Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois Joins Catholic Charities Lawsuit To Continue To Serve Children's Best Interests

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE OF SPRINGFIELD-IN-ILLINOIS, an Illinois non-profit corporation, CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE OF PEORIA, an Illinois non-profit corporation, CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE OF JOLIET, INC., an Illinois non-profit corporation, and CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES OF SOUTHERN ILLINOIS, DIOCESE OF BELLEVILLE, an Illinois non-profit corporation, Plaintiffs, vs. STATE OF ILLINOIS, LISA MADIGAN, in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, ERWIN McEWEN, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Children & Family Services, State of Illinois, the DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES, State of Illinois, ROCCO J. CLAPPS in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Human Rights, State of Illinois, and the DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, State of Illinois, Defendants.
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Case No. 2011 MR 254
Hon. John Schmidt Presiding Judge
SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS, AND OTHER RELIEF Plaintiffs, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield-in-Illinois, an Illinois nonprofit corporation, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Peoria, an Illinois non-profit corporation, and Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Joliet, Inc., an Illinois non-profit corporation, and Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois, Diocese of Belleville, an Illinois non-profit 1 of 49 Case No. 2011 MR 254
corporation (the latter alone hereinafter referred to as CSSSI Belleville), all of which are hereinafter collectively referred to as Catholic Charities or plaintiffs, by their undersigned attorneys, hereby complain of the defendants, the State of Illinois, Lisa Madigan, in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, Erwin McEwen, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Children & Family Services of the State of Illinois, the Department of Children & Family Services, State of Illinois, Rocco J. Clapps, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Human Rights, State of Illinois, and the Department of Human Rights, State of Illinois, as follows: Nature of the Case 1. Plaintiffs, Catholic Charities social service agencies for four Roman Catholic
Dioceses in the State of Illinois which have provided extensive adoption and foster family services in Illinois for decades, bring this lawsuit in a pro-active effort to prevent the lawless infliction of irreparable harm on plaintiffs as well as on many thousands of vulnerable and needy children, families, and adults across the State of Illinois, and to avert the defendants needless and arbitrary collapse of a critical network of social service agencies at a time when a budgetary crisis already has stretched vital social services resources to the breaking point. In order to avert this tragic crisis and prevent harmful and potentially cruel disruption, discontinuity, and destabilization in the lives of so many of Illinois needy young people, families, and others, plaintiffs are asking this Court to resolve several actual controversies, each of which turns on a clear cut legal issue, that have arisen between them and the State of Illinois, the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, the Director of the Department of Children & Family Services of the State of Illinois (DCFS), DCFS itself, the Director of the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR), and IDHR itself. The instant controversies pose pure questions of law.
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Actual Controversy #1 Plaintiffs Are Not Places Of Public Accommodation 2. The initial question of law posed herein by plaintiffs is whether there is an
unavoidable conflict between, on the one hand, (i) plaintiffs conscientious fulfillment of the historic, apostolic, and ministerial role of the Roman Catholic Church in providing compassionate, competent, and professional social services more specifically, adoption and foster care by means and methods that are faithful to the integral and essential tenets of the Roman Catholic religious faith, and on the other hand, (ii) the defendant Attorney Generals enforcement duties and responsibilities, as well as the enforcement duties and responsibilities of the Director of IDHR and IDHR itself, with respect to the provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act (e.g., 775 ILCS 5/101(A)(12)), which proscribe discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sexual orientation and/or marital status by place[s] of public accommodation within the State of Illinois. Plaintiffs are asking for entry of a declaratory judgment in this lawsuit to the effect that the place of public accommodation provisions of the Human Rights Act do not apply to them because they are sectarian and religious and, therefore, they are excluded from the scope of the Illinois Human Rights Act, which covers only those adoption agencies which are non-sectarian. Plaintiffs provide vital social services, including adoption and foster care, as part of their religious ministry, rooted in the Holy Scriptures, and carried on in relationship to the Roman Catholic Church and under the spiritual governance and practical oversight of each Diocesan Bishop. Thus plaintiffs social ministry is part of plaintiffs religious practice inspired, sustained, and bound by religious principles. As a result, plaintiffs plainly do not and cannot qualify as non-sectarian adoption agenc[ies], within the meaning of the Illinois Human Rights Act. 3. Even assuming, arguendo, that these explicit provisions restricting the coverage
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of the public accommodation provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act somehow might be stretched so far as to cover and bind the plaintiffs, another Illinois statute, namely, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA, 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq.), necessarily would preclude any such strained interpretation purporting to authorize an application of these provisions of the Human Rights Act to plaintiffs. Pursuant to IRFRA, defendants reading of the Human Rights Act to require the plaintiffs to process applications for adoption or foster care by unmarried couples, regardless of whether they are same sex or opposite sex, would substantially burden [plaintiffs] exercise of religion, imposing on plaintiffs a coercive choice of either abandoning their religious convictions or failing to comply with defendants erroneous reading of Illinois law, infringing plaintiffs statutory rights, not to mention Article I, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which guarantees that [t]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed and no person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account of his [or her] religious opinions. Therefore, pursuant to IRFRA, in order to prevail, the defendants would bear a heavy burden of proof they cannot even remotely satisfy, namely, (a) proving that coercing plaintiffs to process such unmarried couples applications, contrary to the tenets of plaintiffs religious faith, would serve a compelling governmental interest, and (b) proving that coercing plaintiffs to process such applications by unmarried couples, regardless of their sexual orientation, would be the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Even if coercing Roman Catholic institutions to contravene such an essential tenet of their religious faith could be said to serve a compelling governmental interest, defendants plainly could serve that interest adequately by resorting to a far less restrictive alternative than by forcing plaintiffs to betray and flout their faith. Defendants enjoy a medley of options apart
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from requiring plaintiffs to process such applications in contravention of their professed religious faith, as indeed an entire host of other adoption or foster care agencies do not share plaintiffs Roman Catholic religious beliefs and otherwise have no conscientious objections to processing of such applications. Defendants may easily refer applications by such unmarried couples to these other agencies. As a result, no couple would be denied access to legally available adoption and foster care services were plaintiffs guaranteed the right to free exercise of their religious faith. Therefore, defendants insistence that plaintiffs themselves process all such applications for foster care or adoption is neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means by which defendants could adequately serve the interest of providing adoption or foster care services to unmarried couples who are either of same-sex or opposite sex orientation, because other agencies already process their applications for adoption or foster care, and such applications readily may be referred to such agencies in the future. Actual Controversy #2 Plaintiffs Comply With The Civil Union Act 4. A second and similar actual controversy has arisen between plaintiffs, on one
hand, and the defendant Director of the Department of Children & Family Services (DCFS) and the defendant DCFS itself, on the other hand, over another new Illinois statute, entitled the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, Public Act 096-1513, codified at 750 ILCS 75/1 et seq., whose effective date was June 1, 2011. Said Act provides, inter alia, for the registration and recognition of civil unions in Illinois between persons of the same sex or between persons of the opposite sex. It further provides that [a] party to a civil union is entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits as are afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses, whether they derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law. Id., Par. 20. Even
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though plaintiffs declining to process applications for foster care or adoption by unmarried cohabiting couples, whether same sex or opposite sex, derives from plaintiffs religious faith, and not from statute, administrative rule, common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law, and therefore does not violate the restrictive provisions of said Act, defendants have taken an adamant and unyielding position to the contrary, alleging that plaintiffs are in violation of Section 20 of the newly effective Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act. As a result, defendants have now purported to bar the plaintiffs, without any basis in Illinois law, from continuing plaintiffs ongoing series of annual contractual relationships with DCFS and the State of Illinois, which have endured over many decades, for provision of vitally needed foster care and adoption social services of the highest quality. 4. Thus, defendants threatened action to bar plaintiffs from eligibility to enter into
new contractual relations with DCFS has triggered another actual case or controversy that also turns on clear cut questions of law, which plaintiffs ask this Court to resolve and adjudicate by means of a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs believe not only that Section 20 of the newly effective Act does not restrict their religiously motivated referrals of unmarried couples applications for foster care or adoption to other providers, but also that here, too, they are exempt from coverage under this new statute, the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act, equally as they are exempted from the restrictive provisions of the place of public accommodations provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act. In this regard, plaintiffs cite Section 15 of the new Act which provides, true to the Acts title, that: Nothing in this Act shall interfere with or regulate the religious practice of any religious body. Any religious body, Indian Nation or Tribe or Native Group is free to choose whether or not to solemnize or officiate a civil union. As plaintiffs provision of adoption and foster care services and their declining to provide said
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services to unmarried couples, regardless of sexual orientation, are essential parts of their religious mission and religious practice, the new Act is clearly inapplicable to them. Any question concerning the scope of this express exemption on the face of the new law was put to rest on the floor of the Illinois Senate on December 1, 2010, when Senator Koehler, sponsor of the bill which was adopted later that day, answered specific, explicit questions put to him by Senator Haine, to the effect that the two sentences in Section 15, supra, are to be read separately so as to refer to religious practice[s] apart and distinct from the decision whether or not to solemnize or officiate a civil union. Senator Haine referred to a variety of religious practices on the part of these institutions of faith of all denominations, Christian and Jewish [which] go to their various agencies providing social services, retreats, religious camps, homeless shelters, senior care centers, adoption agencies, hospitals, a wide gamut of things. So, thats covered under the first sentence of Section 15, he queried, to which Senator Koehler answered: Yes. The certainly the intent of Representative Harris and I is not to at all, you know, impede the rights that religious organizations have to carry out their what their duties and and religious activities are (136th Legislative Day, 96th Gen. Assembly, Regular Session, Sen. Transcript, p. 81, emphasis added). 5. Nevertheless, defendants increasingly have made it crystal clear that they are
