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Neoclassical Realism and Middle East Wars
Neoclassical Realism and Middle East Wars
Matriculation # : 080001779
2008-12-08
2
The modern Middle East is an inter-state arena with a long history of conflict and war.
From the 1948 Arab-Israeli War to the current war in Iraq, the modern Middle East appears to
be a region which best epitomizes neorealism’s claim that the anarchy and insecurity of a
state system is the principal determinant of conflict. However, constructivists claim that
realism’s neglect of the incongruence between identity and sovereignty, as well as between
nation and state within the Middle East, proves realism inept to explain the entirety of causes
of conflict in the region.1 In this study, I argue that while both constructivism and neorealism
do contribute much to the debate of what explains conflict in the Middle East, a neoclassical
realist approach does so more thoroughly and accurately due to its inclusion of first, second,
thought by Gideon Rose in 1998, it has been described by numerous scholars as bridging the
gaps between classical realism, neo-realism, constructivism, liberalism, and foreign policy
1
Constructivist IR theory is most closely associated with the work of Alexander Wendt. See Alexander
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999). Neorealist IR theory is most
closely associated with the work of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics,
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
2
Brian Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary
Extension of Structural Realism," Security Studies 17 (2008): 294-321; Gideon Rose. "Neoclassical Realism
and Theories of Foreign Policy." World Politics 51 (1998): 144-172; Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist
Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables," International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 1-25;
Randall Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in International Relations
Theory: Appraising the Field, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003);
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,"
Security Studies 15 (2006): 464-495.
3
It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables… The scope and
ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in
the international system and specifically by its relative material power
capabilities. This is why [it] is realist. The impact of such power capabilities on
foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be
translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why [it] is
neoclassical.3
realism’s addition of “domestic politics, internal extraction capacity and processes, state
power and intentions, and leaders’ perceptions of capabilities and relative power” to explain
foreign policies.5 The addition of these variables distinguishes neoclassical realism from other
realist schools of thought and creates a unique four-level model for understanding
international relations.6
The starting point and independent variable in the neoclassical realist model is neo-
realism’s anarchic international system. This structural environment of self-help and the
realist theory.7 Neoclassical realism is predominantly concerned with how relative power
establishes the fundamental parameters of a state’s foreign policy.8 This is where neoclassical
realists diverge between offensive and defensive neoclassical realists. The offensive variant
—the larger contingent—contends that “instead of assuming that states seek security… states
seek to control and shape their external environment” and furthermore, “they are likely to
3
Rose, 146.
4
Schweller, Progressiveness, 317-320.
5
Ibid, 317.
6
See Appendix 1.
7
Sterling-Folker, 1-5.
8
Here power is broadly defined here as “the capabilities or resources… with which states can influence
each other.” See William Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1993), 4.
4
want more rather than less external influence, and pursue such influence to the extent that
they are able to do so.”9 Still, what truly matters to neoclassical realism are the perceptions
of relative power by leaders and elites, because “statesmen, not states, are the primary actors
in international affairs.”10 States do desire to increase their relative power position, and
therefore their security, but to understand their capacity to pursue such policies one has to
look inside the state at its domestic state power and leadership. By incorporating agency,
neoclassical realism contends that “there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking
The next level in the neoclassical realist foreign policy model is the first intervening
variable; each state’s individual leader or decision-makers who dictate foreign policy. The
foreign policies of states are a product of a leader’s perceptions regarding their place in the
balance of power, likelihood of regime survivability, risk and reward of certain policies, and
ideological beliefs. Also, Rose reminds us, the influence of structural factors are not always
obvious, and given that it is up to each state’s leader or leaders to make sense of its
ambiguous relative power position and respond accordingly, foreign policies do not
neorealism, neoclassical realism argues that when leaders misperceive the international
system, or make foreign policy decisions based on non-systemic factors, “the system will
Neoclassical realism argues that a state's internal characteristics influence how that state can
extract internal resources to respond to the anarchical nature of the international system.14
9
Rose, 147.
10
Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 42.
11
Rose, 147.
12
Ibid.
13
Rathbun, 311.
14
Fareed Zakaria similarly defined state power as "the portion of national power the government can
extract for its purposes, and reflects the ease with which central decision-makers can achieve their ends." See
Zakaria, 9.
