MINICHIELLO G. (Salerno University- Italy) On some paradoxes of quantum mechanics from a logical point of view.

This study aims to provide a contribution to the interpretation of some of the so-called paradoxes of quantum mechanics in particular Youngs paradox in the light of a theory of saturated probability models, which allows us to consider the problem of systems that are neutral in relation to time from a logical point of view.

1. Probability.

It is well known that a cluster of subatomic particles that passes through Stern-Gerlach apparatus divides into just two of many possible trajectories. A magnetic field is used in this apparatus, the intensity of which is graduated so as to distribute the emerging particles according to their magnetic orientation: those orientated in one way move upwards, while those orientated in the opposite direction move downwards, and those of intermediate orientation should be deflected into the appropriate intermediate quantity. This indeed occurs for any magnetically-orientated body. Instead, as previously said, the chosen trajectories are just two [15]. Among the many possibilities for their orientation, atoms or electrons etc. behave as a coin would when tossed into the air: each face has 50 per cent relative probability, equal to 1 as absolute probability. The probability of one face (A) added to the probability of the other face (B) gives: probability (A+B) = 1 [10]. In the example of the coin, the probability is assigned before the toss. If we were to apply the same line of reasoning to the passage of the particles, for each individual particle the probability that it chooses one trajectory as opposed to another is 50 per cent. Nevertheless, this is where the analogy stops. Indeed, in the tossing of the coin, despite the fact that the probability of A appearing in an initial toss is always 50 per cent, it is not certain for example that after 100 tosses, face A will have appeared 50 times and face B the same number of times. Statistical probability simply allows us to say that if we were to count a sufficiently high number of tosses, we could reasonably ascertain that the appearances of A and of B are roughly equal [10]. As for the passage of the particles in the Stern-Gerlach apparatus on the other hand, we still find that each of the possible trajectories are chosen by half of the particles; half choosing one and the other half choosing the other. Here, the equality probability (A+B) = 1 takes on a different meaning. Let us suppose, for example, that only two particles are passed through the apparatus, one at a time. On the basis of the results of the experiment, it has been established that if the first particle chooses trajectory A, the second will choose trajectory B, which is not necessarily the case in the tossing of the coin, where it is possible that the appearance of A is followed by an indefinite number of further appearances of A [15]. In the passage of the particles, supposing that there were a mind capable of choosing in each of these, the second one would know which trajectory to choose once the first had already made its choice. The two particles behave as is commonly said, like a couple. On the other hand, the observer cannot know which trajectory the first or the second particle actually chooses: he or she knows that if the first has chosen A, the second has chosen B. It may