taking a hard and fast position that plaintiffs are in violation of said new Act, regardless of its explicit provisions that do not restrict plaintiffs religious practice but rather exempt them from the Acts prohibitions. First, DCFS Deputy Director wrote to Evangelical Child & Family Services of Wheaton, Illinois (which is not a plaintiff herein and whom the undersigned counsel do not represent) that the Director of DCFS had made a decision that, given the newly effective Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, the contractual provision of foster care and
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adoption services would have to be inclusive of Civil Union relationships and that this decision could well end DCFSs contractual relationship with Evangelical Child & Family Services, saying: The decision to proceed with providing foster care will be yours to make, not DCFS, and that, If the policy changes conflict with your agencies [sic] religious beliefs, you and your Board can opt out of your foster care contracts, in which event DCFS would work to ensure an orderly transition of cases to other service providers, which usually would take up to sixty days. Thereafter, all social service providers, including all plaintiffs, reportedly received a bulletin from the defendant, Erwin McEwen, Director of DCFS, insisting that every provider would be bound to comply with the new law on civil unions as part of their contractors certification of compliance with applicable law. Given the wording of the new law and its inclusion of an express exemption for religious practice, plaintiffs believed they were in compliance with the new law, and accordingly they took specific actions to establish their exemption and compliance with Illinois law. Thus all plaintiffs but Belleville filed this lawsuit early in June, 2011, delineating their precise legal contentions as to their exemption. Then said plaintiffs sought and obtained a meeting with defendants on June 20, 2011, which was attended by representatives of the both the Office of the Attorney General (who also represents defendant IDHR) and DCFS. During that meeting, however, the defendants rebuffed plaintiffs contentions that they were exempt and thus in compliance with law. Rather, defendants representatives stated that they expected plaintiffs forthwith to opt out of any ongoing contractual relationship with DCFS and that, should plaintiffs abide by their religious commitments and nonetheless proceed to enter into new contracts with DCFS (as they proposed to do), then plaintiffs religious practices necessarily would render them in violation of their contractual undertaking to comply with all applicable Illinois laws, including, inter alia, the Human Rights Act non-discrimination
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mandates binding on places of public accommodation as well as the new Illinois Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act. Defendants, the Office of the Attorney General, DCFS, and IDHR, and their respective Directors, have so far merely insisted repetitively, and yet inexplicably that plaintiffs are not in compliance with Illinois law. Indeed, defendants have persistently failed or refused to address or even discuss the salient, pivotal legal issues, let alone recognize and acknowledge: (a) that plaintiffs are not covered by the statutory constraints embodied in the new Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act but are excluded and exempt from it as the new law explicitly recites that its provisions do not interfere with or regulate religious practice; (b) that any ambiguity arising from the text of the new law was eclipsed by Senator Koehlers explicit assurances on the floor of the Illinois State Senate; and (c) that the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq., would require that such substantial burdening of plaintiffs religious practice coercing them against their conscience, and as a condition of continuing their long contractual relationship with DCFS, to process unmarried couples applications for foster care and adoption be justified by a compelling governmental interest, and that such a substantial burden on plaintiffs religious practice be further justified by showing that it is the least restrictive alternative narrowly tailored to satisfy such an allegedly compelling governmental interest. Furthermore, any one of defendants many options for referral of civil union couples to other agencies willing to entertain and process their applications would manifestly constitute such a least restrictive alternative fully adequate to satisfy any needs posed by recognition of civil unions, while also
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fully protecting plaintiffs religious freedom as the Acts very title would require. Thus plaintiffs seek entry of a second declaratory judgment by this Court to the effect that plaintiffs are not covered by the constraints on state government mandated by the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, and even if deemed covered by the text of those constraints, the plaintiffs must be deemed exempt, insofar as defendants contend that those constraints mandate that plaintiffs must deviate from their religious practice of declining to process foster care and adoption applications by couples, whether same sex or heterosexual, who are cohabiting but unmarried. Moreover, pursuant to IRFRA, supra, plaintiffs past practice of referring said applicants for processing by DCFS or other social service providers, who do not share plaintiffs religion-based conscientious objection to such processing, must in any event suffice to render plaintiffs fully in compliance with Illinois law. Actual Controversy #3 Defendants Abrupt Termination Of Plaintiffs Was Wrongful 6. Despite the seemingly hard and fast position that defendants took on the foregoing
statutory issues involving the Illinois Human Rights Act and the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act at the parties June 20, 2011, meeting, defendants DCFS and Director McEwen thereafter tendered new draft contracts to each of the plaintiffs for the continued provision of foster care and adoption social services during the 2012 fiscal year, which began on July 1, 2011, and will continue through June 30, 2012. Each of the plaintiffs signed said contracts and returned them to DCFS and McEwen early in July, 2011, while continuing to render adoption and foster care services in full accordance with the parties past practice in prior years. DCFS also kept on performing under the parties ongoing contractual relationship, continuing to refer new cases for foster care and adoption services on the part of plaintiffs even past June 30th and continuing through July, 2011. Plaintiffs, however, served a motion herein
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for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on Friday, July 8, 2011, which was noticed for hearing Tuesday morning, July 12, 2011, whereupon later that same afternoon, defendants McEwen of DCFS telefaxed a letter to all of the plaintiffs herein, each of which stated as follows: The Department of Children and Family Services is in receipt of your signed FY12 foster care and adoption contracts. Based on your agencys June correspondence to the Department, the statements made by your representatives at the June 20, 2011 meeting with representatives of the Department and the Attorney Generals Office and the legal position your agency has taken and statements made in the initial Complaint and the Amended and Supplemental Complaint in the pending Catholic Charities, et al. v. Madigan, et al. litigation, the Department of Children and Family Services is unable to accept the offer and execute the contracts because your agency has made it clear that it does not intend to comply with the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILCS 75/1 et seq. That law applies to foster care and adoption services. Thus, there is no meeting of the minds as to the FY12 Foster Care and Adoption Contracts. Accordingly, the Department will be in contact with you regarding transitioning cases. Sincerely, /s/ Erwin McEwen Director A copy of defendant McEwens letter, as addressed and telefaxed to one of the plaintiffs, but otherwise identical to that sent to each of the other plaintiffs after 4 p.m. on Friday, July 8, 2011, is appended hereto as Exhibit A. 7. Plaintiffs are seeking entry of a third declaratory judgment herein to the effect that
defendants attempted effort suddenly and peremptorily to terminate plaintiffs eligibility to contract with DCFS and the State of Illinois for ongoing rendition of social services in the field of foster care and adoption was arbitrary and capricious, without authority in Illinois law, and constituted an egregious violation of plaintiffs rights to due process of law, as guaranteed them pursuant to the due process clause, Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and
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was therefore void and of no legal force or effect. Plaintiffs, having satisfactorily maintained contractual relations with the defendant DCFS for decades, having been duly licensed as social service providers by DCFS through at least 2014, and having won many plaudits from DCFS for superior and outstanding performance, possessed a legally protected property interest in continuing their contractual relations with said defendant DCFS, which could not be so arbitrarily denied and cut off by the defendants, without any legal basis, and without adequate notice or hearing provided at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Plaintiffs also possessed a legally protectable liberty interest, pursuant to the applicable Illinois law, to carry on their religious practice as a sectarian adoption agency without lawless interference on the part of state government. Defendant DCFSs violation of that liberty interest, and its co-defendants complicity in that violation, also constituted a deprivation of liberty without due process of law which also offended the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which must be held void. Jurisdiction and Venue 8. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to the Declaratory
Judgment provisions of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-701(a), as there are now three actual controversies over the construction of a cluster of Illinois statutes. Defendants more recent effort on July 8, 2011, to debar plaintiffs and brand them as ineligible for any further contractual relationship with the State of Illinois poses the same underlying statutory issues as well as constitutional issues, arising pursuant to the due process clause (Article I, Section 2) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Those statutes whose construction is contested include the Illinois Human Rights Act, supra, and the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act, supra, both of which must be construed and enforced in light of the provisions of a third Illinois statute, namely, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA), 775 ILCS
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35/1 et seq . More specifically, the first statutory dispute between plaintiffs, on the one hand, and defendants, on the other hand, is whether 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(12) of the Illinois Human Rights Act, which defines the phrase, place of public accommodation, to include only any non-sectarian adoption agency, may be interpreted to encompass the plaintiffs, even though plaintiffs do not qualify as non-sectarian. On the contrary, plaintiffs are sectarian adoption agencies whose mission and character are indisputably religious. Further, the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 20 of IRFRA, 775 ILCS 35/20, which provides that a person whose exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of this Act may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and may obtain appropriate relief against a government. This same statutory dispute also pits plaintiffs against the defendant, Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR), which could only exercise jurisdiction to enforce the Illinois Human Rights Act against plaintiffs if the latter could be deemed places of public accommodation, a construction at odds with the text of that Act as well as its legislative history and in contravention of IRFRA, supra. 9. Moreover, the second actual controversy between plaintiffs and defendants
