Islam and the Human Rights Debate: Essential Questions

By Jamaal Zarabozo For many people, the achievement of human rights is one of the most importantif not the most importantissue of global concern today. For example, Ann Kent writes in Between Freedom and Subsistence: China and Human Rights, The problem of human rights lies at the heart of modern political discourse.1 The importance given to this topic has led to the question of whether religion in general and Islam in particular is compatible with the modern belief in human rights. In fact, it has been argued by some that traditional Islam is certainly not compatible with this modern concept. Hence, Islam needs to be modernizedmeaning traditional Islam must be discarded or, at the very least, modifiedin order to make Islam viable in the modern, pluralistic, civilized world. This article will not delve into the rights that are explicitly affirmed by the religion of Islam. (For a presentation of that type of material, one may consult, for example, The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.) Instead, this article will emphasize more philosophical issues that lie at the heart of the human rights debate. It will then give comments on those philosophical foundations from an Islam perspective. Before delving into those philosophical issues, first there will be a discussion of what some human rights advocates are demanding of Muslims and Islam. This will shed some light on how great and grave this issue is and why there seems to be some friction between Muslims and those who are advocating human rights.

What is Demanded of Muslims and Islam by Many Human Rights Advocates

It is very important for everyone to understand what many human rights proponents expect from Islam and Muslims. In the media today, many might hear about the discrepancy between human rights and Islam. At the same time, though, not that many people are familiar with exactly what the human rights proponents are calling for from Muslims in their practice of Islam. In fact, many Muslims themselves do not realize exactly what is being demanded of them. In reality, as shall be seen, many human rights proponents are demanding the right to overrule and judge virtually every aspect of the religion, including even the most intimate relations between husband and wife. Muslims, they argue, must change their religion according to the principles and laws of the ultimate judge: human rights. (Without trying to jump too far ahead, someone could argue that theoretically this is justifiable. However, one had best have a very strong and acceptable basis for making such demands on other peoples of this world.)

Quoted by Anthony C. Yu, Enduring Change: Confucianism and the Prospect of Human Rights, in Elizabeth M. Bucar and Barbra Barnett, eds., Does Human Rights Need God? (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), p. 107.

Thus, for example, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, a strong proponent of human rights who holds Muslim countries accountable for their practices since they signed the UDHR and similar other accords2, writes,
Muslims may have the sincere conviction that their religious tradition requires deviations from international law, and such private beliefs must be respected. However, the situation becomes different when beliefs that Islamic rules should supersede human rights are marshaled to promote campaigns or measures for stripping others of rights to which they are entitled under international law or when such beliefs are cited to buttress governmental policies and laws that violate the International Bill of Rights. The resulting curbs on rights and freedoms go well beyond the realm of protected private beliefs and enter the domains of politics and law.3

In a work entitled Womens Rights Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives, Mayer wrote an article in which she delineated some of what must be removed from Muslim practices. The reader should note how many of the following clearly and without question violate direct texts of the Quran or Sunnah,
Laws [in the Muslim Middle East] commonly provide that the wife must obey her husband, that wives are not allowed to work outside the home without their husbands permission, that men may take up to four wives, that a Muslim woman may not marry outside the faith, and that women are entitled to only one-half the inheritance share that men inherit in the same capacity. Depending on the country involved, one may find that women are compelled to wear concealing garments in public that their testimony in court is excluded or valued at one-half the weight of a mans, that they are not allowed to travel without the permission of a male relative or unless accompanied by a male relative Obviously it would be hard to justify the retention of such laws if one took seriously international norms such as Article 2 of CEDAW [Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in force since 1918], requiring all states to pursue all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women.4

Howland takes up where Mayer left off. She concludes that the laws of Islam concerning the internal structure of the family, womans dress, marriage laws, inheritance and so on are all violations of womens human rights as recognized by the UN. For example, she writes, [M]any
2

This is obviously a very important point. It seems, though, that many nations who signed such documents would not understand that the demands of those documents are of the nature as explained by some human rights activists. Furthermore, few Muslim countries have ratified the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women) and, among those who have, they entered reservations on some of its points. Mayer, however, argues that such reservations are not valid because they are incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or convention involved. Mayer, Cultural, p. 178. See also Courtney Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis under the United Nations, in Bucar and Barnett, op cit. pp. 199-200. Iran and Sudan, for example, have both objected to certain laws on the basis of their religion. The question of which law takes precedence is still a debated issue but it seems that international law and human rights platforms lean to the conclusion that a religion or culture cannot be used to violate human rights agreements. In reality, the predominance of one may lead to the downfall of the other: If cultural or religious norms or local law overrules international laws on human rights, the human rights issue becomes a farce. On the other hand, if international laws on human rights overrule local cultures and religions, freedom of belief and practice becomes a farce. Hence, this debate is definitely not a minor issue. 3 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p. xv. 4 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Cultural Particularism as a Bar to Womens Rights: Reflections on the Middle Eastern Experience, in Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, eds., Womens Rights Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 177.

