On HEIDEGGER'S TIME AND BEING: TAKE-HOME EXAM

Prepared for Prof. Stan Clarke for course32.310.

Written by: critical (on Scribd.com).
MARCH 96
310.th2

THE ONTOLOGICAL AND THE ONTICAL PRIORITY

Each field of knowledge falls within the domain of a particular being or group of

beings within the domain of the totality of Beings. Our interpretations or life

experiences with these beings before positivistic study and even in the present

now affect fundamentally the way we study and conceptualize these beings. Since

we have long considered the question of Being to be unimportant or a non-question,

we have ignored the fact that we are now limited by the interpretations of Being

that we started with when our present bodies of knowledge were only

developmental. In turn this 'prescientific' understanding of the various beings

within the domain of the totality of beings affects the body of knowledge we

develop about the particular beings of the spheres of study.

This turns out to be not quite true in relation to the sciences. As we will see later

even the fields of physics and mathematics are reshaping their fundamental

conceptualizations of the beings of their study. As its body of knowledge grows

and develops a science which is truly dynamic will be capable of re-interpreting the

fundamental conceptualization of being which is its object of study -- but not in an

experiential conceptualization of Being.

The elaboration of the area [of knowledge] in its fundamental structures is in a

way already accomplished by prescientific experience and interpretation of the
domain of Being to which the area of knowledge is itself confined. The resulting
"fundamental concepts" comprise the guidelines for the first concrete disclosure
of the area (pp. 50 my emphasis).

These "fundamental concepts" also referred to as "basic concepts" are the very

important result of what Heidegger calls prescientific experiences and

interpretation of the domain of being to which the areas of knowledge belong.

Heidegger's ontological priority of the question of Being is based on the

fundamentally generative nature of the Being of beings themselves to all areas of

study and fields of knowledge. More accurately, Heidegger asserts that our

interpretation of the beings of our study ultimately comes before "all positive

investigation" (pp. 51-52). Heidegger's illustration of the priority of the

phenomena of interpretation, above, quite aptly involves a concrete example of

some of the most stable or 'hardest' sciences -- mathematics, physics and biology.

The real "movement" of the sciences takes place in the revision of these basic
concepts [of Being], a revision which is more or less radical and lucid with regard to
itself. A science's level of development is determined by the extent to which it is
capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In these immanent crises of the sciences
the relation of positive questioning to the matter in question becomes unstable.
Today tendencies to place research on new foundations have cropped up on all sides
in the various disciplines (pp. 50-51 his emphasis).

He then goes on to describe a crisis of foundation which the fields of

mathematics, physics and biology have undergone.

I discuss only Heidegger's biology example here. The very idea that the nature (or

Being) of living beings could be defined as something other than mechanistic or

vitalistic became the crisis of biology. Accordingly, Heidegger asserts, the

biologists sought a new interpretation of life that would get "behind" vitalism and

mechanism as constitutive frameworks for definitions of life (pp. 51). What occurs

in these crises of the fundamentals of science is the replacement of one object

with another. It is as if the object of study changes with each new crisis.

Perhaps if we were to seek out the root of our conceptualizations of objects we

could be more clear on what it is we study. In this way when we overturn one

theoretical framework with another we could perhaps add to the root of what we

held pre-scientifically and thus have a better picture than before not just a

different picture. What the sciences do is either ignore the pre-scientific

interpretation from experience of a being altogether or assume that Being is no

longer a question worthy of answer.

At the same time these revolutions or crises in the sciences cited by Heidegger

show how vital the particular interpretation of the Being of a being of study can be
to the dynamism of the sciences or what he calls the real "movement" of the

sciences. Although the sciences do not seek out a foundational experiential

unconcealedness of Being they do illustrate how important the conceptualization of

an object can be to the dynamism of a body of knowledge.

What is properly considered primary by Heidegger in the foundations of a field of

study is the interpretation of the nature of being of the object of study through

life experience -- not theory. That which is prior to the conceptual frameworks of

theory is the everyday sense of the Being of a being. According to Heidegger an

intuition based on our prior knowledge via experiences is far more productive than

ordinary logic within the framework of theories (pp. 52). This sort of leaping

ahead of intuition yields a disclosedness of a being in its constitutive Being -- as

opposed to merely arriving at a conceptualization or theoretical framework as in

the sciences (pp.52). What Heidegger is developing here is a conceptualization of

thought that says poeticizing can take you leaps and bounds beyond simple

deductive logical thought.

The means of achieving this disclosedness is something which is not easily

described or explained it merely happens when you properly concern yourself

primarily with the question of being and let go of the theory that constricts the

object of study. Heidegger holds up the example of Kant's Pure Reason and the
works of both Plato and Aristotle. These men were all 'leapers' who set the very

foundations of the sciences we now hold dear. These men leaped ahead to give us

the frameworks upon which we now only 'limp' along within the confines of logic.

