Research Article

Controlling the Unconscious: Attentional Task Sets Modulate Subliminal Semantic and Visuomotor Processes Differentially
Ulla Martens1,2, Ulrich Ansorge3, and Markus Kiefer2

Psychological Science 22(2) 282 291 The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0956797610397056 http://pss.sagepub.com

1 Department of Psychology, University of Osnabrck; 2Department of Psychiatry, University of Ulm; and 3Department of Psychology, University of Vienna

Abstract Are unconscious processes susceptible to attentional influences? In two subliminal priming experiments, we investigated whether task sets differentially modulate the sensitivity of unconscious processing pathways. We developed a novel procedure for masked semantic priming of words (Experiment 1) and masked visuomotor priming of geometrical shapes (Experiment 2). Before presentation of the masked prime, participants performed an induction task in which they attended to either semantic or perceptual object features designed to activate a semantic or perceptual task set, respectively. Behavioral and electrophysiological effects showed that the induction tasks differentially modulated subliminal priming: Semantic priming, which involves access to conceptual meaning, was found after the semantic induction task but not after the perceptual induction task. Visuomotor priming was observed after the perceptual induction task but not after the semantic induction task. These results demonstrate that unconscious cognition is influenced by attentional control. Unconscious processes in perceptual and semantic processing streams are coordinated congruently with higher-level action goals. Keywords automatic processes, unconscious cognition, attentional control, semantic priming, visuomotor priming
Received 7/5/10; Revision accepted 9/23/10

Classical theories of attention and action control assume that cognitive control is exclusive to the domain of conscious cognition (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Unconscious cognition, in contrast, is characterized by the lack of top-down influences. This conception of unconscious cognition is reflected in the classical criteria for automaticity, in which unconsciousness is a hallmark of automatic processes. According to these criteria, an automatic process is triggered by an appropriate stimulus, irrespective of attention, task set, and action goal (for a critical discussion, see Kahneman & Chajczyk, 1983). The classical notion of uncontrollable unconscious cognition still influences contemporary conceptions of automaticity and cognitive control in domains such as semantic word processing (Duscherer & Holender, 2002), object or face recognition (Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; Wiese, Schweinberger, & Neumann, 2008), and emotional processing (Pessoa et al., 2002). Challenging this classical view, recent theories of automaticity suggest that even unconscious processing is crucially dependent on top-down attention, intention, and task sets (Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Kiefer, 2007; Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002; Neumann, 1984). Based on the same

general assumption, our proposed attentional-sensitization model explains how task sets influence a broad class of unconscious processes (Kiefer & Martens, 2010). According to this model, attentional influences originating from task sets enhance task-relevant unconscious processes while attenuating task-irrelevant unconscious processes. Much as conscious perception is influenced by attentional mechanisms (Reynolds, Pasternak, & Desimone, 2000), unconscious cognition is assumed to be controlled by top-down signals from prefrontal cortex (Haynes et al., 2007) that increase or decrease the sensitivity of processing pathways for incoming sensory input. Unlike conscious control, however, top-down control of unconscious cognition requires constructing task sets in advance of stimulus presentation (i.e., preemptive control) and cannot be initiated reactively in response to sensory input (Ansorge & Horstmann, 2007; Ansorge, Kiss, & Eimer, 2009; Kiefer, 2007; Kiefer & Martens, 2010).
Corresponding Author: Markus Kiefer, University of Ulm, Department of Psychiatry, Leimgrubenweg 12, 89075 Ulm, Germany E-mail: markus.kiefer@uni-ulm.de

