Rivki Stein MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION April 30, 2014.pdf

Legal1us.199607.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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RIVKA STEIN,
Plaintiff,

- against -
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:
:
:

Case No. 13-CV-6795 (BMC) (JO)
WORLD WIDE PLUMBING SUPPLY, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.
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:
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MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS WORLD WIDE
PLUMBING SUPPLY, INC.S, CHAIM LEFKOWITZS, AND SURI LEFKOWITZS
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

MISHCON DE REYA NEW YORK LLP
750 Seventh Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, New York 10019
Tel: (212) 612-3270
Fax: (212) 612-3297

Attorneys for Plaintiff Rivka Stein
Case 1:13-cv-06795-BMC-JO Document 39 Filed 04/30/14 Page 1 of 31 PageID #: 219
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 3

STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 4

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 6

I. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT PROPERLY AND ADEQUATELY ALLEGES A
VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) .................................................................................. 6

A. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Establishes An Enterprise That
Satisfies The Distinctness Requirement. .......................................................................... 7

B. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Establishes A
Pattern Of Racketeering Activity. .................................................................................. 11
1. A RICO Pattern Can Exist With Only One Victim. ................................................ 13

2. A RICO Pattern Can Exist With Only One Scheme. ............................................... 15

C. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Pleads The Predicate Acts. ............................... 16
1. Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleges The Relationship Between
The Predicate Acts And Movants. ........................................................................... 17

2. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Alleges A
Predicate Act Consisting Of Forced Labor. ............................................................. 18

3. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Alleges
Predicate Acts Consisting Of Peonage And Enticement Into Slavery. .................... 19

D. The Existence Of Opportunities To Contact Law Enforcement
Does Not Preclude The Predicate Acts. ......................................................................... 21

II. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT PROPERLY AND ADEQUATELY ALLEGES A
VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) ................................................................................ 22

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 25

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Acme Am. Repairs, Inc. v. Katzenberg,
No. 03-CV-4740 (RRM) (SMG), 2010 WL 3835879 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2010) ..................16
Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners,
697 F. Supp. 2d 674 (S.D. Tex. 2009) ...............................................................................19, 20
Allen v. Devine,
726 F. Supp. 2d 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) .........................................................................13, 14, 16
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Etienne,
No. 09-CV-3582 (SLT)(RLM), 2010 WL 4338333 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) ...................7, 24
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valley Physical Med. & Rehab., P.C.,
No. 05-5934 (DRH)(MLO), 2009 WL 3245388 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009).............................5
Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc.,
680 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2012).................................................................................................5, 11
Bennett v. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., ................................................................................................10
770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985)
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich. v. Kamin,
876 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1989) ...................................................................................................15
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J ., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
113 F. Supp. 2d 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) .....................................................................................20
Colony at Holbrook, Inc. v. Strata G.C., Inc.,
928 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ........................................................................................10
Cosmos Forms Ltd. v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
113 F.3d 308 (2d Cir. 1997).....................................................................................................14
Davis v. Proud,
No. 13-CV-1663 (SJ F)(WDW), --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2014 WL 905576 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
2014) ..........................................................................................................................................5
DeFalco v. Bernas,
244 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2001)...............................................................................................12, 13
ii

In re Energy Sys. Equip. Leasing Sec. Litig.,
642 F. Supp. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ..........................................................................................10
Fortune v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp.,
No. 95 CV 0042(SJ ), 1996 WL 571499 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1996)........................................21
Fresh Meadow Food Servs., LLC v. RB 175 Corp.,
Nos. 06-4905-CV(L), 07-0269-CV(CON), 282 F. Appx 94 (2d Cir. J une 24, 2008) ......13, 14
G.D.S. ex rel. Slade v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist.,
915 F. Supp. 2d 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) .......................................................................................5
Govt Emps. Ins. Co. v. Hollis Med. Care, P.C.,
No. 10 Civ. 4341(ILG)(RML), 2011 WL 5507426 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2011) ................ passim
Greenfield v. Profl Care, Inc.,
677 F. Supp. 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ......................................................................................7, 11
H.J . Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co.,
492 U.S. 229 (1989) .................................................................................................................15
Lavian v. Haghnazari,
884 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ....................................................................................15, 16
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blessinger,
No. 06 CV 391(NGG)(ARL), 2007 WL 951905 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007) ..........7, 17, 19, 23
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excel Imaging, P.C.,
879 F. Supp. 2d 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) .......................................................................................8
Marini v. Adamo,
812 F. Supp. 2d 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) .........................................................................12, 14, 16
Martinez v. Calimlim,
651 F. Supp. 2d 852 (E.D. Wis. 2009) .....................................................................................18
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118 (2007) .................................................................................................................23
Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Contini,
No. 04-CV-0104 DGTJ MA, 2005 WL 1565524 (E.D.N.Y. J uly 6, 2005)........................12, 14
Nielsen v. Rabin,
No. 12-4313-PR, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 552805 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2014).................................5
Nunag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd.,
790 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2011) .............................................................................17, 19
iii

Palatkevich v. Choupak,
No. 12 CIV. 1681 CM, 2014 WL 1509236 (S.D.N.Y. J an. 24, 2014) ........................22, 24, 25
Rosner v. Rosner, ..........................................................................................................................16
766 F. Supp. 2d 422 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
Salinas v. United States,
522 U.S. 52 (1997) ...................................................................................................................23
SKS Constructors, Inc. v. Drinkwine,
458 F. Supp. 2d 68 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) .................................................................................13, 15
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mut. Trading Corp.,
63 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 1995) .....................................................................................................15
United States v. Bibbs,
564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977) .................................................................................................22
United States v. Booker,
655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981) ...................................................................................................21
United States v. Djoumessi,
538 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................22
United States v. Farrell,
563 F.3d 364 (8th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................................22
United States v. Kozminski,
487 U.S. 931 (1988) .................................................................................................................22
United States v. Mussry,
726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984) .................................................................................................22
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,
465 U.S. 354 (1984) .................................................................................................................22
United States v. Sabhnani,
599 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2010).....................................................................................................21
Wood v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue of N.Y.,
311 F. Supp. 2d 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ...........................................................................9, 10, 11
WW, LLC v. Coffee Beanery, Ltd.,
No. CIV.A. WMN-05-3360, 2012 WL 3728184 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2012) ..............................20
iv

