AK 28) 663 - Op(AK 22)
167 - Op(DH 82) 384 - AK 67 527 - AK 83 664 - BE 43
168 - Op(AK 22) 404 - BF 49 530 - AK 73 665 - BF 68
169 - AF 76 405 - BF 64 558 - CF 19 666 - AK 59
172 - Op(DH 81) 406 - BE 39 563 - BF 45 704 - BE 43
174 - BE 73 409 - Op(BC 35) 564 - Op(AK 24) 706 - BD 36
758 - BE 42
On Return Passage: U 43 - 66 - 84 - 89 - 91 - 103 - 106 - 107 - 109 -
160 - 190 - 202 - 221 - 228 - 230 - 332 - 338 - 405 - 406 - 410 - 435 - 439
- 445 - 447 - 448 - 468 - 504 - 506 - 521 - 558 - 566 - 591 - 600 - 603 -
608 - 616 - 621 - 634 - 638 - 653 - 664 - 665 - 758.
Entered Port: U 621 - Brest; U 634 - Lorient; U 405 - St Nazaire.
Sailed: U 584 - Brest; U 594 - 455 - 662 - 267 - St Nazaire; U 181 -
Bordeaux; U 270 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
1240
a) 1) U 572 sighted an E-bound destroyer in AK 2631 at 1220. She lost
contact in bad visibility, after surfacing.
2) U 718 also reported 2 destroyers in BE 4587, course 2300. Boat
continued on her return passage.
3) U 166 is proceeding through the Iceland Passage via AE 6815 and
8715. She sighted 3 drift mines in AF 44, an aircraft in AF 4479 and a
flying boat in AE 6783.
4) Situation reports:
U 185: Coastal sailing vessels only observed in EC 11, DM 95 and 88,
slight air activity by day; sea patrol off Kingston. Boat intends to operate
in DN 75 after full moon.
U 183: One neutral on course 40 in DL 69 and one, course 3100 in
DM 79. No night radar, air activity by day only, no sea patrol. Boat
intends to operate in the area between DL 69 and DM 43.
U 516: Stood on and off in CJ 70 from 18-22-3. There she sank an
American steamer type C2, 7,000 GRT on 20.3 in GJ 7395. Ship was
sailing from Capetown to Bahia with a cargo of oil products. Close
inshore night air activity with radar. Boat intends to operate in GJ 12 if the
moon is favorable.
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: FC 82, FJ 87, BF 4819.
2) Torpedo report from FA 3719.
3) Unidentified steamer with call sign FLTH made an SOS report from
BF 7734 at 1418. (Possibly English aircraft shot down).
d) None.
- 192 -
 IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) The expected ONS 1 convoy has not yet been picked up and is now
unlikely to arrive. It is not known at present if the convoy circumvented
the patrol line or if it sailed earlier than expected. Group "Seeteufel"
proceeded in reconnaissance line, course 260, speed 5 knots from 2100. It
is intended to form a long patrol line SE of Greenland with Group
"Seeteufel" to intercept SC 123 expected in 25.3.
2) U 409 has been given freedom of action within 200 miles around AJ
82. She will report weather by short signal twice daily for information of
returning blockade runners.
3) U 174's new rendezvous with KARIN is BD 8737 left lower edge.
c) 1) U 510 has been informed that she cannot supply in DG 40 before
April 6.
2) The following have refueled from U 463: U 91 and 230 for return
passage, U 614 and 84 for further operations. U 190 delivered her
remaining fuel to the tanker. U 221 took over fuel from U 406 and U 119
a sick man from U 590.
3) U 455 sailed for a special operation (minelaying off Casablanca. See
minelaying order.).
d) 1) In Route A Sector A will be closed from 0000/25/3 to 2400/1/4.
This means that attack on single ships will be forbidden in the whole of
Route A.
2) U 384 last reported at 0805/19/3 from AL 4764. From 20/3 she was
several times ordered to report but did not answer. She must be presumed
lost. It is not known whether she was sunk during the day by the convoy
escort or by the very strong air escort on the following day.
3) U 665 announced herself 36 hours off the escort rendezvous P.M.
21/3. She did not arrive there and did not report again. She must have
been sunk by the unusually strong air patrol on 22.3.
V. Reports of Success:
U 516 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT
VI. General:
1241
U 665 is probably the third boat to be sunk off or in Biscay this month
(U 665, 163, 87). It is assumed that U 665 and 163 at least were victims of
air attack. Altogether 14 boats have been lost by air attack in this area
since 1st July 1942, 5 of them in the period 1st February to 23rd March.
During the period November 1942 to January 1943 enemy a/c A/S
activity had little result, but since February its effect has increased to an
alarming extent. It is not known whether this is due to improved location
gear or to the use of more suitable types of a/c. The fact is that during the
last two months there have been more U-boat sighting by English
- 193 -
aircraft, and more U-boats have been attacked.
G.O.C. Atlantic Air Forces gives the following information on English air
operations in his Reg. No. Most Secret 853/43:
"Average sortie of enemy sea reconnaissance during the last 3 months
was 35 - 40 planes daily from the following bases:
Beaulieu (near Southampton) - unknown number of Halifaxes and
Liberators
Talbenny (near Milford Haven) - 23 Beaufighters
Chivenor (Cornwall) - 36 Whitneys and Wellingtons
St. Eval, Trevose Head - 73 Wellingtons
Mount Batten - 14 Sunderlands
Pembroke Dock - 12 Sunderlands
Poole - 12 Sunderlands
Concentration by day W. of 100 W, by night in inner Biscay. Largest
number of aircraft during the afternoon. When convoys were sailing N.
and S. between Gibraltar and England reconnaissance was reinforced to
about 50 aircraft daily. English reconnaissance aircraft keep radio silence
S. of 490 N., so that it is not possible to discover in what areas they are
concentrating.
no particular increase in activity observed during the last few weeks."
It should be noted here that when convoys are going through it is almost
impossible for U-boats to operate on the surface owing to constant air
activity.
Experience shows that aircraft A/S activity increases when there are a
number of U-boats on return passage through Biscay after major convoy
operations. Action by Ju 88's type C6, available to G.O.C. Atlantic Air
Forces, against A/S aircraft is possible only to a restricted extent.
G.O.C. Atlantic Air Forces states in his Reg. No. 853/43, para. 4):
"The Ju 88 C6 is inferior to the Beaufighter (a further 2 Ju88's lost on
22 on U-boat escort off the Spanish coast) and no longer superior to
modern A/S aircraft Boeings and Fortress II. Reasons: too slow,
unsuitable armament, water-cooled engines sensitive to gunfire".
It is clear from G.O.C. Atlantic Air Forces' report that no improvement
can be expected in the near future in countermeasures to the ever
increasing enemy aircraft anti-submarine hunts, which are now making
themselves felt immediately off our own bases. There will be further
losses.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
24. March 1943.
I. U 43 - CF 19 U 181 - BF 92 U 415 - Op(AK 25) U 572 - Op(AK
25)
66 - BF 52 182 - Op(KZ 50) 435 - BE 66 584 - BF 54
67 - DH 73 183 - Op(DM 70) 439 - BE 66 590 - Op(AK 79)
68 - Op(EC 50) 185 - Op(EB 21) 440 - Op(AK 76) 591 - Op(AK 44)
84 - BD 24 188 - Op(AK 22) 441 - AK 82 592 - Op(AK 22)
86 - Op(AK 47) 190 - BD 24 445 - BF 40 594 - BF 58
1242
89 - BE 64 191 - AD 55 447 - BF 28 598 - Op(AK 39)
91 - BE 51 195 - AF 79 448 - BF 58 600 - BF 45
103 - BF 40 196 - AL 29 463 - BD 24 603 - BE 65
105 - CF 84 198 - BE 42 455 - BF 58 608 - BE 66
- 194 -
106 - CF 87 202 - CF 19 468 - BE 64 610 - Op(AK 26)
107 - BF 40 221 - BE 43 469 - BE 66 615 - BD 24
109 - CF 19 228 - BE 65 504 - BF 52 616 - BE 65
119 - BD 33 229 - Op(AD 98) 506 - GQ 37 618 - Op(AK 48)
123 - DH 88 230 - BD 24 509 - Op(GJ 40) 630 - AF 73
126 - BE 68 257 - BD 16 510 - Op(EP 20) 631 - Op(AK 54)
129 - DF 33 260 - Op(AK 39) 513 - DH 84 632 - AK 94
134 - Op(AK 26) 267 - BF 50 515 - CF 87 635 - AE 66
154 - BF 92 270 - AO 516 - Op(GH 93) 638 - BE 51
155 - Op(DL 10) 305 - Op(AK 45) 518 - Op(FJ 80) 641 - Op(AK 87)
156 - Op(EE) 306 - Op(AD 22) 521 - BF 40 642 - Op(AK 87)
159 - CF 87 332 - BF 68 523 - Op(AK 37) 653 - BE 64
160 - CR 72 333 - Op(AK 72) 524 - DU 21 662 - BF 58
161 - CD 30 336 - Op(AK 73) 526 - Op(AK 37) 663 - Op(AK 25)
167 - DH 88 338 - BF 64 527 - AK 81 664 - BE 53
168 - Op(AD 79) 373 - Op(AK 76) 530 - Op(AK 72) 666 - Op(AK 57)
169 - AF 73 404 - BF 47 558 - CF 19 704 - BE 15
172 - DH 88 406 - BE 43 563 - BE 66 706 - AK 98
174 - BD 96 409 - AJ 86 564 - Op(AK 26) 758 - BE 49
 180 - Op(FE 70) 410 - BF 40 566 - BF 51
On Return Passage: U 43 - 66 - 84 - 89 - 91 - 103 - 106 - 107 - 109 -
119 - 160 - 190 - 202 - 221 - 228 - 230 - 332 - 338 - 406 - 410 - 435 - 439 -
445 - 447 - 448 - 468 - 504 - 506 - 521 - 558 - 566 - 591 - 600 - 603 - 608
- 616 - 638 - 653 - 664 - 758.
Entered Port: U 447 - Brest; U 66 - 504 - Lorient; U 338 - St. Nazaire;
U 332 - La Pallice.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Reports from and orders to Group "Seeteufel" see para. IVa).
2) U 103 sighted a white light on the surface at 0400 in BF 4883, like a
life buoy light. Boats on homeward passage which can do so without
making a long detour are to pass through the position given.
b) - d) None.
IV. Current Conditions:
a) U 572 reported a destroyer, course 2400, in AK 2517 at 1937.
Visibility was bad, with fog banks in parts and she pursued in vain. U 306
also sighted a W-bound destroyer at 2114 in AK 1169. Reconnaissance to
contact was lost in the fog. U 592 had 2 hydrophone bearings in AK 1411
and later a receding bearing in 1600.
All these sightings pointed to the presence of a convoy and the northern
boats of the line, U 592, 188, 168 and 415 were ordered to operate on U
306's sighting report, and U 663, 572 and 564 against U 572's destroyer
sighting. Rest of Group "Seeteufel" was to proceed on at 7 knots on a
course of 2500.
U 632 and 706 joined the Group and extended the line to the S. by 20
miles each. No further shadowers' reports had been received by morning.
The search continues.
- 195 -
1243
b) U 84 and 615 will extend Group "Seewolf's" patrol line to the south.
The boats will then be in line from AK 4428 to BD 1628 at 0800/25/3 with
19 boats.
c) It is intended to supply U 155, 185, 183 and 156 as well as 68 from
15.4.43 in DF 50. Boats are to start on their return passages accordingly.
U 518 is to make for DG 50.
d) 1) U 161 encountered "Regensburg" on 23.3 in the position arranged
and reported as ordered.
2) Contrary to present instructions Portuguese ships are not for the
present to be stopped for the purpose of removing enemy nationals of
military age. This does not cancel the general instructions for occasional
examination of these ships for contraband.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
25. March 1943.
I. U 43 - CF 19 U 180 - FM 10 U 410 - BF 40 U 566 - BF 52
67 - Op(DH 73) 181 - BF 82 415 - Op(AK 15) 572 - Op(AK 17)
68 - Op(EC 49) 182 - Op(KZ 38) 435 - BF 52 584 - BF 45
84 - Op(BD 16) 183 - Op(DM 70) 439 - BF 45 590 - Op(AK 79)
86 - Op(AK 47) 185 - Op(EB 20) 440 - Op(AK 76) 591 - Op(AK 44)
89 - BE 66 188 - Op(AK 15) 441 - Op(AK 79) 592 - Op(AK 13)
 91 - BE 56 190 - BD 39 445 - BF 40 594 - BF 49
103 - BF 55 191 - AD 82 448 - BF 64 598 - Op(AK 51)
105 - DH 18 195 - AF 73 463 - BD 55 600 - BF 40
106 - CF 87 196 - AL 45 455 - BF 49 603 - BF 51
107 - BF 61 198 - BE 48 468 - BE 66 608 - BF 45
109 - CF 19 202 - BF 51 469 - AE 67 610 - Op(AK 18)
119 - BE 16 221 - BE 55 506 - GQ 22 615 - Op(BD 16)
123 - DU 18 228 - BF 44 509 - Op(GJ 40) 616 - BF 58
126 - BE 83 229 - Op(AD 94) 510 - EF 86 618 - Op(AK 48)
129 - DG 37 230 - BE 19 513 - Op(DH 84) 630 - AF 45
134 - Op(AK 01) 257 - Op(BD 13) 515 - CF 87 631 - Op(AK 44)
154 - BE 86 260 - Op(AK 51) 516 - Op(GR 60) 632 - AK 58
155 - Op(DL 10) 267 - BF 49 518 - Op(FJ 90) 635 - AE 67
156 - Op(EE) 270 - AN 36 521 - BF 40 638 - BE 64
159 - CF 87 305 - Op(AK 44) 523 - Op(AK 01) 641 - Op(AK 79)
160 - GR 47 306 - Op(AK 13) 524 - Op(DU 21) 642 - Op(BD 12)
161 - BC 96 333 - Op(AK 72) 526 - Op(AK 01) 653 - BE 66
167 - Op(DU 13) 336 - Op(AK 72) 527 - Op(AK 75) 662 - BF 49
168 - Op(AK 11) 373 - OP(AK 76) 530 - Op(AK 72) 663 - Op(AK 15)
169 - AF 45 404 - BE 68 558 - CF 19 664 - BE 65
172 - Op(DH 88) 406 - BE 55 563 - BE 28 666 - Op(AK 57)
174 - BD 94 409 - Op(AJ 86) 564 - Op(AK 17) 704 - BD 35
706 - AK 82
758 - BE 59
On Return Passage: U 43 - 84 - 89 - 91 - 103 - 106 - 107 - 109 - 119 -
160 - 190 - 202 - 221 - 228 - 230 - 406 - 410 - 435 - 439 - 445 - 448 - 468
- 506 - 510 - 521 - 558 - 566 - 591 - 600 - 603 - 608 - 616 - 638 - 653 -
664 - 758.
Entered Port: U 435 - 566 - Brest; U 107 - Lorient; U 448 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 613 - Brest; U 571 - La Pallice; U 532 - Kiel.
- 196 -
1244
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Reports from U 592 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 564, belonging to Group "Seeteufel", saw search lights flashing at
0755/25/3 in AK 1712 and afterwards observed machine-gun fire. She
pressed on in vain. She observed an iceberg in AJ 3633.
3) U 190 encountered a camouflaged small steamer, zigzagging around
a S.W. course, in BE 1881. The boat suspected a Q ship. She continued
on her return passage.
4) On her way through the Iceland Passage U 635 sighted a drift mine in
AF 8746 and a Whitley in AF 4456.
5) As ordered, U 191 has reconnoitered the ice boundary N. of Iceland
and in the Denmark Straits. The boundary runs from AE 2231 via AE
2284 to AD 2931 and thence bearing 2400. Nature: pack-ice barriers with
drift-ice in parts. Very thick fog in the Denmark Straits. Drift mine
sighted in AD 2931, otherwise no patrol or Radar. Fired on by destroyer at
1700/25/3.
6) U 509 has been off Columbia and Saldanha since 18.3. There she
sighted 4 ships on N - S courses by day on the 100 meter line. No further
successes scored.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: KZ 17, ED 1247, CC 3791, AE 8479, AF 7963.
d) At 2000/21/3 convoy RS 3 was in DH 1395, course south, speed 7.3
knots. This is a convoy plying between Rabat and Freetown.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Report from U 592:
 U 592 sighted a large vessel with 2 destroyers, course 300, at 1500 in
AD 9845. According to an earlier Radio Intelligence (X) report there was
a damaged whale-factory ship in this area and U 168 and 306 of Group
Seeteufel" and U 229 were detailed to operate. U 592 pursued the ship as
far as AD 9394 and lost contact in a squall. The boat believes she made a
leg to 2900. Except for a few hydrophone bearings nothing further was
observed until morning.
b) 1) Search for enemy units reported yesterday by U 306 and 572 was
successful. Group "Seeteufel" has therefore been ordered to be in patrol
line in the old order from AD 9746 to AK 4634 at 0800/26/3, including U
632 and 706. Boats are to arrange their course and speed so as to pass the
position line from AJ 2354 to AK 4576 at 0800. Further details see
paragraph VI.
2) Group "Seeteufel" will leave at 1000 on a course of 1500, speed 5
knots and will remain in patrol line at the position line reached from AK
4736 to BD 2714 at 2200.
- 197 -
The patrol line is being transferred because of U-boat situation
reports received. For further details see paragraph VI.
3) To pick up the RS 3 convoy mentioned in a Radio Intelligence (X)
report, which may be in DH 90, U 67, 513, 172, 167 and 524 will be in
patrol line from DH 9768 to DH 9898 at 1700/26/3. U 159 and U 123 will
make for DU 2290 and are to be there at 0800/27/3. U 515 has refueled
and is proceeding to DH 98.
U 123 was originally to have operated off Dakar and this patrol will
now be taken over by U 105.
1245
4) U 563, 465, 404, 584, 662, 267, 594, 613 and 571 are to make for AK
69.
5) It is known from reliable sources that several ships have put into
Lourenco Marques recently. U 182 has been ordered to concentrate off
this port during the new moon period, if there is no traffic in her present
area.
"Seehund" boats are to remain in the southern area as long as possible,
as there is still a stream of independent ships there on E and W courses. It
is intended to supply these boats in the southern third of DG.
c) The following have refueled: U 159 and U 515 from U 106, U 558, 43
and 202 from U 109.
d) "Seewolf" and "Seeteufel" boats have been reminded once more of the
ban on attack on independent ships in the 200-mile wide strip N. of Route
A, because of "Regensburg".
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
According to an American U-boat situation report on 24.3, by inaccurate
radio D/F bearings, 10 - 15 boats were believed to be patrolling in the area
56 - 610 N and 28 - 360 W, and 15 - 20 boats patrolling in the area 49 -
560 N and 34 - 410 W. Group "Seeteufel", with 14 boats, was in patrol
line from AK 7986 to AK 3955 until 2100/23/3. Group "Seewolf" has
orders to be in patrol line with 18 boats from AK 5179 to BD 1348 and
was therefore still scattered over the area mentioned at the time in
question.
In the former area no boat used her radio or had any contact with the
enemy. There is also no information of sightings by aircraft. There is
some reason for thinking that this is pure conjecture on the part of the
enemy, in that he assumes that all boats coming out from home are
disposed in the area S.W. of Greenland which is favorable for intercepting
convoys.
Up to 19.3 a convoy was pursued by several boats in the area of AL 50.
After breaking off operations all boats reported their position and
remaining fuel, so that there were a great many radio messages made from
this area.
 From the enemy's point of view it would be only reasonable to suppose
that these boats had been reassembled and redisposed. The area in which
the Americans believed them to be disposed is the area which is least
subject to enemy air activity and through which convoys must pass if they
do not want to make a considerable detour.
- 198 -
26.March 1943.
I. U 43 - CF 19 U 181 - BF 73 U 415 - Op(AJ 32) U 584 - BE 66
67 - Op(DH 73) 182 - Op(KZ 30) 439 - BF 40 590 - Op(BD 13)
68 - Op(FC 50) 183 - Op(DM 70) 440 - Op(AK 79) 591 - Op(AK 48)
84 - Op(BD 16) 185 - Op(EB 20) 441 - AK 79 592 - Op(AD 94)
86 - Op(AK 72) 188 - Op(AJ 32) 445 - BF 57 594 - BF 47
89 - BF 45 190 - Op(BE 51) 463 - BD 55 598 - Op(AK 42)
91 - BE 65 191 - AK 22 455 - BF 72 600 - BF 68
103 - BF 61 195 - AF 45 468 - BF 45 603 - BF 28
105 - DH 48 196 - AL 75 469 - AE 82 608 - BF 40
106 - DH 14 198 - BE 78 506 - GH 74 610 - Op(AJ 36)
109 - CF 19 202 - BF 28 509 - Op(GJ 40) 613 - BF 51
119 - BE 28 221 - BE 64 510 - BF 67 615 - Op(BD 24)
123 - DU 48 228 - BF 40 513 - Op(DH 84) 616 - BF 64
126 - BE 84 229 - Op(AD 94) 515 - DH 17 618 - Op(AK 72)
129 - DF 52 230 - BE 52 516 - Op(GH 60) 630 - AE 66
134 - Op(AJ 39) 257 - Op(BD 16) 518 - Op(FJ 90) 631 - Op(AK 49)
1246
154 - CF 23 260 - Op(AK 43) 521 - BF 61 632 - Op(AK 46)
155 - Op(DL 20) 267 - BF 47 523 - Op(AJ 39) 635 - AE 82
156 - Op(EE 40) 270 - AN 30 524 - Op(DU 21) 638 - BE 65
159 - Op(DH 44) 305 - Op(AK 47) 526 - Op(AJ 39) 641 - Op(BD 13)
160 - GQ 62 306 - Op(AD 97) 527 - OP(AK 76) 642 - Op(BD 16)
161 - CD 34 333 - Op(AK 75) 530 - Op(AK 76) 653 - BF 44
167 - Op(DH 88) 336 - Op(AK 72) 532 - AO 662 - BF 47
168 - Op(AD 97) 373 - Op(AK 79) 558 - CF 19 663 - Op(AJ 36)
169 - AE 66 404 - BE 59 563 - BE 19 664 - BF 44
172 - Op(DH 88) 406 - BE 64 564 - Op(AJ 36) 666 - Op(AK 72)
174 - BD 87 409 - Op(AJ 82) 571 - BF 91 704 - AK 96
180 - FM 19 410 - BF 40 572 - Op(AJ 36) 706 - Op(AK 43)
758 - BF 68
On Return Passage: U 43 - 84 - 89 - 91 - 103 - 106 - 109 - 119 - 160 -
190 - 202 - 221 - 228 - 230 - 406 - 410 - 439 - 445 - 468 - 506 - 510 - 521
- 558 - 591 - 600 - 603 - 608 - 616 - 638 - 653 - 664 - 758.
Entered Port: U 603 - Brest; U 521 - 103 - Lorient; U 616 - 202 - St.
Nazaire; U 600 - La Pallice.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: In the area W. of Portugal.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 20 see para IVa.
2) At 1235 U 168 reported the large steamers, with one destroyer
previously sighted by U 592. She was ordered to sink the ship but
reported 3 hours later that it had been an iceberg which looked like a
steamer with 2 destroyers. It is suspected that all boats were caught like
this. U 168, 592 and 306 then made for their position in the "Seeteufel"
patrol line at high speed. U 229 remained in her present area.
3) U 68 situation: 17.3. sighted a tanker, course 700, in EB 99 and heard
a fast convoy, course 2500, by night in her hydrophones. No action
possible. 22.3. in EB 96 double miss at fast independent ship with air
escort, course 2300. A/c radar observed at night. Boat requests a new
operations area as her METOX is unserviceable.
- 199 -
b) A/c reported a convoy of 35 ships and 4 escort vessels at 1213 in CF
6669, course 00, speed 8 knots.
c) U-boat sightings: DN 7559 and EP 25 (possibly attack).
d) 1) The convoy sighted by a/c is SL 126.
2) According to a Radio Intelligence (X) report, SC 12 was ordered to
be in BC 7763 at 2000/22/3 and from there to steer 230.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 20:
U 564 sighted a convoy, course 2500, in AJ 3581 at 1845/26/3. Group
"Seeteufel" was ordered to operate, excluding the most northerly boats
which are over 100 miles off.
U 564 then reported the convoy again at 2109 in AJ 3552, with air
escort and 3 escort vessels to starboard, convoy's course 3400. At 2142
the boat lost contact and reported the enemy's course as 100 when last
sighted. At 2100 U 663 also reported the convoy in AJ 3552, including
one a/c carrier. She did not give the convoy's course.
As it was not known whether this was a SE or NE bound convoy, these
2 boats were asked to give the course. Schmid reported at 0500 that he
had observed the convoy's course as 180. He saw a number of mastheads
for a short time and definitely an a/c carrier of the "Illustrious" class. With
regard to the course of 100, U 564 said that the enemy had zig zagged to
100.
1247
Apart from these reports U 415 reported a destroyer course 200 in AJ
3561 at 0045. There were therefore 3 clear reports in favor of a SW course
and only one for a NE. Group "Seeteufel" boats were therefore instructed
to operate on a SW course. This must be ON 174 (or ON 2) which could
be in this area according to dead reckoning. Operation was made difficult
by a very variable visibility. No further reports were received of the
convoy by A.M. 27th.
b) 1) After Group "Seeteufel" had been detailed against the convoy
reported by U 564, Group "Seewolf" proceeded north, course 3400, speed
10 knots. It was suspected that the SC or HX convoy expected was using
the northern route. This area has been left unoccupied and Group
"Seewolf" is therefore to move 150 miles to the north and if possible to
intercept both convoys.
2) The S-bound convoy expected by Group "Seegräuber" was not
picked up. The boats left at 0100, course SW, high speed and were to be
in a new patrol line from DU 2194 to DU 2625 at 0800/27/3. As, in the
previous patrol line, the boats were only 15 miles apart, it is hardly likely
that the convoy passed undetected. It is more possible that it passed
between the islands.
3) The following temporary attack areas are to be occupied, in order to
provide patrol for the returning blockade-runners and pick up the ship's
crew in case of enemy attacks: U 191 - AK 39, U 635 - AK 53, U 469 -
AD 84.
- 200 -
 4) U 198, 181 and 196 are to steer for square GR for operations in the
Capetown area and the Mozambique Channel.
c) None.
d) Sector C in Route A (15 - 30 N.) is open for attack on independent
ships with immediate effect until 29.3 inclusive.
168 - Op(AJ 34) 373 - Op(AK 79) 558 - BE 94 666 - Op(AK 72)
169 - AE 67 404 - BE 54 563 - AL 77 704 - AL 44
172 - Op(DH 98) 406 - BE 69 564 - Op(AJ 37) 706 - Op(AK 44)
174 - BD 87 409 - Op(AJ 52) 571 - BF 81 758 - BF 47
180 - FM 58 410 - BF 61 572 - Op(AJ 37)

V. Reports of Success: None.

On Return Passage: U 43 - 84 - 89 - 91 - 106 - 109 - 119 - 160 - 190 -
--------------------------------------------------- 221 - 228 - 230 - 406 - 439 - 445 - 468 - 506 - 510 - 410 - 558 - 591 - 608
--------------- - 638 - 653 - 664 - 758.
Entered Port: U 445 - St. Nazaire; U 468 - La Pallice; U 410 - Lorient.
27. March 1943. Sailed: U 124 - Lorient; U 71 - St. Nazaire; U 487 - Kiel.