religious fundamentalist systems of marriage and divorce require women to submit to their husbands, and even obey their husbands. These laws conflict with two areas of protection in the Universal Declaration: liberty rights and equality rights.5 She then shows that there is no legitimate argument to defend such religious practices. She further argues that states have a responsibility, therefore, to work against any such laws and against any such parties that may try to impose such laws. She states, for example, A state would be permitted, and indeed may have a duty, to outlaw religious practices that are systematically violative of women's liberty and equal rights. Under this approach, it is arguable that states with strong religious fundamentalist movements, including, for example, Japan, Italy, Sri Lanka, and the United States, may have a duty to pass laws prohibiting the practice of requiring wives to be obedient.6 Finally, she argues that the other member states of the UN must take punitive actions against those countries that have allowed religious-fundamentalist laws to be part of their corpus of laws. As she states it, All enforcement mechanisms at the community's disposal should be used to coerce these pariah states to cease violating articles 55 and 56. It is time for the international community to live up to the standards of the Charter and the Universal Declaration.7 Finally, Georgina Ashworth, a well-known womens rights advocate, goes even further and impliesnot so subtlythat there is no room for religion or claims of revelation from God when it comes to violating what has been determined by some to be fundamental human rights. She wrote, for example,
There remain the threats of religious fundamentalists who, whether in the United States or the Islamic and Hindu worlds, now constitute enormous political forces ranged against womens enjoyment of their human rights, especially their reproductive rights. Not only do they persecute and make outcasts of proponents of toleration, they also threaten the livelihoods and even the security of anyone courageous enough to stand up for womens selfdetermination. The combined claim of unique righteousness in the interpretation and fulfillment of their faiths and the right to exterminate heretics makes them sainted perpetrators of human rights violations, who deny their human accountability by calling on metaphysical support. 8

The above are just examples of far-reaching changes that some human rights activists demand of Muslims. The sad aspect is that, in reality, if the human rights activists were truly interested in relieving the plight of the masses throughout the Muslim world, there would be many steps that they could take within the culture, beliefs and religion of the people. Unfortunately, Muslim civilization has been in decline for a long time. Consequently, due to the peoples ignorance of their own religion, many non-Islamic practices have crept into the Muslims lives. Muslim scholars and activists have been working hard to encourage the Muslims to change their ways and sincerely apply Islam completely in their lives. Many such improper practices touch upon the human rights of women, laborers, children, the poor and others. Since many human rights activists who critique Islam are often feminists, the plight of Muslim women
5

Howland, p. 187. Note that Howland was not writing about Islam alone but also Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism. In particular, the targets of her arguments are those that she describes as fundamentalists among these different religions. 6 Howland, p. 198. 7 Howland, p. 201. 8 Georgina Ashworth, The Silencing of Women, in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, eds., Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 273.

shall be highlighted here. In her article on fundamentalist religious practices, Howland cited the following laws,
In 1990 Iraq decreed that according to its fundamentalist ideology, men were allowed to kill their womenfolk for adultery. Since the killing is based on the husband's (not a court's) assessment of the situation, it may easily occur if the adultery is merely feared or suspected rather than real. Kurdistan has recently passed a law absolving a man for murder of his wife if he can prove she was morally disobedient.9

Such practices are not part of Islam and are simply cultural in nature. In fact, they contradict the laws of Islam. Muslim scholars should definitely work to remove such a law and grant the Muslim woman her proper rights. The laws of evidence in Islam are very strict. In particular, if a man claims that his wife has committed adultery but he cannot provide four witnesses to that effect, he can only resort to liaan, which is a process whereby the husband and wife are simply separated (no other punishment occurs to the woman). Furthermore, legal punishments in Islam are to be implemented by the state not by individual citizens. In some parts of India, the Muslim woman still pays the dowry, based on old Hindu practices, which puts great stress on such women and their families. Similarly, in some parts of the Indo-Pak subcontinent, the woman only gets her dower in case of divorce or death, and even then she many times does not receive it. All of these cultural practices are against the explicit laws of Islam or the spirit of its legislation and they all adversely affect the status of women and their human rights. Additionally, Ashworth, for example, notes that, many feminists regard [pornography] as an affront to human dignity.10 Indeed, pornography, prostitution and sex slaves are massive worldwide problems that everyone should consider affronts to human rights and dignity. Muslim scholars and activists are vehemently opposed to all activities of this nature. (Sadly, Muslims are sometimes criticized for their opposition to pornography, as some consider this a question of freedom of expression.) Development economists have long emphasized education as a key ingredient to relieving the plight of the worlds most miserable, men and women. Islam emphasizes knowledge for all, males and females. The Prophet (peace and blessings of God be upon him) stated, The seeking of knowledge is obligatory upon every Muslim.11 Muslim activists, Muslim governments and human rights activists should all be working to remove this fundamental blight upon the Muslim community today. However, instead of writing about how such fundamental human rights can be met within Muslim cultures, with the support of the Muslim scholars and workers, human rights activists have continually called for an overhaul of Islamic society and have presented Muslims with a complete basket of goods that they are trying to force upon the Muslims. This automatically and unnecessarily presents Muslims with very difficult and complicated choices. It should be noted that Muslims are of various kinds. There are numerous Muslims who grew up as Muslims but only have some faint belief in Islam while having never studied Islam in detail. These Muslims may easily be swayed and convinced to give up portions of their faith in the name of human rights or other types of ideologies. However, there are also numerous Muslims who grew up as Muslims and who have also studied the religion in detail, leading them to be firm believers in the religion from both a rational and emotional perspective. For the most part, these make up the leaders of the Muslim masses throughout the Muslim world and beyond.
9

Howland, p. 171. Ashworth, p. 273. 11 Recorded by al-Baihaqi and numerous others. According to al-Albaani, it is sahih. See al-Albaani, Saheeh alJaami al-Sagheer (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islaami, 1986), vol. 2, p. 727.
10

There are yet others who have converted to Islam via a study of life, philosophies and religions, leading them as well to the clear conviction that this religion has come from God alone and that its teachings are indeed divine. Now, for these latter two groups of people, the proponents of human rights theories must present very strong logical and rational arguments to support their claims. If they do not, they are simply asking Muslims to give up portions of their faith simply on blind faith in what the human rights advocates are proclaiming. Blind faith may be a cornerstone of some other faiths but it is definitely not so of Islam and something more will definitely be needed before Muslim scholars and leaders are sold on the question of changing their religion in the name of human rights. This debate and friction concerning Islamic practices has led Muslims to rightfully ask: Based on what are Muslims supposed to turn their back on their religion and culture? In other words, what strong foundation are these human rights claims based on that could convince a rational Muslim to accept them and disregard the teachings that he believes have come from God? This, then, leads to a very essential question: On what is the contemporary concept of human rights based on?

