Whitney R. Tilson and Glenn H.

Tongue Managing Partners

phone: 212 386 7160 fax: 240 368 0299 www.T2PartnersLLC.com

December 1, 2011 Dear Partner, Our fund fell 0.6% in November vs. -0.2% for the S&P 500, +1.2% for the Dow and -2.3% for the Nasdaq. Year to date, its down 25.0% vs. +1.1% for the S&P 500, +6.7% for the Dow and -0.5% for the Nasdaq. On the long side, our three winners of note were Grupo Prisa (B shares) (18.9%), Iridium (stock 11.8% and warrants 4.0%), and AB InBev (8.2%). These gains were more than offset by Netflix (-21.4%), Sears Canada (-16.7%), Citigroup (-13.0%), Goldman Sachs (-12.5%), and dELiA*s (-10.7%). Our short book did well during the month and is now in the black on the year (meaning that all of our losses are on the long side). Our biggest winners in November were Career Education (-56.2%), Green Mountain Coffee Roasters (-19.4%), Nokia (-14.0%), Lululemon (-12.0%), ITT Educational Services (-11.3%), and Salesforce.com (-11.1%). Our only loser of note was InterOil (+15.1%). Tax Estimates Tax estimates through the end of October will soon be available, so if you would like to receive yours please email or call Kelli at KAlires@T2PartnersLLC.com or (212) 386-7160. Iridium Iridiums stock jumped after the company reported very strong earnings on November 8th. The company soundly beat analysts estimates and its own guidance for revenue, margins, EBITDA, and subscriber growth, with particular strength in both the machine-to-machine and legacy commercial voice product lines. Operational EBITDA margin hit a new high of 53.5% and management raised its 2011 outlook for subscriber growth (up 25% year over year) and operational EBITDA (up 20% year-over-year to ~$190 million). As an added bonus, the company said it would pay negligible cash taxes from 2011 to approximately 2020. We think this earnings report should assuage the concerns weve heard from investors and analysts, and are optimistic that it will prove to be a turning point for the stock, which we believe is deeply undervalued. Grupo Prisa Grupo Prisa received a boost in November when Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim acquired a 3.2% stake (see article in Appendix A). We think the stock will receive another boost in the next few weeks when the company announces that it has successfully refinanced its debt.

The GM Building, 767 Fifth Avenue, 18th Floor, New York, NY 10153

As background, this is what we wrote in our September letter:

Spain and Portugal are going through a crisis similar to the one the U.S. went through in late 2008, so its not surprising that the stock of a company with 77% of its revenues in these two countries is suffering. Its also not surprising that the companys operating performance has been affected by the deep recession in its primary markets, though the company is holding up remarkably well in light of this: in the first half of 2011, revenues were down only 1.2%, adjusted EBITDA rose 3.6%, and the companys restructuring and cost-cutting is on track. Prisa, however, needs to refinance its debt to give it breathing room to get through the current crisis. Our discussion with management and others plus our own experience leads us to have a high degree of confidence that Prisa will be able to do so successfully, but the uncertainty is weighing heavily on the stock.