Controlling the Unconscious Subliminal priming (e.g., facilitatory) effects elicited by masked stimuli that are not consciously perceived are typical examples reflecting such unconscious processes. In the present context, it is crucial that different forms of priming can be distinguished on the basis of the relation between prime and target (Kiefer, 2007). In response priming, responses are accelerated when masked primes require the same response that their targets do (Ansorge, Heumann, & Scharlau, 2002; Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003). This form of priming arises from visuomotor processes. Masked semantic priming, in contrast, reflects access to word meaning (Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Kiefer, 2002). It refers to a facilitation of responses to target words (e.g., table) when those words are preceded by semantically related masked prime words (e.g., chair). Event-related potentials (ERPs) recorded from the scalp capture task-specific priming processes on-line during task performance and can serve as a complement to behavioral priming effects. Semantic priming modulates the N400 ERP component, a negative deflection peaking at about 400 ms after stimulus onset and having a centro-parietal topography (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). The N400 semantic-priming effect is reflected by an attenuated N400 amplitude (i.e., relatively less negative voltage) in response to a target when the target is preceded by a semantically related prime as opposed to a semantically unrelated prime (Bentin, McCarthy, & Wood, 1985; Kiefer, Weisbrod, Kern, Maier, & Spitzer, 1998). Visuomotor response priming, in contrast, modulates ERPs over the occipito-parietal scalp in the time window between 200 ms and 400 ms after stimulus onset (Jaskowski, Skalska, & Verleger, 2003). Recently, we showed that unconscious semantic priming is susceptible to attentional control (Kiefer & Martens, 2010). In a novel paradigm, participants performed two tasks in quick succession: A subliminally primed lexical decision task (word/ pseudoword decision) was preceded by a semantic or a perceptual classification task that induced a semantic or a perceptual task set, respectively (see also Martens & Kiefer, 2009). In line with the predictions of the attentional-sensitization model, behavioral and electrophysiological data showed reliable masked semantic priming after the semantic induction task but not after the perceptual induction task. Hence, the activated semantic task set but not the perceptual task set sensitized semantic processing pathways. In the present study, we extended this research. We asked whether it is possible to switch different unconscious processes on or off depending on the nature of the currently activated task representation. We contrasted the influence of a perceptual induction task and a semantic induction task on masked semantic priming (Experiment 1) and visuomotor response priming (Experiment 2). The attentional-sensitization model predicts that perceptual induction tasks and semantic induction tasks differentially modulate these two forms of subliminal priming. A semantic induction task should boost semantic priming but not visuomotor priming. A perceptual

283 induction task should create the opposite effect and boost visuomotor priming but not semantic priming. Such a pattern would convincingly demonstrate that attentional sets exert task-specific influences on the unconscious mind by orchestrating processing congruently with higher-level goals.

Experiment 1
Experiment 1 investigated the modulatory influence of semantic and perceptual task sets on masked semantic priming (Kiefer & Martens, 2010). In an induction task, participants were shown object pictures and told to classify them semantically (as living or nonliving) or perceptually (as round or elongated). These object pictures activated a semantic or a perceptual task set, respectively (see Fig. 1). Subsequently, participants performed a subliminally primed lexical decision task. The interval between the response to the induction task and the onset of the prime (the response-prime interval, or RPI) in the lexical decision task was either 200 ms or 800 ms. We varied this interval to obtain information on how the induction task influenced masked priming over time. We expected the semantic induction task to sensitize semantic processing pathways and thus enhance semantic priming. In contrast, we expected the perceptual induction task to desensitize semantic processing pathways and therefore attenuate semantic priming. We expected to observe this pattern at only the short RPI (200 ms) because the task-switching literature suggests that a task representation is active for about 600 ms after task completion (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) but inhibited thereafter (Mayr & Keele, 2000).

Method
Participants. Twenty-three healthy, right-handed, native German speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated. Data from 2 participants were excluded because their error rate exceeded 25%. We excluded 1 further participant whose prime-identification rate exceeded chance performance. The remaining 20 participants (13 women and 7 men) had a mean age of 22.7 years. Materials. For the perceptual induction task, we used 200 gray-scale object images: 100 with a round shape and 100 with an elongated shape. For the semantic induction task, we used another 200 gray-scale images: 100 depicting a living object and 100 depicting a nonliving object. A pilot study for norming the stimuli (N = 8), in which participants were given the same instructions as in the main experiment (see Procedure), showed that reaction times (RTs) did not differ significantly between the perceptual task (M = 547.4 ms) and the semantic task (M = 551.0 ms), p > .82. The error rate was 0% in both tasks. In Experiment 1, reactions were slightly but significantly faster in the perceptual task than in the semantic task (see the Supplemental Material available online).