The Basis of Human Rights

Even among human rights advocates, the very basis for each and every human right is left as an open question or disputed. Thus, when speaking about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Bucar and Barnett state,
UDHR had a limited goal, to articulate the specific human rights that member states could agree upon. The limited nature of this project is reflected in French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritains comment on the debates preceding its drafting: We agree on these rights, providing we are not asked why. With the why, the dispute begins. The text of the UDHR follows Maritains advice, intentionally remaining vague and general on the why of human rights. The UDHR affirms that the inherent dignity [of and] the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, but bases these rights on an unnamed, unspecified, ungrounded common understanding. 12

The question of the basis for human rights is actually a very important question and cannot be ignored any longer if human rights activists wish to spread their message to the entire world. This is especially true when one is speaking about the relationship between Islam, Muslims and human rights. It is argued here that understanding the basis for human rights is also the key in understanding what should be considered a basic human right and what are the limits and parameters of any specific human right. In reality, it is these specific points that have led to the current dispute concerning human rights and the claim that Islam violates human rights. For brevitys sake, two strands of human rights reasoning will be discussed here.13 One argues that human rights are in need of religion, God or something of that nature. The question of Gods role or religions role is a greatly debated issue. As such, it is tackled, for example, in the recently published work Does Human Rights Need God? as well as in the first
12

Elizabeth M. Bucar and Barbra Barnett, eds., Does Human Rights Need God? (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), pp. 1-2. 13 A third approach, wherein the question of the bases of human rights is simply ignored, is simply no longer defensible. As Jean Bethke Elshtain wrote, Are we to take the premise of human dignity as a Kiplingesque Just so story? That doesn't seem a very sturdy foundation upon which to erect something as fundamental, powerful, and important as human rights. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Afterword, in Bucar and Barnett, eds., Does Human Rights Need God?, p. 292.

essay of Michael J. Perrys The Idea of Human Rights: Four Enquiries. A second school of human rights reasoning states that human rights are based on what is known as natural law. Robert George is one of the leading proponents of this view of human rightsa view which is probably much closely to the roots of the contemporary human rights movement in the West. Thus, according to Holmes, Despite the preeminence of customary law, natural law can be seen to underlie the Nuremberg Charter and the Human Rights Declaration of the United Nations.14 Without going into too much detail, only the logical foundations of each approach shall be discussed here. Natural law shall be discussed first. The definition of natural law as given by the Oxford English Dictionary is, in political and legal philosophy and theology, doctrines based on the theory that there are certain unchanging laws which pertain to mans nature, which can be discovered by reason, and to which man-made laws should confirm.15 Holmes describes the history of natural law theory:
Natural law dates back at least as far as the Stoics, and perhaps to Anaximander. The Stoics conceived of nature as a rational manifestation of God and took rightness and duty to be determined by what accords with it Natural law so conceived contains the criteria for judging moral rightness and wrongness. It in unchangeable and transcends manmade laws. It provides a natural standard by which to judge human, or 'positive', law as well as the conduct of peoples of different countries who may not be bound together by positive laws. Sometimes such law is represented as taking the form of precepts impressed by common sense upon the minds of all persons, sometimes as taking the form of natural inclinations that are a part of human nature. Aquinas, who Christianized the concept, represents it in both ways. In his view natural law is part of eternal law, God's plan for the governance of the whole of creation, and as such it perfects man unto wellbeing and happiness in his relation to the natural world and his fellow men. In a more general sense, however, natural law theory is simply the view that moral considerations are or should be the governing considerations behind positive law. In this sense it need not have the implications associated with the formulations of Cicero and Aquinas, and may simply represent an appeal to morality in the formulation and assessment of laws.16

George, a leading expert in the New Natural Law Theory, states,

A natural law theory is, in essence, a critical reflective account of the constitutive aspects of the well-being and fulfillment of human persons and the communities they form. Such a theory will propose to identify principles of right actionmoral principlesspecifying the first and most general principle of morality, namely, that one should choose to act in ways that are compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment. Among these principles are respect for the rights people possess simply by virtue of their humanityrights which, as a matter of justice, others are bound to respect, and governments are bound not only to respect but, to the extent possible, protect.17

From these descriptions of natural law, it seems fairly obvious that such a theory cannot come up with detailed laws or prescriptions concerning what to do in the face of conflicting rightsand this is where many of the contemporary problems lay. Furthermore, natural law presents a very optimistic view of human reasoning. A brief history of some of the conclusions of natural law thinking in the past should lead one to be very cautious on this front. One area in which natural law was historically repeatedly invoked involves war, in particular what is known as a just war. Thus, for example, as Spain was moving across the new world, Francesco Victoria was asked whether the Christians could use military force to convert the Indians to Christianity. His reply was in the negative. However, he further stated that the Spaniards, by natural law, had the right to preach Christianity as well as the right to pass
14

Robert L. Holmes, Can War Be Morally Justified? The Just War Theory, in Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Theory (New York: New York University Press, 1992), p. 205. 15 Oxford English Dictionary on CD-ROM (Oxford University Press, Second Edition), under the entry, natural. 16 Holmes, p. 204. 17 Robert P. George, Natural Law and Human Rights: A Conversation, in Elizabeth M. Bucar and Barbra Barnett, eds., Does Human Rights Need God?, p. 135.