Netflix and Green Mountain Coffee Roasters A couple of weeks ago we sent you an article we published entitled Why Were Long Netflix and Short Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, which is attached in Appendix B. Since then, both stocks have moved against us, making them even more attractive in our opinion. InterOil Though we havent discussed it in some time, InterOil remains one of our largest short positions. Our bearish thesis is being validated as the company continues to miss deadlines on its unrealistic promises, which will likely never be fulfilled, yet the company still has a $2.6 billion market cap. We believe intrinsic value is zero. The government of Papua New Guinea appears to finally be waking up to this gigantic promotion because its demanded that InterOil find an internationally-recognized LNG [liquefied natural gas] operating partner, which is highly unlikely ever to occur, for reasons that are well articulated in this article, and will certainly not happen anytime in the near future. InterOil bulls are hoping for a partnership similar to the one between Oil Search and Exxon Mobil, but this deal took five years to reach final investment decision (FID). Real energy companies do not quickly make multi-billion dollar commitments in one of the worlds poorest, most corrupt countries, so even if InterOil has discovered a major natural gas field (which we highly doubt), it will take years to sign a deal with an internationally-recognized LNG operating partner, yet InterOil has promised this in the very near future. Here is a laundry list of what InterOil has promised by year-end: Secure FID with Mitsui for condensate stripping plant (CSP) Secure FEED [front-end engineering design] and FID with Energy World Corp. for modular LNG plant Secure FEED and FID with Flex LNG on floating LNG plant Sign definitive agreement with Noble Group for offtake of 1MTPA [million tons per annum] Secure internationally-recognized LNG operating partner Sign additional Heads of Agreement for 1-2MTPA offtake
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With less than a month to go in the year, the only one of these that IOC has delivered on is the last one, announcing recently that it had signed a Heads of Agreement (HOA) with Gunvor Singapore Pte. Ltd., for the supply of one million tonnes per annum (mtpa) of liquefied natural gas (LNG). However, Gunvor, according to Wikipedia, has unsavory ties: Following the major Wikileaks release of US State Department cables in November 2010, it was reported by the London Daily Telegraph[17] that the wealth of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is linked to a "secretive Swiss-based oil trading firm" called Gunvor. It said that John Beyrle, the United States Ambassador to the Russian Federation stated that close connections exist between Gunvor and the Russian Government and that he reported: "its secretive ownership is rumoured to include prime minister Putin." The whole point of an offtake agreement is so lenders will provide the billions of dollars that this project would cost but we question whether anyone would lend such a large amount of money against an agreement with a firm like Gunvor. For the most in-depth expose of InterOil, see this article, which links to 12 pages starting here. For a more recent take, see this article. Conclusion Thank you for your continued confidence in us and the fund. As always, we welcome your comments or questions, so please dont hesitate to call us at (212) 386-7160. Sincerely yours, Whitney Tilson and Glenn Tongue The unaudited return for the T2 Accredited Fund versus major benchmarks (including reinvested dividends) is: T2 Accredited Fund net S&P 500 Dow NASDAQ November -0.6% -0.2% 1.2% -2.3% Year-to-Date -25.0% 1.1% 6.7% -0.5% Since Inception 113.9% 27.9% 76.8% 24.2%

Past performance is not indicative of future results. Please refer to the disclosure section at the end of this letter. The T2 Accredited Fund was launched on 7/1/04.

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T2 Accredited Fund Performance (Net) Since Inception

200 180 160 140 120 100
(%) 80

60

40
20 0 -20 -40 Jan-99

Jan-00

Jan-01

Jan-02

Jan-03

Jan-04

Jan-05

Jan-06

Jan-07

Jan-08

Jan-09

Jan-10

Jan-11

T2 Accredited Fund

S&P 500

T2 Accredited Fund Monthly Performance (Net) Since Inception

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 T2 S&P T2 S&P T2 S&P T2 S&P T2 S&P T2 S&P T2 S&P T2 S&P T2 S&P T2 S&P T2 S&P T2 S&P T2 S&P AF 500 AF 500 AF 500 AF 500 AF 500 AF 500 AF 500 AF 500 AF 500 AF 500 AF 500 AF 500 AF 500 January February March April May June July August 7.8 -2.9 4.1 2.1 -5.7 2.2 -0.7 4.1 4.1 -3.1 4.0 3.7 -2.5 5.8 -3.2 -0.4 -2.7 6.4 2.0 5.9 -6.3 6.2 10.3 -5.1 -2.8 4.1 -3.6 5.4 -7.2 -4.5 -1.5 2.3 -5.0 -1.9 9.8 -3.0 -2.0 2.4 -1.6 6.1 -5.3 -0.3 -7.9 0.5 4.4 -0.6 -2.6 5.1 1.8 4.6 -1.1 2.5 -6.1 -0.8 2.3 6.5 3.6 -9.2 -6.4 7.8 0.6 -2.4 -1.0 -6.3 -8.1 1.9 7.6 0.9 -1.8 -1.1 3.0 -0.2 0.0 -7.3 -5.0 -4.3 -1.5 -2.0 3.7 -5.5 2.9 1.4 -2.6 -1.6 0.9 8.2 5.3 1.3 1.7 1.9 -1.0 5.6 0.8 5.3 4.7 7.0 3.9 2.4 -1.4 0.1 4.6 -0.9 -1.6 -0.4 0.8 -0.2 1.8 1.5 -1.5 -1.5 1.4 1.9 -3.4 0.4 1.1 1.5 4.0 3.4 1.1 2.1 3.9 0.6 -2.6 -3.1 0.5 -3.2 -1.5 3.5 3.1 -1.3 2.6 -2.4 2.0 -1.7 -1.9 3.2 0.1 3.7 -1.0 0.8 -1.6 3.7 0.0 4.9 1.9 -3.1 3.9 2.2 1.8 -0.2 -0.9 2.9 5.0 6.3 1.9 1.4 2.7 0.2 1.3 1.4 -2.9 0.2 0.7 2.3 2.6 3.5 1.7 1.4 2.4 -3.3 -0.8 4.4 2.5 -3.0 -5.4 1.7 -1.1 8.2 -3.6 -4.3 1.7 -2.1 1.1 4.6 3.3 -1.5 -3.0 1.5 3.6 1.9 -6.9 -2.3 -0.9 7.9 -1.2 -2.5 -3.3 15.9 -5.9 -3.3 -0.5 4.9 1.2 -8.4 -0.9 1.3 -9.1 -3.6 -8.4 -1.6 -3.6 3.1 6.0 1.6 -8.0 -5.2 7.0 -2.8 4.1 -4.1 1.9 -1.9 -2.4 -4.6 2.4 3.4 0.0 3.0 -1.1 -1.7 -2.0