implicates the construction of the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, and more specifically, whether the constraints on government embodied in Section 20 of that Act also apply to private social services providers, such as plaintiffs, who are merely independent contractors for the State of Illinois, bound to render specified social services for the government, which also contracts with a wide variety of other social service providers alternate providers who may adequately dispense on behalf of the government those certain services which plaintiffs themselves decline to provide on account of their religion-based conscientious objections. Further, plaintiffs contend, in any event, that they are exempt from any constraints said Act
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might impose on their religious practice, pursuant to the provision in Paragraph 15 of that Act. In particular, plaintiffs contend that the Act explicitly bars Illinois or any state agency from purporting to regulate or interfere with plaintiffs religious practice, namely, its declining as a matter of conscience to process foster care and adoption applications from unmarried cohabiting couples, whatever their sexual orientation. This second actual legal dispute also implicates the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq., as defendants threatened action against plaintiffs would constitute a significant burden on the free exercise of their religious faith, as defined in that Act, triggering in turn the imposition of an evidentiary burden on defendants that they cannot meet, namely, having to prove that Illinois has a compelling governmental interest in forcing plaintiffs to go against their fundamental religious beliefs and that said compelling interest could not be adequately served by a less restrictive alternative than forcing plaintiffs either to cease furnishing the vital adoption and foster care they have been providing for years to Illinois citizens in furtherance of their religious mission and character or, rather, to betray their religious faith. Indeed, the defendants referral of unmarried couples to other agencies that do not share plaintiffs conscientious objections would more than adequately serve the defendants stated interests. 10. The third actual controversy dividing plaintiffs and defendants arose on July 8,
2011, when the defendant DCFS, whom plaintiffs believe to have been acting in complicity with one or more of its co-defendants, attempted without any legal basis given the defendants gross misconstruction of all the relevant Illinois statutes (supra) to deem plaintiffs suddenly ineligible to engage in any further contractual relationship with DCFS. Plaintiffs contend, therefore, that this was an arbitrary and capricious action, which deprived them of legally protectable property and liberty interests without any reasonable or timely prior notice or
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meaningful opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner as required by the due process clause of Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The Controversies At Bar Are Real, Actual, Ripe, And Justiciable 11. These controversies between plaintiffs and defendants are real, actual, and
imminent, far from remote, and none is hypothetical, speculative or moot in the slightest. On or about March 8, 2011, the defendants, through the office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois, wrote to Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield in Illinois, as well as to each of the other plaintiffs, stating, inter alia, that the Attorney General had received notice that Catholic Charities discriminates against Illinois citizens in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act. Specifically, the defendant Attorney Generals office stated its understanding that Catholic Charities has requirements for potential foster or adoptive parents that are not required by Illinois law for example, requirements about religious beliefs or refuses to provide services to potential foster or adoptive parents in violation of Illinois law for example, refuses to provide services based on the marital status or sexual orientation of a potential foster or adoptive parent. The defendants letter went on to request that Catholic Charities respond to a detailed request for information and documentation, relative to plaintiffs Foster Care and Adoption Practices, including: All contracts with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS); All policies, procedures and manuals relating to services provided pursuant to contracts with DCFS; All policies and requirements for (a) foster parents; and (b) adoptive parents; All services provided by the Organization and location(s) where each service is
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provided; The Organizations financial statements, including, but not limited to (a) IRS Form 990; (b) Illinois Charitable Organization Annual Reports filed with the Illinois Office of the Attorney General; (c) Annual Reports; and (d) all other financial statements regardless of whether or not they are audited; The Organizations by-laws or articles of incorporation; The Organizations mission statement or other documents regarding the purpose of the Organization; All documents regarding the relationship of the Organization to the [Catholic Church or other religious body]; All employee handbooks; All documents concerning complaints of discrimination against the Organization that were filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights or in any state or federal court, including but not limited to complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, marital status or sexual orientation; and State whether any court, commission, department, including but not limited to those listed in Request Number 10, has found that the Organization was or was not liable for discrimination and, if so, produce a copy of the judicial or administrative order or decision. A copy of said defendants letter to one of the plaintiffs, which mirrors the letters sent to the others, is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 12. Plaintiffs were given deadlines within which to provide documents and data to the
Attorney General, and although the deadlines were extended and the parties (apart from 16 of 49 Case No. 2011 MR 254
Belleville) never met until June 20, 2011, the Attorney General has so far taken no further enforcement action against the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, when asked in open court on July 12, 2011, whether the Attorney General would cease and desist from any further enforcement action thereafter, the Assistant Attorney General declined to answer, disclaiming any authority to address the matter. Plaintiffs, therefore, have feared and continue to fear an imminent effort by the defendants to enforce the foregoing requests, pursuant to Section 10-104(A) of the Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/10-104(A), which provides, inter alia, that: (1) Whenever the Illinois Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination prohibited by this Act, the Illinois Attorney General may commence a civil action in the name of the People of the State, as parens patriae on behalf of persons within the State to enforce the provisions of this Act in any appropriate circuit court. (2) Prior to initiating a civil action, the Attorney General shall conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination declared unlawful by this Act and whether the dispute can be resolved without litigation. In conducting this investigation, the Attorney General may: (a) require the individual or entity to file a statement or report in writing under oath or otherwise, as to all information the Attorney General may consider necessary; (b) examine under oath any person alleged to have participated in or with knowledge of the alleged pattern and practice violation; or (c) issue subpoenas or conduct hearings in aid of any investigation. *** (6) If any person fails or refuses to file any statement or report, or obey any subpoena, issued pursuant to subdivision (A)(2) of this Section, the Attorney General will be deemed to have met the requirement of conducting a preliminary investigation and may proceed to initiate a civil action pursuant to subdivision (A)(1) of this Section. 13. The defendant Attorney Generals aforesaid efforts to enforce the Illinois Human
Rights Act against the plaintiffs have been patently in excess of her authority, as a matter of law,
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inasmuch as plaintiffs are not covered by the public accommodations provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act, nor are plaintiffs, therefore, bound by its proscriptions. Therefore, plaintiffs should not have to comply with defendants request for such voluminous documentation and data, to the extent that said request is predicated on those cited statutory provisions related to public accommodations. Nor do plaintiffs believe in the slightest that they are illegally discriminating, within the meaning of the public accommodations proscriptions of the Human Rights Act, as contended by the defendant Attorney General, and her clients, defendants DCFS and its Director, IDHR and its Director, and the State of Illinois, by virtue of their faithful religious practice in connection with adoptions and foster care. The parties are, therefore, caught up in an actual controversy that is fully justiciable and ripe for adjudication, and which they properly bring before this Court, asking that it resolve the clear cut legal issues dividing the parties herein, as to which this Court is fully empowered to issue a binding declaratory judgment. Moreover, plaintiffs urge that the Court bar the defendant, Attorney General, from instituting any other legal action against the plaintiffs within the State of Illinois, purportedly in pursuance of the above-quoted statutory provisions (supra). 14. Furthermore, although defendants DCFS and McEwen purported on July 8, 2011,
to debar plaintiffs from eligibility for any further annual contracts for provision of adoption and foster care services before this Court could hear plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction on July 12, 2011, defendants letters (Exhibit A, attached) did not constitute an irreversible fait accompli as said defendants have not and could not have implemented their decision, as they concede its implementation would have necessitated a lengthy prospective period of transitioning, e.g., removing children in foster care from the supervision of plaintiffs social workers to supervision by other agencies and perhaps removing them to placements with new
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foster families, etc. This Courts preliminary injunction, restoring the status quo ante, has forestalled such transitioning and barred defendants, pendente lite, from otherwise implementing its purported decision to debar plaintiffs from eligibility for further contractual relations with defendants upon their sole stated grounds, which plaintiffs contend herein to be illegal. Mootness does not apply, in any event, to such matters of the utmost gravity as are at stake in this litigation, which command a surpassing public interest. Plaintiffs Have Legal Standing To Sue 15. Plaintiffs are also fully clothed with legal standing to bring this suit. Plaintiffs
have enjoyed a longstanding, ongoing, and continued contractual partnership with the State of Illinois, going back decades, providing charitable social services including, inter alia, services related to adoption and foster care. Plaintiffs have supplied these services in the public interest, and for the benefit of the defendant DCFS, on a break-even or loss basis, in fulfillment of their religious mission and in carrying out their apostolic ministry, with benefits flowing directly to needy and vulnerable Illinois children and families. Under the circumstances, plaintiffs have legally protectable property and liberty interests in continuing their contractual relations with DCFS, and they are fully entitled to apply to this Court to invoke the benefit and protection of Illinois law against such legally baseless deprivation of their ongoing provision of these vital services, sundering plaintiffs eligibility for ongoing contractual relations with the State of Illinois. Nor might DCFSs abrupt and arbitrary refusal to renew plaintiffs eligibility to enter renewed social service provider contracts with DCFS on account of defendants baseless discrimination claims be assailed, adjudicated, or restrained in any available administrative forum. This case is fully deserving of a complete and final adjudication before this Court. Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies Is Neither Feasible Nor Required
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16.