hence be inferred that the physical and not simply the statistical probability assigned to the behaviour of each of the two particles is 50 per cent [16]. In such interpretation, however, the attribution of 50 per cent probabilities is only valid before the first atom has chosen its trajectory (whatever the cause of this choice); after the first choice, the second atom has to be assigned a one hundred per cent probability that is equal to 1. If we are to translate this situation into numeric language, in the observations made on the passage of the two particles, while the probability to be assigned to the orientation of the first is 0.5, that of the second is 1. Now the sum of the passages actually carried out in each of the two directions is 2, but 2 is also the number of possible passages, so their relationship is equal to 1. Therefore, since the probability to be assigned to the second passage is 1, and this, according to the relationship between the possible number of passages and number of passages carried out (2:2, that is 1), it must correspond exactly to that to be assigned to the first one, it must be concluded that this is also equal to 1. We can therefore presume that the correct sum is: probability (A + B) = (1 + 1) = 2. If we were to travel within each of the two particles, the direction to be taken would be certain, whether the particle were the first to pass through, or whether it were the second. The information would be the same in the two possible directions of the temporal arrow [18]. If instead we were to ignore the relationship of chronological succession of the two passages completely, and considered them as instantaneous, we would obtain the same result. Out of time, so as to speak, the reasoning that we have used for the passage in A must be used for the passage in B: each of the two particles would know immediately which direction to take and the probability would no longer be equal to 1 only for the second; it would be so for the first one too. We would thus have a probability (A + B) = 2. (The absolute probability of the two possible events is still 1, but in this case it only means that the probability of each of these is 1; which is also the number actually distributed between the two real events.) The condition of validity of such a distribution of probability is that the results obtained corresponding to the two possible events be observed in two spatial systems, each threedimensional, different and with time equal to 0. In this hypothesis, the probability of the appearance of A is equal to 1, identical to and simultaneous with the probability of the appearance of B. The situation seems to be similar to a two-value system of logic. In this, given a proposition a true, its negation, non-a, is false. Let us mark true or false respectively with the symbols 1 and 0: we should say that the logical probability that a or non-a are true should add up to 1. However, this sum does not mean that the logical probability of each of the propositions has a value of between 0 and 1, but instead that if a is true, the probability that its negation is true equals 0. In this kind of system, the information is certain, although not definite: we know that the couple in the two propositions possesses a certain probability (that is 1), and we know that the information regarding the value of truth of one includes information regarding the value of truth of the other, although we do not know whether one or the other is true. From a logical point of view, this type of system can be defined as saturated: if a has a value of 1, non-a has a 0 value [20]. The relationship which links assertion a and assertion non-a is contradictory: if one is true, the other is false; that is to say that they cannot both be true, nor both false (this relationship is different from the opposition type, in which the two propositions cannot both be true but can, however, both be false). Nevertheless, if assertion a and its opposite non-a are considered at different times, as descriptions of consecutive events in time, the relationship is not contradictory, because the event described by a (for example: its raining), might be true today, but may not be so tomorrow, that is, on a different today. By introducing a time variable this contradictory relationship is transformed.

This led the first logicians to validate the Principle of Non-Contradiction, so long as the time and semantic value are the same for both propositions. Logically speaking, the proposition a and proposition non-a are always contradictory, but if they are considered as descriptions of events that occur over time, they can be either both true or both false (if it is true that its raining today, it may also be true that it isnt raining today, if by today we mean any day, and vice versa, under the same conditions, if it is false that its raining today, it may also be false that its raining today). This means that in order to be able to state that the two propositions are contradictory, the time variable needs to be suspended, so to speak. Moreover, it means that the contradictory relationship loses its value if its logical objects (propositions that are true or false) are considered descriptions of events in space-time. Let us consider the propositions particle x has an A orientation; particle y has a B orientation which is different from A. These propositions constitute, outside of the spacetime, a sort of connection which is defined as a logical link: in such a connection, the proposition particle x has an A orientation and particle y has a B orientation, which is different from A is true only if both the propositions are true or false, while it is false if only one of the propositions is true or false. Now we have the certainty that both propositions are true: 1. when the particles x and y are not defined, 2. the possible orientations are only A and B, 3. x and y cannot have the same orientation. In this case, the Principle of Non-Contradiction does not lose its value even if the events described by the propositions are space-temporally determined. In this circumstance, the relationship linking the two propositions is the same for both the events that are considered outside of the spacetime, and for events in space-time. It is irrelevant, for example, that the two particles are emitted simultaneously or consecutively, and therefore the description that considers them as events in space-time is equivalent to the one which does not take this arrangement into consideration. In a physical system, we are not dealing with a single particle, whose position has to be established among a numerous possibilities. There are two particles, but they behave as if being in A or in B were their only possibility. Moreover, being in A for the first includes being in B for the second. There is no sense in establishing the probability of the state of each particle; instead it seems useful to us to consider the behaviour of each particle as behaviour that is bound: if the state of one of these is A, the state of the other is B: here, it is not a question of the probability of the state of each particle, but rather the relationship of state between two particles which are considered as coupled. The statement: the position of the particle in A does not exclude that this can be found in B, becomes equivalent to the statement the states A and B of the two particles are such that the position of one in A includes the position of the other in B. The latter definition marks a system with saturated probability. What is more, there is a chance that the results of the measurement of the probabilities might be the same whether we take the time factor into account or not. This leads us to believe that the observer within the system may not be able to establish whether the A and B states are successive or instantaneous; that is, whether a temporal process occurs or not within the system. The laws which govern the system would be the same in both cases. We define this situation as a law that is characteristic of systems that are neutral in relation to time; these are similar to systems with saturated probability, that is, to systems whose success is certain even if not defined. Let us consider a purely hypothetical example of this: if we knew that by tossing a coin, there are two possible cases, A and B, and also that there cannot be two consecutive throws with the same result, we would also know that if on the first throw the event coincides with A, on the second it will coincide with B; if on the second throw the event coincides with B, on the first throw it will have coincided with A. The constraint: there cannot be two consecutive throws with the same result makes the