5
Therefore foreign policy is not simply a direct product of the will of statesmen, but rather
dependent upon the variables of each country's state apparatus. Taliafferro and Schweller
have defined these relevant domestic variables which potentially constrain each state's
response ability as: level of state institution formation, use of regime-legitimizing ideology or
nationalism, level of elite consensus and cohesion, and level of social unity.15 Just as states
are expected to be met with foreign policy failure if decision-makers fail to justly account for
the constraints in the international system, they are also to meet problems when they attempt
In this study I offer a revised version of the neoclassical realist foreign policy model
in order to explain the causes of war in the Middle East.17 Consequently, war will be treated
not simply as a given characteristic of the international system, but rather as a foreign policy
decision by independent states. This model begins with the independent variable, the
international system. In order for war to occur, the distribution of power in the international
system must create an environment where one leader may perceive they have an opportunity
to increase their state’s relative power or security by choosing to instigate a war. The
international system conditions war, but it does not control it. The next two levels, domestic
state power and leader perceptions, mirror the intervening variables of the foreign policy
model, but in this model are interpreted by how they specifically precipitate or impede
decisions to instigate conflict. Therefore, war is a result of the interplaying of first and
15
Randall Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing."
International Security 29 (2004): 169; Taliaferro, 486.
16
Rathbun, 313.
17
See Appendix 2.
6
The Middle East proves to be a superior candidate to utilize this form of analysis due
to its history of conflict, varied levels of state power, and the existence of highly influential
leaders and decision-makers in the region. For this study, I will be utilizing two cases—the
Six Day War and the Iran-Iraq War—to illustrate that neoclassical realism is the international
relations theory that best explains the causes of Middle East wars, due to its unique inclusion
Systemic Level
geopolitically vulnerable situation. Israel was a small country, weakened by the reality that
an Arab invasion from the Jordanian-controlled West Bank could easily split the country in
two. In addition to this lack of strategic depth, Israel lacked a sufficient population to field a
mobilization of reserves potentially crippling to the Israeli economy.18 Lacking any tangible
regional military alliance or agreement, Israel was also reliant solely on itself within the
region. Even the United States—Israel’s great power patron—supported Israel with aid and
trade, but desired no direct involvement in Middle East regional conflict. These factors,
coupled with Israel’s geographical encirclement by rival states which desired its elimination,
led Israel to what Yitzhak Rabin called, “a constant state of dormant war.”19 This pervasive
belief in Israel paved the way for the acceptance of a military doctrine supporting pre-
emption, rooted in Israel’s need to win quick, decisive wars on enemy territory.20
18
Hinnebusch, 164.
19
Rabin’s “dormant war” meant that even during times where no violent hostilities between Israelis and
Arabs were occurring, Israel still viewed the controlled use of force as a key component of its survival strategy.
See Avner Yaniv, National Security and Democracy in Israel, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 13.
20
Martin Van Creveld, Defending Israel: A Strategic Plan for Peace and Security, (New York: St.
Martin's Griffin, 2005), 17.
7
Israel also maintained a material advantage over its Arab neighbors in the realm of
military capabilities. When combined, the Arab armies did have a quantitative advantage
over Israel in regard to raw numbers of weaponry.21 However, as Charles Smith notes, this
direct confrontation with a US client state, provided Egypt and Syria with primarily weapons
which were not sufficient “to allow contemplation of successful first-strike or total victory,”
while the US and France provided Israel with advanced offensive capabilities, such as long-
range attack bombers. 23 Israel’s advanced military was far more prepared for a war which
Great Powers
In the 1960’s, the great powers which permitted relative stability between the Arabs
and Israelis were beginning to change their interests. While Nasser had managed to
manipulate bi-polarity since his rise to power, his increasing tendency to move in to the
Soviet camp forced the United States to begin viewing Egypt as a Soviet client state, and
against the US effort of Soviet containment.24 Any goodwill Nasser had with the United
States was lost due to his persistent Pan-Arab rhetoric, which changed Egypt’s global image
from the victim during the 1956 Suez War, to the aggressor in the 1960’s. Nasser’s actions
had destroyed any incentive the US previously had to serve as a peace broker between Egypt
and Israel, while simultaneously limiting Soviet involvement due to their fear of
Domestic Level
where sub-state identities cut across the manufactured state boundaries. Therefore the leaders
of these “territorial states” lacked legitimacy, and needed to find alternative means to win
local support and protect the regime from harmful nationalist movements.26 According to Jack
Snyder, when numerous domestic regimes are faced with legitimacy problems coupled with
possible regime-threatening cross-border identities, the leaders have the choice of either
outright repression, or regional competitive nationalist outbidding.27 Arab regimes were still
in the process of consolidating power, and they did not have the choice of authoritarian
repression due to their domestic weakness. Accordingly, Arab states competed in Pan-Arab
increasing their regional influence. As the neoclassical realist scholar Jeffrey Taliafferro
notes, regimes which base their legitimacy on supra-state nationalism trade the ability to
extract resources from society for both a loss of autonomy in foreign-policy conduct and an
Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser emerged as the regional leader of the Pan-
Arab movement following his defiance of Western imperialists during the Suez Crisis of
1956. Ba’thist Syria, seeking to champion its own Pan-Arab credentials, challenged Nasser
over his lack of support for the Palestinian cause, which resulted in nationalist outbidding and
26
Eberhard Kienle, Ba'th Versus Ba'th: The Conflict Between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989, (New York: I. B.
