Modern Loti n

America
SEVENTH EDITION
Thomas E. Skidmore
Professor Emeritus, Bruwtl University
Peter H. Smith
U"iversity oj C"lijomi", S"" Die>;"
James N. Green
Brohln University
New York Oxfunl
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
2010
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For
David. ja11lrs, Rolw,.,
and
Jonat/mll, ,",elcr. Snslw. Amallda
and
Sonya
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E
J\lodern L'llin AmericamlOmas E. Skidmore. Peler II. Smith.
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ISDN 978-019-537570-1 (pbk.: acidfree paper)
I. L'llin America-l-lisl0'1'. I. Smith. Peler II. II. Green. James
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FI4JJ.S5S 2010
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CONTENTS
I'KHA<':t:. xi
PART ONE QUESTIONS AND CONTEXTS
Why Latin America? 3
Conlrast ami I\trilclox 5
2 The Colonial Foundations 1'1
Prdude 10 Conquest 14
Colonial Spanish America 16
Portuguese Amcrica: A Different World? 23
Independl'llce for Latin Amcric.l 27
The Pull of the International Ecunomy 40
PART TWO CASE STUDIES: CHANGE OVER TIME '\3
3 Mexico: The Taming of a Revolution 15
From Colony tu Nalionhnod 45
The Mexican Revolution 54
Politics and Policy: Patterns of Change 5S
The Contemporary Scelle 75
4 Central America and the Caribbean: Within the
U.S. Orbit 82
World Powers. the United and the Greater Caribbean 82
From Colonies to Nalionhood 86
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change 91
Polilh::s and Policy: Panama 97
vii
viii CONTI;'NTS
5
6
Politics and Policy: Nicnrngun 100
Politics and Policy: EI Salvador 104
Politics nnd Policy: Guatcl113ln 108
Politics nnd Policy: The Dominican Republic III
Politics and Policy: Haiti 113
Politics and Pnlicy: Pucrto Rico 117
Cuba: Key Colony, Socialist State 121
From Colony to Nationhood 121
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change 124
Politics and Policy: Patterns of Change 128
The CubOln Revolulion 132
I;rmning U.S. Policies 136
Policy Experimentation and Regime Consolidation 140
The Contemporary Scene (t990-present) 146
The Andes: Soldiers, Oligarchs, and
Indians 150
From Colony 10 Nationhood 151
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change 153
Politics and Policy: Peru 163
Politics and Policy: Bolivi<l 173
Politics and Policy: Ecuador 184
(uII"'"h 1\
10 Chile: Repression and Democracy 27R
From Colony to Nationhood 27R
Ovcrvic\\': Economic Growlh and Social 2HO
Politics and Policy: POltlcrns of C1wnge 2R'1
The COlllemporary Scene (1990-prcselll) .104
11 Brazil: The Awakening Giant Jllr,
From Colony to N<Jlionhood 306
Overview: Economic (irnwth and :-;nlia! Ch.llwr .\1:-
Polilics and Policy: ofCh.llIge .HI'
The Contemporary Secnl' (1994 I'rc<;rlll) 1,11
PART THREE THEMES AND REflECTIONS J49
12 Strategies for Economic Development J"I
Narrntives of IklCkw<lrdncss 352
The Liheral Era (I R80s-1920s) 353
Import-Subslitulion lndllstrializ<Jtif111 (1(110" 11J7()<') l:-H
The Socialist Alternative 162
Neolihemlism-Oncc Dominant, Ntlw
(1980s-prcscl1t) .loR
7 Colombia: Civility and Violence 191
From Colony to Nationhood 191
Creating Political Parties 194
The Loss or P<lnama 197
Overview: Economic Growth <llld Social Change 198
Politics and Policies: Patterns of Change 203
The Contemporary Scene (1990-presellt) 211
13 Dynamics of Political Transformation
Olig<Jrchic nule and Top 01)\\'11 ndorlll
(1880'-1920,) 377
Populism and Dictalorship (1910s-11J70<;) ;\79
The Rcvolulionary Pnth (1C)50s-19flO,<;) .1R6
A Rencwal of J)cl110Cracy (19ROs-l,re<;cllt) JH9
Explor<tlions in Comparative Analp'i... JIM
J7(.
8
9
Venezuela: The Perils of Prosperity 219
From Colony to Nationhood 220
Gunboats and Diplomacy 224
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change 226
Politics and Policy: Patterns of Change 230
The Contemporary Scene (1998-present) 236
Argentina: Progress and Stalemate 244
From Colony to Nationhood 244
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Ch<lngc 248
Politics and Policy: Patterns of Change 253
The Conlempor<lry Scene (I 983-present) 271
14 Culture and Society '103
From Colonies 10 Nalions 404
Literature, Art, and New Idc;IS in a \Vodd
Economy 409
Nationalism. Radic<J1 Polilics. <Iud Tllrhlllcnl 'I'illlro; '111
Latin America Cullure Fnlcrs Ol \'Vnrld Mark/'I 42.\
Dict<ltorship, f)emocr<lcy. and New 'social 1\ InvClllcnls '1.\1
GI.OSSARY 438
GUJIlE TO WlmSITE 44.'\
INOEX 445
1

PREFACE
T
hiS edition tuok lIIlIch mort.- work thim Wt: ever illl.lgillt'li. E;lrl)' un, we:
flol unly dcddcd 10 bring the ("ullknls up-Iu-d.tlt', but dl'h.'nnilll'd 10 makt:
the book more accessible and Icuchablt'. 'INc pcdagogi..:al tradl'd
notes 011 classroom experiences, and tried Iu imagilll" ancw the: kiml ofbouk Ih.ll
would best meet the needs uf colleagut's and students.
As our conversations progressed, we Ihal tllis challt'llgc wuuld I t'lluirl'
wholes... le rewriting and ft.'structuring uf Modem Ll'lill America. Tuward this CIUI,
we have
composed four entirely Ilew chapkf:!o-on lilt' <.:('1l1ral Andl;"s (Chapkr 6).
Venezuela (Chapter 8), economic 3lnlkgit's (Chap,,:r 12), alld cultun: and
soddy (Chapkr 14);
created two ch3ple:rs oy r"'l..ollluinillg old Ull":!l> -Ull Ce:lltral
America ;'Ind the Caribbean (Chapter 4) .Iml 011 politk.d tl"ul!l>itium ill
comparative (Chapll,.'r 13);
developed :3 website lor practical usc by sludt'lltS. imtrudors, and the:
geneml reading public
Throughout the text we have added maps and i!lustration:l>. r\.'organizeJ Ih..:
presentation, and done cVl'rything within our powt'rs to t'llhallu darily and
parsimony of expression. This is a new and different book.
As in the past, l.atin America is now going thruugh a periud great
uncertainty. Over the last quarter century, th..: rc:giull has dispensed wilh didatur
ship in f,wor of democracy; it has also t'I1lIJfilccd far.re'll'hing ecunomic reforms.
But poverty and inequality nonetheless persist, and widespread popular protest
has emerged-not in the shape of armed uprising!l>, but in the form of electoral
support for 0ppusition candidates and parties. Democracy has thus bcell doing
what it should. And just as economic conditions ill Latin America wen: slarting 10
improve, Ihe globaJ financial crisis of2008-9 look a It'rriblc toll on COlllltries of the
region. What wUl happen in Ihe futurt' is anyone's guess.
xi
xii P I ~ E F A C E
For work Oil this sevenlh edilion. we <Ire ple(lsed to ;lcknowlcdge the very
c;lp;lble ;lSSiSI(lflCC of M;ltthew C. Kearney, Caroline Land<lu, and Tarso Luis
Ramos. Vve Ihnnk Michael Shifter and Douglas Cope, professional colleagues
whose sage advice rescued us from several unseemly errors. And we wish (0
recognize the special role ofFclicity Skidmore, whose editorial guid<lJ1ce, logistical
expertise, <lnd moral encouragement made it possible for us to finish the job.
Lastly. we extend our gratilude and admiration 10 the peoples of Latin
Amcricn. This is their story. As foreign schol:lrs, we cow only hope to hnve done
il justice.
T. E. S.
P. II. S.
I. N. G.
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PART ONE
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Questions and Contexts
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Why Latin America?
"The..' u.s. will do anything lor l..11in AIllc..'rll.. .I, c..'XH'pt h.,ld .tllI'lll it: wruk
Ihe latl' j;lllll'S for Ill-Ill)' tile kgl'lldary tll,tll 01 US pulitil"i11
Arc thert' reasoll:. why \V'!: ::.htluld If)' Iv provt' him wrong?
Thert' .Ire ::,\.'vt'ral. Flr:.l. our nalll..lll'::" Cl UllUlllH. Illkl l'::.l::. .In' (\t'cply illv,-,I, ,.:ll in
thl.-" 1''''1)IUII. L.llill AIllt'l'i.:O\ b liliC 01 tlllr 11l.ljur If.ldult) 1'-11 llh ..... Ill::. till" ::>llt' vi IIlUdl
U.S. inVl:::.II1lI,.'JH and a ::.ouru.' lor oil.llld ulhc:r crilil.al r.I\\' All 'lLl..d..'I.t
lioll of growth in key J\h:xkn and Br.llil m,IY :'1'UIl produll:'
::.igllitll,Ull IIl:W puwer::. ull the \\'urlll ,)It'lll'.
We h,lVt' duse pulitic.11 linb. upht".,vah alld allii -i\ II h:riGlIl
IllUVl'lllelltS in LUin Allll'riC:1 have fur U.S. loreign
policy. They haw raised serious abuut huw bnl to ddllll', prull"ct, and
prolllote our national U.S, of both poliliLal partks haw
cUllsblt'ntly illknuwkdged ill11'0rl;llJ(l' uf thl' region. Cl'orge
II. W. a Ikpublican, a rd:HiollShip wilh MexIco alld ill
19')0 prOI)osc:d a free [rade agrn'llll'nl I hat wuul<1 tiglltt'll nUJIUlnJ ... bdWCl'!l
all of Lallll AlIIerica and thl' United Hill (:lintoll, a I)l'lllOU,II, folluw....... 1tip in
1994 by hosting a hcmbpheric of tht' (;('org..: W, UlI::.h,
Rq)lIblicall, selected Mexico as the for his fureign visit ill LUOI. And
Oballl3, Delllocrat, hdd ;:1 private IIll'cling Wilh tvkx.icu's
chid eXt'culivl' before taking uffice in 2009.
There is anolher (onsiJeri.ltiun hc:n: at hUlIlc. Large ..:tit)ll'" of uur (Ollnlry
have hecume Lutinizcd by the illflUt'lIll' of lIligr.lllb lrum Mexllu, PlIt'rtu Ricu,
Celltnll America. the Curibbe:ln, and even Hrnil. This in addition to the
llisp.anic t1esct:ndants of the uriginal Spanish spe'lking IJOPutltion of what W.IS
once purt of Mexico. Migratiun. both historical :lnd re....cllt. ha::. brought peoples
und custums from Latin Amerk.. to the Amcric.. n (frolll Tex.ls to
Cllifornia), Florida. and New York. M;:my major U.S, cities now h.lVe:' lIlor....
children from Spanish-spt"aking fa mil ic-::. than frolll .111)' otht:r group.
Bilingualbm become: .1 political is::.uc forcing u::. It) rethink tilt' Jileaning uf
Spanish-spt:aking AlI1erica. both wilhin uur burdl'r::. .llId beycJlld.
t1 PART ONE AND rONTFXTS
M0st U.S. citizens (or -North Americans," as we are commonl), called in L"ltin
America) know lillie about our neighboring societies to the south. Man)' helieve
that Ihe United States can impose its will on the region through "hig-stick"
diplomac), or .military might. Others do 1101 even care. Still others entertain
ohsoletc sicreolypes ahout the peoplcs of the region: Ihe -Latin lover." Ihe "Frito
Ikllldito." Ihe soulful Che Guev::Ira. the Bra7.ilian mulatl:l camiv:l1 queens-these
are Ihe images that often first come to mind.
\Vhen we mOve beyond these caricatures. we find Latin America to be a
complex region. It is not an easy place to understand. Geographically. it includes
the !;mcl mass eXlending from the Rio Grande (betwcen Texas and Mexico) 10 the
southern tip of South America. plus a number of Caribhean islands: a tOlal area
two and one-half limes the size of the United Slates. rh)'sical features present
sharp differences: from the Andean mountain range. stretching the full length of
western South America. to the tropical forest of the Ama7.on b"sin. from the arid
deserts ofnorthefll l\'lexico to the fertile grasslands of the Argentine pampa.
It is" land of great ethnic "nd demographic diverSity. The people of Latin
America cOl1t<'tin clements and mixlures of varied r<'tcial groups-native Indians.
U.S. Stereotypes of latin America
Some time ago. a plOminent agency fOI public opinion research conducted a
nationwide poll in which respondents were given a card with nineteen words on
it and asked to indicate which words best described the people of Central and
South America. The results were as follows:
Dark-skinned 80% lm<lginative 23%
Quick-tempered 49% Shrewd 16%
Emotional .,% Intelligent 15%
Religious '5% Honest 13%
Backward ..% Brave 12%
L.", 41% Generous 12%
Ignorant 34% Progressive 11%
Suspidolls 32% Efficient 5%
Friendly 30% No answer 4%
Dirty 28% No opinion 0%
Proud 26%
Since respondents were asked to pick as many descriptive terms as they liked.
percentages add to consider<lbly more than tOO.
From John J. John50n. Lorin Americ(l in Caricature (Austin: Universiry of TeltiU Pless. 1980J. p. 18.
I
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I \Vhr 1.11111 I\In. II. ,I
white Europeans. black Africans, ChinesC'. Jap<'tlle!'e, .ll1d iIll1llIgr.lll1.. hum .111
over the world. Nations differ imporlantl)' in pfll'ul;JI illll .. l.It (nr;J Iii !lClllg 111".11 h
five times larger than Argentin:l. for instanc('. ;Jnd Illllre Ihall 1('11 111111'" 1.11):1'1
than Chile). B)' 2007 the tolal pOJlulatinn of I.;llill AIII ('I i,.1 I..llll(' I" 111111<' lh.llI
550 million. compared with 30n million ill Ihe lI"ilcd ..
As an expression of Ihis cultural mosait". b ngU:lg"" .,hnt1llll. .'"pani"h I" ."1" .I-l1l
almosl everywhere. one might Ihillk--exCepl ill Brai'i1 (l'IHlllgllC"t'). p:lll "I lh('
Andes (Quechua. Aymara. ;1I1d 0ther 1.11lJ1,1I"gC")' the (:.11 d,lll.11l
(French. English. and Dutch). Mexicn kC'h olllldlg(l\flll"l.uI!:II.I!:'.j.
and Gilalemal" (over twrnt)' Indian l::Ingll:l){e").
Furthermore, Lalin Amcric;\Il !'oci<'I)' dl"pkly" 1111111",.,,1.. Iwl\\I" 11
rich and poor. between city ;lnt! country. hClwccn Ic;ll'lletl :Ill.! bel\\I'1'1l
the powerful lord of the Imciend" :'111<1 the dclerenli;Jl pt.,l".lIll, I>CI\\'('('II WI'.1111,,
entrepreneurs and desperale slreel urchins. 1.11i1l Illlllltle..
twent), n::ltions. large alld whnse re\.('111 ('xpericIHt' 1:I"1:e" lr'llil 1'111,1",\'
dict3torship to electoral (Ielnmracy 10 ;'l <:od:llisl rq:il11l': hnlltllllit ,lily. 1.lIm
America helongs to the v developing w0r1tl. hesel hy 111!>lt 'fit.' I :I,HI , fllllCtl, I'I" ,II \.
obstacles to rapid economic growlh. bUI here 11'0 there i.. divt'I!>lly 11'III,111C' "'l('
crop dependency of tiny Iiollduras 10 Ihe illdllslriall'rtltl1i"l' 01 tll'II.II'lIt Itl.lld
Throughout lhcir model'll history I.alin Amcrit,an<: h.lvt ""ughI. wilh gn.11t'1
or lesser zeal, to achieve political alltl ('conllmic ilHkpcnlll'lH t' 11"111 ,11111111,11,
imperial. and neo-imperinl pow('r". Tim". it I" hillcrh' 111.11 lilt' 1,111 ....(
Lati" Americn was populari7,('cl hy mid Ililleleenih \\hl' lholll:I'1
that since their culture. like Ihat ofSpnnish ,11ll1 P()llllgllt..., W.l"
(i.e. Romnllce language-!'peaking). Francf' lonld 11:11111 ""peri.ll lc.ltkl.hlJ'
throughout the continent.
CONTRAST AND PARADOX
As observations sugge!'t. L.1lin America resi"ls f,llilc 1;l1('l!flrii'atillll 11 1".1
region rich in paradox. This insight yields a numher of ill"tl'lIt.1lVC due"
First. Latin America is hOlh young ;md nld. RCl!inning ill I/IQ?,. il:o- I 1>\
the Spanish and Portuguese cre41ted a lotally new SIt( i.ll ordcr l).l!'cd Con donllll.,
tion. hierarchy. and the intermingling of European. AfriL.III. alHI indigellous
elements. The European intrusion profoull<lI)' ancl incl":ldiL.lhl)' ... llclcti
communities. Compared with the ancienl civilin!if'lll" of Affit.l ;lntl A"i.I. 111"""
Latin American societif's arc rclOllively young. On the nllH'r hnlld. 11111.;1 n:llioll" "I
Latin America obtained political indepcndellcc--froll1 Spain .llld I'nrlllj.;.d IlIlh('
early nineteenth century. more Ihan IOf) ye;'lrs hefmc .l:l1nt'ssfld .lllii. nlflill.d
This is a conservalivc cOllnl. 11 Itllof''' nnl ind",lf' Itlh1('. Frf'lIc-h (,111.1',",. \'''IOll.IlIW. I .","trl''''I
Martiniquc. English-spt'''king isbmls o( Ihe C"Jihh(';m, nr lhf' Itlllllllnn\\r.lhh "I I'"r,lo Ill... Ih,
orticiall"lly o(all enlities ill 1'''lin AlTIcr;l" ;,ntllhr (:l/ihl'('.HI to, '11
(19 J 0), Bolivia (!lJS2), alld Cuha (I ')5'), 1Il:llly as1'0: b 01 II aditiollal SU\. id)'
While the advent ufpulillGd dCIlHICI"h:Y in r.. ell! }' ...df... Jllighlluuk lik...,
<Ill ahrllpt dq)arlun.: from the past, underlying (')lllilltlilil"s [h.::r:.bt.
TIll' pull of history continues III bt' slrung.
Third, Latin Amcril"a has bt'l'lI both indepcndcllt and dl'j!l'IHklll, alllullO
IIUlllS alld subordinate. The adIk'Vl'1 Ill'lll of lJatiilllhoud l>y J ill ;111 hllt pariS 01'
tIlt' Carillbl'all ba:.ill rqJJ"l'sclilct! all a:.serliull 01" slIvcflJignl)' r(Jt)ktl ill
Elllighknment though!. Yd a nL'W lofln 01 flclLL'ir,llioll by l:Xll'rll,d jl\l\'Jers-llrst
Britaill alld Frann', tllt.'11 United Statl's-;l'op'lrdil'.t:d thb nationhood.
El:ullollliL and political \wakllL'ss vb:'1 vis Lurul'l' and Nnnh '\1l1<:rka
frcqucJltly lilllited Ill .... ch\lkes available 10 I.atin Alllt'/itan Wilhill
Latin AllIl'rica, 110wer is irunic.lIly ;Llllbiguous: it is tht' SllPI'l'IIll' nllllllludity, bUI it
has ulll)' a Iimih:d dft'("!.
Fourth, LatlLl J\mcrka is bUill ,If HI pllU'-. I:vl'r Sillu: Iht,
Conqm:st, till' n:gioll has bl'l'll .1::'.1 LlIHdotis In:a::.llrl' IhlIlSt' 01 ll,ltural
rl'sourn.'s. r.irst callie the Eurulw,lll 11I::.t Itolr ::.ilvn guld. TuddY Ihe urgl: Illay
be lor pt:'lruleulll, gas, (Uppl'r, irun urt:, cullct', ::'llgar, \lr luI' expandt'd
Iradt.' ill gt.'llt.'ral. but thl' image uf endlt.'::.::. wt'ahh rl'lll;tilb, III ::.I;lrtlillg u)lltrasl,
Ihat.' is also the pk-ture o(povt'rty: p,,-'asillits wurker::. wilhuut jub.\,
<'."Ilildrell withollt food, 11Iothl:'r::. withuut hopl:'. All 'lpllorisJlI \Ill rq)t'atl'll ill I.atin
AJllt'riL.l ::'lJlIllllarizcs this Sll'lll:': i\111I:rk.l i.\ a hegg.H ;,tup a JlIOllllt;lillOI
guld."
t)IlV l:'lll t'asily Ihlllk uf additiullal t.ulltr.t::.IS, but illuslrate tilt'
dirtkult)'- fa::.cinatiull -ill Iryillg Iu ("UIlIt' lu grip::. wilh .\llt11 LUlliplex and
cuntradktof)' rt'alities. Tu uJldl:'r.\laJld Latin i\lllerit"all hbtury alld so;,:kty n:<.juirts
a tlvxiblc, broad gaugt' appruach, and thb b wlwi we liner ill this I>uuk. \,Vt' draw
Oil tIlt' work uj many scholars, prl.\l'lltillg uur OWll illtt'q)rl'l;llioll, bUI also
alllu;,lilllillg thc rt:alier willi .dtl.:.'fll.llive vit'w.\,
Interpretations of Latin America
I'or gellt'[,llitlll::' lllu::.t ;lnal>,::.I::. 1.11' IllOt!l'l"Il I,alill /\lllt'l"Il,l tIlt" area'.\
I'ulitkal instability, Hlarked In,.'qUl:lltly Ly dictalur::.hip. Nurth '\IIH:fit,1l1 and
Ell ropean obst'fvt.'l"s were fasci n;lted by til rl:'C qucst iUJl.\: Why
ships? \-Vh)' not dl:'JI1uuacy? \'\/lly ::.0 IJlUC!l di::.urdl'l"? III 1 a prulllilll'lJt
Alilnicall sudal sdelltist ubservl:'d, ycar::. rull (Ill and Ihal: aris(' thl'
anxidies anJ disappuilltJllellts uf all ill-t'<.juippnl pl'uple: altefllJlting It) I:sl;lolish
trUt' republicaJl furms of goveflllllt"lll." i\ Britbli st.-hular also nutt::d tllat
puliticaillistury of tile re:pubJics has be:cll a n,:'("urd ofalternatillg periods ulliberty
and despotism." Implicitly assuming or explicitl)' asse:rting that thdr style: of
delllocracy is superior to all otlli:r models of politkal orgallizatioll, foreign
writers freljuelltly asked what was wilh Latin AJllerlt.;1. Or with Latin
Amcricans theillsdves.
What passed fur answers was fur mallY yt"ars a .juIllblt uf racbl 1'l'ithds,
PS)'dlOlogical simpliflcatiuns, geugraphic;l! platillllltS, and ulltural dislonhllis.
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in "I!ll'l tkvt.'lupillg arC.I:>, By lilt' .\Ialldard of natiunhuud, thereforl',
I:> ld.lli\'dy uld,
I ,Itlll i\IOtrk.l tllluUg!LOUt ib hi!>tury bl:l:1I bUlh tUIllUltuuuS
,llltl.\I.lIJIt-. 'I !It'l \IIHpll'SI hcgan a If.ldiliull nfpoJitkal vioknce that has crupted
III anlle:d IIlUVt'lliellb, military intcrventions, and (more
1.ll'l'ly) lde:ulugical ell":Olllllt'rS bl'lween liberalism, positi-
\'1'>11), allarlhblll, sucialislll, ":UllIllllJllislll, fascism, and religious
hlllg'> lit VVl'l")' dOl"Il"ill,t1 hue havt.' sh.lrpt'llnl tht' intcn::.it}' of struggle.
I k:>jlllt' tlH' dilft.rillg flll"lll:> tlf pulitil;d conJlict, uld sucial <lnd economit: struc-
Illl ,''> 1I""t' 1':vl'l1 wllt'rt' IIIUtkrll have struck, as in t\J1cxico
R PART ONE ANn CONTEXTS
According to such views, L.,tin Amcrica could not achicve democracy because
dark-skinned peoples (I ndians and blacks) were unsuited for it; because passionate
Lalintempers would not stand it; hecause tropical climates somehow prevented it;
or because Roman Catholic doctrines inhibited it.
E.,ch charge had its refutation: dictatorial rule nourished in predominantly
white countries. such as Argentina, as well as among mixed-blood societies. such as
Mexico; it appeared in temperate climes, such as Chile. not only in the tropics, such
as Cuha; it gained support from nonCatholics and non practicing Catholics, while
Illany fervent worshippers fought for liberty; and, as shown by authoritarian
regimes outside Latin America, such as Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Soviet
Union. dictatorship is not restricted to any single temperament. Such explanations
did not merely prove to be inadequate. When carried to extremes, they helped
justify rapidly increasing U.S. and European penetration-financial, cultural.
military-of the '"backward" repuhlics 10 the south.
Th" scholarly scene improved in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when North
Americ"n social scientists formulated "modernization theory." As applied to Latin
America. this approach held that economic growth would generate the social
change that would in turn make possible more developed" politics. The transition
from a rural to an urban society would bring a change in values. People would
begin to relate to and participate in the voluntary organizalions that authentic
(.lemocracy requires. Most important, a middle class would emerge-to play both a
progressive and moderating role. L.,tin America and its citizenries were not so
inherently from Europe and North America. Instead they were simply

Modernization adepts thought the historical record showed this process was
well under wa), in Latin America. One optimistic U.S. scholar maintained in the
1950s that the "middle sectors" had "bccome stabilizers and harmonizers and in
the process have learned the dangers of dealing in nbsolutc postulates." Similarly.
the ;luthor of a latc 1970s history textbook saw "I.atin Amcrican history since
independence as moderni7,ation growing slowly against thc resistance of old
in."tilutions and
Reality, however. proved harsher. Instead of spreading general prosperity,
economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s generally made income distribution more
lInequnl. The gap in living standards lJetween city and countryside grew. The
middle strata, relatively privileged, forged a sense of "class consciousness" which,
in crilicalmoments of decision. led them to join the ruling classes in opposition to
the popular masses. Politics took an authoritarian turn, producing military
governments. And in stark contradiction of modernization theory. these patterns
emerged in the Inost developed-and most rapidly developing-countries of the
continent. What had gone wrong?
Two sets ofnnswers came forlh. One group ofscholars focused on the cultural
traditions of Latin America and their Spanish and Portuguese origins. These
analysts argued, in effect. that antidemocratic politics was a product of a Roman
Catholic and Mediterranean worldview thaI stressed the need for harmony. order,
I" \Vhyl.llI1lAIIWI!t.I
J
'/
and Ihe elimination of conniel. I.atin Alllrric;l's Cflll ... lillllil'II'" WI'It' IUT('I .1'.
demncnltic as they appeared. parly politics wns nol ;1" rt'l'n'''clll.ltin' :1" it IIlIgh!
have looked. The North !\mcriC;1n and Ellrnpc;11l nculcllli(. (1l1l1l11111l1ty, :1(111\ It'd
hy its own myopia and bi;1ses, hnd simpl)' misrcad Ihl' soti;1ll.h I...
A second group of scholars accepled lllodC'rnizat i(11l thel u'y .. lillk ing III ""N I"
economic causes wilh polilk";11 oulcomes hl11 turncd the ;111"",n l1p..idc d"wl1
I.atin Amcrica's economic devel0plllC'llt W;1" <Jlmlit:llivd)' tlirklTlI1 fl"IH Ih.II 01
North America and West Europe, and Ihcrdf)rr il pmdllt I'll tlifkn'nl pohll<.11
results. Specifically, these scholars nrgll("(1, l.;1tin Allwrio" nl't'til'tllI' W.I" .11"11'1
Illincd hy the pervasive ("cl o(its et"(ll1(llllk 11("1'C'I1II("nll'. "H\ (!cpellllnu \', .''''1'11''
exponent of Ihis viewpoil1t h;1" expl.lined,
we mC;Jn;J situation in wh1f..h Ihc ('lOIlOIll\' of (1"'11:1111' "Imlnl"''' ... , "11111111'1\1"'.111\
Ihe de\'elopmcnl and ('xpano;:;oll IIf ;1llullH'1' ('.lIlIOI1l\' In wh .. h lilt' (IHIIII'I I',
suhjeclcd. Thc rciatiOil nf inlcn1('IWIUI('n\c Il('lwCCII ('I' 111"1(' 1'\.1'11'111111'''.
and betwecn thelic :lIu1 world 11:J(Ic. a.... mll('.. 1111' j'lrin .,1 ,kll('lI,IcIl'I' wh,,,
sollle cOllnlries (Ih(' <lom"':!ll1 f"l11(.' .. 1 '.lll ('\I'and and hI"' ..tll "".. I.lIIll11g. h'llIlt
olher COUlllries (the t1cl1<'mlcnl nIlC<;) \",11I tl.. Iii ... nnl)' ,I" ,1 ,rlk, 11"11 .. r lh."
cxp.u1sion, which ("an h:l\'(' I"'if!l('r a 1'1''''11\'1' HI a lII'ga I1",' r1lc\ I "II IIlf'll 11ll11\f',II,II,
dc\'c1opl1ICllt.
By ill' intrinsic charadeI', gell(,I.lle,l"p'I>lllllf'ljlll
ties, :lllocating benefits to sectors p,lrticil',lIing inlhc gloh;11 ,HHI
them 10 other groups. !n a cnunlr)' wilh ahlllld,lIli 1,lI1d, Inr c\,lIlll'k. the 111'1""
class elite might reap Inrgc prnfits from agricullnr.d export;.. while work(.r...IlId
peasants would gain or nothing al ;111. Ikt ,llI"'C 01 their illlerc.. t III
the st;ltuS quo, Iandowilers wnuld have liltle IcnSlln In invest ill di\'{r.. itlt alion .. I
Ihe loenl economy-thus trc:lting:l Sitll;llil'" dl.lr,hl('ri/l'(1 .1" "glll\\'til \\'111i"lll
dcvclopmcnl.
n
When growth hl.:(Urfet!, 11I0reover. it ',\'0111<1 10(' Vulllel',lhll' In ,,"h
stantia I risk: if overseas lll;1rkets (ont rnclcd or I'ril'('s tI('dillcd, 1h(' ('1\t in' ('t 011(111)
would suffer. In other words. prll'ipcl'i!y wa." depclHlclll 111\ 1'.1,1(11''' :lIld dt'( Iw,n...
well be}'ond the control of nati(ln;11 ;1l1lhnriries.
The proponents of a... it quickly 1,1111l' III h(' knllwll.
maint;1inecl that economic del'endency led I,) pnlili(al ;Hllhlllit ......
According to this view, Ihe Inl;1tion Ilf 1.;1lin ,\mclit',I's ('(11l1ll1111'"
placed inherent limitations on the reginn's capacity for grllwlh, t'spe< i:llly ill
industry. The surest sign of Ihis eCClllomil Irnuhle W:1." a (ri"i ... n Ihe fllll"'lj..:1l
"ccollnls-the coulllry's ahilil)' to pa}' for ncctletl illlpprt'i. Expoll" I.Igget!
behind imports, and the difference could nnl}' he IlI,U!c up h}' (.apital inn.,\\. Ihlt
the foreign banks. inlernatinnni ;1gencic:- such .IS the \VllIl.1
Bank-denied the necessary exira financing hecause they hdic\'cd th(' gm'ernllll 'lll
could not impose the necessary "s;\criliccs.
n
Politic;11 str;11egy fell hn"tagr III th.
need to convince the foreign creclilors.
The most frequenl solution in the )lJ611s ;lIlt! !lJ70.. wa".1 lIlilll.lf)' <nil I' '1 ht'
resulting diclatorship coulcllhcll lake it" -h.mr t1eCl"ion.., mll.llly highl}' tllll'"I'1I1.1I
1\1 1'.\1<1 tiNt .. (}lJl. ... JIt)N...
,1111. 11111.111011 lIh.'.I:.t1ll:'. hit Wl'rt' the lower c1asst":.. 11lIpkillentation of such
pUhl..ll::' tlll'ldwl' 'l'lillircd a ht''lvy h.tIId owr till: pupular se..::ton. Thus. the ..::uups
,!llli rqllt....:'>ivt, aUlhorilarian rt'gillles that t.1I1lrgt'd in BnlZii. Argt.'ntina, and ChiJe
l.lllll alltllit lltll III :.pitc ul I.at i.1 Alllt:>rka's ecunolllic dcvdopmcnt, bUI because of it.
Within thb uwr;dl l'unkxt, thc cycle of democratization
lhrlluglh.ut thl' rq;,iull 1..:.1lIght many experienced scholars-by sur-
I)' ':'l. LII tlll'I.IIt.' J97U:., Ctllintry .IftlT (tH'lltfy replan'd authoritarian regimes
w.tll l iVI!I,I11 Il,llk.:'> .Jlld dntnl gU\ .... nllllellb. Explalhltiuns lor this trend look llIany
!t'IIII:.. <. >.Ill' hJ hI;." dominanl and 'lIunulithic. authoritarian regimes GlmC to
dl:'I'I.I)' .1 llt-.II ul illluht.r.... lIl..L' .lIld Iragility. Everyday citizens ro:.(" up ill protest
,,\1,\ ..:I.WIII.... 10' 111l'l1 l iV11..: urg.llliz.ltHJlb, ,Ind demallded popuJar elections.
C.. 1I11101l1nl Ill' .... \'t're el..:CJnullliL crisis, peuplt' Irum Argentina and Chile to Central
AIIllfh...1 l')"pre:.:. their polilical right:.. Whether or not these new electoral
IlIlIy MdemlX.r.ltk," a point thai led to much debate, they represenled
I.1I ... idlr.lhk Implovl'lI1etlt O\'el" Ihe hlatantl)' dictatorial jXHterns of previous eras.
SI..IIIII .. I'> .11)!)nlOll..lll'd tlh."Sl.' devdopllll'IlIS with intellectual caution. Instead of
1.1I11l lulIg gr.lIIl! Ihl'orilAs, :.udl .IS 1II0dc:rlliz.ltiun ur dependency. analysts
... 1I l nl till' role HI bdid:.. idl3:., ;llld hllllhill (OllVitlion. Some interpreted the turn
10w,IIli dl .. ItJ......a...), III I..llin J\lIlt.rk.J and a:. a glubal triulllph of U.S.
V.dtll... ...,d.lIly III light 01 Ille (ullap:.e ul the Suvil't Union (and the discrediting
1I11\1.lr)"i .. 1 idlulogy). Uthl'l:' .... Illph.l:.iznlthe impurtance of leadership and la(tical
111.1.lllIVl'", .11 lIlt' dill' Il:'vd. Stili olher:. the I..'mergl..'nce of Mdvil society."
e:,pl'll,dly Illl' I1l't wurk:. of gr.ls:.ruot:. urgallizul ions that gavl.' shape and coherence
It Illli aUllu.ril.lIi.lll And il null'd, 100, that ideological traditions
11,... 1 eVl'r .. HI...l' lhl' IH2U:. emhrined till' ideal of demucracy as a widespread
a,,/llfflfllJ11 1..1Iin AlIleril'''1, I..'WIl if it had been systelllatkally denied
luI' .lll..hl .. ... 1111 llId.
1: ..... J1]lIl1l1l IJI\/:'>PL'l1:. bnghll'lled a:. \\'eli. Under pressure from international
IllllJllgholit tILe !YXU:.. l.alin AIllf'rkan Il'aders imposed far-reaching
.lniglll'd tll -IiIJer.t1izl." their nalitllwl ecoJlullIir.:s-rcdudng lariffs and
b.1l1 kl:. 10 tr.Ldl:, :.cllilig :.Ialc suppurted l'olilpanies 10 private investors. and
dllt.lilillg ddil'it Inllatiull dedilll'li alld foreign investment incrt.'ased. As
:L rC"'lIlt, in Lalill America rOSt' from a scant 1.5 percent per year in
19M:' 10 3.2 pl.l ... enl ill the !lJ9Us. BlIttlte ullexpected Ollset offiunncial crisis in
tvkxi...u ill l.lll' JYl).J and ill Brazil ill l'ady and Argentina's disastrous
l'lunlllllic lllllal':>c ill 20tJl, led tll dbendl<.lntlllt'nt ami confusion. Hopes for
l"\..UlllIlllIl. dn'dupllll;."111 pkkl'llup !rOIil 2U04 thruugh 2007. ",hell overall growth
l;\l'l.... ded 51'1..'1'0.:\.'111, but the glubal el'onolllic crisis of 2008-09 brought this
jlo:.itivc ph.ISl' to;1 and sudden t'nd. Once again, the economic outlook for
L.ltill Alllt'r1l';1 W.I:. plagued by Illlo;.>rtaiJlty and doubt.
Wnhin el'onolllil' realm. SOllll' expl'rt:. rt'garded Ihe growth spurt of the
l'.I.I}' I"Nth ,I:. Vi'hlil.ltiull 11)1' rree-market 1>oliC}' reforms. Others
Ilokl! th.11 the :.urge tellded to rdlect Ihe ebb and flow of international invest-
IlIl'lIb, .1lIl! l'apital promptl)' vanbhed ill the fact' of crisis-leaving Latin
i
I
i
t
1 Why Lilm AlIl..-rica? II
AlIlerica ;ust as "dependent" as before. lJl (tllliinttilig I..UII(ll'II, for lllan)'. was thl'
probklliatic relationship between l."COIIUIllk ;Ind poliliGl1 tr.lll:.ltlrllwtiun. Dul;.":'
economic liberalization lead to political JemocraC)'? Or 'Hight it be tilt: otht."r \"ay
around? Recent developnll'llb in AlIll'fil:a thu:. r;lIse new qUl'stiuliS alld POSl'
t."Olitilluing intellectual challenges.
Analytical Themes in This Book
Thb book i:. a survey 01 Latin /\II1"'l'Il,11I hi:.tory. IIl1t ,I lonllul.II.011 ul :'Ul i.1I
theury, but we cannot t"SGlpC thl' Ilel'd lUI .1 LlIIH.l.'l'tual 11.11lIework ill
approaching our malt"na!. Froll! llludl..'llli,.tIIUIl lhl'ul)' \\t.' born.>\-.' 1\"'0 (t.ntr.1I
ideas:
the causal premise that CCOIlOllll( tr..lII:.ltu intluu;, l'hange..
which. in turn. lead to polilicall..:unsc<llll'IlUS; and
the related idea that shifting alli.lnCt."s alllung SOl.i.11 d.lss group:. giVt.'
to changing pallcms of politKal (olllll( t OWl' lillil'.
I'or Ihes.... reasons, each of our CiIM' :.ludy l .111 U\ el vil'w :.edion un
Me(onomic growth and sodul chang.... Ihat prt'l..edn till' db(Il:. ... lllll 01 !,ulilk:.:
While till' original depcmlclIlia ;Ippro.ldl has long :.illl'l' dbapp....lrcd Inull
;Kudl'mk fashion, we still regar<1 it:. f.alll .... work a... ,I u...dul heuristi\. devkl.
Accurdingly. we adopt tht" notions 111.11'
a country's place in the inlel"llatillll;l! divbJoll til I.tllol' ddim"s till' :.hapl' ul
availablt' paths to economic gruwth;
functional location on the Mpt'riphery vf till' world :I:. dist ilKl frU.ll
the commercial-industrial \."elltcr." alld dl'vd")IUllI'1l1 al a :.I.lgl whell the
Nurlh Atlanlic was already f,lr advillll:wl, 1I1t';tlll that l'... Ollomic
transfurmations in Lalin i\u1l'rio..a wlIu[.1 !II' dilll.'I ...ul trom pattern:.
travt=rsc:d earlit:r in Europe.: alld Nvrth Amcllca;
these differences in t:conolllic would produce dincrl.llt lorlll:. t)1
su...ial change-with fur example, to the nalure of Iht'
classes, Iht urban and rural wurking and th.... rt.latiunship alllong
these classes;
this combination of sucial alld et.onul1Ii ... lon.:e:. would ddllll' the uption:.
available to politiGlllcadt'rs .lntl hl'ip expl.lin the ;;lller,lliOli of dl'moaatic
and authoritarian regimes;
within these constwint:., some Latin }\111.... lilall Llluntrit.':'llJd much bdtcr
than others in C'xpluiling thl'ir UWII f'e.)UlIru:. (nped.llly ... gricultural) for
economic development.
'Our 300lc exception IS MexII.\) (eh,ll'lel J), ",llel .. Ille lle\'ululll/1l ui 1<)10 cxcllcJ 30udl a 3otfOll!)
IllOllen....: 011 lhe llation's development .11,11 Wl' dUJM" 'v cllll'luy OJ Jllkrl'nl fUrlllJI
12 1'1\ In ONE AND I .. \\'Il\' 1.111'1 1\111' II,,'
1 ,
In this l...onlexl. it is essenli;llto (he great varialinns in rCSOllrces.
capacities. and circulllstances or nations in the region. Those with large popula-
tions :01(1 diversifie(l natur;11 resnurces (Mexico and llrnil) were eventually ahle to
llndert;1kC' suhSI;1nti;1\ progr;1l1lS Clr industri;1!iz.lIion, Those with essential raw
nwteri:ds. such ;IS petroleum (Vellewela) an<l natural gas (Rolivia). managed at
limcs 10 henefil rrom rising priccs on world markets. Elsewhere. lhe presence or
copper anel other induslri;11 mel;1ls (Chile and Peru) led rordgn companies to
eSlahli<:h large-scale mining operations, And in lropical ;1nd scmitropical areas.
wndil i'lns or c1imatc and soil cncouragccllhe cultivalion or sugar (especially in the
Cnrihhe;ln) Ihat rise 10 whal we rdel" tn as "planlation A key
challenge ror all countries or the region has heen how 10 trOl., ... fol'ln Ihe earnings
fr<,llll commodity exports inlo processes or economic diversification "nd sdr-
sllst"illing devehllHllCnl.
111 olher words. we intend to examine Ihe relationship hetween sociely.
culturc. economics. and polilics within ;lIl inlernational cOlltexL We helieve Ih:ll
this :lpproach call he applied to the clltire modern era. We shall he looking for "uch
COlllleclions Ihroughout the honk,
We limilation!' in Ihis (or ;1ny) approach. We helieve Ihat
hi<:hlric.al arc cOlllplex proces!'e!". and to under!'tand Ihem we
need tll adopl a Idea... and ideology. for example. not
merely adornment ... or superstruclure!"; they importMlt efrects on the
perceplion", attitude!'. and action!' or lhe people wh(l m;tke history, Anyollc
who has ever tried 10 compMC the polilicallraditions nr Argentina ancl Brai"i1
can vouch for this truth. Demographic factors, such ;1S rapid population
growth. also have rar-ranging social and political dfecls, In om porlrait or
Latin American society. we hope 10 integrale an "inlel'llational political
eCOIlOlll)'" "pproach with consideration or cultural and other noneconomic
force",
Our nnrrativi,' begins hy descrihing flrstthc Conquest and Ihe colonial p<"riod,
1492-UU:'. when L.1Lin America entered Ihe periphery or the capit;1list world
syslcm through suhordination to Spain and Portugal. \,\'e then descrihe how the
(lisnlption or Ihis connection led 10 independence. rollowed by a phase or ecn-
nomic "nd politinll consolidation hetween 1830 and 1880,
The core or the book presents in-depth case studies or long-Ierm transit ions
rWIll the nineteenth century Lo the present. \Ve have dcliherately adoptet'l a
longiludinal focus on individual nations (or cluster!' or nOll ions) in order to
facilitate Ihe detection and ;lnalysis or historical over time. In addition.
the maleri,,1 in this section provides empiric;1\ evidence for testing. evalualing.
and crealing hroad conceptu;ll frameworks (an)' theoretical framework.
we insist. not only Ihe ones that we employ here), C.haplers appear in the
rollowing order:
to Mexico. a close neighhor 10 the Uniled States. the scene of a majnr popular
I1phc;,w:l1 ill 1910;
Central America :lnd Ihe (:al'ihl1(':lII. ,lle,I" lh.I',I<lnl/c,1 1,I.Inl,"I"11
economics and American domination II geogl ,Iphll .11 111111... ,II"
properly reg,lrtled as "itll(" WC' l.ltf11 Idn I,. ,III ,.1 1.,1111
America OlS a
Cuha. an isl;1lld so dependelll on sugar :lnd III Ille 11,'1111.1 ... 1.. " ,', II"
one l.<ttin American !'ncit'ly lhat h,l" undngllllt' ,I lull IInlgctl ...." 1,111""
revolill ion;
The central Andes (Holivi.!. l'elll, h'l.ltlnt), ,I \\'1111 ... 11"'11:
indigenous tradilion:- and 1111<.crl;,in <;.Iep<: 10W,ll' I ... , ,II.d IIy .111' I 11.111' .nIH"" I.
Colomhi:l. a 1l.llioll whel"!""\lnlililal IIc'lll" I,ll r l.w\i ... l... \.111l /'\1"11""\'" ,1111):
I rarricking ill an al Illmp!lere of "ystetlli( vi, Ikl1l c;
Velle7.uela. a wllrld-cl:lss l'fl1l1111.-l'r lit "ii willI ,1 "11 tlli'l I\' ... 1.ll,k Iw" 1',111\
democracy Ihal h:ls given \\'a}' Itl :\lIt!lnrilal.... 11 nde":
Argenlina. a t:/llllIII'Y hy I"erlil(' '1I11ll'llldllllt\"t' 1',11"1'.1<,. wl,,,1 ,t!I,\
internal strire alld mililary inll'rvl'tlll"n hd"I" Illl' rl', f'll1 r' ... lr'III'II.III .,1
Ilclnocl"acy;
Chile.:I leading "Ollrle or IIl1r,lIl'''' ,mol ,111'1,,'1 ,11111 Ih. ",1,' "I ,HI ,11-"",\,
sod"li"t experimenl, allli
Hrai"i1. all expan<:ive n,llil)n <:CI well klHHVtl IIII II .. It.I.11I",tl.II 1'1111'11,1"'" ,'1'
(olTce and, 1110re re\,.('nll)', II,> 1,11'"1 mlltl ... IIl,11 .. n"h ,1111'.1 ., ,I, Ill'" ,_,I"
politic"llr.lnsitiou,
\Vc give rull considcralinn III <:Oli.ll and plllllh.d Ih("IHC... III ,'\n\, "lie 01 Ill/' ,I'
studies. and each chapler t:;11l he re.IlI11Hlcl'clIl!clllly
1\ suhsequent "rrefS an,ll}'l i, 011 ")'lllhC'<:e<: ,111.1 ( hIe t 11"1'1"1
reviews econolllic sl nile! pnlil ic,,; .lnlliller Ill.11 C'" 1',lllelll'" "I I" ,I,t" .11
Ir:l1lsrnnnalion within comparal ive \If'r,pc, t i\'c; I he IhI I'd "lid 1111.11 (' ...... 1\' , "Ill Illd,",
1he h"ok wil h an CX;llllinal i, III of IInl illn,11 ,-, ill IIt c' .... illlcllc, 111,11 t lCll' k ,I tI, I j, II 11" ."
artislil expression.
hook orrer." :1 pictllre or I ,al in 1\ l11el"l,':111 "'4 'l 1<'1 \'. lH11 .1 llelllllI1"" , ,11.11, 'J: ,,j
raCI<:. Our goal is 10 Ir:lce paltern" .llul IrcIlIl .. lh.l1 Iwll' II'" II' IIIUlf'l<,I,11111 Ill,'
(omplcxilies and varialions in I.alin Amcri... a'!, p.llb... III the 1'lr""1l1 \\',' h"I'''- "III
preselllat ion will stilllulate ,Iisnl<:<:illll .Ind tkhall' ..llltl Wt' c"lwll I h,lt c;1 'II knl ... ,lIlt I
colleagues will disagree wilh mallY of nllr illterprdnlilln... Aho\'(' ,III. \\T \\,1111 I"
introduce our readers to tile excitC'lllenl and r:l"dn:lli')l1 of Ih,' hi,lnl)' ,,1.111,111'.1
thnl is intriguing in its own and h,l<::l vitnllolc III I,I.IY "" Ihe \\'"dol ... L'f'
2
The Colonial Foundations
H
l"hlll\..d Il.L1nll.....I ltllllllll":>1 .llld have
... h.ld.. \\., UVl'r lJlodt'lll !..llill j\lllt'ril,..l. I hrec (,.{'IlIUrlC::. of IInperl;l1 rull'
llllill kd lit'l'l' .11uIIMIIIIIlI wlIund:. 011 Lull tlf Ih,,-' region, hierarchical
t l,l.lll. HI,IIII'" \ II dlll.J(HHI .llld dl'I'l:lldI:"IH::y. "'he power ofcAternal alilhorit y-
Jlllll.III)' IUll'lll', 1'lll'l Ulllh,'d tu be ar..cepkd .Iml n:jcclt'd.
1I!JllIll,d .llId k.lll'd. ,Ill .1I11blV.t1l'nt lIb)"'Cl 01 and l..'ono:rl1. At the
.... lllll 1IIIIt', Il t 'Hlll l'l'i::.II,ll... 01 11..1 inju::.tkc :lIltl n:bellion again:)t
..11111 h"lltlt'.tlhnll'l'.'>.::.lllIg III pupul..r IJC:lllil)'. persoll:.J1 pnll ......111<.1 col
lnll\\' ..dl \'lllpIIWL"lllh:lll. Anlill ;llld tnumph. pruccc::.st::' or mutual
,1\!J" .. lllWIlI .llId .IHUIIIIlIO\l.ltlull 1II,llk II possible lor European colonizer::., indi-
).:1'1\.111.. I'\'llpl\'", ,lilt! Illlpurkli !\trit,lll ::.1.IVI'::' 10 furgt' (Ulllpll.:X ::.ucielk'::, with
It)hlld Il.I,lll .. m::., \'llUIIHUll::. t'lll'lgy, ,IJld JiJllit!ts::. ..::;:tpadty fur (h.llIgl.", Althuugh
llldl'l'l'lIllt'llt fl.ttIWI .. would LIlt.:f ::'t'paratl" paths, tht'y all reveal 111 .... lin-
gl'llllf-',dll" h ut Ihl .. tUIUllial ":Xp\'I"lI'IIt"t',!\::' till" ::.lory uf I.atin Ameril.l ullfolds, Wt:
1'llltJllllh'1 I'Jldln.. 1.1I1'S lit' trlaliv.... adaptation 10 illauspidoll::' drClll1lSlalKl'.
t'lIdllllllg .lIld upllllllig tnl.lllll'nb 10 hUl1JaIi lunitude allll
PRELUDE TO CONQUEST
\,'In'll 1.111"1'1',111:' h'.lllJI.-ll pll-::'1:1l1 d..l)l..ltiIlAlIlerica.they fuund llirt'\.' important
I.-Ivlli/.ltll,n..: 1\1.1)'.111, Al.k....llld 11ll.J,Il. That w\.' :.huuld ::.till callthl.." native peoples
1,1 1111.. Ill"III:.!,llt"ft' Illdi.lll" pel pduate::. tile ... rrur of sixlt.'enth-celliliry Spaniards
wh" h.llltnitu Iwilt'W tltl')' h.ld rl'.ldlnl tht' SpIU: rich Indies,
lltl.-' l\1.lY.ln I'l'Upil'. whtJ VI-Clipit'd the Ylicitt:in Penin:.ula, ,:,ollthern Mexico,
.llltllllU:.1 ,,( pi 1.-".. ,'111 d.ty CU.lh:III.d.l. to build their civiIi1.... 11ion around 500
tH ,I. rhl' 1t .....1 1.llIlOll.:. <llhic"Vl"IIll.-'llb ut tllb gruup wcrt: cultural-nol only the
hlllldlllg ull'xqllblk 11.-'1 II I'le.:. hUI abu l'iolll:t:ring .. l.. ....umpli:.hnwllts ill .Jr.... hilcUure.
"ltdplltlt', I',li II II Ill-), llil'l'ogl),l'hk writing, 11l.ltht:matics, a.:.trulloIllY, and chroll
"logy (ill\llldlllg thl' lllVl'lltitlll III lall'ndal':"). Nunnally into a seril,s uf
1 Till' Cululllal FUlllUl.llltlll1> 15
independent dty-states, some with pupulatiuns ul 20U,000 uf Ilion:. tit .... May.lll::'
developed a complex social order. For rcc,,::,oIlS ulliulown, da:.::.il MaY'llI suciety
collapsed. falling victim to domination (972-1200) and thl'lI 'Iusorption (I20U
1540) by Toltec invadt:rs frum the (c;'ntral M .... xi(J,1I highland::.. Yt't. till' direct
descendants of the Molyans haw sUl"viwd in southern Mcxitu illld Guaklll.d.1
down to our own day.
Mexico's spacious central vi.lllt:y ewntually became Ihe :'1::11 of Iht' A7kl
empire, Ollt' of the Chichimcc tribt'::. Ihal Glint' flUIII the IUlllh to subdue Ihe
Toltecs ill the.: lwelfth and thirtee:llth centuries, the AztlC:. t'ng.lgcd in comtant waf
wil h their nt'ighbors, nnally construt"ting Ihe c..-ity ofTenochtlll.in .lruulld 131') (VII
thl' site of contemporary Mexico City), After gaining (Ol1t rul of th.... elltirt' vall!::)' vI
Me:xico, they created a major empire-une that wa::. just t'l':Khing its peak :I:.
Columbus tOllched shore ill the Ciribbe:lll,
Aztecs were fur th.... ir military urganization alld prOwt'ss at l'erl'lllunial
cit),-building, Their art, exc.... pl fur their haunting puetry, W.IS inkrior ill suhtldY
and aaftsmanship to that of many other ancient tvkxiC:lIl t..ivilizatiolls,
In its final form, Aztec soddy was rigidly stratified. At the hUllolll Wl'rl' slaw::.
anJ .. t the top was a hereditary nobility. Education. rn.lrriag1.:. and labvr wert'
meticulously programmed. Land wa:. OWIlCJ individually by buth c..UIIII110nCfS and
nobles, but communities also shared lhe fruits of laml held cOllllllunally.
Hereditary rulers. such as MuctewllW II. ccxercisl'd illlmen:'l' political power.
Dc-spitl' centralization uf authority. however. conqucrt.'d ::.t:.lks in neighbOring
areas were not incorporatt'd into lhe t'mpire. The)' were treated as trilmk-p.I)'ing
vassals. Smile-notably nearby TlaxGlla-retained tlleir illdl'pt'ndcllCc but kept ull
a perpetual sl.lIe of \Val' with Tcnochtitl:in, Onl' rea:.on fur thi:. w.lrfare was 1hal thl'
Aztec rdigion required human sacrifkt:. and prisuners (If war (nuld bt: sel"vccd Ill'
for bloody ritual::.,
Incas adopted a vcry different p;lttern of organization, Theil' cllIpirt' Slrcl..:hcd
for 3000 miles along the Andt's, from Ilorthern Ecuadur Ihrough Pau to soutlll'rtl
Chill', and into the interior <1::. well. After cunsolidating their hold ill th.... Clll.CV
Valley in Peru, the Incas began expanding their empire ill the l"arly 14UO::. and
continued until the Spanish COllllllcst in 1532. (The tcrnl/lll"fl ruler or king
and abo rcrus to the people of Cuzco.) Once dc:feated, groups became inlt:gr..ll
parts of the empire. To strengthen suppurt for lhe l'mpcror. or Inca. local
from cUll<luered areas were brought to Cuzco tn:";.lLed as roy.ll while
resistant elements in recently conqut:J'l"d zones were trall::.ferre:d to cuntrollell
by loyal followers. Political powc;'r bdonged to a tightly organized. highly disci-
plined bureaucracy. with teams of local official::. on the bOIlOI11 alld a :.ingle
supreme: ruler at the top. Incas wen: thereby able to command ellel..liw authority
over most of the Andes.
Incas were master enginct"rs, building a vast ruOld (fur hUlllall and
3llimaltransit. since they did not ust: the whed). all intricate irrigatiull::'YSIl'Ill, and
impressive terraced agriculture on mountainsides, They maintained vast gwnarit's
thilt supported their armies, as well as local populatiolls ililillll":' 01 failed harwsts,
1(, I ONI: ANI) CONTEXTS
The Incas ;111'0 excelled in textile design and in treating head injuries, the laller
lllO\d(' possihle hy eXlranrllinary skills at trepanning Ihe human skull.
Aside from the Mayans, A7.lCCS, and Incas, there were many othcr nalive
ndllll'eS, In Ihe nren of modern-day Mexico alone, there werc over 200 dillerent
linguislic groups. Estimates of the si1.e of Latin America's indigenous popul;ltion
h:we v.. ried widely. Olle scholar has set the figure at 90 to 112 million, with .10
million each in cenlral Mexico and Peru. Though this calculation may he too high,
it i .. cleM that by Europc:m stnndards of the I.. tc fifteenth cenlury, indigellous
sodetiC'<; h;ld grown very "H'ge. Then the Spnniards .. rrived.
The EuropeClIl Context
Eun\l\c's of America (lhe Indians presulllnhly knew where they were)
w..... pari t\f lhe remarkahle European expansion in the fiFteenth century. Europe
w.. s coming to know the rest of the world, as its navigators .. nd explorers pmhed
h:1Ck the fmllliers of then-current knowledge of the glohe. Fly Ihe early 1600" Ihe}'
h:HI woven a nelwork of cOllllllunications all the way .. round the earth. and had
e"!;lhli<;hed Ihe economic llolllinance that would shape thc modern worlel.
This hurst of Eurnpenn expnnsion was m.. de possihle hy a combination of
f:HJors. Onc was lechnic;!1 skill. Pilotage and navigation were Ilotahk ex:nl1ples, as
was the <lhilily 10 <lclapl wastal ships 1o Ihe ch<llknges of the open oce:lIl. Another
eX<lnlple was weap{mq'. which was 10 fortify Ihe Europeilils againsl the oc..:.. .<:iol\-
ally Well-<ll'llled nntive peoples. ns in Mexico.
A SCCll11d fnclor was the economic hase, which furnished capital fnl the
maritime ami milital)' ellierprise. Technology alone was not enough. Viking<; hnd
shown Ihe technical ahility to reach America but lacked the resources to carr)' out
selliemcill ilno coloniza!inll, which required men .. nd money. In short. the New
\Vnrlcl WolS not to he hnd hy speClllrllors of small reSOl1J'ces or Iimitcd purpose,
Third, Ihere had to he a European rower inleresled in more than technical
l'xpertise and profit. It h<ld to he ready to purSllC Ihe unknown with exCel'IiOlWI
tIelerrll illal iOl1. and I'ortllgal fit Ihis descript ion. These Cit holic mon;lrchies.
wllh their ide,,1 of converting heathen masses to the Irue religioll. had a
unitl"e motivnlion. in p.. rlicular had come late tn the consolidation of its
tcrritOf)' against the Muslims who had ruled the Iherian Peninsula since the eighth
centur),. Portugal, although earlier rid of Muslim rule, was equally cOlllmitted to
Ihe militanl spread of the Christian faith. Their holdness set a precedellt for
Europe;ln intruders into Latin Americil over the nexl four cenluries. However
much Latin AllleriGl. struggled, it was to remain an extension, al limes a contra-
diclion. of the Europe thai had sailed west in the fifteenlh centlll)'.
COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA
It was no ..:oinddence that ColumbllS reached America in the ),ear that thc
Spaniards liquidatcd the lasl Moorish slronghold in Sp.. in. Thc reconquest down
fhe Iherian Peninsula S:l.\V Ihe w<lrring Christian nobles .. cquirillg land ;lnd Ihe
r
crown slrengthening its politic,,1 cnnlrnl. The l('<;1l1l hy 111')) \V.I":1 llnhiltl\' .l1I,1
would-he nohility for more conqlle<;t". aod a lnlWll re,uly I" ,llln 1,111",1'
suhjecls overseas.
Spaniards therefore reachct.lthe New World in a spinl alre,lll\ well
developet.1 al home. Spain hnd 1l10dCr:l.IC opporlunity ftlr lll'w.lrd ."" I,d
mobility. and there is considerahle evidem:e 10 Sllf*('<;1 Ihat the New \Yfllll! \1111
qllcrors-I-Iern:in Corles, Fr<lndscc, Pi7.arro, ;llltltilcir fl\llowcl<; (;lIIIC III Allleill ,I
in order to win soci:t\ status as wclI as weallh. mOIIY.IIIOIl wa" Un dllll!>1
complex. Ferdinand and Is.,hella alltl !oouLce<;<;ive 1ll0narLh" Ihollghllhe wl'.lllh ,,( Ih,'
New \"'orld could strengthen Iheir hand in FllfllJ1e. ;.. bU)' dCtli, .lled llli ...,IIIn.II .....
hoped to S;lve the souls ofhe:lthen Indians, The umquel"l h.ltl 1Il1111l1'h' pllfp' ,.,,.., 111
mind: as one conquist<ldllr said, v/(' l;ltl1e herr III scr"r f ;nd .llld Ill." Kl11g. ,I lid .11'.1>
In get BUI Iheir lellll';lllll.ntive :lpl'ears In haw he('11 Ill(' ,l( hinTlllc1l1 "I 11,,1>1,
rilllk and we;"lth, (Ahoul IIlle thinl of the conql1cllIl <; of !'el'll (.1111(' fillm the 11'''''1"1 "I
common- nohility: 1\\'(' Ihinl<; werc of plehci.ln '1 he.,,, \"'rIC P("'I,1e- \\1111
10 v.ain.) Thus driven. Ihey ..('I oul fill' thev kncw Ill,t wh.II 111.1 If'\\' ,,111111 \".1' '.
Ihey had lPppled the might)' empire<; ollhe A/I('( .. ,Ind II\(' 111I.1"
Ilow did Ihe)' do il? \Vhen Corti<; <;el nul fillm (;1Iha low.lId f\ln;u 0111 I ,1'1.
he had onl)' 550 men .. IHI 16 horses. \OVilhill Iwo :llld .1 h,11t yc,lI<;, hI' ,11101 Ill'.
h;ltlered Spmlish cnntillgenl (hplslcred hy !'ocvcr.ll hllndled rcinlnll"lllt"nh)
reduced tn ruhhle Ihe lll;lgnifkclll /\1.Ie<." lapilal "I II'llI'11 1110
c;lpitulalion of the di<;he;lrlenccl alld hewildered ;"!l1llcllllll.l. ,111,1
crushe(1 the fin;ll re<;i<;l.11lle of forLe<; led I,}' Ihe ((llIl".lg<'OIl<' (Il.111hlt'll\p, f hi"
expl;lnation for their fe;lt wa<; Ihe sllperinrily of Sl'ani"h "Iplll'lllrni .tIld In h
nology-gullpo\\'(lcr (for musket" ;lml .:annpn<:), hor"e". ..llld Ilw
confidence to stay consl .. ntly on Ihe ;llIack: lll.1porl;lnl .11"0 \\'a" the rnk ..1 ""11
/\1.lec peoples. such as Ihe whn I'c"i"lcd ;llltl r('<:Cl1le<l AItC< It. '1lIlll.III' III
and who sl.lpplied Ihe Sp;lllianis wilh lroops and ,l(lviLe 111\ ,lppl'llpll:l.l" 11111,1,11\'
tactics. Finally, and perhap,<; mllst illlp(lrtant. an 1)lllhr(',lk pi 1'l"t'\'lllll"l\'
unknown in the America". ravaged a nativc popllblion I.Kklllg nalllr.11 illHl1l1l11l\
By 1521. Iwo years afler the st;lrl 01 Ihe enrlc'<; call1p:l.ign .lIlt! k<:<: Ihan t hll' \ \ (',lI',
after CoIUl11hu<;'s firsl \'o)'age, Ihc A1tel ellll'ire hatllnllell under .. h '\lllIH.l
CorleS. Inst no time in as<;crling his :Hlthority. lie cxlr:tt le(1 .. I
from neighboring chicft;lins .. nt! directed a vigorous re":OI1<;lrIlCliol1 dlnl'l
Some fadors that !:wored the Spani.. nls in jv1cxkn (Ipcr,llrd al ..o Ill. 1'1'111. 1'111
Pi1..arro's t<lsk was simplified by theciviJ war Ihen wl';lcking Ihe Inl.W elll.pil(,: 1111' III' ,I
Atahualpa. preoccupied by the local cOllflid. never tonk Pi/aTTn ,I. ... ,\.,
",.. rranted. The small Spanish band "cwll.lpli<;hell Ihe takellVCl" hy I 1;\. 'nll')' \ .tIll" I
off as Ihcir hooty a hoard ofgold :t1l(1 silver larp,e 10 fill a 12' ... 17' IIlI'l1l. III Ihl'
height ofa man's cxlcnd('<1 aml. 'I'he dreanl of 1'.1 I)nr;llin h:llil (1111(' Ifll(' ill. Ill,(' 1\1\,1,'"
'11 Iraditionall)' IhollAhl Ihal J\7h" \... w,',I!;'rl ....,1 hr ,I 1.. 11< I 111 ,r 11,," IlU.I.I'''f
were di\'in(' a"d Ihal lhr W"I')lI('I,al, ";Irl ll .... ,,,1 <. h.. h.
$harpl}' lhallrnr.rd idea
II did 11\'1 I,Ikl'!OJlg lUI 10 re\,.ll',Ill' lilimy oflhdr uWIl
III IIll' Alllcri.. ,I". 'J'lll')' I.ltd IHll I)'llk,IJly Sp<lnish for cities and cn:ated rkhly
Ullllpk'l( slribn I)evpll: frulll.lll w..lks orlifl' in Spain-
...1111..', ulld..'1 light illlilligl\lliull conlrul. III lilah' their way in Ihe New World.
Ml'll d\Illlilwll'd Ihis ACt,.-nnJillg 10 a siudy on Peru, fur instance,
\\'Illk lll.d.. tlutllllJllbl'rl.'d while hy ,II Il',lSI 10 one, This IIOt only
'll',t1l,.. lor 111l: h,llids vi Sp.lIlbh WOllh'n; il also led
10 1.lk.., Indl.1l1 WUlll ..'1l ,I:. thl'ir l'ulborb, TIll'ir childn:n. often illegi-
llllldh". 1..,11 Ill' til bl' klluwn a:.lIIl.'\/lZII:;. In 111111.:, thl:" mestiz() !"<lce would become (he
dOlllill,lll1 l"Ihllil ,tlllIl'0lll'nl til 11Ill.. h ul Sp.ltlbh AllIt'rk,l. illdudlng tVlexko.
I \'Illl.d I\tlll'li.. a, ,11Id tILt'
Tlt l, 1I11Wll MltHl tl',diznl it had .. cunllici 01 inkre:.t wilh thl' inde-
!,"IHlt-llt alld promplly l,.'rt:illl:d all e1aborale bUl"e<lucn.l":Y.
\k"ll',IJ\'\1 t'l knV III,' Nl'W \\lvlld l,.. unlllllY alHi slIckty under 1IJ'll1 conlrol. In
... ".1111 tIll' kl'y luI' N\:\V \,Vorld W.lS Ihe: Cuuncil nf Ihe
till' IllJil1 L1111( ul Ilrgalli/.lllun the vin'ruy... lty, hCo.ldcd by a viceroy
c\ I\l' ,IPllUillkd by Ihe king, Till:" fir:.t vl\,.cruyahy was l'siablished in Mexico
(tll\'ll kIlU\\lI .1,> Nl'W ill Ic;'lS, thc in PdU in 1544; Iwo olht'rs
wi up III til,' l'lght"'\'nlh cenlury, Till' dHlrdl h,ld led by Ihl'
.lldlhl'<llllp ,II1d by (h\, ollkiab 01 11l1.' Ilt\luisilioll,
III 1".JdIU', ,hi .. hurl',HKlacy I,'d Iv lOIlIlil.:1 OVl'r mailers of
11\.11, lflll till' gl'lliu.. t)ltlH' 1II,It Ihl'y d('vdnpnl, could
,11\\"1)'> lit' tr.lll:'I11111\'tll<I.l high\'l ;llililorit)'. :.u..:h as thl' viceroy or Ihl.' Council of
thl' Indll'''_ I hi" ll\,'.1 II I llhll th\'" would a:. watchdogs over
l'.ll.h Ullin Irum pl'!"iodil fl'views ,lIlJ invcsligations of performance in
ullkl"). t\llllthcl k.llull' of thl' W,I,>. its n\'xibility,
.tli gluul' .. lc.rd oj 10 Ihl' burl'allcn,Ky, And though the crown
1.'1;11111'11 llllllll,tt\' .l11111\lril)/, 100di ulfi(iab aUIOllOl1lY,
.. lInwlI hy Ihdr 1"1'Sp\)II:.\':. Iu IVy;l1 fJl:ro fit) (lI/11p}!)
-1 .1\1..'"\11 )'11111 .llIthOltt)' but \"ill rIot eXl'cule Ihis 1<1\'/"), Despite ils
w\,.'udllg IdIU... yIII r.l .. Ilh' 1J1lr\,allcr,I\'Y ratht'r well in the N\'w
\Vwld, knplllg thl' under rult: fvr lll'arly )00 )'ears.
lJndl'rpillllillg Ihb pulilk.tl rtKI IIrl' W'I:' a Set of valut's and assulllpl ions thai
Iq;llllllll'l'\1 I1lt.J1l;lr\ Imal. ditbl rule, 'I ht')' sklll/llcd from thl' fundament;.!) Roman
<. ',llhnill.. pI\'mbl', 1110:.( ..:-k.III)' arlldtlatt'd by Thomas AqUinas. th<lt there were
Ihrn' killd" 01 1,1\\1: divine 1,1\". lli.lt is. OWll hl'awl1ly will; natural law, ;l
pl'l k\ I rdl"llivn or t'ITlhudimt'lit ul divil1l' law in till' world uf nature; and human
1.1\'/, Ihoruughly illlpt:rfl"(I,lllelllpt to approximate God's will within society,
Burn ill sin, hUlll,wily W.1S fallible by definition, and it was only by the
\II <. ;I.d th.lt pl'lIph: wert:: 11'SS f.lllilJk Ihan olhers, The goal of polilical
l'lg,lllll.1I1UIl, tht:ld'Jll', W.IS (u dt'V,lk Ihl' Il':'ls fa!liblt: to power so tht'y could
Illkl Jlrl'l .llu!l'xe..:-uk will ill a way, And Ihe ruler, OIlCt' in power,
I'l':'POll .. ibll t\l Ill ... HI' own and 10 God-not to Ihe will of Ihe
pt:lIpll'
This ralionale pruvidnl convincing lor Ilie.-' ul Ihe
Sp<lnbh monarch, Its Iheolugic;ll origin I'l'vl'alt'd ;,ami fortified links bdWt'l'll
dlurch alld slate, Resuscitated in Ihe poskololliall'ra, a:. il has unell been, Ihl' codl'
also furnisIH:d, as we shall see. ;,l dev;.lstal ing Cl'il itJllC uf dellllH. ralh. Ihcory. III tinlt'
polilical rulers would thus legilimiza;' Iheir power Ihrough residual asp\,.'clS of
tmdilional Roman ClIholic dOl'lrint',
The e.-'mpire':.t:conomic slruclure: rell",ctt'd the prt:\,;.liling lllt:l\,."'llilisl theOlY
that activity enhance the pmwr .lIld pn::.tigt' vi 11ll' IIll'.l-
surcd on lhe basis or gold Of silva bullion. Tht: guod mcrcalllilisl was Supposed 10
run a r,lVorablt' balan(t' of Irade. Ihll:' acquiring or bullion in payllll'nt.
folluwing Ihis logic. Spain ;'lllemptcd 10 lllunopolizl' tht' tu Wl';.dlh
ered in lht: New World, Tht (argel mining. 01 gold and Ihen lll:1illl)' uf
silver. Anolher go.1I W:lS 10 mninlain complcl'" cUlltrol uvt:r romlllerCt:,
Agriculturt', by cOlllrnsl, initial .1Ilcntion from l.'roWI1 offlciab
(ex(ept for expori produrb). and manulacturing. when later l'unsidercd,
aelivdy discouraged,
TIll" (l:'ntral foundation lor lhb econumy ludlan 1.lbol". obl<lllll'd Irum the
llalive.-::, by one [orlll of coercion or another, Thl'y paid Iribult: lu 111\ crown and ib
appointt:d t:mis:'ilril's. Since chenp labor W<lS so critical. Iht' cruwn, lolo
llists, and clerics fought bittt.:r1y fvr (onll'ul 01 Ihe Indians. III 15/12, :'\,,\,,'king to
..:urtail Ihl' eolouisb, Ihl' king (il'..:rcnl till' YNl'w uimt.:d at prulecling Ihe
native:. b)' removing Ihelll from dirt.:t:lluldagl' urllll' .1lId bringing
Ilwl11 under the dir\'ci jurisdiction of the nown. By 160U tht' cruwn h,ld lilrgdy
sllccet'l!l'l! in Ihis lask. al le.lsl in Ie-gal Icrms, In rl';llily. hO\\''''\'l'I". these change::.
altl'fed only the legallorlll of opprl:'ssion; 1I1l' tlet of pcrsi:.ted.
For the Indian:., Ihe Illeanl above <III ,I draslic rail ill pupulalion,
St:holars have argut:d long and hard about size vf the populalion
\"hen lhe Spaniards arrived, Thl' most n'liabll' 01 i..Llllml rvlexi<.u pl.lCl' the
pre-Conquesl populations. as or 15IY,:l1 16 tu I milliun; lor the IIgurl' is Jml
1.9 million. and for 1605 it is I million-a lot'll dedil1t' 0195 pt"rct:lll! Data Oil I't'ru
are I,.omplett'. but they abo shuw continuing dedlll\", Irulil 1,3 million ill 157U
(forty )'l'ar:. afta the Conquest) 10 less than 60U.UOO ill 1620, a drop of lllore Ih,lll
SO percent. However unct:rtain Ihe-exact magnitudes, the clearly rcsulted
in demographic calamity, largl'ly alll'ibulable to such smallpox,
measlt:s. and influenza,
The Indian survivors S<lW their social order unde.-'rlllined nnd dislvrted. Forced to
give their labor and tributes to Ihe Spaniards, Ihe natives struggled Itl maint<lin llidr
IradilionaJ social nc1works, Most of Ihem lived in thdr uwn vilIagl's. guwrlll't1 by
indigenous elites; in Mex.ico. these cOllul1l1nities kept eXlemivc wrillell
records. ranging frolll annals 10 real estate tmnsactions tu wills. which have Ixen a vit,t1
SOlun: lor modern historians, The most f(rtilt: land was by Iht: cunqucrurs-
who. in Illany cases, cOllwrted thc lalld to r.lbing Jive:.I()(.'k.llllli.lllS Iht:: symbols of
their old religion deslroyed. and tJll:y clung 10 such syncrdbtk .. tht'"y ('Quid
20 PART ONI OtJl;:;,TlONOIi ANI> CON-II'XTS
The construction of this sixteenth-century Dominican monastery in south-
central Mexico aptly illustrates the alliance of church and crown in the conquest of New
Spain_ (Courtesy of the library of Congress.)
devise. took a heavier loll on men Ihan on women. and the resulting gender
imhalance furl her di!'rupled marriage patterns and fanlily
Tn Ihe decline in Indian popul:'lliol1. especially ill tropical lowland
regions, began imporling black slaves from Africa-n prnctice nlready
familiar in Spain and Portugal and their Atlnntic islands. Between 1518 and 1870.
Spnnish America imporled more th:m 1.5 million slaves-over 16 percent of the
entire Atlantic shwe trade-mostly through Cuba and the northern tip of South
America. destined for ktbor in Ihe 10wianJ coastal areas. Braz.i1, with its eXlensive
sugar plantations. brought in ahout 3.7 million.
As we shnll sec bter, Latin America produced largely multiracial socielies. in
conLrilsl to the highly polarized biracial society that developed in North America.
The Ihree ethnic components of colonial Sp.mish American population-
Europeans, Africnns-fit together in a social structure that divided itself
along lines of r;lce and function. The while sector, which included less than 2
percent of the sixteenth-cenlUry population, was the most powerful and presti-
giolls. In Ihe same period Ihe mixed bloods included free blacks. mestizos. and
n1Ulnlloes-nll l(lld, less than 3 percent of the tOlal. IndigenoHs peoples, over 95
percent of the population. were placed in a unique posilion carcfull)' limited and
prolcclccl hy a halleq' of ro)'allaws,
In the first yeMs aner Ihe Conqucst. displllt'\ aro"c hel\V('f'1l Ihe 01'):111. 1
conquerors find their descendants, on Ihe one haml. <lnd. 1111 lite IlllltI.llClll,k "j
nohle birth who nrrived l<ller and cI<lil11c(\ spccial privilege.... (.,\11'("." ill lhe t 1111""
rind the army. or Occup<ltions such as merchant. miner, :Inti IMlltt'!' ,II ....
determined one's social rank. Overlapping social calcv,nries prndlll cd a u'III('II,'\
system in which social was the major pri7C. The I..onlinllll\l<; \\,:1\'1''' "I
Spanish newcomers onen sought through ll1:lrriag<' wilh IOtal f,1I1l;lle...
in order to integrnte themselves inlolhc social antleconom;t f..hrit. 111 lhc ('1,:1\1
centh century, dislinclions and rivalries (lcvelnpl.:d hdwccl\ IW111,II' III 1"11"1'('"1
desccnt horn in the Ncw World (rri(1l1os or creole<;) nnt! .c. ("lIllr ,11 d\CtI prlll'l,
from Sp;lin (pcflitlsuhlrcs). These conOilis :lm\ rc,,('ntIl\Cllt ... Wlllild ",rnll . dh
sh:lpe the struggles thai led 10 independence from Eunll'c. 1l tltlc.
Interaction hetween thc r<H..i::'11 groupings W,t" less ICI\\IIII1 f.lled. hUI \,frll
tenuous. Though interracial cOllcuhin:lge witlesl're:ul, inlcrr:u i,lI 111,11"1",',:"
was prohably rare. and even Ihen it followed gr:ldations. while<; lllighl 111.11 Iy
mestizos, :lud mestizO,( mighl Illarry Intlinns, hUl whites st'ldllll\ lnarri("tl 11,,1;,111".
Since civil an(1 religious consecration W;lS cxlclHletl In inl("',11 i,tl li,li"oll". (""Ilt'
cially those involving thC)' tended 10 hlur SlIcinl hllundarie... Iq:ilillll/i'
aspirations for mobil it)'. <lnd foment uncertainl}' :thlHlt thc ")'o;lelll III "I . tl illt .111' III
Movement definitely existed. hoth sociaII)' and v,eograllhicllly, ,tllli in.lh 1I1 ... d..
could experience cOl1sidcl':.lhlc chnngc dllring their Iifclil1lc".
Mctrriage and family generally Ill,tlc d'1I11il1:Jl;I'1l ,II It'111,II(\
The Clilt of masculine superiority (machimlll) :lIlI'C:ll'cd t';\r!y in I ,11m AI1\Cl'lt .1. \\".Ihlll
;l broad range of social ;lnd ethnic strata. anel mall}' ,t'Olllell lett rc\lrliled 11\"... Hili
contrary to lhe stereotypical image. the Sl:llld;lrd fnlllil)' \\';l" nnl :llwa)'.. hC,Hled !Iv .1
male patriarch presiding over :l large hrood of children. "lorc oll('n th:ln .HII, I.lll1.h,'"
consisted of Ill:lrried couples reasonahly close ill age with hvn 1<1 lour t lllldrl'll
But not all women married, and those who did nften did nnl relll.lill .11:11 IItd
for life. D;ll:l on the sixteenth centu ry :lI"C sp:Hse. hUI hy 1XI I, :H (ol'd ing III ("11\11\
results, only 44 percent of the adult females ill Mexico Cit)' W('fe Il\;lll'i<'li. i\ 1.1 Il\'
women were widows. :l.Ild approximatel)' nne-third flf Ihe htH...c1wld.. in i\ leXltl'
Cit)' were headed by women. This W;lS due in (':"Irl In the 10\\"Cl hlt,
expectancy for men. For whatcver reason. man)' "lexican wnlllCI1 <;I'cnl IlHl\ II
of their lives as single women.
Spanish AmeriC:lil underwent profound t:hallgcs hy the c.lll\,
seventeenth century. The first impetus C;lme from Europc. where
to lose the power it once had in the !:lte fifteenth rind sixtccnlh C('l\tlllie<;:. ,\(1,'1
the defeat of the armada hy the in 15RR. Ihe ro)':tltrC':\sllT)' rqU':tlcdh
went bankrupt, the nobles challenged the crown, f:at;lloni;l cmplct! III 1'(voll.
and in 1640 15RO governed hy Ihe ... h monan.h - "lien'"''
fully reasserted its in(lependence. At Ihc lime, Sp:lin :\1111 beg.1I1
their monopolies on Ihe New World. The English, 11111("1\. ;'In(1 1:,('1,,11
established selllements in Nonh America :lnd nlsn gaincd fOOII1"ld .... n lh,'
Caribbean,
I) 1'.'\ll!IINI l]tJl. ... ntlN... '\Ntl( llNIIXI")
Elite Women and Economic Power
IhI.' illlilgt:'" from latin Amenca is one of violent men,
WOlllt.. 'Il. -.Iud d strICtly patriarchal society. It is often summed up 1Il the word
IIl"llmtrlu Yt.'t tht'le Wd'> a cateqolY of women which contradicted thIS image:
Wlduw:. lIum pIOp"'IIl",d ... 01 <.01011131 SOCiety enJoyt:d the
lll.".dutlllll ..1 1l1l1l ..lId palltupdted rnu:.t t:xtenw"ely in the colonial econolHy.ln
d wtdow full c:ontlOl ovel hel dowry and lht: atras, If
l.lUVtdl:"d I)y lilt:: huslJ..l1d; III adUtllon, she It::ceived hdlf 01 all w<:dlill acqutled
dUllll1j III, IIl<lrH"gt:'. <l WIdow silt:' usually also administered her c:hildlen's
whllt:: Ihey wele Om.' of the most lenhllkable of these
Vlutllt:1I w.. DOn.1 Jl:"rotlttna de Penalosa, widow of a wealthy and powerful
I"wyl.'. Will) In lit", century as a Judge and adVIser to the
..I Pew Olltt: widowt:d, DOll'" Jelonim3 managed the family's vasl ecollon"c
tlhll llH..Iudl'd f':lIms, mines, and <l sugM mill In
..ddtllull 10 plupo::r1Y til Spatn. Silo.:: no::vt:'1 It::m..ffled, choostng 10 malldge, t.'ven
Ih.... fdmlly':. wO::dllh. When sho:: d.ed ho.::I eldesl son inhellted <Ill fdllillled
",,1,,1....1I1t! 011'0::' <hlldrel' wele plovlded fOl, with three sons sent 10 Spaliliol
.' t'ducalton dnd anolher put III the Church; hel daughlel was pro-
v.It'd willi" 1Ic11 dowly ul }:),()(X)
I'Vltl M..lk A Burkholdel dnd lyrndn LJohnson, ColonlOl LarlflAmt'flnl, 5th ed. J
II__H-.I'"W (ull, O,,(utl..l Utl.v.... rslty PleSS, 20tl'l), pp, 229-30.
\Vtlll :-'I',UII'" ,I.-dllll.", ot Europe tu (OUlI-
l"II,.ll.tll".I'.,llIl.t', lll"'>' II, .. pUWt'l. 'rht: Nl'w World b"c<lllll' a vital dt:lllt:nt
It I tit, I tltlJl't.",1l1 \lOW!:"1 t::'lu,lliun. hel".II11t.' dear ill the \,Var of tht:: Spanish
'JUl I.l"....... "ll (17UU 1713), whil h .. llld the Bourbons 011 Iht.' Spanish III rone and
gaw till.' Blilbllillt' ":UlltJ(lct (asiell/v) lor the slave trade to tht: Sp:lnish colonies.
F.II 11..h.. hillg were also laking plac,," within thL' Tht' ethllic
til ullderwt:nt prulound transitioll. COJltinued illlllligration
,llId 1l,llUl,d illln.:,l:.e lurned the mainly creoles, into a segment of
tllt"l'tlpul.ttinll, 20 pcrl.t'nl by IM25. Much moft: dramatit: was the
14
I
\l\\'lh 01 tltl. III .... )tizv and llIixcJ-bloud catc:gory.. from less Ihan 3 percent around
1',70 It) ,llipluxilll.llt:ly 1M p<:fLellt b}' IM25. The shift in the Indhlll population was
t"WIl grl.,lll.'r, JI.:.plk a rc:l."ovc:ry in terms-down frolll over 95
PI.'Il.l'1I1 lu h,'l"Co-'ly tl2 pcrcc1\1. In tht: lllt:antime. !.>Iacks had comc to .lCcount for
11 pl. ...:t.nt ul th" American population.
Tilt' l. ft:olt:s began to assume: active rules in key sectors ufthe economy. such as
llIilllllg ,1I1l1 t:UllllIllrc". EspeciaUy striking waS their increasing ownership of land
hllllH.tlllll14 tlit." t.'".trly Sp,U1ish lllonarchs had discouraged) and, in some areas. the
,11'!ll',II"ln... t.' til glC<lt landed Of haciendas. by vasl territorial
.11Id ddl! pl'ullage, Ihe.' haciendas often became Virtually autonomous
I ur.d '.Ullllllllllltil.':" guvt'I"Ilt."l1 by Iht: Qwnt'l'S or lhdr rorem.HI. I.and litles were
I
l
1. The CulOlli,tl I:OIlIlt!..lllllll,\ 13
hl"feJitary, and wcrl' held by By tht: Illid-t:ighteellth Cl.."IlI11ry, tilL'
crown confronting a proud Ncw \'Yulld nobility.
Tht.' political role of the creoles was Icss obvious. In the late ,lIld
early eighteenth centuries, they held 1ll.IIlY important political posts, mainly 011 Ihe
local or regional level. sudl as in tOWII councils or fludie"cills (t.ourb). Uppe:l-levd
wen: still reserved for pe"itl:i11lures. With the: dt.'c1ine uf Spain
imperial power, however, politi(al 10 function <IS bdt..lre.
PORTUGUESE AMERICA: A DIFFERENT WORLD2
The hblury of PurlUgllCSt: AlIlcrica (oilirasts with lIlt.' siury uf .... oltlnial Spanbh
Anlt'rka. Undl'r tht' royal Iluuse or" Aviz., Porlugal had establbht:d a far.f1ung
empire wilh outposts ill Africa, India, China, and SUllie Atlanti( III fad.
Portugal had !.>('COlnl' Ih\.' European 1L'<lder in \.'xploration hy :.hrt'wd usc uf its
superior Ie:ehnical skills in cartugraphy and navigation. In Itll)1 tht' Treaty of
bdwecn Spain and Porlllgal granted Spain all l'IlHls 370 leagu...s tll
th... oflhe Capt: Verlle Islamls olllh,,: 01 Afrie.l. Parillgal rto'Cl'ive:d all the:
lamb of that dividing Iinc.. In 1500 Pedro Cabral. a
captain, landed along the coast of whal is tOOJy Brazil ;lIld c1 .. imnl Ihal
tt:rritor), for his monarch.
This Ne:w World incursion difft.'"l"ed frum Spain\ ill two
tht're 110 n<ttiv\.. civilizatiun in Brazil I."omparabk to the or the
The Ihe largt.'st l,Illguagc: group. IIvcd along th\.' frulll
whal is now Venezuda into Brazil <Iud Paraguay, .md Tapuias
the interior. SOIllt.' Indians wt'rt: cannibalistic, and mosl wt::re
which tllt.'"anl that Brazil would havt.' Iv bc st.'tlkd gradllall}', ralhl'r than laken al
<l single blow. More itllporlant, it Int:ant that tht: unlikt: lht.' Spanbh,
did not face a highly organized, st.ttled civilization.
Plirthcl'lllOre, there was no trace of silvt:f or guld, and t:oIlSl'quL'lltly no
palh to Clbulous wealth, The impurl<lllt eCollomil: ;l(livily the L'Xport vI
brazil wood (henet' the counlry's currcnt name), priud ill Europe fur its qU:llitks as
a of dyt:. And in tilllt:, contrasting sharply with llloSt of (olullial
America. agriculture. especially Gille sugar clIltiv"lliun, prcoominakd in tht.'"
HraziJian colunial economy.
The: scarcil y (compared 10 Spain) of human and millt:ral resourCeS forced thL'
Portuguese crown to resort to unusual means in trying tu persuadL' or entice ils
subjects to occupy Ihe New World holdings. In the: 1530s Iht: kings started making
massive: grants of effective power over (almost totally unexplored) land, usually to
military men with prior experience in India or Africa or to handpicked personal
favorites, and in eilher instance to llle:1l of gentlt: blood." The hind donations weft.'
huge. averaging about 130 miles along Ihe cuastline: and running all the way
much as 500 miles or more) to Ihc: imaginary Line of Ot'lliarcation thai divided
Portuguese from Spanish America.
2'1 1',\ In ONE QlIFSTIONS AND rONTEXTS
r
"] The I ..I"lI1.111 "1111.1,1111"1'.
Not unlil 1549 did the crown hegin to el'tahlish an effective imperial
hure::lIIcracy-hlll the purpOI'C wal' to protect the area from French and British
intru<:ions and Ilf)t. as in the casc ofSpanish America. to reco!1(lucr the
Map 2 Colonia/latin America: Political Organization
(rom the conquerors. On Ihe conI r::lry. il \\':l<: Ihe l:lck (II .1 1'Illlllglw,e 1" t'';I'lh " I h.ll
forced Lisbon 10 acl.
Partly because in its first lelliury Ufa1il f('ct'ivell a 1,1\\'('r plll1fll)" 111.111
other flollIininn<: (which wen.: mort' prnflLlhld. lIIe1l1,'Io Illc ,.I
control out l1luch l<ltlS('r Ihan in AlIH'l"it.1. EVf'll when Illl'
crown tightencd III' :lfter 15'19. Ihe rt 1)'01 I in:-Illillinn... \\t'I(' 1.111:d\
limited to the Atl:lntk CO:lst. where the taxC's on exporl" nlulcll'e e.l<;ilv CIlllnlld
Power on the loc:lllevcl n.::-ted with Ihe lanelnwncrs ;Jnd Ih(' tt'WII "llllllll ... I \e'll
the church was weak in sixlcenlh C('nlury Hla1il, {.Imp.llcd III il.kXlt" .IIHIInl'
During the l::lte sixtc('nlh rtnd carly :-evcll(('enth c('lllllri!'<;. l,l1Ic!OWllCI'" de,,I, 'I't' I
::l lucrative sug::lr industry in Ihc Hr,11.ilian Nelllht':l ... I. IlavIIIg c,lllln 111.1,lt 11'\1111"1,,
gical breakthroughs in sligar prtKcssillg in their Albntit i... land". "'11, h ,1\ Illl' "'1.1.lt'lI,t,.
the Portuguese had COllle 10 I'd)' tllllhe I1l1lLh III relaillilc plUdll\ t ill bll"t 'pc. I" gil '11
sugilr in Americ<1. however, required ::lhtlllc!:llll lahor. The I'nrltlglw...C l:ltuII1WTlC'I.lil'.1
turned 10 the Brazilian Indian", 1\1' in Mexico :llld PCI u, hnwcvl'r. lhe n.ll"( ... ""U'll 11'11
victim 10 dcvastating Europeall di"<'a<:e!l.. The .... lrvivOls "ftC'1l lied illin Ihe' 11I1f'111I1
Although Ihe Portuguc!'C l.nntinlled 10 exploil the Indi:lll<; unlil wdl iul .. Ih,' t"lJ'.hl
eenth c'Cllluf)'. they h:ld to look e1sewhcre for a sali<;(at.lnrr lahlll '1I1'pl)"
The ohvious source wa<; Africa. H}' the carl)' Ic;Oflo; Ihc !-.1',llIi ... h .md I'.. II ..,:W... ,
alre:ld)' h:ld a half centtlf)' o( ('xperienu' wilh Aflit.lIl ,,1.l\'('I.lhol, buth allllllllt' .11111
in their Allanlic isl:lnds. SUth :l!l. Ihc <:;II1:lflc'; (!-.I,.mi ... h) :111,1 Ihc "'I.HI'II.I'.
(Portuguese). It was not unlil Iht" I C\XOs Ihill Ihc I'nrltlglle"'t' !I.,IW ("llllugh !,,,Ittlll.1I
profll tn warranl Idri(-an sl:wc.. .... H)" Ih';U, III,Wt"'('I. IlnrllH'., ... tc"1I 1:',1/11
h:ld hceome Ihe worle!'1' greate"t SllllrlC of(allC ';llg::ll. pn,(hu ('II pledllllllll.1111 It- \\'1111
African slave l:.lhnr. Sligar exporl" wcre {'!<OI imalc(1 :11 l.25 million :1 )"".11. \\'hit h 1Il.loI,
Bmzil's coast::ll Norlheasl prnhahly the ric!w"l rcgil.n III Ill(' ellill" 1\ 111,'11, .....
Olher European powers wantcd in 011 IhC' hlllllll. '1 he I lull II tlll-.I,ktl
Brilzil itself in 1624 and Illtrnllcd Ihe sligar rich IlIllil ,Ill ,tlll.ll1' C "I
Portuguese planters, mcn.hanls. :lnel mixed,blond InUIJl" pll"hctl thelJl h'1\ k 1111"
the ocean in 1654. The Dutch then tll0V('t! lnlhe (,:lllhlw,lt1 wilh lIew 1{'1 hll",..g\',
in the l:lle seventeenth <lnd eighle\'lll h l ('l1ll1l'ic:-. SIlI-:'1 r lull i\"IIl! ,n WlIlll,1 11.111 ... 10 " III
this region, making it Ihe ('Iltel of Ihe Atlanlk Ir,l(ling 'plelll The 1'''1 11I1:"('<"C
were never again toduplic:lte the ne:lr monopoly 1111 N('\\' \V"tld <:ug.n !,t"dlll II""
they h::ld enjo}'ed earlier in thc lClllury.
In the central and Stluthelll regions of Bra1iJ. the ec..IIIHllll)' IlI .. t l('lllt"lnl "II
callie raising and. more imporlantl}'. 011 sl::l\'c ... t Ihl' Indian' (whll \\Clt'
often shipped to the Northeast), Carric(! nut hl' Ihe blllulrllflllll'. wh.....(" Icgnltl'll\
status in national history mixture oflhe C:llifnrnia gnld prtl<:pCllI II'" .111,1
the American backwoodslllen. these forays extended Porluguese lnntrol lI\'I'r Iht'
Brazilian interior. Furthermore, they led to the discclVcry of mincr:ll \\,('.llth, whit II
had so long eluded the Portuguese. In the 1690s gold W:lS fOl1nel in I"-'lina... (;l'I,li ...
CGener::l1 Mines"). and people no(kec! In thc :lrea. I )iamnncl, werc loc alec! ill l72
t
l
Mining reachcd its peak in 1750. wilh::l yearly output of l. \.(. Itlillinll. allhl'IlJ:1t tltl'
low level oftechnologicill expertil'e conlrihuled 10;l dec JiIH' ill 11111lillg 111'.11 Ihc' 1,11,'
'''94 I inl"
01
Bu<".,.Airu
Effective Fronlier
of

'--_//
1''' 1111 (H.fol, \'
D Spanid' "llIl"d.. ;\; Vin ..
(i;1 AllIel i, a
Olf Ilralil): ca, 17RO
Thl" 01 Ih(' Rio r\(' I" 1'1:11" lll1l1 ew
.. b oriJ:::in:dlr tl.(' "i, l"royallr of
rr."
o

... C.itv.
4), r 1.... I...rtll
Vi ... fir Nt'w Sp;\in and I',....
1,II(h. I al ...." <I hnd export OUOlll illl.:ottUIl, but Ur.lzil would have to
.1\\'.111 1111l('h::elldl-n_'lllllrY cutIn' boolll lJdorl.' reg.lining lIluch prosperity.
had bl'l'll creah:d Jor expor!. The resulting social
:-.11 ntkCIl'd thl' Purtuguese crown had made. The
1111111/fl,11I1 ... il'gk hU111<l11 .. wa.) Ih(' pervasive pr('senc(' of African slaves.
)wr 25 lllillion had to Bmzil by nearly one-third of
i\ 11.1111 10.. Ir;JlI\," in Ihul I:'r;\. Blacb were a major component of Portuguese
Allll:IIL.L11 111":t)1l1raSI to lIIU.)( :Lre.ls ufSpallish Americu.
A...... IIUWII ill T.lbk I-I, amuunled to nearly ont'-half of Rrazil's tOlal
111/llul.Ltiull aruund IH25, with 12 per..:ent in Spanish America, and Ille
llllxnl hllllld gruup. mainl)' Illulalloes, dded allolher percellt. All ill all,
....... lllW.. h ,IS lwo-Ihirds of Ihe entire Brazilian population in the early
11i1It'kclllh WerL' oj partial or total African ancestry,
Illllllir.ln.d colonial Brazilian suciely was highly stratified. Racial inter-
111.Lfll.lgt' h"I:. r.In:, .. (cuunling fiJI' nu more than 10 pcrcent of all marriages, and, .IS
ill Sllalli:.ll /\ IIIL'riLa, it followed lines of graduliun-whil\'"s might Hlarry Inulatloes,
I>llt 11It.:y .IIIIlII:.t never llmrriL-d hhlCks. Concubinage and cOllllllon-law relalioll-
,11'1" WIl' 'Ihillent aillolig bl.u.:ks than whiles. As in Mexico City, about one-
Illlrd til the 1.lluil}' ill it :..Il11 1'1t' ofl..olonial Braz.ilian were headed
I,>,
,\ :.ntlud llla;1I1 01 thc :.ucial SlniL'lurc wus internal division within th....
lulllig :.lr.llullI, parti<.ul.lrly bt.:twt't'n Braziliallborn lalldowntr:. alld
I'I.llllglll... e hl)r11 lIlVlThanls. This dilfcrcn..:t: r('sembled the crcole-pcnirlsuhlr con-
nl' t in America. anti il had polential for leading to all independence
T<obiI..' 1. t U<oClat Composition of Early latin American Population
SPANISH AMERICA PORTUGUESE AMERICA

1570 ('to) 1825 (%) 1570 (%1 1825 (%)
Wtlllt:'" (t''Y<llly 1.3 18.2 2.4 23.4
lJ.... llled 01 by",uel",1
IU'IVt:'IIIUlt)
MIAt:tl IS 28.3 3.5 17.8
11ll.. UI lItul.llh
Iitol ...... tUldulJclJ 1I.') (included wllh 49.8
with ImllelJ IJ\lxed-bloods)

h 96.3 41.7 94.1 9.1
Julttl 100.1 100.1 100.0 100.1
',""'''' Ad"I'I ...,1 tIUlll!iIl!,,,,d M .... "Iii ... H... 'II<lg" ull.. WI III lOl,Jh H<llll. ed., TIlt' FQundmg 01 New
..., {New yu,k t-t .. t(OI,JII, 8IM-" & Wurld. 1'J641. p. l]lJ.
W"I '>"lIll IndY 1101 ..lid up 10 100 lx.c.. ot lOundmg
f
I
I
I
I
I
r
!. Till' Lululll.J1 FlIlllld,lI11lll' 27
As it tUnled out. Europc,ln politic.) thc III allY
thc looser crown conlrul uf Urazil had gt;'lI('rakti Ie!>.) n:scllllllL',1I ,\IlIOn!; the
Ctl!Lll1ists than in IIIOSI Amcrica.
Purtuguesc Aillerica's intcgratioll into tht' Wesh::f11 L'(unuflI)' .IS a j>criplh:ral
area resembled that of Spall ish Amcrica, but with notable fur lwO
UraziJ lacked the guld and silver the Spaniards in tvkxico
and Pt:ru; second, Brazil's 1I1 ill contribution until the l'ightet."llih century w..
agriculture, nul mining; third, and pL'rhaps mO.)1 impurtanl, Purlug.d had dL'vd
oped a simpler system for ensuring rcvenues from its prize coluny. Unlih' Spain,
Purtugal did nut devdop a vast bureaUl..'r'llic netwurk 'Iimed 1;lxing alld (011-
trolling Iht.' dumestic markcl. Instead, il concentr.lled entird)' un 1.IXilig
Urazil's ('xporI5. As a result, Brazil offcrcd SI>.lui.)h Alllerii...1 lor
breeding a powerful alliance of colonial inkrt'.){.) whkh might fl'bcl agailbt the
political aUlhorit y of tht:: mother country.
INDEPENDENCE FOR LATIN AMERICA
The intlcpentlcncc muvemcnls that led to the of llIuSI uf
Lalin America\ 1I.1tion!>talc.) owed their to ill l\lost
were nut radical, and brought L.ttad)'.)luic III the !>\ldal
Much of the illlpduS proved to be COJlServut I hL'rd' !>hapi ng I he ilil t'l tlOt I
of the yOllng /'cpul>li(s in tht' early ct..llIury. ()Ul siury begin:. hal'k ill
Europe.
The Bourbon monarchs of Spain, whose: family had SlIci..'eedcd to the cruwn ill
1713,had .)ought 10 reverst:: Spain's declinc, both III Eurupe anti Ilopillg
10 shore up Nt'''' World ag.linsl riv;J1 EUrOpL'.11I pU\'I'l'rs \\hilt' abo
int..reasing revenues for the crown, the Uourbllll king.) impost'd f.lr
ildminislralivt' and polilic.d relorllls. known as Iltc Uourboll reforms. OtiC W;IS 10
":/'t'a1e llew al New Granada (fil ill 1717, thell III 1759) ill
llorthl:'flI Suuth Alilerlla, (orrespolH:lillg lllaillly 10 mOdL'rll P,lllalll.l, Culumbia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela, anti anothcr al BUL'IIO$ (177(1). l.dled Ihc
Viceroyalt)' of the Rio de b Plata, ('orrespunding Itl lllodt'rIl-d;J)' Bolivl.l.
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina.
III addition, Charles III (1759-88) replaced the
arrangemcllt of the Hapsburgs with the intelldallcy In dfnl, litis Itd It)
tht rt'placemenl of thc !Jakd curre,gidores (lO(:al adminislralivi' and judicial uffi-
cials) in Spanish Alllcrica with "intendanls-Iocal governor!> direcll)'
to tht' crown, not to the viceroy. Almost all lhe intcndunb Wefe
petlitlSularcs, rather than American creoles, presumably thereby assuring lo),alty to
the monarch. The intendants greatly strengthened crown l.:olltrul over govern
menl, but also collided with prosperoll') creoles, 1Il<l1l)' of whum had laken <ldV.11I
lage of the relaxed administralion.
This In:nd could be seen ill the administration of lucal courb. lJespl'rald)'
needing funds, the late sevt'ntet'uth-ccntury I Japsburg pUI COUI t
2R PAWl" ON!' QUESTION!oo AND CONTEXTS .'"
appointments up for sale. as had Philip IV earlier in the century. It was creoles who
bought ... nd by 1750. fifty-one out of ninety-three judges were American born. The
Bourbon Illon.. rchs reversed this trend. and by 1807 only twelve out of ninety-nine
judges were creoles. Ullim.. tel}'. creoles would decide to look elsewhere for posi
tions of authority and prestige.
One pl.. ce they looked w.. s to the town councils, or cabi/dos. which were harely
functioning hy the early eighteenth century. Cabildo offices did not always find
eager buyers. With the arrival of the intendants, however, more erricient taxation
g:lVC Ihe cahi!dos increased revenues-and the}' reasserted their role ns local
councils. The thus became institutional bases of creole authority.
Charles III also sought to increase royal power by tightening crown control of
the church. The most dramal ie step wns the expulsion of the Jesuit order from all of
Spanish America in 1767. Charles S<lW the Jesuits as a state within a stnte. a riv<ll
source of power and wealth. The best properties of the Jesuits were auel ioned off.
:lIld the proceeds, of course. went to the crown.
The milit:'lry was another power source. To ward off outside thre<lts and to
nush any potential rebellion, the king decreed the establishmcnt of colonial
militias, an excellent source of prestige for status.hungry creoles. But it also :tltered
Ihe Illilitnry balance. By I for instance. there were only 6000 members of the
regular Spanish army in the viceroyalty of New Spnin-compared to 23.000
American-born memhers of the colonial militia. This was the foundntion of the
pntriol "TIll)' that would later fight for independence.
The .spanish Bourhons wanted especially to promote colonial c..:onomic
development in OHler to strengthen their hand in Europe. In 177R Charles III
Celibacy and Anticlericalism
Parish priests in colonial Pelll were enjoined by their superiors to lake good C<lre of
their flocks. Such care also had ils dangers. One was intimacy with their female
pilrishioners. As sons of the Roman Catholic Church, the priests were bound by the
pledge of celibacy, on which they were often sorely tested. In response to a wave of
reports about priests having entire families, the crown in 1727 ordered church
authorities in Peru to crack down. They ruled that any servant of a priest be more
thiln forty i1nd have a perfect reputation. Their advice: ,he best way to overcome
the temptations of the flesh is to nee them; he who courts danger will perish in it:
By the end of the colonial era in both Spanish and Portuguese America, more than
a few priests had succumbed. The ensuing scandals did much to undermine public
support for the church and feed the anticlericalism that was to dominate nine-
teenth-century Spanish American politics.
Quotation from William B. Taylor. Magistrares of the Sacred: Priests and
Parishioners in fighteenrfl-Cenrury Mexico (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Pres'i, 1996), p. 621.
f
f
I,
t
prolllulg:'lled .. of Fn'e Trn<lc. whilh me;lIll Ih.II Ihl' Iwt'lIl\" 1t'"1 1'''1 I... "I
Spanish America could now Irnde dirCllly with .111)' 1'011 in :-'pain t\r \\ III. (',It II
other (hut 1101 with any pori outside Ihe Spani"h re:llm). ("tllllIllC'1 I' w"uld II"
longer be reslricted 10 fOllr colllllial ports (VNnl I Inl.l!e .111.lI ' ..11111
Pan<tma) or lied 10 the C:1di7.lllol1opoly in Spain. 1\\I(.'l1oe; I\il(... Illul1cdi,tlrly
to profit from the measllre.ln fa(l. (onlrahandlrad(' h.IIII"I1): Ilflml ... h(llolllhl"l
formed}' forhidden routes. Hill the If(l\\,n inll"e.I ...nl ii' 11,...1"11,... Ittnl'I .... '01111 " II
({ndel nO\\l place 100xes on Ihe goods th;lt wcre ont c
Partly for Ihis many <l:-pects of Iht: (oltHlI.d el I'11' ,11\\ 11",11 I... Ilt'd IIndn
the I\ollrhons. The porI of Ih,enoe; Aires.:l sl1l:lII.1Ild I.H kll .... lcl 11''''11 III 1-'-(" ':'1"\1
to a cit y of 50,000 by the year 1ROO. Mexi(-tJ \\',1'<; 1111111 ing I hr1'1' 11111(,'" ,I" IIUll II "I1\TI
alldgold in Ihe 17tJOsasii h:ld hecn inlht' 17;lf"'. ('llll1I1\('I't' \\'.1'" 11111\'111,:1,\ Iht
turn (If Ihe cenlur)'.
'rhe Bourbon policies .. ppenred to he a su<-<-c,<; .... I\lllnlni ... ll .It i( ,11 be, .11111' 111'11"
effkient. elcfcnscs improved. COmll1enT s\\'l"llc(1, .Inll g'\VCIUIIl(,I1I,d leU'llUl'
inl.reascd. But creoles \\'ere npsel hy mall)' (If Ih(' ... (' 111.1111:(' .... wllilll 11'11.IIIn,,1
(and often managed) 10 redtu e Iheir $1;1111<; :lndmlllll'Iu I' II W.I" Ilw, 1I.lllin,".!" ",
creole st:tlu". more Ih:'lll Ihe innllell(C llf Enlighlclllnelll Ihi IllglII 1'1 lilt" ex. nll,ll I ,I
Rrilish coloniC's in North I\merk.l. Ihal Illtin.;1!el\ p'I'1111'1c1I 1111' "'1,.IIII.1i
I\mcric:tn (lnnlinions 10 (Ipl I/lr ilHlqlellllclu c.
There hnd heen colonial re"i"l:tntl'. 10 Spani ... h 1'\lle III ht' .... 1It". III 1111""
i\ Illnnl II. d:'lillling to he ;t lineal (Ie"l elltl::ml III lilt' 1m .1 11111, .... leI I .11t IIlIII.I I' 1"\, ,II
wilh.m arm)' of Ile:trl)' RO.OOO men. II lonk ne.H"lr IWII \('.11'" III hllll-lll1ghl"'!: /"
stamp out the insurreclions th:tl "wepl over e;olllhcJ'n 1'('1'11 .lIltl gllh\ i,1 III I -S I Ill<"
nfSocorrn, in New (;rnn:ld.l. vlolenllr pn,Ie... lcd ,lg.Iin...1.11.n Ill( I.""'" .111,1
thc disruplion spread Illtllh 01 the \iLcrn)'.dl\". I\llh"lIgh 1,.11'11'11, 1.11111
t\mericnn historians have llfl('n desnihed ll1e,,(' ('VClll ... ;1<; 'PICI III .... 'r ... 11' lilt, It"I,
led independence oj Ihe ninetccnlh l enl111 y. lId... \\',1'" n,\1 lIlt", \ ... 1,'1
Tllpac Amanl II, sorne strande; ill Ihat in'<;lIrreclit>n I'nilll('d 11)\\'.".1 Intll'l'/'II,lt'l1< ,.
bll1 on leTlns of Indian leadership Ih;lt would ncver g.lin ..."lid \ !"t'nk .... 'Ill1<'11 IlIlllf
t7l{1 rrlwllion in Ne\\' Gmnnt!n.lhe I'rCllc!'olors ditlnol ...ITk indqwlHk'HI" 1'''111 111,
Spanish cl'own. The)' were prolesting wilhin IIll' ,,}' ... ICIll. !lol il
Then how did independencC' come? 011"'(' .lg.lIll 1.1111\ AIlHrll,I' .. I.llt" \\ .....
eletermincd hy d)'nastic I'0lilils in the ()Id \Norili. 1\lln h.lving 'IICtl .llhl
failed 10 help the French Bourhons snv(' Ihcir HOWIl dmlng Ih. lit II< II
Revolution, Spain forged all allinnle wilh FI:'lIlIC In 17
t
lt. ..1 p.lll Ih.11 11,1
directly 10 the annihilation n( the Spanish n:t\)' .tl Ihe Itllilc III 11.ll.drll
(IROS). Mennwhilc, Napoleon HOllap.lrle. !lOW FI .llli 11111.11'''. III I XII
ordered his troops to occupy Portugal. Engl;lntl'" InnglilHc .1I1}' N.lplll,lIn...
armies reached the hills ;lhnve Ihe c:tpilal cily of I ishnn i""l :1" Ihe l"ngl .... h
roynl navy was whisking the Portuguese royal III ,lIlil
court off to Brazil. Napoleon's fOfces then tl1rnl'd In :-'p.lln. III lXOX 111<"\
occupiecl Madrid, planting Napoleon's hrolher, Joscph. on the ;"'1,1111'.11
Ihronc. This W<lS the :tcl lhat prompted Ihe colnnil'''' In 11'\'011
\\'.1:> Sll,lllisll 10 Jost"ph, as supporters ofl:t'rdinand VII held
II)' Naplll,'on r;dlit'd \0 Ihl' caust', A junta \v;lS sci up in Sl'villc lu rule in
[11 IHIO llu:n: li,lltJ\wd a parliament, VI' cortes, dominated b}'
lihl'I'.Lb wh\) had llltlwd illto th\.' vacuulII created by the monarch's
.. III IHI2 it proliaillll'd a thai a:o;scrtnlthe authority of
J'.tr!i.LlllllLt, Iht' Inquisition. and restricted the rok uflhe king.
The Cololliol Response
\Vhl'll N,IJlulcull I'IlI hi" brolhl'rvllllll.' Sp,tllish throlll', tht' LTeules rt'jeckd him as
.lll ju:-t Sp;llliards had dunl'. Since Spain no longer had a
Ihl" ... lll.lllisb 'Irgul'll. n:vl:rted to tIll' peopll'. Cvuld this
lu}!... II... l'''klldt'd 10 all arguIIIl'l\1 lor llldl"pendt:1Ke?
y", thne W.IS ,wthing llll'vitabic about the.:: train of events that overtook
Allll'l L... ;1. Nl'iIlI"-'1 Ihl' European EnlightcnllH:llt nor thl' example of the
k.lll 1{l"vvlutiuLl aiulle wUllld havt: IOllll"ntcd rl'bdlions in Spanish America.
\V111H,ut intLTVl'llliolL, Spanish Ame.::ric<.tn colonies nlight all have
IllLl.llllnl lllLtil wdl illiu till' lIillelt't:llth century, as did Cuba.
Uti .... ultlL"-'li",.'11 PVillls ot 10 N;lpuleun was ilucnos Air\;,s, the seat of
llll' IllW"- ... t vi.l"rlJ>,.tlt y, whll:'>\: l t/lJi!du Ilad alr\.'ady acquired remarkable aut hurlt),. In
IHOt, .Ill '>ljuadrOll LllOlpinl tht:' city of Buenos Aires, sending the vicc:roy
III 111l' ill,,",1 iur tity of<'\'lrdoba. 1\ Litizcn's arlll}' drove tht' British out, and in
IXUi' II IIIOIll...- .'>Iltln .'>llrill Ilf .. .'>ll.Olld atl'u.:k. So it was the creoks, nol till'
Vllllq.,:,d ,Iullturitil.'>, h,h" dt'knded Buenos Airt's frolll Invasion. This
dCIIIlJlI ... 1rakd b(ltll tilt' wl'aklll'SS olthe crown and the capacity of the local citizenr}'.
'\lIotla'r lingl'ring ill 11ll.' Rio de.:: la Plata region was frc:e trade, Tht'
l\ll"I.LIII.lli.,11 Ill" l77H had parliall}' upt'llt'd up trade for Buenos Aires, which
Ullrlt! IIUW '>llip glJud-; to Spain-rathtT than along the lung, lortuou:'>
r"ull' 0\ ,,-r1,lIld 10 1'<l1l;lllia alld lillally thl' Atlanllt'. it wa:'> England, not
:--'1'.1111,111.11 ,,fklnlthl' IllO:'>1 pnllllbing 1ll.Irkd for hides and saltt'd bed. A cuntra-
11,lllt! ll.llk llll'rdllll' ;lIal Argl'ntim: for open COlllllll'I'Ce with
"tlll'r l:llfOpl'.llt lIllllllrh:,:,>
III lHU'), ;Ilkr N.lpul,:oll had uush... d Spallbh King h::rdinand V[I, a young
I'l\\'>,t:f lL,lllll't! Marianu /'vlor"-'I\o frull! BUl'IlOS Airt:s called for a two-year experiment
WIth hlt.tll>, Irel' lrade. MorellO argucd that a stcp would !:ilrt:ngthen loyalties tu
llll' S!I.LILbllll'llWLI alld Ilnlvidt: illCfeased rl.'vt:nut:s-sillCe dutks could be charged
IJU kg,d but llot till \.'onlrab,lIld traffic. La(t: in the year the viceroy granted
Hlll'no,> lilnill'd lfet'dOlll oflradt: with II;\(iOIlS allied to Spain or .. utral ill the
N.lpukOlLk War'.'>. Onel' again, Ihe dill.' of BuellOS Aires tasted political success.
\'Vltl'll Napnkon's furces seized tIll.' (t::nlers of Bourbon resistance in Spain in
IH10, kalling citi/Xl1S liid alld dt:ddt:d 10 (Teutt: a "provisional junta of the Provinces
IIIIIle I{LO dlla I'bta,guvt'fnillg luI' Ft:rdilland VJI.
D
Although it was not until 1816
th.lt d uILIgn.::'>S tUrln"ll)' tlt:dared illdependl'IKt', the pattern had been set.
III IH [0 a sinlibr IllOVt'lIlellt t:llltrged in Canlcas, where lhe municipal cabildo
dl'!,o:ll'd tile ,,-.Ll'taill gl'IH."nd and organizc:d a junta to guvern in the name
r
or Ferdinand VII. As ill Buenos Aires, the insurgent group cOllsisted llwinJ}' 01
weahhy creoles. Its leaders had mort.' dt:cisiw views. The lliost SillllHl
Bolivar, from the beginllillg wanled independellce for Alllerica.
Born into a wealthy creoll' in Cilracas ill 17HJ, Buliv'lr was orpllalled al
lhe age of nine. lie was Ihell St:llt to Spain to complcte his educatiun, "11<..1 aftt'r
three years he returned to Caracas with a young Spanish hridt', who withill 11l01lths
died of yellow fever. Bollv"lr was devastated and remarried. (lIt' did not
deprive hilllself of It'lllale companionship. 1I0wt:\'l'I'.) vVilh hi:; llIagllelk.
charming, pt'rsllasive personality, he inspired luyalty ,lnd cOllfidew,:t' alllolig hb
followers, r:amilbr wilh the ideas of the Elllightenlllt'lIt, 111;' vO\\'l,d ill to rrl'c.::
his homeland from Spanish rult:. [n Jlll}' 1811 the lhal cunvt.'lled 10 govern
VcnczlIel;l responded tu his \'ision by declaring
But the pro-Ferdinand regl'llCY in Seville provt'd more rl'silil-llt thall had uel'lI
expected, sending troul-'s to crush this upstart rebellion. Togl'lher Ilrst with blacks,
then with lIwu:rus (cowboys) of tilt' Vellezuelan intaiur plaills, Spanish linn's
defeatt'd colonial troops ul1llt::r Francisco de Miranda, Bolivar himself 10
es(ape to New Granada. In IMI3 hl' rdtlrned III Vellezuela alld WOIl a st'ries of
startling military victories.
Ewnts in Europe again intrlllleJ. In 1814. ... Napollun.... dt'kat. Fl'l'dilland
VII rl'lurned 10 the Spanish Ihronl.', anllulled the liberal t:Ullslitlllioll uf IHI2, and
restored himself in all absolult' monarchy. Many creoles that sinn' tilt'
king was back, there was no re;lSOIl to continue thl'ir lllohiliz;llion.
Brimming with self-confidence. Simon Bolivar assumed military command of pro-
independence forces around the precocious age of thirty. (Courtesy of the library of
Congress.)
32 I'ARTQNF QUESTIONSANDCONTEXTS
Rolivar now saw his men and munilions dwindle. Afler a series of defeats, he
was obliged in 1814 to nee again to New Granada and then to the English island of
jamaica. He hoped that Spanish America might become a single nation. but knew
the odds were low. Ilere he waS much influenced by the recent failures to establish
republican government in Venezuela, His advice was concise: "Do not adopt the
hest systelll of governmcnt, hut the olle which is most likely 10 succeed,"
In New Spain, evenls look a different course. In a prcemplive slrike
creole patriots. pell;1I$1lIarc,( ollsled the viceroy lose de Iturrigamy in 1808 and
prompll}' recognized Ihe regency in Seville, Mexico City was firmly in royalist
h,lI1ds unlil 1821.
The provinces of New Spain, particularly nOl'th of the capital. were .lIwlher
stOTY By 1810 a group of prominenl creoles. including a priest named Miguel
llidalgo y Costilla. were planning to seize authority in Ferdinand's name. When
the plot was discovered, I-Jid;llgo decided to act. On Seplember 16, 1810. in the
lillie lown of Oolores, he gave an impassioned call to arms. Ane!. curiously, it was
1101 the loc;ll not<\hles who rallied, bill ralher Ihe long-suffering mixed-bloods ami
Indinns. The}' flocked to the banner of the Virgin of Gu<\d;llupe. whom ther had
long <\go appropriated as their own. This "colored plebe" now formed a massive.
angry, undisciplined nrmy-"n horde," in the e}'es of the starlled creole e1ile.
I-Iidalgo's men stormed into the city of Gunnajuato. where they massncred 500
Spallish soldiers and civilians, including the intendant. in an nil-out assaull on the
municipnl grnnary. Afler looting freely. they headed toward Mexico Cit},. llidalgo
struggled to maintain control.
By November 1810. Ili(blgo was 011 the outskirts of Mexico Cit}' wilh nhout
50,000 men in arms. In a decision that hns prompted dehate and speculation ever
since. he Ihell pulled bnck from the city. Surel}' he could have taken the capital.
Wh}' did he wilhdraw? Was he afraid of his own follOWing? Instcnd Hidalgo moved
norlh. Afler <l defeat ncar GU;ldalajara in early 1811, he went on to Coahuila where
he was caplmed and subsequently executed by a firing squad at Chihuahu;l.
I.eadership of the ramshnckle insurgency now passed to Jose Maria Morelos,
another priesl. Like Hidalgo. MoreJos supported the abolit ion of Indian tribute and
slavery nnd even proposed agrarian reform, The laller was an explosive issue
among the colonial elite. He insisted, too. that citizens had the right to choose
their own form of government. Ultimately. Morclos envisioned "a new govern-
ment, by which all inhabitants, except pe"imulares. would no longer be designated
as Indians. mulattoes, or mestizos, but all would be known as Americans." Thus
Morclos combined nationalism with a commitment to social and racial equality.
In 1813 the Congress ofChilpancingo declared Mexico's independence from
Spain (although it is Seplember 16, Ihe anniversary of Hidalgo's speech, Ihat is
celehrated as the country's independence day). The congress also decreed that
slavery should be abolished nnd that Roman Catholicism should be the slate
religion. The constitution, adopted the following year. affirmed the ideal or
popular sovereignty, created a system of indirect elections, and designed a
powedullegislalUre ;llongside a weak Ihrccpen;;on executive.
r
Meanwhile the Spaniards werc winning mililary vktorit... ()nc 01 Ihe' ...h
cOlllmanders was the young Agustin de Iturhide. laler In I,I.I)' .1 letllr . l 1111,' III
Mexican independence. In IRIS Morelos wa.. c:lpillred.tricel (hy II1IfI,i'lli.'n .1'.
well as by secular ;luthorilies). nnd exeollcd. Olhcr<; lonlillll1'll 1" ligllr I"r Ih,
cause. htlt Spaniards now held Ihe upper hnnc!.
Thus ended the first phase of Ihe Spanish Amcrk.lIl indl'flcnolcrHl' 11l"\"I'
menls. New Spain's Morelos and' Iidnlgo wcrC' hOlh dcad. Holivnr 1.1Ilglli .. !l(',1 ;11
exile in Jamaica. Thc junla in Ihe Rio de 1.1 Plata In 11I,linl..ill lHlll\' ,10.1
h;ld yet to call for indcpendelllc. B}' wllh Ferdin;ll1d halk fllIthc Il1rl'II\.II11
Spnnish crown appe;lred to h.l\'e sllllffee! (Ilrt its colonialichellloll
Achieving Independence
The Spanish military advanl;lge in Snulh Amcrica did 1101 In"l long. III IS 1(, \:,,11\.\1
returned 10 Venezuela and hegan his cnrlier vicll,rje... Hili 1I0W 111' h.lol
allied with lose Antonio l':iC7, Ihe hrilli;lnl lender of rhe k.II!c.."II./,/n,,', ",11.,1 . 1,1
earlier lought for thc royalists. NtlW 1':1('1 wns fighting 1"1 illdcl'Clldl'IH " Irl>ll1
Spain. Bol1vnr's cause wns fmllier bolstered hy Ihe ard";ll ,Ii I L'illlnl \ ,'rHCll'" II "111
Engl;'llld, which b)' IRI9 llumbered over '1{)OO, 'I'hu!'o .. rIC'Il,I:Illcrw,t. l-:oIIV.I' ,'''; . 1,
lished firm control of VCllczucl:l h}' early IHI!J.
After defeating Spanish fol'ces in New (;r.lIl:lda, Hnli\'.11 .11It'lIlpICt! III IX'I I..
crealc a IlCW stale of Corml Cnlomhi;'l. ulliting VCllezuel:l. Ncw (01,111,101.1 111.1
Ecuador. It gained lillie supporl. so Boliv.lr lIlarl hcd ..lIlIlh\\.IHI. hllllll1lg '''1
more fO}'alists and Spaniards 10 (lefeal.
Me:"ll1while. jose de S;'ln Martin was cllndtlcting .111 exl/.I,lldlll.II\' 1111111,1/\
campaign in the sOllth. The son of a Sp:tni<;h officer. horn I>n IIll' llullhCI II IHllltll'1
of presellt.da)' Argentina. he hegan a milil;lr}' C:lre('T at thc .1}.:C 01 l'!c\'cn. III IS I.., Ill"
offered his services 10 the juntn in Huell(ls Aires. h:lVillg dt'ddl'll III I.w'" 01
independence for the colonies. A soldier hy tr:lining :tnd oul1l1"I-. hI' ,trd 11,,1
hnve Ihe political acumen of Bolivar or Ihc sod... I comlllit'llC'l1t of i\llllfI ..... hill
he was a skillful milil;lry slrategist.
As commander of the rehel fllrces, :-;an Maltin \\1.1" rl'.I,I}' II\' ("III)' I,l<l t"
attempt one of the most daring exploits nrlhis Cfa: le;lchng .111 .11 III V III ,;oon.1t r' .....
the Andes for a surprise altack on royaiisl tfl)()P" in Chile. I k I .llight Ihe do.
completely orf guard. won a major victory in thc h... llir nl (-h.h.lhlhll. ,llltl
triumphantly entered the cit)' ofSantiagn. San Marlin now !,I('pared 1111 III\' 111\/
step in his campaign, the liberation of Peru.
By 1820 San Martin rcached the Peruvian coasl. Liul.l \\'.1', l"vcn 11I01" 1lI"".H
chistthan Mexico City. All hough the c!evnlion of Bueno.-. A;re" In" vl\e'II},.1I1\ III
the Bourbon era had hurt Lima cconomically, its monarchist scnliment wa .. ,1111
strong. Creoles and PCllifJ5l1larcs both tencled to favor the continuation nt
Ferdinand VII's rule. S<l1l Martin wilhheld his altack, Yr dn tIlIi ..('ck
milit<lry glory. nor nm I amhitiolls for Ihe title 01 cnn<IIICI"lIl" fll I'CIII: I ,1111\ \\1.. 11
10 free it fr0111 oppression. Whal gond would I.im:l do Ille il il" inhahll.1l1t .. \\,,'11
hostile polilic:llly?"
H 1'.\lilt'NI ... 1.'PI"'IIP ... ,\NIH IINI 1<' I'"
I kll', lilli, 1.... lll,d ill l;ltal)'z,.'d lVt.:nl:>. Whcn Ferdin:tnd VII
"'U,LUlllIl"d 11111lllitiL,d amI el1dorsld th,liberal \,.'llllStitlitiOll of
IX I ..!. Illl' IllIll.lhuUI II II llld hi:,> LiIll.1 They wcre ..:ially dbl
<I\'l'l Illl' . hllllli"l1 "I Ihl' Inl(lIbitloll .lIld Ihe challl'ngl.' to the dignity of
1\1.111)' lllllld UII IIlllll;lrl.hk.d authorily. bUI 1101 Ull Ihl' role .tnd
I'IIWl'l III Ihl' dHlllh,
'1111'" 111111 III l'vl'nl-. ill SI'.lill altered Iht.: dim:!l\:' 01 opinion In
:'ll.Xhl' ( Ily . lld I llll." Illdq)l'lldlllll:.' 1111111 SI1aili 110 l,-mgl'l .1 ladit::,d Ill"
1'\ l'll .1 111"'1..1 I..WW r-Juw it \\',1 j tJII:>t', "alive goal, .1 01 uphnlding
II,Hlllh'lhd \'.IIlIl'" .llld ::'UlI.d llllk fh if .Ilknuwll;'dgllig 1.lI.."t, tile (lilJl!do 01
[1111,1 ill\ill'll I\l.lrllll III l'nll'r Ill..: dly ill mid 1X21. 011 July 2M ht' lonnully
III I'll-linlnl I hI' 1":1' vi I'lrtl.
Alll'r 1111 tlU:l .. wilh rtl)' San Marlin wl'nl ltl for
. Ill .. Wllh SilllUll Bullvar. EX:lllly what happl'lled Ihl.'re ha.... IH.vcr
l,t.t.lIl..... I.tltll ... lll.tl. Buhl' r 11M)' h.IVl :-,:1 11ll: IUlIl' wh":ll he ollcrnl a to the two
. II-,llnt HIl'1I III AIlll'lll.l, 1VI.lrtin and himsdf. Apparently Uolivar.
..... 111 IlIUll.IILh)' ill Pl'ru, un Ihe uniun 01
(II.L11 ( III0lllbl.l .Illd dl'lltllnl San ulkr to SCI'Vl' llllckr lib UllIllIHllld, In
lllY ";.111 1\1,lllill lllt'lI <III his ulfkt:s and .... uon wt'1l1 to Enrop", whl.'re
IIl'dlnIIIlIH'ltl.
III 1.lll IX:! \ Bullv.1I II Hwnl to I'l'ru, wlll'rl' Iii ... 1I1aint ... illl'd
,Ill 1111I"".lng Itlill', III IX}I tht' 11I)di .... b wac d"'lbivdy dl'feated by lulonial
lil/"p'" III lilt' ballk III Ay.ll'udlu. III 11:)25 Bolivar t'nlcrl'd Uppa Pcru
d,ty Bulivi,l) ill Iltl' lltlp": Ihal I'eru and Uppa P..... u mighl form a
:>lllgk 11.1111111. hut hl' W.I::' tUII 1.llI:. Thl;' rl;'gional leaders 01 Upper Pl'nl Wcrl'
;,d 1111 Lft'.lting Ihelr IH"n repuh!ll,.. Thl'y pnullplly did naming it lor
HlIll\.ll .lIltl 1l1.Ikllig hUll I'm Iik,
,\lll'l lI.:IUIllillg 10 Lilli Uvlil';'lr \"'l'lll un Iv (..;r'lll Culumhi.t. hoping to patdl
Ul' Ihl' I.tlilng ulliull. By nuw hc h,ld grUWII hilli..'r and vindktivl'. Ihal his
,lll..L1I1" h.ld latlnlill 1ll.Ih:ri.dizl'. In Ix3U huth Venczuela ;and Et:lIadur withdrew
1l"/Ill,r.llll \llulIlhi.l. Sul"krillg lrum tuben:ulosb. 13ollv"r looked b.lCk in
r\ Illl'nl .1," Ill' -b unguvt"rnahle. whu served revoluliun hav,
ptllwnl Illl' Un l)eu:lIlb... r 17, at thl' :Igt: uf unly the Liber"tur
I!. ",:wtl .IW.I)'.
In 1\ k,'(Il,.\ I Iill' ddi:.11 ul ill IXI5 stallt:d the illdc:pl'lldt:IKt: lllUVI'-
IlIl'lIl ulItll h'flhll.llld VII deducd tu the uf 1812, thus
111I .. l'III::>I',-'llllb .llld pruinilll'nt l tu thc sidl;' of independ"ncc, 'rhl'
\\".. Inl by the Agu.... tin dl' Iturhidc who had led the: royalists
till' imkpllIdellt.:t.' l1luVClllcnt aCljuired:1 tinge.
Till' IIlljHllllllli.;tit !turhidl' the viceroy 10 giw him cOllllll:Jnd of
1<1)'.111 ... 1 ill IhI:.' I Ie 111 ... 11 IlI:lrlhnl ag.linst il n:bd ll'adcl' with whom hl'
1IIIIIII'dl.ltd)' ",Iftll,.k .III ;dIJ.Uh.C lur Illc .....tkl uf inJcpt'ndcllL'e, In 1H21 hl.:
L.i11 1111 tllrc..T "; ul religlun (the Catholic faith 10 be thl.' official creed), of
llld"-'pl'lldl'nl..l' ulldcr a motlarl'hy). ;and uniun (f.lir tre;ltmenl for
.... ;Llld !'ClltlL\lIlllrl's alik... ). Ilurbid..: IllOk I\k:OLlI Lit)' Oltld l.. I. hh.. :Ill
l'mpirc -wilh hillisi'll, lIfCOLlfSt', as lllIJk'ror. II LI .... ll.'d ollly Iwu )'l..tr.....
III CelHlal i\llIcrita. Iht: I.llltlld crt'1I11' hlI.llIll..' won Ild .Ibout Jlbl"f.1I
dUlIIiname ill Spain.l."l 1i.1l1 un'lI Ilwir lUllllll.'rp.1I b ill f\kXIlU, III 1H21tltl.: (:t'1l11.1I
,\llIcril..-an dccidcd hi Cbl I"l wIlh Illllllldl.... l'lllPIII' .Ind
;lllllUllllccd lhcir lu ruyali .. t l\!lXI<.:O. \Vh... 11 Iltlrbidl' ill
IX2J, lilt: Cl'lltr.11 Alllt'rkan ;-.l.lllo.'.... , Imlll Ctlall'lll;d.1 Iu t:u... ta Itil-a
("'xdudlllg 1'.lllama). h":I..IJlll Illl' indl'jlt'Jllk'lll Lhlllni l'rl,,,illLl..' .. 01 Cl'lllr.d
A/IIel'll. ... By thl' Sp.lIns lioldlllg.... III Ihl' Nl\\ \V"lId \\\'1,' lnllll..l'! III
CulM .Int! !'ul'rlu 1{llU.
The BroziliCln Path
Indl'jJl'ndvllLl' CIIEllo.' lu U...li'il III ,I IIl.IIIlIl'r WI)' lilHvlcnl !lOlll 1IJ.lt (II Sp,llli ... h
Am... ,.il.l. Thai p.lrtl), dUl' ltlth..: l:ll..I Iklt Br.Il.i1 \\',I .. lJ)' IHUU loll" IIhlll'POpuIIHI",
,lilt! lh.llllhl;' liny lIlollll.'l ,,-UlIlIl!")'. By ,-1I11tl.I.. I.1I11 ::'lIlgll' UIIUlli,d
klTllor} e'lu.dt:d 1lI1'1Iul>ulil.lll III ClUJlUllIl1.. III pulllll.11 1'"\\".1. \VIIlII till'
'IJllI.li.tl.... jlrul,.lainll.d llldcpl'IIt!l;'llll. IUtlgll1 Il.ll..k SIMllbl1
Alill.'Ill.:lIlS glcw til 11.111:.' Ih..: ll"O\\'II, Till' l'urtllgul.....l, 1111 Illl' IIlhl.l 11.1I1t!, did !luI
t'VCll havl'lhc ll1ilil,lry pmWl til lhl' 1111IVlIIIW.lld l'ultlil...1l ,IUlolIlllll\,.
I'hl.: It)lIkxt of Hr.lzili.lll illdcpelldl'll(l'lluillll:tIUII .lllllllllr 1111I'(III,.nl dith:;
CIlll;', \Vhl'll lht' N.II,oll'ullil Mill)' Illvadl'd Iht.'li.1 ill I Il\l'lllht'r IXU7. 111,'
llllirl W.I ... abk til lin' III Bra'lil. Ih.lllk.. III Illl' Bllli:,>h 1"1))'.11 11.1\)'
l)ll.l"llig IIll' l."(111)llral pt'riml. 1'0011lgal h.ld IIt,t aIJ'I\\'nl il:'> Illlllilll.t.ll
It) I'pl'rak j1lilltirlg 1)1l........ III lladl' wllh (Jlh":l
11.ltJlllb. l'hl' .11;'\\'1)' .llTivld J,!"bili' Il'gl'lll .11Il! L.II1 1.11)11011\,.11 1)1)111 JO.III VI
pnlll.II,}tly l'lId 01 lOlllllll'rll.11 IllOlllllh,l}' h) upclIillg
BI.II.II pUll .... III:'> loglt.' W,I .. N,lpt,II.:OII IIIIW 1I11111'IIk-d "ullug.d,
lht:' lxil..:d llIoll:ll'l.:h luuld lUllIllIlll' III bl'lIdit llUlll IUfC:lgn
IIJd,' .. II lhe fOlllll'rly l'xdusivc: lillk wilh M;,'Vl.'lnl. Tht 1I11ll1l'
bc"lll'flClanl's w{'r,-' Ihl' whll hild, aftl'r ;1/1, hroughl 11ll' BI.JgdIIZ.1 I,unil\'
.lIltl ib rdinUl' 10 Brali!. .
Brilain gill.ned privilt-gl.d .ll"(I.:.... tu Br .111 ill IlilU by 01111..1.11. Iilln'n )'1.'....
.lgret'lIIcnb wluch (I) g:.lVl Britain Ihl' Ivwc t t.... dl (l'wn JOWl'!' tli.lll l'uJ'lug.d!)
1111 e.llll'ring lkazil; (2) (l.)Jllmilkd tl.e lll)WII 10 III": gl,ldll;11
abulltloIIU/lh{' Afrilall slav..: Ir<llk alld guarallkl"t1 Britlsll .... i.l Bral.il
thl' right of Irial by Britbh-namt:d Ire.1I i..: ... :,>uun deq) I
llIt:llt .Illlung Ihe Hra'lili... u dik.
Tht:' cxill't! PurtuguC'st' lIIo11arl.h lIu\\' Sd .d)UlIll..Il.ltilig II..:W Ill:'>lilullllU..... Mli..11
a natiunal libr:lfy, :I nativnal alld a bot.lllil,..d g.lldl'Jl, all ill I{ill dt'
Jalldro. Dotll Joau VI illvilcd a French III spcnl
ill ;11'(hilccture. painling. anJ M:ulpIUJ'l',
. ,Tht:' lmWII to altr.lli IUl"l.:lgl1 1111IIlIHl.IIlt::. 10 BI.I'lI!. II Ilad VCf)'
hnulcd ..... Eurup...an illlllligialilill llol to bq\lll ulllilthe
I.IIt: II:)HOs. There tv prulllutl' (l;'xtilt- lIl.lll11l.lClllll, illdudillg rcpl'.i1 uf
Jh PART ON!' QUESTIONS AND CONTEXTS
the 17R5 rorOlI decree IhOlt hOllllled all But meOlsures could not get al
Ihe deeper causes of BrOlzil's economic backwardness: the lack of capilOlI, tech
nology. skilled labor, n sigllirlcant domestic market. and a reliance on for all
forms of l11;mu31 work.
In 1814 French troops were driven from Portugal, but forces Ih31 had
joined the Portuguese in expelling the French remained. Arter they. too. len the
country. an assembly (Corles Gerais) was called to write a new constitutioll. The
newly vichlfious Portuguese Liberals. interested in exploiting Brazil's wealth.
pressed for the return of the ro),al court to Portugal. Dom J0:10 soon did retum
hi Lisbon. 1c<lving SOil nom Pedro hehind in Brazil <IS the prince regent of the
<':llInhined Kingdoms.
Altention now focused on the Cortes Gerais. which :lpproved measures that
would have restored Lisbon's roynl trade monopoly in Brazil. The Cortes also
approved me<lsures returning (he individtl:ll Bra7.ilian provinces to direct :lnd
rule from Lishon. therehy undermining the central rule created in Rio
ele I:mcirn nflcr 1808. However the Portuguese Liberals were in Portugal,
Ihe)' :lhhorred the move toward aulonomy ofthcir Americnn "co-kingdom.
M
The landowners and urhan profeSSionals who constituted the Brazilian elite
had heen pn'paring to confront lhe Porluguese recoloni7.ers. Their passionale
rhetoric ovcrnowed Ihe n('dgling Rio press. They wanted the prince regent, DOIll
Peelro. to remain in !'ra7il. The Cortes in Lisbon. however. demanded the prince
regent's immediate.- return anel look new steps to reverse Brazil's growing
autonomy. The Brazilinn plantation owners' pressure on Dom Pedro now paid
ofr: on September 7. 1822, he defied the summons of the Cortes, "I ndependence or
he cried, giving birth to the only durable independenl monarchy in
modern Lntin American history.
To win their independence. the Brazilians had to fight, but not on the $cale of
the Spanish Americans. The lIerce.',t combat came in Bahia, on the llorthe<lstern
coasl, and Gr:1o Pari in the easlern Amaz.on v:llley. In Bahia a junta proclaimed
loyally 10 Portugal nnd fought off the local pro-independence rebels, In lR23 the
rebels trillll1phed, nielcd hy Admiral Cochrane. one of the English military omcers
hired to give the rebel governments experienced help in combat. Another mer-
cell;lry. Admiral Grenfell. led the victory over a similar loyalist junta in Grao P;ld.
Ilis rorces then mopped tip ;l local rebel wing that was demanding more radical
social change. In Brazil. in Mexico. the elite was alert to repress any fund;llllenial
challenge to the socioeconomic establishment.
Portugal's military weakness partly explains why Brazil's struggle for indepen-
dence proved far less hloody than Spanish Equally imporlnnl. the
Braz.i1ian rebels did not split over the issue of republicanism because, wilh a fe'>,'
exceptions, the elite preferred a monarchy to a republic. Thanks to the exile of the
court, the Brazilians could opt for an independent monarchy Ihat legitimized
centraliz.ed rule. Brazil thus entered independence with a unique legacy. Not lenst
imporl:lnt. Brazilinns did not associntc independence with mililary prowess: no
Brazilian Simon Bolivar or Martin arose to domin:lle the patriotic imaginatinn.
The Aftermath of Independence
The new Spanish Americnll repuhlics faceel fnrmid:lhlc pTlllllellle; a.. they tIIIII.I' ke, I
on independence in Ihe 1820s. The physical vinlcl1lC of Ihe W.\r" wroughl t,,,
nomic disaster. The deslruclion prohahly reached ils highee;1 poinl in \'('111'/110"1.1.
where guerra a mllerte rW:lf 10 Ihe took :l hl'.IV}' Inll 011 hUIll.1Il llie Ilw
e.. rly of the Mexic<lll war.., particuJnrl}' tlllIing Ihl' l,lTllp,ligll" IIf IlitLll,:'1
and Morclos. took a similar loll 011 p('oplr ;lncl propcll)'. llrllglla\, wh('l(' I".. ,
Artigas led hands of gaucho rehde; ngainsl \\'c1I-cnlrendlnl :-'p,llli.. h Im"I''' ..1'''"
suffercd grave losses. During the e;ec("lnd ph.I"e ,)f Ihe lIlnVt'llH"nl. Ihe 1111'.111', ,,1
operations shifted to other nre:lS, ee;peLi:llly I'('ro, whcrC' Ill(' lIghling :lI'I'I'.II" 1.'
havc bcen less intensive Ihan hefnrc hut Ihc hurdell fll <;111'1'1" ling 1.11 gt .1I111h'.
was nevertheless Ilcavy. The civilian I.lhnr ftme W.I" thO, i111.II('d .llltl,
Ihe conlinent. C:lpilal was scarcc.
The economics of the new nOli iOlls were overwhc1l11inglr h.l... eil (Ill .1gt h III II' t'
and mining. This was equally tru(' of mosl of Ih(' wl1dd olllsit!C' V,I('<;I FlIrnpc y,'1
Lnlin America differed frolll1l10S1 of Afrita,lhe Micldle- En,,1. and l\<;i.I illlh.II 11\"1"1
the POlst lwo and Ol half cenluri{'<; it lind hecn p:"II.III)' hr"lIghl Illin IIH' wnd,1
Imding economy dominaled hy Fllrope. II W;I', Ihe expoll.lhk <;llrpill" Irnlll 1.11111
American :lgricultural ;llld proclucliolllh:lllillk<'d il III Ihe fllih AILIlIl"
ecollomy. With the creation of sep3fnlc cOllnlric... Ihi .. h,l"i\ t't II!lOl111t .. Ililt 11111'
relllained intacl almoe;t eve'1'whcre. e;lowly 10 he Illnl!irlcl! III "\I{ l('('.lillg tin ,Ill,.
Trade had come 10:tn almnsl <;,lanl!e;lill h('lwe('1I IHIlI .1Ild IX '(.
COllllllerce with .spain had stopp<'d. anil Irnele t h(' lOt Iller. 1Ilnllic.. W.I" .11 ... "
greally reduced. Northwesl Argentina. for inslancc, sulrcrel! hom Ih(' 10..... /II t.. "I,
wilh Peru. Guerrilla wadare in New Spain alld olher :ll"(':I" Ill.Hk Ir:lll"I'flIl dlillt .tll
;llld dangerous. Communical ions syslems within nnd hel w('l'n Ihe Illfrncl \ nit Il1l1''',
never much hy the !-il'aniards, fell inlo !lcnr 1111 ..1 di<;ll ..C
rhere also the (aclor of poslindepend(,lltc I'q,:il111al \(Illflill willl'll
l1l:ljor arcas of Spanish :lnd I\lllcrka. MexilCl W,I .. wr.H ked 11\'
batllcs which kept Ihnt country divided and withoul dIet live l1alion:l1 dirTi I,nn
hefore lR50. Brazil. :11 Ihe S:lllle time, cnllnp<;ctl inl0 ;l .. eric.. pf Iq':IlIIl.ll!.1
revolts after Pedro I abdic<lled Ihe Ihronc and relurned 10 1,lImpC', I('.ldll).: II"
live-year old son and heir. Pedro II, under the gllil!;mct:' of:l rcg(,llq'. rill .. 11'11
the monarchy effectively neulrali.,ed ulllillhe IRtlOs. Ancl in Ihe nill tiC' 1.11'1.11.1
region. the fierce rivalry hclwcen the provilKc of BU('llo<; Aire<;, ;llld Illl' 1'('''' OIl
the counlry was tempomrily resolved only hy Ihe (licl;1Inr<;hip nf JWlIl jVl:l11lld
de RosOls (1829-52). Everywhere Ihe 11l0ve was 10 ns<;,ert ('(lI11omi( .WIlIlI"l1"
by locality or region. That meanl fmgmcnt:llinn. In Sp:llli:<;h Arn('li\a il !lH.II!1
thai Bolivar's dream would be huried tinder Ihe advance of (}IlC
after another of the new repuhlics claimed economic int!C'pcIHlcllcC'. Till'}
would soon lind the world market a lesl.
In mnny pariS of .spanish Americn. Ihe ncw had 111 dc.1I \\'llh
public debts evell hefore they could allemp' 10 rehlliltl 111('lr ('t (1IlOIlIit' ... 1'11 SII .. I.II II
the lighting. to equip the armies. Ihe insllrgelll regill1c" (rcl(ll('nl I)' h:,,1 11'11111.1 itl III
Americall
a c1wnnd
1"'IWW lund:- '1'.1.\ .. "lk.. tiulI, to plll ilillildly, wasdilfi..'lllL. Asa result, the national
ll .... l... tlli ... weI ..' ellll,I)'. <lll..1 guveflllllc:nt authorities had to turn elsewhcr(' for
11111..1 .... A prilile :-uurc.. was Britain. where hankers supported the regimes with
11I.LlI'" lJlArgclltll1a, Chill', l'crll. and Mexicu. Thus 11.1c Ill:W guv('rn
1Ia-lib 11111Ilnlt.lldy rail Ul' dd>ts to lurl'ign ItlIders. Managing th(' fureign debt
1"'IlI.llll ... d, d(IWII II' Ihc pn:sellt day. a major problelll fur Latill Am",rican
h"V,,llllllClll:-.
,\n"lIl"'l .IH.L ill WllI .. 11 fllH;"i!:)1l ... "pilal illvcsted was the African slave tradt:',
\.... 1,1..11 u/lltIIlU..,1 011 ,11;Lrgl' Brazil (unti11850) and Cuba (ulltiIIH65}.l3ulh
h.ld .Ill "'),PUI I uri ... lllnl itllltllrt: Ihat llIJde slavt:.' labor prufltable during all era
\\,IIt'1I II \V.I'" l,dug "bulbh... d ..,n.: in the ''''eskrn I klllispht.'re.
lilt' )''''.11 ... hl'l Wn'lI DUU and Iii'll) saw I.alin America'::. exports to the North
1\11.111Ih n'llllltlll), ill .. '['Ill' l"ulluwillg wcr", key prinlar)' products: wheat and
lIlll,lI ...... hU1l1 (]Ilk. IlJba.. ..:o Irulll Culombia, hiJ",s, salkd bet:.'f. <Iud wuul frum
:\ I!-:"'111 111.1, gll.IlI" In !Ill 1.. rtI, 11 UIlI Cub'l, cuITt.'e frum 13n.lZil, and GIGIU from
\ ...lloud.1. S.llIl .. .. werl' h",avil)' illlporting texliles alld conSlllller
!'.pud , Ih... I,,by ult..-l1 1111uwing lucd artisan producers out of work. It was thl'
lIldtl lll.d ill We::.t EmuJ'l." (especially Hritain) competing against tile
.. Ill.dl ..... d... l.all1l Allleri.:all pruduc.. who had survived froll1tht. colonial era. The
l ..... ult lVII,.gllll,,C(Hldu::.iull.
'1111'" .ill part III fl ...... tr.ld.., lin: dugllw that had arrived ill Latin Arnl'rica wilh
I IIIlgIIIL"11l11"'1l1 I ;Illd the cOlllmit m",nt lu the prilldpks
til lIb,J,dISHl. Applying tlli::. dogma W;.IS tht.: llIosl signifkant policy
d..... I.. ioll I.atin America. Alollg with a rapid inflow orfureign
(I'lilll.lld)' itllpvfb (";1111 ..' a small cadre uffordgn merchants. csp"'cially
Hllll ... h.1 1I ..y oc...lllll.. k... y tlJruughuutl.atill America in the import of goods
.11 h I :-. ..1 VlL...... , till." l.tlll."1 in.. ludillg ::.Idppmg, insurance. and tlnancing.
\W be Ih.11 lllallufa..-tllrcd govds frolll Europe dis
111.1l"-"ll dUllll,.Slk 11l(ldw.. I::.? Wa::'II't il lllr.:vilal>k thaL Eurupt.'s greater technolugy
.111<1 ,'ltllll/lilin 01 wuuld prr.:v.liI? Transpurtatioll costs should hav", hdpnl
I'll 'k.. 1 II)l.1I 1)1 \ldll... Ihl." (VI' genuille) superioril)' uffurcign-ma..le
).'"",,1... I ,,'.... l,l a dil..-lllilia soull alkr illdepelldence and has (,:ontinued down
I" hldd)'. I..lli .. AllleriLallecollomit.'s ulien tailed tu make Iheir own industry Iruly
,PIUPl'lLIIVC ,vil)'? I.....k 01 a markd was certainly a faclor. Hut equally
ltlJl'''II.1111 Ih... ul .1II ..llhe sod.1I hit:rarchy which made it
hi ... 1"1 IIll' ..lit..- II) perl'dll""'-''' based 011 all agrarian-orientcd ecollomy.
'1 hI.: r..... unll/llhe ItUU-50 pl,.riod is therefore Olle aJapta-
III/II I" th.., WUlld ....:UIIUllly. l.atin AIlll'rka W;IS oJlthe fringes ufthe North Atlantic
l.... UIH/llly, whkh was tu l'xpand r;\pi ..Hy ill the nineteenth nntury. Both research
Iud ,1.11.1 lit I IIH' l(otlullli..: hbtury uf this era aI'''' distrcssillgl)' scan.:e-but it
dl'lh.II .... Ih.. uf "'vitkllt'e .. vailable. Ihat Latin Ameril"a's republics took a
1'.' ... .,1\" .. 1.111..... The ..:allle IrUlll uutsidt'.
'I'll .. u..alioll alhl Illaillkllau,,:t:.' llf large armies in lllust Latin
Il'I'IIIJlll.:- .Lbo .. Ill .. i,tll)' alfeckd III .. vrder they crei.lted
.. TIll' c ... l... llI.d hlllllllatltJlb .11)
fur I,,-... reers bast:.'d un talcll!. As tht.: fighting illkllSillc.:d ;llld LIIl' sl.Jke::. ill .. rlas",d,
I.:reolt.:' kid 10 rl,.cruit suldiers :lnd cUllllllanders 011 al>i1ily, n\tht:r lhall
011 skin color or social stOll us. Thus JOSt' Anloniu 1'.1(,1., a rOligh-hl.'Wli I/It'Slizu,
bcc'IlIl" a valued militilfY kadt'r ill Vellezuda. III Mexico lOSt' Maria Mordus was
11If>stiz(). Olher t:.'xalllpies abuund. Milil;lry pmw..ss lIl'crlllIe a by wbidl
llllmb..-rs of Jllarginal groups could gain social rl'cognition. NOlle of Ill .. n"'wl}'
gowrnlllt'liis retained legal disabilil fIll' l,r (It hers of lllixnl
racial backgruunds, a faci whkh Ildped to blur Ull ... e rigid
But if Iht:.' wars 0pclled a social aveHue for II/csti:w:. and olh"'rs,
mobility was lilllited. Eco/lotllic rCSoUHI'S, p'ltlkularly lalld. r"1I1.dned ill th..
hands t)f lraditional creolt CotllJ1ll'r,,-,.., was tllIJdeSI ill Ihe ye.. right
after the fighting. ;llld lllatly merchanl (alllilie::. rdaitl..d tlll'ir l,.ulllrul 01 tr"de.
Industry bardy exiskd. As a rt:.'sult, tiler.. only Otll' way lor 11ll:JI of 1I10th'St
origin to gd lhrutlgh 11le military. and fruln th... re Intu pvlil ::..
This suci;d dynamk hl'lps explaill llllll.h of the pulitical turbllkll e ill Spani::.h
I\llltTica Ix,tweell tILr.: U:l20s alld 185U. The lIew rcpubl ..... ::. tlllish..d lht' wars wilh
J.lrge military e::.lablislull",nLs. often I.... d by lIIestizos who had IlU altl'rnallv", .... lr...
To get ahead they had tu stay ill Ihl' arJlI)'-ur tlIlJve inlo guveflll1l",nl. Itl the
]ll ..untillle, cr..:ole lamh..lWllerS, ill many parts uf t ht.' 1.:0llt illelll, dId 11111 ..'01111''''11,.' lor
pulitical puwer. They withdrew to Iheir hacklld.ls. whidl ,,'uuld J"Ulldioll as
suflkie1l111niIS, alld tried to l!leir lalldhuldings. III dkclthe)' Il.'ft gUVl'lll
111",111 (0 lhe "lid to Ih.., tJIlSSl'S known wlldiflv:., hl ..... IlIM pulilictl
IMW... ,. did not Seem wurth lhl' lrouhk. Later ill lilt' nllldn'nth l,.tlltury, wllt'JI
govenlllll,.'nial authuril}' bl'l.:alllt' a V,dUl"d cOlllll\odity, !lIIet'lIi/lIdus <Ill..! estOllci,ru:.
Cllllt' of( tlll;,ir lands alld look uvtr.
So gov"'rlllllellts Wl'rl.' luppkd alld rUJI hy (ll//lli/!u:., olkll !'>lIldil'rs (or l'1(-
soldier:.) wl10 took power b)' 1<lr(e. Unc.. ill lit ... pre::.i"!"lllial ullin', thC)'
IOllllJ thai sparse tr..'asuril's oflCred lillie rr.:ward lor Iheir Thc.:ir IJallds
thell dbp",rsed. and new ci/Ilflilfus would l,.Ollle lurward wilh Ill'W h'!llds of
folluwl'r:.. The gnv"'rJllll"'lltS did not havl.' strong ;lIld as .. resull w..re
highl), vulnerahle to b,,'ingowrtlll'lHvn. FrolJllhl,.' ...elltuI'Y, polilical
authority ill Spanish Am.....ica W.IS weak; th.. a ",,,ntr.. 1 did nol
wield llluch autonOlllous strength.
DUring this era i1notht'r current llll",rgni. a Iliuve lu 1.:I,.l11sulidak and cellI r:1lizl'
It usually came out in attelllpt ....! nol pupular CUllSetlSU!'>. Tilt'
first 'twv decadl's arkr indep",ndence thus saw till' appearanl.:t:.' uf real or wuuld-hl.:'
Jl1l'Il." like Dic:go Pllrt;J1..,S ill Chile illld Juan Manuel de Rusas ill ArgentiJla,
who sUllghllu impus", Ihdr will Ull tlwir .... Olllltri ... III"-'rl.'b)' strenglhl'lling tilt.: rolt'
of the siale. The struggle betwl'en locally based puwer ;Iud Ihl' centralizers-
military or civilian-became;\ basic thclIle ill tht' polilkallife of tlte llt'\\' nations.
If the Wars of Indq)t.:ndell..:e Upl'lll'J narruw ch.lIll1l'is for and luiddle
range groups ill Spanish AIll.... l'ka, they did vt:ry lillie lur tht: Indian masses. In
g""lIt'nll, Ilatives playn.l an ambiguous role in 1111,.' struggle: thvugh the)' sidnl with
I Iidalgu ur st.. ye..! neutral in M",xku. lhl,.y supported ru)'alists ill suutllt'nl Chik, .uul
'10 PAn r nNE. QIJES'110NS ANI> C:ONTIX
in Peru ;lnd Cn!nlllhi;l they fought on both sides. The IcOtders of the new repuhlics
therefore did not feci in(lcilted tn the Indi;lns. More imporl;lnt. the Indians now lost
the sped:ll protection of ..;aste status they h;ld enjoyed under Spanish colonialla\\'.
Whatevcr ils drOtwh;lcks. thOlt status had bccn ;In on-used refuge for the Indi;lns.
They :llso losl Iheir cOlllmun:l1 lands (which h::l<! been inalienable) :md were
theoretic.. lly forced into Ihe compelitive market so praised by nineteellth-c('nulI1'
lihcmls. In fact, they hecnllle even 1110re isolated and poverly-slricken.
Independence left n sOlllewhnt different social legacy for Brazil. Instead of
rJi$placillg:l mling eli Ie, ;lS happened ill Spanish America. Brazil aall/ired ;l ruling
elite: the Porluguese crown ;lnd it .. ;lltcndants. MmlY of the Porluguese who ;lrrivcd
with the I'oy;ll court quickly illtcgnltcd into the local c1ile f;llllilics. huilding close
politic;ll. eCDl1omic. :lI1d soci;llties with uppcr-c1::lss Brazili'lIls. Hrazil also acquired a
monarchy that would lastunl iI 1889. But these political trends had little elTect Oil the
bl;lCk sl:l\cs. In the institutioll of slavery was not abolisl\ed ;ll independence or
I)y lhe lR50s, as in Sp;lnisl\ Al1leriGI (excel'l for Cuha and Rico) ;lnd it wOllld
later hecome a centrnl issue in Bmzilinn politics. In Brazil. as in nthcr new nations,
independence did nol ch3nge life much for the pooresl segments of Ihe popubl inn.
THE PULL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
Arter IX50 Lalin Amcric;l moved from the post independence consolid;ltion phase
10 begin laying the foundations for its grc;llcr intcgration into the \\'()Tld economy.
In politic;ll terms. this required governmenls read)' 10 create the infmstruclure
needed to export key primary products. such as gU;lIlO from Peru, coffee from
Hrnil. minerals from J\'lexico. and sugar from the CMihbean, As the em of the
("(JudiI/o g;lve W3Y to lhe er:l of the administmtors. Ihe prime t;lsk was nalional
ullifiGllion.
'I'he independent repuhlics moved to 1'1 renglhell the lise of Iwn dcmcnts in their
cconomics: I;lud and Iahor. Most governments sought tn put land into the hands of
ent reprelle\lrS 10 make it bear fnlit, They also sought 10 reward politicnl crollies, build
t;lctical al1i;lllces, ;lnd strengthen ruling con Ii lions. In Brazil and Mexico th;lt meant
government pres... ure to sell off government (previously crown) land. Such strategics
imposed dev;lslating losses on Indi;ln cOlllmunities in Mexico ;lnd the Andes.
To provide lahor. the 1..1tin Americ;lll clites in seveml counlries hoped for
ill1llligmtioll from Europe. Prominent intellectuals argucd that European immi-
grallts would improve the country's rad;ll stock. These years saw repeated propo-
s;lls to attmct Europe;lll illlmigranis. who would supposedly conlribute to national
devc1npment wilh little further investment. In facl. the elite-in countries like
Argentin;l and Brazil-sooll found that immigration was a sensitive issue. both al
home and in the countries sending the migrants. Before 1880 immigration W;"lS
nowhere <I Ill;ljor factor in increasing the labor force. But the strong elite impulse to
recruit Illigrants demonstmled their belief that their countries' economil: and
soci;l! s;l\v;llinn was tn he found in Europe. As will hecome ;lpparenl, this renectcd
Latin Americ;lll douhts their countries' viability.
The mid-ninetecnth ((,I1IUr)' ;11"(1 saw :1Il efforl 10 impro\'e I 1\ 111,'11' .1'.
transportation network. 'Vhat W;lS Ileeded werc r;lilroac!l', calla I.... (101,. k... :md rfl,hk
Since the sixtecnth cenlu'1'. c;lrgn (including pepple) h;ld Ir,l\'clctl hy 1")( k III I Ill' f1'
burro. In only ;I few are;l .. did navig;lhle river.. nr lakes (lrkr :III allCI"II,"I\'(' Ih
midccntllry L,tin Amcrica \\';"1." the Inrgel for IHIIllcrfliiS llfllllll<;,ll ... III h",111 1"11
roads. The c;lpilal USU;l!l), callle frolll lCH'(:igncrs, e<,pcci;.lI)' l\rili .. h :lilt! NOllh
Amcric;ll\. while national gnvernnl<'nls provided the initialivl'
The rhylhm of cconomic aclivity quilkcllcd thmugholll 1.. ltin i\ 1111,.'1 l\ ".IIlt',
Thc stimulus GlllIC primarily frolll Ihe dYllOllllk ('I..l1lnl111C'" .. t Nnl,h
America ;lnd West Ellrope, Icel hy Bril.lin. 1\" I'UI"OI'C pllll1):nl (,\t'l 1Il001l' tlt'II'''"
into industrializat ion. it needcd incre,lsing impIII h offootl, sudl .1" "llg.lr, hed, ,lIhl
gr;lin, as well ;IS prilll;lry c(lll1fllodities. SllCh ., .. gllOllll' nlld 11111.111,.' kll lIi/tr... , \\ 111.1.
and indllstrialmetals. These were Ihe deGHles whell el..On0l1111 Ill'''' tr,ldf'.III\(.. 1
ment, fin;lncing. technology transfer. migr.llion - (.ktpellccl helwecl1 hllPPl' .11101
Mexico. Argentina. Peril, C:hile, Bm"il, ;lilt! Cuha (evell Ihough .. 1111 .1 .... 1',1111 .. 11
colon)'). l1y IXRO the Sl;l}.:c" was set ftll" even greater ClIIIl(111111
Thc ccollnmic uplurn ;lfter IWiO h,ltl illlptlrtallt lilllil:llill1l<'. Fi,Q. il 11''''1111,,1,11
very little growlh of domestic industry. Thc rising l.a1in nccd 1111 1111'1.11
\0011', slll:lll machines, instrulllC"nts, Cllll<;tnlllioFl CI..jUipllll"lll, ,11111 .. 111,,1.11
light industr;;lli7.ed goods wn" primarily I1\cl from Europe, nol II nlll Ilnll\(' 1011111 I \
.shops or f;lctories. The trend was hardl), surpri .. illg. The I\rili<;h, !=rent'll. IIr II.S
products werc I\\ostl)' nfbeller qU<llily Ih:ll1 ,1Il),thing prndull'd:1I hornc. ahhough
that :ldv3nt<'lge could have heen Ilarrnwe(! if the (IOllleSI ic plllChll er.. 11:1<1 h,hl CIl' '11):11
timc ;lnd :l sufficient market tn upgrade <ltmlil)'. Bul th;lt would h.1\"(' le'lllilf't1
governmcnt proteclion either through high lariffs or lHllrighl ;lI\pnrl prl,11Ihllllll'"
No Latin American governmenl \\las prepared or .Ihlc III Llkc "'lIlh " ... ll'p,1I
this time. Economic power gnlllps, such as Ihe 1:1!lllllWI1C"1''' :lIHll:lltlc"H'II, \\. I'
strongly committed 10 free trade, which their European \ 1l .. p/eadlet! ,1 .. 1111'
only true ro;ld to prosperity: ;l1l(1 lllerCh:lnls. Inllct! ill IIll' 1.1'1',1' .. 1
dties. had;lll obvious stake in fighting protcction. 'nl;ll mollvt' was evell gn',ltl'l
when the Illerch:lnt was a fort'igner (usnally British Dr l'rCl11 h). a<; 11,lp''''lll'oI
frequentl)' b), m;dcenillry. Against this ;lfr;l}' offorces.lhe I.nlill Alllcru.l1l ,Ilk"
cates of proleclionism or sl:lte;lided industry c(lllid IlInkc lIllie hc,lIlt...,I)'.
A second limitation \\las its reinforcemenl of the highl)' .. tm' il1ctl "11' 111110
strllclurc inheriled from the independence era: a Ihin eli Ie ,It Ihe '1'1"'.;1 ... Iighllv willI I
middle grollp. and the other RO to 90 pefcenl ;II Ihe hot hun. The 1,.1Intinued lot.. u<' I HI
;lgrO- ranching ;lnd mining mcant thai mO!o'1 lahorers WOllld UIIII illllC uliller Will ktlll:
conditions :lnd r:ltcs of pay that COl lid lIevcr llllwe thelll IIlw.ll"11 IliI'
consumers that a economy bOlh produces :llld needs.
Latin America was being pulled furl her into the international et..lHllllIl)' ill ,I
way th;lt would strongly cnnditioll its sllb!o'eqllent dcvel0pllH'1l1. The llaltllT "I Ih,II
eco!lnmic link has continued to provoke hislorical r1r11;lle ;lnd will h('.1 1('1 HIH'1l1
Iheme in Ihe rcsl of this hook.
PART TWO
Case Studies
Change over Time
3
MEXICO
The Taming of a Revolution
T
he history or Mcxh.n offcr... a .. llId)' in ,ollirasl. Hi, Ii III 11.11111.11 ,,'<;"11', t'". th,'
cOlllllr}' h;ls known hnlh prospcril), (if I1llt), It.r Ill(' chIc) .111,1 I"WI'll\, , "I
sever:ll dccndcs ;lncr independcllce lIlt' 11,11;,'11'<; polit;,.11 lik \\"1".11,,,,1""'1'(" ",
chronic insl:lhil it y. NOll ion,,1 govcrnllH'llls ClUlle and wcnt .11 gllnl" ,inl. 1h r ('.llcnill1:
lhe new n<ltioll'S Icrrilnrinl integrity. H)' the 11lid nillt'llTlllh 't'IlI11r\", ,\I('Xl'" "'.1<'
clllbr;ldng:l !,,,Iit icnllihcr::di.<;llI Ihal wOllld h.lvc grc,llir I"Cdl1l cd , IIlIi 11 l'll\\I" .HI. t
the corrcspollliing bllnlcm or ilS l"'ll'l1li.ll kg:ll)'. )'{'I tlli ... 111111...1 r.1\1' \\.1" tf'
(kcadcs of dicl:ltorship and then 111 rill' I\k:"il,.,lll 1{('\,pllilillll the hI'" ,d rill'
world's grc;lttwcnlicth century rc'V{llutiplI:>. ()ut 01 Ihe Ikl'lIl11t Ii Ill, .1111,'.11" ,hi h.1I
system which produced, for more th.111 11.111 :. ,Cl1ll1l)', .1 p"IIII' ,.1 .. 1.1111111\
unm;llchcd in Lalin Amerk;l, II :llsll po.;lpollcd Mcxi.o' .. tl,Il\ .. ili,," In d".IOl.d
democracy, which would not \l(.llr IItllilthc yeal 20{)0.
Among;'tll countries ofl.alin Allleri'<l, td<.'xko h.l .. h.ld Ihe 11111:-1 llllcn.... .11111
I11mt (ol1lplcx-rehlliollShip with the lJniled Slates. S)'lllhllll. lIe Ihi<: .. illl,ltion I',
the 2000-mile land horder ... h:lre<! hy th(' two Il:llions, 'rhi:- pn1xilllil r 11.1"1'1'11,1111 ,,1
benefits and linhilities (according tn ;l well known :HI<lgc, "!'ullr "'lexi, n! ,S" Ln
(rol11 Gotl, ;lnd SO close to Ihe United The {tllllllrk.; h.lVC \\'.lgc\1 \\',11 \\'1111
one other, joined logclhcr ag01inst common Ihre<lt ... , 0111(1 tlrvcllll'ni ,I"... .111d
hillding economic lics. Migr,1ll1 workers (mill Mexico t01ke Illw pa}/ill): i""" .111,1
remit hill ions of c1oll;lrs tn their hnrne COllllllllllitics, \\'hile M('xi{';lll '\I\lCri. lll
voters form a sought-arter hloc in U.S. polil ks. \.lIlt tI 1'<11 intcgr:ll inn l:Ike... eV('f y,1.1>"
(orm in popul<lr musk, cuisine, cincllla, ;l1l11."pl1rl<:. I.ikf' il "I n'lt, 11ll' ,j. .. lill\ "I
Mexico h<ls heell lln<lvoitl<lhly interlwined with the United :-.(,111 ...
FROM COLONY TO NATIONHOOD
The W<lrs of Independence left Mcxit.:o in disorder ;llld de.. :lY. (:Olh.liti"ll" WI'It' '.11
worse in Mexico than in Argentina or Br;l1il hcc;lll... e thc a.-tll.11 fighling h.ld 1""'11
so Illuch more widcsprcnd nnd protr;'tctcd in Mexit'o. The c\ "nom)' W.l" III
",
j II ,I .... \1,.11 \ i,il ,t:-. Il,ld l,lkl.-'ll 111<.:11 t. ,lllil 1oul ,,1 tlh.' (ollnl J y. 'l'lh'
111111,",>, ""," IIll' IUl,k 01 t.'llIpin:, had I,dlr.:n JIll\) ,!Isrep'lIL
.lIld wy.dbh h.Ld bolh 1lI,I,k ;I poillt 01 killing IL'lhnit.ians whik
lllllll ..:.:lld... \,l 1IIiI1l.:1'" h"d gUill' lilt It) \\,.lr; with,)ul ::>lIjJl.:rvi::.illll, tht'
JI Ii 11,':-' 11,.d l1uu,kd .U1d llla<.'llllll'ry uth'd)' phlllll1lCltd
I" PIli' Ihild Ih pl..:war l.... v,1 I\lining \'Wlllllllilitit's Valelld:llw., ftll'
" I, I, I I I 01'1) rl::.idellb ill IKIU ,lilt! onl)' 1000 III U)2U. It \vould take I '.11111' " __
.1110111\'1 g\II\I.lI1Ull ,Jilt! Ill' fureigll illve"lnH'nt lu rt'::.lol'\:'
111\'I'ln I"U'> JlI1Jll'''' 1,1 lull .
'I'll,' [\'\llk llldll ... lr)' h.ld l.dkll 'Ill hard Till;' ul hallIe Wt'l"t.:
Vl,>lhk Illlllllgll\,ul Illl' \llllnlry, IIH' cl:lJtr.ll v.dley. As UIlt'. traveh:.'r
Il'.lllni. Illl'l" W\'ll' M1uill ... \VlI)'wll\r..: 111r.... ,I viLl'fUy'S as d
1,1\L"rtl, \\,1 II'I l' lilt:' Illllll':' ::.t.,1' lu rt':,t, .llld lilt' drivl'r::. 10 drillk PlIII!lle-tllt'n:, :I
\dhJk vtll.'g.... LJ UlllblJllg til pinl's; Illl11::.t:S, hrokt'll duwn walls and archt'::.,
,Ill ukl dlurdl Illl' n:J1I.lilb lIf a .
1{,J:h!" had lin"n tll,gl .... ,,:tl.1 <I::' \,'dl, so Ill .... LOtlotr}' lacknl:l workable sysh.:m 01
I I,tt l"'pUl I,ll iUI I alld dill Itlllill it..ltiOII. J laving ruled luI' years, II Spaniards had
111.111,1\'\'.1 Iu \1111 ... 1111.1 ulll)' t!lll.'\ 1111-\/lW;,I)''> \\lortll), IIf Ihl' ll<.ll1ll. I ravel hy ::'lage
I
" 1,"11', "II ""I ;,Illd Iran::'11ort-olkn by pack s:lddlt'-was
l U.ll 1 \\',1 ... l l " " .,
II I I
w Tlti ... WI'" 1 IJh::.I.I... J.. 10 t"c"nomic inkgr,ltioll. ,,,... y ,11 h ... J , ,. ,
M.lf> i l'.'1t:xko
" \, 1/ I,
EClllllllllic disllrd.... r mcant vay Il'w jobs and Illut'!l UlIVlllplll)'Jllenl. According
lu ulle t'stiltlate, a!Juut JUU.OUU llIeJl, JIIosl ofwlwJll had ill the W'lrs. had Ill)
jill> III wI 1(;'1 I tht: halllt:s Gllll\.:: 10 all ellt!. '1'I1b rq1r....::.ellled IS 10]11 pern:lll
Ill' Ih.... enlire dull male pupulatiun. The}' were l'aga, angry. alld llsually
armed, They posed not unly an eU)llOJllic prub1elll bUI a suLialthrt'al as well.
SOllll' of these velerans managed tu lind wurk. tllrn d til crinll'
(highway robbe,'y bdng .1 parlkular favurik). Otht'rs stayed in th arttl)'. Still
othl'rs drifted into ulloflldal, ullits lh'll pwvid.... d support lor 10\';11
polilical bussl..s, g.... 'll'rally knnwll as (m/elillo:;,. who WlTt' SUOIl to pia)' a
rok ill tht:.' Mexican ::'Ct:.'lle.
Tht' wars .115U had .. dir.... cl enl'ct un lVlcx SOl ial I II Ihl' I tl2(b
tht: new govt:fllllll'nt iSSlInl <.l dt'cree .... xpdling :dl Spaniards frulll Tlli ...
ruling nol lIllly allowed lhe publiC tll Vt'llt its hatred fur Ihe Spani:'rds. it alsu
ecollomy or an importallt SOUl"Cl' of capital. And it dilllinalnl, :II a
::.illgle ::.truh', a Il..'ading ::'l:.'gllll'HI Ill' Ihl' nation's upper or al i::.tu..:nH:Y. Now
lTeo1...- landuwllers, nut Sl'anish born, IUrlllt'd thl' ulll' .... r l'chdullS 01
soddy.
Ecunoll1ic trallsfurmatiolls d'iting b.lLk 10 Iht' Buur!Joll l'ra, logt'lll .... r wilh
gr,u!ual rccoV<:ry ill the 11:00s allll IH4Us, h.. d Jllad.... it fOI gruups lu
acquire wcahh and st .. lus. Cenlered mainly ill Mexicu City, aspirants, lik....
most nouveaux richl's, were OSll'lllatiolls, pUlling UI\ d,thoratt:: display::.. III Slltll,
early lIillClt.-'l'lllh-c.... ntury /'vlt'xico had a cn.:ok upper \\lith (wu part::.: Ulll'
consistt.:d of old, traditional falllilies who lor the must part kept 10 th...-ir land; lh....
0111\'1' was Ilew, drawll from COllHIll.'rct' and thl' prufessiolls as well a::. lalld. Alld il
wus lht' HI'W seglllt'llt, n:ct'oll)' arrivl:.'d, who bl'callle <Iclive ill politics.
Poverl y persisted among 11ll' vast Illajllrit y of till' populatioll. Fspt:.'cially ill Ihl'
n'lIler ,1Ilel the south, Mexicu had a classic peasalltry-Iarge lllasst'S of cl/lIIpe:;illo:;,
01" country peupk, who ::.cr'ltched uut 1I1eager liVings from bnd. t.argd)' 01
Indian origin. SOlllt'lillles llIixnlbluud or mestizo, peasanls fUl'llis!1I,;,d
lahor for Iht' agricultural St'cluJ'. Many work....d on hal..iendas, what' 1I1t'y livnl in
virtual serfdom, alld wt'nt bl.:'ggillg in dtit'::..
'I'h.... e:(isll'nce or Ihis undt'rempluyed pl:.'astlntry also gU;lI':llllt:l..d lVIt'xico a
large surplus labor lure..... Parlly for thi::. n:"SUll and p'lrll)' beC<lusl' of antifureign
tvlexk<lll authorillt-s did llut 1:.'1Icouragl.:' illlllligraliull lrulll abroad. III
cUlltnl::.t to Argelliina (Chapkr t.J), Mexicu nl..'va a preduminantl),
Eurupean-born working class. Nor did it undergo rapid populalion gruwth al
all)' puint in lhe nint'teenlh ct'lltury. Starting with abuut b million rC5idl:.'"nts in
1800, thl' country had abollt 7.6 million people in 1850; by 190U Ihe llgure had
climbed to 13.6 million, but eV1:.'1l this represents a Illodest anllual average growth
rale of less lhan 1.2 pi:.'rcent over lhe period. Mexi<:o's populatiun
explosion would not COllle until the l\\'enticth et:ntury.
There wert' two institutional bases of power in Mexico <Ifter indept'ndent.:l:.'"-
tile chun:h and Ihe military. The church had COllie Ihrough the il1l..k-pclldellce
with most of its immense weahh int;Kt. According to <II I...-:lst VIII..' uLserver, Ille
I; III I l' I .\1/' \ (I I I
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Ever the diploffii'lt. Filnny -Ihtlnkcd the Cilbinet council for Iheir wilmillg- ilnd
manilged to find iI conventional gown.
Quolation hom Ufe in Mexiro: TIll' (euC',s of fanny Co/derOIl de 10 I101CO. ('n.
How<l,d 1.<ln<1 Manon I-Iall Ftshel (Giuden City. N.V OouhlcclilY. 19661. pr \25 and 6q\ {nole t} J
church Illay h:wc conlrolled nearly onc-Iwlr the Il:llion's I:lnd. The church eOlfIlcd
regular incomc rrom ils vast real eslate holdings and its investmenls, :md it was by
far the largest banking npemtion in all Mexico. Its gencfOu!' loans In large land-
owners not only gllaranteed a steady income but .. Iso createc! a firm alliance with
the lIpper echelons or Mexican society_ SmOlIl wonder thOlt the church and its
economic would evcnlually become a targel or opposilion. pnrlicularly
alllClng those who railed 10 heneflt rrom ecclesinslica] largesse.
The second power hase was Ihe mililary, which dominated nnlion;ll polilics.
Ouring the forty<}'ear period rrom 1821 to IR60, Mexico had at IIny separate
each ror an avef<lge of Ihnn one year; Ihirty-flve of Ihese
State Protocol and High Society
Outsiders can provide remarkable insight into sociill clistom,>. Such Wil'> Ihe case
with Filnny Calderon de la Barc" (1804-87.). the Scottish born wife of the Sp<1nish
minisler 10 Mexico in the latl" 1830s imd early 1840,;. Her acute observations
cilplured the fragility of a "fill-emerging social order, .1'> in her description of
leilelion,; 10 her pl;m to weilr illocal dress flom the> slilt' nf PuchI" 10 ;Hlupcominq
"f"ney bill1":
IOn Jalluilry 5, (840) We had a of Sp<lniards, illl of whom '('mcd
anxious 10 know whelher 01 not I intendt'd 10 WP;U a Poblana drpsc; at lhe f.1ncy
ball, imd seempn wonderfully taken up aboul it Two lIldefinilC looking younq
Poblilnill<ldies lokI me Ihitl cvery one was very much plp<lsed al Ihe ideit of
my going in a Pohlanil I thoughl cveryont> had very litlle to do itnel
lalht>r 'iurprised Ihit' every OIH? ShOllld trouble them'iclves ilbollt il.
About twelvp o'dock the plc'iident. in full unifOlm. illlPndcri by his aidt's ric
e".."p. p<licl Ill'" a <lnd poltt'ling <lnd t<llkinQ for about half im hOlll,
milking himself velY amiable as uSlI.11 <lnd ilS dgreeable as he could. Shortly aftci
citmc more Spaniards, ,md just as we Wf're in hopes Ihat our visiling WitS over.
and wcu' going to dinner. we wCle lold that Ihe secretary of state. theo
of Wi'll, and of Ihe interior. itnd othels. were till in the drawing-room. In
array they camelnd what do you think WilS the purpon of thell visit? To Inform
thill all Mexico W<lS in .1 'itille nf \Iloek ilt the idei'l of my qoinq in <I Pobl.1nil
dl(''i''. ilnd to.,c1jllrC' mI? by .1111hill W<lS mOSI alalminq,lo di'ic.1rd the ide,,1 Thl?y
assllred liS Ihat all Poblanits wele femmes de ';1'11 now thi.. is what I ctlll "
sw('epinq dilUse on the pM1 of Ihe mInistry-that they wore no ..tocking.... and
Ih.'liin m;nistf(l de [sporia should by nn mp,ln... weilr. even for nnf' evening, such
il drps,>.
II
\ .. I he 01.11(1'\ ..1.,11"" 1'/
ill sl;lrred regimes were led hy :ll'm)' lI/fleC! ... '1'111' h:l .. il. IIle.I"" 01 \\'11111111):
preSidential omce was Ihrollgh ;t milit;uT ('oul'. Alld l"lllning Ihrllllghlillt Ihl'.
period was Ihe Iragi(ol1lil fig"rc of I\nlllllin 1.llpe/ lie Salll.1 '\nll.l, will' hi'll 1 IIII'
presidell')' nn nine separ:!t( 1',(.I<;jnn" .tn,1 Willi in"I:llIc(! ligllldH'.lIl...11 111111'1
times.
Sanla l\11n;\ wns fhe 1llllSI (:1Inoll'" III Mexi(-o'" 11111.-1,11,1\. Thl'''(' .. llflll/:IlH'1l
<tsselllhlcd their :lrmed rollowcrs -Illinialllf(' anllil"'... who W('I"\' 1'1 illl.lntr "'1'('1;.11":
wC;lllh. Once Ihe)' rOllghtlh('ir w,J)' inlnl\alioll.ll pnw(,I". hl1\\'('\('I. Ihe\' III h'" l"'lll.l
thai the Irca.<;lIry WOls running !llli (1I .. II.lI1y frnm jll('villll" lllllil.lI\ "1'1.".11111:
1
Evenlually fhe reignil1g .,IIIt/dln h:lnd \\'1>111(1 hl(.lk til'. ,Il\(l .1 ,"'\\' I,.HI,/. \\1111
I1C\" rnllower<;. would sej7e POW('I. The (III/tit/It", IlwlIl"d\'('<; clllllll1l 10, 'I h... \\1/ II Ih.
arts of govcrn.IIKe. Th.tl wa... kn Itl a (ilfllc' Ilr 1.lw\,('r" .,,111 11."k..... u.II . I... 111.111\
frnm tvlcxico Cit)'. w!lnsl:trlet!lh(' mini"llu'" (and III Ihi ... Ih,' 11111 1.11(,'" nil, II
reappeared: Ihere werr IH':trlr (1(111 scparal(' \.lhill('1 .11'1"111111111'111 h('lw"I'11 IX'II
alld IH(,O, h1l1 IhC)' W('1I1 In llilly ;t07 illdl\'Icll1.II,,) '1'1111" ,lid "'/liltll.. ['"1111\ '. "fll.liI
crlntillllil}':I<; we]l <t ... (hal1ge.
The North American Invasion
Crippled h)' the \'\'::11''' or IlIdel'('lId('ll<.e, i\lc,illl \\'.1".1 we.lk .llId \IIII1I'I.lhl,. ''''\\
l1;tfinn. Tn Ihc north I:ly allollH.'1 new lI:1tinll. Wh.,h h.ld 1111"\\11 lIlt II .. IIIJ:It..t1
tll:lslcl' flrt}' }'Cilr!' culier. Nnw III(" neligh IIg llnil('d ,"1.11"" W;l" I WI' .. I\\'.1 n t .11), I
",olllhw:lrd. hC::1ded rllr lhe V:I>;I, "iJIII.tll}' 1I1'I'''plll.II,olllfllll1l'111 ,111111.1111" "I 1\1l.1I
W:l<; ronnerlr the Vkeloyall}' 01 N,'W:-'I'.lll1
Spfluiflrd" had lIever foulld Ihe reSllllft.. l<;lo ""lIk Ih(' 110.111 Ill,. hllgc 1<'11.
lorie" or Calirorniil. Ihe enlire ( "loI:tel,. Un-t!' \.llln..lIId 1,,.1.... '1 hI' 10,.. 1 Ih,\
could do wa" 1o crcalc il nclwo.k 0' ,-digilll'" II1I"<;II.n<;. 1I1.llllled .Ihl'\' .11111\ 1111'
resnurccrlllOlnd loynl Jesuils. The!"oc land ... het ,nlle.lll ,.In-iol, ... 1Il.11:IlCI IllI
tIle reslless North Amerital1<;. 111 lX21 :-'1('l'l1cl1 AI'''''.11 :llltt .1 (.j "'cltlt' ..
moved inlo rexas. thell ;t pnrl 01 l\kxiClI. 1.\Tnll.,lll)' Lh:lfing 111Hlcr ,(,1111.11,,11.,
rrnm Mexico City. the Texilll'" r('volle(1 in line; .llIti tled.lI ..d lIldep,ndt'li. \' Iltt'
following }'c:tr. 1<1 crn"h Ih(" r("heIl11ln. S.IIlI.t /\lln.1 led J\IC"lo.h.1Il 1.""1...
;-tgilinsl the 1\ 1:llllo. killing Ihe Tn.1Il defender<; 10 lilt"' 1.1 .. / 111.111. hilI II("' Lilt" \.1111('1, . 1
c1dt':lf at Snn J:lcinlo nnd Tex:l .. /'(:Illaill("t! IIlIlq'e'hklll. In /X'I";lhc II .... ('Illg ....
voled In :lIl1lCX Texfl.<;. whos(" leaders promptly agre('d.
The Mexicnns S:lW Ihe anncx;llinn of 'I'ex;\.<; ,I" cql1iv.tlrlll In .Hl ,I, I .. , \\'.11
hy Ihe United 5t:lle.... , :111(1 di!>pttlC'<; I)ver fin,ll1tial claim... ,1111111111('111" tllmpl't.II,'
U_S.-Mexican rel:ltinn... Presidenl !:lnws K Polk <;('nl AIll('II(.lIl Iln"I''' Illl" .1
dbputcd border nreil, :l step lh.lt Ihe Mni<:llls S:lW ., .. :In 111\'.'<;1'111. \\'ll('n III('
Mexicans countcratl<lckcd. I'llik en lied il w:lr. Ily <..."n<;enl or (;(lllgre.. , hill \\'.,l!
the opposition or stich promillcnl Icgisl:tlors ns fohn C. ('.111101111 .llld /\hl.lll.11I1
Lilll.oln Polk hild the Will" he :lnd his sllppnrler.... sought.
II was a lolfll llliSl1lalch. 1\1 fir"'1 Sanl:l Anll:! 1Il.l11aged III .c.. i .. 1 A"1\'II' ,III
troops under l...,chary Tilylol'. hUI in IR'17 (;cncrill \Vinflelll .,11 led h.... ,,)111111.1 ..
direclly from Ver<tcfll7 In Mexilll City. C)r()in:II)' i\!cXit.lU" '''"It',lllIe 1'11"11101
llglll ollllll" .ifIll)', ,1111..1 )'\Illllg Illilitilr)' cadl'1s-si!lct' n:Jlll"lllbl::,ro:d a: till'
hvl'UI.:'> III - i.k'alh ralh... r [hall 10 Ihelr Iwtlollal nag,
Btil i[ \'I;t" III lilt .tV,1I1. Mexico 10:'1. Tltl' pri..:e il paid was heilvy,
Till' Ill',tl)' ul t;u;ld.dllp'" Ilidalgo brouglll a formal ... lld to th... war ill
h.hrll;IlY IK,nt Hr tltl.'lr\':lty, tht' LJllikd Stales paid Nkxjeoa
411 t I r; III illlllll illllltllok II1\' t'lltlr\' l'X pall:.t: of territury frolll [0 Calitornja-
,dllltil h,t1follVk.... illl\ It,llillll.tl dOlllain, This was a galling def... at, and it:. painful
1I11.'IIIUl)' ha::. IIl'va dinl ill Mexico. TIll' tlifieialllame orthl,;' a"dul'
III .. 'II .. ibdilll .... III [hl' Unikd Stiltl'::' il is l'alled the -Mt'xiGIIIAIIlt'I'l(iln War, bUI
III I\k"'lllI tltl'}' l,lIllttht' "VV,II urlhl' Norllt AllH.:rkan Invasion,"
Reforlll, Monurchy, and the Restored Republic
1\11111,11)' hllFllill.l[itlll had IOllg-I.t::.lillg illlpuclS on Mexko, Olll' was to llLlrlure it
1l,llion,di:'lk :-'l'll[illllc'll[ Iltal 0111.'11 look Ii'll,;' forlll of a viruk'ilt Yankee-phobia, a
d,'vl' :"',ltL'd itlHlltu::.lihty toward Ihe United An additiollal ..::onse-
l.\lll'llll' \,>,,1" lu pulltical division along parlban lint'S,
III nirh'h'l'lltll u'l1 IUf)' I.alin i\llll'rka, I\'kxi..:{) lk'vdopnl Iwo 11l<l}Or "arlit's:
1\111... "1 \.Ilivl">, Willi 1I1,1Il'ld thl' IUltillll \11' a slrong cenlral guvernll\l:.'llt ill c1use
.tllt.trtU' \\'illt thl' C:lI hulic l :hUl dl, ,lIld l.ibt'rals, who espomel! limited
,1I111 [hI.' 01 derical 1:,II.:h Ihe othl,;'r ul causing Ih,,'
I.nll,v l,tll;l:,> <:llll:'>t'rvallv\'S In.lilltailll:d Ihat Mt'xicu Ilad wt'akl'lll'd ltsdl
lIy lu:)li:-.ld)' Il)'llig lu .Id,)pl [he v,dues alld in::.titutioll::' uf Anglo to
IIUllh, VVltal Illl' 1I.llioll It'qlli ...:d, ;!Lcurding [u COllst:rvalivt':'>, :1 rdurn to lis
Jli::.p,IJlil'traditioll. Spl'l:illcal1y illln'ded [u prumote aristucratic ideab. protect the
1\'g,11 l'llvlkgn 01 1I111il'll Yalld Ihl: lIltlrdl, and c",:ale a cOIISli[utiulial llIOli
.1,,,1,)' (I'l'rll.lll::' hy illlpIHlillg.1 ElIft'pl'i111 prillLe), III reply, Libl.:'rab argued that
1\1l'.\ll" lIl'l'lkd IU l:lIlhr.lll the 01 lll\h.ll'rni'l.alioll, nottradilioll.
Till' .. l.lllllull lH11l illllni UIII ill lie Illid- I whell ;:t Salll;t
'\111',1 '>Illlglll Iv rl'llli.'nbh till' [rl'il::.ury (alld his political by vft lor
'!>IIJllldll"n V.tlle)' (tllday :'>tluthl'fll Nl'w Ml'xiLu an,,1 Ari'l.OIl:l), which
llll' UlIIIl'l1 SI;11I.'::. W;lllll'.Ilor huilding a railroad 10 newly acquired Cidilornia, '1'111:'
dn.billil was widd)' Lrilidz\,d a::. a bl'lfil)':ll of national resolvl', :llll! it prompled tltl'
Iqll)u::.i[ioll til Sanla Anna frolll puwt:r in 1855,
'1 hi .. illili.llnl a IllIlIUItUUU:' I'l'riud relllt'lllbl,;'rl,;'d ill Mexi..:o as 1.11 Uefurlllll
(111l' IklllJ'lIl), CiVilian k'd Libl'ral governmenls elwcled a St.:I';es of sweeping
.tilllnl .11 building a Ill'W sud,,1 orda, (Joe key llIeasure abolishnl the
IJ lilil"r)' dlld I'Lt.:k:.ia:'>1ic.. Ij/lt'f'US, Ille ::.pedal displ'nsations
"krics frolll having Iv sland Irial ill eivilcourts, Anothl,;'J' prohlblh::d ecdeslastlGl1
alld dvil institutiuns from uwning properly nut directly ust'd ill dayto-da),
tllll'r,tlillll:>: litis Illl'aFlI that [hI.' chun:h (oulJ kct:p its dlllrches, monaslerk,s, and
.. ,'IHill.11 il's, hUI wuuld have [II ;uK"lion off the milssiw holdings lhilt II had
,llCtllllubtt'd ovn thl' It'lIlurks. (This wus not soci.. 1 revolution: Ihe lands were
.. old III wl'altllY hllt'I'willliv:;, llot landle:'>s pl'OIlS, In fact, this provision wurkl,;'d 10
!II" .l,llllllt:lJ[ ullhl' pUlIr, ::.inll' it rt''1uirl,d the sa1l' ofpropt'rties held b), ('jidos, Ihl'
\ /\itEXlt'(':TllI'T,lllllllg4ol.ll{l'vultlli'lll 51
LUIlllllLJllill Iandhuldings 01 Indian vilbgl,;'s.) t\ Ihird illitiil[ivt.' trallskrrnl [Ill'
01 rl.gistr), IWIIl Iht: church hi Iht: :-.Ialc: all hirth:'>. lllarriages, adoplions,
alld Wl'l'e 1I1'1ICdilrtii Itl Iw It'gisll'rnl by civil rUllcl jUlia I III J1'157 1lillSI of
thl'Sl' provisitJlIs 10lll1<.1 t!l\'ir way inlu a Il"\\' a lihl'r;d dlarll'r [hal
grallted NkxkallS llidr lirst gt'lltlille hill (If' illalkll:lhle righl:..
1\ (;uIISl.:'rViltivt' rl"lctiolllht,tl rt':.ul[ed illlht' W,lr of till' Hl'IOIIl1 (IH58-(1),:l
rugglc Ih<ll \'I.'<lS ill IIlatl)' wa)'s Ille (lliminat ion llr prugra III Illat k di::'plll:l[ iun:..
cuntrov\rSII:'::., and IJlinor ciVil ""aI's tltal h.ld lolluwnl ill [he w.II,1,;' Ifl
itldt:Pl'lllk'llce, A:-. Jllili[ar)' inlt'milled, so did iJl'ologic:l1 Now
llndt:r lSt-nill.> lu,ireL, iI llHllk 1'1\\')'er ur hUlllll!e Indian urigill, a I.ibt'l al
govt'rHllIl'nl.ill-"":Iilillg a 01 dcLle,:'> e:..1t'llding tll\' spiriluflhe I..I\\'::'
vf hililt allli lllarrLlgl' a:. lIvii ll'rl'llIUllit':>, Ilillioll,dij'iJ1g
ChUfCh a:;:.dS and lillliling ill lite Slrecb, and,
most i111 porI a Ill, llall)' sepa ra tillg ell II rdl a Ild SI a11:, (\I [l'" }'\.;\ rs 0 f hll kr figlll i11 g
jld)'t::t. Illat.k ,t [rillllll'hall[ elliraille illill f\'kXlll) Cit)' dlld "":1:'> lclIllI,i1l}' dl'lll.'.1
P'l':-.idcllI ill IH(lJ.
Pt',lU' :;1 ill plOwd ih thl' lOtlllllT lJ.lJlkruplcy, Ju.iro
dl'ddrnl a two-}'ear 1Il0raiuriullI IIll Mexicu':,> loreigll lkbl--[hll .. "arning tIl\'
wlilth vI' lrt'ditors. Sct'king to it:-. t'lllpir\' ;llId Fr,llICl',
undt'r j':l1Ipcror Napolt:oll III, cOlll11lellll:,d :l 1 )'l'.lf w.,r III oel-Up;ltIUll. (Me,,,, ka II
klllporaril)' halh,d the Frl'lh.h adv.tlll-l tow.lrd (V!l'xi<..o Cil)' III ,l h.lllk' al
lludll" 011 Ma}' 5, JH62, a vil"lvry Ih,'1 lOlllilllll"> 10 hl lUIIllJll:1l101,1[l'l111i Inlive
Cill(O de MIIYV With Juara fl'Il11IWd IrUltl olliu', Napoli.'ull III
imlalled Ihe I\uslri:lll archduke, Fl'rdin:llld l'1'1axillllli:1l1 von 11.lp:-.burg,
l)r Ml'xilo (I hus I.:'HaLl illg tht' COIISt:1 vallVl' Ilresrrip[ iUII luI' Ilal ion.tl IelklJ Iptiul I),
Arriving in i\ila)' a 1l:l1Vl' MaxilJlilian [Ikd lu ingrati:llt: with IllAW
subjn'ls by luuri Ilg [Itt' pn I\'IIK,'::" dl.'Llartng i rt'edlll II uf till' alld pn,ddlillilig
a blV,llI fur p\JliliLal Ju,iJi.''1. ,lIll! llVll W;I/'
l)i::.lrillll,d h}' ll)lI(lTll::. ill Eurup\', Ndlhllt.:"11 lV1.'lItuillly deddl'd III wilh-
dr.lw j:"t'tllh fr\lllll\'ll'xi\u, Ilul'l-ll.:.:'>ly [Ilis hdray;ll, r"laxillliliall
ill May IMb7. 1\11 111110rgiviJlg JU:'lfl'l. IIrdt'rl,d hi::. l'Xt'lllliOJl Ihl'
folluwing Il10tlth, 'I'bus elldt:'d Mexicu's l'xllt'ril'llt.e wilh mOllardl)',
Tltt' reMlInplioJl 01 pU\Vl'r b)' Liberab ill wh.. [ h.ls (oHll' It) hl' knuwlI as
the "restored rl'publi..:: ju;ira, ami rqHluliLalll.ohurl::. alll'll1l'led 10 Sl'l
NkxiLo Oil lill' p:l\h of Hludernij'..1tiVtl, Ikdel..leo ttl a tldrd lenJl .1::' presidl.'ut ill jul}'
I JU:II't'Z prvlllOll'd l'XlellSivl' l:LOnUIl1IC i1lld t'duLativJlill rdonn::., weill so
wdllhat he rail for a fuunh tillie ill 11:0 I, ill une ollhe lilusillolly dl'ctiollS
or thl' nindeentll cell [ury, As Congress st'all,;'d Ju.irez's triUlllph, OJlt:' or Ihe losers,
Porfirio Diaz, rt.-fused 10 acct:'pl the result alld angrily prociaillH:d thill indefinilt'
reeleclion vI' the chil'ft'Xl'clItiVt: endangered Ihl' coulilry's prindplt's alld inslitu[ions,
Tht' l1i:lz uprising was quickly pul dUWII, !lowt'Vt:r, and Sd)ilsti,lll I.l'rdo dlA 'I"'j"da
suc<"cl'dcd 10 Ihe alkr JUilrt'z suddenly died ul a hean attalk in IH72,
Lerdu's It: 1'1 II ill office was rclalivdy IralHjllii and cVllslru":live. hUI pru
hklllS arose ",hen 11ll' ;tJlnUlillct'd plans [0 rel'lectioll ill 1876,
PAin TWO" CAlli' \TUIIIE!\ CIIAN<;EOVEIlTIMI
A self-righlcous Diaz oncc ag;lin revolted in the n;lme of effective suffrage rlnd
Aflcr I'nly one oecisive military encounler. Din occupied
Mexico City in Novcmher IR7(,. Directly or indircclly. he would dominate
Ihe coulllry (or dec;,uks to come.
The Diaz Era: Progress at a Price
For the thirty-live years (rom IR7(, to 1911, Dia1. proved hilllselfto he a Illrlsler of
politks. lie hegan wilh hi .. military colleagues and followers ;lnd from there wcnl
on 10 creale a hroad cO;llilion. lie gave the regional caudillos room to maneuver.
encouraging them 10 light alllong themselves. As his presidellC)' malured, he
ste;ulily buill UI) Ihe nrrllY. In order 10 mainlain control of the countrysi<le.
where the vast majnrity of Mexicans lived, Diaz. relied heavily on the feared
gllard;as filmic... , or rural police. In short, Dia7. paliently built lip Ihe power of
the fe(.lcr:tl gCl\'efllmenl where il cOllnted-in military and police power.
AI firsl llia1 did nol seem 10 repre.. enl an}'lhing new in politics. lie was, aftel-
0111. a produci of the Iiheral IllOVell1enl. As lime passed, it became clear Ihat Dia1.
...vas a I.ihcrnl with a diITe!"t'nce. lIe cllhiv:\led Ileutrnlity nn the crllCi01I question or
the chlll'ch, neither it (like most Liherals) nor defending it. I-Ie con-
spicuously n\lowcd his devoully second wife to serve a.. a of
reconciliation loward Ihe inslitution the Liherals had pilloricd.
1n 01 her respecls. 1)1:11. stuck to principles. Inone ofhis mo.. t imporlant
;lIlt! measures. he ruled that the han on corporate landholdings, a
liberal measure of the IR50s aimed primarily at the church, should apply 10 Indian
This opened new areas 10 ranchers. :md political
favorites. In 1894 Oi:11. helped the landowners even more b)' decreeing that
unused or tcrrnlO5 /mlt/ios, could be over for private exploilation.
The crucial source of new capital to come from abroad. Dia70 and his leading
ministers sought 0111 prospective foreign investors, especially U.S. and British. and
o(fered them generous concessions. This overall strategy thus applied the princi-
ples of economic liheralism Ihal had caplured most 1.....Hin American elites in the
clt.sing deCIde!> of the nineleenth century. In Mexico lhe writers. technocrats. and
intelleclually inclined politician!> who nrticulalcd the!>e doctrines earned the label
of the cicHtijiros, underlining their supposed link to positivist philosophy.
Din proved his command of politics in thai mosl fundamental of w::Iys: he
slayed in power far longer Ihan :lTlY would have dared to predict. 1:01' Ihree and a
half decades he held the presidency, with only one interruption (Manuel Gon1..;'le7.:
lie believed Ihat he was giving Mexico the preciolls gift of polilical
slahility. which he saw as indispensable for economic growth. If that required SOllle
repression, it was (or a good cause. A shrewd politician. Diaz had the constilution
amended. time and again, so lhat he could be reelected to the presidency-blithely
cflntradicling his prior denunciations of in office. Di,,7o knew
how 10 :lppenlln the privileged sectors. how 10 make thcmloyal. how toorche51rate
their for the economic schemes Ih"t would raise their country 10 n
"civilized" level.
Ecomllliic developmen1 was Ibilro:hl .. WClC . ikin): 1':'. lIlIpl,
ni:l7.11r!>llried to huilcllhem with publk (umls, httl hy I.lte IXHO Ill' l'cg. '1 g,.IIIIIII)'.
concessions to foreigners. In only fOil I' }'e:lfS Ihe tr.ILk in opl'l.1111>1l gl('w Ill .. "
750 miles to )(,00 miles. Mexico reached 12.000 mile.. of 11',..., k hr ''lOll. h l}:lIlllh
(oreign huilt, most railronds were lak<:n over hy the in l'lfli'"
As elsewhere in L:lt in 1\ foreign 11':l{lc rOt k('Il'II: IlillCIl ,1111."1 \\'("11 IS
nnd 1910. The Uniled Siale... hecame' Mexicos leading Imilc ",ullin. ,I .. 111111' I.d
eXI'0rls expanded to copper and zinc, as well as .. ilvc!" alHI,:"ld. t\l,II!c<,1 IIHlll"
triali7.:ltion occurred, centered in lext ik!;, eCillenl. in Ill, 1'111'111111 I I'.
nii.l7. sel great .. Iorc hy Ihe necd 10 pllr"uf' C('lllflmil pnli, ic.. 111.11 \\'l\lIld 1l1.1I1l1.1I/1
Mexico's credilworthiness ill Ihe Uniled SI:lles and F.urnpc III IX'I'. 111I' !I'd, 1.11
governmenl produced a hudgel smpl"... , and fi\!' Ihe (II 111,11\ lI'I'ilill' .dl
budgels were h<1lanced. As celehration... for Ihe intkpCIlIIClHt' 1('111('.1111.11':.1 1'1111
;Ipproached, Dia70and his lietllen<1nts ccl\lld (I:limthnl Ihc\" h. ,IIf'. li/c,t '11 t\lt'\I'"
the witlespre;ld ideal of "onIeI' anti prngre...
Economic aClivit}, v<1ried ill Ch:lr01CICT Irlllll 10 .. 11.1 Ihl'" k,t I"
differing snci:ll slructures. Tht north W;l" pl"illl.lrilr:1 milling .Ifl,1 1.ln, 111111' .Ll',1
where the workers wcrc hired l<1hoTCr.. minel''', for IIl,tallt c, . 11.1 "\\'1"":,, II ...
central "aile}'. h}'conlmst, pri\t1l1ccd WhC.11 ,llld g',lin I'll metlll'lII ..... 11.11/:1' ',1/1.1
farms. Sugar was rai!>ed in thc south lenlr;ll Icginn. I':llli, 111."h- in II .....1.11, ,.1
Mordos, where pcas,lIlt land!; w('re !;rilcd 1"1" II'" 1>" th, null'.
Vast henequen plantations pn.spered In the Ylll..al.lll, ",IICI" Illl .11 11.11'\"1... 1\11,
compelled 10 work as peons.
Under IJiaz., Mexico never dc"dt'ped .1 stnlllg cnllcl'lcll'UII.11 '1.1.. .
Concessions nnd favors (":Ime from Ihc slate, <1IHI t;lpll.11 t.lIllf' (11111 d'I".hl
England. Frallce. and, of COllrse. the \Jniled The lI11ddlt- ",', II .... \'0'1'
eXlrcmely wenk as well.
These soci;ll f... clors !>orc decp pnlitit;ll sigllillt.lIlt.e. 1-.I,.. wl1elc III 1.11111
America. middll"-c1as!> profes... ionals provided IHe"sllrc :llld lc:lllc,<,!lll' 1"1 .,!t'l
mist movements, and on occa..ion the)' drcw "uppoll (n'lll net Iglln).: ,.,,111.. 1I1.,11.. 1'.
NOI so in Mexico. Turn o(-Ihe cenlllr}' Mexito hnd Iht' ,,1\,1.11 lIlg.eclh-nl .. "" .1
revolution. hut relativel}' lillie materi:ll for refnrm.
The economic progress of the 1)":11 ycars :llso hnd it., '\-Vliil ... Ilw ,,"c,dlln'
prospered and duly copied the way... oflhe Ellfllperll\ O1ri."lfltr,11 }'. Iht' v.I,1 111.11"1 It\
of Mexicans faced grinding p(wcrty. Civcn ils lah(ll' !;tllrlll, "lexi(f.... \\',.1:1' I,II, ..
remaincd very low. Indeecl. one estilllnle (dnllhtles.. exaggC'r;lled) !ooho\\'('d th. t 1111
avemge purchasing pm...er in 1910 wa.. onl}' one*tp,arlcr Ihl' IHllllc\'d t\l(\lt.,
cxportetl agricultural prouuLls, while prodlldioll til Innsl "kxi, ,10... dwl.lI\
staples-corn and bcans (frijolcsJ-hnrdy kept Ill' with I")l'llinlinn grl""lll V.r,11
statistics were alarming. In IJOn, 29 percent of all Ill;llc hahie, died Wl1h11l 1!l("11
firsl year, and mttny nf Ihe survivor!; clIded up working Iw('1ve hOIll' ,I .1.1\' 11\ .1
sweatshop. Only a quarter of the populalion wa!> lil{'l";lll'.
This highly unequal economic d,'c\\, rqw.llnl pInk... " lrn'lI
workers, hOlh llrh<1n O1nd rum!. Then' were !>trike. IWI, ''. ('''p,., l.tll}
,\h'-I .. \\,.I:;l 1.lh..1 wltlknl lI111ll'r ("onditiulls. Uct\\'\.'\.'l1 Il)U6 ,lIld
l'lOX. ItII t:'x.lll1pk l\kXK;t1l al thl.' Co.llHlllca Luppt'r repeatc:dly
J 'I Illl' 111}-;lll'l givl.'l1 10 U.S. Significanl strikes o(culTed abu
.lllh'II'; III .... 1.llln.,.d wtl/k.... ,Illd..tl Ihe Riu Blallu.J texlile mills. Llbor protest
IIlh"Il"llinl hy .Ill 1I1kl1l.ltitJlWI linalldal in I\)U6-8. III lite rural sector,
j'l.I'hlllh III Illl' f\ an:a billt'rI)' resl.'lllt:d losing their land 10 cOllllIH:rcial
lulllV.III"11 ill 'JUg.11 ;llld ulIIl'l Ill.ll'k\( In 1111. nurth Ih\.'rt: .1
I,,',hlh'll hi III .. I,,:>... "I l.lll..! 101
111,11 .11 I..! Irl" l.uuld a pulky Ihe)'
h...! ll,.lk,1 Ihl' lEu.I\1 dln'livl'I)' ll'l\tr,t1ized govCfllllll'lll Ihal lVkxicu had s\.'ell
.. Ill ... Illdl-Pllllll-llll. I Ill.lklllg h',IS l.-UlU.. -l'llll'.lh:d in tvkxicu Cily. al Ihl.
\ ... " ..11 ... "I 11I,.tI IIr lIwd,lIo). Poliliu..d ulfiet', t:'specially .Illhe fcd\.'r.llievei.
\\.1...."ughI .tlkl hy Ihl.:' lughel Il'Vl'l 01 who made it wen: envieu.
.. III\l. ... t'II""lllll t-:.1I11 ufkll re"'luilt'\llullt.ll.t with Iht' gOVl'rtll1lt'llt.
tll\lllllllllg .1" 1I U.. 11 "Iltlll ,Illlt}llg til\.' yOllllgl."r dih:" whu w\.'r\.' l."xdud\.'d frum th.:
1)1.11 \... against IJf;IZ, hut WllU could have prl'dicted the
f
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION
In\ In.. lulltlll ...lllI"I... il'lIatnl 1'.lr lIlore ulll'll 11I1')' b...gill with
,I '1,111 \\ Ilhlll Iitl' dUIlIIll.1I11 dlh'. I )I,gllllltlni frl.'llllllltly yuung, bel.Ullll.'
.Ill
h
l} ""Il\lUgll I" .llt.I\k llil' II III l\lexilo in 1910.
\ 1111 .. 1111\' k.uhllg h.IlKbctJ I. M,ldero. sciun 01 .1 l.llllil)' th'll had
11I.HI...- .1 1"1 hllll. III \ .1111... .llId lllllllllg .Imf liI.lI Illlkcd 10 D.,It' pOhtK,lI machint'o
I \.HI .. I" f\1.ld"'lll, Il.lll\.b...... gr.llldJ.lthl'l. h.ld hl'l.'l1 govt'rnor 1-11 thl' 01
\ .1,dUlI!.' lwlll tXXiJ \11 IXX I. .Illd thl'l\I.ldt'ftll.llllily had cultiv.ll...:d a frit'IH.1
:>ltlP willi )11"" Y. I.JlIl.II1tHlIr, Pi.li': Itlllgtil1ll' lillaJil.e minblc'f. gol thl'
hI'''' ,.1 .1 htll'lgll ldu...lllllll, III alill ;II Iht' Ulllvl;'rsity (If California.
I It.- I,'WI lll'd hI .lpl'l)' Ill .. III .. wkultlln:. t'::,pl'dally 011 Ihl'
\'ollllll1,1.11I1.llitll . I It.- W.l:>.1 ::.t 1tlllg hlll'l.tI illlUIIIUlllic::., which fitthl.' !)iazt'ra, hut
.11 .... llll'"hli....., wlll\lllhd 11... ,1. bdldin political d\'JlHKraty alicllalt'd him
11 .. 111 Illl' Iiglditil'" III Ihl' 1.111.' I)i.li' lit' hl'lallll' an uUbpoken 0PPOIlt'lit.
.1I!"lIllig Ih.lt Il'.ldy luI' dl.cloral and Ih"l if Di,IZ chus.:' 10
lUll Itlr III I')IU (.1::' I.Vll)'ulle t'xpcl"lcd). Iht'll Ihl' vke
\.llhlld,lh' 11Ill:.1 UIIlIt' lIolll ullblde 1111' clique.
111M W,I.. by IlIlW l.Jpllve ul own 'vVhy should he takt'
thl. 1.IJlI ... vJ .Ill and ::.puiI\.'d yuung olig.uch? Wht:1l Ihe dictatur
I,likd til Illld 1m .. M..d.... ru llld the unthinkablc: ht' entered the 1910
\.UlIp.tigll IlLe \.lllllidalt' uf Ihe Antilh:dectionist Party. Dhtz now
!,IU.1 ul'po::.illUIl lhall .11 .IIlY t ill I\;' ill dnades. His dt'cloral JIlachine produced
,1I1t/llll'l \ 1\ I,,"y. hUI II \\'.1.. 1.11 Inllll Thl.' poli\'e had 10 j;lil 5000 of Iht'
"Pl'o..lllulI.llldudlng M.llkru. Till' yOllng rd.>el. nuw c:mooldellt'd, reJused 10 recog-
111/ ...' 111\' kgllitlhl ... y .... 1 I)i.li" 11.dldiUlI. Ill." (whilt' in j,lil-which
.. ,,\IXI<. U T.IIIIIlI!,; ul.1 Ik\'ulullUll rl ')
Ellliliano Zapata gave delermined leadership to the revolutionary movement
that began in the state of Morelos.
lhal 1)j.1I. h.lIdl)' h.ld .111 hun grill' 1;IIlItHI.. J.lfjjl/ tit' SIIII I.//ls
/lotusi alld clUed for arllll'li Till' I'd)d Ilh)\'t'lllt:lli glew 1"'fJi...lly1::'
its lroops look Ciudad jU.il'l'i' (across lhe bOl'dl'r frol1l 1:1 Paso. III a
surprisillg show 01 Uiaz lapilulall."ll ,llld the COlllIll')'
ill fvlay \91\. A lle\\' dl'CliulI hdd, ;llld f\1.ldl'ltI Iriulllll!lnl. III \YI2. Itt'
IJl'lalllt:' Ille 1I.llion's hd"urt' ..:nnvds III Nlt.-xko City.
Dt..'llIocnll:)'. it UII ib way.
Fr;lllli::.I.U l\l.ldelo alld Idlllw di::.Sld...'lIb Illay havl' lite l\!l.".\h:all
Rt.\'olulion, bUI Ih(')' did llullong (.ul1l rolil. (Jlht'r rd.>ds had I.lrgl'r gO.lb: l:llIilianu
Zapala, for lxalllpic. l'lllerged the f(Kk-hard 1....ldl'r of plas.tllb in thl'
stale uf l\lordos. Th.... y were the (.ouJltry willi h.ld st:cn their
traditiollalland lahn away by thl' lawyer::. alld
using the new laws of inspiraliun. Th.:se (as Ihey hCC;lI11t'
knu\vlI) saw tht..' rchdlioll as a c!lancl' tu resture ;llstkt'. Tlwl Jlll'ant
llldr lamb. Wht'll Madt'fo lililnllu support tltd!' GIUSt'. Ihey di::.lllbsed hinl and
l!c...c!areJ Iheir uwn revolutiun.
Madt'fO was hardly a Irllt' rl.volllliunnry. 1Ie..- a wuuld-he parli.1I1l1lltariall
whu thuugh! Diaz' ahdic.l1iuli would Opl'lI Iht' w.IY tu tnll." dlmu... .-.lly. Madt'ru
56 PAln'IWO" (,/\SESTlJPIES; C! 1..\ N(;F OVFI{TIMI
In the north Pancho Villa created powerful military juggernaut. but his personal
flamboyance earned him a dubious reputation in Mexico and the United States.
(Courtesy of the Library of Congress.)
(Ill:\i.nl)' fmlll the United which relll.lllied thl' gll',11 .ltlll'" "'111'1.111'1 lilt .tli
MeXICan revolutionaries). Villa', :1 rill}' "'Ols \\'t:1I fed .llId well t'lll'!'I ...,l 111,1,',.,1
Vi11.1'" (ollowers nnw h:1(1 a !'lll e ..nil rt l' III l'lll plll}'lIlrllt til Ill, .11111\. \\ II" II '111, It, ,I
a" <1 well paid profcssioll:llllltT(l'll<1t"V lillII'll. .'
Another chOlllcngc 10 I IIIt'lta t;Ullr Irolll f\l,ldcrn'" h'HlIC 1.11,' '" , ",11111.1.1.
where governor Venusliallll C<lfI,lll/.1 1I111111llrll .1 \llllllg 11''' 1. .. " I' 111<>\('111,'111
(:arrallza, like f\bdcro. wa .. a tli ....itlcIlI lJIrlllher olllH' cI II 1', lI.nuIl--: Il'l'll I" II .. 1.-\, I
of during Ihe rl'gillle of I l"Ii'. 1\ \\TOlllh}' lando\\'lll'l, IIl"h,,01 .11 .." I." " ,Ill
Illtcrim Aftcr SOlllC 11I".'lt;'lli"Il.11I' ""1111 Iledl" ""111'.1 11"'\,
melll dllring tlli.: GltIlll,ligtl I.f lqlll. 1)11\(' IIIf' lC'\'"llllinll.IIW... ,.IIIH' ,,' 1"'\\"1
C:ll'ranza wa" .1'. 'he g"veillol' "I ( 11.1111111.1
(arr:l1l7.1 1IIIClt.I' 11"'lrp.III"1I \\llh Illtll' Ill"'\' 111.111 ., "'11111,'1
c1nilll. Carmn7a's 1'''111 d(' (,/U/,Ial/lll(' (,\lartll 1'1' q \lnl"l, d c" !.Il
l
d 111..1 Iltt"ll.1
hcld power illcgitim.ltd)' <1ntl 'h'll hc. (all,lIl/.l. sh"ltld hi' I. "'J:lll/tdI ... 1\1.1
(:hicf(l(the (:Oll .. tilulinnnlt'l A,m\': (llli/' .. 1.11>1I.. h('0I. Ih,' 111'\\ I'll ,.,,1"111 ,,,,"1,1
Ihell LOllnlke new deilltln.... '1 he pl.11I Inc Illdr'll II" .11"'1111" I ,II"" II' .... 1.11':"
"IKic'el'llHlIl1il III Illrol",:I(.III(lII\II"II' lilt .,11111/1".1" 111"\"11'11' 1,,,.1,,1 III,
:lllol!lcr Illlllhlillg, :-0111'1"111 W.I" .. ,.111,""'1. 1,1" .. ,1\ 1111.11, ,,1'\1.111... 1\
limited 10 Ihe norlh
EVCllltl:llly 11 \\',1:- fCllrlgl1 1Il11I\T'lllnll. IInl i\k'H.III ,11111 .... Ih,11 ,1''''111<.1
Ilucrt:l. LJ.:-O. pre.. ident \Vooch,.w \ViI ...Oll, dell'! Illlllt" 11'" I,. In, '1:"11" 1111' .1.,',
gnn'l"lllllent. hOld Srlll 1I1.1ll1le\ to 0\ t 111'\' VCI.H 1111 .1111'1 .111 III' Idl'lll 111\' '1\ 1111' tt.,
of U.S... aitor... I'll ,Ollnl(" Ihl' lJ.:-O 1I1.1I11H". i 111"11.111.1,11, .I,!.I,.\' I.,",! ....
Ol!-:Ollll"l the Alll('ril:ln" whit h wl',lkell(',j !ll" I,,, .. illllll III 11ll' \ 1\ II 1\.11 .... '''111111'.
:-ittlnlioll was hopcle..... IIl{',lrlv JIII\ Il)11 he 1'f".gl1nl..llt 1''''1,: Ihe 1111It<'(I<"I.I"'.,.1
h:wing IH'erthr(lWIl him
By mid19111, th(" 1.11 fi .... IIII.. III Ihe Ul'VllllltH"1 \\,,'1' I", ".11111/: I.tllllltlh
ohvilll1s. Villn. :lnd espeCIally i'.:1jI.l1.1. Iq1lr"'l'lIll'lI (1.11111'. r"1 Lllli,.r! ...... I,d, 1t.1111"
C:lrralli'a lIe wnlll,1 11.IVt' III "fkl nllill' 111,111 Ilhn,IIIIIl"'lll .tlllll"'l:.111
10 edge lertw:lrd. lie promi"Cd. \\'It h"111 de! ,III". .. l,llll III I,ll' II,, 11111'" ,\,'IIWIII "I
the cOlHlitlon of the rllr:,1 peon. Ihf' worker. Iht' lIIlIW..Hld III 1"'1111.11 Ih,
proletari:ltl c1:lsscs.
M
therc.lftl'r.lle p.IllHllllhCd :111 .lgI.lIl,ll1 \.111111:'
for Ihe resioratillll or creation Ill' ng.ill1ltllr:t1 l"lllll1lll1ilh... (.//.1".1. Il'IIH ..
procedures for restorillg legaltillrs. :11111 c... tahli ... llillg:l ll.lli".I.ll.lgl.II . IIl, "1'11\11'.
sion. And then (:'1rran7:l m.lde his tllOVe t"\\':I.<I 1.111I'1: Ill' g"l IIIf' .111.1" II"
syndicalists- the hesl org:l1l17cd Ill' till' '1Il:111 Illh.11l 1.1110)1" Ill/Ht"II(IlI, I" "1:1"0'
that in return (or favol':lhlc lahor I.lwS Ihcil Hnl H,ll.dll' 'II' \\',,"ld Ii... I, 1111
cnrrrlll,;,(lfI calise.
During 1915 the military tide tllfllf'd ill {:nl'l:lIll:l"" 1.1\',11. AI\,.1I0 (lh. 'l:OIl. h.,
brilliant ;lflny cOIllIll:lnder frolll the llorrhcrn sl;!lc of:-OnllOt.l. Ilrl l'1\'dv ,lrk.II'11
Villa in a major h;'lllie. Vill,1 retrl'.llcd to thr hill, of (,1111111,11111.1 ,,, '''111111111' .1
guerrilla "'nr. hilt llO longer offered :I ll:ltion:d Ihn.11 TI ... ,'fI('o/"f,/. ,,,"1.1 Il,d
tllOWll a stlst:linccl challrllgc III Mexi<.o ('jl\, .mol w.III",,\\ 1111 .. Ih... 1 11.1111'
l\'lorelos In hold 0111 again..' !ctlcr,ll illl m.\lflll\
'.'
:.- - .
.' -.
-'
;"
.'
.'-
-:,..'....
nila.hed <II the Ihought-l'ugeslecl to him hy less squeamish rehel" Ih;ll he
should strike ;'II his opposition hdore they slruck at him. The mil'I:lke cnst him
his life in 1913. 'lis killer W:lS his own militilry chief of sl:lff, Vic\(lI'inllll Illlerl", a
high-rnllking gener,,1 under Di:li'.. Huel'lil dragged the indiscreet U.S. :llllhassador
Ilenry 1... 1ne \"'ilsol1 inlo his plot. therehy ensuring that the United States w(lulcl
cOlllinu<.' its 1l0loriou.. role in Mexic;ln polities.
Ilueria waS;I crude figure, who thought he could reestahlish a version of the
Porfirian regime. lie triecllo impose his ;luthOl'ity ncross the aroused (oulllry. hut
soon met resistancc. Many Mexicans who had been caught up in thc rcvolt againsl
Diai' now S;lW Iluert:l as the usurper. Opposition began to huild, nnt! ,IS il g;lthcrcd
force il coalesced into the genuinely phase of Ihe Mexican
Revolution. It also plunged Ihe nnlion into a hloody civil war.
One of the most p0werful centers of resistmlCe to I luerl;'t the 1H11thcrn
ofChihuahua, where Pancho Villa gained control. Villa \Va.. a rough-hewn eX-Gillie
rustler who had mohilized a small army. Unlike Zapata, with whom he wa<: often
compared, he led no peasant rebellion. Villa's slIpporters, at least initially, wcre sm<lll
mnchcrs. unemployed miners and workers, and cowboys: Illell who w.lIlled jobs, nol
small plots of land. So it was not surprising th;\1 when Villa pronounced all :lgrari:ln
reform, in Occcmhcr 1913, he called for confiscation o( large haciend:ls, bllt not (or
their subdivision into plots. The state would administer the haciendas, :lnd their
cOlllll1erci<11 crops would help finance Villa's milit:lry mnchine.
Villa quickly put this idea into practicc. Although it crcntec! administrative
problems, it achieved its go:\1. was produccci and ""pplies were ohtained
'"" 1'.'1\1 t\VI)" 1""'1 ... IUIJlI ... I.IIANI,J\JVEI( 111\\1
Willi III' 1001ih ip.1I ..'Ianll..,!'> !'>.ddy .I( 11;1)', (:.llT.lIlZa ,,:ollid alrurd 10 ..:all a
,Ull\IIlUlltllI;l! UIllV..'lllioll ill I.lk 1916. Jil M.lY 1917 he formally assullled th..
l'I ..'IIh-llly. nle !'>Iagl.. W.I:> IIIIW::'1.:1 lur Ih.., wnting of Ih.. Mexkan Constitution 01
I') 17, .1 jll ..ulle!' d".. UIIl":lll 01 Ille M..Xh:.11I ItI.:volutiun.
(:.lIf.lIl.l.1 hilllM:1I had Ill) fa..li..:al ide.13. lie draftl..'d a pJ.!I..' imitation of thc
( oll ... liluli,,1l ul :X57, little mun: 111.111 a reslutclll ..ut uf principles of classical
IIb.., .II\II1. 'I'h..: I..l/rlVl"lltiulI llth:gJII..'3 h.ld uthl.'r thuughts. They luok contrul and
\\IUIl:.1 ..11,111\'1 Ih.11 W.13 31arlliugly r..ldkJI fvr thb pre Uoishevik erJ. Arlide 27
"mlll/wI'I\'d Ihl gllVl'f1l I1It'1l I tv r..dbtribuk land. Artid... 123 annuunced rights for
1.i1,ol 11t.11 h.ld \<.'1 1.11 II I)' Ill'VI'r hl'ell h"'.lfd til ill Nurlh Amen..:.l. Article 3 subjeckd
1111' .. IIUI .. II I II ..,W r..:!'>lri .. lh'II:>, wllicll illll'u3I::d Ol virtu;11 straightjacket. Sociali.)1
<1\ ..'1 hUln 1'..IIII...ll<.:d 111l' lll1l3111u11UIl. Suddenly it beGlm... obvious that what had
... 1.1111'11 . \ ,11111'11..' 1"'\1111 ul db!'>id"lll dili313 .lgJinst DiJZ wal> threatening 10 become
.1 .... ,.. I.d 11'\'1)111111 '11, II' Ih.,nge sigllili ....'lllly thl.. pOW<.:f and propt.'rt y relatioll3hipl> in
J\ 1<.'\ 1,,1 .\ 11 ..1 I'} 17 ..-va)' a.)plrlllg polil k,t! le.lder had lu aJupl 3t leJ.3t a rhdOril:nl
1",.,lllr.., III 1.1\'.11' 1,1 l\ll'xin."3 \\'tlf'ker3 allJ th..: p... a3.lIlls.
1111' .lgl.tfI,lll rdwb- ViII .. alill Z.lpat.I-..:ontilllled 10 Ill.1int.lin thdr strong-
11<.Iltb .llullqlll.,..-lll.t Illre;'lllo C.lrr.lllZJ. Zupat:.l WJ3 dispatched in 1919,
IIIUI til'll'.! II} ,11"',111\ i:,tl' Irollp3 In .III ambush. Th... following Yt'ar Carranza faced
III ... IIWII III'JI>I":III: II.., ",JIII..d 10 Illlp03t' a lilll ..'kIlUWll politician, Ignacio Bonillu3.
.1 ... 111 ... '>u.. <.I""1. C.lll.ln/.1 W.13 !'>hurl 3ighll'd. Thl.' slugan of
II, .. I'JIll ...lllll'.'lgll 1..1...1 hl't'lI it::. IIHl311'Ilwl.'rfuJ r.dlying l'all, and it luund l:xplicit
1\jJl ..\\lllll III 11. ..' Il ..\\, Nuw C;lnallz.1 W.IS viol.tling Ihal rult: in .)pirit
I,)' 1l1l11""'lllg.1 whu \... ould bl' hl3 3IUtlgl'. Tht' Revolution rcvl'rh:d 10 its
Illllt.d)" 111"... 11 ....': 1111' v.ili.1111 ()lJr"'giJII, Ille ,trdlit..-ci of vlClUry OV<.:I" ViJla, led an
tll'II"'llJg , ,II r,IIJ".1 W.I:. tlll..:..:d Itl 1I1.'1.' alld. whil", UII thl: run, wa3 assas::.inateJ by
,IIIL' .,1 III'" I,WII j-;uarlb, jllol'abl)' ,u.lillg Ull bdl.df of Obregon. ']'ht:: succession
"",1,1"1,1, Wllllh Ilatllnlll' I Jiaz' (all, \\1:13 31ill far Ironl solved.
POLITICS AND POLICY: PATTERNS OF CHANGE
Ill11q.!,.'11 \lh..-.. nd..lllu lIlt: SIHlib Ill" lh.. prl3iJl.'ll":Y. Ilis gllVeJ'lllllent bundled all
.llllllll it III'" IIll.d nlUGltlllll 1'lllljMigil lInd..'r the le;lder!'>llip 01 th... nuted illtdll:ctual
1\,'01' V.I\",'II,dI13. III (Ill' ar....1uf 1.1LJUI, III .. Obrl.'gvII gOVt::flIllll:111 bel heavily on Ihe
II ..\... J) I"tllllbi (tII11 ..... k-r.I .. lull IkgiullJ.I Obn.:r.l tvkxican<.l (CROM). which
IIIIL'gull ,o011 lIJ lIpkd, wldlt' ,It Ihe S'l/Ill: time Iwrassing Ihl.' COlllnlUniSI- and
.111.11 ... 1..... 1 11'11 Ullitlll.,. Onlaod dblnbulioll Obr... gull w.. ::. Gtulious. fi:aring .1103s of
1110..111.. 111111. Ih.. I:bl uf Iht' uriglll.1I popular rebels. Panchu Villa, succumbed 10 a
lu:.dl.ldl n! bulll.'!3 in )923.lIld tht:: era uf ... fii:ctive dcmands for fUlidumental social
Idunll UVI'I Illf Iht: 1I101lll'ni. Obreg'ln du.lnl<.lke two illlport;'l1lt cUlltributions
t.. III ..' til th.., Ihvolution. Fir.)l. hI' ..chicvl'd all under31anding with
\\".\lllllglo.1I ,III .lgle"'lll"'lll un hllw U.S. uII firms would b... Irealed. in retllrn
1111 ll.:-' . ..llpllllll.lIil rlulglliliuli. S..'..:ond, Obr..'gon managed 10 transfer pmvt.'r
1'1,I... dull)' 10 hl3 MI...-...... 3:>or, sOllll'lhing IIU l""kxkilll president had dont' since 1880.
I .. MEX)( '0 Tile ul.1 I{t:voluliull ';'}
Thc /lew pr...sidelll WJS .. lloth..:r g... n,,ral frulll I'lllta,-c(l EI1.I3 C:.lI..:::..
This siolid soon provt'd 10 he tit ... llIall \\'ho wtluld plll tit..:
postrevolutionary political system on a 3trollg luuting. Fur Calles. II0wt'wr, Ih"
A
threat WJS from the right. Calling Ihl.' cristaus Cathullc
lllililants mounled a broad-based ideologit.:;11 c11alJ...ngc II) rl'vollil iun:.lry iJt':.lb. rlll:."
cr;steros were by no mea liS 10 thc we'llth)' dcf..:nde!'.) of Ihe old t'COllulilK
order; Ihq man}' Simple fulk who SJW lit... Rl'voluliull Ihe wurk 01 tht'
dt:vil, (0 b..: slopp"'d only by Ih... .)\\,1..1,-..1. Thb ViOl\) hd.d W.13 rt:."illful ......d by
r... OIltionary clergy, especially in th..: slatl' vi Jalblu. wha... the)' de::'l'",rall'i)'
need.....1 1001 soldiers in thl:ir crus.ldt' ag;ti1l31 the' OIl1lid... nl-.d Ikvolulioll.
When Ihe prcsidt'lltial term ofc.. Hl'S cxplrl..'d ill Ohrt'gllll, n('Vl,;"r polill
call)' relicent, presen1l::d himsdffor electiun anew. It was not a r...dc\."tion, Obr....goll
reassured Mexico, because hl: was nul Ihe in":Ulllbent. lie won "':Isily hut did nol
live to l.'njoy his puwer play: before the lli.' wa3 by .1
rdigiou3 f.malic.
Inlo Iht.' vacuum sl<.'pped the lalll..'-duLk CIlles. lie gul th"'l'uliliclll",.td,,r3 ttt
agree on a new election and on Ih.., Cft::alion 01 .1 1ll'\\I pari}'. thl' Partido N.I..iull.i1
R..:voiliciunario (PNR). During a :>u..:xeS3ion 01 3horltenn I'n::sidC:ll ...-1t'3. Calln
continued to be the power behind Ih..: scenc'3.
l""lost observers expected Calles to continul' Ih.lI rok ill Ihe jJI ...!'>idC:IKy vi
LaL,IfU Cardenas. dectt:d in C;ird... lla3 W.I:. a rdalivdy ohs...-Ul"" .lImy utli..:...1
alld forlner governor frulll Miehoa"!11 wllo SUl'pl i3... d evc:rYOI1I', l'fOllljltly 3t'llding
the 3tunn..d Calles ililo exile. It wa3 the 1i!'31 01 lIIany 1IltJVl..'S proving Ihal C.;nk-II,I:-t
wa3 going 10 be his own man.
Many peasallts had glowll qllic.11 abuul 1111..' -rl'volutiun<.llyft gvab III tlll'ir
I'lll ... !'::,. Wh..:r", waS tIll: land thl'Y had bl'eH ull":ll plunlisnl? C'-II d..:n:13 d.....id"'d III
1I1akl.' good on thosc prumis..s. DUring his kflll (1931-40) Ill.' presid..:d ovcr Ihc
dislribution of 44 millioll acrt's 01 laud 10 Iandl"':-tS Mc:xkalls, Iwice as ll\u..:h
as lhal distributed by all his predecessors cOlllbillld. C;irdl:'llaS knl'w Iht:: dangers ill
simply distributing land withoul the lIcl'essary 3UppOrtill ::.crvil..l!'>. 1\11 lou oft ... l1
Ih.1t I"'d to subsistellce agriculturc. wilh till' fanlll'r abll' Iu ked his falllily bUI
Ulhlblt:: to produce a surplus for Ihe:: market. That would ncall' grave problcms in
the lood supply to the citil:'s, as well as for the l'xpurl lIIarkl'ls.
Cin.lcn<is' solution was 10 rely h... avily un lite l'OlllllHlllalsysll'lll uflhe .:jidv. II
haJ tit ... ndvilnlage of being genuindy Mexic:.llI, while hl'ing ndlllt:r capitalist nor
socialist. Land was formally dislribukd 10 thl' t'jir!u, which heGIll\I' the ..-oll...-ctiv..
owner, even if plots were subst:.'lJuenlly apport ioned for individualusl'. l!.jidus could
include hundreds. even Ihousnnds. of 'iunilic3. The plans for .)..:hools.
hospitals, and financing. which was to be provided by thl.' newly founded Banco
dl,;" Ejidal. Not aLI tht' land dbtribuliull wa3 lH:.l..te tu ('jidvs. Individual
peasants and falnilies got plots as well.
WhiJe the huge distribution cre311.'d an milial cuphufla, the !onger-teflll
results were rather mixed. Agricultural produclion lor Ih... market fdl in Illany
areas. The social and financial services promised by Ihe governmenl fdl 3hort ul
(,0 I'AltTTW()" CA!'I', STUDIES; OVFR TII\II'
overall nee<ll". The rel"ult W:ll" low produclivity and disorganizalion on mallY
!.:<lmIlHlIlallinils :lnd an illl"ufficicllt inlegralion into Ihe market for many smaller
IIllils. Notwithstanding these prohlems, Cnrdenas became a hero to the peas'lIltry,
lie had deeply reinforced the agrarian character of the Revolutioll.
Cirden'ls also reorg'lIlized the party structure that he inherited from Calles. In
19JR C;rdenas reMranged the official party and renamed it the Partido de la
Revohlcil'JI1 Mexicana (PRM). It was now to be built around (our functional
Ihe agricultural (peasant) sector, the labor sector. the mililary sector. and
Ihe poplllar- sector, which was a residual calegory including prim:lril)' the middle
c1as", In applying thi<; concepl of fllnctioll;,!ist represent:llion, Cardenas "!ld his
polilical advisers were harrowing from corporatism, the political doctrine then in
vogue in Brazil and TvlcdilerrOlneOln Europe, especiall}' Italy. Spain, and Porlugal.
III this fashion. Cardenas devised a slrOllegy for deOlling with the lower dass('s:
mobili7e and orgOlni7e "0111 the workers ;'Inti the peasants, bUI keep them apOlrt
fr(llll e;li...h other. Thus the creOltion of sep,lratc (;lnd competin!-t) sectors for each
group within the ofr'iciOlI party, This wa}' the government cOllld maintain (ontrnl of
pnpul;lr Illovemenls :md prevent the plls<;ihlc :lppearance of a hori7ont:ll worker
l'e:I<;:ll1t \o:llitinll.
(:.irdell:ls :llsntnnk a more radicallille in rel:ltions with the lJniled The
tOIlAhc<;t issue was oil. III the cnrly twenticth c('nluf)', Mexico pOl"ses!'ed n signifl-
c:lnl peranlOlAe of Ihe \\lodd's cnnflrmed oil reserves. By lhe 1930s, foreign oil
firm.... Tllol"ll}' U.S. hUI ...ome British, had huge inve... tments in Mexico, The
ulmp;lnies eventually gOI into n w:lge dispute wilh their Mexk:ln employees; it
was fln:llly (;lrried tn the Mexican Supreme Court. which ruled in favor of the
workers. The roreign companies disrcgnrclet.l the courl dccision, assuming thai
now, as hefnre, there must be ;l W:lY around such legal prohlems in b:lckward
Mexico. To everyonc's surprise, the prcsidcnt intervened in 193R and annoullced
Ihe expropriat ion of the companies. The precipil;lting factor ciled by Cirdcn:ls WOlS
Ihe companies' refusal 10 obey the Supreme Comt decision. The legal h:lsis given
for expropriation W:lS Article 27 of the 1917 constitution, in turn based on the
Inl1f!,-slallding prindple in Sp;lllish Inw that all subsoil rights belong to the state
(crown), nOI 10 the OWller of the surface rights. The oil companies were infuriated.
The American flrll1s dCI1l;lll(lcd IhOlt U.S, President franklin Roosevelt intervene
on their behalf. Right-wing propag:ll1dists in the United States had a field day at the
expense of the Mexican revolutiollnries who had firsl att:lcked religion
and were now :lHacking property,
III Mexico the expropriation provoked nn ecstatic response, Mexican
alist sentiment, never far below the surface, poured forth; Cardenas W;lS now an
authentic hero for standing up to the gringos,
At first Roosevelt issued some angry demands to the Mexicans. but cooler
heads prevailed in \t\lnshington, After nil, Roosevelt's much ball}'hooed '"Good
policy meant, nt ;\ minimum, no more U.S. invasions of Latin America,
In f:lci. the Mcxicnn government hnd nlready said it would compensate Ihe
(ornpanie:-, Dispute then centered on Ihe value of the expropriated properties,
\ " ;vll'XIf :f): ., he I .nom): ", ,I l{1,\,,11I1 I' "I ,. I
The companies filed enormous c!.lims. illdllding Ihe tnilire \',dllt' .. , ..11 rill' "II III
the ground Ihcy had owned. hili thcy <liel nnl win 11lt.II" Ul ... e. 1It"j.;"II,1
tions eventll<llly fa\lored the Mcxic;lll governlllenl, wh.."c <;UPI" II I W.l" h,"I1\
needed hy Ihe United Slates nn Ill(' eve of World W:u II.
The companies were p:lid. :lnd the MexiGln<; (fe,II('" .1 .. 1.1ll' 011 11l"1l1lIlf.h,
Petrolens Mexicano!' (PEMEX). For decade<; Iherc:lfter, it u'mailletl a high wlllh,,1
of nation:lli!'m-above :lll, hecause ils Inrgel had hec..'ll the lInited "he lid
companies ;tnd Iheir friend!' in th(' U.:-'. governmenl did ""1 lorgel ('11111'1. I",
another thirl)' years Ihq' enfnrced a world hny(oll .lg.lin"l .111 "II .Illli
effectively ohstructe<!the de\'dnpmcllt of PH\ 1FX'.. rdllllllg npcl.II inn.. h\'
it blacklisted wilh ;Ill le.tlling foreign ell"iplllcnt .. III'I,IItr<;. ()nl r",I""1I II",
companies and Ihe U.S. IllllUghl rhey 11:111 II' I'lllll ... h the ;"k'h .111"
for their nationnlist holtlnes<; was In pre\'cnl olher 1,11111 I\m"1 If',1ll g"\'I'lllII1,nl ..
from allelllpting similar expropri.\llon," kxkn p.lltl a I'r 1'1' lor ... l.lIHlmg lip I"
Uncle
In Sllllllllnrr. Ihe 1920" and 191(J.., wIIIlC"'''l't1 tht' 'llIl"'ollCl.III<>1l III 1\1",1< 0',
pO"lrevollitionOlI)' I(gilllc. II plllve.l I.. hc ., 1"1I11'kx .lnd ,h... llll,II\,
h}/hrid, \\lhile there wcre r('gllbr delliI'll", II W,l" ,le,1I 1111111 Illf' l'lllv'l Ih.11 Huh
the offkinl parly could aLltl:lllr win.lk"piIC prOd,lI1MIHIIl" tn Ihe \ 111111 ,In', It W.I'.
widely conceded that oLltgoing prcsi(lcllt" wlHllt! dC"'Ign.ltc IIH'II ""U\'"""',
Ihrough :lll informal pn,ceo;;" klll)WIl .l" Ill(' dn/l/711 (or -hlg (Thnl' w, ..
cxten... ive <.onsultaliolls. III he "lire. hili the rdgrllllj: pl"c""dent ,lIw,,,',, 11 ... 1til<'
word,) Ambitious office !'cekcrs were llhllged In dl'( Lilt' lei \'ellr 111\,,111\' tl' 1t'\,,111
lionary ide:lls. hutlherc W:l!' no rigid idcnlngr, AIl,I when !;lC (',I h, "1'1"'''11''1', Ill"
regime's mosl rrequcllt I"('spons(' w;,<; 10 hling lriril<;' lillo' Ihe <;." .. 11'111 1,\
offering:l voke. a job, 01':1 policy (,O!lIl'l"<;inll. A... Illl(' ..1"'CI\'CI "'Urllll1.11IlC,f Ih,'
Ilomin:lnt :lppro;lch: two c:lrrnl<;, ma)'he cvell IhlCT I'r fl'll', .111,1 tht'll ,I "I" k It
necessary. By embracing (:lnd derll ... illg) Ihe lIJ'I'0... ilinn, tht' I\kxil,11l ,1.,1(' 111,111
aged 10 stl"engthen its support. These lealllr(' ... wOlllt1 rl'lll.lin ill I'r.\( til (' llrllll Ill"
1990s, :Ind. (Ic!'pile Iheir tI"demo, ralic cltaral...le!". Iher would I'llInllc tIll' 1'.1"'1'. 10'1
Iwo or Mexico's dil"lincl polilkal .l<hieVt'lll('IlI"; tivili,1I1 ("llt .. ,1 "\'1'1111(' flull!.II'
and more lIl:ln a half century of polllical l"t.lhilil)/, III 1111' w.lkl "I It'\'"llltl"ll. 111
olher words, Mexico devclnped:1 relatively :llllhmil:lri,ll11'lIl Ih.lt I>or .. !tIll,
rc!'cmblance 10 the brulal mililary regime" rh,lt \\'Oliid ,llfmin,llc Illc
COile from thc 1960s 10 the 19RO....
Stability, Growth-and Rigidity
C:lr(lell:lS would have !teen a difficull aci for :1I1}' politil ian 10 iI,lIow TIWt hllll I' tit
his successor followed Ol pnttern repeated atlhe end n" ('\'e'1' <;ix }'('.Ir plc<;.ltlrllc.. r Ifl
Ihe 1990s: endless speculation, mostl)' ill-informed, n\'er Ihe IIkd}" nOlliinn' 111
1940 Cardenas chose neither of thc two Illllch-tli<;nl<;t;cd frnnl 1I111rwr... ("11"
mdical and olle conservative) hut turned insle"d III hl<; lillie knll\\'11 1111111'11'1 III
war, General Manuel Avila <:;lllla\hll. (:lc:lrl)' Ihere W,I" ,I 1"n"'('II'II" \\'1111111 Ill'
politic:ll elite on slcering the Rc\'olul ion olllll :1 Illllllcr.lk ( "Ill "I'
,,' 1'.\1( I I WI I .. t ,\\1 \IIIDJl t IIANt,1 OVI'I{ 11",11'
III Ill" .... IIIII).ligtl. AVila l:alll.tdlU Il1:.H.ll' it c.:"',lr that h... W;.lS IIllt allti..:kri....;d; hl'
hllll .....11 .1 bdl..... Vl'I. And hl' ,ll:lually fac.....ll an 0ppollenl: Juan Andreu
'\!lll.ll..ill, 01 th... P,lnidll AuitJII Nadunal (PAN), a Ilt:dgillg, pro-cl ..... r.
h .111,,1 p.lll} till lit ... li/-;ltl. Till' ullili.tI I'nt\1 ...andidall' l'usil)' prev;.lillc..I.
III ,,1'\"1".11 kl')' jhllky .11 a::. Avil.ll:amadlu ::.uon proved .non.> lHudcnlll' 11i.lll
(. .lrdlll.l". l Ill ...' W.I,> I.lud r li::.lrihulioll. \'\fhilt- C.irc..lln<ls had l'lldt':.In:d lum::.df to
Illl' f\lnh.llI Ih.I::..llIIIY hy Iii::. llllKh I'ublidud 1.lnJ gr.lllb. Avil., Camacho
I.II)",lI'd Ill" tlhlllbullOll ,1\ IlIdlVldu.d 1.11 II ilic.::::.. And wh...rl.I::. had
lllhlllnl1-I IIlJlIiClll .I...1l", AVII.I Call1,lcho distriblltl;:d only 11 lllillhHl.
III III\" 1.lhllr Ikld, C<LIIl.ldIU Ill,ld..... anolher mOVl' away lnHll 111 ..... left. lie
IIpJ.IUd lilt' ulll..... ,tI k.ldl1 ulthl' p..ulys 1.lbur wilh Fidd Vdal.qu..:z. who was
IIp''IlI)' 1111..111...- III tIll' llhlle Illilil.llli Ulllun 1..:.lder::. ;lIId help.....d tu nmk..: 11100e
dllli... ult \Vllll... ;HllullOllll.ll::. lllllUll .Idiull bt:lllg discoUr.lgld, till' gc..wcrllllIenl
,,111\,\."\1011 ,1tIulh...... tHllIl: , Il:.1111Ig Ih..... Mt'xk<lllo de! Sl'guro Sodal (Il\lSS), .1
,,"t.\.tl ..l... U1lly .lglll\.)' wbidl prtlvidl'd wilh 11lcdic.:al car..... through a 11l'1work
.. I ,llllh:o. .111...1 1L"."pit:lb. "I'll...: lovl'rage lilllikd to a few hulldl 1
\\\llkl'I" l.y Illl' Inid but II W,l'" Ihe pre(e... 1...-1l1 for a fril1ge b nt'll!
\\ 111...11 Wlluld I,..... ::.k,ldtly lxh:lId.....d tu thl' be::.l-urg.lllized of labor.
III ,h!,hll"ll, ,\vil.1 C.lllI.ldltl I.llt'd Ihe l-h.llll"nge of \"'urld \V.lr II. Mcxic:ln::.
It'll .1 ... t I illig "'}'Illpotlhy lor Ih.... Allied laU"'l. bul:.In almost cllually ::.uspidoll
til .Ill .lIlh/lIl.llic .dli.IIlLl' Wllh Ill\.' Ullill'd Statls. Aft ..... r Pearl J l<1rbor IlIl' Mexic.11l
gll\' ...llllllllIt I,rokl' till dipltJlll:llil relilliollS wilh Japan, (;erlll,ln)', alld lI.dy, hut
... hllli til deLI.lring war. II wa::. unly th..... rl'pl'ated sinking uf tvlcxk,1I1 ships
II} (;...1"1I1.111 U hU.ll::. that Ild Ihl' Avila C;lInacho government to obl..lin .1 declam-
Ihlll 1'111111 Illl' IlativII..lllI/lIgre::.... in f\l.IY 1942. Mexll"o. .llong wilh llnnil,
. lIll uln' til til" unly IWlI LIIlII Anl\.'ri ..... lll cllunlrie::. 10 supply combal furces to
llghl 111\' \ \I .
,\II,.IIHI 11'1' would h,lvl' gr.l\'l illll't1l1.tll......... luI' th..... fuIllr.... Allel .111 expJil"11
hdWl'I'11 I'l'l':-'ldl'lll!'o Fr,lIIklill ]<'tHJ:>l'Ve!t and Avila C:.IIlIa...l10, Mexicu
hq-\.lll "\"lldlllg \\'ork...r::. 1I01'Ih lu 11lllhl' gap left illlh.... U.S. tldds 0)' Ih...
1I1I11I.1I}' dl.L1I A.. Ihl' w.lr .... uIIIIlIlI\.'lI. lh..: Mexk:lll Iabur..... r::. (known .IS unuc!ro:.)
111g.111 II' IIII Ih 111.1/-;11 uhur.. 1)uu" .1::' w...:ll .1 c.I ..... VdOpll1cllt tlt.ll aroused tl....... oppu::.i-
Ihlll ,II ll.:-l. tJlg.llll:t d l.thlil. 1'11.... \\'.Ir l'l\llnl with an import..lllt pre.... e... l..:nt est.lb-
II .. hld tIll' ,jUiu,ally ll1dor:........ 1 Ilurthw.lrc.l movem.... nl uf Ml:xic;.lll worker::. lu
pntullil I'lb., tUI" Wlll ... 11 n" AIIll'l"iC;lIl!'o ... uuld be fuund. B)' 1945, some 300,00U
l\kx 1....111" h,ld tile l,.Xp...ll("llLl' ul wurking in Ihe Ullikd St;lk.... Although
111.11l) II.HI 111l')udILl' .1I1...! disLrilllin;lliun, 11\0::.1 Ilad e,lIlll'd much
hlghl'f \\.Igl!'o IIt.tll W..I... pt)::'!'olhll,. ill f\'h'xko. Th.... promise of a higher income
.1"" v Ihl' hurder, huwl'v",r larllbh..... c.I. rt"l1laint:c..I a conslant attraction to impover-
... llnll\k"i....1l1::. kJl gllIl'r.nion::. to (OI11l.
\'\lltll Illl' ...11...1 ul Wurld War II. f\'kxiuJ saw induSlriulizalioll as a way out of
1'\"1 .. 1.. 1,'111 11,'Vllty. t llIl...ell hI Il',1l1 tIll' WOly Miguel A1..... 111:1 11 , Ihc Ilrst ejvilian
I'lnhknl .. Ill...... thl' IkvtJlulltlll. (, )l1l' 01 Aleillan'::. first a..:ts W,IS (u rcorg.lnizc and
1,'lhlllh' Ihl' p.tlly. litH\' ... ..Il1nl till: IJarlidu Rcvolu.... lollariu In... litu...-ional
.1 .. I\IEXICO 1.llIlIng ul .1 Ik\'ulllllUlI h \
(PRI). Adding Ihe wurll Min::.llItlliull,li" signaled a (urn tuward pr.lglllalblll. Thl'
parly w.l::'lllade up or Ilire..... Sl'clors: work..... r, and pUl'ul<tr, lh.... furlll il ha:-.
since rdailled. It t:'llll'rgl'd aS:lll utt ..... r1y dominant nflkial p,lrl)', dif"fl'rl'lll frulll .111)'
uther in I.alin Amcrica.
'l'lll' new prcsident's hallnhlrk W..IS IV bc ecollomk llcvdupllllnt. WII.II f\ kxico
n1v... 1 Ill'l'ded wa::. infraslruclUre-road::.. dam::.. t."Ullllllullil-aliull::.. and purt
f.Kilitie::.. AI...-tnan th..... rl"forc laun..:heJ all aillbilious ut puhli .... wmb,
::.Ir..... and hydrock'ctrk projec..... Th...-r.... .Ibo hlghw.IY alld hOhl
cunstnll'lio/l 10 facilit;lte Ihl' tourist tradt.: frulll the Uni1l'd Slatl'S. This
paid 011, .1 ... tourism beG11l1t.' an all-illlpurl;,tllt .. I' hlrl'igll e;<dlall)!..... lor
M..:xicu....!though with cultural ;lI1d sOI.:ial illlpikalioll::' Ihal Mexk.llI ll.lliulI,llbb
lou lid dbla leflil.
The M xican e<.llllolllY ::.hOWl'd ::.ignifiL:.Int growlh. Thl: IOUIlJ",liull'" w..:I ..... I.lid
by ::.h;,lrply inO"l'asing prOll'ctioll agaiml impufb. The ... hoflfun ;u::.lilk:ui'"1 wa:.
IU ea::.t: Nkxku.... sever..... halance-of-pa)'llll'llts lh:ficil, but Ihe lit'! df..:(t wa::. In
provide a guaranteed market fur c.lOlllcStic prOdlll'tioll. I)Ulllt:Stic liiallufa.... lurillg
ft'spolllkd with a spurt uf growth. averaging 1).2 percellt " yl'.Lf hetwel'n 19!X
,111...1 1951. Agricultural production did l'ven bell ..... f ill y".llS, awr.lging
10.4 p.... nenl. A sluwllowll in growth thell ca::.1 a sh;ldow uv r 111l' elld 01
1\leman'::. (crill. which was further lainll'd by lIluunting c11<.lrge::. ul urruplion.
Th.... bosses of Ih.... PRJ kllew. when it camc lillle to dluu!'oe a IIl'W SU(Ll':-....or in
11)52. that the)' had In improve the government's image. Overriding A 's UWlI
pr....rer they Sdll ....d 011 a colorless politico who providl'd ..u ll'asl a p.lrtial
answ r. Adolfo Ruiz Cortines h,ld been uf Veracruz and laler ::'l'O"ct,I r)' 01
Ih.... interiur in Ihe Aleman presidency. yet hl' had managnllo earn a reputatiun ror
hun....::.ly, Once e1l t ....c.I president. Ruiz Corlincs made good on a c,lIllpaigll
tll 1"001 uul gr.lfh:r hy firing a ::.erics of ::'U::'pl'cl ulliciab.
The most impurtanl policies vI' Ruiz CurtilH:s L,tlllt: ill the nunulllit..
splwJ't.', Sillce Ihe war, Mexico had b.....I1I ..... xperiencing all inflaliol1 rat...' wbidl
was high lor I.atin i\merk.1. Th.... McxiGIIl ..... (UIIOlllic Illanagers lIlade a nudal
de..:isiull. They opted for a Mhard+mun.... lu\\'-illiblioll ... lraleg)'. \Vhi...:!1 IIll.llll
sctting .Ill exchangl' rate (pc::.o/dollar) ..IIlJ then lU;.lllaging Ihdr et."lInom)' (hy
conservalive fiscal and monetary pulley) so as lu main lain thaI eXdl:lngl' rate.
Th..... flr::'1 step was 10 devalue the ov..:rvalucd pe::.u from Pl'SU::' tu Ihl' dollar
to 12.5 Pl'SOS to the dollar in 1954. This c.h:valuation .111 ;111 11 11"c.1 iall'
stintulll::' to M..... xkall .... xporls. liD\\' cheaper ill U.S. dollars. and lIwdc Ml'xiLli
dlcap..... r lur foreign lourbts. Mexko quickly be.... amc known ;I::. ..I prulllisilll:!.
target fur illlt:rnational inveslors.
When Ruiz Cortines left office at the age of sixty-seVen. he :.Iml the king-
makers chose a successor two decades younger, lIe was Adolfo Lopa Mateo::.. the
outgOing sec.:relary of labor wilh a mildly leftist reputalion. Somewhat ...-ryplkally,
L6pl'Z Makos himsdf declan::d Ihat his "dmillislraliull would b..: K un th..: .... xlreme:
left. within Ihe constilution: Mexico W;.lS nOI highly unionized. Tile V..ISI m'ljorily
of 10werc1ass citiuns. especially the mmpes;'lOs. had 110 indep.... nd.... nt m......lUs of
(,4 I'AHTT\VO" CIIANr;F.nVEIlTU\!E
protecting or promoting their own inlere... l.s. The union... thft! did exist were closely
lied to the regime itself.
Notwithstrtnding this pilllern, Lopez Mateos was quickly chrtllenged by
militrtnt railworkers, who staged :J major strike in 1959. Their leader, Dellletrio
VallejO, was contesting the government-dominated structure of lahar reliltions.
Ollld \VOlS delllOlnding the right to genUinely indepelldenilinion action. The workers
followed the strike order ;md braced themselves for a long siege. Lopei'. M:lteos
;1pplied;'ln old-fashioned rellledy: he arresled the le<ldcrs :tnd ordered the strikers
h:lck to work. The strike W;1S broken and VallejO rCll1:linctl in j;1il for YC;1rs, all
nhje("t less0n to other wnuld-hc lllilit;1nts.
1.(lpCZ Matcos nonetheless sought to dist;1n,e himself from his cOIl.<;crvative
predecessors. The ohvious slarting point was l<lnd. A ch:tlln: 10 acquire land
n:lllained lht, grcatest dream for Mexico's pooresl rural dwellers. Lnpcz. M:lteos
ordered the distrihulion nf approxilll:ltel)' 30 million acres of Innd, giving him a
bnd-rc{llrrl1 record second only to C;lrdenas. Furnishing tmsic services (and
tTcdit) for these new landowners W:lS Illllch 1110re difficull "nd ton seldom
<lchievcd. Nunetheless, revolutinnuy llHlmCnlll1ll 11:1(1 heen rcsuillcd in n crucial
realm.
III economic policy Lilpez Matcos cnlltinued the hard-mnnC)' policies impliCit
in the 19';4 devnlu;1tioll. Investment relllnincd high. nnd Mcxico heg:lll r<lising
capital ahro<ld, :lhovc all in the New York bond markct. The :llll";1(tioll was high
interest mtes, gll;1r;1nteed convcrtibility (into dollnrs). and O'lppnrent pnliti("O'lI
stabilit},. The governmcnt succeeded in O'lchicving cxtrO'lonlin:1l'ily low infblion.
Ihereby making it possible to stick with its fixed exch;mgc mtc of 12.5 pesos to
the dollar. Yet Mexico W<I." hy no I1lC;1ns <I completely open market cconomy.
Indced, "t;ll(' intervention in the economy incrcO'lsed in the ye:1rs 0f L'\pez Mnteos.
U.S.- and C<llwdi;ltl-Owned electric cOl11p<ll1ics were nationalized, for example, ns
was the motion picture industry, which had been l<trgely cOlltrolled hy Iiollywoocl.
The Lopez. Malens ndminislration broughl some signifkant changes in for-
eign affairs. A 19(vl (Orrll;ll agreemellt belwccn Lopez M:lteos and U.S. president
Lyndon Johnson Mexico sovereignly over a long-disputed riverb:lllk territory
in the area ofEI Paso. At the same time, Lope? Male0s prescrved independence on
nnolher is.<;ue: fidel Castro's Cuba (sec Chapter 5). After 1960 the United St;1tes
was pushing incessantly for anti-Cuban votes in the Organization of Americ<ln
Stntes. Mexico wns the only I.<ltin American country never to break relntions with
Cuh:l. II took pride in ils refusal to bow to the U.S. demand for n uniform response
from its Latin AmeriGlil nllies.
The officinl candid;1tc 10 succccd Lopez MO'lleos ill 1964 wns Gustavo
Ord;'lz, who lllallY thought would swing the PRJ back toward the right. lie was
from the state of Puebla. Mexico's Catholic stronghold. As the incumbent secretary
of the interior, he had e;1r1ier OI"<lcre<lthe arrest of certain "radicals," including the
worid-famOlls artist O;1vid Alfaro Siqueiros.
Dial. Orda7. countered this expectation b}' pledging to continue the policies or
Ilis pre<!ccessnr. I,(\pez Mateos h;1<! taken seriollsly the criticisms of the PRI's one-
The student movement of 1968 began limited protest with {'<!e(lic idpOloqy. ,,<;
suggested by the declaration of solidarity with Che Gllevilril during Ihi<; p('i'tcE-fut n1.11("11
along the Paseo de la Reforma in Mexico City. It eventlli'tlly bpGlrnr> ,1 IIaqic oi<;l<. fOl Ill ...
nation's political system. (United Press Internation<tl.j
party S}'Slem and pllshetllhrollgh a :lIllClIdllll'111 th,ll gll,II.lIlt",.!
0pl'nsition parties n minimlllll (If c0ngressioll:J1 ... (':11S il Ilw)' won .1 11lillilllWll
national vote. Applying this principle in the IlJ(l'l dr,rinn<;. Wlllg ,111.1 lett
wing oppositioll pnrl ics had WOIi seals ill (:ClllgIT<;S. all hnl Igh ... t dl nvnwlwl rllllll:1\'
outweighed hy Ihe PRI represelltntioll.
Dial.. Ordnz began hy hnrH,ring this rc((lrtllist tl1nl.... I. l\tll Ilw t'lltrendH'\1 I'J{1
Icnders soon made known Iheir fllry:1t Ihe nC'wl)' :ll'poinIC(1 sc\ rel.I'Y gt'IH'f,II,"
Ihe part}'. Carlos Madr:lzo, who W;lS nl!elllpting to open Ill" the llHllIill.ltlOIi
procedllres-nlways the criticn! link ill a fllle-parl)' systC'lll. l{('sl'llnding tn rIll'
party m<lchine complaints, Dia". Orl!n /Ired M:1dr:17o. The !l('W hard lillt' IV,I'.
further cvidl'nt whell the letlcral governlllent all11ullcll lllaY(lf:l1 elrt ti'lll'" in 1\\'"
cHicI' in the st<ltc of Ibja Cnlifnrnia Nnrlc \\'hith PAN t .1lltllll.t1\... !l,1<1 Wflll '1'h<'
lihemliz:ltioll nfthc one-party s),stem h:Hl ovcrrcadlrd its IInlll
hi, 1"'\1<11\\'11" \ \\1 .... 1\11111\ (JI:\NI,lPVHtT[)\11
1)101/ ()rd,11 \\tluld h.lv\. hn'lI lu... ky II lll..l)'ural \.'I\...:III.)IIS had been his only
l't,IIII\..11 W.IlI). Hili II lib 1.11t: to buvenl illll1l' era 01 SIUlIl,.'llt Ihal shook
Ill\. \Vt.. I",111 \'Itllldllllhl.' 1.11\." II)bU... TIlt' prn.. lpit.lling I.u.. lor was f\.kxicu's
t,l Illl' .. 11111111\.'1 lll),lllllI (;.lllln III 1')6H. 'I'l,\., gtl\'ernlllClll \\,..111 .111 out to
l\1\.:-. 1\. 0 III Ill"" \'I'Irld. 111 l\k:d....1l1 1\.'11, aUlung .... nb, wa:. upSd al
lilt, 111"".1 111.11 Ihi' go' ...'1 111111: III IIl1glll .,1Il\" n'd III gaill ing inlcrll.lt ional respe..:tabilit y.
111\.'1\' hq.;.lll.1 1...... 1til with.. t\ .. (Udt:lIl I"Ok:.t ill tvkxko Cit)' in luly was fIld
\.\ 1'1 tlLI! Ittlu' hUlil Iht' Ilul 1'"li ... \.. 1'11l1I":)t .. pre.IJ 10 Ihl: 1l.lliullal in
... l, \.ullllrll.lllll'-: III .1 .. lliI...... Till' Wlvlrnlll .... lli (hought il was ;(
","1"'1'11.1' l,t'lll '"I dl:)rLlpllllg Ih... 1)1)'lllpit: Gallll.':). I
J
r<::.idl'llt 1)1:1'1. Ordaz
1""I"'lhktl Ity "",udllq..; :11111)' llllOp:' 111110 Ill .... C:lmpus, Ihcreb}' viulaling ils hbloric
".IlI' 111,11)' .. 1.1111... '111... hall I,' wa:. joinl'd. COllld 11ll.' studl'1l1 1l'l'1 .. l0p Iht' Ol),lllpic
I ;.Illlt.. ?
Thl' 1l.lgI, 111)'lltlll nl hdw,'l'll sltu.kllt:) and ...UlltillUl'd.
1IIlIhl"Il""1 2. 1')\lH,.1 r.tll), 01 :.llIdt:llh ill lilt' Mt:xilu City :.t.I,:lioli uf'l'l.llduktl
,lh'W .111 IIIIl ... u.dly IIl.I\')' \lJllllllgl'1l1 III fvn::.... :). All nrd""r Iv dbp.... r:.1;' \'I;]:)
.dkgnlh ""[ llh::.,IV...d, .llld lit\. poll\.\.' ,llld p<tr.ll11ilitar)' lur":t::' muved ill. They
hq..;;a" .. .lIld 11I ... ... I,I\\'d W;I:' \,Hlght 111.1 l..ru::.::.llr\.,. ..Is
kll dt,..,1 .11111 1l1.11l} Jllt/r\. \\I'lIlld.d. '1 hi' ...:r..: .11 Tlatt:loko :)l'nl a
111ft High l\kxI ... tI. 111""1"... \\' .... IHI IIHIIIII")'. lItI ...unviIKIllg t'Xplallatlun Irulll tilt:'
III1IH,,,, 1'1 ivIll,1l1 .Hllholllln 1"""p"ll:.lhlt. IlIr Ilw .. 1.lUghhr. A churll:) 01 critics
...... I lin' 1... 1 1... 1. kill pro\\"d Ih... b.llIklllpl ... y til IIw PRI nhIllOpul}' Oil pu"'.... r. B)'
Iii,' ...1111 ... h')... .. , 11,,blut,l1 ..ltow til JUIU' ltlllVIlKnl virlually \;'Vt.f)'UIl thai
,11.llkllg\" ttl .wlhulll}' wltuld tllIl}' hnllg llluft' wailing Th ... was
dulllll
b
..Ilhlllll: OIYIIlI'I\.. l ..l1lln lu...,k plall' 011 ::.dl ....dlll ... .
I )l"I'll\. Iltt: 1111 tlte l'0ltll....11 [rOlli, lIlt: l\'kxirun CCl)lltllll)' ... ulltinlleJ I...)
III H 1111. 1'1 I"" ).:1'1 ..... 11.111"lla11"' idlH.:I grl'w al () P...'I":Illt a Ylar. alth\HIgl\ Ihe dislJ'ibuI iun
til 11IlI>!l'" ll'IlI.lillld big/II)' 111W'I!I.II. Iklwn'lI 1'J5u alld 11)69, Iht' lll\.ome
I, I 111"" plll'l t ..1kill II I)l (II .. III Ipul,111l III dn,IJP.......ll rUIn 2.4 p... 'Tellt 10 2.0 per",:-clll.
J\kdll\\'lllk. ndl ...... ' h'lIllt IIl1ll,I:.nl Ih ::.han: Irol1l IY pl..'r":l1l1 tu 51 pcrct'llt.
l\k,\l""'\ "llIll.IUdutl:) gllJwlh h.ld tllIl)' 11l":ll',I:)t:d the inomle.
\\,1"'11 Iii... IIIII\. ... ,1111,' Jill' Ih... prl':"l...knli:d Dial' Ordaz :)l'llied 011
l.u ... hlllvIIII.I, III ... :........ ItlarY 01 Iltl' inlt'riur rt:sponsiblt' for Ihe s....curity forct's at
Il.tldtl!"" I.. II \\'.1" lI,lI dl}' ,I ... huit l'llkd)' Itl rl'unlk t.mbilkrt'J rv!t:xiGIll:). Echcverria
111 llu .. Iltlw.l IIl'W 1.1\.1' ill lib .... 11t:rgdk ... alllp:.tign :.tlld, ;Ilter tht' lIMlallandslidt'
, 1 ItJl y. I Illlt) Ill .. Ill'W tlUI i....... Thl' :)plll'rt' in which the Il\'W president sought
h. 111,Ik"'/II.. Wl.lk.. IIII.lrk \\',1" Ihl'lllll.' \,.. h\..'rt;' II.... h':lS soon critidzed: lI1anagt'-
1l1\.nl III Ill\.'" C\.IllIOIII)'.
l:dll'\'l'III:l .llid lib ..lJvbt'r:) w.lllkd nulllllllk growth. bUI alsu bt.'tter dislribu-
IItllI til Ib hl'IU:lib. All IIhVUHI.. pl,lll: tu as always in M.... xico. was thl' rural
.....,ItIl.IIIt"I"'Illkrnl ullllllt.. I:)lrudul\ ... udl rural dCClrilkation and tht: road
.. y.. lllll III ,lid", lu 1I,Il'lI}' \.I111!>1l11llr:. in Ih\. dtil's, Ihe Edl\..'verria glwl'rnlllent
Ilgllh'llltl 1111' .... "bling pri\.I' ulIlllllls Ull ba:)k fuodstulls. In dft:cl, tht' federal
gOV\'lllll\\"111 \\'.1 .. ltJll\lllitllllg lI::.l'lIIU all t.:'lal.lling un loud fur til .. urb;'lll
I .. 'I'll" T.tllllll}) III .l Ik\'ululillil (,7
1ll.ISS.... This t.uuld bt.-' flnallCl:J ullly b)' draining Ihl' kdlr.tllrl.I.. ury VI by p.lyillg
bdow"l..t1st 1'1' icC's for their gvutb. Thl.' 1,lt ..... 1 wuuld illt.:vit<.lbly JI:)... Ullr..lgt
pruductiun. ,tlltl the former would ..... nd loot: IIlllalion.lry, ih lerlll
cUlltinued. hI: resorkJ iIKn.:u:)ingly to :)hort lalll 1I1..... that \\'ould Lhannd
("';'gl'S, lalld, :.ocial to Iht: pour.
At Ihl' :)alllt: timt' Ihe slale was illcr..... ib gelh:ral umlml U\t'l Ih...
ecunomy. In additiun lu dirt.:Ll sp""nding Ihnlugh kd""f,1I t!t:partlll.... nls .Intl
lllinblril::., thl' gu".... fllllll:nl allo... alc\.1 ,I larg... :)h.lll ul tht: hudgl..'l wdl oVt'r h.dl
in of and l-olllpanic rh....
Il..'ading 1""llding lllu:)1 ":(lllSP1\.1l0U:.I)' Ihl..' N.I... IOII.ll Flll,ln... ltr wlr....
opl..'raled by the guvl'rnme1lt, alld Ille mallipulalion uf l redlt I t:'IHluwt.'d
the stak willt cUJlsiderabk inllutlll.... uVt:r Iht' "'COllUIll)'. ul I 1...,1' illsl:lllce,
Ihe guvcrnlllcHt cunlrolled principal shares ill nin.' ol"lhe LUlllllry's hlp It'll finll:',
ill Ihirteell uul uf the top Iwenly-five. alld ill out ul' til ... tup fill).
Whilt.: the j\'1l'xi ....:lll stalt..' took all <Iclivl' I',ut ill Ihe ....tpil.tlbl
econumy, il rtI.lin....d cOII:)idl'r.lbk IrolH IIll' pl'lvale :)edur. Mudl
oflhis autunuJll}' :.kllllllt:'d (rom Ille laLllh.t1 J\-k:<iLu':) flublk w.... I\..'.lur Ihl.'
mosl part. Thl'Y did Iwt U)Illt: hOlll wC'althy l.,,"ilks.1lId
aftcr flnbhing :.chool or uniwrsit)'. Ihey Illowd dir",..:lly into polilkal ...ar\.t'r:). In
conlra:)1 to Ih... United Ihl'lt;' v.... r}' lilllt .... r uf p r:.ullnd bl'lWt:l"lI
privak corporal ions and public Off'll...', Ill\. l\kXI 1Il nol
10 allY :)ud,11 group ur lIlll..'rl':'1. II I"'lld..d lu loJl.thUI..Ik Wll" tht' pnv.lk
:)t..'clur. to he :)un:, OUI Ihis wa:) nul ahva}':) tht ":,1:)1'-.1 Ihat g.IVl til\'
guvlrnlll.... nl ...oll:.iderabl.... Irl'edolll of a":::liull.
While Ihi:. cunlllllll'd, Ihe govcrnlllt.:llll.I......d ,I 11\.'\',' prublem:
a gu...... rilla movC'lllenL l\kxican pulilid:ln!> h.ld long rl'a:.!>urc:d 'h...lll .. lhal
their ..:ounl ry was Irum (ht' r...:)t of La( in AlIl.... ri..:a, wlllr... gUIITill.l:' \W!"...
rifl. I\lkr alL Ml.'xico had alrt:.ltly had rl'VuIUliun. M\.Xl ...O W.I:) nul illlllltlllt.:,
ClIlrrill.l::. called lor violl.'nt acliUll ngaillst 111 ... PRI alld all ib WUI k... ill
I Iht'y stagt:d .. Ofll<lllk robheries and high-profilt kidn:lppillgs. In 11)71
the.: falll ...... -ill-I;.lw uf Ihe and hdd ILlr 1',111:'0111. [n Ihl' :)Iak vi
L;u.... rreru. all .... xst:houheacher. LUl io Cab:1I1,1:', Il'J a gUt'J I ilia al Illy tlt:lt III
strike al will. They kidnapped Ih.... ufficial (PRI) LOlndid.llC' for guvl'l'lIur and dd......d
Ihe: army by dire...'1 attacks on isulukd Olllpu:.IS. II tuok ,I IU.OUU-mall .trill}' lllurt.'
than ;1 )'l'ar 10 hU1l1 down and k..ill Iltt. rl'bd:) and thdr 1...... Jer. 1Jt.:'I"k
un tht: I.... rt, C<.tbailas had no SllCCl::)sor ill l;lIt'rrl'm or .... rt'.:.u lilt' gllerrilb
threat faded, Why? Was it the genius of the ..:o-oplivc Sy:.klll ullhc PRI? Or \Va:) il
Ihl;' government's Ildwork uf rc:prcs:)iun?
But Echeverria's major problem was Ilut with the: gUl'rrilla:). It Wt.l:) with Ihl;'
t:t:Ollumy. Tltc weak point in Mcxico':) ......:onulllic illllatioll. III ...rudl..'
It'rms, Mexico could nol expect to guaranke the t:ullvc:rtihility al a flxC'd mit'
lIllles.. its inllatiull no highl'r than Ihc U.S. J....\'t'1. By IY7) lllllallull wa:) rUlllllllg
at 20 pl'rct'1I1 and rClnained at that !l'vd in I M... xkus gumb, Ull II Ie.: 1
exchange ralc, W('I"(. growing uncvllllwlitin' ull tile wurld 1Il;ll'kd. Yd Ill ....
l'!\ItT'lnrl)" CA!'>!. .... llflHI.!'> (IIANC.! OVrlt liME
governmenl stuck with Ihe fixed rnte. which had heen the hedrock of fvlcxiclIl
development ;lnd a powerful politic:.. 1symhol.
\o\'hr W;lS inflation plaguing Mcxico? Many Latin Americans might have
rcversed the ljueslion: Iinw had fvlexico ,!Voided it for so long? The answer wns
Ihnt the fv1exiGln government. Irying 10 ple:lse so Ill:lny constitllencie<;. wa<:
rUllning huge deflcils :lnd financing Ihem in all inflationary Ill"nner. There
W;'IS :llsn pressure from Ihe h:llrlncc of p,,)'menls. which wenl illto serioliS deflcil
hy Ihe middle of Echeverri,,'s IeI'm of office. Mexico's continuing induslrirlliza
tion retillin:d henvy c;lpilal goods. Hut a relatively new import wns even Illore
worrisome: food. The ('collomy's fnillire wns in agriculture. PrOdllCli(lfl h:ld
grown for <;elecled food<: (lclIll:lloes. st"nwherries) for exporl. especinll)' In the
United SI:lles. bUI Ihe output of hasic foodsluffe:, cspeciall)' cereals. was f:llling
<;horl. Impor!s lel Illee-t this delll:lnd plll :In enormous burdcn on Ihe b:ll:lnce of
r:lrlllcnis.
The I'('ekolling ellllC in Fche\'('rri:l's Inst )'cnr:l<; presi{lent. The (I r:l m:l cellleretl
011 Ihe gre:ltly nver\,;lllled peso. With the governmcnt sluhhornl)' mainlnining it<:
IIxcd r;ltc of 125 10 the t.IollM. every fvlexicOlll ofmc:lns tried 10 convert inlo
U.S. t.'urrency. The govern mellI's ever morc rre(lllcnt dCllinls of devnlllOltion rang
hollow. In 1')7(" :lfter e:lpit:ll flight h:ld reached panic proportions, the
governlllclli g.\Vc W.l)'. Thc pcso was dC\':llllcd h)' 60 percenl. Govcrnmenl
crcdihilit)' \\'01'" so low 111:l! :lllolher devnlu:ltion or 40 percent was needed to
<:cllic the 1ll00l'kei jusl one month !:tter. Could Ihis incompetentl)' mnnOlged dcv:l
IUrllion nlllvincc ill\'cslor" (including Mcxic:llls) to make new commitmcnts in
I'cstls? Allhouv.h Mexicn al last had ;1 re;llisti, exchange mtc. the Echeverria
goveflllllcnt failed tll :lll:lck the rising publicsector deficit-;\I1 esscnti:ll step if
fu[mc h<1lance of l'a)'lllents crises were to he prcvented,
Echcverrin cnded his Icrlll in a flurr)' or histrionic gestures, anI)' eleven d:lYs
befM"" the cnd of his presidcnC)'. he cxpropri:lted rich fannbnds ill Ihe north for
redistribution tn 1:H1dlcss pe:lsanls. Panic spre;ld :l11l011g l:lndowners. POI' the first
ti111e in yC<1r!', Mexicans t;llked seriously aboul Ihe possibilily 01';"1 mililflry coup.
I)cspile widespread nnxict)'. his IeI'm ended penccfull)' ;"Ind on schedule.
The new presidenl was lose Lilpc7. Portillo. the 111l;"lllcC minisler who hOld
presided ovcr fin ecollomy thai sccmed to he wildly out of conlrol. Mexico had
growing deficits. both in ill' federal hudget Olncl in its balance of payments. Annual
inflOltion hOld re:lched 30 percent; though modest 11)' American standards.
Ihis W<l" enclugh 10 erode confidence in Ihe Mexican growth mo{le\. Lopez Portillo
Iherefore gm'c firs! priority to Ih:lt e!rrnaltask of restoring roreign confidence in
IllS ecollom)'. W'ithin weeh after hie: in;'luguration in December 197(1. the ncw
MexiG\Il president traveled 10 Washington for a highly publicized visit with onl-
going president Gerald Ford and nn address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress.
11 W.IS a powerful reminder Ih:\t Ihe Iv1cxican c1ile still saw its fate closely linked to
opinion.
UlpC'l Portillo's presidency C:lme to be domin<lted by economic issues. lusl as
he look offlcC'. Mexico begnn discovering vnsl CJuantities or oil. and hy 1980 I.opez
I .. Mr,XI< () 'I Ill' ["111I111: .. 1.1 1{"\"hlll"'1 ,,'I
Portillo could :lllIlOUnCC Ihat Ihe (Olllit '")' po<;sesse,1 PI"lI\'l'll Ic... ('rn" III 711 hlll""1
h:trrcls ,Ind potcnli:ll reservcs ofmon'lhan 200 hilliflll. Ill:l w"rl,I"l'l'an'nll\ I,,... , 1
Il)' chronic shol'lngcs nnd co.<;ts fnr ellergr. t"'CXl< II h,ltl "udtknl)' ,I<, 11Inl'd
ncw intern<lt innal dout. Dednre,lnll eh'lllicnl 1,,;l'c/ 1
1
01'1 illtl: e .11 c rw', hII" I,.
of in the world to(I;IY tho<:e Ihal clulI'l h;wl' lIil .,".1 lhll.... 111.11 .1'1 \\,
h<lveil."
Holstercd b)' the!'e windfnll profll .... 1.1'I'C7 Pori iIln .l<:<:C'IIC'.lln' Icp"IItIl'lh C' II' '111
Ihe LJlliletl St<lles in foreign polk)' e<:I'('li,llIy ill rtg.lld III ((,IIII,1f \llInll ,1 ..1
region soon 10 he engillfcd in violelli..c and t.ivil \\'.11 (1"1,,,, 'IC ...lllhnllll (11.11,ltl II
lie expressed S),lllp;llhy for" left wing I'CVflllltiflll.lrr 11111\"'11","1 Ih,ll III 1'1'"
topple..ln longtime U.S. nil)' in Nit <Iragll,l. III I lie oriel ('til, ,\\ 1'1'11 nll'cll' ,1'111'1
to povcrty-stricken COlllltriC" orCentml I\lllcricn.I'" ,IIlIC.ln... III budding lllllllill"
throup,houtthe isthmus. I\lld in mid )l)RI.lhr fl.l",:i(.Hl gnn'lllllu'nIIC'lII('lt \\'Illi
Fr:lllce in a decla..... tion th:ll rceogni7c,llcfli<;1 rehel" in 1'1 ..... Ilv.ldol 1 "lq:111I1I.11I
politic<ll rorec" and propo<:ed 10 Cllt Ihc "f '''1:11''1.11 1111(' 1111",,):"
Illedintion. 1\5 U.S. leader<; frowner! in i\ It''\: I,., n 11.11" lIl,lh"I', 1,, \'1-1,1 h
appl:llldctilhese :lsserlive dil1lolltatie gc<;!"rC'<:.
Yel prnhlcllls persisted :It hOllle. Me'\:110 wa, 1lIHIIIlg Ih.11 11ll' 1I,lId 111"11"\
"tr:llegy which h:ld worked well hl'lwccllihe mill 1":;1)-. .11111 Illl' 1.,1 .. 1,,';1).., \\,1
llll longcr possihle. Hy 19R2. inO<lli(l1l "hoI "l' III .111111"\ (,0 1'1'1\ 1'111. ,Ill 1I111'1t'"
tlented rate for Mcxilli. 1\ nnther p,linlnl dr\'.d1lnl,"" be, .1I11" 1Ilt'\ 11,11>11' III
enrly 19R2,
Mexico h:ld h0l'cd In:lvoid "II Ihi!' h)' <Ol<;hlllg III "1111 ... llIIJ:' , .. 111''''('1\'''.. 1''11.,
world slulllp in oil prices after 19HI rrdllee,1 dr.IIlI.llll,lll}' lh(' 1'llljC,ll'tl 1"I"ll:11
exchange earnings. The l.ilpC7. Pori illo gnvel'llllleni w.... Ihcrc!t lit .11"1\'1'11 I" 111'.1\ \
foreign borrowing.therrhy incre<lsing Ihc Ilalinn:ll d('hl. 1\111<;1 \\"Orri<:llllH' \\',1'" thl'
faci thatlhc Mexican cconom)' W:lS stillllni prndll("ing job<;.11 ,I I".lte 1.1 ... 11'11""1'.11 I.,
absorh :lllthc Mexicans enlering Ihe workforcc,
To soften polilic,,1 opposil iOll, LI)PC'l, Ptlrl mil Sl'lllle:ll' e-t! ,I I'l I 'gl ,1111 'It Il'I' ,r 111'
Two in noval ions seemed part icularly f;lr rcaching: III'S!' Ihe rllk... Ill!' .1[1"11 "I
pnlitic:'ll parlic!' were made crlsier, so milch Ihal Ill<' (:(111111111111"1 1',I'ly )',.1111,,1
o(('jd:ll recognition, <lud second, oppoe:ilinll pallie<: gll,'J,111I ..e,I.1 t"I,11 ,,1 .11
le;lsl 100 se:lts in ;"In expanded. 400-lllclllher (;haml)cr of 1)"111111.......... 111 h .,11"1,1
lions seemed lInlikcl)' to \cad to a rund,lInenlnl t.hange ill Ihe- Il'!.ll<; III 1'4I\\'t'I. hill
Ihe}' nt le:'lSI provided all OIlI1ct-wilhin thc -Itu 111(' 01'1'"... ,llflll ,\ ... Ill'.
successor. he selected Miguel de b M:ldrid. rI Ilnr\':11"11 11"inrt! lC'dlllOI I,ll "rid
c:lbinel minister who won;"l prcdidahlc viclory ill Ihe r1e(l,on ... 01 fill\- I'IX.'
Beforc de I... M:ldrid could t"ke offit.e till l)eu'llIhrl I. 1\"\\'l\ll. Ihe f'.1t.\h.lIl
cconomy was shaken hy a milch Irlrger flnnncini cri ... is. Mexiol h,ld Illll 0'11 ,lllII.II.II'"
wilh which to make p<l)'lllellls on its fnreign deht-nnw o\'cr S.HO billion. Nt',lf p.lll11
ensued in \OV:lshington. New York, Frankfurl. nn<ll.ondnn, whf'l'c il \Va... fl'.IH'd 111,'1
other 1.3!in Amcric:l11 dehtors might follow l\lt'xicn's cX;\lllplc;lIul (kll.,rc ,Ilk 1.11111
default. If thaI were the C:lse. U.S. Enrnpc;H1. :lilt! 'np.IIl.. h.lnl-. ... wnllill Lit" 11I1!:'
losses. posing a formidnhlc Ihrr:ltln world IIn.I!l(l"IIl1:llk,'I '1 h,', .111',1', nlll ... , "'.1
II I'.\IIJ 1\\(1'" (,\"'I"..,llJJ111"', IIAN,;IIIVI:j{'JII\II:
I ... fl.IEXIC():Th... T.lltllllgol.llk... "lullt,1l 71
Mexico: Vital Statistics, 2007
---_. ------
__1\ W",lll .. "d LCOIlVlIll( lor
1.. \111 A",.."j(o <>,,0;) til" ( ..,llJu.:ol'
I)
Sq)(elliber which Ill .... ,lnl a IOllg-lentl ":l.Ill1ll1illlh::111 III the r,'dlllllUII t,l
barri\"r.!. to illivurts froJII ahro.ld, Ml.'xiLO prulIIplly h.... IIJ\wnng :lnd
oul its I;:!riffs prOllloting expurls, l:,pl.'dall)' llollpdml,'ulil ,"xpllrls. For .tli
intellis ,lIltl thes.... amoUIIll.'d to a Ill"r ",:olllpkl{"
of the: postw,lr uf illil iun.
13)' early) 988, tilt: de b Madrid gUWII1IlWIIl lould lill It- 11rtlt>lll'(1 Illr
Inl1.llluII h3d uu:dt::rutl'J tv Ull allJlUal rate 01 ItlJ pCrl.l.:llt. lile \"Ididt
apprv.'l.lling 19 p,'rlelll uf Ihe GI)P, .111.1 Ih.. ..1had bl','ll
shakt"11 by a 75 pern'nt drop in Ill .. l1I.lfkd. Yt'l alhJlh.-r
U.S.-"llg11ll't::rL'd capital ClIlIe III J)e':L'lIlb"r 111.1 LUllIl'J.-X sdH.AlIIe,
Mexico would buy u.s. ool1lh 10 pOSI l.'olbtt:'ral ag.lil1SI ,,:ullllller...:i,d b.lllk
The mow uffered 110 prosp,"C1 (or large .. reild' from till' dt'bt, whi..:h h.ld d.:.lrly
becume unpayab/..-.
tht'st" Ihere would be .:unlllltllllg IriLtiun wllit til.... Ullill',J
Slatc:lt, Artt:r Ronald Rl"ag.lll \\'011 IhL' U.:", ill I Ih... dl.: Ia l\ladrid
goverlllllt'ni lIew Iu t>dlle tlte 1.lglllg l.onlll,b III
America Ihruugh multil.llt'ral Ill.:goti.llltlli. KllUWll ,I:. llit: Colll ... dur.I" inillaliv,
(nnmed for Ih.... sitt' 01 the: Ihe plan l..dle:tI lor regiunal pe.......... on lit ....
o( pulitic:d alld t'COllOlllic CtXJp.. r.ltion. Till' Id..a c'lllil.."kl)' g:-.illl"d
frum Ihe Unil"d Natiom btlt CflCOlllller"d opposilioll frulll
Iille Rc.lg.lIlikS-who objl'Ckd to lolLlu re.:uglliliull uf Nil.tragll;l';-. revolu-
tiollar)' govt:rnmt'111 and 10 ils on U.S, Illll:rvt'llliun. Thl' Contadllr.1
vbion expired Whl'lI. under lIonl pro AlIlcri ... all
guv.... rnlllt"llb ill Cosla nka, and EI Salv.ldul" ('xprls.;ed tlleir ullpu:.il iOiI.
Even so, Mexico had unce again ib :lUIUlllllll)'.
All additional ollgoing cause fur bi/;1ll'r,d 1"I\t>ivll 11.1:: U.S, pulicy Iuward
Mexil.ans working (legally <llId illeg.t1ly) in the Ullilnl St,ltn. The
Al."l, p3ss..d ill !lJH6, laid JUWll lOugll pellaltic:. luI' elllllluYCIS \\'IIV llirl'd
Cllllll'lllcd aliens.
n
Tlw prospecl uf ib illlplcllll'lIlalioll sellt t>hlldd.... rs Ihl"ougll
northern and Cl'ntra! Mexicu, \\'hos.... youllger K('lll'r:tliollS had lung :.een jubs ill
Iht: United Stales (usually tempurary) as Ih.:ir main hup"lura decent lite. Wilhin ,\
lew Ihe law appeart'J 10 have had unl)' a milliJ n,d illll),l.:t OIl .I.:tualliligi ,llioll
l1uws, but tvlcxiGlIb rt'mainJ:d war)'.
The debt crisis ,lllt! economic stagll.lliull III Ihe !all..' IlJHlb inlcllsilied soLial
illelltl3lily ulld pupular pi llllllllcted, llllelllplo)'lllelll
hKrl.:3sed, :'lllJ p...... capita incollle dc.:dillnl by murc Ihan pl.:rc"'l1l during th,'
1980$. In \"-ontfilsl tv Ihe Soulhern Cone: coulltries in till: 1960s and 1970s.
however. Mexico did not ft:SOri 10 pervasive, large-seal..- aUlhurilariull repressioll.
Key 3ltribUIes of the Mexican political system-ils restricted COlllpdition. ils
control of working-class movements, its aUlonomy from privuk inkresb, uud it.!.
tactical nexibilily-help explain ..... hy Mt'xko mallaged tu avuid dt'daring open
warfare on ils citize:!b.
Aware of their sagging credibiJity, PRJ IIhtd.. th, pru...:.... of choosing
official nominee for president more vbibll" (if 1I0t 1Il0rl' gClHlindy opc:n) Ihan
105.3
893.4
tB40
31.4
74
POpul.. tlon It. IditOl.'"
C.UI' (billions 01 SUS)
GNP!l<lf.llld (SUS.)
POV<:lly lellt:- 1% 1112(06)
I If", expecldncy (years)
\\','1.' HIt\ hIli'>, I h, pn,,' lot f\Il'XiI.. O\ prillh.: l'xl'"rl (oil) had ililcrt'si r.lll:'
11,1,1"'I'Il.d,'" 111'\\',11 d.Ind 11,11 M,'XlCoIIlS 11,ld or dullars Olll uJ
"'111111) I h" LJ .... gowIllllll'lll, tli,' Fund (IMF). and
Ih" ltllllllll'lll.d b,lnk... a Mr.... luan l).l\,.-k<lge 10 Mt'xko, Thes\,.'
11,'\\ 1",IlI'> l'lt.lhl.-d f\kxh.o tv l.UllliUlll' JM)'illg bUI did llol ullow for
.111 I' 111l/,Ili. III
III,' I.''', til' 1HIII') l'lh,": M":'I.h.ulhld III .Idupl ;:111 IMI:-.II'pruved
"J.Ill. ,\ kq gll.d W.I'" I" ICllll\,.l th,' 11l1l,III'lll.try public Jdinl, which \\'.b .11 .1
d,tllg'II'II ... I)' IlIgh Ir, P"'"'111 til 111\' (;))P, "fIJi:> IlIe.lIlt lillt guverllnWll1
... ul ...... lh 1111 lutld .IIIlJ I'llhhl. i\I"XICO abu had lu rl'lJllu: 13rill barriers,
II"'I..!" IIIIIUl.lllllf.: gl",II"1 dll,it:ncy and gre.lh::r
III \\'11/1.1 '""I""t Jll.lrkeh.
1I'... hklll d,' I.t f\1.ldnd dUlilulty lolJuwed Ihe 11v1F prescripliull, but at tht'
l'lh" .11 ,I d,"'p Hy JlJM5. r..al w.lget> had by 40 pac,'nt
IH'IIIIIII'1i I'JX..! h:vl,:l; li\ .. klll'velilurthl.:r <It> lur
....... Ill 1<'11111.1'" \\\'1",' llldnl. III S"l'kltlher .1 t>eVl'rc t:'arthlluakt: III f\kxku
I II \ dl:. Till' 1 H6 tlrop III 011 pfl'l.t>
""1'011 ,.l1l1l11
h
... tWlh,'" \\'l.lk,'nillg lilt:' l.:'l.1lI01l1y.
.\111 .. 1 dllli'llltl":'. ,I.: 1.1 f\ladrid ;lllll hb .ldvbl.:rt> d'CI,I..d III adopt :'1
,11.1 III.d I.... Inlt III ..u..}lhlEnit.' poli.. y.1 1I,'W 111,,1 Gillie lu be ch.II;lI.-terized as
h.lpll'l" 12). Th,'"" wer.... twu main Iu th,' prugram. One
\\',1'1 I., Intli l " ,111,1 1'''',1')1 th" .... ulIulni.: rul.: ul thl' 10 h....
.1"11.. IJ1l11lig11 .. "lllllltl,d ..ub 1I\ puhlk :,pl'n,ling and through a prugram of
Mill 1\ .1111 ,.11"'1I" 01 :.1.lk u\\'ll,'d nllilpalli .... Of Ihe I I 15 puhlicly oWlied o)lIlpallics
111,11111" jlll.,lil .....1illl.lll' J')H2, .1..,1,1 Madrid managed to offllt"arly
lOIl.lIl.lll"I".", .lu\\'11 27'1 hy 1.1\1' IlJt)6.
'I Ii,' ...\.llnd \ III11plllll'lll \II lite Ill'W poJil.Y lOlllllH:l'dalliberaliziltioll alld
-"IIVlllll}; up" "I lit,' ,'\,.UIlUIll)'. This \V.I:. lliusl dnllll;ltil.aIJ)' dt'llluI\Slrah:d by
1\\.-,'''''''' .llU,:. .. i\,.l1l 10 till' (;lll"I".tl Agft:L'llh.'nt lHl 'I'arins an..1'I'radl' (GI\'IT) ill
71 1'i\lnT\NO" STlJllIFS: nIANI;I' fIVI:I( TI:-'II
the had cvel' hecn. I)e 1;1 cvclllual choice was anolher U.S.-I mined
cconnmisl. Carlos S:'llinas de only Ihirty-nine ycars nld. who the
incumhenl blltlp,el ;lIld planning minisler had aUlhor'cd lhe highl}' IInpopulu
allsleril}' policies of Ihe 19ROs.
The e1ectioTl of hrought surpri"cs and suggesliV(' porlents of mean
ingflll change. For the first limc in it" history. the PRI f:leel! serious oppositioll
fmm hOlh Ihc right Ihe left CuallhtcllloC son of the revered
cx-pre<:i<lenl. led a hreabway factietJl from the PRI it'ielf). Organizc<1 labor also
<:howed ils displcasure wilh the PI{i (.lI1didale. Salinas de Gortari \"on with a har('
r;f).:l percent Illaiorll)'. according to nrflcia! retllrn<:. afl(1 in dniming victory he
declarcd an cud 10;\11 cm of "what was practically!!1 nnc-party Opponenls
nnnelheless accused th(' regime o( e1eclor;l1 fr:mcl. The YOlllhful Salinas tonk ofllcc
in Ikcember 19R5 under ex(('edillgly dirfieull conditions. \Vould he he up In the
dlilllenge?
The Iir"l l;l<:k for Sntina<: wn" III delllon<:lmte political authority. He hegall h}'
1l.1l11ing.1 cahilh.'1 dOlllin<llec! hy his as"llCiatcs. instead of mending politic:\1
(ences. In J<Jllllon)' 19R1) he mastcrmilulctl a spectacular raid on Ihe head<llmrlcrs of
Ille illdcpt.'ndenl-nlilltletl <lnd financiall}' cornlpl head of tile oil worker,,' lInioll. WllO
wa<: !,rPllll'tl}' placed under arresl (fnr illegal po""essioll nffirennns). Shorlly Ihere
after he the !nllg sl<lndillg chief of fhe Inrge nnd powerful teadlers' union.
!.<ll('r he fire<1 Ihe n:lVal sccrctnry from hi<: L:lhinel po<;t, an ullusualmove in "iew of
the dclic;llc ha!:lnce of dvil mililnl)' re!:llinns in I\lcxko.
Jh promi.<:ed dmillg his campnign, S;"Ilinns de (;nrlilri promoled ;"I IlH>desl
polilical opening. lie cOllimanded PIH olficials tn recogni7e a guhel'll<ltorial
Iriumph for the PAN in lhe imporlant stnle of Haja C:lliforni:l (jUSl soulh of Ihe
C:llilnrni:l horder). lie oversa", reforms oflhe electoral syslelll :lIld of the inlern,,1
workings of the PRI. BUI Iherc wcrc limits to Ihis stl':ltcgy. The PRJ c!:limed
lltlrc:llislic victories in key election... in lbe st:llc of M(xico. ncar Mexico Cily. nn
arC<l tbnl had shown itself to he a Icft-wing opposition stronghold in the prcsiden-
tiill elcclion nf 1988. The government also IWrrlssed :lnd inlimidilted 01<1IlhlCillOC
Cardellas nnd hi<: rollnwers, wlw found il exirelllrly difficult to organize their
forces into a cnhercnl :lntl durable politkal parly. The opening. sllch <lS il was, waoS
hiascd toward Ihe right (;\nd Ihe PAN); il did not include lhe left.
Indced, (Ir Ihe first lime in memory. the question of hllmnn righls appeared
Oil the national agenda. Critics cnlled ;\t1elltion to:l numher of cOllllnilled
hy Mexico's nntional police forcc in alleged pursllit or drug Thc)' reported
the assnssinalion or of at least sixty pro-Cardenas sympathizers in
1990 They cxpressed olltrage at the murder o( <l promincnt hUIn<ln.rights
activist. To aSSll:lge Ihe criticism. S:llin:'l<; ilppointcd a National COllllllission on
I fllllwn IHghls. led h}' former university rector Jorge Carpizo. hUI did not give it
genuine authorily.
II W;lS in the e(-onomic nren:l thnt Salin:ls !i:ought hi" most la"ling nchievc
melllS. In hopes of completing Mexico's struclural adjustments. he continued :lnd
cXlendct.!the neoliheral strategy initiated under de la Madrid. Salinas and his team
\ .. 1\11 Xl( (I I h,' I .UlIIIl)'. "I . I{, \ .1.,11"'1
kept lowering Iradc harritrs. They I'll II tlntl'.1 t ht' 1'11\',111/.1111'11 ,01 '.1.11,'
industries, evcn plliring IIJl 101 !<o,I!c II ",1\ 1(',1 ,IW" ,I" Ill" 11'1. 1,11'''1<'
company nnd Ihe hnnking i ndu!<ol I'y (Il<ll ion;lli'lcd hr I "pCI 1
1
", Iill" III I"X}) \V II II
Ihe support o( the lJ.S. gnvernlllcllt, S.llin.I" IWgllt ,I nn\' ,lehl 11 .. t I II' I
agreement Ihat promised to rc(llI(c the n('1 ulIlnll\\, III fUllcl .. h\ bdli,IIl.1 \,,'.11
lllltilthe lllid-1990s. The gnvcrlllll('llt al"" "ollghl Itl ,1<: .. i.. 1 10\,11 ""\.,.1"1'1111111 hI
e"lnhlishing il "program fill' 1l;ltiflllal <:olitl,lrit v- III 1'1 vule ""C(llllOIl/,\, 1<'1 ..('II 111'1"
projects Ihrougholll Ihe UIIlllll')'. 1'('1"11.11'<' III rt."I'"II<'(' til Ih,", 1lll'.1.. 11I" Ih,
nali(lIlal cconomy !i:!lc>\\'('d <:ign.. 01 pl('king lip: .1111111.,1 11l11.1111'/I 111 \,,1 .1 \\ I. ,..
thc 20-30 pcrcenl range, while .Inllll.d growth 1.11('.. Inr Ihe (.111' 10'" 1.1 t I I" I III
for I<)X9 and 1.9 pCf{nll fpl "NO
North American Free Trode
The crowning nchicvelllclll nllhc (f,rll,.' W.I'" Ihe r'HIIl AIIWII\.III IltC
Trade Agreelllcn I (NAFTJ\ ). tllla hll' III ,Ill r.lI I 1.11 <;( .11(' ill\'('<,!llIf III II "Ill I 1I r"I"
or J<lpan. Ihe Salinas admilll<:tr.llioll .111111111111 cd 11<, 1I11t'1l1 I.. III }:1'1I.llc.1 IH' 11-1.1.
Lompacl with the United Slal(... 111(' l'lllp.....11 (,1lt.1I1l'l1.1 1",.lllq'IIoII.II .. '" ..f 1111'
prolcclionisl slrategies nf IIn,,1I11 .. lIh<:tillltillg 111.111.. 1ri,lh/.l111 '11 ..Ill.! II ,II", .11.1,.1
the n:ltinn;ll trn(lilinn o( kc('ping.1 <:11""11 11111" ,II .. LlI\<l hnm lilt' .,1 I IIr,
Norl h. Small-scale indu,,' ri,lli .. 1<; ;"Illcl gl :lin Lli IllCI" C\I'I (' .....1'\1 le.11 11,.11 1'1"\' 1111)'.111
he deslroyed hy U.S. COlllp<tlllon..lIltl ""Ille lllld1c( lll.d.. 1lI1l1l1llnllhc 1111111111' III
dCIl1 isc (I( Ihe nat ion's ('t. flllCllll h. '" '\'(,1 nj:IlI\' .1l1d , 011111 ,11 l'll< I. ....1 I111.1" 1'('1 "1',1 .1
nflilctheless.
Unveiled in August 1\)9). Ihl' NAF"JA ,1\1 old ell\I"lllll ..d Ihe. H"1111>1l nl ,1
three-Ilnlinn p<lrtncrship (indudlllg (:all.ld,1 ,1" wi'll 1\ln.H" .111.1 111C 1
1
,111 ... 1
SI:llcs) Ihal \\'(Hild forge nne III lh(' l:1rgl,.. 1 j,Io>l" III Illc \\1'II,t \\1111.1
populalion of 370 million and 1Ilmhincd C(on(lllli. 1'1"11.111111"" nt .II'I'lll\lIIl.lld\
$(, 1rillion.1t would prolllote Ihe frec flllw ell }:ood.. IIll' llwlllhn "11111111""
hy c1iminalingdulies, tariffs, alld II;Hle h.lI 1\l'r.. I1\TI .1 I'Cll11.t .. , 1111('1'11 \"\'.0" "1\1\
pcn:ent of U.S. gllfltb ga ill('d dill)' fIl'l' !<oLI III" IIlll\ll'diald)" "I \\'11 hIll t 1\'1' \T.II',
hnlr of U.S. (arm gonds exporr('d In il.kXhn IlllIIU'di,llcl\" IH'l.1I1lt dlll\ 111'('. I h,'Il"
werc spccinl exccplions lor ('rlain .. cn .. ill\lR I'".dlll'" ill .lj:lhldl,\l..
typically one of lhc seelors IllII.. t re<:i<:! ,1111 II. ('\ 11111 IIni, I'm; l.h.I ... , II 'III
larif(.. (or corn and dry hean<: ill tvlcxicn .Ino! 1l1-11lg(' 11';' (' and <;lIg.1I III Ih,. Ilnlk.1
SI:lleS would cxtend to the yCM 20(1). Tnrill .. nn .111 :H1IPIIlOhd,'" \\1111111 NIlIIII
I\lllcricn would be phnscd III 1I o\'er 1(,1l ye.lr<:. hIli 1"111('<; '1I"II,:ln <,111'111.,le,IIII.11
locnl content would hilve til he ,II IC;lsl peru'llt lor "dll' Il'" In '1l1,dlh N"I
surprisingly, J\si:ln governmcnts rcgal"<led thi .. t I:1I1 ..e .1" ,1 thinlr .Ii ..1:11i ..." \ ""1 I I..
exclude their industries nnd pro(!uct<: fmlll lhe Nnrlh Amel"il:1ll Ill;Hkl'l.
NAFTA opened Mexicn tn tJ.s. illvc"lrncnl." in V;)flnn<: \\';1\''' llntlcr lit.' 1.. ",1\,
U,S. hanks and sccuriti<'!i: lirms could cstilhll<:h hr.lIh h nH'. t.... 111 J\1c\1l II 1Il.!
U.S. citizens could invest ill MC'xko'" IMllking an;1 lI1"III.lIh. lfulll<.IIK" \\'1111.
Mexico continucd tn prohihil Itlreigll Ilwllc'r.. hlp ,.1 I.il Iid.J.., III .11 I "111.'1111' \\'1111
ils constitution. U.S. firms hel-nIlH' c1igihk In (1'l1Il'ctt. I,"' \. lUll .Il I.. \\11 h 1\'11' ,11"'"
1'\1(11\\'11" 1/\\I,>lllIlIl\ I 1l,\N{.1 U\IRIII'.II
1\ l.. .tllIl,> ( 1'1 ./\ II .'\ J .llld IIpl'l .Ill". III gl'1I1'! .11. Undl-r th... :-..11111' pro"b.iulI'i .IS 1\ k", kiln
ttlllll'.11111''> hll' 111'111 W.l' ltllbpltUOU' b)' bt:yond a narruwly
"111h'11 1'111\1\1\111 Itlr lilt,: IIIVVl'IIII'111 tJltuqlurall' ..llId
,>ltlll,l!... lilt 111.. 1)' 1I1.dt Uti 1t:h'n..'lIu' .d.dl Itl Ih... IIUgl.llioll oflal.>or.
I AI; I A 1'Il'''''pll.IIl'l1 :.lrllIl1t1u'>lkb.lk wllhill tilt" Ulllkd In Iht:' heal 01
1i.I' I'}'}..! prn,llkllll.11 t..Il11I'.lIgll, Iklllllt.f.llh: c.llllildatl Bill Clinton pledged In
'>Ul'poll NAI r/\ till ("tludillUIi lh.11 lill'll' be dll'(livl." :... 1(11' t:IlViWIlIl\t:l1tal
1'1 Ull', IJOIl .IUti kl'I., rir;hh, h) :-'I'pll'llIhl"l" 19'J3 Ihl' gUVl'lllll It'lIb rc.l<.hl.'d
til .,Itll' .Igi n:nh'llh ull l,lhor alld Iht" l'nvirontnt.IlL As Iht: U.s.
LulIglt .... jlIL'('.llld hi \'1111' \111 1,llll1lalll)II, Iexa:-. hillionairl' (and
1' ...... ldl'1I11,tI 111I1'dul) I{u:.:-. l'l'lul lc-d IIll' lh:lrg..: ag.lill:>1 till: 11''':0.11)', claiming 111iI1
Nt\l; 1':\ \\'lltdtll'lllill,IHI:.illL:':' 10 :...:ek IlIw wagt' Mt:;"iulll labol .Illtllhus lost'
1111 IHlll" ul 1\ lllt'l .111 jJr0l'0lll'llts tll.ll NA FTI\ would Stilllll
1.111' U,S I'XI'"l'b. "ddt'vl' l'tUllilIl1il':' 1)/ :-..... dl.", and ... Ilhallu.: U,S. lOlllpditiv('lll.'ss.
l)i ... t'fllIll ul1iOllizt:d lahur,;1 hbluric bastion of
'Uppllil 11)1' J)t'lIIUl rals, Clilllull luhhktl 011 behalf of Ihe Irl'at y. Anti .Iftt:r
I'l'l"III .,IUlllhltd h.,dly during a llll'IlHln.lblt: Idcvisiull t1t'U<lII' with Vice Presidenl
"I (;Olt', Ihl' uj fill.tlly ..lpprovt'd Ihe NAFI'A "lCl-urd by
!. H 21111. Iht' lullv\wd hlilh .1 lUll: 01 bl-jX.
III till.1I 1111"111, the" NAFI A .KlOl'd h.ld ::>t:vt'r..d ollbl.lnding Ollt'
\\.1'> .h Illl(lhlll ,lIl1llllilllll'llt III rq.\llIlI.tl t'lllllllllll( Illtl'gl"lllUlI, Dl:.plle II::> Illh....
:\11,\ \\ .... Iltltl'tilll,"il) ltJllllTlIlt1 \\1111 Irad .- Uy 11.J90 l.lfill.llld t'Vl'lI
Ihllll.I,..11 h.lllll'::> 1\1 1\!I,,,,i...111 t.UIIIIIlLT":t' Wt'I dn:.ltly low li\FI't\ W.IS
('11111011 II) lUlILl'lllt:ll wilh Uy obl.lilling prt'lcft'llli.11 :ll'U:.sS Iu U.S,
111,llkl"l' .lll..!.1 lunll.ll 01 Ihnn'gh NAFl'i\. huping Iu
I ... ",I,1t- IIIlhI' ul t1irnl IUll'igll il\V...... lllllc'nl-lrolll Japan .llld Eurupe as well
.I'> 11'1111. lilt' UlItltd Sl" .....,. By Uhl.lilling ulilralllllll'lt:t1 :1I.1-t:S' 10 low-wage
(lllll Illgldy :.kllll'll) Ml'Xll.1l1 I"bol. Ihl' UlIikd Siaks hI;!S huping III Ul';llt-' all
l".\l" III I,Lll h HIli II" l1l;lllul,ttllll nl guud:. and Ihus illll)rovl' liS compel illve pusilion
III lilt' gIIJb,tll'tlJllllllly. II \\,:1, lur llll"l." IL ... Ihal llle N/\FTA Irt'aly L'onl.tiued
('\h'll'l\\' dlapll'l'> .th"tll IOlllpdiliulI, tl'lL,.. Hlllllllllll(;llions. and
lin,lllll,1! :.l-'l'Vlll". Inq,lidtly, N/\FTA l'lIVlsIOlll,d;,1 SUOSI.lllli.lll}, more.: profound
th.lIl ib Iabd .ILkllllWlt-dgl'l1.
Sl'll"ld. NAI:"rA Ill.lde pruvlsillll lor t.-'lIVlflllllllt.IlI.11 pruknioll,
"11t',llI.tlly 1l1guliatt'l1. NAFTA lIhllt..- only IXlssillg rt'fel't:Ili.'l' III l'llvirOllml'nl.tl
I Ulitt', ",. III kll."pillg \\'ilh l.ll11p.lign pll'dgt:, howc"lr. Prt'sid.... nl Clinton
1)\1"'.1\\ nq.;olialhll ... IlII.1 pruvbioll lor t.-'lIvlrulIlllllIlal prolt't.litJIl .
lIul 1111l11'1 ,I agrt"t1ll1'lll. Iill' U.s, 1\kxk'lll hordl'r rl."cl'ivt:d .special aiit'll
Ihllllllldtr.1 hil.llt.r.tlllllt.gralt"ll bwirolllllC"lIlal Phlll. \Vhilc SUlIIl' observt'rs raist:u
d'IUhl' .111111Illlh pl'.U:lkal Siglillil.lllrt ufllll',st: .lgre.:l'lIIl'llb, the.: merc fa":l oflhdr
llq.1,IIII.llillll 1I1.1dl' tlllt' poinl clt-.lrII.ldl' and l'!IVirUlimenl had IWClIlllt: inextric.lbl)'
illlt'r1 WIIIl'd.
Yl'j .IIlIlII,l'l" dl"lillgul:-.lttllg lh.ll"at!t'lisllC 01 NAFTA ib lIndldying
Illllith,.11 l.llhlll.lk 'l'll t' Ullih'd SI;I!t':. was .s...... king st'v.....al goals. One Iht'
prt:::>t'rV;,tIIUlI ul 011 ib bonllf. Tht: idl'.1 IlwI NAFTJ\ wlluld
e(unullIic growlh ill 1\kxicu, l."asing social .. lid Ml'olaillillg thl'
I'ulitital rl'gillll.". A :>1"CUlld go.d was Iu Iht: Unih:'d or illl rl';!sing .ILl-es,s
10 pdrull'ulI1 lrum MlXit."U, Ollt: of Ihe fi"c leading of U,S. ill1porb. 1\ tlllfd
WJ'i IIII' Ih..: Unilc:t1 10 oblain all impurl.llli bMg.lIllillg ...IIII' III its
tradl' IIlgull.ltiuIIS wilh l:llrupt", J'lpall, and Iht' Gt:neral Agrt'l'IIlt'lIlul\ Tanlb anti
TI:ldc, Ami Juunh, Iht' Unih;d walllt'd to ("umulitl.11t' JipllllllallC
IrU111 1\ I":l\ i..u un rOl'l.'lgn pulk)' ill gl'1I1'1 al. As dt'IIIUJISI r;,lInl by dIS.lgll't:lllt:lll:-. IIVl'r
Cl'nlr.d A1lIt.'rKa during lht' I980s, Ihis hatllullg Iwell ,I 01 1111.Ilt'ral It.lI:.JUIL
BUI wllh NAI''!'A ill pl.let:. Ml'xiul becIlllt: unlikd)' 10 :>ITioll.s d1sagrl'L'
lllent with llll' Unill'd Stalt'S OIl JlIajur issul'S ofilll":f1lalitIJI,11 dij)lulllac)'.
Fur ib pari tvkxicu W.IS ... killg, firsl and lurt:lllusl, uf it:-. :"od.d
Pl'.ll.l'. Tilt: hupt: was Ihal NAF'I'A would alirat'l invcslllI":lll, Slllll11lak l'llll'lo)'-
Illl.'lIl, provid..: llll'''llingrul uPP\.Ir!lInily fur Ihe 1 milliun t-'lllt'rillg Ilit' jl>l>
111arkd l"t.'ry )'l.';,lr-and rlJull' Sl'lUlld, NAFTr\
S,llin:.ts an uppurlllnity 10 illslillltiolwlizt: his e...:onolllk" rduI111S, illsubling tht.'lll
IrOlll Ihe 11Isiuril vagaries of pl'I:.'sidl."lIlial by inscribing Ihl'lII in ..Ill
inlernallonal Ir..:aly, Third, Mt."xlcu was Sl'l'killg inkrn.lliuJlal bl'lll'dkiion lor ib
nul lillilt. tlt'mlKralic polililal rl"gimc. '1 his was illlpon.lill bt....lll:.l'. III
lOlllparisull wllh Argt:nlill.l, Chiit-. Brazil, ;,lIld ulhl'r llmkrgtllllg I'IU-
uf tllIJlOl"rJliL.aliull, 1\ll''''ll"U no IUlIger luukt.'d likl' .1 p.lf.lgun III pulllkal
livilil),. Fill.tll)'. Mexlt.u bdkwtl thai NAFT/\ would pruvide lht' lllllllily wilh
dlplulI!.ltll I,,:vt'ragl' "is-;,'t vis Ille I ul I.al ill AIlIl'fi..:.I .llId. hy lxtt'II'oUlli. IIII' J'hird
\'''odd .1:. .1 whult.-. Assuci"liull wtlh Canada and thl' Ulliktl \\'uuld Illlk
I\IeXIl\J Willi .Idvanll"d industrial dt'l1locracit-'s alld ul lht: First World.
COIIM'qUl."lItly Mt:xico ("ould Sl'r"t: .. bdWt.t:J1 till' dl'vdupilll; wurld
and Ihe devdoptd hlurld as a ll"prl'slJllali"t.' .1IIt! inlelillclilur luI' asplrillg pcupk:.
ul Iht' SUlllh.
\oVhall'v... r ib pulili..-allllolivalilJll, NAFl'i\ app....Ilt:d III ,llhilVt. Iht' n'tlllUlllil
gUdl ul l"\IMlIdil1g t.UIllIllt:IT..... Twu way Iradt' l.lt'l\\'t:CI1 Nkxkll .Ind IIll' Uuilt'd
Slalt':. dillllJl."l1 lrom $X3 billion ill lu bllliun ill 19'):' ,11Id murt' dldll
$2UO billion by 20UO, By Ihis time Ihe Unih:J Stales t-'xpurling 11I\II't: til Nk.xicu
Ihalilu Chill.l, Korl."a, alltl and Mt'XllU bt'l;'UIiC. :tlla C.llhltla,
Iht: larg,,:sl trading p<trtllt'r uf Ihl' Unilt:d (II W;IS 1.11t'1 lhsplaled h)'
China). Cunlr.lr)' 10 widc::>prt'ad (<tnd lxaggcr..llnl) l-'Xpt:'ll liuII, h\lwt'vt.'r, IAITi\
cuuld nul pruvid(' a Clift' lor ;111 uf
THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE (1994-PRESENTj
Alllht: uplilllbm rt:sldting from Ihl-' NAFTA "\ci.ortl prumptly Glllll' unde" assault.
()Il Jalluary I, I'J'Jll-lhc day thaI NAITA wenl inlo df..:t:l- a gUt'f1 ilb 1I10\'\'ll\l'lll ill
llw slall' orChiapas rose lip to Jl."lluunce Llnluri ....s uld grieV;'IlKt"s,
tht. !>fllil/isltl t:cunolllic model, and til(' untlt'lllucralk Ch:lfal'kr ul lht' polilk.d
regilllt'. Wilh colorful and able leadership, 11ll' Zapalista N;llional I.ilwralioll Army
7f> l'AlnTwn" ..IF
(E/.IN) captured national and international atlcnlion during the course of highI)'
puhlicized negotiations with govenlmcntnl authorities. Despite a variety of govern-
mental responses, from military pressure to political negoliatinn, the I,,'lpatisla
mrlvcmcnt would remain a thorn in the side of the regime.
Two months later, as public atlention turned toward presidential succession,
all nssassin's bullet struck down Luis Donaldo Colosio, Salinas' handpicked
sllccessor and the G1ndidate (If the PRI. S"linas hastily chose another Ilominee,
the forty-two-year.old Erncsto Zedillo Poncc de Lc()n, who scurried to develop a
credihle Gllnpaign fllr the upcoming August e1cction. These developmcnts
infliclcd a dCVOlsI"ting hI ow to Mexicl's international image. Mexico could no
longer be seen as an up-anel-coming COUIlII)' on the hrink of joining the First
World; i110oked, instctld, like a Third World society thrcatening to come aparl .1t
the scnlllS.
[nrllest and inlelligent. Zedillo W;lS a technocnll par excellence. A Ph.D. in
eCllllolllics fmm Y;lle University, Zedillo had spent most of his G1reer in thc
centr,ll hank and the plmllling ministry. As n result. he had very few cont,1(1'\ wilh
(:llTCr politici"ns or officials in the ministries of the feder"l govern-
ment. Ikspite a Incklustcr c:lmpaign, Zedillo won the Allgllsi 191)4 elections wit h
'lg.R percenl of Ihe vote (c0mp"red with 211.0 percenl for the rightist PAN ;lIlt!
olll)' I(!.f" percent for Cunuhtcmoc Cardenas' left-Wing P:'trt)' of the Democratic
Hevnlulion, PHD). thlls hecoming the IIfth man in n row 10 rC<leh the presidenC)'
withoul ever holding prior elective nrllcC'.
Inaugur,lled in DecemhC'r 1991, Zedillo (:'tced crisis right awn)'. FeHrllll of the
('lVCrVnlllnlioll (lfthe peso. investor." withdrew more lhan $10 hill ion from rvlcxico
wilhin a week. In response, the ZediJlo administration Iwd to devalue tht.' peso,
which evenlually lost more thiln hnlf its value againsl the U.S. dollar, and
the government wns coming close 10 insolvency. Early in 1995 the Clinton
administration Pllt together a lllllltibteral pncbge or nearly $50 billion, including
$20 hill ion from the U.S. government. One major goal of this me;lsure wa." tn heild
orf <l potential defilult on $30 billion in Icsobollos (short-term honds isslled hy the
Mexicnn trensur)', pa),ahle in dollars). which would have inflicled l11;ljor damage
011 u.s. pension funds, mutual funds. ;lnd olher inslitulionOlI investors. Another
WOlS to sustnin the credibility of economic reform and the viahility ofNA f-TA itself.
The IInancial crisis provoked a political crisis as well. As crilicism mounted
against Snlinas' insistence on m:lintaining an unrealistic exchange rale througholll
199'1, Ihe ex-president publici), criticized Zedillo and his economic cahinel for
mishandling Ihe December devaluation. Zed ilia reactcd by sending Salinas into de
fneto exile in the United Stales, then authorizing the arrest of the former pre-
sidenl's older brother on charges of corruption. The detenlion by U.S. authorities
of an assistant attorney general under Salinas lcd to further dcnunciations of
corruption, family intrigue, and oHlcial involvement in the nssassination of n
high-level PIU 1C':'lder in September 1994. As Carlos Salinas became n figure of
widespread revulsion. serious fissures threatened to split npnrt the Mexican
politicnl elite.
'I'he puhlic promptl)' showell its dis'lPI'l"llv,ll. I:llr Ihe IIr ... 1 /1111<' III ,Ii' .Ill,",
rLllllors hegnn circulating lhat an ei<'ctctl I'HI 11/"(.... idell I II lll',hI IInl h(' .Ihle t" 11111'.11
his term. One poll in e"fly ne:1rly halflht' It... IHIClllcllt .. lll'l1ll:III.1
mililnry COllp w:'ts possihle. l!llllllnicipalities:llld <;t.llc:-. lr"1Il 1.1Ii ... , n In ()'l"rel-ll"
and Nucvo Leoll, opposil ion candidates hCg:ll1 win !ling 01 fll ('. 1\ lid 111 1'1')",
for Ihe first time ill its history, Ihe PHI losl cnilirol of Ihe 11:1lillll.lI (.11.11111"'1 "I
I )cpul ics.
The apparent decline of the PIU led to r,,:-t iVCllC'\S wil hill I he 1',1I 1\.... 1.111" dllt I
file: alld its Irnditional hn.'\sC's, pejnr,lIivcly kllown ;l\ .. dlnn...llll .... "I tllI/''''IIiI/''''
Ch:1fi ng under the decadcs-lolll-: dOlllin:lIl(c 01 tCdllll'l 1',11 .. III /(', 11/' /I.' Ii kt ' ..... hll.l ...
and Zcdillo, the partis national as<;elllhly rliled Ih,It II." IH'i\1 PI(,"I.,!cntl.d I ,1I11hd.lk
would be required tn !l;tve hdd elected llllle (d .. !il'lJ!alltlll Ih,ll \\"""Id h.n,
disqnalified ever)' presielellt since 1971l). l'lt,... idclll I.ctlillll Jlllhltl I)' JlI'" 1.'"11",1
tlWI he wOl1ld not hilllsdf designate his S\I(lc.. <;or Ihrllugh tIlt' lilll" h,QlOQld
rla/azo, so 'he PRJ desi1-:llcd :l new primalY tOI 1111' .'lInn dn tl"ll .1I1,j
g:lVe responsihility lor it:-. I.. t'lI(' ," lIlt' \,.lrly' .. In,,,,! \Tlh'r,lhk
politit.al ligures. By mid 1999 Ilwre wcre tnln (.lIllh,J.lll... lou Ihe 1',1IIr' 1I111111l1.!
lioll. 1I01l(' 01 whom cllilid he cnllcd ,1 Ic(hlln, 1'.11. ,\ .... t'lIt" .!!l.ily.... 1 .!lul 10'1011"
congresslHan proclai11lcd, pt'rh;tp" wi:-.hfldly...'1'111 .... j .... 11ll" "11,101 !:ll\"'llllIWlll 1,\
tcc!JnOLr:lcy, IhOlnk
Down of a New Ero
The presidcllli:ll del.-lioll nf200n 1ll.1Iknl ,I \\,I ... r<;lwd III 1\k\l .I111".IIIIl .... \ 11,,11\
((llllested (.nlllpaign invnlvcd three llwjor ',ll1ll1d:II(' ..... 1'1,111\ 1\, II I .,h,l\lld,1 ,,1 Ill,
PRJ, CllnHhtcmoc Cardellas or the I'IU>, .l1ul;l (ll'W(IlIlWI In Ilw .... , ,'111 \ l< cIII,'
Fox of the (onservalive I'AN. T:dl. I"llgged, 11I11,110 I" Iht' 'l'll. h,\ \\',1 .... d l'llv.ll,
husinessman and r:1ncl1er. lie heclIne (:E< I l.1 (:Ot.1 I IILI nl 1\ln;ll" 111 lile 1.11,
19701' ;lnd entered p(,litics ill 19RR, whell Ii, I' lIu,d lilt' 1'/\ N .111' I WOIl "1," /1' 'Il
a.<; a congressional representallve. Ilc ..... llhsc'll1Clllly .. rr"cd.I" ):O\Tll1l1r (111111' ""1.111
slOite ofCualwju:lto. I-'roll1lhal 1Il1lik('ly h.ll'kgrtlllllti. il1ld.... l.ll<' Idlle.... , 11t' 1.11111, Iwd
his quest for Ihe pr('sidellC)'.
A charismatic cOIlllp,ligllrr, Fox pledged all hOIH .... I g"\"llllIlI'lti 11,'
denoullccd thl' PRJ ns hopelessly tnrrupl nllel nh:-'llirlc. V.l.I:1I1' Oil :-pe< 111> .... I",
nsscl"tcd thaI it was lime rOI" a change ,1I1<llhai wl'ldtllr.HI i\k:OUlIIlI11.1 III n.
modern, ,md delllocratic ('ra. In conirasl !.;th.l<;II,1.1 '\celll,-.II,' I'cr"tllldr rill" I'll I',
most tradilional elements, while 11rtsitlcllt I':rnc<;tn l.nlill'l in... l .... lttl 111.11 lilt (ll,
tion would have 10 be clean.
Fox won the presidency hyn plllrrtlity, with 12.." per,clll ,,11111' \'11('; l.d,.l',II,1.1
received 36 percent and Cardenas look 171'C'rt.:cnt. "'lexiee) w" .. jllhil,lllt. ,1 .... Ille'llgll
il had surprised itselr. According In one ohserver, this was a tl illlllph 01 "lnndt'l
Mexico over Mexico-and hi... dwllcnge would hI' In 1'('0 <1111 ill' lilt"
two. Taking ornce ill l1ecemher 2000, Fox enjnyed apl'r,,\'.l1 1.11111):'" ,II HIlIl' I
Rs percent. Ilis politlcnl hOllc}'lllllCln WOllld he llllll.\llally 11111': hili 11 \\1'11101 11,,1
last forever.
lackluslt:r GlJllpaigll. The evenlual willller h}' ;l Il;Jil::.-breadlh Illargill \Va:- lilt.:
YOlllhful Felip.... Calderon, ..I liCdollg lllt:lJdx'r of Iht: PAN ;llld a
IUfrtlt.r minister of encrgy. Calderon g;lrllt:rnl pcrn.llt of Ihe vu!l', COl II pa r...d
with AMLO's 3S..3 pero.:llt (the PRJ's I{obcrtu Madraw WUll unly 22.3 I'Cl"Ct:lll). As
Ihest' rl'Stl!ts suggest, Ml'xico W;1::. bl'l'umillg pul;lliznl a :'t1.. il'lY divided bl'l\Wl'lJ
rich and poor, right anJ ldl, nurth and soulh, lIlort.:.' and less devdupcd. h would
not bl' an easy place 10 govern.
\ .. It',): Tlte: 1.lllllllg III ,I ]{"VO[UII"l1 :.J
Thele were 9.8 million Mexi(an immigrallls (It:'lJal .lilt! illeyal) III lh.:.: United
Slilk:>-t-quivdll:llt 109 Pt:llt:'111 of lilt:' t:lltllt' jlupul,Jllon bOllll1l Mexllu,
Ur lllillrOll million Wi:'Il:' U11t!UUUHI'I1h:'d eqwv,1
1l:!llt tu less thJrI 2 jlHcent of the U.s. pupllllltlUII
Approximale/y 57 pl:'lcent of ,III undOCIlIlll'IlIl:!d m'y,.:-.nb In tilt:.' Ulli1<::'d
Stales (9.3 million) callle '10m M(:'xico; IIII:' ur L.:llrll Al1U.."I'K<I, rlMlnty
Celllrd/ Aillericd, ill..loullied fOI nearly pt'rC!!II!.
-ll