II. Air Reconnaissance: In the area W. of Portugal.

I. U 43 - BE 86 U 181 - BF 74 U 415 - Op(AJ 34) U 584 - BE 64
67 - Op(DH 97) 182 - Op(KQ 70) 439 - BF 51 590 - Op(BD 12) III. Reports on the Enemy:
68 - Op(EC 60) 183 - Op(DM 70) 440 - Op(AK 79) 591 - Op(AK 48) a) 1) Convoy Nos. 20, 21 and 23 see paragraph IVa.
84 - Op(BD 16) 185 - Op(DM 99) 441 - Op(AK 79) 592 - Op(AJ 26)
86 - Op(AK 72) 188 - Op(AJ 34) 445 - BF 64 594 - BE 65 - 201 -
89 - BF 91 190 - BE 56 463 - BD 55 598 - Op(AK 41)
91 - BF 47 191 - AK 37 455 - CG 14 608 - BF 40
105 - DH 71 195 - AE 66 468 - BF 68 610 - Op(AJ 38)
106 - CF 83 196 - BE 14 469 - AE 76 613 - BF 45
109 - BE 88 198 - CF 19 506 - CG 68 615 - Op(BD 19)
119 - BE 65 221 - BF 58 509 - AE 76 618 - Op(AK 72)
123 - Op(DU 22) 228 - BF 40 510 - EF 39 630 - AE 67
126 - BE 78 229 - Op(AJ 22) 513 - Op(DH 98) 631 - Op(AK 48)
129 - DF 49 230 - BF 64 515 - DH 46 632 - Op(AK 45)
134 - Op(AJ 63) 257 - Op(BD 16) 516 - Op(GJ 40) 635 - AK 38 2) U 123 reported a single smoke cloud in DU 2459, course south, at
154 - CF 23 260 - Op(AK 44) 518 - Op(FJ) 638 - BF 47 0846. She was dismissed from the patrol line for independent action and
155 - Op(DL 38) 267 - BE 69 523 - Op(AK 41) 641 - Op(BD 13) later identified the target sighted as a Spanish steamer.
156 - Op(GH 40) 270 - AN 23 524 - Op(DH 98) 642 - BD 51 U 173 also sighted an independent ship in DU 2613, course S.W. No
159 - Op(DU 22) 305 - Op(AK 47) 526 - Op(AK 41) 653 - BF 40 further reports. It is intended to leave Group "Seeräuber" in its present
160 - GQ 29 306 - Op(AJ 28) 527 - Op(AK 76) 662 - BE 68 line for the moment.
161 - CD 34 333 - Op(AK 75) 530 - Op(AK 76) 663 - Op(AJ 34)
167 - Op(DH 98) 336 - Op(AK 72) 532 - AN 36 664 - BF 54
1248
 3) U 598 reported an independent ship (freighter) in AJ 3883. A little
time after U 631 reported what was probably the same ship.It may
possibly be "Regensburg". Boats are forbidden to attack.
4) U 182 situation: Nothing sighted for 3 days N. of the line KZ 74 -
KQ 66. She intends to return at the beginning of April owing to the state
of the boat.The boat suspects that there are 12 ships steering E - W E of
the Mozambique Channel and 3 ships probably in the Channel.
b) Aircraft reported a convoy of 32 merchant ships, 4 escort vessels and
1 cruiser, steering NE, in CF 3385 at 1510.
c) U-boat sighting in CF 33
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 23:
Boats in favorable positions were to operate against the convoy
reported by aircraft at 1510 in CF 3385 on a N. course and to make use of
chances to attack. U 404 then reported from BE 57, U 267 from BE 6464
and U 181 from CF 3685. The latter searched for the convoy in vain until
afternoon.No further reports were received.
2) Convoy No. 20:
Visibility continued bad. U 564 reported a destroyer at 1117 in AJ
2663. By reason of R/T traffic U 632 suspected the convoy in AJ 3475
and later obtained weak hydrophone bearings twice. The convoy itself
was not found again.
After Convoy No. 21 was picked up, this operation was broken off.
Boats were ordered to operate against No. 21. There were no successes in
No. 20.
3) Convoy No. 21:
The ON convoy was picked up on 26.3 by Group "Seeteufel" and the
whole Group was detailed to operate. After the prospects of intercepting
the expected HX 230 by Group "Seewolf" had been reviewed, it was
decided to draw "Seewolf" as far north as possible. It was suspected that
the HX, which should have been in about AJ 56, would, when it observed
U-boat radio traffic in the area of the ON approaching it, endeavor to skirt
this area by altering course to the E. This assumption proved correct,
because at 1500/27 the HX was reported by U 305 in AJ 3873. On this
1249
first report all boats of Group "Seeteufel" and 10 of Group "Seewolf" were
ordered to operate against this convoy. Altogether: U 168, 306, 592, 188,
415, 572, 564, 610, 134, 526, 523, 598, 260, 706, 632, 305, 591, 631, 86,
618, 336, 333, 530, 440. Weather in the convoy area was reported towards
evening as WSW 4, sea 3, and bad visibility.
- 202 -
U 305 shadowed until 2153. She then lost contact after she had made
beacon signals and then reported hydrophone bearings of the convoy again
at 0227. At 2306 U 631 reported that she had made contact. This boat last
reported the convoy on a hydrophone bearing at 0254. At 0400 U 591
reported flares over the convoy in AK 1954. At 0458 she was forced to
dive by a destroyer was depth-charged and lost contact. No further reports
were received.
The convoy was making 9.5 knots and steering 250. There were no
reports on the strength of the escort forces. Operation continues.
b) 1) Group "Seewolf" halted as patrol line, with 18 boats, at 1100 in the
position line reached from AJ 3857 to AK 8714. As it was assumed that U
592, 306 and 168 were not operating against Convoy No. 20, these boats
are to occupy squares AJ 3810 and 3840 to extend the "Seewolf" line.
2) As her METOX is out of order U 68 will occupy DO 60 and 90 and
DP 40, 50, 70 and 80 as attack area. Single ship traffic, NW bound
destined for america, is believed to sail through this area.
3) Numerous steamer reports (Radio Intelligence (X) Reports) indicate
that there is heavy traffic in Zone "P", believed to be in Guinea Bay, SL -
convoys, which had not been picked up for 6 months, have also appeared
again. U 154, 126 and 124 have been detailed to operate against this traffic
and are steering for ET 50.
c) Boats of Group "Seewolf" and "Seeteufel" which are short of fuel are
to supply from U 463 in BD 2235. U 441 and 663 are at present on their
way there.
d) 1) The following additional areas are closed for attacks on single
ships. Squares AD and AE, N third, because of "Regensburg" CE 20 and
30 and CF 10 and 20 because of "Pietro Orseolo".
2) U 161 has rendezvoused with "Pietro Orseolo" and reported as
ordered. She is now on her way to operate off the American coast.
3) U 174 and "Karin" have not so far rendezvoused. U 174 has been at
the rendezvous for 2 days.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 203 -
28.March 1943.
I. U 43 - BE 92 U 174 - BD 87 U 439 - BF 50 U 591 - Op(AK 10)
67 - Op(DU 20) 180 - FM 97 440 - Op(AK 48) 592 - Op(AJ 30)
68 - Op(EC 65) 181 - CF 63 441 - Op(AK 73) 594 - BE 28
71 - BF 58 182 - Op(KQ 64) 455 - CG 44 598 - Op(AK 10)
1250
84 - Op(AK 76) 183 - Op(DL 71) 463 - BD 51 608 - BF 92
86 - Op(AJ 30) 185 - Op(DM 71) 469 - AE 74 610 - Op(AJ 30)
89 - BF 60 188 - Op(AK 10) 487 - AO 48 613 - BE 62
91 - BF 40 190 - BF 44 506 - GG 29 615 - OP(AK 87)
105 - DH 78 191 - Op(AK 39) 509 - Op(CR 25) 618 - Op(AK 10)
106 - CF 61 195 - AE 67 510 - DR 11 630 - AE 83
109 - BE 95 196 - BE 41 513 - Op(DU 20) 631 - Op(AK 10)
119 - BF 44 198 - CF 48 515 - DH 98 632 - Op(AK 10)
123 - Op(DU 10) 221 - BF 50 516 - Op(GJ 47) 635 - Op(AK 53)
124 - BF 54 228 - BF 58 518 - Op(FJ) 638 - BF 40
126 - CF 18 229 - Op(AK 14) 523 - Op(AJ 30) 641 - Op(AK 76)
129 - DF 71 230 - BE 66 524 - Op(DU 20) 642 - BD 51
134 - Op(AK 10) 247 - Op(AK 74) 526 - Op(AK 43) 653 - BF 81
154 - CF 27 260 - Op(AK 10) 527 - Op(AK 48) 662 - BE 53
155 - Op(DL 38) 267 - BE 67 530 - Op(AJ 30) 663 - AK 43
156 - Op(EE 45) 270 - AF 76 532 - AN 28 664 - BF 50
159 - Op(DU 20) 305 - Op(AK 10) 558 - BF 54 666 - Op(AK 10)
160 - GQ 21 306 - Op(AJ 30) 563 - AK 69 704 - AK 61
161 - CD 27 333 - Op(AJ 30) 564 - Op(AJ 30) 706 - Op(AJ 30)
167 - Op(DU 10) 336 - Op(AK 10) 571 - BF 40 758 - BF 40
168 - Op(AJ 30) 373 - Op(AK 72) 572 - Op(AJ 30)
169 - AE 83 404 - BE 83 584 - BE 29
172 - Op(DU 20) 406 - BF 40 590 - Op(AK 73)
415 - Op(AK 10)
409 - Op(AJ 83)
On Return Passage: U 43 - 84 - 89 - 91 - 106 - 109 - 119 - 160 - 190 -
221 - 228 - 230 - 406 - 506 - 510 - 558 - 591 - 608 - 638 - 642 - 653 - 704
- 706 - 758 - 664.
Entered Port: U 439 - Brest; U 664 - Lorient; U 221 - St. Nazaire; U 89
- La Pallice.
Sailed: U 178 - Bordeaux.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy Nos. 21, 22 and 23 see para IVa.
2) U 518 sank the Dutch "Mariso" 7,659 GRT, course 1100, 12 knots on
20.3. in FJ 9181 the British "Industria" 4,861 GRT course 2000, speed 12
knots. Boat is returning because of fuel.
3) U 630 is proceeding through the Iceland Passage via AF 4532, AE
5984 and AL 2462. She sighted a 4-engined a/c in AF 45.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 9763, ED 25, BF 18, AK 5514, EC 89, EB 7267,
BF 4617, DB 64.
- 204 -
SSS report in unidentified position. U-boat attack in AJ 3995.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 21:
Weather deteriorated during the 28th to a gale from the S.W. and
visibility was reduced to 1 mile. This meant that most of the convoy
dispersed and the individual ships proceeded W. on their own . 5 boats
reported independent ships in the course of the afternoon in AK 0190, all
on an E. course. U 523 reported at 2030 in AK 0277 that she had been
surprised by 2 destroyers. At 0700/29 U 610 sighted star shell in AK
3979. No further reports of the convoy were received.
Operation against the convoy will continue, as it is expected that, with
so many boats, more independent ships will be found. U 666, 188 and 526
have broken off because of lack of fuel. 22 boats are still operating.
1251
2) Convoy No. 22:
Group "Seeräuber" was in patrol line from DU 2194 to 2625, with the
following boats: U 123, 159, 67, 513, 172, 167, 524, later U 515, 105.
The expected RS 3 was reported by U 167 in DU 2378 at 0807/28/3. U
167, 172 and 513 shadowed until 0006 in DU 2723. Stragglers with
destroyers and escort vessels were reported by U 67 and U 123 in DU
2463 - 2493 from 1711 - 2049.
The convoy consisted of a small number of ships, large steamers in the
center escorted by corvettes and destroyers.
3 out of 9 boats managed to attack, 2 of them making an underwater
day attack. 4 boats were bombed or depth-charged, and U 172, 67 and 159
had to move away for repairs. Several boats reported aircraft with Radar
during the night, which made it difficult for them to get ahead.
U 167 sank a freighter of 6,500 GRT at 1247, U 159 a 9,000 GRT
ammunition steamer at 1448 and U 172 a passenger freighter of 7,000
GRT at 0006.
U 172, 67 and 159 broke off because of lack of fuel, depth-charge
damage and lack of torpedoes.
3) Convoy No. 23:
U 267 sighted a light cruiser, course 10 at 1616 in BE 8666. She lost
contact soon after. As no further sighting reports were received, U 404
and 267 were ordered to continue on their outward passage.
b) 1) U 527, 373, 641, 663 are on their way to supply or on their return
passage because of lack of fuel. U 257, 84, 615 are making for AJ 78 and
will later be formed into a patrol line there with other boats.
2) U 183 has been given freedom of action within the Caribbean.
- 205 -
 129 - DE 98 229 - AD 98 518 - FK 14 635 - Op(AK 20)
134 - Op(AK 20) 230 - BF 45 523 - Op(AK 20) 638 - BF 40
3) U 563 is occupying AK 68 as temporary attack area. 154 - CF 73 257 - AK 82 524 - Op(DU 40) 641 - AK 88
4) U 778 is to make for GR, U 161 for CA 39. U 174 is also to make for 155 - Op(DL 30) 260 - Op(AK 20) 526 - Op(AK 20) 642 - BD 51
CA 39 when she has carried out her special operation. U 630 is steering 156 - Op(EE 40) 267 - BE 55 527 - AK 84 653 - BF 80
for AK 63. 159 - Op(DU 20) 270 - AF 47 530 - Op(AK 20) 662 - BE 24
c) None. 160 - GG 92 305 - Op(AK 20) 532 - AF 76 663 - AK 58
d) As Operation "Elisabeth" is about to begin, attention has again been 161 - CD 17 306 - Op(AK 20) 558 - BF 52 666 - AK 81
called to the closing of routes in BF and BE. 167 - Op(DU 20) 333 - Op(AK 20) 563 - AK 65 704 - AL 41
168 - Op(AK 20) 336 - Op(AK 20) 564 - Op(AK 20) 706 - Op(AK 20)
V. Reports of Success: 169 - AE 84 373 - AK 88 571 - BD (67) 758 - BF 91
U 518 - 2 ships 12,520 GRT 172 - Op(DU 20) 404 - BE 54 572 - Op(AK 20)
U 167 - 1 ship 6,500 GRT 406 - BF 91
U 159 - 1 ship 9,000 GRT
U 172 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT
On Return Passage: U 43 - 84 - 91 - 106 - 109 - 119 - 160 - 190 - 228 -
--------------------------------------------------- 230 - 373 - 406 - 440 - 441 - 506 - 510 - 518 - 526 - 527 - 558 - 590 - 591
--------------- - 638 - 641 - 642 - 653 - 663 - 666 - 704 - 758.
Entered Port: U 558 - Brest; U 91 - Lorient; U 228 - St. Nazaire; U 608
29. March 1943. - Bordeaux.
Sailed: - . -

I. U 43 - BF 46 U 174 - BD 87 U 409 - AJ 83 U 584 - BE 21 - 206 -

67 - Op(DU 20) 178 - BF 91 415 - Op(AK) 591 - Op(AK 20)
68 - Op(BC 60) 180 - FT 36 440 - Op(AK 20) 590 - AK 88
71 - BF 40 181 - CF 92 441 - AK 84 592 - Op(AK 20)
84 - AK 83 182 - Op(KQ 64) 455 - CG 72 594 - BE 21
86 - Op(AK 20) 183 - Op(DM 70) 463 - BD 51 598 - Op(AK 20)
91 - BF 61 185 - Op(DM 90) 469 - AD 85 608 - Op(AK 20)
105 - DT 38 188 - Op(AK 20) 487 - AN 35 610 - Op(AK 20)
106 - CF 36 190 - BF 61 506 - GG 22 613 - BE 60
109 - BF 71 191 - Op(AK 20) 509 - Op(GR 25) 615 - AK 83
119 - BF 45 195 - AE 83 510 - DR 76 618 - Op(AK 20) II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
123 - Op(DU 20) 196 - BD 93 513 - Op(DU 20) 630 - AL 14
124 - BF 40 198 - CF 78 515 - DU 13 631 - Op(AK 20) III. Reports on the Enemy:
126 - CF 48 228 - BF 64 516 - Op(GJ 47) 632 - Op(AK 20) a) 1) Convoy Nos. 21, 22 and 23 see para IVa.
1252
 2) U 527 sighted 2 patrol boats on her way to supply in AK 8465.
3) U 510 reported 2 Spanish tankers, course 2400, in EG 12.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: FJ 32 - AL 4124 - BE 5899 - DN 46 - BB 78 - ED
25.
U-boat attack in DC 73.
SSS and torpedo report from ET 76 and an unidentified position
respectively.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 21:
Weather conditions continued very unfavorable for the boats in the
convoy area during the 29th and the night 29/30. SW 9 sea 8 was reported
at midday and towards evening the wind freshened to W 10 - 11. There
were heavy seas and a westerly gale during the night. At 1015 U 591
reported a convoy group of 7 ships and 5 destroyers in AK 0379. She was
driven off by a/c and lost contact. U 632 reported a tanker with air escort
at midday in AK 6332. She also lost contact. At 1723 U 618 reported a
freighter and a destroyer.
Reports from these boats show that some of the ships were making up
to 10 knots, in spite of the heavy weather. It is of course possible that the
boats estimated the speed too high in the prevailing west weather. Boats
have however been told again that they must get ahead at all costs so that
they will be able to intercept individual ships when the weather improves.
It is intended to break off the operation against this convoy on the
30th, as the boats have already reported constant strong air escort on the
29th and air activity may be expected to increase on the 30th.
2) Convoy No. 22:
Weather in the convoy area was extremely favorable, N.E. trade wind,
sea 3 - 4.
As contact had been lost since 0600/29/3, boats were ordered to give
their position and were informed at the same time that the convoy might
have altered course south along the 100 meter line.
- 207 -
1253
At 0915 U 167 reported a corvette in DU 2727, and U 515 another
corvette at 1550 in 4368. It was not until 2025 in 4693 that U 105
reported contact with the convoy, she lost it again at 2206 in 4937.
Boats did not manage to attack owing to strong air escort. They were
forced to dive and driven off by day by aircraft and by night owing to
Radar locations.
U 105 - 515 - 123 - 513 and 167 are still operating against the convoy.
It is intended to break off on 30.3 as the boats cannot attack owing to
constant air escort by day and night and it no longer seems possible for
them to haul ahead.
3) Convoy No. 23:
The operation was continued after U 404 obtained a hydrophone
bearing of 3000 from BE 8321 and was forced to dive by an aircraft.
U 571 sighted 2 destroyers and several steamers on a N. course at 1740
- in BE 5942. At 2120 U 662 reported the convoy in BE 5687, course 30.
U 404 was brought up and shadowed for the whole night. At 0749 the
convoy was in BE 6148. At 2400 the boat sighted flares over the convoy,
and it can therefore be assumed that one boat attacked. U 404 attacked
herself in BE 5653 and scored a hit on a steamer of 4,500 GRT. She could
not observe sinking owing to anti-submarine activity.
U 571 did not reach the convoy. Weather was reported as W 3, misty.
The operation is continuing.
b) Boats will occupy the following attack areas until a new patrol line is
formed: U 188 - AJ 58, U 257 - AJ 59, U 84 - AJ 91, U 615 - AJ 92. U
563, 584, 594, 613 and 627 will make for AJ 67 as will also U 404, 662
and 571 at the conclusion of the convoy operation.
c) None.
 d) U 174 reported that she has not yet found "Karlin".
V. Reports of Success:
U 404 - 1 ship torpedoed.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
30. March 1943.
I. U 43 - BF 55 U 174 - BD 87 U 406 - BF 93 U 572 - Op(AL 01)
67 - Op(DT 34) 178 - BF 81 409 - Op(AJ 80) 584 - AL 87
68 - Op(ED 24) 180 - FU 44 415 - Op(AL 01) 590 - BD 22
71 - BF 47 181 - CF 97 440 - AK 64 591 - Op(AL 01)
84 - AJ 92 182 - Op(KQ 40) 441 - BD 22 592 - Op(AL 01)
86 - Op(AL 01) 183 - Op(DL) 455 - DJ 11 594 - AL 87
105 - Op(DU 72) 185 - Op(DM 90) 463 - BD 51 598 - Op(AL 01)
106 - BE 98 188 - AK 41 469 - Op(AD 80) 610 - Op(AL 01)
109 - BF 49 190 - BF 61 487 - AN 31 613 - BE 83
119 - BF 46 191 - Op(AK 63) 506 - FU 95 615 - Op(AJ 92)
123 - Op(DU 72) 195 - AE 84 509 - Op(GR 20) 618 - Op(AL 01)
124 - BE 93 196 - BD 99 510 - DR 58 630 - Op(AK 38)
126 - CF 79 198 - DG 39 513 - Op(DU 72) 631 - Op(AL 01)
129 - DQ 21 229 - Op(AD 98) 515 - Op(DU 72) 632 - Op(AL 01)
- 208 -
1254
U 134 - Op(AL 01) U 230 - BF 51 U 516 - GJ 40 U 638 - BF 92
154 - DH 11 257 - AJ 68 518 - FC 88 641 - BD 22
155 - Op(DM 10) 260 - Op(AL 01) 523 - Op(AL 01) 642 - BD 51
156 - Op(EE 40) 267 - BF 57 524 - Op(DU 72) 653 - BF 92
159 - Op(DU 72) 270 - AE 66 526 - AK 46 662 - BE 61
160 - GG 59 305 - Op(AL 01) 527 - AK 88 663 - AK 91
161 - CC 37 306 - Op(AL 01) 530 - Op(AL 01) 666 - AK 85
167 - Op(DU 72) 333 - Op(AL 01) 532 - AF 72 704 - AL 16
168 - Op(AL 01) 336 - Op(AK 63) 563 - Op(AK 68) 706 - Op(AL 01)
169 - AE 79 373 - BD 22 564 - Op(AL 01) 758 - BF 93
172 - Op(DT 34) 404 - BF 61 571 - BF 53
On Return Passage: U 43 - 84 - 106 - 109 - 119 - 160 - 190 - 230 - 333
- 336 - 373 - 406 - 440 - 441 - 506 - 510 - 518 - 526 - 527 - 590 - 591 -
638 - 641 - 642 - 653 - 663 - 666 - 704 - 758.
Entered Port: U 190 - Lorient; U 758 - 406 - Bordeaux.
Sailed: U 413 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Area W. of Biscay.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 20, 21 and 23 see para IVa.
2) U 185 reported reinforced patrol in the area W of Cuba and Jamaica.
She was bombed in EB 22 and observed constant air activity and sea
patrol off Kingston. On 30.3. she was bombed at periscope depth by an
airship. Boat intends to operate in EC 13.
3) U 155 sighted nothing in the Gulf of Mexico except 2 neutrals. She
is continuing operation in the Florida Straits.
b) 1) A/c sighted a large merchant ship with a destroyer at 1431 in BE
5253, course N. It is probably a damaged ship from Convoy No. 23.
2) Another a/c reported 3 heavy cruisers, 4 destroyers and 2 a/c carriers
in CF 3596 at 1600 on a southerly course. According to a later report the
size of the ships was overestimated and probably a small S-bound convoy
was sighted.
c) U-boat sightings in ED 23. U-boat detected in CC 53 (U 161)
S.O.S. from British "Manchester Commerce" 5,343 GRT in BE 9688
(Blockade runner "Himalaya")
Torpedo report from unidentified position, probably Convoy No. 23.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 23:
- 209 -
U 662 made several attacks during the night 29/30. She fired a
quadruple F.A.T. and a Pi2 at 2250 and scored 2 hits on a ship of 5,000
GRT, and one on another ship. In her second attack she torpedoed a 4,000
tonner at 2300 and a 6,000 tonner with a Pi2 hit at 0407 in BE 5635. In
the prevailing weather conditions it can be assumed that 2 ships, totaling
11,000 GRT, were sunk and the others counted as torpedoed. U 404 sank a
6,000 tonner in BE 6146. While attacking she sighted at least 8 steamers,
2 destroyers and 1 escort vessel, a sign that the convoy's escort is
comparatively weak.
After losing contact the boat continued on her passage west. The
convoy was not found again. At 1100 U 662 encountered a damaged ship
adrift in BE 6481, escorted by a destroyer. Unfortunately this ship
disappeared out of sight in the dark. During the night U 662 and 571
broke off pursuit and proceeded west.
1255
Altogether 3 ships, totaling 17,000 GRT, were sunk in this convoy and
3 ships torpedoed.
Final Remarks:
The successful cooperation between U-boats and aircraft in this
convoy operation is particularly gratifying. 5 boats took part. 2 of these,
U 181 and 267, continued on their outward passage during the first and
second nights respectively. U 571 had contact for a short time but did not
score any successes.
U 404 and 662 pursued the convoy with commendable perseverance
for nearly 4 days and scored the successes in an area in which hardly any
convoy action had taken place recently. The comparatively small escort
force showed that the English regarded this area as safe.
It would be satisfactory if this success and further constant air
reconnaissance forced the enemy to transfer his convoy route further to the
west. It would then be possible to conduct more intensive operations
against Gibraltar convoys.
2) Convoy No. 21:
Weather conditions on the 30th continued very unfavorable for the
boats. West 7, sea 6, very variable visibility. U 631 reported a group of 3
steamers and one destroyer at 1100 in AL 2957. She lost contact soon
after owing to constant activity of flying boats and land-based aircraft over
the convoy which made it impossible for the boat to shadow on the
surface. U 610 reported that she had scored one hit at a 10,000 GRT
steamer at 2340/29 and had later sunk this ship with a finishing shot.
Operation against the convoy was broken off A.M. on the 30th and the
boats were instructed to search for stragglers west wards along the convoy
route. After operations had ended all boats taking part reported their
positions.
Final Remarks on Convoy No. 21:
The operation against the HX convoy lasted for 4 days from 27-
30.3.43, covering 650 miles, 28 boats were detailed against the convoy, 2
of which had to break off each day owing to lack of fuel. From the first
day the operation was adversely affected by a heavy gale. The lowest
wind force reported was W 7 on the last day. Visibility was bad all the
time.
 Owing to heavy gale, the convoy was dispersed to a large extent at the
beginning of the operation, and small groups or individual ships continued
on their passage E. alone.
- 210 -
One group of 7 vessels was reported, but otherwise mostly
independent vessel.
It was particularly difficult for the boats to shadow these ships in poor
visibility. During the first days it was to some extent possible as there was
not too much air activity in the convoy area, but during this time the boats
could not fire owing to heavy seas, rising at times to 9. When the weather
becomes a little calmer on the third and last day, very strong air escort
appeared over the convoy, which prevented the boats from shadowing.
All things considered therefore, no better results than the one 10,000
GRT steamer could be expected from this convoy.
No boat was lost during the operation, nor was any boat badly
damaged.
In spite of the small results, the operation cannot be considered wrong
even after the event. Even a slight improvement in the weather would
have raised the chances of success considerably and weather forecasts
cannot be regarded as so reliable that they can be taken as a basis for
breaking off an operation.
3) Convoy No. 22:
Contact was not regained with the convoy. All boats reported that
constant day and night air activity made it impossible for them to haul
ahead. The operation was broken off on 30.3. For new operations areas
1256
see paragraph IVb. One boat, U 524 did not report again despite several
orders to do so.
Final Remarks on Convoy No. 22:
The operation against the RS 3 convoy lasted 3 days from 28-30.3.43,
covering 300 miles. 9 boats took part, of which 1, U 524, did not report
after the beginning of the operation. 2 boats did not join Group
"Seeräuber" until the second day. Weather conditions were very favorable
for attack the whole time.
On the first day 4 out of 7 boats managed to fire, 3 of them
successfully. During the night of 28/29/3 air escort was suddenly
increased and reinforced again on the following day, so that the boats
could no longer haul ahead and attack.
Nearly all boats were bombed and depth-charged, 3 of them had to
haul off because of severe damage. U 524 may have been lost before the
operation began.
Altogether 3 ships, totaling 22.500 GRT were sunk. In the
circumstances better results were not possible.
b) 1) Groups "Seeteufel" and "Seewolf" are to be dissolved. Many boats
will have to return home or proceed to supply owing to lack of fuel. Boats
with about 20-30 cbm fuel remaining will be allocated temporary attack
areas and will be refueled for further operations from about 9 April from
the tanker U 487 coming from home. U 598 will therefore occupy AK 03,
U 134 - AK 36, U 415 - AK 37, U 306 - AK 63, U 631 - AK 38.
- 211 -
 U 592, 572, 706, 168, 260, 632, 191, 635, 564 and 530 which are still sinking at maximum speed to pick up the crew. As 2 of these boats are
well off for fuel, are proceeding west at economical speed and are to quite near, the rescue operation is likely to be successful.
operate against independently-routed ships suspected N. of the last convoy 2) U 469 left Kiel on 16.3 and has not reported since then. According to
route. Later it is intended to form a patrol line with these and other boats a Radio Intelligence report English aircraft reported a U-boat in AF 7122
and conduct another convoy operation. on 22.3 and one in AE 84 on 25.3. In both cases it could have been U 469.
2) Group "Seeräuber" is being dissolved at the conclusion of the convoy Possibly she was attacked and sunk by the aircraft.
operation (No. 22). The boats will be distributed over the various 3) U 156 last reported on 7.3 from EE 45. Several orders to give her
operations areas according to their fuel stocks. The following attack areas position, and the situation remained unanswered. On 8.3 a U-boat was
will be occupied: U 515 : DH 9673, U 177 : DH 9593, U 67 : DH 9836, U attacked by an aircraft in EE 91. According to dead reckoning, only U 156
513 : DH 9575. could have been there at the time. She must be presumed lost.
Small and large convoys close inshore and fast independent ships can
still be expected in this area.
U 159 is to operate in EK 40, concentrating off Dakar. Inward and - 212 -
outward bound traffic and N - S traffic is suspected here.
U 123 is to occupy the area off Freetown between the sectors of 450
and 3050.
U 105 has been allocated an attack area around FE 33, depth of sweep
300 miles.
According to Radio Intelligence (X) reports there is NW - SE bound
single ship traffic in the latter areas. Independent ships and SC and SL
convoys put into Freetown.
3) U 129 was to have operated in the sea area off Colon. She cannot
operate here however, owing to too high battery temperatures and is V. Reports of Success:
therefore making for the sea area off Cape Hatteras via Bermuda. There U 662 2 ships 11,000 GRT 2 ships torpedoed.
has been no boat there for 6 months. U 404 1 ship 6,000 GRT
c) 1) U 172 has encountered U 67. U 610 1 ship 10,000 GRT.
2) U 463 is lying hove to in BD 22 with U 642. Supply has not so far
been possible owing to bad weather.
3) U 594 was damaged by 2 unexplained explosions at 40 meters while ---------------------------------------------------
test diving on 28.3. Flotillas have been instructed to ensure better ---------------
protection against sabotage for ships in the dockyard and to have the boats
thoroughly examined before they sail. It is not impossible that sabotage 31. March 1943.
had a hand in boats which were lost through unknown causes.
d) 1) The outward-bound Italian ship "Himalaya" reported at 2200:
"stopped by enemy warship in BE 9688, taking to the boats". U 71, 124, I. U 43 - BF 61 U 172 - Op(DT 26) U 373 - BD 22 U 564 - AL 41
106 and 178 were given orders to proceed to the supposed position of 67 - Op(DT 34) 174 - BD 87 404 - Op(BE 28) 571 - Op(BE 34)
1257
 68 - Op(ED 20) 178 - BF 75 409 - Op(AK 44) 572 - AL 63
71 - BE 96 180 - FU 84 413 - BF 46 584 - AL 84
84 - Op(AJ 91) 181 - DH 28 415 - AL 51 590 - BD 22
85 - AL 44 182 - Op(KQ 40) 440 - AK 91 591 - AL 42
105 - DU 78 183 - Op(DL 70) 441 - BD 22 592 - AL 42
106 - BE 96 185 - Op(DM 90 455 - DJ 10 594 - AL 74
109 - BF 40 188 - AJ 65 463 - BD 22 598 - AL 41
119 - BF 55 191 - Op(AK 39) 487 - AF 87 610 - AL 51
123 - DU 77 195 - AL 22 506 - FU 83 613 - BE 57
124 - BE 95 196 - CE 39 509 - Op(GR 26) 615 - Op(AJ 92)
126 - DH 17 198 - DG 69 510 - DR 61 618 - AL 41
129 - DP 36 229 - Op(AD 92) 513 - DU 41 630 - AK 02
134 - AL 51 230 - BF 52 515 - DU 45 631 - AL 01
154 - DH 41 257 - Op(AJ 59) 516 - Op(GJ 40) 632 - AL 61
155 - Op(DM 10) 260 - AL 41 518 - FC 58 635 - Op(AK 03)
159 - Op(DT 30) 267 - BE 45 523 - AL 45 638 - BF 93
160 - GG 51 270 - AE 67 524 - Op(DU 84) 641 - BD 22
161 - CC 28 305 - AL 42 526 - AK 81 642 - BD 51
167 - DU 41 306 - AL 52 527 - BD 22 653 - BF 93
168 - AK 62 333 - AK 69 530 - Op(AL 42) 662 - Op(BE 53)
169 - AL 21 336 - AK 68 532 - AF 44 663 - AK 99
563 - Op(AK 68) 666 - BD 22
704 - AL 23 706 - AL 42
On Return Passage: U 43 - 84 - 106 - 109 - 119 - 160 - 230 - 333 - 336
- 373 - 440 - 441 - 506 - 510 - 518 - 526 - 527 - 590 - 591 - 638 - 641 -
642 - 653 - 663 - 666 - 704.
Entered Port: U 230 - Brest; U 43 - Lorient; U 653 - 638 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 117 - 438 - Brest;U 381 - St. Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Area west of Portugal.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) None.
1258
b) Aircraft sighted a convoy of 27 merchant ships at 1415 in CG 1272, 8
escort vessels, and 3 cruisers, course E, speed 6 - 8 knots.
c) 1) U-boat detected or sighted in DN 78 and DM 23.
2) Lifeboat with inmates reported in AL 2981.
d) None.
- 213 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) The convoy sighted by aircraft was reported by boats on outward
and return passage. Contact was not made. No operation.
2) From today a NE-bound convoy is expected in the area between AJ
58 and 92.
b) 1) U 618 will occupy AK 66 and U 306 AK 63 as temporary attack
areas until they have used up their fuel. U 610 which was hitherto in the
latter areas, is proceeding to supply.
2) U 67 is still suffering from major damage even after repairs. She will
deliver her fuel to U 515 and then start on her return passage.
U 515 will then occupy the attack area ordered for U 159, EK 40,
concentrating off Dakar. U 159 is badly out of trim and has other damage
which prevents her operating near the coast. She has therefore been given
freedom of action in squares EJ 10 - EJ 20 - 40 - 50 (Cape Verde Islands).
There may be traffic to and from the Coaling stations there.
In the area between the African mainland and the Canary Islands, U
513 will operate N.W. of the line DH 9832 to 9395 and U 167 S.E. of it.
c) 1) U 642 has refueled from U 463 and is starting on her return passage.
2) U 117 sailed for a special operation in accordance with the attached
minelaying order.
 d) 1) "Himalaya" is not sunk and has now put into a port in W. France.
Boats detailed for the rescue operation are continuing on their passage.
2) U 524 was operating against Convoy No. 22 and probably had
contact.Her last radio message was dated 20.3. It is possible that the boat
was attacked and sunk by an English aircraft on her way from CG 70 to
DH 90, as a U-boat was reported in DH 5821 on 22.3. She must be
presumed sunk. Copy No. 2.
S.O. Only
V. Reports of Success: None. By hand of Officer only.

B.d.U.
Reg. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 100 A2.
(Signed): GODT. 8 March 1943.
Chief of Operations
Department. Minelaying Order for Casablanca and Fedala
For B.d.U. for U 117.

1) Task: A second minelay is to be carried out in the harbors of

Casablanca and Fedala. Mines are to be laid in widely scattered Groups of
4 to 6. A tracing is attached as a guide for the distribution of the mines
(for the boat only).

- 214 - 2) Material: 66 SMA with 400 meters mooring rope, time setting 80 days,
safety mechanisms set to flood in shortest time, delay clock work 6 hours,
depth setting minus 15 meters, period delay mechanism one actuation.
Maximum depth at which mines may be laid 350 meters, minimum 50
meters, minimum distance apart 400 meters.

3) Execution: The position indicated in the tracing (11 sections about 2

miles long, each of 6 SMA) is to serve only as a guide. The Commanding
Officer is free to modify it in accordance with conditions observed or
information transmitted to him.