Tauris, 1991), 1-30.
27
Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2000). 21-39.
28
Taliaferro, 474.
29
Smith, 271-272.
9
With Egypt’s forces tied up in Yemen and the possibility of an Arab-Israeli war ending
his bid for Arab leadership, Nasser’s obvious lack of support for any pro-Palestinian policy
brought about heavy criticism from other Arab regimes. In an attempt to quell revisionist
“spread[ing] responsibility for inaction among Arab leaders,” and eventually signed a defense
agreement with Syria.30 Nevertheless, with its new Egyptian security blanket Syria actually
increased its support of Palestinian fedayeen raids from Jordan in to Israel, which served the
tripartite purpose of hurting Israel, shaming Nasser, and weakening Hussein in Jordan.31 The
increased Palestinian raids prompted the claim by the Israeli government that further attempts
by Syria to sabotage Israel would provoke military action aimed at overthrowing the Syrian
regime.32 Nasser had to act or risk losing his Pan-Arab legitimacy. Nasser ultimately ordered
the removal of UNEF troops from the Sinai, closed the Straits of Tiran signed a defense pact
with King Hussein of Jordan who viewed war as inevitable.33 This escalation brought on by a
lack of Arab domestic legitimacy, created a situation where the already insecure Israeli state
was now facing encirclement by a newly-aligned and increasingly aggressive enemy. The
systemic factors may have created the strategic environment, but as neoclassical realism
Israeli cabinet to resist pressure and coercion from the Israeli military which brought about
the creation of a new pro-war coalition cabinet on June 1st. Elites in Israel were divided
between the activist hawks who desired an Israeli first strike, the irredentist Gahal coalition
30
Hinnebusch, 167.
31
Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War : June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 22.
32
Laqueur, 85-87.
33
Smith, 287.
10
who desired Israeli expansion, and the pragmatic camp—led by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
provocations forced numerous votes by Eshkol’s cabinet on the desired response, with each
vote ultimately calling for further diplomacy.35 Yoram Peri notes that Eshkol’s hesitation to
call for conflict, mixed with the already close relationship between the Israeli military and
political establishments caused the pervasive penetration of Israeli politics by members of the
Israeli military.36 With the Eshkol cabinet lacking legitimacy, military generals began to
make direct demands to Eshkol to include in his national cabinet members of the hawkish
Rafi party, and the irredentist Gahal coalition. This politicization of the Israeli military
demonstrated the weakness of the Israeli cabinet as an institution, and Eshkol ultimately
succumbed to the pressure on June 1st and appointed Rafi’s Moshe Dayan as Minister of
Leadership
Nasser
In the case of Nasser, his misperceptions of the international system, and his personal
desire for regional leadership led to foreign policy choices that brought about the 1967 war.
Nasser wrongly perceived that his removal of UN forces from the Sinai and the closing of the
Straits of Tiran would induce a US-brokered diplomatic agreement, and allow Nasser to
escape with no military defeat and increased Pan-Arab prestige.38 However, Nasser did not
account for the growing disdain for the current Egyptian regime within the Johnson
34
Ibid, 287-288.
35
Yoram, Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics, (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), 244-247.