through Indian lands. If the Indians refused these two, which they should know by virtue of the fact that they are natural law, the Spaniards would then have the right to use military force against them. Unfortunately, it seems that the Indians were not aware of these natural laws. As James Turner Johnson wrote, The rights of which Victoria spoke were conceived by him as universal, as natural; yet the Indians knew nothing of them. They were in fact historically derived from the customary practices of European societies. In the name of natural law Victoria was justifying cultural imperialism.18 Even more endearing for the natural law theory is the following quote from Bainton who, noting Victorias reasoning, stated, Later the great theologian Sepulveda adapted the theory of the just war to the new situation by having recourse to its most ancient formulation declared by Aristotle, who had said that a just war is one waged to enslave those who by nature are destined to be slaves and who resist their destiny.19 Someone may argue that that is the old natural law and human beings have moved beyond such thoughts. Actually, that is exactly the point. Those promulgators of natural law, dating back to Aristotle and then to later Christian theorists, all proclaimed their teachings to be universal truths, just like the human rights advocates of today. In fact, the reasoning is the same that is, it is human reasoning with all of its limitations and biases. In the same way that today one may look back at earlier natural law conclusions with contempt and disgust, maybe some day people will look back at their claims of today with the same contempt and disgust as it becomes revealed (as shall be noted later) that their claims were simply illogical and flawed. There is yet another point to be made concerning natural law theory which is directly related to some of the feminist claims concerning human rights. In her article, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis under the United Nations, Howland does an excellent job of reviewing beliefs of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism concerning women. The adherents of these faiths have historically constituted the vast majority of humans. If one were to assume for the sake of argument that there has been no revelation from God and that none of those faiths had any divine teachings, one would probably be forced to conclude that the greatest minds of humankind have come to certain conclusions concerning women and their roles in life. Why are those conclusions believed in by the vast majority of humans not considered the natural law that is obvious and universal in nature? Certainly, if all the religions of the world and their leading thinkers came to certain conclusions about women, doesnt that mean that such is the culmination of human reasoning and should be respected? If one answers that all of those diverse, worldwide communities were wrong, then doesnt that point to the fact that human reasoning is not very good when it comes to these issues? If it missed the point concerning such points for centuries, isnt it the case that the enlightened thought today about human rights can certainly be nothing more than wrong again? Is it on the basis of something of this nature that proponents of human rights are asking Muslims to disregard clear texts of the Quran and Sunnah? On what rational basis could Muslims succumb to such an argument? Indeed, the rational approach would be to say that this is simply not sufficient for one to turn ones back on what one has reason to believe is a revelation from God. In reality, once one removes God and His revelation from human rights and refers to nature as the source of inspiration, one is definitely traversing a slippery slope. All sorts of
18

James Turner Johnson, Historical Roots and Sources of the Just War Tradition in Western Culture, in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, Historical and Theoretical Perspectives On War And Peace In Western And Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 26. Also see p. 17 of the same work. 19 Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War & Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1990), p. 166.

questions arise, including whether there is any noble purpose in life that would require one to respect other humans or that there is some dignity involved in simply being humanyet this is the very basis for a secular belief in human rights. In fact, referring to nature has historically led people to very different conclusions from the contemporary natural law supporters. Thus,
Herbert Spencer wrote in Social Statics (1850), The forces which are working out the great scheme of perfect happiness, taking no account of incidental suffering, exterminate such sections of mankind as stand in their way. This is a train of thought Charles Lyell had pursued twenty years earlier in Principles of Geology: if the most significant and diminutive of species ... have each slaughtered their thousands, why should not we, the lords of creation, do the same? His student, Charles Darwin, confirmed in The Descent of Man (1871) that at some future period not very distant as measured in centuries, the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate and replace throughout the world the savage races. After Darwin, comments Sven Lindqvist in his survey of European thought on genocide, it became accepted to shrug your shoulders at genocide. If you were upset, you were just showing your lack of education.20

Similarly, when speaking about the basis for human rights, Elshtain notes,
Perhaps one might make recourse to nature and nature's laws, although here the post-Darwinian understanding of nature and the survival of the fittest does not seem the stuff out of which human rights is derived. Nature pre-Darwin could be appealed to in a strongly teleological sense. But nature post-Darwin seems a rather different sort of entityfar more likely to feed the fancies of authors of tomes arguing that pitying and trying to spare the weakest and least fit is womanish sentimentalism (though "womanish" would likely be avoided in a day and age when sensitivity about gender, not about weakness, is pervasive). There are all sorts of ways to dress the thesis of survival of the fittest up in its Sunday-best, of course, so it sounds a good bit less harsh. We are more likely, therefore, to read about "evolutionary strategies" than about a harsh neo-Darwinism, but, one way or the other, it comes down to the conclusion that, if nature structures anything, it is the quest for survival.21

One could actually easily argue that there is nothing in nature that would state that all humans deserve equal rights or respect in any manner. Doesnt the alpha wolf have much more rights than the others in the pack? In fact, even with respect to males and females, hasnt secular science discovered that womens brains are smaller than mens, as well as many other differences between the two sexes? Shouldnt a natural law, based on the obvious signs of nature as can be universally witnessed by reason, reflect these differences? If not, on what basis are these natural differences to be ignored? These reflect some of the basic philosophical problems that one faces when basing ones belief about human rights on natural law or on a secular basis. In sum, nature or atheism/agnosticism does not seem to be a strong basis for human rights or even a basic respect for other humans. This fact has led many to conclude that for human rights to have any meaning at all, some belief in religion or God is necessary. Thus, R. H. Tawney, for example, stated, The essence of all morality is this: to believe that every human being is of infinite importance, and therefore that no consideration of expediency can justify the oppression of one by another. But to believe this it is necessary to believe in god.22 Robert George, the natural law expert, states, interestingly enough,
Most, but not all, natural law theorists are theists. They believe that the moral order, like every other order in human experience, is what it is because God creates and sustains it as such. In accounting for the intelligibility of the created order, they infer the existence of a free and creative intelligencea personal God. Indeed, they typically argue that God's creative free choice provides the only ultimately satisfactory account of the existence of the intelligibilities humans grasp in every domain of inquiry. Natural law theorists do not deny that God can reveal moral truths and most believe that God has chosen to reveal many such truths.
20

Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), p. 262. 21 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Afterword, in Bucar and Barnett, eds., Does Human Rights Need God?, op cit., p. 292. 22 Quoted in Michael J. Perry, The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Natural law theorists also affirm, however, that many moral truths, including some that are revealed, can also be grasped by ethical reflection apart from revelation. They assert, with St. Paul, that there is a law "written on the hearts" even of the Gentiles who did not know the law of Moses. So the basic norms against murder and theft, though revealed in the Decalogue, are knowable even apart from God's special revelation. The natural law can be known by us, and we can conform our conduct to its terms, by virtue of our natural human capacities for deliberation, judgment, and choice.23

If this statement by this natural law expert is true, then it furthers the case for an Islamic view of human rights. First, if there is a Creator and God, who could possibly have more rights to determine what a human right is other than the Creator? Can human beings truly usurp that right from God and somehow claim that they themselves have the sole or dominant right in determining what is a human right? Secondly, if that Creator has revealed moral truths, can anyone have the right to overrule such a revelation? In fact, if that Creator has revealed detailed laws, doesnt it behoove the creation to follow what God has revealed and not try to set themselves up as rivals to God in this matter? Note that in the Quran, God has not simply revealed general moral guidance but very detailed laws. Once again, the problem of human rights, as the issue is presently being mandated, is not an issue of matters that are clear to reason, such as basic norms against murder and theft, as George described it. But it has to do with detailed rights of individuals, even including the organizational structure of the family, the right to sexual relations outside of the institutions of marriage, the right to end a pregnancy if the woman feels she does not wish to bear a child and so on. As Georges statement above implicitly demonstrates, no one can claim that these types of issues are grasped by ethical reflection apart from revelation. The Muslim argument is that there is actually no proof that humans are able to soundly guide themselves on these issues. On these types of issues, they are totally dependent upon guidance from God. This means, again, that if Gods revelation is out there and available, as Muslims believe, then there is no rational reason to discard it in favor of some man-made theory (that of natural law) which has had a very unreliable history, to say the least. This, then, brings up directly to the role of God and religion in human rights.

The Role of God and Religion in Human Rights

It is not unusual to read authors claiming that the concept of human rights is a Western invention. For example, Ann Mayer writes, Concepts of human rights are just one part of a cluster of institutions transplanted since the nineteenth century from the West.24 Again, J. Donnelly wrote,
Most non-western cultural and political traditions lack not only the practice of human rights but the very concept. As a matter of historical fact, the concept of human rights is an artifact of modern western civilization.25

It is, therefore, important to note that much of what makes up the contemporary view of human rights is Western in nature and origin. It is very important to recognize this history in order to recognize many of the basic assumptions and biases under which this movement has grown and developed.
23 24

George, pp. 140-141. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p. 9. 25 J. Donnelly, Human Rights and Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Human Rights Conceptions American Political Science Review (1982, 76), p. 303.

In fact, the history of one stream of human rights thought, perhaps the most dominant stream, stems from a break with religion that was unique to the Western world. The history of the conflict between science and Christianity is well-known and need not be detailed here.26 As scholars moved away from religion, they emphasized that entity discussed earlier known as natural law, which accompanied a strong belief that humans on their own, free of any interference from religion, could construct the best of all possible worlds. The Encyclopedia Britannica aptly describes the development in human rights thinking and its relationship to this breaking away from the Church and reliance on rational thought in Europe:
It was primarily for the 17th and 18th centuries, however, to elaborate upon this modernist conception of natural law as meaning or implying natural rights. The scientific and intellectual achievements of the 17th century--the discoveries of Galileo and Sir Isaac Newton, the materialism of Thomas Hobbes, the rationalism of Ren Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the pantheism of Benedict de Spinoza, the empiricism of Francis Bacon and John Locke-encouraged a belief in natural law and universal order; and during the 18th century, the so-called Age of Enlightenment, a growing confidence in human reason and in the perfectability of human affairs led to its more comprehensive expression. Particularly to be noted are the writings of the 17th-century English philosopher John Locke--arguably the most important natural law theorist of modern times--and the works of the 18th-century Philosophes centred mainly in Paris, including Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Philosophes, building on Locke and others and embracing many and varied currents of thought with a common supreme faith in reason, vigorously attacked religious and scientific dogmatism, intolerance, censorship, and socialeconomic restraints. They sought to discover and act upon universally valid principles harmoniously governing nature, humanity, and society, including the theory of the inalienable "rights of Man" that became their fundamental ethical and social gospel.27

It is very important to understand and realize this background of the human rights movement because it still has a strong influence on the movement today. There was a clear movement away from the authority of any type of religion to the authority of what they so nicely call human reasoningor, even stronger, what they claim to be fundamental truths about the nature of humans. This is not to say that previous religious beliefs, those of Christianity or Judaism, had no influence on the development of human rights reasoning. Many have argued that there was an influence. However, the key issue is that the ultimate authority of the church or organized religion had to be rejected and the European had to be free from its dominance before human rights thinking truly made an impact. It seems, more than anything else, that, in reality, there was simply a shift from one religion to another: from church Christianity to belief in some form of secular humanism. This fact is only sometimes explicitly recognized or admitted by human rights activists. Human rights proponents spread and insist upon their agenda as if
26

A classic work on the history of the Christian/European experience concerning the conflict between religion and science is John William Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (Order of Thelemic Knights, 2005). Note that his title should actually be corrected, since it is the history of the conflict between science and Christianity in Europe. In his work, A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), the same John William Draper divides the history of Europe into the age of faith followed by the age of reason, highlighting once again the conflict that exists in Christianity in particular (but also in Judaism) but reason and science vis--vis faith. Islam, it should be noted, never experienced such a crisis. 27 Encyclopdia Britannica. Encyclopdia Britannica 2004 Ultimate Reference Suite. (Chicago: Encyclopdia Britannica, 2004).

