Allodial Title

Truth - Land Patents - Allodial vs Feudal Titles - Truly Own Your Land
Land Patents - Allodial vs

Feudal Titles
Truly Own Your Land
The History of the Land Patent - Memorandum of

Law, History, Force and Effect of the Land Patent
Land Patents And Allodial Titles - Allodial and Land
Patents Titles
What Is A Land Patent - Questions and Answers on
the Land Patent
Land Patents - People think they own their land, but

unless they have the Land Patent on the land they do
not own it
Land Patents - Land Patents Understanding how they
work
Land Patents - The foundation of this nation is real
property ownership
Land Patents - ICR's Allodial Titles & Land Patents,
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Property Tax - Why You Pay and How to Opt Out.
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Truth - The History of the Land Patent - Allodial vs Feudal Titles
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
HISTORY, FORCE & EFFECT
OF THE LAND PATENT
SECTION I
ALLODIAL v. FEUDAL TITLES
In America today, there is a phenomenon that had not been

experienced since the mid-1930's. That phenomenon is the
increasingly rising number of foreclosures, both in the rural
sector and in the cities. This phenomenon is occurring because
of the inability of the debtor to pay the creditor the necessary
interest and principle on a rising debt load that is expanding
across the country. As a defense the land patent or fee simple
title to the land, and the Congressional intent that accompanies
the patent is hereby being presented. In order to properly
evaluate the patent in any given situation, it is necessary to
understand what a patent is, why it was created, and what
existed before the patent, particularly in common-law England.
These questions must be answered in order to effectively
understand the association between the government, the land
and the people.
First, what existed before land patents, since it is imperative
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to understand why the patent was created, the best method

being a study of the converse, or common-law English land
titles. This method thus allows us to fully understand what we
are presently supposed to have by way of actual ownership of
land.
In England, at least until the mid-1600's and arguably until

William Blackstone's time in the mid-1700's, property was
exclusively owned by the King. In arbitrary governments; the
title is held by and springs from the supreme head--be he the
emperor, king, potentate; or by whatever name he is known.
McConnell v. Wilcox, 1 Scam (Ill.) 344, 367 (1837). The king
was the true and complete owner, giving him the authority to
take and grant the land from the people in his kingdom who
either lost or gained his favor. The authority to take the land
may have required a justifiable reason, but such a reason could
conceivably have been fabricated by the king leaving the
disseise former holder of the land wondering what it was that
had brought the king's wrath to bear upon him. At the same time
the benificiary of such a gift, while undoubtedly knowing the
circumstances behind such a gift, may still not have known how
the facts were discovered and not knowing how such facts
occurred, may have been left to wonder if the same fate awaited
him if ever he fell into disfavor with the king.
The King's gifts were called fiefs, a fief being the same as a
fued, which is described as an estate in land held of a superior
on condition of rendering him services. 2 Blackstone's
Commentaries, p.105. It is also described as an inheritable right
to the use and occupation of lands, held on condition of

rendering services to the lord or proprieter, who himself retains

the ownership in the lands, Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition
p. 748 (1968). Thus, the people had land they occupied,
devised, inherited, alienated, or disposed of as they saw fit, so
long as they remained in favor with the King. F.L. Ganshof,
Fuedalism, P. 113 (1964). "This holding of lands under another
was called a tenure, and was not limited to the relation of the
first or paramount lord and vassal, but extended to those to
whom such vassal, within the rules of feudal law, may have
parted out his own feud to his own vassals, whereby he became
the mesne lord between his vassals and his owm or lord
paramount. Those who held directly to the king were called his
'tenants in...cheif'." 1 E. Washburn, Treatise on The American
Law of Real Property, Ch.II, Section 58, P. 42 (6th Ed. 1902). In
this manner, the lands which had been granted out to the
barons principal lands--were again subdivided, and granted by
them to subfeudatories to be held of themselves. Id., Section
65, p.44. The size of the gift of the land could vary from a few
acres to thousands of acres depending on the power and
prestige of the lord. See supra Ganshof at 113. The fiefs were
built in the same manner as a pyramid, with the King, the true
owner of the land, being at the top, and from the bottom up
there existed a system of small to medium-sized to large to
larger-sized estates on which the persons directly directly
beneath one estate owed homage to the lord of that estate as
well as to the King. Id. at 114. At the lowest level of this pyramid
through at least he 14th and 15th centuries existed to serfs or
villians, the class of people that had no rights and were
recognized as nothing more than real property. F. Goodwin,
Treatise on The Law of Real Property, Ch. 1, p. 10 (1905). This
system of hierarchial land holdings required an elaborate
system of payment. These fiefs to the land might be
recompenses in any number of ways.

One of the more common types of fiefs, or the payment of a

rent or obligation to perform rural labor upon the lord's lands
known as socage, was the crops fief. Id. at 8. Under this type of
fief a certain portion of the grain harvested each year would
immediately be turned over to the lord above that particular fief
even before the shares from the lower lords and then serfs of
the fief would be distributed. A more interesting type of fief for
purposes of this memorandum was the money fief. In most
cases, the source of money was not specified, and the payment
was simply made from the fiefholder's treasury, but the fief
might also consist of a fixed revenue to be paid from a difinite
source in annual payments in order for the tenant owner of the
fief to be able to remain on the property. Gilsebert of Mons,
Chronique, cc.69 and 115, pp. 109, 175 ( ed. Vanderkindere).
The title held by such tenant-owners over their land was

described as a fee simple absolute. "Fee simple, Fee commeth
of the French fief, i.e, praedium beneficiarium, and legally
signifieth inheritance as our author himself hereafter
expoundeth it. And simple is added, for that it is descendible to
his heirs generally, that is, simply, without restraint tot he heirs
of his body, or the like, Feodum est quod quis tenet ex
quacunque causa sive sit tenementum sive redditus, etc. In
Domesday it is called feudom." Littleton, Tenures, Sec. 1b, Fee
Simple. In Section 11, fee simple is described as the largest
form of inheritance. Id. In modern English tenures, the term fee
signifies an inheritable estate, being the highest and most
extensive interest the common man or noble, other than the
King, could have in the feudal system. 2 Blackstone's
Commentaries, p. 106. Thus, the term fee simple absolute in

common-law England denotes the most and best title a person

could have as long as the King allowed him to retain possession
of (own) the land. It has been commented that the basis of
English land law is the ownership of all reality by the sovereign.
From the crown, all titles flow. The original and true meaning of
the word "fee" and therefore fee simple absolute is the same as
fief or feud, this being in contradition to the term "allodium"
which means or is defined as a man's own land, which he
possesses merely in his own right, without owing any rent or
service to any superior. Wendell v. Crandall, 1 N.Y. 491 (1848).
Therefore on common-law England practicallu everybody who
was allowed to retain land, had the type of fee simple absolute
often used or defined by courts, a fee simple that grants or
gives the occupier as much of a title as the "sovereign" allows
such occupier to have at that time. The term became a
synonym with the supposed ownership of land under the feudal
system of England at common law. Thus, even though the word
absolute was attached to the fee simple, it merely denoted the
entire estate that could be assigned or passed to heirs, and the
fee being the operative word; fee simple absolute dealt with the
entire fief and its devisability, alienability and inheritability.
Friedman v. Steiner, 107 Ill. 131 (1883). If a fee simple absolute
in common-law England denoted or was synonymous with only
as much title as the King allowed his barons to possess, then
what did the King have by way of a title?
The King of England held ownership of land under a different

title and with far greater powers than any of his subjects.
Though the people of England held fee simple titles to their
land, the King actually owned all the land in England through his
allodial title, and though all the land was in the feudal system,
none of the fee simple titles were of equal weight and dignity

with the King's title, the land always remaining allodial in favor of
the King. Gilsbert of Mons, Chronique, ch. 43, p. 75 (ed.
Vanderkindere). Thus it is relatively easy to deduce that allodial
lands and titles are the highest form of lands and titles known to
common-law. An estate of inheritance without condition,
belonging to the owner, and alienable by him, transmissable to
his heirs absolutely and simply, is an absolute estate in
perpetuity and the largest possible estate a man can have,
being in fact allodial in its nature. Stanton v. Sullivan, 63 R.I.
216, 7 A. 696 (1839). "The original meaning of a perpetuity is an
inalienable, indestructible interst." Bovier's Law Dictionary,
Volume III, p. 2570 (1914). The King had such a title in land. As
such, during the classical feudalistic period of common-law
England, the King answered to no one concerning the land.
Allodial titles, being held by sovereigns, and being full and
complete titles, allowed the King of England to won and control
the entire country in the form of one large estate belonging to
the Crown. Allodial estates owned by individuals exercising full
and complete ownership, on the other hand, existed only to a
limited extent in the County of Kent.
In summary of Common-Law England: (1) the King was the

only person (sovereign) to hold complete and full title to a land
(allodial title); (2) the people who maintained estates of land,
(eigher called manors or fiefs), held title by fee simple absolute,
(3) this fee simple absolute provided the means by which the
"supposed" owner could divise, alienate, or pass by inheritance
the estates of land (manors or fiefs); (4) this fee simple absolute
in feudal England, being not the full title, did not protect the
"owner" if the King found disfavor with the "owner", (5) the
"owner" therefore had to pay a type of homage to the King or a
higher baron each year to discharge the obligation of his fief, (6)

this homage of his fief could take the form of a revenue or tax,
an amount of grain, or a set and permanent amount of money,
(7) and therefore a long as the "owner" of the fief in fee simple
absolute paid homage to the king or sovereign, who held the
entire country under an allodial title, then the "owner" could
remain on the property with full rights to sell, divise or pass it by
inheritance as if the property was really his.
SECTION II
LAND OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA TODAY
THE AMERICAN FEUDALISTIC SOCIETY
The private ownership of land in America is one of those

rights people have proclaimed to be essential in maintaining this
republic. The necessary question in discussing this topic
however, is whether ownership of land in America today really is
a true and complete ownership of land under an allodial
concept, or is it something much different. In other words, are
we living in an actual allodial freehold or are we living in an
updated version of feudalistic common-law. The answer is
crucial in determining what rights we have in the protection of
our reality against improper seizures and incumbrances by our
government and creditors. The answer appears to be extremely
clear upon proper reflection of our rights when payments are
missed on mortgages, or taxes, for whatever reason, are not
paid. If mortgage payments are missed or taxes are not paid,
we actually fall into disfavor with the parties who have the
power, and these powers through court proceedings or

otherwise, take our land as a penalty. When one understands if

he is unable to perform as the government or his creditors
request and for such failures of performance his land can be
forfeited, then he can begin to understand exactly what type of
land-ownership system controls his life, and he should
recognize the inherent unjustness of such constitutional
violations.
The American-based system of land ownership today

consists of three key requirements. These three are the
warranty deed or some other type of deed purporting to convey
ownership of land, title abstracts to chonologically follow the
development of these different types of deeds to a piece of
property, and title insurance to protect the ownership of that
land. These three ingredients must work together to ensure a
systematic and orderly conveyance of a piece of property; none
of these three by itself can act to comletely convey possession
of the land from one person to another. At least two of the three
are always deemed necessary to adequately satisfy the legal
system and real estate agents that the titles to the property had
been placed in the hands of the purchaser and often-times all
three are necessary to properly pass the ownership of the land
to the purchaser, Yet does the absolute title and therefore the
ownership of the land really pass from the seller to purchaser
with the use of any one of these three instruments or in any
combination thereof? None of the three by itself passes the
absolute or allodial title to the land, the system of land
ownership America originally operated under, and even
combined all three can not convey this absolute type of
ownership. What then is the function of these three instruments
that are used in land conveyances and what type of title is
conveyed by the three? Since the abstract only traces the title

and the title insurance only insures the title, the most important
and therefore first group to examine are the deeds that
purportedly convey the fee from seller to purchaser.
These deeds include the ones as follows: warranty deed,

quit claim deed, sheriff'd deed, trustee's deed, judicial deed, tax
deed, will or any other instrument that purportedly conveys the
title. All of these documents state that it conveys the ownership
to the land. Each of these, however, is actually a color of title.
G. Thompson, Title to Real Property, Preparation and
Examination of Abstracts, Ch. 3, Section 73, p.93 (1919). A
color of title is that which in appearance is title, but which in
reality is not title. Wright v. Mattison, 18 How. (U.S.) 50 (1855).
In fact, any instrument may constitute color of title when it
purports to convey the title of the land, as well the land itself,
although it is void as a muniment of title. Joplin Brewing co. v.
Payne, 197 No. 422, 94 S.W. 896 (1906). The Supreme Court
of Missouri has stated, "that [w]hen we say a person has a color
of title, whatever may be the meaning of the phrase, we express
the idea, at least, that some act has been previously done,..., by
which some title, good or bad, to a parcel of land of definite
extent had been conveyed to him." St. Louis v. Gorman, 29 Mo.
593 (1860). In other words, a color of title is an appearance or
apparent title, and "image" of the true title, hence the phrase
"color of", which, when coupled with possession putports to
convey the ownership of the land to the purchaser. This
however does not say that the color of title is the actual and true
title itself, not does it say that the color of title itself actually
conveys ownership. In fact, the claimant or holder of a color of
title is not even required to trace the title through the chain down
to his instrument. Rawson v. Fox, 65 Ill. 200 (1872). Rather it
may be said that a color of title is prima facie evidence of

ownership of and rights to possession of land until such time as

that presumption of ownership is disproven by a better title or
the actual title itself. If such cannot be proven to the contrary,
then ownership of the land is assumed to have passed to
occupier of the land. To further strengthen a color title-holder's
position, courts have held that the good faith of the holder to a
color of title is presumed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. David v. Hall, 92 Ill. 85 (1879); see also Morrison v.
Norman, 47 Ill. 477 (1868); and McConnell v. Street, 17 Ill. 253
(1855).
With such knowledge of what a color of title is, it is

interesting what constitutes colors of title. A warranty deed is
like any other deed of conveyance. Mahrenholz v. County Board
of School Trustees of Lawrence County, et. al., 93 Ill. app. 3d
366 (1981). A warranty deed or deed of conveyance is a color
of title, as stated in Dempsey v. Burns, 281 I..644, 650 (1917)
(Deeds constitute colors of title); see also Dryden v. Newman,
116 I..186 (1886) (A deed that purports to convey interest in the
land is a color of title); Hinckley v. Green 52 Ill. 223 (1869) (A
deed which, on its face, purports to convey a title, constitutes a
claim and color of title); Busch v. Huston, 75 Ill. 343 (1874);
Chicking v. Failes, 26 Ill. 508 (1861). A quit claim deed is a color
of title as stated in Safford v. Stubbs, 117 Ill. 389 (1886); see
also Hoooway v. Clark, 27 Ill. 483 (1861) and McCellan v.
Kellogg, 17 Ill. 498 (1855). Quit claim deeds can pass the title
as effectively as a warrant with full covenants. Grant v. Bennett,
96 Ill. 513, 525 (1880); See also Morgan v. Clayton, 61 Ill. 35
(1871); Brady v. Spurck, 27 I..478 (1861); Butterfield v. Smith,
11 Ill. 485 (1849). Sheriff's deeds also are colors of title.
Kendrick v. Latham, 25 Fla. 819 (1889); as is a judicial deed,
Huls v. Buntin, 47 Ill. 396 (1865). the Illinois Supreme Court

went into detail in its detail in its determination of a tax deed is

only color of title. "There the complainant seem to have relied
upon the tax deed as conveying to him the fee, and to sustain
such a bill, it was incumbent of him to show that all the
requirements of the law had been complied with." A simple tax
deed by itself is only a color of title. Fee simple can only be
acquired though adverse possession via payment of taxes;
claim and color of title, plus seven years of payment of taxes.
Thus any tax deed purports, on its face, to convey title is a good
color of title. Walker v. Converse, 148 Ill. 622, 629 (1894); see
also Peadro v. Carriker, 168 Ill. 570 (1897); Chicago v.
Middlebrooke, 143 Ill. 265 (1892); Piatt County v. Goodell, 97 Ill.
84 (1880); Stubblefield v. Borders, 92 Ill. 570 (1897); Coleman
v. Billings, 89 Ill. 183 (1878); Whitney v. Stevens, 89 Ill. 53
(1878); Thomas v. Eckard, 88 Ill. 593 (1878); Holloway v.
Clarke, 27 Ill. 483 (1861). A will passes only a color of title.
Baldwin v. Ratcliff, 125 Ill. 376 (1888); Bradley v. Rees, 113 Ill.
327 (1885) (A will can pass only so much as the testator owns,
though it may attempt to pass more). A trustee's deed, a
mortgages and strict foreclosure, Chickering v. Failes, 26 Ill.
508, 519 (1861), or any document defining the extent of a
disseisor's claim or purported claim, Cook v. Norton, 43 Ill. 391
(1867), all have been held to be colors of title. In fact, "[t]here is
nothing here requiring a deed, to establish a color of title, and
under the former decisions of this court, color or title may exist
without a deed." Baldwin v. Ratcliff, 125 I..376, 383 (1882);
County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97 I.. 84 (1880); Smith v. Ferguson,
91 Ill 304 (1878); Hassett v. Ridgely, 49 Ill. 197 (1868); Brooks
v. Bruyn, 35 Ill. 392 (1864); McCagg v. Heacock, 34 Ill. 476
(1864); Bride v. Watt, 23 Ill. 507 (1860); and Woodward v.
Blanchard, 16 Ill. 424 (1855). All of these cases being still valid
and none being overruled, in effect, the statements in these
cases are well established law. All of the documents described

in these cases are the main avenues of claimed land ownership

in America today, yet none actually conveys the true and
allodial title. They in fact convey something quite different.
When it is stated that a color of title conveys only an

appearance of or apparent title, such a statement is correct but
perhaps too vague to be properly understood in its correct legal
context. What are useful are the more pragmatic statements
concerning titles. A title or color of title, in order to be effective in
transferring the ownership or purported ownership of the land,
must be a marketable or merchantable title.
A marketable or merchantable title is one that is reasonably

free from doubt. Austin v. Barnum, 52 Minn. 136 (1892). This
title must be as reasonably free from doubts as necessary to not
affect the marketability or saleability of the property, and must
be a title a reasonably prudent person would be willing to
accept. Robert v. McFadden, 32 Tex.Civ.App. 47, 74 S.W. 105
(1903). Such a title is often described as one which would
ensure to the purchaser a peaceful enjoyment of the property,
Barnard v. Brown, 112 Mich. 452, 70 N.W. 1038 (1897), and it is
stated that such a title must be obvious, evident, apparent,
certian, sure or indubitable. Ormsby v. Graham, 123 Ia. 202, 98
N.W. 724 (1904). Marketable Title Acts, which have been
adopted in several if the states, generally do not lend
themselves to an interpretation that they might operate to
provide a new foundation of title based upon a stray, accidental,
or interloping conveyance. Their object is to provide, for the
recorded fee simple ownership, an exemption from the burdens
of old conditions which at each transfer of the property

interferes with its marketability. Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.

2d 800 (1957). What each of these legal statements in the
marious factual situations says is that the color of title is never
described as the absolute or actual title, rather each says that it
is one of the types if titles necessary to convey ownership or
apparent ownership. A marketable title, what a color of title must
be in order to be effective, must be a title which is good of
recent record, even if it may not be the actual title in fact. Close
v. Stuyvesant, 132 Ill. 607, 24 N.E. 868 (1890). "Authorities hold
that to render a title marketable it is only necessary that it shall
be free from reasonable doubt; in other words, that a puchaser
is not entitled to demand a title absolutely free from every
possible suspicion." Cummings v. Dolan, 52 Wash. 496, 100 P.
989 (1909). The record being spoken of here is the title abstract
and all documentary evidence pertaining to it. "It is an axiom of
hornbook law that a purchaser has notice only of recorded
instruments that are within his `chain of title'." 1 R. Patton & C.
Patton, Patton on Land Title, Section 69, at 230-33. (2nd ed.
1957); Sabo v. Horvath, 559 P. 2d 1038, 1043 (Ak. 1976). Title
insurance then guarantees that a title is marketable, not
absolutely free from doubt.
Thus, under the color or title system used most often in this
country today, no individual operating under this type of title
system has the absolute or allodial title. All that is really
necessary to have a valid title is to have a relatively clean
abstract with a recognizable color of title as the operative
marketable title within the chain of title. It therefore becomes
necessarily difficult, if not impossible after a number of years,
considering the inevitable contingencies that must arise and the
title disputes that will occur, to ever properly guarantee an
absolute title. This is not necessarily the fault of the seller, but it

is the fault of the legal and real estate systems for allowing such
a diluted form of title to be controlling in an area where it is
imperative to have the absolute title. In order to correct this
problem, it is important to return to those documents the early
leaders or the nation created to properly ensure that property
remained one of the inalienable rights that the newly
established sovereign freeholders could rely on to always exist.
This correction must be in the form of restricting or perhaps
eliminating the widespread use of a marketable title and
returning to the absolute title.
Other problems have developed because of the use of a

color of title system for the conveyance of land. These problems
arise in the area of terminology that succeed in only confusing
and clouding the title to an even greater extent than merely
using terms like marketability, saleability or merchantability.
When a person must also determine whether a title is complete,
perfect, good and clear, or whether it is a bad, defective,
imperfect and doubtful, there is any obvious possibility of
destroying a chain of title because of an inability to recognize
what is acceptable to a reasonable purchaser.
A complete title means that a person has the possession,

right of possession and the right of property. Dingey v. Paxton,
60 Miss. 1038 (1883) and Ehle v. Quackenboss, 6 Hill (N.Y.)
537 (1844). A perfect title is exactly the same as a complete
title, Donovan v. Pitcher, 53 Ala. 411 (1875) and Converse v.
Kellogg, 7 Barb. (N.Y.) 590 (1850); and each simply means the
type of title a well-informed, reasonable and prudent person
would be willing to accept when paying full value for the

property. Birge v. Bock, 44 Mo. App. 69 (1890). In other words,

a complete or perfect title is in reality a marketable or
merchantable title, and is usually represented by a color of title.
A good title does not necessarily mean one perfect of record

but consists of one which is both of rightful ownership and
rightful possession of the property. Bloch v. Ryan, 4 App. Cas.
283 (1894). It means a title free from litigation, palpable defects
and grave doubts consisting of both legal and equitable titles
and fairly deducible of record. Reynolds v. Borel, 86 Cal. 538,
25 P. 67 (1890). "A good title means not merely a title valid in
fact, but a marketable title, which can again be sold to a
reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable
prudence as security for a loan of money." Moore v. Williams,
115 N.Y. 586, 22 N.E. 253 (1889). A clear title means there are
no incumbrances on the land, Roberts v. Bassett, 105 Mass.
409 (1870). Thus, when contracting to convey land, the use of
the phrase "good and clear title" is surplusage, since the terms
good title and clear title are in fact synonymous. Oakley v.
Cook, 41 N.J. Eq. 350, 7 A.2d 495 (1886). Therefore, the words
good title and clear title, just like the words complete title and
perfect title, describe nothing more than a marketable title or
merchantable title, and as stated above, each can and almost
always is represented in a transaction by a color of title. None of
these types of title purports to be the absolute or allodial title,
and none of them are that type of title. None of these actually
claims to be a fee simple absolute, and since these types of
titles are almost always represented by a color of title, and since
these types of titles are almost always represented by a color of
title, none represents that it passes the actual title. Each one
does state that it passes what can be described as a title good
enough to avoid the necessity of litigation to determine who

actually has the title. If such litigation to determine titles is

necessary, then the title has crossed the boundaries of
usefulness and entered a different category of title descriptions
and names.
This new category consists of titles which are bad, defective,

imperfect or doubtful. A bad title conveys no property to the
purchaser of the estates. Heller v. Cohen, 15 misc. 378, 36
N.Y.S. 668 *1895). A title is defective when the party claiming to
own the land has not the whole title, but some other person has
title to a part or portion of it. Such a title is the same as no title
whatsoever. Place v. People, 192 Ill. 160, 61 N.E. 354 (1901);
See also Cospertini v. Oppermann, 76 Cal. 181, 18 P. 256
(1888). An imperfect title is one where something remains to be
done by the granting power to pass the title to the land, Raschel
v. Perez, 7 Tex. 348 (1851); and a doubtful title is also one
which conveys no property to the purchaser of the estate. Heller
v. Cohen, 15 Misc. 378, 36 N.Y.S. 668 (1895). Every title is
described as doubtful which invites or exposes the party holding
it to litigation. Herman v. Somers, 158 Pa.St. 424, 27 A. 1050
(1893). Each of these types of titles describes exactly the same
idea stated in many different ways, that because of some
problem, defect, or question surrounding the title, no title can be
conveyed, since no title exists. Yet in all of these situations
some type of color of title was used as the operative instrument.
What then makes one color of title complete, good or clear in
one situation, and in another situation the same type of color of
title could be described as bad, defective, imperfect or doubtful?
What is necessary to make what might otherwise be a doubtful
title, a good title, is the belief of others in the community,
whether or not properly justified, that the title is a good one
which they would be willing to purchase. Moore v. Williams, 115

N. Y. 586, 22 N.E. 253 (1889). The methods presently used to

determine whether a title or color of title is good enough to not
be doubtful, are the other two-thirds of the three possible
requirements for the conveyance of a good or complete
(marketable) title.
These two methods of properly ensuring that a title is a good

or complete title are title abstracts, the complete documentary
evidence of title, and title insurance. The legal title to land,
based on a color of title, is made up of a series of documents
required to be executed with the solemnities prescribed by law,
and of facts not evidenced by documents, which show the
claimant a person to whom the law gives the estate.
Documentary evidences of title consist of voluntary grants by
the sovereign, deeds if conveyances and wills by individuals,
conveyances by statutory or judicial permission, deeds made in
connection with the sale of land for delinquent taxes,
proceedings under the power of eminent domain, and deeds
executed by ministerial or fiduciary officers. These documentary
evidences are represented by the land patent and the colors of
title. 1 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real
Property, pp. 99-100 (5th ed. 1980). These instruments, relied
upon to evidence the title, coupled with the outward assertive
acts that import dominion, must be used by the abstreactor in
compiling the abstract, and the attorney must examine to
determine the true status of the title. Id. The abstract is the
recorded history of the land and the various types of titles,
mortgages and other liens, claims and interests that have been
placed on the property. The abstract can determine the number
of times the patent has been redeclared, who owns the mineral
rights, what color of title is operable at any particular point in
time, and what lienholder is in first position, but it does not

convey or even attempt to convey any form of the title itself. As

Thompson, supra has stated, it is necessary when operating
with colors of titles to have an abstract to determine the status
of the operable title and determine whether that title is good or
doubtful. Id at 101. If the title is deemed good after this lengthy
process, then the property may be transferred without doing
anything more, since it is assumed that the seller was the owner
of the property. This is not to say emphatically that the seller is
the paramount or absolute owner. This does not even
completely guarantee that he is the owner of the land against
any adverse claimants. It is not even the difficult to claim that
the title holder has a good title due to the leniency and attitude
now evidenced by the judicial authorities toward maintaining a
stable and uniform system of land ownership, whether or not
that ownership is justified. This however, does not explain the
purpose and goal of a title abstract.
An abstract that has been properly brought up simply states

that it is presumed the seller is the owner of the land, making
the title marketable, and guaranteeing that he has a good title to
sell. This is all an abstract can legally do since it is not the title
itself and it does not state the owner has an absolute title.
Therefore, the abstract can not guarantee unquestionably that
the title is held by the owner. All of this rhetoric is necessary if
the title is good; if there is some question concerning the title
without making it defective, then the owner must turn to the last
of the three alternatives to help pass a good title, title insurance.
Examination of Abstracts, Ch. III, Section 79, pp. 99-100 (1919).

Title insurance is issued by title insurance companies to

insure the validity of the title against any defects, against any
incumbrances affecting the designated property, and to protect
the purchaser against any losses he sustains from the
subsequent determination that his title is actually unmarketable.
Id. at 100. Title insurance extends to any defects of title. Id. It
protects against the existence of any incumbrances, provided
only that any judgments adverse to the title shall be pronounced
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. It is not even necessary
that a defect actually exist when the insurance policy was
issued, it is simply necessary that there exists at the time of
issuance of the policy and inchoate or potential defect which is
rendered opertive and substantial by the happening of some
subsequent event. Since all one normally has is a color of title,
the longer a title traverses history, the greater the possibility that
the title will become difective. The greater the need for
insurance simply to keep the title marketable, the easier it is to
determine that the title possessed is not the true, paramount
and absolute title. If a person had the paramount title, there
would be no need for title insurance, though an abstract might
be useful for record keeping and historical purposes. Title
insurance and abstract record keeping are useful primarily
because of extensive reliance on colors of title as the operative
title for a piece of property.
This then supplies the necessary information concerning

colors of title, title abstracts, and title insurance. This does not
discribe the relationship between the landowner and the
government. As was stated in the instruction, in feudal England,
the King has the power, right and authority to take a person's
land away from him, if and when the King felt it necessary. The
question is whether most of the American system of land

ownership and titles is in reality any different and whether

therefore the American-based system of ownership, is in reality
nothing more than a feudal system of land ownership.
Land ownership in America presently is founded on colors of

title, and though people believe they are the complete and total
owners of their property; under a color of title system this is far
from the truth. When people state that they are free and own
their land, they in fact own it exactly to the extent the English
barons owned their land in common-law England. They own
their land so long as some "sovereign", the government or a
creditor, states that they can own their land. If one recalls from
the beginning of this memeorandu, it was states that if the King
felt it justified, he could take the land from one person and give
such land to another prospective baron. Today, in American
color-of-title property law, if the landowner does not pay income
tax, estate tax, property tax, mortgages or even a security note
on personal property, then the "sovereign", the government or
the creditor, can justify the taking of the property and the sale of
that same property to another prospective "baron", while leaving
the owner with only limited defenses to such actions. The only
real difference between this and common-law England is that
now others besides the King can profit from the unwillingness or
inability of the "landowner" to perform the socage or tenure
required of every landowner of America. As such no one is
completely safe or protected on his property; no one can afford
to make one mistake or the consequences will be forfeiture of
the property. If this were what the people in the mid-1700's
wanted, there would have been no need to have an American
Revolution, since the taxes were secondary to having a sound
monetary system and complete ownership of the land. Why fight
a Revolutionary War to escape sovereign control and virtual

dictator ship over the land, when in the 1980's these exact
problems are prevalent with this one exception, money now
changes hands in order to give validity to the eventual and
continous takeover of the property between the parties. This is
hardly what the forefathers strived for when creating the United
States Constitution, and what they did strive for is the next
segment of the memorandum of law, allodial ownership of the
land via the land patent. The next segment will analyze the
history of this type of title so that the patent can be properly
understood, making it possible to comprehend the patent's true
role in property law today.
SECTION III
LAND PATENTS
WHY THEY WERE CREATED
As was seen in the previous sections, there is little to protect

the landowner who holds title in the chain of title, when
distressful economic or weather condition make it impossible to
perform on the debt. Under the color-of-title system, the
property, "one of those inalienable rights", can be taken for the
nonperformance on loan obligatons. This type of ownership is
similar to the feudal ownership found in the Middle Ages.
Upon defeating the English in 1066 A.S., William the

Conqueror pursuant to his 52nd and 58th laws, "...effectually

reduced the lands of Englands to deuds, which were declared to

be inheritable and from that time the maxim prevailed there that
all land sin England are held from the King, and that all
preceded from his bounty." 1 E. Washburn, Treatise on The
American Law of Real Property, Section 65, p.44 (6th ed. 1902).
All lands in Europe, prior to the creation of the feudal system in
France and Germany, were allodial. Most of these lands were
voluntarily changed to feudal lands as protection from the
neighboring barons or chieftans. Id. Section 56, at 40. Since no
documents protected one's freedom over his land, once the
lands were pledged for protection, the lands were lost forever.
This was not the case in England.
England never voluntarily relinquished its land to William I. In

fact, were it not for a tactical error by King Harold II's men in the
Battle of Hastings, England might never have become feudal. A
large proportion of the Saxon lands prior to the Conquest of
A.D. 1066 "were held as allodial, that is, by an absolute
ownership, without recognizing any superior to whom any duty
was due on account thereof." Id. Section 54, at 39. The mode of
coveying these allodial lands was nost commonly done by a
writing or charter, called a land-boc, or land-allodial charter,
which, for safekeeping between conveyances, was generally
deposited in the monasteries. Id.,Section 54, at 40. In fact, one
portion of England, the County of Kent, was allowed to retain
this form of land ownership while the rest of England become
feudal. Id., Section 55, at 40. Therefore, when William I
established feudalism in England to maintain control over his
barons, such control created animosity over the next 2
centuries. F.L. Ganshof, Feudalism, p.114 (1964). As a result of
such dictatorial control, some 25 barons joined forces to exert
pressure on the then ruling monarch, King John, to gain some
rights not all of which the common man would possess. The
result of this pressure at Runnymede became known as the
Magna Charta.
The Magna Charta was the basis of modern common law,

the common law being a series of judicial decisions and royal
decree interpreting and following that document. The Magna
Charta protected the basic rights, the rights that gave all people
more freedom and power. The rights that would slowly erode
the king's power.
Among these rights was a particular section dealing with

ownership of the land. The barons still recognized the king as
the lord paramount, but the barons wanted some of the rights
their ancestors had prior to A.D. 1066. F. Goodwin, Treatise on
The Law of Real Property, Ch. 1, p.3 (1905). Under this theory,
the barons would have several rights and powers over the land,
as the visible owners, that had not existed in England for 150
years. The particular section of most importance was Section 62
giving the most powerful barons letters patent, raising their land
ownership close to the level found in the County of Kent. Other
sections, i.e., 10, 11, 26, 27, 37, 43, 52, 56, 57, and 61 were
written to protect the right to "own" property, to illustrate how
debts affected this right to own property, and to secure the
return of property that was unjustly taken. All these paragraphs
were written with the single goal of protecting the "landowner"
and helping him retain possession of his land, acquired in the
service of the King, from unjust seizures or improper debts. The
barons attempted these goals with the intention of securing
property to pass to their heirs.

Unfortunately goals are often not attained. Having repledged

their loyalty to King John, the barons quickly disbanded their
armies. King John died in 1216, one year after signing the
Magna Charta, and the new king did not wish to grant such
privileges found in that document. Finally, the barons who
forced the signing of the Magna Charta dies, and with them
went the driving force that created the great charter. the Magna
Charta may have still been alive, but the new kings had no
armies at their door forcing them to follow policies, and the
charter was to a great extent forced to lie dormant. The barons
who received the letters patent, as well as other landholders
perhaps should have enforced their rights, but their heirs were
not in a position to do so and eventually the rights contained in
the charter were forgotten. Increasingly until the mid-1600's, the
king's power waxed, abruptly ending with the execution of
Charles I in 1649. By then however, the original intent of the
Magna Charta was in part lost and the descendents of the
original barons never required properly protercted free land
ownership. To this day, the freehold lands in England are still
held to a great extent upon the feudal tenures. See supra
Washburn, Section 80, p. 48. This lack of complete ownership
in the land, as well as the most publicized search for religious
freedom, drove the more adventurous Europeans to the
Americas to be away from these restrictions.
The American colonists however soon adopted many of the

same land concepts used in the old world. The kings of Europe
had the authority to still exert influence, and the American
version of barons sought to retain large tracts of land. As an
example, the first patent granted in New York went to Killian

Van Rensselaer dated in 1630 and confirmed in 1685 and 1704.

A. Getman, Title to Real Property, Principles and Sources of
Titles-Compensation For Lands and Waters, Part III, Ch. 17,
p.229 (1921). The colonial charters of these American colonies,
granted by the king of England, had references to the lands in
the County of Kent, effectively denying the more barbaric
aspects of feudalism from ever entering the continent, but
feudalism with its tenures did exist for some time. See supra
Washburn, Section 55, p. 40. "[I]t may be said that, at an early
date, feudal tenures existed in this country to a limited extent."
C. Tiedeman, An Elementary Treatise on the American Law of
Real Property, Ch. II, The Principles of the Feudal System,
Section 25, p.22 (2nd ed. 1892). The result was a newly created
form of feudal land ownership in America. As such, the feudal
barons in the colonies could dictate who farmed their land, how
their land was to be divided, and to a certain extent to whom the
land should pass. But, just as the original barons discovered,
this power was premised in part of the performance of duties for
the king. Upon the failure of performance, the king could order
the grant revoked and grant the land to another willing to
acquiesce to the king's authority. This authority, however, was
premised on the belief that people, recently arrived and
relatively independent, would follow the authority of a king
based 3000 miles away. Such a premise was ill-founded. The
colonists came to America to avoid taxation without
representation, to avoid persecution of religious freedom, and to
acquire a small tract of land that could be owned completely.
When the colonists were forced to pay taxes and were required
to allow their homes to be occupied by soldiers; they revolted,
fighting the British, and declaring their Declaration of
Independence.

The Supreme Court of the United States reflected on this

independence, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (U.S.) 419
(1793), stating:
The revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence,

found the people already united for general purposes, and
at the same time, providing for their more domestic
concerns,
by state conventions, and other temporary

arrangements. From the crown of Great Britain,
the soverignty of their country passed to the people of it;

and it was then not an uncommon
opinion, that the unappropriated lands, which belonged

to that crown, passed, not to the
people of the colony or states within those limits they

were situated, but to the whole
people;..."We, the people of the United States, do ordain

and establish this constitution."
Here we see the people acting as soverigns of the whole

country; and in the language of
soverignity, establishing a constitution by which it was

their will, that the state governments,
should be bound, and to which the state constitutions

should be made to confrom... It will be
sufficient to observe briefly, that the soverignties in

Europe, and particularly in England, exist
on feudal principles. That system considers the prince

as the sovereign, and the people his
subjects; it regards his person as the object of

allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being
on an equal footing with a subject, either in a court of

justice or elsewhere. That system
contemplates him as being the fountain of honor and

authority; and from his grace and grant,
derives all franchises, immunities and privileges; it is

easy to perceive, that such a sovereign
could not be amendable to a court of justice, or

subjected to judicial control and actual
constraint...The same feudal ideas run through all their

jurisprudence, and constantly remind
us of the distintion between the prince and the subject.

No such ideas obtain here; at the
revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and

they are truly the sovereigns of the
country, but they are sovereigns without subjects..and

have none to govern but themselves;
the citizens of America are equal as follow-citizens, and

as joint tenants in the sovereignity.
From the differences existing between feudal

sovereignties and governments founded on

compacts, it necessarily follows, that their respective

perogatives must differ. Sovereignty
is the right to govern; a nation or state sovereign is the

person or persons in whom that
resides. In Europe, the sovereignty is generally ascribed

to the prince; here it rest with the
people; there is sovereign actually administers the

government; here never in a single instance;
our governors are the agents of the people, and at most

stand in the same relation to their
sovereign, in which the regents of Europe stand to their

sovereigns. Their princes have
personal powers, dignities, and pre-eminences, our

rules have none but official; nor do they
partake in the sovereignity otherwise, or in any other

capacity, than as private citizens.
(emphasis added).
Id. at 470-71. The Americans had a choice as to how they

wanted their new government and country to be formed. Having
broken away from the English sovereignity and establishing
themselves as their own sovereigns, they had their choice of
types of taxation, freedom of religion, and most importantly
ownership of land. The American founding fathers chose allodial

ownership of land for the system of ownership on this country.

In the opinion of Judge Kent, the question of tenure as an
incident to the ownership of lands "has become wholly
immaterial in this country, where every vestige of tenure has
been annihilated." See supra Washburn, Section 118, p.59. At
the present day there is little, if any, trace of the feudal tenures
remaining in the American law of property. Land in this country
are now held to be absolutely allodial. See Supra Tiedeman,
Section 25, p. 22.
Upon the completion of the Revoluntary War, lands in the

thirteen colonies were held under a different form of land
ownership. As stated in In re Waltz et. al., Barlow v. Security
Trust & Savings Bank, 240 p. 19 (1925), quoting Matthews v.
Ward, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 443 (1839), "after the American
Revolution, lands in this state (Maryland) become allodial,
subject to no tenure, nor to any services incident there to." The
tenure, as you will recall, was the feudal tenure and the services
or taxes required to be paid to retain possession of the land
under the feudal system. This new type of ownership was
acquired in all thirteen states. Wallace v. Harmstead, 44 Pa.
492 (1863). The American people, before developing a properly
functioning stable government, developed a stable system of
land ownership, whereby the people owned their land absolutely
and in a manner similar to the king in common-law England. As
has been stated earlier, the original and true meaning of the
word "fee" and therefore fee simple absolute is the same as fief
or feud, this being in contradistinction to the term "allodium"
which means or is defined as man's own land, which he
service to any superior. Wendall v. Crandall, 1 N.Y. 491 (1848).
Stated another way, the fee simple estate of early England was

never considered as absolute, as were lands in allodium, but

were subject to some superior on condition of rendering him
services, and in which the such superior had the ultimate
ownership of the land. In re Waltz, at page 20, quoting 1
Cooley's Blackstone, (4th ed.) p. 512. This type of fee simple is
a common-law term and sometimes corresponds to what in civil
law is a perfect title. United States v. Sunset Cemetary Co., 132
F. 2d 163 (1943). It is unquestioned that the king held an
allodial title which was different than the common-law fee simple
absolute. This type of superior title was bestowed upon the
newly established American people by the founding fathers. The
people were sovereigns by choice, and through this new type of
land ownership, the people were sovereign freeholders or kings
over their own land, beholded to no lord or superior. As stated in
Stanton v. Sullivan, 7 A. 696 (1839), such an estate is an
absolute estate in perpetuity and the largest possible estate a
man can have, being, in fact allodial in its nature. This type of
fee simple, as thus developed, has definite characteristics: 1) it
is a present estate in land that is of indefinite duration; 2) it is
freely alienable; 3) it carries with it the right of possession; and
most importantly 4) the holder may make use of any portion of
the freehold without being beholden to any person. 1 G.
Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property,
Section 1856, p. 412 (1st ed. 1924). This fee simple estate
means an absolute estate in lands wholly unqualified by any
reservation, reversion, condition or limitation, or possibility of
any such thing present or future, precedent or subsequent. Id.;
Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W. 2d 800, 806 (1957). It is the
most extensive estate and interest one may possess in real
property. While, an estate subject to an option is not in fee. See
supra 1 Thompson, Section 1856, p. 413. In the case, Bradford
v. Martin, 201 N.W. 574 (1925), the Iowa Supreme Court went
into a lengthy discussion on what the terms fee simple and

allodium means in American property law. The Court stated:
The word "absolutely" in law has a varied meaning, but when

unqualifiedly used with reference to titles or interest in land, its
meaning is fairly well settled. Originally the two titles most
discussed were "fee simple" and "allodium" (which meant
absolute). See Bouv. Law Dict. (Rawle Ed.) 134; Wallace v.
Harmstead, 44 Pa. 492; McCartee v. Orphan's Asylum, 9 Cow.
(N.Y.) 437, 18 Am. Dec. 516. Prior to Blackstone's time the
allodial title was ordinarily called an "absolute title" and was
superior to a "fee simple title," the latter being incumbered with
feudal clogs which were laid upon the first feudaltory when it
was granted, making it possible for the holder of a fee-simple
title to lose his land in the event he failed to observe his
feudatory oath. The allodial title was not so incumbered. Later
the term "fee simple," however rose to the dignity of the allodial
or absolute estate, and since the days of Blackstone the word
"absolute estate" and "fee simple" seen to have been generally
used interchangeably; in fact, he so uses them- -See Book II,
chap. 7, pp. 104-105....And further the words "absolute" and
absolutely" usually carry the fee...By the terms "absolute
interest" we understand a complete and perfect interest,...,an
estate in fee simple is meant. Id. at 576.
The basis of English land law is the ownership of the realty

by the sovereign, from the crown all titles flow. People v.
Richardson, 269 Ill. 275, 109 N.E. 1033 (1914); see also
Matthew v. Ward, 10 Gill & J (Md.) 443 (1844). The case,
McConnell v. Wilcox, 1 Scam. (Ill.) 344 (1837), stated it this
way:

From what source does the title to the land derived from a
government spring? In arbitrary
governments, from the supreme head-be he the

emperor, king, or potentate; or by whatever
name he is known. In a republic, from the law making or

authorizing to be made the grant
or sale. In the first case, the party looks alone to his

letters patent; in the second, to the law
and the evidence of the acts necessary to be done

under the law, to a perfection of his grant,
donation or purchase...The law alone must be the

fountain from whence the authority is
drawn; and there can be no other source. Id. at 367.
The American people, newly established sovereigns in this

republic after the victory achieved during the Revolutionary War,
became complete owners in their land, beholden to no lord or
superior; sovereign freeholders in the land themselves. These
freeholders in the original thirteen states now held allodially the
land they possessed before the war only feudally. This new and
more powerful title protected the sovereigns from unwarranted
intrusions or attempted takings of their land, and more
importantly it secured in them a right to own land absolutely in
perpetuity. By definition, the word perpetuity means, "Continuing
forever. Legally, pertaining to real property, any condition
extending the inalienability..." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1027

(5th ed. 1980). In terms of an allodial title, it is to have the

property of inalienability forever. Nothing more need be done to
establish the ownership of the sovereigns to their land, although
confirmations were usually required to avoid possible future title
confrontations. The states, even prior to the creation of our
present Constitutional government, were issuing titles to the
unoccupied lands within their boundaries. In New York, even
before the war was won, the state issued the first land patent in
1781, and only a few weeks after the battle and victory at
Yorktown in 1783, the state issued the first land patent to an
individual. A Getman, supra, Part III, Ch. 17, State Legislative
Grants, pp. 231- 32 (1921). In fact, even before the United
States was created, New York and other states had developed
their own Land Offices with Commissioners. New York was first
established in 1784 and was revised in 1786 to further provide
for a more definite procedure for the sale of unappropriated
State Lands. Id. The state courts held, "The validity of letters
patent and the effectiveness of same to convey title depends on
the proper execution and record...It has generally been the law
that public grants to be valid must be recorded. The record is
not for purposes of notice under recording acts but to make the
transfer effectual." Id. at 242. Later, if there was deemed to be a
problem with the title, the state grants could be confirmed by
issuance of a confirmatory grant. Id. at 239. This then, in part,
explains the methods and techniques the original states used to
pass title to their lands, lands that remained in the possession of
the state unless purchased by the still yet-uncreated federal
government, or by individuals in the respective states. To much
this same extent Texas, having been a separate country and
republic, controlled and still controls its lands. In each of these
instances, the land was not originally owned by the federal
government and then later passed to the people and states.
This then is a synopsis of the transition from colony to

statehood and the rights to land ownership under each situation.