36
Ibid, 244-251.
37
Ibid, 247-251.
38
Smith, 287.
11
strike Egypt.39
Dayan and Menachem Begin, tipped the balance within the cabinet so that any vote regarding
the initiation of conflict with Egypt would be met with approval. Dayan, a passionate
supporter of the Israeli military, saw the current crisis as a perfect opportunity for Israel to
crush Nasser’s Egypt and display Israel’s military superiority.40 In comparison, Begin’s
ideological beliefs were deeper and more historically-driven than Dayan’s affinity for
military force. Begin viewed the crisis in May of 1967 as an opportunity to realize Eretz
Summary
The variables which ignited the 1967 Arab-Israeli War support the tenets of the
neoclassical realist model of war decision-making. The mixture of Israel’s insecurity and
military superiority to its Arab rivals, combined with great power interests created an
environment where Israel elites perceived war as simultaneously bringing security and
relative power gains. These structural realities were intensified by the domestic situations in
both the Arab states and Israel. The international system put the option of war on the table,
but the lack of Arab regime legitimacy which influenced Pan-Arab outbidding created a
situation where Nasser provoked Israel so far that if Jerusalem did not choose war, it would
only strengthen Nasser’s prestige in the region. The domestic situation in the legitimacy-
lacking Arab countries increased the feelings of insecurity within Israel which empowered
39
Richard B. Parker, The Six-Day War: A Retrospective, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996),
136-141.
40
Laqueur, 169-177.
41
Hinnebusch, 169.
12
Israeli hawkish forces, who then infiltrated Israel’s decision-making structure due to the
vulnerability of the Israeli cabinet to coercion. The international system provided the
conflict-permissive environment, and the domestic situations of the states involved served to
encourage and not discourage conflict. However, it is individuals who make the decision to
go to war, and in the case of both Israel and Egypt’s leadership, misperceptions and beliefs
increased the likelihood of conflict. Nasser desired to be the leader of the Pan-Arab
movement, and his perception that he could take Israel to the brink and avoid war did not
coincide with the realities of the international system, and the changing nature of Israel’s
increasingly provoke Israel stemmed from his domestic situation and not from a rational
calculation of Egypt’s relative power, the international system punished Egypt with foreign
policy failure. Finally, the inclusion of Dayan and Begin in the new Israeli cabinet
introduced two voting members who supported war with the Arabs on ideological grounds.
Neither Dayan’s pro-military nor Begin’s Zionist ideology can be directly blamed for Israel’s
choice for war, but they did motivate two individuals who were vital in the war decision-
environment. The June War demonstrates how the interplay of domestic politics and leader’s
perceptions, in the environment created by the anarchical international system, can ultimately
activate conflict. While constructivism would fail to take into account the necessary systemic
factors acting on Israel and the Arab states, neorealism would similarly fail to appreciate the
Iran-Iraq War
Systemic
power gains of Iraq in comparison to Iran in the years leading up to Iraq’s invasion. From
13
1975 to Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September of 1980, Iraq’s relative power situation in the
region vastly improved, thereby creating a perception—held by Saddam Hussein and other
Iraqi elites—that a conflict with Iran would end favourably for the Iraqi state. In 1975, facing
essentially traded territorial concessions to Iran regarding the Shatt al-Arab waterway for the
cessation of Iranian support to Kurdish insurgents.42 While Saddam Hussein personally saw
affairs, the agreement allowed Iraq to make considerable relative power gains in the region.
By sidelining bilateral tensions with Iran and halting the Kurdish insurgency Iraq was able to
focus on building its military and stabilizing the economy.43 In the late 1970’s, increased
Iraqi oil production coupled with record high oil prices brought a vast influx of wealth to the
Iraqi state. By 1979, Iraq’s new riches allowed for an increase in military spending to 13% of
Iraq’s GDP, or $2 billion USD per year.44 Total military manpower in Iraq jumped from just
over 100,000 in 1973 to a force equal to Iran’s at over 240,000 in 1980.45 Additionally, Iraq
used its new economic clout to leverage between France and the Soviet Union to purchase
arms at increasingly lower prices.46 Economically, Iraq’s financial reserves rocketed to over
$35 billion USD, increasing confidence that Iraq could finance both a war and its domestic
While Iraq’s military and economic expansions drastically altered the regional balance
of power, equally striking is Iran’s relative decline in power due to domestic strife related to
the Islamic Revolution. In 1978, a massive strike by Iranian oil workers protesting the Shah
42
Efraim Karsh, "Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War," Middle East Journal 44
(1990): 264.
