Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N.

Manuel

2012

PEOPLE vs. VERA G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 FACTS: This case involves the constitutionality of the old probation law. Respondent Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221, which grants provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that it is applicable to a cities like Manila as it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law, it is unconstitutional because it is violative of the equal protection clause of the constitution. It also avers that the said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards, thus it constitutes undue delegation of power. ISSUE: Whether or not Act 4221 or the old probation law is an undue delegation of legislative power on the ground that there is no standard set by congress for its implementation. HELD: Yes. There is undue delegation of power because there is no standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN (THE FIRST EMERGENCY POWER CASE) G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949 FACTS: This case involves Commonwealth Act 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. Antonio Araneta is being charged for violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He avers that EO 62, issued by virtue of CA No. 671, is null and void as the effect of CA No. 671 granting emergency power to the president has already ceased. Three other cases were consolidated with the case of Araneta. These are: 1.) L-3055, an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; 2.) L3054 filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds pursuant to EO 225; 1

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

2012

and 3.)L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226 that appropriates funds to hold the national elections. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all E0s passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased. ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has already ceased when Congress has met in session? HELD: Yes. CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law."

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL. vs. VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL. (THE SECOND EMERGENCY POWER CASE) G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953 FACTS: Eulogio Rodriguez, et. al. seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were issued pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs issued issued have no force and effect on the ground that they are violative of the principle of separation of power.

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

2012

HELD: Yes, the EOs are invalid. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest. RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes) vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919 FACTS: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro and the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation. 3

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

2012

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code is unconstitutional on the ground that it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial government? HELD: No, Section 2145 of the RAC is not unconstitutional. The legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Also, the Supreme Court explained that an exception to the general rule of non-delegation of legislative power sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CARDONA vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN G.R. No. L-10202 March 27, 1917 FACTS: The Municipality of Cardona alleged that section 1 of Act No. 1748; entitled "An Act authorizing the adjustment of provincial and municipal boundaries and authorizing the change of capitals of provinces and subprovinces, as may be necessary from time to time to serve the public convenience and interest," is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in that it delegates legislative powers to the Governor-General, whereas the Act of Congress referred to lodges those powers in the Philippine Legislature. ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 1748 is "unconstitutional" on the ground that it confers on the Governor-General legislative authority? HELD: No, it is not unconstitutional. The delegation of the power referred to on the GovernorGeneral does not involve an abdication of legislative functions on the part of the legislature with regard to the particular subject-matter with which it authorizes the Governor-General to deal. It is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to more or less rapid change both in development and centers of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently. We find no provision of the Act applicable so far as it touches this case which is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

2012

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 47065 June 26, 1940 FACTS: Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been engaged for 20 years in the business of transporting passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by the Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission). The company applied for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization, but with two conditions as provided for by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454: First, that the certificates of authorization issued to it would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of promulgation; and second, that the company may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into account reasonable depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it acquisition. PTI did not agree with the conditions, and instead asked the Supreme Court to declare Commonwealth Act No. 454. ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional for being undue delegation of legislative power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are concerned. HELD: No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made subject to a sufficient standard that the PSC must strictly follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) The Supreme Court had earlier ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard.

CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940 FACTS: The National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

2012

Commonwealth Act 548 authorized said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.

CERVANTES VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL G.R. No. L-4043 May 26, 1952 FACTS: Cenon Cervantes, Manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO) receiving P15,000 salary a year, assailed the decision of the Auditor General denying his claim for quarters allowance. By a resolution of the Board of Directors of NAFCO, Cervantes was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of August, 1949. The resolution was disapproved by the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises on strength of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, because of the following reasons: (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such allowance.

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

2012

The President promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council creating the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises pursuant to Republic Act No. 51 approved by Congress authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 51 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: No. The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.

PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965 FACTS: President Diosdado Macapagal, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirtythree (33) municipalities. petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, questioned the said EOs and petitioned the court to restrain the Auditor General and his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void on the ground that the President has no power to create municipalities. HELD: Yes, the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void as the power to create municipal corporations is solely legislative in nature. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

2012

(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. L-19850 January 30, 1964 FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission ordering the reduction of rates of Vigan Electric Light Co. PSC averred that Vigan Electric making a net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, and that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately. Vigan Electric contended that the reduction of rate is unconstitutional because it has been ordered without notice and hearing, thus issued without due process of law. In defense, PSC maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of hearing; and that the decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) in which we held that such notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public Service Commission is not in point because, unlike the order complained of which respondent claims to be legislative in nature the Ang Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise of judicial functions. ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress validly delegated legislative power to the PSC? HELD: No. Congress has not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the Public Service Commission. Consistently with the principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and only to matters purely of local concern. However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by it which is complete in itself. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said Policy. Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the 8

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

2012

power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government other than that in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of separation of powers. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a functionpartaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. III. Creation, Establishment and Abolition of Administrative Agencies

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

FACTS: At the dawn of his administration, President Benigno Aquino III on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Petitioner Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer and petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives, assail Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by thirdlevel public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one. To accomplish its task, the PTC has all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

2012

warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. HELD: No. The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise ofspecific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission." Moreover, since the amount that would be 10

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

2012

allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding. Note: However, Executive Order No. 1 was declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object.

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. vs. JOSE PAO G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967 FACTS: Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Bansalan, of Davao. He ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the public land to the Lacson-Magallanes Co. Such ceded portion was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land. Meanwhile, Jose Pao and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area. In turn, Lacson-Magallanes filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was protested by Jose Pao and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, dismissed the claim of Jose Pao and his companions. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources also dismissed the appeal of Pao. The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines. Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the controverted land should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power on the ground that the Constitution does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. HELD: No. The Chief Executive may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

11