Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Mabelle O. Nebres - Local Governments Case Digests: Alvarez v. Guingona
Mabelle O. Nebres - Local Governments Case Digests: Alvarez v. Guingona
Mabelle O. Nebres - Local Governments Case Digests: Alvarez v. Guingona
2.
WON the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by PD 1869. NO. Art x Sec 5, Consti: Each LG unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the LG. power of LG to "impose taxes and fees" is subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of LGs to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization." It does not make LGs sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
San Juan v. CSC Facts: When the Provinicial Board Officer position was left vacant, Rizal Governor San Juan informed Director Abella of the Department of Budget and Management that a certain Santos had assumed office as acting PBO and requested Abella to endorse Santos appointment. Abella, however recommended Almajose on the basis of a comparative study of all MBOs which included San Juans nominees. According to Abella, Almajose was the most qualified since she was the only CPA among the contenders. DMB Usec Cabuquit signed Almajoses appointment papers upon Abellas recommendation. Unaware of Almajoses appointment, San Juan reiterated his request for Santos appointment in a letter to Sec. Carague. DBM Reg. Dir. Galvez wrote San Jose that Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular 31 for the position of local budget officer and required San Jose to submit at least three other nominees. After finding out about Almajoses appointment San Juan wrote Carague protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that Almajose lacks the required three years work experience as provided in LBC 31; and that under EO 112, it is the Gov., not the RD or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO. DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the San Juan's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the his nominees met the prescribed requirements. San Juan then moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling. Such
Pelaez v. Auditor General Facts: Pursuant to Sec 68 of the RAC, the President issued EOs 93-121, 124, and 126-129 which created 33 provinces. Pelaez instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said EOs and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Pelaez claims that RA 2370 had already impliedly repealed Sec 68. RA 2370, Sec 3:Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress; All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof. When RA 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." ISSUE: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? NO. The statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. On delegation of legislative power: While the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power. " Municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
10
11
3.
12
4.
Issues: 1. WON the CA erred in its application of the principle of "equiponderance of evidence", for having based its ruling against petitioner on documentary evidence which, petitioner claims, are void, 2. that the challenged Decision "does not solve the problem of both towns but throws them back again to their controversy." With respect to the first and second grounds, we find that the issues of fact in this case had been adequately passed upon by respondent Court in its Decision, which is well-supported by the evidence on record. The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the respondent Court involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to be whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such showing. Neither party was able to make out a case; neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. As a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions. 3.Alicias purported lack of juridical personality, as a result of having been created under a void executive order Candijay commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of Alicia some thirty five years after it first came into existence in 1949. It appears that, after presentation of its evidence, Candijay asked the trial court to bar Alicia from presenting its evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. Candijay contended that EO 265 issued by is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as Sec 68 of the RAC, on which said EO
13
Vilas v. City of Manila (supra, see p.3) Padilla v. COMELEC Facts: A plebiscite in the matter of the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa was held in the municipality of Labo pursuant to RA 7155 and the Constitution. Only 2890 favored its creation while 339 voted against it. The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of TNL. Gov. Padilla seeks to set aside the plebiscite and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken because the previous one was a complete failure and the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite should have been conducted only in the political units affected, i.e., the 12 barangays comprising TNL, to the exclusion of the remaining areas of the mother unit. Issue: WON the plebiscite conducted is valid. YES. Padillas contention that the Tan ruling has been superseded by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, hence reinstating the Paredes ruling is untenable. Old law: political unit or units New law: political units The deletion of the words unit or does not affect the Tan ruling. Concom debates: Davide asked for deletion of unit or because the plebiscite is to be conducted in all units affected. Political units directly affected: residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof = units which would participate in the plebiscite. Tan v. COMELEC (supra, see p.8) Miranda v. Aguirre Facts: In 1994, RA 7720 converting the municipality of Santiago to an independent component city was signed into law and thereafter ratified in a plebiscite. Four years later, RA 8528 which amended RA 7720 was enacted, changing the status of Santiago from an ICC to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 8528 because it does not provide for submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Issues: 1. WON petitioners have standing. YES. Rule: constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement
14
2.