43
Andrew T. Parasiliti, "The Causes and Timing of Iraq's Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment."
International Political Science Review 24 (2003): 156.
44
Mike Froelich, and Jack S. Levy, “Causes of the Iran-Iraq War,” in The Regionalization of War, eds.
James Brown, and William P. Snyder, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), 137.
45
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1979-80. (London: 1980);
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1973-74. (London: 1974).
46
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990), 140-141.
47
Froelich and Levy, 137.
14
led to a drastic drop in oil production, creating significant revenue problems for the Iranian
state leading up to the war with Iraq.48 Interestingly, Iranian revolutionary leaders viewed the
Iranian military as a source of prestige for the Shah, while the Revolutionary Guards were
seen as necessary for protecting the revolution domestically.49 Therefore, the Iranian military
was seen as expendable, and became the victim of large cutbacks in order to deal with Iran’s
economic woes. From 1978 to 1980 the Iranian military budget was halved, arms orders
were cancelled, equipment was left unmaintained, and nearly “50% of the officers between
the rank of major and colonel were removed” from their positions.50 Adding to the military’s
already dismal state were large scale desertions, dropping the Iranian military’s size from
Great Powers
Adding to the conflict-inviting environment was the lack of interest and ability of
either the Soviet Union or the United States to halt Saddam Hussein from attacking Iran. On
November 4th, 1979, Iranian militants seized the American embassy in Tehran, taking 52
American citizens hostage. The Iranian Hostage Crisis induced US President Jimmy Carter
to cancel $300 million USD in arms shipments to Tehran, sever US-Iranian diplomatic
relations, and ultimately impose economic sanctions on Iran.52 This strained relationship
between Iran and the US led to what Chubin and Tripp described as “concealed satisfaction”
within the US regarding the Iraqi invasion.53 While the US did not openly support Iraq in
their war decision, they were not interested in stopping them either. Moreover, the Soviet
Union was equally dissatisfied with Iran, and its policies reflected a neutral stance toward the
48
"Another Crisis for the Shah." Time, November 13, 1978.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946149,00.html (accessed November 25, 2008).
49
Shahram Chubin, and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, (London: Westview Press, 1991), 33.
50
Ibid.
51
Greg Cashman, and Leonard C Robinson, An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate
Conflict from World War I to Iraq, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 279.
52
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), 451-454.
53
Chubin and Tripp, 207.
15
conflict. Revolutionaries in Iran openly denounced the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan,
and the call for the exportation of the revolution threatened Soviet stability in its Muslim-
dominated regions and satellite states. The Soviet Union’s decision to not denounce the Iraqi
invasion, but simultaneously offer Tehran jet fuel, arms, and assurances on the joint Iran-
Soviet frontier, demonstrates the Soviet’s attempt to play a neutral role in the conflict.54 The
decision of neutrality stems largely from their shared perception with the Iraqis that the war
would end quickly. Once Iran began to gain ground in 1982, and commenced military
incursions in to Iraqi territory, the Soviet Union increased their direct arms supplies to Iraq.55
military offensive was exacerbated by the large material gains awaiting a successful Iraqi
invasion. Confident in its relative power position, Iraqi leaders undoubtedly viewed the
opportunity to regain full control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, and seize the oil-rich and
power in Iraq’s favour.56 Offensive realist scholars would claim that these opportunities
mixed with perceived Iranian weakness, Iraqi strength, and great power indifference were the
main driving factors of Saddam’s choice to attack Iran. Conversely, as Gause notes, Saddam
waited until September of 1980 to launch an attack on Iran, and if he was solely capitalizing
on a permissive environment he would have acted much earlier.57 While these factors created
an environment which allowed Saddam to ultimately choose military action, and were
undoubtedly influential in Saddam’s decisions, one must look at the domestic levels of each
54
Ibid 221.
55
Ibid 222.
56
Jasim Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984), 229-236.