This ontological intuitive poeticizing is prior to the ontic studies and is in fact their

precursor, but it is also a way to achieve the conditions of the ontological questions

themselves. The question of Being seeks not only to reach the possibility of

condition of the foundation of sciences, but also it seeks the foundation of the

foundation of the sciences -- it properly seeks the ontology of the ontologies.

Without seeking out and exploring the various possibilities of modes of Being

ontology has no real meaning or structure -- no "guideline" (pp. 52). Thus the

question of Being itself must guide ontology or it will lose its path. The ontological

priority of the meaning of Being is to unconceal the ontology of the ontologies.

The ontical priority of the question of Being involves Dasein as the being that

questions its own Being. As a being Dasein appears quite unique in that it is

concerned with Being at all let alone the question of its very Being. Thus it is

constitutive of the Being of Dasein that it questions its own Being. Part of

Dasein's existence involves its ontological nature of Being that questions its own

Being as well as seeking the constitutive Being of all other beings (pp. 53).

Heidegger describes Dasein as pre-ontological as it has a way of being that is

fundamentally an un-intentionally ontological mode of Being.

Understanding of Being is itself a determination of the Being of Dasein (pp.

54).

So here we have an interweaving of the ontic and the ontological priority of the

question of Being. Dasein is ontological. The study of Dasein itself elicits an

understanding of the various possibilities of its Being "to be itself or not to be

itself (pp. 54)." The understanding that Dasein has of itself through interpreting

itself by experiencing itself is what Heidegger calls an existentiell understanding.

This term is not to be confused with 'existential' which is a constitutive analysis

of structure and possibilities of existence (pp. 54).

Dasein is the ontological creature whose existence allows a seeking for the

unconcealedness of the ontological existence of the other beings of the world.

Dasein itself is the basis on which the ontologies of the other beings are 'founded

and motivated'. This is the primacy of Dasein as the motivator of all the

ontologies of the totality of beings that are unlike Dasein. This is the ontic

priority of Dasein. That is, it is only through Dasein's study of other beings that

the unconcealedness of those other beings can be realized. Dasein is also in itself

ontological because it's being is an 'existentiell' understanding of itself -- this is

Dasein's ontological priority. The third priority of Dasein is an ontic-ontological

priority which involves its constitution-of-Being to "understand the Being of the

other beings of the world" (pp.55).

The ontic priority of the question of Being is to adopt a mode of inquiry of

knowledge that is embraced in an existentiell way as a possibility of the existence

of each Dasein. Only through this way of approaching the various fields of inquiry

will Dasein achieve a clear understanding of ontological questions. And only in this

way will Dasein get at the question of Being -- through the disclosedness of the

coherence (existentiality) of existence (pp. 56). Therefore, the ontical priority of

the question of Being must be dealt with before the ontological priority of the

question of Being. Some link or disclosedness with Dasein's preontological

existence must be made to clarify the question to then disclose that which in the

origin of Dasein has been forgotten or repressed.

ANXIETY

The search for the question of Being as shown above has ultimately been described

in a number of priorities. The first priority is an analysis of Dasein. To disclose

Dasein with a mind to the question of Being requires a disclosure of the most

original interpretation of Being of beings -- Dasein's preontological self. The

means of analyzing Dasein requires careful consideration. To merely place Dasein

into a theoretical category of one sort or another without carefully considering

the possibilities of its Being could quite likely scare away the very disclosure we

seek. The path that Heidegger recommends and indeed undertakes is to carefully

allow Dasein to reveal "itself to itself on its own terms" (pp. 59).

This path must be undertaken as a means of disclosing Dasein's interpretation of

Being of beings through its life experiences. What better way to travel this path

than to seek out the attitudes elicited by these life experiences. Only after the

disclosedness of the original interpretation of Being of Dasein can we undergo the

path of ontological analysis. This analysis of Dasein then is not interpretive but

merely discovery oriented first the disclosure then the interpretation of the

disclosure will follow.

Thus Heidegger describes the goal of this first task as the "horizon for the most

original interpretation of Being" (pp. 60). This horizon is merely the discovery of a
range of the original interpretations of Being which must then be in turn analyzed

leading to another horizon ultimately culminating in some sort of fundamental

horizon.

Anxiety is a mood that will help disclose this first horizon, as it will reveal in part

our attitude in relation to the totality of beings. More specifically Heidegger sees

Anxiety as a means to explore nothingness. Humanity is fundamentally concerned

with its relation to the world and its attitude guides the pursuit of this relating to

the world. And especially in its scientific pursuits humanity guided by its attitude

"irrupts" into the whole of beings. What we must do to take explicit control of the

Dasein that is revealed or disclosed by this relationship is to accept certain facts:

The relation to the world is always a relation to beings -- and nothing besides. All

attitudes are in relation to beings -- and nothing besides. The irruption of

humanity in science is the result of confrontation with beings -- and nothing

besides. This repetition of "and nothing besides" is no accident on Heidegger's

part. He finds that although we are constantly concerned with beings we always

define those beings in relation to the nothing (pp. 95).