their beliefs are free and independent of any kind of blind faith and dogmatism. The reality is that nothing could be further from the truth. The important point to be noted here is that the causes behind the weakening of the authority of the Church in the West have no parallels in Islam. There was no conflict between science and religion that made people doubt the Islamic scripture. There were no errors found in the textas was discovered through Higher Biblical Criticismthat made the people realize that humans played a direct role in what they possess as revelation. Again, the Quran is the revealed Word of God that has been minutely preserved since the time of the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of God be upon him), as many non-Muslim scholars have attested to. It is due to the fact that Islam never experienced what Christianity experienced that it is often difficult to sway Muslims and convince them not to follow the literal wording of the revelation that they have received. Indeed, this authora convert to Islamwould argue that there is no logical reason for Muslims to turn their back on the revelation they possess, as opposed to what happened in the history of European Christianity. It is true, though, that Jews and Christians are starting to reclaim human rights and argue that human rights, even in the West, are fundamentally based on their religious teachings.28 Perhaps this is partly due to the popularity of the concept of human rights as well as the disappointing overall failure of maintaining human rights on an international level. People realize that something more needs to sustain the beliefs about human rights. Hence, religion is once again injected into the picturealthough definitely not in the same manner by all researchers. This belated interest in God/religion and human rights is the inspiration for the recently published work, Does Human Rights Need God? In the introduction, Bucar and Barnett summarize the different approaches concerning the relationship between God (or religion) and human rights. The first approach they term the theological approach. This is the approach of those who argue that the concept of human rights is religiously grounded. The editors note about the authors who take such an approach, Often these theologians and religion scholars conclude that human rights is fundamentally flawed if not grounded in a religiously sanctified notion of human life.29 The second approach is a historical approach, focusing on religious intolerance and the role of intolerance in violations of other human rights norms, as evidenced by ethnic cleansing and campaigns of genocide.30 The authors critique of this view is that, [p]ursued in isolation, this approach may distract us from recognizing how religious traditions might contribute to a more robust international human rights regime and to a safer world.31 The third approach they call the cultural approach. Their comments on this approach include the following:
[The cultural approach] focuses on the relationship between the universality of a human rights ideal and the diverse articulations of particular religious norms for human life. This approach often focuses on the charge that human rights are an invention of the Christian West and have no role in the non-West, a concept most
28

In many cases, this revival has been slow and limited. See, for example, Charles Villa-Vicencio, God, the Devil, and Human Rights: A South African Perspective, in Bucar and Barnett, pp. 225ff, for a review of late religious claims to human rights thought. 29 Bucar and Barnett, p. 4. 30 Note that although Islam is often being targeted as being intolerant, the historical facts speak differently. Hence, Mann writes, Islam was more internally differentiated and tolerant Christianity became the least tolerant of the worlds salvation religions. It practiced more religious cleansing, killing people of who rather than where they were. Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 42. 31 Bucar and Barnett, p. 5.

famously modeled in Samuel Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilizations. A similar approach grounds volumes exploring the arguments for Asian values made by some Asian officials and their supporters who reject the imposition of Western values. Focus on diverse articulations of human rights has the advantage of raising the question of whether human rights has the same meaning within an array of cultural contexts. This is not simply a question of empty rhetoric or semantics: real cultural diversity may be at the root of much debate over human rights and consequent challenges to their implementation 32

The Islamic approach encompasses the first view and then definitely goes beyond the description that the authors above mentioned. Muslims would argue that, as Bucar and Barnett stated it, human rights is fundamentally flawed if not grounded in a religiously sanctified notion of human life.33 However, not only is any type of belief in human rights to be grounded in belief in God but the exact rights and the limitations upon them are known only from God. In fact, these aspects can only be known via revelation from God. If anything else, in this authors view, the history of the human rights movement clearly indicates this. To this day, there are disputes over what should be considered fundamental human 34 rights. As was already noted, a very important question that secular human rights advocates have historically had difficulties answering is: On what basis can one claim that something is a fundamental human right? A follow-up question is, obviously: Do humans truly have the knowledge and ability to determine what are fundamental human rights? Shouldnt the determining of such fundamental human rights be related to knowledge of the very essence and souls of humans while it must be admitted that humans have had very little success in penetrating the vast mysteries of the human soul? The Islamic answer to these types of question is quite simple: It is the Creator who has the knowledge and authority to determine what is a fundamental human right and no one else. Only God can determine in an unbiased manner and in a manner that is most consistent with human nature, as well as individual and societal needs, what must be considered the fundamental rights of humans. To leave such a grave matter solely to human reasoningwhich has differed over the rights and have obviously changed their minds over time as to what such rights should beand distanced from the revelation from God is fraught with danger. Thus, God says in the Quran, And if the truth had been in accordance with their desires, verily, the heavens and the earth, and whosoever is therein would have been corrupted (23:71). Incidentally, there is yet another important difference between the Islamic view of human rights and any secular view of human rights. Muslims see the human rights sanctioned by Islam as God-given rights that cannot be violated in any way. They are not political weapons that are defended only when politically expedient and otherwise simply ignored. In obedience to God, a Muslim must respect the rights of others as given by the religion of Islam. This has been manifested in the behavior of Muslims throughout their history. Even when war had to be resorted to, Muslims had very strict guidelines that they had to abide by and they were known to abide by them. During the crusades, for example, one does not find examples of Muslim armies perpetuating the kind of violence and slaughter that took place at the hands of the Crusaders when they entered Jerusalem. Similarly, this author is fairly certain that Muslims never committed the kinds of atrocities that were committed recently at Abu Ghraib, although they
32