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Fixation Cross

750 ms

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200 or 800 ms

chair
33.5 ms

Prime

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table

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Masked Response Priming (Experiment 2)

Fig. 1. Trial sequence in Experiment 1 (left) and Experiment 2 (right). At the start of each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 750 ms. This was followed by a semantic or a perceptual induction task, in which a picture of an object appeared for 500 ms. A forward mask was presented for either 200 ms or 800 ms after the response to the induction task. This mask was followed by a prime (33.5 ms); in Experiment 1, the prime was a word that was either semantically related or semantically unrelated to the target, and in Experiment 2, the prime was a shape that required a left- or right-hand response. The prime was followed by a backward mask for 33.5 ms, and then the target appeared. The target in Experiment 1 was a letter string that required a lexical decision (word or pseudoword), and the target in Experiment 2 was a shape that had to be reported by a left- or right-hand response.

Primes and targets for the masked-priming paradigm were the same as in earlier studies (Kiefer, 2002; Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000). The stimulus set consisted of 320 German word-word pairs (plus 80 fillers) and 320 German word-pseudoword pairs (plus 80 fillers). Word-pseudoword

pairs served as distractors, and data from trials on which they were presented were not analyzed. The word-word combinations consisted of 160 semantically related pairs and 160 semantically unrelated pairs, with word length and frequency equal in the two semantic-relatedness conditions (Ruoff, 1990).

Controlling the Unconscious Procedure. In each trial (see Fig. 1), a fixation cross was presented for 750 ms. A picture of an object followed for 500 ms, and then the screen went blank until participants made a response. In the perceptual induction task, participants had to decide whether the object was round or elongated, and in the semantic induction task, they had to decide whether it was living or nonliving. Instructions emphasized response speed and accuracy. A participants response in the induction task triggered a forward mask, which consisted of a random string of 10 capital letters that was presented for 200 ms (short RPI) or 800 ms (long RPI). One hundred sixty filler trials with an intermediate RPI of 500 ms were also included to create a smoother transition across RPIs, but these trials were not analyzed. After the RPI, the prime word was displayed for 33.5 ms, followed by another random letter string (backward mask) for 33.5 ms. The backward mask was replaced by the target. Participants decided as quickly and accurately as possible whether or not the target was a real word and reported their decision by pressing one of two response buttons. Thereafter, three hash marks (###) prompted participants to initiate the next trial by pressing a button. The 640 experimental and 160 filler trials were presented across eight blocks (four blocks for each induction task), separated by breaks. Block order was counterbalanced across participants. Trial order was randomized with respect to semantic relatedness and RPI. All stimuli were displayed synchronously on a screen with a refresh rate of 16.67 ms. After the main experiment, we took an objective measure of prime identification (Kiefer, 2002). As masked stimuli, 80 words and 80 strings of identical letters (nine repetitions of a capital letter) were presented. Masked words were either semantically related or semantically unrelated to a subsequently presented word (40 trials per condition) to keep the stimulation comparable to that in the main experiment. Participants had to decide whether each masked stimulus was a word or a string of identical letters. To obtain a liberal estimate of masked prime identification, we used data from trials with the long RPI only; in these trials, the masking influence from the induction word was reduced. Participants were not able to correctly identify masked words (see the Supplemental Material). Electrophysiological recording and statistical analysis. Scalp voltages were continuously recorded (digitization rate = 500 Hz, band-pass = 0.001100 Hz; BrainProducts, Gilching, Germany) using an equidistant montage of 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted in an electrode cap (Easycap, Herrsching, Germany). Eye movements were monitored with supraorbital and infraorbital electrodes and with electrodes on the external canthi. Electroencephalograms were band-pass-filtered (116 Hz), corrected for ocular artifacts using independent component analysis, and segmented (420 ms to 800 ms relative to onset of the target in the lexical decision task). They were then corrected to a 152-ms baseline that started 352 ms prior to theoffset of the forward mask in order to avoid distortion of the

285 baseline by visually evoked potentials to the mask. Artifact-free segments with correct responses were averaged separately for each experimental condition and electrode and rereferenced to average reference. N400 amplitude was analyzed as the mean voltage in the time window between 500 ms and 700 ms after target onset (Kiefer, 2002; Kiefer & Brendel, 2006). This covered the N400 peak at about 600 ms. Five pairs of contralateral electrodes of centro-parietal and occipital regions (O1/O2, PO1/PO2, PO3/PO4, and P1/2, P3/4), in which the N400 potential was largest, were selected for statistical analysis. Repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed on mean voltages, with induction task, RPI, semantic relatedness, hemisphere, and electrode site as within- participants factors. Only effects involving semantic relatedness are reported.