Statutes
18 U.S.C. 1581 ..................................................................................................................9, 19, 20
18 U.S.C. 1583 ................................................................................................................19, 20, 21
18 U.S.C. 1589 ............................................................................................................................19
18 U.S.C. 1589(a) .......................................................................................................................18
18 U.S.C. 1589(b) .......................................................................................................................18
18 U.S.C. 1595 ............................................................................................................................19
18 U.S.C. 1595(a) .......................................................................................................................21
18 U.S.C. 1961 ............................................................................................................................12
18 U.S.C. 1961(1) .........................................................................................................................7
18 U.S.C. 1961(4) .........................................................................................................................6
18 U.S.C. 1961(5) .........................................................................................................................7
18 U.S.C. 1962 ............................................................................................................................23
18 U.S.C. 1962(c) ............................................................................................................... passim
18 U.S.C. 1962(d) ............................................................................................................... passim
Rules
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) ....................................................................................................................5, 18
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) ........................................................................................................................4
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) ...........................................................................................................1, 4, 5
1

Plaintiff Rivka Stein (Plaintiff), by and through her undersigned counsel, submits this
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to defendants World Wide Plumbing Supply, Inc.s (World
Wide Plumbing), Chaim Lefkowtizs, and Suri Lefkowitzs (collectively, Movants) Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 33) (Motion). For the reasons set
forth herein, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny the Motion in its entirety.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This action arises out of defendants collective scheme to obtain and maintain control
over Plaintiff -- through unconscionable and malicious means -- for the benefit of their illicit
business activities. Three of those defendants now bring this partial motion to dismiss,
seemingly pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
1

Although not entirely clear, it appears from the Motion that Movants challenge only the
Amended Complaints First Cause of Action, alleging a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). See
Motion at 1 (Plaintiffs claims under section 1962(c) of RICO fail because . . . .). Plaintiff can
discern no similar language or arguments relating to the Third through Eighth, Eleventh and
Twelfth Causes of Action, each of which also names movants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz (the
Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action are only asserted against non-moving defendant Yoel Weiss).
Further, Movants make only a fleeting reference to the Second and Fourteenth Causes of Action,
and it appears that the Motion may only seek dismissal of those claims against defendant World
Wide Plumbing, not Chaim or Suri Lefkowitz.
In framing their Motion with respect to the First Cause of Action, Movants do not assert
that Plaintiff has failed to properly allege all of the required elements of that claim, but rather

1
On or about April 15, 2014, non-moving defendant Yoel Weiss answered the Amended Complaint. See Answer
(Docket No. 38). The remaining defendants have failed to answer or otherwise respond to the Amended Complaint.
2

focus their attack on only a few pleading requirements of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c).
2
Regardless of
their presentation, the arguments in the Motion should all be rejected because they are based on
incorrect statements of law and a misapprehension of the allegations in the Amended Complaint.
First, the Amended Complaint properly sets forth a RICO enterprise that is distinct from
all RICO persons. To that end, the Amended Complaint alleges a RICO enterprise that was an
association-in-fact comprised of defendants and others, some of whom are RICO persons, and
that it was defendants -- not the enterprise -- who are responsible for the predicate acts.
Movants argument that the RICO enterprise cannot be composed entirely of named defendants
is both unsupported by the law in this Circuit and elsewhere, and ignores the Amended
Complaints allegations, which include five (5) J ohn Doe defendants and one (1) non-defendant
in the RICO enterprise.
Second, the Amended Complaint properly sets forth a pattern of racketeering activity
because, contrary to Movants assertion, it is permissible to have a pattern consisting of a single
scheme impacting a single victim. Indeed, because the alleged pattern of racketeering activity
qualifies as both an open-ended and closed-ended pattern, and covers a substantial period of
time, the number of victims and schemes is irrelevant to the former, and deserves either little or
no weight in the Courts overall analysis with respect to the latter.
Third, the Amended Complaint adequately pleads the relationships between the predicate
acts and all three (3) Movants, as well as the predicate acts of peonage, enticement into slavery,
and forced labor against movants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz. Movants arguments to the
contrary ignore the many allegations detailing Chaim and Suri Lefkowitzs involvement in
committing and benefitting from the predicate acts.

2
It is unclear whether Movants seek to dismiss the Second Cause of Action asserting RICO conspiracy under 18
U.S.C. 1962(d), but the Motion provides no cognizable argument to support such a dismissal. In any event, the
Amended Complaint properly and adequately pleads RICO conspiracy against all defendants. See infra at 22-25.
3

Finally, whether or not Plaintiff did or had the opportunity to contact law enforcement
personnel with respect to any of defendants criminal activities is outside the scope of this civil
action and irrelevant to the causes of action alleged herein.
For all of the reasons detailed below, the Motion should be denied in its entirety.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action, pro se, on December 3, 2013. See Complaint (Docket
No. 1). On J anuary 29, 2014, Movants filed a letter with the Court seeking a pre-motion
conference where they could seek leave to move to dismiss the Complaint. See Letter (Docket
No. 20). On J anuary 30, 2014, the Court waived the pre-motion conference, ordered Movants
pre-motion letter be deemed their motion to dismiss, and directed Plaintiff file her opposition
papers to said motion by February 17, 2014. See Order (Docket No. 21).
On or about February 13, 2014, Plaintiff and Movants stipulated to a schedule providing
that (i) Plaintiff had until February 28, 2014 to file an amended complaint, and (ii) Movants had
until March 31, 2014 to move to dismiss, answer, or otherwise respond thereto. See Stipulation
(Docket No. 23). Thereafter, Magistrate J udge Orenstein So-Ordered the stipulation and the
Court denied Movants letter motion to dismiss as moot. On February 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed
her Amended Complaint. See (Docket No. 27) (Amended Complaint or AC).
On March 31, 2014, rather than answering or moving to dismiss the Amended Complaint,
Movants inexplicably filed another letter with the Court seeking a pre-motion conference at
which they would again seek leave to move to dismiss the Amended Complaint. See Letter
(Docket No. 33). The Court entered an Order finding the pre-motion conference unnecessary
and deeming Movants March 31, 2014 letter -- as filed -- to be treated as their motion to dismiss
on the grounds stated therein.
4