A Silent Invasion?
hnrlligl<llioll flOm Mexico lidS vllulent 11l1/It,:, Unrtt:'d Mo,>t
denounce Ihe phenomenon 011 culturcll 01 eCOnOIlIl( grounlb-<l'> <l
ch.:Jllenge to long-stJllding Arnt.:!riCdl1 01 cl:. ... thre<1I1O jub worker:..
tn lesponse, mallHain that the MexlCdn AJlIt'lk,HI
Lulture <mel provide:. lHuc.h IdUUI 101 till" U.s. l:CUl1un IY.
The Hltensity ollhe tl:'ll(b 10 levolv.. ,Iruund IHtI11bel:'. Iluw lll<llly
dre thele? Is Ihere of "SilL-lit IllV.ISlllll ,ll
It h<ls been VIItU<IJly to thl' size of tIle ulltlUllUI1t:nll'd
Mexican population with yr""11 preLbion. Skilled derm)gwphl:'r:. hdVl' 11Idl1ay02d 10
make eSlirntiles. though. dnd hell' ,lie ,>ume tindmgs 101 the yedl 2002:
Stalling ill the eally Inlyl,1I1011 frOlll Ml:'xllu It.'vl<lled IJllee Sll(JyeS!lve
long-tellll Irellcb. ull/uded not only wOlkrrllj ..gl'
as In plt!vious erdS, !Jul <llso .., ramllie,> willi women <lnd lhIIUrl'll.
Second, as IdW t:'nluICell\l:'IH tightel1ed ;1t the U.S. bordel, Ihe flllyr'lnts ueg.lll
Slateslde for 101lger pl:liods of 111I1e. lhlld. Mt:'XIC,111 1111g101l1:. Wele liJ1dinl)
wOlk all avel the Uniled flOm the Nanhwe:'1 10 the nul JlJst 111
trilditional areas (e.!:.!., CalifOllllcl and 101 lhe,>c plopo'><.lls for
-immigration leform" l1eeded 10 deal not ol1ly With PIU'>jll:'C1ive border ill
Ihe future. bUl also with <In dll'eildY-lesldelll undocumented papulallon
All in nil, this pattern doesn'l/ook velY much like ,In -irWdsiun" -in tIlt,: of
a delibelate and cooldirMled occupalion of territOlY lor str<lteyic PUiPOSl:"S. II
lepreSents, Ill:.tead, an <lcculnulalloll of millions of deClslollS by <llid
f,unilies. That said, it still poses delicate challenge'> for public policy.
0<11<1 frolll Jeffrey S. Passel, "Me)uc.ln Imrnigrallull Iu lli.. U')" '1 hl: I dt..
(Wa-.hington. I).c., Mlgl,nloli Pollt y Insillute. )UU.1).
r
I I l..... 1'Ill' IIII' ... 11 t'llglll tIl Pll!IUbl supporl, I:ox had lu wilh a rel:akilralll
,I IltJVl:lty III JVkXJt:all The PRJ hdd pluralilies in hUlh
ltl e.llli',I'...... ; Ih"PAN h;ld ollly '16 M'ats illihe Senale (out of 128) and 207 st:als in
IllllllJII ... I III (lI11lurSOO). tvIoretWl'r, Fux had Irollbkd rdalions
wilh Ihl' f'lllli:.t.1 ddq-:,llioll, whose 1ll1'll1ht:r::. did nul see him as a l)art}' loyalisl-
lllll ,I ... ,111 Ollbidl'l' whu had hijadtnlllll' pn:sich:nlial nomination. As ... result, Fux
llllilld II 10 gaill approval I;',, his IlIOSt illlpurtant illitia-
I IVI'''' I.IX 11'11)1111.1'1 iV.lII/.,llion, ,Uld rl'::.ululion of till,: crisi::. ill Chiapas. Thing::. gUI
tlHI} Wt>l:-.e ,tlll'l IIIl: l11idll'l'lll uf 20U3, whell the PAN rl'(l'ived unly
\.!. ['1'1 ll'lll ot ti,l' pUpillaI' VillI' and Iu:.t a lHllnbn of Importanl seats. (JIH: skq)tical
IJh... trVt" t lahllt,llhal, a Fux would he a until Ihe l'nd 01
hh 1l"111l111 20{J(l.
h.tJIlUI1I1': dlVlluplIll111 pr":-l'lllni Fux witll anolher dikJllllHi. As a pro-
AIIII'II"lll hu ... illt.,:-III.lll. Fox lI;hl tuutnl tht.:.' of Nf\FTA during his
I'rl ... ldlllli:t!l.lIli[I,Jigll. l)llllllg Illl' 1I,lll' ut" hi:-. I'I"l'si,Jt::ncr. hO\Vt'Vl'l", teCO
1I"lllll lllr!,rflll.lllu \\',1:'> .dl:-.ululd)' :tlll'lnk: alh:dill.... illihe CDI) 01 -lJ.3I'er(".... nl
HI .!.O\lJ. !I,ll d)' po:.ilivl gl"tl\\ltll ul V.l) pell:t'lll in 20U2, a ra\l' of 1.1 p<:'l'l'" 11 I in
'1 he pllill il'allhag (Ill MexicllI l'l:UIlUlIlY was, of tht: ongoing
:-1'J\\'d"\\'11 III 1111' Ullitt'li (10 which M<:,xi(o sr.:nl nearly 'JU pelTellt or its
l .... I'urh) J''''llplt- pointedlr d:-kl.'ll: \'Vhl'rl' arc thl' bcnL'lib of NAFTA? Their
dl ..... "lllllll IIll".lIlH' all IIll' illll'IISl' Whl"ll il bt.:.'t.::ame clt-ar that Mexico wa::.
I""'llig )1111 ... ,lIld 1I1.lrkd .,h.l1l hI lllailll:tnd China, itself 011 rnpi,J
1'"II'>h" I
f\k.H.. u ... Id.llh'll.,hlp Wllh till' Unitl'd look llIH:Xpl'l"led Assllilling
"llIu' .dlll,,'1 \I Il ln1l. Fox and l:llIrgl.: VV. Bush pl'lHllptly l::.lah
Ihll.... 1 ,I ... Illlllg alld (l/llJln:liUII. l:lJX pl'rsuadl'd to IUllk inlo
lilt' I" 1....,,[ lilil YtJ/ il1l1lligl al iOll I l't\Jl"llI-dli for r....sidr.:l1l illegab in the Unikd
:..1,11..... phi ... a I.lrgl "'l:lk \\'orkt.r progr:UH, Sll'p:-. Ihal \\'ould NAFTA
;dung Illllull... "lth.. ElilVIll'all Union. And in lale sunllllt:1" 2UOI. during a visillo
\V.l.,lllllglllll. hJX .. ll,dkllgld Bush 10 t:lwll such rdonns bdurl' Ihe l;."lId of the
l.d,,rlll.ll yl"lf. ,b pr,lbnllhl' tvI .... xit.:."all prl::sid.... nt's il app.... ared
tll,lll1<, \\'\!uld gd \v.IY. Tltl'lIl:anll'lhe Il.'rrorist atla(ks oCS... ptember 11,2001,
.111l! , .... I'.IIl ... ivl,.' illll1l1gratioll rdOrlll hl'l.:allll utterly unthinkable. Tension flared
Illl' IWII gUVl'llllIll'llb (ami til.. lwu presidl'JlIS) in l'''lrly 2003 whell
f\k.... iu,. II'Jllpllranl)' lll,lIliltg thl' UN Sn'urity Coundl, Caikd lu support the U.S.
i'l\';l.,lull lIt lr:hl. II rl(jl trntil lalll1ary 2UU4 Ihal 1I1lveikd u modest glit'SI-
!'ropu:-..t1I!J;tl kid liltl ..... ltan(t.:.' ot lungressioll,d approval during an dt'clioll
)',';1/'. I'ur ,dlthis tjl1W, Vkl'll!l' Fo.x was ldt holding the bag.
l'tljlular dislllt.::ho..lI111I1ent with Illl' I"ox adminislration hdped to fud a new
lh.dkllgl 10 f\kxko's IIt'dgling o"'IlIUaalY Ihl;." rise of a pulitical left, which
hol ... ltlnl .1 ... llllllg prl::.idelliial hid in 2UU6 by Ih(' PHD's Andres Manud Lopez.
I..IllI.hllll" (,I.I..a. i\f\lU,). hilllSt:ll <I:> a Glildidall' 01 workt.rs, pt:asanls,
;1I1d lhl' ]luor, ,\f\II.lJ :-.llarply lritidzed NAFI'A, fox, and pro-American policies.
I douhk digit !<-;llb ill pn.:dnliuJl poll::., Lapa. Obradur ran a n.:markably
HO I'AlnTW{I. OVntTIMI:
As Cnl<lcn'ln seHiC'd into orfice. three challenges loomed large. Ol1e concerned
Ihe extell"iol1 or of Mexico's polilic:tl democr.lCy. Frce and fair
presidential elections could not hy themselves nssme dellloaatizalioll in stntC',
Illunicipal. ;llId local arenas. In fact. there persisted a significant numher of
aUlhorilarian slrnngholds-hasliolls of hierMchiG\1 Iradition \lntler domincering
jcfn (hosses). usually linked 10 the old-time PRJ. The result was a
pallcfIl of democratic nnd llondcmocr;ltic loc;llitics Ihat crC:ltctI confusion. inCOll-
SiStCIH':y. :llld inefficiency throughout the p,)litical s}'steJl1. Adding to this problem
W:lS the dHOllic wC;lkncss of Mexil.:os judicial branch. Comls were regardefl ns
powerless alHI corrupl. thus undermining the const itulional ideal of a sepnral ion of
pfH\'('rs. :Il\d the I;lw W;lS nol applied fairly or evenly. The polke frelillenlir <lcted
uhilrnrily. hUIll:\Il right" were oflcn Olbused. and di"selll was somelimes
stlppre:-<.;etl. A":l rcsult. hnd what politicOlj Oln:llysls have (nlled an incolll-
plele or dcmocr;lcr-:l systelll comhining free :\Ild fnir c1CClion<.; (nl the
nnlionnllevel) wil h systclllalic reslriclinns on Ihc civilliherl ics of ordinary ... it i/ens.
The prolCS" nf dC1l1(1(,.. r;lli/.ntinn in Mexic('l represcnte<l a lIlnj{lr achicvcmenl-
nhnve .111. on the pnrl of ils Ihere was still a long way 10 go.
1\ secolld mnjor challenge. conneclcd to Ihe first. involvcd conflici with
criminal org,Ulii'alion.,,-spccillc;llly. drtlg trnrllcking carlels. Mexico was serving
as the trnnsit (l(lint fur nendy 90 percenl of the cucaine heading from Colombin
lownrd Ihe U.S. mnrkel (n" well as onc-lhinl ofallthc mariju;ln;l and an increasing
share of melhamphetamines). AnnuOli e:trnings from the <Irug trnde wel'e enor-
1l101lS. somewhere bet\..'een $R hill ion and billion. which not \lilly yielded
handsome prollts btlt nlso enabled pervasive corruption. This comlllerce was
contrnllcd hy four dominant organii'... ,lions-based in Culiadn (Sil1nloa).
Tijuana (nnjn Cnlifornin), Ciudad luarei'. (Chihuahua), and Malamoro....
(Talllaulipas). All of Ihese groups had extensive mnrkeling operations within the
territnrial United States. Indeed. Ihe SiTlOlloa cartel created retail outlel.s in sHch
f;l!";Iwny locnlions as Orcgon. Florida. and Massachusells. while the Gulf o.,.;lrlc:l
established a major <lislrihlllinl1 cenler in Ihe city of i\tIOlnta. And in their Incal
d(llllains wilhin the dTIIg C:lrlels exercised supreme authority: the}' were
states within the stnte. Thc)' were powerful. efficient, creative. ruthless-:tnd prone
to lise violence.
Seeking to enhance naHonnl authorit)', Calderon made an early decision to
lake on the drug lords of Mexico. He nugillented (nnd cleaned lip) Ihe fcdernl
police. cnlisled the services oflhe army, :llld. in effeci. declared war on the cartels.
The resnlt waS:l hloodh;llh. Cartels fought furiously wilh the police, wilh the army,
and nmong thcmselve.... During 2007 more than 2500 people were killed. many of
lhcm innocenl hy... tnnder... ; during 200R Ihe death toll rose to more than (l000. Thc
U.S. governmenl under Presidenl George W. l3ush pledged to support Calderon's
wilh $1.11 hill ion in military hardware. and tenlatively agreed 10 reduce
Ihe cTO!'... -horder sale of high-powered IIrearms to Mexico. A!' of early 2009.
however. there wns!'l ill 110 end in sight So !nng as Americ;lll cnn!'lllllers conlinued
10 dCl1l;lnd illicit ... especi:llly cocaine. Ihe commerce ",ould no dOllhl
\ .. l\ll'XH () 1111' H.,'\"I'II"",
cont iUlie. Caldeftlll's hc"t hopc W;lS Ihal Ihe 1" il:t' 01 eOlHlllI IlIlg 111, .. ,,11'... 111 11-". "
would hecnme Sri high Ihal Ira((jeker" Wllllltl t.lke Ihcll hll .. lIW.... 1'1-.<\'\Il'H (Ill
theory. Ihal might solve Mexico's prohlem wilh Ihe .Irld..: II \\<1111.1 11"1 ... k, II,.
U.S. problem of illicil drug ;lhIlSC.)
E(on(lmic developmcnt posclI ;1 Ihinl Ill:!jlll l hHIIcII):c 1
1
""p,lc 1"111"111"'"
growlh from 2003 through 200R, the M('xk.ll1 ("Cfllll1lllf \'1.'.1<; N'''llh
otl('-I hird of Ihe pnpuln!i(ln sl ill lived ill gl inding I'lIv('rl y. t\ Ill! III \'iew nil he gl, ,1".1
reces!'ioll of200R-9.lhe shorl lerm outlook wa .. trnuhlil1g. "I'llt HilI"'" elll
llf il!' expnrls til Ihe United SI.lle!'. hilt AIlHli ... ;l11 cOII"unw, .. \'\\ lelll htl\ Ill<
price ('If Mcxkan oil "'Ol" declining. Mc.lIlwhile. cOlli I'.ll I inll" 111 Iht' 11. .... I<lh 111.111 I I
were pCI'''II.lJing migr;lIll worker.:; 10 go halk IHII1I...., Whh h IIh.lIlI.1 <;Ii.lll' II'. !til 111.11
in rcmill,lIlee.. (which had grown 10 Illore thall 'i-2.0 lul1illll I't'l \"( ) .1IIt! ., hi ch
in ll\,\'11 Icvd of IInCllll'lorllh'lI1. t\c;,.1 1("..1111. hll h ,,' .. \'1'11'-,11'11
grnwlh ralc for 200
l
) hnd fOlllcll 10 nght nrnunll lern '1 hi .. nlllo 111111 111' "'1\
{onll'Tlled an age-old pOlllcrn..1" Ihe ll.:" cI.,nPIllY ... Ion'\... the I\k... h ... , "1 "11"11".
I,lkc.:; .111 ('vl'n lugger hit.
'\1' I're."idcllt Felipe <:aldc!"l\n \'\'.1!' \'\'('11 :'1\\'.11('. i\k-':HO" ,d,'ll1lll .. hlJ' 1" rhl'
United Stalc!' was a mixcd hlessing fnl hi"'"ollliliry. '1'11,11 kIlH\\'lcdr.t' rlulll'" III.d
his jnh ;1Il}' 1"',I!'icr.
4
Central America and the Caribbean
Within the U.S. Orbit
T
lll.r, .... "II Ill' pl'J il ill lu Ih... S(:th:'s. Along wilh
.Ii l.l"llll,d AJU...11CI ollh\:" Caribbean sharl"'d Ihb :,Iark realtty.
11,lIk, illV,'Slllll'III, ;Ind dipluillacy, Unitt:d Slatt'S exerted
,".\ll.lllldlll.trr llltlllnlll' ,'\I,T (ft"lll!::. and ,'vents ill lhis area throughout tIll'
Ildlr 'I'Hltll)'. '1111.: (and .thll:'>l') of Ihis power nul only yidds insight inlu th...,
I,dhl\ J"t ullhc Unllnl Stall's.lI abo L"llridll's Ollr ulli.h:rstillldillg lit ways thall.atin
,\JI1,'II,.1II" II.tV, 1111,-II'ldnlIJll' llllJlive:-. alld actiuns ofll\l,:ir gi<lll\ neighbor to the:
llOll Ill. .\lI,d)',>,:,> of l \'lIlral Alll""I,;.lllli lit,' CariblH:an providl'S il1lpurl<lnl pl'r
"I'nll\'\' ,,11 Ill,' dl.dklll-\"" lal.'illg 111" rq.;iOll as a whole and 011 tilt' "'>Jnp!L'xit}' l,t"
11111'1 /\111,'1 h..111 ;dt.lir....
hJ.llId" "llllv (:.nil,hL'.ln S".II"lld lu Ill' slllall. Tupugraphi ... s v;try frolll Ihe flal
1,1.1111', ot H.llh.ld'l:-' 1\1 lh,' rugg"d l.'o.JSb or Maninique <lud Guadclullp". A I\:wof
11LL' lik,' (:ul':I alld J;uuaka, h,IV,' rolling hills ;"Ind suhslanti;ll mountain
1IL, dilll,ll<: i:. mild, rainfall abulHbnl, ;llld soil is f,rtill'. Similarly, Ill\'
lid)' ::.1.llL':o. III (:"lllr.d AllIl:'rh:a lille the western edge of Ihe Caribbean
1',1".>111 FIlllil (;uaklllal.1 tll J'.IlI,Il11:J, tile istlllllllS exhibits sharp (ullirasts: a specla-
ltd.1I IIIUUlll,lllL IdUg,', hy volcalloL's of 10,OUO feet or lIlore; SOlll,",
lUll,'::'; .lIul Vl'ld.1Il1 jllngks along tile (O;l::.IS, There are bkes ill the mounlainous
dl,a::. I'lll till lllajtlf Ilavigabl ... rivers. Nur du Ihl:' coasts have suflkient deep,sea
h.lr!>1I1 .... rh ill "I' tilt: Caribbean hasin, nalure (an bring calalllily Ihrough
vll,klll l'.Lrtllqu.lk,:" turr,nli .. 1 railh, and dL'vastating storms.
WORLD POWERS, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE GREATER
CARIBBEAN
.'11111,,1 "t IIII' l.::lIihllL'1l1 S,',l ha::. fur (t;'l\lllfk's COllllll:lndt'd Ihe <.I1!L'lltioll of major
w"d.l 1",\\,,'1::'. TUj!,dlwl with tho: Cult" of tvkxko, it cOlllailll:d sea lallt."s or great
:..Il.llq..',lo.. ill II 'l,rld]lt.". Olll illt 1111.' t.:ulllilial t:ra, 11\1,;' Caribbean provided rotlles uf access
III Sp.lill\ 1111/:"\ Iligllly JlliZ"d NL'w World duminiuns (..IS \Veil <IS milks for S,xll1ish
-_ z
c

.0
.0
."

"
c

v

E

N'I PAlnIWO" (.A:-.I \TII"II ...

Irc:l<;urc f1eds). The i.c;l;lnds (lII'nic;lu:d ideal cli11l:ltes ror the prodllClioll o(sug:lr, ol1e
o(lhe most llKI :lIive enIpS o(the er... I\s European powers jOl'ke}'cd ror e\.ollolllil' and
:ldv:lllI:lp.e in the Americ;ls, the beC:lllle Ihe rrincip:lltl)(,;llcr o(
conflict-as l)l\C hislpl ian hns noled, milch like the Mcc!ilerrane:lll Sca.
The sixteenth cenlury discovery o( precious minernls in f\kxicn ;llld Peru
distrnctec! Spanish :1ttClllioll (rom Ihe Carihhcan, which hccame lillie more than :1
g;lteW:l)' 10 the thcll.prosperous l1lninl:llld. Hispanioln, Cllhn, and Puerto Rico
sCfvetl Illcrely ;lS suppl)' Sl;l! itln" and milit;lr}' g.lrrisolls (or !'O}'al ncets IO:ldcd v,'il h
silvcr ,lIlCl gold. t-.IC:lllWhilc, Ihe Sp:lllish crown proved un:lhle to sllc;t:lin ils
ulllllllcrci:d alld politic:ll 1Il01IOpol)'. The nren wac; simpl}' to(1 l:lrge. c;elliemenis
;llld (Ilrtresscs too thinly di-;per"c\.1. nlHlthe econolllic sl"kcs IllO high. Indeed, the
\,arihhe:ln'sc;l or(ere(l:ln inviling tflrget (01" mcrccllar)' privatcers nile! hllccallcers.
Spnin's leading rivals, especially Engl;md, ellcournged ;llld sometimcs oUlfitled
these pirnles; Frnncis I1r:lke, John Ilawkins, and Ilcnry Morg:ln:l1l hcc:lllle knights
of the Englic;h re:lllTl,
Other Ellropc:ln power" l'.sI:1hlished selllel1lellt.s :l" well. The "nglish sci7.ed
f;lll1:lic:l in Ic,r;,:;. The Frellch took the western h:ll( o( J-li.spaniob in 1659 :lne!
n:llllcd it (present.c1:ty Iiniti). II;lving tKl'lIpied northeastern
Br<l7il (rom )1I:\0 to 1654, Ihe Dutch moved onto :l llumher nf isl;lnd:-. nrr the
coast or Vellc7ucla, l.itlle hy lillie, Spain ccded or :lccepted tic l':'lctll loss o( some o(
ils coloniOlI c1:lillls. C:lrihbc:ln holdings bec;lllle P:lWIlS in Europe'1I1 "';Irs, h:lnded
h<lck :lnd (orlh hetweell winners :lnd losers like the proceeds in " poker snme.
By tile e:l.-1y nincleenth celllllr)', Gre:lt Britain emerged as Europe's preemi
ncnt lllilil:lry, cconomic, :llld politic:ll power. lis principnl ohjective in the
Alllcrica" W:1S el'ollt)l11ic-to promole Hritain's cOllll11erci:l! interesl", wllich 1101.. 1
relied 011 conlrnhallCltfnJe throughout Ihe eighteenth century. The l):lsis (or Ihis
:lclivit)' would he strong eC{\Ilomic institution,,: Ihe hesl ;lv:lil:lble in shipping,
hnnking, insurance, :lnd investmcnt cnpita1. In efrect, lhe British were seeking to
rcpl:lCe the:- (ormer Iberian coloni:ll infrastructure linking L;llin Amcric;l 10 the
world economy, Ye:-( (or the most pnrt, the English sought economic gain withollt
tile burden o( direct political rule. It W:lS all wherehy
Europe's chief inveslor :lnd trOlder :lvoided the expellsin link o( terrilorinl cnn
lrol-with its potentinlmilit:lry cnt:lnglelllcnts.
\,\'hat of Ihe United St:lles? I\s the young repuhlic undertook its qucst (or
geopolitic,,1 stnlus, dOl11in;llion o( the C:lrihhean hecame a m:ltler or nalional
security -hili the n;ltioll's amhition was much greater than its power. In (:lCI, Ihc
Unile(1 W:lS llll:lhle 10 prevenl the city o( Washington (31Hlthe \,Vhite I louse)
(rom heing l!ev:lst:lted h)' Ihe in the War or 1812.11 W;lS nnt a Ill:ljor power
;It Ihis time.
The Unitecl SI:ttes atlempted to assert ils :luthority with the
ill IR23. OriginOllly aimed at czarist Russia's potenli:ll encTO:lchmenls
011 the American Northwest, the doctrine hecame better known (or its c11:lllenge tn
Europe's conserv:ltive Iioly Alli:lnce, app:ll'cnlly plnnning to help Sp;lin reconquer
its (ormer colonies. President 1:lllleS Monroe firmly declared thnt "tile Americall
1
1 ... (("1111':11 Alllt'lll.1 :lIltlllw t .It 11.1 ...111
...:ontinents, by the rree and independenl condition wllit h they h,I\'I' ........ n1llt'd .111.1
maintained, :lre hencerorlh not to he (..oll!oOidered:1" !oOuhjet,l lor I 011l1l17,ltltln h\' .111\
EurOpeOlIl powers." Further strictures warncc! 1he Fllrnpe:lnc; ,11:.lill ... t lIll II,,, I
Ille:ln" 10 extend their polilical power in the New v..'llliti. 1\<,; I.lll'l 1'111 111 ,1 1'1'11111.11
slng:ln,lhe h:lsk: mc",sage \\I:l-" dC:lr: "I\IllCr1\.,1 (or Ihr Alllnk.ln... -
III (acllhe message evokell indifre:-relKc :1nd SCOtl1 illllUllilll'IlI.111 11"'1".11111,1
concern in HI"it;lin, and cOIl"idel':lhlc symp:lllly in I.alill '\IIlClil,1 \\'illllll Ih,'
United Sialec: the Monroe I)octrine, jillgni.stil. :lllil ns.... ntivl', Il(" ,ll'Ii'.1 t 1'lllt'I ... I"111
ror U,S. polic)' toward 1.:1tin AmcriL:\. )'I't thc Ilatlllll 1.1t ketlll"lh thl' \\tll .Hl.t lilt
C:lpacity 10 en(orce the t1cdnr;ltioll: it w:\" pH"" t 1ll'i('d wllh. flUIIlIl'Il!." I 'p.II1"'Il'll
induding:l viclnriou.... war ag.linc:1 MC\hl', .11111 wllh ... 11111'.1:1' .... "\1'1 ... 1.1\1'1\
including n frightful (ivil war.
II \Vas not until the late ninclt.:cnth (('nlur\' th,11 Ih,. IJn;I{'d "'r,lll''' \\.1'" le.ld\, I..
t:lke :lclion in the Carihhenll-which rcselllhlcd ,I "EUflll'C',ln 1.1ke - \\'llh tht'I"\lq'
t ion o( II ispnllioln (shared h)' II:lit i amlthC" Ilolllilli<':lll ) ('WI \ .... 1'.1.111' I
wns:l EUTOpenn cnlony. still hd(l pflSq',,<;iOlllll ( IIha ,1 lid 1'11"110 HhO,
held 1:1I11:\ic:l, part o(the ViI gin b,I:11lds, (;rl'nada, and s('vll-II ..t rl .. , I "1'\\,11,11 ... 1..0.1,
(plus the lllain1:lnd dominions, ,( British IIIHldll,.,l<; :111(1 HI ili,,11 ( h ,III' " 111'1. I
M:lrtiniquc, Guadeloupe, ;md French (;t1i,lll:l; lhe Dutch hdd ",c\'cl-Il i... I.IIHI ... "III".
Dutch GlIian;l (present-cia), Surinallle) 011 lilt' 1l00thelll fringe III \1111 Ill.'
1'he"c European outpoSIS presentcd ullwclllUllC limit .... fill Ihe ('),CII I"'C col II ... , I" '\\'1'1
This rael helps explOlin U,S. intervcntH1I11ll (.Ilha'<; \\',11 fnl" llukpt'ntlcn, I' "'1111
Spain in IR9R. The llcsirc 10 expel ;-'1,.lill flOlll Iht' ll(,llli ... ph"II' 11" ,1'lld'l
pl:l)",d n role in the U.S. <lccisinn. After :\11, Spain .IPI'C,HCdlll ICI',e"'!'lll lilt' 111,,'1
reactioll:lT)' clements of Eur(lpt'an .. iel\'. 1\ lllluni,d 1ll1l1l:lfI h\' ..... p.1ll1 ... t<ll! 1<'1
eve'1'lhing the United d.limetl tn npp,,<,;e, .lIld il rq11 C"("Hlcd ,I I
violatiol1 or Ihe Monrne llfhtrine. POPU!.1l or Ilw I, 1",:1'1101
(ex:lggcrated nccollnts hy Brili:-.h hist(lri.11l pllhlll i<;ls ,llltll,1 ... I, .1111" 1111'" III
the Amcricas) (urlhcr uUllrihutct! to Ihis ("(lllvilliOl1
Ilut Ihe ide:l behind the intervention \...as lIflt nnl)' ltll,heLIIt' ( IIh,1; II \\",1'" .d',,,
to :lssert Americ;lll pm,,'er. CA" \\'ill he c..'xpI.1111nl in (:h:-lI'ICI .. , I,nh, \'IIl.lkl'l'" 111
\V:lshington l1:\d long a"sulllcd thaI Ct1h:l would snnwd:l)' hl'llII1)e 1',111 .. lIb,
Uniled SI:tles.) In :T similnr vein. official<,; hrl;lllle dce!,l\" (llUd'lll,'d .tI"'1l1
EllrOpC:lll e((orts to collec! deht payl11en!.<,; (1"01111011l11";c<,; ;"\1"1111,1 rll(' { .1I11,h(.1I1
hasin hy rorce or nrllls: thi<; f,:l\'e risc tn "dollar diplnm,h 11110111:11 Whll II Iii.
United 'stales :lssumed respoll"ihilil}' Inr Ihe deht p:l)'llu'lll<; <;" long ,1'" 1111'1\'"
would kt..'ep ils gunho:ltc; home, Completion III the Panalll" ("an,lllInlr ... IH'lIglll
cned U.S. determination to converl the Cnribhe:tll illto ,In -l\lllClll,lll hlllli
Wttshinglon's the slnkcs wcre mulriplc-comlllerciai. ('Ullll
l
lllll, 1'1.lt
tical, milit:lry-nnd unnervingly high, I\nd <1C; we shall sec. thi:- str:llcgr Icd III .1
consistent pallcrn o( U.S. milit:lry intervention" :Ind/or d;llld('"till(' :-lIhICllllg"
The oUlhrenk o( the Cnld \"':lr in the 1940.,; addnl .1 n('w .lll1leu... i.111 tIl II .....
security ...:onccrns: the Ihre:lt o( internnt ional cnmlllllllislll Ilot 0111)' ill Ih(' ht'lI11
sphere hilI nlso in !\l1leric:l's Thc :llllil nmIlUlll,,,1 1':1111111."" W.",
Xt. 1'\1.11\\"'" \"1 "llll'II" tll.\hl.1 \I\II(IIMI
.. 1ll1"'1 ... 1,t11 .llld well arllLtd.lkd (whh:h du\.s nul lll",:ln Ih.ll It W.h
.l\.\. III ,lid. '1 ht' Ullikd St.lll:'" had 111I dIUit:t', su Iht: rt:asolling wt:lll, hut tll fight
1,.I\.k .lr,.IIII ... ' tllc :-'u\'kl Uililill ,llld il" .. 11t'llt puwt'rs, whkh \V"'ft.: ..J..:di':'Ill.'d Iv lht:
1'\"11111'1\\ 111,1 ,jIll), 1,1 bUIll1 all Ih..: 'vV'-'3h:rn d"'lllu\.ri.l<.it."3. 'l'ht:'1 hiI'd
\\ 1111,1 \\\lut...! h\..1 1.1VUlik .lI"gllt:d Culd \Var thc-urhb, ;;111...1 wuuld bt'
... tlh\"lll'd II)' .. 1111111111111:...111.11'11..... ') VI llleil klluw Iravch::r'). Thl' mo.::.t drasliL (hul
k'llgn h)' tlll'e,lIl)' 1t};llh had 1''''t'lI ill (tll ..... lkrlin Bluckade, Ill\., Grt:ck Civil
\V.II. 1111' 11,'11' II .1Il..! 1t.llI.lI\ \.,ll.'dIOIl"') and III A:...ia (Iii", Kurt.::lll \-V:.tr, Iht' fall nf
l.lI I'll 1.11t ... 1 t hill.l. ,Iud 1111;' Illdl) ChinnL' civil war). "V,IS I.atill AlIll'rica 10 he
1IIIIIIIlIH'! ( 1111111 1111.' t .lnhhl.lll bnUIIII.t bea(hht':.IJ luI' tht: COIllBllllll.::.t GlllSL'?
\ )1't'l.ttillg linda 1111'" AIllt:n,.\lll gov... tuok repe,ltcd aLl ions within
Iht' rq.!,h.1I III l.l) rq II ..'",=" It'll I"" ILlldt:lll.. II'S, lb) support anilcollllllllnist n... ,llld
(.. ) lIVl'llllr"w :-."... i.dbl ,llld It'll ol-tL'llkr goverllmenls.
\\,ould l'xll'lld wdl hl')'ulld th,' Culd \-V.lr. On.... impclus lor
.1 l"llllllllnllllllll.II)' Illl':-.o.'llll ,tlld l'\l'll lllililJry i11tt:rvelltiull, 11'0111 thl'
l .... \\.11,,11 'Illig...... Alluth"'1 I.llUll'lll IUlll:.nlulI i1kgalllligr;ltiull. And .lltlr Ih..
,dl,h k... III .... pll'lllh,1 I I. 20U I , tla' ( :.lllhht,.. lIl :llIll' undt'r tilt' lllllhrdia of"hollld,llId
..... '.. IIIIl\ .111..1 1111..' gll.h,tl war llil h'nor. impoverished, alld rdativdy wt'ak,
11.111<'11'" ,,1111" ,II ..'., tl'III.III,,1 , ....,tlll' till' SII.ldllW tlflhL' ufthL' Nonh.
FROM COLONIES TO NATIONHOOD
1,,1111111'11'" I.loded till ,I ... l/able 1:.1.ltltl ill lkLt:ll\ber !lY2 ;Il1d l.hrt:.ll'lIt:d Il 1./1
h/'l/1I11/1l ( III 111"'11.lllillb III FlIglislt). lib an iv.1I signalt:d tht: illt:xur,lbk' duolll ul
tlil' ,111',1'", 1l,IIl\l' pUI'UI.ltlull, ntilll.ltn! .. t pcr:,ulls. divilled .1ll101Ig three
.....".11.11' gIIIU!,"': <jhulIt:') III <;U,lll.dlll.lkbl), 'I.linu Arawak, and C....ib (lrolll
\vllldl tilL' Ih lI,tlllt'). Un.. hl!:' to d!:'velup sigllific:.lnl trade. lh..,
"'1'.lIl1,lld... ,1111:-'" ttl "Xl'ltlll Iht' ISl.llHJ a", StHlrLt' 01 I.llid .Illd l;Jhur thruugh tilt:
,'//, "'II/I III I" ... y:...lt111. illstiluliuns WL'rL' illlpo')l'd upollth!:' nativt: su.. il-t)'.
111.11.111'> \\\'1\' 1tlllnl 101 WillI.. III 1IIIIlL'S and IIdd.::.. Ilarsh 1;1!.>"r and
1.]1)"'IL.d L1lllt.I .. 1 wllh Sp.llll.lllb It:d III IIlL'1I dcdlllJtiun: t1i:.tasl' ant! dt:bilil.ltion
1\1111...1 lull. Itt:,di/lllg wh.11 1.11t: hdd in sturl'. many fkd 10 the mUllntains
III ""'.lh.11 lit .... lIt.:'lr ,1IIdlltt:dolll. As ill N..", Fr.llIlt.' ami Nt:w England. the
l'UI'"l.llltlll Il'!l vidlill hi vlrtu,lI l'!inlill.llIOII.
II \\.1'" III Il.t ,lrd,hl.11l wllllt.' ..1... 1'11.::. tJr.::.1 prolt':.lnl :.tg,linst .Ibll:.e of
lhe,' 11.111\ n. III 1'-'1 I ""ltlllill ...1,- f\IUlIt,,.::.iIlOS :...IH)LkeJ congreg.ltion ill lhl': island
... 1110 'II) ,Ii .... 1111. j I II)' .I,noull .. 111.dt reeJtllu:nl uf thl' JIIdian population.
",(,,111 \\ ,II d ItII tulllill" d,' Cas.l:-. bqpn his krvent cOllllpaign to protel t the
Ilhll,ill'" 11"111 .ttlV... lllllleer:. .llId ullI,/ueerors. III response to IIlL'SL' ph"',ls. thee I..fOWn
1II1IIII,Ih'I)' ,Igi L'l,d 1\ I lI'gtlbk lit,, Irl'allll..:l1( of the natiVl.:' popldat ion. Uut 10 protect
l!l, ,\llILIIL.lll ",IIIVL:.... LI:' <:.1....1:. .tlSLI m..dt: a I.lleful Ihal import
,\111.111 .. 1.1\\ 1 1"'UIlILL'of IJb,,,.
:-'1'.llIl.lld lir , I,.!tlll'd CClltral Allh.:riL..t in 15UI.ln contrast tu f\kxi ...o .1IId
1"'111, It Wol ... 11'11 Ila' ... Ih' ,)1 a lellll,di:II.:d ludi.1l1 t:lllpir..... Indigclluus ptuplt:. Iivl'd in
1 w C"lllr.II/\llh'II(,I.lll.llh,<.-.lIllJh,:.1Il X7
stahle, aUIUJlOllluliS COllllllllllilil's alld t:llg.tgt:d ill Ifad\.' with UIIl' allotht:r. Allt'f :;Utl
11.<"./'. a rdat ively advullt:l'd civilizaliun appeilrl'd ill the II ighl'lllds uf Cu:ltt'lIIala
1:1 Salvador, and it was grt:atl), inllut.'lIced by Ollllt:L- culturl' IruIII IhL' Vt:r.ICflI:t
Tabascu coast uf M,,xko. Nahuatl st:ttlelllt:nb Iat,,'!' JulluWL'd. and c1assk Ma)'.lll
culture ill the lowlands or northt:rn C;mlklilahi. The p,,'riut! lrom hOli tu
L.!'. markt:d tht: apex orth... Old Maya Empirt:. as it \\'.IS lurllll'l'ly callL'd, Ihough
it did not constitute l.l highly organizt:d polilkalunil.
'I'h... divt.'rsity ur natiVl' cultures 1IIl';JlIt tllal Spalliards pt'lldratt:d
America ill stages, nut all at Ollce, ;Jilt! t.'<lclt cunqllL' ... 1 retjllirt.'t! th.., l'stJblish
ment of:.t ne\\' government. The rl"Sult \\,.IS ,!eceelllr.t1i:t.lllllll. f\lurlldpaliliees
assullled day-to-da), authOrity. anJ lo\\'n councils bt:Clllll'
Ihe most important governing bodit::.. Nominall)' under thl' L'UlItr,,1 01
vicero)'s, Spanish n:sidellb of the i:.tlllnllS fUlIcti(llll'd lInd,,'r
order.::. for all intl"nb and pllrpos..s. All!:,lllpting tu as:'l'I't aullJoril)', Iht:
Sp.lnish CroWll e:.tablished thl' Kingdolll 01 (;uatl'lIl.lIJ (as part 01 lht: \'IU'
of N"w Spain) ill thL' lllid":.ixlL't:nlh unhtr)'. th ill 11lL' l:aribl>"'an .1Ilt!
Mexico, tht.' t:hurch follow.... d c1o.sd)' 011 till' hn'ls ul COlltjUlSl. Secular and
regular dl'rgy, l'speciall)' Francist:illiS and IJvmillic.tllS. luok :\(:Iivl' llarl III
missiunaJ')' efforts.
ELUlIolllic activit)' \ViiS modL'Sl. Millillg \Va.) Irulll till' beginning ,I
operation. The first major export was cac.lU, thuugh Vl'nl'Zud.1 SUtl1l prt:t:mpkd
thi:. Illarkt.'l. Indigo thl'1l luuk uwr as th, leading t:xIWrl. alld tlterl' \\'.IS;I bllstllllg
... onlraband Irade ill It>bacw. III the 166Us 11ll" l'slahlislwd a fUlIlltohl at thl'
lIloulh of th... IkHzt: River (bkr British I [ollduras 01' Ik-Ii:t.t:), whidl Ihey ll.)ed as a
ba:.l' for COllllllerce in d)'L'wood and ;Jnu for btIl'GlllL'l'ring r.tid:.. BUI lor
the most part, Cenlral Am.... ri....1 was nol a :.ourCt of gn::al WL',llth, alld II rt:cc.:iveJ
liulL' atll'lltion from tht: Spani3h nowll.
The slldal slnILturl' was LUlllrvllnl h)';t 1\\'11 p.ln dill'. ()l\L' dCllll'lll"'Ullsislt:t1 \II
burl'aunats wht):>'" pulilical bas.. was Ih... impl'rial Lourl (l/II,lteflcill) ill
GlI;Jtllllal.1. The utileI' cun.sbtt.'d of loc;Jlly burn 1.lntiholdl'rs whuse strl'llgtll rl":.itl..,t1
in IOW1l LUUIKils. At thl' bOllU1l1 wa:. the I.thor lort:..:, ctllllpnslllg ludl.llls :.tml Aln....H1
slaves. There also elllergt.'t.1 a :.lralulll uf plople uf lIlix...t1 m...-iaJ baLkgrolllld:., kut)\\,l1
as ladillos in O:lllral Amt.'rim. whu \\'orkeed a:. wag..: labul'as or smalllanlll'r:. ill tltt:
t:ulIntrysitic anti as IlIL'n.:hant:.. alld pt:ddk'rs in the Nt:.tr Iht: ":lld vI
th......olonial t:1"1, appruxilllatdy 4 pt:rcelll \lftht: l''''giull's populatiull was whill' (dllll'!'
Spanish ur creole), about 65 percent was Indian. and 31 p",r...",nl was Illdillo
(including tho:.t: 01 AfriGlIl dt:3lellt) .
During the dghtt:t.'nlh century the Bourbon mOIl.H'... h)' .lllt'llIptnt tn reasst:rt
royal conlrol or Spanish Am.... rka, a muve thai ewrywhere rt,tluct.'d Ihe political
autonumy of the landed <:l't'ulc class. In Cenlral AlIlt:rit..:a a ...untinuillg t!l'dint: ill
caC;JO production and;J precipitous drop in IhL' indigo bctwn'll the 1790.::. autl
the lMIOs b.J to furl her dist;"onll'nl within tht: crl'ole r,lllks. Tht's.. hcigh-
kneel long-standing differences bctwel'll the imperial btlfl;\uCf:.K)' :.IlId the lu...-.t1
aristocracy, bt:lwet:n the capital and Ihe provillct.'s.
XX l'AWrT\VO f:ASESTUDII:S Ul/\N(;I IlVrI{ 1'''-11'
Independence in the Caribbean
,,,'h<ll i!' now II"ili, on the !'ide of the island o( llispnnloln, wns onCl' nne 01
Ihe lIlosl prosperous possessions (If Fram::c. The island's originnl inhahi-
lants W('f(' almost cl1tirely rcplaccd hy Afric:lIl sbvco; imported 10 work on sug:lT'
('o;l;lles. 1)llring Ihe I:rendl Revoltllioll. II:-.il i's residents. including I:-.ndowners 01
mixcd J\frican and European descent. were granted full cili7enship. :-. move th"l
while ('o;t.lle owners rcsented. Iksulling <onflict!' led 10 " w;we o( rehcllinno;. Thi ...
tilll(" Ille sl;l\TS wanletlnot nnly l)crslln.11 frcc<lolll htlt nal illllal il1llcpcndence ,IS well.
l! ndcr the 1c;:ldC'l"ship of Pierre Dominique Toussainl I:OLlverl me. tile
ClIII:-.ili re",')lted in 17q I ,md ill I I tlcdared ll:-.tioll;1.1 o;o\'crcignl)'. This WOle; to he
the sCloml free n"tioll ill the Amcric.l!, ;lIld the fire;t independent black countr), in
the Wtlrld. Allhnugh Toue;S:lillt Jed Ihe rehellion, he W;lo; sd7ed :\Ill! !'ent 10 Fr.lllCc.
",here he ('\'el1l tlall)' died in all oh!'cllre tlungeon. 11 w"s one of his lieulen;\Ilt". lean
J"l'que" l1e!'salines. who prodaimcclthe nation free frolll colonkd rule.
rill' war" hroke up ;lIld dcslroyed Ihe cstates. Land \t'a" .11
firsl worked lollet:livcly untler .1 <;y"lelll tailed Ihe ron,cr. hut individu,,1
a"l'ir:ltion" in the pO"lindependcnce periot.l lCtl 10 the distribution of parcel ..
10 freeholder". Thuo; the Ieg:IC)' of I....ge oligarchic landowllers. so pre\';llenL
c1"ewhcrc ill I.<llin America. did llot take ront in independenL Ilaiti. Inslead.
a I"rge 11l1mher nf slll"ll holdingc: rCl'la(ed the e"lnle". "uti produclion
(lecreno;('t1 dr... o;ticallr. IndependelKe g;we pOW('f 10 the hlntk ... who still Inrm
;'I hOIl I 90 percell I of the populatinn. " r:,d Ih:lt Itght-skillned lllu!,\lloec: hav('
rescllled .111 .llnng. Indeed, the mlllatluc" heC;'IlIle a prnspernu" JI1I11orit\'.
dinging 10 .111 idenl or Frendl dvili7:llinn nnd "peaking FrCllch on ;1 regular
hasi!'. The Ill:ljorit>' hhllk pOptll"lion. hy l.ontrasl. spnke a Ilalivc Inllgtlage.
Ilaiti:lIl. ,lIltl found sl'iritll:ll inspir"lioll ill lIoclllll, rill ecledic hlend or
l>ahol11ian religions ;Intl CalholiciC:lll. 1\ kInd nf cash.' dividecl lile'
1lIIII.Itlfle." fnll11 the hl:lck". Olll(l l.1110ill helweCll the twn c1clllent" (tntIled a
persisling Ihcllle in I !:lilian hi!'lory.
These events hOld complicaled spillover cl(eus Ihroughout I lispalliol;l. Since
Ihe I:Ilc scventccnlh centul)'. coloni.ll nlllhmit)' over Ihe island I1,HI hcen tlivilkd
helwecn h;m...:e. wilh Saint-Domingue (l.lIer renamed Ilaiti). and Spain. wilh
S;lnlo I )olllingo. This pallern 1)('140111 In t1nr:l\'e1 ill 1795, when Spain ceded
Dnmillgo 10 Fmllce ill the !'e;Ke 01 Basel (thus sClllillg one of Europe's endles!--
war,,). Thie; gave Fr:lnce Iit ubr pos!'e"sion of the Cl1t ire islnnd. Whell Ilaili achieved
independencc in IRO'I. h(lwcvcr. Ihe eastern put remained tinder
atllhnrilr. And when Napoleon inv,,<letl Spain ill 180R, the creoles nf Santo
Domingo ro"e up in prote"l against Pr;lIIce-"nd. a" Inral "uhjecls (lf the o-o\."n.
they restored Spani!'h rule over their c(llnn)'. Powers Came :-.ncl powers wenl; this
incipient ph"!'e of Dominican independence rc!'elllhlc(1 a of musical ch"irs_
Plots "nd counterplots emitted for the nexi dozen }'enrs. As insurgenl military
t:llllpaigns gained mOlllentullI in Mexico and Soulh America. Incal leaders of
Snnln Domingo in IR21 declared Ihe independence what Ihey <Iecided 10 <.nll
Ilaili.
M
Within a malin of months, armed forces frolll Iinili invaded the
'I .. ('Cllllal AlilClil . ,111,1111(' (.111(,1,. . 11 ,1.('1
counlr)'. sei,..ed power. "nd imposed:l mililar)' govcrlllll(.'ni. J\" olllht'ir :-.idl til Ihl'
island. Ilaifinn nllthfJrilies look r;lflkal sleps ahn!i"hing ... I;w!'r)'.
properly. :lnd reducing the mle of Ihe churdl. The 11.liti,ltl IItlllpalilln Ll ... lnlllll
t\\'enly-l\\'o rears. when local p:llriols rin,,11r (111"'('tl Iht' illV.hlclS, Thi ... IlI.HIe I S II
Ihe secolHl elale of DOlllinicnn independellle Ihi<; llillt' 1""111 II.lili. n"t 11"111,'
l:urol,e:ln power.
Ilailian forces mounted lIe:lr ..olllillUllU" lll\,:lSlllll'" .lg.lill',1 tht"il Ilrighl'''l
throughout Ihe and Out of eX:I"per,llipll .lIld Ir-.Il. 1I1ll" CIIIt'lIlTI"'".!'
I)ominican prc!'itlcnt hil uponlhe ide.ll Siliulltlll: he 1('111111\'11 hi'" (1Illl1ll} I" "'1,.1111
\\'hich re"lIllled ...:oloninl rllk from IX"I 10 IR(,l'l. Thio; .Hlinn plo\ol;('t! hillf'l 11f/,h ... r
in II:liti, ,Ipprehensive ahout Sp,lllish powel ..11111 in the I 'lilted ...1.11\' .... IIllll.l):\',1 1>\
<;lICh;l flagrant violalion nlthe IllllTOe DUt..lrillC. Shfllth .111t'r "'p"il1 \\',10; til 1\,'11 "111
another nalionnl leader pllrsued yel :tnolher c:ollliion: ,1lH1CX,lIilll1 III 1111' lllllk.l
St<ltes. Surel),. Ihis \\'ould protecl the n:\li'lIl lrom II"lhcr inllllO;II'II<' h\
I biti or an)'Olle else. U.S. president (;r"nl C:11Il/lgk "'tlPI'"""" Ill. 1'l.tIl
thinking it mighl provi<le a homeland fnr AmeriC;1ll ,,1.1\'('" "ccd hv 111\' ( IVII \\.11.
hut the proposal f<lilel! to ohl"in congrrso;i,)n:ll npprO\;l1.
The Dominican Reptlhlic Ihlls lapo;ecl inl" illt!ep<'lh11'111 I' .11 II ,. l<.! hv lkl.I lll' II ...
citi7ens sun'ered a series of self seeking :lud v;linglnl i, Ill" I .... "111... 1 pl'"lllll'lil
rlllltlllg them wns LJlises llcureaux,:l di\lator \\'ho rllleel /l'llll III \\.1\
compnrahle 10 those flf Mexico'o; I'f,rf'irin nia'l. 'lnlilh ,11 iFllrigll" ;In,ll'' "11"11111
di .. arr,l}' then'after pl.l/!,IlCtl tht. FIn lion. whi! h \\lIul<1 e\'('lllu,tlk hnd ihdl tlll,tn
lJ.S. military occup"lifln hy 191h. "lllhl'nill "'''VClCl):lll\ I.... kl'd lik,' ,111111.1.1:,
Independence for Cenlral America
Illst a!' the f"te of the OOtnilliC:l1l Rcpuhlit \\' ......"0 ... trl1llgly ,lflelk.! !>\. 11.1111
C.elltral Americl's path to indel'Cllt!rnce W,I'" h\ ('\"'111 ... III {\k\I\"
(;llld/or Ihe Viceroyally o( New Spain. 111 whit I, i :ellll.11 J\ 111('11\ ,I hellllll-!'111. J\ tll I
1hc N"po!conic invasiol1 of Spa i II in IHIIX. pr" l "II til i.d ,1\ II hflri Ii,'" .11 f1 I ... t 11l.IIl.lrl .I
10 maintain cnntml nf\.enlral Amcrit:1 h)' .Ill allialllf' wllh 1(/,1111,,\ .uld
Indians againstlhc IIp.''tarl creole.". In IH20 :ld0l'linn ,,1.1 lihl'f,11 < llll ... lilli
linn senl shock waves throughollt Ihe arC:l. alld in Illid IH11 A,:II .. lln de IlIlt I,,,I, '.
declaration of the Plan de Igtlal:l in Mexilo (orled Ihe i..... Ill'. ['.1I1h' 1e.1I11l1:
Mlihernlion
M
hy Mcxic"n troops. the sodall)' ulllsCl'vnli\'e 1.llId,lwl1el:-' III ('l'lIll.1!
America <lecided 10 hreak wilh nnw-ratlital Sp:lln; ill 1.11l1l,1l)' 1f{7.2 Ihn 1'"1
claimed nnnexation of the isthllluS In imperi.11 Mexitll. Thi ... I.,,,,'cd Itlr lInly nllt
year, nnd Iturhide's abdicnlinn led 10 illdcpcndcll<.c. (:h,.II'.I" IClllaillnl wllh
Mexic(l. The other slales. (mill ,-osln l{it.1 10 (;II.IICll1.11.1 (cxlluding 1'.111.1111.1).
became the United Provinces ofCenl!"al Amerit;1. 'lc"l'il(' (!i"'lnnl.lntl di".lgln'
l11ent, Central America 10 sep;lrnle i'"c11 fmlll "'p:lill ;111.1 ll"lll
Mexico-in a relalivel)' peaceful fashion.
A!' h:lppened elsewhere. the Cenl ral Amen...lll pnlil il ;11 dllc (lividI'll illl" Iw"
'nctions: Liberals nnd Conservativc!'. The I.ihcr.ll" adn'C:llet! tIll' <011111111.1111111 "'
reforms slarted hy Ihe BOllrhon mon"rchy. The)' c.lllcd Itlr n... tlll IInll" 0/1 ..11'1" .11
'J{J 1':\ltl IW'1 .. I ,\'>1 .... 1UIJII. ..... t IlAN(;I.CJVFI{ 1'11\\1
1'''\\'t'l, Ila' ,dll,lllIVll 1)1 :.Iavt"f}', tllC rnlll(liull ut taXl'S, and IlIe prOJlhltiull uf
1 ... IIIIlIIIIIL t!...:\'tlul'llll'lll. '['lll'}' drt'w Illdr support from elllcrging prolt'ssional
ILl .... :........ , willie alld llldllw. and IrUIIl 1II'plr.middlt' St'clors c:xcludl'd from tht' circles
III lilt" l.Ulllt'd tl L'uh: ,Jl ....(y. I.t;'d hy ...rt"olt: Ihe Cum,l:rvatives
lor (lrdl'l , II11Jd"1 .11 iOll ..llld ::.t,dJilit y. They upheld II i::.panil: inst ilut iuns,
IlL.. I hu r, II . .tlld IIa')' ,'X prl'::'::'l'll .\u::.pi ... JlHl of prngrts.\ivt;' rerOrlll.
VI.,lllll.. l 1'1 upit'd III Ihe IH20::., alld thl' Libt"rals at Ilrst appl'arl'lilu ]),IV<: the
UPI,,'I hall'l. 1l'lluIJlltlt-d ill Ihl' Ix3Us lIlldcr the ut Jost-
ICd,td .lIflfa..1 IlIell/HI ::,wllldll'rd with llU formal ldlh.:atil)JI. III mid Itl37 he
tldilhd lIlt' gu.d::. "I III:'> 1I111Vt"'lllelJl lh\:' rliJl.\I;l!clllellt ur' tr.llliliun,d judki.lI
1'1' Itl,luJl Iht" l<;tur;'liull ul n:ligiutJ.\ orllt-rs alld l'cdcsiastical privilege, all1J1csl y
1.11' all III ul)[ 1I.llvr.\ il I e:>. ile -:tlld ulwdiellCl' to his autllOrity. Carrera ft'lilaillcd as
Illl' tI'IlIIIJl.1I11 l'if4url' ill l:t'lliral !\rneril';ln pulilka[ till: until his dcath in IH65.
!{UIII,UI I hL'ClllIl,1I1l' lIftili;l[ sl,llL' religiull, priests l'l'g;lilled prult'Lliull
.. I 1I1l' llll,...,I.l'>II .... t1 ,/11""0. ,1Ild l'llllt,llillll was turncd OVl'r Itl lhl' dwnh. Tht.:
tllll'J1I.,ll.llldolll'lllhL' gll,d lJl ami dl.:ddl'd
III 1'lul"Ll Ilid ib...1 It Ill ......11111 II 11lI1l1 il ..... lllUdl the Spanish l..TOWll had dUlll', a policy
Ih,1l Ildp"d Illulollg 1111' lhal pl'rSbled 10 day.
I dl'I.,[ ... bq.!,.lll ,I ,Jlkr lkalh. Bdil'ving in nutiulis of
1)1"gIV.......111.1 dvv,'I"I'llll'lll, I[ley ::'Illlghl to illkgrale lheir COUlllfk::. Willi lhe ft'SI
"I Iltl' \\"dd. lu ,I ... quill' IIII' ll.q'pJllgS o( tlvilizalioll. and tv l)rlllHote Illaleri;d
illq1ltlVlIII,1I1. III tlutl""k thl..}' ::.halnl Ihe of tvkxko\ d'/Ififiro::.. alld ill
p"JIlIl ... lltl'y luJlIl\v,:d tit\' I..X;1l11jllt' 01 Porllrio Ui;lZ-l'stubli:..lJillg what CI/ll!: to ht'
kllll\\'ll w rl'publit',llI Tile)' t:t'nlralizl'd aUlhority. rigged eJections,
,llld kqJI III power luI' I..xlendt,d pt:riods of time. They drl'w dOll1estk
I !llllll tlltI.lJldl'l1 arblunacy alld frulil middlc:seLtvr delllellts. Tht'},
hllgnl ,Ill:>.e aJliallll'.\ wilh lllll'ign illlt'reSIS-Brilish. German, Norlh Arneric:lll.
Till')' .11"'0 Illod"llli/Cd IilL' polite: and luilitary c::>lahl \vhkh tht:}' rout iJldy
uwd Itl Jlllilllidal,' till' ,JPl'tI::.illuJl.
11r", p.llt'llI pI 1"lul I'll :'>iglltlll.UIl :>.u... i,d ,dltl.ltiIJll.\. VVhe:rt: (:UJl5L'rV,llivl;"
1.111...1.11 ,li llll ... li"ll,> Wl'll' ... It',lfl'::.t lliu,llell\ala alld Rka), llll'y It'd 10 tilt'
Ill'.tl"-Il'l.d t'lljbt 01 IhI..' (lI11:'>lIV.tlivtl.lI11ilit-::.. Whert' \Vt'rl' blurred
(lllllhllll".I,>. 1-:1 Sall'a... lllr), d)'llaslit::. Illanaged Iv hallg 011. proved
II' l'l' ,Ill ,.'lUI)1iIIJl, ,I:>' families Ilad managed to t.:onsoHdatl'
lhl'1I Ihl... iliull ill adv.llll .... Cl'lla,li[)' Libaal a:>.ttnd,lI1cy 0pclIl."d
"PPoltllllitil'S to llIiddll" wtlvr alld IwJillos and led tuthe formatiun
,II Ill"\\, dl"':".
III ,lddilillll, LiIl"lill dUllllllaliuli ::.trippl'd II\(: t.:hurch of puwer alill prestige.
TIll' lilliI', h\ I', \IIlUIlli..: Iule was diminished alld its legal privilt'ges were abolished.
1\'> 1/111' hi .... ltlri;1l1 h'tltdd I.ller wrilt'. -Tht' lll;ljllr rule the dl'rgy had played ill fural
("'lllI,tI Allll'1 i"l hc... ,II lie 11I1Jluf. This W,IS Olle oflhe must important changts ever
1<> t.lkl 1,1.lll in Cl'lllf,,[ Aillerita..
n
The llt-JIIis,' of the church lefl all institutioJlal
V.ll Ullll!. II wuuld t.'vl.'lltually Ill lilled, al Il"ast in par!, by a nt'w kind of Roman
Cailloll' (.'htJlLh ill the I.lk Iwl'llti...th t'l'J1tury.
OVERVIEW: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Et:ullumic lkvdopmellts ill CClltr,d AIIIc:rka and till' C.lrilJlllall prudu(nl .1
ClHIllllun lknOlllinatnL Willi few exctptiun:.. such Cusla Rka, cUlllllril'.\ Ill' th...
fegilill furged sodelies." As a rl..'::.ull. tIll')' SII<ll'l'd.1 llu:.kr l)1 ddllling
cllaractl'rislks:
Ext<:IlSivt:.' prodw.:tion 01 t'xport lash crup.\ 011 1.II'14c II/fij/III/fio:>
(a.k.a. h;lCiendas,jiu((/s, tstaln. or plantaliuns)
J\'lubilizatiull (and cOlltrol) of rural labor for harvesting alld rl..'bkd 1.1:>.k....
" COIKelllraliol1 of land ill very fL.w Iiallds
Inadequate l'l11phasi.\ 011 subsi.\II'IlCc' farmillg. uM,ally t.trl ild nul 011 lill}
III i 11 ifu1Itlios
Formalion of ecollomic and sucial where lu..:al dih'S alld lordgn
Ilh'nl'rS could Jive and work ill relalive isul:ttioll hOllithL' 110:.1 SOdel)'.lt Iargt'
PlantatiOiI sucietiL's Wt're highly Untllllal. Iuxul')' ;111.1 IlllVlfly.
They .\t1rvlvl'd in sEllal[ cOlilltriL's wllic.h Iackl'll till' pOI)ulalitlll and rt:.'sourClS to
undertakl' industrial development. They werl' umlt-rdevd'Jped. TIlt..')' Wl..fl eco
HUlllical[y vulllt;'rablt' to UVl'rseas lhallgl's in lllal'kt'l ..:umlilioll.\. But lJe,aml' III
lheir inslitutiunal rigidity, lhey Wt'fl' resistant to changl'. Belll',llh SllJll'1 fki;d
appearances l)fhaflllolly.thl'Y could givt' rbe lu volatile dbl"t)llll'lll.
The Caribbean: Sugar (and More Sugar)
'I'he priJKipal crop in Ille Caribbe'\ll w;.,\s sugar. 011,' uftlle ,'art)' I..xpl'ditiull"; lrolll
Spain brought sugarc;1l1e cuttings frulll lhe Callary all act thai would alkr
llle (lJllrse uf hislvry. Ami ;lIi\:'r the DUl..:h brought Ill'W tl'chllologies frulll Illl'
Brazili;lll Nurtlleastlu lhl' Caribbt'all illtlle lldd-:>.eVl'lllel'lllh lClltlJry. lhe pll,tlll".
lion of sllgucalle explodl'd. II b...GllllC virtu"lly tlJl' ullly tfUP 011 I3ritbh i::.J.llllb.
l'spedally 13arhados alld lamaka, and it was the dunJiJwlIt crop ill Fl'l'IlCh
lllduding Mallinkllle <llld Saint1 >olllillglJC (i.l:', 11;lili). Togdhel", UJIUlIi,d [n.lding:.
ill lhe Canbbeall <.It't'uUllll'-d fur to 90 perLellt 01 '1[1 ,hI' (lJlISlllllt'd ill
eighteellthcelltury Europl'. By the 1740.\, Jalll;li(.1 ,I lid Saill(,J)tllllingul' Wt'l"e lIlt..'
world's largesl producers of suga ....
As production illcrl.'ased. th" Ilet'd lor labur becaI Ilt' a[1 Ihe Jlluft' app<lrl"llt.
African enslavement appl'art:d to provide;l soluliun. began the tragic hislolT
of forced migration frolllihe wt'slern t:oasl or AfriGI. Ofllll' 1010 IS Jnilliun J'lople
who were Sl'Jlt to thl.' Nt'w WorlJ as slavt.'s, approxilllatdy 5 10 7 million fuulld
their way 10 the Co.lribbc<ln-when: they would work Oil plantat ions, alit'!' Ih\:'
radal composition oflhl' urca, and,ultimately, help to establish l'01ll1111'rdal Jinks
with nilldeenthcelltury Europe and the Ullitt'J Stalls.
TIll.: [oosdy organized socil'lies o(tl1e Cl'lltury. dUlllill:lled by whitt'S
and small-household ullils, gave way to ;I strictly urgallized alld hkrardli":;11
SOCiety of masters ,md slaves hy the sevelllt'enih t:"elltllry. Prodll..:tiun was linnly
coni rolled by the mother countries. With the t'xcl:'ption of EllglallJ, l'adl Eurupe"ll
92 l'Aln TWo .. STUDIES: C'IlAN(;E nVF.H TIME
(OUlit ry formed it.s own trading compnny; in nddilion 10 Ihe crlsn dc cOlli rotarioll of
Sp;lill, Ihere wcre Ihe Dutch West Indies l.Omp;llly ;lnti the Frcnch CO/llpagllie drs
Isles d'I\/IIhiI1'u'.
A primary cnnseCjllelhe of these developments wns Ihe crc;llioll of <l rigid
syslcm of r;lclal str;ltiflcllioll. Virltl;llly everywhere pyramid existed:
whiles 011 Ihe 10p, hrowns ill Ihe middle, nnd bl<lcks al the botlo1l1. I\s whiles
returned to l:lIropc ;In,llndians disnppenrecl, the African heritnge became domi-
nant. Tlli,s p<lllern wOllld 11,1\'C long-run effecls on race rcl<ltions in the region and
wOllld sharpl)' (Iisl inguish I hc (:,1 ri\lhe;lll from m,linland areas, stich as Jv\exlco nnd
Peru. wilh lalge and persisting indigenfl\ls Pflpulaliflns.
"lllliher result wns the Imnsforrllal iOll of ollce-diversifled systems of prnduc
Iion inlo single-produci economics, emphasizing sugnr for export. Mnst consu III p_
linn llccds had to he imported-from other islands, from Ihe mninlnnd, 0r from
Sp,lill itself. Onl)' on the smaller islnnds, such as Grenadn, were other products (in
thi" C<lse, coffee) more important than sugar. Since mosl oflhe original populrttion
Il:ld died :lIld Spanish sellicrs did not like 10 work with Iheir h<lnds.l!lc delllnnd ror
Ihrough Ihe eighteenth CCIlIIIl'}'.
Central America: Vital Statistics, 2007
PANAMA NICARAGUA EL SALVADOR GUATEMALA
POpUI.llion (million,,) 3.3 5.6 6.9 13.3
GDr (curlcnl SUS. hillions) 19.7 5.7 20.2 33.4
GNr/C,lpitil (SU.$.) 5510 9RO ]850 ]11110
Poverty I,lle (% in J.OO(i) ]9.9 61.9 117.5 511.8
Ufe l'XPC(l<lIlcy (ycilrs) IS
" "
70
--
--
The Caribbean: Vital Statistics, 2007
,I .. r.ll AII1('r 1\.1 .111,1 tile (.1111>1''-'111 '1 \
Europe,m demand for sllgnr pl'l"Tllitled many oj thc '>I'uln,> 10 Ill.lkc' I.lq:"
fortunes, which the)' IIsed 10 huild great manorial hOllsl''' ;llld If' 1'"1'1 h,l."c .H\ q'I.IIl' "
into the polilic;ll ,mel SOd;l1 life of Ihe Illolher CfHlIllry. Yr-I Irellt h ,IIHI H,ill'.h
colonists never fell at cast' on fhe islands. M,lsl IOllgrd tll rTlllll1 IHll1ll', .111,1. 'rl
fllCt. some went b:lck to posilions of power ,nul pr01l1iIlCIHC. II Ihne .11'1'1".111'.1.1
pbnlatinn Ilrislocraq' in some paris of Ihe Carihhc:lll, il W.l" llol .\ dccply n lllinI "Ill'.
Spanish initialed sugar produllinll in S,1I11n I )tlllling" ill Ill1' \'.Id,
sixtecnth century, when Ihe}' .d!>o hegan illll'orling Aflil.1I\,>1.1\'(''>. 1"0,111111"11 ,:1('\\
slC:ldily over t he years Ilnel cxp:lndcd in I hr- dghh'cnt h {('nllli \". 'Ihe I )ll'lll11i, .111 '>"g,lI
induslry rC'ceivcd n suhslalll ial hoo.'>! in tll(' mid llil1('I"('1l111 l 1'111111 ,..1" .1 I,'.1I1! ,.1
three factors: dvil slrife in (:llha, whkh kd !lOllI(' pl"olllilH'nl 1'1.111(('1 ... 10 1 IIl',kl Illnl
0pCl"<l1 ions In the l){\llliniC,lll J{<opuhlk; W.lt f.l1l' in 1:.111' II 'f', \"11" 11 \\'1 Ii,\ .1 ... 1.1
ti011 on the conlinental sugar he('t indu<;{ry; and the U.:-'. (ivd \V.II. whi, II Hdlh c'.!
sugarcane prodlici ion ill l.nlli"i'Hla and furlhcr l"edlllcd [he lHIIl] 'l'lllion. III I he ,'.ul\-
[X80s:l markcll..l"ash led In n IClllpllr:lry dc\.linc ill Jill' 1i.11"\'!'!>I: II .11,.n 1,... 1l1ll"d III
shrtrp (1lnCeni ration of owncr"hip hC\.'lU"C only tile 1,lrgl:,>1 111;11 ... wer c ,II,le I" ',111 \ I"".
A" prodliLlion nXflv(,l"ed.l:lhnr lor the h.lI \\'011 I.. nil I'l.llll.lll'IlI. \\'.1'.
imported dircl..ll)' frolll neighhoring Il.lili. (:lllltinualil1l1 .. j Ihl'> Ifl'lld \\"uld
provoke sClci:l1 nlld wililin 1)(Illlinican l'l,1.11illI1, IWJ\\CTIl
the Iwo Lfllllliries Iwd Ilcvcr hecll V('f)' gnod: Ihe Ir'.llllll'1l1 "t 111111.111
workers in IIll' Dominican I{cl'"hli( (lilly lIl<ldc IIHllg'> WOI'>". Anli 11.11Ii.ll1 . lill
ment oftcll look Ihe ugly fnrlll of r:H i.d prClllclkc.
As in l.uha, American inv('slors "howing Inlne.'>t ill 11"1111111' .11l "'"g,lI
around Iheturn orthecelltllfY. U.s. military illlcrvcnlilllllrlllli [(Jlt, 1,,1'/21 .... dl'.1
this hil<llerallc1ationship. B)' lhe elhl 01 tIlt' II(CUp:ltion, tWll ,\rn('III.III
crates owned cleven oulnf I he t wcnl}' nnc il/gCl/ins (mill..:) ill the \' 111111 I"V .111, I '1\"\'
oflhe olhers were nwncd hy U.S. citiJ'ell". AIIllI1<;t allllflllllllll.Hl '>11,1:.11 C\I""I"
were solt! on t he U.S. markel. ShoWIl in Hglll e II. 1, I'r' Idll l ll"l1 ( 111111>1" I ,>1 r' '11):1\-


1.2011
I
r
f
DOMINICAN PUERTO
REPUBLIC HAITI RICO
-- ------ ._-
Population (million.,) 9.R 9.6 3.9
GOP (lIIl"nl SUS 36.7 6_' 67.9
hill ion")
GNPlcapit3 (SUS. doliafS) 3550 560 10.950
Poverty fMe (% in 2006) 114.5
Ufe expeC1illlcy (years) 72 60 78
1.000
'00
4110
"'"
o

-,,--==;==-r,--,--r,-,-",--,--",--,--,,--,-------,
llJOO 1910 1920 Ilno l'Mn I'l"!) 1"(,(1
Ye:lr
World Ilank ilnel E(IH1omic ror I alin AmNitil ilnd the Calibbean

Figure 4.1 Sugar Production in the Dominican Republic, 1902-19(,0
( Michael R 11,)lI. 'iu(jm (/11(/ !"(lwn ", IlIr nnfllIlW(/rl 1If'(,"/1I" I nr"I,,';\,I'1. f,,It ,J\ "".t rl"
CWpqJlOIl (,I(lPfWltlI"lrl PIP"". )OOn)
'",,,,1.
'II 1' .. 11'1 IWl' 4 A',I ',Il'llll:-' lIL\Nt,j\I\'l-!t 111\11 'I .. (;.. IIII.II,\IIJt'IIL,1 alld III\.' {:anLJh,.,111 \)5
t 4.1 LllllJhc,J1l wttll United 1920 2000 (dS % of total)
I."". W W,II,,,
I .,., .",,- I h ,t. 111'1"'" " I II nl. \ ,,," 'lly 1(,""" h. !!JU I
EXPOIns IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS
1l.1I1,
,.,
HI S>l 12 "6
61
1),,,,111111,111 I') 1! jH
"
HI 'J',)
Ito'I'I,I!I"
111I"lIf'.h ... , Ill'll! ::.1<',1<1)' 11"111 tltt: I'J,U", Ihmugh lht' IIlL'n :'>tlarl'd
111,\\,.1,,1 III 1.1h' I')',lh, .\ll\'r l Ul>:l. llll.: I )UlIliIl1l.:111 l{t'publJt W;lS lilt.' secolld-
1.1Ig, t I,,"dl",XI III III lhl' L.lIllJlw,tll. Ilardly :lllY III Ill, prufils Wl're
J\lIn k,1 III klv. 1111... W" ... ,Ill ll\t!.tve t'\..VIlOJlI)' pal ,'x\.. ..
II!I 11.1111 ..... wdl IhL' I)Ullllllll,lIl l{q)uhliL, rdiallt.,l 0111111:' J\Jlleric:lIl Jlwrkd
,.v,', t\'" ill T.dllL' '1.1, lltl' U.S. vf Il.titl.lll \.'xporb
Ildlll 11 !,<'lll'1I1 III I\),W III rlx 11"ILt'llt ill 1'-)5U and H(l !Kru'llt by 200U;
"'11I1I1.IIh, tilt U........11,11,' 01 I )111111111\..,111 Iroll1 7\) p,'rc,'1l1 ill IY2U 10 1)7
1"..'ltt1l1 II} 10UII. ... ullled ,I v,'q' largt shalt.' 01 l)UJIlillicall
... ug,1I 1'I\ltludi.1I1 III 11Il' l,llt" 1'),IU:o. ,111.1 ",Jdy ..ICLOlllllillg lor Ih..: low
1'1"1"'1111'11 ,.1 III lll;ll "1:1.) lhe ,.lrly 1\)605. tlte
IJ"1I11lIi.. .I11 Ikl'ubll, h.l ... hdd lh,' !arglst :titIllation vI tit" sligar
IUlIlIIII '111,11.1 "l'ltL' UlIllnl St.th' ... W.I,> Ihe SOUI'Ll:' 1>1 illlportS ill
I.. ,tll ;lltlloUgll tile 1',II['Op",1I1 UIII\III \\'as llIaking lit>adway the tWl'll
Ill'lll t.lIIlL'III.llll'lId.
Abo mall)' lollt't' lllud,'::.t ill ::.ize.lIld tht,y uwn..d h>'
Ccntnl! i\ll1eri":LIl:-i. Foreign illvestur::. 10 play all illlport,llli P.lrl ill \..onl.'e
production ill NiGlraglia. and Gt:rlll:lllS :Klluirl'd substantial alllUlIllb of
growing Ialll! ill C;uall'lll:lla. But in gcneral, coffce prutlud ion rt'lllallied ill I :t'111 ral
/\nlt'riciln llall'!::>.
Though Libt:ral sought tu eJll:ourage illlllligraliull. Celltral i\lllt'fka
llever re.:l'ivetl Iht' kind 01 IllilssiVt', working-class intlux lhat wenl 10 South
AIIll'riul alill lht.' Ullilt'd l.aUur Illr .. LultiV,lliuII iJl::.lt'ad ...:a Il It' frUllI
tlll'mostl)' Intliall and /I/l'sliztl peasanb. Intillll' tlley l'dl ilJlu tW11 groups:
who lived 011 thl.: pl<.llll.l1iulls and SlII,lll plOb n! land (or
cullivatiun, and jUII/(/{aos, day labol"l'l"s who worked ';)1' wag,':'> whik living
IIOlllt' alld contrul 01 SIll:\11 plots 01 lu nd. In eitlltT (ase Ihl')' l",'t'lilll'd dos\'
with lilt' ,'arlh ami rclailwd Ollilol...lks of traditiollal pt:as;lnts, roth..'r 111:111
forging cunsciousness as a rural prolt'tarial.
Although t'ulTt'e prodm:liol\ dOlllinaled Iht' agrkllhural sector III lh,' niH,'
Ct"nlttry, th,' ball.llla trade \VIlllld t'v"ntu,tlly ht'(UIH\.' ,TJlbk'11I:ltJ( UfCl.:lllral
AllleriGlJl ...:ulturl'. It had ,1J1 unlikd)' III IH70 a Ne\V EnglalJd :'>t'a Laptaill
named Lorellzo Bakt:r bl:'gan ::.hiplllents frolll Jalll,lica 10 Ih\.' I:asl of tll\..
Uniled Slall'S, alld years laler he IlJlllld a partllcr to IOJ III th,d Bustoll I:ruit
Company. III (lw JlI,'alltillll'. another investllleni group beg;ll1 banallas
lu New Orlean::. and crt:atl'd lhe Trul)it::!I Trading :Iud Transpurt COlllpan)'. III
IX")') tht' lwo lll"rged to h,nn :l singular t'llt,'IVrisl'; til" Unitt'll Fruit
COlllpany (UFCO). line began a remarkable chaptt:r ill lh\.' histury ul U.S.
ilwt:stlllell(, penetratiun. and (untrol iJI C\.'11tral Allierka.
UFC( >, or III jmli'l"lI (the fruih:ry), as Cellt ral AInITi ....l II::' (ailed It, established a
virtual Illollopoly ull the productiun and tliSlriblllioll ut" bananas. Through gov
erl1111l.'nt and ulher 1l1,'aIlS, the company a(,!uired vas I traL'ls ollalld iJl
lilt' hut. humid, ::.parsd)' sl.'ulcd Caribbean Ill\vbnd::., I( duminated transpurtation
IU:lwurks and owned a major curporaliun, IIl!t.'fIlalional Railways ur Celltral
America. It built dock::. and pun faciliti.:::., and the Tropied I{adio and
'I'degraph ttl jnllt'nt a large numbL'r \II wi,k-ly kllUWII
as lhl' .. t whik and it eXt:l'kd enorllluus inllul.'ll ....e un lllarkl'lillg ill lhe
Unitnl StaleS. UFCO lokrated and eVt'll encullragt..'d sm:t1I-scale t'oll1pdilion, bill
it was Jlt.:vt'r st:riou::.l)' challl'llgl.'d in the decltles after World War l.
'I'll,' b.llwna trade (f(':Ltcd sucidks and enclave par
excellence. UFCO supervisors and managas elllle from th\.. UJli!<.'d Slale::., lIlUSt
llolahl)' rmll\ the South, and black workl'rs wen: imported frum :lIld til,'
'West Indies. One rt'sllit \Vas to the racial..:umpu::.itiOlI of the lowlallli
popuhltion. Another was tu t.::I'l'alc harshl)' t.'nf'urced racial divisions within III
fril/cra itself.
Th\..' illdustry b\..'callle a gianl Ii.lreign (orpllfatioll. SUlllt' b:lllana lands
remained ill locil hands, but UFCO possesst.t1 .... ontrol of Ie...:hnology, loa liS, and
access to the U.S. market. Bl'c:\use of natural threats lrom hurricanes and plant
disease, urea sought to keep substantial amounts of land in reserw, These could
2000 1'15U

Cenlrol Alrlericcl: Coffee Clnd
\Vllil,' ... ugar \"a:o. llll' lllldl"'pllit'd -king'" ill the L.lribbl'.lll, lwo produch
II! dtollllllat, Ilk ill Lt'lIlr,l! i\llll'lica: ullh'l' :lllt! ball:llla::'.
I Ill!.'I,llL'... III 111\ldtklllJlI 11'\1111 v,lliall"'ll::' 111 :o.tJu.d !Jut tilt
"I 11K ... , ... Llt',IIt',l pl.llIl,ltltJll
(:U... l,l I{k.l hq;,111 ..Ill'" prvdullioll ill ::.hippillg I:'Xports
I.. , { 'II tI" .Hld til I:lu Upt'. {;U.II'IJI,da pnJlllpll)' lollo\Vl'd :'>lIlt. a Ill! b)' IK7U tofft'"
\\.1'" Iht" ... It-,uluig \,,xlltllt. ,I 11\1::.i1HHl it IH:ld ever L-.I $:lIv:1dor,
Nl\,lI,lglla, ,llld I 1.. lmllll,' ... jUIJlt'd lilt' ,tilt ... lrad.. ill the and IH80s. Ccntral
:\, Ih'l IL ,Ill ul k,' ""11\ II b II,lVt' nul II> ,'nl>f1lhHI::. -1ll:'VL'f acuHlllling
1"1 1lllllt'lll,llJ Ilt'lll'ullll till' \yUlld :o.lIpply -hut tht')' havt' al\Y,IYs hecll \Jl high
quality
Cl)ll kid Ulll'UlI,llll SJJice it gro\vlI ill the LUtl!
Illghl.llht ,doug til" IIlUUJlt,lill II did Ilut lIecessarily rcquire
u",ulll,lti\1I1 01 IalhlllOlll IOW1.11111 pl',l::',lnb. Tht'['e Wl're :'>uhstalilial l;lkl.:ovcrs in
l ;lIdIL'Jllal.1 :lIld EI S;IIV,ld"l, tllollgh dramatic than what occurred in Porl1rian
MI'X 41. III Nkal :Igll:l, :II It! (:osla Rica, d i::.loGII ions weft' less C1llHlIHlll.
9(1 PART rwn ClIANr.[ oVEH Tnlr
llSU;llly he ohtnillcd onl}' hy gnvernmelll concession. ;1 fnct which rcquircd the
compnlly to cnler polilils. The piclure is cleM: UFCO provided relatively
SC;l1l1 stilllUhl<i; for Central Alllerk;'l's economic clevelnpmenl, hUI hCC;lIllC dire<..lly
inv0lved ill Illallers of .!olnte.
Coffee ;'IIHI dominatecllhe Allleric;ln ecollomy Iurn
of the (ell 1m}', ;lo,::ollnting for around 75 perccnt of the region's lip
through lhc 19:\05 and 67 percent ;'IS late ;'IS 1960. As a result. the economic
fortunes nf Central Alllcrica hecnll1c extrcmely dependent on the vagaries of the
inlcrnalinn,d lIlarket. \Vhcll cllffec or hanana pril.:es were down, l';lrllillg, were
dowtl. ,1Ild thcre was lillie room for Ocxihlc respollse- since coff"e and h:lIl,1I1n
pl;l1llalioll!\ could nol he easil)' or <juil.:kly convcrted 10 producing basic f(lodstulb
(assul1ling Ihat Ihe owners w;lnted to do 5n. which wns Iwrdl)' the L.ase). II wnrth
noting. IOll,thnt coffee (onsislently ronned a largel' share of exports Il1nll hallall<"ls.
:l1ld UFCO could not cOlltrol Ihe coffee market. In strict elonomic terms, only
C:OSI;l niGI. 'londur.I!\. and Pnn;lma were "h;lnan;l repuhlics. FI
Salv<1dor, and Nic;uaglla were m;linly corfee countries.
1\ ... \\'ilh (:'1rihllC;l1l coffeeball<"lna slrategy led 10 heavy reli;IIKe Olltf<'llic
wilh :1 o;ingle pnrtner: the United Slalcs. In the !:lIe nineteenth <'Ind earll' twenlicth
cClltmies, C:entr... 1 Amcricn h<'l(1 :1 flourishing trade with ElIfClpC-(;Crmnnl'. in fact.
W.IS Ihe coffee cmtOlller. But ;lfler World War Ilhe Uillted St;ltCS ;l<;serted it"
!\uprenl.lcv. From Ihe 1920.. through the 19505, Tahle 4.2 demonstrates. the Unitecl
St;lles ptlrch:l<i;ecl60-90 percent or the region's exports ;lllct provklcll a simil,lr sh;lfe III
imports, The North American predominance in intermltiollnl transactions fnde<1 to
'10-(-,0 percenl hy 2000 for lllo"t coulltrics, but the Unitcd SI:lte" still had considerable
cOlllmerciallcver:lge over naticlllS of the isthmus.
\'\'ithin these broad analytical contexls. geopolitic,,1 ;Inc! economic. we now lurn
10 the Ilislorical development of select('d countries. In Cent ral Allleric<l. we f(lctls on
I'anamn. Nicaragun, EI Salv;ldor, and GU<l.ICIll:lI;l; in Ihe Cnrihbean, we deal with the
Dominican Repuhlic. II<"lili, :lIld Puerto Ric0. (We cover Cuba in Chnptel' 5,) Many
Table 4.2 Central American Trolde with the United States, 1920-2000 (as % of total)
1920 19S0 2000
EXPORTS IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS
Costa Rica 71
"
70 67 52 53
1 s",lv"dnr 56 79 86 67 65 50
(,uatemal.l 67 6\ 88 79 57 35
Hondul.ls 87 85 77 74 39 '6
Nicaragu;l 7R 73
"
72 3R
" Pan<llfl,l 93 73 RO 69
"
33
S('>UIH'\' W. Wilkie.SIn/lIhO (1IlllNnr,nnflIPnlky(l os Anqp'e\. UCLA I ,11," Afll('liCilnCrnlCI. 19741,
Inll'lIig"nle UIlII, Country RellOlIs, 7()(1l.
I .. ('rllll.,1 1\1111'1" ,I .1I11111w l ,II ,I,h, .111 .. '
of thcse nalions enlCrgcd ;IS pnllol}'piGII pl,llIlal ""I ,111.1/,'1 ('II' 1.1\ C ."1" wt 11 ....11 "II"
li,lie or <lnllihef, <III rclllhc twav}' II:lIUllll\lllnll.lllpl,wn.
POLITICS AND POLICY: PANAMA
;\s Ihc United St;ltes heg<ln lIexing lis Illll.. dc<i; on the intern,IIIIln.1I "U'lh" thl' 11I, 1
COn<i;piCUlltlS sign of its expansioni<i;l leal, :1111(' 'I I I III cllo"I .. t '1111 .. 1111' I ., . 111,,1
hetwecn Ihe Allantic and P;lcifil IllC.IIlS. I'!.m.. f"1 ,Ill 1111('Hh ('.1 lilt 1.111.11 1111"'11'1.
Central Amelica wcnl ha... k;l<" Ihe .. n.'llllTlllh lentlll)' III lX,X IIIl' ,:"\'111
Il1cnt nf Cnlnlllhia :lllthorii'cd ,I h Clll h I on""1 I II IIII I II .1 lIllIle I Ill' '"J:1t I!.
llorlhwcst(,l"nmost provilliC', in wl1<lt b now kllll\VIl ,I" 1',111,1111,' t 1,"-_ .'l1j:llh('I ..
tended 10 l<lvnr Nicaragua, .llld .1 Ntlrth 1\ ItH'1 il.lll Ill'" In l'iv.',l ,1 l' '1111 ,Il I II, ',I,ll I
exc:w:ltion!\ ill thaI Ctll1nlry. (:Plllpetilioll ,,11111' II' .1l1"lhl wltll 11l,'fill.1I1, I.tll'.llll'
of I R9J. whell h(1lh grnllps rail nlll nf 1ll01l<')' ,llld qUlI
Turn-of-the twenlielh ('IlIIlI'V W.I" III'IlI'II.t'lI' .... Ildl'lllllllPI ",
cllh<llH.C il .. positioll 011 thc wllrlll I\lId III "'III I. I.d I" ,,,I.. ...1" I I"
lullur/lff' of .')ra ]10\1'('" "/11111 1I,.(J.,r" (I HI)j). lilt, III"'." i.lll 1'111,111 ,.. 1 Altll',1 11.,1\"
;-'lahall fOl"lcrnlly Ih:ll n;w:l1 pow(', W.I<; IIll" k('\, In 11111'1 ".lllllll.11 HIII"'11l " ,
doctrine requiring a two Ille,1lI nav}' lnl Ihe llUlled .... l.lk.. "lIet 1111',,,1"11
hec.lme pre"idclll III l(jnl. II W.I" dl.lr Ih.11 \".",IIIIl,:I"" ""111,1 11I,d I" ,I
nU1\'('.
A.!o will he explained in (:h.lplcr 7, (-lllllmhl,1 ,1'"lle,l .. 1",1111, .11
'Iruggle Ihnl lIdlllinalcd III thc "\V:lr uf Ihe'l htm,and II;1r" (IKI'" 1'10 \-.11",
fight ing was IlParing ill' l'nd. di"11:lIChnl 'I '\111" III lilll'll I II'" 1111.'1 III till'
provincc of I'<l.n<lllla. 'rhis rcStllled in;l diplnm,lli( Ili .. l<; wllllh /'\('11111.111\, 1'1"
dllced the Ilay-Herr;in TI'C'nl)'. <In agreelllcnt perlllitting the l hnh'cl :-Ot.lIn, tn IHuid
a GlIlal through Panama. The U.S. Congress cagnl}' apprllvnl I IIf' dn, 1I1111'nl 1>111
the (:lllonlhian Icgis!;llure, Illlwillill/4 III CC1lllpJ'llIni"l' 11,llil.tl,II"II\'('IClt:ll1\'. II I"" ,j
10 alollA.
Thc next step was instln('tlillll, \"!jlh ]{ooscvclt'<; filii knowlcll):,', .1 I 11'lll 11
enginecr named Philippe Blln;lU-V:lfilla "I,I 1'1 I'd 1:1}'llIg pl.u" lnl .1 "I'p, ...lll',1
rebellion in P;lnalll<l. I\s the Ilprising hCAall, lJ.S. <i;hlp" PI,'\Tlllcll ( 1'!'"I1I'I.111
troops from crossing Ihe i"thlllll' 10 !'<In.lm;} Cil}'. Till' rev.. 1t W,I<;.I
\oVithin d<l}'s. \oVashillgton exiendcli rccogllilillll 10 Ihe '1<'wl\' "'<l\'(,I"l'lgll
emlllellt of Panama and rc... cived Hllllnll-\',lnll,1 (.!olill .1 1lcnlh 'Itl/('II) .1 .. II'
official representative. U.S. senelarl' of ..laic- John 11.1)' anel Bun.HI \'.11"I11.1 h.I .. llh
signed <I giving Ihc llnitc(! SI;llrs conlrol of n lrll null' wltl(' I .111.11/1111"
perpetuity...as if it werr 1\ pllallt 1':1II:llllalll,1I1 """11
approved the docuTllent. BIIIl:lu-Varilla <lnd :llllllilll .. lr.llion Itlhhvi<,l<, 1111 Jl
turned their allention to the U.S. Senate. where pro Nic;u.lgll;l ....c!lliuulIl W,I'
still fairly strong. On the morning of Ihe dc-cic;ivc vole. HII ll:lI I V.mll . p1.h I,d I'll
each senator's c!c!\k;l Nic<lmgtl:lll post:lgc SI;lIllP (Ic-pit ling.1 V/lI,.H1I1 '1111111"11, ,Ill' I
I he silenl rnes"age look hol<1. 'I'h" Sen;llc :ll'pftlVnlt h(' 1ll ......\lII .. hv .1 (,/l 1,1 /11,1 I,1:111.
and Ihe die W;lS C<'lSl.
,)X 1'.\1111\\'1'" I ,\ ... I ... IIJIJII ... lllt\ ,.1 (1\'11< rJi\11
I" .. lllhh...1l1 "")
.lhOUI II::. Lap.H:lly lu In,II11I.lill AddlllHlI.d 10,-11::"'d
011 ::"'curily, .lila Ih, Url';.lklltnvn III 1')l)M 01 nq;oli,llltlil'> IlIr Illl' pU::'::'llJlc
l r'.lllnn of ,I U.S. k-d .ll1lil1.In.:OI it ::'l,'llkr ill Pall.llll.1 (whilh wlluld 11.1\," r"lluirc(1 .1
mililary Sud) f.... :1r::. bt'GIIIIl' allllll' llIurt.' Intllb.: ;llkl IIll' S'jJlt.'lIlbe:r
II. 2UOI, VII Nl.'W Yurk :llId \V.l::.hingltill. un,HI::',' lhl' P,III.II11.1 C.Il ..t1
10 I'rovlCk .111 inviling IMgt.'! tur IUrllll'r 1"'rrt)li'ol ... IlIIt ..
1\ dl',-bivt: viLlur)' vllhl'l'0pulist MartinI'onijv::. 1lllllljllnult.:llll,d dl',11I111
"llUU4 did lillk- Lu 'Is::.uag" Iht.::s.... l;ulluwlllg pUllll'-::' ::'111111.11 10 tlll):'!1..' 01
his falher, Turrijos ::.uppurtnl lhl' (allst: vi indqlt:lld':llo.." IUf lJut:rto Rko alld
l'x!t:ndt'd :1 hand to Cuba. AI tht: ::.<lllW lilli,'. his illilialnl .1
1'.1ll;l11l.1 C;mal t'xpausioll prujl'o..l Iv dvulJl ... Ill ... t:.!J>allly .Intl .dluw
Imllk, All alJlupl shifl in polilical dire:clioll oct'llrrnl in 2009. as t-nHlOllllC
allxlelks It:t! v01l'rs Iv dt:cl It)l1::.,,rv.Jliw lllttllilllilliull;lil'- Ricardo M.Il'lindli
,\ ttl ,'llgllIl.:t'llIlg. IhL" !'.IIl.IIII.ll:.tll.a! Upl'llL"d in 1t,J)tl .IIIJ UIlIIH..
\1I.lld} hl.: ... IIIII.'.1 111.1)01' IIlI,,IIl.llilllhtl w.lkIW.I)', Tht.' C;:IlI.l1 Zun...- 1.:"...11111; a Je fat:lu
ll ... \'ll'IlI}, .111 .111.'.1 \11 kg.I! ;Illd ,-tIUnlfy,dub prospl'rily 111:11 ::.Iuud ill
,UII'>l'hWIU,> ,,01111.1,>1 lu IlIl.d :'tl... d)'. ()ubid,- Ill" Zoo...-, Pallillll.lllt:vdup"d
lll.ll.h.. I..II ... II ..... 111.11 1)'J'il'it.-d 1\'IlII.IIAllllTica .1::' a wi lull.': ,h.. pendl'IKC Ull agril:ul-
lUI.L1 ""P"lh .. lally b,IIHlIl:l::.). I'di.l ilL..' nil lilt: U.S. markt:t, <lnd dOIllt'::.lil.:
,-.lIlI11lIll)'.l Ilghlly kJllllalltlnl olig.ll'dl)'. Thi::. ::.ilmtliull (ould nul 1.1::.1 fun;,wr.
II \,.1'" 11./1 Uillil lIt, J),5I1::. tll.!I.1 lllllilaf)' Illl'::'ldt:1I1 of Panallla, Culund JU::'l'
:\1111111111 1<:."1111111. nJ Iht: Il)U3 IrL".lly, Thn'" year:-. la1l'r hb
dl"l h "''>ldlnl III .111 .lgrt:'lu'-lIl 111.11 11Il.!t:..I:-'I,.d Iht. ,1lI11uily l>.t),... hk 10
tllll,ldnl lJ..... lIIID:n::.. ,tlld soughI 10 nlu.llize: w.lge rale::.
Itll lUl lh AlIll'lI... IlI:-' ,Ind j'an,llll,lIll.llb. BUI 111...- (Iu..:stiun of sovt:r...-ignly \Vas left
llllltl\lLltnl. It l.IIII,- up ill 1956, .llllr l:gYPl'::. uf Ih..: SUt'7. When
1{ll,lld'l Ari.I!'o billl'II)' Ilrule:::.kd Ilan.llllas t.xdusion frum a 4.-onfen'nc.,..
"II III,' lJi:-.i .... .....l.lfy III JIIIIII Fo::.kr froslily Ihal
Illlllni 1I,h..1 t,1 ::.uv,-r,'il4llly UVI'I' Ihl' IJ.lllalllOl Callal ,Iu thL" l'nlirl'
.. il!11 tIl Ill, l{q)ubIlL III l'.tll.ulla 1)/ ;:Ill)' such suvt:reigll righl::., pow.:r, ur
.lIllh, .,11) ...
'1,'11"11111" 1'1'0\' .Hld kll HI :-.uh:-'I,.'tIU,111 )'t:.II"!l. Tht: dYllalllk::. dlangL'd ... lilr a
d ..,.. II'11i ill 1")6K, wllt'lI 1'.II1.lIl1a\ N.llloll.1I Guard sdzt:d powl'r and
1IIIIIlni ,I I tlhllg 1lII1l,I Illakl HI 1).;,,,11"1 I it'lIt'r.d OIll.lr Torriju:-. I it.'rrlr,l. Thh
111.111..",1.1 ,1.. ,.If .1 ......lliull hy til" N,llltHI .. 1<;u.lld ufh"'g"lIlony III polili..:::., III.:d 10
Ih..- \.'111"1 g\'IIU' til lorn},,::. .1::' Iii,' 1I.IIHln'::. ::.lronglll:lll. And it yiddl.'d tuntinuil y in
,>hip, :-. ., til III""> p.al klllly wilh Ihl' Nixun. Furd. and
1..llkr III Iht: Urllkd
'1 iI .., 1I1l1lni fill.illy OllU'plt'd .1 tr".lly ill Iht' 197U:-. thaI provided lor
1',11101111.1111.111 vvc::r tli,' ldllal hy IlJl)t,J, Runald Reagan and
1111"'1 "IIl .. d('lliHllllnlllli' agn.:l'lIh:lll a sellout,
blll I pl":-'ld"l1l JlIllIIIY ( ';11 h'r l'v"llluaJly uhlaillt:'d St.nat..: appruval.
111.11 ....\lld !'>Idll'::.lllt'll Ihrotlghuul 11I1.' hlllIbphl.'re applauded Ihe mOVe.
Ilow"v"1 Illld!). Lllin i\llll-Il ...lli Id,llioll::' luuk.t pusilivt.' turn.
Pll.. pIUdUL"'d hulh t:ulIlinuily and t:hangl'. In f\lay 11)99,.1
... k.llure:d k.ldlllg lOIlIl'IIJ"rs frum Iwo prolllin":l1l lamilic::.-
t\1.111111 III,' ::'\111 uf {lm,lr Turrijos, and Mosco::.o. thl' widuw of
,lIIHlh,-r hllllla In .. wh.11 of a ::.urprbt', Moscu::.o triumphed wilh
1, l)l'IL"11t tlllllL" VIJh::.,llJmp.lrnl Willi 3H pt:rct'llilor Iorrijo::. pl'rcelll for a
1I111d I'Ll\.\.' ...lndld,Ilt.'. (TillS 1I1,lde.: lhl' firsl WOlllan ill
Ill::.lul y III 1'.111..1111.1 ,llId only Iht.' WUl\lan anywhere in Lalill America to
hn.olllt.' I'lnid"lll hy dirl'L1 t:kdiulI,)
11111::.1 illlllll'dl,lk t.!1a1l':lIgl wuuld conCI'l'1I Ihl' l'alWIll .. Callal.
... III Inl111 IIII,.' Unikd St:Jlt.':-. 10 Panama al the.: cnd of IlJl)9. As
... 11 .. plud.llIllt.'\llll IIl'l viclufY sl'l't:lli, an: guing Iu shuw Ihat WI,.' C;ln rUIl Ihe
.. ,111.11 .... \HII .1:-' II", AII,,-rit.:alls Jid." And whilt' tht're was lilllc doubl about
1'.111.1111:1' .. 1..,.. hllh:,,1 ahility lu rndll.lgl Ille.: W,llt.'l'way itself, Ihere arose concern
If
Operation Just Cause
fn((IUIl belw...lll "dll.lIl1o! ,.IlId till' Ul1lll'll h-\Urld( I:.'d HI lilt.'
5tlOlltll11<lrl OnM' TOllIJtI:, lhl:'d III <In .ulpl,lllt' (1.1\11 .1111.-1 w \ (t:"ld.... t.J Ity
Lelleral M.,llu",1 Alliullio N(JfIega, Widely Icpul",d 10 I)L' Illvulvt.'d III Ulllg-It::J.JIt:'d
corruption. {lIe IIdd abo bet:'ll.l pall lllllt;' aCJlnt f(1l th... AlJldnl y
IlIAJ.) P,1n,lllldlli,1I1 lMlIOll,.ll'>ll1 tlelled Wll ... 11 IJ1... NOllltI,1 1.,IU';\>ltlu
1t'Ill:'W the blldler,ll ,lglt:'t"IIlt.'1l1 lUI opelaiion 01 tht- ',)( hool ot IlIl' 1\1111'11I.,\: ,I U'"'
IlnaTlced ,111ddllt'<kd lldltllllg Ih.., 1.111I1 Allll'l1ldll "'llll,lIy
Alltl AmCllldn leeling dYdln Itl 19tW. WItI:.'I1 Pr",Sld... llt Ll'VHJe II. W
,Ill t.'"Conoml.. boyc..Olllll.1II dlUlI to NOII'-"Y.J.J':> p,,1t ullin- 'W.ll
on dlug':>: The followlllg yt.''::11 NOrle<J" annull..>(1 decllon,> appillt!'lIt1y won by
Guillellllo Endald, leader of an OPPosllloni::;1 '(lVI( (lu\ddl:'- Ihe <.1103101
ship, and the Uniled Stille,:> lightened lhe ':>CltW,:>. III Ol'(t:lnlx'l 1t)H') till:' limll
'Op':ld1l0n )USI Willi lltOle 1I1<.l1l 2U.UOU U\, llOup"
<lnd exlt.'nSlvl:.' dell,,1 bumblng, 111'" ov... lwlldnw(1 I'dl1.'"l<.lIlIdll
It.'sisldlKe Lllid (aptuled NOliegd hlllls... lr t.:akllig 11il1I tu M",lnl. Whtlt. Itt:' wuuld
s"md Ilial fUI alleged complitlty III dlllg IrdlfKkllllJ. U.':., UlflUdb It:pollL"d Ih,ll unly
IWl'llly ttHee Amellcan had 10SI lhell IIVt .., but would 1,, 1011
IlIlUlllg lht;' de.llh 1011101 Pdll.lIll,.III,IIl':> k,>lIll1<lI .. 1.-ullJ",d 'IUlit
\INel.ll hundled 10 [(01l01ll1( ddnl.ll)e,:> hom Ih.- 1l1V,ISIOllllldy
havt' been as hIgh as S2 llllllon,
Mdny Pdl1dtlli!man... lllllldlly AIIl('1It ,UI IIOUI'" Willi bUI
Ut.."'<dlli(' dlsenchdllkd.. As .l lesull of llit.' dlld lilt:' till:.'
Ildllon.:al plodll(l Shl.;ll1l.. by 22 IlI:l(1:'111 lx-twl't:rl 19ts8 dnd t:.Jlty J'J'J I PU111l1.l1
fOI new prCSl(hml. by th: Unllt:'d llt:c..Illll:.'d hUIlI IJ
peICem In IIl1d 198910 17 pelumlill M,uth 1991 All Oppo,>IIIOll p.llly Ihl:'
plt:'Sldt:n1 of wllh mtlll:Y laulldt:llllV llll' 1t"'HJI:" lhtll
Ihe h.::td lIsed 10 jmtlfy liS IlIth... III'>t pl,'(t:"
II
100 "ART TWO e CAS I STUPlfS: CHANGF. ()VFR '1111.11'
POLITICS AND POLICY: NICARAGUA
\Vhatever might portend, olle fOlet rell10lined cT)''''OlI-deal':
1'00n:lma\: CC(lIlOIllY remains Iighlly interl wined with thOlt of the United
For mllch of its histoq', Nicamgua has been a pawn of olltside powers, especiOllly
the United Stales. During the nineteenth century it received unceasing Oltlention
fmlll Olvaricious advellturers. many of whom sought 10 huild Ol canOlI. and il
cndured the brief bUI ignominiolls presence of \OVilliam Walker. The pallern
would continuc illio the twentieth
Washinglon developed a strong dislike for Jose SOlntos Zelaya. the chelator
who h;1(1 slOlunchly resisted foreign control in ncgoliOl(ions over <1 G1Il0l1 route. In
1909 7.dOlya (lrdered th(' exeCllI ion or two North Amcrican ;1dvcnt urers. Secrcl3ry
Geographic and economic considerations had long stimulated interest in Ihe iclE'i'I
of an intcrocei'lnic 101lie Ihrough Central America. Having failed 10 discover a
system of lilkes and rivers connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbe<ln Sea,
plannels and visionaries pondered the possibility of an isthmi<ln canal. Because of
its extensive l<'Ikes and the San Juan River, Nicaragua seemed a natural site for the
canal project and in late 1849 Cornelius Vandelbilt and his associates sc<:ured iI
concession from a liberal government. Intrigue lapidly thickened. Cosla Rica
claimed jurisdiction over the proposed terminus at the eastern end of the loute
for the canal. Hoping to block their U.S. rivals, the Bfitish supported Costa Rica. By
18S3 Conservatives had gained power in Nicaragua. and. without conceding
territorial rights. they chose to take sides with the British.
Frustrated liberals turned 10 Ihe United States for help. What they got WilS
William Willker. the glib and intellectually girted son of an austere. frontier-fund",-
mentalist f;unily from Tennessee. As a young man, Walker studied medicine in the
United Stiltes and Europe. then took up law in New Orleans. Under a contract with
the liberals, Wetlker hired a small army and invaded Nicaragua in 18SS. He seized
one of Vanderbilts passenger vessels. won if quick victory. named himself head of
the armed forces, and senled in as the country's authoritative rule!.
The U.S. government took a permissive view of these developments, openly
tolerating intervention by a North American citizen in the affairs of i'lnother state.
Wi'llker staffed his forces with veterans from the 1846-48 war with Mexico.
accepted Sllpport from V;mderbilt's business competitors, and invited migr",nts
from the U.s. South-who brought slavery along. Opposition mounted from the
Blitish and from Conservatives in other states, however, and Walker was driven
from power in 1857. He tried to return and met his death in 1860.
Thus ended the -Nation'll War: an event with long-lasting implications. It
discredited both the Liberals ilnd the United States and helps explain why the
Conservatives stayed in power much longer in Nicaragua than in other parts of

of SI:lle Phi);tndcr C. Knnx <!ellOlIlHcd i'.da).1 .1" M. I hl'll "II Ill .. 111 .. 1,11\ "I III'.
nnd cxpellctl rrolllllw \ lnll,.1 .... III
U.S. support for nn :lllti i",elnya revolt hC'lped ron e Ill(' prr"idrllt I" rC'-IJ:lI
Fin;IIH.:ial Ch:HIS ensued. F.llfllpe:lll hegall /klll.ln,llll/: p.l),lllllll 'HI
their dehls. In dcspcrnl ion. the new prcsidenl. ( orlscTv.II iVt" 1\, I, flf" Ili.I/ .. l ... k,-, I ! III
Uni!c.:d Slnles 10 send milil:lf)' nid In pnltect Norlh AIllC'rH.lll ../,In'lllli, 1111,'1,.1.
rrol1'1lhe Ihre;11 ofdvil war within NiGlr:lgll:l alHll"l'\.I"IHI ,1<" 1'f1"n 11"111" .111,11"
inhahilnnto;: or the repuhlic" Prco;:idcnt \VilIialll I I"\....nIII '1 .111 1'1<11111'11\ .11"'1,'1< 11,,1
Ihc nl<lrincs. A pl:lIl fnr li<; .... ,ll r('((IVel}' nhl.I"wd.1 gll.II.lnl/, 11'"11.1 N.,\\ 1"11
hnnking cOIIglomerale. whit.h received / pnll 01011 he n.11 HIII.tI h,lld, .In, Ilh.. 1,111".1\
as sccurily on ils invcslrllClll. l'olili\.dly ,llIo! C<,,1l1l"IIlI111y. NII.II.I;, ... 1
hec<llllc OJ fllll.nedgcd prnlCL!orate of 111(' lJllil,'" """1 It.., '1111<' "'lhllll'HI 1.1.r,,1
\1nlil 1933.
In the mid 1920s .. di<;pule nr,,"e over 111(".. lIlcl1tl.1I '.11\, '-"''''''11 1111 I fl1llo,1
:-'t;1teo;: imposc(llhe Irll<;l}' Allolln Pi.l:! ;111tl.lgll-nllo <:111'''' \1"'" 1'1'\ "HIlIII' 1"1" II' 'II
,\" :l rcqdt of Ihis ("('IllI'I"lUlli"c..1 Ilher.11 ll.lll11d 111.111 Itlllll.l.l ..... h .1".1 I,. lIllt
president in and (":1I1ed fm wilh,h.l\\.11 "I II ..... /1""1'" lilt' Nn\ 1,,,1
hnllkcrs h<1d alrc3c1y rCltwt:rcd Iht'll inn... 111l("1l1. ,lIul 11,llIkltn Ikl.lll" It, ...., ..II
wns ;1boul 10 proclaim Ihe Good Neighh",. p<lllcy. III 1'1\\ Ihe 11I.11111'-" I,ll
NiGlrngua.
BUI Olle I.ih('r:ll activist. J\llgu:-:'lo (:csar :-'.l1ulillcl. rC'lll<;l-d I...111111,' 11\ lilt'"''
A rcn'cnt patriot. n 11.ltion"li"l. ,lilt! a ..od:-.I modcl.1I('. h.lol
waget);t ;lg:lin"l U.S. inlervclltltlll .'Iltl t"II.lI"'I.III"11
As he g:linell :l wl(ksprc:ld popular follOWing. Ihe t IllilC.! "11( ... \\ UIII(d .lbolll Ih,
presence ofleflist<; .. mong his sllpporler" nnt! deplored t I 1\.1.1I11l(... III 1"111 111 Ih.
CiHllpaign against him. Aftcr the dcpartllrc (If Amcnl.111 1111 ... \,IIHhIH'
llle{'t wilh S"c<1sa in onler In p{',ltl" Altt'l 11\1" 1'1 .... 1,1, 1111.11
p;tlace. Snndino <1nd hi" Iwo milit<ll)' ,..des were .,rllcd hv 1l11ll<H111Col "III,"'" 1tl,I
exccilled. A genuine natioo;11 hern. !-i,IIHlirll' IHm' hn .IrnC.1 In.llIYI ..... \\",11
The Nntioll:ll Cllnrd therc:-.fter hc.... allle Ihe d<l11l i11:-' II I 1<\1\1' IT1 II .11.'):11.111
politics. At ils he;1(1 wns (;cn('l",11 An,I ... !a<;io r I.It ..... m"I.1 (,.11. I." . 111Ihl" .. .
Iyrant who had given thc order t(1 ex.... ""l(' I Ie- ('\'Cnlll.llk Illl .. I ',.h .1' .. '
and took over the pre"itlellcy in 1937. Alllas... lllg ,m CllOll1ll\I1" Inllllllr 11'1 111111",11
;1nd his f;tlllily. SOIllOz.n promoted Ihe nat inn's et <lllPIlli\. gl ,,\\1 h. "1l"llU.l ,dlr.llll 1"'-
with the Innded elite. and as"idllOllSlr culliv,lled Slll'\'j'll 11'1111 lilt' II ..... ):"\'111
Illen!. lie \\'as shol by all nssassin in 1'):'6 anti l'Il"lwd I" :1 hn"l '11.11111 Ihl' ,\ Illn I' .111
coni rolled Pilllallla l.ilnOlI /.one. Ever graldlll rc II" :-" 111111/:1'" 1.111111 .1111 h "I II 11111 111'11 I.
U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower "clll hi"'I'el""IIl,11 <.Illg,'lll I,. Ily 1'1 '..1\" III'
dictator's lire. Somoz., nonctheless succlll1lhed.
The family enterprise ('ndurec!. The cider son, Ill'" I )ch.wk. WIII1
rigged elections for presidenl in 19:'7. A II"Il"ted L11l1il\' ,1"""\ 1,llc. Ikllt' .... hl\ k.
nssumed orfice in t963. Power then passcol.llhe ""Ill. ,\n., .. la"'I" \'lllltl/.1
Deba)'k,:l West Point gr:ldualc nlld.like 111<; lalher. hC.I.! ,,{ II ... N.lll"ll.d (011.11,1
Sclr*seeking :Inc! corrupt. Slllllr):!a clamped .111 ll"llll lldl' /Ill Ill!' '''111111\, hill
II
The William Walker Affair
IO..! 1't\wrT\VO 0
...\' ... vlll'lIllcd thvug,htflll Nkaragu"lIls by his excesses. Particularly unsdtling,
WCfl' rlllll\JfS that Ill' l'xtral'tnl massive profits from the rel."onstruction of Managua
alkr a devastating earthquake ill I
Thc l.Ulllpktl' uf represciltativc institutiuns meant lhat effective
(IppuSiliull to SOlnoza could tah' only one form: armed resistance. In the 19605
a gUt'rrilla lllt)vl.'lIlent Taking their name 1'1'0111 Augusto Cesar
Sandinu, divt'rgl.llt l"ur(l.'s combincd their erfurts to form Ihe Sandinista Natiunal
J iUl'ratiun Frunt. I\ftl'l' years uf bilLl'r struggle. the SOllloza regillle suddl.'nly
in 1(J79.
ill 195Y (:uba, Wasil illgtun now confrontcd a thuroughly 11l1We!Lomc
dl'vl'lol>illl'rlt: llle triulilph ura leftist revolutionary movement. Given the logic of
Ih... Cvld \'\'al", this was a thl'eatl'ning-and potentially unacceptable-turn of

The S.llldinistas prodaillied two broad policy goals. One called fvr imple
lIh:lllatJOIl ul an "indepl'ndl:nt and nonaligned" foreign policy. which me..ll1t no
1lI1)l'l' SUblllis:.ioJl to the Unikd States. The other envisioned the creation of;\
w11lixed l"l.tJJHJJll}'" ill orcla to ;Khieve balanced development and socioeconomic
jmti..:l. Tlw}' abu atlackld sll(h fUlldamental problems as illiteracy, health care,
and h) education. Their economic task was paradoxically eased b}' the
1lI.lgnillld.... \If the Sl)Jlluza falllil}' fortune, which included about 20 percent of
l.ulIlllrfs cultivabll' land. This made it possible 10 nationalize these holdings
.wd ulIdt'fl.tke 'Igr"lriall rdonn without provuking diehard oppositiuJl from an
landed aristocracy,
Thl.' llloCW gOVCl"lllllloCllt at IlI'SI recdwd t'ncouraging signs of illtl'rnational
The}' solicited help from the United Slates, tinder President Jimmy
(:arkr. wI IV initially rt:spvll(kd with a $75 million aid program. Far more sub-
:-.Ialliial support GllllloC from \oVestern Europe-especially western Germany,
hall..:.... and Spain. Tht' Suviet Union extolled the revolution and intensified
(virtually IIUllexisknt) culllll1erd,d tics. but offered little hard-currency assistance.
In the llieantilllc. the Sandinistas wdcollled approximately 2500 Cubans (the
1.\llJnt W.IS carcfully monitort'd by the CIA and State Departmenl)-doctors,
sclluul!l'achers, sallitury engineers-to help raise basic living standards,
Cuhan JIlililary, police, <llld intelligence pnsonnel also arrived to protect the
against what the Sandinistas (,llld Cubans) were convinced would be
attacks frolll within and without.
Euphoria did not last long. In the United States, the Republican Party electoral
platforlll ur 19XQ furmally Milrxist Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua:
and tlit: I(cagan administralion thereafter launched a campaign to undermine the
Sandinista goverJllllent-imposing a trade embargo, authorizing clandestine CIA
attacks, and resorting 10 psychological warfare. Perhaps more important, the U.S.
gowrnllll'llt supp0rlt:d and funded a counterrevolutionary exile army (k.nown as the
cOlHmanded in large part by fonner Somoz.a army of-ficers. Although the
COlltras llll.'t with limih::J lIliJilary success. they forced the Sandinista government to
spcnd half of its tutal budget 011 defense. Partly as a result of these factors, the
" 0 Central America alllllhc Carihbc;1Il 103
t'conomy went into serious tailspin. Output declined by tl perct'nl in 19M7 and M
percellt in 1988, when innatioll reached the unthinkable h:veJ of 33,000 percent!
III this context, elections took place in 1990. With lJ<lnid Orlegil as their
candidate, the Sandinistas confidcntly anticipated victory. At the head of an
opposition coalition (UNO from its Spanish initi<lls) was Violeta Barrios de
Chamorro, the widow of a distinguished journalist who had been assassinated by
somocisla henchmen in 1978. To the surprise of most analysts, UNO captured 54.7
percellt of the vote, against 40.8 percent for the Sandinistas. At t he urging of Jilllllly
Carter (present as all international observer), Ortega made a gracious concession
speech.
Chamorro proclaimcd all end to the fighting and, at inauguration,
announced an "unconditional amnest( for political crimes and an end to the
militar}' draft. Shc was nonetheless unable to consolidale her political base.
Assisted by over $860 million in direct foreign aid and more than $200 million
in debt write-offs. Chamorro's ('(onomic team managed to bring down inflation.
but overall growth remained sluggish. Unemployment rose from 12 percent ill
1990 to 22 percent ill 1993 (with underclllploymt:nt alTecting anothl'r percent).
Now known as rccolltras. former Contras engaged in occilsional sk.irmislll'S with
demobilized Sandinistas. kJlOwn as raompas, bUI the two sides accepted a peace
agreemenl in April 1994. Sporadic clashes nonelheless continued, as the n;ltional
government proved unable to maintain law and order in the coulltryside,
The [990s drew attention tu political issues. A series of
reforms in February 1995 reduced the presidential term from six 10 five years,
placed a ban Oil immediate reelection, and-in an efforl to thwart long-standing
traditions of nepotism-prohibited the president from being succt:eded by a close
family rdat ive. Barely meeting these conditions. the election went to f\ rnoldo
Alcm;ln Lacilyo of the right-wing A!iallza Liberal. follOWing year, Aleman
took steps to advance lhe puinful process of national reconcili::lIiol1, reaching a
final agreement wilh the recolltms and coming to terms wilh Sandinistas over
property confiscated during the 1980s. In early 1998 the International Monetary
Fund approved a second major loan for structural adjustment of the economy.
Things to be looking up.
Then came Hurricane Mitch in October pouring torrential rains down
on Nicaragua and leaving a staggering toll: nearly 3000 dead, about 1500 missing
or injured, and at least $1 billion in damages. Aside from the economic and human
costs, Mitch inflicted political damage as well. Aleman failed to call a national
emergency, bungled international relief efforts, and displayed an awesome level of
overall incompetence. In the meantime the Sandinistas were faring lillie better,
since party chieftain Daniel Ortega was publicly accused by his stepdaughter of
child abuse.
Amid a swirl of rumors, the two besieged leaders, Aleman and Ortega, reached
a political compact in January 2000. Their transparent goal was to secure the
dominance of Nicaraguan politics by their respective parties. They called for
constitutional reforms that would permit reelection, which Aleman favored,
104 PART TWO CASE STUDIES: CHANGE OVER TIME
and establish a single-round system of elections, which the Sandinistas slippOJted.
The election of November 2001 went to Enrique Bolailos Geyer, the candidate of
Aleman's Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (formerly AJianza Liberal). Shortly
after taking office, Bolanos broke with Aleman, who was placed under house
arrest on charges of corruption-and later transferred to prison. With only
modest support in the legislature, however, Bolanos was finding it difficult to
lead. Seeking international approval, he backed the U.S. position on Iraq in
early 2003 and eagerly signed on to a U.S.-Central American free trade treaty
later in the year.
The Sandinistas mounted an impressive comeback in 2006, as Daniel Ortega
won the preSidency (under the terms of the pact wilh Aleman) with 38 percent of
the vote. Two years later the Sandinistas won 94 out of the 146 municipal elections.
The country nonetheless was highly polarized. The poorest nation in Central
America, Nicaragua continued to face a precarious future.
POLITICS AND POLICY: EL SALVADOR
EI Salvador. Nicaragua's neighbor to the north. faced similar periods oftunnoil. As
in other countries of Central America. oligarchic control eventually took hold
during the nineteenth century. A series of legal decrees paved the way for the
usurpation and consolidation ofland by a tiny aristocracy-Ins catorce, a nOlorious
clique of families (which have meanwhile expanded in number and
size). Coffee became the leading export crop, commerce nourished. and from 1907
to 1931 political power rested in the hands of the patriarchal Melendez clan.
Peasants did not accept this situation passively. Angered b), the loss of land,
they staged four separate revolts between 1870 and 1900, The movements were
crushed. but they carried a message: like the zapal;slas of Mexico, the cnmpesino.(
of EI Salvador were willing to fight for their rights,
In May 1930 a popular throng of 80,000 held a demonstration in downtown
San Salvador against deteriorating wages and living conditions. The next year an
idealistic landowner and admirer of the British Labour Party, Arturo Araujo, won
the presidential election with the support of students, peasants. and workers.
Somewhat naively, he announced that the Salvadoran Communist Party would
be permitted to lake part in municipal elections in December 1931. Exasperated by
this prospect. the armed forces dismissed him from office and imposed a right-
wing general, MaximiJiano Hernandez Martinez.
Peasants broke out in rebellion. In late January 1932, as a chain of volcanoes
erupted in Guatemala and northwest EI SaJvador, bands of lndians with machetes
made their way out of the ravines and tangled hillsides down into townships. Led
by Agustin Farabundo Marti, a dedicated communist who had fought alongside
Sandino in Nicaragua, the peasants murdered some landlords and plunged the
country into 3 state of revolt.
Hernandez Martinez responded \\orith ferocity, Military units moved on the
rebels. and the connict took on the appearance of a racial war, as Indians-or
anyone resembling from Ihe government .11Ia... k. IkIWt't'll
10,000 and 20.000 Salvadorans their
The events of 1932 senl several llH'ssages. le:lrncd In t ily
bred revolutionaries who might lead them 10 destruction. Indi:lTls ht').::lll II' "cd:
safet), by cilsting off indigenous hahits and dOlhes. On Ihe politicil kvd, Idll"'"
concluded that they could slill cultivate following.. ill rur,lI e.. pe<..i:dly III Iht'
absence of a reformist alternative. The right drew harsh lessons of it!' owo: Iht' W,lr
\0 deal with popular agitatitlll was hy repres..ioll. :md Ihe WOl)' tn 1ll.lilllain M'lI1111\'
was Ihrough mililary rulc. \"'ilh Ihc conselll and hlc!'o;ing IIf Ifll.'nt" .1I11l\
officers held the reillS of govcrnmcill llntil 111(' I?70s.
A reformist challenge f1nnll}' camc from 100;(0 N.'pnleon l1uOlrl('. v..-lw llluntl('d
the Christinl1 Democralic Part}' (PDC), A!' m.lrnr ofSnl1 Snkadnr (IQ(vl 70),lhl'
dynamic and articulate Dunrte huilt up a slrnng following Olmnng Ihe intdlclll1.d".
professionals, itnd other urb<ln middle-sector group!'. The 1'1)(: hOle n lOllllll1'
men! to peaceful reform through c!eclnrnlmeau!-. Though DII,lrle lllny h.wl' \\'l\1l
the electiol1 of 1972. Ihe ..ec<llcit r;lllt mililar)' IllnH'd I"IW('T (1\'(" Ifllllll'
of its OWI1. Colonel Arturo Armando Molina. I)1I:lr!C hlllle;elf W,l<; 11111" 1"1111('.\.
tortured. and exiled-hut he ditlnOI lake III Ih(' hille;.
Conditions worsened f(lr the pe;l"anls. eXI'orh wert' Ihrlvlng. hili lhe
poor were suffering. Aholll HO percell I of Ih{' peClI'({'livet! in Ih(' nHllllf}'''uk..111.1
hy 1975 ahoul 40 percenl of the pcnsants hnd 110 land al nil (.(lmpared 111111lk I.'
percent in 1960. Increasingly unahle 11\ gain In Ih(' Mlil. lhe ((/l1lll('qt1 "I I I
Salv<ldor were gelling re<ldy 10 rehel.
Reform-orienled options during lhe 11J70s. 'rhe eleClnral tll.HI W.I"
proving to be a dead end. The 1977 election was tighlly coni rolled hy Ihl' lllilil.llV
and resulted in the presidency of Geller<ll Carlos Ilumht.'rln Homero. whll l'n,
(ceded 10 legalize repression IhrOllgh ul aw III defcnd ;111d I'llhlil 01 <It'l -
foor an alternalive means o( public expressioll, many dissidellts Illrtlf'd 10 "1
'
ClpUl.lI
apolitical groups lhat SOllglll nOllviolenl rOlllc:- to l h.wgc.
Sometimes organi7.ed b)' exiles like J)u:lrle. Ihey found support .ll1d o;lill",ltl"
from a revitalized inslitution: Ihc ROrn:lll l,,,I!lnlic (:hmch.
The reawakening o( Ihe church proved to he on(' of the IlI1Isi dewl
oplllents of the time. The trend went hack to 1\\10 evenls: the Sc(:olld ECtllllellll,d
Council of the early I960s (Vnl ican 1J) <lnd a conference of 1.<11 in AllleriCnll hi.o;IH'I'"
at Medellin, Co!olllbi:t, in 1968. Serving a pl;ll fornl (or Ylihcral ion I lilt'
Medellin conference denollnced capitalism ;Inc! Ctllllnlllllism as ('tlllal af(rollh 10
human dignity ;1I1d placed the hlamc for hunger and miser)' (Ill Ihe ridl ,Hili
powerful. To redress Ihese inequalities, Ihl.' hishops Gllkd 101 lllOIT edllt ,111011,
increased social awareness, and the cre<ltion of ro""mir/rulo til' /1m." small ):1'.1....
roots groups of Catholics.
These events had a profound illlpad on the el.desia!'tilal 111 II
Salvador. then under Oscar Arnulfo RomerI'. repre!'<:ioll lll(lunll'1.
the church eventually acknowledv,ed, in l{IHllero\ own word.., "Ihe l,l'l' lilt
insurrection ... when all recourses tn peaceful lllean:- hav!' Iwcn {'xhall'h'tl N,.
1,lll' iltltlllllll' III viull'llll': in JlJHU Ihe an.hbishup himsdfwas shot dead in the
latllnlldl I,f Sail SalvOI,lllr, So Ill\JI,:h for politkJI reform through theological

III .., ul .1 lilaiitiull guvernment, things took a lurn fur the
... Iknutlll(:illg all dissidenls as right-wing officers and para-
IllilJt,uy '\!l'ath .. bR inleltsilkJ rcprl'ssiull. Killings continued al lhe
biting rail: III lunu per Illunth, The cahinet resigned in prokst, but the minister of
dd..'lIw (;,lIeral lost- Cuilll'miu Carda-clung to his government post. The
libl'l,tl Wllig lit tIlt:: Chrislian Iklllu<.:ratic Party defected from the coalilion. Now
oIl'I'"',ll lllg llndl..'lli.dlly the bdeilguered Duarte took OVt'r as head or
Illl' gOVl'J'lLllIl'llt and aIItHHIJlCe:t1 a plan for land reform.
'1'111' \Ippu:.itillli tll,'n lliuved ulldt'rgruund. The IIlUsl impurtant org:lJlizaliun
W.t:. till' hlr,lbuJldu Mani National Liberalion Front (FMLN)-named for thl'
ll',ldn tlltht' 1932 uprising. Inlak four AlllL'rican women-three !luns and
,I I,I}' WIll kIT IIII:'! wilh brutal .. kat lis. TIlt' Carter administration vigorollsly
lhi" .. hust, 01 Illllll,lll rights. and Duarte promised an investigation, In
",LIly 1')X1 Ihe- H......lgan :llllllillistrati()l1, more cOIKt'rned with Cold \,\'ur :lllti-
l'UIIlJllUlli"tll lhall with changt' or hUlIlan rights, softened the U.S. demands.
By Illid ,\ kw luw rankillg lliemb.... uJ the National Guard were impliL"ated
ill III,' lrillll"jiut tlll'fL' wuuld bl.: Ill) s.... riuus plosecution. With tacit support frol11
lit, g"Vl'f!IJlll'lll, thlls tlte I't'gillll' illtefllatiollal furor:
\.... L'lt high ill lilat Duarte, a Notre Dame graduate and a
I,LV'1IIll" II! U.S. poli<.')'1l1akL'r:.. would rt:alizL' thL' reformist programs designed to
Illldvlllli :>Uppl1t'l hll" thl' J\'larxi:.t-Lellillist guerrillas. In fact, OlwrtL' was less
dl...dIVl ill S.1l1 Salvadur thall ill Wushillgtun. FMLN fighters were highl}' dis-
llplillnl .tIld ll..'t'l'ly L'lItrl'llchnl ill ZIlIlL'S Iher had ,,::o!ltrulled for yl;'ars. Duarte's
gUVL'lllllll'llt did rldistrihulL' :.igllilicallt chunks of farmhIlH..I. but he could not
di:.plall llll' "ligardl)' tltat had 1ll.ld.... EI S.t1vador's gap between the ri(h and
pvur ,IlJlllllg tlte ill lhl' Third World.
U.S. publi,' ul>illilitl hL'LalllL' a lllajur factur. Ih of early 1983. tht.' Reagan
wa:. supplying tltl' SaIV,ldl)/'all rt'gilllc with $205 milliun in ecu-
IIOlllk' aid .I1111 $26 lllilJiull in lllilitary with higher requests pending in
l.;rowillg uppusitiun to the U,S, aid came from congressional liberals
;trld rdigiotls espedalty the Catholk Church, stilJ incensed over lhe 198U
killing LlI lite luur Alllt'riGlll Catholk wumen. 'fhe intensity of U.S. oppOSition
(tluld b.. ill tht' humpL'r stkkers that read "EI Salvador is Vidnam in

'I'll .., batlk LUJItillued ill Ihe Salvaduran countryside. FMLN guerrillas made
p..... iudi..:: raids. Aided by U.S. lIIilitary "lminL'rs
n
(not called "advisers," to avoid
assudatiUJl with Vietnam), guverlllHt'llt furces conducted sweeping sean.-h-and-
d"Slroy VillagL'rs and peasants grew fearful of both sides. A decade of
lultlillllUU:> lighting rcMdted in :.talenHlk. It also led to the loss 01'75,000 lives,
eb:tions ill March kd to a decisive triumph for Alfredo
tltt l"llllSl'!'v.llive ARENA parly willt 53 percent or tht' vule, Many
.\ .. CL'lltlal Aml'IX:1 alld IhL' Cariloul',lIl tll7
U,S. policy in Central America prompted a great deal of public contro.... ersy and debate in the
1980s. Top, cartoonist Tony Auth satirizes President Reagan's position and the hesitancy of
the U.S. Congress in voicing opposition; bottom, Ste.... e Benson dramatizes the left-wing
threat to U.S. interests, (Reprinted with permission of Universal Press. All rights reserved.)
lOR PART TWO. CASE STUDIES: CIIANGE OVER TIME
observers believed that Cristiani, an athletic playboy without political experience,
would be merely a puppet for right.wing forces. Mouths after his election. six Jesuit
priests were brutally murdered. apparently by a military-sponsored death squad.
Cristiani solemnly declared that his government would capture and prosecute the
assassins. but little was accomplished. Once again, a rightist regime was paying
scant attention to human rights.
Even so, Crisliani agreed 10 negotiate with the FMLN under the supervision of
the United Nations. In early 1992 Ihe government and the FMLN signed a historic
agreement for peace and reform. The FMLN agreed to lay down arms in exchange
for reforms in political and military structures, including a reduction
in the role and size of the armed forces and a purge of flagrant human rights
abusers. By December 1992 the movement disarmed its guerrilla forces and
became a legal political party. and the FMLN established itself as the country's
second largest political force.
Subsequent elections resulted in three straight victories for right-wing
ARENA candidates: Armando Calderon Sol in 19911, Francisco Flores Perez in
1999, and Antonio (Tony) Saca in 2004. Not until 2009 did the unthinkable occur:
Mauricio Funes of the FMLN won the presidency with 51.3 percent of the votes
(and no major charges of fraud!). Even as a new day dawned. the ARENA faithful
continued to lament the dangers of communist takeover. Echoes of the Cold ''''ar
continued to reverberate throughout this tiny and beautiful land.
POLITICS AND POLICY: GUATEMALA
Guatemala has a long history of strongman rule. After Rafael Carrera died in 1865,
Justo Rufino Barrios established a twelve-year dictatorship (1873-85). and Manuel
Estrada Cabrera followed with a twentytwo-year, iron-fisted regime (1898-1920),
the longest uninterrupted olle-man rule in Central America. In 1931 General Jorge
Ubico seized power and immediately launched a campaign 10 crush the fledgling
Communist Party. Instead of relying on coffee planters alone, Ubico built a
tentative base among agrarian workers by abolishing debt slavery. A national
police (orce maintained law and order. As Ubico himself once said, have no
friends. only domesticated enemies."
A wave of strikes and protests led Ubico to resign in July 1944. He was
replaced by a military triumvirate. and this in turn was ousted by a group of
junior officers. Thus erupted the October Revolution of 1944, an event that
Signaled the beginning of a decade-long transformation.
In 1945 Guatemalans elected as president Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo. an
idealistic university professor who proclaimed a belief in "spiritual socialism."
Arevalo oversaw the promulgation of a progressive new constitution in 1945,
modeled in part on the Mexican charter of 1917. and he encouraged workers
and peasants to organize. Industrial wages rose by 80 percent between 1945 and
1950. Arevalo pushed education and other reforms as well. But the going was not
'I <:clltr:11 Amcril:l :11111 Ihl' ('anhhc,111 10')
easy: during his five-ye;tr lenn in nff'ice, Arevalo weallH.'rcft !11l th.lll !W(,llly
tWO military revolts.
In 1950 Arevalo turned the presidC'llc)' 1,.1\'('1" 10 Colonel 1:I(oh" Atll<'lll
Guzman, the minister of defense, who Icd;l center-left (oalilinn in Ih(' C"lnlloll'
of that year. A central figure in the Octoher Rcvolulinn nf 19/1-1. Arhcllz dC"vdlJ'cd
profound social concerns-partly at the insistence of his wife. tvlari;1 Vil:lllllV.1, .1
wealthy daughter of the Salvadoran elite. "rhell:;'. ;tc\.-epll'c1 cflImllunisl <;upl'orl.
both during and after the election. hut he was a reformcr at he.\l"l. Al hi" 11l.1II):1I
ralioll he spelled oul his hnpcs for the cOllnlry's fllillre:
Our gO\'crnmcnt pnlpnses If) marth to-.w:lrd Ihe ('.. (lo"m"
ofGualcll1ala. and proposes Ihrcc (undallwIII,,1 nhjC<:lJ\lc,;: hI Cllm(',I ("llir (,ulnl r ,.
from a dependent n:llion Wllh :I S('lIll-("I,I,lnl<11 ("'(,nnlllll)' I() <Ill {'Illm'IIlII II\
independent country: 10 COil vert r.u:llemal., (rum :I h:ll k\".ud ..... tlllll)' Willi .1
predominantly fcud:ll economy inln a 1llOf.lern capilali';l !it:l""; :llld III llI:1k(' Illl'
tral1sformation in:l way Ih:1t will r:li.;e th(" <'I:lnt!anl ).:o1C':l1 m.I';" "j
our prople to Ihe highc.;t Icw'l.
To achieve thcse goals, Arhenz !>aid. f,;ualelll,11.1 would l1ec(lln tlil
local private sector. -in whose hands Ihe fllnl!;t!llCllt:l1 c(onolllk ,1d ivit Ytil lhe
Foreign capit;tl would be wektlna' so lnng ,I" il rc.;pcdcd (,llalelll.ll.lli
law and strictly abstains from inlervcning in the "nn;tl ;tnd pnliliC:1111k.-
Finally, the president dedared. (;ualem.ll;l wOlllel emh.lrk 011 ,I proW.11ll Ilf
rdorm.
Arbenzset quickly to work. IIe aulhol'i:;,.et! nl a jlllhlic pllfl 011 tll('
At1<mlic coast and the huilding of ;tn highway. lie I..Il1lvin....tl lhe
legislature to approve an income lax-:I w:llC"l"ed dnwll versinll of.\ mild 1'101'0.... 11.
to be sure, but the first in Gualemalan hi:-tory. lie I""shed rill cxp.llulcol pllhlll
works and the cxploitation of energy rcsotlTces. illcluding pclrn!cUI1l.
The centerpiece of the Arhcnz agend;t agr:lrian refllm1. Ell.l(lcd ill 111111'
1952. lhe bill empowered the government tn expropriate only 1IlKlIlIiv:lIcd pnr
tions ofbrge plantations. AIII,lllds laken were 10 be p;tid for int\\fcnly 11\,('-)'e.11"
bonds bearing a 3 percent interest r:lte, ;tnd lhe v;t!ll;tlion of land \Va, In Ill'
determined according to its taxahle WOl'th :lS of May 1952. f)ming eighteen
months of operation, the agrarian reform distributed 1.5 million acres to SOIll('
100,000 f;tmilies. The expropriations included 1700 a..:rcs In Ar"<'ll'l
himself. who had become a landowner Ihrnugh Ihe dowry ofllis wife.
Almost immediately, Arbenz :lnd the agrarian reform ran intn a !>('I"lllll'
obstacle: implacable opposition from the United Fruit Company and frolll the
U.S. government. La Imtera had obvious for resisting Ihe reform. The
company held enormous tracts of land in Guatemala, RS percenl of which W,l';
unused-or. as the company maintained. held in reserve against natural (.11,1
strophes. And in arranging tax payments, UFCO undervalued il ..
holdings. (On the basis of lax declarations, the Guatemalan governmenl in I,)r, \
offered UFCO $627.572 in honds in compenslllinn for a sei ....ed portion of l\rf1pcII\,;
1111 1'/.1(1 I\,\'l'" i 1\:-.1 ... IIJIJII:-' (JlANl;I'OVhRTIII.II
Ull I,d I,dt l d 1110.: Ihl: Slah:.' I ":Ullutt'fcd with a d"'llIand fOf
'l> 1r"X''', I,X,ll)!)
W,1 ...1ling\l" I W.I ... lin"'ply iJiVIllwd. Sn fdar)' orStatc John j:oskr alld his
III ( 'IA 1)11 I fur l'X.llllp!l:.', bUlh ":<Ill1C rrulll a New Yurk law
11I111 with dml' lillb Itl Unilnl FruIt. Thl'" cUlllpall)"s Wnshingtoll lobbyist was
11111111.1'> l U!UII'<lIl. ;t prOlllllll.'llt hl\vYl'r who un duse with
I IWIlI1l1Wl'l ',> Illl .... alld uf stalt', General \iValtt'r Bedell
"lIlllh, 11111, ....:11 01 h.'" IlIlo.'r.:.... Io.:,J ill .1 puSilillll with UFCO. lor...
1111(10 ,,1.1111 Ih,Lll p..:1 hllw"'vt'r, W<l .... Ihe anticommullist duct rill ... dt'vdopeJ
II'
plllt,,)'III.II..,,r... \\'1..'1'''' pmlullg .1 hard antkullllllullbl lim: in wilh
I ,11111 1\/1'1'11".1. 'l'lll' 1<1\) 1'-;ll"1 ul 1'.1'17 h.ld bid tht.' gruuIldwurk rur <.ollcclivt.' actiOll, or
"" th..- llllll ....! hllpl.'d, <,"ullIlllunbl adv.IlKt"s in J....ltill America, whether
IWIII \\Itlllll III wI[holl!. III ,,.Lrl) 1'J53 Juhn Dull\.':::. was dead)' wurrit"d .100ut
1.11 Lll A111..'1 I...1, hl' :"Ild. It.llIdlllon... .1r,,' :::,ulllewhat cOlllparubk' lu conditions as
III,,)' III ( IUIl,I III lilt' Ihirti\::::. \\ht:n thl.' l:Oll\lllllnbl muvl.'lllenl \\'a:::. gelling
... 1.11 k .. 1 . \Vdl. il h',,' dUll'l look \JUI. \W will wakt' up :::,Ullle morning and read ill the
111'\\">1"11'"'''' 111.11 Illlr.. III J\lIlC'rica tIlt' kind uf thing that
h,II'I'\llnl ill (11111.1 III 1").1'). 'Ill\' k:::.t \\'ould "um..' in Guat ....
III (..(, l.uhll ..... I...tlld 1'ulk:::. bruthc'f:::' Ih,,' Arbl'llz \)fbcillg
- .... 11 .... 11 u'IlIlIIlIl11,>lIl and 1>1'.111\11,11 II a thre,ll Iu Ih.. Uniled ,llld to tht> free
\\.It Id .It 1.11 lultl\,.llnl k.lr.. lh.11 d..:k.11 ill (;U.ll .... llWI.1 might k.ld 10"
[,tk\'\lV\'1 "I I!ll 1',111.1111,1 Colll,d, TIlt')' \'I.trlled lh.11 if(iu.1lt.:mala rell, thl'lIthe resl of
( .. L1tl ,II :\llll'II\,1 IIl1ghl ;..... h'dl (in keqllllg wllh the so calJ..:tI domino theory).
i'lL/I tIll' 1'1111\ 11',11 ,lgr.ln.111 IduIIIl. as Daniel or TIJI.'
Nt'II' I,'"d,'/ w,t1I11'd tll,ll would ll:.e Ih.... program as a
II. j.-, Lill lI11lllil ut (;11.1h:01.1I.1. \Vhaln'l.'r his inlt'lItiollS, thl' United States insisted,
,\rlo\'111 W,I" ju.. t .1 Ilir Ih",
III IlJ:;1 tltl UIlJltd dnidl'd tv <It...!. Jolin Dull\:':> l...d.l
.. III tll\' (. JIg,lllizallull III i\1l1l'riGIIl Stales (OAS) [v brand Guatemala as
IIH' ,lg\'111 III ,III \':-,11',1 lJ ..IJ1i.... phl'riL pllwer (lh,,' Sovid Union) and [hl'rdure subjl:'d
I.. l.lIlklllVI' .lllivlI ulllkr thl..' RiO Treaty 01 1917. Although I.ntin Americall
k.llk, .. illtt-qlrd:.llIOll, t..:k:lrI)' realized 11l;;11 U.S. intervention
W,t .. 111.....t} .. Iii.... cr.1l.ked dUWlIllll dUllll.'sti..: uppO.:.ilioll and turned tu
1:,1,>1 hit, 1(1\' Illr !'>1ll.1I1 :LfllI:., which Wl.'rl' t'n roul1..' by J\'1:ty 1954. Ihl.'
.Idlllllll:::.lralillil dl'lll.lnding. ill ilh.. rl'asingly biulli lallguagt"
1111 U.S. prnpcrI)' in Gualcmala. of coursC.'. United Fruit.
II.IVing 1:lLlnl tl) gel (lAS lor inll..'lv... ntioll, thl' U.S. guvernment
uplnl lor ,,-owrt :It.lion. The;: CIA organized ::In exile invasion under an obscure
1 (;U.,I ..'lll.lbn culunel, Castillu Armas, A rebel column of a few
hUlldll'd W.I:::. the burdt'r in neighboring Honduras. The)'
.1Ild dir...c1nl by Ihe CIA, whiLh up and operalcd a rebel radio
:::.1.1111111 .llld plUvldnl a ft'w Wurld \,\':If II fighter planes to strafe Guatemala Cit),.
llll\ler .111.I"k II)' thn,,' plalll.':::', :Il1d (oll\'ill(t'd that a largl' army was <tppruaching Ihe
c'lpilal. Arhel1z lost hb nervt' :I lid gave up. The Annas rd)d:. 1'0111..," intv the
t.::lpital ullopposed.
The nl'W governlllt'llt purged cUllllllunisb ,l1ld nldical natiunalists, I"l'wr:::'l,d
tilt' expropriation uf United mal dutifully signed a lllulual P:ll'l
with the United States in 1955. Mission .111 ('nallt Americ.lll
republic had bet'n brought back into Iill.... by;1 cht'ap anJ dllll"'llt CIA upc:ralion.
The United Stales waS strongl)' denounced by I.atin Alllc:rk:lll fur
intervention in Guall.'ll1ala. and tu thb da), the relll ... <t ul
q'niGII U.S. action. Even so. the rate orille Arbenl regime wnuld as a
10 n,ltiOllalbl leaders who contemplated dlallcnging
Thl' 195/1 coup marked n turning puint ill GuatellJalan his1lJI1" II virtually
eliminated the lorcc:s of the political center b)' and
Arbcllz). So the counlry had only a Icrt amI a right, and the righl \\'.IS ill cOlltrul.
Coff....e vtlll:r landownc:rs. ami fuft'ign .... and Iheir su'--':.idiark:::.
regailled their puwer under Ihl' prulectiun uf right-wing millt ..tr)'
Individu.d rulers Gllllt" and went, but thb alignlllt'nt until I .
The nlorl' the changed, the mort' til..: th,,' sam",.
POLITICS AND POLICY: THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
overthrow of tht" Arbt'llz gUVCf!lmt'lll W.I:. ;Ill tlllllnou:. :-.ign 1.)1 Iho.. l.'
who ft'.tn:d l'xpanding U,S, inlerVelltiun ill Llliu Allicril:1. II uJlt'I\"l1 )'d
autl.. example or unwelcume llIl'ddling in n:giul1.d Yt'l tht' palkrn \vould

