RESISTANCE TO COLONIZATION: THE CASE OF THE MOROS AND THE

KARENS - A CONTINUING SAGA OF RESISTANCE 1946-2000

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

By:

Nelson Sixto H. Ganancial

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Secession or separatism is one of the various forms of resistance to a perceived

neo-colonialist. Though colonialism or imperialism to a certain degree is a thing in the
past, the recurrence of this issue has been observed from the different periods of history,
particularly in countries that were once under colonial rulers. The Philippines and Burma
are no exception. The problem of resistance to colonization was present during the
colonial period of these two countries. But while the British used education and giving
equal opportunities to the Karens in Burma with other ethnic groups, the Spaniards used
the sword and the cross in dealing with the Moros of Mindanao. To compare the
separatist movements of the Moros in the southern Philippines and the Karens of Burma
is complicated because they have few things in common. First: Burma was colonized by
the British while the Philippines was colonized by Spain and America, in short they were
colonized by different colonial powers; Second: The Moros are Muslims, while majority
of the Burmans are animists, except for the ten percent that practice either Buddhism or
Christianity, hence, they could not be compared with the use of religion; and Third: The
Moros were not totally conquered by the Spaniards and not even by the Americans.
Though in the eyes of the Americans they conquered the Moros, the Moros think
otherwise because they signed treaties of friendship not surrender. The Karens however,
were defeated and relocated from their homeland and distributed throughout Burma by
the British. Though they did not have the same colonizers and similar experiences during
the colonial period of their countries, both the Moros and the Karens signified their
opposition to their inclusion in the independent to be nations. Aside from this, there is a
persistence of their ethnocentric attitude that binds them together. The Moros are
ethnocentric though diverse in their cultures and values, because they are composed of at
least 13 cultural groups with the Tausogs, Maguindanaons and the Maranaos as the
dominant groups. Aside from the ethnocentrism of the Moros, their Islamic faith
contributed much to their solidarity. On the other hand, the Karens are also diverse not
only in culture but in religion as well. There are Red Karens and other sub-races among
them, and Buddhists and Christians as well. These complexities add more color to the
study than ambiguity. However, they have two things in common, their ethnocentric
nature and their aspirations for independence. As both these groups (Moros and Karens)
are ethnocentric, this study attempts to find out whether ethnocentrism transcends culture
and religion in order to achieve their goal.
NSHG 2
It is interesting to note at this point that the Karens considered the Burmans, as
their first oppressive colonizers but not the British. On the one hand, though the British
conquered Burma, the Karens were treated and given equal opportunities with the
Burmans, thus, their positive attitude towards their British colonizers. This infuriated the
Burmans because they consider the Karens as backward hill tribe people. Thus, the
control of the Burmans of the seat of power meant a continuation of the rule of their
original oppressors. The Moros on the other hand consider the Spaniards as their
enemies because the Spaniards tried to conquer them and destroy their religion but they
did not the Americans as their enemies. Like the Karens who consider the British as
better than the Burmans, the Moros also consider the Americans as better than the
Christian-Filipinos. They do not even consider themselves Filipinos, because the
Spaniards were not able to conquer them. The irony about it is that the Christian-
Filipinos are considered as the alter ego of the Spaniards that they consider greatest
enemies than the Americans who did more damage to them than the Spaniards.

It appeared therefore that the Karens look at the rule of the Burman and later the
Burman dominated SLORCs as the return of their pre-Western colonizers, while the
Moros, considered the rule of the Christian dominated Philippine government as the
carry-over of Spanish colonization,1 although it was the United States of America that
granted Philippine Independence. The only difference between these two cultural groups
or Indigenous Peoples is that, the Karens do not regard religion as an important factor of
being a Karen but their race, while the Moros though they belong to different ethnic
groups consider religion as a uniting factor.2

Ethnic pluralism:
The consequence of colonial rule is Ethnic pluralism. However, one could still
distinguish different types of ethnically homogeneous society, depending on the socio-
historical basis on which minority communities are differentiated. According to past
studies, minority communities may be divided into three major categories: The first
consists of minority immigrant population; The second is represented by groups such as
the Aborigines in Australia, the American Indians, etc.; and the Third category results
from incorporating autonomous peoples under an alien authority, or from diminishing the
sphere of authority of local and regional groups under a policy of unification and
centralization under a national government. This study is concern with the third group
where the Moros and the Karens belong. Among these groups, separatism is perceived
not only as having a socio-historical logic but also as being a practical possibility because
of the coincidence of geography and cultural plurality, distance from the center of
authority, and the support of sympathetic groups outside the state.
1
This explains why the Moros always consider any project or development programs for them to
have hidden agenda against them.
2
Among the Moros, the Maranaos strictly adhere to their traditions. Though one may have been
born or even have a Muslim father if he is not a Muslim, he is considered as an outcast, but not is Sulu. As
long as you had been born and grew-up in Sulu, you are considered as one of them, whatever your religion
is. The only difference is that, you do not have a chance of course to be proclaimed as sultan or whatever
royal position because you do not belong to the royal clans.
NSHG 3
An ethnic minority or what is called as Indigenous Peoples (IP) 3 is a group of
people who differ in race or color or in national, religious, or cultural origin from the
dominant group, often the majority population of the countries in which they live. The
different identity of an ethnic minority may be displayed in a number of ways, ranging
from distinctive customs, lifestyles, language or accent, dress, and food preferences to
particular attitudes, moral values, and economic or political beliefs espoused by members
of the group.
Characteristically, the minority is recognized but not necessarily accepted by the
larger society in which its members live. The nature of the relationship of the ethnic
minority to the larger society tends to determine whether the minority group will move in
the direction of assimilation in the larger society or toward self-segregation. In some
cases ethnic minorities have been simply excluded by the majority, a striking example
being African Americans in the American South during the late-19th and 20th centuries.
Ethnocentrism is the tendency to regard the beliefs, standards, and code of
behavior of one's own culture or subculture as superior to those found in other societies.
Because humans tend to take for granted the culture they are born and raised in, the
tendency toward cultural bias in favor of one's own group is universally present.
Ethnocentrism thus may serve the socially useful function of encouraging cohesion and
solidarity among group members; it may also contribute, however, to attitudes of
superiority, intolerance, and even contempt for groups having different customs and ways
of life. In the 19th century, for example, ethnocentrism served to reinforce colonial rule
in Asia and Africa. Because European society tended to consider non-Western cultures
inferior to its own, the notion evolved that it was the "white man's burden" to teach
Western traditions and techniques to non-European peoples.4

Ethnic Solidarity:

There are many perspectives on ethnic solidarity that could be gleaned from
different disciplines and points-of-view. Three of these that are relevant to this study are
the following:
First: Reactive Ethnicity: Internal colonialism and the Cultural Division of
Labor Theory. Ethnic solidarity (ethnic mobilization) is seen as a reaction of the
culturally distinct periphery against the exploitative core. The theory predicts reactive
ethnic solidarity when economic activity within periphery is concentrated in the hands of
the core ethnic majority or when a pattern of structural discrimination exists.
Second: Competitive Perspective of Ethnicity. This suggests that a large part of
the conflict stemmed from competition of different ethnic groups for positions in the
national bureaucracy and in the armed forces.

3
Indigenous Peoples is the accepted term to refer to what was referred before as ethnic group,
cultural minority or national minority etc. This is approved by the UN conference on Indigenous Peoples.
4
Forbes, H. D., Nationalism, Ethnocentrism, and Personality (1986); Reynolds, V., The
Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism and
Nationalism (1986); Robertson, W., The Ethnostate (1993). Copyright (c) 1999 Grolier Interactive Inc.
Please see also the work of W.K. Che Man on Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and
the Malays of Southern Thailand (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990), pp. 1-16.
NSHG 4
The third is Ecological Competition Theory: This states that ethnic conflict is
mainly the result of intense competition between ethnic groups for the occupation of
social niches.

Islam and Nationalism

In the Muslim world, Islam is a political ideology and a way of life as well.
Everything revolves around it and mobilizes the people to mass action. The mosques, for
example, provides a somewhat a safe place to meet but also to discuss matters concerning
them, especially during their Friday worships. Their Imams and other religious leaders
are symbols of integrity and selflessness that contrasted sharply with the corruption and
aggrandizement of the ruling powers.

Buddhism
Buddhism is one of the great world religions, which originated in India in the 5th
century BC. It derives its teaching from Buddha, who is regarded as one of a series of
such enlightened beings. The chief doctrine is that all phenomena share three
characteristics: they are impermanent, unsatisfactory, and lack a permanent essence (such
as a soul). All beings, including gods, are subject to these characteristics, but can achieve
freedom through enlightenment.

Terms used in this article

Abu Sayyaf – A Moro resurgent group in Basilan founded by Abdurajak
Janjalani. The group used Jihad as their means of attaining their goal.
BMLO – Bangsamoro Liberation Organization.
Burma – The old official name of the country now called Myanmar. The study
used Burma instead of Myanmar as it the accepted term by the Karens and other ethnic
races that rebelled against the Burmese government.
Burman – A member of the ethnic race in Burma.
Burmese – Term used to mean the Burmese government.
Karen – An ethnic race in Burma who migrated to the Kawtholei area.
KNL – Karen National League – Canadian based Karen organization supporting
the Karen struggle.
KNU – Karen National Union, the umbrella organization of the Karens and it acts
as their political arms for their armed struggle.
Manerplaw – The Headquarters of the Karens.
MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
Moro – It came from the word Moors or people of Morocco but applied to the
Muslims in the Philippines because for the Spaniards all Muslims are Moros. It became
pejorative when the Muslims retaliated against Spanish incursions in Mindanao in their
infamous piratical and slave raiding activities.
Secessionism or separatism - An act of severing official membership or ties
from a country, province, region or state.
SLORC – This abbreviation means State Law and Order Restoration Council.
The present rulers of Burma/Myanmar and were mostly composed of Burman army
personnel.
NSHG 5
Sultanate – The political system of the Moros.

Chapter II
Background

PHILIPPINES
Philippine History is incomplete unless the history of the periphery shall be
incorporated and this includes the Muslims in Mindanao. Lately, history writers tried to
include the Moro history and their struggles against the colonial powers. However, they
could not give justice to the aspirations of the Muslims or Moros not because of their
biases but mainly because of the insufficiency of data from the Muslims themselves.
Muslim history can never be completed because of the sensitivity of the issues and unless
the Muslims themselves help straighten the records by opening their genealogies to
scholars.5
Present historians agree that Philippine history should be written in the Filipino
point-of-view but attempts were taken to place the Moro Resistance during the Spanish
regime in the right perspective in Filipino history. Even those who wrote the history of
the Muslims failed to place the Muslim in the proper context in the history of the
Filipinos in general. Their model in analyzing the Moro activities is influenced by
western historiography.6 Thus, to write the history of the Philippines without considering
the Muslims is incomplete. Likewise, to write the history of the Muslims without taking
into consideration its role in the overall history of the Philippines is also a liability rather
than an asset in the pursuit of knowledge. There will always be contradictions because of
the psychological orientations of both the Christianized-Filipinos and the Moros
(Muslim-Filipinos).
The so-called slave raids and piracy are seen as notorious campaigns of the Moros
against the helpless and hapless Christians in the coastal areas of the archipelago, without
analyzing the aims and objectives of such activities. Thus, the term Moro 7 became a
5
Moro history is very sensitive that even the Mamitua Saber Memorial Research Center appeared
to have been burned not only because of harassment for employment purposes but for the documents that
put some prominent families in Lanao in bad light.
6
By western historiography, I refer to the superiority of the whites and the much dependence on
written sources, and the inferiority of Oral history. Though Oral History had been institutionalized in the
70s, in the United States of America, in the Philippines documents and records stand superior to Oral
sources. Lately, Oral History became one of the subjects which show that Oral History is getting the
attention that it needs, particularly in a country where people are not a writing people.
7
This is the description of the Moro in the Internet. Moro, member of any of a number of Muslim
communities in the Philippines, speaking Moro or related dialects of the Tagala branch of the Indonesian
languages, and living on the islands of the Sulu Archipelago, on southern Palawan, and on Mindanao in the
regions of Lake Buluan, Lake Lanao, and the northwestern and western coasts. The Moro are of mixed
Malayan stock, with some Arab and Chinese admixture. They are a short, brown-skinned, black-haired
people, following an economy based on fishing, some farming, and the manufacture of cloth, brass, and
steel. Moro homes, often on or near water, are raised high on poles. The timbers are lashed together with
rattan, and the sides and roofs are made of palm leaves sewed together. The Moro were converted to Islam
in the 15th and 16th centuries. Polygamy, sanctioned by their religion, was formerly widespread but is now
generally confined to the rulers of the tribes. Slavery was also a recognized institution, the slaves being
acquired by raids on neighboring tribes. Local government is patriarchal and is headed by a chief called a
sultan. The supreme ruler of the tribes is the sultan of Sulu. At the present time his rule is nominal and does
NSHG 6
pejorative title for the Muslims in the Philippines. This negative image of the Muslims
that is further reinforced by the Spanish friars, is very difficult to eliminate after more
than three centuries of the being the accepted nature of the Muslims in the Philippines.
Hence, Moro piracy and raids are interpreted as criminal activities, not as the heroic
resistance of the Muslims against colonization. Not because it was not a resistance per
se, but because the victims of their resistance were the Christianized Indios from northern
Mindanao to the shores of Luzon, especially the Bicol area. Thus, Albay was then
referred as a Moro Gulf.8
An in-depth analysis is not yet achieved for fear of misunderstanding and re-
opening of old wounds as well as the sensitivities or sensibilities of both groups.
However, as we had just celebrated the Centennial of the Declaration of Independence of
the Philippines,9 it is imperative that the Moro Resistance be placed in the right
perspective of our history to make the records straight.

Short History of the Moros (Muslim Filipinos)

The Coming of Islam

To understand the resurgence of Moro Resistance against the neo-colonialist-
Manila it is first better to review their history. According to Najeeb Saleeby, the first
scholar to do a study on the Moros, “Islam penetrated the Philippines through Makhdum
who came to northern Mindanao and Sulu sometime in 1380.”10 However, he continues,
the “Moro history and nationality owe their beginning in the Philippine Islands to two
persons: Abu Bakr and Sarip Kabungsuwan in Mindanao.”11 Abu Bakr or Sayed-Al-
Hashim Abubakar12 came from Mecca and arrived in Bwansa (or Buansa, the ancient
capital of Sulu) in 1480. He married Paramisuli, the only daughter of Rajah Baginda and
became the judge and a high priest. After the death of Baginda, Abu Bakr assumed
leadership and assumed the title sultan, as well as introduced the sultanate system to the
Tausugs. He proceeded to organize his kingdom, taught former priests with the Quran;
he built mosques, converts people to Islam, levied taxes and tribute and published the
first code and a system of courts. He organized the whole archipelago of Sulu into one
nation.
From 1460 to 1521, the Sulus or the Tausogs lived unmolested and prospered.
But after this date, they seemed destined for a different experience. The Moros watched
not extend beyond his personal following; he has sworn allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
According to a recent estimate, the Moro, with other Muslims in the Philippine Islands, number about 3
million.
8
Francisco Mallari, “Maritime Response, 1793-1818,” Philippine Studies Journal Vol. 34, (1986),
p. 471.
9
I would like to differentiate the Declaration of Independence of the Sang-Katagalogan by Andres
Bonifacio from the Declaration of Independence of the Philippines by Aguinaldo. Although, it refers to the
same country but the first was complete independence while the latter as under “the protection of the
benevolent government of the United State of America.
10
Najeeb Saleeby, The Early History of the Moros, (Typescript, a reprint by W. Mijares, MSU
URC, from the personal files of Mamitua Saber, personal file of the researcher), p. 3.
11
Ibid., p. 1. Please see also the work of the Filipinas Foundation, Inc., The Anatomy of
Philippine Muslim Affairs, pp. 45-50.
12
Please see also the work of the Filipinas Foundation, Inc., The Anatomy of Philippine Muslim
Affairs, pp. 50-68.
NSHG 7
the progress of Legazpi at Cebu, Panay, and Luzon, and they also knew how the pagan
chiefs were subjugated as well as the expulsion of their Muslim brothers from Manila
under Rajah Solaiman. Their love of home and family prompted them to resist and fight
the colonizers.13
Actually, the first person to introduce Islam in the Philippines was Makhdum (or
Sharif-ul-Makhdum in other records). He was an Arabian scholar who reached Malacca
in circa 1350. Later, he went to Mindanao and Sulu in 1380, and made a few converts.
He was believed to have built the first mosque in Bwansa, formerly the capital of Sulu.
However, the honor to have introduced the sultanate and converted the majority in Sulu
and Mindanao belongs to Abu Bakr and Sarip Kabungsuwan respectively. They were
responsible to the introduction of the Quran to the people of Sulu and Mindanao. The
Quran contains the words of God; they call Allah, which were revealed to Mohammad
through Archangel Gabriel (Jibrael).14 The basic teachings of Islam are:
1 Profession of Faith; that there is no other God than Allah and Mohammad is
his Prophet;
2 Praying five times a day;
3 Fasting during the month of Ramadan;
4 Alms giving (ten percent of anyone’s income);
5 Pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime.
The Moros were and still are obdurate, daring, tenacious and adventurous, but
highly ethnocentric or we might coin the word tribalistic. These would explain the
differing motives of their piratical activities and slave raids, economic, political, religious
or mere adventure. They did not have a central government, though culturally diverse;
one thing unified them – Islam, the Dar-ul-Islam (house of Islam). They did not also
have any standing army and navy, but they had boats, forts, and firearms as well as able-
bodied men as their soldiers and sailors, armed and ready to fight when called to duty.
It is a shame of a Moro and his family to surrender. “Life itself meant nothing to them, as
against Islam and honor. No defeat could bend such people to submission.” 15 They
prefer death than the shame of surrender.