Movants letter (now, Motion) seeks to dismiss only the First Cause of Action naming
movants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz, and perhaps the Second Cause of Action as against movant
World Wide Plumbing only. Although the Motion addresses the predicate acts in connection
with the RICO claim asserted in the First Cause of Action, it does not seek to dismiss similar
violations which are affirmatively asserted as independent claims against the Lefkowitzs in the
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action. The Motion briefly references the Fourteenth Cause
of Action for Declaratory J udgment asserted against all defendants,
3
but it is unclear if it seeks
dismissal -- and on what basis -- of that cause of action. The Motion does not address -- nor seek
to dismiss -- the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, or Twelfth Causes of Action, all of which
name movants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz.
4

The Motion also reveals that Movants fundamentally misapprehended the Amended
Complaint. For example, the Motion states that the Amended Complaint alleges a RICO
violation against only nine of the defendants. See Motion at 1. However, the Second Cause of
Action (violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)) is asserted against all thirteen (13) named defendants,
as well as J ohn Does 1-5. See AC at 146-57. Similarly, Movants argue that the First Cause of
Action must be dismissed against World Wide Plumbing because there are no allegations of its
commission of the underlying predicate acts. But allegations in support of the First Cause of
Action are only necessary with respect to defendants named in the First Cause of Action, which
does not include World Wide Plumbing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although the Motion states it is pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), see Motion at 1, it
appears it has been brought only pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

3
Although the Fourteenth Cause of Action is primarily directed against non-moving defendant Yoel Weiss, all
defendants are named because it is unknown who are the beneficiaries of the subject life insurance policies.
4
The Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action are only asserted against non-moving defendant Yoel Weiss.
5

It is well-established that a complaint should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
only if it does not contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is plausible
on its face. G.D.S. ex rel. Slade v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 915 F. Supp.
2d 268, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valley Physical Med. & Rehab., P.C.,
No. 05-5934 (DRH)(MLO), 2009 WL 3245388, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (denying motion
to dismiss RICO claim; to survive a motion to dismiss under Twombly, a plaintiff must allege
only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face) (quotations omitted).
The pleading of specific facts is not required; rather a complaint need only give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Davis v. Proud, No. 13-
CV-1663 (SJ F)(WDW), --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2014 WL 905576, *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2014); see
also Govt Emps. Ins. Co. v. Hollis Med. Care, P.C., No. 10 Civ. 4341(ILG)(RML), 2011 WL
5507426, *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2011) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) to RICO claims, explaining
that detailed factual allegations are not necessary).
In deciding whether a complaint meets this threshold, the Court is required to accept the
material facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
Plaintiffs favor. Slade, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 274; see also Nielsen v. Rabin, No. 12-4313-PR, ---
F.3d ----, 2014 WL 552805, *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2014). A court ruling on such a motion may
not properly dismiss a complaint that states a plausible version of the events merely because the
court finds a different version more plausible. Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680
F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).
Here, taking all material facts alleged in the Amended Complaint as true, and drawing all
inferences arising from them in Plaintiffs favor, the Amended Complaint satisfies Plaintiffs
pleading burden at this stage of the proceedings.
6

ARGUMENT
I
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT PROPERLY AND ADEQUATELY
ALLEGES A VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. 1962(c)
The Motion makes make three (3) arguments focusing exclusively on the Amended
Complaints allegations concerning Movants civil RICO violations asserted in the First Cause of
Action. First, the Motion tersely asserts that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a RICO
enterprise that is distinct from the RICO defendants. Second, it argues that the Amended
Complaint fails to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. And third, it asserts that Plaintiff
fails to sufficiently allege the predicate acts underlying the alleged RICO violation.
Each of the arguments is based on an apparent misunderstanding of settled precedent in
this Circuit and elsewhere, and ignores critical allegations in the Amended Complaint. As
discussed below, the Amended Complaint properly and adequately pleads (i) a RICO enterprise
that is distinct from the RICO persons, (ii) a sufficient pattern of racketeering activity, and (iii)
requisite predicate acts.
To plead a violation of Section 1962(c), a plaintiff must show (1) conduct (2) of an
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity for each individual defendant.
Hollis Med. Care, 2011 WL 5507426, at *4. The first element -- conduct -- is straight-forward
and requires no explanation. Indeed, Movants do not contest that the Amended Complaints
allegations satisfy this element. The second element -- enterprise -- means any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity. 18 U.S.C. 1961(4). Courts in this Circuit
construe the enterprise element of RICO liberally . . . To demonstrate an association-in-fact
enterprise, the plaintiff must show that a group of persons associated together for a common
7

purpose of engaging in a course of conduct which functioned then as a continuing unit. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blessinger, No. 06 CV 391(NGG)(ARL), 2007 WL 951905, *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
27, 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Etienne, No.
09-CV-3582 (SLT)(RLM), 2010 WL 4338333, *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) (pleading an
association-in-fact enterprise requires low threshold, needing only a continuing unit that
functions with a common purpose). It is also required that the RICO enterprise be distinct from
the named defendant, referred to as the RICO person. See Blessinger, 2007 WL 951905, at *10.
The third and fourth elements -- a pattern of racketeering activity -- require at least two acts
of racketeering activity within a ten (10) year period of each other. See 18 U.S.C. 1961(5).
To plead such a pattern a plaintiff must only make a showing that the predicate acts of
racketeering activity by a defendant are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of
continued criminal activity. Blessinger, 2007 WL 951905, at *12. Racketeering activity
includes any act indictable under a series of enumerated statutes. See 18 U.S.C. 1961(1).
A. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Establishes An
Enterprise That Satisfies The Distinctness Requirement.
The Motion does not contest that the Amended Complaint has properly pled the existence
of a RICO enterprise. Instead, it argues that the Amended Complaint fails to allege a RICO
enterprise that is distinct from the named defendants or RICO persons. See Motion at 2.
Movants contend that the distinctness requirement is not met because there is complete overlap
between the enterprise and the defendants in the Amended Complaint. See id. However, their
argument misunderstands the distinctness requirement.
The distinctness requirement does not concern the existence of overlap between the
membership of a RICO enterprise and any identified RICO person. Rather, the distinctness
requirement means that the RICO enterprise itself cannot be the RICO person. See Greenfield v.
8