Bucar and Barnett, p. 5. The authors go on to write (p. 6), These approaches are essential to any conversation regarding God and human rights, but it is our belief as editors that exclusive focus on one approach at the expense of others oversimplifies this complex and dynamic issue. Accordingly, this volume seeks to guide us through a deep and even-handed investigation that brings all three of these approaches into conversation together and, in so doing, raises the discourse to a new level. 33 Bucar and Barnett, p. 4. 34 Note the name of Larry Alexanders recent book, Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression?

were committedand sometimes even defendedby a people who claim to believe in human rights, freedom, democracy and so forth. Thus, for example, Noam Chomsky, in The Umbrella of U.S. Power: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy, gives plenty examples of the contradictory, double-faced policy of the United States, including the Shah of Iran, various governments in Latin America and so on. Once human rights becomes no more than a political toolwhich can occur easily if the entire concept is not based solely on ones religious attachment to such idealsit becomes a completely meaningless concept. (Probably most everyone sees that in todays War on Terror, human rights definitely take a distant back seat.) Finally, when humans discuss and determine human rights, their scope must be very limited. They can only discuss worldly aspects. In this way, they are neglecting the most important right of a humana right that can only be granted by God. To know this right, one has to turn to revelation and the prophets. The Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of God be upon him) explained this right when he was speaking to one of his companions. He said, Do you know what the right of God upon His servants is? The companion replied, God and His Messenger know best. The Prophet (peace and blessings of God be upon him) then said, The right of God upon His servants is that He is to be worshipped alone and have no partner ascribed to Him. Then after a while he asked his companion, Do you know what the right of the servants is upon God if they adhere to that? He replied, God and His Messenger know best. The Prophet (peace and blessings of God be upon him) then told him, The right of the servants upon God is that He will not punish them.35

Paradoxes and Problems within Human Rights Theory: The Freedom of Religion
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares, Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. Here is one of the greatest irresolvable paradoxes of the entire philosophy of the human rights movement. (Note that this is not the only irresolvable paradox of this philosophy. However, the other paradoxes can be considered parallel to this one, while this aspect is the most important for the present discussion.) This article clearly states that everyone must be free to believe whatever they wish and to manifest that belief or religion in public or private via practice, worship and observance. In reality, though, this is not true and cannot possibly be true given the other restrictions of the human rights theory. Perhaps no statement highlights this glaring contradiction better than Howlands statement, Moreover, international law does not require that states be secular or that church and state be separated. A religious state, with its own municipal religious laws, merely needs to conform to international human rights standards.36 Similarly, after the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993, the New York Times stated that Washington warned that it would oppose any attempt to use

35 36

Recorded by al-Bukhari and Muslim. Howland, pp. 355-356.

religious and cultural traditions to weaken the concept of universal rights.37 In reality, in the name of human rights and freedom, there is no true freedom of religion. How, for example could proponents of human rights like Mayer, Howland and Ashworth be serious when they claim that there is freedom of religion but one cannot say that, for example, based on ones religion, the procedures for divorce by the man will be different than that for a woman or that a man is allowed to marry four wives but a woman is not? They are, in reality, stating first what the parameters of a religion must be. In essence, they are telling Muslims and others, You are free to believe what you wish along as it is within these parameters. This sounds a lot like Henry Fords famous statement, You can have the Model T in any color you want as long as it is black. They are telling the world that if one wants to be part of the modern, civilized world today, one must succumb to these principles without any exception or objection. In Howlands case in particular, she states that all countries must abide by these principles or otherwise they will have to face the wrath and sanctions of the civilized nations. When they speak and threaten in this fashion, they become just as dogmatic, fundamentalist and authoritarian as any religious fanatic or extremist. (This is also clear when reading the tenor of passages like that quoted from Mayer or Ashworth above.) More importantly, though, they fail to realize that they are contradicting their own claims in the freedom of belief and religion. Going back to Howlands statement, Moreover, international law does not require that states be secular or that church and state be separated. A religious state, with its own municipal religious laws, merely needs to conform to international human rights standards,38 this is not only an affront to religion but it strikes at the very root of Islamic belief: the belief in the sovereignty of God. Who is the ultimate authority, God or the framers of human rights documents? Can there be a more fundamental belief of a religion and yet it is being negated by those who are propagating human rights, among which is the freedom of belief. Now one is perhaps truly identifying the crux of the problem: the question is one of sovereignty, Gods versus humans. If this is not a fundamentally religious issue, nothing is. But it is the freedom of belief over this core issue that the human rights movement cannot accept. Nothing is to be permitted to override its mandates and principles, not God, religion, culture or anything. This explains why human rights advocates target not just Islam and Muslims. As found, for example, in Howlands article, it is all religions, be it Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and so onall who believe in some authority or sovereign other than those humans who made up the human rights platforms and principles. Actually, one can argue that the entire concept of Islam is in complete contradiction to these more extreme versions of human rights as propagated by many in the human rights movement today, including Howland, Mayer and others. The very meaning of Islam is, Submission to the will of God. As Maududi wrote, Islam is the submission to the revealed law, Shari'ah, and surrender of one's freedom to it.39 Thus, Islam is not about freedom in the sense of claiming so many rights for ones self and doing whatever one claims is his right. Islam is about a very different type of freedom: the freedom from worshipping anything other than God, whether it is ones passions (perhaps disguised as rights), desires, human rights, other beings, the state or whatever. One is giving up a false form of freedom for the true form of freedom. Looked at in this way, the human rights movement is trying to revive the false form of
37

Quoted in Noam Chomsky, The Umbrella of U.S. Power: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999), p. 11. 38 Howland, pp. 355-356. 39 Abul Ala Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1969), p. 69.