Results and discussion

Mean RTs for trials responded to correctly were calculated for each condition. RTs more than 2 standard deviations from a participants mean were rejected (2.5% of the data). A repeated measures ANOVA with induction task, RPI, and semantic relatedness as factors revealed significant main effects of RPI, F(1, 19) = 32.02, p < .0001, and semantic relatedness, F(1, 19) = 22.66, p < .0002, as well as a three-way interaction, F(1, 19) = 5.57, p < .03, p2 = .23 (Fig. 2). Planned contrasts yielded significant semantic priming (RT difference between the unrelated and related conditions) at the short RPI after the semantic induction task, F(1, 19) = 13.05, p < .002, but not after the perceptual induction task, F(1, 19) = 1.82, p > .192. At the long RPI, semantic priming was significant after the perceptual induction task, F(1, 19) = 27.33, p < .0001, but not after the semantic induction task, F(1, 19) = 3.39, p = .081. An analogous ANOVA on error rates showed only a significant main effect of semantic relatedness (related: M = 1.9%; unrelated: M = 3.5%), F(1, 19) = 16.83, p < .001. In the ERPs, the significant main effect of semantic relatedness, F(1, 19) = 6.44, p < .02, was qualified by the three-way interaction with induction task and RPI, F(1, 19) = 6.28, p < .021, p2 = .25 (Fig. 3). Planned contrasts revealed a significant N400 priming effect (ERP difference between unrelated and related conditions) at the short RPI after the semantic induction task, F(1, 19) = 14.07, p < .002, but not after the perceptual induction task, F(1, 19) = 0.95, p > .34. At the long RPI, significant N400 priming was found after the perceptual induction task, F(1, 19) = 5.62, p < .029, but not after the semantic induction task, F(1, 19) < 0.23, p > .64. As predicted by the attentional-sensitization model, an activated semantic task set at the short RPI enhanced semantic processing of the subliminal prime, whereas an activated perceptual task set attenuated it. The priming effects at the long RPI suggest that after 800 ms, the induction task set had been abandoned, and the cognitive system had been reconfigured in preparation for the upcoming lexical task (Kiefer & Martens,

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750

Semantic Induction Task

* Related

Perceptual Induction Task

Unrelated *

700

RT (ms)
650 600

200

800

RPI (ms)

200

800

Fig. 2. Results from Experiment 1: mean reaction times (RTs) for trials responded to correctly in the lexical decision task. RTs are shown as a function of semantic relatedness and responseprime interval (RPI), separately for trials following the semantic induction task (left) and trials following the perceptual induction task (right). The asterisks indicate significant (p < .05) masked priming effects (difference between semantically unrelated and semantically related conditions) within each combination of induction task and RPI. Error bars represent 1 SEM.

2010): Semantic pathways were sensitized when the perceptual induction task was abandoned, but they were desensitized when the semantic induction task was abandoned. This result pattern is compatible with the notion of a backward inhibition mechanism that suppresses irrelevant task sets when the next task is being prepared (Houghton, Pritchard, & Grange, 2009; Mayr & Keele, 2000). This first experiment confirmed the findings of our previous study (Kiefer & Martens, 2010) and demonstrated that semantic induction tasks boost subliminal semantic priming more than perceptual induction tasks do. Next, we tested whether these effects of the induction tasks on unconscious priming would be reversed with visuomotor priming.

expected that visuomotor priming would benefit from a sensitization of visual pathways by the perceptual induction task.

