Controlling Maritime Piracy

Harvard Kennedy School

10-12 December 2009

The Intensity, Spread and Economics of Somali Piracy

By David H. Shinn
Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University

Introduction

Somali piracy has rightly captured the attention of both governments and the
media in the past two years. In the first nine months of 2009, Somali piracy accounted
for more than half of all actual and attempted attacks throughout the world. The number
of attempted attacks as of the beginning of December already surpassed the total that
occurred in 2008. Successful Somali hijackings, however, have fallen in number.
Somali piracy, which was previously concentrated in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali
coast, is now occurring more frequently in the waters between Somalia and the
Seychelles, off the Kenyan coast, in the Red Sea and as far away as Oman. The area
subject to attack now covers more than a million square miles of water. This is a region
about the size of India. It is simply not possible for the thirty or so international naval
vessels currently engaged in anti-piracy operations to cover such a vast expanse of water.
Nor are there adequate numbers of available ships to effectively patrol this huge region.
Successful Somali piracy almost always involves hostage taking and the payment
of ransom before the ship and crew are released. The Somalis rarely tamper with the
cargo on board the captured ships. This is a business, albeit criminal, designed to extract
as much money as possible from ship owners and/or nations that provide most of the
crew. Somali pirates are equal opportunity criminals; they attack western and third world
vessels and crews as well as Chinese, North Korean, Iranian and Russian. Somali pirates
like to point out that they were driven to this activity because foreign fishing vessels have
for many years been illegally plundering their 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
While the Somalis have legitimate complaints about illegal foreign fishing, it is no
justification for piracy. In any event, the vast majority of pirate attacks do not involve
foreign fishing vessels and increasingly they occur well outside Somalia’s 200 mile EEZ.
Most of the attacks in the Gulf of Aden occur off Yemen and Somaliland, which
in 1991 declared its independence from Somalia, where the pirates have their bases in
small coastal towns like Eyl, Haradhere, Garad, Ras Alula and Hobyo. In fact,
Somaliland, in spite of its poverty and weak police force, has done a good job of
preventing piracy. It has little capacity to stop piracy in the water along the coastal area
but has developed a reasonably effective local law enforcement and militia that seems to
have kept the pirates out of Somaliland. The semi-autonomous state of Puntland, on the
other hand, has become ground zero for Somali piracy. The new leadership in Puntland
says that it is trying to stamp out the practice, but has been singularly ineffective in doing
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so.1 The former president of Puntland, General Adde Muse Hersi, recently claimed that
some members of Puntland’s militia are even taking part in piracy.2
Piracy is, of course, a global problem. The waters off Africa have become,
however, particularly dangerous. It is an increasing menace along the west coast of
Africa, especially in Nigerian waters where a variety of issues seem to motivate piracy.
There is a more limited piracy problem aimed at ships steaming close to the Tanzanian
coast or at anchorage in Dar es Salaam that usually involve efforts to break into cargo on
board. These attacks do not follow the Somali pattern and are almost certainly conducted
by persons based in Tanzania. This paper deals exclusively with Somali piracy.

The Growth of Somali Piracy

Somali piracy began as early as 1989, but disappeared in 1992. It returned in

1993, increased in 1994-1995, declined again in 1996 and then slowly rose between 1997
and 2000. It stabilized and rose sharply in 2004-2005, putting Somalia on the
international maritime security map for the first time. It declined during 2006 when the
Islamic Courts, which briefly controlled much of Somalia, cracked down on piracy.
Actual and attempted attacks increased in 2007 and exploded in 2008.3
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau
(IMB) documented ninety-two actual and attempted pirate attacks in the Gulf of
Aden/Red Sea and another nineteen off Somalia in 2008. These 111 attacks, all of which
can probably be attributed to Somali pirates, constituted 38 percent of the 293 pirate
attacks worldwide in 2008. Of this global total, there were forty-nine successful
hijackings; all but seven of them took place in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia. As a
result, an astounding 86 percent of all hijacked vessels globally occurred at the hands of
Somali pirates. All of the ships successfully hijacked by Somali pirates were steaming
when the attack occurred. For that matter, all of the attempted but failed attacks in the
Gulf of Aden and off Somalia involved steaming ships. On a global basis, the vast
majority of attacks took place against container ships, bulk carriers, chemical tankers,
general cargo ships and tankers. This general pattern also applied to attacks by Somali
pirates. During 2008, Somali pirates took 815 crew members hostage. Four crew
members died directly or indirectly as a result of the attacks, two were injured and
another fourteen were missing and feared dead. At the end of 2008, Somali pirates held
thirteen vessels and 242 crew members for ransom.4
During the first nine months of 2009, the IMB documented 306 pirate attacks
worldwide; 55 percent were attributed to Somali pirates. The geographical reach of the
Somalis became much wider with 100 attacks in the Gulf of Aden, one off Kenya, fifteen
in the Red Sea, forty-seven off Somalia, one in the Arabian Sea, one in the Indian Ocean
and four off Oman. Of the thirty-four ships successfully hijacked globally in the first
nine months of 2009, all but two were the work of Somali pirates and one of those, an
attack on a ship anchored off Kenya, was probably done by Somalis. All thirty-two
vessels hijacked by Somalis were steaming at the time of capture. Somali pirates took
533 crew members hostage. A further eight were injured, four killed and one missing.
The Somalis targeted bulk carriers, containers, fishing vessels, RoRos, tankers, tugs and
yachts. The Somalis employed automatic weapons and RPGs more frequently to
intimidate the Master of the vessel to stop.5
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Recent Developments