3. 4.
The independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished: - The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. - The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when RA 8528 downgrades the status of their city. There is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Art 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the IRRs of the LGC is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material change in the LGU directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people. Tobias v. Abalos Facts: Prior to the enactment of RA 7675 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong) the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Pursuant to the LGC, a plebiscite was held where the people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted
15
2.
3.
16
17
18
4.
5.
6.
Chua Huat v. CA Facts: Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., requested the City Engineer and Building Official of Manila, to condemn the dilapidated structures located at 1271 to 1277 Pedro Gil St. and 1553 to 1557 Paz St., Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. Notices of condemnation were issued, stating that the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as required by Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. The orders were based on the inspection reports made by Architect Oscar D. Andres and the Memorandum-Reports made by the Evaluation Committee of the Office of the City Engineer, which all showed that the subject buildings suffer from structural deterioration by more than 50% and as much as 80%.
19
20
Binay v. Domingo Facts: Resolution 60 confirming the ongoing burial assistance program initiated by the mayors office. Under this program, bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed 2k/month will receive a 500php cash relief to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000 for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. R 60 was referred to the Commission on Audit for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, COA disapproved R 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. The program was stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. Issues: 1.
WON R 60 is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. YES. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people.
21
Tatel v. Municipality of Virac Facts: Based on complaints received by the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside Tatels warehouse, Resolution 291 was enacted by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring Tatels warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two months from receipt of the said resolution. The municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses
22
23
2.
WON the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code. Applying these criteria, we agree with the petitioners that the complaint alleges factual circumstances of a complaint for abatement of public nuisance. Art. 694, CC A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else which: (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. Art. 695, CC Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. .. Thus, the complaint states: that petitioner municipality is the owner of a parcel of land covered by Presidential Proclamation No 365 which is reserved for a public plaza; that the private respondents by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the former mayor occupied a portion of the parcel of land constructing buildings thereon; that the private respondents refused to vacate the premises despite demands; that the municipality is constructing a municipal gymnasium in the area financed by appropriations provided by the national government; and that the appropriations are in danger of being reverted to the national treasury because the construction had to be stopped in view of the refusal of the private respondents to vacate the area. WON the municipality is entitled to a writ of possession and a writ of demolition even before the trial of the case starts. Article 699 of the Civil Code provides for the following remedies against a public nuisance:(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or(2) A civil action; or (3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
24
25
26
WON the CA erred in concluding that the Tepoot building adjacent to petitioner's funeral parlor is residential simply because it was allegedly declared as such for taxation purposes, in complete disregard of Ordinance 363 declaring the subject area as dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses. YES. A tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. A property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial
27
28
29
30
2.
31
32
33
34
Sangalang v. IAC Facts: Studies were made by Mayor Yabut et al, on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air calculated to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air. Based on the studies, it was deemed necessary, in the interest of the general public to open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodia, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit, and Paseo de Roxas streets. According to Bel-Air they own the streets and as such, should not be deprived of them without just compensation. Issue: WON the mayor acted arbitrarily in opening up Jupiter and Orbit streets. NO. The opening of Jupiter was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. The same is upheld in the case of Orbit street.
35
36
37
Macasiano v. Diokno Facts: Paranaque passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions. On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the municipal council of respondent municipality subject to the following conditions: 1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas thereon; 2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians; 3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly designated; 4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority. On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Paraaque issued a resolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain
38
39
40
41
42
43
Moday v. CA Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed R 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." R 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." Bunawan filed a petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday, as well as his parents before the RTC at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. The municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property.
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila Facts: The City of Manila alleged that for the purpose of constructing the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila , it is necessary for it to acquire ownership of certain parcels of land situated in Binondo, some of which were owned and used by the Chinese Community of Manila for cemetery purposes. The Chinese Community of Manila denied that it was necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement. The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
56
57
Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project." Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. RTC: gave due course to petition and authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. VM alleged that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the LGC and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Case dismissed, MR denied. CA: affirmed. Issues: 1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance. NO Pque: a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case "substantially complies with the requirements of the law" because the terms "ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the LGU through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain." Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC: "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings." The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this
58
2.