-8.9 -10.8 7.3 2.9 20.1 8.1 -5.0 6.8 6.3 5.9 9.0 9.6 5.5 0.2 7.6 3.6 3.7 -1.8 6.0 1.9 4.6 -2.1 -2.6 4.5 3.5 -1.5 1.7 -1.7 -1.9 0.5

-6.0 10.5 -0.8 -7.1 -7.9 0.5 6.6 2.9 2.3 0.4

-4.5 -13.9 -5.4 8.9 3.8 0.0 6.7 -9.3 7.0 -0.6 -7.0 10.9 -0.2

September -3.3 October November December YTD TOTAL 8.1 2.8 9.8

-5.4 -10.9 1.7 2.8 4.1 -7.4 8.8 5.8 -5.8 6.2 2.2 -0.4

1.7 -12.5 -16.8 -1.9 -4.2 -0.7 -8.9 -4.0 -7.1 1.1 -1.2 5.5

31.0 21.0 -4.5

-9.1 16.5 -11.9 -22.2 -22.1 35.1 28.6 20.6 10.9

25.2 15.8 -3.2

5.5 -18.1 -37.0 37.1 26.5 10.5 15.1 -25.0 1.1

Note: Returns in 2001, 2003, and 2009 reflect the benefit of the high-water mark, assuming an investor at inception.

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Appendix A

WSJ, DEALS & DEAL MAKERS

NOVEMBER 18, 2011, 9:50 A.M. ET

Slim Buys Stake in Spain's El Pais

By DAVID ROMAN And ANA GARCIA
MADRIDA company owned by Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim has acquired a 3.2% stake in Spain's media group Promotora de Informaciones SA, in an unexpected move into one of the economies at the forefront of the euro zone's debt crisis. Mr. Slim, one of the world's richest men, bought the stake through Inmobiliaria Carso SA de CV, a firm which he controls, according to regulatory filings released Friday. Mr. Slim has also used Carso to build up a 8.1% stake in New York Times Co., the publisher of the New York-based daily. Inmobiliaria Carso didn't disclose how much it paid for the stake. At current market prices, it is worth 12.5 million (about $17 million). The shares of Prisa, as the Spanish company is known, jumped on the news of Mr. Slim's purchase, and they last traded up 13% at 0.85, valuing the entire company at 383.2 million. For Madrid-based Prisa, the country's largest media group, Mr. Slim's move is a much-needed show of backing. The company, owner of Spain's best-selling newspaper El Pais, has been restructuring and shedding assets in recent years as it seeks to reduce its heavy debt load. As in the case of the New York Times Co., Prisa's share price has struggled recently. El Pais has suffered a dip in sales, as well as a revenue squeeze owing to lower advertising. El Pais sells around 370,000 newspapers a day. Late last year, Prisa announced a plan to lay off 2,500 staff through the first quarter of 2012. This came after U.S. investment fund Liberty Acquisition Holdings Corp. bought a majority stake in the firm for some 650 million. This is Mr. Slim's first foray in Spain's media sector, which until recently was flushed with cash owing to the country's long-running property bubble. The sector is now in dire straits because large corporate and government advertisers have cut down on investments sharply, just as Internet competition and a drop in spending by highly indebted households has lowered demand for newspapers. Prisa, haunted by a series of bad investments, has been Spain's largest media company for decades. Besides El Pais, it also owns Cadena Ser, Spain's largest radio network by audience, and the profitable publisher Santillana, which has a large foothold in Latin America.