Spanish Period
In the attempt of the Spaniards to bend the knees of the Moros to submission and
to destroy their religion, the Moros retaliated. They attacked and brought havoc to the
countless civilians of the Christianized areas particularly from the northern part of
Mindanao, the Visayan Islands and Luzon especially in the Bicol area that displaced a lot
of people in order to escape the Moro raids. Their offensive operations were called in
Spanish records as guerras piraticas or pangayao16 in the local dialect. They added the
miseries of the families of their Christianized-Filipino victims who were also suffering
from the hands of the Spanish colonizers. There were towns that were totally erased from

13
Saleeby, p. 2.
14
Ibid., p. 3.
15
Mayo, p. 290.
16
A paper entitled, Pangayao: The Moro Response to Spanish Incursion in Mindanao was also
done by this researcher as a requirement of the course KAS 321 was written by this researcher. Please refer
also to the article of Mamitua Saber, Ilanun of Sabah: An Ethnic Extraction from Mindanao,” (Typescript)
Mamitua Saber Research Center, 1984.
NSHG 8
the map because their whole population was either killed or brought down to Mindanao
as slaves.17 The different Moro tribes, the Maranaos, the Tausogs and the
Maguindanaons, either in single or multi-ethnic groups ravaged these areas. They
became so notorious that the mention of the term Moro is already enough for people to
feel the chill of fear and panicked for mass evacuations from their pueblos or towns. 18
The Spaniards were not able to totally check these activities until their last days in the
Philippines.
In spite of their diversity because of cultural, linguistic and ethnic differences, yet,
they are united by Islam and by their traditional datuship system. Nonetheless, this
diversity was also their asset as well as a liability. An asset because once a sultanate or
datu surrenders, the others were not obliged to follow because they were not politically
united (unlike other places that when their leader/s of the superior tribe surrenders, the
rest surrendered as well); A liability because there were times when one tribal group was
forced to compromise, others just did not bother.19 In spite of this, the Moros were not
totally subjugated or conquered.20 They may have signed treaties, but these treaties did
not mean surrender or subjugation for them. It is an indication of their equal status with
the enemies. These treaties are only ploys of the Moros according to Tomas Comyn, 21
and most of the time they were shattered by their offensive operations 22 on the Spaniards
and the Christian-Filipino territories.
Then, late in 1895 the Spaniards when they were about to control totally the last
bastion of the Moro resistance in Mindanao – Lanao, they left. They left the lake area to
concentrate their efforts to smash the Katipunan that was the Philippine Revolution
followed and they never return again. It was a blessing in disguise because it halted the
massive operations of the colonizers against the Moros. However, to their dismay, the
Spaniards included their territories when it turned over the colony to the new colonizers -
the American. Until now the Moros regretted this historical event because for them they
were not part of the Spanish colony in the Philippines.
Saleeby pointed out that the failure of the Spaniards to influence or subjugate the
Moros was caused by the following reasons:
1. Intolerance and impatience (of the Spaniards);
2. Non-occupation of Moroland with forces sufficient to maintain Spanish
supremacy in the South;

17
Please refer to the two articles of Francisco Mallari about the Raids in Bicol and the Naval
Response of the Spaniards and the Bicolanos.
18
Mallari, “Maritime Response, 1783-1818,” p. 473.
19
Let us be reminded that an agreement or treaty of peace for the Spaniards it signify surrender,
but for the Muslims it is only a strategy to consolidate their forces for another possible offensives.
20
This is the same argument that the Cordillerans raised in order to demand their autonomous
status. They too never surrendered or defeated. They prefer to run into the hinterland than being subjects
to the Spaniards as to the Moro’s preference to die than surrender.
21
Quoted by Francisco Mallari, “Muslim Raids in Bicol, 1580-1792,” Philippine Studies Journal
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1986), p. 266.
22
Please take note that this researcher uses the term offensive operations not Moro piracies and
slave raids because it is an established fact that the sultanate was a political institution and when hostilities
between two sovereign nation occur, any act of violence inflicted on one side is a strategy not a criminal
one.
NSHG 9
3. Failure to rule the people through their chiefs and to give proper respect
to native authority;
4. Failure to understand the “Agama System,” for the basis of the Moro laws
and government.23

The American Period

The Americans also suffered the same problems on the Moros at the beginning of
their colonization. But they soon succeeded in bringing the Moros into the claws of the
American eagle without necessarily surrendering but friendship.24 First, they did not
force the issue on religion but tolerance; Second, they used force to persuade them to
submit and compromise; and Third, they had a strong force to counter any attempt of the
Moros to counterattack,25 which the Spaniards had none. They resisted but defeated
because of the superiority of the American weapons compared with their bladed weapon.
Later, they accepted American Imperialism in the guise of friendship. Treaties after
treaties were signed which appeared on surface level to indicate their equal status with
the Americans but not with the Christians. This could be seen in the number of letters
sent to General John J. Pershing by the different Datus of Lanao. In a letter of Datu
Aliyodan of Pualas and his brother Pagabangan, it reads:
In view of our father’s death (Ami Pakpak) and as this your friend we notify you
of his leaving us with the object that you may not that his children have not notified you
of the fact and at the same time we offer you our friendship, as same as you have
professed to our father.
Received June 28, 1902. 26

When the Americans hinted to recognize the Philippine Independence and

Mindanao would be part of it, the Moros were mad and demanded that they should not be
ceded to the Philippines when independence will be granted. Among the spokesmen who
opposed to inclusion of the Moros is the Philippines was Ami (Ama-i or father of)
Binaning. During the visit of Quezon to Lanao, campaigning for the independence in
June 1923, he did not gain the support of the Moros because, “He attacked the Moro’s
friend (Gen. Wood)27 and he threatened them with ‘grave consequences.’” Quezon said
on that meeting, “America’s day is done, her government in the Philippines to-day is a
fable. It is the Filipino Legislature that governs you Moros. This man Wood is a
figurehead. It is only a question of a little time and every American in the Islands will be
chased out. You Moros will do well to submit to us now.” Amai Binaning in front of
Quezon and the Constabulary declared, “You shall not govern us. We stay with

23
Saleeby, p. 4.
24
John J. Pershing, “Lake Lanao Expedition, May 15-September 14, 1902,” Box No. 370, Library
of Congress Manuscript Division. (MSU Mamitua Saber Memorial Research Center).
25
Mark Twain in a newspaper article accused the American government to use brutality while
claiming to be Christians. This is because of the letters of volunteers in the Philippine Campaigns that had
been published in the New York Times telling how they shot women and children to force the Tausugs to
surrender if not they will kill their women and children including their helpless olds.
26
John J. Pershing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Box 319.
27
Quezon told the Maranaos that Gen. Wood could anymore help them because he is only a
figurehead. The Maranaos reacted negatively.
NSHG 10
America.”28 Later, the Constabulary attacked and killed Amai Binaning together with
his family.29 “They simply died-for honor and for America.”30
The Moros sent letters after letters of appeal to be excluded from the Philippines,
but it never reached America or Leonard Wood. One of such letters reads:
United States of America,
Philippine Islands,
Province of Zamboanga

Datu . . . . being duly sworn, upon his oath states:

That he has been informed that his alleged signature is attached to a petition asking for
Philippine Independence and containing statements said to be derogatory to his
Excellency Governor-General Leonard Wood. That the affiant has never signed any such
petition, but that he has always, during the many years he known Governor-General
Wood, had the greatest respect and admiration for him, both as a man and as a public
official.
That he has never been a party to, nor has he ever signed a petition or document
criticizing the Governor-General in the slightest degree. The affiant is in favor of the
segregation of Mindanao and Sulu and Palawan from the Philippine Islands and the re-
organization of same under the American Flag as an unorganized territory of the United
States, or otherwise as Congress may deem best.31

The American congress did not know all this. In the House Committee’s hearing
on March 6, 1924, then Speaker Roxas said:
With reference to the assertion made by the Secretary of War that the Moros are
opposed to Independence, we beg to differ with him. If there is any such opposition, it
comes from those few who, as a result of the organized activities of American enemies of
Independence in getting the Moros to express themselves as opposed to Independence,
salaried agents being employed for this purpose, have been persuaded . . . to express
opposition.32

Whether the U.S. Congress had objectively looked into the allegations of the
Secretary of War and verified the contentions of Roxas, we would never know.

Commonwealth Period
Though the Philippines was already run by Quezon and his men during the
Commonwealth Period, the Muslims did not lost hope that their aspirations for either
statehood, dependency status or complete independence of Mindanao will still be
28
Mayo, pp. 308-309.
29
It appeared that Quezon would like to posture himself like the Americans, that whosoever
disagree with him shall die. It is now becoming clear that this Moro opposition to be part of the Philippine
territory got the ire of the men behind Quezon that to some extent explains why the Moros were not treated
as equal with the Christians. History would show that representatives to the Philippine Congress
representing the Moroland were appointed not elected. In Lanao for example, election was never held
until the second term of Marcos.
30
Mayo, p. 310.
31
Ibid., p. 318.
32
Ibid., p. 331. Of course this is not true. The Pershing papers that had just been declassified
recently would disprove Roxas, and there is even the possibility of those working in the Post Office to be
accused of criminal liability because of opening and censoring letters.
NSHG 11
considered by the American Congress before granting33 Philippine Independence in
1946 as stipulated in the Tydings-McDuffie Law. The negative reaction of the Moros
against the Christian-Filipinos ruling over them, as they considered them (Christian-
Filipinos) as their enemies,34 was already showing during the Japanese Occupation. The
Maranaos for example confiscated the arms and ammunitions of the fleeing USAFFE
soldiers.35 Moro guerrilla leaders like Pendatun, Dimaporo, Mindalano, and many others
defended their homeland but no record would show that they had Christian members.
But it is a fact that only in Lanao that there was an uprising against the Japanese, and
where the Japanese were afraid to go out in their camps without many escorts.36

Modern Nation
After the war the Americans granted the Filipinos their independence. The
Congress of the United States of America included the Muslim Mindanao into the
Philippine Republic, but retained the territories they deemed useful for them, the
Marianas group of islands, supposed to be part of the Philippine territories under the
Spanish colony. But, “the Moros resisted, since their historical enemies now had formal
state power”37 over them, the perceived enemies.
The newly independent Philippine government decided to divide Lanao into two
provinces not only to give way to the clamor of the Muslims for leadership of their
homeland but because the Maranaos were afraid that sooner or later their territory will be
populated by their perceived enemies. Lanao del Norte was given to Christian
leadership and Lanao del Sur was given to the Muslims. However, though Lanao Sur
was already a separate province, there was no election until the Marcos regime. The
provincial and municipal executives were appointed from the prominent families by the
government. In Maguindanao and Sulu however, the Christians continued to take an
active role in the political arena. It was at this time that there was a grave agrarian
problem in the Luzon, that as a palliative solution to the problem, they encouraged
tenants and Huk surrenderees to go to Mindanao through the resettlement program.
Later, more Christian prospectors, industrialist, loggers, and politicians, in collaboration
with Moro elite, dispossessed the Moros (in Cotabato area) and the Lumads of their lands
through legal and illegal processes.38 But it was not according to Hashim Salamat he
said:
Since the granting of the Philippines Independence in the year 1946, the Manila
government launched "settlement programs" for the Christians from Luzon and
Visayas in the Moroland. Prior to that the Moro Muslims had been enjoying the
33
This researcher uses the term granting because the Declaration of Independence of Aguinaldo on
June 12, 1898 was a declaration of protectorate rather than an independent Philippines. Take note on the
statement: “under the protection of the benevolent government of the USA.”
34
Mayo, p. 298.
35
The Japanese Occupation was the opportunity of the Muslims to collect and gather arms and
ammunition without being arrested for position of deadly weapon. The Americans disarmed them in the
early decades of the American rule, which explain the silence of the Moros during the American regime
and even during the Commonwealth Period.
36
Please see Nelson Ganancial, Guts and Common Sense: Intelligence During the Japanese
Occupation 1941-1945 MA Thesis UP Diliman, Q.C., 1994.
37
Nunez, p.17.
38
Samuel K. Tan, The Filipino Muslin Armed Struggle, 1900-1972 (Manila: Filipinas Foundation,
1977), pp. 113-114.
NSHG 12
administration of the region by themselves as the Provincial governors, the
Municipal mayors and the Barangay captains were among themselves. The
Christian settlers, with the assistance of the Manila government, started to take
over the strategic politic and socio-economic posts soon after their influx into the
Moroland.39

In other words, though records would show that the Muslim elites collaborated with the
unscrupulous Christian politicians in exploiting the Moro homeland, Salamat still put all
the blames to the Christians who were also victims of land grabbing in Luzon and the
Visayas. That was the very reason for their migration to Mindanao for better
opportunities. Of course the hidden agenda of the government then is to use the
Christians to educate the Muslims and civilize them.
In an informal discussion with some Maranaos, this researcher learned that before
the Japanese Occupation, Maranaos were not also appointed into the highest position in
the province, much more in congress. Christian politicians like Lluch and Cabili always
got the appointment, while only the municipal positions were given to the Maranaos.
When Lanao was divided into two, politics in Lanao del Sur specifically became worst
when they were allowed to vote for the leaders. Clan rivalries became the order of the
day. During election vote buying is rampant to make sure that they would win. Thus,
after election winning candidates cannot sit in office because of alleged election frauds
that there is a saying that “even the dead had voted.” Since money is involved during
election, as in other places in the Philippines, winners had to replenish their expenses by
graft and corruption. According to former Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez, if the
money allotted for the development of Lanao had been spent honestly, the money was
enough to buy the materials to cement the whole Lake Lanao itself. This statement
contradicts the opinion of Salamat quoted earlier.
Later, Cotabato province was also divided into three provinces, North Cotabato,
South Cotabato and Maguindanao. Of these three provinces, Maguindanao is the only one
ruled by the Muslims. The arms and ammunition that the Moros had saved during the
Japanese Occupation were used this time against the Christian homesteaders in Cotabato
and Lanao (particularly in Wao). This was beginning of the so-called Mindanao Crisis
that coincided with First Quarter Storm in Manila. Then the Martial Law Regime
followed.
These divisions of the Moro provinces were all for the sake of political
accommodations for the Muslims.

BURMA40  
Introduction
Burma was the original name of Myanmar. Even before the advent of the
Western colonizers, in their case the British, Burma was already having problems on
secessions. However, these problems were solved by the ruling powers. Its history is

39
Sheik Abu Zahir, “The Moro Jihad: Continuous Struggle for Islamic Independence in Southern
Philippines.” An exclusive Interview with Sheikh Salamat Hashim. Internet.
40
Though the present name of Burma is Myanmar, this research would like to use the original
name Burma as it is the name accepted by the majority of the so-called secessionists.
NSHG 13
also incomplete without referring to the numerous uprising by the different ethnic
minorities or races that tried to gain their independence from the oppressive Burman
majority. One of these ethnic groups is the Karen. Their role in the Burmese history is
not also placed in its right perspective, so that the Karen’s struggles for recognition and
equality are never known except as ethnic disturbances.41 The worst of it all, the Karens
are considered as only good as porters and slaves. In order to understand as well the
psyche of an oppressed ethnic race it is better to have a glimpse of their history according
to them.

Short History of the Karens

The Karens is one of the races or indigenous peoples of Burma (Myanmar),

numbering about 3 million, who live principally in Kayah State in Myanmar. In physical
characteristics they resemble the Burmese. The Karens are monogamous and practice a
form of nature worship, although about 10 percent practice Christianity or Buddhism.
The Karen language, a member of the Tai branch of the Sino-Tibetan languages, is one of
the pre-Chinese languages spoken in Lower Myanmar and on the borders of Thailand.
They are a people of Thai-Chinese stock but do not compose a single ethnic group. The
Karen languages are spoken by about four million people, many of whom live in Karen
State, others in Shan State, but most of whom live in Myanmar's Kayah (formerly
Karenni) State. It is important not to confuse the Karen subgroup, Karenni (red Karens),
with the Karens, but just the same they are still considered Karens.

The Karens, according to the KNU (Karen National Union) are much more than a
national minority. They are a nation with a population of 7 million, 42 having all the
essential qualities of a nation. They have their own history, language, culture, land of
settlement and economic system of life. By nature the Karens are simple, quiet,
unassuming and peace loving people, who uphold the high moral qualities of honesty,
purity, brotherly love, co-operative living and loyalty, and are devout in their religious
beliefs. Historically, the Karens descended from the same ancestors as the Mongolian
people. The earliest Karens (or Yangs as called by the Thais), settled in Htee-Hset Met
Ywa (Land of Flowing Sands), a land bordering the source of the Yang-tse-Kiang River
in the Gobi Desert. From there, they migrated southwards and gradually entered the land
now known as Burma about 739 B.C. They were, according to history, the first settlers in
this new land. The Karens named this land Kaw-Lah, meaning the Green Land. They
peacefully began to clear and till their land from all hindrances. Their labors were fruitful
and were very happy with their fate. They changed the name of the land to Kawthoolei,
meaning pleasant, plentiful and peaceful country. They lived characteristically simple,
uneventful and peaceful lives, until the advent of the Burman.