Profl Care, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 110, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (motion to dismiss denied where
complaint alleged enterprise to be distinct entity from each of the individual defendants). Put
another way, while a complaint cannot allege that a corporation or association-in-fact is both the
RICO enterprise (the mechanism through which the racketeering is accomplished) and the RICO
person (the agent responsible for performing the racketeering activity), it can allege that a
corporation or association-in-fact is the RICO enterprise and the employee or association
member through which the corporation or association-in-fact acts is the RICO person. See
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excel Imaging, P.C., 879 F. Supp. 2d 243, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (RICO
persons were owners of corporation that was alleged to be RICO enterprise).
Here, the Amended Complaint properly alleges the existence of a distinct association-in-
fact that constitutes the RICO enterprise. Specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges that the
enterprise was and is comprised of defendants World Wide Plumbing, Yoel Weiss, Moshe
Weiss, Pearl Weiss, Baruch Weiss, Chaim Lefkowitz, Suri Lefkowitz, Gedalia Daniel Katz, Sirki
Ehrman, Ruchie Weiss, Abraham Berger, Burtoluccis Ristorante, LLC, Burtoluccis Catering
Corp., and J ohn Doe Nos. 1-5, as well as non-party Wiztel USA, Inc. See AC at 96. The
Amended Complaint further alleges that the composition, scope, and membership in the
Enterprise was maintained as an ongoing organized association, functioning under the primary
direction of defendants Yoel Weiss, Chaim Lefkowitz, and Suri Lefkowitz as a continuing unit
associated for the common purpose of engaging in illicit purposes, including obtaining forced
labor from and control over Plaintiff. See id. at 97-98. Movants do not contest that Plaintiff
has adequately pled such an enterprise.
Moreover, the Amended Complaint satisfies the distinctness requirement because it
alleges that the individual defendants, not the Enterprise, were responsible for completing the
9

predicate acts. For example, the Amended Complaint alleges that it was defendants -- not the
Enterprise -- who obtained forced labor from Plaintiff and subjected her to a condition of
peonage:
Plaintiff was forced by defendants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz, and defendant
Yoel Weiss, acting in concert with the other Defendants, to act-- by her presence--
as a monitor over the workers employed at the Residence/Warehouse. AC at 51
(emphasis added);
Defendants knowingly provided and/or obtained the labor and/or services of
Plaintiff by (i) force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical
restraint to Plaintiff and/or Plaintiffs children, (ii) serious harm or threats of
serious harm to Plaintiff and/or Plaintiffs children, and/or (iii) means of a scheme,
plan, or pattern intended to cause Plaintiff to believe that, if she did not perform
such labor or services, she or her children would suffer serious harm or physical
restraint. Id. at 111 (emphasis added);
Defendants held and/or returned Plaintiff to a condition of peonage on multiple
occasions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1581. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
Further, the Amended Complaint alleges that the Enterprise was more than simply an
association to carry out the predicate acts against Plaintiff. See id. at 115 (The usual and daily
activities of the Enterprise were distinct from the pattern of racketeering alleged herein. The
Enterprise is an association-in-fact enterprise whose respective constituents used Plaintiffs
forced labor in connection with the illicit fencing operation as well as other legitimate and
illegitimate activities so that Defendants could carry on their illicit criminal activities as they saw
fit.). Pursuant to the Motions own cited authority, such an allegation satisfies the distinctness
requirement. See Wood v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue of N.Y., 311 F. Supp. 2d 344, 357 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (Because the plaintiff alleges that the [alleged RICO enterprise] would exist even if the
alleged predicate acts were removed . . . plaintiff has alleged a section 1962(c) enterprise.).
As an extension of this analysis, it does not matter if all defendants are also part of the
RICO enterprise. Indeed, contrary to Movants argument, it is entirely acceptable for every
member of a RICO enterprise to also be a RICO person and named defendant, as long as the
10

enterprise itself is not the sole RICO person. See, e.g., Colony at Holbrook, Inc. v. Strata G.C.,
Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1224, 1235 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (allegation that each member of the enterprise is
also a defendant does not preclude the existence of a valid enterprise); In re Energy Sys. Equip.
Leasing Sec. Litig., 642 F. Supp. 718, 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (an enterprise composed of an
association-in-fact, even if made up entirely of individual defendants deemed to be 1961(3)
persons, is to be viewed for purposes of RICO claims as possessing a separate existence from
its individual members). Even the authority upon which the Motion relies supports the
foregoing. See Motion at 2 (citing Bennett v. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir.
1985) (under section 1962(c) a corporate entity may not be simultaneously the enterprise and
the person who conducts the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity); Wood, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 357 (a defendant may be a RICO person and one of a
number of members of the RICO enterprise) (internal quotations omitted)).
In support of their argument, Movants point to a handful of paragraphs of the Amended
Complaint alleged solely in those causes of action asserting direct substantive violations of
peonage, enticement into slavery, and forced servitude (Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of
Action), and state that in those paragraphs Plaintiff clearly states that the Enterprise committed
the RICO violations. Motion at 2 (citing 162, 163, 173, 182, and 183 of the Amended
Complaint). The Motion ignores the plethora of allegations throughout the Amended Complaint
where Plaintiff specifically identifies defendants as the perpetrators of the predicate acts, see, e.g,
AC at 2, 24, 25, 28, 30, 37, 51, 72, 73, 79, 83, and 91, and, most notably, ignores the
allegations contained in the RICO Allegations and RICO causes of action themselves (First and
Second Causes of Action) alleging the same. See id. at 93-157. Not surprisingly, the Motion
11

does not -- and cannot -- raise any issue with these allegations which, in fact, are the only
allegations that actually constitute Plaintiffs 1962(c) RICO claim.
Moreover, as a result of pointing to a few phrases in isolation from the rest of the
Amended Complaint, Movants appear to misapprehend the meaning of the Amended Complaint
paragraphs to which they cite for support of their argument. The Amended Complaint must be
read as a whole. See Anderson News, 680 F.3d at 190 (reversing district court on motion to
dismiss where, reading complaint as a whole, claim could be inferred and noting that ambiguity
would remain to be resolved by a factfinder). Doing so establishes that the Amended
Complaint alleges defendants -- not the Enterprise -- are the RICO persons responsible for
perpetrating the predicate acts. See, e.g., AC at 93-95, 103-13.
In any event, contrary to Movants assertion, the RICO enterprise is comprised of all
named defendants, five (5) J ohn Doe defendants and one (1) non-party to this Action. See AC at
96 (alleging all named defendants, J ohn Does, and non-party Wiztel USA, Inc. to be members
of a RICO enterprise under 18 U.S.C. 1962 (c) and (d)). In these premises, Movants
argument is completely misplaced, and there can be no doubt that the RICO enterprise alleged in
the Amended Complaint is distinct from the alleged RICO persons. See Wood, 311 F. Supp. 2d
at 357; Greenfield, 677 F. Supp. at 116.
B. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Establishes
A Pattern Of Racketeering Activity.
The Motion next asserts that the Amended Complaint fails to adequately plead a pattern
of racketeering activity because it alleges only one victim -- Plaintiff -- and but one alleged
scheme. Motion at 2. However, again contrary to Movants assertion, a pattern of
racketeering activity may be established even if there is only one victim and one scheme.
12