This however has said nothing of the methods used by the
states in the creation of the federal government and the
eventual disposal of the federal lands.
The Constitution in its original form was ratified by a

convention of the States, on September 17, 1787. The
Constitution and the government formed under it were declared
in effect on the first Wednesday of March, 1789. Prior to this
time, during the Constitutional Convention, there was serious
debate on the disposal of what the convention called the
"Western Territories," now the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin and part of Minnesota, more commonly
known as the Northwest Territory. This tract of land was ceded
to the new American republic in the treaty signed with Britain in
1783.
The attempts to determine how such a disposal of the

western territories should come about was the subject of much
discussion in the records of the Continental Congress.
Beginning in September, 1783, there was continual discussion
concerning the acquisition of and later disposition to the lands
east of the Mississippi River. Journals of Congress, Papers of
the Continental Congress, No. 25, II, folio 255, p. 544-557
(September 13, 1783).
And whereas the United States have succeeded to the

sovereignty over the Western territory,
and are thereby vested as one undivided and

independent nation, with all and every power and
right exercised by the king of Great Britain, over the said

territory, or the lands lying and
situated without the boundaries of the several states,

and within the limits above described;
and whereas the western territory ceded by France and

Spain to Great Britain, relinquished
to the United States by Great Britain, and guarantied to

the United States by France as
aforesaid, if properly managed, will enable the United

States to comply with their promises
of land to their officers and soldiers; will relieve their

citizens from much of the weight of
taxation;..., and if cast into new states, will tend to

increase the happiness of mankind, by
rendering the purchase of land easy, and the

possession of liberty permanent;
therefore...Resolved, that a committee be appointed to

report the territory lying without the
boundaries of the several states;...; and also to report an

establishment for a land office.
Id. at 558, reported in the writing of James McHenry.

There was also serious discussion and later acquisition

by the then technically non-existent
federal government of land originally held by the colonial

governments. Id. at 562-63. As
the years progressed, the goal remained the same, a

proper determination of a simple method
of disposing of the western lands. "That an

advantageous disposition of the western territory
is an object worthy the deliberation of Congress." Id.

February 14, 1786, at p. 68. In
February, 1787, the Continental Congress continued to

hold discussions on how to dispose
of all western territories. As part of the basis for such

disposal, it was determined to divide
the new northwestern territories into medians, ranges,

townships, and sections, making for
easy division of the land, and giving the new owners of

such land a certain number of acres
in fee. Journals of Congress, p. 21, February 1787, and

Committee Book, Papers of the
Continental Congress, No. 190, p. 132 (1788). In

September of that same year, there were

most discussions on the methods of disposing the land.

In those discussions, there were
debates in the validity and solemnity of the state patents

that has been issued in the past. Id.,
No. 62, p. 546. Only a week earlier the Constitution was

ratified by the conventions of the
states. Finally, the future Senate and House of

Representatives, though not officially a
government for another 1 & ½ years, held discussions

on the possible creation of documents
that would pass the title of lands from the new

government to the people. In these discussions,
the first patents were created and ratified, making the

old land-boc, or land-allodial charters
of the Saxon nobles, 750 years earlier, and the letters

patent of the Magna Charta, guidelines
by which the land would pass to the sovereign

freeholders of America. Id., July 2, 1788, pp.
277-286.
As part of the method by which the new United States

decided to dispose of its territories, it created in the Constitution
an article, section, and clause, that specifically dealt with such
disposals. Article IV, Section III, Clause II, states in part, "The

Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful

Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States." Thus, Congress was given the
power to create a vehicle to divest the Federal Government of
all its right and interest in the land. This vehicle, known as the
land patent, was to forever divest the federal government of its
land and was to place such total ownership in the hands of the
sovereign freeholders who collectively created the government.
The land patents issued prior to the initial date of recognizition
of the United States Constitution were ratified by the members
of Constitutional Congress. Those patents created by statute
after March, 1789, had only the power of the statutres and the
Congressional intent behind such statutes as a reference and
basis for the determination of their powers and operational
effect originally and in the American system of land ownership
today.
There have been dozens of statutes enacted pursuant to

Article IV, Section III, Clause II. Some of these statutes had very
specific intents of aiding soldiers of wars, or dividing lands in a
very small region of one state, but all had the main goal of
creating in the sovereigns, freeholders on their lands, beholden
to no lord or superior, Some of the statutes include, 12 Stat.
392, 37th Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 75, (1862) (the Homestead
Act); 9 Stat. 520, 31st Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 85 (1850) (Military
Bounty Service Act); 8 Stat. 123, 29th Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 8,
(1847) (Act to raise additional military force and for other
purposes); 5 Stat. 444, 21st Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 30 (1831);
4 Stat. 51, 18th Congress, Sess. I., Ch. 174 (1824); 5 Stat. 52,
18th Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 173 (1824); 5 Stat. 56, 18th
Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 172, (1824); 3 Stat. 566, 16th Congress,
Sess. I, Ch. 51, (1820) (the major land patent statute enacted to

dispose of lands); 2 Stat. 748, 12th Congress, Sess. I. Ch. 99

(1812); 2 Stat. 728, 12th Congress, Sess.I, Ch. 77, (1812); 2
Stat. 716, 12th Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 68, (1812) (the act
establishing the General Land-Office in the Department of
Treasury); 2 Stat. 590, 11th Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 35,(1810);2
Stat. 437, 9th Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 34, (1807); and 2 Stat.
437, 9th Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 31, (1807). These, of course,
are only a few of the statutes of enacted to dispose of public
lands to the sovereigns. One of these acts however, was the
main patent statute in reference to the intent Congress had
when creating the patents. That status is 3 Stat. 566, supra.
In order to understand the validity of a patent, in today's

property law, it is necessary to turn to other sources than the
acts themselves. These sources include the Congressional
debates and case law citing such debates. For the best answer
to this question, it is necessary to turn to the Abridgment of the
Debates of Congress, Monday, March 6, 1820, in the Senate,
considering the topic "The Public Lands." This abridgment and
the actual debates found in its concern one of the most
important of the land patent statutes, 3 Stat. 566, 16th
Congress, Sess. I. Ch. 51, Stat. I, (April 24, 1820).
In this important debate, the reason for such a particular act

in general and the protections afforded by the patent in
particular were discussed. As Senator Edwards states;
But, said, he, it is not my purpose to discuss, at large,

the merits of the proposed change. I
will, at present, contect myself with an effort, merely, to

shield the present settlers upon
public lands from merciless speculators, whose cupidity

and avarice would unquestionably be
tempted by the improvements which those settlers have

made with the sweat of their brows,
and to which they have been encouraged by the conduct

of the government itself; for though
they might be considered as embraced by the letter of

the law which provides against
intrusion on public lands, yet, that their case has not

been considered by the Government as
within the mischiefs intended to be prevented is

manifest, not only form the forebearance to
enforce the law, but form the positive rewards which

others, in their situation, have recieved,
by the several laws which have heretofore been granted

to them by the same right if
preemtpion which I now wish extended to the present

settlers. Id. at 456.
Further, Senator King from New York stated;

He considered the change as highly favorable to the

poor man; and he argued at some length,
that it was calculated to plant in the new country a

population of independent, unembarrassed
freeholders;...that it would cut up speculation and

monopoly; that the money paid for the lands
would be carried from the State or country from which

the purchaser should remove; that it
would prevent the accumulation of an alarming debt,

which experience proved never would
and never could be paid. Id. at 456- 57.
In other statutes, the Court recognized much of these same

ideas. In United States v. Reynes, 9 How. (U.S.) 127 (1850), the
Supreme Court stated:
The object of the Legislature is manifest. It was intended

to prevent speculation by dealing
for rights of preference before the public lands were in

the market. The speculator acquired

power over choice spots, by procurring occupants to

seat themselves on them and who
abandoned them as soon as the land was entered under

their preemption right, and the
speculation accomplished. Nothing could be more easily

done than this, if contracts of this
description could be enforced. The act of 1830,

however, proved to be of little avail; and
then came the Act of 1835 (5 Stat. 251) which

compelled the preemptor to swear that he had
not made an arrangement by which the title might insure

to the benefit of anyone except
himself, or that he would transfer it to another at any

subsequent time. This was preliminary
to the allowing if his entry, and discloses the policy of

Congress. Id. at 154.
"It is always to be borne in mind, in construing a

congressional grant, that the act by which it is made is a law as
well as a conveyance and that such effect must be given to it as
will carry out the intent of Congress. That intent should not be
defeated by applying to the grant the rules of common
law...words of present grant, are operative, if at all, only as
contracts to convey. But the rules of common law must yield in
this, as in other cases, to the legislative will." Missouri, Kansas
& Texas Railway Company v. Kansas Pacific Railway
Company, 97 U.S. 491, 497 (1878). The administration of the

land system in this country is vested in the Executive
Department if the Government, first in the Treasury and now in
the Interior Department. The officers charged with the disposal
of the public domain under the authority of acts of Congress are
required and empowered to determine the construction of those
acts so far as it relates to the extent and character of the rights
claimed under them , and to be given, though their actions, to
individuals. This is a portion of the political power of the
Government, and courts of justice must never interfere with it.
Marks v. Dickson, 61 U.S. (20 How) 501 (1857); see also
Cousin v. Blanc's Ex., 19 How. (U.S.) 206, 209 (1856). "The
power of Congress to dispose of its land cannot be interfered
with, or its exercise embarrassed by any State legislation; nor
can such legislation deprive the grantees of the United States of
the possession and enjoyment of the property granted by
reason of any delay in the transfer of the title after the iniation of
proceedings for its acqusition." Gibsion v. Chouteau, 13 Wal.
(U.S.) 92, 93 (1871). State statutes that give lesser authoritative
ownership of title than the patent can not even be brought into
federal court. Langdon v. Sherwood, 124 U.S. 74, 81 (1887).
These acts of Congress making grants are not to be treated
both law and grant, and the intent of Congress when
ascertained is to control in the interpretation of the law.
Wisconsin C.R. Co. v. Forsythe, 159 U.S. 46 (1895). The intent
to be searched for by the courts in a government patent is the
intent which the government had as that time, and not what it
would have been had no mistake been made. The true meaning
of a binding expression in a patent must be applied, no matter
where such expressions are found in the document. It should be
construed as to effectuate the primary object Congress had in
view; and obviously a construction that gives effect to a patent
is to be preferred to one that renders it inoperative and void. A

grant must be interpreted by the law of the country in force at

the time when it was made. The construction of federal grant by
a state court is necessarily controlled by the federal decisions
on the same subject. The United States may dispose of the
public lands of such terms and conditions, and subject to such
restrictions and limitations as in its judgment will best promote
the public welfare, even if the condition is to exempt the land
from sale on execution issued or judgment recovered in a State
Court for a debt contracted before the patent issues. Miller v.
Little, 47 Cal. 348, 350 (1874). Congress has the sole power to
declare the dignity and effect if titles emanating from the United
States and the whole legislation of the Government must be
examined in the determination of such titles. Bagnell v.
Broderick, 38 U.S. 436 (1839). It was clearly the policy of
Congress, in passing the preemption and patent laws, to confer
the benefits of those laws to actual settlers upon the land. Close
v. Stuyvesant,132 Ill. 607, 617 (1890). The intent of Congress is
manifest in the determinations of meaning, force and power
vested in the patent. These cases all illustrate the power and
dignity given to the patent. It was created to dives the
government of its lands, and to act as a means of conveying
such lands to the generations of people that would occupy
those lands. This formula, "or his legal representatives,"
embraces representatives of the original grantee in the land, be
contract, such as assignees or grantees, as well as be
operation of law, and leaves the question open to inquiry in a
court of justice as to the party to whom the patent, or
confirmation, should enure. Hogan v. Page, 69 U.S.605 (1864).
The patent was and is the document and law that protects the
settler from the merciless speculators, from the people that use
avarice to unjustly benefit themselves against an unsuspecting
nation. The patent was created with these high and grant
intentions, and was created with such intentions for a sound

reason.
The settlers as a rule seem to have been poor persons, and

presumably without the necessary funds to improve and pay for
their land, but it appears that in every case where the settlement
was made under the preemption law, the settler...entered and
paid for the land at the expirtation of the shortest period at
which the entry could be made..." Close v. Stuyvesant, 132 Ill.
607, 623 (1890). We must look to the benficient character of the
acts that created this grants and patents and the peculiar
objects they were intended to protect and secure. A class of
enterprising, hardy and most meritorious and valuable citizens
has become the pioneers in the settlement and improvement of
the new and distant lands of the government. McConnell v.
Wilcox, 1 Scam.(Ill.) 344, 367 (1837). "In furtherance of what is
deemed a wise policy, tending to encourage settlement, and to
develop the resources of the country, it invites the heads of
families to occupy small parcels of the public land...To deny
Congress the power to make a valid and effective contract of
this character...would materially abridge its power of disposal,
and seriously interfere with a favorite policy of the government,
which fosters measures tending to a distribution of the lands to
actual settlers at a nominal price." Miller v. Little, 47 Cal. 348,
351 (1874). The legislative acts, the Statutes at Large, enacted
to divest the United States of its land and to sell that land to the
true sovereigns of this republic, had very distinct intents.
Congress recognized that the average settler of this nation
would have little money, therefore Congress built into the
patent, and its corresponding act, the understanding that these
lands were to be free from avarice and cupidity, free from the
speculators who preyed on the unsuspecting nation, and forever
under the control and ownership of the freeholder, who by the
sweat of his brow made the land produce the food that would
feed himself and eventually the nation. Even today, the intent of
Congress is to maintain a cheap food supply though the
retention of the sovereign farmers on the land. United States v.
Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); see also Curry v.
Block, 541 F. Supp. 506 (1982). Originally, the intent of
Congress was to protect the sovereign freeholders and create a
permanent system of land ownership in the country. Today, the
intent of Congress is to retain the small family farm and utilize
the cheap production of these situations, it has been necessary
to protect the sovereign on his parcel of land, and ensure that
he remain in that position. The land patent and the patent acts
were created to accomplish these goals. In other words, the
patent or title deed being regular in its form, the law will not
presume that such was obtained through fraud of the public
right. This principle is not merely an arbitrary rule of law
established by the courts, rather it is a doctrine which is founded
upon reason and the soundest principles of public policy. It is
one which has been adopted in the interest of peace in the
society and the permanent security of titles. Unless fraud is
shown, this rule is held to apply to patents executed by the
public authorities. State v. Hewitt Land Co., 134 P. 474,479
(1913). It is therefore necessary to determine exact power and
authority contained in a patent.
Legal titles to lands cannot be conveyed except in the form

provided by law. McGarrahan v. Mining Co., 96 U.S. 316
(1877). Legal title to property is contingent upon the patent
issuing from
the government. Sabo v. Horvath, 559 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Aka.

1976). "That the patent carries the fee and is the best title

known to a cour to law is the settled doctrine of this court."

Marshall v. Ladd, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 106 (1869). "A patent issued
by the government of the United States is legal and conclusive
evidence of title to the land described therein. No equitable
interst, however strong, to land described in such a patent, can
prevail at law, against the patent." Land Patents, Opinions of the
United States Attorney General's office, (September, 1969). "A
patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive against
the government and all claiming under junior patents or titles,
until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal." Stone
v. United States, 2 Wall. (67 U.S.) 765 (1865). The patent is the
instrucment which, under the laws of Congress, passes title
from the United States and the patent when regular on its face,
is conclusive evidence of title in the patentee. When there is a
confrontation between two parties as to the superior legal title,
the patent is conclusive evidence of title in the patentee. When
there is a confrontation between two parties as to the superior
legal title, the patent is conclusive evidence as to ownership.
Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 91=2 (1871). Congress having the
sole power to declare the dignity and effect of its titles has
declared the patent to be the superior and conclusive evidence
of the legal title. Bagnell v. Brodrick, 38 U.S. 438 (1839).
"Issuance of a government patent granting title to land is `the
most accredited type of conveyance known to our law'." United
States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103,111 (1935); see also
United States v. Cherokee Nation, 474 F.2d 628, 634 (1973).
The patent is prima facia conclusive evidence of the title. Marsh
v. Brooks, 49 U.S. 223, 233 (1850). A patent, once issued, is
the highest evidence of title, and is a final determination of the
existence of all facts. Walton v. United States, 415 F.2d 121,
123 (10th Cir. 1969); see also United States v. Beaman, 242 F.
876 (1917); File v.Alaska, 593 P.268, 270 (1979) (When the
federal governmetn grants land via a patent, the patent is the

highest evidence of title). Patent rights to the land is the title in

fee, City of Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors of Mono
County, 292 P.2d 539 (1956), the patent os the fee simple,
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1,6 (1956), and the patent is
required to carry the fee. Carter v. Rubby, 166 U.S. 493, 496
(1896); see also Klais v. Danowski, 129 N.W.2d 414, 422
(1964)(Interposition of the patent os interposition of the fee title).
The land patent is the muniment of title, such title being
absolute in its nature, making the sovereigns absolute
freeholders on their lands. Finally, the patent is the only
evidence of the legal fee simple title. McConnell v. Wilcox, 1
Scam (Ill.) 381, 396 (1837). All these various cases and quotes
illutrate one statement that should be thoroughly understood at
this time, the patent is the highest evidence of title and is
conclusive of the ownership of land in courts of competent
jurisdiction. This however, does not examine the methods or
possibilities of challenging a land patent.
In Hooper et. al. v. Scheimer, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 235 (1859),

the United States Supreme Court stated, "I affirm that a patent
is unimpeachable at law, except, perhaps, when it appears on
its own face to be void; and the authorities on this point are so
uniform and unbroken in the courts, Federal and State, that little
else will be necessary beyond a reference to them." Id. at 240
(1859). A patent cannot be declared void at law, nor can a party
travel behind the patent to avoid it. Id. A patent cannot be
avoided at law in a collateral proceeding unless it is declared
void by statute, or its nullity indicated by some equally explicit
statutory denuncitions. Id. One perfect on its face is not to be
avoided, in a trail at law, by anything save an elder patent. It is
not to be affected by evidence or circumstances which might
show that the impeaching party might prevail in a court of

equity. Id. at 243. A patent is evidence, in a court of law, of the

regularity of all previous steps to it, and no facts behind it can
be investigated. Id. A patent cannot be collaterally avoided at
law, even for fraud. Id. at 245. A patent, being a superior title,
must of course, prevail over colors of title; nor is it proper for
any State legislation to give such titles, which are only equitable
in nature with a recognized legal status in equity courts,
precedence over the legal title in a court of law. Id. at 246. The
Hooper case has many of the maxims that apply to the powers
and possible disabilities of a land patent, however there is
extensive case law in the area.
The presumptions arise, from the existence of a patent,

evidencing a grant of land from the United States, that all acts
have been performed and all facts have been shown, which are
prerequisites to its issuance, and that the right of the party,
grantee therein, to have it issued, has been presented and
passed upon by the proper authorities. Green v. Barber, 66
N.W. 1032 (1896). As stated in BVovier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II,
p. 1834 (1914):
Misrepresentations knowingly made by the application

for a patent will justify the government
in proceedings to set it aside, as it has a right to demand

a cancellation of a patent obtained
by false and fraudulent misrepresentations. United

States v. Manufacturing Co., 128 U.S.

673 (1888); but courts of equity cannot set aside, annul,

or correct patents or other evidence
of title obtained from the United States by fraud or

mistake, unless on specific averment of
the mistake or fraud, supported by clear and satisfactory

proof; Maxell Land Grant
Cancellation, 11 How. (U.S.) 552 (1850); although a

patent fraudulently obtained by one
knowing at the time that another person has a prior right

to the land may be set aside by an
information in the nature of a bill in equity filed by the

attorney of the United States for the
district in which the land lies; Id. A court of equity, upon

a bill filed for that purpose, will
vacate a patent of the United States for a tract of land

obtained by mistake from the officers
of the land office, in order that a clear title may be

transferred to the previous purchaser;
Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 232 (1866); but

a patent for land of the United States
will not be declared void merely because the evidence to

authorize its issue is deemed
insufficient by the court; Milliken v. Starling's lessee, 16

Ohio 61. A state can impeach the title

conveyed by it to a grantee only by a bill in chancery to

cancel it, either for fraud on the part
of the grantee or mistake of law; and until so cancelled it

cannot issue to any other party a
valid patent for the same land. Chandler v.

Manufacturing Co., 149 U.S. 79 (1893).
Other cases expouse these and other rules of law. A

patentee can be deprived of his rights only by direct
proceedings instituted by the government or by parties acting in
its name, or by persons having a superior title to that acquired
through the government. Putnum v. Ickes, 78 F.2d 233, cert
denied 296 U.S. 612 (1935). It is not sufficient for the one
challenging a patent to show that the patentee should not have
recieved the patent; he must also show that he as the
challenger is entitled to it. Kale v. United States, 489 F.2d 449,
454 (1973). A United States patent is protected from easy third
party attacks. Fisher v. Rule, 248 U.S. 314, 318 (1919); see
also Hoofnagle v. Anderson, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 212 (1822). A
patent issued by the United States of America so vests the title
in the lands covered thereby, that it is the further general rule
that, such patents are not open to collateral attack. Thomas v.
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 139 F.Supp. 588, 596 (1956).
See also State v. Crawford, 475 P.2d 515 (Ariz. App. 1970) (A
patent is primna facia valid, and if its validity can be attacked at
all, the burden of proof is upon the defendant); State v.
Crawford, 441 P.2d 586, 590 (Ariz. App. 1968) (A patent to land
is the highest evidence of title and may not be collaterally
attacked); and Dredge v. Husite Company, 369 P.2d 676,682

(1962) (A patent is the nact of legally instituted tribunal, done

within its jurisdiction, and passes the title. Such a patent is a
final judgement as well as a conveyance and is conclusive upon
a collateral attack). Absent some facial invalidity, the patents
are presumed valid. Murray v. State, 596 P.2d 805, 816 (1979).
The government retains no power to nullify a patent except
through a direct court proceeding. United States v. Reimann,
504 F.2d 135 (1974); See also Green v. Barker, 66 N.W. 1032,
1034 (1896) (The doctrine announced was that the deed upon
its face, purported to have been issued in pursuance of the law,
and was therefore only assailable in a direct proceeding by
aggrieved parties to set it aside). Through these cases, it can be
shown that the patent which passes the title from the United
States to the sovereigns, and was created to keep the
speculators from the land, is only assailable in a direct
proceeding for fraud or mistake. In no other situation is it
allowable for the courts, to simply eliminate the patent. One
question that may arise is what do the eocurts mean by a
collateral attack and what can be done by courts of equity if a
collateral attack is presented?
Perhaps the easiest means of defining a collateral attack is

to show the converse corrollary, or a direct attack on a patent.
As was stated in the previous paragraphs, a direct attack upon
a land patent is an action for fraud or mistake brought by the
government or a party acting in its place. Therefore, a collateral
attack, by definition, is any attack upon a patent that is not
covered within the direct attack list. Perhaps the moost
prevalent collateral attack in property law today is a mortgage or
deed of trust foreclosure on a color of title. In these instances, it
is determined that the complete title and interest in the land is
purchased by the mortgagee or another in his place. Such a

determination displaces the patentee's ownership of the title

without the court ever ruling that the patent was acquired
through fraud or mistake. This is against public policy,
legislative intent, and the overwhelming majority of case law.
Therefore, it is now necessary to determine the patent's role in
American property law today, to see what powers the courts of
equity have in protecting the rights of the challengers of patents.
The attitude of the Courts is to promote simplicity and

certainty in title transactions, thereby they follow what is in the
chain of title and not what is outside. Sabo v. Horvath, 559 P.2d
1038, 1044 (1976). However, in equity courts, title under a
patent from the government is subject to control, to protect the
rights of parties acting in a fiduciary capacity. Sanford v.
Sanford, 139 U.S. 290 (1891). This protectin however does not
include the invalidation of the patent. The determination of the
land department in matters cognizable by it, in the alienation of
lands and the validity of patents, cannot be collaterally attacked
or impeached. Id. Therefore the courts have had to devise
another means to control the patentee, if not the patent itself. As
stated in Raestle v. Whitson, 582 P.2d 170, 172 (1978), "The
land patent is the highest evidence of title and is immune from
collateral attack. This does not preclude a court from imposing a
constructive trust upon the patentee for the benefit of the
owners of an equitable interest." This then explains the most
equitable way a court may effectively restrict the sometimes
harsh justice handed down by a strict court of law. Equity courts
will impose a trust upon the patentee until the debt has been
paid. As has been stated, a patent can not be collaterally
attacked, therefore the land can not be sold or taken by the
courts unless there is strong evidence of fraud or mistake.
However, the courts can require the patentee to pay a certain

amount at regular intervals until the debt is paid, unless of

course, there is a problem with the validity of the debt itself. This
is the main purpose of the patent in this growing epidemic of
farm foreclosures that defy the public policy of Congress, the
legislative intent of the Statutes at large, and the legal authority
as to the type of land ownership possessed in America. Why
then is the rate of foreclosures on the rise?
Titles to land today, as was stated earlier in this

memorandum, are normally in the form of colors of title. This is
because of the trend in recent property law to maintain the
status quo. The rule in most jurisdictions, and those which have
adopted a grantor-grantee index in particular, is that a deed
outside the chain of title does not act as a valid conveyance and
does not serve notice of a defect of title on a subsequent
purchaser. These deeds outside the chain of title are known as
"wild deeds." Sabo v. Horvath, 559 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1976);
See also Porter v. Buck, 335 So.2d 369, 371 (1976); The
Exchange National Bank v. Lawndale National Bank, 41 Ill2d
316, 243 N.E.2d 193, 195-96 (1968) (The chain of title for
purposes of the marketable title act, may not be founded on a
wild deed. These stray, accidental, or interloping conveyances
are contrary to the intent of the marketable title act, which is to
simplify and facilitate land title transactions); and Manson v.
Berkman, 356 Ill.20, 190 N.E. 77, 79 (1934). This liberal
construction of what constitutes a valid conveyance has led to a
thinning of the title to a point where the absolute and paramount
title is almost impossible to guarantee. This thinning can be
directly attributed to the constant use of the colors of title. Under
the guise of being the fee simple absolute, these titles have
operated freely, but in reality, the evidence something much
different.

It was said in common-law England, that when a title was not

completely alienable and not the complete title it was not a fee
simple absolute. Rather it was some type of contingent
conveyance that depended on the performance of certain tasks
before the title was considered to be absolute. In fact, normally
the title never did develop into a fee simple absolute. These
types of conveyance were evidenced in part by the operable
words in the conveyance and in part by manner in which the
granter could reclaim the property. If the title automatically
reverted to the grantor upon the happening of a contingent
action, then the title was by a fee simple determinable. Scheller
v. Trustees of Schools of Township 41 North, 67 Ill.App.3d 857,
863 (1978). This is evidenced most closely today by deeds of
trust in some states. If it required a court's ruling to reacquire
the land and title, then the transaction and title were held by a
fee simple with a condition subsequent. Mahrenholz v. Country
Board of Trustees of Lawrence County, 93 Ill.App.3d 366, 370-
74 (1981). This is most closely evidenced by a mortgage in a
lien or intermediate-theory state. These analogies may be
somewhat startling and new to some, but the analogies are
accurate. When a mortgage is acquired on property, the
mortgagee steps into the position of a grantor with the authority
to create the contingent estate as required by the particular
facts. This is exactly what the grantor in common-law property
law could acquire. All the grantor had to do was choose a
particular type of contingency and use the necessary catch-
words, and almost invariably the land would one day be
returned due to a violation of the contingency. In today's
property law, the color of title has little power to protect the
landowner. When the sovereign is unable to pay the necessary
principal and interest on the debt load, then the catch-words

and phrases found in the deed of trust or mortgage become

operational. Upon the occurrence of that event, the mortgagee
or speculator, having through a legal myth acquired the position
of a grantor, is in a position to either automatically receive the
property simply by advertising and selling it, or can acquire the
position of the grantor and eventually the possession of the
property by a court proceeding. In common-law, the grantor of a
fee simple determinable where the contingency was broken or
violated, could automatically take the land from the grantee
holder, by force if necessary. If however, the grant was a fee
simple upon condition subsequent, the grantor, when the
contingency broken, had to bring a legal proceeding to declare
the contingence broken, to declare the grantee in violation, and
to order the grantee to vacate the premises. These situations,
though under different names and proceedings, occur every day
in America. Is there really any serious debate therefore, that the
colors of title used today, with the creation of a lien upon the
property, become fee simple determinables and fee simples
upon condition subsequent? Is this a legitimate method of
ensuring a stable and permanent system of land ownership? If
the color of title is weak, then how strong is a mortgage or deed
of trust placed on the property?
Fee simple estates may be either legal or equitable. In each

situation it is the largest estate in the land that the law will
recognize. Hughes v. Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 246
S.W.23 (1922). If a mortgagee, upon the creation of a mortgage
or deed of trust, steps into the shoes of the grantor upon a
conditional fee simple, does it then mean the mortgagee has
acquired one of the two halves of a fee simple, when cases
have shown the fee simple is only evidenced by a patent?
Actually, courts have held in many states that a mortgage is

only a lien. United States v. Certain Interests in Property in

Champaign County, State of Illinois, 165 F.Supp.474, 480
(1958) (In Illinois and other lien theory states, the mortgagee
has only a lien and not a vested interest in the leasehold); See
also Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Ganswer, 146 Neb. 635,
20 N.W.2d 689 (1945) (Even after a condition is broken or there
is a default on a mortgage, a mortgagee only has an equitable
lien which can be enforced in proper proceedings); South
Omaha Bank v.Levy, 95 N.W.603 (1902) Strict foreclosure will
not lie when mortgagor holds the legal title); First National Bank
v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N.W. 595 (1902) (Mortgagee
cannot demand more than is legally due); Morrill v. Skinner, 57
Neb. 164, 77 N.W. 375 (1898) (Mortgage conveys no estate but
merely creates a lien); Barber v. Crowell, 55 Neb. 571, 75 N.W.
1109 (1898) (Mortgage is mere security in form of conditional
conveyance), Speer v. Hadduck, 31 Freeman (Ill.) 439, 443
(1863) (Assignments or conveyances of mortgages do not
convey the fee simple, rather they hold only security interests).
These cases amply illustrate that a mortgage or deed of trust is
only a lien in lien and intermediate-theory states. Even in title-
theory of mortgages states, courts of equity have determined
that the fee simple title is not reqally conveyed, either in its
equitable or legal state. See supra Barber, at 1110. A fee simple
estate still exists even though the property is mortgaged or
incumbered. Hughes v. Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 246
S.W. 23, 24 (1922). In fact, a creditor asserting a lien
(mortgage) must introduce evidence or proof that will clearly
demonstrate the basis of his lien. United States v. United States
Chain Company, 212 F.Supp. 171 (N.D. Ill. 1962). If a
mortgagee, even in the title theory states, has only alien, yet
when the mortgage or deed of trust is created he has a fee
simple determinable or condition subsequent, then obviously
the color of title used as the operative title has little force or

power to protect the sovereign freeholder. Nor can it be said

that such a color of title is useful in the maintenance of stable
and permanent titles. The patent, in almost all cases, has been
originally issued to the first purchaser from the government.
Theoretically then the public policy, Congressional intent from
the 1800's, and the Congressional intent of the last few decades
should protect the sovereign in the enjoyment and possession
of his freehold. This however is not the case. Instead, vast
mortgaging of the land has occurred. The agriculture debt alone
has risen to over $220,000,000,000 in the past three decades.
This is in part due to the vast expansion of mortgaged holdings
and in part due to the rural sector's inability to repay existing
loans requiring the increased mortgaging if the land. This is in
exact contradiction to the public policy and legislative intent if
maintaining stable and simplistic land records, yet marketable
titles (colors of title) were supposed to guarantee such records.
Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800, 805 (1957). Colors of
title are ineffective against mortgages and promote the
instability and complexity of the records of land titles by
requiring abstracts and title insurance simply to guarantee a
marketable title. Worse, a practice has prevailed in some of the
states...of permitting actions to determine titles to be maintained
upon warrants for land (warranty deeds) and other titles not
complete or legal in their character. This practice is against the
intent of the Constitution and the Acts of Congress. Bagnell v.
Broderick, 38 U.S. 438 (1839). Such lesser titles have no value
in actions brought in federal courts not with standing a State
legislature which may have provided otherwise. Hooper et. al. v.
Scheimer, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 235 (1859). It is in fact possible
that the state legislatures have even violated the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution. These actions are
against the intent of the founding fathers and against the
legislative intent of the Congressman who enacted the statutes

at large creating the land patent or land grant. This patent or

grant, since the land grant has been states to be another name
for the patent, the terms being synonymous, Northern Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Barden, 46 F. 592, 617 (1891); prevented every
problem that was created by the advent of colors of title,
marketable titles, and mortgages. Therefore it is necessary to
determine the validity of returning to the patent as the opertive
title.
Patents are issued (and theoretically passed) between

sovereigns...and deeds are executed by persons and private
corporations without these sovereign powers. Leading Fighter v.
County of Gregory, 230 N.W.2d 114, 116 (1975). As was stated
earlier, the American people in creating the Constitution and the
government formed under it, made such a document and
government as sovereigns, retaining that status even after the
ceratin of the government. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (U.S.)
419 (1793). The government as sovereign passes the title to the
American people creating in them sovereign freeholders.
Therefore, it follows that the American people, as sovereigns,
would also have this authority to transfer the fee simple title,
through the patent, to others. Cases have been somewhat
scarce in this area, but there is some case law to reinforce this
idea. In Wilcox v. Calloway, 1 Wash. (Va.) 38, 38-41 (1823), the
Virginia Court of Appeals heard a case where the patent was
brought up or reissued to the parties four separate times. Some
of the issuances of the patent came before the creation of the
Constitutional United States government, and some occurred
during the creation of that government. The courts determined
the validity of those patents, recognizing each actual acquisition
as being valid, but reconciling the differences by finding the first
patent, properly secured with all the necessary requisite acts

fulfilled, carried the title. The other patents and the necessary
requisition of anew patent each time yielded the phrase "lapsed
patent." A lapsed patent being one that must be reacquired to
perfect the title. Id. Subsequent patentees take subject to any
reservations in the original patent. State v. Crawford, 441 P.2d
586, 590 (1968). A patent regularly issued by the government is
the best and only evidence of a perfect title. The actual patent
should be secured to place at rest any question as to validity of
entries (possession under a claim and color of title). Young v.
Miller, 125 So.2d 257, 258 (1960). Under the color of title act,
the Secretary of Interior may be required to issue a patent if
certain conditions have been met, and the freeholder and his
predecessors in title are in peaceful, adverse possession under
claim and color of title for more than a specified period. Beaver
v. United States, 350 F.2d 4, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 937 (1965).
A description which will identify the lands (and possession) is all
that is necessary for the validity of the patent. Lossing v. Shull,
173 S.W.2d 1, 1 Mo. 342 (1943). A patent to two or more
persons creates presumptively a tenancy in common in the
patentees. Stoll v. Gottbreht, 176 N.W. 932, 45 N.D. 158 (1920).
A patent to be the original grantee or his legal representatives
embrace the representatives by contract as well as by law.
Reichert v. Jerome H. Sheip, Inc., 131 So. 229, 222 Ala. 133
(1930). A patent has a double operation. In the first place, it is
documentary evidence having the dignity of a recored of the
evidence of the title or such equities respecting the claim as to
justify its recognition and later confirmation. In the second place,
it is a deed of the United States, or a title deed. As a deed, its
operation is that if a quitclaim or rather of a conveyance of such
interest as the United States possess in the land, such interest
in the land passing to the people or severeign freeholders. 63
Am. Jur. 2d Section 97, p. 566. Finally, the United States
Supreme Court, in Summa Corporation v. California ex rel.

State Lands Commission, etc., 80 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984), made

determinations as to the validity of a patent confirmed by the
United States through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat.
631 (1951). The State of California attempted to acquire land
that belonged to the corporation. The State maintained that
there was a public trust easement granting to the State authority
to take the land without compensation for public use. The
corporation relied in part on the intent of the treaty, in part on
the intent of the patent and the statute creating it, and in part in
the requisite challenge date of the patent expiring. The Summa
Court followed the lengthy dissertation of the dissenting judge
on the California Supreme Court, See 31 Cal.3d 288, dissenting
opinion, in determining that the patent which had been the
apparent operative title throughout the years, was paramount
and the actions by the State were against the manifest weight of
the Treaty and the legislative intent of the patent statutes. Id. at
244-46. In each of these cases it is states that the patent,
through possession, or claim and color of title, or through the
term "his heirs and assigns forever", or through the necessary
passage of title at the death of a joint tenant or tenant in
common, is still the operable title and is required to secure the
peaceful control of the land. These same ideas can also apply
to state patents for lands that went to the state or remained in
the hands of the state upon admission into the Union. Oliphant
v. Frazho, 146 N.W.2d 685, 686- 87 (1966); Fiedler v. Pipers,
107 So.2d 409, 411-412 (1958) (Not even the State could be
heard to question the validity of a patent signed by the Governor
and the Register of the State Land Office). No government can
object to the intent and creation of a patent after such is issued,
unless issued through fraud or mistake. The patent, either
federal or state, has an intent to create sovereign freeholders in
the land protected form the speculators, (any lending institution
speculates upon land), and a public policy to maintain a

simplistic, stable and permanent system if land records. Land

patents were designed to effectively insure that this intent and
policy were retained. Colors of title can not provide this type of
stability, since such titles are powerless against liens,
mortgages, when the freeholder is unable to repay principle and
interest on the accompanying promissory note. Equyity will
entertain jurisdiction at the instance of the owner of fee of lands
to remove a cloud upon his title created by the sale of the
premises and a dded issued thereto under a decree of
foreclosure of a mortgage thereon. Hodgen v. Guttery, 58 Free.
(Ill.) 431, 438 (1871) (though this case dealt with an improper
sale of land covered by a patent, any forced sales of lands
covered by a patent is improper in view of the policy and intent
of Congress). Equity however will protect the mortgagee who
stands to lose his interest in the property, thereby requiring a
trust to be created until the debt is erased, making partners of
the creditor and debtor. What then exists is a situation where
the patent should be declared (confirmed or reissued), to
protect the sovereign freeholder and to reinstitute the policy and
intent of Congress. The patent as the paramount title, fee
simple absolute, can not be collaterally attacked, but when a
debt can not be paid immediately placing the creditor in
jeopardy, the courts will impose a constructive trust until the
new "partners" can mutually eliminate the debt. If the debt can
not be satisfactorily removed, it is still possible, considering the
present intent of the government, to maintain sovereign
freeholders on the property immune from the loss of the land,
since it is Congress' intent to keep the family farm in place. The
use of colors of title to act as the operative title is inappropriate
considering the rising number of foreclosures and the inability of
the colors of title to restrain a mortgage or lien. However, the
lending institutions, speculators on the land, maintain that the
public policy of the country includes the eradication of the

sovereign freeholders in the rural sector in an effort to implant

upon the country, large corporate holdings. This last area must
be effectively met and eliminated.
To those who framed the Constitution, the rights of the

States and the rights of the people were two distinct and
different things. Throughout their debates they had two objects
foremost in their minds. First, to create a strong and effective
national government, and secondly to protect the people and
their rights from usurption and tyranny by government. The
people's liberties and individual rights and safeguards were to
be kept forever beyond the control and dominion of the
legislatures of the States, whom they distrusted, and against
whom they so carefully guarded themselves. If such control and
domination and unlimited powers were given to a few
legislatures they could override every one of the reserved rights
covered by the first ten Amendments (the bill of rights); they
could change the government of limited powers to one of
unlimited powers; they could declare themselves hereditary
rules; they could abolish religious freedoms; they could abolish
free speech and the right of the people to petition for redress;
they could not only abolish trial by jury, but even the rights to
a day in court; and most importantly they could abolish free

sovereign ownership of the land. The whole literature of the
period of the adoption of the Constitution and the first ten
amendments is one great testimony to the insistence that the
Constitution must be so amended as to safeguard
unquestionably the rights and freedoms of the people so as to
secure from any future interference by the new government,
matters the people had not already given into its control, unless
by their own consent. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716,

723-726 (1930). The problem lies not in the lending institutions

that simply practice good business on their part. The problem in
the loss of freedoms by this present interference with allodial
sovereign ownership lies with the state legislatures that created
law, or marketable title acts, that claimed to enact new
simplistic, stable land titles and actually created a watered-down
version of the fee simple absolute that requires complicated
tracing and protection, and is ineffective against mortgage
foreclosures. None of these problems would occur if the patent
were the operable title again, as long as the sovereigns
recognized the powers and disabilities of their fee simple title.
The patent was meant to keep the sovereign freeholder on the
land, but the land was also to be kept free of debt, since that
debt was recognized in 1820 as unrepayable, and today is
unrepayable. The redeclaration of the patent is essential in the
protection of the rural sector of sovereign freeholders, but also
essential is the need to impress the state legislatures that have
strayed from their enumerated powers with the knowledge that
they have enacted laws that have defeated the intent and goal
of man since the middle ages. That intent, of course, is to own a
small tract of land abvsolutely, whether by land-boc or patent,
on which the freeholder is beholden to no lord or superior. The
patent makes sovereign freeholders of each person who own
his/her land. A return to the patent must occur if those sovereign
freeholders wish to protect that land from the encroachment of
the state legislatures and the speculators that benefit from such
legislation.
SECTION IV
CONCLUSION

As has been seen, man is always striving to protect his

rights, the most dear being the absolute right to ownership of
the land, This right was guaranteed by the land patent, the
public policy of the Congress, and the legislative intent behind
the Statutes at Large. Such rights must be reacquired through
the redeclaration of the patent in the color of title claimant's
name, based on his color of title and possession. With such
reborn rights, the land is protected from the forced sale because
of delinquency on a promissory note and foreclosure on the
mortgage. This protected land will not eliminate the debt, a trust
must be created whereby "partners" will work together to repay
it. These rights must be recaptured from the state legislated
laws, or the freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and
Constitution will be lost. Once lost, those rights will be
exceedingly hard to reclaim, and quite possibly, as Thomas
Jefferson said, the children of this generation may someday
wake up homeless on the land their forefathers founded.
Return to Land Patents
Return to Articles

Truth - Land Patents - Allodial and Land Patents Titles
ALLODIAL AND LAND PATENTS TITLES
Developed by
Constitutional Law Research Trust
in association with
Citizens for Sovereignty
Step V
Disclaimer
Much of this information has been gathered over a period of

years from some fifty different sources. It is presented for
educational purposes and is up to you to determine the validity
of any and all information presented. The author makes no
claims as to be an attorney, lawyer, paralegal, or other type of
legal counselor and neither recommends nor means to entice
the reader to commit any unlawful act.
If there are questions which come to mind that may not be

easily answered through your research of the enclosed
citations, please consult the appropriate legal counsel. DO NOT
attempt to co-mingle or "shepherdise" case law and other
citations to situation which are not specifically defined within
each specified volume.
http://www.truth.tc/information/LandPatentsAndAllodialTitles.html (1 of 73) [9/19/2009 11:14:42 AM]

The materials presented herein are done so under the

authority of the First Amendment to the constitution of the united
States of American and said authority pertains to that Freedom
of Speech and Freedom of Press which our forefathers held so
dear.
PREFACE
TO THE DCS EDITION
The DCS Edition of the Manual for the "Freeman", Volume II,
"Allodial and Patent Land Titles", is A WORK IN PROGRESS,
i.e., it is continually being revised and updated to include; new
or expanded thinking on the part of the authors, with new
authoritative sources, new court cases and case cites.
INTRODUCTION
Personal Property in today's world seems more and more to

be what you can 'hang on to'. It is a shame, but certain people
actually believe that the world owes them something. To some
that means a living - living of the welfare roles when it truly is
not necessary. To others, it is how much of what you have can I
take and hold as my own.