Burman Feudalism, British Imperialism and Japanese Fascism

41
For a short history of Burma (Myanmar please refer to the appendices.
42
It must be noted at this point that the population of Karens depends on which record one will
consult. Statistics show that even the non-Karen speaking Karens were not included in the Karen census.
NSHG 14
The Karens could not enjoy peaceful life for long. The Mons was the next to
enter into their territory, followed by the Burmans. Both the Mons and Burmans brought
with them feudalism, which they practiced to the full. The Burmans later won the feudal
war, subdued and subjugated all other ethnic races in the land. The Karens suffered
untold miseries at the hands of their Burman lords that they considered to be their first
colonizers. The Karens experienced persecution, torture and killing, as well as
suppression, oppression and exploitation under the hands of the Burmans. They always
tell stories of Burman subjugation of the Mons and the Arakanese, and especially the past
atrocities against the Thais at Ayudhaya. These events stand as firm evidence of Burman
feudalism, so severe that those victimized peoples continue to harbor a deep-seated
resentment of the Burmans until the present.

As a result, many Karens fled for their lives to the high mountains and thick
jungles, where communications and means of livelihood were extremely difficult and
diseases are common. They were thus cut off from all progress, civilization and the rest
of the world, and were gradually reduced to backward hill tribes. The rest of the Karens
were made slaves, forced to do hard labor and cruelly treated.

When the British colonized Burma, the conditions of the Karens gradually
improved. With the introduction of law and order by the Colonial Central Authority, the
Karens began to earn their living without fear, and they could go to school and be
educated. This infuriated the Burman, to see the despised Karens being treated equal
with them by the British. Ba Maw in his Memoirs wrote: “They (British) also gave the
Karens military training in the British army in Burma, whereas the Burmese, in spite of
their long and notable fighting history, were kept out altogether. However, in many
similar ways the British encouraged the two races to be more aware of their differences
and less of their common interest and destiny.”43 The progress of the Karens in almost
all fields was fast, that by the beginning of the 20th Century, the Karens were ahead of
other peoples in many respects, especially in education, athletics and music. It could be
said that the Karens had a breathing spell during the period of the British Regime. But
during the Second World War, in 1942, the Japanese invaded Burma with the help of the
Burma Independence Army (BIA). These BIA troops took full advantage of the situation
by insinuating that the Karens were spies and puppets of the British, and therefore were
enemies of the Japanese and the Burman. With the help of the Japanese, the Burmans
began to attack the Karen villages, using a scheme to wipe out the entire Karen populace,
which closely resembled the genocidal scheme Hitler was enacting against the Jews in
Germany.44 The Karens in many parts of the country were arrested, tortured and killed.
Their properties were looted, women were raped and killed, and their hearths and homes
were burned. Conditions were so unbearable that in some areas the Karens retaliated
fiercely enough to attract the attention of the Japanese Government, which mediated and
somewhat controlled the situation.

43
Ba Maw, Memoirs, p. 187.
44
Ibid., pp. 192ff.
NSHG 15
Post WWII Period

The bitter experiences of the Karens throughout their history in Burma, especially
during the Second World War, taught them one lesson, that unless they control a state of
their own, they will never experience a decent life with peace, and freedom from
persecution and oppression. They will never have to work hard to grow and prosper, as
most of the Karens are in forced labor.

Soon after the Second World War, all the nations under colonial rule aspired for
their national independence. As the possibility of granting Burma’s independence was in
the offing, the Karen sent a Goodwill Mission to England in August 1946, to make the
Karen aspirations be known to the British Government and people, and to request for a
true Karen State. But the reply of the British Labor Government was "to throw our lot
with the Burman."45 The Karens deeply regretted this, for as it predictably has turned out
today, it was a gesture grossly detrimental to their right of self-determination that
condemned them to further oppression. It is extremely difficult for the Karens and the
Burmans, two peoples with totally opposite views, outlooks, attitudes and mentalities, to
live together.

Nevertheless, differences in nature and mentality are not the main reason for their
refusal to throw in their lot with the Burman. There are other more important reasons for
sticking to their demand for their own State within a genuine Federal Union. These are:

1. The Karens are concerned that the tactics of annihilation, absorption and assimilation,
which have been practiced in the past upon all other nationalities by the Burman rulers,
will be continued by the Burman of the future as long as they are in power.

2. The Karens are concerned about the postwar independence Aung Sun-Atlee and Nu-
Atlee Agreements, as there was no Karen representative in either delegation and no
Karen opinion were sought. The most that the Burman would allow them to have was a
pseudo Karen State, which falls totally under Burman authority. In that type of Karen
State, they always live in fear of the cruel abuse of the Burman authority over them.46

On January 4, 1948, the British granted Burma its independence. The Karens
continued to ask democratically and peacefully from the Burmese Government the Karen
State for self-determination that would comprise the Irrawaddy and the Tenasserim
Divisions, the Hantha Waddy and Insein Districts and the Nyauglebin Sub-Division,
where they are the majority. But instead of negotiating with the Karens peacefully, the
Burmese Government and the Burmese Press started a black propaganda accusing the
Karens as puppets of the British and enemies of the Burman (ethnic race). The Burmese
Government agitated the Burman people toward ethnic or communal clashes between the
Karens and the Burman. Another accusation against the autonomy of the Karens was that
it was not the entire Karen people who desired a Karen state, but a handful of British
loyalists who wanted the destruction of the Union of Burma.
45
KNU, Internet.
46
Ibid.
NSHG 16
To show that this black propaganda was wrong and that it was the desire of
whole Karens for a Karen state, a peaceful demonstration all over the country was held
on February 11, 1948 participated by over 400,000 Karens. The banners that they carried
during the march contained four slogans, namely: 1.Give the Karen State at once 2. Show
Burman one Kyat and Karen one Kyat 3. We do not want communal strife. 4. We do not
want civil war. These slogans reflected the same desire of the British Colonies after the
Second World War: Liberty, Equality, and Peace. They followed the established
democratic procedure in requesting for their own Karen state.
This mass action of the Karens was untimely considering the political situation at
that time. There were successive desertions in the AFPFL that put U Nu, the then
Premier, in grave trouble. The revolts of the Red Flag Communist Party in 1947 were
still fresh in their memory. Their peaceful demonstration in February 1948 was followed
by another revolt of the Communist Party of Burma in March 1948. In June of that same
year the People's Volunteer Organization revolted also followed by the mutinies of the
1st. Burma stationed at Thayetmyo and the 3rd Burma Rifles (army) stationed at
Mingladon, Rangoon (August 15, 1948). U Nu approached the Karen leaders to help the
Government by securing Rangoon, and save it from destruction. The Karens did not take
advantage of the situation; they readily complied with the premier’s request and helped
him out of his problems. The KNDO (Karen National Defense Organization), officially
recognized by the Burmese Government, was posted at all the strategic positions along
the routes leading to Rangoon (Yangon). They (the KNDO) faithfully took charge of the
security of Rangoon. The KNDO was actually formed in 1947 to protect the members of
its community.47

The KNDO according to the official Karen Internet Web,

. . Was given several tasks in forming an outer ring of defense, particularly at Hlegu and
Twante. Most important of all was the reoccupation of Twante town, Rangoon's key
riverine gateway to the Delta towns in upper Burma. This little town had fallen several
times to the communists. Each time it was retaken by regular troops, only to fall back into
the hands of the rebels as soon as conditions returned to normal and control was handed
back to the civil authorities and the police. This time, a KNDO unit under the leadership
of Bo Toe and Bo Aung Min was ordered to retake Twante, which was once more in the
hands of the Red Flag Communists. They succeeded with their own resources and
without any support from the regular army other than river transport. After wresting the
town from the Red Flag Communists hands, they garrisoned it in accordance with their
given orders.48

The mutineers of the two Burma Rifles marched down south, unopposed along
the way until they reached Kyungale Bridge, near the town of Let pa-dan, where they
were stopped by a company of Karen UMP (Union Military Police). Their truck carrying
arms and ammunition received a direct hit from the mortar fire of the Karen UMP and
was destroyed. So, they retreated after suffering heavy casualties.

However, while the Karens were busy defending Rangoon, the Burmese
Government was hastily organizing a strong force of levies to make an all-out effort to

47
The Far East and Australasia 1995 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1995), p. 613.
48
KNU, Internet.
NSHG 17
destroy the Karens. In December 1948, they arrested the Karen leaders in many parts
of the country. Karen service men in the armed forces were disarmed and imprisoned.
General Smith Dun a Karen, General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Burma Army,
was forced to resign. Many Karen villages were attacked, and Karens’ homes were
burned and destroyed. On January 30, 1949, the Burmese Government declared the
KNDO unlawful, and on the next day Burmese troops attacked the KNDO Headquarters
at Insein, a town about 10 miles north of Rangoon, where most of the top Karen leaders
lived. The Karens had no other alternative but to fight back. An order was issued to all
the Karens throughout Burma to take up whatever arms they could find and fight for their
lives, their honor, and their long cherished Karen state: Kawthoolei.49

Because of these development and the failure of the government to give them the
state they requested as well as the cultural protection they thought they deserve, 50 and
agitated further by the ungrateful act of U Nu and his army, the Karen National Defense
Organization (KNDO) rebelled against the government. Three battalions of Karens from
the Burmese Army deserted and joined the KNDO. The KNDO captured Mandalay,
raided Bassein, and even attacked Yangon (Rangoon), but eventually the hard-pressed
government prevailed and the organization collapsed because they were not yet prepared
for a revolution. They had to withdraw from many fronts, allowing Burmese troops to
reoccupy these areas. It was also compounded by the call of the Burmese Government to
all other uprising Burman rebel groups for unity. These Burman rebels saw the Karens as
their greatest obstacle to seize power, so, they joined hands with the Burmese
Government and fought against the Karens. Soon the Karens found themselves fighting
against all the armed elements in the country.

Another cause for their setbacks was their lack of external support because, as
stated earlier, they were not prepared for the revolution. The Burmese Government on
the other hand received large amounts of foreign aid, including military aid from both
capitalist and socialist countries and even from the so-called non-aligned nations. In spite
of the shaky condition of the Burmese Government, it managed to sustain its war against
the Karens mainly through the aid from abroad. They even went to the extent of begging
for support and supplies on the streets and it is hard for the Karens to believe the Burman
bowls had always come back filled. In other words, there was really a concerted effort
against the Karens. It is not however clear whether the other ethnic minorities aided the
Burmese government in crashing the Karens.

Tired perhaps of fighting against the audacious and tenacious Karens, the
government formed the Karen State in 1952, largely consisting of the Salween district.
In 1955 five additional townships voted for inclusion. Originally it was planned to
include the Karen populated areas of the four Karenni states east of Toungoo, but three of
these states decided to merge as the separate Kayah State and the fourth decided to join
the Shan State. In the early 60s the population of the state of Karen was estimated at
more than 600,000; by 1994 it had reached an estimated population of 1,323,000. It is

49
KNU, Internet.
50
The Far East and Australasia, p. 613.
NSHG 18
located in the upper part of the country with an area of 30,383 sq km (11,731 sq mi),
and its capital is Pa-an, a small community east of Thaton, on the Salween River. The
northern portion of the state is hilly and covered with thick jungle. Much of its southern
part is lowland and is bordered on the east by the Dawna Range of the Bilauktaung
mountain range. The climate is tropical, and rainfall averages 3800 mm (150 in) annually.

Present Situation

Though the Karens have their own state, still they have been oppressed politically,
economically, and culturally. In education for example, the Karen schools and
institutions were taken by force by the government and many were destroyed. They are
no longer allowed to study their own language in Burmese schools. Even the Karen
newspapers and literary books were banned. Economically, their farms were nationalized
and confiscated in the guise of socialism. They have to work hard all year round and
forced to take all their products to the Burmese Government for sale at its controlled
prices, leaving little for their subsistence. Culturally, the Burmese government had
attempted to absorb and dissolve Karen language, literature, traditions, and customs. The
Karens were denied all political rights; they had been systematically exterminated as part
of the annihilation, absorption, and assimilation program of the Burman. As a
consequence the educational and living standards of the Karens have dropped
considerably, falling far behind the Burman in all respects. “These efforts and actions
against the Karens are as strong, or stronger, at present as ever before in the past.”51

Since 1960s, the Burman government has been attacking the Karens with what
they call as the "Four Cuts Operations." According to the official Karen Internet Web:

The four cuts includes cutting the Karen lines for supply, cutting the line of
communication between the masses and the revolutionaries, cutting all revolutionary
financial income and resources, and cutting off the heads of all revolutionaries. To make
the four cuts operation successful, the Burmese troops used and still are using strong
suppressive measures. They destroy the fields and crops of the villagers and eat their
grains and livestock. They take away whatever they like and destroy the things they
cannot carry away. Captured villagers, men as well as women and adolescents, are made
to carry heavy loads as porters for the Burmese soldiers. Many of the villagers have been
forced to work as porters for several months; deliberately starved, and regularly beaten,
raped, or murdered. When the Burmese soldiers enter a village, they shoot the villagers
who try to escape. Some of the villagers have been accused of helping the
revolutionaries and then murdered. In certain areas, the villagers have been forced to
leave their villages and have been moved to camps some distance away. They are not
permitted to leave the camps without permission from the Burmese guards. Some of the
villagers, who have been found in their villages after being ordered to move to the camps,
were shot and killed by the Burmese soldiers with no questions asked.52

51
KNU, Internet.
52
KNU, Internet. For samples of these atrocities, please refer to the appendices for the details
supplied by the BurmaNet News.
NSHG 19
These situations and sometimes-even worst are happening constantly
throughout Kawthoolei that caused a large number of Karens and Shans to leave their
villages and take refuge along the Thai border. What worsened these difficulties is the
lack of financial support for these Karen and Shan refugees to provide for their
subsistence. To add their miseries, refugee camps were also attacked by the government
forces. In spite of all these odds, they are determined to move on, even though there is no
end of the war in sight. The Karens are moving forward the best way they can although
they are unable to obtain assistance from other countries.
In this long and harsh forty-three years of war, the Karens have seen many
changes that took place in their revolution. The strong will and determination of their
fighting forces and their masses to fight and win the war is increasing in magnitude.
They were able to endure the hardships, both physically and mentally. They grew in
strength, not only in quantity but also in quality. The Karen masses have shown more
cooperation by even participating in the battlefields to fight against the enemy in various
ways. Karens from other enemy occupied towns and cities have joined the revolution in
great numbers. University students and graduates have joined the fight, thus enriching
the quality of their revolution. One of these is a physics student named Sonny
Mahinder. Mahinder was not prepared for the life in the jungle, but his knowledge in
computer brought about a new dimension of their struggles. The BurmaNet News calls it
the “Wired Revolution.”53 From then on, first hand information of the encounters of the
Karens and the government forces reached around the globe via the Internet. 54 News on
the abuses of the government forces is known by the world through the electronic mails
(just like how the majority of the data in this research were collected).

There is an old adage in the annals of guerrilla warfare that says: “Guerrillas as
like the fish and the people are the water. Without water, the fish will die, without the
support of the people the guerrillas will also die.” This is true in Burma. Karen’s
villagers throughout Kawthoolei are actively supporting the secessionists, boasting their
morale, discipline, and military skills of their fighting men. They were able to inflict
great setbacks on the Burmese Army in all their encounters, and presently against the
SLORCs.

The United Front

Burma is inhabited by different races that it is even considered as a multi-national

country. After independence, these ethnic races, the Kachin, Arkanese, Karenni, Lahu,
Mon, Pa-O, Palaung, Shan, and Wa, etc. were also denied the basic rights of freedom,
self-determination, and democracy. Thus, almost all the other nationalities in Burma
have also revolted against the Burmese Government for their own self-determination.
These once divided ethnic races fighting individually for their own existence are now
united in their National Democratic Front (NDF) composed of nine different
organizations namely: 1) Arakan Liberation Party (ALP); 2) Chin National Front (CNF);
53
Thomas Crampton, “Latest Technology Links Jungle Rebels: Wired Revolution Helps
Guerrillas,” International Herald Tribune, BurmaNet News, October 18, 1999, Internet.
54
Please refer to the appendices for the data on the abuses done to the Karens and other ethnic
races in Burma.
NSHG 20
3) Kachin Independence Organization; 4) Karen National Union (KNU); 5) Karennie
National Progressive Party (KNPP); 6) Kayan New Land Party (KNLP); 7) Lahu
National Organization (LNO); 8) New Mon State Party (NMSP), and 9) Wa National
Organization (WNO).

This National Democratic Front (NDF) has resolved to form a genuine Federal
Union of Burma, composed of all the states of the different nationalities in Burma,
including a Burman state, on the basis of “liberty, equality and social progress.” 55 This
united front is determined to fight on until victory is achieved, and requests the people of
all classes and walks of life to join hands and fight the Ne Win-Than Shwe military
dictatorship and the SLORC.