There is no requirement that plaintiffs exhaust any administrative remedy before
DCFS or the Illinois Human Rights Commission, because there is no such remedy. The Illinois Human Rights Act provides that the defendants claims of pattern or practice discrimination must be adjudicated before the Illinois circuit courts, whether or not a charge has been filed before the Commission. 775 ILCS 5/10-104(A). Nor does IDHR have any jurisdiction to entertain or investigate any other charge of discrimination against the plaintiffs which might be predicated on the baseless claim that they are places of public accommodation and thus bound by the proscriptions of the Illinois Human Rights Act in their adoption or foster care programs. Such jurisdiction would only exist if plaintiffs could be classified as places of public accommodation, which would be contrary to law. And indeed, the sole issues posed herein are clear cut legal issues, peculiarly and eminently suitable for adjudication and resolution by the judiciary, as said issues relate to the interpretation of statutes, either on their face or as applied to indisputable facts plainly appearing before this Court, or relating to the constitutional inadequacy, as measured by due process standards enunciated under the Illinois Constitution of 1970, of an arbitrary, abrupt debarment of longstanding contractors of the State of Illinois from any eligibility for future contracts, without benefit of any provision whatsoever for prior notice or hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Venue Is Properly Laid Here 17. Venue is properly laid as both plaintiff, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of
Springfield in Illinois, a non-profit corporation, and all of the defendants maintain offices within Sangamon County, which encompasses the city of Springfield, the capital city of Illinois. The Parties 18. Plaintiff Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield-in-Illinois is an Illinois
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non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Springfield, Sangamon County, Illinois. 19. Plaintiff Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Peoria is an Illinois non-profit
corporation with its principal place of business in the city of Peoria, Peoria County, Illinois. 20. Plaintiff Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Joliet is an Illinois non-profit
corporation with its principal place of business in the city of Joliet, Will County, Illinois. 21. Plaintiff Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois, Diocese of Belleville
(sometimes hereinafter referred to as CSSSI Belleville), is an Illinois non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in the city of Belleville, St. Clair County, Illinois. 22. Defendant, State of Illinois, is a political entity amenable to suit in this Circuit
Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, the City of Springfield, Illinois, the seat of Illinois State Government. 23. Defendant, Lisa Madigan, sued herein only in her official capacity, as the
Attorney General of the State of Illinois, has a principal office within the city of Springfield, Sangamon County, Illinois. Said defendant is sued herein for purposes of plaintiffs securing a declaratory judgment to the effect that her proceeding against plaintiffs is patently in excess of her specific statutory authority, as delegated to her pursuant to the Illinois Human Rights Act. 24. Defendant, Erwin McEwen, sued herein only in his official capacity, is the
Director of the Department of Children & Family Services (DCFS), State of Illinois, and defendant, DCFS, have a principal office in Springfield, Sangamon County, Illinois. Defendant McEwen as well as defendant DCFS are also being sued herein for purposes of plaintiffs seeking relief against them by reason of their acting clearly in excess of their legal authority pursuant to Illinois law.
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25.
Defendant, Rocco J. Clapps, sued herein only in his official capacity, as the
Director of the Department of Human Rights (IDHR), State of Illinois, and defendant, IDHR, have a principal office in Springfield, Sangamon County, Illinois. Said defendants are also sued herein for purposes of plaintiffs seeking relief against them, by reason of their threatened action against plaintiffs in excess of their authority pursuant to Illinois law. CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT I (Declaratory Judgment Sectarian Adoption Agencies Exempt from Human Rights Act) 1-25. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 inclusive hereof with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 26. The Attorney General, acting in her official capacity on behalf of the defendant
State of Illinois, has asserted by letter dated March 8, 2011, that plaintiffs are bound by the public accommodations provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act. Said defendants also have alleged that they have received notice that plaintiffs are discriminating against Illinois citizens based inter alia on marital status and sexual orientation in their provision of adoption and foster care services. More specifically, said defendants have focused on plaintiffs requirements for potential foster or adoptive parents that are not required by Illinois law or refus[al] to provide services to potential foster or adoptive parents in violation of Illinois law for example, refus[al] to provide services based on the marital status or sexual orientation of a potential foster or adoptive parent. 27. Furthermore, said defendants appear to have invoked 775 ILCS 5/10-104(A) of
the Illinois Human Rights Act, which empowers the Attorney General of Illinois to conduct investigations to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that any person or 22 of 49 Case No. 2011 MR 254
group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination declared unlawful by this Act, to make sweeping requests for the production of information and documents from the plaintiffs, indicating that the defendants believe that the discrimination on the part of plaintiffs of which they purport to have notice is indeed widespread and systematic. 28. The public policy embodied in the Illinois Human Rights Act bans various types
of discrimination including discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation, etc. but only in connection with employment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability of public accommodations. Operation of an adoption agency, as carried on by plaintiffs as part of their social services ministry, fits none of the first three categories just mentioned employment, real estate transactions, or access to financial credit. The public accommodations provisions are pertinent, however, and the question is squarely posed here, whether those provisions apply to the plaintiffs, who operate sectarian adoption agencies. 29. Before the 2007 amendment of the Illinois Human Rights Act, that Act defined a
place of public accommodation as a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, and advantages of accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public. 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(1). The Act provided, by way of examples, a lengthy laundry list of place[s] of public accommodation, including facilities of the following types, as follows: [I]nns, restaurants, eating houses, hotels, soda fountains, soft drink parlors, taverns, roadhouses, barber shops, department stores, clothing stores, hat stores, shoe stores, bathrooms, restrooms, theatres, skating rinks, public golf courses, public golf driving ranges, concerts, cafes, bicycle rinks, elevators, ice cream parlors or rooms, railroads, omnibuses, buses, stages, airplanes, street cars, boats, funeral hearses, crematories, cemeteries, and public conveyances on land, water, 23 of 49 Case No. 2011 MR 254
or air, public swimming pools and other places of public accommodation and amusement. 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(2). In 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois Univ. v. Dept of Human Rights, 159 Ill.2d 206, 211 (1994), that the Illinois Department of Human Rights lacked jurisdiction under the Illinois Human Rights Act to entertain complaints alleging racial discrimination in the academic program of public universities. The high Court stated that the definition of place of public accommodation set forth at 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(1) had to be read in light of the examples given at 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(2)(Bd. of Trustees, supra, 159 Ill.2d at 211), applying the maxim of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis. Under that maxim,when a statute lists several classes of persons or things but provides that the list is not exhaustive, the class of unarticulated persons or things will be interpreted as those others such like the named persons or things. Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court noted that the terms institution of higher education, education program, and classroom were not contained anywhere in the list provided in the Act (again, this was before it was amended in 2007). Id. Further, the Court observed, the examples listed in the Act are fundamentally different from institutions of higher education, which administer educational programs. Id. at 212. Instead, the Court explained, [t]he cited establishments are examples of facilities for overnight accommodation, entertainment, recreation or transportation. Id. The definition specifically requires that the services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations [b]e extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the general public. Id. (citation omitted). As a consequence, what was anticipated by the General Assembly is a restaurant, a pub, or a bookstore, but not an academic program of a higher education institution. Id. Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the conduct alleged by the Illinois Department of Human Rights did not fall within its jurisdiction. Id. 24 of 49 Case No. 2011 MR 254
30.