As discussed above, the third and fourth elements of a 1962(c) claim require a pattern
of racketeering activity, where racketeering activity is defined as at least two predicate acts
committed within ten (10) years of each other. See supra at 7; 18 U.S.C. 1961. In connection
thereto, a plaintiff must show that the predicate acts are related -- the so-called relatedness
argument -- and that they amount to, or pose a threat of, continuing criminal activity -- the so-
called continuity requirement. Marini v. Adamo, 812 F. Supp. 2d 243, 261 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(quotations omitted). Movants do not contest -- nor can they -- that the predicate acts alleged in
the Amended Complaint satisfy the relatedness requirement.
The continuity requirement can be met through either an open-ended or closed-ended
pattern. An open-ended pattern requires a showing of a threat of continuing criminal activity
beyond the period during which the predicate acts were performed. Id. at 262. The
determination is not made from a position of hind-sight; rather, open-ended continuity may be
shown if, at the time of occurrence, the racketeering activity threatens future criminal activity.
Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Contini, No. 04-CV-0104 DGTJ MA, 2005 WL 1565524, *3-*4
(E.D.N.Y. J uly 6, 2005) (money laundering in furtherance of embezzlement scheme sufficient to
establish open-ended pattern even though acts occurred for less than one year). Where an
inherently unlawful act is performed at the behest of an enterprise whose business is racketeering
activity, there is a threat of continued criminal activity, and thus open-ended continuity.
DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 323 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding open-ended RICO pattern).
A closed-ended pattern requires showing that defendants activities were neither
isolated nor sporadic, and that the activities persisted for a substantial period of time. Marini,
812 F. Supp. 2d at 262. In evaluating whether a pattern qualifies as closed-ended, courts in the
Second Circuit also consider a variety of non-dispositive factors, including, inter alia, the length
13

of time over which the alleged predicate acts took place, the number and variety of acts, the
number of participants, the number of victims, and the presence of separate schemes. Allen v.
Devine, 726 F. Supp. 2d 240, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Because continuity is centrally a temporal
concept, the importance of these other factors varies based on the period of time over which the
predicate acts are alleged to have occurred. Fresh Meadow Food Servs., LLC v. RB 175 Corp.,
Nos. 06-4905-CV(L), 07-0269-CV(CON), 282 F. Appx 94, 99 (2d Cir. J une 24, 2008)
(explaining [w]here the racketeering acts span nearly three and one-half years . . . the presence
or absence of the other factors is less critical). Movants contest only the final two non-
dispositive factors in the test for closed-ended continuity -- the number of victims and the
presence of separate schemes. They offer no argument for why the pattern cannot be found to be
open-ended.
1. A RICO Pattern Can Exist With Only One Victim.
Movants assertion that a pattern of racketeering activity cannot exist in a situation where
there is only a single victim is incorrect.
First, a court only considers the number of victims when the alleged pattern is closed-
ended. SKS Constructors, Inc. v. Drinkwine, 458 F. Supp. 2d 68, 78 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(discretionary factors only relevant when determining whether closed ended continuity exists).
Here, the pattern alleged in the Amended Complaint qualifies as an open-ended pattern as well as
a closed-ended pattern. As an open-ended pattern, while the racketeering activity was occurring
(i.e., when defendants were dominating Plaintiff), there was at least a threat, if not a likelihood,
that defendants would continue to force Plaintiff to work against her will with threats of harm to
her well-being, and deprive her of the benefits of her labor. See DeFalco, 244 F.3d at 323-24
(open-ended pattern established where allegations demonstrated continuing threat of criminal
activity). Additionally, there was a threat of continued criminal activity because the Enterprises
14

business is alleged, in substantial part, to be racketeering activity, and the predicate acts were
inherently unlawful. See Contini, 2005 WL 1565524, at *3-*4 (actions taken in furtherance of
embezzlement scheme, an inherently unlawful activity, sufficient for open-ended pattern).
Therefore, because the pattern qualifies as open-ended, the number of victims is immaterial to
the Courts analysis.
Second, even as a closed-ended pattern, the number of victims is only a discretionary
factor the Court may consider, not a determinative element that must be satisfied. See Allen, 726
F. Supp. 2d at 248 (describing factors as non-dispositive). Moreover, the Second Circuit has
instructed that where the period of time during which the racketeering activities occurred is
substantial -- as it is here, spanning some 4 years -- the number of victims is less critical. See
AC at 27; Fresh Meadow Food Servs., 282 F. Appx at 99 (three and a half year period
considered substantial). Thus, the fact that Plaintiff was the only victim of defendants scheme
should be given minimal, if any, weight in the Courts analysis.
Finally, even considering a single-victim pattern, courts in this District and the Second
Circuit have consistently found patterns of racketeering activity based upon single-victim,
closed-ended patterns. See Cosmos Forms Ltd. v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 113 F.3d 308,
310 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that single victim does not, by itself, preclude a RICO pattern);
Marini, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 262-63 (six year, single victim RICO pattern alleged; Courts have
routinely found that continuity exists where the alleged scheme spans such a substantial period of
time, even where only a single victim . . . was involved); Allen, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 248-49 (five-
year, single victim RICO pattern alleged; other district courts, as well as the Second Circuit,
have held that a single-victim scheme may form a RICO pattern); Contini, 2005 WL 1565524,
at *3 (the fact that there was only one victim is irrelevant to whether the continuity element is
15

satisfied); Lavian v. Haghnazari, 884 F. Supp. 670, 684 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (argument that pattern
requires more than single victim to closed-ended scheme lacks support both in RICOs
legislative history and under the law of the Second Circuit).
5