outcome of each throw certain if the outcome of the other is known, although it does not define each of the two results. To say that a system that is made up of two contradictory events has saturated probability is similar to saying that the two events are coupled in relation to time. The property of superimposition of states in quantum mechanics is interpreted here as the saturation of probabilities of components in a binary system, or the coupling of contradictory events in a system that is neutral in relation to time. 2. Youngs paradox. In the well-known experiment carried out by the English doctor Thomas Young (1802), a beam of light is projected onto a plate with two slits. The behaviour of the light behind the two slits is therefore observed on a screen that collects the images, positioned some distance behind the plate. The important thing that in those days was seen as revolutionary is that Young saw alternating light and dark bands on the screen. However when he covered one of the two slits so that the light only passed through the other, the bands disappeared. As is well known, the interpretation of the experiment led to the belief that light generates a phenomenon of interference, as if it were composed of waves as opposed to corpuscles, or corpuscles associated with waves. The paradox is in the circumstance that even if one photon at a time is projected onto the plate and the two slits are left uncovered, there is interference, while when only one slit is left uncovered, the interference disappears. The single photon behaves as if it knew whether one of the slits was closed or whether both were open [20]. There have been numerous explanations proposed for this paradox [1][12]. We suggest that the behaviour of the photons is explainable if we consider it within a system that is neutral in relation to time, or in a system with saturated probability. As seen, it has been ascertained that interference factor occurs even when one photon at a time is released. It could be proposed that this is caused by the casual grouping of many photons [11]. Let us try to break up this mass into pairs. We would still obtain the formation of interference, otherwise it would have to be concluded that the formation of interference depends on the statistical probability that a large number of photons causes interference, and that therefore, as in the case of statistical probability in the tossing of a coin and in the equal number of successes and failures of face A and face B, there is not always necessarily interference. In Youngs experiment, this cannot happen, since it occurs in any case. If this is true, in the case of the two photons which are projected successively onto the plate and can pass through any one of the two slits, interference occurs only if each of these photons does not pass through the same slit chosen by the other. If they were to pass through the same slit, that is, if the second slit were to be ignored, there would be no interference, inasmuch as the situation would be identical to that in which a single slit is open. We therefore need to consider the possibility that if the first photon chooses slit A, the second chooses slit B. Here too, we have: probability (A + B) = 2. As we have seen with the Stern-Gerlach apparatus, this means that the two photons are coupled along the time axis. The decision to consider a pair of photons with a probability to pass through A or B = 1, as opposed to considering a single photon, allows us to avoid resorting to the assumption that the single photon does not choose one of the two slits, that it passes through both and therefore interferes with itself. In the case of the release of one photon at a time, the interference appears on the screen progressively (which confirms that they couple up over time), but even if they were released simultaneously there would be interference. Indeed, if a large number of photons were to be released at the same time, as in Youngs experiment, there would instantly be a complete 4