Avoid laying in places where there is steeply sloping sea bottom or a lot
of surf. Individual sections should be about 5 miles apart where possible,

1259
so that only one section can be swept at a time. The time of laying is left
to the discretion of the Commanding Officer after surveying the area.
4) Geographical limits: The mines are to be laid between 70 and 80 W and
340 N.
5) Enemy Situation: The approach to Casablanca is protected by a
minefield, the passage gap is closed at night. At dusk many of the
freighters lying in the harbor leave on a N. course and anchor about 2 - 3
miles north of Casablanca. Casablanca harbor is illuminated by night,
lights are on, the city is blacked out. There may be enemy mines inside
the 50 meter line.
6) Reporting: A report is to be made by short signal UDWF as soon as
possible after the minelay has been completed, but from at least 100 miles
away.
(Signed): GODT.
Chief of Operations
Department.
For B.d.U.
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
I. U 67 - DT 36 U 172 - DG 99 U 373 - BD 22 U 530 - AK 65
68 - Op(DP 70) 174 - BD 87 381 - BF 58 532 - AE 68
71 - BE 93 178 - BE 99 404 - BE 19 563 - AK 58
84 - Op(AJ 91) 180 - CF 36 409 - Op(AK 44) 564 - AK 64
86 - AK 93 181 - DH 54 413 - BF 44 571 - BE 19
105 - EK 18 182 - Op(KP 60) 415 - AK 37 572 - AK 56
106 - BE 96 183 - Op(DM 41) 438 - BF 54 584 - AK 95
109 - BF 61 185 - Op(DM 90) 440 - BD 22 590 - BD 22
117 - BF 54 188 - Op(AJ 58) 441 - BD 22 591 - AL 81
119 - BF 68 191 - AK 62 455 - Op(DJ 16) 592 - AK 65
123 - EK 17 196 - CF 48 463 - BD 22 594 - AK 94
124 - BE 93 195 - AL 23 487 - AF 73 598 - Op(AK 03)
126 - DH 47 198 - DG 99 506 - FU 54 610 - AL 47
129 - DP 53 229 - Op(AD 94) 509 - Op(GR 20) 613 - BE 46
134 - AL 17 257 - Op(AJ 59) 510 - DS 17 615 - Op(AJ 92)
154 - DG 99 260 - AK 64 513 - DU 16 618 - AK 66
155 - Op(DM 10) 267 - BD 61 515 - DU 44 630 - AK 61
159 - DT 29 270 - AK 82 516 - Op(GJ 30) 631 - Op(AK 38)
160 - GG 12 305 - AL 47 518 - FC 29 632 - AL 42
161 - CC 18 306 - AL 42 523 - AK 93 635 - AK 61
167 - DU 24 333 - AK 95 526 - BD 22 641 - BD 22
168 - AK 56 336 - AK 94 527 - BD 22 642 - BD 34
169 - AL 15 663 - BE 18 666 - BD 22 704 - AL 31
662 - BE 27 705 - AK 66

1 - 15 April 1943
On Return Passage: U 84 - 86 - 106 - 119 - 160 - 172 - 305 - 333 - 336
PG30321 - 373 - 440 - 441 - 506 - 510 - 518 - 523 - 526 - 527 - 590 - 591 - 610 -
618 - 641 - 642 - 663 - 666 - 704.
Entered Port: U 109 - Lorient; U 119 - Bordeaux.
Sailed: U 303 - 108 - Lorient; U 414 - St. Nazaire; U 258 - La Pallice;
U 177 - 462 - Bordeaux.

1. April 1943. II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

1260
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) At 2100 U 71 was forced by a destroyer and aircraft to submerge in
BE 9215. She confirmed their retirement to the S.W. by means of
hydrophone. According to dead reckoning, this was probably KMS 12.
No operation.
2) On the 31st March U 123 sighted a flying boat in DT 9346 and was
bombed by an aircraft several hours later in DT 9379. Boat continued
operations in spite of extensive damage.
3) U 506 has sighted nothing since the 24th March from GJ 77 - FW 51.
She is returning via square FF.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: ED 8652, BB 89, DD 3913. Aircraft attack on U-
boat in DO 95.
d) None.
d) 1) The following sectors are opened for Route A attack on single
vessels: Sector A as from midnight on the 2nd April until further notice,
Sector D from now until the 6th April. All other sectors are still prohibited
including the additional prohibited areas outside the route.
2) U 303 and 414 have been transferred the command of Senior Officer
U-boat Mediterranean, and have departed for this area.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------

- 216 -

- 217 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) The following boats will form new Group "Löwenherz" - those
proceeding from Convoy No. 21 to the W, and those coming from home
ports, i.e. U 169 - 191 - 168 - 630 - 635 - 706 - 260 - 564 - 592 - 572 - 530
- 563 - 594 - 584 - and 632. They will be ordered to take up
reconnaissance patrol at midnight on the 3rd April from AK 2516 to AK
5919, course 260, day's run 100 miles, in order to intercept convoys bound
for England.
c) U 172 has taken over LJ from U 154. Supreme Command of the Navy
S. O. Only.
1261
 8) U 529 - New boat, experienced Commanding Officer. Last report was
U-boats as of 1.April 1943. on weather S. of Iceland. No information regarding loss.

I. In service on the 1st March 1943 : 411

Put into commission in March 27
438 - 218 -
Losses in March 15 (incl. 1 in home waters, U 5)
In service on 1st April 1943: 423
Foreign submarines 9
432

Losses in March :
In the Atlantic: Type VIIc: U 87 - 444 - 633 - 432 - 384 - 665 - 469 = 7
Type IX: U 529 - 130 - 163 - 156 - 524 = 5
In the Mediterranean: Type VII: U 83 - 77 = 2
At home: Type II: U 5 = 1
15
Details:
In the Atlantic: Type VIIc.
1) U 87 - Arrived in the Atlantic. Refueled from U 461 for the last time
on the 26th February in the North Atlantic. Then did not report again.
2) U 444 - 2nd voyage. Last report was contact with convoy on 11th
March in the North Atlantic. Probably sunk by convoy.
3) U 633 - 1st voyage. Last report on 3rd March after passing Iceland
Passage. No further information.
4) U 432 - Old boat, new Commanding Officer. Last report on the 10th
March S.E. Greenland. No information.
5) U 384 - 2nd voyage. Last report on 19th March S of Greenland.
Probably sunk by convoy.
6) U 665 - 1st voyage. Last report on 21st March that she had been off La
Pallice for 36 hours. Probably sunk by aircraft bombs.
7) U 469 - 1st voyage. No report, no information.
Type IXc.
9) U 130 - Old boat, new Commanding Officer. Last report on 12th
March in the North Atlantic. Probably sunk by convoy.
10) U 163 - 3rd voyage. No report, no information.
11) U 156 - Old boat. Last report on 7th March from the Caribbean. No
information.
12) U 524 - 2nd voyage.
In the Mediterranean: Type VIIc.
13) U 83 - Old boat, new Commanding Officer. West Mediterranean.
14) U 77 - Old boat, new Commanding Officer. Badly damaged by
aircraft bombs. Sunk 15 miles off Cap de la Nao (Spain). 9 men rescued.
In Home Waters: Type II.
15) U 5 - Loss when she tried to dive deep contrary to orders.
II. Distribution:
II VIIa VIIb/c VIId IXb/c IXD1 IXD2 XB XIV Total
Operational: 3 - 159 3 53 2 6 3 6 235
On Trial: - - 93 - 20 - 6 2 3 124
Training: 33 4 25** - 2 - - - - 64

1262
 36* 4 277 3 75 2 12 5 9 423
* a further 3 temporarily out of service for the Black Sea.
** 12 of these temporarily transferred for training purposes.
VI. Set out in March:
From home waters 20 boats (7 into North Sea)
III. In March: From Western France 46 boats
Further boats detailed for operations: 20
Total number increased by: + 12
Number of operational boats increased by: + 6 ---------------------------------------------------
Number of trial boats increased by: + 4 ---------------
Number of training boats increased by: + 2

IV. Distribution of Operational Boats on 1st April 1943:

In the Atlantic 194
In the Mediterranean 17
In the North Sea 21 (to be made up to 23 during April)
In the Black Sea 3
235

V. During the Atlantic in March :

Daily average at sea: 116 boats.
Of these, in operations area: 49 boats.
Under way: 67 boats.
Of the later on return passage 28.5 boats.

- 219 -

- 220 -
1263
 177 - BF 91 404 - BE 17 564 - Op(AK 29)

On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 106 - 160 - 172 - 229 - 305 - 333 -

336 - 373 - 440 - 441 - 506 - 510 - 518 - 523 - 526 - 527 - 590 - 591 - 610
- 618 - 641 - 642 - 663 - 666 - 704.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -

2.April 1943. II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

III. Reports on the Enemy:

I. U 67 - DT 38 U 178 - BF 97 U 409 - Op(AJ 83) U 571 - BE 17 a) 1) U 178 convoy report see paragraph IVa.
68 - Op(DP 40) 180 - GG 42 413 - BE 65 572 - Op(AK 53) 2) U 229, reported single vessel with course 3200 in AK 1576. Since
71 - BE 84 181 - DH 76 414 - BF 58 584 - Op(AK 59) this square lies in the prohibited 200 mile line the boat was ordered, if she
84 - Op(AJ 81) 182 - Op(KP 60) 415 - Op(AK 37) 590 - BD 22 had sufficient fuel, to pursue the ship to the western edge of the prohibited
86 - AK 97 183 - Op(DM 70) 438 - BF 45 591 - AL 97 area and then turn about.
105 - EK 48 185 - Op(DM 90) 440 - BD 22 592 - Op(AK 53) 3) U 195 sighted 2 aircraft and a flying boat while proceeding through
106 - BF 46 188 - Op(AJ 58) 441 - BD 22 594 - Op(AK 59) the Iceland Passage over AE 6595 and AE 7995.
108 - BF 54 191 - Op(AK 28) 455 - Op(DJ 20) 598 - Op(AK 03) 4) U 129 sank the British ship "Melbourne Star" 12,806 GRT in DD
117 - BF 48 195 - AL 19 462 - BF 91 610 - AK 95 9929, with a cargo of goods, from Liverpool via Panama to Australia with
123 - EJ 36 196 - CF 78 463 - BD 22 613 - BD 63 course 2500.
124 - BE 94 198 - DT 27 487 - AF 47 615 - Op(AJ 92) 5) U 182 found no traffic in the area between KQ 64 and 99 and is
126 - DH 74 229 - AJ 36 506 - FW 16 618 - Op(AK 66) returning.
129 - DP 22 257 - Op(AJ 59) 509 - Op(GR 20) 630 - Op(AK 27) b) None.
134 - Op(AK 36) 258 - BF 91 510 - DG 77 631 - Op(AK 38)
154 - DG 99 260 - Op(AK 29) 513 - Op(DH 97) 632 - AK 66 - 221 -
155 - Op(DM 20) 267 - BD 28 515 - DT 38 635 - Op(AK 27)
159 - DT 58 270 - AE 84 516 - Op(GJ 40) 641 - BD 22
160 - FU 85 303 - BF 54 518 - ER 89 642 - BE 17
161 - CB 38 305 - AK 95 523 - AK 95 662 - BE 18
167 - Op(DH 89) 306 - Op(AK 63) 526 - BD 22 663 - BE 28
168 - Op(AK 28) 333 - BD 22 527 - BD 22 666 - BD 22
169 - Op(AK 35) 336 - BD 22 530 - Op(AK 53) 704 - AE 84
172 - DG 99 373 - BD 22 532 - AE 59 706 - Op(AK 62)
174 - BD 87 381 - BF 49 563 - Op(AK 56)
1264
 c) U-boat sightings: DM 56. corner, for "Karin" which is homeward-bound and has been due for several
Aircraft attacks on U-boats in AJ 33, DO 95, FJ 64, attacks or reports of days.
torpedoing from FW 9988, FJ 6469 and EQ 1112 (Brazilian vessel "Poeter 2) U 169 has not yet reported since her departure from Kiel. British
Second") aircraft sighted a U-boat on the 25th March in AF 7963. Possibly this was
d) From various recent special intercept messages regarding convoy U 169. The boat must be considered lost.
traffic on the American coast, the following information has been
obtained: steamers proceed from Ambrose lightship through 30 mile V. Reports of Success:
channel to the S.E. and form a convoy from CA 5230 to 2890, then U 129 - 1 ship 12,806 GRT.
proceeding in a line about 60 miles wide via CB 1790 to BB 7950. Here
and in BB 87 rendezvous with part convoys coming from Halifax, then ---------------------------------------------------
further E. Two out-going and incoming convoys can be reckoned on off ---------------
New York within 10 days as well as continual unescorted stragglers.

IV. Current Operations: - 222 -

a) U 178 sighted at 1605 in CF 3389 a convoy with course 2000 and slow
speed. She was ordered carefully to maintain contact until U 124, which
was in the vicinity, came up. At 1855 the latter reported the convoy,
consisting of a few steamers, in CF 3628. U 178 then proceeded S. U 124
pursued the convoy alone and does not appear to have sent in any further
reports of contacts. Up to morning the boat had not reported again.
b) 1) In the patrol line of Group "Löwenherz" the North boats, up to and
including U 572, will move up by one position to the N. The unoccupied
position will be taken up by U 632. Following the loss of U 169 the patrol
line now extends from AK 2516 to AK 5678. Sequence: U 191 - 168 - 3.April 1943.
630 - 635 - 706 - 260 - 564 - 592 - 572 - 632 - 530 - 563 - 594 - 584.
2) U 258 - 71 - 413 - 438 - 270 - 532 - 381 and 108 will proceed to AJ
99 and are to be disposed there in the patrol line. U 177 will proceed to I. U 67 - DT 38 U 178 - CF 62 U 404 - BD 35 U 563 - Op(AK 56)
GR, U 124, contrary to previous order, to CA 50 after breaking off of the 68 - Op(DO 60) 180 - GG 82 409 - Op(AJ 83) 564 - Op(AK 29)
convoy operation. 71 - BE 58 181 - DT 35 413 - BE 56 571 - BD 38
3) U 161 will have freedom of action in area CA 20 - 60 and CB 10 and 84 - Op(AJ 91) 182 - JA 24 414 - BF 49 572 - Op(AK 53)
40. It will operate there against traffic according to III d. 86 - AK 67 183 - Op(DM 70) 415 - Op(AK 37) 584 - Op(AK 56)
c) U 67 has handed over her remaining fuel to U 515 and is returning. 105 - Op(EK 40) 185 - Op(DM 91) 438 - BE 65 590 - BD 22
Also, U 641 has refueled from U 463 for return. 106 - BF 55 188 - Op(AJ 58) 440 - BD 22 591 - BE 26
d) 1) U 174 will take up position as from 4th April in BD 7897, upper 108 - BF 45 191 - Op(AK 25) 441 - BD 22 592 - Op(AK 53)
left-hand corner, for rendezvous with "Irene" which is returning home. 117 - BE 93 195 - AL 74 455 - Op(DJ 20) 594 - Op(AK 56)
Until time for departure the boat will wait in BD 8777, lower left-hand 123 - EJ 66 196 - DG 36 462 - BF 81 598 - Op(AK 03)
1265
 124 - CF 39 198 - DT 57 463 - BD 22 610 - AL 95
126 - DT 26 229 - AJ 33 487 - AE 68 613 - BD 37 IV. Current Operations:
129 - DD 95 257 - Op(AJ 59) 506 - FP 77 615 - Op(AJ 92) a) No reports on convoy from U 124.
134 - Op(AK 36) 258 - BF 81 509 - Op(GJ) 618 - Op(AK 66) b) None.
154 - DT 52 260 - Op(AK 29) 510 - DG 73 630 - Op(AK 27)
155 - Op(DM 20) 267 - BD 11 513 - Op(DH 95) 631 - Op(AK 38) - 223 -
159 - Op(DT 88) 270 - AL 16 515 - DT 38 632 - Op(AK 52)
160 - FU 58 303 - BF 49 516 - Op(GJ) 635 - Op(AK 27)
161 - CL 29 305 - AK 56 518 - ER 59 641 - BD 35
167 - Op(DH 96) 306 - Op(AK 63) 523 - BD 22 642 - BE 27
168 - Op(AK 25) 333 - BD 22 526 - BD 22 662 - BD 36
172 - DG 83 336 - BD 22 527 - BD 22 663 - BE 62
174 - BD 87 373 - BD 22 530 - Op(AK 53) 666 - BD 22
177 - BF 82 381 - BF 47 532 - AE 81 704 - AE 68
706 - Op(AK 27)
c) 1) U 590 and 440 refueled from U 463 for return.
2) U 455 reported special operation carried out (minelaying off
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 106 - 160 - 172 - 229 - 305 - 333 - Casablanca).
336 - 373 - 440 - 441 - 506 - 510 - 518 - 523 - 526 - 527 - 590 - 591 - 610 d) None.
- 618 - 642 - 641 - 663 - 666 - 704.
Entered Port: - . - V. Reports of Success: None.
Sailed: U 203 - Brest; U 189 - 197 - 648 - Kiel.
---------------------------------------------------
II. Air Reconnaissance: None. ---------------

III. Reports on the Enemy: 4.April 1943.

a) The steamer reported yesterday by U 229 was definitely established
by her to be former type "Kota Nopan". The last sighting was at 0200 in
AK 1543, mean course 00, cruising speed 6 knots. This ship must have
been the "Karin" which has been awaited for several days by the U 174,
been missed by her and proceeded on her way in a northerly course.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings in DM 51.
Attack by aircraft in DM 28 and in position not decoded. (Gibraltar
Radio).
d) None.
1266
I. U 67 - DH 76 U 180 - GG 97 U 381 - BE 68 U 563 - Op(AK 46)
68 - Op(DP 40) 181 - DT 65 404 - BD 26 564 - Op(AK 19)
71 - BE 49 182 - JA 72 409 - AK 77 571 - BD 26
84 - Op(AJ 91) 183 - Op(DM 70) 413 - BE 55 572 - Op(AK 43)
86 - AK 89 185 - Op(DM 90) 414 - BE 98 584 - Op(AK 43)
105 - EK 75 188 - Op(AJ 58) 415 - Op(AK 37) 590 - BD 32
106 - BF 61 189 - AO 438 - BE 56 591 - BE 62
108 - BE 66 191 - Op(AJ 33) 440 - BD 22 592 - Op(AK 19)
 117 - BE 98 195 - BD 39 441 - BD 22 594 - Op(AK 46)
123 - EK 74 196 - DG 66 455 - Op(DJ 20) 598 - Op(AK 03)
124 - CF 69 197 - AO 462 - BF 71 610 - BD 22
126 - DT 56 198 - DT 87 463 - BD 22 613 - BD 25
129 - DD 91 203 - BF 54 487 - AE 59 615 - Op(AJ 92)
134 - Op(AK 36) 229 - AK 18 506 - FO 69 618 - Op(AK 66)
154 - DT 83 257 - Op(AJ 59) 509 - Op(GJ 70) 630 - Op(AK 17)
155 - Op(DM 20) 258 - BF 72 510 - DG 58 631 - Op(AK 38)
159 - Op(EJ 20) 260 - Op(AK 19) 513 - Op(DH 95) 632 - Op(AK 43)
160 - FU 27 267 - AK 77 515 - DT 96 635 - Op(AK 17)
161 - Op(CB 19) 270 - AK 39 516 - Op(GJ 40) 641 - BE 19
167 - Op(DH 96) 303 - BF 71 518 - ER 29 642 - BE 61
168 - Op(AK 15) 305 - AK 86 523 - BD 22 648 - AO
172 - DG 58 306 - Op(AK 63) 526 - BD 22 662 - BD 34
174 - BD 79 333 - BD 22 527 - BD 22 663 - BF 52
177 - BF 72 336 - BD 22 530 - Op(AK 46) 666 - BD 22
178 - CF 68 373 - BD 22 532 - AE 79 704 - AF 76
706 - Op(AK 17)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 106 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 229 - 305 -
333 - 336 - 373 - 409 - 440 - 441 - 506 - 510 - 518 - 523 - 526 - 527 - 590
- 591 - 610 - 618 - 641 - 642 - 663 - 666 - 704.
Entered Port: U 663 - Brest;U 106 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 552 - Brest.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 24 see IV a.
2) U 71 reported large vessel with two funnels in BE 4485, course 240 -
2500. Pursuit unsuccessful owing to enemy speed being too high (20
knots). Further U 564
- 224 -
1267
reported in AK 0142 single vessel with course 1500. The boat was
ordered to sink it, if there was no possible confusion with own homeward-
bound vessel ("Irene" or "Karin"). No further reports.
3) U 167 dived six times, in view of aircraft, during 4th April in the area
between the Canaries and the mainland. Traffic was not established.
4) U 156 patrolled up and down from 24th March to 3rd April from GH
60 to FW 50 and 40 but sighted nothing apart from a small coastal steamer
in FW 5835. Return owing to fuel shortage. Still 8 plus 5 torpedoes.
b) - d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 24:
As regards American U-boats, several U-boats were expected to be
taking up disposition on the 31st March in the area 300 miles S.E. of Cape
Farwell. Since it was assumed that the stated position constituted about
the center of the presumed disposition, and the expected convoy would
probably divert to the N, Group "Löwenherz" was ordered to take up a
patrol line further N. However, before the order could be carried out, U
530 sighted at 1224 the expected HX 229 convoy in AK 4645 with course
600. In addition to "Löwenherz" U 270, coming from home waters, was
sent in to operate. U 415 - 134 - 598 - 306 - 631, in AK 30 and 60, being
so low in fuel were given permission to operate according to their position
and fuel supplies. The weather situation in the area of the convoy was
favorable for approach by boats of Group "Löwenherz" there being a
moderate S. wind. According to dead reckoning, all the boats of the Group
would be able to come up to the convoy in the first night. In the course of
the night the boats reported wind S.W. 5, sea 4.
 A further 5 boats approached the convoy on the first day, apart from U
530 and 2 further ones in the first night, so that in all 8 boats were up to
the convoy in the course of the first day and night.
Several boats reported star shells over the convoy during the night.
There was no air cover with the convoy on the first day. No reports
were received on naval escort and the strength and composition of the
convoy. The convoy was proceeding on a mean course of 200 and
according to dead reckoning, at a speed of 8.3 knots. U 572 reported
having to dive in view of a destroyer and being rammed in the attack.
The following sinkings were reported:
U 229 - single vessel type Glenearn, 9,800 GRT, sunk in AK 0193.
- 225 -
U 635 - 2 steamers, together 13,000 GRT, sunk in AK 0117.
The operation on the convoy will be continued. At 0900 on the 5th it
was in AK 1859.
b) 1) U 455 will take up position for operations, in the area of the Canary
Islands, in DH 9180 and 90, 9270 and 80, 9420 and 30, 9510 and 20. In
this area further unescorted traffic and small convoys may be expected.
2) U 267 will not, as expected, operate against Convoy No. 24, but will
take up temporary operational position in AJ 96.
3) U 409 returning via BE 71 and will there take over MG C 38 from
vessel outward bound.
c) The improvement in weather has led to refueling being quickly
effected. U 333 - 336 - 440 - 666 - 373 - 590 - 541 - 527 and 526 refueled
from "Wolfbauer" for return.
1268
d) As from midnight on the 5th April the 200 mile wide strip will be
moved to the N. of Route A in view of the vessel "Irene" which is expected
home. The middle line of the strip will then run from BD 78 to AK 13.
Attack on unescorted single vessels is forbidden in this area until further
notice.
V. Reports of Success:
U 229 - 1 ship 9,800 GRT
U 635 - 2 ships 13,000 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
5.April 1943.
I. U 67 - DH 54 U 181 - DT 95 U 404 - BD 21 U 563 - Op(AK 16)
68 - Op(DP 40) 182 - KZ 66 409 - BD 12 564 - Op(AK 01)
71 - BD 65 183 - Op(DM 70) 413 - BE 45 571 - BD 13
84 - Op(AJ 91) 185 - Op(DM 90) 414 - CG 14 572 - Op(AK 16)
86 - BD 22 188 - Op(AJ 58) 415 - AK 61 584 - Op(AK 29)
105 - ET 14 189 - AN 36 438 - BE 54 590 - BE 11
108 - BE 64 191 - Op(AK 29) 440 - BE 14 591 - BE 41
117 - CG 17 195 - BD 66 441 - BD 33 592 - Op(AK 92)
123 - ET 15 196 - DG 96 455 - DM 39 594 - Op(AK 16)
124 - CG 70 197 - AN 36 462 - BE 67 598 - Op(AK 33)
126 - DT 94 198 - EJ 15 463 - BD 22 610 - BD 22
129 - DD 54 203 - BF 45 487 - AE 81 613 - BD 13
134 - Op(AK 37) 229 - Op(AK 01) 506 - EO 61 615 - Op(AJ 92)
154 - DT 97 257 - Op(AJ 59) 509 - Op(GJ 70) 618 - Op(AK 66)
155 - Op(DM 20) 258 - BE 92 510 - DG 57 630 - Op(AK 27)
159 - Op(EJ 22) 260 - Op(AK 01) 513 - Op(DH 95) 631 - Op(AK 37)
160 - FU 12 267 - Op(AJ 96) 515 - FJ 33 632 - Op(AK 92)
161 - CA 30 270 - Op(AK 29) 516 - FV 66 635 - Op(AK 18)
167 - Op(DH 96) 303 - CG 12 518 - EH 97 641 - BE 28
168 - Op(AK 29) 305 - BD 22 523 - BD 22 642 - BE 66
 172 - DG 57 306 - Op(AK 63) 526 - BD 23 648 - AN 36
174 - BD 78 333 - BE 11 527 - BE 11 662 - BD 21
177 - BE 99 336 - BE 11 530 - Op(AK 25) 666 - BE 15
178 - CF 98 373 - BD 22 532 - AL 21 704 - AF 24
180 - CQ 24 381 - BE 55 552 - BF 58 706 - Op(AK 29)
- 226 -
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 229 - 305 - 333 -
336 - 373 - 409 - 415 - 440 - 441 - 506 - 510 - 516 - 518 - 523 - 526 - 527
- 590 - 591 - 610 - 618 - 641 - 642 - 666 - 704.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 24 - see IV a.
2) In the course of rendezvous with the homeward-bound "Irene" U 174
sighted in BD 7879 a large vessel with two funnels, course 2700. Contact
was lost owing to superior speed. Boat returned to point of rendezvous.
3) U 487 (U-tanker) coming from home waters reported convoy course
80, in AL 22. According to dead reckoning this was SC 124. U 487
withdrew and proceeded to position ordered.
4) U 438 shot down a British aircraft in BE 34.
1269
5) U 610 situation: Has, since 26th March, searched area GH 89 over
GH 52 to GJ 19 to 84. Apart from Argentinean vessel in GQ 3262 nothing
sighted. Extensive fog under the coast. The boat is returning.
b) None.
c) U-boat sighted or confirmed CC 2897 - FJ 9132 - DM 2683 - AK 0259
- AK 26 and two further sightings in unknown position. British aircraft
reported depth-charge hit on U-boat in BE 1514 (U 527). Several SSS
reports from Convoy No. 24.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 24:
The weather situation in the area of the convoy on the morning of the
5th was wind N.W. 2, sea 3 with good visibility. In the night of the 5th -
6th, it freshened to wind S.S.E. 5 and sea 4. Visibility became
increasingly poor and, towards morning, was only 3 miles.
Contact was reported at 0900 by U 260 in AK 1859. The boat
maintained contact until 1600 and then was forced to submerge by a ship's
aircraft and subsequently by a Sunderland, having to remain underwater
until 2100. Apart from this boat, 5 further ones approached the convoy
during the day. Towards midnight contact with the convoy was lost. The
convoy was not detected again until 0800; by U 270 in AK 3726.
- 227 -
Towards midday of the 5th the convoy changed course sharply to the
E, and then proceeded with easterly course on to the North Channel. It
was confirmed that part of the steamers had been separated from the
convoy after the first attack in the night 4th - 5th, and were proceeding to c) U 510 took over reserve fuel from U 172. Both boats proceeded home
the North Channel by themselves. 5 single vessels were reported by the with 39 or 41 cbm fuel. Further U 305 refueled from U 463 for return
boats. passage.
Towards afternoon on the 5th air cover appeared over the convoy for the
first time and ships' aircraft and flying boats were reported by the boats.
According to reports on the escort it does not appear as if this is - 228 -
excessively strong. One boat reported being discovered by a destroyer
with searchlights and depth charged.
U 229, 564, 572 and 134 have reported breaking-off operations up to
now. 16 boats are still operating on the convoy.
Assumed
Boat Report Sunk: Torpedoed:

U 630 At 0158 in AK 0114 6,000 GRT tanker and a further ship

torpedoed. Noises of sinking heard. 1/6,000 1 hit
U 563 At 1145 hit on 7,000 GRT tanker in AK 1931 1 hit d) None.
U 706 At 1615 in AK 2722 8,000 GRT of a convoy sunk 1/8,000
U 632 At 0136 in AK 0354 Type Nardana 8,000 GRT sunk 1/8,000 V. Reports of Success:
U 530 At 2200 in AK 2521 9,000 GRT tanker sunk 1/9,000 U 630 1 ship 6,000 GRT 1 hit
U 563 1 ship 7,000
4 ships totaling 31,000 GRT sunk U 706 1 ship 8,000
2 hits on further ships. U 632 1 ship 8,000
U 530 1 ship 9,000
The operation on the convoy which was reported at 0800 on 6th in AK U 438 1 aircraft
3726, will be continued.
b) 1) As from the 6th April a convoy is expected to leave Freetown,
according to the known schedule. Boats U 123 and 105 which are in the ---------------------------------------------------
vicinity will take up position in ET 21 and 24, also 13 and 16 in order to ---------------
intercept the convoy.
2) U 188 - 257 - 84 - 615 - 267 - 404 - 662 - 571 and 613, constituting 6.April 1943.
Group "Adler" will be in reconnaissance patrol at 0800 on the 7th April
from AJ 5693 to AK 7174 course 210, day's run 100 miles. According to
dead reckoning an SC convoy may be expected in that area as from 7th I. U 67 - DH 25 U 181 - EJ 35 U 404 - AK 79 U 563 - Op(AK 37)
April. 68 - Op(DP 40) 182 - KZ 59 409 - BD 52 564 - Op(AK 37)
71 - BD 53 183 - Op(DM 70) 413 - BE 41 571 - AK 78
84 - Op(AJ 67) 185 - Op(DM 90) 414 - CG 48 572 - AK 26
1270
 86 - BD 22 188 - Op(AJ 67) 415 - AK 91 584 - Op(AK 37)
105 - Op(ET 10) 189 - AN 31 438 - BE 54 590 - BE 24
108 - BE 82 191 - Op(AK 37) 440 - BE 27 591 - BF 58
117 - CG 47 195 - BD 96 441 - BE 19 592 - Op(AK 26)
123 - Op(ET 24) 196 - DT 21 455 - DH 68 594 - Op(AK 37)
124 - CG 70 197 - AN 31 462 - BE 57 598 - Op(AK 35)
126 - EJ 34 198 - EJ 38 463 - BD 22 610 - BD 22
129 - DD 18 203 - BE 65 487 - AL 21 613 - AK 75
134 - Op(AK 37) 229 - AK 59 506 - FO 25 615 - Op(AJ 92)
154 - EJ 37 257 - Op(AK 37) 509 - Op(GJ 40) 618 - AK 94
155 - Op(DM 20) 258 - BE 83 510 - DG 53 630 - Op(AK 37)
159 - Op(EJ 20) 260 - Op(AK 37) 513 - DH 69 631 - Op(AK 35)
160 - GH 64 267 - Op(AJ 92) 515 - Op(EK 40) 632 - Op(AK 37)
161 - Op(CA 39) 270 - Op(AK 37) 516 - FV 61 635 - Op(AK 37)
167 - Op(DH 96) 303 - CG 45 518 - EH 67 641 - BE 61
168 - Op(AK 37) 305 - BD 22 523 - BD 22 642 - BF 45
172 - DG 58 306 - Op(AK 35) 526 - BE 16 648 - AN 31
174 - BD 78 333 - BE 27 527 - BE 16 662 - AK 75
177 - CF 39 336 - BE 28 530 - Op(AK 37) 666 - BE 24
178 - DH 28 373 - BE 19 532 - AK 34 704 - Bergen
180 - GQ 53 381 - BE 46 552 - BF 48 706 - Op(AK 37)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 134 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 229 - 305 -
333 - 336 - 373 - 409 - 415 - 440 - 441 - 506 - 510 - 513 - 516 - 518 - 523
- 526 - 527 - 564 - 590 - 591 - 610 - 618 - 641 - 642 - 666 - 704.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 128 - 176 - Lorient;U 376 - 262 - La Pallice; U 209 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 24 see IVa.
2) U 509 situation: Contact on the 26th March in GR 5341 with 5
steamers on westerly course; forced to submerge
1271
- 229 -
continuously by locating aircraft. During subsequent night cruise on
100 meter line 2 steamers and 2 escorts, course 1600, sighted in GJ 8144
on the 2nd April. Four-fan torpedo fired in the fog according to
hydrophone, a detonation heard (torpedoing confirmed by intercept
message). On 5th April in GJ 4312 two-fan misfire on escort. Whale Bay
empty on the 6th April.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DM 5115, DN 76, DE 18 a further 3 boats with
Convoy No. 24.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 24:
The weather situation in the area of the convoy on afternoon of the 6th
was wind W.S.W. 5, misty. Visibility in the course of the night 6-7th was
at times very low up to 1 mile.
There were no further reports after U 270 had again reported the
convoy, with course 900, at 0800 in AK 3726. It was not until the evening
that U 632 reported the convoy to be approximately in AK 3865 and that
she had observed continuous air cover. During the night U 563 reported
four hydrophone fixes, probably on part of a convoy, according to the last
report in AL 2598. U 260 also reported towards 0600 that she had
maintained contact for four hours with the convoy by means of
hydrophone fixes; she reported its position as AL 1888. Further reports on
the convoy have not been received.
 During the day of the 6th there was constant air cover over and in the
vicinity of the convoy, so that the boats presumably could not approach.
The boats were instructed for the night of 6 - 7th to attempt to overtake
the enemy during hours of darkness, in order to be ahead of the convoy on
the morning of the 7th for daylight attacks. Control assumes that the
convoy will make for the Channel with course 1000, passing to the S. of
the Rockall Bank.
Sinkings: U 632 reported that she had fired on a destroyer
approximately in AK 3865 with Pi 2 and heard noises of sinking. U 270,
at 0142 in AK 2838, fired two single shots each on a 4,000 GRT and a
6,000 GRT ship and heard two hits. One 4,000 GRT ship assumed sunk.
The operation against the convoy is to be broken off on the evening of
the 7th. 8 boats are still operating.
b) 1) U 195 will proceed to square GR for operations in the Cape Town
area.
2) U 518 will proceed to DH 44 for refueling from U 117.
c) None.
d) 1) U 174 met the homeward-bound vessel "Irene" at the rendezvous
- 230 -
ordered and reported as instructed. The boat proceeded westward for
operations in the American area.
2) After leaving the Bay of Biscay U 124 operated against a convoy
bound for Gibraltar and reported it for the last time on the 2nd April in CF
3652. Since there were no other boats in the vicinity, U 124 was ordered
not to send in further reports on contacts. Later orders to report her
1272
position were not answered. She must be considered lost. There is no
information from any sighting or operational report.
V. Reports of Success:
U 509 1 destroyer 1 hit
U 632 1 ship 4,000 GRT
U 270 1 ship 6,000 GRT torpedoed.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
7.April 1943.
I. U 67 - CF 98 U 181 - EJ 66 U 376 - BF 91 U 552 - BE 69
68 - Op(DP 40) 182 - KZ 81 381 - BE 41 563 - Op(AL 27)
71 - BD 27 183 - Op(DM 70) 404 - Op(AJ 92) 564 - AK 63
84 - Op(AJ) 185 - Op(DM 90) 409 - BD 65 571 - Op(AJ 93)
86 - BD 22 188 - Op(AJ 56) 413 - BD 38 572 - AK 15
105 - Op(ET 16) 189 - AF 87 414 - CG 81 584 - Op(AL 27)
108 - BE 48 191 - Op(AL 27) 415 - BD 22 590 - BE 29
117 - DJ 11 195 - CF 27 438 - BE 41 591 - BF 64
123 - Op(ET 24) 196 - DT 52 440 - BE 29 592 - AL 18
126 - EJ (61) 197 - AF 87 441 - BE 28 594 - AK 28
128 - BF 54 198 - EJ 68 455 - Op(DH 92) 598 - Op(AL 27)
129 - DC 36 203 - BE 56 462 - BD 34 610 - BD 22
134 - AK 02 209 - AO 463 - BD 22 613 - Op(AK 71)
154 - EJ 65 229 - AK 89 487 - AL 16 615 - Op(AJ 68)
155 - Op(DM 24) 257 - Op(AJ 65) 506 - FG 89 618 - BD 22
159 - Op(EJ 20) 258 - BE 49 509 - Op(GJ 40) 630 - Op(AL 27)
160 - GH 51 260 - Op(AL 27) 510 - DG 34 631 - Op(AL 27)
161 - CA 30 262 - BF 91 513 - DH 39 632 - Op(AL 27)
167 - Op(DH 96) 267 - Op(AJ 67) 515 - Op(EK 40) 635 - Op(AL 27)
168 - Op(AL 27) 270 - Op(AL 27) 516 - FP 22 641 - BF 44
172 - DG 35 303 - CG 81 518 - EH 38 642 - BF 58
 174 - BD 78 305 - BD 36 523 - BD 22 648 - AF 87
176 - BF 54 306 - Op(AL 17) 526 - BE 28 662 - Op(AK 93)
177 - CF 69 333 - BE 61 527 - BE 29 666 - BE 29
178 - DH 58 336 - BE 61 530 - Op(AL 27) 704 - AN 35
180 - GQ 65 373 - BE 28 532 - Op(AL 27) 706 - Op(AL 19)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 134 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 229 - 305 -
333 - 336 - 373 - 409 - 415 - 440 - 441 - 506 - 509 - 510 - 513 - 516 - 518
- 523 - 526 - 527 - 564 - 590 - 591 - 610 - 618 - 641 - 642 - 666 - 704.
Entered Port: U 591 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 465 - Lorient.
- 231 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 24 see IVa.
2) At 1520 U 257 in the patrol line of Group "Adler" sighted a destroyer
with course N. in AJ 6745. Since according to dead reckoning, convoy SC
125 is expected today, Control presumed the convoy to be in the vicinity.
The three most northerly boats, U 188 - 257 - 84 were sent in to operate.
Orders for the remaining boats were course N. and speed 8 knots.
Visibility in this area was unfortunately only 2 miles. U 188 was forced
by destroyers or sub-chasers type PC 451 to submerge several times in AJ
5930. By evening the convoy had not been sighted. A patrol line was
ordered from AJ 2973 to AK 4415 for 1000 on the 8th April in order to
1273
have the Group ahead of the convoy at daylight the next morning. There
have been no further reports.
3) U 409 reported from prohibited sector of Route A, in BD 6599, an
unescorted vessel with course N. The boat requested permission to attack.
Since the positions of some German vessels homeward-bound are not
certain at present, she was ordered to pursue the vessel to the outside of
the route and then to put about. As the enemy speed was 17 - 18 knots the
boat, however, soon lost contact. She reported the vessel as type
"Tannenfels". Later this was sighted again, by U 258, with course 250.
This boat fired a two-fan torpedo which failed in BE 4134, contact then
being finally lost.
4) U 185 was in position EC 13 and DN 76 from 1st - 5th April and only
encountered coastal traffic and patrols in varying strength. She sank a
freighter of 5,000 GRT on the 6th April in the Windward Passage, out of a
small convoy with north-easterly course. Boat also reported that the magic
eye still indicates location when this can no longer be detected by acoustic
means.
5) U 172 was attacked in GF 7874 by 2 aircraft located coming out of
the sun. She remained surfaced and successfully fought off the attack with
all her guns. No damage.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DM 26, DE 43, DN 8189, AL 0395, EP 7272, DD
36.
Also several sightings with no position stated, but probably in the North
Atlantic.
d) According to a special intercept message received towards evening
convoy SC 125 received orders on the 2nd April to proceed via BC 5963.
Position on the 3rd April stated to be BC 7284, course 73. According to
this, the escort vessels detected by Group "Adler" could hardly have been
any of SC 125.
- 232 -

IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 24:
No further reports were received on the 7th regarding the convoy.Two
single destroyers were reported, in AL 28, only. Since the air cover in the
coastal area was very strong and boats were continually bombed, the
operation was broken off on the evening of the 7th.
Final Survey - Convoy No. 24:
The operation against the HX convoy lasted from 4th to 7th April 1943
and extended over a distance of 700 miles.
20 boats in all operated against the convoy, 4 of which probably failed
to come up to it owing to shortage of fuel. The Commanding Officers of
the boats in operation here were, for the most part, on their first operation.
After the convoy was detected at midday on the 4th, it was anticipated,
in view of the favorable position of boats of Group "Löwenherz", that all
boats would come up to the convoy during the first night. During the first
day and night, also, 8 boats contacted the convoy. In spite of this, very
little success was achieved in this first night. This was probably due
primarily to the inexperience of the young Commanding Officers.
After the first attack during this night part of the ships straggled from
the convoy and it was possible to sink three. The convoy itself was
reported on, with breaks, until the evening of the 6th but only by 1 - 2
boats. It is assumed that the other boats were only able to advance with
difficulty in view of air defence becoming increasingly stronger.
Numerous boats were bombed and some of them were unable to carry
on further operations owing to damage sustained on the evening of the 7th,
the operation was broken off since the boats were threatened by aircraft to
an ever increasing degree in the proximity of the coast.
In all, 8 ships, constituting 58,000 GRT, were sunk, of these 5 ships
being from the convoy, also one destroyer. A further 3 ships were
torpedoed.
1274
2 boats were probably lost on operations against the convoy, i.e. U 632
and 636. It is to be assumed that the boats were lost as a result of aircraft
bombs. A further 5 boats were heavily damaged by aircraft bombs or by
depth charges.
b) 1) U 129 has been given freedom of action in the area around Hatteras
as well as N. and S. of it. There has been no information on the traffic
situation, but small N.S.-bound convoys may be expected near the Cape.
2) U 455 - 515 - 105 and 123 may withdraw from the ordered
operational areas if enemy defence is too strong.
- 233 -
c) First supply rendezvous for tanker U 487, coming from home waters
will be in BD 16.
d) 1) In view of the inward passage of "Irene" Sectors A and D in Route
A will be prohibited as from now until further notice. Therefore, attacks
on unescorted vessels are prohibited on the whole of Route A. The
moving of the eastern boundary in Sector D by 200 miles to the E. remains
in force.
2) The area S. of 560 N., in the 200 miles wide strip N. of Route A, is
open.
3) According to a report from the Attache Group, about 50 Germans
have landed on the Canaries. These are the crew of 167 which was so
badly damaged by a British aircraft in DH 96 that the Commanding
Officer had to scuttle the boat. The whole crew was rescued.
V. Reports of Success:
 U 185 - 1 ship 5,500 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
8.April 1943.
I. U 67 - CF 95 U 182 - KZ 74 U 381 - BD 38 U 552 - BE 64
68 - DP 40 183 - Op(DM 70) 404 - Op(AJ) 563 - Op(AL 37)
71 - BD 12 185 - DN 91 409 - BE 45 564 - AL 48
84 - Op(AJ 61) 188 - Op(AJ 29) 413 - BD 34 571 - Op(AJ 69)
86 - BD 22 189 - AF 73 414 - CG 94 572 - AK 29
105 - Op(ET 16) 191 - Op(AL 37) 415 - BD 22 584 - Op(AL 28)
108 - BD 66 195 - CF 57 438 - BD 38 590 - BE 62
117 - DJ 24 196 - DT 82 440 - BE 62 592 - AL 54
123 - Op(ET 24) 197 - AF 73 441 - BE 65 594 - AK 66
126 - EJ 92 198 - EJ 88 455 - Op(DH 95) 598 - AK 66
128 - BF 48 203 - BE 55 462 - BD 34 610 - BD 22
129 - DC 31 209 - AN 36 463 - BD 22 613 - Op(AJ 69)
134 - AK 59 229 - BD 22 465 - BF 54 615 - Op(AJ 65)
154 - EJ 99 257 - Op(AJ 61) 487 - AL 45 618 - BD 22
155 - DM 20 Op. 258 - BD 63 506 - FG 76 630 - Op(AL 39)
159 - Op(EJ 20) 260 - Op(AL 01) 509 - FW 84 631 - AK 91
160 - GR 14 262 - BF 82 510 - CF 75 632 - Op(AL 02)
161 - Op(CB 38) 267 - Op(AJ 65) 513 - CG 78 635 - Op(AL 02)
168 - Op(AL 28) 270 - Op(AL 39) 515 - Op(EK 40) 641 - BF 46
172 - CF 75 303 - CG 94 516 - FO 84 642 - BF 64
174 - BC 97 305 - BE 28 518 - DS 99 648 - AF 73
176 - BF 48 306 - AK 66 523 - BD 22 662 - Op(AJ 66)
177 - CF 54 333 - BE 63 526 - BE 62 666 - BE 62
178 - DH 84 336 - BE 63 527 - BE 62 704 - AO 40
180 - GR 71 373 - BE 65 530 - Op(AL 03) 706 - AK 39
181 - EJ 96 376 - BF 81 532 - Op(AL 27)
1275
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 134 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 229 - 305 -
306 - 333 - 336 - 373 - 409 - 415 - 440 - 441 - 506 - 509 - 510 - 513 - 516
- 518 - 523 - 526 - 527 - 564 - 572 - 590 - 592 - 598 - 610 - 618 - 631 -
641 - 642 - 666 - 704.
Entered Port: U 642 - Lorient.
- 234 -
Sailed: U 628 - Brest; U 382 - Lorient; U 264 - St. NAzaire; U 954 -
732 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Western Bay of Biscay.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 203 sighted in BE 1689 a large vessel type "Queen Elizabeth"
course S.W.; contact lost in view of excessive speed.
2) In AL 2875 U 168 successfully fought off an attacking Sunderland
with MG and scored several hits.
3) In DM 4288 U 155 sank a freighter of 3,000 GRT, course 2400 and in
DM 2883 a tanker type "Andalusia", course 600. Also one tanker each
sighted in DM 1117 and DB 8735. During the day strong air cover,
several airships. Return passage via DO 10 intended.
4) U 123 sighted on 4th April a large passenger steamer in EJ 9598,
course 2900, speed 20 knots, on 6th April aircraft in ET 2145, neutral
vessels in ET 1363, course 3050, and 2 silhouettes in ET 2167.
b) Our own aircraft sighted at 1500 in BE 9485 3 merchant vessels and 3
escorts, course 300 medium speed.
 c) U-boats confirmed in CA 8788 and DC 13. SSS message by French
steamer "Bamako" (2,357 GRT) from EK 4633.
d) According to a special intercept message, the position of convoy SC
125 on the 6th April was BC 3536, course 550 and speed 8.5 knots.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) No further reports of sighting have been received from Group
"Alder". Convoy SC 125 suspected there was, according to reliable
special intercept data, further to the S. and can no longer be reached by the
Group. Control has now decided on operations against the HX convoy,
awaited according to dead reckoning on the 11th April, and has given the
following order: U 188 - 257 - 84 - 615 - 267 - 404 - 662 - 571 - 613 - 71
- 108 - 258 - 413 - 438 - 381 and 618, constituting Group "Alder", will
take up reconnaissance patrol at 0800 on the 11th April from AK 7257 to
BD 1959, course 2250, day's run 100 miles. This patrol extends over an
area of 300 miles.
2) After breaking off of operation against Convoy No. 24, the boats
which are still operational will proceed to take up a new patrol line AK 85.
3) The convoy which according to dead reckoning left Freetown on the
6th April, was not intercepted by the two boats there. The following
operational areas are ordered: U 105 - FE 30 and FF 10, U 126 - EU 80
and FF 20, U 154 - FF 40 and 70, U 123 will operate in the sector off
Freetown ordered on
- 235 -
1276
the 30th March. Since the individual areas are very large, results will
have to be awaited. According to special intercept data and other reports,
single vessels may be expected proceeding from N.W. to S.E.
4) U 159 which is no longer operational owing to extensive damage will
be ordered to DG 69 and will rendezvous there with U 455. It is intended
to pick up the crew of U 167 from the Canaries with U 455 and to
transport them home later, some on each of these two boats.
5) U 552 - 262 and 465 will proceed to AK 88 for operations against the
HX convoy expected on the 11th April.
c) 1) In order to obtain data on ice conditions in the Straits of Denmark U
189 has been ordered to proceed to AE 22 at increased cruising speed and,
after reaching the ice boundary, to proceed along this to the W. and report.
The boat is prohibited from attacks on unescorted vessels.
2) U 463 refueled U 523, 610 and 86 for return and U 618 for further
operations. The tanker is now empty and will proceed home.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 155 - 2 ships 12,000 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
9.April 1943.
I. U 67 - CG 66 U 183 - Op(DM 70) U 382 - BF 54 U 563 - AL 29
68 - DP 40 185 - DN 69 404 - Op(AK 71) 564 - AL 82
71 - Op(BD 12) 188 - Op(AK 65) 409 - BE 54 571 - Op(AK 72)
84 - Op(AK 69) 189 - AE 66 413 - BD 34 572 - AK 64
86 - BD 34 191 - AL 41 414 - CG 90 584 - AL 01
105 - Op(ET 54) 195 - CF 87 415 - BD 24 590 - BF 45
108 - BD 61 196 - EJ 23 438 - BD 34 592 - AL 82
117 - DJ 20 197 - AF 47 440 - BF 58 594 - BD 33
123 - ET 16 198 - ES 38 441 - BF 44 598 - AK 92
126 - ET 11 203 - BE 15 455 - Op(DH 90) 610 - AK 89
 128 - BE 69 209 - AN 31 462 - Op(BD 34) 613 - Op(AK 72)
129 - Op(CA 88) 229 - BD 34 463 - BD 32 615 - Op(AK 69)
134 - AK 89 257 - Op(AK 69) 465 - BF 49 618 - Op(BD 19)
154 - ET 17 258 - BD 37 487 - AK 93 628 - BF 54
155 - Op(DC 79) 260 - AL 45 506 - FF 93 630 - AL 42
159 - EJ 21 262 - BF 72 509 - FW 72 631 - AK 97
160 - FP 87 264 - BF 58 510 - CF 57 632 - AL 42
161 - Op(CA 30) 267 - Op(AK 69) 513 - CF 69 635 - AL 42
168 - AL 29 270 - AL 29 515 - Op(EK 40) 641 - BF 40
172 - CF 57 303 - CG 90 516 - FO 47 648 - AF 47
174 - BC 87 305 - BE 61 518 - DT 47 662 - Op(AK 71)
176 - BE 93 306 - AK 92 523 - BD 34 666 - BF 58
177 - DH 25 333 - BF 45 526 - BF 44 704 - AO
178 - DT 36 336 - BF 45 527 - BF 44 706 - AK 39
180 - GR 84 373 - BF 45 530 - AL 52 732 - AO
181 - ES 36 376 - BF 72 532 - AK 03 954 - AO
182 - KY 94 381 - BD 34 552 - BE 55
- 236 -
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 134 - 159 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 229 -
305 - 306 - 333 - 336 - 373 - 409 - 415 - 440 - 441 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 510
- 513 - 516 - 518 - 523 - 526 - 527 - 564 - 572 - 590 - 592 - 594 - 598 -
610 - 618 - 631 - 641 - 666 - 704.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: - . -
1277
II. Air Reconnaissance: Western Bay of Biscay.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 168 submerged in AL 1931 in view of destroyers and established
by hydrophone a small, very fast unit, escorted by several destroyers,
course E.N.E. Pursuit hopeless.
2) U 662 reported from AK 4781 hydrophone fix in 3200. Since search
was unsuccessful the boat proceeded to patrol line.
3) U 183 situation: On the 29th March in DL 69 single vessel sighted
with air and sea escort, course 100. Nothing sighted since 31st March
from DL 68 - 94 - EA 31 - 29 - 37 to EB 14 and 37. Air activity by air.
Return owing to fuel shortage.
4) U 516 confirmed heavy corrosions on pressure hull at the level of
battery compartment 2. She is able to dive only slight depths, and is
returning at increased speed.
b) Our own aircraft reported at 1200 a unit of 4 merchant ships and 2
escorts in BE 6219, course 00, medium speed.
c) 1) U-boat sighted or established in: EO 65, CA 85, ED 99, CA 8466.
Aircraft attack on U-boat approximately BF 1840. No German boat in the
vicinity. Position not definite.
2) Report of torpedoing from unknown position.
3) American aircraft ordered at 1150 to attack enemy U-boat in
minefield off Fedala (U 117).
IV. Current Operations:
a) - b) None.
c) U 86 took over spare parts from U 462 and returned.
d) 1) U 128 - 376 - 91 - 262, outward-bound, were to be disposed in BE
8335 - 9134 - 9226 and 9795 as a wing formation for the homeward-bound
vessel "Irene". Boats were to remain submerged if possible and at once
report any enemy forces sighted.
On the personal orders of the Naval High Command, the above
mentioned boats were later sent at maximum speed to meet the homeward-
bound vessel, in order to take over in close escort complete flak defence
and defence against surface ships. "Irene" was to proceed with course 860
to
- 237 -
BE 9527 and there be met at 1800 by 4 destroyers which had
previously escorted the "Himalaya" out. In view of several reports by our
own aircraft of enemy forces sighted (cruisers, destroyers), Group West
decided to escort the "Himalaya" back with destroyers and order "Irene" to
proceed to Vigo.
U-boats will now operate on a new course and the rendezvous
according to dead reckoning. They will wait there for about 2 hours and
then proceed to Vigo with searching courses. Rendezvous with the ship
will take place at the earliest in the course of the morning, approximately
in BE 8640.
2) U 653 and 632 operated against Convoy No. 24 and reported this at
0910 on the 5th April in AK 1852 and at 1710 on the 6th April in AL 3851.
Both boats still had contact with the convoy. Since there were no more
reports after this, they were ordered several times to give their position but
without result. They must, therefore, be considered lost. There is no
information as to whether this was due to convoy escort units or to aircraft.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
10.April 1943.
1278
I. U 67 - CG 17 U 182 - GR 99 U 376 - Op(BE 91) U 530 - AL 45
68 - Op(DP 40) 183 - Op(GM 70) 381 - BD 34 532 - AK 65
71 - Op(BD 12) 185 - DO 46 382 - BF 48 552 - BE 28
84 - Op(AK 74) 188 - Op(AK 72) 404 - Op(AK 79) 563 - AL 41
86 - BD 34 189 - AE 26 409 - BE 59 564 - AL 98
105 - Op(ET 83) 191 - AK 67 413 - Op(BD 16) 571 - Op(AK 79)
108 - BD 28 195 - DH 18 414 - CG 90 572 - AL 71
117 - DJ 20 196 - EJ 37 415 - BD 34 584 - AK 66
123 - Op(ET 28) 197 - AE 68 438 - BD 34 590 - BF 49
126 - Op(ET 42) 198 - ES 69 440 - BF 58 592 - AL 98
128 - Op(BE 83) 203 - BD 36 441 - BF 51 594 - BE 16
129 - Op(CA 87) 209 - AN 31 455 - Op(DH 90) 598 - AK 97
134 - BD 25 229 - BD 34 462 - BD 34 610 - BD 24
154 - Op(ET 49) 257 - Op(AK 72) 463 - BE 14 613 - Op(BD 12)
155 - DN 23 258 - BD 25 465 - BF 47 615 - Op(AK 75)
159 - DT 81 260 - AK 93 487 - BD 22 618 - Op(BD 19)
160 - FV 72 262 - Op(BE 92) 506 - FF 67 628 - BF 45
161 - Op(CA 30) 264 - BF 49 509 - FV 65 630 - AK 66
168 - AK 63 267 - Op(AK 75) 510 - CF 53 631 - BD 25
172 - CF 53 270 - AL 44 513 - CG 17 641 - BF 46
174 - CC 31 303 - CG 90 515 - Op(EK 40) 648 - AE 68
176 - BE 94 305 - BF 54 516 - FN 24 662 - Op(AK 71)
177 - DH 51 306 - AK 97 518 - DT 18 666 - BF 64
178 - DT 66 333 - BF 46 523 - BD 34 705 - AO
180 - GR 94 336 - BF 51 526 - BF 46 706 - AK 61
181 - ES 66 373 - BF 49 527 - BF 55 732 - AN 30
954 - AN 36
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 134 - 159 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 229 -
305 - 306 - 333 - 336 - 373 - 409 - 415 - 440 - 441 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 510
- 513 - 516 - 518 - 523 - 526 - 527 - 564 - 572 - 590 - 592 - 594 - 598 -
610 - 618 - 631 - 641 - 666 - 704.
- 238 -
Entered Port: U 666 - St Nazaire; U 704 - Kiel.
Sailed: U 226 - 175 - Lorient; U 650 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Western Bay of Biscay.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 25 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 182 pursued steamer course 1000, on the 5th April in JA 1470.
Attack prevented by the "Aloe" (5,047 GRT) which was subsequently
sunk. Cargo: wheat from Australia for the African front.
3) U 615 fired a four-fan torpedo in AK 4840 on a single vessel of about
10,000 GRT and obtained a hit. The ship proceeded, after repairs, with
great alterations of course to the N.E. Boat pursued.
4) U 188 also sighted a single vessel on a south-westerly course in AJ
6924. She did not pursue as speed was too high.
5) U 440 reported a destroyer in BF 6778 (probably one of our own).
6) U 564 had to submerge at 1236 in BE 6714 because of a shore-based
aircraft and at 1410 in BE 6715 because of three of these. Further
intercept messages from this area indicates strong enemy air
reconnaissance.
b) Reconnaissance flight for "Irene" and "Himalaya". At 1250 one
cruiser of "Adventure" class in square 3355, course 300, high speed.
c) U-boat sightings: In DP 76, AK 71, CA 8186, AK 7183, AJ 9631
(probably attack).
Report of torpedoing from EK 40 and SSS report from AK 7183.
d) None.
1279
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 25:
At 1400 on the 10th U 404 reported a convoy with southerly course in
AK 4768. In all 8 boats of Group "Adler" were sent in to operate against
the convoy which was an ONS convoy bound for America, i.e. U 84, 257,
188, 267, 662, 613, 571 and 71.
Contact with the convoy was maintained until 0119 on the 11th. U 188
reported the convoy at that time to be in AJ 9383. Apart from these two
boats U 404 and U 188, 4 further boats U 84, 257, 662 and 267
approached the convoy at daylight. With the exception of U 188 and 267
all the boats were driven off and depth charged. From these two boats,
which were the last to report contact with the convoy, nothing further has
been heard. Operations against the convoy will be continued.
- 239 -
b) 1) Since sighting of Convoy No. 25 by U 404, the 10 boats of Group
"Adler" to the N. have been sent in to operate. The remaining 7 "Adler"
boats have formed Group "Meise" and taken up the following sequence U
415 - 413 - 438 - 381 - 618 - 108 - 258, as at 0800 on the 11th April in
patrol line from AK 7593 to BD 1617.
At the same time U 706 - 532 - 168 - 584 - 191 - 630 - 563 - 270 - 530
and 203, proceeding westward from Convoy No. 24, were ordered to take
up, at high speed, patrol line from AK 5489 to 8916.
Both Groups overlap in such a manner that the expected HX convoy
will certainly be detected by at least one Group. The convoy is expected
in patrol line "Meise" as from the 11th April.
 2) U 174 will have freedom of action around BB 79 and 87. If the fog is
bad in this area she will proceed along the edge of it to the south or
southwest and carry out operations according to instructions on traffic
situation for U 161 given in War Diary of the 2nd April.
3) U 134 - 598 - 306 and 631, at present refueling, will subsequently
proceed to AK 78. The following have refueled or taken on spare parts
from U 462: U 415 - 381 - 229 - 438 and 523.
c) None.
d) 1) "Irene" was not encountered by the 4 U-boats proceeding to meet
her. She was attacked towards 1700 in BE 9884, lower left, by a cruiser
and presumably sunk. The boats were ordered to proceed to the position
and take on survivors or look for lifeboats. At 2032 U 176 reported enemy
unit in sight in BE 9762. She recognized this later as a cruiser or destroyer
with unknown aircraft and lost contact in BE 9495 because of high enemy
speed, course being N.W. No further reports have been received.
2) U 704 has arrived in Kiel and will be used as training boat.
V. Reports of Success:
U 182 - 1 ship 5,047 GRT
U 615 - 1 ship 10,000 GRT torpedoed.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 240 -
305 - 306 - 333 - 336 - 373 - 409 - 415 - 440 - 441 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 510
1280
11.April 1943.
I. U 67 - BE 98 U 181 - ET 74 U 333 - BF 40 U 523 - BE 14
68 - DO 98 182 - KY 95 336 - BF 52 526 - BF 40
71 - AJ 96 Op 183 - EC 11 373 - BF 40 527 - BF 55
84 - Op(AJ 95) 185 - DO 29 376 - BE 90 530 - Op(AK 86)
86 - BE 51 188 - Op(AJ 96) 381 - Op(BD 12) 532 - Op(AK 57)
105 - Op(FE 30) 189 - AE 13 382 - BE 66 552 - BE 18
108 - Op(BD 12) 191 - Op(AK 82) 404 - Op(AJ 96) 563 - Op(AK 67)
117 - DJ 20 195 - DH 47 409 - BF 47 564 - BE 68
123 - Op(ET 60) 196 - EJ 67 413 - Op(AK 79) 571 - Op(AK 74)
126 - ET 58 197 - AE 83 415 - Op(AK 75) 572 - AL 87
128 - BE 90 198 - ET 79 438 - Op(AK 79) 584 - Op(AK 59)
129 - Op(CA 80) 203 - AK 89 440 - BF 64 590 - BF 58
134 - BD 25 209 - AF 87 441 - BF 52 592 - BE 34
154 - ET 85 226 - BF 54 455 - Op(DH 94) 594 - BE 28
155 - DN 32 229 - BE 14 462 - BD 25 598 - BD 25
159 - DT 52 257 - Op(AJ 96) 463 - BE 24 610 - BD 51
160 - FU 66 258 - Op(BD 15) 465 - BE 65 613 - Op(AK 74)
161 - Op(CA 30) 260 - AK 97 487 - BD 51 615 - Op(AK 49)
168 - Op(AK 59) 262 - BE 90 506 - FF 54 618 - Op(BD 12)
172 - CF 32 264 - BE 69 509 - FV 28 628 - BE 65
174 - BE 99 267 - Op(AK 74) 510 - CF 35 630 - Op(AK 83)
175 - BF 54 270 - Op(AK 68) 513 - BE 98 650 - AO
176 - CG 12 303 - CG 90 515 - Op(EK 40) 631 - BD 25
177 - DH 81 305 - BF 54 516 - FE 79 641 - BF 64
178 - DT 96 306 - BD 25 518 - DT 13 648 - AE 83
180 - GR 99 706 - Op(AK 54) 732 - AN 31 954 - AN 31
662 - Op(AJ 96)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 134 - 159 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 229 -
- 513 - 516 - 518 - 523 - 526 - 527 - 564 - 572 - 590 - 592 - 594 - 598 -
610 - 615 - 618 - 631 - 641.
Entered Port: U 336 - 441 - Brest; U 641 - 440 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 358 - St Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: Western Bay of Biscay.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoys Nos. 25 and 26, see paragraph IVa.
2) U 615 pursued the vessel reported yesterday further and sank it at
night in AK 5417. The vessel was probably an auxiliary warship of
12,000 GRT. The Commanding Officer was wounded by splinters and had
to return.
3) U 465 was bombed by an aircraft in BF 4569 and is returning.
4) On the 9th April U 515 sank a vessel of 3,500 GRT in EK 4633 out of
a small convoy. Off Dakar little naval escort, by day continuous air
activity, at night radar on shore. For 8 days scarcely any traffic found off
approach to the harbor.
- 241 -
5) U 181 sighted the American vessel "Monasses", 5,983 GRT, course
450, in ET 8881 and sank her by torpedo and artillery fire. In the course
of the engagement 1 man was killed and 2 injured by 3.7 cm barrel
premature. As it was necessary for them to be taken on by a homeward-
bound vessel, rendezvous was arranged with U 516 at 1200 on the 12th
April in FE 6155.
1281
b) Air reconnaissance reported at 0940 in CF 3354 a cruiser, course
3000, and at 1140 in CF 3332 a destroyer, course N.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: CA 81, DB 38 and 4 further boats in in known
position - depth charge attack.
2) Torpedoing report from FE 22, EK 5158. SSS message from
unknown vessel, probably of Convoy No. 26.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 25:
The weather situation in the area of the convoy at midday on the 11th
was wind E 3, slight visibility and rain. Towards evening visibility
improved to good to very good.
At 1100 U 71 reported the convoy in AJ 9934. Apart from this boat
which again lost contact at 1300, U 662 and 404 contacted the convoy.
Shortly before dark U 71 again found the convoy and reported it last at
0630 in BC 2683.
The convoy, which was reported by one boat to consist of 30 vessels,
was proceeding at an advance speed of about 9 knots and on a mean
course of 220. The convoy was reported by the boats to have strong air
cover on the day of the 11th. 5 boats reported aircraft, one was attacked
by aircraft bombs.
2 boats were detected by escorts during attack and driven off. The
following were sunk:
Assumed
Boat Report Sunk: Torpedoed:
U 571 0735/11 7,500 GRT sunk, 6,000 GRT probably sunk. 1 hit
probable 2/13,500 1 hit
U 188 0550/11 2 vessels each 5,000 GRT sunk. 1 tanker 8,000 GRT
sunk, 1 further hit. 3/18,000 1 hit
U 84 0821/11 2 hits heard on 3 ships, each 5,000 GRT 1/5,000 1 hit
U 404 0130/12 8,000 and 6,000 GRT sunk, 1 hit on Type Tomas (10,000
GRT) 2/14,000 1 hit
U 613 2330/11 Straggler of 6,000 GRT sunk 1/6,000

- 242 -
Only 4 boats are still operating against the convoy, as U 84, 662, 404,
613 and 571 had to withdraw owing to damage and received new orders
from Control.
2) Convoy No. 26:
At 1100 on the 11th U 584 detected, in the patrol line of Group
"Lerche", the N.E.-bound HX convoy No. 232. The 9 other boats of
Group "Lerche" were sent in to operate against the convoy, i.e. U 168,
532, 706, 563, 270, 630, 530, 191 and 203.
In the area of the convoy by day there was a moderate S.W. wind, with
good visibility. The contact with the convoy, which was first reported at
1100 in AK 8213, was constantly maintained. In good visibility 5 further
boats approached the convoy by day. Towards 0800 on the 12th the
convoy was reported in AK 6721.
The convoy consisted of 25 vessels, according to report from one of
the boats. 4 boats reported having been driven off by destroyers; no air
cover apparent up to now over the convoy. The operation is being
continued.
b) 1) U 84 will proceed to AJ 82 and en route there, in order to give a
false impression of the presence of several boats, give out radio messages
continuously.
2) U 571 will take up as temporary operational area BC 34.
1282
3) U 552 - 628 - 465 - 258 - 264 - 262 - 175 - and 226 will proceed to
AK 75 for disposition in new patrol line or for operation against any
convoys detected up to that time.
4) Since the expected HX convoy arrived a day earlier than expected
and was detected by Group "Lerche", Group "Meise" will proceed to take
up reconnaissance patrol as from 1400, course 2300, day's run 120 miles.
c) U 117 has carried out minelaying as ordered.
d) 1) Sectors A, B and C in Route A are open for attacks on single vessels
until further notice.
2) Of the boats sent in to pick up survivors from the "Irene" U 128 was
forced to submerge for several hours by a search group in BE 9726, U 176
suspected the sinking to have been in BE 9790. At 1800 on the 10th April
she observed in that position or southward from it a large cloud of smoke
but found nothing in spite of a lengthy search. Our own air reconnaissance
reported at 1101 in BE 9739 8 empty rescue smacks. Our own boats were
ordered to proceed over the above mentioned square and, if nothing were
sighted up to then, to break off the search at midday on the 12th April.
- 243 -
3) U 414 has passed the Straits of Gibraltar and has, therefore, reached
the area under the command of the Senior Officer U-boats, Mediterranean.
V. Reports of Success:
U 615 1 ship 12,000 GRT
U 515 1 ship 3,500 GRT
U 181 1 ship 5,983 GRT
U 571 2 ships 13,500 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
U 188 3 ships 18,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
U 84 1 ship 5,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
U 404 2 ships 14,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
U 613 1 ship 6,000 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
12.April 1943.
177 - DT 33 306 - BD 25 526 - BF 40 954 - AN 23
178 - EJ 36 333 - BF 40 527 - BF 61
180 - KY 96 358 - BF 58 530 - Op(AK 68)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 134 - 159 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 229 -
305 - 307 - 333 - 373 - 409 - 415 - 563 - 506 - 509 - 510 - 513 - 516 - 518
- 523 - 526 - 527 - 564 - 572 - 590 - 592 - 594 - 598 - 610 - 615 - 618 -
631.
Entered Port: U 409 - 305 - Brest; U 527 - Lorient; U 590 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: U 92 - Brest; U 707 - 614 - St. Nazaire; U 378 - Drontheim.