The fact that Plaintiff is the only identified victim of defendants RICO scheme does not
preclude the existence of a pattern of racketing activity nor mandate dismissal of the First Cause
of Action.
2. A RICO Pattern Can Exist With Only One Scheme.
Movants second assertion, that a pattern of racketeering activity cannot exist where there
is only a single scheme, is similarly incorrect.
As discussed above, the number of schemes in a pattern of racketeering is a (i)
discretionary factor that (ii) is given less weight when the time over which the predicate acts
occurred is substantial, and (iii) is only considered with respect to closed-ended patterns. See
supra at 13-14. Here, the Amended Complaint alleges a substantial, four (4) year period of time,
and a pattern that can be considered open-ended as well as closed-ended. See AC at 27. The
fact that the Amended Complaint alleges only a single scheme is not only irrelevant to the
alleged open-ended pattern, but should be given either little or no weight to the finding of a
pattern of racketeering activity with respect to the alleged closed-ended pattern. See SKS
Constructors, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
Nonetheless, a pattern of racketeering activity can be properly found where only a single
scheme is alleged in the complaint. See H.J . Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989)
(We find no support in [the text of the statute and its legislative history] for the proposition . . .

5
Courts outside the Second Circuit have reached the same conclusion. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mut.
Trading Corp., 63 F.3d 516, 523 (7th Cir. 1995) (the existence of a single victim does not preclude the existence of
a pattern of racketeering activity); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich. v. Kamin, 876 F.2d 543, 545 (6th Cir. 1989)
(As we read the statute, we do not believe that Congress intended that one could insulate himself from the reach of
RICO simply by repeatedly bilking the same victim.).
16

that predicate acts of racketeering may form a pattern only when they are part of separate illegal
schemes.); Marini, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 262-63 (Courts have routinely found that continuity
exists where the alleged scheme spans such a substantial period of time, even where only a . . .
single scheme was involved.); Allen, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 251 (finding RICO pattern where
single scheme involving single victim alleged); Lavian, 884 F. Supp. at 682 (multiple schemes
are not required in order for a pattern to be found). The two cases upon which the Motion relies
do not contradict this conclusion because neither case stands for the proposition that a closed-
ended, single-victim, single scheme cannot satisfy the pattern of racketeering activity
requirements. Rather, the two merely offer circumstances where the Court found such
allegations insufficient. See Motion at 2 (citing Rosner v. Rosner, 766 F. Supp. 2d 422
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (scheme to hide marital property insufficient to constitute pattern, but making
no statements concerning ability of single-victim, single scheme patterns generally); Acme Am.
Repairs, Inc. v. Katzenberg, No. 03-CV-4740 (RRM) (SMG), 2010 WL 3835879, *8 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 2010) (scheme described as conventional corporate swindle insufficient to constitute
pattern). Moreover, neither case analyzes the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity with
respect to open-ended continuity, as alleged in the Amended Complaint. See supra at 13-14.
C. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Pleads The Predicate Acts.
Next, the Motion argues that plaintiff does not adequately allege how [the] predicate
acts relate to the Movants, and that plaintiff has not properly alleged the necessary elements of
each of the crimes that purportedly form the predicate acts. Motion at 2. As with the first two
arguments, this third argument is based on incorrect statements of law and omissions or
misapprehensions of the supporting allegations in the Amended Complaint.

17

1. Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleges The Relationship
Between The Predicate Acts And Movants.

Movants argument that the Amended Complaint fails to adequately allege how the
predicate acts relate to them misunderstands what is required to plead a proper RICO cause of
action, and ignores the material allegations in the Amended Complaint.
To adequately plead a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), a plaintiff need only allege that a
defendant, through the commission of two or more acts constituting a pattern of racketeering
activity, directly or indirectly participated in an enterprise . . . . Blessinger, 2007 WL 951905,
at *9. Such acts can be of the same kind. See, e.g., Hollis Med. Care, 2011 WL 5507426, at *9
(multiple acts of mail fraud created pattern of racketeering). Movants ignore the allegations in
the Amended Complaint that set forth Chaim and Suri Lefkowitzs implicating activities,
6

asserting that plaintiff does not state a single fact indicating that defendant Chaim Lefkowitz
engaged in any predicate acts. On the contrary, the Amended Complaint alleges Plaintiff was
forced by defendants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz . . . to act -- by her presence -- as a monitor over
the workers employed at the Residence/Warehouse. Plaintiff was forced to do so for over
sixteen hours per day from J uly 2008 through J une 2012, except for the two months Plaintiff was
confined in Toronto, Canada . . . . Plaintiff was never paid for any of her forced labor. See AC
at 51. The Amended Complaint further alleges that movants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz,
together with non-moving defendant Yoel Weiss, directed the RICO enterprise and its RICO
activities, which included subjecting Plaintiff to conditions of peonage and enticing Plaintiff to
conditions of slavery. See id. at 114. Such allegations, which implicate both Chaim and Suri
Lefkowitz, satisfy Plaintiffs pleading burden. See Nunag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch.
Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1145, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (allegations explaining defendants

6
The Amended Complaint does not allege a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) against moving defendant World-Wide
Plumbing.
18

involvement in forced labor scheme sufficient to state claim of forced labor for RICO purposes);
Martinez v. Calimlim, 651 F. Supp. 2d 852, 859 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (allegations that defendants
unlawfully harbored plaintiff to exploit her for forced labor sufficient to state RICO claim).
2. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Alleges A
Predicate Act Consisting Of Forced Labor.
The Motions assertion that the Amended Complaint does not adequately allege the
predicate act of forced labor fails because it misunderstands the scope of conduct indictable
under the RICO statute, and neglects to consider the Amended Complaints material allegations.
Here, the Amended Complaints allegations are sufficient to establish liability under 18
U.S.C. 1589(a) and (b). Movants assert that the Amended Complaint is deficient because it
only contains what they term conclusory allegations. However, this statement misunderstands
Plaintiffs pleading requirements at this stage, see Hollis Med. Care, 2011 WL 5507426, at *6
(applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) to RICO claims, explaining that detailed factual allegations are
not necessary), and mischaracterizes the allegations in the Amended Complaint.
Contrary to Movants view, the Amended Complaint alleges how movants Chaim and
Suri Lefkowitz participated in the campaign of abuse and harassment of Plaintiff, threatened
Plaintiff with involuntary hospitalization and commitment to a psychiatric ward, and placed
Plaintiff under a continuous state of confinement and surveillance, all for the purpose of being
able to force Plaintiff to labor against her will and cause her to believe that she would suffer
serious harm should she disobey their orders and cease providing labor. See AC at 25-30, 37,
51, and 180. The Amended Complaint further alleges that movants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz
played key roles in managing and directing the Enterprise, and as part of the Enterprise Plaintiff
was compelled to provide labor for satisfaction of an alleged debt to defendant Yoel Weiss and
was induced to travel to Canada to be held in a condition of slavery. See id. at 83-86, 91.
19