Even cities expanding beyond their original limits now seek

new territory for the tax base. Further, we hear of declared
easements where none existed before. We then find a
conspicuous piece of mail in the mailbox which notifies us that
we are about to be moved - for the good of the community.
This last few years we have seen natural disasters such as

tornadoes, hurricanes and floods. We pay little attention to the
announcer as he orates that those 'displaced' persons will NOT
be allowed to return to their homes.
We are told of how the 'government' has come to the rescue

with relief in the form of loans. Those 'low interest' loans are to
be used to rebuild elsewhere. Are these loans callable at any
time? Some of those now receiving aide have worked their land
for generations. Their land was free and clear of encumbrances.
Their land was allodial in nature and in fact.
Your property is currently held as 'commercial'. Your property

needs to be restated as personal, private and inviolate.
The pages that follow attempt to present a clear and concise

review of the 'Law' regarding Allodial or Patent Land. It presents
a framework for educational research which will assist you in
the reclamation of your personal property rights. You can;

1. Own your Land.
2. Remove the requirements of Property Tax.
3. Eliminate the need for Building Permits.
4. Remove your property from Zoning Restrictions.
5. Save your property from foreclosure actions.
6. Eliminate usurpation of property by government.
The applications are endless. You are the sovereign. You

create the ground rules... So go out and take back your rights.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW HISTORY, FORCE & EFFECT OF

THE LAND PATENT
SECTION I

ALLODIAL v FEUDAL TITLES
In America today, there is a phenomenon occurring that has

not been experienced since the mid-1930's. That phenomenon
is the increasingly, rising number of foreclosures, both in the
rural sector and in the cities. This phenomenon is occurring
because of the inability of the debtor to pay the creditor the
necessary interest and principle on a rising debt load, that is
expanding across the country. As a defense, the land patent or
fee simple title to the land and the Congressional intent that
accompanies the patent is hereby being presented. In order to
properly evaluate the patent in any given situation, it is
necessary to understand what a patent is, why it was created,
what existed before the patent, particularly in Common-Law
England. These questions must be answered in order to
effectively understand the association between the
government, the land, and the people.
First, what existed before land patents? Since it is imperative

to understand what the land patent is and why it was created,
the best method is a study of the converse, or the Common-Law
English land titles. This method thus allows us to fully
understand what we are presently supposed to have by way of
actual ownership of land. [1]
In England, at least until the mid-1600's, and arguably until

William Blackstone's time in the mid-1700's, property was
exclusively owned by the King. In arbitrary governments; the

title is held by and springs from the supreme head--be he the

emperor, king, potentate; or by whatever name he is known.
McConnell v. Wilcox, I Scam (111.) 344, 367 (1837). The king
was the true and complete owner, giving him the authority to
take and grant the land from the people in his kingdom who
either lost or gained his favor. The authority to take the land
may have required a justifiable reason, but such a reason could
conceivably have been fabricated by the king leaving the
disseised former holder of the land wondering what it was that
had brought the king's wrath to bear upon him. At the same time
the beneficiary of such a gift, while undoubtedly knowing the
circumstances behind such a gift, may still not have known how
the facts were discovered and not knowing how such facts
occurred, may have been left to wonder if the same fate awaited
him if ever he fell into disfavor with the king.
The King's gifts were called fiefs, a fief being the same as a
feud, which is described as an estate in land held of a superior
on condition of rendering him services. 2 Blackstone's
Commentaries, p. 105. It is also described as an inheritable
right to the use and occupation of lands, held on condition of
rendering services to the lord or proprietor, who himself retains
the ownership in the lands, Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition
p. 748 (1968). Thus, the people had land they occupied,
devised, inherited, alienated, or disposed of as they saw fit, so
long as they remained in favor with the King. F. L. Ganshof,
Feudalism, p. 113 (1964). "This holding of lands under another
was called a tenure, and was not limited to the relation of the
first or paramount lord and vassal, but extended to those to
whom such vassal, within the rules of feudal [2] law, may have
parted out his own feud to his own vassals, whereby he became
the mesne lord between his vassals and his own or lord

paramount. Those who held directly to the king were called his
"tenants in ... chief. " I E. Washburn, Treatise on The American
Law of Real Property, Ch. 11, Section 58, P. 42 (6th Ed. 1902).
In this manner, the lands which had been granted out to the
barons principal lands were again subdivided, and granted by
them to subfeudatories to be held of themselves. ld., Section
65, p.44. The size of the gift of the land could vary from a few
acres to thousands of acres depending on the power and
prestige of the lord. See supra Ganshof at 113. The fiefs were
built in the same manner as a pyramid, with the King, the true
owner of the land, being at the top, and from the bottom up
there existed a system of small to medium sized to large to
large sized estates on which the persons directly beneath one
estate owed homage to the lord of that estate as well as to the
King. Id. at 114. At the lowest level of this pyramid through at
least the 14th and 15th centuries existed to serfs or villains, the
class of people that had no rights and were recognized as
nothing more than real property. F. Goodwin, Treatise on The
Law of Real Property, Ch. 1, p. 10 (1905). This system of
hierarchical land holdings required an elaborate system of
payment. These fiefs to the land might be recompenses in any
number of ways.
One of the more common types of fiefs, or the payment of a

rent or obligation to perform rural labor upon the lord's lands
known as socage, was the crops field Id. at 8. Under this type of
fief a certain portion of the grain harvested each year would
immediately be turned over to the lord above that particular fief
even before the shares from the lower lords and then serfs of
the fief would be distributed. A more interesting type of fief for
purposes of this memorandum [3] was the money fief. In most
cases, the source of money was not specified, and the payment

was simply made from the fief holder's treasury, but the fief
might also consist of a fixed revenue to be paid from a definite
source in annual payments in order for the tenant owner of the
fief to be able to remain on the property. Gilsebert of Mons,
Chronique, cc. 69 and 1 15, pp. 109, 175 (ed. Vanderkindere).
The title held by such tenant-owners over their land was

described as a fee simple absolute. "Fee simple, Fee commeth
of the French fief, i.e., praedium beneficiarium, and legally
signifieth inheritance as our author himself hereafter
expoundeth it and simple is added, for that it is descendible to
his heirs generally, that is, simply, without restraint to the heirs
of his body, or the like, Feodum est quod quis tenet ex
quacunque causa sive sit tenementum sive redditus, etc. In
Domesday it is called feudom." Littleton, Tenures, Sec. lb, Fee
Simple. In Section 11, fee simple is described as the largest
form of inheritance. Id. In modern English tenures, the term fee
signifies an inheritable estate, being the highest and most
extensive interest the common man or noble, other than the
King, could have in the feudal system. 2 Blackstone's
Commentaries, p. 106. Thus, the term fee simple absolute in
Common-Law England denotes the most and best title a person
could have as long as the King allowed him to retain possession
of (own) the land. It has been commented that the basis of
English land law is the ownership of all reality by the sovereign.
From the crown, all titles flow. The original and true meaning of
the word "fee" and therefore fee simple absolute is the same as
fief or feud, this being in contradiction to the term "allodium"
which means or is defined as a man's own land, which he
service to any superior. Wendell [4] v Crandall, 1 N. Y. 491
(1848). Therefore on Common-Law England practically

everybody who was allowed to retain land, had the type of fee
simple absolute often used or defined by courts, a fee simple
that grants or gives the occupier as much of a title as the
"sovereign" allows such occupier to have at that time. The term
became a synonym with the supposed ownership of land under
the feudal system of Eng-land at common law. Thus, even
though the word absolute was attached to the fee simple, it
merely denoted the entire estate that could be assigned or
passed to heirs, and the fee being the operative word; fee
simple absolute dealt with the entire fief and its divisibility,
alienability and inheritability. Friedman v Steiner, 107 111. 131
(1883). If a fee simple ab-solute in Common-Law England
denoted or was synonymous with only as much title as the King
allowed his barons to possess, then what did the King have by
way of a title?
The King of England held ownership of land under a different

title and with far greater powers than any of his subjects.
Though the people of Eng-land held fee simple titles to their
land, the King actually owned all the land in England through his
allodial title, and though all the land was in the feudal system,
none of the fee simple titles were of equal weight and dignity
with the King's title, the land always remaining allodial in favor of
the King. Gilsbert of Mons, Chronique, Ch. 43, p. 75 (ed.
Vanderkindere). Thus, it is relatively easy to deduce that allodial
lands and titles are the highest form of lands and titles known to
Common-Law. An estate of in-heritance without condition,
belonging to the owner, and alienable by him, transmissible to
his heirs absolutely and simply, is an absolute estate in
perpetuity and the largest possible estate a man can have,
being in fact allodial in its nature. Stanton v Sullivan, 63 R.I.
216, 7 A. 696 (1839). "The original meaning of a perpetuity is an

inalienable, indestructible inter-est." [5] Bovier's Law Dictionary,

Volume 111, p. 2570 (1914). The King had such a title in land.
As such, during the classical feudalistic period of Common-Law
England, the King answered to no one conceming the land.
Allodial titles, being held by sovereigns, and being full and
complete titles, al-lowed the King of England to own and control
the entire country in the form of one large estate belonging to
the Crown. Allodial estates owned by individuals exercising full
and complete ownership, on the other hand, existed only to a
limited extent in the County of Kent.
In summary of Common-Law England: (1) the King was the

only person (sovereign) to hold complete and full title to a land
(allodial title); (2) the people who maintained estates of land,
(either called manors or fiefs), held title by fee simple absolute,
(3) this fee simple absolute provided the means by which the
"supposed" owner could devise, alienate, or pass by inheritance
the estates of land (manors or fiefs); (4) this fee simple ab-
solute in feudal England, being not the full title, did not protect
the "owner" if the King found disfavor with the "owner", (5) the
xxxxxxxxxx it owner" therefore had to pay a type of homage to
the King or a higher baron each year to discharge the obligation
of his fief, (6) this homage of his fief could take the form of a
revenue or tax, an amount of grain, or a set and permanent
amount of money, (7) and therefore as long as the "owner" of
the fief in fee simple absolute paid homage to the king or
sovereign, who held the entire country under an allodial title,
then the "owner" could remain on the property with full rights to
sell, devise or pass it by inheritance as if the property was really
his. [6]

SECTION II
LAND OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA TODAY
THE AMERICAN FEUDALISTIC SOCIETY
The private ownership of land in America is one of those

rights people have proclaimed to be essential in maintaining this
republic. The necessary question in discussing this topic
however, is whether ownership of land in America today really is
a true and complete ownership of land under an allodial
concept, or is it something much different. In other words, are
we living in an actual allodial freehold or are we living in an
updated version of feudalistic Common-Law. The answer is
crucial in determining what rights we have in the protection of
our reality against improper seizures and encumbrances by our
government and creditors. The answer appears to be extremely
clear upon proper reflection of our rights when payments are
missed on mortgages, or taxes, for whatever reason, are not
paid. If mortgage payments are missed or taxes are not paid,
we actually fall into disfavor with the parties who have the
power, and these powers, through court proceedings or
otherwise, take our land as a penalty. When one understands if
he is un-able to perform as the government or his creditors
request and for such failures of performance his land can be
forfeited, then he can begin to understand exactly what type of
land-ownership system controls his life, and he should
recognize the inherent unjustness of such constitutional
violations.

The American-based system of land ownership today

consists of three key requirements. These three are the
warranty deed or some other @ of deed purporting to convey
ownership [7] of land, title abstracts to chronologically follow the
development of these different types of deeds to a piece of
property, and title insurance to protect the ownership of that
land. These three ingredients must work together to ensure a
systematic and orderly conveyance of a piece of property; none
of these three by itself can act to completely convey possession
of the land from one person to another. At least two of the three
are always deemed necessary to adequately satisfy the legal
system and real estate agents that the titles to the property had
been placed in the hands of the purchaser and often-times, all
three are necessary to properly pass the ownership of the land
to the purchaser. Yet does the absolute title and therefore the
ownership of the land really pass from the seller to purchaser
with the use of any one of these three instruments or in any
combination thereof None of the three by itself passes the
absolute or allodial title to the land, the system of land
ownership America originally operated under, and even
combined all three can not convey this absolute type of
ownership. What then is the function of these three instruments
that are used in land conveyances and what type of title is
conveyed by the three? Since the abstract only traces the title
and the title insurance only in-sures the title, the most important
and therefore first group to examine are the deeds that
These deeds include the ones as follows: warranty deed, quit

claim deed, sheriffs deed, trustee's deed, judicial deed, tax
deed, wig or any other instrument that purportedly conveys the
title. All of these documents state that it conveys the ownership

to the land. Each of these, however, is actually a color of title.

Examination of Abstracts, Ch. 3, Section 73, p.93 (1919). A
color of title is that which in appearance is title, but which in
reality is not title. Wright v Mattison, 18 How. (U.S.) 50 (1855)
[8]. In fact, any instrument may constitute color of title when it
purports to convey the title of the land, as well the land itself,
although it is void as a muniment of title. Joplin Brewing Co. v
Payne, 197 No. 422, 94 S.W. 896 (1906). The Supreme Court
of Missouri has stated, "that [when we say a person has a color
of title, whatever may be the meaning of the phrase, we express
the idea, at least, that some act has been previously done,..., by
which some title, good or bad, to a parcel of land of definite
extent had been conveyed to him." St. Louis v Gorman, 29 Mo.
593 (1860). In other words, a color of title is an appearance or
apparent title, and "image' of the true tide, hence the phrase
'color of" which, when coupled with possession purports to
convey the ownership of the land to the purchaser. This
however does not say that the color of title is the actual and true
title itself, nor does it say that the color of title itself actually
conveys ownership. In fact, the claimant or holder of a color of
title is not even required to trace the title through the chain down
to his instrument. Rawson v Fox, 65 111. 200 (1872). Rather it
may be said that a color of title is prima facie evidence of
ownership of and rights to possession of land until such time as
that presumption of ownership is disproved by a better title or
the actual title itself. If such cannot he proven to the contrary,
then ownership of the land is assumed to have passed to
occupier of the land. To further strengthen a color title-holder's
position, courts have held that the good faith of the holder to a
color of title is presumed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. David v Hall, 92 R. 1. 85 (1879); see also Morrison v
Norman, 47 Ill. 477 (1868); and McConnell v Street, 17 111. 253

(1855).
With such knowledge of what a color of title is, it Is interesting

what constitutes colors of title. A warranty deed is like any other
deed of conveyance. Mahrenholz v County Board of [9] School
Trustees of Lawrence County, et. al., 93 111. app. 3d 366
(1981). A warranty deed or deed of conveyance is a color of
title, as stated in Dempsey v Bums, 281 111. 644, 650 (1917)
(Deeds constitute colors of title); see also Dryden v Newman,
116 111. 186 (1886) (A deed that purports to convey interest in
the land is a color of title) Hinckley v Green 52 111. 223 (1869)
(A deed which, on its face, purports to convey a title, constitutes
a claim and color of title); Busch v Huston, 75 111. 343 (1874);
Chicking v Failes, 26 111. 508 (1861). A quit claim deed is a
color of title as stated in Safford v Stubbs, 1 17 ILL. 389 (1886);
see also Hooway v Clark, 27 ILL. 483 (1861) and McCellan v
Kel-logg, 17 111. 498 (1855). Quit claim deeds can pass the
title as effectively as a warrant with full covenants. Grant v
Bennett, 96 111. 513, 525 (1880); See also Morgan v Clayton,
61 111. 35 (187 1); Brady v Spurck, 27 111. 478 (186 1);
Butterfield v Smith, 111. II 1. 485 (1849). Sheriffs deeds also
are colors of title. Kendrick v Latham, 25 Fla. 819 (1889); as is a
judicial deed, Huls v Buntin, 47 111. 396 (1865). The Illinois
Supreme Court went into detail in its determination that a tax
deed is only color of tide. "There the complainant seem to have
relied upon the tax deed as conveying to him the fee, and to
sustain such a bill, it was incumbent of him to show that all the
requirements of the law had been complied with." A simple tax
deed by itself is only a color of title. Fee simple can only be
acquired though adverse possession via payment of taxes;
claim and color of title, plus seven years of payment of taxes.
Thus any tax deed purports, on its face, to convey title is a good

color of title. Walker v Converse, 148 111. 622, 629 (1894); see
also Peadro v Carriker, 168 111. 570 (1897); Chicago v
Middlebrooke, 143 111. 265 (1892); Piatt County v Gooden, 97
111. 84 (1880); Stubblefield v Borders, 92 111. 570 (1897);
Coleman v Billings, 89 111. 183 (1878); Whitney v Stevens, 89
111. 53 (1878); Thomas v Eckard, 88 111. 593 (1878);
Holloway v Clarke, [10] 27 111. 483 (1861). A will passes only a
color of title. Baldwin v Ratcliff, 125 Ill. 376 (1888); Bradley v
Rees, 113 111. 327 (1885) (A wig can pass only so much as the
testator owns, though it may attempt to pass more). A trustee's
deed, a mortgages and strict fore-closure, Chickering v Failes,
26 111. 508, 519 (1861), or any document defining the extent of
a disseisor's claim or purported claim, Cook v Norton, 43 111.
391 (1867), all have been held to be colors of title. In fact,
"Itlhere is nothing here requiring a deed, to establish a color of
title, and under the former decisions of this court, color or title
may ex-ist without a deed." Baldwin v Ratcliff, 125 111. 376,
383 (1882); County of Piatt v Goodell, 97 111. 84 (1880); Smith
v Ferguson, 91 111. 304 (1878); Hassett v Ridgely, 49 111. 197
(1868); Brooks v. Bruyn, 35 111. 392 (1864); McCagg v
Heacock, 34 111. 476 (1864); Bride v Watt, 23 111. 507 (1860);
and Woodward v Blanchard, 16 111. 424 (1855). All of these
cases being still valid and none being overruled, in effect, the
statements in these cases are well established law. All of the
documents described in these cases are the main avenues of
claimed land ownership in America today, yet none actually
conveys the true and allodial title. They in fact convey
something quite different.
When it is stated that a color of title conveys only an

appearance of or apparent title, such a statement is correct but
perhaps too vague to be properly understood in its correct legal

context. What are useful are the more pragmatic statements

conceming titles. A title or color of title, in order to be effective in
transferring the ownership or purported ownership of the land,
must be a marketable or merchantable title.[11]
A marketable or merchantable title is one that is reasonably

free from doubt. Austin v Bamum, 52 Minn. 136 (1892). This title
must t)e as reasonably free from doubts as necessary to not
affect the marketability or salability of the property, and must be
a title a reasonably prudent person would be willing to accept.
Robert v McFadden, 32 Tex-Civ.App. 47, 74 S.W. 105 (1903).
Such a title is often described as one which would ensure to the
purchaser a peaceful enjoyment of the property, Barnard v
Brown, 112 Mich. 452, 70 N.W. 1038 (1897), and it is stated
that such a title must be obvious, evident, apparent, certain,
sure or indubitable. Ormsby v Graham, 123 La. 202, 98 N.W.
724 (1904). Marketable Title Acts, which have been adopted in
several of the states, generally do not lend themselves to an
interpretation that they might operate to provide a new
foundation of title based upon a stray, accidental, or interloping
conveyance. Their object is to provide, for the recorded fee
simple ownership, an exemption from the burdens of old
conditions which at each transfer of the property interferes with
its marketability. Wichelman v Messner, 83 N.W. 2d 800 (1957).
What each of these legal statements in the various factual
situations says is that the color of title is never described as the
absolute or actual title, rather each says that it is one of the
types of titles necessary to convey owner-ship or apparent
ownership. A marketable title, what a color of title must be in
order to be effective, must be a title which is good of recent
record, even if it may not be the actual title in fact. Close v
Stuyvesant, 132 111. 607, 24 N.E. 868 (1890). "Authorities hold

that to render a title marketable it is only necessary that it shall

be free from reasonable doubt; in other words, that a purchaser
is not entitled to demand a title absolutely free from every
possible suspicion." Cummings v Dolan, 52 Wash. 496, 100 P.
989 (1909). The record being spoken of here is the title abstract
and all documentary evidence pertaining to it. "It is an axiom of
[12] hornbook law that a purchaser has notice only of recorded
instruments that are within his 'chain of title'." I R. Patton & C.
Patton, Patton on Land Title, Section 69, at 230-233. (2nd ed.
1957); Sabo v Horvath, 559 P. 2d 1038, 1043 (Ak. 1976). Title
insurance then guarantees that a title is marketable, not
absolutely free from doubt.
Thus, under the color or title system used most often in this
country today, no individual operating under this type of title
system has the ab-solute or allodial title. All that is really
necessary to have a valid title is to have a relatively clean
abstract with a recognizable color of title as the operative
marketable title within the chain of title. It therefore be-comes
necessarily difficult, if not impossible after a number of years,
considering the inevitable contingencies that must arise and the
title disputes that will occur, to ever properly guarantee an
absolute title. This is not necessarily the fault of the seller, but it
is the fault of the legal and real estate systems for allowing such
a diluted form of title to be control-ling in an area where it is
imperative to have the absolute title. In order to correct this
problem, it is important to return to those documents the early
leaders or the nation created to properly ensure that property
remained one of the inalienable rights that the newly
established sovereign freeholders could rely on to always exist.
This correction must be in the form of restricting or perhaps
eliminating the widespread use of a marketable title and

returning to the absolute title.
Other problems have' developed because of the use of a

color of title system for the conveyance of land. These problems
arise in the area of terminology that succeed in only confusing
and clouding the title to an even greater extent than merely
using terms like [13] marketability, salability or merchantability.
When a person must also determine whether a title is complete,
perfect, good and clear, or whether it Is a bad, defective,
imperfect and doubtful, there is any obvious possibility of
destroying a chain of title because of an inability to recognize
what is acceptable to a reasonable purchaser.
A complete title means that a person has the possession,

right of pos-session and the right of property. Dingey v Paxton,
60 Miss. 1038 (1883) and Ehle v Quackenboss, 6 Hill (N.Y.) 537
(1844). A perfect title is exactly the same as a complete title,
Donovan v Pitcher, 53 Ala. 411 (1875) and Converse v Kellogg,
7 Barb. (N. Y.) 590 (1850); and each simply means the type of
title a well-informed, reasonable and prudent person would be
willing to accept when paying full value for the property. Birge v
Bock, 44 Mo. App. 69 (1890). In other words, a complete or
perfect title is in reality a marketable or merchantable title, and
is usually represented by a color of title.
A good title does not necessarily mean one perfect of record

but consists of one which is both of rightful ownership and
rightful possession of the property - Bloch v Ryan, 4 App. Cas
283 (1894). It means a title free from litigation, palpable defects
and grave doubts consisting of both legal and equitable titles

and fairly deducible of record. Reynolds v Borel, 86 Cal. 538, 25
P. 67 (1890). 'A good title means not merely a title valid in fact,
but a marketable title, which can again be sold 'to a reasonable
purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence as
security for a loan of money." Moore v Williams, 115 N.Y. 586,
22 N.E. 253 (1889). A clear title means there are no
encumbrances on the land, Roberts v Bassett, 105 Mass. 409
(1870). [14] Thus, when contracting to convey land, the use of
the phrase "good and clear title" is surplusage, since the terms
good title and clear title are in fact synonymous. Oakley v Cook,
41 N.J. Eq. 350, 7 A.2d 495 (1886). Therefore, the words good
title and clear title, just like the words complete title and perfect
title, describe nothing more than a marketable title or
merchantable title, and as stated above, each can and almost
always is represented in a transaction by a color of title. None of
these types of title purports to be the absolute, or allodial title,
and none of them are that type of title. None of these actually
claims to be a fee simple absolute, and since these types of
titles are almost always represented by a color of title, none
represents that it passes the actual title. Each one does state
that it passes what can be described as a title good enough to
avoid the necessity of litigation to determine who actually has
the title. If such litigation to determine titles is necessary, then
the title has crossed the boundaries of usefulness and entered a
different category of title descriptions and names.
This new category consists of titles which are bad, defective,

imperfect or doubtful. A bad title conveys no property to the
purchaser of the estates. Heller v Cohen, 15 Misc. 378, 36
N.Y.S. 668 (1895). A title is defective when the party claiming to
own the land has not the whole title, but some other person has

title to a part or portion of it. Such a title is the same as no title

whatsoever. Place v People, 192 111. 160, 61 N.E. 354 (1901);
See also Cospertini v Oppermann, 76 Cal. 181, 18 P. 256
(1888). An imperfect title is one where something remains to be
done by the granting power to pass the title to the land, Raschel
v Perez, 7 Tex. 348 (1851); and a doubtful title is also one
which conveys no property to the purchaser of the estate -
Heller v Cohen, 15 Misc. 378, 36 N.Y.S. 668 (1895). Every title
is described as doubtful [15] which invites or exposes the party
holding it to litigation. Herman v Somers, 158 PA.ST. 424, 27 A.
1050 (1893). Each of these types of titles describes exactly the
same idea stated in many different ways, that because of some
problem, defect, or question surrounding the title, no title can be
conveyed, since no title exists. Yet in all of these situations
some type of color of title was used as the operative instrument.
What then makes one color of title complete, good or clear in
one situation, and in another situation the same type of color of
title could be described as bad, defective, imperfect or doubtful?
What is necessary to make what might otherwise be a doubtful
title, a good tide, is the belief of others in the community,
whether or not properly justified, that the title is a good one
which they would be w@g to purchase. Moore v Williams, 115
N. Y. 586, 22 N.E. 253 (1889). The methods presently used to
determine whether a title or color of title is good enough to not
be doubtful, are the other two-thirds of the three possible
requirements for the conveyance of a good or complete
(marketable) title.
These two methods of properly ensuring that a title is a good

or complete title are title abstracts, the complete documentary
evidence of title, and title insurance. The legal title to land,
based on a color of title, is made up of a series of documents

required to be executed with the solemnities prescribed by law,

and of facts not evidenced by documents, which show the
claimant a person to whom the law gives the estate.
Documentary evidences of title consist of voluntary grants by
the sovereign, deeds if conveyances and wills by individuals,
conveyances by statutory or judicial permission, deeds made in
connection with the sale of land for delinquent taxes,
proceedings under the power of eminent domain, and deeds
executed by ministerial or fiduciary officers. These documentary
evidences are represented by the land patent and the [16]
colors of title. I G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modem
Law of Real Property, pp. 99-100 (5th ed. 1980).
These instruments, relied upon to evidence the title, coupled

with the outward assertive acts that import dominion, must be
used by the abstractor in compiling the abstract, and the
attorney must examine to determine the true status of the title.
Id. The abstract is the recorded history of the land and the
various types of titles, mortgages and other liens, claims and
interests that have been placed on the property. The abstract
can determine the number of times the patent has been
redeclared, who owns the mineral rights, what color of title is
operable at any particular point in time, and what lien holder is
in first position, but it does not convey or even attempt to
convey any form of the title itself. As Thompson, supra has
stated, it is necessary when operating with colors of titles to
have an abstract to determine the status of the operable title
and determine whether that title is good or doubtful. Id. at 101. If
the title is deemed good after this lengthy process, then the
property may be transferred without doing anything more, since
it is assumed that the seller was the owner of the property. This
is not to say emphatically that the seller is the paramount or
absolute owner. This does not even completely guarantee that
he is the owner of the land against any adverse claimants. It is
not even that difficult to claim that the title holder has a good
title due to the leniency and attitude now evidenced by the
judicial authorities toward maintaining a stable and uniform
system of land ownership, whether or not that ownership is
justified. This however, does not explain the purpose and goal
of a title abstract.
An abstract that has been properly brought up simply states

that it is presumed the seller is the owner of the land, making
the title marketable, and guaranteeing that he has a good title to
[17] sell. This is all an abstract can legally do since it is not the
title itself and it does not state the owner has an absolute title.
Therefore, the abstract can not guarantee unquestionably that
the title is held by the owner. All of this rhetoric is necessary if
the title is good; if there is some question concerning the title
without making it defective, then the owner must tum to the last
of the three alternatives to help pass a good title, title insurance.
Examination of Abstracts, Ch. 111, Section 79, pp. 99-100
(1919).
Title insurance is issued by title insurance companies to

ensure the validity of the title against any defects, against any
encumbrances affecting the designated property, and to protect
the purchaser against any losses he sustains from the
subsequent determination that his title is actually unmarketable.
Id. at 100. Title insurance extends to any defects of title. Id. It
protects against the existence of any encumbrances, provided
only that any judgments adverse to the title shall be pronounced
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. It is not even necessary

that a defect actually exist when the insurance policy was

issued, it is simply necessary that there exists at the time of
issuance of the policy and inchoate or potential defect which is
rendered operative and substantial by the happening of some
subsequent event. Since all one normally has is a color of title,
the longer
a title traverses history, the greater the possibility that the title
will become defective. The greater the need for insurance
simply to keep the title marketable, the easier it is to determine
that the title possessed is not the true, paramount and absolute
title. If a person had the paramount title, there would be no need
for title insurance, though an abstract might be useful for record
keeping and historical purposes. Title insurance and abstract
record keeping are useful primarily because of extensive
reliance on colors of title as the operative title for a piece of
property.[18]
This then supplies the necessary information conceming

colors of title, title abstracts, and title insurance. This does not
describe the relationship between the landowner and the
government. As was stated in the instruction, in feudal England,
the King has the power, right and authority to take a person's
land away from him, if and when the King felt it necessary. The
question is whether most of the American system of land
ownership and titles is in reality any different and whether
therefore the American-based system of ownership, is in reality
nothing more than a feudal system of land ownership.
Land ownership in America presently is founded on colors of

title, and though people believe they are the complete and total
owners of their property; under a color of title system this is far
from the truth. When people state that they are free and own
their land, they in fact own it exactly to the extent the English
barons owned their land in Common-Law England. They own
their land so long as some "sovereign", the government or a
creditor, states that they can own their land. If one recalls from
the beginning of this memorandum, it was states that if the King
felt it justified, he could take the land from one person and give
such land to another prospective baron. Today, in American
color-of-title property law, if the landowner does not pay income
tax, estate tax, property tax, mortgages or even a security note
on personal property, then the "sovereign", the government or
the creditor, can justify the taking of the property and the sale of
that same property to another prospective "baron", while leaving
the owner with only limited defenses to such actions. The only
real difference between this and Common-Law England is [19]
that now others besides the King can profit from the
unwillingness or inability of the "landowner" to perform the
socage or tenure required of every landowner of America. As
such no one is completely safe or protected on his property; no
one can afford to make one mistake or the consequences will
be forfeiture of the property. If this were what the people in the
mid 1700's wanted, there would have been no need to have an
American Revolution, since the taxes were secondary to having
a sound monetary system and complete ownership of the land.
Why fight a Revolutionary War to escape sovereign control and
virtual dictator ship over the land, when in the 1990's these
exact problems are prevalent with this one exception, money
now changes hands in order to give validity to the eventual and
continuous takeover of the property between the parties. This is
hardly what the forefathers strived for when creating the United
States Constitution, and what they did strive for is the next

segment of the memorandum of law, allodial ownership of the

land via the land patent. The next segment will analyze the
history of this type of title so that the patent can be properly
understood, making it possible to comprehend the patent's true
role in property law today.[20]
SECTION Ill
LAND PATENTS AND WHY THEY WERE CREATED
As was seen in the previous sections, there is little to protect

the landowner who holds title in the chain of title, when
distressful economic or weather condition make it impossible to
perform on the debt. Under the color-of-title system, the
property, "one of those inalienable rights", can be taken for the
nonperformance on loan obligations. This type of ownership is
similar to the feudal ownership found in the Middle Ages.
Upon defeating the English in 1066 A.D., William the

Conqueror pursuant to his 52nd and 58th laws, "...effectually
reduced the lands of England to feuds, which were declared to
be inheritable and from that time the maxim prevailed there that
all lands in England are held from the King, and that all
proceeded from his bounty. " I.E. Washburn, Treatise on The
American Law of Real Property, Section 65, p.44 (6th ed. 1902).
All lands in Europe, prior to the creation of the feudal system in
France and Germany, were allodial. Most of these lands were
voluntarily changed to feudal lands as protection from the
neighboring barons or chieftains. Id. Section 56, at 40. Since no
documents protected one's freedom over his land, once the

lands were pledged for protection, the lands were lost forever.
This was not the case in England.
England never voluntarily relinquished its land to William I. In

fact, were it not for a tactical error by King Harold II's men in the
Battle of Hastings, England might never have become feudal. A
large proportion of the Saxon lands prior to the Conquest of
A.D. 1066 [21] "were held as allodial, that is, by an absolute
ownership, without recognizing any superior to whom any duty
was due on account thereof." Id. Section 54, at 39. The mode of
conveying these allodial lands was most commonly done by a
writing or charter, called a land-boc, or land allodial charter,
which, for safekeeping between conveyances, was generally
deposited in the monasteries. Id., Section 54, at 40. In fact, one
portion of England, the County of Kent, was allowed to retain
this form of land ownership while the rest of England became
feudal. Id., Section 55, at 40. Therefore, when William I
established feudalism in England to maintain control over his
barons, such control created animosity over the next 2
centuries. F.L. Ganshof, Feudalism, p. 114 (1964). As a result
of such dictatorial control, some 25 barons joined forces to exert
pressure on the then ruling monarch, King John, to gain some
rights not all of which the common man would possess. The
result of this pressure at Runnymede became known as the
Magna Carta.
The Magna Carta was the basis of modem common law, the
common law being a series of judicial decisions and royal
decrees interpreting and following that document. The Magna
Carta protected the basic rights, the rights that gave all people
more freedom and power. The rights that would slowly erode
the king's power.
Among these rights was a particular section dealing with

ownership of the land. The barons still recognized the.king as

the lord paramount, but the barons wanted some of the rights
their ancestors had prior to A.D. 1066. F. Goodwin, Treatise on
The Law of Real Property, Ch. 1, p.3 (1905). Under this theory,
the barons would have several rights and [22] powers over the
land, as the visible owners, that had not existed in England for
150 years. The particular section of most importance was
Section 62 giving the most powerful barons letters of patent,
raising their land ownership close to the level found in the
County of Kent. Other sections, i.e., 10, 11, 26, 27, 37, 43, 52,
56, 57, and 61 were written to protect the right to "own"
property, to illustrate how debts affected this fight to own
property, and to secure the return of property that was unjustly
taken. All these paragraphs were written with the single goal of
protecting the "landowner" and helping him retain possession of
his land, acquired in the service of the King, from unjust
seizures or improper debts. The barons attempted these goals
with the intention of securing property to pass to their heirs.
Unfortunately goals are often not attained. Having repledged

their loyalty to King John, the barons quickly disbanded their
armies. King John died in 1216, one year after signing the
Magna Carta, and the new king did not wish to grant such
privileges found in that document. Finally, the barons who
forced the signing of the Magna Carta died, and with them went
the driving force that created this great charter. The Magna
Carta may have still been alive, but the new kings had no
armies at their door forcing them to follow policies, and the
charter was to a great extent forced to lie dormant. The barons
who received the letters of patent, as well as other landholders
perhaps should have enforced their rights, but their heirs were
not in a position to do so and eventually the fights contained in
the charter were forgotten. Increasingly until the mid-1600's, the
king's power waxed, abruptly ending with the execution of
Charles I in 1649. By then however, the original intent of the

Magna Carta was in part lost and the descendants of the
original barons never required properly protected [23] free land
ownership. To this day, the freehold lands in England are still
held to a great extent upon the feudal tenures. See supra
Washburn, Section 80, p. 48. This lack of complete ownership
in the land, as well as the most publicized search for religious
freedom, drove the more adventurous Europeans to the
Americas to be away from these restrictions.
The American colonists however soon adopted many of the

same land concepts used in the old world. The kings of Europe
had the authority to still exert influence, and the American
version of barons sought to retain large tracts of land. As an
example, the first patent granted in New York went to Killian
Van Rensselaer dated in 1630 and confirmed in 1685 and 1704.
A. Getman, Title to Real Property, Principles and Sources of
Titles - Compensation For Lands and Waters, Part Ill, Ch. 17,
p.229 (1921). The colonial charters of these American colonies,
granted by the king of England, had references to the lands in
the County of Kent, effectively denying the more barbaric
aspects of feudalism from ever entering the continent, but
feudalism with its tenures did exist for some time. See supra
Washburn, Section 55, p. 40. "[It may be said that, at an early
date, feudal tenures existed in this country to a limited extent."
C. Tiedeman, An Elementary Treatise on the American Law of
Real Property, Ch. 11. The Principles of the Feudal System,
Section 25, p.22 (2nd ed. 1892). The result was a newly created
form of feudal land ownership in America. As such, the feudal
barons in the colonies could dictate who farmed their land, how
their land was to be divided, and to a certain extent to whom the
land should pass. But, just as the original barons discovered,
this power was premised in part of the performance of duties for
the king. Upon the failure of performance, the king could order
the grant revoked and grant [24] the land to another willing to
acquiesce to the king's authority. This authority, however, was
premised on the belief that people, recently arrived and
relatively independent, would follow the authority of a king
based 3000 miles away. Such a premise was ill-founded. The
colonists came to America to avoid taxation without
representation, to avoid persecution of religious freedom, and to
acquire a small tract of land that could be owned completely.
When the colonists were forced to pay taxes and were required
to allow their homes to be occupied by soldiers; they revolted,
fighting the British, and declaring their Declaration of
Independence.
The Supreme Court of the United States reflected on this

independence, in Chisholm v Georgia, 2 Dall. (U.S.) 419 (1793),
stating: the revolution, or rather the Declaration of
Independence, found the people already united for general
purposes, and at the same time, providing for their more
domestic concerns, by state conventions, and other temporary
arrangements. From the crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty
of their country passed to the people of it; and it was then not an
uncommon opinion, that the unappropriated lands, which
belonged to that crown, passed, not to the people of the colony
or states within those limits they were situated, but to the whole
people;..."We, the people of the United States, do ordain and
establish this constitution." Here we see the people acting as
sovereigns of the whole country; and in the language of
sovereignty, establishing a constitution by which it was their will,
that the state governments, should be bound, and to which the
state constitutions should be made to conform It will be
sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe,
and particularly in England, exist on feudal principles. That
system [25] considers the prince as the sovereign, and the

people his subjects; it regards his person as the object of

allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being on an equal
footing with a subject, either in a court of justice or elsewhere.
That system contemplates him as being the fountain of honor
and authority; and from his grace and grant, derives all
franchises, immunities and privileges; it is easy to perceive, that
such a sovereign could not be amenable to a court of justice, or
subjected to judicial control and actual constraint. The same
feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly
remind us of the distinction between the prince and the subject.
No such ideas obtain here; at the revolution, the sovereignty
devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the
country, but they are sovereigns without subjects and have
none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are
equal as fellow-citizens, and as joint tenants in
the sovereignty. From the differences existing between feudal

sovereignties and governments founded on compacts, it
necessarily follows, that their respective prerogatives must
differ. Sovereignty is the fight to govern; a nation or state
sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In
Europe, the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the prince; here
it rest with the people; there the sovereign actually administers
the government; here never in a single instance; our governors
are the agents of the people, and at most stand in the same
relation to their sovereign, in which the regents of Europe stand
to their sovereigns. Their princes have personal powers,
dignities, and preeminence, our rules have none but official; nor
do they partake in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other
capacity, than as private citizens. (emphasis added). d. at 470-
471. The Americans had a choice as to how they wanted their
new government and country to be formed. Having broken away
from the English sovereignty and establishing themselves as
[26] their own sovereigns, they had their choice of types of
taxation, freedom of religion, and most importantly ownership of

land. The American founding fathers chose allodial ownership of
land for the system of ownership on this country. In the opinion
of Judge Kent, the question of tenure as an incident to the
ownership of lands "has become wholly immaterial in this
country, where every vestige of tenure has been annihilated."
See supra Washburn, Section 118, p.59. At the present day
there is little, if any, trace of the feudal tenures remaining in the
American law of property. Lands in this country are now held to
be absolutely allodial. See Supra Tiedeman, Section 25, p. 22.
Upon the completion of the Revolutionary War, lands in the
thirteen colonies were held under a different form of land
ownership. As stated in re Waltz et. al., Barlow v Security Trust
& Savings Bank, 240 p. 19 (1925), quoting Matthews v Ward,
10 Gill & J. (Md.) 443 (1839), "after the American Revolution,
lands in this state (Maryland) became allodial, subject to no
tenure, nor to any services incident there to." The tenure, as you
will recall, was the feudal tenure and the services or taxes
required to be paid to retain possession of the land under the
feudal system. This new type of ownership was acquired in all
thirteen states. Wallace v Harmstead, 44 Pa. 492 (1863). The
American people, before developing a properly functioning
stable government, developed a stable system of land
ownership, whereby the people owned their land absolutely and
in a manner similar to the king in Common-Law England. As
has been stated earlier, the original and true meaning of the
word "fee" and therefore fee simple absolute is the same as fief
or feud, this being in contradistinction to the term "allodium"
which means or is defined as man's own land, which he
service to any superior. Wendell v Crandall, 1 N. Y. 491 (1848).
[27] Stated another way, the fee simple estate of early England
was never considered as absolute, as were lands in allodium,

but were subject to some superior on condition of rendering him

services, and in which the such superior had the ultimate
ownership of the land. In re Waltz, at page 20, quoting I
Cooley's Blackstone, (4th ed.) p. 512. This type of fee simple is
a Common-Law term and sometimes corresponds to what in
civil law is a perfect title. United States v Sunset Cemetery Co.,
132 F. 2d 163 (1943). It is unquestioned that the king held an
allodial title which was different than the Common-Law fee
simple absolute. This type of superior title was bestowed upon
the newly established American people by the founding fathers.
The people were sovereigns by choice, and through this new
type of land ownership, the people were sovereign freeholders
or kings over their own land, beholden to no lord or superior. As
stated in Stanton v Sullivan, 7 A. 696 (1839), such an estate is
an absolute estate in perpetuity and the largest possible estate
a man can have, being, in fact allodial in its nature. This type of
fee simple, as thus developed, has definite characteristics: (1) it
is a present estate in land that is of indefinite duration; (2) it is
freely alienable; (3) it carries with it the right of possession; and
most importantly (4) the holder may make use of any portion of
the freehold without being beholden to any person. 1 G.
Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property,
Section 1856, p. 412 (1st ed. 1924). This fee simple estate
means an absolute estate in lands wholly unqualmed by any
reservation, reversion, condition or limitation, or possibility of
any such thing present or future, precedent or subsequent. Id.;
Wichel'man v Messner, 83 N.W. 2d 800, 806 (1957). It is the
most extensive estate and interest one may possess in real
property. Where, an estate subject to an option is not in fee.
See supra I Thompson, Section 1856, p. 413. In the case,
Bradford v Martin, [28] 201 N.W. 574 (1925), the Iowa Supreme
Court went into a lengthy discussion on what the terms fee
simple and allodium means in American property law. The Court

stated:
The word "absolutely" in law has a varied meaning, but when

unqualifiedly used with reference to titles or interest in land, its
meaning is fairly well settled. Originally the two titles most
discussed were "fee simple" and "allodium" (which meant
absolute). See Bouvier's. Law Dictionary. (Rawle Ed.) 134;
Wallace v Harmstead, 44 Pa. 492; McCartee v Orphan's
Asylum, 9 Cow. (N.Y.) 437, 18 Am. Dec. 516. Prior to
Blackstone's time the allodial title was ordinarily called an
"absolute title" and was superior to a "fee simple title," the latter
being encumbered with feudal clogs which were laid upon the
first feudatory when it was granted, making it possible for the
holder of a fee-simple title to lose his land in the event he failed
to observe his feudatory oath. The allodial title was not so
encumbered. Later the term "fee simple," however rose to the
dignity of the allodial or absolute estate, and since the days of
Blackstone the word It absolute estate" and "fee simple" seen to
have been generally used interchangeably; in fact, he so uses
them. See Book H, chap. 7, pp. 104-105 .... And further the
words "absolute" and absolutely" usually carry the fee ... By the
terms "absolute interest" we understand a complete and perfect
interest,... an estate in fee simple is meant. Id. at 576.
The basis of English rand law is the ownership of the realty

by the sovereign, from the crown all titles flow. People v.
Richardson, 269 M. 275, 109 N.E. 1033 (1914); see also
Matthew v. Ward, 10 Gill & J (Md.) 443 (1844). The case,
McConnell v. Wilcox, I Scam. [29] (IR.) 344 (1837), stated it this
way: From what source does the title to the land derived from a
government spring? In arbitrary governments, from the supreme
head - be he the emperor, king, or potentate; or by whatever
name he is known. In a republic, from the law making or
authorizing to be made the grant or sale. In the first case, the
party looks alone to his letters patent; in the second, to the law
and the evidence of the acts necessary to be done under the
law, to a perfection of his grant, donation or purchase ... The
law alone must be the fountain from whence the authority is
drawn; and there can be no other source. Id. at 367.
The American people, newly established sovereigns in this

republic after the victory achieved during the Revolutionary War,
became complete owners in their land, beholden to no lord or
superior; sovereign freeholders in the land themselves. These
freeholders in the original thirteen states now held allodial the
land they possessed before the war only feudally. This new and
more powerful title protected the sovereigns from unwarranted
intrusions or attempted takings of their land, and more
importantly it secured in them a right to own land absolutely in
perpetuity. By definition, the word perpetuity means, "Continuing
forever. Legally, pertaining to real property, any condition
extending the inalienability..." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1027
(5th ed. 1980). In terms of an allodial title, it is to have the
property of inalienability forever. No@g more need be done to
establish the ownership of the sovereigns to their land, although
confirmations were usually required to avoid possible future title
confrontations. The states, even prior to the creation of our
present Constitutional government, were issuing titles to the
unoccupied lands within their boundaries. In New York, even
before the war was won, the state issued the first land patent in
1781, and only a [30] few weeks, after the battle and victory at
Yorktown in 1783, the state issued the first land patent to an
individual. A Getinan, supra, Part 111, Ch. 17, State Legislative
Grants, pp. 23132 (1921). In fact, even before the United States
was created, New York and other states had developed their
own Land Offices with Commissioners. New York was first
established in 1784 and was revised in 1786 to further provide
for a more definite procedure for the sale of unappropriated
State Lands. Id. The state courts held, "The validity of letters
patent and the effectiveness of same to convey title depends on
the proper execution and record ... It has generally been the law
that public grants to be valid must be recorded. The record is
not for purposes of notice under recording acts but to make the
transfer effectual." Id. at 242. Later, if there was deemed to be a
problem with the title, the state grants could be confirmed by
issuance of a confirmatory grant Id. at 239. This then, in part,
explains the methods and techniques the original states used to
pass title to their lands, lands that remained in the possession of
the state unless purchased by the still yet uncreated federal
government, or by individuals in the respective states. To much
this same extent Texas, having been a separate country and
republic, controlled and still controls its lands. In each of these
instances, the land was not originally owned by the federal
government and then later passed to the people and states.
This then is a synopsis of the transition from colony to
statehood and the rights to land ownership under each situation.
This however has said nothing of the methods used by the
states in the creation of the federal government and the
eventual disposal of the federal lands.
The Constitution in its original form was ratified by a

convention of the States, on [31] September 17, 1787. The
Constitution and the government formed under it were declared
in effect on the first Wednesday of March, 1789. Prior to this
time, during the Constitutional Convention, there was serious
debate on the disposal of what the convention called the
"Westem Territories," now the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin and part of Minnesota, more commonly
known as the Northwest Territory. This tract of land was ceded
to the new American republic in the treaty signed with Britain in
1783.