II. Air Reconnaissance: None.

I. U 67 - BF 72 U 181 - FE 53 U 373 - BF 91 U 532 - Op(AK 68)
68 - Op(DP 70) 182 - GR 99 376 - CG 21 552 - BD 39 III. Reports on the Enemy:
71 - Op(BC 26) 183 - DN 84 381 - Op(BD 11) 563 - Op(AK 68) a) 1) Convoys Nos. 25 and 26, see paragraph IVa.
84 - Op(BC 34) 185 - DO 39 382 - Op(AK 84) 564 - BF 48
86 - BE 61 188 - Op(BC 26) 404 - Op(BC 34) 571 - Op(BC 33) - 244 -
105 - Op(FE 30) 189 - AE 26 409 - BF 52 572 - BE 22
108 - Op(BD 14) 191 - Op(AK 68) 413 - Op(BC 33) 584 - Op(AK 68)
117 - DJ 20 195 - DH 74 414 - CG 90 590 - BE 64
123 - Op(FT 60) 196 - EJ 98 415 - Op(AK 77) 592 - BE 63
126 - ET 94 197 - AE 81 438 - Op(BC 33) 594 - BE 61
128 - BE 94 198 - FE 27 455 - Op(DH 94) 598 - BD 25
129 - Op(CA 85) 203 - Op(AK 61) 462 - BD 25 610 - BD 51
134 - BD 25 209 - AF 73 463 - BE 29 613 - Op(BC 26)
154 - FE 34 226 - BF 48 465 - BE 55 615 - AK 83
155 - Op(DO 12) 229 - BE 51 487 - BD 51 618 - Op(BD 14) 2) U 195 reported sinking a freighter of 8,000 GRT in DG 9248, course
159 - DT 51 257 - Op(BC 26) 506 - FF 41 628 - BE 64 to Mogador.
160 - FU 37 258 - Op(BD 17) 509 - FF 16 630 - Op(AK 68) 3) U 176 sighted in CF 3348 3 destroyers course S, speed high.
161 - Op(CA 30) 260 - Op(AK 68) 510 - BE 97 631 - BD 25 b) None.
168 - Op(AK 61) 262 - CG 21 513 - BF 55 648 - AE 81 c) 1) U-boat sighted or confirmed in DN 75, 2 further ones in unknown
172 - BE 98 264 - BE 66 515 - Op(EK 40) 650 - AN 36 position.
174 - BB 97 267 - Op(BC 26) 516 - FE 62 662 - Op(BC 34) 2) U-boat attacked or was attacked in CA 37.
175 - BF 48 270 - Op(AK 68) 518 - DG 93 706 - Op(BC 35)
176 - CG 11 305 - BF 52 523 - BE 27 732 - AN 23
1283
 d) 1) According to Italian decypher, SC 126, expected by Group "Meise",
was in position BB 8851 at 2100 on the 9th April, course about 900, speed
7.5 knots.
2) According to special intercept message, the S-bound convoy was, at
0800 on the 13th April, in approximate position EK 4850, with speed 7.5
knots.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 25:
The operational area on the 12th was approaching ever nearer to the
fog belt off the Newfoundland Bank. Towards afternoon the boats
reported the visibility as 300 - 500 meters owing to rain and fog. Air cover
also became increasingly strong as the operation came nearer the coast and
more dangerous in view of poor visibility. Operations were therefore
broken off before the night, since the convoy had no longer been detected
since 0630 in BC 2683, by the 4 boats still in operation.
Final Review:
Operations against the ONS convoy extended from AK 4768 to BC
2683 over a distance of 340 miles, and the period from 10th - 13th April
1943. 9 boats participated, 4 boats still operating at the conclusion.
The convoy was reported by one boat as consisting of 30 vessels. It
was proceeding at 8 knots. Escort was not excessively strong, but had an
easy task in detecting the boats, since only 9 were operating against the
convoy and, therefore, were detected separately as they approached the
convoy at lengthy intervals. 3 boats only, therefore, were detected while
actually attacking, and driven off by the escort. 6 boats were depth
charged, 2 of these being heavily damaged.
Air defence increased very much on the second day and 6 boats
reported aircraft.One was bombed.
In spite of calm weather, and consequent unfavorable conditions for
the boats, and especially strong escort activity concentrated on the small
number of boats, 5 boats were able to achieve success.
They sank 9 ships with 56,500 GRT and torpedoed 4 further ones. No
boats were lost.
1284
- 245 -
2) Convoy No. 26:
The weather situation in the area of the convoy on the 12th was wind
N.W. 3, with very good visibility.
At 1100 U 203 reported the convoy in AK 6821. She lost contact again
at 1625. At 2100 U 270 again contacted the convoy in AL 4443 but lost it
again soon.
U 168 reported the convoy for the last time in AL 4287. The two last
reports from U 270 and U 168 were, according to dead reckoning, too far
ahead to be likely. According to this the convoy must have been
proceeding at 14 knots. Upon enquiry U 270 reported inaccurate fix.
The convoy, according to reports from the boats, consisted of 25
vessels and was proceeding during the night in close lines abreast. During
the day of the 12th air cover especially was very strong. Some of the boats
reported planes two or three times. 2 boats were bombed by aircraft, 2 had
heavy, and 2 light, depth-charges.
3 boats, however, of the 10 in operation achieved successes.
Sinkings:
U 168 at 0203 scored a hit on a 5,000 GRT vessel and a further
detonation after 184 seconds.
U 563 sank 1/1,000 GRT, 1/8,000 GRT and 1/5,000 GRT and scored a
further hit.
U 706 sank an escorted, damaged vessel of 6,000 GRT.
The operation against the convoy was broken off on the morning of the
13th, in view of the strong air cover to be expected on the 13th and in view
of the fact that only 5 boats were still operational.
 For final review see 14th April.
b) 1) The Group "Meise" was reinforced by several boats and disposed in
a new patrol line for the operation against convoy SC 126 which was
expected in the course of the 13th April according to dead reckoning.
After U 84 had carried out her special operation and U 404 and 613 had
joined up after breaking off operations against Convoy No. 25, Group
"Meise" took up patrol line from AJ 9987 to BC 6349 at 0800 on the 13th
April. Sequence as follows: U 84 - 613 - 404 - 571 - 415 - 413 - 438 -
662 - 381 - 618 - 108 and 258. However, as the convoy is at least one day
behind according to special Italian intercept message, it is intended to
allow the Group to proceed S.W.ward today in the reconnaissance patrol.
2) In view of the small amount of traffic off Dakar, U 515 will have
freedom of action between Route A and the mainland S. of latitude 130 N.
After the opening of Sector D, operations are intended as from the 20th
April in area ES lower third, and FD, upper third.
- 246 -
3) The new objective for U 128 is FC 50, for U 176 DC 70. The boats
are to operate off Brazil or in the Caribbean, since the boats operating in
these areas have all started their return passage.
c) 1) U 181 gave wounded men over to U 516.
2) U 598 refueled from U 462.
d) 1) U 303 passed the Straits of Gibraltar and, therefore, has entered the
area under the command of Senior Officer U-boats, Mediterranean.
2) According to a report from the British Station Daventry regarding the
destruction of U 444 and 432 the following information has been obtained:
1285
U 444 was attacked near Convoy No. 16 by British destroyer "Harvester"
with depth charges and later, when she had to surface, rammed. The
destroyer was also damaged in this engagement. The French corvette
"Aconit" hurried to her assistance, firing with guns on the boat, which was
surfaced, and sinking her after further ramming.
The damaged destroyer "Harvester" the next morning was completely
out of action and had to stop. She was sunk shortly after by U 432 with 2
torpedoes. The "Aconit" which had hurried to the scene sighted the U-
boat on the surface and sank her by gunfire and ramming, after she had
submerged for a short time and been attacked by depth charges. 29 men in
all were rescued from the two boats.
V. Reports of Success:
U 195 1 ship 8.000 GRT
U 168 2 hits
U 563 3 ships 24,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
U 706 1 ship 6,000 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
13.April 1943.
I. U 67 - BF 61 U 180 - KZ 76 U 358 - BF 49 U 552 - BD 23
68 - DP 27 181 - FE 69 373 - BF 68 563 - Op(AL 54)
71 - Op(BC 29) 182 - GR 89 376 - BE 68 564 - BF 49
84 - Op(AJ 96) 183 - DN 67 378 - AF 58 571 - Op(BC 32)
86 - BE 63 185 - DP 16 381 - Op(BC 39) 572 - BE 37
92 - BF 54 188 - Op(BC 29) 382 - BE 55 584 - Op(AL 51)
105 - Op(FE 30) 189 - AD 55 404 - Op(BC 32) 592 - BF 45
108 - Op(BC 39) 191 - Op(AL 45) 413 - Op(BC 36) 594 - BF 44
117 - DH 38 195 - DC 95 415 - Op(BC 25) 598 - BD 16
123 - Op(ET 60) 196 - ES 39 438 - Op(BC 36) 610 - BD 51
126 - Op(FF 11) 197 - AN 79 455 - Op(DH 90) 613 - Op(BC 32)
 128 - BE 86 198 - FE 56 462 - BD 25 614 - BF 58
129 - Op(CA 80) 203 - Op(AK 67) 463 - BE 63 615 - AK 98
134 - BD 25 209 - AF 78 465 - BF 58 618 - Op(BC 39)
154 - Op(FF 41) 226 - BE 66 487 - BD 51 628 - BE 61
155 - DO 10 229 - BF 64 506 - FE 22 630 - Op(AK 42)
159 - DT 21 257 - Op(BC 51) 509 - FN 99 631 - BD 25
160 - FU 21 258 - Op(BC 63) 510 - BE 97 648 - AE 79
161 - Op(CA 30) 260 - Op(AK 48) 513 - BF 61 650 - AN 31
- 247 -
168 - Op(AL 54) 262 - BE 86 515 - Op(EK 70) 662 - Op(BC 29)
172 - BF 71 264 - BE 64 516 - FE 26 706 - Op(AK 91)
174 - Op(BB 87) 267 - Op(BC 28 518 - DH 47 707 - BF 58
175 - BE 69 270 - Op(AL 45) 523 - BE 61 732 - AF 76
176 - CF 35 303 - CG 90 526 - BF 55 954 - AF 76
177 - DT 63 306 - BD 25 530 - Op(AL 42)
178 - EJ 66 333 - BF 68 532 - Op(AK 68)
On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 86 - 134 - 159 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 229 -
306 - 333 - 373 - 415 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 510 - 513 - 516 - 518 - 523 - 526
- 564 - 572 - 592 - 594 - 598 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: U 67 - Lorient; U 333 - 373 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 231 - 192 - 531 - Kiel; U 125 - Lorient.
1286
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 26 see IVa.
2) U 465 sighted a U-boat in BF 6728 (probably one of our own).
3) U 257 was attacked by surprise in BC 2629 by a destroyer appearing
out of the fog. Course S.W. Boat continued on its way.
4) U 155 proceeding further over N. line of DO sighted nothing.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CA 5811, DN 84, CA 81. SSS message from AM
4529.
d) The Italian report regarding position of SC 126, being at 2100 on the
9th April in BB 8851, has been confirmed by our own special intercept
message.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 26 Final Survey:
Operations against the HX convoy were begun on the 11th March and
broken off at daylight on the 13th March. 10 boats of Group "Alder" and
U 260 were in operation.
After detecting the convoy in AK 8213 at 1100 on the 11th, contact was
maintained up to and including the 12th, enemy speed being about 8 knots.
Visibility in the area of the convoy during the two days was good all the
while, weather being relatively calm.
While there was no air cover, over the convoy on the first day, on the
second strong air cover appeared at dawn, so that the boats could only
approach with difficulty. The escort apparently had good success with
radar, above and below surface in this calm weather, since 4 boats were
depth-charged on one occasion, 2 of them with considerable
- 248 -
 V. Reports of Success: None.

---------------------------------------------------
damage, and only 2 boats were able to attack the convoy with any ---------------
success in spite of the fact that in all 7 out of 10 boats had contacted the
convoy on the first day and in the first night. Obviously with these good
weather conditions the enemy was able to spot the small number of boats.
In the case of a large number of boats the next wave of boats comes up to
the attack, while in this case when one boat after the other approaches each
one is driven off and then the gap in defence cannot be exploited by any - 249 -
subsequent boats. Approach was no longer possible after the first night,
when strong air cover came up.
Total sinkings:
Sunk 4/30,000 GRT and 3 further hits.
No boats were lost in the operation.
b) After breaking off operations against Convoy No. 25, the boats were
assigned to Group "Meise". In view of the later arrival of the expected SC
126 convoy, the patrol line of this Group was moved further westward, so
that it should come into the arc of the convoy during the day. The
following was the sequence at 1000 on the 14th April in position from AJ 14.April 1943.
9777 over BC 3579 to BC 6667, U 267 - 257 - 188 - 71 - 84 - 613 - 404 -
571 - 415 - 413 - 598 - 438 - 662 - 381 - 618 - 108 - 258 and 610.
The convoy may be expected to arrive as from midday on the 14th I. U 68 - DP 64 U 178 - EJ 95 U 270 - AL 55 U 530 - AL 91
April. 71 - Op(BC 23) 180 - KZ 58 306 - BD 25 531 - AO
c) During operations against Convoy No. 26, U 191 several times 84 - Op(BC 23) 181 - FF 77 358 - BF 47 532 - AK 82
successfully beat off attacks by an aircraft. She reported it as follows: 86 - BF 45 182 - GR 87 376 - BE 84 552 - BD 21
After diving twice in view of a "Sunderland" 20 miles behind the convoy, 92 - BF 45 183 - DO 47 378 - AF 49 563 - AL 82
continued pursuit and started anti-aircraft defence when the aircraft 105 - Op(FE 30) 185 - DP 26 381 - Op(BC 63) 564 - BF 91
approached. Boat was turned diagonally and warded off attack with both 108 - Op(BC 63) 188 - Op(BC 23) 382 - BE 56 571 - Op(BC 34)
MG C/38. After approaching twice, the aircraft circled within range 117 - DH 52 189 - AD 84 404 - Op(BC 34) 572 - BE 66
before the boat until a destroyer was sighted after about 2 hours. The 123 - Op(ET 60) 191 - AL 45 413 - Op(BC 38) 584 - AL 41
radio message will be repeated on all wave lengths in order to give all 125 - BF 45 192 - AO 415 - Op(BC 35) 592 - BF 40
boats necessary encouragement for similar action. 126 - CF 53 195 - DT 24 438 - Op(BC 38) 594 - BF 58
d) U 455 kept a rendezvous last night off Las Palmas with Woermann 128 - CF 34 196 - ET 47 455 - DH 94 598 - Op(BC 38)
tug and took on the crew of U 167. 129 - CA 80 197 - AL 12 462 - BD 25 610 - Op(BC 66)
1287
 134 - BD 25 198 - FE 94 463 - BF 45 613 - Op(BC 34)
154 - Op(FE 40) 203 - AK 82 465 - BF 64 614 - BF 49
155 - DO 26 209 - AF 44 487 - BD 25 615 - BE 14
159 - DG 93 226 - BE 64 506 - ET 76 618 - Op(BC 63)
160 - FN 76 229 - BE 66 509 - FN 91 628 - BE 52
161 - Op(CA 30) 231 - AO 510 - BF 74 630 - AL 45
168 - AL 45 257 - Op(BC 23) 513 - BF 61 631 - BD 25
172 - BF 78 258 - Op(BC 66) 515 - Op(ET 10) 648 - AL 21
174 - Op(BB 79) 260 - AK 96 516 - FE 21 650 - AN 23
175 - BE 67 262 - BE 81 518 - DH 44 662 - Op(BC 38)
176 - CF 53 264 - BE 53 523 - BE 66 706 - AK 91
177 - DT 69 267 - Op(AJ 97) 526 - BF 61 707 - BF 49
732 - AF 48 954 - AF 48
On Return Passage: U 84 - 86 - 134 - 159 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 229 - 306
- 415 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 510 - 513 - 516 - 518 - 523 - 526 - 564 - 572 -
592 - 594 - 598 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: U 513 - Lorient; U 465 - 594 - St Nazaire.
Sailed: U 266 - St Nazaire.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 68 situation:Naval patrols in the Anegada Channel up to DO 68.
In DP 70 air activity by day and night. Return for supplies.
2) U 563 reported a large passenger ship, course 200 and speed 17
knots, in BE 2176.
3) U 358 was bombed by aircraft in BF 5466. Outward passage
continued.
b) None.
c) U-boat was attacked or was attacked in BC 35.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
1288
b) 1) Up to 2330 the expected convoy was not sighted. Two boats - U
404 and 571 - were detected by aircraft towards 1600.
- 250 -
In order to be ahead of the convoy at daylight Group "Meise"
proceeded in patrol line, course 500 and speed 6 knots, as from 2330. It is
intended that the Group should proceed to meet the convoy next day.
2) U 134 - 306 and 631 refueled from U 462 and are now proceeding to
AJ 94. The boats are either to operate against the convoy or, if they do not
intercept it, to extend the patrol line of Group "Meise" to the N.
3) U 552 will take up position in AK 75 as temporary operational area.
c) U 189 will proceed to AK 2810 after passing the Denmark Strait and is
to lay a meteorological buoy there.
d) While entering Lorient escorted by a sperrbrecher, U 526 struck a
mine and sank in a matter of seconds at a depth of 8 meters. The boat was
proceeding at a distance apart of 300 meters, as ordered. By contrast with
earlier cases observed (particularly high water columns with mine
detonations) a surprisingly low black explosive column only was seen up
to about the level of the conning tower.
It seems possible that this is a new type of mine which is directed only
against U-boat escorts and was possibly laid by some vessel from Lorient,
and , therefore, that this may involve sabotage. The point in question - the
fairway channel at "Trois Pierres" - is passed daily by numerous vessels
outward and inward bound. No laying of mines by aircraft has been
observed in the last year, and is considered a very difficult task in view of
the heavy flak defence.
 Investigations will be carried out by the Flotilla and the Officer
Commanding Western Defences.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
15.April 1943.
I. U 68 - DQ 44 U 178 - ES 36 U 267 - Op(AJ 97) U 532 - AK 79
71 - Op(BC 23) 180 - KZ 64 270 - AL 47 552 - AK 79
84 - Op(BC 23) 181 - FM 36 306 - BD 25 563 - BE 24
86 - BF 51 182 - GR 72 358 - BE 68 564 - BF 93
92 - BE 66 183 - DO 54 376 - BE 80 571 - BC 32
105 - Op(FE 30) 185 - DP 33 378 - AF 47 572 - BF 45
108 - Op(BC 63) 188 - Op(BC 23) 381 - Op(BC 63) 584 - AK 64
117 - DH 43 189 - AD 87 382 - BE 52 592 - BF 40
123 - Op(ET 60) 191 - AK 68 404 - Op(BC 34) 598 - Op(BC 38)
125 - BF 45 192 - AN 36 413 - Op(BC 38) 610 - Op(BC 66)
126 - Op(FF 20) 195 - DT 55 415 - Op(BC 35) 613 - Op(BC 34)
128 - CF 56 196 - ET 78 438 - Op(BC 38) 614 - BF 47
129 - Op(CA 80) 197 - AL 22 455 - DH 57 615 - BE 24
134 - BD 25 198 - FM 23 462 - BD 25 618 - Op(BC 63)
154 - Op(FF 40) 203 - AK 79 463 - BF 46 628 - BE 42
155 - DD 95 209 - AE 65 487 - BD 25 630 - AK 65
- 251 -
1289
159 - DH 44 226 - BE 55 506 - ET 45 631 - BD 25
160 - FN 44 229 - BF 45 509 - FN 54 648 - AE 79
161 - CA 63 231 - AN 36 510 - BF 55 650 - Bergen
168 - AK 68 257 - Op(BC 23) 515 - Op(ET 10) 662 - Op(BC 38)
172 - BF 40 258 - Op(BC 66) 516 - ET 48 706 - BD 25
174 - Op(BB 79) 260 - AK 92 518 - DH 44 707 - BF 47
175 - BE 55 262 - BE 49 523 - BF 45 732 - AF 44
176 - CF 54 264 - BE 51 530 - AL 98 954 - AF 44
177 - DT 99 266 - BF 58 531 - AN 36
On Return Passage: U 84 - 86 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 183
- 185 - 229 - 306 - 415 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 510 - 516 - 518 - 523 - 530 -
563 - 564 - 572 - 592 - 598 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: U 564 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 377 - 709 - Brest; U 634 - 525 - 514 - Lorient; U 223 - St
Nazaire; U 710 - 386 - 533 - 528 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 262 reported at 0434 a N-bound convoy (No. 27), speed 9 knots,
in BD 9345. The boat was given freedom to attack and was ordered to
maintain further contact. U 626 - 175 - 226 - 258 - 264, outward-bound,
were sent in at maximum speed to operate against the convoy. Since all
the boats were still rather far away, their arrival could be expected only in
the course of the following day or night. Further report were not received
up to this morning.
2) U 161 situation: In area CA since 8th April search carried out in CA
37 - 38 - 61 - 62 for several days. Apart from patrols in CA 3778 no traffic
was seen.
 After the first sighting on the 11th April, spasmodic very heavy air and
sea patrol. In CA 6125 aircraft bombs, long term search groups with Asdic
up to 180 miles from the coast, aircraft up to 300 miles. Boat considers
operations in the vicinity of the coast as hopeless, as it is necessary to
remain submerged during the day and, therefore, there is no freedom of
operation.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: CB 4921, DL 93, EC 1297, CB 4912, BB 8444.
d) According to a special intercept message there was a large floating
dock, probably bound for Freetown, in EP 4879 on the 3rd April and on
the 11th April in FB 1566. Course 850, speed 4.5 knots. Boats have no
news regarding this.
- 252 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Group "Meise" remained at 1000 in the position line reached from
AJ 9739 over BC 3236 to BD 4184 as a patrol line. U 134 - 306 - 631 -
203 - 532 and 552 also joined the Group and extended the patrol line from
AJ 8375 to AJ 9723. THe boats received instructions for the night to
watch enemy convoy radio wave on 124 meters, as well as to effect patrol
of the area as far as visibility and weather conditions allow, with all
possible means. At 0545 U 438 established convoy W/T. No further
reports were received up to morning.
2) In order to carry out a special operation in the area of the St.
Lawrence River, U 262 is restricted for attacks beyond 520 W.
1290
3) U 628 - 264 - 258 - 175 - 226 - 92 - 358 - 707 - 614 and 125 will
proceed to AL 15 to make up a new patrol line. U 648 is already in this
area and will operate until arrival of the above in AL 13.
4) U 84 - 630 - 270 and 168, will refuel from U 487 before further
operations. Objective for this will be BD 2555.
c) None.
d) 1) In view of the loss of U 526 the following instructions are given,
effective at once, for incoming and outgoing boats when sailing in convoy
- as far as weather conditions permit.
1) All members of the crew are to wear life-jackets.
2) Boats will proceed with bulkheads ready to close, and ready to
submerge with the exception of Kingston valves, watertight forecastle and
watertight stern.
3) The whole of the free watch must remain on the conning tower and also
all on watch, who are not definitely required below deck.
2) All prohibited areas in the Atlantic, apart from Route A, are now
open. Attacks on single vessels are prohibited now only in Sector D
including the extension to the E, as well as in the permanently prohibited
area in the South Atlantic.
V. Reports of Success: None.
For Flag Officer Commanding U-boats
Chief of Operations.
(Signed): GODT.
- 253 -
 - 254 -

Naval High Command

2 Sk1/B.d.U. Operations
30.April 1943.
Top Secret.
S.O. Only.

To: High Command of the Navy,

By hand of Lt. Cdr. Bauch. Top Secret.
15.March 1943.
Enclosed are War Diaries of Flag Officer Commanding U-boats
S.O. Only.
for 1st - 15th April 1943, copies Nos. 2 and 3.
Mining Instructions "Westafrika" for U 455
By order.
1) Operation: Mining of harbors Casablanca and Fedala within the 25 m-
(Signed) Demmbers. line, alternative operation mining of shipping routes between the two
Lt. Naval Artillery and harbors.
Adjutant. A sketch is included (only for the boat) as a guide for the laying of the
mines.

2) Mines: 12 TMB, time setting 80 days, UES 6 hours, response at 10

m/Oe, detonation on the first run-over 8 mines (4 blue, 2 red, 2 A2) at the
fourth run-over. 4 mines (2 blue, 2 red), 6 mines M1 detonator blue, 4
mines M1 detonator red, 2 mines A2 detonator.
Maximum water depth at which mines may be laid 25 m, minimum 12
m, distance apart of mines 1,000 m.

3) Enemy Situation: Entrance to Casablanca is protected by mine barrage

probably directly before the entrance, passage through is closed at night.
At dark a large number of freighters lying in harbor puts out with course
N, anchorage about 2 to 3 miles N. of Casablanca. The harbor of
1291
Casablanca is lighted at night, lighthouse with lights burning and the city
is blacked-out. There may be enemy mines within the 50 m-line.
UEIS : minelaying carried out off Casablanca and Fedala
4) Geographical Limits: The mines are to be laid between 70 20' and 70 UESC : route between Casablanca and Fedala mined.
40' W and 350 45' N.

5) Carrying out the Operation: En route into the operational area 2 bow For Flag Officer Commanding U-boats
tubes loaded with torpedoes and 2 bow tubes with mines.
Enemy traffic should be observed before minelaying and the Chief of Operations.
Commanding Officer should under all circumstances make every attempt
to lay the mines as far in as possible where they will have the maximum (Signed): GODT.
effect. The alternative position (see chart, red marks) should only be
mined when all attempts to minelay in the harbors have failed and further
attempts to do so appear to be hopeless.
The positions of mines given in the mining plan are only for guidance.
Any alterations may be made by the Commanding Officer according to F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
enemy situation observed or notified.
Minelaying to be avoided at points with very shelving sea-bed and with 16 - 30 April 1943
heavy breakers.
The time of minelaying is left to the Commanding Officer after PG30322
investigating the area. The operation must, however, be completed by
latest 2400 on the 6th April 1943. The are between 70 and 80 W and 340
N must be left by 0800 on the 7th.

6) Report: Report should be sent in as soon as possible after minelaying,

but from at least 50 miles away, using code signals as follows: 16.April 1943.