TIlt' slratcgh: pusition 1lI,Ide the bl.lIld illlp(lrtall! tu llll' Ullilt'd
Siall':-', c0ll1111i\(('d b), Iht: t'arly lIillt'lt't'l1th cl'lltur)' [0 kelo:'Jllllg Eurupean
from il1terwning ill Ihl' hemispht..'rl. Anarch)' and h"d prulllptcd Ihl' Ullikd
to inlcrVl'Ill.' al various limes, Frolll 1'116 Iv 1924. U.S. Marillc:, IXCllpit::l1 [h",
I)umillkan Republic (;IS wdl as neighburing Haiti). A Naliunal Gll.ml \V:lS crl.'alcd
10 light gUl'lTilla bands. Amvng 11Il' lllOSt brilliant disdpl ..:. til' the American
vt.:cup;l(iun lor<.e W:lS Rafael Lconidas Trujillo. ;111 soldkr who wuuld
cvclltually become one of tht' most ruthless diet,l[urs in lhL' hemisphere.
Th;lnks to the stimulus of World War 1, which bousted prices lor expurb,
l'CUllOlllic cunditions illlprowd in tht" Duminican Rcpublil' timing [ht: Allieriean
ut.:cupatioll. U,S, troops strengthelled thl: "ounlry's .. lLpgrading Iht:
t'duc;Hion;11 SYSlt::lll :lnd imposing control on publi..: IInant.:es. Critics
beg;lll tu complain about the "dumping" of inrt'rior U.s.ll1ade products on Ih,,'
local market and abuut the general disdain Ihe invacll'rs for local citizens.
An agreement between the United Statt:s and Dominkan leaders ill 1922 led
to the formation of a provisional government. Twu Yt':lrs Inkr, t'k'ctions gavt.'
puwer 10 I-lorado Vazquez, a rcspcctc:d politician of long slanding. Yd in 1929,
V:izlJul:z made the error that has plagu,,'d so many Il'.1der.:. III Latin America's
hislOry: he tried to rl'vist" the constitution so he could run (or office agalll,
112 PAnT T\'VO CASE STUDIES; CHANGE OVER TIME
A rcbellion erupted, and Trujillo presented himself as a candidate in lhe 1930
elections. Wielding his power base (the National Guard), he made clear lhat he
would win at any cost and claimed victory with 95 percent of the vote. He quickly
began banishing politic<ll opponents from the scene. The future belonged 10
Trujillo.
As with so many dictators, Trujillo exploited the country's resources in order
to amass his own personal wealth. During the 1950s the avenlge annual growth
rate was R percent. rln impressive performance by any standard, but henefits failed
to reach lhe general population. Much of the nation's income was stashed in
foreign bank accounls, while peasants and workers remained woefully poor.
P<tradoxically, economic prosperity heightened contradictions bel ween Trujillo
and his coterie of sycophantic supporters: the more he look for himself, the morc
discontented his collaborators became. The most egregiOUS offense involved his
person;l!lakeover of the sugar industry: by 1957 Trujillo controlled more than 70
percenl of the 1l<11ion's production. In 1961 his formcr friends and cronies. n0t his
enemies, slaged a coup find masterminded his assassinatioll.
Free and fair eleclions in 1962 led to lhe triulllph of Juan Bosch, a former
journalist and social reformer who sought 10 confiscate and redistributc Trujillo's
l<lndownings as part of a program of agrarian reform. His efforts at improving the
l('It of the masses aroused discomfort among the traditional clites. who saw his
in nov:llions as dangerously communist ic." A military coup ousted Bosch in 1963.
A cnunten110vemcnt then sought to reinstate him as president. The resulting
connict led to a civil war between the armed forces and the pro-ilosch "conslitu-
tion<1lists," m<1inly workers and students.
As the struggle intensified, the United States under Lyndon H. Johnson grew
fe<lrful Cuba" and took over the country in April 1965. The invnding
force consisted of 22.000 marines, a conlingent whose size amazed even American
officials on the scene.
To justify its action, the U.S. government tried to engage the participation of
other countries from Latin America through the CAS. Favorable responses came
only from Paraguay and Brazil, both under right-wing military rulers. The Johnson
,ull1linistration's allempt to form an peacekeeping force" not only
failed to legitimize the intervention, but also discredited the OAS as a whole and
cont ributed to thc subsequent debilitation of that institution.
The U.S. intervention led to the formation of an interim government and,
eventually, to elections in June 1966. Victory went to Joaquin Balagller. an ex
Trujillo official and favorite of the United States. With full blessing from
Washington, the l3alaguer government implemented a number of important
developmental programs. Housing was built, land was distributed, and educalion
was strengthened and improved. Austerity programs reduced severe problems
with the balance of payments, and, to assist with these and other challenges, aid
from the United States climbed to more than $132 million for 1968. Agricultural
production rebounded and foreign investment responded. Economic growlh was
sllbslantial.
4 \.c1Ilral America and lhcCalihlw<1ll 11'
The Dominican armed forces lIndcnvcnt llloder<1te reforlll, and its most rc(,ll
citrant clements were dispatched ;'Ihroad, oftell on ficlitiolls diplornali..:
Despite poverty and deprivation, the transition townrd democracy conlinl1cd.
Elections survived minor threats in 1970 <111d in 197H. whell the armcd f"r({' ....
thre;'llened to anlluJ the resulls, bUI on holh occa,<;ion." the outcome was eventllallr
allowed to stand. Balaguer's opponents won the elections of r97R <lnd 19H2. hill
bounced back to win three .subsequent times-in 19R6, 1990, "lid 199'1.
After Balaguer finally retired from public life, partisan sCill:lhhling ("<11llC tn
characterize the political process. The elections of 199(, reslll1cd in lrillmph fm
Leone! Fern;ll1dez Reyna. an able and charismatic politician who Ilonelheless f:lt I,d
opposition majorities in both houses of the legislat lire -which gleefully par;lly'll'd
executive policy initiatives. Elections in 2000 led In vicl0ry fflr lliplliitn ]\!lcji:l. wllo
presided over the collapse of one of the country's I:lrgcst hanks, ;"l SGlIH1<1 I th.11
discredited 1110St of the political class. Despile resistancc frolll within his \IWll
party. Mejia insisted on running f("lr rcelecti01l in M:l)' 2(l(Jtl.Aflcr a highl), I h.llgcd
campaign, he lost by a wide margin 10 hrn:indcz Re)'lIn, whn was rcdl'l"kd
presidenl in 2008. Despile spurts of economic grcn\,th, the 11<1linll f.llld
significOlnl social and economic problems.
POLITICS AND POLICY; HAITI
Like other island nations ofth{' Caribhean, Ilaili fcllulldcr the long shadow III tht'
United States in the twentielh century. As the second rcpllhlk ill the '\111('1 It ,'''',
independent Haili faced many challenges. Political life was plagllcd hy inst.\hililv.
From 1804 to 1867 Haiti had onI)' ten chiefcxeclltivcs. Frol11 IK67 tIl 1915 IIH'rc
were sixteen presidents, with an average term of only three }'ear.... And frolll 11)11
(0 1915 H.. iti faced olle of its 1I10st ch<lotic periods. during whidl tililC :-.i\
presidents mel violent deaths.
Confronting World War I and equipped wilh "doll:1r tile I Inirt'd
Stales occupied Haiti in 1915 and slayed until 193'1. This W<1S a filii SC<1!c mili!.lr)'
occupation. U.S. authorilies aholished Ihe <1rll1y and replaced it with a ll:ltiofl.ll
police force. A cadre of American technicians and bUre<111CrOlt ... tll0k over the
financial administration of the counlr}', ensuring prompt pa}'lllellt of all foreign
debt obligations (especially those owed 10 the United States). New puhlic works
were initiated and old ones wcre repaired, but the majoril}' of Ihe pnplll<lliflll
regarded the foreigners with smoldering resentment.
One reason for this feeling was dismay over the loss of sovereignty. 1\.... :In
occupying force, the United Slates look over general administration hUI, In
particular, the management of the customs hOllses. As a malleI' of f;KI,
American financial experts would remain in Haiti until 1941-seVCll years after
the departure of tile mililary garrisons. Another reason W;lS thc Ilwrked preferelld'
of U.S. officials for the mulalloes, whom the)' brought to power ill ;1 V:Hicty 01
ways-including the superficial election and reelection of 'stcnin Vincent " ... pn'
sident during the 1930s.
Ii<lCl:.t depiction of Haiti as a naive. inept black child formed and reflected U.S. attitudes
dLwut lIlirit<try intervention, Occa::.ioned by the political and economic crisis of 1915, this
Cdrtoon expressed the hdplessncss of Haiti-through the caption in for something
fluw!"-and Uncle Sam's determination to take charge, (Hanny, St. Joseph News-Press,
1<) 15. of the St. Joseph New:.Press/Gazette.)
III k h.ll..k.....d by Ille 11,liti:.l11 Cuard (.I:' tilt' pulice fon.:e
W.I:' kllUWll). IltlSlnl 1I1l11.111u prl'sid(,Jll allli DUlll:lrs:lis Estimc in
1'),11" ulll,:i.lb witll black:. alld ullder!ook a serieS of reforms
III bl'/Idit lllliit llrh.lll wurker:. ,nul agril..lJ!tuf::l1 producers. I h: di:.ch:.lrged
th lkht 1\1 the Ullitnl Stall::. :llld signed an agreement with thl" Export*
III q11lit HalIk lor Illl' dl'vl'lulHlil'n[ of til\:' Anihonitl' Valley, In 1950 Estimc: trit'd to
,lllll'llll till' he ,uuld remain in powcr, and fvr this he was deposed
by .trI1lY alld :'l'llt into
CUlltfol Il,\:.:.cd [u Colulld Paul E. Magloil"l', a bhKk leader who was inOuential
\\'Jlhill 1I1l' afillY alld puplll.tr ,Ilnllllg llil' Hativll's llIaSSl'S. At his inauguration he
prllllll:>t'd 10 :-.all'J.!,uard Ihl' right:-. gU:lnlnkl'l! by the constitutiull, to continue
III igalillli projl'cb :tlld 11uh!il and 10 prOlllo(l' public educalioll, In
IIll' illtl'lll;ltioll,d arl'n.l Maglolrl' :.tJugllt gvvd rdatiolls with the United Slates,
willIe [Ill iJH..re,I:'<l" ill l'XIJllrt I'riu::. bruught Oil by tht: Korl'an War hdpeJ to
slilllubtt: l'COllOlll!l" growth. Ik:-il'otnl by rivals, hl' \Vas OVl'rtl1rowu ill a
coup ill 1956.
Alier mOllths of ullcertainty, there emt'rgl'd tht' figure of Fr;1I1.;ois Duvalkr,
whu had himself elected pn:sidt'llt in St'ptcllIbt'l' Soon alkr seizing pvwl'r,
Duvalier set out to bend the natioll 10 his wiJ!. Tht' arJllY, tilt' pvlkl', alld tlli.:.
sl:"curily forces beGlllll' accountable to hilll alolll:. lIt' crt':lted a special pulke forel',
which (ame to bl.' known as the M{/c.'ulIle:i. thl' Illu:.t dreaded rq)ressive
fvrce in the counll-y, Thrvugh sheer tl'/TtJ( he rid hilllSdf of his opponeuts alld
m;llll::uvered electiolls to becollle presidenl fur lill' (presidelll avie), As nccl'ssary,
hI:' mohilized largl' l'fowds with insi:.lclll prop;lgatiull uf Ilw off!':ial !)Iugall:
Diem, fJllva!icr, el Ie frape/I, /til :1 ill/lil'isibll.' -Gud, Dllvalin, :llld Ilag, une and
indivisible,
A propunent uf lIoiris1l/(', a IIlUVenh:'nt that Jvoked tu Africl fur inspiratiun,
Uuv;llil'r expelled lIlulattoes frolll thl' n:Hional bUfl'aucr"cy. I It- gained illl1uence
over the by cannily assvdatillg himsc:lf wilh the figure: uf Haron Sallledi, the
earthly kecpl'f of Ihe vudull tUlllbs. ..:rt'ated a of lalter-day COUr!, who:.e
!;lvurites gained riches I hrollgh the dispcllsat ion uf statl:' favors, '1'0 iliStitut iUllali:t.e
a systelll of kickbacks, Duvalit'l" even up an lllllbrcila orgallb,ativn, the
Movl.'ll1cnt for Natiunal I{cllovalioll, which cullecled contributions from busilll.'SS
and high government employees for Ihe ostensible PUfPOSl' 01 uuilding public
fadlities. Net'dlrss 10 say. the /lIolley WilS nevl']' usn! fvr such lnds,
Ulltil his death ill Duvalkr took thl' sidl' of Ilw United Slates ill Illu:.1
inlCl'lHltiullal arl'lla:., induding the Ullill.'d and thl' OAS, 011 uccasiulJ pru
U.S, votes would lead tu aid or loans for hbtulTupt regillll', Fur the llIost
pari. Alllerican govt'l"nments tolerated I )uvalil'r a uut if
unpleasant ally in the Culd vVar,
As death lll':lfCd, Duvalier persuadl'd the: Ndthmal A:.sl.'llll>l}' to lvwer IIll'
minimum agl. lur jJl"l'sidl'nt from luny (u ciglll"l'J1 ,lllli I-Hul.. ..... nll'd lu ill:-ilall his
son as his SlI(ct'ssor :md presidl!lIl (i vii'. Yuung )loan Claude I)llv:llier, or kBahy
I>lh:" as he was SOIlIl'time::. knuwn, inlwrilt'd a uittnl)' illlpovcrished cOlllltr)',
Though he may have bet:ll less brulal thall hi:. btl1l'r, hl' n:tainl'd a parasitical
group 01 f'lVorites-:.I "'kJeptocracy" of sorts. Guvl'fllmt'Jlt beGune a means of
self-enrichment. Popular discolltent and illll'rne(ine: struggles finally led to his
dl'llIist, in Ft:bruary 1986, when he boarded a U,S. Air Furce: plant' and tkparh:d for
r:rancc,
Political recovery was tentative, Fur the oppo:.itioll had been sup-
pressl'd, labor ullions coni rolled, ,Iud the media currupted. When Baby Doc left
the country. ther(' were nics fur liberty and c:.llls for dedw/lk(/j, an "'uprooting" of
the Duvalier regime: tombs :.Iml statlll'S Jell, policemen fell popular wrath.
erstwhile collaborators Iled the country, Elections in 1987 rl'sulted ill a bloodbath,
as paramilitary forces assauht'd voters and opposition candidah:s. A subsequent
ballul resulted in the (untruwr:-iial election of Leslil' Manigat, a well-knuwll social
scientist who lasted in office lor Ic:ss than a yeaI". Yt't another coup h:d to 111l'
ascendalli.:y of Gener'll Prosper Avril. an young military officer who
116 PAnl TWO. CASl:S'IUPIESUIAN(;1 nVF\{TIMI
revivcd thc Toulons Macautes and imposed ;l new W;lve of repression. To m:;tn)'
observers il appeared th... 1 Ilaili was suffering from "Duvalier wilhollt DlIv:llier."
Aulhenlil. change hegan in 1990. Prolest demom:tration<; <In(\ a general strike
persuaded Avril to le;lve the country. Under a woman interim prt.'sident, Erthn
P;lsGIITrouillot, open eJections took place in December 1990. Emerging \\'ith two-
Ihirds of Ihe vote was Jenn-Berlr;llld Aristide, a ROIll:l.Tl Catholic priesl who
espoused liberation Iheology nnd ndvocnled fnr-reaching politicil and sod.11
change. In lantlnry 1991 disgrunlled nllcmplcd a millinry coup 10
prevcnt Ihe Aristidc from t;lking oHkc: the effort fnile(1 hut Iclt 74
dead ami 150 inj\lrcd. Lntn in the year. unruly e1emcnts wilhin the mililnrr otl!'led
him from office_ The United States ;'Ind other nntiollS prompl1y c0ndelllnC(! Ihe
COtlp. nnd Ihe OAS slapped an emhargo on lrade with lIaiti, hut diplfllllalic
negotiations fM n penceflll solution to the crisis drngged on for year...
As Iinitinns sought to escape the oppression imposed by the new Illilitnl)'
regime of Gencrnl Raoul Cellrns. it wns the prospect of a large-!'cnle Onnd of
illl-Illigrnllt" lhnt gnve 10 U.S, policy. The Consl Guard picking up
Ihnw:ands of I I"ili:lIls who were attempting tn rench U.S. shores on hOlllel1lnde
Ollld took them lonn encampment :ltthe U.S. nnv:l1 stalion::lt (;u;1nl;\11;'!1l10 (in
Cub;1), In Mny 1992 Presidenl George II. VI.,!, Rush ordered Ihe Coasl Guard to
return all Iinitinll rnners to their hOl1lelnnd withoul ;lny scrccning to (Ietennille
e1igihilil)' ror politic:ll ns)'lulll. Del1locratic presidcntinl c;'lndidntc Bill C1inlon
denounccd Ihe Hush polk)' ns 'On cnllous response 10 n terrihle hUlllnll trngedy.M
but then consenlcd 10 its continuation'lfter his election ns presidcnt. By c:u'ly 1994
lenders of Ihe Africnn American community mounted shnrp criticism l)f
Washinglon's innction. nnd Clinton reversed himself hy anllOllllcing that U.S.
nlllhorilies would process rafters at sea and grant asylulll to viclims of political
repression. This Icd to yet nnother wnve of rnftcrs,
Despite puhlic skepticism, Clinton beg;'!n to conlemplntc the usc of military
force. III mid-Septemher he denounced the Cedrns government ns l1lo!'t
violent regime in our ;'Ind stressed the (bngers of inaction: As long
as Ccdra.. rules. Haitians will continue to seck sanctuary in our nation. . Three
hundred thousand Illnre Ilaitians. 5 percent of their elltire popllintinn, arc in
hiding in their own cOlilltry. If we dOIl'1 nct, they could be the next WOlve of refugees
al nllf door. We will conlilluc to face the threat of a mass exodus of refugees and its
constant threat to stnbilily in our region nl1d conlrol of our horders.
M
As tension mounted, Clinton dispatched a high-level delegation under former
president jimmy Cnrtcr for a Inst-ditch effort nt negotintion. Atthe finnlminule, as
U.S. troops were nlready ell route for an invasion of Haiti, Cnrter rC:lched all
agreemcnt with the Ccdras govcrnment. Clinlon cnnceled the but instend
imposed an occup;1tion; in less than a week there were more than 15,000 American
lroops on Ihe ground, Aristide returned to office in mid-October, and the U.S.
gnve W:lY to an internation;'!1 peacekeeping force in early 199;'.
Undcr intense internalionnl ohsCfvntion (and quasi-military occupation).
elections took place in ;m nrderly fnshion. Aristide resisted the temptation to
" ("l1tlal .Ind Ilwl .1111>1>,.111 II'
succeed himself. and Rene Prev;11, 011(' of his formcr .l ......ual('" .111.1 l'X 1'111111'
minister. look office in Fchrunry 199(1. ('flverninJ! W:I', d,t'
Aide(1 :lnd abelled by the ililernnlioll.11 (OmIlHlllilr. l',c\,.11 Ip 11111'0...
pro-market economic rclllrlllS. Arislicle suddellly nlO\'l'11 illill lilt.: '1I'P'''ll''ll!.
refurhished his populisl credenti:lls. :Inc! :lsstll1led Illl' k,llln,hIJlII' 11H' 1.1\'.11.1'.
Part)'. Strikt.s. deillonslrntion.". and violcllce tIl0111l1l"'ll.
The politicnl stalell1<lte continued Ihrough Ihe prc"il!cnl ial t'kl rilill .. II N. 1\'('1111 '1'1
2000, which 'cnn-Bertrand I\rislidc WOIi by ;111 ovelwhdlllllt}: bill lllll!l.. lctl
mnjorily. In protest ;1gnhl ..1 e1eclor.11 III p,llli,\lllCIlI,lI-y ;'lllll(',", ,h,'
opposilioni"t Convergcnce !)clIloanlicl"C refll"e(lln rC(llgl1l/c .. I.III\t \11 1"1,"
of 1\ ristide's 1... w:1I;lS !'<lrty. An!'ticle IUlllcthelc!'o'" took nffill' III hhru.lr\ 20{1I 011"'.1
hero to II;liti's poor nlld llllc1crpl"i\'ilq;C't-1. Ari"lIdc "cCIll('d l'VI'I IIHIIl' h.. t.lJl I Irt>IlII11'.
people-and ever more inclincd to illlpnM' IllS willthf411lgh ,1111.\1 r.llil Ille.II'''' .... 111(1
protests resul11ed. and violence cnnlinuecltn pl.lgue the pulilll.11 prou.:"s.
The econolll)' WOlS no hellef. B)' 20110 Ihe grf\\\'lh 1.lle II.HI tlI't I II lI't I I"
less thnn I percent. In hOlh 2001 ;1ntl 20fl2 CI0l1(1111h '1lltl'lll 1.111Ir.hl"11Il\
percent. Thrcequnrlers of Ihc p(ll"""lalill/l was living 111 .1hJel t 1\,"" 111.111
hOllflhe ndult popul:ltioll was :lhl<' In n',HI,Hld wrile. t 1I1Clllpln\'ll1Clll \\',1'" 1111111111.1:
nfllulld 60 percellt.
Mailers COlllle to a hend in e... .-Iy 20(1-1, \Vhile Ari"lllle 1"('l.lllle..! .1 ""h"",llll1.11
al110unt of populnr supporl. opponcnt" d,lillle<! lhal hl"' h.ld he, nlll(' .1111<11 1".,111.
intolerant, nnd corrupt. Di,,"idcnt gnng<; d.l"heri wil h jll tl 1\ 11.. llllc fllll" kll'I\,",1
as clljmi-rcs. Under the lendership of l;ll}' Philippe..1 111111)('1 nfhll'l III 1"1I!:
discredited Ilaitian nrlll)'. nrmed rehels ath.llllell Ihrruigh 1'1"I'\IIHI.Il I Ill\''' .111.1
soon approached the capitnl of Pnrt-nuPrincc. Apl'e.ll" hr Ihe hcsieged gO\TIII
ment for help from the internalioll;11 COI11IlHlllily, cspcc i.llly Ihe llnilt'd """1 Ie....
were 10 no Olvnil. I:accd wilh Ihe prospect 'lvil w.lr. Ari ... lid.. 1"I,..
left the counlry, Crilks chided U,S.presic!clll (;eIJrgc \v. ... h ,llltl SCI I I'Ll! r Itt
State Colin Powell for l'<Jiling 10 suppllrl a <!c111oLfal11 ,lily deIit'd gOW'I"llllWlll III
Ihe Al11erica".
Together with detachmcnts frolll C:nn;Hln nile! !=rnlll t', I I..... 1\ I,ll IIll" 111'>\'1'11111
10 estnblish n modiculll of order. In 2006 Prevnl \\',1" cll"'t Ict! pr('"elrlll \\1111
over 50 percellt of the vote, Arter sevcrnlllnsl1cces<;flll nU('ml'l ... to apl'flllll .'1"11111'
minister. the president desigll:lted Michele Pierre-I.olli<;. till"' dtrel.!(11 01 .111 in leI
llatioJl:llly recognized educationnl foumlnl iOIl. ()ff In n ... h.lk y ... t,lli. Ihc ).:IIVt'1 llFlU'111
fOlced endemic poverty, unemploymcnl. nlld sodal IInre"!. Iialli rCIIl.ltlH'11 III
desperate condition.
POLITICS AND POLICY: PUERTO RICO
As we hnve seen. U.S. adl1linislrntiolls-i{ep"hlic<ln nnt! Ikl1lfH. ral nlikc ,1"'!'o"ll,.1
their right to interfere directly in the domc<;lic nfl<lir<; IIf (ounlll('<; III ( ",,11,11
Americn nnd the C1rihbc;1Il for the snk(' ('If "nalinllnl 1ll1('1('<;t .... (l,ll' ,... 1.11111
nation, however. remnined under perl1lnncllt Ameri(an (0111101
11K 1',\11 I 1\\'1/ .. \ /\..,' ... 1lIDII'')- "111\11,
1'(1\,111 1{1 ... I' l'll.lllh: p.lrt ul thl' United as a 01 thl.' Sp.ulish-
,\ 111... '11....11I \Y.II. III lui)' IHlJX, lit retaliatiull lur the: sinking 01 Ihe U.S. Ma;'/l'
III IIb.l. ,\nllII....1l1 dbl..'lIlbarkl..'d in Puertu Rico, initialing Ihe cOllntry's IIrsl
I ul hlltlpl.lll ..I The island hl..'lJllll' the pawn ill <I war
hl'l\\n'u ( uh.tII p.llrilll.:. ;llld Spallbh g.trrbuns. II had not ",xpl.'ctld lHiJit<lry
Ill,III'.111I1I1.
(Julll' til ... ... Ulltl.II)'. had ;dle.ldy .tgrt:.:d to gr;lllt PIIl'rlO RIco autonolllY
.llid II' d \ I.. ,' .. Ulll"': .. tlrI ul ruk"lur tile island. The U.:::'. ch.lIlg...:d all
101 till tllIlI,llIy. l'u"rlu I{ko h'l.1l1ll'.1 cruciallaclor in U.S. glohal !)trollt'gy-not
Uld) J'l'.U"" 01 II-. pll!l'lliial fu!" illve:-otllleni and COllllllt'n:l', bUI abo of
g...upoltlll.d Itil , III "'l.lll!>olid.tling U,S, naval pOWl'l'. BUI therl' rl'lll;\illS a basil:
qlh .. Il\'f1: \VlLy Illi III .... Ulllll'd wk... Puertu Ricu as a lulully whill' helping
(:uJ 1.1 .1 ... JIll'Vt' illdlll....llde:II......?
TIll' dilkl ...tlll III.IY wdJ ililltl.' hislorks uflht:: Iwo TIl ...r... was a
IIl1lg .. .11111 1 llIVv....lIh.:nt ag'linst Sll;till ill Cuha, .lll
\\ hidl wlIuld h.IVl' l> l.'ll llHldl 11IOr..... diJfit.:ult to UCCUP)'. Pu...TIO Itico, howl'vcr,
uti lilt' \".I} hl.1 1I ...goti.llnl .llld could preSl.'1l1 resbl.II\(".... lo uLlhidt:
luI ........... Plll'llu Rku thus Gwght in a complt'x slrugglt;;' belwet'll major
I'U\H"" .,"d l :1111.1\
I'lh" to 1{llO "tlrl' ul dominaliutl. During Ihe l"ulonial
lilt' ,,1.llld h;l...! .....I-v....... 1 .1 .. ;111 illlPOlt..tllt lIlilit.lry .llld
,- ...IlIl'I ..1 101, 11t.11 lIlt ...Il .. llild Ih... tr.ldl r..... JclllJ its p .lk 11I11ll' 1700:-0. SUg.l!"
1'1'. ,dlh III '11 II..." .1111 ...' Ih,' pl ...dUtllllWlll .lgricullttr.t1l'llll'rprb . Ther...., Wt'fl' .tbu
1.11111\'1". rugg......1 indlvidualbb wht..1 cultiV;:tkd ... rnp:-o and helped
Ill.II11I.111l .1 dlvlr..ill..."d Hecaus\.' of Ihl:' SIaVl' pupulation always
r\III .. lll ...tl .1 lIlil1tlllly.
i\ Ill'r 111l' .11 Iivai Ill' Ill ...' JlIH.:r!o Rico dt:Vt'lopcd a p...:ntlial"
willi Ill ...' llll;l,,1 Slilt ... IXYH r.... Ullll\.' island had Iitl dear Il'g;l I stalus of
;Ill}' kind. III ]'117 lh y WCl'l' grallkd (ilizenship ill the Ullitl'd Stah..s. In 1947,
11.111 .lll.'lllury .tIkI' Ill...: invasinll, PUt'rlo Rico pt'rlilill .... d It I all .... lllpi
h"1' ...llltll'1I1 III 1');.2 Ih.: bJ.ltld grant..... d -COllllllollwl'allh" within til\.'
UIIlI ....... 1 .. , 'l'lli .. all situatiun: PUt::rtu I{iro i.. neilh.... r a
1l.lllull 11t.1 ,"luny nl)!".l but sOllldhing elst' again.
'J .....I...-vdop Ih... hl.lIlll, 10 Ihe of Ir ...worltl capit-
. It..... , .1lI...! lit prllvidl' .111 llbpir.ltiull lor Latin Alll.:riGI, Ih Unih.:=d
\\.11.1(,01.11\' ... 1 wilh (Iy".lllli... gov""'rnor Luis [vlujio.... M.lrin 10 undertake
-()I'l"I.llhlll Blluhlr.lp" durillg Iht.. and 19605. Under thh plan, till'
lJ 1...d,I.11 gvvl'rllillt'll( "'ould cncotlrag\.' ill Puerto Rico
Ihn-.llIglt .1 ... til t:.tx anti other allowanct's. Buotstr.. p wroughl
in the and economic life of PUl.'rto Rico. Sugar
nl.lln .Hld :'>111.111 lanll:'> w.... rl.' fl.'placl.'d by factories; llldustrializ;ttioll
till 1\ 1, ... 11l/ ...Il:,> join....... 1 lit ... uf Ihe laboring BUI Ihl;' o\' .....
Ill\' IIII ...II\:O' did llul pruvid,,' ""llUugh jobs 10 absorb Iht' growlh in Ihe
WOI kllig .Igl 1It11111I.Hioll, and lit .... result w;ts massive: Ulllltlp]oYlllelll.
011(' cons\;,lllll'nce W.IS to accd..... rak thc 110\'1 ul tu Ihe U.S.
mainland, where '10 pe:rc.:nl of pu.... rto Ricans Glllll' tu r....side. Full)' olll:'-half
of Ihe migrant population sdt!.:d in New York Cily. 111 a sense. this tfend
formed lwo PUt'rto Ricus: one on th..... island <Iud one on Ihe mainland. Thac
has b':':11 cunsidcr;:tble mOvt::lIl .... nt and ("otnlllllniGltion back "lid lurth, bUI
social tensions and cultural differeuCt.'s st'parall.' the Iwo In
demonstralion of thb lact, Puerto Rican rl.'sideilis 01 l'W York arl..' Sttlll ...-
known
Political life on Ihe island has bcell .. ctive :'Ind ord..... r1y. TIlt.;' ("hid ...x..... tutiVl: b
lilt;' govcrnor, who is eleclcd eV('I)' foul' y(;lfS. The dominant ..... has b.....ell th.....
island's rdalionship wilh Ihl' United In a IlJ67 plt::bisdte lIll
60 percI.'1l1 1:lvorec! Ihe continuatioll and illlprovetlll'nl 01 Ihl' CUllIlIlOl1wt'alth
and 38 cam..... out in favur of statehood. Thus..... who favOJ'l'd COlllpkll:
independeu(.: 10 boycull Ihe plt.:lJbcik, but this I'ac..'tioll has bl..... ll vue'll and
visibl .... (ill in fact, a pro illl!q)l'lll!l.'lIl.:l group mad!..' an altl'lllpt Oil Ih..... lilt- of
U.S. presilkut I larry S, Trumall).
Tltl.' pro by the New ''.Ifly
(P 1'), won gub.:rnalorial ill 1976tIld I98U. Under the
leadership of F..... rre and Romero Barcelo, Ihis group
to Iht: bdid thaI full stall.'hood would provide PUl.'rlo
wilh hi 1i.,tIt::ra! wdfa rl" ClUtlOtllil
growth, alld r..... lllov... Ih..... sligma or ...e... .. od.llnl willi
..:OlllIIIOIlW..... ;t1lh Popu!;.lr for llluveillelli .....Illl.: lsp....... ially
front Itrhall
The pro-commonw.....alth parly. or Popular I)elllocr;llk Party (PDP), WUll the
d..... of IlJ72, and 1988. Its 1Il0si prolllinl.'lllll"ader Rafad I krmllld..... t.
Colon, who callt'll for a grl':\!l'r d...gre..., of m..... anil1gful aUluntllllY wilhin Ih....
cOlllmonwcallh rdalionship, As governor, Ill'rn;,ndl'z Cololl aClivdy pn..Illlvlcd
wnrldwitk eCOtlomic rdaliolls for th.... island alld playl'd ;In al:tive rvle III
dt::vd,)pml'nt or the plan( COlll:""!)t-dividing the prudullioll pro("...ss into
separak with inilial phas.... to be dUlll.' ill som... olha arl.''' ul Ih.... Caribbt.:'i\n
and Hnal ;\ssl.'mbly in Puerto Ricu.
Concern steadily mounted ova ec.."ollomi..: ami, l;trgdy ;\ result
of a U.S. Puerto Rico lac..... d ;t dowulul"Il in lite l'ad)' 1990s. Amid
Ihis allllosphac the 19lJ2 gubernatorial d('(tion wellt lu Ihl' Pedru
Rossello. who vowed to for statdwod. firsl act in office wa!) lu sign
a bill giving Englbh equal stalus \'lith Spanish an offici,,1 language. And in
ovember 1993, fulfilling a campaign promist', Rossdlo held a new plebbcile
on the island's status. To the surpris.: of many obst'f\'l:'rs, lite pro-comlllon-
wealth position won with 48.4 p..... rcent uf the vole; stiltehood ohlained 46.2
percelll; Ihe pro-independence stanc.... gOI only '1.4 pcrccnl. Five yt'ars latcr-
on December 13, 1998, exactly 100 Y""'ars and une day "fter Sp.lin ufficially
ceded Puerlo Ri...:o to the United Siales-yel another plebiscite yiddetl a
simiklr 46.5 Iwrcelll lor statehood, 2.5 percl:'nt for indl.'p"':lldcllCl, 0.'1
12n I'ARTTWO" <:1\:-.1' :-,TlIDIE:-': CIIJ\N(;F nVI'R
percent for "free association" or cOllllllonwe.dth status. and 50.2 percent for
"nolle of the above." The status quo WOIl out again.
Eleclions of 2000 brought the pro-commonweallh PDP back 10 power
unda Sila Maria Calderon. the first wOlllan ever to serve as governor. As
Illayor of $:lll $alvadnr and thell as governor. Caldef()n focuse(l on urhan
re(lcvelopment. proseclilinn of government corruptinll. and an end to U.S.
hombing exercises Oil the offshore island of Vieques. Her successor.
Anihal S;llvadnr Acevcdo Vila. also of th(' rDP. governed under a cloud of
alleged c1eclnr;l1 fraud. In 200R he losl a reelection hid to Luis Fortuilo, a
pro-st;llehood candidale of the PNP card-c:lrrying memher of the U.S.
I{epuhlic:ln PHty, I lis election gave every indication th:ll Puerto Rico would
cOlltinue its slrange ;lnd nmhigllolls rc!nliollship with Ihe United Stn[es in the
future.
5
Cuba
Key Colony, Socialist State
C
uha has a hist<lry <lr heal illj.: odd.... ( '1l\Ttnl fill lenllllll... hr 1Il.lil 'I 1'11\' 11 .... I J II
mllion foulld a w"r 10 a....ert it .. ,111.1 !llenilir. Inlllwlh cd (.'"11
often dominatcd) h}' Ihe power .1Ilt! proXil1HIV of lilt" {lillIe.! !'>I.llc-,>. II h('1 .1111(' .1
bastion of anliAmcri<:lll "cnlllllcni. :-'hapet! fOI ).:.t'lI(I.lllllll .. h\ II1\" I"r. (' ... "I
inlcrnaliollnl Glpitalism. il pnuIIKt-'d a genuIne "111.,.11 1('''1,1111''''1 ,Hll' Ih,11
spawned ;ldmiration. "dll1:ltlfJll. and lear .1Ilel 10.ltllll1g III 11I,l1n' p,lIl" '" IIIl'
world. Conlr"ry 10 Ihc n"lnfidcnt prcdlLIIOI1" Ilf I lilil.ll oh,..I\'I,., .... ( ,d,., .. "lit 1.111,.1
experimenl managed to (llIlla,llhl' l'ml ofth.. ('nld \V.Il. Ihe dt'lIli"'t' nlll,.. ..... \111
Union. the widesprcad di"u'('dltlllg 01 J\l.lIxI 1 idtnlogy ;lllol Ihe
hostilil)' of Ihe U.S. ()nc of Ihe 1 (II 1111 l"Ie... 111 lilt' \\',.. ... r.11I
Ilemisphere. all isolatcd i"Lll1,1 in .1 d:lllgCfl)ll" "1'.1, (:111':1 ILl'" '1'llIC I" 111.1\ .1
thoroughl), ollt!iii7ed role ('II tile <"f.lgC .. t gloh.ll I I!II... ,11l1 tlll''-'' Ihlll':'
happen?
Geography offers one h:l!'>IL duc. CUh,l... hl .. lnric.t1 I!C\"(']npIIlCllI h.I'" lWCI1
dccpl)' nffccled hy its slralCW{ kl(alinn ill Ill(' (:;ll"1hh",ln h.l'-lll. (""lllmh".. dl'-
covered the island 011 his first vo)'aAc (1'192). nnd II SOOIl h..l .1I11C.1 grou"d
for Sp;lI1ish expeditions 10 thc Mexic"ll and {'clllr,11 J\Illt'l"ic.m 111.llllI.UHI. 11<,
commercial "nd polilkal impnrlalhl' grew wilh Ihe ('Xp,lll"ltlll "I 1/1' ..1 Ik('"
hetwecn Spain and ils ,\mcril.lll tnlol1le".
FROM COLONY TO NATIONHOOD
The indigenous population scared}' sllrviv{'cl the fir"t (('lllnrr of Ihe !'>p.lni .. h
colonization. Here. ali: e1sewhcre in I.:ltin All"lCric". Ihc Europcan ,0lI(1I1Crol<'
turned to black Africa for their Iahor sHpply. As. a le,,"11. (lIh.t h(,. ,lIIH' .1 Illlll"
racial society: b)' the 1wenl iel h ("clll 111")'. ;lLcnrding tn 0111' ('"Iimal (', I11(' 1'111'111.111
11
11
was 40 pcrcellt hlnck. JO I'CI"(Cl11 whilC, """ !'{'!lCIiI I1I1'\C.I (l1h 1\<'1.11'
"ncl Indian).
'71
HIlHIII.\N
'"
1'" III
\11 I" II
HIll ,',\1""
..""I",
, .HMAIJ
hIANI'"
'.
I
N
,
A h.lIldruJ til Cuban nalionali:-'I 111..'(1 inlO exill' and plOlll'd .1 Ill'W rdwllitlll
<.lg;!inst Spain. Thl' Illosl famous MartI, an dOllt ...1l1 fl'V(lluliollar)' pOl'l-
lawyer. A revolt ror im.lejJt'ndelKe brukl' uut in CUl.M III
allothl'r sav.tgc war. whkh Jragged 011 for thrt't' The Sp.llli.lrlb tu
brulalml'lhuds. such [13 the usc or concentralion GlIllpS. 10 liquidate Ihe gUdrilla-
Slyle
GiVl'n ib huge econumic st.lkc ill Cuba. Ihl' United St,ltl.3 unlikdy III
UII Ihe Tilt..' U.S. puhlic l'xcill'd by 3cIIsaliullaiisi alYounb ul
Spanish hrllialil)'. busine3s and religious leaders delllalllkd U.S. I"C(ugllJlluli of
Ihe rebels. TIlt' expansiollist mgt' ill Ihe United W,13 lted buth Ly Iho::>I' who
stuod to gain ct:onomio.:ally and by Ihose who prl"acht'd of ;1 U.S. lllis3ioll lu reseu\,
thl' Cuhans from Spanish misrule.
Although I'rt'sid""lIl McKinley n:sisll'd prcssun: to iJltl'!'Velle, l'Vt'llb IIveJ t0uk
hilll. In April the USS Maille' Ill)'steriollsly exploded in II.IV,lIla harbur.
The biaSI, which has never bet.:ll salisr.lclorily expJailwd, :-'Wl'I)1 aw.L)' dll' la.. l
veslige3 01 .llltiwar senliml'nl, and COllgrl..'ss promptl). dcd.Il"l'd h'ar 011
TIll' ill l"lluipped wellt duwn lu humiliating ddl:.ll. Till')' h,td lillIe dlOkl'
hut 10 gr'1lI1 CUO.1 ilidepl"ndeJl(e ill IJt>celiloef I
( 11"-") l'l. 1111011 I)' UlH.ll'r tht' rigid pulidt'::> of the
.... 1'.1111'11 ,,-UJ\"11 lItlllllhc lJourhlJll n.:fonll::> ufCharit') III (17SlJ-8X) pruvidt'd Ihe
""IIIUdi ,1 . 11 IllI tu groh'lh. "'ht' nilll'll'C:lllh Cl'IlIUry saw a bridcuffee boom give way
10 till' luJli".llioll vi tulxll'l..'o, whkh hCC:llllt: a major crop b}' midct"lllury-a
pU,>llltlll It :-1111 hlJld:-1) CUh.11I dg.,rs (jJllruS) l"tll1linut' 10 hI..' n:ganlt'd as among
llll' lilll'..,t III thl' \YUill!.
Hut tl ...: 1I11I)l 1I11I'UII,UII MJllI...X ul wl'.dlh was <11101111.:1" pruJuLI: 1..";lI1e
ElIlpl" .... ,,> Hil bl"g.1l1 ill thl: t'ighlct'Jllh l:t'nlUry. and by 1860 Cuba W3S
I'Il/lIth.lllg Ilt'ally it third tum.) uf tht: world') l'Jllirl' sugur Till'
Iltllll,LI1 puwer lu rud tltb bUIIILl I..vlliinuld Iv (Ume: rrUlll thl' nighlm<lrish slave
II ,Ilk, \\'llllI1 tid iWJ ld murt' Illall 60U,UUU Africans ill dwins tu Culm bel wt'en 1800
,lIld IXC,S. ibdl until IMX6, longer than anywhere dst:' in the
i\llllril.... save Hrazil.
nonUlllil.: tllus oet'n typical or tropic;d America: a
llltJlhllultural. t'xpurI-uril'nlcd plantationsociety.
A...II..lUWll jl'wd urtllt' Sp.lllbh 1'1I1pire, Cuba remained a colony throughout
thl.. nilldt'l'lIlli It'IlIUI)', Ewn eflediw conlrol or the pearl or 111e
i\lIli11I'S sll'adily Jt'dilling 0\'1..'1' lillle. It took ten years or biller warrare to
...-lll::.h .llllo;lrly illdt'pendcnce IlIvVCillellt (1368-78). And by Ihe I880s, Cuba's trade
.lIld wen: alllluslexdusivdy with Iht' United Stnles. The U.S. economic
illl ..... ill Cuba k-d lu 1l11lllf.:rOll:-' to purchase Ihe island (ountry. The
Sp.llli.lld.. illv.lfiably I'dused, .dthvlIgh pruminent Cubans strongly ravored
.ilIlLI'x.. thlil hy Ille Ullited SI;IIl'S, Ml'allwhile, Cuba was drawn l'vcr closer into Lhe
U.S. urhit.
Dubious Independence
Cuba Ill'r new Linda U.S. military uct:upaliull. hardl)'I.l\urahll' It)r .1
1ll'.IIIII)' 3ell::.e ufll.llion.ll illt-ntily. The U.S. authoritil'S
rebd arlllY. lllu:-. rellloving Ihl' unly poll'Jllial SOUf((: III ,ll"Illc.:d l'l'po.. iliuli to
The Bronze Titan
fllf' rno!>t l;1mOtiS AlroCuban of tIl(' centUly was AntonIO M.)cco,
lhe 1I11111.IIY geniu!> of two wars for independence and
1895 98). Bam of a Venezuelan lIluldtto emigre and a free Afro Cuban,
Maceo enleled the ,ebel army as a privale in 1868 and reached genelal
only five yeals later. Having eSlablished military leadership among Ihe u:bels
(despite ,acist sniping f,orn his white comlades). Maceo led highly successful
guerrilla operations in the 189S-9B war. His soldiers wele mostly Afro-Cuban,
and Maceo hllllself had been an oUlspoken advocale of abolitIon, Ihl.'teby
alousing white lears that hl: wanted 10 establish a "black lepubllc: [ven
Winston Churchill, then a young volunteer with the fOlce.., It.'peatt"d
that prediction In a magazine article.
Maceo was killed in 1896 by Spanish lroops who caught hhn in an ambush. I'll.'
has ell1ered Cuban history as an exemplaly pauiot and soldier. He had lalth thot
Cuba would create a rightful place for AfroCubans. I'll' also US. entry
into the 1895 war. arguing -I should not wan! our neighbor tu blvod fUI
our cause. We can do Ihat for J
12'1 l'ARTTWn CASF CII/\NGEOVER TIl\IF
Americ,lIl rule. The occupation was a textbook exitmple of what was regarded as
"cnlightenccr inlervention. The North AmeriGlIls built hadly needed s<.l1ools.
roads, scwers, and telegraph lines. Llut it was all in the service of intcgraling the
now -civili7.ed" Cuhnns within Ihe U.S. sphere of innuencc.
U.S. govcrnmcnt Icaders saw thcse cconomic. moral. and politic,,1 rcsponsi.
hilitie.. all going hoHld in hand. The Cubans wcre allowed, cven encouraged, til
choose:t convention, which produced a ch:lrter in 1901. Hut the U.S.
government h:trhored doubts ahout the new country's "hility to govern itself. so
Washington forced the Cub"ns. under protest. 10 incorporate a provision (the
"PI:111 Amendment") which gave the Unite(1 Sinh's the right to intervene in
domestic politics nt will. This stipulntion made Cuba nn Americnn protectorate.
Around this lillie, the United Stales ;llso leased rights for
installation of a nav;ll b;lse at Guanl:lnamo Bny. In other words. the U.s. govel'llment
;:lccplired a pennanent foothold on Cuban nationnl soil. This agreement w(luld have
unforeseen consequenccs more than a (entllT)' later, as (;uant:lnamo came to he usc<!
as:l detelliinn center for slI!'<Ipects in the U.S.-directed on
C:uh:l'!'<I fir!'<lt rre!'<lident. Tom:l!'<l Estrada Palma (1902-il), favored outright
alll\l'x:ltion hy the United States. lie was 1}1)ic::l1 of much of the Cuhan clile,
which saw little future f('lr olll independenl Cuh:l, Their willingness to embracc
Y:lnkce encroachmcllt arouscd the fury of those few Cuhan n<ltion<llists who kepi
nlive the n:lllle of Jose M<lrli's dream of a Cuba (ree from Yankee domillancc.
Estrada Palmil WOIl a second term hy c1ectoral (raud. The ensuing revolt. led
hy the defeated Liber:lls, broughl :l second U.S. milit:ll)' occupation (190(, 9). The
United States imposed <In interim presitlenl. Charles Magoon, who oversaW;l ncw
eleclion. Fmud recurred, however, triggering :lnother U.S. military intervcnlion in
1917. Alilhese interventions presentcd opporlunities for U.S. economic inlerests
10 deepen Iheir hold over Ille Cuhan ecollomy.
OVERVIEW: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE
During Cuba's yeilrs as a protcctorale, it underwcnt a great sugar hoom. Cuha
emerged as one of the worlo's mosl efficienl sugar producers. helped by the
modern vacuum methods of refining. As oUlplil increased. sugar camc 10 c1om-
in<llc Cuba's econom}' <lllcl, eventually, 10 have a lasting c(fecl 011 the class structure
:lnd socinl rcl;ltionships.
By Ihe carl}' twentieth century. as shown in Figure 5.1. Cuba was producing
seveml million tons of sugarcane per year-nearly one-quarter of the world suppl)'
around WorM V";lf I. <lhout 10 percent of the tot;ll during thc Depression )'c;lr...
and closc to 20 percellt jusl after ""orld War II. Throughout this entire period.
sllg;lr exports earned approxiJn<ltc1y 80 percent o( the island's foreign exch:lnge.
Such Jcpendence on a Single product obViously placed lhe Cuban economy in an
ext remcly vulnerable positioll. If the harvest was poor or del1l;ll1d was low or price!'
were down. Ihe Cuh:l11 economy would suffer. Sh<lrp decline!' in product ion during
Ihe I
l
HO!' and 19.50s illu!'tratc some of the dangers o( this situation.
1\llnlher fealllre ofll1c hoom was ... 0 11<.e 11 t 1',11 1011 III o\\,lle, .. IIII', 1'''1''
... iall}' ill Ihe hands of Al1leric;l 11 io\'esltlrs. After Ille lR7Ch,llu' 111'\\ In
particularly railways.stimulaled:l r:lpid reduditlll inlhe 11I1I1l1>('I 1l1"lIg,11 III II I..
(from 1190 in 10 only 207 in IR9<J). 'I'll<' inek-pcndellt gl!l\\'{r". wli ....,
sll1all- alld llledium!'i7ed (;lrllls had I'rnduccd rHo.. 1 "I tilt. ,.IIlC hd'''I' lh,
IR70s. no\\' c;old out ill wowing numhers tn Ihe I>lg "lIg,l!" \ '1Illl'.llli\ ... I'll'
large firms controlled more thall 10 peru'llt (Of .1111.11111 ill ( 1Ih,1. Ih t"", lh.
Ilumher o( sugar mills h.ld drnpped In only 11H. ,11111 Iht")' 'lIlllltdlf'.1 I''''
per(enl (\1 l.t1han land.
Thi .. UlIlcentration of mill and 1.l1ld IlWnc-r.. hlp \V,I" ,I ILIIlll.l1 r('''1111 "I ,h..
tIl,Wller in which Ihe sugar hoom had pmlccdetl. IJndc-l' Ih(' .. hidd tlllh. pl,.I.-,
lorale, lJ.S. illve!'lnrs poured capiLli intn the huilding nllllndClllllldl .. (,,'/1111111"
and Ihe consolidation of lall(' gl'llwing lillHl!>. All1c-rilan "Wllnl Illill .. 1'1,,,111., ,I
only 1.5 percent o(Cuba'!, !>ugar ill 190(" hut h)' 1')lR their .. It,1I1" le.hll,,I.d''''11
7"" percclll; hy 1950 it stone! at '17 perl'ell!.
Till' tech nolog)' of !'ug;ll" produci ilJll ,llk(ll'd l.\hl'l .1" wdl ".. 11\\ ,H'I .. II rl' ,11 .. 1
IH<lnagelllclll. Cllltiv:lti(m l:llnC to requilc !>\.lk \..'I.rkt"I.t'_ ( ,IIU' ,1t1"I .. I,'
he rcplanted onl)' perioc!i(,lll}'. al inlen:al .. 01 t1Vl' ttl tW..llly 11\'(' \'(',11" '11"'1.11.,.
Ihe principal need for l:lhor i.. for thc har\'c.. I, or 1l1l1.. llr "1'<'111 I'll I h\ .11 dll"u'.
(;I!lC with Ill:lLhele" rile rc-.. t o(llIe p.11 \\',1" knnwll III ( tlh" " .. Ih, ,1,.,,1
"\'<l"on" of witle'il're<ld unemploymelll anti 1lIltl('I"('1l1 I'll 'plWIlI
nllt workers had nowhere tl' gil. Ik....l'l .. e t.1 Ihe ell'\III""'" 1'1.1111.'11"11". 11 .. \
cnuld not lease or p\lllh,'!>e sllmll ,,\;'lk pltll-. 011.11\.1111, Illl II 11\\"1111"(". I'
w
"
,
til
c
"
7
\Y\

"
<;

,
Figure 5.t Sugar Production in 1880-1998
....,.,.".,;, II "
Fd,IOIli'tl de ( I"nr-I'K 50oal{'... I07Al.lll. A'lhttr "'''',' I W,lfl Rrvol"'/OII ",,,t ''''''''/11" , \,.j ','" "1'"
(Nl'w YOlk Mallin'., Pl'('.,\. IQR1). 0\(,,11 1\ r II'It"'V.lffl.l.( lIb.l ,1"d 'II" 1"'''rn.III'''' " '''1-'1 !
of The r,flh Anrl\lal MlV'ltrlq of tllf" I\.,',o(!it',flfl "" 11,... '.I,,,h" I rllf' I "I .HI "j' .. " '" ",
10 1).1<)1)';. Co II,)ocll)('Iq ,lnd kl"'; Alval!"'. 'llI',tow,,1 (1v... \.1' 111>" (". r .f" H' I" h'" ,.
Imn"(,111l11l\ lor 'Ill' I \lIllie: nf food imll A{jl" 1I11,rr.ll '., ,r", r', II", ,f'r .'1'" .111",,,1.> f. 11(1 I .".,
WilkiP. ('It. III A/lI/IO( 1 t)f 11/1<11 AIl,rlll" I) (I " .. />," Wlr\ III I/>. /111111
w,Llllnlll. kl'ql IIll'II1 Ill',11 IIll' 11lilb, ,IV,IlI,lbl.: luI' work, and fur Ihis Ihe)' J .... vised
1,llliL", ('Ill' 10 pUrdl.lM.' a share o( C,1I1\. from illdt'pt'nd('llt
grl''''l'r.. 111',1111)' whIt would .. han: III .... of labor with Iht'Ill, AIlolher was 10
lel "'UI W) 11110 ddJl,::>o IlIl'y would ft'III;'lill lliider oblig<ltioll 10 11ll" own.... rship.
A IIl1n.l W.I" III l'lh..lIUr;lgc: 11ll' lurnHltiull uf Illud....st urban sdlh:lIlenls, called
111.11 \"utld lfe:,lk ,,urklllg-"'!.I::>::> olllllllunilit's.
Ih ,I Il' ..llll , CULM Illl' Uppl'.l!';.lIlCe of a rur.tl prolt'larial, .1
tJlIf' Ih,ll ,iii kl ,'J W'l',llly fl o III .1 ,1,1::>3i,- \,Vurker::> in Ihe mills .Iud
111111" ::.,Jllb WlII'!.Lhorl'r.. , Ilt/I I.. rlliers, Thl')' were concl'rned more ;,lbOlll wages
,L1HI ,1IIldilhIJl" IIl,11I dhullt lhl' of land,
J\1'III:UVl'r, till' rlll,ll h;ld illlillHlll' l-ontact wilh tIll' working class ill
lilt', llil .... 'I Ill')' olll'll Illigr,llnllu urhan arl'as, living in IllI:: kind of::>lllll1S thai hav....
l"Jlll' III dl.lfOllll'li/1' Jllall)' vi Lllin Alllt'rica's largesl Il1ctropulisl'S: k.nown as
ill Ml';..h:t) allli JlIw/.b ill they acquired ill Cuba till'
... tlll.1I III' II,LIIII' I II vl/tlll (-, \11111' .llld :'1'11 k'''). And tht'il' rt'sid('nIS were blighled
II)' IltlVl'lly ,llUl dep,.ivaliull. Onl)' 40 pt'rt:cllI of UrlXlll lowa-di\ss had
Ill:.hk Ittdd:lo, 0111)' 40 pl'ncill had Il:fng.... r.ltiull of an)' kind, alld as llIallY as a dozen
pl'tl11lt'lhl'J III a :loillgh: (Illlll"
(:tnll.ld .lllll UJllIlllunil'alloll hclWl'l'1I urban and rural dellll'lll::> of tht' Cuban
wurklllg wtJttld l:'VClllu.t1ly 11,1 VI' ,I cfft'ct on the COli he 01 tht' ...-OUlltry'::>
lu.,IOI lin ,llI:lo1- Ihl'y pl'f1llilkd Ihl' MIll ul unifll'd, ::>Od,ll IllOvenlt'nt lhal
1i,1" bl'l'lI !"\llld ... tll,lrl'iy III L.tlill t\1l11'ril.t.11 b wurth IlUIlIlg, too.tllallhechurt:h
11!.I}'l't! 'IIII) .1 1II1Iltir lull.' ill CUh.111 Intl lradc uniuns Ilad a alld
pH".IlI11U... lxi ... ll'IIH', III IlIhl'l Wllllb, till' oUlluok and bdl3vil1f of Ihe Cuban
1.t11111111J!, Wl'l'l' 11011 ullldlllUlle:d ur cuntrollt'd by exi::>ling
\Vt'lkl'l'" WtHllt!, iJltilllC,lll' OlV.lll.lbll'lul' Illohilizalivll.
l\k.lll\vlllll', Ihl' lIllitnl SI.III'::> hllllt up Ill(lrC ;Illd llll)rl' ctlnlrolovt'r thl' Cubnn
n'll1tltll)'. Nill nlll)' dId 1\IllI'rit.LlIl:'apit.d lakl' IIVt'/' major ofplanlaliulls
,Llld Inill ... , lltt' Unih'd St;ltl'S bl'clInl' h)' tar thc customer fur Cuba's sligar
,.'(]lUl'" ll:lotL.dly 7:. or XU pcn,enlllflhl.'lutal. Through it all, Cuba was
dq"'lltl"lll 111'\111 U,S. lUI 1111' 1,Ilt' uf it::> major indu::>try. And U,S. sugar
illlplill IIl.llt y W,L::> lIIV,lri.lbly;l lupic vll,rulonged debatl.' ill Washington,
Nl'wl)' IlIdl'pl'llllt:lll CUh.1 1i,ld Uriglll<lJly signed a reciprocal (ralk treaty in
It)(U \\llllll g,IVl'l,ub,111 .120 pl'rt:"ellt redUClion from the l'xisting U.S, tarilfs,
II1Idlllll, l :111,,1 Il:dll'-l:d it::> 1.lri! b Oil AIIll'riLan goods by 20 to 10 pl'rccnt. For tht'
111.';..1 Ildrl)' tr.ide J't'btiuns grew ever c1ost'r, il::> the Cuban
,-",_01 lui II)' lor .dllllkllb and inkgrated into Ihe U,S. ecollomy,
U.:". InVl-:lolol'::> ill Culla might well havt' smiled over their good fortunt', The
l'ltd ul Wllrld W.lr I hold bruught <l widl'spread food shortagt'. and all exporters,
CUh.1 llldudni. hHIlld Ihl'IllSdVc:'s r.lShing in on near-pank buying conditions for
lULlllllU,-hlll'::>, A tht"1l (.HIlt' ill Prices suddt'nly plunllnett'd. and the
v.lllll' 01 IIll' "'I"0P In lillll' mure Ihan one-l.J.uarter of Ihe postwar
kvd, '1111' l'll::>ui ng l.rbb h:lJ a dl'vOlstaling t'(fl'ct on Ihe l'conomy, hilling especially
IIIU:'I' I uI.d whust' exi:.lt:IlCl' pre(ariOliS eVt'n in best of times.
A steam-driven engine hauls wagons of sugar cane to the mill in the early 1900s,
(Courtesy of the library of Congress,)
With Iht' ullhe world t',--onomy in Cub.l::>uun::>ullt'rt'd luI' il::>
(.:loOlIlt'what IIIvululllary) dl'pt'lldl'Il11' vn one: Inlding p.. rlnt'r, lilt' Congrn... ,
trOlll tilt' ::>Ug.lIhl'd pruJu":l'r::>, p.I::>::>\:d thl'
tanf! III bunlenlllg Cub,Ill, ::>ug,lr h'ith 11I.:W dUlil'::>. Thb lHl'rdy lilt'
011 lhc ::>I,lgge:f1llg Cub.tIl ::>ug.lr l'... ImunlY. whith (UIIII.ldl'd :lol'vcrdy, The
unl), bright ::>pul ....tlllt: wilh Fr.lIlklill .13wlnlllil1ll 01 I'I)\VI'l" in
ill 1'-)33. Ruo::>.... vcll alld tht' IkllIU(falil.- (:ongrl'::>s hruughtluwt'l" tariffs.
In Congn:::>s mandalt'd flxt:d <jllul.IS alliollg donlt'stic and forl'ign suppliers of
the U,S. sugar markl't. CUb:l'S lluota \\Ia::> 2M perl'ellt, :1 sharI' Ihal endured, with
l1lodilkatiolls. unlil IY60. This pl'UvisioLl g.IVl' Cuha a privill'gt'd :1l"leSS to Ihl' U.S.
markd, II abo tit'd Cuba It> lilt.' will ul 1111' U,S. whk-Ii lvuld lhallgl.' 11ll'
It'gislaliuLl al allY lilllt', II .tlllhl' vullll'r;lbilily whil.h illdcpellllelKt' had
bruught Cuba in tht' .... ra of AIl\t'ri(a 11 dominance:.
In Stllll, the rdianct' on produced Illixt'll blt's::>illgs for Cuba's l'I..':OllOlllV
and socit'ty, It LJroughl I..':oll::>idcrabl .... pruspt'ril)' 10 Ihl' t'slwdally in
uifra )'cars. bUI it abo crl'nlt:d a volatilt- ::>ocial SlnKlurt'. Olle ill which and
urban e1l'lIlents 01 ;1 long-depnvell working class maintained Clllnlllllllic.lI ion with
each olher. Tht' top of Iht' sodal pyramid was uccupit'd not by landlords.
as in classic haciendas, but by furdgn or Cuban owners who oftt'n
lived in Havana or New York: Ihe Uppl.'f class was absentee. Therl' was a sizable
middle class, at k'as! by Latin American standards, hUI it was all amorphous
lhat lacked cohesion and sdf-t:"onsciollsness, A::> Maurice
Zt'lthn once observed, this combination of (actors was bound 10 Iww ib dTeLt:
entt'rprise in Ihe COUIlII')'sidt' the illh:rminglillg uf indmlrial and
.'
12S PART TWO. CASE CIIANGE OVER TIME
POLITICS AND POLICY: PATTERNS OF CHANGE
:lq:;ricultuml workers in the sugar centrals pcrmc:lted Ihe coulliry largely with
capit:lli!'t. nationali!'tic. sccul:lr, anti-traditional v;lluc!' :lnd norms of conduct. In
this !'cn!'c. the country was prepared for dcvelopmcnt-Ihe only thing kIcking
bcing the rcvolulion
Cub:ln govcrnments in the 1920s and 1930s wcrc :lll1ong thc most corrupt :lnd
hrulOlI of the repuhlic's hi!'tory. Gcmrdo Iv1OlchOldo gOlincd the prcsidcncy hy
c1cclinn in 1925 and soon llscd his cxcculivc powcrs to make himself forcvcr
\lnhCal:lhlc al the hallot hox. Machado's repre!'sive IllC:'I!'ures Olnd Ihe growth of
nOli iOll:'llisl opposition, cspcci:llly among studcnts labor, broughl oul 1hc
uglicr renlitics of the U.S. protcctoratc. When thc global Deprcssion hit. Cuba's
export-oriented cconol11Y !'uffcred badly. Thc bottol11 dropped oul of world !'ugar
priccs yct :'Igain, and thc Cubnll economy conlraclc<! even further. Total income
plummelcd, and uncmploymcnl mushroomed.
Economic distress provoked political conflict. Opposition to Machado included
:l co."tlition of students, labor Icadcrs. middlc-c1ass reformers. :'Ind disgruntled poli-
ticians, heJd togcthcr by a common hatred for thc dictator and a common aspiration
for a more honest and mnre just Cuba. Anned plots abounded. Machado's police and
milit:'l'1' bore down with morc rcpressivc measures. The United Statcs. so attentive to
some other kinds of deviations from democracy in Cuba. stood b}' passively"
Fmnklin Rooscvelts election victory brought nn aClivist to the \"'hite Iiolise.
While Washington assumcd a morc critical stance toward Machado. the Cubans
took matters into their own hands. A successful general slrike in Augusl 1933
helpcd prod the army toward undcrclilting the dictator, who fled Hav:'Ina. Now
opinion bcg:'ln 10 pol:'lri:;,.e sharply. Thc young radicals dominanl in thc provisional
governmenl joined wilh :'Irmy cnlistcd men. Icd by Scrgeanl Fulgcncio Batist:'l. This
"This nqlJle is lor estimaTed "purchasing !'lOwe'" in the 10{.11 <,conorny. Thp aOu;"!r
dollar figure would be c10sel to $3500.
SOlJlln: WOlld Bank and Country Prome and Dernogr;"!phics. Dala on glos.. domestic product
,In<l poverly levels are not available. J
Death at the Microphone
alliance look over lhc governmcnt, I{ooscvd(!'> Illgh le\'eI t'11\'ll}, :-011ll1l1,r
\Vellc!'_ Thc new dvili:'llllc:'Idcr W.IS Ranuln <;r:'ll1 S;ln /\l.lrlill. ,I l!tll.1111 l'lllk....."r
and long-tillle hcro 10 Ihc studenl lefl, wilh whol1l ht' had im.lri.lhh- "I,kd
"Soviets" werc formcd. followed hy OCCupOilions 01 l:lll"rir... ;11,,1 r.llltl" Ilw 111'\'
g(wcrnmcnt prociOlimed :'I !'ociali!'1 rcvohllion.
\V;lshinglon hccame deepl)' worried over lilt' Idr\",\f,1 hlln h\ II.
protecloralc. U.S. N:l\'Y !'hips look lip sIal ion .. pfr Ihe Ctlh.ln In.I ... I; old ... 1\1,
intervenllon seclllcd ne.1r. Hul :'I new stronglll:'ll1, I,) 1111111\' 1111 ,,,h.1II
fnnnul:'l fOl llnding power .11Iel WC:'lllh, was ;llre.ul}' IIIl "'l.lgf' (In "'1):11.11 hOIll Iii,
UnilCd Siale." B:'Ilisla ca.. ily lIllsled Crall and Ihe r;",,11I ,II ... 1\ h"lll 111.111 1"",,1,1, 111
Olcceptnblc 10 W:1shinglnll W;1S soon arranged. and 1111' f.l,lt, . 1... 1111' n.III"II.oIl ... (.
and the rerofmers warched wilh hiltct"llc..,s as (:uh:J11 polili, .. 10'1111111'.1 ",1>11"'111''''''
as llSl1:'11. U.S. hegcmoll)1 was Sll ('!"Iain 111:'11 Vl,l:-hillgltHl had rill r1I'lIhle .lgrt(IlIJ: (.,
abrogale the I'lall Amcndmenl ill \93'1. The ll.:-O. 11:1\',,1 h.l ... c.lI 1011.1111.111,1111" \'.1"
lIol affClled.
Fill lhc l1CXIIWCIlI)' five yc,II". <:lIhan !,,,Iili, .. w.'" tl0111l1l.1Ictl hr I'ulg, ,I< I"
Bali.,I:\. HClwccn 193" :'Inti 1t)'IO. Hali<:IOl rail hi .. l.(Il1l1l'y llllllugh pu!'pel I'"
sidcnt ... lie ruleel direclly from \<)40 In 194", IllC11 w('111 h.hk In.1 1",11111\111.,
scelle!' role as Ihe oneti,ne melical San M,lrllll 1{'111111(',II" Illl. II/t.... lnl, \
(1944-4R). There wa.. lillk lefl of CrOll! the uk. I",I, ,IIHI IIII' "1'nl,HIe ,.11.1'.
de..ccnl inln Ihe ncther \,",odd ofCuhan polilit.::JlllllllIl'lllllllllc/l'h dl'qlclll',lllw
disgll"t :lnd moral fllry hll 1"111 IIg inlhe l;"Idil.:JI<:and 1I.llion.tll"' .... (rI.lI'-" .. Ih ,1"""., 'I
another Halisl:'l fronl IlI;tn. \\':1'" C,ld.l<: Prin CI') 11'\ .... I.1 Iltll .... '-11
rClook lhe presidential rein" III ,\ (OUP :lIHlllrlHd"rlll 1111",1 \"1111 ,1,,1 . 1,111. 1
powcrs ( I 952- <;9).
Cuba of the 1940s anti 1950.. hold no beller knoWIi r dlo Ih,IIl Ill"
vnliltile Eddie Chib,l!>. His Sund.ly ('v('ninq proqr.llll Wft .. li';I"'IlHl'l lflr nlll
lions of Havana residents. especially the middlf' c1.1"SC'" who If.. .pnt ... ,j Ill... Iyr", .11
milchinations of Ihe political esl.lblishOlenl. Chib.ls W.1S .1 th(' IMICI!('I"'r Ilf Ih'
opposition Orthodox political pMly. and he pO\l(l"d fOrlh "'I)(II... .. IIIW.llv'"
againsl the corruption and hypocri..y of Cuban polHi",
In July 1951 he launched wild cOlluptinn chiHqr's .1(pmo;,l Ill'" ...dllt.l11''''
minister of President Catlos Prio. When challenged. C111b,is f;ul('(1 It) plOdll' f' Ih,'
promiseO proof.lnslei'ld he wcnt on thc air wilh i'I paso;,ion.ltf' .. ('If et"f... n (Iyin"
out to his fellow dtizens: Comrades of OrtodOXlii. forwald! Sw('cp i1W,ly Ih ,lu('vC'''
in the government!" A pistol shot then rang out Eddie hftrl shol hiOl.. rlf in 111('
stomach. Evidently he had meant only 10 wound himself wilh i'I d'iUllftll( <I' u, ...
that would galvanize his lisleners. Unfortunatcly. howevc(. h(' h.1(1 qnn" off Ill 101
just before pulling the Irigger. ChilJo"ls died len d.,ys lill"'1. I II .. nwn p,uty (0..111 IIIlT
"9ree on i1 successor and wpnl inlo rilpid declin('. Th(" sl"II" w;"!<, V'I (fl' Ill'" 'm.ll ,\. I
long rUle._
t 1.3
99.8
I.,
.500
78
Population (millions)
literacy (age 15 and over) (%)
Unemployment (%)
GNP/per capita. in purchasing power' (SU.S.)
life expectancy (years)
Cuba: Vital Statistics, 2007
Ii
III h.dily, (:Ull.lll .llId I'0llli ..... lilll ..., ... hange bllwl.... n 1')31 and I')SlJ.
'111"" fUlility .... 1111... ...-l ....dlll.t1 1l1' ...;lI ....dly delllolbtnlteJ, ;,IS tht' p('rennial
.. lltlllglll.lll (y...... ll'ld.I), f\o!a...:h;ldo.loday H.ltbl.l) wurked hb will. The hOllesl oppo-
... 111111 ... I.lllllnl .llld :.Ifuggkd in v.lill. \Vllal llad Ilappcllcd to Ille revolutlunary
kl VOl 01 J""\ S? \VllI:I ... w.I:.llll had:.o frighkll ....d Wilshington? ItlHld
gil II...' III... W.I)' 01 all Cuhan natiun:.llbl IlIuvl'mt'IlIS-rendcrcd impotent by the
IIl1hl.ll.dlk .dll.llll': lit Ille CUb.11l dltell, thl'lr polilic.1I and lIlilit,lry hO\lllJmaidens.
.Ilhlll,h.k 0..;.1111. II ull(' '1.ld (I:.knllllo"l ill 1959 \'lhclha tlldr link bland
lutl .111) \,.h.llh.... <II Iru... indep\,,lhklh.."l. how man)' wuuld have \"Iarcd sa)' ycs? Vcry
1...\,. 1\ 1".. 1t:dll\" .111,.'...1 CUh.lIl:' LHll,.loubt""llly Ihuughl that tht' besl Iht'ir <.oulli r)' could
Iltll'l,. 1111 W.I" Iq Will .1 lew advanlage:> .11 thl,. llIargin. \Vh"l ebl: <."ould un...' hope?
t\ .. .111:'\"1,.'1 ... forth.
III Iltl' 11I",.llIliIllC. powl,.r ..llId presl'IKE: cXl'rcbed it dominaling
1IIIIullhX. llllIu...t1ld:. IIf Nunh lived in Cuba, chidly in llavana.
Ilh'} l-IlJII)'I,.d pdJ\,. "I pl.llt'. Il'ingling wilh IlIclIlbas 01 Iht:' Cuban dite, along
h I1II w....t1lhy I."X 1'.1 Ir 'II Iht:' Ilav.lnil Coulltry Club, the Yitchl Club, the
fl.111.1111.11 Y,hollt Clull.tlld ollll'r sLllial Mall)' mort:'
!\11Illll.lll .. vhitld 1111,.' bl:tlill Iuurbb. and gang:>tcrbm became
.. 11I'11)'1111 HI .. Wllh III\,.' U.:--'. H,llbta WdlOllllJ lIlob.. ll,.rs likc Meyer
I..llhk y oIlld '1'1 JI. Thl' g.lllg:.!l'r!'> ill lurn :.hared Iheir ('arnings with
til\,. di, I.tlor .Hld hi .. IUlIdlllh:lI. I'n... lillltlllil .. pread to GI!l'r to North American
"liB .111\1 .....X IIlun.. h.
U ..... ,tIl,1 Ililhil. fill...d (:Uh.1I1 l.lIlCIII.t alld raJiu a.. yuung Cubans rushed
t" k',lIl1 Ihl,. 1.11l':-1 dalll-l'" ;111.1 ... alch the I'o..:",:cnt of John \'Yayne
.tlld 1\\",.tlYll Mllmut'. I:nglbh wurd:. WlTl' illlorpur,lkd into Cuban Spanish:
feill/O/l (!tOlll\'" rllll) 'Ilal {lid (duubJ...- pl.IY) illu:.lr,llr.: nOI ullly tht' popularity
III h,t"lh.t11 1111 til\,.' (illtrodllLL'd ill thl' I bUI abu lhe growth of a mon
I l', l'lll I'hl'llllllll'IIoJlI,
By lit\,. IllSlh,:1 Nllrlh AIl'lo..:nclll lOIl!'>UllIer I.Ullllrl,. had takl'lI hold in
II00v.III;I .llId tltr.: l.ll'g\,.r prllvindal lllk... CUb,Lll dill'.. bought U.S. :lulOlliubill's and
\\'\,.1I1 IIi,,) (u Mi.lllti ,Iud N...w York, bringIng Ihe hlll'st f,l:.hiollS
.111...1 While: llwir sodal bdkr.. livl'" ill lill: st)'le: uf the North
"llll'I'1I .tll rid I. rlliddlt'-lll"':Ollll' Cuban:. :.trugglcd within a depelldent {'conomy to
.,1,1.1111 llll. U.S....UlhUllll'J' dC:lltOllltlnl by the:ir pft'(arious position.
Castro and the Batista Regime
!SIll II ill 1')27. Fidd Ca:.tro w.I:.111l' 01.1 MllCt.,..:>ful Sp:lnbh illlllligrant. and he
rl'J'lo..:!'>llltl'l1 .1'1 old Cub'lIl tradiliOll-llll,. IIC:ir uf u peninsular whu had
AOltril,I." .IS t hl' Spaniards pul it in tht' sixkenth ct:"lltury. Hut this imllligrunt's son
W.I" 11111 lllll"fl..tl'li ill l'lljuying the comfortahle life his background and training
IIligltl 1I.lvl,. prullli..I,.J. I It: wanll"d to mah a different America.
hdd h.ld lollll\\'('d tilt" palil-primary anJ ..econdary education with the
k .. wl:.. Illl'lI .1 I,.,, I,.lq.!,n:,t:'. lie plunged intu Iltl' turbull'nl worlJ uf student politi"':s.
I It' prowl! 10 Do..: artkllhll\,.. ,HId '1II1biliIJU:'. 1'.1:.!'>ionaldy 1l:ltiOII:t1isl.
hI,.' sto..:l.'red <lear ul Ihe (Unlnlllllists, who wert:' tile organized (If Ill\,.' slud<,'111
group:..
SUUlI aft.... f gr.lduatioll, Fidd bl'gall 11.IVdillg ill L.ltill AIlIo..:fll..I, llllI,.'ting tJlhlT
radiGIln:ltiullillists alld learning abolll olher political rlalilir.::.. Ilis most dr:lIl1ali("
l'xpenelKe camc ill in 19IH, Whl'lI the lolos..al urbitll riut uf tho..: !JogOltlZQ
turned Ih{ Lily upside dowlI for two Thl' triggt:'ring t:'\'t'1l1 had bCt:1I the:
as..a:.:>inatioll of a young and progressi\'t:' polittcian n:lI11cd Jorge Elil'cer C... it.ln.
TIll' populace rose as one and took ova iI cil)' who:>c ;Iuthoritit.. h:11..1 i1bdiGllt:d in
terror. !-idel w..... swept up inlo Ihc wave of pupul.lr outrilgt' ,Iltd, III tltt:" prLKt:":':',
acquired a glimpse of Ihe of popu!.lr llIohiliz.1l iOIt.
Fidd Castro's un B.ltbla's :>tak "'-:Illlt:" str,liglll uul uflhe Iraditiun uf
rUlrHlIIlK Lalin ;\Illt'rican revoilltionarie:.. It wa:. an "'1I"Kk on tilt' 261h uf July 1953.
ag.:liml tltt: provincial .trlny b..trra...-k.. at MOlIl.II,.I,. in tht' city of
S'lllti.lgU. Fldd It'd a band of \65 who .. tort lied the Tile govt:rllmenl
r....:lCllon W.IS swili ruthlt:":.s. Th.... policl' bq;;111 :>I.lllghlt'ring :>U:>Pt'...:h. Fidd ;'llIJ hb
brother Ralll wo..:rl' t.-.lpturcd, trit-d, and selllellll'd III liltel'lI )'e:ilfS ill prison. !Juring
thl' lrial Fidd gave a lung, impassion....d. ramMing .. pt'r.:lh CHi.. tory WiJl Absolw
Mc). little llolkt'd at tht: time but later to belulllt:.1 :>:I... red kxl 01 lht:" revolutlun.
The Caslru brolhr.:r.. \'It're lucky. Thcy .. 1.I)'ed ill prboll unly d ...Wll llIo11th:.
before Batbt ... granlt'd ;Hllllt'sty in an attempt Iu l'Ourt public upinioll and 10
illlprove hi.. polilkul image. GiWll 1rCI,.dolli , Fidd II II lIIt'dl:tt d)' lied 10
l\!cXlt.:O to begin org:lIlizing a lIew rt:'vulution:II'Y Inrll.
In 1956 Fidd sci oul wilh a IIl'W band or ill Iltt' Grlll/tIIll, <Ill
:llldo..:nl With him \lIKe ag.1I1l wa.. hi.. brother It-u'd, 11l1}JC 1'0Iilic:lII), radi..:al
thall Fidd. Also aboilrd was Ernl'sto GUt'vara, a hv""l1ty-seven-ye<lr-old
Aq.:\l'lltilll:' ph)'sidan whu had pl'l'solially lhr.: CIA-cundul.ll:d ovcrthruw
ul radically alltiAIllt'rican GuakllliJ!;1l1 prl,.:.idllll Jacoho Albellz in 195'1. Afkr a
harruwing voyage, Pidd and his fdlo\\' SurvivUh Ht'd inll) lilt' Sit'rra Mal'.. lr:l in
l'aSle:rn Cub,l. horn this forsakell OUlpo.. l, Fidl.."! rdHiilt lebd band and ren.... wt:'d
Ill:. war agaillst Balisla.
Fuld and his top knew thaI a kt:y lu luppling Ualist.1 wuuld bt:" the
erosion uf the dictator's foreign supporl, IrOllt Ullitt'd Stales. Fidel's
lOllta.... ts found the perfect whidl': llerbt'rt Mallhcw.. , <l Vt'tl'r;'1Il lurcigll ..:orre:,pol1-
(kill ofthe New )fork Times. Matthews was :>lllugglt'...Iup Iu 1II0Ulll:lin hideuul
and from thl:'rl' wrolt' a st'ries ofstories whkh exploded 011 tltt' front page oCtile Illusl
prestigious Ilew.. paper in the Unikd SI.I!l:S. M:tllh.... dispatches por-
Ir.lyed I"idd ,IS an idealbtic refor me!' and gave 11Ir.: rebel:. illlt'rtl:lliull.tl statu:. over-
nigh!. Suddl-'nl)' Balista was on thl:' dcfclIsivt: in wurld publK upinion. I Ie was in that
most dangerous of realms-seen to be both brutal and impotent.
As Iheir ranks increased, Fidel's youthful folluwers t:ltColinkfld Iltt' h.trsh and
diflkult world ofCuba's peils:lntry. Tht: rdxb took a strong pt'oplc's
It wa:> the first principle of tht' gllr.:rrilla: rt't.lIJ1 tht' of the: local
nol only for but al:.u so they willllot bc:tray you to thl'
132 I'ARTTWO. CASrSTUDIES:CIIANr.rOVERTIME
The rehel band was still. however. primarily middle class. A few pen"nnts
joined the rehels. but they never GUllC in Inrge numbers. and they never held
positions of lendership. This is hardly surprisi ng. Most revolutions in history h:we
been led by fl coulllerclite, This is not to say lhat participntion nnd support from
peasants was unimportant. RUI the Fidelistn phenomenon was middle cla."s in
origin nnd leadership. Its Inler directions were nnolher mailer.
Guerrill:l w:ldnre is :l lonely nnd dangerous business. Month nfler month
through 1957. the rebels l11anage{lthe e"senti;1.l-to survive, But they failed to score
seriously against the enemy.
Endy 1958 brought S(1me encouraging signs. In FebmaT)' the CUh;lll hishops
issued:l paslomlletler calling for a government of nationalunitr. In r\'fan:h the U.S.
government. under pressure for supplying arms to the repressive Batisln regime.
placed ;:m embargo on :lrlllS shipments to both sides. This move amounted to a
partial withdrawfll of legitimacy for the established government. After i1 general
strike f;lilecl in April 195R. Fidcl decided to hecome more i1ggrcssive. Ikltista's :lfllly
launched a "liquidation II1<\t resulted in disaster, By Augusl the :ll'Ill}'
h"d withdrawn from lhe mOllllt<lins. defei1led hy their own poor leadership nnd
fi1ulty Iraining i1nd hy intelligence :lnc! rledici1tion 011 the rehel side,
Through the rest of 1958. :l savage guerrilla war raged on. There were never
"ny sci It was i1 \.V:lr of hit-and-run. with bomhings. sabotage. :lnd
men!. lbtisli1's reSpOll!;e was counlerterror. Since he could catch the
guerrillas. he sent his against the students and Ihe middle class suspected
of having links 10 the 261h of luly Movement. In so (Ioing. Batista r;tpidl)'
enlarging the support for Fidcl. Ironically. the repression ended up :lllrading new
recruils to the rebel cause.
Support for B:ltista began 10 evaporate, I\S dictator his gre:ltest card to pIa)' had
i1lways been his ahility to keep order. Now even that was disappe:lring, B"lisla and
his arlllY were unprepared for the kind of underground th"t could elude Iheir
network of regular inf(lrlll<lnts, Torture and execution only sparked popular nllt rage.
By 1:'Ile 195R Batista had no desire 10 fight a losing cause 10 the end. I Ie could
sec th:'lt his power W:lS shrinking daily. His <'Irmy and police had become holh hated
:lnd derided. lie Iwd lost the all-importanl support from \ashington. And the
counlry had hecome so convinced of his fall that the economy was increasingly
disrupted as husinessmen and bankers waited for the inevitable. Suddenly. on New
Year's Eve. he called his :lides together. designated a president. and took
orf with a planeload of relatives for the Dominican Republic, The W:lY W:lS now
clear for Piders triumphal entr), into Havana.
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
EuphOl'ia is Ihe only word 10 describe the country's mood in the early d"ys of 1959,
Ficlellwd i1chieved genuine heroic status, The question now occupying the minds
of the middle workers. peasants. foreign investors. the U.S. embassy. and
other observers was. What kincl of revolulion would this be?
t IIha' "C}' I ninny tI".1 "'1.111' I \ :
Fidel enleret.l a politiGll vacuulll. The dvil W.ll h.ul nnl 1I1Il\' dl"'lll'lh" ,I
Batist:l; it hi1c1 hesmirched Ihe entire political t.!a"....11101 it .. 1ll1llIhn.... III
or lesser degree. compromi'iet! hy the diclalnr. The Illtlllll'ntlllll 1I1l\\' I.I}' \\'llh lilt'
guerrillas in the green fatigue uniforms. The rehel .Irlll\, \\'.1'" I" r('IIMill till' 11'\
politic,,1 institution thcrenfter.
Fidel's weatcst as!'el. i1side from his llwn formid,lhlc Ic.ldcr... hq' }:ilh. \\',1\ till'
desperi1tc desire for change among his feIlOl\' (:uh:ln..... Tht' 1'll" ... 1 1111<1('11'1
Ihe rur,,1 poor. It"d never l.otlntc<! for anything in Ihe c1edol.d w<;lelll.
cJ:l"ses in the :mdto\\'ns had precious lillie I'Iwre welghl
The mO"1 restless :lnd Ill,,"t imp(ll'tant "ndal "'(Ylnr \\'.1'_ 111(' llliddle t I.,,,,,.
which W;'IS r(,;ld}' to recei .... e i1 new pnIiIK.llme""age. Ih 1'11(.mht'''' wellhl'.t 01 ..11
c1isgu<;led hy thl' old polil ic:ll c.h..lre. .sell)IHI. tlw)' wei C lIl(l\'cd h\' "l'l'c,d... 111I gll'.llrr
social justit.e. Third. the}' longed lor:l mMe In(!cpCIl<lcnt ('lh.l. Th.11 tllC,11l1 .1 t 111',1
freeroflhe Uniled $t:1les. Yel any :1"scrlilll1 "fCuklllll,llioll..I dlgnil\' W,\ ... h01l111ol
10 collide wilh the Yankee 1,,"('seluT.
1959 wa" a }'car of drama for Ihc Rev'llill i.'Il. 'rhe fll ... t tll.ljl'r 1"llilll,11 111'.1'.
<I rose over what to e10 with the 1:ll'lllrcd Bali.;t:1 offkial ... Willi 1,.1,1 hct'll 't... I'.'I, .. il,I.
for the worst of the !"epres!'iflll. The l"I'Vnlrltlnllaric!> 1l... Olll'd I'l ."hlll.1I r 1'111. "
e1ures in trying their victims. appealing In ... C't1lilllctlh "f ""rtllll.lry 10'
legitimi7c Iheir execulioll". V\'itllin six nIl1l1th"..Ihmll ';'>11 \\'1"(' pill I tlt'.llll.
following trial hy v"riOtlS rCvllhltitlllary (llllrl<;, The"I..' CX('\Ullllll'.. 1111/11111.111',111\
cries of {'"retlau! (tn Ihe wall!). worried lllo.lc,.ltC'" III ('111),1 .lntl ,h"II' '>\"1I11'.lIhl/' I,
;'Ihm.HI. e.specinlly in th<. Uniled
III April 1959 Fidel "cl nut fpr New York. wheR' he \\'.1" 10 \'1'11 lilt' liN 111".1, I
qU"r!er". lie 111<11laged to pnljcctlltc im:lge Ilf i1 n,llltlll"II...1rdol rnn, <,trongh', '111"'\,t ,I
to foreign intervention. hut ;11,,0 lUll :'I I..nmlllUtli<>l , I Ie W,I" Ifl rn.lhll,IIlll'I,I\
cont,,(t \\'ith the ll.S. Anw'rnmenl ",hill' "killflllly \lllliv,Illllg dlt('. cr,l, I" "I
opinion Wilh, for example. a lrillmph"lll apl'c:"",ltll<: ill 11:1 1"\'.11 d :-'Lltlrlllll
Fidcl retuTlled In Cuha 10 CMfY (lut hi.; mll"l 1,ldll.1I lllf'.\'IIIl' til ,I,lt. tilt
Agrari"n ncforlll I.aw of May 17. 19'>1.) The l"w c1111111l.,tl'd lite 1 ... 1.111...
expropri<lting nvcl' 1000 :Itrcs. with I,. Il" 1.11,1 III
Cuhan currency hond.., No foreigncr ... w(lul.1 heilidoit II Iw .1110\\,('.1 In 11\\ 11
agricultuT<l1 land. The expropriated I:lIlds would he IUTIlell O\'el til .. m.,l1 1'11\',111'
holders :lnd cooperative". ANal inn,,1 of Agr.H"ian (I I{ 1\) \\ .1'"
created to implement the"e far-real.hing me.l"ures. (:1 itlt ... III ('lIh.1 .lInl .1I111l... !.
especially in the United St<ltes, hegan 10 r;Jise Ihe abnn, \\1.,<; Ihi ... nol Ihe IlI ... 1... ttI'
10 cOlllmunism? Hadn't Fidcl appointed a communi ... 1 a.. lht' fJl'eT.lling he.\.1
of INRA?
Pol it ic:l I polari7A,lion heighlened throughoul the ycar, Fidel allllflllilled thr
discovery ofa 1'101 ag"inst the Re....olution. Noncomlllunists " Illl Illg Iht' "llllll"II('I'"
of Batista's overthrow hecame increi1singly <l1<ll"llled. A fonner pre"itlellt .,j lilt'
Senate atlacked Ihe agrarian reform :lnd called for Ihe election" \\'hit h I;i. lei h.l,1
promised, The commander (If the i1ir force resiAllcd in prote,t ll\'C"I" .1Ikg\lll' IIlIII'll1
nist influence in the milil:1ry.ln July Fidcl."l:lgrd whnl \\';1" 101 IW(f111.... ,IICtlllH'1I 1
111
1',\ltl 1\\,11" ..,tE
us
I
III' . ill the llIilbt of what he as conspiracies
.1 .tlll.t. u.' II,; 1'11.: I I r II - I
I
- -I'll 'r' fullowed rallies. Wlere t Ie care: II y prun",(
Illl.' Ih. ... o ullun. t c: . '11 d
"I I - 11-110,-1--,1'110 n.:lurH lu tht' premiership. He bOWL"C1 to tht:lr WI <til
Illli 11111 ...1 II .
111 ..0 t1uillg, allllUtlllll,d a lengthy tllOnlhJriulll un
I. . . - 'til'll would lor Illany becollle' a hallmark of
'rhl'rl' W.l'> IIU\\' vrewIllg.1 . .. ,
Ill ..' Ikvollltltlll'S radicalization. tvlajur Ilubt:rl Matos. one o.f I"del:.
]1ldith.al ,dlit'" ,Illd a IUllgtillll.;' rt'volutiunuy, (hose to bn:ak the hdelJst:l
II m' I It- Inigllnl !lUlil till,.' ,Illlll'd lUI ..:cs alld a h:lt.el: "1t .. t.ht:.gn.H\'t.h
I
- , ",II""llet' Fidd\ rC:'llunst' was He JU,h:d Matus and mubl
o . I .
II/nl;l hugc pftll'.lg:tnda co.llupaign ag:tinst him .l,!, a traitor tu tht: !{evo utlon,
I
' I- - I- - I' 1'111 tvhtus lucked away in prison. remained for the
I'ul t I..' nt'xt I,. ...HI,; .1111,. .1 I. ' , , ..
l,d,.ll .. t.1 fl'gUII .. thc of revolutiona.r y many
Matos relllained the quintessential vlCtlln of Stalinist-style
..' _ f b
Iii.' YI,;'.l1 I<}f,U provcd Iu bt' cven mure de":lslvl.' .101' () tht: eu an
Ih'vlllulllIll. I'our ha:.ic tr..'nds look huld: (I) lht: nationalization of the
I
- I ,S -" "'0' (3) the c:'stablishmenl of an aUlhontarwn
(.!) .1 1.11(' lu til.: UVlc U l, . .
- I I (I) lhe hunchinI' or an t:galitari<.1ll socioeconomic pohey,
I 'II 1,.' 0 'Cb
It illl'vitabic thai any Cuhan govcrllllH:111 allelllptlllg to rC<.ISsert 1I:1I1
U'lltful uVt'f ib ..'(unolilY would ('ollidt: wilh the Unikd Statt:s, Tht: major
- -I WI - 1'- I -I h ld discovered that he could buy crude 011 cht'apl,.r
ll.I .. II ....IIIIt"UVI,.IUI. 11,.11 Ill,. , . .
I 1< 1
11"" 1'
-0111 VI,;'l\l''l.uda he urdered the U,S.-owned otl
11\1111 t I..' -.
l"l.lll".1 ill Cuh.1 Iv 1111,;' RU33i.lll crud1.', Although an old law obligated th:m
It) I,.UllIl'h', thl")' refused. Fidel promptl)' confiscatt:d Iht: U.S. oil compallles,
1'.lrti:lIl)' i'll ret:lIiatiun. Ebenhower suspended the Cuban sugar quota
ill Ih" lIlIilcd Statl.'3. ,
'1 Ill' ( :uhall govl,.'nlllll,.llt IIOW lullo\\'eJ by seizing viftuall,y ulltllc rcsl of ,s.
l'l"la'''')'. '1'I1.lt Illl..lud..... l dcctrh.ily and ldepl,lolle (.,IHother prlllle
irril.lllI tn the lIalitll1alists), mills. and lllCkel 11111lCS, Washlllgton reactt:d
Ii)' l'lllh:lrgoilig all lradl' In Cuba, t:xcept
"'JlIh:lIl{u would I.llcl hI,.' in remal1l In phlU: fOJ
lu "IHllt'. .
Thl' ltJ thc Soviet blut.: \....IS neither a cause nor an effect 01 the c1a3h
Willi 1111,.' United Stale:.; it p:lrt.lllJ pared of the same it W.1S:l
, - '-I O'Y ,-" 11,t' Sovicb mil-ht bl' ",iIlilw to commit III Cuba.
'IUI,.'3 lUll tl 1 .. 0 0 II
'1'111' pn.wt'J holda th.tn.lllllost ;:lnyone expected. In 1960. we
(,durl,.' lht' full e":ulltllIli..: brt'ak with the UniteJ Slates, the Soviets a tmde
,1l!.f'e"'IIH'nt with Cuha. $IUO million credit to buy
pnJlliising 10 purchase 4 milliun tons of sugar in each of the COlllll1g rou.r years.
Fidd was Ilt)\\' all alternative sourCe of
.llld thc SlIvil'ls Wt'rl,. gl'lting ready tu intl,.grate Cuba as a socwllSI ally In the
'Illird World. .
Ih'vulutiunary Cuba's slatl,. was l,.l1ll'fging in a piecemeal. ad hoc
hdd Ih:gan hy pruclaiming his commitment to Ihe 1940 constitution, which
B.llbtOi had rl,.IHltli.lted b)' hb ((luI' ul IY52. Thc pluhlelll was.1 UIII,.: huw
to Glrry uut fUllJ.tlllclllal eCOJlomk and 30dal ..:h.lngl,. when illg gOVt:fIllllcnl
institutions wert' St'l up 10 lIIainl,lin the quu. Fidel re3ulvt'd this
with authuritariall effidellcy, as:.crling rtvnlutioll.lfy ... ulltrol uvcr hoy ill3litu-
Iions of tIlt' "bourgcois" urder-tht' J111,.dia, courts. unions, univasities. and
schools.
Though thc uld I....gal :>ySk'lIl reillaillt:d ill plact', thal' lIt'WI" all)' atkmpt 10
clect a ne\\' k'gisl,ltlln:, The 26th ur }uly Mm'CIIlI,.lIt (nuld h.lrdly prOVide .111
It had lIeVt:r dt'v('lopl,.'d into ;1 lighlly knit urgalli/atiull. aud it
\Vas hlr from a political party. From tIll' sian. Fidd rdic.. 1un lhc JIIu:.t r....
and popular institulion at hand: the revolutionary Mill)',
I..He in l'JbO thc gOVt'f1I111t.nt Cl"eal('t! an ilnporl<.lnt Ill'W
COilll11illees fur the Ddcnse of tht Revolutioll (CORs), Locally dli'l.eIl3
groups, they wcrt' urganiud primarily civil ddt'IlSt.'. Thl,. COlbt.lllt Ih!"I,.,lt of
such a Illc:asurt'. Sinn' tht' J{evl)lution also had t'1I1'1llil."3 <.II
humt', tht' CDRs also had the lask of monitoring thl,. populatioll fur (tJunter
revululiollar)' 0lliniuns ur behavior.
The Revolution Sd (.luI 10 (" ..e:ltc new instilulitJll:-i ill pl.Ke of the old. FiJt:1
st'cillcd 10 be everywlll're, Mubili'l..ltiull W:h IhI,;' illl,;'xor:thll' thl'lIlc: IlIObili'l.<.llion
against mobilization sudal and econumic prulJlelib at hOIllt'. To
:!chieVl' goal, a huge militia wa,!, I..fe:ltl'd: by thc I,.nd 01 IY6U il 500,000
nut 01 a total pupubtioll of 6.7 1I1111ioll. Alid nOIiC I,.uuld doulu Ihe Itlelltil)' 01 thc
COllllll:lndt'r-11l-cll ic[
The unly polilk.ll p:tl'ly tu Sllrviw the rcvolutiull.lI"}' tran:-itiull thl,.' Cuban
Communist Part)'. Never a lllcmbcr. Fidd had ":'lrt.'fuJly .lvoiJl'd :Ill)' pasullal
idt'ntific,ltion with the part)'. Hut hc Illade il c1car that .llltkonllllunblll wuuld be
consic!l:!"I,;'d ..'ouillerrt'vululiullary. lie also cnlntstnl part)' with such
as agr.triilll rl'lUl'Ill,
,,"Vhal most CUb.IIlS carcd "bout \Vas [lot puJili..:al slrllctllrl' hili ho\V till'
Rt'volulion would dlangc their liv..s. On scure. Fidel ami his guerrill.l
kept thdr eyes fixed Oil thc pour, t'SpC..:i.llly in th.., l..uulltrysidc.
The revolutionarie3 wcrt' ddermilh'd to :1l1ack Ihe legac), ur tht' currupt.
capitalist Cub::l: illiler"ll")'. malnutrition, and dilapidated housing.
A yearlong crusad(' clli illiteracy ratl,.S in half(Cuba\ illikfacy r<.ltc was alreaJ)'
low by Latin AllleriGl1l standards). and illiteracy virluall)' disappe.lfcd SilllC
then. Sensing the direction of the Revolution. tht: ridl (and mall)' from tht'
middle class) bCg'HI tu flt'c. and Ihe govl,;-'rnmellt <Icquircd a windfall: lhc
refugees' abandoncd assds-homes, offices. farllls-thnt the- st.lle could now
distribu1c.
The IllllnLer or defecturs steadily grew, Most attacked the gucrrillas
fur betraying the hopt' of rapid dlctiolls. Insll.'ad, they charged. Fi..ld and
his dillue werc leading Cuba tow<.lrd communisl totalilariunislll. Must prob-
\lbly were Othcrs also thought it the bt'st tactic to arouse the
United States.
1;\(. PAWl IWO" (A\1 (IIJ\Nt,ltlVFnTIMI
,'.
FRAMING U.S. POLICIES
The Cllhan He"olulion to Ihe Uniled States. Afler U.s.
jllllicylll;,kcrs had !lIng daimed 10 havc relationship with Cuh,,-\,"hich,
in effect. mennt conlrol of the isl;md's destiny. As John QuinC)' Adams put il so
famously in 1R23. -There MC laws of as well as ph)'sical gr:witalion: and if
apple scvcred hy Ihe telllpcst fmm its native tree cannot choose hut f"lIto the
grnlllld. Cuha. forcihly disjoined fwm ils own lInn"tural connection with Spain,
nnd illl.lpabic of self supporl. (all onl)' toward" the NtH,th American
Union. whid1 by Ihe same law of nature ("nnot her off from her hnsom,- (In
Ihl' cl1d. r:Kinl prejudice prevented outrighl nnnexntirm of the islnnd-how (.ould
the United Stales nh.sorh su\.h :l "tlbst:llltial hlru:k population?) But Ihe hask
C(lIlSCllSUS W:1S dear: olle W:lY nr the other. ;1" eilher ;l stale or a prote\.l11rate,
Cuha rightfully helonged tn Ihe United Stales,
In Ihi" spirit, lkl'uhli(:tll" :tnd vOlifemusly dellCllllllcll 1:i<ld
( :,Isl m's upstart The lIot inn this slll:tll-si;ted pl:1I1Ial ion Sll\. irt)' could
ch:tllenge Wnll Sireel's inve"lmenlo;; :Illd \o\'a.. hingtons :Hllllflrity w:!.s deellled to he
:\hsnilltcl)' galling, It ch;llIcnged cOllventional wisdom :!.hollt Ihe hene\'olence of
U,S, powcr, Ihe solidarit)' of Ihe Western Ilcmisphere, and ahoul the forces
.,f hislnric.ll ch''IIlgc. Given Ihe dyn:\lllics of the Cold something hnd to he
done.
The U.S, go\'cfIlment dc"el()petl nntirevnlution:\ry policies in (lVer time,
A<; Fidel and hi .. foIlO\..'crs wer\. "till lighting in Ihe IlltHlillains. the Ei ..cnho\\'er
rntioll heg:ll\ lor :lll :lltefll:ttive preservation .,f the <;Ialll" <luO
tinder another pro-Alllericnn :\utoer:lt. under the fonnub of
without B:tlist:l," The <Iictator's sudden dep:lrtllre al the end of 195R hrought
Ih:tt option to :til end,
After Ihe triumph of Ihe Revolution. (:nstro's naliona!iz;lti0n of Allleric,\1l-
owned enterprises offered grollnds for govcfIlmcnlnl overthrow (:lS in Cualemal:l
in 19S4). Whilc diplolllntk hostilities intensified. U,S, political lc:tdcrs decried
whnt l!ley as Ihe leftward drift of this onetime protectoralc. only ninel}' mile..
ofrthe r10rida coast. intolhe orhit of the Sovict Union, Washington cOllld simply
not ahide a comllHlIlisl wilhin the Western llemisphere, This was the
thinking th:\t prompled the Eisenhower :tdlllinisiratioll 10 sever diplomatiC rel:!.-
lions with Cuba in J:lllllary 19t1l. and to planning for an effort 10
overthrow Ihe Castro govcrnment.
The most ohvious strategy for \Vashington W:l.S 10 support exile invasion of
l.llh:t, Th:l.t was how Jose M:uti h:td returned 10 Ihe island hack in 1895, nnd it was
lhe siandnrd stralegy in C"rihhean-exile politics, In jul)' 1960. the C.IA convinced
President Eisenhower to approve the of an force,
The toughness" of U,S, policy toward revolutionary Cuba becaBlc an issue in
the 1960 presidellti:l.l ,,,mpaign. which rcnturcd Eisenhower's vice president,
Richar(l Nixon, :tlld the rcl:!.tivcly unknown senalor from M:l.ssachllsetls, John
Kennedy, Inlhcir ftrsllelevised deh:lte, Kennedy lOok a more :l.ggrcssive
stance 10w,Ird Cuh:l th;:111 NixOIl-\'I.ho k1ww olll1c ill\' ... ioll 1,1' I
.11l. llli \\'.1', trlllhl"
10 acknowledge it in puhlic. .
II was Kennedy, Ihe oslensihl), tougher \.andul.lle who \\'on II,, .. I
. I.' . , . 1". "II I fl' ,
and 1Il1erlted the (,uh:tn prohlem, Eisenllll\\'er broke Iii" I' I
. ( 11111.1 H 1(" ,111.111 .. III
jallll:l.ry 1961. III response 10 Fidel's demand th.11 the Unilcd .... ",. I II
d' , . \ .. , 1.1 .. 1"" \.
re uce lis emh:lssy III 11:\\1:111:1. In AI,ril Kellllcd)' I "" I I "11
, .,. , ' II ( 11111"( 1'1 c..... II ",1 I"
"ppro\e an exile l,nVaSU)Jl of (,llh:l. \V:lIlling III (Ill hi ...lllti\,"lIlIlIHtll .. 1 dllh 1'111
fearflll of the posslhle cffe(1 1111 wOlld IlI'inioll Ihe Ill'W I'r" .. i I" I "
, . " I 1 \ Illl,lll' nllh.ll
there he 110 Idenllll:lhic U.S. in\'ol,'ellleill II I'rovr' 1 I
. 'II " ,Ill 11"1111 ,llld t..tdld
conccrll,
The BCJY of Pigs
rumors nHl lll1ted.;ltl il1\l;l .. inl1 "Int 11c1I1c.1 I", ,',,1, \.,
, ,.1III j pll l'lld 'I h,
oper:llioll proved :l misadvclllure Irnlll !he 1)('/'11111111/' 1\11,, '1 ' I I
) , . .' Il 11111111" , c' I,ll, ,
I resldcnt Kcnnedy reduced the nile piloted ,Iii' lon'I .1Il.! VtI.,\"I",,, . I
US I "" I". " ,111\
.. , p :IlleS, I lC ITlvaders fOllndcrc(! in nil ill hll .. I "11",1, .", , I
R f r .. 1 1".1" . -11 I ...
I Ig... I he hoped-for 111'f1"illt-:... whidl \\'I'ul<l "lll'l"I"I',II"/"II.II\'/c Ih, ( ,,1',111
defenders. ncver malerialiled. The CUh,11l 11HI\....d 1I10lC ,I", I. .
'1'1 _' " I' . I .It <'llIlll
1e 1Il\:tSlOIl lflg<1des wcre <JlliLkl)' <.,II'ltll"(,(1. Thn' 11('\,('1'1" I , I I
I . f: III . . . l 1.1111 (' In .1. fil'l
t H'>lr,.:t ,:ck proccdllre-he:ld for the mlllllll,1 in" .11111 mlllllli .1 glICI' 111.1 I 'I'CI,III' 'II
I hc I a)' of Pigs COllid nul havc heen a ).:1'(':llrr Inllllll,h f.u I, I' 1 I
I' ." \ .llil III
revo tlIIOn:lfle..s, fhe Unile(1 h.ltl fill:llir "IHIWllll" 1I111'Il!ll'II.. llll.(' wh.11 11,1, I
had nlwn)'" S<1ul Ihey were: a (Ic.. ire to 1111 n Ih' I k I k I I
" I \"t. '.'\ III ( 11 l,l. 1\ 111"11,:11 II ..
h:ld tfled In .scrcen flul Ihe mort.: 11II".IV.I')' ex B.III"',1 1)"1.(... Iht' '11\" .. 11'1',
IIlclud('d more thall :I few who Imd <;C'rn'd lhl' di I" , I 11 I I
. \ ., ", II ( .Illl " .. s"I'I"'III'I"
sClzed on those namcs 10 pro\'(' Ih,l! Illlilcd \1'" , .,
,
. I' d ' . \ .. \\,,," \ \ In /c.. !nJ(' III<'
(lScre< lie Iyrant.
The Missile Crisis
Thc f:liled inv:lsioll marked a walcl'"hed in II \ ('"h", ,'('1,,', "" \\1 I 1 .
, ,., " ... lit II' "II '.
ohvl:us slrntegy h:td failed, \Vh:ttl)l'll()n .. WI'!"C Idt '''1 thl' lillilcd :"1.1;;",)
." fhe ISsue now shiflell to the le\'el of Ihe Slll'crl'<lWCI,>. III 1')(.0 1111.'
had rallied Soviel missiles ill dcfen..c lit (:llh,lIl '>11\.1.111 .. 111 '1111"
thereafter decided Ihey Illllsi hack III' Iheir th,(':I1 hy pUlling llli<;.. dc.. III
Cub:l Iiself, and b)' Octoher 19(,2 II . II'
b _ . 1 ley were IIlsla IIlg 'Ilterme(li,lle 1.lllgC IlH kl'l
ases This waS:ln unl'receclcnled ch:lllenge 10 Ihe hn\.llIll' of lI11hl.lI\'
power. 1he United St:lles dem:lnded Ih"llhe Soviets wilhdr,l\v !lIcil l1li .... ile.. hOlll
Cuba. under sanction of a "" , .' II' \:1 <jualal1l111e on a nll/ll.11'" .. lllplllrlll .. tll
The world seemed 10 011 Ihe edge of lluclenr W:1I, J\llrl ,I LllrllIl
Khrushchev complied. The mis!'ilcs were wilhdr:twu.
C I
superpowcrcol1frnntalion ill Ihc C,rihhe:Hl hnd l.lternl illlpli.:llion.. I",
U )3, hrst Fidel himself . I , ..
C
" ,W.l,S not cnnsu le( al an)' I he re"lIlt W:I': 10
uba, In 1..11il1 Americ:lI C . IS' I"
S ,1 yes. III 0 a. oVlcl snlc I1le III r",..cnlial .. nlllilv 1ll.1Iln ..
econd. Ihe Soviets wilh" ,. .., I
, In.::W t \('11' rnl.SSles on)' h('\.';1I1se hl'\I('II,)
I IX
,
,\"1 "IUPII" UIANI,1 tlVUt 111\.11'
I',\HI IWu w I
t 3'.1
illku!::. .ll1d
Miami :I::. a
uver lOllllllllllblll. Fur pr.ld1l'.11
Ih.. ilntiFiddbta COlllllHluity III
ul Ihe ::,upl'fiurily 01 lapil.tlislll
\VilShillgtOIl rl'gardnl
guvcfllrllclli ill {'xiiI..'.
This long-terlll rdianct' Ull Cuban dissidl'nts would kWl' 1".lldul
Onl' was to give til(' Cuban Aml'fit.:an community ill Miallli illordillak inllu... ncc
uver U.S. policy toward Ihe Castro regimc, As thl'ir lltllllher::. grew and prosperilY
swdled, tile exilcs IOfllu:d a power(ul polilkallorct' within thl..' o(Flllrida. Alld
through a light-wing urgani1atioll known .IS Ille Cllb.l/I t\lllt:'I"ll..'ali
FounJ.l1ioll, Iheir bilh:r1y-allll dfectlvdy-oppollt:'d rd.lx.ltivil 01
hoslilitk::. toward Ihe rcvoluliull;lry govcl"l Illlell I. 'I'u <l l'UIlsld",ral)le l'xll.'lll,
Cuban American:. in Miami managl'll Iu tie the hands 01 dClll'd polith..iall::' ill
W.I::.hlllglun.
An addilional CUllst'<jl1lnt.:1.' was I..'utirdy lInintclltion.t1: Ih", U.S. polil y cJlablnl
Castro 10 export his oppositiun. Over tinh', Fidd's lIlust vuciferuus aitks wert:'
vbligl'd (ur l.'llcouraged) 10 k.lw Ihe.: ,,--olllliry. A::. .1 re.:::.ult, IhI..' 1Il0::.1 rt'::,uIIll.dul
("l.'llkr of di::.lIidt:'lIct' Willi nowht're 10 be found Within Cub.l; il W.I::. III tviiallii.
lronically.tlds prU(l'::'::' provided CaslfO wilh a pulitkal sali.:ly valVl'. II abu .1Ilownl
hilll to taint his 0PPOIlClllll as unprincipled ufthe tltht:'r1..iIld, a.::. 0PPtlrtu-
nistic gusllnos (worms) ralher th:m luyallllbmlOs. Words were.: ullporl.11l1 we.:apun:.
in Ihe struggle::. over Cuban dl'stiny,
U.S.-Cuhan rdalioll:. took an llllCXpl't.:lt:l1 lurn ill AIIl'l :Illli-(:a::.lro
Jbsidt'lilS storml.'d tht:' Pl'ruvian emballsy ill hup('s or g.lilllllg pulilil..';d asylulll,
Iht:' Cuban gUWflllllt'llt rl'talialcd (ilgain::.1 Peru) by withdrawlllg it::. sl'...-urily gUMJ
around Ihe diplomalit.: compound, Word sllddl'nly sprt'ad Ihal Ihe l'mbassy w.!::.
unguarlkd, ;.llld within hours IOAWO Cubans rushed 01110 the.:
groundll. The Castro gO\'t:'fl1mt'1l1 imllOlillce.:d that thc)' would <III be allowt."d 10
l'migrak, along with anyolle dse who c;lrt:'d 10 infoflll aUlhuril ies. TIll..' Inl.lll'xodu::.
eventually climbed to 125,000 peuple.: (including t.:riJllinab deadbcilt::.).
Dl'partillg rrom lhl' port of M;uiel, must went vi,1 ::.JlIaJl cralt proVided by the
Cuban Americal1 ill what b'..'l".tnH. KnUWn.1::. thl' "t\larid bOillhlt: Alter
thai, Ihl:" Castro gowrnnlcnt pruhibill'd llllauthorizI..'d 1..'1lligr'IIiuII tronl Cuha to Ilw
United Slates.
The third and final pillar of U.S. policy toward was all economi(
embargo, In lale 1960 Pre-sid... nt Eisenhower imposed a partiid tr;,tde embargo 011
Cuba. excluding food and mt'dicinl'. The Foreign Assislanct: Act of 1961 pruhib-
ilcd aid 10 Cuba ilulhorized the presidt'lll 10 imposea tOlal t'mlxlrgo upon all
traJt'n with Cuba, which John Kennedy did in respoll::.e to C.lslros t."xprupnaliolls
of properties (notably. Ihose belonging to the Ullited Fruil Cump.IIly
alld International Telephone and Telegraph). This took pl;;K'" in February 1962-
months before the missile crisis of that
The embargo remained in plact' t'Vt.'f sinc\.:'. In 1992 it W.lS ..:udilll':'d inlo law
for the staled purpose of Mbrillging dl'lllocraC)' to the CUb'lll people." In 1996
Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, further restricting U.S. dtizt'llS frolll
doing business in or with Cuba, and ill 1999 Prl'sident Bill Clinlon amplilied Ihe.:
TI,e Hardening of U,S, Policy , ' , 'I' '
, I , I ( 1111 I..... fl..'volulHJlhlry lIot OJlly IIltl'lI::.dll:d U.S.
I II..' :'lIlIYIV.I" ' . . ' I I, The
I
,
I II
"" I Illlliq' to\'\'ard I.atlll Amenca as a W lU l.
IIV t.l::.u.1 1..1.. ll.. l'> S' 'I
' . . C lbt::. Nu lllUrl' socialist i:xpl'nmcnls, no OVh:
I..I'UII II ,lIllui,>l.. bl..'l;l II II.."110 IIhlll..
A
1 .' I' I
' 'I I " A III llle lulltc:xl urille Cold \0\ ;,II', tilt' UllItCI
'Ill'l'd,>, 1I11.lull '\lll('III...IIIII..I..'Vtlbll:::'. ...,
I..1'uld nol .lIld \'\'\lIlId nl'! pl'flilit .IIIY ::.mll fvrm::. 01 I II::.
lIvi Ih'll I'rovidnllhl..' IIJr :.uhse'llit'llt oVl'rl or CO\'ert mter
l

I." l . I bl' (1""5) l'hil-(11J73) Grena<;1

II, ,1,1 ( 1
",.,1) 1111; I )UI II III ll."aJi {l'PU II.. ;.-0.,..... c ,
Vl'HIIl'II'> III., . . ebb' '.
, I ' (II' Itllhl'e}'l'sol \'V.1::.hlllglon, u a t'calllc
(l'nUL.lIldl lnll.l t\llIl..lIl.1 II .
.111 uh'l..d 1..'::''>1111 1111 Ille hl..IlIl:.pht:'rl... . ".
A::. hI!" .. :uIM, IhI..' U.S. gll.t1 ... -bringing thl' rt:'gulll.'. I
1111 "-'Ihl, ,\llIlIII...1I1 1'"II":yll1.lkl'r::. pllr:,ul'll ,I 01 ul.',;del
l..I II", "111'(1"11 11Ir ldugn....11Il1 ami ::.tr,lIlgulatlulI 01 lhe CUJaIl
. '11t'llly nll':-l' l'lIltlll':'o noIlI,llnl.'d in pl.llI.. luI' dCGldt."lI 10 t.:ome.:. _
ll\ I Ill' ;11 .. 1 ,>Ir.llq;)' W,I::. \lrinliliw: a::.::..lssinah: C<lslro. AI Ihe bd,lCSI 01
WllIIl' IIl>uw, IhI..' CIA urdlt:':'oll,lkd llluhipll..' ami <lltempt::.. Such plots
,
1
,1 ,. "'IJllIdill" d 11 .1 lunval-infedl'll diving SUil, and gangland-style
Illl Illl:I..,l ,. () {'>, 0 .. II b' "
. . .. _\,' b 'Inti lu::.1 cuntrul o( prollta) l' U::.IllCSSCS III
::.11I111111IlJ,. (AllIl..lll,lll J\ .1 1.1 v::.::.\:::. . ". '
I 'I
," '\' Illtiun ,>n Ihl'y Wl'rc .IS ...ager as the pO!lUChlllS to
II.\V.IIl:l ."" .1 11.... 1I I II I It; "l U , .
I
' ' ,) 1\ urdin,' tu fOfllll..'f St:'CUflIY
Il1I111\1l..1.... 11U ItUllil II: :'ol..llll:. 1.-1.. 0 . . ' "
, I "I,' IA tUlIk dill'll II!' 11Illin:":1 pari in638 a::.:.aSSIIHltIUIl eCtort::. ag.lln::.t lUll
III .1\., Il , . . . .' I'
I
1\ ", 11'0 b rt'llUrll'd to Iwvl.' ::.aid, "II survlvlIlg assas::.llla Ion
\lVl'!" \ II..' :'0 ...... :'0 "
.I!h'lllpb \\,l'l'I..' all OIYlIlpi.. e\'l'III, I would will thc guld medal. .... A
Till' hdtind Illc::,\.:' .11Ie.:l1lpb wa::. .IS tlawt."d a::. Ihe ... XClutIOIl:. I h,1:
'"1',1"'11111.1111 'I::':'lUlllllll\JlI 1\';1::. IIl,II C.uba:'l rl.'vulutionary .. nl \vas s
I
' "',.,.,, ,I,,'Olll.h till' 1,II'(l' 01 his dwr'l(lcr-unlrusl wOlthy, ruthless, and
pl'!'>Oll,1 lll. . 0 ,.' .. \. I
ht:' h.td t.. kl'n hb cuuntry aw.ty Imm.-ts
1.11111111.111: hUll and I..'Vl1 )'\hlllg would Ch.1l1gl. \Vhal II11S logiC r.HIt'd to :h..knu,\ I
nl 'I..', III 1\\'e.:\'l'l. WI.'I I.' IIll' 1.lctufS uehind thc revulution: illCllu<t1il )', Irusll"lllun, long-.
h '.1 . . I ,opu!;,Ir su,'port for !)rograms 01
:'ollllllll..llllg ul U.S. uunllll.. UOIl, all'- I . .
1.ldit.. .. 1 ..:h.llIgl;'. Thi::. .Ippro.ll h .. bo got 11ll' U.S. government mto Ihe lhstasteful
, , I, I f tatt:' 'l laClk that was later
vi .llklllpllllb Iu ;1::.::..1::.::.111-111:" IOrclglI ll.l( sus "
dn.l.unl ulll.l\vrul by all ad orColIgrC::'lI. .'
'1'111..' lI1..'lVlld I>rll.ld ::.tratl..'gy W'IS 10 I'lIIbr.u.:e Fidel's opponents. 11I11t'
vi Lblllll.I'lI llt'pal lure.: ililak 1'J58, the UlliteJ 51,tlcs welcomed eXiles and
rdugcl:"::' with UPl'Il arms. And tht')' GlIlle by thc IhOllS:.lnds, settling (or Iht'
p.tl I ill lite Miami ,Irl.l-whae.: they furn1t'd a vibrant and successful.
, I I 'b 'I .' 'y beachside resort Into a multi-
C\'l:"lItll.llI)' II ;In::.luflillng w 1.\1 lal ('ell a s 1:"-'1 .' '.
lillgU.11 M
lap
il.i1 vr Al1Icri..:a." Thl..' U.S. guvt'rnment lUHh:d all dissidents
, I 13 "'" I,"'ration W;;lS carried out by antl-
lfenlvlli llghtn::. (r(,lIll'll1bl'f, t It' ay II Igs 0 C "
(:,I::.tru CUb.llI::') ilnd procl.lillied thaI Ihdr l'xodus provided unnllstak.. blt:' proof
III tllIll ....ld II \'\'\lul..l Jlul IlIv.ldl..' Cuh... '1'111.: h.ld
.IIIII\'\' 1111..' '>1'1..1.111,>1 I..':\I'l'IIIJllAIlIIII Clll,.1 Iv pllll..led.
1.16 I'AWIIWO. ,,
FRAMING US. POLICIES
The Cubrl" Revolution utterly unrlcccptrlble 10 the United Strltes. Arter all, U.S.
\l;",d long drlillled to lwve ;l relat illnship" wit h Cuhn- whi<. h,
in dfect, tIleant LCltltl'Ol of the destiny. As John Quincy Adams put it so
falHously in are laws ofpoliticrll as well:-ls physic;].1 gr.lvit:l.tinn; and if
;11l apple severed hy lhe tcmpest frol11 its Il<llivc tree (<l1l1l01 c110()Se hut fall to the
grCll1nd. (:Uh;l, forcihly disjoined from its own unnatllral connection with Sp"in,
and inclpah1c of self "uppnrl, <nil gl':-Ivitate only tnwards th<.' North /\nH.'rkan
I Jninl1. whit h hy th(' samc In\\' ()f n;11l1rc (:lllllnt Gl"l her off from her (In
thc cl1d, r,,(inl prejudice prevented outright annex<ltion of the island hem' could
the United ahsorh sHch a substallti:ll hlack population?) Hut the hask
consensus was Llear: one wa)' or Ihe olher, as eilher a slate or a protectorale,
Cuha right full)' belonged 10 the United Stntes.
In this spirit. Hepuhlican!- <lnd Democrats vociferously dCllounccd Fidd
IIp!-I:,rl regime. The notion th:\1 this plantntion society cnuld
challcnge \-"nll Streel's and \.Vnshington's authority \\'ns deemed tCl he
ahsolulely galling. It chnl1cnged <nnventional wisdom <thout the henevolence nf
ll,S. pnwer, ahout the solidnrity nflhe \"'estern 1lc'misphcre, <llld aholll lhe
of historilall hauge. (;ivcn the dyn;lmic.; nf the Cold \,Var, sOl1\cthing had tn he
donc.
The t I.S. gm'e!'llment developed anlirevollltioll;lry policic!- in stages ovcr limc.
As I:ickl :1nd hi.; followers werc still fighting in Ihe mountain:>, lhe Eiscllhm.... cr
;1drninistrntiol1 beg<ln searching for;1n allernative-prc5erv;ltion nflhe status quo
llnder nlJOlher pro-American ;1t1IOCI'<lt, 11nder the formula of "13fllisfiallisnw
without The dictntor's sudden departure <It the end of 195R hrought
Ih;1t option to <In end.
After the triulllph of the RevolutiCln, Cnslro's n<ltion<lliz<ltioll of American-
nWllcd enterprises offered grollnds for governmellt<ll overthrow (as in CU;ltcm.,la
in While diplOlll;1tiC hostilities intensified, U.S. pCl!ilic;ll 1c':,ders decried
wl1:1t they S(lW a.<; the leflw;1rd drift of this onetime protector"te, only ninety miles
offlhe Florida coas!. into the orbit of the Soviel Union. V/;"lshington could simply
not ahide a "communist he<lchhead" withinlhc Western Ilcmisphere. This was the
thinking th;lt prompted the Eisenhowcr administrnlion to sevcr diplomatic rela-
lions with eU!>;l in !:lrHl:lry 1961, and 10 :lccclerate pl:lI1ning for all effort to
overthrow the Castro government.
The mosl obviolls stralegy for \,V<lshinglon W;lS to support an exile invasion of
Cnha, That wns how Jose M:lrll h<ld returned to the isl;1nd hack in 1895, and it \\,;1S
thc standard str3tegy in C;1ribbean-exile politics. In July 1960, the CIA convinced
Prcsident Eisenhower to approve the t raining of an invasion forcc. ;:
The ofLJ.S, policy toward revolution<1r)' Cub:! beC11l1e an issue in
Ihe 1960 presidential Lampnign, which featured Eisenhower's vice president.
RicJwrd Nixon, and lhc rc1<ltively unknown sen;1lor fnllll Mnss;lchusells, John \.
Filzger;11d Kennedy.lnlheir Ilrsltc1evised dehale, Kellnedy look:l more aggressivc
stance loward Cuha Ihan Nixon-who kncw nl the ill\"I<;illl1 1,1", I, , , I
' '. 11 \V.I" 11'1.1 "
to ncknowlcdge it ill puhlk.
II wns Kennedy, Ihe osknsihly IUlll'hcr 1;lIlllidlte who W"II 11,, I
,
. I' " , 1'1' '''Ie "11' \
alll 11llenled lhe Cllh;].n prohlcrn.
R
I:i... ellhower hroke dil,IH'" ,', ,."
. ' \ \" '''11'' III
January 1961,111 response In Fidel's demand th;1t Ihe lll1ill'll \, "", I II
]
. ( 1,1" I,., \
rec uce lIs emhassy in Ilavana. In April Kenncllv found him ". I
. . ', .. c prr.... llll" I"
an ex,le of (:llha. \'Vanling til do hi ...1I1Ii,nlllltll'Il, .. t rllll,. Illit
fe,ll(111 of tIle poss,hle efl<'(l.lll \\'"rld Ilpini.ltl. tile Ill'W I'tc.. ,d ",' I- I' I
1
. I . . . , \ , 111.lIlt ,', I 1.11
Ilele 1C 111) l<kntlflahle itlvolvc'llCJ11 11 ]'r!lv-'d' ].
. l" " .111 It"II1, .11111 I.lll lid
((lIleern.
The Bay of Pigs
As rUll10rs tll0llnted. :lll invasion loru' ht.: Hkd f", (,,1, \ I
. '. .1 III '1'1'1 1')(" .[ III
operallon proved ;1 misndvclllufC rrom llll' hCI'inllln" A",o,. ,. ,.,
P.'I ' 1" 1-, .. 1("IHlntl" .,' ).lll.
leslc ellt Kcnl1edy reducc\llhe exilc-piltllcd :Iii "IVl'r 'llll1 v,-'",-,' ,I,,, I
US I . . . . ,"" (I .1I1\
" . p <lnes. I he mv.,ders foundered in ,Ill ill l.hll"ell hil (It ""ull . I
H' f!",TII '" UIl1,H.I'.. I,Hl1rl'
") 0 ",llIdl wpuld <;ul'l'"snllr !"Ilal)'/(' rill' I '111'.111
defenders, nevel m:llenah7cd. I he Cuhan ddcllsc.. I'nl\'nl 1111111' ", '" I. ,
TI ' . , I' _ . ,I( I 'It I.. \
II Il1VaSIOIl 1ng:ldes \Vere qUII kly I. ;1 1'1 III'('d. The)' /1('V(", 1 I I ,
1
. C III 1.1' ,I' LIII< C ,,, .11 "1'1
11Clrla )ackprocedllfe-hendfol'lhctll, , .. I .
'1'1 B)' Oil .1111" .1Ul mllllnl,l glll'n JILl 111'(,1,.111 011
1.C Ilgs (ould nlll have hcen :l gn'alc, triulI\ph It'r I idel .11lt! rllt'
rcvoJullonnnc!- rhe Unit S, I I] I- II I ..
... ( . :l ('S 1,'( Ill;! )' .. l(l\\'tl II" rnrCllllnll\ In 10.... \dl,'1 Iltl, I
h'ld alw;lys s;lld Ihey were::l desire 10 lurn Ihe dOlk ],,(k it, (,,1, AI,' I 1
CIA I I . ' ,I. 1 I w
, 1;l( tned \() screen \HII tilt: more l'llsavIII)' ex lYl'r ... rhe I1IV,lIkl"
Included lllore than ;1 few who had served Ihe Ii " I '1 ] 1
. .,l ,11\1'. II \ .11ll 11" !-llf'I"'lln ..
seized nn those names III prll\'e thar the \ flliled SI ",- , . I
,
. ,. d ., .. W.lll" ttl 1(' .. 1"1(, 1111
(ISCree lie tyrant.
The Missile Crisis
The failed invasion ll1<lrkctl :l walcr"het! in (I S (. I -I ' .
". .11 ),111 It "llt'II". \\ ,t .. 11 Itll'l 1111 '.
most obVIOUS slratcgy h:ld failt:d. Wh.lt options werc Il'lt fill the """ . I', ,". ;
'1'1 . t.I .....1 {".
lC Issue now shifted to the level nf rhl' sllj'erp""'\t<.;. III 1'/(,11 N,kll.l
Khr.lJshchev Iwd rall'led Soviet missiles III c1eknsc n! (:Uh,1I1 "tll I.di .. m. Tire
therenftcr decided thcy 1l111."1 hack lll' their hy I'llrtin)' llli .... ile.. III
I
CUha
nnel hy OCloher 1962 llley were Inslalling il1l\l'llledi.ttc to, kr'l
>ases 111 C b TI' .'
,.. . II <l. liS was an unprecedcnted dwlJcnge In Ihl' h.d,ltHe "f Illilil.lI\
power. 1 he United Sf;1tes dell1:1 ncled t h:ll Ihe SOVlel" with\ I r:lw tllelr tJli'<;!-tl('." I rt 'III
Cuha, .1l,llder sanction of:l naval qll:lr:llliinc nil :111 11lilil:,,)' .. llipIl1l'11t... III
Cuba. I he world seemec] I I I - I I .
i . , . . )n_a,Utc on lle ecge olllllcicar \\','1, Aller a 1.1trfltl
!llcnal, Khrushchev compiled. I he missiles were withdrawl1
C The superpower cOnfrol1l;1tinn in the C:lrihhc;1t1 had 1:II;ful illll'lic.ltitlll" r"l
hin,lsclf W;1S nol consulled al an)' The tC",lIl \\',1" 10 1l1.IJ.:C
S
1)", III "allil AlllCnC<ln eyes, inlo a Soviel saldlile ill e""clltial .,,('( lIrity 1l1.,llet'.
econd II S 'I I .
, le. oVlels Wlll( rew their ll1i.<;silcs onl}' hClallse \,Va.. hilll'lnll hc,rdl))
-'
Ill!
",\
:-.1',:-.1 IIllll S uVI']{ ']II\.IE
1',\1<1 J\\'\)" l
" '" " " ..',,,. of US owned cllrporatiolls from
I I b'(il1 I tllleign l.:> ' ,
l'lldJ.
lJ
14
tl
Iy IUO II I. b, I, , I' J'II'ln l:onlinuatillll and cxtensiun uf the
I
I' I 1'''Hll' with <,uua, II ,Irgt: r' , . . I
lUlll llL lug , . f I 'C Ib"n American COllll1HlI1lty 111 ltc
I 11 I' Ilhl' PVWl'l u Ill.: l
1'111 ).11 g,tl It' l'L l:l r FI . I, Till' was perpclUalion of the mosl enduring
11 illll'UII.lllt :.1.110: \I urll.l.
II' Idl' l'llIh.lrg
li
ill 1l111llem I ' _ r II '" Cuban
. rile Idl'.1 hdliml IIIi!> pulit)' .lpl'e.lrs lu be Ihal :.Irangll allOIl 0. lc:
I
'll' '.ld dislOllkll1 Ih.11 would rl'sult III a popular
l'l\IIIIIIIIY \\llllld V.l'JlI:I.11o: WILt!>1 l: '11
1 II ' (I:.I!U rl'glllll' whICh wuuld lead 10 it:. eventual Jownlu . A:lo
"1,".... .I lc':tllr)', nulhing of thl' kind had laken One
" I >II } - .' - I .. t C' lro w,)s
It'l\HII IJlllllhlllld l'.IIIit-r, w.l:.llhlllhc resuurcdu opposition 0 _
. 'I I I hUI III Flurid.l: 11ll' l'xile leade:r:lohip Moreovt'r. the
n"l III Ill. ., " I. blockadc") had enabled
"I trill 'l"l'V Ol:. II b kllOWIl III 1, I.e., I It
lllll,llhll \1 II , '" b, k an 1dowllturns
t' 1... 1Il I .llId to hhllllC allY ;llId.d t'conOIllII..: ae S I. r. I
.\ . policy thus becamc a uselU
"II 1111' gllVI:rJllllt'lIt ,1111.1 it:. l:lIlh,lrgo. J lIlerlcan
I I"
, 1I,l. (, .Uh.1I1 Il'.llkl
"l
POLICY EXPERIMENTATION AND REGIME CONSOLIDATION
\11' d'i -tllllg Ihl." Ua)' ut ill IY61, the cvuld cun-
r I I I. II ." "UI"it' ladlll' Iht' Ill'W Cuba. Thl.' ..::cnlral fa..::t W;.IS that thl'
ll'llIl,tk oil II llV :;, . U . d S'
(, ut III l'llllhllll)' II..'Ylllvnl l'xpurtillg )ug.lr.l.':,pl'l:mlly lu lhe: Illte
,. I . ,,', 1,\ '1"II1inl'd IUlh.llll'cth,11 hUlllili,ltinglkpendt'llct'. I hI.'
I Ill." H'VU \\\:H Il I. 0.., . '11 I
" I"" -,"I ." Ihe Arventlllt' physlClan-guelrl :1 W10
,Il Il,., 0, ..... '
II,
"",,
., llivl\hn.)fdilian <Ullong thl' n:volullonanes. GUl'vala dn:w up a
\\,,,.. I' I , ,. t. I .
I \
'" 1'1", ",Ilidl ":'llltc'd fur a,'rindtulal divtc'rsllKalloll (a le-lmpwsls 011
'(Hll l;lI. 0 C b
) I
"", I":.lri t11'llliun (111l' In.lllllfdctlln' of liglll consumer guO(:.. U.\
... IH'.11 .llll l. ,.
I .' I hL'd 111i:. allluitiuus plan alilid grl'al (antarl. 'I
,1111 1<J1Il: 1l::-.uh:.llad alrL'<.tdy pruvl'J disappuinting. In p.ut. a.'h
f
I' , II lui WL'n: rl.aping IhL' whirlwind ufthe pohcleso
II" )"U I , k I" I IYbl Iht' Cubans had
I');'') 110. pruducllun had la t'll a p lIngl:, n ., ',.
1 . I u HlIlilliulllllns ul sugar Ihe st'(ollcl highest harveSl1Il Cuban IIIStOIY,
l'IO,llll'l . .,.. .... ,I, Ihe 'uvt::rnlllt"ni was
"'"I Illllllil Illl'n... ly dbl'Lllsed Ihl' dellbtl.lIt: neg ecl g .
I. I 0 '11' 'dIII
I
" "r 1" 1"6" ,I", htrvest drolJped to 4.H Illi lUll an
luwlng III . 7 _ ... , .
'11 \Va:-. unly 3.M lIIilliun lOllS, the: sllI:.llle:lo1 sinl.:e: 1945. The fall W;IS or
'"'IH>rl larning:.,
. I . I. II C ba lackc;'d the raw mate-
ThL' ialil.:.ltiuJl drive .. su gUlllg ua( y. U d
"I "I" " S' ce 1960 the United States ha
Ilab ,llld l'Xlwrtbl' tu rush inlu IIll llstna Izallon. III ,
" C 1- .' 1 all U S firms (and their
l'lIl"rl'l'l1 t:l..ollumic embargu ag;lInst lIva, pressurJI g . '. "'.
" ,. "I" " ") t cease trade With Cuba. I hiS
l.atin AIIlt'riGll\ Europe,lll StlvSI( 0 ,
l..'lllhMgu furl..'ed Cuha tu dept:nd largdy 011 lhe Soviets and the bloc .tor
"lluiplllllll. I)ireltiun W;l:lo Iu cOllie from highly c.c.nlrnlized
lil... 1I10l1dt:d alta Sovkl <tllli Czedl patll'fIIs. I he effort was. l.neffedIVl:. a
l
"
" I" aboul umkrwnllllg 3 sOCia 1St
t'>:I>III:.IVl. I',vt:n the ullt:,t:loy
ullll'i., ill thc C.lrihbl,III.
1.
In llIid-1 lhe SOvicb pUI thdr luul dowlI. Thl.' Cubans llIust sluw dUWll till'
induSlrializ.IIion drive and improve their planning. Thc)' llluSt
comparativt: advantage: sugar. Chl' Guevanl resigllt'd. conft'ssing his l.'rrlus. Fidel,
l'v('r on Ihe initiative, now embraced sugill", whit-II he had so rt:celllly SpUfIllJ. III
19C>3 he annoullced Ihal ill I Y7Q (Ialer labeled Ihe of thl' Decbivc Elllk.lvor")
Cubu would bre"lk all for :-.ugar produclion: il would 10 million
lOllS. Like olht.'r plantation Cuba lhu:lo tell irllu Ihl' trap ul rdiance WI ;)
sillgle expon crop,
De:balt.' COlltilHlt'd over :lotralt'gies fur 1'1.OIl(..-"llil devdoplllt'llt and polilk"<.tl
cOllsolidalioll. Slill active in Ihe regime, Che GUl'V;lfa argul;'d lor .111
slratt:gy, a Maoist approach lhat would IUl.llI)' dilliinak Ihl. lllurkt:t and 1I1.Ilaial
The economy would bl: fully colle..:tivil.l'll and dirll.tl'd by.1 cellindizecl
planning authurity, A raJicul break wilh the cupitaiisl past wuuld rl'quire ;1 nL'w
mall," a Cuban who would work for lIlordl (dccuraliollS, publil' prabt:)
and rdleci u IIl'W, higher It'vel of politit::.t1 Ill'rl' IIll' Cub.tll
leadt:'h Wl.'fC going Ihrough Iht' fanlih.lr dilcllllll.1 01 huw tu
rccullcill' tvhlrxisl idealism with a prilglll;lti(" ClUIIOlllk pulk)'.
GUt'vara's idl;'31isiS funht'r argued tlMI Ihl' constructiun 01 a( hOlllc
required Ihe aggrc:losivc promotion of revululion abruad. TIH.:y wankd III provt'
that u gUl'rrilla stratt:gy cuulJ wurk Ihroughout 1.;l1in Allll'ril.il <Inti pt'rhap:. Illl'
I'nlirl' Third Wurld.
1ll,Iin UppOlll'II1 ill 111i:-. dd>;tk W.I:. Carlo:. IC11al,1 Rodrigul.z. all
l'collomisl and IUlIglillll' Communisl PMI)' Illl'lllbL'f. I{odrigutc'z luok ;l Pf:.ll-
tical approalh. 1It.' favorcd ;I mure 11Ie.I:lollled 01 ct'llllal plauning, partial
rclhlllcl' un lIlarket lIll'chanbms, and autonomy lcll 10 the individual
prisc:-.. I k Ihoughl stale firms shuuld have 10 accuUllt for thdr l',XPl'IlS1':' .1IIt!
earnings, In short, Hodrigul:Z and hb allies pruposed d lIlort' cUllventional
palh, rdying 011 Ill<Hl'fial illcenlivt's illskad 01 only llIoral OIlt;'S. Thl'y favorl'd
also a :.lrung part}' and a kflexibk" polit.y tuward I.atin J\llll'rica. This llll'alit
;1 wilJinglll',,>:-, to dl'al with regimL's Illal <Jlll'Vara unly as largels luI'
rl'volLltiollary OppOSilioll.
\"'hile tht: argulllents went 011, Cuba ft:lul'Iling III sugar. ElUllUlllic
production W..IS nunt'lhdt'ss disappuinting, The Yl'ar 1\)64 yiddt'd ;\ 9 percenl
gruwlh ralt: for of the economy. but thai was primarily a GIICh-lip frullI the
declillt's of 1961-63. In IY65 tht: figure slipped 101.5 percenl.less than Ihe rule: of
populalion growth, alld in bt'came negalivl' again (-3.7 perlcut).
in policylllaking was nul building ,I dynamk soci..di:-.nL
At this poinl Fidel broughl lhe debate 10 an l'nel by endorsing Chl' Guev'lra's
idealislll. Cuba would make 3 gigantic collective effort accompJ.nied by moral
inct.'lllives. This immedi:1tdy increast'd Fidd':lo own power, :loin(t: he himself took
chargl' of Ihe now strengthened central planning I Ie: anJ lruskd
lielllt:lIaltts plunged into the: minutiae of econumic llIa1l3gt'ml'nl. The almusphere
fl'called the early romantic days or the Revolutioll- rhetoric. cuphoric
drtc'ams. celebr;;.l ion of the selfless lIew mall."
112 I'ARTTWO CA:-.I. STUnliS C:IIAN(;F OVER TIME
Fidel Castro addresses a rally in the early 1960s; the doves, frequently used <ts a political
symbol, represent the idea of a society at peac.e. (Center for Cuban Studies, New York.)
Along with thi" idcalistic mohi1i7"at;on at home wenl a stepped-up cOlllmitment 10
revolution ahroad. Cuba sought out guerrilla movcmcnts across 1...11in America,
offering arms,lraining. :lnd experlise. ehe Guevara spearheaded the drive. 1\lways
a heroic figure, ehe bec<lllle the nemesis of Ihe CIA and the Latin Americ<ln
milil:w)'. Unfortunalely for ehe, however, he chose the alliplano (highbnds) of
llolivia to stMlthe "pread of his "many Vietnalll"" in South America and Ihne llIel
dealh in 1967 atlhe hands of Bolivian Ranger In"l0ps.
By 1968 Pidel wa" pulling hack from Ihe Gucvarisl line. There had alre<ldy
hcen signs that ehe did not get full support frol11 ,1:lV:lIla c1llring his ill-fated
campaign in Bolivia. By supporling Ihc Soviet inv:lsion of Czechoslov:lkia in
I;idcl signnled :l return 10 Soviet orthodoxy. lie then hegan to downpl;ly Ihe ex pori
of revolution.
On the domestic front. howcver, Guevarisl policies continued inlact. The
spring of 1968 sa\\' a "rcvolutionary offensive." The remaindcr of the priv;tte
sector was ll;llionalizcd, consumption W:lS suhordinated to investment, :md
Cub'IIl." werc exhorted to give thcir ;tIl 10 rc::tch the omniprescnl t:ll"gct of 10
million tons of sugar in 1970.
Thc m;tgic year came. :lnd all of Cuba was l1lobilizcd to (III calle. Everything
was s:lcrificed 10 release lahor (or Ihe C:\l1l' rields. Ihat the I:\rgel waS
( lIh,l I\,'y ( ..1',,1,'. \, .. ,.111 .. , '1.11<" II:
dislanl, the :lulhorilies left some of Ihe 1'J6'1 h<llvC"1 ill Iht" field .... I"
improve Ihe 1970 rigll,.e. It W;lS 110 usc -lhl' rc.llll<'d s.r, lllilll"n Inl1"
It w:\s a prodigiolls tnt;ll, Ihe 1:\I"{:cst ill (:ub.1I1 hi ... lory, hilI II .. loll Icll .. /lIlT1 /,1 ,h
much-louted goal. So IllllCh prnpaganda, Illall)" p.... ml .. (' .... II W.l".1 1IlII,I.III,I,,\\
(or the philosophy o(<:h('. TI)(' loll \\.1'" 1'lll1l"1WII,..
Hut Fidel. ever rcsollr(c(ul. was ;lholll 10 l h:lIlg(' poli\ w...1):.1111
Consolidoting the Regime
The failufe of Ihe 10-111 illiOIl-lnll e(forl m"d(' I:idel' .. ,11101,1 l.lt t' ('" .. ie,. ,. "('1"\" "I'
{ould see IIl:lllhe muclel had (,lIled.l)1I 1111)" 2(" hlt'l. ,,111t.......1 ..11
In" lll:lf:lllwl1 speech ("Iellhe Sham' Be \Vcll'"1IC-), ('.1"11,\ IIIt1k "II h, .. "'\11
shoulders the responsihilily for Ihe qll,,(ollL LIII":hle 1111 Ihc "'11'('1 11.11\,'..1 II,
offered 10 resign, hili Ihc ("(0\\'...1" uietl 11.\ '1 hc Cl ollnllllC Llll",, \\"1<; "hlllel.llt't1 h,
revollilinll:lr)' lhc:ller.
Cuhan polic)' now l11rtlCII rnnn.' p,.lgIII.lli,. Iir"l. III,"" w,,. I" 11(' 11t\\
managcment :lncl pl;lnning S)'SIClll<; ;lIUIIlHII'(, ll<;, III "1" f Ifll .. ., ... 1 h,l .. i.. I." .1"1 ,.. " 'II
making. Second, the privale seclor was hI he t-:ivell .1 gr(',lhT Init' III hili Ii
and service". Third, wages ;Jlld salaries wOllld flOW he Iinkrll In 111111'111. WIlli
prcmiums for needed "kil"'- Finally, Ihere W;l'" In he (" '11101111... inleLI, 11nl1
with Ihe \Vesl.
Thi" morc convcnlional cLllllorniL plllil y W,l.<; ;lll 1l1ll1':1I1ird h)" .1 .. l1l1d.1I .. hll'
ill instillJtinnnl policy. The COrllllltlllisl I':I,.I\" w,." IIIIW "lrCl1glllCllc,L Ille 11111.>1\',
;"Ind ot her mass organi7al inns w('rc re'lrg:l11 i"lcd ;lll(l given ,I .. r I' lit'. 'nll<;, Ill""
toward grc;"llcr "orlhodox)," (i.e., doser rc..elllhl:lIH C In I\'I pl,lt til rl .lll.', 1(.1
culture ;"I" well. CCnlf;J1 conlrol" o\"('r ('(llIl-,llipn ,HHI Ih(' 1ll.1"" lIlf'dl.' \\, II

In e;lrly 1971 Fidel 1:lllllLhed (l1riol1...Illalk.. 011 "1"11.1.. - 111 1111'
Hcvolulioll who had ch;uged Ihal Hders pl'rsonali"til regil1le \\",1" Ic.lding C1I!>.1
lowMd economic defcat. In addilloll, Fidcllracked dnwn nil the ('tlh.lll .111''''1<
s(enc h)' arresting the inICrn;Jlioll;llly knllwn wriler Ilphclln I'.hldl., "1'1'.lIl"l1lh
llnder coerciun, P"dill:l was forced 10 lCIIlle"" lflnl{'" ,lg,IIlI.. 1 Ihl' J{("V"IIIII"11
lie later repe:llcd his IllC:l culpa hefole a wrill'r,,' ("onlcrCl1U'. whil h .. ('I rhe 1011.
for a tougher siandard of polilicallo)';llty IInw cXI''t!'<! nl .111 .lrli .. l" III In"l"
lion;lry Cub:l. Usc of Ihe police In enfnrlc polilital L"lIlo,rlli1r h"llighl !>.'lk
unple;lsallt memories of fccenl dicl:llors.
Part and parcel of Ihis polil y shift W:lS an iIICl"C';]"lng ap,,"":': Hila I,,'11 I,j ,
models of cconomic and polilit.'::ll decision m<1king. II had h{'('n nnder \\',1\' I.. ,
several )'ears, hilt the shift in (IOlllcslic polic)' IHIW lI1;lde "tlh;l'" owr,lll .. Ialll c Ill' 'II'
consistent. Radical experiment:llion was over. The inevilahle logic 01 Cllh.,..
enormous economic :mcl mililary dependence on the Sovirb w,,<;, !Iring 1'1a"l'"
QUI. Fidel Was now a reliable :lIly of Ihe USSR in Ihe Third World. Thl" (:111,.,1\
Revolution W;lS :lpproaching Ihe Soviet model morr dn.<;c!)' th:llll"Vl'1 h<'folc.
r.uha thus sCllled inlo an exlreme economic dependl'lll(, lin Ihe 11111
that hore much resemhlance In onetil!1e 011 1111' .... 1.11...
III 1'.\l{1 t\\l) W l .'\,>1 ,>IUIIII,> 1. HANI,IOVI.R 1"11\11
,\ltlltlllgh Illl' l ...It... 1 11I1.d W;I::. dillilult IlIl.dull.lt(;', it probably lllll.lh:d :lbOUI um'-
lI
u
.
llkl
"ltlll'l.uh.llI gru::.::. n.ltiun;" pn.u.llll.:t (c..;NP). Thl' ul with
111l. Illol 1.111::'l tu wl1.lt it Ihld vn\.c bel'n with thl UnitcJ States. Had
1. .lIb.1 1I1l1 d)' II.Hkd ulh: br.llld vI" dl,Jl:ull ... llcy lor allotlwr? Yl'I thl" til's 10 the Soviet
l Jllinll did llut produce thl' din:l.t which had created a natiunalbt
.lg.llmt l"l.."tJIIUlllh: pellltratlull befure 1959.
\\'h.lt \\'l'l thl uf thi .. neW d('>t'ndlllly? We k..nm" that Fidel
11... ll'lI1l Il,d Ill\' Sllvkt 111ll.'" t!l-IlUlh... l.ll iU11 It! Illl" Suhdarit y muvement in Poland and
1'1 .llw,1 Ihe ....ovld Illkl VlII1 illll ill AIgllall ist.1I1. Cuba St'nt Illort' th.1ll 30.000 Iroops
1'1..1 .... lu <I regillll' ill SOllIe olJsl'r
\1.1 .... :'lIggl:-.II'd th.11 (;ub.1 h.ld pludlln:d a IIC\\' hybrid rt'gime capil:llisrn."
In utll.'" kl.y rnpl'L1, rlgillh: had ::.hu\'\Illlilll... changl'. I Ie !Jromisl:d
IIlllll' puhlic participation, hut ;Ktual rule rl'l1laint.'d lOp down and the
filial VUkl' \\',1-. hi ... Irunk.dl)'. ;lpplyilll; Marxist dogma ill the Caribbe;lll
1.ltin AlIh:rila\ durable t"(lI/dillu. Th.... profound social rcvolu-
tlllll ill t:uh.1 had bel'll ullly 01 Sovil'l milit'lf)' pmkclion and
.lId. II ICll .. lI11dl,lI whl'lhl.'r h:lt! more: bilrg;lilling power
\\'Itll I\\u..... ow tll.llltltly Olllt' h.ld with Sovict-Cubnll
Illl.l11 1"1'..1 III 1.11 Wl.lkr Ih.11l h,ld with the Unikd St.\\l"'s. Tht:
( lIh.1l1 .... , whll ,,1 .... 11 .Ilkd Sovid achit'vt:d hrilli..lnllllilililry victories
II\l.r thl '-IlIlIth All I\. ,Ill .lrlll)' ill A!ril.l ,111..1, a f(;'SUIt, WOli lI111t'"h in the
1IIIltl\\lIlld
., ill Ih\'lIlutl\l11 I'lought 11I.1IIY t:haJlgl .... to Cuba. SOLl.dbl CUU;I'" gre:.ltest
II HII II pll .. 1I.lvl. blt'll III ba:.ll. hUlllan Jll. ... lb. Jllih:r.llY bll.n wipeJ out.
.llld .. llllll,"dll'II"'IVl' ...llltll)1 ::,)':.Il.111 has h'-'l'lll.n:.lted. It::. k;t.:hlllg (ullknl is. not
.... 111 pI llighl), id,"lugil.l1, lll":-.Igm:d 10 illllllcall' Iht' Jle\,' values.
H,l'>ll Ilv.dlh l.lll, prt'vlJ1IIVl. (.trl.', has bCt'JI t'xtcndt'd tu Iht' 10wl'I"
:-.llllll I\kdll.d 11.L1I1IH!!, 1I.t:'> bl.lll l!,c.llnl II) publi( h... ;dth. l:lIvd distributivll,
.11\\,1)' 1I11l III lhl IlIu;,>1 IcJll'diVll::' uf iJll.qu.l1ity.ll.ls bel..'n gllanlll
kl..1 h)' l,lliHIllll}!,. Thl Inull thdt lik l.'Xpl.'ClaJl(y rust' trolll thrl't' ye.lrs in
PU,I) III WWtll)' l"ight 11I1U07, and Ihl' illl,tIIt llHHtalit), rate: fell b)' llHlft' lhan two..
Illud:,> III thl :,>.11lIl.'"
1':',ltl Id.11 Hllh underwcnt 1II.Ijur 1I1Ipruv\.11l ... nts \\'dl. III Cub.l, as dSl:wht'rl',
die: Ilg.h)' III ::al.lver)' h:ld bnn l'xtt'lI::.ivt' prejudice. Whitt's occupied Ihe
Jill rung'. IlIUl;ltIU.... Wl'l t: in the middle, and bl.Kks were at the bottom.
(IIVe-1I thl' ddlrnllnJtion tu rectif)' ::.oti.d injuslic..... I"iJdbla policies enabled
tll .Il.lltllll" l'duGltioll and .ldv.ll\n: ill caret'rs ull lhc basb of m.... rit. Afro-
dllllIJl'd III 1I0Iilbl) high mnk::. within the armed furces. of these
illlprUvlIIlCllb. thc blJck l:ollllllunil)' ill Cuba rt'mained ilS one of Fidel's most 10Y:l1
h.I:-.liulI:,> ul pulilical
The lulc Ilr \\'Ollll'll hn'n 'lIlutlll."'r afla of t:hangt', The tradition
III pruvcd it 1I\"ljor 10 Ihl' ft:millist lliOVt:mt'nl. To lake a
::.t rikillg t,..;alllpk, b), mid .. 198U 0111)' 1'-) pt'rel'nt of the Communist Party lllembers
;lIld 11ll" w ... rt: WOlllt:11. NOllethdes:., th(' Federiltioll of
Cub.lIl WUlIIl'll (Fl'lllr.lcil'lll de 01" FMC) h.l::' gUile a IOllg W.I)'
luward ch.llIging upinion illld behavior. Thl. Illllllba vf WOlllell ill higher lduel
tion and prokssioll:.J1 SdlUOls mt'diline. whCo'rl.' klllall' sludl'lIb now
lIlall.'s) has imTl.'ascd ::.harply. Tht' 1f\le \\'.IS IllSlnlml'nt.d ll\ getting
;l<.lopted III 1975 an ....galitilri:lll family code whidl obligatt'll to do hall vi
all family chores. Any viewer of the Cuoiln t'il1Il Portrait ofTl!rt'!Jtl knu\\'s that
and othcr 1(:lllinist goals will IlOt bt' easily reached in Cuba. I >t-spitl' pel t"t:'pl ihlt'
dl<lnge ill Cuban allitlilks, married \\,Ollll'lI, ....ciall)' thosl' wllh dllldrcll, havt'
found it difflLult tv cnkr the full-lillil' labor forl-t'. One tilt' and
illCOIIVt'llil."'llce 01 (hild ell"e.
. was th.... olllt'r ba:.ic n... ed that had bn:ll su lI11tllllall)' distrihult'd
bdorl' 1959. IlerCo' thl' revolutionarit's had Iruublc maklllg rapid It W.IS
t'as)' l.'llUugh to expropriatt' Illl: resid.... lh:cs uf thc wealth)' alld givc thl'lll 10
spt'dal (like studellt::.). Bill IllW cUllslflKtiull alit! tllOI"l'
III th.... ::;:hon rUIl, illv.... stlllcnt ill lI .... w rlul :'>Cl'lI a::. a tup
pflunty.
Ironic.llly l.'llough. one 01 "'lUllOIlliL' III .lgrit"ul
ture. In Ihe t'arl)' of thl.' Ikvoillt ion, thai ulldt'r:.talllbhlt, The:
w:re .... ager to rt'pudiall' Cuo:.J\ Junglillll' hOIHI.lgt Iu .1 :'lllglt' l.xpOrl crop. EVlll
allt'r tUIU t'conomic r.....llbm ill 19(d, fuud VrUdU(tlun 1,lggl"d.
i\I..l.lJrJmg tv a UllIkd Nallons ;lgrkultur.11 pt'rlunn:IIKl' fur
IY61 76 lit'd with 01 Chik lor Iht' in LIlili Allll"rll..1. Aha
fMIIl output gr.;w ilt .1 hl'<Ilthy I.Ill'. hUI b), tlit' .... nd 01 tht I'-NU::., Ihtert' \\'t'rt'
food
Although CUb.1 rca..:ht'd Ihc withoul IhCo' ul Ih.lt
dUUlllld COllllllllnisl\1 in Eurupl" Ih... h.ld til III F\'la)' 19M7
tht' dqltlt)' chiefof IIll' CUh.11I air ftlrn" ;111(1.1 hl:fO olille B;l)' uf dillllwd illlu;I
pbnl: :llId dt:f ..:tcd to Florida. III JUlll' I')X') .1 ht'.tvi..-r bill\\' kll. Thl .11 Ill),'::.
J"t' sl)t'(lcd Il;HI r, Cl.'nl'ral Arnaldo S;incht'L, archi1l'd vf hlilli,1ll1 b.J1lldidd
\'iLtvl VVt:r SuulII African !on.t's wlll.n Cuba loughl tu (ull:.ulidatc thc I.."VllllllU
r(;'gillll' ill Angola, alld ex... cutl'ddung Wllh tlLrl.'c vl!ll."r high
I he wel"c drug running alld clllhczzk'lll... nL Mall)' asked Ituw oefkers whu
t'njo)'ed Fidt:I's COllfidl'ncCo' (ould Ilave orgallizcd sudI iI t:onspir.1C)'
the k.lIu\\,)tedgl' of a kade!" \\ho posses::.t'd .1 Ie:gellllar)' ilVpctik for adlllill-
detail. Or was Ihis a w:.Jy of dimillating a pUkllllJI lor ultimate:
powt"r?
A key to th(' Revolution's surviv.lI \\'uliid bl,the ability to 11isIitlilionalizx tht'
rcvolutionary Vroccs::.. The chaJJ(;'nge wa::. tu Il':.JJl'r::;:hip frum a
tin)' t'litt' uf gut:rrilla veterans and parly faithful to <l grvwing b;lse of lo),al
supporter::;:. The most obvious was to broaden thc ha::.c of thl."'
COllllllunist Parly. III 1975 this pruee::.s began. Under Ihe of
participation:' gra::;:sroots eJeclions for I"l'gional asst'mblies Wt'ft: held. Yd b), till'
Illid- 1990s Cubans were still comphiining about a highl)' (Co'lltral ized. bure:illl-
cratized, illCo'fficient stale
THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE 11990-PRESENT}
After 1990 Cuha underwent OJ p;linful rcalit)' check as the foreign underpilllling of
its econonl), v:lnishcd. The collapse of the USSR and o(Comecon (the foreign tmde
;mlhority for the and Eastclll Europe) hrutally exposed Cuha's economic
vulnerability. B}' 1992,,11 Ru,>sian economic and military aid was gone. Oil ship-
ments (c1l86 percent from 1989 to 1992, while food imports dropped 42 percell I in
:lImos! the sallle Vital equipment, stich as huses. once supplied h)' f=..aslcm
Europe. now klllgllishcd for lack of replacement paris. General ecollomic activity
fell by al IC<lst 29 percent hetween 19H9 and 1993. Cuha suffered an economic blow
greater than ;lll)' (including the Great Depression) experienced in L'llin America in
Ihe Iwentieth century.
Dissolution of the Soviet hloc imposed enormous strains upon the island. It
hrought a end to economic subsidies and. more important. to
cOll1lllen.-i"I links with Comecon. Cuha thus faced what :m::t1ysls called a -double
rcnccting the longlime polier of the United Ihe other
from the implosion of the USSR. The demise of lhe USSR also hroughl
'\Il Clltll() thirt), years of Soviet support for Cuba's polilical sovereignty. Ominous
warnings from the Cuhan American cOllllllunit)' in Miami abollt plans to -rctake
W
the islnnJ hy force aCCJuired a new sense of plausihility. Isolated hy Wilshington
;11ld nhilildoned hy MnSC0W. Cuba found ilselfin iln extremely vulnerahle position_
Fidelistil leadership forged a douhle-edgt:d response. One pari W:lS 10 hunker
down: In assert the integrity of the Cuhan Rev()lulinn. In stress Ihe ill1porl:lnce of
national unity. and to mrtintain a commitment to socialist ideals. As a m::l.ller of
f:lct. Cuh:l w;\!; virtu:llly the only forlller Tllemher of Ihe Soviet bloc Ihat retained a
one'p:ut}' cOl11munisl system. The other part involved modest political reforms.
Direct e1eclions for Ihe nation:ll legislature (As:lmblea Nacional del Poder
Pop\ll:lr) were introduced in 1992. Procedures for selecling local and provinci:ll
representatives were Iherenfter oJlened uJl as well. Restrictions on religiolls orgn-
ni7.nliolls were rclnxed. and, in the aflermalh of::l. visit by Pope lohn Paul II in 199R.
the n.omnn Cal holic Church assullled n significanl role in Il:ltionnllife. III Ihese nnd
olher wa)'s. Cuhn's leadership Il1nde significant efforts 10 strenglhen Ille legilimnc)'
of the regime.
Tolerance of dissent remninecl a dclicnte issue. The regime carefully permilled
lhe exiSlence of n "Iegar opposition and :lllowed writers. ::l.rtists. :ll1d nthletes to
cultiv<lle inlernationallinks and travel abroad. Yet it also imposed harsh penalties
011 Ihe "iIIeg:lr opposition Ih:lt echoed U.S. government demands for "regime
chnnge." which. in effecl. meanl overlhrow of the political syslem. II has been
estimated that Cuba holds hetween 100 ::l.nd 1000 political prisoners.
A major crisis emcrged in 2006, when Fidcl Castro underwent an emergency
operation for gastrointestinal complications. Could the Revolution survive
without its "1ll::l.Xillllllll lender." the only president thai it had ever hnd? Fidel
responded hy "Ielllpomrily" stepping down and hnnding over power to his
deputy and younger hrolher R:Hd. Fidel also nssigned key respol1'iibilities to
L
.. 1111'.1 .... 0"\ C"It'I1\. \, .. I.lh.1 ',1.11, II
The Saga of Elian Gonzalez
Cuba's f'conomic crie;IS of Ihe C<1fly 1990.. /1"I111pI ...,1 ,I l.wI!' IIl11nl\f'1 of (1Ih.HI" I,.
s,lil to the r10rida CO<lsl on v............ ls 01 hOIlH'ITI",r11' 1.111 .. lh,,/\,H) Ih.
.. led 10 milny dpillhs anfl o"',lIPfI ;In Ulllll('fh,Ilr hlllll.lnll.1Ii.1I1 (11'.1'. III
.esponse. the Iwo qovernmenlS IPilC!l('f1 .1rl .1qll' ... rnrnl 'Ill' I..., wlmh ("I'.H\
intercepler! ill S('<I <1.(. e;PIlI b,lCk to CUh,l, whilp who m,ll-I' 11 I" 1\111<"1, .lll
e;oil a.e pellnitter! to rel1ldin in Ih(' lJnllNI Ih, .. , ,1111(' tn Ii... kllllWIl .\'. lh.
wet-fOOI. dryfool" policy.
TIll'. imperfe<:1 but work<lblp ,l1l,lnqclIlt'lll C.1IllP IIll1lr. V'V"I'" 11.......11I1 II' .1
highly publicized C,lse involvlI1C) child (tlslody. pollllC.,1 Ill.ln"'l 1V...r II 1'1lIl,III.III"I\.11
pride. In Novembpf 1999 a lIllie boy Il.lllled Ui,ill (,OIl/al...;. Iw. mnll1.... 1 II.',
boyffiend. and othcrs lef1 Cubit in .111 "IUlnlllllm 110,11, 111(' ('IlIIIO'" f.Hlrd .1mlll
10l/gh seilS, the vese;f'1 <;;mk.1nd InO<;1 p.l nql' ... dl(',1 1h... Ill'\' .mel Iwo ',IIIVIV'U'
floiller! ill <In inn'1 IlIhF' Ilntllthry W("II" ' fll ... rj hy ,Itld 11111,,'1 nV"1 r,.
Ihe US. (OilSI GUilHI. "Thie; was ,I (Ipal (,1<; 01 wrot fOl.I .,pp,,,h"'Il'.I,,n
The Irnmlgralion ilnel N<lIlIlillt.l.11l0rl <;""VIf-'" /lNr,)I ... rnIVl,.llIlv 1...1..... <.<,<1 11.111 t"
his pitlPlIlill q.eill uncle. LilZ.1IO ('on7.11....7 II,... hoy'e; '.1111... ,. 11I,1Il Mlqlld ('(lIl/dl... ,.
had In the meilnlimp notified l.1.fi'llo hv 11"1f'phnnf' from (111"'111.11 Ill... Illnlh"lll1fl
h,s son wcre BilCkpr! by (1/11.111 Arn("'.,c.lll IlowrV"1 1.1;.111' 1I.I1.n' ,I
lhill Ihe boy shollld Sl;ly in 111(' lhlllf'cI "till"" lath.... Ih.lll fIn h,II" ,.. (01).,
Wl'1nqlinq followpcl lI11df'l Ih' ql,l'" nllnl"'n<;IV'" m...dl.l' "V"I.l'!'" 111.111'.1.1111"1
;lIld bOlh grilndlllolhpre; C'1lll" flolll (lIh,ll/l plrild fl" II!'. l"Itllll 111... 1'" h.I.l'd
reliltlves countered by se'king leqill.l'oyhllll 10' Ih(" hny II fr-rIf',.lI'll1lq" d"I1I'1l .h,
pelillon. Mi,lml D;lde COUllly VOWl'd 10 ''''SI\1 nff1CI.11 ... If,,,t<; .11 l"'p.III1.1
lion. :It;\n went to Dislley World on(' r1.lY.md m('t wllh r)Ollllr.ll f'IIII1 ...... Ih... n"')(1
Seeking to enforce Ihe <OUlt lulmg. Allnfney (,<>11,1.11 J.ln"t IkllO 1'111('11"<1 Ill"
,elulIl of [I,.;n 10 his f.llhel hy no 1,11CI thill! Ap.il 11. )000. l)r-ft.1Ilt MI.ullI 1,'I.IlIVI".
kepi Ihe boy ;n ,1 hou"!" SlJllnllllrieri hy prnl"''''('Ie; .lnd poll,,' A w,... .1ft"'l ,h.'
dC.ldline, Reno ilulholizf'd '1 r.lid by <;,wl\r "qllipp('r! nffl'I" of til... II" 'In''''!<-I
Pal.ol. Onlookels proIP'olec! ;lnrl a dl.lollr IH('I' .... f'ne;u... d prnn,...d .1 1"11
block illeil of Miitmi'e; Llltlp H;rv.1tl.l r1,e;Iltll.l'otlfr we.'" d,-'plnv... d tI. 11"1 " .... 11 .1ull
(car gas filled the iUl
I\n obvioue;ly h.1PPY Itl.1n W.l"I('lmll...cI wllh hl\ 1.1Ih"'l hilI h,I,II', 1"111.1111111 II ...
United Slaies while the MiamI 'Cl.llives exhitue;lcd Ihl'lI 1('9,11 "l'tll'll'. II rllClIlI f"llIl
evenlually ruled thaI the Il'lallvee; IMkrd the t'gal e;lanrllllq 10 ........ k .1'>ylullI nn III'.
behalf. In Jlllle 2000, nei'lrly a half YP'1' <lfl(" Ihf' ",ltj.lll'(I.lll. tllf' "111111'111'" ( (1111'
let Ihe cifcuil courl decision Sl.lnd. l.aler Iholt e;.llllf" d<lY. r11.11\ (,011/,11"'7 .lnrl 111'.
falher finally returned to Cubil.
Throughout Ihe case. elecled U.S. offl<.titls from h{llh IXllltu .11 p.1I11. .. \V"I"
alli'lcked for getting involved III whal ..ome [If'ople r....q.l.drd ,le; ,1 pllv.l1'" f.llllliv
mailer. Wrote a columnist in the WoslJinglOlI PO\f. Eltiln.1nO Jllall MU'I, 1(,Oll/iltf'/.
SOil and father. The former is "n innoc('nl child. Ih... I,lllf" iI rnilll who hoy W.l'.
li'lken frolll him. Eliiln hits h('h.lv('(1 likp ,1 typiC.ll 6 yPii. nlrl. IildO Mlljll... 1 IlkI' .1
IYP1<ill f<llIlC'r.l\nd rnoe;1 of Ihf' polilki.lne; like lyp.(.ll fOl'''' "
IIX 1.\HI l\Vll" I,A'II (11t\N... ;I:UVtl<'IIJl,II
utlll'l .I'>pillli
h
r...llkf:'>. )'OUlll; IIgufl':'> as Carlo:'> Lag..: ,wd Felipe
RUqUl'. Alllllhl'll ill Fdlru.lry 100M-day::. beforc Ihe Assclllbly w.,s
dill' I" l'i,,'d Ihl' prnuit'lll-I-idd anlloUlh:l'l1 Ihal he would lIul .Iccept another
kllll, .uullt,lul \\.1:. dlll)' dl'lled. Althuugh 1<..llillack::. Fidd':,> billa .lIld popular
''Ilpl.II, hl' l'XPI":'>:'>l':,>.1 rl,dbtil" ,1IId pr"l)llwlk :::,t.use ofn3Iioll:tllh:eJs. l\lort' 10 the
puinl. lu,,;I... l'uhlh...d ill ... lltulilln:::. m:lllagni tu ::.urvivl a major (.'hallt'ngt'.
Un till' ... idl. Ihe Sovid facilitalt:d tht' reupt'ning ufCuba':::.
dlllit'lll.llit Id.IIIlIlI ... willI II,IIIUII:'> ul 111\: AIlll..'rici.I:,>. mosl of which wt.'rl.:' citht.r
1'.11 It. til llllh.,rketlllll path::. or dl'llluaalizal ion. Threl' n:ltiuns uf the hemi-
,>!'!lVll' {.tJIOld.l. f\kXit:'lI. ,llld VllIlLUll.l-bt.(,lIlH: esplt:ially prominenl partncrs
III and invl ... tllll'lli. (It did nut illll:rnation,11 not icc that Canada and
f\k:Olll W,,'l,,' loullding NAIo'TA lIwrnlwr:::..) As Hugo eh,iva intellsifled efforts tu
t"q.!,l' t \"l'1I1)' II ll'lllul y Vl'nl::Zut'la began providing Cuba with low-
oil .Illd .IIJUlld:lllt turdgll .... x..:h,lllge ill rdurn for thl.: Sl.'fvicl uf or
h'.ldlll ... ,tlld Llrgd)' " ....1 rt.:::.ult or tilt.' Chavisl,l sub:::'lllil::'>, in ract. Cuba
lol'g.lll III ... lt.1 VlT)' high r.lll::' tlf !J,ruwth. .
j'igllie 1),2 (llkr:::. ,I broad ut Cuu,,'s oVl'r<l1l t:conomk perlonnanct:
"'11 Ill' I'J'JII, Tilt.' gru:::.:::. .... pruduct (CUP) llropped sharpl) <II first, plunging
I.. II) 1"'It.l'1I1 ill IY')3. Tht'rt'alh:r GUilt.' a decade-long modt':::.t relovery. with
t.t>lI'>I:,>ll'lll ,Illd or gro\\'lh (sonu:tilllt's ovcr 5 percelll), And with
:,upl'lIrt !10m Cub:t l'lIjO)'l'd a brit'f in 2U05-7, as the
hl'lh'lll I,Ill' "'\t.ll"It'd 11. p"'rlt'111 III 20U(I, ()l1l' W..I)' or allothl'r, (:uh.1 1ll.luaging
It, II:'> \\,1)' Illrllugh thi ... lr.1 ul tlll..:ert.lillIY
NIII\vllh... l.llIdllll) till' t.lld ul thl' Culd \V..lr. the' UllIkJ St.ltl:'> cOlllillUt'd it:::.
... llldl.:lli <lppu:::.lIiulI 10 thl, CUl"'ll It:gUllI:, Afkr tht' Sovkt thrl'al dis.lpplaretl.
\V.I ... hingItJII IUlll:'>nl ib wr.t1h Ull thl' pl..'r:::.i:::.tl.'llLC of unl'-party rlllt'. In OcLobt'r
till' (;l'<lI14'" \V. Hll:.l, wt'lll lar tt> crcate' a ::.hadow
" -
III -

c.. \I - 1- -r-.--.--[--,-,-,--='t--,-T---,-T',T-,,-,-
I 'Nil I'J')..:! I'''il, I'J'JK 2uuu 2UU'1 2UU" 2UU6
guvcrnment, a su called COlllmissiun lor Ihe 01 a Fin' Cub.1 (CAFe)
thai W,IS inlt'nlled to "help preparc tht' U,S. gOVCflllllCll1 10 pruvidt' dlcdivl'
assistance 10 a frt'c Cuba- and 10 stt'p up Iht' cnfur,,:clllcni 01 Tht'
following yt'ar led lu a lighlening of rc:'>tricliolls UII travd ;llld n:llIill.lll.... e:::.. And
in 2007, the CAFC rt'ilt'ratt'd persi:::.tcnt U.S. ollidal dcmands fur dl.lllgt...
in Cuba a:::. a precondition for rela..'(alioll uf sanction:::..
The U.S. cmbarl;o remained !irmly ill placI.:' ulldcr bUI HoL withuut
int:rc.,sing For lhe :::.eventcellth str<.light yt:.Il. thl' UN Gl'lll-ral
Assl'mbly udopted in October 20UH a nunbinding IIIl;'asure urging It:fll1inatiun ul
Ihe cmbargo-bY'1 vote uf 185-3-2 (Israd thl' Pacinc :::.t.llt: of P.dau
with tht: United States in oppusitioll, while Microllesia alld Illc Mar::.hall bland:::.
abslainl'd). Amcrican business illlCl'cSIS also I..'xpre::,sl'd muunting trll:'ltralioJl wilh
lhe cmbargo. since il prevented U,S. compalliL's frolll seizillg pOll'lllially IUCf::ltivc
opportunities for Irade and invcSllIll'llt in Cuba-and left Ilcld dear fur
EUJ'opt'an and t>th!..'r compt'titur:::.. Timc was running uul luI' Cult.! W,lf Idtovt.'f
policies.
II was in Ihi!> atmosphere of llllCl'rt ..lilily that Cuhan:,> Illarkt.d thl' i1ftit'th
anniwrsar)' of tht' Rt'volution on j;:llluary I. 20U9. Apart frolll oblig;lIofy llbplay:::.
of pOSler::. and flags, the t'vt'nt gave rise 10 little An "liling Fidd did not take
part. PI,1I1S for an ambitious celt'bralion wert' lOlled down illlighl 01 m.tjur d.lI11.Jge
(rolll thrl't' hurricant":::.. Ralll ClStro led the galhering in Ihl' t'.J:::.lcrn cil)' 01
S::l.Iltiago, I)raising thc regime's sUfviv,i1 unht'allhy .1I1t.1 \'illllit.tiw
haired of tht' puwcrful Ilt'ighbur: Efkrvt'::'ll'lIt Cuban dti/.t..'lb huggt'd .Illd ki:'>::'ld
and drank un Nl'w Year's Day, whilt.' childrt'H r<.lll .Il\d pbYl'd ill Ihe street:::.. Ollt.
ob::'t'fver, a rdlel-tiw middlt:-agt'd man. exprt's:'>l'd faith ill eh.llIgl t)f It.'adl'hhip-
1I0t only ill Cuba but abo in the Unill'd St.llcs, with 11ll' in,wguration or Barack
Obama thl' U,S. pr... are hoping ,lIld l.:Ollllling OJ! lhlllg:,> g\'ltillg
bt'lIt'r," hI..' said, Dilly lillie would It'll if hl was right.
'"
"
Figure S,2 Cuba: Annual Change in GOP. 1990-2007
" ,', I I II'r,1 '.1,\1 1.,10l1 .\11\1"10 ,I .111,1 Ill>' ( ,0111 ,t".."r, tt,ul,llwwwl'll"ll
6
Thereafter. Japanese ;'Ind I.ehancsc immigrant ... hllllu'r ('111 It Ill'll I'cnl\I.llI ""t 10'1 \
Indec<l. Japanese Peruvian... havc pla),cd a PHllllilll'nl 1IIIl' III InC-ill 1','111\1.111
politics. a:' have Iho:,c of I.chanese ill ECIl.ulol.
The Andes
Soldiers, Oligarchs, and Indians
FROM COLONY TO NATIONHOOD
The Vicero)':tll)' of Peru plovidecl ... t:lggering nll1(1I1111" n( ilh'lnw Itll 1111\'1'11.11
Sp"in. During the sixicellih (cnlury. Ih(' o( I'oln,,' 111 11pl'('1 l't'llI (hlt.ll I"
now Bolivin) produccd 110 Ics!' th;lll twn IIHrds III Ih(' world". klltl\\'!1 HIIII'ul "I
silver; the cily of P0In... i. initially lr(';Iled ;I.'> :-. 01111'''''1. \\'.1'. Ill.11l
((lnlcllll'nrary London. veins were I:-.I('r f(HIll,1 III Illl' \/,'/111 1,/ \\'lul I" 11"\\
Penl. fllrlher stnking Ihe (]I1'''' tllr PI-c\ inllS 11lel;II ... Jil ,,11111.1.. 1. "11"111,11 1'11."1,,,
(under the ,l/lrJ;('II';O OfQllilo) ilCV('r h('(<l1111' .1 11lilllllg\('lllfT.11l .. 1(,HI. II Idle',1 "II
Indi;11l Iahor for lexlilc prncllKlion .md IOta] ;lgJ'i1 11]1111'1' III lhl' hlf:hl.lntl "J:i",,,
Map 6 The Central Andes
'\
\ 11111 I \ I A
,-' I
"'= i' ",,,.J
-')'"
-)r-- ", .;--,-:--y. '.. I
r "'/';""1/'
, \_...... tllI.\ I I I
lj.llI' )-1.. -.-r// ')
\.,
..;. ,/1\1 II:I
19o11.
1
,,,
.. , .. I ..I.m",
.
...,......
I I'
'1, '\ .. "A)
} '"'' ILj ,''';,1 N"NA \ '-
I",,
, "",'/Ii
/'''1/ /1'.1
1)\///1

, ,
\,
\
I ...I. r... n. '?

,
\
/',1 ( " ,(
Or I-AN
N
I
"
. WC Ill(' l('rm "Ct'nlml Anile"" in a scn<;(' T<,chniLally the "cel1'lal" Andes
cxl('nd flOIll northern Chile through Bolivia and I'c'ru inln EC\I;"Idnr. whilc lhe (()f(frlkra in
IIortllf'rl1 F(l1;ulnr to h('lnllg lolhc "norlh('rn" AIl<lr.".
T
Il(' Andes MOlillIOllll" deflnc the terms of life ill milch of Alllcril:a. \-Villl
sUBunits :lppronching 23,000 feci above sea level :lnd wilh deep interior \'<ll1cys,
this imposing mrdl!f('ra (fmm the word for stretches 4'100 miles
:llollg the north-soulh length of the continent. Tn the we51. ils snow+cnppc<l peaks
lower <wer narrow cnast::!1 :lrea"; 10 the cast, the)' slope through \'crdanl jungles and
cXp:'lll<;;vc plains towaro the vasl Ama7.01l bnsin. For human settlements, the rugged
lefr,lin of the Andes h.lS had a divi..ivc effcct: conditions in the highland Slcrra arc
worlds apart from lowland :IrC:lS, and cOlllmunic;llioll between the regions has heen
slow <lud tlirfiCliIt. This bask renlil)' hOll' led to soci:ll. economic. ::lI1d polilic.11
Ir;1gmenlalions within :III n:ltinns embr:lcecl by this In:ljestic feat of nature.
We fncus here 011 counlries of the central Andes-Bolivia. Peru. and ECIl:ldor.
In precolonial times. these :lrea!' were home to l:trge and settled Indian societies
under t he rule of Ihe Incan empire. centered in Ihe ancient cit y ofCuzco. today,
native-speaking Indi:llls make tip !'ignifkant shares of Ihe nntiol101l poptdations:
ahout 62 percent in Bolivia percent in Peru. nnd 25 percent in Ecuador.
Indi:l1l" live (and have lived) mainly in the highland!', oftell in tightly knit tr:lclitionnl
t:ornnlllllilics. perpetunting folkwnys that go bnck to Inca d:lYs. 'such fact!' raise
t:lnt.tlizinl-{ quc!'tions :lhout the contemporary welf:tre nnd status of indigenou"
peoplcs. Ilow h.we Indian communities farecl in modern l ..'ltil1 America? Ilave
they done betler in some places than oLhers? \-Vhat might explain the differences?
R:lcial and ethnic oiversity has created complex and fascinnling societies
within the Andes. Mixed-hlnod everywhere form the largest single demo-
graphic element. Descendants of African slaves make lip ahout 5 percent of the
population of Peru and 10 percent in Ecuador. Perceived labor shortnges in the
ninetccnth century hrought hundreds of thousnnds of Chinese laborers to Peru.
1.50
I',.'
1',\Hj j\V11 l ,\ ... I:"ltJlIII.S:f
J5.l
Th". dghIL' .... lllll I,.l"lliury plllllgl,;'d Ih.... vkl,;'roy:.dty into :1 eCOJ.lomic
I.] i:.l ..... BourGoll lin' tr,ll,iL' p()lid.... 1.... 1.1 to the displaceillent oll.:.cuadonan textiles by
ill,,'xpell:.ivL' duth... Irol1\ EUropl'; thl'Y also dil1linatl'd Peru's legal on
lllllllill'/ll' WillI Upper I'l'rll alld Chile, a:. guuds t:ould llOW t:Olllt: ovcrlmld Ir,olll
Ihll'1l0., Ain':., Silwr productiun wl'nl inlu a slump. Administrative reurgalllza-
lurllLl,'f \wak... lIl'lll.illl:l's while the creation or tile Viceroyalty of
NL'W (;I:llldda (prl':'l'lll day I':cuador, COlolllbia, Panama, alld Vellt."Zuda) IUSli:rcd
d :'lll"l' "I dlllllllg 10c.ll "rl,ll .... dites,
I) ,ILa!',;\ iLall)'. Ille's,,: 11VIHb did nut pruduce a widt'spread illdelJelldl'llCl,;'
JIII'VL']IIL'llt ill l'l,'lll, lClthl'l, LIIII.IS illll'lIl,(tuals argul'd fur COJlCcssion::. wilhin thl'
,lnd lur lhat would n:storl' the privik:gl's ami prosperity
"I pll,' BuurbtJl1 l'ra, A:. illdl'pl'lldt'JIC": 11luvelllelltS were swct'pillg Illruugh thl'
11,':.1 III Spallbll Alllt,'rila. PlTU rl'lliailled a loyalist slrUllghold of tIll' crl)wn.
N;tl)l,k'IlI':' "I Spain in [I:\U8 and his assumptioJI of II10nnrchicui
p"\\'L:r:. :.IIUl,.k \\'av.... :. through thl' t.'lllpirl'. III till' absence of the king. local
jUlItol:' ill Sp.dll rl'sl:.tcd IIH' Frellch takt'over. III the Viceroyalty of New Granada,
Ihv LrL'Ilk dt/lHill.lIl'd tUWl1 I.:uulldl (ca/liMv) l)r Santatc de Bogolil threw its sup-
IlIIl1 Itl 1111,' JUJlI;! al Sl'vilk, III JXU'> neole di1l's in Quito challenged royal power
.tlld nl.lhll ... hl,'l! IIll'ir uwn junla; angl'red 11)' the vkeroy's repressive reaction,
lfl.t1I,,':-, prtJlllplly lwgaJll'llllting aguinstthe Spanish regime, Earl)' in IHIO, elites
III '.lr.h ,Hid d ... l'w!Jt'1"l' ,",..'IHOVt'd Iht'ir culollial governors, Almost t'verywhere.
11Il""" Jlltl\'L'llll'nl'> .lvowed thdr loyahr to Ferdinand VII, till' Spanish king.
1:VL'lltU.dly. thl'}' wuuld upl'nl)' assnt thdr illdependelln.
III IKl2, li,rces inlli(ll"d a crushing deft'al in Vent'Zueia on proilllk-
I'L'lH!L'Il\I,' tl\IUp::' ulldl'r Sinlon Bolivar. By mid- 1816 ;\11 ufthe mort' populous rt'gions
III Nl.'w ;ran.ld.l wcrl' ha..:k ulll.kr n1yalist cUlltrol. 13rlltal repression during lhi::.
1",.. Illndy :'l'lvnllo strl'llglhell the insurgents' determination tu
g.lIJI ""lIll'k'\\" indl'lwlldl'lll":, Aidnl hy arms and troops from Grt";lt Brit;lin, patriols
lq,:.llIlL'd IIlI' illili.llivl .\lId Uollvar rcturlll:d lu the fmy. After the dclcal of l"Oyali::.t
l':' .11 HII)'.IL:l ill IKIY, Itluk Cllllt rolof most of NI'W Gmll;Jda.
[)Ill tlt l' ulllrM' uf his military campaign, Uolivar led a movement 10 unite
VL'lll'/Ud.1 aJI(.1 L:ulollluia. '['hl' Republic of Colombia was proclaimed in 1819.
I,,,u dnr in Iti22. (Much later. this composite stute was called
l:"llllllhi.I," VI' Cr"',IlL'r Culombi3, to distinguish it from prcst"nt-day Colombia,)
I'rllill it-. tht' ilL'\\' republic fact'd two chalkngl's: warding off continuing
tlll,:als Ilonl Spallbll for":L'::', and laying the foundations for politkal ordt"r.
I'vkall\vhilt", de Sail Martin led his troops over the Andl's from
i\lgl'lllill;l lu l:llllL', I.at .... in IH20, hl' rl'ached Ihe I,:oast of Pl'fll. Several months lalt'r
the Sp.lltiards evacuatcd Lima, and on July 1821 San Martin prodaillled the
ilHkpLndt'llLI.' uf Pl'ru, Rl'lugnized as the by the 10Gli populace, he made
plan:,> 1\1 l':'>I.lLli:.h a lllOll;ll'(hy and commissioned an agt"nt to search for a suitable
EurIJI'"',tll pi incl'. Thi:. bruught oppositiull from liberals, whu wallh:d a republican
tonll til gOVl'flIlllt"llt, and the projt'ct disappeared nrta San Martin's fateful meeting
With Bolivar ill bk IH22 .lllLI ::'llb:'L'quent withdrawal frolllthe sCt"IlC, Boliv"lr wun n
dedsive victory OVL"r inll)t'riallurCt:s at tlll'battk' ofJunin in 1823, alld in Ikcelliber
182
i
l I\ntonio j\lse Suert' delivcrcd the coup lk gruel' al I\ya<:uclllJ. I{o)'<.llisl truops
thereafter surrendered, ending SIJ;\llish rule ill South America.
To ro::.ter cOlllinelltal unity, l.3ulivar propos\'d a conl"lllcr.ltiull ul IJeru with
Upper Peru ilild Gran Columbia-under his k'adership, of l.:uursL'. III the
time, creole leaders in Upper Peru decided to t'stablish an ::.tak. Thl'Y
ll<lmed it afkr Bolivnr, and illvitl'd him to cumpose its cOllstitutiul1 <.llld rule a::.
prl'sidl'JlI. Thus was the statL' 01" l301ivia founded, Thl' I.ibel".llur propused ;Ill
extr('llldy ::.trong executive power-;l prt'sidl'lll fIJr who, ill lluminating his
vict' prt'sidl'lIl. could llame his successur,
Slllil ten by his o\\ln I,:real ivit y, tht' Liberator r\'ga rdnillb Buliviall COl 1st it lit ion
as th.... ideal solutiun for all of Spanish Aml'rica alld sought 10 illlpose il 011 (;r,11I
Columbia. Critic::. dismissed it as a prl'sniplion fur munarch)' ill republican dress.
As disagreeJllenlS lllolllltnl, two rival f.lCtiollS l'lI1t"rgcd: pru CI.nlralist :'lJppUrlL.'rs
of Bolivar and pro-l;"'deralisl di::.sidt'llts who expre::.sed alann uVt'r his nUlhuril ari:ln
tcndencies. By 18)U l3oJivar\ hl'alth was ill rapid tb.linl" alld llediL'd in D,c"-l1lber
of that year.
t;r31l Colombia thus broke "parI. II was rivL'1l by ((Jllilieis Od\\'l't"l1 1111.' clergy
alld univl'fsit)'-edllL"atcd liberal polilicialL::', helWL.'l'll IIlI' alhl :.allllA
politicians. bl'lh'l'l'll the cl'nlral guvefllJllent ill Hngot;i and clites ill Vl'lll.'l.uda
Ecuador, and bL'lWt"t'1l Holiv<.lr amI his rivals. By IX31 Idl inlu its
cOl1stituL.'nt parts- VI,.'llaUl'l.l, Ecuador, and Culumhia, In lht.:' Illt';mtilllt", Bulivia
alld Pt"!"ll retaineJ tht"ir separate claims tu nalional I.tc'ss Ihall a dl'cadL'
afkr independence, Spain's furlller viceroyalty in Soulh AmeriLa had broken lip
into nilll' differt'nt rl:publics.
OVERVIEW: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Cycle:. ul growtll have charadl'ri:tt.:'d the \XOIlOlllJl'S, TilL"
rhyl/lills 01 .... xpansion ;:lnd Jt"c1ine illl'XpUr!S h;lve v.lrin!lrolll LOlllllr)' 10 cUllntry,
hut paltl'l"llS havt' heen consiSknl. Illkrnalional tradt" ill agriLlJltlllal pruducts ur
natural rl'sourc\;,s led to growth in spccillc Sl'(tors ;tlld el1ridlt"d tho::.L.' in conlrul of
proJuction and comlllerce, Lleclints in wurld (orkll brougllt by cUllljJt'ti
tiOll frum other countries) pruvoked periudic crisl'S in ll<.ltional l'cunulllit:s. As
other prodUl'tS proved profilable on IIII,.' world markel, dilferellt region:. Gillie 10
j/flllllinL.'l1ce, Individual ;llld family wt:alth rUSL.' <llld fdl \\'itll llplu.... :. and duwn-
swings in the l'Xport sector. Unable tu sharI.' 111l.'sL prunt::., va:.t Sn'tors u[
population r('mailled margin;]l and poor.
Peru; From Guano to Minerals
N;1tllre bl,;'stownl an unusual bonanza un pustllHlepl'lldl'lKl' I'l'ftl. For (l'Jlluril's the
coldnl'5s of the Coulltry's olTshon: walcrs h<ld atlrat:led large ll11lllUl'rs of !ish, The
fhh ill turn attra(kd birds, which Idt Iheir droppings Ull i!'llallds Ill'<.lr Ihe t:oasL
PAIn TWO 0 CIIAN(;I. oVEn TI/'.IE
Atlllospheric dl)'lleSS aided the prescrvntion and calcification of these deposits,
known ;"IS guano, which hml n high concentrntion of nitrogen. And gun no, "s lhe
Inc:Is had known, turned out 10 he a fertilizer.
from IH/II lllltilthe 1890s, guano exports fueled the Peruvian ('collumy and
crealed the O1ppearance of prosperit),. Since the islands were public property, 1101
private land, national policymakers faced a thorny question: How to take
advant;lge of this virtual monopoly? The answer was a "consignment" system.
The government leased out (usually exclusive) exploitatinn rights to a llH.'ITh"nt
hOllse or partnership. [n retul"l1 it obtained a fixed share of total sales, ralher than
n l"x (Ill profits. The mcrch;lllts (usllillly foreign) received the remaining
percentage of sales plus reimbursement for costs. On ils f;lce, the strategy
involved a mutllnlly hencfki01I partnership between n liber<ll stnle and privale
enterprise.
But the consignment system pl<lced the state in constant connict with the
merchant houses. The government wanted 10 sell the gU<lno for ns high a price ns
possible. This could mean holding hack on shipments to keep prices IIp. Merchanls
were more interesled in the tot;ll s:des volume because they h;ld time-specific
contr:1cts; from their sl:llldpoint, it was often 1110re profil:1ble to sell luge <lmOllnts
of guano:1t mo<!er:1tc tlwn to sell small amounts at high prices. AS:1 result,
state authorities and their consignees const:1ntly hickered.
By the early IH60s, the Peruvi"n government was enrning 80 percent of its
reVellues from guano. At the time, nboul hair the government's receipts 011
gunno were destined for payments on lonns from English bondholders. The
hoom therefore provided lillie stimulus for long-run economic development: as
historian Fredrick Pike IIns obsen'ed, gren!er the windfall gains bec.lllle, the
less self-sllstaining the econom)' grew." Deposits neared exhaustion hy the late
18HOs. The nge
R
Lhus came 10 an cnd.
From the ]890s to the 1930s, the Peruvian economy experienced a series of
booms (m honmlels) in export products. Prominent among Ihem:
rI A ruhher hoom in the Amazon rainforest. elltrepreneurs like
Julio C. Aran<l amassed huge forlunes, and by the lurn or the century the
city of ICJuilos h<ld grown to <lbout 20,000 inhabitants. But then Peru, like
Brazil, was eventually pushed oul of the market by the more effiCiently
grown plnnt01lion ruhber from the Far East.
" Sug:lr production in the coastal lowlands. This was a profitable operation
that required substanti"l c"pit;ll investments. Machinery for the model'll
mills was expensive, nnd il took luge ;lmounls of land to feed sufficient
cane 10 the mills. In contrast to the Caribbean (sec Chapter 4), Peruvian
production was a yearround activity and required a permanent labor
force. immigrants from China :1Ild Japan, and Indians
from Ihe sierra camc to work in coast<ll plantations under coercive
conditions. Sugnr output and exports grew rapidl}' through the ]92005.
though the market coll;lpscd "I the end or the decnde.
(, 0 Thc Andc!>: 0Iig.1I' ..llld I,',
Colton, also grown alnng the coa.'>!. Some colton f.Hmcrs were "111.11] .. , .111'
pensants, .. It hough the mO... t common lahnr W;1'; <;!l:lICl ropl'lIlj:
(yallacoIUJje). Peruvi;lll IHltion:1l.<: were Ihe lal"gt'st investllr". :1"
Glpitrllists were rcluct:1nt to engnge in 1l1l1l1l1<lrkel rd.11 i< Ill" of 1ll"!IIllll I., III
By 1930 cotlon accounted for IR percellt of l'el"llvi,ltl eXI',).I ...
\'\'001 from the Andean highlands, ;llwnys:l sccond:lr}' cxpnrl prodlll 1.11.1
ditionnl peasants produced the highest-grade' variety from the alp;lc.l: <;lwf'l'
wool came from Inrge-scalc haciendas. Ihc collapsc nf the 11''llkd in III<'
1920s hrought on:l reccssion, cspcci;l11}' for sheep 1".liSCI"<;
Meanwhile the once dominant scctor nf thc I'C)"IlVi.1l1 Cl 1I110111r. 111111111):.
underwent n shift from precious mctals, such :1.<; silvcr ;ltltl gnld. tn Illdl1 ... 111.d
metals. Copper gnined special il1lpnrtnnle. ].nl"gc-scalc U.:-O. IIl\'C"lmc'lt .1,.,\"{',1
in 1901, with the purchnse of a complex at Ccrro de I'a<;ll', .11ld l'nH1II\t.till
quickly acceJcrnted. Ownership fell nlmnst comp[etely IllHlcl" Ihe ,flllr)"ll] I"
foreigners, eSJlecinlly from Ihe Unitcd whilc miwanl ,",II,m \'''>1\ .,k, r
the workers,
Petroleum exlracti(11l <llsn expnnd('d in Ihese }'l'ar.... e'l'ct..iall}' dllling \\'01101
\''';11" I. Coastal fields conlained not:1hl}' high grade deposil". ,11ll! l J.<". ,.ll'iLlh... t..
took nctive pnrt from the start. In I<)]J rhe Inlcrn:ltioll.l1 Pcllfl1clllll (01111',111\
(IPe), n Canadian-registered of SI:lntlanl Oil, .1< (e 10 1l1.linl
fields. By 1930 oil made UI' "hout .10 perccllt oft{lI;11I'cl"l,vi.ltlc.-':II"lr .
The Great Depression :ltul \'-"odd \,Var II ;l!tercd the sl rill t lilT of ill1crn.ll., 111.11
markets and prompled " modest reorientat ion of Ihe Ct..OIlOlllr. [11 ( 0111 r.l"l In IIW11
counterparts in Mexico (and Argentin:1 and Bra"lil. ,1S we <:h'lll ..c'c), hnwevcr.
Peruvian policymakers did not atlempt tn emh:lrk nn n sll:-.t'lincd progr.1111 nl
import-subslilution illdllstri<l[ization. \oVhcn 0pl"lrtullltr hcck(1ncll ill tin' 1.11,'1
1940s, they reverted instead to 'l Iried-and truc exl'0" led J:lll\\th 111
cooper<ltion with foreign investmcnt.
Sugar production eXl'nnded in the 19(JOs, as I'C'II ITlcivnl.l .. h,II"t'I,j rIll' tl"-
market quota Ihnl was taken awOlY from revoltltionary Cuha. (:ot!on I'lndllltlon
more than doubled hetwcen the 1940... and the 19(1Os, thell (lc( linc,l ill 111C 1,1\ t' 1,1
competition from synthetic fabrics. Copper r('t<lined ils pn.<;ilioll .IS lilt' k,ldillg
minernl expol1, all hough iron ore became imporlanl ;"IS well. Fi<:hlllCal expo.t ...
undenvenl a briefsurge frolll the 1950s tuthe 1970s, lalcr dc.-Ilnin): ,1"':1 n'<,ult 01
chnnging ocean currents.
In sum, the Peruvian economy underwent three 1(lllg ,}'dcs nt eX!,I'11 led
growth. Figure 6.1, showing the volume and v:llue of exports, illtlS[ ral c.... lIlt' '(I'III",I[
pattern. The first phase, corresponding to the guano ngc, sl I"ctdle,1 f t"I fill IIIC IX"I,
through the 18701'. After a period of oscillalion, the cconom)' rcnwC'rnl ill 111l'
18905 and began a period of expansion that Insteo untiltllC' CIT'll [">ep/,cs.. ion inl!le
1930s. The conclusion of World W<lr 11 reopened intCrtl;ltiollal market ....111.1
precipitated a third cycle of growlh th:1t t:llntinlled to the mid P,70<;, whcll
world prices for <lgricllltllr<ll and other wcnt inln dcditlc Oil, C " .. Iill
'."J" I 11"'.",",,.y 11I'1l1' ,n"l t 1lt.,II.lIl1. "I.'/ll Ill'JU I'J// (,/ul'"o'(/1 (!IlJ f-'ufuy 1/1 ()II Upen h UII(,rIly IN"w
'"I"ll,t"" lJillv'-'\!lj "It\,. l'l/tll. p "
')i1ver lefilling (;It Cerro de Pasco in the early 1900s large-scale technology.
(Courtesy of library of Congress,)
thl' highlands. And fuurth, 1>1"1"1l furgt'd a highly 1I1l1.qual p,ltkrJl ut i1lCU11I1:.'
distribution. Hy the 198Us Ihe lop 20 percent oflhl" populaliun n'cdvcd p.... r<...:J11
of the incollll:.', while the lowest 20 IJ,,:r...'t:nt got 11111)' 5 percl'nt. (Do::cldes Ialer, tho.:
figures wcrt: abollt the same.)
During the lutl:.' 1970s and 19HOs, Ihe lllOSt profitable Peruvialll'xpOrlnup was
illicit-coca leaves, uscd for the production \)1' C'ocaint: (in hiddO::l1 Iaboraturies ill
Colombia). Cultivaled mainl}' in thl..' Upper Huallaga Valley, thl.' coca leaf harVl'st
C,Il11e to 2UU,000 melric tons in Ihl:.' year 1'-)')0, e(juivak'llt to twulhinls o( wurld
production. 11)' tillle coca ll'afprodmtioll e'ligagni Pl.'r11:lIJS 10 p...rce'111 jlfthl'
Il.ltiol1's agriC'ulturallahor forcl:.' ;,lIld 200,000 \\lurkers al nil stagl's of prodW:lioll,
wilh a tolal economic impact ofnboul $1 billion, Whil,,: Ihis waS a llIajor :lCtivily, it
did not creale Illultimilliollairl:.'s aJllong Ihl:.' highland c(jlllpcsiIHJS. FMlllgat\..' priets
for COGI lenf were actually r:11 her mode'st; largc-sed,,' profils ill Ihl' drug Irack ClIlI\..'
Ihrough wholesale <Iud retail sales in ovcr:'icas markets, ...:spct.:ially Eurupe and the
United Statl:.'s. fb Ih\..' cClltury o..:aJlle 10 .LIl "'lid, guvcl"lllllvnt and p1.11l1
disc:ls"'scolllbilled 11.) r('duce th...: Pi..'I"uviall Tilt: would b... takl.:'l1 up by
olher cuulIlries.
Bolivia: Silver, Tin, and Gas
llolivia long been renuwlle'd fur ib lllining. Ourillg lht. t.:oluld,,1 i..'I.I, tIll:
principal product \\las silver: by Iht: tWl:lltit'lh n'lItury, lill bl.GllllC the 1..:.ldillg
cXI>orl. In fact Ilk's,,'t\\lo mil1\.'rals Il:nd to appt:ar :dollgsidl' Olle <l1ll,lher, alld a good
dl'al of till \Vas jl'llisonl:.'d as lIsdt:ss by illlpo.:riaillwrlunh., IIII..' Indusl ri;d
Ikvullllil)1l aCCl:ll'rall:... 1 ill ninelCl'llth ce'nlllry Eurol'l:' :lnd Norlh huw
eve' 1', wurld demand for tin :lnd wilh II1\.' cUllslnH.tiuli 01 rail-
road !illl'S during Iht: thl' prospl:'clS fur pruCitalllt.: explllit.tliulL beGinlc
abllnd.llHly clear.
Local entreprcnt'ufs seized UpUll the upportullity. '1 he lllO",1 promincllt was
Silllun IJatiilo, OJ mestizu of modest backgrollild wllo startet! oul as a nllning
apprentin. lly 1924 he owned olll'-Iwif of the 1I,ltion's produclion, (olltfolkd
the EurOVI:;l1l rdlning of Blllivi:lIl tin, ami was bn:oming Ulle: or tl\l! world's richl..'sl
Il1cll. \,\'hill:.' Paliilo SPl..'lIt much of his lire ill Eurupe', Ih\..' othe:r ll:ading l.'ntrepre
lll:.'urS, Carlos Arallla)'u and MOJuricio Ilochschild, rl:.'sidt'd prim;ll"il)' ill Hulivia.
These three f:-llnilies controlled about:>O pefCcl11 of Bolivian lill. Thl:.'Y forl1lt:d
:t close-knit group: alullg willlthl.:'ir retaint:rs, they we're nickllflllll."d fa rusclI- Mthe
scn:w," in a poillll.'d metaphor. Lkcausc taxcs and fl'cS froll1tin pr"duLlion lorllll.:'d
an important source of national revenue, the Illining barons widdl.::d \.onsiderable
inOucllce OWf governmental polic)'. Unlike the sitv!.:'r 11Iagn;lIt:S of thl:.' nindcenth
cl:.'ntury, however, the till-millt' owners did not dircctly in politics. The}'
relied instead on pressure group tactics, which provnllo be highly efli.:'ctive,
Bolivia quickly bccaml' one of thl:.' WOrld'3 Icading suurces of till. Production
climbed trOIll an allnual averagt: uf Ill"arly IS,UOU Illl:."trk in ItJUU-190'1 In
3'1,000 ill the 1940s. Thl..' peak individual year was 1929, wilh all output of LllorC
Ihan 47,000 metric tons; by that lime Bolivia plu3 Ihree ulher cuulltries accotlnted
11I.U1I11
lMlIl,
Willi
:'uu',
;;
y IOWI
"
uUU

1011
,

'.!tJll
;.
,
? lOll
,
0 1"1
t,11 .
.:1
,
Ill
, ,
"
:w
Dull.H'
11.1 10 h'y f... alufl's of Pl.'rll'S t'l.:onulIlk- devdopml.'nl.
1'11,>1, Iht' lUlllllry relll.lIJllt1llighl)' d"''Pl'IH.il'llt olll:.'XpurlS :IS:l slimulus 10 growth.
ulId, I 'ell! W.l:> n.tllllld), vullll'r.lbk' 10 priLl' :>\\'ings ill thl' inkrnatiun:d lll:lrkd
,111'\ tllll., III h,.:'yond il:> (otllrol. Third, IWClllieth-cl:lllury Pl'HI .111
l ... "IJllllly \\11111 Vl'I)' lo..'\\1 pl"du":livl' hdwel'n Ihl:.' capital-inlensive Mmodt.'rn"
""... 1"1, 111.tllll), \Ill 1111,.' ... "a:-.I, alld Illl' labur-Illknsivl." Mll'adil iOlla!" SCCIUf, mainly ill

lli-lU lijlJU lli7U IHMU IIiYU 190U IY:lO 193U IY-lU IYSO IYtiU IY7U
Fi9ure 6.1 Exports from Peru, 1830-1975: Indices of Volume and Dollar Value
t 1990 = 100)
J5R "ART TWO" CASI': CIIAN{;F ovrn TIME
for SO pen:('nl nfllle world's lin. As a resull oflhis lransforrn:ltion, I.., I'm' eclipsed
Potosi ns the financial and <;ervice cenler for the nation's mining sector,
... el Ihe tin hoom led 10 social tensions and 10 frequent slrikes. Ilighlancl
Indian peasanls provid("d most of Ihe bbnr, mnving from Iraditional rural com.
Tllunit ies inln rollgh-;1lld-re;1dy mining cnmps. They lived nnd worked in ;11 rocious
COlldilions. 'rhe}' Inhored nt :lllitucles of 3000-'1000 feet nbove sen level, descending
every dlly inlo deep and precnrious mine shllfts. Illness and injury were C01ll11l0n-
pi <Ice. Women 13bored along... ide the men, hearing equal risks and dangers. cat
the explained one female worker. "and Ihe mines cal LIS."
The Great Depression h3d an especially dev;1slnling impaci on Bolivia.
causing tin prices 10 plulllmel from $917 a lOll in 1927 to S3R5 a lOll in 1932. In
cOlllpnri<;on wilh its leading competitors, Bolivi3 had Ihe lowest-grade ore and the
highest 1";\Ilsportalion cnsls and would therefore find il hnrder to recover. World
\V:u II hrought a boost in tin prices. but a postwar slump left the nation's economy
weak.
And while III rosCfl survived the 1930s and 19'1Os, its vast holding... were
expropriated h}' the government as ;l result of Bolivi;l's Revnlutioll (lf 1952
(descrihed l;lter). M<1n<1gcll1ent of Ihe tin industry passed to the Cor"I)1'f/c;lm
Mil/e1'f/ de 11(1/iv;a (a.k.a. Comihnl), <1 staie-rull elllity that was controlled in large
part hy organized lnbnr. As the second-largest tin enterprise in Ihe world. Comibol
took fiftee!) }'enrs to bring production back to pre-1952 levels. Even so. tin
accounted for Ill(lrc Ihan h31f of Rolivian exports in 196R. During Ihe 1990s,
Bolivia reg<lined ils slalu<; :IS the world's fourth-largest source of lin, with lllosl
CXPOI'IS hcadinf. lor Europe and the United States.
OUlside of C:olllihoi. small- 3nd medium-size operations continued 10 seek
other l1lel:tls, stich as silver. 7.inc, anlimon}',lead, and tungsten. A short-lived
rush" in Ihe late 1980s ;111racled hundreds of cooperatives and Ihollsllnds of
indivitlll:ll prospectors; it was eSlimated, in f;let, thnt contraband sales were
equivalent 10 HO p("rcent of legal gold exports. Bolivin's historic mining fever
relllained alive and well.
Explor:llions for pelroleulll hegan :IS early as 191(,. These operations were
n;1tion;l!i1ed in 1937 under Ihe control of the slate-run }'acimienlos
dc Holivia (Y!'foU)-one ye3r bdore Mexico's nationalization of oil ill
1938,. Bolivian production peaked in Ihe earl)' I970s but declined there3fter. YPI:n
W3S priv:ltized in 1996.
More imporlant was the .. a......ociated natural gas" typically found in conjunc-
lion with petroleulll. As proven reserves became significnnt, Bolivia negotiated the
C<lflslructinn of a pipeline 10 in 1972. A Inter ;lgreelllent wilh Hrn7illed
to construction of a second pipeline in the 19905 ;111 the wn}' to Sao P3ulo, nlotnl
cost of $2.2 billion. As a result of subsequent discoveries, Bolivia's estimated
r("suves of natm31 gas incre:lscd exponentially between 1997 and 2003. In 2004
naillml nccOIlnted for 29 percent of all exports. By this time Bolivia W.IS known
to possess Ihe second-I:lrgest reserves in nil of South America. In keeping wilh Ihe
then-prcv<liling elllphasis on privatization, l'Xplojt3tion of the newly discovered
II Th(" An,Ic,, Snltlicl". Olig.uI II.. "11.1 111011.11'. 1.'1
wn<: granled h, ,III Illlt'f1l.1IIIH1;l1 (('Ilsorlilllll nl ttIlUp,IIIIt'" Ir"lll HI.I/,I
(I'etrohms), Spain (Repsol), ;lIld Fr;lIIu; ('1'01.11).
Inevitnhly,thc natural hOIl,II11.1 sp<lfkcd inlclI ...t'l'lllitil.II",nllo\(,,,,\ ., h.'
locnLion oflhc rescrves, ill the dcpartnll'nl nfSnnla CrU1 ,1lltl"IlIlPlII1IIlllg ...nlllll
easlern arC;lS, provided a harsh rt'milukr ofso<,ial ;lntl n 1'11' 'Illlt I 1t',1 \.Igc" h"l \\t,I'
the highlands and Ihe \OWI;lIHls. Anlignvcrrll1lenl crilil.s IknOllllt col ., wide
of orricial decisions: the pricing agrcclllcnts willI Argcll tina .llid It .. ,l.,il. IIll' I,"".I,,!'.
agreements wilh cOlllpnllics. nnd 1:1X .(lllC"clioll" hr .t'lllr,,1 .111111 1 11111"'.
Vcnting regional fruslrnlioll wilh Ih(' polilic.ll pr('('rnillnht nl r" ".11. 1to, .. III ... II'
Snnla Cruz mounted insi<;I('1l1 Gllllp;lign<; fltr vaguel)' ,ldllll,.1 ):".11" 1.1 lq:"II . 11

Generall}' speaking. the Sllll'Y of Bnlivl;ln milling Il'vt'.II ... 1\\" 11111'1'11.'111
differences from Ihe Pcrurinll expcritlll.c. First W<lS Ihe plctlnlllln:lIll I"k ot
nation... 1invcstors. ralher than foreign IlHISIIII,I . hl)' III 1111 l'lllllih 11"11
Second W;1<; Ihc economic rfllc of Ihe SI:llc. \\lh("l"C'a<: 1'('1'11 ,l'Iucl ,dill' ,,,I n,. 111 .... \,"
nn priv;lle enlerprise,lhc governmelil (,1111('10 perf01 111 donllll.tlli II ti,'" 111 I:, ,11\ I.' ..
('xl rnclive riC's. Throllgh C:c llnihol, Y1'1' H. ,llld 01' hel 1111 Ill ... III I LO '11. 1111"
stale prnved to he a rnaj(lr C(OIlOnllC ador ill Ilnlivi.1. I\S wc "h. ll ."Ic. Ihe cud, of Ih, ...
slory W<lS 'l(Iw!lcl"e in
As ill Pcru. coca Piliduclioll h,ltl;l lllllg antl'I'I'II,ln. Ili"II'I' III 1:,,111'.'
Originall)' grown for Ir;ldlt iOllal ('n<;lI111pl HIli hr hlghlalhl "I"'l'n'I/"(. II',., 11".11
L(llllrihutcd more Ih<ln (, percen! ofCnl' hy Ihe 1.11(' l'mt)..,. 1'11111111 I'l.hl
in !\'l'(l print.ip,lI area:-: tilt' ,I high IllllUl\l.lin .111',1 \\111i IIIlCrl'1l Inl.lIl1.
where it ;lccounled for J5 percenl of .Iglllllliliral pn'tlultltl1l (1l1.lilllr 10" 1'''.11
cOlll'umplion); ;lntl Ihe lowl:lnd Chapare. wh("l"e il :lIlHHlIlll'd 10 lIlole Ih.1I1 'It!
percent of ..gncultural oulpUI (mainly for expllrl .1hro,HI). !-.vef "inl" Ilw 1'.111\
1950s. coca Icnf growers (known :1<; werc l"C'llll:IlIlCd ,'" "
grollP of Illrmers. In lhe the I (l(fl/{'I"fl( joinctl :I (//111/11'(;1111 1.1"01 .dh.lIhl'
org:lllizetl under Ihe Ilnlinn's pc.,k bhnr ")'IH!ic.;lle. \oVhilc Ihc illlnll.Illt'Il.tI dIll):
trade W:lS illicit, lhc harvesting of (Ira leave<; W.I<; nlll
Ecuador: From Cacao to Petroleum
The slimulus ror Ecuador's t:onlempnr;lr)' C'I.OnOIllIt. lkvd. 'j'llwnl Ii.l, '\111'
mninlr from the C03Sl. r;llher Ihall the qam. In (onlr.l"t In goll\'I,1 .lll.! I'rill.
high-altitude mining never took rool in lhi<; cnllntrr. I.lrgclr .1".11.... 1111. 1,".101,,1
played ;l minor role in Sp:lin's imperial tle<;igns.
Independence left Ihe nation wilh :I I"IlInl eCOlllllll)' "I llI1lr h.111 .\ 1111111""
inhahitnnls. Lahor rdalioll<; took Ihe f(lnn nnd ... h.IIC', ""I'I'llIJ: 1\' '1\'11\
focused 011 cash crops 3nd inexpensive raw 1nr Ihc \\'llIld 111.111..1'1
Vulnerahle In ch;1nging l11:lfkel demands anel price fllH 111:1111111 .... F'Il.Illoll.
economy was suhjec! to uncerl;linly ;lnd inslahilil}. Tlw<;e {Olldiliflll'" , h.lllj:4tl
lillie during the remainder ofthc nineteenth lelliurr.
SI:lrling in the 1880s, Ecnadllr's first cnIHlllcrtial hoom involrnl II\(' C\ It'll I "I
cacao. (The intern31 ionalmarkct expandc(\ gn'all}' 011 ,hi" 111111', 1'.11 tlv l'l'l .111"' Illllk
ll,ll 1'.\1,1 I\\\J" 1 .. \ .... I ... lll!)II ... 1 11.\ '(,I 0\ I-!( 11r..IF
,lh"III.lk hn..IIIIt'.1Il IIC:III vI ill Unih,:d By !lJO,I,
h 1I.ldclI \.... 1111' larg... prodw... ,:r of(:<II.:ao, accuunting lor 15-20 pt'rcc:nt 01
wurld \llIll'lI!. am.! Hu'SI;:WS len tht:' highlJlIds tu work wage laborers in
1111."1.,10...10 pl.IIII,IIIUII::.. Growll Ulldl.'f 1l.Jlllr.t1 Sh,hll'ull luwland Ileal' Ihl'
b .. u.ldlll'iall l"lldO Ill'CHIl'" 1.IlIl11US lor Ihl' high (ilialit)' of it:.
.lllIllI.lli... -1l1l",H
'I'll,, 1-'0:1::.1 hn.IIlI" Ill'" ""'IIll-r 01 IIll' 1l.lliullS n'ollorniL adivit)',
,1"llIllI.lll'.IIJ.lI ddllg. UJIIlltll'n i.d. alld "''':1'01'1 illljlllrt ,lff,li rs, C,ll'ao buill
,dli.llll. l'::' WillI IIh... ldl.Llll::. \\'110 o)uJd pnwidl: acl.."t"::.s 10 illkrnalional
111.11 kd::. .111,1 1IJ11111l1nl gOlJd::.. Although CiIl,.IU allloullit'd 10 GO 70 I'l:"l cent or all
11. thllltlll .. 11 \'XI'Ul b, gelll'r.lt illg 1.lhor .llld iIII.Olllt>. II pfCIvidt'd lillie rur Ihl'
1I,1l10ll.11 ,'UIIlUltl)' .1::'.1 wi lui .... Ill::.ll.'.ld ul promoting dlvdopl11enl.
lite pl.tlll.IlIUIl::. Il'h...d 1111 rivl:"r::. luI' Ir.lIl::.purt.l1iOll and COl11lllunil'alioll. J\flon:over.
IIll' \lWlll'l:> I'f.... llI...\'I..1 10 ll::.t' Ihl'ir pruJ1b 10 rrOlll ralhc:r
Ih.1l1 illlht'IUI,:.d i... LUtlOIIlY. ib wilh oll1t'r III L<ltin America.
,.II-.ltl pllu.lul.tillll killo the lll'aliOIl 01 an -endavc
N
el.:vnoJllY,
AnHllld 1915 thl' C<Il;H, bllll,lIli'.a bt'gan lu faller in Ihe (,lte vI LUlllpdilioll
IHIIlI \Vl':-.I j\ fru,'.1 .llld Brazil .lIld. IlIOrl:" ill\purt,lnll)', Iht' appt\lranCl' of a drcadl'd
pJ.Ull kllO\"'11 Ill .., hrooJll." By Ihl' \lJJOs Ecuador was pn)ducing
only'J 1',,'rl.l'lIl 01 lit", wurld induslry enjoyl:"d a parli.1I in til,
1) .0.. ,I" .1 Il'''lIll .,f g.w',"1 nllll'lll rq>l.llli ing Hy )')SS Ecu:lllor
h.l III,,' \\url.l'" D.th l.ug" ..1 ,,'XpUlllT. ,dlllough 11::. wcre 11111 ul Ihe ::..lIl1e
tlll,IIII)' .1::' tl\hll' llld pl.,dlltliOll l.tk,,'lIlJver by ::.mall-scal..: I-'lanll'rS,
l\'llhllll ...d ::.lgllllil.IIlI, bUI lltll 011 till" :'l.lI... ull'alllt'r
El 1I,ldo,':> 1l1.I)Ul expvrl buum illvvlvt'd the prodUltlulI uf banana::..
Hn .HI::.,' ,II III,,' 01 pl.1111 dl::'l'.I::.e and Ihl'l:)'d",s 01 ion. I.lrgc.:.c,dl'
1I,III,III,llllltiv,IIillilltlfllnl 11111 10 bl' a t:nlerprise. a::. were
\.\1I1 .. 1,IIIIly ::'l',-klllg 11,'\'" '11'1-',1::, Illl' llillivalitlll. 'I'hl':'C l'l':.lrkl..:d Ihl:"
1\1 1.1Igl' lUIIlP,IJlk.. wilh slllfkiclll lu olll prudud iOll
"h'I'.1 1I11lllhl'I .. I .. Uniled Fruil f.JI .llId .Iwa)' lit", l.rrge:.l l'1I1ily. ill
I'}\'I Ilghl III lite 1I1lddll' oj lhl' (;ll'.l1 !)l'j)rl'::.::.ioll!-UFCt) t'::'labli::.hnl upt'r.l
11011" ,tllIUg IilL' /'.lu,Hluri,1I1 Ol.l::.t. p.lrlkul,lrI)' ill Ih", coasl ..d :lfl:"as
'I'll", dilll;llc, alld suil of this Iropkal arc;,l would .Imply juslify Ihe
dloiu... ollol..llioll,
i\ pu.. ' \,Vlllld \V.lr II ::.urgt" in world dl:"lll.llltllor o.lnal1a::.led 10 a lakeoff
III plududillll_ Tlte b)' building road::. connecling inl'lIld
10 111..' VtJ1b; Iv ,I lllUdl grt'.ller degree Ihan In<'.IU, tlte uanan.1
htHllII Itl::.ll'rl'l1 11.lthlllal dl:"vd,lplllelll, By 196U Ecuadur providl:"d JU percenl or
IlIlal wllrld UUlplil. represcllted 60 pt'rcclli of all Ecuadorian
Tit ... l'CUIIOlilY grcw a rapid p"h,:l', alld t<lriffs illcrcast::d governmt::nl revenue::.,
NOlwilhstanding lurc:igll early rule. tilt:: ;;lclual produclion of bananas
"Vl'lllll,clly 111UV... d ililu EClI.ldorian haillb. illv<lded UFCO laillb ill 1962,
.111(1 .1 ....ai,,s uf alld Lonvillct"d the company 10 cede: direci owner.
:11111' of Illl' pl.lIllaliun.. III I"GII (UFCO mighl abo h<lvt' learned somt'
It'ssons lrom its ,,'xperi..:nce in l:ualclllala, de::'l.Iiued in Chaptl'r 4,) But thi::. lilJ not
mean that UFCO disappearec.!. On the colltfilry. il remain..:,,1 ill (ontrul 01 mar-
keting and dislribution. This \\'a)' the comp'lII)' (uulJ avuid IhI.' risks of I.lbur
agitation ..md/or plant discasl', but still earn profits lfom overseas
Oil provided Ihe fuundation for E(uador's third export boum. Tht' di::.(ovtT)'
of petroleuIII ileitis in Ih..: easlern AnKlzon rc:gioJl illihe tall' 1960s Ilamfufllll'd Ihe
counll)' inlo a world producer of oil brought large increasl's ill guvernnll'1l1
reVl'llue. The ycar 1972 saw COJllplt'1ioll 01 Ihe pipl'lilll'.
eXknding frolll Ihe OriC1l1l: region 10 Ihl' pOri lily ur Esllleraldas_ In addiliun,
:.ubsl.lIlli.11 of g<l:l \wrl' found in Ihe <":tllr (II CuaY<lquil ill Iltl'
Largely bCGIU::.e of pt'trolcum exports, Ecuador's nl't )ureign "'X..:h,lllgl'
earnings dimbt'd from $43 million ill 1971 10 over milllun in 197-1.
Augmented by OPEC-led increases in internalional prll'e::., pt"trolt'ulIl
boom promolcd unpr",cedelllct.1 l'Conumic gro\\'th, Rl'al Gnp incrl'ased by all
.lVcrage of mort' Ihall 9 pern"lll per yt'<Ir frolll 197u 10 1977 (tolllparl'd with tl
pen:ent lor Ihl' 1960s), Ecuador bt'Cilllle lhe pdrolelllll t'xporlc:r 111
Soulh Amaica. afkr Venezuela. and in 2007 .:rude <lnd rdillcd Ill.:trulelllll pro
duCls aCCOlll1kd for 5R percelll of the' nalioll's tolill t'xpurt earnings. At lhe same
time. the oil boullI Gillsed sevcre l'llVirolllllelltal daJllage 10 Ih... 01 il'nk regiull and
pOSt'll seriolls he.dlh hazud::. for Iht' 10(:11 indigt'lluus populatiun_ Alld as ill oll1l'r
nations. petroleum-led dt'vdopmel1t It'd 10 massivc ill iJllpurb .tJ1d in
furl'lgn t.Jell!. 1\::. MexlCu dbl.(lvl'rc,l (Chapll'r 1), nJl \\';\:> nut a 1Il.lgi( p.lnal.c.l.
Social Tronsformations
pron's::.",s of l'COliomll' change led to ill Ihe ::.t.KI.l1
:.lructure of Ihe cenlral P.llkrns wcre broadly Ihe Illll:"e
lolllllril":., bUI Iherc wt'll.
At Ihl' lUI' was a capilalist dill', Ihough il by nu Illunolilhil-, Thb
W.IS:l cosmopolitan grollI', shrewd and wdll'duCllcd. wilh its (ellkr 01 aClHJn III
Illajor citil's (Lillla. La Paz, This ladl't' lonk a i1exiblc, pnlglllati(
approach 10 mallL'rs OIl hand, olten collahuraling wHh !orl'igll inw::.lor:-i :lIld
frt'qut'ntly pel'lllllling Ilt'wly rit.h illv,,'sturs alld milil.lI")' ullk.... 10 join ib
circles. In Peru alld Ecuador Ihis st'glllent was headquartered alollg Ihc P<ldlic
(oast; ill Bolivia, ils center or action alternated bclwe('n La Pa'l Cruz.
The olig;,lrl'h)' was III general morc Ir<lditiunal. in .Il1itudcs ,1I1d
illsularit)', In Ecu;'ldor and Peru the provincial patro" bound Iu the lalld and
Illitinlained an intimate (though hierarchiGll) rdatiunship wilh Ihe wurking peon.
OWl' lime. howewr, Ihe preeminence of highland lltll:clldado:> calli'" und..:r inknsl'
pressure, In Uolivia, the Revolution or 1952 (described later) led to large-scale land
reform and liberated wl1/pesitlos from the oligarchiC stranglehold; in Pc:ru, a
gradual erusion or dilt:: authorily was hastened by lhe agrariHn prujeci of a Inil itary
government in 1968-75. Many peones left Ihe rur jobs either ill
coastal sugar or cotlon plantations or in mountain mining (:Imps, As if in admi::.
sion of ddeat. some frustratct.i landlords simply turned tht'ir lamb over to
162 I'/\RT TWO CtlSE STUI1lE:;;: ('1It1NCt!" OVIR TIMF
Hcnc;\lh the elite there were people of modemle in("ome, members of middle
sectors if nol :l middle d:lsS (ill the sense Of;l cohesive, sc1f-;\ware soci;\1 ...lass Ihal
emerged in nineteentJl-cclltury Europe), Mosl of the,e;e heads of household lived in
UrlXlll ;\rC:\5, had high school or univ('rsily-levc1 educalion, and held while-collar johs.
I.;\rge enlerprises employed engilleers. computer progmlllmers, and tecllilicians.
Many aspiring profcs.<;ionals found positions in government-including Ihe miJitnry.
Bure<lucmcy, as well as c01l11l1erCe,llCC;\me the ultimale middlesector occupalion. In
EClI:ldor, lIlost middle-d:lss citizens resided in Guayaquil and Quito; in Bolivia. Ihey
emerged in 1.,:1 Pn7.. Cochnb;'llllba. and Snntn Cruz: ;'Inc! in Peru, I.ima remained the
l1Iost pnwerful magnet for :llllbiliollS would-he professionnls.
And Ihe lm\'er classes. pcrhaps $0 percenl of the Andean populalion,
remained soci:llly heterogeneous. The}' included Ihe I'ur:ll proletari:ll on Ihe
sugar :lIld han:lIl:l plant<llions, tennnt fanners :l!ld hired hands in Ihe coffee ;lnt!
cotton fields, and peas:lllts and suhsislence farmers in the siam. They were wage
e;lTllers on fishing hoats, miners in the mountains, and organi7ed workers in the
cilies. They included dnlllestic servants in Quito and Bogota, coca Ie:lf growers ill
Peru and Bolivia, and residents of suhurhnn in Lima La
1';17. nalive of Aymara and Quechua, m:lll}' remained on the fringes of
TlntiOll:l1 \\'as :In siraillm, divided alon!!. three dimensioll,e;:
hetwcen workers ;lIld pe:lsants. hetween CO:lst and $icrm, betwecn non-Indian and
Indi'H1, Network and family lines oftell hridged divisions, howcver. alld the
effects of migration reduced once-major geographic gaps.
The exodus from rur:ll to urhan areas occurred later in Ihe Andes th.1Il in
other pmH, of L'ltin Americ:\, but it has intensified (lver till' past forty years. Over
70 percent of lhe population of Peru now Jives in cities. ApproXimately 76 percenl
of the citi7cns of Ecuador reside in t(1\\'ns or cities. as do 63 percenl "fthe people or
Bolivia. Accelerated movement frolll the countl"}'<;ide to cities h:ls created nc\\'
sodnl prohlems-slums, crime, and poverly.
<,Ot_I,.; World Bank and EconomIc Commission for ano the
The Central Andes: Vital Statistics, 2007
II
PoplJliltion (millions)
GOP (current SU.s. billions)
GNP/capita ($U.5J
Poverty rate (% in 2006)
lire expeclancy (years)
BOLIVIA
9.5
13.1
1260
63.9
65
PERU
J7.9
109.1
3450
44.5
71
ECUADOR
13.3
014.2
3080
39.9
75
II
Ine(luality and poverty h,lvc h('('n pcr"i .. t(llt .11ltl \\I\k""ll'.lll IllIllng II.,
1?l{()S. the of lnore h;llf (If the P'I'lII.II1I11'" lell Iwl,.\\' IIII' 1"'\'1'\
lille. Although those havcdlopped .. llghll}',I!lc ,1I ..."llIle 11111111>1'1,11 1"'PI,1e
living in povert)' has iocreased. Snci;ll :llld ClIHlIHllIl I1le"lll 111(''' l nullllll" I"
prevail. The persislence (If Ihese neocolonial legal 1(''' 1"1'-e.. illll,lll,I,,!t- 'lIW,tl'lll"
.\houtthe Andean region as:l whole. Ilow did 1'0lilil:ll.HIII"<; :HldlC"" 11,'11,,",11
prohlems ill the arterlllalh of illdel"'elidelHc? \-Vhal WI'I" the I" \\1,,,1.
indigenous people fOllgh! for we:ller 1" 1,IIut ,IIUI .1 Iwllt'l 11\"tIII"'j,d'
V1.'hal h:lve heen Ihe effcc.ts of Ihe eXl'fll'l tln\'Cll In"tlel .. III ,h\..lj'I'IIIIIII) I h."
have polit iLal ;llld SOl ial lllovclIlenls Ir,lIl<:lll/ tlH'd Ihe... II ,tllIlI It..
J
POLITICS AND POLICY: PERU
Peruvian pnlitic<: in Ihe po<;tindepcIHlcnLC,' cr.1 l'rc"'III,.1 ,1 1,11 ,HII '\11 . 1.. , "11" 11.1\'11'):
defealed Spain through Ihe help "f flllt<:i(kr... 1'1'111 1I1"nd II ddlh lilt III ,",'.lIl
aUlonolllY from slale". Tllc eL,"I'''II)' \\.1.. c\le",hll,:h \\"".11 11,:11
1
111):
had ravagNi landed eslates alollg the (0:'1,1 :lnt! illlhc \wn<l. f "tllI1lt'" " "'111,1111' .1111
depression. The mines were ill dl<;rCp:llT. The ll'"IlII),\It:'.Hlcl" dr,l'( 1.lkh 1I"cdl"
Illoney in order to huild Ihe ne\\' nalion. hili Ihe Ile.le;lIl r \\';1.. lK.nl\' 1'11'1'1\' I-I"mlll,
IH20s onward. the govCl'lll1lCll1 hegall 10 :U.. ClII11I1I,lle,1 <;cl"lc.. llf IPII'I,:1l 1111.llnl\
1o Brilish lenders) tha, w(lulc.llalcr prove Ip he IlIil1""",
Nor did conditione; i11lprn\'('lol ,he 11l(li,IIl ... Wli" I ,111,'"1 "0 I" I" "'
01 Ihe tolal popul:llinn of apprIlXI1ll.lleh- I '", 1111111011 I'pltlH 1.111" 111,1.1t ,..1 II,..
tr:lditionaltrihule. formally ahnlislH'd \\'llh Ihc .'\p,.I<;11\1I "t "'1',1111. \\'llh Ill>' ,,/
trilm(ion tlr i"digl'flfl$, n he:ld I;lX (,1 nat t:n, 1111 C"\C'r\'lllH", /cg:ltdk "I Ill' ""Icl
Since nineteenlh-centuq' liherali"lll regaldctl Indl:'lll<;' .1" IlItllvldl1,II IInl '''11111111
nities,lhe)' no ('Iljn}'('d Ihell pl('\'inl1<; leg,lI p",ln 111.11.. "'"nll' ""11,:111 r,
:IS peones on esl;Jles or :1," w(lrk... rs ill milw" ()lllc"" 111(',1 I" 1',1.... ,I" I//{"/I. ", ,111,1
find cmplo}'l1lctlt in cities :lnd 10WI1<;.
I'\)' 1845. as the gU;lnn Ir.ldr W,l'- ('Xp,llldlllg, 1'1'111 l.llllt l11ukl lilt 1111,' ,,[
R,llllon C.I'ililla. its strongesl 1l\1l('ICl'nl h (l'nlill \. 1,'.1\ 1'-1 A 1ll11,1,11 \ "III' 1'1, { .1'1 IlL,
sought to l1loderni7e Ihe counlr}'. lie oq:,l1l1/l'1l till' 111 ..1 11,1111111.11 hlltl':"1 .111,1
promoled puhlk works. inc1ulling Ihl' (1!Il .. lllILlulIl 1.1 ,1 1,1111 .111
I.illla wilh Ihe port cil)' of <:allao. I )llrinJ.:. a <;eL 1111,1 telm III / ,1111", ( .1 .. 1111.\ .Ih, ,1,..1"'1 I
Ihe nmfril",ci(;/I dr ,mel e!llall, ip:llC'd hl.1t k ..],1\'('''. '1 n 1I\.1k" "I' tOI 1,,',1
I;lhor, Peru imported loo,oon Chillrsc (o'llie 1Ild l'1l1}rll'q,IIl" ,1'.. 1I"klllllr
l
d
wnrkers froTH ,he mid lR;,Os to 'he mill IX711 t\ bllllilel "\ ill .. tllll'1fHl". I
also encouraged military profcssionaH7:ltintl and I'lIhlH (',h" ,1111111
The nalion's srirnJing dehl posed in"oluhlr pl'llhkm.. fOI "lIh"('ljlll'lIl 1,"...
1
dents. Under lose Balla (1 R68-72), Ihe 0\'('1" the (; ,rcigll,khl In
the Parisi<lll firm of Adolfo Dre}'fu<;; in Ilrf'vill" I'\llk ,1\'('1 Ihe 1ll,111,1):"
ment of guano consignmcnts. The ,!c.ll Illiglll 1.,1\'1" 1l1.lIk ,,"11'111111 ",II..e.j,1
Illany Perllvi;lns. however, it repr(<;cnlccI.l1l UIl,lL1 CI'Llhlc It II killllr "llItI' 11,111"",.1
pal rimony. Parl\y for Ihis Presidenl f\ 1.0111(,1 I'.lfdp I 1x;.' "(,) t nl" ,n' it'd I"
H,I 1',\1(1 I\\tl (1\ ..>I ... llIIIJE:-. I.IlANCJ,UVUtTIl\II':
tlll:'o :">lllllllllJlI by 1l.Ilioll.t!i,ing till' LUlllltfy\ llitratl;: fields, Ala.'>, that gc.'>lurl;: would
.11l1ll" IIl1doll\:" ill IIIL \,Val' ol the P,ILillc.
III IIIL w.lkt "I" tlli.'> c.dallliluu.'> defeal. Peru tu prudllL"t:: a new
lJ.I'>'> 01 ,lvill.tll kadt"l:"> wlLu rc.'>tlllblcJ lht.' ciclllifictls ill tVkxku, Highly
t.lul.lh",1. 1I,lJl'0... ilivblil" hy Ir.lilling, and liberal by outlook, they cUJllprised
.1 l UIIIlIl'> hfnd: 1,,1' l.lLh. III a bdkr phrase, they might Ill: dassilied as
,llJ'>It>ll.IIIL tvllllloLr,Ib. Thdf lIlitial spokesman was Nieol:'l ... dt Pkrola,
Wll", .1'> ,t 1"a... 11 )'UlIllg tll.t"'Uf)' millbtt-r, Ilad negotial\:"d the t.:onlrt.JVtrsial
lll'")'lll) LlIlIlf.lL! vJ Aher fonning tilt:' DelllocraliL P.lrl)', I'il:rula
IIt'l.lllll' I'rl... idL'llt ill JH95. Eager ttl reinvigorate expLlrt-led expansion, he
lIH'Vl"d 10 ... trl'llglhLll I'l'ru's unlit rating. He tightt'lled tax alld
Jlltrt:.l"'l"d dlilin viI CUlIlIllL"fll:. which ltd to a doubling uf government
IJlttlllll' dUlillg Ilis fuur )'lar krill. I-IL abo establislled a ministry uf
lJpllHnl II' a ...... isl lucal L,llrq)l'tnl'urs alld facilitate participatiun
III l'llllllJIllit growlh.
i\llL"r I'il'rob slqlllL'd dUWIl, Pl'ruvian politics entered era of
known .1 gWI/U/lIIIiSlIIlJ. I'Jfi:clive competition lur rowa was restricted to tht'
uPI"'" LI.I llllt.:. Eit-Lliulls hlok plaL:1' uut ballots were not Sl'cret, so landowllers
,-wild held Illli .. work.:r:,> alld peolles to tile polls and mUllitor their votes.
Ild'I'II,/a,/os Irllill tht S;('/III had clcclcd to the national Congress,
Wllllt Illl)' ... .'>upporled Ihl' president-in for llncheckell
II
The War of the Pacific
fb llltl,llo.: IJhldUUIUl1 in the Ui!U), Chilean IllIile owners coveted the
lit II rtwrVL') oWrlf'd by UOllVld and PelU, In IH79, Chilean investors refused to pay
!It:W 1,IXt:) 011 Uohvio!l nitratt: reserve). In retaliation, Bolivian president Hilari6n
[).lld (1 H76- /')) ordered the seizure of Chilean-owned nitrate operations in
!\lItul.ltjd)I,I, UUIlVl<l. sellt In tlOOPS to occupy the region, Aftel sorne hesita-
(lUll, Pl"rllVldl1 governlllent decided to honor an 1873 alliance with Bolivia and
JOI! I till' WdJ.
Ihus bL't.Jdtllht:' W"r of L1le Pat..ifi(. (1879-83), pining PelU and Bolivia against
t 11I1\" WUII d SIUlIlIHIY milttdry victory and occupied lima, In the ensumg
pC,I,,-, 'rt'..lty, Boltvi.llu'>tlb plUvinct.' 011 the coast. Chile gained outright contlol of
111,-' 11l11,Hto' Il( 11 provInce of Tarapaca, including Ihe city of Iquique; and it
lu kCL"p lUlllrul of l..len,l <mel Aricd fur ten years, their subsequent fate 10 be
lid Itk'lI by .1 pld)1SClte.
IIlL' Well of 11 It:' PaClflL Ildd f'Jl-It:'dching effects on alllhree countries, For Chile,
II u.,h,'It'd III d Illlrdle IJOOII1 and boosted national confidence. For Bolivia, it denied
.In...... It) tilL" '>L'd. !-ur 1't:'IU, it was a humiliating defeat, which discrt:'dited the
pultuu.IIlS <llltl accdeldkd the declinL" of the economy, II was a failure for Bolivia
ell.d I',-'ll ill LVl'IY (ullcL"ivdblt: way.
JI
lucal power. lVlt'antinlL". tht.' coastal dile, ib cOlltrul 01
policy, pur... ued the path or t'xport-,Ied growlh" .
As tIll' twentieth celltury opened, all urhall workIng dass bl'g.lll 10 as...t:r1 Jls
illtcrcsb tllruugh collectivt' acl ion. indudillg s('riullS proksts ,Igain... t inilatiull ill J,) I I.
In this COlllt.:xt, Guillermo Billinghurst, a naive and aral it." pupulist, triulllllhnl ill 111('
IYI2 A propOIlellt ofell1iglltened Billillghurst dt'lliull ... lr.ttt,d llis
sympathy with the worke'l"S b), supporting public housing, all eight-huur <1::1)'. and
collective bargaining. When he l'ncouraged streel delllulbtratiull.'> ill :'>uppurl of his
policies, however. the elite closed ranks against him, A COl*!> lit-posed hUll in 191
/
1.
Power J't'Vt.'rtcd to civilialllcchnocrats under Jos':-I'ardu, a Illoth:ratt' rdiJl"IlIt'r, III
Janual), 1919, "s labor prolests erupted in Buenos Aires, Santiagu, and Solo Paulu.
workers in I.ima-Callao prucbimed a thrl'e-day general .'>Irike:. With ",upl'0n frulll
university students, they demanded 100wr food pricl'''', ;1/1 dghthnur d,l)'. and t'lIat:t
IlIclll of other A hesitant P:mlo L"vt:ntually caliedoul th..: arlll)' 10 dispL"r.'>L'
thL' workers, and in the w;lke of thL' violencL'. he accLded in \':lrt to (lidr dL'Ill'lllt.b.
In the midst of rcsulting confusion, Augusto B. I..eguia WOli lIlt' 191') deLtiul1.
Eager for absolute rule, he staged a coup prior to his own inauguratiull and st'izetl
the national sent Pardo off 1'0 L'xile, dissolvnlt he me, :tlld l'lls(ull :d
himst'lf ill powt'r. Thus began Legllia's dictatorship, a watershed rt"lllellllll'r l
throughout Peru as tile tJllcclIio, or eleven-year rult.. ;\ pliant
;lssl'mhl)' devised a charter that legitimizl'd J.l'guia's aUlhoril)' and prL'slribLd a
!'>1J'ung state rok in Ihe t''':OIlOIllY. To cunstruct tilt' fatlwrl.llld," l.l.:glli;1
undertouk a vigoruus prugr:llil uf public works and pnJtl10kd furt'igll iIIVtstlllt'nt.
lie also 1l10wd aggressively h) silellc" his nities, dismissing dlssidt'nt
from universit)' chairs alld turning against stullt'nts. alliong thern a young kadl'r
by the name of Victor Raid Ila)'<t de la TorrL'.
In foreign affairs, Leguia s(ttlnl in 1927 a long-standing hOUlld;ll"y dlSpule with
Culumbia. Two years l:ltL'r, ill 1929, hl' J'cadlL'd all agrt'l'lIlt"lIt willi Chiit': tilL'
northern provinet. ofTilena would go to I't'I"U, and Ark.1 \\'vultl l"t"maill under
Chile's t."untrul. Tltl War uf tht' Pacific, so Glta... lrlll'hi..: lvr Pt'l"ll, finally rL'ached IIl L'
t'nd of its diplomatic coda. VVilhin lhis carefully cunstructed politiLalt'IlVillH-llllcnl,
LL'gula had no trouble getling rL'dected in 1924 and 1929. I-IL st.t'llh:d invindhlt:.
Flirting with Policy Alternatives
As in other parts or L:l!in America, tlte Grt.'al J)eprt'ssioll prumpted lIlilitar)'
intervention. III Augusl 1930 a young :ll"Illy ufficer, Luis tv\. S:'lllcheJ' Ct'rro,
be..:allll.' hlold of all interim junta. A Illall 01 Illodesl backgrullilti. brought a
distinctive tuuch to Iht' executiw OHlct', st:l'killg to build ,I pupulbt coalilion
between disgruntled lipper-class elemellts alill the working masses. In [931 hL
became a formal candidate in upcoming dections. His principal 0ppoJlellt was
Victor Raid Haya de la Torre, the t.'rstwhile studellt agitator andlluw leader ortlle
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Ikvolutionary AllialJCe
Party, APRA), all organizatiun tlwt wuuld becollle tht. rl"u)st durable political
party in tht' nation's histor)'.
An Aprisro election poster expresses both the party's outlook and the intensity of the
1931 campaign; the slogans say "Only Aprisrno will save Peru. vote for Haya de la
(Private collection.)
The 1931 Gllllpaign provcd Ill;) fateful evcnt. S,indle7 Cerro (altetllnr ngrarian
ref(lrm. rur,,1 exlensi0n programs. anti assimilalion nflhe Indialls. I-Ia}'" de I" Torre
countered h}' stressing the C'vil.. of impcri"lislll and the injustice of social inequilies.
II was nn inlense Glmpaign.markcd b}' violence and mutual nc(us-,tion<;. Ahhough
APRA received ample sllpport, S:inchcz Cerro cmerged as the viclor.
l'olariz;llioTl ensucd. In 1932 :l fall;ltic<lI }'oung "prist" tried to "ssassinate
S;lllchcz Cerro. APRA p"rtis"ns organi7.ed nn insmrectioll in the provinci:ll cit}' of
Trujillo. which led to thc arrivOlI of" heavily "rllled milital)' colulllll. As panicky
"fri.<lo5 ned the premises, Ihey executed arm}' officers. policemen, and other hos
tOlges. \Vhen the government troops discovered this :ltrocit}'. the}' sl1mm:lrily
cuted "tleast a thousand local residents suspected ofsupporting the insurgents. This
set the tone (or APRA-army relations thereafter <lnd convinced m<lny officers that
the)' must never lei APRA cOllle to power. This determination gained strength the
following year, when another (l1'I"ista gUIllll:'lll succeeded in killing Cerro.
Beset hy crisis. Congress elected General Oscar It Ben.wide!' 10 serve out Ihe
relll.lindcr o( the presiclentinl lerm. 1\5 nen"vides took ofl1ce. Peru entered n
I, Thc Antics. Ohg.ll,h....I1Hllllth.lIl'> II.'
tnillsitionnl ph'lse that heltl out Ihe possihilil)' o( rCI.1t1l 11l
b
IhI.' lllllllll"y'<; dq\t'ndl'lh "
nil international markets and invcstmcnls. Export .. <;LUIl'd III rt'lIWI"f. hlllll',n
C:
1
pital he"l :l slead)' retreat. 1.llcal enlrcpreneurs. <;lll1lclillll.... \\'ilh g,IVI'1111111'11
1
help. gnincd parlial conlrol of some mineral !'el I Olt-Itlll <11111'111 WI'lll
Industrial cap"city was modcst hut gf('lwing. II ;lp\,e;lrcd Ih.ll I'rlll \\'.1'" lin\\, III .1
po.. iti0n to redirecl its economy.
Ben:lvides allemptcd to seii'e 'he npportunil}'. III hi<; ,1I1I1l1I11 ... II.III"0
the st<lte-directed developmel1t n( petrolClIlll. "1"1 ,Hie d"uhkol 1I1l1l1 1""1"1 I"
1936, while the national currcnc), (Ihe fo(ll) r('lllaillcd .... l.lh1c. Th(' 1;0\"('111111('111
:lc
l
ivc1}' promoted public works and sodal projcll!-. illl 1I1;lo! l' 'Il"'lnl, II' 111.
working-class hOUSing. and a cOlllpllbor)' sodal sClllrit)' ,y... ll'llI Ikl1,l\'I,k.11,..
supported an agricullUr:l1 h<lnk 10 give credil hI nliion 111.11Itt'l" .11101 .'Illt'l 1.1,,,1
owners, thtls reducing Ille role o( foreigll merch;llll holl"(,'"
The presidency Ihen p"sscd In nllldel":llC ("ivill.IU.... f\l.llllld 1'1.101" .lnd 1,1""
I.uis Hustamnnlc )' Rivero. both of whnm gnverllct! wilh '11"1\'<1 ""1'1'''11. 111
tandem. the}' furlhered the modest rlnricnl.llinll 011 lilt' 1'1'111\'1.111 Cllflll'lll\
awa}' (rom excessive rdiann. Oil internal illllal 1ll.11 kcl .... "1"111'\' Ill< 1('.l ... t,] go\ "111
ment !'pending :lnd established lonlrnl .. nil illlporl<; ,1l1l11"Il'lgn e', 1i.1lIgc. I lin
launched a scheme (or a sl:lle controllell iron :lnrl <;te('1 ,,!.lUI. 1111')' ""lllgill
to diversify :lgricult Ill"<.' "!lei lh,llkn)!,ed the I oa<;1 :11 ... ug.lf 1>,1rO., .... !"(''1"Ulll,: Ihnn
10 meet d(lllleSlic-lll:lrkel tl"ol:l .. heft Ire CXI"llting It I (1\'CI ... r.1<;' 1l1,llktI '\1111.1
puhlic controversy. Bll!>.I.1I11;111\(' apprllved.l llllllr.hl gi\'ing 11'( 1"11I1I I"n I"
sc"rch for nil inlhe I)e..erl. Takingadv.lrl1.Igl' (,\ .In.lllllll,dl ... 1 "Ill. 1\' ,,\,'1
this decision. the clla .. tal elite en}-:inccretl.l Illililal)' t (IIII' Ih,' J:' '\,,'111111,,11
in 194R.
Once ill office. f\\alHlcl 1\. ()dri.l prOlllpll)' It... l,,rl't1 the .Hlllltl\ ...
Ir"dillon,,1 export led growth modcl. nllhlldnx e(llIlnll1il \'lllillC'" en, /1111.1):,.1
foreign inveslment alld reslril..led govcrnlllCnt,,1 lrllervl'nlioll (hlll.l' "., ... ,,1,.1.11,,1
his position by winning the 1950 e1el-tlons Illelt' wa" Ill' '11'1"\<;111"11 ,111.11'1"
("ceded to lighten his hold nn power. Much in Ihe 1ll,1I11ll"1 lIt Argllllill,I ... 111.111
PenlIl. he courted .. m:ls<;es. I,l\,j.. hetl IlIlltb ,m 1l... h'IlI.III"II" !'"hll.
work... and developed a person.dislil fI11l'lwing. \Vllh tilt' .Iul t1 Ill'" \\'11l",
Oelgado de Odria. he mohili7.Cd women ill supporl of Iht' ll'gll1lC',
suffrage to females in 1955. lie harassed and imprisoncd "pl'0n(,l1t,. ('''I't't 1,1Ih'
As civilian nlig:lrchs exprc... sed "ppre!lcllsillll !lVCI hi'" 1.11'1 It I"n'" 1111111 "I
rule, Odria finally consented to free elections in 19';(1.
The leading contenders were forlller pre!'ident 1\1:lnuel I'I,HIII. "'up!,,,'lnll,y
APRA. :lnd :l politic.. l newcomer n:Hlled Ferll:lntln Tl'rry..1lloliol.ltr .. 1
the National Front o( Democmtic Youth. HcI:lllllOC. a lIniverl,ll)" IlfTrx.I ... tr.1I1HoI
architect, articulated the hopes and (rustr"li0ns o( the cdtKaled middle <;('tl,I, ..
Arter winning the election. Pr"c1o hroughl in a period o( pnlilll:ll Iihcr.lli/,II11,n.
permitting trade-union organization and nllowing \,01111\111111 ... t.. ,IS \wll ,I!>. "1""""
lo operate freel)'. He proclaimed a progr:llll (or sheller .1111 II.Ull r (f"1 1111 I' /,('/ I" /111
the name o( the peas:lnts. hUI did little ahoul il.
H,S t"I\1 1\\'\'" 1/, ... 1 "'1111111\( IIANI.I (IVI'1{ 111\11
Ti'l' lh'xl pll... H.ll'lIti.d dCdltlll, III IY6l, ulkll'd II I..kar picturl' of pulitical
I ,llIdld.lk:'> IIh.llllkd Ilay.1 dl' 1,1 TlIlTl', ,Ihle ,II last Iv run 011 Ilw Ilpristll
1'1,,[1111 Ill; Ikl,HlIldl" .I Ill'W Ulg,llllZ.ltiull l.dlnl Acdoll Pupular; alld
Illl' .dW.lp hUl'l'IuJ l)dn,l. 1!.ly.1 Wlill tile Illu::.l Vule;'::., wilh 33 pl'r(l:1l1 uf the lotal,
hili Illl' 1lIt1lt.ll Y .1l1lIUIJl'll Iht. HI urdt.'!' tu a possible aprista
1'1 nidt.llt.. )', Ille IllllowlJlg ye.lr pruducl"tl .I lllore an:t'ptabll' rt.'Mllt: vklory
Illl Hd.llilldt.' (Tilt.' \/1 dt.L101.11 g.lllll tim::. bt'G.lI11e ell:ar: tlpristtls cuuld
Itill, lUll tll\') \\'I."It.' llut .lIluwel..llo WilL)
Ihol.lIllh!\' Il'V\'.t1..-d he .111 .IPIH.'.dlllg, I..h.lrtslllati( politician. An ,wid
,'I"pUIH'1I1 <II LJ ...... JOhll I" K"-Illledy'::. AlIi,Jllu'lur he.: pruposed
\/1 .llr.III,:.,AIlHIZOII high\\';ly. invokl'llthc ollncan power,
,II hJ III gt:d Il'lIow l'it hI to 1I.ltlUllal grl';ltlle::.::. again. On a mort' practical
Il'\d, 1Lt.' "'lIughl to the HlI.: 01 tht' expand ::.oci.t1
111.llllIl:It.llIIlllg. ,lIld Ulldcrl.lkl' agral i.1ll rdt.)l'IIl. Aftt'r .1 hoslilt' Congre::.s em;:lscu-
Lllnl hi'" I.\llli Idurm hill, huwt.'vl'r, III lilt.' sierra rl'al..-h:d angrily by
11I\'.llltllf. h.lt. and tdkillg I)ver 1:.1 Ill"', cunllkt raged throughout the
)1,'11", .1 ('lIh.1l1 guerrill.l lIlllvelllelll lJeg.1l1 u::.ing violent in order to
"'11.tlk \IHIII[r)'Wldl' revolulioll. III ::'I'ilt.' (or of lib reforJllist
Ihol.lIllltlt.' wilh fort.t.'. 111.1 vit.-h.HI'" (;:lI11p.lign, the .1fI11Y killl'd and jaill'd
l/tIlU.... llhl ... ollllghl;lnd '1'111: fUrlned.llraUlIl.llk ..-xperiellcl' for
hulll II ..: 11"1I/'l'::>lIlll::> ;1I1d IIll' sult.ltcr:-..
\)lll' lit utJllT W.I ... to ,I IUllg dispuk witll
Iill' 11'1' I It.- 1.I\..:d.1 AIlCI IIv!;' 01 pratnl(:tcd IIl'gatiations.
tll,ttkt.',1 Ii) llHI ... lal1t Irolll Ihc IPC gailll.:'d ..H.:cess 10 IIl'W
11t.,ld... lit Iht.' AIlld:t.IJII, ,1IIdlht.' I't'ru\ l.lll gvvt'l"IIlll..-nt Iv crude oil to IPC
.11 .1 ll\l'd I'rtu' 11I1 Idinlll).!, .I[ Iht.' CUJllp!t.'X. Oppon..-nts :leolsed
lkl.ll'llhll' ul wJlJllg Ullt lI,tliI'll.d ih (rilil..hlll swdlt'd, Hd.lllnde's opli-
1111 ... 11, VI ... IIIII \II .1 IlJlilt.'d ;lIld Pl'fll proved 1\Jlilitary
Ollll' ag,llIl ""tlllht'ir to lltt'
The Military Revolution
Tilt.' 1')hH lUUP !),lvnllhl' \V.IY lllr 011(' ul L.IIIII AllIeIK,"s .llllbitioliS mililary
g"Vt.'1 t1J1I..:11b. I.t.'t.! hy liellt.'f,lI lu.lll Vd.l:-'lO i\lv.lladll, lite junla ded..lrc:d its inten
tlllil Itl hllllg 1.1/' r.... ldlillg dl.lllg..::,> III the t.lf Pl'ruviall socidy. \<Vhat Peru
llt.'\'lkd. Ihe iJlli ... pru...l.lilllt.'t.!. a l1t.'h/ (;.'LVlIUllli( orlk-r, capilalist nor
,I tlidt wuuld .Iblllbh prey,liling, illt:ljuities and I.."rt'ate the
1I1,11\'II.d IUlilld.lt lor harlllvny, all...! Jignit y,
'1Iut.'t.' sd Ie.:gillll' ap..ll'l frolll ulllt'r cpbwt.s of military rule, One
w.'" ih ...lIli.11 and politit.';t1aulllllollIY, Tht.' P..:ruvi:1Il armed aclcd alone, rather
th.1l1 III With l-I\'ilian pllWl:'r the leaders of the regime
.1,1, 'I .t"'tllll.., Ulillook .Int.! vi llll' dl'IIt.'lldt.'llt.:ya of anal)'sis. seeking to
l'lhl h'h.llthl..'y t..dkd ul thl' Peruvian et.:onolllY 10 foreign centers
"I dl'U"'IUll.
a
Thlld,l.lrgdy ht::t..Hl't.' ul ib expcrielKe: with alltiguerrilla cmnpaigns in
thlt sianl, Iht. Peruvian mililary exutll'd gt.'J1IlIlIt.' wilh Ihe plighl 01 lilt'
peasantry, The rt.'sult l'l'voJulhmary Illilit.ll"y rt.'gillll:'.
A kl'y lu the rdunn. In Illid 1969 Iht.'
Vdascu regime annoullCed Ihe mosl s\'Jl'l'ping land rl'!UI'Ill prugram ill Lalill
AJlll.'ric.. since Ihe Cuban Revolulion, All Iargt.' l'Slalcs, ur pruductivity.
\wre subject to expropriation. The highl)' Il1l.'chaniud sugJr of
t.vast lIllllc.r tht.' of worktrnln coupelaliv..:::.. B)' Ihe llIid
1l}7tb, af tlt..- t.oUll1ry\ I'rlldll(tIVt- 1.llld Illldt.'r lOOpt:I.ltivt'
Olli..' ::.01'1 ur anolhl'r. 1\1.11I)' of till' huge.' t.'::.t.ltl':-. that h.ld dUlllillat..-d
thl: Pcruvian <lgr.lri,Jll sl'llor Jbappc.arld.
To l:vmulidak ib tilt.' rt'gillle U't';tlnlthl' N,ttion,11 lUI
Supporl of Social Mobilization (Sistemfl Nfldotl,,1 Apuyt} de Iii MUl'ili.wt.ic.m
Sodal, or SINAMOS). SUIlll'lillles writll'll ;IS Iwo mllU!>, without
-it was 10 as the: illtt.'grating institlllion for and working-
groups. It linkl'd tht.' rcgime with tht..' idcntifil'd th.... gOVl.'rtlllll:'nl with
its group::.. and prumo(l't.I a ufll',lt.ler-loJlowl;'r relation
dcsire to urg..lnizt;' ;llld lIlohilizl..' tht.' bee.lIllt.' Ulll' 01 lht.,
gc.)\'l'nlll1l.'llt's halllH..
A priurily Ihe sprawling .arl)und 1.1111.1 amI
otilt'r cities. Mililary officers organized thl' rl'named N
(plll'blos jOINflt'S), and l"nlislt'd Ihe ;lid oj thl' dlllreh in their Pari ul tht.'
solulion \V.IS ,:.,illlple t'nollgh: the grallttng of pl'Ope.:rty hi tilt.' migrant
O(t."Ilp.llltS, Another t..lctit- wa::. bringillg tht.'/1I/('iJlvs jlJI't:/h'::> und..:r Ihl' Ullllndl:l
stniLturl..' or SINAMOS and thus PI'IJlllOlt.' IJ)' 1\)74 thl' lll;,ljurit), ul
urban had been rl'organlzl'd frolll ahUVl' illto charlt'red PUl'll/OS
jIJIII'fll'S,
lop-duwl1 pattan ul org,llliz<lllllll allli 111ubilizdtiull rl'vcalnl a audal
kalurc ufllll' Vcla:-...::u r..'gilll":, II \.... nnl ,ltlt.'lIlpllllg to a st1..::ialist
did Fidc:l Castro in Cuba, Nl>r was it sl't.'killg It.l ('xcludl..' and re.:pf'(;.'ss 31rcady
urganiJ',l'd llIovt'll1el1b, ;lS would milliary governllll..'lllS in (:hiil..-,
Brazil, and Argtlliina. Instead, Ihe Pl'rUVi,ln regimc was illll'nt 011 inlegrating
nwrgil\al urban and rural massl'S into Ihl' n;Hio1l31 sudely in ordt.'r 10 Jay the
gruundwork for induSlrialization and autunomous dl..'vdopnlt'1l1. III tit is th..-
I)erllvian regimc t'll1age:d as a corpurate stalt'. rl'lllinist.ent of tht'
C:irdl'lIo.ls guVt.'rnmt:nt in Mexit.o (I 93'1-4U),
III addilion, Ihl.' regime took 10 rt.'du(l:' Ihe roll' orrordgn
capilal. Suun alter the coup. the rl'gilHl: nationalizatioll ul JPC and
the I;.'stablishllleni of the fJdrlJpeni. III tilll..: Ihe: guvernml'llt touk
owr other promincnt forl;'ignowllec.i finlls: I'lT (196\). Chase: Manhattan lJank
(1970), Cerro de Pasco (1974), and M:trcona Mining (t975)-tht.' lalkr two
rl'placed by Miflopeni. Thest' actions mel with prt'dklable: hOSlilil)' rrom thc
Unito.:d Stall's. bUI in February 197'1 till' twa readied all ;;IccurJ.
Peru paid $150 million as full settlement of :.III outstanding alld IIII;' Nixon
administmtioll withdrl'w its oppositioll 10 Pau.
170 PARTI \\10 " C/\SI: (IIJ\NGF OVr.R riME
I )c<;pile its populist st:mce. the government met with
home. Prcexisting labor unions. such a!" the llprisla-dominatcd
orgal1izations .ullong sugar workers. resented the inro:lCls on their terrain.
Pea!"ants orten (ound Ihe top-down institutions unresponsive to their demands
to stage protests. Tradilion:ll eliles voiced their horror at the regime's
poliCies. In response. I he generals seized cont rol o( newspapers nnd telt-vision nnd
radio slat ion!", while six other dailies ill Lima C:lme Hnder man-
agement. This compounded the government's prohlem. as intellectuals nnd jour-
mdisls denounccd restriClions on freedom o( speech.
Economic conditions added to governmental woes. Export earnings dedined.
pelroleum explomtiom: yielded no new oil depo!"ils, and world prices (or sugar and
copper (Iropped. The bal<1nce of payments deleriorated. the foreign debt swelled, and
innalion slmck. \o\'orkers began to demollstmte their discontent. As these problems
first loomed on the horizon. Velasco himself succumhed to ill health. In Augu<;t 1975
Peru's joint chiefs replaced him with General Frnncisco Morales Hel"llllldc". Under
press\lfc frolll the IMF. the government imposed an extrcmcl)' h<l.rsh ('collomic
austerily prognllll th<1t reduced the renl income o( the urhan working hy 110
percenl. hlllhcr. Morales Berlllll(lez unveiled plans 10 convellC :l constilulinnal
asselllhl)t in 1978 and hold general elections in The o(ficers were getting out.
In retrospect. Ihe Velasco regime (ailed to gain solid support from an)' social
c1:ls<; nr grouping and. thereh)'. estahlish inst itlltional (oundations for ilS :lui horit)'.
By real.hing into so man)' areas o( Peruvian societ)'. Ihe military government
succeeded in alienating "lmost everyone. No group felt safe (rom intervention or
control; no stratum o((ered its uncondilional :ldhercnce. Ironically, lhe fealure
which had given Peru's revolutionar)' military government so much (reedom o(
<1ctiun-its autonollly-also !cd to its evenlual demise,
Struggles of Civilian Governments
r:or the 1930 gcneral election!" the top two p<1rties were AI'RA. whose lickel W<1S
now led hy Armando Villanueva (Ha)'a de la Torre having died). :lnd Accion
Popul<lr, still under Fernando Be1<n'lIlde Terr)'. After an ardllow; cnmpaign.
BeiallFldc cnptured a cOlllmanding plurality with 42 percent o( the votc.
Chastened by his earlier experience with far-reaching reform, Ihe statesman-like
Hclatlllde now espollscd centrist policies: reducing the role o( the state. strength-
ening private enterprise, and encouraging foreign investment. His economic team
had dose tics to international banking circles, and its pro-(ree-market orientation
helped to renegotiale the foreign debt and attract (oreign capital. An unusual surge
of optimi.<;m .<;prend throughout much of Peru.
Insurmountable prohlems then arose, By far the most serious was the debt
crisis 1riggered hy Mexico's Ilear*dc(ault in 1982. a shock that was greatly amplified
by the 1981-83 world recession. Arter modest growth in 1982. the Peruvian
econolll), contracted hy 12 percent in 1983. This was a crushing blow.
Economic uncertninly and social injustice provided a fertile environment (or
revolutionary activity. Around 1980 a Illovement known as Sc"dcro L"mitloso
( I he 1\llcko;; I.... (Htg.I', I,..lIt,1 In.\ ... \1'" I I
Path
R
) emerged in the impt"lven<;hc<1 1'111"'1\(" .. I A} ... III 11"
C(1lllhining ideological illllodrinatiol1 with 111('... (' gll(rnll.l\
burst onto the SLene hy assassinating village IC<1(lcrs whcl (.111111 "111.1... 1,
aulhorily and eSlablish an egalilarian Ililipia. rVlotlnling .'\('/1.11"1/1 Vll,ll'lhl' loillo.1
Bclnlll1de to authorize a military of(cnsivc. whiLh lell 11<; llWIl nf replt''''''''''
and helped Sendern ils illnUCIlt..e, 1\1'f)\IIHI It)X/t .1111.lllel gl'fllll
'
lIlt
1\10v;II/;('lI/o nCl'ohl/;ollfiritJ Tlll'tII A11/(/1 II UvIRTI\). ,d"o high 1'"oIde
;\'lorc ill Ihe da<;.. iL ,HI)ltI of ITV(,I'llit'Il.I'V IlltIV\'II,nll". llH' r>.11(l 1\
hnilcd the Cuhan ({evolutinn ;lIld lI<;ed .Ill.! '.111"0'11 ,.1111l'1 111,111
\'iolen<..e to .1ltrad allclltion .lIultll ;lUtlllllll.,I<' 1""..... lIn'... ,\" glwfldl.I .1t11\11\
I)ertl fell inlo a ... I:llc of ncar <..ivd \\'.11.
Ihe<;e prohlem<;. Iklallllde IIl.1n.'gcd h ....('n( lIul hi" Icrlll III 0111\ I. ,HIli
ill 19K:; the e1ectorat{" dlO..C a... hi<; "11I.<.e... "nl" 1\1.1Il (.,11\ 1,1..1 Ih"t\ "1\ \'1',11 ..loJ
neWCOlller from APRA. \'Vllh hi<; I':lrtr '11 Lontrnl 01 (011):1(....... ( .1111.1 111"\'1'.1
swiftly Oil Ihe economic frOlll. I It' IIKn';l"cd re:11 \\.Ig........1.1\111"11 1.1'1(' .... I\.hll ('01
interest rate<;, Irnze prin.... lnd dev.l!lw.ltllC',,,1 '1 I H.' 111"1 dt(c t \\'.1" oI"III.llId
which lh(' (;ar<:ln le,11ll hnpt'd would alllv.lll 1'("11'<; t!olllll,lIl1 Illdll"!II.d "'1,.1111\
The governmenl ,111111111nccd investml'llt I'r",:r.1111" til!" .1/:1 i, ultllt.d dlnI
Il
I'IlI,nl ",
the long llegleftetl highland" .Ind. In t!cfl.llhl Ilf tlH' illll'lll.III/1n.11 t/
1
111111111111\.
prod<lilllcd a dcf:lllil (Ill Ilefll'<; {"xtclll.II t!chl '1 hi" W ..... :l1l ,"""lllt'II" g.'l1)hl.
II did nol pay (In, (l.IIIl11Illii. 1".lit II'" pll.chlll',I.1 ,,11,.,1
lived economic !tPtllll <;t)()n followcd h)' ... 1111,'1"'('. \ 1I.ldl .Id" II
rapidly exh,w... lcd Inreign eXt 1i,111ge re<;(.'n-c" 1IIIel"l1011 I' ,,1,11 , IC,.lll .11111 1'1\\... 1Ill. 1.1
with(lrew In l!le face tll Ih... <lebl (1e1.IIII1, Vu.lelll ,lllk,'" p,II.lh-IC,1 1'1,111\ .11,'.1" 1
c(onomic activit)'. An ('(.ollolllic pillgr.llli III 1'IXH tl' .... l"II I"..Inll
massive ullcmployment .Irove millilJ1l<; oll'cnl\,ial1'" 1I1111lhe Illq:'11 II'
C(OIlOIll}', Amici skyrol.kctlllg hypel"inf1.111t111. tllC' gill"" dtllllt'''II, p!'l.dlll I plllllgt.l
Ill/Ire tllall 10 l'eH.ell! in IhlTe ye<1' .... 'rht' {'llllill" \\'.1'" lel'l"IIII!: t'll IIH' \"1'l',O ,01