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Appendix B

Why Were Long Netflix and Short Green Mountain Coffee Roasters
November 13, 2011

T2 Partners LLC The GM Building 767 Fifth Avenue, 18th Floor New York, NY 10153 (212) 386-7160 Info@T2PartnersLLC.com

DISCLAIMER: THIS LETTER IS FOR INFORMATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY AND SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED TO CONSTITUTE INVESTMENT ADVICE. NOTHING CONTAINED HEREIN SHALL CONSTITUTE A SOLICITATION, RECOMMENDATION OR ENDORSEMENT TO BUY OR SELL ANY SECURITY OR PRIVATE FUND MANAGED BY T2 PARTNERS. SUCH AN OFFER WILL BE MADE ONLY BY AN OFFERING MEMORANDUM, A COPY OF WHICH IS AVAILABLE TO QUALIFYING POTENTIAL INVESTORS UPON REQUEST. AN INVESTMENT IN A PRIVATE FUND IS NOT APPROPRIATE OR SUITABLE FOR ALL INVESTORS AND INVOLVES THE RISK OF LOSS. INVESTMENT FUNDS MANAGED BY T2 PARTNERS OWN CALLS AND ARE LONG THE STOCK OF NETFLIX AND OWN PUTS AND ARE SHORT THE STOCK OF GREEN MOUNTAIN COFFEE ROASTERS. WE MAKE NO REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTIES AS TO THE ACCURACY, COMPLETENESS OR TIMELINESS OF THE INFORMATION, TEXT, GRAPHICS OR OTHER ITEMS CONTAINED IN THIS PRESENTATION. WE EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM ALL LIABILITY FOR ERRORS OR OMISSIONS IN, OR THE MISUSE OR MISINTERPRETATION OF, ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS PRESENTATION. T2 PARTNERS MANAGEMENT LP IS A REGISTERED INVESTMENT ADVISOR. A COPY OF T2S DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (PART II OF FORM ADV), WHICH CONTAINS MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ADVISOR, INCLUDING ITS INVESTMENT STRATEGIES AND OBJECTIVES, CAN BE OBTAINED BY CALLING (212) 386-7160.

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Netflix and Green Mountain Coffee Roasters are former market darlings whose stocks have collapsed in recent months, wiping out a combined $23.2 billion in market capitalization from their peaks ($11.7 and $11.5 billion, respectively). By many metrics, both stocks appear cheap and the terrible headlines are attractive to value investors like us, who like to buy when others are selling in a panic. For example, BP was one of our biggest winners in 2010 (click here to read our analysis at the time). The company, its CEO and the stock were all universally hated, with endless negative headlines (similar to Netflix today), which provided a wonderful opportunity to buy the stock far below its intrinsic value. We love situations like this as long as were convinced that theres a good company and a cheap stock once one cuts through all of the noise. So are Netflix and Green Mountain similar opportunities today? Yes and no. Weve analyzed both companies carefully and concluded that Netflix is an attractive investment at todays price, so funds we manage own the stock, but Green Mountain isnt, we remain short it. Allow us to explain why. Similarities The stocks of both Netflix and Green Mountain over the past three months have suffered similar declines, as this chart shows:

In addition, the companies are remarkably similar in revenues and profitability over the past 12 months:
NFLX $2,925 $393 $238 13.4% 8.1% GMCR $2,651 $369 $201 13.9% 7.6%

Revenues Operating Income Net Income Operating Margin Net Margin

All figures are in millions, over the trailing 12 months

Yet here the similarities end. Lets take a look at both companies.