3.
59
60
61
Facts: On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28, which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors in Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon approval. The subject ordinance was posted from November 4-25, 1996. In the last week of November, 1997, the petitioners members were personally given copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in January, 1998. On December 8, 1997, the petitioners President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance. Respondent opposed the appeal. It contended that the ordinance took effect on October 6, 1996 and that the ordinance, as approved, was posted as required by law. Hence, it was pointed out that petitioners appeal, made over a year later, was already time-barred. The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time, i.e., beyond 30 days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, 1996, as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 LGC. Citing the case of Taada vs. Tuvera, the Secretary of Justice held that the date of effectivity of the subject ordinance retroacted to the date of its approval in October 1996, after the required publication or posting has been complied with, pursuant to Section 3 of said ordinance. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner did not assail the finding of the Secretary of Justice that their appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. Instead, it urged that the Secretary of Justice should have overlooked this mere technicality and ruled on its petition on the merits. Unfortunately, its petition for review was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for being formally deficient as it was not accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. Undaunted, the petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Issues: 1. WON the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for review for petitioners failure to attach certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. YES. In its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner satisfactorily explained the circumstances relative to its failure to attach to its appeal certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, thus: during the preparation of the petition on October 21, 1998, it was raining very hard due to (t)yphoon Loleng. When the petition was completed, copy was served on the Department of Justice at about (sic) past 4:00 p.m. of October 21, 1998, with (the) instruction to have the Resolutions of the Department of Justice be stamped as certified true copies. However, due to bad weather, the
62
4.
63
64
65
Estanislao v. Costales Facts: The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Zamboanga City passed Ordinance No. 44 which imposes a P0.01 tax per liter of softdrinks produced, manufactured, and/or bottled within the city. The Minister of Finance sent a letter to the Sanggunian suspending the effectivity of the Ordinance on the ground that it contravenes Sec 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code. Zamboanga appealed the suspension in the RTC. RTC: the tax imposed by the Ordinance is not among those that the Sanggunian may impose under the Local Tax Code, but upheld its validity saying that the Finance Minister did not act on it w/in 120 days from receipt of the petition. Finance Secretary appealed. Issue: WON Ordinance 44 is valid. NO. A city, like Zamboanga, may impose, in lieu of the graduated fixed tax prescribed under Section 19 of the Local Tax Code, a percentage tax on the gross sales for the preceding calendar year of non-essential commodities at the rate of not exceeding two per cent and on the gross sales of essential commodities at the rate of not exceeding one per cent. The Ordinance is ultra vires as it is not within the authority of the City to impose said tax. The authority of the City is limited to the imposition of a percentage tax on the gross sales or receipts of said product which, being non-essential, shall be at the rate of not exceeding 2% of the gross sales or receipts of the softdrinks for the preceding calendar year. The tax being imposed under said Ordinance is based on the output or production and not on the gross sales or receipts as authorized under the Local Tax Code. Even if the Secretary of Finance failed to review or act on the Ordinance within the prescribed period of 120 days it does not
66
67
68
Floro Cement Corp. v. Gorospe Facts: Municipality of Lugait, Misamis Oriental filed a complaint for collection of manufacturers and exporters taxes plus surcharges against Floro Cement Corporation. Lugait based it on Municipal Ordinance No. 5 (Municipal Revenue Code), passed pursuant to PD 231; and Ordinance No. 10.
69
Drilon v. Lim Facts: Pursuant to Sec 187, LGC , the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In Manilas petition for certiorari, the Manila RTC sustained the ordinance. It also declared Section 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional since it vests in the Justice Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. Justice Secretary: It is constitutional and the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the LGC had indeed not been observed. Issue: WON Sec 187 of the LGC is constitutional. YES.