The attempts to determine how such a disposal of the

Westem territories should come about was the subject of much
discussion in the records of the Continental Congress.
Beginning in September, 1783, there was continual discussion
concerning the acquisition of and later disposition to the lands
east of the Mississippi River. Journals of Congress, Papers of
the Continental Congress, No. 25, 11, folio 255, p. 544-557
(September 13, 1783).
And whereas the United States have succeeded to the

sovereignty over the Western territory, and are thereby vested
as one undivided and independent nation, with all and every
power and right exercised by the king of Great Britain, over the
said territory, or the lands lying and situated without the
boundaries of the several states, and within the limits above
described; and whereas the western territory ceded by France
and Spain to Great Britain, relinquished to the United States by
Great Britain, and guarantied to the United States by France as
aforesaid, if properly managed, will enable the United States to
comply with their promises of land to their officers and soldiers;
will relieve their citizens from much of the weight of taxation;....
and if cast into new states, will tend to increase the happiness
of [32] mankind, by rendering the purchase of land easy, and
the possession of liberty permanent; therefore ... Resolved, that
a committee be appointed to report the territory lying without the
boundaries of the several states; ... ; and also to report an
establishment for a land office. Id. at 558, reported in the writing
of James McHenry.
There was also serious discussion and later acquisition by

the then technically nonexistent federal government of land
originally held by the colonial governments. Id. at 562-63. As the
years progressed, the goal remained the same, a proper
determination of a simple method of disposing of the western
lands. "That an advantageous disposition of the western

territory is an object worthy the deliberation of Congress." Id.
February 14, 1786, at p. 68. In February, 1787, the Continental
Congress continued to hold discussions on how to dispose of all
western territories. As part of the basis for such disposal, it was
determined to divide the new northwestern territories into
medians, ranges, townships, and sections, making for easy
division of the land, and giving the new owners of such land a
certain number of acres in fee. Journals of Congress, p. 21,
February 1787, and Committee Book, Papers of the Continental
Congress, No. 190, p. 132 (1788). In September of that same
year, there were most discussions on the methods of disposing
the land. In those discussions, there were debates in the validity
and solemnity of the state patents that has been issued in the
past Id., No. 62, p. 546. Only a week earlier the Constitution
was ratified by the conventions of the states. Finally, the future
Senate and House of Representatives, though not officially a
government for another 1 & ½ years, held discussions on the
possible creation of documents that would pass the title of lands
from the new government to the people. In these [33]
discussions, the first patents were created and ratified, making
the old land-boc, or land-allodial charters of the Saxon nobles,
750 years earlier, and the letters patent of the Magna Carta,
guidelines by which the land would pass to the sovereign
freeholders of America. Id., July 2, 1788, pp- 277-286.
As part of the method by which the new United States

decided to dispose of its territories, it created in the Constitution
an article, section, and clause, that specifically dealt with such
disposal. Article IV, Section 111, Clause 11, states in part, "The
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States. " Thus, Congress was given the
power to create a vehicle to divest the Federal Government of
all its right and interest in the land. This vehicle, known as the
land patent, was to forever divest the federal government of its
land and was to place such total ownership in the hands of the
sovereign freeholders who collectively created the government.
The land patents issued prior to the initial date of recognition of
the United States Constitution were ratified by the members of
Constitutional Congress. Those Patents created by statute after
March, 1789, had only the power of the statutes and the
Congressional intent behind such statutes as a reference and
basis for the determination of their powers and operational
effect originally and in the American system of land ownership
today.
There have been dozens of statutes enacted pursuant to

Article IV, Section 111, Clause 11. Some of these statutes had
very specific intents of aiding soldiers of wars, or dividing lands
[34] in a very small region of one state, but all had the main goal
of creating in the sovereigns, freeholders on their lands,
beholden to no lord or superior, Some of the statutes include,
12 Stat 392, 37th Congress, Sess. 11, Ch. 75, (1862) (the
Homestead Act); 9 Stat. 520, 3 1st Congress, Sess. 1, Ch. 85
(1850) (Military Bounty Service Act); 8 Stat. 123, 29th
Congress, Sess. 11 Ch. 8, (1847) (Act to raise additional
military force and for other purposes); 5 Stat 444, 21st
Congress, Sess. 11, Ch. 30 (1831); 4 Stat 51, 18th Congress,
Sess. I., Ch. 174 (1824); 5 Stat 52, 18th Congress, Sess. 1, Ch.
173 (1824); 5 Stat 56, 18th Congress, Sess. 1, Ch. 172, (1824);
3 Stat. 566, 16th Congress, Sess. 1, Ch. 51, (1820) (the major
land patent statute enacted to dispose of lands); 2 Stat 748,
12th Congress, Sess. 1. Ch. 99 (1812); 2 Stat. 728, 12th
Congress, Sess. 1, Ch. 77, (1812); 2 Stat. 716, 12th Congress,
Sess. 1, Ch. 68, (1812) (the act establishing the General Land-
Office in the Department of Treasury); 2 Stat 590, llth Congress,

Sess. U, Ch. 3.5,(1810);2 Stat 437, 9th Congress, Sess. H, Ch.

34, (1807); and 2 Stat 437, 9th Congress, Sess. H, Ch. 31,
(1807). These, of course, are only a few of the statutes of
enacted to dispose of public lands to the sovereigns. One of
these acts however, was the main patent statute in reference to
the intent Congress had when creating the patents. That status
is 3 Stat 566, supra.
In order to understand the validity of a patent, in today's

property law, it is necessary to turn to other sources than the
acts themselves. These sources include the Congressional
debates and case law citing such debates. For the best answer
to this question, it is necessary to turn to the Abridgment of the
Debates of Congress, Monday, March 6, 1820, in the Senate,
considering the topic "The Public Lands." This abridgment and
the actual debates [35] found in its concern one of the most
important of the land patent statutes, 3 Stat 566, 16th Congress,
Sess. 1. Ch. 51, Stat. 1, (April 24, 1820).
In this important debate, the reason for such a particular act

in general and the protection afforded by the patent in particular
were discussed. As Senator Edwards states; But, said, he, it is
not my purpose to discuss, at length, the merits of the proposed
change. I will, at present, content myself with an effort, merely,
to shield the present settlers upon public lands from merciless
speculators, whose cupidity and avarice would unquestionably
be tempted by the improvements which those settlers have
made with the sweat of their brows, and to which they have
been encouraged by the conduct of the government itself, for
though they might be considered as embraced by the letter of
the law which provides against intrusion on public lands, yet,
that their case has not been considered by the Government as
within the mischiefs intended to be prevented is manifest, not
only from the forbearance to enforce the law, but from the
positive rewards which others, in their situation, have received,

by the several laws which have heretofore been granted to them
by the same right if preemption which I now wish extended to
the present settlers. Id. at 456. Further, Senator King from New
York stated-, He considered the change as highly favorable to
the poor man; and he argued at some length, that it was
calculated to plant in the new country a population of
independent, unembarrassed freeholders; ... that it would cut up
speculation and monopoly; that the money paid for the lands
would be carried from the State or country from which the
purchaser should remove; that it would prevent the
accumulation of an alarming debt, [36] which experience proved
never would and never could be paid. ld. at 45657.
In other statutes, the Court recognized much of these same

ideas. In United States v. Reynes, 9 How. (U.S.) 127 (1850), the
Supreme Court stated: The object of the Legislature is manifest
It was intended to prevent speculation by dealing for rights of
preference before the public lands were in the market The
speculator acquired power over choice spots, by procuring
occupants to seat themselves on them and who abandoned
them as soon as the land was entered under their preemption
right, and the speculation accomplished. Nothing could be more
easily done than this, if contracts of this description could be
enforced. The act of 1830, however, proved to be of little avail
and then came the Act of 1835 (5 Stat 251) which compelled
the preemptor to swear that he had not made an arrangement
by which the title might insure to the benefit of anyone except
himself, or that he would transfer it to another at any
subsequent time. This was preliminary to the allowing if his
entry, and discloses the policy of Congress. Id. at 154.
"It is always to be borne in mind, in construing a

congressional grant that the act by which it is made is a law as
well as a conveyance and that such effect must be given to it as

will carry out the intent of Congress. That intent should not be
defeated by applying to the grant the rules of common law ...
words of present grant, are operative, if at all, only as contracts
to convey. But the rules of common law must yield in this, as in
other cases, to the legislative will." Missouri, Kansas & Texas
Railway Company v. Kansas Pacific Railway Company, 97 U.S.
49 1, 497 (1878). The administration of the land system in this
country is vested in the Executive [37] Department if the
Government, first in the Treasury and now in the Interior
Department the officers charged with the disposal of the public
domain under the authority of acts of Congress are required and
empowered to determine the construction of those acts so far
as it relates to the extent and character of the rights claimed
under them , and to be given, though their actions, to
individuals. This is a portion of the Political power of the
Government, and courts of justice must never interfere with it .
Marks v Dickson, 61 U.S. (20 How) 501 (1857); see also Cousin
v. Blanc's Ex., 19 How. (U.S.) 206, 209 (1856). "The power of
Congress to dispose of its land cannot be interfered with, or its
exercise embarrassed by any State legislation; nor can such
legislation deprive the grantees of the United States of the
possession and enjoyment of the property granted by reason of
any delay in the transfer of the title after the initiation of
proceedings for its acquisition." Gibsion v Chouteau, 13 Wal. (U.
S.) 92, 93 (187 1).
State statutes that give lesser authoritative ownership of title

than the patent can not even be brought into federal court.
Langdon v. Sherwood, 124 U.S. 74, 81 (1887). These acts of
Congress making grants are not to be treated both law and
grant, and the intent of Congress when ascertained is to control
in the interpretation of the law. Wisconsin C. R. Co. v. Forsythe,
159 U.S. 46 (1895). The intent to be searched for by the courts
in a government patent is the intent which the government had

as that time, and not what it would have been had no mistake
been made. The true meaning of a binding expression in a
patent must be applied, no matter where such expressions are
found in the document. It should be construed as to effectuate
the primary object Congress had in view; and obviously a
construction that gives effect to a patent is to be preferred to
one that renders it inoperative and void. A grant must be
interpreted by the [38] law of the country in force at the time
when it was made. The construction of federal grant by a state
court is necessarily controlled by the federal decisions on the
same subject The United States may dispose of the public lands
of such terms and conditions, and subject to such restrictions
and limitations as in its judgment will best promote the public
welfare, even if the condition is to exempt the land from sale on
execution issued or judgment recovered in a State Court for a
debt contracted before the patent issues. Miller v. Little, 47 Cal.
348, 350 (1874). Congress has the sole power to declare the
dignity and effect if titles emanating from the United States and
the whole legislation of the Government must be examined in
the determination of such titles. Bagneu v. Broderick, 38 U.S.
436 (1839). It was clearly the policy of Congress, in passing the
preemption and patent laws, to confer the benefits of those laws
to actual settlers upon the land. Close v. Stuyvesant, 132 M.
607, 617 (1890). The intent of Congress is manifest in the
determinations of meaning, force and power vested in the
patent These cases all illustrate the power and dignity given to
the patent. It was created to dives the government of its lands,
and to act as a means of conveying such lands to the
generations of people that would occupy those lands. This
formula, "or his legal representatives," embraces
representatives of the original grantee in the land, the contract,
such as assignees or grantees, as well as the operation of law,

and leaves the question open to inquiry in a court of justice as

to the party to whom the patent, or confirmation, should enure.
Hogan v. Page, 69 U.S. 605 (1864). The patent was and is the
document and law that protects the settler from the merciless
speculators, from the people that use avarice to unjustly benefit
themselves against an unsuspecting nation. The patent was
created with these high and grant intentions, and was created
with such intentions for a sound reason. [39]
The settlers as a rule seem to have been poor persons, and

presumably without the necessary funds to improve and pay for
their land, but it appears that in every case where the settlement
was made under the preemption law, the settler ... entered and
paid for the land at the expiration of the shortest period at which
the entry could be made..." Close v. Stuyvesant, 132 HI. 607,
623 (1890). We must look to the beneficent character of the
acts that created this grants and patents and the peculiar
objects they were, intended to protect and secure. A class of
enterprising, hardy and most meritorious and valuable citizens
has become the pioneers in the settlement and improvement of
the new and distant lands of the government. McConnell v.
Wilcox, l Scam. (M.) 344, 367 (1837). "In furtherance of what is
deemed a wise policy, tending to encourage settlement, and to
develop the resources of the country, it invites the heads of
families to occupy small parcels of the public land ... To deny
Congress the power to make a valid and effective contract of
this character ... would materially abridge its power of disposal,
and seriously interfere with a favorite policy of the government,
which fosters measures tending to a distribution of the lands to
actual settlers at a nominal price." Miller v. Little, 47 Cal. 348,
351 (1874). The legislative acts, the Statutes at Large, enacted
to divest the United States of its land and to sell that land to the
true sovereigns of this republic, had very distinct intents.
Congress recognized that the average settler of this nation
would have little money, therefore Congress built into the

patent, and its corresponding act, the understanding that these
lands were to be free from avarice and cupidity, free from the
speculators who preyed on the unsuspecting nation, and forever
under the control and ownership of the freeholder, who by the
sweat of his brow made the land produce the food that would
feed himself and eventually the nation. Even today, the intent of
Congress is to maintain a cheap food supply though the
retention of the [40] sovereign farmers on the land. United
States v. Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); see also
Curry v. Block, 541 F. Supp. 506 (1982). Originally, the intent of
Congress was to protect the sovereign freeholders and create a
permanent system of land ownership in the country. Today, the
intent of Congress is to retain the small family farm and utilize
the cheap production of these situations, it has been necessary
to protect the sovereign on his parcel of land, and ensure that
he remain in that position. The land patent and the patent acts
were created to accomplish these goals. In other words, the
patent or title deed being regular in its form, the law will not
presume that such was obtained through fraud of the public
right This principle is not merely an arbitrary rule of law
established by the courts, rather it is a doctrine which is founded
upon reason and the soundest principles of public policy. It is
one which has been adopted in the interest of peace in the
society and the permanent security of titles. Unless fraud is
shown, this rule is held to apply to patents executed by the
public authorities. State v. Hewitt Land Co., 134 P. 474,479
(1913). It is therefore necessary to determine exact power and
authority contained in a patent.

provided by law. McGaffahan v. Mining Co., 96 U.S. 316 (1877).
Legal title to property is contingent upon the patent issuing from
the government. Sabo v. Horvath, 559 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Aka.
1976). "That the patent carries the fee and is the best title
known to a court of law is the settled doctrine of this court."
Marshall v. Ladd, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 106 (1869). "A patent issued
by the government of the United States is legal and conclusive
evidence of title to the land described therein. No equitable
interest, however strong, to land described in such a patent, can
prevail at law, against the [41] patent" Land Patents, Opinions of
the United States Attorney General's office, (September, 1969).
"A patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive
against the government and all claiming under junior patents or
titles, until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal."
Stone v. United States, 2 Wall. (67 U.S.) 765 (1865). The patent
is the instrument which, under the laws of Congress, passes
title from the United States and the patent when regular on its
face, is conclusive evidence of title in the patentee. When there
is a confrontation between two parties as to the superior legal
title, the patent is conclusive evidence of title in the patentee.
When there is a confrontation between two parties as to the
superior legal title, the patent is conclusive evidence as to
ownership. Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 912 (1871). Congress
having the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of its
tides has declared the patent to be the superior and conclusive
evidence of the legal title. Bagnefl v. Brodrick, 38 U.S. 438
(1839). "Issuance of a government patent granting title to land is
@the most accredited type of conveyance known to our law'."
United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 111 (1935); see
also United States v. Cherokee Nation, 474 F.2d 628, 634
(1973). The patent is prima facie conclusive evidence of the
title. Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. 223, 233 (1850). A patent, once
issued, is the highest evidence of title, and is a final
determination of the existence of all facts. Walton v. United
States, 415 F. 2d 121, 123 (10th Cir. 1969); see also United
States v. Beaman, 242 F. 876 (1917) File v. Alaska, 593 P. 268,

270 (1979) (When the federal government grants land via a

patent, the patent is the highest evidence of title). Patent rights
to the land is the title in fee, City of Los Angeles v. Board of
Supervisors of Mono County, 292 P.2d 539 (1956), the patent of
the fee simple, Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1,6 (1956), and
the patent is required to carry the fee. Carter v. Rubby, 166 U.S.
493, 496 (1896); see also Klais v. Danowski, 129 N.W.2d 414,
422 (1964) [42] (Interposition of the patent or interposition of the
fee title). The land patent is the muniment of title, such title
being absolute in its nature, making the sovereigns absolute
freeholders on their lands. Finally, the patent is the only
evidence of the legal fee simple title. McConnell v. Wilcox, I
Scam (ILL.) 381, 396 (1837). All these various cases and
quotes illustrate one statement that should be thoroughly
understood at this time, the patent is the highest evidence of
title and is conclusive of the ownership of land in courts of
competent jurisdiction. This however, does not examine the
methods or possibilities of challenging a land patent.
In Hooper et al. v. Scheimer, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 235 (1859),

the United States Supreme Court stated, "I affirm that a patent
is unimpeachable at law, except, perhaps, when it appears on
its own face to be void; and the authorities on this point are so
uniform and unbroken in the courts, Federal and State, that little
else will be necessary beyond a reference to them." Id. at 240
(1859). A patent cannot be declared void at law, nor can a party
travel behind the patent to avoid it. Id. A patent cannot be
avoided at law in a collateral proceeding unless it is declared
void by statute, or its nullity ind-cated by some equally explicit
statutory denunciations. Id. One perfect on its face is not to be
avoided, in a trail at law, by anything save an elder patent It is
not to be affected by evidence or circumstances which might
show that the impeaching party might prevail in a court of
equity. Id. at 243. A patent is evidence, in a court of law, of the
regularity of all previous steps to it, and no facts behind it can

be investigated. Id. A patent cannot be collaterally avoided at
law, even for fraud. Id. at 245. A patent, being a superior title,
must of course, prevail over colors of title; nor is it proper for
any state legislation to give [43] such titles, which are only
equitable in nature with a recognized legal status in equity
courts, precedence over the legal title in a court of law. Id. at
246. The Hooper case has many of the maxims that apply to the
powers and possible disabilities of a land patent, however there
is extensive case law in the area.
The presumptions arise, from the existence of a patent,

evidencing a grant of land from the United States, that all acts
have been performed and all facts have been shown, which are
prerequisites to its issuance, and that the right of the party,
grantee therein, to have it issued, has been presented and
passed upon by the proper authorities. Green v. Barber, 66
N.W. 1032 (1896). As stated in Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. H,
p. 1834 (1914): Misrepresentations knowingly made by the
application for a patent will justify the government in
proceedings to set it aside, as it has a right to demand a
cancellation of a patent obtained by false and fraudulent
misrepresentations. United States v. Manufacturing Co., 128
U.S. 673 (1888); but courts of equity cannot set aside, annul, or
correct patents or other evidence of title obtained from the
United States by fraud or mistake, unless on specific averment
of the mistake or fraud, supported by clear and satisfactory
proof, Maxelli Land Grant Cancellation, 11 How. (U.S.) 552
(1850); although a patent fraudulently obtained by one knowing
at the time that another person has a prior right to the land may
be set aside by an information in the nature of a bill in equity
filed by the attorney of the United States for the district in which
the land lies; Id. A court of equity, upon a bill filed for that

purpose, wig vacate a patent of the United States for a tract of

land obtained by mistake from the officers of the land office, in
order that a clear title may be transferred to the previous
purchaser; Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 232 (1866);
but [44] a patent for land of the United States will not be
declared void merely because the evidence to authorize its
issue is deemed insufficient by the coun- Milliken v. Starling's
lessee, 16 Ohio 61. A state can impeach the title conveyed by it
to a grantee only by a bin in chancery to cancel it, either for
fraud on the part of the grantee or mistake of law; and until so
canceled it cannot issue to any other party a valid patent for the
same land. Chandler v. Manufacturing Co., 149 U.S. 79 (1893).
Other cases espouse these and other rules of law. A

patentee can be deprived of his rights only by direct
proceedings instituted by the government or by parties acting in
its name, or by persons having a superior title to that acquired
through the government. Putnum v. Ickes, 78 F.2d 233, cert
denied 296 U.S. 612 (1935). It is not sufficient for the one
challenging a patent to show that the patentee should not have
received the patent; he must also show that he as the
challenger is entitled to it. Kale v. United States, 489 F.2d 449,
454 (1973). A United States patent is protected from easy third
party attacks. Fisher v. Rule, 248 U.S. 314, 318 (1919); see
also Hooffiagle v. Anderson, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 212 (1822). A
patent issued by the United States of America so vests the title
in the lands covered thereby, that it is the further general rule
that, such patents are not open to collateral attack. Thomas v.
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 139 F.Supp. 588, 596 (1956).
See also State v. Crawford, 475 P.2d 515 (A-riz. App. 1970) (A
patent is prima facie valid, and if its validity can be attacked at
all, the burden of proof is upon the defendant); State v.
Crawford, 441 P.2d 586, 590 (Ariz. App. 1968) (A patent to land
is the highest evidence of title and may not be collaterally
attacked); and Dredge v. Husite Company, 369 P.2d 676,682

(1962) (A patent is the act of legally instituted tribunal, done
within [45] its jurisdiction, and passes the title. Such a patent is
a final judgment as well as a conveyance and is conclusive
upon a collateral attack). Absent some facial invalidity, the
patents are presumed valid. Murray v. State, 596 P.2d 805, 816
(1979). The government retains no power to nullify a patent
except through a direct court proceeding. United States v.
Reimann, 504 F.2d 135 (1974); See also Green v. Barker, 66
N.W. 1032, 1034 (1896) (The doctrine announced was that the
deed upon its face, purported to have been issued in pursuance
of the law, and was therefore only assailable in a direct
proceeding by aggrieved parties to set it aside). Through these
cases, it can be shown that the patent which passes the title
from the United States to the sovereigns, was created to keep
the speculators from the land, is only able in a direct proceeding
for fraud or mistake. In no other situation is it allowable for the
courts, to simply eliminate the patent. One question that may
arise is what do the courts mean by a collateral attack and what
can be done by courts of equity if a collateral attack is
presented?
Perhaps the easiest means of defining a collateral attack is to

show the converse corollary, or a direct attack on a patent As
was stated in the previous paragraphs, a direct attack upon a
land patent is an action for fraud or mistake brought by the
government or a party acting in its place. Therefore, a collateral
attack, by definition, is any attack upon a patent that is not
covered within the direct attack list. Perhaps the most prevalent
collateral attack in property law today is a mortgage or deed of
trust foreclosure on a color of title. In these instances, it is
determined that the complete title and interest in the land is
purchased by the mortgagee or another in his place. Such a

determination displaces the patentee's ownership of the title

without the court ever ruling that the patent was acquired
through fraud or mistake. This is against [46] public policy,
legislative intent, and the overwhelming majority of case law.
Therefore, it is now necessary to determine the patent's role in
American property law today, to see what powers the courts of
equity have in protecting the fights of the challengers of patents.
The attitude of the Courts is to promote simplicity and

certainty in title transactions, thereby they follow what is in the
chain of title and not what is outside. Sabo v. Horvath, 559 P.2d
1038, 1044 (1976). However, in equity courts, title under a
patent from the government is subject to control, to protect the
fights of parties acting in a fiduciary capacity. Sanford v.
Sanford, 139 U.S. 290 (1891). This protection however does not
include the invalidation of the patent. The determination of the
land department in matters cognizable by it, in the alienation of
lands and the validity of patents, cannot be collaterally attacked
or impeached. Id. Therefore the courts have had to devise
another means to control the patentee, if not the patent itself As
stated in Raestle v. Whitson, 582 P.2d 170, 172 (1978), "The
land patent is the highest evidence of title and is immune from
collateral attack. This does not preclude a court from imposing a
constructive trust upon the patentee for the benefit of the
owners of an equitable interest" This then explains the most
equitable way a court may effectively restrict the sometimes
harsh justice handed down by a strict court of law. Equity courts
win impose a trust upon the patentee until the debt has been
paid. As has been stated, a patent can not be collaterally
attacked, therefore the land can not be sold or taken by the
courts unless there is strong evidence of fraud or mistake.
However, the courts can require the patentee to pay a certain
amount at regular intervals until the debt is paid, unless of
course, there is a problem with the validity of the debt itself This
is the main purpose of the patent in this growing epidemic of

farm foreclosures that [47] defy the public policy ()f Congress,
the legislative intent of the Statutes at large, and the legal
authority as to the type of land ownership possessed in
America. Why then is the rate of foreclosures on the rise?
Titles to land today, as was stated earlier in this

memorandum, are normally in the form of colors of title. This is
because of the trend in recent property law to maintain the
status quo. The rule in most jurisdictions, and those which have
adopted a grantor-grantee index in particular, is that a deed
outside the chain of title does not act as a valid conveyance and
does not serve notice of a defect of title on a subsequent
purchaser. These deeds outside the chain of title are known as
"wild deeds." Sabo v. Horvath, 559 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1976);
See also Porter v Buck, 335 So.2d 369, 371 (1976); The
Exchange National Bank v Lawndale National Bank, 41 ILL.2d
316, 243 N.E.2d 193, 195-96 (1968) (The chain of title for
purposes of the marketable title act, may not be founded on a
wild deed. These stray, accidental, or interloping conveyances
are contrary to the intent of the marketable title act, which is to
simplify and facilitate land title transactions); and Manson v.
Berkman, 356 ILL. 20, 190 N. E. 77, 79 (1934). This liberal
construction of what constitutes a valid conveyance has led to a
thinning of the title to a point where the absolute and paramount
title is almost impossible to guarantee. This thinning can be
directly attributed to the constant use of the colors of title. Under
the guise of being the fee simple absolute, these titles have
operated freely, but in reality, the evidence something much
different. [48]
It was said in Common-Law England, that when a title was

not completely alienable and not the complete title it was not a
fee simple absolute. Rather it was some type of contingent
conveyance that depended on the performance of certain tasks

before the title was considered to be absolute. In fact, normally
the title never did develop into a fee simple absolute. These
types of conveyance were evidenced in part by the operable
word sin the conveyance and in part by manner in which the
granter could reclaim the property. If the title automatically
reverted to the grantor upon the happening of a contingent
action, then the title was by a fee simple determinable. Scheller
v. Trustees of Schools of Township 41 North, 67 ILL. App.3d
857, 863 (1978). This is evidenced most closely today by deeds
of trust in some states. If it required a, court's ruling to reacquire
the land and title, then the transaction and title were held by a
fee simple with a condition subsequent. Mahrenholz v. Country
Board of Trustees of Lawrence County, 93 III.App.3d 366, 370-
74 (1981). This is most closely evidenced by a mortgage in a
lien or intermediate-theory state. These analogies may be
somewhat startling and new to some, but the analogies are
accurate. When a mortgage is acquired on property, the
mortgagee steps into the position of a grantor with the authority
to create the contingent estate as required by the particular
facts. This is exactly what the grantor in Common-Law property
law could acquire. All the grantor had to do was choose a
particular type of contingency and use the necessary catch-
words, and almost invariably the land would one day be refused
due to a violation of the contingency. In today's property law, the
color of title has little power to protect the landowner.
When the sovereign is unable to pay the necessary principal

and interest on the debt load, then the catch-words and phrases
found in the deed of trust or mortgage become operational.
Upon the occurrence of that event, the mortgagee or speculator,
having through a legal m@ acquired [49] the position of a
grantor, is in a position to either automatically receive the
property simply by advertising and selling it, or can acquire the
position of the grantor and eventually the possession of the

property by a court proceeding. In Common-Law, the grantor of
a fee simple determinable where the contingency was broken or
violated, could automatically take the land from the grantee
holder, by force if necessary. If however, the grant was a fee
simple upon condition subsequent the grantor, when the
contingency broken, had to bring a legal proceeding to declare
the contingence broken, to declare the grantee in violation, and
to order the grantee to vacate the premises. These situations,
though under different names and proceedings, occur every day
in America. Is there really any serious debate therefore, that the
colors of title used today, with the creation of a lien upon the
property, become fee simple determinable and fee simples
upon condition subsequent? Is this a legitimate method of
ensuring a stable and permanent system of land ownership? If
the color of title is weak, then how strong is a mortgage or deed
of trust placed on the property?
Fee simple estates may be either legal or equitable. In each

situation it is the largest estate in the land that the law will
recognize. Hughes v. Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 246
S.W.23 (1922). If a mortgagee, upon the creation of a mortgage
or deed of trust, steps into the shoes of the grantor upon a
conditional fee simple, does it then mean the mortgagee has
acquired one of the two halves of a fee simple, when cases
have shown the fee simple is only evidenced by a patent?
Actually, courts have held in many states that a mortgage is
only a lien. United States v. Certain Interests in Property in
Champaign County, State of Illinois, 165 F.Supp.474, 480
(1958) (In Illinois and other lien theory states, the mortgagee
has only a lien and not a [50] vested interest in the leasehold)
See also Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Ganswer, 146 Neb.
635, 20 N.W.2d 689 (1945) (Even after a condition is broken or

there is a default on a mortgage, a mortgagee only has an

equitable lien which can be enforced in proper proceedings);
South Omaha Bank v. Levy, 95 N.W.603 (1902) Strict
foreclosure will not lie when mortgagor holds the legal title);
First National Bank v. Sergeant, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N.W. 595
(1902) (Mortgagee cannot demand more than is legally due);
Morrill v. Skinner, 57 Neb. 164, 77 N.W. 375 (1898) (Mortgage
conveys no estate but merely creates a lien); Barber v. Crowell,
55 Neb. 571, 75 N. W. 1 109 (1898) (Mortgage is mere security
in form of conditional conveyance), Speer v. Hadduck, 31
Freeman (HI.) 439, 443 (1863) (Assignments or conveyances of
mortgages do not convey the fee simple, rather they hold only
security interests). These cases amply illustrate that a mortgage
or deed of trust is only a lien in lien and intermediate-theory
states. Even in title theory of mortgages states, courts of equity
have determined that the fee simple title is not really conveyed,
either in its equitable or legal state. See supra Barber, at 1110.
A fee simple estate still exists even though the property is
mortgaged or encumbered. Hughes v. Miller's Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., 246 S.W. 23, 24 (1922). In fact, a creditor
asserting a lien (mortgage) must introduce evidence or proof
that will clearly demonstrate the basis of his lien. United States
v. United States Chain Company, 212 F. Supp. 171 (N. D. M.
1962). If a mortgagee, even in the title theory states, has only
alien, yet when the mortgage or deed of trust is created he has
a fee simple determinable or condition subsequent, then
obviously the color of title used as the operative title has little
force or power to protect the sovereign freeholder. Nor can it be
said that such a color of title is useful in the maintenance of
stable and permanent titles. The patent, in almost all cases, has
been originally issued to the first purchaser from the
government [51]
Theoretically then the public policy, Congressional intent

from the 1800's, and the Congressional intent of the last few
decades should protect the sovereign in the enjoyment and
possession of his freehold. This however is not the case.
Instead, vast mortgaging of the land has occurred. The
agriculture debt alone has risen to over $220,000,000,000 in the
past three decades. This is in part due to the vast expansion of
mortgaged holdings and in part due to the rural sector's inability
to repay existing loans requiring the increased mortgaging if the
land. This is in exact contradiction to the public policy and
legislative intent if maintaining stable and simplistic land
records, yet marketable titles (colors of title) were supposed to
guarantee such records. Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d
800, 805 (1957). Colors of title are ineffective against
mortgages and promote the instability and complexity of the
records of land titles by requiring abstracts and title insurance
simply to guarantee a marketable title. Worse, a practice has
prevailed in some of the states ... of permitting actions to
determine titles to be maintained upon warrants for land
(warranty deeds) and other titles not complete or legal in their
character. This practice is against the intent of the Constitution
and the Acts of Congress. Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. 438
(1839). Such lesser titles have no value in actions brought in
federal courts not with standing a State legislature which may
have provided otherwise. Hooper et. al. v. Scheimer, 64 U.S.
(23 How.) 235 (1859). It is in fact possible that the state
legislatures have even violated the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. These actions are against the intent
of the founding fathers and against the legislative intent of the
Congressman who enacted the statutes at large creating the
land patent or land grant This patent or grant, since the land
grant has been states to be another name for the patent, the
terms being synonymous, Nonhem Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Barden, 46 F. 592, 617 (1891); prevented every problem that

[52] was created by the advent of colors of title, marketable

titles, and mortgages. Therefore it is necessary to determine the
validity of returning to the patent as the operative title.
Patents are issued (and theoretically passed) between

sovereigns ... and deeds are executed by persons and private
corporations without these sovereign powers. Leading Fighter v.
County of Gregory, 230 N.W.2d 114, 116 (1975). As was stated
earlier, the American people in creating the Constitution and the
government formed under it, made such a document and
government as sovereigns, retaining that status even after the
creation of the government. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (U.S.)
419 (1793). The government as sovereign passes the title to the
American people creating in them sovereign freeholders.
Therefore, it follows that the American people, as sovereigns,
would also have this authority to transfer the fee simple title,
through the patent, to others. Cases have been somewhat
scarce in this area, but there is some case law to reinforce this
idea. In Wilcox v. Calloway, I Wash. (Va.) 38, 38-41 (1823), the
Virginia Court of Appeals heard a case where the patent was
brought up or reissued to the parties four separate times. Some
patents were issued before the creation of the Constitutional
United States government, and some occurred during the
creation of that government. The courts determined the validity
of those patents, recognizing each actual acquisition as being
valid, but reconciling the differences by finding the first patent,
properly secured with all the necessary requisite acts fulfilled,
carried the title. The other patents and the necessary requisition
of anew patent each time yielded the phrase "lapsed patent." A
lapsed patent being one that must be required to perfect the
title. Id. Subsequent patentees take subject to any reservations
in the original patent. State v. Crawford, 441 P.2d 586, 590
(1968). A patent regularly issued by the [53] government is the
best and only evidence of a perfect title. The actual patent
should be secured to place at rest any question as to validity of

entries (possession under a claim and color of title). Young v.
Miller, 125 So.2d 257, 258 (1960). Under the color of title act,
the Secretary of Interior may be required to issue a patent if
certain conditions have been met, and the freeholder and his
predecessors in title are in peaceful, adverse possession under
claim and color of title for more than a specified period. Beaver
v. United States, 350 F.2d 4, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 937 (1965).
A description which will identify the lands (and possession) is all
that is necessary for the validity of the patent, Lossing v. Shull,
173 S.W.2d 1, I Mo. 342 (1943). A patent to two or more
persons creates presumptively a tenancy in common in the
patentees. Stoll v. Gottbreht, 176 N.W. 932, 45 N.D. 158 (1920).
A patent to be the original grantee or his legal representatives
embrace the representatives by contract as well as by law.
Reichert v. Jerome H. Sheip, Inc., 131 So. 229, 222 Ala. 133
(1930). A patent has a double operation. In the first place, it is
documentary evidence having the dignity of a record of the
evidence of the title or such equities respecting the claim as to
justify its recognition and later confirmation. In the second place,
it is a deed of the United States, or a title deed. As a deed, its
operation is that if a quitclaim or rather of a conveyance of such
interest as the United States possess in the land, such interest
in the land passing to the people or sovereign freeholders. 63
Am. Jur. 2d Section 97, p. 566. Finally, the United States
Supreme Court, in Summa Corporation v. California ex rel.
State Lands Commission, etc., 80 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984), made
determinations as to the validity of a patent confirmed by the
United States through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat.
631 (1951). The State of California attempted to acquire land
that belonged to the corporation. The State maintained that
there was a public trust easement granting to the State [54]
authority to take the land without compensation for public use.

The corporation relied in part on the intent of the treaty, in part

on the intent of the patent and the statute creating it, and in part
in the requisite challenge date of the patent expiring. The
Summa Court followed the lengthy dissertation of the dissenting
judge on the California Supreme Court, See 31 Cal. 3d 288,
dissenting opinion, in determining that the patent which had
been the apparent operative title throughout the years, was
paramount and the actions by the State were against the
manifest weight of the Treaty and the legislative intent of the
patent statutes. Id. at 244-46. In each of these cases it is states
that the patent, through possession, or claim and color of title,
or through the term "his heirs and assigns forever", or through
the necessary passage of title at the death of a joint tenant or
tenant in common, is still the operable title and is required to
secure the peaceful control of the land. These same ideas can
also apply to state patents for lands that went to the state or
remained in the hands of the state upon admission into the
Union. Oliphant v. Frazho, 146 N.W.2d 685, 68687 (1966)-
Fiedier v. Pipers, 107 So.2d 409, 411-412 (1958) (Not even the
State could be heard to question the validity of a patent signed
by the Governor and the Register of the State Land Office). No
government can object to the intent and creation of a patent
after such is issued, unless issued through fraud or mistake.
The patent, either federal or state, has an intent to create
sovereign freeholders in the land protected form the
speculators, (any lending institution speculates upon land), and
a public policy to maintain a simplistic, stable and permanent
system if land records. Land patents were designed to
effectively insure that this intent and policy were retained.
Colors of title can not provide this type of stability, since such
titles are powerless against liens, mortgages, when the
freeholder is unable to repay principle and interest on the
accompanying promissory note. Equity will entertain jurisdiction

at the instance [55] of the owner of fee of lands to remove a

cloud upon his title created by the sale of the premises and a
deed issued thereto under a decree of foreclosure of a
mortgage thereon. Hodgen v. Guttery, 58 Free. (i I 1.) 431, 438
(1871) (though this case dealt with an improper sale of land
covered by a patent, any forced sales of lands covered by a
patent is improper in view of the policy and intent of Congress).
Equity however will protect the mortgagee who stands to lose
his interest in the property, thereby requiring a trust to be
created until the debt is erased, making partners of the creditor
and debtor. What then exists is a situation where the patent
should be declared (confirmed or reissued), to protect the
sovereign freeholder and to re-institute the policy and intent of
Congress. The patent as the paramount title, fee simple
absolute, can not be collaterally attacked, but when a debt can
not be paid immediately placing the creditor in jeopardy, the
courts will impose a constructive trust until the new "partners"
can mutually eliminate the debt. If the debt can not be
satisfactorily removed, it is still possible, considering the present
intent of the government, to maintain sovereign freeholders on
the property immune from the loss of the land, since it is
Congress' intent to keep the family farm in place. ne use of
colors of title to act as the operative title is inappropriate
considering the rising number of foreclosures and the inability of
the colors of title to restrain a mortgage or lien. However, the
lending institutions, speculators on the land, maintain that the
public policy of the country includes the eradication of the
sovereign freeholders in the rural sector in an effort to implant
upon the country, large corporate holdings. This last area must
be effectively met and eliminated. [56]
To those who framed the Constitution, the rights of the States

and the fights of the people were two distinct and different
things. Throughout their debates they had two objects foremost
in their minds. First, to create a strong and effective national

government, and secondly to protect the people and their fights
from usurpation and tyranny by government. The people's
liberties and individual rights and safeguards were to be kept
forever beyond the control and dominion of the legislatures of
the States, whom they distrusted, and against whom they so
carefully guarded themselves. If such control and domination
and unlimited powers were given to a few legislatures they
could override every one of the reserved fights covered by the
first ten Amendments (the bill of fights); they could change the
government of limited powers to one of unlimited powers; they
could declare themselves hereditary rules; they could abolish
religious freedoms, they could abolish free speech and the right
of the people to petition for redress; they could not only abolish
trial by jury, but even the rights to a day in court; and most
importantly they could abolish free sovereign ownership of the
land. The whole literature of the period of the adoption of the
Constitution and the first ten amendments is one great
testimony to the insistence that the Constitution must be so
amended as to safeguard unquestionably the rights and
freedoms of the people so as to secure from any future
interference by the new government, matters the people had not
already given into its control, unless by their own consent
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 723-726 (1930). The
problem has not in the lending institutions that simply practice
good business on their part. The problem in the loss of
freedoms by this present interference with allodial sovereign
ownership lies with the state legislatures that created law, or
marketable title acts, that claimed to enact new simplistic, stable
land titles and actually created a watered-down version of the
fee simple absolute that requires complicated [57] tracing and
protection, and is ineffective against mortgage foreclosures.
None of these problems would occur if the patent were the

operable title again, as long as the sovereigns recognized the

powers and disabilities of their fee simple title. The patent was
meant to keep the sovereign freeholder on the land, but the land
was also to be kept free of debt, since that debt was recognized
in 1820 as unrepayable, and today is unrepayable. The re-
declaration of the patent is essential in the protection of the rural
sector of sovereign freeholders, but also essential is the need to
impress the state legislatures that have strayed from their
enumerated powers with the knowledge that they have enacted
laws that have defeated the intent and goal of man since the
middle ages. That intent, of course, is to own a small tract of
land absolutely, whether by land-boc or patent, on which the
freeholder is beholden to no lord or superior. The patent makes
sovereign freeholders of each person who own his/her land. A
return to the patent must occur if those sovereign freeholders
wish to protect that land from the encroachment of the state
legislatures and the speculators that benefit from such
legislation. [58]
SECTION IV
CONCLUSION
As has been seen, man is always striving to protect his rights,

the most dear being the absolute right to ownership of the land,
This right was guaranteed by the land patent, the public policy
of the Congress, and the legislative intent behind the Statutes at
Large. Such fights must be reacquired through the re-
declaration of the patent in the color of title claimant's name,
based on his color of title and possession. With such reborn

rights, the land is protected from the forced sale because of

delinquency on a promissory note and foreclosure on the
mortgage. This protected land will not eliminate the debt, a trust
must be created whereby "partners" will work together to repay
it. These rights must be recaptured from the state legislated
laws, or the freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and
Constitution will be lost Once lost, those rights will be
exceedingly hard to reclaim, and quite possibly, as Thomas
Jefferson said, the children of this generation may someday
wake up homeless on the land their forefathers founded.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND SOURCES FOR STUDIES IN
ALLODIAL TITLES
Cases Relative to land Patents - Ejectment and Estoppel.
In cases of ejectment, where the question is who has the

legal title, the patent of the government is unassailable. Sanford
vs. Sanford, 139 U.S. 642, 35 L.Ed. 290.
Transfer of legal title (patent) to public domain gives the

transferee the right to possess and enjoy the land transferred:
Gibson vs. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 20 L. Ed. 534.
A patent for land is the highest evidence of title and is

conclusive as against the government and all claiming under
junior patents or titles. U.S. v. Stone, 2 U.S. 525, 17 L.Ed. 768.
The presumption being that it (patent) is valid and passes

the legal title. Minter v. Crommelin, 18 U.S. 87, 15 L. Ed. 279.
Estoppel has been sustained as against a municipal

corporation (county). Beadle vs. Smyser, 209 U.S. 393, 52 L.
Ed. 849.
A court of law will not uphold or enforce an equitable title to

land as a defense to an action of ejectment. Johnson v.
Christian, 128 U.S. 374, 32 L.Ed. 412; Doe v. Aiken, 31 Fed.
393.
When Congress has prescribed the conditions upon which

portions of the public domain may be alienated (to convey, to
transfer), and has provided that upon the fulfillment of the
conditions the United States shall issue a patent to the
purchaser, then such land is not taxable by a state. Sargent
v. Herrick and Stevens, 221 U.S. 404, 55 L. Ed. 787; northern

P.R. Co. v. Truitt County, 115 U.S. 600, 29 L. Ed. 477.
The patent alone passses land from the United States to the
grantee and nothing passes a perfect title to public lands but a
patent. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Peters (U.S.) 408, 10 L. Ed. 264.
Priority in General, for liens see:
26 U.S.C.A. 6323, S. & S. Gasket Co. Inc. v U.S., 635

F.2d. 568.
Mantovani v. Fast Fuel Corp., 494 F.Supp. 72.
MDC Leasing Corp. v. New York Property Ins.

Underwriting Ass'n.
450 F.Supp. 179, affirmed 603 F.2d 213.

U.S. v. Hage, 417 F.Supp. 74.
Matter of Fisher, 7 b.R. 490.
26 U.S.C.A. 7426. Peterson v. U.S., 511 F.Supp. 250.
Angelos v. Maryland Cas. Co., 380 A. 2d. 646, 38 Md.

App. 265.
United States v. Champaign County, Fed. Supp. 474,

1958.
For Public Lands cases, see Cent. Dig. 119, 121, 314,
316, 322, 324,
332-335, 461-465, 481, 720,
Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, U.S. 102 Reporter, p. 2858,

28 June, 1982.
Art. I v. Art 3 usage, Does not have force of law. V 104, Supra
Reporter, 175-1, April 17, 1984.
31 Cal. 3d. 288; 182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 644 P.2d. 792, 104
S.Ct. 1751 (1984).
Cases of attack on United States Land Patents and the land

so covered have been appealed to the U.S.S. Ct. 139 times and
it has held each time, that if a claim against the land is not made
before the patent is issued, no claim made thereafter may be
recognized by a Court and no Act of Congress can place such
land in jeopardy to the owner. The above case cited is: Summa
Corporation v. California ex rel. State Lands Commission & City
of Los Angeles.

"When Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds

contempt for the law, ..." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (dissenting
opinion). See also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. -- , 104 S.Ct.
1338, 1354, 79 L. Ed. 2d. --- (1984), Stevens J., dissenting).
...interests by states must have been presented in the patent

proceedings or be barred. Cf. Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481,
21 S.CT. 690, 45 L.Ed. 963; U.S. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265
U.S. 472, 44 S.Ct. 621, 68 L. Ed. 1110; U.S. v. Coronado Beach
Co., 255 U.S. 472, 41 S.Ct. 378, 65 L. Ed.
736, Pp. 1755-1758. 31 Cal. 3d 288, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 644
P.2d 792, reversed and remanded.
Title 43 U.S.C. 59, establishes that duly certified copies of

Federal Land Patents shall be evidence in all cases where the
originals would be evidence. Section 83 of Title 43, covers the
evidentiary effect of Certified Federal Land Patents for all States
and all the Courts in the United States must take Judicial notice
of the Federal Patents and their evidentiary effect under these
Federal Statutes. All judges in all States shall be bound as to
the power and validity of the patents. U.S. v. Debell (1915 CA8
SD) 227 F 760.
Patent as foundation of title at law. Fenn v. Holmes, 21 Howard

481.
Immunity from collateral attack.
Collins v. Bartlett, 44 Cal 371;
Webber v. Pere Marquette Boom Co, 62 Mich. 6262, 30

NW 469;
Surget v. Doe, 24 Miss 118;
Pittsmont Copper Co. v. Vanina, 71 Mont. 44, 227 Pac. 46;
Green v. Barker, 47 Neb. 934, 66 NW 1032;
Neff v. U.S., 91 CCA 241.
Paterson v. Ogden, 74 P. 443, 141 Cal. 43, 99 Am. St.