1\<; the 1990 eleclion<; ,lpprn:l<.IH'c1. a nc\\' savillr SI'CI1l("clll'.III\, II' , 1'''1 Ilt' l'I'PI
(rom ils doldrullls Ih(' intern,llion'llly ,1 ... d.11I1H.'d 11"\('11,,, M,IlI" \'.lIg,1" 11"".1 \
of grIlles and 1l11<;cak ulallon" hy 1.10:-..1 gl.Hlu,llh "'111:11111('1 I'd hI'" k,hl
howevcr. an<1 he eventllally lo!"t 10 Alherto Fujllllnl"l ..1 1llllc-klltl\vn .lgl,'II."1
economisl horn o( Japane\c immigranl panIlI<;. A qllll1lc"'''I'nli,I!I\' .II1IH.. I.II>II\h
ment candidatc. Fujilllfll'l tl<;ed Camhio 90, ,lJl ad hill. clIg,1I1i..-,ltillll )";tlhn IIl.HI .1
political party, 10 huild deLloral .. 11I1ll ...cll.I" .1 ilia II III Ihc I't"plc.
Fujimori vowed to improve their economi( plight.
11 did nol take I("lllg fill' him lel hlt':lk I"C.1111o;;("\. 1'1... !{".HI .01 .1 1"'1'111'''1
progml1l. Fujimori's tcchnncratsloHlIKhcd:l nHlic<l1 re<:lrLlltllring I"'lgl,IIIl Thq
slashed tariffs, welcomed foreign inveslment, rind 'ImlcrlllillCII 111(' IC'!(' III clrg.l
nizcd I.,hor, These measures coni rolled hyperinnatinn. ,llld l't'lll I"{"SI1IIH'cl p:I\'
ments on the (oreign dd1t. VJilh l1loral.-.nd lln;lIlcirll (:n<.ollr,lgellll'nl lrlllll 1.11'.1ll.
where Flljimori culllv.lled special lies hC(;lU<;{" tl( 11 .... I'l'r""n,d .111('''11\. Pt'lll
)"e"umcd:l pnth o( (if Ilol slc;HI)') ecollfllllil gl\l\\lh
rujilllori' s Lillliled Democracy
'\Illloyni h)1 .tlld t'agt;'" to llwilltain the olh'n!>ivl', Fujirnori suddenly
:-.11111 dUl\'1t tin:' ill April ,IJld illlnolllK\:d il !>weeping rt'organiz:atioJl
III ,ll.ll.iaIY, III Ill' slnKk down his own gov('rnlllcnt in Wllilt bl'Cilllle
1,.lllJWII .I.., all (l1I(t} gulpt:, or MdutU-f..:UUP," madc possiblt' bl,;'ClllSe of sulid military
I."d;illg, Pall thus hl'clJJlt;'ll1l'lir:-.t Suulh AIll\;'rican country oftht.: 19YU... to slip
h.l l k 111\\I,ud .HlIh"ril,trblli.'>1l1.
Hdlllld till:. ..,lllklUg dn'dopllll'nt, a:. bulh and conscqUl:lln', was il
p."grl',..,ivl: w\'.d'l'lling uf Pl'IIl'S tr.lditionill institulions. Pulitical ksl'\;'-
'I.tll)' ,\I'H.A) I,,!>t lTl'dibilily hl'L;lll:'\;' ofllll'ir painIt ilKolnpeknlc ;llld OCGISiOllal
"llItlj'tl\lll. 1..11111' 1Iliioll:. rdaint.'d Iiltll
A
inlhll'lllC. Univt'rsilil's lost and
vll.ilit),. /\gdill..,1 Illi:- Val.lIUlll Fujinluri built hb uwn j)owt.r base ill the armed
... ,Iud Ihl' illldlrgl'lt.e Sl...Vlll.... lIe also daillped down on the prl'SS, as slate-
pWIll,d Jlll'dl.! h'l.tHll' hbt<lully pru-gUVl'rlIlIlClll alld official intimidation pres-
... url'" Ill.1I1}' ullin JOlllllalbt:. inlu ...
( "llI ... pll :'>Ulll':-'" lllllowcd I Ill"' ( ;OVl'1'I1111(:nt (ol'..:e... :l rre... tcd thl.'
lup k.ld"j ul tla' tvlKI'A. 1\ few 11lOlllhs lall'r, i\bill1ad GlIzJIl,in, the foulldl'r and
Ill,l.\illllllil k'.llll'l ur St'lldl'ro Llilninusu, WilS captun.:d, imprisoned, and lhealrically
pUI lIll dl ... pl.l)1 Illr llil' 1'1'1:::-':'. Mnre uf high,level St'lldl'ro leadas fullowed,
.'I,d 1I1I' ... Iartnlt'l disilllcgrate, Many 11cruvians applauded Fujilllori's
i"'I\'\' RIding Ihi:. tidl' of popularity, Fujillluri WUll Ihe /INS t'lel'tiull
\\1111 (, I Pl'llClll III IItt' Votl',
,\ ... 11'1' I<)')U.. laille lu'l dose, l:ujilllOri laid till"' groundwork till'}'d alHltht'r
11I,':-idl'llli.t111'1111. III lIlt;' SUprt;'lllc COLIn ruled that Fujillluri would bl'legally
rllll 'Jnl'l' again. sinn' it would bt' hl... lirst rl'dlxtiun under Ihe CllllstilUlioll
III 1')1) '. I-:Vl'll :'lJ, lltl: IOllg l'lllb.ltlk,d llpposition WilS Sign:. or lire,
1>1 ... ..,.Ili:'>I.I'lhlll \villl Fujirnuri was gruwillg over Pl'ru's pt'l'lorlnance,
Wllll!' w.r ... 111.1 11t'iI,j'lg workl'rs 11I'IIIl'Iowcr Illiddk dasses, and UVl'r the prl':.idellt...
IIIglI h,lrhkd .lbIlSl' 01 PllWl'r. Fujilllori cOlltinUl'l1 lu cullivate :.uppurl, howevt.'r,
1
1
,1111<.111.1 ,Iy .11 IllJ1Ig 11Illg IIl'gll'l:kd peil:.a IltS and alllllllg lniddll' class WUlll\o'll. As thc
l'klllIJI! dl l'W .J hljilutlri vi('lory appl'arl'd to be il IOl'cgune cundusion.
Slhldl'lrly lilcre t;'ruerged all upstart cilndidatl', Alejandro Toledo, a U.S.-
nlul:lll.'ll l'lUIIOlllbt whose nm1l'-fI'Om-IIOwherl' campaigll wa... rellliniscent of
hljiull)ri's own llll'leoric risl' in 1990. By willning more than 40 percent of lhe
Vlltl' ill Illl' April 20UO conkst, Toledo dellied ;,t majority to the president and
,I ballot. Thtu, with lillie warning, Toledo withdrew fr01l1 the race ill
"101 l'''' t ag'lin... t lit' claimed would be declural fraud. Fujilllori resolutely
pfl'pill'cd Itl take ullin', out thell a bombshell struck: ;J tape was rdeo:lsed to the
Vladimiro Muntesinus, Fujimori's top adviser intelligence
IIIlIClal, bnllllig an uppllsilioll l'Ungrl'SSJllan lu join the Flljimori coalition. The
Il1Ibli> lIllll'l')' dt',!f;':ning, Muutt'sinos and Fujilnori were hopl'lcssly exposed,
I..lk,lll NOVl.'lllhl'!' 20UU, whik' till il visil 10 Asia, Fujilllori n,'signed from Ihe
alld sllught asylulll in Japan, Ilis l'arerully cUlltrolled democracy carne
10 Illll'.\;pn-tl'li end.
The Contemporary Scene (200o-pre,entj
A caretaker government OVl'rsaw free and fair elel'liOIlS ill 200 I. In it se..:und ruulld
rlllH.lrf (ag.linsl former president Alan Garcia), Alejandro Toll'llu t.'llIerged as a
.... It'al' winner with 54 percent of the votes. Electoral delllO(ral}' WiI ... halk. but
govt'rtling was t1ifficuh, Olle reason was Ihe cougl'llil:tl wcakm... :. of party
:.ystell\ in Pel'u, characterized by numerous parties wilh fickk fulluwings,
Toledo's own party, Pl:rll Posiblt', was inll'rnally dividt'd by constant hid,l'rillg
:Jlld ht'id unly 4U pern'nl oflhl' st'ats ill CUllgrns. 'I'u Sl'CUl'l' pa:-.sagl' of II'gisla Ii 0 II,
Toledo then:-fort: had to forge ad huc allianccs with a bl'wildt:rillg arfar
tillll parties.
Economics post:d alluthl'l' !)rubit'lll, Like vlher pulilicians, Toll'll!,.) fUllnd it
impossibk to live lip to his campaign promisc:. about t.:Jl\pIU)'llICllt, growth, and
safdy nets for the poor. He S3W little '11tt.:rtIative tu Irt'e-llIarb:t eLonomlcs, III 2U02
Toll'do weDI ahead with the pri\'atization 01 IWI) dectrkit), LUIJlpank:., whi(h
provnkl'd tllrn' days of violelll prok'st. gOVl'J'llllll'JlI thl.:ll backed duwlJ and
I'l'vt'rsed its tkci:-.ioJl. This Sellt a ratal sign of pulitical weakJlt':.:.. Capitulal iUll 10
protesl would I1l'COlllt: hallmark urlhis gOVel'llllll'llt.
There were personal issues as well. Arter prolonged dt'llials, Tokdo 'Il'knuwl-
edged that he had an illt.'gitimale daughter, As is su often the ..:aSl" the problelll by
lIot ill thl' Ifuth-but in the ,lttempll'd COVl'l'-UpS. Hb \Virl', a Bdgi.lll-UOJ'll
OIllthropolugist nalll(d E1nine Karp, also allllOyl'd Inilny Ilt;'I'IIViarls,
Illembers of thl' elite, because of her ulltspuh'n LUlllllll'llb .l!)OUI tIll'
01 ... ucial injustice, Predictably ellough. she wa:. both prai.'>l'd illld do:nuulI('ld,l ...
Ilillary Clinton" of Peru.
The 2006 elections pilted Ihe inddatigable Alall Garcia ag;linst 011allta
IluJilala, a Idi-Ie;;\ning nationalist and arlll)' colnul'! who had kd all UJl:.UCcessrul
lllilitary uprising against Fujimori ill O(tobt:r 2UOO. (Tht:.' CUJlgress pardoJled him
ilrtcr Fujimori's dowllfall.) HUlll'lla ulilpolll.'d l;arcia ill tht: 11r:.t round with 31
per..:cnl to 2-1 percent. During the runoff campaign, Velll'ZudaH presidcnt Ilugo
Ch,ivez proclai1ll1.'11 his support ror Ilumal'l, whit'll provokt'd :1 fl'rocillllS baddilsh
againsl IIle idea offureign-t'speciaJly c1llll'i.stll-intrusiull ill natiunal altair... (St'l'
Chapll'r S). For his pari, Garda insislt'd (without 'Illy St'nSt: of irony!) Ihal hl' :t1011l:"
possessed lhe stature to negotiate sllccessfully with international e,,:ullolllic orga-
nizations. In the end, Garcia won 53 percent of the popular vo1t', althuugh t'xit
pulls suggested that he was seen as Mtll e lesser uf two t'vib, A resounding
nHllldate this was not.
POLITICS AND POLICY: BOLIVIA
Although some radical ereoll's ano me.stizu.s d:ullorcd lor indo:pl'Il(!l'nce in IS09,
dite society in Upper I'eru was hesitant to .-llign wilh reud rOln'S, III their repc,llcd
attempts to illvade the highland areas, insurgent armies suught support from local
Indians with promist's 10 terminate forced bbor, abolish taxes, alld redistributt'
17'1 I'ARTTWO o.;TllIlIFS: C11AN(,F O\TR TllIl!:
1:1Ild. Such overlure.. intell .. irled creole fears indepcndence from mighl
upset :l sod.11 :llld economic hierarchy. For thc next sixlccn ye:1rs,
civil W:lr enveloped the region.
A.. in PCI'll, the ecollolllY of the newlr founded rcpuhlic W,IS in
Thousands III mine.. h:ld been 000ded. Owners l<lckcd Ihe C:l pil:l I to renew
prndllclinn. while lhe coll:1psc of the fon.:ed I:lhm syslem (//li/(/) created a scarcity
(If w(lrkcrs. Agricultural !'rtulllClion slagnalCt! as well. Indigcllolls COllllllllnitie:s
retained ;lge old 1r<ldiliolls.living on l.."ollllllllnity land and prndu(ing only fllr Incal
markel". I\t le.ls( SO percellt of lhe inhabitants spoke Qucchua or a
lll;lin I,lllgllage. Fonnerl)' nile of Ihe wC;llthicsl of the Sp<lni"h empire.
Bolivia W,lS stllfering IrnlH prnfollnll ecollomic millaisc.
I\S the niltion's IIrsl president. Jose Antonio Sucre (IR25-28) allempted tn
con"tnl(:l <I liher;ll slale :md reinvigorate pro"perily. With declining revenues from
silver produclion :1Ild a sl;lnding army thaI comumed ;:lImosl one-half of govern-
mental cxp('ndit\lfe... hi" adlllini ..lralion decided 10 replace the recently ahnli .. hcd
Indian lrihule with;1 head tax on the indigenous popul:llion. Between IR35
IR6S. this ('(III,,.i/'I/(';I'1/ de ;1If1i):,ClIfIS provided n constnnl revenue stream Ih;"ll
(overed 'lO percent of ."I:lte expenses. Sucre nl ... o weakened the church hy con
fisc:ltinp. its properties. I lis sllccessor. Andres de Santa Crll7. (IR29-J9), sought to
achieve nne of noli";lr' .. goals hy eSI:"lhlishing it confedcmlioll \\'ilh Pel"ll.
Thre;llcned hy Ihi .. I'0tentiall}' powerful :llli:lnce. Chile ded:lred W;lr on Ihi"
w(luld he cOlllctler;ltinn. Although S:lnla em:! \\'on some initial victories. the
Chilean ;lrmy "nundlr defe:llcd Bolivia and Peru. lIe \\'('nt inlo exilc in IR39.
Polilic:ll inst;lhility ell .. ued over Ihe next thrce decades. In contr.Jst to his
predecessors, Isat.lor nelzll (IR
t
I8-S5) was the first preSident 10 appeal
direclly to lower-clas.. urhan IIIestizos (especi;llly :lrtisans) and peaS.1llts. He cncour
aged dOlllestic production hy rnising lariffs 011 imported cloths. lie do... ed foreign
warehouses and declared lhal only Bolivinlls could engage in intern:ll Irade. To
incre::lse sl;lle revenues, he estilhlished a slale monopoly on the export of chinchol/a
bark (used for CJuilline.;lIl :tntifever <lgent employed especially :lgainslm:lhria). I Ie
<lIsa volunt:ll'ily retired frolll omce, the firsl president 10 do so since Sucre.
Another prominenl president, Mariano lVlelg:lrejo (IR64-71). oversaw leg-
islO1tifln in IN661hat gavc the statc the power to confiscate all Indian (flmmunity
1:1Ild. Thosc who worked individu::l1 plots had to register title 10 their land within
sixty clay.. ;l11(1 pay <I sum of 25 to 100 pesos. If Ihcr failed 10 do so. the state
would put their land up for puhlic auction. Many Indians did not have the cash
to P;\)' the reqllired fees. Others lost their I<lnd Ihrough fraud. The beneficiaries
of this duhious slatllle included we:llthy landholders who enbrged their
hacicnd::ls. mediumsi7.ed landowners who purchased more property, mer-
chanls wilh ;wai1ahle c;lpita1. illld urh:ln investors who used the land <IS a
source of incollle or:lS collilleral for minor mining inveslments. In response 10
this legislalion, a series ofimligenous rehellions hroke out. Although Mcl1{arejo
hrutally crushed these uprisings, he w;\s suhsequenlly forced 10 reverse some of
Ihe lanel confiscation'i.
In foreign affairs. Mclg;Jfejo enlered inln dllhicl\1'" illlcIII.llltlll.d .I!:II c'III1I1"-
Opponents charged thai Ihey favored llnly 111(' person.lllill.lllll.ll illlne... ' .. "I lilt
president. ralher than Bolivia. In 1l{6(,. he .. a In'.lly Ih;ll rcn'J-:nilt',1 (lllk.11l
terrilorial daims 10 the region 01 lilt.' 1\1.11;1111.1 111 ... '11 III
lR68. he ceded 010.000 st)lI:lre miles 10 Bla7il illlhe Am,l/lIlli.11l
arr<lnged free lrade agreelllcnis with (:hilc alltl I\'ru lh.11 111111 II.t" Ht,IIV1.t11
eCOllOI11)'. :lnd gilve lip gU:lIlO cxtra(linll right .. :l11l11j..: Ihc l'.llill, lO.I ... I. I II' W,J'"
finally nverlhrowll in IH70, when an alli,ll1l..c nt erclllt' "1'1''''''1111111.11 h',Idt'I" .111,1
alliplano Indians forced him to nec tht. (tHll1tl)'
Ar. noled e:lrlier. the \Var or the 1',ldf'l h,ld ulh'll\, t1i .... I<,lroll .. t tllI .. t'plt 11. 1""
fnr Hnli\'i:l. It <llso led 10 the di"pl;lC('lI1ellt nf 1111111.11\ IIl1nlil/,,\ wh.. h.I,1
politic.. since lIulel'cllc!cnle. ()rg,lIli7etl 1IIIIIIIgh Ihe ( 111l",I\'.II,\"!"
Parly, nlig:uchic mininv. inlere"ls "\\'Iftl)' 1ll0\'ctlllltfl till" \'.1111'1111 Tlln I "nllllllC'd
free trade policies. improve\! lr-ansporl:llulll. ;11111 .lC'"c1flj'C't! 11'('1'.1"'(('111 10\d."I,1
frnnticr region through slalC' l;locl salt:-.. III .. "eol1:1tnl" .llltl ... clIll', ... ("1\('1111111'111
r.uhsidies .Ind illtern;ltilul,ll IlIl.InC"ing plt,vi,k,1 Ihe rH..lc.....II) I .lp,l.l1 111' '111"'1 III r
r;lilway lines lhnl cllllld IllIl\'C 11lillcr.ds In 11K P,llifil pllrl III Anlnl.lg..... t.I. ('11111
(formerly Bnliviil). An lIplurn in r.i1\'C'r protlll<.li(l[\ and H('\\' rn,HI l'"1.. 1'lll 1'"11
expanded inlcrnill markcl ... Morcovcr, 1\lIli\'ia took :ldv,lIltagc I,r, he tiller 1\,11'011.11
ruhber hoom h}' elK(lurilging exporl .. f!"("Im iI .. /\111:l/0111,111 1('11 illlr)' or 1\\ 1('
Indian lands relll:linct! :l Irouhlc.. lIlllc hSllc (I)I\ ... e,\.III\I'" 't'!'t'.tll'oI IIH'
comlllonpl;lLc argullleill" Ih;ll l,ltll,11l Illllllllllnilr lanll ... h"1111I Iw hl.,lt1l "I'
into illdividuall}' oWlletl pllll". ;1Ill! gO"CI"nlllenl" Innlllllll",1 IIll' 111111,111\,''''
begun hy Mclgarejo a dcc;lde heflllc. i\1.IIl}' Illdi.lIl ... werc IOlll"t! 10 ..clllh,l.lIlol
they had workc(1. V\lilh lantlle..... IndIans ill Iheil (,IllI,I,,\'. h,h.Il'lld,1 11\\111', ..
incre:lsed hoth their holding" alld prtldlll..tioll. In,h,IIl" '1Ihl' 1"I."IIIt!
ag:linst Ihese measures. In IX')!) unde!' lhe IC:l(ler.. hip t'l ;I,II.lIl' \\'1111.:.,1. ,11101
with support from Ihe l.ihl..ral !'arly. indigellous Clll1l1l1l1nlll(''' llr lhe .11111'1.11\"
defenled:l Cnnservali\'elcd nalional ;"Irmy. \oVillka tllell 11l111Ct! .lg.lInQ hI" ,dill''''
massacrcd <I detachment of Liheral sI11dicr". al\(I dc( br(:d a 1'.11 C W.l1 111\ ,.II \\ hili'"
Ilorrirled hy th is development. I.iher"l" ,lIltl ( '1"'1 kh I' 'Innl I, "l t
:llld defeated the rehels.
As a coll<lpse in internatiol1:11 .. il\'er !,rices \\'e"k(,llell lhl" (
demands by Ihe Liberals to move Ih(' n:llion;ll I..apllill hlllll :-'1111(' III 1.1 1'.1/
intensified conniel hetween Ihe t\\'o panic... In I(mn I.lhel.d.. wle... tctl !,,,hllt ..I
cOl1lrol of the counlr)' from lhe silver (Iligarl..hy. /\1 the tUlle. till 11111111\):
W<lS emerging as Bolivi:l's major export. S(1me silver h;lrflll" qllldJr ,ld.lpl(,llp 11lC'
new export mineral, while olhers S<lW their forlunes del line. II wa" nol lllll): hdoH'
:l new and close-knit mining oligarchy look hnld-Io 10(11. Ilndr .. Ill(' ILl!
leadership of Simon I. 1':lliilO.
r1espite the import:1Ilce of mining. Illl' Wl,<,! Ill:ljoril}' 0111\" ludLIll I'll I' II !.l
tion rcmained in :lgricullure. l.iherall'.lI"ty prollli.;cs III ''It'l' 1.1Ild ll .. nr p,lllPll .ltd
not prevent the transfer III' properly hi 11011 Illdi,l1ls. Br IhC' 1')0" IlIth.lll"
ret<lined only one-lhir<1 of Ihe land (If Ihe h iglll:llHls. \1 hlle 1f"1 "/It/,lIl, '" I i "III t ,11",1
l,c. 1'.'.1(1 tWO" I \".J ... UI,\Nt;l'(JVH{T11\1I
111\' ,.111\'1 two thild.. , Iru::.tfatioll!l about till: los3 01 to lalld
wl/uld .... k Ill'W rl'bdli\IlIS ill the 1\)4U::. and 1950s.
'l'lll' ill,'t';'''lligly ,lutoLr,ltk rult: or' Libl'ral Party politkians provoked a split in
tln:lf I,111l......llld lin: I.'fllhlliull oftlw Republican Union that Gllnc to power
lIulll Iu I'}J1. Ii)' hrC'<.tking up a two-party monupoly, Republican role opent'd
thl' .... )' ..klll It, lllultil'.lrly groupings. Although tht: sale of Indian community lands
\ 11111.111)' ll.l",.1 ullder Ikpublit.1ll adlllinisiralions, the govenllllent t'ontinued to put
.1.,\'0'1\ ll'bdliol1S, IhL' 1927 Cha)'anl<.luprising, UIII: of the largest
111,11.lll 1,'vI1II .. ill thl' IWl'Il1ldiL Cl'llltlry, by brute furce, TIll: Chay"llita insurrection
.lg.lIlL.. t pWlll'rl'o til hlrge h.lI.iellda.. lU.:g.LlI in southern Holivia and quickly spread to
11111l' 1111 ,\ Illu-'S, hIV"lving \JVl'l IU,OUU I dlt."ls. II istori<.ll1 Erk: D. Langl..'r has noted that
-.,hll"ugh llil' rl'Vt,1t W.I,> :!!ollpl'n''':!!ot'd, il drl't:livdy hulled the of tht'
II.lticnd.1 ulltu Indhlll t:tlllllllllllity anJ prompted Iht' gOVl'rnllll.'llt to replact'
ltllll1l'l lUI..II ollill,":-....
111 BlIIIVI.I, .1:> the Great had a dc(bivt, imp'll't 011
I'0llli ..... III tlli., p....tit:ular (;ISl', Iht: I:'(onolllic crisis hdpl'd lead the government
nllu .111 l'XPl'Il:-.IVl' war.
TI,e Choco Wor {1932-351
Blildl'l .. klrllll .. hl'::' hl'l\\l'l'l\ Bulivi;lll .Illd UVt'1" thl..' Chaco region
111 lla' \ .... 11111 B"hvl,lll lowl.tlld:-. h.td brukl'llulil in tht: 1'J20:!!o. The dbcovl..'ry of \lil
III I hI' !\ "tll',111 l\ltllh ilb III 191.H rabed Ihl.' plJs.. ihilit y thai lurtht:r t'xplnralion lIlight
lind rl''l'rVl''' III Ihl' luwlamb 10 tilt' III IlJ32, Bolivian pre:!!oident D'lllie!
(19.\1 JI) ordl'rnltroops to tKCupy'l Paraguayan garrison, ,tilt! war
I,.okl nul bdwn'll Iht' twu lOUlltrit::!!o.
)pplllll'Jlh ..I,timcd Ihat the conllict was a (-ynical effort 10 distract altention
,1\\'.1) 111/111 t hl- luUtll t'cunulIlit:" crbis_ Hulivian soldil'r:!!o frulIl tht: highlands wert:
"ul'plinl alld did llul ildapt tv thl' tropic:.tl luwl;,llld climate:, The
,0 LlLr''' i.tJIIVt:lltiull,t1 fighting ::.lrall'gy ..lIso !)ruve:d indfective against the guerrilla
1,1\ II." "I thl' In:> IILLllll'roul'o hut nllirl' sc..lsoned Paraguayan 'I"housands or
"'fldl"I" UII bllih :>id\'" dinl In Iht' war, mostly due to as malaria.
IU:!!oI 65,OOU young lllcll, a significantllumber in a total population of only 2
lIullit)L" III lilt' Inal)'. Bolivia losl the eh.ICO region (which ended up
11\11 t.tHII;dlling vii bUI I'daillt't1lerrilories that in faci hdd a ridl supply
III uil allllllalul"LI ga::..
'rhl' C1lal..o W.t!' had implications, First. thl' COJlscription of high-
I.tllli ludi.lIb inlu thl' Holivian army hastened the inlt'gration of traditional COIll-
1l111I11tll':> illto thl' naliunal ::'Oddy. No 10llger isolateJ in remote villages.
suldiers at:'luirl'd a neW sense of perspective (and grievance), Second,
till' 1I1dil,lry ddl',lt disaedill'd thl.' Iraditional parties and provoked a widespread
de... il'l for dlange,
Yuuthllli generals rl'spulldetilu this damur by seizing power and implementing
that !tod theln Iu be called -military socialists.- David Toro (1936-38)
l'.. t.lhlbhld a tvtillbtry vI' Lahur and n;ltionalized Standard Oil of Bolivia. which had
tI 1hc Andl':>; SoldLt:"rs. UIIg.lrdl:lo, .Iud Inl!L.III:lo 177
t.-ulitrollcd lilt oil produclion, Thl' constitutiun 01 19JH granlt'd lhl' gowrn-
1I1t"llt a Illurt' adive rolt' in the l't:onomy. EWIl !lO, it rdainl'll liler<lI..-y rl'quirclllcllb
til'll political participatiull 10 lhc slllall IlispalLidzcd upper alltl uliddll:
As II rt'MIIL.lcss thall 50,UOU J-leopk' Wl're digibk 10 vOll' ill n'llioll.l! dntiull:>,
Leftwing <.Ind bbor ftlru"s t'lllcrt'd thl' pulilit,d :lot.lgl ,llId IOrnll.'ll
lhn:e partit'::.-tlw P.lrty of Ihe Rl'voluliullary Ldi. the Trobkybt
nevolulion,ll'y Pari)', .1Ild in 19,10, Ihe N;'ltivllal Rl'Volulion;IIY I\lovl'l11l:'l\t
(tvINR), ",llleh appc.t1l'd 10 lIlodl:'rak, lllitldll' t.Ia..s naliollalt:lots. AlIlhle,' platlonnl'o
called (or nationalization uf Ihl;' lill Illine:-.. LJm!tor lhe Il.'adl'rship 01 Juan I.t't.:hill, a
lllilitalll Tl'Olskybi, Illl lIlilll'l"S lvrtlll'd Ihl.' h:dt-'ratillll vI Bolivi;Lll I\'IIH' "VOl kl'r:!!o. III
19,1') over I,OUO Qlll::chu;I alld A)'lllar.1 l'opl'akillg Il,.. d'I:lo galh\'rnl .It thl.. 1i!"..1
N,llivn.t1 Indian Congrl:'s:!!o III La Paz. A::. hl:!!ololl.ln Ilnbt"r1 h.I:!!o nOletl, BoIIVi.1
had -dwngt-'J fmlll being of IhI:' lllobillLl'd In Lallli Amt:ril-a. III
tt'flns vf I"ldical ideology and union olgallizalion, into one ulthe nlo:lol .ldvarlCl..'d:
JII tilt' 1.11e 11)-10::., pt'a:lo.Lnl fl'volts !I.lred up til rouglll,ul Iht: 1..111l111. ) "I LI'
millt'r:>' uniun, tht Rl:'vulutiol1ary Wurkas P.Lrty, .Ind tvlNI{ lJ,l\knl the:.l.'
,Ind to l"urgl';1 bruad p\)/itit.:al allt.1I11..l'. t\ drop ill 11I1 pritl::> ,llkt
""orld \Var II loru:d mine to lui W.lgl'l'o, pruvuklng grl.'alel 1.lbor mili-
tant y. 1\ 01 worKt'r" 1Il I ht' Cat.lvi lIlill\':!!o hy Mill YIrvvps in 1,,),17
dn:'pen",l hU:!!olilil)' tuw,lfd Ihl:' l-t'ntl,t1 guveflllllt'llt. 11111.llh1H .llld t' ... l)ILt)lllil
lurtht.'r illlemiflt'd popular di:lo(Ulltl'lll, III 191'}. Illl' I\INR Ulldt'1 thl'
kad\'l":!!ohip Ilf I Ierll ..i II SJll':!!o Zua'lo org.llliLCd a \ ivtliall :Ll'lllt'd rl'voll tlw
;lfllly that ulliled llliller:-. and nliddk Llass :loUppurkrs. ;\lthuugh Ihl' Upl billg
f.lill'd, the tvt Rled all armed I,lbur slrikt' tht.:= ll(:xt Yl';lr .\lllllllg 1.lt hll) wurker:!!o in
La P:'l:l-. The gVVl'llllllt'1l1 "'\Iuirt"d alliller)' .Illd .lirpl.ul":!!o tu 1..I1I:!!oh th..: l<.Il.Hlr
rc=volt.
Thl' l\INR Iht:"11 turnl'tllu;lll dl:'t-ttll.d ill Ib pur:!!oUlt vi !'UWI..I, III 11ll'
1951 prc:!!oidt'lIli;.d dcclrolls, MNI{ It'adl'l" Vklor Paz El'oklb:>clrn raIl un ,I I it:kd wilh
Sties l.11al.i.l and gamcrt'd 53 Ih'rlcllt of thi.' Vllll', U:!!oilLg Cold War <lllliUlllll1ll1l1ist
rhdtln.... the IHilil.Ll)' to Id tilt.' rvlNlt lakt- onJlt' and .lllllUlkd
The: MNlt ..gain up in rl'voh, l'oeiziu
b
\\Icapom frulll.lI"IlIoril':> .lIld distribuling
guns 10 thl:' publIC. !bdicalizl'd \\Iorkt-r.::.. peasants, and Ihe mltldle dl.fe:ucd Ihe
army and the: MNR seized powl'r. Thus h"gan the Bolivian Ih-'volulioll, the firsl
MKcl..'ssful m... ssivt-' and popul,lr n:vol! in L.-llill America sinct:" Ihl' Ml'xi..:all
Rl:'volution or 11)10.
The Revolution of 1952
Paz ESlenssoro, thl' Ill.'W prt-'sidt'lll, had graduated fmlll Ihl' N;uiollal
wilh a degree in economics. Ht:: volunlct'n:J in tht' Chaco War ag'litbt Par,lgu<.t)'
and then joint"d a group of young Turks Ihat supporkd the lIlilit..lry'- In
power he built the t\'INR into a broad co,llitiun that ranged from Ihe: COllllllunist
Party to lhl' middle d .. He gave Ihrl'l' cabine:t posts lllllw lill rnillt:r::. <Il1tllankd
OUI his campaign promises: nationalization of tilt' a(ross-the-board wugt.'
hikes, and governllll'llt subsidies for b... sic st'ctor::. of the lc0110my.
17R I'ARTT\Vc)" ClIAN(;F TIl\lE
The B0livi:1I1 Hevolurion of 1952, like the Mexic<ln Revohllion, Iwd;"l profound
effeci on Ihe country. The new government dropped <Ill elector<ll1iteracy require-
Jllenls ;1nd cnfr<lnchised hundreds of thoul'andl' of t ndians. The vot ing popul<lt ion
incfC.';1sed fivefold. By nationalizing the mines (with compenl':ltion tn the owners)
and selling lip :l sl:lle-Owned mining giant (Comihol), the government gained
effective coni 1'01 over refining plan Is olltside of l3olivi:l and could essent i<1l1y dictn!c
the pri(e nl"till. The miners' federation also formed an all-powerful Crl11!cd('rnciclll
O/'I'('/'11 Holil'itll/{/ (Bnlivian I.ahor Federation, COB) that pllshed for heller wages.
conditions, <lod over<lll policy.
Furthermore, Paz Estenssoro purgt'd milit:lry offic!.'rs who f:lvoreJ the tracti
t ion:ll elites and reduced the size of the army. The miners' milit i<ls he-GIllle the most
import<1nt :H'llleci force in the COUlltry. Throughout Ihe highland countryside,
peasants began t<lking over medium <1nd large est<1tes by force of arms nnd forming
peasant unions under Ihc guid<1nce of the COB. The {vINR intervened in this
pr(l(ess and implemenled comprehensive agrnrian reform. After ohtaining land,
the pea.";lIlls tended to become more conservative :lnd less involved in nationill
although the)' continued 10 provide a lo)'al polilical hase for the MNR_
While lillld reform look pl<lce in the highl<1nds, lilJ'ge estnles remnined int<1ct in
the (':lstern lowl<ln<ls. U.S. ;lid <lnd capital poured into this region to flnallce
cOllllllrrcinl agriculture. Unahle to shift Ihe course of the Rolivinn Revolution in
the highlands, Washington polic)'lll:lkcrs nttcmpted to huild their influence in the
(ountr)"s most dynamic economic area. A regional boom drew highland peas<1nts,
and the city of Santa Cruz bec:lme a power cenler for l;1rgc-sc<1le Irllldowners.
Silcs ZU<li',O succeeded Pai'. Estellssoro in the 1956 elections, cnpturing 83
perce lit of the vote. The son of a forlner president, he represented the more
moderate wing of the 1\lINR. During his administration, the MNR split into diverse
f.1ctions al(11lg persoTl:lllincs over policy implementation. As inflation son red, Silcs
ZU;17n decided to stahilize the economy through 'In austerit)' program under the
auspices or the U.S. governillent <1nd the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In
the midst of eoIt! Wnl' pnlarization, he nlso re<1ligned foreign policy in support of
the United Sl<ltes. Al thc same timc, the right-wing Ffllange Soci;1list Pnrty mobi-
lized disconlented sectors of the clites nnd the middle class in <Ill unsuccessful
attempt 10 topple the MNR government.
Un<1hle tn block the radical reforms of the Bolivian Revolution, lhe
Eisenhower and l:lter the Kennedy adminislrations chose to offer economic nlld
Illilit,lry aid to the country <IS an :lltern<ltive means of establishing inlluence_ The
U.S. government also consolidated support in the <lnned by providing
offker lmining in the United St:ltes and counterinsurgency instruction in
Bolivia. (tn contrast to Guatem<lla, where the Arbenz refflrms had direclly chnl
4
lenged American economic interests, the MNR progf<1tns of n<ltionaliz<ltion and
redistriblltion focllsed exclusively on Rolivian-held properties. This greatly
reduced the incentive for decisive U.S. intervention.)
When pnz Eslenssoro relurned to the presidency in 1960 with Juall Lechin as
his running mnte, tin prices hnd flattened and the government had few disposable
resources to meet economic prohlems. Ilnp:l1ielll willi tl,c .... IIIW ",he 'It ld,lllll"'.
opposed to the government's move to dis;lrmlhe :ll1d ... lrcngl11l'1l
the militnr)', nnd resistnnlto n constitlltional ;lll1elldllh'lll Ihal wllllid 1t,IV(, ,dlownl
Pnz Estenssoro 10 run for reelection, Lechin resigned (l'l"l11l hi... I'"... t ,I'" \'11'
president nnd split the MNR coalitinn. Silcs :I,lI:li'O ;lbn broke willi Ihe
over PaZ Eslenssoro's mnneuvcrs to rUIl for reelcL!llJll. Il.lVIllg 111 ... 1 sllpl'llrl fr'lIll
the left wing of his party, Pnz Estenss("l1'O attemplcd 10 ,,110Il' III' hi ... 1'llpld,lIll)' h,
selecting Gener<ll Rene Ihe charblll;lt ic I.C 1111 rll,lllIlel III IIll' II 1\'i,Ill 1\ II
Forcc :l1l{1 a longtime MNR supporter, ,\S his nrrllllll,L: m,llc' ill Ihe 1'1("1 dCI llnll.
Over lime, the milit:ll)' had hecome resentfulllllhe ern... inll (11 I'" 1'1( ... 11,1:\ .111<1
power. Three months ;1ftcr the election, vile prc... idt'l1t It-ulic-nll .... ,ll1d ,\llle,l,
Ovando, COllllll<1nde!' of the :Hlll)', Ollsted I'ni'. ;old dl'l 1.11 c'tl 111I'rl1"I'I\'('"
co presidents. E;lge'" to cbim ;lIlot her nIl)' ill Ihe (:old W,Ir. \V.l ... hin,J.loC] I11111 ll'1 II
<ltely backed the new govcrnlllent. For Ihe lU'Xt tln/t'll yc,lI"', the lllr!i!.uY .1"1111
naled the political life of the (OIlIltr),.
Military Rule and Popular Resistance
A nntiveQucchu<1 speaker, BarrientosS;l\\' his OWIl po!rth,lIlorlllllc... 110tlw II"'C, In
1966 he resigned from his interim po!'ition <llld cl1np,ligllcd fpI Ihe I'H""d"lll\,
developing a conservnlive populist hnse among rlll',d Indi.lll:-. pC,I"';1I1I", .lIltl ti",
middle class. As president, he promoted pro lll:Hket :llid aIlIiClllHllHllli',1 IlW.I"'l111"'.
breaking strikes that ended in the mnssacrr CIt workel'" lie ,11"0 1l\('r:-,lW lhe ("111111'1
insurgency cnrnpflignlcd h)' U.S. tmined R:lllgcrS lh.11 ill l'u,7 !'lll' ( ...... 11111\
tracked down nnd execl1ted 1\ rgent inc CUh;l1l !'evolnl iOlla ry I 1']11'''''0 :hc- C d U'\'.II.1.
who !l;ld <lttempted to estahlish a gllerrill;l hase illlhe Antlc.lll flinthill....
Rnrrientos' sudden death in <l hclicnptcr C!':lsh in 1l)(,IJ 0pl'llcd tll<'l'lllc... wl111111
the army corps until Jl1an jose Torres C;1111C In power in 1971. " I.Idil .tlll.lt IOIl,dt,.!.
Torres furned 10 the left, convoked an !\","clllhl)' of lhc' 1'1'tll'k. ,lIld "'lglw,1 ,I
contmct with Ihe Soviet Union to huild;1 Ill'W lill "meller. (;;"I'n Ihe LrllpCI.llt\I
of the Cold W:lr, Torres was overthrown within ,1 lIl;lIlel I" IH"11I1I ....
Bolivia's new leader waS (jcner,llilugo (1971 7XI..l 11.11 I\'(' .>1 ".011.1
Cru7. who went on to become the lQngest -surviving III rlil:l r)' dll 1.1101' in Ih.. 11,11 It Ill''''
histor)'. III lhe 1l1i<lst of f<lvorablc economic (Ollditioll", I 1111'11 t l'1 1111 IIU' rrgll1
with a conservative wing of lhc MN R ;lIHI the semi 1',1 .... 1. i"l l:aLlngc Sill i,lli ... l I':II 1\.
Tin prices sO:Hed, and Ihe rcl;ltivcly .... rnall \Iii 1'('.<:elTC... provided !>i}:l1llc
c<lnt foreign enrnings arter the flilcri!'is 01 1<17'1. MnrCIl\(I. 1111'
long-Ierm effects of Bolivi:l 's r;ldic<ll l<lnd reform ;1nd III 1ra'" n Ii l! liT dcw'I,II'llWlI I
expanded mnrkcts and increased agriculturn1 prod liLt inll. Tile eX!'1 II I 01 ,111' I
later cotton from lhe Santa Cnn region slrcngthened ('(llllllH'rlial aglklll ll l l't'.
Ral17.cr also sought closer economic tics with Brni'.it .11111 Argell1ill;l. CSpCli.lllv ill
the hydrocarbon sector. At Ihe same time he govcflIed wilh a he,IVy 11;11111. h.lllllill!',
left-wing p:lrtics, suspending Ihe COR, ;lnd closing c!lIWIl 1IIliv<'fsilks.
Arter Jilllmy Carter assumed the U.S. presidency in 1')77. Ihe H.11l7el gO\'CI'n
ment callle under pressure to enact <1 delllocralic lrnnsition. \-\lhcl1 it ... e('1I11'd likl'lr
tSlI 1"1'1 I"" (,,'I 'lUtHI" t 11,'Nt,1 OVI"I{ tl,\II'
11,,11 Ilhl,.tll\II'lll'ld 'til l 1..'''''''1 II \\IIlIld I"'l' hI Slk':lo /'1l.IZU, IIOW\.Vl'l , B.lllzlr allllUlkd
Illl' d",II\'11 /\''''11 It ... ".X.t'II",r,lh.'d h)' Iii ... anll)' lllril.l;'r:lo :lollllllllaril)'
Il'lllu\nl hllll 1111111 \l11i.. l
lhl'l tli.. 1\.... 11 )1',II:lo, ,I :lotnng UlllVlh.1ll and lllilll.lr)' guvl'rlllliellb alter
1I.lkd III 1'11\...../, ..... 1'.1/ E... Iln...... OrU and Sill.:lo ZU.lZO vild fill' th... pn::loidl'nc)', 1l..'\V
Pi lIlt iI..1111 111..1" 1'1 1Il..'I'!4\.'d , ill.. llIdillg till' !'.Idieal Movement 01 the l<evolutiunary I.en
(i\III{) .llld 11'1' II).!.III WIll!4 N.lliull'lllhlIuKr'llic !\(tion, hlaJ\.'d by Ilugu Ball'lt'r.
"1111,1 Illh 111,1111,.11 .. 11.h...... (,Ilhl.tI l.lll:lo (;,Ircia Ml'l,1 (1',JHO-MI) !'>l'lll'd 1'1I\V1.1.
\\'111'11 Ihl' jUll'tll.llmo.ll prl"..... I"l'\'l',dl,'d Ih.ll key figurt's III hb gov"rnmcnl wel'l.:
11l\"h'I'd III 1111' .. U,.llIlV II.llk', f\i..'i.llluio..kl), Ill!'>t credibdlly. Suaring IIlILlliUll .Illd
I"l',hl 1>.1,,d 111'11111.11 Ilrull.:... I'" hi, lul\.ll'd to hi:lo ulI ... ll'r ill IYXI. 'I'he Ilcxl
fl.!I, H"I"I.I 1l'lIIJ"lIl"\lluln'I' alld l.tll \.k-dioll ....
Tile CUlllclllPOI ory Scene ( I 980s-presenll
l)lh .. .li',.IIIl, Illv "ldl'r glIll' .ltllJII III Ihllill.... all:lo dbplltl.'ll I'0\\'t.'r.
lk,.lu',,' It \\.1' \, .. Id)' .. U11 ... ldlI ..d 111.lt Sdl::-' ZU,IZlI h.ld \\'ull Ih\.' d\.'Clillll:lo.
till..' ( "IIl-:II....' dl'\.tl'lillilll plnull'lll III I'JH1. Ill.- .. nl.1 enmoillil
\Il,i ... IlllI,tltll'ltl dluppnlllllllllllll. wlllld 1111 Illarkc:t, .lnd ill hyplrinn.ltiun
1,.I,llnl ,III .IIlIHI.d LII\.' III 60.000 Ihi' IlHlrlh.highnl level III w(lfltl hbtorr.
II u... lrdkd 10) Ill'" Hl.illllll), Itl gun:rn, "Jdl... ZU.170 slepped d(IWIII'.lrly .1Ild dlxtioll:lo
\\l'1 I.' dlnl
Nil' ... IIII'I .... P.l.f J ... 1\.'11...... "111 \,Ill\..Il!>\.d:l:lo Iii", Willlll'r. l.UIII', 11I1\\,\,V(r. w.....
Ihl'I'ltlt.l.llllllt.ll ""uI.lvl111.'l1 :lol.ll\,llllltrul U\l'r till'lIlajur OllhlIl.OnuIIlY.
1'.1/ I '1\"11......"1<1 til"'''''' .I"'hlt" .tli IIlthl:" n.lllllll.dl:lot .llld r.ldit.a1l'rugr.1I1111l.1tic point!'> ul
Ih\. 1\1NI<. Huddllll-: .111 .dil.lll\..e wltll 11l1'1Ill'r dKtatuf Ilugo B.lll'l\.'!'. P.1Z
1'11'1"'''',1'1 Ill"lllll'I.1I N\\\ 1':IIIlHIIIIIl PI.III. Folluwing uriliudux llll)uc:tary pulicil':lo,
Ill' .. ul V.'!\t'IIIlIIIIIl llt'\.'d puhb( "'l.. lur plin':lo, .llld illl.l",.lSl'd rl:Velllll:"
\VIIt'1l lldl.lli"JI drtlpPl'l1 III d.Hlbll: digib. Ill.' lllllvl'd to dblllalltic Ih...
'[.lk JlJllllUg .Hld Ul'l'lI till' l.lJllllty Ifl.'l tradl'. II1I hard hy IhI,'
1... '.1"1111' .. 11 ... 1', hilt 1\1 no .... vail. MallY whl) jllbs
111\1\1"\1 III llllll'l Iq.!,ivlI'" .llld l'Vl'lllll"II)' hll.tllll ... lllaUscall.: t:Ol,l gnlwl'rs.
"J1l\"\\"nllllg prl... llkllb lollu\.... nl P.l.f .. Ill..olibcwl policil-:lo, Jainll' P..lZ
/'.1111111.1 (I')H'J 'iJ) III till' 1\111<. huilt.1 l.unuu:loco.lIitioll wilh right-wing Hugo Hanzel'
.llId hlllh\'1 hlokl' Ihl'l'uwl'r 1)1 thll.lhtll lllU\'\.lllt.'lI!. II SllCu':loSOr, CiUIIZaiU $.lnchez
lIl' I \li.ld.1 (I'N \ 'J7). r:'lll 011 .1 tKkl.'l wilh Vi.... tur Ilugo a leader of the
'11111.11 1..::.11.111 I{l\I,lutlllll.lr)' 1.lha.llioli tvluWIll"nl, Although he continued
IIHIIIl'l.IJ) nod tu "Idigenuus Ihdr
to gl\.1I11 pllllliGlI p.lIl kip.,tiun. i\ mung S:i.nchez de l.uz.ld.l'S reforms \Va:lo a
l.lpll.dii..ltlllll progralll l:II01bling juint vcnlurc:lo bt.'tween pliv3h: capital and stale-
\I\vIl\.d II hi U:lot I'l ...':-;, At Ihl: :loa 11 II.' tillll., h" I.k'1.:larcd Bolivia 10 bc a pluricuhural statl',
.!t-U'IItI.IIJ'lI'd IlHlnitlpal guvl.'fllanct' (:lotrl'llglh\"lling indigenuus COIlHllullities), and
I
l
lrtllillnlllllllg.'IlIlU:-.I.lIlgll.tge:lo lu hll.tllght ill SdlOols.ln Iv U.S. pressurl's
,lIloul drug Irallldullg, S:'111... hcz dl.' l.lIZ.llLI abo sl.'l up a volulltal)' cocaine l.'r<ldicalion
PIl/gI.lIll Ih.ll Il'l'lIrlt'llly reducc..ll'rtlductiun by ollc-thir..1.
A Ill.'wl)' minted Ilugo HallZl:r rduml'll tn pO\Vl'r III 1'.N] .111...1
t:Olltilllll:l1 frn'-lIlarkd ..lnd privatiz.ltiun pulkil':lo.11I.' llIlbra\.-nl a U.S.
percenl HKaine eradication program, known as Plan I>igllid.td, that pourl:tllllillilJll:lo
uf mtu thl.' cuulltry for cUlInkrnarCOlic:lo dllllh. Ball'll'r ;llso lit\.'
.s.,ll' of Mate-owned resourc("s to the priV.IIt: :lo\."Ctor. An agr\.I.Illl.'lll with Ih\.' Ikdltd
Corporation that privatized the Woller supply .. m ill Cudlaballlb.1 met wilh
popular n:sistancl' when tht.' COlllpall)' lripled ib rates; in til\.' facl' of signilicilllt
lIlobilizatiun, thl.' govcrnment n:sl:indcd Ihl.' l.l.)IlI,..KI. Irulll ufliu' 1'lIly
for he:llih reasons, Banzer was sllccl.'eJl'd by llis vke presid\.'1l1.
In 20U2 S;ln('hez dl: I.uz.tda rl,'g<llll\.'J th\. pn:':loid\.'IlC)' wilh ,I llllllillhd "llll.lIily
in a multiparty contesl. I lis ehiel UPPUIll'lIt Evu Morak':lo, a katll'r of th\..' (Uta
growers' union rUJlning un Ihl. lickt'l of Ihl' MOVl.'Ill11l1 lowanl Soci.dbm (MAS).
(The Spanish word auonYlIl MAS llleallS Morak:lo surprised politkal
by cuming in a strong secund. This but a prdudl' of dUllg:lo tv CUJllI:".
Sallcht'z de LOl.ada illIJajkd all et:ollulllY ill :loh.lrp dt:dilll' ;j1ll!.1 ... wdling I1Sl;11
ddkil. 11l\.ady 2003, r;Hlit:al 0PP0:loiliullisb lunned Ihl' IlIgh COllllllalld
10 challengc Evo Mor.lIe:lo o(lhl' coca groWl'fS' Ulllon Ic\llhi, illiliativ\'.
ow all t.'1ll\:rging IC.lder of indigenml:lo and popular slll.l,d 1IIUVl'llh'nts, Mllrak-:lo
and Ihl: Peopll"S lligh COlllmand lallndll'd a of prutt":lob gowrlllll\"nl
TIll'ir demands ranged frolll long IIdd local grkvallt::l::lo to ul'p'I:loitioll ttl
cuca t'radil..lIioll policil':lo. blockl'd 1"O,ld.... and ":!lie:....llld .llfl,...... lhl
":(Iulltry t:.lIl1l' to a III lktohl'r 200J dl' 1.11/.1\.1...
:lol'\.llril)' fOrll':lo to opcn thc W.I)' luI' Iud tfll.. k:lo " .. ruull' lu 1.1 1'.li;
0pclll'd lire Oil Ih.. dlmonstr.ltl.. :lo, killlllg ul Ull;lflll\.d llli/l'lI'<, 'I'll\.' prl'
SkPPl'd (luwn .l1ld bu.lrded.1 l.UIlHlll:I..-i.t1l1igllt IH Ihl' UIlIll'd
A New Course for Bolivia?
louk plan' ill lall' 2U1I5.1 )11\..1' again, ":V<l Mor.II.., 1.lll 1\11 Ih\ ,,111\..\', .llld tlli ...
lim... hl' III powl'r wilh 5/1 perCl'nl IIll' voks. 'I'llllluuI I1..':11 Ill'll .111 all liulI:'
high, with X'l pt'rn'lll 01 c1igihll.: VOll.'l':-; p:lrti(ip.lling. All A)'IIl.Jl.l ludi:lll 11'0111 Ih\.'
01 Orinocu, Oruro, MVI.lks had lIluvnl with hb extlll..kd 1.lIndy III Ihe
Cuch"l.>:illlba Valll'Y 10 find work as :lomall f.lrJl1t.'l"s prududllg lruib .llld C"lk..a Io.::aw:lo,
1-1 .... got involVl'd in the c()(olero ulliull, rbing tu naliullalll:".ldl:"l and henllll;llg all
uutspoken OppOlll'nt of lh.... gove:rnmcllt's ... ucaillc l.raclit::aliull polit.il:lo.
His vktory evoked a rc:tllrn 10 the idl'ab ulllll" 1952 rt'volutiull lalld rdorm
and lhe nationalization of industries and natur.d Moral\.':lo, how\"vl:r,
l>roadeut.'J its scope tu indllde real partkipatiun ufllll' Indi.HI pupulation in local
national gO\'l;'rnancc. To sigllallhis :lohil". Murale:lo org:\Il1'l.cd .1 inaugu-
ration ceremony following Aymara rituals prior to the ufrici;11 cveili. I k 1'..... 1'1'.... -
senled himself as thc first full-blooded indigenous pr"sidenl who \Va:lo dedit:<lkd tu
vvcrturning Bolivia's centuries-old sociailliera!'chy, (II opprl's:loion,
this was a stunning culmination and di!'>play 01 Ill'wly found Intli.tn PO\\'\.'I".
Soon after laking office, Morall's took over Bolivian as:loeb
and negotiatl'd ncw contracts Illun: f'lvurablc: 10 Bolivia willi 1
1
clrobras, Brazil's
IRl PART TWO. t:ASI STUDIES: CIIANGE OVER T1to.<lr-
Evo Morales dons" poncho presented by the Mapuche Indians of Chile during a political
rally; <'s a democratically elected president. Morales has become a figurehead for
indigenous movements throughout latin America. (Getty Images/AFP.1
rr
( '1 he /\lltk..: ()lll:H, 11 .... ,",1 Iwll."" I'"
Why Bolivia and Not Peru?
The political sllcces<; of Ihe imliqenous POfllll.llion III !'ohv,.\ 01f"1<, .1 ,,'Ii":""l
contrast to the relalive quiescence or pro In<!iiln mOVl'I1H'III<, III Pr'rtr. Incllfl"lInll'.
peoples constitule mOIl" Ih;Ul 60 pPfCr'nl or 1hI"' Rolivl,ll1 pnl'lIl,llilll1, ,..,r fllllt<, ....
compared wilh less Ih;1n 1\0 in rNlI. htll thill i\ riot Ill" only 1".l\On 1.0111
the Ch;aco War through Ihl"' Rl"'volulInn o( 1'1"7. Illillnl "V""l<' ill Ilnlivi,1tl 11I'.I"lV
have mobilized ,'md heiqhl"nl'd ,ollsfioll<,Il('V, ,lmOlli1 lh" r..,1II1"',
Indians.
But the di(ferenc('<, (10 not <;IOp Ih('lc. A"o,d.nq to pOlll'f ,II '" 1""1,'.1 I )OIl'l.I
lee Van Cott, factors intcrn"llo PCflt oUc' IIn(")O.1<\ol ell"'lll"n, .. of r'xpl,tn.""\l1
The lag [in Pelul i.. allribul ... blr> 10 th(' c101l1l1l,11l(f' of M,lIX"I .1Il.! ,.,l.ln,.\ 1,1<-..1
ogie.. in the majority indlgf'nou<, h.qhl..nd<,: Ihp Ilf'q.ll'v'" rl'l,lfhNI
to indigenous elhnkily Ihf"{', Ihr> 11'\11"'1 <,IICC r'<'\ 01 Ih... lalld ."(01111 of Ill':' 1<170'.
a leqill systf'm thaI ha\ II,ldlllOn.1Uy Irp,ll"d htqhl.'llrl ,lilt! 1"\\'1.10<1 hHh.lll.
separately, m... king jo,nt Mlion Illor(' diffl(,i1L Ih... poll( "I lh" '.111I1111'11',\111
c!wing Ihe 1980s and {'ally 1 1('1 .. '";,in,ll'" rlv,111... "d",<, f,f '.,i1 IIl"'," 01('1111"
the policy of Ihr> Albe,'o FujimOli qov('lIm''''nt In lab'" ,1<' I('lInrl'";l UPl'fl\l
tional political aClivily; ,llld hl',wy 'lllqr,llion tn Ihr' I II.", dllrillq rh" It'JIlI\<' ,ltld
1990<;. which rf'movcrl flom thilt Wf"I'" I",flIIIOIMI Itl..-l"I"nOIl'.
terrilories. Since Ihe 1('(UI)('r.,l1on .1n<1 ('If ,nfhqr>nflll<, I ... lIlln.I.... ". Ih,'
cenH>rpiecC'of in<1igr>nou<, moh,h7i11,nn In Il",nhhnlinu ""\111111"<'. 1"",11<'1'" ,"I",n
of much of Prlu's incl'9E'nou<' pOPII'<lI'''''' d"p'lvP<, th" l'''Il'VMIl "" "_'''''''11' "f
I)(lWcrflll OIgilm71n9 th"'m("
<;talc-owned oil company. which imporlcd two-third<; of Bolivia'!, nahlr:11 g:1!'. lie
:1lso ovcrS:1W :1 c1eci!'ivc turn in foreign policy. :1ligning himself SqllMely with the
icnnlc Fidel r.:1st rn :1nd Ihe lIrchr:lI1d Hugo Chavc7.. Gmtcful1y ;lccepting ecollomil.:
aid from oil rich Vcne7.llela. Mor:11cs heC:1111C:1 key memher of the leflisl Jlolilical
mnvelllent known throughout Latin America rl.S the "pink tide" (sec Chapter 12).
And ;IS all ardent nationalist. he dist:lnced himself from lhe United St ... te....
The W. Bush :ldministrnlioll in Washingl01l took gre:lt llmhr::lge over
thi<; d('\,('lopmenl. hUI W:lS unahle-or ullwilling-to devole Ihe resource" 10
opposing it.
The Mornles ndministralion :1lso presided over the ",riling of a new constitu+
lion. In an e:1rly 2009 referendulll with ... 90 percenlturnollt. 61 percelll ()fvOlers
... pproved the new n:1tional charter. It acknowledged Bolivia as a unitary. plurina-
tinn;ll. secular slate. :1nd it dec1Med lhal nalur:ll resources were the exclusive
patrimony of the Bnlivian people and should be administered hy the stale. In a
separntc refercndum, 81 percent endorsed a restriction 011 private land possessioll
to 12,1100 .. cres. lhus opening the door 10 :ldditioll;ll redistribution or large
I.. ndholdings.
The Mor:lles govcrnment encountered significant opposition. espcci:llly frolll
:lgrihusillcss intcrests in $;ulla Cruz that used <ICIll:lIHl!. ror regional ;\utOIlOIllY
threats of secession :1S rallying eric!'. " recall effort ag;linst Momles ill 2007 failed.
\OUfI(r: Donna lee V... n Cott, 1l11ni"'q \11<"<' '1110 OppnllltnllY AI h,"v"m"nt'...I
E)(c1uded Grours in lhe Andes: in Pilul W. Dlkf" ;lOr! [.ic 11""hh"',q. <'(I<., "',/1,'
(Inri Society in Conflict; Compauui"e I'f'ISI'('l 1m !1m/rOil (//'.i'<' (rllt',hlllflb
of pjltSbUrgh.I'II"'S.... 700(.,),_ p. 1(I) _ .
whell ()7 percent of the c1cdoralc voted III ",-.('1' hilll ill nUu.c. .11111
highland Indi;lIl prejudi((' wa.. within Ihe mfl\,rllwnt .lg.lII'" i\lnl.II,.
Following:l visit to S:1nl:l Crt!; in 20117. nndlllfn 1111" II .... 1'.. I,d
Rapporteur on I-Iuman Righls of Indiv,enoll<; I'('opk<;. l\!t"cf\'cd thnl lilt' !,,,lrl" ,II
c1im:lle h;ld given rise In "J1l;lnife"lnl inn<; of ral.. i"'lll 1111 11(' '1IIIl',II'l .1 t .lll.nl.II "I, Id
than a modern democr:ltic st:1le.
Morales' mulliple electoral viclnries revcnlctl hi<; hn),HI 1"'I'lll.lr \,111'1'(1'1.
especially among the indigenoll<; l'0pu1:"ltion. They .11<;0 rdln Icel the
willingness of popular movemcnls to push for a social atlel CCOtllltllit" 1"('<.,1 n II.-I
of thc country. Thc ncw consl illit ion permits Ihe rceled inn of t 11(' I'l"c!'oidcnt. :-\11',1 I
ofsignificant political turmoil, Morale:"sccms likely In remain in pOWl'I until )011
Ouring .. cclebralion ;lfter Ihe rntillc:1tinn 01 the new I.-('Il<.,lilulillll. J\1,1r.lk, "I"
claimed. "They can drag file frolll Ihe p,I):lLe. Thc}' 1...111 kill 111(". i\ll ...... IIIn .hl fllll
plished for the re-founding nf the new 1I11ilCti I\oli,i.l
IXl 1':\ltl IW\I" I.A... ! ... .... ( 11,\NI;F tJVIj(1 111.11'.
POLITICS AND POLICY: ECUADOR
1.\ u:I\I"r I.:mlllrni ollguillg pl.)!il kal volat ilil y for the last two ccnlllries. Bet weeJl
IX \0 :Illd Iltl' prl."';lul, till!)' IWl'llly have complt'led constitutional terms
ill ollkl.. Thl' Ilalion h.. :. had twenty-uuc t.liffercJlt constitutions since il\(ll:pcn-
dl.'Ih.I.. l)wiJlg tlh.' t\\'l'nlidh ,,:clItury 'llonc.the seized political power Oil
11,1 Ie..... Ihall thil'llI.JI Pulilkal institutions have remained and
gOVl'IIl<lllll.ll,lgl!L.
Coudillos, Conservatives, and liberals
With tIlt: .Khil.\'l'llllnt or illdqlt.ndellCe, Ecuador juilled Colombia ;tnd VCIlI;.''l.uelii
ill (ir'1l1 Columhia projl'CI. Bullvar ill turn appointed Juan Flores, a
\'Clh"lud.lll t.U11I1lI;lllt.kr in Ihl' Wars of Independence, as governor of Ecuador.
Although waS or hUlublt.' urigins, he quickly married into the local creok
dltl' ul (2ullt) tu gain :KCl'ptallCc.:.
,\lll.r h'u:ld0r broke away fmln Cran Columbi:\ in 11:\30, norl's became
1'1\::.idl'lJl ot the IlL'W repuhlic. Wht'll opponent ViLente Rot.:afucrte
till ag,rill:.l hilll, ht: jail..... '" his adv.... and then struck a dt'al. Flures would
lullill krill :lnd !{uGlfucrk .... ullld th",n assume office. Flores continued to rull'
1Jlhilld tILt.' IllC 11t... d uf Ilit;' army. \.vhen Rocafut:rte's term t..'xpil'l'd, flores
rdufllnl ttl IhI.' and tlJl'll fort.t.'d Ih", ratification of a new constitution
Ih.d l'uablnl hilll III ;lllulha l'iglrl )'ears. As dsewlwre in nineteenth-cC'ntury
1..111il Alll ...li.;!, 111....:.1.. t..ll])' l.vl..lIls ;I p.ltlerll til' ((/Iulil/o politics. III
!Luwl..vl'r. Ilrl.. IMtll'rn vt.: ... alnt..' a traditinll.
III Ihl' llle.llllim"" l.ibt.'rab <.llld Consavalives vied for cuntrol (If th.... state. The
l.rllt.'ral Ilan)' tl..'lHlt.-d I.... (\1',1\\' it., :>lJl)pmt frulll Ihe business dasst's of Guayaquil, whitt'
Ill ..... Cun"'t.Tv,tliveS rt.linl lIlI lilt.: of Quitu. Both usnl military
:.tnlIgIl1 III 111t.if ]Jutilkal will. l;eJleral Mari:l Urvin:l, a l.iberal, seized
]lll\V('f ill a CllUP d't'lal III IX'll. Urvilla fjllitldy signed a deere\,:' Irl't.'ing till' nathJlI's
lCltili.:d ,I:-.!H...silkllt ill a t'ulltrolkd dcctinl1, hI.' remained ill
1I111Jl IHr,el. l;...Jllr:r1 I:ralldsul ]{ublcs, alsu a Libt'ral, l'llded Indian
Illhull. rl..'1ui1t:'llh.'llh. Tllc:.. llIt.:a::.ures built sYllIpalh), fur LibC'l"als (llllOllg the 10wl..'l'
1,1 ...... hut l.ibl..r;tl-.; t.olltrul of the governmenl ill a sail's uf il1terr....gional
:!lllllng rival ((lIIdll/oS ill (known as terrible
le:lder (,aurid Garela Mort'no joined with utlwr military
II' IHlt dl'\\,ll Iht: rt.gil.llal rebdlions, rt.:storeJ order. and Came to power in 1860.
1\ devuut (:athlllil:, (v!tU"l'I1U gov..... rned Iht..' t.:ounlry with all iron fist fur tile next
.llld ,I halt, ",ililn .t:-. ur as puwer broker. lie OVersuw a new
l..ull::.tilutitlll ill JXhl Illat IHadl' Humall Catllulkisl1l the olTidal statt' religion, and
;Illtlther dial tt'r ill II:HJI) that Iillked citizellship to the Cutholic faith. Although
Mt.r....IHl ,I figure ill Enmdorian history, even his detrat.:lors
adlllit Ihal 11\' ht.IJll'l1 illlpmVI' tht.. l'lhu:atiullal systelll by expanding primary
tt'cllnit:d inslitulions, and improving universities with the
111.'111 ul Inuil lit.' abu stn:llgt!ll?lled tht:: country's infrastructure,
" .. Thl: Andt..... : Suldit.r:.. Ulig.lrt.h:., .1IIt! Illdialls
uuildillg roads betwet.'11 tht. highlands :.llld Ihe coast.r1 rt:gioll alld inili,llillg a
railruad line linking Quito with Guaya"'luil.
Cacao, Prosperity, and Turmoil
As Libenlls and Conservatives battled fur t.:untrul ur th\.;" a buum in
C:1C,1O exports brought economic prusp('rity for the l\IerChallt.s and
the L,lCking political power. this IIrril'istc uligardlY
11Il:lnc....d a 111r1ltary coup III 11:195 by IUllglilll1' Liul'ralll'ader Elu)' Albnl. Ct)a.st:ll
clites rt'maint::t1 in t.:ommalltl 01" the st,l!t' lor tht: follmviog tltree dt:'t.:adt:s.
Once in powt'r, the Liberals carrit.:d uut two lllajor reforms. thl'Y
separated Ihe Catholic Church frolll the state, legalized divorct..', and est<.lblished
civil marriagl'. This meant tllat the stale would now adnlinistcr t:ducaliOll and
soci,ll welfare programs, services thai the church prl'vit)usly had providl'd. St;'cond,
the Lilwrals relied on rl'venues drawll froBl tarirfs on imports to finance publk
wurks, education, and government-full welrare services. These COSily programs
depended increilsingly on loans from the banking St;'ctor, as custumhouse reVeJlues
were insufficient to fllnd the burgeoning budge! or all activisl Thl' govern-
ment found itself deeper in dt'bl.
In thl' 19205, Ecuador lost its llIarkt'l ::.haf( ur the c:lcau lradt.' dll\.;" 10 plant
disease and rising compel it ion. I >eclining rt'velllJt:S made it increasingly difllcult to
nation's political modd :\Ild discredited Liberal politicians. :Igain
the Hulrt;lr)' moved 10 (l'oter stagl', '\Ild a gruup of yoling olfkt:rs seiznl puwer ill a
coup.
This :su/pc de esilldu of 1925 lnarked a significant shift ill tht.' rull' uf tla. arrlll'd
forces ..Up to this point, military rule had beell linked to pt'rsonal ambitiolls; all of
the country's most importantlcadt.'rs from 1830 to 1916 w",rt.' lllilil,lI)' oITiet..rs. III a
l'oulltry with weak govt.'rnllll..III:II instilutions sharp regiulHlI diflerences,
lllilH:lry might had becoll1t: Ihe privilt.'gnl Il1l'ans 10 pOWC'. Yel the armed t"or..:cs
did nol havl' a strong idenlity. In the ",arl)' tWl'ntit..'th ct.lliury, how-
I'Vl.'f, within tht.' lllililar)' werl' i:realing a ilion: pruft.s::.ional unicef curps-
dr;l\vn Il'sS lrolll the llppl..'r dass and mon: from the lIliddl", st.'t."lors uf suCid)'.
Coming mainly from Ihe highlands, thl'se llt::W soldiers saw the Liberals as having
mOrlgaged Ihe country to coastal banking interests.
The of Young Officers thaI took cuntrol of Ihe govenllllt:.nt in 1925 did
su in the name of Ihe nation alld Hul 011 bchalf uf any single individual. Stilt, old
patterns of governance died hard. Power soon shifted 10 Isidro A)'ora, who quickly
assumed dictatorbl powers and undcrtuuk a reform of lilt' cuulItry's financial
SySlt::lll. Ayom appointed a team of foreign I.collomic advisl'rs, headed by Edwin
W. Kelllmerer of Princeton University, to suggest ways to improve the nation's fiscal
and b'lnklng systems. Ayora established a Centraillailk and restructur.....d budget ing,
taxalion, and clistom These reforms brought signillcallt new reVl'llUeS to
the central guvernml'llt and reduced lhc Ilnandal role of the Guayaquil clites.
In addition, the military oversaw the pnssage of a new 1929 constillltion that
granted suffrage to women-the firsl in Latin Allll'rka!-and included progressive
Ii'll> 1',\RrTWO" CA.... I:-,llfI)ILS.UIANC,FO\'lR 111\11'
soci,d Ille;lsures for the ..ses, It ;llso gr:tnled more power 10 Ihe legi .. latlm.'.
'111isl"lter prnvision, designed to Iimil arbitrary presidential nIle. endeclujJ weakening
the ex('("uli\'e branch's ahilit)' 10 govern as Ihe counlry faced the Circat Depn.'ssion.
III the wake of the worldwide crisis, an abrupt drop in the international
demand for cacao and other export products devastated the ECll"dorian econoln)',
Disillusioned with Ayora's le"dcrship, the military soon ousted him from power.
\V"rring political filct ions ilnd parties hatt1cd for control of Ihe gov('rnment, an<l "
.. trillJ:: of military and civilian figures telllpnrnrily hcld execulive power. Liheral
GlIlllid;lte Juan de Dios M;lrtinei' won election 10 Ihe presidency ill 19,n, but
p:lrlis:lll opposilion p;lmlY7ed his would-he goVenlmenL The challenge 10
M:lrlinc7. was led b)' Jose /'vlO\ria Vclascn Ibarm, the dwrislllalic president of the
Ch:lInher of Deputies, who insisted that he person"II}' ret:lined no presidential
nspir;llions. Popular mobilizations forced M;lrtinc7.1u resign: less than a )'ear laler,
Vclasl,.o Ih;lrrn won a resounding elecloral bid for Ihe presidency. Eleven ll10nths
l;lter. after he :lliempted to close Congress, jilil his oppnsit ion, and seize dictatorial
powers, the Illililary removed him from office, This \V,IS the fire;t of five times that
VcI:lscolb:lI"ra would occupy the president.-y over the nexl three and;l h:llf del..ades,
III 194\, Ecu:ldor :'Ind I'eru engaged in a war over disputed territol'ie::o in the
AI1l:l'l.on River hasin thnt would have <levastnting re::oults for Ecuador. The peme
I!"e:lt)' recogni7ed Peru' .. territori:ll claims and deprived Ecuador of ;lCCCSC; to the
Amn70n River and, ;'Ie; a re.. ult, of;ln outler 10 the Atbntic Ocean. The Jefeal
pwvoked nn outhurst of nationalislll thnt cO;lIc..ced in the Democratil Alli;1n(e led
hy Velasco 1I":lrra. The president resigned in Ihe \\lake of an uprising in (;wI)'nCJuil.
all(1 VelilSCO Iharra came to power 011 the wings of a populist promise to cont:lin
the "cornq.,t Liberal oligarch)'M responsible for the loss of Ihe w"r.
Velasco Iharra promised soci ... 1justice for the lower classes, he did
little in pr;lctice. As inflation increased find foreign exchange reserves dwindled. hc
too lost popular support. Once again, the milit;lr)' stepped in and removed him
fr(llll office. Artcr ;mother ye:lr of partisan disputation, the U.S.-educntc(1 (;;110
1'1017.:l L;lSSO defeated his Conservative opponent and led a coalition of independcllt
I.iherals and socialists inlo power.
Bananas and Dictators
In the 1950s bananas became the new export product that offere(l sufficicnt
economic stahiJity to ensure political tranquility and delllocmlic transitions of
power for another dozen )'cars, Traditional parties lost their electoral appeOll, rind
new political formOltions sought support from the middle and lower classes.
Velasco (harrn's lerm in office from 1952 to 1956 exemplirlcd this new
political strategy. His progralll of massive publiC works projects, from roads and
hridges to schools and electrical plants, won him widespread popular I,ll
fact, he rode to power for the fourth time in 1960 garnering the largest vote In hiS
entire career. Unfortunately for Velnsco Ib:lrra, earnings (rom hanal1;l exports
temporarily declined. Filcing capital flight illld economic crisis, Vclilsco Iharra
responded slowly and c1ulllsily. lIe soon lost popularily, A general strike led by the
l1;ltinnall;lhor fcder<ltiolll'lalllllred ftlr wage' 1'1"01(', tll'tl" ,lod ,111 t'IIIII"I'I"):"\"' 11\
men!. Although the ;lrlll)' sllcces!'llllly replc""ed the \\'ork .. Illpp,lgC, "''''11 IlIn,
after it stepped in and oue;led VcI:lS(O Ih,lrra.
The new incumhenl wns endos Julio "Hl"l'mCIl,1 i\11'1l101)', "d,l"'" Ih.III.1..
preSident. At this jUllcture, the Cllhnll Ren.Jlltion ,Inti ( old \\',11 1',,1111'"
determined the shape of lint ional polit K!'. 1\ rosnnen,1 i\ 'nnn .\' I'n.1 1("1 (,1 .Itl lilt I,
pendellt foreign polic)' alui. like hi" (Ollnlel"p,IIIS III i\lt'\II(I. rdll"l',l I,. l.t,,11
diplolllatic rcl;ltiolls with Cuhn. (;cm\ervalin' "'111'''1111\11(',1 loll hi" 11'1'1"\,11 .11,,1
in t')(J1. the militnry depnc;cd hilll.
As in 1he <lmlY ft.'l1lOlinc,1 itl the Iwc.;i,ktlll,11 p.ll.h (' I, 'I .1', ,',I'tI, I", I", t I'" I
1\,101'(' aulollomous nnd profes,.. innnilhan hclnl"C, Ill,' tlllll!.II\' 11I1l!.1 initl.llt'd ,I "'11",
o(structllnll reforms supported with (J.S. g(\\,('ltlIlICIlI ,11t1lhl""gh II ... AIII"Ult t"l
The)' changed the t,lX s)'slcm tn ilH,1't',I"C 1l'\'C'IlIll' ,111d l""1t"IIIII'I'1I01)',-I
deficit. The)' decreed;l mOd('SI land rdnrm ,lIltl ("lllnill.l1el! IllI' 111/(/'/1'1/11.1:" l.,h"t
systelll Ih,lt tied Indian I,) the: Inlld a.. "h:lleuopp"I" \IIlU' rill' "1 "11"111\
relll:lined st"gn;lllt, Ihe: junt:l rai"ec1l'evcnllc"';, hv i'll rc,l .. illl: 11111")11 tllll'l... 11",( )1111"
;lnd (;u,I)'nquil dlamhel"" nf Cl'Ill Illerce t-IHIIIICft'd tlli .. pi' 'I" .... 11 w,1 h ,1 gl IWt ,II .. , t11 ,
signaling th:ll the economic e1itc" wnllid not ,lllow IIH' lIulll.lI \ I" I tlllt t.l\TIl' IIt'1I
((lmlllercial interests,;\ r('Hcw('d cllolt the foll"wlng l'lt'llgbt "111111.11 l'I,'lt",1
Quite- ahrupt!)', the milil;l'l'lclt nlllLe III I'U,';. hll\ll.llc.! Ii)" Ihe 111,11>1111\ I"
Ill;lke e\'en mild reforms, nnd (e-Mflll nf ,I dc, lilH' 111 the I'llhllt 111l.lgl, ..1Ih,' 11\11 ...11 \
the officers simpl)' rclinqui.;hed power. In the IU'lllicl the nlllll.lI \ 11"1 rIll
eCOllomlC c1iles mohili7etl pOl'ul,lr .. lIl'porl 1111" 1'"l1tlt,tllt'" 'I m.. 0' fill 1'1.111"" 1 0111
the generals. Citizens remained on Ihe sulcliIH'''. A 1'111\'1 .. " '11.11 1:1\V('1 tllllt'1l1 11d,-, I
for lwent)' Illonlhs.
Once ag;lin, Vclascn Ihnrra {;1I11(' 10 powcr illthc I'}(,X dt'l IIIln.. , .111,1,1" Illlh,
past, he f:ll;ed revellue shnrtralls tll;lt tOilld Ilnl fin.llilc llH' 1"11>11. 1'''''gl,IIII'' III'
promi.e;ed in his electoral CIlllp;ligll, F,lling;l hcll1gcrclll ("ngt ...... , Ill' 1'.,111",1
support from the mililnry for his movc III n<;"lIllle die I.llnri.r1 1'1'\\'1'1" "Ill ".1\'(' rh,'
coulltry from total ruin.- lie closed ... l'xlkd "PP"tlCIlI .... 111.1 1(' .. 1111,
tured government operation.. tn ellSllrc more fie;c;ll CffiUI'lIl \.
Ahhough widely regarded;le; a Vda<;lll Ihat I,I rdlcd Ie.... 1"1 1"'I"II,lt
mobilizationth:ln on empt)' promises. I Ie hnilt no h,I"C within the \\"Oil-kill!: 11. .......1"
Perc'm and VMgas had done in Argcntina and Hr:lzil. Nor 111d he .. nlldilv hi" 111"\'
ment through" natiol1<llist. anti.imperialisl di"ClHII "C ,I" It.ld Il.ly,l oil' 1.1 I ""l' III
Peru. Having weathered repealecl political stortne;, hl' IcllClllllnH' on 111 .. 1"11':1"\ 11\ .1',
a politicnl figure than on his aeh;('v('ll1ent of COn(lTte re.. lIl1..
The mUit<lry grew dist fIIstlul of Vd:l"co Iharr,., ee;pell,llly ".. Ilewly ,1,,,, ,.\ ... , .1
oil reserves presented new possihilities of governnicilt II' I'f"
the military ousted him from office for the final time. The armed 10l"tt,,,, It, ,,\'('\'CI,
did not simply move in, exch:lllge politici;lllS, :1,11 retrc';lt linIn Ih.. I'IC'>Iell'lIll.11
pal;lce, This lime the)' remained in power (nr sevcn )'e,ll".
The defining fe;lture of this period came from tile- di .. ,,\vl't"y p( I'cl,,,kllll1
deposits in ECtl;ldor's Alll;li',On reginn. (;el1cl"al (;llillcrtllfl 1{,.,lriglll/. 1,Ir.l. wi",
I'\J(I J\\tl" (,\'.;I:-,IIJlIJI:-' t IIANt,1,l)VEHTIl\II:
The Curse of Oil?
I
' 0 It 01 lcuddo,'s It fkldno::s d
l III. tItll'lIt1y rL'pll:"L'llI'> t 1<111) Pl:J<.t:'1
I
b the lI(h deposits of
lhud .,1 IId1l0n<ll budlJ.... t Yel SOIllt:' U ),:>dV .
1\11','1'0111.1" vii .'':>.1 (U'':>t:'. What lluyht led them to such il .
I" l'Ju'I, 11lL" U.S. b.,'iL--d COllll)3ny began searclllng for Ollln.the nOlth
\ ...... of E<'Uddol. Aflt:'1 l1lilpping area ilnd dOlnlj sample
""lIlmJ, tIl... l.Olllp.lIly 11l,),ked off ,In eighty lillie ,:>watch of and an
'''lrL'I'IIlL'nt willi till: yovt:lnm... nt. Texaco slluck 011 ill 1967.11 bUilt a pipeline across
II". Alld......,nd lJL'IJ.l1l lull "L.lI"", puxlUdlOIJ In 1972, all extlilction b,ought hefty
pll,llI ... tv thL' IVIIlIJdllY dlld ..IYIllIKdnl fUI Iheyovernmenl. .
Y.'t Ilh'IL' \'lid" a ploblt:m: Hvw tv dl'>I>o""'" 01 wd,>I"",? Side products of
I""""':'. Ilw"L' IluXIOU':> lIldh.,,'ldls includt:d tOXIC water and mud. callYlllg high
I,'VI+, 1.1 (.lIt IIU.KJl:Il':> .1I,d hedvy metdts. 1he company's solution was to dump
11"'111 III 1.lly.... ulllul",d d.ly pit'>. (nvllunnlt:ntdlist,:> charge that. over the of
IVll'Illy YL. <It l<:'dSl 12 LIlhul1 Ydllons of ttw. waste have leaked Into the aqua film.
Illl'y .,I'>u d':>..I,.'illhilt TeXdCO tOlLIC waste III that Violated U.S. law.
IlJt1llhilly IL'lullL'd lhdt II und<:'ltook c1t:anup m the 199Os. when It
pull..t!out vf rcuador. and any link belween thelf opelatlons and reported
h..,lth jJlublt:'llI" III tilt;< dltc'd.
Wht:'ll T... x.ltO left l:l.u.llJur III 1992. II h.lIldt:d over drilling 10 PeHoecuador. the
',I"to. UWI ..... t1 ulI cUlllpany. Ihe Ilt:'xt YI!.H I:cllddolian and US. lawyers flied a
.I\ 11,111 I.IW.. Ult <l9.1I1l,:>t Tt:Xdl.O II' .1 New Yall. fedeltll court on behalf of 30.000
All l.ll'ur I r...... known dS 105 Aft!ctado5 the Affected The attorneys
,ll.II':.I
L
'd til.,t Ille: ljloumIW<.lI<:" w,)'> cont<lmm31ed from the ledky open pits. causing
Illqlll.IIC:> ul (,)Il(02'r. ,:>klll dl':>t:.l,:>e.mel utllel hCdlth problems Ihose liVing III
II ... IL'IJlvrl IIll001 <l Judy\:' ruled th,1t lilt' Ctlse should be liled III That
' .. II IlL' yL.,I. buuyhl UUI T...x<lco. lhe secondlalge,:>t uil l.ompany m th<:,
tJIlll,.d bL'(dllll' tht: new pldllltitf In a rnllilibillion-doll,ll l<lw'>lIlt.
IJu lilt:' IJt..'1 It'l It':> uf olll"",VCl1UCS vutwt'iyh p0h:ntidl hdnn to alld Ihe:
. I1VIl\)Illll.... llt? l).1vld l'otilL of (sper.ln7il Intelllationill, Inc.. a nongovernmental
tlHjdlllLdllUIl tlhll lid.. lJet:1l IIlVolvt-'t1 in the lawsuit, ,:>ees Ihis Cd,:>e as d potential
w"I,'I.,lwd: <If jll .. lllC' I:' brouglH to tile people of Ecuadorian Amazon, it could sel.ve
.1', .111 III uth""'l IJdll'> of tht. world for righting aYilinst the negatIve
III1IJ.1l.1 vI ""'Xll.Kllun."
"lilll ... )' gOVCIIlIliI:."IH whcll illvuk powl.:r ill initi.llly. lu
l.lllon.dlft... upcralHHls IV tWller IH:nelll frolll tht: luunlr}' S new
1.111 IlVt..I1U<'S. I k 1,.lllplt)yed rlldul ic and 10 a certain eXlent Ill.otldcd IllS
1til,' .Ilkt IIIte" lllilihiry reg.iIllL of Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru. Rodriguez Lara
L11'.IIL'.! IIL'\'o' guvcrllm...nl to uperale the oiJ industry, natiomllized failing
\'IIIL'I p'IW:-O. and up lIn.llleial
[\l.1 V) L.I pl.llll ( ;u,>I.IVo J.II Ii II AlIlvudi.l, the 11L:'W 1II inbll:r of llatt.1 ral res:u
.Iml .111 .lILh-nt 1I.IIIVII.llbl, fur a fI:."llegulialioll of conlracls WIth foreIgn 011
\llllIp.IIIlI,.,\. E... tlador juinnl Ihe Organll.:I1il.lll uf Petroleulll Exporting Countries
(OPEC) alld huslnl a ll1et'ling ill Quitu. W!tt..'n Jarrin lJeGIllle OPEC pr...sidL;IlI. h....
propOSt'd thai tht: Ecuadurian stall: should ;!("lIuirt' :l 5 I pc:rccnl intl'l"esl in IhL'
Tt'x:lco-Gulf cunsortiulIl. Jarrin's hard-Iille slalu:t" loward foreig.n oil CUlllp:lnil's
provoked a negative reaclion frolll Iht' U.S, governmenl, which thre;lkllt:."L! to (lll
un mililury aid unless Jarrill resigned. 'fhe guwfIllllt.'nl dbJllisSL;'d him
Ihcfl:afkr.
It)' sl..'clurs of the IlJ ilil aI")' ;lnd Livili.ln le.,dcrship l>..t ... kcd .1 l.OUp Iv
RodriguC:."Z Lara from power. Although Ihb dlort 1I1lIi.t1ly f.lileL!. ht..'
resigned Ihe lll:."Xt Y('ar, anJ it triumvirate of <.U1IIl1l.lnder,\ sluwly
the coulliry unct.' again to delllocmlic rule.
The Conlemporory Scene {1979-present}
As olle schol.lr has noted, Ecuador's pOSI- ul pnlitit.ian.'>
ported the modernization of Iht. pulilit.:.t1 through IhL' .... 01
tile:' dl;'l'IOrtltL', issue-oriented campaigning.lUd Ihe tlevdoplllL'lIl III mudern !,oil
liGtI parliLs." Reform measures propused by I'residenl Jaillle Aguilera
(I 1) .... ntl his successor, Osvaldo Ilurl.ldu (llJH I-H'I). Iu pdrolL'UlI\
in infrastructure. edUL.:alion. and rllr." lkvdopllll.:nt Wl.rl,.' nulll.thd...ss
thwarted by w'lrring factions within Congrcss. An ecunomic downlurll lullowing.1
drup ill oil prices increased the di(ficllltil's 01 h.lfIll.,\sing petrokulIl reVl'lllle for
economic "lid socinl relofllis.
Throughout Ihe and inlo lIlt..' IIlld I <)t)th. pf'I'sidL'llb .'>WIlllg b.lck .Ind
forlh b.... IWC:."t.'1l Ihl' righl and the 1....11. II as it tilt..' pulilk.11 kId lJrukt'li
down. Abdal;i Bucamrn, Ihe gr.llltison of I.ehant's.... inlllligr;lllb .lIltl .t lllcmber 01 a
ClI<lY'l(luil polilical clan, callie lu po\'/t..[ in 19\)(); six 1l11111lhs 1.ller. lite G..lllgrl.:".'>S
hill! 011 Ill(' ulltlsual ground III in... An illll:."rilll prl'
vice presidenl, and IhL' interirll (.. lg.lin) Llui<.kly lullu\\'t'L1. Janlil
M.lIllIild, all Arab Chrislian vI dL:M.l:lIt, luuk ult'it.t.. ill ll)l)tl. bUl delllun-
slr.lliuns fort.."t'd him to r,'sign, 'l'hcII LUt..io liutilTlt..Z, a lllt'Jllbl:f oJ'IIIt.. sllull-livt'd
junta thaI ousted Mahund. won Ih,' 2U02 dL'(lions lIll;1 plallunll In iJllfL.. lse
once ill oITicL', he rl'verst:d his alld implemented austerity
Ilh:asun's in ol'lkr 10 oblain .1 n...w luan frvm I Itt..' IMF. lrUlll
the leli and the righl joined in <1/1 allt'llll)( 10 impe.lL.:h hiJIl Ull curruplioll (harges.
and subst'quenl stret'l demonslrations It-d Cungress Iu rCllloV(;'" him frum office.
Indig<"t1ous movemenis playnl shifting rules ill tht..'st: dL'vduplllenls. III the
... of a lransfurlllalivc' historical event ... h lht' Bulivian l{evulution uf
1952), Ecuadur's Indian cOllllllunities \wre dispersnl and IraglllL'lllt'd bt'lwet'llihe
coasl, tht.. siam. and tht: Amazon. Org.ll1iz<lliun.lI d'lurlS uwr Ihe years had heen
made by such diwrse (and opposing) groupings as the Communist Parly. thl,.
Calholic Church. and evangelical Proteslanls, It \Vas nul llntil Ihat dhnic-
bast.'d federations coalesct:d in the Confetleraliol1 of IlIlligenulis Nalionalities of
Ecuador (CONAl E), which mounit'd llh\jur dlurls un beh.11I uf ludi.1l1 dghb in
199U a 11(1 1994. By the late 1990s CONAn: rt:prc:.'>cllted percenl of the CUlllltry'S
indigenous population, anti in !LJ9M illt..,d Ihe popubr Lklllunstralium that (orced
l')() I n\'o .. ( A'" YlllDII\ ('IIi\NC,F 0\'11{ T1l\1I
Ahl,.bl.' HIIC:mllll frolll the !,re"jdency. Rut in partkular and the pro-
Indian llltlVClllenl in generallml coherence and <;trenglh afler in Ihe
ludel govcrnmcnt.:\1l experience that proved 10 he extremely
And ;1 <:ONAIE pla}'cd (lnly a minor role in the dVilupri .. ing Ih:1I ou"lcd
CUlicrro in 2005.
I:illallr. in 200(\. I{afad Correa, a young U.S.-tl';lincd econollli:-.l :lIld (onner
Ilnance mini... ter, won a runoff e1eclion, seemingl)' stnpping the pre... idential
revolving <10M. A... a decbretl Chri"tian leflisl "nd a proponent of -twentyllr... t
cclltury so(j"Ii... m," Correa tcnninalrc! ongoing negolialion... for.1 free tr.1de :lgrcc-
Illcnt with Ihe Siales, crilicized I\merica's imperial prelcllSiolls, and
dCl1ol1l1ccd the BII'.h :lthnini... lralion... role ill wnrld affair.... Together wilh Evo
1\lol:lle<; nf Bolivia, he hcc:ulle:l promincnt alld highly arliculatc memher of the
len leaning "pink lide- in I.alin America.
1ike JIlO,<;( prcdeces...or... , (:orrC:l relied on slrong person.... l .... nd I're"i(lell
Ii .... I po\\'el. A IlCW (on<;!itlliion in 200R permilled a Iwo-Iel"ln prc"idency and
illt re.... exenltivc power". In the c1ccloml contest o( early 2009, Correa WOIl a
tleci<;ive victOf)'. lie repudlaled Ecuador's l1;1tional deht, calling it immoral .... ntl
l:linted h}' hrihery. :lnd pronll':;ed 10 lise oil 'Venue" for poverl)' allevi:llioll. As
intern,llional price.. (or pelrolculll lTIIl .... incd :ll llltldc...1 Icvel il \\'a<; ulldC':u if
F.Ctl:lt!C\f'" e,lrne<;t ,,-hid exeulli\(' wOllld he :lhlc In (ulfillihat olellln pledge.
7
Colombia
Civility and Violence
C
nlOlllhi:l is a Ialld 01 p:lr,ldox 'I'll(' mllTI"tl n,l\'ig.llor 1'\1" who1Jl II I" 11,1111 1
Chri<;tophcr <:nllllllhll", never IIllt(' ..('\ 10c,I "I'nll Iht' 11,111011'" l'I""I'nl kIll
tOf)'. Allhough C:ollllnhi,ll1 I("ader<; <;oughl In pHJlnoh' IIII 11\' ,1l1HlFlg Ill(' 1I1'I.-p. II
denI fcpuhlics of SI'.llli<;h J\Ill('l"Il.l in 11ll.. c"dy llillctn'I1111 lcnlii/l', Ih.'11 .'\\11
countr), \\'ould laler sllflci hOlll dl"IllCmhc'fllh'llt ,lllll 1I,lglllClll.Il11111 1\111","}'h
pnlHical e1ile<; 1hel"(' .... I'tel' ntllivaicci :Ill elhiL 11( t ivililv, 01 l."".h'rl/l ;.,. Ibt' 1l.lllflll
plullged inlo eras (If eXlrannlinar)' violcnl c. Although ('"lolllhl,1 ... no\\ \\ 1.(, h
judged 10 he Ihe longesl.<;urviving delllOt ra\.)' in I ,Itill I\ll1ni, ,1,1111.1<; 11lf' 1"111:' "I
lasting guerrilla movclllenl ill the enlin' "Ihl \\hlk 11 h,\" 1",1)'. I, ,'II
ncglecled hy world power<;, the United ( /llomhl,1 h.I" "lId.I,'nh
rbenlo Ihc forefronl of the 1I11cr Alllerk,l1l agclld,1
FROM COLONY TO NAT10NHOOD
As ill Ihe uI"e ol"the \.enlral/\IHlc.lll n,lti'IIl", gC(lgl,II'h)' 11.1" 1,l,I}c,I,1 Ill,I!"1 ",I.' III
shapillg Colomhian dev<'1tlp1l1t'llt, '1 he ('tlll.ll(11" l n'"..c( the "lllll!Jnll 1',11 I ,01 lilt
Ct1tllllfy, As e1scwhere in Ihe Irtll',\.$, telllpel;llllrl,... \'.11)' \\'1111 .lltitudc .wd .IIt
rcl .... tivcly constant; rainfall i" ahllnd:lnl. The I\nctc" III ( ol"l1lhi,1 101111 If HI .1
single mountain range. in Peru, hilt Ihrec "ep.lIate Im""',./(/, th.11 hl.1I1t 11 .. 11
from each olher jusI norlh of Ihe horder with Fnlador :lud rUIl mOH' "' Ie",
parallel in a norlh-northea... lerly direclion. This rllggetl terr.lin h"" m,lIle 1.1ll.1
especially {Iifllclllt. From coloniallime<; to Ihe I're<;clll. 1111" 1"1'"
graphy ha... dividcd the cotllllry into Ihrec major regi\lll": Ihc La<;l. the \\'\,,,1. ,lll.l
the C,rihbean coa... 1. Under rule Ihe Ea<;t IlCl .... me Ihc !'cal of 1'0lllil.11
power, with tllc capilal of the ViccTOyally of Ncw Cranatla localed in lilt', 11y 01
Sanl"rc de Bogola (nnw known more commonly Hogo!.i). <;Illd 1'lillillj: 1'/
1
'
viciNI economic power 10 Ihe \>\Ie<;t and spllrred the growlh 01 <;1Kh Illlllli, '1',111111'"
as POpa)'an in Ihccclllral villleyand Medellin in thc prnvirllC' lit /\1l1io(llli,1 ..\1""1'.
lhe Carihhean co.... Sl Ihe dl1lllin:llll dly \\':1<; (:;11'1:1):(,0.1, wl1ilh h(', ;llllC lilt' huh .,t
I') 1
1'.\1(1 1\\11 \ \','''''1(,1111'''' \ II\Ntol U\11t 11r.11
,,:llruni<.:all)' ,II wOIr with .llIuthl'r. I-artill'r to '>Uuth,
highlanJ Wt'I'C mustl)' dudl.... Ih\:y duminatiull oy
outsiders, howl'vcr, including ;.lgCllb 01 Ihc IIleul "'lllpll"l'. TIlt'
wcre controlled by thc comlllunly knuwlI ,I
tutal poplll;ltiull betwccn 80U,UOO alill 1.2 milliun, but without allY gl'l.':ll III ball
(l:nlers. Along with the Tairona, Ihl' tvluiscas had till' hil'rarchkally orga
nizt:d allli krritorially l'xtcmiw social SySIl;'IIlS hy till' I rille the' Spaniards arriwtl.
Thl.' Eurupe.lll (Ullquesl of COlulllhia alld lIlll'Vt:11. Thl'
clJ,.,lilIt'f(/ was contjul:rcd by Sp,llli,lnb who wert' 1lI.lking [hl'ir w,ly dvwlI
lrolll Ihe C.lribbe,1l1 vVl':.lem COIOlllbi.1 rdl tu 01111111I'/011011') who werl'
l"uming llorthward rrolll Peril and lrolll C:HI,lg..:na; panly
fur thb ftason. llIuch ol COllllllbi.l nevC"r Clllll' ullde'1" til,, l'IkcII\'I.' Jur
isdiction or colonial allihorille:. III d..: Bogol.l. Along thl' Ll'lIll"ll wnltllo'rll,
urfer!;"d ferol'ioll:' II.sbl.llIce lu would-h\'
Thl: 'I'airona around the C:ll'Ibb"'.1ll abo put up .\ light. III IIll'
lo\vland an'as,lIo\\'\:vl'r. th(: arriv,d 01 lhe Eurupl.'all'> .llId their parl .... u
larty l1l:lI.lria alld .... lIo\V ft'wr-led to dl'/lwgraphiL
As a 01 tl1(..sl.' geographic and historicd dHfl.... the lltll'l. leglllll",
lk'vdujJl'd dislitl(tiw r.tti.d and l.ultural prullk:., TIll' 1,lpid dl'Llim' uJ
pOPllJaliollS 011 IIH" C.lribhlall <.oa",1 alld ill gold rnining rt'giom til 11I1' led 10
tht'ir !'epl:K\'Illl'llt br .1 largdy AlriC;.l1l I.lllor for......,. In till.' e,I",[,,'rll highl.md:.,
'>lllvivnl in gn.:.l1t" ,II III 11-\\' AI,.iL.11I ",I,lvC".. Wl.'ll
illtroduLl'd. In Illl' E..... t. \\lrl.' h)nnah:.tic and hi,,rarthil';.ll; alung
Ihl' Carihbt.'an loa:.t and in p.lIb uf till' Wl':.t, th,,"r,, l'''I ... led lIlurt' ..... .lIld illlunllalil)'
hdWl'l'lI the d"IllIll.lnl alld a Atru-Colt)fllbiall 1,IhIJr l"'I'Lt:.
Ultimately...lluJ pt'rhaps illl'Vllahlr. tllr.: pupul.1I iOIl of <"':01(1111)1,1 hCI.,lllle pI'","
dominanlly 1\\ixL'd-raCI'-lIh'.!.t;ZlJ, lIlulatto, nr lOlllhlll,lti{111 tll1'rlOr.
"L'Lurding to a natiOllal uf OVl'l' l)lh.:-thil'l! 01 Ihl' l.ountry'",
inhabilallts (3/1.'1 pl.'reL'nt) wefl' dassilll'd ..... 10 pl'rct'lll W,,t'l' hlack, only
6.. pl'rll'llt w,,'re Indian, ,Illd 119.2 Pll"Cl'llI-tII,:;.lrl), II rw-h:-ll I 01 thl' lo[,d-wl.'rl
rr.:curdnl;.ls -nllxl.?d.- I krl' and 1IIlOUgilullt [.:!llll /\rlllrk.I,lllbu:gl'lhltioll [)b)'ed.,
u'nt!',,1 role in lilt' forlilation or :,o<.ll'ly.
N
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MdJ.' 7 Columbia
kg.1I uJlIl/lll'l u' \\ 1111 IhI' oul .. idl world ,1IId. llol slIrprbingly. 01 a thriving lunt r:1
h,IlIlIII,ldl'
Abtl III ... til Pl'ru, ClllollIIJi.l'l> wdigcnutls pOpUI.ltLOll did nut form ;1
.111...! lcnlr.lIly org,'tI''lcd cmpirl' in prcl'ulonial tillll.?S. Ihrl'l'
hllglll:'>lil pr....... lurninalnl-Ih\: Chibdl:l. Ihl;' Carib. and Ihl;' Ar:lwak,
Aruun"'! Ihl' ell ibhl'OlIl. Ihl: civilizalion was [hal uf Ihe: Chibcha
'>I'l.. killg 'I'aitllll.l, wh\. l:ngin.......riILg wllrks in including kIll
,,1...'''' :lnd irrig:'liun alld drain:tgl.' Aroulld tht:
).:llid hl,':11 iug rl'giolll)1 Alltimluia,.1 cuhurallll:ltrix l:mbri.lcc:d as many as I million
lllh,lhil,lllb divitk\! Lillo m,lIly trib;11 spt'aking diffl'n:llt llialt:cts,
Independence and Its Ahermalh
Nt'\\' Granada played a c.... nlral !'ole in thl' nll1tinl'nt.11 for lLbl.r,ltion frum
Spain. Local elitt's firmly rc:jec!l'd Napoleon\ assumption 01 po\wr III Ille wah 01
III:. IHOl:S invasion of Ilk' Iberian Although they initially
restoration or the Spanish monarchy. l'venllJ:llly (,Ilill.? vut ill favor of
ll:ltion::tl indcpr.:lh.knce. And as events unfolded, [h.... demands of a drawn-out
ll1ilitary campaign led thell1 to tIIubiliZl: popular ill SlJl'purt "II' Iheir
CaliSI..', By juining llil' indt'pcnJelH.:l: llluWml'llt, dis-
dained by rhe ("lill' as thl: pO/J1I/1lc!w-aJdnl a 10 tilt :lllti-
Spanish turbull'nce. Women ht:rc plaYl'd a ruk. During an uphe.lval
in in I!:S 10, itS th..: viceruy's wife W"IS bt.'ing led to lhe WOJllt'Il'S prison, an
194 I'ARrTWn .. C/\!)F!'ltJllIE!':CJIAN(.EOVERTlfl.11
noted th::lt Mthe vile rahhle of lined the route to the jnil. hroke
through the proleclive conJon. tore off the good lady's dnlhes, and showered her
with curses. "'The insolences that they were saying." said the slartled observer,
were enough to make one cover his cars." Fearing thaI they might lose control of
lhe m::lsses, local leaders soon attempled to restrain such popular excess.
While creole clites remained supreme, the W::us of Independence hrought
signilkant soci,,1 change to New Gr,madn. Militnry exploits fostered upwud sadrll
llHlhility, and mnny Afrn-Colombinn sl"ves oblrlined their freedom in compcns<1-
tioll for their ."ervice in the patriot colllse. The pop"laclln revenlcd itself::ls both ::l
politic::l1 ::lsset ::lnd a potenti::ll source of dnnger. Ever so slightly. women found
means of expression in the public ::lrena. The church ..ome or its power but
retained moral ::luthority.
In the political arena. Simon Bolivar's allempt 10 creale a composite of
"Gro1O Colombia- produced a constitutional ch::lrter in 1821 th::lt combined a
ccntrali<;1 form or governmcnt with progressive social measures. It prod::timed
:\1) end 10 the Inquisition. estahlished freedom of the press, ::lnd sought to incor-
porate bbcks nnd Indians:ls eventual citizens. A of free stipul::lted Ihat
children of slaves should be free. while another clause indiC::ltcd that Indi::lns
be called and have the right to hold puhlic office.
As recounted in Chapter 6, Gran Colombi::t was doomed from the Its
component p::lrts- Venezuela. Ecuador. Colomhi::l-each went their sep::trate
ways. As hi<;lorians fomnk Safford nnd Mnrco Palacios have noted. "Thc collapse
of gre::ltcr C(llol1lbia was Wh::lt would happell next?
CREATING POLITICAL PARTIES
During the 1830s, Colombia resumed its path::ls a sovereign liberal republic. Yet
another constitutional convention proclaimed the need for reconciliation and
inst:llied Frnllcisco Pau1<l de Santander ::ts president. In comparison with other
postillllepcndcnce governlTlents of Spanish America. Colombia enjoyed one dis-
tinct ;Hlvanlagc: the delllohilization flf the patriot army and the dep;uture of
VenC7ucJan forces meant that. as a corporate group. the rcm::tining mililary
would have less weight in Colombian politics th::tn would its counterparts in
Mexico. Peru. or Venez-ueln.
The aftermath of Boliv::lr's short-lived Gran Colombia produced :l truly
remarknble development: the emergence of the political parties, I.iberal and
Consclvative. th::ll would dominate the nation's political life from the 1830s to
the pre.<;ent. What determined the formalion of these parties?
At leasl in part, the parties emerged as a sequclto the conniel between P"o-
federalist Santanderislas and pro-centmlist Bolivarians. A connict known as
the "War of the Supremos" hardened lines of disagreement. Slrident opPosition
drove lTlany moderates into the arms of the Bolivarialls and lhe clergy, where. ::tS
so-(alled m;Il;Mer;ales, they hecame supporters of the admillislralion. In 184R,
... ('"t"luhl.l , ',","'\'.11111 \'".1"11,' 1"',
these pro f,0vernlllcllt (orl..t.<; ftlullc!ctl the ('flll"nV.ltl\, 1'.111,' 1'/" Inl, 1,,11'.1
relaineclthe 1a1}(,'1 of Liher:l\-..
The shClrpesl source of disagreemcnt hclwn'n 1.lhn.,I... ,Illll (.'11"'('1,.111\1"'"
focused on the church. thought the church W.I" I"n "'1""1ll: .111.1 Ih,ll II<.
innuellce lelltled to !'c:-tr"in economic prodll<.livit)1 ,llltl pllhlll 1..llllghlcllltU'nL
Conserv"lives. in contrast. Ihe chttnh <1" all illdi ... pl'lI .... lhlc Inl1lld.llt"tl oj
sod:ll (lrc!cr :l!lel cohesion and cOlltr;lslc<! thdr l'Ollllllillllcnl to nli):l!ltl. 11.11 Illnn,.
and morality with what ther r('gaftlcd .IS Ih(' irrcligipII<, .11I,11,111"'111 .. I Lldl. l1
Liher::ll ... A second issue lOIll.lrn('d Ihe rd,llioll:-hil' J>dwl'('1I Ihe, clIt\.d '.1.11,' .111,1
pl'ovindal autllOritic.... hilt h('r(' Ih(' t1iVI<;illll<; Ito...... ,1e.11 f\1.1... 1 11111'1.110..
espoused feder::llislll. hilt StlIIHIc.IICti a w(...lkt.nlllg 01 l('IIII.11 '0111101 Alld 11111'.1
Con<;erv:lti\,es supported (,elltr:thslll. hut <;nllll' (('''pc, i.111}' III /\nll'''p,i.l) l'rlllk.1
:ts a refuge frnIH liher:tl excc:-".
I'artisan connict tlHIS dcfined the sh::lpc tIl (:'lhtlllhl,III 11'llilll .... )','1 II \'.1"
neither peaceful nor preclict::thlc. The slrtlgglc het wCC:lI I IlIel.ll ...1Ild ( """1'1 \,'11\....
led to fretjtlent oulhursls nfviolc'lLc. til pCl'lndi, Li\'i1 \\'.11" . 11101 In 1he (nIh ""II I. III I
el('vation of military orti",('rs 10 the prcMclclitiallJrti(c. II led 1/1 ,I I'COdllll11l1 Irk('
alternation of Lib('r;lls or (:on"('rvalivcs ill power. 1'.,1111"1' lli,lll 1" 1I1Iii .. / '"
coalitillllS. And il led to chwnic inst:thilit)' paltl)' .1<; .1 11 ... ,11 ,II 11,,"'11, ....111,1
conlradktions within th(' two p::lrtics :llld parllr :1'_.1, n"...'1"('II' (' .,1 rh,' 1"11,100111 \'
fOl individuals 10 switdl "ide".
The ",iI,istcrirlirs held pnwcr through nUl'" .11 'he I XII"'. tlu'n 111., I ,I "'1.11 ..
came 10 power with the (')ection nfCenel.d Ililafln Inpf'./Itl IHIX t'l \\'1111 Ilu
urging I.iheral ... the 1..,pC? ao!lIlilll .. tralinn ,Ih"II.. I",cl .. 1.1\"n..- ,,'IIIIJ:hl.
expelle<lthe Jesnit order (perceived .IS the v,lllgll.lr\! nf,lll' Illn"l ,.):grc.... I\T' 11111. II
position). and dccI::lred:1I1 endtn (IINIl (\\,h .. h a.... .. I>'1
priests in rather th::l11 civilllltlrl!'o).
After Ihe election of Josi' Maria Ohando ill I Liber.'" III {'lIngl c.... .1.1, 'I'!r" I
a highly secularized new ifln thaI l..;dlcd lor sCI':lr,ll ion "I chit Ii ,11101 ..1.11\".
of civil Ill:lrriage ;lIld divorcc. aholilion of tllf' de.1l11 pell.dr\,. dr.I"II'
reduction in the st::lIldinJ,: :Il'llly, :llld dil'nt elel tion of prnvlII\.I,1l wn CIIl. II" 1.ltlll'l
than their appointmellt hy the Oh.llldo <lcplllrcd Ihc.. c ,kvdnl'"lCIII ..
without presidenti:ll cont rol of the chllr<.h ::lml of provim I,tl g' ,\'('1 Ilf'r... Iw 1\c!II'\'C' I.
it would be to govern. In IR1l4 Oh::tndo thll" .1<.11"lc"l..ed 111 the "1','1
throw of his own goverllment. There ensll('d :lnnt her dnl w.lr. Ihi" tlllr 111.11 1,(',11 ,\
deep <lnt:lgonisms- hetween::ln elitist t n;llitioll (II {"III"CI'\',III\ c" .111,11 ,h('I,II..
on the Olle h'lIld and ::In alli::lllCe of Illililary soldiers ::llld POPII!.I!' l J.I ..... fIll 111,-
olher. In December 1854 the Conserv::ltive-l.ihcral ,dli.IIlU .Ilh,,'vnl " ,k.I"I\'
victory.
triumphed in the clcdillll 01 IX';(,. WII1111111: the
presidency (under Mariano nodriguez) :lnd 1l1.1jllritir.. in hOllh hOll<;C''' 01
Congress. Two basic policy initiatives of 'II{' Lihclal .. 11(l1l(lltd(' ...... lIn"l\nl ()Ilt'
was the continuous scaling IlowlI of the Il:ltional .Hlllr. The olher w.'" the 11',h"
tribution of power from Ihe cenlral to Ihe pronrh I,d J:t1\""IlIIl(,l1t .. : .1 Ill'\\"
I'hl 1'.\ltl 1\\"1" (',\'>1 ,'II,\N(;FUVEltTlf',ll'
.. \!ll:-.Iilulloll III IK5X W.. lar a:. I.) rlllallh.' the country Ihl'
(:IIJlI"ed"'1 iun."
i\f"kr :Illulltl'r dt'va,,>talillg dvil W;lr (IXSY-63), the Liberals assllllwd COlll-
1Il,llld III 1l,llillll:tI ptllilks during, Illl' Itl60::. Hlld IX70s. The most prominenl figure
ld l'I",' w.... Cipriallo dl." Muslluera-Ionncrly a cl'nlralist, now a
lnkrali:-.t, luro.:Vl."1" a Ilh:'rl"urial rlllhlt-ss opportunist. As vidor ill the civil
wal, [\\I/:-.qlH:r.l dl.lslil.:alJ)' attacked tile dlurdl-asserling civilian control, exp.... l.
Illig till' J":'>llil:-. (.Lg,dll), ;wl! dn.:larillg l.unlrol of unused church properties,
WlJill." lhl dislike of Chlln.:h support ror Ihl:'
(:Oll'iLrVdliv.. ]/ar!y, mall)' bdit'vl:'d hl' wellt too far.
Fe.lllul 01 lite Liberals adol>!L'd a cunstitution in
tXed Illat lilililr.:d 10 ullly IWO years and prohibited ret'lectiol1.
TII"'II illklll W.I::' tv dis,,::ullrag... dvil W'.II"::' by making the presidclK)' Icss of a prize.
Bul L'\lllstitulion ..d::.u Iliade th.... national government 100 10 provide
d"fi..'lI ivr.: g'H'enl<l1lCr.: 01" 10 ,,'cunulllic policy. And while nalionwide wars
W,,'I'L' :lvuided, cOlll1kl--alld vioknL'l."-vfkn l'rupted al the stalt' kvd instead.
(:OllttIlIIHlrari..,:-. ofkll lh... re::.ult anarchy."
Rafael Nunez and the Politics of Regeneration
lllllliL,tlly. tIl ..' 1,lhL'rab' pre.... milll'llCe 1c:d to Ihdr downfall. During the e1I:.'C-
liun L,lIlll',lign, ItH.Hkrak l.ihnals gav.... thdr ::'l'llport to Ibfad Nlllll:'Z. all illlL'llec-
tual .111..1 diplolllat who 11.1(1 allr.I(Il'..! al1l'lltion by warning thai Culombia :-.Iuvd un
11.,' l.rillk 01 r..g.... nerOltion ur cala::'lrophe." Arkr a two-y.:ar term ill
[SHU X2 hI..' rl'lUfIlnlto lh"'l'rL'sidL'llq' ill liiS:I, this timl:.' with avid support fralll
lit .. illld Itt' would ill officI:.' until his death ill
II during Ihb dec.ld.... that Nlll1ez illlplr.:lllClllld his progrul1I for national
IL'gt'lIL'l,ltillll. \'Vh.1I Ih.... lOllntry lll' ...... lcd, in his view, WaS a p.... a..:e" (:1
1lt,II wOllld he ,'chOl.:d hy COllIl'llIpllraries ill Mexico ami e1sewhl:.'re).
hll' \ :llllllll!ll,l, lhi-. IIlt'allt a cl:'lltralbl constitution that wOlild enshrint'
(,,11111,1111:-'111 .1:-' a .. (II 1..' elt'llll'nt u( suda! cohL:-.iull. Nuilcz' b<lsic criticisms focused
"ll .1 [1C11il h:;lll'ultilfe dl,lra...:tI:'J"l1xd by illlulL'rancc and viol.:ncl::. Adupt ing prenlisc::.
IIIHII Ih..' pilil\I:>l..lphiLal pusitivism lhat p..... rvudnl much of Latin Ameri"::;l al Ihe
I1111C, Nlllkz L'on':!udl'd that popular religiosity could be all instrument of social
... Ill.' fOI.... rl'j,,'ctcd thl' anticiericalisill of earlier Liberalism.
TIll:> vi::.il.lll Inlt\) the adnpth.Hl of another constilution in llwl
would laSI until thl:' nallll:' of Gud, supreme source of all authority," the
.. 11.11'11.."1" ..... llpll ... ::.izl.'llthl' rok ofCatllolicism but ;]lso called for religiolls tokraliUlI.
It u'nlralizl'd puw"'r alld strl:.'nglhenl;.'d the prcsid.:ncy: terms were lengthened to six
(I.lllr to lour), and chief executives were endowed with a variety of
...... ial pU\wrs. K.... y 10 lhe ::'YSll'Hl was tht' alliance of church and state. formalized
ill a ...ullcurdat of 18H7 'llld an additional covenant in which granted the
..'lIlltru] lab IIsnl in publk schools. Elections during this era lacked
but nondhll .... ::.s lllarkt'd the rhythm of public life, ritualizing disputes
willdll Ihl." go"..'1 11llll'lIl p.ll ty.
7 g (:olumlJi-l: CivllLI)' ,Iml IlJ7
ily the cnd of the J 1390s, ColOllllJia was ill a clIJ1ll11r.:rdal dcp",s:-iioll .
Incre;lsillgly resenlful of thl' Conservative mOllopuly on Jlowl:'r. a gruup of
Liberals rebelled ill OClober The Cl'lllral government reaCll'd by gr;ll1tillg
dl:'partlll"'ntal govl;:rI1or:-. the aUlhority to dr.:crl'l' furced loalls alld ...
whidl wen: levied on artlul'llt Liberals and in ar..'as un.:upi,,d b), Iht:.'"
accomplices, supportl.'fs and s)'lllpalhizl'r::." orthe uprisillg. I(lluwn a::.llle \'\';11" of
thL' Thousand Days. the struggle laslcd Ihn-.. Ylars. l'velllllall)'
triumpll"'d, bUI .11 all a::.trol1ullIil:al
THE lOSS OF PANAMA
TIll:' \rVu of Ihe.: Thousand Days consumed tli .... (l1l:'rgit'::. and ur Ihl:'
Colombian government and paved thl' way fur ;1 pivolal alld IraUlllali..::
I he loss of Pall<\I11a.
Panama had belonged 10 Ihl' viccroy;l!lil;:s of Peril and Nl'\\' CLlllada evn SIIl":C
Ihe Spanish cOIlCllll'St and, aftL'r indCJwnde.:ncc, to Ihe Colomhian natiun. I.:kc<lu::.e
of its physicallocatioll-separated fronl the main body ullhe n'publil: by irllPCIII:-
trauk jllngl....s ::md :lcc(-ssibk only by sea-Panama alw:!ys had spni,ll :-italu">
within lhe federation of Cl)lollluia. (AI Olle point thl' Naliollal CUllgr...
d... darl.'ll Panama tu be a f..tIl'r:!1 stall'.") And u('caus.., ol"ils ptlkillialtu
link th..... Allanlic alltl Pacific o(cans, !Jallailla W:lS of gr..... al inll'I"..'::.t 10 lhL' wurld's
II{)w",'rful n.ltiOIIS,
A::. .1lI illcipiO:l1l wurld l'cunumic pow.... r, Ihl' Ullill"d Stall'S a::.:-.erkd its dalnl:>
wilh e\'l'r-illCreasing into:nsily. Ulldt:r 1111.." Treaty ul IIH6--IK,
thl:.' Ullill'"d Siaies pre-SUllIed to guaranII..'..... thl:.' nelllralil y oj lhe istl111111::' ,\Jld Irc..dulll
oltl";:Ubil across iL The CaJifofllia gold rush of hl'ighlennl U.S. inkrest alld
SOUIl t.:d 10 Ihl' CUllstru((ioll of a U.S. nnall(....d railw.lY. As Anll.:rK;1I1
rU:-ihed acro::.s the iSlhmus,:1 dbpUlL' wilh naliv.... Pallaillallians lnlln.1 rinl ;llld the
Jl:'ath vI' I1flct:1l U.S. dtizens ill IHS6. III r.... ::.pull::.e, Wa::.hinglull dL'lllalllll:'d all
indemltil)' of $400,000, thl' creatiun of ::.df-guverning al 1t.'flllillal
puints of the railway, a sovereign CI:.'Ssiolll.... n Illile::. widc 011 e,ldl slde 01 thL- railway,
and the lISI' of two islands by th... U.S. Navy.
Such .... xtravaganl provokl'tI sirong reactions frOlll Collunbialls.
called fur sllcL'umbl;:d 10 a ur hdplessnl;.s::"
Thl:' Liberals wen: perhaps the JIIost confused: Ihey had long regarded the.: Unill..'d
Stales as a political Illodel-antl now Ihe United Slall;:s was acting wilh imperial
haughtiness, issuing an unreasonable u1tirnalum. A Cunservativl' secretary or
foreign relations suggested that Colombia goad the y.,\I\kt ....s inlo sd:t.illg Panama
and then collect an indemnity from Washington. M<lriano Ospina, soon 10 be
president, briefly imagined that Gre::!t Brilain or [":rance mighl inlervene on
Colombia's behalf; when lhat hope vanished, he Ihought of annexing nut unly
Panama but all of New Granada to thl' Unitcd Slales.
The dispute was eventually seuled for a modest indemnity, but Cololllbi.. ns
would thereafter view Ihe United Stales wilh suspicioll. Ih.... Itl40s alld
191{ PAWl' TWO" CIlAN(;E OVER T1fo,'IE
noted. the Uniled l;'Iking l;'Inc! rrom Mexico "-Ilel lI1ihuslcring
ill Nic,lr:lgll:l, Expressing:l gcncrnlized sentiment. Jose MOlri:1 VOlrgns Viln would
wrile of unruly and hrulal north that despises us." And inlerestingl)' {'llough.
Ra(ael Nlllicz' regcllernlion wOllld inspire a cOllservative ll:ltionalist current with
:llllilihcrni ano anli-Y:lnkee tones. Following the papal ellcyclic:l1 Dc Uall",
Nol'tlrll1l1 (I R91). Colomhin's cOllservntive Iwl ionalism exuded :lll anticapitnlist
n.1\Ior <IS well.
In 1879 the Cololnhian governmcnl gr:lnled a contrncl lor O(;l
canal to Ferdin:lnd tic l.esslIps, Ol French engineer ;lnl! enlfepreneuf. already
(amoll" (or his cre;llion o( Ihe Suez C:lnal. I)e J.essups hegan construction in
IR82 but r;lll into numerous delays. i\ third extensioll of his contr;lLl Cilme ill
1900, just as the War o(the Tholl"and D;l)'S reached the iSlhmlls.
l\1canwhile the U.S. government. now under Teddy Roosevelt. decide(1 to
build the c.;nal. It acquired rights from the New French COlllP;lllY and signed ;'I
Ire,II)' \..ith Cnlomhi:l in 1903. The Colomhian Senate rejected the tre;'ll)' On the
grnlilld Ihat it viola led Il::tt ion:ll sovereignly. There (ollowed a cOllspiracy n( c1iven;c
th::tt ended with a tleclaration o( P;lll::tlll::tniall independence. under the
vigilanl pr(ltecLioll of the U.S, Navy. and recognition of Ihe new repuhlic hy the
Unilcd in Novelllher 1903. Al' Roosevelt reporledlr dednred with pride.
lonk
Negotiations thereafter focused On U.S. cnmpellSation 10 Colombia. A Ireat)'
ill 191'1 initially offered an indemnily 0($25 million. pay;\hlc in five inslallments,
logel her with :l st::tlemenl o("sincere regret" on the pari o( \"'::tsh inglon" Amel'ic;lll
politicians (Ienounced the pact as n ,I!ld the Senale wilhheld ratification.
Years laler.lIH' trealy wns rewrillell, the "regrets" were excised, :llld Ihe first of five
allllual pa)'mcnts o( $5 million was made in 1922,
OVERVIEW: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE
The Cnlnmhian ecollom)' W::tS conspicuously underdeveloped during most of Ihe
nineleenth centur),. Part o( the prohlem cnme (mill politic:l1 instnhilit)', which
hindered long-ternl planning and inveslments. Equall)' important was Ihe cnun
try's fonnidahle lerrain, which presented serious ohstacles to commerce among
the three major zones-Caribbean. Easl, and Wesl. Overland tr::tnsportatinn was
dangerous and prohihitively expelll'ive (:lround IR50 il cosl no more 10 move
frcighl (rom I.iverpool across the Atl... ntic and then up the M::tgd;'llen;l River by
steamboat to the interior port of Iiond... than for it to travel by mule down the
mountain from Bogota. less Ihnn 100 miles away). As :l result of the geogr::tphic
dispersion or the population. consumer markets were modest in size.
During and :lfter the c.oloni:ll period. the only substanti;'ll and reliable export
was gold, which rem:lined important into lhe carl)' lwentieth Cenhll)'. From Ihe
JR50s 10 the Colombia exported !'igniflcant amounts of tobacco nnd
C.hint..hona b;'lrk (the l'ource of quinine). Bananas also bccame important in the
S::tnla r-"Iart:t regioll of Ihe l... ribhe:ln COOlSt, where the US-h:l!'ed United Fruil
Company ntlt lU11)1 owned a I.lrge pl.llll,ltlllll 11IIt ,11"" \l,nlll,llni .. hll'plll): .tllli
export",
Hut the mosl dur.. hle tlevcllll'lllelll. lht, 011(' lh:ll bid Ihr n't'lll11alltlllnd,llu.n..
of l.nlombia's economic devdoplllcllI, \Va." the t1I1livalinn .I1Id e)(I'0l"l.llll1l1 .. I
co((ee_ Ily Ihe l::ttc cof(t'" heGllne Iht' Coulll"r'" Ie,uhllg Br 1')0(. II
flccoullted for more Ihan ;\7 pen,:enl of Ihe n:tlioll'" ('Xpori ('.\fllilll:". ,I IIgUl" 1b.11
dimhctlto 70 percent in Ihe 1920" and ,I" high;l" xo I'rlH'II1 ill Ihr 1
1
''",0" 1\".1
reslIl! of co(rce exports. Cololllhia 1X't.:lI11e filiI)' mtegl,llrd 1111" lh. wlIlld
There could he no douhl :lhnul II: cllfhx \,'a" kll1g
By the coffce ill loillmhi.l wa"l'lf')dllt ,dlll.lmiv h\' .. m.IU .11111111("01111111
sized cuilivator,," In olher ar("l" 1l11lahly nl,l/il, II .... ,Ih:lllol ..Illtl 1,II.l1cnl.II.I
co((ee nourished nil large "t:lle e"l.lle". (01\('11 Iht' 1t''!lIl1rlllCnl .. I.. t III It'll '"\ ,
manll::tl l:lbor in CIIII i":lting (l II Ic(' Irce". hll\'l.'C\'el. (1,1 Icc 1'1 "tim t 1"11 til' I 111 \ 11,1,1
"ignif'lcant economic!' o( st..:lle, $0 "m:llI ,,(,lie (,IIIll.'r, Inllid 11'1n,IIIl .ollll'!'IIII\'(
In C.olomhia, il would c\,cnlu::tll\, he ;'I<;"elI("d Ih.1I Ihl' <'111"\"1\.11 III ,I .... 10.. \.11111.11
'" ralUlll of small cnlfee ( ulIIV.llllI" WIIIIJII ht'II' 1'111\ "II' ,I Illullik \ 1.1 .... 1'.1,,1" I, 'I III\'
ltlll"nlidalioll or polil it. ,il 11('111(1\ I,ll \.
hcrlllore. CO(rcl' pI odll( 11011 "pUll ("d lilt" t11'\"c1nl'lllcnl 01 II,In"I"'1 l.1l11 'II
when it hec,lllle llC(e"",lly III "hll' Irclgllt 1IIlIll Ihe hlghl.llhl" 1\, 11\.'1"
(:lIUllhell 10 Ihe coa"t and ,Ihroad). Unhke (-.tT ( h.lp1t:1 'I), (,,!t'Ill"I.1
mn<lc little progress IHl rnilw.I)' (Ollsl, I1cI iOIl (hlrillg Ihl' /I11H'1en11 h \ ('Ulill \' t\ ..
co(rl.:e collival ion expanded. <,n (hd Ih(' ra IIw,I)' "yslt'lll, ,I" (II III \11, 11 .. \,,('\,1'1. Iht' h\ II
Inr!!eSl Lilies, Bogol:1 nntl Medellin, WCI(' 11\11 \,('1 IllIked Ililt'lll\' I" r,lil. l'Ill',.\ll'\,
Ihe govern men I hegan stn.'ssing lhe t..onS!1111 111011111 11Igllw,IV" In.. lt'.ltl III 1,111\\',1\'"
(During Ihe ::tnd I()lin". high\\'.I)''' :Jill! r,lilw,I)''' e,Hh l,lIl",d ,dU'IlI .111\' 11111.1
of all frcighl: hy the IlJ90s. thl' highw:lrs t flrned HO P('l"l t'1I1 .1I111111t' 1,111\\"1\,, lllllv \
percent.) III view o( Colomhia's (h:lII("Il).:in): Ifll'llgr,ll'hr, :111"\\'.1\"" ,d"o het.wl!' .1
c('nt rid p:l rl or Ihe na Iilln's 1 H"I ,lilt 11 I 11('1 W(II k \ \' II h 1111 IY""Illl' ex ,Ill' II \.
il h,ll' heen S:lid Ihat ColPlllhia leaped dirct II)' (rnlll the lilliit' In Iiii' .lil!'!.lI\!'
By f:lr Ihe dominanl o\'("r,,(':I<' m.lrkt'!. Iht' t Jnih't1 '-.1.11('" \\',1" t. fill "I II III ng 11I"lt'
Ih<11190 percenl O(C0101llhi,lIl cof(ee eXI'IIII .. illlhc 1
1
J2fl" ,lIltl I') Ill" I k"I'llt 1111"
n')llllectioll. Ellrnpc remain("d Ille n( '>1'11.11 ,11111 tlllllll,III'rr<,llp' I<1f III"
cowllry'S clites. Suspicion of Ihe (:010"511<, of Iht' North IlIlllilHll'd It I 1't'1\,ldt
Colomhian !'ocict)'.
!)uring Ihe the (I,f!t'e hOllall1,1 II' <:'1!l'111111,1 Irll tn 1:11'111 gl"wth .Irul
.111 expanding Ihal (:tlllC 10 hc kllowll ,1<' 'Ihe d.III' I' 01 II ...
millions." as Ncw York h,lllk"r.. nlfclCtI <'i;ahlc In,1I1"" Lh I", .. 10.
Ihis hull ish optimism :lntl it" fln.1I1lial hllhhlt' WCI(" <,It':ltli1r 1-'1"'11" ,.1
b:IIlOl11a<; aod petroleum, holh produced in (Inllllll.lled ("Ill I.W(''', ;lIUlll" "'1'1
of Ihe $25 million PnnamOl Indcmnil),. Much flf ('olnmhi,I'" hUIgcl1nlll): .kl'l
wns incurred nol hy !he ll;'llional J.,:tlvernlllcni hili hy 1ll1l11I(il',llilIC" ,111.1 I..,.d
government.\<.
Then Ihe Gre:tt Dq're"sillll "Iflltk 1'.\'(,1l <,n, !he <'lIt In('tIlIHIIllll .!Ild "011111 ,II
effecis of Ihe Deprc<;"ion wer(" le"" "('\'('1(' ill I '"Inllllll.l 111,111 111 111.111\' 11,,1
l',\lll l\\"." \.,\:-.1 \11)1'1/\ 111i\N(.I,OVIjtIIMI:
l'I'j', :"lIl1tl I'IW, 1')""
\"."
- -----------'''''
IVI'. 1'.',1)
'"
.'

..
,oj
'0 .w

It, ---------
u "" r,-." ,-,-, ,-,.,-,-.-,---,-.-" ,-,--, , , ,-, ,-,..,--,,-,, ,-r" 1 ,-, r,-, ......,
This dl.:vdUPIlll:llt hits had imp.lcts-oll LolulIlbl.lll sucit.:'I)'. it:-;
....t:llnOllly, ;:liltl rd.ltiumhip \Vnh thl' Ullilt'd $t.lll::'. t-\IIlUllg olht.:'r Ih,,-"
unn:gulat"'d mllu\\' 01 introdlll.t'd enOflllUU::. unlxrt,ILJlty IIIlu cconolllic
poliC)'ll1illUng, It helped su::.lain the value or tht.:' COIUlIIbi.1I1 IWSO (dUring thl.:'
early ... , dullar-pl.:so I.:'Xchangc r,lles on tit.... blalk m:ll-kct W,'II,C' uSll:llly luw"1"
tllan Ihe llflkial ratr.:s!). Till.: "'llrgl' \11' dull,ll":' l:llcuuragnl 11IIpOl b thai. ill turn,
thrl"llelll.:d dOllll.:SlIl induslry. TIIl'rt: is wdl, th.lt willdfalll..'.lI'll-
ings frulII pctruklllll ,lilt! drugs dbLollr.lgl:d active ill uthl.:r po!cntially
pruductive arl'as, a phr.:lltJllll:1101l knowll ilS "1)11I('h disl..':l::'l."
I\s Culombia's cconolllY undl,.l"\wnl c!Iange, ""'I did ib "'''-'lIdy. '1'111..' I'upllhltillil
expanded from JUSl 2 millioll ill IH50 10 4 milliun ill 1900 .11I.1 IlluIl' thim -12 11Iilhull
in 2000. Its lllobility and dispersion werc as important a... it::. ... i/l,.'. Thl: Columbian
population h:l:t neVl'r been ,,-uncl'ntr.llt:'d around :t ::.inglt:: ItX,l1ioll. Around tht" mid-
nineteenth ccntllr)'. lIlo:.t peoplc Iiv....d in Iht' highJands-llut ill 1.lrg.... cities. but
in a cong.... ries of middle-or small-sizl,. tUWII .... Thcn b"g:m a ::.It:'ady IIIUVC'llIcnt of
pc::ople from thc cool highlands to tlit:' warlllt.:'r ZQll"-'S ul th.... IIIUUllt.lill and
valkys allli to the Caribbean lowbnds. a tre:'nd that SOUle rq;anl the:
mo::.t illlpurtanl social pht:nomcnon uf the hundred-Yl"ar pe:riod from 1850 tu 195U.
Urbanizalion followcd, but Ialer than in Argt:lItina or Chile. Hy the lall:' 1930::.,
less than 30 percent of the Colombian population residl,.'d in citil:s; b)'lhe end 01 the
cl.:nlury, around 70 percent did. Thl.: pruccss of urbanizatioll rl.:adled its ma,Xillllllll
velocily ill Ih.... it W;)S and divergl"nl, JlotWl\Cclltr,JteJ ur
centralized. In sharp contrast to Argelltina and Cllik., dUlllill:lll'l1 n:spectivd}' by
Figure 7.1 CoHee as a Percentage of Colombian Exports, 1945-2000
.,. "" I' t.Jt'Il,Jrl.JIIM:'lIhJ Ndl.Il.It ...1lito PI,JIlt;.J< tutl dlod Ildl" U <-<:'1111,,1 fk"uIA.... ,I, I "I.xlIl",)
l..\'UlItll'') 01 1.11111 '\lll,,III...1. Th,,' nxovcf)' W.IS grcatly by tht:
HI.IIlII.IIl pllli" )' 01 (:.Cl, Chapler II) which r.... duc....d the- world's coffe....
"ul'ply tllwugh tli,: "k:.trudioll of7H milliun su(-ks ofcoff,,'1o: b.... tw........ n 1931 and
1').IlJ {llll' "',!UIV,lkllt lit th'lI full yc.lr:. uf wurld production!). Also helpful to
rnuvC:f)' Wl'r,' lilt: inh:rn.lliun.ll d.... lllillll,llor gold, the adoption of .... xchang....
Ullllrub, .llId thl' Jl.:valu.llioll uf thl' Columbi,lll p.... So. B....sides, expOriS accounted
lur tli.1lI Olll' llll.lfkr IIf Columbiil's natiollal prodlll'l. so the impact of
,kdilllnl{l'xporl luke:. rdatiwl)' limitcd.
IJuduaIHJll::' III illll'm,Jtional coffl'''-' pricl's tendcli to r....::.pund tu variations in
Ill, w\,rld\ :'>ul'ply, rather 111.111 Iu COIl:>lllll,,-'r prdl'l'CllCCS, (Clll1::.ulll.... rs cuuld b....
'\It11lll'd 011; by thc th'l:lltieth cl'lltury, ('ofkt: had become a basic product, Ilut a
luxury, Ihal Vl:upk' jusl had to haw-evell if tlll'ir inCOllle::. dedined,)
Pl'filu.ll( bUI 1I11l'rl.:dklabk Ir,,-,,zl..'s in Brazil could bring sudden reductions
ill pnldlll..lillll, lausing prit't's 10 risr.:-stilllulatillg growers in Colombia and dsc-
\\'hnl,. III pl.lIll nlll,..... hu::.hl:'>. whidl would COIlle: to maturily in four or five years
,ltld ,hll::' ,,-n.ll,, .tll ("v,'Hlual uverproductiull Ihal would drive: price:'s duwll-
",.Ild .lg.llli. f\luf,,uvl.:r, Lufll:e could be:' nlilivaled nol only in L.llin America but
ill 111.111)' 1,.lIt .. III Ih,,' world, which illtroduce:'d thrl.:ats uf compdilion; in facl,
::.1i.lll" 01" wurld produdion lIc.'vcr <Iuite: re:adh::d 2U pcrlent. a situatiun
111.11 lll.hl,,-, It Vulll,,-'r.lbl.... tv I,.I .... vduplllcnts ill other coffee,pruducing arl'"as. Parlly ill
rOpOIl"" 10 1I111,.e:'rlailll )'. I..offcl'-cxpurting anJ -importing Lountrit's reached an
1IlI'lJJ.lthlll,d -.. '"lin' Agr"-l"llll.:lIt ill that was designcd to :.tabiliz....
,\It.-r ,I p,,-rlO.I uf rdatlve:' r"-tf.... nclllllent from the J9-10s 10 Ih,, mid-J970s,
t \lluIllbl,1lI ,olin' prolllh.:1101l rl,.g.lin,'d II::. expan:.ive:' mode lar-gt:r-scale produ-
"- ....::. JlI,llI,lg"'d to illCfI:,J::.e productivily and profit margins. Cancellation of the
11Ih'11l.ltlllll,d Colin' Agrc:clliellt in 1\)t)'J brought exposure to price
1l1ldu,llll)JI:', bUI n::.k ::'1,.'1,'1111..'1.1 for the cnsuing dt'cade-if not
Illln,,,'1 J'llllIllgh 111"-' I';)')U:., l"tk,,-' ,,-xpurl ... pi..:kcd up from utlit:'r part ... ur tht:'
d,vd\lllllil-: \\'1..111.1 indudillg ::>ulllhl'l"lI Al'l iL.1 ulld from .. h L1J1likdy
.I" \'Il'IJI.tlll, wltidl hlI,.'.IJIl,,- tIll..' wurld's :'>"-'culHl-largcst cuffer.; proJuc,,-'r in 2002.
A.. -..:"JIIIlIlud'::. l'CUIlI1J11Y divl..r::.itll.:d, Lulle:'t:'\ ill1purlilllCe As showli
ill hgUIl' 7.1, 1..01,,1..' drupped than 80 percenl of the lutal cxports in lhe:
I lu .II"IHInd 1U pe:rl'cnl fur Illo::.t ufthe I\)90s and tu less than 10 pcrce:nt by thl:
"/Ill III Ih,' dl'l.",k-, III IhI,." c,Jrly I950s, accuunted for mure than J0 percellt of
Illl "-lIllllllY'''' (;iJP; b)' tilt' 19I)U::., it dOWll to only 2 pcrcellt.
At ill p....t, th.... rclativlo: dc-cline ill culfc:c was compclls,H.... d b)' the growth
",I IIOIlll.lditiuII.11 I..'xpun::,-clli l1uh'I..'I"::'. (again). ::.hnc::., tobacco. and
"r""-"-..... nl 111I)d. A ... urg.... ill pctruJI,.ulll productiun in the mid1980s also contrib-
ul,,-'d II) cxpurt e.lflling::..
Bllt expon.t.:'wli bdort.:' the was illicit dntg..., especially cocaillt:.
t)nl' ,,'stilnatl- hold::. that drug t raflicking brought $36 billion into Colombia between
1
1
)80 :Iud 19')5. w"... I:quivalcnt to more than 5.3 percent of GOP, oVl..'rsha-
d\lwiug ltllllrihutiulI'" frulll buth l'olb: ('15 perccnt) and pl..'ll"OICUlll (1.9 pcrcent).
'I'll,, .dbOllll"-' voill/Ill,.' ,,(trafficking inll....asl,.'(l steadily frolllthl..' J98Us to Ihe 199Us,
202 I',\HT TWO" CM:;I S'I UIH!-.S; CHANe,!: nVFn TlMI
World Oilnk ;lnd Economic for I atm
L
AmC'ICil ,mel lhe C<lribbean.
__
'II
POLITICS AND POLICIES: PAnCRNS OF CHANC,I
The \oVar ollhe Thou"and Pa)'" and the (al.l<;tropllH II, .... 1,1 1'.11\,1111.1 11\,11 knl.l 111.11' 'I
llIrning poi"l in COIOlllhl"'" nalioll:Jllirr. I'or;\ lillie, al k,I<;,I.I'"hIH .11 thl(' .. Inkl.ll".1
through rituals or ccmvivc"cin, the gcnh:cl rule" nr P,lrl',IIJlCIIl.1I \ ,I,h,llt. ( 1\11 \'..1'
"';IS c1elegitimiz('d ... s a form or (Olllpelil kill. New plllllit.,11 ,Iltlll'" .1\'I'("lf,,,1 "II' I, ,1'.
lahor uninns-:Hlcl1Oocial and polilicnl right" \\,l"f(' hrn.lIlen('d. And 10 \ "It ...
exp<wts, Colomhia would allast fine! it.<> Ilk.he withlllllw world 111.11 kel
I:resh rrom Iheir lriumph ill the \0\' .. 1nlthe'l 1101l",1I1d I J,I\..... 1111" ( 111\"'1' '.111\' '.
r('tained control or the arl1l,", Ihe halll)1 \lox, .11111 IIlSllltlliflll.ll I'P\\'l'1 (."IHI.II
Haraclltcyc... hecame prc"idenllll )1)01 ;1I111 pn)(n'dcd Ii' willi .111 lI"Tl 1,.Ind
\Vhell Congress railed 10 conpcr.. lc, he lIi""olv('(\ II, I,ulnl ",,1\14' 1111'1111"'1, ..11101
exiled other". Re)'es d('t..\;Hed lll:lrli:-.llaw :1n(1 as... llnll'd Ii .. 1.I1I1II.d I'l'\\II". I \1'11 '.".
he managed In rcoq':,llli/(' Ihe 11:1lion' ... III1:lIhe.... !"I,,,tnIC l'olllll1hl,I'" \ 11.111111 \\l'II,1
market". :H:\..cleratC' the lllIl ... lrut..!lllll 01 ,.1Ih\',n" ,!lId Illgll\\o,n ....111d .. 11111111..1,
C(llree production. In slI<.11 wa)''', hi'" rule 1I':,\'lllblnlllPtllllh" lh,111,1 h'"I''' ,Il'\ ' ..... l"
J{;lfacl Nuflel., but ;llso Ih.\I III Porllrll' l)i:Ji'. III '1""1 "1'1'11... 111.111 <.mIlI.1
when Re)'es ath.'mptc(lto .. OI1 .. lllde a Ifl',lly IIIl,kl whi .. h 1111' \llIllell ... \.)I\ ... \\l",hl
pal' $2.5 million in rei tlrn ror ('nlnmhl,l' S IOIIlI,ll I t'I ,.1 111" IIIl (,1" ".Il n, I
or Pallnllla. This appeared In sel an unduly Ii 'w 1"1\ e I'll ( Ilh ,mlll.11I "",c"'I!'nl\!
(;onrrontcd hy populnr fllry, he resigned (1011101111(' In ll}[l"
Although Conc;efvalivcs cOlllillllCI!tl!('lr 'll11tllll (II 1'11\\("1. tl,e I"" 1.1""'1.11
( h,lllgC ",a" quickening. I.. ,I,,)r inn I('tl hi ;'I c1n .uk III I 'II Itllll'I\I""I. \\ 1110 h
peaked ill the late 1920s. Ten..ions call1(' to.) h(';1(11II Ihl.: lllwllllf ( 11'
when a Ulli(1ll gllided hy the Revolulion:lfy I',nl\ (,I 1'11'1111 ...111 .. I Ill'
Communisl P;lrly) clccl:ued a slrike and 2S,Ono \\'urker.. , p.IIIIUrl,lIly Ill"... ' .11 II",
U$.-(l\vned United Fruit pl:lIllalion.... , slopl'n! <.lIlting h,1I1,111,I .... Ilw t\nll'II' ,Ill
manager dispatched 3n IIrgcnt Illcss.lge Itl Ihe- ('llll,mhl.lll 1\11/:'11 1
Ahadia Mendez. "an eXlrcmely grave .lml d.Hll-:l'I"ll'" ",111,1111'11.
Mendez responded h)' d('plo)'ing .trlllY unil'" ill link. III 111,linl.,ill "ld!1
The ensuing confronlalion led to ",h... l has (om(' 10 he k11l1W11 .11; 1l1.1....... 11'1,1
the banana a cenlral evenl in Ihe (ol1('(IIVC memor)' 01 c
and recounted, alheil WitJl purposdul exaggeralion, hy C;:Jhnd (;,1111.1 1\1.11'1
1
11"/ III
OtiC IIwuJrr.d Year5 oj Solillulc. (The Ir;lgedy did lint, l\llW('\"I1. IUII\"il" (' 1
1
11l11.1
I:ruil to Icave Colomhia. That occurred only in the 1
1
)'11)..". ,1111'1 .111 1IIItlll",11 ,.1
sigatok... dis(',lse dcvaslatellthe hallan:l pl.ullalioll1O it dlllirolll,d)
Inequalily and pcwerly ha\'(' hcell pcrsislclll :lIld 1>III Ill!: th,' \'\ 11'.
and 1980s, Ihe incomes or !lead)' (ll) percell I of Ilw 1'(11),11,11 j, '11 ",II 1",!t lW ,ill' 1"'\"1"11 \
line: hy the 19YOs Ihe figure had dropped slightl)' III '-,r, pel,el1l, ,III hough 11lf' ,II ,1111.'
number or people living in poverl)' h:td i1U..re;J<;('tl. I\y IIll.' 1.11(' III-If"', ,I" wdl. It".... 111.111
I percelll or t he people were earning one Ilunl.l111 11.11 i"ll,lllih In I 1, 11111',,1.
;"IC; elsewhere, such patenl injustice m'lc!'>!'>.lnly "np,hlctl 1,,lllIt'" III 1,1111, .. I,ll
incqu;\lities orland di!'ilrihutil)1l \\'ould k.HI PC;1S,lIlt .. In 1.I"l' tillT' t,h 11"" 11\1 n' ... I\' '.
"
"
46.1
172.0
3250
46.8
73
Colombia: Vital Statistics, 2007
Population (millions)
GOP (current SU.5. billions)
C,NPlcilpfta (SUS)
Poverty rille (% in 2006)
life elCpeClancy (years)
Buenos Aires and Santiago, Colomhia hac; rour large regional Bogota,
Medellin, Cali, and Barranqltilla.
Like other countries or I.atin America, Colomhia developed a substantial
middle class-hilt nile Ihat is less distinctly urb;:1II than in the Southern Cone. As
shown h)' the history orcorree production, the middle class ill Colombia has a sii'.:lble
rural component. loreover, its urhan elements arc spread out among diverse
in dirrerent (ami ortel1 competitive) regions, so the)' are not especiall)' cohesive.
FU1111Cnl1nrC, economic change gave rise to a working c1a"c;. Initially, Ihe wllrk.ing
clas.; was Ctll1Celltrateti 110t so llluch in manuracturing as in roreign-dominated
('"daves, such :lS oil fields and hanana plantations. and in the transportation sector,
espcci,llJ)' r:lilw,l)'s and river navigation. Arter Ihe turn or Ihe century man)' workers in
these arc... " hccamc markedl), radical. nationalist :lnd anI i-imperialist in idcolog)',
sometimes with S0Ci... list over1ones or in"piration. In the cities, labor unioJ1!; were
created, controlled, or co-opl('<1 by one or three entities: political parlies (usually
I.iheral. sometimes CClIlsclvative), Ihe chmch, or the cOlllllllmist len. Indeed. Ihe
polilicallen (Liheral. Sllci:1lisl, or Communisl) came 10 dominatc <:In import<:ll11 seg-
mcnt or the 11Ilion movemenI the creation in thc late 1930s or the
<:llllfedl'r.lCibn de Trahajadorcs de Colombi<:l (ere). The process or unioniz.ltion
was llo11elhcle"s slow: oul or 4 million workers in the I940s, only 90,000 (2.25 percent)
werc unionized. By the Tlli<I-1960s, union l11emhership c1imhed to 700.000, approxi-
111alcly 1].4 perccnt of the Jahor rorce, Inll Ihis I1rol1ol1 ion has declined in rccent yenrs.
At prescnt. Ihe r... lc of union membership i." among Ihe lowesl in L..1tin Amcrica.
,"Vhcll all is said and dOlle. Colombia's rcliam'c on exporl promotion failed to
t.Te;lte :"I trill), prosperous society. To he sure, thc Colombian econom)' grew slightl)'
I:,ster Ih... n the average ror I..,lin America during the course or the Iwentieth
century. In the country's GDP per capita ranked tenth in l..,tin America,
and by it wns eighth. Rllt hy 2002 Colombia's pcr Capil<l income was
still rar helo\\' ctllllpar... hle levels in Argelltin... , Chile, or Mexico. According to
worldwide stalH.bnls, Colnmhia nnw r<llls in the income , ... Iegol"}'.
This \\',1" progress--hut on Ihe installment plan.
II
'1 11,' IrOlil 11:lWi III J').{U tlrtl'll 1.,11I..d 0111.: 01
1"'I',\'lIltl"}: bUI II W,I,> /l1'lfl" ltlnlpll'.,< 1II,Ill Ihal. Thl' Cathulic hit'i"an.:h)' ind"l'd
11,1,1 ,... 1,.,llli\..11 rOll' .LIlli W,13 ,.Jll31dlrld pari uf Ihl' gOVt:l"lllllt:1l1 undt'r Ihe
,1I11.. tllull"U 01 Il:\X6.3P...... l,dl)' \'Ilih Ille C01l3l'fValiv('3 in puwl'r. Yd Ihe church did
1It11 "1'"',ld II-. ,h.IIViti.'3 l'Vl'III}, .1\.1'0:>3 Ihl' lOlilltry. III t'thnic tt:rI1b, the churl'll
IlIllI .....d 1I1l'/l' llll 1II,;,fl.:u .111.1 k:>:> lll1 blal.k:) ,lIId lIlulath,)es. The I.:on-
"l'V.lll\'\" l'I"\llll' uf A/ltlulluiil 1..1..1 ,111"':>IIl"l.i.III)' dust.' connectiun tu thl' church.
"'",1.11, 1,.lllg' Illtll\llllk.... I'l':>nl.J Ihl",.iltu Il", ..lilioll.ln 1925 IhI;' reclurofa (hurch
ILIII ... Ill" ,1.,lk/nl .1 I.JIllelll ,lbOllt dill' youlh:> .Ind c1mngcalJiJity uf tlwir spirit,
II .. }'.Il1111lg lUI dl\'",r.:>IUIl:>, till.: hlllhty lall3nllJy the tinl"lIla ... Ih... rebdliuusne:>s
1h.1I "',1'1. IIIUI ..., in till: nl..:>:> ululidisdplinell:>ludelllS, Ihanks 10 lhe
... ".I"II} d.... IIUlII\.llfe::>.)... Sl:lul,lriZ,ltHIII \'1,1:> :>prr.:ading through :>Ocidy.
t.. .1lI'>l1 v.illve rule W,IS h'l:akl'llnl LJ}' the ufl:>d of Ihl' Gn:at Depn:ssion, and a
.. \\1111111 tl.e p,lrl}' Iliad..., il po::.sihll" fvr.1 nll.xJerdle Liberal, Enrique' OIaY.1
I kll\:I,I, III IIl.'lUlllt: pn:3idc'1l1. inaugur.ill"d it f1ht...... n-year pl'riod known as Ihe
rl'puhlk: Thi:> .:r,1 wuuld Willll':>:> considerable t:xpal1:>ion in the role and
... Ltlllllllhi,I':> 1I,llion,,1 gllVernnl...lIl. ()II a 1...':>$ posilive note, it would inereilsl'
Ih, pt>hll' 1/,111011 .)1 pulit..)'lIhlkillg pruc... ... and thus intensify parti::.an rivalrks.
l\lhhv,,) Ih...ugh hl,>I..-rIll, UI,I}',lllmllul.Itc:J'1 vI5ionary propusal fur agrarian
IdOl III .\ 1,1.. k lUlu' IIml.:" his .Iirl"ctlOn :>uggl'slcd a reform ba:>ed on principles of
""ll,lll .. 1 LII"1111'nl I rlII.11 1,Iw and un Ih... agrarian principles of the MexiGln
Ik\ldulh'll ,tIl.! III. :'lp,tJII:>11 I{l'"lhli.. Itl'slablb,lll'd a prl':>ulilplioll OWll+
,/ .. 1III' .. I - .Ill 1J1l.1l111\ ,lll.'d l,llld" alld.J luroll.Jr}' principle Ihal public l.111ds could
I,, .. hl,lIllnl lUtl}' hy wllo Wl'rl' working un Ihclll. The lInal stalull.'
,lj '1'1 U\ ...1 loy till' Iq.;bl.lt UI c.:: \\''-':> !lIU( II IIHJre lllllscrvative, how(;'vt:l", privileging th...
.....1111 II}' 1litll:' Ilv..r Ih... ,llJOI.:::illiul1 ollalld tu pl:"<.lSOlnb. In t?lrecl, tIle
,lg'dl i,llI l,tw 01 19J(, I h}' rndhuds ill III>I:' since the J
Illlllllgll Ilu' l"IV.11\.' or guverllillelll divbiull uf large that \'It'rt.' besieged by
IO/l/IW;, U)' IIIl' .ldjudil-alion 01 pllblk !;llhb Oil a cilse:-by-..-:asl-' basb. Vcry little.
II ,IllY, gll\Jd l.llld W,l" in f:KI. As a OVl'r Iandowllcrship
.Illtl "11l>lli:r,lliOll wuuld U)lItillllt' lor tlL.. Ill'XI halll:elltury.
:-'Ulll'l'dIJlg Ulay.L ill lilt' pn'3id"IlCY Ihe charislll.ttll: Allunsu Lope:z
l'UIlhLll'j", \\'Ilu plod,lilill'd Ihe illiti:ltiull l)1 a revo/llcioll ell f11lln/w Jurillg his
I') JX 1...'/111. A :>lrtHlg of UniUllil.atiull, h.... bec,lllle the supreme arbikr
,II wlllkn 11I,lllagl'llll'lll cOllnil:b. Dirlctly cOllfrollting tht' pakrnalisl cUlltrol of
Idh"r II II IIII I.:> hy illdll3trialbb ill l\ledellin and olher cities, h.... actively t:llcouragcd
.. h}' l.olll"lllar... ,llld thl'ir ljU...SI f.lr llllioniz,llioll. In 1936 Lopa alsu
I'Vll ..aw II,, eXIl'll3iuli uJlhl' vull.- Iv all,ldllit lilait's, a Sll"p th..lllllovcd Culombiu
dltWIl tIle rv,ld pulilks.
Ellll,lIdu S,llItll:> a sud.1I modt:ratc. tvuk :>trong stands on eeu-
Ill/lidl P\!Ilt..)'. To IHumute llldu:>tri,lI devdopmelll-spc(.-il'k.t1ly, illlport-subslitu
IlllII 11"ILI ..ln.t1I1,ltlllll (lSI), .1 relipe: f'lllm\'l'li l'bcwhert' ill L:Illll AlII",riG.l-he
l.Il.lll,... 1 Ih... Imtitutu dl' I:Ufllenlu Industri.d. Ilis thus bucked the
Ulll:>lllldltlli vf a ill f\'kJdlin (1\)-12) 1 rubber f.KlOf)' lIt:ar llogota
(19'12).:1 :>hipyard ill Barralll)lIilla (194.3), :Jlld a Sll'd plallt ill BoY,Il-,i.
prornotl'd low-cosl huusillg and thl' dl'vdupllll'llt uf illlra:>lrlicturl', including
,lquedllcb and st:wers. All such prugraliis tl". autllOril}' <.Illd
cxpandc:d the I"c:ach of IIll." national st.lle.
From thl' 1940s to the 1970s. Columbia ,lduplcd a pr.tglllatiL l'l.unullli ...
puhey thilt combinl'd demenb ofouth prulcctivni .. 111 ,llId Il ...,c Dvwlllul nl> in
tllc intenlational coffee lllarket accentuated support fur :>0111t: dl'gree oj lSI, e:Ve:ll
rdiance ull t'xporb stressl'd thl" 1I1,;'1."l1 101' (I ..... 11,ldl" ill (:n!tullbi.I':Jo
lll.ljor llIarkt.b!). Mt'anwhile. \'\'a:>hingltlll Columbl,l ,I:> a l.l\'urill' rl'cipklll
of ecollumh: a:>sistanee lIndt'f the Allialll.l' fur Prvgrl:>s. 1,llllh,hcJ ill 196 I. Initially
ht'r;dded of the Alliance. Coltlmbi.\ got oil' 10 ,I :>Iart, hUI Iltt.'
cull..lboralioll with the: United Statl's svon sour(d. Corruptiun,
and partisan polilics marrt:d Iht.' Colombi.tn ....rrOrl, while
preoccupation with other parts of till' wurld IMI'IKularly thl' W.tf III Vit:lll,llIl-
led to virtual uoandonment of tht.' Alli.IIlC...,. During Ih... I'JMOs till""" l'llIe:rgn! ill
ColumlJia <.I new comlliitment to the doglll..l:> 01 Irn' tr,lde, .ILl.urdlllg ll.1 111.1Il}'
a thm appeared to he hy Ih.... d... hl ultli.11 lI,I. the:
subst:llu""llt globalization of marhts, thl'l'xpt:llaliuns lrealnl by gruwing lIh.:UlIh:
from pl.'lrulc'ulIl expons, and the illlp:lci 01 drug Ir.tfficking.
Gaitan, Reaction, and La Vio/encio
I'olilil.:> wa" rdaliv...!y peacdul during thl." Ir.lllsitlUIl IrUIII COll:>..'fV.IIIVllwglllIl)lI)'
10 the Liber.1I repuhlic .lIId through Illlllh 01 Ihl' ,Llld 11Itll IIll' 1'.lHh.
Ek'ctiollS b""GIllle free and fair, ltller..lctcd wilh llI11tu,11 and Illlf...
evidence of I>odal progrt:ss. Thi:> tranlillil inlclludl' would Itot lur I.Ulg.
'rhe init iallhnlkllge Glllle (nJln within-in the pl.r:>Oll ul Jurgt: Elit-l.l"r (;.1 it,il I,
a lllaVl'rick Libcral who cultivatld a lollowillg .lIllOllg tl1l:"
:>l'cturs ufsucidy. Based l<.lrgcl), ill the (ilies, his nHlVl'llll'llllJore a It)
populist mU\'l.'lllenls ill Argentill;J, Brazil, Chik', <.Iml (JIIll'!" I.:UlJlllrils or Latin
Ailierica, although it !<.Irked sigl1illcallt suppurt frulil COlulllbial1 industrialists.
Ililllsclf all utll:>ider, Gait.ill allalk...d Ihe .l1ld
dlalllpiolll'li thl" empuwermellt oj vldlnary p"'lIpk. Cun:>lfu,llllg hb j)ubli....
image wilh cart', he provided frl'c leg.1I dcfl.'lll>"' 10 deSlilUII:' ddcndanb.
Cdling fur a (as had Raf,lel NIIIlt"Z ,I hall celliury bdure),
Gaitan spoh of the division uf Colombian soddy inlo pulitical and
"Ihe n3tional counlry." For Gait<:ln, Iht: Mn.ilional cuulltry" represt:lllcd all
who were excluded by Ihe uligarch}' trolll th.... lUlIntr(-llut unl),
working peopl\. but also industrialist:>, agrit.-ulturali3b, and of Ihe:
middlt: class.
Gaitan represenli:d a Ihreat-not onl}' 10 the whu held the
under Mariano Ospina Perl:z (1946-5U), bUI abu lu 1l:.ldel:> of Ilis own
Lib... ral Part),. G.lilan diJ not ('omt: frolll the elill'. 110: d""l\oullced thl' vligarcby's
dhos of civility as 3 charade fur the perpeluation 01 puweL 110: lllubilizl'..I th...
m.lsses. An elt:ctrifying speaker, he cuuld COllllll.IllJ l.'xtr,lOrdinary lo)'alty -to
206 I'AI{ I TWO CAq !'iTliDIFS CIIAN(;F OVER T1Mf
hom Herbert Braun, The AHoHmorion or Gaitan: Public life and Urban Violence in
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 19851. pp. 102-3.
III .
legacy-hy inciting pOlrti<;:lIlIl()<;tilitie". '1111<; \\'.l'_;1 p,llllllll.IIl.l .Il'llIlIll': 1l1ollll'llt III
Colomhian polilicallifc. The ass;lssin;ll illll (If <. ;,Iit,tn .. III<'CI I Ihe ,,",IV Ill' ellil I',t .In, I
reformist solutions for dcc:ldcs to (nme. (nlll'/l'nrtlfl \\',," gPllc
GOlit:ln's murder thlls led 10 " grisly ,lllc1f'r"lll1n in 1'1l1111l.11 \"Ill!. '" ,'..Ill
er<l known simply "s 1,(1 Vin/rlll i(/. 11 !'>lreldH'd Irnlll I') Ih II! 1'1(, l. wllh It ..
most c!cslruclivc period ill I'JIlR r;1. Unhdkv:Jhly, 11 Ic",tllc'd In .... 111.U1\ .1',
200,000 dealhs. lis flllHlamclllal \;1I1<;;e \\',1" virl1h:nl p.lIll".lll"lllp_ Illlcll"lIu,1
hy the (;ait:lll assa<;sination :Jill! hy ,h(' clho" "I the ( ..1,\ \\',11 III p.lll t1
emergell from long-st;Jnllinl: velldella<; helwcell 11\,,1 I l.11l" Ih,ll h.I.1
lillIe 10 do with ideology. And from Ihe mid 19r;n" In IIH' Inld I'U,I,., II I"..k
the form of vioknce. as lll:tr,lllclin).!. grolll'" "'''11,:111 CP1I1PIlIh ,:.lIn
instead of political power (hy o,frce \\lflrkt',.!'> ,tl 11;11 H"l Ilnlt. l!ln
could hring l:lndowncrs 10 their knccs). C:ollLenlr.llcd in "1'("( Ifll ,,,,:lon.....1
thp country. including the coffc(' helt". J tI V,fllr"ri,/ 11"11tlllt'II, .... inlll' 1t,1
trauma on the national society al large.
In protest :lgainst whatlhey regarded:ls the Cnnservnllv(' ,,1)11"(" lilt'
Liberals ahstained from the presiclcnlial C1f'(tillll of JI).1I}. Thi" g.IW l'rl' .. IIlt'TlI
Ospina an excuse to close Congress. pack Ihc lIllIl't" Willi pMI\' 1,,\.II1"h,
and declare a slate of siege. Aided hy the pnlkc. Cflll"l'!"\',lll\'I' 1111.1", ",III,\'(1 .Hld
burned the of Iwo of thc IIlIl.. t imporl.lI1l ,11I01 rt'''pl'' Itd Ilht'l.d
Angry crowds react violently to Gaitan's hy ,,"itrkinCI <;ymhnl .. flf
traditional authority in the bOgOt070.
Gaitan's slog.m 'n pueblo es sU{JCrior (I sus dirigentes' ('The pueblo is superior 10
its leaders') . W<l<; the most far-reaching of all his slogans, for it pointed to ,10
twprturning of Ihe HKlal order. Gailan Ihreatened the le<ldefs with Whill IhC'y
most feared. an ochlocracy [rule by the rabblel. and he offered his followers a
democracy
Yel another ma<;lerfully crafted slogan-'Yo no soy un homb,e, soy un pueblo'
(" ,1m nOI a man, I am a pueblo')-reunited the t\'YQ worlds that Gaitan had
separ'lIed and reversed. He represented a npw order with himself as head of thp
f1o(lollol. The <;Iogan contradicted the tradilional distinction between pI!
V,'II' and public life. G,'itan vias claiming to be an entirely public figllrp for
rp,l<;ons Ihat wele precisely Ihp opposite of those of the cOflvivialislm: they
separated Ihcmselve'i from Ihe pueblo; he was giving himself over 10 H. For
hi.. followers the slogan meant that their leader, a distinguished with tht>
chillacter to ch.,llenge the (onvivialislas, was retlllning to the puehln hom
whIch he had corne.
("><'Ilt.1n'<; other major slogan, 'Par /a 'estourac;on morol y democro"ro dE' hI
'<'lJlihfir(l' ("Tow;ud tht" and democralic restoration of Ihe nation"), suc
cll'lclly GlplUred the clusiv"" ielpal of a return 10 a social order Ihat thp ron",v'rJ
IiHIlS had betrayed." mllst have produced an intense feehng of racial isolalion 111
the white ehle, which saw allY restoration, .lny return to the past. thaI was not
led by them, as a return to the indigenous, pre Hispanic origins of Ihe nallon.
Even Gaitan's 'iimple call 10 a'ms-"A 10 CDrgo'-contained a meaning thaI is
not readily app;ucnI. The word cargo also signifies a physical burden, a heavy
welghl to be carried. Every time Gaitan c.. lled the pueblo to action at the end of
his m;lIions, he was eliciting images of the daily world of labor. Gilitan ended
1ll0'il of his speeches hy repeilling Ihese slogans. As Ihe crowds grew accus"
lomed to the rilll.. 1, he would c..11 out. 'Pueblo,' and the crowds responded: 'jA I"
rorqa!" 'iPueh!o," 'iPO' /0 rPlrourociOn moral y democrcitiCfl rie 10 republrco"
',Pueblo!' 'iA 10 vkroflo!' 'iPupblo!" 'j(onrra 10 oligorquia"
Mobilizing Masses, Empowering People
Rhetoric has always been an import.mt source of political power, especially in Latin
America. Artfully and thoughtfully, Jorge Eliecer GaHan appealed to his followers
with a series of carefully crafted slogans. As analyzed by historian Herbert Braun,
Gilit<ln's plllilses often held multiple meanings:
II
himself, nol to the syslelll or its leaders or even its institutions. To Colombia's
traditionalists, Gailan was an upstart-dangerous and unpredictable.
On April 9,1948. Gaitan was shot by;H1 unknown assailant in the center of
I\ogola. Ilis assassin:ltioll prompted massive riots lhroughollt the city, the 50-
called ImgOlflzo. At firsl lhc uprising horrified and unified the traditional politic:!1
clites. Once (;:lilan hecame a martyr, however, lhe e1iles oplcd 10 destroy his
1'/ 1'1,tII/'1l ,tud U 1::'/I,,t,ldor. Tllrowll UII Ih.... ..', 1111..' l.ibt'rals
11'1"111..,1 unil:.. Vit,ll.:ll(\:' and \'lltllltl'l'viok'IICC nlOlllll\11. Approximald)'
;,U,lJtlU I'\'opk \\'\'11' killnl ill IlJ'10 .duIIO:.
\Vill I l.ilwr,d.. ah:.tainiilg I rUlli tll\ dn t iun, Cullso:rv.ltiv.., c.lndid.lIe I..IUr('.II1V
('I'lI11'1 th.... III 1'150. 1\11 UpCll adrnirt.'r 01 POri ug;:1 I
,I lid h .111\ 0':' "ip.UII , (;,"III\:'Z tu (':.t.lhli ..h .111 uhr.l(OIl:>lrv.. ti".... order Oil
t. .. Ullllll1i.. lIldll .. tll,llizaliun umlt'l guid.IIILC, 1,:01111'01 (;:llld rl'llres:.iun) oflabor
Illllllll'>, ,Iud d,'dlll,ll d"lIlohihL.lliull.to \"llIdl l.ihcrals unwittingl}' t'ontributt'tl by
,111,>t,llllillP. tntJll d"Lliull'>, E;:lgcr 10 dt'vdopmt'nt, Gomez also promoted
Ilit.' ,.\ 1',111"11111 til lh, ulunl 1")'':, inlt .I'>tlllttun:-dctt rirk,llioll, tran:.portat ion, ;:I.lld
\ "11111111111\ ,Itlllll".
\ d t '"111.... 1 r,tli .dulIl oj lin' mllit.1I )'. \Vh.... n he '1lIl'lIlph,'lI tu relllUv\:, C"'Ilt'ral
t ,11,>1,1\ II 1'111111.1 ,I'> \OIlIIIJ.lIH.kr ul Illl' .Inned ill 1<)53, Roja:> re:>pondt't.!
wllh ,I "IHlp d'l'l.11. t )1I\'lll lir:.t .ll'l'> wa:> til offer ;:111 10 guerriJlas. l11u:>tly
I Ibt.I,d,>. Ihll'> brillging Ihe 111''>1 ph.l:.e ill III Viu/t!tlda to.1ll end (.IS W.b llIentione't.!
\',1111,,'1 ..1 :.\:,\olld ph.l:'l \\'ouhl :.lrdlh 10 1<)64). In:>pired by the t'X:llllplt:' of Juan
1',",," III ArglAlltina, Roja:> .ttklllpl,,d 10 furm his OWI1 political base', the
1\111\'11111\'1110 lk
A
i\u:ion Nadoll.Jl, ,lIld hi:. UWIl poliliL.ll pany. the Third Force-
\"llIdl hulll 111"'01' pal'lle':' jler.. d\ ...d .I:." Ihr,'.I1. I1kl' 1'('1'011, Ro)":. sought to
,ldv,lllll' 111\' of Wt II IlL'II , ill.. urporaling WOlllen into thc poli..:e furce.
,II'I'IJIlIIIllg Ih\' 1i1:.1 \\'Olll.lll guvt'rnol .lu\1 Iho: fil':>t W0I1);:111 ... ;Ibilld Illinbkr in
Iht' 111'>1tll) ul 1111.: (;(Jlllllry. ,I lid :.u!fr.lgl' .Illd lull pullllL.ll rights luI'
WIIIIII'Il III ).;'IIt. ..t1. MUI\:,UV..'f', Ill' alll'lllpkd 10 tUlTY :.uppurt alllung
WOl k'I".
A...111 ....... Ullulllh.: ubb gripped lh.... LIIUlltfY, Columbia':> traditional diks
lllllll"d ,lg,lin:-.t hill!. III 1\)5h a lI),ditiulI ul and .... rv;ltivl'S furmed all
,1111,111\.\' h. lIlI .. t H.up:. !lOIIl pll\\'l.'r. Still OpP\):.itIUll muunted fr0111 the dlllrch alld
IllIlll Illdu:.tl 1I1l."r... hallb, and banker:., whu 11l:1I1.lged 10 muunl a gt'ul."ral
'>llikl.. III l"11l:.11.111.:\1 1.... :.ignnllJ\lI11 uffkl' ill 1:/\'01' uf ,I 11Iililary jUllt.l
IIL,II ,,\\'1 .. .1\'" ,I p',lu-(ultr,llI:-.iti'llIlu.1 LOll:-.litutiull.d gUV"'rlII lll'llI.
Tltl'w dev\'I"jllll\'lIb Slrv..' ttl highliglll lwu dlstinctivl' ,:h.ll.. h.::kri:>lits or
... Ll,;'lIl11I')' l)olLtit":>. nlll' w.. IIIOtlc:-.1 eXpt'rkllLC' with military
Illt .... IV'llli,ll!. 'l'lll' Rojas Pi.lilla dh:lattll':.hip wa:> llllquC:.tiullably autllUritarian-
IHlt it W.I:-' rd.lIivdy Illild and I>rid, tilt/II.: populist thall cOllsC'r\,;Itive in ido:ological
Ilfi,,'llt.ltioll. Unlik, toulllrk:. oftl1l: Southel'll CUlle, Colnmbia nl'Vl'r had to endUft'
.1 MbUlc.luLr.lllC autlwritari,lll" fegillic ur .I :-.tatc-:>poll:.uret.! w"lr" againsl
:t1lq!,.... d :.uhv..... III sub:.equL'1l1 Ihe Colombian military would exat
iltllu\'IILl' 1)11 lhl' puliti..:al <llId .l ...llllire a cun:.iderahk degrcl:' of
alHuliomy, BUI il wuuld 1101 overthrow elected ci"ili;:lIl government:>.
SL'nJllJ, COIUllIbi,I':' tran:.iliun to electoral demucracy in Iht' late 195Us was
'::lln:-.pit..uoII:.ly IIlIl'''''lItllll. That' 11t1 wav.... of poliliGlI assassinations, no
hlul,d.. II\ll ill Ille :.Ired:-., 111I t'xlelll,ll W.II, l:.:,:,cIltially, tht' rt.'lurll to dcmocracy
fl':>u!lnl Ii'll/II all 'llllil'ablt.- b.lfg.lill .Jlliung Iradiliol1.ll dites, Tht' process w;:t:>
r.... lll.llk.t1lly :>1I11)oth. III rl.lnl:,pl'cl, il 111.1)' been tou :>llluOlh,
The National Front
Emcrgillg from the anti-Uojas coalition of 1956 57, the Natiunal FrOlit reslllkd
from .1 lormal pact between tht,;' majorities uf both lhe Libt:ral ;:Ind COllst.'rvativc
partie:>, Untkr the terms of the agr....clll\:'ut, the prl.:sidclicy would ,titanate bel wn:ll
Liberals and Conscrv;:I.tives, and all positions ill th.... br.ulchl's of gOVt'rIllllt'lIt,
Ihrollghoul Ihc (;ountry. wuuld be dislrilHlted evcnly bdwt'en Iill. two partks. In
eflcct il created all automatic mechalli:>lll that wuuld rL'movc lIltLertaillt)' frum
declOral politics. Endorsed b)' Ill'arly 95 p..'rcent of th.... participants in a natiullal
plebiscite in late 1957, the compact was scheduled to la:.t until IlJ74. III 1968 tht'
tWO parties re;lChet! a suppleml'nlary p:l(t cdit'd th... tll'.sm(}lIt\' (ur Mt.!islllanlllllg""
which confirmed an understanding th;:l.t there wuuld be ,Ill Mrl/uilable" reprt.':>ellt.l
lion of till' two partk:> in the nalional cabinet .Ifkr till' l'xpirallOtl of Iht' Front
III 1')7,1.
Tho: National Front had sewral gO.lls, ant' key purposc was 10 bring"l1 ... lId 10
tllc Vio/e"da by frl'l'zing thc of pu!itiGti
.I:>sl'ls, A second was to restore constitutional dt.'lllocrai..'y and tht' (,tho:. pf ovility
or COllvH'lmda. A third, of (O\lr:>t', was to ensure that politicians of hoth partit.-:.
would have access to pOWl.:(, As they learned during till' ROjas Pinilla di.::t;:l.torship,
all)' share of power would be much more plea:>ing thnn nOIlt.'.
Wilh access to office guaranteed, political <.'lllnpelilion during Ihe Nalional
FrunllOok pla..:e nOI:.u much bdwc... llthll)arti.... withillihe parties. This It'd tt)
the trivialization 01 politi.::al dbolssion anti a plt'thora uffa<.liunal infighting, And
by tlt'finition, thc FrUllt denied political l'l'prcsl'lltation to thu:>e who did 1I0t
:>upport the traditional parties. So it ended partisan fighting bdWI.'t'1l the Liber;:tls
alld th... COllservatiws; by excluding all others, howevCl', il pruvokt:d Ill"W of
violence,
Nul' did the Natiull;:l.! Front lead to a visiolwry slId.1I polk),. Onc uf thl;' 1Il0st
illlpUl'I<lnt bsues for Colombia W;:IS ;tgrariall rdunn. I..... gislatioll adupkd under the
Libl.:ral Albertu L1cras Canmrgu by Cull:..... rv:lliVt'
lluillt'l'l1lu Leon Vah:nda (1962-66). It \V.IS rl.::.lIsdlalt'U b)' .Illothl;l' Lil>t'ral.
CMlos I.h:ra:. Restrepu (1966-70), wlJol.:llcouragt::t1 peasant 111obiliz:tliuIlS. Later,
undt'r another Conservative, the governlllt'llt su:.pended land distribulion in 1972,
and the leaders ofooth parties agrecd to abandon the clltire p!'Ojl'Ct. In its place. the
Liherals proposed an income tax onl;:llId-which would presumably encourage the
salt oflands-butthat proposal WaS blockcd by tht' COll:>l'rvativl's in the lalt' 1970s,
Such a prolonged partisan stalemate provukcd discuntent throughuut the

As might havt.' bt'en I.:xpected, Ihis silU;:llion g;:tvt.' ri:.e 10 arllled revolutionary
movements representing politic;:ll elements th;:1t were \:'xcluded frulll thl.: National
Front. First to ;'lppear was the Ejercito dl' Libl'racion Nadonal (EI.N. or N;:ltional
Liberation Army). cre;:lted in 1962 by university stlldl'llb who dt'1l0UIKt'd
Mparliamenlary cretinism" of the Commullist P.JrI y and, by ex.lension, Iraditional
e1iles and the National Front as a whok.lnilially fucllsed on urban areas. the ELN
exlt'nJed its operations in the late 19605 to the countryside, where it mel with a
210 l'AltTTWO CAo.;FSTlJI)II"; 11
decisive military dele:Jt in 1973. ,\s distress mounled :JlllOllg r011l/1('.(;IIIIS. the EI.N
wOIlld 1:ller regroup, and b), Iht, 19ROs it beganlnullching s)'slelll<llic and repealed
:lItacks on oil pipelines oWlled by U.S. companies,
The Fuer7.as 1\ rlll:ldas Revnllll.."inllarias de Colomhia (f/\ RC, or Revolutionary
Armed Fnrces ofC..olomhia) elllergctl in 1966. The FARe had its roots in COlll-
munist led peasant agitation dilting ha("k tnthe 1920s, and. unlike the EI.N, it had a
hugelr agr;uian focus. From experience in Ihese struggles. the FARe's preeminent
le'lder. Manuel Marulanda. h;ll! ;lctlllired the nicknamc
III rcaclioll 10 all;'lcks frolll governmellt forcc:". the FARe: developed lll{lbile
gucrrill;l Hnits for offensive ::lCtinn. In Ihe 19XOs FARC.lradership hroke with Ihe
(:ol1ll1luni<;1 I'arl)' nlHI hecamc nn independenl revolutiollOlry orgOlniznt ion with ito;:
own mililnry and political doctrines. The FARe nlso formed t::lCtic;l1 nllinnces \.... ith
l1an."o-1 raffkkers. and hy Ihc 1990<; it was Ihe musl pt)\\'erful guerrilla movemen t in
Colomhia.
In the l1lenntimc, Cuslavo I{()jas I'inilla hnd returned tn the polilk:ll st:lgc in
the 19(,()s :lnd estnhlished nil Opposilion parI)'. I'H.:cillll Nacioll:ll Popular (or
I\NAPO). 0111 with less than 4 percent of till' Vole in 1962. I\NAJ'O
sonn hecame .1 potent dedoral forcc-Ihu<; Ihreatening the NOllionOlI Front.
whose hn<;ic premise was a I.ihernl-Con<;ervOltive tlunpoly 011 power. a
credo of MMlCialism on ChrisliOlIl hases in the Colomhian Rojas Pinill,l
directed his nppenl to Ihe coulllry's urban lll:lSseo;:. 1\ n:ltiollalisl. he sought 10
impose re.<;;lrictiolls nil foreign inveslment; a social cOllservntive. he endorsed <1 hnll
on hirlh ..:onlrol. In SOme wn)'s Rojas hore all un..:alln)' resemhlance 10 Jorge
(-;ait:tn. Whl.... had so effectively mohilized the working c1nss and urh;lll poor
dllring the 19'1Os.
Ao;: Ol resull of A I\P()'s rise,lhe National Front losl credihility in the eleclioll
of 1970. people thollght Rojns Pinilln wOl1the mosl vOles. On c1eclioll night
Ihe government cnncclled lhc trnnsmissioll ofresulls. however, nnd the nexl da), it
:l11nounced the victory of the offidnl cnndida Ie. Ihe C:onserval ive M isael Pnsl ra !la.
The orficial tally awarded ANAPO 35 percenl. o;:till a respeclnhle showing.
President Carlos I.leras Restrepo. an otherwise disl inguished statesman, conllrmed
this outcome and promplly imposed a curfew in the nation's major cities. Initially
hniled OlS a triumph for delllocrncy, the National Front came to an ignominious
end.
The disputed cleclioll of 1970 spawned yet another guerrilla movemelll, the
April 191h movcment (or M-19. named for the date of the eleclion). A radic'll
splinter group fmlll I\NAI'O, urbnn in origin and (ocus. 1\'1-19 was initiall)'
innuencetl hy the (temporar)') success of Monloneros in Argentinn and
Tupanlaros in Uruguay. II mounted some spectacularorerations. In a monulllen-
tally s)'mbolic allack, M-J9 chagrined the Colombian mililnry hy snatching the
sword of Simon noliv<lr. In 1980 ils adherents seized the embOlssy of the
I)olllinicnll H,epuhlic, holding diplolllOlts and others hoslage. And in November
1985. M J 9 guerrillas seized Ihe I'alace of lust icc. prompting Oln all-0I11 Olssaull hy
the milil:try; the resultanl pit<-hcd hattie led to the deaths of twelve justices of the
-II
Suprelllc Cnurl. all forl)'-one guerrillas mvn!v('IL :lnd 1lI,1Il) 1.1\\')'el ... ,md 11111"" III
cit i7ellS. (Over Ihe door of the I'al;ll C of lllst a e, thrOll}:h willi h .1 rmy '-Il1k.. I' ,11.001 I"
mOW down Ihe arc wrilten Ihl' wnnl" "Clllplllhi:ln.... Irlll'" h.I\( j:I\TIl }tHI
independence. 1... "I\\"s will give )'011 frecthHl1. - Thi .. Il,ft)' rhell till \V.l"" '\'el ,,1,.11 I. ,\\,', I
h)' h;lfsh re:llit),.) Thereaflt'r viewed;ll:l negati\"e I1ghl. 1\1 ,', 1'\'('lIll1.llIr' II....., I"
:lban<lon armed slruggle ill order to p;lllidl',lle in t i\lhan poltlll\
In the 197-1 election Ihe first wilhout Inl the 1\\"" parlie.. 1IIt'I 11'1'1.11.
(l\'crwhellllcd the Cnnscrvaliv('". 1\11;-'11"0 1."\'c/ i\ h( IIchcll (1 hl" ...nll 01 1\ If, 'II ..... I "1" '/
I'tllnarejfl) hccalllc prc<;idenl alle1" l()rgl11g .m .11l1,llhl Willi ,I 110111111111'" 11'-1,1111\"
polilician. lulio C:i'!'>ar Tmh,ly, a move Ih.l1 dl ... dlmlonc,1 IlJ,lI1\' t III/l'Il .... lilt' 111><"1,11...
dnllunaled hoth hOII<;"!' 01 In' a 1,1111' "I 1ll.llly}. I. \ In, 11\ It I.-d III ,I .. '
lillie 10 improve the policy prn<l'''''' howe\cl". .Illd I1l.1l1\" 11l7cn.. 1Wl .1I1lC" ,.h'I1.llt'd Ir, '111
nalion:11 politic.<;. Disillll<;ion spre-ad eV('1l lmllle!" .1', 1\1.....11'1 01 lilt' 111\1.1,11
mathine, won the parly\: nOlllill,lfln!l and bel,lIlll' plt... idclll III I"'X.
('olomh;a hil hy Ihe <!chi lri .. i.... I,.nn): 111i' :.. IIllIIII.II.lllllll "I Ikl1'.. III"
IklallClIr. a {:ollscrv.llive (1')X2 X(,). In lOIlII.I ... 1 10 /\lgl'1I1111.1 ,Iud t ... III' 1.111\
r-,1cX;t o. Cn!(Jll1hia h,ltl ki'pt plIhlt\ hOI 1 t.. Illlldt... 1 lnd.... hilI pi 1\ .11,' tld'l'
illl"urrcd hy cnt('rpn"c<; \,.1 ('.lled .In all,le 111111 1... 111.11 t I,"I .... 1" .1"'1... 1
wilh tleht s<.heduling.the Inlerll:lllflll.ll 1\111111'1.11"\' 1-I1IId 1..11"\\'1'01 II .. " ... n,d ""IH \ ..1
ecolltllllic nrlhndox)' h}' del1l:1ndllll!, ,1 tlr,I"" 1"1'(llhll"ll III 1'111>11' ""1''111111111"'.
which re(luired a (re('/e on pllbli( .. ('(.101" \\',1$:('" .llltl \ nl .. III (,111\ ,.111>11 .1Ilt!
(tH' lhe poor. a11<1 t1l'v;duatinn !II lilt' wl11< h 11,1.1 Ihr ,tk, I "I l'lnlet Inll:
domeslit" manu(aclllri'r.. fftllll f'Jldgn \('Inpt'tllll'li
The presidential hntollthcn p,IS"t'tltll VllgllI" H,lI(.l (t'IX(, ')(1) .1' .hcI.d 11 ..
hrought I he t/csmnll/r In a llll"e h)' ahalHlt lnlng Ihe. PIH epl III .1 hll',lll 1'.111 ,.II'lnt'! .
Barco hegan to <lisJl\:1lllle Ihe l:ldlf prnlC\ IUlll 01 ,Il,me'" It III. hl'.11 \", .1 prl" ,...... 111.11
would hc completed ill the early 1<)')0.... r"t'l1 "". gll\'l nl1.1 gil '"I" an, 1\1. 1lj:,.11 11+.
wcre gaini ng sl renglh, and I'"hll' al vinklll t' (1I11t i III let! III Ill' 'II Il I. 111 1\ I'IX".
Ihe assa.o;:sinalion of I iher;;!l prc"idl'lllial lanllid,lll' 1 Ill'" (,Jlll .... {;.ll.ill. "I,lcl."II,\
drug traffickers. senl shock w,nT<; Ihrolq::htllil (.olllllll>l.11l .... ,\wl)'. III .111 dt"ll I"
;lddress these challenges. Bnr(tl made hi... n1l1..1 "'Ignllll.lni tit'. ''''11111 III ",,1.1 .1
plehiscite Ihat would pn"e the \\'ny for.l Ul1l ... tilllli
n
n.lll
Cl
ll\,\1I1I
n
n
THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE 11990-PRESENTj
III respol1se to popular d(,lll:lncl. I.ihcral l'arlv P1"(''''11 1<'11 I Ct.... ll (,,1\'11 I,' (1')'111 '111
over!':lwlhe clectinll of:1 cnnO;:litulional.ls<;elllhl}, III 1)f'lC"lnhcl 1'1
1
10. ,\ "'1'1. 11
feature of this pnlc('s" wa:- an ofleI" Ilf :1l1\lIe... ty 1'1 gIICIIIII,1 11 I' >\'.'I11CI1 I....111
invitation lhat was promptly accepled h)' Ihe r\'1-19 llU>\'l'nH'l1l. WillI h het .IIll" .1
signillcant force within fhc assC'mhly ilO;:clf. The held ...(' ..... "11<; nnlilnlitl
1991, al which time Ihey approved a new lharlel. 11 III <;tl('llgllll'1l kl'y
inst itulions, protect civil righls. open channel<; (Ill" (it i"ell 11.111 h ill,.t i, 'II ill 1'/11111< '"
nnd regulale the rcl:llionshil' helween Ilu' exclllli,,<, allll 1cgl ... 1.111\" hl.111l Ill ....
Iluleed. if \\Ia" hope<llhnllhe Ilew tOll"Iillllu'll w.,tll.1 \\,olk 11111.1t It-.... l... I.tl,II .. IIIllI:
2.12. 1'1'111 IWl). 11' ... I,"JUIIlI ... :('IIANt;rOVEI(TIf\IE
:!on.nUII
"',..
'IUO.lJtlt..l -- ---------
o 1k;!I'l.' J
t "IUl"I".,
U 1'1""
r,(,ltI.t)t.iU
l.utI.OUIJ ---
(princip.\lIy the Uuitt...d .tlld Europt.'), Ihc)' could al:llllil L' lIt.t.').. IVe.: 1>lUlib. OUl illg
the 1990::., hO\wver, produl:Iiull d\:'dine.:d ill Bulivi'l .lIld I'au lor a varid)' ul
iIl( Iud ing guv\:,rnlll\:,llt.tl repl - it Ild CUllllllhia II lIIlJll1t::';1I0.\ I,irkl.'d Ill'
til\:' slack. As is ['ew.lled ill FigurL' 7.2, Colombia btG\I\Il'th,, world's leading ur
coca Ic.:af by Ihc lllid-1990s alld would c:ollliJHI\:' its aSLclld.tlKY, plllducill!J, nearly
60U,OOU L'stilll:lled lllL'tric tum in 2000. l3y lOn."\, Colombia Ihoughl to produc:L'
oflhe cocaine l:OllMl1l1l.'d in the United Stal,':>'.
Drug cartels undermined Ihe authorilY of tht;." Culomblan guvL'fnmcnt In
s\:,vt;."ral Firsl, Ihey .... llIployed violl.'lIcC aud inlimid.lliull. uud"',,
Escobar, tilt: Medellin carld w.lged virtual \Val' Ihe gov"'nIlIlL'nl in Iii\:' bll'
191:50.') and l.'.ldy 1990s; in particular, Ihc}' WL'fL' f(';'lcling ag.llmt an ul/kial
10 extradite drug tr..lffickt'rs for trial inlhL' UnilN! $1"tL'.'). To Iheir point,
Ihey of pro.')ecutors, law cnfur""L'IlIL'nl "gents, and
politic"ll1gurt's. Mt'ddlin wcnt a.') to blow up all AV1;,IIlC:1 airliner
that was thought to be carrying police informants. Four oul of presidcnli,,1
candidales in the 1990 election process were shot to death, Secolld, llarco-tr:Jf(jckers
compromised government authorities through the extL"nsive and 1.'f1i.">("tive us\' of
briber)', Third, Ihey won public support by prl;'senling in Robin 1loud
soccer teams, building playgrounds. charitic!>, and
tht;." like. Fourth, the drug lords Jisplayed a bra:tell of ililpunit y. Th.: weakllc::..')
j
'S00.1I01l

Figure 7,2 Coca leaf Production: Colombia and Other Countries, 1990 2000
NOle: Estimate'!> of coca and yield figure'!> lor Colombia wcle revl'!>NI upward In t9'J9,
beglnlllng wIlh dala for 1995.
I U OfII(\.' ul N.II"It",1 [)IlJolJ ('M,lllo! ',11,,1, h ':dl,,,,,,,11 lIu<j ""111"'11,1' J> 1"' ... J'u",I, ... 1 It
V.I"II' Huu.c'. lIJUj) I ",I ... '>Uf'j ,1"111<.'111. T"l.!t 4"
p,,',au' ,I lid 11.111011.11 r,,'(olll:ili.llioli. Offering;,t judgment,
politi, ,iI ","I,,'ull .. 1 Cl'I'C:.I.1 Ulloa de.:c1ared: "It wOlild 1I0t be an eX.Iggcr;l.
tiun III 111,11 Ilw lIew I<)<)J Colombiil wdl t"ndowl;'d as f.lr as
II ..: !'lOklltl.11 lur d"lIluI..I ,llIl.. concerncJ. '"
I k"pllc.: it.. Ille.: !leW I..OlhtilUll011 creakd its share ul probll;'llls. By l;'st.lb.
li ..1111l1; III \IIIAXc.:Llltiw .llld kgblatiwappoinllllc'nts lor thl;' IltajUrity of
llll Ih,,' Illp ,ldlllilll:>.lr<ilive.: \.:0111'1, il h:IllIL'd tu politicize the already lottering
jlllli,i'li 111'.111\ 11 H)' 11l.lIHl.ltillg lilc Irallskr 01 lle"r1}' one-half of lla.tiollal rt'Vl'lllICS to
Illllnl, ip,tllll",,, ,lIId III lIvinl.i,t1 dq).lrllllenb, il brought aboul a Iheal crisis for the central
.. 1,IIl', B) Ill.: Inllll.ll ion or IIlUlllPIc.: p.lrties, il \.:onlribuled to Ihe fragmen-
I,ll il III 'It Pi Ilill' ,II !I)r(l.'). Alltl hy l.'.')I.II)lislll1lg a vile prt'sid\:'llCY and runoff elections for
IJI'" )'. it 11<)1 IIIlJy lllllh:J'lllill\:'d Iht.' dOlllinanc:c of Ihe Ub.:ral Pany-bul also
\W:d'L'IIL'" Ihv 1l,IIIOll'S IUllg standing pany systeill.
(Jill' \It)'>llivl' Irl.'lld was increasl'd ellfranchiscmL'nt for WOllll.'ll. Uy 2002,
Wlllllt'll Ildd 12 11n'''\:'111 III IbL' SL'at:. ill lh\:' lower HUllS\:' and 13 percenl in tht'
.... ,11.11,, JU:'>I .1I)tllIl Ill,,' .'),III1L pmporliolls those in Ihe Ullil('d Equally
.. iguilil,II11, WtllIlt'!1 hdd l1\:'.trly une-liflh of the.: ..::abind positions. (Indeed, a
\\'11111.111 \\IHtld WI \1,.' .1" til dl'l"'I1:''''.) UlllikL" soml' oth..:r L.llin AIllt'fk"an
l.lillllllll"'l, t "JltHIIIII,1 did Ilul L:.I.lbli:.II.\ law'" for fL'lllillc r\'prl.'sentaliun in
p.llll.... l'kdl)J,11 I.HII il c"'elllu:1Jly louk the unusual Skp of rl'''-!uirillg thai
W"III,,'1I 1I1,lh' tip III p..'rl.l'1I1 01 d\:'dsioll lIlakl.'rs in Ihc public sector.
I ).... pll,, lilt: II"'W l.\)11.:-.tilutlt1l1, Culumbl-I wuuld fil(l.' th.. pro::.pcLt of dbinlc
gr.ltltlll 1I1IIHlglltl1l1 Ii II' I'NU:.. (Jutl.lw oigalllz;:llions posed St'riou:>. :llld mounting
hi .,I,IIL' .llIlhunl )'. OnL' .')Ullrc\:, ofd.lllga Glillc from n.lfeo-trafficking
11t.11 1II,Idl' ClhJfllIUU.') plullts lrolll Iht' \:'xport of cocaine, principally 10 the Uniled
"'1,llt':>'. bllnl.dly prulle tu viul\:'IILC \\'.IS th,,' Medellin carld, ulld('r till,.'
1.-.11 I\:'I ",I 11 P III I',lhlu E:>Lub.lr, who lin.tlly 1lIl'1 his dl.'alh in a shoot-uut in IatC' 1993.
Th,' U.S. gtlVClllllll'lIt W:I", dl'cply involv"'d in Ihc hunt for Escobar, Jispatching
Inllllil,;d and a l1lilitary IL'.lIlI. And all Ihe while, Washingtun
ill::.bkd Ih.11 th.: L.IlI:>.e.: uf ilHLiI drug Irafl'icking came from production in Soulh
J\lIwriLa, I.IIIIL" th.tli consumptiun within the United Stales.
,\It"" F:'Ltlb.lr's d,,'mise, Cilrld from the city of Cali Ime to the fore,
vil/klll, IIIVIl.' :::.uhtl\:', ;alld murc 011 profits thail on thc elimination of
,Ill.'llli,... WIl"'1I Ihi::. glllujJ W.I:> dbb.lJldnl ;,lIld broken up a result of top-level
,1111'''''', drug Ir.tllh king t:ullliIllIL'd-nuw ill thl' hands of dozens of smaller c;.lrtels,
I",,,,.') ulIlr.II,II:d, vi:>ihl.." :tllllmurL' dill'icult 10 trace, Colombi.l Ihus confronted
,I "lIupIL' 1.111: .1:' IOllg .IS Ihl'rc.: W..IS strung demand for illicil drugs ill foreign
11l.Ifkd.'), npni,t1I}' Ihe Unilc.:J St:ltt'S, there would be supply.
;\.') drug L.trtds werc rbing and Colombia shifted its poSition in thc
I'r\,duLlioli 01 l..ot.:aint..'-lIlade frum coca Icavc..'S grown only in South Aml.'rica.
Tr:tllilillll,llIy, Columbian Irafllckl.:."rs rdied on Bolivia and Peru for their r.lW product,
pill dhl.,lllg lIl,,1 k.lVC's (til' l.ULil alld 1r,.IIlslorllling it illtu powdered cocainl' ill
d.ll1dL'.')II1'\' Iilhurallirks. In ..,frc\t, this gave Colombian traffickers a
Vit tll,t1I1H'llllplll)' Oil world cocaillc Shipping their goods to overseas markets
21'1 l'AWrTWO" LA:-.E:-'TUI>rI:S:CIlAN(;EOVEHTll\IF
"
7 .. (\,lfll11hia: ( Iv,III\" .1I1d \'",l"fl" 'I'
of tll(' judicial syslem and pnlke corruptinll heGlme especially conspicuollS. At one
point Pablo Escohar. for cxample. had suhlllilted to delentioll only ,lner lengthy
negotiations wilh ClutllOrilies; he then to conduct husiness in
a special :lnd luxurious prison ofllis own design. from whkh he lalcr walkecl away.
In its confrontations with drug traffickers, the government secmed powerless.
The seconcllhrc;lt Glme from guerrilla groups, which gained strength through
the 1980s ancl 1990s. The FARe acquired econ01llic leverage through its
wilh n;'l!'co-lr;lffickers, and it moved directly into the cultiv<ltion of coca, Illar-
iju<lll:'l, and opium poppies. According to official estimates. the I:ARC expande(l
from 3600 insurgents in 1 10 aboul 7000 ill 1995 and as many <lS \5,000 (or even
20,0(0) hy 2000. I)urillg.lhe same period, the ELN grew from only 800 insurgents
in the mid-l<JROs 10 5000 by 2000. In sharp contrast to other countries of Latill
America. where revolutionary movements had all but disappeared, Colombia
continued to face serious ch:lllenges frolll ;nllled insmgencies.
Relationships hetween drug cartels and guerrilla groups werc Illercurial <llH.l
changeahle. Alliances were tnctical. instrumental, ;lJld often eXlortionntc. In cxch:1llge
(or <l -tax 011 drug profits. for instance. gllerrill<l groups sometimes furnished milita,)'
prolection for traffickers and COGI-growing ((Il11peshlOs. By the laIc 1990s. 100. il
appeared thilt the FA RC was actively involved in the cultivation of (ocn le,l( To this
extent guerrilbs and trarrickcrs shared common interests. At the same time. conflict
<'Inc! lellsions persisted. M-19 anc! oLher guerrilla groups alteml,tcd h) extract rall.<;OIll
fmlll drtlg traffickers hy kidnapping relalives of c;lrtel memhers: in (urious response.
the cartels unleashed ;1 vicious c;llllpaign of -death to kidnappers' (mlU'rfc (l s(,C/fcslm-
dOles). On their part. nOllvenll riche drug traffickers sometimcs used their v;\sl profit.e;
to purchase rmal estatcs-thus joining the landed oligarchy against which agrarian
n..hels h:ld t:lken lip ;Inns in the first pl:lce. Guerrilla:" <Inc! ll'nffickers fought one ,mother
just :l:" often :lS they forged
Dircctly and indirectly. these developments led to the emergence of slill allolher
lhre:lt: :lnned units lh:lt presented themselves as groups. If
the government could llol prolecl its cilizens, according 10 maximum leader Carlos
Caslal-w, the people would h:lve to (end for themselves. In f;lctthe paramilitary groups
functioned <IS self-apPointed vigiklllte ullits th<lt unleashed violent <llt<lcks for a broa<1
variety of motives-economic. political. and personal. \-Yith a v;lgucly right-wing
idcology. paramilitary units lended to offer their selVices to prominent landlords.
\\'e<lllhy businessmen. and, at times, opportunistic drug trnrfickers. By 2000 they
were said to have 4500-5000 members. Evidence showed th<lt paramilital1' units had
close lies to the Colombian armed forces and lhat their ranks included soldiers.
policemen. and even ex-gucrrillas.
Triangular conflicts aillong drug cartels, guerrillas. and p<lramilitaries inDicted
frighlfullcvels of violence on Colombi<ln sociely. From lhe 1950s through the cnd of
the 19705. homicide rates in Colombia averaged around 30 per 100.000 citizens-the
highest in 1... "Itin America, but still within range of other violent countries (including
Brazil, Mexico, Nical":lgua. and Panama). Then levels in Colombia began to escalate:
hy 1990 Ihe rale h"d c1imhccllo 8(, per 100,000, ;lIld by 1995 il \Vas 95 pCI' 100.000.
Assaults, kidll:lppings. <lnd assas.e;il1atioIIS mClIJ.lted slc;hlilr tlln Illgll(llll Ilu'I,lll' I'}'In,..
Violence had returned to the bnd of /.0 \lillft'II';a. The trnflk in drug... \V.\\ (11"'11\".1
lllajor provocation <IS Medellin hecame the nntion's Illlmicr (:lpiLII.
Colombian governmcnls struggled In Illcel thest.' Illultipk hilI \\'1111
liltle visible Sllccess. Glinllllers nf hope Olppcarcc! under Ccs.lr (;aviri.l. ;1 l.ih'I.II. \\"111'
oversaw the conslitutional process nf 1991 ;lIld the (Iis;lflnillg ,,1' 1- (ll W;I', tn 1I1!>1111):.
though. tllat neither the FARC nor the ELN acceptcd llle' gf'\cnll1ll111 .... "fl"1 ..j
;:\lnnesty). An effective leader, (;nviria t1nderlt 10k wh;'ll he (.llIed ,I Cllllll'\"< ,I, III' '11.-
more popularly known in Colol11h;'1 as cI 1"/'1'010)1/ (liter.llly. Ill(' 11l11l1,k. "I
wrnover). In addition to promoting peace. he ao... elcraled the prnL<... III C,Oll"llllo
opening, creal ing a new minisll1' for (prcigll Iraclc. r('dlKing ,111(1 11111.11:111):
foreign invcstment. At the end of his terlll, he elected e;l'\ 1"('I.lr)' W'lle"ll nf Ill<'
Org;lnization of American Slates. in which post he wf1uld serve wlll1 di tllll 11"11.
The Liberal Party won the elections of 1994 bill onl)' .\flt.'!".1 1111111,]
runoff, whell f.rncsto Sa III per defe;ltcd Con..;ervativ{' I\ndrt ... 1'.1..;IJ.II1,1 "y ill ... t :-
percentage points (50.3 perrenllo 'lX.2 perc('nt). Almost .1" .... Illll .1" hl' Illnk ,,111. ,'.
Samper's presic!enC)' fell undcr the cl.H1d of ,,;cullial .... pel lilt all r. lI .... lri,Hl ... 111.11
he h;ld accepted ovcr $6 million in c:llllp;'lign lunds from the Cali drllg \ .11'1..1.
Under pressure, Samper (once-ned lll:l! Glllll':lign lll\('raliv('<; h:1d .Iu.. cplcd t1111j:
money, hut he denied :lny personal knowledge (If Irallsa,-li'J1I". III \VI,.I!
heC<lllle known as -lhe Irirll oflhe first timc <l prl'..;id"1l1 \\'.1'
subjecI to possible impeachment the Cn[\llllhirln (fl1lgre<,..; lllHkrtfJ(,k .tll .,1\,<'"
tigatioll. In June 1996 the legisl:ltlllT voted 10 disconlinuc inqlliry (1llll'lIllllr
absolving Samper) by a margin of 1I 1-43. SlIspi\'ipu.<; flf a ((lvcr-llp. <:I.;(ptil <, 11<,tnl
that the president':" own party dOlllin;lled the <:llngress nnd lhal I\\''' d"'ell
members of Congress werc thelllsclve.<; facing chargc...; of cllrrllp!i('11. 1\<; .1 rn1l11.
the Samper adminislration became virtuall}' Jlllwcrlcss-"\\'hik pllhlil tllllf"ll'lh"
in the nation's polilic;lls)'slem plumllleted In al1lin1(' low...;.
Assuming a moralistic st;lllce. Ih" United r"spnll,k,lll\ lhe",' llevC'lnl'
ments by .. decert Colollloia for illackqunle efforls in th" flght .11{.1111 ... 1,Illig'"
In p:lrlicular, Washington was unhappy with S;ll11I't'r..; rdll<;.ll 1<1 exlr.l,hlc' ,11'
tured drug kingpins to lhe United Slates. And in luly 1
1
)')(,.... holll)' .1tll1 IIJI'
congressional vole in his favor. lhe Clinton atllllinistrntioll rcvnk('d ..... ;11111'(1 ...
visa for travel 10 the Uniled States.
With the Liherals discredited, lhe COllserv;llivcs IInnll}' \\'\111 the I'nqdCllll.IJ
election of 1998. This timc Andres Paslrana selected a provincial g\\\,('fIlllr
with the M-19 as vice presidential candidale :llld, in a SCCollfl-rnullll run,lfT. r1cfc.lle,t
the Liberal candidate by 49 percent to 46 percellt. Ycllhc I.iherals (Iill well il1Icgi..;lalivC'
races, so Pastrana took office without a working lll<ljorily ill either chaillher "r
congress. Colombians thus encountered the re<llitics of a divided gnVenllllcnl.
In search of peace <lnd reconciliation. Paslana :ld0l'ted a fre.... 1l ;ll'pr(ladl tl1\\,.I101
the guerrillas. creating <l demilitarized zone (I)M i'.) hy wit hdrawillg nrlll}' f r. 'Ill
lhe southwestern part oflhe COUlltry and opening Ilegolint inn.... \\'ith Ihe F/\ I{(:. T:.lk ...
dmgged on for years and lhen hroke down in 2001-2. In Septcmher 20/1 I Ihe I: 1\ HI .
complex pruposal for constitutional rt'lorrll. EVl'nttlally.lhough, UI i[ll.' rll<lllagl.'li tu
secure fur a amendmcnt pertlliltinl:) rl'dt'ctioll, III M;ly
2006 hl' triumphed in a landslide, willi 62 pl"'"CCllt 01 the voll', At Ihe sa II It.: tilllc:',
legislative eJections produced a pro-Uribe Illajurit)' and heraldt'd 1111.: illllllllll'nt
c1emist' or I.ibera!-Collservativt:: traditional part)' dOlllinance. SOlllcthing nt'w wa...
in the air.
II
llltlflklnllhv WIll' lit till.' allUlllV)' gl'lIt'r,tl. hersdfa well known public ngurc who
lJ.td .1', till' IlJillbll'r vi (Ullllrl', .llld hlucknl dfurts tu rt:::.lIllle negotiations.
Full "'lak II(J... rl'::,ullInl wlll'1l Pastrana ordered military units 10 retake Ihe
I )lVli'.. dlld gUl"r rill",> :'>ll'Plk'd ul' a<.livilks ill urban as well as rural Mens,
I )hWI'VllIg ,llt'Sl' lk-wloplllcl1b willi Illuunling ah.... n, the Unikd States finally
.1}',I"n'd III provkk' the adlllinistratiun wilh a $1.3 billion aid package in
:.uI'pIlrt \It "1'!.lll irlilialJ), ,k::.iglled as a lI11dtifacetcd strakgy to
1'""LlL. rl'VI\l' t... t,ILtJll1i, d.... Vt'h1Illll ...11I, (Olllb.!1 drug tnlHkkillg, and SIl"l.'llgthcll the
dVIIIII... 1.ll1L pill.! ..:. ufCululllhiall :..1)\, ..... 1)' (thl' l'sti11lall'l1 price lag: $7.5 billion). Ydlllc
( ,Illltlill ,(lllllllll:.ll . tlull l'.11 11l.1J kl'L1 alIIHI:'>1 all its aid IOJ" IHilita!'}' liardwan.:, rather than
11'glllll,.1 d\'wllljllllVlllllr ,rup :.uh... lilutiuli. alld stipulaled Ihat it shuuld be used only
!t'l .llllldlUg dlllll ... -llIltlllr l"uulll<.:rimurgL:ncy, Critics ofthl' plan vok-cd warnings
.,[ltlllt III... ul" gell 11 19 invulvL:d ill a Vil'lnam-Iik,' raised concerns
.1111 Itll lill' l'Ull'llllal lUI viuldllUllS III IllillHlll rights, arId expressed ... kt'pticislll about Ihc
1,l.ltJ:.il'lllly III ::.eparatillg ,111lidrug from antiguerrilla t:amp.ligns.
'l'lll' .lllalb .tg,liIISt tIlL: Ullikd States OIl Septl'lllbL:r II, 2UOI, sud
Ill'llh' lids l'lltil"l' (ull!L'xL U.S. pulilymakl'l"s bt'GIll\c less queasy about Ihe
II"',' .;lId Il:.k... Ill' IHililar)' tortL:. T ...'rrurists eVL:rywhcre became a source of dallgc::r.
A... l.tlk... brllJ..l dUWll with Ihl' FAH.L alld ELN, Prl... idellt Pastrana dellounced till'
gfl'lll's .1:- -Il'rnlri:.b," l:urdillL:rr.:!lt but rehllcd reaSullS, bOlllthc United
Sl.lh... ,\lId, :010111111:1 aduptl'll illll'lal"ablt' ... tands.
IEltl.l....tllllll::'l'hl'll'llJl;' l,ll"t1iun of2UU2 Wl'lIllI) Alvaro Uribt', a dissidL:llt Libewl
WIL,i V\l\wd llll rtt:.h gunrilld llltlVl'llll'llb wilh ull}'idding lor(e. own btller had
bn'll hy FARe gUIITillas.) A fUfllH:r mayor of Ivkddlin and governor of
Urih..., touk ,)J pc:"rct'1l1 ul the volt' a::. Libl'fals \\'ull majorilks in both houses
ul {.'ullgle...:.. Ill:.. gd allitude gOI olrtu all unevcn start WhL:ll guerrilla violence.:
:-tllll'lilldlll!-'. III::. lJl;ulguralillll Plllilipled hilll to dcclare a llilld),-day stale 01 l'llltr-
!....II, y, 1\ ... J Ile:-ltklll. Urr]ll' l.llllll'llIllt'd 1\\',1 Illaj\lr dl;lllcngl's; IlI;Jllagillg lilt' app<trclltly
JEll Ll,t,lhk illtl'f1 Lal cOIlIJil'1 Wlllk' upholding Livilliht'rtk::. alld impruving the hUllIan-
11gbI'> Il'UIJ"d... lit llll' Ilrilil,ll)' aud lhl' puliLe, aJld cUllsulidalillg tht: CUUlltl)"'" finances
,lrlll.! I"JV,'r!y ;Itll[ llllellll'[II)'llll'lll (whidl had dilllbl'li tu more tllan 15 percellt),
Till' Hu:.11 adlllilli:..lr'LliulloOi::rl'l1 strung suppurtlo Uribe, Washinglon resisted
Ih,' ll'IIlJlt,ltillll 10 t::xtend its own antitc-ITorislll war to Colombia-despite impas-
... iUII ...'...! llllrl'.tlleS Irulll lillartcrs-but cUlltillUt'd military aid. III 2002 tht: U.S.
CUllgJ"':'''' ;luIllorizl'd lire u...\;, of AIllt:rican coulltenwrcotics assistance for cQunlcr-
ill:.urgl.-lll')'up<'raliulls, thus erasing the [inc that had been dwwn undt'r ClioIon. For
U,S. aid (allle to appruxillialdy $573 million. or this amount, aboul $100
Illdlit)]1 \'1.1:. illtelalnllo proteci all oil pipelinc uperuted by Occidental Petroleulll, the
l'lrget ul lliorl' than a thousand guerrilla allacks since its opening in the mid-1980s.
UIlbc:' rdaillcd ... ubSI;JlIlial pOI)ularity, if polls can be believed, with a 64
l'l'rll'lI! .ll'llrtlVal l"tling ill lIlid-200). Like others befort' him, however, he dis-
lllvl'fni lhal there Wt'J"l' limits til his pOWl'r. Congrt'ssiol1al support remained
t ragill" (ll'pu:..ition pari il's achkvcd important footholds in local elections, taking
ulliu' ill :'Udl prUlllinel1t citk's as Hugul;i, Cali, ilnd Medellin, Vokrs rejected a
IL
The Kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt
Ont.: of the IllOSI highly Pllblicized confrontatiun... IAHC ,md
Colombian government involved the C<1<;e of Ingrid l3el.ll1cuurl.
A woman of aristoCiatic bearing and French-Colombian citizenship,
Betan(outl ran for the preSidency on behalf of the Oxygen (Oxigeflo
Verde) party. One of her Slgrhlture Cillllpalgn gclrnbits was lu chstflbuI Viatjrd
pills to startled Colombian men and proceed to explain thut the countl y ,I
cornpawble boost of enelgy, She denuunced lhe Silategy uf
seizing prominent hostages and demanded a halt to this practict;'; No //leis st'cUt::s-
1I0S, she declared more than onet>, "No mOle
On FebruiHy 23, 2002, en route to d meeting With gUto"rllltJ l<:ddEe'IS,
Betancourt's entourage Ian into a FARC checkpoint <md sire WdS InkclI
Accordillg 10 all, of hel captors, tile kidnapPlrlg W,IS nOI planllcd beforellnncl. 11('1
naille still rlppt:'dled on tht: prt.::sidentiul ulIlI\JI <lilt.! SilL' lto"tt:ivt>d <I token vot ...,
Because of her internalLQrldl PI ofii\:.', nonyovernmC'lllal III lilt;;>
European Union and around the world rallied to her SUppOll,
Years of agonizing unccllilinty (allowed. Tile newly elected "drnlnlstl<.lIJOIl ot
Atv'aro Ullbe was reluctdnt 10 t:.'xchange guerlillcl for thEe' rAIlC's hOSlilljl:.':".
(Havillg launched II!> own "global Wilr un the Bush Cldlnlllistrdu0n III
W.lshington supported this hJrd line.) BetJllcourt'!> j,HlIily Jl1ernbto"rs rejected dll
aImed illtE:'lIlpl I'" 100 ddllgeruus, lilt' govt'IllIllE:'IlIS of hdnCe dnc!
VeneJ::uela offered to SOIII(: form of hUIl1,lnit,1riJIl cxchungt>. I<UlllUIS
llldicdted that Betancourt's heallh was failing,
On July 2.20013, six and a hall years lifter lhe kidnapping, CololllUl<ln st.::curily
forces succeeded ill rescuing Betdncourl and fourteen olher Irostdges (three
Americans, eleven Colombiam). Code-named "Operalion Jaque" (Spanish lor
"check," as in checkmate), this was a dalillg and carefully pldlllled maneuver,
Freed from captivity, Betancourt became Ihe object of enlhu... iastic lI1terna
lEonal acclaim. She mel with Pope Benedict XVI and received the French Legion of
Honor and the Concord Prince of Asturias Award, President Michelle Bilchelet of
Chile announced her intention to nominale Betancourt for lhe Nobel Peace Prize,
Addressing herself to the FARC leadership at a rally in France in July 2008,
Betancourt issued an eloquent appeal: 'See this Colombia .. , and underSland
that it is time to stop the bloodshed. It is time 10 drop those weilpons and
exchange them for roses, substitute them with tolerance. respect, and as brothers
and sisters lhat we are, find a way so !hdt we can all live togt>ll1cr illlh", world, live
together in Colombia:
II
21X ",\In-TWO 0
Colomhia thus confronted all enduring dilemma: how 10 mect serious chal-
Icnges from 01111 isystelll forces while slistaining its commitmcnt to elcctnral democ-
raC)' :llld capitalisl economics. This was made all the lllorc difllcult hy what
Clhservers regarded as the country's crisis of NatiClnnl politics
revcaled unTesolve(1 tension hetween the lure of the future and Ihe pull of the
past. At the sallle timc.:l new generation of politicinlls was coming to the fnre-
more l'<1rochial Ih:ln nnlional in outlook. more opportunistic than prngmatic or
pntrinlk. In :l sociel)' thnl wns accustomed 10 llloder:ltc le:ldership, govcrn:Hlce
hecnme erralic and Ulleven.
It would he an cxaggeration 10 classify Col(lmbia as a failed statc.
w
nut it is a
gravely weakened slate. As historinll John Coatsworlh has said, Colombia remain<;
"a shaky archipelago of modern cities surrounded by an ocean of The
oulcome of Ihis nation's search for social comit)' and governmental capacily will
h:lvc serious consequences not only for Colombi:l hut also for the \Veslern
Ilc'mi"phcre.
.
8
Venezuela
The Perils of Prosperity
V
enezuela ic; a land nf surprises. In"t(',hl If lilld iIlg Ille 111\ ,I, II .11 I I 11,'1.111.
EUrQpe;lll explorel:- cIlI.. C1llnICred Ilo\live hlll<; nn <;1111-. 111 ,1 I.II):C 1.11,\, .111.1
christened Ihe nrC;l ,1 lIanl(' th.l1 h,I .... :-llIlk nn .. 1111(', 1
1
\ .... 1"',.
visionary leadership :111d i(lcl11oIgil:ll {cal, 111l' "Va, .. III IIHlqwll,IClH (' 111'111 "'1l.l'11
led 10 lillie alteralion of Ihe (.olon;:l1 nrdcl. I kp,lrl ing flom Inll' , lh.,,10 " "11
tr;l(litiolla! agrictlllure. Iwentielh-cellllll') VeI1C711cl,1 (,1llh.lrl.:I'oI 1111 .1 It,'.
wheeling pelrolcum hon,lU7a, :l 111;11 wollid dl,IlI,:C IllI' 1.1. " .. I lh.
cnunlr". \Vhen neighhoring nalion<; werl' <'lltl.ll111hlllg 'II blnl.lIllllhl.IIY "'P, ....
sion, Velle:l.uela waS proudly upholding ,1 I'jll,II(:l1 lil'IlUlI I,ll Y. (\1111 III .1 .. 11.1/1'
reversal of roles, VenC711da l1a" n1l1,,1 r('lellll), h('('11 1ll.1\lllg Il!\\,II,1 1"'1',.11',1
a." other (Olllli Iit:'.. ill Ihc regh,n h,l\'e Ilt'('ll II ....
and fair elections. Indeed, VeI1C711('1.. h.l .. "'"Ill('how ".:('olt'd .Iilfnlllt IInlll Ih,
res I ofl.alin Americ;:J-:l 110111011 apart. diqilillivc in 1111C'lll.llll1ll, \l1l1 .. 1 .. ICJ' \, 1111
cnntillcntaltf('IH.ls,;ln Indolllill,11l1 1).11\('1"11'" ,1IItlIICl1d... I.. 1111" Il,dh
thc case?
The laic nf VcnczlIcI.\ hcglll''> wil h J!,t.'ngr.'phy. 1III ,lied 1111 Ihe 11' '11 11('111 til'l .. I
SOUl h AllleriC<l, it emhracc" .t rcm<l rka hi)' d 1\'l'l ... c h"'pogr.1I'h \ II ''''11111.1111<', \ .111\\ .
coastline. rivers, deserls. :lnd jtlngles. Alnng Ih(' \\'(,,1('111 hOltlt'l With ( '1IoIlnhl,I ..1
spur of the Andes splils (":lsi and wc<;t 10 form Ihl' glg,lIlllt. h,lqn '''I I,Iht'
Maracaiho. III the cenlr:ll part of Ihe celunlry, a Ie",ser mOlllllalll I,Ingl' 11111.. 1'.11 . 110'1
to the Carihhean coasl; it was in thi.; lelllpclat(" 'lonc th.lt ... c11Icl:- "'1111111'11 tl,,'
capital city of Caracas. safcl)' prnlcclc<1 frOlll I'imle.;, wilh 1..1 (;Ilail.. "'CIVlor .1" II'.
port. The (':tstwar<1 cn:tsl of Vcnc"llId:t Illf>V(,<; inlo lhe lll:t;e<;;li. ()"ino,.' I kiLl.
spanning somc 250 miles 011 Ihe nc("an !<idc. ;1 low-I)'illg hlll1lid InlH.' wilh ,1 I,lill)'
climale-Ilot all inviting sile for SCI1!clllelll, hul :tn efl'it..iclll 1'0111(' I.. the illlcrinl.
East of the Andes an<1 south of the Orinncn there slrelch v,l"l :Illd n:h'Il"iV{' 1'1.1111'"
known as lIa1/os, reaching all thc W.I)' III Ihe ClI)':lll,1 IllJ-:hl.llHk :-',,11111 01 1111'''''
llfl1l0S liesa si7ahle portion oflhe Ama{tlll ;ungle, .In ,ll"t',' th,lltl"... ,c.. the I PllIllI\...
border with Brazil.
11'1
1'.\1(1 IWI) w 1';\ ... 1 ... IUI)!!.:-' \ II.\N(.FOVEIt lIt-II'
Ii. VClh.':luda:Thl' l'lll!:;ull'ro:;l'lrtly 221
There Wert.'no great to be lIl'-ldl"" Pl"arl bed:. around bl:.,l\larg,lIita It'd
to ;] short-lived boum. but the real wealth 01 colonial V"IIe:L'uela calllc frulll
Jives(tKk and agriculture:, t."spcdally cacau_ pUpUl,lllull 01 the
Caribbe;:tn declilled, slaving roJids ror Illlli,lIl:' :.d the tOile or SpOJnbh-lndiall
relations. And .. fler smallpox decimated Ih," native population, addilional
were imported Irom Africa.
Froln till' siXlt'enth to Ihe l"arly eighlcl"llth l.enillry. Vt'llezucia ,kvcl0pl'd a:. an
outpost for l'lnpirt' in Amt."rk.." principal role:. Wl're to plOtilIce lotld
stuffs for the Iargl'r alld more impurtant colony or Nt."W (Nkxko) and tll
bolster tht' Oank or imperial deknses in the Caribb",lIl. hHllltl,'d in 1567
and governed by c3pable municipal Caracas evcntually uecUlIe Illl' Ct'ntral
hub of polilical and economic lilc. A silc of higher learuillg, till' Real y Puntifk"
Ullivel'sidad Caracas, was ill 1715. t;jwn the crown's rl'!atiw
inattenlion to Ihe r("ginn, llIissionary orders picked lip the :-.I:u:k: Frandscam,
Capuchins, Dominicans, Jesuits, and Augu:.tillians all beGUile kl")' acturs in Ih,"
fOfmation of culonial socict}'"
As in otht::f parts of tbl' AU1t'fic'-ls. the: Spanbh I.I'OWII':' .lttt::IUpb to
improve and centralize imp,rial adlllinbtration hdpl'd hi)' Ihe: basis fur
inJepcllllenct'" Bourbon in tht." hlle l"ighkellth Ct."lltur)' l'nh.lnLed thl'
aln:,u.!)'-tlolllinant position of and Cl"l'atl"t1 ,I 1I:1:'('el1l :.ell:.l" ol unit)'"
Prominent <.ullong thcse were Ihe t"sl .. blbhllll"nt or colony wide: t11h:ntlallC)'
(177b). a :.illglc: captaillcy-gt."Il<:f,t1 (1777), ,Ill mulictu '" (17tU,), ,I 11Ierdl.1l1l
farml'r lOlISlI/mlo (1793), anti tlnally all an:huishupl'l (U;OI) all ht",ldlluar
ten.. tI in the city of Carac.Js. The mort" illlpon:lllt V("!louda IIIl"
more likely it was 10 br<:ak away"
Nut surpriSingly, it was thc newly empllwcrl'd elra"::,I:' ..lite Ihatlnlthc ch'lrg..:-
1<11' indl:pcnde!lct:. Upun newS of the Napoll'ollit: il1v:lsion, the IIIHI/I'II'IIO c;lbiltlo
proc1ailtwtl its supporl for Ferdinand VII-and. 11)1' good Ille,l:-.ur,', abolishld till'
slave lrade as well. A declaration orindt'pelldt.?IlCt: ill IX! I ledtu thl' lIl:wguratilln
ul a po/rilllJo/m rrcpublk 01 the ,hillel'S") tll,11 W,I:. prolllptly l>venhrOwll
by Spanbh li.lrCeS. Simoll Bolivur ,ntl'l'ed tl\c lray ill IMI J, took IcllI11lH".lry cOlltrol
ofC:mll.'as alld in thl" (,Ice or dcfe.1t f1t."d to l"xile (wlll're h, wrot,' the memorable
rrom Jamaica, an t"xposition ofhb political philo:.ophy). The i/llidaligault'
Boliv<tr returned to action in ISI6, led successful milliary l..lInpaign:., is:.ued a
proclamation on frccJom of the slave:.. and was ,-:leLled uf Vt"Ilt."'luda b) a
congress ofnotabl<:s in 1819. Arter crossing thl" Antlt":.laler Iltat y,'ar.lte:
president or the newly formt"t1 republit.: of Gr.uI ColullIuia (indutling Ecuadur,
Vl"nezuela, and Colombia)"
The decade of the 1820s gave politit.:al shapl" to continelltal indl"pendelKl". In
1824 Bolivar and Antonio Jose Sucre securl"d the indc:pendt"nce of Pe:ru wilh
decisive military victories. In Ihe meantime. Jose Antonio luugh-ht."Wll
warrior from the /lemos-was chafing untler dumineering It"atlel'ship and
launched a separatist movement. Five yeo.lrs latt'r. his ,'ontinued agitaliun resulted
in Venezuela's formal sect:ssion from the Gran Colombia and in suVt:reign
OJ l:..ll.uh.l....