- 255 - I. U 68 - DQ 27 U 181 - FM 66 U 358 - BE 64 U 532 - AJ 96

71 - Op(AJ 98) 182 - GQ 63 376 - BE 533 - AO
84 - Op(BC 31) 183 - DO 61 377 - BF 54 552 - AJ 96
86 - BF 28 185 - DQ 13 378 - AE 66 563 - BE 37
92 - BE 61 188 - Op(AJ 98) 381 - Op(BC 39) 571 - Op(BC 32)
105 - Op(FE 30) 189 - AD 80 382 - BE 19 572 - BF 46
108 - Op(BC 63) 191 - AK 59 386 - AO 584 - AK 94
117 - DH 44 192 - AN 31 404 - Op(BC 32) 592 - BF 40
1292
 123 - Op(ET 60) 195 - DT 86 413 - Op(BC 35) 598 - Op(BC 36)
125 - BE 66 196 - FE 24 415 - Op(BC 32) 610 - Op(BD 41)
126 - Op(FF 20) 197 - AL 16 438 - Op(BC 36) 613 - Op(BC 32)
128 - CF 81 198 - FM 61 455 - DH 44 614 - BE 67
129 - Op(CH 85) 203 - AK 75 462 - BD 25 615 - BE 29
134 - Op(AJ 94) 209 - AE 59 463 - BF 91 618 - Op(BC 39)
154 - Op(FF 40) 223 - BF 56 487 - BD 45 628 - BE 12
155 - DE 47 226 - BE 29 506 - ET 14 630 - AL 74
159 - DH 44 229 - BF 67 509 - FN 18 631 - Op(AJ 39)
160 - FM 38 231 - AN 31 510 - BF 61 634 - BF 54
161 - Op(CA 63) 257 - Op(AJ 98) 514 - BD 54 648 - AL 24
168 - AK 83 258 - Op(BD 41) 515 - Op(ET 50) 650 - Bergen
172 - BF 40 260 - BD 23 516 - ET 41 662 - Op(BC 39)
174 - Op(BB 79) 262 - BD 69 518 - DH 44 706 - BD 25
175 - BE 54 264 - BE 15 523 - BF 61 707 - BE 65
176 - CE 69 266 - BF 49 525 - BF 54 709 - BF 54
177 - EJ 39 267 - Op(AJ 97) 528 - AO 710 - AO
178 - ET 44 270 - AK 95 530 - BE 34 732 - AE 65
180 - KZ 76 306 - Op(AJ 95) 531 - AN 31 954 - AE 65
On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 86 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 172 - 182 -
183 - 185 - 229 - 306 - 415 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 510 - 516 - 518 - 523 - 530
- 563 - 572 - 592 - 598 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: U 86 - Brest; U 510 - 523 - Lorient.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 27 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 176 sighted an armed steamer of C 2 type on a northerly course,
speed 15 knots in CE 6816. Pursuit was abandoned after 8 hours as the
heavy sea made it impossible to over haul.
b) None.
1293
c) U-boat sightings: CB 2427, EF 45, AE 8557, AE 8275, FE 38, KL 87,
CB 24. There are several sightings from unknown positions. English
aircraft reported ineffectual depth charge attack (No information of grid).
d) According to special Radio Intelligence reports, the SC 126 convoy
was in BC 8485 at 2100 on 12.4 and is to have carried
- 257 -
out a change of course.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 27:
U 262 was beaten off at 0606 by destroyers and pursued with depth
charges, and contact was thereby lost. Last position of convoy: BD 9356,
course N.E., speed 9 knots. 12 large ships were identified. The boat
continued its westward passage as the special duties must be carried out
punctually. The boats deployed on the previous day - U 264, 628, 258,
175 and 226 received orders to continue the search independently. U 175
sighted destroyers in BE 4542 at 2330. U 382 reported the convoy again
at 0641 in BE 4537, course 900 speed 8 knots. In order to exploit the
chance thus provided all outward bound boats able to reach the convoy
during the night or ready to attack during the day, were deployed. U 628
also established contact before 0800. The operation continues.
b) 1) The recently received special Radio Intelligence report of 12.4 gives
a convoy position much further to the S than previously conjectured.
From this, the convoy should have passed the line on about the
afternoon of the 13.4 in very bad visibility. It is not out of the question,
however, that the lines were circumvented to the S. 5 adjacent boats
reported convoy R/T of varying S/S during the day, and in the night 2
other boats, 180 sea miles to the north, similarly experienced R/T. It is
impossible to form a clear picture of the approximate convoy area or
course, especially as it is not certain whether the R/T heard was actually
convoy traffic. According to the earlier isolated boats messages received
up to now, the R/T wave was heard up to a distance of 50 to 60 seamiles.
Knowledge and experience of the spread of critical frequencies do not
permit conjecture as to the distance, to be made from the signal strength.
Communications Experimental Command is working on the
development of a critical frequency D/F apparatus for U-boats which
promises speedy results in the evolution of a practical useful nature.
However, in order to exploit every chance, and be ahead of the convoy
on the following day, if it should still appear, Group "Meise" took up
position in reconnaissance channels on a course of 500, speed 7 knots at
2100, and will remain in patrol channels from AJ 6782 via BD 1154 to BD
4231 at 1000 on 17.4. No further messages have been received.
2) The following passage routes in the South Atlantic are ordered for
research into the traffic conditions there.
U 198 via FU 47 - GP 32 - GZ 49 and JJ 8210.
U 181 via FU 58 - CQ 13 - GZ 5240 and JK 2870.
U 178 via FU 68 - CQ 22 - GZ 2680 and JK 2280.
U 196 via FV 48 - CQ 31 - GZ 31 and KZ 7410.
These boats are to be deployed in the area round Madagascar.
- 258 -
c) 1) U 518 has been replenished from U 117.
1294
2) A meeting has taken place between U 154, 159 and 518. The crew of
U 167 has been evenly distributed among the boats.
d) 1) Since U 376 put out of La Pallice on 6.4 it has not reported. The
boat was detailed to search for the crew of "Irene". Apart from aircraft
sightings of U-boats, there is no information of any kind whatsoever from
the Biscay area or W. of it. Several requests for a situation report
remained unanswered. The boat must be presumed lost.
2) U 177 reports on "Bachstelze" (observation device).
On the southbound passage from 33 N there were two take offs daily.
Successful operation up to seaway 4 and medium swell. Critical point
when landing, pitching of boat is no great hindrance as the landing
platform is midships and static. It is advisable to wind in the last meter of
wire by hand.
The Commander considers more discrimination in the choice of
personnel and better training in engine maintenance necessary.
V. Reports of Success: None.
VI. General:
Convoy warfare in March has led to a considerable using up of U-boats.
A large number of boats have returned owing to fuel and torpedo
exhaustion and damage. The gaps thus produced must be filled as quickly
as possible, if the monthly sinking figures are to be increased. On 6.4,
therefore all boats of type IX about to put out were ordered to proceed to
the North Atlantic in order to make up the number of U-boats needed there
to intercept convoys.
The fact that sinking results (as far as can be seen) in the southern
operational area have decreased (owing to absence of traffic caused by
withdrawal of ships for operations in North Africa, and the frequent
changes in isolated vessel and convoy traffic.) makes this order timely.
Whether future events will justify it remains to be seen.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------

- 259 -
17.April 1943.
I. U 68 - DQ 34 U 181 - FN 74 U 306 - Op(AJ 67) U 533 - AN 36
71 - Op(AJ 96) 182 - GQ 37 358 - BE 28 552 - Op(AJ 92)
84 - Op(AK 77) 183 - DP 17 377 - BF 45 563 - BE 63
92 - BE 28 185 - DE 98 378 - AE 67 571 - Op(AK 77)
105 - Op(FF 30) 188 - Op(AJ 96) 381 - Op(BD 15) 572 - BF 40
108 - Op(BD 18) 189 - AL 80 382 - BE 42 584 - BD 22
117 - DH 44 191 - AK 73 386 - AN 36 592 - BF 58
123 - Op(ET 60) 192 - AF 87 404 - Op(AK 77) 598 - Op(BD 11)
125 - BE 61 195 - EJ 31 413 - Op(BD 11) 610 - Op(BD 42)
126 - Op(FF 20) 196 - FE 56 415 - Op(BD 15) 613 - Op(AK 77)
128 - CF 79 197 - AL 23 438 - Op(BD 14) 614 - BE 55
129 - Op(CA 80) 198 - FM 93 455 - DH 44 615 - BE 63
134 - Op(AJ 67) 203 - Op(AJ 92) 462 - BD 25 618 - Op(BD 18)
154 - Op(FF 40) 209 - AE 82 463 - BF 93 628 - BE 17
155 - DE 46 223 - BF 49 487 - BD 27 630 - AK 97
159 - DH 44 226 - BE 19 506 - EK 74 631 - Op(AJ 92)
160 - FE 99 229 - BF 64 509 - FM 32 634 - BF 46
161 - Op(CA 63) 231 - AF 87 514 - BF 49 648 - AL 14
168 - AK 89 257 - Op(AJ 96) 515 - Op(ET 50) 650 - Bergen
172 - BF 61 258 - Op(BD 18) 516 - EJ 98 662 - Op(BD 14)
174 - Op(BB 79) 260 - BD 25 518 - DH 44 706 - BD 11
1295
175 - BE 42 262 - BD 92 525 - BF 46 707 - BE 28
176 - CE 67 264 - BE 17 528 - AN 36 709 - BF 45
177 - EJ 97 266 - BF 47 530 - BE 63 710 - AN 36
178 - FT 75 267 - Op(AJ 96) 531 - AN 24 732 - AE 59
180 - KZ 82 270 - AK 97 532 - Op(AJ 92) 954 - AE 59
On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 183
- 185 - 229 - 306 - 415 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 563 - 572 -
592 - 598 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: U 172 - Lorient; U 229 - St. Nazaire; U 463 - Bordeaux.
Sailed: U 383 - Brest; U 186 - Lorient; U 455 - 448 - St Nazaire; U 466
- La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 27 (see paragraph IVa).
2) U 129 operated off the Bermudas from 6 - 8.4 and did not find any
traffic. Land-based radar, daylight air activity and extensive surface patrols
were confirmed.
3) Apart from Halifax convoy section in BB 7955 U 174 sighted nothing
in the operations area BB 79 and 87. Weather conditions and defence
made torpedo shot impossible. On the average visibility was good. There
was sudden and continuous daylight and night air activity in cooperation
with search groups, two days before the sighting of the convoy.
Before this there was slight patrol activity.
The boat will operate during the full moon period on the southern edge
of BB 79 and 87 to take up position at the convoy assembly point.
- 260 -

4) U 506 reported an unidentified U-boat in EJ 4550, which afterwards
turned out to be U 195.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: In DN 76, DM 99, CG 4826 and 3 other reports
from an unknown position including a report of a depth charge attack.
A U-boat had been and was being attacked in BB 77.
English aircraft were reported by an HX convoy from an undecyphered
position. Whether this refers to Convoy No. 26 has not yet been
ascertained.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 27:
On the 17th and in the night of the 18th there were high pressure
weather conditions in the convoy area. A boat reported wind N.W. 1
seaway 0, so that the boats anticipated particularly effective enemy
defence as a result of the calm conditions.
3 more boats established contact with the convoy after U 382 had
rediscovered it in BE 4537, course 900 at 0640 (U 628, 264 and 175).
After 0910 then, no other contact messages were received. Not until 2050
did U 614 again sight the convoy; it maintained contact, but was beaten off
by destroyers and aircraft in BE 2795 at 2200. There were no further
messages giving the convoy's position. There were heavy depth charge
attacks as the result of the calm weather conditions. U 264 reported being
attacked for 5 hours. External fuel tank manhole cover 2 on the port side
leaking. Large oil track. U 226 reported being observed by the convoy at
0750 and being depth charged until midnight. U 382 reported being depth
charged for 16 hours and that the boat has been forced to return owing to
damage sustained.
2 boats were able to score hits. U 628 reported scoring 2 hits on two
fully loaded freighters. One of the two torpedoed ships - a 5,000 GRT
freighter - was later sunk with a finishing shot. U 226 reported sinking a
1296
damaged ship of 7,000 GRT. This was probably U 628's second ship.
Operations were broken off on the morning of the 18th owing to the
unfavorable weather conditions and the anticipated intensified air activity
on that day. All boats will report on withdrawal. Except for U 175 - a
large boat - they have done so.
Final summary. Convoy No. 27:
Operations on this England bound convoy were not originally planned,
so that it was not until the 17th that additional boats were detailed for this.
Actual convoy warfare did not begin then, until the morning of the 17th
with, in all, 8 boats after U 262, which had first sighted the convoy,
received instructions to withdraw to the W. and proceed on special duties.
Calm weather conditions (seaway 0) more than anything prevented
successful operations. The convoy must have assumed from the area in
which the action took place,
- 261 -
that only local boats, and not an entire group were engaged, and that
therefore the number of boats was small. The enemy's defence against the
intercepted boats was therefore persistent, and, owing to the glass like
calm of the water, successful. 3 boats were attacked for a long time with
depth charges whereby one was forced to return owing to the damage
sustained. It must be presumed that U 175 was lost in this action as it
reported contacting the convoy on the morning of the 17th. It was not
possible to fight a long drawn out action under the prevailing conditions.
The sinking of 2 ships may be considered cheering. This operation has
shown that there is not much that one can do to a convoy in such weather
conditions.
b) 1) It can no longer be considered possible to intercept SC 126 with
Group "Meise". It is possible that the convoy sailed through the center of
the line in the bad visibility of the last few days. As visibility has
improved since yesterday and these conditions are likely to continue for
some time, Group "Meise" is to remain in this area, but further to the N.
The reason for this is the assumption that the HX and SC convoys
expected in the next few days will again use the northern route.
Order: The new Group "Meise" will take up patrol lines from AJ 8216
via AJ 9491 to BC 3536 at 0800 on 19.4 in the following order: U 134 -
306 - 631 - 203 - 552 - 267 - 706 - 415 - 413 - 598 - 191 - 438 - 188 - 613
- 404 - 571 - 381 - 108 - 258 - 610 - 257 - 618 and 84.
U 662 is proceeding to supply ship owing to shortage of lubricating oil
and U 71 is returning home owing to multiple damages sustained in a
collision with U 631.
2) After execution of special duties (see paragraph d.) U 180 is to
operate in the lower third of KP and KQ and the upper third of KZ and JA,
with central point off Durban. E.W. traffic is presumed in the vicinity of
this port.
3) Contrary to previous instructions, U 382, 264, 175, 628, 226, 92, 707,
614, 125, 358 are to proceed to BD 51 after the breaking off of operations
on Convoy No. 26.
c) None.
d) U 180 and the Japanese U-boat are ordered to meet at 0600 on 23.4 in
JA 2432.
V. Reports of Success:
U 628 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
U 226 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
1297
- 262 -
18.April 1943.
I. U 68 - DR 14 U 182 - GQ 22 U 358 - Op(BE 27) U 531 - AF 87
71 - AK 71 183 - DP 27 377 - BE 66 532 - Op(AJ 82)
84 - Op(BC 35) 185 - DP 77 378 - AE 82 533 - AN 31
92 - Op(BE 52) 186 - BF 54 381 - Op(AJ 98) 552 - Op(AJ 82)
105 - Op(FE 30) 188 - Op(AJ 98) 382 - Op(BE 24) 563 - BF 52
108 - Op(BC 31) 189 - AD 80 383 - BF 46 571 - Op(AJ 98)
117 - DG 86 191 - AK 71 386 - AN 31 572 - BF 68
123 - Op(ET 60) 192 - AF 73 404 - Op(AJ 98) 584 - BD 25
125 - BE 48 195 - EJ 73 413 - Op(AJ 94) 592 - BF 64
126 - Op(FF 20) 196 - FE 92 415 - Op(AJ 86) 598 - Op(AJ 94)
128 - DG 38 197 - AL 51 438 - Op(AJ 94) 610 - Op(BC 32)
129 - Op(DC 45) 198 - FU 11 448 - BF 58 613 - Op(AJ 98)
134 - Op(AJ 57) 203 - Op(AJ 82) 454 - BF 58 614 - Op(BE 19)
154 - Op(FF 40) 209 - AE 76 455 - CF 88 615 - BF 44
155 - DE 52 223 - BF 47 462 - BD 25 618 - Op(BC 32)
159 - DH 13 226 - Op(BE 42) 466 - BF 91 628 - Op(BE 25)
160 - FE 92 231 - AF 76 487 - BD 25 630 - BD 22
161 - Op(CA 66) 257 - Op(BC 32) 506 - EJ 65 631 - Op(AJ 82)
168 - BD 25 258 - Op(BC 32) 509 - FE 96 634 - BF 44
174 - Op(CB 24) 260 - BD 25 514 - BF 47 648 - Op(AL 13)
175 - Op(BE 24) 262 - BD 82 515 - Op(ET 50) 650 - Bergen
 176 - CF 82 264 - Op(BE 24) 516 - EJ 23 662 - BD 16
177 - ES 26 266 - BE 65 518 - DH 13 706 - Op(AJ 86)
178 - FE 21 267 - Op(AJ 83 525 - BF 47 707 - Op(BE 24)
180 - KZ 72 270 - BD 25 528 - AN 31 709 - BE 66
181 - FN 12 306 - Op(AJ 81) 530 - BF 44 710 - AN 31
954 - AE 82 732 - AE 82
On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185
- 306 - 415 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 563 - 572 - 592 - 598 - 610 -
615 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: U 563 - Brest; U 592 - St. Nazaire; U 572 - La Pallice.
Sailed: - . -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) See para. IVa) for convoy report U 707 and 732.
2) U 226 sighted auxiliary cruiser and destroyer at 1204 in BE 4275.
Northerly course. The boat was forced to submerge by aircraft and lost
contact. It continued its outward bound passage.
3) U 129 sighted tanker on course of 1750 in CA 7998 on 14.4. Attack
impossible owing to bad weather.
4) U 123 situation report: Aircraft with flying boat sighted on 11.4 in
EU 4773, and on 14.4 Spanish passenger steamer on a south-easterly
course in EU 4851. No traffic sighted on passage along 200 meter line N.
of EU 81. 3 misses on warship of 800 GRT, course 1300, speed 11 knots.
An escort U-boat approximate type "Triton" class was sunk in ET 6537. A
freighter similar to "Rapido" of 5,500 GRT was also sunk in ET 66543.
The boat withdrew to the S.W. to charge batteries.
- 263 -
1298
b) None.
c) 1) U-boat sightings: DM 26, DN 87, DM 32, DM 31, BC 24, EF 58
also 4 undecyphered reports.
2) U-boat had been or was being attacked in BB 8727 (U 174).
3) Aircraft of 19 Group reported: Dive bombing attack on U-boat,
possibly 4 hits. Boat is now on the surface. Probable position DJ 2457.
There is, however, no German U-boat in the vicinity.
4) SSS report from an unidentified American steamer from ET 6527 (U
123).
d) For special Radio Intelligence report see paragraph IVb.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Outward bound U 732 sighted 5 steamers in AE 78 at 1954.
According to later reports the convoy was steering a course of 2200, speed
8 knots. The boats U 209 and U 648 in the vicinity according to reckoning
were detailed to operate.
U 732 attacked towards 0100 and sank an ammunition ship of 5,000
GRT in AE 7792. The boat was forced to submerge by aircraft and
destroyers and was attacked with bombs and depth charges. In AE 7768
the enemy altered course to 1500. There was no contact by the boats
engaged. Further reports have not been received. The ships probably
belong to the Reykjavik section of the ON convoy at present at sea. But in
any case, the presence of an ammunition ship contradicts this supposition.
The operation continues.
2) U 707 reported a convoy at 2255 in BE 1947. When it was
ascertained that this referred to an isolated vessel operations were called
off. U 707 was to attack in the event of favorable firing conditions. The
boat, however, was forced to submerge for a long time by heavy air and
destroyer escort at 0300 and proceeded on its way. The operation is
broken off. Considering the moon and the exceptionally calm weather
conditions also U 707's experience, deployment of boats in the vicinity
would scarcely have come to anything. It is more important for them to
proceed to the west to take up position on about the 21st against an SC
convoy. The unusual disproportionate losses were also a discouraging
factor.
b) The convoy reported by U 262 on 15.4 (No. 27) is according to Radar
locations of the aircraft listening group, HX 233; the convoy intercepted
by U 707 today is confirmed from its cover name, to be HX 233.
According to this both convoys proceeded very far to the south, contrary
to previous experience, so that they cannot be intercepted by the Group
"Meise". The reason for this southerly course probably links up with a U-
boat situation report now received in which it was stated that the American
presumed the patrolling of 20 U-boats in the area 48 - 540 N and 38 - 450
W. Actually Group "Meise" had 18 boats in this area. The present
disposition
- 264 -
of the "Meise" patrol channel took place on the assumption that further
HX and SC convoys would again sail along the more northerly convoy
routes. As, however, there is no concrete evidence of this, the boats
available, are if possible, to patrol the route last used as well. The boats U
270, 260, 168, 584, 630 and 662 (in the order in which they leave the
tanker starting out from the S.) are to occupy a patrol channel from BD
4669 to BD 4335. A convoy should be encountered from 1200 on 20.4.
The boats should possibly have occupied this channel at this time.
In addition U 226, 614, 264, 358, 707, 628, 92 and 125 at present
outward bound, are to be disposed in a reconnaissance line from BD 8644
1299
to 5677 at 2000 on 20.4, course 2700 speed 7 knots. These boats form the
Group "Specht".
c) 1) U 462 began its return passage after handing over the remaining
binoculars and Fu.M.B. (anti-radar) gear to U 487.
2) For the boats operating on the American coast (U 174, 161 and 129)
supply is planned to take place on the return passage in BD 50. Until then
boats have freedom of movement.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 123 - 1 U-boat
1 ship 5,500 GRT
U 732 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
19.April 1943.
I. U 68 - DR 21 U 182 - GG 96 U 358 - BE 41 U 531 - AF 73
71 - AK 57 183 - DP 34 377 - BE 64 532 - Op(AJ 32)
84 - Op(BC 35) 185 - DF 87 378 - AE 84 533 - AN 23
92 - BE 43 186 - BF 45 381 - Op(AJ 98) 552 - Op(AJ 82)
105 - Op(FE 30) 188 - Op(AJ 98) 382 - BE 58 571 - Op(AJ 98)
108 - Op(BC 31) 189 - AD 74 383 - BF 44 584 - BD 25
117 - DG 85 191 - Op(AJ 94) 386 - AN 23 598 - Op(AJ 94)
123 - Op(ET 67) 192 - AF 48 404 - Op(AJ 98) 610 - Op(BC 32)
125 - BE 51 195 - ES 31 413 - Op(AJ 94) 613 - Op(AJ 98)
126 - Op(FF 20) 196 - FM 23 415 - Op(AJ 86) 614 - BD 63
128 - DG 64 197 - AL 72 438 - Op(AJ 94) 615 - BF 46
129 - Op(DC 45) 198 - FU 18 448 - BF 49 618 - Op(BC 32)
134 - Op(AJ 82) 203 - Op(AJ 94) 454 - BF 49 628 - BE 42
154 - Op(FF 40) 209 - AL 21 455 - CF 59 630 - BD 25
155 - DE 35 223 - BE 68 462 - BD 25 631 - Op(AJ 82)
159 - CF 82 226 - BD 63 466 - BF 82 634 - BE 65
 160 - ET 44 231 - AF 48 487 - BD 25 648 - Op(AL 13)
161 - Op(CA 40) 257 - Op(BC 32) 506 - EJ 11 650 - Bergen
168 - BD 25 258 - Op(BC 32) 509 - FE 67 662 - BD 16
174 - Op(BB 70) 260 - BD 25 514 - BE 68 706 - Op(AJ 86)
175 - BE 10 262 - BC 99 515 - Op(ET 70) 707 - BE 19
- 265 -
176 - CE 75 264 - BD 17 516 - DS 69 709 - BE 56
177 - ES 64 266 - BE 59 518 - CF 82 710 - AN 23
178 - FE 53 267 - Op(AJ 83) 525 - BE 65 732 - AE 77
180 - (KZ 58) 270 - BD 25 528 - AN 23 954 - AE 84
181 - FU 51 306 - Op(AJ 81) 530 - BF 46
On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185
- 306 - 382 - 415 - 462 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 598 - 610 - 615 -
618 - 631.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 217 - 403 - Brest; U 616 - 359 - St. Nazaire; U 468 - 569 - La
Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: West of Portugal.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) See paragraph IVa) see convoy report U 732.
1300
2) After a long chase U 108 (in Group "Meise" 's patrol channel) sank a
unit freighter of type C 2, cargo partly ammunition. General course 500,
speed 13 knots.
3) U 226 reported a fast isolated vessel in BD 6368 at 1140, zig-zagging
on a north-easterly course. The ship was later recognized as being Irish
and was sighted again by U 628 at 2000. The name of the ship is "Irish
Rose". In spite of the incorrect behavior on the part of the Irish, the boat
was forbidden to attack.
4) U 634 had a machine gun action with a "Sunderland" aircraft. The
boat submerged after the second bombing attack. No damage.
5) U 378 was attacked in AE 8357 on 16.4.
6) U 954 proceeded through Iceland Passage via AF 44, AE 68, 83, 87
to AL 22. Apart from slight aircraft activity, no defences were confirmed.
7) According to a report from U 189 the loose drift ice boundary round
Iceland runs from AE 2222 via 1665, 1712, AD 4814 to 6880. Permanent
ice boundary is not accessible for U-boats. Search for blockade breaker
"Regensburg" possibly iced up, without success. Land-based aircraft
sighted in AE 1575 on 15.4. Surprised by destroyers in AD 2929 on 16.4
during snow squalls. 5 depth charges - no damage. Radar locations were
not confirmed.
b) Our own aircraft sighted a convoy consisting of 30 merchant ships, 4
escort vessels and 4 destroyers, course 3600, speed 7 - 10 knots in BE
9592 at 1205.
c) U-boat sightings: In DM 23, BF 1834, BE 6792. Further, several U-
boats were sighted, their positions could not be deciphered.
- 266 -
 U-boat had been and was being attacked in BC 31 and BB 74.
Aircraft attacked U-boat with depth charges in AE 7887. No report of
success.
Unidentified aircraft reported that U-boat had sunk a merchant ship at
1030 on 18.4. No details of position.
According to Radio Intelligence report, an unidentified unit was located
in AD 8810.
d) none.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) The boats U 648 and 209 detailed for operations on U 732's report,
have received orders to continue operations if conditions make surprise
enemy attacks appear unlikely and success probable. Up to 1900 all boats
including U 954 which also went after the convoy, had broken off
operations owing to air activity and unfavorable weather conditions. The
operation is therefore broken off.
2) Boats in the vicinity of the convoy reported by aircraft are to exploit
all favorable opportunities of attack. A more extensive operation is not
intended.
b) 1) The HX 234 convoy expected by Group "Meise" should arrive at
1900. There was, however, no contact up to dusk. Owing to the small
distance between the boats (15 sea miles) and bright moonlight, the groups
remained in the former patrol channels. The present uncertainty
concerning the convoy cycle still makes the appearance of the HX convoy
possible.
2) The following temporary operations area are to be occupied until the
disposition of reconnaissance channel: U 209 : AL 15, U 954 : AL 11, U
378 : AD 88, U 732 : AK 31, U 648 : AK 84. The boats from Western
France U 266, 709, 377, 514, 525, 223, 634, 383 and 186 receive AL 15 as
position.
3) Owing to excessive distance the position for U 125 in patrol channel
"Specht" is unoccupied. U 125 proceeds to BD 51. After the arrival of
another boat the ordered patrol channel for the boats near U 487 now
extends from BD 4933 to BD 4335.
4) Operations against isolated traffic may now take place in the Sector
"D" on Route "A". The unsuccessful boats which have been several days
1301
in the Guinea Bay are to be detailed for this. The following areas are to be
occupied at a depth of 180 seamiles: U 126 : FD 15, U 154 : FD 57, U
105 : FD 62, U 515 : FE 15. U 123 is to continue freelance operations in
the Freetown area. FOr the new moon period, U 515 receives freedom of
movement from its present area to the N.E. as far as the coast.
Replenishment of fuel from U 460 is intended for all boats from about
15.5.
- 267 -
c) 1) In order to exchange experiences of defences and traffic conditions
in the Caribbean, U 155 and U 176 are to meet in CD 9585 at 1600 on
20.4.
d) 2) The operational area in southern waters is to be extended
immediately. The new boundary now runs from GZ 7644 via JK 8254, KT
4745, KJ 4772, LM 2456, to the W. as far as the coast. Outside this area
all attacks on unescorted isolated vessels are forbidden.
3) U 175 put out of Nazaire on 10.4 and was detailed to operate on
Convoy No. 27 immediately on leaving the Biscay area. The boat reported
for the last time at 1057 on 17.4 with a short contact signal. Position at
this time was about BE 46. As repeated requests have not been answered
its loss must be presumed. The convoy was heavily escorted by air and
surface forces.
4) U 217 has put out on special duties (Minelaying off Lands End). See
appendix.
V. Reports of Success:
 U 108 - 1 ship 6,100 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
20.April 1943.
I. U 68 - DR 13 U 185 - DF 99 U 377 - BE 56 U 531 - AF 48
71 - AK 03 186 - BE 66 378 - AL 11 532 - Op(AJ 82)
84 - Op(BC 35) 188 - Op(AJ 98) 381 - Op(AJ 98) 533 - AF 76
92 - BD 67 189 - AD 93 382 - BE 68 552 - Op(AJ 83)
105 - Op(FF 10) 191 - Op(AJ 94) 383 - BE 65 569 - BF 58
108 - Op(BC 31) 192 - AE 66 386 - AF 76 571 - Op(AJ 98)
117 - DG 85 195 - ES 53 403 - BF 54 584 - BD 27
123 - Op(ET 90) 196 - FM 38 404 - Op(AJ 98) 598 - Op(AJ 94)
125 - BE 44 197 - BE 11 413 - Op(AJ 94) 610 - Op(BC 32)
126 - Op(FF 10) 198 - FU 47 415 - Op(AJ 86) 613 - Op(AJ 98)
128 - DG 86 203 - Op(AJ 82) 438 - Op(AJ 94) 614 - BD 83
129 - Op(DC 40) 217 - BF 54 448 - BF 47 615 - BF 68
134 - Op(AJ 82) 209 - AL 14 454 - BF 47 616 - BF 58
154 - Op(FE 60) 223 - BE 64 455 - CF 62 618 - Op(BC 32)
155 - DF 14 226 - BD 91 462 - BD 36 628 - BD 68
159 - CF 64 231 - AE 66 466 - BF 48 630 - BD 27
160 - ES 36 257 - Op(BC 32) 468 - BF 58 631 - Op(AJ 82)
161 - Op(CB 44) 258 - Op(BC 32) 487 - BD 25 634 - BE 55
168 - BD 27 259 - BF 58 506 - DS 96 648 - Op(AL 34)
174 - Op(BB 79) 260 - BD 27 509 - FE 52 650 - Bergen
176 - CD 99 262 - BC 89 514 - BE 52 662 - BD 27
177 - ES 96 264 - BD 67 515 - Op(ET 80) 706 - Op(AJ 86)
178 - FE 69 266 - BE 54 516 - DS 39 707 - BD 62
180 - KZ 64 267 - Op(AJ 83) 518 - CF 65 709 - BE 52
181 - FU 58 270 - BD 27 525 - BE 56 710 - AF 76
182 - GG 56 306 - Op(AJ 82) 528 - AF 76 732 - AL 13
183 - DQ 11 358 - BD 67 530 - BF 40 954 - AE 68
1302
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 -
185 - 306 - 382 - 415 - 455 - 462 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 598 - 610
- 615 - 618 - 631.
- 268 -
Entered Port: U 615 - La Pallice.
Sailed: U 218 - Brest; U 461 - St. Nazaire; U 402 - 638 - La Pallice.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 188 reported aircraft in AJ 9578.
2) U 176 sighted large two funnel ship course 800, speed 18 knots in
CD 9574.
3) U 180 sank tanker "Corbis" of 8,132 GRT, course 2300 in KZ 6568
on 18.4 bound for Cape Town. During an attack on a steamer on a course
of 2800 in KQ 7764, on 20.4. the e-boat was thrown up by the swell and
observed. Pursuit was broken off owing to inferior speed. The
Commander reported that the boat "smoked like an old coal boat". Type
IXd.1 with E-boat engines.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: DM 23, DN 84, DN 7665. 4-6 reports have been
received but the positions could not be deciphered.
A report from a U-boat of an attack in BA 9596 (unlikely).
d) Special Radio Intelligence report of HX 234 and SC 127 see
paragraph IVb.

IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) According to a special Radio Intelligence report received today, the
HX 234 convoy was in BB 9653 at 2100 on 17.4 and had orders to
proceed on a course of 359 degrees to approximately BC 4110. This
proportionately large detour might mean that the enemy was aware (as a
result of aircraft location) of the disposition of the Group "Meise".
Probably, however, this ties up with a U-boat situation report of 18.4 in
which the Americans presumed the presence of 10 U-boats in the area
between 53 and 580 N and 35 - 410 W. Group "Meise" will therefore, be
withdrawn to the N. at high speed and disposed in patrol channels from AJ
1684 via AJ 6117 to AJ 6982 at 1000 on 21.4.
According to reckoning the convoy may be expected with speed of 9.5
knots from 1200. As the boats are proceeding in quarter line formation an
earlier interception of an eastward bound convoy is possible. If U 404,
618, 257 and 84 - all of which have only 20 - 30 cubic meters of fuel - are
not taken into account and U 188 is on the return passage, Group "Meise"
still consists of 19 boats.
2) Another special Radio Intelligence report has been received from SC
127. According to this the convoy was in BC 4985 at 1700 on 20.4. As
this position is considerably far to the S, it is assumed contrary to earlier
experiences, that the convoy is keeping to the previously used easterly
course. It is planned to dispose a channel of 15 boats from 22.4 to
intercept it. The former "Meise" boats U 404, 257, 618,
- 269 -
1303
84 are to be disposed in patrol lines from BD 1713 to 4116 until the
arrival of the boats approaching from the E. These boats are still able to
operate for a further 7 - 14 days, are then to be replenished by U 487 for
the return passage.
3) U 197 is ordered to proceed in the Cape Town area.
c) 1) U 155 and 176 have met for the purpose of exchanging experiences.
2) U 509 took over cypher material from U 178.
d) U 218 has put out for special duties (Minelaying in North Channel).
See appendix.
V. Reports of Success:
U 180 - 1 ship 8,132 GRT.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
21.April 1943.
I. U 68 - DF 98 U 186 - BE 61 U 378 - Op(AD 88) U 531 - AF 57
71 - AL 16 188 - AK 77 381 - Op(AJ 65) 532 - Op(AJ 27)
84 - BC 39 189 - AJ 33 382 - BF 47 533 - AF 48
92 - Op(BD 57) 191 - Op(AJ 61) 383 - BE 61 552 - Op(AJ 27)
105 - Op(FE 10) 192 - AE 68 386 - AF 48 569 - BF 49
108 - Op(AJ 68) 195 - ES 91 402 - BF 91 571 - Op(AJ 65)
117 - DG 85 196 - FN 47 403 - BF 44 584 - Op(BD 64)
123 - Op(ET 60) 197 - BD 65 404 - BC 35 598 - Op(AJ 61)
125 - BE 45 198 - FU 78 413 - Op(AJ 67) 610 - Op(AJ 69)
126 - Op(FE 30) 203 - Op(AJ 27) 415 - Op(AJ 53) 613 - Op(AJ 65)
128 - DT 14 209 - Op(AL 15) 438 - Op(AJ 64) 614 - Op(BD 84)
129 - Op(DC 10) 217 - BF 45 448 - BE 69 616 - BF 81
134 - Op(AJ 16) 218 - BF 54 454 - BE 69 618 - BC 36
154 - Op(FE 50) 223 - BE 24 455 - CF 33 628 - BD 58
155 - CD 95 226 - Op(BD 84) 461 - BF 58 630 - BD 25
159 - CF 36 231 - AE 68 462 - BE 52 631 - Op(AJ 19)
160 - EJ 88 257 - BC 35 466 - BE 69 634 - BE 21
 161 - Op(CB 44) 258 - Op(AJ 69) 468 - BF 49 638 - BF 91
168 - Op(BD 54) 260 - Op(BD 49) 487 - BD 25 648 - Op(AK 34)
174 - Op(CB 31) 262 - BE 52 506 - DS 66 650 - Bergen
176 - CD 94 264 - Op(BD 81) 509 - ES 34 662 - BD 25
177 - FE 11 266 - BE 16 514 - BE 21 706 - Op(AJ 28)
178 - FE 92 267 - Op(AJ 28) 515 - Op(FE 10) 707 - Op(BD 81)
180 - KQ 78 270 - Op(BD 54) 516 - DG 85 709 - BE 28
181 - FU 94 306 - Op(AJ 16) 518 - CF 36 710 - AF 48
182 - CG 27 358 - Op(BD 81) 525 - BE 53 732 - Op(AL 31)
183 - DQ 22 359 - BF 49 528 - AF 48 954 - Op(AL 11)
185 - DF 96 377 - BE 25 530 - BF 40
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 -
185 - 188 - 306 - 382 - 415 - 455 - 462 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 598
- 610 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 504 - Lorient; U 459 - Bordeaux.
- 270 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: West of Biscay.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 266 reported 3 large funnel vessel, presumably "Queen Mary" in
BE 2159, course 150, speed 28 knots. Chased without success. Boats in a
favorable position received orders to operate. No further report.
2) U 160 fired double miss on fast freighter in ES 2146, course 2700.
1304
b) Our own aircraft reported a northward bound convoy consisting of 43
ships, 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers in CG 1115. (for deployment see
paragraph IVa.)
c) 1) U-boat sightings: AE 92, AJ 5283, AE 6886, EO 43, ED 73.
There were six more sightings in the North Atlantic, unknown position
and 4 depth charge attacks.
2) U-boat had been or was being attacked in DC 46. SOS message from
unknown steamer in KZ 61.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) No operation is planned for the convoy reported by aircraft.
Outward boats received orders to exploit all chances of attack during the
night, however, contact was not established. U 454 searched during the
night without success, and continued outward passage at dawn.
At 2004, U 466 sighted several U-boat chasers in BE 6565 presumably
stationed there in order to pick up the convoy. It was pursued with depth
charges for three hours. There was no damage. The operation is broken
off.
2) Convoy No. 28:
At 0600 on the morning of the 21st, U 306 (Northern section of Group
"Meise") sighted a northeast-bound convoy in AJ 2771. The first message
from the convoy was not received until 0930. The boats belonging to the
Group "Meise" were detailed to operate on the convoy if they were not
more favorably placed to attack the southwestward-bound convoy further
to the E.
U 306 continually reported contact with the convoy up to 0200 in the
morning, in AJ 2696. This boat sank a ship of the type "Sibajack" (12.000
GRT) at this time and lost contact. U 598 reported a convoy hydrophone
bearing at 0100. Other boats did not come up. 2 boats reported flying
boats with the convoy. Visibility deteriorated during the night and fog and
snow drifts came with a N.N.E. wind strength 8.
Up to now 7 U-boats are operating on the convoy, U 306, 631, 108,
598, 134, 552 and 189. In addition, a group of 5 more boats in waiting
positions further to the E, are detailed for this - U 378, 732, 648, 209 and
934.
 a ship in the rear column. Up to now U 415, 706, 203, 613, 438 and 191
- 271 - have operated on these 2 convoys.
b) 1) As intended Group "Specht" was reinforced and will take up
position in reconnaissance lines at 1200 on 22.4 from BD 1482 to BD
7455 to intercept "SC 127". Order: U 630 - 662 - 404 - 257 - 618 - 84 -
584 - 168 - 270 - 260 - 92 - 628 - 707 - 358 - 264 - 614 and 226.
The convoy is expected in the course of the afternoon. Boats have
been ordered to maintain wireless silence except for tactical messages.
2) AK 53 is ordered as the new position for U 448, 466, 403, 468, 359,
569 and 454. Boats are to operate on the E. or W.-bound convoys
according to circumstances.
Operations on the convoy continue. According to the plot and 3) U 217 receives freedom of movement in BE. The boat is to withdraw
convoy reckoning this should be the expected HX convoy No. 234. from this area in good time so that the special duty can be carried out
3) Convoy No. 29: when the moon is in a favorable quarter.
At 1100 on the morning of the 21st, U 706 reported a south-westward-
bound convoy in AJ 5382. Shortly afterwards, U 415 also reported contact
with this convoy. This boat reported that owing to bad wireless - 272 -
communications it was unable to report on the convoy. As it assumed that
still more boats belonging to Group "Meise" will operate on the convoy,
the boats more favorably placed in relation to this convoy than to the
northeastward-bound convoy, are to continue operations to the S.W. After
U 706 lost contact at 1300, only U 415 reported up to 2000. The convoy
was then in AJ 5644. At 2300 the boat sighted another isolated destroyer,
but nothing more was seen of the convoy.
At 1530 in the afternoon, U 438 sighted another S.W.-bound convoy
consisting of up to 5 steamers in AJ 6151 80 miles behind the first convoy.
U 613 also reported this convoy.At 2300 this convoy was also lost owing c) U 662 and 630 replenished supplies from U 487 for further operations
to thick fog and snow drifts which made it more difficult for the boats to (Join Group "Specht").
maintain contact. d) None.
The first S.W.-bound convoy is according to the convoy plot ONS 178.
The second possibly the ON convoy. According to the plotting chart the V. Reports of Success:
first convoy is proceeding at a speed of 5 knots, the second at a speed of 7 U 306 - 1 ship 12,200 GRT
knots. U 415 - 2 ships 12,000 GRT
U 415 reported having sunk 2 freighters of altogether 12,000 GRT at U 191 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT
0800. After a double miss on a freighter 2 detonations were heard after 3
minutes 20 seconds and subsequently sinking noises also a possible hit on
1305
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
22.April 1943.
I. U 68 - DG 78 U 186 - BE 53 U 378 - AK 22 U 528 - AE 69
71 - AL 22 188 - BD 13 381 - Op(AJ 65) 530 - BF 52
84 - Op(BD 41) 189 - Op(AJ 34) 382 - BF 49 531 - AE 68
92 - Op(BD 48) 191 - Op(AJ 59) 383 - BE 26 532 - Op(AJ 27)
105 - Op(FD 60) 192 - AE 59 386 - AF 47 533 - AF 47
108 - Op(AJ 37) 195 - FD 33 402 - BF 82 552 - Op(AJ 34)
117 - DG 85 196 - FN 84 403 - BE 66 569 - BE 48
123 - Op(ET 60) 197 - BD 95 404 - Op(BD 17) 571 - Op(AJ 65)
125 - BD 69 198 - GF 34 413 - Op(AJ 61) 584 - Op(BD 42)
126 - Op(FE 27) 203 - Op(AJ 59) 415 - Op(AJ 59) 598 - Op(AJ 37)
128 - DT 44 209 - AK 26 438 - Op(AJ 59) 610 - Op(AJ 69)
129 - Op(DC 10) 217 - BE 66 448 - BE 28 613 - AJ 64
134 - Op(AJ 37) 218 - BF 45 454 - BE 94 614 - Op(BD 74)
154 - Op(FE 48) 223 - AL 88 455 - BF 58 616 - BF 72
155 - CE 72 226 - Op(BD 75) 459 - BF 91 618 - Op(BD 41)
159 - BE 96 231 - AE 59 461 - BF 57 628 - Op(BD 48)
160 - EJ 73 257 - Op(BD 17) 462 - BE 62 630 - Op(BD 14)
161 - Op(CB 44) 258 - Op(AJ 69) 466 - BE 28 631 - AJ 34
168 - Op(BD 45) 260 - BD 45 468 - BF 48 634 - AL 85
174 - Op(CB 27) 262 - BC 77 487 - BD 13 638 - BF 82
176 - CD 87 264 - Op(BD 72) 504 - BF 54 648 - AK 26
177 - FE 46 266 - AL 88 506 - DS 35 650 - AF 47
178 - FE 99 267 - Op(AJ 28) 509 - EJ 85 662 - Op(BD 17)
180 - JA 24 270 - Op(BD 45) 514 - AL 88 706 - Op(AJ 58)
181 - GG 16 306 - Op(AJ 34) 515 - Op(FE 10) 707 - Op(BD 48)
182 - GG 82 358 - Op(BD 72) 516 - DG 85 709 - BE 27
183 - DQ 32 359 - BF 48 518 - BE 96 710 - AF 47
185 - DG 75 377 - AL 88 525 - BE 19 732 - AK 23
954 - AK 35
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 -
185 - 188 - 306 - 382 - 415 - 455 - 462 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530
- 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: U 530 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 621 - 604 - Brest; U 752 - 575 - St. Nazaire; U 952 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: West of Portugal.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) Convoy No. 28 and 29 see paragraph IVa.
- 273 -
b) According to an aircraft report a convoy consisting of 36 merchant
ships and 7 escort vessels was in CG 4661, course 3500, speed 8 knots at
2125.
c) U-boat sightings: BF 4836, BF 4957, AJ 3291, AJ 23, AJ 35, AJ 39,
AJ 32, BF 46, DM 51, AJ 59.
4 other boats were sighted, and 3 attacked with depth charges in an
undecyphered position. U-boat attack in AJ 5675, 5725 and 2696.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) No operations on the convoy reported by aircraft. All the same, the
boats are to exploit every chance of attack.
2) Convoy No. 28:

1306
 Weather conditions in the convoy area are reported as wind N.W. 5,
visibility 10 seamiles on 22nd. Contact, which was broken off at 2000,
was not reestablished during the day. Only 2 steamers on a course of 60, a
destroyer and an aircraft were reported by U 413 in the evening. U 306
resumed contact with the convoy, lost it again and then reported the
convoy in AJ 3361 at 0800. This boat also reported aircraft with the
convoy.
U 134 began the return passage owing to heavy damage. No enemy
activity. 18 boats are now operating on the convoy.
3) Convoy No. 29:
Contact with this convoy was not reestablished. The boats were
informed that if they did not receive any more reports of the Neide convoy,
they were to operate on the convoy section about 80 seamiles astern.
There is no information however, of this either.
OPerations were broken off on the morning of the 23rd, as there
appeared little prospect of finding the convoy in the poor visibility caused
by fog and snow. Apart from this, several boats reported heavy air convoy
escort, so that conditions would deteriorate in every respect on nearing the
Newfoundland Bank.
Operations on this convoy suffered from unfavorable weather
conditions and bad visibility and the 5 boats engaged could achieve little
in the face of heavy air escort.
3 ships were sunk. No boats were lost.
b) If contact has not already been established, Group "Specht" was to
take up position in the line reached at 2400 as patrol channel. The
expected convoy was not intercepted by morning. It is presumed that
according to the cycle the convoy has chosen the northern route and
therefore avoided the lines.
- 274 -
1307
In order to form a clear picture of the convoy's future route, a further
channel is to be disposed to the N, with outward bound boats, in order to
intercept it.
Order: U 634, 514, 223, 266, 377, 383, 525, 709, 448, 466 and 166 are
to take up position in reconnaissance channels from AK 2966 to AK 6799
on a course of 260 at 0800 on 25.4 as Group "Amsel". Daily reckoning
150 seamiles.
An eastbound convoy could be attacked for about 2 days from this area.
c) - d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
23.April 1943.
I. U 68 - DG 84 U 188 - BD 21 U 382 - BF 58 U 533 - AE 68
71 - AE 84 189 - Op(AK 18) 383 - AL 97 552 - Op(AK 17)
84 - Op(BC 63) 191 - Op(AK 17) 386 - AE 68 569 - BE 69
92 - Op(BC 69) 192 - AE 82 402 - BF 48 571 - AK 44
105 - Op(FD 60) 195 - FE 18 403 - BE 61 575 - BF 58
108 - Op(AK 17) 196 - FU 23 404 - Op(BC 39) 584 - Op(BC 63)
117 - DG 85 197 - CE 34 413 - Op(AK 15) 598 - Op(AK 18)
123 - Op(ET 60) 198 - GF 63 415 - AJ 59 604 - BF 54
125 - BD 56 203 - Op(AJ 85) 438 - Op(AJ 83) 610 - Op(AK 18)
126 - Op(FE 17) 209 - Op(AK 18) 448 - BE 21 613 - AK 47
128 - DT 74 217 - BE 64 454 - BE 55 614 - Op(BC 96)
129 - Op(DC 10) 218 - BE 66 455 - BF 64 616 - BE 86
134 - AJ 38 223 - AL 81 459 - BF 82 618 - Op(BC 63)
154 - Op(FD 68) 226 - BC 96 461 - BF 48 621 - BF 54
 155 - CE 57 231 - AE 85 462 - BF 45 628 - Op(BC 69)
159 - BF 48 257 - Op(BC 39) 466 - BE 21 630 - Op(BC 36)
160 - EJ 41 258 - Op(AK 15) 468 - BE 69 631 - Op(AK 18)
161 - Op(CB 40) 260 - Op(BC 66) 487 - BD 21 634 - AL 72
168 - Op(BC 66) 262 - CC 13 504 - BF 45 638 - BF 48
174 - Op(CB 18) 264 - Op(BC 93) 506 - DG 88 648 - Op(AK 18)
176 - DE 33 266 - AL 81 509 - EJ 49 650 - AE 68
177 - FE 82 267 - Op(AK 17) 514 - AL 48 662 - Op(BC 39)
178 - FM 38 270 - Op(BC 66) 515 - Op(FE 10) 706 - Op(AJ 82)
180 - JA 24 306 - Op(AK 15) 516 - DG 85 707 - Op(BC 69)
181 - GG 52 358 - Op(BC 93) 518 - BF 48 709 - BE 13
182 - FU 86 359 - BE 69 525 - BE 12 710 - AE 68
183 - DF 79 377 - AL 81 528 - AE 68 732 - Op(AK 18)
185 - DG 84 378 - Op(AK 18 531 - AE 59 752 - BF 58
186 - BE 20 381 - Op(AK 17) 532 - Op(AK 17) 952 - AO
954 - Op(AK 18)
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185
- 188 - 306 - 382 - 415 - 455 - 462 - 487 - 506 - 516 - 518 - 571 - 598 -
610 - 613 - 618 - 631 - 509.
Entered Port: U 455 - St. Nazaire.
Sailed: - . -
- 275 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
1308
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) U 415 sighted a "Q-boat" with chaser group, northerly course, zig-
zagging heavily in AJ 59 on 22.4. Steamer, one funnel, thick pole mast,
high four-sided bridge, two ventilators in the stern. Radar activity by
motor (U-boat) chaser lasting 3 hours in the night of the 23rd. Impulse
like echo containing 5 explosive sounding devices. After releasing
"Bolde" decoys the location became increasingly faint. Pursuer almost
continually stopped. Renewed location on surfacing shaken off at high
speed.
2) U 531 reported heavy air activity in AE 83 and 85. Four bombs some
damage.
3) U 415 sighted aircraft in AJ 9396, course 30 at 0430 (see paragraph
III a 1).
4) Convoy No. 28 and 30 see paragraph IVa.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: In BB 7823. 4 boats were sighted by English
reconnaissance units in an unspecified position. 4 reports from presumably
one aircraft in Iceland area of enemy U-boat (possibly not more than 2
boats) in corrupt position, attacked once with depth charges.
Presumably convoy unit reported 2 U-boats on the surface.
Distance 12 sea miles. (Convoy No. 28)?
Torpedoing reports: DC 5657 (U 129).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 28:
Weather conditions in the convoy area were reported as wind W.N.W.
5, visibility 15 sea miles at 1700 on 23rd. A boat reported wind N.W. 2,
seaway 1 at 0200.
U 306 reported the convoy in AJ 3361 on the morning of the 23rd.
Contact was reported throughout the day in such an exemplary fashion that
11 more boats were able to approach during the day and night owing to the
good messages. U 306 reported the convoy in AK 2443 at 0700 on the
morning of the 24th. Various boats again lost contact. In spite of this 7
boats were in the convoy area in the night. Not until 1900 was the convoy
escorted by aircraft. The Command found it difficult to form a clear
picture of the surface defence as only a few boats reported depth charge
attacks. 4 boats were attacked with depth charges, one sustained
considerable damage. One boat was attacked by aerial bombs. The mass
attack on the convoy did not have the desired results. U 306 sank a
steamer of 7,000 GRT at 1500 in an underwater attack. U 954 also scored
a hit in a daylight attack on a
- 276 -
fuel supply was greater than the Command had anticipated, began
freelance operations until the exhaustion of fuel supplies. In the event of
contact with Convoy No. 30 being lost, Group "Specht" including recently
joined boats, received orders to take up position in reconnaissance lines
from AJ 6762 to AK 7791, course 400, daily reckoning 150 seamiles, in
the following new order: U 203 - 438 - 706 - 630 - 662 - 584 - 168 - 270 -
260 - 92 - 628 - 707 - 358 - 264 - 614 - 226 - 125.
c) Up to now, the special duties assigned to U 262 and U 180 have been
executed according to plan.
d) None.

V. Reports of Success:
U 306 - 1 ship 7,800 GRT
U 954 - 1 ship torpedoed
U 610 - 1 ship torpedoed.

---------------------------------------------------
---------------
large steamer at 1600. U 610 scored a "FAT" hit at 0635 on the 24th.
15 boats are now operating on the convoy, as 3 boats are attacking the
recently intercepted S.W.-bound convoy.
2) Convoy No. 30: - 277 -
U 732 sighted a convoy, course 1800 at 1000 in AK 1866. Only boats
ahead are to operate on this convoy. U 732 received permission to attack.
According to short signals received, U 108, 404, 191 and 514 are engaged.
At 1415, U 732 was forced to submerge by the appearance of a bi-plane
(catapult aircraft?) and lost contact, but this was reestablished at 1730 by
U 191. The convoy on a course of 1900, speed 8 knots, was in AK 0165 at
1830. For the most part tankers, broad formation. U 191 fired 4 misses
during a daylight attack. The last contact message received was from U
108 in AK 0159 at 1920. Weather conditions: wind W.S.W. 4, seaway 3,
very good visibility, occasional snow fall. 24.April 1943.
b) On receipt of U 732's convoy message (probably the ONS 4) Group
"Specht" was ordered to steer a course of 3350, daily reckoning 150
seamiles, from 1130. The boats U 84, 257, 618 and 404 (low in fuel) I. U 68 - DG 85 U 188 - BD 21 U 382 - BF 40 U 571 - AK 76
received instructions to refuel and therefore left the group. U 404 whose 71 - AF 72 189 - Op(AK 24) 383 - AL 74 575 - BF 49
1309
 84 - BD 15 191 - Op(AK 43) 386 - AE 59 584 - AJ 99
92 - BC 35 192 - AE 76 402 - BF 47 598 - Op(AK 22)
105 - Op(FC 60) 195 - FE 49 403 - BE 26 604 - BF 45
108 - Op(AK 43) 196 - FU 62 404 - BD 15 610 - Op(AK 31)
117 - DG 85 197 - CF 68 413 - Op(AK 22) 613 - AK 78
123 - Op(ET 60) 198 - GG 72 415 - AJ 96 614 - BC 39
125 - BD 19 203 - Op(AJ 67) 438 - Op(AJ 67) 616 - CF 36
126 - OP(FD 29) 209 - Op(AK 22) 448 - AL 74 618 - BD 15
128 - EH 36 217 - Op(BE 56) 454 - BE 43 621 - BF 45
129 - Op(DC 10) 218 - BE 64 459 - BF 72 628 - BC 35
134 - AK 46 223 - AK 66 461 - BE 68 630 - AJ 99
154 - Op(FD 50) 226 - BC 63 462 - BF 90 631 - Op(AK 22)
155 - CE 39 231 - AE 76 466 - AL 78 634 - AK 65
159 - BF 40 257 - BD 15 468 - BE 64 638 - BF 47
160 - DS 99 258 - Op(AK 22) 487 - BD 21 648 - Op(AK 22)
161 - Op(CB 40) 260 - BC 32 504 - BF 44 650 - AE 59
168 - BC 32 262 - BB 86 506 - DG 85 662 - AJ 99
174 - Op(CB 10) 264 - BC 39 509 - EJ 17 706 - Op(AJ 68)
176 - DE 31 266 - AK 69 514 - AK 59 707 - BC 36
177 - FM 21 267 - Op(AK 24) 515 - Op(FE 10) 709 - AK 96
178 - FN 47 270 - BC 32 516 - DG 85 710 - AE 59
180 - JA 24 306 - Op(AK 22) 518 - BF 40 732 - Op(AK 51)
181 - GG 59 358 - BC 39 525 - AK 96 752 - BF 59
182 - FU 54 359 - BE 27 528 - AE 59 952 - AN 36
183 - DF 89 377 - AK 69 531 - AL 23 954 - Op(AK 22)
185 - DG 85 378 - Op(AK 16) 532 - Op(AK 22)
186 - BE 25 381 - Op(AK 17) 533 - AE 59
569 - BE 64
552 - Op(AK 22)
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 -
185 - 188 - 257 - 306 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 571 - 598 - 610
- 613 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: U 382 - St. Nazaire; U 462 - Bordeaux.
1310
Sailed: U 456 - Brest; U 107 - 103 - Lorient; U 607 - St. Nazaire; U
460 - Bordeaux; U 418 - 645 - 227 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 28, 30 and 31 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 129 sighted a convoy in DC 4657 at 0400, southerly course, high
speed, probably a cruiser among ships. A 7,000 ton ship was sunk in 5693.
3) U 188 reported a periscope in BD 2559 and gave warning to supply
group U 487 in BD 2145.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: In BB 7822 (U 174?). Approximately 6 sighting
reports, presumably in Iceland area. (Convoy No. 28?) and AE 8848
(outward bound U-boats). About 10 more sightings reports from Group
- 278 -
"Meise" 's areas (Convoy No. 28) including several results of hits.
(Loss of U 189?)
Reports of attacks: AK 5980, DC 10 - 50 (U 129?).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Convoy No. 28:
While weather conditions in the convoy area on the day of the 24th
were fairly mild, on the night of the 25th, the wind freshened considerably.
A boat reported wind N.N.E. 9, seaway 8, visibility 500 meters at 0200.
 Contact was maintained until 1500, at this time the convoy was in AK
3361. Contact was then lost and it was not until 2300 that U 267 again
sighted the convoy in AK 3493. This boat again reported at 2330, but then
lost contact once more. Since then the convoy has not been sighted.
In spite of the fact that altogether 12 boats were operating on the
convoy on the night of 24th, and that at dawn several boats were still in
contact, this could not be maintained during the day. The reason for this
was the appearance of strong air escort with the beginning of daylight.
The boats were beaten off in the course of the day, therefore, and the
convoy was lost.
As intensified air activity was anticipated in the vicinity of Iceland on
the 25th, these operations were broken off on the morning of that day.
Final summing up of operations on Convoy No. 28 see KTB of 25.4.
2) Convoy No. 30:
U 404 reported several craft in AK 4875 at 0454, westerly course.
This was subsequently confirmed to be an aircraft carrier with escort. A
report from U 108 at 0700 gave the last actual enemy position as AK 4568,
westerly course at 2315 on 24.4. After a fairly long depth charge attack,
the boat continued the pursuit. Weather conditions: Wind W 1, seaway 1,
occasional snow fall.
U 108, 514, 191 and 732 are for the time being operating on a message
from U 404 as a S.W. bound convoy is expected here. The last enemy
report from U 404 gave the position at 0710 as AK 4766, north-westerly
course.
3) U 386 sighted a convoy in AE 8478, course 1300, slow speed at 1300
(probably Iceland to England convoy). U 528 sighted 2 land-based aircraft
and was pursued by 2 escort vessels in AE 8728 at 1930 with depth
charges.
- 279 -
1311
(Presumably Convoy No. 31's escort). The boats received orders to
operate on request, if it was still possible to establish contact during the
night. The last convoy report was received from U 386 in AE 8882 at
0143. A steamer of 3,500 GRT was sunk. The boat continued its outward
passage. The operation is therefore concluded.
b) 1) On information in reports from several boats, Group "Amsel"
received instructions to occupy the ordered patrol channels at a cruising
speed determined by the weather conditions. Deployment against the
"SC" convoy is therefore no longer possible for the time being. Further
operations by this group will be determined by the situation.
2) U 531 received orders to operate on Convoy No. 28.
3) U 378 : AK 35, U 381 : AK 37 as temporary operational areas.
c) U 180 reported: Met at 0620 on 23.4. Exchange has so far been
impossible owing to weather conditions. Boat accompanying until
improvement in weather. (Trans. note: no indication of what U 180 is
going to exchange etc.)
d) None.
V. Reports of Success:
U 129 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT
U 386 - 1 ship 3,500 GRT
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
25.April 1943.
I. U 68 - DG 85 U 188 - BD 34 U 386 - AE 87 U 571 - BD 21
71 - AF 24 189 - Op(AL 10) 402 - BE 68 575 - BF 47
84 - BD 21 191 - Op(AK 45) 403 - BE 21 584 - Op(AJ 92)
92 - Op(AJ 96) 192 - AK 34 404 - Op(AK 47) 598 - Op(AL 10)
 103 - BF 54 195 - FE 84 413 - Op(AL 10) 604 - BF 54
105 - Op(FD 60) 196 - FV 48 415 - AK 79 607 - BF 58
107 - BF 54 197 - CE 95 418 - AO 610 - Op(AL 10)
108 - Op(AK 45) 198 - GG 79 438 - Op(AJ 67) 613 - BD 27
117 - DG 85 203 - Op(AJ 67) 448 - Op(AK 67) 614 - Op(AK 77)
123 - Op(ET 60) 209 - Op(AL 10) 454 - BE 11 616 - CG 44
125 - Op(AK 77) 217 - BE 51 456 - BF 46 618 - BD 21
126 - Op(ES 20) 218 - BE 28 459 - BE 68 621 - BE 65
128 - EH 66 223 - Op(AK 53) 460 - BF 91 628 - Op(AJ 96)
129 - Op(DC 55) 226 - Op(AK 77) 461 - BE 56 630 - Op(AJ 92)
134 - AK 83 227 - AO 466 - Op(AK 96) 631 - Op(AL 10)
154 - Op(FD 50) 231 - AL 21 468 - BE 28 634 - Op(AK 02)
155 - CF 22 257 - BD 21 487 - BD 21 638 - BE 64
159 - BF 61 258 - Op(AL 10) 504 - BE 65 645 - AO
160 - DS 93 260 - Op(AJ 96) 506 - DG 85 648 - Op(AL 10)
161 - Op(CA 60) 262 - BB 50 509 - DT 77 650 - AE 85
168 - Op(AJ 93) 264 - Op(AK 77) 514 - AK 72 662 - Op(AJ 92)
174 - Op(CB 10) 266 - Op(AK 53) 515 - Op(FE 10) 706 - Op(AK 69)
176 - DE 27 267 - Op(AL 10) 516 - DG 37 707 - Op(AJ 96)
177 - FM 28 270 - Op(AJ 93) 518 - BF 40 709 - Op(AK 66)
178 - FN 75 306 - Op(AL 10) 525 - Op(AK 96) 710 - AE 85
180 - (KQ 99) 358 - Op(AK 74) 528 - AE 79 732 - Op(AK 45)
- 280 -
181 - GG 95 359 - BE 12 531 - Op(AL 10) 752 - BF 47
1312
182 - FU 18 377 - Op(AK 53 532 - Op(AL 10) 952 - AN 43
183 - DF 96 378 - AK 35 533 - AE 85 954 - Op(AL 10)
185 - DG 85 381 - AK 27 552 - Op(AL 10)
186 - BE 13 383 - Op(AK 64) 569 - BE 55
On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185
- 188 - 257 - 306 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 571 - 598 - 610 -
613 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: U 159 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 659 - 230 - Brest; U 436 - St. Nazaire; U 600 - 89 - La
Pallice; U 119 - 406 - Bordeaux.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 28, 30 and 32 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 134 operating on a steamer, according to a Radio Intelligence
report, abandoned by its crew in BE 11, reported not yet sighting anything.
3) U 177 reported experiences with "Bachstelze" (observation kite).
4) U 413 sighted 2 steamers on a southeasterly course, speed 9 knots in
AL 1478 at 1420. Quadruple spread on a modern type large freighter. 2
detonations. Presumably end of run detonation. Flying boat.
5) U 231 report of passage between Iceland and Faroes: Via AF 44, AE
83, 88 to AL 12, heavy air activity in AE 83, 86, 88, 87. Aerial bombs.
Chief Quartermaster overboard.
6) U 438 sighted a passenger ship as well as a destroyer on a course of
3000, high speed, in AJ 6588 at 1800. At 1900 this boat reported sound
spread, true course 320 - 3400. U 203 has been detailed to cooperate for
the time being.
7) U 404 (see Convoy No. 30 of 24.4) reported: Aircraft carrier at 0817,
escort of 4 destroyers in AK 4737. 2 "FAT" 2 electrical, and one Pi 2 on
carrier. 4 hits heard. 2 tongues of flame observed. Several very heavy
vibrations felt while making off on the surface. "Ranger" possible.
Presume sinking as no air or surface defence. Search unsuccessful.
Return passage via supply.
 b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: 3 sightings with unknown position, 2 probably in
Iceland area. (Group "Meise" ?) In CB 52 (U 161, 174 ?) In DN 83 (not
one of ours).
d) None.
- 281 -
IV. Current Operations:
a) 1) Final summary: Convoy No. 28:
The England bound convoy, HX 234, was pursued from the morning of
the 21st to the morning of the 25th over a distance of 700 seamiles by
altogether 19 boats. 4 boats broke off operations on the second day, so
that when the convoy was intercepted with certainty and continuous
contact messages were being received, 15 boats were engaged.
It was U 306, who from the beginning of the operation reported the
convoy with persistence and efficiency worthy of recognition, and who
every time, also found it again after temporary loss.
It was not until 2 days after the beginning of the operation on the
morning of the 23rd, that more boats came up to the convoy and this was
made possible , as is obvious from the position reports, by the boats good
fixes. This meant that during the day and the following night, altogether
12 boats came up to the convoy. Although the boats had about 7 hours of
darkness, 2 hours without moonlight, there was nothing achieved. U 306,
requested to give a situation report on the following day, reported that
during the night when numerous boats were in position, there was very
unfavorable weather, hail, fog, rain, snow squalls with variable visibility.
The convoy exploited this very cleverly for his zig zags. The enemy sailed
1313
in line ahead with about 10 ships, and destroyers or escort vessels were
disposed in the gaps.
The main reason for the failure can be attributed to the extremely
changeable visibility experienced during the night. The Commanders, for
the most part inexperienced and fresh from home waters, were unable to
cope with these conditions.
Air activity was so intense on the following day, the 24th that all boats
were beaten off and the convoy lost. On the following morning, the 25th,
operations were broken off.
Altogether 2 ships of 19,500 GRT were sunk and 2 ships torpedoed.
The slight success achieved, in an operation lasting four days and with
a fairly large numbers of boats, may be explained as follows: The
conditions of convoy warfare are becoming increasingly difficult, above
all the case of convoys in the N., where the nights are especially short, and
the enemy is able to provide protection with strong air forces from
Greenland, and to an even greater extent from Iceland. Boats usually
choose a night when a large number of boats are in contact with the
convoy, and the not disproportionately strong defence makes success
appear likely. The night of 23/24 in this case. Before this, only one boat
was in contact and afterwards the air protection was too strong. This night
was the only chance. It could not be exploited owing to the very
unfavorable weather conditions in conjunction with the inexperience of the
large number of new Commanders who were not equal to the situation.
- 282 -
 On the next to last day the convoy air escort was particularly strong 2) U 638, 504, 402, 621, 752, 575, 107 and 103 receive AJ 99 as
and all hopes of success had to be abandoned. Surface protection was of position. A disposition is intended against northeast-bound convoys on the
normal strength. 4 boats were attacked by depth charges by the convoy. southern route cycle.
One boat U 189, was sunk by the convoy after reporting contact for the 3) Temporary operations areas: U 456 : BE 83, U 566 : BE 91, U 230 :
last time on the afternoon of the 23rd. BE 94, U 607 : BE 95. It is intended to operate with these, and other
2) Convoy No. 30: outward bound boats on the England - Gibraltar traffic. Reasons for
U 108's enemy position report was the last received. Group "Specht" decision to operate thus in this tricky area are:
was detailed to operate temporarily on U 404's report (see IVa) 2) of 24.4)
When it had been ascertained that U 404 was in contact with the aircraft
carrier group, Group "Specht"received orders to proceed on a course of - 283 -
400, speed 10 knots at 1400, from the reconnaissance lines previously
ordered. If no contact was established, the group was to turn back at 0030
on 26.4; course 2200, speed 6 knots, and to take up position in the line
reached at 0900 as patrol channel. If the convoy maintained a
southwesterly general course, it would have to pass through "Specht" 's
reconnaissance channel in the course of the late afternoon. An advance in
a southwesterly direction from AK 4792 by U 514 was unsuccessful.
Operations broken off at nightfall.
3) Convoy No. 32:
U 509 sighted a convoy on a northerly course speed 9 to 13 knots in 1) The difficult situation in the Mediterranean,
DT 7514 at 1945 (probably Trinidad - Gibraltar convoy). 2) Possibility of success by opportune surprise attacks quite possible
U 509 received permission to attack. The position of the convoy at according to experiences of the last months.
2000 was DT 7275. Contact lost owing to general zig zag during rain
squalls. Search to the E. as far as DT 7622 and subsequently to the N. was
without success. c) 1) U 506 and 68 have taken on supplies from U 117 and proceed on
b) 1) After the discontinuation of operations on Convoy No. 28, Group their return passage.
"Meise" - together with recently arrived boats received orders to take up 2) The repeated sighting of a periscope in BD 2288 by U 571 has
position in a line from AK 2386 to 0347 in the following order: U 532 - resulted in the transference of U 487's supply point from BD 2145 to AK
378 - 381 - 192 - 258 - 552 - 954 - 648 - 209 - 531 - 413 - 598 - 610 - 306 8759.
- 631 - 267. A short operation on an SC convoy according to d) 1) U 119 has put out for special duties. (see mining order Halifax).
reconnaissance in this area, is intended. Later, reconnaissance lines 2) The loss of U 191 (Convoy No. 30) and U 189 (Convoy No. 28) must
against an HX convoy proceeding on a northern route are planned. U 598, be presumed. The boats reported for the last time on 23.4 from AK 01 and
610, 306, 631 and 267 are to withdraw from Group "Meise" after reaching AK 15 respectively.
their positions in the given line and to begin the return passage via supply
boat. V. Reports of Success:
U 404 - 1 aircraft carrier
1314
 183 - DF 76 752 - BE 68 533 - AL 31 954 - Op(AK 35)
--------------------------------------------------- 185 - CF 79 383 - Op(AK 65) 552 - Op(AK 35)
--------------- 186 - AL 78 386 - AL 30 569 - BE 27

26.April 1943.