Rep. 31.
Judicial opinions of form of Declaration of Land Patent.
Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U.S. 488, 30 L.Ed. 1039 USCT;
Scheimer v. Conway, 23 How. 235, 16 L. Ed. 452 (1860)

USCT;
Summa Corp. v. California Ex Rel. 104 SCt 1751 (1984)

USCT;
Fiedler v. Pipes, 107 So.2d. 409 (1958) Louisiana;
Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 Howard 691.?
Land Patent as prima facie conclusive evidence of

unassailable legal title.
Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 20 L.Ed. 534;
State v. Crawford, 13 Ariz. App. 225, 475 P.2d. 515.
Texas, etc. R. R. v. Smith, 159 U.S. 68, 40 L.Ed. 78, 15

S.Ct. 935.

Miller v. Grunsky, 66 P. 858, 141 Cal. 441, reversed (1903)

75 P.48.
Filing property tax return acknowledges that State owns the

property.
Sargent v. Herrick and Stevens, 221 U.S. 404, 55 L.Ed.

787;
Northern P.R. Co. v. Trail County, 115 U.S. 600, 29 L.Ed.

477.
Hooper v. Scheimer, Same v. Conway, 23 How. 235. 16

L.Ed. 452.
Ejectment against a defendant in possession cannot be

maintained in Federal court on an equitable title, gained by
entry made with the register and receiver, though the State
statutes otherwise provide, p.249
Langdon v. Sherwood, 124 U.S. 83, 84. 8 S.Ct. 431;
Carter v. Ruddy, 56 Fed. 544, 15 U.S. App. 129 or 429.
Le Beau v. Armitage, 47 Mo. 139;
Johnson v. Christian, 128 U.S. 382, 33 L.Ed. 415, 9 S.Ct.

90.
Doe v. Aiken, 31 Fed. 393.
Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co. 106 U.S. 417, 27
L.Ed. 226.
Ejectment not maintainable on State certificate of purchase.

Kircher v. Murray, 60 Fed. 52, 23 U.S. App. 214; affirming

S.C. 54 Fed. 626.
Harrest v. Kinney, 44 Mich. 460, 7 N.W. 64.
Moran v. Moran, 106 Mich. 12, 58 Am. St. Rep. 465, 63

N.W. 990;
Headley v. Coffman, 38 Neb. 72, 56 N.W. 702.
Clagett v. Kilbourne, 1 Black. 350, 17 L. Ed. 216.
Wilson v. Fine, 14 Sawy. 35, 36. 38 Fed. 790, 791.
Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U.S. 579, 37 L.Ed.

856, 13 S.Ct. 939.
Abbott v. Union, etc., Ins. Co. 127 Ind. 73, 26 N.E. 154.
U.S. Circuit Court will enforce new equity created by State

statute.
Wisconsin etc., R. R. v. Wisconsin, etc., Land Co., 71 Wis.

102, 36 N.W. 841.
State v. Hewitt Land Co., 134 Pac. Rep. 474.
Hogan v. Page, 2 S.Ct. 605, 69 U.S. 605, 17 L.Ed. 854.
98 Stat. 1671.
Wisconsin Central Railrod Co. v. Price County.
Bagnell et al. v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 450.

Raestle v. Whitson, 582 P.2d. 170.
Walliker v. Escott, 608 P.2d. 1272.
Litchfield v. Register & Receiver, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 575. 19

L.Ed. 681.
U. S. v. Steenerson, et al., 50 Fed. 504, 1 CCA 552, 4

USApp. 332.
Jenkins v. Gibson, 2 La. Ann. 203, Louisiana.
18 How. 87.
Minter v. Crommelin, 18 U.S. 87, 15 L.Ed. 279.
King v. McAndrews, 11 F. 860, 50 C.C.A. 29.
Davis v. Fell, 211 P. 30, 59 Cal. App. 438.
Thompson v. Thompson, 155 P. 1190, 79 Or. 513.
Vanderheyden v. Crandall, 2 Denio (N.Y.) 21.
Backus v. McCoy, 3 Ohio 221, 17 Am. Dec. 585.
Tate v. Jay, 31 Ark. 579.
1 Washburn Real Prop. 16.
Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. 492.
Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis., 367.
Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 498, 10 L.Ed. 264.

Wineman v. Gastrell, 54 Fed. 819.
U.S. v. Cherokee Nations, 474 F.2d. 628 (1973).
Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104 (1918).
Desenroth v. Dodge, 350 Il. App. 20, 11 NE 2d. 575 (1953)
Lomax v. Pickering, 173 U.S. 26, 43 l.Ed. 601.
Estoppel has been sustained as against a municipal

corporation (county).
Beadle v. Smyser, 209 U.S. 393, 52 L.Ed. 849. See Title

43, Sections 83, and 43 USC 57-59.
Diversity of Citizenship, 28 USC 1332. See also 1331, 1343.
Treaties, 8 Stat. 80, 8 Stat. 200, 8 Stat. 218, 9 Stat. 869. 10

Stat.
1031. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199.
Lead case Louisiana Purchase States; Am.Ins.Co. v Canter,

1 Pet.(26US) 511
On ultra vires, see
1st Nat. Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe, 69 SE 1123;
Norton Grocery Co. v. Peoples Nat'l. Bank, 144 SE 501;
Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. L. Herisson, 33 F.2d. 841;
Am. Exp. Co. v. Cit. St. Bank, 194 NW 427.

Ashley v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 410 F. Supp. 1389.
Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571; 44 L.Ed;

20 S.Ct. 222.
Davidson v. Lovett, 446 F. Supp. 1171.
Florida Cent. & Pen. R.R. v. Bell, 176 U.S. 321; 44 L.Ed. 486;
20 S.Ct. 399.
Hanford v. Davies, 163 U.S. 273; 41 L.Ed. 157; 16 S.Ct. 1051

(1896).
Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 273; 50 L.Ed. 776; 26 S.Ct. 478
(1906).
Kirklin v. Ellerbe, 278 F. 168.
Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561;
Nolan v. Cal. Coast. Comm., 177 Cal.App.3d. 719, 722 (1986)

55 U.S.L.W. 5145.
First Eng. Evan. Luth. Church of Glendale v. Co. of L.A. 55

U.S.L.W. 4781.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d. 266.
Davis v. Pima County 590 P.2d. 459 (1978)
Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 513 (1986)

Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d

587 (1976).
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621.
U.S. v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114.
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Loretta v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 U.S. 419.

(1982)
Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898).
Candid Ent., Inc. v. Grossmont Union H.S. Dist., 39 Cal.3d 878,

890, (1985).
Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d. 317,
325, (1981).
Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d. 110,

128, (1973).
Strumansky v. San Diego Co. Emp. Retirmnt. Assoc., 11

Cal.3d. 28, 32, (1974)
Avco Community Dev., Inc. v. South Coast Regn'l Comm., 17

Cal. 3d 785 (1976)
Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979)
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)
Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa, 69 Cal. App. 3d. 74, 78, (1977).

Penn Central, 438 U.S. 124.
Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Return to Articles

Truth - What Is A Land Patent - Allodial Titles
WHAT IS A LAND PATENT??
Essentially, a Land Patent is the first conveyance of title

ownership to land which the U.S. Government grants a citizen who
applies for one. One of the earliest laws for granting Land Patents
was passed by Congress on April 24, 1820. Among other things,
Congress set up Government Land officers, now known as the
Bureau of Land Management. Land was usually sold in parcels of
160 acres for $1.25 per acre. The law in 1820 prohibited the
borrowing or use of "credit" for the purchase of government land. In
the debates in Congress prior to passage of this act, Senator King
of New York said in March 1820 ... "it was calculated to plant in the
new country a population of independent unembarrassed
freeholder ... that it would place , in every man, the Power to
Purchase a freehold. the price of which could be cleared in 3
years... that it would cut up speculation and monopoly ... that it
would prevent the accumulation of alarming debt which experience
proved never would and never could be paid" !!! (emphasis added)
Later on, in 1862, a Homestead Act stated in Section 4: "That no
lands acquired under the provisions of this act shall in any event
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt or debts contracted
prior to the issuing of the patent therefor".
It can be clearly seen that the intent of these early lawmakers

was for the people of this country to be FREEMEN AND
FREEHOLDERS of their land, and not ever be subject to have it
taken from them by any government, feudal authority or banker or
any other party who might have a claim against the person who
owned the land. In plain English, a Land Patent which gave you an
allodial freehold, that was "judgement proof and yes- even immune
from tax liens. In [60] effect, the only authority over you or your land
was GOD himself. In England, a man, who owned free from
authority of the king, was known as a freeholder and his land as a
http://www.truth.tc/information/WhatIsALandPatent.html (1 of 127) [9/19/2009 11:14:51 AM]

freehold or allodial freehold. Most land patents in the U.S. were

issued prior to 1900. However, even today, new land patents
continue to be issued, mostly for gas, oil and mineral rights on
public lands. For this reason, there are several land offices that
remain open in the United States.
WHAT IS THE VALUE OF A LAND PATENT?
On the basis of all the case law I have seen, there is no doubt in
my mind that a land patent issued by the Bureau of Land
Management which gives you a title at law is far superior to any title
acquired in equity. such as a sheriff's deed. The land patent will,
therefore, prevent your ejectment and removal from the land or the
property you occupy on the land. The debts or claims of other
parties will remain, but the land will be removed from assets which
they can attach. The law is on the books today which says that any
debts, which lie against the land, that existed prior to the land
patent being issued, are removed from the land. The next question
is; if the land patents were issued 100 or more years ago to
persons who are no longer alive, and if I now reside on only a
portion of the land that was originally described in the original land
patent, then how do I bring up the land patent in my name'? And if I
bring it up in my name, will it remove the land as security which the
Bank or Mortgage Company can sell and seize in a foreclosure
action? [61]
DECLARATION OF LAND PATENT

The procedures which I will describe are not time tested, as they
have not worked their way through the U.S. Supreme Court. This
does not mean that these procedures will not ultimately be
successful. Any basis for a legal approach must be supported by a
legal theory. We already know and can substantiate that an original
land patent will protect your land from any equitable or collateral
attack. However, we do not know for certain that the existing
procedures will vest in us the same rights and immunities by filing a
DECLARATION OF LAND PATENT, and updating it in your name.
However, since there is little to lose and possibly much to gain, it
would be wise to file a DECLARATION OF LAND PATENT, in the
future event that it is sustained.
The theory is based on two premises. First, in the original land

patent, that was granted, lets say 100 years ago the land patent
document itself says that this patent is granted to the original party
AS WELL AS TO THEIR HEIRS AND ASSIGNS. While most of us
are not heirs, ARE NOT WE ALL ASSIGNS? Since land patents
were originally issued, nearly all conveyances of title were done by
the use of deeds, like Quit Claim Deeds and Warranty Deeds.
However, the money lenders found a way around land patents by
creating, new paper instruments like deeds of trust and mortgages,
all of which convey equitable interests. However, the land patent its
remains the highest title at law, and few persons have updated a
land patent in their name. Where a land patent exists, no lien or
mortgage could be ever placed on the land. Since the intent of the
lawmakers is the law, historic evidence shows that our founding
fathers wanted us to own the land [62] in its entirety, and subject to
the claims of no other man or government or other institution.
Because the laws were passed by Congress setting up Land
Offices to grant land patents, the best jurisdiction in which to raise
these issues are the Federal Courts.
In the Declaration of Land Patent, we then declare that we are

the ASSIGNEE'S of the original land patent, even though we may

be 2nd,..3rd, 4th, etc., after the party to whom the original patent
was issued. TO LET YOU KNOW HOW SERIOUS THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IS TAKING THESE DECLARATIONS OF LAND
PATENTS, Don Walker has recently stated: "That in Illinois, he
personally knows of a farmer who applied for a $500,000 loan and
was told by the Federal Land Bank that it would be granted if he
removed his Declaration of Land Patent. Also, the FLB is now itself
applying for and filing Declarations of Land Patents on farms it is
"foreclosing on". We have also learned that oil, gas and coal
companies are filing these declarations on land already titled in
their name through deeds. Also, Dennis Schlueter of Fort Collins,
Colorado has stated: he knows of banks who are foreclosing on
mortgages, that are then filing these DECLARATIONS OF LAND
PATENTS on the property that they just foreclosed on. Now if these
land patents were worthless pieces of paper, then why is
everybody jumping on the bandwagon?
After the review of several different land patents, the one

enclosed in this paper is, considered the one that best sums up
what is to be said. [63]
The one major pitfall, that must be avoided, is that when filing
the declaration of land patents, do not place the same legal
description in the declarations that was in the original land patent
issued by the Bureau of Land Management. What this does is
cloud the title to the property of other persons who are living in
properties that are part of the legal description of the original land
patent. As a result, several lawsuits were filed to quiet title. To
prevent this from happening, you must write in your Declaration of
Land Patent only the legal description of the property to which you
are an assignee. In other words, the legal description from your
deed or abstract is what you must use. For this reason, the
enclosed Declaration of Land Patent has in it, adequate language
for this purpose. A Declaration of Homestead should be attached to
your Declaration of Land Patent, but the legal description in your

Declaration of Homestead must be 160 acres or less to comply with

Federal Law on filing Homesteads. Along with the declaration of
Land Patent and the Declaration of Homestead is a certified copy
of the original land patent which you can obtain from your nearest
land office. These papers are all stapled together and filed in either
your County Recorder's office or with the Register of Deeds.
DO NOT SEND CHECKS. SEND MONEY ORDERS ONLY /

MAKE PAYABLE TO: Bureau of Land Management
After you receive your copy of the original Land Patent or Land
Grant, then staple it to a Declaration of Land Patent and file it in
your County Recorder's office or Register of Deeds. You now have
your allodial title. If you haven't filed a Declaration of Homestead,
then you should do so and attach it to your Land Patent. You may
file a Declaration of Homestead on up to 160 [64] acres, but not
more. A Declaration of Homestead can only be filed on property
that you actually live on. A Land Patent can only be filed on
property that has been assigned to you. You don't file one on your
neighbor's property or they can sue you for slandering his title.
A Declaration of Homestead should be filed whether or not you

file a Land Patent. It may be filed with, before, or after your lawsuit
is filed. Both Land Patents and Declarations of Homestead must be
Notarized. A sample of both are enclosed. Make photocopies of
both before using them or you may retype your own.
After your Land Patent is filed, you must send a photocopy by

Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested to your bank or mortgage
company, FLB, FMRA, PCA, etc and to any and all parties that may
have an equitable interest in your property so they have been
placed on NOTICE that you are updating the Land Patent in your
name and they will have 60 days to challenge your claim to your
allodial title in a court of law or forever keep their silence. Be sure
to keep your green tickets when they come back.

GIVING NOTICE IS A BASIC PRINCIPLE OF LAW. WHEN

THE GOVERNMENT
LAND OFFICES ORIGINALLY ISSUED THE LAND

PATENTS, THEY PUBLISHED
THE LAND PATENT WITH LEGAL DESCRIPTION FOR 60

DAYS: WHEN NOT
CHALLENGED BY ANYONE, THE LAND PATENT WAS

THEN GRANTED. AN
ALTERNATIVE WAY TO GIVE THE OTHER PARTY NOTICE

IS TO PUBLISH A
"NOTICE OF DECLARATION OF LAND PATENT" in a legal

publication in your county
of residence.
Include the legal description on your property in the ad with this

warning: "If any party having a claim, lien or debt or other equitable
interest fails to file a suit in a court of law within 60 days [65] from
the date of filing or on (insert date), then they shall waive all future
claims against this land and it will become the property and allodial
freehold of the Assignee to said Patent. (your name - Assignee)
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Why must we give the other side `NOTICE'?
A. Giving NOTICE is a basic principle of common law. If someone

was going to file a claim against property that you thought was
yours, would you not want to be given NOTICE? if they fail to file a
suit in court within the 60 days, the case is substantially weakened
if they file it later. Also, filing the Land Patent is an excellent
diversionary tactic, since the focus of the court battle shifts to who
has the best title. Remember, you are an Assignee to that original
patent, and your claim is valid. The U.S. Government signed a
contract granting that Land Patent to the original party, their heirs
or assigns. YOU ARE AN ASSIGNS to all allodial title or freehold.
The original contract does not specify any expiration date. it is still
in force. If the original land patent is immune from equitable or
collateral attack, then so is yours.
Q. Where can I find more case law on Land Patents?
A. At your local library at your courthouse or university. Look up

the Supreme Court Digests [66] on Land Patents, also a set of
books called 43 USCS 17. Also books on State Law Digests. Look
underthe section on Land Patents. There is also material in
Bouvier's Law Dictionary. Also look under the term "Bureau of Land
Management". You will also find many court cases and related
documents on the DCS computer system, especially in the
directories:
Law
Pre1868 - Supreme Court Cases
Post 1868 - Supreme Court Cases

9th US Circuit Court of Appeals
Q. Why send the Bureau of Land Management $20.00?
A. This is the approximate cost for most copies of the original

patents.
This includes $4.25 for the patent plus a search fee. A copy of the
County Plat map makes it easier for them to locate the patent or
grant. In your letter, BE SURE TO ASK FOR A CERTIFIED COPY.
You should receive it in 4 to 6 weeks.
WHO DOES YOUR LAND BELONG TO?
While it is generally believed in America today that the purpose

of the American revolution was to resist taxation without
representation. The primary reason for the revolution was to deliver
America's Land Titles out of the hands of Great Britain and return
them to the people. It was assumed by many, before the
Revolution, that England rightfully "owned" America. It was
because of this assumption that she gave grants of land to
supportive Colonists, then taxes the Colonists as subjects. But, the
patriots, of that day, insisted that the King of England did not own
the land ... so it was not his to grant. After the Revolution, the land
became the property of each [67] State's people, with the authority
in the people to parcel out the land to claimants in a fair and
equitable manner. If some land remained unoccupied, Jefferson
said: that anyone occupying it had possession, the right of
ownership, land title, was then to be held by way of ALLODIAL

TITLE. That simply meant that there was "No Superior" to the land
owner. He was the Superior, the Sovereign on his land.
To encourage railroad growth and provide transportation for over

three million new settlers that had immigrated from the East into a
wilderness devoid of roads, the government gave the first railroad
land grant ... 2,595,000 acres of federal land, six alternate
numbered sections (640 acres in a section) of unpreempted, land
for every mile of track built, to be issued to fund the building of the
Illinois Central, with a branch to Chicago. The contract said that it
should be completed in six years and that seven percent of the
company's gross should be paid to the state in perpetuity. Also,
Uncle Sam was permitted set his own charge for carrying troops,
freight and mail, and eventually settled on fifty percent for the first
two and eighty percent for the mail. The Illinois Central, then the
longest line in the world, was completed three days before the
deadline set in 1856.
One of the earliest laws for granting patents was passed by an

Act of Congress an April 24, 1820. The law in 1820 prohibited the
borrowing or use of credit for the purchase of government land. In
the debates in Congress prior to the passage of this Act, Senator
King of New York said "... it (the Act) is calculated to plant, in the
new country, a population of independent, unembarrassed
freeholders ... it will put the power in every man to purchase a [68]
freehold, the price of which can be cleared in three years ... it will
cut up speculation and monopoly ... it will prevent the accumulation
of an alarming debt, which experience proves never could or would
be paid." In 1862, the Homestead Act. in Section 4, provided that
"no lands acquired under the provisions of this Act shall in any
event become liable to the satisfaction of any debts contracted prior
to the issuing of the land patent."
When taxation of real property began (and the people did not
object) they voluntarily accepted the premiss that government was

the Superiors and the land owner a mere serf in a feudal

relationship to his master. And the whole process helped to
contribute to an ever increasing control by Lawless Government.
This Lawless Government has been preparing America for the time
when the land will be confiscated to pay off the indebtedness to the
Federal Reserve that has America on the verge of financial
collapse.
According to conservative estimates, possibly half a million U.S.

farmers will be driven from the land in the next several years. Jim
Hightower put the goal of the previous administration at 10,000
super farms. No one knows what this administration might do. Mr.
Hightower is the Texas Commissioner of Agriculture. A total of
"10,000" farms for the nation has been the goal of public policy ever
since the Committee for Economic Development wrote its Adaptive
Program for Agriculture, but true to "People's Republic" type
thinking, the matter has never been taken up with the American
Public. [69]
Democrats and Republicans alike have allowed this policy to

march forward, annihilating not only the family farm, but the
freedoms of all Americans.
So the mortgage foreclosures, in the words of the great thinkers,

will deliver the landed resources of the United States into a few
strong hands. Thomas Jefferson would have called it "landed
aristocracy."
The founding fathers knew that free men could survive only as
long as they owned property, because it was this ownership that
accounted for broad spectrum distribution of income and
preservation of the jury system. They also knew that manipulation
of the money supply, via debt, would ultimately take from the
people their substances, by concentrating the property into the
hands of a few, which is now the curse of the majority of the world.

Thomas Jefferson wrote: "If the American people ever allow the
banks to control issuance of their currency, first by inflation and
then by deflation, the banks and corporations that grow up around
them will deprive the people of all property until their children will
wake up homeless on the continent their fathers occupied." [70]
"I OWN MY LAND?"
Taken from a letter/notice from the United States Department of

the Interior, it stated: "the United States has paramount title in the
land."
The legal definition of Paramount is as follows:
Paramount Title: "In the law of real property -- one which is

superior to the title with which it is compared, it is used to denote a
title which is better or stronger dm another ..... (Black's Law, 4 Ed.
pg 1267)
Under the National Constitution, Article IV & 111, Clause 2,

Congress was given power (by the people) to dispose of its
territories and the land acquired for the people of the United States
by purchase and by TREATY. The Administration (government)
holds this land as TRUSTEE for the people!
After the Declaration of Independence and the "REVOLUTION',

the land was to be held by everyone (landowners) in/by Allodial
Tils, which simply means there is no superior or "overlord" to or
over the landowner. [71]
Before we get into what Allodial Titles, and Land Patents are,
let's go to the first U.S. Supreme Court case on land titles for a
clearer and basic understanding as to what our forefathers
established through their experience and sacrifice for their progeny.

The case is WALLACE v Harmstad, S Ct 492 (1863), and the

opinion of@the Court was delivered, May 6th 1863, by Justice
Woodward, and in part, he stated:
"I see no way of solving this question, except hy determining

whether our Pennsylvania titles are allodial or feudal. It seems
strange that so fundamental a question as this should be in doubt
at this day, but it has never had, so far as I know, a direct judicial
decision. In a valuable note by Judge Sharswood to the opening
passage of Blackstone's Chapter on Modern English Tenures. (2
Sharswood's Black. 77), it is said, "that though there are some
opinions that feudal tenures fell with the Revolution, yet all agree
that they existed before, and the better opinion appears to be that
they still exist. "In support of this statement, the feudal principals
that have entered into our conveyancing are alluded to, and several
cases are cited in which the consequences and qualities of feudal
tenures have been recognized in our estates, although generally, in
these very cases, it has been assumed that our property is allodial.
I venture to suggest that much of the confusion of ideas that
prevails on this subject has come from our retaining, since the
American Revolution, the feudal nomenclature of estates and
tenures, as fee, freehold, heirs, reoffment, and the like.
Our question, then, narrows itself down to this: is fealty an part of

our land tenures? [72] What Pennsylvanian ever obtained his lands
by "Openly and-humbly kneeling before his lord, being un-grit,
uncovered, and holding up his hands together between those of the
lord, who sat before him, and there professing that he did become
his man from that day forth, for life and limb, and earthly honor, and
then receiving a kissfrom his lord? - This was the oath of fealty
which was, according to Sir Marlin Wright, the essential feudal

bond so necessary to the very notion of a feud. But then came the
Revolution, which threw off the dominion of the mother country, and
established the independent sovereignty of the state (the people),
and on the 27th day of November 1779 (I Smith's Laws 480), an act
was passed for vesting the estates of the late proprietaries of
Pennsylvanian in the Commonwealth. Another act on the 9th of
April 1781, (2 Smith 532), provide for opening the land office and
granting lands to purchasers; and, says the 11th section, "all and
every the land or lands-granted in pursuance of, this act shall be
free and clear of all reservations and restrictions as to mines,
royalties, quit-rents, or otherwise, so that the owners thereof
respectively shall be entitled to hold the same in absolute and
unconditional property, to all intents and purposes whatsoever, and
to all and all manner of profits, privileges, and advantages
belonging to or occurring from the same, and that clear and
exonerated from any charge or encumbrance whatever, excepting
the debts of said owner,... [73] The province was a fief held
immediately from the Crown, and the Revolution would have
operated very inefficiently towards complete emancipation, if the
feudal relation had been suffered to remain. It was therefore
necessary to extinguish all foreign interest in the soil, as well as
foreign jurisdiction in the manner of government. We are then to
regard the Revolution and these Acts of Assembly as emancipating
every acre of the soil of Pennsylvania from the grand characteristic
of the feudal system. Even as to the lands held by the proprietaries
themselves, they held them as other citizens held, under the
Commonwealth, and that by a title purely allodial. All our lands are
held mediately or immediately of the state, by the titles purged of all
the rubbish of the dark ages, excepting only the feudal names of
things not any longer feudal. Under the Acts of assembty I have
alluded to, the state became the proprietor of all lands, but instead
of giving them like a feudal lord to an enslaved tenantry, she has
sold them for the best price she could get, and conferred on the
purchaser the same absolute estate she held herself,... and these
have been reserved, as everything else has been granted, by

CONTRACT."
To get a better understanding of this issue, we must take a look

at certain definition, from Black's Law, as follows:
"ALLODIAL. Free; not holden of any lord or superior, owned

without obligation of vassalage of fealty; the ol2l2osite of feudal, "
[74]
"ALLODIUM. Land held absolutely in one's own right, and not of

any lord of superior; Land not subject to feudal duties or burdens.
(Emphasis added
Take note that AIIodiaI is the opposite of Feudal.
"FEUDAL. Pertaining to feuds, fees; relating to or growing out of

the feudal system or feudal law; having the quality of a feud, as
distinguished from 'allodial' (Emphasis added)
"FEUD. An estate in the land held of a superior on condition of

rendering him services. An inheritable right to the use and
occupation of lands, held on condition of rendering services to the
lord or proprietor, who himself retains the property in the lands. In
this sense the word is the same

as "feod", "feodum", "feudom", "fief", or "FEE".
To simplify, one can have two different and opposite titles of

land, one of 'Feudal, nature - owing a fee or duty to another who
actually retains or own the land or the other being 'Allodial', Where
the land is held absolutely in one's own right, not subject to
another, a fee or a duty!
So the..term OWNERSHIP" may take on a totally different

meaning, dependent upon the type of title one has in the land.
'OWNERSHIP-' is a key principle as it pertains to the rights to
acquire and use property as well as rights in the land as well.
Ownership is defined as follows: [75]
"OWNERSHIP: The complete dominion, title, or proprietary

right in a thing or claim. The entirety of the powers of use and
disposal by law. The exclusive right of possession, enjoyment, and
disposal. Ownership of property is absolute or qualified. The
ownership of property is absolute when a single person has
absolute dominion over the property. The ownership is qualified
when ... use, of the property is restricted." (Emphasis added)
The Act of Congress of April 24, 1820 was one of the earliest
statutes passed for granted land Patents, along with the
Homestead Act, Sec. 4 in 1862 and as stated earlier, the disposal
of its territories and land acquired for the people is by purchase and
by TREATY (Contract of and by the
People) to wit:

1) Northwest Ordinance (1787)
2) Treaty of Peace, 8 STAT.80 (1783)
3) Treaty of Ghent, 8 STAT.218 (1818)
4) Oregon Treaty, 9 STAT.869 (June 15, 1846)
5) Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 STAT.922 (1848)
6) Treaty of Cession, 8 STAT.200 (1863)
The Treaty (Contract) Law cannot be interfered with, as the

Supreme Court has held that 'Treaties' are the 'supreme law of the
land'. See also Article 6, Sec.2 of the U.S. Constitution. The Treaty
is declared the will of the People of the United States and shall be
superior to the Constitution and the laws of if any individual State.
[76]
It was through the 'experiences' of our Founding Fathers, coming

from a Feudal system, that they desired that in the new country, the
United States, that all men would own their land, in its entirety,
absolutely, with full dominion, and subject to the claims of no man
or government! This was done through grant or purchase.
Black's Law, 4th Ed. pg. 829, defines Grant as a conveyance(?),

same reference, pg. 402 under general, to wit:
Absolute or Conditional Conveyance. An Absolute conveyance

is one by which the right or property in a Thing is transferred, by
which it might be defeated or changed; as an ordinary deed of
lands, in contradistinction to a mortgage which is a conditional
conveyance.

Now under the' term 'Grant' it shows 'Private Land Grant' as: A
grant by a public authority vesting title to public land in a private
(natural) person.
Public Grant: A grant from the public; a grant of a power,

license, privilege, or property, from the state or government to one
or more individuals, contained in or shown by a record,
conveyance, Patent, charter, etc.
Before we go on to Patents, and with a little understanding of

'Grants', we will take a little time to touch up on the 'Purchase' of
land as it affects title. Two points are raised or established, the first,
from a court case, called STANEK v WHITE, 215 NWR 781 (1927),
states: [77]
"There is a distinction between a debt discharged and one paid.

When discharged the debt still exists, though divested of its
character as a legal obligation during the operation of the
discharge."
How does this affect your land purchase'? Very simple. When
Congress, in 1933, suspended the gold standard (Art. 1, Sec. I 0)
which denied you the right to PAY YOUR DEBTS AT LAW (which
extinguishes the debt), to a system where you can only discharge
your debts, but the debt still exists. This may be where your duty or
fee comes from in the form of your property tax. But there may also
be a distinction in the form or type of payment that you made in and
for the land. The courts have ruled that the Federal Reserve
Bank/System is not an agency of the U.S. Government, but rather a
Private Corporation!
Therefore, when you participate in the Federal Banking System,

you are participating in a private money system, which is a
privilege, and therefore a duty and fee is extracted, in the form of a
tax, but since Federal Reserve Notes are not Lawful Money (no
substance backing it!) you cannot pay your debts at law, they are
only pieces of paper of which a debt attaches!
To prove this, we go to the second point, the definition of Title,

as found in Bouvier"s Dictionary of Law:
"The means whereby the owner ... hath just possession of his
property.
3. Title to personal property may accrue in three different ways; by

original acquisition, by transfer by act of law, by [78] transfer by act
of the parties. 5. THE LAWFUL COIN OF THE UNITED STATES
WILL PASS THE PROPERTY ALONG WITH THE POSSESSION.'
(Emphasis added)
The Lawful coin of the United States was Gold and Silver which
is 'substance'. In olden days, one got gold from the land and one
could buy land with gold. But back then, the conveyance of land
through purchase was honored (in the law) and full and absolute
possession and ownership was transferred!
So what we have covered so far, you can see that perhaps you
don't own your land. Merely compare your so-called title or deed to
the points of law as brought forth herein. See also the attached
'Exhibits' for your comparison. In mid-stream, we ask you the
question, "Is property tax evidence of ownership?" We'll let you also
answer that question.
Now on to Land Patents- Because all Federal Land Patents

flow from Treaties that fall under the "Supremacy Clause," no State,
private banking corporation or other federal agency can question
the superionty of title to land owners who have perfected their land
by Federal Land Patent. Public lands, as found in 42 American
Jurisprudence, Sec. 781 thru 873, shows that a Patent of land is to
be the title to land and anything else is FRAUD. Transfer of a
Patent is by release of Patent Interest Right and not by some form
of 'USURY INSTRUMENT' of Trust or Warranty. (See also 40 AM

JUR, 577 thru 688) [79]
A Land Patent issued by the United States is legal and

conclusive evidence of title to the land conveyed. (Opinion of U.S.
Attorney General - Sept. 1869). A Land Patent is the highest
evidence of title. Since Land Patents cannot be collaterally attacked
as to their "Validity" or "Authenticity" as the highest evidence of title;
Federal Land Patents were given free and clear 'ALLODIAL Title'
with no encumbrances, then and now. Can you say the same about
your land title'?
The Patent alone passes land from the United States to the
grantee and nothing passes a perfect title to land but a (WILCOX v
JACKSON, 43 Peter (U.S.) 498, 10 L Ed. 264) ".... with no fee or
duty (TAX)!!!
Since a Land Patent is not a conveyance of title by someone

assigning their equity interest over to you, but a Land Patent is a
TITLE AT LAW, which establishes an ALLODIAL FREEHOLD that
is judgement proof and even immune from tax liens! Again, can you
say the same thing about your land title'? [80]
"THE PROPERTY TAX --- SCHOOL FUNDING ISSUE"
"OWNERSHIP VS FRAUD IS IT A MASTER-SLAVE

RELATIONSHIP
Well there's a lot of emotions flowing out and about, around this
here Property Tax --- School Funding Issue! Within the State of
Oregon, there was more than a lot of talk about a sales tax, which
would accordingly lower property taxes. Following that, the people
voted in the Lottery. With the promise that funds would or could go

to lower property taxes. Time will tell on that one, just don't hold
your breath! Most Oregonians don't want that sales tax! (Nor does
any other person in this country, unless they are a politician.) And if
school funding issues are brought into any discussion, in relation to
or based on property taxes, watch out, 'fur can fly'! I
Many people, with good intentions, support the schools, to a

point, irrespective of the poor quality (the results) and the
underlying goals of such controlled education. It seems that every
year, along with teacher strikes, the property tax issue arises, with
all the pros and cons. Seems to just get worse than better! And
haven't you noticed, that all the politicians ever do, at any level, is
to raise taxes ... then again, maybe you haven't noticed!
But then it's a 'Catch 22 Situation'. To support the schools,

financially, property taxes must go up! Vote property taxes down,
and the schools must suffer! It's really a no win situation.
Maybe the solution lies within QUESTIONS, or to put it another

way, YOU may have to go back to the beginning and find or
discover the ANSWERS! [81]
In order to get the right answer(s), one must ask the right
questions, like: Are property taxes necessary'? Are property taxes
lawful?
But the most important question is: "is property tax indicia
(evidence) of true ownership"?
Well now, let's, do some investigating! What does 'ownership'

really mean? "The colete dominion, title, or proprietary right in a
thing or claim. The entirety of the powers of use and disposal by
law. The exclusive right of Possession, enjoyment, and disposal.
Ownership of property is absolute or Qualified. Ownership of
property is Absolute when a single person has absolute dominion
over it. The ownership is qualified when ... use is restricted".!

(Black's Law Dictionwy, 5th Ed., pg.979) (Emphasis Added)
So what does this tells us? Ownership in land is: "THE

COMPLETE DOMINION, TITLE, EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF
POSSESSION, ENJOYMENT, RIGHT TO CONTROL WITH
ABSOLUTE DOMINION OVER IT!!
That statement seems fo be meaningless in view of the

compelling of PERMITS, and of course PROPERTY TAXES! Kind
of like there's somebody watching over you, controlling or dictating
what you can or cannot do on your land, and then demanding
"TAXES" as well. [82]
It would then appear that most people who have bought (paid of
off) their land (with or without a home on it) do not have absolute
control, dominion, use, or even full enjoyment of it, when the
individual and land is RESTRICTED by local permits and property
taxes!
Then it also follows that, if there are such restrictions on your

land, that you do not have 'absolute title'. Maybe then ... your not
really an owner, in the true sense of the word. I guess you would be
called a quasiowner. They kind of define that as 'something like" an
owner! Maybe there is a 'SUPERIOR' above you, controlling the
use of the land and compelling a duty of fee for the 'interest' or 'use'
of the land ... called property taxes! In the old days, way back in
time, it was called "FEUDALISM", which is defined in part as:
"The system was based upon a servile relationship between a

"vassal" and "lord". The vassal paid homage and service to the lord
and the lord provided land and protection." (Black's Law Dictionary,
5th Ed., pg. 559).
Well now, not too bad, but let's take a look at "FEUDUM",
defined as: "A feud, fief, or fee (tax). A right of using and enjoying
forever the lands of another, which the lord (superior) grants on

condition that the tenant shall render @ (duty or tax) military duty,
and other services. It is not properly the land, but a n@ in the land."
(Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.,'pg. 560) (Emphasis added) [83]
So what you may be involved in, as a so called 'property owner', is
a form of feudalism, which is basically in modem terms:
"A system based upon a servant relationship between the

servant and a superior (State, Banking Co., Corporation, or other).
The servant for the payment of a property tax (fee) has a right to
use the land on conditions! "
For today,, those conditions are the property tax, land use laws
and permits. It should be noted however that if the servant falls to
pay the property taxes or violates any of the conditions, the servant
will be removed off the land and another servant will be allowed to
use the land ... on the same conditions! One must remember,
however, the state will use any means to remove a servant/slave
who fails to pay the taxes, even to the point of using a SWAT
TEAM!
The right to use the land does not grant absolute title. The
servant is without and is denied the true title, and is involved in
what is called simply a 'feudal system'. Please bear with me, my
leading is not in vain!
Let us now look at and define the word "FEUDAL", it is:

"Pertaining to feuds or fees; relating to or growing out of the feudal
system or feudal law; having the quality of a feud, as distini!uished
from 'Allodial". (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., pg.559) (Emphasis
added) [84]
Well now, that's dam right interesting. This thing called

"ALLODIAL", which is distinguished (opposite) from the "Feudal
System" of the use of land without true ownership - for a fee! Well,
we're going to take a good look at this 'Allodial' thing.

But now those people who are in the know, or supposed to be,
from REAL ESTATE AGENTS, STATE OFFICIALS, to
POLITICIANS, obviously are not directed to this information, or
most likely this information has been suppressed or even denied,
not only from them ... but from you too, the so-called property
owner!!! Could it be that those we elect(?) or the powers that are in
the 'mushroom business', keeping everyone in the dark and feeding
them 'bull'?
Well hang on, we're getting warm. I now direct you to the
definition of Allodial, it is: "Free; not holden of any lord or superior;
owned without ablization of vassalage of fealty; the opposite of
feudal." (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., pg.70)(Emphasis added)
Can you believe, a title of land where you are not beholden' to
anybody', owned without any 'obligation', of any duty or fee... a
property tax'? Amazing but true!
Strictly speaking, in regards to land, we go to yet another

definition, and that is of land being held in ALLODIUM, as- [85]
"Land held absolutely in one's own right, and not of any lord or
superior; land not subject to feudal duties or burdens. An estate
held by absolute ownership, with out recognizing any superior to
whom any duty is due on account there of". (Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed., pg. 70)
Therefore, if any title on land would be wanted or sought after, as

a treasure, it would certainly be an 'Allodial Title' would it not'?
Imagine a 'Title', on your land, where you are not subject to

duties, fees, or taxes! Land held in absolute ownership with no
superior above you! That means (what should have happened)
when you paid off the debt on your land, the State, the Bank, or the
party holding the contract until full payment, should of then
transferred the proper true title, an Allodial Title. You would then
own your land free and clear, fee simple. absolute! It could then be
said, that you held your land in "PARAMOUNT", as in holding

paramount title. Paramount being defined as:
"In the law of real property, one which is superior to the title with
which it is compared, in the
sense that the former is the source of the later. It is, however,
frequently used to denote a title
which is simply better or stronger than another, or will prevail

over it." (Black's Law Dictionary,
5th Ed., pg. 1001) [86]
So now the question is, does the title you hold, or will receive,
give you full absolute ownership, free and clear, fee simple, not
subject to any duty or tax .... do you hold your land in Allodium with
a paramount title'???
In the old days, it is my understanding, that land held under

these titles could not be licenced, seized, or taxed! Of course this
applied to the land as well, because of the "STATUS" of not only
the land, but the "owners" as well. The land was owned, and
nobody else had any control, what so ever! The land represented
the wealth of the family, it was the family! Irrespective of hardships,
family members could always go back to the land, the family farm,
to survive and rebuild any monetary loss and self esteem!
But no so today! With the many restrictions placed upon the

land, and of course, with the State owning the land (State holds
true titles) the people cannot use the land for their needs,
purposes, or desires.

Many people have been forced onto the welfare system as a

result of this modern day 'Feudal System'. The land is simply ... not
yours!
But now the question is this; "Why do you, the so called property
owner, do not have and hold an "Allodial/Paramount Title" to the
land (And Home) that you THINK you own? [87]
Why are you, the individual(s), the true substance and strength
of this country, denied the proper lawful title to your land? Why are
you denied the full enjoyment, from the use and ownership of your
land'? Is the quest for control and power, by those in authority over
you, worth the violation of your "Life", "Liberty", and "Pursuit of
Happiness"? Why are you led to believe that you own the land?
Why are you called a landowner, when you are compelled to
duties, fees, and taxes'? When you bought your property, did you
understand and agree to having a 'superior' above you, controlling
the use of your land? Why has the State denied you true title to
your property?
Is it because the need and greed for power and control over the
masses that necessitates the fraud and scams to keep the State
coffers full and the sheep in line, thinking and believing that they
own their land, thereby making it a little easier to fleece! State
Dictatorial control, under the guise of permits, property taxes, and
school funding, in relation to the ownership of land"
necessitates..."the end justifies the means!"
This "Citizen", having an interest in the basic land/title issue, and

fully understanding the principles involved, the truth that "we are
merely serfs upon the land," that no one really owns their land, and
having no need to participate in "their" deceitful fraud ... has turned
his energy toward other interests.
One such interest was 'prospecting' and its related area of

information. That of course led to collecting and reading books and

information about mining claims and U.S. regulations on [88]
mining claims from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). One of
the letter documents that I had received was quite a surprise, since
I had skimmed over it some time back.
The letter was from the "United States Department of the

Interior", "Bureau of Land Management", titled "Notice to Mining
Claimant", 2nd. paragraph, and in part said:
"Since a mining claimant has merely a possessory interest in

the
location, the United States has PARAMOUNT TITLE in the

land..."
(Emphasis added)
*this statement could apply to so-called Property owners!
NOW THE QUESTION IS! "By what authority does the U.S.
Government and your State Government hold land in paramount
title (untaxable, unalienable, and unseizable) and yet denies the
very people of this country the RIGHT to hold their land in same
status ... in Allodium?"
Is this not a government of the people, by the people, and for

the people? Who's fooling who? Who's controlling who? Those are
questions you need to get answered. Its' been said many times, but
here, it is more than applicable - and that is:

"All had better WAKE UP! For Gods' sake, WAKE UP!!!" [89]
Consider and understand that, your government(?) is involved

in a 'belief system scam'. That is, if they can get the people to
believe in certain things, then the Government can not only control
the people, but also get the people to pay for their own servitude!
HERE ARE SOME EXAMPLES:
1. Socialistic Income Tax
2. Socialistic Social Security
3. The Welfare System
4. Government Schools
5. State Ownership of your Vehicles
6. Zoning
Get the people to 'believe' that 'they' own their own land and they
will pay the taxes on it, most of them, with a smile on their face! Get
the people to 'believe' they need to pay a property tax to support
the schools (free education) and the Government can add another
link in the chain ... in the enslavement of the people in this "Land of

the Free!".
One might ask now, "How do the schools get funding"? Well,
that's simple. Since the monetary system of this country is run by a
"Private Corporation" circulating 'Bills', 'Notes" and 'Checks' (credit)
without substance and in violation of U. S. and every State
Constitutions (U. S. Art. I Sec. I 0) (Look up your own States'
Constitution Article and Section). Since most taxing schemes are
based upon fraud and theft, demand your public servants to retum
the power [90] and authority to regulate the money system back to
the U.S. Treasury, and then demand the Treasury to turn on the
printing presses. I mean it's not really money, there's no substance,
it's just paper! It's one of those 'belief scams', you believe its
money, that it has value, and your 'confidence' thus makes it so!
But it's just paper with nothing of value for support! Since your
Government can and should operate honestly, they can just send
the 'cash' directly to the schools!
Of course, the other alternative is to shut all the schools down

and tum over the education to `private enterprise' and 'home
schools'!
But remember, the issue here is "That you don't own your land!"
And that's why you are compelled to pay property taxes ... to
support the schools. Now I realize that every point cannot be raised
here, either in support or otherwise, but you must start with the
basics.
"Get your land back, under a lawful, paramount, Allodial Title

whereby you own it free and clear, fee-simple, ABSOLUTELY,
owing nothing to nobody!" To do this, there's a price to be paid, and
it is; Tum off the boob tube, put the beer down, read the
Constitution, study the points raised herein, write some demanding,
letters to your public servants, get together in your local and MAKE
it happen.