Method
Participants. Twenty-one healthy, right-handed, native German speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated. Data from 1 participant were excluded because of excessive errors. The remaining 20 participants (13 women and 7 men) had a mean age of 22.9 years. Materials and procedure. The induction tasks were identical with those used in Experiment 1 and showed a comparable level of task difficulty (see the Supplemental Material). In the visuomotor priming paradigm (see Fig. 1), four white geometrical shapes (circle, ellipsoid, square, and diamond) were presented on a black background equally often as primes and as targets. Half of the participants responded with their right hand to a circle or a diamond, and with their left hand to a square or an ellipsoid. The other half of the participants were given the opposite stimulus-response assignment. The masked prime required the same (congruent) response as the target in 320 trials and a different (incongruent) response in another 320 trials. Even in the

Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we investigated the influence of the same semantic and perceptual induction tasks used in Experiment 1 on subliminal visuomotor priming. Participants made right- or left-hand responses to discriminate between geometrical targets (e.g., circle or square). Each target was preceded by a masked prime that required either the same or a different motor response. Because the correct response strongly depended on visual processing of prime and target shapes, we

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Related Unrelated +6 * V

Perceptual Induction Task

2.5 1.3 0 1.3 2.5 V

Short RPI
400 2 600 ms

2.5 1.3 0 1.3 2.5 V *

Long RPI

Fig. 3. Results from Experiment 1: grand-average event-related potentials from centro-parietal and occipital electrodes following the semantic induction task (left) and the perceptual induction task (right). For each response-prime interval (RPI), waveforms for the semantically related and semantically unrelated conditions are shown. Because statistical analyses did not yield significant effects of the hemisphere or electrode-site factors, voltages were collapsed across electrode sites of this scalp region of interest for the purpose of illustration. The target onset is indicated by the long vertical lines. Significant masked semantic priming effects are highlighted by an asterisk (p < .05). The topographical maps display the significant N400 priming effects, coded in color (difference voltages: semantically unrelated condition minus semantically related condition), averaged in the time window between 500 ms and 700 ms; the topographical map for the short RPI (200 ms) presents results following the semantic induction task, and the map for the long RPI (800 ms) presents results following the perceptual induction task.

congruent condition, primes and targets always had different shapes. Primes were masked by eight randomly assigned pattern masks. A prime-identification test showed that participants were unable to identify masked stimuli (see the Supplemental Material). The procedure and analyses used in this experiment were identical to those used in Experiment 1, with two exceptions. First, the electrophysiological visuomotor priming effect was defined as mean voltage in the time window between 400 ms and 600 ms after target presentation at electrodes O1/O2, PO1/ PO2, and PO3/PO4. We used this definition because the visuomotor priming effect has an earlier onset than the semantic priming effect, and because it has an occipito-parietal scalp distribution (Jaskowski et al., 2003). Second, congruency replaced semantic relatedness as a factor in all ANOVAs.

Results and discussion

RT outliers were rejected as in Experiment 1 (4.5% of the data). A repeated measures ANOVA of mean RTs on trials responded to correctly revealed a significant main effect of RPI, F(1, 19) = 30.38, p < .0001, and, most important, a significant interaction between induction task and congruency, F(1, 19) = 6.61, p < .019, p2 = .26 (Fig. 4). Planned contrasts revealed statistically reliable visuomotor priming after the perceptual induction task, F(1, 19) = 5.60, p < .029, but not after the semantic induction task, F(1, 19) = 2.06, p > .17. Analysis of error rates showed only a significant main effect of congruency (congruent: M = 5.3%; incongruent: M = 4.2%), F(1, 19) = 5.62, p < .028. Because this effect was not modulated by the induction task, F(1, 19) < 1.18, p > .29, it is unlikely that the

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Semantic Induction Task

750 Congruent

Perceptual Induction Task

Incongruent *

700

RT (ms)
650 600

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RPI (ms)

200

800

Fig. 4. Results from Experiment 2: mean reaction times (RTs) for trials responded to correctly in the target-shape discrimination task. RTs are shown as a function of response congruency and response-prime interval (RPI), separately for trials following the semantic induction task (left) and trials following the perceptual induction task (right). The asterisks indicate significant (p < .05) masked priming effects (difference between incongruent and congruent prime-target responses) within each combination of induction task and RPI. Error bars represent 1 SEM.

