Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FFRF V Geithner 5 10
FFRF V Geithner 5 10
FFRF V Geithner 5 10
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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FREEDOM FROM RELIGION
12 FOUNDATION, INC.; PAUL STOREY; NO. CIV. 2:09-2894 WBS DAD
BILLY FERGUSON; KAREN
13 BUCHANAN; JOSEPH MORROW;
ANTHONY G. ARLEN; ELISABETH MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
14 STEADMAN; CHARLES AND COLLETTE MOTIONS TO DISMISS
CRANNELL; MIKE OSBORNE; KRISTI
15 CRAVEN; WILLIAM M. SHOCKLEY;
PAUL ELLCESSOR; JOSEPH
16 RITTELL; WENDY CORBY; PAT
KELLEY; CAREY GOLDSTEIN;
17 DEBORAH SMITH; KATHY FIELDS;
RICHARD MOORE; SUSAN ROBINSON;
18 AND KEN NAHIGIAN,
19 Plaintiffs,
20 v.
21 TIMOTHY GEITHNER, in his
official capacity as Secretary
22 of the United States
Department of the Treasury;
23 DOUGLAS SHULMAN, in his
official capacity as
24 Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service; and SELVI
25 STANISLAUS, in her official
capacity as Executive Officer
26 of the California Franchise
Tax Board,
27
Defendants.
28 /
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2 Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. (“FFRF”), a non-
3 profit organization that advocates for the separation of church
4 and state, and several of its members who live in California have
5 filed this action against Timothy Geithner, in his official
6 capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of
7 Treasury, and Douglas Shulman, in his official capacity as
8 Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and Selvi
9 Stanislaus, in her official capacity as Executive Officer of the
10 California Franchise Tax Board, seeking a declaration that 26
11 U.S.C. §§ 107 and 265(a)(6) violate the Establishment Clause of
12 the United States Constitution and that sections 17131.6 and
13 17280(d)(2) of the California Revenue and Taxation Code violate
14 the Establishment Clause of the United States and California
15 Constitutions and seeking injunctive relief.
16 Defendants Geithner and Shulman (“federal defendants”)
17 and defendant Stanislaus separately move to dismiss plaintiffs’
18 Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
19 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and pursuant to Rule
20 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
21 granted.
22 I. The Assailed Statutes and Regulations
23 Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”)
24 provides that:
25 In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income
does not include-
26 (1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part
of his compensation; or
27 (2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his
compensation, to the extent used by him to rent or
28 provide a home and to the extent such allowance does not
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1 v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (“Of
2 course a state official in his or her official capacity, when
3 sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983
4 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not
5 treated as actions against the State.’”) (quoting Kentucky v.
6 Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)).
7 This provides a narrow exception to Eleventh Amendment
8 immunity where the plaintiff seeks to “end a continuing violation
9 of federal law.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
10 73 (1996) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)); see
11 Green, 474 U.S. at 68 (“[T]he availability of prospective relief
12 of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy
13 Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of
14 federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in
15 assuring the supremacy of that law.”).
16 Here, the “continuing violation of federal law” alleged
17 by plaintiffs is the administration and enforcement of sections
18 17131.6 and 17280(d)(2) of the California Revenue and Taxation
19 Code in violation of the Establishment Clause. In their
20 Complaint, plaintiffs seek only prospective declaratory and
21 injunctive relief, both of which are available to plaintiffs
22 bringing suit against a state pursuant to § 1983. See, e.g.,
23 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 847 (9th Cir.
24 2002) (collecting cases).
25 Although Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521
26 U.S. 261 (1997) limited Ex parte Young and held that the state
27 sovereignty interest in title to its lands is “core area of state
28 sovereignty” such that suit for quiet title is barred by the
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1 income under the tax code rather than though direct grants. The
2 court declines to so hold today. Plaintiffs have therefore
3 established that they have standing as federal taxpayers to
4 challenge §§ 107 and 265(a)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code for
5 allegedly violating the Establishment Clause.
6 b. State Taxpayer Standing
7 The Supreme Court recently clarified state taxpayer
8 standing limits in DaimlerChrysler, stating that the general
9 prohibition on federal taxpayer standing “applies with
10 undiminished force to state taxpayers.” 547 U.S. at 345. The
11 Court specifically addressed and rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
12 criteria–-most prominently articulated in Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi,
13 741 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1984)--for determining whether a state
14 taxpayer met the Doremus v. Board of Education of Borough of
15 Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952), “good-faith pocketbook” test for
16 whether a taxpayer had standing to sue. DaimlerChrysler, 547
17 U.S. at 346 & n.4 (“[W]e hold that state taxpayers have no
18 standing under Article III to challenge state tax or spending
19 decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers.”).