"Yes, we may not know what the future lies, but MAYBE IT'S
TIME FOR EXODUS!!!" [91]
This same point and principle applies to your automobile, you

think you own it, but the State compels you to 'Drivers License,
Registration, and Insurance, because the State holds the true title
to your car, you merely carry a 'Certificate of Title', certifying that a
true title exists. You do not have paramount title to your car, which
is your property('?)(possession 9/10 of the law). [92]
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
When you buy property, you must know the difference between
Allodium and Feudal, and the various kinds of Titles.
When you own property, Allodial, no one can claim any control
over your property but you. When you own property Feudally, you
do not really own it, but are only renting it, and the owner has
control of the use of the property. Feudal ownership is a deception,
because you have, in actuality, contracted for a third party to own
the property. Therefore. you must abide by the provisions of the
contract, and pay the third party a rent for the use of the property. If
you do not pay that rent or tax, you will be removed from it and it
will be "sold" to someone who will pay. Property is "sold" on the
courthouse steps every day of the year, except weekends. You ask
"Why on the courthouse steps and not in the courthouse'?". This is
because the property is "sold" under color of law, and not according
to the Common Law.
In order to own the property Allodial, you must make a Bill of

Conveyance to contract with the seller of the property, get the
property surveyed, do a Title search, and file those documents with

the Recorder in the Judicial Circuit or District in which the property

is located. If you do not file for "homestead exemption or make any
other contracts with the County or State, then you cannot be
assessed any tax or be forced to obtain permits to improve upon
your property. This means that the property is yours and no one
else's, and that you are the only one in control of your property. I
feel that every property owner should have a copy of "Blacks Law
Dictionary". [93]
When you buy, make sure that the seller includes "ALL RIGHTS
to the property in the Bill of Conveyance including mineral rights.
When you buy a car, you must also know the difference. I will
give you an example.
When you buy a car from a dealer, the MANUFACTURER

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN is sent to the State (Department of
Motor Vehicles). The Manufacturers Certificate of Origin IS THE
TITLE!!! The State records the Title on microfilm and ISSUES a
Certificate of Title, which does nothing but certify that there is a
Title. THE STATE HAS THE TITLE!!! If you read the small print at
the bottom of the certificate, you will find that you only have
"VESTED INTEREST" in the conveyance, and not ownership of it.
YOU HAVE JUST CONTRACTED FOR THE STATE TO OWN
YOUR CAR!!!. When you do this, you must comply with the
provisions of that contract and register the car every year, so the
State knows where the car is, obtain a drivers license, and
purchase insurance.
You must also obey the statutes of the Corporate State and all
the regulations that go along with them, so the Corporate State can
keep their large greedy, deep into your pockets.
You must also know the difference between paying and

discharging a debt. When you pay a debt, you must pay with value
or substance. (see Art. 1, Sect. 8, Cl. 5 and Art. I Sect. 10,
Constitution for the United States of America). You pay a debt with
Gold and/or Silver coin, but you can only discharge a debt with
"Federal Reserve Notes". Gold and Silver coins are value, [94] if
coined by Congress at the U.S. Mint. (Art. 1, Sect. 8, Cl. 5), and
only Gold and Silver coin can be used to pay debts. (Art. 1, Sect. I
0). When you use Gold and Silver coin to pay a debt, it is paid in
full. A Federal Reserve Note cannot pay a debt, because it is only
BANK CREDIT, or a debt in itself. How can you pay a debt with a
debt? You cannot! You can only discharge the debt with Federal
Reserve Notes. The debt still exists and is not paid.
Article 1, Section 8, Cl. 17, of the Constitution for the united

States of America, establishes the District of Columbia as a
DIFFERENT and SEPARATE NATION from the Republic of the
united States of America. The Congress has the EXCLUSIVE
RULE OVER THE Citizens of the District of Columbia, it's
territories, Insular possessions and Federal enclaves. Those
people have no RIGHTS, WHATSOEVER, other than what
Congress gives them. The Social Security Number is the Main
Contract with this Foreign government that creates this status of
slavery.
The way to own property in a Freehold status is to rescind ALL

CONTRACTS with the Foreign Corporate Federal Government and
the Corporate Regional State, county and municipality.
These contracts include:
1. Birth Certificate
2. All licenses (including Marriage)
3. All permits

4. Social Security numbers [95]
5. Bank accounts (except barter banks)
6. Any contract that requires a Social Security Number
7. Any incorporation, entitlement, or privilege from any
level of government.
This you must do by Affidavit. This is your declaration that you

are a Free American, and not a United States Citizen (Citizen of the
District of Columbia). You MUST, after you type them, get them
notarized and have three of your peers witness yours, and the
notaries signatures. The only reason for the notary, is to make the
document cognizant in a foreign venue.
Send a copy of the affidavit to the pertinent agency, along with

the original True copy and certification and service. Keep two
copies for yourself, and file the original Affidavit with a copy of the
true copy certification and service with the Recorder of the Judicial
Circuit or District in your area. You can do this in person (in the
Common Law) or by return receipt mail. One copy goes with you, in
your car, and the other remains in your files.
With every Affidavit that you send to an agency, the number or

identification card must be surrendered. In the case of the Social
Security Administration, if you have a card, it must be surrendered
and accompany the affidavit. In the case of the Department of
Motor Vehicles, the Number Plate, Registration, Certificate of Title,
and Driver's License must be enclosed with the Affidavit, etc.. The
only exception to this would be if you do drive for hire, i.e., Taxi,
Bus, or Truck driver.

Make a copy of your Positive Identification in the size of an ID

card with your right thumb print overlapping the bottom of the
photo, laminate it, and carry it as your photo ID.
Always work on a contract basis and NEVER sign anything

"under the penalties of perjury," or use any Social Security number.
You are then, a Free American and NOT a U.S. Citizen.
NOTE ADDED BY DCS STAFF:
When making up your photo ID, you MUST, absolutely MUST,

place a disclaimer on the ID such as: "Not a government issued
identification."
The disclaimer must appear on both the front and rear of the
identification card.
This step is necessary due to the fact that Congress has passed
a law stating that it is Fraud for anyone to carry an non-
governmental identification card without the disclaimer.
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
When you "buy" property today, you do not buy the property, you
buy a lease from the County? Think about it for a minute. If the
county can tax the property, require a permit to improve it, take it
away from you if you do not pay the tax, who owns it? (see Black's
Law Dictionary, definitions, included.)
If you PAY for it in Gold Coin, and on a Bill of Conveyance, do

your Title search, and survey, file those three documents with the
clerk of Circuit Court and the county recorders office, then you own
allodial property and the county cannot tax it, make you get any
permits, take it from you, or
even zone it, because the county does not own it anymore. Make
sure that you retain ALL rights to the property on the Bill of
Conveyance.
The same goes for your car. Lets say that you buy a car from a
dealer, and that you discharge the price of the car with Federal
Reserve debt (FRAUDS). The Manufacturers certificate of origin
(Title) goes from the dealer to the State (regional) Department of
Motor Vehicles. When you sign all those papers at the dealership,
you are contracting for the Regional State to own your car! When
you do this, you must abide by the provisions of the contract and
register it every year, so the owner knows where it is, buy
insurance (a paeans scheme) and get a drivers license.
The drivers license was only designed to regulate "Driving for

Hire" and not to regulate the right to travel.
A license is "privilege, or permission to do what is otherwise

unlawful". The Right to travel cannot be regulated or taxed. (Art. 9
of the Bill of Rights).
As for payment, you cannot pay a debt with a check or Federal

Reserve Notes (FRAUDS).
They only, discharge the debt and the debt still exists. To PAY a
debt, you must barter, or pay in Gold or Silver Coin, which cancels
the debt. The Federal Reserve Note is debt and you cannot pay a
debt with a debt! (see Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 5 and Sec. 10, Constitution
for the United States of
America)

To own your own car you must buy it on a Bill of Conveyance,

and obtain the manufacturers Certificate of Origin. THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA AND IT'S REGIONAL STATE WANTS TO BE
YOUR GOD, BUT YOU CANNOT BE A U.S. CITIZEN (under the
U.S. Code and statutes passed by Congress and the regional State
legislators) and an American (under the Constitution and Gods
Laws) at the same time. You cannot serve two masters. YOU
HAVE THE CHOICE, MAKE IT! [98]
WALLACE VS HARMSTAD
Ground-rent Deed invalid for fraudulent Altemation in hands of

Flurchaser for Value without Notice. Effect of Altemation on the
parties and those claiming them. Ground-rents are Rents - Service.
Statute of quia emptores not in force in Pennsylvania. Titles to
Land in Pennsylvania are allodial.
1. Where a landlord after a sale of lots reserving groundments,

and delivery of the deeds, obtained possession of them, and having
fraudulently altered the causes reserving the rents, sold them: the
purchaser, though bona fide and without notice of the fraud, cannot
recover, either by action at law or by distress.
2. A vested estate will survive the loss of the instrument by which

it is created, for the deed may be proved by secondary evidence or
presumed from prescription; but if destroyed by the fraudulent act
of the party claiming under it, it cannot be then proved or supplied
by any presumption in his behalf.
3. Ground-rents are rents-service of which distress is a necessary

incident: but a grantor who has not reserved his rent by a valid

deed cannot enforce it, because the statute of which would have
convert*ed the rentservice into a rent-charge, is not in force here,
and it cannot exist independently of the deed, because
Pennsylvania titles are allodial and not feudal. [99]
ERROR to the District of Philadelphia.
This was an action of replevin, by Edwin Harmstad against Mrs.

Alice Wallace, who avowed for rent in arrear as reserved in one of
the four ground-rent deeds, the validity of which was passed upon
by this court in the cases of Arrison v Harmstad, 2 Barr 191, and
Wallace v Harmstad, 3 Harris 462.
The material facts connected with these cases will be found in

the reports of these cases, and are in substance as follows:
In the fall of 1838 Matthew Arrison agreed to sell to four brothers

Harmstad, four adjoining lots of ground, reserving out of each lot a
yearly rent of $60, payable half-yearly on January 1st and July 1st,
in every year; the first half-yearly payment was to fall due on the 1st
of July 1839. Under the deeds executed in accordance with this
agreement, each of the Harmstads entered upon his lot and built a
house thereon. The deeds were executed in duplicate, each deed
was signed by both parties; a part of the bargain was that the
grantees might extinguish their ground-rents at par whenever they
pleased. When the deeds came to be executed, one of the four
brothers discovered an 'open space, or unfilled blank, in all eight of
the deeds; and in answer to his inquiry, was told by the alderman,
that it meant that there was to be no limit of time within which the
rents should be extinguished. This being in accordance with their
understanding, the deeds were executed and delivered - the
Harmstads took away their four deeds, while Arrison took away the

four counterparts. [100]
Some time afterwards an agent of Arrison procured from the

Harmstads their four deeds, for the alleged purpose of getting them
recorded, and while they were with Arrison, or another party
beneficially interested in the ground-rents, the same, together with
the four counterparts, were, either by Arrison or by some one under
him, altered, by the filling up of the blank in each of them with the
words "within ten years front the date there of." In the mean time
the first half-year's ground-rent falling due July 1st 1839, was paid
by the Harmstads without any knowledge of the alteration. When
they paid it they asked for their deeds, and found they have not
been recorded. Another agent of the grantor, or of his cestui que
use, then carried the deeds to the recorder's office, left them there,
and gave the Harmstads the recorder's receipts therefor; and it was
not until some weeks afterwards, when the deeds came back, that
they discovered the alteration. Since that time they refused to pay
any more ground-rent.
The case of Arrison v Harmstad, 2 Barr 191, and Wallace v

Harmstad, 3 Harris 462, having settled that an action of debt on
such ground-rent deed, or on the original contract prior to the deed,
but supposed to be executed by possession, or for use and
occupation, or of covenant on the ground-rent deed, will not lie--
that all the covenants in the deed are gone, and that the estate in
the land is vested in the grantee, freed and discharged therefrom--
that the spoliator may lose, but could not gain from his wrongful act,
and that any innocent purchaser of the rent is in no better condition,
having bought from the spoliator nothing at all, and that there is no
similitude between these cases and the case of negotiable paper in
third hands, the owner of this deed, Mrs. Wallace, resorted to a
distress for rent, on which distress this action of replevin was
founded, as above
stated. [101]

Under the ruling of the court below there was a verdict and
judgement for plaintiff; whereupon the defendant sued out this writ,
assigning the judgement of the court below for error.
E.S. Miller, for plaintiff in error.
J.A. Phillips, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered, May 6th 1863, by

Woodward, J.- It is not to be doubted that the cases of Arrison v
Harmstad, 2 Barr 191, and Wallace v Harmstad, 3 Barr 462, do
decide that by reason of the fraudulent alteration of the deeds,
reserving the ground-rent in question, neither an action of debt or
covenant would lie on any one of the deeds for recovery of the rent,
nor is it recoverable in an action on the verbal contract under which
possession was obtained, nor in any action for use and occupation
of the premises. Setting aside all the obiter dieta of those cases,
they clearly established these several conclusions, grounding them
all on the policy of the law which altogether forbids parties from
tampering with written instruments or deeds, and which, in its
application to the deed in question here, avoids the covenant
reserving rent in favor of the fraudulent grantor, but preserves the
fee simple to the innocent grantee, discharged from the covenants
in the deed. When it was said in the argument of the first of the
above cases that equity would reform the instrument in favor of a
purchaser, Chief Justice Gibson replied, "Show a case; the deed is
dead, and equity cannot put life into it."
The stern ruling in those cases was applied without hesitation to

a bonafide purchaser of the ground-rent without notice of the fraud,
so that, as far [102] as concerns Arrison, and all persons claiming
under him, the part of the deed which was intended to enure to his
benefit, may indeed be said to be dead. It was not merely a

voidable instrument, it was void. It was called a forgery, and treated
as such, and neither law nor equity would tolerate it even in the
hands of an innocent purchaser.
The question presented now is whether a ground-rent so

emphatically condemned, and denied all remedy, both at law and
equity, can be enforced by distress. Mrs. Wallace having executed
a distress, was sued in this action of replevin, when she avowed for
rent in arrear, as reserved by one of the four deeds which were the
subjects of animadversion in the above cited cases. Her learned
counsel does not impugn those cases, but he seeks to parry the
authority of them by a distinction so nice as to be highly creditable
to his acumen, even if it be not well founded in law. Let me try to
state it distinctly.
He says that a ground-rent reserved in a deed by a grantor is an

estate which vests in him the instant the fee simple in the land
vests in the grantee that estate is a rent-service; that it continues to
exist, though the instrument reserving it be destroyed- and that a
right of distress is one of the necessary legal incidents of the
estate. Then he argues that the plaintiffs distress was not by virtue
of the deed, but was founded on the intrinsic and essential qualities
of the estate in the grantor, and that the reference to the deed in
the avowry was only for the purpose of defining the estate and the
amount of the rent. [103]
I think the defect of the argument will be found to consist in the

third proposition. Not that it is untrue as a general position that a
vested estate will survive the instrument of its creation, but that the
position is too broadly stated when it is made to include an
incorporeal hereditament which lies in grant, and can only exist by
virtue of a deed, devise, or record, or by prescription, which is
rather to be considered as an evidence of a former acquisition, than
as an acquisition de nora: 2 Black 266.

That ground-rent is a rent-service was demonstrated in

Ingersoll v Sergeant, 1 Wh. 337, a case which has been so often
recognized and followed as to have become a rule of property.
Rent-service was the only kind of rent originally known to the
common law; a right of distress was inseparably incident to it so
long as it was payable to the lord who was entitled to the fealty; and
it was called a rent-service because it was given as a
compensation for the military or other services for which the land
was originally liable. When a rent was granted out of lands by deed,
the grantee had no power to distrain for it, because there was no
fealty annexed to such grant. To remedy this inconvenience an
express power of distress was inserted in grants of this kind, and it
was thence called a rent charge, because the lands were charged
with a distress. Rent-seek, or barren rent, is in effect nothing more
than a rent for the recovery of which no power of distress is given,
either by rules of the common law or the argument of the parties: 1
Co. Lit. (Thomas' ed.) star p.443, in note, and 2 Black.
(Sharswood's) 42, and note. Blackstone ranks all of these rents as
incorporeal hereditament, and Coke, commenting on Littleton's
distinction between feoffment and grants, says, here is implied a
division of fees into corporeal, as lands and tenements which lie in
livery, comprehended in this word feoffment, and may pass by
livery with [104] or without deed, and incorporeal, which lie in grant,
and cannot pass by livery but by deed, as advowson, commons,
etc: 2 Coke Lit. (Thomas' ed), star page 333. Rent belongs to this
category, and is implied by Lord Coke's "etc.," and is indeed the
most perfect illustration of an incorporeal hereditament, for it issues
directly out of the thing corporate, without being any part of it.
But suppose the deed by which an incorporeal hereditament was

granted be lost or destroyed, must the grantee lose his estate?
Lord Chief Justice Eyre answers this question in Bolton v The
Bishop of Carlisle, 2 H. Black. 263, where he says, "In pleading a
grant the allegation is that the party at such time did grant, but if by
accident the deed be lost, there are authorities enough to show-that

other proof may be admitted; the question in that case is whether

the parties did grant? To prove this, the best evidence must be
produced, which is the deed, but if that be destroyed, other
evidence may be received to show that the thing was once granted.
" So in Reed v Brookman, 3T. R. 151, where a lost release of an
annuity was pleaded without profert, the King's Bench sustained
the plea and overruled the demurrer to it.
These cases, and others cited in the argument to the same

effect, assert nothing more than a rule of evidence in very familiar
practice with us, that secondary evidence will be received where
the party shows it is out of his power, without any fault of his, to
produce the primary, but they establish no exception to the general
rule that incorporeal estates must be evidence by a grant. If the
best evidence of the grant cannot be had, the next best will be
received; but the result of the evidence must be to establish the
grant. Even when an easement is to be suswned by [105]
prescription, or a right of way by necessity, a grant is presumed
from long enjoyment, of the easement, or from the necessity for the
right of way, and thus again the result of the evidence is to
establish the grant. So true is the maxim that incorporeal
hereditament lie only in grant.
But what is to be said to a party who is unable to produce the

original grant because he has himself fraudulently altered it? Shall
he or his alienee be permitted to go into secondary evidence?
When the law has refused him all its forms of action on such a
mutilated instrument, will it allow him to take redress into his own
hands and levy a distress for himself? This would be to reverse the
maxim, in idium spoliatofis, omniapraesumuntur. In accordance
with the maxim, we ought rather to presume that he never had a
grant, and therefore no estate which carried with it the incidental
fight of distress.
It is apparent that this view of the case places the plaintiff in error

upon the Arisen deed just as much as she stood upon it in her
former action of covenant, and it has been suggested, not in
forgetfulness that it is not the position chosen for her by her consul,
but by way of showing that his main proposition was too broadly
stated for the case in hand, and that, holding only an incorporeal
hereditament, he cannot get her case away from the deed. It
seems to me that her fight of distress must be judged by the deed,
and that the deed is no more available for this purpose than it was
for the actions of debt and covenant.
But now let the case be looked at from another stand-point. By

the common law, before the statute of quia emptores (18 Edw. l,c.
1,A.D. 1290), according to the text of Littleton, "if a man [106] made
a feoffment in fee simple, by deed or without deed, yielding to him
and his heirs a certain rent, this was a rentservice, and for this he
might distrain of common right; and if there were no reservation of
any rent, nor of any service, yet the feoffee held of the feoffor by
the same service as the feoffor did hold over of his lord next
paramount." Upon which latter clause beginning with the words
"and if there were no reservation," Lord Cokes's comment is, "This
is evident, and agreeth with our books that in this case the law
created the tenure," and on the words "by deed or without deed,"
he observes, "for all rent-services may be reserved without deed;
and at the common law, if a man made a feoffment in fee by parol,
he might upon that reoffment reserve a rent to him and his heirs -
because it was a rent-service, and a tenure thereby created:" 1
Thomas' Co. Litt. star p.444
Rent-service, then, was an essential element of the feudal

tenure. It did not depend on contract, it resulted necessarily out of
the grant of the feud. The services which the vassal was bound to
preform were indeed declared by the lord at the time of the
investiture in the presence of the other vassals: 1 Craise's Digest 9,
and were assented to of course by the vassal: but as these were to
a great extent uncertain, they could not be specified, and were only

declared in a general way, as to attend on the lord in war, and on

his courts in times of peace; to defend his person, and aid him to
pay his debts, etc.; terms not agreed upon as between contracting
parties, but terms dictated by a superior to an inferior. And by the
old feudal law, the nonperformance of these services was not
redressed by distress, but by forfeiture of the feud. Baron Gilbert, in
his excellent little work on the "Law of Replevins, " tells us that the
distress came from the civil law into the common law, and that
there appear no footsteps of it in the feudw authors. He [107]
admits, however, that it is immemorial in the common law " and
was at first as burdensome and grievous to tenants as the feudal
forfeiture for to the tenant there was no difference between the
lord's seizing the land itself, or stripping him of the whole produce
and fruits of it at his pleasure. But these oppression ended with the
wars of the Barons, and towards the end of the reign of Henry III,
particular laws were made to regulate the manner of distressing,
and not to suffer the lords to extend this remedy beyond the
mischief it was first introduced for, which was no more than to
empower the lord, by seizing the chattels, to oblige the tenant to
preform the feudal services: Gilbert's Law of Replevins, pp. 4-6.
Fealty to him from whom the lands were holden was the great
characteristic of feudal tenures; the services of fealty were enforced
by distress, and hence, although a feud were granted absolutely, in
fee simple, by livery of seisin only, and without a word of
reservation expressed, the lord had his right of distress for the rent,
which came to be the substitute of the feudal services. That right
depended not on contract, or the terms of the reoffment, but was a
condition of the tenure. It is very clear that it would have been no
answer to a distress to tell the lord that he had lost, or by his
wrongful act avoided, the deed which expressed the reservation of
his rent-service. The reply could have been that the rent-service
depended on no formal reservation, but that it resulted by inherent
necessity out of the tenure, and that distress was its inseparable
incident. This is the ground on which the present case is attempted
to be supported. Let us proceed carefully in tracing the principles of

the law that must determine whether it can be placed on this

ground.
The statute of quia emptores destroyed subinfeudation in

England. Saith Littleton (speaking of the effect of the statute),
"where a man upon a gift in tail, or a lease for life, will reserve to
[108] himself a rent-service, it behoveth that the reversion of the
lands and tenements be in the donor or lessor, for if a man will
make a reoffment in fee, or will give lands in tail, the remainder
over in fee simple, without deed reserving to him a certain rent, this
reversion is void; for that no reversion remains in the donor, and
such tenant holds his lands immediately of the lord of whom his
donor held:" I Thomas, Coke Litt- star p. 444. Such was the effect
of the statute.
I find the best explication of this subject in Comment on Landlord

and Tenant, p.97, to the effect following: "The statute quia
emptores having abolished all intermediate tenures, and the
reversion of every fee being by the feoffment divested out of the
feoffor, and transferred to the original lord of the fee; the fealty and
rent, as incident thereto, were likewise transferred. The fealty was
inseparably incident to the reversion, and therefore never could be
lost to the ultimate lord. But the rent, though generally incident to
the reversion, might, at the will of the feoffor, be so separated from
it, and reserved to the feoffor himself, provided such reservation
were by deed. But the fealty being now severed from the rent, the
remedy by distress, which was only given in respect of the fealty,
became lost to the feoffor; and therefore such rent stood precisely
in the same situation as other rents before the statute; and could
only be distrained for by being charged upon the land by a special
clause in the deed of reservation. When, therefore, a man aliens all
his estate, and leaves no reservation in him, as if tenant in fee
make a reoffment, or tenant for life alien his life estate, no rent can
be reserved, except it be by a deed. On the other hand, a lease for
years not being alienation of the freehold, but a mere contract for a

temporary enjoyment of the land, a rent might well be reserved by

parol upon such a contract." [109]
The effect of the statute, to state it more briefly, was to take the
rent-service out of the tenure, upon subinfeudation, and to convert
it into a rent-charge, which must have a contract to support it. Now
it is apparent that any right of distress which Arrison or his alienee,
Mrs. Wallace, possessed, would in England be referred to the
deed, because the reversion was gone from them, and all the
essential qualities of the tenure went with the reversion. But the
statute of quia emptores was never in force in Pennsylvania,
Ingersoll v Sergeant, 1 Wh. 337, and therefore this rent-service is
not converted into a rent-charge. Can it exist then independently of
the deed? It certainly can, in the absence of the statute quia
emptares, if our titles be feudal: it as certainly cannot, if our titles be
allodial.
I see no way of solving this question, except by determining

whether our Pennsylvania titles are allodial or feudal. It seems
strange that so fundamental a question as this should be in doubt
at this day, but it has never had, so far as I know, a direct judicial
decision. In a valuable note by Judge Sharswood to the opening
passage of Blackstone's Chapter on Modem English Tenures (2
Sharswood's Black. 77), it is said, "that though there are some
opinions that feudal tenures fell with the Revolution, yet all agree
that they existed before, and the better opinion appears to be that
they still exist," in support of this statement, the feudal principles
that have entered into our conveyancing are alluded to, and several
cages are cited in which the consequences and qualities of feudal
tenures have been recognized in our estates, although generally, in
these very cases, it has been assumed that our property is allodial.
tenures, as feel, freehold, heirs, reoffment, and the like. [110] This

term "rent-service" is feudal language, as we have seen, and yet

there is nothing in the application of such terms to determine the
quality of the tenure; for Cruise tells us, 1 Digest 7, that the
circumstance of annexing a condition of military service to a grant
of lands does not imply that they are held by a feudal tenure for the
possessors of allodial property, who were called in France liberi
homines, were bound to the performance of military service. He
defines a feud as a tract of land held by a voluntary and gratuitous
donation, on condition of fidelity and certain services, and allodial
lands as those whereof the owner had the dominium directum et
verum, the complete and absolute property, free from all services to
any particular lord. And yet the accident of services being annexed
to an allodial grant, did not make it feudal, which shows that the
genuine distinction consisted in fealty, and not in services. Fealty,
says Christian, in his note to 2 Black. 46, quoting Wright's Law of
Tenures 35: "Fealty, the essential feudal bond, is so necessary to
the very notion of a feud, that it is a downright contradiction to
suppose the most improper feud to subsist without it; but the other
properties or obligations of an original feud may be qualified or
varied by the tenure or express terms of the feudal donation."
Our question, then narrows itself down to this: is fealty any part
of our land tenures? What Pennsylvanian ever obtained his lands
by "openly and humbly kneeling before his lord, being ungrit,
uncovered, and holding up his hands both together between those
of the lord, who sat before him, and there professing that he did
become his man from that day forth, for life and limb, and earthly
honour, and then receiving a kiss from his lord?" This was the oath
of fealty which was, according to Sir Martin Wright, the essential
feudal bond so necessary to the very notion of a feud.
I grant that the charter to Penn was in free and common socage,
to which feudal tenures had at that time been reduced in England,
and that the oath of fealty belonged to socage tenures as much as
to original feuds, and was expressly recognized in the charter. But

then came the Revolution, which threw off the dominion of the
mother country, and established the independent sovereignty of the
state and on the 27th day of November 1779 (I Smith's Laws,480),
an act was passed for vesting the estates of the late proprietaries
of Pennsylvania in the Commonwealth. This act, after reciting in
four sections the rights and duties of a sovereign state, proceeded
in sec. 5 to transfer to the Commonwealth every estate, right, title,
interest, property, claim, and demand of the proprietaries, as fully
as they hold them on the 4th day of July 1776, and all royalties,
franchises, and lordships, granted in the Charter of King Charles
the Second, were vested in the state. The manors and lands which
had been surveyed for the proprietaries were excepted, and a
pecuniary compensation to them was provided. Another Act of 9th
of April 1781, 2 Smith 532, provided for opening the land office and
granting lands to purchasers; and, says the 11th section, "all be
free and clear of all remorvations and restrictions as to mines,
royalties, quitrents, or otherwise, so that the owners thereof
respectively shall be entitled to hold the same in absolute and
unconditional property, to all intents and purposes whatsoever,
belonging to or accruing from the same, and that clear and
exonerated from any charge or encumbrance whatever, excepting
the doubts of the said owner, and excepting and reserving only the
fifth part of all gold and silver ore for the use of the Commonwealth,
to be delivered at the pit's mouth, clear of all charges. [112]
If it should be suggested that these acts were inapplicable to the

city of Philadelphia, because it had been laid out by the
proprietaries before the opening of the land office by the state, I
would refer to Judge Gibson's observations in Bubley v Vanhom, 7
S. & R. 184, where he says, to have suffered the Penn family to
retain those rights which they held strictly in their proprietary
character, would have been inconsistent with the complete political
independence of the state. The province was a fief hold
immediately from the Crown, and the Revolution would have
operated very inefficiently towards complete emancipation, if the

feudal relation had boon suffered to remain. It was therefore

necessary to extinguish all foreign interest in the soil, as well as
foreign jurisdiction in the matter of government.
We are then to regard the Revolution and these Acts of

Assembly as emancipating every acre of the soil of Pennsylvania
from the grand characteristic of the feudal system. Even as to the
lands held by the proprietaries themselves, they held them as other
citizens held, under the Commonwealth, and that by a title purely
allodial. All our lands are held mediately or immediately of the state,
but by titles purged of all the rubbish of the dark ages, excepting
only the feudal names of things not any longer feudal.
Escheat, which was one of the incidents of feudal tenures, is

sometimes mentioned as making the feudal origin of our titles, and
the allegiance which we owe to the state is also often spoken of as
fealty. Escheat, with us, depends on positive statute, which makes
the state the heir of property on defect of known kindred of the
decedent. Nothing about it but the name is feudal, and this is
another instance in which a word applied in a sense different from
its original [113] meaning, suggests ideas which have been
exploded. As to allegiance, it is indeed due from every citizen to the
state, but it is a political obligation, and is as binding on him who
enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, without owning a foot
of soil, as on him who counts his acres by hundreds and
thousands. So also it is due to the Feudal Government, through
which none of our titles have been derived. The truth is, that this
obligation, which is reciprocal to the right of protection, results out
of the political relations between the government and the citizen,
and bears no relation whatever to his land titles any more than to
his personal property.
Under the Acts of Assembly I have alluded to, the state became
the proprietor of all lands, but instead of giving them like a feudal
lord to an enslaved tenantry, she has sold them for the best rice

she could get, and conferred on the purchaser the same absolute
estate she held herself, except the fifth of gold and sliver, and six
acres in the hundred for roads, and these have been reserved, as
everything else has been granted, by contract. Her patents all
acknowledge a pecuniary consideration, and they stipulate for no
fealty, no escheat, rent-service, or other feudal incident. I conclude,
therefore, that the state is lord paramount as to no man's land.
When any of it is wanted for public purposes, the state, in virtue of
her political sovereignty, takes it, but she compels herself, or those
who claim under her, to make full compensation to the owner.
Now, if the state was not paramount lord of the lots which Arrison
possessed, how could he become the lord of his grantee? How
could he receive anything out of those lots, against his absolute
deed in fee simple, except, by an express reservation? To do so,
he must ignore the American Revolution, and all our legislation
about lands, and place himself back upon the [114] common law,
as it stood in the thirteenth century, before the statute of quia
emptores was passed. But if he is not permitted to do all this, then
he must show a deed for what he claims, and this brings us back to
the first conclusion, that the present right of distress depends on a
deed no less than the previous actions at law.
There is in the English reports a long line of cases terminating in

Ward v Lumley, decided in the Exchequer in 1860, and reported in
5 Huristone, Young & Gordon, wherein it was held that canceling a
lease by mutual consent of both parties, does not destroy the
estate vested in the lessee, and the lessor may therefore maintain
an action of debt on the demise for the recovery of the rent, a case
which is a fair type of its class and which it is said rules the present
case in favor of the plaintiff in error.
An obvious distinction betwixt that case and the present is the

absence of all fraudulent intent in the destruction of the lease; but
not to insist on this, let me say that all cases of that sort proceed on

the ground that, the lease leaves a reversion in the lessor, in virtue
of which he may sue for rent. That this in that ground of recovery in
such instances, is shown by the cases in which it has been held
that a lessor cannot bring an action of covenant, after he has
assigned the reversion for any breach subsequent to the
assignment, but the action can only be brought by the assignee of
the reversion. Consequently, if the assignee of the reversion sue
the assignee of the term, or the assignee of the term sue the
lessor, the action is local, and must be brought in the county where
the land lies: Thursby v Plant, I Saund. Rep. 241, and notes. [115]
Now, whoever will tum back and read the extract I made from
Comyn, will see that the statute quia emptores did not affect leases
of chattel interests, but only reoffment by mesne lords.
Subinfeudation was what the statute destroyed, and it destroyed it
by vesting the reversion in the ultimate signory. But in leases for
years, the reversion remains in the lessor, and goes by
assignment, to his assignee, and carries with it the right of action.
The reason, therefore, why this class of cases does not embrace
this case, is that here was a conveyance in fee simple of an allodial
estate, without any reversion remaining in the grantor, and
therefore all his remedies for rent on his contract. If the estate were
feudal the absence of the stawte would lead to a different
conclusion - but with great deference to all counter opinions, I hold
that the estate was strictly allodial, and that Anison retained only
what was expressed in the deed.
If the question were up for the first time, we might perhaps doubt
whether the alteration made by Arrison was fatal to Mrs. Wallace's
rights; but we consider ourselves concluded on that question by the
previous decisions, and have not therefore discussed it. Taking the
doctrine of those cases, the only question left has seemed to us to
be, whether Mrs. Wallace had any remedy by virtue of the estate
that is in her, and independently of the deed; and all we have said
must be understood as applying to that question.

We have not thought it worth while to consider the case in

connection with the Statute of Frauds and Peduries, for if that
statute should be found to be applicable, it would only bring us to
the conclusion which we reach without it. The judgment is affirmed.
[116]
CHAPTER IX
LAND PATENTS AND ALLODIAL TITLES
Part 1: Introduction
If the American people ever allow the banks to control issuance

of their currency, first by inflation and then by deflation, the banks
and corporations that grow up around them will deprive the people
of all property until their children will wake up homeless on the
continent their father occupied.
[Thomas Jefferson]
While it is generally believed in America today that the purpose

of the American Revolution was to resist taxation without
representation, the actual reason was to eliminate the cause of this
and many other injustices, and that cause was the admiralty
jurisdiction imposed within the bodies of the counties. A major
effect of this cause was a contractual feudal/serf relationship
between the colonial landholders and the Crown - legal title being
held by Great Britain and an equitable title being held by the
colonist/serf in possession of and working the land.
This presumption of rightful legal title was challenged by the

colonists, who insisted that the King of England did not own the

land and, therefore, it was not his to grant to supportive colonists.

After the Revolution, the land became the property of each State's
people, with the authority of the people to parcel out the land to
claimants in a fair and equitable manner. If some land remained
unoccupied, Jefferson said that anyone occupying it has, by
possession, the right [117] of ownership. Land was to be held by
allodial title, which simply means there is "No superior or overlord"
to the land owner. He was SovereiEn on his land.
One of the earliest statutes for granting land patents was passed
by an Act of Coneress. April 24, 1820. which prohibited the use of
credit for the purchase of government land. In the debates in
Congress prior to the passage of this Act, Senator King of New
York said:
It (the Act) is calculated to plant in the new country a population

of independent, unembarrassed freeholders ... it will put it in the
power of every one to purchase a freehold, the price of which can
be cleared in three years ... it will prevent the accumulation of an
alarming, debt which exigrience proves never could or would be
paid.
In 1862, the Homestead Act, Section 4, provided that:
No lands acquired under the provisions of this Act shall in any

event become liable to the satisfaction of any debt or debts
contracted prior to the issuing of the land patent.
The issue of allodial v feudal land titles in Africa was addressed

by the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania in the case of
Wallace v Harmstad in 1863:
I see no way of solving this question, except by determining

whether our Pennsylvania titles are allodial or feudal .... [118]


tenures, as fee, freehold, heirs, feoffment and the like.
Our question, then, narrows itself down to this: is fealty any part
of our land tenures?
What Pennsylvanian ever obtained his lands by openly and

humbly kneeling before his lord, being ungirt, uncovered, and
holding up his hands both together between those of the Lord, who
sat before him, and there professing that he did become his man
from that day forth, for life and limb, and certainly honour, and then
receiving a kiss from his lord? This was the oath of fealty which
was, according to Sir Martin Wright, the essential feudal bond so
necessary to the very notion of a feud.
We are then to regard the Revolution and these Acts of

Assembly as emancipating every acre of soil of Pennsylvania from
the grand characteristics of the feudal system. Even as to the lands
held by the proprietaries (City of Philadelphia) themselves, they
held them as other citizens held, under the
Commonwealth, and that by a title purely allodial. [Wallace v

Hanmtad, 44 Pa. 492, (1863))
So, the people had a right to allodial land titles as a direct result
of the Declaration of Independence and the War for Independence
that followed. A holder of an allodial title, (i.e., there being no
Superior or overlord) cannot be taxed on that property against his
consent. There [119] could be a transfer or sales tax imposed by
the State at the time of purchase, but no taxation on the property
itself against the owner's consent. And yet, the taxation of property

soon became the custom, and not the exception, in this country.
Why and How?
When taxation of real property began, because of "the confusion

of ideas that prevails on this subject," the people unknowingly, and
voluntarily accepted the premise that government was the Superior
and the legal title holder; and their interest in the land was merely
an equitable one. This voluntary acceptance constituted tacit
consent to a feudal contract. King George, once again, was back in
America.
When the gigantic public trust was implemented in 1913 via the
Federal Reserve Act, no immediate changes with regard to this
master/serf relationship between government and landholder were
necessary. Life went on as usual with no clues to the fact that all
property had been hypothecated to the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve; and as trustees. they held legal title. This was
accomplished by allowing the same taxing agencies to act as
administrating agents for this newly formed trust.
With the feudal tenant registered as a beneficiary of this trust via

a Birth Certificate, and title to the land held in trust, further
involvement and the consequent subjection to the controls of
management was left to the individual. For example: The
farmer/tenant was left to his own devices and discretion as to what
to plant, when to plant, how much to plant, etc. - as long as he paid
his tithes to - the tax collector (now, in actuality, a collector of
interest and/or insurance, [120] premiums). However, when he
applied, for, and received, such "benefits" as farm subsidy,
government supported grain storage, etc., he became further
bound to the trust and incurred certain additional obligations and
duties, he voluntarily subjected himself to the coercive terms of
adhesion. Now, he could be ordered and directed as what to plant,
where to plant, when to plant, how much of each crop, and even be
ordered to destroy crops already in existence. If he thought that

such coercive, and apparently insane, actions were violative of his

rights to due process of law and went to court, as many farmers
did, he lost; and the court did not tell him that a contract was being
enforced against him in which he had voluntarily subjected himself
to its coercive terms.
If he had understood the facts and the applicable law, as it

applies to those facts, he could have used the law to extricate
himself from such an intolerable situation, in lieu of having the law
used against him.
The founding fathers knew free men could survive only as long
as they owned allodial title to property, because it is this type of
ownership that accounted for broad spectrum distribution of income
and preservation of the common law jury system, which they
referred to as the "palladium," or the very comer stone, of liberty.
They also knew that manipulation of the money supply, via debt,
would ultimately take from the people their substance by
concentrating the property into the hands of a few. [121]
According to conservative estimates, possibly half a million U.S.

farmers will be driven from the land in the next several years. Jim
Hightower had put the goal of the past administration at 10,000
super farms and there is no reason to believe that this is also not
the goal of the present administration or any administration. Mr.
Hightower is the Texas Commissioner of Agriculture. A total of
10,000 farms for the nation has been the i!oal of public policy, i.e.,
the policy of the Board of Govemors of the Federal Reserve, our
trustees, ever since its Committee for Economic Development
wrote its Adaptive Program for Agriculture.
Mortgage foreclosures of equitable title interests are on the

increase, and are the means of implementing this public policy.
The best title one can acquire from a title comp is a "Fee Simple
Absolute" defined as:
A fee simple absolute is an estate limited absolutely to a man

and his heirs and assigns forever without limitation or condition.
At first blush it would appear that this is the same title as

"allodial;" deaned as:
Free, not holden to any lot or superior; [Black's Law Dictionary]

[122]
In order to discover the legal distinction between the terms

"allodial", and "fee simple absolute," we must define the word
"estate as used in the definition of "fee simple absolute."
ESTATE: The degree, quantity, nature, and extent of interest

which a person has in real property is usually referred to as an
estate, and it varies from absolute ownership down to naked
possession. (Black's Law Dictionary)
Thus, "fee simple absolute" is an over broad, catch-all, phrase

that encompasses all interests in land from allodial down to naked
possession. It in no way describes or defines your vested interest in
the land. Clearly, if the land is in trust, with legal title being held by
the trustees of that trust, you do not possess allodial title. In order
to discover your particular interest in this "fee simple absolute"
(your degree of serfdom), we must know of all adhesion contracts
you have consummated, placing additional burdens and restrictions
upon your use of that land.
Maybe we are beginning to understand the legal basis for

planning commissions, land use permits, building permits, etc.,
etc... The bottom line is the degree, quantity, nature, and extent of

interest; and which party to the contract(s) possesses what.
What we are going to examine now is how one, as a free

sovereign, can claim allodial title to property hypothecated to a trust
governed by the Monetary Power. [123]
The formula of the Monetary Power for a world program to

deprive landowners of their lands has been stated thus:
We shall soon begin, to establish huge monopolies, colossal

reservoirs of wealth, upon which even the big ... properties will be
dependent to such an extent that they will all fall together with the
government credit on the day following the political catastrophe.
The economists here present, must
carefully weigh the significance of this combination. We must

develop, by every means, the importance of OUR SUPER
GOVERNMENT, REPRESENTING IT AS THE PROTECTOR AND
BENEFACTOR OF ALL WHO VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO US.
(join the Trust wherein "US" are the trustees)
The aristocracy ... as a political force has passed away. We need

not take theirs into consideration. But, as owners of land, they are
harmful to us in that they are independent in their sources of
livelihood. THEREFORE, AT ALL COSTS, WE MUST DEPRIVE
THEM OF THEIR LAND.
THE BEST MEANS TO ATTAIN THIS, IS TO INCREASE THE

TAXES AND MORTGAGE INDEBTEDNESS. These measures will
keep land ownership in a state of unconditional subordination ...
At the same time, IT IS NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE ...

ESPECIALLY... SPECULATION... Without Speculation, industry
will cause private capital to increase and tend [124] to improve the
condition of Agriculture by freeing the land from indebtedness for
loans by the land banks. It is necessary for industry to deplete the

land both of and through speculations, transfer all the money of the
world into our hands....
To destroy... industry, we shall, as an incentive to this

speculation, encourage - a strong demand for luxuries, all enticing
luxuries.
We will force up waies-which however will be of no benefit to

the workers, for we will at the same time cause a rise in the prices
of 12rime necessities, pretending that this is due to the decline of
agriculture and cattle raising....
That THE TRUE SITUATION SHALL NOT BE NOTICED

PREMATURELY, (before recognition of the Anti-Christ), WE WILL
MASK IT, BE A PRETENDED EFFORT TO SERVE THE
WORKING CLASS AND PROMOTE GREAT ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES, FOR WHICH AN ACTIVE PROPAGANDA WILL BE
CARRIED ON THROUGH OUR ECONOMIC THEORIES.[A]
Part 11: Color of Title [B)
Today, the American based system establishing land ownership

consists of three key requirements. These three are the warranty
deed or some other @ of deed purporting to convey ownership of
land, title abstracts to chronologically follow the development of
these different types [125] of deeds to a piece of property, and title
insurance to protect the ownership of that land. These three
ingredients must work together to ensure a systematic and orderly
conveyance of a piece of property. None of these three by itself can
act to completely convey possession of the land from one person to
another. At least two of the three are always deemed necessary to
adequately satisfy the legal system and real estate agents that the
title to tile property has been placed in the hands of the purchaser.
Often, all three are necessary to properly pass the ownership of the

land to the purchaser. Yet does the absolute title and the ownership
of the land really pass from the seller to purchaser with the use of
any one of these three instruments or in any combination thereof?
None of the three by itself passes the absolute or allodial title to the
land, the system of land ownership in America originally operated
under, and even combined, all three can not convey this absolute
type of ownership. What then, is the function of these three
instruments that are used in land conveyances; and what type of
title is conveyed by the three? Since the abstract only traces the
title and the title insurance only insures the title, the most important
and therefore the first group to examine are the deeds that
These deeds include the ones as follows: warranty deed, quit-

claim deed, sheriff's deed, trustee's deed, judicial deed, tax deed,
will, or any other instrument that purportedly conveys the title. Each
of these documents state that it conveys the ownership to the land.
Each of these, however, is actually a color of title. [G. Thompson,
Title to Real Property, Preparation and Examination of Abstracts
Ch. 3, Section 73, p. 93 (1919). [126]
A color of title is that which in appearance is title but which in

reality is not title; [B] (1) and, in fact, any instrument may constitute
color of title when it purports to convey title to the land, as well as
the land itself, although it is void as a muniment of title. [BI (2). The
Supreme Court of Missouri has stated:
[when we say a person has a color of title, whatever way be the

meaning of the phrase, we express the idea, at least, that act has
been previously done ... by which some title, good or bad, to a
parcel of land of definite extent has been conveyed to him. [St.
Louis v Gorman, 29 Mo. 593 (1860)]
In other words, a color of title is an appearance of apparent title,

an "image" of the true title, hence the qualification "color or which,

when coupled with possession, purports to convey the ownership of
the land to the purchaser. However, this does not say the color of
title is the actual or true title itself, nor dies it say the color of title
itself actually conveys ownership. In fact the claimant or holder of a
color of title is not even required to trace the title through the chain
down to his instrument. [BI (3). Rather it may be said a color of title
is prima facia evidence of ownership of land, and rights to
possession of the land until such time as that presumption of
ownership is disproved by a better title or the actual title itself. If
such cannot be proven to the contrary, then ownership of the land
is assumed to have passed to the occupier of the land. To further
strengthen a color of title holder's position, courts have held that the
good faith of the holder of a color of title is presumed in the
absence of evidence to, the contrary. [B] (4). [127]
With such knowledge of what a color of title is, it is interesting to

discover what constitutes colors of title:
1. Warranty deed - A warranty deed is like any other deed or

conveyance, [B] (5) and a warranty deed or conveyance is a color
of title. IBI (6).
2. Deeds generally - Deeds constitute colors of title (BI (7) and a

deed that purports to convey interest in land is a color of title. [B]
(8) A deed which, on its face, purports to convey a title constitutes
a claim and color of title. [B] (9).
3. Quit-claim deeds - A quit-claim deed is a color of title [B] (10)

and can pass the tide as effectively as a warranty with full
covenants. [B] (I 1).
4. decds, and tax deeds are also colors of title [B] (12), as are
Judicial deeds [B] (13). The Illinois Supreme Court went into detail
in its determination that a tax deed is only a color of title:

There the complainant seems to have relied upon the tax deed
as conveying to him the fee, and to sustain such a bill, it was
incumbent of him to show that all the requirements of the law had
been complied with. [Huls v Buntin, 47 111. 396 (1865)) [128]
A simple tax deed by itself is only a color of title and does not
meet all the requirements of the law for a fee simple, allodial title.
Thus any tax deed which purports, on its face, to convey title is a
good color of title. [B] (14).
5. Wills - A will passes only a color of title and can pass only so
much as the testator owns, though it may attempt to pass more. [B]
(15).
6. Trustee's deed, mortgage and foreclosure - A trustee's deed, a

mortgage and strict foreclosure [B] (16) or any document defining
the extent of a disseisor's claim or purported claim [B] (17) have all
been held to be colors of title:
ltlhere is nothing here requiring a deed, to establish a color of

title, and under the former decisions of this court, color of title may
exist without a deed. [Baldwin v Ratcliff, 125 Ill. 376, 383 (1888).]
Thus, a color of title does not mean the actual title, nor does the
question of notice of outstanding title effect a color of title. [B] (18).
None of these cases have been overruled and are still valid, well
established, law. All of the documents described in these cases are
the main avenues of claimed land ownership in America today; yet,
none actually conveys the true and allodial title. They in fact convey
something quite different.
[129]
When it is stated that a color of title conveys only an appearance

of title, such a statement is correct but, perhaps, too vague to be

properly understood in its correct legal context. Of better use are

the more pragmatic statements conceming tide. A title, or color of
title, in order to be effective in transferring the ownership, or
purported ownership, of the land must be a marketable or
merchantable title.
A marketable or merchantable title is one that is reasonably free

from doubt. [B] (19). This title must be reasonably free from doubts
as necessary to not affect the marketability or salability of the
property, and must be a title a reasonably prudent person would be
willing to accept. (B] (20). Such
a title is often described as one which would ensure to the

purchaser a peaceful enjoyment of the property [B] (21); and it is
stated that such a title must be obvious, evident, apparent, certain,
sure or indubitable. [B] (22).
Marketable Title Acts adopted in several states generally do not

lend themselves to an interpretation that they might operate to
provide a new foundation of title based upon a stray, accidental, or
interloping conveyance. Their object is to provide for the recorded,
fee simple ownership an exemption from the burdens of old
conditions,, which at each transfer of the property interferes with its
marketability. [B] (23). What each of these legal statements in the
various factual situations says is that the color of title is never
described as the absolute or actual title, rather each says that"is
one of the types of titles necessary to convey ownership or
apparent ownership. In order for a title to be effective it must be
marketable - it must be a title which is good of recent record even if
it may not be the acwal titje in fact. [B] (24). [130]
Authorities hold that to render a title marketable, it is not only

necessary that it shall be free from reasonable doubl; in other
words, that a purchaser is not entitled to demand a title absolutely
free from every possible suspicion. [Cummings v Dolan, 52 Wash.