57
F. Gregory Gause III, "Iraq's Decisions to Go to War," The Middle East Journal 56 (2002): 69.
16
Domestic
insecurity for Iraq and added to the already conflict-welcoming environment. In February
1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power in Iran espousing a radical doctrine of
Islamic government in direct opposition to the secular policies of Reza Shah. As Walt notes,
regimes which come to power following a revolution lack legitimacy, and often use ideology
as a way to consolidate power and increase stability.58 Therefore, Khomeini and other Iranian
clerics who came to power promoting the universalistic ideology of Islam began to call for
way to dually gain legitimacy and increase their influence in the region. In addition, the new
government in Iran was also in the process of a power struggle, as fundamentalist elites and
clerics were being challenged by leftists and autonomy-seeking minorities.59 The easiest way
for these clerics and elites to strengthen the public standing of the fundamentalist camp—and
their position within it—was to compete in ideological outbidding by increasing their calls
for the exportation of the revolution.60 After the resignation of Prime Minister Bazargan and
the subsequent consolidation of power by the more radical forces, Iran began to use state
resources, such as the Revolutionary Guards, the Interior Ministry, and the Intelligence
Ministry to sponsor potential revolutionaries in other states.61 This elite competition and
radical ideology proved influential in Iraq’s war decision due to Iraq’s own domestic
fragmentation.
58
Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 22-30.
59
Homa Omid, Islam and the Post-Revolutionary State in Iran, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994),
143.
60
Ibid, 144-145.
61
Hinnebusch, 194.
17
likelihood of conflict because of its direct relation to social fragmentation realities within the
Iraqi state. While Shi’a Iran’s call for Muslims to rise up against their secular governments
was aimed at the entirety of the Islamic ummah, it was felt predominantly by Shi’a Muslims
in the region who identified with Iran’s Shi’ism.62 This put Iraq, a state with a 60 per cent
Shi’a majority and a Sunni government, in severely vulnerable position. The aforementioned
use of Iranian state resources to export the revolution is demonstrated in Iranian support to
Iraqi Kurds, underground Iranian Shi’a movements, and the Shi’a Da’wa political party.63
These actions by Iran directly challenged the survivability of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Iran’s provocations of Iraq and their decreased relative power in the region created a situation
where a war with Iran could be rationalized by Saddam as both a war of opportunity and a
war of vulnerability.64
the centralization of Saddam’s power and a strategic culture that treated diversity of thought
as national disloyalty.65 When Saddam officially took power in July of 1979, he ordered the
execution of all those he deemed suspicious, and created a circle of loyal advisors from his
Tikriti clan.66 Even prior to his ascension to the Iraqi presidency, Saddam ordered the removal
of the Iraqi military’s high command, placing the military essentially under Saddam’s direct
62
Shireen Hunter, “Islamic Iran and the Arab World,” Middle East Insight 5 (1987): 17-25.
63
Karsh, 266.
64
Janice Gross-Stein, “The Security Dilemma in the Middle East: A Prognosis for the Decade Ahead,” in
The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World, eds. Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, and Rex Brynen,
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), 56-57.
65
Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military
Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance, (London: Westview Press, 1984), 658.
66
Charles Tripp, “The Foreign Policy of Iraq,” in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, eds.
Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Raymond Hinnebusch, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 171-174.
18
control.67 Therefore, any military assessment which did not coincide with Saddam’s current
perception subjected the messenger to be viewed as either simply wrong or even worse,
treacherous. Iraq had ample reason in 1980 to believe the Iranian military, economy, and
government were in disarray, and divided. However, the strategic culture of the Iraqi
government did not allow for a thorough military assessment of Iran before the war. For
example, Saddam’s fear of insecurity drove Iraqi assessments of the Iranian military, and Iraq
misperceived how an Iraqi invasion would unite the fractured Iranian revolution, the relative
weakness of its own military to wage a full-scale inter-state invasion, and the superiority of
the Iranian air force.68 Saddam was not ‘cherry-picking’ intelligence to support his desired
policies, but rather the structure he created did not allow for varied assessments to be made,
much less manipulated. While Saddam may have believed he was making a decision in
harmony with the realities of the international system and his relative power position,
Domestic
Saddam Hussein:
The lack of any structure limiting Saddam’s will in pursuing his desired foreign policy
increased the importance of the Iraqi leader’s personal perceptions and beliefs to Iraqi
relative power position, his individual desires for prestige and regional leadership directly
influenced his decision to invade Iran. Saddam’s lieutenants described the Iraqi leader as
67
Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2005), 13-18.
