Role of PRA in Enhancing External Events Safety the Past, Present, and Future

Commissioner George Apostolakis U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

CmrApostolakis@nrc.gov

International Experts Meeting on Protection against Extreme Earthquakes and Tsunamis IAEA, Vienna September 4, 2012

Overview
Approaches to external hazard evaluation Early seismic hazard evaluation results Contributions of deterministic and probabilistic methods Lessons learned from recent events A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework
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The Traditional Approach to Establish Natural Hazard Design Basis

Primarily a deterministic process Issue of uncertainty was recognized and considered implicitly, for example:
The development of a design basis considered maximum historical events Margin was added to compensate for uncertain knowledge

Technological Risk Assessment (Reactors)

Study the system as an integrated sociotechnical system Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) supports Risk Management by answering the questions:
What can go wrong? (thousands of accident sequences are studied as opposed to the limited number of design basis accidents (DBAs ) How likely are these scenarios? What are their consequences? Which systems and components contribute the most to risk?
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Individual Plant External Events Examinations (IPEEE) in 1990s

Seismic and fire events were found to be important contributors to CDF for a majority of plants CDF contribution from seismic or fire events, in some cases, approached (or even exceeded) that from internal events Most commonly reported dominant contributors to seismic CDF
Failures of offsite power Failure of various components of the electrical system such as motor control centers, switchgear, and relays Failure of the emergency diesel generators Failure of dc batteries Failure of various tanks Failures of structures such as block walls located near safetyrelated equipment

Deterministic and Probabilistic Methods

Deterministic Design Method SPRA

Ensures adequate margin in individual structures, system, and components Uses a fixed, single level of seismic hazard for design Uncertainties are implicitly accounted for by using conservative approaches and safety factors The frequency of occurrence of a seismic event is not considered in developing a design basis

Evaluates plant performance as an integrated system considering design, operational, and as-built conditions Evaluates the integrated plant performance over the entire range of seismic hazard Known uncertainties can be explicitly included and displayed in results The frequency of occurrence of seismic events of different sizes is an integral part of the methodology

Risk-Informed Framework

Traditional Deterministic Approach

Unquantified Probabilities

Risk-Informed Approach
Combination of traditional and risk-based approaches

Risk-Based Approach
Quantified

Design-Basis Accidents Defense in Depth and safety margins Can impose unnecessary regulatory burden Incomplete

Probabilities Thousands of accident sequences Realistic Incomplete

Lessons Learned from Fukushima and Other Recent Events

Importance of adequate design basis Our knowledge of natural hazard phenomena is uncertain and continually evolving; periodic assessments may be necessary Common-cause effects of an external event can compromise several layers of defense in depth at the same time External events affect the entire site and the civil infrastructure Combined effects of natural events (e.g., seismic and seismic-induced tsunami, storm-surge, seismicinduced fires and floods) need to be considered
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NRCs Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Actions

Orders to all operating plants & plants under construction (issued March 12, 2012)
Develop mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events Install (or upgrade) reliable hardened containment vents for BWR Mark I & Mark II containments Install reliable spent fuel pool level instrumentation

NRCs Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Actions

Requests for information (issued March 12, 2012)
Perform seismic and flood plant walkdowns Re-evaluate seismic and flood hazard
Use current NRC requirements and guidance Upgrade plant design, as necessary, to protect against the updated hazards

Perform emergency preparedness staffing and communications assessments

New Rules
Revise station blackout requirements Strengthen and integrate emergency operating procedures

Longer-Term Recommendations external hazards

Consider ten-year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards Evaluate seismically induced fires and floods

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Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 1 Establish a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense in depth and risk considerations NRC staff proposal to be submitted to Commission in early 2013
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Risk Management Task Force (RMTF) A Broader Initiative Going Forward Suggested by Chairman Jaczko in late 2010 Task Force formed in February 2011 Charter
To develop a strategic vision and options for adopting a more comprehensive and holistic risk-informed, performance-based regulatory approach for reactors, materials, waste, fuel cycle, and transportation that would continue to ensure the safe and secure use of nuclear material.
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A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework (NUREG-2150, April 2012)

Mission
Ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment

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A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework

Mission
Ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment

Objective
Manage the risks from the use of byproduct, source and special nuclear materials through appropriate performance-based regulatory controls and oversight
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A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework

Mission
Ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment

Objective
Manage the risks from the use of byproduct, source and special nuclear materials through appropriate performance-based regulatory controls and oversight

Risk Management Goal

Provide risk-informed and performance-based defense-in-depth protections to: Ensure appropriate barriers, controls, and personnel to prevent, contain, and mitigate exposure to radioactive material according to the hazard present, the relevant scenarios, and the associated uncertainties; and Ensure that the risks resulting from the failure of some or all of the established barriers and controls, including human errors, are maintained acceptably low
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A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework

Mission
Ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment

Objective
Manage the risks from the use of byproduct, source and special nuclear materials through appropriate performancebased regulatory controls and oversight

Risk Management Goal

Provide risk-informed and performance-based defense-in-depth protections to: Ensure appropriate barriers, controls, and personnel to prevent, contain, and mitigate exposure to radioactive material according to the hazard present, the relevant scenarios, and the associated uncertainties; and Ensure that the risks resulting from the failure of some or all of the established barriers and controls, including human errors, are maintained acceptably low

Decision-Making Process
Use a disciplined process to achieve the risk management goal:
Identify issue Identify Options Analyze

Monitor

Implement Decision

Deliberate

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A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework

Mission
Ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment

Objective
Manage the risks from the use of byproduct, source and special nuclear materials through appropriate performance-based regulatory controls and oversight

Risk Management Goal

Provide risk-informed and performance-based defense-in-depth protections to: Ensure appropriate barriers, controls, and personnel to prevent, contain, and mitigate exposure to radioactive material according to the hazard present, the relevant scenarios, and the associated uncertainties; and Ensure that the risks resulting from the failure of some or all of the established barriers and controls, including human errors, are maintained acceptably low

Decision-Making Process
Use a disciplined process to achieve the risk management goal: Identify issue Identify Options Implement Decision Analyze

Monitor

Deliberate

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Application to Power Reactors: Eliminating the Patchwork

Design basis event?

Adequate protection rule?

Adequate Protection Category

Current cost-beneficial safety enhancement rule? Included riskimportant scenario?

Proposed Design Enhancement Category

Remaining scenarios

Proposed Residual Risk Category

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RMTF Findings - External Events

The processes for establishing the external hazard design bases do not use consistent event frequency and magnitude methods New information that would provide the basis for external hazard frequency updates is not systematically collected, evaluated, and communicated PRA methods for assessing external hazard risks are available, but expertise in performing such studies is very limited

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RMTF Recommendations External Events

The NRC should reassess methods used to estimate the frequency and magnitude of external hazards and implement a consistent process that includes both deterministic and PRA methods.
Consideration of the risks from beyond-design-basis external hazards should be included in the designenhancement category

The NRC should establish a program to systematically collect, evaluate, and communicate external hazard information

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Next Steps
NRC staff to recommend a path forward on the Risk Management Regulatory Framework 6 months after receiving Commission direction on the staffs response to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 1 (February 2013). In mid to late 2013 you should hear more as NRC develops its path forward

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Acronyms
BWR boiling water reactor CDF core damage frequency DBA - design basis accident EPRI - Electric Power Research Institute IPEEE - Individual Plant External Events Examination NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PRA - probabilistic risk assessment RMTF Risk Management Task Force SPRA - seismic probabilistic risk assessment
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