1
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
70
71
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos Facts: MCIAA was created by RA 6958 which provided that it be exempted from payment of realty taxes. The Office of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to MCIAA. MCIAA objected, claiming that it is exempt from payment of reality taxes. It also said that as it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, it is exempted as provided for by Sec. 133 of the LGC. The City insisted that MCIAA is not tax exempt as its exemption had been withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the same code. MCIAA paid the tax account under protest but it filed a petition for declaratory relief saying that the powers of LGUs do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees of any kind on an instrumentality of the national government. TC: dismissed the petition for declaratory relief. MR denied. MCIAA: It is a GOCC mandated to perform functions in the same category as an instrumentality of the government and it is an attached agency of the DOTC. Thus,
72
73
74
75
76
Benguet Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals Facts: BC seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of the CBAA of May 28, 1991, as well as the Resolution of July 1, 1991, denying its motion for reconsideration, which affirmed the decision of respondent Local Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province of Benguet declaring as valid the tax assessments made by the Municipal Assessor of Itogon, Benguet, on the bunkhouses of petitioner occupied as dwelling by its rank and file employees based on Tax Declarations Nos. 8471 and 10454. The Provincial Assessor of Benguet, through the Municipal Assessor of Itogon, assessed real property tax on the bunkhouses of petitioner Benguet Corporation occupied for residential purposes by its rank and file employees under Tax Declarations Nos. 8471 (effective 1985) and 10454 (effective 1986). According to the Provincial 2 Assessor, the tax exemption of bunkhouses under Sec. 3 (a), P.D. 745 (Liberalizing
2
"Section 3. Pursuant to the above incentive, such domestic corporations and partnerships shall enjoy tax exemption on: (a) real estate taxes on the improvements which will be used exclusively for housing their employees and workers . . ."
"Section 1. The provisions of any special or general law to the contrary notwithstanding, all exemptions from or any preferential treatment in the payment of duties, taxes, fees, imposts and other charges heretofore granted to private business enterprises and/or persons engaged in any economic activity are hereby withdrawn, except those enjoyed by the following: . . . (e) Those that will be approved by the President of the Philippines upon the recommendation of the Minister of Finance,"
77
78
2.
79
80
81
82
83
Casio v. CA Facts: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Gingoog passed Resolution 49 which classified certain areas, including Casios coliseum which was licensed as a cockpit. The classification led to the cancellation of Casios license to operate such cockpit. The ordinance provides that changes in the zoning ordinance as a result of the review by the Local Review Committee shall be treated as an amendment provided that such is carried out through a resolution of three fourths vote of the SP. Said amendments shall take effect only after approval and authentication by the HSRC.
84
85
2.
86
87
88
89
90
91
Facts: Seven of the thirteen members present, including the president, of the municipal council of Tabaco, Albay, voted in favor of Ordinance No. 25, concerning cockpits, and six members voted against the ordinance, with three members absent. ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid. NO. Section 224 of the Administrative Code reads as follows: Journal of Proceedings Majorities necessary for transaction of business. The council shall keep a journal of its own proceedings. The ayes and noes shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances, upon all propositions to create any liability against the municipality, and upon any other proposition, upon the request of any member, and they shall be entered upon the journal. The affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall be necessary to the passage of any ordinance or of any proposition creating indebtedness; but other measures, except as otherwise specially provided, shall prevail upon the majority vote of the members present at any meeting duly called and held. The law is clear. It needs only application, not interpretation. While the Spanish text may be ambiguous, the English text which governs is not. The law is entirely consistent in context. The ayes and noes are taken upon (1) the passage of all ordinances, (2) all propositions to create any liability against the municipality, and (3) any other proposition, upon the request of any member. The same idea is carried into the succeeding sentence. For the passage of (1) any ordinance or (2) any proposition creating indebtedness , the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall be necessary. Other measures prevail upon the majority vote of the members present "Creating indebtedness" refers to "proposition" and not to "ordinance." The contention that only ordinances creating indebtedness require the approval of a majority of all the members of the municipal council, is devoid of merit. Corroborative authority is really superfluous. Nevertheless we would invite attention to the case of McLean vs. City of East St. Louis ([1906], 222 Ill., 510). Section 13 of the Act for the incorporation of cities and villages in the State of Illinois provided: "The yeas and nays shall be taken upon the passage of
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