The reasoning of the high Court in Board of Trustees of SIU was followed in
several Appellate Court decisions, which held that the term place of public accommodation did not include a business offering scuba diving classes which required physical and other standards to be met by prospective students (Gilbert v. Dept of Human Rights, 343 Ill.App.3d 904 (1st Dist. 2003)). Nor did it encompass a company offering health insurance (Cut n Dried Salon v. Dept of Human Rights, 306 Ill.App.3d 142 (1st Dist. 1999)). Nor did it include a dental office (Baksh v. Human Rights Commn, 304 Ill.App.3d 995, 1002-06 (1st Dist. 1999)). Plaintiffs contend that, under this line of authority, it is clear that an adoption agency would not be regarded as a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the Illinois Human Rights Act. 31. In 2007, the Illinois Human Rights Act was amended, and by that amendment the
definition of place of public accommodation was deleted. Replacing the definition was a detailed list of specific examples, some of which had been held not to be places of public accommodation under the pre-amended wording of the statute and the cases decided under that prior wording of the Act (e.g., insurance offices, the professional offices of health care providers and certain educational institutions). See, 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(1)-(13). But with respect to the issue posed in this litigation, the list of examples of public places of accommodation now includes a senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, non-sectarian adoption agency, or other social service center establishment . 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(12)(emphasis supplied). Plaintiffs contend that the obvious and unavoidable implication of this amended language is that a sectarian (i.e., religiously-based) adoption agency is not a place of public accommodation, and, therefore, does not fall within the scope of the Illinois Human Rights Act, nor within the jurisdiction of either the defendant, Illinois Department of Human Rights, or the Illinois Human
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Rights Commission. By the same token, sectarian nurseries, day care centers, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, postgraduate or other places of education are also implicitly excluded. See, 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(11). 32. Again, any suggestion that this text is ambiguous and may somehow be read so
that sectarian adoption agencies may be covered, equally as non-sectarian adoption agencies, as places of public accommodation is wholly negated by the legislative history. The sponsor of the amendment which inserted non-sectarian adoption agency into the statutory text, Sen. Cullerton, explained the purpose of the amendment in terms admitting of no doubt that Catholic Charities is not covered by the statute: This retains the underlying bill and exempts as places of public accommodation sectarian adoption agencies (State of Illinois, 95th General Assembly, Regular Session, Senate Transcript, 38th Legislative Day, 5/10/2007, p. 38)(emphasis added). 33. Nor is there any legal basis for the contention that an entity might somehow
qualify as a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the Illinois Human Rights Act because it receives governmental funding. Such a contention was roundly rejected by the Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court in Duffy v. Department of Human Rights, 354 Ill.App.3d 236, 239 (4th Dist. 2004)(claim that receipt of federal funds through Medicaid and Medicare brought clinic within the definition of place of public accommodation as the Human Rights Act does not create such an inference from the mere receipt of federal funds). 34. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiffs pray that the Court declare and adjudge that
as plaintiffs are sectarian agencies engaged in the rendition of charitable social services in connection with adoption and foster care, they cannot as a matter of law be subjected by the defendants, or any of them, to restrictions imposed by a statute whose coverage is explicitly
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confined to non-sectarian adoption agencies, and so explicitly intended to exempt sectarian adoption agencies such as plaintiffs. Nor are plaintiffs bound by any provisions restricting their religious practice with reference to adoption and foster care in plaintiffs contracts with the defendants, DCFS or the State of Illinois, including not only their past contracts but also the contracts that defendants McEwen and DCFS initially proposed that plaintiffs execute for the upcoming fiscal year, July 1 through June 30, 2012, but which defendants then refused to execute, abruptly purporting to end plaintiffs decades-old public/private partnership with DCFS. There is no legal basis for defendant, DCFS, or any other defendant, claiming that plaintiffs have been, or would be, in violation of any provision in said contracts mandating their compliance with Illinois law. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Count I, plaintiffs pray that the Court issue a declaratory judgment to the effect that plaintiffs are not covered by the public accommodation provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act, nor are they subject to the jurisdiction of the Illinois Department of Human Rights or the Human Rights Commission with respect to the proscriptions against discrimination by reason of marital status or sexual orientation or otherwise which arise from and are predicated upon those provisions; that any pattern or practice investigation or other enforcement action on the part of the Illinois Attorney General, pursuant to the public accommodations provisions of the Human Rights Act, would be in excess of the Attorney Generals delegated authority under that Act; and that the Court grant plaintiffs all other relief to which they may be entitled upon Count I hereof. COUNT II (Declaratory Judgment Claim That Plaintiffs Are Also Exempt From The New Illinois Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act) 1-34. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in
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paragraphs 1 through 34 inclusive hereof of Count I with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 35. As is hereinabove alleged, plaintiffs are informed and believe that, on or about
May 5, 2011, the Deputy Director of the defendant, DCFS, wrote to another religious social services agency, Evangelical Child & Family Services of Wheaton, Illinois (not a party to this lawsuit, nor represented by counsel for plaintiffs herein), citing the new Illinois statute entitled, Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, Public Act 096-1513, due to become effective on June 1, 2011. In his letter to Evangelical Child & Family Services, the DCFS Deputy Director reportedly advised that the Department will be revising policies and procedures to include recognition of Civil Unions [which] may impact potential service delivery issues for faith-based agencies. The Deputy Director also is reported to have written that the defendant Director of DCFS will be sending out a letter to all agencies sharing the Departments intention to be inclusive of Civil Union relationships relative to adoption and foster children. It was further stated in said letter that DCFS decision to be so inclusive of Civil Union relationships in connection with adoption and foster care might well have a dispositive and terminal impact on that sectarian adoption agencys future relationship with DCFS. Specifically and pointedly, the Deputy Director observed that, [I]f the policy changes conflict with your agencies [sic] religious beliefs, you and your Board can opt out of your foster care contracts, and in that event, DCFS would work to ensure an orderly transition of cases to other service providers, usually taking up to sixty days. 36. More recently, all of the plaintiffs received such a letter from DCFS, dated May
10, 2011, and addressed to All Department Service Providers and Contractors, in which DCFS Director, defendant Erwin McEwen, bannered a string of boldface admonitions
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(REMINDER REMINDER REMINDER REMINDER), beneath which he advised the DCFS service providers and contractors, including plaintiffs, that the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILCS 75/1 et seq, had been signed into law in January 2011, and that it amends and supplements existing state and federal laws which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Mr. McEwen then proclaimed, also in boldface, an additional admonition, as follows: All federal and state anti-discrimination laws, including the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, are incorporated by reference into IDCFS contracts and subcontracts. Later, also in boldface print, McEwen noted specifically that DCFS standard Contract provides: IDCFS Contractors and their subcontractors are required to comply with the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act and all other state and federal equal opportunity laws. McEwens bulletin also pointed to other provisions in DCFSs standard contracts that bind all service providers to observe all applicable laws, and to certify their compliance with Illinois law. This bulletin, on top of the reported letter to the Evangelical Child & Family Services, reinforces that defendants were taking a hard and fast position that the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act somehow bound the plaintiffs, as if it negated rather than protected plaintiffs rights to continue their religious practice in providing foster care and adoption services. This hardening position on the part of the defendants had been foreshadowed by a March 2, 2011, story in the Chicago Tribune to the effect that Attorney General Lisa Madigan, Gov. Pat Quinns legal team and the Department of Children and Family Services are carefully researching the Illinois Human Rights Act, the Civil Union Act and the Illinois Constitution to determine whether they prohibit agencies from considering sexual orientation as a factor in foster care and adoption in Illinois, etc. Furthermore, the same newspaper story
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quoted Kendall Marlowe, identified as a spokesman for DCFS, to the effect that, Social intervention such as adoption laws and practices inevitably reflect their communities [and] Illinois as a state has grown on this (gay rights) issue as evidenced by (civil union legislation). Adoption law and practice should reflect the values of the people of Illinois. 37. That defendants insisted that plaintiffs would be in violation of this newly
effective law, which they persistently misname as the Civil Union Act, at the parties June 20, 2011, meeting, and thereafter, that defendants DCFS and McEwen purported on July 8, 2011, to declare plaintiffs ineligible for further contracting with said defendants, amply demonstrates that there is another actual controversy between plaintiffs and the defendants as to whether the new Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act applies to plaintiffs at all, let alone whether it requires that they betray their religious commitments by processing foster care or adoption applications from unmarried couples. Examination of the text of the new law plainly shows that it does not purport to, and expressly disclaims any intent to, interfere with or regulate the religious practice of any religious body (supra, p. 6). 38. Moreover, the legislative history of the new laws passage back on December 10,
2010, absolutely confirms through the words of its sponsor on the floor of the Illinois Senate that this critical wording in Section 15 of the text of the Act stands alone and should be read separate and apart from the reference in the ensuing sentence to the freedom of any religious body to abstain from solemnizing or officiating at a civil union ceremony (id.). Rather, the reference to the laws not regulating or interfering with the religious practice of any religious body should be read to refer to a wide gamut of things, encompassing religious practices such as social services, retreats, religious camps, homeless shelters, senior care centers, adoption agencies, hospitals, and so forth (emphasis added). In response to Senator Haines listing these
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types of religious practices and inquiring whether they were all covered by the disclaimer of any intent to regulate or interfere with them in Section 15, Senator Koehler answered unequivocally, Yes. The certainly the intent of Representative Harris and I is not to at all, you know, impede the rights that religious organizations have to carry out their what their duties and and religious activities are (136th Legislative Day, 96th Gen. Assembly, Regular Session, Sen. Transcript, p. 81 emphasis added; supra, p. 7). 39. That the plaintiffs involvement in foster care, adoption and other social services