496, 100 P. 989 (1909)]
The record referred to is the title of abstract and all documentary

evidence pertaining to it:
It is an axiom of hornbook law that a purchaser has notice only of

recorded instruments that are within his chain of title. II R. Patton &
C. Patton, Patton on Land Titles. Section 69, at 230-233. (2nd ed.
1957); Sabo v Tiorvath, 559 P. 2d 1038, 1043 (Ak. 1976)]
Title insurance then guarantees that a title is marketable but not

absolutely free from doubt, and under the color of title system used
most often in this country today, no individual operating under this
type of title system has the absolute or allodial title. All that is really
necessary to have a vlid title is to have a relatively clean abstract
with a recognizable color of title as the operative marketable title
within the chain of title. It therefore becomes necessarily difficult, if
not impossible after a number of years, considering the inevitable
contingencies that must arise and the title disputes that will occur,
to ever properly guarantee an absolute title. This is not necessarily
the fault of the seller, but it is the fault of the legal and real estate
systems for allowing such a diluted form of title to be controlling in
an area where it is imperative to have the absolute title. In order to
correct this problem, it is important to return to those documents
the early leaders of the nation created to properly ensure that
property remained one of the inalienable rights the newly
established sovereign freeholders could rely on [131] to always
exist. This correction must be in the form of restricting or perhaps
eliminating the widespread use of a marketable title and refuming
to the absolute title.
Part Ill: LAND Patents - Why They Were Created

The Americans had a choice as to how they wanted their new

government and country to be formed. Having broken away from
the English sovereignty and establishing themselves as their own
sovereigns, they had their choice of types of taxation, freedom of
religion, and most importantly ownership of land. The Founding
Fathers chose allodial ownership of land for the system of
ownership in this country:
After the American Revolution, lands in this state (Mmyland)

became allodial, subject to no tenure nor to any services incident
thereto. [in re Waltz et al., Burlow v. Security Trust and Savings
Bank, 240 P. 19 (1925), quoting Matthews v Ward, 10 Gill & J.
(Md.) 443 (1839)].
The tenure referred to in this case was the feudal tenure and the
services or taxes required to be paid to retain possession of the
land under the feudal system. This new type of ownership was
acquired in all thirteen states. [B] (25).
The basis of English land law is the ownership of the realty by

the sovereign and from the crown all titles flow. [B] (26). It was
stated this way in the case of McConnell v Wilcox: [132]
From what source does the title to the land derived from a
government spring? In arbitrary governments, from the supreme
head - be he the emperor, king or potentate; or by whatever name
he is known. In a republic, from the law making or authorizing to be
made the grant or sale. In the first case, the party looks alone to his
letters patent; in the second, to the law and the evidence of the acts
necessary to be done under the law, to a perfection of his grant,
donation or purchase ... The law alone must be the fountain from
whence the authority is drawn; and there can be no other source. [I
Scam. Ill. 344, 367 (1837)]
The American people as newly established sovereigns after the

Revolutionary War, became complete owners in their land

beholden to no lord or superior, sovereign freeholders in the land
themselves. These freeholders in the original thirteen states now
held allodial the land they possessed before the war only feudally.
This new and more powerful tide protected the sovereigns from
unwarranted intrusions or attempted takings of their land. More
importantly, it secured in them a right to own land absolutel in
perpetuity. By definition, the word perpetuity means:
Continuing forever. Legally, pertaining to real property, any

condition extending the inalienability... [Black's Law Dictionary, p.
1027 (5thed. 1980).]
In terms of an allodial title, it is to have the property of

inalienability forever. Nothing more need be done to establish the
ownership of the sovereigns to their land, although confirmations
were usually required to avoid possible future title confrontations.
[133]
The Constitution in its original form was ratified by a convention

of the states on September 17, 1787. The Constitution and the
government formed under it were declared in effect on the first
Wednesday of March, 1789. Prior to this tine, during the
Constitutional Convention, there was serious debate on the
disposal of what the convention called the "Western territories,"
now the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and
part of Minnesota,, more commonly known as the Northwest
Territory. This tract of land was ceded to the new American republic
in the treaty signed with Britain in 1783.
Part of the method by which the new United States decided to

dispose of its territories, was stipulated in Article IV, Section 111,

Clause 2, of the U.S. constitution:
The Congress shall have the power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States.
Thus, Congress was given the power to create a vehicle to

divest the National government of all its right and interest in the
land. This vehicle known as the land patent, was to forever divest
the government of its land and was to place such total ownership in
the hands of the freeholders who collectively created the
government. The land patents issued prior to the initial date of
recognition of the United States Constitution were ratified by the
members of Constitutional Congress. Those patents created by
statute after March, 1789, had the Congressional intent behind
such statutes as a reference and basis for the determination of their
powers and operational effect. [134]
There have been dozens of statutes enacted pursuant to Art. Art.

IV Sec. 111, Cl. 11. [B] (27). Some of these statutes had very
specific intents of aiding soldiers of wars or dividing lands in a very
small region of one state, but all had the main goal of creating in
the sovereigns - freeholders on their lands - a status in which they
were beholden to no lord or superior. One of these acts however,
was the main patent statute in reference to the intent Congress had
when creating the patents. That Statute is 3 Stat. 566.
In order to understand the validity of a patent in today's property

law, it is necessary to turn to other sources than the acts
themselves. These sources include the Congressional debates and
case law citing such debates. The best source is the Abridgment of
the Debates of Congress, Monday, March 6, 1820. This abridgment
and the actual debates found in it concern 3 Stat, 566, one of the
most important of the land patent statutes.
In this important debate, the reason for such a particular act in

general and the protection afforded by the patent in particular were

discussed. As Senator Edwards stated:
But, he said, it is not my purpose to discuss, at large, the merits

of the proposed change. I will, at present, content myself with an
effort, merely, to shield the present settlers upon public lands from
merciless speculators, whose cupidity and avarice would
unquestionably be tempted by the improvements which those
settlers have made with the sweat of their brows, and to which
they, have been encouraged by the conduct of the government
itself; for though they might be considered as embraced by the
letter of the law which provides against intrusion [135] on public
lands, yet, that their case has not been considered by the
Government as within the mischiefs intended to be prevented is
manifest, not only from the forbearance to enforce the law, but from
the positive rewards which others, in their situation, have received,
by the several laws which have heretofore been granted to them by
the same right of preemption which I now wish extended to the
present settlers. Ild. at 456.1
Further, Senator King from New York stated:
He considered the change as highly favorable to the poor man

and he argued at some length, that it was calculated to plant in the
new country a population of independent, unembarrassed
freeholders... that it would cut up speculation and monopoly; that
the money paid for the lands would be carried from the state or
country from which the purchaser should remove; that it would
prevent the accumulation of an alarming debt, which experience
proved never would and never could be paid. [Id. at 456-571]
In other statutes, the Supreme Court recognized much of these

same ideas.
The object of the Legislation is manifest. It was intended to

prevent speculation by dealings for rights of preference before the
public lands were in the market. The speculator acquired power
over choice spots, by procuring occupants to seat themselves on
them and who abandoned them as soon as the land was entered
under their preemption rights, and the speculation accomplished.
Nothing could be more easily done than this, if contracts of this
[136] description could be enforced. The Act of 1830, however,
proved to be of little avail; and then came the Act of 1838 (5 stat.
251) which compelled the preemptor to swear that he had not
made an arrangements by which the title might inure to the benefit
of anyone except himself, or that he would transfer it to another at
any subsequent time. This was preliminary to the allowing of his
entry, and discloses the policy of Congress. (United States v
Reynes, 9 How. U.S. 127 (1850)]
Congress has the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of
titles emanating from the United States and the whole legislation of
the government must be examined in the determination of such
titles. [B] (28). It was clearly the policy of congress, in passing the
preemption and patent laws, to confer the benefits of those laws to
actual settlers upon the land. [B] (29). The intent of Congress is
manifest in the determinations of meaning, force, and vested in the
patent. These cases illustrate the power and dignity given to the
patent. It was created to divest the government of its lands, and to
act as a means of conveying such lands to the generations of
people that would occupy those lands. This formula, "or his legal
representatives," embraces representatives of the original grantee
in the land, by contract, such as assignees or grantees, as well as
by operation of law, and leaves the question open to inquiry in a
court of justice as to the party to whom the patent, or confirmation,
should enure. [B] (30). The Patent was and is the document and
law that protects the settler from the merciless speculator

from@the people that use avarice to unjustly benefit themselves

against an unsuspecting nation. The patent was created with these
high and grand intentions, and was created with such intentions for
a sound reason. [137]
Part IV: The Power And Authority Of A Patent

provided by law. IBI (31) Legal title to property is contingent upon
the patent issuing from the government. [B] (32) That the patent
canes the fee and is the best title known to a court of law is the
settled doctrine of this court. [Marshall v Ladd, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.)
106 (1869).]
A patent issued, by the government of the United States is legal

and conclusive evidence of title to the land described therein. No
equitable interest, however strong, to land described in such a
patent, can prevail at law, against the patent. [Land Patents,
opinions of the United States Attomey General's office. (Sept.
18691
A patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive against

the government and all claiming under junior patents or titles, until it
is set aside or annulled by some judicial. [Stone v United States, 2
Wall. (67 U.S.) 765 (1865)]
The patent is the instrument which, under the laws of Congress,

passes title from the United States and the patent when regular on
its face, is conclusive evidence of tide in the patentee. When there
is a confrontation between two parties as to the superior legal title,
the evidence as to ownership. [B] (33). Congress having the sole
power to declare the dignity and effect of its titles has declared the
patent to be the superior and conclusive evidence of the legal title.
[B] (34). [138]

Issuance of a government patent granting title to land is 'the

most accredited type of conveyance known to our law'. (United
States v Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, Ill (1935); see also United
States v Cherokee Nation, 474 F. 2d 628, 634 (1973)]
The patent is the only evidence of the legal fee simple title. (B]
(35). These various cases and quotes illustrate one fact that should
be thoroughly understood. THE PATENT IS THE HIGHEST
EVIDENCE OF TITLE AND IS CONCLUSIVE OF OWNERSHIP OF
LAND IN COURTS OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION.
Part V: Treaties - The Substance Of Federal Land Patents
The question of supremacy of confirmed federal patent

proceedings, pursuant to an 1851 Act that had been enacted to
implement the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, versus a
claimed public trust easement by the City of Los Angeles, and
State of California, was decided by the United States Supreme
Court in April, 1984 (Summa Corporation v State of California, 104
U.S. 1751) In this case petitioner (Summa Corporation) owned the
fee title to the Bailona Lagoon, a narrow body of water connected
to a manmade harbor located in the City of Los Angeles on the
Pacific ocean. The lagoon became part of the united States
following the war with Mexico, which was formally ended by the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. Petitioner's predecessors-in-
interest had their interest in the lagoon confirmed in federal patent
proceedings pursuant to an 1851 Act to implement the treaty, which
provided that the validity of claims to California lands would be
decided according to Mexican law. California made no [139] claim
to any interest in the lagoon at the time of the patent proceedings,
and no mention was made of any such interest in the patent that

was issued.
Los Angeles brought suit against petitioner in a Califomia state

court, alleging that the city held an easement in the Bailona lagoon
for commerce, navigation, fishing, passage of fresh water to canals,
and water recreation; such an easement having been acquired at
the time Califomia became a State. Califomia was joined as a
defendant as required by state law and filed a cross-complaint
alleging that it had acquired such an easement upon its admission
to the Union and had granted this interest to the city.
The trial court ruled in favor of the city and State, finding the
lagoon was subject to the claimed public easement. The Califomia
Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting petitioner's arguments that the
lagoon had never been tideland. Even if it had been, Mexican law
imposed no servitude on the fee
interest by reason of that fact, and such a servitude was forfeited

by the State's failure to it in the federal patent proceedings. The
Supreme Court ruled as follows:
The question we face is whether a property interest so

substantially in derogation of the fee interest patented to petitioner's
predecessors can survive the patent proceedings conducted
pursuant to the statute implementing the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo ...
CALIFORNIA ARGUES THAT SINCE ITS PUBLIC TRUST

SERVITUDE IS A SOVEREIGN RIGHT, THE INTEREST DID NOT
HAVE TO BE RESERVED EXPRESSLY [140] ON THE FEDERAL
PATENT TO SURVIVE THE CONFIRMATION PROCEEDINGS...
The necessary result of the Coronado Beach decision (U.S. v

Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472 (1921), is that even "sovereign"
claims such as, those raised by the State of California in the
present case must, like other claims, be asserted in the patent

proceedings or be barred...
Those decisions control the outcome of this case. WE HOLD

THAT CALIFORNIA CANNOT AT THIS LATE DATE ASSERT ITS
PUBLIC TRUST EASEMENT OVER PETITIONERS PROPERTY,
WHEN Petitioner's PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD THEIR
INTEREST CONFIRMED WITHOUT ANY MENTION OF SUCH AN
EASEMENT in proceedings taken pursuant to the Act of 1851. The
interest claimed by California is one of such substantial magnitude
that ... (it) must have been presented in the patent proceedings or
be barred.
Part VI: The Land Acquisition Treaties [C]
Northwest Ordinance:
A resolution of Congress that merely stated its intent that the

territory shall be divided into three to five states to be created upon
the existence of a certain number of inhabitants required to become
states of the Union. The Ordinance was not a treaty. Its subject
matter was part of [141] all territory gained from Great Britain under
the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
Treaty of Peace, 8 Stat. 80 (1783):
The boundaries of the territory are given in Article 11 of the

treaty, i.e., the western boundaries of those states today known as
Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Illinois and Minnesota - all the

states from the Mississippi River and eastward to include the,

original 13 colonies. Therefore, every federal land patent in every
state thereof flows from that treaty.
Treaty Of Cession, 8 Stat. 200 (April 20, 1803):
This was the famous "Louisiana Purchase" from which was

gained the following states: Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma,
Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Wisconsin, North and South Dakota,
Montana, Wyoming, and the Northeast two thirds of Colorado.
Treaty Of Ghent: 8 Stat. 218 (October 20, 1818):
Merely established the northern boundary of the Louisiana

Purchase as the 49th parallel to the Rocky mountains. [142]
The Oregon Treaty, 9 Stat. 869 (June 15, 1846):
An agreement with Great Britain that gave the United States

undisputed claim to the Pacific Northwest south of the 49th parallel.
The states created from this acquisition are Oregon, Washington,
Idaho, and the southwest corner of Wyoming.

Treaty Of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922 (1848):
Following the War with Mexico, under this treaty, the United
States paid Mexico $15 million dollars in gold coin for reparations,
and the territory now known as the states of Califomia, Nevada,
Utah, Arizona, and the western portions of Colorado and New
Mexico.
It is noteworthy that all lands under this treaty, purchased by

private individuals from the United States, were paid for in gold and
silver coin, after which a federal land patent was confirmed and
issued to the private claimant.
Because of the confusion of land claims by the Gold Rush

settlers on Mexican land grants, Congress enacted the Act of
Congress, March 3, 1851, to ascertain and settle the private land
claims in the State of Califomia. For the first time, a Land
Commissioner was established to confirm the claims and the Court
of Private Land Claims was established to settle disputes before
final confirmation by what is now known as the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management under the present Department of the Interior of the
United States. The Act of 1851 established [143] a two year limit to
contest claims, after which the confirmed land claims were closed
forever by the issuance of a federal land patent that generally
included the phrase: given this day to his heirs and assigns forever.
No claims could be made after the issuance date of the patent.

This is what Summa (supra) was all about. The two year limitation
on contests of federal land patents issued to private land claimants
was extended by the Act of March 3, 1891, and is still in force
today.

Gadsden Purchase, 10 Stat. 1031 (Dec. 30, 1853):
This was a treaty between Mexico and the United States in

which the U.S. paid $10 million dollars in gold coin to Mexico for
that southernmost strip, of New Mexico. The treaty is significant
because it refers back to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and
conferred all the same rights and privileges to citizens of that
territory as in the 1848 treaty. Hence, that southernmost portion is,
in actual fact included in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. All
feudal land patents in this area also flow from treaty law.
Cession of Texas:
Texas was annexed to the United States by the independent

vote of the inhabitants. [144]
While the Cession of Texas is a treaty, it was annexed as a

House Joint Resolution (HJR) and it should be reasonably certain
that its inhabitants had the same protection as those given under
treaty law.
Part VII: The Supremacy Clause [C]
The lead case which said treaty law cannot be interfered with by

a state legislature is Ware v Hytton (1796), 3 Dall. (3 U.S. 199). In

this case, the Supreme Court held that a treaty is the supreme law
of the land, pursuant to Article VI, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution. ... and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or the laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding... ... any act of the legislature cannot stand
in the way because a treaty is
the declared will of the people of all the United States and shall be
superior to the constitution and laws of any individual state.
In other words, federal land patents put into evidence by a land

owner cannot be challenged by a state court because it flows from
a United States treaty and, therefore no court has -jurisdiction over
title or ownership to land traced to this paramount source of title.
Only private citizens were given federal land patents, hence the
term "private land claim, "or "PLC, " used by the Bureau of Land
Management as the date of the original patent. [145]
Because all federal land patents flow from treaties that fall under
the supremacy clause, no state, private banking corporation or
other federal agency can question the superiority of title to land
owners who have "perfected" their land by federal land patent.
Jurisdiction by any state court is invalid. Since federal land patents
cannot be collaterally attacked as to their validity or authenticity as
the highest evidence of title, no mortgage institution can claim title
to land by its "lien." Certified federal land Patents were given free
and clear allodial title with no encumbrances, then and now!
43 USC 59 establishes duly certified copies of federal land

patents shall be evidence in all cases where originals would be
evidence. Section 57 covers the states of Oregon and California.
Section 58 covers Louisiana.
43 USC 83 covers the evidentiary effect of certified federal land

patents for all states. All the courts in the United States must take
judicial notice of these federal patents and their evidentiary effect

under these federal statutes. If the patents are not certified when
entered into evidence, any court may ignore the patent and
overrule it as evidence of superior or paramount title versus the
mortgage lien, the county tax assessment, etc..
The Act of Congress, March 3, 1851, since updated by the Act

of Congress, 1891, stated anyone who was establishing a claim
had to have it confirmed by the United States Land Commission. If
no one protested that claim within a two year period, it could no
longer be attacked under any circumstances, it was final. This is
what the Summa case addressed. When the United States
Supreme Court interprets a federal statute, the courts of every state
are bound by that interpretation. [146]
The key to finding case law in every state upholding federal

treaty and its laws can be found in its law libraries in the Key Digest
under "public lands". Am. Jur, 2d is the starting point to find the
case law on treaties as they pertain to decisions in the states.
Part VIII: In Summary
The federal land patent is the paramount or common source of

titles from the united States government. It is the mechanism and
procedure for an individual to lay claim to his right to allodial title of
land, as was established by the Declaration of Independence (our
first organic Law) and the
War for Independence that followed.
A free sovereign individual who has a perfected federal land

patent in his possession, is in a very enviable position at law. No

one can take that land from him without first proving they have a
superior vested right in the land, and that is not possible.
For example, a title company insures "good title" and a bank has
given a farmer a loan on those grounds. Basically the title
insurance company is at fault; they did not search that title back far
enough to its original source to see who owned the land. If the bank
subsequently attempts to foreclose, the farmer, who has done his
homework properly should win. Any remaining controversy is
between the bank and the title insurance company. In this example,
it appears that it does not matter whether the farmer is an heir or
assign, the bank has to prove it has superior title in that land in
order to take it over. [147]
Anyone who has purchased foreclosed lands has done so

without guaranty of clear title, including IRS and state taxing
agency foreclosures. By perfecting a federal land patent, a free
sovereign should now be in a position to go on the offense. [148]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[B] "Memorandum of Law - History, Force, and Effect of the Land

Patent".
(1) Wright v Mattison, 18 How. (U.S.) 50 (1855).
(2) Joplin Brewing Co. v Payne, 197 Mo. 422, 94 S. W. 896 (1906).
(3) Rawson v Fox, 65 111. 200 (1872).
(4) Davis v Hull, 92 111. 85 (1879).

(5) Mahrenholz v County Board of School Trustees of Lawrence

County, et. al., 93 111. App. 3d 366 (1981).
(6) Dempsey v Bums, 281 111. 44, 650 (1917).
(7) Dryden v Newman, 110 111. 186 (1886).
(8) Hinckley v Green, 52 111. 223 (1869).
(9) Busch v Huston, 75 Ill 343 (1874); Chickering v Failes, 26 Ill.

508 (1861).
(10) Sufford v. Stubbs, 117 Ill. 389 (1886).
(11) Grant v Bennett, 96 Ill, 513, 525 (1880).
(12) Kendrick v Latham, 25 Fla. 819 (.1889).
(13) Huls v Buntin, 47 Ill. 396 (1865).
(14) Walker v Converse, 148 Ill. 622, 629 (1894); see also Peadro v
Calliker, 168 Ill. 570 (1897); Chicago v Middlebrooke, 143 Ill. 265
(1892); Piatt County v Goodell, 97 Ill 84 (1880); Stubblefield v
Bordors, 92 Ill,
284 (1879); Coleman v Billings, 89 Ill 183 (1878); Whitney v

Stevens, 89 Ill. 53 (1878); Thomas v Eckard, 88 Ill 593; Holloway v
Clarke, 27 Ill. 483 (1861). [149]
(15) Baldwin v Ratcliff, 125 Ill. 376 (1888); Bradley v Rees, 113 Ill.
327 (1885).
(16) Chickering v Failes, 26 Ill. 508, 519 (1861).
(17) Cook v Norton, 43 Ill. 391 (1867).
(18) Burgett v Taliaferro, 118 Ill. 503 (1886); see also Connor v

Goodman, 104 Ill. 365 (1882); County of Piatt v Goodell, 97 Ill. 84

(1880); Smith v Ferguson, 91 Ill. 304 (1878); Hassett v Ridgely, 49
Ill. 197 (1868); Brooks v Bruyn, 35 Ill. 391 (1864); McCagg v
Heacock, 34 Ill. 476 (1864); Bride v Watt, 23 Ill. 507 (1860); and
Woolward v Blanchard, 16 Ill. 424 (1855)
(19) Austin v Barnum, 52 Minn. 136 (1892).
(20) Roberts v McFadden, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 47; 74 S.W. 105

(1903).
(21) Barnard v Brown, 112 Mich. 452; 70 N.W. 1038 (1897)
(22) Ormsby v Graham,, 123 Ia. 202; 98 N.W. 724 (1904).
(23) Wichelman v Messner, 83 N.W. 2d 800, 806 (1957).
(24) Close v Stuyvesant, 132 Ill 607; 24 N. E. 868 (1890).
(25) Wallace v Harmstead, 44 Pa. 492 (1863).
(26) People v Richardson, 269 Ill. 275; 109 N.E., 1033 (1944)
(27) 12 Stat. 392, 37th Cong., Sess. 11, Ch. 75, (1862) (the
Homestead Act); 9 Stat. 520, 31st Cong., Sess. 1, Ch. 85, (1850)
(Military Bounty Service Act); 8 Stat. 123, 29th Cong., Sess. 11,
Ch. 8, (1847) (Act to raise additional military force and for other
purposes); 5 Stat. 444, 21st Cong., Sess. 11, Ch. 30 (1831); 5 Stat.
51, 18th Cong., Sess. 1, Ch. 174, (1824); 5 Stat. 52, 18th Cong.,
Sess 1, Ch. 173, (1824); 5 Stat. 56, 18th Cong., Sess., 1, Ch. 172,
(1824); 3 Stat. 566 16th Cong., Sess. 1, Ch. 51, (1820) (the major
land patent statute enacwd to dispose of [150] lands); 2 Stat. 748,
12th Cong., Sess. 1, Cli. 99, (1812); 2 Stat. 728, 12th Cong., Sess.
1, Ch. 77, (1812); 2 Stat. 716, 12th Cong., Sess. 1, Ch. 68, (1812)
(the Act establishing the General Land Office in the Department of
the Treasury); 2 Stat. 590, 1 Ith Cong., Sess. 11, Ch. 35, (1810); 2

Stat. 437, 9th Cong., Sess. 11, Ch. 34, (1807); and 2 stat. 437, 9th
Cong., Sess. 11, Ch. 31,
(1807).
(28) Bagnell v Broderick, 38 U.S. 436 (1839).
(29) Close v Stuyvesant, 132 lit. 607, 617 (1890).
(30) Hogan v Page, 69 U.S. 605,,(1864).
(31) McGarrahan v Mining Co., 96 U.S. 316 (1877).
(32) Sabo v Horvath, 559 p. 2d 1038, 1040 (Aka. 1976).
(33) Gibson v Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92 (1871).
(34) Bagnell v Broderick, 38 U.S. 438 (1839).
(35) McConnell v Wilcox, I Scam. (Ill.) 381 396 (1837). [C] "Acres
U. S. A., A Voice for Eco-Agriculture, " November 1984, Volume 14,
No. I 1; 10008 East 60th Terrace, Kansas City, Mo. 64113: (An
interview with Carol Landi) [D) Common Law Liens," from
"Memorandum of L-aw - History, Force, and Effect of the Land
Patent, n (supra).
(1) 1 Kent Commentaries, 471; Western Union Telegraph Company

v Call Publishing Company, 181 U.S. 765, 770 (1901)
(2) Karlson v Murphy, 56 N.E. 2d 839, 387 Ill. 436 (1944); [151]
People exrel. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v Barret, 46
N.E. 2d 951, 382 Ill. 321 (1943).
(3) Mudge v Mitchell Hutchins and Co., 54 N.E. 2d 708. 322 Ill.
App. 409 (1944); Heineman v Hermann, 52 N.E. 2d 263, 385 Ill.
191 (1943).

(4) Williamson v Winningham, 186 P. 2d 644 650 (Okla. 1947); see

also 42 Okia. S. 1941 sec. 9.
(5) Williamson (supra) at 650; (Okla. 1947); Cincinnati Tobacco

Warehouse Co. v Lefevre, 146 N.W. 653, 654 (1914)- Sullivan v
Sudiak, 333 N.E. 2d 60, 30 Ill. App. 3d 899 (Ill. App. 1975); linger v
Checker Taxi Co., 174 N.E. 2d 219, 30 Ill. App. 2d 238 (Ill. App.
1947);
(6) Sullivan (supra) at 899; Deitchman v Corach, 71 N.E., Id. 367,

330 Ill. App. 365 (Ill. App. 1947);
(7) 51 Am. Jur. Sect. 20.
(8) Williamson (supra) at 650; Boston and Kansas City Cattle Loan
Co. v Dickson, 11 Okla. 680, 69 P. 889 (1902).
(9) Williamson (supra) at 650; Boston and Kansas City Cattle Loan
Co. v Dickson, 11 Okla. 680, 69 p. 889 (1902).
(10) 51 Am. Jur., Sect. 21.
(11) 33 Am. Jur. 419, Sect. 2; City of Sanford v McCleland, 121 Fla.
253, 163 So. 513 (1935); Small v Robinson, 69 Me. 425 (1879).
(12) Peck v Janness, 7 How. (U.S.) 612 (1849).
(13) Williamson (supra): See also Robert v Jacks, 31 Ark. 597

(1876); Marston v Miller, 35 Me. 153 (1852); Stewart v. Flowers, 44
Miss. 513 (1870).
(14) Gordon v Sullivan, 188 F. 2d 980 982 (1951); See also Brown
v Petersen, 25 App. D.C. 359, [152] 363 (1905); 51 Am. Jur. Sect.
21.
(15) Drummond Carriage Co. v Mills, 74 N.W. 970; 51 Am. Jur.

Sect. 21-, Shaw
v Webb, 131 Tenn. 173, 177 (1914). [153]
INTERVIEW: CAROL LANDI ON LAND PATENTS AND

TREATY LAW
In an effort to track a big story called land patents, Acres U.S.A.,

has covered both miles and monumental telephone tabs. Tucked
into the paragraphs of the newly released Land Patents,
Memorandum of Law, History, Force and Effect is a reference to a
case styled Summa Corporation v The State of California. It is this
case and the implications it holds, that prompted her to raise a
family, but she is back--in her words, "an advocate," meaning she
fights for causes and principles often left unattended by ordinary
lawyers. She enjoys her role as a researcher because it keeps her
in touch with the real scholarship of the profession. Since this tape
is long, we will now terminate introductory remarks and get down to
bare facts.
ACRES U.S.A., Carol Landi, in the course of this business of being

an advocate, you have come in contact with the land patent the
law, the concept, and what's being done. So, Carol, will you review
for our readers what is the background of the land patent?
LANDI. When I spoke to you before I talked about the Summa

Corporation decision in the U.S. Supreme Court this past spring.
This is styled Summa Corporation v State of California. I hung my

hat on the Summa Corporation decision that just came down from
the high court. I've been working with federal land patents in
California and in Utah. I'm doing the historical research on the
federal patents in California. We have what are called ranchos
confirmed by the U.S. government after the conquest of the
western states. And these grants are comprised of anywhere from
5,000, 6,000, 10,000, 23,000, maybe up to 100,000 acres in one
shot. A township consists of only 640 acres. [154]
When I read the Summa Corporation decision, I had known

about the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo through researching a case
right here in Contra Costa County. The case is a trial court case
and it cannot be found in any reporters, so I just went over to the
court with the name. I found the case and low and behold it was an
eminent do , under the fifth amendm@n . In California it's under the
California eminent domain laws, and this lady, Virginia Stetson,
held off the redevelopment agency by is evidence in court a copy of
the patent and the lands that they were trying to take. It also gave
quite a liability on the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
ACRES U.S.A.: What law was the decision based on?
LANDI: Treaty Law.
ACRES U.S.A.: What is treaty law?
LANDI: The substance of all federal land patents is based upon

treaty law. Treaty law is the law of the nations. It is embraced by

the United States Constitution Article 1. Section 10. Clause 1.
****************************************************************************
THE TREATY POWER
The treaty-making power is an extraordinary power, liable to

abuse. Treaties make international law and they also make
domestic law. Under our Constitution treaties become the supreme
law of the [155] land. They are in deed more supreme than ordinary
laws, for congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to
the Constitution, whereas treaty laws can override the Constitution.
Treaties, for example, can take powers away from the Congress
and give them to the president. They can take powers from the
state and give then, to the federal government or to some
international body and they can cut across the rights given the
people by the Constitutional Bill of Rights. - John Foster Dulles
****************************************************************************
ACRES U.S.A.: Which makes a treaty the law of the land?
LANDI: Yes. The Judges of all states shall be bound by treaty

law.*
ACRES U.S.A.: And the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo made

secure these grants? Is that what you're saying?
LANDI: That's right. Let me stray from the Treaty of Guadalupe for
a moment and give you a little historical background on treaty laws.
Now to begin with, our entire country was acquired through treaties
with other countries as our young nation conquered lands from the
original 13 colonies and - westward to Califomia- EyeEy inch of
land in our couma comes under tr@ law. [156]
ACRES U.S.A.: Because of the Louisiana Purchase or the Treaty

of Cession, 1803? The Treaty of Ghent? The Texas Treaty?
LANDI: That's rights. Let me parade you through the historical

sequence. Let's take Northwest Ordinance*. This ia a resolution of
Congress that merely stated the intent of Congress that the territory
shall be divided into three to five states to be created upon the
existence of a certain number of inhabitants required to become
states of the union--nothing more, nothing less. The Ordinance was
not a treaty. It was part of those unknown lands that were part of all
that territory obtained from Great Britain under the TroV of Peace
with Great Britain, 1783 (8 Stat, 801, in which the original 13
colonies derived their independence together with lands Britain
gave to the original 13 colonies of territory westward to the
Mississippi River. The boundaries of that territory is given in Article
11 of the treaty, that is, the western boundaries of those states
today known as Tennessee, Kentucky, Illinois and Minnesota. All

the states from the Mississippi River and the states mentioned
above, and eastward to include the original 13 colonies comprise
all those lands that come under the Treaty of Peace with Great
Britain, therefore, every federal land patent in every state thereof
flows from that treaty.
ACRES U.S.A.: Is there any case law saying the treaty is

paramount?
LANDI: Yes. The lead case that said treaty law cannot be
interfered with by a state legislature in Ware v Hylton, 1(1976 3
Dall. (3 U.S. 1991). In this, the Supreme Court held that a treaty is
the supreme law of the land (Article VI, Section 2: "and the judges
in every state shall be bound thereby, [157] anything in the
Constitution or the laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding"!) ... that any act of the legislature cannot stand in
its way because a treaty is the declared will of the people of all the
United States and shall be superior to the constitution and laws of
any individual State." [Emphasis by the court.] In other words,
federal land patents put into evidence, by a land owner cannot be
challenged by a state court because it flows from a United States
treaty, and therefore, no court has jurisdiction over title or
ownership to land that traces its source to the paramount or
common source of title from the United States government, banks
and private corporations notwithstanding, because federal land
patents were never corporations - only to private citizens hence the
term 'private land claim" or "PLC" (as we call it) used by the Bureau
of Land Management as the date of the original patent.
ACRES U.S.A.: And then there was the Louisiana Purchase?

LANDI- Yes! The very next treaty of the United States from which
all land patents flow under the supremacy clause is the Louisiana
Purchase from France under the Treaty of Cession, April 20, 1803;
8 Stat, 201, signed at Paris in which our young nation gained the
territory of the following states. Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma,
Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Wisconsin, North and South Dakota,
Montana and Wyoming and the Northeast two-thirds of Colorado.
After that we had the Treaty of Ghent, October 20. 1818 [8 Stat.
2181]. It merely established the northern boundary of the Louisiana
Purchase as the 49th parallel to the Rocky Mountains, nothing
more, nothing less. The lead case for the Louisiana Purchase
States is American Insurance Company v Canter [(I 828) 1 Pet (26
U.S. 51 11 in which Justice Marshall held the power to make
treaties is an absolute power of the United States [158] government
and from that power arises the right to govern it, i.e., treaty law is
superior to any state and is the supreme law of the land. "Zoning
law" included.*
ACRES U.S.A.: And Texas is in a class by itself?
LANDI: That's right Texas was annexed to United States by the

independent vote of the inhabitants. While the Cession of Texas is
a treaty, it was annexed as a House Joint Resolution (HJR) and it
would be fairly certain that the citizens had the same protection as
those given under treaty law. I have not searched out the HJR as
yet, although the HJR would be a simple matter to locate in the
United States Statutes by year of annexation, month and day in the
statutes. It is interesting to note that as an annexed state, it is the
only state that has the power to secede from the United States.

Hawaii is the last state with that power to secede.
ACRES U.S.A. What did the Oregon Treaty do?
LANDI - The Oregon Treaty of 1846 was an agreement with Great

Britain that gave the U..S. undisputed claim to the Pacific
Northwest south of the 49th Parallel. The states carved out of this
treaty are the present states of Oregon, Washington, Idaho and the
southwest corner of Wyoming. This treaty with Great Britain was
signed on June 15, 1846, [9 Stat. 869], and all federal land patents
of these states flow from the treaty and fall under the supremacy
clause of the constitution therefore, no state, private banking
corporation or other federal agency can question the superiority of
title to land owners who have "perfected" their land by federal land
patent. Jurisdiction by any state court is invaded, and since federal
[159] land patents cannot be collaterally attacked as to their validity
or authenticity as highest evidence of title, no mortgage institution
can claim title to land its "lien." Certified federal land patents were
given free and clear title with no encumbrances- then or now!
ACRES U. S. A.: And this brings us to the Treaty of Guadulupe

Hidalgo, 1848.
LANDI: This had to do with the Mexican War following the War
with Mexico, under this treaty,, the United States paid Mexico $15
million dollars in gold coin for reparations and all that conquered
territory now known as the states of California, Nevada, Utah,
Arizona, and the western portions of Colorado and New Mexico. All

lands purchased from the United States as private land claims were
paid for in gold and silver coin, after which a federal land patent
was confirmed and issued to the private claimant. This is a point to
keep in mind regarding "loans of credit" by financial institutions in
violation of Article I Section 10, * 31 USC 463 (a),
ACRES U.S. A.: How did the Act of Congress, March 3, 1851
figure in all of this?
LANDI: Because of the confusion of land claims by the Gold Rush

settlers on Mexican land grants, Congress enacted this act to
ascertain and settle the private land claims in the state of
California. For the first time, a Land Commission was established to
confirm the claims and the Court of Private Land Claims was
established to settle disputes before final confirmation by what is
now known as the U.S. Bureau of Land Management under the
present Department of Interior of the United States. The act of 1851
established a two year limit to contest claims after which the
confirmed land claims were closed [160] forever by the issuance of
federal land patent that generally included the phrases "given this
day to his heirs and assigns forever." No claims could be made
after the issuance date of the patent. This is what Summa [104
U.S. 17541 was all about. The two year limitation on contest of
federal land patents issued to private land claimants was extended
by the Act of March 3. 1891, and is still in force today!
ACRES U. S. A.: And of some importance, is the Gasdsen

December 30, 1853 110 Stat, [1031].

LANDI: This was a treaty between Mexico and the United States in
which the U.S. paid $10 million dollars in gold coin to Mexico for
that southernmost strip of New Mexico, The treaty is significant
because it refers back to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and
conferred all the same rights and privileges to citizens of that
territory as in the 1848 treely. Hence, that southern most portion is,
in actual fact, included in the Treaty of Guadalupc Hidalgo. All
federal land patents in this area also flow from treaty law, still the
supreme law of the land by which all judges in all states shall be
bound as to the validity of the patents. 43 USC 59 establishes that
duly certified copies of federal land patents shall be evidence in all
cases where the originals would be evidence, Section 57 covers
the states of Oregon and California.
Section 58 covers the Louisiana Purchase, Section 83 of Title 43

covers the evidentiaa effect of certified federal land 12atents for all
states, and all the courts in the United States must take judicial
notice of these federal patents and their evidentiary effect under
these federal statutes. If the Patents are not certified when entered
into evidence, the court may ignore the patent and overrule it as
evidence of superior paramount title versus the mortgage lien the
banks use to lay claim to the land. *Assuming "lien" was [161] NOT
"Ultra Vires.
ACRES U.S.A.: How. does this figure in lien theory states?
LANDI: If the bank, or lending institution lays claim to the land by

the lien theory, it must have been presented in the contest of the
federal land patent within the two years after the last act of 1891,
supra, or forever be barred. In point of fact, as against a federal
land patent, it is extremely doubtful that any of the present lending

institutions were in existence in 1891 in order to present any claim

against the owner of land under a federal land patent flowing from a
United States treaty, also known as the Law of Nations, in which no
private citizen can dispute the terms of a treaty or act of Congress.
ACRE. U.S.A.: What about state conflicts and attorney general

opinions, and the general attitude we find among attorney generals,
such as General Stephens in Kansas?
LANDI: You can print an excerpt from a document I submitted to

the state court, one referring to the California Supreme Court
decision which Summa over turned. What is shown is the dissent of
the California Supreme Court justice(s) that was ultimately upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court (unanimously).
ACRES U.S.A.: So where are we?
LANDI: There is nothing arcane or esoteric about federal land

patents, treaty law and the law of nations. I'll send a news article
from Northern California in which the BLM had to participate and
[162] obtain an act of Congress to clear the way for clear title under
treaty and patent law. California is more than familiar with the
obligations of treaty law, and the requirements of federal patent law
under federal Title 43 USCA public Lands. We have more than a
passing acquaintance *stare decisis law on the subject up to date
in the April 1984 case. Courts will resist it, or be confused by it.
However, if nine justices of the United States Supreme Court are
not confused by it, under the supreme law of the land, why should a

state judge be permitted to ignore it? In point of fact, the state of

California has just recently begun to acknowledge U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. Because of the great socialist experiment in
California, (courtesy of our unusual Senator Alan Cranston),
California and Justice Rose Bird are not convinced yet that
California is a part of the United States. However, we do have case
decisional law recently reaffirmed by its appellate courts that when
the
United States Supreme Court interprets a federal statute, the courts

of this state are bound by it. The key to finding case law in every
state upholding federal treaty and its laws can be found in its law
libraries in the Key Digest under Public Lands. I have had opposing
attorneys searching through American Jurismdence under Public
Lands, which is the starting point, however, the attorneys are still
baffled by it all. Am. Jur. 2d. is the best starting point to find the
case law on treaties as they pertain to decisions in the states. It is
all so simple, you can expect judges to be confounded by it; as the
scriptures say, "God takes the foolish things of the world to
confound the wise, and God *takes the weak things of the world to
confound the strong. * = To abide by, decided cases.
ACRES U.S.A.: Earlier, you said every inch of land was acquired
by treaty and falls under land patent. Even the original 13 colonies?
[163]
LANDI: I have the treaty with Great Britain, upon which we

founded our original 13 colonies and gained our independence, a
treaty dated 1783. And I have the leading case law on that, their
treaty. which covers land from not only the original 13 colonies, but
all the land west to the Mississippi River.

ACRES U.S.A.: In other words, the British were giving away

something by treaty they really didn't have?
LANDI: They didn't know it was out there. They knew about the
Mississippi River, I believe. They knew about it as a result of their
trade with France. The Louisiana Purchase goes from the
Mississippi River and covers your Midwest states. The Louisiana
Purchase, of course, was the Treaty with France. That was in 1803,
signed at Paris. Some government people who are a bit busy
nowadays, filling land patent orders are telling people there were
no patents in the original 13 colonies. Let me say this for the
record, right out of my survey book. The first patent issued in New
York City on March 4, 1788 to John Martin and is simply for Lot
number 20, Township 7, Range 4. And he paid $640 for that
section. That was the very first patent in this country.
ACRES U.S.A.: Who patented that to him?
LANDI: The United States Government.
ACRES U.S.A.: And what does it really mean? [164]
LANDI: John Martin apparently squared off or surveyed a plat of

land, a public layer, that did not belong to a private owner. He

squared it out. He applied to Congress and said, I would like to

settle on this land and whatever provision you require for me to
settle on this land I would like to have it confirmed and have a
patent (in those days they didn't know about deeds, so they called
them patents) so that it will be mine. in my name, and it will be my
private claim. And Congress said, Okay, we'll have somebody
check on it. They checked on it, and they agreed with his surveys
and gave him a federal patent.
ACRES U.S. A.: And what does the patent mean? It is just a
simple title, no different from any other title, or does it have a
special character to it?
LANDI: It has a special character to it. The federal land patent is

the paramount common source of titles from the United States
government. All public land originates from the U.S. government.
Even today, any public land in any state is still under the United
States Government.
ACRES U.S.A.: Does this patent inure to heirs and assigns?
LANDI: Yes. Forever. And that is a long time.
ACRES U.S.A.: Okay, this is really the case for the land patent
then, isn't it?