significant two-way interaction in the RT data was due to a trade-off between speed and accuracy. Analyses of ERP priming effects yielded a significant interaction of induction task and congruency, F(1, 19) = 6.06, p < .024, which was further qualified by RPI, F(1, 19) = 6.89, p < .017, p2 = .27 (Fig. 5). Planned contrasts showed significant visuomotor priming subsequent to the perceptual induction task at the short RPI, F(1, 19) = 35.18, p < .0001; there was no visuomotor priming after this task at the long RPI or after the semantic induction task at either RPI, all Fs < 0.24, all ps > .63. Following the perceptual induction task, ERPs in response to incongruent targets were more negative than ERPs in response to congruent targets. Consistent with our predictions, the RT and ERP data both demonstrated that perceptual induction tasks enhanced subsequent subliminal visuomotor priming at the short RPI more than semantic induction tasks did. Hence, unlike semantic priming, unconscious visuomotor priming benefited from sensitization of perceptual pathways. At the long RPI, RT priming was present after the perceptual induction task, whereas ERP priming was entirely abolished; this suggests that task-set inhibition was less pronounced than it was in Experiment 1. We assume that the effects at the long RPI were driven by

reconfiguration processes that depend on the similarity of the induction task and the priming task. From a task-switching point of view, Experiment 1 resembles a task-switch condition (i.e., a switch between the semantic induction task and the lexical decision task) that causes strong backward inhibition of the abandoned task set of the induction task (Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Mayr & Keele, 2000). Experiment 2 instead resembles a task-repetition condition because of the similar requirements of the perceptual induction task and the visuomotor priming task, a situation that presents little need for task-set inhibition. Future task-switching studies could use our paradigm to establish how task-set similarity influences subliminal priming at the long RPI.

General Discussion
In two experiments, we tested whether specific attentional task sets can selectively and differentially enhance unconscious semantic processes and visuomotor processes. To this end, we used a novel experimental paradigm, in which participants engaged in a semantic or perceptual induction task before a masked semantic or visuomotor response priming task. Behavioral and electrophysiological results showed for the first time

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Semantic Induction Task

Congruent Incongruent V +6 2.5 1.3 0 1.3 2.5 V

Perceptual Induction Task

Short RPI
ms

400 2

600

Long RPI

Fig. 5. Results from Experiment 2: grand-average event-related potentials from occipito-parietal electrodes following the semantic induction task (left) and the perceptual induction task (right). For each response-prime interval (RPI), waveforms for the congruent and incongruent conditions are shown. Because statistical analyses did not yield significant effects of the hemisphere or electrode-site factors, voltages were collapsed across electrode sites of this scalp region of interest for the purpose of illustration. The target onset is indicated by the long vertical lines. The significant masked visuomotor priming effect is highlighted by an asterisk (p < .05). The topographical map displays the significant visuomotor priming effect, coded in color (difference voltages: incongruent condition minus congruent condition), averaged in the time window between 400 ms and 600 ms; this topographical map for the short RPI (200 ms) presents results following the perceptual induction task.

that induction tasks that were designed to differentially modulate the sensitivity of semantic and perceptual processing pathways influenced the magnitude of subliminal semantic and visuomotor priming in opposite directions: Subliminal semantic priming was greater after the semantic induction task than after the perceptual induction task. Visuomotor priming was modulated in the reverse direction by the same induction tasks. This pattern of results supports and considerably extends earlier findings of top-down modulation of masked visuomotor priming (Ansorge et al., 2002; Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Naccache et al., 2002) and masked semantic priming (Ansorge, Kiefer, Khalid, Grassl, & Knig, 2010; Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Martens & Kiefer, 2009) by convincingly demonstrating that top-down control can influence unconscious processes very specifically: An attentional-sensitization mechanism enhances or attenuates the responsiveness of semantic and visuomotor processing pathways to incoming subliminal stimuli depending

on the currently activated task set (Kiefer & Martens, 2010), thereby differentially influencing subsequent subliminal semantic and visuomotor priming. Hence, in contrast to classical views of automaticity that characterize unconscious processes as being not susceptible to attentional control (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), the results of our study show that top-down control constrains unconscious cognition by emphasizing task-relevant processing pathways. Because primes were presented subliminally, application of attentional control did not depend on consciousness. However, this does not mean that attentional control also originated at an unconscious level (van Gaal, Lamme, & Ridderinkhof, 2010). In fact, participants consciously processed the induction task and applied the consciously induced attentional control settings implicitly to constrain prime processing in the unconscious domain. Consciousness therefore acted to repress unconscious tendencies (Jolij & Lamme, 2005) by specifically enhancing processes that were congruent with the task set and attenuating