In 1988, the oppression of Ne Win's military regime had become so harsh that
even the Burman masses rose up against it. The regime responded by shooting thousands
of peaceful demonstrators, mainly young students and monks. But Ne Win could not
subdue them all, so, he was forced to resign, apparently handing over power to his chosen
successors in the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), yet, he still
controls the strings of power from behind the scenes. In late 1988, the KNU proposed
that the NDF form a broader political front along with the newly formed Burman groups
to meet the developing political situation. The other NDF members agreed to the
proposal. Thus, the birth of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), that includes all
the members of the NDF as well as groups such as the All Burma Students' Front
(ABSDF) and the All Burma Young Monks' Union (ABYMU). The DAB is committed
to the following four principles:

1. The removal of the military dictators.

2. The establishment of democratic government.
3. The cessation of civil war and the establishment of internal peace.
4. The establishment of National Unity and a genuine federal union.56

Because of this development the SLORC promised a multi-party election and held
it in 1990, however, instead of handing over the power to the winners the SLORCs
arrested them and put them to jail or house arrest. Disgust and hopelessness drove
thousands of Burmese students, monks, and other dissidents to flee to the areas governed
by NDF member organizations, which they once despised. They were accepted and
sheltered by the ethnic peoples, particularly in the Karen areas, where no less than 6,000
students arrived along with other dissidents, all wanting to organize and struggle against
the dreaded SLORC. “This marks for the first time that the people of all races, even the
Burmans, have been united in trying to throw off the yoke of an oppressive SLORC’s
regime.”57

Comparative Analysis

55
KNU, Karen Internet Web Site.
56
Ibid.
57
BaSaw Khin, “This Karen National Union,” Karen Internet Web Site.
NSHG 21
Pre-Colonial
The pre-colonial history of the Karens and the Moros differs in some aspects.
The Moros on the one hand, belong to a mixture of ethnic races or tribal
affiliations. They are highly diverse even with the coming of Islam. The Moro
history has some similarities and dissimilarities with the Karens. First: The Moros were
the first migrants to their traditional homeland they called at present as the Bangs Moro
homeland – Mindanao. Second: They are also highly ethnocentric like the Karens that
they were able to maintain their racial identity, particularly the Maranaos who look at
disgrace at those who married non-Maranaos, especially Christians (especially women);
Third: The Moros however is not democratic when it comes to religious preference.
For them a Moro is a Muslim or to put it right a Maranao, Tausog, Maguindanao, etc.
is always a Muslim; Fourth: The Moros are cosmopolitan too but selective. They
prefer the Arabian culture than western.
Further, the Moros never care about other tribal groups in the southern
Philippines. For them they are their subordinates and good as slaves. However, there
was one leader who consolidated the whole western Mindanao into cohesive body to
fight against the colonizers, he was Sultan Kudarat, had the Moros convince other tribal
groups including the Christianized ones, our history should had been different, but they
attacked them and made them slaves. Thus, the term for slaves for the Moros is bisaya.
The Karens on the other hand were: First: They were also the first migrants to
their traditional homeland they called Kawtholei; Second: They are highly ethnocentric
that they were able to maintain their racial identity; Third: They are democratic and
respects one’s religious preference; Fourth: They are cosmopolitan. The Karens
actually descended from the Mongolian racial stock called Yang by the Thais. They
are friendly, peace loving people and prone to accept changes while maintaining their
traditional customs and traditions. This friendly and peace loving attitudes were
misunderstood by the next waves of migrants as inferiority. They are not like the other
migrants who through intermarriages lost their cultural and racial identity. The Karens
maintain their unique way of life but strongly ethnocentric. The sense of peace and
democracy allowed the Karens to maintain their identity while some members adopted
other religions. Among the Burmese nationals, the Karens had a number of Christian
members,58 yet they never lost their identity as a Karen. The hatred against them by
the other ethnic races was actually caused by the conversion to Christianity of some of
their racial members. For a Burman only the Buddhists are pure Burmese. Anyone
who is not a Buddhist is a Kala (from the Indian word caste) or a foreigner and lost his
nationality as a Burmese. This is the result when Buddhism was declared as a state
religion. By cosmopolitan it means that the Karens accepts and even adopt changes
brought in from the outside while again maintaining their ethnic identity. Take for
example education. When the British occupied their country, the Karens accepted
education and the technology that were brought by the colonizers. They became
educated more than their former oppressors the Burmans.

58
They have even a Karen Christian Militia.
NSHG 22
The Karens are natural leaders if we have to look at the history of the struggle
of the Burmese against the SLORC. They are willing to submit themselves to others as
long as it is for the benefit of everybody. They are not also vengeful to those who
adopted other religions and those who got away from the war fronts and decided to
accept government sponsored states. There were some who even joined the Shan State
rather than pursuing their aspirations for a single state for the Karens. Yet these
changes after 40 years of struggle never weakened their determination to end their
suffering from the hands of their Burman/Burmese and now the SLORC oppressors.
Whether they will accept it or not their perseverance to demand their independence is
the inspiration of the political leaders of other ethnic races in Burma in their desire to
end the oppressive SLORCs.

Colonial Period
The greatest difference between the two groups was their response towards the
colonial powers. While the Karens and other tribal races in Burma were defeated and
subjugated and forced to move from their traditional homeland to be scattered around
the country, the Moros were not. While the British allowed Christian missionaries to
preach the gospel of Christ and convert the people the Spaniards used force to destroy
the Islamic faith. This is of course caused by their previous experiences with the
Moors who occupied Spain for more than seven centuries, as a form of revenge, they
vowed to destroy Islamic believers they called “Moros.” The Karens adopted the
education of the British but maintained their own ethnic identity. The Karens threw
their lot to the British but the Moros did not. Instead, they retaliated and attacked the
occupied areas of the Spaniards and victimized the Christian-Indios or Christianized
Filipinos from the northern portion of Mindanao up to the northern part of Luzon, but
concentrated their attacks mostly in the Visayas and Bicol.
By nature the Moros are warriors. There were times when the Moros
surrendered, not because they were defeated, but this was one of their strategies to
consolidate their forces. While there were treaties signed, these treaties were good as
nothing because these were mere ploys of the Sultans, a deceptive strategy to know the
strength and weakness of their enemies. Though treaties were signed, there were times
that the sultan could not control his men who raided the Visayas and Bicol. In some
cases to show the sultan’s word of honor, they returned their captives, 59 but no record of
returning their loots and booties.
It is interesting to note that the Moros had two western colonizers the Karens
had only one with the Burmans as their first colonizers. However, if the Spaniards
were not able to subjugate the Moros, the second - the Americans did. The Americans
duped the Moros into believing that they are treated equal with them as suggested by
the treaties of friendship that had been signed with the sultans. So that when the
Philippine Independence was about to be granted, the Moros wrote a number of letters
expressing their desire to stay with America and not with the Filipinos, like the Karens
59
Francisco Mallari, Muslim Raids in Bicol, 1580-1792, Philippine Studies Vol. 34, 257-86
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1986), p. 266.
NSHG 23
who signified their desire for independence from Burma once independence would be
granted.
After the granting of independence of both countries, the Karens started their
campaign for secession by their march in the major places in Burma, while the Moros
did not. The incident that triggered the Karens’ armed struggle was the attack done by
the Burmese troops against the KNDO. In the Philippines, the Moros waited for the
right time until the so-called Jabidah Massacre.

Chapter III
THE RESURGENCE

Introduction
The researcher selected the Karens of Burma and the Moros of Mindanao in this
comparative study, firstly because they had similar history of the resurgence of their
resistance to colonialism, and until now there is no tangible solution yet to be found of
their problems. On the one hand, when Burma was about to be granted its independence
after the Second World War, the Karens requested from the British government the
creation of their own state. The British government, suffering from a major setback due
to the war and the problem of rebuilding their country, did not act on the request and
handed down the responsibility to the new independent government. The Moros, on the
other hand, did the same. When the American government was preparing to grant
Philippine independence, the Moro Leaders in Mindanao and Sulu sent a number of
opposition letters to the Congress of the United States of America to exclude them in the
territory of the Philippines and proposed to be one of the states or protectorates of
America. Just like what the British did to the Karens in Burma, so did the Americans to
the request of the Moros in the Philippines. The following are the short details of the
Karens and the Moro Secessionist Movements.

Moro
The secession of Mindanao from the Philippines started even before the country
got its independence from America. The first move of the Moros was their letter of
opposition for the inclusion of Mindanao as part of the Philippines when independence
would be granted. Letters after letters were sent, even as early as 1932, but just the same
the Moros were included in the modern Filipino nation. Unable to press their demand for
lack of means, the Moros waited for the right time. The event that ignited the renewal of
their desire to secede was the Jabidah Massacre. It was started by Datu Udtog Matalam
of Cotabato of his Mindanao Independence Movement, and followed by the MNLF. But
this Moro secession was later concentrated in the Muslim dominated areas. There was
also a Christian led Mindanao Independence Movement by Reuben Canoy of Cagayan de
Oro City, but it did not get the support of the Muslims so it failed. At present the
secession is centered in the Maguindanao area led by Hashim Salamat, but still the
objective is the secession of the thirteen provinces as provided for in the Tripoli
Agreement.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

NSHG 24
The Moro (Muslim) aristocrats and politicians conceptualized the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) after the Jabidah Massacre on March 18, 1968. 60
The trainees code named Jabidah Forces, were composed of Muslim youth, trained in
Corregidor Island, for marine maneuver and attack to penetrate and reclaim Sabah,61 and
to split the Islamic ranks. This was the last option of then President Ferdinand Marcos if
the Malaysian government rejects the peaceful settlement of the Sabah Case. The lone
survivor of the massacre explained that the trainees were shot after they responded
negatively of their mission to invade Sabah. This incident was the eye-opener of the
Muslims. The first to react, on the one hand was Datu Udtog Matalam of Cotabato. He
declared the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM),62 to free Mindanao from the
imperial Manila. On the other hand, Congressman Rashid Lucman, according to Nuñez
“responded to a Malaysian offer to train and arm dedicated young Moros for war against
Manila.”63 Negotiations were done and the first trainees, according to instructions must
come from the villages or “village boys.”64 However, the trainees were majority “City
boys,” called the “Top Ninety.”65 These aristocrats and politicians were mad upon
learning that the trainees were educated ones. But they could not do anything because
they already left. It was perhaps the reason why Lucman organized the Bangsa Moro
Liberation Organization,66 in anticipation of the moves of the educated Moro youths.
However, in the study of Taher, he wrote that “the selection of the Top Ninety was based
on the recruit’s physical and intellectual capabilities to spearhead and implement
guerrilla-type warfare in their respective territorial jurisdictions with the ultimate goal of
maintaining the nationhood and independence of the Bangsa Moro Homeland.” 67 One
member of the Top Ninety related that during their training they were not the only group
being trained for clandestine operations. There were other nationalities too, and their
trainers were British and Malaysian Army Officers.68

60
Omar Taher, “Marawi City Uprising in 1972,” Undergraduate Thesis. AB History, MSU
Marawi City. p. 13.
61
Even the Christians were also being prepared for the repercussions. Young men were called for
reservist training for the defense of Mindanao, in case Malaysia would retaliate.
62
Then he organized his Blackshirts.
63
Ibid. According to my respondent whose will be withheld, Senator Domocao was also involved
because the wife of Rashid Lucman was Princes Tarhata Alonto, the sister of the senator. This offer is
comprehensible as a token of gratitude that the young members of the Jabidah Forces whose main target
was their territory in Sabah.
64
The interviewee did not give any reason of the instruction. However, we could surmise that,
village people are less educated and are bound to obey what they are ordered to do by their superiors,
particularly from prominent Muslims and Royal Titleholders.
65
The Top Ninety according to my own knowledge are: Nur Misuari, Abulkhayr Alonto, Dimas
Pundato, Jamil Lucman, Datu Ali, Ronnie Malaguiok, Al Kaluang, Native Membisa, Camar Riga, Indar
Tampi, Sali Wali, Maas Bawang, Punduma Sani, Ali Alibon, Otto Salahuddin, Julhambri Misuari, Suboh
Gayanandang, Toni Malaguiok, Asrap Tayuan, and Abdul Alonto. Others, I do not know.
66
It is alleged by some writers that this group is different from the MNLF. However, Prof. Sani
noted that they were the same in Maguindanao and Lanao, that the MNLF was not really formally
organized as such. He did not even know until the middle of the 70s.
67
Taher, pp. 13-14.
68
No wonder that the American government did not really take hand in solving the problems in the
south, except in case of CPP-NPA, because their close ally, Britain was responsible for the training of the
Moro rebels. Once they are going to interfere, they would be in quarrel with each other.
NSHG 25
What the Moro aristocrats and politicians were afraid of really happened. The
training graduates or the TOP NINETY organized themselves into the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF),69 with Nur Misuari, Hashim Salamat and Abulkhayr Alonto as
the prominent figures. Misuari was a UP professor, Hashim Salamat, an active student
leader in Cairo University and Alonto, the son of former Senator, Domocao Alonto. It
was at first, Muslim National Liberation Front, but since their ultimate aim is the
liberation of the whole Mindanao from the imperial Manila, they changed it to Moro
because anybody coming from Mindanao is considered a Moro, whether he is a Muslim
or not, and beside it is also historical. 70 The implication of the organization of the MNLF
is the breakaway of the progressive youth from the Moro traditional-politics of royalty
and patronage. Another feared event that came true was the proclamation of Martial
Law. But, the politicians did not read Marcos right. Marcos approached them instead for
help. Hence, Princess Tarhata Lucman was appointed Governor of Lanao del Sur, but
soon relieved by Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, because Jamil Lucman and Abulkhayr
Alonto refused to surrender. Later, they surrendered and were given government
positions. Alonto (1978) was appointed as ambassador, and Dimas Pundato (1982) was
given the Office of Muslim Affairs. One MNLF commander lamented that they were
left fighting while they (the children of prominent aristocrats and politicians) enjoyed
appointments in the Marcos government.71

People of Manila and other parts of the country were made to understand that the
first encounter between the government and the MNLF was during the Marawi City
Uprising on 21 October 1972. It was not! The MNLF was still consolidating their forces
and were training their cadres at this time. The Marawi City Uprising was the response
of the Maranaos who were deceived into believing that Martial Law was intended to
Christianize them. This misinformation campaign was perpetrated by unscrupulous
appointed local officials of Lanao del Sur and by two or three Muslim religious
organizations. These local officials knew that they would be arrested because of their
graft and corruption cases. To solve their problem, they approached the two big Muslim
religious organizations for help.
Soon after a call for support and mass action was aired over the radio with the
propaganda that since Martial Law was proclaimed, “the soldiers would come and
Christianize the Muslims by force.” The people responded and Marawi City rose to
arms. It was around six o’clock in the morning when the Maranaos got out of their
hiding places and shouted “Allah-uh-Akbar,” and attacked Camp Keithley (now Camp
Amai Pakpak Elementary School), the Chinese community in Bangolo, Marawi City and
prominent Christians particularly a certain Dr. Primero who allegedly owned a big track
of land from Baloi, Lanao del Norte to Marawi City. 72 As a result, the Chinese business
district in Bangolo, Marawi City was destroyed and the Chinese fled to Iligan City. 73 The
eminent arrests of the unscrupulous local officials did not happen because they are now
69
Please refer to the appendices for other pertinent data on the MNLF.
70
This is according to one interviewee, an MNLF Commander, name withheld.
71
Name withheld, because he is now also working in the government after the GRP-MNLF Peace
Accord was signed.
72
It would appear that even the Marawi City Uprising is still connected with agrarian problem.
73
Prior to the uprising Iranian students in MSU were killed after they robbed of their valuables.
NSHG 26
instant rebel commanders. The government did not pursue their arrests in the belief
that the MNLF was behind the event. Thus, even today, Manila based writers still
believed that the Marawi City Uprising was the first salvo of the MNLF offensives.
Though the MNLF did not participate in the uprising, they were there all along;
always prepared if the Military of Marcos will attack their camps. Actually, it appeared
that the leaders of the Marawi City Uprising could not wait for the completion of the
tactical plan of the MNLF. The original plan was to attack Iligan also, particularly the
National Steel Corporation, but Punduma Sani, then the leader of the Green Butra
Command was opposed to the plan because their enemies are not the Christians but the
Marcos soldiers and to destroy the steel plant would not gain them anything if they hope
to have an independent Mindanao.74
Actually, the roots of Mindanao crisis started way back when the government
started to bring to the south farmers and surrenderees of the Huks in Luzon and the
Visayas, and other migrants seeking a more-greener pasture. 75 Those who settled in what
is now North Cotabato were majority from Ilocos and in the south, now Maguindanao
were from Panay and Negros. The Maguindanaons welcomed them at first and some
even bartered their lands with goods from the new settlers. 76 However, tension arose
when the natives of the area noticed the large influx of new settlers particularly in the
sixties. They resented this and started demanding back their lands, but the settlers
refused because they had already spent so much money and efforts to develop the once
neglected swamps and logging areas into productive farms, thus, Cotabato gain the name,
the Rice Bowl of the Philippines. The natives started harassing them and stealing their
goods and animals. At first some Christians moved to other provinces like Lanao del
Sur and Zamboanga del Sur. Those who remained left their farm houses and built their
communities that later became full pledged municipalities (Surallah, Nurallah etc)
because of their agricultural production. Because of the destruction of their farms and
lost of their farm animals, the Christian settlers organized their home defense unit to
guard against carabao rustlers and bandits who were known later as the Blackshirts.
These small home defense units became the ILAGA (meaning rat or pejoratively the
Ilongo-Ilocano LAnd Grabbing Association).77

Coincidentally, the organization of the Ilaga happened when the Top Ninety were
training in Malaysia, so much so, that when the offensives of the MNLF started, their first
encounters were against the Ilagas and not with the government forces. Later, the

74
Personal friend of this researcher and he related this stories a number of times during their
conversations.
75
Please see May, p. 128.
76
This is according to some interviewees who came from Cotabato and are not residing in Wao,
Lanao del Sur. Name withheld.
77
I had a chance to talk with the bodyguard of Commander Ligaya, the sister of Commander
Toothpick. He told me that Commander Ligaya was formerly a Nun who was raped in front of her parents
tied to a post of their house by a group of Muslim natives in Cotabato. Mistaken her to be dead, they cut-
off her right breast and killed her parents. This incident triggered the formation of the home defense unit
they named Ilaga. As part of the so-called low-intensity-conflict strategy, the Ilagas were used at the
frontlines. Simply because they knew the terrain and the style of fighting of the Moros. It is on record that
the Ilagas were the ones who controlled the Moros not the Military. Please see also the work of Nunez, p.
22.
NSHG 27
military used the Ilagas as their front liners in exchange of arms and ammunition and in
what is called in the US Military Manuals as “Low Intensity Conflict.” Hence, the fear of
the Maranaos and Maguindanaos of the Ilagas was shown by their distrust to Ilongo
students in MSU because they were also considered as Ilaga members. Because of the
knowledge of the Ilagas on the strategies of the Moros and with their amulets, believed to
make them invulnerable to bullets, Christian politicians hired them as their private
armies. Gov. Quibranza of Lanao del Norte hired the services of the Ilagas against the
Barracudas of Ali Dimaporo.