Morata v. Go Facts: Victor and Flora Go filed a complaint with the CFI against Julius and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages. The parties are all residents of Cebu City. The Moratas filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the Gos of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed. MTD denied. MR denied. Issue: WON the Katarungang Pambarangay law apply to cases heard by the Regional Trial Courts. YES. SECTION 6. No complaint, petition, action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
Bonifacio Law Office v. Bellosillo Facts: In a letter-complaint dated August 28, 1997, Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon Jr. of the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 34, with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and obvious partiality. Salomon assails the Order dated April 2, 1996 referring the said ejectment case back to the barangay for conciliation proceedings despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified complaint, that the matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the Certification to File Motion was attached [to] the verified complaint as ANNEX E thereof. Bewildered with such Order, he tried to talk with respondent judge but
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
Montesclaros v. COMELEC Facts: On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros sent a letter to the Comelec, demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief. On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House and the Senate President about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was operationally very difficult to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002. Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5, 2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled. On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March 11, 2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee (Bicameral Committee for brevity) of the Senate and the House came out with a Report recommending approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 [14] and House Bill No. 4456. [15] The Bicameral Committees consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age. On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition. On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committees consolidated bill and on March 13, 2002, the House of Representatives approved the same. The President signed the approved bill into law on March 19, 2002. Issues: 1. WON there exists a justiciable controversy. NO. The Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a
117
2.
3.
118
4.
119
120
121
122
Lim and Garayblas v. CA Facts: On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lims instructions inspected and investigated Bistros license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistros night club and restaurant operations. Lim also refused to accept Bistros application for a business license, as well as the work permit applications of Bistros staff, for the year 1993. TC: issued first assailed TRO, after hearing, court granted Bistros application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. Despite the trial courts order, Lim still issued a
123
124
125
2.
126
127
128
129
3.
5.
4.
6.
130
Pandi v. CA Facts: Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the Department of Health of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, issued a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office-Amai Pakpak General Hospital (IPHO-APGH), Lanao del Sur. In the same Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr. Mamasao Sani, then the provincial health officer of the IPHOAPGH, Lanao del Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City. Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office Order No. 07 designating Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Sani filed a
131
132
133
Ordillo v. COMELEC Facts: The people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to RA 6766. The COMELEC results showed that the creation of the Region was approved only by a majority of 5,899 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city abovementioned. Sec of Justice: considering the proviso that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably legally constitutes the CAR. As a result of this,
134
135
136
League of Cities v. COMELEC Facts: 11th Congress: 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities were enacted. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. 12th Congress: RA 9009 which amended Sec. 450 of the LGC by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million was enacted. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Sen. Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA
137
138
3.
5.
4.
139
140
2.
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
Caasi v. CA Facts: Merito Miguel won in the 1988 mayoral elections in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Petitions were filed seeking to disqualify him on the ground that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service which would mean that he his a permanent resident of the United States, and not of Bolinao. COMELEC dismissed the petitions on the ground that possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, despite his green card, he has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. Commissioner Badoys dissent: A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not done. Miguels opponent, Caasi also filed a petition for quo warranto. Miguel filed an MTD which was denied by the RTC. CA ordered the RTC to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case on the ground that the COMELEC has already ruled on his qualifications. Issues: 1. WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States Consti: Article XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
161
2.
162
163
164
165
166
b.
