Batson v. Kentucky: purposeful discrimination on the part of the prosecution raises constitutional questions of utmost seriousness. A party asserting the Batson claim carries the ultimate burden of persuading the trial court, by a preponderance of the evidence.
Batson v. Kentucky: purposeful discrimination on the part of the prosecution raises constitutional questions of utmost seriousness. A party asserting the Batson claim carries the ultimate burden of persuading the trial court, by a preponderance of the evidence.
Batson v. Kentucky: purposeful discrimination on the part of the prosecution raises constitutional questions of utmost seriousness. A party asserting the Batson claim carries the ultimate burden of persuading the trial court, by a preponderance of the evidence.
ss”
DOCKET NO. CR09-0628569 —: SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT —: JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD.
vs. : AT HARTFORD
EDDIE A. PEREZ : APRIL 13, 2010
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
‘The undersigned Assistant State's Attomey respectfully requests that the court
reconsider its decision seating juror number two despite the state’s use of a peremptory
chatlenge. In support of this motion, the state asserts that the court incorrectly assigned
the burden of showing that the use of the peremptory challenge did not violate the
dictates of Batson v, Kentucky to the state. When the burden is correctly assigned to the
defendant, the record is insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the state excused the venireperson on the basis of race.
“In Batson , .. the United States Supreme Court recognized that a claim of
purposeful discrimination on the part of the prosecution in the selection of a jury raises
constitutional questions of the utmost seriousness.” State v, Collazzo, 115 Conn.App.
752, 762 (2009), quoting State v. Monroe, 98 Conn.App. 588, 590-91 (2007). “The court
concluded that [although a prosecutor ordinarly is entitled to exercise permitted
peremptory challenges for any reason at ail, as long as that reason is related to his [or her]
view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried . .. the Equal Protection Clause
forbids [a party] to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race...“ State
v. Acosta, 119 Conn.App. 14, 184-85 (2010), quoting State v. Latour, 276 Conn. 399,
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408 (2005).“Under Connecticut law, fojnce a [party] asserts a Batson claim, the [opposing
party] must advance a neutral explanation for the venite person's removal . ... The [party
asserting the Batson claim] is then afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the
{opposing party’s) articulated reasons are insufficient or pretextual .... [T]he trial court
then [has] the duty to determine if the party asserting the Batson claim] has established
purposeful discrimination.” State v. Collazzo, 115 Conn,App. at 762, quoting State v.
Monroe, 98 Conn.App. at $91. Ultimately, the party asserting the Batson elaim
“carries the ultimate burden of persuading the trial court, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the jury selection process in his or her particular case was tainted by
purposeful discrimination.” State v. Acosta, 119 Conn,App. at 185, quoting State v.
Latour, 276 Conn, at 408-410.
In this case, when the defendant asserted his Batson challenge the state
appropriately provided the court with a race neutral reason for the exercise of its
peremptory. Specifically, the state asserted that it was excusing the juror because he was
presently working as a bail bondsman and would be working as a bail bondsman on his
off hours during the trial. The state expressed concern about the fact that the juror
indicated he spent at least one day a week in the courthouse in Hartford communicating
with defendants charged with crimes in an attempt to drum up business. Given the nature
of the business in which the juror is engaged and his close contact with people charged
with crimes the state could reasonably be concemed that he might be mote sympathetic to
someone charged with a criminal offense than would another person.! Courts have
repeatedly upheld the use of peremptory challenges based on employment. State v.
' The state's concern in cis regard is enhanced by the venireperson’s response to « queation posed by
opposing counsel that he knows people who were arrested but didnot do the things the prosecution claimed
they did.eda, 51 Conn,App, 409, 425, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 912 (1999): State v. Collazzo,
115 Conn.App. at 764 (juror struck because she was a teacher),
‘Once the state raised this race neutral reason for excusing the venireperson the
burden was on the defendant to show by « preponderance of the evidence that the reason
‘was a pretext. Our courts have identified “several specific factors that may indicated that
[a party’s removal’ of @ venireperson through a peremptory challenge was motivated “by
race or gender]. These include, but are not limited to: (1) ftJhe reasons given for the
challenge were not related to the trial of the case .,. (2) the [party exercising the
peremptory strike] failed to question the challenged juror or only questioned him or her in
a perfunctory manner. . (3) prospective jurors of one race [or ethnicity] were asked a
question to elicit a particular response that was not asked of the other jurors .. (4)
persons with the same or similar characteristics but not the same race {or ethnicity} as the
challenged juror were not struck . . . (5) the [party exereising the peremptory strike ]
advanced an explanation based on a group bias where the group trait is not shown to
apply to the challenged juror specifically .. , and (6) the [patty exercising the
peremptory strike] used a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges to exclude
‘members of one race [or ethnicity].” State v. Holloway, 116 Conn.App. 818, 823-24
(2009), quoting State v. Monroe, 98 Conn. App. 588, 590-92.
In this case, the reasons proffered by the state were related to the trial of the case.
While a venireperson’s potential sympathies to those charged with crimes might not be
relevant in a civil case they certainly are when the venireperson is a potential juror ina
criminal case. As the court noted yesterday, the venireperson was not questioned in a
perfunctory manner nor was he asked questions that were not asked of other jurors, Noother jurors who are acting as bailbondsman have been accepted and because there is no
evidence that the state has used a disproportionate number of challenges to exclude
members of one ethnicity. Finally, the state's concetn that the venireperson’s
employment might lead him to be sympathetic to those charged with crimes is supported
by his response that he knows several people who were arrested who did not do what the
prosecution claimed they did.
In this case, the defendant has made no showing that the state’s concems about
the effect of the venireperson’s employment on his ability to be a fair and impartial juror
are invalid, The fact that the veniteperson indicated he could be fair and impartial is the
reason why he was not challenged for cause. ‘That, however, should not preclude the
state's legitimate use of a peremptory challenge.
Wherefore, the state of Connecticut respectfully requests that the court reconsider
its ruling and allow the state's to exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse juror number
two.
Respectfully submitted,
Christophel A. Alexy
Supervisory Assistant State’s Attorney
300 Corporate Place
Rocky Hill, CT 06067
860) 258-5800
aS SeORDER
‘The foregoing motion having been heard it is hereby ORDERED:
GRANTED/DENIED.
‘The court
CERTIFICATION
Thereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to counsel of
record, Hubert Santos, this 13" day of April, 2010.
‘Commissionef of the Superigr