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Netflix When Netflix fell 35% in one day last month to under $80, we purchased it aggressively, not as a short-term trade, but with a multi-year horizon. Over the next few quarters, the company will likely lose money as it invests in international growth and struggles to overcomes its missteps over the past few months. Ultimately, however, we think Netflix is an excellent company and that the market has overreacted to all of the recent negative news, thereby providing us the chance to own it at a cheap price, for reasons we discussed in our October letter to investors. Green Mountain In contrast, we are not only still short Green Mountains stock, but it remains our largest short position, even after last Thursdays 40% decline. Our reasons are superbly articulated in the 110slide presentation that Greenlight Capitals David Einhorn gave on the company at the Value Investing Congress last month. Even if you dont have a position in the stock, its worth studying as a brilliant piece of analytical work and its a must-read if you have a position. Although we were already short Green Mountain, after seeing Einhorns presentation we concluded that it was an even better short than we realized and increased the size of our investment, which has paid off handsomely. Theres a saying that pigs get fed and hogs get slaughtered, so why dont we cover our short and take our profits? After all, the stock, at $43.71, is now trading at only 16.8x the midpoint of the companys guidance for next year, and at 12.5x Einhorns estimate of the companys long-term earnings power of $3.50 (see page 66 of his presentation). The answer is that we think only the first shoe has dropped and there are more to come. Netflix vs. Green Mountain Here is a summary of our concerns about Green Mountain, with a comparison to Netflix:
Green Mountain gave strong guidance for next quarter and year, which we think, in light of the companys performance last quarter, is too high and will need to be reset downward. Analysts remain bullish. In contrast, Netflix has given very poor and, we believe, conservative guidance that we think the company can exceed, and analysts are significantly more bearish. Though it has similar revenues and profits, Green Mountains market cap, at $7.0 billion, is nearly 50% higher than Netflixs $4.7 billion, which means theres more downside and less likelihood of an acquisition. Green Mountains business is highly dependent on two key patents, both of which expire on September 16, 2012. Contrary to the companys and bullish analysts views, we believe that soon after these patents expire, there will be significant competitive pressures that will meaningfully impact Green Mountains profitability and growth. Netflix faces no patent risk though it, too, faces many competitive threats. There is an ongoing SEC investigation at Green Mountain and we think Einhorns presentation provides a detailed roadmap that will, in our opinion, likely lead the SEC to uncover various accounting shenanigans. Netflix faces no such risk. Green Mountain has spent $1.4 billion in cash on three richly-priced acquisitions over the past two years, which raises questions about organic growth and earnings quality. Einhorn notes: The very
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high allocations to Goodwill raise suspicion about subsequent earnings quality. (See page 53 of his presentation.) In contrast, Netflix has made no acquisitions in recent years. Green Mountain inventories and cap ex have been growing much faster revenues: last year, on a 95% revenue increase, inventories rose 156% from $262 million to $672 million, while cap ex rose 125% from $126 million to $283 million. The result has been severely negative free cash flow and a significant worsening of the balance sheet over the past two years, which raises questions about how the company will fund its cap ex plans for next year. The trends at Netflix are precisely the opposite.

Netflix vs. Green Mountain: A Comparison of Balance Sheets and Cash Flows The last bullet point warrants further discussion because, while the two companies have similar income statements, their balance sheets and cash flows diverge massively. Netflix has a healthy net cash position of $166 million, while Green Mountain has $561 million in net debt. And Netflix has healthy operating cash flow, which substantially exceeds both net income and cap ex, resulting in free cash flow of $201 million, whereas Green Mountain is the reverse, with free cash flow of minus $282 million. This chart shows the data for both companies over the past 12 months:

Cash & Cash Equiv* Debt Net Cash (Debt) Operating Cash Flow Cap Ex** Free Cash Flow

NFLX $366 $200 $166 $349 $148 $201

GMCR $13 $574 ($561) $1 $283 ($282)

* For GMCR, excludes $28M of restricted cash ** For NFLX, cap ex includes "Acquisitions of DVD content library" All figures are in millions, over the trailing 12 months

The balance sheet and cash flow numbers are critical because both companies are making large investments to grow their businesses: in Netflixs case, signing deals for streaming content and growing internationally and, in Green Mountains case, primarily to increase our portion pack packaging and expand our physical plants. Both companies (and stocks) are at risk if they run into trouble financing these investments. Given Netflixs strong balance sheet and free cash flow, we think its highly likely that the company will be able to fund its growth, even if it loses more subscribers than the company (and we) expect (within reason). In contrast, Green Mountain is at much higher risk, both because of higher planned expenses and also a far weaker balance sheet and cash flow statement. As noted above, in last weeks earnings release, Green Mountain said For fiscal 2012, we currently expect to invest between $630.0 million to $700.0 million in capital expenditures to support the Companys future growth. Thats a huge amount of money for a company that only had $201 million of net income last year and less than $1 million of operating cash flow. Our question is, where are they going to get the money? Theyve guided to $2.55-$2.65 in EPS in the next 12 months, but we are highly skeptical that the company will meet this guidance, and it also excludes some very real cash expenses like acquisition-related transaction expenses; legal and
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accounting expenses related to the SEC inquiry and the Companys pending litigation. In addition, the companys balance sheet is consuming huge amounts of cash: due mainly to the rise in inventories and, to a lesser extent, accounts receivable, operating cash flow over the last 12 months was a mere $785,000 basically zero. Nor was this an exception: in the prior year, the company had $80 million in net income yet operating cash flow of minus $3 million. On top of this are numerous richly priced acquisitions, which consumed $908 million in cash last year and $459 million the year before. To summarize, over the last two years, Green Mountain has generated $281 million of net income, yet lost $2 million of operating cash flow, plus spent $410 million on cap ex and another $1,367 million on acquisitions a total cash burn of $1.8 billion! This chart shows the companys accelerating cash burn over the past three years:
GMCR ('09) GMCR ('10) GMCR ('11) $38 ($3) $1 $48 $126 $283 ($10) ($129) ($282) $41 $459 $908 ($51) ($588) ($1,190)