To Heidegger the question of the nothing is a question we have too long ignored.

In the past we have assumed a pat answer to the nothing and seen negation as

merely the product of the syntax of language. Heidegger sees a way to access the
nothing through the characteristics of Dasein's trinity of relation to the world,

attitude, and irruption. Attitude becomes the key here as it is in Dasein's

attitudinal relation to the world that allows or guides its irruption into the domain

of the whole of beings.

On this path to the nothing Heidegger recognizes and adds body to his reasons for

finding logical thought limited. In the face of the question of the nothing it

appears that there can be no logical way of analyzing it. Nothing is the absence of

being the absence of everything. It in fact defies being questioned altogether. To

word a question would be to view the nothing as having properties that it clearly

does not have. To ask about the nothing, (what is the nothing?) is to view it as a

being. Since we cannot grant the nothing the status of being we cannot even

phrase a question about it. In taking recourse to thought as a 'leaping' poetic

intuition, instead of a 'limping' logical process, Heidegger believes he can get

somewhere with the question of nothing. Heidegger views the difficulty of

phrasing the question of the nothing as a mere 'formal impossibility' -- not beyond

the intellect merely beyond the bounds of logical discourse (pp.96-97).

The nothing is the complete negation of the totality of beings (pp.98).

This definition which apparently flowed quite readily from Heidegger's pen is a

demonstration that a search always has within it an anticipation of what will be

found. We already know the answer to the question of the nothing we just have

not unconcealed it yet. A proper place to start the analysis of the nothing is in our

experiences of it since we seek the original life experience or interpretation that

Heidegger posits as prior to our scientific fields of knowledge.

If the nothing is the negation of the whole of beings then we must seek out the

whole of beings and thus negate it (pp. 98). Perhaps we could image the whole of

beings and thus negate this image but as Heidegger points out we can not

understand the whole of beings. Not only is the above an impossible task, we

cannot get outside of the whole of beings to operate its negation. Hence the only

alternative is to address the whole of beings as we are in relation to it. We are in

the midst of the totality of beings.

Our attitude in relation to the world is about as concrete as we can get to an

experiential relation to the totality of beings and this is where Heidegger begins

to describe our various ways of being to the beings of the world. Not just any way

of being will do as we need understand our experiences with the whole of the

beings of the world not just in relation to specific beings which we are frequently

related to at specific points in time (pp. 99).

Feelings are the fundamental, and perhaps among the most original, ways we relate

to the world. Feelings are ways of attuning to beings (pp. 100). Heidegger seeks
the nothing in moods which bring Dasein into attunement with beings as a whole.

But of course when our attitudes of boredom or joy in the face of beings is evoked

the nothing is more concealed not less. We are distracted by the mood and at the

same time the mood may carry us far away from ideas of the nothing. What we

seek to disclose the nothing must be something more original than these moods

something which is as original as we imagine the nothing to be itself.

The fundamental mood of anxiety affects our relation with the whole of beings to

bring us in the face of the nothing. This anxiety is a "fear in the face of" which

does not lead a person to "lose their head" (pp. 100). Perspective is calm but "ill at

ease" the whole of beings begins to slip away. This mood is the nothing disclosed.

The nothing is not experienced as a negation of the whole of beings it is at one

with beings in the slipping away of the whole. This anxiety is what Heidegger

claims is the original separation of beings from the nothing in experience of Dasein.

Within the original mood of anxiety is the discovery that beings are beings -- and

not nothing. Thus he asserts that the nothing is the source of negation and not

the reverse.

It is through anxiety that Dasein is able to grasp beings and even itself. This is

achieved through the experience of the nothing and the slipping away of beings in

the face of nothing. Dasein requires the nothing as a means of a disclosure of

beings of a disclosure of even itself. Heidegger describes this relation Dasein has

to the nothing as 'being held out into the nothing'. This phrase is now adopted as a

definitive description of Dasein (pp. 103).

As it holds itself into the nothing Dasein is 'beyond beings as a whole'. It is the

essence of Dasein that it transcends all beings. Dasein does this by holding itself

into the nothing. Without holding itself into the nothing Dasein would not have a

relation to any beings whatsoever -- even itself. The nothing allows beings to exist

in relation to Dasein through allowing Dasein to relate to beings. Without the

original anxiety the unfolding of the nothing with the slipping away of beings would

not have been revealed to Dasein. It is to this disclosure of the nothing that

Dasein owes its very existence as Dasein (pp. 104).

It is through the disclosure of Dasein's most original attitudes that Heidegger

draws us nearer to the question of the meaning of being.

It is only through the intimate connection between the revelation of the

ontological and ontical priority that we can truly understand anxiety. Within the

exposition of the ontological and ontical priority Heidegger's new language unfolds

as also the relation of Dasein to these priorities unfolds. And of course it is

through in part anxiety that Dasein in itself is explored.