Then the OIC and Libya intervened elevating the internal problem to international
status forcing Marcos to negotiate in exchange for the much-needed oil in the country.
The Tripoli (in Libya) agreement was signed on December 23, 1976, and Marcos
implemented it according to his own interpretation of the provisions of the agreement and
decreed the creation of the autonomous region of Mindanao composed of twelve
provinces and ten cities. But the Muslims demanded that it should be thirteen provinces
as mandated by the Tripoli Agreement. Marcos appointed his loyalist Mohammad Ali
Dimaporo to the post of Regional Governor while holding the positions of governor of
Lanao del Sur and Acting-President of Mindanao State University. Dimaporo appointed
his closest associates to other regional positions to the resentments of other Muslim
groups.

The MNLF members later found themselves plagued by internal problems.

Solution was hard to reach because Misuari went to Saudi Arabia in self-exile.
Differences of policies they claimed are the main reason for the division of the MNLF
into different factions. Hashim Salamat from Maguindanao organized his Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF – March 1984), which is fundamentally Islamic in outlook, and
the MNLF Reformist Group78 (1982) under Dimas Pundato, a Maranao, that supported
autonomy.79 Pundato, as earlier stated surrendered and gained a post under the Marcos
regime.

Corazon Aquino, the wife of the assassinated Benigno Aquino, a.k.a. Marcial
Bonifacio, deposed Marcos and the contribution of her government to the peace process
was her initial dialogue with Misuari. Her hastily and emotionally done 1987
Constitution provided for the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) and the signing of the Organic Act of Muslim Mindanao (RA 6734).

During the early and mid-1990s, the southern Philippines was the site of renewed
guerrilla violence by Muslim separatist forces. After the initial meeting of then Pres.
Aquino and Nur Misuari formal negotiations started in 1993 after the Indonesian
President Suharto offered Jakarta as the site for the resumption of the stalled peace talks
between the Philippine government and the MNLF. The First Exploratory Talks were
held in Tripoli in October 1992, followed by the 2nd round of exploratory talks, three
rounds of formal talks and eight meetings of the Mixed Committee and scores of sub-
78
Please refer to the appendices for other pertinent data.
79
It is interesting to note that, when Misuari finally signed the Peace Accord in 1996, all the Top
Ninety members were given a Tamaraw FX each.
NSHG 28
committee meetings. The first step in the peace process, after the venue in Jakarta was
agreed upon was the signing of the interim cease-fire agreement in April 1993. However,
on May 29-31, 1993, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres held secret talks with
Misuari in Dubai, Saudi Arabia. Misuari pointed out the desire of the MNLF to
implement the Tripoli Agreement comprising of 14 southern provinces and 10 cities with
Muslim populations. Torres compromised by proposing a five-man Commission for
Peace and Development of the Southern Philippines (later the SPCPD). This would set up
to oversee the areas covered by the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. Five years after this, full
autonomy will be granted, with a consultative assembly of some 70 people, including 25
from the MNLF, who would advise the chairman. The government formally offered this
compromise deal in Davao GRP-MNLF Talks where the issues of the structure of the
autonomous government and the integration of the MNLF into the Philippine Armed
Forces was dealt with.

President Fidel V. Ramos issued the guidelines to the RP Panel in negotiating

with the MNLF on August 26, 1993. He said "the conduct of the formal talks shall be in
line with the aim of the national comprehensive peace program to seek a principled and
peaceful resolution of armed conflict, with neither blame nor surrender, but with dignity
for all." The following are the guidelines:

OBJECTIVES OF RP PANEL IN GRP-MNLF PEACE TALKS

1) The return of the MNLF into the mainstream of Philippine society;

2) The attainment of lasting peace and security in Southern Philippines under a

meaningful program of autonomy for Filipino Muslims; and

3) The establishment of a continuing and constructive consensus with the Islamic world,
through the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), on a peaceful, comprehensive and
durable settlement of the problem of Muslims in Southern Philippines.

GENERAL APPROACH

1) Seek a comprehensive solution to the problem taking into consideration the existence
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the other Muslim rebel groups, and the
sentiments of affected communities and sectors;

2) Establish common ground with the OIC; and

3) Find a meeting point between the aspirations of the MNLF and the political, social and
economic objectives of the Philippine government.

PRINCIPLES

1) While the Tripoli Agreement shall be the starting point for the talks, each party shall
be free to introduce into the discussions issues that may lead to the attainment of a just
and lasting peace in Muslim Mindanao;

2) The Tripoli Agreement provides for rights and obligations that are not self executory.
Autonomy is a dynamic and evolving concept whose ultimate goal is to secure the
greatest benefit for the greatest number of Muslim Filipinos in Southern Philippines; and
NSHG 29

3) The options for a "transitional structure and mechanism" must be consistent with
democratic processes provided for in the Constitution.80

During the Jakarta Peace Talks between the GRP and the MNLF, Chairman Nur
Misuari gave a number of fiery speeches in the three rounds of talks and his "war" threats
if his demands were not granted. However, according to some observers, it is evident that
he, together with the members of the GRP panel, does not fully perceive the autonomy
that will work for the Moros (Muslims). They have given much attention on the
execution of the Tripoli Agreement thinking that the 13-province autonomy would work
for the Muslims,81 but it will not.

According to Rudy Rodil:

GRP-MNLF Peace Process

As we all know, the Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was signed on
September 2, 1996. The opening line of the document clearly states: "the final agreement
on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement." It represents the product of four years
of exploratory and formal peace talks. It reflects an honest to goodness attempt on both
the GRP and the MNLF to come to an agreement on the implementation of the Tripoli
Agreement signed nearly twenty years ago on 23 December 1976.

Participants in the talks were the Organization of Islamic Conference Ministerial

Committee of the Six and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic
conference. Indonesia as Chair of the Committee of the Six presided over all meetings.

Agenda of the Talks

As agreed upon in Par. 14 of the Statement of Understanding between the GRP and the
MNLF, signed in Cipanas, Indonesia, on 16 April 1993, "the agenda for the formal talks
will focus on the modalities for the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in letter
and spirit, to include specifically:

a. Those portions of the Agreement left for further or later discussion; and

b. Transitional implementing structure and mechanism. 82

During the early and mid-1990s, the southern Philippines was the site of renewed
guerrilla violence by Muslim separatist forces. In September 1996 the government
reached a peace agreement with one of the largest rebel groups, the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF). The agreement established the Special Zone for Peace and
80
Guidelines to GRP Panel on Peace Negotiations. Internet.
81
Please refer to the appendices for the facts and fallacies concerning the Mindanao peace process.
This article is in the Internet.
82
Rudy Rodil, Kalinaw Mindanaw, Internet.
NSHG 30
Development (SZPD), consisting of 14 Mindanao provinces. The agreement includes
economic assistance to develop the impoverished region. The following are the stages of
the implementation of the peace accord:

Terms of Agreement

After three years of peace negotiations, the two parties signed what is now popularly
known as the Peace Agreement of September 2, 1996. There are 154 points of consensus
in the Agreement. Let me quote pp. 7-8 of the document itself.

I. "Implementing Structure and Mechanism of this Agreement

Phase 1 shall cover a three (3) year period starting after the signing of the
peace agreement with the issuance of Executive Order establishing the Special
Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippines Council
for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and the Consultative Assembly.

During this phase, the process of joining in of MNLF elements with the
Armed Forces of the Philippines will start. The joining in of MNLF elements
with the PNP as part of the regular police recruitment programme will also take
place in this phase.

Phase 2 shall involve an amendment to or repeal of the Organic Act

(RA6734) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) through
Congressional action, after which the amendatory law shall be submitted to the
people of the concerned areas in a plebiscite to determine the establishment of a
new autonomous government and the specific area of autonomy thereof.

While peace and development programs are being implemented in the SZOPAD,
a bill to amend or repeal the RA 6734 shall be initiated within Phase 1 (1996-1997). The
bill shall include the pertinent provisions of the Final Peace Agreement and the expansion
of the present ARMM area of autonomy. After a law shall have been passed by Congress
and approved by the President, it shall be submitted to the people for approval in a
plebiscite in the affected areas, within two (2) years from the establishment of the SPCPD
(1998).

The new area of autonomy shall then be determined by the provinces and
cities that will vote/choose to join the said autonomy (1998). It may be provided
by the Congress in a law that clusters of contiguous-Muslim-dominated
municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged and constituted into a new
province(s) which shall become part of the new Autonomous Region. 83

Other rebel groups, however, continue to oppose the Philippine government. "47

83
Rudy Rodil, Kalinaw Mindanaw, Internet.
NSHG 31
SPCPD

The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development or SPCPD is

perceived to be the last attempt of the Philippine government to formally solve the so-
called Mindanao Crisis. The creation of the SPCPD is perceived to the stepping-stone for
the "full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement." The Peace Agreement describes the
area covered by the SPCPD consisting of fourteen (14) provinces and all the cities therein
as stipulated by the Tripoli Agreement. These areas shall be the focus of intensive peace
and development efforts, where public and private investments shall be channeled to
stimulate economic development and uplift the conditions of the people therein. But of
these places only five at most where there are Muslim majority.

This SPCPD is composed of one Chairman, one Vice Chairman, and three
deputies, one each representing the Muslims, the Christians, and the Lumads (non-
Christian indigenous people, Manobo, Bagobo, Higaunon, etc.). President Ramos
appointed Misuari as the Chairman in spite of the oppositions from other sectors because
he is the incumbent governor of the ARMM. The SPCPD is not provisional governments
as the majority of the Muslims are thinking. It is not a governing authority, and it has no
law-making power. Neither the SPCPD is an autonomous region or a political
subdivision of GRP, nor a public corporation. It has no separate judicial personality;
hence, it cannot sue or be sued. It is a transitory administrative arm under the control and
supervision of the President of the Philippines; in other words, it is the alter ego of the
president when it comes to the solution of the Mindanao problems. The power and
functions of the Council shall be as follows:

1. To take charge of the promotion, monitoring, and coordination of the improvement

of peace and order in the area;
2. To focus on peace and development efforts, especially in the depressed areas and
initiate the implementation of appropriate projects;
3. To support the local government units, when needed;
4. To use other powers needed to implement its mandate as may be delegated by the
President;
5. To assist in the holding of elections, referenda, or plebiscite, and peoples' initiative in
the area, if deputized by the Commission on Elections upon the recommendation of
the President; and
6. To recommend the creation of such offices or instrumentalities necessary for the
effective and efficient administration of the affairs of the area. There shall be
approval from the Office of the President for budgetary purposes.84

In the performance of the above functions, the SPCPD on the one hand, shall
coordinate with local officials and request their assistance in order to promote the
improvement of peace and order, and development in the area or in causing the
implementation of its peace and development projects. Since the SPCPD is under the
direct control of the President of the Philippines, it cannot posses a power or functions
beyond the authority of the President to delegate, or which only Congress by law can
grant to an agency like the Council.

84
SPCD, Internet.
NSHG 32
The Consultative Assembly on the other hand is not a law-making body but a
forum for consultation and discussion of issues and concerns, formulation and
recommendation of policies to the President, and provides appropriate advice to the
Council. It is composed of 81 members as follows:
1. The Chairman of the Council shall be the head and presiding officer of the Assembly;

2. The Governor and the Vice Governor of the ARMM, the 14 Governors of the
provinces and the 10 City Mayors therein the area;

3. 44 members from the MNLF; and

4. 10 members from various sectors recommended by NGOs and POs after due
consultation with the MNLF.85

Majority membership of the Council and the Assembly is given to the

MNLF. It is considered a concession to allow full and responsible participation of
the MNLF in the democratic processes and within the fold of the law as a
confidence-building measure. But there is check and balance. In turn, the MNLF
agreed to: drop their demand for a provisional government; recognize the need for
a plebiscite in establishing a new autonomous government; accede that the new
area of autonomy will be determined by the choice of the people in the said
plebiscite; and implicitly recognize the Constitution.

The Consultative Assembly shall exercise the following functions and powers:

1. To serve as forum for consultation and ventilation of issues and concerns;

2. To conduct public hearings as may be necessary and to provide appropriate advice to
the SPCPD; and

3. To formulate and recommend policies to the President through the Chairman of the
Council and make rules and regulations to the extent necessary for the efficient and
effective administration of the affairs of the area. 86

However, the secession or separatist issue did not end with the signing of the
Peace Agreement. Hostilities erupted when the renegade faction of the MNLF, the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf (AS) renewed their offensive
operations against the military and hapless civilians. They abducted foreign (except
Americans) and local civilians as the declaration of the renewal of their demand for
independence.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front

In an exclusive interview by Sheik Abu Zahir entitled “THE MORO JIHAD:

Continuous Struggle for Islamic Independence in Southern Philippines,” Salamat divided
the Moro Jihad into three phases; First Phase: the Moro Jihad against the Spanish

85
SPCD, Consultative Assembly, Internet.
86
Internet.
NSHG 33
invasion (1521-1898) 377 years; Second Phase: the Moro Jihad against the American
colonizers (1898 - 1946) 47 years; and Third Phase: the Moro Jihad against the Philippine
colonizer (1970 - present).87 Salamat even claimed that he was the contact man between
the Moro politicians and the Malaysian government that resulted in the training of the
“Top Ninety” or what he termed as the “Batch 90.” In this same interview Salamat
disclosed his vision of the government of the Islamic State of Mindanao. The interview
is very comprehensive. It covered the history of the Moros from the point of view of the
Moros or Muslims themselves. Hashim Salamat is determined to pursue their goal of
secession. Thus, after one year of the signing of the peace accord between the Philippine
government and the MNLF, the MILF started their offensive operations against the
government forces.
There is fear of some alliance 88 between the MNLF and the MILF after Misuari
and Salamat met in Camp Abu Bakr in Cotabato, but Misuari is strong in his stand to give
peace a chance. But if Misuari will rejoin their struggle they will welcome him with
both hands, according to the MILF spokesman and said that: "That reformism is not the
way to the liberation of our people." It goes like saying that the MILF will never, at this
time submit for a proposed peaceful solution to the secession issue. This researcher one
time asked a Maranao employee of the Mindanao State University, of what is the MILF
all about, he answered that the MILF is the alter ego of the MNLF. He continued to say
that, “When the negotiation succeeds and later discovered to be defective, the MNLF
members are still assured that they have something to fall back to.”89 After the refusal of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to accept former rebels for integration into the AFP
due to age and educational requirements, it was observed that a number of former MNLF
cadres rejoined the armed struggle of the MILF.
As earlier mentioned differences of policies was the main reason for the division
of the MNLF into factions. Hashim Salamat from Maguindanao organized his Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF – March 1984). MILF is fundamentally Islamic in
outlook. And the MNLF Reformist Group (1982) under Dimas Pundato, a Maranao,
supported autonomy. But what really happened according to Sheikh Abu Zahir in his
interview with Hashim Salamat:

While the “Front” was still at the stage of organization, a conflict between Misuari and
one of the then Cairo graduates (a doctor) broke out as both expressed aspirations to the
chairmanship of the “Front.” Sheikh Salamat Hashim, who was the leader of the whole
group, did not insist to the chairmanship to avoid further dispute and eventual failure. So
Misuari became the chairman of the “Front.”

After a few years of the start of the struggle Misuari’s inefficiency had unveiled
itself and most, if not all, of the field commanders signed a petition that Misuari should
step down and give way for Salamat Hashim to assume the chairmanship, but Misuari

87
Sheikh Abu Zahir, “THE MORO JIHAD: Continuous Struggle for Islamic Independence in
Southern Philippines.”
88
Please refer to the appendices for the text of an interview by Al Jacinto and Joel Vega from Gulf
News with Mohagher Iqbal of the MILF member. Internet.
89
Name withheld. This Maranao is a former member of the Philippine Constabulary and a senior
officer of this researcher in their ROTC Officers Organization, the MSU REARGURADS.
NSHG 34
cunningly insisted to stay and Salamat Hashim has to lead the "front" in accordance
with the choice of the majority.

In order to avoid confusion, the members of the Central Committee had decided
to replace the word “National” with the word “Islamic” so the true “Liberation Front”
aiming at the re-establishment of a sovereign Moro Islamic State was given the title
“Moro Islamic Liberation Front.”90

But who is Hashim Salamat that he could have been the chair of the MNLF.