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GUIANA

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FROM COLONY TO NATIONHOOD
V
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:.1.. , ......1....
I 1 I,tl,
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11I.ld" I.llItilall un till" Canl>h,',lll coast ill UII hb third voyagl",
th,lt h," 11,1,1 1e:.:adll".1 Indi.J" diu not urr("r a h:mpting
luI' .. Ull,!ll''':'!. I'ht."u: 1\0 lIlythic.11 kingJolll. no prosperous civilization
,Itop .1 ur V,Ulll. Early l'xplol't'l's instead a larg("
1I11lllbl:r 01 ,',Ich with its own language. In contrast to
I\IkXll"o '-Illd Pau. wlll'rl' lb," cOfl(llI;sltultJres struck at major urban centers,
IIl, Iuuk lunlrul uf Vt."lIe/.ul'!a at OJ gradual. and
p,IU-l'xpnhtlull" hlt"fl' re:sbt,lIKI;' was d("terlllined, alld nativl' COI1l-
Wl'rl' :'l:,llt,rt'd alld divl"r:'l".
2::2 I'Mn n\'o ( ,\'1 "TlIPI!"\: CIIAN(,I OVI'R -111\11
independence. N:ltioll.11 liher:llion IllllS GlIllC' :ll Ihe expell<;e of one of Boliv:lr's
fondesl drc:lllls.
Thrllugho\lt Ille h;ml-follghl independence wars. VCllezuel:l suffered frighlful
levels llf physic:ll and economic devnstal iOll. 1n Ihe f:lce (If Spallish lllililary mighl.
insurgellt elites needed alllhc help Ihey could gel. To altr:'!cl support from hlacks.
lihernlion 1<';lders prncJ.limed;\Il end 10 sl;wery: 10 engage lllulattoC'<; (parrlos) and
mixel..l-blnods as well. Ihe)' pronoullced their Oppo<;ilion In official elhnic labeling.
Yelthese were timid slep<;. and Ihey did Ilol precipilate a major <;odal lr;lnsfnnna-
tinn. In Ihe judgmenl 01 historian John LombnHli:
If greal ... hange" wer(' In ha\'{l cOl11e 10 America III Ihe uplH".1\',11 (II
Independcncc 'hey should h:1\'e happened in Ihe land of 110livar. whcre
111",illltions were re(cntlr formed and relatively wcak. where the pO\\'I'r nnd
we,llth of the Illcal afi<;ln.... raC)' nppcared Illu(.h le<;s thall in \'lceregnl
where the racial IC!I<;inn<; ul :l "tlrdl1 <;nciely :lppe:lre-<! \'c'1' high. anrl where the-
di ..ttrdcr and de<;lrucllnn (If a dcc:l<!c IIf dvil war provl(lcd all cXLC'llcnt
npl'0rtllllitr for r.ldk.\l change. Thai fcpulJli<..Ul Velll:7uc!a l11allal-\ccltn preSefye
inl.H' lIlanr cnlnll1al and most <.l)Innial eloquent lestimunr In
Ihe <;tl ellglh nf Ihe lIleric:l1l social and ecollolllk syslem. olle Mefll11}'
(l"("llc.I and a,IJIl.<;ICc! In h'cal fC''luifelllenl<; f'lf Ihree hllFldrl'd yC:lf<;.
Es<;enliall}'. lhe neol..olnninl sncinl $lrl1ctufe of VC!lezl1c1n would relllnin in pbce
fnr the fnllowinr. 100 }'eMs. II \\'.1" nol until the Il)ZOs lhal l1lnjor ch.lllge would
I..0111e,
Coffee ond Caudillos
\Vith Ihe onset of indcpendencC'. Venczuc1:l succumbcd 10 political rulc hy
Ifwdil/lls-militMy chieftain<;. offid,ll or unoffkial. in cOlllmand of pcrsonal
armies dedicated 10 Ihe advancemcnl of their leader and 10 jlldidou.; shares of
Ille spoils from comhat. 'rile essent i;"ll ingredients for success wcre mililarr prowcs<;
and cOlllrol of the t.:;"lpital city.
AI <;take were Ihe term<; ofVene7l1el:l's relntionship 10 newly .wailnhle markets
in ElIrClpe and. laler on. Ihe United Stales. Which regions would tnk<.' cha'-ge?
\Vhich inlercsls would bcncfit the most? Would il be coffee planters of the Andcs.
C:'l(:'IO f.1rmers alnllg Ihe cenl ralmollntain range. (lr ranchers (If the IInllos? C:lr:lC;lS.
of ("oul"<;e. formcd Ihe pivtltal link between the hinterland nnd the oversea.<;
m:lrkeIS.
Wilhin thi.. Conlexi. Jose Antonio paez. a tough-minded I/allem of rudimcn-
trtry edllt.:nlioll. dominaled Vcnci'uclall politics from IH30 1018'18. 11i<; principal
CI("hievClllent was to promote the transition from n CClc;\o-oriented coloninl
econom}' to;1 coffee-producing international economy. In exchange for generous
loan<; from Europcnll merchnnt houses to the local plnn!cr class. Ihe P:icz admin-
iSlr:ltion adopted n free trnde model of development which included two vilClI
("(lndition ... -sccurily of propcrly nnd sanclity of conlracls. The scheme workecl
well enough Ihroughoul Ihe IInos.
,\ drop in coffcl' prices ill Ihe IRIJl)<; hnillt:hl 111Hlt'r1YllIg IClI"'lllll'" IIlIll Ih.
open, Invoking the snllctily 01 tIHllr;'H.t<;. thc Illf1lle}" kncln, lklll,llhlcll 1',1\'11" lll'
on Iheir with in dt.:<.lille. th(' pl:IIlICI ... I 011111 Illli kecl' Ill' \\ 111, rhcrr
ohlignlinlls.
rJiS:lgl'celllellls hclWCtll ,11111 I il'l'I.ll" \\t'It' ,II 1111 ... 1'1'1111 Itlo.,
in<;trlllllellial Ihan idetllilgicai. the (:;ltlullil (Illlit II 11.lll Ile-\'CI .', llllll"tl till'
power during Ihe coloni,11 period Ih.ll it h.tcllll J\lcxiul III 1'('1'11. lilt' t !Inn h '1.1k
relalionship pn<;cd ales... illfl.lllllll:llorr ill ninelcenth tClllllry \'I'nt'lnd.,
l\ lore promillent diffel ('Ill CO;; lllllH'1 !lC'tllhe rel.lll\( .... 11 englll "I ,1111.11 \('1 ... 11.... 1"1 . 1
hilt e\'('11 lh;lt of'ell h,t.IIUC blllned h) !'II"'''Il.,h... llt ""1111:
hclween rh':ll (/lllllilln,\.
ncollotllic interests ;111,11 .. haped polili(.11 allcgi.lI11 ct;. Th.. ( 111"'('/ \',11 1\1' 111I.ll'!
W('I"(. lied III Ihc tIltUlC}'lclllkl"s :llltl Illlei,:tI agt'nl"': 11ll' I il.cl.ll It ,I 1.\
Anlonio I cornelio reprC'<;I'nlC"t1 Ihl' dcbt ndtlC'tI l'l.lllter.... , ,\lIcI "'1'\'".11
"e;lr!' of di<;conl anti <.(I!I(u<;i"n. Ihe f\!lJII.Ig.l<; hlolhcr.... III... t' Lldt'" ,lIId 1",.1'
(;regmio. imposed .1 p(,I"II)(\ 01 IlhcI:t1 dOllllll.llilll1 1t'l'kll' \\"llh 1.,,\ .... Ilil dd'i
rdiefaml:l rCl'c;l1 o(lhe ...Illclitr '1Ill'\ ,lh.,II hnl .... I.I\TI\ .lllllll.I...... f'll.l
mining code affirming th(' Il"atlilion.ll ... h rille lh.11 Ilh... llil/igllh hdnll!:nlill
the ll;lliflll. To S}'lllhnlii'e- 11;llinn:lll'lngn'<;<;.llw llI'llllcr"'t'\'I'I .... I\\" '11'.1.,1
I..-.liotl of a Ielegraph IIIlC hCl\W'Cll (',Ir:'l( as :Jlld it ... l na... 1.l! 1'''1 t .It 1,1 (;U.1I1,1. 1111'
ccollom)' Lonlinuetllfl (ollnder, howcver. a... I ihcl,lloltll i,d ........ l.llllhlcd I" r.-.... II'
lilt' :lgriudllll;11 e1ile (I'llill Ihe rlehl Illnngl'l .... 1.1.... \ Ill"tl'l ,tnd lI/ltOI1.1I11 1'1,,111.
lrealctl a \'tll.llllc mixIIlI'.
Intel1<;i(it:ation llf ClOIHlIllll ll'l1llit I I'llIpll'dlll filii ..... "kl 1\ II .... tllll
in IR5H. The sepillngcnnriilll !'.io lcl lIrne<! I" el,l.lhll h .1 ,II. I.ltfll ... llIl' IrHIll IX,,j III
IR63, 0'11 which point hi<; (:ono;cr\,ati\,e<; Iml Ihc w.ll" III .1 f.u linn 111"\11"" h.
Fct!cr.di<;ls. Inslnlleel ;1<; "II c pfe"idcnl ill 11-:(.1. the Illlim,lh' k.l,kl l.1 IIH' 11"1/,.111... ' ....
would provc 10 he Atil 011 in ( ;117111;\ n IU..-. IlC II 1he- "'Oll 01 A11 Inil It I I I'nt ,It lilt C .. lllll.i II,
lormcr spokeslll;lll 'If the I iher.lIs, Tnl(' tll I (jill/II/II II,ld;1 ilIO.... ' ,lIllll,ltl 1\1.1 lit l' w' 1111, I
Ic:ld an uprising against hi<; :llld p'IWCf 111 lX7fl.
An lllHl<;ualfigllrr. BI:llKfl helongcd In hOlh nl \,'llt/ll('I.l1, \\0.101,
;lrch;lIc and modern. Fond of kIH"'."n ;1 ... -The 11I1I tritlll ... '\lIlt'lll ,Ill
(el (Imrr;cnlliJ ill/stre). he <;ct ahollt Ihrce re-I.llnl I:l'.k.. : t ... l.lhll lllng p"hlJ. olll.I,
re\'italizing international tratlc. and illll'lO\'ing go\Tfllllll'llt.11 dO. It'IH \
1\ rcronner (If S(lrls. C,11i'_lll:tn BI.IIlL(l openly 1 h.lliellf:cd Ihc II ,Il lit 11"1.11 till II It 'I" ,Ill...
01 the church: he lll;ldc edllC;"llion free anti COlll pllbory. ( I ....cllllll.IIII ....
and convent ... awudeel rcspnnsihilit}' for rcligil'lI<; "tlltlie... 10 Ihe tl,llil'll,d 1lI11\CI
sit},. nnd cSI:lhlishcd Inlelll nn s('lf cnrit hl\le-1l1 a ... wcll ., .. n nUl '1111.
developmenl. he cultivated loreign ItlOlns as hot h n pcrsOlI;11 .llul nnlll lll,ll IC"'l ltll'"
During the I 870s and IHROs Guzm:tll H1nnco had him<;c11 r('clcelctl;l<; I1I"C...... ,II\.
c1niming vict0f)' by "an.lam'll ionW for hi<; Ihird nntl fin:ll Icrill Yd 1'1l1'1ll.U I(',It tillll
mounled .. gainst his usc of repression. lie del'nltctl Oil .1 tllP 10 IIIIOI'l' III
August IHR7 nnd. Icnrning tlf the di<;l onlent h;'\l k hOIllC, he ICI,IJ:lH'l I lilt' 1'1'... 1' I"IH \
ill IRRN.
1'/\1(11\\'11" t:" ... I ... tUIIII: ... ;( JI,\N(jl: l1VEH Tltl.IE
GUNBOATS AND DIPLOMACY
:--'uh:-'l'qlll'lIl Yl'ars IHarked Velle'l.UeG's el1try onto the stage of global politics, It W;JS
llul ,til ,lll:.pit..:iuIl3 debut. Two prOlnilll'llt events would l:OIlJlrlll <l tillle-honored
Ill,1Xi1i1 vi iutcillat iunal I'd,It iuns: big powt.:rs do what they want, sl1lall countrit.:s du
\Vllat IIll'}' 11l1l3t.
'I Ill' Jir31 q'isodl' (OIll."l'l"llnl a buundary dispute in the mid-18<JUs between
Vl'lll/.llvI.L ,llld Hliti311 <.;uiall<l, wlliLll Iwd acquin::d rrUlll Holland by
Ill',lly III IHIJ, III IHJ5 tilt.: UritbJI daimed a \Vt.:stern buund,try tllal drectivdy
t'XII,llll!l'd it-. ll:lrilul')' hy .10,000 3ljU,II"I: llliles; Vl."nezuda insisted Oil the dl:.'linea-
III/II .. IlljlJ,h.l' 011 IIII:.' tilile ufilldl'pt:Jldt'nn: Irum Spain. When guld was discovered,
HI it,lill Illllhl'J cXll'lld... d it .. c1ailll by ;.Ill additiun;Jl 33.000 square mill'S. HUI the
111\1:.1 u ilk,1I b311t' was llt:itilt'r land 1101' minerals; il was contrul over the Orinoco
I kll,l.
I:.lrlll .. tl}, invuking thl' MulHOe DllCtrinl', Vencl.uda appealed for help to U.S,
1'l"l':.idl'llt (;ruwr Ck\'l.'bnd, Till.: Unitnl Stalt:s had t\'lO interests in the dispuk:
Ill,lillt,lIlLin!!. its :ll'l-l'SS to till' Orinuco, ;.Ind (tlrlailing British innUl.:llCC wilhin thc
\'V1.'3kIJl I kllli:.pht'rl'. III IH95 tht' US Cungn:'ss i.lllnOllllcc:d its oppusition tu the
ill .. h daillls, alld SeLTl'lar)' ufSlak Rkhard Oillcy dispatched <Ill unusually blunt
/lll .. ... lgl' 10 1.1Indull:
1".d,ly 1Ill' Ullltl'd SI.Hl':> b pr,ll"til,dly :.uver",igll 01\ this continenl, and il3 fiat b
J,IW 111'0111111: :'lIbjl'l'\:> to which illuntllll'S it:. illtl'qlllsitioll, \VII)'? Jt is nul b("cau3t'
"t till' Illl'lt-blll!, ll" glllid v.. ill fi..'h lor II. It is JlOI simply by 1'1.:,1:'011 01 ils high
.. I,.lf.ll'lLr ,13 ,. l'ivilizcd :.t.ltc, nor IJl'Cilll:>l' wisdom iJlld juslice ilnd l'quily afl' thl'
JlIV.lfI,lhk dhll,ll.lt'ri:.lIl:' .. t Ih..: d":illillg:. of th..: Unil..:d States. Jt is bl'GIlJSl', ill
,111.111'011 III alt \ltllt'" grollll,b, it:. infiJlill' r"'SOllrt:t:S combined with ils isolah:d
rl'Jldl" jt '11,1 .. ll"r 01 til,' 3itU.ltiUll ,Lilli iltVulLllf.lbk:l 3 ag;linsl
,III} "I .111 IIth,'r I'"WCf3.
l:\'l'll wlllk 3l.\lInllj-\ at thl" Munrot: ()u(trinl', Brit<lin's lort'ign lIlinistl."r
,tlll'l'tl'd ()llIl'y'" for .lrbitraliull. A buundary l'OJ1llllission was
initi,tlly tLlIIIll"l1 with IWll AllJl'ril"all jurists, t\'lO British, and OElt' I{ussian:
,tlta a vigoruus prUll'st, Vl'nel.uda was allowed tu have (llle representative on
tILl.' bo,lId. Four year:. latl'r, tht: I.:OlllJ1lissiOIl rendered a dt:cisiull that COil-
Jinlll'd till' IHJS buundary.
Fur till' Unitt'll Stall'S, this UUtCOIllC rt'prt'sc.:'tlkd a major step in its long-term
l:lllLpaigll tu ;1:'>3l'f[ ltegt.'lllulI)' ova the Allll.:ricas. Fur Britain, it representc:d a
l.Lltilal rdrl':lt alld a willingness tu rl'cognize U.S. dominiun in the helllisphere,
hll' Vl'Ill':Iul'la, il wa:. a hitkr pill to swallow. And ror Latin America as a whok,
illleiliperale Itlt's:.agl' uffl'n:d a transpart'llt declaration or U,S. arrogance
.Illt! ('1)tldl'St.:lIISiull.
Thl' 3l'l-0Ild l'jJbudt:" uccurrl'd lluring the dktatorship of Cent'r... 1 Ciprianu
(:,I:>lru, will) guvl.'flll.'li witll illl il'Ol1 halld r"rulIl IM9910 'rlle nlost Illt:ll1urablt:
dl.'Vl'lUl'llIl'll1 or" his tl'llllrl' wuuld illust rate lilt:' d<lng('rs of delilll!tlng un debls.
Confrolltl'd by all enlllornic downturn, lIC";JI"-constant l"('gilill.d upri:.ings,
;lnd ddicits resulting from hb pl'rsonal t'xI.:t:sst:s, Castro dl'darl'd a
llll)ratorilllll ill 1902 on debt p,lylllt'IlIS tu Vl'I\l.:zud,,':, Eurupt';\11 III
,I furiuus rl'spol1SC, llritaill, Gcrlllauy, alld Ital), \!ispatdll'd \\'.Lf3hips 10
blockade the Vent:zlldan coast and, therealtt:r, 10 bombard tIl(.' l'Ulllltr(s
porls, A distinguislwd Argt:lItillc diplulllat, Luis Maria Dragu,
urged the United Stall'S to (b:hlrl' its oppusition 10 tIll' usc of llLililal")' roru'
(or lhe collection of debts. Pl't:sidl'lll Tl'dd), dellllllTl'd but initia!l'd
negotiations that resulted ill the Washingtllll Protocol of IlJ()j, all agrct:lJlt'J1t
l)bliging VCIlt'Zuela to allut ]U pl't"U::lil ot it:. lllStUlIlS dutil'S luw,lrd p.lyllll'lIt
ot" the EurolJeall claims.
Survt:ying till' situalioll it yt',lr Ialt'r, Rnusl'vdl laid ;J lOrtH:rstuJll' ul U,S,
polk}' luward thl.: rl'giuli. "Any cuuntt)' pl'opll' conduct lhelllsdv('s wdl,"
he bl?gall,
l..Lll coulil UpOll Olll IiC.ll ly Iril'lllbhip. It ,I Ih,ll it how 10 ,Ill
willi ft"1501labll' cffi...-icllq' and dl'Cl'lIly ill 5\1lial ;llid p\)litil:al Illallt:IS, it it kl"l"p!)
order to p,ly Jb obligation!>, il llt'l'll ft'ar Illl int..... krl'lIcc frulII Ihc UlIitcd
Cilrollic wnlllg duing, or:lll illljlOIt'liLC \,,'hich rcsulls ill ;I gt'llcraliuliscliinl) ulthl'
IlcS uf Illay in AJIl..:ril:l, a:. ebn..,h.....c, ultilll;lldy IC\lllill' mIL" velitiUll by
30111C civilized llatllHl, and illlhl' lwskmlJl'lllbl'herl'llie atlht'rt'llu' 1)1 the UHit",1
Sial..::. 10 till' !v\lml"lll' DodIille lIlay forcc the Ullil ...d Stah':., hUWI"Vt'l I'l'Iw.. lalLlly,
in t1agr'lI11 of stllh I,'rong-duing Ul iILlI'0tl'lll":, In Ilw eX"rli"v lOf ,III
int,'rllaliuJlal plllk,' Ihl\'lCl".
KIII)Wn. as Iht' Curoll:llf' 10 11ll' tv! 01 Il"Ut' DUl.lrinl.:, tht' :.Iakllll'llt
cUlltaitll'd ;J dual purposl'. I:irst, it warned I.alin t\1I1t'liea of U.S. Iv
t'Xl'"rdse an polkl' WIH:'lll'vt'r llt'Ct:":.sary. Sn.. ond, it \\':ll'llnl
Eurupl' 1\) kl'l;'p ils gunboals nul ufllw AlIll'l"il."as, IIOW prodaillll'd by tn
bl' all l'xdusivt:' U.S. sphere uf innul'nll', OIlCl' ag.lin. Vent'zltda wa:. Ilnding ibdf
to be ml'rd)' a pa\'>'ll ill big-powt:r politics,
III tlte wake or this humilialion, Ca:,lro dt'Li{kd 10 curry Ihl' Llvllr of
roreign illtaests. '1'0 tnke advalliage or lucrative asphalt a nl'W
mining law ill 1905 alluwl'd the gov.... rnment 10 grant cuncl"ssilltls to priv;I!I.:
companies ror up to fifty years. (E.ssentially, these cOllct'ssiollS wert:' identical
to the "consiglllllt:l1IS" thaI ninekcnth-ccntury Peruvian goVertlml'nlS had
grantl'd for exploitation or guano deposib,) III IlJU(J CilStrtl pl'rsuadt'd
pliant legi!'datols to agrl'c that thl' asphall concessions would 1101 rt'quirt'
congressional approval; thl'Y could bt: granted lllad)' by Ihl.' Ouurish of Iht:
presidelltial pen, As chid executivt', Castro thus put himself in :I position 10
make huge amounts or mOllt'y. Bl:'causc of his l'gregious corruption and
mismallagl'llletH, he was ousted from orne\' in The presidency thNe-
aftl'r passl'd tu Juan Vict:lIll' GUlIH."'z-whu would hold tht: rt'i!ls of pvwer
until 1935.
2l(, "AWl' TWO" CAS!' <>TtJIHI S: ()VFH T11\IF
II - --
The Generation of 1928
Student protest has often played a m<'ljor role in national politics throughout liltin
America. Pel haps the most significant sign of this trend in Venezuela began dUring
'Student Weeko at the Universidad Central in 1928. when a young firebrand named
Jovita Villalba ;mel two other studenlS were arrested for speakinq out against thl"
Gomez dictatorship. I\s crowds of students g<lthered in of their fellows,
IIlOle were cal ted off to j<li1. This led to <l large-scale popular demonstlillion Ihilt
was met by violent police retilliation. Some wele killed. milny went to
prison. and others escaped into exile.
Amonq the youthful refugees were three future presidenls: Romulo
Betancourt, Rafael Caldera, and Raul leoni. Clearly. this episode proved 10 be il
lorrniltive experience not only far this but the niltion as il
(;.lmei' ruled wilh skill and rllthle"s cnmpclence. I lis techniquc for rc"olving
politic.:.11 prohlems wa!'l to remove whoever appeared 10 he responsihle-through
... dlllonilion. imprisonmenl.lorture. exile. or ass... ssinalioll. Placed in chargc ofker
;H.. ti\'ilics, the military heGII1le his praetorian gu... rd. 1\ <;ecrct pnlke agency
"e:lrched out ... nd hounded <Iissiclents. Pence cnntu... lly settled over Vcnezucln.
Ironkalil" Venezuel ... " most powerful c{/udillo hroughl the age of mlldilli.(/1/() tn
an end.
OVERVIEW: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE
major comp;:mies got in on Ihe ground nltor: l{o)'.11 I hllch/ .... hcll. 1,1111. .\lHI 1'.11I
American (soon to be purch... se<1 hy St ... ndard Oil flf Indl:lIl.I).
1\ few yenrs laler, Coma invile<1 repreo;C'nlaliveo; (If th(' 1111 11111I ... h'
draft a new I... w on concessions. As a rcsu II , :l P.J21. 1,1\\' 111\ n".I<,nl Ih(' "'111' III
allowahlc p... rcels and lengthened Ihe period" of explnil.111"n ('11"'1,,11.11,111" \lllll
p... nies wanted). With only minim:ll :l<ljllSllllcllls.lhi ... l.lw \\"uld 11'111.111111I tnlll'
for more thnn twent)' }'C';lr:o..
Produdi(ln :lccderated r... pidly. By I')l(, pelftl1C'lllll h(',.11I1(' llu' ".IIIlIIV...
thief export. l'urpnssing corfee ill value. Hy 1I}2') V.llt'lllC'l,1 \\'.IS I Ill' ... t ,,11
exporter in the world, second lInl)' 10 Ihe Unikd :-,l.llt... III Inl.d nUII"lt All,]
as shown in Figtl re R. I. nut pill in(l'eased Ih l'Ougholll IIII' I 'n!).., 11ll' ", '11.1
wide ('ra of the Grcm llcpressinll and dilllhcd "1' :o.lccpl\' Ir'lIo 11ll' 1'1 Ith I"
llle endy 1970s (when VCllei'.lld,1 deliheralely f{'dlhctll'l"ndliL1Il'n .1" I'HI "I ,I
slrnteg)' In c1evnle priu's). All t)il hOnalli'.1 \\'.1" IlIH1I'r IV.I\', .111,1 II \\"'11,1
I"clll:lke the nation.
()ne efleci oflhis devclopllll:llt wa" Ihe ll"(',IIillll ,,1.1 "I'clr" ... I.llt."., 1,.,IIIlt.ll
system Ihnl hecame Iltlcrl)' c1ep(,lldelll UpOIl .llltl I'r II\( t'l!lph.I""" ".I,.Ll
VellC7uela had ... n extremely we,lk <;Iat(' at Ihe 111(' tlllh<...... (l'II .. hq:.1I1. 1111'1"
W:lo; no civil service, 110 lenl r;11 hallk, nnd no independenl ItltltU.11 \ ('/Il1h/lI''''''
hnd tr(':ltecl ;1 legnc}" of perl'on.lhslil fillC'. p",.. hltIIII,11 ""\\'('1 ..lIltl 1'11"11.,101\
politics.
The concessiolls und('!" (,Oll\('i' l"eI'I.'''<'I1I('.1 (1.1...... 1'111 ... 1111\nl h.llg.llll"
The foreign companies coul(1 ('xpaIH! IIH'II' tllllll.,l .\1 lh(' 11111'111.111"11.11
m... rkel, diversify source" (If prodllctinn. :11111 pIIllI .. h IlIHIU'pCI.III\I g.".nll
mento; In couTltries with oil <!cpno;ito; ec"pecinlly r...1C'Xitll .lllc! Htl ... ",.I. Ill! ',111",
I'IXII IlJ(,() 1'I711
YC:lr
1940 1930 1920
o -,-,-- I -
1'1'111 '111111
1\:1,1('1,
flCt n.,),
4
2
Figure 8.1 Petroleum Production in Venezuela. 1918-2007
',0.'10(1\ Ill;, Ofop<lrlm('nt 011 nP/Qy. f l'H"'roy 1"lnllnMl{101 AdmulI'.tt.lIu,n, /lmll/.,II ''''/'1, ,.', ",'" ,
(hnpllwNw(',c1 rlOf' lo.q(> ... ( <lll,Il11. nil III rll,. /1 n"(1mu / '1'1t" ", r
VrOr/llr/1l (Nl"w YOlk Pri!C'qpr. 101(,). fr!w,n 1,'"Wf'n."rrll"rwn III \'.!I. iud.1 /l flJ,. , II
F. 10(,/)
Pel rolcu1l1 W:lS in the 1l1c:lnlill1e asserling its importance :ltthe globnllevel. Oil wns
h('C('lllling:ln essential ingredicnl for industri:ll development and Illillinry strength.
Under Iuall Vicente c'rllncz and shadows of \"'orld WOlr 1, Venezuel .. entcred ils
peirolelllll :lge. Nothing would ever be the same again.
III keeping with Cipri;lIlO Cnstro's mining laws, (he Gomez regime offered
umcc"l'ions to priv;lle iTweslors. Under this system, the governmenl awarded
permits for exploration and extraction within ... deSignated 3rea for a specified
period of time; in return, the concessionnires would pny nn annual fixed fcc th... t
was analogous to .rel1t.
R
For Venczuela. \'I!indfnlls from oil concessions thus
incurred little cost or sense of obligation. To renp the richcs of "'s
one :l1l:l1}'st h:ls said, "the government had only to provide scraps of offici ... 1paper
granting rights to drill on rd... tively worlhless agricultural land, or even bettcr, the
cmpty bed of Lake MU;lcaibo.
R
Petroleum profits were freebies.
The ptlrade of concessions began in 1914, when the Caribbean Pctroleum
C:ompnny, a subsi<litlry of Roy... 1 Dutch/Shell, hegan commercial production. As
lhe ecollomic stakes became incre... singly apparellt, a subset-lllcnl law m... de clenr
thaI concessionaires would h... ve rights to rxplnmtioll of designnte<1 p... rcels, not
olilrigill oWllership. Translation: concessions were 110t equivalent to s<lles. Three
-'.'x I',\I(J l\Vii L" .... I ,>ll'llIl'> I II"Nt,1 (,VlltTII\II'
"I """ I.d 1"voIIlIIOIl" durill)-\ llll,' dl,l,.ldl, III' lhl.' 1910.-.), For his part, C('nlll''l
"'llid Itl"llllig Ilulll 1)11 pIIWl,'r :lllll io(reasl' hb pl,'fsunal weallh. A.-.
k ... l.lllll,'lll III Ill" dll,'lllV,'Ill.' ...... , Illl,' didalof wuuld dit' ffulIl natural GiliSes in
l'/i', \\lllk III nlli ....:.
I'll" ... 1.11 iv,' u'llI l,'rpk,"l,' 1,1 Illb l,'vulving s}'slt'lll, 11ll' Pl'! n,leum I.aw of 1922,
11.ld wVI.'I.d illlpurl.1l11 dkl.ls. HI ... I. II ... lIilkd power frolll priVall' propert}' 10 Ihl'
... 1.11,'; ollly Ihe gUVl'fllllll'lll ... nl Ih,' aUlhllril)' 10 wilh foreign
I'1111'.1111' '\l,"Ullh.l. it Ihl' (alr".ldy dOlnin;lllt) ruk uf till' presidl'uI,
.1" til,', hi 1 01 COIl'l...:.IUIl'>. Alld Ihirll. il rulefs 10
llhl,lllt' IlIl\\l'\l'r till.:')' l"uld .llId Itlll"',' II IU)\\'l'vt'r 11Il')' w'lllkd-whil.h vl'r}'
111l,k 1111' IOfllll,II.lvi...h publll \\ork... <.hllullo:,s:.ions wurk...d to :ldV;IIlI.lge 01
IIl,lIlh.. 11 1I1l.lllld)llIb.
\'II"hlllillll louk pl ....,l' ill 111,' .Irl'a:. .lruund l"lkl' MarJLaibu, rl'lllok
11,1111 IHlll.IU,I.III'" .llld pU111 kal ll:llkrs in Car.K.ls. Foreign companil's paid
II \nl h'lI!'> (pill" Ilt:l.l... 10 Ih,' llaliun.1I govt'rnmenl .Illd r.lbt:'d their
11111111 .. III Ihl' IllilXllllUlll l'xlt'nl. TIll'Y hr'lughl in lheir own machiner)'.
111,'11' t ,\\ II 1,,llllid;lIl:'. alld thl'ir own g,'ultlghl.'>. To he Ihe inlernaliunal firms
1IIII,h,)nlll".11 wurkt:'r:. ill wh,'rt:' ":Olllp..lll)' stort:'... could chargl:'
1l1l11.1I .. 1l ..1t lor ha.. il good... t\ludl a.. banan.1 pl.lllialion... did in
'\llll,'lh,1 tIll' l,\llll'.... inll ... II) 111:'111,1"(1111 lorml'd t:'COlll)lllic
\\1111111 \"II,/ud.L
I Ill' lid hllll:lIl/.1 lI.ul dllwll .. ldn wdl. Pl'rhap... impol t,\Ilt, il It'd 10 lilt:'
II.", III h' ,I .1)-\1"1111 Ilrl' .11 HI 'JI 111" i Ill,,' III Ulllllwni l.llHllord 'vVII h (Ill' collap!l"
111.,,11,',' .Ind ,.I,.Il' ,xl'llr!.s dl,lkl'll::s:.iull, nOll-oil inl,resl.'> laded Iromlhl'
..... ,Ill '\1ll1 oil ,.1I1Iing... It'lldld 10 boblt:'r Ihl:' ... Ir('ngth of VCllezuda':.
llllll'II,), Ih,' "Olil"/I, III,' \\'.1" 10 llln.lllr.lge impurts .llId 10 discuuragt:'
,'x 1II II h (\..1 I ...:11 b,',dllle il1l,Tt'.I .. illgl), l'xpl,'llsive in 01 olhl'r currencies).
\'Vllldll of gl'lIeralioll, V"Il'l.Ilt'b -UII":l' 011" or Iht: llIo,,1 PI'O"PI:'l'OllS agricllllllf:ll
IJludll'lt .. ill !\lllerica-...-uuld JlU IIJnger feed ils people alld wuuld star!
Illllltllllllg llllld.. ltlll:. hOlli .duvall.
I Wltll Ih,' pfuJlli",' 01 "lllpll)yll1l'IlI, Ill, dl' elllpha... Oll agriclll
lillI' IIlIl'II:'lllnl prtlll"... 01 inlerllal migralivlI, as and (tllllpesil/os
"'.I1lllnl 1\11 w\lrk ill jillbli... prugraills alld/ur the oil
II/knll/.llilln '.1111,' IJlulh LII"I III VI'JI":luda than !I) nWlIY olher
til 1.;,IIJl Aillt."ri,a, hUI it .tc.... d,ra1l'd .-.1I;lrpl)' uver tillll:'. By 195U uver 3U
1'1'1'1,'111 01 111,' Vl-lle:lud.lll pupulalioll livl'd in St'ltll'nll'nb (II' 2U,000 or
Illtill' IIlII.II,il.tllb; 1.,.)' 1975 Ih.1I pruporlivll would ri.-.l' 10 nearl), 64 percell I
(Willi 1& I'l'lll'lll living ill cill:'''' III IUO.UOO or more). In Iht' meanlime.
C.lr.ll,.t.... IIll' JOlllin.lJlI 1l1l'Iropoll.-., grew 10 huvt: 1lI0re Ihan 2 million
Illh.t1HI.I1II ...
'l'lll' ... IlIfl I-volvl'd ill "'.1)' .... The emphasis on oillended
Itl 1"''''I"'"l' Illdu:.lll.t1ualloll: :.Illl.e ..:ould bt: illlported. Iht."rt' "'..IS
lillie 1','.1..011 lu iuili.lk lll'lIl11l;lt.:turing. As a resuh. urbaniz:'Hion in
did Ilul I' lido\'>' the illdu.. lrial wurking d:'ls.-. wilh substantial
of puwe ... IllSll'ad il stilllllla1l'd Ihe (ormalilill of a .... Ul11111erci;d alld profl':'-
siunal seClor, a new and duminalll class with do... e tit':. lu Ihe vii '-'l'(lor. Jh
L)'llll K:.arl has pul ii, Vellezuela t:d Udh,,t:'ll 1920 ;lIltl 1935 Ih...
p;lradl)xic:tl t:'lllcrgt:llce or urhan middl,' da sl's logdhl'r (and 10 a !t-S... lr
exlenl) with working classes Wcft:' Vl'Sll'd bOlh ill Ihl' pI:'rIOrlllallCt.:' 01
tltt' oil :>l'clor :'lI'ld ill a polt:1l1ially :'IJvl'fsarial rdilliu..... hip wilh III ulh...,.
\\'onb, 111I:Sl' groups slood to bl'nl'fit from 111,' uvt'l':.l1l devdopllll'lli
hOlll Ih,' pt'lroll:'ulll hll( Ihey wuuld l,'vt:'nlll.t1I)' lOlli" 10 lhl'
privilcges ac..:ruing to well-collllt.:'Ckd ditt..'s, 11 W;lS llllddk
:'ll.l(lr", lh,' n'IUlJ) mafias, Ih.1I would l'\,(lIll1.llI)' ,.111 lor l'nlllUllli...- 1llIl'r\'l,'I1-
lioll b)' Iht' slall:' in order 10 r('cli!')' iIlJu... li(e alld illlllll.lllt)'.
Iklllands for a ;In'" !Ilurt' 1I11"lhilil'd dllring \ Vorld
War II. Ami in 1943, IIH.' Vt'nl'zuclan gownllnenl undl,rtook a ladlell chang..: ill
pl'lroll:'ulIl poli..:y. shining its re\'t'l1lll' basl' Irolll 011 lUlll',...... ioll:. 10 illlOllh:'
(.IX'... 011 Tht:' principlt:' de.lr: th,' Illghl'l" Iht' l"l)lllp.llIY prufib. lilt'
grl',ltl:'r Ihe ... Ialt' Thi.-. W.I... tht.:' IIr... 1 ... iglliIK,lIl1 ul .1 gtlWrlllllll1l.t1
challellge lu Ihl' multinational firms. .1 lllcilliS vi d,'fl'llding ib
Vl'IIt:'zucla would lalt:'r lIlCUUr:.lgl olhl'r pclrol"lllll-eXI)or! ill!;
Arabia, Kuwail, and -Iv adopt Ihi .. pvl,,)'. A COIllIIWll Iflllll would
bt'l1ef'it all.)
'I'hl' bOllanza cOlilinued Ihrullgh 11", .llld 1950:. leMlh 01 illk/II.\
liulI.lll.KIOI ... : pl'Jll-Up dl'llland ill Iht:' Wodd Wolf II jlll"Iud,.1
ill Iran (urll' or thl,' world's majur .Illd .. 11'lllpurary vf Ihl' SUl'/
Canal (whidl cut off Europt.:'\ fWIll Ihe Middle V,'Ill'Zlll'la skpl'",1
inlo Ilib silualion <lnd profilt'd h;1l1dstlllld)'. .-.lale flVt'llue... Il'nd",1 lu
bend!1 dliL's, t:spccially CUI'3C;lS. oftL'n rl'sldling in 1ll011111l1t,:'lIlal publil. wurk..
projl'Cls.
Durillg this sallle period, OJ COllllnilJ1l,'1\1 In sl.ltl' illll'l'veniioll
g:.lilled increasing mOIll,'nlulll, Thl' Jriving ide.1 lhal revelHll':' (ronl oil
should he us,'! Iv stimuJa!l' non"oil aclivili, .... A widl,'slH"cad slogan neatl),
captured lhl' concept: seminar eI petro/eo ("(0 :.uw IiiI.' pdrolt-lIlll"). CiVt'JI ib
ncvcr""nding (and 10w-cosI) rCSOUlTt'S, Ih,' Slall:' exp;llIdl'd 1U1t... in gl'o"
Ilwlri( progression, And while Ihe sial,' becallll,' .ukpl al dl,'aling wilh foreign
comp;lni,'s, il did nol have' trul), t:'fft'clive readl inlo Vl'IH:zudan sociely. Th,'
rt'sultanl gap belwet:'ll jurisdiction and authoril), prodlH,:cd wlI:l1 Olll,' observl'r
has ":'1 hollow slrt'Jlglh."
B)' lhe 1960s and 19705. Venezuela looked v\.'ry dilkn:nt IrOllllllosl of Lalin
America. It was the richest country in lhl' region. II:. principal export W.IS petru"
leum, 1101 coffee or sug<tr or ban:.lllils. It conducted negotialions with
powcrful ll1ultinalional companies. It confronlcd hopdul fUlurl. It st'eIHt'l1 to
havt' Id"t i1s P:'ISI behind. In Ihe words or Juan Pablo P.... r...z Alunzo. Ihe counlry....
out!lpoken oil czar: courSt' we are dilrl'rl'lli. Wt' 10lik Jlmr,' Ilk\. S;llldi Arabi:.1
than llrazil. We are Venezuela SuwJjw." Oilnol only alternllhe of histoI)';
it evell aneclt'd nalional idenlity.
el1lerged :\s well: the Comitc de Organi7adbn Polilil.-,I EtcllOl.d Indq'I'IHlwllk,.I
righi-of-center Christian l)elllOCf:llic org.llli7alinn known .\" (.( )1'F1, ,1IIti Illl'
Union nepuhlicana DemoCr:11ica (URD) of Itlvilo V,II.llh;l, ,I IIlC'lllh('I nl IIII'
generation of 192R who c1ecid('d to form his own pcr.<:on.ll "dll...le.
A presidential ciCCI ion ill 1947 gave victory 10 (;,lllcg'I.....1 well kIlIIWIl
intellectll<ll :lnd Af) candid:lle, Ilis IeI'm in llffkc Illarkcll h}' Illopi.11l ...( 111'111' ....
ideological rigidity. and pnlilicalllaivelc, Ilaving :lSSiSICd in IItt' dllip lh.ll """lIghl
A0 to power, military offlcer<: resenledt heir ex, ltl ... lfln Irnlll key pnll, \.
decisions, Eventuall}' Ihey delll:lllt!('d Ihnt indlldl' ( ll'I'1 HI IIU'
Illent and h:lnish Belancourt illio ex ill' (p;\rrl)' hCl,III"(' of hi ... pHlfllillCIlIl' III \1 I,
pMlly hcclUse of TUlllnre; th:ll he had lent Vt'IlC/lld,ln "I I I'Plll t III (,.111.111 ,Iud Ih,
bogCltazCl in Colomhia). When Callcgo<: rC'lllq'd to (",Ipilul.lt(, lhl' III il I1.11 \ tlt-p. '''1.1
him in Novemher 194R. The threeycar perind of party rule. Ihl' 11/('1111I. tllll .. t,Hlll'
to;'l1l ignominious cnd.
The umed forces wielded powcr wil h ;'I \'CllgC':lIlCC. ('I.I .. h('e; \\'llh ... 1UtiI'll I" .111< I
workers led to the (If oil indue;lr)' l:lhnr IInion", 111(' <:11"'1'1'1\ ... 11111 ,,'
classes .-.1 the Il:ltional llnivcn;ily, and Ih(' nllll:l\villg nl IIIr' ( nrlll1111111"1 1'.111\
In the regime dcdaretl election" nllll :lnd v(litl 1" ,l\TII ,If I (l1'1'1l"illnll
vich1ry-.. nd inslalled OIlC nfils melllhere;, f\lann<: I'erci lilllt;lll'/, ,1"l'lt'd"11111.t1
presidenl.
There followed a IhOfOllghly llIl",IVflrv tlid,llllr..lllp 1'1 t 'I Llll1l1llJ: ,I
"New N<ltional Ideal: I'erel Iilllcllel e;oughl 10 l.-nll"nlld,II(' l'Il\\TI Ihrnllgl, .
comhinal inn of massive puhlic worke;, ex!t'n'lVl' plllil Il,ll, ep't'.... 11 'II, ,11111 :llIq:l.llh t
to the Uniled in Ihe enid \"';'If. In 1')';4 Ihe h'i.l'l1hll\\'cl .ldlllllli"ll,llllllI
rewarded his loyalty with the Legion of :ll an n.. tenl,llillll" Il'rc'IIIIlll\' III
Caracns, In the name of :Hllicoml1l11llislll, PC-rei 'illlcno j,ldnl 1l111"l'llkt.'1I Ill .....
dents and ;'Illempled to ohliter,llc AI), nut whf'1l he "oughl III I'lolllllg hi .. lUlU' III
office through a rigged c1CClilltl ill lllilit,lry drew Ihc 11111.': the ,III" Itlll C 1",1
a popular rehellion that senl him inlo ('xile. \-Vhal would h,IPflt'1l l1cxt;l
Punto Fijo Democracy
Opposition leaders Iwd learned lhe 01 Ihe 'nl',1/o. III ,I "1'111'" 01
meetings before and after the COllI', Ihe)' reachcli agreclllcnl lIll ('\1'11111
rules of the political gamc. The h.. sit' prillClplc W,I' inllue;inl1 .. 11 1ll,IIPl
interest groups must henefit from pctrnieulll-h;l<:('d I'ln"l"'c,-iI\'. III nthn
words, all m.. jor contending forces agr('etl tn for('w, Ih('ir t .11',1t ily III h.1I In
each other by exlending guar;'lntces nol 10 Ihre:1lel1 (,:ll h ollu'r .. vil;'ll 1!l1l'1
ests. Appeaselllent bccame the order of Ihe dOl)'.
One specific agreement nn thc milit;'lry. In r('11I1"II lllr a l.-0l111llllnlClll
to political neutrality, Ihe armed forces would receive illlprllvelllt'IlIS in
salaries and equipment, a pledge of amnesty, ami pllhlk rl', ,lglliliOln lnl their
patriotic services, Younger officers agree(lto th('se IeI'm" a.. lIU'.III" III cnh,lIh t' lilt'
professional slanding of Ihe military and ef,l"e Ih(' ,Iiglll:l 01 .""0, I,\tlnn \\'Ilh
dictatorship,
27.5
228.07
7320
20.8
7.
28.5
Venezuela: Vital Statistics. 2007
Populiltion (millions)
GOP (cullent SU.s. billions)
GNP/c"pitil (SU.5.)
lnt'mel users (pel 100 pcoplC')
Life ('xpecl"ncy (yc,1rs)
Poverty rale (%)
POLITICS AND POLICY: PATTERNS OF CHANGE
-----
In the w.. ke of lhe Gomcz regimc, two fnctors emcrged .. dOlllin<lnl forces in
Il<llioll<ll politics. One was the armed forces: the other consisted of polit iC<l1 parties.
Complex illler:lclion betweell Ihcse two institutions would give sh<lpc to
Venc7uclall politics for decades (0 come. The relatiollship hctween them varied
from connict to cnoperation 10 cxtended periods of truce, hut it was always suhject
10 change ;tlld rellegotialinll.
Mililary officers moved inlo power upon Gomez's death, First to govern was
Ele;t7.:lr l.ope7. Cnntreras lollo\\'ed by General Isaias fVledina Angarita
(19'11-45), Given their innate sense of discipline. bolll made strenuous efforls to
Illaint;'lin l:lw and order, AIl(l given their sense of patrioth: dUly, lhey sOllghtto take
full ;'Idvantage of Venczuela's privileged position as an exporter of oil. II wns the
Medin" Angarita regime, after all, Ihat changed the terms of foreign exploitation
from long-term concessions to taxes on income,
At the sallle lime, dissident forces were gathering, The "generation of
hack frolll exile under the leadership of ROlllulo Betancourt, cultivated support
among nascent labor unions and established Ihe Partido Democnitico Nacional.
Temponlril}' outl.. wed by Ltipcz Contreras, the parly reemerged in 1941 under the
name of Accion Delllocnitica (AD), In 1943 the government responded by
formlllg a part}' of its own. In 1945 a conslitutional reform retained indirect
election of the presidenl hut cSlahlished a direct popular vote for congressional
deputies. while lifting a long-standing prohibition on communist activities,
Grudging lhough it was, tolerance was giving way 10 change,
Yel the opposition grew impatient, and in October 1945 a group of young
military ofllcers joined with A0 leaders 10 oust the Medina Angarit<l regime.
Under net;lncourl. n governmental council exiled Mcdinn Angarita .. nd Lopez
Contreras, suspended constitulion<ll gu.. mntees. cre<lted a ministry of labor, and
recalihrate(1 the oil company earnings lax in order to assure a fift}'-fifty split in
profile; (with half for the government). In this he<ldy atmosphere two new parties
2.\0 I'AI{T)W()" IIANGEOVFHoTIML
2'2 l',\jtj 1\\"" UIANl.i:t>V/:H JIMI
III lilt" 1'.Il.1 \,1 111111h, I'ijl', Il.lllY It'.lder:. agrt::t'd to Iht' dn'loral process
.llld, IIHllt' IIllplHI.IIlI, Itl pOWt'r to voting r(sults. The spirit ofa
-l'n,ft
1
ognl polllll..t1 II uu" would gm't'rll the distribution of cabinct posts, state
'I,b'), .tlld l.Ulllr.ll. b. 1'111.' would ensure Ihl'
p"hlll..i1 ... unlv.1I ul .i11 Notewurthy here was lhe exclusion of the
!'.lfllth,' '1Illlllllbl.l VeHt,/dallo (PCV), Ihe cOllllllunist p.lrt)' of VC:Ile..'ZlH."hl.
III Iht t'ttlllUIliit n.dlll, .1 program of gt)WrJIlIlCIlI" obliged Ihe
Itl t.'t.llJhllnit IllUtk-I.lllllll: .t1lluHlgh tilt' economic rult: 01 Iht: stale would
t'.II.l1 HI. ,It'll H.t ".11 It W,Vt'nlillt.'nb wtJtlld :J\'uid Jrastic nationalizations and expru-
IUI . II"n... ,uld "'Ul'ptlll lht' 11lllll-lplt:s uf private enlerprise, III dfe.:t.:I, tht: nalioll's
l.;qlll.dl ... h t'.th.lllgt:d tht' righlto ruk' lor the right tu make mOl1e:y.
III :'I'ilt' (01 ht.'t.'.lllSt') of ib the political pact also included
III tilt., U,S, (;ltl:;'t' ill IIll' Culd War. This proved highly controversial.
I.dli:-.I gUHII' ... II.ldl,lkcll prLllllillclit p.ln ill the to Pl'ra Jiml:ncz, often
,II glt'oIl ... while Eht'ldwwl'f's :-.upport for tht' dit.:talor h;ld left a bilkr
Wllt'lI Vke 1(it.h,lrd Nixun visited in May 1958.
... ltolll\ ,lIlt'l tht' lUlip. ,lllgq' lfOW(b dl:.ruptnl and nearly overturned
hi ... li,"tlu... lllt' "',Ifdy batk ill Nixon denounn'd Ihe agit:.t1ion as
-, UlllllIlllIl ... 1 pl.lllllni. In!, ..tnd CUIlIlllunbl-t.'olilrulled: One U,S.
"'t'II,11t11 111.11 lilt' I'cpre!)t'lItcd pert'ellt Ru:.sian
while.: .Iuolht'r Ih.tI it re:ve:ale.:d a pattern of
t. ,.nIlIIUIIl"t EVt.'ll "'0. ;lllti-AlIh."riclli se:lllilllt'ni W.I:. in the
Vtlll'/UtI.1 01 Ikll t'r;1.
I ,lit' I')',X lI:.ht'lt'd III all t'l,l 01 tlt-llllIcralk the newly c1eclctl
l>lnhlt'lll, l{tllllUlu Ikl,lllt..-UlJll til /\1) 1I1idertuuk a :.e:rit.s of gr.ldual rdorms ill
kn'l'llIg wilh tht' P.lll Ill' l'Ulltll Fi)v. Till.: minister vf milll.:s allli hydrocarbun:.,
Jlid n 1'.1hll' 1'I:ll" ,\ 10I1Z", ;I :.I,llc
4
run corpural ion 10 dl:al wit h fureign
,,'nll'.ltllt ... 1''1l1,tlly illlpllll.llll. th", Iklall...:vurl gove.:rlllllllit plaYl.:d a key role in
IIIJ'ltllllg t. ll'h:, Pt'tt'" 1\loJlI\I had lung on Ihl.: need luI' cOopt:ralion
,lIl1ll11!'.ul! plodtlt.lll!-\ tOllllllln, The oppurlunity fur aclilln caml' ill intht.'
tWIl hu:.lllt.- tlt.-vduPIllt'IlI:': ,I ulIil.lkr.ll cuI in wurld by tht: major
..Intlillt." ofa lII;Jlld;ltory tillot<.l un Vt:IH::zudan imports
hv Iht' Ei"'t'llhllwa adlllilli:.lralioll (presllmably in order to assure overland
Itl uJlItUl1I Call.ld.l ..tntl f\1c:<.il.'tl ill the evt.'lll uf",ar, l.Hlt actually in order
t .. 1'1,'lt'd III Perez Alonzo hdped arrange an
II Igt.'111 Illn'l III Baghdad. i\ I Ih i:. gat he:rillg, uf five count ries-
11.111. II.hj. I\.llw.lil. J\r.lhla, and V.:nezuda-agrt.'t.'J 10 promote their
11I1I11I.d 11Ilt'rnb hy t.':.t.lbli:.IJllIg .1 pl'Othll-crs' cartel known by its initials as
UI'I:"". AI Ihl.: lilllt." il ' .....1:. nul al all c1t:'ar whetha and how this new entity
wuuld ht.' .Ihk IUlnllut.'!lt.t' wurld it would do:.o with a vengeance in the
1')7U:.. !':Vt'll Ihe orga lIizat iun's loullding showed thai Venezuela was prepared
1,1 a...... t11 .11'ruoIlII\,t nile" illthL' lnlernatiunal alld Ihal,lhrough the shared
ilivulVt'lllt.'1I1 wllh pdrultUIIi. il W;!:. (It-vduping unusually slrong bonds with
lldlltlll'" III 111L' f\llddlt' E.I:.!.
Ii .. Vt:llt:7.uda: Tht: Pt:rib or I'l'u:,pt'nl)' 2:.U
all Ihe dUllle::.lic frollt, lhl.: Bclalltuurt pa:,sl.:d in
agrarian refurm law c:llling for expropriation wilh Painfully
aware oflheir de:dining inOuelKe, Ianduwncrs happily accepted Ihe: goVertllllt:IlI'S
(erms: lurds and pea:.allb \Wl'e bOlh lu bt'lld'il.
Pt'ace was nonetheless fragile, Membas of Vent'zud.lll CUllllllllni:.1 Party
and radical d ..... me:nls witllin AD objcClc:d to Iktancollrt's Int>tll.:r.lll stylc and jOillt"tl
guarilla lllOvelllenls, The tliscovery of a weapons (ache: in !lJ63 l.':<,post'd Iheir I
to tht.' Castro gove:rnmelll. Vt.'llczuel:l prompll)' diplolll.llic n:lation:. with
Cuba and cracked down on Ihe Tht' AD tllLI'o dd'illt.'d ils
as a party of Ihe auticommunist Idl.
As a left-of-cenler rdorlllcr, lklancourt beulllh:' a prulllint:lli ill ht.'lJIi
sphaic affairs. His ilnlagunisrn toward bOlh lhl.: rt.'vohlliollary Idl and lhe '\luhur
itarian right gave him uniquc inlernational cre:del1tktls, Aside frullI /:it.ld
unsuccessful meddling, Iktancourl ;lll assassination aI klllJ-lt in ]1.)62
orchestrated by thl.: L>ominican I{l.:public's Rafad Trujillo, who llhjccted tu hb
principled stance..' against dictatorial rult' in the.: America:., ilt'lalKourl abo devd-
oped an excellt:nt relalionship with U,S, presiJt'nt Juhn F. Kellne.:dy, who
his advice during Ihe Cuban missile crbb of Octoher )1.)62, In evt.'ry w"y, he.:
pt'fsonified tht. lofty Ideals uf JFK's AllialKe fvr Wilh Ill:. tr.ldL'nhlrk
pipe: and ht.'avily-riJIIllled glasse:., RUlliulu Bc:talKliurl t.:'lIlie 10 bt.' h;tilL'tl a:.
fatha of Ve:nt'zudan democracy:
Sub:.etlut'nt de:ctions led to the victor)' of Italll Lt.'oni (1\ 1 alit! R.lf;lt'! Clldt.'r,1
(COPEI), Iht.' twu lllajor parlies contilllll.:d lu lllonOplllii't' cVlllrol uf natiolMI
office, Ldlisl agitation nonetheless persbkd-Illon: as an irril;lllt than a:. a
threat, but a revealing sign or t1i:'COlllenl. A group Gilled Ihe MUVllllicnlO 0.11
Socialislllo (MAS) fUl"lIll..J in 1971, ;Hld Iwu )'e.. rs later Ihe Cdde:ra
lined all l.'Ic\'t'n-year sll:.pemiull agaiml tilt.' Movimit'llill til- I" IztltliL'nl.1
Rt;'\'oltltiollaria (MIR). The gClIeral ide", ul was Iu ltJ I1pl lltt'st. de.:Illt.'"llb
and bring tllt'lll into lhe inslilulionali'l.td political ganw,
Tht' IlJ74 brought Ihe inauguration of Carlus Pt'rt'z (AD), ;l
Ibmboyant left-of-cenler candidatl' whu captured 4".1 PLTt:l.'l1t or prl:.ide:lIlial
VOle. Widdy known by his initials, CAP himst'!f from Ihe Cold War
policies of Kissinger and Nixon, He: restored diplumatic relations ,.,..ith Cuba and
firmly opposed Ihe anticomlllunbt dictatorships ill Cohil" and NlCamgua.
Emerging as a hemispheric slatesman, he helpe..J fadlitat( the Carter administr.1
tion's negotiations over thl: Panama Canal and, togl'lher with Ihe president of
Mexico, cofounded an organization fur economic and scil:IHific cooperation
among countries of L:ltin America. (To consolidate his progl't.ssive.. credentials,
CAP would become vice presidenl of till' Sod:llist International after the: cnd of
his term.)
And as OPEC cui back on pruductiun in on.lel' to rabe world for uil,
suddeilly received a $10 billioll windfall. In I':)75 CAli raised the ill('tJllll'
lax on oil companies from 63.5 1070 percenl. A subSCl.JUe:llt law tile
pdroleulll induslry and crealed a state-run cumpany, later kllOWlI as I'dVSA,
2.\4 I'ARI TWO. CA<;E"TUI>IES.C1IANGFOVrItTI;"lr
1000;;,
followed in November 1992. CAl' man;lgt'tllO ,('n't' 1)111 hi" Inlll. hilt \\'1111 Iltll,
salisfnclion. III 199] he \\,;1S impeached on lhnrg'" III (,Iuho/ling 1111"e th,II'
lllillion,
The Puntn Fijo system \V;IS nlllning nul of .. Ie:l 111 , /\Illldk (1.1.... (Irlll"lI'.
expressed mounling olltrar.e over Ihe hlalanl "elf cilrithlll('lll of le:ldmg I"'hll
dnns. including Lw;inchi :llld CAP, Org.llli7cd wnrker.. h('(.II11e .1W.II<' Ih.11 Ih,"
were not receiVing a f.1ir share of hendits fmlll I he pcl nllel 1111 Wllalf.111. 1\ n, I II" ,'nl
migrants 10 Ihe cities. ullderemployed :tnd IIIHlerp.lld. hrg.1I1 d('III,II\,III1'; ... " I,t!
services and economic
As c;owse :lnd effeci of this cxIJa1tslinn nflhe Plllllll l'ill).1t 1,lngr'I1It'n!., 111/,'11,
were turning ;')way from rhe Iraditionnl partics .Hld fHll" dcditll1' III gtIWl..r
Sillce CA p's embrace of l1('oliher:l1 ('conomic pt,lit in f.IL I, IhtTt' ,celll(',llll 11,' Ill'
!'uhslnlllive differences helween AD and COPEI. Whl' 'Ilk illhcH' \V,l' llll 1111"111
ingful choice? As shown ill Figllre R.2. vtller lumfUll drnl'pctl lrom .1 j'c,lk lit '1(,
percell I in (;') rem:lTkahly high lew!) In XX ,,('IlI'nl in 1')lX ,111.1 I'JX \. X'
percent in 198H. and (i0 percelll in Ihe 11.)90... In Ihe tll(':lnll 1111'. I hl' '"IllIIlI11" I \ 1111"
Inr An plus COPEI would !",11I1l).:C Irom arollnt! (In P('I\l'1I1 III I'lt,.. "ltllll,d
election.. of I97R-88 10 perccnt io I')l} \ 10 lllcn'h' I I 1'('ll('nl III "J'JX
As Ihnugh 10 underscore these trend". ({,.(:lcl (;')lllel,1 ('()I'I'I p, ....,,1,1I1 III
19(i9-7'1 -returned 10 ,... in Ihl' dnlil\1l of 199."\. hili 1111' Illne .\ ...111 llldepcll,I,'nl
candidate! Unwillingl)'. his lriumph re\'ealed 1\\'0 \\C':tknl' ....(' .. III Ilw
Punto f-=ijo s)'stem. One wns the relus:l1 01 the "filII llt! IIlg IOl\l,"........ 'Ill
for new. young. fresh faces. Allnlher \\';') .. the Illlre.l\lllg Irn!l'\,.lllle 01 1111' Il.ldl
tionnl parlies.
Sod;')1 conditions were worsenlngns weir. A!'.lleo;tlll tIl ,hnfllil' 111/1.'11"11, !Ilf'
purch;')sing power of "verage s"brics 11.1<1 (:tllell to nul)' IItlC II1Ird of wh.11 II kId
heen in Ihe Inl<: 1970", During the UHlt"SC 01 Ihc 1')'1110, Ilw 1'\1\'1'11\ 1.llt' w,nd'!
AI) I COI'FI VOlt'" Shalt'" The Oevil's Excrement
which would lake direct pari in pClroleum production. Anything and cverything
seemcd llOssible. As CAP repeatedly exclaimed, arc going 10 change the
II was the cquiv<llcnt of EI Dorado-or so il seemed <II the limC'.
The fnllowing decade proved rcla!ivc!)' lranquil. The P<lct of Puntn Fijo
remained in place. oil income was substantial, and the economy performcd fairly
well. Presidents Luis Herrera Campills (COPEI) <Inti Jaime Lusinchi (AD) Icd
moderate and cOlnpelent adlninistmtions, although accusalions of corruplion
wcrc slarting 10 mount. A surprise tlevalu<llion of Ihe bolivar in 1983 temporarily
rcduced popul;u confidcnce in the government, hut Ihe system still
survived. Despite disngreelllent with Ronald Reagan's polk)' toward Central
America (described in Ch"pter 4). the bilateral rel<ltionship with the United
St;ltes remained on <l mostly even ked. By Ihc laic 1980s. Venezuela nppeared to
offer "n ellviable political model for other Latin American countries: it was a stahle
"nel prosperous democracy with a two-party system (or two nnd a half p:'lIties.
according to some analysts). \o\/hat lllore could anyone want?
The wheels begnll tn comc off when Carlos Andres Perez made a triulllphant
return In the in 19R? Suddenly reversing course, CAP impo$ed a
proW<lm of llcoliber<ll economic reform$ Ihat included pri";ltizatinn of
state ov.'ned compnnies. liheraliz<llion of tr<ldc. nnd deregulation of eC(lnolllic
<lct ivity-:tlollg with sharp increa!;('s in the price of gasoline and public Irnllsporta-
tion, including hilS fares, Enraged dtizens of C1racas took 10 the streets in
spontnneous protest. allli a heleaguered CAP called on the military to restore
order, Army tanks rolled down major thoroughfares. skirmishes broke oul. and
looting heGune Widespread. The governmcnt Inter acknowledged a de:lth toll or
287; independent observers put the lotal at nearly 2000. Either wny. the cnrt1WZO
W<lS a time oftr<tgedy, despnir, and disillusionment.
f\ fev.' )'ears laler, the unthinkahle occurred: clements of the :trmed forces Iried
to seize pOv.'er by force, III Fchnl<lry 1992 a grol1p of paratroopers :In
unsuccessful COUJl under the leadership of a young wlonel named IllIgo Ch:lve"l,
As delllnnslr<lliollS continued throughout the ycnr, allolher alleillpted
0% -'-,--,-_-,__-,-__,-_---,-__-,--_-,
YeaI
Figure 8.2 The Rise and Dedinl:' of Major Parties in Vcncwelil. I Q5R 199ft
I JCflnif('f Mc(oyimd f),lVI(l I Mv""" ((',1\1. Til,. 1I/J",,rl""1 "I P,'I''' ".""/"" / 'oj" "
(Artlrlll101(' Ilnpkill', I Jrl'Vf>'\'IY r', ...\\, )()()(,)
One of the most telling ,m"lyses of Venezuela's oil bonanza came from none other
than Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo (l903-1979)-two-time cabinet minister, author of
the firty-firty formula, and OPEC's founding father, Writing in the 19705, Perez
Alfonzo warned his fellow citizens about overexploitation of the country's oil
reserves, reckless government spending, insufficient attention 10 non-oil economic
development, and-above all-the false illusion of prosperity. len years from
now. ye,us from now, you will see: oil wilt bring us ruin. Oil is. the c1e.
V
H'S [I
ex(remen!.
195R 1963 196R 19D 19X \ I '1'1
.'Ie. 1':\1<1 1\\'00 t 1\:->1 -.TUllll'> I..IIAN(.I.UVFI{'tlf\ll
.lollhk, .lI'IIIthU..Illllg (.1I l't:"fl.. t'lll h)' lilt: t"IH.1 of the del-alit:. An amorphous
.. ltll"lll,1I ::>cdur" \Va:> :::.prtw..Iing Ihrough lh..: dlit'.!>, as poor peuple sought to
lll,d,\' t"lId.. rlll'l't hy workillg UII Ill\' l'>lrt'l'b. tvlcanlinll: the elite remained above it
,Ill, lItJl .. ill l"lllllliry dub :,>ecurity, .1:> Vlollczuda retained Olle of the highest
It..vd .. vi n:OllUllli\ jlll'qualily ill the world. 'fhe sitmllion callell for drastic
1111..',1""1'\' ..,
THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE (1 998-PRESENTj
I Ih' \IIII,q'''\' III V\'ll\'/Ud,I'::> IWO-I',IlI)' :>}'.!>Ielll It'lt all ..:llunnuus vacuum in the
Il,llh'lI .. 1'1'1111\::>.. Ilitu thi:> hr\',llh :>tcppt:d Ilugo Ch:lvez, k'adt'r of a failed coup
,llklllpl 1II !l)91.
1"IHllIll\'d .llkl .1 Iwo}'eM ill pn:,oll, Ihl' unrepentant Chavez emt:rget..l
,I" ,I 1l.lllt'Il,t1 hero wllh .1 1I1l'S:.i'lIlic CUlIHmtment to hi:> own personal destiny.
HI,l .. h, IIlIbpokt"lI. IIlluulvl'nliullal and down-to-earth, the l'x-paratruoper suc-
\ll... d\d III huildlllg p\)werlul gra:.:>roob support among gruups th'1t had been
Ih'j.!.I\",lnl hy I!lt" P.IL! I.JI ('uutu Fijo-lIlo:>t nutably, tht: middle classes and the
III h.111 1'1'111'
Who Is This Guy?
11\1IJ" (lI.wel c1asslflCdtion. SUPPorlers him as d
",,111.)1, d plUlL'l.lOl, ,) and d lto'volUtlonary; denounce him as a
till I"tlll, all oppUllwmt, <.J and- ironlcdlly-a revolutiondly. Who is this
WilerI":.' did hl'
Ilwl1 III IIJSti.. UldVto'l up III tllto' hdllliel of Sdbaneta on
III\"' /fill/{):. uf Ii,HUt":>.. A.. d younlJ Inal1, ht: tJrt:dntt of becoming a professional
1l,'\eIJdll pl.'yl'''' lhroulJll inlOlfllal lulori..ls with the fdther of boyhood
IIIL"mh. hc .,bo IL'lL'ivt:"d ,I luclullt.'nl.lry Introduction to Marxist teachings and
V"IIL'/tlL'I,ln IlI.. tOlY
At tilt..' "ljt:' of "L'Vell\('Cn, ht:' entered the !ldtion's military academy in the
l"',l'tMy (lly uf While thele he dt:'vdoped a strong interest in the leftist
tluhl,'ly It:<jlln:os then IJIt:sent under Ornal Torrijos in Panama and, especially,
und,'r Juan Alvarado in Peru. "With ToniJos: Chavez later recalled.
"1I>e(.,lllt: d TUIlIJISt. With Velasco, I becdrnt:' a Velasquist. And with Pinochet (in
Uuk'l. I Lt:'I..1111t:' <in "ntl Pinochetisl
AIIL'l <jIMlllatioll from the academy, Chavez established hnks with recal-
lItl,ulI 1I1111tary colleagues and with dedicated members of the Venezuelan
Id!. He lNl)an living a double life: <IS a disciplined soldier, and as a con-
spll"lor .:Il).llmt the yovernmeill.. As d military officer, Chavez disdained what
II\' lumldt:"t:'d to Ihe corrupl ilnd foppish pohtical ehle; as a person born
hi IKlvlrty. he bittelly resentt:'d the country's economte oligarchy.. His nation-
<.Jh.. 111 dllt..l dntl AlIlellCdllislll (to the point where he even rejecled
,,\ .. U.s. impolt), And he nurtured grand ambitions, Before 2000 I'm
going to be d yeneral: he boasted 10 friends, and I'm gOing to do
something major in this country."
In it scornful response to Black Friday of 1983. Chavez dnd young offlcels
took a solemn oath. quoting flOrn Bolivar: "I will not let my soul repose, nor Illy arm
rest until my eyes have seen broken the chains that oppress us dnd our people by
the orde' of the powerful: The group thus formed the l:jerclto Uolivariano
Aevoludonario (Bolivarian Revolutionary AlIny) and wdited for the opportunity to
stllke, They beheved Ihe time had come In 1992, dUllng the second presldell(:y of
Cados Andres Perez, although events would prove Ilkm 10'110119.
It nOI until the mid-l990s that Chavez and COhOlh dt:'(.idecl to
the eleetoralroute to political power. During the inauguration ceremonies ahe, hiS
election as president III 1998. Chavez stopped to elllb'dce it for Iller coconspirattJl
and quielly whispered to him, We did it. blOther. After all those years. the
revolulion can finally begin:
Wt.H1 (llilln,) Marcano and Alhella 6.:"":1<1 lYiZk..a.. 1/ugo (l1{jWL (New Yurko H"rldulll

Preparing for the eleclion 01 1998, Ch;iwz fOlllldl',I,1 1l1'W polltit.."al parly Gdlt::ll
the Mov;",icllto (juillta Uep'lbJial or Republic 1\<lovt'llIt"nt," Iulown by tht.'
acronym MVR (the V be rcad as .1 I{uman numl'ral).
Prest:llting as a latter-day UoHvar, Ihl' charislll.llic
lIlounted a whirlwind GUllpaign, Ill' daimcd Ih"l AD, COPEI, alld ollll'r long-
standing partks were obsolele and uut uf tuudl.. lie dl'1I01111Ced tit ... cnllltJlHic and
business ditc as a '"rancid oligarchy, Ill.' in:.iSh:J Ihat thl'rl' I..-ould be: only Olll'
expbnatioll for puverty ill a natiun oil rich a:> Vellc"i',ucla: I.OlTlipliun, ":OITUp-
lion, allli still more \'OITUptiOIl, It wa:. lilllt: lor radk.\1 change, Itl' argued. alld he
W.I:> the pl,;'rsoll 10 bring it ;lbOliL I-kedinl:!, hb l1less.lg\,;', tlte peuplc hilll
wilh 56,2 per('cllt or Ill\' vole-a remarkably :>ubslanlialll1<1l1d.lle.
Two rdalcd f"clur:. cumbined tu pruduct' tltis rl'Milt. Olle lht..' lllCOlllpdt"lllc
;llld of the oppositiun, As Chav\,;'z's own call1paign lllall:lger acknowl-
edged, '"The viclury had morl' 10 do with his adwr:'i11 ie:.' political arurs lhan lhe
quality of our OWII e1t:clor:t1 campnigll, which was relatively disorgallizl'd, The
dl'ctiollS were WOIl more beCiluse ofwhallhl' oppositiun didll'l achiew Ihan because
of whal dlfll'ismo actually achil'wd: According 10 the rl'spt:ctcd Ill'WSpapl'r U
Nl/cio/w/, 1111..' olher key stemmed frolll -I he trt:lllendous It:vcls of fru:>If<.llioll Ihal
have lurned the majority againstlhe uld political II is absolutely clcar
Iht: l'lIlirl' cOllnlry has chosen an option Ihat is differ":l1t front which the
traditional ruling class was trying to The tilllt: for change had come,
The first phase of Chavisla rule brought mixed results .. On one hand, eh.iva
It'lstcncd 10 consolidate politicill powt:r. He Gilled decliuns for a constitut:nt
assembly 10 wrile a new constitution, Once the convention wa:. seated, pro-
government delegates used their majority to dislll;'llltlt: Ihe Suprt:llle Cuun, db-
band the elected legislature. and anoinl themsdvcs 10 Servc ill place of L'ollgrcss..
Overriding tlte opposition. they approvt:d a constitution that pcnnittcd reelection
2JN 1',\RTTwo" Ct\<;J:'TlIf)IES:C!tt\NGI.OVERTtMF
of the president, enhanced (already-strong) executive powers. and created a ulli-
camer;'ll legislature (thus weakening checks and halances against president ial
authority). Insofar as possihle, Chave7. and his followers determined 10 destroy
Venezuela's long-stnnding politicnl institutions-pnrties. legislatures, cnUrls-for
the sake of revolutionary transformation. From 1999 forward, tile cards were
stacked in fnvor of the government and against the opposition. As an indication
nfthis situation. ChavCi'. went 011 to win Ihe presidential election nf2000 with 59.R
percellt of the vole.
On the other hane!' Ch:\vez faced serious economic difficulties. Oil prices were
low nnd petroleum e... mings were hovering <'It modest levels. Leery of the presi-
dent's incendial1' rhetoric. the business class-foreign and domestic-refrained
fmm making new investments. During Chavez's (irst yeM in orncc. 1999,
VenC7ucJ... s g.ross domestic product contracted by more than 5 percenl.
The solution was str:lightforward: to rectify economic injustice. Chave7. would
h:we 10 gain conlrol of Ihe petroleum industry. This mennt taking chnrge of
PdVSA. the stilte-sponsored enterprise that had become "an empire within the
empire." Admired :lhro:ld for their rnan:lgerial skill. PdVSA executives were seen
by Chavist:ls as members ofn global (and alien) capilalist elite. while Ihe oil workers
(ormed a well-p:lid :llld privileged MislocraC)' of organized lahor. Early in 2002
Chavez fired the compan}"s president and Iried to take over the hoard of directors.
In retalintion, oil workers went out on strike. Most lost their jobs as:l result.
Tensinns C:lmc to a he;'ld in April 2002. After;'l week of marches ;llld countcr-
I1lnrches. opposition lead{'r" dernnnded Chavez's re.. ignation. The president
responded hy closing dowll five private television stations and denouncing
delllonstrntors as and As he spoke. violence e!'cnlaled
outside the presidential pal<lce. Gunmen opened fire on the crowds. killing nt
lensl fourteen people. Military lenders thereupon :lrrestcd Chavez Oil the chnrgc
th:ll he or<lcred thugs to open nrc 011 unarmed demonstralors. As would-be
presidenl Pedro Carmona issued n series of draconian decrees. ahrog<'lIing the
constitution of 1991..) :lnd dissolving the lcgislatur{'. Ch;lvistn loynlists I1lflhilized
hlll1c!n.'d of thollsan<ls of supporters to demand the return of their hen.l. \<\'ithin
fort}'-eight hours, Cldvez was released from c:lptivity and restored to power.
The struggle over petroleum continucd. With unemployment "round 20
cent "1ll1 infl:ltion nearing 30 percent. a general strike hobbled the econolll)' in lale
2002. Chave7 took adv:lntnge of;l subsequent PdVSA strike to (ire more than
17.000 workers. replace the bO:lrd of directors, :lnd restructure the organizalion. It
seemed at the time like a pyrrhic victory: the president had won the political halllc.
bUI economic out 1'111 plummeled by 13 percent for the yenr.
Conflicts with Uncle Som
Under President Clinton, American ofricials had expressed concern about
Chavcz's politics hut :ldopted :l waitnndsee atlitude. "Wnlch what Chavez
docs." was the ... dvice of the U.S. ;'Il11hnssador, "not what he Under
President George \V. Hush. in contr:lst. the admini .. tralion took n hard-line
stance. In the words of Ilenry I. Ily<lc (I{lIllllois), Ihe "lIialH..t"' of ( :h.IV('1 \\.'llh "I hl'l
Icft.leaning rulers in thc hClllispherc formed an "axi" llf ('vii III t 11(' A .1". - l\f!l1
9/11, Hush ofrici;tls were otltmge(! hy Ch:iv(':/s t.nndelllll.,lilln 01
actions in Afghanistan:ls massacre ... 1<'1 I"lH i"lll . tlIIOII'l' 1'111):111
with
The 2002 coup hrOllghl;l1l irrc\'ersihk in Vell('/'Iel.,.. Id.lIH.,."hll'
with the United Stales. C:h,ivC1. heGulle \luerl)' c("winccd Ih.ll Ihe .. h .1.llninl ..
Irntion hnd aided ;)!lel ahetled Ihe }.:(ll,'r flf 2001.. 'I"hel"(, 1<' IH' 111.11 11 ....
officials wcre in c:nnHlHlIliulllon wilh l!Ie plolters til' Ihall!lc}' ,lppl.llhltt1the 11 ... 1111
They mighl \\'cll h:we j.:i\'en a grcl'n light In Ihe "hll. 1\, lnldlllg In 1'1I.... lt-nll.d
spokesmnll Ari Fleischer, ChavC7 h:ld hrrllll.,dlt n'eul, UpOl1 hllll,c1I, 11,(, 1'\1'11 hr' .\,.
wa" not a coup. hut l:h<lllge in
th:l.t point nnw:l.rd, ChavC7 hn,II11{, ;Ill I"t' (.1 Ih{' lilill ..d
Sinies uncleI' C;eorge W. Rush. lIe forge1 an C:lrly wit h Fidel ( ':,,11 0'" ('lIh.,
He succ{'ssfully spenrhcnded nppo"ilioll \I. pl:1l1" f"f:l Free T,.l,I,'/\n.1 ,.1Ih,
America". proposing illslend ;l schelllc of his own Ihe "1/'TlIl/til'll '(1'/'1'1111'111'1
ptll"(llll$ "mcriells (AI.BA). lie pledged ';l1pp,.rl 1111 1:.\',1 f\\('I.I!c'; .,1
and olher presi(!cnts Ihrouj!.hfillt I.nlin Alllcril,l. ,I.liming (It' 1.11lf'
leadership of a "pink Ihal W.I'; in Ihe AIlIClll,I'; ('1I.1I'h' I II 110-
launched a Ikmco del (Il.lIlk (If Ihe Soulh) IlIr dew'loping ll;llinl\" .1" .111
a!ternntive to the Wnrld Hank. nnd fnrged IlIlk" With .1" wdl lie
laml'0onl'd Prc"idenl HlI"h n" "Ihc c1e\"lr 111.1 "1'(1'\ II 1,('Iore IIll" (,ell('I.II A.... nnl>h
of the Uniled Nations
This l:onspicuollsl)' undiplomat it. Illlnuet tOflk I'ln\ e WII hill ,I dn It kl II\' 1'1.":
matic contexl. The flln(l:1l11('nl,11 f<lct \'\'ns ('lntl remain.. ) Ih.11 \'clloud.1 .11,,1 Ih,
Uniled St<ltes were innl ricnhly t iecllfl nne nnl)ther hr Ihcl r 11111111.11 1"111 C "II
petroleuTll. Three-quarters of VenCi'Ucl,l'" nil <.'xl'orl'" welll III IIH' Unil,'.!
Ve/lczuc1:l accounted for rnllghly 12 pen elll flf {IiI 11111'( ,rh, \'\"110'1111'1,1 lI.hl ;s
billion han'els of conventional cnu!c oil re'"',,,e". wink Ihe 11llilcd .. ll.,t1 n"l\
22 hillion, o<.casioll,11 Ihrca" Ih.ll \\nCI1I('1.1 \\'ould .. 1,,1' .. l1ll'lIwlIl" "r
lhalthe United \\'(1\111 h:llt pllr(h,l'c<; Ih('<;e w!'le ('1ll1'1\' rl1o'II'II' .,1 ,:,'"111'''''
Political hostilit)' had cconomic limit ....
Yet the tension extended well he)'ond the hilalCI":l1 ,Iud regul1l.,I.lrl'lI.,,,. A".,.I
from its occasional p}'rotechnics, Chavist.l foreign polil}' h,ld 1111('(' 11'1.Itni go I..
challenging the hegemon}' of Ihe Uniled Slntcs, di",-rcdiling tilt' ,',f>rlOtlllh piC
script ions of Ihe Wnshinglon consensus. nnd llnil)'llig thl' dn'doping world
often referred to as \Vith Ih(" al'l'(Ov:ll of all aging Fidd C:l.;lro, ( It,ivt'/
became the leader ofa revilalized movell1enl of"nollnlignc(r /lal inn... \ ViI It IIt(' .Ii, 1
of his minister of energy nnd mines (n fonner COlllllllllli"l lehcP). he hrll'co!
resuscitate OPEC. lie vigorously denounced U.s. polkirs ill AlgII.1Ili"I.111. 11.1'1
and the Middle E.,sl. lie l(}(lductcd intensive di"I('lllnl}' tll""II)-:lIolll lhC' Ar.,1t
\Yorld. huilding on Vene7.llcln's longst<'lnding association wit h th.lt ..11\(1 he
courted solitlarity with holh Russia and the People's Repllh1i( of Chill,. I\lId.I" .111
J',\I<l IWII l/\\1 ,>IUIlIt.., {JI/\NI,LUVI'J{ JI1\II:
1111\'1-:1.11 1,.1l1 "I lilt' unp\'pubr (il.'orge VI/. tu
Id'lllk:.'> lidll.llic.
1he Limits of Participatory Democracy
t\1lt:1 g.lllllllg l.\llltrul uf I'l'II"ult'uIll, Ch.ivl'J", prou'clkd Iv lighll'll his hold on Ihe
1l,ltlun':. ptJllIil,d Wilh growing (but nol much clarity), he
IlIlh.I.I11llnl lUllllllitlllt'lI( 10 building for the twenl}'-firsl century:
\\1 Ilill' Ill.' lIb I'ulitk.d fUI"lIlUI.1 a:. .1 III..W kind of dl.'lllocral. y-parlicipa_
11)1")' Iklllll\..I'".l')'- hi:. alliun:. ;Illluin.'li incrl..'a:.ingly aUlhoril'Hian overlone:..
I>t:::,pllt: w".. 11 1ll,.lnJlIg .hlvile Irulli I.ula vi liraziJ and ulher :>ympalhizers,
CIl,lll'J" Hllh.'" n'.! of Ihe lll.'ni fur .1 loyal opposition.
j,l.lUllllllg IhI..' ul Iht' prc:.idcllcy. hc routinely expressed conlempt for
l"hilc.' hi:. lulluwd:> dl'nuunotd, and bullicd oUlspoken critics
ul Ihl..' gUI'l..'rllllll-nt..
o Ill' ul 111e: IIlU:loI pMIS 01 this t'quatioll w.tS, in liKt, the chronk
W,',ddll':lo vI IIll Ollll..ial intimidation was only p<lrtl), 10 bl<lme. Anti-
(:IIavb,I,1 dl.:lIl1..'llb ill Vl'Hallet.!. Wt'I'"C disorganizc:J, and leaderless. They
,.lllll' Inllli V.II ditt:, Ihe media. th(' church, and parts of
Ihl' intdlntll.d Iht,y lacked" common agenJa. The coll<.tpsl' uf
:\1) .llhl CUI'I,I Idl thl'llI WltllOUI <.t I.:gilinwll.' pulitical part)', Many w(:re also
1,llllln!ll)' 'l i.11 illJ I with Ihl.' 2UU2 lllUp .llll'lllpl. a resull. Ihl' oppositiun could
I.d... l ,I Uq1,.IlIVl it .1IIIi-Ch:lvez, but 1I0t Onl..' of il::.
11111,>1 I.lldul wa:-. 10 IJU}'l'UIt thl..le:ghlalivl.' c1l'ctiollS of Decel1lber 2005-
\"ltkll IUl'ld)' gllari.llIk'n! Cliavbla ullanimit)'. III Ihis way, tht' opposition
Il'IIIIUII,tI])' ibdJ.
UlI.!,'r CIt.lvi:-.t.1 ruk pulitks ill .. UCC<lllIC polarizl..'d, persollalizl"d,
.uul unll,tlr/ed, With IlIl'I).lnial e:xcepliollllt"t!lc military, llational institutions-
1. .. pnlaJly IIll' kgi .. hlllll"l.. ;llId Ihe (llul'lS-werl' notoriously we:ak. Tht.'rc wns nu
duuht tllat Ch:ivl..'z ,'njo),,'d cOllsldl"rablt' pupular support, winning the pr('sidential
dl..'dltlll of 2UlJtJ willi h3 01 Ihe vuk. By this tilll..: th..: sudal base of hb
dnIVI.d lIe'll 'Lul furm: Ill'ar-UllaliinIUU..:. support ffom tile IOWlT
ll,t:':-'l':', II Ie lIlhlt:I"t'lnploYl.'d Ihat lived ill shanlytowns IIcar major cities;
11,lIlial (bill dillli lIis!liJlg) support alliung thc middle: c1ass('s, illcrl..'asingly opposed
10 hi:. aUlhvritarian klJllcl1cit's; and IIcar-total opposition from the uppel'" clas:..
Alld tllluugh lib ,II till' polls, Chawz fostering .. tyranny of the
1l1.ljllnly.
E'>l'nlall)' tdllllg \Vc.:re: l)lr..:.blillg dfurts lu prolung his in pO\VI:r. In
!"'n'plng with 1II,llly nlhl..'r Latin AllIc.:rk:l1l ,h<lrkrs, the Venezuelan constitution
ul 11)'.}')-IIIt' une llial Ch..\vt'z himself owrsaw :Ind impused-called [or a limit of
1\\'11 (lI113l'l..uliw krlllS. Unhappy wilh this reslricliun, Ihe prt'sident called for a
pllpU!:1I n'krl'nlltllli ill 2007 Ihal would remove Ihe limits 011 reelection, It was
ddl,llnllJy .. 1I.lffOW llIargin of 51 lu ,19 pc:r":I..'II1. Chavez tempor.trily accepled this
rc:.ult IIl1dl'/" illkrll>llional ('lIld, it was said, under pressure from the
,lflllnllllrl.l'', 111:.1 uvt'r a Yl"'..lf J.lkr. he: :.ublllitll'J <l ncw pruposallo lift lhe ban on
Raising his fist in a characteristic gesture, Chavez addresses a partisan crowd in his
hometown of Sabaneta during the 2006 presidential campaign,
n::dc..:tion (n01 only Ull Ihe presideD":y, bUI abo Oil all ekded ufflcc:,) alld W011
approval in a rdt'r('ndum hy 54 perct'1l1. I\s 1)1" this wriling, Iht'fl.' was no t"l.Irest't'
Iimil 10 his length of ruk.
A Decade in Power
DOlllt'stic politics and int":l"lIativll,tl 1l1.Irkels have t"llal>kd Ch.ivl'Z tu
drcam for tht' Iwenty.flrst cCIlIU/"( with ,,:ollsiJerable effect. One ke:y
factor was a steady rise of oil prices, whi<.:h c1ilnbcd from just over $1 Upl'r barrel in
thc l;tte 1990s to $59 per barrel ill 2U05 and $147 j>l.'r barrel ill mid-20U:;. As a
rt'sult. Ihl.' value of Venezuelan oil exports increased from jllst over $10 billion in
1991:llo more than $50 billion in 2007-<ln increasl.' of nearly five times!
NOI all this money was wisely SptWI. Large amounts weill inlo C1mvista loreign
policy schemcs, military procurement, wasteful proje..:ts-and, it is said. into the
pockets of governl11t:'nt loyalists. Blatant corruption bt.'Camc a ce:nlral topk: ill
Vellezuelan gossip, As pulitical scientht Francisco Rvdriguez wrole in 2006, -Tht'rt'
b lillie or 110 evidence that Chavt:'L is finally shanng Vl'n..:zuela's oil \""',Ilth with thc
poor. Most existing statistics do Ilot show signilicant improvelllcni in either the
being or the share of resources dirt."Cled al Velll..'zuda's Illost dis.lClvantaged cilizens.
.Nl ""In', wo .. (;\"'1' nv, 1'1,\11
()Iher expert .. have di .. puted such as."ertions. Ther observe, (or instancC', Ihat
the Chavez government devoled suhstantial (unding 10 social programs, so called
llIi ..sions 011 behal( o( Ihe poor, especiall)' in thc fields of health and education.
According 10 nfflcial statislics o( the Venczuel;11l governmenl, as an,llyzell by a
Washinglnn D.C.-hased research group. Ihese expendilures had discernibly posi-
I i\'e effects:
" Real ..ocio'l! spl'nding per Glpila (adju.. ted (or inOalion) more than tripled
h('(wecll 199R and 2006.
" The povertr mle declined (mill S9Jl percelll ill 19991030.2 pC'rcelll in 200t\
while povertr went down from 21.7 percclll to 9.9 percenl.
" Income inequalilr was reduced (nit hough vexing Illcnstlre!l1Cllt issues underlie
this daim).
05 In(nntmortnlitr fell hy l110re lhan ollc-third bel ween 199R <tnel 200(,.
" Substnnlial gains were made in health care ;11ld educalion, especi,llI)' ace(' ....
In higher education.
" Over the course o(lhe decade. the llllllllwr o( <;oci:ll ..eeuritr hCllefidaric<; more
than douhled.
Allel the first quarter 0(200.1, when th(' government hlok eonlrol of l'dVSA, the
e(onolll)' grew at;m average anntlnl rate n( I.\.S pcralli. ;"Iuch nflhisgrowlh took
pl:lce in Ihe private 11C1Il-oil scctor.
If the lI11derl)'inR ll:tt<l arc <lCcurale, Ihi" would look like qui Ie :l respeclnblc
pcrI1ll11l:lnce. Yet an}" such anal)'sis raises (undament;ll questions of c.\lIse :llld
d({'Ct: Did Ihese development .. take place as a cOllsclluencc o( governmelll;tl
jloliC)'? 1\<; Ihe resull. inslead, o( rising jletntlelllll prices? Or in re"ponsc 10 olher
(Olein!".. ?
In retrospcct. il nppeOl!"ed thalllugo Ch:lVe7 dr('\v his pnliliC:11 strenglh frnlll a
variCI)' o( sources: (I) the illll"cnsing income (rolll p('troleulll. (2) his charism::llic
,.ppe.1I 10 pnpl1br Ill:1SSCS. (.1) the org:lniz;llinnal weakness of the Opposilion. ;lnt!
('I) his resistance \II U.S. hegemonr nnd, espednlJr, hi" ahility to exploil wi\lcsprc:ld
dl'o,lasle for Presidenl Bush. Those (nclors s\lstnined hi" grip Oil power for the
del.;lde (rom 199R through 200ft
But things coulll also change. As a result o( the glob:tl economic mclldowll of
200R 9.lhe price of oil dropped precipitou..ly from $147 per harrclto onl), $37 per
hnrrel. the Vellezuelan economr was projecled 10 contract in 2009.;t
downlurn that could impose significant constraints on Ch;1Vista foreign policy.
And ,IS a rcsult o( partisan realignmcnt. Ihe politicnl campaign of 200R led to the
inslal1;ttion of Rarack Obama as president of the United States. A dlastencd
Ch.lvc7. announced that he would be more than willing to Illeet with Obama "on
eqll:ll and respectful terms.
R
Whether an extended enCOUlller would
ever come 10 pass was a topic o( widespread specul<ltiol1.
On halal1ce, Ilugo Chavez Ctlt a distinctive historical figure. In his
nSpir:llioll .... he oft ell compared himself 10 Silllbn Hollvar nnd dnil11ed to be
.'
" ","
" <
the I.lhernlor's modern dar heir. III .Illillll. hOWt'\'l'l. 1110" "'IIllt'1 1',11.111''''1''''
hnre .'11 even grentcr r{Sf"lllhI.IIH.e tn :->lll II l'r<;lwlllk tllk,.. .1" \ 111"111"
(;U7l11:l
1l
Bl:lnco. lu.1n Vil.l'ntc (;llllle7, .llId II 11111 .. 1 I", ... 1111 ('1,".111..
Ca<;lro. In Ihis sense, hf" \\'.1" .1 nindel'nlh U'1I1111\' ifill' 1"'.. III 1\\', 111\ 111.1
ccnlllf)' ''''ith the ;\"t.cnl o( Illlgo (I1.ive/, \'elll"lI1\"I . \,11111' l.h' I,. I.",
Ilot fllll)' \\lith ils (Ulllll'. hilt wilh il<; 1',1'"
9
Argentina
Progress and Stalemate

111\: W.l'.11 kill ll'lIlury Iht: Lat in

with .1 !'ol.llhl.lld til IIVll1g cOInp.II..lhll..' 10 thai 01 I:Uropl'. I ogether wIlh a
po\wlllll wavl'1l1 ill1Jlligratillll frulll EUfOIW, robust cxportsofbcefand wheu! laid
till' 1\l\llld.lli\111 Ivr dyll.llilil l'(:illlOllli..: growth. In the wake of World VVar II, Juan
Ihllllingli 1'l:n'lIl H...,lI.lptd the pulitknl map. and in the 19705 a
Illilll.I!')' lI11lcashl'd ,I t:ampaign of violt'llt rt'pression that shocked
Illklll.HUII1.l1 puhlli.. opiniun. EVl'1l thl' nation rclurnt'd 10 delllocracy. it
... wllh l',:onUlllll.. IIlh.eft,lilll)' and political strife. Uy the: slart of thl.'
(wl'nly fJf31 u':IlI11I")' .tlkl" .I of l'conomic (,I'isis and polilicu]
I'JlIII:III, t'\rglllllll.l') Il!.lliVl' ofhvin!:', h.ld undergolll' pn:cipitous dl'c1illl'
III Wh.11 .Irl till.' ruut:. of Ihl.'sl' prublcllIs? \'Vhal can ;:lC("uUIlI for such
11.lt.d)'/lllg dl"'ltJltllll Illghly l'lIUl,llnl ;.lIld well-endowed so<:icly?
fROM COLONY TO NATIONHOOD
I'I"- ..."-lll tidY '\lgCllI1Jl . ,I ualkh'all.:r ill till" Spallbh t'\llll'ril",ll\ coloni'll
l:llIJllll:. UlIlik,,-, Nkxl"-u ur 1',,-'1 L1, Ihc rq;ion ur Ihe Riu dl" la Phlla had no settled
11.IIIVl IIOpul.lIIUII. '('11"-' IIIJi.lll:> WCIC ill numba ;:llld nomadic, so Ihl' Spaniards
h.ld Ill' ro:.IJy 1.lrgl-:o,,-all" I. bor The an:"l's greatesl resoun:t> was ils fertile
!.tlld .llliong Ihl: I ill Illl' wurld. A further ;:ISSl'I was tht: IOGllioll of
'\lIl';,>, will... " wdl siluakd Iu bC'(l)lllC J greal port. Yet no dynalllit: ecunomy
l'llll'I"gl'll ill IlIl' 1I1111lli.d lr."
'tJI" oflhl'lululli.d ('fa, Argl'lliina was illduded within Ihe Viceroyalty of
I\:ru, ,llld ils C('OlltHll k dcvdojJlill'lll was linkl.'d to Ihc norlhward shipmenl
'1IlUIIOll, rill', wlll:al, and Il'allll'r goods. The coastal region around Buenos Aires
aClive. lb gll'all'SI illduslry was smuggling. Only in 1776 did Buenos Aires
,LV'.Ullll' 11IIjHll'l.L1h.l', wlll"1I il III.HIt: Ihl' scat of n lIew viceroyalty. Powt:r then
Illg.1I I 1\1 shill IrulIl lhl' 10 Iho: southl'fll (o;.\st, .IS Bucnos Airl's be(amc
,Ill' l'llll')' 1'01"1 hlr import:..
I
N
,
"ALII-Ie
UCf:AN
lOtI,,,,
4au
Map 9 Argentina
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i\ltGENTINi\

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'l). Ik,,:o:/, \ I"m"d
.. I"IJoII,g,
l:u"ic"ln
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ip
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2'16 !'J\lrI TWO .. CIIAN(;E OVER TIME
The V-lars of Indcpcndence shook Ihe Viceroy.lIly of the Rio de In PI;lla. but
withoul the properly dnlllage that hil Mexico (and Uruguny). Anti-Sp'lIlish senti_
ment in La Plaia united the locnl elite and produced whal hecnme nn enduring
mylh of military prowes<:. as General Jose de Snn (\'Iarlin dcfcalcc.!lhc lmops loyal
10 the Sp;lllish (:rowl1. 'With independence achieved in the IR20s, Ihe 1;lIH.Jowning
arislocracy viewed its realm wilh salisfaclion. (\Iost import;lnl. Ruenos Aires and
Ihc inlcrior 10 the norlh and west grew steadily farther apart.
Struggles for Supremocy
In the c.!ccntlc.<: aner independence, competing regionnl groups battled over the
diredion of nation:ll development. One faction wa" Ill:lde up of the
Illainly from the province (and city) of Ruellos Aircs. They wanted to n:ll iOllali7.e
the port cit)' of Ruellos Aires: slrip it of its aulonomy, thell use it ;"IS n hnse for
reclueing provil1cinl h:lrriers tn trade, nnd therehy opell Ihe enlire country 10
illt('flHltioTl:l1 cnlnmercc.
The second group was the "federalists," who wcre from the interior. They
<lgreed on the need to n:llioll<llize the eily of Buenos Aires hec<luse they wanted the
Lit)'s ctl<:loms receipts di<:trihuled 10 all the provinces. At Ihe same time, the)'
w,lIlled 10 m:1int:1ill pro\'incial autonomy, especially the nhility to lev), inlerpro
vinciall:HiH:.. and 11111<: proieci loc:11 industries.
The third grOllp \\'.IS also called the hut the}' were of ::\ very
different kind: the)' were from the province of Buenos Aires and opposed ll<l!iO-
nali7::\tiClIl of the port lity of Bilenos Aires, since that would me::\n the loss of their
province's monnpol)' over the cilis customs revenues. They also wnllted
Iree tl'::\tlc. In crfecl, lhe Ihird group was <ldvocating the status quo.
The conni" nlllong Ihese lhree groups lasted through the IRJOs and IS'IOs.
The is!'IlC was evenlllally decided h)' one of Latin Amcric::\'!' fa mOlls diclators: Juan
l\lanucl de Rosas. a politically ambitious cntllc rnnchel' from the province of
HUt'llllS Aires, who won lhe gnvernorship of his province in IR29, But his ;1I11hi4
tinns did noL stop there. He wanled to rule all of 1\ rgcllt ina. and pursued his goal
with policies favoring the ('stallricros (r:lnch owners). Ihus furthering the C01150-
lid<llion of n bnded :lristocr;tcy. As an ardent Buenos Aires federalist. ROS:lS \'...ns
determined to suhdue rival caudillos. lie extended the power of the province of
Ruenos Aires over the country. in effect building up a nation 011 the prinCiple of
fedcrnJism. AI the same lime, Rosas built a powerful government machine. with an
enforcemenl squad (Mazorc(l) thai lerrorized 0111 who dared oppose him, even if
only hecause lhey (<liled 10 wear the official color of red.
I{mas's evcntunlundoillg W:lS his efforl 10 appl)' the same dicl::\torial lactics
Ihat had worked so handsomely in domestic politics 10 Argentina's foreign policy.
Unfortunaldy for Rosas, hc succeeded in arousing a powerful opposition alliance
that included Brazil and Uruguay. as wcll as the Argentine General Justo Jose de
Urtlui7:l, who comm<lllded a force thnt deposed ROS:lS in IS52 <lnd forced him into
imlllcdinte exilc. Despile his ignominious f"II, RosOlS h:ld succeeded in creating a
united ArgenlillOl 0111 of the dispnrate provinces. Fromlhc momcnl of his defenl,
IJ AlgCllllll,l l'r"}.:II..... 11lI1 \l.lklll,11t' ) I"
Al"V,CIlI inc n<ltion<llists ,ulople(l him al; all AI gentllH' pall iol who 11.111' '11.11
(lcvclopment against Ihe <llien forces seeking to <:uhvell AI).:ellllll.l I; n ..(' In lull
nationhood. In this respecl, I(osas resemhles Chile'I; I'nrlale.. ,lIul J\1' ... ",,..
Av,uslin de Itllrhide, who al<:o hC'L:lllle Sll"ong allll I Illkr.. ill Ihe dc, ,hi"
aner ilHlcpendcnce.
During the em m.l1l)' Argcntine inldl(,t!Il,11... ... 11< 11 01" \lnnllllJ..:"
Sarmiento alld EstehOln Echc"<'fria, ned Ihe r('prt's"i\'c regime. S,II111icnlll d....\ II!lnl
RosOl<: :1.<: Ihe nl:'ill "Whfl appliNlthe kni(e of Ihe gall< hn 10 til(' I 11111111' 01 HIII'II""
Aires :lnd the w(lrk of of \l\'t1i7..llitlll, 1,IW .Illll lihnlr ,,('
inld1cclll;I!<: dre:lm('d of c;lpturing control of ,11ll! .. \1'('1 II till 1, , tilt'
course llllihcral reprcscnt:ltiVt' gllvcfllllh'nl, \Vilh llw 1,1111.1 !to".I" tilt,\, IlwlI
(halh_C,
Justo lose de lJrqlli"la, n federalisl frolll the inlenll', 11l1l1llptly ",w 1" I'lll\l'
I Ie bcg.-111 hy n constillltional COil vent inll. which pn III III Ig,ll cd ,I \ 011'.11111'1' 'II
in p;ct;J, c10sd)' followinp.lhc cX;JmplC". It w" ... 10 hC.l letln;J1 "'v.. l(IIl. \\'llh 1111'
presidelll cho<:en by an e1ectornl college. Antllh(' 1('01('1.11 I ,\nglel;" \\,,1'. In h.I'''' t\\11
house<:. with Ihl' C:h;Jmhcr 01 IkpUI iel; hv dlre( I \'111(" ,IIHII he I,ll" IIII
hy
The controversy over the sl<ltuI; (If the llty nl I\U('IIO" All"e.. \\',1'" 1.11 h"l1l
<:cll1cd, however. Ihc Ilal iflll,lIi7.11 ion 01 the I 11 ,. III Ihe" Il'''''' I fH\ ..1111I111l1l.
the provincc of Huenos Aire.. rcflll;cc.! I" join thc llCW t nnlcl!CT,lllf>n I trlt .11o-.11II.l
bnefdvll W:lr in the provlllce ro..;e in revlll1lwlI \(',11<; I.IIt I. led hv 11.111 ..1"111,'
'litre, <llld captured conlrnl flf thc lOllledn,lllllll.
For the next two dccndes the lihcr:ll<: UIlltlllllCII III 1'0\\'('1" In IXf,' i\l,lr,'
W<lS i nallgurnted as president. ;Jntl he l<lllllchn\ n IICW (II iv(' 1(1 Iln,1 ,. AIg\'nl' 11,1 I I,'
was followed in Ihe presidency hy Ilomingo SanniClll1 I, :11111" II 1\1 "'.U 1111,1" ( I KI'.).
the most famous lilcrnry all<lck onlhc r{//uitlJ(J ... ty1e g,lll( hn.. , ".1I"1I1ICOI,1 helll'v,"I
ardelllly ill North Alllerit:lll slylc ['uhlil' etllli allnn .111d Illgcoi 1"
follow lhe U.S. model. Thc drawn-nul l'aragll;Jy<lll \",1,11' (I 70) illlcl' ell(' I.
in which tin)' Par:lgua), hdd ofr Argentin:l, Hra7il. and llfllj:ll,l}' fnl live n.I1 ..... 1'"
it triecl (ullsuLceSSfllll)') Itl lllonopoli7c ,1((e"s III Ihe .111 1111 pili 1.1111 ",11.\11.1
River hasin.
Thc third liberal presiclcnl W:IS Nicol.is A\'('lIalled... III Ill'" term (tW'1 XO).
Argentinn undertook ils l:lsl major lerrilori:ll cOllqllC"t 1111.' "Inoli:lll \\,11 .... I h.
provinces 10 the soulh anri wesl of BllellO<; A hOld long h('cn I'l.lgll("flllY Inlh,111
raids. Now an army force uncler the cOlllm:lnd Clf (;ener,ll Illho Hllt,l ... nbdllnl "'
extcrminatecl the indig.enoll<: h;mds-lhe "Cnnqlle<;t of Ihe I)C"CI I
By now. the libernls had enjoyed powcr \(lng clHOuJ.!,h to 1.1)" Ihe b,l .. h lUI thl'll
counlry's mpid integration into Ihe world economy. The t;.pllhnlit;1ll .. I Ih(' 111'\"
could hardly have heen bcller: Ihe llll!l:ln f1ghll'f 11\'1'1 lilt'
Europennization of a SOllth Americ<ln repuhlic
The political elite had few douhts ahollt ill; Illi"sioll, r.ike Ih('lr cnUlllcl p,lll ... II'
Br<lzil nnd Mexico, the Argelllille pOlilici:lll!'o alld illldlc( 111,11 .. ";.1\\' Ihclll"'I,hT" ,I"
:lpplying the true principles of hllih ('COlllll1lil antI plilillt ,II li]1CI,III .. 111
r....lllliul1:- 01
USlJ
1960 1950 1940 1930 1920
Year
1910 1900 1890
2UO
o
,.80
1200
1000 -
MOO -
600-
4UO
Figure 9,1 Exports from Argentina by Sector. 1880-1960
\OU"'I Orlando J IAn uqlol df! (rooomitJ HlUo/lf.I Ar!/t'/lft/1(1 ,'II (/1/<1\ UJIO-lU(J-1 (BUt.-nu,>
Aun rund..... I!On NoH'" y'.,01, llI05). pp
1600 lJ Uthel
1400 0 AgricullUrc
10 LivcSlod..
rurallaburl'f,'), Othl:r jobs th"," opl'nnl ill tire urban sn::tor: illtl"Ubpurl k,')p"'lially
Iht' railruads), proce:>sing. and the st"rvict' industries (banking, gO\'t'l'1Illlt"llt) .
Argelltina's l:COnoIl1Y Ihus enkrcd ,Ill era of inclt:asing prusperity ba,')l,d Ull
til,,' exportalioll of meal alld grain and un Ihe impurtat ion vf nlallufactureJ
Fromlhe 1860:> 101914, Argentin3's GOP grew at an ;.ulIIllal average rakoratle;l,')t
5 percent (exact data for prl"-1900 areskt-tchy). Thi!lo olle of the highest
y,rowlh rales ewr recorded for any counlry.
But the coulltry paid a price: for Ihi... :>1It.t.t":>:>. betam'" ul ib uverwhelming
export dependcllcl' un foodstuffs, This nl.ldl' thl' ,,'lItirl' Argl.:lllillt' e"UlhJIHY \lul-
Ill.:r;!b"" to fluctuatiom in Ihe wurld price:> ur agri" uh lIr.1 I ;lml 1',1,')101'..11 guu...b. wilh
JIlY dip ill tho:.c prices pruvoking .m overall CCl.HIOll1ll duwnturn withill
Argentina. A,') ,')hown by Figure 9.1. Arg"'lItinc ",xpurb comi!>(ed ,lImo:.t ,,ltlirdy
uf products frum farming and ranching; maJluradured guods (the cate-
gory) weI',,' miniscule: throughoul the entire periud frulll tSttO tn IY6U. Ik(";.llbl of
v3garil',') in lllarkd d.... mand. thl.: valut." 01 Argentine wa... "'xll'emdy unstable:
OVer tillle:: up during World \oV,lr I. duwn in the: l.arly I Ihl'n up and down
;Igain with the arrival of the Great Depl't:s:.ion ill thl' IYJtb. A b"il:f upward ,')pllrl
afkr "Vorld War II was followell by ,')h.IlV d"",lillt's ill the carl)' allli th"'lIlhl.:
appt'al";'IlKe or a :>hort lived steady ,')Iale lip hi Ihl' I '1'1 I\!,') ilhl.lik,, utilI,;'/'
e:xpurting countril':> of Latin Amel'ica, Gillie to Ol' l... ulIumil:.t1ly dl'p"IlJl.:nt UII
trl'lllis ,md decisions made the contll1l's ultll", llaliun, ill tltt"
L('lllt'r of the world-syslem.
Ecunumic dl'pelh.lt'ncy abu appl'ared ill Ih... Algl'lltiut" banklllg ,')YSklll. whkh
W,IS pt'riodically tied 10 thl.: guld st.llIdard. Short Il'flll IlttCltl,ltiolis in Irade "... us",d
:.h,lrp l"hanges ill Argt"lltina's guld rcsen'l'S, cOlltr.l"tillg or t'xp,\lldillg lite
OVERVIEW: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE
.'IX I'.\I<J J\\'O" t ,\')1 ' .. IUDIJ .... c'IIAN(,1 OVI'j( 1'11\11:
"I 11"'lbl'll Ihl'y argued lilal if an .lri:>lu.:r,lI... y ruled
1\ I1:'.1'111 11I,1. II W,I,') Ihl' n',')1111 oillatllral :>dl:Cliull, vVilli Ihe Indi.1I1 nnd the: gaucho
... ,dd)' ... uhdunl, Ill", di1(;' Ct)lll1dc:nll)' hluk",d furw.1l'l1 Iu ",miching ibdf. and, by
hha.d lugll' tll,,'rdl)' ,,'nrkhillg Ihl:ir UHllltry,
,\lgl'IIII1I,1 ,u.:lllevnlntlt.lhk \"UIIIOlllK gnn"'lh in the "'1'.1. Thb SUCl.::l::>S
\...., ... b.lwd 1111 ... upplyillg agrkuhur,tI to Ihl: Nurth Alhllltil: indu,')trial world.
... lllU '\lg"IlIIIl.1 h.ld a "ulIll'ar..ltl\l' adv.llll.lg" ill producing IUl.al and grain. Two
Inllll\Ilugll.11 .ldV.IIK<:,') II;ld Illadt' it tn fuud:>tuff:> IIIi..' many Ihou
.... llId... ul 11111,,,') tnull BUl'uD:' Alrc:... 10 Loudun .llld Antwerp. One wa:'> Ihe :>Icam
wllb Ib 1.1,')1(;'1' ;I lid 1.11' more: Ct'rt,llli p.let.' than the sailing ship. The olher was
,I 1"0"".... lUI dlilllng IlIl.II, whkh kepI th,,' products fresh fur sale: in European
JlMrl..l.:h,
!\1!!."'lltill,l\ p.lInp.l,') we:1'1.: .1I11ung thl.' IllO,')( lerlllt: lands in the workl. But
'\lg('l1tlll.1 la... kl.:d c.lpital ,HId I.tbur. Engl.III"I, Argt."lllina:> principal l.u,')tulllcr.
""111 Illl' 1I"'l:lkd "'lpit,1I ill th,, IUrlll of iIlV('SIIllt."lIt III r,lilroad:>. ducks, packing
lulu,'),,.....llld IHlhik l:ngll:>ll 111111,') abo h..lnd1cd shipping, ill:.uranc<:. and
h.lllhillg. nIl,') Il1lh,w 'It c'lIutal wa.. t'x,lLlly wll.11 til": Argt'lltillt' pulitic;;!1 dilt' saw a:>
l....l'llI1.11 1111 thl'lr uHIlllry' .. d,,'vdoplllllIl.
Tltl' ...oIUIIIIII 1", tilt" ulher lllb... ing I.ldlll'. 1;1001', abo callie fl'olll Europe.
.dllllHlgh 1101 1111111 Britaiu, Tht' b;ldly nn:dl.:d workers ,')trl;llllt."d into ;\rgentina
11\1111 "llllllt'lll 1:.l1nI11I:, l::.pni,dly Ital)'. Bct\\'Cl'11 Iti57 and 1930, Argeillina
Il'u'lvnl .1 lId iUlllllgnlt iOl! (illlllligr.lllb minus (,'llligl'anb) of 3,5 milliun, mcaning
IIt,II ,Ihou( hO pa"":llt uf till: tvlal population inCJ'l';\:>c cuuld be attrihuted tu
llllllllgr,lllllll, 01 Iltt'S'" illlllligrallb, <tbUllt '16 pcn,:clIl wert' Italian and 32 percell I
Sp.llll:-h. TIll' dllllOgraphi.: dicCI of illlllligration on Argentina was greakr
111;111 011 .lllY C11Il('r Inajor COllilt 1')' of llll' WC,')!l.:rll I Wilh Iht' e:pic tide of
1l1l11Ilgr.IIIUll, Ihe national pupulatHHI swdll'd frum 1.7 million ill IM6lJ Iu 7.9
llldlllll1 ill ,Ibolll 3u percellt vI whkh W,IS IOl"l'igll burn. (At Ihc samt: time
III IIll' Un ilnl Slatl','), anol hcr h,Wl'lI for Europt:a n emigrants. only about 13 percenl
uf Ihl' pVpU);,ltiUll W;IS lurt'ign burn,) Tht' n:,')uh was to gi\lt." Argentina ,) distinctly
l,tlrllpl',111 qu.i1it)'. \... ilh .1 n:sultil1g !l'll,')itlll among Argenlint"s as to their real
11.111')11:11 identity,
"hi:. illlllligrant labor fun:e ofkreJ a lexthook eX<llllplt: of Iht: mobility of
I.lhur. Thl'r,,' \... ,I rl'Jllarbbll'IllUVCIllt'lit oflaborel's back and furth bel ween Italy
.Illd Ill,, ;\rg('lllilll' pampas (I:arning thl'llI the: nick.name ofgolondrillfls. or
lu\\':>"), Thae: wa,'); ,) lIuid IllUvt."lllent within Argentina, too, with Bue:nos Aires
;11\\'.1)',') ,Itll.lcting a large :.hart' of til(.' foreigners.
Till' r.lpld e:1,.UIlOlllic gruwth of Ihl' 18MO-191'1 era h<.ld profound soci<.ll
1L1IpIK.ttlulb. i\t the out,')t't the Iand"",1 dilt" W;.IS UII top, gauchos and wage labor
011 thl' hullulll. ;h till' l.'col1omy boomt'd, llt:W economic niches apPl."ared. The
1t.lli,lIl,') 'llld Sp<llli.lrd:. "",,lIll'" fir:.t to Ihe: farms, as colunisb, knanl farmers. and
I 1
250 I'M{'f nvo C'A!-oF STlJnIF" C1IANGF nVFR TIl'.H
dOIllCSlic mOllcy supply anti making Argentina's ('collOm)' a hoslngc In inlcrn;'l_
lionnl currcnc)' movements.
51 ill nllothcr link 10 the world ecollomy posed furl her long-term problems: the
large role played by foreign cnpilat rind foreign businessmen. From 1900101929,
)5 percellt of the COtllllT)"S total fixed investment came from foreigners. Brit;lin
was the princip.tl source. (0110\\,('(1 b}' France and GcrmOlny. This high degree of
foreign economic involvement lalcr became a prime largel for the economic
Ilnlionalists.
Argentina's growth paltern ;'11:0:0 created inequities;11 home. cSl'cciallr among
gcogrnphic regions. While prosperity hlessed the pampa" :lnd Ruc!loS Aires. paris
oflhc interior stagnaled. Only Mendoza, Tucum,ln, and Cordoha cscaped this falc,
IhOlnkl' to their winc :lIld :o>ugM prflc!uction. Throughout the ninetccnth century,
Ihe interior had fought 10 prevent its demise at (he hands of Buenos Aires. It lost,
and the price of its defeat was poverty.
Of course, inequities also existed within the prosperous regions. The ,,",eahhy
cslmlcicrm huilt c1eg<llll chalets, while foreign-born tcnant farmers and displaced
nalive workers scralched out a IllcOlger existence. In Buenos Aires, c1cg::mtly attired
:lrist0crats mct at their Europe:ul.st)'le dubs while workers struggled 10 prolect
their families from inn.. tion. The Argentine hoom, like so many others in c.. pital ist
countries at Ihis lime, did facilitale consider.. hle upward mohility. Bul it also
fostered huge income discrepancies, which were ultirnntel)' bound to creale
sodnl nnd polilical lensinns.
Onc crucinl sncial effect of Argentina's laIc ninetcenlh- and earl}' twentieth.
century expansion was a nonevent: till' cOlmtry "ever del/eloped (l pcman/ry. The
Conquest oflhe Desert in the I870s \'irtuallyeliminatcd the Indian pOpul:Hion, and
the land was promplly distributed in large Imets appropriate for raising callie and
sowing grain. In conlrast 10 the policy in Ihe Greal Plains of the United Slates.
Argclltina did not give ils land to family farmers or individual homesteaders. Cattle
ranching did not reCJuire n Inrgescnlc workforcc, since barbed wire was sufficienl to
contOlin the herds; and though wheat was onen grown by foreign colonists Wl10
renled bnd, they did nol constitute an influential social group. As a resllit. a classic
peasnnily-sllCh as those of Mexico. Chile. or northeaslern Bra7il-did not exist in
Argentina.
This faci meant, for instance. that land reform wOllJd never becomc the vital
and symbolic issue that it was in such counlries;lS Mexico. II was not thatl;tnd was
so evenly distributed in Argentina; it was thai therc werc no longtime rural
dwellers to In)' historic dnim 10 the soil.
Further. no peas:mtry mennl Ihere was no power b:lse on which to build
coalitions with other social groups. L'Uldowncrs could not resort to the time-tested
alliance with the peasantry that frequently occurred in other countriestnd urban
lahorers could not enlist peasants in broad-based wndare with Ihe social system
allnrge.
In the hig cilies, however. wage laborers found strenglh in org:lIliz:llion.
Mal1l1;11 workers accounled for nearly 60 perccnt of the population in Buenos
..
This difference in living conditions renee's the social inequality th<lt <lccomp<lnied
Argentina's economic expansion after the 1880s. Top, luxurious residences of
aristocratic families in Buenos Aires; boNom, tempor<lry shacks for worker<; in the ciIY"
port area around 1910. (Courtesy of the Archivo Gener<ll df' 1;'1 N:t(ion, nllf'nm I\;IP<;.)
}'d
Argentinil's nationul danCE:, the lilngo, traces It .. origins (u thl:: lall' nillE:tecnth
century, when Buenos Aires street tOlllJhs (compod,itosJ borrowed fedtureS of lhl:'
AfrO-Argentine c(//Jdombfe dance, which they man ied to Ihe rnilong<l, d folk music
originating on the pilmpas. In the dance hdlb and brothels of Buenos Aire.. '
decla.. se barrios, the.. e working class men .Hld theIr p.utners gradu..lIy (le'lled
the dance that would become Ihe tango 10 Illusic Cleated lJy dHl,lIeur mu..iClclll'>,
whose impl'Ovisation Oil flule, guitar, harp, vlolm, amJ clanneb matched the
conlortions of the dancels.
By Ihe turn of the Iwentieth century, the tullgO acquired ddditiondl rt'fllll:'rnent
as professional musicians and dancers emerged. l!<llian lItlrniglatlts thell
accordion'> and mandolins to the instrumentation, MU.. lcians t..olllpo..ing
and publishing tangos for piano. ending the ei.l 01 loose improvl ...:ltlon. 1he lan90
also acquiied a wider audience as it rnoved into more re..pt:!(table dall,t' 11<111 .. .:Inti
clubs .::mel Ihe fir!>t Ilue S!<lrs emelged-dancers, nlusicians, and bandleader.. who
have remained famou.. to the present day. The Argentine dlte scolllt:!d Ihe tanyo,
however, because of its origins in the seedy neiyhbOlhoods of Buellos Aires. It W.l'>
not unlil the 1913-14 tango (faze in Europe, when d soflf::ned verSion swept
London and Paris, that it won respeclability in Argentina. Tile mOlt:! oUHdgeou..
aspecls of the dance were left behind. and Ihe music slow<.:d .JS it re.Jclled the
ballrooms of Buenos Aire'>.
Tango now entered its Golden Age.Jt hOtlK', III cafes and (dbaret'>, where elite
men paid to dance with lower-class women. MusicIan-. Wl:"11:' Inu\:.'<billgly prolt!..
sional, playing to huye crowds a\ thriVing tHghtc1ub.., while .. I lent movies appearto'd
at city cinemas. Vocalists became eve! ct.:ntl<lt to lile Id1190. abovt' all the
world-famed Carlos Garde!.
The Golden Age W,IS over by Ille eddy 1950s, Venue.. du,>ed ,I lid t.l!lgU band..
shrJnk ;11 size, facing competition from a new gene"Ition of folk rnu:'lcians, who
clljoyed inClea)irlg airtirnto' 011 Argt::ntine I"UIU.J Ill:" t.::lngu rl(::vt::ltllde.... :,u!vlved, In
the 19805 and 1990s, it enjoyed a resUlgence of popularity in Ille Unitt::d S"lll,') ,md
Europe, suggesling that the tanyo is, altel jau, the Amenca,>' sE'loml glto'.:I1 (Utl-
to internationall1lu.. K.
,!',..' 1':\1(1 I\V\I" I i\"'I. "I 1I1J11."
(\Ifl... III 1111' l"lrly tWl'lltkth Cl'ntur)'. AmJ abllllt of Ill(' working dass,
III tUftl, ulIl ... bll,d ul illlllligrallts who retained citizenship in Ilal)' Spain.
TIll' firsl drlll'Is al organizing Argt"lIlinr.: labor inllllt:llced by
Pll'll'lkllt:-.. III tIll' 1870:t alld 1880s, Ellropeall :.lliarchist and
'oIh.. i:di'll l'xill':' bl:'gan vigorous ofganizing, and ill 1895 Argentina's Socialist
1'.Llly w.,:-. ({JuIILln!. TIll:':'I' Sodali:'ls molded 011 thl:' European lIlodel: a
1",r1,.II11I'IlI.tt'y P:lIty, ck.lrly (Ollllllittcd to all e1cctornl (Jlld evolutionary
... 1"Ikg>'. A" III IlJUU IJlll' Illigllt havr.: t'xpc:clt'd the Sodalbt Parly to bl'COllll;
.L IIl.l;1I1 puillil:d Vllll.l' luI' till' Argl'ntilll' working class, Yet il failed to attract
lltt.> lllllJllgr,lJll \\'\lrh.er:..
Till' IJrh.lJl wurkillg cia:.:. proved receptive to anolher message:; il came from
1111 :lllardlbts. Theil l.'l:'dl'nKiull Obrl'ra Rt"gional Argentina (FORA) caught the
Wl1l h.l'l:" illl.lgillatiull witll it:. ulll fur action. The FORA-sponson::d local and
gl'lll'l-.1I :-.Ifikl's wvrrkd the gllVlTllllll.'llt. which assumed lhat any labor problems
II It 1;.,1 111' IllI: work 01 fllrdgn ,Igitators, Congress therdorl:' passed tht: Ley de
l{c... idelh.i.l Clksidl'llLe Law") ill 11)02, which ,'mpowered the government to
llqIllr t ,Ill IIJll'lglll'rs who:>1:' Ul.'klVior cOlllprolllised national secllrit y or disturbt'd
!,lIhlll lJl,kl" by I):lrticip.lling in strikl':', for tX'lIllplt",
TIll ,lllafl!tbi l.Hllp,ligll r,';lLhed a climax in 1910, the n'lItellnial of tht'
dl'lJ.I,,,dhlll 01 Argeillilll' indl'l)I'lltit'lICe, when a great publk ce!lbratioll was
I,l.llllll'd 1\1 gillrily Argl'lItill,I'S As militant opponents of the liberal
dill', Ill,' .1 11.1 l'dJi ... t kadll:,> w.lnkd to rabl' their prolest again:.t Ilw farce of till'
1.lIl'lIlll.11l IIlll'lltl'" IlltHld 01 progrl's:,. Till' prutestors filled Ihe: :.treds and plazas,
hlll \WI, llU:.hl'd .lm1 :.clIll'led by lll<l:>ses of police. Till' reaction against tht:
l'l\oI\':.tl!I'" "Vl'r ill!tl tIll' COllgre:.s. whi.,:h npproved a new law (Ley dl.'
III"Il'II"',1 Slh.i.d, lIr MSod:d Ih'li:mt" I..\W"). making the arn:st and proseculion of
1.lblll 1'1t',.IIIIZll:> l'Vl'lll,I:.ier.
Till'" \\'.1:> tltl' lkath kill'll lill Arglntith.-' anarchislll, but not of urban proleSI.
:'111ikl' ,11.1IVlt)' ill Blll.'llil:' Airn ft"<tl.'hcd ;lllUtller peak in IYI8-1':1. and it would
u"'Lill.1l1' fn!Hl lim\' II! lillll' lhal. 111 [he early Ylafs vI' thl' twcntieth u:'lltury,
"lh,IIII/I'd ],IIII'f l'lllt"rged <l:, a key actur III Argen[ine SOLid>'.
r
'I .. Algl'lllltl,l: lr\lgr... ,llid Stall-illal,' 25.i
Rhythms of Popular Culture
Wurld U"n" illlt! EconollllC fOi LdlUl
Am>.:... ,I ",,{\ II.>.: C"llbbe.II1,
[i
Il
Argentina: Vital Statistics, 2007
Pupulalion (milhons)
GOP (currE-lll sus bllhons)
GNPIc"plld (SU.s,)
Poverty I<HE: (% III 2006)
1itt' expeetilncy (ye.Hs}
39.5
262.3
6050
21.0
75
>
.,
POLITICS AND POLICY PATTERNS OF CHANGE
'lhe liberal politicians were known as the "Gelleration of (so Iabdcd for thdr
t'mcrgcnce that year). They were themsdvC's members of, or very close [0, the
landowning class Ihal produc('d Argentina's richcs, The)' Illanaged to control the
army (Jnd the eleclions. resorting to vote fraud when necessary. They also .... ted
a highly effective political machine, 'rhe most imporlant natiunal decisions were
made by aCllerc/o, an informal agrt-eillent between the presidl'nt and oligarchiC
power brokers. In this respect the Argl;nline libc..'rals ignvred one kl.'y aspect ufthe
13ritish/U.S. example-the central rok of the legislature, which in Argentilta had
been rendered inconsequential in this period.
2:;'1 I'ARTTWO e (:ASJ:STUIlIE'>:CIIANCI.OVERTI""lE
AI glance thi .. political seems to have admirably scrvcd the agro_
exporl inlerests that profited from the post-I R80 exp;lIlSiOIl. But the ari!Hocrals
in control <Iiel not go unchallenged. The spreading prosperit)' helped feed
political discontent alllong three (I) newl)' prosperolls landowllers; (2)
old ;lristoCf;ltic f;llllilies which h;ld fililed to profit from the ;lgro-exporl hoo
m
;
and (3) memhers of the middle class doing well economicnll)' hilt excluded (rom
politic:!l power.
These Ihree groups crenled the Radical Part)'. destined 10 pl'l)' a major role in
twclllielh cenlury Argentine politics. In 1890, just as the country enlered n short
hut scvere economic crisis. the Radicals attempted an armed revolt. An (lcuerdo
ended the rehellion. hut some intransigent leaders (ounde<1 the Radical Civic
Union (Union Civica Radical. or UCR) Iwo }'ears !:ltCI'. Unable to make electoral
progress against Ihe fraud routincl}' practiced by the ruling politicians, they
resorted twice more to armed revolt. Both attempts failed. onetheless Ihe
Radicals, led first by Leandro Alem and then h}' Hipolito Yrigoyen, maintained
their stllhhorn pursuit of political power. As for economic goals, the Radicals
remained committed 10 Ihe agro-export economy. They simply wanted a share in
'he pnlitic:al direction of their society.
Nol all the oligarchs endorsed the government position of freei'.ing the
R:ldic:lls oul of power. i\ more enlightened wing saw labor organizers and the
working class as the real threat-not Ihe middle classes. This group won out in
191 I when President Roque Saenz Pella proposed an e1ector:l1 reform aimed at
Co-opling Ihe middle dasses. Passed in 1912. the new law called for universal male
sufrrage, the secret ballot, and cOlllpulsol)' voting. The well-organized Radicals
immediately capitalized on the new rules and gol their longtime le;lder. Ilipolilo
Yrigoyen. elected presidenl in 1916. W;lS this to be a new era?
An carl}' lesl c:lme in Ihe governmenl's behavior loward the workers, The
Radicals began with a gelluine con(crn for lhe working class, partly becallse they
hoped to win eventll:ll voles in their struggle with the Conservatives. As lahor-
management conniets arose, the Yrigoyen govern men I followed an apparent 1'1'0-
l;lbor slance in its inLerventions. Labor organizers saw this as an improvement. but
one lhat would depend t.ln government action case b)' case.
A crisis came in 1918-19, however, when the entire \"'estern world was
shaken by sirike waves. It was a connuencc of specific grievances and generalized
hOSlilit}'. In Argentina, workers were aroused over the reduced buying power of
their wages. Food prices rose sharply. stimulated by European demand, but wage
incre;lses lagged. Union leaders called a series or strikes in l;lte 1918mel in carl)'
1919 syndicalist organizers decided the time "';'IS ripe for a geneml strike-the
syndicalist instrulllent for bringing down the bourgeois state.
Their idea had tragic consequences. The Yrigoyen government decided it hild
10 act firmly. Antilabor h)'steria was promoted by a newly formed ultra-rightist
civilian p:lramilital)' Illovemenl, the Argentine Patriotic League (Liga Patriotica
Argentina), which effectively exploited the middle- and upper-class fear of the
popular chnllenge. Lcngue members took to the streets 10 3tlack workers; it was
..
clasS warfare with :1 vengeance. Ilundrcd.. 01 dcmon.. II.l101" \\"{'IC "hnl I h, I.ilt",
Ic.. ders were :1gain rcpre.;sed. lime Il)' Ihe 1{:1dic.II... wllh the he.l\le.. 1 1>10\".
f.. lling on the s)'ndic:1lisIS :llld the last rel11l1.IIlI.; llf tlU' .111:11' hl ..1 ka,kl"hi\t
Organized labor did IHlt dis,lppcar. Two olhel 1I1.:010):1t..l1 t IIIICIII-. \lcg... , I.,
make headway alllong Argentine workcr..: "o(J,dislll :lntl l..tllllllllllli"lIl Tllc ttllllWI
strcSS
et
! political actioll. hClling on the Soci:llisl !'arly .1:- lilt' hnpc 101 t h.IIl':C II'
Argentine capilalism. The Comlllullist .. l..lllpll:lsind lhe 1.lllo, 11IlICII' n'tl\TIlWlll
instenO (If Ihe h:lllot hox. and Ihe)' ..onn made nllll!c.. t III ht'"
unioll posititU1S.
The I920s did not 1l1lILh .. U(l..l.... III 1.lhnl" n, ... I h't.llllt'" III ,11,1 "
aclivil)' allowed the govcfII II1Cll I In ignt1lc kcr tJl1e"I,on<. ill 1.11,,,, ,cl.ll'tllI" 1'1 \11
urganized lahor had hecome.l rcl:lliv('ly .. lIhdlleti ;'\(11'1' 011 Ilir Aq:C"111lIW .. 1.11:
1
'
At the other end of the polil'l..al "pnlflllll welt' Ihe (nll..('I\".'I1\"1... \\11"...
hopes of co-opling the Hadic:ds had hn'n ..orel)' ,h..:lppfOl1IlfoI 111..11".111 01 '11"
taining the tr"dition oragrcemenl hl' (It /latlfl. Ihe 1'1'11.1 cll', Inr.11 r.-l ,III 1,',1
to hasic changes ill lhe pnlitkal"l'slcllI.
the electorate was steadily elll:lIgcd ,IIHlck, l,ull" 11('("1111" l11gllh '''til
petilive. All Argentine nlnl"s overci,;hltTll }'c.lr.. Illd nllW had the righl tn \"'Il' ..,"d
nend)' I million peoplcCiualified in 1"12. Willtler.. r.lfelv c'llIeq:cd wllh IIIOIf' lil.11I
60 percenl nf the vote. Univer..al male "llffl age di .. llng,li .. IHcl/\ Igl'IlIIII., II ('1'1 (,II,,.
major Loltin American ctluntric... ,I" 'l('xit" nr gl.l/il. \.... 1,,"'( 1.11 11 It II I'
restricted e1eclorates rene(.lecl !ll\\,er I1.IIIlIn.11 hlcr.ll..\' 1.,Ii' .lIlolln"IC (1,1,,' d 1,,,11
tical s)'stem.;.
A further consequcnce of exp.llld(',1 voici p:u-llt",.III'"1 \\.1.. Ihe 111'1'..... 01
imporlance of the politic:l1 1':1 1'1 i('s. 1\11110.. 1 nflnCXI"lcIII IIn,l"r Ill(" (,t'I'CI.II"'1I "I
IRRO. after 1912 the parlies hecnme pflmnr)' vehkle.. ftll 1111' "I
power, spn\\'ning <l Ilew kind 01 polit i<. OIl e1ilC" Illitldlt: t ].1.... pi nll.... I' 111.11.. whOl 111.101,
careers out of
As innovative as the S;1en'l, Pef"l elnllllal 1'('1"01'111 \\'.1.. ["I it .. d.lY 111 [.Itlll
America, it left the political system still limilcd. II nnl flllly ('Xt Illtied womcn hill
:llso left oul al least h<llf of the adull 1ll.llt" he(all"e Sll 1ll.1Il\' \\'("1(' .. 1111 In""l:1I
citizens. Since the lI1111alllralized illlllligr.lIIl!' were IIlOrt..' 'lllIlH'I"II" .IIIIUI1}: lilt"
working class, the reform disproportionately helped the Huddle <. b ....
The praclical result of all the!'e ch.lnges wn.. Itl Ic:l\"(' the (-'111"'"\".11 1\ C'" 1.11
from power. The Radicals. huilding upon Iheir pnpul.Jr h.l"e .1Ild lI!'ing 111.11 111I1C
tactics, displayed continuing elector:ll .;uprcll}:lc)': tvl.llt.cln T. d(' ,\I\'('.H' hn .lIlIe
president in 1922, Yrigoyell was ree!c(!ed III 192M, :Jnd lhe ILHlic.d" oIOI1I1Il.lled
holh houses of Congress. The pnlitic:ll s)'''lem C:lme In rcpre"l'lIl all .lllhlllllllltlll"
thrent 10 the socioeconomic syslem, hoth Ihrottgh Ihe Ilegc'1l1tll)' (II l"llill,.11
professionals and through the acculllul:"ttion ofpnlitical pow('r within:111 i," rc.l"
ingly .. utonOl11ous state. For Conservalives and their allies. 1\ rg(,lllin:l '" ('xl'\',-il1'CIlI
in limited democracy was di"lastcflll and ri .. ky.
The worl<l ecollollliccrash of 1929 hil ArgcIllinOl. ht,t IH'I .1'; "(Illll III .1" h.llll.I"
some other countries. The prices ami v:lllI(''; nf hed l'xport .. held lip 1111111 1'I \ I III<"
1'1\1l1 1\\11'" /\ ... I ... Jlllllt ... I:tl/\N(iluVII<tlfl.lI:
\\h,.11 1I1.tl'kt'l \\,1'" b.ldly. l.HI1 III:linly 01 ..I drought;
1.11111(.I ... l'\lllnl 'l.1111 1)I,lilh.i1 illlluelKe. p.lrll). because so lIJ.1l1Y. as noted. Wert'
1l1l1l.llUr.lllhd llllllli
h
,-.lIltS. III 11130 rcal underwt'1I1 .1 brief dedillc and
tllll'lllployllll'111 10 but labor agitation remaincd :It a llloderah:
k"d. Thl' ';1'(."11 IlV duubl l:"x:Jcerhatcd the tt'nsiolls in Argt:ntina's
jluIIlJ(..d :.phal'. \Jut il alulll' would 1I0t have beell t'l1011gh to cause <I pulitical
IJrl,lkduWI1.
TI ,e Milil'" y Tur n, Back Ihe Clock
1)11 tJ, Il)JO. :1 U.l:tlitivlI 01 lIlIlit:lr)' vllkl'rs .11Il1 l"ivili.lll aristOl.'rats
1'11'1\..,1 YligoyCII, l,.1.llIllillg his guveflllllcnt was ilk'gililll:ite, :Illd set lip
,I I'll" i'hIIl.tI rl'gllllt. Iluw had soldiers COllie: to int('rVClIl' in whal scclllt'd to
bl.1 'llllluthly hllh.tiullillg urJl.'r?
111,llht"r.lb \\ho callle 10 powl.'r back ill lti52 bdit.'ved that a profcssiollal arm)'
W.I'" for dt'vdupmclIt. They w.lIltl'd a well-trained mili.
I,ll Iu Llml\ pi uVlllcial j'tiwldlos ,llld to provide the order neccssary for economic
gl ,Iwili. III :.11 elll:!otilcil tlldr <I rI lied t ht' Argentincs looked to Europt:'
Itlr 1111.'11' IIHldl'b, III IX')') <';l'lll'rall{oca and his collt:'agllt's IIt'gutiated the visit ora
(;l.'IIlI,llI 1111 ...... \'111 10 Ir:lI11 sl,lff vIYlt.:er::. ill lllodl'rn military tl'chllology. Thai
... 1I1J.d)OI,llloll WIlh (il.IIIl-lllY W,I ... lo furty
'1 Itl' IlIlI",I""'d pr"k:.... ltlll.lli/..IIIIl11 or tit .. Illilit.try Il.'d to,1 ill the outlook uf
II.l :\ I !\"lltlll" .. lllu"r l:1I1 By IlJ 1U Ihen: a dhlllgt' in tht' lillena lor prolllo
Ihlll: Ihl'" II 11("l,lllll' ,lilt! vi the Ill:W let.llllvlugy rather th.1II
I'llhlll.,d I.IVllrltl ... lll. Al Ihe time:. tllcn: .1 shifl ill control over prulllo,
111.111... trulllllll" IV:lll all milit.lry cOllllnittct' made lip o( army divisioll
.111...1 ch.lirl"d by till' higlll'st-r.lllking gellt'ral. This changc t'nablcd til('
11111 It,ll \' III lkv"hlp a luglll.r dq.';IC" ul nutunom)'.
I lit" II". 1l..I:.,d VII llll'ril abu ul'cl1l"(.lllIilitary to suns
"t IIH' 1111l1,lll' Nul tlli:'> iJldtllkd Mill::. of
npl'lI,t1I)' !rllill Il,d)'. SUt.ll'",:.llll rl. ... whu Jlhillc: tlldr W.lY up thl' hicrarchy
1"1I-:,d.1 'tl\lllg allq.i,'<ltlc,' I,) .111 Thl' sidl: ol"lhb
,I d"lV 01 UUISllll:fs. e:spcdaJly politiciam. By 1930 Illost
"lliul ... lUlllUI"ll'd th.lt till' only w:,y uut uf th,' political W.IS to rt'vise tht: ruJes
til Iho.: g.llllt:.
"grl.'t'lllt:llt ... Iu)lpt'll thae. hll"'l:wr. On cwrything the: llIilitaq' divided
11IIu ()lIe 1.ldioll. !L'd b), Cl.'nt"ral Agustin P. JUSIO. wallted 10 rdurn to tht:'
"llg.utllit..!1 01 Ihe Pt'i,a rl"l"orlll days. Tht'sl.' oflkers Ihoughl if
)'llguyl.'l\ ,lIltl,hl.'l{adlCab wal'!"l'lIlUVed frolll polilics, then power would revert tt>
thl' an:.luLT:ib :Jlld Iht' spl'Clc:r or class slruggle would disappt'ar.
AllOlhl'" factioll. lcd b)' Jose F. Uriburu, suggested a llIore sweeping
:-'1)IUliqn: Ihl'l'stahlishrnent III a se:rllifas..:ist corporate state. Tht'Y SolW the problem
III bl,h" \'l'I')' .llIlIII1 lu try dl.llIULf.KY in Aq;.... lliina. rdlecting the alltidemocratic
.drl.;ldy rallipallt ill Europe, especi<llly in Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The)'
.1 "runltion.ll deHlOl,.r:ll. y." whae Ihe del'led would represent
,.
fUllctional (ur interests, such worh'r"" IlIl'rdJa 11 I'i, and
industrialists. The theory was Ihat :l vertic.l1 would rcinlq;r.11c: till'
fHJ!iliGII with thl:" Ct'ollolllk th.lt tht' politiL.11 arl'n:l wuuld Oille
again reOect the dislribution of cconumk puwt'r. It W:IS abo, IIUIIe Oh\'li... .1
formula for stopping c1ass-orienkd politks.
Although Uriburu Jirt'cted thl' provisional guvenlllll"nt ill 19.10, till' jmtt)
group eventually won oul. Arta jllSIO becnll1t' pn..'sidt'llt in JI)J2 hl: nl'alcd a pro-
government l..oaliliull uf parties c:tlled thl. ConCOl'd.Lllda, :Llld he l"(.'pl.lt.ct! ..
llUlllba of mililnry Illell in sensitive posts wilh wellknuwII Cit-ad)'.
Justo was hoping 10 funu a broad, 1I:llional govt:l'lllllt'nt thaI wuul...l give him Ihl'
aulhorit)' to respond to th.: sociocconomic elfecb uf tht' wurld
This proved impussiblt:. OIiC thl' ul all urban wllrklllg
dass which madt' rt:pt:all"d Ull tht' govcrnmellt. Anutht'r Iklt poli
tical professionab-commilte:d 10 to play by Ihe: old-
fashioned rules. This bt'cal1lt' cll',lr wht'n Radilal Pan)' Il'..ldl.'r Holwno Onii'.
Justo's successor in 1937, stopped decloral (raud and Ih,'rl'hy ;llIo\\'t'd Ihl.'
Radicals to win conlrol of Congress.
Oni:;.' health forced him tu k':lvC orne.: in 1';)10. Iii ... Slll'(l'SSUJ', 1(:lnu')I1 Cl:.lil1(I,
resorted to Ihe It:dllliqul,t)'pic<11 nf l'lIlbaltlnl olig.ll'chs wlh'n !:Ilnl with

. I
Despite its historic importance, the military coup of 1930 was a relatively genteel affair-
here a white flag of surrender flutters from the presidential palace (see arrow) as
onlookers gather in the Plaza de Mayo. (private collection.)
2:'fI PAIn-TWO 0
stufring the hallot hox. This cheating only dramatized the illegitimacy of the
incumbent civilian government.
Milit<lry officers watched with increasing impatience. As World War II spread
ill Europe in the e:lrly 19t10s, ;lIld the Axis-which included Germany, Italy, and
Inpan arter I940-seemcd to be carrying the day, the Argentine military chieftains
saw the need for slead}', sure leadership in their own land. The obstacle as they saw
it \\Ins the cabal of civilian politicians, who had continued pursuing their petty
interests, ;lnd therehy rendering their country vulnerable.
Politics in Argentina was taking a unique path in L,tin America. The causes
\\Iel'e several. In contra.. t to Bra7.i1. whose government h<ld, after a long Oirtation
with N;lzi Gernl;lny, decided to casl its lot with the United States in 1942
Argentina w<lnted to preserve its That meant it would continue
sell essential foodstuff:.. to hesieged Britain while refusing to join the U.S.-led
mililary effort.
B('hind this rough cunsensus "hout ncutrality among the Argentine elite lay
the continuing milit:u)' impatience with the civilian polilicians. Dissidenl officers
mllunle(1 several plots 10 seize power. The triulllphant group was calle(lthe GOU
(;rlll'0 Ohm de Unific;lcion ,)r Grllpo de Oficiales Unidos), which justified its
..ciz.urc of power in 19'13 as a response to popular demand.
In fact, the amhitiotls officers wanted to revamp the cnlire politicrtl structure.
They hegall by dissolving the Congress, Ihat target of their oft-expressed scorn.
The ascend:ull military, led by the first provisional president, General Arturo
Rawson, grandly rtnnounced, aNo\\l there ;1.re no political p::trties, h\lt only
Argentines." The military set Ihemselves to rid Argentina of politics, as well as
politicians. In 19'1'1 they decreed the end of political parties, and they excluded
from the cabinet all profession::" politicians, :\side from a few
R:Hlicals.
Another factor was <It work as the military was seizing control of the political
systelll. Class consciousness was growing alllong the workers. B}' the 1940s thc
urban working class was now abollt 90 percent literate, and it was mohi!c, with
many of its members having recenlly arrived from the countryside. In contrnst to
the era of Ihe great exporl hoom (1880-191'1), most urbnn workers were now
nnlive Argentines, not European immigrants.
1\5 the political drama unfolded, the principn! actors turned out to be the
military and labor. The military had its own institutional base, but the large and
growing urban working class lacked effective political representation. Why? In
part, this was because the Radic<lls and the Socialists were genred to the electoral
system:"ls modified in 1912, when over half the adult 1ll.. le population remained
excluded from the vote. With the partial exception of the Socialists, none of the
major political parties created an authentic working-class base.
Enter Juan Peron. A 1ll,IIl of middle-class origin, he had risen to the rank of
colonel in the Argentine :"IrlllY. Ambitious and outgOing, nearing fifty, he had taken
an active pari in the GOU movement thai ousted Ramon Castillo from the
presidency in 1943. Pef()n became secretary of labor, a fairly minor post. but one
, .'1
lhat he transformed into a h<lstion I If sl rengl h. h.,lll t.lr!"ll!'" .1 1111 ... k" 1'('1' 'I'
courted the supporl of industrial worker... PartIr hCf.UI'" III Ihi, illnlll'lht'. h. 1..1,',
became minister of w<lr <lnd vice presid('nt. WIICll i.likd hr I"1v.ll lllll'I'}: 1111
Illil
ita
ry officers who feared his growing l'0pll1.lril}'. hi, 'lll,hll." ,I .
massive demonstr;ltion (In Octohcr 17. forcing hi ... Tl,le.I,C. 1\ lino I.. lIlt
dispossessed, he immediately cnter('<! th(' I'rc'ldenl i,1I CI'III(' .. 101 I'J If>
The U.S. governmenlunintclltioll;llly provicft'(I.lllllII'llIili'lnll'r I''''I"{,n', 1.1'11
p;lign b)' accllsing hi III of pro. fa,List "Ylll p.IIIII('''. The OII"-pokl'lI "lIlt'l .1 II .11111> I'
sador, Spruille Braden, repcatc(lthese t.halg( ... ill ,,"hlit .Illli "'"1'1'1"1
them wil h evidence in a so-c.l!led 11Ilie HOlll.. (III 1/(1. .111011,11 i,t, p' '111 II (,d .. "
these undiplomatic interventions and .I ... ,,'rlcd th.lt \,. It l/l'n, wOl1hlllnW h.I\'( .1 t 10-.11
choice at th(' polls-"Rradell Ill' l'('n111.- (;,Vl'lI rhl'" ol'tlo'l.tIH \".It', ... t 11 ....1' 1"'1"11
by a solid S4 percent majorit)'.
Even so, this episode revealed Ihe forcl,' 01 dl.lngill): mltIIl.111I 'l1.d I c.llllle,. 11111\1"
\"ake of '""orld War II, with th(' ri<;(' 01 1I.:-'. pow{'r ,mil Ih... d...t IlIll' of IlllP\",
Argenlina would have tn cope wil h Ihe pow.....Hill PH'{'llIll1c'nu' of Ih.. l r",1<'.1 \'I.IIt
" new world order had ..Hltl il wOllld .1 If..," I III 111\ II.I.! " . \"'.
Peronism and Peron
Onc(' installed as presidcnt, I'el,\n pro,"C'I'tlcd II' pili ,III., \'1.1' lu. lilt Il"I"'I.III','
principles of the GOU. Argentina would n.H\, org,l1li/('d .11 \ '" t1l1lg 10 111111 III 'lI.d
groups: induslrialists, farmers, workers. The gtIVl'rlllllCllt \\001.1 .11 I .1" Ilh' 1111,.1
arhiler in case of conniel :JllIong group.... " Five )'<',11 I, nlllHUIi 1'1.111 \'.1'- 1..lInl.
and a powerful n('w forcignlrade instiLute (In"litulnl\lgentilli' cll' 1''''I11Ud"tI do'!
Intercamhio, or IAPI) was given a sl:ltc mnnnp"ly .IV.. I Ihe eXI"'11 ,,1 ker
tLlral crops. Argentina now heg;ltl the Illllst t"llHH.1l11, p(,I't Ytllll,/.11
scen in twentieth-century I.:llin I\m('rica.
Peron was carrying oul the 1930s cflrpllr,lli<;t "i<;I(lll III (;('11('1.11 \ 1111'11111.11111
wilh a vital difference: l'en'ln made urh<111 WI Irkers hi<; Ill ...... t 111lp' 'rl:J III 1'11111 it .11 .111\'.
fl<1nked hy industrialisls and the anned ri.I"("c .... lie Illilhill/l'.1 P"I'III,Ir '111'p'i11 1,\
lIsing resources 10 promole his ideology. Knowll :I' III"'I( 1.111'111'1.1111'- 1.1'l,I,,)'.\
promised social justice and puhlic welfare.
Peron had campaigned for Ihe ple<;idcll':y 011 a 11,lli"n.lli... ' .lllt! p"pllll'l rI.,It.
aArgentina was a count'l' offat bull .. :I lid tllldeTIIOllri .. hct! I'Cj'I1',- '.li,II'erc,n 111 I" It'
He promised truly Argenline solutions while channeling III Ihe wnrkcr, Ih... lew.ll.1-.
they hnd been unjustly (lcnicd. Peron contilHled the Lallic" h.. heen 11cIlnllllJ:
since 19'13: the encouragement of st rikes whidl Ihe gll\'CfllllH'lIl IlIrn ,drhod in 1.1\'01
of the workers. Real hourly wage r:llcs jumpcd 2" I'cl","cnl in 1'117 .m.lll 1'<'1.' 111 III
1948. L,bor's share of the national income increa"Ctl hy Ilerl.clIl hC:l\\'('{'11 I') tf> .1110 I
1950. The losers were the owners of capit:ll, Ihe lalldnwllC'TS, 'l1h (' 1111'
governmelltlrade monopoly (11\ PI) bOllght mosl ofth('ir prndllll' al!{l\\I,lix{,d I'me'
At first this bold strategy worked well. The hy XJ, I'ITt elll III 1'111>
and by the even more starlling ratC' of 12.6 I'('n.:enl in I"/ti. h cn Ih.10\\'('1 I.llt' , ,I
5.1 percent in 194R was slill v('T)' rcspcclahl(' Ii}' wotld <;Janel,lnk Till' \\'.1'
.'C,ll 1',\I,I'IWU" l,\SIS'IIIIJII ... ,IIIANC;1
(1Ill ..d ill part by ;\rgl:lltlll,l':-' hlllJlllitlg l'XpOI"ls, whkh produced ht'althy IrJde
'>llrplll:-'l'''' IrUlll 1')46 lhl"llugll 19()1"\.
l'l'Il'lll a!su Illdd.: good 011 his promis.: 10 reducl' foreign inllul'llce in Ihe
l'UIllUIJlY, III 1'J'lts i\rgl'lItill.1 Il.llioll,dized Ille Brilish-owned railways, Also nalio_
Il;l!izld was the k'ading kkphunl' cOlllpany (from U.S.-controlled nT) and tht:
l:h'lll!L'lIwnl,d dOl'k I.H.:J1itll':-'. In l'vl'ry GISl', the Argentines compensated the
OWl 1<;"1:-', ,tl PflU':-. Argentine nationalists later dailllt:d were too high. And in July
I').I?, 1'l:IVll ".lid "f[ i\q.;elllin.ls l:lllire foreign dl'bt, at:colllpunied by a
MI )..'Ll.lr.lliulll,r 1:":Ullulllit Illl.lel't'ndl'llt:e."
I.V,I l'l'I"111 ,d:-.o ,,'1 II..'rgl'd a:. a pnlitit:al powl'r in Iter own right. A fiJflllCr radio
.h.lrl':-. ... hU111 .1 :.lllalJ tOW/l in thl' interior, was snubbed by the society
111,lln'II:lo (H'IIUlllS ,gunfll: WillI Ilad alway:. munopolized the polilical careers of
1',I:.t filSI 1,ldil':'. To establish a pupular base, Evita set up her own foundation in
19IX. l)i.'>jll"ll ... ing La:.ll allJ bl'lldltS pl'r:,ollatly. she rapidly built up a f.,nntically
lU)'.d lolllJwillg. EVlla',., cUlilplemented h":-I" husband's, and Iht:y together
:.t1cnnk..l in building all illlpU:.illg political machine, but one that steadily
..Iluking "If any Upl'll pulilkal dissl'll1.
By I')"IX il :. ..l'lllni lkar sailing rill' lhl' Pl'l'Onists. Social justice was rapidly
Iwillg ,1I.. ulll1pli:-.lled, .llld tilt' e(UllullIY continued 10 hUIlI. The political
tillil 11,1..1 Ih.'l'lI lk'lIlor;tlizl:d ,lIld humiliated. The streets wen: continuously full
uf 1I1l' lailIJlul. It was till' realizalioll of till' MNt'w Peron had
Illllllll'>nl.
"1'111"; Sllll\':-"; 11nJvl'li .... Ilurt-Ilvnl. IhlWeVl'f, as 1949 brought lhl' firsl foreign
tlddl' ddlclt :.ill":l.' till' WM. Ellu.lIly illlpurt;tnt was the sudden jump in innation to
51 l'I.:llCIlt, dtlllble thl"l,rl'viuus Yl:ar. To lliake matters worSl:, a St:vere drought
l-llllolill'd tltl' 1'1 ud ud iun ufl'xpnrtabll" goolb. IvYorlJ prices lor Argent ina':. l'XpOI'lS
W,,'ll" dlUPl1ilJg; prill'S 1'01 illlpUfb, l'specially IlHIIlUI:lCtUITd goods, were rising,
1\lhl P,,lulli:.1 11l.licit::- l(lllllluurllkd lile Pfllblclli. IAPI, lhl: government foreign
tr,Hk lll.'>lilule, Il..ld :-.l'1 llI11l',lIbticaJly low prices for agricultural goods to keep
..111\\111 1;'\Jd IHill'.'> in till' dtiv.'>. Hut till" dll:ct was also to production,
tllll:lo hurlillg lxIJorb.
I'n(ln rl',Kll'd 10 tile l'COllt)lllit ..:risis ill 1949 by appOinting a new llnalKc
1I1illi.'>tn whu launched an vrlhodox stabilization program: light credit, reduced
g\JVl'l'llllll"lltl'Xpl'lIditurl', alit! tough limits un wage ,llld price increases. Peron was
ddl'l"lIlilll'l1 tu gd the l'lullumy undl'r cOlltrul and resume as soon us possible his
alllhitiullS .'>u.. ial polilit..'>.
/\Jlll'uding tltl' LOlbtiluliull of to permit a second term, ill 1951
wa.'> l'l'dednl willJ (17 jJl'rcenl of lhe 6.1) million voles GISt. I-Ie drew especially
hl'aV)' slll'jJnrl fronl WUlllell vuters, who h"ld gained the right to vole in 1947. A
Pl"rlJllistllarty was abuliHllldnl. The goverllment now marc: frequently to
autllul ital'i;llI IlIl'aSUres, sudl lhl' l'xprupriation in 1951 of La PrcrlS{/. the IC;l(ling
(IPIlI,:.11 it HI Ill'wsl':1 pl"l .
UlllIlll.' pulitkal frollt, however, was defeated. In running fur reelection
ill I'):'l I, hI;.' W,Hltl'll Evito.t 10 bl" his vit.::l' presidential candidate. Her political
'J Argl:lllilla: l'rvgro::.s alld SI.dclll,lll' LCd
inOUCI1C'l' had grown ellurlllously, as IHallY worker:. had Collie to idelltil)' her a:.tlrl'
heart of Pl'ronislll. Shl: was brilliant al promoting Ihis illlagl', aided by hugl' (and
largely unaccounted lor) gove:rnll1(,111 funds. Hut tile mililary refused to a..:cepttlwt
a WOI11all might, by succeeding to thl' pn:sidcllcy, bccome: their
chier.
The lllilil.lry veto of Evit:....s candidacy foreshadowed alar grl"akr hlow. I':vlta
fcll ill and c:ventually cuuld 110t hide thl' that sill' wa.'> dying of (alH.:l'r. She grew
hauntingly thill out fought tilt' disea.'>l' krocioLlsly and continul:d hI;,"/" l'xhaLl.'>tillg
schcdule, In July 1952 Sill' finally dkd, dt::privillg Peron of a polilical partnn wlto
had beColl1e fuJly a.'> important as hc.
Evita 1IOW UeGlllle largl'r in de:lth thall shl;.' had ever bl'l'll ill life. Till' gUVl:fll-
ml'ot Sllspendt'd all functions for two days, and thc labor ullion cunfederation, till'
eGT (Confedcracion Gcneral del Trabajo), onkrl'd its ntl'llIber:. 10 obserw a
month's mourning. The outpouring of grief was astounding. Tht::rc were
imll1l'diatc plans to build n mausoleum 15U fed talll'r tl1;ln thl:" Statul' 01 Libat)I,
Dead at the age of thin y-thrl"t:', Evila beGll1ll' a powerful mylh bindi ng togl'lher till"
Peronisl 1:lithful.
,
I\JI
Ill, gaunt, and nonetheless compelling, Evita Peron waves to the crowd during a
motorcade for the inauguration of her husband into his second presidential term in June
1952; she died the following month. (Corbis/Bettman/United Press InternationaL)
2112 I'AWrT""/)"
The good news of 1952 \WlS lll:ll the tough austcrity plan of Finan<.:c tv! blister
Alfredo Gome7, Morales was beginning to produce results. Peron <lnd his advisers
now opted for a second Five-Year Plan, far less populisl and nation:llist than the
policies of the laic 1940$, 'I'here was a direcl appeal lor foreign capitnl, I"('slliting in;l
contmcl with Standard Oil ofC<llifornia in 1954. There were also new incentives to
agricullure, previously a prime larget for exploil<llion under the cheap-food
str:ltegy. \.\forkers were asked 10 :lccept :l two-ye:lr wage freeze as :l sacrifice in
the nnllle of fill:lIKing muchnecded investrnenl.
III order to regnin e<.:onomic growth, Per()ll helieved he h:ld 10 reverse some of
his n.ltionalist and redi."tribuliollist policies, As long as the ccnnnll1Y was
expanding, it was cas}' ttl favor one sod:ll sector; with a st:lgnanl econ\)[ny,
hnwever. the workers (,.ol.lld g:lin only at the direct expense of the middle or
upper sectors. Class connict Ihre:ltened tn lear apart Peron's carefully COllSt rUCll'd
populist c(lalitioll.
Perhaps for this re<1SOI1, the Perollisl po!ilicnl strntegy hecame mmC' radic,1.
After 19'19 Peron moved tIl win control over the :"Ifllly hy promoting politic:ll
new proW<'l1ll was set up 10 indoctrin:ltecadels wilh l'e!'Ollist teachings
and to dres..; Ill' the lower with n:lshy uniforms. Peron knew he had
(lpp()llellts within the army, and in 1951 thC'y allempted n coup ng;1illsl him. lIe
easil)' suppressed them, hut the germ of discontent 1"CIll:lined alive.
After Evita's death in 1952, Peron shifted attention from the :lrm)' 10 the
labor unions, led by loyalists. As the economic policy became morc orthodox. ;l
mililantl)' Jllsticialist working-clas." tone became evident. In a I'ernni."t streel
crowd pillaged the lockey Club, the hast ion of the Argentine nristocrac)'.
In 1954 the Peronist rndicals took on another pillar of Ihe traditiollnl
order: the church. Oivorce was legalized, :1nd all parnchinl schonls were
placed under governmcnt control. The )'e;lr 1955 brought mass demonstra-
tinns against the church, orchestrated by the Pcronists. Severnl famous
cath('(lrals ill Buenos Aires were hurned by Peronist crowds. The Vntican
reta1inted by excommunicating the entire governmental c:lhinet, including
Peron. Peron vowed to mobilize his masses ag:linst the "conspirntors" who
lllenaccd II. rgenl ine independencc.
In (act, the Peronisl government W:lS oul of control. Many officers became
convinced thnt he was hent on destroying the country. The ugly bailIe with the
church finally gave Peron's enemies wilhin the military Iheir ch:mce. In September
1955 military conspirators presented their president with anullimalum: resign or
face civil war. Peron, so oftcn given to exlreme rhetoric, had no stonl:lch for ;l
bloodb:lth. He retreatC'd to the refuge of a Paraguayan gunboat tlwt took him to
asylum across Ihe Par<l.lltl River,
The Military Stewardship
Peron h:ld no! really heen defe:lled. He had departed under duress, making no
"'"fort to mohilize his followers. Despite the sudden vacuum created hy his depar-
ture, neither Pcnln Ilor Pernnislll was finished.
The ncw president was Eduardo 1.0I1ardi,,, IlHlderalc W'I1<'r;1I wlln \\',11 It I'< 1II>
avoid a vindictive policy. which he Ihought would hep lite I'crolli .. Ullilcd. Hilt
the hardline military grew illlpntient with his Loncili;ltpry appro.1t II. III NIlVl'lllhcl
Ihey deposed Lonardi nnd inslallc(1 (;cllcr:ll I'ednl !\ralllhllrli a:- 1'11'vi ... i'III,11
president. The anti-Peronist zealols no\\' gIlt their I..!lallcc III purge nTr}'lllIllg
Pcronist. Pcrcl/l's was olltl:\\vcd, nnd evcry SU';lJl 01 Perolli .. 1 I'rol',ll:,I1I1I.,
becaillc contl"nball(\,
The h:l.rd-line mililnry :l.nc! the Aramhlll'lr polilicil :-lr.tll'gi .. l.. hrlinr'd tll,11
they c(luld rcsh:l.pe Ihe political system for a In ,I I'Cl'" l'nnrll .. 1 l'l,t
Former property owners hit hy Perolli.... ! cxprnpri,lllllll" h,1I1 Ihl'lI 1111lclllll:"
restored, The government pushed the crack,I(lwll on l'nol1i .. t 1e,lIle"", C"I'l'{ 1.111\
ill lhe unions, In JUlle 195() the l'el"Onists h,l(k. A revoll nf 1'1" 1',ll'lIi .. 1
militall' look plnce in several provinces, ;ll\(11 he gOV('f'1l 11 H'1l I I"I':-pl .nlle, I willI f, '. I C'
In lhe follow-up some forty lenders were C'xeCllted. Ilnwevn alltho!'il;U'i,lrl 1'('1"'11'"
goVe1'll1llcnt, it had llC'ver rC'snrIN\ 10 ;l len'l of 11111, i;11 I'ill.llh. ,til
parties were now reqlliretll() ()lllll1it them.. elv('<; In clCIll"ll',l( v. r I.lvill)'. II'
lish a wn" drnlll:Jtic prnlll 01 Ihe ..1 1\l'gI'l1l011"
democracy.
As Argentina hcnded intn its IIrst del.tum..... inl (' l'cn'III':- ('\'nlh!'f1\\'. Ill!'
political was confused hecause thC' anli Perolll"l (ivili.IIl 1',,111111.111" \\"1'1'"
deeply divided. The lnrgesl parly W:lS still the rtldkab, Ihe \'C'llIT,lhlc 1',111\ "I
Yrigo}'en and his :lColylC'S. BUI at a pnrl)' (llwentioll in I();'6. Ill<' R.Hli\,d.... (I It 10
split in Iwn. Onc f"clinn W:lS Ill(' bPn\llllnr (lll 'l{ \lcll'Ilcl,ll', 1'1 ll( HI').
led hy Ricardo Balbin, the parly's cider slnleslllan wltll had rim till' I"'('''llklll III
1951. The other was the "Intransigent (lICRI), led hy I\rtwn Ir.,ndill. ,111
economics professor. The B:l.lhin fnctioll wn" fnn;ltlcllly anti l'en'lll, whiil' Ilw
Frondizi faction advocnted nexihilil}' ill dealing with the 1\'1'11111:-1'>. Thr .. p.llalkl,11
"simil;"!r split of opinion within the milit<1q'.
Politic:ll uncertainty reigned in clecl1011s tor :l1..(,n<,litllclll ,...... C'l1lhlr Ill\' 1\\'''
Hadical f"cliolls WOll an allllnst e<jtl:ll numher of scats in thl' llJllvcnlillll. ,,'lll< It
reinslated theconstilution of 1853 hut wns sn .. plitthat il \\"1:- dl<.h,lIHII'd
The mililrlfy held new elections ill Fchruary 19.5R. Ullnhlc tn get the vnh,.. /rllill Ihc'
Balbin wing (UCRP) of the Radicals, Frondi7.i struck ,1 deal with thr ]lerolll... I.... ,
promising to reslore their pnrly to legality. Ilis aggressivd)' n;ltion,lli<;t (,Hllp.lij:1l
WOI1 him the presidenc)' nnd ;l mnjority in the Il:lti()llnl (:lll1gr'C' ..... 11 Illoked ,I" d
Argelltina wOl1ld now have n cenlrisl government that ('tulld 1:1kc II]' tllr I'nllli{,11
ilnd economic challenges Ilwt In)' ahcad. a Illnjnl" drllid \\,;1" h,lllj:"1g 11\'1'1'
Frondizi-his debt 10 the Peronists.
The Failure of Developmental Reformism
The new presidenl seemcd to he from Ill(' S;lllle mold as lither demon,lli,
reformers then making Iheir mark in Latin Arnerkn, :-Udl :IS hlu:'lrdll Frl'l 01
Chile and JlIscclino Kuhitschek of Brnzil. I.ike Ihelll. he dc{ Ided In Llkl' 1l1,1fol"
gambles.
21,\ l'Altl" IW\l" {r\ .... \\'tUl)lI .....
()Il tile: n'olHJJlIk Irollt, FrUllllizi put intu plan.' all ambitious program 10
:Il'ldl'! ,t!l' iJ ion while alsu stimulating agricultural production, thereby
hoo:.tillg l'xpurt While st;lll' intervention in the economy was to be
n:du<.nl, JlllJdl of till' IIllillh.:illg for 1ll.':W industry was to COI11(' from abroad.
illllllnliatt'ly, Ilowever, Fr\lllllizi fa("ed an aClIte b;;llallct: of payments
lTI'>I.'>. Silll'l' hl' lu:eJed to forl'ign creditors, from whom he
\\',1'> :'Il'eking 1ll.'W investlllellt, Frondizi decided to accept their biller medicine: a
11Ilg\' \kv,du,tlioll, :.tin l'l.lllllOls Ull lTnlil, Cllts ill public spending, tough wage
lindh, n:du.... lillil of 011 puhlic and the dismissal of redundant
I,uhh\ \'IlJplurn,:-..
TIll' illt'vitahk dln:t til these polil-ies a sharp shift in income nway from
111l' \\'lll kill): l lass. 'I'he purdl.lsi ng power of industrial workers dropped by almost
:::!<J pl'r(\'nt ill 1'):'9, cOl1lpart'd with all o( 97 percent (or gallndcrus
k,lllll'lllt'll) 1.'IIjoyed till' gains frum highl..:r prices but failed to increase the
vulutlle "I hn"t e:xports ill ;'111)' (01 II llll..:tlSll r;,a tt' degree. There were gl'llcwl strikes in
i\ Ilnl. 1\1.1)', alld Sepklllbl'r uf 1959 and an exlt'nded railrmld st rike ill November of
tll,lt )'l,tf. i\n t'lllhauled Fromlizi was forced tu ;lo:ep( a compromise settlement in
Will, II I.dltlr \"as Ihe dlt,(tive Willlll'l". The stabilizOltiull policy also came ullder
"II,lll.. t'rllill i\rgt'ntilw espl'dally thosl' from smaller firms, who
d\lltlllll ......\llltl nnlit ,lIhlthl: huge increase in imporl prices resulting
truill lkvalualioll.
A.. ,I I'olilkal furtunes were fuundering. Labur and Ihe left
BeVel" his orlhudux poliCY, with its cut in real wages und its
lIIlIH,h.. C ul toreigll capit.d (induding se..:rd l'Olllracts with U.S, oil companies).
i\nd while tilt' militar), had suppurh:d-indeed lurced him to adopt-his IMF
elollUlllic pulicy, the unker (urps deeply distrustt'd his conciliatur)' moves
IUW;lld the l'efOllists, party had regailled its ll.'gal status, The climax (ame in
Ihl' \k\ tilJJI:. of Mar..:h IlJ62. Thl' "eslill was a disaster for the government. The
led all parties ill total volts, with JS pl.'r(ellt. The Frondizi Rndicals got
2X I'l'r"l'1l1 aud Ihl' Hanlin Radkab 22 pl'r((;'III, thc n':'st going to smaller parties.
TIll' lIlilil.Ll"y ljukkly lur":ld the pn:sident to anllul the: Perunist election
victorit's in Ihl.' provinces. Till' Frondizi Radicals then trkd for a coalition with
the H.dhill fa...:tioll. This JlIight Sel'1l1 an obvious way out, sinc' together, the
Ibdkals rqJl"l'st'ntnl hall' thl.:' dectorall'. But the Balbill followers rejected the
Frumli"l.i OVl'llurlS. Unce tht' middlec1ass part)', the Radicals, proved
lI11l'LJll.1 tll the t'l:-.k u( governing Argentina, tile most middle-class coulltr)' in
Latill Anwl"ka.
Yl'I Frondizi rd"usnl to resign. 011 March 29, 1962, (he army tanks rolled onlo
till' slrl'l."Is aml n:JIloVt'd hill!. Intl! tilt' preSidency stepped the constitutiollal
Sellale President jose." Maria Guido.
Cllidu acting presidl'nt fur a year and a half. Th..... r..... al power was hdd
hy thl' lllilit,t1'r, But Ihey wae still deep1r divided un how to de;;11 with the civiJian
politicians, which led to rCpl'atel! intramilitary revolts, In particular, the military
WCJ't' divided ova the advisability or trying to Mreintegrale" the Peronist masses
'.J .. i\rgl:llliJw: and Stal..-lilak 205
into thl' political SySIl'Ill. Complicating this situation tl1l' l.'xilnl Pl.'rOll hilllSdf,
continuously sending instructions to his lieutcmlllts ill Argentina.
The military finally decided to annul cntirely the election results of IlJ62 and
10 hold a new round of elections in July 1963, 'I'his tillle the lJalbin Radicals wun
the largest total, with 27 percent o( tile balluts. 'I'he new pn:sidellt was Arturo lilia,
;l (olorless provincial physician whu \\las 10 thl' seo)lld l{adical altelllpt al
governing post-Peronist Argentina. Unlikl' Frondizi, Illia had made no owrlllres
to the Peronists. Nonelheless, the hardlinl: nlilitary were l'ver vigilanl to find 'Illy
signs of softness towilrd Peronislll or lhe left.
iltia was relalively fnrtllna!l' ill the ecunornk situation he found. The guVC['Jl
ment began v..... ry cautiously. It soon became evident, howevl'r, Ihat (ht' policy-
makt:rs were set 011 t'xpansioll, granting generous wage and imposing
price controls. These measures helped to swing Argelltina into the MgUQ phase of
the stop and go economic patlern (;llternately stililulating and nllltractillg Ihe
economy) it had exhibited since thc war. The: GNP slllall dt:c1illloS ill 1962
and IlJ63, but spur!l'd to gains of 10.'1 pl.'ret'llt ill 1<)6'1 and 9.1 pacl'lll in IlJ6S.
On the agricultural frolll, Ihe !Ilia government sllfft'red through a dowllswing
in the "beef cycle," when th.... deplt'led herds \Vl're withheld for hreeding. The
resuhing shortagl.' irritated urbnll COnSUll1l'rs-;l1ways vorad..)us bl'ej e;lkrs-nnd
reduced the prm.!uctioll available for t'xpurl. Call1l.'lllell Wl'I"L' angry bl'GIUSe till'
government did not let prices rise to the k-vcls illdkakd br lllarkl'l <t..:mand. lilia,
like virtually l'wry othl.'r Argentine prl'sidelll Silll'e IlJ45, (uulld the rural seclor
virtually impossible to harness lor the natiunal intt:rl'sl.
'rhe Peronist unions were opposed tl) Illia frolllllh.. 'IIIUJIIClllllt't'lltl."fl'd ulfke,
ill part be..:ause they were barred from till' 1963 de(tiolls allll lilia's initially
large wage settlelllcnts. The Pt:ronist-duminated CGT drew IIp;l Mbattle plan" (pia/!
de /ucJw), which included strikes and workpla..:e t:lkl:'overs. In the congressiunal
dectiolls of March 1965, thl"' now legalized P\:'runisl party WOII 30.3 perl.:l:nl uf thl'
vote, agninsl 21'<.9 percell I for the Jllia Radicals.
in his Spanish exile, was l'IKuuragt:d by tht: vule <llld third wile,
Isabel, to Argt'ntina 10 negutiate directly wilh the feuding Paonbt groups. The
hard-line miJitary grew ever more worried llVl'r the apparl'nt Pcronist l."umeback.
The economic scene w..1s also taking a dislluicting (urn. Inflation t:rupted ant'w,
and the government deficit was alit ofcontrol. In June 1966 the militarr interv(.'lled
again. Illia was unceremoniollsly ejected ffOm Ihl' Rosada. Oncl' again the
officers had removed a Radical governmcnt ullable effectivel)' to t'ither court or
repress Ihe Peronist masses.
The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Solution
The military coup of 1966 marked a sharp..-r with the past than allY coup
since 1943. It was the most repressive, at least ill the initial stagl's. Pruclaiming tht'
adWll( of Argentine Rl.'vulutioll," Gellcral Juan Carlos Ongania, lilt.: /lew
president, sough I 10 implant a new kind of regime-a bureaucratic.. authoritarian
state. The goal was to attack thc rool causes of Argl'ntina 's problellls, rather than to
I
I
I
I
I
2M I'ARTTWO 0 CASESTlIDlFS;lfIANCEovERTIME
deal with Ihe symptoms: society lIlust he transformed. The Onuanh gove",
1:" lllent
shut down the recalcitrant Congress, ousted opponents from the and
sci out 10 control (and purportedly "upliftR) the tone of social life. Di
s
ll1issin
politicians from positions of rluthority, the military leaders forged ;'llliances
technocT<lts and foreign inveslors, whose crlpital was sought to spur economic
growth.
The economics minisler, Adalbcrto Krieger Vascl1r1, announced a Wide-ran.
plan. A key fe<llul'e was a two-year w<lge freeze in 1967, which the governmenl
W<lS <lble to enforce hec<luse orils :wthoritarian methods and its rclalive success in
holding down price increa<;;e<;;.
The Ilew military government also thought it had another f<lCIOr working in
its favor. 1\ significant wing of organiz.ed labor, led by CGT executive Augusto
Vandor, \\'anled to support them, which would have the benefit of diViding lahor.
This tactic proved partially successful in 1967 and 1968. But in 1969 it was
engulfed hy ;\Il explosive lahor rehellion Ihat developed in Ihe provincial city of
C:oT<loba, where there had heen a series of antigovernment prolests and lahor
sloppages. Ouring a street protesl the troops opened fire, killing some tens of
prolestors and hystan<lers. A howl of protest wenl up in the country. The Illany
cnemies of Ihe government's economic progr:Hll, including some military who
opposed the wage freeze, seiz.ed the occasion to lobby for Krieger Vasenil's ouster,
which finally came in June 1969. The Ongania governmcnt Irlsted :lnolher yea 1', hUI
it ... cretlibilit)' was shallercd.
II was not only the lahor opposition thrlt doomed Ong;,mia's regimc. There
was :11.<;;0 a shocking rise in politic;ll violence, including drlndestine torture and
execution hy the military governmenl rind kidn<lpping and assassination by the
revoilltional)' left. I.ahor policy soon came to depend on coercion, so the left now
decided to repl)' wilh violence of its OWIl. In 1970 leflist terrorists kidnapped ex-
president Ararnburtl. who had ordered Ihe execution of Perol1ist conspimtors in
11)56. Ara1l1burll was laler found murdered.
The Ongania government was by all standards a political failure. Allhough it
hrought olT postwar Argentina's mosl successful economic stabilizrltion progr<lJ1l,
it f;liled to create ;l broad based political coalition thai could make possible
gelluine planning for Ihe future. This outcome left Argentina with few alternatives.
The new president W;'lS another geneml, Roberto Levingston, a little-known
intelligence officer, who frlced immediate threats from rising inflation. He pUTslied
a moderately expansionary course, but a do\VTlswing in the beef cycle caused
shortages and high prices. Never well el1<lowed with military prestige, Levingston
found himsclfisolated. Yet another military coup removed him and installed General
Alejandro I..anusse. who h<ld heen the brains behind the ouster of Ongania eight
months earlier.
Lantlsse made no pretense at haVing ;111 answer for the economy, deciding to
ride rllong with growing budget deficits and mounting inflation. His real ambition
was 10 achieve a new politicrll riCCOI'd. I Ie opled for a rciegaliz..lIion of the Peronisls
:\I1d, in an even greater g:llllble. <Iecided to <lllow Peron to relurl1. Elections were
.'
'.
al1noUllced ftlr March 197J. l'l,(('111 hrieny It'IIIIIH'III., 1\lgenlin:1 in 1.11\' 1''-'-.' ,111l1
lobhicd intcnsively for his sl;lnd in, 1)1'. Ilet lor C:lIl1p"I,I. ,1' hI' 1'\\'11 pI.'"hllIIII.ll
C3I1did;lle. Me;lJl\"hile, Ihe \'iolcnLe uIIllinllcd. The glll'lllll.l" h('\;1111C I",!tln,
directly striking al high r;lIlking l1uhl,I!")' o(flu'r"..1\ well ,1<;' ,11 1'1'1""11', ,n"l
barracks.
CimpoTa rc\'ei\'ed 49 perccnl of lhc pllpu!'lr \'1'le, 1.11 ,Ihe.lll "I H,dIHII'" !}
percent. The president and lik(,-Illinded IlillLer<;; heg.lll 11' "1,..(' '1('1"011 ,1' Ill(' "111\
hope against Ihe Idl. \Vhen IleLior (::lIllpnr;l wa, in.ltIgtll.ll('<! III j\ 1.1\' I'" t, 111111'
than a fe\,\' officer.. fell Ihat Ihe '11 ..1 .. I("p low:lltl ,1 '11111111111 III 11i(' II Itl'-t lhll .11
he al hand
Peronists Bock in Power
Campora hnd left nil Ilouhl Ih.tl I1t' \\';)" tllll)' " .. 1.lIld III IIl1td 1'('lrlll \01111.1
rei urn and run in a new dCI linn. NClncthcle.... , Ill .. gtH'('IIlIll('1l1 I.lllth Iw,l .1
bold new ('\'onolllic pnlic)'. II W;'I" ,HIllCII ,II 111"1 .. I.lhdi/lllg pri\c, .11I01 ,Ill ..
boosllllg workers' earning" h,ll k II' Iht' sh,lre tit 11.1111'11,11 111"'II1C 11h'\ h,I.1
reachcd in Ihe earlier l'eloni<;;1 1'1'.1. ()lwlflu<;;ly 1111'. w"tlld ICIIIlIlt' C\II,I'"
dinar)' cooperalion from all gr.HI,". The (-,11111"'1.1 j:"\'('111lIIt'111 111.111
aged 10 llcgoliale ;lgrcel11cnl 10 il .. I'lopn'cll (-ollll.lt 1- (I'.\\ I ........ l,tll.
which was lorlllrllly ratiri("d h)' lahtll .llld hU... lllt.... Ilfg.1I117,111"1l" 1\ 1',II.dld
compaci with rurnl pHlllucer<;; (rx\epl I"r lit .. 1,lhldl" .11111 I'n"IlI.. 1 ,.1111,
brceders) prollli<;;ed prkt', 1.1),:, and \ H'tl!l it1(1'1l11\ \'" III 1('1 til II j"l .1 pr. '1111"1'
to douhle f;lflll production h)' I'JHO. llt l IlI'W [','1"11 ... 1 11":1111,
had cou!'>trucled n coalilion 111.11 int.llld('d ,lImll.;t ("VCIV intnC' .. t gH'UI' III
Argentille societ)'. IItH\' W.I" II III p,1I1. lin ,111"1' hnlh ("\h,lu .. lllln
and realism had laken hold of ArgclllltlC'" Ilulenl. 111111"1' 111.11' ,1 lc\\' ],'11",11111'
311ti-Pernnisls lookcd 111 Ihe I'Cl"flll )-:"\'('l"IlllH'111 .1" 1,.',h;lp" Ihl'lI ,"Ill!
try's hl!'>t t,h:ltlce to sulvC' Iheir prnhlcill" hy ""ll1t'lhitlj-: .. hllli ,01 "'111111110',1
naked forcc.
Evell so, the odds for ... 1I(l..e....." \\,er(' HilI high. l'olitit,t1 "I"kllll' W,I" 11\111):
steadily, as gl,errilb for(e... rcjcLlcc! the IIt'W l'cHlIli,,1 regime ;1I1d 1I1,d. lhl"ll):ll
kidnappings and ass;'Issinations, to dt:<;lahili:le thc fr.'gilc Jlllhllt.11 h;1l.11h('. A (wIlli"
liabilily was the nge and health I)f Ihe ntlccch:lriSl1lrll it ngurl..' .lnHlIld wh'llll I JI(' IH'\\
social consensus had 10 be huill: Peron W;lS sevenl)' ."evell ;1I1d III f.lilillg !leah"
New presidenlial e1eclions W('f" ...chetlllleci f(lr Sq\Il'lllhel 1'171. 1'('1''" 11"1\
succeeded in a pOlili(altactic whith h.ld f:liletl ill he gilt h, .. wilt'. "',tI,d.
nominated for the vice presidenLy. Th(')' sW('l'lllle c1edloll wilh (12 l'nu'lllllf lit,
vote. Pcron now began to lurn :lgain.. 1 Ihc n:voll1lillll,lr)' \cfl. \'\'IH'lll h" Ii,nl off,'"
cilcourrlged in his comments fmm eXile. lust :IS Illlght h:l\'t' hopcd, 1'<'lnll
W<lS proving the perfect sponsor to preside over a milil:lry .lIld pllhlC I,.nllnlt'r
offensive against the revoilltinna,)' lefl.
On the economic fronl, j\J74 hroughl tTtlllhk. All ()I'H oil 1'"1(' 111,11'.1"1'
hurl the brllance of prlylll(,1l1S, ,llthnugh Argclllin.1 W.I" illllllllllllg '1111)' 1f> 11('1' ,'111
of its oil. hlrthermore, <;;ollle 1l111l C(;T union<;; won Ih'\\' III
Vllc shall lleVt,'r know how mallY 01 thl' Wt:'rl' tutall)' illllUI.Cllt
and huw many <lctivd)' suppurted lhe guerrilhl 1lI0\'clllenb. ThutlS<lnlb uf
Argcntillc:> wert,' 110 duubt invulvcJ in 0111.' way or :IlIutllcl. Frum bank robbcflt:'S
anJ .... tht' guerrillas built a war Chc:>l of at le.l:>t $150 rllilliUll, :lIlt! tlll'Y
proVl'd highly adept ,II paramilitary slrikl':'.
The gCllcrals decided to pursue an all-uul llflel\:>iw withuut allY It>gal con
straints. The "disappeared" wc:rc victims in a tacti( to
terrori'll,.' Ihe countr)', In the cnd Iht:' gellcrab won, but at .l It'rriblt.:- prkl. 0111.,'
proud Argentina became all international pariah. along wilh Chile and South
Africa, ami its pl'uplc, by habit articulall' .1IIl! .lrgullIl'nt.ltIVl', :>uffl'rl'd thl' ignu
mill)' of silcllce and intimidaliun.
What had the guerrillas wanted? With rHinor dl!J,agrl'ellll'llts UVl'l' l'mpha:>is,
thcy soughl the viuknt overthruw of 1111.' gOVl'rJIll1Clll and lhl' ill:>tallaliull of a
revolutionary sucialist rcgime Muxist-Lcllinbt line:>. Prcdoillill.lllll)' Illiddic
class and deeply alienated b), the merry'go I'l\llnd uJ Argcntine' pvlitil.:', they wcn:
caught lip in a pas:>ionulc rd>dliun ag.til1:>t .1 :>ol.iueLVllOllli\. th.lt W.I:>,
irOlliGllly, one of the IllOSt in AlIIt:'fica. OIIt.'C IUl knl ill b.lttlc,
was no exit for tht:' guerrillas, It was a w.lr 10 Ihe dl'alh.
'rhe war :>huwed Ihal a well-equippeJ ,II III dl'tl.'rlllilIClI g'lvclllrllclll ":.111,
barring all)' major split alllong lhl' society':> ruling di!l':>, ddcat a guarill.1 llILH'C-
mell\. A key factur was Ihl,tacit (ancl Oftl'll t'xplicit) suppllrt uftlle middle lor
the <Inllgul'rrilla GlllljJilign. Thc Argt'ntillc llliddk was prtlpurliuna!l'ly till'
largest ill Latin AllIl'ric.1 , andlll('rl'furl' a crud.1I .Ktur illlh,' POJitl\..11 drallla, It h.ld
.!hX J',\ltl I\\u" t.t\:-.I ... TUPIl'> t IlANl;J'OVl.lt 11/1.11.
\1\11.1111111 III 111l' \lId.d c..:tlnlr,u.. 1. ""..-\l'r.1I CCT uniulI:> :>OUI1 lollowcll suit. Under
1-:1I1\\lIlg I'fC')UH..' Inllll UIIII/ll k,ldlr::., I't'rull agrl.'c.:'d 10 kll"gt" yl'"r elld bonuses for
all l ',;'1' Ullillll::', th,.:'"n::by tllld"f1ninillg hi:> mVll anli-inOalioll program,
Wlldll,:l l'l'l\IJll.uuld hdVt" yl'l ag.lill wurkl'J his Illagic with workers Was
11\1\ II! hl' kllOWIl. III July 1">7'1 hl' died; thL' I'n:::.idl'ntllow W<lS Isabd, had met
IIL'I \Vhl'n was a nightduh dancer in Panama, during his leisurely journey after
III'> Il"i'; t)wrthrtlw, Isahd no Evila, as hl'f inst'curily and indecision had
,dll'.tdv 1Il.ld" ...1",11'", Sill' .1::.:>UlIH.:J ollllt' .1:> the Pt"ronbts were billerl)' squabbling,
'111l'1" \V.I:> ;Ill :>..:ralllbh: tu illtlul'ncc ovt'r the frightened WOlllan
\\ Illl 11,..1 ..... n'dl'd lu th,' I'rL':>ldt:llti.d dUIIC:>,
I lit: ,tdvbcr with tht" illfluence was lIlini:>tt:T of social wdf;\re,
1<1'>" Ikg,l, all .1I11bititltl:. .llld biz,IlTC 11g11rc well knuwn lor his militanlly
I iglll willg 1"'lOlli:>t vil.'w::.. J.OPl'L Ilrst hclpl'd cOllvilll:e to purge her
,.lllllll'l ul 1I101L' JlH,,!t.-l.lll lllilll:>kl:> in Ol"tobcl' 197
1
1, tht::ll pcrsuadt::d her to
'1.1.. 1.. tlU\\1l1J1l lhl,ldl- IIH.luding Idl-wing PC"ronists. This bet.:alllt' tht:' direction
III ill b\.:gall lWgoli.llillg 1lt.W conlracts wilh 100 percent wage
IIILI,',I:",':" 1I1 1IIllr,'. lllUUllkd a L-uunlc:rGlIllp:.lign, annulling the huge wagt'
..... lIlllllt:lIb. hut 1.ltt:r, alh'r ,I :>,'ric" 01 lHa:.:>ivt:' Slrikl':>, rl'instating them. Lopl'z Rcga
1t:,IWI\d III .1Ilt! Ih\. .. bo hcr 3:>
tltl' 1'1..'1 VIII:.t dC!t.-g.ltitJll :>pJit aJl.lrl.
I'Ill' gueJrill,ls (olllillunllht:ir prlJvo..:ativl' "llacks 011 tl1l..' pulke and military,
hllllgllig lilt '0111,' dr.1l11atit'" The right thruugh l'CJu.. lly
\'1,,!t.-1I1 org.llll/allulI'. Till' v.dul' ul 1lI01ll.'y rallk daily, aimusl hourly, as inllatiun
f tl.. l..dl'd h)' .\3:; 111..'1'lnt ill )1)75, F".lf ut krrorisls, whctht'r of thl' right orldl, took
Ihllt! 'JIII1"lhlptll,llC, till.: llrb.lll iliilldlL' Cl.l:>:>. -I'lll' prl':.idl'nt was tt=rrificd,
!llklly Ulhlhll' to h'idd 'Ullllllillld. Olll.C again .111 dcdl'd govdlllllt:'nt disappeared
1111111 III ... C.....I
III l\l.lr,h 1')7fl. ill t\q;,lItlll.I' ... bc... l.prnlicll.:d 'Ullp. llll' 1I111itary placed
J .... dIVI 1','n"ll utldl'r IHHlSI' arrcst, a yl'ar bl'l'ul'c hl'r term was 1I1', \I'l/h)' had the
1111111,11 y w,lllni :>0 lung? bl..'l.<lll:>t'" thl..'Y did lIut walll tu takl' UVl'r
101111,11 fur govl'rning ulltil tht' national had :>0
\'loll'lIl .lIld IIll' l't:llIlOIll)' so chaotil.' that no Olle could <IOllbt the nec:d for
lIuhtary illtl'rvlntiun.
The Military Returns
Wlll'lI lht'" armed furce:> JlllaJly moved ag<limt babd, they were determined tv
a burl"aut:!';ltk-aulhorilarian solutiollthat wuuld las!. Undcr G..:neral Jorge
I<:dad Vit!da, the rt'gillll' Ialillchl.'d a viduliS campaign, allL'mativdy known as a
war" ur war" again:>l thl' oppusition. The government began arresting
at will. Alid thl'lI thac wt're the desaparecidos, those who simply
pcrhaps IU.OOO or 20,OUO in all. These people were abducted by
hl'OIvlI). :Inllnlllll'lI who Wl'rl' ulJdtHlbtcdl)' lIIen uperating with
tb,' llllillary gtlVL'll1llll'llt':> knowll'dgc, Virtu;Jlly llOlll' of the abducted were evcr
hl'.lfd flUlll .Ig.dll.
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The Mothers of the Plaza
lhe Argentine milit.uy jUlH<l th<lt powel III 1976 Idl ,Ill clpp<llJllly te(u,d of
tonure and The least hllH of OPPOSition (ould resulllIl dlsappearilllce:
only protesters who managed to defy Ihe generals were d small group of older
mothers who met spontaneously every Thursday to march around the Pldza de
Mayo in downtown Buenos Aires prominently dlspldying the names dnd pICtures
of Ihelr missing children. Hesitant at firsl, Ihey courageously stood Iheu ground
when police and military harassed them with threalS and iruimidatlon. By some
nmade {he women were allowed to continue, Were these men, normally so ready
to brutalize any suspect, now afraid to atlack mOlhels. ttlt" supreme symbol of Ihe
vi:llues lhey claimed to be defending?
Their demands were simple. They wamed an accounling or what had hap-
pened to theil loved ones. They had no illusions. Most knew their sons and
daughters had been exe<uted. They wanted contirmation and the chance to
bury their losl progeny, They ra,ely gOI Ihat satisfacllon. Yel they continued
llldtching fOI years. a sornbf:r rernindel of the tl!rrible puce Ihal has
paid for the demented fanaticism of its military.
J
bcnchheilcls. All bllt three other I.atin Allleril.1l1l:01111lries hacked Argenlin,1 ill ,Ill
Qrgnnization of American St:lles vote tlH'
Why had the Galtieri government dccilkd tIl in\'a<k? (:Ic,lrl}' Ihe l\rgclllll1C
economy was on the rocks :lgain. Onl}' d;lyS hcrorc th(' Aprill. il1\';I<:1I111 tlwrC' h.ul
been the Inrgest antigovernmenl demonslralion since the milil;ll-y <;cI7('(1 P,'WtT Irl
1976. Galtieri and his fellow omcns IIndouht<-'dly saw the Illre til a quick rllihl:H\"
victory in the Falklands/Malvillas as a hoost 10 the s.lggin): ptll'lI
larity. Furlhermore. C,altieri fclt certain Ih:ll he would haw' ,II k,l<,1 lhe loll It
support of Ihe Reagan administration. with whkh Ihl' Argl'lltillc ):1'1ICI.I1 ... h,Id
developed a warm relalionship.
In the short run. Gallieri was righl tllC Argl.'tllilH re.llllt)!I,
wrong ahollt Ihe United Stales. Tht, inv,l.sinn brollghl all tJlltl"lllring til p.ltrl"ti,
sentiment in Argentina. In part that was dllc 10 gnvellllllC'1l1 lOlllrnllcd 1f'1"lltiIl1:
thai lold of nothing hut Argent inc victories. Bill I he Al gellt illC III Illli,' ""1I In <'llllt'l ['II
a rude return to reality. The hel!C'r trained :llld IHIJa' expninllcd ... 11 ll'It'Il"
laid effective siege 10 the 7500 Argentine trnops holed til' in llle M,t1\'IIl,l<, 1.11"I,l!,
pori StanIe}'. After brief consult:Jlinn wilh BIlCllO!'> Airc!'> and "I't'r.ldk /1',,1... 1.1111 t',
the Argentine commander surrenderc<1 the t,nl}' .<,cll<:il11c Illllil'll. givCll Ill(' 11IUlI
Illornle. condition. and positioning of his Yel IIJc ,,1tdden "ul"tl,tldn lit!
Bucnos Aires hard. Britain. sllppo!'>edly cnlcchlcd and IlIl.lhle 10 ddcl1d thC' .....
distant islnnds, had decisivcl)' dcfc<llcd nlllll('ri< all)' sllpcril'r 1\ r I, 'I' ,""
Only the Argenlinc Air FOflecrncrgctl a... h;\\'ing had holh till' <'kill.lIld Iht', "1I1.1g"
to fight effectively.
THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE (1 983-PRESENT)
The G.-.!t ieri-led junta had fl1.l<lc a Imlrl:ll crrnr:l:- a Illilita ry glWet'lllllcrlt: it 11 ,I
military ndvelliure that it failed 10 Will, Patriotic fervnr turned mIll ugh .1<'1111111
stmlions outside the Cnsa Rosada. (;.-.llieri Cline ulldel' firc (rllm hi ... kll,,\\
officers. lie resignecl as military tlnity hegallto Ilnr:lVcI, alld p.-.!'>sc.llitc I're... idcnti,d
batoll to an obscure retired general. RCY";lhl(1 Bignollc, U,,,,n a,<,sllllll11g ,11fl\(' 111
July 1982. I1ignone repeated Argelltill;l'S dlilll 10 the Falkl,llhl ... /f\1.11v1ll.1'" I Ie
promised an election in 19RJ and:l relurn It) dvilian gnvcllll11C'1l1 I,y 19H'I.
The Argentine econom), wenl fmlll hnd tn worse ill I\)K2. Inll,ll it III .. ht 'I 111"0
200 percent. workers lost ahoul one-ql1.1rler of Iheir IC,ll illLlll11l', ;'llid th(' \ .)lltlll\
wenl inlo de facto default Oil its private foreign deht.
To virtually everyone's Radil.al Parly leader H.lld WOll
percenl oflhe vole in the pre.... idelltinl elcdi"11 llf I()H:,\, Tile ICllliL;ll ... ,11"'1) g.lilH",1
majority control of the Chamher or Deputies. AlfollSill h:ld be('n ,I Utlll,ll:C""'"
battler ror human rights during military rule. Also. his jlHrtr was Ihe t>llh' Il"n
Peronist group cap<lhle of forminp..-. viahle government.
The new regime faced formidahle prt)h1cllls. \V:lS Ille ((ltlltllllrllf'lll II'
prosecute the mililary personnel and police who had killcd nr 1111lte
than 10.000 SllspCCIS. The pllblic rcvulsillll ag;lillst Ihe peql('llalllr<, W.l<, ,Ie!']' ,llitl
,.
\'f'
ii
5
.,

"
270 I'I\I("I"T\\IO" C,\SF STUDIES: CfIANl;1'. OVFn TIME
w:ltchcd with dismay Ihe c1ec:l)' of order under Isahel Peron. .-.lld most of it
supporlcd, at least initially. Ihe coup of 1976.
That fateful takeover was intended as n coup to end all coups. Videla and his
collc:lgucs proclaimed Ihat Iheir goal WaS not merely to terminate the ch:los orthe
PCr0nisl ye:lrs, hut also to restructure Argentine society. The junta promised to
eradic:lte and lherehy remove some potent aclors from Ihe political
st.:ene. They planned to reduce the puhlic sector. and conscquenlly to rearrange
rel:ltiollships among husincss. lahor. and the stale. They affirmed Argentina's
align men1 with the and Christian world." and in keeping with these
lofty principles. they promised 10 ureeducate" the poplll;')ce by emphasizing
:llit)'. uprightness. ;md effiCiency."
In pursuit of these ideas, the militnry penetrated Argentine society Illore
deeply thnn ever hefore: in .-.ddition to aholishing the (icnernl Confederation of
l.ahlH, milit.-.ry officers took over olher institutions. such as sports and charit<lble
organizalions.
In 1978 the gener:ll,,, got a heaven-sent propag;lI1da opportunity when
Argentil1<l hosted the \"'orld Clip soccer Ill<ltches and won Ihe cup. to the ecstatic
c!leer!' of the hOllle crowd and the obviolls ple;lsllre of the generals. FOI' a few weeks
.-.1 ordil1:lry Argentines could take pride in their cOllntr)'. !JuL the euphoria
w.-.s soon dissipated by the realities of Argentilla's plight.
Among Ihe gravest worries W:lS the economy. Et.:onomics r\llinister Jose Martinez
de Iloz,:m outspoken representative of the -neolihemr view, immediately imposed:l
s!.-.hi1i7alion program. L:lhor faced declining real wages. while husinessmen found
credit int.:rcasingly hard to Ohl:lin. t"lartincz de Iloz also moved to privatize a number
of slate enterprises. while slnshing tariffs on almost all industrial goods.
These policies succeeded in hringing inO:ltion down to 88 percent in 1980 ;lIlci
in :lchieving a surplus on the h:llance of payments for four successive years
By 1981. however, the picture had darkened. IIlOation again exceeded
100 pcrcen1. industry oper:lted al only h;llf c:lpacity, and real income W:lS less th;ln
in [970,
IJcspitl' Ihese economic lroubles, the anned forces demonstrated notahle
coherence :lnd unity. This W:lS an institutional regime. not a one-man show,
:lnd Videla turned the presidency over to General Roberto Viola in March
19HI. Viola lacked the staminn needed in the pressured position nnd passed
the presidency in early 1982 to General Leopoldo G.-.ltieri. the cOl1lmanoer-
in-chief of the army.
In March Gallieri chose to stake his government's fale on the FalkJand Islallds
controlled by Ihe British bUI long c1:limed by the Argentines. who called them the
Malvinas Islands. The military thought the British would not defend the desolate
islands-8000 miles away from Rritain, popul:lted by only 1800 inhabit:lnts .md
600,000 ,,,heep. So on April 2, 1982. a large Argentine force invaded the islands Clnd
quickly overwhelmed the badly outgunned royal marine garrison,
But the Brilish denounced the invasion and mobilized a major task force. In
!<lIe Mar, the I1rilish lflnded thousands of lroops onto hl.lklands/Malvinas
!.'l.!. 1',\](11\\'11" (/\,>I:-.IUIJlI\ I
Allun:.in vok. Al'gc:ntiml, would be the country 10 try its
OWIl Blllll.II)' luI' dUIlllO'stil" CrilllCl>.
'1 l>l.l.ulld plvLIl./Il wal> Ihe Inllation had rC:<Ichcd 400 perct'1lI in
I ')X \, .llhl could nol its huge foreign debt. Alfonsin also faced the
l-WI slfuggl.... fur alllong competing dass....s ;mJ sectors, wilh the
I.lhor 1I1liUlb hloodied but unvanquished by military repression_
IlIir\1 \....IS finding a viablt' political basco Could the Radicals, a
10111"111) p.llly .. ill\..... I').!'), rd;.ill Ihl,.' lIl;ljurily Alfollsin had won? If nOI, was an
\u,dlllOIl Ic.tl>ihk!
Allllll-.lll :.Ilugglnl v.lli.lIllly wllh .Ill IhL""l>c dl.dkngcs. Prosecuting the
IIII Itlll"I" III .1 llo-will uat iun, A president ially appointed cOlllmis.
:-otOll lk.ltll Ill' disappearalKe of 8906 Argl'lItint's. 'I'he govern-
IIH'lIl dl.llgld Illl' military for crimes ranging from
lI11IHkl Itl FiVl' Wl'rl' given prison terms, while three of the
,llqllilh:d wt'rl,. laler Irit'd b)' mililary justke SCIlI('lIct'd to prison. BUI
Ilo\\' 1.11 dowII l>huuld IIll' pruscnllions go? A 1987 military revolt protesting
hlllllt"r IUl"l,.'ed tu I.:xcmpl all below tht' rank of
glIIl. ..d. Ilil' ollgoing PI'Ol>ll..utiuns bugged ... n, human rights
.. 10 Ihc l.lilur(' to pursue the of other cases.
;\111111 ... 111 .. fl,.plied th.ll nu olher LOitin Allll'riGlll government had
\'\\'1 tl) II-. olfiLl'rl> fur during a militar)'
r,' 1\'Illlllhnl.
j\kdllig p.I)'lIllII1-. UII tht' 1I1.ll>SIVI: SSU billiun lordgn llt-bt \\'.130 illllllediall'
\.. IIII' /\IIUll::'1I1 gUVl,.l"Ill11Lnl. Alfonsin had tu IIt'W
hUI 111\' Ill"ll l.' \\1.1::' .Ill Ij\ 1F-dl:"lgllnl au::.tcrity policy at hOllle. Inlbtioll ruarl'd lip to
I.!.:' ill I'JXI .\lId 7UU ill 1985. With its back againsltht'
\\'.tll. lite Alh'll-.lll go... allllwlII UIl\'lt1nl a w.lgc-pricl' frel,.'ze. 11I1iatiun drupped to
k ..... 1110111 100 hut;1 alld a ::.harp in wages also occurred,
(>ad)' lll,lknllifl IlIl'.IM1!'l:::' thc gOVl,.rHlIllllt Iu avuid dt-f.ndtillg on Ihe
Il!ldgll ddt!.
'I hl:lI I I llllr>lvded. By early 19H9 price::. \\'erlC' al lllOrl..'
,11.111 JIJ plrl.l'1l1 a mut/I"; wUllld rl'adl more lhan IOU percellt month by
ulid)'l''''. Till.' grusl> dOIlllC'stil,. pruduct by J percent in 1988 and 6 percent ill
I'JX'J (lIw..III, imOllll' fur Argt.'nlines declinl,.'d by nearly 25 percellt
J ')gU::.).
I'lWlIi .. l,!, M."I/,l,.'d Ihe uppurtunity, In the presidential of May
I'JXl) , 11ll' ("<llldll!;.Ik, Culo::. Sillil Mencrn, govcrnor o( Iht"' interiur
I'I"lIVI1Il.l' ul 1..1 !huja. touk -17 perccllt of the popular vole-;.Il1d a c1e:u
11I.ljunty ill thl,. dcclur.t1 colkgc:-winning h;.lndily Over the Radical candidate
Angdoz. Thb lll.lfkni ;t potential watershed in Argentine politics: il
was lilt.' thai an opposition party had triulllphed in a presiJential
dl'\'IIUIl III UVl,.1 )'l,.'ar::.. If Ille CUUllt'")' could take Skps, SOllie
illlalpb Argl'lIlina might have a realistic chance of nchk'ving
gl'lIU iIll.' dl'UHlll,.l,.y,
..
,
It would nut be l,.',ISy. The l'CUnOllll( crisis illll.lIsilinl. Argelltina, Ihe prowf
bial hreadhaskcl ulthe conlillcllt, suflen:J the Ilulniliilliulll.flulld riotl>. A ::.tulllled
Pre:::.idl'nt Alfunsin declared a l>lalc ul Sil'gl'", thcn anllouncl'd Ihat lit' wuuld rl'l>ign
from office six monlhs of schedull',
Argentina's persistent financiill <:fiSt's stemmed frolH ill> 1.lilurl,. tu adjust tu
changing world realities. From 19461u 1956. Peron had imposlC'd an illward-looking
nationalisll"cOl1omic policy, This expcriment (ailed 10 cn:atl' growth,
although workers' incollle kId cCl1ainly improwd. ..
bruught a sucCl;.'ssion of contnlJil::lory policie::.. tilt' hbcr;ll:., with
their anli I'cfOnbl obsl'::.sion, lIor the natlUll.llt::.b. witll lu thl,. llIarkd
and tu furdgn tradc, cver cOlltrollcd policy luI' Ihml ;J ft.w Yl.Il::' .11 a lillie.
Instead, 1h... CCOllOlll)' pulled ba<.k alld (urlll ill ;Jlllicipaliollihal wltol:'vel \.... 1::. ill
opposition would soun gain powl:r and change <.uurSl' agaill.
This pallel'n seemed 10 haw wilh Ill,,: uf IIi ..
prospcclS secilled lavorable because a Perullist he cuuld rt'lain the
natiollalisb' loyalty, while also following :l llt'uliberal
restructuring. But Mcneill had his full. 11111.ttilill was rUlilling.tt ISO jh'l'(ellt
per lllLlnlh. The <.ountry Wil::. lIearl)' $4 billiull ill afl"t'.tr::. ill paylllcllt::. Ull Ihe
{'xkrnal debt. Melll'lll inslalll'"d a nl'W llliniskr who illlpol>cd it slr,,-,
austc.>rity program. III Jalluary 1990 he ::.IHKkl'd Ihe publi( by transkrring
be:lring h:lnk lertilkates into klt-)'t'ilr bondS-Ill ... fkcl, <.llllli,!,l,..lIlng tht' l>;I\'ing<; 01
the llliddil' c1...1s::.. Tht'30e hard-Ilo'!'cd e\ClltllalJ)' pro"qh'd .1 Il'<'l",sioll Ih;11
broughl an l:lld to
Violatlllg dlerbhl'd prindpll... ul Pl'fOllbm, J\km'lll .Jlld
t'lIIbal'hd on a program lu "privalize- l>t.ltt:-owlled by ,:.,dling tlll,.m otl'
to 111 IlJ90 the gOVt'flllllt'1I1 auctiolwd olf I:lltd, the natiun,ll
telepholle (Ollipall)', and the naliollal Argelltlll.I':", kllt'Il1 alsu
illlllollll<.ed hi'!' inlellt to procet'd with Ihe privali:t.illiull uf dl'ctridty, l" ,al alld 11,Iturai
gas, and shipping. Nculibl'l".d 1'1,.OIIl)1I1k doctl'illt' Sl'l;llll'd to hl' triuIllphalll.
III l':lrly 1<)<)1 Melll'lll lIalllt'd as Ihl' llew cCUllull1il''> IJOllllllg\)
Cavallu, a linn believer in striU market orkntt'd C.lV.dlu till:
privatiL:ltit)J1 campaign and ct'lIl1:rcd his program 011 a wl,.OllVl,.l"IlbilJlY Llw"-which
reslricted public expenJilun:s 10 reVelluc.>s and, B10SI a
exchange rale between Ihe Argl,.nlinl' p<:::.u and thc U.S. Julbr. 10
this exchange ri.lte lx'came the '''Inchur'' fur ccollolllic l.unllckn.,;c, lIeutralizilig tht'
Argt'nlinl's' wdlfounJeJ fears of h)'perinflatiun. As ;J re::.ult, inll.Hion dl'c!ined
from 4900 percent ill 1989 to 4 perC('llt ill 1991.
But there wcre negative features as \'>Idl. One ovcrv...Ilu.ltiulI of thc
leading to:1 trade ddkit of Illore than $6 billioll in Allotht'1" was impover-
ishment of the middle class. According to one study, nearly h:llf the
llliddJe class slipped down inlO the lower class during the t'arly 1990s. In the:
meantime, open unemploymcnt frum 65 pcrCl:lll ill 1 tu 12,2 pl'ff..enl
in 1994. Thesc werc the typical fruits of a "hard mone( pulicy that was cnthu-
siaslically endorsed by Ihe IMF and the Wurld Balik.
candidales together g;lfnered ,16 percellt o( the vUIe ;111(1111111 e 111,111 11,111 11u: "'1",11 ... II'
the lower chamher. W'hile Ihe Peronists still held ;111 ah"tllulC' 1Il,Iimitr ill 1111"
Senate, Ihe dissident cO;1lition cmerged ;l potellli:"d thrc:11 In l'clllni\t
dominance.
III omce. the Alliance congresslllen, as promised. sltl'l,oll('d t,,!t1\tl11 ...
economic policies while criticizing corruplion ill gOV(,'fllllll'1l1. 'I'll(" 1'1"11< l'\", 01
turning the electoral conlilion intn a viahle Clppo"iti01l :llld .1 1.011ICl1dcr Inl
nalional power also heg:ul. Mellem toyed with Ihe ide,I 01 II ring fill "I 11111t!
lefln, hUI Ihe negnlive polling re<;ol! .. "oon di<:'"11r,lgt:t1 hUll nr Illitl 1'1'.'!.
the Alli,mce presidcnli;ll candidale. FCfIl.lIHlo dt' LI 1(11,,1. I.l, cd .1 tll\ ult".!
Peronisl calllp led hy BI1CIl0S 1'1'1'WI 11(, 1.11 gtlVt'nlf1l I lIll.lr,I" llllh.lltk
Argenlina's relillions wilh the United StiltP't 1)I>f".,mp 1I1lt1't1l.1Uy w,um rlurlllq 11If'
decilde of Ihe 1990s. Thi<; rE'presentl'd a nliljor OPIl.lrtlllf' fOI ,1 Ilol1iflll tll;'!1 11.,,1
historicillly considered it<;elf <IS il cultur<ll eClll.,1 <Inri poliltl illllV,ll In thl'> (nln....m III
the North. How and why did this occur?
The shirt began with Ihe election of(,'1105 $,llrl Mpn('m.11',II)n... l. il) I,ll" 1'1H'1
Surveying Ihl' impending post-Cold War world, Illp n"'w .'(lrninl<.Ir;,tl..... n 1.'''1'' I"
the conclusion thaI Argentina's nillional intprp<;t .. would bp hf".1 "f'IVf'rI hy (I,,'.f'
alignment with the United SIMes.
By mid-1990 Argentina declilre<IIIS <lCccpt.1nc" of Ill(' 11,0""('1.11 plllll Il'lp...j
the Washington consen<:u"', espedillly in r
p
q,lId to ftcp tI"d" .lr1d <;li1hthlV of Illl'
currency. In December of Ih..,1 year, Guido eft l
p
lI". Menpm'<; IIIIJ.olIlf' fOIf'''lu
ministt"r, offert'd the lonque in cheek obsclv.,lion th"t hi", f"nUl\uy would 1If'
seeking re/nciones ((!flln/e<; ("c<'lmal rcl"Oon<;"l With th" Ilnll('(I<"I,IIf'''
There followed an astonishing tlllnabout III forelqn polity. In ',h\lIl Illll,.r.
Argentina abandoned the Movemenl of Nonaligned N"llnrl<;. ttlflk .1(IIV\' I',lrl II'
Ihe U.S.-led Gulf War of 1991 (for which Presidelll Gporyc 1-1, W. Bu<.h <,Pllt Mpn""l.l
note of warm apprediltion1, terminilled its Iluclp.lf (01l.1hor<'ltlon With Ir.lfl. ll'"llll('(t
every phase of Ihe Haiti opelillion in imd <lher 1994" propn",pd Ih... dppl0ynlf'1l1 ot
UN -While Helmets" for peacekeeping <'Ind hUOlanitall,,1l purlJO"'f'''. <mel (h..p.1lrh('(t
peacekeeping missions 10 Central Americ<l, Kosovo. BO<;lli.1, ,'11(1 0111('1 t1t .. l.lrl{
locales. (The peacekeeping operalion<; <;PlVed dompsti( plllpn<;p<; Ion: Ih"v 'l,lVf'
Argentina's ilImed (orc"S an opportunity 10 1Pl"'ilil Ih('ir t.,ltf'lf'<! ptlhllf" 1111.1"".
while keeping Ihem out of the couiliry and out of p01iticill mi<;rhif'l.l
In eillly 1998 President Bill Clinlon rewilrded Il)e<;(" ('florl .... " ... p,..(i.ll1y llw
peacekeeping missions, by designaling Arq("nlinil as ;'! "milio, n.... n Nfl 10 .1I1y
This rather strange-sounding status was ere.,led by thl' U.S (onqr('<;<; in l')H') fOi
countries that had close strategic working relationships wilh Am<,ri(",lll miht.lry
(orces but were not members of NATO. lniti<'ll d("<;ignee<; W<,I<' J\u..tlilli",. [elvr!.
Israel. Japao, and South KOfea.
For Argentina, the principal benefit WilS symbolic. It f'1l1ililcd ll)f'mlK'l<;hip lIl.l
privileged club, It gr<'lnted legitim;o,cy 10 the nillif)1l .,'> iI wholr II .11<"" t1l1pltf'fj
The Ten-Year Honeymoon Ii
."
;
274 PAlffTW(). 1(;rOVFRTlMI
Not surprisingly, the ,\lcnclll initialives disruption and discord within
the \;'Ihor movement. II seemed ironic to man)'. and grievous 10 somc til I
. . a a
Pcronisl government by organi.zed !:lhor nnd confronting
protests from Ihe worklllg class. SlIllllarly, Menem ortered a round of pardons in
favor of former leader:" of the militnry There would be 110 continuing
sentences or prosecutions for Illllllill1nghts offenses cOl1ll1lilled in the dirty war.
In 1994 the adl1lillistrntion gailled congressionnl approval for n constitutional
;llllendllclltthat would reducc presidential terms from six to four yeMe:. but pennit
one reelection; reduce Ihe president's authorily to rule cmcrgellcy decrce;
;-\IId creilte the post of c:lhinet chief, who would he subject to rel1lov:l1 hy majority
vote in Congress. Proponents insisted that Ihe reforms would improve govern_
mental ;lccountabilily. Opponents, including llKlIl}' Radic:lls. regnrckd the reform
;IS;l maneuver by Mellem to perpetunte himself in power.
Mcneill promplly declnJ'ed himself;l Glndidale for the pl'esidenli;ll elections of
May 1995. Despite conlinuing rumors 0f high-level corruplion and widespread
resentment of the president's alltll0ritnrian style. Mcneill won 4lJ.8 percent of the
vole. Divided. dell1omli7Cd. and represented b}' n lackluster candidate. the once-
proud UCR earnc<1 only 17.1 percent.
In the inlernation;ll aren;l, Argentinn promoted the cOlltinued development of
(I he "C0mmoll Market of the $outh
n
). n four,piHlner nssociation
thai included Argentin;l, Brazil. Uruguny. nnd I'arnguay. ESlahlishcd in 1991. the
scheme ellvisioned crention of n free t rnde zone Ihat would eventually cvolve into a
ttlll-nc<!ged NCOIllIllOIl along the lines of Ihe Europenn Union. Despite
oCGlsi011al tension alll0ng Ihc memhers. Ihe volullle of trndc nnd investmenl
within MERCOSUR grew rnpidly throughout Ihe 1990e:. Its apparent success
hCllstcred Argentina's claims to lendership in AlIleric;l. "It hough Rmzil
wCluld claim this manlle as well.
Until the late 19905, rvlcnem's cOllllllitment to the nenlibeml model had
hrollghllillprecedented economic growth and stahility.lnnation h::ld heen brought
under control (less thnll I pen..:ent in 1996 and 1997). while privalization had heen
extendcd 10 virtually all state-owned industries ::Ind utilities" The L;DP grew all
average of S percenl per }'e;lr for the middle yenrs of the decnde. The"dollarizalioll"
of the eC0nomy proceeded to a point where dollars were a normal means of
exchange fm most transactions (hy 1999 there was talk of nhandoning the peso
altogelher). The decade's lihcmlizali0n had a darker side as well. Uncmploymenl
;'lnd high living cosls combined to weigh on Ihe lower seclors of society, and
corruption ;'lffeCled Ihe lives of Argentines of all classes.
Even Ihough Argenlines wcre tired of public malfeasance, the}' were wary of
disturhing the existing politicnl order, which had hinged on Menem and his pnrty
since 19R9. In preparntion for congressional elections in 1997. however, opposition
groups banded together under the label of Ihe Alliance for Work, Justice, and
Education. Careful to reassure nervous voters, Alliance candidates declnred their
supporl (or the neoliberal model while using the issues of unemplo}'ment and
corruption 10 critici7e Peronist candidnles. The results were surprising: 0pposition
(;
,
IJtlllldly III l,ltlll Allll::liLJ IIlUI'" p<lIIlLUI<lIly III Suuth ArnellclI, dnd most specifi-
lJlty III (OIlIPdrt:.Oll with alch IIvJI BrazIl.
NUl I I I.lILy <l1l",r M"'nelll left olflce. His immediate successor, Fernando
lit." 1,1 I(U,I. decidt,rt to n:"cmphd:.ize ailldnces wilh MEnCOSUn panner:., including
Iil<l/ll Aut:.lIII Itl",llt C<.lIS, Argenlina has atigned itself with Hugo Chavez and the
Idt of lell"'" pink tldt2'" .. urtllny through latUl America. like <III honeymoons, this
W<I,>tllr'
1 hllkl l'ollth.tI lIIt:.Ill) til f\!t:.-lllllI. II dl' 1.1 Holl.I who pr"'v;\i!ed in Ihe
lll'dlOIl
Tho:" IIl'W l,rn.ld"llt 1111\'" h.ld tv pay Ivr Iht:. C::lUIlUllllC I'0licit:s 01 hb preJcces-
... 111 .... TILt:.I'l\''''l'lllly "'t1\ln t.ldll!. It turlll,:d out Ihal thc llxnlcxdl;llll!,l' rate::, whirh
W,L'" llllt'lldL'l1 Iv IJt:. .111 k.ll1dlllr," ..:uuld Hut Ill.: Illailll.tinl'li hy IlIl'rc rhetoric. Tht:.
.Ldll,tl v,lIm' l1J Illl' Iu SillU:: lilt:.' peso rale was ullcolH..Iilionall),
gu,ll,lllh'nl (.tl 1:1 11)1' till" dullar) by Illl' l.klnk, Ihl' :-tCCIle' was Se'l for <l
I un \Ill till' h.lnk\ dull.. r C;IV.llIlI, with f\kllC:lll behind him,
\dll'lllt'lIll) rdu!>nl III dt:.:v.lIul"', Wllldl the ubviou') remedy.
J\ lIhl ...... 1I1!!.hl ol ",llJit,d, holh AI'I;l'llllllt:.: .ll\d furdgll, rc:>ultt'd. P;ll1ic swcpt Ihe
l'ilL,lllt:.I.t1l1l,llklb. Argl'lllillOl 1.lcl'd Ihl' ultimall:: ddault 011 its inlcrna-
liull,tl t1dll 1-:.lllil1 11ll: IMI: had bailed Ill' I Argl'lllilla. NUllhis lillll:. The land of
Ila' \,.111'1,.1 W,l'> I..Hill 111':>\ rwllun 19
1
1S Iu cull apse' into
!tlll'lgII dd,lldt.
Tht' \\'crt:. horrl'nduu:>. Thl: t't.:onolllY fdl inlu ils
tkcpl ... 1 .Itdllll' .. inn' tht:. I'lith. In lUll 1 CDI--' pl'!' t.:apit.1 fdl 12 pl'rcent, as 2/1
pt:IU'111 III h,III" t1t:.'d lhl' dllllltf)'. '\"gt:lllint: illUllllC::S shr.ll\k :.danningly,
,I'" 1l1Il1I11.[UYllll111 k;q)1 luw;lrd 20 pcr'Cenl and s:'lvillg!> Wl'rt:.: Wiped Ollt (dollar
.h... Olllll'> \\IIt:. hU/ln). 1{IU,," .\lId Illllll1lg ill l1lajor publit.: urder
t:. "lI.lpWt! 1,\ ,rl'igll II ,Ilk IUltlll'r fltllll illg Illl' ::'l'pply of l'xchang('.
III IIll' Illom')', Ihc IUIl'lgll tld)l had ::.u.m:d to $141 billion. rVh:a:>ured
1'" ,I Pt:'I .. llIt.lgl' 01 l'XpOII th;11 uebt w:.\s Ihe highe::.t of all major count
F"'I'lll.III), dl:-.tft:'>:'>Lllg thc tlrup ill trade:: in M ERCOSUR of
tlt
l
,Idv,llll,ll!,e Ih"t Br.lzil hOld gutten flUIll its 1999 dcv;Jllialioll. Argentina,
tIll' h'I."dthk:-1 1.llld in I... lill Alllt::rit:.'a, llOW ;J shuwt:.::Jsc 01 :.lnd
Jllditit:.,d II:tllknll'lcy.
'1 Ill' t:. Ulllll 1')' till II'> UWII. Thc IMI', initially tu Cav;.lIo's
I'"llid..!'>, grcw dbt:.nt:.:lJanku with swdling public sector
ddkil'>. The Ilewl)' inaugumled lie::orge W. L3ush adminislration in Washington
W.I ... t:.VtU Il ... ::. "')'lllp;HhdL... II di!'>lllb!>cd Argt:lltin;J .\S a ::.c::If-madt:.' disaster of only
:-t:.'t:.ulldal)' ililportaLI ....t:.. would have tu CIHnc Irom within.
TIll' kl'Y lu lurtha rt'luwry lay with Ihe political leadership. Folluwinga phase
til illtt:.!bl l'ulili ...t1 .. l1nfu::.iUl1, Ihl' 20t).\ presidl"l1tial dcctioll crucial. 'rhe
'J .. Argt:.llllll.l: .lIld .... 1.ltt:.lIJ,lh' 277
willllcr Nestur Kirchn....., a minor I'l'runbt l"X"UVt:'f!lor D "'1'" I . I
.1 '.1,", 0 It ll!>lllOlc:>1
crel e::nll.1 s, KLrchncr prumplly camed pupular :>ul'IJurt by ,. , I I
f
. I).' . . 0 1t l'PClltl'IKC
rom Ill' I eloJ1lslm<ldllneand conJclllllillg the military's hlllll'l " / ,_
J
k' . Ib <lUlISl'::' 01
I It: past uy UVCrlumlllg amnesty laws lor military offkers IJ", I' .... J
II
'. . IJlllKlpa
WUlI ( be Iu Ilegullak rC:t::lltry mlo llll' inte::rnatiOll"l1 I":",a" ,,1 - .
" . II l. lUlIlllllllllt)'.
As prt:::>ldelll, Kirchner reslruclured Arge::ntin.l's hillio I I . I I
I
'.
llscounl OlllllOSt bonds, paid ofT loans 10 the IMF (allh I .
, d:. .. '. oug 1 11111 III 1ll;IlIY pnvalc
U.S. ,m LlIIOP(;.1l1 holdt'rs 01 Argl'Il11JlC bumb.) alld I," """,,1" ,
. J " .Cl ::.Ullie pn'
VIUIlS y pnvallzt'd cnterprises. lie clllphasiznl Iii, rnli' '. I . II
. . e UII!> !I0CI.I PIU) COl!> alld
devoled addilional t::11l'rgy and 10 I I ,j' /.. .
. . . . l (;\\: Oplllg lO$l'l l'LUllOlllIC 'llid
pollllCal tiC'S wilh olllt:.'r countries of I.atin Am 'ricI . . I ' .
; C - _ '. . (;" In pJII >)' ::.trellglhC'll111g
ME.1t Iii.: pICked up support In Inidll'llll congrl':>:>iunal ballutin' bUI
dt.'cldcd nol to run fur reelection, imkad b<lckilw hb wilt:.' th... " ""a, C g
I
, 'I I 0 ,... ,.1, or nstlll'1
crnan( Cl. l C Klrchnt'r. In O":lobel' 2U07 . . I '.
I
,
. ' .1::'.1 )UOIII III agrlt.:ullur,r1 cXl1url::.
l' evale( ('cononw.: growlh ralt:::> slit' wo" ., I" I I I . .
, ,,_. . ' ,Il S C VIltO!")' at I Ill' polb. Shl'
Ihus btC.lllk tht:: fi"sl woman dir 'cll ,', > I I .
I I
cy c cett,;( 10 I IC pn'!'>ldl'nC)' '11ld
I It:: 10 serve as prt::sidt::nl. '
. ufn.Cl", dc Kirchncr emplo),cd :>UOll' 01 Iht' lllilil.llll lI:ltion;dbt
rhdonc 01 the Perolllsi movement :'\lul ldvu-nl' I I , I . .
., " ' .. Cl .I .Irgt:.:r ru..:: lUI Ihl.' 5t;lll" III
m.llhlgemenl of the economy. SIlt:.' proposed Ihal priva!c:: funds bt:: rcdir
eclt'd 10 thl' govern men I !luciaI sl"curily sYSlt:.'1Il In JU,)" I" I .
. .' . - <}!1 It .LlklllptCl 10 r;lI!>l' Ilk
CXpOlt I.IX un agncultural t:.'(1I11modilies, illcludirll' so)'bl'Il" '" ,.., .. ,. I
I I 0 .t" III l.t lVI" I I'll
t::llgt:'llt l're( a massive (and dft::ctivl') fr 1 A ., I '
U . bl' . UII rgcnlln.L!> rur.L ,S..'ell)l.
n.1 c 10 'sulve tilt:.' cUlIlltr)'::. cconomic in tile of \.'0,11 '. _ ..
,/,
" 3\' I '_I' I l
.. \ It'r pliU IC support l rop sharply.
Till"' prl'sidenck:> of Kirchnt"r anJ Crblin'l 1","',,,,1-, , ,.. I
I
, . . ' t le "Ir( lllt::r
(lll1Unstratt' Ih(' per.'>lstlllg pUI>ular '11'pnl I p.. " .. I
. U elUlII:> n.lllOII.I wlIh Ib rdi
;IllC(:' govt.'l"l1ll1cl1lal intl.'rvo.'lltioll and it::. ;LUt::nlitili 10 Ill .. plight 01' thl' po' I
BUI Ihe slat.r uf till' econolllY fl'w,lls serillUS vulllcr.lbilil)'. Ar
tu slruggk 10 Jllld a l>al,uKl' bl'lWeen il:> rdHlllllo on ex purl I .
alld Its lIt"ed tu dev;>lop'l '1>" f' 0 l I rc
. ' t:: .' VI t) nalltHlal growlh. A return hI pru!llwrit)'
rC:l11:llllS, for now, a stdl elusive promisc.
10
CHILE
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Map 10 Chile
FROM COLONY TO NATIONHOOD
27H
Repression and Democracy
What we now call Chile was one of the 1110st inaccessible realms wilhin the Spanish
empire. It was hemmed in by barren deserts (in the north). the Andean cordillera.
and treacherous seas around Cape Horn (10 the south). In time the region's central
valley became valued for its "gricultural production. The Spaniards encountered a
strong-minded indigenous population. but man)' perished under the onslaught of
diseases brought hy the Europeans, A relatively homogeneous population, meMizo.
emerged from the colonial ern, although few oflhe inhabitants wished
10 admit the exlent to which their Spanish forehe:uers had mixed with indigenous
partners,
C
hile made .. Illuch-delayed entrance onto the world stage. 11 was fnr
centuries all ohject of henign neglect. As a colony. it received soc"'''! allcn-
lion from the Spanish crown. Small, remote. ;lIld I:lcking in precious minerals, it
was a fClugh-and-llIlIlhlc Clllipost of the cll1pirc-:l "frontier in evcr)'
<;CI1<;(' of the lcrlll. Independence brought lillie fundamental ch:lngc. :thhough
the di<;Clwcry of industrial minerals led to the country's evenlual inSCrlion in the
wnrld economy. It was not until the mid-twentieth cenlury thai Chile acquired
promincllce as the sHe of contradictory political experiments: populism, refor-
mism, socialism. and authoril:trianism. ''''hen the subsequent restoration of
democracy wenl IWlld-in-hand with impressive economic growth. Chile
heGlIne a first-class poster child for the neoliberal cOllventional \.... isdolll of the
I990!'. The nation's record of struggles, !'ctbacks, and achievements thus
aUluired speci;ll meaning through a process of extrnpolation: Chile bec;llllc
important not only for its own sake. bill also ;IS a tesl case for what might
happen elsewhere. Wilhin Latin America. Chile gained stature as:lIl example. a
warning, a public-policy laboratory-and. notwithstanding its diminutive size, a
cOlltinen(:l1 leader,
/XII 10 .. {.hilt: Ih:l'rl':... ioll .1Ilt! 1>...o,lllllI.llY 2:i1
N I
',I, "I,'lill Iht' in Chilt: rc.lI.. kd much as Iheir
\VIl ...II .q'llttlll 11I\.ll U ,
,I ' I ,. howlIlI' luyalty to the lTown. As the Frl..'nch
0 co .
I
"
I ,-d lIll dter till.: l:Ollljllest in lHUH, the Chileans sel'mel!
... tllIll" " "1',1111 l . . .. .
h".ldl'll tOI llldq)l:'lIdl'IKl', hut tilt: for..:e::. reg..lilled :llIthltlVt' by
tl'l'l"ld III IXI,I WUll (ulltrol ul Chill'. It ag;linstthis that
I
)'11 ' 11 'I,) k"ll! 'I rt'VOlliliun,lry arm)' from Mendoza. I he rebels
Bl'III.llllll l l.. , . ,
" 11 (:I,il....11I illllqu:ndl'IKe lrom till' Spaniards in ISIX..AS thl' rt:plIbl.ICS
I
"
()'III .llh:f.lh('constltu
"UI'I'llll,lllllll, g,g. .'
I
"I ,I I 1"'u"'I:-...d ril'"l'll however, and III IM23 the dlscon-
thlll.1 .. It: 1.ll ..... DC'
klthd t.. Illk.1I1 lurl.ld hilll III rl.'::.lgn.
I Ill' lullu\,'jllg )'C:.H"::' ::'.IW polilil...d imt.lbility, as Libl..'r.lls and
I I
,
"
'01 '1'1,,' 1'1""1' WUIl in uno bellinnilll' the three of the
.. tl ...l UI I.UI I. ..o... 'co co
-t Rt:puLJhc." Till,;' h'y fig,url. was Diego ",ho became the
.. llIIllgII1.11l 01 till' rl.gilllC:, ahhough Ill'vt'r prl,;'sident in 113me. A Constituent
I'rOl.luH1.1 a u.mstitutioll in IS3J. It created a strong (entral governmenl,
with l'tUnlllllk IlUwl,;'r in the ufthe landowners. Purtales ruled unchallenged
hl......lll .. l.. till' gu\'efllllll:llt (olltrull .......1 the dl'..::tur<:ll machinery and the landowners
\WIl' h.II'I'y ttl 11:1 t'xerciSl' PUWd (induding reprl,;'::.sion when deemed
lll'l.t.....1t y) hI!' 1I1t'lr hl.lldll. .'.
unduing \,'.ISo.' \... M wilh Peru (I S36-39). Willdl provoked a n\lhlary
Il.hdhull .11 hWlle ;lnd hrought till.' dktator's Chik tht'n went on to
ddl.."l IIIl' llrilkipal war Ill'ft) \Va::. Ct:lleral M,lllUd who
I
' I"" ,'u,' 'I ,I", ,,1,' 'II'",, IHtl1 UVl'rsceinl ' all era of ferment ;ll1d
"lr",1. .... pa'::'h I. .. , , co
\. IV.!II\'lt)'. .
111... IHSO.. blllllgl1l dn:;lllc uf Iruitflll l.ullsolid.ltiull lor the new
lIo.11111l1 Till' .. 1.!luS til Ihl. dlllHh prowd " key politk.d <jut:stlon. Olle wing of the
l.t1l1.ll'\"llllll-'. dih' Wo.lllll.'d grl.ltl.r ::.tale cOlltrul ov(,r the church. in
l.dlll.lllllil .111...! li,lalll.ls. 'I'hdr IJpptlilelib defended the church s pnvllegt's.
WIIVII 1111.' 1Iltrlllall)' alliidericll l.iheral l)arty softened its stallce ill the lalt:
I .. , tll:-. .. idl'lll l.ilwr.t1:-. IlHlnd..d Iht' l'nrly, an organizatiol1 Ihal would
""11l1. ,,, 1,lay .llll.'llduriug mIte'" ill 1111.' pulilkallifi: of IhI,;' naliull,
OVERVIEW: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE
I'ur (:llIle, as 1..11' lIl"lllY Latin 1\ Illel k'lll i..-ountrit's, the ninell.'l.'llth ('cntllry a
1ll'lllId 01 f.lr I.collolllic suci,11 transformation. During the colonial
1.'1.1. t :Illll:' pl..yed a rdatively lIlinur mk in Ihe Spanish Amcrkan economy. !.;.lIld
III the n'lltral \'illlce)' wa::. concentrated in the hands of a smull number of
1111\'1'1.'1 ftlilandlunis. Their vast estak::. agricultural ?oods. especially
alld gr.iIIl, ::'Ullh: hound for ::.lKh <.ilks as Santiago or Valpar.l.lso. but most destmed
lUI CX-plll I to Lillla alld othcer urban lIlarkds in PCI'll. Maritime along the west
1.'0.1::.1 ot Sliuth Allll'rica tllll::' ('ulIllccted Chile.: to the ccntl'rs of the Spanish empire.
'1 It I.' W.lr::. lur Imlt:pendl.'nce illterrupkd t!lis coast..11 tr'ldt', and Chilean
. grilulillfl' prUlllptly l'lltl'rcd ;.I pl'riod uf rd'ltivt: stagnation. The situation was
Though mining became the most dynamic sector of the Chilean economy. agriculture
continued to playa significant role; here sacks of beans are loaded for export at the port of
Valparaiso sometime after 1900, (Courtesy of the library of Congress.)
further "llfccted by prolt'cliollist policies in I'all. III tht' the Cllilurnia gold
rush provided a It:mporary stimulll::' for il booIII ill agri(ultural arurts. L3ut
thl'reafter the)' kvdcd off and thell declined again. CUlllpletiun of tht: U,S,
tran:-.contil1t'ntal railroad helped 10 take away the Calilornhl markel, although
t'Xporl to Ellglalld ..:ontillUl.'d. VVilh ib ad\'.1I1tagl.'ou:; location and tertik palllpa::.,
howevl'r, Argentina had beller access tv Ellropl.'. Agricultural prudul:Iil)1l and
....onlllll'rCe ill Chill.' continued, nf cuur:;I.', but tl1l.)' did nol becullle thl' leading
fur ecollomic growlh.
It was mining, initially of llitrales (USI.<I for fa!ilizcr and expJosiws), thaI
bCG1111e Ihe cOlilltry's leading export sector. This dl.'vdupllll:'nt \Vas made possible
by tht' ;\nluisitioll of northt:rn It'rrilory from Pl:ru as ..I rt:::.lIlt uf tht: War of the
Pacific (st'c Chapter 6). Foreign investor::. (especially Briti:;h) quickl)' rushed in,
and Europeans owned about two-thirds of the nitrale Ilelds by 1884. l3ut Chilean
investors retained il hold in tllb area, rt::aping ovcr half the by 1920.
Eventually. howcver, the nitrate market dedilled. An increast:: in exports during
''''orld Wilr I was followed by a cutback in the t.'arly I920s. Iht.'n a brief recovery.
then a sleep and final reduclion in the 1930s. SynthetiC nitrates tuok over after that.
The nineteenth-century growth of Chilean mining-in sil\'t'r, cupper. <lnd
nitrates-It'd to impurtant changes in the country's social Slructure. One W'1S the
appeilrance of new elements within the elite, consisting uf mint' in the
north and merchants from the gruwing IOwns and citks. Yt:t these delllt'nts did
10 .. r h,I, H,I"'''''''" . ,,,1 I., 'I"" '.1. \
,
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, ,.
"00
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DOO
1200
1100

1000
""""""""(
2
'5
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'0
.;
'00
c

;
0
7(J('
2
c
B (.no
,

<no
"""
,no
2no -
rno
':':---c=---c'----'-----'-----'-
1912 1920 19JIl 1940 1950 IQf,o I 'no
Figure 10.1 Chilean Copper Production. 1912-1987 (ld.!I" I "Ill/.II'
\( ,'''', M.l,L"\Mi!m.ll.ilk'\i1fl1"lC!lILV\JII.vI,,,ld / ,.,,, ,jl
lfY<ln.I'"lf>").PI11'1 11,Rl(illdnlf,rl\,h /'1.1' 1'11"/ "1.'" 1""
,q, ,,,1 "I', l' I'
J. '- M.,nu.,ll,l"YI.l. "",I ,,//>r,I,"J,,\I/\ ," ,I"" /, r "", ,' .. ' l'
M<'I\\ [l ( llC'dlh. l<lRl). r "'lIV I.In.l 1111. _" l'" _
were Illiddle d;lSSCS as well. and a glllwlllg. ll,ltiv{' hl'IIl lllh.ll1 \\llIklll): \1.1 ....
ForeIgn II1vestor' -
l' were lOIl"pl(t111Il:>O from IIld('p<'Il,kIlU' 011\\',11'11, 1'111 Il} IIII'
twentielh c I I
ell Ilry Ilelr pr(',;;clhc "'a." epill.mi/cll 11\ /111' 1'/(TIIIIIII'lhC ,,, I: '.
COpper '
llol Irtll}' rival the IraLiitionallan<lownel's. ror in (;hile. more thall in mml L'Uin
American COUll tries. the landowning elite did not remaill isolated and apart from
the manllf:lCluring :111(1 mining diles. There wa,;;. inslead. a kind of l11erger. often
al hieved through f:\mily tics. so bndowners frequently had relatives in upper levels
of the other secton; if they did not lake 1'.11'1 themselves. Brothers. cousins. :\nl!
brothers-in-law I'rovilled importanl links. and these connections lended 10 mini-
milc connict hetween lhe city and the countryside.
There also appeared;l working cbss. first llilionile(\ in the nitr:\te fields of the
nllrlh. Chile's cconomic development in Ihe laiC nineteenth and early twelltieth
lCllttlries did not require Ihe ll1;lssiv(' 1ll1Plwt.ltion ofl:\hor, however. antllhis fall
points In a Leillral fC:\lure of the (ountr)"s working dass: it W;lS nalive born. This
s1:l1Ids in de:lf conlrast to Argentina, where 25 pen.:ent of the populalion W<lS
foreign horn in for Chile Ihe proportion W;'lS less than 3 pel'Lent. From lhe
noise!' Chilc:lIl workers h;\d direct access to the politic;ll scene.
{:npper production underwellt :l technological rcvohltilln just aficl' 19110, due to
Ihe invention of a n('w smelling process, and this led to:\ lllajor tr;lll .. form,ltiOl1 in
Chile. rCtJlIircd large amounts of capital. and the"c came from ;lhro;ld.
In 190llhc Br;ldell C.opper Company began exploiting the rl Tcnientc mine ncar
S;llltiagn. British inlcresl" were S(lon laken (l\'er hy lhe Guggenheim<;..mel hy 1920
the illdu<;try w:\e; J(lmin;'lted h)' onl}' three companies, known from their inili:lls a,;;
"lhe Am!c(. Ilr.Hlen Copper, ;:1I1t! Ihe Chile Cpmp:lI1Y-
Chuljllicamat;l. '1 he flr.. t mlCl Ihirt! helonged 10 ;\nacollll.l. while Bmden wao; a
(.uhsidi.,rr of the Kellilecolt Corporation.
The Chilean (opper industry thus was lOllccntmted ill a few hands. and these
h;lnds wCI"e Americall. II Cilme t(l cOllstitule a forciglll'nclave, one that would provide
relatively lillie SIiIl111I11<; to the reSl of the econolll)'. The heavy rcli;lllce on capital :lnd
tel.hllology lllean1 modest level,;; or employment f(lr Chilean workers. The imporla-
tion of equipmenl and parts did not give 11lIKh husiness to C:hile;'ln TTlrllluf:lcturers.
And ll1os1 of the proflls, oftelliarge, were returned to parent cOl1lpani<.'s in the Uni1cd
States instc;ld ofheing invested in Chile. It is lillIe wonder II\;1t rcsenlnwllt grew.
A11 ndllit ional I'rohlelll came frDIll the gre;ll instal>ility of cnpper prices on Ihe
world ll1:lrkel. Indeed. copper prices could nllctuate :lS much as 500 or 1000
percent within a year. This made it extremely difficult for Chile to anticipate
Ihe dollar amount of foreign exchange earnings. Unprediclablc gyrations in the
wmld copper markt.'l could wreak havoc with the most carefully laid-oul plans.
And copper came to <Iominate the Chilean economy (see Figure 10-1). B}'
I?:'fl copper production ;lccOIlOted for half of all the country's exporls. and taxes
On Ihe companies' profits yielded onef1fth or the government's entire revenue. As
copper went. it was often said. so went Chile's economy.
1n Slllllillary, these developments formed a complex social stnlcture. The rural
sector contained :I lradilionallandowning elite. a peasantry tied by lahor obliga-
tions to lhe est;lle where they lived. and;l sl11:\ll bullllobile workforce that provided
wage I;lhnr for the \;lrge cnmmercial estates. There was ;:l mining and industrial
elite. many of whose memhers had kinship lies 10 the landed Mislocrac)'. There
,;:,'
POLITICS AND POLICY: PATTERNS OF CHANGE
1'.\ltl I\VII" (/\'>1 :..rUIJlr,>:('IIANl,IOVIll'111I.11
'>,."" '/lulld 11.".1-. ,Hid fur I.alm ,JIlt!
lh" L,,,,!JI,,.,',,,,
the Il'gislativl.' powl'rs. This diminutiull of till' pO\VL'r lit tilt' church illld prl'sidt:lIt
led 10 labeling the yeMs between Itl61 and 18')1 the Repuhlk."
Tht: mid-1870s brought a SCVlTe lcunLllni..: dl'l>rt'ssioJl. They hruught
Chilt-'s most bmolls foreign conflict: the War oflhl' Paeifk (1879-83), when Chilc
fought bOlh Peru and Bulivia. The ostl'llsible issue was the trt'atnlelll of Chilean
investors in the dt:sert tl'rl"itories goveflli.:d by Peru, AftL'r e.... ll'lldtd lighting, tht:
Chileans won an overwhdlllillg military triulliph. As vktors, the Chilealls look
cOlltrol of thL' coastal strip that had bdonged 10 anti Peru,
This cOllclusion had two illlportanll'!'fecls: to illlreast: tlil' sdt-(UlIlldelKl' of
Chilealls and 10 arouse IkeI' resentment alllong tilt" Peruvialls alld Boliviall:'1, It
also led to ChilL"s nitr:lk boolll,
The 1880s saw much activity onthl" church-slalt: issue. The Liheral n-fuflllL'r"
made new gains. Civil registration uf marriage, birth, ilnd was Ill<tde (Olll
pubory, further t'roding dlUrch control uwr daily life. In tllt'Sl' saml' years, till'
Congrl'ss extl'IHled tltL' vote tn aJllikr<l1l" Illaks OVer Iwellt)'-lIvl', dimillating thl'
previuus illCOfllL' test.
The second half of till' I tlt:lo::. brought thl' prL'sidelH.:y 01 ju"e Ballliaceda
(I tl86-9 I), thl. Illost cuntrovt:rsial uf bll" lIilleteenth-(l'lltury Cllik
Connict OVl'r lood policy arose wilen Chilt"all (;loll, proposed ;t l;trill" un
Argentine beef, which would have llle;HlI less llleat higher prices for Chileans.
They Wt'rL' countert'd by the new Illiddlt.:'-dass-It.:'d Dt'lllclt.:ratit: Party (fOtJlll.lt'd
I tlS7), which helped lIlobilizL' Santiago's arlisans, slllall 1llL'n.:hants, and skillL'd
wurkers against llit' tariff. Thl' oppositinn (;lrrkd tht' day. Ballll<IL-eda convinced
Ihe bill's proponents to withdraw it.
This carl)' triullIph of the Dl'lllocrat ic I'arty the start of an impurtanl
trend. It was a dirt'ct appe,,1 on econumic groLllllls to the middle o.nd lowl'r SL'cturs
01" the cities, Seeking a broad electoralI', tliL' Delllo...-rats 'Irgued lur laws tltat would
help workers, while they also presented classic Iiber,1l dt'lIHlnds fur LOlllpulsory fret'
cduc<tlioll and dcmocrntic procedures in e/(:clinggoVerlllllellts, 'rilL' party's articu-
lation of mass demands shuwl'd how far Chik had alrL'ady L'Utllc Oil the ruad
toward modern politit's.
Tht' fate of Ballllaceda's presidellcy was ::.cakd by civil war. To this day
Chileam argue passionately oVer the its IUSL'S, and ib 1llL'<lning, TIt .. pre.
sidellt wanted to increasL' guvernmellt inlervention in the economy. III order to
pay for the building of new railw<tys, roads, and urb;lll int'rastrllcturL' (watt'!" :.lnd
sanitation), lialmat:eda Heeded growing tax revellues frolll the nitrate industry in
the northern province of Tarapad. Foreign investors IIrmly rcsiskd, and stiff
opposition emerged in Congress. In facl. UaIJllu(eda's boldness masked a deepl'r
constitutional struggle, that of legislative versus presidential authOrity. Congress
had been fighting to eSI<tblish its supremacy in the constitutiunal structure, while
Halmaceda \\IUS determined to impuse his will. The result was instabilily.
III 1890 the Congn::ss failt'd to product' a budget. whercupon president
ruled thut the previous year's appropriations would apply, Balmaceda had earlicr
venlllrcd into an area which had always provl'd st'nsilivc; the chuict'" of a
16.6
163.9
8350
13.7
78
l'UIIUI.JtH)II(rllllholls)
GlJP (nil r,,111 billions)
(,NI' PCI (dPlt<J (SU.';) J
l'UVo.:lly hiit.' ('1(,111 2001..0)
1If., L'Xp..tl.lIlty