Somali piracy is constantly changing. The Somalis are entrepreneurial, flexible

and adaptive. The primary goal is making money; if the costs become too high or the
task too difficult, the Somalis will seek another way to carry on piracy. The presence of
additional naval vessels in the relatively confined waters of the Gulf of Aden, increased
vigilance and stronger counter measures by crews and even special security teams have
sharply reduced pirate activity in those waters. The Commander of the European Union
naval operation, Peter Hudson, announced in early December that there have been no
hijackings in the Gulf of Aden since July 2009.6 This has not, however, diminished
Somali piracy in the wider region. It has only caused the pirates to seek targets further
from shore, make more frequent use of lethal weapons and probably take higher risks.
As of 9 November 2009, Somali pirates held eleven ships and crew hostage in
Somali ports. The vessels included:7
• Taiwanese tuna boat.
• Maltese-flagged ship owned by Greece and crewed by twenty-four Ukrainians
seized north of Madagascar.
• 2,800 ton cargo ship and nine crew members attacked south of Oman.
• 3,716 ton Spanish fishing vessel and thirty-six crew members seized 400 nautical
miles northwest of Seychelles.
• 24,637 ton container ship and crew of twenty-one seized 300 nautical miles north
of Seychelles.
• 76,000 ton Chinese bulk carrier of coal and twenty-five Chinese crew hijacked
550 nautical miles northeast of the Seychelles and 700 nautical miles off the
coast of Somalia. The ship is being held at Hobyo.
• 38,305 ton Panamanian-registered bulk carrier and twenty-six, primarily Indian,
crew seized 180 nautical miles west of Seychelles.
• 38 foot yacht owned by a British couple seized off Tanzania.
• Thai tuna boat with twenty-three Russians, two Filipinos and two Ghanaians
seized 200 nautical miles north of the Seychelles and 650 nautical miles off the
Somali coast.
• 53,629 ton bulk carrier with twenty-one crew from the Ukraine and the
Philippines seized 250 nautical miles northwest of Madagascar.
• Panamanian-flagged vessel and eighteen crew carrying general cargo from the
UAE to Mogadishu.
The ICC Commercial Crime Services maintains a live piracy report.8 A recent
snapshot of attempted and successful attacks is instructive. Between November 13 and
December 1, 2009, it recorded twenty-one pirate attacks globally. Somali pirates
accounted for ten of the attacks. They took the following form:
November 16 – Pirates armed with machine guns attacked, boarded and hijacked a
chemical tanker steaming about 600 nautical miles southeast of Mogadishu. They took
28 North Korean crew members hostage.
November 16 – Pirates armed with guns in two speed boats chased and fired upon a
general cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden. The ship took evasive maneuvers and prevented
boarding.
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November 18 – Pirates chased and fired upon a container ship about 600 nautical miles
northeast of Mogadishu. The crew took antipiracy measures and an onboard security
team returned fire. The pirates aborted the attack.
November 19 – Pirates armed with guns chased and attempted to board a bulk carrier in
the Gulf of Aden. The Master took evasive action, called for naval warship assistance
and mustered the crew. The pirates opened fire on the ship but gave up the chase.
November 20 – Six pirate boats with a mother vessel in sight chased and opened fire on
an oil tanker 1050 nautical miles east and south of Mogadishu. Two RPGs penetrated
into the port bridge door. One crew member sustained injuries. The pirates aborted the
attempt after three hours.
November 20 – Eight pirates in one craft and four in another, armed with machine guns
and an RPG attacked a bulk carrier 1050 nautical miles east and south of Mogadishu.
They fired at the ship with machine guns and the RPG and attempted to board. The crew
activated anti-piracy measures and foiled the attempt.
November 24 – Four pirates in a skiff fired upon and attempted to board a tanker 1100
nautical miles east of Mogadishu. The ship sustained damage but the pirates aborted the
effort.
November 26 – Pirates armed with an RPG and machine guns in two skiffs chased and
fired upon a container ship 470 nautical miles south and west of Mogadishu. The Master
took evasive measures and the pirates aborted the attack after three hours.
November 29 – Armed pirates hijacked a Greek-flagged tanker 970 nautical miles east
and north of Mogadishu. They sailed the ship and the twenty-eight crew to the Somali
coast.
December 1 – Armed pirates in a skiff opened fire on a tanker 1200 nautical miles
northeast of Mogadishu. The crew used water jets and evasive maneuvers that prevented
the pirates from boarding.
These ten recent attacks by Somali pirates are indicative of the current state of
Somali piracy. Four of the attacks took place more than 1000 nautical miles from
Mogadishu. Only two of the ten attacks were successful and both of the attempts in the
Gulf of Aden failed. This reflects a diminishing success rate by Somali pirates
throughout 2009. The pirates have not, however, reduced their attempts to hijack vessels.
Except for the two attacks in the Gulf of Aden, the nearest ship to Somalia was 470
nautical miles away at the time of the attack. In every case, the pirates fired on the ship
in an effort to force it to stop, suggesting a growing tendency to use force. Although
Somali pirates do occasionally attack fishing boats, all ten of these vessels were tankers,
container ships or bulk carriers. The Somali pirate argument that they are trying to stop
illegal fishing in Somali waters is at this point a fiction. In any event, it is difficult to
believe that the Master of any fishing boat would be foolish enough to enter Somalia’s
200 mile EEZ under the current circumstances.