Salamat Hashim was born on July 7, 1942 in the municipality of Pagalungan,

Maguindanao. He comes from a religious family of seven: four boys and three girls.

Salamat’s first teacher was his mother. . . . At the age of six he started his formal
education in the Philippine public school. He finished his elementary education in 1954
with honors and his secondary education in 1958 also with honors. . . . While pursuing
his formal education, he enrolled in the village madrasah where he attended classes
during Saturdays and Sundays. He finished ibtida’iyah at about the same time that he
graduated from high school.

In 1958, Salamat joined the pilgrims from the Philippines in journeying to

Makkah for the hajj. He took this opportunity to stay behind and study in Makkah under
the care of Sheik Jawawi. He attended regularly the halakat held at the Masjidul Haram
and enrolled at the Madrasatu As-Sulatiyah ad-Diniyah.

In 1959, he went to Cairo . . . graduated from Al-Azhar’s Ma’had al-Buuth al-

Isslamiyah as-Sanawiyah in 1963. Then he enrolled at Al-Azhar’s College of Theology
for a bachelor’s degree program majoring in Aqidah and Philosophy and graduated in
1967. Pursuing his scholastic inclination further, he took up his postgraduate courses in
the same university and finished his master’s degree in 1969. He completed the academic
requirements for a doctoral degree, but he was unable to write his dissertation because he
had to return to the Philippines by then to organize the Moro revolutionary movement.

Salamat also became interested to learn the English language so he enrolled at

the British International Correspondence School and the American University in Cairo.

Salamat was an active student leader. His active participation in different student
activities exposed him to various revolutionary trends, both Islamic and secular, which
Cairo was known for at that period. This exposure brought him awareness of the colonial
oppression his Muslim brothers and sisters were suffering back home, an awareness
which gradually transformed him from a scholar to an Islamic revolutionary later on in
his life. …It is interesting to note that among the contemporary Muslim thinkers who
influence Salamat, two Muslim personalities made a lasting impression on him: Syed
Qutb of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun and Syed Abul A’la Mawdudi of Jamaati Islami. It was,
however, Syed Qutb’s writings which shaped his Islamic outlook and political beliefs.

90
Sheikh Abu Zahir, Interview with Sheikh Salamat Hashim, Amir of the Moro Mujahideen,
Continuous Struggle for Islamic Independence in Southern Philippines,
http://www.Islam.org.au/articles/23/ph2.
NSHG 35
The impact that Syed Qutb and Mawdudi made on him was what inspired him to plant
the seeds of Islamic revolution in the Bangsamoro homeland.

….As a cover for his mission, Salamat found a convenient employment as provincial
librarian of North Cotabato.

In the organization of the MNLF, Salamat served as the first chairman of the
Kutawato Revolutionary Committee (KRC), a Committee in charge of foreign relations.
Using his contacts and connections in the Middle East, Salamat was able to bring to the
attention of the Muslim world the cause of the Bangsamoro struggle for de-colonization
of their homeland, thus gaining for the MNLF moral, political and material support.
As a person, Salamat is serious in everything he does. He is well organized with regards
to his family and his work. His personal discipline was developed during this spiritual
sojourn with Sufism.

As an alim, he loves learning so much that even in his jungle base he maintains a
library. He is also a prolific writer and lecturer in Arabic, English and Basa
Magindanaon, his native language.91

The following are the stand of Salamat on the issue of Mindanao problem:

1. Salamat Hashim believes that "Any solution [to the Mindanao problem] less
than full independence of the Bangsamoro Muslims will not work." To Salamat and the
MILF, their objective is the reestablishment of the Bangsamoro state, and to continue the
building of the political institutions in accordance with the supremacy of the law of God
which was impeded with the coming of the Western colonizers. In one occasion he made
it clear:

2. All what the Muslims are asserting are their legitimate rights to self-
determination that is independence of the Bangsamoro homeland.

3. Salamat envisions establishing not a secular state but an Islamic state founded
on the doctrine of the sovereignty of God, an Islamic government in the Bangsamoro
homeland.

4. Salamat believes that government is an instrument for realization and

perfection of man’s worship to God. The function of government is to regulate the affairs
of humankind so that individually and collectively they can perform their worship to
God. Government should ensure that justice prevails and should eradicate all forms of
evils and encourage all forms of virtue and excellence.

5. Salamat’s model which shall be considered in the establishment of the

Bangsamoro government is the government organized by the Prophet, peace be upon
him, when he migrated to al-Madinah. Likewise, the rule of his four immediate
successors, al-Khulafa al-Rashidun, shall also be considered.

91
Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga, The Peace Process: Salamat Hashim’s Concept of Bangsamoro
State and Government, http://www.Mindanao.com/kalinaw/peaceproc/salamat-2.html.
NSHG 36
6. The Qur’an does not recommend a definite form and structure of
government. Salamat’s position is that this should be decided through consultation with
the people. Experiences of other people, Muslims and non-Muslims, have to be studied to
determine what form and structure that may be suited to the political culture of the
Bangsamoro.
7. Salamat made known his personal view in favor of a federal system where the
Muslims, indigenous inhabitants of Mindanao and the Christian migrants will reach
constitute separate autonomous states.

8. In practice, the organizational structure of the MILF is similar to the structure

of the Philippine government. The executive functions are exercised by the Office of the
Chairman, the legislative functions by the majlis as-Shura (Consultative Council) and the
judiciary by the Shari’ah Court.

9. The position of Salamat is that government should ensure that its citizens,
Muslims and non-Muslims, enjoy freedom, justice, equality and democracy, and their
human rights are protected and promoted.

10. To the non-Muslims of Mindanao who do not want to join the Bangsamoro
state, Salamat commits that the MILF is duty-bound to help them if they opt to be free
from the oppression and exploitation of the Manila government.

11. Salamat is of the opinion that the imam shall be elected. However, the
manner of election will depend upon the situation and level of political maturity of the
people. If the condition is so that the people can freely choose the leader and they can
judge fairly who is the most qualified among the nominees, he is for direct election. If
not, the election of the imam shall be delegated to a council called ahl al-hal wa ‘al-aqd,
composed of scholars, professionals, thinkers and sectoral leaders.

12. The foundations of governance, according to Salamat, are shura

(consultation), justice and equality. In his view, justice is the natural consequence of
shura and equality is the natural consequence of justice. There will be no equality if there
is no justice, and there will be no justice unless the affairs of men are conducted through
consultation.92

The preceding presentation is very clear that Salamat’s goal is to establish a

Bangsamoro Islamic State and government. His theocratic state is no doubt contradicts
the constitutional provision that sovereignty resides in the people, because in theocracy
God is sovereign. For the MILF, autonomy as an alternative political solution to the
problem in Mindanao is no longer feasible and viable as shown by the events that
followed after the GRP-MNLF Peace Accord was signed. Salamat believes that the only
way that the Bangsamoro Muslims will attain prosperity and development is the
implementation of an Islamic government.
This is the problem that the Philippine government has to deal with seriously if it
has to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty. But the government is confident
that they can hurdle this obstacle because the MILF is not supported by the OIC.
According to Malacañang:
92
Ibid.
NSHG 37

Malacañang maintained Wednesday that the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) does not
recognize the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as the representative Muslim group in the Philippines
and said any foreign government that supports the MILF will be interfering in the country’s
internal affairs.

Presidential spokesman Jerry Barican made this clear in response to reports that the
MILF is seeking support from Islamic governments worldwide for international recognition. In a
statement, Barican said the only Muslim group in the Philippines recognized by the OIC is the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) headed by Gov. Nur Misuari .of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao.

In 1996, the MNLF forged a peace deal with the government brokered by the OIC, a
grouping of more than 40 Muslim countries. "In fact, the MNLF still has observer status in the
OIC," Barican added, noting that it was the OIC that facilitated the peace process between the
government and the MNLF in 1996. Barican pointed out that the peace process with the MILF is
purely an internal affair of the Philippines.

"Therefore, any foreign government that supports the MILF will be interfering with the
internal affairs of the Philippine government, aside from contradicting the position of the OIC," he
said. The MILF is negotiating a peace agreement with the government, following the success of
peace talks between the Ramos administration and the MNLF.93

What Malacañang is hiding from the public is the fact that the OIC can help the MILF
officially or unofficially. Officially, means that there is an approval from the members
of the conference, while the unofficial support could be made by the individual member
nation like Libya.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Another group that is also giving headaches to the government is the Abu Sayyaf Group
that is basically a criminal element engaged in extortion and abduction of local foreigners
and is believed to have some links with the MILF. According to an official report of the
US Department as of April 1999:

Description

Smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups operating in the southern
Philippines. Split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 under the leadership of
Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December
1998. Some members have studied or worked in the Middle East and developed ties to Arab
mujahidin while fighting and training in Afghanistan.

Activities

Uses bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion payments to promote an

independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern
Philippines heavily populated by Muslims. Raided the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995, the
group's first large-scale action. Suspected of several small-scale bombings and kidnappings in
1998.
93
Daily Inquirer Internet Edition.
NSHG 38
Strength

Unknown, but believed to have about 200 members.

Location/Area of Operation

The ASG operates in the southern Philippines and occasionally in Manila. 94

The encounter between government forces and the MILF is still going-on. One
had given peace a chance; the other is still waging their war because the change that they
are waiting to see is not happening except for some MNLF members who are now
members of the bureaucracy. It must be noted as earlier stated that there are three
factions of the MNLF; one faction was under by Misuari and his members are mostly
Tausogs, the other was led by Pundato and mostly were Maranaos, and still another, the
MILF under Salamat and mostly Maguindanaons. Pundato surrendered earlier but his
men had been left behind, Misuari accepted the peace accord but the bulk of the old
members are left without job. Salamat took these people into his fold, and that is why the
MILF has a strong following from the three Muslim dominated areas. Will the men of
Pundato rise again and demand for secession once the peace agreement with Salamat is
reached, so, that they will have a portion of the big cake? We would never know, except
the fact that people are now suffering because of the renewal of hostilities not only by the
MILF but also the Abu Sayyaf claiming to be fighting also for the secession of the
Moroland.

There can be no peace in Mindanao unless understanding the history of the Moros
is not achieved. It could not be possible too unless the Moros themselves will accept the
fact that Mindanao had been lost for them already and they have to accept the realities
that there is still peace in co-existence. All the people in the affected areas in Mindanao
are victims of the “internal colonization” process that they were not able to anticipate
because they allowed themselves to believe that education is a Christianizing agent.
This left them behind from the rest of the major groups in the Philippines. The few
qualified and educated Muslims could not be blamed on the government Christians but
themselves. As their fallback, they resorted to Islamic fundamentalism and ethnocentrism
to get the support of the Muslim world and their people who want peace. Nobody, I
mean nobody among the Muslims when interviewed would say that they will not support
the MILF least they will be the next victim. But in private conversations, these people
are already fed up and frustrated of the use of religion in the trouble in Mindanao but they
could not do anything except to be the silent opposition and victim at the same time.
Some of those who can afford left their homeland and search for a peaceful job outside
Mindanao and be free from the politicization of their religion.

Karen National Union

94
United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998. April 1999.
NSHG 39
The Karen National Union (KNU) was organized on February 5, 1947 “to unite
and spearhead their movement for freedom.”95 The organization was timely, as the
British colonizers would be granting the independence of Burma. The KNU is basically
a political arm of the Karens while the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO
later the KNLA) was the military arm. From the very beginning, the KNU adopted the
principle of “solving their political problems by fair, lawful and civil dialogue within
political context.”96

The KNU represents the Karen people and while sincerely attempting, with full
commitment, to solve their problems, and also problems relating to the unity of the
indigenous people, preservation of the Union, and achieving genuine and definitive
peace, through nonviolent, political process, such puissant and pugnacious operation
against the KNU Headquarters simply indicated that the SLORC's verbal expressions and
declarations differ completely from their practical and ruthless actions. 97

As history has it, they sent a Goodwill Mission to the British government to
express their desire for self-determination and political autonomy. However, the British
government did not bother about it and left it to the independent Burman led government
to decide. So, the Karens tried their lot by negotiating with the ruling AFPFL in 1947
but to no avail. On February 11, 1948 a month after Burma was granted its
independence, and a year after the organization of the KNU, the Karens staged a peaceful
march requesting for their autonomy. This was participated by more than 400,000
Karens all over Burma, disproving the allegations that only few wanted autonomy. But
the elected officials were busy preparing for the next election that they even forgot to
give the needs of their people. As it happened, there were rebellions of the Communists
and mutinies of the Burman Army personnel. The military arm of the KNU; the KNDO
was requested for help, particularly to secure Rangoon. In spite of the deaf ears of the
government of their request, the Karens willingly assisted the Burmese government. As
stated earlier they succeeded in preserving Rangoon. What happened after was history.
The Burmese government started to attack the Karens all over the country that forced
them to retaliate. Unprepared for a revolution they had to withdraw later from the war
fronts and adopted guerrilla warfare. From then on the Karens suffered extremely from
the hands of the Burmese government.

Yet, they still hold on to the principles by which the KNU was organized, “fair,
lawful and civil political dialogue.” The creation of the Karen State did not solve the
problem of persecution and ethnic violence. In 1960, when a Caretaker Government
under Bo Ne Win was formed, the KNU again tried to offer a peaceful solution to their
problem but just the same the government did not care about it. They tried again in 1963
under Bo Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council but failed. Ethnic persecution continued
unabated. Thousands and thousands of lives of the Karens and other ethnic races were
lost because of what appeared to be the first ethnic-cleansing campaign after that of Hitler
in WWII. Because of Martial Law the sufferings of the Karens were never known. In
95
KNU, Web Site, Internet.
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid.
NSHG 40
1984 the Burmese government began a military campaign against the Karen National
Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU).

In 1988 after the SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) took control
of the government, Gen. Saw Bo Mya, president of the KNU sent a letter offering a
solution to the political problems in Burma through dialogue and negotiations which
follows:

KAREN NATIONAL UNION

THE SUPREME HEADQUATERS

To:  Senior General Than Shwe

Chairman
State Law & Order Restoration Council

Dear General:

We see that it is imminently necessary to establish genuine and durable

internal peace in the entire country of Burma. We also need to strive for a suitable and
appropriate step-by-step approach, in order to secure that peace,

In this ascending step by step approach to obtain genuine peace, the first
desirable stage is where mutual trust and close relationship can be established with
preliminary representatives of both sides meeting face to face and planting the good
seed of frank and open discussions.

To obtain mutual relationship and trust, both sides should respect each other's
dignity and arrange for security in order to cultivate initial open and frank discussions.
The KNU is thus ready to begin this incipient good seeding through direct conference at
a mutually agreeable external (foreign) locality where the preliminary representatives
could meet. For this purpose, we are sending this letter with Rev. Enos, through whom
communications should be made, to formally find out the Senior General's opinion.

General Saw Bo Mya

President
KNU - Karen National Union
Manerplaw, June 7, 1994.98

There was no answer to this letter. The Karens also tried to negotiate through the
Military Attaché in Burmese Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, named Colonel Thein Hswe
and through Anglican Bishop Andrew Mya Han to hold a dialogue and peace
negotiations between the KNU and the SLORC. During these exploratory discussions
the following are suggested for consideration:

1: That the negotiations should not be made separately with each group or party alone;
instead, to definitively represent all the opposition parties as a whole in the discussions
for solutions, they should be made between the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB)
and SLORC.

98
KNU, Web Site, Internet.
NSHG 41
2: That the locale (place) for the negotiations should be a foreign country acceptable to
both sides.
3: That this meeting for peace negotiations be conducted under the supervision of the
United Nations.
 
4: That this meeting for peace negotiations be accessible to people of the news media,
and news conferences can be openly held with them.99

These suggestions were rejected by the SLORC, so General Mya again sent the
same letter that he sent on June 7, 1994 urging the ruling power to start a peaceful
solution to their problems. However, the SLORC responded by attacking and taking
over the KNU Headquarter in Manerplaw in January 1995. They also increased the use
of Karen civilians as forced laborers (1995-96), especially to build the Ye-Tavoy railway
and road. Karen villages were also relocated, crops destroyed and property confiscated,
forcing thousands to flee to Thailand.100

Two months after the Manerplaw attack, in March 1995, the KNU convened an
emergency meeting of the Central Committee. It was decided to hold a bilateral
negotiation between the KNU and the SLORC instead of holding on to the proposal of
including other members of the DAB. The issues to be tackled during the formal
negotiations of preliminary intermediaries with the SLORC’s representatives were
identified. The following terms for negotiations are:

1. For this KNU and SLORC negotiation, the rank and number of responsible
representatives should be discussed and agreed upon. (Members of the delegation of each
side should comprise First Line Leaders and the KNU should be represented by 7
members, plus 4 office staff members to record minutes, a total of 11 members to attend
the negotiations).

2. To settle on the time and place for the delegations to meet (To discuss for agreement
that the negotiations should take place no later than the first week of January, 1996, and
that a suitable place in Rangoon be chosen, and only if that is not possible, then Pa-an be
considered as the venue.)

3. To discuss for the arrangement of broadcasting over the radio and announcement in
newspapers about commencing negotiations by the two delegations one day ahead of
time (on the eve of the meeting).

4. To discuss and settle on allowing the attendance by the peace intermediaries during the
negotiating sessions.

5. To settle on the freedom of recording of all of the negotiating sessions from beginning
to end by video camera, movie, still camera and audiotape.