situation of interference. By progressively reducing the number of photons to two, both released at the same time, there would still be interference, since the probability that they pass through slit A or slit B is not statistical but rather physical: probability (A + B) = 2. We find ourselves in the same situation of the particles released in the Stern-Gerlach apparatus. Here too, it would seem impossible to ascertain from within the system whether or not the two photons take into account, so to speak, the passage of time. They behave like a pair both in the succession of time in the same space, and in the superimposition of different spaces in the same time period. In the first case, reference should be made to the coupling of single units along the time axis in a system with saturated probability; the second is a well-known characteristic of the non-location of subatomic particles [1], [4]. In the first case, the space-time coordinates of the pair are described as the coupling of two events at different times: in time X, the probability of event A equals 1, if an event B is associated to this in time YX with a probability equal to 1. In the second case, the spacetime coordinates of the pair are described as the coupling of two events in different spaces in the same time period: the probability of event A in space X equals, if at the same time an event B is associated to this in a space Y#X with a probability equal to 1. It is probable that a single photon cannot be distinguished if it is in a system of a multiplicity of photons released simultaneously or in succession. Since Youngs experiment gives the same results even if carried out with electrons, nuclei, atoms, etc., it can be argued that for such objects the laws of nature are the same; both leaving spatial coordinates unaltered and varying the temporal ones, and leaving the time coordinates unaltered and varying the spatial ones.

Space-time. The experiment of the two slits is to quantum mechanics what the Michelson-Morley experiment is to relativity [2]. An interpretation of it is proposed here based on three definitions: 1. They are systems with saturated probability in which the number and the succession of possible events coincide with the number and succession of the events observed; 2. Two objects form a longitudinal pair in relation to time if the behaviour of the first determines the behaviour of the second; 3. A system is neutral in relation to time when its state is indistinguishable from a system with saturated probability. The entities involved in the experiment of the two slits can be described as objects coupled longitudinally in relation to time and the combination of their behaviours can be interpreted as forming a system with saturated probability or that is neutral in relation to time. Consequently, the description of the two events that are successive in time so as to form a pair cannot be distinguished from the description of the same events in a hexa-dimensional space, corresponding to a system with saturated probability. The description by means of succession in time and the description by means of a doubling of spatial coordinates are equivalent. In this type of interpretation, the statistical probability ||, or the wave function that defines the probability of locating a particle in a particular point in space-time, describes the state of the objects and of the quantum systems considered within a three-dimensional space and with a time # 0; vice versa, for systems described within a hexa-dimensional space and with a time = 0, the probability would be ||-, according to the distribution of probability in systems with saturated probability. (GIULIANO MINICHIELLO) 5

Bibliography [1] Albert, David, Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1994. [2] Barbour, Julian, The End of Time, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000. [3] Barrow, John, The Book of Nothing, Pantheon, New York 2000. [4] Bell, John, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993. [5] Blanchard, Ph., Giulini, D., Joos, E., Kiefer, C., Stamatescu, I.-O., Decoherence : Theoretical, Experimental and Conceptual Problems, Springer, Berlin 2000. [6] Boniolo, Giovanni (ed.), Filosofia della fisica, Bruno Mondatori, Milano 1997. [7] Davies, Paul, About Time, Simon & Schuster, New York 1995. [8] DEspagnat, Bernard, Le rel voil. Analyse des concepts quantiques, Fayard, Paris 1994. [9] Deutsch, David, The Fabric of Reality, Allen Lane, New York 1997. [10] Feoli, Antonio, Minichiello Giuliano, Finalismo classico e quantistico, Sophia, IV/1999, pp. 19-27. [11] Feynman, Richard, QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1985. [12] Greene, Brian, The Fabric of the Cosmos: Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality, Vintage, New York 2004. [13] Gribbin, John, Schrdingers Kittens and the Search for Reality, Little Brown, Boston 1995. [14] Hawking, Stephen, Penrose, Roger, The Nature of Space and Time, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996. [15] Lindley, David, Where Does the Weirdness Go?, Basic Books, New York 1996. [16] Maudlin, Tim, Quantum Non-locality and Relativity, Blackwell, Oxford 2002. [17] Penrose, Roger, The Emperors New Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1982. [18] Reichenbach, Hans, The Direction of Time, Dover, New York 1956. [19] Stenger, Victor, Timeless Reality, Prometheus Books, Amherst (N.Y.) 2000. [20] Zeilinger Anton, Eisteins Schleier.Die neue Welt der Quantenphysics, Verlag C. H. Beck oHG, Mnchen 2003. 6