Economics of Somali Piracy

So far, Somali piracy has been all about extracting ransom payments. Some of
the ransoms obtained a year or two ago were quite modest. The Somalis have learned,
however, that by seizing more valuable vessels and cargo, they can obtain higher ransom
payments. The Saudi-owned oil tanker, Sirius Star, seized in 2008 reportedly netted $3
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million for the pirates. That seems to have set the standard for vessels of such
importance. The pirates may claim they have received higher ransoms than is actually
the case in order to up the ante for hijacked ships in the future. For the most part, ship
owners do not confirm the amount that they have paid and sometimes deny they even
paid a ransom.
The Maltese-flagged Greek ship noted above was released in November for $3.7
million according to the pirates. The owners did not confirm the amount. The Spanish
fishing vessel cited above was also freed in mid-November. A pirate source said the
owners paid $3.3 million; the Spanish government said it did what was necessary to
obtain release of the ship but did not acknowledge a ransom payment. Pirates are
demanding $3.5 million for the Chinese bulk carrier of coal, $3 million for the
Panamanian-flagged cargo ship and $7 million for the hapless British couple who
reportedly invested their life savings in the hijacked yacht.
Relatively small amounts of the ransom payments go to the young Somalis who
take the most risk and board the hijacked vessels. Most of the money ends up in the
hands of the organizers of the operations in Somalia and various intermediaries involved
in the payment process. Nevertheless, the actual pirates earn by their modest standards a
princely sum that justifies continuation of the practice. It sure beats fishing.