167
168
169
170
171
Galido v. COMELEC Facts: Galido and Galeon were candidates during the 18 January 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol. Galido was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Galeon then filed an election protest before the RTC of Bohol. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of Galido as the duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by a majority of 11 votes. On appeal to the COMELEC, RTC decision was reversed and Galeon was declared duly-elected mayor by a plurality of 5 votes. MR denied. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial "C" after the name "Galido" were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid. The COMELEC said that where a word or a letter recurs in a pattern or system to mark and identify ballots, the ballots containing the same should be rejected as marked ballots. Galido filed a petition for certiorari and injunction. SC dismissed for failure of petitioner to comply with par. 4 of the Court's Circular No. 1-88 which requires that a petition shall contain a verified statement of the date when notice of the questioned judgment, order or resolution was received and the date of receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any was filed. MR denied. Galido filed petition for certiorari and injunction with prayer for a restraining order which contains the same allegations and legal issues. TRO issued, respondents required to file comment. Issues: 1. WON final decisions of the COMELEC are appealable. The COMELEC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Article IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution). The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are
172
173
174
175
Lonzanida v. COMELEC Facts: Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections. Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby declared vacant. On appeal, the COMELEC declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling 1,720 votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which he obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time. The COMELEC found that Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the LGC. The finding of the COMELEC First Division was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11, 1998. Issue: WON Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.
176
177
178
Adormeo v. COMELEC Facts: Adormeo and Talaga were the only candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Talaga was then the incumbent mayor. Talaga was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. On March 2, 2001, Adormeo filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Talaga on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he served the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he again served the full term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election. Petitioner contended that Talagas candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Talaga responded that he was not elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive terms. He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each. Respondent added that his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the contemplation of the law and the Constitution. The COMELEC found Talaga disqualified for the position of city mayor on the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive terms, and his Certificate of Candidacy was ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled. MR reversed COMELEC ruling and held that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the three (3)
179
180
2.
181
182
183
2.
184
185
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC (supra, see p.150) Menzon v. Petilla Facts: On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, Secretary of Local Government Santos designated Vice-Governor Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. On March 25, 1988, Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. On May 29, 1989, Provincial Administrator Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the Department of Local Government Rubillar as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. In his reply letter dated June 22, 1989, Rubillar stated that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of Menzon as the temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices. As a result of the foregoing communications between Quintero and Rubillar, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in a special session held on July 7, 1989, issued Resolution 505 where it held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte on the ground that there is no permanent vacancy in said office since Petilla assumed the Office of the ViceGovernor after he took his oath of office to said position. Menzon, through the acting LDP Regional Counsel, Atty. Alegre, sought clarification from Undersecretary Rubillar regarding the June 22, 1989 opinion. According to Rubillar, the peculiar situation in the Province of Leyte, where the electoral controversy in the Office of the Governor has not yet been settled, calls for the designation of the Sangguniang Member to act as vice-governor temporarily. In view, of the clarificatory letter of Rubillar, the Regional Director of the Department of Local Government, Region 8, Salvatierra, on July 17, 1989, wrote a letter addressed to the Acting-Governor Petilla, requesting the latter that Resolution No. 505 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be modified accordingly, as to previous actions made by his office and those of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which may have tended to discredit the validity of Menzon's designation as acting vice-governor, including the payment of his salary as Acting Vice-Governor, if he was deprived of such. On August 3, 1989, the Regional Director wrote another letter to Acting-Governor Petilla, reiterating his earlier request. Despite these several letters of request, the Acting Governor and
186
2.
187
188
2.
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
Reyes v. COMELEC Facts: Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, having been elected to that office on May 11, 1992. On October 26, 1994, an administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Manalo. It was alleged, among other things, that petitioner exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market; that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the Department of Interior and Local Government were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and that he took twenty-seven (27) heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven months. In its decision, dated February 6, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. It appears that earlier, after learning that the Sanggunian had
207
208
3.
209
210
211
2.
3.
212
4.
213
214
215
2.
216
217
4.
5.
218
219
220
221
222
2.
223
224
2.
3.
225
226
2.
227
228
229
2.
230
231
2.