6. To discuss and settle on the KNU holding a press conference at the end of the
negotiations at a suitable place in the city where the negotiations are held. (This can be
99
Ibid.
100
James F. Guyot, "Myanmar," Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2000. © 1993-1999
Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
NSHG 42
omitted if SLORC objects to it. However, each side, on its own, should always hold the
right to dispense information to the news media.)

7. To discuss and settle on the access to telephone/telegraph/radio communication

between the KNU delegation and the KNU Central Headquarters.

8. To discuss and agree on the security arrangements for the KNU delegation by SLORC.

9. To discuss and settle on the absence of internal or external threat or threatening

gestures and actions during the negotiating sessions.

10. To discuss and agree on the right of the KNU representatives to meet freely with
relevant people and to be able to attend religious / worship services of each own faith at
will without any restriction during the negotiation period.

11. The right to meet with relevant people means:

(1) Leaders of Karen people organizations

(2) Educated elites and Persons trusted and revered by the Karens.

(3) Buddhist Monks / Abbots and Christian Clergy Leaders.

(4) Relatives and Close Friends

(5) Members of Ethnic Political Parties and Political Leaders supported by the
people or mass.

At the end of the negotiations, to make known to the country through radio and
TV broadcasting, and also through newspapers and periodicals all the minutes taken
during the entire sessions.101

The first round of negotiations was on December 18, 1995, but of the 11 points
presented by KNU delegates for SLORC’s considerations, points 2, 3, 6, and 10 were
rejected. The SLORC representatives were adamant and unyielding to point number 10,
as if they would like to isolate the KNU with the rest of the political leaders. The agreed
points for discussions during the formal negotiations were inadequate in the point of view
of the KNU, but they did not press the issue and prepared for the next negotiation on
February 15-16, 1996. During the second round of negotiations the KNU being the
interested party submitted and discussed the cease-fire arrangements to be observed
during the coming negotiations. The following are:

1. Memo on the KNU Viewpoint concerning Cease-fire for the During the
Negotiation Sessions. It is necessary to observe cease-fire during negotiations between
SLORC and KNU. The necessity derives from:

- the desirability of cultivating trust by each side during negotiation;

101
KNU, Internet..
NSHG 43
- the need to avoid military matters during the negotiation;

- the essentiality of conducting the talks under secure conditions;

- both sides to obtain the trust, reliance and confidence of relevant parties, organizations,
ethnic peoples, and the entire mass (people) of Burma.

- in continuation, along with the cease-fire, the following items are deemed necessary and
proposed for mediation by the KNU; they are:

2. The need for SLORC to let the entire country know about the cease-fire.

This need to declare the cease-fire to the whole country rests on the following reasons:

(a) Without the declaration of cease-fire to the entire country, (troops of) KNU allies in
the basic KNU territories and the contiguous areas, and within as well as outside the
KNU regions, would continue fighting with SLORC, and, inevitably, the KNU troops in
the basic KNU territories would be, in some way, involved in the conflict. It is therefore
highly desirable that SLORC officially announce the cease-fire to the whole country to
avoid these complications.

(b) Everyone is aware that the fighting and battles between SLORC and KNU have been
the fiercest. In view of this, to alleviate the obduracy and antagonistic sentiment between
both sides, and, concurrently, mitigating the hardened animosity and hostile emotions
between all other armed resistant powers in the country and SLORC, it is desirable to
cultivate a good seedling in starting this negotiation by the two sides.

(c) The countrywide declaration of cease-fire can provide encouragement to the people of
the whole country. They will have faith on this negotiation, and support and cooperation
can be forthcoming from them. And these are extremely desirable to be attained.

(There has been a precedence when in 1963, during negotiations with the then ruling
Revolutionary Council, the Rev. Council government made an official declaration of
country-wide cease-fire.) 

3. It is desirable that reinforcement for the offensive forces and movement of

heavy weapons to frontline areas be suspended.

If reinforcement for the offensive SLORC forces in the KNU territorial grounds were not
suspended during the negotiation sessions of the two sides, there will be no doubt that the
KNU as well as the Karen people cannot put any faith in this negotiation. Thus, it is
imperative that this extremely important point should be seriously taken into account.

It is necessary that construction and maintenance activities of roads used in the military
offensive operations should be suspended.

4. The front line roads used by SLORC offensive operations are threatening
gestures to the KNU and the Karen people living in the KNU territories. Therefore, if
construction, improvements and maintenance work on these roads are not suspended
during the talks, there would be troop movements and confusion will undoubtedly arise
between army units on both sides as well as among the people in these areas. Thus, to
prevent these problems road construction and maintenance activities must be suspended.
NSHG 44
Recruiting new army personnel, engaging porters for the troops, enlisting locals for
watchmen or security duties, and raising corvee should be suspended.

5. During the cease-fire period, rounding up new recruits for the army, drafting
porters, getting watchmen from the locals, and calling for volunteer workers or corvee are
activities directly related to the public which can cause complications, bad feeling and
confrontations, and thus should be suspended. Only then the negotiation can earnestly
proceed without these concerns and anxieties.

6. It is necessary to suspend all the levying of money on the people in lieu of

porters, watchmen or people for security duties, corvee or 'volunteer' workers, and
demanding provisions from the people.

SLORC's various demands on the people, things that are seriously detrimental to the
people, must be absolutely stopped. Should instances like these arise, the most
appropriate actions should be taken. If not, the negotiation between KNU and SLORC
and the cease-fire would not be beneficial to the people, and the negotiation,
undoubtedly, in some way would be harmed or impeded. Therefore these things should
cease, and in case they still happen, actions should be immediately taken against them.

7. To refrain from forcibly relocating people; and those that have been
reestablished elsewhere by coercion, those who have to run away and hide to avoid
forced relocation, should be allowed, arrangement and security given them, to return to
live in their own villages.

Not to forcibly resettle people elsewhere, and allowing for the return, with guarantee of
full security, those who have been relocated by force as well as those who managed to
escape and hid to avoid relocation, would be highly required and demand immediate
action. If this is not done, it would not be easy for the cease-fire and negotiations to be
successfully conducted. Additionally, permission should be given for necessary help that
can be rendered to the suffering people by various NGO's.

8. Information and messages should be promptly available to both sides concerning

necessary personnel and troop movements.

During the cease-fire and negotiation period, prior notification and messages on
necessary troop movements on both sides should be sent to each other. In only this way
would accidental encounter and firing on each other be avoided. Since this can create
messy and complicated situations, each side's troop positions should be precisely
demarcated.

During the cease-fire period, KNU must be able to freely communicate with their own
ethnic people.

Since the negotiation between SLORC and KNU is the political destiny for all the Karen
people, during the cease-fire and negotiation period, the KNU should be able to
personally meet and discuss with, and obtain the suggestion and counsel of the Karen
people, revered Karen Buddhist and Christian clergy members, educated elite and
respected Karen leaders. Therefore, it is desirable that these contacts and communication
should be guaranteed with freedom and security. Only then the negotiations can be
carried out honorably.
NSHG 45
9. To mediate and solve problems that may arise during the cease-fire period,
negotiating committees represented by delegates of both sides should be formed.

Since there could be problems between the two sides, many questionable and difficult
situations concerning the people and mass, necessitating promptly mediated solutions, it
is desirable to organize negotiating committees within both the upper echelon leaders and
lower members of the delegations.

10. The cease-fire should be observed by an observer delegation from the United
Nations Headquarters, acceptable to both sides.

Monitoring should be available to ascertain whether or not the cease-fire terms are
strictly observed. For this, impartial and fair observer groups, acceptable to both sides,
should be maintained. Inasmuch as the most suitable people for this are available from
the UN, both sides should request for help from the United Nations.

11. During the cease-fire period, the KNU Central Committee member P'Doh Mahn
Yin Sein and KNU members and Karen people arrested by SLORC should be released.

In order to implement the cease-fire with positive results, it is desirable to free the
arrested and detained KNU members and other Karens. In releasing the KNU members
who were arrested in 1995, including P'Doh Mahn Yin Sein, the Karens should be
unconditionally freed. If this were not carried out, the KNU soldiers and the Karen people
cannot look forward to any hope on this cease-fire and negotiation. Thus, this situation
must be implemented with practical results.

12. Within 30 days of mutual declaration of the cease-fire agreement obtained

during the negotiation by both sides, negotiation should be started on fundamental
problems related to internal peace for the country.

The cease-fire being particularly for discussion and mediation of basic problems of the
country, both sides should begin serious negotiation, aspiring for a firm and lasting peace
in the country. Only then progress (the ascension) toward genuine unity of people in the
country and an authentic federation system can be achieved.102

Of the 12 items above proposed by the KNU, five were disapproved and accepted
seven (# 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 11). These 5 items were again resubmitted for
considerations in the third round of negotiations on June 29 to July 2, 1996. In the
overall analysis of the points presented by the SLORC was for the Karens to stop their
armed struggles and return to the fold of the government. The meeting ended with the
assurance that both sides “to look for answers to bring their positions closer” during the
fourth round of negotiations.

At the fourth round of negotiations on November 20, 1996, the KNU submitted
the following proposals:

(1) The problems between the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and
the Karen National Union (KNU) should not be solved by military means or armed
struggle, and to maintain cease-fire;

102
Ibid.
NSHG 46

(2) Once the cease-fire goes into effect, the SLORC and KNU should continue
negotiating on matters concerning the Union (of the country), unity among the peoples,
and the achievement of a firm and durable peace in the country;

(3) In order to maintain the cease-fire, mediation and demarcation to be made on the
positions of the troops of the two sides, and regulations and rulings to be followed by
troops of both sides.103

These three proposals were submitted by the SLORC delegation leader,

Colonel Kyaw Win, to his SLORC superiors who countered with the following
points:
 To relinquish the armed resistance course of action and enter the 'legal fold', and make
legal declaration (on these).

Observation of cease-fire.

Mediation on the demarcation of troop positions.

Cooperation on projects for the regional development.

To attend the National Convention, relating to politics.

When the Constitution has been drawn up (at the National Convention), to finally reject
all arms and weapons, and form a lawful/legal political party.

 When the SLORC delegation sought the impression on their 6 items of counterproposal,
the KNU responded that they would furnish their reply on these by the end of December
1996, and the Fourth Negotiation was brought to a close.104

Proposals and counter-proposals were submitted but the negotiations were stalled
at some issues that are unacceptable to the SLORC. After the fourth round of
negotiations the SLORCs began their offensive operations against the Karens. However,
the KNU continues to pursue a peaceful solution to the war raging in Burma. On
January 7-14, 1997 they held an Ethnic Nationalities Seminar at Mae Tha Raw Hta in
Kawtholei, and agreed upon the following items:

1. AGREEMENT RELATING TO POLITICAL AIMS

(a) To dismantle the military dictatorship and establish peace in the country.
(b) To practice the democratic political system;
(c) To achieve the rights of equality and self-determination for each and every
nationality;
(d) To establish a federal union.

2. AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE SLORC'S NATIONAL COVENTION

The sham National Convention being held by the SLORC, present, is for the perpetuation

103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
NSHG 47
of military dictatorship. Since absolutely no rights will be gained for the ethnic
nationalities, we, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, do not in any way recognize the
SLORC's National Convention and agree to oppose it.

3. AGREEMENT REGARDING TRI-PARTITE DIALOUGE

We, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, accept the tri-partite dialogue agreed to by Daw
Aung San Su Kyi, and called for the by the resolutions of the UN and international
organizations. The tri-partite dialogue must include three forces, namely the force
composed the NDF, UNLD, PDF and other ethnic nationalities, the pro-democracy force
led by Daw Aung San Su Kyi and the SLORC military clique.

4. AGREEMENT RELATING TO FEDERAL UNION

We, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar unanimously agree to establish a genuine federal
union composed of national states having the full rights of national equality and self-
determination.

5. AGREEMENT RELATING TO ECONOMIC POLICY

Regarding the economic policy, we, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, agree to practice
market economic system and invite foreign investments. However as foreign investments,
at present, are benefiting the SLORC military dictatorship only and increasing its
oppressive power, we strongly object to them.

6. AGREEMENT RELATING TO NARCOTIC DRUGS

We, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, unanimously agree to cooperate with international
narcotic drug eradication organizations for the eradication of the entire business of
narcotic drugs, including cultivation, production and trafficking.

7. AGREEMENT REGARDING PRO-DEMOCRACY FORCES

We, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, agree to raise the fight on all sides in the fields of
politics, diplomacy and people's action for the dismantling of the SLORC military
dictatorship.

In this struggle, we agree also to join hands with the pro-democracy forces led by Daw
Aung San Su Kyi, and act unitedly and simultaneously for the achievement of rights of
the nationalities as well as democratic rights.

Moreover, we acknowledge the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Daw
Aung San Su Kyi as the winner of 1990 general election in accordance with the true, will
of the people and democratic process, we fully support all acts of opposition against the
SLORC, by it.

8. AGREEMENT RELATING TO ASEAN

We the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, agree to send letters to ASEAN requesting it to
delay, indefinitely, acceptance of Burma under the SLORC, as a member of the
organization.

9. AGREEMENT RELATING TO ALLIANCE

We, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, agree unanimously to help develop the National
Democratic Front (NDF), the nation-wide alliance body of the ethnic nationalities, into a
politically militarily and organizationally more solid entity.

10. We, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, agree to maintain and implement the results of
the seminar and to have reunion at least once a year.105

105
Ibid.
NSHG 48

All the efforts of the KNU appeared to be useless for the SLORCs continued their
attacks on the hapless and helpless ethnic minorities; even refugee camps are not
spared.106 But it is not a hopeless case as long as the SLORCs are also willing to meet
on the negotiating table.107 In an email answer of BaSaw Khin to the queries of this
researcher concerning the present stand of the Karens on the issue of secession, BaSaw
noted that the situation before and when the article in the Internet was written is different
at present. With the developments of the negotiations and the unity of the population
against the SLORC, BaSaw seems to believe that most likely autonomy of the different
ethnic races will be achieved in the near future.108

In the introduction of the KNU Web Site in the “Summary of the KNU and
SLORC Negotiation Process” General Saw Bo Mya, President of the KNU wrote:

It has been almost fifty years of civil war, which began since Burma gained her
independence in 1948. This civil war has continued through this long period because of
two enormous basic political problems concerning: ethnicity / the different ethnic
peoples, and democracy / the democratic principles for the entire population of the
country that have failed to be resolved by peaceful, political means.

From the time it was organized in 1947, the KNU (Karen National Union) has
never desired to solve problems through the military method. During the demonstration
of more than 400,000 Karen people on February 11, 1948, the Karens emphatically
expressed their strong emotion against internecine strife by proclaiming loudly the slogan
"(we) don’t Want Civil War". Simultaneously declared was the desirability to seek fair,
just and peaceful solution to political problems. However, when the KNU and the Karen
people were provoked and attacked by force, in order to defend themselves, and with
whatever available weaponry, they had to resort to (taking part in) the unavoidable
revolutionary war.

In any event, endeavors have been made throughout this time to solve the
country's political problems through nonviolent, political means. After the SLORC
military took power in 1988, the combined efforts of KNU together with other ethnic
groups and powerful democratic forces to resolve political problems by civil and peaceful
means have been in vain.

By December 1995, the beginning of conferences between the KNU and

SLORC was made possible through the striving/toiling of those committed to peaceable
process. Unfortunately, when the fourth meeting ended, the then prevailing mutual cease-
fire agreement was unilaterally broken off by SLORC which, on the first week of
February, 1997, started an intensive military operation, thereby resuming hostilities, and
effectively discontinued and destroyed the peace negotiations.

106
Please refer to the appendices for the reports concerning SLORC’s atrocities.
107
Rodi Rodil, a member of the GRP Panel during the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks said, that during
their meeting, at first the Indonesian government arranged the tables far apart. Then, as the negotiations
progressed, the tables were moved closer that the negotiators need not have to use their microphones and
they could even reach one another’s hand. There was one coffee table so that everyone would like to offer
each other coffee.
108
Email letter of BaSaw Khin. Yahoo.com, Internet. It could not be retrieved because of
technical problems with the PLDT.
NSHG 49
While conducting violent and ruthless military operations against the KNU and
Karen villages, SLORC maliciously implied that the KNU was responsible for the
breakdown of talks, and it was the KNU that made unreasonable demands during the
conference. From their vantage point, propaganda is carried on through their radio and
television stations, making calumnious statements, and creating suspicion and
misunderstanding against the KNU.

It is hoped that through this clarification document, keeping in forefront the just
and best interests of the Karens and all the ethnic nationalities, the actual, truthful
proceedings during these negotiations that the KNU had participated with much liberal
attitude, would be, to some extent, made known to all the people of the country. It is also
hoped that the Karens and all the different ethnic peoples in the country are able to
differentiate between right and wrong, and can faithfully hold on to truth and justice. 109

In other words the Karens at first started their campaign for an independent state
in a peaceful means as also outlined in the history of the Karen people. However, the
hard stand of the Burmese government against the Karens and other ethnic races made it
hard to achieve a practical and long lasting solution to their perennial problem of peace
and order and ethnic discrimination. However, as BaSaw wrote, the possibility for the
granting of autonomy will be the best alternative to secession once they ousted the
SLORCs from Burma.