- 284 -
I. U 68 - DG 85 U 188 - BD 39 U 402 - BE 59 U 571 - BD 26
71 - Bergen 192 - Op(AK 33) 403 - AL 87 575 - BE 65
84 - BD 21 195 - FM 15 404 - AK 72 584 - Op(AK 40)
89 - BF 90 196 - FV 84 406 - BF 94 598 - Op(AK 36)
92 - Op(AK 40) 197 - DG 34 413 - Op(AK 36) 600 - BF 91
103 - BF 40 198 - GP 39 415 - BD 21 604 - BF 52
105 - Op(FD 60) 203 - Op(AK 40) 418 - AN 30 607 - BF 40
107 - BF 40 209 - Op(AK 36) 436 - BF 58 610 - Op(AK 36)
108 - Op(AK 40) 217 - Op(BE 51) 438 - Op(AJ 68) 613 - BD 31
117 - DG 85 218 - BE 34 448 - Op(AK 67) 614 - Op(AK 40) On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 -
119 - BF 94 223 - Op(AK 53) 454 - AL 77 616 - CG 75 188 - 257 - 306 - 404 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 571 - 598 - 610
123 - Op(ET 60) 226 - Op(AK 40) 456 - BF 40 618 - BD 21 - 613 - 618 - 631.
125 - Op(AK 81) 227 - AN 30 459 - BE 56 621 - BE 53 Entered Port: U 604 - Brest.
126 - Op(FD 10) 230 - BF 54 460 - BF 80 628 - Op(AK 40) Sailed: U 410 - Lorient; U 437 - St. Nazaire; U 332 - La Pallice.
128 - EH 95 231 - AL 20 461 - BE 51 630 - Op(AK 40)
129 - Op(DC 50) 257 - BD 21 466 - Op(AK 92) 631 - Op(AL 15) II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
134 - BE 88 258 - Op(AK 35) 468 - BE 16 634 - Op(AK 02)
154 - Op(FD 50) 260 - Op(AK 40) 487 - BD 21 638 - BE 55 III. Reports on the Enemy:
155 - BE 88 262 - BB 50 504 - BE 56 645 - AN 30 a) 1) U 161 reported convoy in CB 2154, 600, speed 8 - 10 knots, at
160 - DS 63 264 - OP(AK 40) 506 - DG 85 648 - Op(AK 36) 0248. The boat received permission to attack.
161 - Op(CA 40) 266 - Op(AK 64) 509 - DT 45 650 - AE 87 2) U 569 sighted a fast freighter in BE 1891, course 1800, speed 16
168 - Op(AK 40) 267 - Op(AL 17) 514 - AK 44 659 - BF 54 knots at 2100.
174 - Op(CB 16) 270 - Op(AK 40) 515 - Op(FE 10) 662 - Op(AK 40) 3) U 468 sighted a large isolated vessel in BE 1353 course 200, speed
176 - DE 42 306 - Op(AL 15) 516 - DG 33 706 - Op(AK 40) 17 knots, at 2000.
177 - FM 64 358 - Op(AK 50) 518 - BF 54 707 - Op(AK 40) 4) U 108 (Convoy No. 30 !) forced to submerge for 10 1/2 hours in AK
178 - FU 22 359 - AL 77 525 - Op(AK 92) 709 - Op(AK 64) 4810 and 4570 by stationary fast search groups.
180 - KQ 90 377 - Op(AK 53) 528 - AL 20 710 - AE 79 5) U 532 sighted an isolated vessel in AK 2615, northeasterly course at
181 - GQ 24 378 - Op(AK 25) 531 - Op(AK 36) 732 - Op(AK 44) 0645.
182 - FU 11 381 - Op(AK 25) 532 - Op(AK 24) 952 - Bergen
1315
 6) U 702 sighted a U-boat chaser in AJ 6591 at 2231 (Convoy No. 30 -
aircraft carrier group ?).
7) U 650 reported passing Faroe Islands. Air patrol in AE 8387.
8) U 533 reported passing Faroe Islands. Two attacks by Sunderland
aircraft were beaten off, at 2330 on 25.4. Three men were wounded.
Strong air activity in AL 23 and 14.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: AL 3185, DB 61 - 64 (not one of ours) 3 sighting
reports with unknown positions including one in Iceland area.
U-boat attacks: In DJ 2196 (probably hit mine) (U 117) In KX 9190
(Italian ?).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) None.
b) 1) Group "Amsel" including recently joined boats, received orders to
take up position in reconnaissance channels from AK 5535 to 9576 at 0800
on 27.4: U 634, 233, 266, 377, 383, 525, 709, 448, 466, 454, 359, 186,
403 and pass a position line from AK 8183 to BD 2621 on a course of 205
at 0800 on 28.4. This is to extend the area covered by Group "Specht" for
the expected HX convoy, to the E. and S.E.
- 285 -
2) After breaking off operations on Convoy No. 30, Group "Specht",
with the boats recently allocated to it, received orders to take up position
in patrol channels from AJ 5593 via 9264 and AK 7467 to 7883 at 0900 on
27.4 in the following order: U 438 - 662 - 630 - 584 - 168 - 203 - 706 -
1316
108 - 514 - 270 - 260 - 732 - 92 - 628 - 707 - 358 - 264 - 614 - 226 - 125.
Operations on the northeast bound HX convoy are intended.
3) New position: U 569, 468 = AJ 98 (imminent northern route cycle).
U 231, 528, 386, 710, 650, 533 = AK 22 also AD 79 (Ops. plan: Against
ONS convoys with remaining Group "Meise").
c) None.
d) U 566 experienced a sharp depth charge attack at 2325 in BF 4599.
Unable to submerge, return passage. Close escort by 4 Ju 88's from
daylight, also escort by F.O.I.C. Western Defences.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
27.April 1943.
I. U 68 - DG 36 U 188 - BE 43 U 402 - BE 59 U 552 - Op(AK 26)
71 - AN 31 192 - Op(AK 26) 403 - AK 95 569 - BE 17
84 - AK 87 195 - FM 51 404 - AK 87 571 - BD 36
89 - BF 82 196 - GG 33 406 - BF 81 575 - BE 64
92 - Op(AJ 96) 197 - DG 64 410 - BF 54 584 - Op(AJ 59)
103 - BF 44 198 - GQ 45 413 - Op(AK 37) 598 - Op(AK 37)
105 - Op(FD 60) 203 - Op(AJ 67) 415 - AK 87 600 - BF 82
107 - BE 66 209 - Op(AK 28) 418 - AN 34 607 - BF 71
108 - Op(AJ 92) 217 - BE 16 436 - BF 49 610 - Op(AK 39)
117 - DG 85 218 - AM 77 437 - BF 58 613 - BD 36
119 - BF 85 223 - OP(AK 53) 438 - Op(AJ 55) 614 - Op(AK 78)
123 - Op(ET 60) 226 - Op(AK 78) 448 - Op(AK 67) 616 - CG 84
125 - Op(AK 78) 227 - AN 31 454 - AK 92 618 - BD 61
126 - Op(FD 10) 230 - BF 54 456 - BE 69 621 - BE 51
128 - ER 31 231 - AK 34 459 - BE 54 628 - Op(AJ 96)
129 - Op(DC 50) 257 - AK 87 460 - BF 72 630 - Op(AJ 59)
134 - BE 25 258 - Op(AK 26) 461 - BE 55 631 - Op(AK 39)
154 - Op(FD 50) 260 - Op(AJ 93) 466 - Op(AK 67) 634 - Op(AK 02)
 155 - BE 94 262 - BB 40 468 - BE 12 638 - BE 46
160 - DS 33 264 - Op(AK 74) 487 - AK 87 645 - AN 31
161 - Op(CB 21) 266 - Op(AK 53) 504 - BE 51 648 - Op(AK 28)
168 - Op(AJ 67) 267 - Op(AK 39) 506 - DG 38 650 - AL 11
174 - Op(CB 10) 270 - Op(AJ 92) 509 - DT 18 659 - BF 45
176 - DD 66 306 - Op(AK 37) 514 - Op(AJ 92) 662 - Op(AJ 56)
177 - FN 41 332 - BF 91 515 - Op(FE 10) 706 - Op(AJ 67)
178 - FU 37 358 - Op(AK 74) 516 - CE 84 707 - Op(AK 74)
180 - KR 359 - AK 95 518 - BF 61 709 - Op(AK 64)
181 - GQ 55 377 - Op(AK 53) 525 - Op(AK 64) 710 - AE 77
182 - FM 79 378 - OP(AK 25) 528 - AL 12 732 - Op(AJ 93)
183 - DF 82 381 - Op(AK 25) 531 - Op(AK 38) 752 - BE 55
185 - CF 82 383 - Op(AK 64) 532 - Op(AK 23) 952 - Bergen
186 - AK 95 386 - AL 12 533 - AK 32 954 - Op(AK 26)
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 -
188 - 257 - 267 - 306 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 566 - 571 - 598
- 610 - 613 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: U 518 - Lorient.
Sailed: U 439 - 447 - Brest; U 445 - St. Nazaire; U 304 - Kiel.
- 286 -
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
1317
a) 1) U 161 was unable to follow the convoy reported yesterday owing to
engine trouble.
2) U 185 sighted the reported Red Cross ship "Caritas I" course 2600,
speed 9 knots.
3) U 155 was attacked with bombs on the night of 27.4. The boat
defended itself with machine gun fire and intends to continue its passage
by day.
4) U 129 sighted 3 escort vessels on a northeasterly course in CA 9418
on 25.4. and on 26.4. fired a triple miss on an American U-boat of type
"Narwhal" in CA 9951. The boat withdrew on account of oil tracks and
began the passage to the N.W. after charging batteries.
5) U 168 reported 3 destroyers in AJ 6724 at 1455 (Group "Specht").
As destroyer groups have been reported in this area for several days -
lastly in AJ 6591 on 26.4, it is assumed that a search group is referred to.
Apart from this, a convoy in the vicinity would have been heard by the
boats. For this reason no action was taken.
b) None.
c) U-boat sightings: In FK 43, AJ 67 and another in an unknown
position. A U-boat had been and was being attacked in CB 13 and BB
9718. Depth charge attack by aircraft in BF 7316.
d) 1) According to a special Radio Intelligence report the SC 127 convoy
should have been in BC 5447 at 2100 on 20.4, from there to a point BC
5278 and then on a course of 350 degrees.
According to a new decoded report, the convoy was actually in BC
4372 on the evening of 21.4. It therefore curved prematurely to the N.,
probably to avoid a suspected U-boat disposition. At this time Group
"Meise" with 19 boats, was in channels from AJ 1690 to AJ 6980.
2) According to an American U-boat situation report the enemy
suspected 15 boats in the area 50 - 550 N and 39 - 450 W on 25.4.
Actually Group "Specht" had 16 boats in this area. In spite of the fact that
on the previous days numerous wireless messages were sent and U-boats
sighted, the very exact dividing line of this channel is significant,
especially as up to then Group "Specht" was on the move and took up the
present disposition from the south, only shortly beforehand. This
confirms, more than ever, the suspicion that the enemy has at his disposal
a radar device especially effective for aircraft, which our boats are
powerless to intercept.
3) Further, 5 boats were reported within 150 seamile circumference of
500 N, 340 W. Supplies have taken place here for a long time.
Unfortunately, the boats
- 287 -
have often inaugurated radio concerts here and this had led to the
interception of the supply point. It is, however, significant that this was
suspected in the area where there has been no wireless activity for several
days.
IV. Current Operations:
a) An extension to the S.E. of the "Specht" channel near the
Newfoundland Bank was planned with Group "Amsel", in order to
intercept the suspected HX 235 convoy on the southern route if necessary.
U 377 on the outward passage, reported a convoy at 0358, according to
hydrophone bearing in AK 8118. As according to reckoning only the HX
convoy can be in the vicinity (which then in any case would have had to
pass Group "Specht" 's patrol line unobserved on about 26.4 at 1000) a
more northeasterly course is presumed. The boats nearby belonging to
group "Amsel": U 223, 266, 377, 383 and 709 received orders to operate
on Köhler's report (Commander of U 377) at high speed and to report
position as soon as possible. The remaining Group "Amsel" boats were
temporarily retained, however, several hours later they were ordered to
proceed on a course of 300 as no course reports had been received.
1318
The boats U 306, 610, 598, 631 and 267 in the N.W. bound for supply
area are also to operate on the convoy on a N.E. course.
At 0800 U 377 reported having had a first class hydrophone bearing on
the convoy at 0409, visibility 300 meters. Contact was not reestablished
until morning. If the convoy is not sighted at dawn, the search is to be
abandoned and boats will proceed with Group "Amsel" to the west.
b) 1) As it is assumed that the expected HX and SC convoys are sailing
very far to the W. (see also paragraph III d) 1)), Group "Specht" is to be
withdrawn to the N.W. and will occupy the new patrol channels from AJ
4378 via 5913 to AJ 9386, cruising speed 9 knots. Channels must be
occupied before 0900 on 28.4. Another N.E. bound convoy (SC) is
expected.
2) For quite a time it has been possible to dispose a patrol channel with
boats from home waters and Western France, between Iceland and
Greenland. The object of this is the interception of the next ONS convoy
at present proceeding in the N.
The following boats form the new Group "Star": U 710 - 650 - 533 -
386 - 528 - 231 - 532 - 378 - 381 - 192 - 258 - 552 - 954 - 648 - 209 - 413.
They are to take up position in patrol channels from AD 8731 via AK 3523
to AK 0329 at 0900 on 28.4.
A slower S.W. bound convoy is expected here from 28.4.
3) A patrol channel from BE 8615 to BE 9536 is ordered for 0800 on
30.4 to intercept the next S-bound W.S. convoy from England. Order: U
607 - 456 - 230 - 659 - 436 - 406 - 600 - 89 - 437 - 332. The boats given
are on the outward passage.
- 288 -

In the event of an early arrival, the boats are to operate to the N. and
S. of the channel, but to remain if possible unobserved and unlocated, so
that the channel is not suspected. Air Force Command Atlantic will be
reconnoitering in the area N. of the channel as far as 480 N with strong
forces from the 29th. U 445, 439 and 447 are to make for BE 97 at high
cruising speed and are to be detailed to operate on the convoy probably
intercepted before this.
c) 1) U 571, 415, 84, 618, 257 and 404 have taken on supplies from U
487. The tanker is therefore empty and begins its return passage.
2) U 180 has taken on the anticipated apparatus from the Japanese U-
boat. It is operating as ordered in the area off Durban.
d) None.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
28.April 1943.
I. U 68 - CF 76 U 192 - Op(AK 35) U 403 - Op(BD 21) U 552 -
Op(AK 36)
71 - AN 36 195 - FM 82 404 - BD 26 569 - BD 35
84 - AK 87 196 - GH 17 406 - BF 75 571 - BE 18
89 - BF 72 197 - DG 94 410 - BF 48 575 - BE 51
92 - Op(AJ 67) 198 - GQ 73 413 - Op(AK 03) 584 - Op(AJ 54)
103 - BE 64 203 - Op(AJ 54) 415 - AK 87 598 - AK 53
105 - Op(FD 60) 209 - Op(AK 38) 418 - AN 34 600 - BF 72
107 - BE 61 217 - AL 78 436 - BF 47 607 - BE 95
108 - Op(AJ 55) 218 - AM 77 437 - BF 57 610 - AK 56
117 - DG 85 223 - Op(AK 49) 438 - Op(AJ 46) 613 - BE 15
119 - BF 71 226 - Op(AJ 93) 439 - BF 54 614 - Op(AJ 92)
123 - Op(ET 60) 227 - AN 43 445 - BF 91 616 - CG 90
125 - Op(AJ 93) 230 - BE 66 447 - BF 56 618 - BD 63
1319
126 - Op(FD 10) 231 - Op(AK 31) 448 - OP(AK 84) 621 - BE 53
128 - ER 53 257 - AK 87 454 - Op(AK 87) 628 - Op(AJ 67)
129 - Op(CA 96) 258 - Op(AK 35) 456 - BE 91 630 - Op(AJ 46)
134 - BE 37 260 - Op(AJ 55) 459 - BE 27 631 - AK 67
154 - Op(FD 50) 262 - BB 40 460 - BE 94 634 - Op(AK 48)
155 - BE 96 264 - Op(AJ 92) 461 - BE 19 638 - BE 51
160 - DG 84 266 - Op(AK 73) 466 - Op(AK 84) 645 - AN 31
161 - Op(CB 20) 267 - AK 64 468 - BD 32 648 - Op(AK 58)
168 - Op(AJ 54) 270 - Op(AJ 55) 487 - AK 97 650 - Op(AD 87)
174 - Op(BE 97) 304 - AO 504 - BE 17 659 - BE 65
176 - DD 59 306 - AK 64 506 - CF 78 662 - Op(AJ 46)
177 - FN 48 332 - BF 81 509 - DS 32 706 - Op(AJ 55)
178 - FU 65 358 - Op(AJ 92) 514 - Op(AJ 55) 707 - Op(AJ 67)
180 - KR 52 359 - Op(AK 88) 515 - Op(FE 11) 709 - Op(AK 73)
181 - GQ 83 377 - Op(AK 57) 516 - CF 58 710 - Op(AD 87)
182 - FM 48 378 - Op(AK 33) 525 - Op(AK 84) 732 - Op(AJ 55)
183 - DF 91 381 - Op(AK 33) 528 - Op(AK 31) 752 - BE 43
185 - CF 56 383 - Op(AK 73) 531 - AK 28 952 - AF 76
186 - Op(AK 88) 386 - Op(AK 31) 532 - Op(AK 32) 954 - Op(AK 36)
188 - BE 52 402 - BE 54 533 - Op(AD 87)
- 289 -
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 -
188 - 257 - 267 - 306 - 404 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 566 - 571 - 598
- 610 - 613 - 618 - 631.
 Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 109 - Lorient.
II. Air Reconnaissance: None.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 33, see paragraph IVa).
2) U 515 sighted a cruiser of "London" type putting in to Freetown in
ET 3778, also 4 destroyers and 2 large transport ships. Smoke trails in ET
6113 on 27.4. Submerged on account of Sunderland aircraft.
3) U 504 was attacked by aircraft without previous radar location in BF
49 after a suspicious looking trawler group had passed. The boat
presumes cooperation.
b) None.
c) 1) 2 U-boat sightings in unknown position.
2) Enemy U-boat in AF 7668 at 1810 on 28.4 and shot up one of our
boats.
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 33:
U 650 reported a westbound convoy in AD 8739 at 0942 on the
morning of the 28th. According to a later message this consisted of 6
steamers. It is therefore probably not the ONS 6 convoy itself, but only a
section of it.
As the weather was variable during the day, visibility sometimes as
much as 2000 meters, no boats with the exception of U 650 were able to
approach the convoy. The boats messages were also very inaccurate and
they had overestimated the convoy speed. The boat was requested to send
D/F signals about 2 - 3 hours before darkness. 2 other boats then came up
shortly before dusk on the D/F signal, U 386 and 378. Both reported the
enemy's position: U 378 at 0232 in AD 7941, and U 386 at 0155 in AD
7864. As these positions are so far apart from one another, the boats were
requested to examine the grid given. However, no other messages have
been received since 0300 on the morning of the 29th.
1320
As there was still no messages at 1000, not even the requested weather
report, it must be presumed that interference is preventing the messages
from coming through.
There is no information as to the strength of the escort. U 650 only
reported twice that there was a Sunderland aircraft over the convoy.
- 290 -
The operation on the convoy continues. The entire Group "Star" (15
boats) is engaged. U 650 - 533 - 386 - 528 - 231 - 532 - 378 - 381 - 192 -
258 - 552 - 954 - 648 - 209 and 413.
b) 1) Group "Amsel" 's operation has been broken off without success
having been achieved.The boats have received orders to pass the position
line from AK 4866 to BD 2123 and subsequently, occupy patrol channels
from AJ 9634 to BD 1555 in conjunction with Group "Specht" at a speed
of 7 knots. There are therefore, 32 boats in a large channel covering all
convoy routes so far used.
2) U 108 (Group "Specht" channel) began return passage on account of
fuel shortage. The boats to the W. therefore move up one position to the E.
3) BE 97 is ordered as new position for U 439, 447 and 445. Three
boats are requested to report the position reached at 1700 on 29.4. One
boat is to act as beacon for the Condor aircraft.
c) None.
d) 1) U 437 was heavily bombed during the night in BF 7281. The boat
is temporarily out of control and submerging is restricted. Help is urgently
needed. All boats in the vicinity are ordered to proceed at high speed to
this area to render assistance. Destroyer and fighter protection is
requested.
 The night attacks repeatedly reported recently make it necessary for
the boats in the Biscay area to be given permission to proceed on the
surface during the day only to recharge batteries, and submerged at night.
Every effort is being made to produce apparatus able to intercept the
radar equipment presumably used by the enemy.
2) U 710 has not reported since it sailed from Kiel on 15.4. There have
been numerous sighting and attack messages recently from the area of the
Iceland Passage, so that its loss through aircraft must be presumed.
V. Reports of Success: None.
---------------------------------------------------
---------------
- 291 -
1321
29.April 1943.
I. U 68 - CF 57 U 188 - BE 61 U 402 - BE 45 U 533 - Op(AK 12)
71 - AO 192 - Op(AK 12) 403 - Op(BD 13) 552 - Op(AK 12)
84 - BE 19 195 - FM 97 404 - BD 39 569 - BD 22
89 - BE 94 196 - GH 49 406 - BE 92 571 - BE 51
92 - Op(AJ 67) 197 - DT 15 410 - BE 93 575 - BE 51
103 - BE 52 198 - GQ 85 413 - Op(AK 12) 584 - Op(AJ 54)
105 - Op(FD 60) 203 - Op(AJ 54) 415 - BE 27 598 - AK 59
107 - BE 52 209 - Op(AK 12) 418 - AF 76 600 - BE 92
108 - Op(AJ 55) 217 - BE 26 436 - BE 92 607 - Op(BE 86)
109 - BF 54 218 - AL 93 437 - BF 72 610 - AK 83
117 - DG 85 223 - Op(AK 72 438 - Op(AJ 46) 613 - BE 28
119 - BE 92 226 - Op(AJ 93) 439 - BF 44 614 - Op(AJ 92)
123 - Op(ET 60) 227 - AF 76 445 - BF 49 616 - CG 90
125 - Op(AJ 93) 230 - Op(BE 86) 447 - BF 44 618 - BE 42
126 - Op(FD 10) 231 - Op(AK 12) 448 - Op(AK 79) 621 - BE 43
128 - ER 83 257 - BE 17 454 - Op(AK 79) 628 - Op(AJ 67)
129 - Op(CA 90) 258 - Op(AK 12) 456 - Op(BE 56) 630 - Op(AJ 46)
134 - BE 63 260 - Op(AJ 55) 459 - BE 17 631 - AK 86
154 - OP(FD 50) 262 - BB 40 460 - CF 31 634 - Op(AK 71)
155 - BF 40 264 - Op(AJ 92) 461 - BD 39 638 - BE 42
160 - DG 85 266 - Op(AK 75) 466 - Op(AK 79) 645 - AF 76
161 - Op(CB 20) 267 - AK 83 468 - BD 23 648 - Op(AK 12)
168 - Op(AJ 54) 270 - Op(AJ 55) 487 - BD 35 650 - Op(AK 71)
174 - Op(BB 90) 304 - AO 35 504 - BE 18 659 - Op(BE 86)
176 - DD 81 306 - AK 83 506 - CF 81 662 - Op(AJ 46)
177 - FN 79 332 - BF 72 509 - DG 85 706 - OP(AJ 55)
178 - FU 96 358 - Op(AJ 92) 514 - Op(AJ 55) 707 - Op(AJ 67)
180 - KR 40 359 - Op(BD 13) 515 - Op(ET 53) 709 - Op(AK 75)
181 - GQ 98 377 - Op(AK 75) 516 - CF 61 710 - Op(AK 12)
182 - FM 41 378 - Op(AD 78) 525 - Op(AK 79) 732 - Op(AJ 55)
183 - DG 74 381 - Op(AK 12) 528 - Op(AK 12) 752 - BE 54
185 - CF 31 383 - Op(AK 75) 531 - AK 28 952 - AF 48
 186 - Op(BD 13) 386 - Op(AD 78) 532 - Op(AD 78) 954 - OP(AK 12)
On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 -
188 - 257 - 267 - 306 - 404 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 571 - 598 - 610
- 613 - 618 - 631.
Entered Port: - . -
Sailed: U 202 - Brest; U 91 - 66 - 664 - Lorient; U 465 - St. Nazaire; U
340 - 760 - 731 - Kiel.
II. Air Reconnaissance: In center third of BE against England - Gibraltar
traffic.
III. Reports on the Enemy:
a) 1) Convoy No. 33 see paragraph IVa.
2) U 123 reported sinking 7,000 GRT freighter on a northwesterly
course in EJ 9788.
3) U 752 reported scoring a hit on ship of type "Winchester Castle" ar
1200. Subsequent loud dull explosion. Depth charges followed.
4) U 126 reported sighting A Spanish ship of 4 to 5,000 tons at 0230 on
29.4 in FD 1169. Course 400.
- 292 -
5) U 119 reported having submerged after unsuccessful bombing and
machine gun attack at 1130 in BF 7175 by "Sunderland" and "Lerwick"
aircraft. Smoke buoys at submerging point. A Petty Officer of the watch
was killed.
1322
b) Aircraft reported convoy consisting of 13 steamers, and 6 escort
vessels at 2050 in BE 5280, course 3600, a light cruiser in BE 5346,
course 400.
c) U-boat sightings: In DD 32, EE 81. 4 sightings in unknown position,
one in Iceland area (U 952?).
d) None.
IV. Current Operations:
a) Convoy No. 33:
The weather conditions showed no improvement on the 29th. Wind
S.S.W. 6, seaway 4, snow squalls and poor visibility were reported owing
to W/T interference, boats were unable to communicate with the
Command on the night of 28/29 and it was not until midday on the 30th,
that messages were again received from the boats. According to these, the
last convoy contact message originated at 1150, in AK 1236 on a course of
2400. U 650 attempted to attack the convoy in this position, but was
picked up by a destroyer using radar before the attack. The same boat
reported having fired a triple miss on a destroyer at 0410. Contact with
the convoy was not reestablished. U 386 reported difficulty in submerging
after depth charge attack, and withdrew for repairs.
U 258 reported having scored 3 hits on 2 ships of 4 and 6,000 GRT in a
convoy of at least 30 steamers sailing in loose, wide formation at 0720
according to morning position in AD 7852. In a later message the boat
reported the sinking of a 7,000 GRT ship with 2 finishing shots, probably
one of the ships torpedoed earlier.
The operation on the convoy continues. As there has been no contact
since 1200, the boat is to continue the search assuming the enemy's course
to be from 205 - 2500 and enemy speed to be 4 - 7 knots according to the
weather.
b) 1) The Groups "Specht" and "Amsel" are transferred further to the
S.W., this means: for Group "Specht" from AJ 7575 via 8824 to BC 2381
at 0800 for the 1.5, in the following order: U 438 - 662 - 630 - 584 - 168 -
514 - 270 - 260 - 732 - 92 - 628 - 707 - 358 - 264 - 614 - 226 - 125 and for
Group "Amsel" from BC 2622 via 3875 to 1853 in the following order: U
634 - 223 - 266 - 377 - 383 - 709 - 569 - 525 - 468 - 448 - 466 - 454 - 359
- 186 - 403. U 569 and 468 are to join Group "Specht" owing to fuel V. Reports of Success:
shortage. U 123 1 ship 7,000 GRT
2) Group "Drossel" receives order of disposal from BE 8615 to 9526 in U 752 1 ship 20,000 GRT torpedoed
patrol channels for 0800 on 30.4 in the following order: U 607 - 456 - 230