232
233
234
Facts: On November 20, 1997, petitioner filed a Protest Case with the Civil Service Commission. She averred that she was appointed as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by then Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, upon the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur; that despite the recommendation of Secretary Gloria, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed respondent to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur; that respondent's appointment was made without prior consultation with the Provincial School Board, in violation of Section 99 of the LGC of 1991. Hence, petitioner prayed that respondent's appointment be recalled and set aside for being null and void. On March 31, 1998, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 980699, dismissing petitioner's protest-complaint. The Civil Service Commission found that on September 13, 1996, President Ramos appointed respondent, who was then Officer-in-Charge Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City, as Schools Division Superintendent without any specific division. Thus, respondent performed the functions of Schools Division Superintendent in Iriga City. Subsequently, on November 3, 1997, Secretary Gloria designated respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, and petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City. In dismissing petitioner's protest, the Civil Service Commission held that Section 99 of the LGC of 1991 contemplates a situation where the Department of Education, Culture and Sports issues the appointments, whereas respondent's appointment was made by no less than the President, in the exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments, in which case consultation with the local school board was unnecessary. MR: denied. CA: dismissed. Issues: 1. WON Sec 99 of the LGC is applicable. Clearly, the afore-quoted portion of Section 99 of the LGCof 1991 applies to appointments made by the DECS. This is because at the time of the enactment of the LGC, schools division superintendents were appointed by the DECS to specific division or location. In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1994, placing the positions of schools division superintendent and assistant schools division superintendent within the career executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive service positions was transferred from the DECS to the President. The appointment may not be specific as to location. The prerogative to designate the appointees to their
Osea v. Malaya
235
2.
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Paredes Facts: On 11 June 1997, Rayos, Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5, District II, Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages before the RTC of Caloocan, alleging that David, Punong Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City and then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997. On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of the general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975. However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner David, and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was held as scheduled. Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the LigaCaloocan, and thereafter took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan. On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, and Secretary Barbers.7 Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997 by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.8 On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted the TRO, enjoining therein respondents David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and effective for a period not exceeding seventy-two (72) hours. Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner Davids instance, Special Civil Action (SCA) No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCA No. C-508 pending before Branch 124. Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent Motion, invoking the Presidents power of general supervision over all local government units and seeking that the DILG pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office.
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
Facts: This is an action for damages against the individual members of the municipal council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of Act. No. 1634 of the Philippine Commission. After user of a little more than one year, the plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the herein defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person. Issue: WON the municipality may be sued for acts done in the exercise of its corporate functions. Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal Code have both governmental and corporate or business functions. Of the first class are the adoption of regulations against fire and disease, preservation of the public peace maintenance of municipal prisons, establishment of primary schools and post-offices, etc. Of the latter class are the establishment of municipal waterworks for the use of the inhabitants, the construction and maintenance of municipal slaughterhouses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries. Act No. 1634 provides that the use of each fishery, fish-breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or township shall be let to the highest bidder annually or for such longer period not exceeding five years as may have been previously approved by the provincial board of the province in which the municipality or township is located. The twofold character of the powers of a municipality, under our Municipal Code (Act No. 82) is so apparent and its private or corporate powers so numerous and important that we find no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the general principles governing the liability of such entities to private individuals as enunciated in the United States are applicable to it. The distinction between governmental powers on the one hand, and corporate or proprietary or business powers on the other, as the latter class is variously described in the reported cases, has long been recognized in the United States and there is no dissent from the doctrine. The municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents in the performance in the performance of its governmental functions. Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being delegated to the municipal government. Nor does the fact that such duties are performed by such officers of the municipality which, for convenience, the state allows the municipality to select, change their character. To preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of the community and
276
277
278
279
2.
280
281
Torio v. Fintanilla Facts: On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn organized a subcommittee on entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the "cancionan". The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravanganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe arrived in the evening of January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilla was taken to the San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day. The heirs of Vicente Fontanilla filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11, 1959 to recover damages. TC: Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had exercised due diligence and care like a good father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a stage strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces beyond the control of the committee on entertainment, consequently, the defendants were not liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The complaint was accordingly dismissed in a decision dated July 10, 1962. CA reversed. Issue: Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the exercise of a municipality's governmental or public function or is it of a private or proprietary character? Holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malasiqui Pangasinan, was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. A fiesta may be held in each municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council. A fiesta shall not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty reasons, such as typhoons, inundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other public calamities,
282
283
3.
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294