Chile: Vital Statistics, 2007
,\ ... Hllll'ln'lllh cClllury Chil .., Iwgal1 to l:oll:.ulidall' its place in Ihl.'
(','JIIUllly, puliti..:al L'risi:. "Ilsllt'd. A civil war ill IH59 had convincl.'cl thcdlte II \'las a
lor quid cunsulidatiun, 'I'1ll'y gut it frOll1 Jose Juaquin who began a kll-
yl',lr prl',>identialkrm. . .
Tit" 1\\'11 IllOst illlpurtant pulilical issucs uf thb era wert' the LOllstltutlOll
and till' 01 thl' I.llurch. Oil till' "ecolltl issue. the Liberals cOlltinued
tltdr L;lllll'aign fur l'quality or rdigiun, while the Conservatives fought to
I'nlll'd llil' slatL'-bvorl'd position o( the Catholic Church. Slowly the Liberals
\'Iun .. ullces:-.ions, ;IS IlOn-Cathulics re":f'ivt:d tht' right to havc churches and
r,,'ligilills s..:huuls. In dlect. Ihis was a IIlUdest opening of lhe elite, making it
Illurl' plm'll ist k, . .
fl." fur tltee constitutiol1, the dill' \'las struggling with how tll achiceve dfecttve
glIV..... IIIJ1L'JII while avuiding dlsputblil. III 1871 the cunstitution W;lS amended to
prullibit presidellb frulll stTvillg t\\'o cUllseculive tL'rms. III 1874 further changes
guVerJllllelltlllillblers morl' to Congress, thereby strengthening
,\1 k.l:>t l lull- 11,1:> lIut It,alto 1;10..1.' (l1lL' pruLJIL'lll that LJL':-'I:'l so many other
.. 1.;11111 i\lllt'ril:a: population growth, llldt't'd, Cllile has COll-
I I I I'll ' I ',\\",,'i1 flks of 1"'IHdation .. rowth ill the hemi- "'1"lelll y I,... Ull .. 0 U .t.:... .. . 0
:-.1 ,llcr..,: iII I J 'J J lJ it wa:-. just 1,2 1"'rcL'IlI, and in 1970-80 it was onl)' 2, I percent
(llllllp.lll'..ItlJ LX pL'rcellt tor Latin Anlerica as a whole),
A" L.lII:>I' llJ dYel! of this situatiun, women in Chill' have:' enjoy('d more
III'P,HtllllitJl'S tllall ill many ... Clllilltrks. h'males ellterl.d with
,I ",-' , '" "",1 hJ' 1')70 It,r illslallcl', lIL':.lrly 16 perct'llt 01 ChilL's l'mployed 1,.1 lId", ,
1v1l1.1i ..,:, IJdd j>wk:.siullal or k ..-!lllkal jobs (highL'r th.m the U,S. r.lk of 14.. 7
I) , ,I ",'Iu,\" ,\I,u rdlccll'd fairly "I)en and egalitarian standards 111 p... r....11 . \... . .
111 ..' rvl.t1lv, trl'atlllCJlI ollhv M.... e:>.
ZR6 I'ART TWO. (;/\$E STUJ)IFS: Cllt\NftE OVFH Tll\tF
prc"i<lcnti01\ \\'hom he Iried 10 nomin<lte on his own <lulhority. The
Congress n l<lw voiding an)' such nomin<ltion, which Ralm<lceda thell
to sign.
Congression;ll opposition W<l.S now ready 10 seek 01 remcdy by force of arms.
The mining region in the norlh proved a rebel stronghold, where the mine Owners
were happy 10 support <l force that promised to Ihe president who threa.
teneel 10 !i ... v... ge their economic inlerests. The resulting combat produced the
hloodiest in C:hile<lll with Bahnace<la's forces going <Iown in
defent. The tonk refuge in Ihe Argenline embassy, where he cOlllmitted
suicide onc dny nfter his prcsidcntial term ended. In less th... n a month a new
pr('sidenl was e1ecled: Jorge Montt. One of the key issues of the war-the stalus of
fnreign invcstors-h:td heen sCHled. Niltionali1.illioll "'ns mil, hut the pilrli:lllle!1.
1;111' viclors continued pressuring the European investors. Nalioll:llistit. senlimenl
h<ld penelr<lted all sectors oflhe Chile<lll elite.
B<llmace{ln's fall ilt Ihe hnnds of the congressional rehels chnngcd Chile's
t.-ol\slitlltinn<ll structure. The strong presidency gave W:1Y to p;Hlinlllentnry dom-
iflnnce. hul it proved impos"ihle for ministries :lIld governments to Inst vcry lonft.
This in"tnbilily was reinforced by the fragmenlation of the part) SYStClll. \\'hich
C'xpnnded 10 include five m:1jor parties by 1900.
Political conlrol remained in the hands Of;'lll oligarchy repre"enting primaril}'
;lgriculturnl interests. Occasionally they were ch;lllenged b}' urbnn groups, such as
lllercl101nts. The workers. although not yet t1fganiz.ed into politic;ll pnrtics, were
,dre;ld}' beginning 10 mnke lheir weight fell. The issuc that aroused them was rising
priLes. In 1905 workers staged ;l of protests Ihal led to direct confrontat iOIl
wilh umcd memhers of Ihe olignrchy, ;lnd;l mincrs' strike in 1907 in the northern
cit)' of Iquique simil<lrly erupted inlo violence ;md bloodshed. vVorkcrs hecame
even more mililant ;lfter 1910. The le<lding org;lnizers were Ihe an... rchos}'ndical.
iSiS, indef<lligable who excelled in orgnnizing slllall firms. Cenlered in
S;mliago. Ihe an<lrcho-syndicalist unions WOIl significant improvements in wrtges
<lnd working condilions.
These unions did nol. however. represent a bnsic threat to the political system.
J\S for working conditions and fringe benefIts, the employers could undercut mllch
of the militnncy by granting social welfare henefits. The Congress did exnctly this,
legisl<lting workmen's compensation in 1916, employer's 1i00hility in 1917. nnd;l
retiremcnt system for railway workers in 1919.
After a slowdown in strike activity and a loss in b<l.rgnining power, organized
labor began to revive in 1917. Economic recove')' strengthened labor's h;lnd, as
World War I had gre;ltly stimulated the demand for nitrates. By 1918 the growth of
labor strength led Congress to pass a Icy de reside"cia, designed to facilitate the
deportation of aliens who were active labor org:1nizers. Since immigration from
Europe hnd been minimal in Chile. however. the deportation strategy proved to be
irrelevnnl.
The yeflr 1919 marked lhe pe... k ofbhor mobilizalion, ns union leader!' C:1l1ed
huge r<llliel' 10 protest Ihe high prices of wnrlil1le infl<ltion. A 1l1<lll1ll1oth
III Chiit.-: Ikl',,.... iOlll .1I1d I kill'" I... \ 'X .
demonstralion C<l.l11e in Augusl, with 1011.000 p;Hlit.ip.llll .. lIl;udling p.I .. , Ihl"
prcsidenli;ll palace. The nexl monlh a gener;ll strik{' ill :->.lllli.lgO l:like!' IHI"-'I'\"I.
:lnd worker morale was shaken. There:lf!e'r. Ihe' fOlIe o( .. Irikc.. (In IIllelt
Surprisingly enough. the government response' 10 "Irike-r" h.Hllwl'1l IIllll!l-,.ll,
since the 1011101' upsurge hegan in 1917. In I)ct.C'lllher :11l utl\,(, ('illl I 1ll.lllt Ih,
government 01 mediator in st:1lel11:lled I:lhnr t.onllill!'o. Althol1gh !"ej('de-c\ h" .1II.1I
chi"t and s)'lldicalist le;lder:-.. il wa" hea\'il)' u"cd. oltrTl fill" l.lhor"" hlnrlll. ill I'lls
nnd 1919. Th:lt p;\llern nllllinllt.'d into 1920. in p.llt ht(,ItI"C the gll\'ntlllll"llt \\".1"
worried abolll the preSidential e'lcctitlllS :-.dWt!IlI('t! for IllllC.
Chilc.like Argelltill:l' had o\,cl1ed the llnnl" III middle "1"( 1.'1' I'nllill ,II I'.HIIlI
pal iOll, :'I process f:'lr leI'S ad"<lnced in Bra:til. The Illlmhri nl wnrk IIlg I I" .... \"l 'h'I".
although still small. had hegtln 10 nllracl Ihe "IIClllllll1 nl" (,hilc.lll h"lIrgcolI"
espccinlly in :-;:-.nti<lgll. Their Ltllll\1 1)(' Llllli.ll. 1.."'1'('11.111\'
when the vote was divided :lIllOllg tllnn)' p,lrtic<;. ;t .. ill ('hilt' The politi!.11 1".ld"1
who S;lW Ihi" most c1('nrly W<1" Alluro /\le"".lIl<lll. who Ill, lh,
presidcncy hy <1 pal'"iOIl:llC 'lppeal II' Illhall \llln". w."le""
Ales..nndri represcnlc<1 ;m middle "t'IIClI \'H"\\'. fir 1""11I, .. t0I I.,
Icgitimi7.e unions. hut also pullhcm inlo flllllllri(01ltlcg.IIII.lllllWc'lk .kleln 11C'11
h)' the government.
J\lessandri won Ihe 1920 hy.1 1I,lrl'(I\\' m.lrgm \Vllh till'; 1.111'
excn..:ise p:lst, the oUlgoing presidenl Ill,ln 1111" kit IIt'e III hi" kl\
rCll\nining days 10 <lnswer the l:lhor dl:-.lkngc. \Vnlk('I .. \\('f(' h:tr.I ....('oI I"" 1'.11.1
military 5t reel activists recrllile(l from right \"'ing lIluldlc .llhllll'IWI' ILl .... 1.11111111'''
Virlllnlly :III :lnarcho.syndicalist and olher k<lder" who did 1101 I hom/' nile "' g"
underground werc nrrcstecl :1ocl Th" le<ldelle".. w, ,rkn.. wn e hilI It,.,
dcmorali:t,ed by a wnve of lockollis. ns "' Ihe, Illlt C....... ll',
made belwcen 1917 nllt! 1920.
There was hope thai the anlilabor policy would (hange witI'll AIc..... 1I1dtl
<lsslJllled uffice. For the flrsl half of 1921.Ihe Alcs"nndri gOVC'I"llIlH'lll Intervcllcd III
a number of strikes, favoring w(lrkcrs in their lllcdi<llilili. HilI IllllfIKlll101Itllt'lt ..11111
Alcl'sandri drew alt;lcks from nil sidcs-fromlhe righl for heing 11011 ...,,11 Oil 1.1""" .lIl1t
from the left for winking;1I nggrcssive clllr!o}"er la(lil". In /111)' 19.11 ,\\c"...lIllhl
finall}' opted for the employers nnd reverled 10 s}'''IClll<l1 ic Icpr('''SI.ln 1,1 1.lh,.I.
While org;lnized boor was siruggling <lg;lin"l advcrse el nnomk ,1/1(1 pnlllll.1I
conditions. AI('ss<l.nclri pushed his propos<ll" for il lahor ("(Hie ;md ,,"ti." wdLm
package, inlroduced in Congress in 1921. C:on.. ervative" hnlk((1 :-.1111('''1' hk.I", "lilt ,.
they preferred the status quo-where uniol1" h<ltl flO "t<llll" t.,Ollle-
Conscrvatives also feared that Liherals might pick up !lCW Vell('l"" ;lI1111llg III h.1l1
workers. The impasse hetwcen I.iheral presi<lenl :lnd Con..('f\ati\,(' <'0111:1(' ....
continued unlil 1924. Then lhe milit<lry intervened.
From Instability to Popular Front
A military junta look pnrti:ll control of the government in e,llly .....c!'temll('1 I.
and three cl:1ys Inler isslled n mnnifesto li!'ting Icgisl;ltive <!('lll:lnds. wilh ( ngle....
L:-IX 1',\1(1 IWil I.A",l ",lllllIl'",i IIANCEOVI:ltTI1I.11
dUlilull) .lpl'rovlllg l'Vl'r)' Hill'. M'I:.l illlporlani was illl d'lbor.llc: I hur code that
.. uh}n Inl llllilill" tu llu:.t: guvc:nlllll.:nl :.upcrvbioll.
"l.Id.t1.ldv.IIII.:C W.I:. tlu/llll' prllduci ofa political ill \.. hich
1,1.')'ld .1 roll'. I{atht:", il \V.I .. ;J preemptive mov!: by tht: government to head
i,11 llllllll'r Illt,blli1alit.1I1 by wllrker:.' orgallil..ations, III Chiit.' this apparently pro-
... h l' rt:... uhnl frulIl lite pre...... ul t: uf a govcrnment c;ldrc Ihal had much 10
Il.11 II tllll \\ UI kt'l Illtlhill/.11 it'li till' Inilit.lry offict'r corp .
Aln.... llidl .. III tlte Illl.llltlllll', \\I.I ... lu:.ingground illlu slruggle wilh Ihearmy
,tlld IUllk .1 k.tVi' Irlllll ollke 101 .1 lrip to Ital}', lie WilS rCi:allnl altt'!" a se(ond
Iniltl.try l..UUp III c,ldy 1\)25. I\t 1111 ... plJilll, irUlliGllly, thl' ufllcl'l's 1I0W in
kll lhl')' Illl..dll..l hU11l AIt.:..... llldri ,tlld urban bbl)r support to bolslt.'r their
Iq.\lIilll.llY. Till' IIl'W lllilitar}' gtlvernmt:llt interwlIed f'reqllt.:nlly ill strikes.
u.'>t1ally IIll llll' ... kll ul lite wurkt.:ls. II :.;et.:Jllt.:l! lhal urganizt;'d labor might be un
IIll' Vl'lgl' 01 g.lillillg pO\\"l.... Fl.'ar .. mung the dite, wllich set: its
p' 'Wll :.ltppillg aW.ly.
rill' revtlluliUlI wa... 1101 al(hUll!. Ak... sallliri I't'tuflled frulII his leave in [Vlarch
I').!', .llId wlIhill lIIunths url.ll..rl'l1 gUVt.:rllllll?nl troops to I.:rack down on nitrate
Will kl'l" \0011 IlIt:n:dkr. thlllllb.lllll.'d resigned. and instability
l'll'\
(.ol"lld ( .Illu.. Ib.llll'L lIIIt.:1 glJ .1:' till' frolll thb almosphen:
.. I 11l111ltH!. Iii 1.ly Il)!,7 Itl' \\'.1... lurlll.Jlly dectt.:d pn.. by the
,llld Ill' pl"ll'l'dl'l! hlli'll:.ulld,lll'.1 dltt.ltor... hip thatl"... ted until IlJ.ll. Chilealh,
h.lvillg I'lldnlll'l'lIl;<>l'(vl'" untht:ir rdativl' dClIlOC['<KY, Wl'rl' :.hockt.d. Till' glller.:tl-
I" nidl'llt J.lllni i1ppunellb. l''>ped.lIly I.lbur leo.lder... , and ... u... pendcd
Thl' gUVl'fllllll'1I1 llU\\I grc:ltl)' t.:nbrgt.:d its role ill thc cconoll1)', That meant
"pl'l"dlllg tlll'lUlhl1 udioll ul r.lil\\'ays, ruads. and power lacilitit's. Nol surprisingly,
Ih.llkl .tl:.u :-oll'ppnllljl lor the lIlililary, Mllch uf the financing came from
.dJj\hld 111,111:. .llid U.S. inVl.':.tlllelll ill mining. '1'111.' \'\'orld e":Ollulllk"
1..".\11.111:'11111 ul till..' IlJ2u:. Illddl' il .tll po...... ibk.
Till' \V.1l1 Slrlt.:! na:.11 ,Ii al,ruptly t.:llded Ihallfa. in Chilt.: :IS dse\\'herl'.
1\11111..'1.11 Idl dl .... I:.trlHI... ly and lon:igll financing driL'd lip.
Ilt.'lIlpb to ,,:fl:.llt.: a ll.ltiollall.-artd lor nitrate salt'S failed. Protests againsl
thl;" gll\'lf1I1Ilt.:lIt grl'\v. An t'ver-widt.:nillg spe..:trum of the: society. now including
prtlln"'lunal pt:r... on:. :IS wdl as workl'rs, joined 011 the dictator. Ibailez
Iin.III)' g,lVl' in. III July 19JI he resigned, joining the ranks of lhe other South
Allll ... t.";lll Iw,ld... uf gO\'l'rl1111ent whu had the misfortune to be governing when the
(;rl...lt l)q>Il'"...... iun hit.
Fur Iill' Ill'xt )'l'M Chile 1.I(kl'"l1 a stable government. The interim regimes
illliulkll a thirtt.:ell-da), intt.:r1Ul.k 01 <.l "Socialist Republic" in which Colonel
l\lanll.lllukl GroVl' bl'C:lllle the best-klloWIl figure. Anothe:r presidential election
\V.I'" lin.llly hdd. Till' winner W.IS a familiar facl;": Arturo AkSS:'llldri.
Tltt.: \.Jllle fit'l")' i \Va... now JIlore intere... tcJ in order than change. In
I'J,H" Wlll'll a W,IVl' or :.trikl:'" brukt.: uut, Alcssandri took lough measures. lie
11rUtl.lilllnl.1 st.lle of ... iq';l, du... nl (:ongn.:ss, and scntlabur leaders into ex.ile,
10 .. C1lilt': I{l'pll...:.illll .llllllk-lllUI.I:II..Y 11;,')
In cconomic poliq the Alt.:ssallliri pre... idclKy wa:. qlllk ... uc(lssful. All ullra-
orthodox finance minister, Gustavu Ross, dra... lkally l'eduLetl puhli(-sector
spt.:llding and dismantled sume of the key guvt'rJlment agelldl... Ih.lt Ibanez had
created. Thanks to recovery of world demand for Chilean l.'Spl't.:i,llly
minerals, thc foreign trade balance improved dramatically. TIll;' ollkial unt'mpln)'-
ment ligurc. at 262,000 in 1932. droppt.:d to less than 16.000 hy 1937. Inn.Jtioll
remained a problem, howe:ver. inCl"l'aSeS ... ddolll kepi P.Kl with price
incrt'a...
Chile approached the ial dediull ul 11.)39 with apprdlln,>illll. In 1935
the world t:ull1l11unist lnOVt:ll1t'lIt, dOlllinatn! by the Silvit.'t-dlrl'''-Inl COlllill!t.:rn.
had Gllled fur a cualilion strategy in b:llllillg in dkCl l'lh.. llllf.lgillg l"um.
lllUllist punks to seck alliances wilh partit.'s of till: Idt and center. In ISl36 tht.:
COllllllllni... ls and Radicals ill Chitt.. joilll'd forces ill a FrulIl," whkh b)'
1938 GIllie to illcludl.' a broud spectrum uf p:lrlit,s: Ibdi(.d:.. Sudalists,
Communists. Delliocrats, pillS a nL'\\' Conft'(kr:lliOIl 01 Chileall Workers. Aftl'l"
the len-Il'alling i\!larm:IJuke Grove withdrcw his GllldiJat.:y. llll' lIulllin.lliulI wenI
hi I'edro Aguirre Cerda. a wcahhy Radi(al known fur hi:. rdurllli:.1 ide,lS 011 tltt'
3grarian lluestion.
Thl' iJl(.lIll1benl pulitical alli.lllll 1I0lllin.lkd fill,IIK(: nlini:.ler,
Gustavo Russ, who pre...enletl all illlle:'tiblt.: :lnd oackw.lrtl louking illlage. Tht.:
;,:alllpaign \V.IS bitterly fuugill. ;:llld Aguirrl'" l:t'rlb \\'011 hy tht.: Il,IfltlWl,... 1 of 1Il.lf
gin"'-:l Illl'lt.: 4UOO OUI of 141.UOO VOtl ... l.bt.
De... pik ib llarrOWIlt' ... or uf it, thi... dl'ctiun Sci tltl' politl(.ll
CO.lltextlor )'cars to coml.:. Centrist vOll'r... had tippt'd till' bahlllCl' by opting for Ihe
lelt. Allhl' ...allll lilll .... howevl'f, thl'Y Wl'rl' vOling for:l modl'rale relormbt.
outcome set'lI1ed amhiguous. \.vhat SOI'l uf a Illandatt: would the: rl'sulling govl'fn-
m... llt havl'?
The Popular j:runl guvt.:flllllellt ... UUll ... ulkred lilt: ... tr.lins inh... rellt in sudI a
Itch.-'rogt'lll'OlIS I...'ualition. The R.ldicab ,vt.:rt.: tlit.: dOlllillallt dt.:nlt.:1l1 alld lhl' It:...... l
mtlkal in ideolugy, Tltt.:y fOcused 011 Cl'OllUlilil' devdopllH.. nl, Hul sudal wdfarl'.
The Cummunisls and Sucialisls were naluraJ antagonists be:c:lII ...t' mallY Socialisls
wcre ex-Collllllunists who had rduscd to knuckle under to party discipline. BOlh
the Communists and Socialists tried to mobilize rural workers. Ihereby alarming
the powerfullnndowncrs-'IllJ phlCing Ihemselves in competition with each other.
Yel the policies of the Popular Front were anything hUI mCIKlCing. ECOIIOlllil"
policy conct'ntrated on an expanded economic role for the nation:d government.
In 1939 a Ill'\\' corporation was cfl'ated: CORFO (Corporacioll de Fomento).
which was to stimulate economic development by stfatl'gic inve... tmellb ill both the
public and private sectors. Moreover. Congress was controlled by the right.wing
opposition, which was able to impose effeclive limits on t"xt"cutive powcr.
The Popul3r Front lost even its titular leadership wht.:n poor h(';!Ith IOI'(cd
President Aguirre Cerda to resign ill 1941. The fullowing W.kS anuther
Radical. Juan Antonio Rios (1942-46). who struggled to kcl'J) Chik neutral during
World War II. Under U.S. pressure 10 join the Allil's, he feared:1 reat."lion
1
I
290 I';\RTTWO 0 loASI,S'llIllIES:C1IAN(;I:OVEHTlMI-.
German colony ill the $ollih of Chile. lie also fcared possihle Jap;lIlCSc allack On
Chile's long. undefended coastline. In January 19/13 Chile finally hrokc rcl:ltions
with the Axis.
The succeeding president, Gabriel Gonzalez. Vidd" (1946-S2), was once
O1gain a Radical. He ",,(cpled Coml11unist support. bUllhis modest throwhack to
the Popular Front did not Insl long. A call for a general strike in 1946 provoked
strong polkc measures, and riots ensucd. A full-scale social connie! loomed. The
governlllent dcckm:d n sl:llc of siege and suspended civil Iiherties. Strikes COil
lillllCd inlo 1947.
Gonzalez had by now purged the Communists from his wbine!. The strikes
gave fhe right its chance 10 mount an offensive. The righlists had heen .. Iarllled by
the ste..dy rise in the Communisl vole, which came 10 18 percent in the TlHlIlicip:11
elections of 1947 (up from 12 percent in the congressionnl elections of 1941). The
Chile"n government now decided to move against the left, <lnd in this it h<ld plenty
of support frolll ahroad. III tllese early years of the Cold the U.S. gcwernlnent
was hwnching a major camp.. ign in 1... 1tin America to isolate the left. especially the
parties, and the U.S. emhassy strongly encouraged the Chilean Con
sen-'atives. The left fought hack hy att01cking the Gonzalez. government and the
United St<ltes. The climax in 1948: by an act of Congress. where the lefl was
great I)' oUlnumbered. the Communist P;lrty was outlawed, and its memhers were
h;lnned from running for office or holding official pOSls. A witch-hunt followed.
Together with the rightists, Ihe centrist Radicals had again shown how they \'vere
prep<lred to usc "Iegnr ll1enns 10 eliminate their most liangerous adversaries fmm
the political game. For the Icft.the Popul.... Frnllt becnlne an object lesson. ;lnd they
vented their nnger on Gonzalez Vielda.
The Era of Porty Politics
The fillal demise of the Popular Front ushered in a period of inlense polit ical
competition bnsed on party orgnnizations. During this period, the Chilenll politic"l
<Iisplnyed severnI idenlifying chnr<lctcristics.
First. elections were extremely competitive. There were mnny different par-
ties, so it wns rare for anyone of them to receive morc than one-quarter of the lotal
vote. This fact accounted for .. second (enture: in senrch of governing mnjorities.
the pnrties had to t01ke pnrt in coalitions. Alliances were fragile. however. and
political leaders were const .. ntly in quest of new arrangements and intent on
m('nding (ences. Underlying this was an increased tendellCY toward ideologicnl
pnlari7,atioll.
Third. the system was highly democratic. In contrast to Argentilln. where
trnde unions had uneasy relationships with political parties. the Chile;lll labor
movemenl was closely identified with various parties. mainly on the left. so it did
not form a separate power center. Measured as n percentage of registered volers.
electoral pnrticipntioll W::lS high (;lround 80 percent, compnred 1050-60 percent in
the United States). nnd regislration grew r"pidly in the early 1960s. And e1eclion
reslIlts were accepted by nlmost :111 Chileans as binding.
"
The 1952 presidential e1eclion hrnughl h::"l(k .lIH.lher f'Olll the- 1.1... 1.
Gener<l) Carlos Ib:ii'ez. Now in hi" mid sc\,elll1l<;. lhl' Illlllll'l di\ I.ltnl 1'10\ I.llllH Ii
hirnself Ihe only answer 10 Chik's man)' pl"ohlelll'" ., III'" 111,,""11, 1'111 hllll ... dl
forward as n true nation:llist. hut his appe,ll w;'" 1"('.111\ .1InH'll .11 Ihc IIghl .1Ilt!
center. who were once agnin worried ah!)ut the left. :-'0\ 1:-111 ... '" alld ( nlllllllllll"''''
formed another electoral alliance, .llihough Ihl' blll'l W('II' hohhlet! Ii)' 11ll'1I
iIIeg;llity. The e1cclion result" were ;nclicall\T lit Ihe 1',1111 (.l1d(' \,';1'" tn loll",,' 1"1
dec;ldes: n deeply dividc(1 vole wilh lin candid.II( or pMI)" gl'lllll}: ,I Ilr.ll Ol.,,"llh
IhaflC7. took omce wilh a 0147 pellcnl.
Ih:li'lez claimed To hc Ihe :lpolirk.lllll:l11 :lhlc 10 "'01\'(' .JlIIII, pollrl!.11 I'I,.hlt-IIl'"
bUI rlllt surprisingl}' h" failcd 10 deliver 011 thc... e I'nlllll ... l .... 111"'l'fl11W 1'1"11"1111,
pn1hlcIll was illnalion. whi!1i h,ul hil Chile c,lfli,,1' ;lilt! 1i.lld'1 Ib.1I1 Ill" ... r "ll ,11111
All1eric:l. Becnus{' he r.1lcd n 1ll00jor deficit in Ihe h,ll.lIh l' lit p.l}"IlICllh. 11.,1111"/ h.ld
10 look abro.. d for help. The Ingical S(lUrLC W.I" Ihe 1IIIclll.lrillll.ll f-,l,'llIl.lrr 11111,1
(II\IF). llnforlunatl'l}' (or Ihe Chilc;ln". ir \\".1" Ihll ... illlpl,.1 IlI.llrer ,,1.111.111,:1111: ,I
foreign lonn. In effeci itlllC:lllt Ill<.' IMF lIlu... 1 ,'\'('I""'CC Ihc '''1l1l11'...
economic policies. As a res,lllt. The IfvlF l.llllC 10 he hv 11111'" ( 1111(';111'" f.llllll,,"
most other Latin Amcril,Ill<;) .1<; all exl('n<;jon IIfl J..... Cl'IlHllllh .11111 pnltli, .111" 'W'I.
Ih,iile:l. "'..s thll<; C:lIIghl in the typic,ll pnhc)' ddcll1l1l.1 1'".dlllCtl II, 11111,1111'11
Iii" government had to act hel.Hlse it was. tlllr 011111"('1).:11 ncJI,ll1gc Yd lht"
of foreign finnndlig offered their help nlll)" lin !he (flndlllll/l Ih.II Ihl'\' b.n,
a veto over hnsic polic)'lllnkll1g. Ih;iilC7 knew Ih.lI Ihc It'll ", ... 1.1 h,' III 11111 I'"
ng.. insl him if he acccded In Ihe IfI,ll: lei illS 11<.' dCLidccll" I.lkl 1111' g.llIlll,,"
I lis government soon p:'lid thL' pric!.-. The inlli.llnlt,lslIIc... f"1 .111"'11"111"
E:1I"I)' tnrgets were public lllilities ;llld Ir:lll<;pnrtalinn. \,-,111\ h lllV.lfI.lhl" I h.llJ.:cd
very low rates in Iilll('s of rapid inflaTioli. ""l( e 11l:1Il,IJ:CI''' 11,'<:Ir .. lc.l III 1'.1..... 11"'11):
en"ls on to customers :lnd sp:lrk POI'lllar l'n'lc... l.... I\n 1111 IC.l"l III htl'" I,llI''''
provoke!l:l furious Rill!:" heg.l11 ill ,11111 "p'C,HI1'. (lrlll't ,III'...
Givell the strength of lahor and the lefli"l p:lrli('<;, \\',1" ,I dilli. IIII 1'1.11 I' 10'1
anti-inflO1lion policies. In Ihc end Ih:li;cz "I'mcd 10 he.1 lllcd nIt! J.:l"1IC'I.d \\'Illi .1
modest polilic;ll bas(' and even lesser ideas.
The 1958 e1eclion prociliced a new presillt.'1l1 wllh .1 1.IIIIIII,Ir 11,11/11' 1'lfj:I'
Alessnndri. the son of Arturo. Althn1lgh lOIl<;illcrillg 1111l",dl .In iIHhpCllllcllr.
lorge had run as the le.. der of Ihe right. on :l C011lh;IlCd ConSCT,.Ilivc 1.,11("1".11
ticket. His opponents were Salvndor Allemle. ,I ll1ecllL.11 1101 ,mol !t'llgllllh'
polilician who represented the Soci<llis,t-Conllllllnl"l alli:llll"e .Illd
Echmrdo Frei. an amhitious young idrali<;t who hcaded Ihc IIClllll( 1.1/ ...
(PDC). a relatively new party 011 the n01tinn<lI .. A1c.......lIld I I \\'ou ,I phll,dil" ill
the vole (31.6 percent).:'Is against 28.9 percent for Allende .lIld 211.7 pcrLcll1 I"..
Frci. with the remaining IH.R percent split hetween Illl' H;,di(.ll '-,llldid.ll(' .llltl .1
mnvcrick priest. A vole for presiden! then look pl.lLe in Conglc..... ;1 ... IC'lllil"cd I.,'
the constitution when no c<lndi<l;Jte won an ahsolulC m,lionly. :lilt! I\lc.... ,"HIr,..
plurality was readily confirmed. Once again. the ('hl1C';111 clt-tlj,r.llt 11.111 ... 11'1\\'11
ilself to be deeply divided.
:''}1. l'i\H J 'I WI) .. 1.1''''1. t.t[i\N{.E ()VrI( 'liME
'Ill,,' 1\,,'\'0' pf''''sidl'lll .111 authl'lllil: rq)n:st'lltalivc of conservative political
.llld nUllUllllC !lll.Hlght in Chill-. lie believed in free enlt'rprise economics.
Jll"ludllq..; Illunl'lMy orlllllduxy and an OpCIl door IU foreign investment. His
gtlVl'lllllll'llt .llt.l(ked the serious ilillatiun with an orthodox stabiliza-
lion pllli\.)': uuJgl'l l.ulling, dl,;'v;tlualion (to a fixed exchange rate), and an appeal
It/f Ill'\'\' IUldgil
st;lbili:wliun dlorts wae Utl(h:rcllt b)' a bitkr bailie over copper
111111" Il'. I Ill' IrieJ to cOliviIlC'" the U.S. copper companies to increase
11 ..:11 Thl' idea lu gd lIlOfl.' of the processing of the copper to be
dllll'" In l:hile. Thb would incn:as,,' Iht: t:I.:onumil: rdurns to Chile. as well as make
<. Illk !lllll'" ill marketing the IInal product. But Chilean nationalists
W,,'IC Iht'), \'o';lIltcd 10 t'xpropriah: the cOlllpanit:s. not just encourage their
<';UVt'rlllllcnt polky carried tilt: day-but copper company invest-
llH.'nb did Hoi and Chik' Jid no belll.'r exploiting its only major asset
III lllklll,tlhlll.d 11'.1..1,,.
,\I,,.....lIldri hopnlth..lt hb orthudux could make progress against the
IIlIHlntlll!!, prubk-llb Ul.'lllg ..:re;ill'll by sluw and unevt'n economic
!!,I\lwtll' 1.. publi" worb prujecb wac l..Iunched. financed mainly by
II/I llllah, A l'f'indp.t1 tlte United St;:ltes. where worry over the
,hrl'.lt ul rt'volutiun had led 10 hurrkd forlllulation of a major
"l.IJlhlllllt.. prugram knOW11 .b the Alliance ror Progrt'ss. Alt'ssandri even
d.llnl III t.ILkle 11110' .Igr.trian long a forbidden subjt'ct in his political
l,Illk,. Ailltuugh lilc law p.bsnl Lll 1962 was thuught by 011 Ihe left to be
ludi"l uu .. ly ill,td,,'qll.I!l'. in it did furnbh thl.' for an aggressive expropria
Illlll plllgldlii.
Nlll :,ulI1rblllgly. IIUII ... uf IIll' pulkks did lllUcil IowaI'd solving the
gr.IVl ,u(illo.'U.llIOlll il: facing ell ik. The steady ('xodlls uf till.' rural poor to
tIll' \ ;11"... , \:"I'I,'d.dly Santiago, l,mlillllt.:d, Thel'c they were illhulls..::d, ill-fed. and
ill l'l!u"alo:d. Furthalllon:.'. thl.'rl' was liull' work. These nwrginals" were the tragic
01 c;lpil,t1ist urhalliz.ttioll ill;l dl"vdoping country.
,\k:..:...lndl i wUllld have likt:d tu guv"'fIl a Events soon ruled out
111.11 dll:.tll1. In Ihe early 196Us lh,, Chilean politic<ll scene began to change
Till'rt: was 111':.1 grl'at growth of the electorate. just over 500.000
III 1')JX, hy P)6'\ it had r"'adlt:ll 2,5UO,OUO-<I fivdold expallsion in twenty-five
1 rl.aligllllll'lli 01 puliti... al furco.'s h.uJ occurred. There were now four
Ill,li .. (I) Ih,,' right. including Ihe Const:rvative and liberal parties; (2)
Ihe \.llIlrisl Hadkals, long thl: 01 upportunism; (3) the Marxist left,
primarily ur the ;:Illd Sucialists; and (4) the Christian
Democrats. located in the cenlt'r, a reform-oriented party now building its e1ec
toral follOWing. In Ihe 1':J63 municipal dections, each of these four won roughly
"'''Iual p"'rcl'lltages ur the vote. The biggest net gainers were the Christian
I klllO...... ttS. who wert' attracting Vult'S from both the left and the right.
Th,, 1904 election loomcd as a crucial one for both Chile and
Lltlll Alllerlca, Tht: lelt OlKe agaill ntll Salvador Allende. FRAP's strident
::
10 0 Chile: ,1IlJ Dt.:llIul:rJl:Y 2<)j
criticisms of capitalism seemed all thl' llIore rdt'vant, now that <l classically
conservatiw government had so recently faill'd, Concerned about tht' rbing
strt:ngth of the left, Liberals and Conservatives quickly dccidt'li that their onl)'
salvation lay in an alliance with the Christian Democrals. When the rightist partit's
decided to endorse the PDC candidate, Edlwrdo Frei. the Christian lJelllocrats
an enormous boosl. It was made out of the fear that the FRAP might win a
pluralit), victory, as all110st happened ill 19sH. The dt:('ided Ihis
their misgivings about the poe's reformist idt'<ls, which m<lny <IS
dangerously close to the forlllulas of Ihe left.
The PDC campaign was designed 10 l:OnVilKt: tht' dt:etoralc thai Fr"'i could
bring a "Revolution in Libert)': In fact. howcwr, Christian lJemocr.:tls wn,,'
promising reforms. not rt:volulion. The added up to a more c-lliciellt
capitalist economy. to be achic-ved by such Illeasures agmrhm reform (through
the expropriation of underused land). incr"'.lsl'd public housing, and grt'ater
control over the u.S. copper companies (through Chikm of pMI
ownership).
Frci poe wastl'd no lime in br.lllding FRAP .111 of
Moscow. Clevcrl)' wrillen campaign and 011 01
another Cuba- in Chile, The U.S. goverllment. wdl Whl Ellropt'<lll Chrbliall
Democrats, also took a strong interest in this contest between rdormislll ;:tIld
Marxism. The Centrallntelligellce Agency would lalt'r ;ldmil 10 (onlributiug nlorc
than su percent of Frd's campaign expenses.
It Illay have been a case of overkill. Frd WlJn th,, dection lIlure handily than
anyont' h;ld l'xpected. with 56 percent of the votl.'. Allende got 39 pa(t'nl. wdl ova
his share in 1958. The diffcrt'llce, of courSe, was that this tillie it was u twu-way
ract'. The triulllph bdonged to Frci, but Iht: Ikvolutioll ill Uberty uwed ib hirth f;u'
morl,;' to tht' abselKe of a rightist candidall.' (hall 10 ,IllY <-hange of lllimi Il)'
Chilean vOlcrs,
Frt'i's governlllent began with high cxpl'ctatiolls, First prioril)' was given In
o.'collomic pulicy. Ont: ofthl,;' IlOlIest was copper. lie....:. as dst:wherl,;', thl' Frd
stralegists sought ;l middl,,' way. Outright nationalizatiun (with cumpt:IlSatioll)
would be too expensive, they reasoned. since Chile would have to come up with
enormous dollar payll1l,;'nts. Simply encouraging the U.S. companies to increase
thC'ir investment under the old terms was equally ullaccc:ptabk sinc(' it would be a
backward step on the path toward greater national control. Thdr solution W;'IS
cenlrist: the Chilean govcmment would buy into part ownt'rship or Ihl: cOl1lp<lnics,
with the proceeds to be reinvested by the companies ill expanded facilities.
t:specially for processing. The goal was to double copper production by 1970. If
successful. Frei's plan for "Chilt:aniz.ation- would increase both mttional control
and export earnings.
The proposal was savagely attacked by lhe left. which branded it a sdloul.
With congressional support from Christian Democrals, Frei reached <lgret'ments
with Anaconda and Kennecott. the t\\lO leading companies. but copper production
increased by only 10 percent over the ensuing five years. Export earnings doubled.
291 "Aln TWO" CA"J S'I Utll[S OVER TIro-II
but th,lt w"s hcc"u<;e of a rise in the world price of copper. nol becau!>e (If OUlpUL
Ftlrlhennure," big sh"re of those higher e"rnings went to the comp:lIlie!> hec"use
of techni... alities in the new contracts. Frei had won" hollow victory.
Tllc !>ector w"s another kc}' policy area. Chile had long Sllffel'ed under
one of I.atin America'!, most archaic ruml structures, with Ihe marginalized rural
masses daily hecoming more desperilte. The ChristiCln I)ellloc.rilts pushed through
::l land reform act in 19f17 which was another compromise. EI::lborale provisiolls
were m"de for l::lnd 10 he distributed 10 100,000 pe;le;anls b}' 1970. The program
went more slowly Ihan hoped. nnd by Ihe end of hei's IeI'm there were only 28,000
nc\,.. ClI'In nwnerships, n number whose significance was ohscured hy the high
expeclations the Christian Delllocmts had aroused.
The United States continued In take a strong interest in the fortunes of the Frei
government. It hild all the marks of the kind of reformist regime lhat the Alliance
fnr Progress was designed to support. The United Stiltes, ns well as thc multibtcral
agcllcie:-.. such as the InterAmerican Develnpmellt Hilnk nnd Ihe World Bank.
g:lve Chile extensive fin:ll1cing.
III the politic:l1 sphere. the Christian Democrals attempted to deliver on their
promise of a new kind of popular pOlrlicip:ttion. Rejecting the lll:lssive sinte role
Ihat the solutions of the left would illevilahly hring. Ihey pushed for ol new kind of
grnssronts political activit)'. In pr"clice it mcanl a mixture of communit.lI'ianism,
self-hrlp. ;lIld cooper;ltivcs. Abovc all. it me;ant he;ading nff the left. which h:1(1,
thmugh ilS unions ;md p;art)' structures (hoth cOlllmunist ;and soci;alist). gotten a
he:ld stMt in organi7ing al the mill'S Ievcl. The net effecl was a dogfight 10 win
eleclinns throughout the sociel}': in llllinns, student ae;socialinns. cooperatives. bar
associ:llions, and every kind of professional group. Politics was penell':lling more
and more deeply into Chilean societ)'.
Time W:lS running out 011 the Revolution in Libert)'. The rcfortni!>t gains had
heen suhSl:llllial. if measured b), past hi!e:ln standards. hut the)' wcre no longer
ellough. Because the conslitution forh:lde consecutive reelection of the president.
the c'hrisliiln Democmls had to find a new candid:lte. Frei h:ld been an over-
sh:ldowing figure. hut not without detractors within the part}'. In fnct. progressive
Christian ()emocr"ts had veered sharply in the direction of radical change.
The 1970 presidential election in some wa),s resembled 1964. But this time the
righl decided to run ils own candidate. Jorge J\lessandri. the magic name in
twentieth-century Chilean politics. The divided Christian Democrats nominated
Radomiro Tomic, whose leftist stand precluded an)' possible electoral alliance with
the righl. The Communists and Soci:llists, now united under the rubric of Unidad
Popul:lr (UP or Popul:lr Unity), once again chose Allende. The UP relentlessly
att:lcked the Christian Democ.... ls record under Frei, charging a selloul to imperi-
alism and domestic oligarchs. Aless:lndri offered nn old-fashioned conservative
rec.ipe. Tomic sounded remarbhly like Allende. He favored r:ldical change.
including complete 11:llionaliziltion of the copper companies.
''''hell the votes were counted, Allende had won a plu.... lity. bUI it w"s f:lr frol11
a decisivc result. Ilis vote total W:lS 30.3 percent. Alcssandri got 34.9 percent, and
,
111 ( luk' Hf'l'rC' .... IIUI .1110111.111'" 1.1t \ "1.
Tomic only 27.8 perccllt. The len wa" jllhibnt. hut lhcil IIIP!"f' ".lllt1 1('.1<11'1" w....t'
:lW:lre of the fmgility of Allende's mantbh'.
The White House Reacts
Thc rcsults of Chile's dectim1 arousetl intt'l1s(' dispkw'l1I"e ill \V,I .. II ingll III. I 1.< :. AII
outraged President Rkhard tvl. Nixon took Ihe lit'\\':-' .1:-' .1 J!CIM'll,d ,lIftonl,
Sll1ilshing his fist inlo his h:llld and repcatedly dCllllUn( ing "Tktt S.< >.1\. 111.11
S.O.B.. then adding for clarity's :-.akc th::ll he was I'cfel Illig III ..nil "I .I hili II
Allcnclc.
w
Meantime national sccllrily .Hlvi"cr Ilenry Ki"<:lIII:cr pcrll'IVI'II ,I lillI'
thrc:ltlo American intercsls ::llltl darkly pnldailllcll. d.'Il't "('(' \\11Y W(' 111'('111.1
sland by :l.T1c1 "'ntch:l counlry go COlllllllllli .. 1 due tt) Ih(' .. Ill'> I1WI1
Something would have 10 he dOllt'.
Wh:lt could accolIlll fnr !'lIch a .. trung re:lllinll? J 11(' fir .. 1 1."11 n 11 W."
geopolitics. Within thc conlext of Ihe (:01<1 \Vitr. Ihel1 .11 it .. helghl ..1 "I" 1,11t .. !
triumph in Chile-or anywhere else ill the Thiltl \,vpdd wnuld \nll .. IIIllh' .1
victoq' for intern:llioll:ll cOllllllunislll. Thi .. w.'" nlll .1nlv Illlllc"".lll!t,; \\1111111 Ih.'
Western hemisphere il W:lS ullilccept:1hlc.:-.itlt..eit h.ul l,ll'ClI pl.ll(, wlIltlll/\IlU'11, .,".
"backy" rd. 'rllis wOllld larnish Ihe lJ.S. illl'lgC .,,, a .. 111'tI"I" 'WI'I .IIHI. 1'1 (''''1111,11 .1\ .
wcaken its position in the glnh::ll ::lrcna,
A second concerll focusc(1 on ripple cllelle;. (lnl' nl 1111' 11111,1.1111('(11.11 Il'llth III
U.S. pCllicy during Ihe Cold \,Vilr W;Ie; Ihe tht'clI}'.- wllleh held Ih.11 011'"
country' .. fall tn COlllllHltlle;lll would le.ullo Ihe f:lll (If Illg C olllltl ,... II \\.!I,
therefore to hol,lllIe line. In Ki""lIlJ,!er .. \'kw, ,I <,/1\ l,dl .. 1 ):(IW'lllllll'lll III
Chile would greiltly incH':lse the likelihond nft.olllllllllll .. ll.lkcnvCI" Ltl Alg.'I1IIII ...
Peru. and Bnlivia,
A third concern w"s somewhat lllnre e;uhtlc. l',Vclll" III ( 11I1t- "'Hld\'I1'"
presented the United Slates with whal seellled like:lll illlpll.... lhic 1'ln"I'\,\ I
install:llioll of a sodOllisl governmcnt IhnHlgh .1 frct' ,11111 1.111 t'I,,II\"l '111'"
conlmdicted a fundOltllent:l1 linc nf Cold \Var thllllghl Ihe .Ie;"tI, i,tll"l1 \"
socialist ideology wilh brnl"l l)'t:lllll)'. Wlthill p"ht..)' \lllk... II 1\.1'.
widel}' assumcd th:lt socialism (or communism) (ollid ClIllle ttl I'nwn tlnh
through revolutioll:lry violence (ilS in Cuh;a). :lnl! th:lt il tUlllt! It'Ill.lIl1 III 1'11\\\'1
only through repressive dictatnrship (ilS in the USSn). <.hlle rdlllcd Illl .. Ide;].
lis citizens h;:Jd voted for an ilvowed soci:llist thrn'lgh the eXCI(I"!' ll( ,11'11111
cralic choice. in what came to be known a<; fn 1'/0 ,1"1,,11,, ("Ihe I hik.ltl \\.l\'WI.
Such an exnmple would legilimize rvl:lrxist mllVClllellts .1" delllot l:lth flll'd':-
and bronden Ihe p,lth tuw:lrtl leftist :llltl :lnti /\Illt..lit;ltl I'olitit.." .!IIIlIIHI Ill"
world.
Fin:llly, Allende's socialisl orientation posed ol lllrcal 10 Alllcrican C.{lljtltlli.
interests. Prominent U.S. corpomtiolls-SIlCh as Iblsttln I'Hrin:l, Furd..llIel ITT
(Interniltionnl Telephone and Telegraph)-had m"jnr inve.. ltllcnl ... in (hilr.
Corpora Ie execulives underSland:lbly opposetl :Ill)' III tl.lti'ln,lll/.ltl n III
government expropriation. and in :In)' t:l:-.c ther wtJltld Itl .. i"t "1'"11 ",lli .. 1.1l I.. ,,
compensation.
.!')h 1',\1(11\\'\1" It\ ... I ... JUII11 ... lIII\Nt,j()VII{ IIMI'
111.1 wurd, Clllk d,"lgl..'ruu:., Nixon and Kissinger plOlllptly furmed a
"II (:.lIkd "uri)' CUllllllitln' lu dl':,ign polides It> prevenl Allcnde's coming to
POWl'r. Olll' i.. I\, to Eduardu Frei 'IS prcsidt"nl. AC(llrding 10 thb
pbll, th.., Chilt.'.lll Congrl's;; would snuh Allcnt.le and cast its vote instead fur
flllllll'r up will) wuuld tlll'lI (:all for Hew dectiolls-which Frd wUllld
IH' alluwnllu will. III kecpilll:', with 10ng-:.t'llldillg tradition, however, the Cungress
l tilkd til.. r..'MIII:.. t.f th.., Il<lpllbr l,ll'Clioll :Ind dc(tcd J\llcnde as president.
A idl',l wa:. tu IlnJl111l1l' H lllilllary C!lUp, dIller beforc ur after Allende':.
1II,lllgUI,tlit'II. J\ kcy uh:-t'll'k Lall1\. fruilitup rank Chilt"an unit-as, whu tcndL'd to
uphllld tlil' lI,lti.. J1I':-. d,,I1IUll"ltil. A U.S.-approved plot to kidnap the
.lfllI)' lOllllll.llldl'l' illdlicf (.1 :'llppuner of the constitulion) failed unly
wlll'lI Ill' 011' 111:-' was murdered instead. Nonetheless, thl.'
U,:-., Cl'ntral Agenl..}' rdenllc:.sly prcsseJ the military option,
AlI.uhllllg to UUl' CIA (ablt:, linn and policy that Allende he
oVl'rtiln,wll hy;.\ lOUP. \tVl' arc ulIllilluing to gt.'neratl.' ma.ximum pressure toward
till .. t'IHI utilizing t'very appropriatl.'
lJllt.t' Alkll..lt' in nftlc..:t', tht;' NLI(Uli administration tuok SIl'I)S to impose an
blll(k.l..ll'" tilt.: Chilean ec..:onolllY, This policy went into effect
Ildt.llt.tllt' Ilatiull>llizatitlll uf:.udllllajor U,S. companies as ITt' Ford, but its
IUUlld.llltlll W.I:' h)' thc Allende.: guvernlllL'nt's rerusal (and\or
lll . hlht\') hI 1t'.Kh agrt'cllll-'nb un :.uit.l.bk cumpensation. U.S. govcrnment lllca-
.. uln 1;llludnl .1 lIt all t,'lOIIOllli( assbtancc to Chilt.:, oppOSition to
Illh'lll,.IIUll.d Ll't.:dih (frum thl' \"'odd Itlllk and the Inter-American
I kvdtlpllll'lli H,lllk), lhM:oUr;.lgclHent of private investment. anJ disruption uf
tilt" Wllrld UJppt'1 Illarkt"t. In lllL'lllurahle thc inh.'IH was 10 make
lht.' Chilealll'UllltlnlY
\vorkillg Ill,dllly lhrough llit' CIA, thl' Nixon Kissingl'r 1t',1111 <lllclllptcd to
n.l'll till t'Ll lid llll'llt.t.' Ull CllIlc.lll politic:.. The U,S, govl'rnmt::nl pruvidcd subSlan
liOlI .. lIlllHlrtllJI' til\,: ;llili Alkndl' Illl'dia, nOlably the COllSl'rvative newspaper
1:/ Alt'''tllril', .llld 10r llppositlllil in 10c.11 and It"gisbtivl' dt:ctiuIIS. CIA
lundlll!!. abu :,uppllrtnl :-.ll and olhl'r actions designed to
AIII'IHh-' .. goVt"llllUclil. (It nol unlil lhe yt.'ar 20UD th,1I CIA officially
lOllllnncd ib .h. in Chile, finally .teknowledging the of $6.5
lllillHll1 -llIr Clllll'.1l1 politiL.t1 media and private: organization
tlppo'lt'(1 III till' Allt.'mlc reglllll':) Thb included, of cunstant efforts to
provokl' " Illilil.ll)' t:lI11p.
Sociolislll via Democracy?
thrcl' Yl'.lr pn.'sidelKy was rich ill signifiGUlce, for buth the history uf
(:Ilik alld that uf L.ltin Allle.:ri(a, although thc.:: naturl' of that significance is slill
billcrl)' argued. Till' prl':.ident ami his advbers de.:cidcd Ihat despite Ihe narrowness
til their dtc..titm viClor)', tile)' would sce.:k radical changt::-but by Was
:,ulh a l'lIUr:'l' or ;toillll Could socialism be introduced in a genteel

IU .. Chile: Itt'j>re:-siull ,I lid lJt.->lJIUU<llY 2'J7
Allendc's initial e(onomic str<llcgy was similar to Ih.lt of Pl'n)ll ill ll)tIc.> and
Castro in Il)S9: freeze prices and raise wages. Thl.' result was an illllnedialc.:: boom in
consumer buying, This caused a .'.IhOrHerlll redblrihution of inCOllle.
Merchants' inVl.'lllories wen: qllkkJy dt:pletcd, while prodlKl'fs pili ... hold un all
orders until Ihl.'y could see how long pricc cuntrols would la:.1. I len.' AlIcndt'
pursued an essentially populist strat('gy in ordl'r to exp;.md hb political support.
Allende's other eCOllomit.: policies flowed frulIl campaign pruillist:s. Tup
pi iurity Wl'llt tv tht: cOlllpll'll: llatiunalizatiun of Ihl' t:opper cOlllpallit':',
the congrt:ssional vote on Ihis was ullanilllUU:', Th.lt spoke
VOhllHl'S about lilt: growth of nationalist sClltilllcllt in Chill' and the pa\'civt.:d
failure of her:> Chilt'anizatioll policy, Lalc.::r, thc Allende govel Illllcnt .Irgunl Ihat
no compens.ttion was due the comp:lllies of ",hal tht:: prt.'sidcllt dlargl'd
werc their previous illegally high profits. Thai aggressivl.' stand furllisht"o U,S.
government hardMliners with that Chile had (Ieclarnl W;lr (Ill priV<l1l.'
property in thl.' hemisphere.
The UP government also l.'xlt:ndt:d state I..'ontrol into many other e(:onolllic..:
Sl.'(tors. Coal ;.1Ilt! sted wcrc nalionalizl'd, alollg with 60 pl'rcclIt ul the "riV,11l'
banks. As the to socialism" COlllilHled. murt:: and lllore (inlls and
businesses werl.' llationalii',cd, with Allende's hand often (nrced by workt"rs who
ocolpied managemt:nt offic('s and rt.:fusnl to It.->aVl' unlil expropriation was
.1111101111CC<1. Foreign linns were .. r.l\'orilt: largel, induding w(lI-known
I'IT Ford,
In the rural the Allendl' government llluvc;,d with :.pn'd. The l.'xpropna-
tions callle r.ISll.'r thall the governmcnt's ;lbilit)' to the (cfl'dit,
to equipment) nl'edc:d by tilt" nt::w MIl-Ill owner:>, thl'
government was incre<lsingly outlbnked by pe,I:..IIHs, olten org.lllized b)' leflbt
radicals, who sdzl'd hmd all thdr own, Lalldowners hired arllled guartl:-., trit::d to
light uack legally, or simply fled the country, Thl' long-standing agnlrian probll'llI
was being md by radical l1wans.
In its ovcrall lllallagt.:lllt.:llt of the eCOlltllllY, Iht' Alkndl' gll\'l'fIll11t"nt look an
early chance, Fadng a majority ill the politi/.:aI
str..llegists decided to go for a <i1llt"lldlllcllt that would CCt',lIe an
assembly of thl' people ill place of the COllgrl's:" I'll<.' pupulht of 1970-71
(freezing pricc;':', raising wages) were intended partly to build :>upport for Ihe
aml'ndmenl. II ""as a risk bccause the poplllbi wcre bouud 10 be
inflationary. A greal deal was riding on tht.: gamblc to ""in inCfc.lst..'d (Ollst itutional
pOWl'f becallst.: the could block so nllKh of tht' program Allende sought
to carry oui.
Not surprisingly. Congress rejccll.'d thl' :11llt.:lldlllcnt ill !l.J72. At lhat puinl,
Allende and his advisers decided 10 pause in order to consolidate.: their political
gains, They planned eventually to submit the allll'ndmclltto a popular plebiscite-
thereby bypassing tile opposition-doillinated Ctlngress. 'rhc proper liioinent IleVer
came; at least Ihey could never identif), il. As 1972 continued, the government was
preoccupied by the enormous dislocalions hilling the economy, First. tht..'re Wl.'re
29X PAin TWO. CASI STllllll',!'l; CIIAN<;I= OVEH TIMF
Ihe distortions resulting from the nllempl to enforce price controls. Second, there
wns extensive snbotage or delibernte diversion hy producers, landowners, and
merchants who wanled either the UP experiment to fail or wanted to make
quick profits, or both. Finally, there was Ihe inefficiency of an inexperienced
governmenl trying to take over and run huge sectors of the economy. New and
often untrained bureaucrats. frequently appointed for political rather than tech-
nicnl qualifications, cnuld hardly master t:lsks that still bedevil their counterparts
in tightly coni rolled societies.
The Chilean eCOIlOlll)' was falling into a shambks. [\'lon('tar)' authorities weI"('
IHlmping OIlt money 10 cover hllge hudget deficits. thereby provoking inflation. An
overvalued exch;mge I"ate was el1cournging imports, while low world copper prices
depressed export earnings, r:oreign credits and itwestments had virtually disap-
peared, Partly under the pressure of the Nixon administration's "invisible
Chile's gross nation,,1 product declined by 0.8 percent in 1972 "nd hy
1U':lrly percent in 1973.
Hut how could the transition to a socialist econolllY he smooth? In Cuha (sec
Chnpter 5), there certainly was disloc"tion in the early years. Chile faced much
greater nhstades. Allende did not have the power Fidel enjoyed in Cuba. Chile was
still a pluralist delllocrnc)'. The opposition still controlled the Congress. The
eC('lnol11Y was still open 10 international blackmail.
Added to these inherent difficullies was the intransigence of the opposition.
At no time, one should remember. did the Allende government gel over hnlf Ihe
volc_ Allende became preo;ident in 1970 with a smaller percentage of Ihe vole tlHln
he had received when he lost in 196/1 (36.3 percent, compared with 38.9 percent).
In Ihe local elections of April 1971.the UP parties received 49.7 percent, their high
point. Suhsequent month!' saw furious hnltle!' in ev<'l"}' politic<l1 arena-elections in
unions, s.tudent groups, and profc!'sional nssociations.
The UP itself was we;lkened hy splils within its own r<lnks. The fnr left. led by
Ihe MlR (the Movimiento de la Iz<]uierda Revolucionaria, or Movement of thc
Revolutionary Left), pressed for more mclical action. They wanted faster nntiona
lizations, tough police ;lction agninsl the opposition. and rule by decree. The
moderntes within the UP, including Ihe Communists, urged caution, arguing
that precipitous action would plrlY into the hands of the rightists who could
m"nipulate Ihe military and the middle class.
By miel- 1972 the polit ical climate had become superhealed. Massive street
mobilizations by both pro- "nel nnli-Allende forces became routine. In August
shopkeepers staged a one-da)' bo),cott to protest government economic policies. In
Octohcr a series of protests beg"n 10 sweep the country. These eruptions showed
that widespread sectors of the Chilean public were wiJling to confront the govern-
ment in Ihe streets. They were determined not to go down without a fight.
The government had its own mass support. The UP could on command turn
out several hundred thousand disciplined marchers. Their ranks included the
many Chileans who had already begun 10 experience significant changes-
higher renl wages. subsidiz.ed fresh milk, a role in administering their community
T
llr workplOlce. The}' Ollso responded 10 Ihe Ilew 1l00!ion:lh... m 'he l.lkt'(l\'{'r 01 lin'
copper companies, the lough line toward nil lorcign firm", ,h(' IlIghly pl1hhl l/,'d
welcome to Fidel Castro when he COll11e 10 Chile in 1971.
March 1973 broughl ,mother polilicallcsl. 1\1 !'I;lkc Ihl"' l,.ompf\o;illOIl "I
Congress. The opposition hoped 10 gain :llwO-lhirds majority and Ih('rch)' he .Ihl"
to impeach Allende. When the voles were counled. govcrnllleni h.ul d'ln,'
heller th"n even it hOld dnretllo predict: UP gnl ,lj I't'fl"cnl, reducing the IIpP""'1
tion's 1l100jority from 32t030 (c.ul of >;0) in Ihc Senn'e nnd frllm In X7 ('1111,.1
150) in the lower house. UP lendero; jtlhil;llltl)' pointe,II,. IIll' lilt 11'.100C 111 klll ... 1
vole over 1970. noting th;lt no (:Illlc:m presidenl h:1(1 evcr ball ,Ihl l ' I.,
increase his suppnrt in a Illidlenn (ongrc..... lonal rlccli'm I ht' 1'1'1111111
10 its 56 percent vote as e(!uiv"lcnl to Frei'o; lando;lltle vI\.I,.",' In J (}h I.
The e1eclion retllrno; could he 1I00ed In hullreo;<; nlIl1P... 1 ,lIl\' politicli 1''''''111''11
One thing was cerlain: Ihe ('lppoo;ition had nOl 'hc "II! (:!t-t I"r;ll h"o... t 11 h.t.1
sought. Allende Ill;l)' have Incke(1 an ah$ollllC m;lIorilr. hili he hn(1 ro, k 11.11.1
support alllong Ihe workero; ;lnd an inc.:rc.l ... lIlg 1II11111lt'r III Illr.11I.lholer.-.
There had never heell a of In (lV(', Ihrnw Ih(' rlcll('d 1\ 1.11 \1\1
government. The righiisl P:ltria )' Lihert,1l1 (Falhcrlnllcl ;md I ihel'l}') h.ltl .11l1.'.HI\'
been engaged in terrorisl attacko; :lgainst g(,verllmelll otfiLial ....1Ilt! vilnll'l 'I/IIIIllI'
im>l:-tll"tions. Ry 1973. however, mor(' :HHI mor' of Ihe middle i 1.1 ..... h.leI til
think there was no delllOCf:llic soluliolilo IIll' (risk
In April n slrike of cnpper gIving thl' It.k.11 plIlIlHI ...
In cI:lilll lllUIt idass resislnllcc 10 Allclllil', In Jill)' Ihe t, k OWIl\'I'" ... " lit k, I, Igg",IIl):
01 wave 01 strikes hy middleclass :lss'ttiaIIlJllo;, <;lltll .1$ 1.1w}'ers. Ilhy.. i, 1.1'1...... llll
architects. The pro-AIlcnde 1n:l">S l;lhnr illno; .. l.lget! huge t. oUlllcl p' 011'''''''.
Chile was in the grip nf n (everish polillt..ll h,lltle. Tel rorisl incident" he, ,1111"
frequent. Few thoughl the siliialion co111,1 n'lllaill pC':lcdlll Ilnlil I'Jll,. wl1('" 111"
next presidcnl would be cleCled.
Allende knew this. lie: had long since rcjeclcd his l.lr len's adviu' I,) 1(''''1111 In
extralegal lllC:lns, and he knew the Chrislinn IkllloCf;llo; were the nnl}' I'olilh .11
force Ihat \\'il5 strong cnough :H1d possihl}' willing tn rr;}l.h ;'Ill .1gt'C'CIlH'1l1 th.lt
might preserve thc countl)"s dCIlHX,."t ic S)'o;l(,lI1. Allendc ll('gnt inlet! wil h h ('l .111' t
his fellow leaders, but after extcllded ddiheralioll they rclll ... cli. ThC)' did "'" \\.1111
to he drawn into joint responsihility for.l g,>VCrtllllenl; ('(Iually illll""
lant, the)' suspected Ihc)' had lllllCh In g:lin from fl1rlher di ...{!"editing ,,( lil'. Th\'\
may cven have anticipated Ihal a military 10llP would r('o;lol"I: 1111."111 1ft P<I\VC!
Allende concluded that he hOld to incrcasc lllilll.lI")' parlil il'alion 111 h, ...
government. Although it mighl give shorl lerm il mighl :tlo;:o "I'cl1 til<'
way to military intrigue and to opposition charges of p(llitici;;ing tile ;lrIllClIIc'll"".
Allende sensed the danger and in Augtl:;t allemplc,IIO s.hurne hi.. army cnllllll<lll
ders. It was too late.
By early September the military conspirncy to ,Iepose Ihe lIP g' ,v('rnlllent \\ .1'"
in high gear. Strikes and counterdemonstrnlions had furlher slowed nn e,IIIHHlly
already hit by h)11erinflatinn an(l cnpital flight. (;cllcral Carloo; P,.l"', :11111\
palace located in central Santiago burst into flames under rocket
dllilCk) by the Chilean armed forces during the coup of September 11, 1973.
(Colbi'lo\Uettllliln\United Press International.)
lullllll:lIJder iIH.:hh:f and Illinbll'f of dc:li.:nse, proclaimed his support for Chile's
"'"II:-.llllIlillll,d dL'lllOaih.y UIJl\lrtllll<lldy for Allende and the UP, Prats' military
Iln':-.Iigl' wa:. badly. Outvoted al .. gL'llL'f3Is' council ill late August. he
Il':.ignnll'IIIJI Ilis :lfllly alll! cabille:! Ilosls. Ilis successor;]s amlY chief was General
i\ugU;o,ltI l'iIIOlhd.
'I'll<'; Illilil.try now 1,,::.1 lil1k lilllL'. 011 Sl."'ptl:lllbt:r II, 11)73, a wdl-coordin:.:lh.'d
... PlIp h..... g,"L Early lhat lllUl"lIlll!:'. thl.' Special SL'rvices CllrfllJilleWS, long thought to
l'JIlIJOd)' tradition 01 llonpolitkal polit:e, weft: still guarding the pre-
l'aldLl' against attack. Oillinously, they pulled out when informed
Ill.n Illeir LOJlIIII,lIldL'f had joilled till' unfulding coup. At6 A.M. Allende decided to
gil illllllL'di.l1dy 1\1 l.a Muneda, Ihe landmark palace in the he'lft of
S.III!l;lgll.
Till' Ill' Iht' JIlullling frl'llzio..'d activity at tht' palace, as the defr.:nses
wvr\;' pll'P.trnl. Alklldc began re..:eiving or safe exit to exile. but he chose 10
aJld light. Just hdol"t' Iluon, air fLlrce Ilawkcf Ilulllt:rs attacked the palace
with IUl.kd nrl. army troops prq);.\red 10 storm the pillact', Allende committed

(. to the ("uup was SGlltt'fl'll. but the repression was rapid ilnd brutal.
Wl' :'I1L,tll I1I:Vl" I klluw how IllallY dkd-at h:ast 200U. It was the most violent
nJilit.lIY IIIlL'f\'t'lIlilJn ill tWLnlio..th-ccJltury Suuth American history. The
During the darkest d<lys of the Pinochet dictatorship, politlCdl OPPOsition or
even appeals to human rights were impossible, if nOI olc!lnary ChileJn
women challenged the dictatOlship and spoke uut dgaimt human
in innovative ways. like the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, Chilean
women were able to organize protests with d degree uf irllpuility unlhink<.lble fOI
others, so long as they acted in theil accepted yender roles <IS mOlIlt:rs, WIYt:'S,
and grellldrnolhels, Catholic protectors of their
One interesting way in which these women Wl're able to thell glid emL!
appeal to human rights was through sewing arpillems, lradiUOlldl Chiledn
In messages combining the personal and the political. women Lleplcted thell
children, or better times, or eyen scenes of human rights yioldtions and allli,eglme
protests. The Catholic Church helped III the production and distribution of the
arpiJIews, sening up 311(1 providing rnaleriab to weavelS, well as selling
the tapestries.
The role of the arpillel'Ds in allowing Chilean women to lo::.s and protest
the hUlllan rights violations was only one of th", ways III which the
functioned. Sewing these visual testimonies of grid ciS d kim.! of therapy lor
women whose suffering continued as they contemplated the (dte of tht:'11 disdp
peared loved ones. The sale of QrpilieffH also provided incorne in extremely scMce
times, as Pinochet's neoliberal policies made lifo! ever hardel for poor and middle
income communities. But their irnportant furlCtlon W,IS to dl) avenul.'
fo\ protest in il society In which depoliticization W.lS enforced by gun and b<lyonet.
Weaving Opposition
L
to socialism" that so 1l1;lIlY 1)11 thL' k.fl thuught til hl.' irrL'vasiGk was
cUllling to a halt.
Allende's resulted largely IrOlll th.., illtcrplay hdwecll
<lnd polilic<J1 The left drew its suppurt IIWillly from tht: urban wurking
dass. It met 0ppositioll frolll a cohe:->iw upper ullited by lies and
objective interest, and this unified ditc was able to gain lht' aJlegi,1I1ct: of llliddk
se..:lOr gruups and, most important of all, mil it anI ;H,.tivists,
such as storekel'pers and truckers. l.3eLwct'Jl 1970 alld 1973, the worker-b<lst:d
Allende muvement was unable 10 form an t'nduring coalition wilh Ihe uther
strata in Chilc<lll society. That explains it:-> inahility to Will a ck'ar at the
polls. henct' its ultimate vulnerability.
This is not to discount the effects of opposition frolll the United St<ltcs, which
worked steadily at -destabilizing- (that is, ovel1hrowing) tht: Allende regillle. But
U.S. intervention was not the deciding in the guvernllll:Jll'S duwnfall. Tht'
Allende administration had a mountain of of ils OWII. NUlldhdess, Ihe
United States once again placed itself squarely Ull the side 01" cOllnterrevulliliOilark'lj.
If
.,
I . ' ,
.','
,;
,'
"
, .,
)02 I'Aln-TWO
The Pinochet Regime
The Ilew military government prumptly set out to impose an authoritarian regime
on Chile. Proclniming its goal as "Il;ltioll;ll Ihe junta set abollt to
destroy-not merely reform-the country's political system. Congress WOlS dis.
solved, the constitution suspended, and parties declared iIIegnl or placed
there W;lS to be no more political hickering. The junta further imposed a
stnte of siege, called a 9 o'c1ock curfew, and set strict limits on the media.
The armed forces sought to revamp long.standing relationships hetween state
and snciet}'. One critical cOIllp<lnent o(this plan was the unity of the military, led h}'
arm)' general Augusto Pinochel. Another was the disarray of civilian society, which
made it possihle for the regime to dismantle (or at least repress) such inlermediate
ill"titutions as political parties ;)nd labor unions and 10 establish direct authority.
Political acti"it)' in its traditional sense stopped. In January 1974 General Pinochet
announced that the military would remain in power for no less than fi"e vears.
Through cIe"er political maneuvering., Pinechet achieved supreme
;lnd what hold at first heen a thoroughly institutionalized military regime hec3me
hIghly personalized-as Pinochet alone commanded power. A plehiscite in 1978
produced the Widespread appearance of support for Pinochet's "defense of the
dignity of Chile." Another plebiscite in 19RO approved a constitution th'lt con-
firmed Pinochet's hold on his office until 1990.
In the meantime, a group of civili:lIl technocrats inlroduced far-reaching
changes in economic policy, These economists hclicved strongly in the effkiency
nnd fnirness of lll<lrket competition. What had restricted Chile's growth. they
reasoned. was governmellt intervention in the economy. To Pllt the laws of
sllpply and demand back 10 work. they set out to reduce the role of the stale and
<llso to cut b<lck inflation. The ultil1l:lte goal, Pinochel once said. was a to make
Chile nol a nntion of proletarians, but a nntioll of entrepreneurs."
'I'he regime's progr:l.lllS had a clear effeci on inflation, which was rllnningnl nn
<lllllll:ll rate of around 500 percellt at the lime of Ihe coup. By 1976 it was down 10
IRO percelll, by 1978 it was around 30-35 percent. and by 19R2 il W;'IS down to
10 percent. hom 1983 to 1987, inOntion fluctuated between 20 and 31 percent.
This was a far heller performance Ihnll thai of Argentina, Br,nil, or Mexico, and
here Ihe junta could justifiahly cbim success. They could make a similar c1nim for
growth, which averaged over 7 percent from 1976 through J981. Bllt it was
achieved at the cost of lower real wages and declining social services.
The University of Chicago-trained technocrats' goal was to open Chile to lhe
world economy, drastically reducing tariff protection, government subsidies. and
the size of the public sector. In laIc 1973 Ihe slate owned nearly 500 firms. The
junla returned about half to their original owners and opened bids for many of the
rest. The lack of true competition made for low sale prices. benefiting local
business conglomerates and multinational corporations, such as lIT.
Economic policymakers also reduced to imports on the ground that
quolas and tnri((s prote<ted incfficient industries. The result was that manr local
111 (.!Ilk ({cpr"""I'I'1 .llltllkllHH I.t, \ 111\
firlll
s
lost out to Illllltin:lliollal lorpnratiolls. The Chile.1I1 hll"lIU'S" 1I11111.ltllllly.
whieh strongly supportc(1 the coup in 11)7.\. \WIS h,ldl)' .1Ikl h't1. Irnull.ally, (.hd,
\\'a$ attempting to cre:lle a free market c(onnlllY wilh .ls"i"I"Il'(, 1.1.gdy ,11.1\\'11
(1'0111 international org:llliznlinns and "I her gmclllllll'llh. tlnl pri\.Ilr h.lIll.." .llld
companies.
The financial crash of 19H2. triggerl'tl hy Mn:I(Il's til' I.ulo Iid.llIll 011 II<.
foreign debt, hit Chilc- h:lnler Ih:lll Ihe r('''1 of I alin AIlIC"l'it:l. Thc grot"" .Iom,... I"
product plunged 10 percenl that ycar. a" ullclllplnyltlt.-nl (induoIlIl!: lho.. c 1111
government make-work program") In IIldlltlc n Ihird ..I Ihe 1.11001 Ifll' C 11\
lllid-1983. Pinochet inst:lllcd;'l new set of lllll"cr'\'ali\T lnhn"t 1'.11 .... Whl.l.llll" IWII
an even more radical CCOllOlllk rmlllnllg. Ther stilllld.ltcd ill\'C"IIll'IlI. !:'I.llh
increased exports, ami sh:'lrpl}' redu{;C'd UIl,,lllploYlllclll. nlll \.....I)..:l' ... 11"111.,IIWoI
chronicall}' low, and Ihe syslt'mati( privali7at Itlll III "Oll.1I "('r"itt" Idl 11I.11I\
poor Chileans without the esselltials of life
On the political front. the IJinot.-het rC'),:imt' Ill'V('f hC"Il.lhd 101 ""'t' 11\'I" ..... ,"n.
especially at an)' hint of lahllr Ullrest 01 p('plll.lI" p,olc"l. II'> hltlt.1I LI\!ll'" (.II/It'd
Widespread condemnalinn, as critit.s dennllllt.-cd IqX,IIt.d .111,1 pC' ... I... lt-nl \1..1.111""'.
of human rights. In Septemh(-'r 197(,;,\ 1..11' homh III 'Va.. hillgloll. I ) ( ." IlIn\ ( ),1.11I, I,.
1.etclicr. a former Allende :'Imhassadnr In Ih... lhllictl Siale....1Ilt! :It the I1l1h' 01 lh,'
bombing an effective lohhyist ,lgain... l gm'('llllllclll .lId l"lhe l'IIlIl( hl'l g"n'lli
menl. The assassins' link with Chile.1ll inldllgC'lHt' ".'S dc. I. hul ( 11,1(" ,""llelll!,
tunusly rehuffed Ihe CarieI' gtiV,'rnmclll'" allempl 10 r;ld,lP Ill( .It \ 11 ...,1 IIH'lIlhcl'"
of the Chilcan military. The t'!edinn nl J{ol1.t1d J{c.lgnn \ .Inll' ,1 .... 1 ):1\"11 "'II,t 10 Ill.'
I'inochel government, which SOlin found Vv.I"lllngtnn Ic\..."" rcl.ll'llI1"
Around 198.5 Ihc Reag,l11 adminblr,Ilillll "u<ldclll}' hq,:.lll II' ili .. l.lll' I' 11",,11
fmlll Pinoehe!. By Ihis lime Chilc's aging (anti p,.lt'tllly lIlhlelllOtl.11H) dl' l.1101
was hecoming $oTllclhing of n politi(al Clllhal'l.I"t;JJlInl I" lht' 1111111'11 ... ,.t,,...
especially at a time when President Reagan W.IS lomlly d,'l1tllllH ing 1111111.111 llr
lll
"
abuses wit hin Ihe Soviet Un1l11l's "evil cmpirc. ft Mor('ovt'l", I J.:-'. 1'01 it )'I11.II.:CI ...
10 fe<lr lhat Pinochet's r('pressivc rule was cl1(ollr.lging Ihc tlC\Tltl]lIl1('1l1 "I .1
radical opposition-a gucrrilln mo\,elllellllll:l1 mighl !oo('lIt.-' p,l\wr 111ltlll)..:11 .11111(',1
violence, as had oeculTe(l so long ago ill (.uha. \Vh.IIC'''(''' lht' 1("1""11. Ih('
administration was backing awny fmlll its initial hOIlC)'llltlOIl with 1'1111'\ 111'1.
In 1988 Pinochel look a dralll:llic g<llllhie :lnll Iml. Hcading In illICIlI.lli<lIl.t1
pressure to liberalize and feeling confidenl in a rccovering ('Ctlllllllly, II.c gt'IlI"I.111 I
another plebiscite on his one-mnll rule. The opposition nnw t1llil('(! ill .1
party aUiance, called the and mounted :l highly die, livC' 1"lnl"'011
c:lmpaign (:'Iided briefly b)' U.S. meclin COllsllltnllls) for the "lHI. ",Ilk II trllllll\III1'\ l hv .
decisive 55 to 43 percent The <lie now cast for a returll 10 c1cdcd gIW('l"llIl1C'1l1
After a tense interv:'ll. Pinochet ;lccepled the result, knowing Ih.11 Ihe l:Ollt;11
tulion ensured his continuation as :lrlllY COlHl1lnllder-in dlle( unl il llJ9H. '1 he lIex I
step was the 1989 presidential e1eLl ion. W(1Il h}' Ihe illle <:hric;l i,111 I)('11I'\( I ,II i,
leader (and implacable Allende foe) I'alri<.io A)'lwin. supported h},.1 fl,.llilu'lI "I
seventeen center and cenler left parties. The exlrC'lll(' Idl t.llkd 10 will .1
1'.\1,11\\'(1. (A... ' n,..l1
""llgn'>"hlll.t1 ....:.lt, .I!lo Ih..: 1IIh':l"I'0wcrlul COllllllunbt !'.Irt)' intu a bilkr
Iighl lid W"''':II rl.,luI .llld ha ai-I ill..: l\ xis1- L":ll iniSb.
THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE (1990-PRESENT)
/\)'lwill .1 .... Ulll..:d I'tlWlT ill COllllllitlld to the reslOratioll of Chih:'s dcmo-
II .111 ... 111 .. tltlll iOll ... illVl:'!lotlgatitll1 nf pasl hUlllan rights abuses, and rapid improve-
111"111 III IIll' 11\ 11Ig .. uf the pour. Ilis h..:avil)' technon;ltil.: cahinet was
Itl Ill.lilll.tining Ihe esst'lltiah. of Latin Alllcrica\ leading economic
,>UUl',>,> .. hll} (.11 by urtllmlox rt'lativt: priu: booming
l'XjlUI h (bUU)'l-d hy lugh lUppl'r rt'(ord fur('igll impressive
IUI"'igl1 dd>1 rl.'dlldiun. and progress ill priv.1lizillg IlHll:h of a once
Illgld}' illdll,,:il'nl puhlic
( IIlwly "k'llluuac)' f.llCJ forlllid,lolt' ;\11 l'vcr-alcrt
.\fIllY -.1111 IIt'.ldnl bY:lll unrq>llIt.lnt IJlllochet (although Ill: \'o'as nt)W tarnished by
I.IIIIII)' 1111.llki.d ,>1...llld.lb), .1 Judiciar)'. u rightist-dlllllinated Senate,
,,,"I,ldl" ll'rrtln.. lJJ hUIlI Ihl' Idt .llld Ihl' and thc of what to do
.lIltllll 1,.1,>1 IIUIIl.111 Ilghl ... ib potelltial to ignill' civilian-military
uIIIIlII t.
Th,,' gilVt..llllllg lll.llitillll (Illc CUlIlI,:lt,ll'ion) held together lor anutht..r
'>llk-nll.d dl'( ill IIJYJ. ()nel:' again Ihc Christian l)elllnn<lIS furnished tht.'
1'11 .. hk-1I1. J Ie \\'.1'> Edu.lrdll I'rl'i, thl' ot Chilt"s prl'sid"'nl fnull 10 1970,
\<..IIl' WOli '.K P"'lu'lIl lit lhe vok. Th,,' llIKh.lrismalit.: Frl.'i. whosl..' 1l.II11C wa!lo his
r:r"',lk,>1 .I'>::.d. pltllllbnl -growth with llluit}'." The ollce-powerful Comlllunist
1'.1I1) ,,'lllllllUl'lt hi hI..' Illuroughl), Illargill.1li ... cd. while tht' PUrl}' rt'maint'd
IlIy.1I Itl th,,' ... u,dIIIOIl. 1t>,>1 IlUport.lIlt, tht'rt.' g..:nl'ral 'Kccptanu: of the rule!lo uf
Ih,' d"'llltkl.ltll g.llll".
{ 111U:-1 Iltll .. hl,, ;I,, ... contillLl..:d 10 bl.' ib lIllllinflalionary
1.IJ11d gJ"wth. I)\lrlng Ille IIr!'>1 eigllt )'l'ars of CU'Kl'rlaCItJII cU:lliliull govern
1l1...11l (I'NU 9X). (;np grl'w 6.7 pt.'rct.'lIt per year, thl' in Latin
.lIld Ull'" til the high"'st in tht: world. The lorcigll debt WitS signifi.
C.Illtl), rl'dundllld llt:W fureign was readil}' attracted. Privatization
had gUll,,' virtu,lIly to tilt.' maximum. Espl.'cially impressive high savings
.nld whit..h laid solid foundalions for continued
I'rodu"tlvity.
Tht: distribulion oflhb growth. was ll'sS imprl'ssiVt'. Although
Ii... :- :-1 ItlW... d ,hat tilt' Ilunlber of Chileans living in povl'rt)' decrl..'ascd uver Ihe
III til,,' 1')')0:'>, I,,vds of powny rt'lliailled high and disparities in iJlcome
I..olltinul'd to gruw, llIaking Chile unt: of the most unequal Socidil's in the region.
t)1I tht: inh'm;lIion.ll frolli. Chile in the early 1990s staked its hopes on
Willlllllg ill NAFTA. Whcn it became clear Ihat the Clinton ::ldmin
""Ialioll ..::uuld nut vhtain congrcs.!>iunal Wfast lfa(k" 3uthorizatiun to negotiate
l'lltr)' intn NAI'TA, tht. Concertacion government opted instead for
a:l .. ot..l,III' ill MEI{COSUIt
'"
-,
.'
III .. Chile: 3US
In March IlJ9S. Gt:llcnlll'illu... ht:tlill.tlly !lokpped duwll alta tW"'llt)' five
a!lo arlllY <:!Iil'[ TIll.: gt:lleral did lIut. howcv,,r. relreat hOIll public lilt:. ht:
bccallll.' ,I joining a handful of uthl'r llundn:Il'l1 furthcr
strcngthl'ning thc hard-lill": right's ability to vclO gOVCfllllll'llt legislaliun.
While Pinoclld's assullIption ufhis S"'llall' sl'al sparkt.'d prokstlnHlllll ...ldl,
that geslur,, was soon overshadowed by (h:vclopnh:nts ;Ihroat!. On O(lobcr 16.
1998, while visiting London. Ihe funnel' dictator \... as arre!loted by Urilish at
the of a Sp,lIlish magistralc wanling to him for hUllIall
abuse!lo of Spanish citizen::. during hi!lo sC'venlt:t:n-y..:ar rule. III Chile, the hum.1ll
righb cOllllllunit)', Ihe polilicallt:ft. and 3\)l111' melllhl.rs ut' Ihl' ruling (:Ollt t:rtal i(lIl
applauded the alTl'st, while the military alld tht: right dt:nllllll(ct..! it tht: wurk of
an -internationnl socialist campaign."
Faced wilh putcntial destabilizaLion .11 IIUJIIV if l'illuchct Wl'J"e cxtradilld tu
Spain, President Frl'i mainhlillctl th,,' rortncr gl'lIclal ..:nju)'ld diplomatic
immunity of his SI;;ltIlS ill the Senalc-<llltl that till.' whule pro
cct'ding amountl.'d to a violation of Chill'.1ll !loowrt'ignty, III the l'n;,l. tlit' Briti!loh
government finally decided tv let Pinochet rl'lUfll hom...' 011 IhI;' ground Ihat hI;' was
not mentall), fit to undergo n complex alltl Il'ngthy tri.:d.
By coincidence "U' nOI. Pinuchet arrived ill Sallti,lgtl jllst a lew hd'ul'" Ihl'
inauguf<\lion of Ricurdo the Cvncertadun candid.11t.' who ll.lnvwly
right-willg 0PPOlll'l1t Juaquin ill a rUllolf c/t:l'liuII in Jalillar)' 20UU. '1'1""
victor)' of Lagos. a appt:'ar..:d tv hefald ;111 1.:1"1 of rt'UlllLilialioJl. BUI
ullderl),illg his Iriulllph wac sodal and fraglllt;'llt,ltiun, ..::unlilltling Il'n
ill dvil-military rdations. and pef!loi!loling OVl"r Ille I,lrgl'r politilal
and ct.:ollolllic of the Pinochet cr.l.
Subsequellt I.'vC'nts revt.'alt:d effurts 10 r..... wa[ III", Pillucht:t legaLy III
Chile. A s(,.'ries of cOll!lotitutioJlal l'lfunns ill 2005 !loouglll It) rcdw.,t..' Ihe prilll.lt.:}' vI'
the l'Xl..'cutivc br.llIch anti bubll'r dt:lllucratil' by r...duLing Ihe l're!loi
dClltial term filmI to four yl.'an., 111lell..'clt:d ill Ih,, S"'nall',
strengthl'ning thl' rok uf the Il..'gi!lolahlf", ;Illd diluting th", puliliGl1 illlpnrtallc... or
thl.' military. Ell..'ctions ill 2005-6 IcJ to th", victury of Micltdle Baclldcl, lh,,'
candidate of the governing coalition, a alld Ihc daughter of ;\ pru
constitutionalist military gencral who had becn lortur",d alld killed by the
Pinoclll't regime. The Concertacion now faced a M:'rivlI!lo challl"ngt: frolll the
right, whose candidate won 47 percellt oftht.' volt: in tht: !lot.:'cond round of elcctions.
By this time the political atmosplll're in Chile waS moving aw.IY from polar.
iza!ioll in the direction of accollllllodation, pragmalismlnl! COllSt:llSUS. Alllll;;ljor
parties agrced on the nt:ed to cOlllinue liberal CI.:OllOlllic policies. Kt:y lurces 011 thl.
Chilean right were intent on divorcing themselvcs frol1l Pinoch.... t. while tht: kit
had secured a prominent place in the nation's politit:al There were (on
troversies, of course: Buchclet ::.aw her popularity d",dillc a::. .I rC!loult of studclll
strikes. botched policies. and accusations of curruption. Blltlhe!lo... \"'erl' rUIl of Ihe
mill political 1I0l di!loputations ovc,:r the nature of the S}'.!>lem. As
the prospects for Chilean delUocracy looked extremd)' ::.olid.
1'",1<
ttl I,'. '"
", I \.
o ',t,WI, I',W' '.(\0', ""
1<"" .'.' ,to
1',.,,1. I. "....."
1\'( '/."/111 \\ I
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11.-1 II,.""",,,,
n n A"III
f JNII/I \1"\1
Nnrall
rACIFtr
OCFIIN
COIO)\\IIIA
B foreigners alike have long "the lo111d of the
fUlure. Wllh an OlfCOI of mOTe than 3 111l1lloll s<luare miles. Brazil occupies
nC:lrly half of South America. lis land mass ranges from the semiarid northeas.,
plagued hy recurrent droughts. 10 the rich (orests and (ertile plateaus of the centef
and the sOllth. The country ahounds in natural resources. including iron and other
incluslrialmincrals. 1n rcccni )'cars Brazil has discovered vasl arC<lS of undersea oil
deposit!" in offshore fields within its zone ofsovereign jurisdiction. lis populalion is
creeping toward 200 million. Allhough Brazil relied hcavil)' on export ;lgriculturc
fnr much of its history. a cornbin:llion of reccnt developmentS-industrialization,
moderniZ:lIion, and polilical stability-has made the naticl!1 into an important
region:11 and potenti,d world power. Perhaps because of this anticipalion, citizens
lend 10 have an optimistic. ebullienl outlook on life. As Ihey like to sa}'. "God is;]
Bra7.ili<ln.
Brazil
11
The Awakening Giant
Map'l Brazil
FROM COLONY TO NATIONHOOD
Br<lzil's relatively nonviolent acquisition of independence from Portugal in 1822
left the country with an auspicious start. The lack oflargescale conflict meant thai
ph)'sical "nd economic destruction was minimal. espeCially in comparison to the
devastation wrought in the Rio de la Plata region. in VeneZllela, and in central
Mexico. Nor did Brazil have to cope with the problems of demobilizing a massive
military apparatus in the postwar period, And most important. the transition of
the Portuguese monarchy to Brazil provided a coherent political structure
endowed with the authority of time tested tradition, There were struggles. to be
sure, but Brazil did not face the same kind of inslability that other Latin Americans
faced at the outset of independence,
The economy was mainly agricultural. and sugar was by far the largest
cOl1ll1lcrcinl crop, By 1822 the popul<ltion included ahout 4 million inhabitants,
more lhan Iwlf of whom were slaves of African birth 01' descent. The social order
consisted principally of Iwo Iicr.". I... ,ndowning ari,,!lI(r.ll ... ,11111 o"llh<;(TVll'nl t.1 I Illl'I'"
controlled :lgricultural production. while African ..);1\'('< and Iheil dC'>lt'lId.llll ...
worked the land. This dicholomy would CPllle In 1"'0(' :ll'lly and e;}'ml'allwllt,lll\"
described by Gilberto Freyre in his c1a:r;:r;ic honk. T/lr ,\ "wll"r S/II1'("( 'l'lll'l,'
were some merchants and lawyers and olher profe:r;e;iollal". malnl\" in Ihe- 1..11,e-<, .11111
especially in Rio de Jall{'iro, hilt society w.le; d'lllllll.ll('tl 1,\' 111(' II>1t('<' "t lIlt,
countryside.
Dom Pedro I (1822-1831)
In nineteenth-century Brazil, ITInny h:lsic socinllssllc:r; were hllllnclllp wllh Ill(' 1.11l
of the crown. Mo:r;t ohvinu:r; wa:r; the cClllsnlidallon nf Hr.i/il'!'- illlkpCIltkll\ "
Related issues involved the ccnlr:lli7:llioll 01 de(cnlf;lli7alltlll III .1ulhlllllV .In,l
cxecutive versus legislative pow('1'. These (]1lc!'-linll:r; h,l<l III he f.u (',I illll11l"dl.II,h
306
IllX 1'1\1,1 IWll ..
I I I I II, ,' ,,1,',, ;lllJ tilt' l.'lllueror wanted to write a
.dll1 IlIl l'pl'lldl'llll' )l'l..IlI:'ll' lui I ...... ..
Illa:J.ilidll l..\lllstitutiUII.
1)11111 l'l..'dro ll>n:.lllll..' Ilh: firstl'lllperur uf a newly ind<,:pcIH.lcnt Brazil in 1822.
\'/110.:11 IlLl' Bra:J-ili.11l aristU(I..llY lill'Cl.'d a break with Portugal. A year earlier Pedro's
lathl'r.l )Olll JII:io VI. had Il'ft Brazil to reSUllll' the throne in Portugal. but only after
advbillg Ilis ::'1)[1 III relll.lill ill Brazil (to which the ruyal family had become very
.ltt:h:llld). l'Vell il it IIl('alll (!'l..lting a st'parak lIlonarchy, Dorn Pedro I called for a
... oll:--llttrv'lI alld 11ll:" re:-.ullillgo.:"lectiL)Ils in IR23 revealed several political
divbIUlI:'l. i\lu:--lbd::.iL W,IS tho.: :">plil bdWt:l.'ll it Brazilian alld a pro-Porluguestc'
1,lllioll.tlll,I,III",r \:Illl::.islllig uIIIIU:'\:.' wllo Ilad uppost:d Brazilian independcnce alld
w.llllnl lu rl':">ul>ordinalL' Riu dl: Janl.'iru to I.isbon. lis leaders were primarily
l'IIl'lUglll;':">l'-!>Urtl. IIIll:--tly Illilitdry urllcers, bureaucrats, and Inen.:hal1ts. Tht:
Brazllt.ln 1';I..:tiuli W:l::' !c'd by Bunifacio Andrada t' Silva, a Sao Paulo landowner
whu \Va" Ihl' leading. for Brazilian liberalism and the leading minister of
I )UIIl Pnlro's g'lvl'f111nt:'1l1.
Inajority slq)1'1J1'I ill thl.' assclllbly, Jose BOllir,lcio's L:abinet had to
.lIta tlllt:'1;' Ihl.' cmpl'ror continually endorsed the
1'{lrttlgUl.':">l' f,,(tiuII':. proll':.t OVCI' tht' guverllll1ent's anti-Portuguese llleasures,
I k.lInl PUll'lllil::' (ulllillUnl illld :.tn:et lights brok\:.' out, us cxtremist fuction of
till' Br,ll-ili,11l blu... l:dlnl luI' dl'L:l:"lltr,dized rule and piil"'d abuse 011 the l'rOWIl,
i\llIid thl.' rlll illll:"> ddnlk till.' elllpl'rUr ::.imply dissolvt'd Ihe assembly in
NIJVl'IIlhvr IH2,l. Sltonl)' Illl'rl'.lfler Ill" unilaterally lkcn:t'd a (onSlitlltioJl for
BraZIl. II IlldlHkd IllallY k.ltllre::. fro II I a drart prepared by Alllonio Carlos
Alldr.ld,l l' SJlV,I, brolher, but re:.erved greater powers fur the
I'udn (thl: "Muda<lllllg I'owt'r"), which was to be Ihe monarch
hilll:">dl. iUll'urt<lllt was thl' PU\\'t'f to dissolvt: the Chambt'r or L:kputies
.llld III "PIJuilll ,lIld dblnb:. IIdnblt'fs. Citizl'll voting. was tied to :l high
Illilllllllllll propl'l'ty k::.t, thl'rt'b)' s...vl'rdy limiling public partkipatioll in :111
IlIIpl'ri:d gl)Vl'nlllll'llt tlt;ll was 10 be highl)' ct'lltrali'!cd. lronicalt)', thi:-- llllil<ller
:dl)' dl ... rl,l'llulIl:--lillitiun indlldt:d passages from France's 1789 Dl'c1aralion 01
I III ilia 11 I{ight:..
Till' :.Iury til llli:. (Ull::.1 it llt ion dl:"lllUnSI rated kt:y fC:ltlll'CS uf lilt' lH::W naliOll or
H,.I:Jil: (I) tht: 1IlllJl:lrch had sl:"t:lllingly prl;'servcd his absolutist illiti"ltiw by
di:.:.olvillg tiel' dl:ctnl as:'l.'lIlbl)' :tnd impusing his own constitution; but (2) the
(ullstitutiun, whiIL- lavurillg tht' cruwn ill lh\:.' divisioll of powl;'rs, was more liberal
than ah:-.olutist, lIlort' akin tl) tlte conll:mporary English parliamentary system
tllan 10 lhl' Freudl; alill (3) the .... ollll'nitml;'l1l to human rights, however qualified
by Ihe real illknt ions of J)UIll Pl;'dnl olild h is loyal ist :\dvisers, thenceforth became
:l!odl:::.tar in Brazilian history, an ide:d to which libertarians and reformers would
cuntinuollsly repair. Till;' struggll;' Over the !lew country's political structure thus
cnded ambiguously: a libl:f:ll charter imposed by an emperor who was thereby
lintilS 011 all future governmcnts,
Thl' ahsolutist aspects of ewnts in Rio stirred concern in the Northl'ast, the
rq..;ioll tllat had l)J'ovl:d 1l10!>t rl'L:cptivc to tilt' liberal ideas of 'lbolition,
,:
11 .. Br,lzil: Till' AW.lkl:lllll
b
lii.1ll1 30'1
':'2..

Celebrating the declaration of Brazilian independence from Portugal, this mid
nineteenth-century lithograph, 0 Grito de Ip;rallga, depicts the "Cry of Ipiranga
H
by
Prince Pedro (September 7, 1822) in allegorical style, (Miguel Maria Lisboa, Barao de
Japura, Romances hist6ricos, por tim brasileiro, 2"d ed, (Brussels: n. p, 1886), Author's copy,
fcda:l1islll, and rl'pllbikani::'lll, Back ill 1MI? rl.'publi<:all (ollspiraluf::' ill
Pernambuco provinel' had stubbornly rl'sl::.kd thl;' disdplilll' o( IUo. DOlll
Pedro's imposition uf till' cOllstitution ill I S21 prov(lkl'd .1 IlI:W rd.Jdlioll,
which dramaliz.ed thl' fllnd:ullt:lltal issul:'S at Ihe hl'arl of Braziliall polilics fol'
the rest of the empirl:,
The Pcm:lmbucans drdarcd their indl'pelldenci:' nlll'W. i\lkr gaining till'
support of oth.... r IlOrllH'aSlern provinct's, thl' n:bcls cllIC'd for thdr OWI1 COllstitllc'nt
assembly, The movcment split apart on the sl<lvery iSSlll', however, as Olle leader
shocked his coll .... agues by calling for an end tLl till' slaw Irade. of tht: rebd
organizers feared <l mobilization uf tile lower '11'(11:1':', and not without rl.'ilSUIl,
Discontent of marginal rret persons, mallY of colur, was Ihreatening to turn the
anti-Portuguese, anticentralist agitation into:l social revolution,
The rebels' internal Jivisions ill Pt:rnambuco (allll' as the lllilil:lI)' pre:.surl;'
from olltside was growing. Th.... empl;'ror had hirl:d English :Ind Frl'llc/t and
mercenaries, <lnd they taughlthe insurgents a bloody political lesson. Most of tht:
rebel leaders were executed, There were limits to the rang.... of p.... rlllissible social
protest in Brazil.
Rio's domination call1l' only with British hdp, and that aid had its priet',
Having secured a fnvored foothold in the Braziliall economy sincc uno, Britain
now found itself underwriting the transition to Brazilian indl'pcllllcIKl"
JIO I'ART TWO" CASE STUDIES: IIIANC;E OVEH TIME
Britain could help consnlidatc the newly independent Rio government by
(,lcilil:lting diplolll:llic recognition (rom the world's principal powers. That goal
was achieved by a series o( 1825 agreements that Britain negotiated with Porlugal
nnd Brazil. They provided that the Portuguese king, now Dom 1nao VI. wns to
recognize Bra7.i1 ;'IS a separ;'lte kingdom; that British exports to Brazil would
continue to receive n preferential tariff rate; and, not least important, th<lt Brazil
w
O
\.l1d pay Porlugal an indemnification o( 2 million pounds sterling (or damages
suffered in the struggle for independence. (This was exaclly the debt that Portugal
owed 10 Britain; the negotiators kepi this provision secret.)
The following year, 1826, Britain gOl from Brazil n Ireaty commitment to end
the slave trade by 1830. The British wanted this commitment becnuse they fen red
that slnvc-produced :;ugar (rom Brazil would prove cheaper in the world markel
than sugar (rom the I3rilish \.vest Indies, where slavery had recently been
abolished. Anolher reason was the pressure on the British government from
English <1holitionists. The new Br<1zilian government. \\'ith liltle enthusiasm and
less genuine cOlllmitment. gave the British tile c1<1l1se Ihe)' demanded. Further
concession.<; were made in <1n 1827 trade treaty which pUl Brnzili<ln exports to
England <11 a disadvanlage with exports frolll British colonies. rVluch o( the
Br<lzili<1n e1ile S<1W the concessions as excessive and explicable only by Dom
Pedro's apparent desire to retain British gnodwi1ltoward Portugal, which despe-
rately needed continlled British economic help. Criticism would howe beel1 even
lllClre strident i(the 2-million-pound paymenl had been made publiC.
In the end, DOlli Pedro's loyalty to Portugal proved his undoing in Brazil. His
new constitution h<1d not ended the struggle over the division or governmental
powers. In 1826 the emperor became the target of new attacks, (rom the "moderates"
w<1nling more power (or the legislature and revisions in the treaties with Britain. 10
the del1l<1nding autonolllY (or the provinces. The emperor's critics
domin<1ted the exp;:Jnding press with their drumfire o(invectivc.
In Ihis same period Dom Pedro suffered a seriolls reverse in (oreign poli<.....Y.
Whal is modern-day Uruguay had heen <1nnexed to Portuguese Americ<1 in 1821 as
the Province. But in 1825 local guerrillas seized power <1nd procbirncd
union with the United Provinces of the Rio de 101 PI<11<1 Argentina).
The resulting wnr between Brazil and the United Provinces ended in 1828 with a
treaty tll<1t crealed <1n independent state. Uruguay. The British. again
aries ill <1rranging the treaty, hopcd (or <1 buffer state between Argentill<1 and Brazil.
This setback to Brazilian ambitions in the Rio de la Plaia soon faded in significance
when compared to the qU<1gmire of Ihe Portuguese roY<11 succession.
When Dom loao VI died. in I R26, Dom Pedro, his legal succcssor, had
becomc increasingly <1bsorbed in trying to protect his daughter'S succession
rights in Portugal. Th<1t made him less able to deal with the <1ggressively ant
<1hsolutist political forces in Bmzil. He (ound his position incrc<1singly untenable.
a.<; his opponents mobilized slreel crowds to protest his preference for an absolutist
ministry. On April 7, 18)1. Dom Pedro' ahdicated. dep<1rting the l<1nd whose
independence he h<1d helped 10 secure less than <1 decade earlier.
11" Hr.l/.1 Tllo'/\w.lkn\lllgl;I.'lll \11
J)OIl1 Pedro's <1hdiC:ltion was <1 victory lor lhe allti I'nrtllgltt'!-(' Inl"'C" .IIHI .1
ddcOlt for the hcle<1guered It <lIS(l (rented a pow('r VaLlllll1\ h('\.HI!-( Ille
emperor's son, later to hct.:ollle 1)0111 Pednl II. wa!': nlll)" n\'C }'l'ars flld. Iii .. 1.lllll"
Iwd left him behind in order to maintain the HI'<1g:'tnn f<1lllily's claim III lilt'
Brazili<1n throne. Who would exercise power in his n<11't1e? Would Ihe hllge .lllti
thinly settled lands of this former colony hold together? ()r wOIllII l'nl"1l1g1l('!-('
America follow the example of Sp<1nish America, which imnH.'(liatc-l)' rho"" rnl i nl, I
the p<1tchwork of nalions we !':ce tocl<1}'?
nine }'C<1fS after 1)0111 l'edro J's ahdi(.alion, <1 l('gel1C)" cxcHi... ed C'X\'\ 1Ili\"t'
power. In lR34 fhe constilutinl1 \\'<1S amend('d 10 give' illtITasC'(1 po\\'('f." I,) IIII'
provinces, p<1l"tly in response 10 s('pOlr<1lisl s('nlil11clll.". lhe Inn.. t \l.,lenl "q,.Ir.lll,l
movement was in the province (If in lhe !\llla7on vallC')'; Ihe JIl,,"1 d.lng.,!, 'II",
becausc of its 10catiol1 in 01 province horde'ring Argelll1n,l, W:l" lilt' (,114",.1,1" ..
rurapos in Rio Grande tlo Sill.
Dam Pedro II 11840- 1889)
Dom Pcclro II's <1CCeSSiOIl 10 the thronc in I};'IO unillt'd the divided elill'. (1lll.likd
separatist challenges, and h.,lted lhe drill toward Sfl\ iOl I revllhJtinll. The j'1111'l'H'l
assumed the wide powers (the in Ihe \:-:2'll(">Il ...1illlli,IJI. '11,,'
young ('mpert)r and the politici<1ns now seltled intI) an ef;l .11 I el.lllvely h. rrn' 1111. 'II"
p<1r1iamentar}' politics.
The two dcc<1des after rnidccntl1l"}' wcre the goldell }'t'MS pI Ihl' ('lllpJII'. The
emperor <1nd his ministry exerch:ed excclllivc power, although Ihi ... ;lull't.I1II\ \\".''''
ckpendent upon rClaining the (ollfitlelKe of the lower hon!-c. Y('I the .. I.ltllJf'"
Illtim<1te power was mnre <1pparent Ihan real, hecause Ihe clllperor l/lliid dl".... I\1'
the Ch<1mber at will. thereby necessitating new ciccI ions. \Juril lhe 1,1Ie I:-:h()."
howcver, Dom Pedro II exercised his pll\\"er discn:ctl)', ,md Ill,' "y"lelll sCI'Jlwd til
function well.
B}' 1850 two distinctive political parties had el1lcrged bnlh Ilwillg Ihcl!
origin to the Brazili<111 faclion of the 'rhe palliC''' wen' <:Iln<;crv.lli\'l .11111
I.ibcral. althclIlgh historians h<1ve Inng (aUlll111l'11 .lg.lill!-t 1.1kJJlg IllC."f' I.llwl ... 1,,,,
seriollsly. In IRS3 the two parlies <.nllahoratcd til lorlll .1 "\/lJl\!li.lllllll \.ll'IJl,'I"
which held power, except (or th(' IR5R il2 intcrval, until IHM{.
The empire's 1110st imporl;llll test in foreign policy CHile iOll1<.' I{io de 1.1 1'1.11 .
basin, the sile of a longtimc rivalry <1llloug 1':H<1gu:ly, Uruguay. I\rgenlill,l. ,wd
Br<1zil. The I3ral.ilian government became al<1rmed over Ihe ,Ind 'lltCJlli,tJl"
o( Juan lv1<lIlUcJ de Rosas, the autocralic ruler of Argentina, who daillling IIH'
right to control all traffic on Ihe Rio de b PlaIa. Tid." \\':1!-.1 gr.lvc 1111"<.':11 III Ih;lIlL
since the economics of its southern provinces relied heavily nJl.l("es<; 10 the 1'1.11.1
river basin system.
At the S<1me time Ornzil was being drawn into:l p"lilil:ll h,lllle ill
Uruguay, where Brazili:lns Iwd g<1incd a flnO'tnci<11 :md (l1lll1llcl't.ial
Brazilian troops were sent inlo domeslic hallies nn th(' side HI Ilw
"Colorado
ft
faclion, which prev<1iled. The Hrazili;m!- Ihen tUI Jled hi /.11 ('
From Adele Toussaint-Samson, A Parisian ill Brazil (Uoston: James H. Earle. 1891).
translated by Emma Toussaint. Edited and introduced by June E. Hahner
(Wilmington. Del.: Scholarly ResoUices 2001), pp. 57-58.
TIlt: ulIly 1>Ollltion, according to Ih......... planlers. was in.... rl.:as....d illlllligratioJl .
III 1886 the province of Sao Paulo laullched a major dforl to ;lltract Eumpt'illl
illlmigrants 10 Brazil, but the !Jal.llis(lI.s fuund thelllsc!ws to altraCI the
amount uf chc-ap labor thl')' needed. Why? Partly b.....cause of th.... pcrsislt'lKe of
slavery. This led some of tht:: elite to becolile abolilionisl nl1 tJle pragmatit.: ground1>
thaI immigrants could never be recruited unless Braz.il's retrograde itllage in Europ....
was transfurmed. Abulition would be th.... most ubviuus step.
The manner in which Brazil carricd out abolition was llnilllll' ill lhe.:
Brazili:lll slawry was a nationwide institution, thus prevenling the kind of St'cliollal
conllict tlwt occurred ill the United States. Bra"l.ilian slaws had wurkld
in virtually every job category. induding many OIlCS. No less important. 3
large number of free persons of color h;ld already established themselVt.'s economic-
"lIy. providing examples to the newly freed. llrazil had :;Ilso the eXlreme
racist view that dismissed aU persons of color as irrl'mtdiabl). inferior. The large
mixl.'d-blood population,;) fcw of whose members had reached prolninellt natiunal
positions by 1889 (such as the novelist Maclmdo de Assis and tht engineer-aboli-
tionist Andre Rcboutras), showed lhat some mobility WilS pussible.
Abolition in Brazil was a scventeen-year process marked by three The
flrst C<lme in 1871, which provided fre....dom for all children thelH.'cforth horn of
slave mothers. But the masters were given the option of rdaining labor rights OVl.:r
these children until the age uf twcntyolle.
It was not until tJle 1880s that the abolitionist mowment was again able 10 lorce
slavery to the cenler of the political arena. The aboUtionisls were led by urban
Much histolical writing on Brazil has ernphasiLed Ihe allegedly benevolent nalure
of its race relations. BUI it is worth remembering the nature of the institulioll that
brought Africans to Brazil. In the late nineteenlh century. the French wife of a
Brazilian described her visit to a Brazilian plantation:
1
JU
I I ... Bwzil: Tltt: Alvak<-'lllllg Ci.lfll
The Realities of Slavery
Here it was that the miseries 01 slavery appeared to me in all their hunor <lud
hideousness. Neglesses covered in rags. olhels half naked. having ciS coveting
only a handkerchief fastened behind Iheir back and over their bosoms. which
scarcely veiled Iheir throats, and a calico IhlOUgh whose relllS could be
seen their fJoor. scraggy bodies; some negroes, with tawny and besotted look...
came and kneeled down on the marble slabs of the veranda. The majority
carried un their -,houlders the marks of scars which the lash had inflicted; sevClal
were affected with honible tlldlcldies, such as elephamiasis, or leprosy. All thi'>
was dirty. repulSive. hideom. Fear or hale. thdl i'> what could be re"d on ailihese
faces. which I never have seen smile.
r
The End of the Empire
Thl' II n:tl Iwo dl'cades \)1' the empift' \Vt're dominated by debate over the legitimat.:)'
01 Iwo illstitutions: slaver)' and the munarchy. Both came under scrutiny during
tlit' l'aLIgU<lyan War.
Although the slavt:.' trade efl..... t"liVl.'ly ended in 1850, slavery was by no means
d...ad t W llt y yt'ars lakf. Tilt: rapidly growing coffee plantations in the southeastern
regiun d lll<lndl'd labur. alld lht' planters turnt'd to an obvious source: slaves from
thl' t("tltlorllkally dt'eldenl Northeast. Even if every slave in the Northeast had
lIlllv........l slluth Ihey could nol have furnished the needed in coffee
of lilt.' Jail: I
\vn .......rh:our.lg...d by tltl:: Fn.:ndl alld 13rilish, who chafed over the lough terms
Il.ld for t:.'conuillic aCCeSS to Argentilw. The ;'lIlti-Argentine coali-
tilJll prlvailnl. Fureigntroops. ,lssiSled by Argentine rebels (the Inlier representing
Iht' t.hllnin<lnt liberals). ddi:<lted the Rosas forct:s ill 1852, sending
I{ll:.as tll;1 pt.lln;Ulent l'xilt:: in England.
But l'Vt'll with BJ'ilzilian support the Colorados lost t.:ontrul ill Uruguay. Since
tl1\' victoriolls Bbncos could no long!,;'r look to I{osas for help, they turned to
Fldll ... b ... o SilIanu LOlJt'z, th.... dictator of Paraguay. Argentina, now <":olltrolled by
tilt' libl'l",ds, joined Brazil in support of the Colorados ill UrllgU<1y. Solano l.opez
w.llIll'd III .... xpand his rule by allying wilh the Uruguay;'ln Blancos to conquer the
Bra'ljlian pn>virH."t' of Hio Grande do SuI. I II;' invaded bOlh Argt'nlina and Brazil in
tht'ln and th.... Culoradu government of Uruguay into a military
,dliallll.
war la1>kd livt' Yl'ars. The Paraguayan army proved to be weU
dis...-iplilltJ. allll l'xtraurt.linarily brave. The IJrazilians bore
hnllil oj lh... fighting 011 th... sid\:'. At I1rsllhey suITen::J reverses,
hut tllt'lI triumphed ,Irkr gl't'atly l'xpanding their
Paraguayan War had importallt consequences: (I) to the Rio de Ia
PI,.t" riwr ll\'lwork was guaranteed; (2) the two major powers, Argentina and
Ihom!. Lt.lIu:llkd ..:Ios('" rdatiulls; (3) Brazil consolidated its position in Uruguay;
,lilt! (1) 1',It,'gllay l...ft with haJt"(it is thought) urits population dead and the
... UUlll)' III
Tltt' war abu Iwd a profuund effect on politics within Brazil. It forced Brazil to
ln!arg... ib ;'Hlll)', \vhllst:.' ulTit:ers suoIlLJt.t.:allle important actors in politi<:s.
It .lbu pruvoked the ...lllpt'I'Or intu ullpn:Cl.'denICd steps in his ;'IlJlhority.
I'l'll I u II dt'lllandl'd 1';lraguay's unconditiu/lal surrender. while the l.ibemls, who
ltdd a Illajurity ill the Challlbt'r, b), to Ilegoli;,lte. lie dismissed the
<-'ahinl'! and caJl ...d for Ilt'W dl:'ctiollS. Some radical Liberals reacted ;'Ingrily
h)' lurllling a splitllt'r group that ill IH70 hecame the Republican P:;Irty. And the
W,ll lllft'w a n.... w lighl Oil Th... slavt's rl'cruitl'd fur the Brazilian army
wt'll ill b;lllie ;'lnd \vere given tht'ir fn:t'donl in Their
must hav(' givell pause 10 the while oiflccrs who \Vere later
Grll ...d on 10 hunt down fugitive slaves.
3ltl I'ARTTWO" T1/'.lE
especinlly Prominent among them was Nabuco. a
deputy soci:\1 origins. Lcd by such orators as Nabuco, the
hccamc the cmpirc's first political movemcnt. They rniscd
significanl SUIllS to finnnce Iheir propagnnda and 10 buy Ihe freedom of local slaves.
This lllohili7..... 1tion had its impnct on the parli:ll11ent. which in 18RS passed lhe
sccC'lnd abolitionist law. This one granted freedC'l1ll to :lll shIves sixty or older,
without compensation. Cynics pointed out that if slaves sun'ived to such an
age. their masters would he delighled to he freed from for them. The new
law did lillIe to defuse the agitation of the abolitionists. some of whol11 began
inciting slaves to nee from or rebel against the masters. By 1887 slavery was visihly
disintegrating. The army, charged with ;\nd returning fugitive
found Iheir job more and more repugn01l11. In 1887 O1rm}' officers formally refused
to c;\n)' out this mission any longer.
By 1888 slave owners had had nmrle timc to prepnre for the transition to free
I:\I-oor. The Ilnal step wns the -golden Inw." in May ofthnt rear. which freed all
renlaining slaves without compensation. 'I'he Inw wns approved hy an oven"hc11ning
vole in hoth houses. The political elite had managed to preservc a consemus while
dealing wilh a \'olatile socioeconomic issue. This success Olt incremental reform
helped to perpeluate the Bm7i1ian e1ite's self-image ns concilialo,)'. Remnrbbl}'
enough. II\i" image has comc to he Sll<lrecl b}' mnn}' of the nOllelites.
The other mnjor drnma of the late empire was the rise of republicanism. II hOld
cflIpted earlier in the cenhlr}', usually linked to regional del1lnnds for autonomy.
The Republican Part}'. founded in 1871, hnd a .strong cast. espe-
dnll}' in SilO Paulo. The birth of Ihis party could he traced to Libernl deputies'
reaction to Dom Pedro II's imposing. in 1868.:l Conservative ministry inlhe face
of Libcml majority in the Chamber. In IR70 a group of ex-Liberals
founded the Repuhlic:lIl Part}'.
Al Ilrsl Ihe Republicans nppeared harmless, Up to 18R9 the}' had a \Icry
ulleven follOWing. It was strongesl in S;in Pnulo. Rio Grande do Sui, and Minns
(;emis and weakest in the Nol'lheasl. The Republicans a republic headed by
n directl)' elected president. governed b}' a bicamerallegislatUfe. organized on
federalist principles. In effect the wanted to trade Brnzil's English.
style cOllslitutional Illollnrchy for a U.S.-style federal republic.
During the 1880s republicanism I1lnde greal inroads among the younger gellern
tion-the university-cduc:lted sons of planters. merchants, and professional men. Onen
Ihey combined republicanism with abolitionism. Both scntiments were reinforced by
the teachings of the Brazilian Positivisls. who believed in rnlionality. science. and logic.
A group of Positivists pcnelr:tted faculties of higher education, especially in
miJita." colleges. and innuenced intellcrtuals. 'l1,e 1880s thus 53W a convergence of
movements that were eroding support for lhe monarchy and for slave.".
However. it was not higlHllinded dehnte that sealed the empire's fate. It was
the In the late I880s. recurring friction mounted between army officers and
civil inn polil icialls-often over thc oHkers' rights to express publicly their political
views. Because of the Wnr. Brnzil had created a much larger military
,
,
II Hr,I,,1 'I Ill' AW,lkclllllgf'I,1111 \1'.
than W:lS w;lllted by tile politicians. who provided lIle.lgl'l" 1>11 IU'U"'!'
nization of the aml}'. By the IRHOs there was a di.;propol'tiollat('ly IlIgh 1.1110 "I
officers 10 troops. That led tn fruslraliol1 over delayell pftlll10lillllS ,llllllllg J.ll.il"
and middle-Ievcl officers. who hecame especially re(('pli\'(' til Ih(" aI1O,lill"11I\1 .,,1,1
sentiments that werc.so innuenti.11 among Ilwil" I Ivili,ln 1')1101('1"1,.1'1\
The final agon}' of the empire came in IHR<J. ThCc' C'1ll1ll'IOr h.1I1 111"".1('\1 "II
trying to rule with a Conservative minislry. drspil(' il" minflrit}, pmiti"ll 111 'he
Chamber. In June the emperor in\'it('d th(' Viscount III Ollrll 1',('ln I.. hlllll .1
cahinet. IIe sllcceecled and fonmd:tted an .1I11hitioll" rdOrrllll,t 1'")gr.lIll. gill II \\'., ...
too late. A mililar}' plot dcveloped in NllVC11lher I.('d hl' I.lIl,h.ll1 I kodn,,, 01.1
r:onSe(Ol. Ihe conspirator,.; demandedt hat tile lllon:1 rch .lhllicat('. [)t'llI I'c. I,. I II .111. I
his famil}' calmly Icft for exile ill Porlugal. The repuhlJl \\'.IS prOt 1.'11Jl('c! the IInl
cla}'. November 16. I R89.
The empire hacl fallen wilh little upheaval. Although th(' 1'1.1111('" h.HI I"IW
feared lhat aholition would doom O1gri..:ullllr.11 CXI'I'II.;. ,onll 1.1'IIC I" Iht'll
senses, The)' now reali7ed they could I're,erve llle'lr I'IOllllml. (.1Ilt! the,d,,,,
dOlllinnllcc in a wnrld withoul ItlfllWrdl\ fir ,,1.1\'e\ 1'1111("1" th(' .lh.. IIII"1I
of sl<lveq' nor Ihe overlhrow I)f Ihc empirc In 1I!CIll"c!\'l''' 1,11.11 , 11.1111:"
in Rr:l7.il.
OVERVIEW: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGF
In th(' mid nineteenth <.eTllllq'. 1ill' 1\1':1/111.111 1>('1:.111 .1 IlInd,lIlhIIl."
trnllsilion. nol tied to any legal or (On,.;tliutillll.ll ... han}:e\. Ih,ll lnnlltltlnl \\1'11
inlo the twentielh century. It has nho had a profound illlp:lt Ion Itr,l/lh,111 \." w!\
nnd Oil rcla1inns between social classes.
Like Illost of I.al in America, Hr:l/il h:ll, l'XP()! It'd ,1 lew pi I tl1.l! VI'l'" Illl I\ I" lIlt
Norl h /\ Ilanl ic economics. Btli ill l ('111 rast. Brol/ill,.I1- 1'''1-,('<1 II I fl High .1 \c, l'It" he. d
dependence on the expnrlnlion nf t1iff('l"(,1l1 prnt!lIlt":1I oIdfcIl't,1 1'01111<; 111 111111'
The pattern IJfllflOrn ;Jnl! hll"t h.. \ IIl,ule It ,lilt1( 11111(, ,1(111{'\T \ll ... I.liIW,1
growlh. Since the various products h.l\'(' come trolll ddlerclll {\', k'.
have cre:lled pockets of prospt'rily and dedine.
After independence. sug;n continuer! to he thc mll,l IU("I",HIV(' 0'1'011. ,\\
during the eighteenth ccntu.". Produced mainl}' 011 large pl:llll.1110I1\ ill
where Iahor came from slaves. "ugar ,,("( .. uTllet! lor Ul pel"( ('111 0'
Brazilian exports in IR21-30. II then hegan ;l long d('llille..mel hv I<lUII 11
contributed only 5 percent of the over:111 export amfluili.
Rubber produclion slarted in Ihe e.lIly nillf..'tccllth "elllul y. I'nllllf\,dl)' 111 Iht'
Amawn, and ste;\dily By IR5] the port (If Belem W.I\ cxpnrllllg mOIl'
than 2500 tons of natural rubber. Demand ill Ihe industrial worltl gle\\'
enormously in the of the discovery of Ihe vuk.lIli';ltioll prOt.c"" whil h
prevented rubber from getling 100 sticky in hoi \\'e:llher anti hl"ltlle III the 101.1
A spectacular boom arrived ill 1900-191."\. when Illhher .1lllclIllllell Ii' .lht'lll
one-quarler of all the counlr>"s cxports. TI1('n the Hrili<;h l.II'II.III/t'tl "11 the Illon'
>10 I''\!( J I \\'tI .. ( ,\ .... E:-. rtllJlJ ..... CIIANl;l: (JVER TIME
In tllto' late nineteenth century, sacks of coffee left Sao Paulo's plantations on mule trains
dnd eVto'lltllillly reached overseas destinations. (Courtesy of the library of Congress.)
vlll1.h111 IllIlIIVI illihe Itldles, ;lnd tile wurld price collapsl'd. TIH:
I ht!lIll1 ....11111.: III a and pcnnanenl cnd.
II W,IS ...111kl lhal providnllhl' durable stimulus cconulllic change ill
t11\' pI Idt'pl'ldeth.l lra. production began to develop ill the Caribbe.m in
the ...,Irl\ Jlllldt.:l'lllh l..eJltllry alld then luok hold ill Brazil, where it enjoyed
lxulkonl natural lUlldllilltl!'>. Thl' vulullIl' of Brazilian l'Xpurb Ill'ld bidy
1IIIIil til ... 111 ...11 l:lll ...r... ,I p...J'iud of spectacular growtll. III 1901 Brazil
...xJlllrkd Ill:.lrly J 5 tllilliuJI S.IL"kS 01 collee (at sixty kilograms each) and produced
Il ...,llly ulllu;, lutal wurld supply. E;ldy ill the ..:(.'ntllry, coffee )'idded
.dllllli \111\' hall' ur the l'ullntr)"s fureigll exdwlIge.
thm bn';IJIlt:;I ceutr.d rl'<.ltun: ufBr<.lzilianlilC. Whl'n coffel' prices wt'rc
high, Ihc I'ruspl'cb for Brazil WCft' positivl'; if they were down, 50 was the national
I..llllluuk. i\lJd Illc uf cuffee has long beel1 an essential aspect
"I' ...-i.d lilt-. ctllldu..:t IlllTlings and discussions over cup after cup of
.,t...-:lllJillg ..:olhe, usuall)' lakcn wilh largt: llU<llltitks of sugar.
Cull..... c pruductiun tlourbhed ill southern-cenlnl! Brazil. particularly in the
:>Iall' ul S;IO Paulo. It [('quires good bnd, <.l fair investment, and much labor. Coffee
}'kld fuJI pruduction after six years, and they need steady care. Berries
JI ...u! lo be galhered, washed, and shellcd. The bl'uns the berries lIlust be
drinl, sifted. :>llrled, sacked, and stured. This requires labor.
I.ikc Argclllilla, Br:Lzillul"I1t.:l1 its e),es to Europe. Firstlht' stale ofS::'to Paulo and
tht:ll tilt' Ilational govl'rJllllt'nt allracted millions uf Eurupl;'(ln immigrants. especially
ill tl\(' quart...-r of lhl' llinetecJllh ccntury. The largest portion, perhaps a third,
II .. Br.l/il;Tlll'l\wdk... 117
came from Ital}', c1usdy followed by immigranls frulll Blltlhe rdaliw siz...
of lilt:.' immigrant population never rl'ached Ihe lcvd ul Argelltina. Frum 1877 to
1903, over 1.9 milliun people entered Brazil, an annual average 01'71 ,UOU. From 1904
to 1930 another 2.1 million immigrants arrivl'c1, <.lVl:raging 79,00U pl.:oplt' )'lar.
Although ample labor wus avaiJable in the Brazilian Cl'ntl'f and Northeast,
where the Humber of jobs hud ralll'll disastrously behind thc illcreasl' in workers,
the prophets or immigration opted for Europeans, wllo would
bl.:t!cr workers anu llIore rdiable future citizens. alsu Ill'ld thai
former slaves would be less productive laborers. So thl' Brazilian governml'lIt p:lid
the ocean passage of milliuns of while of in Minas
Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and thl' Northeast could 1I0t afford tn movl' Grl'<lt
COlltributions were m,ldt' by tilt' transplantr.:d Europeans and Japanesl', hUll'ach of
those jobs might have been held by a Brazilian who \Yould have bl'l'll rescued from
Ihe ewnomicllly moribund regions.
Technology was harc!l'r 10 obtain. Till' Brazilians, like otlter pupubtiuns
outside the dynamic North Atlantic industrial cOlllplex, found
having 10 accept direct investillent by foreign firms in order to get tt..:("hnology.
The s),stem, for example. arrived with British and American tlrllls. which
installed rllld operall'd own equipllll'lll. The sallie held Irue for
ekctric utilitk::., and shipping-most of IIll' infrastructure lllt:ded to tIll'
growing agro-txport econolllY. Thest: were highl), visihle illvesllll\'llb lall'r
h('Glllle convcnient targets for IHllionalist all:Kks.
Capital was also sought abruad. II elllle in the lurmufloans to I{razil till till' stall'
and nalionallcvt'ls. in 1907, for example, the 01 1'aulo. C...rab, and Riu
de Janeiro signcd a I..-offee llIarkeling agrl'emClll to be Jinanced by furl'ign The
state gowrnments planned to repay the loans witlllhe rl'ceipts lrolllI;'X!)Orl t<lxes un
con.....e. Such cOllllllitmellts obligated ilrazil not onl), 10 repa}' tlle loaus bUI also 10
I1nancl' the remission of prol1ts (and evl'lltu;.\ll)' (:apital) on direct itwl's(IlI\"nts by
forl.:igners. The ([ucial question was the terms on which all trans:lCtiollS took
plaLc. Availablr.: data suggt:stthat the profit rate 011 raih":I)'s, to take an
obvious example, did not exceed rales fur cOJllparabll' in Britain.
Throughout the years bl'!ween 1889 and 193U the centl'r of the 13razili<l1l
econom), moved south and southwest. The priJll<.lry push C:\tl1l' rrOlIl the "llliHch"
or corfet', as planters fOllnd it cheaper 10 break new ground thall lu recyde thl'
plantation soils whose yields were dropping. The result was a path uf abandolled
plantatiuns, stretching from Rio de Janeiru and Minas Gt'rais down into 5:1u Paulo
and its vast interior.
The reliance on coffee entailed Iarge-scule risks. One was ovcrprudul'tion. It
was dimwit to anticipate demand six yC<.lf5 in advance. and therefore to pl<.lll whclI
trees should be planted. In 1906. for example. ilrazil produced 2U million sacks uf
coffct' for a world market that could absorb onl), 12 or 13 million. A political
question promptly arose: What should be done with IIll' surplus?
A related uncertainly caml:: frollllhe rise offureign competition. Brazil's sharl'
of the world market declined from 75 percclll ill 19001067 percl::nt ill 1930 to only
JIH "Altl TWO CAS!' STUDIJ:.S: CHANGEOVER TIM!"
Since Ihe late empire. however, a handful of intclledu:'lls ,lIld men (II bll"illc<':"
began disputing this logic. They argued th:'lt Br:'l7il should Slillllll:'lIC hOI1\('
industry. These critics had little infiuence on key polilY .!fC;tS, "mh :I" IMilf.. III
exchange rates. Yet they did succeed in creating a "n;llillllali .. I" uitiqlll' Ih;11 W,I" t"
prove important after 1930.
Official encouragellleni of industri:'lliz;llion GIlllC forth in IX90, whell ,I t.lfill
revision provided mild protection for loc"lmanuf:'lctllring (rPlll '1IIlljlc!i
tion (ami also lowered the duties on lapil:'ll goo&. required fOl 1'1"0<111(110111).
Engineering schools sprouted in Recif(.', Solo P"ul(), 1'1'1"111 Alcgrc. ,mil H,lIl1.1 Ih'
1907 the country had :lbOui 3000 industrial establishlllCIlI\, lllo"l III thcllJ "11I.111.
textiles and foodstuffs hcing the princip,,1 product!'. fly 11}20 Ihe Illunhc.'r 11111111I"
had grown to more than 13,000.
Brazil's industrial seclor underwenl I;lrge-scalc CXp,lIl'>Jllll III the linn" ,)lId
1940s, as the Great Depression and World W:'lr" rc<llIl.etlll1(' .l\':lil.lhlc "111'1'1) III
rnanuf:'lclured goods from nhroad (a" h:'lppelwd d"ewhcle inl.lllll/\nwrl' .1.1,,"1
As with corfee,thecelller of indUSI rial /trnwlh was in lht' <;t ,I Ie.' III \al> 1'.lIIln \\'I1'"r,
15 percellL of Ihe 11:1lion's population W.I!- prndlllil1g ,\hnlll ':;0 J't't'l'lll ,of th,'
country's manufactured goods h)' 19010.
The upsurge conlinued thereafter. and Hra7il lIHlvcd illin <'II( II h('.I\v 1111h."
tries as steel 3ml automohile production. Between I 'H7 ,II1d l'}(, I m:llltlf.ll 11111111:
outpUI increased al :1n :'lllllu:l1 r;lle of 9.(1 I'ercelll, c(lIllI',lr('(1 10 ,t.', 1'('1' ,'111 101
the agricultural sector. By I'-}(,O inc.lu"lrial l'f"(ltIUCIIOn ,ll1l1'\IIlI'tl "I 1111'1(, Ih.I.l
25 percent of the gross domeSlk prodlill. and hy 1I}i':; il W,l" "l' fl' 111',111\
30 percent. This diversificalion of the CCtlllOm)' hclpetl ,1e!,t'll
dence on the outside world and lelll Cfcdihilitr 10 dnllll" Ih:11 Ih(' w"uld
someday join Ihe ranks of superpowers.
These economic t fansform:'lt ions hrought /:11"-1 (',Ie. hing .. h:1l1ges, '>lIl h ,I',
urbaniz:ltion. In 1920 :1hOlil 2:' pcrcl'lll or the population lived ill 1Irh,lIl .11\','''.
and hy 2000 Illore than HO percent lived in cities, Bill there :lre IWIl lIl1l1"11,1I
features in Ihis trend. foirst, Ihe tendency IowaI'd urh:1l1i/:1lion ill Hr;lIil h. " 1''''/'11
lalcr and slower th:'lll in Ill:'lll)' othel" Amcricall lOllnlric". !'>c(ond.
docs not have a single prcdominanl cil)' (like Buello" ;\in:s or l\l"ntcvid('". lill
instance). Sao Paulo :lnd Rio ..Ie Janeiro have hOlh hClnlll(' will.
millions of inhabitants and the amenities and complicalion" of lIrh:'l1l hilt
between them they contain only :lhout 10 percent of the nalioll,ll plljlUl.llicll' I,j
192 million. Urbanization has t:'lken plac(' ill Orazil. htll Ihe ('ilie", nOl .. t with ,I
large and populous countryside.
Consc'luenl1y Brazil has develope<-I nil intricate :-odal :-y!-lCl1l. The upl't:r d,I","
elite includes landowners, frequently <livided rllllong th(,Il1.'>elves, 01:- when 1)(//lli.(/,1
coffee planters rose up in the nineteenth century to challenge the sligar haro,," 01
the Northeast. In the course of Ihe Iwentieth century, there appe<ll"cd ,I" well .111
industrial elite Ihat would struggle for sl:'llus alltl wl':llth, SOlllC!iIll{''' ""Ill): th.
power of the slate.
I.
to If;
.B
"
5
'12

'"
,
...
,
(,

,
2
2"
32 percent in 1970 and 18 percent in 1978. With tillle the country graduall)' lost its
ncar-monopoly on supply.
/\. third source of vulnerability came from wide Ouctuations in the world price.
This rcOeclc<1 not only Ihe effects of competition but <1150 changes in demand.
Iklwecn 1929 nnd 1931, after the Great Depression struck, the price of coffce
plumllleted from 225 cenls a pound 10 merely 8 cenls. Frequent oscilhllions led 10
wide variation in Brnil',s foreign-exchange earnings-and in governmenl
reVellues, which callle primarily from export duties.
To illustrate both Ihe growth and the uncertaillty of the Brazilian coffee sector,
Figure I 1.1 displays the volume of the coulltry's coffee exports during the period
from I R6Q to 1985. The rise in output 3nd commerce is clearly visihle. So arc the
Ollctualion'l:, which mainly renecl the instability of world demand.
i\ final hazard derived from the small number of purchasers. In Ihe late
nineteenlh and e.lfly twentieth cenluries, Brazil sold hetween lhreefifths and
three t1uarler" ('l ils 10 nnly three countries: the United States, Britain,
rlnd Germany. The United Slates was Ihe largest single huyer. The reliance on two
or Ihree cmh"lll1crs cre;lted llllpredicl:1h1c tics to outside economics, as Brazil
dis(overcc! :1ftcr the cf:lsh of 1929.
Pmmincnt pcllilici:lns and economists regarded Ihis vulnerability as an
incvit:lhle re"ult of Brazil's "ngrarian vocation." Brazil. they argued. had no
choile hul to btl), needed foreign finishe(1 goods wilh the funds earned b)'
export :lIlt! augmcnted hy direct foreign investments or lo;ms. Any significant
allempt to indu"trialize. Ihe}' reasolled, would produce inferior goods and
jeop:lrclize relation.. with foreign huyers and creditors. Furthermore, Brazil
could nol hope to copy lhc United 5t3tes "hecause we don't havc the superior
aptitudes of their race," ill Ihe words of a Brazilian cabinet ministcr of the 1890s.
Brazil mllst live with wh:1t God gave it: a comparative advantage in a few
agricultural expOI'll'.
IIIr'oO uno IMFlO II1!lO 1900 1<110 19'20 1!.l30 1940 1950 19(.0 1970 191\0 1990
Figure 11.1 Coffee Exports from Brazil. 1860-1985
\('uou f W('1I1f'r Oacr.lndlJHtmlt?OI/On and [conomlC ()eV'('loptn{'n/1I1 Branl (Homewood. 111 RI(h:'lId 0 Irwm.
1%"I.pp )66-67. )arnc", E- ( Ochoa...mel DaVId E Lorey. Swr,wcolllt'Slr()(1 DilorIO
AmCII(II. JR (I os AnqelC' tKLA LaTm Amellc;m (elller. 1'}Q()1. Tahlf' }476
WOlld tiJllk <lud [(0110111"_ (01 liHin
AllleU(d .1I1t! rhe (,:lIibbe<lll.
Tilt' pupuLII' wtr.... varit'd, 100. Th.... rt." has beeJl. and remains. a largt."+
:-. .. ale p.... :.alllly. Tlll'l'C' b a mr:lI pruletariat. ill the coffee fidds and elsewhere, a
lltat pt'r!OfJIIS wage 1,lb\Jr in Ill .... nJulltl'ysidl'. And ill Ihe interior tllere are
ilidiglC'"llOtl:'> gruul':' Ihat hove lillIe contaCI wilh national sodct)'.
All vrgalliznl working class of sllhSl,\Iltial size, at least 4 million by 1970 and
C-, Illilliurl b)' I Yt:U, t'l1lergt'd within Brazilian ..:ilies. lIs struggles with employers
,tllll it" lllaniplll"lioll by the stale pruvide one of the ccntralthemcs ill
1.1h' Iwclll kl h Brazilian Iif,,:. TIl .... rL r.... m:liJls a Io.rg.... st rotum ofchronically
Ulll'llll'lo)'nl ..-it)'
III lJ",t W,,'L'I I uppL'r .JIlll 1"lwer dasse:.. lIliddlt: Sl,;'ctors gradu<Jll)'
apl1l',llt:ll. '1'llL')' Illay IIUW ilKlude Illtlch as 30 percent of the people in
:'I)lll .. II,uugh thdr :.ltarc of Ihe national population is less than that
(p..:rh:q's IU 10 15 p.... rLt:nt). Tilt')' play importallt roles in COlllmerce <Ind thc
.lIld Ihq' It,lve had a particularly intimak relationship with one
1I1:tjor ill:.llIutIUlI: Ih.., llillital )' .
..... od.d :.talu:, ill Bra'l.il is nut just:1 fUllction Ufoccllpatioll or wl...dlh. It is also a
Illalkr of nlCL. Tilt' !Hassi VI..' ililpurtatiull of slave labor from Africa brought an
:tddititlllal dltllic dilll.... llSiuJI illto Brazilian societ)', and this in turn has affected
lU"ltlJ]I" and :lllitudl's.
Thae kllds til lJl..' a :.tl"Ulig cund,ltioll belwct'll race and social standing in
BLlzil: illosl 011 tOIl are white, llIost bhkks are on the bottom, and some mixed-
I,!tlllll ... IVlln illbl..'1wtTIl SOllle institutions, such as Ilaval uflkers
;1I1d tilL' thpllHlIatic (orps, lung relllainLd white. But ill Brazil raCe is nul defined
purdy h)' physic:ll ft.>attll"t's. It is a social conct;;.'j)I, open to interpretation. To be
tine has to bt' tot:dl)' black (in (ontrasl to the Unitt'd States, where partly
hla(k ill dhnk urigill lIWallS bla(k), so that peoplc of mixed radal backgrounds ill
Ih.lzil have :'Ulllt: opportunity fur upward mobility.
Thi ... i... nnt to say lhal Brazil cunstitutes a racial p:lradisc. Prejudice and bios
hdYl' rUI thr: I,ISI (t'lliury the Braziliilll elite has placed ils faith in
lJrilll'IIIt'IIJIIt'lIfll ("bk';lchillg"). with tht' uI1LqlJivui.:ally racist intentioll of pur-
ging Hrazil o( bl,ICk hlood. 'l'hL' oVl'rall l'orrdatioll bdwt'ell status and rac,"
Brazil: Vital Statistics, 2007
Populaliorl (milliorl))
GOP (CUIlt:nl SU.s. billions)
GNP/capita ($U.s.)
Poverty 1<l11i' (% rn 2006)
Ufe expectancy (yedl))
191.6
1314.2
5910
33.3
72
(Ontillues tu cxist, dl'spite the denial 01 wdl-tu-do Statistical
by I3rniJiall d.... lltographers alld sociologists have shuwn Sigilifil';lllt dif!en.'lICLs
ill income by race (controlling for all other fuctors). The t:ondusiun is Ihat raCt is
a separale and signific'lllt variable in tli .... Urazilian soLiOe(OnOlllic s)'sIt'Il1. Bll!
mobility exists, marriage :lCross color lint'S is CUlllmon, and alliludes arL' llIul"I..'
up..:n than has ber.::n true in North Amr.::rican history. NOlll:.'thdt'ss, sulndellt
racial discrimination exists to havc provoked the flderal and stall" guvern-
lllents lu adopt alTi fIllal ive action programs in the eil rly )'l'ars oft he 1ll.:'W cr:ntury.
Racial diffcrentiation ill Brazil has posed Ollt' obstacle to tht' forlllatiun of
durable co:llilions social strata. Another obstade is IilL' of Bra/il.
Distance (and puor cOJl\lnunications) made it fur a long tillie illlplausible 10
inwgine all alliance between urball wurk.... rs uf Sao P:'lLJ!O, lor lxample. and Ihe
landless peasants in the Northeast. Such divisiuns enabled Brazil tu alleillpt
political solutiolls that would have becn illlllH:dialdy impussible in !llore dl'nsdy
pupuhlted and integrated countries sudI Cuba.
POLITICS AND POLICY: PATTERNS OF CHANGE
Although the lllilitar)' overthrew thl' L'JlIpirt', puliticians shaped the Ill'\\'
republic. A COllstitut:nt asst:lllbly WilS dt'clcd and produced a Ill'\\' constitution ill
1891. It waS:l virtual copy ofthl.: U.S. Constitution. Urazil beGIIlll' a kdt:ratiotl of
tWt'llty states, :llld thl: Brazilian president was 10 b elected din'l"ll}' and t:lllpmv-
lTCtlto inkrvcnc in tlte slates ill GISt' ufthn':llL'lwd s paratioll. foreign illvasinn. or
conflict with other stott's. Suffrage was n:slricted to literate adult mall? citizens.
This re.sulted in fewer than 3.5 percent of the popubtion voting in an)' presidl'l1lial
election bdore 1930 and onl), 5.7 perl'cnl in IY30.
The First Republic (1889-19301
Aftt'f dectillg Dcuduro dd Fonseca pn:siJelll alld allulhl'r officer, 1:lorl,ll1u ]J.... i.xotu,
viet' president, tlte assl'lllhly r:.lpidly collided with DeodurtJ over It is polie)'
and his interventions in the !It:W govcrllments. III NtWt'mbl'r I t:lJ I, plagued hy
ill health, Dcoduro resigned. passing power tu Horiano Pei.xoto,th(:, so-called Iron
Marshal. Horiano soon encountered a rash of revolts. In Rio Gr:lnde do Sui. the
re.... ult was part of the <.Ie'ldly conflict between local factions; in Rio de Janeiro. it
waS:l naval revolt led by monarchist officers. Both rebl'llions were crushed, as the
new republic used censorship, martial law, and executions. When Prudcllle de
Morais of Sao Paulo was elected in 1894 as the first civilian pr.... sident, the nt'W
rt:girne had gained stability. But it llleant recognizing the legitimacy of the
entrenched oligarchical regime in each stalt'.
Who were those oligarchs? In every Slate a tightly organized politicallll:lchillt::
emerged. In stales such as Sao PauJo and Mina:. Gerais, wht're the Republican
Party had been strong before 1889. the "historic Ht'publicans" cUlllfOllt:d the stale
governments. In nahia and the Northeast, which had few Republicans bcfon: I
powa went 10 those politicans whu Illost quickly established ..::redelltials us
322 PART TWO 0 CASE STUDIES; CHANGE OVElt TIME
ncwhorn RcpuoliC:llls. The resulting powcr structure was n of the gover-
nors" nt the nationallcvel and thc Qrul e of the colonels" (coronclislllo) nt the locnl
level. The colonels were rurnl oosses who could produce hloc votes in <lny electioll,
In rcturn, they ohtained control over state <lnd national funds in their area or
innllence. At the stalc Ievelt he polit icnlleaders llsccltheir denls with the colonels to
hnl"gnin on the nalionnllevel.
The chief prize was the presidency. As might be expected, the stales enjoyed
very Wl('CJlI;l1 innut'nce in this process. S;'lo P;lulo nnd Minns Cernis were the most
illlp(lftnllt. with Rio C;rnnde do Sill nole to tip the halnnce when the two Inrgel'
st:ltes wcre :It odds. Ibhin, Rio de Jnneil'O. :ltld Pernambuco were second-level
states, often serving as power hases for dissident presidential nominees.
The constitution:ll dccentr:llization :lllowed sever<ll states to gain virtual
alllonomy over their own developmellt. Belween 1890 <mel 1920, the slate ofS:i.o
P;lldn more than tripled ils popul:ltion. It had contracted:l foreign debtlnrger than
the llnlionnl governmellt and wns accounting (or 30 to 110 perccnt of 13r:lzil's
national output. Ahle to impose its OWI1 t:lxes on interstate comllierce, it h... d
:lchicved:l rCIll<lrknble self-sufficiency, ani)' a loose feder;ll structure could have
aJ1nwed Siio Paulo's extrnordillnr)' burst of economic development ("the locomo-
tive pulling the lwent)' ell1pl), hoxcars," SOlid fUll/lis/a chauvinists), l<lter to propel
Hrazil's rise to world prominellce in Ihe rnid-Iwentielh century.
Brazil's relatively smooth-running politic:l1 Ill:lclline rnn into trouhle soon
after World Wnr I. The polilical system created by the Repuhlicans in the IR90s
hnd lIot sllrvived long in its originnl (orlll. The first major crisis grew Ollt of
prep;lralions for the 19[0 elections. The "official" choice for president was
Governor Jo:i.n Pinheiro o( Min:ls Gerais, who died unexpectedl)' in 190R. The
nisis deepened when the incumbent president. Afollso Pena, died in 1909,
eighteen lllonths hefore the end of his lenll. " hitter struggle ensllcd, with
N!:lrshal Ilennes da Fonseca, son of the rcpubl ic's first chief execul ive, bccomi nf{
Ihe "offici ... I" candidate, He WOll, out for the first tillle there WaS a significant
opposilion movement. It supported Rui B:lrhnsa, the Hhernl crusader from
Bahia.
During Hermes da Fonseca's presidency (1910-1'1), many of the smaller stales
experienced bitter h:1ttles within the politicnl elite-usunlly between the incumbenl
machine and dissenters. These bat lies made it impossible to return to the smool hly
fUllctioning Qpolitics of Ihe governors." not leasl o( all because President Hermes
usually sent (ederal troops to the dissidents' aid, Formally, at least, the system
continued functioning until October [930. The Yorricial" presidential nominees
were invari:lbly elected, and the federnl Congress remained under the control of
the stale machines,
Yet the political culture of Ihe Old Republic had become a target for criticism
from eve,l' qU;Irter. Prominent among the critics waS:l new generation of the elite.
born wit h the republic. Most were educated as lawyers, They denounced :lS cormpt
the wny the politicians were running the repuhlic. Most Iraced this 10 Ihe republic's
founders, whom Ihey :lcCllscd of having imposed on Rrnzil a libernlism (or which
it w,lS utlerly ullprepnred. Necessnry I.:h:lllges could he IOlllld only ,dler a .,11.-1,11
annlysis of where Brazil stood-econolllicnlly, socially, politically, :llll! intdk.
tually, In a word, Brazilian problems necd Bra7.iliall diagnose... ;11111 Bl;l'liliarl
solutions, They descrihed themselves as "Br:1zili:IIlS whll Ihink like
American, Latin, and tropica1.
ft
!.e;Iders of this grnllp ilH"1tld('d ()livdr.1 Vi,HIIl,1.
sociologist and lawyer; Aleen Amoroso Lim:l, literal-)' :lIld essayi<;l: .111d
Gilberto Amado. essayist :lnt! politician. Their lllC'lllnr W,l' AlIWltn '11"11"', ,I
restless Republicall of the tllder geller:lli'ln.
Criticism from intellectuals W<lS p;lralklctl hy ,1 1111111111111' 11Hl0.1
rOllllger army orriccrs. Thcre W<lS:l serics of han;llks I<""nll<; in 1'1,1]: ,lIld I'J) I.
led by lieutenants (tl'lIel/tc.(). The 192'1 rc,'olts, whidl heg,lll in l',wln ,Ind 1'/"1"
Alegre, were the most serious. But the rehel'lrritl.'r.S ned <lnd 11dd 0111 f"1 t\\"l.llltl,1
h;dfycars as guerrillas 011 a 25,000 kilometer lllOlICh Ihrnugh thc interior of
It was dubbed the QPrcstcs nflcr I,Iii..; <;arlo, 1'le<;I('<;,;1 rehel lielllCll.llll
\\,ho was l:ller to IC:ld Hf<li',irs t.ollllTlunist I':lrl}' lor ill/liT tll:111 lhillr rcn1'
The rehels' formal Illnllift'slos were vagllc, cllljlha ... i7ing lhe need IHI LUI
c1edinns. nlong with nllenlion In the 1l<lli'ln.<.: ..;"cial IWI."!..;. 1\ 1\l(1\T illIIIW,r'.111'
corn pia int focused on professional COlllcrll:- a Il:l<-h I (Illist il. 1r,1 illing, ,,1 I... ' Ill'l ('
weapons, and plIOI' prospect.<:; for prolllotioli. 'I'his fnl<;lralil,n \\'a.... rl.'l11llll"\('Ill "I
the late empire, when :lfllly offkers had bOlh prnlc.. siollal and llllcllc,lll,llll',I',lln...
for supporting a coup the crO\\'Il.
Another powerful politicnl currenl 01 the 1'J2lb wa .. tht' I kl\1tll 1,111\ 1',Hlr
founded in Siio Pnuln ill 1926. lIs le;u!crs, I),piflnl hy ,'"flce h,llf'n Antoni .. 1'1,1.10.
agreed that the Old Repuhlic was a (raud, M:lflY nflhc p:1rl\"'<; v<lle<; 1.,11111.' rr'lillth,'
urhan professionals, disgusted 011 seeing their \'olc.<; '-:lnll,led Illit 11y nll,ll \'"lel"
mobilized hy the feder:ll government's machine, TIH')' walllC'.l wh,\1 the \'Ill I ll'e.lll
middle classes had won in the ninctcenlh cenlury: !,oliti"iI pow", Ihlllligh ,111
e1eclornl s)'steJl1. It W;lS no accident Ihat this Cllrrcnl nl Qlihel,rl, 11Il,llllllinll,11L"1II"
Tll:lde ils strongest showing in S:i.o Palllo, Ihe \'('Ilter "f tl,,' j,l<;l".. t 1', 'lilt lillie glll\\"lh
nnd url.l<lniz:llion, It W:lS the voice of Bra'l.1I spC';lkillg "III :lg,lill'l Ilw
disproportionate innuence of lheir cOlllllry's
Economic development in the laIc nineteenth century had, n',lled,l WIlllell!!'.
c1nss in three or four mnjor cities, Workers' first 0rgallizalion (.:Iflle III "lllllt\l;1I :lid
societies." They were superscded in the early 1911()<; hy :l1l:llchi<:1 ,llltl ,In,llthe,
syndicalist organizers who were (u more mililanI. In the dC\,hlc :i1tcr 1')10, till'
an3rchist and an:lrcho-syndicnlisl unions staged a v,lliet}' nf <:Irike inc luollng
several nttempted gener:ll strikes, -I'hey Illet heavy '1'11(, 1';\11, .. 11 "I
Italian-born leaders were deported, while Ur;17.ilian lenders w.....l' j,likd, bl"dlt'lI, ,111.1
ha:rassed, By 19211he organized movcmenl was n
In subsequent years, social wel("re laws were passed, :l." ,1 !'lIdy \.,111,,1 I"
accompany the omnipresent stick, But I3r:lzilian workers Il,l.! fcwcr "l}:d
nizing rights and wel(nre provisions lhnll, for example, Chilran worhr.. III IIII'
same era. One renson was thc COlli inuous Inhor surplus in Bnll il. In Ihe j"I. C ,d .. II. II
numbers, Hr<lzilinn workers found it h:lrd 10 org:lIlize.
\!I 1'/\1(1
l lIu: W,l" Ihl' d..:dllll' uf ,lIl.lrchist and leadership and
Ihdr rl-plaLl'llll'nt, in b), COllllllunists, whose Brazilian party was founded
ill I'J:!L Tilt: prl':'l'llCC furnisht'd a Ilew lilrgd lor the authoritarians
,II1l0llg dVlli,lll:' ,\JId Illilililry. B)' 1930 urban 1,lbur, although growing steadily in
lIuporl.Hll":, a pulitil:;d M..:anwhile, saw no reaSOn
10 dl,lllga: till' ,IUIIK..I.lti( 1I1.lIllll'r in which they had long dl.;'alt wilh their workers.
GehJlio VClrgas and Ihe Eslado Novo
'Ill..: world ecunulI1ic l... 01 1929 hit Brazil, like the rest of the Americas, Vt'l')'
lI.lld, 'I Ill' l'Xlhll"tl.'r,) l)ulfl'rl'd ,I huge drop in fordgn exchange- earnings.
I )nplll' till.: l... ll)!l), Prl'sidt'llt Washingtun Luis clung tu a hard-mone)' polic)" In
din I Ih.11 llIl';lIll gll.lrallll't'ing (ollVt'rtibilily of lht' 13razili.Ul currency (mil reis)
Intu glild ur :.tI:r1illg. The guld and sterling reserves were quickly exJlalisted,
ltlh.iug 11Ll: tu UlllvdtibililY of Ihe mil reis, The
W,I:. ldl Jll ;1 lkqll"'J1lllg b.d.IlI11-of-pa)'llIe:nts abb, <lnd the coffee growers wert'
Wit II ,Ill uJI:wllabk hal \'n!.
lult.....e':. gleat illlpOrl,lJll"l' tu llll' Br;lziliall econOIll)" onc might have
Ihl' to ill with hdp. Inl)tead, il tricd to please foreign
II) 1Il,lllll;lllling ulllve:rtibilily. SudI wac the prindpll's by the
hJll'lglI .Illd ..:COIIUllibb. At a l"rilicul 1l10lllent, the: Brazilian govl'rnment
,Ic,idnl III .. tilk witll ,Ill l"lIIlHlIllk pulic)' which had no l)upport frolll Brazilian
:'Ulll'l) ,
III ,lddJl ilill III putllil di<.t rl':':' abullt the c(unulilk silllal itlll, \'V;ll)hillgton I.uis's
.Iltltlll::. hdpnl sl':llllis dllwnl:lli. Ilis terlll coming to an end, hc overrode the:
-""hill" ulthl' b)' t:lldorl)illg:!l) the: candidate: for
llll' I') iU dnliull .. polilki.Jlllrolll Sao Paulo. Since Wal)hington Luis was himself;l
1,.IlI!J)I.I, Ihi::. ,)dt'diull ril)ing re::.entlll..:nl frolll aspiring leaders in other
l)I,lk:., whu W.llltl'd Iht"ir uwn Itlrn ill puwl'r, GctlJlio Vargas, from the southern-
()f Rio Grande du Sui, llluunll:d ;t Gll11pnign itg,linst tht'
bUI ddcatt'll. The re:.ult pruvuked widesprt'.ld complaints abollt
h.lllni hy di:.gruntled pulilicians ;IIH.1 thdr allies. rail so high that
stak militia:.. joined togethl.'r in a march toward Ihe nalional capital.
l,,)ullluillb..:red by tilt' joinl force:s now approaching Rio, the fedeml military
tu dcpose tila: silting prl'sident (still Washington Luis) rather than risk
.111 :lnn... d confrontatiull. Thl'y Ihem power 10 Vargas, who had kept ill close
t\ludl with Ihe nmspiraturs but was tuu cautious (some wuuld say wily) to lead an
altl"lllpt was cumplddy assuft'd.
Thl' l:UUp ul Oltvoef 1 diJ nOI constitute a The top military
lUllllll.lIldt"rl) simpl)' ulll)eateJ olle chid executive amI installed another, The
labilll'l illvoktd revolutionar), power in order to take the ad hoc steps they thought
Yd 1')30 is a w<\krshed ill modern 13razilian history, even ifit was not
II) lhl' Mexkall HevolutiOIl or 191 U-20.
WlLell Cl'Ililio Varg:.ts llIuWJ into tht: presidenti ..ll palace in November 1930,
kw huw llllportant ,I leader he would b..:come. lie was there only because a
connict within the national political ditl' was turning into afllll'd w:lrlare, II Ilewr
re:lched a climax only because the military intl'n'l'IH:d. After the seniur lUllillWIl
deI'S had deposed Washingtun I.uis, some officers walllt'd In retaill power thl'lIl-
sdvl.'s, but alter oilly four da),s in pOWt'f tht:' three: cOl1lmandl'l's powl'r
tv Vnrgas. Sillce there: was 110 legislatun.', thl' prl:.idt'nt gowrne:J b), dl'crt:l.
J\lc:anwhile, importanl shifts were occurring among the puhtk,d lorce::...
First, Vargas muvcd swiftly tu rl:"placl:" the: in all 11ll' :..t:IIl.'S l'XCt'pt
Olil', Gerais. The ur "interVCJllurS,- rt'purll'd dirt:(lly III thl'
prl'sidclli. Such activism from the celltral govcnllllcnl uncll Ihrew till' Slah'
machines off balance and gavc ben<:fit to thc disM::llting factivns, 1ll,IIly ul" which
had supported Vargas in the 1930 dt'ction. Al) ill tltt' I !l'llIln da Pllml'c.l
presidency, political rivalries within stalt'l) werc bl'illg st.'ttled b)' in IHu.
A st'cond majur (kvdopment wal) a re;:llignlllt.'llt 01 pulitical fun":l) III S.1tJ
Paulo. Varg;ls' intl'rvl'ntor (Ju5u Alberto) Iwd prove:d illl'llt .Illd in hand-
ling tht' tuuchy pllulis/tls. Their heightened M'llSl' ull)tak Il'),;1lty alld their lury .It
10'-10 Albertu united S5u Paulo against Vargas. Its !t'aders dl:l1\andl.'d Ill:It V.lrg,ls
fulfill his promise to call a constitucnt :ll)sl'mbly lhat would wrilt' a tll'W lumtilll
tion, III Ihe [Jtlu/i)1(l frustration finall), l'fllptl'd into an annl'd r... bdliull. Tlil'
stale militia lought kder-II force:.. tu ,I lor fuur !Ilunth::. ill Ihl;'
Constitutionalist Revolution. The: rel:wh had 10 surr":l1lkr Ihe)' werl'
hy Ihe fc'deral forCE'S' l'llcircklllcnt uf SolO Paulo Cil)'. The: plIl//is/as h.ld
further dil)creditcd the cause 01 de:ccnlraliznl govt'rlllllt"llt :llld :>tr":lIglllcnnl till'
hand of the centralizers in Riu de Janeiro.
A third signifil"ill1t politic:11 t!t"vdopment was th..: disintl'graliull ullhl' /t'm'flk
movement. These young military uffiCl.:rl) had nt've:r ,I COh":l)IVl' organi'l..J
tion. Some ;}ccompanied Vargas into poWl.'l" in 1930. Olhers fuundt'd the: Odllbcr
3rd Club to focm t'fforL 011 achieving radic;\ll)od.l1l-hangl':', but t1u:ir lllU\'c:llIl'llt
wns isolaled :lnd vllll\ernble. long, police railk'd the: dub and thl"'
group disintegrated,
Meanwhile, was strengthening his uwn nelwurk uf political alld
collaborators. Ilis SUCCl'SS be\:aml' obvious during thl' cOIlSlitul'nt :'lsse:mbl)' of 1933-
34. In the new constitution state autonomy was reducl--d: could nu longer tax
goods shipped interstate. Yet it conlinued the bkamt'rallegislature. which was to be
directly e1ectL-d, as was 10 be the prcsidl'nt (except tht' first), Sunlt' n:i1ionalist
me;lSllJ'es apPc:lred for the first time, pl:.ldng on foreign oWIH:rship of
l:md and Oil aliens' participation in profl-'ssiumll occupatiuns. The mudest of
thesecollstitutional changes simply confinned tlI;}t the: rl.'volutiun 01 1930 had grown
out of elih: infighting. The constituent aSSembly's most importanl was to e1l-'Ct
Vargas as the firsl pre-sident wilh a four-year term under the Ilew conslitulion.
In 1934 Drazil entered one of the most agilated periods in its political history,
Attention focused on two nationally based and highly ide-ological 1ll0Vt'Illt:nts,
both committed to mass lllobilizatioll. One was Integralislll, a fast-gruwing rightist
movement with affinities to European fascist partics. FOUlldt'd in late 1932 and led
hy Plinio Salgado, the Integralists claimed a rapidly gruwing llll.'lllbership hy 1931:).
like the r('!>t of latin America. began the twentieth century with women
denied Ihe vole. The few women who protested such discriminotion were con
tempfllollsly dismissed by the mille politicians who riln the government. The
worn;m who olganized their suffragene victory was Bertha lutz, who was born
in 18911 in Sao P<lulo. Hef father was Swiss-Brazilian ;md her mother was English,
but ANtha proved to be thoroughly Brazili;m.
She founded her first women's rights ofganization in 1920, which fWO years
1,11e, became the Bmzilian Federiltion of Feminine Progress. The Revolution of 1930
the political establishment. and Ihe lUlz-led suffra e movement convinced
the fr<lmClS of the new civil code of 1932 to enfr<lnchise women. lutz subsequently
served in Congress, pushing tirelessly for legislation to protect women's legill
st<'ItuS and social rights. In addition to her intense activities in favor of women's
rights in Brazil <lnd obroad, lutz was an accomplished botanist and expert in
herpetology. She will be remembered as the preeminent <lavocate for women's

Their dogllln wns Christi'ln. nnlionalist. :lIld IrndilionOllist. Their sl),lc was
pOlrnlllilitary: uni(ormcd r;lnks. highly disciplined streel demonstrations, colorful
green shirts. ant.I rhetoric. The}' were essentially middle c1;1ss nnd elrew
support (rom military omcers. espccinlly in the navy. Unknown to the puhlic, the
Illtegrnlisis were financed in pnrt by the Italian embassy.
1\1 the olherend orthe spectrum was a populnr (ront movement. the N<\tional
1.iheralion I\lli"nce (1\lianlYn Lihertadora N<\cional. or ALN). laullchct.1 in 1935.
Ostensibly n conlition orsocinlists, communists, and miscellaneous rndicals. il \\las
in fnct rim hy lhe Ih<\i'ili<\n Communisl Parly. which was carrying out a Latin
I\meric.-.n Slr:llegy (ormulnled in Moscow. The Ilrst sl;"\ge of the strnlcgy in Brnzil
would he Illohiliz;llioll on convenlionnllines: rallies,locnl oHices, nnd fund-raising
erforts 10 forgc n hrond conlition on the left in opposition to Ihe new Vargas
government. the Integralists, and the Liberal Constitutionalists.
By Brn7ilian politics hnd reached a (evered pitch. The Integralists
nnd the ALN were feeding off each other, ns street hrnwls and terrorism increased.
BrOl7.il's major cities begnn to rescmble the Nazi-Communist balltes in Berlin of
1932-33. Hut the ALN wns (ar more vulnerable than Ihe Integrnlists. In July 1935
the governmen1 moved against the ALN. with troops raiding omces and jailing
leaders.
The communists now moved to the second singe of their str<ltegy: a revolu-
tioHnry uprising. It was to be triggered by a barrncks revolt, led by pnrty members
Of' sympnlhizers nmong omcers in the army. The insurrection began in November
in 1he northeastern state cnpital of N<\tal. spreading within days to Reci(e and
Rio. hom Ihe rehel standpoint, it was a disnster. Although the Nnt;'\' rebels
Brazilian Women Get the Vote
II
coni rolled !he city (or several d.I)";. their c.nllll-.lIlt... III I{el dl' ,11111 RIll. wh,\ 1.11 kl'cI
the <\c1vantage o( surprise. were olllinilletl ill Iheir g.lITi""ll" .lIul qui\" klr 101 \ ('d III
sUHen(ler.
Vargas and Ihe lllilitnry now hOld :l pedeci 0PI'Hltlllllty 10 n'\"ok(' norlllal
cotlstitulionnl gunJ';"\nlcc.... The \.Ilngres" voled il. The Icd'l.ll gll\"('nllllcnl
imposed n crnckdowll fill Ihe ('1\1 irc left wil II nnests. Iillllli c. .11111 sllnllll.lrr f ri.ll....
The Intcgrnlists wef, elaled. With their chid rival dilllill.ltl'\l. Ihey hq:.lfl III .. flIdl
power. Whnt coukl he more !ogi\"allh:lll Cor V;lrga.. In IHlll Iillhc (J1lh- ".!lC'''f\C
nalionwide movemenl on Ihe nghl?
II look Iwo )'ear... for thai illu"jon 10 he tle"ln'}T,1 1'11/11" ..... llg.HI, .11111 III"
collnhoralors were hCt...ol1ling Illore Olnllmlln' \lln\ilh('\llh.lt llwv \\'IHIIIIII',llh
pO\\'er hy Ihe 193R plC'''idcnllnl e1eclion. Ir IIllt hr nlhcl llh',lfh, Hill \'.lIg.l .. h... \
other ideas. On Novemher 10. 19."'7. he Innk In the I.Hlin ,lIlei fe.hlillt' 1n.1"! \'1'1
anolher cons1ilulion 10 a nation Ihal had jll"l \\'lloe cd vel ,mol her llllbLln'
inlcrvention. That morning Ihe (:fJnJ;re.... lI,ltl hL'ell '11 I,I\c\l, II .. pICllli ..t .. 'II (11
pied hy soltliers. Hrai'ilthus cnleretllhe Nlwll. 1 kg.11 hyhri.l \,.Illllhlilltll:
clemenls ofSnlnzar'sl'nrtligal and Mllssolini'" Ilair. All the I!Cllltl( r.llil hl1lw.. wef"
gone. Brni'.il had sllcclllnhctlio it." own hr.lIltlof :lllthllriLlri,llli"ltl.
Brazil'slurch intodicl.ltor.. hil' ill lItlhccl.1. HIlI \\".... th('I" IlllH"i'
Ihnn a superficial simil.lril)' hetween Hrai'il\ F.slado Novo .lIul j,,,. l"'lll?
'Vhere. ror example. wa$ the Illa"" l1lohili/.ltinn .. o Irpit ;11 o! I !III",.. (,e'IIl.IIl\ .Hld
J\lussolini's Ilnl)'? ''''ere lhe In pl.w Ihal rplc) l.UI\" hnlh 1I1"hle ,lful
outside Inlegralisl mnk" ccrt:lillly Ihoughl "0.
The Integrniisis in 19'37 dehated nOI whelher th(')' .sIHlllltl c'nlcl !:O\'l'lllllH'lll.
but 011 wlrat terms. SOllgndo. their le;l(ler. r('jeclcf! Varga,,' !<'llI.IIIVi' 011 kl of a t .Ihlllt"l
pml. Salgado thoughl he ..:ould hold out ror more. In L1C1. V.lIg.l .. and lilt' flllht.ll\
were pl;l),ing their OWIl g:ltlle.
By enr1)' I?3R the greellshirts hnd lH'corne vcr)' Inl"t r.lle,I.:-', lilfl .IIICI Ill\" 1'111'.
the g(lvernmcnl hnd hnnlletl nil pnrnmililn'T III g:llli7,11 iflll". lilt llb\"l! III" I.If j;l'l \\,.'.1"
thc Intcgrnlists. somc of whom decided In lake malin" into thclI OWll h.l'Hk III
Fehruarr the)' orgnni7.ed armed Ol""null nllihe pre"idcnli.ll ft .. ltlellU.1 licit \,',1"
a shool-out and a slandof( theead)' morning hm,,'" ,II Ihe p.Il.IU' g.Ih' ...
hallie ended at dawn. when ann)' IInils arre"led Ihe reln:lilling 1IIIegf",lli"l ..
The government crncked down nnd Ihe Inle).:rOlIist nHlVellH'nl in dlt"ll di ...lp
pcnred. as SOllgado ned into exile.
Vargas could now survey a polil ical scene thai no longef I,llel eel .111)' ill g.IIIII('ll
opposilion. In the CO\lp Vargns had appoinled hilll"elf In anolher pre.. itlr-nri.II
term, 10 last until the c1eclions, scheduled for PJ43. Few ronk Ih,ll ,f'llllmi!llH'llt
seriously, given the case wilh which Vnrg,ls had nborted Ihe ekt..ti(lll lhnl \V.IS to
have heen held in 193H. Thnt skepticism was well founded. Wh('ll liJ4J 'lflivCl1.
Vargas announced thaI lite w<\rlime emergcncy precluckd ('It( t ion\;. I It- ITIll.lilll1i
presidenl unlil Octoher 1945.
Whal wns the signillcOlnce o( Vnrgns' nlllhnrilarian rule trnlll 19'7 to I'H
r
,)
First, Vargns and his politicnl :\nd lechnon"rit collnhor,lturc; gilt .\ free h.lIld ill
I',\HI IWII <I ,'\'>1 .... IUI'II .... (IIANI./'OVElt'l'lt\1E
IIl.tlllU\','! II 19 III Ill.Il'.llIlILl' HI :11.11'.., .ldv.llIl.lg\.' ill .1 world moving
low.lld W.ll. Al .. 1.lh, wer..: Iwu cl'lIlral ,llld rd;:lkd quesliuns abuut Brazil's
lIlh:IIl.lllllll.11 rull..'. Whl) ..:uuld hdV Ih\.' to mode:rnizt: and l'(luip
tlll'lr .lllll ..... llufLl':"! '\lId whll ...-uuld uffl'f Ihl.' most favorable cunditiuns in foreign
I r .... ll"?
BduIl' Illl' l..Uup ul 1937. N'l/i Gl'l'l1Wny had offered <lltractivt: tt.'nllS in both
aft'.l':". Sirall'g)' and idnllug)' \WI"C >lbo at stake in these lIt'gotiations, Tht' pro-
(,""III.111 1.llllOIl wllhin B,.lzd. ill Ihe mililary. WJ.$ ....ullllkred by a pro-
1.11..11"11. rht' 1.lIll'r ' .. gut'd thai Br.llil had opted for the J\\Iit's in World W,U I
.lllll h.ld 1111' III g.lin by wilh Iho.: Unilt'd M;ln)' of the Brazilian
dJk tlllldull..' Iho.: 11irtalitlll wllh Nazi Geflllany as dangl.'rous and shorl-
:"lgl,t .... 1.
fvk.1I1wlllk. till..' milil.ll')' ulld Slale lJepilfllllelil w..'r...: spHing no dfort
lu pull Hr.lIi1l,a... k inlu Ihl.' U,S. d".lInill,lkd henJispheric orbit. The)' slicceeded.
hUI oIJl)' .tlkl U.S. .Iud l;erman failure 10 offer Ihe armamenls
1\1.11..11 \\'.lllini. 1:111111 ullw.trd Br.ILil bt'...,\lnc a vil.ll cog ill the Allied war
lll.I ... 1l illl" I U1"111 "I II IIg ..:' .. l1\1 i.1! r.lW lllat ..:rials (like q uarlz and natural rubber) and
.Ii, .1l1d 1I.lv.1I th.11 bl..'l.lllll' lnllo.:<l1 in the "Ball!o..:oflhe: Atlanlic." Hrazil even
.1 llllllh.11 III It.d)' in j9+1. whc..r... il fought Ihe U.S.
AI 111\
".II!!..I .. h.ld ..1 ...111 :..11II..'wdl)' wilh thl' Uniled Slat .. In Idum lor its raw
1l1.1ll'11..I, .lIlll Br.lId gill IIII.' nf .1 1u,:lwork of air and naval
JlI .. .dong lin: Ilurlh""nl .Ind lIortheaslern Allantil' ... Tht' Unilcd
SI.lln .11 .... pn,m':'l'd II) hdp lilian... first large-scale sled
mill, .JI Vull.l Ih'dumb Ill'ar Itin ..I J.lllliro, II was the firsl lime an Americolll
gOV...flllHl'lIt lUllllllllkd puhlIC luud.. 10 in Ihe .....Ieveloping
wHrlll ..
Th... Nuv" Illnli:.II ...d a l..lJllr.lIl'lC;'l1 appanHus thruugh which Vargas and
IIi .. :Ildl'" l.llllid pur.;ll.... l.. UI Hlllll( .. kvt'lllpnl..... nt alld orgallizationall"hangl.'. The federal
gIIVlIIIIII..'IJI .111 I"lJ!o..: ill tIll' l\.ollumy, organizing and
lIhlrkdlllg l.tlld:. (in UI...U.I. (ulle..." :.ug..lr, .lnd 1"':;1). and cr"'aling lIew state ente:rpris...s,
Ih... N.lliullal J\llIlur Fao..lury (tll produce trucks ailvlane engines). Vargas
d:'0 OV..OI hauled th.. kd.... ral hure;:tunacy. ..::r.... a lll""rit-orit::ntcd system to replace a
palron.lgl-riddln strudur.... Hll.llly, unt' of the most important measures was a new
1.11>01" ... ll...ll (1913). wltich uut rulel> of industrial relations Ihat were to lasl unlil
til.: j....,..JUs. Onl)' Olll.' Ulliull p... nllittc:d in c:ach plant-undt'r the scrutiny of the
labllr lI11llblry. whkh ..:unlrulkd union linalKt.'S and elections. Unions were in effect
t1..,d Iu Ihe: gov..-rnllu..IlI,Uul Lht' uniun Ic:ad....rs who couJd profiL person-
ally. Thb laoor union structure was paralleled by a semicorporalist
l>lruClure: anlong th.... employers. Th....se al rangements gave the federaJ execulive ,I
1IIo.?..::h.llIblll luI' ..:t.lnlrolling Iht" elonolllY. But Bmzil of the c:arly 1940s was 1Iot a
Illud...fll. urballiz...d SOd...:I)', Oulskk' of a few ke), citks. Ihe corporatist
:..1 ru..::tllrl' 10..'11 unlulldll'd lllost uf Ih.. Coulltr)'. which was il vaSI. disconnected rural
Th.... ESlado Nuvo alsu h;Jd its darh'r Th.... :'l..::urit)' rurl(':' had a vinuallr\.'e
hand. Tonur... roulin..... agaillsl lIot ulll) !>uspectt..'d ... bUI also
foro..:ign (Gc:rmall businesslllt'll we:r.... "ullla'lbl...). Ct'morsllip
covcr....d all til .... Illl'dia. wilh a governm.... nL age.:Ill.)' (l)epart.1l1l,,1l10 de
Imprensa e Propag'lIlda. or DIP) furnishing Ih\.' "orrkial" wrsion of 11ll'
Tht''!"l' wert' re::.c:rnblanct's to GCrlll;JIlY ,1Ild It'lly. bUI thl' Bra/iliall!> stopPt..d w....ll
short of lhost'
Brazil's ':\..l.1l101llic hislory frum 193U tu b nul Iu
Coffee conlinued to be Ihe primary lor"'ign ex..:hange eaJ'lll'f. although h....lpl'd
during warlimC' b), the bOOlll in other r;lw .. hipped 10 11ll.' Unitld
Slat .... s. Industr;;11 growlh cOlllinued in SilO P,lllio and. 10 a l'xknl, ill
Rio. Th..... war Cui off trade with Emop...:. with lllost !>hi(ting. tu the United
Slall.'S,
Varg.. s had in IY43 promised for wllkh lit' wlluld b..., ineligible. Jh
Ih\.' war continued. Vargas kn..... w that a W;lV..... ofdclllll......lti ... opinion building..
;tnd he anlicip,\Icd ev.. by adopling a nlW. ropulbt !>1.lIlCl' .11'"",. ]')43. Tlit"
urban working class was now the object of gOVo..'rll Illell I .ttteniioll through
llledi.t Ihl' nighlly naliunalbt r.tdio bro'llk.bl CTh... 1lUll,. ul BraZil"). amI
we:r... lll.u.le loward Cf";lling..t L;Jbor PMty, Ir)'iug lu cr"atl' a
Ilew dectural Ill' had beellubl" to Ilegk..:t eMh"," ill th... E:..taJo
Novo.
EVt'lib IIlu"....d rapidly in ]"J"5. VMg.as hop"d Il\ pl.l)' dowll Ille lOlllra.. l
bdwct"11 the: llc:feat 01 ill Europ" alld \.ollliuul'll ;wthufJlari.lIlbm al
home. In M<.ty 1945, with victory ov..... r Ih\.' Axb .1 fort'g.nll .... l'ondusioll,
Varga!>' governmenl i!>!>ucd :.t tough antimonopuly dent'e '"llled at restricting
the roll.' of fordgn firlll:' in til...: ('(OIlOIll)'. It pari of Ihe.: tllrn
tuward pupulislll bq;llll ill 19'13. Th... U.S. gov.... rnJlIelll put Vargas on ils IiSI
or I.alill Amerkall pn:sid.... nls whl) had Itl go. Th""r... Wt:fl,' plenlY or Bra'l.iliall$
wllo shared till' U.S. view. 'I'he Lih\.'ral bdicve:d thaI foreign
capilal should be wekomed inlo Br;:lzil. And Ih ..,y saw Ihis as ullC Ihat
might hdp th""m gain Ihe puwer thC'y Ihuught had bl'e:n wilhin Ih.... ir ill
1937.
The:n.: w(;'"re olher signs ofVargal>' shifl 10 till." Idl. III early 19'15 hI.' decided to
rdeasc;' Ic:ftisl political prisoners. Most prominent was Carlos Ihe
leader of Ihe Bnlzilian Communist Parly who had be:.'en j'liled The
relaxalion of police control gre-'ltl)' helped the COllll11unbt Party, Ihe:.' best orga-
nized force on Ihe left.
The polari7..<llioll acceleraled as Ihe;' yl'ar wenl on. The: anli- Vargas forces included
tJle Libe-ml Constitutionalists, many military ofllcers, and mosl stale political bosses.
On the other side were assorted populists, SUint' labor union It';l\.krs. and the idrolo.
gkal left, which included socialists and communists, The \.-ollfronlation climaxed in
1945, when the army gave V;lI'g:IS <til ultimalum: resign or be deposed. Ill'
rt'fus....d, so the dc...c1ared him depose:d. Vi.lfgas then ;lCced...:d and flew ofl' to a
self-imposed exile on his ranch in Rio Grandt' do Sui.
:no I',\ln TWO .. s: OVFR TIi\lF
11 1'.1,1/11 \\1
Nothing is marc Britzilian than thc samba. the infectiously rhythmic dance and
music of Afro-Brazilian origin. Samba has become synonymous with the lavish
parades <;Iaged in Rio during Cinnival week by the AfroBrazilian samba schools.
Although samba today is truly a national form of popular culture. it was not
,1lwilyS such. In the lale nineteenth century, police systemiltically repressed such
expressIons of Afro Br"zitian culture. That changed in the eilrly twentieth century.
however. <\s the poor bliKk <\nd mulatto neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro earned
populilrity with their Si\mba music. In 1935 the Getulio Vargas government began
funding samba schools as a uniquely Brazilian tourist attraction.
TIH'y succeeded, and now Rio's Cilrnival parade explodes cilch year in front of
90,000 spectators in the specially constructed Sambadrome: Each samba school
follows an elaborate theme. usually from Brazilian history. When one designer WilS
criticized for dressing the p<lraders in lavish costumes, he replied, "The poor like
=1,=,=h=e=I=,,=,e=,:,e=,=,="=a=,,=w=h=O='=lk=e=m=;,=e='Y= ..
The Second Republic 11946-1964)
Three principal political emerged in 1945: Ihe UDN (Unio'io Democr:ltica
Nacional). the rSD (P:arlido Social Delllocr.ltico). and Ihe PTB (Partido Trabalhista
Ilrasilciro). The UDN was a coalition of anti-Vargas forces dominated b)' the Liheral
Com;tit\11 iOI\:alists. 'I'he PSI) was more helerogenemls; it incilldcd man)' political bosses
and hurcaucrats and some prolllinent industrialist!'. The PTIl. of the Ihree. was
created by Vargas in 1945, when he was still trying to shape the upcoming elections.
The PTB was aimed at urban labor with a roliliGll approach supposedly modeled on
the I3rHish I .. ,hour Party. These three remained Brnzil's principal pnrties until 19M.
'I'lley were often descrihed as nonideological. personalistic, and opportllnislic,
for a constituent assellll)ly had been c:alled before Vargas' fall. and. when
held ill Deccmber 1945. Ihey proved to be alnong the fTeest in Brazil's history. The
newl)' elected presidcllt. with 5S percent of the vole. was General Eurico DlItra, a close
Vargas collabornlor in the E,<;tado Novo and one of the orticers in charge of the
Bra7ilian Expeditionary thai fought alongside the Allies in World War 11. The
chid opposition candidate was Air Force Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, a Ihrowhack to
liberal constitutionalism. He won 3S percent of the vote. The Communist candidate
received 10 percent of the vote. which greatl)' encoumged the left. President Dutra and
his advi<;ers began watching closely the growth of the left and its links to urban labor.
In 19t16 the constituent assembly produced another constitution, one that
rescmbled thc constitution of 1934. There was decentralization and a return to the
classic guaranlees of individual liberty. The elections that produced the constituent
assemhly had highlighted some other trends. They showed that the traditional
polilical machines could still dominate in a national vote, That was hardly sur-
prising. since Brazil was still a mainly rural society, and electoral maniplliniion was
II
Samba and Carnival
II
,
.
k
easiesl in the countryside. NOllet hdes<;, Ihe exlcn"i\'C' ( OIllIllIlIlI"1 \'4 ,Ie "h,,\\,.'d Ih,ll
lie\\' forces were al work 1111 the lIrh;"l1l scenc.
Soon after the war, Hr.17il \\'1111 IIll' IS<;fW til hll\\' In 11II.\llt" II',
economic development. In w01rlimc the nhje{ tl\'l' W,I<, 10 1II,IXllni,c 1Il0hih/,III"Il,
hUl the same appro01ch coulll h(' applied to pl',I(C'linl(, ('( llllllllllC t1e\"('lol'lIlt'1I1
Inslead. the Dut,", government (19016 avoid('11 1,l.lllllltlg ,llItl fel'Illu,,1 1".1
rcli:ltlce on coffee exports, dropping most nf Ihe 111(',\"111(''' I.lk('1l hv \'.11):.1" I..
slillluinte induslrializalion. Tllb polil)' Ill.Hk Bra/II,tll1t' hlgl,h \11111('1,11.11
1(1 chnnges in lhe world denlOllld ror LorfeC'.
On Ihc political fronl, Ihe Dulr,1 regimc "0011 t!nld"d til Ihl' 11'11. Ilw
Conllllllnisl Party. Icgnli7ed in 19/16, had shn\\'11 slIl'prising ."1 rl'II)',[11 in ...... 1' I 1',11 rill ,111.1
Rin de J:lIleiro. Labor unions, despite Ihe lorp(\rali"l kgal !lIre, \\'('1(, J:.llrllllg ,k
facto autonomy, 10 the worry or cmplnyer<> O1nt! lon<;crV:l!ivc 11/l!lliCl,Il1". ;\" "",rid
happcn one ye:lr !aler in r:hilc, Ihe Hr:l7ilian l,nngrc.;;<; in ('arly Il) 17 \'l ,t('ll II, I{'VI ,I." II H'
ConlTlluni$1 Party's legalil)l. Polite 1':lickd it<; OrrllC" .lIld "cl/nl It" 1'1Ihh".ltlnll" I h.
Illini"try oflahor inlcrvcll('d in hlilldred<: ofl.lh'lr 111I11111" :IIHI ,llrl'<,lc,! 111 (11"1111"""'.1
their oH'iccrs, appoinling governmcnt .;Iunge<; in Iheir 1,1,ll(' '1 he \'("11." ICI I "rtl\ ,.1
10 he a rerllil of 1930-35: a politic.11 opening, Ihen .1 hur<,1 01 ,Idl\I"111 ..n lile' loll.
dill1axc<1 hy government rcprcs<;ioll Ilcll(dortll. 1111' Ittt \\.1" l"111.1\ "I, ,Ilhl
Conlllllll1isl Part) candi<bll'$ hatl In I'C<;llrt In del [llml ).:111"('''
Vargas hao nnt acccple(! hi<; {'xit in (klnbC"r I') 1'>:1" the .'Ihl 1,111 ..... ,IICTI 1)111\
t\Vo monlhs later, he \Vas c!('ded <;('U,lInr flllfll l\Vll <,1.1t,,'" ,Ind. !In',\' III I",,,c.rlll
Rio <. ;mnde do Sill. During Iht: Dutra pi ('<;idellq, V.II g.,,, wnr "Id <;1<'.HIII1- III I cl.1I11
nalion:ll visihility and maint.lin his polilicall,:onl.ll.I". I.. " IriL'lul... ,lilt! ,11 hi'''
were urging him 10 rtlll for president. lie did lInl llL'cd 1I111C h ,olwin, Il1g
In the prcsidenlial c:ll11paign of Vnrgn<, \V,J<, nlll"l 111 III<'
PSI) and PTR. Ilis princip;,t! opponcnl lorlller /''//('/If(' [1I:II'CI '1',I\nr:l. rlltllHllj:
under 'he UUN brll1l1er. V;Hgas (onducted a :lllll'aigll. alta. IIII'
I)lllrn rcgime for neglec[ing ('('flnomil' and Cor f.IVOI iU1: 11ll" I il 11 Y('I III',
po<;ition wa<; moderate enough 10 nppe:lllo the 1.1Ild'lwlln<; ill "1.11('<; "", h . " i\\III.I,
Gerais. Vargas won hy a pluralit}' (o1X.7 pern'n!) .1nd heg.1I1 111<' IJnrd 1'Il'<'hkll"
the only one he gained by popular dcclioll.
In returning 10 power hl' poplliar volc. V"rga<, l"evcl""'lllllC \"I\lllr\ Ih.lt 111"
opponents. especi:llly Ihe Lihernl Comlilulinnali"I<;. h:lcI \\I(.n in II} I>; 111('\
exploded, some even c:alling for the arm)' hl hlol..k tilt' 1('llIrn 01 [hi' <':\ dllLII"1
But it \Vas to no avail.
Vargas made economic policy his top prioril) .1Ilt! hI..' prolllpth- ,1"<;t'lllI1Il'd .1
team of young technocrats-engineers, economist!'. O1nd pl:lIlllcr<,. Thn' f"l rllil
lated an eclectic strategy designed to Il1Olximi7e the innow of Lapital :Iud leI hlllllflg\'
from both public and private sources ahroad. The lookt'd lavol,lhle. 111
1949 the U.S, and Brazilian govcrnments had I.lIl11ch('d ,I joinl <;tllll)' 01 IIH'
Brazilian economy. The commission's report in <>pntlight('d Illndcqll.llt
cncrg)' and poor Iransportnlion as the prime 1,1 ral'ill L'LlllHHllil 11('v('1
opmen!. The U.S. govcrlllllelli inclicalcd inlerc<;t in c!lallrlclillj; 1'1Ihli< IlIne!" lor
\\/ 1'.\1<11\\'(1" (,\'..1 ,>1111)11'>
ill ..\tld IIH. Hl<1zilian governlllt'lIt cn:aled new federal
lg"ll"l ... " In 11,llhllt: IIit' IIIVl'stlllent projnt::. nuw in prospect.
V.lI
r
'"I' l'i..tllltlillic :.tr;.lh:1W abu had its nalionalist sid...,. Pronl remissions by
l"I('lgll "Wilt.! wefl'" Irequl'lIt largel for nalionalist ':lllack. In !lJS2 Vargas
dl'IlIl1111ll.:d Ih,,' IOfljgn ;.lnd Ihn'ah:l1l'd ne:w controls.
AIItIII,l'l t,lrgd fur the Ihllioll;l!bl.!> W'b uil. SilKe the laIc 1930s Brazil had bee:n
\\ III klllg \Ill ,I 1I,ltlullal uil pult""). t\ alld tvh.xku h:'ld alreaJy upted for stall'
ItlollltJI1lllk.... , hlUUghuut 1.ltin America, inlern:'ltioll;,ll oil companies werl;'
Iq':,lldnl wilh ,I I1I1ll!. Brazil no In 195' Vargas proposed
.1 IIl1xnl pUGbl pIIV.ltl' .. urpol ;atum (tu In: c.d!l'd Ih'1t would l1lonopoliz,..
,Ill' l';'\I'II",IIIOIl ,lilt! produdion of viI.
lilt' I'rttpm.d tUlldll.:(\ off Ihl;' most hl'atl;'d political debate since 1945.
,II illll.d ..... 111 IlrvvClI very among army orricers. Bitter conlrover
'Il" ,1111'>"', h'ltli Illunopoly aJvnC<.ltes the p:.llriotism of fret'
l'llll'llllI\e anJ vkl.:' In 1953 Ihe Cungress cn.:all;'d an even
IIiOIlOpoly Ihan by Varg,ls. The debate had sharply polarized
'1IllIIIUII. 1l'llu.. ll1g thl' fUVlll for politkalm;lllt'llvCr.
had b,,'cn dt:'lte.::d in on a mode:rale pblform, and tlie party lineup
III Cllngll.... lequired him Iv llHlintain Ilt,ll But economic pressures were
llllllllg 1.,lId lll11i...n on Ihe.:: gvvc:rnnwnl. rate of inllalion turned up
[IOIlI II p"r.. lut ill IlJ51 10:W Pl'J"(l'1I1111 IlJ52, Second, the forc.::ign trade balance
\H'UI Illto Ila' Illl.1 hird, lhl' ill 1952, Uwighl Eiscnhowa,
1111n" 1111.) dUlIhl Illl'lo:ll1 the thought the Unil('d Stall'S
h,ld Ill,ldl' lor Ihl' invl'sll1ll"lltS.
Tlll ... gavl' allHllllnititlll tu V;lrgas' t'lll;'llIies on bUlh the: It'rt and tilt'
ngl,!, Thl' !ln dlargt.'ll Vargas with sl'lling out to the imperialisb. The right, Oil
till' otll"'r halld. dlarged that was alie.::llating tht' trading partners and
IlJll'lgll IJIl WhOlll Brazil Ilad to dept:lld. Must pulitically
B',I,d"lll'" klJ hd\Vl'l'll thl'se Yl'l e.::COlltllllic and politic;]l pfl.:ssures
\'l'll' IJldhil1g Jlloda,lti(Jll mOrl' dinicult. spdling danger for Vargas :lnd hb
g.IVl'll11lllll[
III 19:.J hb .... abind 10 face 11le: crisis. Innation
,lllli tlh' h,d,lllle-ujI':Iyllle.::llts deficit wen' related problems Brazil had
lllllll'. ttl ,Ill l'Vl.'IV,llul'J l'xcllange rak which, ....ombined with Brazili:'ln illnation,
hold 1I1,ldl' IlllptJl'b l.lleapl'l' alld l.:XllUrb IIHJrl;:: expensivl'. An economic stabilization
plllgl,llll W,I' urgl'nlly Ill:'ede<l. In the: short rUIl, Ihal would mean fnlling real w;]ges
,Ilul uIlltrob un lredil and government spending. Such a policy was
buulld tu hl' lJllpvpul,IL
'1 v It'ad the dfurt Vargas recruited OswaJdu dc Aranha, his longtime political
hl'ull'll;IlII, Illillister ollinance. Ar.mha pursued C"ISSie stabilization measures with
,11'1'.tflUI ill 195J. approachl'd, however, a bitkr fight loomed over
WJgl' ptlll.. y. Undl'r tl1l' No\'u the llIinistry of laoor flXed Ihe minimum wage,
wlndl lIot Oe.::t::ll illUl.:<!Sl.:J fur ll1Jny years. Aranha's objective was to prevent an
illl MI 1.11 g"' to Wft'ck the allli-inflation program. For this Aranha would have to
deal Willi the Illillbtt'f of labor: JuJo GOll];lrl, ;l )'OUllg P'I'U pt Ilitlcian dosdy ideJltifit:d
wilh the PTU Idi and the militant labor Il'adl'rship.
By 195'1 Aranha was pulling l(lward austcrit)' alld Goulurt tuward a populist.
redislributiunist puth, Vargas had to decidc the In Fe:bru;jr)', apparently
opting for Aranha's austerity, he dismissc:d Goulart. TIll' lefl, by ib
in the light OWl' oil policy, nuw allalk,,'d fur pande.::ring Iv till'
imperialists with his stabilization progr.t1Il. V.lrgao;; de,ll'e(llhc .lir VII May I. 195.1,
whl'n he: annouIKe:d a 100 p..::rct'llt ill thl' millillHlI1l w.lgt-!lighef eVclI
th;m Goul.1f1 had recolllmt'I1l,.It::tl.
This battle now merged into widl'r polil iC:l1 V,Irg.. hllkll'.:.tl.:lIemit'.:.
had found'lIl issue 011 which Ihey Ihought thl'y could bl',ll him: 1.01'l'1Iplioll. Thl'
propagandists c1osl.:d in on the we:'l!')' Unbeknowllst to
him, thl' palace: securit)' chief had arrange(l an :Il1l'mpt Oil C"r10'i
l.acerda, a journalist who leading Ihe al tack Oil Varg.1s. Till.:'
bulll;'t lIleant for Lan:rda killed an air force olTiur who was a \'olul1ke:r budy
guard fur Lac..:rda. The: ofrlca's death brvught Ihe Illilit.lr)' into tilt' WIil'lI
their invt:sligation pointc:d 10 the p;II;Kl', 1111..' olfker,
demanded Vargns' resign:ltioll. Realizing IH: \\';1' trappe:d and bolait'll, Varga.!>
pUI .1 bullet through his heart on 2--1. lit- Il:'It ht'hind all lllllallllll:lloq
suicide.:: lelia, blaming his demist' on sinistt'l .11 III fureign. alld
proclaiming a highly natiOll:llist posllit)ll. By his exil, V aal It'd
revt'l1g"' 011 hb Lall'rda !I;ld 10 fin' Br;l:td, ,II HI tltl;' ,lnli
among thl' UIJN and thl.: Illilil .... ), foulld thclllSdvt:s 011 Ihe
...kknsiw.
Caretakl'r I'l.'gilllt:s govl'rnl'd Br;lziJ unlil Illl' !lJ5() iJlaugUl",LliOll 01 jlls..diIIO
Kubitschek, deetnlto a rull pre.::sidllltial tlTll1 in 19'15. I Ie.:: an cbullknt PSi)
pulilician and former governor of C;erab wilh " n.:putatioll a
c:llllpaigner. Although he.:: won the.:: prt:sidlll... y willi ulily 36 peru'lll U(thl' vllk, he.::
quickly lllov(.'d tv gain broadl.:r support.
Milldful of IIOW of!l'll the.:: mililary had illte.::rVl'l1l'l! ill
l\\ollifit'd them with large wl.'apoJls purchases. Kuhitsdll'k also had all dkctj\'l'
PSDPTB coalition in Ihe Congress. The 1'rogram" of l.'conomic dL'vc.::Iop-
ment, plus the audacious idea of huilding :.1 IH:'W capilal. Brasilia, ill the.:: inlerior,
combined 10 generale enthusiasm which ITlllnled the bitkr pvliticall-ollnicts rrom
thl' ll1id1950s. No slllall part of Kubitschek's politiGlI Sll.... was due 10 his own
talenls. Kubitschek's molto had been "fifty of progress in fiw," and Ihe
e:conomic leap forward was impressive.
Yet it \Vould have been too much 10 l.:xpccl poJiti..al strall'gy to
endure forever- The PSD-PTB alliance ill was coming ::tpart, disl..-ord was
growing among military orricers. and the economy had once again run into
inflation and balanceof-payments deficits. Kubitsdl,,k brit'lly Iried l.'conulnic
stabilization in 1958-59, but scullied it when the IMF demanJe:d
that would have prcwnted Brazil from reaching the presid<.'nl's economic
"targels: Kubitschek pressed on with his economic program, and Ihat created
,.
.111 PARTTWO"
1ll:l111Ill(lth prohlems for his successor. \o\lhell he IcC, orficc in J:lllUnl1' 196I, no Olle
doubled !hnt :l reckoning wilh foreign creditors wns <\1 hane!.
The president who inherited this ch<lllcngc was Janio Quadros. one of Brazil's
most talented and most llawcd politicians. A whirlwind success, first as mayor of
the city of Sao Paulo and then as governor of the slate, Quadros \Von big in the
1960 presidenti;'!1 election. running with LJDN endorsement. His C<Hnpaign fe....
lured ;l broom as the symbol of his fight against corruption. Thai talk huoyed the
Lihcml Constitutionalists, who believed lhat ;\1 last power was ncnr.
Ql1:ulros hcgnn by clllhracillg a tough stabilization program. Arter seven
Illonths or idiosyncratiL rule. however. Quach'os suddenlr resignecl in Augusl
1961. II is reasons have never heen enlirel)' expl::lined-app::lrentl)' he expected
the Congress 10 rejeci his resignation and offer him increased powers. lie was
Ihe promplly accepled his resignalion. Quadros. the mosl char-
ismatic populist politician of modern Brnzil. faded inlo retirement. (He relurned 10
puhlic office::ls Ill:lyor ('lfS;-IO r'allin fmm 19R5 10 19Rft)
Quadros' self-enginee,"CC1 demise was del110rnlizing for the anti- V:ugas
factions ::Iud olher Bra1"ili:lns who hdie\'('d thai hie; Illornlislic promises and
his ndminislr<ltivc success in $;10 Paulo hmled well for the new federnl goverll-
menl. \Von;! nf nil frol11 the UON viewpoinl. Qundros' departure IllC;\Il1 th<ll
power would now P;lSS 10 the elected vice rresiclenl-Vargas' former Inbor
minister. 10:10 l.oulart. the epitome of populism and :In:llhell1:l to the conser
vative Illilil:lry.
The mililnry W,lS in no mood It) :lgree to Goular!'s succession 10 the pre-
sidency. HUI lhe ilmOl1g Ihe officers argued in f:lvor of ohserving Ihe
conSlilution. A compromise was reilched. The Congress crealed a parli;lIl1entary
system in which Goulart W:lS president bUI with :I c:lbinel nccollllt:lbic to Ihe
Congress. II W:lS :1Il unworkable hybrid, designed solely 10 reduce Goulart's
power. The new president his diminished powers in September 1961
<Ind promptly starled <I c<llllp<lign to get the pnrliamentary innovation repe:lled.
Ia.rltlnry 1963 success when a plebiscite restored the full presidenli:ll
syslem. B)' then Goulart Iwd precious little lime lefl from Ihe 19fil-1l6 presidential
lerlll.
Goulart's presidency proved ill,slarred from the beginning, compounded
hy his inexperience. weakness. and indecision. 13)' 1963 inflation and Ihe
h:lbnce-of-pnYlllenls deficil h:ld grown even more difficult to deal wilh.
Goulart chose his own slabilization team, headed by the brilliant intellectual
politician $nnliago and the noted economist Celso Furtado. Dantas
worked oul a detailed plan, July negoliated wilh the U.S. government and the
International Monetary Fund. 11 called for the usual: reduction of government
deficit. tough controls on wages. and painful reductions in credit. 11 was the
snllle medicine that had been served lip in the stabilization efforls of 1953-54.
1955-56, 1958-59.nd 1961.
For Goulart. stabilization presenteJ special problems. A tough wage policy.
which nlways meanl falling real wages. would strike at the social group to which
,
"
Goulnrt was mosl COIll III ill cd. Furlhermore. nweling Ihe t('rlll'" ,., IllIt'IJ:11
lenders would invite :ltlack from the I1nlionnlists. ;lIlolhcr .11"('.1 of hi'" I',illil'
support. Even if he could bring off slnhilii':llilin. hi" t!'rlll \"'1\11111 pn,h.lhly
before Brai'.il could resume nlpid growth.
Notwithstanding the gloomy pro!'pecls. (;o,Jlarl the Il.lnl.I" 11,,1,111.,
plan. Rut he did not st;ly with it for long. In a lew lIlouth" 1).IIII.IS quieti), fe'agllnl.
Furlado h:ld ;I! read)' left Br:l!'ilia. :ll1d :Ill)' Illrlher scrinu!'o <;1.lhili1"al'llll cllt"t \\., ..
thereafler Ollt of Ihe
SI;lhilization \\'as nol (joularl's onlr WII/fr. l'U.1 Iht' BI".l/rh,llI 1".11111.11
<;cenc hnd hecn henling III' on holh Iell .Ind righl The IIllhLln, ......1!\\,Iy". '\.1".1
faclor. Some of the officcrs who had Illughl (;oul.... Ie; .1111,. ..... 1'111 til I'/>\\'CI' III III" I
were still fighting. The)' h:ld hegun an 'Ulr,lling 1,.011"1'11'.11,. yin (>\,C'IIIIIII\\ {,"1Il.1I1
oflhe ideas :lnd I'ere;onncl of the (1II1"'pirn,v (tlllltlll(' Ir:l,cd III IllI" 1'1.1
mililary c;lbal against Whnl slea(li1r inCfe.I,,('t! Iht' ,trenglh III 1111' ; ,,"
spirnt('lrs was the incrc;le;ingly (;l{licaltonc nfthe p.. hlil,.,II"llllll . ll.1Il1 ...
The left of the pnliticnl SPCl211 Ulll h.ld htI,.'HIIl' vnr IIOWllt:d. t\ "1,.'11"1',.1
confidence hnd gripped Ihe m<iicnl nation.lli"l", wilt. 111...111111'11 (.llh,.11t lIt, 1.11 \
teacher!'.lnhor union ll1ilit:lnl ... Trnlskyie;1 sludclil orgnl1i/c",..1l1l1.Jrli,lh ide.III ... ' ....
;1\1 sl're;lding a revolulionary nll'se;age Ihrntlgh popular udlllll'. Hr cad) 1'1(, I lin'
r;l(lic;l1 left hatl g:lined gOVcJ'lllllenl ble.. sing. e;olllelimee; ('\"("11 gm'('l nnwnl btl.llI
cing nnd logistic:l1 support.
\'Ol1s('l'vativcs were incensed over 1I,Illtllialie;1 infll.HI" :I11l'lIIg tWll gr'.lll' .... ' hi!"
hI;lS Ihe milit;lry. Bmzilinll CllliSICtl men had 1101 hccn ..rltlwct!ltl \Ilk
The mdicals hegan 10 ndvllt.:ale unionization of clllie;led lIIel1. Thi", .11111.111/(:.11111'
officers. who werf' hardly ahout 10 Ie:ll'll lollCdi\'C' harg"illllig ht'll I'nllti, .111\
centrisl officers could underSI:llld Ilwl Ihreat.
The other new area of Illohiliznl iOIl 1he lOUlll IJ1 11)(, '\ rIll;] I till" 'II
izat ion \\las legaliz.ed. and compet ing groups. indud ing se\'('I'.d till 1Ill' It'll. \'11',1 1,1
win sponsorship ofloc;ll syndicnles. Yct Ihe rurnl !'eclnr wns nn II IlJl 1"01l1 i... ing .1' ('!l,1
for the Brazili;lll lefl 10 tesl its power. There wns ;1Iwa1''' <,xue; ... I.llmr. and 1.11\01
owners tmditionally ruled with :In iroll IWlld. Thi!'o rUI'.d llllinrU7nll('11 ,,11111'.11):11,
combil1ed wilh a few land invasions. pr0voked lalHlowll('l's I'llnkt' tlclie;in'.1l llllll
They pressured the pro-landowner politician". who wele 1111IIH'nl\J" in .1 1I"lt-I.,1
Congress which overrepresented ruml dislrkls.
Goul;lrl's opponents did nol have the vtlles Ie> illlpe;H.h him. The "It! 1' .... 11
PTll alliance still operated. It might not hnt.:k;l e;1:lhili7.llion hill 11\,'., ..
;1150 not ready 10 servc the nntiCoularl coml'ir:llors. Tllr plnllt're; .... 1\\' <l1lh- "n,'
way out: a mililary coup.
The president's mililary advisers had w<lrned him ahoullhe lon,<;pII,llr. (l\\,
even centrist officers were leaning 10w;I1 n coup. The principal faclnr I'n-.hillg
them was the radical move to the left already untler W:I)'. C'ilher hr Ille pl"(' .. idelll.H
by Ihose who controlled him.
The U.S. government was laking:l strong in Hrazil"s emerging I" .1111\ .11
confrontation. Both the U.S. amh:lssndnr. Lincoln (;ortlnn. nntl Iht' mill!.lI}
JH, 1'1\1(11\\10" (A\I"llIIJll" 1.11/\Nt;J.uVER l1MI:
(.11.'1110-
0
1',11 VCl"lltJlI IwrLOill tlltlcll with the l.ullspirators, both
lllilil,U)' ,.lilt! liviliall. 'I'IlL
o
United had a contingcncy plan known :\s
Opl'fation Hrullwr Sam ttl till' 'HltiGoulart rehels with fud and weapons,
II llcellt:do il happtOJled, thl:)' WL'rC 1101. On March 31, spc(ulalioll t:nclctl as a
Illilil.tr)' rLovlIlI, fir::.t ill Gerais. sprc;.lcl across thl;' country. \'Vithill
lW"'llt)' lour huurs, Juiio (;uulart Iwd tled into exile in Uruguay.
()n Apnl I the leader of thl' Cnngrl'ss, in Goulart's absence, declared Ihe
V,LL'IIlI. Altl,uugh hb ,h.:tiunl'Kked any legal fuundatioJl, tht:: COJlgress
""L...odnl. Intu Illc power V,U,-UUlII llluvcd lhe Jllililar)' cOIl::.pirators and their
...ivJ!i,lll Bnll.ili,t11 Il-,Itkrs (lIKe again 01)led (or the aUlhoritarian path tu
d,vd'ljlln"IIl.
III I'dl'l::'j1t:cl, tIle' IlrL'akduWll 01 Br"zilian dell10cfacy bore a dose conne..::.
11011 Itl lllL' inll.:rplay \1/ rdatiuns. The populist policiL'S of Gctl'llio
V,lrg.L::' h,hl Lr".,tlLod in::.lituliun::. ror urganizing urban workers. This posed
.L ::'Igililil,llil but ultinl,lll'ly ,ICLL'Jllabh- challclIgt: to the uppl:'r and middle
th...
o
I'Ltkr rep rL'::'l:'lI I L'LI largely by Iht: militaryo But in 1964 <";olliart
.. II' .rppc;lrl:'d til prLoscnl, a Jlllll.:h mure t"undamelltalthrcal. By mobi-
li/lll}.', j!"",lsanh wdl ,I::. workns, and by \Ising radical rhcturk, he sL'ellled
1'1 h... ue,llJllg IilL' for a dlls:>wide wurker-peas'lIlt allianCL' against
Illl' ::'lllitH"LUllllllli,,: t::.lahli::.llIlILont. HOIII tile suddenness and the Silllullall-
""il)' "I tile:>... 11lIlVl'1l1.... lLl:. startled and elites. The radicalization of
BraId':. l\l\\'l'r ... 1,lss.... ::. W,IS !lot aCL'cptablt" The military .... xercised its
Illng VL'lll pUWl'l" ,wd wenl Ull to crl'ate a burL'aucratiL-'lLlthoritarian
lq.\illll.
The Battle for Brazilian Souls
III Ill) L,llli' AlllCllLdll <uulltly llil:.' lUlllpeution bt!twt:'t!1l Protestallts and
c.,tfu)IrC\ becn 'llOle thilll In UI..lZil, lOlly known as the world's rllost
populou\ C'lholic CUUlltIY. Since 1960, aggressive Protestant evangelicals have
m,lde slgnilicdlll 1I110dl.h among BraZilian worshipers. During the 1990s, the
nurllbo:!r of P'uteSlants doubled, while the proportion of Catholics declined by 10
pLolcelltdge pUlnbo Olle PIOlestant church has buill up a media empire of ninety-
luul Slalioll,>
V.aticdll duthorl\ie,> t!xpre:>\ed cOll'>iderable atarm allhese developmenls,
<11)(1 the pOpl:' hds 10 13rdzil',> younger generation of priests to lake up the
<lnd lost glOund. A dramatic answer has come from Father
Marcelo Rossi. a charismatic pliest in his forties who has attracted huge crowds
wllh hb lIll:'di"-'>ilvvy predchillg. His CDs have become runaway best-sellels, and
Iw plclyt:'u the Gabnd in the 2003 film Maria: The MOlllel of the Son of God.
AdJ,o:-,>,>ing the fal\hful of Orazil, the priest has solemnly declared: "Many s,)y they
,lie Cdthali<.. but <I'l:.'nl, may Ihis movie save them." The battle has been joined.
,
II Brazil: Til.... Giallt 337
Military Rule
The conspirators of 1')64 wert' surpriscd at tht: spt"ed with which the I..;oulart
government collapsed. Goulart's zigzagging and the diviSiVl'lleSS withill the Ieli
had undercut any effective mass support. Tht' rebels l'IKOUlllI.:red liltk ur 110
resistance as lheir troops seized command of thL' gUWrJllll\'1l1.
From 1964 to 1985 Brazil was governt:d by a su(ct:ssioll uf iluthuritarian
governments. cach headed by a four-star gener'll. Despite varialions ill slruclurl'
and all were coalitions of milil"ry ofllcL'rs, technocratic administra-
tors, and old-lillL' politicianso They retaillL'd sUllie ve:o.ligL's or furmal d""lIlonacy,
such as congressional ckoclions, but every IhL' Opposiliunallul....-es sCl-lllnltu
t!lre,llen their hold 011 IhL
o
statL', they changed the ruks of the galllL' to stay ill
power.
The most illlp0rlani group was nlilil'lr)'. Arm}' have had a long
history ofinkrwlltion in Brazilian pulilics sincL' tll(" was broughl dowll. III
1930 Ihe military t'nd.....d Ihe Old Ih'public by ddiwring pow!;"r 10 V"rg,ls, whom
they kept in power by the COllp of only to depose hilll in IY450 II was a
military manifcsto Ihat led 10 Vargas' sui("idc in 1954, alld it \\l;lS a MprLVt"lllive"
coup in 1955 thai cnslllwi Kubitschl'k's SUCC.....SSiOll to the preside'lL:}'o Finally, the
military led the flght against l;oulart's succe::.::.ion to Ille prt'sidl'IKy ill 1')61 :lnd
Ihen conspired to bring him down in llJ6'1. Army ufficers had bL'COIllC vital ;Ktors
in Brazilian politicso
Afta IY'15 conllicting political ClIl"l"L'JlI::. bufft'kd the arlllY olnca l:urps.
1950s brought a polarizalioll between .wliullalist and allli"-:OJllIIIUllist positions.
Tht: anticollll1lunisls identilled with Ihe United States in tilt' dcepening Cold
War aild saw the n:llionalisl kft as a stalking-horsl' for pro-Castroitt's or
COllll1lUn ist s.
Orfict:r OpilliolllUl"llcd lk'dsivt'l}' against thL
o
pllpulbts, vfwholll (;oul'lI't was
a principal Lxampl ..... The Guulart guvernment'::. inability Iv gel control oj tllL'
ewnom)' (I3razil was in ncar default 10 foreign creditors in M,lrdl 196'1), thc
mobilization of tht' lower sectors. :md the dirL'L1 thr.... at 10 military hierardlY ;111
pushed Lentrist military uf/kers toward supporting a coup. By early the
conspiracy was headed by General HUlIlberlo Castello ilranco, lhe army dlit'f of
staff who had sllpporkd Goulart's sllcct"ssion to the preSidency in 1')61.
Once the military deposed Goulart, a new lJut'sliun facld tile conspirator::.: the
form and direction of the governmellt. One orthe generals' first moves was to issue
;1Il extra-constitulionallnstilutional Act (the lirst or man)' wilh that tilk
o
). II gave the
Brazilian executive cxtn.lOrdinary <.Ind exclusive powers to adopt CUJlstit utiollal'll11end-
menIS, propose expenditure bills to Congress, and suppress the political rights of any
citizcn lor ten yearso Wilh authoritarian powers in different currcllts within
the military debated the course of the new government. The hard-liners argued that
Brazilian dL'mocracy had been corrupted by self-seeking and subversi\'.... polilicianso
The country needed a long recuperation. which would such meaSures as
purging legislators. suppressing direct elections, ami Ilring civil The hard-
liners' economic views were less easy to discern. The modt:ratL" military cumposed
I'ARTT\\'O" CASESTtJl)IF.S: CHANGEOVER TIME
.mother group. The)' believed a relativcl)' brief interval o(administrative nne!
. '. . . . economic
return Brnzlllo the e1cctoml democracy recently endangered b
politICians. y
C.eneral Castello I3ranco (1964-67) was <Iuickly cho"en bl' the (
. . '" . purged)
C:ongres" as the new I he Inllnedlate need was 10 brirw '''In .
o allon
under control and to improve the balance o( p.ymenls Roberto C.. 1
. ... rlpos a
well-.known econ.omist-diplomat. was mnde planning minister and hecallle
dOllllnant figure III economic policym<lking. The government reduced inOation
and establi.shed surpluses in the (oreign necounts. Cnmpos'team also nllemptcd
In reorgallize and IIpd<lIC Bra7.il's principal economic instilutions. The govern_
ment overhauled the banking system (a proper central hank was finally ere-
nled). institulionalized a stock market ;'Ind;'l governlllent securilies market (or
the first time, revised labor regulations to make easier the disch:lI'ge or
employees. and Simplified export regulalions. Campos har! long nrguc..1 that
capit:1lism had nnt (niled in Hmzil hecause it hadn't yet heclilried. This was his
chance. The short-Icnn results were disappoinling. hut Caslello Branco and
.. did not de.. pnir: they saw Iheir e((ort .. as indispensahle (or Sound
grnwlh in the (uture.
. The U.S. gov.ernment gave its unconditional supporl to the new military
reglllle. In pnrl tlus slemmed (rom n tradition o( close re"rtions between the two
COllntl"ies that started at the heginlling o( the twentieth cenlury. This "unwritten
as it was called hy some. was based on close military. economic. and
political conneClions. Washington poliC}'makers quickly recognized the ncw
republk in 1889. During \Vorld War I,Brazil joined the United Slnles in declaring
war on GerJnnny. Br;:lzil sent troops to fight alongside the Allies in Haly during
World \oVar II. When Ihe Cold War started. most Brazilian presidents sided wilh
Ihe United States. Starting in 1962. U.S. amhassador Lincoln Gordon kept in close
louch wilh Ihe conspirators thnt overthrcw the C.oulart government. Thus. il w.....
110 surprise thaI Presidellt Johnson immediately supportet.1 the new military
regime. The Uniled Stales authorized loans and other financial aid packages 10
help the fledgling econol11)'. II stepped up the Alliance (or Progress program thnt
technicians, Peace Corps volunteers. and other resources into the cOllnt.-y.
I he U.S. government increased training o( military officers ;:1I1d the police appa-
ratus. Brazil wns the recipient of'A'ashington's second-largest (oreign aid program
in Ihe \Vorld. Anticommunist sentiment and the long-standing unwritten alliance
closely bound the U.S. government to the authoritarian regime.
On the political (ront. Castello Branco con(ron ted many challenges. In
October 1965 gubernatorial elections, the government's handpicked candidates
in the important states of Minas Gerais and Guanabara (greater Rio de Janeiro)
lost to moderate opposition candidates. In response. Castello Brnnco issued
Institutional Act No.2 that abolished the old political partics and estnblished a
pro-governmenl parI)' (ARENA) i'lnd a new weakencd opposition part"}' (Brnzilian
Democratic Movement. MOB). The decree alsn made the elections o( president,
vicc prcsident. :Inc! all governors indirect.
.,
C,stcllo Branco (aced other prohlems as well. /\ hopetl '''1 eUlllflllH( lIplllrll (1111
not occur in 1965-66. so he was pcrsll:1ded hI c.:x!c1l(1 hhl'l't..... idlllli.IIICIIIl a )'l'.11" In
the hope that the <:collom)' \\10111..1improve. In Ihe lIllIlIlry' .. ('lIlIHlmK I'l"Ohll'lll'"
could nol be resolved even in hi" two and .1 hall )'I'al'" III nllile. Hr thi ... 111ll(' II \\,1'"
be-coming appnrenl th:11 lite milit:1ry did Ilill intelld I.) kaye 1'II1W('1 "'0 qlll( kl). III j,ll I.
the sllppose(lIy moderntc C,slelJo Bf;ln(O illslilull(lIl.lli7ed lltt' .Iuthnril.lri,\ll Iq:Illl>'
through a National Securily I.aw. exrande(1 pllwef!'o III l\'tl"nl lilt' pH...... llld ,11f'
indireci c1edion o( the ma)'on. o( m.ljor Lilies. lie OIl"" Ihe WI 01 .1 I1t'\\'
conslilution Ih;1t cudifle(llhc aUlhorilui,1II ... III lilt' IllillLlrr I"q:illw
The second lllilitar)' governl1ll'llt 01 l'lc!'oiclenl AIIIII d,l (II"!., l' \11\'.1
(IYfl7 69) hroughl all even uglier tllrn. Sooo :lller In ,1Ilt.IIH'
stated that he hoped to preside ovcr . liher;lli:t:llinn, hill ('\'('111"I'IO\'('d 1 llhl'l wi .... ,
Unl il 19f17 the authoritari;lll gOV('l'11 Illelll had <;howo t. oll ... idl'l".lhle tiller ,lilt (' Illr Ihi'
oppo!"i1ioll. at least in comparison 10 Spanish /\nH'liL,ln 1Il11il.IIT ."
the 1960s ;lI1d 1970s. Hili Inler,lllcc invilcd lll\lhili:t.1I1111l. In 1')h7 ,II1d l'IMl I'lt'
opposilion. headed h)' mounted :l ".. ric.. 01 1'1"(.le.... ". t11l1l.I>.mJ\ III 111,1'.'.
delllonstrations in (Ie landro Ih:ll \\I('rc .. ".lIked hv Ihe "nlil. ... ""lilll: ..1 ,I
sluoen!. Protests uickl), took nn n.llilln:tl ....
The hard-line military. now oppn.. illg all)' (1IIlll'lollli<;e ht'l\\"I't'1l tlCIIlI'1 1,1. \
and a "lough" governlllent. ror :l ..-r;"k1Inwll In 1111.1 I'}M( ,I ... 111..... ,1
induslrial strikes spre:td (rom f\.lin.lli Cerni .. illill the IIIdut;It'i,11 IW,llll.lIld nl \" ..
Paulo. The Costa e Silva ht.'sitalccI, thell l'e.1( hy q 1"Il):I), rq'!"t ... <;,lIg
the sl rikers. /\ pnlterll wa!" set: an ,HII horilariall go\,enlll11'111 rl'''ltrl Illg h' 11,1 I.ltl'll,ll
measures to cnrry 0111 ilS version o( rapid ('collomi .. <1c\'c1npllll'lll. 11 \\',1'" ,I grtm III
strategy hased on repression o(f;lhnr IInion<;. :wid n'llllil illg III Inrdgn 111\..... 1111.111,
:1nd high rewards (or economic lll;lIwgers.
The military alsll decided tn disband ,III ... IUtll'lll .1dIVi ... r org,uli/.ltlon... In
Octoher. the arm}' surrounded a c1;ll1dcSline L()IIVClllioll or Ihe N,lll'lll:t1 llrlll1llof
Students and arrested 1110rl' Ihnn 700 and Ie,Hkl'. l'I"OI('''!'- ill lIlt' It,tll ... 01
Congress against the eSCal:llillg wave (If repressioll ... !tulenl" nnd "Ibn
oppositionists, as well as reporls or lorlll/T. Inl 10 ;1 ... hnwdnwll Ilt'l \\'('('11 1'I (...,d.lll
Costa e Silv;l and the legisl:Hive branclt. When ,I 111.1)01"11), I,f IedlI.11
refused to lift the congrcssioll:11 imlllunity o(lwo or il!'o 1l1Clllhei t; Wltl' h,lIl t. ntil i/It!
the militnry. the government issued Inslitution;tl ALI No. t;. Oil Ik<;elllhcI II,
1968, the ruling gener:lls shul down su<;pendet.1 hahe...... 1(lqlIlS. I
the powers o( Ihe military to censor Ihe press. and curtailed t1ClllnH:ltic righl". Thl"
marked the heginning o( the most rerres!"in YC:lr.. o( millt.ll"}" rull'. whl'll 11'1'1111 1':'<;
a means to eXlract information from opponents o( the regime nltd tn Ie.lr
among those who dared challenge the diclatorship hec.lllle widesprcatl.
In 1969 Brazil was hit with new levels o( political violcnce. The lIlilit:1nt
based opposition had produced a guerrill:1 network. mainl)' in lhe (1Iie<;. In
1969. President Costa c Silva sll((ered a dehilitaling ,"lroke. 1\1 Ihe S;1II1(' tilt\('. two
gllerrilla organi7.alions ki(lnal'pcd the U.S. anlha."""tlilr. Wllllill llicy
(reed, in return (or the governlllent's releasing (1'0111 pri"'l111 rillccrl Il"hli. ,J! I'li...
IU
lf'I'"
.111,1 plIhli ... hillg 01 ,I rl'\,ullllivlI<lry ill allihe 11 lI.:dia. For tht' next luur
)',"r:-., Bra'l.il l.-.:plriLll'....t gU"ITilb \Var!(lr.:. A sllJall GH.ln: of activisls
kidllaPIJt'lllurl'igll diplulnats, holding 1Ill.:lll hustage 10 ranSOlll ollwr rc::volulionaries ill
I'I"ISOII, .Illd allt'mpl"d to sd up rural gw:rrllla activitit:s.
C;"lll'ral I:lllilio who succeeded Costa e Silva, uversaw a
growth ill tht' el"unom}' and all upsurge in nationalism. Alicr 1'J67 the
Hra'l.i1iall l'Ctl110ltly rdurn..... l 10 a growth path, duplicating tht' record of
hUlll [')(,X tu J97l 1 growth rall: av.:nlg.:d 10 pl'rce111, and l'XportS
IIlUI",' tll'lll '1u.ldnlplt-d. though to llIark Ihe elld of all era, manufactured
glllld ... r':Jllacnl ... as tIll" leadillg export prudlKt. Outside
l.lIked ultlll' wBr.lziliall Pridt' in the cuuntry <llso t'ngendcrcd support for
tIlt: Illlhtary regirnt. The naliun broke out in exuberant celebrations wht'n Brazil
WOIl lht' world dl<lIlIIJiollShip fur thl' lilird time in 'l'he governlllcnt
llllli.ltnl r\,Md ulll:.tnILtiull ill the Amazon allli otllL'r major public works projects.
l )I'tillri ... lll .111\1 a buulnillg l't"VIlUILlY strellglhl'Jled Medici's rult-.
From liberolizalion to Redemocralizolion
Hy ]IJ7) 111\' gUl',rilla IllclVt:lllellls wt.'l'e vanquished. 'rhey had exhallSIt'd their
[HlllldtJ JV:.IILJrL\":- III adlil'vl' llh.:agt'r re:-.ulls. In fact, th\'y had reinfurct'd Ihl'
,Ipparatu:. allLI Illalk (redibl.... the hard-liners' argulllent that :my poli-
lIL:lllJpl'lIlllg 11It',1l11 civil war.
Wht.'l1 (;\'II''l"al I':rnvstu lil..'i:.d (1')7'1 7'1) tIle prt'sitknq, hl' rt.'peakd
l'.lllil1 1111" a rdurn tu dt'll1oLl"aC)' and the rule oflaw.A major obstacle was the
whk:h had g.dlled grL'al inlluelH:c within the government. Their
um,lvury IlIlthvd3, il1Lluding lunurl', h"d facilitated the liquidation of thl,;' rt'volu-
tl' 'I I,ll)' iurl, but Ilad giWIl thldlll a I)owerful veto over liber.lliz<ltioll.
(;l'i'id's 10 cam... li'om his dust' personal link to
lh.. [..:g,llbt traditiun of Ca:'kllu I)r'\l1(O. Geisd saw this pru.:css not as a rcsponse to
IJII.':-.:.ur\,, Ilul lhl' WtJl killg out of a lklllOCI alk commitmenl inhe:rt::lll ill thl' rnilH.. ry
inll'rvt"lIliuII ill ['J64.
'I'll<: lundalllt:"lIl:d prubklll lor as for all the preceding military govern-
111\'111:., wa:. thl..: illabilil)' to win ,I flel.: popular election. This would nOI h;,lve
Ill,tlkrl'd it th\,o IIIHitary had lH.ol l.tkt'll tht' democrati.: rules so sniously. But tht,y
did. alld lilt' was :llll:lldless ufil11provisations and polilicalmanipula-
tu lIlah tlw vUling prefeJ"\,'lIces. oftbe problem W';lS
:-.lww/l ill O('lubL'r I whell Ihe Ile:W guvernment, in contrast 10 its predecessor,
alluwnl rdalivdy free congrt'ssioll:d dl'l:tions. The result wus a landslidl: for the
oppoSiliull party, TIlt' 1t':'SOIl dl'ar: if givt'n a choice, the public. especially ill
Ihe urban industrialized (cntns, would volt' ag'linsL the government.
The Geisel gUVl'I"l1111t'11t 1:1Ced serious economic problems as well. Brazil had
kw oil ami 1111..' sharp hikl..: ill petroleum prkes in 1974 forcl'd lhe
govt'nlJlll'lll lu pay signilll:lnll)' higher prkl..:s fur imports, which fuded inOalioll.
Hy I'1HU inllaliull was llIore thall IOU percelll, the foreign debt mounte'd, and
illduslri.ll l,ruduL.lion saggnl. I'"urthermore, industrial labor had bestirred itself in
t J .. Brazil: TIll..' AW;lkellillg (;lalll .H I
S:io Paulo, staging a series of sl rikcs ill [lJ7'J, <lnd 19HU, It:tl by II Ie charismal ie
union Ie:aclt-! Luiz lllacio cia Silva, against goVerlllllcnl wage policies. The
church, in the persun of Cardinal Arns, supportnlthe strikers and IldpL'd drama-
lize the disproportionak Sklrl' ultht: sacrillct: tht"Y had borne during thl'
The Brazilian military also faced It'llsions in its historic allianc\,' with th
L
'
United States during the adminislratiull ofJilllmy C;,u-kr ( 1977-H1). Brazil refused
to sign the: Nuclear Nun-prulift'r<lliun Trcaty, whkh cnuse:cI a rift betwcell the tWLl
(oUlltrks. Relatiolls beelllle worse whl'n Brazil turned frolll the llllikd Slaks to
l;ermany for technology 10 build nuclear rC<1(tors. The i,.,sLiL of humall rights abo
provob:d differences bdwcen Brasilia and WasllingltHI. All illtt'J'llatiollal GU1I-
paign had successfully called attention to the regillle's LISt' of lorturt" Ull polilictl
prisoners and had badly d'lInagcd its image auroad. Presidenl Cartt'r's vbit \0
ilrazil emphasized that Washington policymakcrs would not off""'r unconditional
support 10 a regime th'll torturcd its dti'l.ens. Although a break ht.'lwcell the two
Coulltril.'S did not Inh place, tilt' alliance" lh,lt had bl..:cll forgt'd at Ihe
begilliling of the twentic:.:lh ct'ntury
Bdure leaving office ill 1971.J, Gl:'isd liftcd the b.lll ull all e.-.:ibl
ligures, allO\ving thcm to rdUrll 10 Brazil. lIb l;t"n.... ral lo,lu Figueiredu
(J siglll:d an allinesty bill that frt'\,'d 1l1USt political prisiOllers alld druPI)l'lllllc
charges against many polilit:al dissidt"llls. It also granted ,mmesty to thust' govlTn-
ment officials involved in Ihe torture of cktainel:s, III all atlempt to dividt' a moullling
unified opposition to Ihe dktatorship, the govcrnlllt"llt abolished tile two political
parties and allowed lIew 10 be fOl"mt'd. It a dividt:-and-conqu.... r stralegy. th,:
govt:rJ1Hlellt backed the PSI) (Socialtkmocratk Part}'). A nlajorily 01 the
lormed the PMDU (Brazilian Demucralic Movemenl Party). Amung the nt:w pank's
s<:l Ill' was the Workers Parly, led by tU!:I, the leader of tht.' strike w.lve.
III 19S2 Planning Minister Ddfirn N('to alld Ilis ft.'lIow polkYlllakers hup"d to
an economic recovery, an iSSUe all thl' 1110re pressing since it \v,IS lu be all
dectioll )'t'<lr. Thest.: hopes were soon daslll:d b}' tht' world re:cessiull, whkh
d.... prcssed the value of 13razilian exports. At tht' Sallll.: timL', high inleresl rail'S
kept the cost of servicing the foreign debl at:l crippling level. By Ihe end of 1982,
Brazil gained the dubious honor of the largest foreign llt'bt in the world
($87 billion) and. likt: Argentina and Mt'xico, had to sLlspt'nd paYlllellls on
principal. To gel the essential loalls
n
to lIlet'1 illllllniiale obligalions,
Brazil agreed to <In IMF-architccted economic plan lhat involved :l brutal reduc-
tion of imports in orcler to eam a trade surplus.
III the midst ofa severe economic crisis, fl,r thl: fJl'stlil1ll: Hrazil
directly elected all its Sl<l!t: governors in Nuvelllber 1982. The uppusition Party of
the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDU) won a smashing victory in the 1110st
developed states, winning the governorships of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and
Minas Gt'rais. The Workers Party l1l<lde only a moclest showing in its first electoral
tJfurt. Tht: 1l1'W govel"l1J1ll'llt party, the P$U, lost cuntrol uf the Chamber uf
Oeputies, but rdained control of the electoral college, which would dlOOSt' the
new presidenl ill 1985 through indireci b.. Uoting,
J 12 PAIn TWO" <;A!'-I'. '\TlJIlIE5: UIJ\N(,E OVER I'II\IE
III massive rnohiliznliolls Ihroughout the COlllltl)' del1lnnded thaI Ihe
Congrcss pass n Inw resloring dire\.! presidelltial elections. Millions took 10 Ihe
streets <!clllnnding dirrita j(i ("direct elections now"). They fnilec! to Will a COI1-
gressiol1nl majority to change the law, and so the indirccl presidenti;11 selectioll
process took place in a very HraziliOln way. The lllOlin opposition parly (PM DB)
canc!id<lle W;lS Tancredo Neves. a skillful. politician from Minas (;cr<lis.
lie shrewdly bcg;ln his campaign for the presidency by reassuring the military of
hi" moder<ltioll. Meanwhile, Paulo M;lluf. the government party (PSD) Gln<lidatc.
alienated his parl}' hy his heavy.handed camp:lign. Enough PSI) e1eclnr:ll college
<Iclq::ntcs clcfected 10 e1cct T'lncredo.
T.\IlCl"ecio llid not live to fulfill the great hopes Ihe public hOld in him. On the
en: of his inauguralion. he underwent emergency intestinOlI surgery from whi<:h he
never rel:overed. Former sel1ator Jose SMney. the vice president elect. hecame
president. Ironically. Brazil's first civilian president in twenty-one re<lrs was n
prcvlous PSD leader and former pillar of the militar}' regime.
'1-11e hest that cmlld he said of the S.II ne}' presidency was thai the milital)' ren1aincd
on the <\Illi the presidenl W;1.S cOlllmilled to redemocratization. The l1e\\I
government implemented <l stabilization proRfam (Ihe Cruz:l(lo P13n) that imposed a
w<lge-price freeze and dmslically reduced Hrnzil's inflation rate fTom it" 198,5 high of
227 percent. The initial SlICCcs.c: of the progmm enabled Sarne}"s backers to to:l
huge viclory in the Nowmber 19R6 elections. But did nol hold, Inflalion
exploded :lg<lin in eul}' SOlrney's pOI'"I<lrity sank precipitously. <1nd by the end of
Ihal }'e:lr, his c1ectorOlI victory had turned to <1shes. The scene WOlS now sCi for "ome new
leader. cal'ahlc ofhringing new solutions to BrOlzil's pressing prohlems.
The new face was Fernando Collor lie Mello, a young Olnd previously unknown
former governor of Ihe poor northeOlstern stale of Abgoas. lie mounted a lavishly
filHlnced television-based cOlrnpaign aimed at the more Ihan three-quarters ofBra7.ilinn
hOllles with TVs. His chief opponent in Ihe 19H9 carnp"ign wns the fOrlner Inhm union
IC:ldcr 1,lliz Imkio dOl Silva. Collor won in a runoff. <llthollgh Lub's percentage of
the vole (47 percenl) had reached a level unprecedenled for Ihe left.
By lllid-1991, "fter flfleen monlhs in office, Collor proved <l biller disappoint
men!. lie had begun. a l;l '{\llin Quadrns, wilh ;l highly autocratic slyle and n
personal arrogance ill-suited to Brnzili<ln politics.
Collor chose to hel 011 economic stabilization. Unforlull<ltely, his program
relied on such short-term gilllmicks as the freeZing of financial nsselS and the
illlllledinte abolition of indexation. Goth proved ineffective after only a few
months. ny carly 1991 the stabilization plan had come "part. Innation hit nn
annual r:lte of 1585 percent. fiscal control w"s losl. "nel indexation \VolS hOlck. The
Grazilian econom}' returned to its paltern of drift. discouraging foreign "ncl
domestic investors alike.
Collor hOld also begun Oln ambitious program of neolibcml reforms. It included
priv<lti7ation. deregul<ltion, anel opening of the economy through lower tariff...
l\'Iany of these proposals aroused slrong oppositinn from industrialists and from
nat ionalisls in the Congress. The government's victory in this sphere was the
s,lle of n Illajor s'nt(' owncd mill. ",hidl grc,lIlv ilh 1'\'.1"1'11 It .. 1'11,111'< ,Ill.!
productivity once in privale hands.
Collor failed to sec <lny of his prnr-r:IIIl" through. In hltl{ 1l1nllIh.11l 1\\11 \("H.. ,
he lost his manclnle. I-lis nelllcsis provell ro h(' Ihe .... I(dc' he h,ld (,1l1lp.II)-:l1t'li
against in 1989: corruption. Investigative rcpnrlao;, a <hc:gnllltlni I'll.... itll.llll.d
hrolher. nnd "conwesc:innal illCllliry furnished pro"f 111.11 Collnl W,I" l'llllll'"h('tlll'
a vast wcb of bribery. Cllllor turned to televi"ioll lor hi" 41'1(,,11,,(, Wf"II'''U. hili I....
telegenic skills h,,<1 wnrn thin. I'uhli<" led In .1 11\11 (.11I'1'.1I);" lnl Ih,
president's impeachmcnl and renuw.ll. III I't'I.' Iht' ( h.lluhn 01
Depulie" overwhelmingl)' voted hi..: impe.1t hlllcni ..Illti ( olin' /t'<;Jpwtl nllh h"/II"
before Ihe "ppfOved Ill" lOllvktion on grnllll(l<: "I "lIll,.llm.llk.I"."" e
The vice president wlw "lllC(,l'(ll'd him W,1 .. /t.1111;11" 11.1'1l,I,.1 1Il'llWI "1"11,'1",
and politic:llnonentity whose pcrson;11 hCllleC:h' \\',1 .. 111" }.:n.Ile.... l rClllfllllll'llIl.lll"lI
But his government. which l;Jcked ;lll)' parI}' h,I"('. ,11"(1 I.h.kl'd I'nlllit ,II dlll'l IHlll
Innation s(larcd 10 :In anTlllal r:lte of 2't'J(J 11(''''. ('11 t ill j\v h'IllI ... "I"I"
conc:ensus. Br:lZil Wol" reg:llded the C:lI..k 1lI:11l III /\IIII'IH.1
THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE (199,j-PRESENTj
The government finall)' found ,In ;1I1<-hor whell I (IIl.lIlllo I kill hille' ( ,1"1....,,
hec"nw fin;lnce minister in 11)\)1. III" 1.11el11ed kd,lHlll.ll ... 1.1I11hhl'ol \,1'1
another nnti-inflation progrnlll. B'II th,,, 01H'. ':ll heltt" "lw',l 111.1'1 II .. pn
decessors, hrought inn'1lion limier lontrnl.
Cardoso capitalized nn :llld Ihe m,)"d or Ctlnlldclhc' I"
run for presidellt in Octobt.'r 1994. ()vefCtlllling hi ... P:1 .. t rqllll.,lll'" .1" .1 11'111"1
intclleclu;ll. Cnrdoso. a former sellalnr from Ihe Bra/dian ;"lIl i.d I)t'1111 11I.11 i. I',Irl \'
(PSDH), WOIl Ihe or lhe 1',11 tr, \Vil!ln111 .1 ... ignin. ,1111
righi-wing candidale in Ihe fmy, wfln penelll "I the vnlt', i.It;ilv
defealing Lula. Olgain the rllnner-llp. Tnkingofficc in I')')'.. (:"rdll".l' IOI'!.: .1,k.1Il
tage ofrublic conl1dence, huo}'ed hy .... I:lhili/alinll C:IIUl'';'' ,lilt I BI.lIir ... IIIII'It'
cedented fourth \Vorld Soccer Champion... hip Ih,' pn"IIlU.. \'('.11 111111.111\,
Cardoso's luck held: Ihe Trill remained st.,hle. ;lnt! Ihe 1111V.1117:1111111
notably stalled under Italll;lr Fmnco. picked Ill' ,,1('., Ill. '11l<' puhlic "edor dehllt
remained unsolved. hardly surprising. given the nalurc til Canlo"n ... gOVCllll11g
cO:llition 3nd Ihe built-in barriers to trimming governlllcnl ellll,l"vcct,.
\Vith Ihe specter ofhyperinn;llion gone. mnny pnor('r Hra7ill,III" clllll, Ltnr .1 p'.l1
or two. now buy theconsumerd'lr:lhles pre'vin.. c:ly In til(' wralthy ,11111111.'
middle class. For much of the country, however. Ihe l;lIll1liar "Ol i,1I I"Ohlclll" ICIll.\IIwd
hunger. iUiteracy. and ill heahh. In the midl990s. poliu' 1Il:l"c:al of pt'.I".lllt "ql,alle,"
dramali7.cd the prohlems (lfl<lndlessness. h\llthey 011":0 hdl'ed I'fI IVI Ike the gm'c'IlIll("'It
inlo ;In accelerated land-distrihution program in Br.wll, lJnllke the ,e'" III 1,11111
America, Brazil hOld re$ervcs of uncllltiv<lled $t,lle oWl1ed 1.\11,1 II t(1I1111 II",tlll>lltl.
The government's failure 10 provide a(colllpall}'ing <:('I'"\'I(e" (( redll. tr.1I1"pllrl. ,II1d
the like). however. left ne\'l' l:lndowner" 1In:1hle In lI!llr n 1111011111 ;llh- vi,lhlt'. P,-t,l'ih'
\11 J',\I{I I \\Ill .. t:A:\I .... IUIIII;:\ t II/\Nt'!
III:. ill.lllIllly (1).I ... lli...vc gnlwtll, C'lr...!usu rd.>im:d publk: supportlhrough
I \VII y ;U ... III lIlid-1 'N7 hI.' eWIl IIhlllageJ, ;'It considerable politic'll t:ost, lu push
through .1 UII.. lilutiVll.t1 ;)mlO'tu.llllettt .lllowing him to rUIl (or ff:dcction.
'111e IIl'xl year, Iw.:k began to changt'o A world financial ..:risb,
wlLi..."h III ,hi.I, hit and then llrazil. Cardoso's economic managc:rs
I ... .. pulld...d by intal'st ;'Ill...! taxt:s. stubburnly battling to
".1\'1.' Illl' uVl,v.llUl...! real. C.ll,ilaJ night as lilt." government lost $1.6
bdhllil III Illll'igll IX...-ll;lIlgl"' ...rvc.. pcr llay during the firsl two wt'eb ill
"'epklllll",I.
SUdl \\'.1\ Ih... ...Jirn>ll ..., \\'11\.'11 Brazilians went 10 Ihl' pulls ill October 19lJl! Ihat
..:allll'aign 11l,IIl<tgl'rs did their bt:st tu divert alll'lltioli from the
\\'III:l ...'rllrlg Iill..lrld,,1 t:risis, was rn:k"'l'kd wllh 53 pcrcl'nt of the voh:, with l.lIla trailing
Ullll': .Ig,till. Ulrlikl' J huwlvlr. Cardoso's victory did 110\ reflect voler confidence,
hUI rath""r ,I kar that thert' was 110 alll'rnal ivl' tu C;'lI'doso's orthodox econoJllk poliCies.
lib vktury, Cardosu W<.IS under heavy pressure from th...
JU[l'I"lI.lllllllal r....ltilidary Fund 10 IIwke hroad cuts in public sp.... nding and new
Illh':-' ill 1,lxn ,111...1 whidl h..... dutifully did. III November, Brazil
'l'ldvnl $115 hillioll in aeJits frolll tht' U.S. government ;llld international
.lg",Ill"tl\ ('.lpit.d lIighl slowed, bUI at the of economic growth (less than 1
1h'l"ll'lll ill 1991\). .lIlll hb t1nalH.:e minbter, Pt'Jro Malan, gained a
fl1'1I1.1111l11 lor 1\llIowing tll till-' leiter tht' dClll.ll1ds 01 th..... ir f...)rl"'ign (:reditors.
( ... "lll . lIy Ih",Il\IF.
1... 0'111111 .... ... OlllllHll'd III Iltl' lIew year. C;;lpihd flight ill C<.lrly January
.Iuder,llnltu $b Lilliun. \VhC:1l a t.1t.:\'almllioli ofK percel1t l'ailt'd, the
C"'lIlr.d H.lnk filially ...Iecid..... d tu !lvat tIll' relli. Br.lzil's curren(')' lost more than 40
J'lI\.. l111 Ih... dollar, althuugh il :.UUll al 25 percent.
Till' lerlll was spent dt:speraldy avoiding a
IId,lUlt 'Ill till' IOl"t'ign tkht. i\ IIltld""st push 10 strengthen ...,I ..... melllary cducalion.
11l.:gk":ll'd lJy gUVl'fIlJllt'1l1S, otherwise lhe JIlust
'llJlahll' "llli.d g.dn. Till: highly l'r.lgllllIII ...d party till,: 01" vt'ry
I'lrllli .. ,r"..., dl'dural law:. -Ilhldl' diflindt the of controv...'rsial laws,
1,1.\ v, rdurlll. Slllh reforlll was needed because Brazil's
I.IX bu,dlIIII.1l1 rbc.IIIU 10 pl'rLelll o(tllt: CDI'. olle orthe world's highestll'vds,
.1lHlthe pllhli( pl'O:.iOIl rUllning a current 3111lU;}1 deficit of over $20
billion.
Th.... C.lr... t:luuumil record mixed. A stubborn adlwrence to an over-
l'.dul'llull"Iellcy haJ led to a spet:ulativc crisb in 1998-99, which climaxed in a 20
Pl'l'...'...'lIt d",v,du..tliull. Thl' prc:ct:ding overv.>lualiun discouraged exports und led to
ulhalt of Brazil's furdgn exchunge reserveS. The flC:Xt pre-sidenl would face
.1 hug.... loreigll dd)t .me.! thl' thn,'o.lt of new specuJative attacks un Brazil's currency.
Iluwever, coulJ bt' justly pruud democratic proceJures were scru-
vh:'''''1 ved tllrouglluut h b despite widespread skepticism about
til ullivilhln guv..... rnlllcnt gt:llc:r;lJly, further distnncing Brazil from its still
I' 'elll .. utllnrit,1I iolll pas!.
Brazil's First Working-Class President
The three prim:ipal for presidl'llt ill the 2002 w..... re Sl'rr.l.
supported by the Clrdoso government; I.ub, of the P.. rty; and Ciro
Gomes, a populist candidate from th... Northeast. The GlIl1p.llgn was lllarreJ hy
Ilear panic in the linancial markets. Thc GlliSl' was le,Ktion III
early lead in Ill(.' polls. Lula was the ex-machinist and union Il'.llkr who had hdped
found tht.' leftist Workers Parly during till' militaf)' rille :lml who run umuc-
..:cssfully fur president thn:c tilll ...S. the dcUiull ..tpplu;lc.hed ill 1.11 ... "' 2002. l.uLI
had striven in this campaign to appt'3r t1wd('rate, g.lthcfing the h.ICklllg ul ballkill
b
and industry leaders.
Lula WOll the fin;ll Vole (tht're W;\:;, a mllull "galll:.1 jlllillil>al UPIH)IlCllt,
Cardoso's health miniskr, Jose Serra) b)' all lll.lrgin. Thl' millivns of I'T
faithful whu had fought for the rdum of dl'lllo...:raq' could at vktnr)'.
now had its lirst genuinely working-dass prl'sid..... nl. Thc new presidl'llt
astuunded nil by choosing orthodox ligures for kl')' ... policy
such as the finance minisler ;llld tlil' dirl'ctor of th..."' Celltr. ] Itlllk. Illtl:'rnatiollal
financial circles w'lrml)' tu I.ula's lllOdera!l" Furdgn
upgraded Brazil's credit f;lnking, alld lhe govcrnlll"'"'llI adll\\'l.'d a s;lti:.l.lCtol"y
lui a exerts a magnetic effect on crowds. Here he greets well-wishers during celebrations
for International Women's Day (March 6, 2004). (Evaristo SA/AFP/Getty Images.)
.'4(, PAnT TWO r.ASr C!lI\N<;F OVEn TIME 11 HI:l/il rile Aw.lkclling (01,1111 \ I"
primary hudget surplus in lhe firsl two yenrs. as required b)' the International
Monetary Fund. Brn7.il exceeded its third-year tnrgct nnd paid off its 1M F debt in
full h)' 2005. Iwo ye:.lrs "hend of schedule. The new government also continued
monelflry policies of the previolls :ldministrnlion 10 restrain inn:ltionary trenels.
Fnvnrablc export enrnings nf ngricultural goods also strengthened the economy, as
Brnil beGlIllC the !'econd largest soybean exporter in the world <lnd elhannl
production from sugarcane expnllded significnlltly.
As part ofa poverly recluCliQn plan. the Luln government also stepped lip efforts
inili:lted under the Cardoso aclministration to benefit the poor. The new program,
fl,lI11Cd B(lisn Familin (F:llllily Grant), gives direct transfers of small funds (abollt
thirty five dollars a month) to low-income families who cOlllmit to keeping their
children ill school :lud taking Ihem to regular he;llth checkups. It stal1ed 0(( under-
funded and burdened by poor adminislration and chaolic coordination with other
government welfare programs, hut now reaches II million families and more than
4(1 million people, a ll1:ljor porlioll of the cOUlltry'S low-income population.
Thi" new progri'llll l1li'lde the Lula administr.ltion extremely popular, espe-
cially i'lIllong Ihe impoverished sectors of the Norlh{'flst and olher ;Jreas of the
<.ountry where Iherc rellli'lins a signilic;lIlt gap between the rich and the poor.
Over the course of 350 years, slave Iraders brought four times as many Africans 10
Brazil than to the United States. Today Brazil has the largest Afro-descendant
population in the Americas. Throughout the colonial and national periods, there
has been consideri1ble racial mixture; al least one-half of the population has some
African ancestry.
Yet a racial hierarchy persists, and the darker one's skin, the lower one is likely
to be on the socioeconomic scale. During the 1970s, a new dynamic black con-
sciousness movement reaffirmed Brazil's African cultural roots and demanded Ihat
the society address long-standing pattems of racial inequality. In the 1980s,
Governor leonel Brizola of the state of Rio de Janeiro appointed Afro-Brazilians
to imporlant government posts. During the Cardoso administration, the federal
government began to discuss measures that could overcome the palpable gaps
between those of European descent and those of African or mixed racial ancestry.
In May 2003, President lula appointed Joaquim Barbosa Gomes, a prominent
Afro-Brazilian lawyer, to the Supreme Court. The highest court in the land was no
longer a bastion of white political dominance. In recent years, a debate has ensued
about the best ways to address entrenched vestiges of racial inequality through
affirmative action programs and other initiatives to ensure more open access to
higher education and employment. As Supreme Court Justice Barbosa Gomes
observed about the society in which he grew up. "Racial issues were taboo_
Brazilian society had a false ideology that this was a racial paradise: The nation,

Overcoming Racial Disparities
II
Greatcr investment in higher educi'ltion i'llso WOli hackill14 h)1 ot Ihe Illldtilc
c1ilss. The left wing of Ihe PT. howevcr. hillerly flttacked 1.111.1 ;llld hi .. n' 111"IUI,
orthodoxy for having perpctmled n fri'llld 011 his pUly nnd Ih(' nation.
In mid-200S. Braz.iI rocked h)' a of revcl.lliml" in .. ill,1 .d'<l1I1
government corruption infesting the PT. I\n inveslig;llion illio 1'0.. 1 olhu: (ll'n.1
tions revealed that the PT congressionallendership had h(,(,ll hUVlllg
votes with cash of uncertain origin. The goal wa" to gllar.lllle(' ,I (111):11"..... 1011.11
majority on bills for which the governlllt'lll lackcl \.'!HIUgh vole" 10 win hon(' ... II\"
Charges pointed to memhers nf the inner urcfc of 1111.1'" ):(l\TIIIIIlC'1l1. IIh IlIdlll1:
Jose Oircell. the former student ;\Ild J{uerrilla 1c;l(ler. who hnd 1Il(l\Tl! Ihl' I'r III
mnclemle positions as Ihe prel'idenl of the p;lrt)' in Iht' II}'JII.... "-lIllllenl" Ilw lt lilt .11
superiority of the PT Wi'lS gone. Lub \\1:1" now elllllc"hed ill the "('.llI1V "Ide ",
Brazilian politics. which the PT hnd cbinwd if wlluld ncvCI ("lltl'l. R.lllu .llletl \\'1111'"
memhers of the PT quit (or were expelled) :lIld c"tnhli .. hcd :I ncw 1':11 h'. 1'\,,111'.111 \
of Soci:lliSIll nnd Libert)'), thnl altracted Ill.lll)' 1''1' t1i"'i'lfkl let! dh..idcllh
Ch;lrges of corruption or lIlisuse of power ag.llll .. t I'T !c.IlII'I ... IIl,wnn. r... n I
Ill;lll:lged 10 re"ch Luli'l. who. likc I{on:lld RC;'Ig.lll. h,I" hC('1l (".11l('e1 IllI" ,.(1"11
In the 200(, presidentli'll c1Clllllll". h(" "Iunt! tl"\V1I IIll' ,h.dl'I1):' 10\"
Cieralclo Alckmin. the ex-govcrnor ofS:1O !'.tt1ln. niHil he .... mdu\.llc In 1111 I "lll.lIld.,
Ilcnrique pari)'. III Ihe firsl roul1d nf Ihe prT..lllcIIII.11 \-011111:, 1111.1
received 48.61 percent of the hallols last. J\lcklllill f.,:.lfllelc11 ,II (, p lll"lll ..111.1
PSol candic!:tte l-Ic1ois:l IIc1cna receivcd (d': pcrcell!. III Ihe "1'( flU.! 111.1. 1111.1
picked up 60.$ percent hI "\9.1 peru'1l1 (If the lnh' ...
In his sccond terlll in orticc,l.ula prnl'l..:d hllll ..df:l .. hnwd .lIull'I,lgUI.III'
reformer. fnr from the rcvolution<lf)' ftgme depided hr IllS dC11 ,Illnl". I k h.I'" "pCIl!
much lime ;lbroad. I.ulns nllenlioll 10 forci}.:n aff.lir .. 11.1" rdnful1cd 1;1".1111' .. lOll}:
term i'lspir:ltioll 10 bccnllle ;'I allil wnrlll k:ufcl. 1'.11 Ill}.: ,I lllllllh I 1\1111
Bolivin in early 2006 over what newly elecled pr('."i,I('1I1 EVil 1\1111".111'" 1"Il'-l,!cr,.1
natural g:lS l.ul;\ IH'golinkd ;1 ncw OIgll'(,I11('1I1 111,11 1'1"
vided Bolivii'l (which supplies p.... rlC'nl nf Brazir.. llntllral f.,:,I.'.) wilh 11111. II 111'11"
favor"hlc terms" The Lui;, ..dminislralioll h,lS also .. llu_I' .... iull\' ,11.llkl1gnl I J:.
trnde policy through Ihe World Trad(' .. lll.ll g.l\. 11111"'111
subsidies to U.S. coli on fMmers vinlnle inlernal inll.ll ,lgnclllcnl". 1111.1 ... Inodl I.llo'
policies (ill compi'lriSOll to thosc of II1Igo (:h.Il'(,/) and hi .. gnvC11111lC'1l1 ". 1\ 111
ingness 10 head the UN pe,lLekeeping fon_I. .. ill 11,1ili. nlhell lrilill/l'li .11 11'IIIH-.
rencct erforts to present nrazil ns i'l .. IT14illn.d leader. HI.III!,.111 dll'll<
I11nts have so far unsuccessfully lohhied the f<'ading wodd I'tlWCIS 10 lIw
country a permanent position on thc UN :\ccnrily Cnnn'll. hili Ihe dlllll II."
gained substantial support in recent YC'i'lrs.
Nonetheless, Brazil remains, as it has for decOldcs, if not I.cnlllflC'''. ;1 1.1nd "I
problems. Some are symptoms of ils i'l" an "c!llcrging \\lUI'>l'
demogmphic growth has outdisli'lllced its i'lhilil y to gellerate Ihc maIer 1.11 n'", 11111 ,."
that sustain a modern snciely.l\1thollgh l:ln(1 redi!'trihlilioll h,.., IIIllt':I ..cd dill Ill!:
Ihe last deci'lde, in pMt dlle In 11I"C' ..surc hy Ihe L"lIlclle.. 1'1';'I":l111" f\lmrlllllll. 1111.11
\1:-1 1'.\111 IWlt 1,\ ... 1 ,\IUIIII,\{ IIAN'.1 uVLI( 11i\1I
Ill.VCII)' 1..11111111111'" III bc 1..'lllkllllC 'I'hl.' 1I111'qual di:.tributioll uf "'I'illth, :'Ullll.'
1llIlde.. 1 g;lill:' ;lIlHJl1g llll' Itl\ver-incOllll' pupulntion, contillues, Unclllplo}'lllent
.tlld ulldl'rl'lllpluyllh.:111 rt:lllalli high, Urban vivlen..:l.' flll'kd by poverly illld drug
I'rilll;Jry and puhlic educalion is undedundl'll. Many
IIl1ddll..- 1..1.1:':' lamilll'" lhdr childrl'n Iu privak' schoob in orllcr tv prcparl.'
thclll hi thl.' UllllpdillVt: lvllc:gl.' t:ntr.uKt: l'X:lmS thai ",ill guarantl.'l.' thl'lIl a
lin' l,dul..tllOll ,II J.lld
St Ill. lI11' HI :lillian 1.:":01\(111)' has diversified ::'Ignificantly. The export of agri-
I..llliural prodlll..-I:. pruvidl.'s foreigll earnings, as long as international pri..:es
rClII,llll Illgh, Hra/il bn\lllll'.1 leading IJrudllu:r of dhalll)l and ha::. developed
. kollol Iud tl'dlllulugy 10 Il'place pdl'uh:Ulll in the transportation The
1"1..',l'lIl .1I111Iltlll":l'IIll'1I1 uf I.lrgl' vffshull' uil Illay dimilliltc any fUllln:
dq)CIllklll-)' till IOll'lgn tvtajor itS and Vall'
d" I{ill DOl-c, ulkr guud:. .lIld .... 10 natiollS throughout tht.' whole world.
HI.lnl I:' ,'Xp.lllllllig II:. nlll' III Afril.a thruugh il\volving ilssistanCl.' ill
.lgn,ulllJral prodlidlulI, nIU(aliun, and health Mure: than I\....u decadl:s of
dl...II.II..I.llh. gUVlIII,IIII.C: II<lVl'lulltrihull.'d to ccontJlllic stability and strengthened
Ihal Br.Ild to pby a lIIurt: important inlernational role.
HI.lnl' .. IUllll\.."'
PART THREE
..-....
Themes and Reflections
12
..---
Strategies for Economic
Development
E
vcr since I he independence CI":1, 1.,Ilin 1\ l1ll'riL:' h.l.... l'.H Ill'''' h' ""llgll I p,lI h \\ .1\",
to C(Ollf'lllic I.e,ukr....1lui, it i Il' II' ;111kl' 1.,1\'1' ('''p' HI ... ",I .1 WI' It, I
of vicw$. positive nod IlCA<llivc. ahout the legion .... 11,11111,11 ('lldn\VllH'lIh, lllllllolll
rCSOllrccs, tlild Cl"e;1l!vc capahilities. But the)' h,l\'l' ,lglenl 1I1'flll thl"
Ilced (('II" e(feclive puhlic poliq'- Ihill is, lor gO\TrllnH:l1l.lI pr"IlH.linll lIt ... ,,, Il'1.11
improvement, slruclural devc!01'11ll'111. anti (olkdivc \\'cll heing 1"W.l1,III1I'.I'I1'1.
I.:llin I\IllCricnll clites have 111Hlcrl.lkcll ,I rCIlLlrk.lhlc <'11< 11' ...... Il.11 llf <" 1"
ccnnnrnil expcriI1lCIlI<;. 1'.11"11)' .1" .1 r{'""II, lil., 1l11llICllwlll.l1.Oln .. I ,',1> 11 n,'\\
ugr;lnd dc::.ign" ha::. provoked lIhlpi.lll eXI'c\ 1.11 III II" Nil\\"..11 1. .... 1.1\1' 11,,101 I" I', f"
the Promi::.ed I.<lfld! h;1\ led In;l r('knl"':-... I y\ Ie "t b"I"'" .111,1
crush ing 11 h,1'_ n.'vc;ll('d. ,I'" \\'0'11. IIll' 1,.'1 "l"klll t' .lll' I 11 ... 1111'11. ,. ,d
1"llin AmericOln
nllr gnnl in this chaplcr is tn 1111' .... ''111.'11\('. \llnklll, .JIlll OIII\.lIllt.>I
the prOlllinclll experiments. Th(' (II", n ...... l' III f,,\ 11"('''' I'll t, 'III I tl,111l ... 11
or
economiL lihcrn1isfll, dnflliflaf11 IHlfll Ih. Illlollgh Ih,' I'J.1("'.
illlporl-suh::.liltllioll ifHhl ... lri,lli1:1Iitlll, ill \'0):111' rllllllth. 1'1 \11.., th.