freedom that the final Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of God be upon him) clearly showed was not the true way of happiness for humankind. When seen in this light, the paradox and logical flaw of the human rights movement becomes glaring: In the name of freedom for all, no one is truly free to believe, as everyones freedom is actually restricted by some parameters laid down by mere humansdefinitely not Godin the name of freedom. But what is much worse is that this restriction on freedom is actually striking at the most important freedom and most fundamental belief, without which, for some, none of the other freedoms actually have any meaning. Indeed, this meaning was captured by Ambassador Seiple when he wrote, Thomas Jefferson always referred to religious liberty as the First Freedom, demonstrating his own understanding that if the mind and the heart are not free, nothing else really matters.40 Furthermore, this restriction on free belief is done in the name of freedom, leading people to believe that they are free while, in reality, they are certainly not free. One is reminded of Goethes famous words, None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free.41 Nothing can be done about this flaw in human rights theories. There can never be complete freedom. Everyone recognizes that freedoms need to be restricted. A famous statement is, Your freedom to swing your fist ends where my nose begins. In other words, there has to be some limits. But now this brings one full circle to the type of question that secular human rights advocates cannot adequately answer: Who truly has the knowledge, ability and fairness to determine what the limits on such freedoms are to be? Sadly, one now comes back to square one. The Islamic response, again, is that only God has that ability and therefore His teachings above all else should be submitted to. In sum, the human rights agenda as being promoted by many throughout the world today is a flawed agenda, with internal logical inconsistencies. As being promoted today, the human rights agenda is actually a replacement for religionin particular a religion like that of Islam. Perhaps there is no question that human rights must be respected but this can only be the case if those human rights are based on a firm foundation and are understood within the limits of other important parameters of life. These types of dilemmas and questions can only be solved by the complete and perfect revelation from God, which Muslims believe is contained in Islam and for which no rational alternative is offered by secular human rights advocates. Thus, instead of Muslims giving up on their religious beliefs, they should adhere to them more strictly to truly bring about the true human rights.

Conclusions
In this article, although they have yet to be mentioned explicitly, some essential questions have been asked concerning the contemporary view of human rights, especially as promoted by the more secular Western human rights theorists. These questions included: What are the bases for the specific rights that are being promoted? What is the role of God or religion in determining human rights and in restricting or overruling some of the components of human rights? Who is the ultimate authority in the grand scheme of issues, God or humans?
40 41

Ambassador Robert A. Seiple, Religious Freedom: A Legacy to Reclaim, in Bucar and Barnett, pp. 270-271. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, quoted in Abid Ullah Jan, The End of Democracy (Canada: Pragmatic Publishers & Distributors, 2003), p. 254.

What is demanded or expected by human rights proponents from the Muslims with respect to their religious beliefs and practices? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions as visualized by a secular human rights movement have not been satisfactory, to say the least. Like Christianity beforehand, Muslims are being requested to make a complete change in their paradigm of life. If the proposed new way of life was based upon something solidmore solid than what Muslims already believe init would be rational for Muslims to make such a wholesale change. The fact, however, is that the paradigm is not based on solid grounds and therefore it would actually be irrational for a Muslim who believes in his faith based on proof and evidence to make such a change. This forms the basic friction between many human rights advocates and those people who are called Islamists. This does not, in any way, mean that Islam or Muslims are completely against any concept of human rights. It simply means that, from an Islamic perspective, there is something unacceptable or flawed in the contemporary secular view of human rights. In other words, the perception of human rights from an Islamic perspective differs in some important ways from the perception of human rights as propounded by many contemporary human rights activists. It must be admitted even by secular proponents of human rights that the contemporary Western, secular concept of human rights cannot be considered the only concept of human rights. Furthermore, one can also question whether that concept of human rights is the best concept of human rights or whether it can be considered universal in nature. To elaborate further, in reality, there is no one single concept of human rights even among Western scholars and human rights advocates. As was noted earlier, even the very foundation for belief in fundamental human rights is not agreed upon. This author has no doubt that many, if not most, in the human rights movement are wellintended people. However, good intentions are not sufficient in and of themselves, especially when they are misguided. In the name of human dignity, human rights and freedom, the human rights movement as it stands today, in general, seeks to strip the human of the most precious of all of his beliefs and feelings: His/her relationship with God based on his/her hearts and his/her minds fullest conviction. In reality, there are many aspects in which human rights advocates can take advantage of Islams stance on various issues if they truly want to make a positive change in the lives of millions of people today. Islam specifically upholds many of the concepts that are today considered human rights, although Islam upheld them long before anyone proclaimed them human rights. Furthermore, Islam requires Muslims to always stand and support justice. This is a divine command that Muslims have historically upheld. Muslims have also shown that they are willing to make great sacrifices for the sake of justice. Human rights advocates should consider a very different attitude from that of approaching Islam and Muslims with an attitude of changing it and reforming itwhich will probably never be successful because the basis for their arguments are actually extremely weak. Indeed, they are asking of Muslims to uphold principles which are not even truly upheld in their own enlightened societies. It would be best for them to implement them in their own lands first and then they could set the example for others. This, by the way, would include the United States. It is noteworthy that the equal rights amendment (ERA) in the United States was not ratified yet. (According to the arguments presented above concerning Islam, there is no need for it to be passed as the US must already abide by such laws internally since it is a signatory to the UDHR and other conventions. Perhaps the human rights advocates do not make this too big of an issue because there are too many right-wing extremists in the US who are ready to completely disband the UN and bring an end to international law.)

In the end, though, the human rights platform and movement is not a complete way of life. It has internal flaws and inconsistencies, including its own bases. It cannot truly bring about freedom, especially since it is not completely based on what the Creator has stated, while the Creator is the only one who can truly recognize the needs of humans. It will never be considered a true replacement for Islam, as there is no logical reason for a person to give up his belief in Islam for this movement. Thus, if Muslims want to give the most they can to humankind, it will not be via giving up on the teachings of their faith for a vague and weak concept of human rights. It, instead, will be by going back to some of the fundamentals of their faith and applying them sincerely and honestly at all times, among Muslims, among nonMuslims, within Muslim lands and within non-Muslim lands. This will help bring some dignity back to humans and give them the rights they truly deserve.