68
Cordesman, 648-659.
69
Cordesman, 658.
19
both viewing himself as the natural leader of the Arab world, and as constantly worried about
the security of the Iraqi regime.70 This constant feeling of insecurity amplified the
importance of Iranian attempts to topple Saddam with a revolution from below. With Sadat
relinquishing his role as the Pan-Arab leader, and the perception that Iran was provoking Iraq
from a position of weakness, Saddam was presented with an opportunity to act on his
ambitions.71 Saddam was not a violent megalomaniac, but an insecure opportunist. While
important to note that without Iraq’s concurrent relative power position, and the domestic
situations in both countries, Saddam’s ambitions alone would not have been enough to start
the conflict.
Ayatollah Khomeini:
Misperceptions on the Iranian side also encouraged conflict. Motivated by a radical
Islamic ideology, Ayatollah Khomeini and other Iranian clerics incorrectly believed that the
like Saddam’s.72 The incessant calls for revolution did not create a completely destabilizing
force in Iraq as Khomeini wished, but instead invited a war which would last nearly eight
years. The counterargument is that Khomeini’s calls for revolution may have eventually
overthrown the Iraqi regime, but this was thwarted by Iraq’s invasion of Iran, which in fact
helped to consolidate the power of the Iranian fundamentalists. Even so, Khomeini’s
ideological beliefs and disdain for Saddam Hussein influenced a conflict which may have
been beneficial to the ruling regime, but detrimental to the Iranian state as a whole.
Summary
70
Duelfer, 24, 41.
71
Froelich and Levy, 131-133.
72
Shireen Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, (Bloomington: Indiana UP,
1990), 41.
20
The Iran-Iraq war is another ideal demonstration of the international system creating
an environment where a state perceives war will bring them considerable utility. Iraq’s
growth, both militarily and economically, together with Iran’s relative demise shifted the
balance-of-power in the Gulf toward Iraq. The lack of US or Soviet interest in stopping Iraq
from invading Iran, and the vast material gains awaiting a successful Iraqi invasion added to
the conflict-inviting environment. Furthering the probability of war was the regime-
legitimizing radical Islamic ideology of the Iranian government, which called for the spread
of the Islamic revolution to other Muslim-dominated states. This directly challenged the
security of socially fragmented Iraq which had a predominantly Shi’a population who
identified with Iran’s Shi’ism. Not only did domestic factors increase threats to Iraq and
therefore the probability of conflict, but Saddam’s centralization of power in the Iraqi
government and military removed any obstructions between Saddam’s desires and Iraqi
Iraq’s decision to go to war, and his misperceptions of Iran’s military capabilities, desire for
regional leadership, and fear of regime vulnerability all played in to his final decision to
choose war. While the case of the 1967 war illustrated a state that chose war due to its
correct perceptions of the international system, the Iran-Iraq War is a demonstration of the
opposite. While the balance of power was moving in Iraq’s direction, Saddam overestimated
Iraq’s relative power and was forced to endure a war far different than the quick and easy
international system, domestic precipitating factors, and leader misperceptions all contributed
to the origins of the Iran-Iraq War. Once again, constructivism fails to understand the
importance of Iran’s perceived power decline, and neorealism inadequately explains why
Saddam’s fears of domestic subversion to his rule helped to accelerate his call for war.
21
Conclusion
By examining the first, second, and third image variables at work during the 1967
War and the Iran-Iraq War, I have shown that the neoclassical realist model of war decision-
making best explains the reasons why leaders eventually choose war. In explaining war
neorealists would solely look to the international system and constructivists would look to
ideational factors, but neither of these theories can explain war in a region like the Middle
East, where the realities of the balance-of-power and issues of identity are dually present.
Contrastingly, neoclassical realism examines how relative power realties of the international
system interplay with the ideational factors present at each state’s domestic and leadership
levels. In a region filled with insecurity, irredentism and authoritarian leadership only a
theory such as neoclassical realism which examines foreign policy at the international and
regional, domestic, and leadership levels can fully grasp what causes wars and conflict.
22
Appendix 1
Independent Variable
Dependent
Domestic State Power Variable
Appendix 2
Interplaying Intervening
Variables
Independent Variable
Domestic State Power
- Desires
- Ideology
24
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