e::.pcci;lll)' signiflcanl from tl1\' 1
1
':,0.. through 111 .. '''1m... , .Ifld
n<.'oliberalisl1l, innuenlial fmlll tll<.' 19'/(1\; III Ihe 1'1','\;1'111
Each of these doctrines <;pcdflL P\.lll il's fIll' ('<.1'11"11111 I\dl heilig, 'I Ill'\'
offered diffcringexplnnalions nfthc rCOlsoflS IIII' the rcgloll'" IIIHkltll'\'r!I'I'lllt'nt .'1
Over Ille rJ11l,th('y e:lt:1l pr'H111<;('.I10 pnlnHl!(' hl".111 )".lIlgl',1
prot.:esses of nnly In ct:t>I1(lmi, gn,\\'th hili .11"0 III
c1iminalc poverl)', reduce illCqu:llil)', promfl!C dfl\icllt}', :l1ld illll'llllT 1IIl'
The term idco/(IRY (or e(nnnrmr ,!e"d"I'"ll'lll) ]... herr I" .'''1 ""u,,",.'l>'!v ","
slSlelll hod)' (I( bdic(s, i(leas, "I' 1""lnl "I' '1Illl'q,,I, 11,.11 I" I,I"", t .,1 'II ., I'10"1< .,
economic I'liRht amlIn indicale t "re'
,'.: 1'''1 I I 11IU I .. I Jt I hI! "A IJ 10/ I I
... "lIdlll< III" III ..Vl1 )'d.l) Ilk. I hl')' .. lid lIul 311l.1..",nL But ..V..... II 30. thl.'r.. is cunsillt-r.lbl\:
lilglllly III 1..11111 AIlh:I"IC.I'3 I-UlItJllllillg "llIle::.t fur ;'11I-cllI..olllp,assing solutions.
\V..lllI ... .ldtllll.1 11IlJltil:lld..... d :l1'pnl.11-11. 'I'he ('hapkr presenb a combination
Ill.11 hi::.l"r)', pulky an:lI)'3Is, ,lIld 3udolugkal ubserv'ltioll. As iI
1\ ""xlllorl':J th.. pulitkal dill1leJlsiul1::' uf Latin AlI1l'rica's long-tl:'l"Ill t"'H1S
k,lllI,ttiul1 uver Ihl' cl'lltur)' and a hall:
NARRATIVES OF BACKWARDNESS
( ....llll.dl) ::'pl.tl...lllg.l're::.niptluJl::.lur 1.:1-011UllIic poli ... )' r"'quire lIlH.h:r3tandings of
Ihl'lllllhll'lll:-' 111.11 11 .....d Iu bl-' llvt'rUJllll.'-:lnd thi::., ill turn, demallds a diagnosis of
11;\::.1 r.ldul ... 1111::.t,lkn, alhl we.lklles::.e::.. Celltral queslions thu::. :lrosl,;": \Allty W;.lS
I.atlll AIIII.:II ... :! l.Jgging su 1'.. 1' behinJ Europe alld the United States? What could
,I ... II III II t lor th.. n:gioll'::, l'U>1101lIic b,lCkw;,lnln\:ss? Less offensive tl'rminology
rd...llnl ill .. k.ld lu p.ltkrn::. uf -ulIdt"r...l\:vcl0pllll.:'nt." -dda)'t'll development," or
MI,lll' lIulu::.triali/.IIJOIl"-Inll all Ihese l:uphclIlbms Illt'ant prct\)' 1I11ICh the same
thing.
'1111" \\',h .111 Ullplc.l!'>.lltl la::.k. ExplainlJlg failure b no fUll. It b much
.Iglll-allll It' ... tlIl!'>trult 11.ltional 1"lrr.lti,,{s around tho.: notion of
III ... Iv I..ilill Allll.:rica. lor l'xaillple, Unill'd has shaped its
1',1111, fll ...... ltl1)' arUIlJlt1 pllliti...:al and l'nlllOmic achicV(:lllcnt. 1:1'0111 its bcgin-
."" "".1 lily upun .1 hill," .l( .... ur.. lillg 10 this "iew, lilt' United Slates has
1'1 t/"hkd ,I 1ll'.ILOII lur d,,nIO(r;.lC)' around the world; and as a
l.'ltllhllll)'. II !Ia.. di::.phl)'l...1 th.... virtue::. 01 individU:l1 cllterprist' and tht" capi-
vc...UI'. hut tht')' ..Ire minor (nolwith::.t:lnding Ih....
(;le.11 Ih'pl III Ih.. IlJ3lh .lnL! the cconomh.- of 2008-9). The
1I11dl'II)lng tl'l-'nd I ... 31..' ..'11 a:J ::.tl.:'.td)' iniproveillellt. Amtric.lll citizens hav..,
illluibl',1 .. I . .t... uf um'ndillg progres!> throughoul their lives.
lhll ll.tliulI.d 11Iyll1OIogy rq)l' .... slnls a hroad consensus.
(,,".. id\'r, IlIl'o, 1Ill' dl:llh.-ng..,::. faced by Latin AlIleriGl. III ord..:-r to point the
'\,1) tow.lrt! .1 hl'lh:1 htlun: .Ilhtly:-.b lIt'l:ded tu identif), the sourcc::. of f;'lilurt:.
011... IlIll' 01 IIlIt'I prdaliun 1..-...1 10 rcllJltl ....ss litallit's of self-laceration alld self-
I-OIHI,,llllhlliull. In ,I prullllll.... nt uuuk t'lliitied Nues/rtl infc:riuru/ad ccollom;t:tl
(lhll I.l-ullvnll... lllkriorily, IlJI2). the Chil ..an writer Fr;.lncisc.:o Encinas explained
III .. the r""sult uf weak habib, and valu....s-
thelll ...... lve::. Ju.., II> poor h.... rldit)' and had l-duGltion. An alternative vicw gave way
tv .... q,..gu.ltiJlg: Ihl' prubklll Iit:s nul ill uursdvcs, but ill the rest of the world. In
1I11l' way lIr anolhl.:'r, Ihe rl'giofl'S rdativ..' underdevdupmenl was c;.lused by Spain,
I'urtugal. tIlt' United Staks. ur th... glob:.!ll.:'conomy aS:l whole.
b"l.'lltially. ,Ill .Ku:ptabl .., narrative rt'quired SOlll..... villains. Potenlial culprits
\\'lTl' lIt/t harll til find. 011.... W;.IS the Cilholic Church. denounced for duping
\\'II .... il!lo ::.elklllg uth... rwurldly 1I1slead of worldI)' profits.
AIlUt/I""1 1111.: Indian hl'l'ilage and th... supposed burden of indigenuus tradi-
tilll"". Slill :lllOtht'r was thl' Unilt'd Slatt:s, ao.::ust:d of l.:'COllOlllic exploitation
,
throughuul til(' rlgiull.l\s the Nkxil:an writ!;'r lJ.mid Cu!'>iu OIlu' ub::'l-'n'l'd.
til .... of suspecls eXlended in lllany direci
Why is til........ lllll\,.h \... su III11Lh pO"l'II)' 11I lhb f,IUlllull!> 1.IlId ?
Ah. S;Jys olle-it is the pricsh' fault; anollwr blame!> iloll till' mililary; :.1 ill oth r"
011 thl' Indian; on lit" foreiglwr; on delllon.IC)'; un dklalorsbip; Oil
011 ignurano:; or finally Ull divino: pUllbhl1lo:nl.
In Ihc end, economic backw;,lrdnt:'ss might simpl)' be ;lm,lll ... r uf(;od::. will. Wh.lt
could be more
Tu Iheir defllal uedit. hvwlevcr. L.ltin I\meric.llb Il .... V\:C gave lip. Ovel I hI.'
..kcadl-s, tht:)' continued to st:..... k He\\' ::.olutiulls to ago.: old probll'lIls. III the faLl' ur
changing cin.'ulllsl:lIlCcs and ..'conumie ...riso.:::., the)' IlHlde '"l'I)..... ,lIed .lllelllpb lu
cum..... lip with inlHwative policies. Whl'ther or flul Ihey "'ere succ..... ssful is SUlllt>
whal beside the point. Th..... distinctive fact b that Iht'y kept on trying.
tht" rl"cord will ::.huw. wtill AlIIl'fica prcsenll:'d itself as:t 1,lboratury fur
a remarkable range of economic cxp.... rilll ..llb. This lll<lke::. fur hislur)'.
In comparison. it i::. wOrlh noting th"l the Unitt'd Stall's lIa::. nt'ver fl.1t the llc..d 10
shift course from its (;Ipitalist. puth. In cOlltrast, Latin Ameril.';!
unde-rtaken;.l relentless. set"mingly .. "ndl.... ::''''ardl for programmalic th:ll
would cure all the region'::. l'l.'Ollomil..- iIIs-" ulopia ul" In ils d""lt'l'IlIinatiull,
Ihe clfort our adlllir;'ltion.
THE LIBERAL ERA (1 BBO,-1920,)
It \\',1::,1I0t until a lull half c..... nlury after illdep"llden(e that L.llin "Iu ri(;.l emlll"I.. ..-d
ils grand slrakgy for achil-'ving pro::.p..... ril)'-lh..... dOdrilll.:' of 1- ollomiL liber.
alisill. Thb Gllll .. about as til ..... 01 ,I timely l.'unVl'rgcllt.:l' bclw"'t'l\ hleulugy .tlld
OPPorlllllily.
I.. kological ill:-.piraliun fur t'COllUlnic laJlle rn:tinly frull1 Eurupt'. III
the conlext of inknsiw political chang...... eigllll-cnlll-(Cillury tlJillkl.:'rs proclaimcd
the llt:ed 10 economic ;\Ctivity from illiposo:d by church andl
ur stale. Extolling til\: virtues of pcrsonal rn:\:dOlll, they argued Ih"t the pursuiL of
indivit.lual self-interest would llla.."<.imize productivil)' ,Ind thercfor.... bendtt Lhc
enlire community. As Adam Smith (J 723-90) declan:d ill '11'l' Wl!(I1,11 of NatiollS
(1776). privale profiL and collective wdf:.!rc would come tog..... lht'f und\:r th\:
guidanct: of the h:lnd"-a mechanism that economists
denne as workings of mar-hI." natural interplay of supply and demand
would therefore optimize outcomes for citizells and nations. Govcrnments
not intt'ffcre unduly in this process (hellce th\: terlllitiissez-j'irl!, or it
The key to prosperity was liberty.
Commerce played an essentinl role in this worlJ"i..-w. In an aa when mon-
archical governml'nts roulindy placed extremely tighl on Iradc-
through licenst:'s, quotas, and tariffs-liberal economists call .... d for openm'ss.
Nations should be able to trade with each oth\:r Oil the basis of" lIlulual
i
I!
I"
1'i\In'TIIRH e T1lrMISi\NIlIlHlfo.CTlONS
III the words of David Ric;lrdo (1772-1823), every n;ltion should concentmtc upon
its "comp;lrative cxporting good<; th:lt it could produce most che:lpl).
and importing goods that it could not. All nations stood to gain from such
trans'KOons. (The classic eXOlmple involved the exchange of Portuguese wine for
English cloth.) According to this logic. trade was not a zero-sum game; it could be
good for everyone.
Economic opportunity C;lllle to L.,lin Allleric;l 011 the heels of the Industrial
Ik\"olutioll. By the mid-nineteenth centul)'. the process of industri;llization in
Engkmd and continental Europe was creating strong demand for agriculturnl
ClIllllllOllilies and raw malerials. Embracing the precepts of Smith ;lnd Ricardo,
I.nl in 1\ nlericnn leaders hCg;ltl 10 pronlotc the exportation of foodstuffs and minemls
in exchange for the import;ltillll of lll:JllllfnCltlfcd products from ahroad. Instead of
dosing the region off from olilside influence, as Spanish and Portuguese coloni;ll
rulers had attempted. liberal policies would exploit the compnrative advnntage of
regiollnl resource endowlllellls through inlensive interaction wit h the industrializing
center" of lhe \..:odd econolllY, t r;1<I(' ;md la;.(."('z ja;t"{ h('<:;lI11e the catchwords of
Ihe d;l.y.
I.ihcrali."m thus hec;l.l11e a dominant ideology throughout the region, Citing
Europcan theorists, it." proponent." conlldenlly proclaimcd that Ihe internntional
division of lahor wns Mnaturnr (or decreed hy divine intervention) nnd lhercfore
optil11:l1. Any tleviatioll frolll it" dictntes would he foll}'-reducing trnde and
therehy reducing incollle. Allempls at prolective tarif(" were bC;l.ten hnck by
politicians who argued thaI l..,tin Allleric:l wa." not well 'wiled, either hy its
resource... or h)' it" relative position. to violate the principles of free
trade,
To some degree, lihernl economic pnlicies achieved their ftlndnlllental goals.
The major Latin I\merican countries underwent startling transitions from the
1880s ollward. Argentin;l, with ils vasl and fertile {ltllllpaS, became a lending
exporter of ;lgricultuml and pnstornl goods-wool, wheat, and beef. I1mzilunder
went a slrong hut short-lived rubher hool11, and was a large-scale producer of
coffee, Chile resuscitated the production of copper. nil industry that h;ld fallen inlo
decny in Ihe postindepelldencc years, Cuba produced tobncco and coffee and,
espccinlly. sugnr.l\'lexico cnl11e to export a variety of raw materinls, frolll henequen
to copper and 7.inc. Afo developmenI progressed. inveslment Oowcd into Latin
America from the industrial nations, particularly England. In return, Latin
J\merican<; purchnsecl European textiles, machines, luxury items, Olnd other fin-
ishe<:l goods in steadily growing qunntities. In prnctice. liberalism was effectively
promoting exportimport development,
But there were contradictions too. Like many ideologies, Latin American
liberalism was nn import. Its principOlI sources Iny in Englnnd and France,
Unlike those countries, howevcr. Lntin America had not undergone significant
industrialization by the middle of the nineteenth century, Latin America therefore
lackcd the social structure th;lt had nurtured lihcr;llislll in Europe. a fact th"t wns
hound 10 Icad to different outComes.
11. Stl.11l'JW'<; lnr h 1l1l0l1lH I )n..lI'I'"l('ll1 P.',
Key debales about cU)llomil policy in I..,tm I\lllel"lt..1 wCU' I,ngeh' 1t'''lllIlt'd 10
the elites, hcre defined a<; that uppermost slr,ltlllll (It'<;<; Ih'1I1 peHC'1l1 til thl'
population) that had thc powcr and wealth to control politic.11 dcci"inn m.lking .11
local lind nationalle"e1s. Their commitllll'llito liheralism \\'.1" uHnplic.lIl't1 hy tlt'l,\,
seated rncinl prejudice. The)' viewed their native (;lIld "bw) pnpul:lIinns .1<; Illtdlct
tually and morally inferior. This conviction chnllengetl an ullllerlying a:-slIlllpl iOIl 1.1
Iibernlism: faith in the rationality and enterprise offellm... e..iti,en". In Hra,iI,llfllill
ci.lIls had spent years juslifying ,\frieall on Ilie..' gl"(llilltl" Ih.lt il \\.1\, .1
necessary evil for the n;ltioll\ tropical. agr:lI"ian c<.t>nl)IlI}. Si III d.ll" ,lr):IlIlIl'lIl" 1.111"
nnlizcd the continuing oppression of indigclloll!> (lllnllllillilie<;
America. In lillie these prC(lc(tlpatlon" L:llllt' h:lt.k tIl h.IUIII Ill<" Ilher.ll"
In response to t!lesc c1iles lhroughout Ihe rer.inn CII\'I"lolll,d
Europe:lll illlllligration ;lS the solution tn their lack of skilled 1.1hnr. They p."11(11
lilrly preferred immigmnt." from northern F.IlropC. Illilling Ih.11 h.lhil<; III "elf
rcli;.IIll:e nnd entrepreneurship -Ihr hallrn.lTk<; nl the lihcf:ll,,' 1(1c.11 t01lld 11111\
be rcinfo!"l'etl in L.,tin Irllnitnlly. or lUIII"e, IIii' \, ....1 1II,ljnlll\" 0111111111
gr;lllts L:lme instead frolll southerll !-.ufOl'e llotly, .. IIHI 1'''llllg.11
A...lding 10 douhts W:l\,:l colleL!l\'e infcillonty (II' Ilnlll 1111'
1920s. I...,tin American ellte<; frequentl)' t1c<;ll"ll'l{'tl Ihelll"ehT...1" lillie I1lnll' 111,111
illlil:ltors of European culttlre. For Ihe Iropit.11 Cllllnlfle<;.tllclI \\ol"lle<; ah"lll 1.111'
were reinforl:cd oy concerns :,hollt dim:lte. whkh Fllrfll'c.1n 11Ieon<;l<; (IHl<;l.lIllh
dilimed could nevcr support :l high L!v!li7.."ltion. bnvll"lIll111t'nt.11 tlclCllllllll"nl 11111"
reinforced racial detcrminism..1Ilt! the' ctllllhill:llinn :IppCilfed In d"'qll.llll\" Illill h
of the region ;lS a !'tage for reali7:ltion of Ihe I,heml tlre.llll.
Despite their fnith ill free markel!>, I';ltin ,\meriL.I's liheLd" Il ...... igIlCtl t1I1U.t1
responsibilities to Ihe stnte, Uncler thcir leadership. in f:lLI. Ihe liher:ll !>talt' Iliok
deci!'ive !'teps to filcilitate ilnel suslain the region'." new ill"crlioll inlo Ill(' ('\olvill):
world ecollom)'. EspeCially in former (enler!' of Ihe Spani."h cmpire. Ihe "(,111" \','1
Ollt to ro), neofeudal rCmll<lllts of coloni.11 the "II lit III 11,11 rllll.I):C
ilnd privilege thai threalened to inhihit Ihe devdopllwlll nl capit:lli"lli. ()IH' kq
;lchievcmcnl \Vas to reduce the economic power of Ihe C.llhnhc Chllrt h. 1,.I,lhll
l;lrly its hold over lane!':l step that opcne(1 lip fin:lIKi:l1 lll:lrkels :llltl cllahled Ih('
emergence of profit-orienled ngricult lIral clites. III Me), KO :llltl 01 her LOtlntl il... Ihe
granting of individual land litles wilhin traditipnnl Indi:ln cOllllllunil jc" hOlt I .1 tlll.11
effeCl: one wns to make high-qu;llity land ;lv;li!:lhlc for pllrch:l."c and illlclqllll ,II it on
inlo commercial haciendas; another was to create :llandlc,,<; lilhoring cla<;<; :l":til.lhif'
for employment as peones. In addition. the liheml ... t;lte nclivclr comte(! forcign
investment. espeCially for the development of infr:ll;lrllctllre, ;1Ilc! p:lTlindarly Inr
railroads. In Argentina the government actll;llly gUil!"Olnle('d a nllilimal profit
margin to 3 British railroad concession; in Mexico thc governmcnt evenlll,lll}'
purchased a majority share in railwaY-". not so much for the purpose 01 (fl'.lllIlg.1
slnte enterprise as to rescue the indehle<l companies.
The liberal state assullled considemhle responsihility fror tilL' lahor Inrl c.
Wherever workers wcre s(arce, c1iles sought In illlpnrl thcl1\ Imlll ,Ihl"n.ul 111 Ihe
I'H' l'Al, I 1IIIU.1. .. 1111.1\11') t\Nt,
IXXlh A11!,l'nl ilia ,111..1 Ural,11 <lggrcssivl' GIIllpaigns tu immigration
frl>lll EUr"tllw; Cllilc n:cl'ivcd a slll"llltr bill substantial now as well. Wherever
\\r .. abulidanl, l'artio.:ularly in cuuntries with large indigenolls popula-
IIUll:>, Ill..: libl'r.d :>tale ull .. k'flollk to dbciplillc Ille labor force. In Guatemala, the
gllWrlllllt'llt :>lqJ..'rvi:>,,-'d alill Cllfuf(cd the seasonal migration of work<.'rs from
tra..liliull,d villagl':' III l-uff\:e plantatiun:.; in EI Salvador, it monitored labor rda-
IIIlllS di:.pl.ll-cd pl'a:.allt:. whu had come to be empluyed by capitalist
LIIIIl!.lld". (hI h,lnalla ill llthl,;'r !:>t'ltings, the nineteenth-cenlury stale
.. lJll:>I'itellll)' ul'pl,s..-d lalltJr urg'lll izat iOll, broke sl rikes, and champiuned thc inter-
l':>h ,,-apJlali:>t lb:.:., III :.hOrl, tht' Latin r\l1\erican slate pi:Jyed an activt: roIL- in
ltJllll,ltitlll ul ,,-'Xjlurl-irllport t'COJlUIlIit'S,
Pn:,,-b,,-'Iy lur tllb rl'a:>UII, guvcfllnlc'ntal perrormance was illl'Ullsistent. l.iberal
11lnJlY 1.Ilkfl'd Ill,l Lk',lr prl'snilltiull for stalo..' roles. Its very activity pused a Lontra-
dlctillJl: ill .. slrategy 01 /1//SSl'z-j'lIro.', thl' stiltt' should have onlY;l minimal rull- in
1ll,ltkl:. nOIlUlIllt, A111W:>t hy ..Il'linitiun, thl,;'rlt could be no long-term develo!->-
1l1l'llta] and, lit>! :.urprisillgly, tlil' nature and extent or governmental
lllVolvl:llll'll1 V;ll'kd Irulll UIlIntr}' ttl countl-y. Policymakers It.:'nded to follow
1l1,lrkl:1 alll!. det:isivdy, tu eaIT)' out the wishes of economic elites
Ltlher I!lOlll 10 pllrSlil' an o\'cl";l1l ..Il:sign.
Social Transformations under liberalism
Cllllsulidatillll "rtlle libt'ralllludd I>rolllpted l'lIl1dalllelltal changes in the rl'gion's
:.u.... i.d .... tUll'. First ill if nut in importance, was the mudernization of
tlt l' 1lI'I'cr-da:-.:-. o.:'lite. LllldoWlltTS .llld property Owners wen: no longo.:'r content to
nil I SLlh:.i .. klll:l opt'l":Jtions un their haciel1lbs; instead, they sought cOlllmercial
0111l\lrlullit k,,, alld tlw lllaxilllizatiun uf profits. 'I'his led tU:l1l entrl'prelH:urial spirit
,11.11 1l1,11 a iL,ll1 t Ch;lllgc ill thl: outluok and behavior ofelite groups, Cat lie
raiS,,-'I:. coffee growcrs ill Columbia and Brazil. sugHr barons in Cuba
,!lui f\kxlto ,ill Wl'rl' :>l,,,-'kjllg dfkiclh_}' and ('ollllllercial success. They nu lunger
!IH'lllnl <t closl'd, selllifl'udal t'lik; bl'c.11ll1." aggressive: capitalists.
Sl.... t llld wa:-. Ihl' appearancc <Illd gl uwth of middll,;' sucial stmla. OCClljJat iunally,
uf IllCrlhallls, hlW}'l,;'fS, clerks, shopkeepers, and slllalJ-:'iCale entre-
who prulitl'd (Will thl- expurt-import economy but who did not hold
L1ppcr r;\llk pusitions or uwnership or leaJership. Particularly import:Jnt was
growth alld (hangc in tilt" cOllllllcrdal sectur. Merchants, often foreign born,
pla}'l'd ,11\ l'ssl'ntial part ill this transformation, as they worked to tighten Call nee
li ..ms hd\wl'l1 Lalin Allll'ricalll'CUnulllies and overseas markets in Europl,;'. Lawyl'rs
,11 III utha whitc-coLlar prufessionals alsu assullled critical roles in shaping thl,;'
imlitutiunal allJ juridi(al frameworks fur this new era.
Third was the Clllergellcc of a working class. In order to sustoin expansion of
thl:' t..'XPllrt economics, as lllentiuned earlier, elites deliberately attempted to import
bLur [IUIIl abruad. As th..: Argelltilll' Juan Bautista Albel'di once put it. govern
I:> lu popul,llc"-" slallu: tiwi prumpted aggre:.sive encouragement of European
inlJlligratiull, Startillg in thl' 18HOs, th.., tide of arriv'lls over the next three decades
was so greilt thai Olll' histori<ln labeled it as th.., naliun':. "alluvial era." Brazil alsu
recruited immigrants, IIr:>t from Italy and Spain and 1.111:1' from Japan, primarily to
work in the colree fields of Sou Palll(l. Cuba remained a spedal GISe, silKe thl'
impurtation uf black slaves frolll Africa Iwd long sincc ddermined Illl' nJlllpu:ii-
liol1 of thlt cuulltry's laboring class (this wa:. alsu tnll' in northl'astl'rn Brazil).
Mexico a revl::aling l'xcl::ptiun tu tltb patk'fll. Alune ;llliung lhe lIIajur
(Ollntries, M\;'xico 1Il::vt:r sought large-:Jl::ale illlmigratiun IrUJll abruad. The reason
is obviuus: the brge population or Indi;lll peasants within the uHtlllry lll;tdl' it
UlHlt'ct.'ssaq' to import new recruils lor the labur ful'co.:',
Fur a v<:lrit'ly uf laboring c1assl':' did ltul g,llll much ul a fuulhold un
pulitical power in the early twentieth cl'ntury, Immigrant:> ill Argl'lllina and Brazil
were 1101 entitled to vole unless they w.... 111 Ihruugh n<llur.dizatioll, so politicians
could afrurd to ignure them. In iVkxico, workers of peasant background had little
(hance of influt.:ncing the nation's <luthurilari,lll rq!,illlc, And ill Cuha and
ea:ill'rn Brazil, the histor)' of slavt.'ry Idi ib own p;Linlul kg<lcy,
What this nll,;'ant, at inthe shurt run, was that Latin Allll'ri..:an could
promote expurt-orit.::lllcd econoJlli..: expansiun without having tu fact' an dl\:div....,
threat of political particip'ltion by the working class, Fur much or thi:> l'r<t it
seemed, for many, like the best of huth wurlds.
To be sure, b.... gan 10 organize t!lelllselvl.'s ill the (',lrly twentidh
century. first in Illutual-aid societilts and lall'r in unions, Their role ill vit;d s..:ctor:>
of the eXl'urtimpon in transportatiun (railways and
them critical putelltial !t.::vl'rage. Any labur stoppagl' posed ,111
ilnillediatl' threat to a cuuntry's comllll.'rcial viability Hlld therd'ort: it:> t:;q)adty
lu trade; nut surprbingly. l!le lllOSt militant (and dfectiw) 1ll0Vl'lllellb therefurl
illvolved nlino..:rs, slewdures. and railroad worker:>, Yel lhe relatively prilllitive stall'
of illdust rializat ion lllcanithatnlost laborers worked in very small firms (willi
than twenty-five employees). Ollly a few industries, sucll ;IS textiles, fit the COll
wnliunal image of hugl' facturk:. with IJwductiuli tt.'LhnkllleS. A wavc vI"
strikes erupted throughuut parts urthe rl'gion during thc dl,;'cadl' of till' 19IU:., but
thc}' were all put down by forct'.
The halcyon days of economic Iibltralisill in Latin America were brought to an
end by the Great Depression. As econumic crisis struck the United Stales and
Europe, international dl'maml for Latin Aml:rican fuodsluffs and raw lllaterials-
coffee, sugar, wheat. metals-suddenly faded. In 193U-3'1 the total value of Latin
America's exports was 48 percent lower than in 1925-29. L;:u.:king alternative:
oullets for their products, leaders of the region ill truuble.
A few countries sought to salvage their situation by securing market sl1ares
abroad, Argentina and Cuba both adopted this approach. Under a 1933 treaty,
Britain promised to uphold its imp0rl quot,ls for Argentine beef in return for
preferential tariffs 011 British-m'lde goods. Using differenl means for a similar
end, Cuba in 1934 obtained a 28 percellt share uf thc American sugar markl't
after intensive lobbying uf the U,S. Congress. Such llll'<:ISUrl'S reflected cunSUlll-
mate efforts by Latin American natiuns tu rl'SUtTeet the benefits uf the liberal
:lSH 0 THE/viES ANn REFI.ECTIONS
cnmOIll;(/ (/grnillll'ot"far/orrl. They also illustrated the vulnerabilities thnt this
str;llegyentailed.
IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION 11930,-1970,)
The coll:lpse of the world economy in 1929 led to widespread disench<lntmenl with
liheral ideology. L<llin Americ:ln elites had done everything within their (very
consider:lhle) power 10 :lhide hy the dictates of economic liberalism, and they now
were forced to p;ly a heavy price. Earnings were down, nnd social agitation W:"lS on
Ihe rise'. Frustration W;lS everywhere mounting.
Moreover, the prestige' of major powers was f<llling in decline. The sense-
less brutality of World War I cast doubt upon Europe's tradilion;ll claim to he
the cradle of high-minded Repeated U.S. military interventions
ill CClltr;l! America and the Carihbean (more than thirty times between 1898
and 1932!) made the Colossus of the North look like nil exploit::ltive colonial
overlord. The Russian Revolution raised serious questions ahollt lhe sup po-
seJly inevitable triumph of liberal capitalism, while the Mexican Revolution
ullieashed powerflll and penl-up forces of <lnti-imperialist ;lnd nnti-Yankee
sentiment.
III Ihis context, socinl thought ill I.atin America displnyed lwo rcl<lled ten-
dcncies. One was to find fault with the olltside world. Thc othcr wns to search for
Latin American solutions to the area's econOJnic problems. As thc Peruvian
reformer VicinI' 1{n\'d Hnyn de la Torre prod;limed, it was time to discover what
he ctllled the Yllldoamericnn Wa(-
'Vlly llol huild into Ollr own re<llity -a$ il really the h,,!>.c!>. of a new polilicOlI and
c.:onnlllic nrg;lnizalion which will accompli$h the educational anti COI\!>.lrllclive
l<l$k (lfindu$1 rialistll 11111 will he free of cnlcl <lSPCCI$ of human cxploitalion and
nalion;ll
L.atin America should casl aside imported ideologies and discover a path of its
nwn.
Tentatively at flrst, polic)'m:lkers in major counlries began to embark on <l
progmrn of industri;l\izntion. This was a gradual process. In the 1920s and I930s,
industrializ;llion was generally seen as a supplement for agricuillif<ll production
nlld nol as a replacement for it. M<lnufacturing W;lS a second-best option, and there
W;lS considerahle skepticism about the feasibility of long.lerm industrial develop-
ment. Elites approVingly cited Ricardo's distinction between "arlificinr and "nat-
ural" industries, b;lsed on nation;ll fnctor endowments, and firmly withheld
support from presumably artificial (manufacturing) activities throughout most
of the 1930s.
Inti me. however. indust rializat ion acquired a clear sense of purpose. The idea
was not Simply to copy the paths already traccd by nineteenlh-ccntur)' Europe and
Americn. Instead, Latin America's economies started producing manufactured
goods thai they had formerly imported from (e.g. textiles, apparel.
12
0
Siralcgic<; fn.. 1-.<"11'11111< Il('Vl'l"I"11<"llt V,, I
beverages, certlmics, cosmetics, <lnd slllOlll app1i:01(('s). I krll C Illl' 11;"lIIlC I", 1111"
approach: :l150 kllll\\'11 .1<;
As political leaders promoted Ihis strategy. they relicd UpOIl ;1 51IPtl,: .Illd
interventionist state. Proactive !1(llicics focltsed 1)11 IllC.lll:-. 01 .1' hievillg ;llld ,1 .... 111 Ill):
economic growth under governmental Illtclngc. Sla!C-Sttppnrlnl enlilles 11 l"l1\'i,kll
credit to ellt repreneurs, while puhlic invest ments st rcngthellrd vil:ll inll .1 .. llllt IIlf\'
(espeCially Ir;lnsportntinn tlnd comlllunicat i, In). Mitlist ric... and l'Ilre,llll r.ll ic..
attempted to sct goals and guide-lines withoul rej..',;lrd for <;o( ial l'rc.... llIT: lin! .11\\ .1\ ..
Sllccessful in this regnrd, the lechnn(f;1!s in IlI1l1l'1hclc.. <; I,ri/l'll Ill(' Uk.l "I
insulation from political or pOJllllar iIlI1UClh('. At lillles Ih(')' .11 .." e"l'flu ..('d 11l"dl.. 1
redist rihlltivc policic's. 011(' oft he disl in.. tlve I harOlt'lcri ... t1\ .. 011 .. 11111 1\ Ill(-ril "II I,,,I h \
during this ern was the foclls nn illward-lnnkillJ-', devc!nplllCIlI .1 \"11\1'111 \"rlll
ll;lliollnl producers :lnd ((lnSUIllCrs, rather Ill:ln wilh ,lv('r..c:l" 1l1.llk('I ...
lSI in Theory
Ideological and theoretical sllppnrt l'lr 11"11'\\ IWII I'r til( 11',11 ""111\ ,'" I lIlt'
was nationalism, the longhdd desire for ,11110110111)1 :IIal "cll deleflllin.l1illn .\'.
inlelleCluals nnd pnlic}'lllakers surve}'cd the re.'.trlt ... of IIIl' IihCl.rl {'xl >('1 Illlenl. 111.1I1'
concluded thnl the ide:l." of"compnr:llive lllldl'l",1 (,nd giVCll "inh'111.1
liannl division condemned the regioll III primitiv\" ;)):lllllllul"I', Clllll"lllh
hackwardness, ;llld politic;ll vulncrahility. I.atin Alllcri,a tll1dd ,Ilhil'vc IrIH' 1',011
tical sovereignt y onI)' 011 Ihe hasis of C(.OlllHlI k scl f sn rfll ienl r .1l11l Illdl"l'l'IlI kll' c.
This meant industrializalion.
A second inspiration camc from;lll inilially 11111ikdr "Olln(': .1 In hnll' t.III'
bureau of Ihe United N;1tiol1s. (:rl'alell in the 1')tlOs, 1111' lIN.... 1',lltH'll1l'
Commission for Latin Ameri(;1 (F.r-LA, 1:11('1" known as F.C!.A(: .lfl('l" Ihe ill' hlqlll1
of the C:lribbean) W;lS charged wil h the systcillat iL :111.llysis ,11 l', Illlllillil P' (lllk,ll"
of (he region and its individual CO\lntries, Hul il W<l," mnrc Ih:lll jll<;1 ,1 II'l1111h .11
sccret3fi;l1. Under the le:ldership of R"lJl Pre-hisch. ;l 1"Clllarbhl)' alll!' ("("011111111'"
from Argenlinn, ECLA hec:llllc :11l aggressive pnrticip;lllt in ,dlC")111 r ,.!in
America's relationship to the world economy. In ;1 ddiher.lle dfnrl In oill-lin
distance from W:lshinglon, D.C.-and tIll' power nnd pre.'.('l1..-(' elf (he I J...... g'I\"'11l
ll1ent-ECLA established ils headquarters in Sanliago dt' Chile. hOIll 111(' <;Lul,
ECLA set out to give voice to l.atin Ameri(;lll olltlooks and COlleCI I)".
One of ECLA's major accomplishment." W:1S If) train .1 j..',l'llcralinll 01 ,'(IIt11l
miSIS who learned, during their lime in Santiago, to sec their c\llIlllrie<;' plnl>lClll"
within a continenttll perspective. They also gnt to know Iheir ill 1111 ....
tl:ltiolls and were able 10 compare notes till till' prohlclll<; :lnd pll.""I"illlil'" j
economic policymaking. EeLA thus helped to pnldll((" as \Vell :1<; tn ,cOnI ..1
distinctively Latin American approach to ccollomic anal}':>b.
During the 1950s EeLA hcgnll puhlishing ;1 series (If Icdltlil,ll 11'1'"rl ..
demonstrating that, over lime. cOllllllerci:l1 rcl:lti(lllships worked 10 the ..
temntic dis:Jdvalllagc of primary-producing Ulltlltries. Ikt.lll<;c the "rile III
m:lIH1f;lcturcd goods was incrc:l:>ing (n.<;I('I" th:ln the I'ril"l' "f .lgri, ldtllr.d ,Inti
\1M 1"\ltt I/WH 11I1i\1I .... /\NIIIUIII< I IuN ....
Irllllt'J ,d LOllllIll till' dl'vt:lllpi ng l \lllll t ul LOll ill AIllt'riL:a Wt'rt: ubtaining
11::-... ,\lId k ..... It.11 V.dlll' 1m their I:Xpul'l products. Althuugh ECLA lIsually
Itlr.ltllld InUl1 C:XplKl1 IH,IKy ItCUlllllIllld.llion.... th<:re three logical solu-
Ih>ll.'>tu till ... ddtllIn ..l. On..' ''',1... 10 illll:rnational COlllllludity agreements;
.l .'>l'Ltllld, hll I.lrglr lullntll ..... , W.I... tv t1l1d,,rt .. kc: indu::.trializ.llion; a third was to
Iltlr"'lll' t'IUlH)lllil ,HIIIIllg l.'oulltrks of tile region alld thus expand
ltlll"llllll'r 1I1,lrkl'l ....
1.<.1./\':- .llglllllCllb PI\I\')!--"'d lil'rl.'l 11' ... p<lll... e... in 1.llin America and, l'spe-
,I.dly, ill I!II' lI11itnl SI.ltt Till' Ei",nhmv..'r ;u.llllinbtr.llion (1953-61) ... aw ECLA
.1'" .1 b..dllV.. III ddlllll'ti 1,111... 1.. IhuuglH, JHullloling policie... that would harm
Itllt'lgll Illvt... llllt:111 'Illd jlJIV.LIl:' t'lllt'l pri ... t:.
III I,ILl, lilt: Illrllished alllJllUlliliull 101' t'cntrist leaders
till uUghtlUI Ihe IIl>t lor ratlk.lb. Ahove all, ECLA gave relorm-minded
1.ltlll Allltllt,III'" till' IOlilltll'IlU: It> ... hap..' lIll'ir own (>(Onollli!.' ::.tratcgies. ECLA
thll ... tJllt.:rnl .1 lIIilnlUlll' ill 1..11111 Atlllrica' ......earch for self-knowledge and self-
Idl'lltity. TId ... \\',1.. ;:1 ... igllifk,lllt sinn: L'Hill American analysis
,lIld I'Ullt11 iam had IOllg kit at a db,ldv.lIllage Wht:ll 1:ldllg the t:conomists,
h.lllklI .... ,llId hll ... illt: ...... llILn til' IilL' wurld.
Innately skeptical of conventional wisdom and diplomatic rhetoric, Raul Pn!bisch
displays impatience during a UN meeting in the 19405.
.'.
11. .. lor 1)... \ dupnll"'1\1 lb I
151 in Practice
A prilldpal goal uf impurt-substitutiun illdll ... was eCtllloJlli( indl:'pt:ll-
dence. The idea was that b)' building it.'> uwn llldu... try. I.atin AIllt:rka would
become le::.s Jependent 011 Eurupe ami thc Ulliktl State... fur
goods. National economics wuuld bccume llIlIrl.' inh::gratt.'d ;Illd ... dl-Sllffkit.'llt
;:'Ind, as a result, less vuln('rable to tht.' kind uf slull.'ks brought Ull by :I worldwide
depression. This aspiralion urkll appealt:d to Jllilital")' ulficers, l.. ger to uphold till'
sOVl"rdgnty of whal they called '(1 putria rlhe ... I.lIld").
A second goal was joh crt'ntion. ConCClltr.llcd almost "'ntirely in citks, tht.'
Latin Aml'riC3n proldariat was by the 1930... :tnd 19'10... bl'ginning to ",x.cl'l it.'>
pOWl:'( as a social forl.'c. In cOulltrit'....... uth a... Chill', lI11iUl1 movcments Wl'r..,
rdativel) frcc or arbitrary governlllellt invulvt:lllelll. in J\!txitu and
Argclltinil ilne! l3J"ilzil, politidan.'> recugllizr.:d lahur ..... a I)Oknti,11 poJitit..d .ISSt::! and
touk a direct hand in stimulating (and controllJng) labor org.lllizatiun::.. \'Vhdhel
perceived as ally or threat, thL' urban working ria::. ... W.IS secure emplo)',
ment, anti L;atin Al1ll'rkan ll'alkrs S;:lW indu... tri;lliz;llion J. ... Ollt.' way to respond.
From the latt:.' I!)30s to the !lJ60s, a1 ll'a::.t in major CtHllltrit:S. lSI pulicks llIel
wit II relative success. 'I'hl' lkprl'ssion arh.l World War II affulded tadillrotntioll
and explicit opportunity for inf.lllt indll... tril::..11 ll(tIIlt'. St:ltl'''' pIaY"'d key rllJc... ill
laking advalltage of this ::.ilualion. (;overJlllll'llb n:... tl it'tld loreigll COlllpditiulI
through lariff... 3ntllluotas,,,IKouragld locallllVl tJIl..lllthroligh credl!.'> ,llld loan... ,
sl imulall.'d dumeslic dl'lll.lnti through puhlll dur lxpl.'lltlilur..... , ,I lid, p"'1 h.,p'"
most important, took dirt'ct part ill lilt: proCl.'SS through Ihl' lornhllioll 01 slalL'
owned comp;lIlies. As a rl'sult, largl'r Cllunlries uf tilt' rt:gioll t1t'vdoped ... igllilkant
indusrrial plants. The Tornwtu di Tdla corpuration appliance... ;lIld
illitomobiles in Argentina, Volta I{edulldil produced ... It:.'d ill Br<lzil, and group... ill
Mont<:rrey br(.'wed high-<Iunlily b('crs in !\'kxil.'o.
I:ollowing ;lnother Eel.A prl'scriptiun, h.\rH.lcd IIlgcllll'l ill 1':J60 to
crcale a Latin American Free Tr;lde Ar"'il (LAITi\). The intt.'nt was to crt::lle larger,
integrakd markels thai cuuld encourage: and ::.u... tain illlltl.'>lrial lkvduplllelll.
About tWt.nty years later, it would bt' renallled the I.atin I\lIlt:ricilll Illlt:gration
Association (ALAD!). Out: to natiunalist stlltillll.'llb and t.:ompelitivl.' t't.:onomies,
however, nt:ither of these experinlt:llts 1l1d willi praclicnl SUCClSS.
As lSI nOllt.'theless look hold, regional growlh hovt'l"t'd in the 5-6 pl'rcelll
range frolll the IY50s through Iht' (The ;lnllllal.lvt.rage W;b 5.1 pt:rcent ill
the 1950s, 5.4 percent in the 1960... , nnd perccnt in tilt:.' 197U::..) Primt' IllOvers
behind this performance wt'rt: Brazil and Mt'xico, cach with strung g.lins in the
Inanufncturing sector. Indeed, both of tllese (Ounl rics would reccive international
ncclaim around this lime as economic "miracles"-Mcxico during the 1950s and
19605, Brazil for its spectaculnr growth in Until Iht' mid-1970s, lSI
appeared to work.
For smaller and less endowed countries of IlLe f,,'ginn. huwt.'va. lSI was not a
feasible optiun. Located princip:.llly in Cl'nlral Amaita ;llld Ihe Caribbl',lIl, sUlne of
.162 Ie;
these counlries :"lInnunled In "plantation societies" (as defined in Chapter 4).
mineral and other nalur<ll resources. they buill Iheir economics <lround
the cultivation of nile or two :lgricultuml for export-sug:lr, coffee. tohacco.
h:ln<lllas. cacno. Prodllction look place 011 large-scale planlations lhat required
prodigiolls amounts of labor. either imported from 1\ friGl llnder slaver}' or forcihly
extr:lcled from the indigenolls population. Private invcslment Cilme mostl}' frolll
foreign soun:es. Landownership W:lS highly concentrated. ami the social order was
sharpl}' divided hetween elites at the top and peasants and workers at the bottom.
l\liddle sectors were liny. and local consumer markets were extremely small. From
the hegillning<; of the colonial period. Ihese arens shipped their products rthroad-
first 10 Spnin and POrlugnl, then 10 England :llld contincntal Europe. and flnnlly 10
the United Stales.
Within the larger cOlilltries. the social consequcnces of industri.d develop-
mcnt werc cnmplex. One was the formation of an entrepreneurial G\pitalist class.
In Chile. nH'lllhers of this group came principall}' from f;lmilies of the landed elile.
In l\lexko and Argentina. Ihey callle from more modest origins and therefore
presented a potellli01I chnllenge to the power of tmditional ruling classes. Hut the
h:tsic point relllrtin<;: industrializalion. even of Ihe lSI 1)1le. created a new power
grnup in l.rttin American society. Its role would be much dehnled ill the years
nhe:td.
Ultimately, the economic trajeclories of I\rgenlilla. Mexico. and (to a lesser
exlenl) Hrazil came In illllstr:tte the weaknesses of lSI development. Typically.
import.suhstilution industrialization produced spurts of growth in Ihe short term
hut en(olllllered limit" in the medium and longer term. N3tion:t1 markets, espe-
cially ill countries with modest populations. fell subject to saturation; production
processes continued to require substantial imports of capital goods; higher pro-
ductitHl costs were passed on to consumers in protected markets; and near-
monopoly cliscouraged investment in technology. Once estahlished under state
protectionism ilnd sheltered by tariff walls. highly subsidized and ineffidclltlocal
flrrns were unahle 10 compete in the interna!ionnl market. Moreover. the concen-
tr.ltion of resources 011 industrinl development tended to wenken the agricultural
sector. Evelltunlly. policYlllakers in I...,tin AmeriCiI would turn away from lSI in
search of yet Ilew stralegies.
THE SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE (1950,-1980,)
Neither liberillislll nor lSI were providing durable solutions to the c1H1l1cnge of
development. Goth resulted in economic crisis :tnd stagnation. Both left legacies of
socinl inequality, favoring privileged sectors (landowners or entrepreneurs) at the
expense of popular masses (peasants or workers). And both illustrated the political
costs of cconomic vulnerability. ''''hen push came to shove. export-import strate-
gies and industrialil'ation drives both suffered from Ihe vagaries of global eco-
nomics ;\l10 hig-powcr politics.
Confronted by these re"lities. a Sllhst<lIlIl.lllllllllhtr nl I..lllll Aml'l'lI .111 111111
kers soughl a p:lth to radicnl change :lnd t'mlu ,,(cd thl' I ,lll ..r 01 ..lit i.lh"lIl. i 'I.
more specifically. M:lrxist Many took p:trt in rC'volllliilllary ..
For the most put. advoc<lles carne frnm lleilhn dil(' h,11 kglilHIHI .. III II III<
working c1;'lss. The)' emerged. inslead. frolll II\(' reginn's IHIdill,- 11.1....l' .. TIIl'v \\'('1 C
well.reOld, university educOllccl, idealislic. nftC'n ll;llve :-Iud tnnlllllllcd I" IhI' ):".d
of social just ice. From their st:lIldpoinl. "od.dl"t thC'fll Y I'rovidctl hi 'I h .1 1'.IlllC'\\' III
for analysis :tnd a program for :tctioll.
I\s initiall}' de\'c1opecl hy K:tll M:trx (INIH ,IIHI!llt',llltll Ingel .. (IX:II
95). whal hrts come to be kllllwn:to: tl"'llghl Clllh,ItIICll., "('Iii'" ,If 1"11'
principles. Most fUlHI:llllental \\'.1<; Ihe (IlllvillllHl th,ll l'II'll.III"I11 CIII,llkll tl'I'
exploitation of workers hy the IlW1H'rs of I'lndllllinli .1 'IInn1' I 111.11. in 111111.
gave rise to perpetual class stmggle. nften ,ICl.l'l'lcc! lhcul'ligllt .1".' rC"lllt
of intense ideologiC:ll indoctrin:ltion.:\Il oh"erY.,tillll whill, led i\1.IP; III
orgnnized religion as "I he npi<lll' "f lhc m01S"c". M 'I he only lllC.Ill" of IIl1p"'\'U,: IhI"
situ,,1 ion would he through socirtl rcvtlltlliOll pi e... IIIll.lilly (lull nnl 1\(', ("...... ,"lh I .HI
:lnned upheaval from helow. A Ie"olut iolt:try II Hlllll'h \'I!t111111 illo;,l.dl ,I M lilt 1.1" >l o;,hil'
of the Ihal \\lliuld eliminate hIH1IHlant.... inlp1cIlH'111 1.1111' .,1
change. and prOll1olc the l.ol1ecliVl' \\'e1f.Jre "I the "'Ill.iel)' ,II I.lrgt.
Extending the 10gic of Ihis worldvie\\'. v. I. J,(,lllll ( IX711 I I) ,tt Iv.lIlt n Illw Il 1e.1
that imperialism represenled 6 thc highcsi stnge of l..:lpit:l Ii<'lll A... ""l i.II,LI...... PIIII.I
dictions :lpprnached the point (If (Tio:i". he O1rgu('tl, :tdv"nl.etlllHhl"\lI.lln.IIl, 'II" lUI lilt!
their nllention toward colonial expallsion in lcss c1e"c1c"lpetl p.lll .. nlthe \...(lIld (1\11".1
Asia, and L,lin America). Brutal cCtlllomic cxplnit:tlioll 01 lh("..(' ll\I,,"Wo;, 1ll.1,I" It
possible for capitalist natillns to rai<;c the li"ing st"ndanl" of Ihcll' (1\\'11 Kill kC'l'- h\'
sufficient increments to forcslallthe pro<;ped of rc"oltll ion. Tim I(,;l"4111ing le,ll ('!lllll,'
maintain, ill shnrp conlrast 10 Marx, Ih:tl the true prnkl.lrl,Hl 1('\'01,,11011 \n,"ld
erupt not ,\lHong the most :ld"anccd induslrial cnunlries. hllt IIll"lVcrly <,lrRkcll .llld
lesser-developed areas. (I-Ie lhus snw C7:lrist RlI"t;ia a.t; .1 likely II \\'.1'-
through revolution, and nnl}' through r('"ollll JOIl. Ih;lIlapil.III.. 111 \ ,1,11(11)(" 1"'1'11111' 0\\'11
MarxistLeninisl ideology <lc<jtlired Sllh,lrtlllinl "ppe.llm 1.ll1n 1\1111'111.1 II'-
t!i:tgnosis of class connict applied directl}' til social lllC'l"IIIC',," IllIpughllllt lit<"
region. Its c"lIto revolutionary action offered imme<lirtlc h'lpe hi tle,wnlllhl,ll"Il
workers and peasanls. lis identifkation of impcri:lli"lll .1' til{" (Ullllin:llifHl .,1
capitalism offered both a coherent explan:ttion alld.1 (oullol.,
tion for nationalislic ilppe01ls. Moreover. tvl:lrxisl illlcrn.lllollali,tt; alld 1.ltill
American nation:"1lists had one cncmy in common: the lhlllrd St:.lleo;,. Ic.lder "j
thc capitalist world and dominant power within the WCo:lCl"tl IIc1llio:ph(IC.
More important than its doclrinaire principles. howevel. w:ts rtll lInde! lying
attraction of Marxisl-I.eninist thought: as nn icieology of t hr opprC' .. il sl nil k .1
deep and resonant chord with the cullures of resistance th.lt h,ltl heCIl wclling lip III
l."tin America ever since the nineh:elllh century. Inone forlll IIr :tIlIlIIHI. "I If ,.,Ii .. m
appe"red 1o offer a promising palhw:l)' for I.lltin Allleri(a.
1'\I{1 IIIIUI nuN...
At 111,>1, IHllh.lp.d vl..'hkk:. lur l\1.lrxbt thuught in I.atin America wen..
1",llIll.11 !'.Irtit.-:.. Alkl till..' Revolution, orthodox COllllllllllist parties
.q'lh.III..'d III a IIUlIl!II..1 vi U:,>ually ba3l:d in the dties, led b)' intelle(tllals
.llld d;dlllillg Iv rt:llre:-'l:llt Ihe "prugn:ssivc bourgevisie," tht'y Il'mle:d to
1..':'l'uu,>e pl'al..'dul road to po\Ver" ratha than insurrectionary action. r:rom the
I\)J(I:. til rllugh thl PMI)' 1t.':l1"ltrs dl.:'vdoped c1os(', oftcn servile rclat ions with
the: SUVld Uilitili. U)' tile I\)60.. ami 1970::. Cllllllllunisl p;'lrties had bl.:'collle pnssi\'l'
1,1':>I..'rVl'l" Iltll.llioll.11 pulitlt.':>, irrdt:v.lnt ill mo:-.t n;ltioll:-' orthl" regioll.
In uHllr.l:,>t. ..1 parlil.. "ollldimes managed 10 pia}' signiricant roles ill
thl' 1'0::.I\\,.lr plllllll.. .. "I' Lalin Allll'ril.:;I. were krti:.t political groupings that,
III/ Ihl' 111,,,,t p,III, hll'rhlnl l\I,trxbt allalY::Ols of da:.s struggle with nationalist
111 .. I .. tlllll' "n till' :'<lll(lily (II ::Ollvl'rl'ignt)'; while dellOulKing U.S.
tl1l..'Y llld lhlt, hllwl'ver, lilllllw Snvil'l dictall'S in the inlernaliunal arena. Mure
Ikxlhk' Ih.1l1 till' <. onIJllllni:-.b, IIIIII"L' altulled to lucal realitks, sucialist parties (in il
V.II id)' ot !III Ill">} g.IH' ::.u":'>t,lIl1i.1I lfl'llibilit}' 10 the pulitical left. Their
:'>llI.."l..:l....L:'> ...lIm: III (;u.ilt'llhtl.I, under Jacobu Arbellz, .1Ild ill Chilc.
1Il1dll :-..dv.ldur AIIt:ndl.
nlll .1" .. hu\\'11 III Clhlpkr:,> 'I anJ 10. the l.lh: ur Iho:>l:" :.:.lme
dllllIlll .. lr.ltl,d till' i1llllo'>sihilil)' "filiI..' road" tuward sud;llism. Bnth w('rt'
\'\'l'l"IIII\)WII Ily 1llllilMy wilh U.S. ba<.killg. 'I"hl: conclu.. ioll was
ill\"l;'1',lble: 1111 lllallL'r 1111\'" ILl'l.: or r:,jr tl\l' ballol, L'lt:cloral politics t"uuld nul Orrl:r;t
Illl.lllillg1ull'.llh Iii ,>ol,.lalbl trall:.ll)flllatilll\: \V:lshingtun would <.llway:. inkrvelle.:.
nil' IIllly uptUIll \\'.1'> afllwd fl'\'olutiull.
Revolutionary Movements
Ik\lIlutlllll" .11",,-. II1I11"l' lklll 011 prnidl'lltl.d p.lI:Kl.':'>. Frolll ollr pt'rspt:(tivC', we
l"ll:>hkl tv hI,.' 1'.\flfl/tgO/ :II';ZIOI' oj pvlitiuli/JOII'('r. by the liSt' 111' uJ
JIIII I', jill till' PUlP":>I' o!ln'illglllg lliwol sf rudurlll d/(jllge ill tile dis! rifJUI iOIl o//'ulil iwl,
:>[/011/, or I'WIIlJlIIIl' f!UWt'I'. Truc rl.'volutions an' qualitatively differenl from barracks
llr lvutitlt.: lil' ..':>1'1"0, which Jcdd to Ihe rulation ur 1t'.ldel"s but It."av!:
.. tUll':'> illl ....-t. 11.IVl t,lr'feadliJlg progranls tUf SOCiOI.'CtJllUlnic ("hangl'
hut nut lle(t.':'>sMily, Idlbt in orielltation}. I laving allained political powcr,
fl.."volutillU;ll y k:adl,."r:,> 11M)' ur lIlay not be able to carry ollttheir social programs. There
I" :'>mh U an or revolution.
,\ (t.'lltr,d ide:a within M.lrxbt thought-;b dcvdopl.'d in Latin America-was
laith III thL' power lit Ihl' stall'. It was the stale that conditioned the social order,
Ilplllld IIII..' dist rilnl! ion uf jl\Hver "lid bendlls, and legitimized the status quo. Ir the
(vuld Jo things, it could undo them as well. Thilt is why the state was
worthy 01 conquest. Once in control or state institulions and the "commanding
heights" ul the naliunal e('onolllY, revolutionaries could bring about mdical and
dli:o:tive \-hUlIgl'. ill Iht' olllnipotcnce or the stale thus be.:calllt: U
I-l'lItr.d pdlar ul fL'Vulutiull.lry Itllology.
hom Ihe I'JSO,> to tht' II)t'!O:., anul,d ft'volutiun;ll")' movemcnts t.'l1lerged in
,dIIHJ.. Il'WI")' <.IlllIltry of the rq!,ion. Virtually all proclaimed Marxist ideologies. or
Il .. SII,llq;il::> 101 hUlIHlIlh. I)lvduj>Il1l'1l1 J6:'
one sort or another, though they tellded ttl natiollalist alld
as wdl. They of!(n drew inspiration rrulIl thc du(trilles 01 Mati ZL'dung, whtl
challcnged Marx's cmphasis on lhe need lur illdustrkd by c1aillling
(and demonstrating) thai rcvolutiunary mu\'t'lllCllb could urigillall' among Ihl'
rural pe.lsilnlry. Their leadcrs and cadres Wl're kJlown guerrillas, small-sized
righting units that atte:mpted to we.lr down through a
relt'lllless and long-term series of hit-and-run assaults.
ami roremost alllong thl.'lll the Ftddista v.lllgu;lrd in Cub,l, wherL
C;ISlro's rise 10 powt.'r sent shock waves throughout the hl.'ltlbpherl', ElIlboldl"'ned
by tht' Fiddista example (and somctinll's with ,lctivc :.uppon fflllll Cuba), pruilli
nellt guerrilla lIlOVt:lllents sprang up in Guatl.'lll:lla, Vellcl.ud.l, ;J1ll1 Culomhia.
Otbl'r groups made brkf. ir ullsuccessrul, appe,lrances ill Ihe Pl'fllvian AIllks. And
in lhe Uolivian highlands, Ernesto (;Ul'VM:I org;llIi7.l'd ;111 effurt that \Vas
cruslH..d in 1967. Urban gUl.'rrilla moVt'lllent:-. appeart'd III Argl'ntina,
Colombia, and Uruguay, but rcvolutionary cadrl's gener.llly madt.' hllk' hl'adwOl)'
ill tht' I.!rger and more developed or Iht.' rL'giun.
A secund wavc or guerrilla movemenb crc:-.tt'd III tht' I ;llld IlJ$Os,
nutabl)' in Central America. A dccadt'-Iung t.:lmllict ill 1:1 Salv.ldor I,.'\entually
rl.'Sulled in stalemate, In Nicaragua,:l youthful band ur furtnltllt'
dictatorial Anastasiu oul of the I.'ollnlry and luok power alllid poplllar
euphuria in 1979,
Among alltht':.e ("omings and gOillg:-.. glllrrilb llhlVl.'1I1t.:llb llJ.lIl.lgl'd II)
political power in unly t\'loGbes-Cuba and Nil.aragllu, buth -plantation socidll'S"
or modest size. The rt."asons are IIOt far Iu sl'ck: thl.' of rl.'vu!lltion,u)'
1Il0vl.'lIlcnb depcndl'd not only upon their OWlI but ;11:.0 upon thl"'
support and military OrinCUlnbl.'llt Espct.ially n01;lbk
is the f,ICt thut Ihe- ami the wert' bUlh o:halknglll1) lorruI't
dictalorships that Wl.'rc losing tuudl with Ihl'lI lhl1l1l.t1 b,l:'lion::. 01 ::.uppurt-Iand
uwners, businessmen, and Ihe Ullitc.:d Stall's. Throughoul tilt' Cold as a whult"
EI Salvador was more Ihe rule thall Nicaragu.l: wherev..-r ka:,>iblt', Washingtun
sl-urricd to tht' aid ofguvernlllt.llb under siege Irom
III the facC' or such realilit's. socialism 10::.1 ib id('o!ogic.ll appt.'al during the
1990s. The end or the Cold War-and the collapse of the Soviet Union-served 10
discredit Marxist ideology. The econolllic strangulation or Cuba del110nSlnlled Ihe
real-world costs of defying the Uniled 1110:.t importantly, the
disastrous l:llt' or guerrilla mUWlllcnts throughout the I'l'giun revcaled tile:
hopelessness of revolutionary action. As Ihl' tWl'lItkth n'nlllr)' drew tu a c1osc,lhe
curtain was coming down on the: socialist .I!ternalive.
Liberation Theology
One or the most significant legacies of Latin Amerk:an mdicalislll a hy-produo:t:
the elllergence or-Iibt:mlion thl-'Ology: The doctrine repre::.cnted'lll llnlJkdy blend or
t\\lodistinct traditions. Marxist theory and Catholic teachings. The result WilS a power-
rul and sHU-vibrant summons 10 political activism in the naml' or social justice.:.
3MI 1'/\nTTlfHEE" TlfEfo,IES AND IlEI;I.EC:TIONS
And... Dependency Theory?
How does the theory of "dependency" fit within (\ discussion of Liltin America's
strategies for economic development?
Sidewilys, one might say. As it evolved over time, dependency theory proved
to be more useful (IS iI conceptuill framework for historical ani'llysis thiln i'lS a
prescription for public policy or social action.
Of course there were connections between theory and policy. The initi.:tl
foundation for the dependency approilch carne from EClA's writings ilbout long-
tenll deterioriltion in Latin America's terms of trade with advanced industrial
countries. This literature suggested that global commerce unfairly favored wealthy
nations ,lt the expense of the poor, while decision-making powers were concen-
trated within the privileged "core" ilt the center of the world economic system. (For
the record, it should be noted that these insights becu considerable relevance to
contemporary patterns of "globillization.")
As an additional tool, social class analysis-more specifically, Marxist anil-
lysis-provided a means of detecting the differential consequences of economic
development within latin America. Who benefited from these dynamics? Who was
left behind? For these inquiries Marxist writings offered a reildy-made set of social-
c1i1ss categories (e.g., bourgeoisie and proletariat), a literature rich in debates and
innovations, and il conviction that "class struggle" formed the ultimate basis for
historiCill tran<;formil{ion. Because of Ihis Marxist orientation. the dependency
ilpproach inevitably came to be identified with the political "left:
Within the schol;uly reillm, social scientists employed the dependency frame-
work to examine vari;lIions in social-class configurations (e.g., those associated
with agriculture vs. mining), to show how capitalist development in the world
"periphery" intensified economic inequalities while perpeluating widespreild pov-
erty, and to speculiltc about the political consequences of such processes in Latin
America.
But dependency theory did not yield a clear-cut set of policy prescriptions. On
the contrilry, it produced il plethora of proposed solutions-ranging from nation-
i1list protection of local industry (via 151) to regional economic integration to social
revolution. All these stratE'gies were intended to reduce economic dependency,
enhance national autonomy, and promote social justice, bUI the meilns were
infinitely broader than the ends.
In the long run, the dependency approach has proven to be most erfective as a
heuristic device. It is in that spirit that we employ it in this book.
Conventiomd wisdom lIslIally depicts tile Catholic Church as a bastion of
conservative politics-a hierarchical institution based on reactionary principles,
uSlI::llly <lllied with elite f<lctions in society. It is to be remembered, however, that
parish priests bore intimate witness to the suffering ofllle ponr. As they catered to
their flocks, lhey became aculely conscious of lhe harsh realities of poverty.
ineCJtl::llity, and social injustice. In time tlley rejected the traditionnl idea that, as
Gelds chosen people, the ponr ... hnuld (;,Illlly acccpt their plight .,n,l aw"it \,llv,1
lion in Heavell. Il1sle;1(1, s;lid the priesl.<-, it was lime tor pnpul.lr ,ILl inn nn F.Ulh.
During the 1960s and 19705, lip Olnd-c(lIning Ihcllll)gi;lll<; 111,lllagc(1 tIl hkfHl
Marxisl analysis of class struggle with cccl('siasticall.oll( ('I'm ;lhllllt sorial jll .. tll ('
and fairness-as exemplified in <I IMpai ('ncyC'lic;,I cnlitled U'T'tlll N(lI'(II"IIJII (lH
Q
I).
n sympal helie treatise ahfllit the misery (If Ellrnpcan \Vllrkillg 1:1 ... <;(,.\. In the vif'\\,' d
these priests. the cxislen(e nf pllvcrty \Vas;, ((In''('11I1('11I(' nl willr.. preall "in .1
result ofavarice, selfishness, and !al.k of lompassillll. \,V!I"t the wl\lld 1l('Ct!e,1 \\ ,1\ .I
p:1th to According [II :l d.l ..... Il. lrC.ltl';(' h}' (;1 .... 1.1\0 (;lIIH"llel, .1
Peruvian Jesuit, true lihcration wtlllid Ilnfnld III IIHI'C dIIlWlI ... illll ....
eI iIl1 inCl tion nf the i 111 med in1e Ises "I' povert r .11lt! ill j \1.;1 i.. {'.
emancipation oflh(' poor frolll "those lhing.. tll;"lllillllt tllcir (,111,HltV I"
develop themselves fredy and in diglli1r," ;1lld
liheration from selfishnes" and sin fnr all hdicw'f\. ,I mill I' peril" 1
relationship with Cnd and with other htrl1l;lll
Christ was in this view llotllllly a redeemer hili ,11.''11:1 lihel,lloI III lhe IlPllIC.. .\11.
The quest for social justil.:e then'fo1'c <I solemll Chri.;ti:lll llIi".;illll. II \\',1\
incumhent tlpnl1 the dcv(,lIIt 10 cxerds(' "a 1'1"('lC'1'l'llti;11 "l'lilll! lllr the pnol""
Political aclion \\las an act of (,olllpa.;... illll. gr,l(e, and solid,ll'il)".
This rO'ldical revision (If (:;llholk tcachings ('merged 1l1.lilll)' In'lll 1.ltill
America. Priests and missionary Iluns In th.. regiol\ (,11111." III f.h{' 11111 llol}"
with poverty, bill also wilh frighlful ahus('s of hlllll;"ln righl\ Illllin Illi!it.II"\'
governmenls. They S:lW the urgent nccd for;l( llnll. III l'J(lX lilll'f;ltilln l!lcIII'lg,
became th(' domlnanllhel11e;"lt:l mainr 01 r ,!llll hi .. lltll'" ill
the Colomhi:lll cit">, of Medellin. It \\';, ... a ClTalive ,lIld 1'1.'",,'"11<'(' I"
compelling soci:ll needs.
In sharp conlra.<;t to revolutionar)' thcory, tilll'ratinli thClIlng)' did nfll \ ,Ill JOI
conquest of the stale. Inslcad, it espoused the ClllPIl\VC1'l11Clll of pelll'lt- !rnlll
helow-consciousness-raising. gr;ls.<; root ... org:lni7.:l1inll. :Illll Illtal IIHlhili/,llltHI.
In a theological sense, the goV('rtllllclltal app.lI":ltll'" \\';"1<; legard('d ;1'; hcy"nd
redemption: it was corrupl, incf!1cielll, uncaring. ;111 in.stnlll1ellt or
oppression. Insle01d of l:lking over the slille, people "hollld C1'C:lI!' new 101111<; "I
power for and by themselves. Organized in soei,ll llll)V('IlICllt .... ordiTl.ll')' pcoille
could work to bring about llle;lllinghrl improvemenl" ill their cvcryd,,}'
Within the Catholic Church, lihcr;l!ioll lheolnJ.W ,u.:quirc<! ,I ... uhversivc ('t1gl'.
As part of the effort In raise I10l'lll:1r consciollsl1ess, :ldVIIGII(... CIl(ouraget! 1
1
<11-
ishioners tn meditale 111'011 the Uihle-nf1en ill groups. or so (,ll!('d hase (lllllllHl
nilies. This stratagem presented a frnntO'lI challenge 10 IradiliollJ. of the dlllrdl,
which granted sale authority for the interpretatinn of God's \\lord lothe pricst
and to thc Pope-and not 10 individual wor.<;hipers. According tn this view, lh('
proper understa.nding of divine will \\fas to he ch;lllllc!ef! exclllshT!)' throllgh the
ecclesiaslical hierarchy (as emphasized hy the notiollof"pO'lpal Therr-
was no room for dehale. doubt, (II' persollal interl'rct;"ltinll.
Figure 12,1 Economic Growth for latin America, 1960-2000
(C0I10111l( lor I dlUl Am"I'\ <l <llld Illl'l.llIbl)l.'JIl ([C I Al), ')(" I(/II'''II'''WII,I "lilli,"
Amt"fI((I. /UO/ 100J
In the 111':,,1 01 Ihl' (!"isis, from 1<)82 10 19/15, ballkers and dd)to!"s
:ltkmpled 10 "muddle through" what 11lL')' S;lW as 01 (or
lash Oow). This approach assured :>llccl'ssfLlI rescue of Ihl' b,lIlb, SOIl1;.' of whid)
wcr..: seriousl}' overexposed, A s..:cund lll'gall in 1985, Wlll'lI U.S. treasury
secretary James A, Baker III strt'ssl'd th\;' Ill-'ed fur econol1lic growth io illdd)lt'd
'Kknowledging Ihal those counlries faLl'd crises of SOIVC'llly, not
just liquidity. III Baker's Sll(CCSSor, Brady, ann0unced U.S. gUVl'rll-
Illelll support fur a broad portfuliu or dt'l)t reduction rest rucluring alttrnat iVl's
fur cuulllrit:s willing to undcrtake markd-basl'd eCOIlOJllk polidt'"s.
As it sought 10 comprelu.'nd the C;llIS\;,S of this (risis, the inh:mal ionaf finallcial
community evclllually arrived at the conclusion th:ll Latin America t'l'lIl1il'l,:d
fundamental economic reform, A principal source o( the problem was held 10 be
structural distortions arising from lSI. Of course, the dd)1 crisis itsdf was brgd),
duc to factors outside of (and outside the conlrol of) America, Even so,
ecunomists and policymakers in major international institutions-frulll Ihe U,S,
Treasury 10 the World Bank and tile International Mondar}' Fund, all headquar-
tered in Washington, D.C.-issued a clarion call fur economic restructuring ill
Latin America.
What came 10 be known as the "Washingtun consl'llsuS" entailed three sets of
prescri pt ions:
first. Latin American governments should support the privale sector;
second. they should liberalize polici\;,s on trade; ;lIld
I',\I( I JIIIU I Jill [1.11 ... ,\Nll 1\1 H 1:\.J"lONS
II W.I'> Ihl':'>l.: r..:a:-'OllS tlldt POpl' Jolin II, ill so 1ll,llIy ways,
hllkll}' l\llldl,.'lllllnlliheralioll Illl'olngy and excollllllunical<:d lll,:lly of its
"
]]', "",""',,"'" ]{'Ill,.'di<.:t XVI has been even morc Il1tulerant 01 the PIOJIUIlI..'Il:-'. :>, -........... , .., .
Iihl'l.lliUII IllUVI'IIlI'IIl. II lias pn:s"llkd a dlallenge tu the powa strllctur\;' of the
I hun 11, alld Ihat b a:. Ull'lLLI'ptabll,.'.
NEOLIBERALISM-ONCE DOMINANT, NOW CHALLENGED
(1980,-PRESENTj
III 1111' 1111'dllllllIL', gluhal devdopnll"nlS brouglll Latin AIHeriea f:ICl'-to-fa..'e wilh
n0l1u1l1i ......... !)urillg lltl' 197Us, the pri....: or petroleum rose r;Jpidly, largely as il
1":-'1111 ul lllarkel by the Organization of Pdroleum Exporting
t :otllltrils (OPEC). Thb illLrl'bcd the in1port bill for most countries of Latin
t\llllTk.1. II also k'd Itl pdrudullar willdblls ill major private banks, suddcnly Oush
wllh lkpusits rrulllthe oil exporters, Necding tn nud borrowers rur these new f\lnds,
haokl'r,> tlll"lll',!lo I.;ltin America-which beller credit ratings than other devel
"I IllIg alld whilll abtl lll'lth:d Ille Illone)', 'j'he bankers also iJllagined that Ihese
a:. :-,uvl'rl."'igJl \\'el'l.: iJllll1lllll' frum bankruptcy. Suon lilt' borrowt::d
llllld:. \\'l're g.. ,i Ilg fur t:Ut'relll UHISUllllHiun, \;,lwblillg milital)'
01 ... ivili.1l1 III lUff}' 11."'1"111 favur from their cilizens. Thus began a wave of
1'011 u\\'ill)4 Ih,ll grl'atly in,-reasl."'d 1I1l' 11 I:lgni tlid..: of Latin AJllerka's fordgn debt.
By till' l'ady 19t)tb, I..llill AJIlerica was I1nding ilself in .1 squeeze. Thl."'
1"'IJ"Wlllg h.ld ulIllracted their at initiall)' Illodest (but variilble)
rat" .... 1\ .. thl' Ullitl'd Stak:-. and Europe adopted tight-moue), policit's 10
,-utJllll'r l rippling :-a.. gll.lliun al hUllll., intl."'rest rates climbed-and su did the costs
ut dl'I'1 :"lTvile. 1\1 lhe tim..:, inlernatiollill prices ror Latin American COlll-
\wre I'llItllllll'1illg, SII dt'blor counlries had less <lnd foreign exchange
ill tlll'lr .. ,Yllllll!:.. TIll' siluatiot\ WilS impossibl('.
III l<JtQ t"kxl..:o lkd.m:d Illal it could no longer f1wd pa)'llll'Jlts (In it:-.
IUll'lgll ddl!. 1\ t.;.w IJlUlltll:. !at\;,r Brazil, the largest borrower, followed sui!. This
l'lggl'rnl a Ulllkr tIle guidclllce of the Inkrnational Monetary Fund,
I>.lllhr:-. k'lIt .Idditiooal rnunt'y fur luans. This only made matters worse, as
1.:,lill AIlll'rica':. frum U.S. $2,12 billion in 19HO to $431 billion by 1990.
The regiull\ ..:r'l'dit was accompanied by a protnlCteJ economic crisis
Illluuglluul Ihl' Tu fureign lenders (and sel-vicc the debt). coulltry
"lll'r ltlUllt ry 11:ld 10 adullI :In urlhodux 1MF-style austerity plan-slashing govern-
Ill\:llt alld subsidies, lighkning credit markets, and, wherever pos-
sihll:, rnlul"illg real \\'ag\;':., Thl' result wa:'l stagnation. As shuwll ill Figure 12.1,
uVl'rall outpul fur the region as;l whok' dt:r1ined sharply in 1983-84 and showed
ollly lIlodest growth fait's in following years, III per capita terms, in fact, Latin
AIIIl'rh:a's (;IJP fdl by 8.3 percellt bt:tweell 1981 ilnd 1989. Un..'mploymcnt swelled
:lllll plummded. III Mexico, whose conduct sct a modd of good behavior for
til bIT dl'btor (ountrit's, real wagl's d..:c1ined by nearly 50 percent.
%
7 -
6-
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--.,------,---- ,----,----,- ---,----. -I - --I
[<)65 11)70 11)75 1')XO I'JX5 1\)')0 1'J'J'i 2000
370 I'Altr TIiE/l.'IE:-' AND ItHI.Ec'T10NS
Ihird, pcrhnps mO$1 imporlnnl,lhC}' should reducc lhe economic rolc of the
slnlc (ill pnrticular, thcy should privati7c stnlc-owl1ed industries).
They should exercise fiscal discipline-as commonl}' preached, hut mrcly prac
ticed, by Washington itsel( Thcy should concentrnte hlldgetar)' expenditures nOI on
social subsidies bUI investments in health, education, and infrnstructurnl
investment. They should also deregulate their national economics, Jelling market
forLes opernte without political or burenucmlic constraints, (Point of order: At leasl
011(' prominent L.1tin AmeriGlIl policYl11aker bter denounced the "Washington
label a<; &insulling: on the ground Ih;'lt '"these were Ihings we wclllied to do fOI-
our counlries on our own, not because of internationnl opinion.-)
In man}' wa)'s, the \Vashington consensus called for a return to liberal export-
import economic policies, much like those of the 1880s-1920s, Thus it came to be
known as -neoliberalisl11,- There were differences, of course. but both ideologies
rested on the same foundaticlIl-f;'lith in the "'invisihle o( the l11:\rkel.
This ncolibcml vision con tallied nnc major paradox. A ccnterpiece o( the
enlire program was reducing the role o( the slate; at the same time, implementa-
tion (If Ihese policies could be accomplishcd only by a powerful stale, Economic
reform was hound to encounter resistance (mm entrenched groups-sheltered
enlrC'prC'nellrs, unionize<1 workers, puhlic-secl(lr employees, Imposition o( brnnd,
equitflble. and effeclive I;'IX policies, ::lllother o(the \Nash;ngton proposals. would
generate opposition from ::llmosl everyollc, II would take a strong and autonomous
slate to overcome such pressures, Propollenls o( the consensus <llIelllpted In
resolve Ihis paradox by advocatinr. small but efficiellt governmenls-"'\ean and
mean," in their (elicitous phr<lsing. Even so, this lorty formulation did not squarely
address (lIll(!::lmenlal C]llestions abollt st::lle p<lrticipation in economic ;'Iffnirs.
Free Trade
As wilh nineteenth-celllul)' Iibernlisl11, the llcoliberal consensus plnced great
emphasis on the role ofcommercc, Given the imperatives ofeconomic globaliz,\I;on,
nations should embrace the inlerTl;'ltional division of labor and export products (or
which they had a comp;'lr:;ltive advnntage: Lat;n America should discard 151 and
revert to what il did best-agriculturc, mining. exploitation of nalural resources.
Throughout the 1990s, economic ;deology and practical considerations led
the United States to advocate the adnption of "'free trade" throughoul the Western
Ilemisphere, This was to be accomplished through formal treaties, which would
set schedules for the reduction o( tariff.<; and other b<lrriers to imports. The goals
were to develop expanding markets for U,S, exports; enhance efficiency (or U,S,
manufacturers (mainly through access to low-cost labor); and, in a variety o( ways,
strengthen America's "'competitiveness" in the world economy. Regional integra
tion in the Americas would also strengthen Washington's hand in negotiations
with Europe, Japan, and other economic powers of the time,
In 1990 the George flush (senior) administrntion opened (ormal negotiations with
ClIlada and MexicO (or the creation of a North American free trade area. That same
ycar, Bush ;'Ilso proposed the developmenl 0(;111'('(' Iradl" IIIIlC Ih.11 \\'olllli ('"1111'1,11 l' III('
entire hemisphere, stretching rrom Ihe port tlr Am hllTngc In Til'l"I.1 {ld Fuego
As descrihed in Chnpter .1. lhe Norlh Free Tr:ldc Al'lcelllCll1 \\'t'l1I
into effect in J<lnll<lry 1994 and created (lIIC llr tll(' 1.lrgcsl Ir,uling 1.1\ .:'<, III 111l' Wl'l I, I
Ullimately, NAFTA marked a turning 1'01111 ill l'lono'llil I'0lkr .llId III
relations with Mexico. For the firsl time ill hi<;ln,)'. \V,I<,hilll-:lnn \\":1', I'llr"lllllg ,Ill
explicit st rategy o( economic iutegr... tion wit h il:> Ilcighhl.r II. llll' "IHII h, II W,I" .II ..
consolidaling the U,S. sphere ofinflucllt:e.
Yet lhe prospects for :l helllispheril frcC' tr.hlt' ""I1C' 1..'III,lIIICd 1C'1lI111t',1"
initiale Ihe process, the C:linlon ::ldmilll<;tratllill ho<;lcd.1 gl.llhhll<;l' "' IIIl
,\mericas- in Miami in Decemher P)91. Artcr illl('n"l' hdlllHI Ihl' "(C'm'"
lions, the gathering proclaimed Ihe goal 01 forging ,I hcc "r,lllt' 1\Il'.l nl 'h,
l\mericas (Frf\A) hy the ycar 2U05- wllh impl('llIl'nlalllHl tl"nllo\\" ill <;llh<;l'qlll'lli
years. Suhsequent summit meetings ill 1\)l)M .llld 2001 1'.lullll' <;l'ITII(' II' Ihl"
hut aclll ... 1progress was p"infllll)' "low, '
'n Ihe meantime. the Uniled Stales l'Inh.llknlllll ,I <;('IIC" 1.IIIC(' 11 ... le ,1\'111
ment:.. with individll<ll coulll riel' n( 1,<11 in "111('l"Il.1 (n lui gl 1\llp" 1.1 .. I1\.1I1C'1 11,11 ,; :11" I
This produced what is known as a "'huh a!H1 IOllllalion llndl'!' ,111<; ,,\, .. 11'111,
a cenlml country, or &huh,- enjo)':> "pcd:lll'rdC'rrnl(' IlIlhr 1ll,1Ikt'1 ..1.'.It h
COUnl!)' under a !'crics of separate hil:ltclill f1grl'Clllelll .. !'he "I'"k".. , 11"\\'l'I'I'I, tI"
nol pre(erentinl '\Lccs!' 10 (,:leh olher'" llI:lrk... ",: 1'\','11 W'II""', thn 11,1\'\' I..
\..1\1(\1\ vI I)
111\ I
\" Ill'
..

/'
I hUNI 1\ \,rl\'..
fRU
I PALJ[
...jlll/
'>1'(\11\1
Concerns about NAFTA prompted recollections of the Sp.mish conquest, (Danzigerl
Christian Science Monitor.)
\71 PARI 1111{1:!- .. ANI> I{HI.ECTIONS
;llIlullg tll .... for prl'lln..'I}(l'S within tile hub Ilwrkl'l. \.yhat is good
Illr lhl' Illdl h. Ilut ;II\\';I)'S so guud (ur thl' spok.... s.
I'ln' lrade agr(A('llIl'llts (FTAs) (Ontailled a fllllc!<.1l1H:ntal iruny. As
I I I I'b It d 'cisiuJlS b)' $Ov.... rcll'll
IIll'lll til gllvlnllll.... 111 tilt')' n:! ed.... l lei cr, e e. I:)
r;l!lu.'r than th(, Minvisibl .... hand" or tht.' market. And while they lowered
h.lI to Iradl', thl'y did 1101 rl'!lllIVe thl'lIl-not <Ill of them, and not riht
;lW;lY. Stricti)' tht' Mfret.' labl1 was and remains a misnomer. F1 As
dlt! lHlt .Illlkvl llllllpide rlct'llulll vt'tradl'; they n.:pn:sentcd new tcrms for tile
11l,t1I,lgl'llll:llt 01 tradl' by :.tate:.. . .
A.... ullall' 2lJOlJ, the' Unilcd Stdles had r,'adll'd In.:e tradc agreements wllh nlllC
llHllltlk.. of 11 Ie fvil'xico, Chill', the cuuntries ofCenlral
I )tJlIlilli.... ln Ikpublic), and I'eru. A lreaty with Colombia was awaiting ratllLcatloll
II)' till' U.S. S"rwtl', ;llId nl'goliations Wl'n.: continuing with Panama. At the saml'
lilli\:", 'llita illlport.lJll naliuns-Argentina, Brazil, Ecumlor, Paraguay, Venezuela,
,lilt! BIl!ivl,t, luge-thl'r accoulltillg.l(lf olll'half of the rc:gion's population-showed
linle inl",r,':.t III linking thl'ir e({1I10mil' dcstinies so closely with the Colossus of the
Nortl1. 111 thi:. I.atin '\llll'rk.1 was being divided right down thc middle.
\Vhlll ;tlld IlI'w thl:. would l'nd w,'rl: anyolw's guess.
Counlen noyes
A.... Ulli1l'd Slall's purslll'd it:. hub-;uldspokl:' ;lpproach, leaders of Latin
'\111...11....1 ,kvi .... ,d illl an.lY 01 ','heir efforts drew intellectual support
hU1l1 illlpolt.lni ill ecunomic theorit.'s of international trade-,
which 111I IOl1g.l' n.'Sll'd upun das:.kal notions of As
Nubel III iz,' winning ,'UlIlll1l1bt l.Jaul Krugman noted, countrtes uften trade
\vitlJ \'cr)" partner:.; a:. a nlaller or fact, countries ofkn im.purt .thl'
:,.lIl1e III 14t1ud:. that lhl'y ,,-,x purl. The reason is that COl1lpanH:s often
pl ,III\\ .. irllil.ll gocl,b hUI \vilh :.Iight vari<.ltiuns. As companics becollll' 1ll0n:
sped.III/.nl alld l'llicit'rlt at producillg tlleir gouds, thcy increasl' sales, expa.nd
\lll,ratLllll .... , alld luuk fur Jalga 11larkcts. For ,their part, t:.ons.ume,fs Itkl'
v.llkty, .... 0 Ihq' pi .. k and tlH:ir products /rom compailies In cilfferel1t
As a rl'sult, cuuntries t'nd up exc:hanging similar products. So some
1\lllait.lll.... [HI)' and some Germans buy Fords. Or, more to the
plJillt, 1\rg"lltillL'S UlIl:.Ullh: ddicatl' whit\;' willes frol11 Chile while chilellos
t'njllY 11I';Il'ty frolll Arglntina. .
At .IIlY rak, this hdpt.'d t:stablish fOI. In::e ag.ree-
Jll,'llb ;llnung (oUlitrit's ill Latin America. In 01le Jormulatloll, a lew
I\lllllni hub and-spuke- arrangt.'lllclltS. Prominent illllong thel11 wt.'re Mt'XlCO,
wllkll furged FTAs with \,.'ountries or Central America; Chile, which estab-
lished prl'll'felltial rdatiulls with othcl' nations of South
which sought tll ("rt'atl' a South AIlH:rican Free Trade Assocwtlon (SAl I A)
wit II ibdl at the .. l'lIter.
1\ sl'colld rt'SplllISt' illvolvl'l1 sub-regional integration. The Central
LcillllllUll Mal kd rl'viwd, thl' Caribbt.'<ln Community (CARICOM) \V.IS
"

reinviguratl'd, and the I\ndean Pact was rcshaped :Inc! revitali'l.ed. Such project:.
could S!llllulalc eCOllomic growth among the 1lleJllber cOl1l1lries and, it \Vas hoped,
strengthen their bargaining position ill rdatioll to the United St<.ltes and other
major POWl'!"S.
The 1110St ambitiolls alld ioJluel11hd of these sell"liles enll'rgnl in 11)91 in
South Amcrica, where the MCOlll11l01l Markd of the SOllth" (MERCOSUI{) linked
tlw econOmic fortunes of Argentina, ilra'l.il, Uruguay, alld Paraguay. tvh:lIlbl'f
(oulltrks clllllmitlt'd thelllselves to (OIIStl'ucl a "custums uniull" with.1 ,011I'l"lIJII
external tariff, and to mOVl' onward toward :I (OmHlon Illarkd ilt
subsequent years. Espl'cially in view of lung-standing bel\vl','l1 Argelltill<l
and Ihazil, IvlERCOSUR was :J truly rel1larkable (kvdopnwnl. II:. partnt'rs COil
stitLlkd nearly one-halfufl.aLin America's GDP,lllOre than 40 perc"Ht ufits total
population, and about ont'-third of its foreign trade.
More important th.\ll its sizt' was its stratt'git: orientation. III (Ulltrast to
traditional free trade urange-lllcnts, MERCOSUI{ fepn:sell\l;'d a cOllllllillll<.'1l1 tll
"olltwllrd-orielltt'd integration"-that is, frolll;l dl'll'l'lnillatiunltll1l<lke 1lll'lIlhef
states more competitive in Ihe international arena, rather thall to rdy ctll1lple-
tel)' on closed markets via imporl-substitutiun The project
also had de:tf polilical goab: the l:ollsolidatioH 01 peace and democracy
throughout the Southern COllC. To reduct.' military tensions, Argentina and
Brazil agrced 10 ball the development uf Iluck'af weapons. III a sens,',
MERCOSUR would provide dvilial1 democrats with regular oppurtullitit'S for
conl:>lIltalioll and mutual support, thus offsctting the long-estahlislwd
for the armed fort:es of the area.
Extending the scope of its .llllbiliulIS, Brazil wt.'nl Ull 10 proilOSC thl' format iun
uf a SOUtll Anll'ricnn Free Assodatioll ill 'l'lll: idca W<lS [0 lreak <l In'e
trad,.. zone throughuut thl' contincllt (rather than lhc hCl1lisplh:r,') by the yeM
2U05. Public inlentions Wl'rl' maniruld; to GlpH<lJi'l.c on the ,'Xpl'l kilt'<: 01
MERCOSUR, which was rapidly increasing illtf.ll"egivnal tralk; to avoid Illl'
or MERCOSUR, especially from Chik and the Ancit'all Croup; and tll
,1CCtl111ulate ncgotiating power lor dealing with the possibiJity of broader U.S.-led
integration schemes in the Americas. Not coincidcntally, SAFTA would confirm
Brazil's historic claim to be thl' dominarH puwer thruughuut South Alllerica.
By far the most dire(t ami radical challenge tu lhe Unill:d Stall'S carne frum
Venezuela, where, as exphlilled in Chapter 8, Hugo Chavez was seeking 10 promote
Msocialism for the twenty-flrst century," As part or an dTul't to boo:.t his fl'gional
authority, Cld.vez launched an initbtivc known as the AIIt:I't/(l/iva I3vliwlT"i(///(/
para/as Americas (ALBA), i\ broad alliancc !Iwt would provide nn to
the FTAA and, by extension, to AmeriC:Ill hegemony within the hemisphere.
Rapid increases in petroleum priccs proVided Chavez with a massive influ-x uf
pelrodollars, which allowed him to dispense all,nanllerof econolnic assistance Iv his
allies.l3y the ye,lr 2006, the Chavista regime had fonncd clOSt: rdations not only with
Cuba, but also wilh other left-of-center governments Ihroughout tht' regiun-Illost
notably Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nican;lglla. Ch.lVl';'. also rnaillt,lint'd a \,.'vlllplex
I _
37'1 P/\RTTIIREE TIIEl\IES AND
relationship with Lula of Brnil, a prominent leftist with a decidedly pragmatic streak
and, in many ways, his principal rival for leadership of South America.
For different reasons, Lula and Chave7. both opposed U.S. plans for the FrAA.
Brnil objecled to Washington's refusal to discard huge-scale governmental sub-
sidies to American "griculture; Venel.llela objected to the geopolitical implications
of the project as a whole. At a memorable summit meeting in Mar del Platn,
Argentina, in Novemher 2005, the two counlries joined forces 10 dismantle the
FTAA. As least for the foreseeable future, the vision of a free tmde area of the
Americas would have to be ;tbandonccl. What remained was a divided hemisphere
with a p<llchwork of integration schemes.
Interim Reflections ond the Crosh of '08
After what seemed like interminable delays, Lalin America began to reap the
hcnefits of neoliheral policies around 2003. hy growing demand for com-
modities, countries of the region sh.. r1'l)' increased their exports. They found avid
cuslomers not only in traditional markets, such as Europe and the Uniled States,
but also in new (Kirts of the world, especially in China. As a result, Latin America
emharked on a five-year period of continuous economic expansion, with
annual growth rates around 5 percent. These figures translated into per capita
il1crea<;cs of3 percent per year. This was by far the best economic performance for
the region since the 1970s.
Proponents of Ihe Washington consensus could hardly conlain their glee.
According to their self-confident predictions, it appeared thaI the unfettered
interplay of market forces was unle:lshing economic creativily, vitality, and enlre-
preneurship within a globalizing world. The capitalist spirit was riding high
incleed.
Yet there were warning signs as well. As prescient observers noted, Latin
America's free trade expansion displnyed some structural weaknesses:
e The rates of growth, while very welcome, were lower than in many other
regions of the world (such as Asia and Eastern Europe).
e Levels of inequality were the highest in the world.
e While povert)' rates were declining, unemployment was still high and
climbing,
" Investments in infrastructure and education were inadequate, and
e The region continued to rely on traditional commodity exports, rather than
on economic restructuring (as exemplified by China and India).
For all these reasons, according to these analysts, L'ltin America remained suscep-
tible to exlernal economic shocks. This vulnerability had cost the region dearly in
the 1930s and the 19805, It could happen again.
The shock arrived in late 2008, with the sudden collapse of financial markets
in the United States and the world. In the waning months of the George Bush
(junior) administration, the American economy plunged into a deep recession.
The U.S. rescued key financial institutions with hundreds of billions
of doJlus in bailollts-socialii'.ing Ihe hOlllking illdll,<;lr)', ill clTc( 1 whill' llw
Federal Reserve brought COIllmercinI inlerest rales dowll In Ilc.lliv i'f'IO '1 ..
revive Ihe economy, Presidenl BOITack ()hama prnpo<;cd ,I 111.1<;\1\"1'
program ofpllblic expendilures in e;lrly 20091h<ll \\';"1<; tlcl:;iglwtl hOlh In (,IlIl,IIltC
the nation's competitiveness ;lnd 10 stimulalc e(fH10lllil ;!,livil)',
III terlllS of economic polky, Ihese developlllenl .. had 1.1!" I"(":lt fling Hl1l'lIl,l
lions. lhat "I he wnl:; neil her onmiSI i(,1l1 11111' (:IP,lhk 01 "I'll
I he}' dcrnollstrnted Ihe need fill' j.;I)Vcl"llll1(,lllal '1'111'\' t'l
l1
l'h"
Ihe Imporlance of puhlic invest menl.;;, e<;pt'l.. iOlIl)' '11 edlll al il'll 01'11111111.1... 11'1<
IlITe (hridges, highw;l)'s, the Inlernc!. elc.). Th<')' I"cvc.,kd Ih,ll, ill lilll,'\ .. I 1'1\1'..
onl), tile could lake decisive ,'Llioll. ('lIlillll"I)', 111('\e In\,glll ... I"'"
moted;l revlv;ll of ill John M:I)'nOlrtl Ke)'llcs (I:-lxt 1'/11(.), III\' HIlll .. 11
who argued th,,' goverlllllcllt" should Ulllnlel Ihe Ilcpll'<,<;ioll "I Ill('
1930s wllh largc-scnle programs of deficit I:;pentling. The \('IIf'I, ;1t,;Ulltlllll' t"
Ke)'n.e.... was milch the amollnt 01 I1HIII(')' Ihf' gflVf'l"IlIllcnt Spt'UI. hili i;,.\\"
It slgn;llcd a re'vival ofth(' eulilt IIH iI..' galllC .llld Ihtl<; enl .... c,II'I,I\1 r...
III the prlvale seclor 10 overcome their r('arS .Inil slat'l playing ,lg,lill,
As a corollary, these t rcn<!<; ofrered sa lis (:\l. linn III 1;It ill 1\ lIlenl.1Il illlcll
"
, lll.d\
and 1'olic}'mnkers who had stollll), rcsi"Ietl tlOllrin,lilc 111I1"'<;'111111 ,.1 lilt
\,V;lshinglon COllsen.<;us, Given Ihe prohlem<; Ihc)' faced, 1ll.11I)' \\'e,c ICllhl.11l1 I"
remove the sl;lte from aClive' parlicipalion ill Ihcir 1l,lllIlll,11 l'IOllll/nil''' I" .11I01
behold, ('ven rhe Uniled wa" rel),ing IIII il,<; (C'lllr:l1 gnvC'flIIIlCllllf' I'lln Ilk.1
pathw:l)' In recovery. Slate intcrvention \\'ollld he respcl'l.lhle ,lg.lill!
Yel the ncar-term outlook for L;ltin AnH'ric.1 was 1.11' from eIHllllr,lgll1g.1 hI'
U.S.-led crash of 2008 would havc neg.llivc illlp:lll" 1101 hf'I.HI\1' 1,11111
Americans had invested in U.S. suh'prime 10:lllS, which Ihe}' hOld 11(11, hilI hl..'t ,HI\I'
ofn in U.S. and European t!CI11;llld fllr 1.;11 ill Alllelit.IIlI'I"OItlth 1\
As ha
pp
e.lled 111 the 1930s, overseas Illarkcls \\'('rc drring lip, FOl('ign il1vI'\IUII'111
was ;llso In free-fall declil1e. According 10 flllC prf'dil Illlll, 1'/ tlllllln"
growth for the region woulel clecline In le.;;<; th.lIl 2 prlll'Il1 in 2(l1l'l wllh II"
assurance lhal Ihings wOlild gel heller tlwrean('r
Under these distressing circllm<;lance", I ;'Ilill AIllClil,lIl le.ltle,I:; ,llld 1111111-1'1\
began exploring new to economic dcvelopmcnt. Ol1n' ,lg,lin. I!If' <;I'.\l'\ II lnl ,I
worbhle stT:'llegy was undcr wa)"
13
Dynamics of Political Transformation
W
h;ll h,lvl.-!Jecll tilt' pulitlLoll LUI ut Anu:ric.\'s
fl. .. ill Iii... l.11.\I)\l::r, of the :1
<IIT..Jr .)1 I,ll L'l:uIIUlllIL
.Hld 1lI'IIIlI>l.:r.dblll. 1\3 .. .1110 of Iht.'se alteration::., social strllctun:s
lllh.k'WI'llt lh.1I1gc, Litit"::. burg,cullcd, and politics a
Illt'lll III l'xlh:rillll'IIlS -rI:'VUIUIIUII, rdurlll. reactiun. and dClIlcx:rac.y. \'Vnhm tht:
I. I I", I"
",,,,y IIh.l ... h 11lI'\..' h:l\''': bt'l:n the central and definmg Iht"Illt.'::..
l'tlll....llC.1 .1 t 0 .
(.UlItp.II..tIIV..., .1lI.d)':,,::> ulkr::> .111 dkdivc way to lhe underlYl1lg
rc:I.llhlll 11l1' b\'twn:ll CLlIlh)lllic polith.-al I chapter
hJl\' 11.1 lWu gu,d:., Olio..' I::. 10 .. h similarities in processc:s of
II ,11I::.illllll. Uur illknlioll b nut to tkpkl lht' hblory of ;Hl)' single country; .r:Jthel:, II
i:. lu plo..'M:lIl .1 l'olllpH::.ilt' purlra;t th;ll rev('al the overall conh:xl III which
iIHlivi,III.11 Ilallllll::. 1,:IVo..' dL.'vclopnl.
Our goal is to idt'ntify kt')' dijjerclIces among the cuuntrks of the
IqjlUll. 'rillS (I:' 10 11Il::.t intriguing Why, fur
::'lId.d 1\'vuluIIUII::' ill HoIIVi.1 .11)(1 Mcxil..tJ hut Ilot 111 Peru? Why did such dl.vr.::rsl.:
... tHIlIII j....::. ,I::' ArgclIlilla, HrM.. il, and Chill" succumb to military at
.lbUlll tht' :.;tllle timc? COlllparativ..., analysis not only sharpens our perception of
. I I I I'" ," ,I u ull 'I" .I k\'y to ddcctin" pallerns of cause and effect.
III... "'It 11;1 ... UUII III,:::' ul ,::. L 0
'1'0 ...xplon: pruc... 01 tran::.forlnatiun, we focus not UII Ihe rise or fall
inJividual pre::.idcnb or of p.trtiS.11l administrations, but on
tiUlI::.IIL'1wn:l1 /,ull,iml sySh'W;) (a.k.a. politiG11 regimes), We are seeking 10 Identify
p.ttkrlh of :..1 rUl.lur.ll eh.mgt: over limc. _ .. ...
For lhi::. pUrpllSl.', wc begin with straightlorward of pohtJcal
r\."gilllc:" Ulld\'r thlA g':llenll hC"lding uf th'mvcrclCY, Wt' distlllglllsh between lht'
lullowing:
.. l)l;g.lro.."lli.... dl'lllo... racy, which restricted electoral competitiun to rival
liun::. ollhl' :"UdOl...OIlUJllk dill';
37"
I J l>yn,llllit:::.. vi Pulill....ll Tralhlulillatioll 377
Co oplalive demucracy, which inviled rbing llIiddle ...Ia::.::.e::. to lakc pan ill
d\.'ctions;
Liberal democracy, which trc:e and fair dC:Cliolls wilh Ihe full
enjoyment of citizen rights; and
Illiberal democracy. the most commun fonlt in r\.cl.'l1l yl'ars, which
combines free and fair elections with the partial (bul syskmalic) dl.'llial 01
civillibt'fties to citizens,
Further, w\.' ohserve scver.t1 of (wtlwritariaflism:
Traditiollal dictatorship, usually by individual military ::.1 It1llglllen;
OnL'-parl y (or rull.', oftell associalt'd willl til\." preduillill<tlh..\
uf multi-class "populist- alliallCes hel wcell local L'lltreprelll'lIrS <tIlL! orgallil'.t'd
labor;
authorilarianism, rulL'd by the as an institutioll
(insl('ad of all individual offica) in ....ollahoratiun wilh bUn.:;lllcrals and
It'chnocrats from the sc('tur;
Revolutionary slates, intendc\! to bring aboul slrllClural dHlIlgl' in
wilh socialisl prescriptions,
As thesL' dassifiGlliollS ..., Latin AlIlerlt":t ha::. c:xp\'ricIKnl all unu
sually broad array of political r\'gimes. The concc.'ptual b to make selb...
uul of what might olhenvisc look like \'mpiric.. 1 chaos. In lhb spiril WC uller
not condusive M)luliullS.
OLIGARCHIC RULE AND TOP,DOWN REFORM 11 880,-1920,)
As in Chapter 12, the Revolutioll in Europt.: preCipitated
fundamenlal ('hange in lilt' economic::. uf ...'nlury I.alin America.
Inspin:d by liberal Iheory, elites thrOll!)hOlll thc rcgion .witlly promoit'd the
formation and consolidalion of \.'LOllUlllics. Ildying un ils
advantage," Latin Amt'r;c.1 at"cderalL'd the ...'xponaliOlI of agllt::ul ..
tural good::. and raw nWlcrials, including minerals, and illlpurted lllallufa.... lllrl:t1
goods from Europe and lhe Unikd States, Cummerce Oourislll.:d Oil the hasis 01
this exchange, and foreign investment flowed from the industrial nations.
In the domestic arena, cxport-imporl devdopmellt slrL'lIgthened lhe
economic power of Ihe upper classes. AI a slroke. international tr.Il.lc :..uddenly
enabled traditional landowners 10 reap enormous profils frum lheir ranches,
farms, and fields. With so much al Slake, L1tin AmeriGlIl
owners-began to lake a clear inlerest in national No IOllger contenI It)
stay 011 lheir fief-like haciendas, they began to pursue political power. The era of
the swashbuckJing caudillo was coming to an end,
This upper-class quest for politic'll authorily took two ba::.ic lurnb. III Olle:
versiun, landowners and olher economic dites took direct control of thc govcrn-
ment-as in Argentina and Chile, ThL'Y sought 10 build sirong, I.'xclusive regilll\'s,
usually with military support, often legitimacy through adhero..'llc\' 10
J7H I'ART TIlREE " ANIl RF;H.ECTIUNS
constitutions strongly resembling U.S. and Europcan democmtic models. In both
Argcntina and Chilc, there was genteel competilion betwcen that
tended, at Icnst in this early phasc, to represent competing factions of the
aristocmcy. There was more agreelllent than (lis<lgreement "bout basic policy
issues, an(1 little serious oppositi(lll to the wisdom of pursuing export-oriented
economic growth. Competition was restricted and voting was often a sham. One
might think of such a regime as an oligarchic
A secnnd pallcrn involved the imposition of dictatorial strongmen, often
military officers, to assert Inw and order-again, for the ultimate benefit of the
economic clites. Porfirio Diaz of rvtexico, who took power in 1876. is perhaps the
most conspicuous example-but the pattern also appeared in Venczuela. Peru, and
olher countries. In contrast to oligarchic dcmocmcy. where elites exerci<;cd direct
political power, here it was the indirect applicntion of elite rule through dictators
who often did not themselves come from the upper mnks of the society.
In either case. the emphasis was on stahility and social control. Dissidenl
groups were suppressed, and the struggle for power was .within
restricted circles. Indeed, a hasic goal was to centralize power. stnpp1llg lt frolll
region:tl calldillils where nece<;!iiary. and to create strong and dominant nation
slate!ii. In Argentina. centralism triumphed with the establishmcnt of the city of
Ruenos Aires as a federal district in IR80 (much like W"shington. n.c., in the
United Stales). In Mexico, the often ruthless policies of Porfirio Din led to
enhanced national powcr at the expense of local !iitrongholds. In Brazil. the
imperial government of nom Pedro II made significant headwa}' toward the
eSlahlishment of an effective nation-state (thereby provoking a region<llist hack-
lash that conlributed to the empirc's overthrow in 1889).
A primary motivation for these centralizer!ii was to safeguard export-import
economic development. Political stahility was viewed as essenlialto allraet foreign
investment. which, in turn, could stimulale economic growth. When the invest-
mcnt Glme, it helped strenglhen the forces of law and order. Railroads offer 01
classic example. Foreign investors would be reluctant to pul funds into a country
threatened by political disorder; but once the railroads were built. as in Mexico and
Argentina. they became important instruments for consolidating ccntral rule,
since Ihey could he (and were) w;ed to di!iipatch federal troops 10 put down
uprisings in almost any part of the nation.
Consolidation of the exporl-imp0l1 economics led to the emergence of urban
working classes. Inspired mainly by anarchist principles. insurgent lahor
rocked the capital cities of the major countries with large-scale general stnkes
between 1914 and 1927. Most of these actions mct with violcnt governmcnt repres-
sion, a result that would weaken organized labor for decade.<; to come. Latin America's
ruling oligarchs felt no obligation to make serious concessions 10 the working classes.
Co-optative Democracy .
Instead. liheral elites in leading countries made a!iisiduolls efforts to gam the alle-
giance of the region's rising middle classes in order to strcngthen upper-class power.
The most common tactic W:lS to promote just c:nough ill.... lllutIClll,ll relllllll II> .11111\\
effective pursuil of polilical office hy memhers and repre.;ent:1liv('<; of the middle
c1:l!\.ses-witho\lt incurring the risk of major polk)' IIl'lIeav.11. 1\ voting law 111
Argentina opcned suffrage to large !iieclors of the male 1'01'1l1:I!itlll .lnd pl'l"lIlilled.1
middle-class party, the sn-c01l1ed I{ndical P:lrty, In win the prc<;itlcllt} in 1'11(,
Changes in Chile. actually heginning in the IH9()!\.. S:IW til(' lempolaq' insl.III.,111>1l
of de fncto parliamentary rule. In Bra7il. the overlhrow of the IIlOII.lft hy ill IHN'I
opened a period of limited c1cctclral polil i...'<;. And f'\Tll in lexi{ II, Wlll'l e.1 LII ':1' "'1,111'
revolution hroke oul in 1910, the generalization hnlck the IIliginal g0:11 of Ihe
movement was nolto transform hUI lIu'rd}' In anllllrc .11.0 I'"'' It> [II<'I'olllll.11
system for excluded fragment.<; nfthe cOllntry'" Illidcllc ...1.1 ... <;.
Generally speaking, these reformi<:t movelllent .. prodlllcd \ .. OOpl.lll\'
democracy"-in which effettive p:uticipatilln (mill Iht' upper (1.1.... III 111,'
middle dns<:, to the continuing excillsion nf Ihe Inwer <:1:1<;". I\lthough thc)' ... nnw
times had unintended cnnse(llIellC"('<:, .... I... h Iran"itinns 1I'''I,llly Icn...... lc,1 tilt
of ruling sociO<'conollli... elite" t(l (0 npt the llliddlf' <;e,lnl" 11I1" ""l'
porting the sodoeconnll1ic S}'<;tCIll.
One significant side ... was the lorlllation 01:1 (.Hlrc. in \":1ril'Il" (011111 f1('''.
of professional politicians. Parly politi...s cl{'ated carccrs llll :"nhitl11l1<; vOlin}:
activists (mostly male) who could devote their enlire ndull Ii"....., 10 the p" .... 1l11 III
political power. As nften as 1101, thcy rcpresented Ihe il1l('fe<;,t<; III Ihe
:Histocracy. hut thcy an idclltifiahl)' "q'aT"all' 1\ ..
prominent actors in nation,.,1 politics, Ihc)' would l\rlCtl 1>(',1'111.... 1.1Igcl .. f"f II.,
disdainful wmth of the military estahlishm.... nt.
For many countries of l.atin Alllcric,." III :ll lea .. 1 lor Ihe dile!', lh(' fefnr
str:ttegy worked fairly well. European dem:lnd rot" r:t\\' malcri.ll<; tlliling "ntl ,1111'1
World \,V:1r I led to continued and pnl!'peril}l. '1'11(" eXI'(lf I illll"lrl flll,dd
of growth appe;lred 10 offer a functional and profltal\1e I1lC:lns 1.. lllfl
Allleric;l into Ihe global of c"pitalisrn. Pnlilk<ll :I(I:1I)t:1li'lI1' "('elll('(1 111
;,\SSllre the long-standing hegemony of IWlional cliles. I\nd Ih(,l1 t1i<;:1<;t(,1 "[llh k
POPULISM AND DICTATORSHIP (1930,-1970,)
The Great Depression had catastrophic impacls nn I.atin A JllCri .... I' C",IIIlIJlllic<;. II
al!iio wrought far-reaching changes in the poliliGl1 arel1".
One response to pressures oflhe time return In lllilil:1lr nilf'. \Vilhin ,.
}'eilr or so after the October 1929 !iitock m:lrkct crnsh in Ne\\I York, :1f111}' UnItTI"
had sought or taken power in Argclliina. llmziJ. Chile. PCi'll, (;Il.llelll.d.l,
EI Salvador, and Honduras. Mexico was enduring a special consliltltiol1al t risi ...
of its own. and Cuba succumhed 10 .. military takeover in 1l)3J. The t111tlcrl\'lllg
fear was that the economic downturn wnuld IInlea<;h villlellt pIniest Ih.11
could disrupt the prevailing social orJer. It would he an exag}.:cr:1lioll III <:;Ir Ih.ll
the effects of the Depression alone caused thc<;e politic"t111ukntlle... hili Iher ... :1 .. 1
con!\.iderable (louht on the vi:thility of the export-impl .rt model llf growt h, h('lprll
HW 1' ..\1{ I f1I1U'1 - TllIl\lES ANIJ RHLH.TIONS
dl:>d nltt luling pulitl ..... \."'ngcIH.kr\,d frustmtioll within the low\."'r dasscs, and
lll,hk lniddlc l'!t.Il11'llb InOrt' willing to ac(('pt milital)' intervention. From the
I "JJU, 'Hlw.trd, thc ,Irlllcd lorl.'t.s n:.I::.,:..e..rtnt their traditional role as a principal
.Idul ill I...till t\llIClk.lll pvlitils.
I'r;h.-ti ...... 'lly l'opc:tking. Ihl.' wave of military coups brought the em of
d..... llUK.T..C( ttl its ignolllinium, end. Economic Jevelopment had Inlto
... ill Latin Arnerk.1I1 partkular. the emergence of
1I1iddk ,111....1 Ihe .lppe...lr.lllct'ullirban Intralllural COlllpdilion
.1I11e..U1g I._dillll:> 01 Ihe tr;lditiun:d arbtol..T:I(:y could no longer make convincing
d.lllll:> t\l ",,!llk,1I Iegitillla.... y. To be sure, attempts to sustain olig;lrchic rule touk
pl.lu,: tlll\kr thl.' rubril.: ur what 111 ight bt.: thuught of as -e1eclions
Ill.lt \V\l"l.' from the start, so tllat only acct'ptable candidates could win. One
part kularl)' lIutllriuus t.:pisode ;'ppe;lrI:d in Argent ina frolll 1932 to 19'13, a so-called
dC"-::;ldl'- during whkh dt'ctiuns were settled by patriotic fraud: For
tltl.: llHJ::.t p.... t, Ihuugh, oligardls lIladc ,I dbf.:r\,et exit from the pulitical scene.
Two .ldditiull.t1 lkwlupm\.nl:> h.ld CI udal implications for politkal changl.'.
()lIe th\. aduptiull of an t'loIH)lIlic policy orimport-substitution induslrializ<l-
lion" (1 .... 1). A:> t'XI'Ltilh;:ll in the..' preceding ch;lptcr, this strategy augmented tht'
l'\,. 111101 II h. role.. nl St.lk:> .Itklllpted to protect Ilational -infant
indu,tl il':>H by ,re\.ting b.trrkrs 10 init'rnallonal trad\."', favored loc.ll producers in
)!.IIVe..r1Ulh111 pnll...lIre..llle.."llb..llld pruiliull.'d public partncr:)hip:) in :>tall.'-owned
IInll::'. Tllfougll prutntllU1 .lnd participatiun. thc in L.ltin
'\IIl...1 il.l h'.IS lurllishing nitit.al impdlls lor et.-ollomic recovery.
A;-, IIhlu::.try progre::.sell in major cuuntries, the working classes grew in
,lr\"lIglli ;111<.1 illlpurtalKl'. ''\'hetht'r ;lUtOllUIllOliS or state-directed, union move-
lIlL"llh illd\.t:>l'd r.lpidly thruughout the..' 1930s. ;mel the support (or contrul) of
I.lhvr bl..... llIh" l fudal fur tile..' continuation uf indu::.trial exp;lllsion. ''''orkers were
lU'nhd III provide labor .. lid pfulllS for e..'nlployt.:rs. Orgallized labor W;l:) e..'lIIcrging
,I'" SigllJll ....;lllt aduL
'rJlI"I),)litkal \'xl'f\':>",ion chang\'::. lOok two forms. One
W.l:> thc l..lllitinuatioll of (-o-uptative.. deJJlocracy. through whkh industri"li:>b and
wnrk\."'r:> gai'll.:d (usu.tlly Iimitc:d) access to power decloral or other compe"
titillll. One l'XOllllplc was Chile. whert' political parties were reorganized to represent
thl" illlcn.:::.ts of Ill'W groups and social strOlla. Pro-labor and pro-industriaJist pank'S
thu:> cllkn:d the Chi!c;:m e1t'ctoral process. As lung as this arrangemenl lasted, their
1';:lrticipaliun 1.:111 vaJuable support 10 th!,;' regilll\."'.
All "ltcfIl.tlivl;. response involved the creation of multi-d:tss "populist-
aliJances. The emergcncc of an indmtrial elite and the vitalization of the labor
mOWlllent made possibl ... a new. proinduslrial coalition merging the interests of
cntreprcnt'lifS ami workers-in SOIllt' CaSes. directly chaIJenging the long-standing
pre<!Ultlill.lllce of agril.::lIltur.lI and 1:lllckd intercsts. Each of Ihese alliances was
U"caled by nalionalleade..rs who e..xploitcd the power of the stnte for the t:nhance
ment olthdr personal POWl'r. In Brazil. Gdltlio Vtlrgas thus began cOllstructing a
urb;ulbased populist coalition in the 19305, as would Juan Peroll in
Argentina in Ihe I910s. COllllllon denumin;ltors wcre tilt.,
GljXlCity to mobilize working-c1a::.s e1c:nll'lIts, the utiliz;lIiun 01 nationalbt and :lllti.
imperi;tlist rhetorh: (and polici!,;'s) 3:) a unifying dbcoUf:>c, tile..' rdiilllt.C on ullb 01
personality, and intolenlllce for Ihe domestic .
Extreme versions of til is populist formulation resulted III -Lorpolatbt" stak::..
ill which political institutions followed functioll;j! r;lther limn palth;Ul lines. Thb
harkened back to ancient Ilispanic tradition. which organizl'd :>udet)' into fUIK-
lion.1I or corpor..ltions"-soldiers, pric..'sb, landowlle..'r::., Illert.hallts, shee..'p
herders. ctc.-all under the pr!,;'sulllably henellcent It:adership u( the Illonarchicli
slate. During the 193Us, contelllporaq' illspiration GUile (roll I i\'llIssulini's Ital)',
\vhich est;lblished :l classic corporati::.t moclel. During Ihe 19t 1Us, Fr;lIKo'::. Spain
providt'd yet ;ll1other t'xal1lple of tllis approilch. Fasdsili. likt. COllllllllllislll, struck
some rcsponsive..' chords within Latin AIllt'rica.
To one degree or 'lllother. corporatist elelllents found institutional t'xpres::.ion
nut only in Ur;lzilundcr Vargas ill Argentina lInclL'r 1'1.:...011, but ;llso in Mcxko
under L;l1'.lro Cardenas. Under his leadt'r::.hip. Ihl.:' illtern.ll :>lnU:lllrt. of the ruling
part}'-Iater known as the pRI-lollowcd !,;'xplicitly fun..:lionallinl':>. with org.llli-
zations or for workers. pea:);llll:>. ;tnd soldit'rs. and olle lor eVl.:'ryone d::.e
(known a:> the popular" sector). As in Brazil alld Argentin , the ":t;.'lItl.lI
wt're to e1illlin;lle class conniet. ree..hK!,;' partl:>:ln:>11Ip. and 1101:>h.'r till' dJ\."'f.:tivl;.'
power uf Lentralizec! authority.
Corporalist or not, populist had two key Ch.lJ.kkll .. ti ....... For Olle..
thing. they Were authoritarian: they lIsuall}' coalltloll:> 01 l)Ill' ::.ct 01
intc..-rcsts {e.g., industrial) against an opposing St'l of inlt'f('st:> (e.g.. 1.lndcd) that
wt're by definition prevented frum partit.'ipatioll, and this involwd Wille degrct' ul
both and repression. Second, as tillle would tell, thl.'}' rq)resenkd the
inlr.:rl.':>ts of c1as::.es k.g., workr.:rs and indll:>lrblists) that \wrt. bound tu cunllict
.1111Ullg the..lll:>dvl':>. 'j'lle lll:tilitellalll.e of :>U....-l1 I"l.'gilllt.::> Illlre..foll.' dl.:pe..lldl.:ll ill largo.'
part 011 the persunal innuencc and dwrislll<l ofindividuallt'atkrs -::'lIdl as Varga:>
in Ura1..i1 and Pl'ron in Argentina. It abe..) meanl thai, with or withuut m:lgnetic
leadership, the regimes would bt' h:lrd h) sustain in timcs uf e..:unoillic advl.'rsit)'.
Parenthetically. this also helps explain why Ml.'xko Wl'nt to such gro.:"ut lengths to
ils revolutionary l('g;lCy.
Women and Politics
Traclitionally, the social role uf ft.:mall.'s in Latin AIlIe..'ri..:a h:ld IOllg bCt'll conllned lu
the private sphere. particularly tht' lamily. Among the luwcr c1a::.so.:":). espt'cially.
WOlnen were often heads ofhousdlOld-be..:-ause husbands (or partnt'rs) had either
died or moved elsewhere. Among the uppt'r-c1ass elite. extended families were
frequently dominated by forceful matrons. grandmotherly figures who wielded
unchallenged authority over such intimate matters;lS marriage..'. place.. of residcllCt'.
and inheritance.
Over timt: the boundaries of acceptable social behaviur lor women started to
brotldcn. 11\ the nineteenth century, women of culture frequentl)' hustcd tikrary
.\H2 1"ltlfIIIOI "TIII.I'oII""NIIIOTIHrrON"
disctls<;inl1s. or Icrlufi(1$. whne guc.::-t<; (Huld engage ill spirited discourse ahout
novels :-.nd Iw/lc$ /t'lIr('$. SOllie. like Mnllo de Turner nnd rvlen:edes
Cnhello de Cnrhnnero in Pent. hecnme dislingllishe(! wrilcrs (a tr:ldition flrst set
hy n sevenleenth-century f\lexicnn nUll. SOl' luana Ines tic la Cruz). The prnLess of
at:cclemlcd during Ihe twentieth century. Within ll1iddlinJ!, and upper Llass
strata. proper young women ceased to he chaperoned on :111 social occasions
(partly hcc:ltlsc there W:lS less ::It st,lke in the ('vent of an inconvenient Illilrri;\gc).
\Volllen ;\1<;0 cntcrcc! thc joh market nnd m.Hle their mark ;\S teachers, pwfc<:snrs.
dentists. doctors. ('ven Inwyers.
Yel I he pllhlh.. ;\renn w;\<; 01 f limits 10 wOlllen. Iiolitic<; W;\S I rndit ion"ll)' viewcd
as an eM.lllsi,c1y 1llnsclliine dOl1lnin. an arenn for the interpln}' ofhigh-teslosterone
madl(J egos, As early as the 1920s. howe"('I. women in Chile and elscwhere
mohili7ed in ordn ttl dCl1lnnd thc righl 10 volc. And in time Ihey rcnched Iheir
goal. A.. Tahle 13.1 Indicale<:. Latin America's women ohtainetl <:lIffrngc mO<;lly in
the 1910<: nlld 19'101' (and :l .. lnle;\, 19(,1 in l':u.lguny)
Titble 13.1 Female Suffrage in the Americas
II I ',ll1'.I"rl'1.,I"'ll tloil
II i";\11 innlllvcllielll lac! Ih.11 1('111:11( ... t,fll,lgl in l.l11n A111('1 l' .1 \''''11,111\'' ,'111'
from aillhorilarian nllers Whll w('rl" hnping 1'1 t',ln<,1111l1 IW\\ 11,1<:"<: III 1,.,IIIh .11
sllpporl for olle sided or ff:llldlllcni dedlOn", Thi ... "tr.lll'gy \\',1'. !':1I11t tll.llh
('vident in the C:lse nf populi"l (.lIlti/or corpor.lli,t) reg"llt' ....
Thc pallerll look ronl ill 1')2lJ. when .1 g,l\,cnlnlclll III 1,11,1.10'1
imposed a COlistillition thai indlldl.'tl \\'(11111'11'<; righl III "flil'. Silllil.lr "'1111.111011'"
Inlcrnccmrc(! in Brn7.il (1932). C:uh::l (19\'I).lhe I }olllillh;lIl Hl'l'llhli\. (Ill L!}.I 1.1111
(1950). 'lcxico (1953). Pcru (195';). 1'.lrngu,I}' (P}61)..1Ilt! 1ll0'1 III ('nlll.1!
,\merica. Perhaps Ihe I1HI<;( '\'l'1I knllwn Ill<;I.llh (' tll(lk pl.lli" ill (I') I',
where E"lla Pen'm h<'l..ame OIlt 01 the 1ll1l\1 PO\\('lllll \\IIIlWII III Ih.. hi<,lory ,,, II ..
\Ve!'otern Ilellli<:pherc. l'vCIl <:0. ,II(' 1'l"e<;l'I1I('(1 her.. c11 \\'1111 <;('It 1'\11"" 1.1\1" 111,,,1.... 1\
In 1111" hUII<:(' o( 1h(' lIolNhell.lll'l. I ,111I 111 .. 1 'lk" ,Ill}' .,Iher \\, '111.11\ III .111\ .,rll' r
of the 1Il1i1lmerahk hOIl<;(," (\( m}' pc""II' In.. ' IIk(' ,,11.,lll1el1l. 111'-' ".111\
ilhollllll)' anti III \ (hil,II.'1I 11\ Ih,ll 1 ..... ,' .. 1\ ltd 111\ ...,1/ 11"""",1,,, 1

Thu, <lui I"iln. "'i1Iflll :In.l .11111>1111111 ... , (',,,kl' IllI1\' IllIIH'lnlllwllw" ..1.1""" .. 1" ,1\
nnd mlliherhood.
Sol..! Eh... M {hol""'y. 5UI)f'lnl(ld,('. Wonl('n In rolitlf!S In Laml
IInlf'''Hl Ufl.V{'r..lly of .... (' ..... 1979). P 16Q
COUNTRY
United
E<UildOf
Rlal;1
Uruguay
Cuba
n S.llvitrlnr
DOll)lniciln Hpp,.bllc
(iu.llemal;1
Pan.lmil
fllgC'ntinil
Vene71lc!it
Chill"
Costil Rica
Ililili
Rohvi.l
Mexico
Honduras
NicMaguil
Peru
(olombiil
Pilrit9lJ.1Y
YEAR IN WHICH NATIONAL
WOMAN SUFFRAGE WAS
RECOGNIZED
1970
1929
1937
1937
1911\
1
Q
39
191\2
191\5
191\S
19'1'
19'17
IQ'19
191\9
19';0
19')2
1953
1955
1955
1955
1957
1961
A Surge of Democracy
I..llill Amerk<l enjo)'cd ,,,h"I<lIlII.t1 1,lll'''' III ('(1l111l1l11\ gr"\\'lh Irlllll thl' J" I"...
throllgh the IlJ60s. Allinl delllnlltl lor lood<,lull ... , IIlIlle'r,II ... ,lllll 1,1\\ 111.\It'I,.ll ..
during \Vnrld \VOlr II led III Ihe It'(ov('r)' 01 Iradlli(.n,t1 1'\"1'"r1 .. c,I"l"'. ,\Ild III
Jl1njnr CPlllllrics. lSI produccd suhSlnllli:11 r,III''' (,I e(,1I111111U gr.n,lll H I,A <'Id,
writings provided inspiralilln :lnt! \'.dltl:1lioll for umlillll,llillllllt ... "h.. 1111I
lion prograllls, while rll1;lllCi.ll l'xl'('I'I<; h,lilcd 111(' III ,111 l'l"IIlI'I'1<
in highl), slnlisl J\'h:xilo,
Wilhin Ihcconlext ofposl \Vodd \V,II IJ clIph"ri,l.elcllol.i1 t!1'11l"l I"lr 111'):,111
10 lll;\ke suhstantial hcndw:l}t. J:I'OIIi Ihl' mid J(}'llb 1l1rnllgh Ihcc,lIJr I'J/Ot;. lin' ,111<1
f:lir elcctions rouk plnce in approxilll:lIelr hnlf the lOti III I Ie" of Ihe rq.:ioFl C"'I'C'lI.III\
in Soulh Alllcrica (including AI)-.:elll ill.l, Hnlivi.l. HI.I,d. ('hik, ( 0101111>1,1. I, lI.ltl"l.
Peru. lJrllglla}', :lntl Vcnezuela). wert' Iml}' "Iihcr.d- dl'lllo\ I,It 1(.... Will' h
granled cilizens more ur Ic<;<; full ;lCC('SS IOl i\'lllihcrlit.'s (frcedolll' ,f <'11('C\ h. fTc",I, 'Ill
of nssemhl)'. fl"eedom 10 join pfllilital partie,. :llld "/I 1111).
\,\/inners of presidcnti:11 e1Cllil11l" in Illn"l L.1se" \\erc nli,ldl,' I I,,,.. rd.11 lilt" ...
delllocralic polilicians who soughl In Illlldel'lli,e SllUOl',IlIHHllh \lnl'luf( .... ):I\t'
Illc.mingful voice to lower-<.h"s ,('dol'''. alld hring nhlHII ... ignili .1111 (h:luge III Ih,'
113llle of social jllstiLc. Eveillually, Illese \..1Il1C III <,t:l iou" Illll.II ... III
cst:lblished interests. Agr:lrian e1iles ohjet..tetl 10 LUll! I'd!)! Ill. mel ..... ll i.lh.. I'"
opposed higher taxes (and workers' righls to 0I'J!,nni7e). <llld. in lilt" nlltl"t .. I Ihl'
C:old WOlr, the Unitccl Stales ohjccln! to left of I..('nlcl' ,0' i.11 prflgl.lIl)(,
Tension mounled during the 1960.. 0111(1 1')70s. as 1.01111I '\mcrit.1... 1',,<;1\\.11
economic hoom began 10 suhside. As ('xl'laillctl in (,hnplt'l' I J. lSI Ic.plInd Ill'.'"
imports of capit:11 goods. Given Ihc slllnll,i.ll' 01 Ilnlillll.lllll.lIkch.l'llllq'IlIlt'II ....
H'H l',\l( J 1][1(1 t
I I .. l'lhlll\i... ut I'ultll(,d 3S';
An cartoonist depicts the latin American military as a continuing threat
to institutions. (Roy 8. Justus, Minneapolis Srar. 1963. Reprinted with
pt:'rlllission of the Star and Tribune Co.)
IUlIlHI Ilhlt dl:Ill.llld 1111' Ill.llluf'll'IUred was st:verdy limited.
Tl,\IIIH,IIJgll..d illlluvaliull, by intl'rnational standards, nonetheless led to
,11\, di:'>1 ,1.1\ \:1111,:111 l)f manual 1.lbor. Till' inlcrn::ll llligntl ion of displaced c(l11/pesirws
IowaI'd Jllajll], (ilil's Cl'nl('rs swdlcd till' r;lnks of urban workers, The inevitabll'
gruwing 1lIll'lnpll)'llll'lll. Thb, ill (urn, provoked rCilctions 011
till' p,ut 01 org.ltli/xd lahol.
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes
..h intensifil'd, ruling ill sl'veral countries imposed highly repressive
UItCIi through military in Brazil (1961), Argentina (I and
Urugua)' .lIId Cllllc (both (973). In all the most important decisions were
11l.lde (ur wne lu vl'tO) by till" top ranks of milit;'lry offkers. In view of
C:l.:unollli( the military and civilian elites believed thai they had to
stimul:ate inWsllllenL In order to accomplish this, they believed they would have to
\.Iismantle, perhaps even crush, the collective power of the working class. The n'lore
nrg;lIliz\.'d the working d:lSs, the more difficult this task became.
E:Kh ul Illilitary-dolllinatt:d governments control over deci-
siolls l'ollcerning Iahor's most vit;.d interests-wages, working conditions. fringe
bendlb, ,11111 tltl;' right lu organize. Labor thus had to reconcile itself to llleasures
approved by govt'l'Ilment bureauaa(,:k's. Outright :.trikls wert' virtually 1I0llcxb-
lent ill Chilc and Brazil during the Argt'lltin.l's tradition or
unioll initiative \\1.IS harder to suppress, butl:lbor leaders thert' felt obliged to show
prudt:llcc ;'IIlJ rt'straint as well. All thrce military look :In i.luthoritarian
appro'lCh to labor relations.
Why this heavy hand? Vit.'wed in the short krIll. these devdoplllt.'nts could be
explained by Ihe need to curl;'lil runawa}' inOatiun. rl>gillll.'S came to power
when innation .. nd ddldts had madl.' their e\.t-1I10mies dan-
gerously vulnerablt'. Intcrnational nt'dit, both puhlic and priva!l'. h:ld essentially
dosed off. They would therefore havc to launch anti illfl.lliullary
programs, which. in turn. threaklled to rl'dm.c real wagl's fix Under
these conditions, it was no surprist' tlwi Ihese military governments sought strict
control OVl,;'r organized labor.
The soldiers in power attacked civiliall leadership as wdl. Milit;lr)' govern-
ments proclaimcd themsdws 10 be k:lnti-politiGII." All blamcd the plight of their
countries on the :tlleged incompetence, dishonest}', cnrruptioll, ur treacher}' of
profeSSional politicians. The rulers were IXlrtkularly tuwal'd pulitidans of
the left, especially the radical left, alllitoward leilders uf mO\'Clllents.
Few channels of political oppositioll wt.'re left open. Just .tS Cllill' Ilad unce beel} tltc
must (!l:lIlocratic in the regiun, ils military n:gilllc bt'(":lInc thl' most
draconian, abulbhing .tll pulitic'll :lIld burning thl' ekcloral rolls.
Argentina's militar)' governlllent took stl.:'rn measurn in 1976,
and all political parties, thcceby signifYlllg ..l 11Ii.ltus in cumpetitiw
politics, Brazil's military guardians, having cume tu powa in an
less radicalized in Argentina. i.lIH.J Chik, pushed to l'q>I.lcl.' Ihe old pulitical
(,lI1d tighten (outrol) with twu guvcl'Illllclll-sanctiu/led Ill'W UI1l'S. In Brazil,
intensified repression in tIll:' hltl' 19605 was fllllo\wd by a gradual "opening" in
the latc I
Regimes pursuing this path became known as kbUrealll.ratic authoritarian"
and they had several distinl.'liVl' t..'hara(ti:rislic:.. Olle waS thc granting of
public o(fi(e to people with highly bUl't'aucratizet! mcmbers of thle'
military, the civil service, or large business tlrms, A sl..("und feature W:IS the political
and economic exclusion of the working class and the control of labor movements.
Third W<.IS Ihl: reduction or ncar-elimination of political activity, especially in the
early of Ihe regime: werc defined kchnical, not political. allli
they were mel with administr:lIive rather Ihan negotiated setllellll'llb.
Fourth, ami most infamous, W<.lS Iht: widespread reliance on torture. incarn'ratioll,
and assassination of opponents as instruments of intimidation and control.
Particularly notorious were the of thousands ofalleged dissidents
in Chile and Argentina, Terrorism by the state bl'camc a source of power for the
state, or so it seemed at the time.
Finally, governlllt.'J1ts sought to revive economic
growth by consolidating ties with inll'rnational economic forces-revising, once
again, the terms of national dept'ndency on Ihe global Specifically,
3R6 I'ARr r1IREf .. T1IFMfS ANO
IC:ldcrs of Ihese regimes forged alliances with multinational corporations (V;lSI
international companies such as 113M. Philips. Dow Chemical, or Volkswagen). To
establish credit and gain time. they needed to cOllle to terms with their creditors.
including U.S. and European banks and internationallcnding agencies (such as the
World B;lIlk and the InterAmerican Development Bank). Tasks of this kind were
cOlllmonly delegated 10 the most internationalized members of the ruling
coalition, frequently young economists trained at American universities-orten
idenlificcl hy derisive nickn:\llles. such as the Chicilgo boys" in Chile.
Mexico represented a different situation. Since the state flcquired effective
contml over working-class organizations during the I930s and 1940s, the counlry
wns ahle 10 make a transitioll from scmicorporatist authoritarianism
toward a modified version of authoritarianism wilhollt a brutnl
military ClIUp. The control of the labor force would Inter he tested :Jnew during Ihe
protracted post-19fl2 economic crisis. And by the 1990s. even the PRI began to
loosen (and eventually lose) its grip over n rnpidly changing population.
THE REVOLUTIONARY PATH (1950.-1980.)
In contrast to such relatively wellcndowed countries as Argenlina, Brazil, and
Chile, nations at the other end of the developmental spectrum presented fl
poignnni profile of dependency and poverty. Located principally in Central
America and the Caribbean. as explained in Chapter 4, most of these disadvan-
tnged countries had less than 10 million inhabitants by 2000. Lacking mineral ;lnd
other IHltural resources. Ihey built their economics around one (or two) agricul-
tural crops-sugnr. coffee, tobacco, bananas, cacao. Production took place on
large-sGlle plantalions-hellce the term plat/laliotl sociclil's-tllOlt required prodi.
gious ;'llllounlS of labor. either imported from Africa under slavery 01' eXlracted
frlllll Ihe indigenous population through coercion.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, plantation societies
followed essentially the same route as larger nations of the region: extending their
exportimport economics. :lchieving higher levds ofeffiCiency, concentrating their
attenlinn on the overseas (U.S.) market. This led to :In influx of foreign (mainl)'
American) investors and to the emergence of small-scale commercial and profes-
sional clites. The socioeconomic structure of these nations was bnsed on inequality
of landholdings and cxploit;'ltion of labor. The corresponding political formula W;'lS
oligarchic democracy,R in which upper-echelon groups passed around the pre-
Sidency among themselves. supplemented by shorHcrm bursts of military rule.
usually in limes of Illolllentnry crisis.
During the 1930s these plantation socielies diverged from the dominnl1t Latin
American pallern. The world depression inflicted especially pervasive damage on
Central America and the Caribbean. Unlike Brazil or Argentina, the smaller
nations did nnt have the option of import-substitution industrialization. They
lacked the resources, the c:lpital. the technology, and, most of all, the market.
Be<...:Jllse of their poverty and small size, they did not have enough consumers to
I' 1>)'11,1111,.... ,,11'011111.11 Ir.llhh'llII.l1,n IX'
Sllpport local manufacturing. Their only choice W;11' 10 U'lllllIlIC' pro(I'lting :1):11
cultural goods for export, mainly to Ihe United Siaies. \\11111(' olher 1I;1lionc; We're
constructing industrial plants in hopes of gaining ccntllll1li. indq'cndC'lI, C'. rh.'
lo\\,erincollle economics remained IIlterl)' nil Ilw !\Illcrilall 1lI.11 ""1.
And while South AmeriGI continucd ilo; cxpnimcnl" with 1'0 npl.llI\I'
dcmocracy" and masshased populism, olig,lrchic (Iemilt r,l( \" Itl Ihe<;(' Ic..... t1cvd
('ped cOlmt ries gnve way 10 nne man (lill.llIu .o;(lil'''': ., III' li ... 1'If .111 .... 1\. 't \
dc,'sPOIS included Jorge Uhico in Cll:llcfllil!n. J\ I.lxilHih.11l0 I kln;l1l1!c1 j\ 1.111 HI. / Itl
EI S;llvador. Anastasio Somozn in Nicar;lgll:l, I{aCld Tflljdln in lh... I)Iltllllli, ,111
Republic, and Fulgellcio Balis!;1 in \.uha. 1\11 lhe..c dill.llll'" clllcrgcd It''I'' lb.
armed forces; an fosll'red primilivc CullS clf persllll:l!ity; alll'llietl wilh tlllhll ...... IIl1n
hi1nds; .. II enriched lhclllsclvcs and Iheir fatllilies a! pllhlit. eXjlcl1sc.
Social conflict intensified in Ihe dec:ldes ant"!' \V(lrld \-\I ar II. Yt'l lhe 1'1111\ 'p.d
issue in these countries did nol illVolve nn Ilrhnn wllrkillg 1 I., ..... ; "'Ill h .\ Illing 1',11"1'1\
existed. The main prohlelll wao; Innd. As Ihe l'(;lIll.llitin ".Inlll'" <;"Il I'll ! 1'1'11 . ,
efficiency and higher profits. they lllorc and Illort' 1.11111.. \ i1l.ll-!.r...
small owners. and peasants. The W:l!':l l:lrgC'. ,111,( ... It.'l1tlll
of displaced and landles!; campl'simu. As in (lthel p:lrlS III 1.11111 '\lllcnl.1. (I.",..
connict was intensifying. although Ihe I/aflln' of til(' (onll1l I W.l" "pC'l Jlf. III
plantation societies. As dispossessecl peoples Iheir \'IlU" III 1 0
11
'1'],11111.
they were met with viol enI r"pre....inn hr sl:l!c ;lulhOl iii"...
The political resull!; were predictahle. (llle W,I ... Ihe .ll'pC.l"l1h l' 01 f\1.1I \1.. 1
oriented revolutionary movcmenl .. seeking 10 sei7c p"wcr 111I""gh violcnl 111t.'"'"
Since inslitutional opportunities fill' sneial reform werc nnrH'"I(i.. lelll. tI,<".. ,tlCI1I'"
l:onduded Ihat thC)' had no choice hUI In fighl fire Willi fill' ;\ L1.1l1dC"'1 1Ill g'lllIl'
Illan:lgecl tn assassinate J{ilfacl Trujillo ill Ih(' Ilolllllllt.lll RCl'uhlit. Ollly 10 h.'\T
their lriurnph hijacked hy the dicI:ltor's dosc!'>1 helll 11111.111. III Ihe me,ltlllllll".
armed guerrilla groups emerged in (;lIalel11al.l, El S:dvadfll. Nil .Iragll,l. ;11111 ('lIh.l
Only in Cuhn and Nicaragwl did Marxi<;1 revolutillll.Hy lIlflVt:11H'111<; .It tll.tlly
manage to take power, while gucrrilla.... in EI CVCI1111.lllv h.ld 10 q'lIle h'I.1
truce. Everrwhere else in thc region, Icrt.wing gucrrill.l 1I11IvC'lll;nt!' l-l1lkll'.1 dele.1I
and extermination. Clenrly, thc social structure nf plalltatinn ..tI( icliC' .. pre<,,('lIlecl ,I
necessary (but by no means suffiCient) condilion fnr revoIUlioll'''T IflUlllph.
A principal task for revolulion:lry lenders in holh Ctlha .IllII Nicar,'gll,l W.l" In
creale strong stales, not just lake thel11 over. (Indc('(I. thC)' hat! Ill.ln.lged III mTr
throw preexisting governments precisel}' hecnll';:C' thc}' were "'co wc"k.) IIIIII.111l
drawing much of ils legitimacy from Fidel C;lslro'o; "("r....Il.11 chnri"III.I. Ihe
Cuban state evolved in the 19701' into a powerful network 01 lahle itltilullllll".
A Marxist constilution took effect in 1976, the Cuhnll Commllnisl Parly het.une
dominant, and the military became a modern profcssion,,1 fune. Ao; (('nll.1I
manngement became routine, the Cuhan slate nsserte(1 thnrough (PIll/ll:lnd ,II
the national economy. In Nicaragll:l the Sandinista dirct:lor:lIC'. Ilevn dependelll
On individual chnrisma, soughl institutionallegitilll:lcy Ihrllllgll l1,llion.11 dc. li.lll'"
in 1984. It all'o established lllech"nisllll' for popl11nr I':lrlicip.llillll in gCl\,{'lll.llltt".
\SX 1'.\1(1111101" IJllfo.ll'>t\NI,IOIIH I JUN":.
.Hld ...... Ulllnl .1 1I jur IIlk III \... onuJlI)' through n.Hiunaliz;\1 iun u(Svmuz.t-hdd
.IIHI.,tllt111ruplltil'lo.
(, ...lll,.dly ... i,tlbt fevvlutlllilary k,IJer", monulitllic
p"ltti\.d Tlllr..... W...II.. lI)'lJly 1...... Ivr this h:'llll ...... u... )',
'" IIll' t tlllVlllltUl th.II .1 pvwaful government W<lS ,111 c.:ss..... nlial prerequisih.> for
III..... 1IIIpll'llIl'III,ltiull vI IUlldallh..'nlal pulicy dlange.
... .:.IlLllglh .1Ild tru.:ulclll..l of the
- IIll' Ilirl'.l1 uJ lorl'igll inl ..... n'...nlltHl, ,lIld
...1lI Idl'llloglLal Ctllllmitmc.:Jlt tll h:vulutionar)' ..I pari ban (and
p.lltly p':')'lhological) in'lobtenCl.. 011 orthuduxy and <lisciplinc.
I Ill' ILk.1 W.t'lo III "''lot ... .I monopuly on power with ur withoUI loken
CIII>.! llIurt:: III this than Nicaragua. \>Vhatt'ver the
"''''1'1: app.lrt'lll: n:vululionar)' governments tenJed to be
.11111."111.111.111.
III "l"'"l'llIg With ltlupi.lIl rl..vulutionary re'gilllt:S far-
Il'.ldttlig '<od.d dt.lIlgl,.'. Both .IIH.I Nic.lragua laullchc:d national literacy
\.lIlJI'.llgn .. ,<ulIn .Ifllr t.lkillg Till' goal was lu workers
.lIul pl..... lllh, Il'llIlWillg Itl thdr lull partidpatiOIl in the: national
nOlltllll)' .llId IIll'n:h)' dinllllaling ;t prilll:!ry source of long-standing inequity,
'I Ill' plllllll.t1 inkllt Iv mubilizl' till' population ,mel inculcalt: valut:'s appru-
pII.Ill' 111.1 Ilvulutlun.II)' 'lovl..kl)'-in olh\'r wunb, to rorgt:' Ilt:W socialisl man."
I..lIld 'dllnll allulh..... r "t'y lIujl'diw. The Hdelista r.....gilllc in Cuba pursucd
gl,.tlill lwo lil:.l,"1 Iv Ihe program initiated ill 1959. and
:'\'Ullldl)" lltlII.IIIIHhlli:taliol1 vi :t1lllvldings owr 67 thaI Icrt abollt 30
p\'l Ll'nl 01 Ihe 1.Lf1ll popul.lliun ill the pl"ivall' The directorate in
NI.... lr.lgu. lb Iargdy 011 fUl'lllt'f landholdings or tht' SOllloza
dYll.l .. ly. By IlJHX l"l)OPI;'I":ltIV\'S and lJ.rllls cOJilrulled :tpproxilllatdy 35 per.
u'lIl Ill' IIll' LUIlJlII")"S dgrkulturalland.
Fi,I.IJly.III\ gU\'l'III]lll'llb ill Cuba .Illd Nkaragua C:lICUullkl'ed viruklll
IWln thl' UlIill:d Siaies. As delaih:d ill Chaptl'r 5, the U.S. gOVCl"lllllt'nt-
Hlldl'! IkllW(l"alS a'lo wdl I<.... publicllb-madc rep.....ated (and unsuccessful) efrorts
1\1 owrtl,rv\v Ihl' ngillll.. ill Cuba. During thc the' Reagan ;1<.Lninistra.
llUll gaw \'Xll'lIsivt' political and military to antirevolutionary conlras
Il\lllpting tll ddeal lhc Given the logic of the Cold War,
W.I:..llllIgluli I'cvoluliolwry witJlin the hClIlisphL'ft: as potential
III I 1I.ld:..!>y l!tl'l..'unllllunbi ..... llllIly. They ("ould IIOt be pel"milled 10 lake powcr; and if
Illcy did, Illl'y (.uuld lIut be pC:fmilled to govc:rn.
l'.II"tly uut ul (l'af uflelt.wing n:vulutiull. plantation sodeties in other nations
Il,lI.undl'r lite heel of brutal military full.'. Stoked on by the Cold War, right-wing
III tlte 1\)70s and t'1ll!>ark...d 011 massive campaigns of repression. in
Illl' lhtlll\' ull'ollriulk guvernmcnl furces in EI Salvador Illur-
dernl .1IId tholls uf innucent citizens, And ill a lacit quest (or
-dIlIHl. military rulers in Gl1alcmala lal1nche'd gcnocidal assaults
Ii" J vi 1'01111\.11 I Ill,LII"11 HN
'lg.lillsl peoples and villagls. Smh did 1101 bt'ar .dl llll:
haUlllal'ks orSoulh AmeriCilll o;bUre<lllcrati(aulhorit,lrian" l'L'gillll's-lacking, as il
were.lhe participation of technocratic dill:s-hutlltl'y wcrl' CVt'll II10r...
l.ksidcs, the closed natun? o(lhe military caSle ol"kn lellt a tono? lu
these governments.
A RENEWAL OF DEMOCRACY (1980s-PRESENT)
Subsc.:quent developments thruughout Latin Amt'ril.1 pawd the way for a rlnmrk
able :'Ind largely unexpected trend-an extc:llsive \V:we of polit ical deIllO(r:ll y. Onc
factor was the crisis" of the 1980s, a crushing c(onomic burden th3t
ultimately unraveled tJle social coalitions which had initially supporlt:d llUre'au-
cralic-authoritarian dictatorships. Local industrialists fdt threUlened b), Illulti-
national corporations_ Under the weight o( the tlebt 100, som\:' military
le:ldas dIOse 10 return to the barr,lcb-and lei civiliam ;tSSlllllC I"l'spollsibilil)'
fur what seemed 10 be an problem:
A (.lctor was pressure from bdo\V. 'I'll(' aUUSl' uf
rights aroused prolests frolll inlellccluab.
and the inlt:rnalional cOllllllunily, A prominent fl..aturl or Lalin Allll..'ficall
politk'lo throughout the 1980s and was a risc in civIC partiCipation,
ordinal')' citizens began to insist on tllt'ir rights dCI11;tnd :Kcountabilit)' frolll
governmlnts. In part this resulted from the uniting of opposition pl"Oducl..'d
by the !>rutality 01 military II1Iman righb (;Ill1paign:. brought to the
fOl'e a lit'\\' Gld!"e uf civiJian, middle-class. wdl-lduCi.llcd OJlce' delllllcr:u..:)'
took hold, tht'rt' was an increasing COIll III it 1I1l:1l I 10 frel' .. nd fail' decliolls.
A third faclur was lhe' conclusion of the Cold War ill I. 'J'his l!l.VelOp.
ment ]Iot only led to widespread disenchantll1l'1l1 with 1111..' illusory idl:t1s or
ideology. It rl'lllOved <I principal ("alISl' or Icfl.vs.. right pularization Ihroughout
Latin Allll'rica, and greally reduced th..... of pulitkal conOkt throughoul
tilL' regiun. It al.so appeared 10 demonslrale Ihe innate superiorily or WCSIl'I"ll
over Soviet-st)'lt' Furtht'r, il brought ,ltl end 10 lhe :lnli-
cOJllmunist crusade that had been waged lor Jecadt's by the Unill'd States.
Throughout Iht:: 1990s, at least, Latin Alllcrk was free 10 sdtle displI!l's un its
uwn terms, rather Ihan as part or a global slruggle of tiwnic proportions.
A rourlh and related factor was an ('ud uf ideology. As lhe Washington
spread throughout the hemispIH.'re, public db(ourse becamt: econolllic
rather than political, pragmatic rather Ihan ulOpian. After dt:cades of intense
ideological strife, political actors tacitly agrt'c.:llto a prescriptions
became the watchword or the day, In the race of technocratic orthodoxy, popular
traditions or vibrant and voluble debate fell silent. An air of resignation tendt:d 10
replace dissent.
To illustrate the extent and timing ollhis pulitical trall::.Jonnaliun, Figure 13.1
plots the incidence of democratic and semi-dt:ll1ocralic regilllt.'S ill Latin Anh:'riGI
from 1972 Ihrough 2004. The vertical axis the lIumber ur l..oUJ1lrit's with its
If'"
I
:l9n I'!\IIT TllltEE AND ItEFl.EClIONS
t \ D}'nalllk... of ... f"flll.lllHtl 1"1
cycle of delllocr"tic transformation pnsccllillle fundamC'nl,1I lIllT,lt 10 c.. t.lhll ... llrll
interests. In contrasl to the "dangcroll!'>" dC'mlhl'.llic.. III thl' t')(,lh, lhr III'W
democracies of the I990s were rcl;ltivdy
fiy the turn of the twenty-fin_l century. 1.;lt ill Alllerka'" poll! kal ... ,'n tlll111
encompnssed a broad span. At (lIlC end was Mliheral dcmncr;'"ll"y,W wilh Irc(' .Inl! I.ll!
elections and generalized resped fnr right" nf fr('(' sp('('( h. org.lninlioll..1Ilt!
dissenl, Arter a long struggle wilh t)'r;lnny. C:hile r('sllllled ih I'0<:ilioll..lllIlIg
with Uruguay and Cost" ;lS one of the most (lrmocratil.. t.l111Ill,i(' ... flf 111e
region. AI the other end were aullwrilMi;lIl episode....IIul I. 0111 ... \\"('1 (' ,I II eIII 1'1 ell
if unsllccessfully-in Guatemala. ;'"Ind VCIl(,i'uc1.1
In helween lhese Iwn c)(tremc" wa" ,I IOtill oj ullom
plete delllocraC)' that comhined clet.tor;\1 competitloll \\'ilh l'l'rv. <:in (1111"1 r. il1l ...
011 citizen rights. To one degree or mall\' 1Min A1llcricIIl t.olllllnc\
including Argentina and Brazil during Ihe jt}90.. tell mIn Ihi<: in!t.'llll('(h.ll.
category. Moreover, essent kd politlc,,1 inst illlllon'" ..lalllf(.. , (nl1r1 .... re):III.1t", \
agencies, and the civil service wele notol'loll ..lr weak. K('\, 1I1I:... t II 1110; !lll'ldnH
emerged: \,"ould L,tin AmcriC:l \ dCIl\(}( l.lliCS (k\'dol' lilt: \\ ill .11\(1 t. ,11"" It \'
10 proteci the rights of citi7('n,,? \Volllcl tiler .wqllirc Ihr ... Ircnglh .ml! .d.d,l\' In
impose the rule of
Empowerment of Women?
From the 1950s through lhe IlJRn", WOIll('1l 01 I ,11111 AnHril.l h{'o..;11l1l Illl Il',I"ngly
forceful. They look ;\ctivc part in revoilltlnn,lr)' II1ll\'rlllelll<;, 1l1,lklllg III' OIIC tl'll'!
of the Sandinista fighting fnrLe ill Nil;JI'Olgll.l .lIul :1 UIIllI',Ir.lhlc "h.Hr 111
El Salvador. As brut;ll milil:lry regimes sprc,hl Ihrollgl)(\111 Soulh 1\111..... 1. 1,
women found ways to resist. In Hrai'.il. Ihey joined t!lg('lhCl III lllolllel
10 denounce ;'"Ihuscs ('If human right!'> ,11111 lll'tll;\IHI .ll11lw... l)' f('l ,,1.lill(,ll
prisoners ;Inc! exiles. In Argent in,l. tIle tllot hers of Ihe l'Ia"l (Ie i\ 1.1)'0Wllcld \'o,"('('''ly
vigils demanding informatioll 011 loved one's who had In (:hil{',
female arpilleras expressed allger and grief t h l'Ougl! SIIl1\'('r<;i\'(" f( lnl1'" .If aII, \Vhik
other women engaged in pl1hli(' pmlcsls against military rille.
The trend tow;\l'd dernncralii'ation al first prlldl1led ;\mhi\,.11c1l1 ('(l('( , .... 1.lg"1
to recoup political power, civili<lll men ;'"II Ilrst Lonlroll('d Ihe pnlitit::ll 1'1 "t.c....... ,
reserving high-ranking posilions for thelllsclve... and Iheir collc;'"Igue<;, Ill:lkillg nnlr
token concessions to women's dell1an<ls. The slarted h)' tht' 1))0....
\"'omen now constituted significant electoral "nll\etimc!' a 1l1,li
o
nl}'
of voters. They were increasingly educ;ltcd and ill the wOl'kforu. III
solidarity, they camc together 10 fnnll inl111l11cr"hlc gr:ls.sro(lts 1I10\'('l11ellt ....Hul
non-government31 organizations (NGOs) devote<1 10 improving (olldilinm Inr
women. Feminist public;\tions emerged in Mexico, (:hi1c. Brai'il. ;llld
other countries.
As a result. women of Latin America g"il1ed incrra<:ing rel'rl'"clll.llinl1 III
positions of power. III 1990. women ncclIl'icll all average of 11111)' 0; pencllt nf Iht'
scats in upper legisl;\tive housc$. (or senate... ) ;lud 9 pcrunl III lower hnl .... (' .... hr
2005 2000 1995
Year
1990 1985 1980
o Nondcmocf<lcy
o Semi-democracy
Democracy
"
4
2
o
1(,
14
12
10
8
Figure 13.1 The Rise of Electoral Democracy in l21tin America, 1972-2008
regime l}'pc. and the horizontal <lxis measures )'ear-by-ycar change over
lime. The category includes countries with free ;lnd (;lir elections.
"Semi-democrnc)' refers 10 "rigged- elections thaI were free hut not fair: ;\Ilyn!lC
could run, uut only one clIldidalc could win. The upper porI ion of the graph
corresponds 10 any fmm of nondemocratic or authoritarian rule.
The trends reveal n long-term risc in democratic politics. In the mid I970s. an
era of stark military repression. only three countries could boast sustained records
of free and fair elections: Colombia, Costa Rica. and Venezuela. What became a
persistellt cycle of democratization first look root in 1978 in Ecuador. Peru, and
the Uomil1ic:ln Republic, bringing Ihe total number of electoral democracies up to
six. The 1980s witnessed the restoration of democracy throughout Illuch of Sout h
Arnerka. with the addition by 1985 of Argentin:l and Uruguay and later of I3mzil
and Chile. The 1990s heralded the installation of essentially new democracies in
J'vlexico. Central America, ;\nd the Cnribbe;\ll. By 1998 there were fifteen electoral
democracies. four semi-democracies. and only one authoritarian regime, By 2004,
seventeen out of twenty countries were holding free and fair elections. the excep-
tions being Cuba. J Initi, and Venezuela.
Most of these dcmocracies were limited or In some countries,
til{' military still wielded considerable power from behind the scenes, and could
exercise a veto over m;\jor policies. Human rights suffered continuing violations.
The press w;\s only partially free. Many crucial decisions, especially on economic
policy, were made in high-handed and undemocratic fashion. After years of
repression (including ph}'sical elimination) hy military dictatorships, the political
left was weakened and divided. Key topics, such as land reform and income
redistribution, stood no chance of serious consideration. As a result, this new
Numher of
cOllnlfies
20 --,--------
18
I
I
I
1002, llll""' l,rt11Iurtiull:' llilllhl'd tu 13 and 15 perccllt, approxilll<ltdy the SUllIc
!l'Vl.,I.I' III till.' Ullllt,d :-,t:ltl'S, Laws rl'quiring quolas for women candid:Jles on parly
ti... hh Wl'rl' pruving dlt-ctivt.'. where they were firmly enforced. By
10UU. \\',llIlt'lI ltillstitlllt.'d 13 pl.lll'nt of L.ltin America's cabinl'l ministers, They
Wl'I"l' IIlIW 11l.1ll.lglllg kq' pUrllolius, ;13 foreign rdations, and in some
1111... ), thl' Ultilll..lk uf authority-the ministry of
ddt'lI':'l'.
/'Vl'IlIU.llIy. ,wd illl'vilably. \\l)lIlell hl'C.lllll' prcsidclIb. To he orthe
\',111)' c,-.:.II11pk',:, b.llh:1 J\lartillt.'z dt' Peron in Argl'nlina, Violda Barrios de
l:ll.LIlHlllll III Nh. ......Igu.l. Mirt')'.1 ill Pan.llna-aLlluir<:o public profiles
Ilhliul)' .1' or pruJIlillt'll1 JIlen. BUI indept'ndt'llt WOIlll'll were stepping
Itlr",.II,! .1:' III 2U05-6 Mi<::hclle Bal'he/e! won the presidency
ill <:llik. Cristill.l I:enl<.illde.... de Kirchller thereafter loJluwed suit in Argenlina
(althuugh I Ill.' wile uflht' outgoing president. sh..., had much earlier forged
\lolitit'.l! un hcr 0\'111). Llgacit.:s of machismo were llol Ilt'ndy as Slrong
.1' nlight ... SI. By Ih.... sc st'II11lards, it is worth nuting.l.atin America
wt'll of tht' United States.
Economic Uncertainty and Political Disenchantment
til till' C,UIIUIllil arel1.l, I..ltin democracies gr..ldually beg'lll to rcap
fl'W.lld:. 1111 JJllpusing stringl'lIt Ileulibaal rt'forllls, lnnation dropped, investment
.Illd. alll,,..1 long lld.I)'. l.'COllUllli L gruwth re;lppc;lrnl. Frum 200--1 through
20U7. till' .IV1,:r.lgl' gruwlh lur the rt'giull "xceedt'lIS percellt, hut then plunged
ag.lin III 10uX 'J,
llllgl'rni. IIt'W private funding came in the form of
wporlllJlillR IljVl.'Slllll'nts (Ihal !lurch.lses of paper stocks or bonds) ratht::r than
dlrt'll IIIVt',lllll'nb (construcl ion of planb or factories), l'url foliO investmellts lend
tll Ill' lJij!,hly muhll\' <llld llotoriousl)' volatill.:. and they can leaw host coulltries
:d tlll 1,,1 Ikspik and often effurts at cconomic
rdul"ln, I aliI! i\lliaica still rl'lIlailll,d vuJr1l'rabll' tu Ihe vagaril's of world financial
1II,lrl-..tI,.
'1'1 l\'ll' \,'l"ll' prublell13 ,IS wdl. One was tile of poverty.
Al''-Ul ditlg Iu IlIll'mation.. 1 lll'ady pt'rct'llt of the population of Latin
AlIll'ril.lllu.llilil'd poor" ill Ihe mid-IY90s. A second long-term problem was
illl'qu.dity. Ewr sinl't' dat.l on th" first became available in the 1950s, Latin
Allh'l"lc.1 dISpl.lyt'd tht" Une\'cll distribution of income in the world-
lIlort' M) than Alrk.l. South Asi'I, .llld the Middle Easl-and tht' situation W:lS
gl,t1ing \... clillit)' still posed a major challt'nge,
Thl' of tht'sl' problems fostered widespread disenchant-
IIlt'llt IhfuuglJout till' regiun. In popuJar frustration led to the rise of what
1..lIlll' t(l bl' t.dlnltht' !II;'W It'll" (a.k.a, the pillk tide"). Starting with VCJlezueia ill
IlJ'JM, Ilit' rl'l;iUll a uf leftist electoral Iriumphs-in Brazil,
Hulivi..l, ELuadur, and Some observers believed (and mnny
hlll'l.'d) th.1\ Ihi.:. tide in 2U06, with losses for populist c'lndidates ill
Ij I ur PUIIII.,1I j,)J
Pau :lnd Mexico. Hut in200H, voh'rs in Paraguay thrt'w thdr .:.upport to Fl'rnalldu
Lugo. a fUrllll'f Catholic bishop and advvcale uf Ihl'ology" whos...'
victory ended tht' 62-year reign of the." Colorado Party. his ...'OUlltfY'S equivalent
of the Mcxic'lll PRJ. In t'arly 20UlJ. voters in 1:1 Salvador thft'w their tu
Mauricio Ftllll'S, the candidate of a political party that grl'w Ollt of the counlry's
fort' most left-wing guerrilla 1Il0VCllIent.
What was the meaning of this trend? and till' pink tidt' was .1
mOVt'lllelll. It was a protest against tlf puwny. Illl'ljualit)', :lllli
corruption. It a agaimtlhl' inability (ur 01 go\'t'rnmenls
to promoit' efli:ctiVl.' social justice, II W.IS a protnt of citiZl'1I3 ,Igainst
t'conomic forces and unc<Jring political leaders.
Secolld, il amounled to a ft'jeclioll or I hI;' Ilt'ulib.:ral propounded b)'
Ihe Washinglun consensus-free-lIlarkt'l desigul.'d to prumult' frt'(' trade,
foreign investmt'llt, and reductions ill slale power. Poor peup1l' hdil'ved that the
W.\shingWn consensus favored privilegl'd C!itl'S althe t'xpcnsc ofsulli:rillg
The movcment further exudt'd an anli-American lIavor, resulting lrolll dl'l'p-
seated resentment of the George W. Blish unilateral style and,
more particularly, from oppusition to the war ill Iraq. Citizcns uf btin
werl.' casting judgment on U,S. policies around the world. not ollly in thl'
Hemisphere:, and man)' were losing tht'ir l'espe:ct for Al1leric:w socid)'.
Third. Ihe pink tide a broad collet-tion of Illovellll'nts, lIl'lllergcJ from
Incal <.onditiolls, It was not celltr;lliutl. Its 1llt'lllbership lIuid, alill ther\'
COlllpditioll in ib ranks, II far from doctnnairc-ldt'tlloj!,lc;11
comes from such diversc sources;.\s natiunalbm, populism, indigl'llous tr.lditioll.
allll, not surprisingly. dilut('d of Marxism,
It was. furthermorc, a delllocratic trend. Its It'aders CUllle 10 power through
free and fair elections, They reprt'sented their citizcJls. To be surt'. Ilugo Ch.iv('z 01
Vt'nczuda subsclJuently movl'd ill :Jllthorit.u'iall dirt't:liollS, hut olht'rs did 11(11.
And tht'Y weft' by no me'llls all might have admired Chnvc..:s
abilily to yank Georgt' Bush's chain and t'lwied his petrodollar windfalls, but they
soughllo emulate neither his pronoullcements nor his policks. Over tilllC, Lul:J. uf
BraziJ steadily distanced himsell frulll Ch;:ivt.'z and bl'Glme hb principal riv.1! for
the leadership of South America.
Ultimately, the rist' of the pink tide Gln be understuod a reoctioll against thc
of democracy that waS so ill the 1990s. As c1t'scribed earlier.
democracies in America posed liule if any threat to estab-
lished interests and elites. Policy agl.'lldas wcrc 1l3rroW, popular sectors Wl.'rc
disorganizt'd, and states wcre lacking in resources and capabilities: in contrast 10
a prior generation, democracy was no longcr After the lurn of the
century. however, the relentless acculllulation of popul:lr grievances and the
progressive disintegration of traditional institutions creall'd demands and oppor
tunities for a new gl'l1er>ltioll of political movemt'nls, 111 a dialectical sellse, il
the weakness of Latin American democracy in thc tll.ll pavl'd the w:Jy ror the
new left in thc 2000s.
,. .. 'I "I er cl-,," often knllwn a' th(' pOpU!.lf (1.1 ..,,(..
I he groupings In 1e ow . ,., . .. . .
" " 'I f:lr the hroeo:;t sec'l1lenls III "oCielv. Illl'<-r ,Ir,'
in Lallll Ameflca. represell , >y " . b' l;>,
I ndere
ducated <lnd sO!1letimes !1l<llnouflshctl, ;llld Ih('y 1I'I\T
I
)oor peop e. u .,
, " II del1rived of the hen('fits of <!evclnl'l11elll, f\.1.1Il)' ld Iht'lll
been systcma Ica y ,
participate in the rapidly emerging "infol'mal sCllor,. worklll g . at "dd ..
"1 'I e 'orlnal economy (The informal seclor all 1l11l1slI,llly ,1111'"
outSI( e 1 II <
pho
llS
grOllI', including peddlers and hegg:1l's ;ll1l1 small. "L,d,('
d r
""" I""" '"Ike ",I docs Ilol rcl..civc sl'11:lr;ltc ((ltlc;ldrI".IIIHI1 111 1111"
:111 III Sllllp lel ys ,<, '
analysis.)
One additional social aclor- not a c.bc;s 01' slralul11, hill ,I t nllL.d g
l
n
l1
\,
Ilonelheless- consists IIC 1111' l'xlrrllfll l-,/I.,,', II im.IIII,.\(-" 111/\'.11(' ill\'.""'I" ,111,1
corpomlions :IS well :Ie; inl(,flwtion,,1 a).tencir<; \Vtllhl H,lllk), t"lt'I!:ll
, d foreil'l1 mililarl' est'lhli"hment" I hough tll\ 111('01
govern men s, an f"' " ,
" I ""elf the external sector h,le; oflen widllcd ('11011111'11" 1'/1\\"(" III 1.11111
agallls I. ,
America.
'1'0 enlwnce their rd:1ti\'e I'0Sili.1ll, tll('<;(' "O(i;ll ,lll,11" 1\'I'itally t"II'I'I'I, h'l
control of major institulions. The mosl CrllCi;l1 illSlillltiOll 1,.1" hC(,lllhc (III f.", \\Illlil
COllllllands largescale rCSOlln;es and usuall)' t l;lim," all .. frCt 11\'(' rllp'lIll'nl\' Illl IIll"
legit imnte lISC offorcc (only" government. for ('x:llllpk, (-:111 pill ,11iII'lCli III "n,I), I Inl"
key group within the stal<,' has heen the llIilil:lry; <lIlPlllt'l' (1In"I"I" or p:lrl v 1',11,11, 1.111'
(when they exist); another is composed 01 t('dllHlaal .. ;llld hOH'.IlH 1.11 .. AI"..
importanl as social aclnrs have hccnlhe I{m!lall <:alhllill (hlll\h .111,111Ih... 11I'1l
governmentalorganizatinns.
Figure 13.2 provide.. a pi(IIIIC I.f Ih(' ..c ).tI'iHll'" .llltl 111"'1'1111"1'"
It does not depict the outlin('s of "ny e;p('cirk !."Iill A III ('I il:J1l <'P( It'1\, II I"
an ahSII'<lCI scheme, a h}'pothetic';ll lll(';lll" or illll<;lr.llillg Ihe .. "lllI'll "I
concern.
\<1'.

I 'hlill II
N.lllI,",,1
1,,"llll1!lI'"''
1;'I(I('Inal
S('Cl111
'on'!!"
,,,veo,;(o,",
Illf'f("halllc;
Rural Urhan
Workers,
Ilncmp10ycil
rnigmnls
,--J
l.arj!c
hanke"
1;IIll!OW:"_
Mcrchanl<;.
Small
prorcsslOnal",
rarlllcrs
,nle1leelurtls
Lowcr
Figure 13.2 Hypothetical Array of Social Actors
Upper
A second broad goal of this chapter is to explore (and explain) key differences in
political conditions among countries of I ..,lin America. Comparative analysis
involves three steps: first, identifying elements shared in cOmmon by I.atin
American societies; sccond, uncovering key differences between their historical
experiences; third, and most difficult, ascertnining the rcl::ltion.
ship between those diffe,cnces, Arc there discernible palterns of economic and
sOl:ial development th:ll c:ln account for political trajectories of cotlntries in the
region? (Or, in form,,1 terms, docs Vilria!ion in x reall)' explain differences in y?)
Ilow might this "ctually work? Thus f:lr we have described com",o1l fcatures
ofhistoricnl chnnge for tWI) groups of n;1tions in l.at in Americ.,-(a) larger and IllOre
advanced counlries, SUl..h as Argentina and Bra7.i1, and (b) the lower-income plan-
lation societies.- 'Ve 110W turn 10 the challenge of identifying and explaining eSsen-
tinl nll10ng Ihe nations of the region. ''''e adopt two distinct str:ltegles:
(I) the ;lnalrsis of differences in soci<ll structure and political experience
across illdividual cmmlrie$-an approach Ihat would permil, fol'
('xample, a comparisoll hetween Argentina nne! Brazil, or helween \.uba
and EI Salvador, :Iud
(2) explor:ltioll (If r!ul1Igc over timc within individual countries-a focus
\\'hich would allow liS to trace the (ormation of social cO:llilions
supporting reaction:l')" dictatorship in Chile, for example, andlor
revolutionary rule in contempor<lry Cub:l,
Once again. our is to present a schematic wa}' of thinking ahoul such
devcloplllenls, rather than a definitive s('t of rigid judgmellts.
EXPLORATIONS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
394 P;\RT rllREf TIIEMES AND REFLECTIONS
Building a Conceptual Framework
Our first t;l!':k is to cOllslruct a framework for :In;ll}'zing social struclures. We
Ihel'efor(' concenlrate on urban and rllral soci:lIc1ass groupings:
o the IlrlHlII "!'!'er r!asJ, consisting primarily of industrialists, hankers,
financiers, and largescalc merchants;
o the rum/llpper class, mainly landowners;
o the urball middle clas.(, a heterogeneous slratum including profeSSionals.
teachers. shopkeepers, and so on;
o the rural middle class. not often noticed in Lalin America. one that includes
small farmers as well as merchants in rural areas;
e the /lrballlowrr class, principally an industrial working class. but a stratulll
that also includes the services sector and growing segments of unemployed
migrants from the countryside; and
e the rural lowN clan, either an agrarian proletarial or a traditional
peasantry-some of whose mcmbers ma}' take part in the national
economy. some of whom (especially in indigenous communities) may
suhsist on the fringes of the marketplace.

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GeHing Down to Cases
')ur fir .. , .lpplk.llioll Jt'"b wilh Argl'ntilla, described in Chupkf Y, where Ihe
l... Olllllllll thJlllill.IIKe 01 ul,d and whl'at produced twu major results: the
.. hwllo..l ul .1 pl"a:-..llltry. ill the: pampas region. and the importation of
\\lI'h.illt; d.l':t:-. 1.lhm lrOlll Eurupl'. III Ihl.' )'t'ars befure: 1'1:'1'011, the state allll Ihe
I, ,rl';bll wllur h't'rl' IIlustl)' ill le.lglH: with I,luded inlc:ft'sts, as shown in Figure 13,3,
(.\lIlid .LITOWS repl"e:-'l'lll I'd:Jtivcly firm .dliallL'es; broken ;;lrrows represent fragile or
!,.lIti.1I lll.ditions,) EVI'Il tIll' Hadicals who governeJ with urban Illiddlc.dass
"Ul'l'ull ill IVI6 JU It"lldnllu [,,'or Ihe cJltlt.-rah,ing oligarchs.
hll CLUUlIlllie .lIld dc'lllographk n:asons, Argentina's urban wurking class
"q.;,111 e.''tlrtillg UII Iht' political system in Ihe: 1930s, but there was no
I'u:-':-'lhdity 01 ... da:-.:-. alli.mee wilh J pea:-.antry; Iht' l1losllikely allies. inslead,
wc, ..... llc'wly l'lIll'l"gl'lIt illduslrialisls whu Wl.'l'e ready 10 dlallcnge Ihe landowning
.lri,.. tul roll.)' .Iud ils lon:ign COlllleclions, TIn:: preconditiuns thus existed for all
1lI I..11I. cO;;llillon 01 industrialists, 'lnd some segments of Ihe
liliddlt' d.I:-':-'. II luok the: pvlitical in:-.tillct, the populist rhetoric, and the personal
l.h.lri:-'Illa vI' Colond Juan Pc:ron 10 Illake Ihis alliance a reality, and he used a
.... ulporati:-.t stal<: structurt.' Iv inslituliol1.dizt' it. Onl' reason for its inilial success
W.I:- Ihal Ihl' landv\\'ller:-. h,ld nu peasantry with which 10 form a CUlllmon
Ltlll:>l't'V,tliw frvill. A rt'aSUII for its llltillHile failun:: was that limited industrial
g,tlwth bl to da:-.:-.b.ISc:d \\'orhr-uwner cunflict within lhe coalition ilself,
.. \'Vll.11 ,Ill' Illl' prindpal s\/l.ial Which unl.'S ;ll'e prl':-.ellt, and whkh
tllll':-' .Ire .Ih:-.t:llt?
.. \Vllldl da:-':-'l':-' havl.' tilt' lllu:-.1 puw(:r?
.. Whidl gruup:-. an: allied with whkh? On what basis?
.. Iluw powl'lful b thl.' :-.t'lk? b it captive to any of the SlKh11 classes, or is iI
,luIIIlIOllllHl-.?
... \VII.II alt' I ill' prnlVtllillant 011 the international sCl'lle? Whal, in
p.utit"U];ll, b IIll' oflhe UllJlcd
Wl' lleXI SlhlIII.llk 'lII.t1y:-.t.s of political and Ir,lnsitioll.\> in
..dt'lkd ll't1ntlll::-', VVl, t:VIKt'lIlra!l' ht'rt' 011 th.... year:-. from Ihe 1950s through the
1')\)lb, thvugh Ihe lIlelhud cvuld jml a:-. well apply to other periods in lime, This is
.Ill illll"prdivl.' ..... Wt.' t'ulphasizl.', nol a definilivl.' SI.IICllll'nl; il requires
l' .. tllll.lll'" .llld judgrlll'l1b tll .. t should provokt' discussion and deb;IlI.',
N"lIt'lhdl':-':-', Wl' thillk thc ,lppro.lL'h provides strong conflrmaliun of our basic
,llgtlllll'llb: Ih.11 polillCal ullluUlle:-. ill Lutin Allll'rica derivc largely from the social
d.I .... .. lllrl, Ihal the :-.t ruetll!'l.' dl.'rivt:s largdy from e;;lCh COllIltry':-. position
III Ihl' \\lJlld l''':tJlIUlIlY, allli th.11 a perspective on lht.::-.l.' phenomena
l.lI I lidl I du..:id.llt Ihl' v,ld.1I ion:-. aud Ihc regularities in L"lIin Alllerican sociely and
l'uIJli ......
'I" .tPI'I),thl'lr:llll<:WlIrk 11I.11I)' hbtvi ie.1I :-.ituatioll, we 1Il.'t'd tv pose a "::0111111011
wi III ItlJhl.lllh.'lIl.d I kl'l.' we thu:-. inquire:
\" .. 1'''1( I IIIIUI .. I II Lfool 1 ... "NU 1(1:1,1 LCTJUN'i
397
IT
"
I,:
i
I'ARTTIIRF.F TlIEI\II'.S ANI) REFLECTiONS
1\ J ))'11,11111\'" "I I'"lillt . 1 J 1 n.. I""1 I"'I!
:'1'1
Starting ill 1966 <Inc! ag:\in ill 1976. the mililalY. COlnmit1cd 10 barring the
fmm power. seized the siale and attempted to impose a "bureaucratic.
regime. The dominant alliance consisted of military officers, foreign
investors, local industrialist ... ;'Iud landowners. Workers were repressed and fordbl}'
excluded from power. The middle sectors played a wailing game, then found their
opportunity with Alfonsill's election in 1983. Their party was, in turn, displaccd
by an elected Peronisl presidcnt, Carlos Mellem. He soon l:ulIlchcd an orthodox
!;{.. hilizalion program th<lIIUrncd Argentine class politics on its head. The Peronist .. ,
once the implncablc foes of economic onhodoxy, now provided the congres.. ional
votes 10 pUI Ihat doctrine, including wholesale privatization, into ;lction.
Chile is quite a differenl case. It has contained every type of social actor.
including a pe;'tsantry (and migralory rural proletariat) and a working class that, hy
1900, W;lS well organized, ;ltirasl by Latin American standards, Foreign interests.
especially the copper companies, collaborate(i with an upper class that, in contrilst
10 Argenlinil, was deeply involved in finance and industry as well as land, Though
political pilrlics represented specific social groups. the state generally nl10wcd free
politic:'!l competition.
So lhcre existed clements of a powerful socialist movement (sec rigure 13.4).
Party politics could (ami did) lead to ideological polarization. The allinnce of the
foreign sector wilh tile upper clasc; ndded a nationalistic dimension 10 antiaristocratic
A brond-bnsed coalition of workers and peas,mts seemed possible:
hence thc triulllph ami cuphoria of the carl)' Salvador Allende go\'ernment.
Chile's s(lcialist movement Ilot allIe, howevcl. 10 lXp.llld iI>., !'o1l1'1",,1 Illih II
heyond ils induslrial workillg-c..I""s ha...e. Allcndt' ... uppnllcr" f.!ill'll ( 1". ,.dk
to convert Illany of Ihe lower middle class. lJlh.ll\ .11ld 1'11,11 del1l('nl 'If 1111'
upper c1nss, on Ihe other hanel, Ilt:lint;lilled their \,.lrl1y J.lllllk
connections, and landowners managed 10 gel Sllp,")11 frllm ollwr ... tr.ll.1 11\ II ...
countf)'sidc. U.S. undernl\'l'r intervention lurlhcr ha"I(,Il('t! thC' 010\\ 111.111 011
Allel1cle's regime and thereh)' the Chilc;lll t Ol\"'CI \';'11,\'('....
1\ fler '973. the Chilean military. like il" (ollnlcrp:lrl ill 1\ 1):('111111.1. C' ... l.lhll ... lw.l
a hureaucralic-authorilarian "ysf('m. The ruling \'o;ll1tlo>n Illl Illlled llIdll ... tl . lIl ... I ....
lanclnwllcrs. foreign inv('stors..lIHI a slalC' Ih:'1 I", .. ,,(' ...... cli f'xlr.lI",llI1.ln ,,"Wf'I
Staffed hy generals and ledlllol.lal<;. iall)' Ill\' 111t,lgn ho)' .... - lh,' I hlk.11l
sci :lhOllt its (llurse del('f111il1etllo I'revailll"cr ,Ill)' ,lilt! ,111 "1'1" .... ,1 1"1\
In the (ourse of financial rCllrg:l1li:tatinll ,Hid l'xlcn... iv(' pri",lli'I.IIIOIl, thl'l:,,\"'rll
ment nlso incre:lsed Ill(' ('ollccnlr:tli{l1l of w('.llll1. \\'h(,l1 .1 few 11\ h ll.HI ....Inol
cOllglorner;lles hought Ihe privati:tCt! "I,lle ellleq'n... e",
Brazil presented ;l similar pit.t lire. lllldn V;'I rg.l .... Ihe I,... I.\tl" Nl'\ II 'II g,lIH/Cd
urhnn workers under the auspi(.('s of slal('clIl1lrol. In Ilu' ("lI'\\' II}(,O h,,, 1'1"11'1:'"
Joan Coul;lrt. stepped lip Ihe mnhili:talllHl (11111\' \\(\rk,, ... ,Inti .11 , 1"'IH'III"11
(or at least permillcd) Ihe III pC.I<;,1I11<; ill l.(lllnll)' .... d, I h,'
prospect of n worker-pe;l"nnl ;lnl;lg"ni/ed hoth Ihe "l'pCI t 1.1 .....lIItl
foreign interesls, depict eel III 115.lIlil prtllllptt-d I hl' milll.lI \. I.. 11111"1 \'t'llt'
KIII:!1
n>1I111k
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a. ,mdt',. Goulart (1%1 (,4)
b. unde,. Pinochet (1973-90)
,
I
a. lind,.,. Allende (1970-73)
Industrialisls
I
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_____ strong allianct:\'
- ---_ two-way fragile or p3rt;al alliances
- - - - __ one-way, fragile
(from supporter 10 recipient)
Figure 13.4 Politic'll and Social Coalitions: Chile
_- sllong
_ - - - _ fragile and partial allianct
__polential alliance (hul nN :II.:hic.,td)
Figure 13.S Political and Social Coalitions: Brazil
ltil) I'\I( I IIIHI I .. 'J III ,..11.., "Nt> ItHLH I JoN') I I 1J)'II.llllil'" ul l'uIiIH.,tl Tr.lll'olultll,lllOII ,lUI
III I'}I> I ,llId 10 ,... I:thll h .1 prOIUI)'pll-i.t1 hun.:ulU,:ralicuulhoritariull regime.
I k:-'I'lk W.IVl. .. III n:pfe lull Ihal hil eve-f)' sOdal St:ctur (although to highly
Iht" Bnt'liliall goverllmt:nt sllcceedl'd ill retaining more ft'si-
du.1I llllddll' Ll .. "'lIpport its cuunterparts in Argentina or Chile, and this
l'xpl.llll:' 1111).111 \vhy th" uflibcralizalioll (t1hertllra) was sun.essful al an
l',l1 Ill'l ')1.lgl' Illl'f".
1\ In: \.1 kl.., .1 dtlkrl.'lIt (:ulllhinallulI. Prior tu the: I{evolul ion of I tJ I 0, the
ll'Ul.II\ lloid Ill' IIIJlge:IIVll:. dile: or rural llliddk se:(lvr; tlwre was a
1I,I'oll'IIl 1l\.11 lllhllg.IIIIZl'd wUlkillg ll..I ....... A... ill Figure 13.6, Ihe ruling
ul.dllIUJI, und\'! lite I'urllrioll\" tlll:luded three gruup... : !;lllduwlll'rs, tht: fureign
'o'llul. ,llld tIll' 'o1.lll',
1111' 1{{'\'lIhllh'lI rllpillfl.'d Ihi ... 1..IIalilioli and, through agr.lfian rt'furm,
w",dt"IIl'l1 lite rur.d dill-'. The slak ilH.:n.:a... cJ its authority and, from Iht' 1930s
OIIW,lld, l'll,uuragnl lht' IUflllatiun uf all illdustrial bourgeoisie. The poslrev.
Ohlliull.ll)' gllVl'flllllCllb drew popular "'UppUfl from both work<:rs and peasants,
,llid lllldl'l <:.II,k'II;b dt'vdul'l'd .1 for dl'alillg witll Ihl' Ihe
:-1.1(,' \\Huld urgalll/l' worklr....llld ill such a way as to tht'1ll apart.
I hI' 1'1<1 dl..'vdllpt'd -... ector... tor workers pe3sullts, rellccting Ihe
1,'gUlh"" .)h\l,...... illll With 1ll'.ldlllg nft' .IIlY l>pOnlalleous. c1ass-bal>e:d pulilics. By Iht'
mid-19tJOs, howcvcr. the PIU nlajor dc(:tur.d dck.lt .. , ull
the slale anLl local Icvds. I:urlhcrmurc, tup Il'vl'! fl.ulh Wl.'rl Ihrcalclllllg to destroy
the party's lllulti-c1ass hegemon)'.
Cuba's plantation society rewals still anuther prorik', Fureign (I hat b, U.S.)
dominalion of Ihe sugar induslry Illeant lhal, for all praclicul purposcs, thcrc
hardly any lucal upper Workcr... in the milb and on plalll.ltiuJls forlllt'd an
active prolelariat, as pictured in 13.7, and liel>
bd\\'el.:'ll Iabort'l's in the cilies and Ihe (oulltr)'side. WI'J'l' wt'ak, Ihl' <Inn)'
was corrupt. and Ihe slall.:', unda BaliSI.I, W.I ... a pitiful pla),tlllllg uf U.s. intcrl.sb.
Cuba delllellb of a IllUWnll..'llt, th.11 luuld capilalizl.. un
anli-imperialist sClililllt'nlS, Tht'r\"' wa... anotht'r tll Fidd\ cv..:nlual SllI.::CI'SS: IllS
movcment would lllt'd vtor}' little eXCl'pl fur thl.' foreign
proconsuls did nol usc all the n:SOllI'CCS at Ihl'ir dispos.d. Sinc\' IY5<.) Fidel alld
lieutenants have revamped the island's sudal slructllrl', l'lilllinalillg \'\'sliges of Iht:
old upper orgallizin Initldlt'- .tlld luw\'r-c1a...s ill cit II'''' and Ille lUlilltf}'
side, and implementing a command CL'UllUllly.1l acillt'vl'd, lIow('\'cr, unly wilh
Soviet support. This dcpl'ndclll.y heL'illllt' painfllll)' app.lrclli Whl:'ll lIlt'
Soviet Union and its bolh db.tppc;lrcJ ill Ihl.:' early
Tilt: of this t'xercbo.: h.lvt' becn huth lIlcllllJdolugic.11 ,lllJ Our
met1lOdtlrO.lJiml goal ha... 1.>1.:'1.:'11 tu ,llld Il'chlliqut'l> uf
U 11.,,,,,1... ,,,,,, (1')5') )
r-----,
I I
I L.lIlclrd 1
L ...J
r----.,
I Ku, ..1 I
I middle I
L ...J
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: lllduSlnaJisl$:
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", lulu'f! tho: H.,uufr.<tIQrI
r-----,
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r-----,
I Ru ... 1 I
middl" I
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b. ujl..,. ef;,d."",) IIY:H-:lUOUj
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_-- --_ 1'''!!Ilk 0' " .. lli.. l ..Ill."ll\')
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I ul IIrd.:liul; 1l")Ull.>"
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I I sud..1..CIO, in wo: .. k
I I or 1'00'li","
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13,6 Political and Social Coalitions: Mexico Figure 13.7 Political and Social Coalitions: Cuba
'102 I'ARr IIIIU:F
comparativc ;lIl.1lysis III a way as to illuminate difference", and similarities
alllong countries covered in this book. Our w!Jst(mtil'c intent has been to support
the claim that. over time. changes in soci:ll structures-and in social coalitions_
Gin shed significant light on p:ltlcrns of political change in L.,tin America.
We wish to cmphnsize thaI this perspeclive illustrates only one appro.. ch to
comp<lr:ltive historical analysis. There arc many other ways of carrying out this
kind of exercise. Political scientists h;1\'(' focllscd on the importance of formal
(and informal) institutions. especially dectmal instillliions. Gender specialists
Iwvc delllonstratl'd Ihe Ulilil}' of (olllparing societies according to their lrcatmenl
ofwolllen :lnd f:lmilies. Sociologic;ts :lnd anthropologists have :lnalp.ed
live dilllcnsicllls of SOci.IIIllOVCl1lentc; ami grassroots organiz:Hionc;. Practitioners of
cultural studics havc rcvcOlled the- contours of ideology .. nd the subtle interplay
among literature. the <I ''IS, ;lnd c;ocial form;llions. All such perspectives c.,n he
extremcl)' useful.
Our hasic point is modest: comp;lf;ltive historic;l\ ;m;llysis is fe:lsible,
slrllctive. :lnd enlightening. II is lllore ;Ht than science. At the s.. me time. it can
illulllill;lle whntever mny hc "uniquc" nboul speciflc societies, and it Gill shed tighl
on palterns or cnuse nnd effcc1. 1"hnl cOllvktion ha.<; estnhlishcd a fOlll1dntion for
this hook,
14
..-...-
Culture and Society
R
ichness.lexture. nntl cOlllplexity ;Ire Ihe h:llllll.ll'b nl1.atin 1\111('1'11.111 (1111111.11
expressions, These fealures :lrc deeply 1'1101('11 ill Ihl' Icgi'IIl'" Il,l!-I '1'111' 1""
qllering Spaniards nnd Portllguesc broughl \vith Ihelll 1l11!ioll" nllldllll('
:lnd considered them to he superior to \\'.I}'" Sill li 1.1 rI r. llie)' held
Africnn religions and culture!'> 10 he inferior It I tht'ir OWIl. Till tlllglHllI1 Iht' t nit 1111.11
period, elite society looked I! I Europe.1Il 1I1(1.lllIre. poel ry. :lrl. Illll"h .. llIt II he.lln .1"
the stand:lrd for propriety. Sllll;lhilitr. nlltl (fcall\'ily. TIll<; 1IlIlIpe.1II ol!Cllli ,I
world disdained the lower c1as<;e<;. 1\1 Ihe ",1111(' lime. Inlll.1II (',lIt Iclh'(', "lIn-I\t.I
<lnd r('tnined rel:lti\'c aUlonomy as they concurrclllir illlcl",lt Icd h'llh Ihe .... p.lIlt.ll,l ...
nnd Portuguese. Likewise, <;);I\'c<; Ill:linlaincd Alric.lIl II.uhlulll'" Ilf If'hgllill. lwlld.
customs, nncl Janguap,e even :1'. Ihe)' le:lrllCd In (0l'c willi Ila'Il IILI""t'I'" .111,1 Ih,'"
newenvironmcnt.
Parallel cultures cllntilllied. )'cl over lime mixlurl' :1fld h)'hndll}' 11Ilt"Il,,1fwd
The interactions ;l111ong differenl pcoplc-s cngende,'C,1 Ill'\\' 11dllll.11 fl\IIlI" 11,.11
evolved ;Inc! been me dislincI from Iheir origin". :11111 (1'('\'(1 I,('(,pk i"
African desccnt crented new rhythmic and lIlu<;ic:l1 1111'lnC; .Intl allern,lllve W.I\'"
of expressing their religious heliefc;. They horrowed flolU IIHilgt'noll'" .111,1
European traditions as well. lndi:lns nn:ulluralecllt) Sp:ll\ish W.1)' .... Ir.IIl .. llllllllllj!.
them .. s Ihey adnpted. Those of Enropenn b:lckgrnllnd al"o modliled IIidl 1.....1I1I1Ie;
;lnd culturc. Born in the Americas, they evcnlually S:lW Ihclll"dvc....1" 11IIUl.IIlWIl
tally distinct from those arriving from Iberia.
On the cve of independencc. only a small perc.. III Iht' pOpUI.llitlll "I
L.1tin America was literatc. Very fe\... womcn had ;1CCCSS to the- Wnlll'll W(lft!. III Ihl'
Spanish colonies, the sons of the c1itcs nnd :l scnllering of olher taknlcd male<,
attended universities founded in the sixteenth nnd seventc('nlh cClllllriC'S (c. g.. in
fvlcxico City, Lima, Bogol:l, and Guntemnla), hUI 1110st rCn'ivccl l'tlm :lIiOIl (rplll
private tutors. Bmzilialls hnd to cross the Atl:ll1tic in nrdC'r to :l1t('llti ullive-ro;il)' ill
Coimbra, Porlugal, or in other Ellropcnn Cilicc;. Only in IROX \\'ht'll th(' 1'01 ...e
101 I',\I<! 111101. IlIFr.II,>,\NIIIU,H.I-CTlON:-.
'tl),.ll ,"Hln Illllvnll.1 I{il) de 1.llllIIU did the (uunlry acquife a prilliing press. II
took .wolher dn.lde lor 10 ue c:st..lblbh...J within Hr.lzil.
I ill'l"..lry wurk:.. e:.... Illd eVl'll circulated among a small seg-
1l1l'llt ttl Wllhill llluall MallY aspiring supported
Illl'lll:>dw:> .1:> ,UIlIII,tlbb1 Il.ldilllHl thai wuuld (ulltinut:: thruughout the nine-
In'lIlll .1Ild IWl'lllldh lllltu.-ie.... Thl'sl' lik""f)' Velllll'S and cultuml exchanges
Illl'rd), 1I,:llllurnd a IlIa:>(uliIW world of intellectuals and letradus (men of
k'lIl'I:') llulil Illl' 11liddk 01 llppl.'l' el:helolls ot"sociely. ;,dthougll b)' the mid
1I1lll.'lnlllh lelllul )', :>ulIll' WOllll'1l p.lrllCipakd ill Ihesl.:' drcles. Thus. I.:'xemplary
PUdl)', .llId Ihal It.lve l'ume to reprt'M:lll the canon of Lalin
,\Ill\.lllall Ulhllle.: rdled unly l)ll\. ... nt of :.uckty and olle kind of cuhural
IHududilln. 0111\.'1 luno:>. prodll..:nl hy th\. luw... r classes. r... nmined vital to
"'vl'r)'Ja)' 1110.:. lHll h.IVl h"l'll Il':>:> .... n:d and prcservt:d.
Wh.11 th"'11 h.l::' het"ll lIlllqUl' .Ihout huw Latin Americans hav.... describt;>d
ll"lll::.dvn .tlld Ihl'" wurld thl' \-'o'ritt"'l1 word. Olrt. songllld perfurmanc... ?
IIIIW It.... Ih.lllh.1I1gnl ill IIll' IWl'l1lidh and tw",nly*llrst cenlurii..s with film, radio.
Idl'vi"HIIl, >tlld till' Illkrnd? IV!lJr"(lv... r, huw has Latin Amcrkan culture been
.. h.lp,d hy Ihl' hhllll'y 01 a giVl'1l (tHlnl1')'. regioll. 01' the continent as a whold
FROM COLONIES TO NATIONS
III Illl' Lit .. ..lgllll..lllh ct"nIUlY. lilwral dl'rive.:d from Ihl' European and
1\llllII...lll 1;llllgllh'nlll"'nl ... 11 .. ul.llnl In Ih... Sp.ll1l::.h and PortUgUl':>'" "'lI1pires, At
IlIlIl':-', 111<.')' .IHIVl'lllli bvub .lJld p.\lllphll'b b)' ;'luthul's such a:> Rousseau.
ktkl ... tJll .11ll1 IJld... rul Ih"l \\'I.:'r..... lllllgglld inlu Ih.... coluni....s. Ofkn tltl'y enlerc..1
\-'o'illL Iii.. Ill' Ihe privdq;.....1 fl'\\' Whl'll rl.'llirning from study or Ifavd abroad.
I Ill ..,\'> 11111 11111)' tIll' llldt"p.... IH.llll..:e lllov... m.... nl. bill affelled
.1 .... IIiI ..... ltll .. .1lId ItkraIUI"l'. 1\ rdIitlCt::. .lballllulIld the b.lroqu... and mure
llrn.IIlll'IlI,d 1'0...0\.1) ::.Iyks \\,lIl'11 d"'::'lgllil1g churches and publk bllildings. and
\,III .. Il'lllll\1 nlili .. l" III :.Ilal'!)lr alHI d ... ant'r llellclassilal slyles. Inspired by th...
Allllri....111 .llld Frl'lllll r"voIUIl\Jll::', htll1Hlnbl thinkers penlled cS:>:lys and articles
llili..iLlllg ..:oluni,d .Ind prunloling freedulIl and nationalism. For
lll.lll)'. till' gr.llIdl'ur .Iud lilt" poklllbi grc.ltness uf the cuntinent bt"cam... ;,t theme
Ih.11 ,\1... 1111.....1.1 brl.lk wilh 1111,:' old and an embrace of the new.
A::. Ih", l'lllpin: l"rUIII hlt'd. patriutk poetry helped consolidate new
11.llillll.d idlntill........ AllHlllg 11ll' plld:> of thl,;" period was Jose Juaquin de Olmedo
(17150 IX17). Ill'" ::.011 t,1 a Spalll::.h L:lplain ;111..1 an Ecuadorian mother. who joined
ill dn-lal'illg Ihe.: city of Gllay.lquil indt"pendent from Spain in 1820. His
lIlu:'>t wdl knuwn pUl'lIl. l.tI Victoria dl' }lInill: Canto (I Bolivar (Victory at Junin:
SUllg lu Bolivar), praisl.'s 11ll' Libcrator for his heroism on the battleground and
It-gitillli'l.t:s th.... indl'pel1dellCC 1Il0Wlllcnt by ell'e1aring its warriors to be the rightful
hl'lrs tu Ihl' IIh.. ::..
Alft".ld)' .1 II ... \\, Iheml' h.ld lmergcd. For some writers. claims to ;'HHhority,
Iq;itilll.Il)'. ;111..1 tr:Hlition ....Ulll' from the indigenous past rather th'Hl .. European
h,,ritage. podr)' cun:.lrlll.:tl'd lH.lII)' of around IIll' 1I('.lr
divine powi..r of its indep\.ndlIKc Ic.lders whose bellicose ways wi..r.... dl'eply ruoled
in Ihe colonial and prl'-Conquesl past. Yeltht'y prullliSt'd all enligh1l'n.....t futurl' fur
lhe new ndtions rising uut of the bloody bOltll....s for indq)CllJlIll:l'.
Th... novel offered a new form for social criticism urthe old and IlI,:'W ufi..krs. J:f
peril/lli1lo sllmi,mtu (Tht' Mangy )lurrot). wrillt'll ill 1816 by MeXI":,lIl Journalbt
alld author Jose Joaquin Fernand...z dl.:' LizarJi (1776-1827),l,;"x... this gl.'nfl'.
Considered by many as Latin America's firsl no\'l,'l. it a piCal"l'slJlIl.' lall'u(ll1... SUIl
uf a creule family from M... xico Cily who a wild :.Ind ca.-....free lif",. This gcnrt:
provided an opportllnit)' for h:=rmindez ..Ie Lil.:lrdi tu paint.1 pla)'lul piclurt' ufllb
milieu and satirize all:>ocial classes during this lransitiunalmomenl from colony 10
indepenJellC....
A number of remarkable polymaths contribukd lu the IOlludin!) 01 Iht' Ill:'W
nations of L:.llin America. Espccially oUbtanding .1l\lOng ttwm wa::. Amlre:> Bdlu
(17X I-I g65). a native of Car.IGIS a law),... r b)' Iraining. who .l(colHlxlninl til....
{jennan nalm;dist and Alc.:xander von Ilulllboldl Oil pan vi Ius :.(il'nlitlL
....xpl,;"ditioll of Soulh America ill IgOO. I-Ie,> abo ::.erv...d flJr :t ::.hon tilll.., :I:'> Sllllllll
Bolivar's IUlur. Afler serving a diplumal for till' rl'Public. hl' llllived
lu Chiit' where he bl'CillIll,;" thc first rertur 01" lite Univasily of ChiI..-. Bdlo authured
Ihe 1852 Civil Code.: of ChiJ.. tll"t borrowed trUIII Napuleonic law. II wa:> later
adopled by Colombia and Ecuador. II 1l'l1glh)' ... piL poem Silvill/ lllilgrind/Ilra (11'
I" Wllfl tonida (AgriwltuH' uf the Turrid LOllI', IH2b) 111 0<.1l' tu lrllpi...ll prudLH.. b
or a lush alld boulltiful continC'IlI, is consiJl.:'ft'd a fuundaliunal work lor l--<llin
AlHt'rkan likraturl. Bdlo repn.'senkd Ihe elllhll:>i.I:>llI of the founding g"'ller,llioll
ollh... nt'w rq>ublics thai :>Irungly d,,sir.....llo creall':t unique literatllt... wilh ib uwn
cultural and inldle(tunllraditiulls.
Romanticism, Indians, and Slaves
'l'urmoilnnd warring shupt:ll politiLall.'vl'lI1::. frullltlll' tu tht:
ill must CUlllltri..,s as Liberals :tllli Cun:>t'rvatives fuught for hl'gl'IlIOlly ,Illd hattling
warriors laid thl'ir claim::. 10 the uf pOWl'f. Ddlning the naturl' I,lf IIll'
(arved oul of the Spanish t'mpirl' lJe..:al1lt" a preuccupatiun of humanisb and
wriler::. throughout the period. In rejecting Ihl' furmalism ul n...oclassicism. ,I
rising generation of attempted to distinguish thellt::.dves from
Europe. Yd in a patlern that \'Iould repeal itself throughuut the lIint'lt'enlh and
twentieth centuries. tlll'Y appropriated European trt'ncls and and
fmmed Ihem un American soil
III Ihl' \'lake of independen..:e. romanliclsm b... caml,;" Ihe vehidt' lur
ddlning these new countries. Enthusiastk i(ll'alislll about lit\:" IIt'W nation::.'
potential for wealth and prosperity drove Ihis literary current. The nalural
riches of the land and the force of its people promised gr... alnl'ss. Among tile
first promoters of romanlicism in Suulh America was Esteban
(1805-51), an Arg\:"lltine pOd and writ.... r. Having liwJ in Paris Juring thl.:'
zenith of the French romantic movement. he returned 10 Aires intenl
nl'
'1,
I'
.i
'106 I'ARl Tllrf\II:$ AND REFLECTIONS
on forging 01 IHllioflnl literature rcnCClivc of its 1l00Iurai 5iurrnundings ;'lnd its
IOGti SOdOlI realily. This did not mean turning his hack on Europe, as
Echeverria and man)' olher ninctcenth.cclllury intellectuals considered the
Old World 10 be a positive innuencc on the backw.. ,-c1. primitive. and violent
1l:l1urc of AlIlcricn. Ilis lllost famous work, El II/aladcro (The SlaughterhOlise.
I RJ9). looks al the clashes between whal he considered the rC;lctionary and
lrcnchcrous caudillos, such as Juan tvlanucl de Rosas. For Echeverria, cnligh.
lened Europeaniz.ed intellectuals were the chosen ones who could Ir;lIlSmit
the culture Ihr.1 wns necessary to civilize the emergenl nation.
In this regard. Echeverria's work stood 3S a precursor to that of Domingo
Fauslino Sarmiento (1811-SS), the renowned writer, journalist, and president of
Argentina. whose b:lItles ag:linst Rosas forced him inlo Chilean exile. There he
\'I!rote FaCIO/do: Cil'ilizadoll C Barbaric (F<lClll1do: CiviliZ;lIiOIl and llarharism),
that allacks Ros3s for his <luthoritari:'ln rule. For Sarmiento, the ruml !-:aucilO
represented a harrier 10 Ihe counlry's potcntial. Instead he favored Ihe city
where institutions of education, learning, and refincment could transform the
nation's hnckwnrdness. An underlying premise of SMllliento's work was Ih:11
European immigration would solve cuhmal and den10graphic
deficiencies. lronic:llly, while (Ieriding thcfl,alldlO for his supposed negalive innu-
ences on lhe cOllntr)', Sarmiento ended up pl:lcing Ihi<; llgure al the cenler of all
discussions ahoul the nnlure of the coulltry and its I'cople. While in Chile,
Snrmientn \\'as re<;ponsihle for establishing the fir<;t school for teachers in I... "ltin
America. As president of Argentina (IR6R-74), he promoted the expansion of
public education as thc path to the coulltry's moderlllzalion.
Not all mid-nineteenth century Argentine writers rejected the j!(lllrilO as a
h.... ckw:m..l pull on sociely. In 1872, fOliC Ilernandez. (1834-R6) penned an epic
poem 1\ lat ti" Fierro Ihal w.... s :lll immcdiate popular success. II presents the story of
.... pOOl' Argentine cowhoy nnd his h:ll"d life on the POI/lf'rlS (gr.... ssy plains).
In offering a romanlici ....ed talc of a gaucho, Hern;lndez. who opposed
Sarmiento's immigration proposals, prescnted this pasloral ch;1r.... cler as the
represent;llivc of Argentine people. For Ilcrnandez., the gmlcho h.... d
gu.... r:tnteed the country's independence and ensured its vitality. His poetic homage
to the gaucho is in part .... lament over the impending disappearance of this noble
figure of the pampas. This tension betwccn the TIlr:l1 and urb:ln continued
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Argentine Ilationnlists wouJd
return 10 the image of the gaucho as .... national symhol on numerous occasions to
counter wh.... 1 were considered the corrupting innuences of the Europe:lnized
urb01l1 world.
While residents of Ihe Rio de I.... Plat .... region debated the role of the gaucho in
Argentine's future, Brnzili .... n romnnticists faced different dilemmns. The empire's
polilical slnhility largely relied on the iron fisl of the gener.... ls who had crushed
lllultiple regional rehellions, including a ten-ye:lr revolt of gauchos in the country's
south. this reason, :lnd contrary to Argentina, Brazilian g,Hlchos were utterly
disqu:llified from hecoming .... s}'mbol of the n.... tion as:l whole.
I I .. ( 11111111' .1I1t1 \11. Il'1\ 111-
Instc:ld, romanlic wrilers llost .... lgically IlIrnell In lilt' Ilf Ihc 1I"I/lh.lII
Indian. Ry the mid-nineteenth century. Ihc IIllhge!loll<; l'eople of Hr.llil h.1I1 h('1'1l
exterminated, assimiblelj, or pushed inlo the hackl;lIl1l<;. Bud)' "('1 I",
(If sociely, they heCOlme :\n esscnt 1.... 1pari of .... pllrc :Inti "illll'k fnl'IHbl j, III:lll,,\,1 h 1,1
the Brazilian nOli ion.
Two romantic wrilers nrc cmhlcm:ltic of wh:ll hl'I,11l1C kllllWll .1" liH'
Indinnist movement. One was Anlllllio (;on,.... les I)ia:- (IX2,l (,II), wholraj:i(,dly
dicd in n shipwrcck hefore completing the epit 1'0('11' (h l"i1l1flll'l\ (Tht'
Timhiras, IRS?). Dias hdicved Ihal th<.' I'ortllgll('<;l' h.ld I1n;u:-lly ,,1I1l'l'll'led
the cOlilltry .... nd wrongl}' decilllated tht' inlligenl1u'" 1"II'Ul.llil'll. Iii" \\Illk
laments this loss. To preserve Ihe lallgll:lge (If Ihe pe(lille \\,1 It , h,ltl Illh t' J:IITIt',1
Portuguese sailors with open .... rms, lli,I" nmlpikd :1 dl( 11I'II.1f) nl Ihe 1111'1
languagc in IRSR. While Irawling in ElII'npe under the III the 1111\'<'11,11
government with the mis!>ion of studying ClIU(,11111Ilal in<;\iluliI111<;. lit .11"1'
composed poetry that evoke<; hi" deep <;en<;e of 11l1lp,lIlg tOI hi" 11.,11\'1' l.llld
Two slllall pnssngcs of Ihe poem (:(111(/1(1 do i:.\ i/ln (.... 1111): ot F'dlc. I x I l .11"
incorporatcd into Ihe national .... nlhclll ;lnd ('xpr<.... inlt'Il"'C I'ndt',11 Ilw 11,11111"
and heauty of Brazil.
Jose <Ie Alenear (lH29 77) W:IS pcrl,ap:- lhe Illll"ll)' \\'ltld\' I('.HI .1111111'1 ,II
the Indianisl movemenl. Ilc ",nile a Irilogy Ilf 1111\'('1" Ill,11 1"1' II ,'r III,.!.I\'
romanticized relatiolls h('tween i'flrlUguC<;C" IllCIl ,11ltl IIUfigCI'II' .... \\'111111'11
lmccttl(l (1865), for CX01Illplc, i<; sci III Iht' nnnhea<;llTll <.l.llc 01 ('r,lI,I .llld 1.-11"
the story of the love belweell M .... rtll11, .... whilc "kllllll'li I'lIrlll).:lIl'''(" m,lli ..lIul
Iracclll;l, a "honcy-Iipped l.lIIl1l',ll !"tllll,IllIIl!<;1 1.. ,1'1''',
Alenear creates a frustraled lov<.' :lffair th.... 1 reple,enls Ihe 1t'n... ltHI" ht'l\\n'll
n.... ture anel civilization. I.-a("('ma (an all.lgl,llll lor Alllcilla) j .. rllll l ll l1kr Ihl'
nohle (and innocenl) savage, who carnes hel' 111\'('1 '" dlild 11111 lr,lglt .11I\, tilt ...
after giving birth. Symb(llically, her son b Ihe Ill'W Il.lllOJtL ,I 1111\lltrl'
of Portuguese .... nd Indiall. Hraziliall horn ll:lsslt..d tllllll',,:-n (:,111,,, (,01111\'"
(IH36-96) used this s.... mc thcrne in hi ... lll .... il. Iii ... tX?lh Opl'l,l If (d/lIlIl//I'
(The Guarani) that prcmierecl at 1..1 Slal.l The"lcr III i\ld,lll. 1l.11)', hilI It I\\''' frfllll
another volullle of Alencar's illdigCIWII" tnlog}'. II 1<; Ih(' 11111)' Hr.l/ll"I'l "1'('1,.
that has ever won internatiCln.... 1acclaim.
Using Indians 10 personify the nation and porlra)' ,I J"lllllnnlK 1'..... 1 \\',l">
possible because Ihey were essenti:llly invisihle in nillctCf'llth I cnlu,"}' BI,I/II
Slnves frolll Africa were not. Their hll'llir in the l-offce 01 P,lIdo.
in the sugarcane mills of Pernambuco, .... ncl in the (011011 fidd<; of 1\1,1I.l1lh,11l
provided planters, lllen.h;1I1Is, :lnd olher rncmhcrs of the elilc wilh I1Il',I"', Itll
accumulating significanl wealth. AfroBrazilians wnrkccl in ('VCI'}' sedor 01 lhl'
economy. They were considered essential for !lnlion:ll prosp<'fily. Ikl"all"(' !-I I 1I1,1ll)'
middlc. and upper-class Bmzilians owned sl .... v('s, lhe ide,l nr ('Ill:llll ipaliflll \\',1'"
slow to g:tin support througholll society.
Nevertheless, the .... holil ionist movement prolltlt ctl .1 pot'! of J!l'c.ll ulll",,1
Antonio de Castro Alves wrolc his firsl poem... \\'1111(',1 l.m' "11I1It'1l1
lUX 1'.\1<1 11I1t1'l 111I1'\11 ...
1\"> Illl' !{.llllnl IlIUllIl'llllllll, IIC: rcad his work aloud in pllblk
l'\'l'llh Ih.lt ulchr.llc.:d Ihl' I:lll.llldpalioll of individual alld pushed for the
l'lhllll 1I1l' "1lI01lg his lllosl t:Il11UllS puel1ls b 0 fit/via 1Iegreiro (The
sl.lv,: ltio'J) 111.11 lh. 1111: Ilunill..: l.undiliullS being Africans as they
till' AlI-lilli..., fill" hard life ill Brazil.
l:uh,l, Ilkl' Br;l'/il. t"llllni unly ill Ihl.. (MHUs. Among the Cuban writers
whll Pl.'ll tu nilkiz.l.' Ihl' imlitullUll was (J(.'rtrudis Gomez lie Avellaneda
(IXII 7\) .111 uppl'r WVIII.III, whu:.c Itrsl lloyd Sab (18<11), sparked a CUll-
110\l'l ') III CulM and II:> lundl..lIlllallUn ofslavery. Her posili\'e portrayal of
111\: 111\'1.111), '>llpl..'liUl :.1.1\'1..' In 10 hb white owner:., as wdl as her
.. II Ild:'ol II til Iltl' ul 11Iarri.lgl..', ,lnd.t1iLt::d Cuban dile sodelY. The Spanish
j!,l/Vl' 111l1..'1l1 prumpll)' balllll.:d lite buok. 'I'hl..' nt"xt year, her novel Dc>s 11/ujeres (Two
"gaill crilkiznllliarriagt' ;1111.1 ponr;lycd adultery in a pusitive light. 130lh
IlltIIII...., Illil rorl..'(1 A UWI} frec-spil'ikd lifestyle. She lived in Spain
1\11' IIlt .... 1 01 h..:r .Idull Yl'ars and pul hersdf forward as a candid,He fur
IIllllIhl'I:.IIIj> in Ihl' Spanish RO),.11 Acadl'lIly. bUI shl..' was barred from admitlanct::
bnau,, 01 hl..'r gendd. Avdl.IJleda h'b COlIll' to be sc... n as a precursor for womell
Wltll \\'ould hl.'lUIIlt" IIl1port.1l1l writlrs ill thl..' twcnlielh Cl'lltur)',
'\11 ttH.k 011 IICW iIUptlrl,lIllt" ill thc Ililll..'lecllth Cl'lltur)/ as Ihe Spanish rcpub-
11, '> .lIld Illlpl'rl,IJ H/'<tLil slatt-fln;lllced academies. These institutions
u,,>u,dly Illvikd ,In inslniliurs frulll I':urupl' 10 train their studcllts. They encou/'-
wlll1 naliunallhlllI..:. .Ilul hOllorcd taltnted artists with prizes and trips to
l:ur"I'" III Ilrdl'r hi l.l'lllllille Illdr ArtislS produced t:pk paintings thai
1'11ltr.I),'d grt';11 hi'hlri( lIlUllIt'lib ill thl..' )'oung hislOril's, vV;IIl-sized
t:.lllV..... lkpidl'd llldcpClldl.'llU' ligllrl':' llIuunted on horses with Iheir swonls
,1,.I\\'n d'LI.lring iIUlt'pllldl.'nll.' III" l-all ing Ihdr I 10 dl'fcal Ihe Spnniards, (Sl..'e
Ill,' tkl'ldlUll ul till' dl' ill Chapte! lion Brazil.) I:raming th\.'
.."> tIl IlldlII"llll"IKl' \vl..'ft
A
l.lllgkd hudil'S Ill' suldiels of ,III coil Irs,
IIlllI .... illiu ballll.',
,\ Ikgurl(,11 p;iillting:. \wrtc' ,tbn pUpUI.ll. [VI,llly drt"w on tht: lndianist litt:r<lture
.Illd l''jlll'''>l'llkd IIll' :..1..1 1.lk:. vI" Il,.gic l'IKuunh:r!'> with
J..tlId,>",I" arlbl:> (.Iplmnl Ihe bl'.luty of the Andt:s and Ihe deep, dark
undagluwlh vi IItt Ihick tropil".d Still-life paintings depicled the
.t1HllId.IIIL' 01 uul uf cornucopias. Musl of tht:se reprc-
hung ill ullidal uuildillg:,> ur III Ihe homes of the uppa echelons or
Althuugh Ihe lllarkd fur :.u(h ;lrI wa:. small, Ihe state and clites providcd
l'lIl1tlglt ,Il'lllaud Iv allow talt'lIlt'd artists to !'>ufvivt". Allhe salllC lime, the ongoing
l Ulil r\lllldl iuns bdWlt"n Liberals and Con:.crvutivcs uvcr the separ.ttion of church
alld wl..'aklm,d largl..'-sl.:;l1I.- of Ihe arts. Patrunage becalllc
dnt"lIlf.ili'll'd ami dcpl..'lltktl UII local wealthy families 10 finance work usually
t:xn:ukd Ii)' artbl:. .1IId architl'LI:> not tminl'd ill Ihe new national acadcmies. Folk
.llll:.b .11,1.1 prOllull'd culurlul uf as part of ongOing popular religi-
rh"'l' illlagt:!'> WC:I"l' impOflittll in rdigiolls processions ,1Ild in 10GII
lddJI.lIIOIlS,
H Cuhult: Jlltl :IUI)
A still-life painting entitled Melon and Pineapple by Agostino Jose da Mota (1821-781
portrays the bountiful natural riches of Brazil.
LITERATURE, ART, AND NEW IDEAS IN A WORLD ECONOMY
B)' Ill\.' IH70s. pulitical slabilit y, illCl'I..'aSl'd UI baniLaliull, ;.Illd lilt:: bl'giJlllillg u\ ;l wavt:
of Europt::lJl imllligratioll to pariS of Latin Alllt:rica Ir.llI:'>I'urrlll'd tilt" l'ulturalland
Steamships and cahll' brought pt::ople. and Ilk
nlltur<ll trends 10 I.alin Amail,1 :llld Ihl' Caribbean at all acceler.ill'd p.H_-t". TIll'
oourgeoisies that were growing wealthy frulll Ihe boolll C,.)'des uf I;':<porl l'l.UIlUlllil'S
insisled Ihal their major cities imitale Ihose: of Europt". W ilh revenul..' mcrl'ilsing. Ihey
fin:lnC(>(lthc rellovaliun of Iheir capilals, conslrucling bl'uulilul BdJt' build
ings and wide avenues following conkmpOntl'y European By tht" turn uf thl.'
twentieth Ct'ntllry, Uuellos Aires boaSIc:J the luxurious Tl.'alro Colon 0pl'ra houst",
The rubber barons and Iheir wives of Man<lus '-\Ill'ndt'd Italian operas ;11 the 'realm
Alll;lzonaS ill the sweltering tropical heal while dn:sst"d ill Europt';\1l Jruck coals and
heavy velvets and silks. An internationally acclaimed pianisl inallgllrall'd the 'l'c;llro
Nacional Sucre in Quito. Ecuador. The famous French stagl..' aClreSS S;lrah Bernhardl
played to packed audiences in Rio de Janeiro, Sau Paulo, Monlevideu, Buenos Aires,
and Sanliagu all her off-season South Americ;ln lours. She: dl'c1nilllcd III I'rench, ;,tlld
her audience understood every word, French W.IS the c1i1l."s Ianguagl' aJld
signaled worldliness, sophistical ion, and Iinbgt"s 10 Iht" Old World.
'11'
I;
I,
L
"
1j10 PAIn I II EM F!'i ECTIONS
Journalists, writcrs. <lnd intelle(;tun!s also lookcd to Europe to seek about
how thcir countrics could modernize and adapt to a changing international economic
order. The philosophy of positivism scemed to offer an <lnswer. It gave those anxious
to find ways to cast (lIT colonial legacies an ideological justification for wedding their
countries' economies to Europe and the United States. Developed by the French
thinker Auguste Comtc (179R-IR57), positivism outlined the history of human
development in three stages. Following superstition and melaphysics. the third and
culminating stage embr:lced science nnd technolog)'. Reason, order. and progress
would open the path to evolution and prosperity. Modern roads ami bridges.
railronds and "tenlnships, telegraphs and other technology improved countries'
infrastructures and increased production for the export market. These ad\'ances
created a sense that Latin America had the pOlential of catching up with Eumpe.
Positivism offered a scientifically based forl11ula for practical success.
The philosophy had ils greatest impact in Rrazil, Chile. and Mexico, although
proponents in each country applied the ideas surrounding positivism in quite different
ways. In imperial Brazil, positivism merged with republican sentimenL", as figures such
:IS Benjamin Constant ofthc Militnry Acadam}' promoled the idea that the empire h;Jd
becollle nn impediment to progress and needed 10 be dissolved. The Bmzilian positi
vists won support among scclors of the army. joumalisls. and young intellectuals.
Adherents of the philosophy were influenti;J1 figures leading up to and immediatel}'
after the overthrow of Emperor Pedro II in IR89. And as a result. Ihe positivist mol to.
Order :lIld Progress. even todn}' appears on the Braz.ilian flag.
In Chilc. pnsilivist idens permeated sectors of the Radical PMt}' through
Vnlenlin I.etelier (J R52-1919). who was also the rector of Ihe National University.
rvtexican positivism had a more lasting influence. In IR67 President Benito Juolre7.
nppoinled Gnhino Barreda (181 X-81) 10 reorganize Ihe National Preparatory School.
lie did so follOWing Comle's philosophical principles. Positivist influences reached
intn the IR90s when a group of advisers to Presidcnt Porfirio Diaz, known as Ihe
dl'lIlificos. .<:haped the finances .md planning of the government. They cmphasized
order within society ns all iIllportanl means of ensuring the politicnl stability thai in
turn could guarantee economic progress. In doing SQ. the Mexican positivists aligned
thcmselves with an authoritarian regime. They also adapted ideas that regarded
Indians as inferior 10 Europeans. In short order, the Mexican Revolution would
overturn these racist assllmpliom.
Realism and Naturalism
At the same lime thai positivislll was gaining widespread influence. romanlicism
yielded to realism and nalumlism in literary circles. Again European (especially
French) trends inspired Latin American authors, as realist wTiters attempted to
describe Ihe world thai Ihey inhabited. Pemvian writer Clorinda Matto
de Turner (1852- 1909) is considered a pioneer of realism for her portrayals of Andean
society. Born in CU7.CO, Pem, the fonner Incan capital. she became interested in
colonial and Incan history and depicted the indigenous characters in her work in a
positive light. Matto learned QlIechua as pal1 of her desire to undersland and promote
indigenous culture. In 18X9 shc published A1'I'.\ m"do (Bird.... wirholll ;1 Ih.11
shows how Europeans slrippcd indigenolls people of their F ighl<:. ;Jnd hn\\' ...ell
indulgent priests mistreated and explnitetl thelll. The nnvd .11<;0 lilt' ... 1111\' .,1 "
love afr.1 ir between a while nlan and an indigcnous \\'C111l:1Il.
Although this type ofliaisnll might h:1\'e heell al,.ceptahlc III Fllltl Ililll'IC... 111,
century Brazil, where middle and upper c1a!'<:c" ill IIlhan lelll('r<: h;1(1 c<;<;enll.llh 111>
contacl wilh indigenous pel11'le. son.11 LO'lVcntion" wCle fl"llc diflclelll III I'nll
Indians and Iw.(lizCJs 11l<l(le up the va ... t Tll.ljnr Ily of thc popnl.,lillil ..1Ilt! 1,1\ .... ' .1IId
hierarchicaillorms prevailed. III Ihe (nntext Ilf .1 "llllt'lr whc, C Iho,1' flf Illell,' II .,,111
European dcsLent lived side hl' propcr \flIl"dt'l('d \lit h '''11'.11111\
encounter!' as absolutely scamlaIOl .... In ,Iddillllll In her f'lf\\.lI"d II11nking \"f w'"
ahollt indigenous peoples. (\1""11. like A\'cllnlled.l. \....1" ,I (h.llIlI'IOIl "I 1:11".111'
cducotl inn for wt1mcn.
Nnluralislll emerged ,1<' an nlllgl'owlh of rcalt"lll. In<;tead of ""III ph- dc,( II!lllIg
rcalit), in pOClfy or pro<;e. n"tur"li"<: trie(lln explain il w<;, icnlifi,.llh- ,IIIlI.lh""1l
gnined popularity e!'pcciallr anwnp. inlelledll.ll<: 1Il1l11ent('tl hy '''I "d 1),11 Wll\l'lll
adapt inn of Charlc<; Ilarwill'" Ihcorr Olf ev"Jllholl (Iln,iol.!tt1 Ih.lt h."llIl \
;"Inti social environment inflLlenll'd an lh,ll.ldCI. In 1ll.11l)' l.ht.....1ll
ov('rwhclllling pcssimi"lll is elllhctltlcd ill naillrali"'ll .1<: "Ol j:ll ( 'IIltilltnn<; ,111.1
station in life inevilahl}' pmdllle grim IlUllOlllC....
A prominenl representative nfthi<: lilerar)' Irend. Halillllclo I til" (lX6f- 1"0 I)
grew I1p in the norlhern mining rrgioll nft hile. Ilc "",,I'" :1pl'alktl hv Ihe h'lt,h 1.11l1'!
c(lnoil inllS of the mincwol'kcrs. II is writ ing \\1:1'" ,Ill ,II rcmpl 111 n 1""('" t IICll 1.I'ghl I"
a largcr public. engcndt1' S)'lIlp01lh}'. and implll\'(' Iheir .... 111.lli,'n. 111 hi, ,h',,1
stories. ('ollecled in lhe hOflk S/{IJ InTt/ (llll<lcIgnl1ltlcl. ICllllIl. 1.111t, ,t.'lllll,,t
miners Ir01pped by their destin}' and forced to live drenry II\'c' lI<,il1g FIlIOI,,.1I1
lllachit1c'l' tn providc Chilean minerals ftlr :I!l illl(rtl;lti(H\OlIIll.llkt'l.
Adolfo Caminh<l (1867-1)7). a Hrnzilian nalllr.I1i.... l. sllillketllhc rC;ltling plll1lt. III
wilh his novel 0 H01l/ (:,.i, 11110 (Irallsl.llt.:d <'IS 'rI,(, BI.\tk I'Vl,111 ,lllti Ille {:;111I'1
Cnminha chose a hl;lck sailor In he Ihe prolagonisl (lfhi!' ,I Hrcl.1l }'I hllicc Ih.11 \\'.1'
UnCOlTllllOn <lIthe tillle. lie dcvdnp('d the trngi\ t.llc orthc I,w(' Ii'l n piliC ,11,,1
innocent blond cabin ho}'. All hough Carninlln S,1\\I Ihe c('nl ral \ 11,11,11 ler'!' II,,1I10... c'):1I
alit)' as a perverse trait. the novel remain" <'I piot1C'ering work for hliid I 111.111('1
A more immedi ... tdy influential nnlur... lisl Ihai'ilinll :11111111,. \\':(<; bldi,lc... d"
Cunha (1866-1909). a young journalist and :'Irlll}' engine.r. III lR97. Ill' ... , "Ill
panied the federal arlllY to repress the inhnbil.lnls of " rl1l.11 III
northeaslern Brazil. that W;"IS led b}' Antonio Cnnsclhcif("l,,, lh.lri"m:lti, ilillc':11l1
preacher. J)a Cunha documented the army's cnlllpaign in the 11)02 hook
(published in English as Rebellion ill 'he 1J(I(;klaml.(). lie vividly descrihc" Ihe :lI"itl.
harsh region and makes the naturalist argulllent thai Ihe b:lCkwaHlncs" 01 tht'
people is environmenlally determined, while the const of Br,l1il i<; ,I 'tIl,UIl 01
civilizations." Peruvian novclisl Mario V:'lrgns 1.I0<:n (h. 19J(1) retell" the !'It'I"V 111
Canudos in his beautifully wrillcl1 novel/.a KHcrra lid (111 rldlmou/" (Tht' \\',11 . 1
the End oflhe \..vorld. 19RtI).
.11.' 1',\1<1 Iltl<ll .. 1111t-II,>t\NUIU'HFlIION'>
Ulllollll"r.Il)' ltgUIl' ItWJ.... leJ ove:r all lIthl'r Ikazilian rUlIlanticislS, re.lIbts, nnd
1l.11t1",IIt,b 011 Ihl"' 1.1ll" lIillekl'lIlh and carl)' Iwenlielh ce:nlur)'. Junquim M:.uia
f\ I.h.b.ut( I dl' (I HYJ-I '10H) llllivl'rsally cOllsidered Brazil's grealest writer
.lthllJlII..' 011111..' 11111:.1 illl11urlalli ill I.alill AlIll"rica of all times. Born 10 the sun of
,JaVI.." alld ;I l'urlUgUC:'l' wasltl'rwollwll, ill the 1880s he began 10 write in a
ll,lrr.ltivc: lllalllll'l" unlike Ih:lt of :IllY of his contcmporaries. His first Ilovd in this
111'\\1 ... 1)'ll I' A/t'tl/dt/II;} !Ju)tllllJll) (h' Un's elllwj (The Poslhumou:lo Memories of
t .lIh,I', I xx I). f\!.ILIt.ldu lll' i\::.:.b' :.hurt :.101 ie::. and novel:. cOl1Jbin1..' dements
\,1 rl.IIt'1ll ,I lid ">urn;"t1blll ;dong wIth a :loharp. critIcal eye to Ihe political, ::.ocial, ami
l'LtlItOIIiIL d),lllmtlt)lI:' uf 1.lk lIilll:h:enth-u'ntury llrazilian :.ocicly. Ilis concbc
.wl! n ..tl! ,1,,1t- alld I',lrdull)' cr,tfiL'd studil'::' ul the p::.ydlOlogical Jimension uf
11l1l11.11t lllkr:ll tillll:- havt' re:ndlrld hb \\'urk ullique in Brazilian Iilaaturl;'.
Modernislll
:\1 IIll' l'lld "I Ihl' III11l'kl'nlh 1..I:1I1UIY, Rubl.-n 1).lrio (1867-1916), a Nk.lraguan
ptld, .1 Ilkr.lf)' lJWVe;.ll\lIH knowll as modernism. Enriching poelry
.tlld I'It'W tillougi. IlHl,il.dly LUlbtrULtt'1..1 vt'r::.t' wilh inventive: imngt'ry and
111'111rnl 1).lliol'.llapulk<!IU l';'ltill American faille age I\\'"oty-one
Wllh hi::. uIlkdHHI AZI/I (Bhh:. 1888). A pldhora uf lIew::.papcrs published
tlin HIglllJll1 IIll' l.."ullllllel1l at thl" tlim of the I wl'nl id h century e'xp;lIldcd rt:adt'rship
illll\lV.lllVl' lultural Lil'vduplllt'nts, and Dadu had un illllllc:diate every-
\\lIlll'. Ill' wUlk W.IS lO::'llIupulilan ill it:. approach tu lill'wry dialogue::.. II also
IllVI'llI'd IIIH 111.11 l.:II.llllld:. nt illllu1..'llll"S bl'IWI:l:ll Europe and I,alin Alllt'riGI. Unlike
I'IL'\ iOIl:. Ilh:rary allll.trti:.liL ::.tyk.::., L:.\Iin AIIlL'riLan modernism originall"d on lhe
1\1111'1"11'.111 I..UlIlill1..'1I1 .1Ild Ihell JIlovcd ca::.lw.ln.1 ncross Ihe Atlantic 10 Spain and
"lhl'" p.llh III 1:1Irupl'. l\lu(il'rnbm abu reJll.'Ck<! a cunfidence among ne\\' genera
IIOlh LIt ,1lIt1wr.s .lbuul lilt' illirill'::'h_ vallie ofthdr work in rdationship to European
,Illlllt" ... ()ol'lill'rafY ldlic ha:. ,aid, willi any poem \"rillen in Spani.sh. Olle
I.W stall' prl,cj"dy wlll'lhe.:r il was wrillt'll bd'nre or after
r\l1otller .. L1l l'lI11fide.:llttil.1l1 ultl1l.' lllOderni:'lllIJlOvt:ment was Cuball pOd and
Illdqll"lIdllh.\' Il',1dL'1 11I:.t Marti (IX!}J 95). lib pulitiL:.t1 al'tivblll It'd him to spelld
iiI\- in exik', W!lcfI: he ::.upported hunsdf as a Like Marti
,-on:.duu::.ly ItiL'd 10 illnuV;lIe Ihl' Spanish language in his poetry, essays, and
Jtlum.lli:-lil.. .Irtidl..::'. Ilis pa:.siun.llc: prUillutioll of tht' ideal of Cuban inde'pendt'nce.
l"Pl'l i.llly III .. III unify tlh;' Cub.tn t-migre cOllllllunity, played a decisive role in
g.llhl'ring :lollppllft lor Ihl.' indt'pelld1..'IKI..' cause. Unfortunntely, he died in nn
.11ll'lllptl'd iIIVi\-;illn Ol"tl1l' in IMl)5 bdure.: his drt'am (ould be achkvcd.
Alkl U,S, :JIld Cuban dl..'f1...ltnl Spain in 1898, and Theodore Roosevelt
ill'g,lll lllcddlillg in P.lI1anta and dsewhere in Central America, Ruben Dario came to
dl::.lru:.t W.I:.ltillglull'::. illtentioll::. ill Ihe regiOll.llis collt'ction of poems. Ct",tosde vida
c' c)pa'lII.w (Song' uf Lilc and IllIpe, 1905). his d1.."t'p concern that lhe
t ulu:.::.u,,> ul tlte urth lIIight l'lId up duminaling I.atin AJl\l'rica.
The;.' glOwing inllucliCl: 01 the United Slates in the Western Ilemisphere
.1I.111lInl tllhl'r illldle.:Clll:l1s as wdl. In 190U, Uruguayan css,lyisl Jose Enrique Rod6
J.l Cuhllrl' ;111\1 SOUI"l)' IIJ
(1872-1917) wrole.: all l..'ssay l'ntitle.:d I\ril'1, insplrl'd by Sh.lkl::.pe.lrt'.::. play nil.'
Tem/Je)(, In Rodo's essay, Arid represents L:.ttin anJ C.t1ib:.tll rqm::.cnt.::.
North America. Rodo criticized what he considl"l'l:d 10 be the l'ra::.s of:.l
U.S. cult un: that I;'mphasized speCialization alld makriaJi.sllt as the Illeans to dl'vdol)
.society, Rodo (carl,d tllal tile United Stall'S w;llItt'd to illll'0:.e its culture: on oth..-r
parts of Ihe world. He warned agnin.st :.l lendency for Latin AmeriLnns tu be
uncritically allracted to North America culture, wl.'alth, .lnll ri:.illl) POWl'''' Tu L'oun!t'r
Ihis Ihrcat. he cnllcd 011 Latin Am<.>rican youth to :>e.:t'k in.::.pir,lliu!l in.l biliad das:.k.11
education, Hodo's ess:I)' had a I:t.::.ting dlL'l"t on intelh:l.:tll.l!:. throughout Latin
America. It encour,lgeJ the natiunalist ilmi n:gionali::'1 se'lltiml'lli uflhu::.c: whu were:
unea.sy with the emergent power of the Unitl'd Slaks ililhe loady lwenlil'th celllufY,
Although representative of il latcr gcneration of lllul..ll'rnist wl'ill'r.s, Chile,HI
poel, cduGltor, ,llld felllini.st Gabriela tv! blral (I 1 gaint'd inll'l'IIalional
:'lppreci:ltion for her work by bL'ing the flrst L:lltn AIlWric..::.lll to rt.'ccivc till.' Nobel
Prize for Literaillre ill 1945. Recognized lIationally in Chill' (01 tlil' (ullloctioll
Sotletoj tie '(1 "merit' (Sollnd::. of J)t'ath, ICJI4), ::.he u>nlinut'd her pUd!")' whik'
working as .1 prim:.!r)' :lochuol 1l.'.ldlL'r .lml tlll'lI .I::. thL' dirLoctur uf
llewe::.1 lllO.::.t prestigious public scholll lor A 'l'colld l'ollectloll Lalled
Ol'so/m;otl (Desolation, 1922) won her inkl'll;lliollal,iCdailll, That :loame: Yl'ar
left Chile to assist in lhe devdoplllt.'nt of rdorms l:lking pIaLL' ill
Mexico under the guidance or Minister of Sht: lalL'r
taughl in the United anJ worked as.1 diplomat .Illd ctlltur.d .1II1ba.::.:.ador fur
Chile.
Mistral's early Glrl'e:r as" primary ::.chuol t .... lch1..1 ::.tMted lil'r Ult par.dld
as an inte.:rnntionally celebrated poel and e<!uL:lliulIal rL"furml'r. ller exp... rkllce::.
1l.'3ching Ihe rudimenls of literacy 10 childrl'n in:'1 '::'1lI.t1ltuwll in Chill' we:rl'
not unlike Ihe of thousands of other luw1..'r- .lIld llliddlt'-cJ.l::'s WOIlle:1l witH
found that the tea(hing offt'rcd UIl.'LOllUmic independl'ncl..'.
Many became important foulldt'r:lo and leader:. ill tltt' e.:arly I.atin AIIIl.'riCllt felll-
inist and suffragist movellle.:nl.::.. They werL' joint'd by ulhL'r WOllll'n from bolh
middle' sectors and di1l' backgrounds in initialing a dbl:u::.::.iull abuul Ihl.' rok' of
wOlllen in Latin American society.
By the 1850s, these women began prudu(ing Ilt'wspapl"r::. in Arge:ntina. Brazil,
Cuba, and Mexico, alUong other COllntric:lo. The:::.l.' publiC-Ilion::. werl..' dl.'dic:lled lu
issue.s related to women in politicS. edllGltioll, alld lht' public sphcre.:. The muve-
lllent quiLkly spr(.'ad as debates aboullhe emancipalion OfWOIlll'Il, suffr:.lg(',their
Ie.:gal stnlus, marriage.:, nnd tht' family allracll,d support frolll skilll.'d workt'l's,
immigrants, govefllllll'lll employces, and .sl."boolle:lLht.'rs. NUlllerous congrL'sscs
held nround the turn of the cenlury discus.sed possible loward greall'r righls,
They usually became divided along 1'0litiGli JiIlI;'"S or owr divergent
strategies for achieving Iheir goals. Although wOIlle.:n writers such as Avdlaneda,
Matto, and Mistral were nol leadas of lhese 1II0ve'1Ilt'nt.::.. their published \'lurks
disseminaled feminist idea.s and raised till' social prulilc:. of WOlllell throughout
Lalin America.
til'! 1'/\1{'1''l'IIREE'' TlIEI\IESANDREFLECTI()NS
NATIONALISM, RADICAL POLITICS, AND TURBULENT TIMES
The first tWCl dccndes of the twentieth century were times of great social upheaval
around the world, International events reverberated throughout the continent: the
War pf 1898 in Cuba, the Mexican Revolution, World War I, the Russian Revolution,
and Ihe student reform movement of Cimloba, Argenlina. In some ways, Rodo's call
for an emphasis on c1nssical education as a means of counterbalancing the rise of the
United Stales in the region was nn attempt to return to a nostalgic past. Instend, strong
naliollnlisl sentiments emerged It) counter the giant 10 Ihe north, They were particlI-
I<nly strong ill r\l1cxico where a social and political revolutioll upset traditional
hierarchies, No longer wel'e isol:lted individuals questioning the mistreatment of the
indigenous populalion and the nation's lInderciasses, A new general ion of Mexicnn
intellectuals hegan to rethink their relationship 10 their counll)' and its people. The)'
produced new forms of arl, literature, poetry, music, and theater that renectcd the
complexity and di\"crsil)' of their n:Jlion,
'!'llrOllghollt l.atill Americ:J, n nood 0f new politicnl iclens took hold. Anarchism,
s0cinlism, and cOlllTllunism, in sOl11e plnces brought by European imll1igrnnls seeking
better opportunities in the new world, seemed to offer solutions to pressing social
problems, Proponents of these mdiGll ideas encournged lllutual+nid associations,
unions, strikes, and hopes of revolutionary change, The fast-pnced shirts in
European experimelltnlism also had an impact in Latin America as nrtists and writers
ndopled allli adapled new trends from Europe, They included cubism, futurism,
surrenlisl11, For thesc writers, modernisl poetry seemed too old-fashioned, too pre+
occupied with aesthetics, truth, nnd beauty. Free verse, Ihe subconscious, and dis-
orderly forms of expression shaped the new poetic styles, A world war that had
decimated Europe nnel lefl economic chnos nnd the rise of fascism in its wake pol:Jrized
dehate nmong intellectunls, as many moved radically 10 the left. For some, revolution
seemed to offer the solution to social and economic problems,
"I'he term wlIIgllarriiS/lI captured the concept of experimentation tllM W:JS nt the
core of the cultumlmovcments in the endy twentieth centllry, Writers and artists saw
themselves in the forefront. 'fhey wnllted to t:Jke L.ltin American cultural production
into uncharled terrains, Poets considered Ruben Dnrio's work overly embelJished and
lacking in substance, They chose to employ metaphors instead of aUusion and elim-
inate what they considered useless words nnd unnecessary rhymes. They experimented
with originnl layouts of the text of written poetry as a way of fusing it with visual arts.
Poets tested the limits of public acceptance for the themes in their work. Pablo
Nenlc1<l (1904-73), n young Chilean poet, prodllCed a collection of eroticaJly chnrged
love poems, \lc;/lICpocmas de amory lOW candon desesperada (Twenty Poems of Love
and a Song of Despair, 1924) that scandalized some but became his most popular book.
Like Illany intellectuals of his genemlion, Neruda joined the Communist P3rty in the
1930... , and his poetl)' <lssumed a political and overtly Marxist content. Simil .. rl}',
Nicolas Guillen (1902-R9), nn AfTO-Cllb<ln journalist and writer,joined the communist
movement in the 1930s, Guillen's early l'oeil)' experimented with Afro-Caribbean
forms nnd rhythm.c;, and he became best known for (blncl< poell)'),
Sincc the nincteenth celllul)', BUCllOS AIIT<; Ilall heell;l 11l;I.in1 1.('1111'1 nllll,'r",}
production, bUI in the 1930,<; it tOllk on a llCW ilnportance llnllcr Ihe gllltl.llhl' 1,1
Vicloria Ocampo (1890-1979), a pilllH'cr ;lllllll1g \\'lllllCII wriler" rl1 1\ IgCIItill,l. HIli II
into n wealthy ninelecnlh-ccntur}' ari,c;tolTntic I:llilily, l kaI1l11'\ hC(,lnle ,I Ill,II'l!
jJntroness of litcmtllrc nnd (uhllre. In 1931 ,.. he founded lilt, lultllr;d n:vkw "/11,
with the help of Eduardo Mallen (190J-R2), ;111 i\ rgcntinc, anti W;lldtl F!";lllk (
1967), <lll American literary flgurc, Slir quickl}' [,e(;\l11e Ille he<;1 knowll litl",ll\
jnllrnnl in L<ltin Americn. A pnrnllcl puhlishing house, :ll"n l1;lI11ed 'sill', wa" llC,ltn!.
thanks 10 Ocampo's person,,' funding. 111 b,llh el1lefl'ric;c" ,,,he I'X('lll,,,etl ,I llll11
managerial hand, making literal')' quality, nllt ideology. her prinlc 1"(''1111n'II1I'I11 .\rl/
becnllle an imporlant outlel for tile tran"laled ediliollc; Ill" c;lIlll lnrt'ign Writt'I" ,I"
Andre (;ide, T, S, Eliot, and Alhert Camus. It .Ibn o'fernl;1 foruill hlr inrCll"e 11ll-I,ll\'
and cultural debates in which intcileclllais frolll :Ill (1\,(,1' I"II in AIlwrt. ,I p,1 1'1 j. 11',11,', I
Brazilian Modernism
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Pntllo became other signifk,1l1t u;nlt'I" Inl l'XI\t'llllICll1.lllllll.
as a dYllamic new cultural llltWClllCll1 crnergell ill Ilr,l/il irl lilt.' 1'1 20" ;11hl I'II()".
Known as modernism (not 10 he confused with tile ('arl)' mOtklfli..;1 j1ll('lly 111(1\'"
ment of Spanish Amcricn), its propollents sough I tll rcjuvcllale 11!llllIe
The movement's adherents reje{.(cd whal 111(')' I nn"ilh'red In be "l.dc. 11'111Ll!
European culturallradilions emhraced hy the coffce h;lnlllS 111,11 ruled high "n. H'I\
in Silo Paulo, the COUll try's most illlj10rtnnt melro]'olic;. III 1917., tlmillg 1111' I'll
tcnnial celehration of Bra1.ilian independellce. ,I grnllJl 01 Yelling, 1l1".,lly \\'(',dlh\',
bohemian artists and writers pro<!llccd an evenl klltl\\'l1 a... rll(' l\lllllcnl 1\11 \\lcek ,11
the elegnnt Municip<ll Thenter. It inclll(lcd al'l exhihit". lclllll'C'''. :"lnl II'I Icl rr rc,\( IllIg',
It was designed to challenge the cullllral cst:lhli,c;hIllCllt l!lnl ..;Iill ddrlldcd llllll"
teenth-century tmditional styles, Ilcitnr Vill:l 1,0hll.c; 1')',1)) .t\ndillted Ill"
mllsic nt the Modern Art vVeek as well. Comhining da...skal "lyle..; wilh l'nj'lIl.11 t..ll.
music and legends, his work wns nil erfort In compo.';e mllSll th,lt COllvt.',,\,d 11111'111,'
national traditions nnd influences. 1\lthOllgh the Modern I\rl 'Wcck W,I" whlrl\
disd:Jined by cult urn I crilics of t he ti Ille, l1lnny (If thflse \\ll1n 1),lftl\ ip,lIed III Ih, lT1'1I1
became the le<lding ani ... ts :lnd writers or suhsequcnl decadec;.
One important current within Brazili;1I1 Illodernism wa" knnwl\ ,I"; rhe :1111111'(1
pophagic (IiteraUy, man-eating) movelllcnt. It was le(1 hy Oswald tic 1\ IlItr;"k (r R'IlI
1954), Referencing the tradil inn of ritual cannihali,c;11l :1 mOllg .';lllll(' ]{ra1ili:lll 111111,111"
during the colonial period, the movement's proponents nrgucd Ih.lt ,Hli<;to;, ,lilt!
writers should borrow from Europenn and American Then, ,1fll"
digesting these innucnces, they ... houle! produce their own il1ll{l\',lIive \"re:lli'lll".
An emblemalic novel of this movement is MaClUI/li11lfl (JlJ2X), wrillcl1 hy
Mario de Andmde (1893-1945, not related to Oswald), who was:Jl1 nq.,:alli/I'r tIt
the Modern Art Week, a lilcrarycrilic, <lnd folklorist. M;"lCIIIl:lillla, a "hem wit 111'111
ch<lracter,'" is born in the AIll:lzoninn jungle hilt Iravcl" In 'silo I',lldo wl1eH' h('
experiences modern urhnn sociely alld thell returnc; 1(1 Ihe jUllgle. lie pn""('"''I'''
eXlraordin:Jry supernatural powers, and Andradc clllploys lil('Lln' !r(hlllclllf"" in
III 1930 this modernist painting by Erniliano de Cavalcanti (1897-1986), entitled Five
Girls uf Gt/(UQtifl9ueta, represented new notions of race in BraziL (Museu de Arte de Sao
Paulo"
Ili:-- IHJvd tlldl willlakr bl''':Oll\l' knuwll as lllagkal rl:ali:.m. Borrowing from
h,lk :.t,lIi,,':-- ,llld tr;Hlititlll:-- ;Jlld using Brazilklll languagl', the 110vel
:1"l'if"t.'":. III prnlllllk a pall-Braziliall llational cultural identity,
Ib \\'1111 alld pol'll"}', I3ra'ljlian art adopted very natiunalist themes,
I; Ilg lIn Ilrdi Iia ry 11I:upk', eSIH:ci:llly thost' of nun- European background, A new
people of colur as positiVI: representatives of the I3razilian
llatinll. 'I';lrsila do Allwral (IMH6-1973) was a !e<lding painter of this trend, and
Ill'r works, such as Hlack Womt/ll (1<)23) and Anthropophagy (1929), shocked
lOllSef"V,ltivl' bourgeuis Paulist:l tasks.
Revolutionary Art and Literature
At thl' sa nil' time, Mexican :lrtists and wrikrs responded to the dramatic changes
thaI had takell plan' ill thl'ir country, Uy 1920, the most violent phase of the
Mexil'all Rl'vulutiull had <llll'llll. Alvaro OlJregon had eSI<lblished himself
ill pmvl'r, The task now was to Glrry out tht: reforms promised by those leaders
who had :->llrviv,,'d the wars of tile prl:'violls dccade, As minister of educntion, Jose
Vasl-oIKt'lus ( 113X2-1951J) rl'dirt't.:"tE'd the government's cultural :lgenda, I-Ie orga-
lli"Lnl a ruraledu(;ltion program that illcillded 2000 new Iibruit:s lhroughollt the
14 oJ Cu!lllfl' and Society 417
country. A Departmt'llt of FiliI:' Arts had lhe task of presl"fving popular art \\'hill'
promoting the work of (,:Olltemporary p\)ets, writers, artisls, and COllI posers,
Vasconcelos made a major contribution to thl' debate about Mt'xican natioll:ll
identity through a book entitled I,(j raUl COS1IIit:(/ (The Cosmic 11J25),
Vasconcelos argued thai Latin America was producing a IICW -flfih racl'- lhat was
an alllillgalllJtion of Europeans, Africans, Asians, anJ AlIlerindians. By loday's
standards, some of lhe characterbtics that hc allribUles to diffcrelll peoples of lhl'
world SI:Clll sll'reotypiGII and SOllll:wltat racist. EVl:ll SO, he articubll'lilltc Iht'sb Illal
widespread ltIeslizaje was a pOSitive developmclIt for
\,yllik Vasconcelos l:luded racial mixtllrl', other Mexicall intellectuals \WI"t: nllll
mit led to Indianism, ur i..lldigenisln, It W..I:' the ct'ntralthelllc ill tile 1935 Ilowl IiI II/tlio
by Gregorio Lopez)' Fuentt's (IM95-1966), It thl: lllllskal works ofCarlu:.
brilliant conductor, pianisl, composl'r who Wl'lll so flras 10
score his SillfOl/ill Inditl (1935) and Xochipili-MIlC/liLxochitl (1940) for
inslruments, Emphasizing the country's illdigt'nou:. histor)', this cultural movelllClll
became an integral part oftht' otncial polilical crt'ed. As such it ofrt:rld inspir:-.tion kll
the ll1agnillct'lit N:-.tional Museulll of Anthropology and Archt'ology in Mt'xico City,
tvlt'xican artists entered this discussion as the Rl'volulion un!t'ashed a lorrelll or
creative t'nergy in tllC arts. Like Vasconcelos, lllany praised the illdigcnom alld II/('stizu
profile of the people. One especially prulllinent outlet lor their work elllle lhrough
public murals, as a trio oj gifkd painlt'fs-Diego Rivera David Siquciro:->
(I R96-197
t
l), and Jose Clemente Orozco (IXM Illfurill alld l'dUGlle
the coulltry's largely i[[ill'ratl' maSSeS. -An no lnllgl'r be till: ul
individual satisfaction,a they lit-dared in a lllanifesto, bUI should ailll 10 ucn.Hllt' a
fighting! educative tool lor all: Through massive lllllJ'als ill such public buildings tilt'
Agricultural Scl101,1 in Chapillgoand the National Palace ill Mt'xkoCity,tlley ide.dizcd
till' past, ('mpathized with Mt'x.ko's llla:>scs, l1l'aped lkrbivt" on
Spallish Ct1nqUt'rors and Yankee capitalists, and elevated popular leaders likl' Zapala 10
a pantht'on of heroes, Marxist in degrees but naliunaJist to tht' COft', the llluralisb
played a major rok in reshaping tJle popular history uf rcvululiunary t\'kxil:o.
Tilc Mt'xicall RevolutiOll produced putel1lks :lIHI:I torrent of popular novl'!s. As
early as 1915, Mariano Azuela (1873-1952) published Los dc fluajtJ (lranslalt'd as 'I'ht"
Underdogs), a story of charadcrs entangled in a llle:lnillgiess war: -Tht' revolution:
says one, Mis like a hurricane; if you're in it, you're nOI a lnnn , , , you're a It'af, a dt':ld leat:
blown by the In the 1920s. Martin Luis Guzman (1887-1976) wrutl' lit Y
/a serpietllc (The Eagle and the Serpent), a talc of idealistic rc'vulutionarit's and vellal
politicians that also contained a firsthand portrayal ul Pancho Villa. When he f"ir<:s, it
isn't the pistol that shoots, it's the man himself. Out orhis very hearl COllles the ball.ls it
leaves the sinister barrel, The mall and the pistol are Ihe S<.lll'le thing, A generation later,
Carlos Fuentes (b. 1928) presented skeptical views in two acclaimed nowls, La UlIlcrte
de Artemio Cruz (The Death of Artemio Cruz, 1962) and La region 111115 fml/sp(fref/(('
(translated as Where the Air Is 195M), For thesl' writers, llle dcfining
istic of the Revolution was its violence; their goul, ..lOci that or tlleir characlers, was to
<lscertain the purpost' ot" it all,
Rethinking Race
Not all L",tin American intellectuals looked to the people of mixed racial or indi-
genous hackground as a positive representation of the nation. The mestizo also came
in for h;-arsh criticism. Soon after Jose Vasconcelos propounded his pro-mestizo ideas
about -the cosmic in Mexico, Alejandro O. Deustua (1849-1945) offered in
1931 a biting critique of Peru. - Among us,- he said. the problem of the mcsliw is
much morc gravc than in other countries. The product of the Indian in his period of
moral dissolution and Ihe Spaniard in his era ofdecadence. Ihe llleslizo has inherited
;-all the defects ofeach without being "hie 10 conserve the remains of the gentlemanly
life of the conqueror. ... 'fhe mixture has been disa.c;trous for the national culture.
w
Ilcyond Mexico, young intellecluals throughout Latin America found sociaiisl
and communist movements p:uticularly ;-allr;-acti\'e ;-after the world economy
coll;-apsed in 1929. As the derlHwd" for export comlllodities plummeted. countrie$
heg:'lllto feellhe effect of the Creal Depression. European society seemed polarized
and headed toward another great war. Among the new recruits to Marxism was a
Peruvian named Carlos Madtegui (1&95-1930). In 1928 he
Siele ell$nyns ric i"lerpre/ado" de la rcaUdad !'enul1w (Seven
Interpretative Essays on Peruvian Reality). an original analysis about how a
soci;llist revohltioll might take place ;n Latin America based on 10c,,1 conditions
and praclices. Marialcgui "rgued that Peru was Simultaneously comml1n:l!, feudal,
:lnd capitaliSt. I-Ie blamed the subordinate position of Indians in Andc"n society on
the Innd tenure system. His solution was to reorganize landholdings so that
production would be b"se(1 on tr"ditional indigenous community lands.
long in the shadow of her contemporaries, Frida Kahlo (1907-54) has emerged in
recent years as one of the twentieth century's most celebrated artists. As shown in
the film biography Frida (2002), her personal life was one of tragedy, struggle, and
rC'ii'itancc. Stricken by polio as a child and then gravely injured in a trolley-<:ar
accident, she endured frequent illness and constant pain. In 1929 Kahlo married
the already famous Diego Rivera ,md joined the Mexican Communist Party.
Despite her political commitment and her appreciation for the muralist Tradi
tion, Kahlo's painting was highly personal, priv.Jte, and intense. Known especially
for her haunting self-portr<lits, she combined Mexican traditions of religious folk art
with European traditions of portraiture. Iconoclastic and original. she sometimes
drew upon Christian images for inspiration but always in her own way, frequently
chillienging classic conventions of ecclesiastical representiltion; in Kahlo's paint
ings, women's bodies are as naked and bloody as those of Christ and as clothed
and emotionally stoic as those of Mary. Rejecting the traditional ideal of the self
abnegating woman, Kahlo also affirmed female sexuality and sensuality. As Rivera
himself acknowledged, "This is the first time in the history of art that a woman
expressed herself with such utter frankness.-
Frida Kahlo at work in her studio.
II .. (l1huH.m.l :-'u\lI'l)' \1'1
Miscegenation was for Ddlstua nol a sign of sod,,1 progre..... hUI .1 '}'Illplllill "I
hackwardness. Peru was condemncd hy Ihe r"ei,,1 (ompP<;llion il h'ld ;llhC'lilecl
Olher Andean thinkers, however, found ilu'l'iralinn in Ihe ,-IlUIlIr}".c; Inol.,11I
heritage. Jorge Icaza (1906 7R) hrought atlcntionlo the explnil"l;olllll 1.CIl,Hllll ....
native population in the 19.1R novel IIl1a.c;il'IIJIJU" (pllhli<.!lec\ ill Enp.li.;h .\!'o Till'
Villagers). Another not"ble case w;-as. Josi- Maria Arg1tct!:ls, :l rltlvclisl Whll lll'l1lagcd
to penetrate hoth the indigenous. :Inc! creole worlds til' Per u. I II.' W,I." a 111('.";;;:'0 wh"
h:ld lived in Indian cOTllmunities as a child ;1I1d W,I5 full}' hilingll'll in Sl'anish ,)lId
Quechua. In Canto Kec1l1wl (19JR), he argued thai indigelulu.c; i:;; !lot inknnl.
And the day on which the people of the highbnd.. who still feel ".. h,lIlletl til Ihe
Indian discover of their own ncconlthe We:lI crcnlivc p""!'oihilillf'<; of Ihell hl<ll,1I1
spirit. on that da)'. conficlent of their own value.c;. Ihe mr'il,7f1 'llul Indian pi'ell'\c'
will definitely prove Ihe equ"lity of their own crcallVt' ahilil}' with Ihat III till'
European art which now displ:lces nnd puts it to shamc:
This debate about racial mixture and nationnl culture look pl;1cc in Hra7il ;1'
well. Whereas much of the Peruvian popul"tion \\':\" incligcnou", Hmzil h:ul III<.'
largest Afro-descendant population outside of Africn. with a lllillllritr
of mixed racial heritage. Gilberlo Freyre (1900-H7) frarned Ihis disCLISsill!l willl tIl('
publication in 1933 of a treati<;c enlitled (:11<;(1 (;rlllldr " St'//:",JIJ
(published in English Mastrr.'i aud SI/lvt<;). lie argllcI] 111.11 fhe
II
Frida Kahlo: Privacy on Public View

r-
.I.!\) 1'.\1<1 1illUI 1111.i\lI ... ,\NPIU'Illt'IIONS
llIIIIIIlZt.'I:> h,ld (fl'.lll'li ,I multiracial trupi..:.ll colony lJa::oed 011 tllc plantation.
Io'll'yrc\ wl"lling:> till.' African and indigenous to Brazilian
udlUrl' alld Ilis sluod in sharp contrast to racist ideology still
dfllll.llillg ill L:.ltin Allll'fka, Europe, and the Uniled
EvcJl aitk:> maintailll"l,l that Freyre unduly romanticized Ur;lZil's colonial
p.l:>t by dn'mplt.l:.izing the hierJrchical Jnd the sexually coercive nature of r<lci.1I
lllillgling. ;llso ubsl'rwd that his ch.lracterization of Brazili;H) socil.'ty, later
')'llllloi/.nl ,I' Mr;u.:i.d dl'lllO(r.IL y," OIJ:>Lllllo:d thc exbtellO: ul widesprt'ad hopes that
illltlligratHlll would illlpruve.-' thl' nation's radal stock. In this
pll'v.dcllt Ilkul\lgy III Mwhikllillg" (l1lC/IlIIIlt!(IUlt:Il/U) maintained subtle forll1:> of
.h"l nllll11.llltHI Afro Br.lzilians. f>..\or<'ovc-r. Fn:yre's elllphasis ull I he ne;ltl}'
t1l'\'J'L'd In,ld 1,1 Afril.lm-llIdi.lIls Europeam ignored the role of other elhnic and
r.h:l.d groups. sw.::h J.lpalll's,,: and Syrian Lebanese immigrants. In spite (or
I.JI Frt.. Yn.... s nunetheless bt"(amc integrated by the
gOWJ'llllh'lll ul Cl'IlJlio (IYJO-/15) intu a larger nationalist discoursc abollt
till' :'l'l'Lialoal tift Brazil a:. a COUllt ry that had dilllinatcd the racial divisinns and
I\'u.. itlm pl.lgllillg till' UlIitl'd 5t.lleS and penncating EUfopcan fascist ideology.
1\1 tht' :"III\e.-' lillle thai FrL'yrlA's idc<l:' .. bout rnce in Urazil rcceived official
1'-0111 Ih..: U.-azili.1I1 guvcflll\lCnt, Aime Cesairc (191 3-200ti), a young
Alru !lUlU the Fn.:nch Caribbe.tll island of Marlinique, began working
011 :l bUlIk pOl'lli t'nlitk'd Cilltia d'lIl/ rl'lollr (/1/ /lays IUl/1l1 (No!l..'uuok on a
Ih'lulll Itl My N,lliw I.and, 11)'\')). It rl'\Jre:.entl'd a defining lllOlllenl ill Caribbean
lullurc, Cl'"lill' ,llId utlll'r yUllllg intdk'(IUals qucstiolll..'d the Eurocentric focus of
1l.I\litinll,d lill'raturL'. They (kvdoprd a lliovemcni calkd J/l;gritudl'
111,11 tunlnl hI Aflll..ln III IhL' lUlblrul:lion of l..-ulturc in thc
(:.11 illhl..'".J11 ,llld Iuuknl .11 Allll.l willI .1 o!>L'll:.e of pride. The :.urrounding thb
II II.IVl1lLl..'"lLt h.ld :.lgllll ..... allt llllpad inlellectuab in I Jaili and olher
:,lrihl'l',I'1 Ilail kill I.)uvalil'r (1<)57-71) appropri.llcd
till' Idl',I' tIl the 1II0vcllll'lll lL.dkd ,win;,nll' ill Haiti) to juslify marginalizing
lllUI,llIul'" frulII p"lllL'ipalivlI III his guvelllllletli. For it linked Iht:lll mort:
Itl Al hel.lIllL' a prolllincnt among African stUllc:nls
livillg ill Ellropt" who forlllcd p.lrl of the.-' gl'ncratioll that led the l..kcolonization
ill ana '\lurid "Val' II.
The Making of MCISS MediCI
\oVhik l':.:.ays, houb, lllurab, :H1d I1cwspapl'rs readll'd a limited
.lUdil..'"lln, til.., film ulkred a ncw, popular cultural mediulll almnst il1lmedi-
at'll-r it inlrvduced ill thl
A
last years of the nineteenth century. Although
Europcan and u.s. films dominated the screen at the turn of the twentieth century,
U,.:lziJian and Mexican L'lltreprl"n('urs proJuced thtdr own pictures that created the
lirst national sill'lll f11lll :.Iars. In Ihe carly years of film, documenlaries dOlllin<ltcd
nalional produl.:lioll,
II}' the 1l)20s radio bl'l":IIJll' anotller important new llIass mediulll. re<lching
an publi..: wilh talk shows. sports. and varidy shows.
1-1 <.uhUftalltlSt'kldy '121
Colg.lk-Palmolive sliccessfully launchl'd a Spanbh versiull of ib
sllccessful soap operas in the Cuba of the 1930:., Sl'rializcd rfldiol/ol'l'11l5 bet.:anll'
popular throughout Latin Allll'rica oVl'l"night. The phonographic industry, whkh
largdy controlled by loreign compallies. worked in tandl:llI with radiu st.l
tions. They j><Jckaged and produced local lllusidaJb alld singt:rs. Through suc-
cessful record promotion, distribution, and careful progralllllling,
cuuld sOIllI..'times elljoy u Illl'\L'OriC success <lIlJ bCl.::ollle natiollall)' knuwn (dcb-
rilies, Stateowned radio stations bl.'Callle an illlp0rlallt vehicle for forging a
of patriot ism :llld nat ionalism. Radio standardized IIIL' n;lI iUllal language l:\'l'n as it
programs that rcgiollul dilfcrl:llcl..'"s, (Radio:. relliailled all
important means of cultural wdl into the I.lte tWlClilicth u:ntury,
evcll after television had already reachell all seglllcnb of so.::ict}'.)
When U.S. studios lxgan producing sound f1lms in I92lJ, they lluickl}'
responded to the Lalin American market with :.illlultanl'om n:.'makes in Spanbh
alld dubbed mlm featuring a galax y of Hollywood sial'S, U.S. llIIliS noodcd inio I.alill
Anwrka transmittillg Ihe Alllcric;'1Il way of un thl: silVt'r Scrt't'll tu
everywhere. Although compelition frolllthl':.e 1111115 llliidl' it hard to dcvelop national
illdustric:s. state support in Mexico and Argentina allowed thusc coulllries 10 Clllcr:l
golden n.gc offilm production with scripls f...lturing natiunal pluto!>, anJ
Copying thl' Hollywood studio system, production established
selves in Mexico City, til/enos Aires, Rio dt.' Jalll'iro, and Siio Paulo. Tango singln
such as Carlos Gardd (1887-1935) and Mexican divas such :1:. dd Rill
(1905-H3) became inlcrnational cdl'britics thruugh thl'if lillil Cuba
and Peru also began to pwdu..::e films wdl, bllt Mexican alld Argelilille cinclll.l
It'ndl.'d to have a grealt'r impuct un other l..ountril.:s ill thl' rcgion.
Whcll the Unill'd States L'lIkred Wurld \Val' II. the govefllllll'lll Il'(Tuill-d
Iiollywood :.tudios inlo the war effort. Walt Disnl'Y traveled tn lu
dcvdllp ilkas for nc:w cartoons with Latin AlIlerican-\tylt' a 01
promoting guod relations wilh the coulltry's "frielldly neighbors 10 tlte A
Iloll}'woo<1 studio hired POrlug:d-born Braz.i1ian singl'r Cormell Mir.lIld.1
(19U9-55) 10 perform in pictures as Ihe bombshell." A 01
movies filmed in Los Angeles but sci in Latin America IOllg-held
stercotypcs about the region.
Papular Culture, Theater, and Sports
Although music produced b}' the: Imwr ChISSt:S, gl:lIt=rally rcl't:rred tu ,1/1'/5;1,(/
popular. had been an esse:ntial part of everyd:JY life lrom the Andes to islands of
the Caribbean since the colonial period, radio ami film brought these sounds 10
milch wider. national audiences. The rumba, the Argentine Itl1lgo, the
sentimental and romantic bolero, and the Braz.i1i<J1l sa1111Jl1 were pcrforll1l'd in
movies and transmitted over the legitimizing wh:ll the eliit's had 01'11..'"11
considered "low culture."
As nationalism and anti-imperialist sentiments strcngthened ill Latin
Alllt'rica. tc'specially in the 1930s and 19'10s. Ihe l.ulturl' of tile people
,122 I'AlfrTllllEE. TIIFMrS I\NP HEFr.FCT10NS
louk 011 additional signiriGlllce. Governmenls promoted projects 10 l.:ollect ;lntl
preserve indigenous and African musical traditiolls, and regionallllusic receivcd <l
new nMinnal prominence. At Ihe sallle timc, Cuban (kmce hands hrought the cha-
Ch,l and Ihe rurnhn to the United States, nnd the tango circulaled throughout Lntin
America and heyond.
Modern the;lter C;lllle to the fore in the 19305 and 19'10s. rvlexic<ln directors
staged vangtmrd thealer productions using innovative lighting ilnd scenery and
plnls with politicnl content. Argentine plnywrights wrote dramas thaI addressed
sncio cultural prohlems. In BraziL Polish-emigre director Zbigniew Ziembinsky
(190R-78) innovated theater with his production of \Irs/ida de Hoilltl (VVedding
Dress, 19'13) hy Nelson Rodrigues (1912-RO). The drama tells the story ofn yotlng
wtlmnn's :lltempt 10 understand her f:liled marriage and her i rnmincnl denth while
in a slnte of COIll:l. The ground-breaking staging that presented ;Ktion on vnriolls
levels-renlity, melllory. nnd h;lllucination-and offered a surre.. listic and non-
linear plot revolutionized Brazilian thenter. enrly works est:1hlished the
groundwork for nn explosion in the quality .. nd contenl (If thenter. As onc
expert has explained. plnywrights <lnd direclors look up the chnllenge of bringing
to 1.atin American the.. new sense of its own identity. c.. pturing the n:llional
nnd hurnnll spirit through heliev:lhle ch.. r:lcters who manifcsted the soei:ll, poli-
tical, religious, nnd personal connicts nf individuals in modern SOciety."
Innovative Iheatel" provided n new space for artists to affirm
their (ultur:ll herit<lg.e. In the mid-fort ies, Abdias do Nnscimentn (h. 1914), a youllg
l)l .. ck intellectual, foulHlcd Il1eTe:ltro Experimcntal do Negro (Black Experimelltal
Theater). whose purpose was to develop new texIs focused on people of
Africnn descenl. Beginning with a 1945 production of Eugene O'Neill's /i11lpcro(
/OIlCS, with N:lscirncnlo playing the lend characler, this project bro:loened cultuml
nor1lls hy expanding the suhject 1Il:ltler of Brazili:ln pl:lYs. Nascimento nlso
promoted heauty conlesls to redellne hegemonic aesthetic gender stand.. rds :lnd
nn art cOl11petilion with the theme of the Bhlck Christ.
By Ihe e.. dy twentieth century, soccer h:ld hecome the l110st popul .. r sporl in
I.<ltin America. Brought to the region hy the British. the foreign eco11omic power
that dominated llluch of South America ulltil the 19205. soccer was originally
played hy the upper clnsses. The middle nnd lower classes quickly adopted tile
sport. Soccer clubs, professionnl players. :lnd devotetl fans strengthened the
region's cornpelitiveness worldwide. Uruguay won the World Cup in the first
international competition in 1930. L.. tin Americ:lll cOllntries h.. ve taken first p!:lce
in half of the World Championship g<tmes: Uruguay twice (1930 and 1950),
Argentina twice (1978 nnd 1986), and Brazill1ve limes (19S8, 1962, 1970, 1994,
<lnd 2002).
Basehall is the second most popular sporl, gaining Cub<tll ndherenls;ls early;ls
lhe I870s. Its widespre.. d practice beyond the United Slates cnn be lr.. eed 10 U.S.
imperi<ll influences in lhe laiC nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Cuba.
the Dominic.. n Republic, Nicaragua. P:lnallln, and Puerto Rico, occupying
AmeriGlIl troops populnrized the game. In Venezuela it \\',lS pl:lyed in enclave
I I ., \ .1111111/' .11101 .... ", wt\ I ' \
dOIl11ll<ltcd by U.S. oil, IlIllpani('s. A... (',Idy ;1<; !Ill' 1'J \11.,. Il ......c "'1111111'''.
supplying lalented players 10 the major !c;'gll\ ....
LATIN AMERICAN CULTURE ENTERS A WORlD MARKET
A l1l .. rkcd increi\sc ill urhnni7.'1tioll athllh" growth of the Illiddk 1.' .....1 ... nf r ,tlln
America during :lll(l nfter the 19'IOs signirlc<llltl)' allclll'd ,,,ltllr.11
sySl('tl1S cxpanded. ,lnd ll111re \\'Iltllcn altcnt!c,llIIIIV'T.. itil's. I ltCI.1I \
rates incre:lscd, :lnd aClive reading pllhlks grew in ,i/c. ({\Ithough 1I:lni ... HIIl \\.1'.
introduccd itlthe t9:;Os, it W;l<; reslri/ Icd to urhan :lIlt! 111II1dle \1.1 ..... .111\111'11' ,", l1/ltd
Ihe mid-1960s when it beC:llllCn mn<;s l11cditl11l.) Tit n '''ghflllt the I'Hlh. 1'1'",0..... 11 .. 1
[9(,Os. hooks nnd other lorrns lIf Lullllrnl prndllctilill H'.hlH'd .111 1'\,'1 \\,,11'1
<ludit'l1ce. The numher of .1Ilt hor.", poel", playwright <;. and ,1111111l . kl'l I, I I
..s well. Architects huill new moderni<;t lh.lt h')llllIVt'd 1111111 '''1/'1):11
trends hili thell created dislinctive nl'W .. trk". New I"llnl, 1'11l111"I<.d ("\1'11"''''''11
hlo"sollied too.
Crowing illlerest in I.nlil1 At11('ril.... ,!fter the CUh:lll l'llll!ull..d
intern.. lillll:ll curiosity ;1hol1l lhe ("ontinent's :llllhllr..;, ptlcr.., ,Ill.! ,,,.. ',I)"i,I'. 1.11111
Al1leriC:1I1 writers firsl reached a larger foreign re:llkr... llll' Ihlllligh <"p.ll1i .. h l'llb
lishing hnuses, :lnd soon thereafter their ;lpl'carl'l1 ill l"llgli ... h alld IIClI\ II
Ir.. nslatiotls. There \Va.":l ill r.alin Anwri':Jlllitcrattllc. HC,.IlI"C Illeic I" ... "
much divcrsity :lnd variety in llll' 11mcls. (' .. <;.J}'''. I'"ctt\', lhe.ltn. ,lIltl Itlnl ... IIf Ilu'
period hetween the 19'1Os :ll1d the 197(h. CVCIl a hrid il\Tt \'j,'\\', .11111(,t ,I" jll .. IH (" t"
thc plelhorOl of inllOV:ltiv(' work prodtllctl thrt>llghlllll lht" Nl .. lClhdl ......
sevcr;ll l11erit attention here.
Alre:ldy:l prolific \\Tiler it! Ihe 1')\It... Ivligllcl/\tlgd t\ ... llll'i.I" (IX')'J 1'1711..1
Cuatcmnl.. n I"()el, noveli..;t. and ttiplolll;1t. l)l'I..:ltllC ;l 1'IIlIlt ... 'tr I" till' "1.ltlll
Amcrican in litel":llllrC pf Ihe II)(JOS and I')/fh. I k lllmhllll'd 11l1l'1,'''r.. HI
anthropology and Maynn mythology. wI tic h he all:d int" hi" t1l1\ d" wllh
shnrp politicli p(lsitions. i\"lmia... was expelled Irlllll C;1l,IICIl1.l1.1 ill I"'; t '''1 hi.
support of the reform'lllillde,1 I;1Clll", l\rht'IlI gllvI'rnll1('l1t tl1.ll \\'.1' ,\\,('rlI1t,I\\'11
wil h (] A hOld inK II is first mnjor work. U .\mllr Pn'sirlnll(' ((\ 11. I') Jr,)
was actunll}' completed in 11.)3.1 hul (llldd n(l[ he I)llhli"hell I,ll" ilIon: 111,111 ,1111,11\1'1
decnde bccall."e of its scathing critique Ill' life linda a III ilit.1 ry til' Llllll sh i t\ 1.11\'1
work, 1-/Olll/Jre5 dc lIIr7iz (tvlcn of Maizt:. 19'19). i.<;;1 c1di.tl";t' nl (\1.1\',111, IlIIlll" .Itld
customs. In 1967. Asturins W;lS the second l.atin aller{ ;ahl iel.l (\li .. II".III(\
receive lhe Nobel Pri?e for I.iteraturc.
Asturias' inlerest in illdigC!lotls America wns t:lken lip h\' o[ller writer... III ,I
younger gencration as well. The Peruvian "lIthor 10<;(- M,lri.1 Arglle<!:l ...; (1<) II (,II)
was of mixed Spanish .. nd Qucchu:l descent and p,re\\I 111' ill pllvet'ly ill.l Vill.ll:" III
the soulhern Pernvi:lt1 Andcs. Ilis novel. ,.OS I'r(lfllll'/Il'\ (I kcp l{ivCII" 1'1(,11.
uses n mi.xlure of Spani<;h and Qu('chua and :Hldn's"'(,,, tIll' ll('t\\'l'I'11
Europeanized :lnd indigenous cullures. Similarly. I{ll... ari" Ca"kll.ll11" (I'}.v, 71).
:l Mexican poet nne! :luthor, sci hcr nnvcls ill the largely 111diJ:I'IHIIl" .111'.' III
j.!1 I'.\I{I Illlnl .. IIJHI.II':-,i\NPRHI.F(IION,> 11 .. CUhllh: .11Id .Il'>
.lJj