Those allegations are more than sufficient to plead a predicate act based on forced labor against
the Lefkowitzs. See Nunag-Tanedo, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1148 (allegations that defendants made
plaintiffs feel indebted so they would remain in teaching program sufficient to state claim for
forced labor).
Furthermore, the Amended Complaint alleges that Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz knowingly
benefitted from their leadership roles in the Enterprise which they knew used the forced labor of
Plaintiff, or had at least reckless disregard of such fact, to their collective benefit. See AC at
182-83. These allegations are also sufficient to plead a predicate act based on forced labor. See
Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 693 (S.D. Tex. 2009), dismissed on other
grounds, 2014 WL 198305 (S.D. Tex. J an. 15, 2014) (active participation in and knowingly
benefitting from a venture involving forced labor and trafficking sufficient to establish predicate
act for RICO violation).
7

3. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Alleges Predicate Acts
Consisting Of Peonage And Enticement Into Slavery.
In addition to forced labor, the Amended Complaint alleges additional predicate acts of
peonage (18 U.S.C. 1581) and enticement into slavery (18 U.S.C. 1583). Movants assertion
that the Amended Complaint does not adequately allege these predicate acts also fails because
they again misunderstand the scope of conduct indictable under these statutes, and ignore the text
of 18 U.S.C. 1595, which provides a civil cause of action for victims.
The Amended Complaint alleges that movants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz knowingly
benefitted from participation in a venture which they knew or should have known engaged in

7
The Amended Complaint makes no allegation that moving defendant Worldwide Plumbing engaged in the forced
labor of Plaintiff because the Amended Complaint does not allege a 1962(c) claim (First Cause of Action) nor a
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1589, 1595 (Fifth Cause of Action) against Worldwide Plumbing. See AC at pp. 27, 37;
Motion at 3. Critically, though, the lack of such allegations in no way affects the sufficiency of the Amended
Complaints cause of action against World Wide Plumbing for its alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) (Second
Cause of Action). See infra at 22-25; Blessinger, 2007 WL 951905, at *13.
20

violations of 18 U.S.C. 1581 and 1583. See AC at 162-63, 172-73. As detailed in the
Amended Complaint, the venture consisted of the Enterprise and included a goal of obtaining
compulsory labor from Plaintiff. See, e.g, id. at 96-98. Movants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz
are alleged to have played key roles in managing and directing the Enterprise, participating in the
campaign of abuse and harassment of Plaintiff, threatening Plaintiff with involuntary
hospitalization and commitment to a psychiatric ward if she did not comply with the Enterprises
directions, placing Plaintiff under a continuous state of confinement and surveillance to foster
her compliance, and forcing Plaintiff to work against her will. See id. at 25-30, 37, and 51.
The Amended Complaint further alleges that as part of the Enterprise, Plaintiff was
compelled to provide labor for satisfaction of an alleged debt to defendant Yoel Weiss, and was
induced to travel to Canada to be held in a condition of slavery. See id. at 83-86, 91. Given
movants Chaim and Suri Lefkowtizs position in the venture, it is reasonable to infer that they
were aware of, approved of, and benefited from these activities. See WW, LLC v. Coffee
Beanery, Ltd., No. CIV.A. WMN-05-3360, 2012 WL 3728184, *14 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2012)
(court able to infer defendants participation in operation of enterprise where plaintiff alleged
defendants occupied leadership and management positions). Indeed, the same activities as those
alleged against the Lefkowtizs here have been held by federal courts to satisfy the predicate act
requirements for a Section 1962(c) RICO claim. See Adhikari, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (active
participation in and knowingly benefitting from a venture involving forced labor and trafficking
sufficient to establish predicate act for RICO violation); see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
N.J ., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 345, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (defendant could face
RICO liability where allegations and evidence showed defendant was at a minimum, indirectly
and knowingly involved in orchestrating or directing the affairs of enterprise).
21

Moreover, the allegations of the Amended Complaint are such that movants Chaim and
Suri Lefkowitz could be indicted directly under 18 U.S.C. 1581 and 1583. See United States
v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 243-44 (2d Cir. 2010) (evidence that defendant knowingly
contributed to creation of victims indebted situation, forcing victims to work, and benefitted
from victims labor sufficient to state peonage claim even though defendant himself never
threatened victim with debt or participated in abuse of victim); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d
562, 567 (4th Cir. 1981) (affirming 18 U.S.C. 1583 conviction where jury could conclude that,
at defendants instigation, co-defendants carried victims away to be held as slaves at defendants
farm, despite defendant not transporting victims). In light of the foregoing, it is no surprise
movants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz failed to move to dismiss the Amended Complaints Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, or Eighth Causes of Action alleged against them -- all of which are
premised on similar allegations as the predicate acts underlying the Amended Complaints
Section 1962(c) RICO cause of action.
8

D. The Existence Of Opportunities To Contact Law Enforcement
Does Not Preclude The Predicate Acts.
The Motion makes a final bizarre argument stating that Plaintiff had numerous
opportunities to contact law enforcement during her claimed ordeal, but apparently chose not to
do so. Motion at 3. Although its purpose is unclear, it is of no moment here.
Whether or not Plaintiff contacted law enforcement personnel regarding defendants
actions, or whether any criminal investigation or prosecution has occurred or is occurring, is
irrelevant to Plaintiffs civil claims. See Fortune v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 95 CV
0042(SJ ), 1996 WL 571499, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1996) (failure of plaintiff to pursue criminal