Issues for the Future

A combination of increased naval patrols and more effective anti-piracy measures

by the Masters of vessels has reduced the Somali pirate success rate. Many ships are still
not taking adequate steps, however, to maximize their chances of warding off pirate
attacks such as stringing barb wire along the free board, using high pressure water hoses,
high frequency sound devices, caustic lime powder and even petrol bombs in some cases.
This is the single most important action that can be taken to reduce piracy in the region.
Although naval forces and individual ship Masters are being increasingly aggressive in
dealing with piracy, they need to be even more aggressive. About 20 percent of the ships
now transiting the region are armed. Even those with special security teams, however,
seem to confine their response to firing warning shots at fast approaching pirate skiffs in
the open ocean. Although this tactic usually deters the pirates, it serves as no real
disincentive and only results in an attack on an unarmed vessel. The time has come to
dispense with the warning shots and fire live ammunition directly at the approaching
skiffs. After all, the pirates are shooting at their intended target. This kind of response
will send a meaningful message.9
The handling of captured pirates is a serious problem. Between January and
August 2009, Combined Task Force-151 and other cooperating naval forces encountered
527 pirates. They disarmed and released 282 of them; disarmed and turned over for
prosecution 235 and killed ten.10 The legal community has established a high bar for
successful prosecution and the commanders of naval ships are reluctant to transport
pirates to the few locations, especially Kenya, where they can be prosecuted. Hence,
there are numerous cases where pirates are simply disarmed and released because they
were not caught “in the act of piracy” or it is just too much trouble. In a few cases, the
pirates have even been given assistance so that they can return safely to the Somali shore.
The assumption is that those disarmed and released pirates quickly return to piracy.
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Unless they are prosecuted, there is no incentive to give up piracy. With some important
exceptions, there has been too much coddling of captured pirates.11
In an agreement with the Seychelles, the United States recently deployed MQ-9
Reaper drones that are capable of scouring the Indian Ocean with their infra-red eyes.
The drones are remotely controlled and can fly up to eighteen hours at a time. This will
permit the United States to monitor wide areas of pirate infested waters.12 Other than
providing warnings of potential attacks, however, the intelligence will only be of value if
naval ships in the region are prepared to be more aggressive in taking action against the
pirates. In certain cases, this should include the capture and possible destruction of
mother ships found in international waters. The UN Special Representative for Somalia,
Ahmedou ould Abdallah, recently urged that the international community crack down on
pirates’ financial backers located outside Somalia.13 This is another promising area for
putting pressure on the Somali piracy operation.
There has been very little evidence linking Somali piracy and the al-Shabaab
terrorist organization in Somalia. Except that they have no respect for international
norms, the two groups have nothing in common. The pirates seek to make money and al-
Shabaab is trying to take over a country and impose its extremist Islamic agenda. Most
experts on Somali piracy dismiss out of hand any link between the two. That may be too
facile. The pirates and al-Shabaab may find that it is in their interest to develop a
marriage of convenience. A recently released Canadian intelligence report acquired
under the Access to Information Act concluded that al-Shabaab has been arming and
training pirates in exchange for a share of their spoils. Canada’s Integrated Threat
Assessment Centre said that al-Shabaab has formed a “relationship of convenience” with
one of the two main pirate networks operating out of Mudug. Al-Shabaab provides
weapons, combat training and local protection to the pirates, who then give al-Shabaab
cash, captured weapons or other material stolen from the hijacked ships.14 It is time to
take a closer look at possible collaboration between some Somali pirates and al-Shabaab.
1
Stig Jarle Hansen, “Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconceptions and Remedies,” Norwegian Institute for
Urban and Regional Research, Report No. 2009:29, pp. 30-41. See at
www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf. Lauren Ploch, et al., “Piracy off the Horn of
Africa,” Congressional Research Service, R40528, 28 September 2009, p. 7. See at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf.
2
“Former President Says Puntland’s Troops Join Pirates,” Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu), 29 November 2009.
3
Hansen, p. 19.
4
ICC International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,” Annual Report: 1 January - 31 December
2008, pp. 1-22. See at www.icc-ccs.org.
5
ICC International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,” Report for the Period 1 January – 30
September 2009, pp. 1-23. See at www.icc-ccs.org.
6
Lucas Barasa, “East Africa: Operation to Fight Piracy a Success,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), 1 December 2009.
7
“Ships Held by Somali Pirates,” Reuters, 9 November 2009.
8
See “Live Piracy Report” at www.icc-ccs.org.
9
Jason Straziuso, “Maersk Alabama Repels 2nd Pirate Attack with Guns,” Associated Press, 18 November 2009. Horand
Knaup, “Increased Violence on the High Seas,” Spiegel Online, 19 November 2009. “Admiral: Can’t Stop All Pirate
Attacks,” Associated Press, 2 December 2009. Matthew Saltmarsh, “Pirates Widen Range, Straining Naval Patrols,” New
York Times, 20 November 2009.
10
Ploch, 20. According to the U.S. Central Command, between August 2008 and September 2009, naval forces disarmed
and released 343 pirates compared to 212 who were sent for prosecution. See Jon Ungoed-Thomas and Marie Woolf,
“Navy Releases Somali Pirates Caught Red-Handed,” Sunday Times (London), 29 November 2009.
11
Ungoed-Thomas and Woolf. Will Ross, “Drones Scour the Sea for Pirates,” BBC, 11 November 2009.
12
Jim Couri, “Somali Pirates: Anti-Piracy Combat Coordinated between Seychelles and US,” American Chronicle, 9
November 2009. Kevin Kelley, “Killer US Drones Pursuing Pirates off the Horn,” The East African, 9 November 2009.
Will Ross.
13
“UN Envoy Urges Crackdown on Somali Pirates Backers,” Javno, 2 December 2009.
14
Stewart Bell, “Somali Militants Training Pirates,” National Post, 3 December 2009.