Operating Cash Flow Cap Ex Free Cash Flow Acquisitions FCF Minus Acquisitions

So how has Green Mountain funded these huge cash flow deficits? By using cash, taking on debt, and issuing stock. Over the past two years, the company has seen its net cash position go from +$164 million to -$561 million, a swing of $725 million, plus its raised $990 million by selling stock, as this chart shows:
GMCR ('09) GMCR ('10) GMCR ('11) $242 $4 $13 $78 $354 $574 $164 ($350) ($561) $395 $9 $981

Cash & Cash Equiv* Debt Net Cash (Debt) Issuance of Common Stock
* Excludes restricted cash

In summary, we question how Green Mountain will fund its $630-$700 million cap ex plan over the next 12 months. Even if one believes the midpoint of the companys guidance of $2.60/share, this only translates into $414 million of net income, plus the balance sheet is likely to continue consuming cash. We think investors will not look kindly on more debt, nor issuing stock at depressed prices, yet the company almost certainly will have to do one or the other. Conclusion Were long Netflix because we think the bad news is out, we like the companys balance sheet and cash flows, and see few red flags. In contrast, with Green Mountain, we think there is much more bad news to come, are very concerned about the companys balance sheet and cash flows, and see many red flags.

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T2 Accredited Fund, LP (the Fund) commenced operations on January 1, 1999. The Funds investment objective is to achieve long-term after-tax capital appreciation commensurate with moderate risk, primarily by investing with a long-term perspective in a concentrated portfolio of U.S. stocks. In carrying out the Partnerships investment objective, the Investment Manager, T2 Partners Management, LLC, seeks to buy stocks at a steep discount to intrinsic value such that there is low risk of capital loss and significant upside potential. The primary focus of the Investment Manager is on the long-term fortunes of the companies in the Partnerships portfolio or which are otherwise followed by the Investment Manager, relative to the prices of their stocks. There is no assurance that any securities discussed herein will remain in the Funds portfolio at the time you receive this report or that securities sold have not been repurchased. The securities discussed may not represent the Funds entire portfolio and in the aggregate may represent only a small percentage of an accounts portfolio holdings. It should not be assumed that any of the securities transactions, holdings or sectors discussed were or will prove to be profitable, or that the investment recommendations or decisions we make in the future will be profitable or will equal the investment performance of the securities discussed herein. All recommendations within the preceding 12 months or applicable period are available upon request. Performance results shown are for the T2 Accredited Fund, LP and are presented net of management fees, brokerage commissions, administrative expenses, other operating expenses of the Fund, and accrued performance allocation or incentive fees, if any. Net performance includes the reinvestment of all dividends, interest, and capital gains. Performance for the most recent month is an estimate. The fee schedule for the Investment Manager includes a 1.5% annual management fee and a 20% incentive fee allocation. For periods prior to June 1, 2004, the Investment Managers fee schedule included a 1% annual management fee and a 20% incentive fee allocation, subject to a 10% hurdle rate. In practice, the incentive fee is earned on an annual, not monthly, basis or upon a withdrawal from the Fund. Because some investors may have different fee arrangements and depending on the timing of a specific investment, net performance for an individual investor may vary from the net performance as stated herein. The return of the S&P 500 and other indices are included in the presentation. The volatility of these indices may be materially different from the volatility in the Fund. In addition, the Funds holdings differ significantly from the securities that comprise the indices. The indices have not been selected to represent appropriate benchmarks to compare an investors performance, but rather are disclosed to allow for comparison of the investors performance to that of certain wellknown and widely recognized indices. You cannot invest directly in these indices. Past results are no guarantee of future results and no representation is made that an investor will or is likely to achieve results similar to those shown. All investments involve risk including the loss of principal. This document is confidential and may not be distributed without the consent of the Investment Manager and does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to purchase any security or investment product. Any such offer or solicitation may only be made by means of delivery of an approved confidential offering memorandum.

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