.,f""_
. ,
;,.---.-
\ '\ 1;1""-13Jl'
The glittering capital of Brasilia boasts extraordinary modernistic architecture. Top,
headquarters of the governor of the federal district; bottom, the legislative palace,
whose twin towers and buildings contain the separate houses of the national congress.
(Courtesy of the Consulate General of Brazil, New York,'
(.Il1.lp...... (J/il;o .1.' fltlieMII:> The Book 01 Lmllt:l1t<lliuns. 1962)
1t.h.llnl h.h.. k lulu Ihl' llilll'll'l'lIlh u.:nlllly tv tdl the t.alt: of:'1 Tzotzil
work I"l'Vl,.. b .:III i(k'lllificalion with ;.tlld dt:t:p for
Ihl' pl'lIpll' uf Ml'xko.
EVl'r Ihl? ML'xk:.m Ikvolutivn. gCllerations of intelll'l,tu;:tls
h.IVL' rdIn.h:d 011 thl' ft)vts and naturt: of tvkxkan identity and culture. In IlJ50
()I.I.IVi41 IJaz (II) 111-9X) produCt.d a bouk,lung collection of ninl: essays entitled ::1
1,IlJt";II/l! tI.: 11/ (Till: Lilbryillth or Solitude) to those qut":Hiolls,
Hutldllig 011 tIL.: llutioll th:ll illdividllab arc illhl'rl'lltly lonely. Paz cvnsiJert'd Ih'1I
)ll':>('l:> (puhlil proviJt' an 0pp0rlllnily 10 express community and allow
l\-k\llall'" In off Ihdr sdf,(knial. Paz also offered a sweeping
,lIl.lly:>b ul 1\1c:,\il.lll frum the pre-Columbian perioJ 10 thl' Mexican
Rl'vulutiull, AIll'r the..' of hundreds of Mexican students in 1968, he
tllb work with additional th.ll discussl'd Ihe tragic arfair.
t\lthollgh to 11ll' rl'vOIUlionar)' Idi ill youth, Paz moved toward
Illlll"l' Uludl'l.ill' hl' grt'w olll..:I", nitil.-izing the authoritariau nature 01
:-Olll i.tll ... 1 rq;ll11l:-O. For Paz. art was all import:lnt component of hUlnan existenct':
l.lll hl' Ill' :-ooddy wilhuut pOdry. hUL socil'ty call nevcr be rt'<'llii',ed as
p.ll'll")'. it i:-o IIl'vcr jlu..:Lk. lilt.' two terms scek to break apart. They
... P.1/. I'le.. ..jVlJ till' Nubl'll'rizc lor Lilt'raturc in 19lJO,
1Ill1ovutive Architecture
th I\ln.i...1I1 inldll"l..luab rdkl..le..'d untllc illlp:lI.:t oftht: un their SUL"il'ly. nMIl)'
Br.I"li.1l1'" gol'll'd uptilllblH.dly IIlIU Ihl' lutlll"e. The modern architeL"tuml style
d..'llItlll,,>tr.i1l"d Ih.lt tlw l.'Olilltr)' was nol Illl'rt'ly imitating Europe and the United
but sOllll'llllng Ill'W. SiIKl' Ihl' twentieth century. builders had
!JoI"I"wl'd Europl'an arlhilectllr.ll Irends such as art Ilouveau and latcr arl
dl.. ll Illr IICW I'uhlil. huildillgS, private dwellings, and public InOllumcnts. Modern
l',1l1h' to I.atill AIlIl."rka through students educated abroad who
l",,'tunlt'll 10 Bra'lJl lu lleW huspitals. schuuls. ami housing
IllUJlCb. As Olll' :-odlul;lr lIu[nl. the: prugrammatic of lhe modern
IlllIVl'IIIl'llt Ik till: of JelllO":I',11. )'. cre.ltivc lilJert y. social equalit y. ..:onstruct ivc
1.ltiulIality. .:Ind conlldence in and the sckntillc method 10
I'flJdlll..l,.1 physic.11 rl'ality tholt humankind and soddy and rdnvenb
tlic diy,'" The..' clIl.'rgy of this IllUV('llll'llttuok hold in Brazil and produccJ some of
thl' inlluvative 11l0J("rn ::tr..:hile('ture ill Ihe: world.
Le..adl.'rs in tlte: UraZili:lll 1ll0(lall architectural 1ll0Velllcl1t included Lllcio
.. (IYU2-lJK) and OSGlr Nil'llleyer (b. 1907), who were inOuenced hy the
1919 iliid 1936 visits to Urazil ufthc Frl'llch architect Le Corbllsit'r (1887-1965).
tltc (alhl'r uf Illl' JIIUdel"ll glass IUWI'l" building. In the 1940s. Niel1leyer designed a
uf IlIodt'rll building projccts ill Udo Ilorizonte. including an innovalive
C.llhulii.. churd\. Ill' Jid with Ihl.' support of Juscdino
Ihe mayor and Jalc..'!' the go\'ernor. And as president of Brazil.
Kuhibl.hck (llJ56-61) lh:e..lk'ltl.'J his administration's efforts 10 completing tht'
lIew lapilal of Brasilia in the country's interior. lie colUed on architcl'ts ;'Ind
planners 10 suhmit their proposals to an inlernatiollJI jmied compt'lition. 1.'Ieio
CflSI.I'S project won. The new colpital took the shape of:l. large ;\irplOlne with
huildings on a 1ll00in Olxis leading 10 the presidclltial palnce.
Congress. nntl Supreme Court. I luge hlocks of residcntial npartlllents fanned out
from the center like wings 011 the pl;1l1e, Niemeyer designed the most important
Tile constnlClion wns innovative an<1 hold. He ll ..ed slell(ler arche<:. lonp.
r'lIn!",s. and large geometric shapes. Although critil's claimed that the cit)' was
.:;terile. llnfricndl}' 10 pedeslrian traffic. and overly planned, it symholi7ed a prn-
llIi.:;e Ihat Brazil was ::t':; mOdeI'll :IS. if not more modern than. :lllY Europe.1ll or
American society,
As Hrasili:l was being built. ::t FrJl1co-Bra1.ili:lll film and a new musical style
plnced Brazil nn the international map, H!ac"k Orphells (1959) \\'as scI in the hillside
fm'clns (slums) of Ri(l de Janeiro in the midst of Carnival nlH.I featured nn all-black
(:l.:;t of ch:lracters. Thc \\'inner (If:ln O..car for Best Foreign Film, the nwvie offered
it .. :mdiellce an idyllic view nf the C(lUnlry :md mce relation... It intro(luuc! til<'
\\'orld 10 hm,(iI /I(lWI (new style) with it .. cool j;,n !'ollntl and it .. "ynnlp.ltcd heal.
Btl"";1 nll\'., hecame :In imlllediate inlcrn:'IIiOllal SUCCC"5.
During the 1960s. other Illu.. il'al from I.atin i\mericI 1Ill)\'C(1 ontn Ihe
world a... well. cspecially soumis lmm Ihe Carihhc;\n, Culmn salsa. 1)ominic:lll
I1IC,.C".f:U1. :lntl the Colomhian n/lIIbin hC(;:lme popular:'lll 0\,('1' L.ltin Ameri(a :lnd
moved til the United \\lith migmllt .. rrom the Carihhe::tll ha.. in. Silllibrlr.
Mexk:lll illlllligr:lnts hmught regional musk with thclll. inciliding the rnl/{/(i'l
r(l1Irhna, which h:'ld het::omC' plll'ul;lr .111 over I.iltin i\llleriGl through Mexican
films of Ihe 19'1os and 19S0s.
latin American Revolutionary Culture
AI Ihe same time thai Kuhilsdlek was inallgur::tling Br:lsilia ilnl! bossil nova
lllusici:lllS were playing 10 packed auditoriums :ll Carnegie I-bl! in New York,
Fidcl \':lstro ::tlld his band of hcnrcled revolutionaries were changing the p(lliticnl
and cult urnll:lnclscape of 1.;ltill AllleriGl, A surge (If art isl ic and literary enlh IlsiaSIll
followed the victory of the Cuhan rebel.:; in 1959, Early reforms won widespre:ld
poplll:l!' slll'pnrl on the i!'bnd and abroad, The new govemlllcnt increased the
literac)' r:lle from 76 to 96 percent in n successful 1961 c:llllpaign in which students
fnnne<! oul into the countryside to teach peasants how to read. Education:ll
opportunities expanded. Sons and daughters of the poor hild :lccess to university
;'I/ld technical training. Colorful walllllurais and posters promoted revolutionary
i<leak Schoolchildren learned ncw and revolutiollnI)' songs, In the
first twn }'cars of Castro's rule. cultural heterogeneity was expressed in the literary
supplcment 1,IHu's de In Rf'voillcioll (Monda)' of the Revolulion). It provided J
fmulll for rich debate on the relationship of culture to revolutionary change.
1\" the regime turned to socialism and considcre<1 outspoken critics to be
of the revolution, 1.""e5 de hi Revo/"ci()l1 was shut down. Man)' of its
contrihutors left the coulltry, Yct re\'olutional)' felVOl" that promised radic:l1
l' ( 11111Ilt .Iud <" '( "., \ I
aero.... the continl'lll ill"pircd loy.11 illlC'I'Il.,1 ,11111 hlll'l!:'l "lIl'I""1 It'l 11ll'
Cuban experience. Thc NIlC'va Trowl (Nt'w lll"Vc'IlH'nl III th" 111101 1'/(,0..
used politid7etl lyrics In pr;li,,(' lhe :u.. lnlllplislllllelll .. or Ihl' Ih'\'I,IIIII"1l ('lh,1
organi1cd international ulIlft.'rellces th:ll hrought .Hltllllr... I"orl ...... III .. t... 1.1111
makers. plarwrights, and Illu<:iti:ln" fnull Illrnugh.llll l.ll.1l '\1110'110., I" III<'
i.. lalHlto celehr:lte a revolutiol1:lr)' vi<:jnn (or Ihe r('glllll. ('IIIUIl "lIlgl'''' and "'''111:
writers, sHch a.. Silvin Rodriguez (il. IlJt1l'.;) ,lIld I':lhln .. (I> 1'1 I tl. I ""I1'''''',j
!'c\olutioll:lr) vcrses thill the ..... ,l Wlll.11
Cub:l's politicall}' eng::tgcd Illll .. il rcprc.. enlt'd .\ I.,rgn It'lltllH'lll.d Illlld
American (and to n JesseI extelll EUlnpe:lIl) pop 11 111<: It c"l'n I.tlk Ill, k'n Inll.
reached ever-wider Latin Amcrit.lll 1ll.lIk(,t .. in the JlY.O....111.1 I')h''''. 1\1.111\ r .HIIl
Americ:ln musicians adapted tn thesc Ill'W .... lllTld .. Th('\' wn,te ... ,'ng" ,111.111111"" III
the same styles and found f.lv(lrahle relC"l'tinn. ()thel" IUllw.11< I .11 II .Hlll j, Ill" ,.
counler fnreign innucncc... In Argentina :lntl C11I1e. fnlklon"lo, ,11101 11111'1, 1.111',
"ought (lilt folk sound!> .Ind in.. tWln('llt .. l'll.. clving ",'ng" ,llltl 111\1111n.. 111,'1
.:;cemel! tn he disappearing. the\' ll .. ('(ltll<lr IlIw... 1Igal 1.'"<' I., ,li'"I('.1 IH"\\' III I1"11 ,.1
genre, eventuall)' kno\\,Il.I!' 11111111"\',1.,111111111 (Ihl' nl'\\' ""'"gl
Chile \\",IS ,II the (ellier IIf Ihi .. 111I'I\'(,I1H'lIt, ,Ill.! \'lolel,l 1',11 1,1 t 1"1; I, L ,I
wnlll.lll fhulllhlc origin<:. wa.. nllC III it .. le.l,lel'" ;\ "111'1"1111'1 .,lllw ( hlk,lll 11'lt
Parra hegall colleding Inlk lllll<:ll .IIHI her O\\'Il .. ong.. lh.11 .ul,lr ......t'd IIll"
prohlems of poor slum (lwcllel". 11111\('1 ... ,lllll t,ltl'lI\ \\"'11..('1" "Ill' l'IIIH'.1 III I
111111 .. (" intll :l center fill' mll .. id.ln" ,llltl ",lk .11 Ii... t". 11'\'1\ 1'< I . II ,11111 11 'II, 1..111 1\\ 11 .1'.
In !/Clio. a tliltur:ll cCllter where !,clfurmt'r.. tllldtll'I"t' .. cul Ilwlr I II "III, "'1/
111/{'''1/ chi/clla became e!>l'elwlly p'IJllll.l1 dlllllig Ill{' "'lli . II .. 1 g"\c'lllllWlll.oI
Allende (1970-71) 01 Ihe Sllllg... I'I'"gl. ..... I\.' p.ollllt.d "'1111'111
Using Ande::tn rh}'thms ::tncl io<:tnlllH'1l1" :ll1d l'"rtlC hIlt", lhr 11111 .. 1< .11111"11111 ,d.,
nnliOllal :llld indigenous udltllT 10 nppo.. itlon 10 C"I"" l,d1>, (1,".1111111
enees. After the military CI)IlP d'i,tnt thai nvcrlhr('w i\lkll.lc .llltl In .. l.dkd IIIl
seventeen-year dictatorship III Augll .. tn Pin"lht'1. Illll ... il,d gl.'"I'" ... lI t h .1"
Qlli/af1fl)'lllI ::tile! lilli-filiI/III/II wcnl iliin n:ile. 1'('lt"III1('oI rllI'll 11111"1,
around the world:ls a (Ifhllilding illtcrn.lli"1l,11 "pl"I"llll'll I., 1111' 1111111 ..,\
reginlc, Argelltine singer Mer<. cdC'<: (h. IIJ ",.,) ,I lid I r fnll.; lull,I.te(,1 [".Ill n.ll/
(h. 1941) popularized Violel:l ''.ura .. mll.;t I.Ullflll'" ",ling. i.l" .1 (.. \"Id,l"
(Th:wks for I.ife. 19(6). which ntTc!'t'd a h.nllllillg ode 10 hlllll,lll e:o.I .. lclI' " III Ih
lacc of daullting hardships.
Brazilians made their own Ilniquc l(llltl ihlltillil" 10 Ihe Ill'\\' ...ong IllO\Clll< III
In reaction to rock 'n' roll and other foreign 1111l"i<.d IIlfluclltc.... BrMdi.lll 1'''1'111.11
Music, as it was known, used :lcoustic gllilars :llld rcginll,11 in... IIIIIIH'nl .. til I'rn,hh I'
songs addressing national Ihemcs, Snlllelimc" thc}' wrl'r o\'C'rtly l'olitit..11. (lIhl'l
times the)' drew on folk music or conveyed simple storie.:; 01 ('\'crnl.l\' lilt-.
This musical current was challenged h)' (mph ,jim (Inll'il.III<"Ill), ,111.'11 Ilu
n
,'
ll1("nt thnt inc(lrporaled pllet!')', thealer. :llld Illll .. it: inln .1Il .11IClnatl\'(' (.,11111."
outlook. BorrO\.\'ing from the modernist. t.:lllllihaJi"lil idt"l .,1 illllmrn!,I,I!./t1 .1('\"('1
oped in the 1920san<.l ils proponent.; ill .. iq('tlth:ll .1I1i,,' ....holdd It'd h .... I"
,I2X I'AH I 11110'1' '1111-0\11 'i ANI) IU'.II.FlTIONS
.11'1111'1111.111,: l'!lllllt11:-.lrlllli tfl'llds <lnl! crealivdy transfonn
Ilh:.11 11l1t' o;lt.ullallt>nn:-. 'l'rupicalislllo was also a n:nectioll of the
wild .llId .d,dholl:-' yuutll .... ullUrl' til.ll wus swel'ping the world in the lalc 1960s.
C.ll'I.IIH. Vduso (b. I'J.I1) and Gillh:rto C;il (I>. 19
l
12), thl..' leading performers of the
willg \11 thb .IHI\'I;'llIl'lIt. were flJrll'd intu exile in 1969 for a period Oflillle.
hut .l'IUlnld Sutlll Ihl'fl';J!ta \u continul' lung and productive musical caret'rs.
Vl..I....o ... wdl-kllln"'l1 inkrn;lliullally. ilnd Gil st'rved itS min-
1:.11'. tit I..uhurl..' frolll 2U02 unlil during thl' I.ui'l.. In:kio Lula cia Silva govern_
II..nl, \, II.k (11ll1.IIUlllg a MlIIgwrikr nd pt'rfonnt'1".
TIle Literary Boom
,h ... tnl 1'1'1..'\ Ihe Cub.1ll Rt'volution allracled wurldwide .lltelltioll
Im".lrd .111 01 Lalin AmaiGI the C<tribbl'an. One histurian has nOled, "Latin
A.IIl..,i...lll hl..'C.lnle wurld 1:1111Om til rough Iheir wriling and their advo-
....1.. y \11 polltic;!1 allli soci<.d <.tt.:tion, alld bel..aml' many oflht"m had the good fortune
10 n:.I ... h IImrkt'b ,1I1d bt')'ond Latin AlIleriGI through translation and
11,lvd .lIld ::.omctilllc. thruugh exilc:."
Alllong III .., Int'nllwrs of thl' "boom of tl"lt' 1960s was Julio
t ,111,1/"" ( 1') I 'I-l)-I}. an Argl'ntine who Spl'llt lUuch of his life in France. Among his
.110... t uriginal worb UaYIlt'l1l (J IY63), which offen:d the reader till'
"l'poltUlllty Iv h.ld Ih..'novd's in'lIly ord.... r. Cortazar also used stream uf
1.."'l ..... :l I III Illller in hb ll'xts, Similarly, Cuban nuvdbl
t;udlt.-lllllI {;,ll>rlI.1 Illlan1l.. (I Y29-20U5), who initially supportt'd the Cuban
H,CVllluliotl hut Wl'lIt inlo l'xile in 1965, elllploYl'd strcam of consciousl1c.:ss in his
,,'xl'l""llIlIl'nt.d novels, among Ihc.:1ll 'I'res IriSh'S tigres (translated into English as
Tltl ...l 'I'1'11'1'l't1 Tig,,r:., 1967). Althuugh .. onsidl'n:d alllong the' internationally
.I1..lI.11111l:d wl'itl;:r:'> (Jr"llll' gellcralioll, he rcjc.:tl'd Ihatlabd (or himself.
C.lbll:l.l lul;lIlll<lxc'lI11e alienated frulll the Cub,ln Revolution. On the uther
1I.lIld, 1'.lhlll Nl'ruda rl'lailled luyalty tu IIll' Latin Aillericall left uver his IOllg
1111..'1.11')' ( ......:a Illal fivt:' lIb wurk l"debrated tht' indigl:llOliS
l'Oul:. o( I.atin Alilerk"all culture and dt'lluullct:'d U.S. multinational penetration
illLu I Ill' rq;iun. A1ll011g his masterpieces was the book-length poem Canto General
(Cl'lIeral Sung, 1<J50) thai glorifled the wondrous beauty of the Incilll ruin of
]\Iadlll PlcdHl. It also CUnde1111H:d SI,lIldard Oil's explOitation of lhe continent's
Ilatur.tl rl'::'UurCeS, Nel'llda a ..:untruvt:'fsial choic.... for the Nobel Prize for
Lill'rall/ll' ill 1\)71 bl..C:lll::'t' of Il'f1-wing political vil'ws. He died twelvt:' days
.llll'r ALlgn::.lu 11inudld GUile tt) power in Chile in S.... plclnber 1973. Thl' new
b.lIHll'd mourners from attending his funeral 10 avoid possible public
.Igainst Ihe militar), thai had just taken over the country.
NeruI..la's political pOc:'lry was cchoed by many journalists and novelists who
:-o,IW tlllit' IIkrar)' mission (0 aw"ken I.atin Alllcrkans to a conlinental sensibility
Illal \'Vent hC)'olld bordels and Ilarrt.>'" Among these l'Ssayisls is
l:.deanu (b. 1\)40). III Iht' carl)' 196Os. he ",ns an editor of the influential
wl'ekly MClrdlCl. which. like Iht' Argelltine cultural m<tgazine Sur.
publislu'd a widc array 01 writl'rs from Latill AlIIl'rka. Whl..'11 Ihl' lllililary tnuk
power in Uruguay in IY73, he ned the cuuntry luI' Argl..'lll ina whcI"l.. he loundt'd the
publiciltion Crisis. Whell the genaals luuk POWCl' ill Argt'lltill'l ill 1\)76, hl' fled
ag.lill, Ihis time tu Spain. I lis wurk was 1.11:;, 1't'IW:;, IIbierlllS dt.'
AnU!rlC/I I.atil/(! (The Open Veins of Lltill Allleric.I, 1971). which was widely featl
in Latin America. Europe, .md Iht' United Statt'::.: (;ak.lno olkrl-d a sweeping
histuri..:al <lIlalysis uf Latin Amt'rk"a frolll to Ihe pre:.elli. Ilh pol..l1li<.al
style defended the view that first the Sp.lni.lrtl:. ;:lIld Purtugul'se later tht' Brit ish
and U.S. governllll'IlIS explOited the pt.'ople :lIld Ihl.. 01 Latin AllIerica.
Like sOllie other COIlh:mporar)' in Lallll I\llll..'ril...l, he W.IS l..ulKlrned .Ibout
the cOlltinenl's hislory. I-k once wrott'. '" alii a wrill'!" with l"1lllembering.
wilh remembering the past of Alllerka "bovl' all and abuve all Ihat l)f Lalin
America, intimate land condemned to amnesia."
Like P...,blo Neruda, Uraziliall writer Jorgt:' Amado (1<J12-20UI) joinl'd Ihl'
Communisl Party ill the 1930s, He time ill prhull. hb bouk::. bUll ned
under the regime ofGetlllio Vargas. ,lilt! Wl'nt illio exile. In 1946 hl' c!l:ctl'd 10
Ihe Nation...,1 Conslituent Assembly; during thl' 1 hl' withdrl:w t'mlll active
pulitkal work in order to concentrate 011 his writing. II IS Iargdy regional ill
chamcter. ct:lebrating northe<lstern Ura'l.il. Ilis novd:. l"lHubilll'd alklltiun low.lrd
poverty and social disparities with a cdebr.ttlon 01 llil' African alld mixl-d-ract'
people of Brazil. I <J43 novd Terms do SCIII FilII (tramlakd The VilJ!elll
Land} paintl'd a gnll'SOllll: story of till' l'xploitaliull 011..;11...\(1 gl(,Wl"" III B.t1lia who
n:Jllained under the thumb of powl'rful landholding l:imilie::.. Uthl'r wurks \VerI..'
filled with picaresque and hUlllorom dl'pillion:. uf IlIl'mumble char.I(laS frulll all
walks of Brazilian lifl. D01l(/ FloI' e Seils Voi.s Mill idl)s (DUll,1 FloI' and I IeI' Twu
IlllSb'.lIltls, I Y66), for l'xampk rl'l..oulltnl thl' comil al talc 01 lhe gho:.tl)' rdurn uf;1
widuw's can:free and womanizillg husband who disrupts hL:r lIew lll.lfriage Iu it
sl'cond, more cunvt'ntional spouse.
Perhaps the most inkrnationally rello\\'lll:d I.alill AIIII..,kan :llIlllor ill till.: Iall'
IWl'llticth century ""'IS Columbian juumalist alld author l:abnd Carda M;irl..llll"Z
(b. 1927), Willilerofthc Nubel Prize ror Lill'ralurc ill 19S2. must fa mOlls novel,
Cien llIios de sofc:dad (One: Hundred Yt'ars of Solitude. 1<J67), is a modern wurld
classic. Sd in the banana-growing rt:'gioll uf Culombia ill till' IIction:d town of
Macondo, it was narrated in thl' style of realism" in which myslerious
dements invade realistic sellings. Marquez once the ch'lllt'ng... of writing
in this gt:'nre. ""My most important problem was dl'stroying Ihlline of dl'nWrGltioll
th:lt sep"ratl's what seems real from what St't'I1l:'
Cieri mios de soledad is a gripping talt' of ficlioll; a cOlnpdling allt'gory aboul
the history of Colombia; and a searching t'xplor:ltiun of lik lov..... and
personality in conlemporary Latin America. Marquez drew on hislorical events in
his work. One story in the book was on an ilH:ident in thl' town ofCienag;:l in
1111: sallie book Ihal VCll .. Hugu l-;lllwr 1111111:>1\'<'1)' I.. U.S
prc.'":>lllcnl Ikaf'".Ick Oballl.l al a lIu:cllng 01 hemlsphc.'"rll o( :>1.11... 111 t\pIl121)(),)
130 PARTTIIHFE 8 AND }{EFI ECTIONS
1928, when a union guided hy the Revolulional)' Socialist Party (a precursor or the
COllllllunist I';uly) declared a strike and 25,000 workers, particularly those at the
U.S.-owned United Fruit pbnlations, stopped cUlling bananas. The American
nwnager dispatched ;In urgent lllessage to the Colombian president, Miguel
Abadia Mendcz,-dcscribing "an extremely grave and dangerous
Abaclia Mendez responded by deploying nrillY units in order 10 maintain "public
order." The ensuing conrrontntion led to wh.. t came to be known as "the massaCre
of the hannnn a central evenl in the collective memory of
Colombi;lns-and recounted, nlheit with purposeful exagger;ltion, by Gabriel
Garcia M::irquez. (The Iragedy did not, however. convince United h'uit 10 Icnve
C:(lloTllhia. That nccurred only in the 19405, aner an oUlbreak or sigalob disease
dcvast::lted til(' h::lIlana pl;lntalions it controlled,) f)ming the 1970s ;md 19ROs,
wns ::Ill outspoken opponent of the Pinochct regime in Chile. lie also
attcmplcd 10 help negotinte sever<ll unsuccessful peace accords hctween rebel
groups and the Colombia government in the 19905.
Literature ,llld poetry were nol the only hoom industries or the 1960s and
1970s. Film :lnd lc1evisioTl took nn new dimcilsions as well. In the post- 'I/I,'orld 'I/I,'ar
1I period, Latin I\mcrican films had to compete with international cincm<l <lnd the
growing influencc of television. As the quality of IHltional cinema production
declined ov(.'rall, young intellectlwls, influenced by French nc\v wave and Italian
lleorealist cinematic styles. began Ill:lking 111ms designed to reHecl their countries'
social IT<llitiel'. III Brazil this movement hecame known ::lS ci1ll'''/(I novo (new
cinema) nnd produced documentary-like reflections on sociopolitical themes by
fI1rnmnkers such ns Nelson Pereirn dos S::lntos (h. 192R), who directed \lidm SC'cllS
(!3::lf!'en Lives, 19(3), <lnd Glauber Roch::l (1939-81), whose masterpiece Deus e 0
dinho 111/ lerra do $01 (released in English :IS Wack God$/\'Vhilc Drvils, 196/1)
received international acclaim.
Filmmakers in nlher countries produced works along simibr lines. TOlll:is
Gutierrez (192R-96) directed films about postrevolutionary Cub::l. Mcmorias de
sululc$arrollo (Mcmories of Underdevelnprnent. 196R) examines an intellectual's
nmbiv::l1cnce ahollt the The epic trilogy I.lIcia (1968), directed by
Humberto Solas (1941-200R), portr<lYs three different women in Cuban history
<lnd their rebtionship 10 revolutionnry change, Argentine filmmakers Fernando
50lnno (1913-92) and Octavio Getino (b. 1935) directed La IlOra de los hOn/os
(The Hour of the Furnaces, 1970) Ihnt lauds the liberation movemcnts of Latin
America, Al'ia, and Africa, Genernlly shot in black and white with innovative film
techniques, these films represent the work of a generation determined to make
powerful slatements L.atin America's ongoing 1'0cial and economic
problems.
Thealer underwent intense transformation in the 19605. PlaY'vrights and
directors turned <lway from European and U.S. sources for inspimtioll and rocused
morc on themes related to Latin Amcricn. Among the leaders of this trend was
Br;lzilian Iheater director Augusto Boal (1931-2009), who developed ncw perfor-
1l1::111ce ;"Ind stnging styles. The T1l\lsicnl drall1<l Arella C01lta ZumlJi (Arena Tells
ahout Zumbi, 19(5) l'kirted governmenl cellsnrs hy retelling Ihe :-.tory lit IIH'
seventecnth-Centlll)' nlll::lwn}' slave community of The play is ;11"'0 ,I
metaphor ahout opposition to the militnry regimc thaI h;1<1 (Otlle III pllwcr Ih(' }'('.l t
before. Simil<lrly, Colombian directors Enrique BlIcll;lVelllura (192.'> will'
headed the Experiment::ll Theater or (;::lli, and Sanl i<lgn Cart ia (h. l1J2'l), whll led
1,;1 Candelaria Theater in Hogot::l, turned to innov::llive fClfIll<; of plililkal Ilwalt'l.
M<lny the;ller groups moved away rrom the hierarchical h;md 01 Ihe thC,I1l'1
director and adopted more colleclive prnce<;ses ror dcvclllping ;11111 staging 1'1'41,111,
tions. By 190R lheater restiv:ll ... throughout l,atil1 AlllCrit,l ,n'.11("(1 n .... ('11 ... 1,.' "t
comlllunity among aclors, directors, alld perfc 11111"1 .... 1llC')' I Ih"l'C \'(", I
c;'lcll other's work and shared ideas ahout hllw best to m,lke 111('::II('r reln.11I1 III ,I
brondcr public. This i.<; not 10 say that other Ihealer di"',ll'l'(,:1r('d I\l1ddk
c1nss audiences soughl a wide variety or enlcrt::lin1llenl lll'tioll<;, hUI (''.;l'crillll'lll.ll
lhenlcr rcnected whal W;1S new :1nd cxciting.
\'Vhile Ihealer produclions were hecoming l1lore c'.;(lcntllcnl,d. Ic'lr... i"'H1n \\',1',
becoming more commercial. In its ('ad)" tdcvisioll fl.HI re!lc, I till
loc<lllive progralllming similar to radio show,". Ihe 11)(.1\ .. , rllt"eigll (1lIo.. ,ly 1r.... )
programming nooded the ;lirw;lves, hringing duhhed TV ;'Illd IlH.vir... In .111
ever-widening ::lllc1iencc. Al the S<ltllC timc. thc tradiliol1 ,.1 I"(/(!ifll/('I'/'{,I, \\,,",
lransferred to the new mediul1l. het:lIl1e natiollnl Ilxnlillll ..... 1<; I.lllllll""
gathered around Ielevision sets fc,r favorilc nigllttillle <;cries,'[ lIe (11111('111 1.11":1'11
frolll historical to modern dramas. Somc rOCIISCll '111 trndillOll.l1 l"llln,lllli l ,111,1
family themcs while others addressed sOcl;'\1 and politiG11 i.... uc.... IlIlhe 1'170.. ,111.1
1980s, Argent ina, Brazil. Cnlnmhia, Mex kn, allll VCllC".llcl:l heg,ln ('XIII 11 t iIlg 111"1 I
products to olher pMls of I.ntin America, 10 Spain and Portugal. to :-'p.1tl1 .. h
language channels in thc Uniled Slales, and even III lllUlllr;c... ;1 .. [.11" ,1\" \" .1"
China and Russia.
Radio and lelevision <..ould readl an iIlilerate pnpul.lliClll. ('lIllll, hflt.k..
bec::lme a poplll<lr print medium entertainmcnt vehidc for the tilt'
working c!;1SS, nne! their children. \-omie hooks wilh nalioll::11 tl1('111<.."" .1Ild lItlHIlI('
local ch<lracters <lchieved popul;'\rily ill the j'HOsand 19'IOs. 1\1 l!lesalll(' lilllC, [1.:-'
comic books penetrated the Latin American market. Di.o.:ncy Glrtnons and nthel
foreign series were translaled and widely disscmilwtcd. As tdrl/(wdfls hn ,HIW
popular, publishers produced /Of01IOVc!(IS th;11 n::ll...atcd everyday .1I1d
reached broad audiences. Comic hooks also hccnl1le a pcc!agngit. ... ehicle ;1I lite
1970s in politicized literacy campaign,<;. \tovern lllent IIllllcd III Ihe 101 m,ll
as well to address social and cduC<llion;l1 issues.
DICTATORSHIP, DEMOCRACY, AND NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
The ;1uthorilarian regimes that swept across South AmeriC::l in the 1')711,0.: araltlw
civil st rire Ihnt divided count ries in CCllt ral ATllerica during tIlt.' I rllrecd lll;lnv
of Ihe politically engaged writers. lllusicians. and fllllltll<lkel"s, along wilh 1,'11." of
thousands of revolutiol1::lries and politk;11 activists, illlf! exile. 1'11111\ Plher
1\2 1'.\1(1111101 IJJI .... II ... ANIlIHIJlt nON\
III 1.11111 ,llnl hl.l t'xh,'111 Iht' Uniktl they
wlillt: .11111111 Ill"W or tht. polilical rt'pre.!>sion laking
I'I.I\.\.' III A llt:\v gt..'IlIt.' knowu as kstillloniallikraturl'.
III \\'C 'I h fJlvpll.' luld Ihl' olthl'ir their at.tivisll1. and the
tll.lt Illt.'y 11.ld t..'Xp"'IIt'lll..nl.
I\U1Uli
b
tltt' (.lIld lalt.'r t..olltrov..:r.!>i.d) b tht'
.1\.\.\IUllt "I 1{lglll,t:II.1 l\kll\.IIU (II. 195Y), .In illtligl;'llOUS Guat..:nmlan WOlllan
Ill\t1I\l'd III Ill'l Il'v\llllliollary 11IOVl'/lll'nt III till' IlJ70s. IIl'r lestimony
.\I,'lI'/11111 UI,I:tll'C-'/(,1 Melli III;)' lI::.i 1IIl' 1/(I(Ju 1(/ Cllllt iC.'lIda (publbht't1.1s I. I{igubc:rta
t\klllhll, J'JX2) lih [0 tlL.lI nul unly my Iii..:, it\ abu the
/l.... llllItlll}' III Ill)' M}' i.. Iht.' of all poor My
i.s lilt.' II' a WllUIt..' p\.uple," In Iwr book, she rdntt'd IIH.'
W,lp III wlti, Ii Iht.' (;llalt"JlJ;JI.lJl :>t.'curity fuJ''':t's killl?d memhers or hl'r hUllil)' ror
llil'lf III fl'volliliollary glll::rriJlas. I kr beclllle an international
",ut.l.n:-., :tllli J\ ,It! i VltieS ill favur \lr human rights wun ht.'r tht' Nobel Pe:.lCl.'
1'11/1' III IlJ'J.!.. anlhfopulugi:>t I).Ivid Stoll ("hallcngl.'d the 'J(t..uracy of
dl:lad.. 01 ht.'1 ,dlhuugh ht.' .tl.:klltlwlnlgl.'d that her aCCuunb hdped 10
,II.IW IIIit'fll.ltIUIl.tlltllU:, 10 tht' hrutalil)' ul thl'lju.llelll<ll.lll military.
J\kll\. Ilu'.., .lftll III 1.lvor 01 the pl'ople urGllate:lI1ala rt'prco+
"l'nt ,I 1I111l..h IUIi.ldl1 ,\Ild l.OJltilll'llI.lI pht.1l011lt:null 01 Ihe sevt'ral
del. ,I.!,,... II.lVl' lorgt.'d ol"galli/,.ltioIlS tu Innkc nt'w daims on
till.' .. t.lk. '1 IIl'y h,llC dl'IIl.lllllld th,ll 11,1111r.1I \\'I;'.lIlh distribuled in ways mort'
l.lV,II.II}ll' t\l IUl..II ... ulIllllllllitit':->. SWIll' h,IVt.' un l:Ullural.mtolll)JIlY; others
Ilavl' l.,dlnl lUI" l.lngu,tgl".!> to be an lIltegr.1I pari of c:'ducalional pro-
M,I .. y org,lllii'.aliuns h.lv,,: on en::.uring Ihat lands .lre rc:'served or
I'llwrvt'd Jill plUp!...'. III :>Ollll" 11.'SpnlS, .!>odal articulatiuns ilre n
I tiV11 1)1 IfII/lgl'/II)I1/U ill whkh Sl'0!.:.l ill Ihe llalllC: of the Indi.llls of Ihdr
Ullllltf)', I',lll Indi.lll alld havl' pruvidt'd .lIlutht.'J' platrorm
1111 allivi:.l:. tIl Il'l.IJlh.l'!Jlualizt' lhl' rdatiullsllip ur the: indigt'IIUliS population Iv
1l,ltlUll.d l.lIlt till':'.
Illl.hgllIl111:-> Pt.'ol'lt..- Wl'll' not olll}' kd group articubtilll:).1 lril iqul,;' or IhI,;'
\Ul.I.d ,lIld polJlit..tlordl'r. \'Vhik ill exile ill the I97U.!> una mallY len-wing
1.ltill WUllll'1l ht'g.lu Il) rl'think uorm.ltive sudal and cuhur.11 assump-
11011:-> ,1I'Ollt gt..lukr. Ihe pl,;'n'a.!>ivt..' lraditiumtl gentlc:'f rolcs un thl;'
1...-1 t and Iltl' hil'r.tl"l hk.11 n,lturl' uf (enlralizcd politiGd movements. Influenced by
klllilll ..1 idl',l" in I:urllpl" and [ht' Unitcd SI.ltt'S, man}' returned from exiJe with
111,,1 hdpl:'d l>lllld llloVelllt:ul.!> and organization:>. Inspired by Ihe
LJllIled N.ltioll:> First \'\/orld Cunfert:nct' 011 Women held in Ml,;'xico in 1975. they
jllineJ tvgt.'tha with ,Klivists illvulvt'll in antidictalurial struggles and grassroots
IIIUVl:'llll"llh lighting and ecvnOllliL incquality. The WOlllC'U'S movements in
dilk, t'llt llHlIl1 rie.. addr,,:ssld ;.Ill arr.IY 01 bSlies r.tnging from reproductive rights to
Ill'W Ilblitutiull:> tv lurhlil violc:nce.
\oVUIlll'll WI ht'l:.lllll' 1I10fe pruminenl a.s well. Among Ihusl;' who g.lined
rl'l.tlguitioll pusI hoom art.' Isabd Allende (b. 1942) and Luisa
V.llenzuda (1.>, 1938). IS<.lbd i\J1l'ndt;" wa:> hurn ill Chile but lIloved inlu l'xilt' alter
the 1973 coup d .... I.11. Since: thl' ht.'r work rt.'.lchl'll ,I wkk inkrn<.llioll.t1
audience. La ("(1St! de ICJsespirilus (The 1IOIlSe: oj Spirits, IlJH2), written \\.hill' in l:'xill'
in Venezuela, was inspired by <.l lettc:'r that wrolt' 10 her d}'ing Her
short stories and novels. inOuenceJ by 1TI'lgical n.:alislll, focus 011 Ih....
t'xperil;'ncl' of women, Argentine novelisl shorl-stury wril ... r Luisa Valt'nz.ut'b
has employed an experimenlal avnnt-garde sty!...' to cOlisidt.'1' Ihl' impacl of the
Arg":lltine dit:t.llorship on human in CUII/O l'Ultt GUeJ"nI ill \Var,
1977) and CtlIIIIJ;o tit' Arm(lS (Change uf 1\ nilS, 19M2). Both WOlllell I'''-present ;l
nl:"W ft'minist lTitique of gender rd<llions thaI b b}' lIlauy !)11lt'r
;llllhvrs.
Paralld to tilt: t.'nlergellCl' llIuwll1enb througlilllil l,atirIAnwrka,
gay Illel} and It'sbians began to car\'o.' uut a tlew polilkal and so..:ial 1'01'
thl'msdvcs. In 1971 several polilicizecl group.!> merged to creall' Ihe Fr(;'JI!l' dl'
LibemLion IlolliOSexu<.l1 dt> b Argentina (Argt'ntinl:" 1!Olllo:>l;'xual Liberation
Front). Thl' W;lVt. of which l'nveluped Ihe:- cOlilltry In 1')75 and culmi
nalt'd ill a military coup d'Clal the tollowing yt..'ar, ublitcr.lkd tIlt' nlOVt:mt.'1l1.
Activists formed similar gruups in Puent) Hico, Mexico, and Ikli'.il in the mid-
to lalt' 1970:>. 'I 'he)' .!>t'rved both as SUppOrl alld ,IS .llld
sp.lCes to t'bbor.lIe a new political th;,)t chalkng('d hegcmunic
about gt'nder and Mnny lesbi,lll a..:tivist.!> movl'cl inlO tht' \\,vmln.!>
1ll0Vt'Illt'11l. Afta rl'ct'iving initial tht:y parti(ipakd vpl'nly HI cre.lting
.Ill indmuHlary felllinist prugram,
Thl'" AIDS epide:mic in Ihe early bUlh dis::.ipatnl alld strl'ngthellt'J g'ly
political urganizations, activisb devdoped llt.:W 10 th..: stnk tv
address ht,.. hh In 1995, the Lc::>bian and Gay Assudatiull held
ils st'venkt'nlh intemational l:Onrert;"lIce in I{io de lant'iro, Brazil. That event
e:n..:ouragcd nl'W local, rt'gional, :lnd natiunal organizalions from Mexico Iv
Chile. The movement's polilical ngenda indlldes enacting alllidi.scriminatury
legislation, "ddrl'.!>sillg onguing violencl' alld gay b.l.!>hillg, alld t'ducating tlw
public. Pride :ll1U mardll's havt' .111 illlpUI'I,II11 ll1t.'all.!> orvbibility.
In recent ye;lrs, Ihe.> annu;l! Lesbian, Cay, Biscxual, and Transgl'llllered paraJe in
Sao Paulo. Bra:i.i1, has am<.lsseJ 3 milliun peuplc. making it the: I.trgt'sl of .su..:h
mobilizations in Ihe: world.
Concurrent with;l politicized llloVt'menl, nUlhors writing :lbout homosexlI:Jlit)'
have become prominent. Among them i:> Rt'inaldo Aft'nas (19113-1990). who
clashed with Iht' Cuban government in 1967 for his writings and vl>l.'nly gay lifeslyle.
Arenas was imprisoned for ;l time for having published abroad without official
authorization, He finally lert Cuba in 1980, His work Antes qlle {mochezm (Before
Night Falls, 1992) was a frank autobiogrnphy that sharply criticizeJ Iht' Castro
regime. the Catholic Church. and U,S, culture :Jnd politics, Another
g"y author who also Ilt.'d his counlry was Manlld 1-'1Iig (1932-90), Ill' wt'llt into exile
in 1973 as the political situation polarized in Argentina. Ilis novd 1.iIIJcstJ ddtlllwjer
arm/a ('I'he Kiss of the Spider Woman) told tilt' tale of the rdalionship bdween 1\vo
/1'4 rtlRtE e TIIEJl.lrSANIlI{EII.FCIIONS
prisoners-a ga}' I11nn and a revolulinnnry. It was 1:1Ier made into a successful
I1rnadwa}' musical and a prize-winning IlolI}'\vood film. Such works mark the
emergence of a new generation of writers willing 10 puhlish their creative considera.
li<lIls about previousl}' tahoo topic.'i.
lust as women, gays, :\Ild leshians began to articulate new concerns about
inequality and discrimination, the ucmocf3ti7..1.tion process in man}' countries in
the 1980s expanded opportunities for Afro-L..1tin Americans. New social move-
mcnts such as the Movimenlo cgro Uniflcado (Rlack United lVlovcment) in
Bf<lzil presentet.l hiting critiques of ongOing social an(! economic gaps hetween
Afro-llr.17ilians and people of European descent. Although the movement did nol
create a mass following, Illany of its ideas provoked n:ltional discussions ;lbout
r:lei:ll inequality. pressured the state to ;lddress historic:l1 p;lllerns of discrimin:l
tion. ;lnd created new government programs. Similar movements have developed
in Peru. Ecuador. Colombia, and Mexico, where intellectuals and activists have
focuse(1 :lllention on lingering forms of discrimination and positive African
innuel1ces in Ihese countries.
American culture has enjo}'ed a renaissance since the 1980s.
1igratory Oows betwcen the C:lrihbe:ln and both Europe and the United States
have increased the circlll:ltion of ideas :lhOlll black identity and culture. Musical
sl),le!' from sals;1 to the J\fro-Cuban sounds of the Buena Vista Sodal Cluh have
gained popularity among world music aficion:ldos. Nongovernmental organiza-
li(lllS. tlnthl'Opologists, and ethnolllusicologists have soughI 10 record and preserve
Afro-Lalin Americ:ln tr:lditions.
New musical forms nnd I.:UIt ura I traditions arc being created. To offer nne
example, Afro-Brazilian identities arc being expressed in a new way through
p:trlicipatioll in hlocos Afros. percussion groups organized 10 parlicipate in
Cnrnival festivities. These Moms arose in poorer Afro-Brilzilian neighborhoods
in Ihe 1970s in t he northeastern cil)' of Bahia to allow residents lo part icipale in Ihe
festival and to provide an Afro- Brazilian altcrnat ive 10 the /rios de/rims. while rock
hands that h"d come lo dominate Carnival performances.
The most famous of the dozen bloeos Afros of Salvador is Olodum, which
hegan as a small neighborhood group and now has thousands of members in
Salvador, as well as fans the world over. The group's name comes from Ihe Yoroba
word Olodllmare ("'God of Gods
n
). Olodum is widely credited with the invention
of"samha-reggae." an innovative Illusical st),le in which vocalmclodies charilcler-
istic of Caribbean reggae arc wedded to the aggressively rhythmic drumming of
Carnival street music. More recently, the group has added traditional Weslern
instrumentation to its ensemble, hut drums and voices remain at center stage.
Olodum's musical repertoire has also incorporated clements of salsa, ""'cst African
music, pop, chants, and African-American hip hop. As the genre
samba-reggae" suggests. the Olodum members see themselves as pari of the
African diaspora nnd as sharing musical styles with Afro-Caribbean peoples.
This connection extends to a celebration of negritude or and of
Africa and peoples ofthe diaspora. Olodulll's director of internalional relations. Rill}'
11 ('1111'111' :\1111 \"'11'1\' I I'.
i\rquimilllo. explained thi!' hy staling: -Olndlllll is pMI pI Ihe 111Iern.llion.1I hl.ll k
movemcnt. and we want to pmll10le self e.... t(clll :l1ld prllk: AIlIllg wilh Ihi ...
celebration of J\fric;m rools. notahie in a sociely ill whith I" ..ftell
denigrated. even by Afro-lJrazilians. comes a CCllllmitm('llt 10 lhl' fnr r.1I ,.,1
equalily and a celehration ofhl:\ck leaders the world over. "W(" fight diq'rilllil1.lll.. 11
with protest noted J\rquimill1o. Our Illes... i... Ih(" ",lIlle .IS l\.\;1111111ll X.
Marcus (;;Irvey. Roh Marie)' or M;lrtin I.uther King Ir.: wc'r(" fighting fnr 1'I1I,,hl\'-
''''hile the effccl!' of Iheir appeal" to hl,lck (lIU"'\,.IClu<:ne"" .lud Ia\,. ial c'lIlalil v .11(" Il.llly
impos"ihle to g:Hlge. Ihey selve ,IS p()\Verful ex.ll11plC' .. of Ah,,-nr.uih.11l itl.'llll!\
Films, Pop Music, ond the Internet
The se\'ere economic crises of Ihe IfJROs slgnilu. anI IT... Ir.lIl1ls on 11.1Iltltl.d
film industries. Nevertheless, man)' of the \'t.'ter:l11 d irC'<. lor.. of the It)(.n....1" \\0,11 .1"
new generations of filmmakers. including 1ll.1ll)' WllnH"ll. hcg.ln pnllhh'ing
(Iualit), feature filrns and dOCllIl1Cnl:lries, 111:111)' wilh P111iIi\,..11 .llltl "'l( i.ll (onl('1I1
Two films dealing directl)' \"ith dramas during OJ' illll11edi.ltdy .Iflel Ihe IIl1hl.\I\
dictatorships represented this y..enre. 1.11 l,isl(Jria IIficild (Th(" ( Ufit 1.11 ";;Imy. I')W.1.
(!il'ecled by Pellnzo (h. 19'1h). Inhlthe "lory III the childlen til Ihose tll",'I'
pearecl in Argentin:l during the -Oirt)' Wars- of the I97ll.. al1d (".lIly I/lXI)..,. () ,/110' "
;550 colllpmr1lciro (Four Da)'s in Septemhel. If)0)7). tllrntetl hr Hrullli H.lll,I.' (I,
1955). recounted Ihe 1969 kidll:lpping ufthe II.S..llllh;I"S,")'Jr 1,\ llrh.lll gill 11111....
Bt)th films received intcrnatioll:ll recngnitlflll.
The economic valuC' of lllany of the J'c1e.I ... 0\'('1 Ihe 1.1 .... 1 IWlI dc, .111, ...
especiall)' those from Mexico. A ina..lIlt I Hr.17il. .1" well ,1" Ihei r .... fll'h I"II( lcd
scripls and outstanding acling. have made them (Olllpctiliv(' 01ltll(" world 11I.i1kt'1.
Waller Salk,s (h. 1956) dirccled Ihe touching film Celllmi do Ilmsi/ (Ccnlr"I ..... t.llloJI.
199R) ahout a child's search fflr his f;llher in all arid. I\o\'('rt)' regl""
of northeastern Brazil. VelCf<lll :lettlr Fernall l l;1 Monlenegrn (11. 192< r('tClVl'tl
internntionnl praise for her leading role in the film. r 1111l/Of/UI fallll,ih, (J\lld Yfllli
Mother Too. 200 I) was a coming-of-age film of 1\\1(1 )'nllng hfl)'S alld .1 WllllJ.ll1 III
her lwenties who took a road trip with Ihe Ilnlitic:ll :IIHI SO(I.II l'ftll1Iclll" "I
contemporary Mexico as:l hackdrop. The film ganl('ITfl mall}' :1\\'.1111<:. /)/(/1/"\
de n/otoricleta (Motorcycle Diaries. 2004) continued the trntlilinn flf 1'01111\ .11
themes with a romantic re-crealion of Erlleslll Che- yOll1hfl11 H.p
through Lt1tin America before he joineclthe revP!,lIionaIT fnr,c'O Ih.11 ('\'I'llh",'\\'
the Cuban dictatorship of Fulgenein Balist:l in 195<).
Thc underside of life in 1..1tin Americ.l. cSl'cci:lll)' I'r{'".. pr("lhlclll" of
poverty and the impacl of drug lr:lfficking. h:ls hecome :lnflther prominent .... hII" I
for filmmakers. ThefavcJa.( of Rio de Janeiro provided the "clling fnr lhc )110)
Brazilian crime drama Cit/anr de DellS (City nf (;0<1) thnt lracked the I1v('" "f
generations of petty crooks and drug dealers an(lthe violence UpOI1 Iht
city's residents. The joint Colomhian-American production Mario IIrlll' nr( ,I,'
gracia (Maria Full of Gr:lce. 2004) :llso :lddl'cssc(! Ihe impad of l!rug" 011 1''''\1
people's lives. The film followed the ordeab of:l WIIlllal1 whn ,lgn'cd tf) tr.lll"I''11
I'll I''\HI IllHII .. llllflll .... :\NI'lnH.lcllllNS
d lug:-, III Illl' l), lill'd Siall':' \\'111'11 lll,'r I.tlll ily laced :.eriolls ecollolllk probll'llls, Latin
"llll'lll,111 liIICIII.lluglaphll'l'> have .lbo l'xo:lled at donllllclltary fillllmaking,
IltlU,>illg 011 lopk:. r.lllgillg frUill immigratiullto environment,,1 dcstruction.
Ah(l\'l' .Ill lbl.', Lltill i\llll.'rlC.lIl kkvisiHIl and cOlllllll'rcial music production
ltolVl' l'>igllifkant growth uVt:r thl'I<I::.t several deGJdes. Although much
tl'll'VI!'>hlll 1llllgI.llllllling tod.1y blight l'ntcrtainlllt.'l1t for wide audienccs. stalt'-
IIwllnl ll'llVI:.itJll .IIIJ !'>UIlIt" Ihltiunal netwurks dcdicak to variou::. types
,I! lulllll\: f1ll':'l'llllllllll' prl':'l'lltalioll:' ufllll'afric'll d'l:.:.ic::., hi::'hlric.ll donllllcn
1.llll.':', I(Hllldt.lhle lll'!l,ltl'::' witll inlelll'l..tu.. b and authors. and programs abuut art.
lit ... 11111' ... 1I111l1111,'!'>. ll,ltiollal Ih:t wurk::. h.IVl' bcutllw billiun dullar
II I'> 1::.llllhlh,d th,ll XU III 95 p...rl.-\:'Ilt urlll\:' pupulation::. Orlllu:.1 cOllntries have
Iq,:ul.tr dllt1.1 ,lltn.. to Il'IevI::.iUlI. Vil'wer r.l\c;'::' art' slighlly luwer in rural are.IS and
III p"IJl ...I lIHlIllrk... hUI dunng tdl'GI:.b vr crucial !locccr mah:hl's (especially the
\\lurid ( up fill,Ib.), I'ntire appl'ar tv down as p.:ople g:1lht'r with
1,II1ldy ,lllti Illt:lld.. lu view fhc:.!.' all impurt.1Il1 conlests. Just as SCk:cer
"t,tf...Ill...! pl,l)'l'r!l lIa\'l' bl.'Lvllle expufl tv U.S. and European
k.llll'>, Id.'t/1I1'd,l:> .lIl nllw throughout the world. bringing multiple
III'W 11I1.1!!.l" III I..Hill AJlllrk.1 10 III Mi,uui, tvtoz:'llubiqUt', and tvloscow.
Lltlll i\lllt.'rk.1Il pop Pt"IIe1I'.llcd illlt:fnatiun,-,1 yOllth markets with
llllll.,l .. illg ::.int.\. the 197U:. wlll'n Bob Marley (1945-81) introduced
1,II11,IIt'Ill Ilh!!.al Itl ,llldit:lltt.':-. III Euru!'l' .lnd Ihl' Unilt:J Stales. p... rfonnance
"j 11lIlllly l 1111 (b. III Ihl' J,Il11.lk,lll film nit, If"rder "fhey COllie (1972)
lll,llnl,II\111I,llllit. 01 .tIlt! Illarijll<lna dl'<ller:. in tropical Kingston.
lilt.' "l'ln,lllt! 1111 wIllld allilltig froln tile' north has
pl'jlllltl'" ,I grll\\'illg Ilhlrkd luI' I,.llill l'>uUlllb routl'd ill a ur Il'ltional
lllll::lll.,d glllll'!'>. l.alilltJ !'>tal!'> ::IIKh Hick)' Marlin (b. 1':)71) rrom Puertu Rico and
:-.1.'1 ...11.1 (1
1
)71 95, wilt I bll'ndnl Mexkilll f'(/llcllefli tr.. with Alnerican
t\HIIllr)'. l;t'llllaIJ polk,l, :.llid C.lrillhl.'all have offered crUl'>suver mush.:
th,t! 1l.1:' It:dLhed wide audit.llces in Lalin America :.tlld tht: Unitl'd
[\'lllle :'Ignifk,lllily. Ihl' Illtenlt'l has revlJllltiunized ...Ollllilunicaliull :.lnd cul-
IUft' ill Latlll '\\llenL'!. Tud.. y largt' sCUur::. 01 the llliddlt: dass own computers, ,HId
Lybt:II.,tlt"') ur :-,indl.lr uu:.ine:'::It:s offl'r :.ef\tices rur people 10 pay for Inleflll'llISl' by
lilt' lIlillUk. iVlany nOllgovtTlllllC'ntal organizations have developed projects to help
pt:opll' IrOJlI lower SUciUl'CUnUlllic backgrounds gain access to thl' Internet.
I.lll.1lly IMM'd cOllllllllllity prvgrallls have begun Iraining youlh to work with
vidt'O C3nll'r:.t::. 10 product' films docullIenting their quotidian t:xperiences. The
t.)'ber "t:VOIUlivll delllocro.llizl'd 'Kn's::. lu cuhllr", nc:ws. and inlurmnlion. and it
lias illll.'fIl.lllolHtlizld t".ISY lxdl;lllg.:S between writers, authors, and the
publiC in gl'lltr..1.
For .111 Ihl'::Il' L.llin AllltTic'l b eXt'rling increasing influence on Ihe
Ulliled Iho: I.Ulllllr)' thaI fur long lookc:d down upon its southern
IlLlghhuf:-'. Citit-:. :'Udl New York, Chicagu. and Lo:. Angeles, not to speak of
tviiailli, h.IVl' burgl'olling Spanish-speaking COll1ll1Ullitics. U1rge concentrations of
Hr.l:tih,lII:-' lI"t' ill .111(1 nround Boslon, Nt'w York, and Mimni. In rccent years,
illlnligranis havo: muved to slll."1 lown.!> and rural 0/ tilt' Midwl':-,l and thl'
South. Music. d:1llce. and cuisine arc undergoing IrallsJurlllatiuns. III 1992 salsa
outsold kt'lchup for Ihe Ilrst tillle ill America, By 2006 the L;ltiuo pUpUlaliOll
reached tl3.2Illilliull. and by 205U, il is e:.lilllo.ltcd, L.ltinos willlllake up Ulll;'-tluartl;'''
of Ihe U.S. population. Such change within Allleric3 (.lIlliut I.lilto alta its bdieb
aboul and altitudes tuward Latin Americ:!.
And in the future, as in past o:nlllrie::., Ihe lalt' ul Lllin I\IllL'ric.1 will CIJIltillllt.'
to dl:pt'ntl on its relationship 10 the o:nkr:. of Illkrn.lt ion.1I pOWl'f. Thl' rt:gion will
rellmin <l ::'Ite ()I struggle. triumph, tragedy, .ontntt!ktiull. t\h:.lIlwhill'. IHII
will Luntilllll' to staltled r":'tinalcd hy wh.1I C,t1md C,1rLi,1 l\t:.irtluei'
c.lIl... d "th(' unearthl), or Latin Alllerk.t. th:'lt boundll.':':' rl'.llm uf haulltnl
Illl'lI .lnd Illstork women, Wh05(' unellding ohl'>tin,lcy blur::. into k-gend."
measures
10 promote
Glossary
anarchism a political philosophy which views the ns <In unnecessary ;'1I111
harmful institution ;"Inc! ""gues lhal society should be organized without :l
centralized governl1lent.laws. police, or olher authoril)'.
anOl,"c1Hl-syndicalislll all ideological current within anarchism th,,' COllsidt.'rcd
workers and 100hor lllovemcnts to be capable of revolution'\I)' change to
overthrow the C<l.pil<llisl slale and estahlish workers' governance over the
('CtlllOlll)' and government.
mu/ic"da a Spanish imperial court.
[Iamleirm,tr a hackwoodsman or pioneer in colonial Brazil. often a tmder of
indigcll(H1s slaves.
Bourbon rc(onns a series of administrative rind economic
implemcnted hy the Spanish Crown in the eighteenth century
(OllllllCrei;11 :wd fiscal development in Spain :1I1d its colonies.
w#Jildo the locallown council within the Spanish cmpire.
cllmpc:;jt/olo ;1 peas:wl or a rlll":lliaborer working the land.
caudill(1 a charism:ltic mililary Ieadcr or strongman who lakcs powcr :l.Ilti rules
by forcc with popular support.
dClIlifim literally a "learned a term Ihat rders to a circle oftechnocmlic
advisers 10 Mexican president Porfirio Di.w.. who adhered to thc philosophy of
positivism as a means of promoting the modernization of the country at the
start of thc twentieth ccntury.
COllcerlado" a center-Iefl coalition of Chilean political parties established in
1988 that defeated the diclatorship of Augusto Pinochet in :l plebiscite :lnd
governed the counll)' Ihereafter.
Conscl"Vativc Party a polilical current that emerged in the early nineteenlh
century throughout Lalin America Ihat favored a strong, cClltm1izcd slate
and support for the Catholic Church, often in confrontation with the Liberal
ParI}'.
4JR
(01lI
r
;IIIIe;Oll fll! ;'lflij{emr... ,I he:ld 1;IX pI.HTt.1 IIIl Indt,lll" (Ie...1 II ... 1.1\ on
c\'Cr)'one r('gardles" (If income).
cm'rcj{itlor :l magistr:lle or judv,f' appointed hy Ihc .... h <"IOWII.
Cades Portugucse I",r1i:lmenl.
eriol/o/creole :I person horn in Lalin J\Illf'ril ,l.
dependency theury a set nfsnci:ll SCi<:IKC thelliit's t.lllllcnding Ih.lt II.I.IOI,d ,111,1
:lgricullur:ll resources now rrOFll poor ,1111.1 111\lknkvclc,pt'll ,Illllllnf'<' 'I' Ih,'
gloh:d 10 the devf'lnped cnllnllies al th(' "( k.H'ltlg 1110' IOIIIIl'1
impo\'erishc(j :ltld Ihe bller rkhn.
ejidtl commull:lII:lnd held hr Mexion Iihiiolll .... ; till' kl111 1.11('1" 1".1 I" 1.111.\
<Iistrihuled to )leaS:lIlI" inthf' 1930" ill whll h nll,111.1I.,'II" .... g.lIIl(',I Ihe I"
lise hut nnl own 1.1Ilt! antl!'a....s it nn III 1111..'11" (hdtlll'll
enclave a territorial unit nUllpkd anf! ,nllllnl1cd hy Illrcigll,I .... \\11111111 ,111"11111
cOllllt!")'.
jfll'cla :l Hra7i1ian shlln. often a"socialcd wllh poor hill .... ule lllllllIlUlllli".... til lb"
de J:llleiro, where the lerm nriv.ill:"lICd ill Ihl' Iw('nltclh 'Ill lit)
jllclllhcor)' a rcvoluliollilr)' doclrine dl'velnl,('(l h)' C":he ('II{'V,lr,l, \,rh" pIC"lt'<"',l
Ih"t:l small group ofdcdiC:llcd gll('rrill.l IIghlt.'l"S I..l)uld holtlrllr.ll li'llltnl"\'
wilh Ihe support oflnL:l1 pt';lS<lnIS ,wd tl .... f' th.lt h;I .... (' .1" ,1 tlll'.IlI .... I,' "v('lllIt,,\\'.1
consf'r":ltive or rC:H.:lionary regime.
gflllcilO a cowhoy who work" on Ihe gr.l".... )' pl.lln.... III tllllpl,n. ,'t
soulhern Brazil.
j{,UltW dried dropping" flf "C;I hinl" IIMl .IUUIllIl1.llf't! 011 lhc I' ... 111\ ( 0.1.... 1 .HIlI
were u"cd as a rich nilr;tle rerlili7Cf.
guerrilla Inl1lt! .... or revolutionary Iighlcl""" Ill.lll\' Ill .... pired I,,' lilt.'
Cuhan or Chineq' rcvnlillioll<;. who .IIlel11pl If I 1.lke 1'"Wt.1 11I1"I'r1l .1
rclelllles" series nrsm.lll rndll;ll)' .lllinl\ .... (litn.llh. "lIllie \\'.11 .... '"
skirmishes).
IUlce"d"do the OWllf'r of;l l;1rgcr rarlll Ill' ('"I.Ile.
Iwc;c"dfl :l large farm or estale.
impol.t-suhstitulion ilHlustrializatioll (lSI) an ('( n:\I)BII< pnh<}' fill Ill\"
ide:l Ihat a COlllllr)' should t:lke aLlI"e lllca"\lr(''' In rethlt (' II" 11111'1,:11
dependency through the replacement nf illll'0rl" hy Ihf' 111\ ill "rfldUlllnn ..I
industrial products.
jllsl;c;"lisIIIO an icleolng)' pnllnotcd hy JII:l1l I'en;n in Ar)!f'llllll.l III Ill(' 1').1lh .\lltl
thai promoted "oci:ll justice Ihrough the rdi.lIh(, 1)11.1 "Irllng
st:lte :Inc! nationalist me;lsures ag,linsl loreigll comp.lllic.... ; ill phil
ll
...... pll1l.11
tcrms, il claimcd 10 estahlish nil appropri,Itc halan' I' 1",1\\'1'(,11 "l'iritll.IIi<,1Il .
lIlt
l
maleri:llislll, <Inti helween Cllllllllllnism and capil:lli."m.
r
. I I I 1 I lIul1.1 II
I"dilwla in Centr:ll Americ:l. :I person ('I III IXl't ,111'1l1'(';1I1. I (
background who j" :lcculillfalcd into
Liberal Party a politic;11 currenl lh:ll c1cvc\opcd ill Ihe flinch'clllil lelllllt)'
defendCfI a dccentralized, federated r,Ovcflllllcnt :lml Ihe clillllll.Ilillll III .... 1'1'11,11
1111
ngllb .Llld pnvilL'gl's lur till."' Catholic Churl.-"h; it was ulkn ill confrontation wilh
tlil' (:Olhl'rV,llivl' Pany.
lihl'ratioll thl'olugy .L sd o( idl'as dl'vdoped within the Catho/iL Church in the
I')(,lb that tll.lt llle Christian missioJl is to bring justice 10 thl'
pOllr ,Iud Ihruugh pulitie.d activislIL
Illllws till' v.lsl lnJpk,,1 grassland plaills of Colombia and Venezuda.
fVlaoiSlll a tll/n'nl wilhin fVlarxislll ull the ideas of Mao Zl'c1ong, thl'
(:Ililll':'l' p\)litiLal who bl'Iil'Vl'd Ihal revolutionary change could tnke
pl.Lll' t11rough Ill l, mass involvl'lllellt uf peasants ill rural guerrilla warfare.
1\I.lI"xblll ,I l'ulilil".11 philmophy lkvduped ill tile nineteenth century b)' the
(;enll.lll thinklT Karl tvlarx, who thaI the industrial proletariat was
til"" Iv"diug lurl'''' Lilpablv llf oVt'rthrowing capitalism. establishing
:'\,li.di:.lll, .wd Jall:r bllildillg l.'UllllllUllblll,
i\'lI':IU:OSUH a rq.:iollal trade agreelllent signed in 191)1 among Argenlin<l,
I'.lr.lguay, afld Urugu.IY to clilllin<ltl' and promole COllll1lerCe
atlll
IIIt'slizajt' hiolo14kal ilm! ",ultmal ur indigenous and European
...
I/it'slizo/" a pl... uf lllixl'li Indian and European background,
IIIlnlt't"lJiSIIIU d 1,lll'niJll'il.'t'lllh alld l'ad)' 1\Vl'lltk'th-ct'ntuf)' Spanish Latin American
Iltl'r;lI')' JtluVl'llll.'1l1 in L.ltin AtHt'rica tllal t'mphasized h::Jnnony, rhythm, and
p,t:.:.iIlJl III it-. :.tyl..-.
1\10llnll' 1)odrine it U,S, pulicy introduced ill 1823 assl,rting that an)' ;\(tt'lllpl by
.. LUIUl'l.lll gllVt'llllll<:1l1 tu cu!u[Jize or illlcrfert' ill Lalin America would he
":tllI:.idl.'/l.'d atl ;KI uf aggrl's:.iun the Unitt'd States.
I/lfj/lllll)/o .1 Ill."r:,ull ul tllixed I\lrican alld European heritage,
NAI"I'/\ a tq.;iu/l;lllr.Hk' agrt'ellll.'ni :.igned ill 11)'12 alnong Canada, tIll' United
<';t.lk:., :11 III t..,k:d":t1 de:.ignn!tu dilllillatl' tariffs and prumolt' CUl/llnerCe.
Iialufalbill .1 nilll't<;'l.'nth-lelltlJry lill'rary current daillling Ihal an individual's
lll:lLllll'l \\'.l:. tlekl'lllirll."lilly hernlity and the :.uciall:nvirOlllllellt,
1/(;.\:rillll1l' .1 likrar)' .11Id pulitil.-"al lllOvellh.:nt dl:vduped ill Iht.: 193Us hy a
gruup 01 IlltdleLlu:lls IrU/ll French culonies emphasizing the importance
of Alrililll culture and tradition in Ihe right against domination ilnd
l.UI,nliali:'lll,
lll'ulihl.'ralbnl a bil.' Iweill idll-Cel1t ury polic)' doctrine advocat ing free trade, frct'
JlI:trkds, alld rl.'ductiull uJ" the eCOllomic role of Ihe
lIoiristlIl' ill I idcolugiCitl CUrJ"l.'Jlt Ihat develuped in Haiti in the 1930s, emphasized
respect fur the country'l:i Afri(an cultural ruuts, and urged Haitian lllulalloes
Iv accl'J)t tht.:ir Africall heritage; Frans-ois Duvalier, who ruled Haiti frolll 1957
to 11)71, embraced tile philosophy,
oilm}c :l teXlile factory.
JJfjltlpas the fertile South Anlericall lowlands l'llcornpassing parts of Argcntina,
Url/gu.l)', alld suulhl'l"lI Brazil.
pllrdo a pl'rSOll or mixed African, Indian, alld Eurupean Il.Tllb uSl.'d
mainly in Brazil, and Venezuela,
p{,tron a boss,
pellinsular a person burn in Spain or Portugal.
peon a Spanish ieI'm lor a poor rural bborcr
pink tide a krill referring 10 the wave of sucialisl and left wing guvenlllll.'nb th,H
came to power in Latin America althe l'nd Oflhl'l\wlltietll century and inthl.'
first decade uf the twenty-Ilrst century,
positivism a philosophy developed in tht, mid-nineteenth Cl'ntul"}' by Frelll h
sociologist Auguste COlli\\;' that outlined the hislory ofhlllllall t1evdopllh':111 ill
three stages, culminating in a period in which superstition
were replaced by and tcchnolog)'; its 01\ rl.';I:.Oll, orde\", ,\lId
progrt'ss was '.ldopteJ by Latin a gukh.: to Ill ..... dl'wluplll""llt ,lIld
prosperity of their countries.
rOlllantidsm an artistic, Jikral")/ alld illtdlectLlal llllTl'lll ill tht' Ilindet.:llth
century that stressed t'lIlutiull ;I:. a sourCe uf lht' al"slhdic and
placed value in rural and folk tr:lditiollS as t'mbodylng aUlht:lltic qualitics and

re;llisJll all artistic ;lnd Iill'r;lry IHUV<:/lIenl of lht: mid alld !ail' llilletl't.:lllh
ccntury in which pellple were depicted the)' .lpl'l',lI"l.'l1 ill l'veryday Jill'
withoUl t'lllbdlishml'lIt or interprdatillll.
Rousl.'vdt Ctlrollal'y a IYO'I alllcndlllelit til till' MOllrt)l' 1)\I("lnlll.' hy l'rl'sidl'llt
Theodore Ruosevelt the righl 01 lhe Ullitnl Stall'S to inlervenl' in
Celliral AllIl:'rka iliid the Caribbl.'illl to l'COllOlllIC or puliti!..a! affairs.
sharec!'opping a sySll'1II of agriculturt' ur <lgrkllllllr,lI production in which a
landuwncr allows a It:nant tn t1:'l' a IMr"'-l'l of land in n:tllfll fl.)\" a :.hare lit" the
crop.
sudalislll a puliticil and el.'1I1101Ilil.-" idl'olog)' lhal Iht: should
own and (olllroltll(, 1110:.1 import.lIlt ()f tIlt' and rl:distributl'
wt:alth t:quitahly throughout suddy.
Trotskyism a politiCil1 current within Marxbnl supporting LeOIl a
l{ussiiln revolutionary who Joseph Stalin; Trobkyi:.t:. l.l'iticizec! tht'
hurl:aucralic and authoritarian nature or th",' Sovit't Union and bdil:ved Iklt
socioeconumic conditiuns in L.atin Alneric.1 m;lll..- ;l socialist rt.:vtlll/tion
inevitable.
vanguardisl1l a literary. artistic. and illtellcctual mU\'<:lllellt in tilt.: earl)' Iwcntieth
century that promoted CUlling-edge <Jnd innovative :.Iyles and idt.:ils.
vkeroyalty a subdivision of the Spanish l'lllpirt' in colonial Latin Alllt'rka
headed by a representatiVt' of till:' CrowlI, There were originally two
viceroyalties-New Spain, encumpassing tht' Caribbean, Mexico, and
Central America; and Peru, including Panama and Spanish South America.
In thl:' eighteenth century, the Viceroyalt), uf Peru was divided into tht"t'e parts:
New Granadi\ (Venezuela, Columbia, Panama, i\lld parts uf Ecuador); thl.'
Vkcroyalt y or La Plata (Argentina, Urugu<l)', I'aragu:ly. alld pnrts or Bolivia);
:lnd rhe Viccroyally or Peril (Chile. Peru. :lT1d parts or Ecuador ;and Bolivia).
1.11 Violctlda literally. "The VioJcnce." an era or political and civil strire in
<:olombia hctwecn the Conservativc nlld I.ibernl parties hcginning ill
:lnd lasling morc th<lll a decnde.
consensus n term coined in 1989 to describe the ncoliberal palicic..
prescrihed for I.atin Amcricn b}' policYlllakers and international financial
agencie<; in W:lshington, D.C. that included reliance on the rree Ill:lrket. a
diminished role or the statc in the economy, :wd Ihe privatiz.,tion or
Lomp:lnics under stale control nnd ownership.
)'(Ul(lco"aje shnrecropping hy indigenous people who han been sepnrnted rrom
their anccstrallnnds nnd arc working as rural bborers.
...........
Guide to Website
W
e invite all readers to eXI'I<'rc the wl'h'lle 1111 AlII/lew 1,1/'" A'"n/,Il.lI
\,'ww.oul'.com/us/skidmore. \\le regolfd It .1'.111 1I1tCgl.d p.lIl "I the 1"".\
and nol as a cosmetic"supplemenl" thnll.;lIl he ',lfel)' IJ:llnr,',j It \\dll ... 1I1'tl.llf'ol "1\
:l regular basis, so contenls will dl,mgt'.
For gelleral readers :lIld studcllts, the w('h.. lle llllll.llIl'"
"timclinc or key cvcllb,
Anrdyscs or major IlCW" dL'\'<'!"l'llH'IlI .. ,
"list or heads of sl:lle fnr CUllll! riel' nlvt.'ITd ill th(' h"nk.
On:l ch:ll'tcr-b),-ch:lplCr h:lsb, thc wehslte
Questions ror revicw. and
Suggestions ror rurther rcading and r""can h.
For the region as a whole. lhe wehsite :l1Sfl
A compendium of sotln.:cs lor d.l!.l.
"guide to inlerne! rC,"Ollf(es. :lilt!
"selection of prilll:lry doculllents,
In :lddition, we have created n speci:ll seL'lioll flU' ,flIlr<;(' 10.. ,1"1",.1,"... I'lllltl,',!
Modern L'ltin America.- (/\cccss tn this diret.l0l')' will <;1'('\ l.tI
password lhat can be easily obtainctllhrollgh the wch<;ire Ibcll.) Thi .. 1I11"t'IIIIr\
contains
An essay on pedagogical challcng<-'s in tC:lt'hlllg I..ltin AIlH'ril.l,
Sample course syllnbi, :llld
A guide to instructional vitleos :lnd films.
I II I,lllill lu WI 11'>1 II
Ih WI.: l ..:n.'>\' th.: website t"rUlll IlllU: Itl tillll", WI: welcome sllgg... for
.I1.1..Iill\)lI,> ,Hid 1'1...--.1:'>1.'" dkk Oil 111l: icon Ihat on
111\: Jlllllll' pagv. Ullr 1II,Inks in adv'lIh.:l:!
'1'.1'.. 5.
P.H.S.
I.N.G.
Index
Ab".lia Mendez, l'I'ligud, 203, 4)U
A/Illju, 1.lls lIe (A,wela). 417
AUeflura, 400
Accion Dl/Il.l..-dti<"a (AU; Velll'luda). 2)0, 23 I,
232, lJ3, 234, 2.'15, 237, 24U
Acclon NlIcion.d Pupul," (ANAPO; Cololllui.J),
210
j\cciun Populllr (I'eru), 17U
ACt.'vcdu Vila, Alliual Salvador, 120
Alllt'rt/tl. 25.1, 25'1, 255
AD. St.'c Accion Ikl1locratl"J
Ad,lIlls, John (JUIlICy, 1)(,
A..r..)lill ... 1.73
Afedados, IMH
:\fghall1:ot311, 11'\, 23'.J
"fro Lalln culture, 'II') -120. 13<1-'135
Agr.llian r.form: in I{oll\'ia. 17'1; in Hrll'l;ll,
347. 111 ChilO', 29l, 2'.JJ, 291; 1ll
Colombill, 20'1, 2U'); 111 Cub,l, 133, 3RM; 11\
l)Oll11l11Gl1l Ikpuhlh:. 112: III EcuadOI', 1/'17:
ill Gualcl11ala, 10'1-110; in M.xiLo, 56, 57,
5'1,62. b'l, 6K; ill NIC.lIoJgU:l, 102. 388; ill
Peru, 169; ill V,,newl.'ia, 233. SI:'I' IIlst! L:lIld

Agr.Jriilll Itdorlll Law (Cuba). 133
Agriculture: 11\ Argentllla, 262, 2M, 265; in Chi],,>,
280-281; in Cub", 145: in ""kxiu), 53, 63, 68; 11\
Vene'l;uela, 221, 22K. Sec Agrarian rdorll1;
Land
t\SlIIl'j y I,l scrpie",e, EI (Gulmjn), '117
Aguirre Cel'd:J, I'nlro, 2K9
AIDS, 433
ALAUI. See Lalill Al1ll'rkall [nh:gralivn
Association
Alalllo, baltle of, 11)
ALIJA. SCt! Alterl\aliva BolivOlrlana para

Juan l5illisl.J,
Alb.nu, Joao, 325
Alclunin, Geraldo. 347
AlclIl, Leandro, 254
A'cmall, l.u<,.Js, 5U
Alclllan, Mlgllel, 02-63
:'IClllall La(,lyo, Anlol{I'I, 10\
AIl'nc.lr, Jose dc, 407
Arturo, 2'11
2'11-21)2, 2'14, 29b
Alf,l1"f), Uoy, IlJ'>
AlfOllsin, Ralll, 271 2'11.,273, 31M
Aliall,:l 1.lberl,ldula N.lIlllll.ll (AI.N; BraJ;ll).
32b
Aliam.,1 I.lbn.t1 (Nical,'gu,l), lUI. 101
:'IIJllza l'opul,lf Ik\,ulul.lOI1.1l1.l AllICIK,III,1
(APltA; PCIU), 165, 166, 167. 17n, 171, 171.
AlIeu..!c, h.Jbd, '132 '11.\
i'llclldc, SalvoJdul, 2'JI, l'J2, 2'H.
2'1"-301, 3U3, 3(11, 391\ j',J'J, Il?; ,,,nllLd:o wllh
US., 21)5-2'.Jb, 1.'J7.l'JlJ; dnll"n vI, 2')'1-1')'>.
slli{ Ide vf, JUO
AlIl.Jl1c. for 16K, IM7, 20". 7. B. 7.'n.l'J.1.
"8
AllialH:c fm \'\'Olk. ;In,1 Edm.I!lull
(Arg"nlill:J),275 27t.>
AlmaJ;,ill, Juan Andrcu, h..!
Al.N. S,'c AliJI\(;l Llbcl'\aduloJ N,lUUIl.11
AhO'rliallva I5vllv:JfI,ll1a para
VCllczuda), 23'.J. 373
Alvares C.lblal, Pedro. 23
Marcelo T . ..I,'. 255
AlIladu, Gilberto, 321
Amado, Jorge. '12<)
Amar,oJ, Talsi!,l ,10. "lib
Anlolusu, Akcu, 323
AnaCOIl,b C{IPPcl', 2M'!, l.'.J3
ANAPO. Sl'<' ACt.:IOIl N,lclul1,11
jJopul.lr
AnardlisllI, 58, 252, 323, 324, 41'1
57, 21St>, 21S7. 323, 321
Andean l':u:l. j73
Cupper. 282
Andes MOlllllilim, 150. 191,21').
S,'I' tdsu CClItril1 AIHks r''gIon
445
'1'16 INDI'X
Alulrada t Sllva,,\nIOI1I()Carins. ItlM
Al1Ilrarb c Sih-:l. lose flnuir.loo.
Anllr:lrlc. dc, 11 'i -11(,
Andr:ltlc, Osw:llfl dc, 'I I"
Andres Pi'rc7, Carlm :AI'). 1 1.17
Angclo7., tdll:lrdo, 271
1,14, l'I'i
Alltc5 que 411
1ll0\'elT1enl, 'II "0. '1).7
A",lIropoP/wRY (AIIl;lral). ,110
Anli ncdeninlllsi PMI}' ,,), 5-1. "7
AI'I{A. Sre ,\1I;m1;\ 1'01'111:11 Itt'\'"I,,! Ulll;lri.l
AlllcriCilll:l
Aplill'Jth 11I1I\'('lI1cnl (""1 Il), 7 III 71 L n I.
Th"mas. IR
Ar:llll:lp). C:lrl...". 1'i';"
Ar3ll1burll, Pedro, 26J. 1(,(,
.\r"na. J..lll' C. IS'I
Aranlla. dc, 117. 1"
Ar:lu'o. Arllllo, 101
AI Rh, 1<)).
Alhell7 IllH 10'1, t 1(1 111. r II,
17R.3M.4H
Archil('ll'"e. 40'1, 4]1 IU,
ARE 1\ (IIr:I11I), U8
ARENA (FI S"h-"dor). lor. lOR
Arc"a rmlta /",111" (lI('1al), ,110 411
A R('1I1,,1\lo, ,n1
Arevalo IkIlI1CJO. lose, 10M. III
2'1<1 277: hed, 1/l, 214, )5'i, }M, 26'i.
266, 21l5. 1"4,157,1%; ltoli\,;a "m!. 17l). Brillsh
,.... 1R; hlll(''''In'''tla'l\hnn1.111ani''lll.
7.(,5-267, JR4, 1R<;. 198. Civil war .247;
c... mpar.'lli\'e :ulaly",,,, 1%-19R, nr Ihe
Desert, 2<17, 250; cotl!'lilllllf'lns. 247, 260;
cf'llltenlporary <;cellf'. 271 277; co oplalive
delllocr.1C)',J79: COrntpll... n In y.{)\ernmenI.17i.
276; cuhllre, 415. '12:7; Dccl;lrall('ltl or EcononliL
Inrlel'cn,knce. 260; democmLy, 2:(13,
:\90,391; de\dopmenl,ll reformism railure,
263-265: Illrly W:lIS, 2f>R, 274, 4]'i; "di.s.1ppcar('(1'
f'lf, 26R-2(,9, 271-7.72, lR', ,:llll. ('Cf'lllumiL
conditions 10. 241l 2'>2,
259-2f){l. 2"2, 261. 26'>, 267. 270. 271. 272-274,
7.76-277; economic liher.1ll!'m, 247-241'1, 354,
355. )5(" 157: film ,12:1, 4.15;
debl, 2(,0, 2M. 271, 272, 276; culture, 433,
r,t1crri11:l lllovemenlS, 267, 26R, 269-270, 365;
immigration ltl. 248, 256, 316-317. 3'>6;
in,llIslri:llintlon, 361, 362;
independence movemenl. 17,146, lndi:ln
247: map. l45; ncolilxralism, 270, 273, 274, 27'>.
372.373; oligarchic rule. 377-17&, 380;
Parngu:l)'an W:tr. 2,17, 311, 312: pipdine 10, ISR;
political 392: political
lil1er.'llism, 217-218; pOpUri<lll, 3RI; Social
('...onlra(I, 7.67, 2Ml: Sp:lnish rule, 24-1-2,16;
SpOilS, 1ZZ: slrogglc.< fi'r 246-24R;
thealer, '112; \'ilal 2'12; women in..'91
t..laria, 419, 423
Ari:l(, Rkardo, 9R
Arll'f (Ro(lo), 413
Arislide, Jean-Ikltr:md, Ilfl-117
Arlls, Crordinal. 3'11
Arosclllrlla Monro)', Carlo" JLllio. IH7
Arpillerrl$, 301. 391
Arqllimimo. Hill)', 434-'1 \5
Arl, 408, 'lIf)-419

"'lach.1lo .tC', BJ
""UA"d Angt'!, '171
AI"I1I1;'111':1. 17
Illllliell';II<, 23,87, 221
\Ic,,!lell, ,19
III Bra71!. J27 UK H9, 1 J7;
in rhlle, _102 10,1;
Irpc" of. 177; 111 Venezuela. 219 .vt' ,d....
HIit('aul.r,,'ic anlhont:lnan.slll
All'''' X(I/pt". In
An'l1ant'da, 247
A \'/'.' $i/t /tufn (M:1Il0 (Ie TUluer). "It
AVlb Mnlllll'l. (,1 fll
Ih'17. of 2l
A\'fil,l'rnsl'<"r. liS
ApCltehn. banlt> "f,14, I" 1
Ayh,in, !'alrkio, 303 101
A)'111ar.\ 174
A)'nra, IR5 IS6
A,',mltll/tw/tlo.<. S7
1,1, 1<;. 16, t7
,\1nda. ",1:.ri:lllo.'117
A:;111 (lJario), 412
Hachdt'l. Michelle, 117, 10... )92
[IaN, Joan, 427
Haker, l:lmes A. 111. )(i')
Il:lker, I.orenzo, 95
Ilalagllcr, Joaquin, Ill-Ill
Halbin, nic;'Inlo, 263, 2M, 26<;, 267
flnlmaced:l, 2R5-280
Balta, lose, 103
Han:lna repuhliC'<, 96
Bannn:ls, '}4. 95-96, IMI-If.I, 186,
198-1'J9.200,20J,356
Il:mco de Crroi'o Ejidal. 59
flallco dd Sur, 239
R(lIul";rrmlrs, 2;;
fl:l117er. Hugo, 179-180, 181
flarbados,91
n"rhos", Rui, 322
[larhosa Gomt''', loaquim, 346
Rarco, Virgilio, 211
Rarrack" revolts, 323, 326-327
Barreda, Gabino, 410
Ilarrem Tyszka, Alberlo. 237
Harricnlos, Rene, 179
Bnsehall,422-423
na<e!, Peace of, IlR
nll/e)'rs. 126
n..,n"la, F\llgencio,128_13,>,IJ6,I1R,3R7,400,43S
Rar or I'IW" 137. 13R
Bechlcl COlpnr:ltlOn, IRI
Ileer, 38, 244, 255, 264, 265. 2(,(,. 2R". .1;;1.
.157, WI'
Ikl:ltllldeTerry, Fern"ndn, 1(,7. I('R. 17fl 171
IJehu,Il7
Bello, Andres. 40S
Iklzll, bnlld 17'1
Bellil\'irlc". Oscar R.. 166-1f.7
BenetliCl XVI. Pope. 217, J(,R
llernhMdl. Sarah, 101)
1It'5(l ill'lll IIIltjn /IImlll. ff (('til!:). _In" III
Belancollrl.lngrld,217
I1rlalll.ourt. nOllllll,), 226, 21}.
Iklancur. Ikhsann, 211
Bignnne. Rc)'n:lldn, 271
Big Sitek dlplom:lcy, 'I
Guillermo. If.';
Rlack 8..
!Uruk Orpllt'll$ (film). 41f.
IlIrl, " \\'(11111111 (Amaral). 41f,
mallL,t<.312
W(lw.< Arms. 4 \1
/l/"t' n"nl.. ('II A'.cr"lI/til. 1."l)
410 411
Ro.c0la:;o, 2OC 211
(jerer, FllIltp,e, 104
1\01ero.421
1I0Ii\'"r, $lIl1on. 12. n, If., 37.
1'>1 1"3,IM,Il)11,210,J21 27.2.'10'>,
hackArollnd, 31; c"IIl!,;'Ire" WIlli. 1. 17.
242-241,1t'ller frNIl lal11;,i(", VI; lIlec'llIIJ:
wilh s',n 34.1;;2
Il{Ill\'artan".I''''-195
lIuli\'m, 1'i0. lSI, 17.1-1111; I\r;17.I1 .md. I<>A. 1';9.
17'>,179. 181-IR2, 347: Ch:lCO \\I",. 17t,. In.
Charanla 176; ... 177, I I'll.
UU; conlcmpo':ll')' IflO 1111; ,hllg
Irnrficking, IRO-l I'll, 211-211: ('(flnom"
conditions ;'Ind poliCies, 157-1 'i9, 1110: J:IIl'1 nll;l
IIl'Welllenls, 3(,5; inclepcl1llellCe, 173 17'1;
nalllr,,1 ga<:, 12, 1"8-1;;9, Ifl2;
172; new ((Iursc ror, 181-1 R\; Il(llilio.::al
392; RC\oll11101l. I';M. It.l.
177-179: socialtr:tn$foflll:ltlon<. If.I-I(.l,
Venf"ltIcia and, 1112,239,37.1: War o'lhe
Pacific. 164. 175.2115
nolsa Farnili;'l (Hr.'lzi1), 346
Rom eriol/ln. () (Caminha). 41 I
Bonaparte, loseph, 29-30
Bnnaparle, N;'Ip<rlcon, 29-10, 31, 193. "ho
Napoleonic Wars
nonillas, Ignacio, 5R
Rosch, Juan. 112
Rossa nova, 426
Roslon Fruit Company, 9S
Oourbon dynasly (Spain), 87, R9; insl:llled on
Ihrnne, 22; ...f, 27, 211-29, 122,77.1
Ilmrrros, (,2
UradCII, Spruille, 25')
Indn. 11-
It, ... kn (.,,1'1'.... , 4 ,'Il'
Ilrad)'. Nicholas, Ih"
111l1,,\, <of (l'"rlll!:.ll). 1'1. t', . I I
Ilrmli/llrt",,,,nlll. llil. '12(1
Hra<iha, 3.1\. ,12(,
n':I\III, Ilell'I"I1, 211(,
Ilralll. f,2. 3Of, 14M: Af," 11I"/IIIan
LlIhllle.'II" 12n.IH.:1I.llIle'IllI<".'I/I 1'/,.
Arg('nli!1ol :l1l,I, 21(,; 10,11101' Irli..II". I) I.
1,>(. 127; 1\..11\"" awl. 17.... 1:'1.
lRI lRl, ."llh..
1"1, 'R'. '1011., 111'"11'" "",.". 1\0., "II, ' .. 'f,. I;;.
10.\12 "III. \](,.11"1 IIH.Il'I. 1.'1. \11.1111.
1'.l.IOlnl';\r.,II\"(' :111.111'''\. \,"1 Ill/I.
lln,.h'h,.n
\117.,1011 \41'1, 'Ill. \11. \.'1. \.';, tIll. IN
(<lnl"nll''',,11\ \,('ne. 111 . " "1'1.,r".
,lrll1...n.IC\. 1-",''1'1'''1:111\'11. \11 Illi
('" rlll'11011 III I I I. \ II. 11-
t1f'lllocr.\, r, Ilf'. I r; \ l)t. 1 III 11 I. \'111. \'11
I ,,,r.h 0" 111':\r"m. ;> .... Jot I """"'1"" , ..,,,III,,'"
.'nol I'"h, Il'\. HI. II', PI. 1'1. 1."1. III II',.
110 \41. 1" \ I I. II', \ 1/, ,', ""'11""
1:'1. I n. I ltl. \" I. V,f. \"-.
.. nllJ!'.11i,ltllt"'II. \.\'1,,1,,111.,, "'I'"I'. II' I"
I </mln ",,,,.... 1;-;- \ "'. \ Ill. \ \' \'1'1. f,11II
mdll\lr\'.llll,I\'. ln\rllq,,,I.I,, 1)1 \'1
l"llIJ.:II,!t"hl. I.lJ. tlfl, III.
1l1\"('''1tl1i'lll. \1-. ,1111",.. Ill. f'" ...11.1
nll,q'lHenrs, 1111. 1,'1. 11'1 1111.1/.',
1I1ll1lIgl.III(l1l roo \I 1. \1(, \1-. V,I L' ""I'.. lr
'IIOIII,ln. I".'II"" 1f.1. 1/,'.
Illd,I..nd.... II' c. \'. 1M. lor,. Illoll', 10'
II' Ilf. 111"11.'" 1,\. 10, llf \ I '
nlLl'I(.'117;"e"Id...... \1'. 1,-,'. l-l.llIlll, II
\>'e,II><'Il", 111. ohr:;'If< IH\ lull'. l"";"Jol.
\Va',ll7, III. II]. 114.1"1'<"11Il'I".I'.K
l'''I",I.lt frnnl In'lVl'ln,."I. 1.'/, 1\1
'lr,. 1", tllll.I'nllllgIlC.... lllk.)1 'f. UIt,
4111 'Inl.I"'''lr'V!\IlI. 11'1. I Ilf. Ikn,ll,r,,,,, "I
I'}\O. 12'1. I}. 1}f.; 1"I1I.I'llh 111(, \(\H.
IlIhh('I". II'. 'Ir. l"1 ...." ..11.1 1{'I'ltI.ll'
1.'0 11(;. '''\ I....... I II,. ".". I)). 'II.
7r.,. 111<,. lin. 11-. rhr.II", t Jl. \'.11"'1/.\1",,1 'Iltl
\"'lle711r1. "11.1. l':' 1. 1t,.",I. \ 11,.1 ..1.11 ,q" ... I 'II
"""111('11 Ill. I'll
I\Ia7111an Ilellul( ",11\ I 1/11. I \S
Hr:l711lan Iknl'''- ,.111\ M"\'Illf'nl 1'.ulV (1'",1 1'111
1'11, .14),
FI'd"I,ltll'Il ..1 l"IllIIlI'\<' \ '"
lh"/ihall 1'01',,1.11 "'111"". ''''
Hra7iltan M1t" 1.11 1)('!lIn. f,lIl( I'a, I, f 1 ...1'1\1. 11 \
Hra:rilwonrt. ::!l
Ilnlalll; AIg('nlma .lml. llot. JI!'l, 1;11, .....11.
77lJ-l71.1'.); Illalll alld. \". It. \0') 110. \l'
11 '._3 If. Ufl. \.allhll(':on (t.I"...,,\. 101',. "1.
91; CllIk antl,2ftl. 7M7; I"alkbn,r Isl.ulI'"
inva!'i'III,27(\ }71, lo""s I" 'nll"(,1 ",I.,tIlt ...
\11; .,"d. .md. If, \, "1'IIII,h
WIlli. II, 72.10, ll. \'ell .... " ... I.,
ItlV,lQnn. ))". \Vml,1 \V." 11.111.1. )',101
IIX INI!!\
(,U'dU. X",,':': I
I hm,llll.I'. :i'" Xi'
\\,,"1 11Il11n, lilt
1111/.,1,., I HI,
11",.11.1111, AIl.l.,I.I. IX'). I'/IJ
lIuI'I.l\lulUI.I. 1.111 "pll', 111
IIltn. .I \ lui" "1.1
Ilulun, /\1.11.111'1. !XII
nUI Il. V. ,.II, I'I"I'I'I"" '11
IIII,.-.lll., IlI.l\llll111II.l/I.l11bll.,
: ... .:" \ Ix I IKt" \'J:i. 1')'1, IUtI
1;",1..11,,101.0. fll,,, I.. A.':!
1\",,"......,g. II \\'. 'N. 1110. \7U 171
11..,1" (".".,:,. \\' I. \:1. I'JJ; '\lb"'Ullll,' I'0ILt y.
.: 'I. 11,,11\1., ,,,,h, )', US1. t "lum!>l.I pulh.y. 216.
.!I '.t llr..'I'"h.. \.I.Hi
1'111 11.1l111'"h,) I li./\kl.llUpoh.}.
'M 'J. XI. \'\"11,'/11..1.11',,11,)'.
1 IX 1 N .!IU. l-Il
1l..,I .... ,.,uh \ 1<lh'''. J...... I"". Ib7
..1','11 ,. Ilh'''. "X
.II,dl",k\ ... 111'"'''''' (\I.- ....I.". IIU
1"1'11.1,,,. .'X. 111
\ .11"'1 11l1.lllh'. I Ill!
t ...... ,. IS, X7. I'.') luu, Iii .... IiiI>. .!.11, 1.!.1. !!Ii
I .11111'1- ,I 11/1 tl/,'w ,III 1"'.1'0 ",tI,d l( ..::..lIf<'). ,no
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I ,.I.I,IUII. J dll"" I\U XI
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, .,1.1",,,.. .1,,1., II., .. ". J IK
I ,,1.1"1<11, ....,,1. .\IJlL.u"loJ. lUX
\ ,.II .. 'UII. ",ll .. 1 ,1')
1.11. ,I,tlf; ,.lIld, 11',
.,I,hum", ilil
1.,11.". l'hlloll'" I 11.1), "').1,0
\ ,11111. ... 'lll (1"'1<1). III
I "III,/n" If, II/lilli' (V.,J'h/lll'l . ), .lll
\ .1111mb", I\d"It... 11 I
I 17. I,J. III-I, 1',9, 11>1,210. .!.IJ.
.! 1'1. 11iI, HI!
I ,LlI'I""'" I I,', 10'1, 2.. 7
t '''''1''''. 1t"b'II". IIX
.iII"'), ,\1I"'1 t, 11">
(:,"1,,,1.,.71. Ir,. 117, I'IM. J/O ill
t .'''.LlI(., 1 .<)1111""')" ',-1
( "'''11I1! ,/u ["jim 1)1.. )).1lI7
I ,''" "1/1 111I"'1',1 <1111...1111. /'1.ll7
I ,lilt lUll ',ltIl """,, I!..
l ..u .. kl.ill.IIIi..;.I ... I.I .. 111
I .lIl1llh.lI')lIl, lJ, 1 I
I ,mIll (:.tI./ld (Neluda).
K...Im" (Alblle.I.. ,,), 419
t ',IIIW!> II.: I'ltil/ t' ")p"I,m'll) (1I,'riu)... 12
C"II<1:> 1II",b'15. 22'J
(.u.kll.ts. ell.Ill"............ 7J, 7b. n. 71t
( .lnl""I.I), 1..i/oiI U 00. o.!.. lu'), '1$1.-100
I ,lhl"II"Jo, Vldur I Ill};". IHO
I .. ld'.)u.I"III,II.d.. 11.-111111""'. \.I1-J"'I.J45.
1,1t,. j'17
1',11 illb".11I COllllllUlIllY (CAIHO),.,I). J72- H 3
C.lllhhc"ll ."Iallds, 3, tl2 tltl, CIlIUIlI.t1 rul ... 25.
112 M5, '.II; delllo<.r:.cy. 3<JO;
MM M'J,Il1 p, l\3; )ugar. 12, 10, M'I, MI:I. 91-')1;
UI.llt'll all.!. 71, 75. il2, XoI-I:It>, 89; \'I\al
::.t"IlSIl,,). 'Jl
C.lllbb...111 1'... 1rulellli I CUlI1p.lIl)'. 226
\ .!flb). M6. 1'J2
Lt\I(\( :0/\-1 .'Xe C.nbl'Call <....U.. lIl.Ullll)
C.lnnoll,l. I'ldw. i3M
LlIllIl' 1(Ik;wlt.ln). 3Ju
{... q.lIOJ. '"rg..., 7 J
(;,111,11I".1, \' ..\1)\1.1110. '>7 5M
{.lller... J"sc.- It.ll.ld. 90, lUIS
C.I'-' ..I. !lnllnr Hollvl.l poll.. y. 17'J. Hr.lll! pOlK}'.
J"I; C1HJ... polK)'. 30J; 11 !,uli,,)', lOb,
11.11111.1"11'1'.110. Nicar.lguol polky. IU2, 103;
1'.I11.. lIIoi CillI.l1 poltq, V'lIezudoi puhq. ,:1:3J
("htl ,I., 'lJlltrflt,IClcm.
Lil>'l ,1.. /u) 1'5/11I1111>. til (,\II.. nile), 4J i
( .IJoIoiliu. C.lrlU). ll"
(,')ldl",uus. l(u".Inu. '12J-"l'l
(.I)ldlo UI.lIlCO. IIUIIlUcllo, 317.
1JM JJ'J, J4\1
(,,::.llll 1(.Il11ulI. 10J
t ',1)1111 It.Hllon. 257 25M
C..)IIIl" ,\ Iill..), Carlu", 110
Ca)lru, Ctl'liallo. 224 -225. 226, 243
C.. l'IJd, ('>'1. 13u- l'I'l. 109. I ISl, 3R7, '100, "26.
41,1. ,,",lId.: "Oll1P""'.! ..... Ith. 2'J7.1'JM, .111.1.1..::.
UII ,11))I.I"lIb, l'lJ, h"'lkgluuHd,
I 10 I J I. Ikl.III(Oun .Ind, 2J3; t Ii.i\'o .,nd,
.'.\'J. (Jille \'I"U 01.
1''); (]t\ pJuI. UI:I; hoilldo\','r ul
!,uwcr.14b-I'IK;
.hUlllg IkvuJullon, 13l-IJ'>
.. )IItl.I(:H,j, IJI, 1116. 1'11:1, 14')
C'::.llt) t\lvl'). AI11illliu d.... 4U7-IOH
L.llh"ll, eli,,!".!., 1:1. J5l .155, \'15; .1II(lo:!en.. ,.h)lll,
1H: ill t\ 1'1-\"111 111:1. 26:l; in Uu!illl.,. 174: III BI.llIJ,
lJo; 111 CCliln.J Allll'm... 'JU; ill Chil.. ,
11:ltl. lM'I. /.85; 111 CololI,bi,1, 19,1.
1'1';, 1'1(,.lUI: III Cub,l, 116, 1,16;
III .. ,lul, IHI. 1M';, 11:1'1; 1II 1;1 S,III',..I"r.
IUS IUb; Itba"liurllhcology and. 365 36M, III
lVl<x"o. 32. J ... 47-4R, 50-51. 52, 59:
III 1''''1'11, ili; III Sp:lIHsh c"lol1ll').
1M PI. III Velll'zud.l.123
( ,lIul'I.'. Ilh, 101, 1U5
C"lIdllhn. J'). UH. 37H, 4U6; 1II Arg""lllla, 1.16,
2'17,2<;6. III M,'XI..U, 47. 1'1, 52, '>4, lU
Vell<.'":l:lId.l, 222 123, !20. 2!7
C"v.lllu. lJullllll};". 273. 276. 277
C",drd), Raoul, 116
C.. ntrJI Amt:rl .... , ), ')4 96; banana::.. 'J.l, 95-'16;
'),1-')5, 9b; Conlado,a 1Il1l .IIIV... 71,
dl'I1lO\. ... cy, 3')(); 1I1d<1""nJ"'IKc, I:I'J-'JO; map, IB;
J72; Spamsb lule. tl6-87; Unil<:d
I'loVull.n 01, 35; UIIIII.-d Slall'S and, 71. 75. H!; vllal
'Jl. )p.:cirk coulltno:s
j
!
l
I
Cenlr,ll COIlInlOn /\Iark<'l. 372
Cenll,,1 Amll') reg'oll, 150-1'.10; mal', 151; r.lu.lloilld
elhllll': ISO-lSI; soci.u tran)iOfllloitlulI),
161-163; vllal )tatlSllCs. 162. S.'c ulw HoItYI.I;
&'1I.ldOI; I'...ru
C"'"trall"ldhg"'"cc "I;I'IIC)' (CIA): Chik and.
296; Cuba anJ. 136, 137. 138; Gual"'llIal,1
.Ind. 110 III; NlC.tlagu.I.lI1J. IU2
C... nlr.lIt)J1l, 195, 1%, 22J. JrnI, 371:1
(".rltmIS/IHII."" (Iilm). "J5
l.q)ed.l Ullw, rl'lII<llld... 212
C.. rro 1'.1::'''0. 169
'\11111\ '120
C(;T xc ConflJeral.lOII 1;..II.... r.. J dl'! Tr.. lJoi/u
Ch.lcabuco. batt I.... of. 3'\
(hadl'a, 422
Cha<-o \\I.lr, 17b, 177
Chamunu, VlOleloi BallJos J ..... IOJ, J'J2
Chal'b III (klllg of Spain), 27. 28-29. 121
CIt.I"e /\lanhattan lS.tnk, 169
ChaWl. Culos. 417
Chjv"I.,llugo. 111:1, 173. 11:12.23-1,
236 243.276.347, 3')); uf, 23M;
.I)l>C))ln.... llt of
241 243; hJ.. kgruund alld plulvwlllt)' uf,
2.\0-237; "onlllClS wllh US. 231:1<!40, lH.
wNku...)s uf 0ppuSlllUlI. 2-10
Chay.. nt.t u!'"sm!;, 176
Clt,b,i:" Eddlt.', 12'1
(llIl1d1.1S.191*1.,,3
Cillcagv bol'::', 3gb, J'1'J
CllJdlll1l... s.15
Lillie, 271:1-305; UulJyia alld, 174, 175; Bnllsh
loans to, 31:1: l)tlrl'aucr:tllCaulhonlan.llll)lll.
31:1'1.385,3'/8; CllIIl'arllzatlun polic)'. 293. 2'17;
<:Ivil w.U, 2M'I. 21SS; cOmparallve allal)'sl).
a) CUUSl'rY.lllv., It.'publu;:, 28\1,:
,UllSIIIUlioll", 28U, 28-1-21:15. 302. 303. 305:
s.. 30'\-)U5; "u'upl:1tll'C
UelllUCI.lCY, 37'1, 31:10; CUp)) ... r, 12,281. 2H2, 21:13.
292,2'J'\ i94, 296,297. 2<JI:I, 2')9, 30".351;
ullUr., 427; d"'ll1uc,acy, 21111, 2'J6-30 I. Jil'l,
3U5, 3'J0. 391; ",h"appe;lfallces Ill. 31:15;
c"u,'ullli" ,ol,<htlOll) .Iud 2I:1u-2M.I,
21:15, 28M, 2119, 2')1, 2'J2. 297-29M, 302-30J, )0-1,
el.ulHJlllk lib... ralbm, 35... 356; toreigll ,11'1.11.
J04; gu... rnlla moycrn... nts, 303; import.
)ubSlllulion industriallzalion, 361. 362;
ill. 15: llIdepelldencl', 33. 2MO; illVlslble
blockaJ... 296, 298; as Libt:rall(l'public,
map, 279; IIcoliberalislll, 372; nitraleS, 38, 21:11,
282.285, 286. oligarchic rule. 377-3715;
PerUYlan boundary 165; Popular
Front, 289-290; positivism. 410; Rl'volution III
Liberl)', 293, 2<J4; socialism. 2Ha, 2')5. 2%-301.
364. as Soclahsi Republic, 288;
Spanish ruk 278-280; Vellezuda 311J. 233;
vll.t1 ::.laustlcs, 28'1: W:tr ofth", I'adfi,. 164, 165.
175.21:\1,285; wumcn Ill. 301, 391
c.:Jw/II!rd.1 17
Chllla. 76, 78, 239, )74
C1l1l1dlOlI,1 b,lrk, 174. 19H
1';0, 1'jI, IllJ
e1,mtl.t11 1}o:'IIOt-I.ltl( P,lll)' (I'IX:; t..lllle).!.'Jl, 2')1.
2')3, 2').1. 3U3, '01
l 1111)II.lII n..llH)<.r.lllc 1'.111)' (1'])( .1.1 Sall'ad"r).
105. 106
ChUll"".III',II.l, 282
Cllur.l1l1l, 12J
CIA,.x", CCIIII,II Intdilgelllt
t IWlle)' p""pk. KU
( "1,,,/... .I,' nl/I> (Iil,ll). 11..
LII''' ,/flO) de )vl.:,lml (t-.II':I.I r..1.lI'IueL), .1l'l 1 JU
CIO'II'!)",)). r,1. '10,161,"1U
<""lg;1I'), Luh.llJ (p"rV)J. III
l.tllcod.. /\1 ... )'u, 51
('lIIllIIll11tJl'IJ,IJtJ
CIylIll)' diu,. St" Cfllnll','/I< ",
( 1,Yd.ln,l, GrU\"I, l2,1
CIll!, Illlllll)'. 'Ilo
(JlllltJII. 11111. 76. lib. !7S;
CUIUlilbl.l pOlll). 215.116; Cub.l pul,,)',
IJ,) 1'10, NAFI A. 7,1. 75, '01. 311; vi
Ihe AlI1,n"a). J, J71, Vcn"l.ud"IJuII'y. 231:1
CO.. bwOlth. lullll, 11M
CtlU .",.' (.olllcJ.r.....)1l 0(1,1'1'.1 l\uh\laJl.l
Cuc.l1l1.'.l:ItJ.MI, 157, UIO 11-1
CO<..Ile.lI':". Ir.7, 1'">'1, IXI. 21-1
(<Xlll.w), 15'.1
CUdll.lll.. AtlllIlI.,IIIl<II1I,l), J()
\.ullc. HIMII,21>. 1M, 10. JI2 II). lit>, JI7 HM.
JI'J. 31,1. JJI. 140. 351.(l'1I1I.1I"\IIlI"I',I,
').1 ';15. ')0; Lolollll,.a, I'N :WO, !UI, !.UJ, lUI,
2u5, 207; Cub, Ill, i5,t, tl 91, %.
IU,I, 105: Vel1l'wd,l, 212 -223. 227, 22loJ
('llid W.u, JClS. II:IJ. 3MM; 11<)11\'1,1 "nd. 17loJ, 17';1,:
HI ,llll ;1]\.1. 3)7. J31:1, C:inl,bo:,lll .lllll, 1:15-1:16; Ullk
,Hid, l'N, 1') ': CUll1l11111.1 ,111.1, .'.U7; conduMtJll vi,
11:1'); ( ulJJ .111.1, IJo, 13M; hu,ldur .'11.1, IM7. 1::1
.tIld. IUl>, I LUll ,Iml. 11 ..; NK:or..gu.
.111.1. 102; ,uld, 2:1 1,2 n. BJ
t 'ullol' ,Ie Mdl.., l'crll.ll1d,l, J'1l J'I \
(:ulvll.bl".I')1 1'J'J.2UO,2U3,
,.111,11. I'JM;'I\'ilIV.ll 1'15.
.'.(11, .'.03. :llil, 10" 1'Jl>,
liM, 21 I -ll!; "ul,I"'I'I'll11 .Iry 211-218;
('Ofl"llplH,lll 11\ gUI'CrJllllelll. 215; ,lel1l()(T... <-y, 20H.
dlug 1l.IHlckul
b
, 80. 200-201. 205, 21U. 211.
212-215,110. e"-:OIIUIIlI( cundiliullS alld 1",ll,.e),
19M 101,20-1 10<;. 211, Iibo:l.lI"'IIl,
350; g'::o.>gl.'ph)'. 191; as -Gr.madlll'"
Conle,I,r"II"", 196; ,.. Glall Culumlll.l UlII"l1.
152, 15J, lil4, 1,)1,121; guell'lU.lII\OVl'IllClib.
210 211, 21,1. 365; IlOIlU, ide ral.,) UI. 21'1;
indcpo:n,I",,,"'. I'J3-1 91.ts Llh.:r:ll r... publt<:, 20-1.
205; Ill.lp. 192; IldlllUcmlislil. 371;
',Iuluc. 217,: !"'ml'l:lll UoUlllloiry .11)1'\1'" wilh,
165; IlOl'll<.) oll ..g... n..rauun. 1%-197; d
, .. <'VI. Oil. liS: ruJ..... 191-1';3.loba... u, 3M.
19!1, 2110,: tl-ad"" 371.; l;l V\ul...nuJ. 107-20M, 2(N,
liS; vllal )1.111)11'). 202. W:tf ufll,,' 'l1,vu).il.d
0.1)'), 'J7. 197, 1'JI:I.lOJ
'ISO INDFX
C"loni;llisll1, 5-6, 1<1-27; ill C:nibhr;lI1,
91; clIlIlIr(' ,lllring,
<103-404; political or!:;lni7,;ltion lI\;lp, 24, Ser
(11,<0 Pnrlllr,al. C("Hili;l1 rule; rule
(',,!rmi(lS /IO/mlfll"s. 12(.
C<llml<Js, 95
r..nlor;ldo Party (I':mlguar). 31 1. 312, .'\93
ColMio, Luis nOIl;lI,lo, 76
Coillmlms, Christopher, 1(" 17. Rr., 121,
191. 220
Cmnecon. 14(,
COlllihol. Sec rorl'0r;ldon /l.fim'r;l dt'
r"llIie '1.1 1
Cllmintelll.2R9
CornilC dc ().-g,ll1i7:1dI'1I1 P"lillc;l Elector;ll
Indcl'cndll:nte (COPEI; VI"lt'/lIeb). 23 1.2 '.1,
2.101.21". V7. NO
COlllllllssion for Ihe of;l Free Cub;l
(CAFe). 1<19
C,.,rmlliUccs for lhl' DdclIsl' of lhe Rcvolulion
('uh:1). I'"
Common M;lrkct of thc 5'I\llh. Src MEIK:OSUH
(:ollllllunisllI. 41 <I, '\1 R; Argcl1til\:1 :1nd.
IIra7,i1 ;lml. 324, 3.17 .13/l: C:hilc ;In,l. 292. 295.
Cub;l ;lnd, Il3. 13<\. 1J5. 14"; EI S;Jlvador anll.
105, 10C>. InS;(;uatemab ;lnd. H19. 110: Mexico
;lm!. "R; l'enl ;lnd, 167; Vcnezuela ;Jnd. 2.1ll.
V t Src Cold W:1r
C'"1111l1Inist rallY (Brazil). ]2:\. ]26. 329. 330. 311
Conllnllnist 1':1rl)' (Child. 289. 2
Q
O. 291. 2'Jl.
29<\,3n'l
COllllllllnisl P;lrty (Colombi;l). 203. 209
COlllllmnist !';lrt)' (Cuha). 13!'. 1<1.l. 1<\'1. 1<\", "1117
r:nnulHl1list ParI)' (Ecllatlor). 189
1':1I"t)' (EI Salv;ldor). 10'\
C:Olllllll1nisl Party (Glmtelllala). 108
P:1Tly (Mcxico), 69-70
l':1rl), (Vcncwda). 231. 2.12. 23"1
Como ell 10 (;lIcrra (V;llcl1wda), <133
COmp(IRllie drs Isles fI'Amhi'llic. 92
COmp:1ralive a(lv;lnlage. 354. 3!'9. \70, '77
Cnlnp;lrative :1I1al>'l:is. 376. 394 '102
r:omte. Auguste. <110
Ccmllwit/ndrs dr blUc. 10:;
CONAIE. Sec C,'rlfedcralion of
of Ecu;ldor
Conccrtac1on (Chile). 303, ]0'1. 305
ConcordallCia (Argentina). 257
Confcder;lc1on de Tr<to;ljadores de Colornhia
(erq.202
Confederacit'm General del Tr;lb;ljo (CGT;
Ar!:entilla). 261. 265. 266. 267-268. 270
Confe(lerndon Ohrera Bolivi;ln:1 (COB), 178. 179
Confederacion Regional Obrer:1 Mexican;l
(CRaM). 58
COllfeder:1lion ofChikall Workers. 289
Confedemlioll nf Indigenous N:ttionalities of
Ecuador (CONA1). 1R9-190
Congress of 32
"-6. 7; p.-elll\l(' 10, 14-1(,
Conquest ofthc Desert. 247. 250
Consclhciro, Antonio. 41 I
Conservative Party (ArJ;enlina), 25t;
Conscrv:1tivc P:1rty (Bolivi;l), 175
Conscrv;Ilive P;lrt)' (Hra7.il). J 11. JJ5
Conservative Party (Cenlr:tl Americ:1). R9-90
Conserv;Jtive Part}' (Chile). 2RO. 28<1, 287. 292, 29"\
COllsel'V;llivc P;lrl}' (Colomhi:1).
19<1-1\)7,202,203,20<1.20'>.
207-20R, 209-2[1.215, 217
Conservative P;lrly (Ecuador). 18<\
Conservativc !',Hl}' (Mexico). 50.!'1
C01lSrn'alive P:trl), (Venezuel,,). 22"1
Consignmenl syslem, 154.225
Conslallt.lkllj;lrllin. <110
Rcvolillion (Brazil). .12"
Cont;lllnr:l initi;lli\'c. 71
("ontras, 102. 103, 3R8
Colltri/>uciOIl r!1! irrt/iXl!fI{lS, tf>3. 17<\
ConvergelKc OCllIocr:ttilJllC (11:1iti), Iii
COl1vellibilil)' law (I\rgel1til1:1). 27:'
COIll'iwllcia (civilily), 191.203.205.2(17.20<)
CO'Opl;ltiv{' democracy. 377 .liR 379 .lRO, 3R7
COPEL See Comil"; de l'olitic:1
EleCIOT:1lllldl'l'f'lldif'llte
Copper: C:hile, 12. 281. 2R2. 2113, 29l, 193-294.
29(;.297. 29R, 299. 304. 354; Mcxiw. 53, 35<1;
Pent, 12, 155. 170
CnrcQT:1Il, Thonlas. 110
CORro. Sj'e Corporacion ,Ic F"1l1Cnlo
Cormrl'1iSllw, .l22
COrporac10n de FOIllento (C:ORFO; Chile). 2R'J
CorpOmci('lll Millera de Ilnlivi;l (C:omibol), ISR.
159, 178
COrl'0r;llislll,6O. 169.259, 3J1. l81. .183. ,"196
Correa. naf;lel. 190
I:nrregidnrc.<, 27
Cnrta.mr, [lIlio, 428
(prtes, Hernan. 17
Corvce, 88
f:osio Villegas. Daniel. 353
COSI;l, lIicio, 42<1. 426
COSl;l e Silv;l, Artur (b. 339. 340
COSl;l Ric:l, R9, 90. 94, 96, 390, 391
Colton. 26. ISS, 179,347
Council of Ihe I n(lies, 18
Creoles: in Centr:11 America. 89. 90; ill Colomoi;l,
193; in Mexico. 47; in Peru. 1!'2. 153; in Spanish
colonies, 21. 22-23, 27. 28, 29, 30.32,33.34.35
C";sis (journall. 429
Crisferos. 59
Cristi:tni. Alfredo. 106-108
CRaM, See Confedcr:tcion Hegion:ll Obrem
MexiclIl;l
Cruz:ldo Ptan, 3<12
ere. Sec Confedcr;ldoil (Ie Trahaja(lores (It'
Colombia
CU;JUhtClllOC. 17
Cllba. 121-149. 390; inva(icll hy. 1<14. 145;
coffee. 122.354; colllp;lr.ltive all:1l}'sis. 401;

,
I
I
j
I
1
constitulion, I.H-135; eonlt'mpol'ary S"I1I'.
146-149; corOlplion in 128;
cllhure, 42(.-<\27. 12R; econnrnic ;llld
policies, 122. 124-12/l, 1<10-144. 1<16, 148;
economic liber:llism. 3!'4. 35(,. 3!'i; ECl1illlor
:11l1!. 187: cxilcs and from. '38- 139. 110.
1<\6; exporl of revolution. 142; f1lm indlls1ry.121 ,
r:a)' opprC!'sion in. '\33; 121; gllerri11;l
mOV('lllenlS. IJ 1-132. 365. 3R7. 38H;
indepcm!ellce.1I5, I 18, 122-123; Mexico :111'1.
6<1, 148; Nic:1l:tgU;l amI, 102: 1':tllall1a :11ll1. ')9.
policy cXl'erimenl:llion. 140 143; polltic:11
in. 14(,;
14<\- 1<IS; rC/,;i1l1e cOIl'iQli,l:ltion. I,D 14<;;
Revnlulioll. I '2 136, 428; 'I(lS.
Spanish mle, 30, 35, H4, 8:" 121-123; '122.
SIlf.::1r. .lit 122, 12'\-ll7. 13'1. 140-1" I. 3'.7.
'100; tOO;l(CO. 122. 35<1; VenC'zuc!a ;l11l1. 23.'. 2 N,
vil;ll 17.8
(:ub:1n Amcrlc;ln Naliun:1ll;oun(blion. I]')
11I11;l U.s relOllinns. M. 12R-l "10. Il"" 146. lRS,
<100; ;lllllex;llinn LOlisiderCll. 12l. 1"16; Iby "f
invasion, 1.l7. 138; current, 1<\11 149.
diplomalic rd.ltions se\'eretl. 1"1(, 117; fr:uninj:
U.S, policies. 136-1<\0; <lIlTing indrpelld(,!l< e
movemenl. 85. 1IR. 122-123; 125.
121>-127; /l.larlel hO;lllifl. 139: milllar}'
nccup;llion. 123-124; Illissile (mi<. 137-1 18,
233; n:ttion:lli7A11inn of eillerprises. I.\t!, 1"1(,. l,tl.
dl1l'ing Ih" 131., Dl. 13<1. !lr,; Irati"
1l9-140. 1<\'J; lVel ,fonl. Ilr)' fnnl
polk}'. 1<\7
Culture', 'IOJ 437: popular. '121-<\ll;
.revolution;l!"}'." 1(,-<119.42(1-47.,11: ill II", w"rl.l
lll;lrket.423 <131 SrI' (/11t, A,thllr<.!urC'. Art,
I.iler:1t\lrr;
Clllllhb, <126
1'"
1):1 Cunh;l, <II I
l):1nce of the millions. 199
n:1nt:ls. 3]4. 33S
D;lrio. Hllhen. <112, 114
D:trwin, Charlcs, <\ 11
l);l 5ilv:1. Lui7. Imido (Lul;l), 2411. 3,11. 342, 3<13.
344.428; Choive7. and, .'74, ]9.'\; po1ides of.
3<15-347
]):17.a. Hi!;lri"n, 1M
Ocehollk(/j. 115
Decree of Frce Trade (Spain), 29
Det/azo. 61, 77
Dc la Cnl7.. Ju:tn;l lnes. ]R2
De la Madrid. Miguel, 70-71. 72. 73
De l:t Rua. FeTO:tndo. 276
Dc Lessups, Ferdinand. 198
Delgado de Odria, M;lri:l, 167
Del Rio. Dolores. 421
])emocr:tc)'; Argentina :tnd, 26J. ]<)0.
391; Rril7.i1 ;lnd. 336.
337-338.3<10-343.390. ,WI; C:hile ;lncl, 28R,
Illdex 'I'll
2''', '101, lIH. 1(1"" 1')[1. 1'/1,< 01"1111>1:1 .111<1.
lllH. 1<)0; <." IIpI.111\'{'. 177. :1711 17'J. 1,110. IWI,
1)"miulI';Jn .Illd. 112. 1'10, Iblll all'l,
117; illihcl:1I.RO. t77. 191; 1;J(k 01. 7 '1.li"I""1.
177, lltl, W [. fl,4ni!" .lIlll, 110. \')0; ollg:llfhi<,
q(" ,\77- '7X..llolO, \jU" 'S7; 1"'''1 :llld. 17).
1'10, rCllewal "f. \,11'1 ", I. rbc of. to; , lRll,
NO: oj, of, 17(, 17i.
Vl'Ile'7rle1.1:1I1lI,7.I<J.111 Jl(,.
NO 2<\1. \')0.J91
nt'lnOer;ltl, Alli:tl1l(' (I'< lIa,I"I\. lHI.
Ilrrnllu.1tlt' I':nlr (lira/III, \) \
Demncralh 1'.1I1y (t hllr). ]R',
I kill"'" !";l11t I'arly (1'('111). ">'I
11C't"'I1<lC'll<'y Ih.("y. '1, 11. II,R, Ihl,
Dr<lIIn1rtr, 209.).11
fll'"'{m"j,, (Mi<tl.1II.<11 \
k.Hl 1:\('1111', RS
I " " ,/rill,,, 'Ul Innl ,I" ,,,Il filml. -I III
Akj:tlld,0(), \1'!
2'i
/lw',," d,'",pl"",I.'/" (101''1). II'.
Ili;lI. Ad"I(o, 11)1
[11.17, 1'".-flnn.:'1. '.} ',I,.','. ',So H'I.
'10. J03, 171>, ,110. lrlll:lh ,,! 1'11''1<1"",\" ','
lie r,2 '"I, 1/(' ... ,101111'11 ,111.1. "'1 r.l,
I hal Orfh7, h I (,'
177.17') l)oll., IS '. III jl':lIol.
327 12H, in 111Ile. 2RI>. ultllr:ll""!,.,, I "I.
'112; in E'I1:"I"r. 11>/, lH'l.
J',,,tul:ll(',11(>1'.7 Ill, 111 \"'IH,,,,,,I.I, '\1
M;l111ll1'7, 11I.11l 01", IH..
IllI(,u.lu\ Hi
111 AlgI III Ill,'. Jf." .'1.'1
271 272. "If',. 'lllll1lr.
Mn:i,o.7'
l)l<;nr}'. W;lh. <Ill
I)i Tdb. J'I'.
111'lell:I, T"I<.lIal", I(,l
I Jolb.- dil'l"ln:lI R',. 11 I
Po1J;lri7:tlioll. l7'1
I)"lni IlIC:TlI RCI'l,hlu. I 1I I I '. IXi. I .' ,I, .ml'l.l"
SCI/.ur r of .. 210, drtlllH 1,I, I I "1. l'lfl.
l11dl'l'clll1cnee.HH I'N. 'i). "I,.
422;sUg;lT. 93-<)<1.112. V,'IIt'JIIC'l,I .mol.ll I
Domino then!'}', I Ill. 1'1,
J)(lI1(I I'/nr(' .<;,'1/' /)m< /1/,",,1,,< ('\lll;l,I,,).
Dr;lt:o. l.uis M:lri;l. n;
Dr;lkt'. R'I
I Adolfn, 11, l
Dru'g tr:lHkkillj.: 111 II.. IIV"', IRO 1111. 11) .'1 I.
in c':nlmnhi:1. loin, 70n )Ill. !no;, 1111. lil.
1.12 215. 21(,; ,11",,,1, '11'; -l1( '"
/l.!('xico. 80-Rl: 11\ P.lIl;llllol. ')1), 1Il I'nll. 1<;;.
212-2D; war "". Rr,. 9"
OU:lr1e, Inse Nal'"l('im, 10'i. 10(,
Duh;llde. Elluartlo. !.i(,
Allt'll. Itll)_llfl
')11. Ill'! 110
I '"tch Nl'lh"ll;lr"h
Dnlch Jill
J IN III .\
""1./1 I ,1I1.1I1." x,
1'111' Ir l '"IIIMI'), 'I.!.
IIUll,I, hUI,'" I lU, III
1111\'.,1'0:1, I I 1,1 11 'i, 'Ill!
1''''.,111",. k,ll' ( l.'lhk, 11<;
1"1"'\<"111.,, 21i', .1O'i 'lO(,
I ,II"\"'lli,I, 1.111",67 IJM
J ,,,'1UUll, L.. IIll,\lIllII,.1
(I-< 'I t\: Fe 'LAt '), l'i" 11,(1
I" ,,'h"III, ,,,,,I 1",1" H II,
III Alg"lIll1,.I. Ill, 211'; ..!',..!, 2')'1, lr;'J .!.bU.2112,
.!.lrl, !lI'" ,Ioi', 2'1). ,.or. l72. 2.71,2711 .!.17; III
II"J'\'I." 1'>/ 1'i'J, IMU, III 111.1111, 10, \1'> 121.
1!'1.12'J, III II'>, HO HI"H2 )11,11'> Jill,
",I luI.-, 2t1lJ 2MJ, 2M'>. 1.1'11'1, 21'1'),2')1. 2')2,
2"1 2.')11, 102. Illl, ..Il1,l, 1111:"101111,,,1, I'JM 2UI,
.!.UI 20',.21 J; ",1",1, ,of 2.0(11), :17I-J75; III CUb",
1.!.2.12" I1li, IIU 111, 11l). 1,1:1;<.1111,'111
IIIh '"1.11111), 1')2. \')1, ill htl,lll"r, I';') Ihl,
1M" IXu. III I I.LlII, I II; III 1\lnkv, to, 1<; ,l(J,
.,t ',,1,1).1, nI,I'(J,C,i'. 1,1'l,VI 71.7l> 7/.'/H,1'lI,
III NI',II"gu", IO..l.IIlI ' ,ru, IS2, I'll 1'i7,
11./, I i'll, 1/1, 1:".IIII'",wgu,"ullw",-,,, 25,
.'.1. III 1",,,,1 ,,,I"llI,.J n,l, IU-'ll; III
,,,J""I'". 1'1, 2M 2'J, III V,I"/Ul"!.I,22b 22'),
! 21'>. l IH. 111
1'''"''1111' ,l.-vd'JI'""Ul ""l"kj;l""', ''>1, ,or,. :;,,"t'
.lh'J FUll""III, IIIIIJUII ",ul ,,,,I II III I. II I
IllL111'11 I.II".IIIUII, N,, ,I d't't' . !t"'I1l: ::'u'loll""l
11111. \'",1. hi 3SH,111
.!17 .!IX, 101, Ir'b, Jr,7; HI
1I1",II.ll.! I.! t, 11ll. \"1, \0-,6, 1'l7.IIlU; III
\ 1,,1,', 1"'1. I')IJ; til eu!>.I. y;,1, .\5\.>, 157; ill
I\kXl,v, ',1. \'>1, III 1'",1 ... "ltOl",,1 ,'1", Iii, ::.,.,.
"b" N,"III"I"lbll'
1,,,,..I"I,lr,O, IM'I luU IIlI.11'I6,
""'''', 1(,lI. IX'>. IMo; 11'1.1,
IX'> IXr.. "'"I,""!,,,r,,,}' "', ,""', 1M" ,'}U.
,,,hul ". 'II 'J; d'lllll"'l ,", y, \'JU. C<tJJlUlll, ...
.<Ill! l'ulI ... ",, 1"i')-II>I, IH'>, 11:\tl; III
I" ,It I l:"I')llIb',1 lIlll,'ll, ..II, ..1-1, I '>J, 11'11, 1')'1,
!.l.I; Ill, J71.. puJIlI,.11
dl"cll<'lI,JlIIJlll'lll, 03')1; SLIt hI! II
I" I-Iol; Spal1i",h mJ,>, 151; Vt'llczuda alld, :i7.l
Ed,,, .!lloll. '12J; III U,an!. ..1/1,1, )'17. J'I/( 'IOJ-'IO.I;
ill L'I,ilc, 21'1'>; in Cub.J. 144./12(,; in E... u,llluI.
HH; UIlIvCI",ily, 221. '101-'10'1; III Vell"zlld,l,
!..!J.2'U
I'gypl, 'JH
l'l",ellhu\""l. lJWlgIl1 II., I lLi, JI10; lIul,vi.1 pvllc)'.
17x. Br .. iil pull'y, Ll2; {IIIo.1 p"li,y. 13,1, !..Io,
117, Nk.JI,.gll,1 I'0ll ... y. lUI; VCII"l.ud,1
,'ulI,y. ,UI, 232
1.,L'I'II" Iloll\,;onallll l(evolll"ull.lllI, (VclH'/ucla),
21'1
J J;'(llU .1,- L,l,er,IIlulI N,l' IUII . 1(El N.
l vlullllH.,), 2ll'J-1. I 1,21'1, 1.1 S, 2 JI,
1'/,,1,1>, :>lI-SI, ')'1, 'i'l
J l'UI, T. S. ,II'>
I'I.N .'>0:,' Fjl'I"IU ,I,- t 11"'I,""JIl N",,,,,,,,I
J I 6'J, 1'17, 'JU, IO'1-IUM, 31'11'1; Lui Icc,
'Jh, IU'I, JU5; death S'IU,l<b, 106, 107; CLtllll.'nti<
J56; gucnilla 1III)VC1II"I\1:., 106, lOll,
.165 ..IH7; p"IIlIGll diMtlCharlllllO:lll, 3Y..I;
WtJJlICIi ill,
1.:1 TClllclilc rnine, 2112
/;"lIlpuor /III1CS (O'Ncill), 422
Fr,llIcisco, 352
/;'I1LU/IIIO:/II/". Ho
EILtlM.J, tilll!J{'l"ltlO.
hto:dnrl., 03603
Enl;I,Im!. "';0:,' Bnl.Jill
EIII'ghtelllllCl\I. 7, 2Y, 3U, 31, )X. '10'1
D.\
bwu.tr, 1'.llll", 212, 2lJ, 21'
/'""'1',"1,',/"" fl. 2US
6(Ildu Nu"o, 327-032'). )3U, JJ2.,)9')
EMil/I( 3'J, 246, 250
113-11'1
bln"!;l C"hrn,l, Manuel, lOX
1::.lr.ld,1 !',llllla, 124
I:.II"IIIUI, :'1-16, JIM
.ll',HlSillg, 3HIl 3H9
l'urul"': CIllitexl fOf Ib; toilligr:llioll
from, '10-11, 313, ) 16-317. 355. 356-357
Fxpcrillll'lllaJ Tlwaler of Call, 'I) I
h'l,vtl.lJllport Il;lllk, J 14
Itllporl ecunumks. 351-.15H. 377, 37H,
.179, IHb
Expurt:.: uf Alg"IHlIla, 2-19, 2(,u. 2(,4; of Brazil,
115. JIH. uf C.JriUbo:.IJI, 92, 9-1; ut elllk, 21:11.
2M'J; uf Cull.'lI\uia. 198-20I; ul EOl.l<lor.
15'J-161; vi McxiL:o. b3, 6H, 71, HI; uf 1',Tu,
155-156. 11l5; III post-wIOlli,,1 n,l. o3H
FXkrll,11 3Y5
jjj.N, Scc Z,IJ,,,lbt., N311ull.J1 Llbel,lllull Al Ill}'
1,1( will" .. LlvlII2mlv" I' /illrulllw (S;u tlltl'lllo),
1.,17,4U6
J'"lallgc SUtl:lI'Sl PMly (Hullvla). 17H, 17'J
blarltb, 270-271
1',lr,lbllndo M<lfli NatiollaJ Lluer,1l1ull Frl.'nl
(FJ\'II.N), IUb, lOll
FI\l<C. SCI' Flu:n,as RcvuJudoliarias LI ...
Colombia
I; Arg"lltina ami, 256-257. 259; Bmzil
amI. 325, 327. 329; Chilo: alld, 2H9
1'",U'c/llS. !2o, '126, 435
Fnlcl.J(lun <I" Cuballas (FrI'IC), 1'1/1-145
Fc,I,t',1I1('lll Obrtora !(o:gioll<ll Argclltilm (FORA),
m
u( Argo:ntina, 240, 247; uf Colollluia,
1'J5, 1'J6
J;o:dl.'mtiull of Bolivlall Mine \VCllkO:IS, J'17
F"rdlilalld V (klllg uf Sp<llll), 17
F",.dill.md VII (killgo(Spain), 30, 31, J2, 33, 34,
152,221
J:\.'n"il\llez dc KilchllC", Crislill.l. 277. 392
F.'rnalldcz.1e Li7.ardi, Jose Joaquin, '105
F'fllall,IL7. ](c)'lIa, I..o:ond, 113
FClt"l\ tub. 119
"
I

1
,
Figuciro:do, JO:IU, .111
I,U'II b'l. ,120, <12.1, <l2tJ, 113u, IJ(,
Ari, 2J'J
Juan jI.'SC, IH-I
t'Z. FmuciSL:O, IOH
PMLN. Sec Far3bllndu I\larli N,tli01l31 Liberatiun
FruIH
I;Ull:'Ct, Uo:otluro d,l, 315,321
I di\, 322, 325
FORA. SCI' l'c,!t.r;IClon Obrera RcglOlJ.l1
Argcntill.
Funl. Gcmld, 69, ')1:1
Furd MOllOI' Cump,llly. 2')5. 2')6, 2'Yl
I'url'igll .Ild, IU2. 106.216.3..18
Furcign Ad (U.S.),
I'url'ign debl, J61:1-309; Argl'nllll:l, 2bO, 26'1, 171,
272.276; B,.JZ1I, 322.3'10, 3'11, 3bH; Chill', ]UI:
MexlLo, 51,69,70, 170.303, ..1611; I'o:ru,
163-16'1,170, I'll; V'Il,J.udJ. 22'1-225
FUft..'lgll IllV\.'l>tlllent, 74, 317, 392
F"rluf!o, LUIS, 12U
Fl.'rly COlllllLllIce. 2')6
J.'vlulluvdm, 403 I
l'ux, Vke1l1e, 'I7-HO
Fr.JJlcc: Arg.:ntill.l.Jnd, 250, 260, lIoJI\'I,\ and, 159;
Hr.tlil .Intl. 312; CJnbUC,lll (l)IUllles, 1'14, 1:15, 81:1,
'J2, ')03; LOJ""l.l1 I uJ.:, 21,22; I kUll oC<.Lll'ic,J by,
117; MO:llICO anti. 51,53; NicMagu;\ and. 11l2;
](':\'l.'lullUrl,29 S<:<: I,v N.lpukl!l\lc
l;r,ulC", Fratl<l"'cu. 20H, .\1:11
I'ranco, ll;lInar, 34.1
Frallk, \VaJ.Ju, 115
FRAI', 292-2'))
Fr\.'l Irati\.', .lx, 'II, 1.05. 353 -.151.370-371
FrcL' TrJdc 1\1"\.',1 ullhl' {1I'AA). 2.1'J,
371 ..i'lJ-J'I1
I;r(;,l, EduoJrdo, 263. 291, 1%, 2'J'I, 2'/'J
Ftel, blu,lrd'l, Ii., 30'1, ..IU5
"r"nch GUlalla, H'>
hcnte (I.- Llbtol.J<"UJIl Ilull"',,,CX\I.ll de 1.,
Atgelllm3,433
Frl'yrc. Gilbcrlo. 307. 419-'12U
l:r,)m],7.i, AlllllU. 2(l..I 265
FTAA. SCi.' Fn'c Tri\lJo: Area 01 tho: AllIel":I'"
Fuentes, Carlo"" 417
I'Il<:ros, SO, 195
Fucrzas Ann;ldas Rcvolucion:lrias (Ie COllllllbi.l
(FAKC), 210, 214. 215-216. 217
FII)illlOI'l, Alucrto.171-172, 173
Funcs, Moturidu, lOll, 393
FUrl:,do. Ce!so. 33-1,
G"ilall, Jorgto Elieccr, 131. 205-2U7, 21U. 231
Gal:ill. Luis Carlus, 211
Galeano, Eduardo. 428-429
GaHegl.'s, R,"mulo, 231
G;llticri, Leupoldo, 270-271
G,It/Wllll/mllo, 16'1
L;/lIlluleros, 2611
Garda, AI.Ul, 171, 173
(;ar.-i:l. Juse Guillcflno, lOb
Imltx <153
li,II'.;,I, S.lIIlloll;U, '1.11
l;,u'('i,1 M,irtJ\lO:J, l;,LI",,"', 2U..I, <Il'J ,no, 137
Gald,1 MLbl. l.ub, IMO
MurcHo, l;.Jutid, IH'I-IH5
C.lrdel, -121
(;.IS. Set' N.lhlr.J1 gas
l;,\Tl'. S,'t! ti"Ilo:ral AgrccllicHt UII 1.H'llls :tllll
Tr"dc
GaVIn;I, CCS;II, 2tl, liS
t;ay JIlI'II ami 13J-"\JI
3'11l "II
GCll,'r31 AgrcclllL'1l1 Ull T.trllh ;"111.1 TI',td.
(t.;ATI'), 71,75
l.cllt-l'aliulI 1/1 IHflU, Zr>..l. 25"i
GCllo:raliull of 1'J1H, 22b. 2.m, Lit
CO:I"lIl,1I1y: t\ 1'l;O:lIt 111,1 ,111.1, 25U. 2<;(,; IIr.11I1 ,md,
31 ij, ..I2H, 3,11; Cellll,11 Amt'II(.1 ,111'1. 'Jo;
NI,al.,gu,1 and, 102; Vo:nL7.ul"!J 21'>;
W"tld \Val' I ami, ..I3H; Wurl,1 W.1l II .tll,l, 62.
25'
(;ctillo, OctJvio, 1}0
\ j,dc, Andr'. 115
Gil, t.iilb,'llo, '11H
l;old, 7, I 'J, 25, 27. 2'J; Bul,Vl". I "iM; C,lilullIl.J,
2ijl;Col,,1I1hl.l, I'JX,2UU;Mexlcu,
40.53; 1'\.'1 II, ISS; V'lll'Wl"!.J, 22'1
l,ol,klllaw (Br.J7.il), 311
Gul,l 2'I'J-2<;O
t;,,[ol/l/rJ//(/), 1'18
(;"I/,c <I\.' CSI<I((v, I H5
l;ollln, ( 107
)IS
FoduMdu. 0310
G0I110, luall VI", .."" 12'> 1111. LIll, 1.1'
(iolllcl.. L.UllC,lIlU. 2Ul'I
(;':1I1IC/.1\.' t\ Vdl.lll\.',l,t. I Lub",.
'10M, 41 I
<.,;iltllLl. ,\HI\.'<lu, 2(,1
(;"Il\.Jlo:", 01.''''. ,\uuJnIO, 407
t;ulllalc7., EIi,ill, 147
(Jull7.:ilL'l, M,tllll"I. 52
(iOll/;il\.'z V,dd,l, l.i3Ullel, 1.'J0
Goud Neighbor puhcy, 60
Gurdun, 1.1I1cl.'lll. 3..15, 331l
(;orc, AI, 71
GOU. Sct' GI'UPU Obm lI,- Unili.l(IUlI
Goul.JI1, Joao, 333, 33'1-336, .137. 3JM,
"Grada", J la Vida" (",ollg), 427
Gr.Jlll, 2'IH. 24')
(;r<lll CuJolliula, :13, .\.1,1<;2. 15J. IM4, 191,
221-222
Grill/nUl (yadll), 131
Graill. S., H'J
Grau Sail Marlitl. Rallull\. 12'J
Grc"l Do:prcssioll. 352, 357, 35H, 361, 3'19-3!S1I;
Argelltina and, 249, 255-256; Ilolivia alld, ISH,
176; Ur.Jt.i1 :lnJ. 318. 31 '). 32'1; ami, 2!SH;
Columbia and, 1,)'J-200, 2U4, (:UU,1 ,111.1, 12,1,
12H; Ecuador ancl, IHo; Pctll ;llld, 155, 16S;
VCllellll'la ;111", 227, 221s
Crl"l1.Jda, HS, n
4S4 INDEX
Grrnfd1. Aclmir.ll l"hll 1'.. J(,
(imvr. ""'lannadukc, 28x, 2S9
(irupo Ohla tic UllIficaooll ;OU; Arg('ntina).
25R.259
Guadalul'>C I hd,IIW'. 'le.11\' or, 50
{,wldclollpc.II";
GlIanahualehe}" 1JN'>l'le. 11(,
Guano. 3R. 40. ISJ 1<;;4.1<;5. Illl. 175
{,uanlallamo Hay. 116. 124. 129
(;lItlrallY. If (Gomes). 407
(;rmrdw. rum/c. S2
(;"alen1,11:1.1I9. 90. 9.1. 9<;. '.16, 1011-11 J. 17f1. JR7.
.l91; cnIlSlllllll'm. lOS; economic
3'=;6: rlhnic c1eansin}; tn, 11l1l-3R9: guerrilla
..l(,S. 3,117: Mayans in. 14. 15:
Octoher lOR. 109; lOR.
:1M: Spanish rule. il7
GHam ridfilt IIIlIIltlll, LIl (Varl;as Unsa). 41 I
Gucrrilla mm'etnrnIS: in J\rgcnlina. 267. 2(,R.
269-270. J6';: in Holivia. J65: in 1Ir:17il. J 10. 1;n.
1.l9-.\'HJ. 1(,';: in C:hik. .103: in C,)lolnhia.
210-211. 214. I(,'=;; in Cuba, 111-1:\2.3115.38;.
)118; ill EI Salvador. 106, 108.365.3117; in
Gual(,IIl:lIa, 1f><;;. 'UI7; in MrXlCn. 67_(.11. 76; ill
Nlc:lraglla. 102, :165.1117-388; in Peru. 1;0-171.
in UnlJ::lI<1Y. 36';: in Vene7llcla. 233. 3fiS. &e aUn
Re\'nllllional)' mn\t'mrnts
Cucvara. Frne<lo (rhe). Ill. 140 14 \. 179.
It>C;, '115
Guro:enhellll f.lIluly. 2112
\,uidn. Jmt- ltd
(illll1cn. '114
G"lf Oil. I11').7.27
CUlicrre7, 3(,7
l,ulicnc7. Lucio. IR'), 190
I,ulierrez, Tom:lS. 4.10
GU7lmin. r\lmnacl, 17l
GU7.man, Anlconlo Le(lo(at!i(l. 223
G117111all. MarlIn 417
G117111an R1:111n). Allhmio, 233, 24.1
llm-em/arlos. W. <;0.161. IM.17S-17f>
I 2::'.47.56, 355
Ilaili. 84. 91. 390; t'connrnic condilions :llIcl
policies, 11;; indelK'ndence. "oirismc,
420; raflers, 116; UN peilcekeeping forces in.
347; U,S. re!:lIIOIl< \\;Ih. 94. 113-117
dyn:l<ty (Spain). 27-211
Hllrrler 711ey Cr"'Ie. Til(' (fiIlll). 4](,
Hawk.ins.lohn,84
lIa),. lohn. 97
HilYil de 1:1 Tom'. Viclor Ra.t1. 1l'l5-IM. I(ill. liO,
IR7.358
Ila)'-Henan Trealy. 97
Health CMC. 62.144.242
Helena, Hcloisa. 3'17
Ilclrm:-llurlon ACI. 1J9
Henequen. 53 .154
Hernande7.. Ime. 406
Ilernallcle7. Cololl. I{:lf"d, II'}
Ilcrnandez MarliU('1. Maxuuih:mo. 10 I. JS7
Ilerrcrn lui... 2_l4
Ilcureaux. 88
Ilidalgo r Coslilla. Millud. l2.11. 37, W
I lispaniola. 114. IIS.M. 111
""'orill oficin/, l.n (film). 43'.
I liller, Adolf. R. 127
Ilochschiid. MauriciO. 157
Hoi)' Alli:lllcc. 84
Hom"ns dc mail 423
1Innclura... 85. 117. 90. '}'1. %
/lord (Ie 105 1101II0S, I a (film). 'llO
'-Iour of Brazil, Thc
(r:ldin I'rngram). 129
IIlul5ip/mj?o (r\ "I <)
f-1l1llsipllllg" (system). 187
fluband-spoke formal ion, 371 172
I Ilierla. Viclori:lno. 56 57
IlulIlab. Ollanla. 173
Ilurnan rights i<slles, 3119: ancl.
271-272.277: Br:l7il and. 30R. 3<11; Chi!.: alili.
3UI. 303. 30,1. 305; EI Salvador and, 1M. lOR;
Mcxico and. 73
Hllman sacrifice. IS
Hllmholdl. Alexander \'on. 40.
Hurricanc Milch. 10.1
Hurlado. OS\';lldo. 1119
II)"d('. Ilem)' I.. 219
I, Rlgof'f'rta MCIU:l1II 412
IA 1'1. Sct' Ins'illlio de I'wlllonon cI('1
Int('rcamhio
Ihanel. Carlm;, 288. 289. 291
lIIia. Arturo. 265
Illiberal democracy. 80, 377. 391
1f\1F. St'c Inl('rn:ltiOIl:11 Monel:lry Fund
Immigralion: 10 24R, 2%.316-117. :lS6;
to Brazil. 313. 316-317. 356. 357; European.
40-'11.313.316-317.355.3%_357: frOIll
3. 78-79 (sec film Ivl1gralll workers); to
PCi'll. 150-151. 15'1: in pml colonial era. 40-<11:
from Puerlo Rico. 3. 118-1 19
Imporls: 10 Argentina. 260; In C3I'ihlX':ln. 92. 9<1:
10 Chile. 302-303: 10 Mexico. 68
Importsubstitulion induSlri:llizal;on (lSI). 351,
35ft-362. 380. 383. 386: in Colombia. 204-205;
in Mexico. 71. 361. 362; in Peru. 155: in
praClice. 361-362; in Ihf'Of). 359
lMSS. &e Ins!ilulO Mexlcano (Ie Scguro Social
Incas. 14. 15-16. 17-18. ISO
Inca7..a. Jorge. 419
Income dislributlon. 8. 66.157.392
IndelK'ndenc(' mov('lllenfs. 27-35; Argenlina. 37.
246; Bolivia, 173-174; Brni!. 35-38. 306;
Caribbean. 88-89; Ccnlf:ll America. R9-90:
Chile. 33. 2RO; Colomhia. 193-19<1; Cub.,. R5.
IIR. 122-123; Dominic:lll Repuhlic, RII-89;
Mexico. 32-33. 34-_15. 37. 45-<17; Peru. 33. 37.
152-153.221: UruJ.:ua)'. 37; VClle7uela. 31-32.
:17.219,221-222
India. 174
Indiani"'ll (j"d'g,lIismn). ,11)7. <I 17. ,I \2
IndiJ;enous peoples: in ArJ;t:llllna. 247. 2:-.0; 111
Boli\'ia. ISO. 174. 175-176. 1111. Ilil. 1II11r;l711.
407; ill Carihhe:m. R6; In Ccnlral J\rnrnca.
116-117; In Chill'. 27f1: in Cnlomhla. 192 IQ3.
194: ill Cuha. 121: cuhurnl imraCl and
depiclion... 407. 4 10-411. '117.421 424.411; III
Ecuador. ISO. IR9-190; in EI5.,I"all(ll.
10'1-10C;; in Mexico. 111: in Peru. Jr,. 1'>0, Ir.-l.
IftJ; I'opillalinn. 16. 19: in 1'0rltlJ.:"e<l' (lll'"II1..'<.
25: in colonial era. 39-'10; pre (
14-1(,: ill colnllles. 1'l-2ll: 111
Velie/ucla, no. 7.l1
IndiJ.:o. f/,7
,"r1/0. 1:1 (I (11'e7 y Fl1rnles). -117
Imhlstri:lliz:llion. 35'1: in Argenrltl:1, 2{.4: t1I
I.\ra7.i1. 3)lJ: In Cllba. 140-1,11: m
62-63: in pnsl-cnlnnial era, ,11, Srr (/1'(1 Iml'Ml
induslri:lli7alinn
Revnlullon, )<;,1. 177
lttjllU't1CC "f Sell "ower IIp''" 111<'''' ", t I,c
(1\hha11),97
Inform;'!1 seClor. 171 .
h1l1uisilinn. Ill. lO. )1.194
Institulional Acts (Hr.l7il). J17.HII. l I')
In<!lIlIlo Argellllllo or Promonon del
Inlercamh10 (lAP!). 2'>9. 2M
Insliluln de Fnmenlo Indu<trml ( 0InIl1111.').
201-20">
tid S('gnrn So< ,al (1:"-1"-;). 1.2
11ltegr"lislll. 325-126. 327
Integrated EnviromuCnlal Plan.
lotcndanq' s)'stelTl, 27
Inler-Americall Developmenl l\ank.l9'1. ]9/., \f/,t>
Intern:lliollal Coffee 200
Inlern:llional Lesbian :lncl Gay ,I \,
Intefll:lli(lnal Mnllel:lry Fund (1",,11'). \f)I\' 195;
Arl;clllina :I lid. 272. 274, 276. 277: 1l0liv1a :Ind.
1711; Brazil ;md. 334, 34 1,344.34(,; (.hM "IHI.
291.292: Cnlombia :1nd, 211; Ecuador :11111.
Ifl9; Mexico :md, 70: allli. 10l; I'C(l1
aml,170
Intern:llional PeTrnleum Cnlllpall)' (11'(:),1<;0;.
167. 168. 169
Inlelnalional R:lilwars of Cenlral ,\merica. 9'.
Inlcrnalional Telcphonr- and Teleglaph (ITI').
139.169.260.295.296.297
Inlernel.436
Inti-lIIimani.427
Inlransigent Radicals (UCRI: Argenlllla). 21.\
IPC. Me Inl('rn:llional P('II"Olelllll Cnmpanr
lracmw (Alencar). 407
Iran, 229. 232
Iraq. 79. 104,229.232.239,391
Iron. 306
Is:lbell:l (queen of Spain). 17
lSI. Sr" Imporl-suhslitulioll induslrlalizatlon
Iialian imrniwanlS. 248. 2S6. J 17. 1<;7
Ilaly. 62. 225. 25R. 3R I
\'"
n I t;...r Inlr'".'II"".,II""'III"I"'.1I101 Id'p'I.1l
1111,1",1.-. Agll<11tl ,I, 11. \ I \". WI .lT
... ).. I""'d,' It
lamalla. RI. W,.'II
1:1l11r... I);tIll('I,111I
lal':1I1. (.1.. 7'1. . .".1'. ",Il
1,ll'anc<;(" 1""Il1):,.ll1h. 1,1. 1-"1, II'. \'.-
larlm AIlII"ltil,I,' .11<1,,\ ... I Mil IW)
"I. ;OX. 1"',. I''',
/,I,,,,..... IIR
lofio VI (k1t1J: "Il''''hlr"n. I'. It. Im( \111
lohn l':mlll. I'tlP('. 1 1( 1f.1{
I pn,"1 I . ).'
Inhn",,", I rn,l,.tl II. t, I, II). \ \,'l
,,'II/oll'r"\,')';
lllaro.lknll". ';1, ,110
)1Itt1lt,ll:llllrtll,l.\

)II .. ln. '\A".. Iin 1'. 1'.(,. ".
Kahl", 1'11,1", 111{
1{:1I1. 1"1,,'1 )'1lI', ..... /
Ii\
KeIlHnrr..,. I <IWItl \\ IX',
"CI"lrc nil (."'1,,,, .11 I"n. )11.', ."1 I
Kcnne,l\'. II,lul I ."ltrr-I1,1. 1 II. 1 I I N_ I/.!>.
17M. }l\
]0\('\'11<'<. lohn 1\1,11 n_,,,\' I
KllIlI<h, hr\'. N,klr.,. 1\-
KIf< hn('l. Neq"I, .' ..
Ilrnll. 1 \ \. )'1". ,"I'.
Kkm, l!crh"II. 1"-;
Knnx. l'h11,mdrl f ,1111
Korean \Var, 111
Kriej::cl Va,ena, l\d,lll"'rT" 1(,(,
KIlIgnt,'n. 1';11,1, 17)
11111\.1\
'1/4 ol)(,
Kit"";"!. vq,}, I)
l.ah:-o'Tul.I, I ".'Ill n. ';.;,-l'I
I.al"rt,,fr' ,I" III .. ,fr,I.ld, II (1',1/). 1'\
lal",>! .\rc \\',,,kf,,,,,'
l.ahnr Parh' (111MIll. 11'1
I...,(crd.,. ( arlnt, 1 n
/ mlll"'<. R7. RI). '10
IAFTA\c.. \m"'Ill.'nllcrl ."I, '\1""
I,,'p.e. Carln<. I III
I ay.n<. RKanlo, 1/1;
I.. .. 1'",,":1nl'
(1Ir:lIlI).147
I...,ml Hwnrrslup III t\1J,:rlllma. )"11. III g.,IIII.I.
174,17<; 17(,. III I 1111... )RII. }!'P. '" ( 111>... I"
111 11":lI,,;ulnr. In'l Hl
e
',lIl f\!cu,n. IX. '.11 ,I
<;2: In P"Illlr."C<C1l11'UIW", )\. 1111"'''' .,.1,"",11
rl.l. 4n, III "I',IIII<h. "1,,ttll"'.I' '\ , .....,1",
A"r:lrl,ln
I..ln"er. l'Ill 1).17..
1.11"1..)', r.1'}'I. I III
1\1",.'11.11" . .!.tK, l.l'l
I H,JII"lvlII.;
1,,1111 '\111,'11<...1 111.1 UlhlllId.IIH,III:.
,,1.1 II ""'1', .... I'..I'"I.. u"" ..I. ".
vi. I
1.,1111 '\1I1'lh.'lI hn' Tr,Jd. Au.1 (1'\1 rAJ, Jot
1.11111 '\Ill'lllll 11110'1-:1,111,"1
(1\1 AlII). ltd
1.,\.,1." 1,.,,1) (11.1111). 117
1.'1111, h""luill. IU',
1.1'" .,1 la'" hU11l (l "llIllIbl.l). 1J.i
I ,.1 ](... ,,.111. '.
I . ul ) 'HiliI-> l Hll...I:.
(hu.I,lul). HI'"
1.1',,11,':',' 1IllIlIlgl.'lIh. 1'.1
I nlulI.lu.HI, I ,. I '1'1 I"I'J
I. ( .,llou:...I. ,l!-I
1",'\'.11<1 bI.HI,h, xc,
1.,t:UI.I.1\llgll:.lu 1\
Inlill. V I. Ih\
I ,'UIII, I{"ul. .!..!.o, .!. \J
1.',.II,.k '1"J,ld,l, S..!".:.II"rl,"'1 ... :!
I <'1,,1"'1, (III.....!.., ,\oJ
I "ld"'I, \' ,L1,1I11l1. ,lIt)
I "/1,1,1..", 1ll1
H,.I"II." .!.('l'
Il") ,1,,1"'1.-11:',' (1\11\'I,IUIoI). .!S.!.
1.).1. 1<.-:.1.1..11<-1., ('\'g'IIIUM). !'i.!.
1,)'d.lk:'I.I"lhl.,(I...IIlI"),1Ilf,
l,b.I.,ll (111,,/11).
\1\. 11h. J1'J. '\1.
1111\:1.11.1,'111<.. 1... ), \77. Jgl, 1'.11
111":1.,lhlll ,>,o' I 'UI1VIIII, 1,b.IJII:.III, l'..hll 11

1,1','1.,11'.,11" (111,11\1.1). 17S. 17/,
111"'1.,1 1'.Jlly (111.11,1). JII, til
111"I .. II'.IIIY (,'1111.11 AIII'II<.o}, H'J-'JU
I 11"'I.,II',lIly (/ lul<"), lMO..HII HI'i. !1l7, !.'J.!.. 2'J I
f 110.'",1 I"'lly (l .. ],IIIILI.I), I'Jl-I'17.lu.!,
!U7 .!.Ul'S. W') !II, 211, 11'>, !lh. 217
111'cl.,II'.uly (l ,,!J.d. III
1111<.'1.,11',,11) (l.u,,,lul). Us-I, UI'i
I 11 ...,.,II'Jlly (fo.h-u.u), so. 51
LllxI .. II'oIIlY (v,,uOC"l;ud.. ).
LII ...I .. II..IIII. 105-106, Ill>, J6S-3bK. J'H
I'.IIIIVII 151 I'>'>
I III... 1i lull"'I". 11 I
1.1111.1111""1, 'UM' Y.><I
,\1..1.111.. 111. 1')
I Ill....I l)"III:II 'II"n,!J
l.'IOC"I<!"y I.It..:.. 5J. 111, .!51l, .IIlX. "OJ. "n
LlIcioIlw... 'lU'I-'IOK.
,IJ U-I JJ. 111 <117, 'I.!.J IH,42H-IIO
J/I/Ilt!IOS. 31, U
YIM/J, Ill>
1.J,I.I:. L,lIl1."':", (\II,c'h'. IU')
LI.-r..:. Ik:.lhl'v. \ .....lu:..IU), llll
nt..I"IIU, l.!!
l.uII.I"I" hlu.II,I".I(,J
Lope'/, Jlil;H1o. 1'J5
Lope!.: 1-I,.Il.. r, 230
1.o1M:1 fo.l.uct>s. Adollo. 63-66
I "IJCI. ;"!lchdst'll. Alfonso. 211
I vl.IC'/ Ol.J'oI,l"r. M .. nud (Afo.lI,O).8U
1.l)pOC"z l'orullv,lv:.e, 69-70. 7J
1.01"'1 Pumar..,u, AHvIlSO, 2U,I. 211
l.opa l{OC"g,l. Io:.e. 168
Lop..... y Gr,gonu. 117
1.,.. i,1 (Iilm). 430
F.1I1.wdo, 3'J3
Wasillugtoll, 32'1-325
I 111.1 'i<,c D.I SIh'.I, Luiz 111:\'::10
twlt'f ,i., i,j #lCVU/ll< lUI/ (ltlcrar)' 4211
I.U)mdll. 1;11111\'. 23'1. 235
lUll, lkllhJ, j211
f\1.IHU, ..\Illl)llio. 123
f\I.I.. h,ldo. Gl'lOIr,lo. 121l. 130
fo.\'lCh.. do <.I,' A:':'Is. JoaqulllI
l\laria. "12
t\lu,hhmQ, 21, 144.392
{\/</lllll,,;/Ill/ (l\miJ,ld... ). 415-'116
M.lll.-fo, EVJn:.to, 5'1
M.ld.-ru, I., 5'1, 57
1\\.I,bJl'.u. llf>
!\I.HlrOlzu.l(uu.:tl". MO
.... l h.Ilt:'lII, 'lib, 'llY
M.lglvlr<'. 1'.lut I: . 11'1
fo.l.Ig,,)UlI, ( hJrI.:,. 121
f\\.Ih.. n, ,\lfnJ Tha)<'r, 'J7
;"loIhuJd. I.. nul, 18'1
,\/'"".... USS. I 17. In
f\1;tI .. n. I'e.!ru. )14
f\\.,I"IIa, I'JJ
fo.L.n.lIl1lv I.hdla.k Tr..JIY. 197
f\1.11l ..... EJu.. nl... 'I 15
M.llut, I'.. ulo, 3'1:!
M.llligal, 1...:.11",115
1\1"0 Zl'dullg, 365
fo.l.II<ill'gUI, CJllu:., 41 'J
1\1'11\,IIIU. Crbtula.13'1
M'l" IIIl (J,)urIlal), 42M-J29
MJrcuna MUIlII!;. 16'J
Aitjrlll It.(m t!,...j ,Jc grllcw (film),
1J5 436
f\IMld ooall,(I. 13Y
M.JrIJuallJ,80.21'1
M.. Bob, 436
Marli, .. j:arJbondo. 104-105
MM'i, 12'1.136.412
I\larlln. Ricky, 'l3b
Martllldli, RkMelO, 99-100
Martinez de I-Ioz, Jose. 270
Martina ell' I'('ron, Isabel, Sec Peron, Isabel
A-Illrli" fic"\) '106
MMlini'lu<. M5
MMuloluda, M:lllud (Tirolijo), 210
Marx. Karl. 363
fo.l.Irxbm. 36J-J65, 387. 3g'J, Set! ,dsn Soo.:ialislll
Mo\'<,mcnl toward S4XI.. ItSIll;
fo.l0\';lIl1enlo al Soclah:;lIIo
fo.lassacn.: uf Ihl' oonan.. pl.lnlalLons, 203
Mastt'rs <lIul SiUl'd (I:r<'yre'), 307. '119-420
Mmmil!ro. 1:1 (Edl<,v('nia). 'lOll
MalilliquI!,91
M.IIOs, Ilubert, 13'1
Mallh<,ws, l!crul'rt. 131
MathJ ell.' TUfIlcr, Clunud", 382, 'i 10-'111, 413
Maximillall VOIi IlapslJllrg.
FertllllJlIJ.51
14-16. 16, g7. 42.1
IIIIu.UHtl, 2-16
f--kKinlcy. William. IlJ
fo.lUli M" Brazilian DculOCr.llI( l\lo'"CIlI"'"1
19
Meat. 2-18. 2-I'i. .xt! Ikd
Medellin drugc,Jr1d. 212, 213. 215
fo.lt:dla, 3U2. 329, 339, 3'iO. 42U 421
Mi-dlCi. Emlllu. 340
Mcdin:1 Anganta, l:.alas. 230
M(,Jia. lilpolilo, 113
Mdi-Ildel dan, 10'1
Mdg;lfejo, Mariano, 17>1-175
M.'IIl()rim de SlIbdesllfl'ollu (tihll), HU
IIleI/lOII,I) til' C/lf"15 (M.l< 11.1.1,-, de
Als),412
MOC"I1.. hll, IUgu!xrl'" 4)1
Mellem. CJrlos Saul, 2n. J,7(',3')g
Ml'rCallldlSIII. 1'1. 122
MERCOSUI{, 2J<). 274, 276. 277. 30-1. J7J
i\1.".1I(l0, fl, 2'Jb
Mero:nguc,410
fIl,,$t.zos: III Bollvl... 17-1: 111 'nl, .. l Andt':' h'glvn,
15U. III Chil.., 278: III Colombia. 1'J3. 201,
... ullural JcpiClIl.m:. of. 'II'J; HI 47; III
(010111(':', 18,20.21.22
M,'lhaml'hdalninc:., gO
Meltlcan Am..-rican W:u. 4'J-50. H5
M"'xicall l(e\'ululion, '15. SI-5g, 177, 178, J24.
J58, '1UU; 'UhUl.llllHl'lld, 116 117; llllilcd
f,oIdiulI, 56, 57
McxlCo. 'i5-81: Unll:.1J tWitS 10. 3M. bwe;tu.., .. lll
aulhonlarialU:.LIl. 386; Cluapas uprbrng. 7b,
or, 52. 90, 16-1. -110; compal .. tiw
,Jl\aIYMS. 400-401: cOlISlilutlOllS. 32, 34, 51,52.
5g; conh'mpolOlry S('o:ne. 76-81: co-optallvt'
JOC"lIlocracy. 379, corporallslIl, 60. 3SI:
corruplion in gov<'rmoenl, 63. 77, 80: CUU.I
.md, 64. 14g; (ullurl'. 414, 116-418. "24:
1IO. 390; earlhlluake in, 70;
economic conditiulIS and policies. 10.45-'16.
53_54,63,64,66.67.68,69-71,76-77,78,81;
c:cunomic IibelOllism, 354, 355, 356, 357;
.. migration from, 3, 78-79
(5...1.' (jlso Migrant workers); film industry. '121,
435: foreign ddll, 51. 69. 7U. 170, 31n. 368;
foreign invcslillenl, 74: GATr Ollld, 71, 75: g;ty
culture, 433; guo:rrilla mowments. 67-68. 76;
1II1porl,sub:;lilutioll illdu:'lrialil'.ation, 71, 361.
Index 157
362; ultkptudOC"m.... 32-33. 34 35,37.45 47;
pe pks vI, 16; 1I\;t1'. -16: fo.l .. )'alllo
;tIIJ AzI..... S Ill. 11, IS: m.lllar.. hy. 51,
1l<'Ollbcralbui. 71. 73. 372: ollg.. l.hl.. rule. 378,
puhllC,,1 .h:>tuch.lIl1l11elll. J'JJ, pulilical
'15; Iro:'III.-i:.lll, t\ 10. 1..:.lore.l
51; Rl.'volullUl1 (5,'e f\k:IU(;UI
IkvolulllJlI): rule, 17. 1M, 1<),21, 19 (.>,','
(11sl! N.. w Sp,HU); t>ludclIl (,6. 'I!-I;
IVlllblll, V," .. /ucla :11111.227 2lK, \'11,tl
101,llbll<:'. 7\1. W')lIWIIIII. WI
M"xku U.S. f.JI, -15. 75.
dlug 11.,IIIl.klllg, MO
forelgll lroh.y. 0<): fl.kXI ltI An1<'II.. .J11 \\".Ir.
-1'i-5U, s'>; IIIlW.1I11 WorI.OC"I:'. IC,. 62. 71. 7M 7'),
SI: NAt I A. 1 '/6. 7S.80. I-IS. J7U 371; ",I
finn:.. Sg. 60 61. 75; /1.':'<' (I<' Iu.m,. 70. 71. 76;
,lurlllg IhOC" KO:'vlullvn, 56. 5"1; !rollk, i. 53. 7\
f\liddl .. III Algt'IIIUI,I. 20<)-27U,
27-1; m UI;tlll. 310; lIIlenu;t1 Ami...:. 1000glOlI.
161:; IIIllill..lgS. 2:1l7; 1II COIOIII!>I.I. 2:02. III
Cub,l, I '\; lHlltlllllU. IIhelall:'1Il ,1IId, I'll); III
fo.10C"Xl.0. III Velie/lid.. , 1.!.'J
M.grallt W'-'I k.. l:. U'..kM'l')' 'I'>, (,2. 71,71:1-7'). MI
N1Llancs, 1',lblo, 4a
f\1I111,lIy. ,t7'J 18U, III Alg"lIlm;t, 2:')1' 2::'<),
261-2:f.JJ,2M Ill.... ll.ll:l-171. .JWI.1I1 Bu!lvl,'.
III 111,11;11,311 115 .nil, Jl5. .JJ'>,
137-JIlI, \.II, \'I'J IOO.lIlllllk.!X7-2liM, 'JU.!.
III ("II"I1ILI.l. 11, lUH. "I h lI.. dur. Ig..; III
1:1 Salva.!"I. IU'); HI 1\IcXI..U. ";', llS--I'J. III 1','1 u.
Ibl. Il)g I /U. III \ <II ..lltd.. , I III 1 H.
MIIII.II') :w...1.IIIloh. 170
I\IIlUllg: 11111..11\1... 1'>7
CO:lIl1;tI,\lIIel I.;t, K7; 1I1 ( lu1l'. IlH 19l, III
CUIOIlII'I", IJI. III II. I'...-u,
151, III .. ul"IIIl:', !'l'!b; 1"
SI'.lIl1:.h ,-,1'-'1 u,", I"; III V,II.,ud." l!\.ll'>
,\flli/)",.,,,I,'), 1')1-195
MIIlO!'.'lll.It><)
MIR .. fI.\O\"'I"'111 "i 111,lk'l,lull<"I.II)' Ldl,
1\1uvIII""III" .Ie I.. 1/"lull'I,I" Il.\'vlll(h'",III.,
fo.llI nd,l, L.Il111>:,II. 'Ill
MlramlJ. I 1',1I1'b.. Ode.)1
t\hs..egenJllvn. 18.21. 2b, l'Jj
Mblral. (,;tblll'l.I. -II J.--Il}
Mlt",171
MI1IOC", H,Jrt,-,lvlllc, 2-17
MNlt See NJltonal ROC"\'olullull;tl) M"vemenl
fo.hklOC"W,lt.J II. 15. 17
Mud<'fll Arl Week. 41
Br.lllh,1I1. 415 41ll, p...... lry, ;112-41 J
MOtkrnnatiUII Iheory. H ':I. II
Molin:., Arturo Armando, lOr;
MUIlHg.\).lo)e GrOC"gol'lo, 223
Monagas.losi- T,ld<',-" 223
Munrul.', 84 gr;
Monrve' DOCldill', 81-85. glJ. 2N. 21'"
Monlellegl''-'. Fernand,l. II)'"
Anlv'IlO d<" 86
'158 INPFX
Vbditmro. 172
Monloneros.210
MOllll, jnrgc, 2R6
Morais, PrudcnlC dc. 321
Moraleli. Evn, IRI-183. 11}(1, 2.19.147
Moralc.. l\cnm:ldf1. rr:mdM:o, 170
Mordos. l\laria, 32. JJ, 34, .17, W
1\loreoo, Mariano. 10
Mnrgan, Ilen'1'. M
r..lmcow, 1\hrr)'a, 9R. .1')2
1\ln"qllcn, Cipriano de. 19(.
Mnlhers of Ihe Plaia tic Maro, 269, 391
r..lovel1lclll for National Iknovation (ll;-lIlil. II r,
f\lovclllcnl <lflhe Revohllionar)' I.crl (Min,
Iloli\'b).IRO
MO\'clllcnl lO\\',IIc! (f\IAS; I\oll\'la), IRI
1\lo\'lrtlenlO NeWo UnHiucio. 4
r..lm'lI11ienlo:l1 VCl\c:wel;\), 1.1 '1
Mo\'imicnIO de Accinn N.. dnnal (Colomhla), 20R
MovllllielllO de la 17<Jlllcrd;\ Rc\'olucinnaria
(f\I11t; ( IHIe). 29R
1\lovimielllo dr 1;\ l1'1lllc1"(b Rrvullt(inn:1I1a (1\11 R;
VCIlC71,d.I).23 ,
M()vi111ienl') Quillla Reruhlic.. (MVIl;
Vcneweb).217
I\hwimienlo RcvolllClol1ario Ti'p:tc Aln:tru
(Min A: I'cru). 171. 172
MirrA. Scc Movimielllo Re\'olucinnarln THr;lC
AII\;lru
'd"c,./c dr Arf/"IIl(1 (:r/lZ. /..(1 'Iii
19.1
20. }r.. RR. \9'1.20,1. 222. 420
tduilO'll\br;I\, 1111
407, 415,417, '121, 42(i. 427-428. 434. 41(,
from Sp;lin ;lnd Pmhlgrll. Ih
l1enilo. :127, '1RI
Mll1lmlald 12'1.
MVn. Srr ;\'lovimicllln Quinla Ikp,'lhht;l
Nahllco, 10:l1l1l11l\. \1'1
NfU;(IIW/. 1:'1. 237
N.lcion:ll Fill:lncit'r,1 (r\,lexico). (,7
NJ\ FTA. Src NOl III Alllcric:T11 Fre(" TI:ul.
Ar.reclllcni
N;lhuall cuhllrr, R7
Nal'olC<l1l 111 (emperol of FlrlOCC),
N:II'0Iec.1Iuc. 2t} .\0, J I. 15, \(" R8. R9. 1'";2,
221,2RO
Nascimento. (10. 422
National Democralic ,\clion
(l3ulivj;l),180
N:lIlOl1ill Front (Colombia), 209-211
Nalional Front o( Oemocrnlic Youth (Peru), 167
N;llion:llism: cllhure and, 414. 417. 420. 421-42'-:
import-suhstilulinn industrializalioll and, 359
N;llioll:lli7alioll' in ArRcnlin:l. 260: in I3nli"jrl.
176-178; in Chile. 295-296, 297; in Cuba. 13'1.
I '1f>. 119: in f\ Iexico. (,()-(i I. i3; in 1'('1.1. 169; in
Vene7.uela, 231
Nalional MOlor F:I(!orr. \2R
N;llion;lll{l'\'olulion;lfr Mo\'cmCIII (MNH;
1I0Iivi:l), 177, 178. 179
N:llion;ll (I1razil), 339
Nalion;ll War. 100
N:ltllf:tl II, 158-159, 161. 182,347
N;lturali.. m. 410. 411
NIIVIfI .."o. 0 Ahc<). 407-408
'120, t\J'1
Ncnliher:lli\m. '151, 3AA-.'17"; in Argcnlina, 270,
2i.'1. 2i4.275. 372. 373: in Rra7il. 342 .'172. 37:\.
III C:cnlr:ll Amenca, 372; in Chile. 372: in
Colombia. 372: in Dominicall Rep"hlk, 372: III
Mcx.co, 71, 73. 372: in PCfU, 372; ill VrnC7uela.
2'14.2)".372. 371-374;
169-.\70, .n4. 3Rt), 19.'1
Ncrud;l. rahlo. 414. 428. 42l)
Nrlhcrlanck 21. 25. B4, 85. 91
Nelo. Ddfim. 341
Nr\'c", Tancredo, 341
Ne'" Economic 1'1:111 (Rulivj;l). I RO
Nc" French Company. 19ft
New 1,lall;lcb. 27, 31, 152, 191, 19"
Ncw I.;:\ws (Sp:milih colonies). 19
Nrw l.t:adrr. Tilt:. I 10
Ne,, ..i\'e I';lrly (PNP; I'UCIto RICO). 11<).
120
NCI'" Sp:tln, IR, 2R. J2-.n, 221
New )'or,l, Timrs. 131
NiOlr:l(.;lIa,9O.100 104; co((cr. 94, 95, 90;
e;lrlll'1uake in, 102: cconnmic condilions and
102.10:1; guerrilla 102,
3(,". 3E17-38R: Hurricanc Mill'll, 103; Nation;ll
W,lf. 100: 1'01i1i(';l1 ;\')2:
422; Unilell :lncl. 69, 71. 100-102,
104. 3RR: Vene711clrl ;llle!. 233, 373: women in.
391
Nlclne)'ef. 42<\. 42(,
NltlOllt's, .l8. 164. 175.2111. 2R2. 2R5. 286. 2M
Nixon. Richard. 9R; Chile policy, 295, 296. 29R;
Cub:l policy. 136-137; Peru policy, 169;
Vell('wrla policy. 1.32, 2.n
Nnhcl I'ri7.e 'Ill, 4n, 424, <12M. 429, 4.12
NniTluuc. 115.420
Noriqp. Mannd Anlonio. 99
Norlh Americ:ll\ Frce Tr"c!e Agreemenl
(NAFTA), 73-76. 78. 80.148.304. :170-371
NUc!C:lr NOIl'l'roliferMion Treaty, 341
Nllc!e:lr we;lpons. 3'11,373
NII('stTfl ill!rri"'itlflll ('COrlom;((1 (Encill;l"). 352
Nllcm candOrl. 10. 427
NUl'V;l Trov:l movement. 427
Nililc7. Rafael, 196. 198.203,205
OAS. &c OrganiZ:ltion o( American Slalcli
Oh:tma. flarack, 3. 149,242.375
Ob:lndo, lose Mari;l, 195
Obregon, Alvaro, 57, 58-59, 'lIt>
Ocalllpo, Vicl(1ria, 415
Occidenlal Petroleum. 216
OchO;l Arn:!lc!o. 145
nc.loher Jrcl Club. 325
()clohcr nevultll;on. 108. 109
Odri:!, Manuel A.. 1(,7, 168
Ofido tie tr"reMas 424
O'Higgins. Ikrn:lrclo, 280
Oil. J6R: Argcnlina. 2(,7; Bolivia. 158, 176 177.
179; I\razil, 306, 332. 340, 348; t.ol",nllla. I9'J.
200.201: I.uha. 134. 14(,; F.rtl:ldm, 1t,1.
187-189, 190; Mexico. 58. 60 61.6f). 70, 7t;. RI.
I'Cfll, IS<;. 167. 16R; VCIlC7Ucl:l. 12.1.2(, n'I.
210. lJ I. 232-234. 21'>. VR. HI. 2<12. \7 \
OJ''}';l Ile"era. tnrlcIUt', 204
.. hjc rulc. 376. 177-37R. lRIl. lRt>. IR7
01111(' cuhure. R7
Olmedo. lo'>i- lo.'1qllin dt". 401
Dine}', Richard. 224
(>lodunl,434-41",
OI)'l1lpK (;:lnu'" of 19611, (,(,
165
Or/t: IllIrldrl'd YC'(If< "[.\o/",,.IC' (( .,11( 1.1 I\la"IIIC'1J.
20'
ONelll. 421
Ongani:l. Inan U,'i-1(,('
OPFC. Scc OrRan.7alinll of I'elrnlemll I '(l'flllIllj:
Coullllies
Opcr<tlloo !\oolslr:ll'. IIR
Operaliun {\rfllhcr Sam. I If,
Opcr:llion 217
0l'el:lllOn 9<'
Opiulll poppies. 214
O'-j!;allI7.1Ii('ll of American ( ),\,,). (.1. 110.
112. II"'. 116.215,271
Orl\rllli7alion o( "C'Irflleum FXI'0I111l!:'
(OPEC). 161. 179. IRM 1111),232 _}'11. }W.
2(;7,368
Orinoco nell;l. 219. 224
Oro7.co. Jose C1"Inellle, 4 17
Orlcg.l. D:lrne1. 10.1 104
()rri1. Rnllaln, 257
Ospin:l l'ere1.. hbri:lllo, 205. 207
Ospin;l Rodriguc7, M:lli;lllO, 19". 1'J7
Duro rrelO. flf, 11"
()vrlnclo, Alfreclo, 179
OXip,flHl Venlc r:lrly (Colornhi;l).lI7
Prlet of I'unlo Fijo. 231-2.\6
I'aelill;l. I-Icrhcrlo, 14J
losC Anlonio. 33. 39. 222-221
rrlJacios. Maren. 194
PAN. See I'arrido Accion Nadonal
Panama. 97-100; ')16: <.f.
197-198,203; Operalion Jllsi <:19,
sparls.422
I'anama Canal, 85, 97- 100. 110.2.\1
!':In American, 227
P;lrngtl:l)', 311, 312. ]QI, 393: Ch;lCO War. 17(. In.
neolibernlism, 372. J7J
Paragua),an W:lr, 247. 3 11.312. J 14
Itiver basin, 247
1':lf:lsl;Ual firms. 31\0
1,\1
1'.lTd". If,'i
Pard". 1(,<1
I'all;l. V,01clrl. ,127
l'a'lid" I\cci'lIl N.h IUIl.1111,\ N: I\lnll n). h'. f'"
72. 7(,,77, 711.Rll
Parlicln (:nrm.nl..t:l V('IIr/d"nn (I'VI 1\,'.
I'a.-I) (VC'I1("/, ...I:I)
1'.11 IId.. ric b Rr\l,Iml"" /llru .'".1 {I'Il;"1

I'rlr""" l)rlll'" r.il1f" N." 1"1'.II/\'l'WIlU 1. 1
1'.1111<1" 1111('1;.1 ( (Nil .11"1'.'1,.1
WI
1';l,IId" N:I. ""'.llllnnl", '"'',Ill''' 1':'J11
",,,<,,), r,'/
1'.11 lui" I{c,"I'I<lflll.II'" In<I'I'h 1",1.,1 j 1'111
1\1,''(i\n), (,! (.t. (,I. "C'. f. (,<;' ..
RI). lRI. 'R(. 1111
1':lIllrlo .... l<.lallkl1l".,.'I'." fI".I'. 1l1.IIII,. lltl
HI, In. n
r
\II. It)
I'."lllln 1I,.IQ!rllfl (1'1 It! t 10. \ II
tl\. tt',
I'alh' ,,1 .... .'11" 1111<."1\ II'''',,\' 11,-1/111 I I
l''''Ir,\1 'hr I km"c 1:111< 11,\"1,,1,.,,,/1'1111
f<lr'(j, ,.), if. T;.
I':lll\' "Ilhr I{t\nl.,llf'l,al\ I dl 111,.1,\" . 1
I IIuulll>l. 1,lh,1. II", Ilf,
} ", I ..,
]In
1.llm". I';'.; I
/'''/'''1 1>,,/,". 221
1'.,.,1")' 1,"rll;l'! (f 1111<1. )',',
1':lI.Oc.lrl\I.... 1N
1':1" 1.. V"IoIl.I-
1'.11 / ..1111"1.1. 1:lIlIlr. uw
l'll( ......'/IIII<II;l1\ I kill," 1.,11' 1'.\111
1'111'. Sn' 1'01'111.11 Ilrlll'" 1.111' 1'.\11\
1,IV.... A.}l \ .1\<1.1. \R. ),1,'
1'\':1((" pr MS
I y' in A//:"1I1 Ill;l 11""11' ,. "I ' ',11. I'll. I>
Il"lIv,,,. 174. 177. 17H. III 111.,"1. I.'ct. 1""- ,"
( hl1(". VIR. III II ",,1\".1,1''1.101 IW.. lt1
t .Hall'lIpl;l. lOR. III "Inu"- 17. ,'1 '.11. 1(111
III Pelll. 1(.'1. t70
I'c.lltll(ellll'('rnrnflll.lflilo tf, '-. III III
l'c,IT" 11 ('1111'('1111 of 111.11111. 1-;'". t I I 'I.: II I
\Ir,. l7R. 410
1'111, l;lU". 1) t
......r I'fl",lro( "-1(""'11'"
Pcna. AI"n\fl. 1).'
I'rlill. In. <127
l'eil:llos:I. n... il:l 1<:'1 "l1ll11a dr. 7.}
21. 21.l7. l,'. n. I',. 1
1
0
I'l'II\17n. " v.
I'cople's llip-h (';ollllll.m.!1 1\01,,'1.1). IS 1
I'err,ra <I .... $:lnlm. 41(1
I'rle7. lo"c 1ll:lll"in, 7.114
I'rrC'7 AIf\l17n. 11l;l1l I;lhlr J,"I. ) \} ) \ I
l'ere711111Cnc7.1I1:lI( ...... }\I . .'t)
I't;(C7 l(oquC', Id'I'C'. 1411
"('I/t/ml/fl !ar 11/(',,/(1. II (I rr n.III'!c-1 ,I, I 1/ II' Ii I. III.
lloU HlPI \
l'd"l1 I ,., (I "I.IJ. .!I.(I 2Id.ll>2 .!I.. 11'l.!
1'o:I,m. h.,I,..:!. .!old '!t.I'l.1711. I')!
1"'1'1lI, JlI,1l1 11"'lIulg", 11l7, l:il, 201'l, 2+1.
2<'1:1 20 I. . .!.'J/. JI:IU. JHJ. \'10,
..1.2'>1'l 2'>'1, ,k.1l1! lit. 2(>1:1; III ':1I11.. 202-.!.o I,
":h'>. 1',,11, II'!> ui. J.c..'J lll.!; Idum vi. 200 loK
I"'IUIII)I IlI"H'lll"ul, J.7.!..lJb, 177. )')M; ltlUllthll).;
"I. !(>lI. vIIII..WIIII: vI. !(>J. llillhgl.lUVII
.111"1111'1, lc.\-.lto<', 11'llIllllo I'HI'':I, 2lJ"I 26/'1
1"'ldl, 1(11, i1
1"'1 ,1,HI \ ,,,Ii \\'.11 J.',".
I"III.I')U 1<;'/.11,1 III. "01111',11".1 Willi.
I Ii \. 1I.,lnI,' 1<"1.111\1111> "'Id" 174, B,I!ll>h lU.HI) 1",
IX. III I, ( 1..1,\ h.1l "'111" lliU, 'Ulll>'glLllI"1I\
1',/ . ,,,uk,nl",r.. ')' ),,,n.. , 171,
"'1'1"1. Ll. I'>';. 170, CIlL" .ILIJ, lJ'J,IU!lUh.
II'J tI, 1111" I... )'. I"I.!. I')IJ; dllll: 1'>7.
.' J!. .!I J. ",UllUllILt , .. mlllluILI> .. m! pult<.I':!>.
1',1'. 1()7. l}iJ.171, 17J. hu..JuI)
,"ILlh,l ,,,"1,, HIl,. JI!rUILI,ILL)II)'. 111. hll':Igll
.1.-I'I.llJ\ III I, 1711, 171; l:LJ.L1IU, Jl:I. 1"01 1'>,/,
1';<'. Ihl: 1:11l'1 I ,II" IIL"\'Ult'L1b, 17u-171;
lI11lllLgI.Lllh Ill. I"iU 1'>1. 1"iI.lllt.l\II'.
ludqk:lIJ.IL.t:". 17. 1')2 1'>\. l!l.
1II.1'g.. III)U) , ...... ,I'ln vI. 1o, IloJ. lIS),
ll."hl I.III)llI. II.!; ,,111:,11 I h", lUI.'.
""'m ""IIII,.LI ,h",II<.Ii.Lltllllt:"lll, J')J.
\"... Ihl ,\".1111)1, lUI.'.
17. Iii, 1'1, lX, 1<'1
1/11 171, \\1.11 vIII .. 1',lllli,. Ih'l.
It,';. 11'11.
1"'111 1''':)lhl,. 17\
I'dlul ...,).I'>',Il'l1 IHl, HK
1... 1.,..11...101,
I'd. "I..,,) 1\1"",1 ..1... ') (/'1.1\11' X). lli. 71
l'.lt"kulIL ....... \ ILl
I',II"I':UIII Llw l \ .m'llId.lJ.Ul'I
1".1,.'1 ....1.'. 16'J
1'llIhl' IV (klllg vI "p.LLII),.o1'l
1'lull['I". <;uy. 1/7
lL.lul .. , NllU!.I) ti,. Illi
j''''lh' lolLlI),F<.I,.hd... 117
1'11I1It:"lr.., ju..lv. 3:.'1
I'll." 11.1 Il:I2. I<,IU.! W, 2/b. J'll )'))
lllIU1h AIII;U)lv. !Jo. JUU. JUI, JJli. 4!7, ;Ill'l.
1 '\U; .In 1')1 .,f. J05; l"'gUII.. ,Ii, JUl JU'I
1'1\,...111I... ). i;J:) ..Illd IILI, 15M, I()I. !tU, 216
J".,,, Co/vmlml. 21(.
/'/UI/ .I.' <:II<I,I,/III/W, "7
/,/,1>1 ,t.' 1'1')
1'/'11I ,I. '\'lfI 1.141) 1""1"1. '>',
I'll", JJlgmd,/,f. IISI
l'I.. ILI..Illon ,)\J{"1... 11..". I!. ') I, Ill. )1'>1, \0'>. Jl:Ih.
)!l7.3lil:l,J'J4.4UI
1'1.,1I AIl''''lI,hllt:"lll. 121, Il'J
1'1.11.01 1.;I!>)(I. C .. lu. lISCo
1l,.I,o;iIi,LLI 1>"lll"U"II' M""'LIIl'111
I',nly
I'NI'. S.. New l'ruglc\:)I\, I',Llly
I'NI(.\c.: 1'.Lllhl.. N,ltl llk\.,lu.llill.ln"
/',IU/,/ II.}.;"I. 411
I'lldl)'. 'IU", 105. 'I I J-III
l'ul,llId,I14
l'ulilll,llllbcraIiSlII: III Argelllllla, 217-2'IM; III
(I.I':XlIt'. -IS
I'vlUlI.llparll"'!>: III Argcllli1l3. 2'>5; III Chllc, 2Mo.
III Colombia. In V..ut'l.uel ... 230-2.1 I
1'01111<.) .Illlipollcy: Argl'nlllla, Boli\ 101.
17,\ IH3; lkll.il. 321-3-13: Clllh:, 28'1-304:
1.I,lulllhla.!.OJ 211; Cuh..l.
IluII11IIK.llllkpuhll'::, III-IIJ;
Il:I1 El S,llv,ldur. 1O'IJt)H: (.;ual,tnala,
IU1'I-1II:1I..lIII, II) 117;Mexico.5S-7u,
Nh.Jlagu.l. 100-10'1: l',lllallla, 97-IUO: I' ... ru.
Ill} Pu,'rlulh..:v. 117 120: Vt'llcl.ucI.,.
HU-!36
Pvl", /.tIllC" K. 1"
l'tJpll/,u-lw. I'JJ. 1'1'1
1"'1',,1..11' <.ullIlrc. 421 42l
1'''11"1.,1' l).:llllltl.J1Ll P;UlY (1'Ill'.Pu"lI" Ill...).
II'>. UO
1'lll'ul,'1 ltld,cal) IUCRP: Al'ge/1hna). 20)
I'Ul'ul.IIII)U: AlgenlHl:l, 241:1: Hr;ll.il. JU6: Lilli.:.
.!HI. (;uluUlllI,I. 2UI; Illdlgellom pcuple). lb. I'J,
1..11111 }\lIIenc.l. 5; 47
I'vl'uh)lII. 1JI. JJlI. 337. J77. \liU -381, i83. 387
I'unll, DanJ. IKli
l'ulI,II.::), IJlcgu. J'), 2-17. IHU
l'n, IluliO 3')2
/)I}III,III uJ /"cl':)(/ (fillll). 145
l'UIlllg.d: Ulal.illllil i'ld,nJllilit..lllon. 311l; cutuni:LI
I uk, '5-.18. JOb, 40J-'104; 5;
,lIugl.lllun Irolli. 317. J55; of court 10
1'\1..1111. J5; 21.
F<.hl)llLll) lrom. 16. NJpvlevlll' \'I.r".
2". I'>. '\1,
l'u)III\I\Ill. '>.1.. JII. IIU
P,,\<,lly, III Ih.I(LI, Jlb. ',\H.II1.':llll..l1 And"'l>
1"'1;1.111, Ib.!. 16J. III Ch,l,', JU'I, in t '"lomb"l,
lUJ. III /'vk:<'II\l, '17, "0.1, 1:11: ill VIIlCLUd.L,
!.J'> 2Jo. HI
hJ"dl. ( ullll. 117
I'r.ldo. Antulllf>. )!J
I'I .. d". /\lanucl. 167
1'1..11), C..IrlO). l'J'J-3lJO
1'1(11. .kt' l'arlY 01111, D.. IIlOCrall... I<t'volulton
1'r.III,...h, I<.,ul. 359. 36U
J'ret!)l/, 1.11. !.00
S.:.' Mcdi,1
PI,:)I,:). Luil> C..IrlU). 323. 3l'J
I're:.l.:) ( IJIUlIIlI. 323
I''''''al, K"ILe.116-117
I'KI PartLdo R,vulu.-Iullanu 11l)liIUtlull.t1
I'llv Sut.urr.is, Carlm. 129
1'1l... 1"..1I0l!: III Arg",lIIina, 273. 274; III IkJli\'ia.
15t). IBI. III Urazll, :i'l2. 3H; ill C1l1le. 303,
JU'I, 39'J: III Mexicu, 71. 73; ill Peru. 173: III
V.. llel.uda.2:i4
I'RM. .. I'arlid.) d .. b l(evolution M...XIC.III.1
1'1"1,)1.1lI11)1II, IX'J, 336
Sc.- P;arll.tu
I'SIlIi. S c Ural.il",u SodaJ l)cmoC!OlIh: I'.arly
I'S..1. S l'arly "fSocJalbm [jIll.! Libcny
1''1'11. S ' Partido Trabalhbl'l Urasikiru
Puerlo RICO, 3, 117-120; (OlUlllOllw,'alth )1 .. lus,
118, 119; gJy ClJlure. 433;
Boul:.lrap, 118; I'Juarna and, 99; SpalU!>h
American \\' ar, I 17-1 IS; SpJllbll nil ... J5, 1:14.
MS. 117-11 H; sporlS, 422; slaldlOod 119
I'wg, Manuel. 4)1 134
PUIII(J FIJu. Sce !'.Ill uf 1'111110 l'l,u
Qu.ldn)), j:IIllU. 33'1, 3'12
Qucchua :)peak.. r). 174
(Jue i hStJ CO"'lhmllt'lfO, 0 (1iI1ll). 4J5
QIlII"1'nYI;/I. 427
1(.IlC; Bral.ll, 32U-32I ,346.419-420; Cal Iblw..lll,
')2: <:entr.. l AIlIcnca, ')5; (lllulnbJ.l, 1'1 I: CulM,
Ill, 14'1: (uhl/r,11 mtlu.:nct of, 41
Ecu..Idor. 15U, '11<); Pcru, 15U-151, ,119:
I'urlugu.:sc colonn,'s, 26: Spanish tuIUILI ... ). 20,
21.21. 2b. Se.. abo ILldLg':IIUtl:) pco"ll')
RaCIsm, 7-1:1. 317
l(atl,c.. 1PJrl)' (Argt:"u"n;t). 251, 255. 156, 257. 251'\.
272.37".390
1{.IJ,I.IIl'an)' (elllk). 21:10. 21:1'). 190, 2')2.-I1U
1{,ld,O. 420-421, 4J I
I{mlwllUl'..Ilu. '121, 43 I
1("illO;l\b. '" I. 5J, 54. 37B: 1Il Arg":lllIlL.I, 2011, 355:
III Hohvla. 175; LlI Br;ml. 317: ILl 2lil; III
Cnlumbl,l, 1'l7. 199, III Cuba. 125; m M..x.. u,
\5S; III Pl'rlI. Ib3
I{Jbl".. J>unlLa. 295
I(.IW)IIII. AliUlu. 25M
R'I)'lldfl (Lvrlal..ll)...UM
R,/:w ('IHlllIlll. L" (Vascontdu. 417
Rc.lgall. l(onaIJ, 71. 347; Algelllm" pul" y. 271,
Chill' pollC)', J03; EI S.llvadur lUu;
NIIM..gU" I'uhly. 1U2. JMM; 1',1Il3m.1 i.....1I1..1
jJtlh.y, 'Jli, Ven"71lda pvlll)', 23,1
Rcalt)lll, -IIU 411; maglC'.II, oj 16, -12<)
Real y Pontiflca Uni\'eulJad de uraC;l). 221
R.. bou,a!>, 313
Rl'l U/llptli. IOJ
1l.'fOlllrtlS. 103
Itdonn<t, La, 50-51
l<eggal'. '136
R. ...g/l)1I IIlllS 1/
(FU"'lltes).417
Religion: illdigcllous, 19-20; VOl/lilli, I:IIS. 115.
(11$0 Cailloltc Church
Antonio. 98
Reno. 147
15')
Ikpublican ParlY (13r.l'llI), 312, 314. 321-322
ItI'public3n Ulliol1 (Holivi:!), 176
N...rIl111 NOVl/rlll/l. (papal (I!Cyclical). 191:1.367
Rl'scue lo.ms, 70. 71. 76, 368
lam.:s. 3
It..,,/.,,,. d. 215
U.'I'''/Ilfltm .'/1 Imll, 1"1, ltH
Ikvululltlll.. l)' 30'1 IuS.
<\!IIUllll'l> ,din 1",llIy, JB(J J89; .utlll"'LI
frolli. 41<> 'II,), 120 '11K St'. (dSu
Gu.:rt 111..1 muvclllelll)
It"\'olullunary P.llly (COIUIlII.IJ), 10.1
Rt'volul,vll.lry \Vvl'k.:h I'arly
(Holivi .. ). 177
Ilt-r"s, 1(.,t.Ld. lU i
H.II.lnlli. I)"vld. 35'1, ,ISIS
Ihv 1'''11, 110
lU;IlL AulOlllv, 2X9-2LJO
/(10$ /11'0/1<11I1.,;;, L)) (Argll,.la:). 'Ill
RI\.I..I.l l l..gt,,417..IIM
Kobl,'s, Fral'<.I)CU. IHI
1(........ lulllJ. 1-17. 250
I<OC.lluerll, VitClllc, IH4
It .... h,l. t,;1,wh':I, 4 m
l{vdtl.lllSC hllItIU\,lll ,IIJ,III
I{odnguc). NdsOIl, '122
I(v.triguc(. c.,rlus It,t,wl, 11 [
ROilrigll"'1., Flollh.b.tI, 2'11
1tOt.lriguel., 12,
H....lngul'L I al..l. (;U1l1nrllu. 187 18')
Rup" I'llUlI..I, (.;ul>l,,\u. 2tll:l. 2lJl), llu
Itilldo) AgIIII,rJ. lallll'. Il:I')
l(lllllallIIU)l1I, i10') -10K
Ihlllll'l'v.< .... llu:) Ilulilell.l, 10'>
I{UII1.ro, (h.,lr i\lnultv. W'. Illo
ROlllcro 11M. do, Lllius. 11')
1(,10)1'\,\,11. 1 I.LIlk.hll 1)1'1.11I", W, O!.. 10 I. 127.
11M 11'J
Rvu)l... elt. I'hcvdvre. 1')8,225.-I1!
IhJu:)e\'eh i....I'rull..lry (10 tl.lolUtX Doetrmc). 22';
l(ol>Js.lu.ultl.t.ulud,k,J7.1').2'16 H7,JII tl!.
'Ob
It",. ,/. 1 r'. 1',1, 151:1. 17<;
11S'J
J{ll)sdlu. l'ldw. lit)
J{uS)I, tl.1,IIIc1u, JJ(,
l(lIyal DUllhl\hdl. l10. 'l.l7
l(uLb,1.151. JIS-JI6.j5-1
Ihuz Corllll...S, .""dutfo. 6J
J<umha. 421, 121
Ihlssla.227 228, 2J'J. s..(' tllw UlI1un
I(U)1>Iall ItcvuJUllull, 3S1:1
SIll, jOIll"1 ,I, Avdl,lILnl.I). IUS
Al1lUlllll. IUS
lu.1l1 U..Iulbla. 101
S.il'lI:t I'dla. 25'1-155, 256
SJlfurd. Fr.. nk. I'JI
SAFTA. Set' Soluh AIII'II... .I .. F..,.: I'I ..d.
I\SSOCIJIIIlII
S;1l111l)nlllingu.:, tHo I:IB. 'J I 5,;", Ilalll
I).miel, 176
SJI:lZ3r, AlllolIIll dc Vllvella. 2Ul:I. 327
Salg:ldu. I'lilllO. 325. 327
S.llina) dl' CUII,II I. C:lrlu:). 72 7'\, 7c... 7b. 77
462 INDEX
W"lter.4''l
music. 426
Samh". 330. 42.1
43'1
S:Hnc<li. Haron. II!'",
S:II11pcr. Ernest), 215
S:inchez CerrO, M.. If15-1(,6
S:inchez lie 1.07"lla. GOll7.alo, IRO. IH I
Nation;]1 l.ihcralion
Froill. 102
102. un. 1(14. lfi5. 3R7. lMS
SaTldino. IOl.1U4
Jnan 2117
San I\.larllll. (\e. 3 '-34.36. 152..24(.
Sanla Anna. Anlonio 'opez dc. 4i1. 50
Sanla Cru7.. de. 174
S;'Inlanderislas.194-195
Santander. Franciscn clc Paula, 194
S;'Into Domingo. 86. 8R-1I9, 93
Santos, Elhmrtlo. 20'1-20'l
S;'Innienlo, Domingo 247, 40(,
S;'Irne)', 342
SaUlt; Arabia. 229. 2'7.
Schick. Rene. WI
School oflhe Americas, 99
Srienlific pe.. (('. 19(,
Sr-nll. Winfield. '1<)
St'lena.436
delllocracy. lRO. ]')0
Sendero (Pem), 171.172
Sc,iflr Prf'$/(Irtllr. FI 421
Serra. 34'l
St'rliH'j. OJ (Dil Cunha). 411
Sharecropping. 155. 1<;9. 1117
Shining Path. Src 5cmlero Luminoso
Sirte Cll$ll)'CI$ dr mlrrprrfllrinn dr 1" rrtl/,'/ml
prrrumn (l\l:lr.ilcl:\lIi). 41 0
Sig:lloka 2(13. '110

Silv(l11 la agnnl1tllfll rlr III :!:Otltl t,irrinfl
(llul1lholdl).
Sih'rr,7. 19.27.29; Ilollvia.157. 174. 17'l.Chi!c.
281; Mell:ico, '16. 53; Pcru, 151. 152, 155
Sillll'son.Rodillll Acl. 71
SINAMOS. &e SiSI(n1a Nacion,,1 ell ApCI)'o dc la
Social
Sirifmlia f1ldw (ehavc7), 417
Siquciros. David Alfaro. M. '117
Nacional en AI>O),o de la Movlli7.acion
Social (SINAMOS; Peru). 169
SI;'Ivery: aholilion of in Brazil. 313-314. '15;
ahoHlion of in Colombia. 195; abolition of in
Ecuador, 184; aholilion of in Mell:ico. 32:
abo11lion of in Peru, 1(,3: ilbolilion of in
Venc7.ue1:l, 221. 222, 22.1; in Br:l7.i1, 3!i, .1(" 3R.
40.306.307.309,310,312-3'4,320,3'1(,.
407-40R; in Carihbean, 86, 8R. 91-92; in
Colomhi". 193. 19'1: in Cuba, 38, 121.122.144,
357.408; wlturr- ami, '103. 407-408; undr-r
economic 355; in Portnguesr-
25. 26; in Puerlo Riel). 118; in
20. 22; in Vene7llda. 221
Sm:lllpox, 17. 1<).22\
Smilh. Adam. 353. 3'>4
Smilh. W:lher Rlcll. 110
SlIloOI.llawley t:lriff. 127
Snccer, 422, 436. Sre fl!SCI World Soccer
Chanlpionship
Socialism, :l51. 362-3611. '1\4. 4 IR; Argenlina and.
2';';; Chile :lnd. 2RS, 296-301, 3M.
.198- .199; Colomhia and. 202; Cub.. and, 14 I,
Gllalemal:l ;Ind. 108.364; mililar)'. 176;
lOR; Vt'lle1.ucla :lnd, 148.240.24 I
Socialisl Inl('rnallonal. 233
Soci:llist Pany (Argenlina). 252. 255. 258
P.ut) (Chile). 289. 291. 292. 29'1. 304
Soci:lliransformalions "nd in
Argenlina, 248-252; in Dr;17il. 315-321: in
cenlral Andes region. 161-163: in Chile.
280-2113: Ill. 394-395; in
Colombi:l. 19R-203; in <:uh:l, 124-128; under
cconOlnk lihna1ism. 356-35R; in Mcxico. '17,
51; in Porlugucse 7.6: in
20-21; in 22(,-229.
Sre (lbCl Middle WorkfnTl'e
501"'10. Fernando. 410
Solano I."p('z. ]12
Humhcrlo, 430
Solidarity OIovment (Polanll). 1401
SomMa Oeha}'Il'. lUI 102.165. HP.
388
$om07..""1 Dehayle. I.ui... 101
So1l101.3 Garda. AnaslaSlo (Tacho). 10\
SaMICls de fa mll/'rte 411
Mercc<les. 427
Soulh Africa, 1,14. 145
5nUlh American Frce Tmtle
(SAFrA), .'72. 373
Sodcl Union, 86. 30). )M; inva(!clj
hy. 14": Boli\'ia :lnd. 179: col1:lpse of. 10. 1/16.
365:Cub:l:lneI,134. U7-IJR, 140-\41.142.
143-\44, 146. 148.400; C7cchoslov:lkia
invilcled by. 142; Gualem:lla :lnd. 110.
Nic:lragu:l :lnd, 102, a/<o Cold \V:lr.
Soybeans, 346
Sp:lin: nolivia and, 159: corpor.uism. 381;
cllininlt power, 21-22; emigration from. 248.
355,357; Muslims expelled from, I';;
N"poleonic \\lars. 29-10. 88. R9. 152.280;
Nic:lragua and. 102; Sp:lnish.Amcric:l1I \Var.
117-118. 123: War of lhe
22. Srr also rule
Sp:lnglish. 130
5panish.Americ:ln W:lr. 117-118. 123
InCJuisilion. Sec Inqui$ition
Spanish rule, 16-23; in Argenlina. 244-246;
hurcaucr:lcyof. 18; in C;lfihhean, 82-84. 85. 88.
92.93; in Ct'ntr:'II America, 86-87: in Chile.
27R-280; in Colombia, 191-193: Conquest, 5:
in C:uba. 30. 84. 85. 121-123; euhurl' umler.
41l1. econOTllIC condition.. al!llp'oliclC<;. lt.
2R-29; in ECU:ldor. 1"1; 11111Iival"111 fnr. 17;
origin l.f lOckpendellcc 27 1'>; III
I'eru. 17. 18. 19. 2R. 1';1-1';2: rnl.-
compartd with. 2_'. 2';; in !'lIerlo Ih,n. le,. IN.
85. II i-118: social Slrucl,lre :lnd. 2fl 1.1. In
Vcn('zucla.220 222
Spenccr. Ilerhell. 24X
Spiritual lOR
Sporg, '122-'\21
Slalin, 10sll'h. M
Slilndard all. 1';5. 176 Ii? 27.1. ]62. ,WI
St:lvenh:lgcu, Rodolfo. 181
Sled mduslry. '19.3211
SlolI. D"vid. 432
Sirike<;: llI,\rgclltina. 252, 254 2t;';. 2<;1). 2M.
in I\nliVla, I I n: in Rr:l7il. -'2l 319. ',11. HI
C1uJe. 286-287. 2811. 290. 299; 111 C'llumlna. 2m.
20.1: in CUhil, 12M. 132: in Ecuadnr. 1116- III
Mexico. 64: in Peru. 16'i. 171; m
2 'fl
39. <)8, lOR. 280. 2f1R, 177. \7R
Sluclrnl proll'sl.. , (>t>, 22(,. I \(). 424
S,f!, It'rrll (Lillo)." II
Sucrc. Anlonio I 174.221
5111.'7 C:lnal, 9}1. 19R. 229
Sugar: ArW-lllina. 250; Holida. 1'1<). IIr,'7il, JO. l".
106.310.1IS;(:arihhcan.ll"II).R-I.IIR.91 'H.
Cuba.JR, 122.1201 127.1.14.1'10 I "."d.
'
';:.
40Ct. Dommic-:m R('publlc. 91 QI. 112; /l.lC'xlln.
';3.54; Pl'nl. 154. l'l';. 1(,<). 1711. PIll',,,.lheo, IIX
"'llmlnll of Ill.. '. 171
.<illr (journal), '115. 42R
Surill:lll1e.85
Taft. 101
T:lirona$. 1')2.. Ill'
T:lngo. 25.1, ,121. 422
TapuillS,2.:l
Ta'lOT:l, Illllre7. )' I
Taylor. Willi:lnl II. 2R
T:l),lor. 7_1ehary. 49
Tealro Cnlim opera '1M
Te:llro Experimenl,,1 do 'Ill
Tealm Naclonal SUCft'. o1oq
TechnocralS, 52. 76. 77.164. 16'l. 2(',(,.102.1111.
304.331.343.-'59.389
Te(ho}' tlura 11>7
Trlcrrovclll',411.416
Television, 423. 430, 431, 4.'\6
movell\l'nl. 323. 32S
IS. 17
Terras do Sem Fim (Amado). 429
Terrorism: in Argenlina. 26R. 270; Scplelllher II
:ltl:lcks, 78. R6, 99. 2\6; IV:lr on, 124.217
TrsolJotloj, 76
Tcxaco. 188. 1119
Texas. 49. 50
Thealer, '122. 430-431
Third Forct' (Colomhla). 20R
TII'IIIp". II. J.nM
1,,,,llI1n<. I). (l ,1111\;'111"< \ll.I<). 10-;-
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Il.llalj!.II, balllr ..1. J"
11. lh,.lIllr.....1111"<. II 110
'11.11I'1"'II.I'lon. '11. II. "II 1"",1'1" "1-' "I,
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I rUlll.lll. 11.1I.}' .... II"
'illpal.. "Illalu II. J"
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1\Io\'("II1CIII 1"0
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'1111'1 (,uM"n; l,ll1J!u.,,:r ,:"'II\,. ' I
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2t.th of lui)' ,\I",','mrnl I I). I".
'1 Will "lalll (I'Il,c!,l. II"
\ thu ". J(O'I:". lOR. 187
VIH ."rr I lniilll Civil a Ib,11l Oil
llCIH ."rr Inlran<iW'111 n"dir.. b
\lCIU'. POl'ular
UDN, Scr llni:in I 'Clllllllalil a N:h.I"II,,1
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181), 30'; in Cnl".,.hl".ll(. III ( "loa, Ir. Il'
Ilaili. 117: '" Mr... ". 'F; HI NII.H.I!:u.. III I. II'
I'''TlI. 171. III \'('11('/11'1.1. ] I"
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111,111..1\.1
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2'I'J. .\UO
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.'1, I, 211
III !',I L'>", L02, 2\).1, 21,'"
.'t,; 2t,x.!.12,11' 111.1111.121 IL'I,J.l1'l. 111,.1\'>;
III c 11ll.-. 21'1.1, !Xl> lXI, LXX, L'IO, 101.. lId; III
I "["'111"'1. .'o!., /tfl . III { "h", I.!l>, 1'1 I; III
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1/"IIL;".1 (IJN), 71, lOX. II'>. l'I'J,1.I'J.
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1!l"t ... :\'L:<'llllIl.1 ,lIul . .15X, 15'.1. 2u'1.171,
21', !."ll>,II"II\I.l.lll.t. 17x. 11'.1. IXU IISI, Ix2;
1\loltll.II"I, IIX. 12'J..ill .H2, jj'>. Uu,
I II, I IX. \.II. J,II, .\,17. \ :.111100':,111 ,11I.1. 11. 75.
1'1.1.1'11 I'll', IN, C"llCI.,I'\llln 11.., ,iIld, 71. 75, li2,
')1', I :llIk ,111.1, lXI. 2lil, .11i.1.1H'J. ..Nl.l').!,
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II'.
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,,"11,,1111, 1".11<) .,.IIL.lIl'd. IS.! l'lI,I"II,ld'>I
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II ,110. ,11 I, II '''-Ili" I'"il, Y,11,,11.-111;'::>.
I I, \ """I Nl'lglllILu pUll')', hI!, (dl,lll'Ill.,I.,
,,,,,I, Ill') IIU; 1[,1(1; ,1I1.t. ') 1.113 111: Jr.lll
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1,'1, I I, IUU 101. llH, ()I'I'I ,'IIIJU Jluoblr,lp.
1111; \ 'p", ,'l"1ll 11'''II,,,r "",",, I 1(,; 1)1'<'1,'111'11
J.. ,I J'J.I"lIl.lI11., \ ', .. ",J .III't. tI'i. 'JI lUll.
IIU. /.\\; 1"'11i ,1I,d. lroK, I<"J; /'u,"I" 1<,,<>
.11'.1. I 1i'-12u; 2.15,
.lId. 1(',1 . .11)'>;
'\IIl<:lk.'ll 'V.II, 117 IIX, 12.1;
"I WI I, 'Ill. 116, 'J'J. llu; V'IIO"..I,1 al.d, 224.
11:',2 il, 21,1. 2 IX 2-1U. 1.'12. i7J-17.1.
Jh'JJ7U. q,l . .!Ii'J,
I'JJ. I'llJlutul. 2/.5; Wurld W.I/
,.. ,d. 111,.1 HI, \Vurl,l W.lI II .llld, (,1. 2'>1'1, ."!.X'J
11 I. IU I '101
UNO,IO.l
Ullwrilll'lI.,III.lI',,', JJH, J41
UI'. S<,,: Ullid,.d 1'lJjJlIl..r
UPI'l'l l'.:ru. 151. I '>2, 1'>3. 17 I..\,,<: III,,, BullVi"
U,I).lllll..lliull ill Bullvl . , lu!; III HI,Il.II. ,I I'J; III
""lIlml 1"1::'011, Ill!; III Colombia,
1411-202; II' CuI,... 1/.(" i"I:L.u,.dl,r. lu1; ill
l'l"lI, [h,!; III V<:II"I;U,'I.I. 2.!1l-.11'J
U, IU':, 1\I\'Mu, 210-217
U, il,urll, F" l56-L57. 25'..1
UI'lul/.l, <1<" 246, 247
Urubll,ly. 31U, 412; I\rgelltllla <111<1. 2'16;
IJIll ,'.lll' r,Ilk ,1utJlUril .. ri . llisll,. 3111;
I,Ky, JYLI; l::ucrritJ.1 1lI0\'Cill.:llb. 365;
Imkp.:udl'llo.:e .17; llculiucr,llblll .173;
1',1I.1gU,Iyall INaI'. 2,17. JI I. 312
U1Vlllol. Mari,., ltl4
V,ll,' .I" Riu I)"lC. 3'111
V,d<:IlL.I... (;,Iilll'nllU 1,"""1, 20')
\';Il':lll.ul'ia. ,13.1-'1'13
V.,Il<'ju, lJ"Jllclnu. 6,1
V;,luru,lli"n. 2UO
V,III ColI, DOllll.l Lcc. lliJ
V"n,telbill. IOU
V,lIldUl, 261.>
1 1'1
Itl7. 330, 335. 31l0. 3'.J'J, ,12U. '12'..1;
.lepUSI'd by lLIilil,If)', 32<); 324 -32'..1,
336; relllllllO powcr, :nl; suidd,',
.\J.I,337
V Mario. 171. 381, 1 I I
VII,I. Jus': Maria. 1<)/\
51l. 413, 416-'117. ,11'.1
V.II<III"'-, Ilur;IL.lu. III
V<'III/e p'JI'lI/as dc 'II/WI")' 11I1 l'tliH i';11 ,/t's"S""fUd"
(NI'III,t .. J.414
Vd.l'lIlCl. bdl.'!, ell
Alv,lhldl!, IIl,HI, loll 17U, IIiX. lJo
u 10,11 r.l. Juse Mal i,l. 1Ill> I li7
C,Idaliu. 'llll
V,'Wl) alll,'llm de AII/r/,/aj. 1.(1) (G.II.:al1o), 112')
"ell':/u..I", Iloll\'i,j ,'Ild. 11l2. 21'J, J71;
l;III,1Il.1 IILlrd.:r dispute, 22'1; Gll:W. 38.
M7. HI, 122, 21M; coft':l'. 222-223. 227. 221l;
gr.lllled hy. 215. .12f>-221l. 12'1;
237-238. 24U; cUIlI"mporary
2Jf>-2,13. o.:"nllplllJll III gVVC.lulllnl.
L.S'I. !17. l'll; Cub,1 ami. 1"8; lklllolraq'.
219. .1JI-lJ6. 2-10-2'11. 3'..10, .:wn,HJll(
,,,ndHll!m lId pulici<:s, 232. 235,
l.1ll. 2'12; IU!'I'Jgll lidJI. 21.'1-225; I::,ograph)'.
1l'J; III (irall C0101llbi.1 uniull, 33. ]1. 152.
1'>3, 11'14. 22 [-222; guerrill,l mov':lT1eJ\lS.
li \.365. lI11kpl'lI<kncl', 31-32, 37. 21'.1.
221 2!l; ll\"p. 2l0; nef,libcr,1115111, 235.
In. 373 .17'1; NcIV NallOlHlI Idl',IJ. 231; oil,
12. ll6 2.!Y. 230. 231. 232-234. 235. 238.
2'11.24.1.373; Illig;lrchic rull', 378; P,Il1 uf
I'unlo I-I)u. 231-236; pulillcal
,1'M:lldlanlnlclll, 392; Spanish rulc. 220-222;
'122-42.1; vila I stalistics. 230
Ve)lid,J il,' 1I<)II'{j (Hodril::ucs), 422
Vi:l1l1l3, OlIveira. 323
V"nu)';,hics, III
\I'th),.", iiI: J,m/II. I.': Om/u {I Bulll'lIr
(Ulnmtu),4U4
\1i<J1l) ) .....05 (hJIll), 43U
Vidd,I, /"rg" It,(.,eI, 2bH.l70
Vkln.lIll, 2UU. 205
1(,
Vilalluv;l. !I,l....i,l, ICl')
Vill;l. I'audlo. 56 57, 51l. '117
VIllalba, Jovnu. 220. VI
Villa Lol1os. HCllur. ,115
Vill,lIlucva, Ann:IIllI". 1'10
Vi'Kcnl, Sl"uio. 111
Viul,I. l{ubcll0, no
VLOk,l(l<1. L:I. 207 lUIi. 20'J,
VUWll II'>
VU'/lIIlI. Illl. 115
VUIl.l Hcdolld:I,
III AIgCllll1\... 254. 255, 379; in
Bulivia, 177, 17t1; III lirazil. )21; III C1uk. 2W;; III
Colomb.... 204, .'icc Ills" WOI1\l'Il's
W,llk,'!'. William. 100
W.lh.:rs. Vernun. 31{j
W.\f ul 8,1
War lAth.. l'aClfic. 16-1. 165. [75.
2t1[.285
Wolf o(lhe R.:(orm. 51
War oflh.: Spanbh n
I;V;lr v( Ihe SUpf<'lllllS. I')i\
W.lr vf ,11(' Thuusand 1},1)5. '.17. ['J7. ILJX. 2U3
Cunsensus, 36'..1 -J70, 374, lt1'J. I(J.I
I'n,l,)lol, 22'>
\V"I/Itll uf NtlllUI/S. '1/11' (SlIlllh). 35\
:->11111111'1.
W.:I-fo"l. dry-fuol polky. HI
',\'he;J1. 53, .1"'1, 250. 35,1. 1'..16
. .:U. 22
Wlllk.l, Zarate, 17'>
11':lIr)' LIll<', 5\.1
""lbull, ','iu,)L!rvIV. 57
\'\I1I\e.150
broom. 160
W"II11'Il: III Arg':lllllJ.I. 3'J1, III IIr.I/.II .1')1; in
Chit..:. 28,1. .lUI. J'JI: III COI"llIbl.l.
20M, 211; III CUlM. Ulllllr,l1
(UlllfilmliuIlS. ,IIJ, '132-'133; III Mcxllo, III
NiGlral::ua . .191; III l'cru. 167; political
p,1/1iop"lion. 31:11 -383; and d,:cled
utt'Cials,91l, 103. 115 .. 116. I 19-120.212. 305.
3'J [-3')2; ill SI';lIl1Sh culonies, 11:1.21. 22
SUtll,lg.:, Jli1- HI.I. III 1\11::"111111." 2(,(1; III
Brazil. 126; ill Culolllbi,l.lUtl.lI'!; 1I1
IIl5-1!:I6; 1II Peru, 167
Wool. 35,1
Pan)' (1IC:lfll). J<I [. i'I')
WlukJuf'.:c; ill l\'gClllill . 2'Ili -l'I'), l'iO .
25'1-2'i,'j.1SIl-.15'). 2\>,1. LbO; III 11,1111",1, 1'>1'1; III
Iltazil. 3lO. 3.1.lj2'1. J'llJ ..1.]1, \')'),
l!urI'OlllL.nlli, -;mlI1u. 11", i.mislll .111Lt . .18,1 'n
C,III,.al '\111,:1(,.,. ')5. III Chik, 2X1.. 3'JH, III
CU10IIl[)I:I, 19.1. .!U.l; 1Il (,lIh." 12S- I !o;
eculH)llIic ,IIll\' 3'>'>-1'>7; III
Gu.lklllal". 108; III l\!c:\IL.(). '17, :OJ-5'1. (,0. (,2.
'IOU; .,1 !'''''ll. 155. 165; "1
25; ill 1'.1. III V"(\Cl;ll..1,I,
221S-22'.1, St'c Ullelllploylll"IIl;
Ulliom
Wllfld Itlllk, '). 274, 2')1. 2'J6.11\f>. .I'J';
World Soc,e.. ChalllplUllsllll'. 27U .\4\1. '12.!. ,Ilb
""orld "["1:111.: Orl::,111I/.allUll. J47
World '.'/.lI I. 11A, 126, 155. llll . .1$0. Y,M, 17'),
I\rgelllina .llId. 24'J. Ihal.ll Hnd. ,121'1. J3H;
1)01111111C,1l1 Ikpuhll< ;111.1. III
World W,L1 II. 124. Jo!. 421; Algt.'lIlm" ,11111.
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