290 processes that were incongruent with the task set (Kiefer & Martens, 2010). However, the present study did not reveal whether attentional control selectively influenced processing of congruent or incongruent primes because the induction task set did not contain information about prime-target relations. The modulation of subliminal semantic and visuomotor priming by induction tasks observed in these experiments provides novel insight into the mechanisms underlying attentional control of unconscious cognition. Our findings are remarkable because the same induction task produced opposite modulatory effects on semantic priming and visuomotor priming. We thus obtained a functional double dissociation between type of induction task (semantic or perceptual) and type of unconscious priming (semantic or visuomotor). This double dissociation demonstrates that attentional sensitization of unconscious cognition is a general computational principle and excludes the possibility that particularities of the induction tasks (Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Martens & Kiefer, 2009) or task instructions (e.g., Ansorge et al., 2002; Ansorge & Neumann, 2005) caused the modulatory effect on priming, as it may possibly have done in previous studies. The proposed attentional-sensitization mechanism of unconscious cognition can account for hitherto unexplained paradoxical phenomena in many areas of psychology. For instance, as behavioral or neurophysiological effects associated with semantic processing of word meaning depend on task orientation, such as attention to word meaning versus letter form, it has been concluded that semantic processing is controlled (Maxfield, 1997, p. 206). However, other studies demonstrating unconscious semantic priming effects have provided evidence for automatic semantic processing (Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Kiefer, 2002; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000). Similarly, seemingly contradictory findings have been reported in the literature on sensorimotor processing (Bub & Masson, 2010), emotional processing (Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2003), and the psychopathology of psychiatric disorders (Kiefer, Martens, Weisbrod, Hermle, & Spitzer, 2009). These apparently conflicting results can be easily resolved if automatic processes are assumed to be susceptible to topdown control: According to our research, unconscious or conscious stimuli can automatically trigger only those processes that match the sensitized processing pathways. Automatic processing and the notion of attentional control are therefore not necessarily contradictory, as has been traditionally thought. Processing can be automatic in the sense that it is initiated without deliberate intention at the time a stimulus is presented. However, automatic processing is nevertheless modulated by top-down attentional control that is exerted via task settings prior to the onset of the stimuli. The present work could therefore also help to explain why putatively automatic cognitive processes are strongly modulated by hypnotic inductions (Raz, Kirsch, Pollard, & Nitkin-Kaner, 2006). If attentional sensitization of automatic processes is a general computational principle, a fascinating question arises: Is it possible to specifically enhance or attenuate unconscious cognitive and emotional processes in healthy or patient populations? Future studies could assess, for instance, whether

Martens et al. stimulus-elicited fear can be attenuated when the activated task set induces a positive emotional state. Our framework combining an induction task with subsequent unconscious (or conscious) processing of a stimulus is an ideal tool for addressing this and related questions. In conclusion, the present study provides striking evidence of implicit top-down control of unconscious semantic and visuomotor processing by attentional sensitization. Our results demonstrate that preemptive top-down control of unconscious processes coordinates the perceptual and semantic processing streams in congruency with higher-level task sets. This attentional mechanism optimizes ongoing processing toward the pursuit of an intended goal and therefore ensures the adaptability of cognition even in the unconscious domain. Acknowledgments
The authors thank Lana Rohr, Marina Klle, Sabine Gnter, Silvia Zischler, and Cornelia Mller for their help during data acquisition.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.

Funding
This research was supported by grants from the German Research Foundation (DFG) to Markus Kiefer (Ki 804/3-1) and to Ulrich Ansorge, Ingrid Scharlau, and Werner Klotz (An 392/5-1), all of whom are within the research network Neuro-cognitive mechanisms of conscious and unconscious visual perception (PAK 270).

Supplemental Material
Additional supporting information may be found at http://pss.sagepub .com/content/by/supplemental-data

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