is a central, critical element of their religious practice is patent. Catholic Charities mission is said to fulfill the Churchs role in giving charitable aid to anyone in need by providing compassionate, competent and professional services that strengthen and support individuals, families and communities based on the value and dignity of all human life. Catholic Charities agencies around the entire United States form a network, which includes the plaintiffs herein, comprising more than 1,700 agencies and institutions, involving thousands of programs, over 62,000 staff members, and more than 240,000 volunteers. Essential features of Catholic Charities agencies mark them as indelibly Roman Catholic: Catholic Charities ministries are deeply rooted in the Scriptures, including the Hebrew Scriptures in which the very heart of the biblical concept of justice was the care of the widow, orphan, and stranger the gauge of whether one understood his or her relationship to God and to one another. Catholic Charities contemporary work continues to focus primarily on these same groups: women who are poor; children who are poor; and individuals who are marginalized, including foreign workers, immigrants, refugees, racial minorities, disabled persons, those afflicted with HIV/AIDS, or other conditions that set them apart. All these needy and vulnerable
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human beings are children of the one God who is passionately concerned for the least among us. This was Jesus teaching, as in the judgment scene in Matthew 25, where Jesus tells his followers that the world will be judged by how they treat the hungry, homeless, sick, imprisoned, and poor. Catholic Charities ministry has been an integral part of the Catholic Church for 2,000 years. In the earliest days, the apostles appointed the seven deacons whose first ministry was to make sure that justice was reflected in the life of the community and that poor widows and children received care. This ministry of care was institutionalized and flourished in the great monasteries of the first millennium as the religious communities cared for the widows and orphans, sick, elderly, wayfarers, and the poor. Later in the cities, religious orders established orphanages, homes for the sick and elderly, hospices, and other centers for health and social services. Lay and religious groups, such as those begun by St. Vincent de Paul, expanded and deepened this work, and throngs of saints were known for ministries to the poor and vulnerable, including St. Francis of Assisi, St. Clare, St. Peter Claver, St. Catherine of Siena, St. Martin de Porres, and St. Elizabeth Seton. The Ursuline Sisters of New Orleans pioneered the institutionalization of this vital work in the New World, starting in New Orleans in 1727 where they built an orphanage, home for women, and health care facility. By 1900 there were more than 800 Catholic charitable institutions in the U.S., and now staff and volunteers serve almost 7 million persons a year with group homes, elderly residences, family counseling centers, hospices for HIV/AIDS patients, soup kitchens and homeless shelters, among a vast array of social services. Plaintiffs Catholic Charities agencies alone serve thousands of children in foster care
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daily, helping children heal from abuse such as trauma and neglect, stabilizing their lives by avoiding multiple moves among different foster homes, resolving problems that led to placement, and finding stable, lasting relationships for traumatized children. Catholic Charities promote the sanctity of human life and the dignity of the human person. Although society may exclude some people because of sickness, disability, poverty, racial bias, disease, undocumented or imprisoned status, Catholic Charities reaches out to them with respect for their human dignity, a sacred concept at the very root of Catholic social teaching. Jesus Christ rejected no one from his healing touch, and enjoyed fellowship meals with tax collectors and sinners. Among Catholic Charities ethical standards and values that shape their work is the preferential option for the poor articulated by the late Pope John Paul II. Catholic Charities are authorized to exercise their ministry by the Diocesan Bishop. All four plaintiffs herein have a formal Catholic identity in relationship to the Church and their respective Diocesan Bishops, each of whom is charged in Church teachings and canon law with responsibility for the apostolate within Diocesan confines. Catholic Charities respect the religious beliefs of those whom it serves through its various ministries. This respect for persons of other faiths or no faith stems from a determined position to serve the entire community, a custom going back as far as the fourth century and, again, in this country to the Ursuline Sisters in New Orleans in 1727. In the pattern of Christ Jesus, Catholic Charities feed the hungry, homeless, depressed, troubled, and frail regardless of their religious beliefs. Thus Jesus cured the Canaanite woman in Matthew 15 and the Centurions servant in Luke 7. On April
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18, 1997, the Pope, John Paul II, directed that: Actions of aid, relief, and assistance should be conducted in a spirit of service and free giving for the benefit of all persons without the ulterior motive of eventual tutelage or proselytism. Catholic Charities recognize that some services require attention to physical, mental, and spiritual needs. Addiction treatment programs that involve 12-step programs have a distinctive spiritual component, involving recognition of a higher power. In such programs as well as in marriage and family counseling, grief ministries, and other services it is appropriate and necessary to recognize and respond to the physical, mental, and spiritual needs of those whom Catholic Charities serve. Catholic Charities have a special relationship to the Catholic diocese and to Catholic parishes within the diocese. Catholic Charities agencies often have formal programs which support and encourage Roman Catholic parishes in their ministry to the community and its needs, assisting parishioners in the exercise of their baptismal commitment to the poor and needy. Catholic Charities work in active partnership with religiously sponsored charities and the civic community, reflecting the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, as Catholics are mandated as well as willing to work hand-in-hand with other religions and other people of good will to serve the needs of the larger civic community. Catholic Charities support an active public-private partnership with government at all levels. The Church has a long and strong tradition of teaching about the responsibilities of government in promoting the common good and protecting the least among us. Catholics are also charged with a responsibility to support their roles as citizens and taxpayers and to actively participate in civic life. These teachings
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have impelled and authorized Catholics to seek out and accept partnerships with cities, counties, states, and the federal government to facilitate and insure the provision of needed services for the wider community that are judged to be consistent with the Churchs own mission. These relationships are sometimes contractual relationships, as between plaintiffs and DCFS, to deliver particular services such as adoption and foster care application processing, placements and related services. They also may involve voucher payments from the government, such as Medicaid, or government funding of construction, such as housing. The Church provides additional funding, volunteers, efficiency, values, community credibility, and dedication to service for the benefit of local communities and their needy families. Catholic Charities blend advocacy for those in need and public education about social justice with service to vulnerable and needy individuals, families, and communities. Consistent with its special concern for the poorest and most vulnerable human beings among us, over the last century the Church has been increasingly outspoken about the need for economic and political change. Following the lead of the Vatican and the U.S. bishops, Catholic Charities have made working for a more just society an integral part of understanding their mission of service. 37. Nor could plaintiffs observance of their conscientious religious obligations be
held, in any event, to violate any provision of the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act. The core protection embodied in the new statute is set forth at Section 20 thereof, which provides: Section 20. Protections, obligations, and responsibilities. A party to a civil union is entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits as are afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses, whether they derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other 35 of 49 Case No. 2011 MR 254
source of civil or criminal law. Catholic Charities religiously grounded practice of declining to entertain or process applications for foster care or adoption on the part of unmarried same sex or heterosexual cohabiting couples, together with defendants options to refer such applicants to other agencies willing and able to accommodate them, does not even remotely deny any legal benefit to a civil union couple that would be available to a married couple, let alone effect such a denial by statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law. Couples in civil unions same sex or opposite sex remain perfectly free to contact and obtain all relevant services from other adoption or foster care agencies or to make private adoption arrangements, all without the slightest interference of obstruction on the part of plaintiffs or any hindrance arising as a matter of law. Thus there is no underlying predicate for any application of the new Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act against plaintiffs, even if plaintiffs were not deemed exempt as provided on the face of the Act itself, and also as recited in the statutes own text. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Count II, plaintiffs pray that the Court issue a declaratory judgment to the effect that plaintiffs assertion of their conscientious religious objections, together with defendants capacity for referral of same sex or unmarried cohabiting couples to other agencies which do not share plaintiffs religious objections and may provide all requested social services in connection with adoption or foster care, does not deny any unmarried cohabiting same sex or heterosexual couple any legal benefit whatsoever; that plaintiffs are not covered by the new Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act, but exempted by its text, as confirmed by its legislative history; and that the Court grant plaintiffs all other relief to which they may be entitled on the premises pursuant to Count II hereof.
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COUNT III (Declaratory Judgment Claim Under The Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq) 1-39. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 39 inclusive of Count II hereof with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 40. The Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq. was
enacted in reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which articulated a narrow, compound test for evaluation of constitutional claims asserting infringements of the First Amendment freedom to exercise ones religious faith, and in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), which struck down an attempt by Congress to overrule Smith by legislation. Both of these U.S. Supreme Court cases are referenced in the findings and purposes of the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra, 775 ILCS 35/10(a)(4),(5). 41. as follows: Government may not substantially burden a persons exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (i) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. 42. Exercise of religion is defined in turn to mean an act or refusal to act that is Section 15 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/15, provides
substantially motivated by religious belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief. 775 ILCS 35/5. And government includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the State of Illinois or a political subdivision of the State, including a home rule unit.