20 While prior Ninth Circuit case law interpreting Doremus may have
21 articulated different tests for state and federal taxpayer
22 standing, DaimlerChrysler applies federal taxpayer standing
23 restrictions to state taxpayers as well. See Arakaki v. Lingle
24 (“Arakaki II”), 477 F.3d 1049, 1061-63 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting
25 that DaimlerChrysler effectively overruled Hoohuli).
26 Stanislaus’s reliance on Doremus, Arakaki v. Lingle, 423 F.3d 954
27 (9th Cir. 2005), Hoohuli, and Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765
28 (9th Cir. 1991), therefore, is misplaced in light of
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1 DaimlerChrysler.
2 While the Supreme Court has never decided the issue of
3 whether a state tax benefit was “analogous to an exercise of
4 congressional power under Article 1, § 8,” DaimlerChrysler, 547
5 U.S. at 347, the Ninth Circuit in Winn specifically noted that
6 state tax credits constituted exercises of the state’s taxing and
7 spending powers. See 562 F.3d at 1008. Furthermore, as the
8 court has previously discussed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
9 heard and decided state taxpayer suits challenging state tax
10 credits, exemptions, and deductions under the Establishment
11 Clause and analyzed them according to the Flast test. See Hibbs,
12 542 U.S. 88, Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. 1, Mueller, 463 U.S. 388.4
13 Because, as explained above, plaintiffs have
14 successfully alleged an Establishment Clause violation that meets
15 Flast’s strict dictates, plaintiffs have likewise established
16 that they have standing as state taxpayers to challenge sections
17 17131.6 and 17280(d)(2) of the California Revenue and Taxation
18 Code for allegedly violating the Establishment Clause.
19 B. Motions to Dismiss for Failure To State a Claim
20 On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the
21 allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
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23 Federal courts have also decided challenges to state
tax benefits under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
24 Amendment. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 93-94 (“It is hardly ancient
history that States, once bent on maintaining racial segregation
25 in public schools, and allocating resources disproportionately to
benefit white students to the detriment of black students,
26 fastened on tuition grants and tax credits as a promising means
to circumvent Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27 The federal courts, this Court among them, adjudicated the
ensuing challenges, instituted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and upheld
28 the Constitution’s equal protection requirement.”) (internal
citation omitted).
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1 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990) (general sales and use tax does not
2 impose a “constitutionally significant” burden on religion to the
3 extent that it “merely decreases the amount of money” the tax-
4 paying entity has to spend on religious activities) (citing
5 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1980)); Hernandez, 490
6 U.S. at 700 (rejecting the argument that “an incrementally larger
7 tax burden interferes with [] religious activities” because
8 “[t]his argument knows no limitation”); Follett v. Town of
9 McCormick, S.C., 321 U.S. 573, 578 (1944), (reiterating that a
10 preacher is not “free from all financial burdens of government,
11 including taxes on income or property,” and “like other citizens,
12 may be subject to general taxation”). The exclusive benefit to
13 ministers and religion provided in § 107, therefore, cannot
14 reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed
15 deterrent to the free exercise of religion.
16 The federal defendants also argue that § 107 is a
17 natural outgrowth of the historical tradition of exempting church
18 property from taxation. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 677. The federal
19 defendants correctly note that there is a historical precedent
20 for the state exempting church property from taxation that
21 precedes the Republic, and such exemptions have been found not to
22 violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 667 & n.1. But see id.
23 at 678 (“[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right in
24 violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of
25 time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates
26 it.”).
27 Indeed, property tax exemptions serve the important
28 purpose of keeping government out of the undesirable–-and
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23 v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1993). The United States Senate
24 Finance Committee report on the Act stated that the reason for
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27 If § 107 is found unconstitutional as this court has
indicated, then plaintiffs’ challenge to § 265(a)(6) is moot as
28 there would be no “double dipping.” The court nevertheless
addresses plaintiffs’ claims.
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2 for mortgage interest and real property taxes claimed by ministers and
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At oral argument, counsel for Stanislaus represented
27 that section 17131.6, unlike its federal counterpart, contains no
limitation on the amount that a minister may claim as a housing
28 allowance. This, if anything, would strengthen plaintiffs’
claims that California is impermissibly benefitting religion.
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