Comparative Analysis
Resurgence of Resistance
The secession movements of the Karens and the Moros, by the KNU and the
MNLF/MILF are basically caused by the failure of their governments to address the
needs of the people. The Burmese government abused the Karens even though they
helped that government against the rebels after their independence was granted. The
Moros on the other hand felt that the incursion of the Christian settlers into their
ancestral homeland was the strategy of the government to complete the colonization of
the south. Their miseries from the hands of their (Moro) politicians were blamed on
the government while the sufferings of the Karens were really instigated by their own
government. The pre-conceived Christian hatred against the Moros, which has no
reality, is the result of their guilt and fear of vengeance of the Christians who were their
victims during their naval guerrilla war against Spain. Majority of the Muslims living
in the Christian areas did not meet this kind of attitude and mistrust from the Christians.
The Karens is another case. Their friendly and democratic attitude to foreigners and
freedom of choice of religion of their ethnic race members seemed to be the basic
causes of being alienated in their own country because of the concept that a “Burmese
is not a Burmese unless he/she is a Buddhist.”
The resurgence of colonial resistance of the Karens was ahead of the Moros.
Right after their independence they already started their request for autonomy, while
the Moros were still observing their fate under the rule of their pre-conceived enemies.
However, the black propaganda against the Karens worsened their suffering. They
were later fighting all other armed groups in Burma, perhaps because they are
perceived as foreigners due to religion (some Karens who adopted Christianity). But
109
General Saw Bo Mya, KNL, Internet.
NSHG 50
this is not enough reason to hunt the Karens. It is the strong ethnocentric attitude of the
Burmans and not the Karens; to lord over other ethnic races has to be blamed. But the
perseverance of the Karens for their cherished dream of autonomy if not secession or
freedom encouraged others to fight. The event that triggered the secession of the
Moros was timely because it happened in what is called as the First Quarter Storm.
The Marcos government could not fight all the discontented factions in the Philippines.
The martial law regime helped in promoting the cause of the Moro leaders among their
people because of the use of the military to crash them. As the Christians are the pre-
conceived enemies, the soldiers who were majority Christians provided the excuse or
propaganda that indeed Martial Law will Christianize the Moros.
However, on the one hand, though the Karens were ahead in their secession or
autonomous demand, the solution to their problem is still bleak because of the martial
law regime in Burma. The only advantage of the Karens at the turn of the new century
is the use of the cyberspace or Internet in providing the needs of the outside world to
know what is going on inside Burma. Though earlier, the Karen state was created for
propaganda purposes (just like the change of Burma to Myanmar) and as a partial
solution to the problem confronting the Karens, however, it did not help any better.
The SLORC’s armies would like to annihilate them and other races, in other words the
problem is still there but it is more political than racial because all other races are also
victims. The unity of the ethnic races and the Burman themselves to oust the
repressive SLORC is a sign of development for the Karens. Now the fight transcends
racial barriers, hence, Khin believes that there will be positive outcome of their struggle
because other races had joined hand with them.
The problem of the Moros on the other hand, is still raging. However, the
partial solution to this was already put in place, but when it comes to the tangible
results, it is still more wanting. The concentration of the programs of the SPCPD is in
the Sulu archipelago, while leaving the other areas. Misuari said that his budget is not
enough to cover the whole Muslim areas. No wonder that discontentment is ever
present. But the Moro resurgence to colonization did not end there with the signing of
the Peace Accord. The war is still raging in Mindanao between the government forces
and the Moros (MILF, and the renegade MNLF faction that do not believe in
compromise as the solution to the problems of the Moro people) with a bleak
possibility of peace at present. There is also the Abu Sayyaf that rides on the
bandwagon of secessionists.110 For them there is no other solution but independence.
As the Karens are gearing towards real autonomy the Moros under the influence
of the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf is going an all out war that is even exported to Manila,
to press their demand for complete independence.111 What united the Karens on the
one hand in their aspirations for respect and self-determination is their strong ethnic
identity. The Moros on the other hand had more edge over the Karens because beside
their strong ethnic identity too, their Islamic religion became their rallying point and a
source of external support.

110
Please refer to the appendices of the report about the Abu Sayyaf.
111
Please refer to the appendices for some reports of their offensives.
NSHG 51
Chapter V
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Philippine Government
The Philippine Government that represents the Christians – the perceived
enemies of the Moros and a neo-colonial power did not scatter the Moros all over the
islands to prevent them from reorganizing. They were allowed to stay in their
homeland, and continued their illegal activities that resemble their age-old practice of
Pangayao or piracies and slave raids, which took the modern form of abductions and
extortion activities. While the Moros are aggressive, the Christians are patient; hoping
and waiting for the time to come that the Muslims will change and accept them as co-
Filipinos as the Christian accepted them. A case in point was the abduction of
Christian students by the Maranaos in 1992. The Christians were planning to retaliate
by abducting Muslim students in Cagayan de Oro City. But cool minds prevailed and
negotiations were made. The government is very patient with them because it only
reacted when attacked. In fact it was the government who negotiated for a peaceful
solution rather than the Moros.

Burmese and SLORC’s Response

Right after the Second World War, the Karens outwardly opposed their
membership into federated Burma. Even before the independence of Burma was
granted, the Karens were already blacklisted by the Burman leaders for their desire to
secede from Burma. The government that followed was ruled by the Burman ethnic
group, so, knowing of the Karens’ war exploits as proven by their successes in
defending Rangoon, it scattered the Karens all over Burma except those places where
the Karens were the majority. They were forced to work with low salary, their houses
were confiscated and their children and families were also scattered, a sort of ethnic
cleansing. Nonetheless, they persisted and even grew in number. But just the same
they could not do anything because the racist government saw to it that nobody from
among the Karens would get the right education because of their threat to the Union of
Burma. Aside, from this, the other reason perhaps is that, they could not get the right
leader to represent them because they themselves are divided. Other Karens preferred
to form their own separate autonomous state rather than continuing their fight for
autonomy. Another factor might be religion as earlier pointed out. The Karens are
divided into Buddhism, Christianity and their pagan beliefs (majority). Christianity
and Buddhism among the Karens is only ten percent of the population. Thus, they
could not influence the majority who are pagans. As the Christians have many
denominations, the Buddhists in Burma have many sects too. Hence, they could not
influence the total population. One sect may not have the same beliefs from the others,
thus, alienating one from the other. With the military as the lords and masters, the
monks had no way of uniting the people as they themselves are disunited.
NSHG 52
External Support
Moros
The Moros being Muslims had the support of the Islamic countries all over the
world. The Moros may be the least developed, Muslims but just the same they are still
Muslims and according to the teachings of the Islam all Muslims are brothers and as
brothers they have to help one another. Take the case of Malaysia. Malaysians
offered to help train the first (Top Ninety) and the succeeding batches (Batch 300 and
others) of the MNLF, because they felt that it is their obligation to help their Muslim
brothers who are abused by the Philippine government. The liquidation of the Muslim
trainees in Corregidor Island popularly known as the Jabidah massacre got the
sympathy of Malaysia. They were able to ascertain that the trainees were trained in
order to invade Sabah. The massacre became their excuse to help the Moros of
Mindanao, because they were killed for their refusal to attack Sabah, the grand design
of Marcos if the Malaysian government refuses to return Sabah to the Philippines. The
claim of the Philippines over Sabah is based on the concept stating that what is owned
by its citizen is also owned by the state, and the concept that a citizen of a country is
under the protection of its government. Malaysia until it got its independence paid the
Sulu Sultan an annual rent as stipulated in the lease agreement between the Sulu Sultan
and the British government. However, whether the Jabidah massacre happened or not,
Malaysia was still obliged to help the Moros because of the concept of “dar-ul-Islam.”
The OIC is very influential for the cause of the Moros because from its member
nations the Moros were able (and still are as in the case of the MILF) to get the much
needed logistics and assistance for the families of the guerrillas. Actually, without the
OIC the Moros of Mindanao would not last in their struggle because of their ethnic
diversity. Never was there any representative from the United Nations to oversee how
the ceasefire agreements between the government and the Moro rebels were
implemented but there were Muslim observers from other countries. The American
government did not in any way interfere with the problems of the Moros because in the
first place because they are blamed by the Moros for including Mindanao into the
Filipino nation. Not only that. The Americans won’t allow the incident in the 1970s to
happen again. They were threatened by the OIC and OPEC that if they would not
convince Marcos to negotiate with the MNLF, the Arabs and Egypt will not enter in the
negotiating table with Israel for peace and order in the Middle East, and without the
repercussions on their oil needs.
Having external support which is a basic requirement for successful
unconventional and progressive fighting, gave the Moros the advantage over the
Karens. Although members of the OIC are secretly giving aid to the MILF to continue
their fight, officially the OIC gave the Philippine government the assurance that it does
not recognize the MILF. This statement was issued so that the OIC will not appear to
be contradicting their actions, because they cannot support peace process of the
government and the MNLF at the same time giving assistance to the fighting MILF.
The ongoing support to the MILF is shown by the number of Arabs entering the
Moroland in the guise of evangelization, but they are actually military advisers to
Hashim Salamat. The training of new recruits in Pakistan in the pretext of
NSHG 53
participating Islamic religious conference indicates that the OIC is still supporting the
Moro mujahidin or Holy Warriors of the MILF.

Karens
In the early stage of the Karens secession movement, there was no external
support. While the support of the people is vital to the success of the fighters, the
people supporting the Karens were also hunted so the Karens have nowhere to turn to.
The Karens likewise lacked external support, be it in the form of arms and ammunition
or subsistence supplies. The war that the Karens waged was at first thought of as a
case of ethnic strife because their main antagonists were the Burman race, their first
colonizers. That is why there is not much attention given to it from the outside
because it is basically an internal problem.
However, reports on the violations of human rights against the Karens became
severe that the United Nations mediated to find the solution. Even the non-combatants
are still attacked, annihilated, abused and exiled. The pathetic condition of the Karens
caught the attention of Human Rights activists all over the world, so that a number of
international support groups for the cause of the Karens and other ethnic races in
Burma the whole Burmese population who are suffering under the regime of the
SLORCs. The Karen National League for example is based in Canada. There are also
those that are based in Thailand. The function of these support groups is basically to
relay to the world through the Internet or the tri-media what is happening within
Burma. But as the support is through information, this will not help a lot because what
they need most are arms and ammunition.
Careful analysis of the events in Burma will prove that the atrocities of the
SLORCs had in a way or the other helped the Karens as well. The situation: First: the
Karens are not the only ethnic race (they prefer to call it a race than group) in Burma
that are being hunted by the SLORCs but a lot of them, i.e. the Cachins; and Second:
the Burman ethnic race as represented by the daughter of Aung San is also suffering
from the abuses of the SLORCs. This scenario made the other races in Burma realize
that unless they are united they cannot win against the SLORC that has the support of
the multinationals operating in Burma. As pointed out earlier the different ethnic races
formed the DAB or the Democratic Alliance of Burma. The DAB is their united front
in order to defeat the repressive martial law regime of the SLORC. Even the Burman
students who were at first anti-Karens are now taking refuge in the Karens refugee
camps. In spite of the use of the modern technology to inform the world of what is
happening in Burma, external support is still lacking.
Unlike the Moros that have the support of the OIC and other Muslim countries,
the Karens have none. While the Moros have their Muslims supporters, the Karens
who are majority Buddhists have no Buddhist country that could afford to extend their
help because majority of these countries are also suffering from their economic
problems, i.e. India. The United Nations on their part cannot enforce sanctions on the
SLORCs because the SLORCs argue that it is not within the bounce of the UN to
interfere in an internal problem of the country. The United States cannot also interfere
NSHG 54
as it interfered in the Middle East and in Europe because it has no interest to protect in
Burma.

CONLUSION

Summary

The history of resistance movements of the Karens and the Moros can be traced
back to the time when the colonizers came into their homelands. But, while the Karens
were overwhelmed by the superiority and the trickery of the conquerors, the Moros were
not. The Moros became the stumbling block of the imperial design of the Spaniards in
Mindanao. But as the Karen experienced earlier, the Moros changed positions. They did
not surrender to the Americans but made treaties of friendship, which placed them on
equal footing with the conquerors. They stopped fighting upon learning that the
Americans meant business, and accepted the treaties of friendships. But for the
Americans, it meant surrender. Hence, when they opposed their inclusion to the
Philippines, they could not do anything but accept the fact that their perceived enemies,
the Christian Filipinos would be their rulers. The same is true of the Karens. The
Burmans, who were aliens of their place centuries ago became their rulers, hence, they
did not like to be ruled by them again.

After the Second World War when independence was granted to the Philippines
and Burma, the Moros and the Karens renewed their efforts to regain their freedom by
organizing their secessionist movements. The resurgence of the Karens’ secessionism
was ignited when the Burman dominated Burmese government attacked them after
defending and preserving the capital City of Rangoon (now Yangon) and of course the
ethnic cleansing campaigns by both the Burmese and the SLORCs. On the part of the
Moros, the slow response of the government for the development of Mindanao, and the
influx of the Christians into their ancestral domain became the rallying point in the
resurgence of anti-colonial resistance. This resurgence was ignited by the Jabidah
massacre in 1968.

The governments on both countries tried to solve the secessionist movements in

their respective countries that plagued their administrations using different approaches.
While the Philippine government, even during the feared Martial Law, used persuasion
and negotiations, the Burmese government used force and firepower to crush the Karens.
While the Karens were made as forced-laborers, the Muslims were pampered, money
were poured to Mindanao to show to the Muslims that the government would like to
fulfill the promise that Mindanao is the land of opportunities. Nevertheless, the money
fell into the pockets of their own (Moro) politicians, but they (Moros) are made to believe
that it is the fault of the Christian government not of their Moro leaders.

The escalation of war between the Moros and the Christian-led government forces
compelled the OIC to intervene, which the Philippine government could not refuse
because of the much needed oil and of course as dictated by America. As earlier
NSHG 55
discussed, at the time when the trouble in Mindanao was intense, the peace negotiation
between Israel and Egypt and other Islamic countries was in progress. The OIC and the
OPEC secretly demanded from the US government that they would only enter into the
negotiations if the US convinces the Marcos government to suspend military operations
against the Moros and to negotiate with the rebels instead, if not, no Middle East
negotiations would occur. This is not present in Burma. There are no Buddhist or pagan
countries that produce what the SLORC government needed most, or any world power
that can influence them, just like the influence of America over the Philippines. Of
course there are American companies in Burma, but the US government cannot interfere
with affairs of private enterprise. In short, the Karens have no external support while the
Moros have.

Conclusion

In all of the preceding discussion, there is only one denominator of the resurgence
of anti-colonial resistance. This is basically cultural in nature. The Karens do not want
to be ruled by their perceived former conquerors, the Burmans, although, the sufferings
of the Karens are more on the ethnocentrism of the Burmans than of the Karens. As
history has it, the Karens are friendly, fair, and democratic. They are also cosmopolitan
hence they are able to achieve higher education during the British period than in any
other period of their history. Nonetheless, the Karens had already won in their fight.
They had proven to the other ethnic races in Burma that the Karens are not the problem
but the oppressive Burmese and SLORC governments. They were able to show that they
are willing to cooperate with others for the benefits of the greater majority. What really
preserved and encourage the Karens to go on is their ethnocentrism, but a more positive
kind of ethnocentrism. They would like to preserve their own identity while learning
from other ethnic races.

The Moros on their part do not like to be ruled by their pre-conceived enemies -
the Christians Filipinos; of course this is not true. If ever there are people that should be
blamed for the alleged neglect of the government on the people of Moroland, these are
their own politicians. There is no time in Philippine history after the granting of
independence that there are no Muslim legislators. These people are supposed to protect
the interests of their constituencies but they too became power hungry that they forgot the
needs of their populace. These people were despised and called palatikos a pejorative
term for dirty politicians, yet the Moro masses blamed the government for their failures,
they elected them into office. While it is true that the Christians had taken their lands,
history would show that majority of these small farmlands were acquired legally. Those
big tracks of lands that are owned by absentee owners are the ones acquired illegally
through their own unscrupulous (Moro) politicians.

Both the Karens and the Moros felt that their homeland is so small to have
another group of people to stay, hence, the ethno-centric and the competitive theories on
ethnicity apply to their problems. On the one hand, with the present developments in
Burma this ethnocentrism is now a part of the past. They are now learning to see the
good thing from one another, which in a way caused by the ethnic or religious cleansing
NSHG 56
of the SLORCs. Because of SLORC’s atrocities the different ethnic races are now
helping one another to fight their single enemy – the SLORCs that resulted in the
organization of the Democratic Alliance of Burma spearheaded by the KNU or the Karen
National Union.

On the other hand, if ever the Moros could not be hired into the bureaucracy
because of their lack of necessary qualifications, the blame is on them because they
thought that education would make them Christians, hence, they refused and look down
on those Moros who sent their children to school. As in the case of the Karens, since
they are not allowed to use and learned their language, it did not make education less
important, also look down on the Burmese educational system. However, unless the
Moros and the Karens will stop thinking as Moros and Karens but as a citizen of their
countries without surrendering their respective ethnic identities, secession or separatism
or more appropriately resurgence of anti-colonial resistance won't end.

In conclusion, since the secessionist or separatist movements of the Karens and

the Moros are caused more by their refusal to be ruled over by another group whom they
consider as enemies, rather than the alleged neglect by their governments, and the
destruction of their ancestral domain, therefore, these movements are ethnocentric in
nature. Since the war being fought is ethnocentric in nature rather than political or
military, then it is an encounter of cultures. And since the Burmans are thought of as the
original oppressive colonizers of the Karens (who first settled Burma), and the Christian-
Filipinos as the alter-ego Spanish colonizers, therefore, the encounter of cultures
popularly called secessionist or separatist movements is the resurgence of anti-colonial
resistance than mere insurrection or rebellion.