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Id. 43. 35/20: If a persons exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of this Act, that person may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and may obtain appropriate relief against a government. A party who prevails in an action to enforce the Act against a government is entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs incurred in maintaining the claim or defense. 44. Plaintiffs contend that the States coercion of plaintiffs religiously based Pursuant to Section 20 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS
adoption agencies, under penalty of law, to act in a way that directly conflicts with their sincerely held, fundamental religious convictions with respect to the morality of sexual cohabitation outside of marriage, and the morality of placing children for adoption or foster care in the homes of unmarried cohabiting couples (regardless of their heterosexual or homosexual orientation) would, indeed substantially burden their constitutionally protected rights to free exercise of religion. Accordingly, pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, it would be incumbent on the State (or state officers or agencies) to demonstrate that the burden, as applied to plaintiffs, their directors and staff members, was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 775 ILCS 35/15. 45. Plaintiffs further contend that there is no compelling government interest in
burdening religiously based moral objections on the part of plaintiffs to processing foster care or adoption applications by unmarried couples, whether homosexual or heterosexual. Nor may the defendants rely on the anti-discrimination provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act as a predicate for deeming that alleged governmental interest compelling, when that statute clearly exempts from its public accommodation proscriptions sectarian adoption agencies such as plaintiffs. The Illinois Human Rights Act also has been held repeatedly to represent an
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exclusive remedy for anyone in Illinois who claims to be a victim of discrimination, and as shown supra (Count I) it affords no remedy at all to those allegedly aggrieved by acts or omissions of sectarian adoption agencies, such as plaintiffs. Indeed, the ringing declarations of Illinois public policy bound up in the free exercise of religion clause of the Illinois Constitution, Article I, Section 3, must be taken into consideration and at very least deemed a powerful counterweight to any facile assertion that Illinois law somehow dictates it a compelling interest to coerce its citizens under penalty of law to disregard their own sincere, deeply held, conscientious religious objections to what they deem immoral. 46. Nor could the defendants argue that there is a compelling interest in suppressing
plaintiffs rights to pursue their religious practice by urging that serious harm would flow from plaintiffs declining to process adoption or foster care applications, etc. when defendants command a host of options for referral of those applicants to other social service agencies which provide foster care or adoption services whether those other social services agencies are sectarian or not and which are willing to accept and process such applications. Indeed, defendants undisputed capacity for making such referrals represents the least restrictive alternative to placing such a substantial burden on plaintiffs free exercise of religion. Referral to other providers would assure the proper and adequate handling of everybodys applications, while not trampling on plaintiffs conscientious objections and permitting plaintiffs to continue to practice their religious faith through social ministry within our religiously pluralistic democracy. 47. Still another factor should be weighed in arriving at an accurate and proper
interpretation of the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Statutes should be construed so as not to yield untoward or absurd results. Yet, Federal Executive Order No. 13559, dated
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November 17, 2010, a copy of which is appended hereto as Exhibit C, was promulgated by the Obama Administration as a modification of a predecessor Executive Order, dated December 16, 2002, promulgated during the Bush Administration. The 2010 Executive Order recites in Section 2 thereof (Exh. C, pp. 1-3) ten Fundamental Principles for the implementation of policies that have implications for faith-based agencies that administer social service programs or that support (through prime awards or sub-awards) social services programs with Federal financial assistance. These Fundamental Principles support use of faith-based social service agencies, such as plaintiffs (id., sub(b)). Also, they ban discrimination on the basis of religion or religious belief in the administration or distribution of Federal financial assistance under social service programs (id., sub(c)). Finally, the Fundamental Principles mandate that [e]ach agency responsible for administering or awarding Federal financial assistance for social service programs shall offer protections for beneficiaries of such programs by, inter alia, providing for Referral to an Alternate Provider, so that whenever a beneficiary or prospective beneficiary of a social service program supported by Federal financial assistance objects to the religious character of an organization that provides services under the program, that organization shall, within a reasonable time after the date of the objections, refer the beneficiary to an alternate provider. While plaintiffs do not purport to invoke these principles as any cause of action herein, as the Executive Order explicitly disclaims that it creates any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party, plaintiffs do allege that their state funding, which defrays only part of their financial burden in providing foster care and adoption services, is largely derived from federal grants. Thus those federal funds should be administered in a manner that assures the availability of the very referral procedures which plaintiffs have been providing to prospective beneficiaries of their foster
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care or adoption services over their decades-long partnership with the defendant, DCFS. Plaintiffs further allege, therefore, that the Illinois General Assembly could hardly have intended to flout these Federal guidelines for the administration and distribution of Federal financial assistance, by discriminating against plaintiffs denying plaintiffs referral options to accommodate their conscientious objections while providing referral options to beneficiaries or prospective beneficiaries who object to plaintiffs religious character. Such patent discrimination against plaintiffs, moreover, would constitute a gross affront to the religious liberty guarantees in the Illinois Constitution. The avoidance canon of statutory interpretation, therefore, would also militate in favor of reading the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, together with the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, to require that plaintiffs be guaranteed a legal right to opt out of processing foster care or adoption applications against which plaintiffs have deep-seated religion-based conscientious objections, lest the newly effective Act be struck down as unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Count III, plaintiffs pray that the Court issue a declaratory judgment to the effect that, in the event the Illinois Human Rights Act proscriptions that apply to places of public accommodation are held to apply to plaintiffs and/or the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act is held applicable to plaintiffs, plaintiffs statutorily protected exercise of religion would be substantially burdened by a reading of the Illinois Human Rights Act that would force them to process applications for foster care or adoption from unmarried couples, regardless of their sexual orientation, or a reading of the new Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act to apply to them and restrict their religious practice, for which there is no compelling governmental interest, and that defendants many options for referral of such applicants to other adoption agencies willing to entertain and process their applications
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represent the least restrictive alternative to burdening plaintiffs exercise of their religious faith, pursuant to the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act; that the defendants effort to coerce defendants into going against their conscientious religious scruples and commitments would constitute a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; and that plaintiffs be granted all other relief, pursuant to Count III hereof, to which they may be entitled on the premises, and pursuant to said Act. COUNT IV (Claim For Illinois State Constitutional Due Process Violations Notice & Hearing) 1-47. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 47 inclusive of Count III hereof with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 48. Each of the plaintiffs has executed a series of written contracts with the defendant
DCFS annually, going back many decades, for provision of social services in connection with foster care and adoptions. 49. As the State of Illinois is parens patriae for all children within its borders who are
found to be abandoned, abused, or neglected, it is only by agreement with state authorities, that is, with the Illinois Department of Children & Family Services (DCFS), that a social welfare agency may provide foster family services, including inter alia training, recruitment, placement, and supervision, for Illinois children and families. 50. Widespread concern over perceived inadequacies in Illinois programs for
abandoned, abused, neglected, and otherwise dependent children, which were very extensively dominated by state agencies, led DCFS several decades ago to reach out to private social service agencies, including religious agencies such as plaintiffs, to share a major part of the mission of providing care, nurture, and secure and stable households for these children, with a view toward 42 of 49 Case No. 2011 MR 254
achieving permanency in their circumstances, and perhaps, in appropriate cases, adoption. 51. Among the social welfare agencies whom state authorities recruited to participate
in these programs were plaintiffs, affiliates of Roman Catholic Dioceses, which are licensed by state authorities at regular intervals after intensive oversight and inspections by state officials. Plaintiffs voluntarily undertook the task, investing significant resources over the years in recruiting, training and maintaining professional skilled staff, including both administrators and social workers, both recruiting prospective foster parents, assisting DCFS in state licensing and placement decisions, and in adoptions. Over time, plaintiffs programs grew and achieved successful results. Plaintiff CSSSI Bellevilles case load in Southern Illinois, for example, has grown very rapidly, by more than half (some 57%), over the last five years. Plaintiffs have not undertaken this mission in order to reap any monetary profit, but rather pursue it as a religious mission in fulfillment of Gospel values and in an effort to help those children and families in need. Nevertheless, the size and scope of plaintiffs programs, reflecting the statewide need for the social welfare services that plaintiffs provide, requires a degree of financial assistance from state authorities in addition to plaintiffs own monetary investments in these foster care and adoption programs. 52. While plaintiffs, equally as other social welfare agencies working in tandem with
DCFS, do not discriminate on religious grounds or proselytize in their staffing or otherwise in their provision of social services for children and families, religious factors do play a significant role as mandated by law. Thus in implementing and in accordance with the Illinois Child Care Act of 1969, 225 ILCS 10, a regulation promulgated by state authorities and appearing in the Illinois Administrative Code, 89 Ill. Adm. Code 402.18 (2011), mandates as follows: 402.18 Religion. a) The religious beliefs and rights of children shall be legally protected. 43 of 49 Case No. 2011 MR 254
b) Each child shall be given religious instruction in his own faith, or that of his parents, unless there is written consent of the parent or guardian (if residual parental rights have been legally terminated) for the child to participate in religious instruction and to attend the facility of another faith. This shall include consent to baptism or confirmation. c) Children shall be permitted to participate in religious services either singly or in groups. Plaintiffs have fully complied with this mandate, as with all other mandates applicable to Illinois licensed social service providers. 53. All plaintiffs have been duly licensed by DCFS after extensive, intensive state