LANDI: That's the essence of it. [165]
ACRES U.S.A.: Why does the treaty confer superior status to the
land patent, a status that cannot be retreated from by lessor courts,
even the Supreme Court.
LANDI: It pertains to the pecking order or authority. Potential land

belongs to the person who receives it and his assigned heirs
forever. It doesn't matter who is on that land today. No one can
touch that federal land patent, except the United States
Government. No one can challenge it. Let me bring you up to date
from the Treaty of Great Britain. The Act of 1851 which has been
updated in the Act of Congress, 1891 has to be reviewed.
California, you will remember, was badly turned upside down
between the Mexican Government, Spanish Government, and the
Gold Rush. The Act of 1851 stated that anyone who was
establishing a claim had to have it confirmed by the United States
Land Commission. It was a commission of three men. If no one
protested that claim within a three year period from the date of the
Act, it could no longer be attacked under any circumstance! It was
final. And this is what Summa Corporation was talking about.
****************************************************************************
JUSTICE KAUS'S OPINION

I confess to a growing unease about what I view as an

Accelerating erosion of private property rights of California citizens.
We need to look no further than the first section of the very first
article of the state Constitution to learn that the sovereign people of
California have proclaimed: "All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying
and defending life and liberty, and protecting property and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy." [166] [italics added] From this
solemn pronouncement of the people, identifying the protection of
their property with the defense of their lives and liberty and
describing such interests as "inalienable," I conclude that
preserving the sanctity of a citizen's private property is a singular
responsibility of government and its courts. When, therefore, that
government itself seeks to trench on such constitutionally protected
and "inalienable rights", of its own people, its conduct must be
closely scrutinized and its reach carefully measured by the rule of
law." --from the Venice Properties decision.
****************************************************************************
The state of California has been trying to grab land - federal

land and offshore drilling land. With the Department of Interior they
have tried to say, well these are swamplands, these are tidelands,
and they belong to us because, as we became a state, these lands
automatically became ours. The courts have consistently said, NO.
Nothing passes to you unless the United States government grants
you this land and it belongs to you, then you can do whatever you
want. NO DNR.

ACRES U.S.A.: What practical application does this knowledge

bring to farmers who are now being foreclosed on by government
agencies, namely FMHA and PCA and Land Bank? Jenny Mae?
Freddie Mac?
LANDI: Some are backed by the full face and credit of the United
States government, some are not. If somebody has a claim, if the
bank says, they have a claim on that land, they are going to
foreclose. How are they going to prove that they have title to the
land from the United States government? Was [167] title given to
them in their name'? No, it wasn't! It was given to Corporal John
Smith in a land patent 120 years ago, or some such person. It
doesn't matter whether you're an heir, It doesn't matter whether you
were an assign. The bank has to prove it has title to the land, in
order to take it over.
ACRES U.S.A.: And so people who filing and getting certified

patents and registering them in the court house are doing
something that is proper, for now, pending disposition of this whole
matter.
LANDI: Absolutely.
ACRES U.S.A.: But you see the judges in these equity courts are
not looking at it that way. They say to themselves. We've got to
protect the creditors. It's much easier on the community to let this
farmer go down the tube than it is to put the bank in jeopardy, to a

point where there is a run on the bank. How do you face that
proposition'?
LANDI: Well, number one, I would ask you how the case was
filed? is the
farmer a defendant in the action?
ACRES U.S.A.: Usually he's a defendant.
LANDI: Is he's a defendant, and he has a patent on his land he

says to the bank: you are making a claim on my land, you want to
foreclose on it. Sorry, you can't do that. You come up with a
superior title to my patent, something superior to my land patent,
then, I'll [168] give it to you.
ACRES U.S.A.: But, you see, the judge won't even entertain that
particular point. He is shown the contract and he rules on the
contract, and that's it.
LANDI: No, It's not a contract!.
ACRES U.S.A.: Well, what is it, when you have a mortgage? Isn't
that a contract?

LANDI: That's a loan of credit. It is not a contract.
ACRES U.S. A.: Just for the sake of argument, would you set up,
for me, in as good a narrative as you can, the defense that the
farmer has? Let me give you a hypothetical situation. This farmer
purchased some land. He now has some sort of title on it. He went
to the bank and he borrowed some money because he wasn't
making enough, and he had been promised the land values would
be increasing. So consequently he was able to borrow money to
keep on farming, to grow more so he could sell it for less and lose
money. And it finally came to a terminal point because the land
values have dropped. So the bank says: You don't have the
collateral you had last year. I guess I'm going to have to foreclose
on you. [169]
LANDI: My first question! What does the bank call as collateral'?
ACRES U.S.A.: The land, the building and the cows.
LANDI: Okay, now let me explain something to you. I don't know

how it is in much of the country, but I'm pretty sure its the same as
in California, because property, real estate law, is no more screwed
up in the whole country than in California. If you look at your tax bill
I'm sure even in your state you will see that the land is assessed at
one amount and the improvements at another amount. I attribute
that to, my background information as, being an Assistant Deputy

Tax Collector. I know the difference. So, there is a difference

between land and its improvements. If you look on the title
insurance of the American Land Title Assurance Association
standard forms uniform forms abbreviated ALTA you'll see that the
title company insures absolutely nothing but the land! Four little
letters L-A-N-D. I looked and searched those insurance policies.
They will not insure anything. All they insure is good title. And, on
those grounds, the bank has given the farmer a loan. Basically, the
title insurance company is at fault. They did not search that title
back far enough to its original source to see who owned that land.
ACRES U.S.A.: Okay, and it came to the United States by treaty.
LANDI: Right. But the bank can make no claim on that. No one can
make any claims on that land with a federal land patent on it,
unless he brought up that claim during the patent proceedings in
1851 under that two year statute of limitations. [170]
ACRES U.S.A.: What about that Mexican family that owned land in
New Mexico? Suddenly, that family found itself in the United
States. The title that came into the United States would be secure
under treaty, wouldn't it?
LANDI: Absolutely! No question about it.
ACRES U.S. A.: But the land that no biological person had laid
claim to was just wilderness, claimed by Mexico. That land ceded
to the United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Then the

government patented it over to somebody - a soldier, perhaps!

You're saying, that this land, to that man, and to his heirs and
assigns is secure forever?
LANDI: Forever,
ACRES U.S.A: So now we've arrived to 1984, and this farmer, who
has that piece of land, orginally patented to some, is being
foreclosed, and they haul him into court. They've got maybe 50
heartbreakers out in the yard to seize his equipment and to take
him off in cuffs if he resists. And they go in front of a judge and the
judge hands it over to the John Hancock Insurance Company or
some bank, or whatever. What is the defense? What can this man
do?
LANDI: I think the problem that you're having out there right now is
getting the patent recognized in court. [171]
ACRES U.S. A.: Right. Nobody will listen.
LANDI: You must record a certified copy with the recorder or

register of deeds.
ACRES U.S.A.: In other words, you get this original information,

put it on the appropriate document, and then have it recorded in the

courthouse. What does that do?
LANDI: There is a copyrighted form that has all the stare decisis*
case law. No one can attack a federal land patent. *To abide by,
adhere to, decides cases.
ACRES U.S.A. Yes, but they recruit the heartbreakers and come
out. A judge has told them to throw you out. What does this rancer
do?
LANDI- Number one, you tell the court it doesn't have jurisdiction
over federal land patents.
ACRES U.S.A. And he ignores that. He says, objection overruled!
LANDI: Say, fine. I'm going to appeal it.
ACRES U.S.A.: Where do you appeal it? [172]
LANDI: You appeal it right then and there, I don't know if you have
what is called a demurrer, a declaratory plea. You bring that up. In
California a declaratory plea is called a demurrer. It's attacking the

legal proficiency of the plainfiff's pleading. As a defendant, you can

attack that and you can say right off, the court does not have
jurisdiction over this federal patent. This is a state court! This is a
federal land patent, Case law says; state or federal courts cannot
touch land patents. You don't have jurisdiction. You can't rule on it.
Boom, it's finished! It's over! If you say, No I'm going to appeal it to
the highest court in the state, even the highest court in the land. I
don't know of any court that will foreclose on a property without
some kind of notice to the farmer that a court proceeding is taking
place, or in the alternative, the farmers don't know what to do when
the default notice comes that the farm is going up for sale. I am
dealing with residential foreclosures presently, including those
under FNMA (Fannie Mae) and FHLMC (Freddie Mac) both and all
of which come under Title 42 USCS "Banks and Banking". I am
presently researching these federal mortgages, and fighting some
with federal land patents. Farmers cannot be lawyers, and lawyers
cannot be farmers, there's no question. But someone should be
able to tell the farmers what signs to watch for and when to take
action before the action hits them. I suspect that the only problem
the farmers are having with the courts is purely procedural. I have
seen my share of dishonest judges but, I have also learned how to
force there hand in court, on the record
ACRES U.S.A.: OK, can you walk us through the procedure?
LANDI: After recording the land patent, the important thing is to

know the law of the treaty that covers your state. Every protection a
farmer needs is in that treaty and the judge knows that the by [173]
Supreme Law of the Land, he cannot touch or have any jurisdiction
over it. When the banks are faced with the fact that the court has
no jurisdiction over their foreclosure action due to a federal land

patent recorded on the property, and treaty law preempts state

and/or federal law, the court will make a mistake of ruling against
the farmer, which in itself, is good, because now you can appeal
and buy more time to keep the bank at arms length. I would want to
look at a court file, to see what really went wrong, and how. If a
defendant is not responding, or if he is responding, then he doesn't
his appeal rights. Any case on federal patent could end up in the
U.S. Supreme Court just as Summa did in California. Appeals are
all done on paper. No court appearances. Everything on appeal is
done in writing, as there are no oral arguments allowed. [Wis. Stat.
407. 103 + 401. 201]
ACRES U.S.A.: What about those who have lost their farms?
LANDI: As to those who have already lost their farm, my position is

that, whoever the bank conned into buying the foreclosed farm, has
bought a farm without warranty or guarantee of clear title. Look at
the fine print in a trustee deed sale notice. IRS does the same
thing! IRS sells foreclosed property with that particular statement!
So, no guarantee goes with purchase of foreclosed lands, except,
that you put a federal land patent on it. I would have no
compunction about even IRS auctioning off my land because, as
long as I have the patent recorded, on it, then I can challentye the
new buyer that IRS didn't guarantee clear title, and that I still own
my land. Therefore, if I were the new buyer, I would tell IRS, I want
my money back for fraud for not telling me that there was a federal
land patent on the land, that I can't fight to get off my land.
Incidently, even IRS cannot supersede federal treaty law or the
provisions of any treaty of this country. [174]

ACRES U.S.A.: How do you handle the matter of non-real property

seizures?
LANDI: We told the banks that, my federal land patent granted

land only, and that is all I am claiming is land. If they have a lien
against something on my land, then please get it off- but don't
trespass in the process not on my land I have offered banks to take
their buildings away, board by board, just let me know, otherwise,
they will be trespassing. Farm equipment cannot be seized on
federally patented land without trespassing. They must have a
court order! And if someone is not defending, in court, against a
court order, on grounds of jurisdiction and statue of limitations,
someone needs help, but not from a lawyer, unless the lawyer is
totally dedicated. Let me tell you about a case up in Oregon. This is
heresy on my part, but I can report what I learned from sources I
believe to be sound. A landowner up in Oregon was foreclosed on
by the bank. The court wouldn't listen to his arguments. So. a
federal land patent was laid on that property. By that time the bank
had foreclosed. The Sheriff sale had been held. Now, he went back
into court and he said: That sale is illegal. The state had no
jurisdiction over the federal land patent and the court said, oh
really? Where's your proof? How do I know this land patent, that
you're talking about, did not come under my jurisdiction? How do I
know it is correct? The land owner said, Well It's certified! I will
bring a witness out from the Bureau of Land Management, and he
will testify and witness that this is an exact duplicate of the original
document which is admissible, as evidence, in the state court. And
that is precisely what they did. They brought in the Chief of
Records, as a witness, to testify that the document was true, and
certified, and was absolutely correct. It could not he changed under
any circumstances, by any court. [175]

ACRES U.S.A. So, what happened'?
LANDI- The judge dismissed the case and said, you are absolutely
right. You own the land. You have perfect title to it. You traced it to
its original source. You own the land!
ACRES U.S.A.: But in the mean time they have carted a farmer's
cattle, as they did in Illinois.
LANDI: He has to bring suit for trespass.
ACRES U.S.A.: OK, now where does he bring this suit?
LANDI: He brings it right to state court. This is what happened.

The landowner sued the bank for trespassing. He Won! You see,
this man could sue the bank. He could sue the judge for involving
himself in a case in which he did not have jurisdiction.
ACRES U.S. A.: For now, what do we do? Step by step.
LANDI: What you do is build a sandwich. You've got your federal

land patent on the bottom. You got that certified at the Bureau of
Land Management. You have to ask for it. The bureau of Land
Management, I believe, will charge a dollar or so to certify. If you

don't want it, they wont do it, and you don't pay. It's part [176] of
their service. It must be certified! That's the first layer of the
sandwich. That makes it admissible evidence in the state court.
ACRES U.S.A.: What's the next layer?
LANDI: The next piece of paper is your declaration, Number three,

the top of the sandwich, will be your ordinary deed, whatever it is
you call it in your state. You can grant it to yourself. It could almost
he a simple thing, such as a will. Those are the three pieces of
paper. Now you waltz up to the courthouse and say, I want this
stuff a matter of record and I want to know where you record this.
And they give you the reference of where they recorded it. Always
take an extra COPY to the recorder and say, Would you endorse a
copy for me? And of course, they will send the original back to you
with a book and a page number on it.
ACRES U.S.A.: Do all of these pieces of paper have to be

certified?
LANDI: No. Just the federal land patent. If you have a certified
document that purports to be a lost or destroyed piece of paper,
and someone certifies it as true and correct copy, this is admissible
as evidence in a court.

ACRES U.S. A.: Thousands of people are asking for a copy of the
land patent covering their acres. But the problem is, it seems to bog
down at that point. They get into court and they get clobbered
something awful. Either they don't know the procedure or what
issue to bring, in what way, at what [177] time, in what court.
LANDI: If you don't know how to go into court, you're in the position
of the fellow who goes into farming without knowing a tractor from a
disc. The law won't protect you if you don't know how to use it.
[178]
HOW ... WHERE ... TO OBTAIN CERTIFIED FEDERAL LAND

PATENT (FLP)
FARM PROPERTY: Send Certified Legal Description of Property

(from the County Treasurer or, Register of Deeds, and Town, Plat
Map (from Register of Deeds or County Recorder) then circle your
Property(s) on Plat Map(s) ... Your Property(s) may be in one or
more Sections and/or Counties. (1 FLP per land Parcel) Be sure to
request CERTIFIED COPY of FLP.
Record FLP + Declaration of Land Patent + Deed. If desk clerk

refuses to file ... use procedure outlined above by Paul Tomas.
Clerk is bonded to perform "ministerial duties"... NOT "Judicial".
Certified FLP supersedes ALL CLAIMS. Bank must prove Title to

land per #25 p.4. ALTA insures only "good title" per #32 p.5. Bank
claims ceased March 3, 1893 - FOREVER BARRED per #12-14
pgs.2&3.
ALL STATE COURTS LACK JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL

LAND PATENTS
issued per
TREATY LAW = Superior Status can NOT be overruled ... even by

U.S. Supreme Court! (See A on the Treaty Power, p. 1)
CITY PROPERTY: Can also be "patented" ... obtain Range and

Township Numbers from City Engineer + total Certified Legal
Description of lot/Property (obtain FLP as above) ... Record with a
Declaration of Land Patent + Certified FLP + Declaration of
Homestead attached and marked "Exhibit A & B"...on Declaration
of, Land Patent write: "Attached hereto are Exhibits A & B".
Register of Deeds or County Recorder then Records in "Real
Estate" file. [179]
CONTACT: FAMILY FARM PRESERVATION, Box 2587, Hwy. M,

Tigerton, Wis. 54486.
PROPERTY OWNERS RECEIVE DEEDS TO ANGELS LAND

ANGELS CAMP. The first of local property owners who for

decades have been paying taxes on land actually owned by the
federal government were to receive title to their property last night.
At the City Council meeting, the five landowners were to receive

quitclaim deeds from the city and the federal government, which
until recently was the rightful owner of the land.
The parcels in question were created when old mines, with

federally owned claims, were gradually worked out and broken up
for sale.
Mine owners apparently never went through the formality of

patenting the land before they sold it. The buyers built homes on
the land and paid taxes on it.
The problem came to light, some three years ago, when a local
surveyor, trying to determine title for a land division he had
surveyed, found out the property still was federally owned and
under jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of land Management.
BLM officials agreed to cooperate to make sure the land became

the legal property of those who had purchased it from the mines,
however, an Act of Congress was necessaq to clear the way. [180]
Congressman Norm Shumway introduced the necessary

legislation and it was passed by Congress last year.
The legislation turned title of the land over to the City of Angels
Camp, which in turn is issuing quit-claim deeds to the property
owners.
A total of about 80 acres involving 20 plots of land are involved.

From the Calaveras (California) Enterprise. [181]
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A Republic Under God
To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:
LAND PATENTS, EJECTMENTS, AND ESTOPPEL
1. In case of ejectment, where the quesfion is who has the legal

title, the patent of the government is unassailable. Sanford v
Sanford, 139 US 642.
2. The transfer of legal title (patent) to public domain gives the

transferee the right to possess and enjoy the land transferred.
Gibson v Chouteau, 80 US 92.
3. A patent for land is the highest evidence of title and is

conclusive as against the government and all claiming under junior
patents or titles. United States v Stone, 2 Us 525.
4. The presumption being that it (patent) is valid and passes the

legal title. Minter v Crommelin, 18 US 87.
5. Estoppal has been sustained as against a municipal corporation

(county). Beadle v Smyser, 209 US 393.
6. A court of law will not uphold or enforce an equitable title to land

as a defense to an action of ejectment. Johnson v. Christian, 128
Us 374: Doe v Aiken, 31 FED. 393.
7. When congress has prescribed the conditions upon which

portions of the public domain may be alienated (to convey, to
transfer), and has provided that upon the fulfillment of the
conditions the United States shall issue a patent to the purchaser,
then such land is not taxable by a state. Sargent v Herrick &
Stevens, 221 Us 404: Northern P,R. Co. v Trail County , 115 US
600.
8. The patent alone passes land from the United States to the
grantee and nothing passes a perfect title to public lands but a
patent. Wilcox v Jackson, 13 Peter (US) 498.
9. Patents and other evidences of title from the UNited States

government are not controlled by state recording laws and shall be
effective, as against subsequent purchasers, only from the time of
their record in the county. Lomax v. Pickeriniz, 173 US 26.

10. In federal courts the patent is held to be the foundation of title

at law. Fenn v Holmes, 21 Howard 481.
11. Congress has the sole power to declare the dignity and effect
of titles emanating from the United States and the whole legislation
of the government, in reference to the public lands, declare the
patent to be the superior and conclusive evidence of the legal tide.
Until it issues, the fee is in the [183] government, which by the
patent passes to the grantee, and he is entitled to enforce the
possession in ejectment. Bagnell v. Broderick. 13 Peter (US) 436.
12. In ejectment the legal title must prevail, and a patent of the
United States to public lands pass that title; it can not be assailed
collaterally on the ground that false and perjured testimony was
used to secure it. Steel v St. Louis Smelting and Refining Co., 106
US 417.
13. A patent certificate, or patent issued, or confirmation made to

an original grantee or his legal representatives of the grantee or
assignee by contract, as well as by law, Hogan v Pace, 69 US 605.
14. In federal courts, the rule that ejectment cannot be maintained

on a mere equitable title is strictly enforced, so that ejectment
cannot be maintained on a mere entry made with a register and
receiver, but only on the patent, since the certificates of the officers
of the land department vest in the locator only equitable title. This

rule prevails in the federal courts even when the statute of the state
in which the suit is brought provides that a receipt from the local
land office is sufficient proof of title to support the action. Langdon v
Sherwood, 124 U.S. 74: Carter v Ruddy, 166 US 493.
15. The plaintiff in ejectment must in all cases prove the legal title
to the premises in himself, at the time of the demise laid in the
declaration, and evidence of an equitable title will not be sufficient
for a recovery.
The practice of allowing ejectments to be maintained in state courts

upon equitable titles cannot effect the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States. Fenn v Holme, 21 Howard 481. [184]
16. Under USCA Constitution, Article 4, section 3, clause 2,

Congress, in exercise of its discretion in disposal of public lands,
had power, by this section, to restrict alienation of homestead lands
after conveyance by United states in fee simple, by providing no,
such lands shall become liable to satisfaction of debts contracted
prior to issuance of patent. Ruddy v Rossi, (1918) 248 US 104.
17. Patents are tied to the Bible, in Genesis 47 by way of the word
assigned in italicized print. Also note in later verses the beginning
of sharecropping. BC 1701.
18. The right to the ownership of property and to contract with

respect of its use is unalienable. Golding v Schubac, 93 U.S. 32:
Seville v C I , 46 U.S. 495.

19. Parties in possession of real property have the fight to stand on

their possessions until compelled to yield to the rule title
determined by trial by jury. 47 Am. Jur. 2d 45.
20. Giving a note does not constitute payment. Echart v

Commissioners, C.C.A. 42 F2d 158; 283 U. S. 140.
21. Actual or threatened exercise of power over the property of

another is coercion and duress which will render the payment
involuntary. Cleveland v Smith, 132 US 318.
22. Property value means the price the property will command in
the market, or its equivalent in lawful money. PeQple v Hines, 89 P.
858, 5 Cal. App. 122 [185]
23. Neither a town nor its officers have any right to appropriate or
interfere with private property. Mitchell v City of Rockland, 45 Me.
496.
24. A state may provide for the collection of taxes in gold and silver
only. State Treasurer v Wright, 28 Ill. 509: Whitaker v Haley, 2 Ore.
128.

25. Taxes lawfully assessed, are collectible by agents in money

and notes, cannot be accepted in payment. Town of Frankfort v
Waldo, 128 Me. 1.
26. There must he strict compliance with statutory requirements to

divest property owners of their property titles for non payment of
taxes. McCarthy v Greenlawn Cem., 158 Me. 388.
27. At common law there was no tax lien. Cassidy v Aroostook,

134 Me. 34.
28. A tax on real estate to one not the owner is not valid. Barker v
Blake, 36 Me. 1. [186]
LAND PATENT STOPS BIDDING AT SHERIFF SALE
In a recent case, Robert Deardorff of Indianapolis, Ind. had filed a

DECLARATION OF LAND PATENT with a certified copy of the
original patent. In a Sheriff s Sale, which took place last August, Mr.
Deardorff and and a witness went to the Sheriffs Sale and met with
the sheriff. He had previously warned the sheriff that if he went
ahead with the Sheriff s Sale, he would go to the U.S. Attorney and
swear out a warrant for his arrest for Criminal Trespass on his Land
Patent. However, the sheriff's counsel advised him to go ahead
with the Sheriff's Sale anyway. So, on the day of the sale and while
he and a witness were in the sheriff's office, he called the Federal

Clerk of Courts and told him what was happening.
The Federal Court Clerk, told Mr. Deardorf that, if the sheriff
went ahead and sold the property, with a Land Patent on it, that
inside of three days, there would be a U.S. Marshall there to arrest
the sheriff. Mr. Deardorf then told the sheriff this, word for word.
Later, at the sale, the sheriff told the bidders, including the bank's
attorney, that there was a Land Patent on the property and that if
they bought it, they could never be able to get a clear title and
would never be able to get a loan on the land. As a result. no one
bid. Under Indiana Law, when no bids are placed on a property, the
property reverts back to the owner after 4 p.m. the same day. No
new Sheriff's Sale was ever scheduled and there is no pending
action of any kind in the courts. (Robert Deardorff, 7002 N. Graham
Rd., #128 Indianapolis, IN. 46220; Phone (317)325-2505). [187]
PROCEDURE TO FOLLOW IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF A

UNITED STATES
LAND PATENT OR LAND GRANT
Instructions to give the Sheriff, Judge, County Attorney and

Bidders of your property. Present all concerned parties with a copy
of your Certified Land Patent and declaration of Land Patent.
1. The Land Patent, issued by the Bureau of Land Management,

Department of the Interior, of the United States Government; is the
highest and best Title at Law. The holder of a Declaration of Land
Patent, as an Assign, is the absolute owner of the property as

described on that Patent. No court in the United States can change

a Declaration of Land Patent, without the express permission of the
holder of that patent. A Declaration of Land Patent being the
highest Title at Law is superior to any other type of deed. Included,
in this in a "Warranty Deed" and "Sheriff's Deed". Once a
Declaration of Land Patent is in place and duly recorded it cannot
be removed.
2. The only authority responsible to the holder of a Declaration of

Land Patent is the United States Government. A Patent cannot be
violated or transferred without the permission of the Assign.
Enforcement of a Patent must come from the United States
Government.
3. Should a Declaration of Land Patent be violated. It is the

responsibility of the Assign's to file charges with the Justice
Department of the United States Government. Specifically, the
Attorney General. Criminal Trespass Charges, Civil Charges and
Charges for Fraud should be included in your Statement of
Charges. This being in violation of a United States (Federal) patent.
[188]
4. The Sheriff should be notified before the sale, but near the time
the sale is to start, he must notify each and every bidder of the
following:
A. The Declaration of Land Patent is the Highest and Best Title at

Law.

B. Once this sale is complete, the property can never be resold.
C. A Warranty Deed, can never be drafted on this property. The

buyer or successful bidder of the property will not be able to borrow
or get a mortgage against the land.
D. Title insurance cannot be obtained for this property.
E. The Declaration of Land Patent "CLOUDS" title to the land

forever.
F. The successful bidder of the property will not get possession of

the property.
G. The Declaration of Land Patent stops ejectment.
H. A "Sheriffs Deed" or other type of document transfer shall be

proof of fraud. The notification that a Patent exists before.the
transfer shall be sufficient for this charge. [189]
I. Criminal Trespass, Civil and charges for Fraud will be filed

against the successful bidder and all those who took a part in the
forced transfer of the property. The notification that a Patent existed
before the transfer shall be sufficient for the charges stated.
J. Obtain a certified copy of the "Deed of Transfer" or "Sheriff s

Deed. Proof of the charges stated will be necessary for the Attomey
General.
K. Mortgage or lending institutions may bid the existing mortgage

or lien. This shall not be sufficient notice for fraud. The transfer of
the property to a second person or persons in the form of that
stated above is what will be necessary to obtain. Bidding of
mortgage or lien is not sufficient and cannot cancel a Declaration of
Land Patent. While a "No Bid" is better-for a lending concern to bid
the existing lien is a formality and is not powerful enough to
overcome a Patent.
L. The holder of a land patent, which has been certified. The filing
of a Declaration of Land Patent shall present to the holder all of the
rights and privileges forever. This is stated an the front of the
Certified copy of the Land Patent, which was obtained through the
Bureau of land management, Department of the Interior of the
United states of America. [190]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Q: Why send the Bureau of Land Management $20.?
A: This is the approximate cost for most land patents. This

includes $4.25 for the patent plus a search fee. A copy of the
County Plat Map where you circle the part you want them to find
the patent on makes the search job easier. In your letter, be sure to
ask for a Certified copy of the Land Patent. You should receive it in
4 to 6 weeks. (Note: if you need the land patent faster, like in a
week or so, contact Luther Bartrug, 2708 Fenholloway Drive,
Mechanicsville, VA. 231 1 1. Phone (804)746-1074)
Q: Where can I obtain a brief on Land Patents?
A: Writ to Acres U.S.A. Box 9547, Kansas City, Mo. 64133. Ask for
the Land Patent Brief by S. J. Stewart. Cost is $25.
Q: Is there another way to update a land Patent in my name other

than filing a Declaration of Land Patent?
A: Yes. In some parts of the country, Court Clerks are refusing to

file Declaration of Land Patents even though they will file a copy of
the Land Patent itself. Here is what you do. First, file the Certified
Copy of the Land Patents by itself. Then fill out a Quit Claim Deed
(available from, local book stores or Title Companies) and name
yourself as the first and the second party in [191] the deed. After
filing in the legal description of your property, add the following
language in the Quit Claim Deed: "The first party to this deed,
(name) grants and deeds to the second party (name), with all
rights, privileges and immunities, Land Patent # per the above legal
description and updates the Land Patent in the second party(s)
name and to his heirs and assigns forever." (Note: a variation of the
above when two people own a property is for one to file ... the land
patent and then file a Quit Claim Deed and assign the Land Patent
to the,second party.
Example, a wife filing a Quit Claim Deed to her husband and in it

assigning her interest in the Land Patent to her husband. Once this
is filed, the Land Patent is updated in her husbands name).[192]
*****************************************************************************
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

REGIONAL OFFICES
Here are the offices that can issue a Land Patent if

provided with the legal description of your property.

ALASKA:
United States Department of the Interior
Bureau of Land Management
Anchorage Federal Office Building
701 "C" Street, Box 13
Anchorage, Alaska 99513
ARIZONA:
3707 N. 7th. Street
P.O. Box 16563
Phoenix, Arizona 85011
CALIFORNIA:
Bureau of land Management
Federal Office Building

2800 Cottage Way, Rm. E-2841
Sacramento, California 95825
COLORADO (KANSAS):
United States Department of the Inten@or
1037 20th Street
Denver, Colorado 80202
IDAHO:
United States Department of the Inten*or
Federal Building
550 West Fort Street
P.O. Box 042
Boise, Idaho 83724
MONTANA (NORTH DAKOTA, SOUTH DAKOTA):

Granite Tower
222 North 32nd Street P.O.Box 30157
Billings, Montana 59107
NEVADA:
Federal Building, RO()m 3008
300 Booth Street P.O. Box 12000
Reno, Nevada 89520
NEW MEXICO (Oklahoma):
Joseph M. Montoya Federal Bldg.
South Federal Place
P.O.Box 1449

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501
OREGON (WASHINGTON)
825 N.E. Multnomah Street, P.O. Box 2965
Portland, Oregon, 97208
UTAH:
University Club Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111
WYOMING (NEBRASKA)
2515 Warren Avenue

P.O. Box 1828
Cheyenne, Wyoming, 82003
ALL OTHER STATES
Eastern States Office
350 South Pickett Street
Alexandria, Virginia, 22304.
Return to Articles

Land
Edited Excerpts from: "Do you own your Land?"

WARN Vol. 1 Issue 1a July 4, 1997 p. 13 (order info)
The foundation of this nation was real property ownership. That's why the settlers came here. To insure private
ownership of land, the nation's founding fathers made it unlawful for government to own land except for the ten square
miles of Washington D.C., and such as may be needed for erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockyards, and other
needful buildings. (The Constitution)
...
When an American fulfills the requirements to obtain a "Land Patent" the patent is assigned by and under the hand and
seal of the President of the United States, in accord with an Act of Congress.
Fictitious entities, like trusts, corporations, etc. cannot obtain land patents except by express act of Congress. An
example of Congress granting land through patents to fictitious entities is the railroad grants made to compensate the
railroad companies for building railroads across America.
The Land Patent is the only form of perfect title to land available in the United States. Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 PET (U.S.)
498; 10 L.Ed. 264
In America today people think they own their land, but unless they have the Land Patent on the land they do not own it.
Most people today obtain "Real Estate" by contract and then on fulfillment of the contract they transfer control of land by
"Warranty Deed".
The "Warranty Deed" is merely a "color of title". Color of Title means: "That which is a semblance or appearance of
title, but not title in fact or in law." Howth v. Farrar, C.C.A. Tex.; 94 F.2d 654, 658; McCoy v. Lowrie, 42 Wash. 2d 24,
Black's Law Sixth Ed.
The Warranty Deed cannot stand against the Land Patent. "A grant of land (Land Patent) is a public law standing on the
statue books of the State, and is notice to every subsequent purchaser under any conflicting sale made afterward."
Wineman v. Gastrell, 53 FED 697 , 2 U.S. App. 581
The Land Patent is permanent and cannot be changed by the government after its issuance. "Where the United States has
parted with title by a patent legally issued and upon surveys made by itself and approved by the proper department, the
title so granted cannot be impaired by any subsequent survey made by the government for its own purposes." Cage v.
Danks, 13 La.Ann 128
...
In the history of this county no Land Patent has ever lost an appellate review in the courts. As a matter of fact in Summa
Corp. v California, 466 US 198 the Supreme Court ruled forever that the Land Patent would always win over any other
form of title. In that case the land in question was tidewater land and California's claim was based on California's
http://www.teamlaw.org/land.htm (1 of 3) [9/19/2009 11:14:57 AM]

Land
constitutional right to all tidewater lands. The patent stood supreme even against California's Constitution.
...
Land cannot be taken for debt or taxes, but Real Estate can be.
What is Land? By definition: "'Land' is not restricted to the earth's surface, but extends below and above the surface. Nor
is it confined to solids, but may encompass within its bounds such things as gases and liquids. A definition of 'land' along
the lines of 'a mass of physical matter occupying a space' also is not sufficient, for an owner of land may remove part or
all of that physical matter, as by digging it up and carrying away the soil, but would nevertheless retain as part of his
'land' the space that remains. Ultimately … 'land' is simply an area of three dimensional space, its position being defined
by natural or imaginary points located by reference to the earth's surface. 'Land' is not the fixed contents of that space,
although, as we shall see, the owner of that space may well own those fixed contents. Land is immovable, as distinct from
chattels, which are moveable; it is also, in its legal significance, indestructible. The contents of the space may be
physically severed, destroyed or consumed, but the space itself, and so the 'land', remains immutable." Peter Butt, Land
Law 9 (2nd ed. 1988) Reprinted in Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition
What is Real Estate? It's a document that lays over the land in color of title; though it is not the Land itself, it may
include with it the right to real property that sits upon the Land. Banks and corporations like Real Estate because they
can own it without an Act of Congress. They and others can use the fiction of title to it to seize property under the color
of law.
They've taken their colors of title into the courts for so long that the people (under three generations of deception and
ignorance) simply allow them to go ahead. Generally, people seem to have forgotten about land patents.
For that cause when you go into a court today with a real land title case (a Land Patent case) chances are the judge and
any attorneys involved won't know what a Land Patent is.
The first court you run into that understands the power of a Land Patent may be a U.S. Circuit court of Appeals, and in
the history of this nation there has never been an appellate case where a properly set Land Patent has ever lost its title to
the Land.
If you ever have the occasion to have to defend your right to your land in court. And someone else presents a proof of
right to the land patent on your land, you'll loose your land.
If you haven't secured your right to your land by its land patent, you may be abandoning your right to your land and any
prior owner with lawful right to the land patent could secure it to themselves and evict you off from the land you thought
was yours, and you'll have to leave.
So contact us and get your land patent secured. It's important.
Now, let's suppose you have your Land Patent properly secured and for some reason you have to defend your right to the
land. What do you do?
If you understand the patent and how it works you'll defend it successfully.

Land
So again, here's how it works:
The Land came to the nation by treaty or war prize. The government only had limited ability to own land, as before
mentioned, and all of the remainder of the land was held in the sole disposition of the United States until it was granted
under act of Congress by the hand and seal of the President to some person. Then in that same act the President makes
the Grant Patent. Which means that the Land came to the nation by treaty and the patent assigns a specific part of that
treaty to you and your heirs and assigns forever.
So your land comes to you from the treaty through your Land Patent. This is critical, the Land Patent secures the treaty
to you. The court is bound by the supremacy clause of the Constitution to uphold the treaty making your Patent a
statutory limitation throughout the land. Wineman v. Gastrell, 53 FED 697 , 2 U.S. App. 581.
If you ever have to defend your right to the Patent here's how. Get a full abstract on your land. The Abstract will show
the assignment on the land and patent from the patent to you. Each record of the Abstract is a matter of public record,
well established over time. If your right to the land was well secured (with a properly secured Warranty Deed) and you
have properly accepted and secured the Land Patent to that Land (Team Law's documentation has worked over 60 years),
you'll win, if you're prepared.
...
For more on Land patents check out:
Land Patents - Understanding how they work
The Land 101 mini course on Team Law’s ‘Land Patents’ Forum.
To listen to Senator Madsen on Land Patents order the Audio Tape: "Do you own your Land?"
Back to Main Do you own you Land? Family Ties

What is Team Law? What are Team Law's Benefits? How do I become a beneficiary?
Products / Services: WARN Online Store Other Links
All information on this site is provided for educational purposes only, with all rights reserved. Use it at your own risk. Team Law
does not provide legal or financial advise.
All materials on this site are under Copyright © 1996-2005, and may not be reproduced, except as noted, without the written consent
of Team Law’s Trustee.

Land Patents
Land Patents
Understanding how they work
There has been much talked about in relation to Land Patents lately. As far as most of that talk goes I am glad people are
talking about them — It is about time. The problem with patents is the people are typically ignorant of them and of their
effect.
Some say, “The only bad news is no news.”
It seems that most of the people in our nation today either have no idea what a Land Patent is, or they think it’s a good
way to swindle, or otherwise avoid paying, a bank or tax collector some amount of funds. The simple truth is, a land
patent does not eliminate your ability to otherwise contract and secure the property that sits upon the land to others as
collateral against your promise to pay. People also think they own their land because they paid for it and they have a
Warranty Deed—However, often that is not enough.
Though it is true, “Land, protected by Land Patent, can’t lawfully be seized for debt or taxes”, you must understand what
‘Land’ is before you will understand this rule of law correctly. Accordingly, in law, no forced mortgage or tax liability
can stand against a Land Patent; but, by the same token, the land patent does not eliminate your private ability to contract.
Further, knowingly entering into an agreement with the intent of not fulfilling said agreement constitutes fraud; not to
mention, the honor bound moral responsibility that limits people from hiding from their agreements or obligations by any
means. An honorable person simply will not do it.
Furthermore, hiding from nearly any kind of situation is likely not the best way to go and Team Law can likely help you
discover far better ways to solve any legal problem equitably — call us.
Historically, we live in a nation that has not had elections in its central government since before 1944. The States
individually stopped electing government officials at least by 1968. The main cause of that was electors were either
ignorant of their responsibilities or part of the national takeover. The main cause of that was the people forgot about their
abstracts and Land Patents and accepted Title Insurance instead. (An abstract is a document that contains all of the
transfer documents used to assign Title to Land from the Patent to the present.)
Some ignorant people will tell you, "land patents don’t work." What that means is they don’t know how land ownership
works. They speak from their ignorance.
For those who have tried land patents unsuccessfully, the cause of their lack of success is — ignorance. It’s time to put
that ignorance to rest.
Think about it.
Where did the land within the United States of America come from?
It came from: England, France, Spain, Mexico, Russia, Hawaii, and from the Native American Indians.
How did the United States acquire the land?

By purchase like with Manhattan Island, the Louisiana Purchase, and Alaska;
By war power like with, Hawaii and much of the Native American Indian lands;
By Treaty like, The Northwest Territories Treaty, The Guadeloupe Hidalgo Treaty; and
http://www.teamlaw.org/LandPatents.htm (1 of 4) [9/19/2009 11:14:59 AM]

Land Patents
By treaty as the end result of war like the Revolutionary War for independence from England.
The end result — regardless of how the land was acquired — a Treaty was ultimately designed whereby the land was
resolved and reserved for the proper possession and individual ownership of the people of the United States of America.
Security in land rights was, and is, found within the Treaty.
Once land was acquired in the nation it was held by the United States until someone proved their claim to it. Once the
land was properly claimed and filed, the General Land Office certified that the surveys were paid for. According to the
various land acts of Congress, the land was then made patent under the signature and seal of the President of the United
States of America.
When a State enters the Union of the United States of America, an Enabling Act is agreed to. The Enabling Act requires
that all of the unappropriated (unpatented) lands be forever granted to the Union for its disposition. For example, here is
an "irrevocable ordinance" from Colorado’s Enabling Act:
"That the people inhabiting said territory do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the
unappropriated public lands lying within said territory, and that the same shall be and remain at the sole and entire
disposition of the United States".
Without such transfer of control over the right and title to the land, there would be no effective authority in
a land patent sealed under the signature of the President. For example, with few exceptions, U. S. of A. land patents have
no authority in the Republic of Texas because Texas never ceded its lands to the United States. Once the land is placed in
trust under the sole disposition of the United States government it stands there until someone makes a proper claim for it
and because the Constitution forbids the United States from owning it, they must grant it to the person that proves their
proper claim to it; that is when the land is granted to the proper claimant and that grant is made patent under the hand and
seal of the President.
Notice the net effect of these Enabling Acts in relation to state taxes and state statutes:
‘After exclusive jurisdiction over lands within a State have been ceded to the United States, private property located
thereon is not subject to taxation by the State, nor can state statutes enacted subsequent to the transfer have any operation
therein.’ Surplus Trading Company v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274;
Arlington Hotel v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439; Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285
Every State within the Union of States (with the exception of the Republic of Texas) granted their unappropriated lands
to the United States as a condition of statehood. Then as people acquired land, under various acts of Congress the
President signed the patents securing the patented rights to the patent holders and their heirs and assigns forever.
There are many more cases where the United States Supreme Court has supported the fact that the Land Patent certifies
absolute and supreme title to land. There are no cases where the courts ever ruled against the properly obtained Land
Patent.
Summa Corp. v California, 466 US 198, is not listed above, yet it is one of the best cases describing how land patents
work. In that 1980’s case the court noted that they had ruled and ruled and ruled and they were not going to rule again,
the Land Patent is supreme title to land. The case was one where California was granted the tidewater lands in the
California Republic Constitution and therefore California went after a family’s land, which land was secured under patent
on an old Spanish Land Grant. Interestingly, the case doesn’t talk much about land patents; it talks about the Guadeloupe

Land Patents
Hidalgo Treaty. Imagine that, a land patent case that speaks mostly about the supremacy clause of the Constitution,
which clause states that Treaties are supreme law even over a State's foundational Constitution.
Don’t you get it? Here’s how land patents work:
1. The Land was originally acquired within the United States of America by some Treaty.
2. Your Land Patent secures the rights of the Treaty upon which the land was originally acquired within the
territories of the United States from the Treaty to the individual person named on the patent.
3. The patent specifically grants the described lands to the party named on the patent and to their heirs
and their assigns forever.
4. The party named on the patent then passes the inheritance, grants, or assigns the patented lands to
someone else, which heir or assignee is now named on the patent by that assignment. The documents
that demonstrate such an assignment are often called, "Deeds".
5. Because the granter can not compel you to accept the assignment it is necessary for you to take some
action to signify your acceptance of the assignment. For this reason we use Team Law's copyrighted
"Declaration of Land Patent".
6. Once you have accepted the proper assignment of the Land Patent with proper documentation, you are
named on the physical Land Patent where it says, "and to his heir and assigns forever".
It doesn’t matter how many times the land is reassigned. The patent by its own creation lasts "forever" and belongs to the
named party "and to their heirs and assigns forever".
So what do you do now to secure your Land Patent?

Follow the instructions presented on the following, "Steps to secure a Land Patent".
The most important use of your Land Patent
Our opinion is: "In America today, the most important reason to secure your land patent in your name is to secure your
status as an Elector. An Elector is a land owning freeman. Only electors can vote for State Senators, Governors and
Presidents of the United States of America. When the Government vacated its responsibility to dispensation of the land
by not maintaining elected Presidents and Governors the elector’s responsibility to reelect those officials becomes
critical. Do to the nature of land ownership in America, such elections can only be caused by electors. If we don’t reseat
our state and national governments we will loose our nation to IMF’s New World Order. If we do reseat our
governments we will have a chance to save our nation and our Constitution. This year Governor’s Elections are taking
place in: New Jersey, Virginia. If you elect an original jurisdiction State Governor this year, they can reseat their
national Senators and those original jurisdiction Senators will have the authority to reseat our nation’s original
jurisdiction President. The entire world is watching us; and, most of the world wants Liberty.
We're working to take our nation back! To learn more visit the
Governor's Corner
More reading: Excerpt's from Do you own your land?
The Land 101 mini course on Team Law’s ‘Land Patents’ Forum.

Land Patents
Listen to Senator Madsen on Land Patents on Real Audio.
Get the latest Real Audio Player here:
Back to Main Do you own you Land? Family Ties

What is Team Law? What are Team Law's Benefits? How do I become a beneficiary?
Products / Services: WARN Online Store Other Links
All information on this site is provided for educational purposes only, with all rights reserved. Use it at your own risk. Team Law
does not provide legal or financial advise.
All materials on this site are under Copyright © 1996-2005, and may not be reproduced, except as noted, without the written consent
of Team Law’s Trustee.

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Truth - Land Patents - Allodial vs Feudal Titles - Truly Own Your Land

Land Patents - Allodial vs

The History of the Land Patent - Memorandum of

Land Patents - People think they own their land, but

http://www.truth.tc/information/LandPatents.html (1 of 2) [9/19/2009 11:14:33 AM]

http://www.truth.tc/information/LandPatents.html (2 of 2) [9/19/2009 11:14:33 AM]

HISTORY, FORCE & EFFECT

OF THE LAND PATENT

ALLODIAL v. FEUDAL TITLES

In America today, there is a phenomenon that had not been

First, what existed before land patents, since it is imperative

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (1 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

to understand why the patent was created, the best method

In England, at least until the mid-1600's and arguably until

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (2 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

rendering services to the lord or proprieter, who himself retains

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (3 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

One of the more common types of fiefs, or the payment of a

The title held by such tenant-owners over their land was

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (4 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

common-law England denotes the most and best title a person

The King of England held ownership of land under a different

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (5 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

In summary of Common-Law England: (1) the King was the

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (6 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

LAND OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA TODAY

THE AMERICAN FEUDALISTIC SOCIETY

The private ownership of land in America is one of those

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (7 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

otherwise, take our land as a penalty. When one understands if

The American-based system of land ownership today

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (8 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

These deeds include the ones as follows: warranty deed,

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (9 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

ownership of and rights to possession of land until such time as

With such knowledge of what a color of title is, it is

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (10 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

went into detail in its detail in its determination of a tax deed is

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (11 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

in these cases are the main avenues of claimed land ownership

When it is stated that a color of title conveys only an

A marketable or merchantable title is one that is reasonably

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (12 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

interferes with its marketability. Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (13 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

Other problems have developed because of the use of a

A complete title means that a person has the possession,

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (14 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

property. Birge v. Bock, 44 Mo. App. 69 (1890). In other words,

A good title does not necessarily mean one perfect of record

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (15 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

actually has the title. If such litigation to determine titles is

This new category consists of titles which are bad, defective,

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (16 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

N. Y. 586, 22 N.E. 253 (1889). The methods presently used to

These two methods of properly ensuring that a title is a good

http://www.truth.tc/information/HistoryOfTheLandPatent.html (17 of 65) [9/19/2009 11:14:38 AM]

convey or even attempt to convey any form of the title itself. As