8
These substantive causes of action are brought under 18 U.S.C. 1595(a), which provides for liability against a
direct perpetrator of the act and anyone who knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from
participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in the act.
22

charges not a basis to estop plaintiff from bringing civil claim); see also United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361-62 (1984) (outcome of criminal case irrelevant to
civil case on same facts). Similarly, the opportunity to escape from captivity or to contact law
enforcement personnel does not preclude such causes of action. See, e.g., United States v.
Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 375 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction for peonage despite workers
being able to leave country); United States v. Djoumessi, 538 F.3d 547, 552-53 (6th Cir. 2008)
(involuntary servitude conviction sustained despite opportunities to escape); United States v.
Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1984) abrogated on other grounds by United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (opportunity to escape . . . is not enough . . . to preclude a
finding that a person was held in involuntary servitude.); United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165,
1168 (5th Cir. 1977) (liability for involuntary servitude where defendant placed victim in such
fear of physical harm that the victim is afraid to leave, regardless of opportunities for escape).
II
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT PROPERLY AND ADEQUATELY
ALLEGES A VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)
Finally, the Motion insinuates, without supported argument, that as a result of Plaintiffs
failure to adequately plead the required Section 1962(c) predicate acts, Plaintiffs Section
1962(d) claim against World Wide Plumbing must also fail. See Motion at 2. Notwithstanding
Movants misguided flailing, Plaintiff has properly and adequately alleged a cause of action for
RICO conspiracy under Section 1962(d).
A cause of action under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) has far fewer elements than a 1962(c)
claim. Palatkevich v. Choupak, No. 12 CIV. 1681 CM, 2014 WL 1509236, *22 (S.D.N.Y. J an.
24, 2014) (comparing elements under each statute; conspiracies are easier to prove than
violations of 1962(c)). This statute makes it unlawful for any person to conspire to violate
23

any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of [18 U.S.C. 1962]. 18 U.S.C. 1962(d).
It is not necessary that a defendant actually commit or even agree to commit a predicate act.
Rather, to be liable under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), a defendant need only adopt the goal of
furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65
(1997); see also Hollis Med. Care, 2011 WL 5507426, at *10 (agreement can be shown if a
defendant possessed knowledge of only the general contours of the conspiracy); Blessinger,
2007 WL 951905, at *13 ( 1962(d) liability possible where defendant agreed to act in
furtherance of scheme even if defendant did not commit or agree to commit the predicate acts.).
The Amended Complaint contains both the required legal and factual allegations
necessary to plead a RICO conspiracy under Section 1962(d). First, the Amended Complaint
alleges specific details of the Enterprise and its goals, and that each of the named defendants,
including all three (3) Movants, possessed knowledge of, at minimum, the general contours of
the Enterprise and the Enterprises goals and purposes. AC at 93, 96-102, 121, 147, 149,
151. Second, the Amended Complaint alleges that all defendants, including all three (3)
Movants, agreed and intended to further the goals and purposes of the Enterprise and that [i]f
such goals and purposes were completed, they would satisfy all of the elements of a substantive
RICO violation. Id. at 122; see also id. at 150. These allegations alone are sufficient to
satisfy Plaintiffs pleading burden. It is not necessary, as the Motion contends, that the Amended
Complaint allege that defendant World Wide Plumbing engage[] in any of these acts,
9
or
state a single fact indicating the defendant Chaim Lefkowitz engaged in any of the predicate

9
The Motion also argues that, because there are no allegations that World Wide Plumbing engaged in any of the
predicate acts, the Fourteenth Cause of Action should be dismissed. See Motion at 2. The Fourteenth Cause of
Action seeks a declaratory judgment on grounds completely unrelated to the predicate acts and the RICO causes of
action. Compare AC at 129-57 with id. at 244-51. The absence of allegations concerning World Wide
Plumbings commission of any of the predicate acts is completely immaterial to Plaintiffs entitlement to declaratory
judgment. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (declaratory judgment only requires
allegations of (i) substantial controversy (ii) between parties having adverse legal interests, (iii) of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment).
24

acts. Compare Motion at 2 with Etienne, 2010 WL 4338333, at *8-*9 (rejecting argument that
plaintiff must allege that each defendant agreed to personally commit at least two predicate
acts, holding allegations of agreement to participate in scheme and knowledge of co-
conspirators role in predicate acts sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss).
Still, even though not required, the Amended Complaint alleges the acts that each
defendant took in furtherance of the conspiracy. Specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges
that:
Suri Lefkowitz repeatedly threatened Plaintiff with hospitalization and
commitment to a psychiatric ward;
Chaim Lefkowitz and Suri Lefkowitz falsely imprisoned Plaintiff, placing her
under a continuous state of confinement and surveillance . . .;
Suri Lefkowitz instructed Plaintiff not to leave the residences without the
permission of defendant Yoel Weiss or one of the other Defendants, and
threatened Plaintiff with bodily harm should she do so;
Suri Lefkowitz would also come to the Weiss House to check on Plaintiff and
humiliate her, persistently warning Plaintiff not to try to leave the premises and
almost always reminding her to smile because she was on camera;
World Wide Plumbing, which was owned and operated by Chaim and Suri
Lefkowitz, was used to store illicit merchandise . . .; and
in support of the Enterprise, money was laundered through a group of individuals
and companies, including Movants.
See id. at 151-52. These allegations -- all of which Movants ignore -- are more than sufficient
to satisfy Plaintiffs pleading burden and adequately state a claim for a violation of Section
1962(d), regardless of whether the Amended Complaint states a claim against any movant
pursuant to Section 1962(c). See Palatkevich, 2014 WL 1509236, at *22 (Section 1962(d)
conspiracy adequately stated against defendants dismissed from Section 1962(c) claim).
Finally, even if movants Chaim and Suri Lefkowitz were to be dismissed from the First
Cause of Action -- they should not be -- Plaintiffs Section 1962(c) claim will still stand against
25

defendant Yoel Weiss, who has now answered the Amended Complaint. See Answer (Docket
No. 38). The existence of Plaintiffs Section 1962(c) claim against Yoel Weiss is sufficient to
support her Section 1962(d) claim against all defendants, including all three (3) Movants.
Palatkevich, 2014 WL 1509236, at *21-*22 (rejecting motion to dismiss Section 1962(d) claim
where Section 1962(c) claim survived against at least one defendant).
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court deny the Motion in
its entirety.
Dated: New York, New York
April 30, 2014 Respectfully Submitted,

MISHCON DE REYA NEW YORK LLP

By: _/s/Vincent Filardo, J r. ________
Vincent Filardo, J r.
Daniel Mandell

750 Seventh Avenue, 26
th
Floor
New York, New York 10019
Tel: (212) 612-3270
Fax: (212) 612-3297
vincent.filardo@mishcon.com
dan.mandell@mishcon.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff Rivka Stein


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