inspection and reviews. Plaintiffs most recent licensing reviews have won rave plaudits from DCFSs investigators. Indeed, plaintiffs are among the highest rated social service providers in the State of Illinois. Plaintiffs licenses all run for several years hence, until 2014 or 2015. 54. Illinois regulations provide elaborate procedures for prior notice and hearings
before any service providers license may be terminated. During that lengthy termination procedure, it is mandated that the targeted contractor still perform its mission and be paid until the last child is removed from its supervision. 55. Plaintiffs past practice with DCFS has been that at or near the end of each fiscal
year contract, ending June 30th, DCFS tenders a series of contracts which plaintiffs thereafter execute and return to DCFS, often many days after the commencement of the new fiscal year, after which DCFS then also executes the contracts. During this period, the parties continue to work under the contractual terms previously agreed upon. 56. The contracts which the parties have signed from year to year have included
provisions entitling either contracting party to terminate the contract, but always upon thirty (30) days prior notice. 57. Plaintiffs have had an expectation, based on accumulated years of past practice,
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which amounts to a protectable legal interest that is threatened by the defendants effort to declare them ineligible for any future contracting with DCFS for the provision of foster care and adoption services. This expectation includes not only plaintiffs continued receipt of state funds by which to recoup expenses incurred in the rendition of services, but also their exercise of religious faith in continuing to serve the vital needs of children and families -- neighbors whom they regard as brothers and sisters in Christ. 58. The actions of defendants McEwen and DCFS, supported by their co-defendants,
in purporting to terminate plaintiffs by telefaxed letters late on July 8, 2011, were arbitrary and capricious, both substantively and procedurally, and both devoid of supporting legal authority and bereft of basic fairness in the manner in which said actions were taken. 59. Plaintiffs purported termination as candidates for future contracting with DCFS
and the State of Illinois for the provision of foster care and adoption services was an egregious violation of their fundamental constitutional right to due process of law, as guaranteed them by Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, in that there were no substantive legal grounds whatsoever by which said peremptory action could be justified. On the contrary, plaintiffs expectancy of continued contractual relations constituted a legally protected interest which could not be taken away from them merely by the naked fiat of state officials, on an utterly arbitrary and illegal basis without even any colorable basis in substantive law. 60. Plaintiffs purported termination as candidates for any future contracting with
DCFS and the State of Illinois was also an egregious violation of their fundamental constitutional right to procedural due process of law, as guaranteed them by Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, in that plaintiffs were peremptorily denied any notice, as even their contracts required, let alone any meaningful opportunity to be heard in protest against this
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draconian action in a meaningful manner. 61 By reason of the foregoing, this Court ought to declare said purported termination
of plaintiffs contractual rights void and of no lawful force or effect whatsoever. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Count IV, plaintiffs pray that this Court issue a declaratory judgment, providing that defendants purported termination or debarment of plaintiffs rights to enter into contracts with DCFS and the State of Illinois was void and of no legal force or effect whatsoever, on substantive as well as procedural grounds; and that plaintiffs have all other relief to which they may be entitled on the premises in accordance with law. COUNT V (Claim For Preliminary & Permanent Injunctive Relief) 1-61. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 61 inclusive with the same force and effect as if fully set forth. 62. Plaintiffs have pled several causes of action herein upon which they have not
merely a fair chance of prevailing, but rather a substantial likelihood of prevailing. 63. Plaintiff lack any adequate remedy at law to redress the irreparable injury they
would be likely to suffer now or in the future if the defendants were not enjoined from taking adverse action against plaintiffs pursuant to either the place of public accommodation provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act, which do not apply to plaintiffs, or the newly effective Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act, which also does not apply to plaintiffs, and in derogation of plaintiffs rights pursuant to the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, all as alleged herein, or upon any one or more of the foregoing grounds, supra. Plaintiffs irreparable injury would include inter alia an interruption of its legal rights and/or its protectable legal interest to maintain the status quo ante, to continue its religious practice and ministry to those birth parents, prospective foster parents and adoptive parents, and those children whose vital 46 of 49 Case No. 2011 MR 254
interests plaintiffs are serving now in fulfillment of their religious mission, on which their Church has been embarked for millennia. 64. There would be no legally cognizable harm to defendants or to third parties were
this Court to enter the injunctive relief, permanent as well as preliminary relief, which plaintiffs seek herein to protect their vital legal rights and continue to carry out their religious mission as protected by law. Unmarried cohabiting couples applications for adoption or foster care could be adequately serviced and accommodated (as they are now) by defendants referring them to other providers which do not share plaintiffs conscientious religious objections. On the other hand, the harm to plaintiffs and to the poor, needy and vulnerable third parties whom they serve, should no injunctive relief issue, would be severe and, given the patent merits of plaintiffs claims herein, even unconscionable. The balance of hardships weighs decisively in favor of plaintiffs and those who are beneficiaries of plaintiffs vital social services. 65. Defendants have not been endowed with legal authority or otherwise clothed with
statutory jurisdiction to enforce any public accommodation provision of the Illinois Human Rights Act or any provision of the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act against the plaintiffs, and any authority which the defendants, or any one of them, might claim based upon said statutes is non-existent and, in any event, would be negated and superseded by virtue of the provisions of the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as alleged supra. 66. Granting of permanent equitable relief in favor of plaintiffs, barring defendants
from any repetition of the illegal actions hereinabove alleged would avert any recurrence of irreparable harm and would be in furtherance of the public interest. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray pursuant to this Count V that this Court enter both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, protecting the plaintiffs rights and the vital interests
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Attorney for Catholic Charities for the Diocese of Peoria James C. Byrne Spesia & Ayers 1415 Black Road Joliet, IL 60435 Tel. 815-726-4311 Fax 815-726-6828 Attorney for Catholic Charities for the Diocese of Joliet, Inc. David W. Wells Catherine A. Schroeder Thompson Coburn LLP One US Bank Plaza St. Louis, MO 63101-1011 Tel. 314-552-6000 Fax 314-552-7000 Attorneys for Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois, Diocese of Belleville
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Exhibit A
Exhibit B
Exhibit C
VERIFICATION Steve Roach, upon his oath, deposes and states as follows: I am the Executive Director of one of the plaintiffs herein, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield-in-Illinois, an Illinois non-profit corporation, and under penalties of perjury pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Illinois, 735 ILCS 5/1-109, I hereby certify that I have read the allegations of fact recited in plaintiffs Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, and Other Relief, that said allegations of fact are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as they pertain to Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield-in-Illinois and its charitable activities in connection with the provision of professional social services for adoption and foster care, and otherwise, and insofar as said allegations of fact may pertain to other plaintiffs herein, I am informed and believe said allegations to be true, as aforesaid. Further this Declarant sayeth not, this 26th\ day of July, 2011.
__________________________________
VERIFICATION Trish Fox, upon her oath, deposes and states as follows: I am the Chief Executive Officer of one of the plaintiffs herein, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Peoria, an Illinois non-profit corporation, and under penalties of perjury pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Illinois, 735 ILCS 5/1-109, I hereby certify that I have read the allegations of fact recited in plaintiffs Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, and Other Relief, that said allegations of fact are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as they pertain to Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Peoria and its charitable activities in connection with the provision of professional social services for adoption and foster care, and otherwise, and insofar as said allegations of fact may pertain to other plaintiffs herein, I am informed and believe said allegations to be true, as aforesaid. Further this Declarant sayeth not, this 26th day of July, 2011.
__________________________________
VERIFICATION Glenn Van Cura, upon his oath, deposes and states as follows: I am the Executive Director of one of the plaintiffs herein, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Joliet, Inc., an Illinois non-profit corporation, and under penalties of perjury pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Illinois, I hereby certify that I have read the allegations of fact recited in plaintiffs Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, and Other Relief, that said allegations of fact are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as they pertain to Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Joliet, Inc., and its charitable activities in connection with the provision of professional social services for adoption and foster care, and otherwise, and insofar as said allegations of fact may pertain to other plaintiffs herein, I am informed and believe said allegations to be true, as aforesaid. Further this Declarant sayeth not, this 26th day of July, 2011.
__________________________________
VERIFICATION Gary Huelsmann, upon her oath, deposes and states as follows: I am the Executive Director of one of the plaintiffs herein, Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois, an Illinois non-profit corporation, and under penalties of perjury pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Illinois, 735 ILCS 5/1-109, I hereby certify that I have read the allegations of fact recited in plaintiffs Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, and Other Relief, that said allegations of fact are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as they pertain to the Catholic Charities affiliate of the Diocese of Belleville, Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois, and its charitable activities in connection with the provision of professional social services for adoption and foster care, and otherwise, and insofar as said allegations of fact may pertain to other plaintiffs herein, I am informed and believe said allegations to be true, as aforesaid. Further this Declarant sayeth not, this 26th day of July, 2011.
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Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois Joins Catholic Charities Lawsuit To Continue To Serve Children's Best Interests

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Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois Joins Catholic Charities Lawsuit To Continue To Serve Children's Best Interests

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS

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Hon. John Schmidt Presiding Judge

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There is no requirement that plaintiffs exhaust any administrative remedy before

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