POLITICALLAWREVIEW

VOLUMEII

BasedontheoutlineofJusticeVicenteV.Mendoza
May1996RevisedEdition _______________

CompiledbyJoseSalvadorY.Mirasol

UpdatedbyUPLawBatch1995 UpdatedandEnlargedbyRodellA.Molina UPLawBatch1996

ThisworkisdedicatedtothemembersofUPLawBatch1996,towhichI belong, especially to the members of Prof. Barlongay's class in Political Law Review,withoutwhoseencouragementandsupport,thisworkwouldnothavebeen accomplished. SpecialthankstoLianneTanforlendingmeherdisketteinPoliticalLaw ReviewasupdatedbyUPLawBatch1995,ShirleyAlineaandRaquelRuizfor lendingmetheirnotes,NonLerrer,BuddyCarale,TJMattaandIreneIsidorofor patientlyprintingthiswork. TotheLordAlmighty,thisworkislovinglydedicated

RAM _______________

II.THECONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSIONS

IndependentConstitutionalCommissions Art.IX,A,Sec.1. TheConstitutionalCommissions,whichshallbeindependent,aretheCivil Service Commission(CSC). the Commission onElections and(COMELEC), andthe Commission on Audit(COA).

A.CivilServiceCommission 1.CompositionandqualificationsofCommissioners

Art.IX,B,Sec.1. (1) ThecivilserviceshallbeadministeredbytheCivilServiceCommission composedofaChairmanandtwoCommissionerswhoshallbenaturalborncitizensofthePhilippines and,atthetimeoftheirappointment,atleastthirtyfiveyearsofage,withprovencapacityforpublic administration,andmustnothavebeencandidatesforanyelectivepositionintheelectionsimmediately precedingtheirappointment.

Art.VII,sec.13.xxx The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices, includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

2.AppointmentandtermofOffice Art.IX,B,Sec.1.xxx (2)TheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentof the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,theChairmanshallholdofficeforsevenyears,aCommissionerforfiveyears,andanother Commissionerforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforthe unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporaryoractingcapacity. Transitionalterms Of the first appointment, the Chairman shall serve for 7 years, without reappointment. Of the Commissioners,thefollowingperiodsapply: 1Commissionerfor5years;anotherfor3yearswithoutreappointment

3.AppointmentofpersonnelofCSC Art.IX,A,Sec.4.TheConstitutionalCommissionsshallappointtheirofficialsandemployeesin accordancewithlaw.

4.Salary Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise xxx the Chairmen of the ConstitutionalCommissions(shallreceiveanannualsalaryof)twohundredfourthousandpesoseach; andtheMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,onehundredeightythousandpesoseach.

Art.IX,A,Sec.3.ThesalaryoftheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbefixedbylawand shallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.

Thesalary,ofcourse,canbeincreasedandtheincreasecantakeeffectatonce,since,liketheJudiciary, theConstitutionalCommissionshavenotpartinthepassageofsuchalaw.

5.Disqualifications Art.IX,A,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdany otherofficeoremployment. Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactive managementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice, norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseor privilege granted bythe Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

NomembersofaConstitutionalCommissionshallduringhis"tenure": a.Holdanyotherofficeoremployment. Thisissimilartotheprohibitionagainstexecutiveofficers.Itappliestobothpublicandprivateoffices andemployment. b.Engageinthepracticeofanyprofession. c.Engageintheactivemanagementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythe

functionsofhisoffice. d.Befinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseorprivilege granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.

6.Impeachment Art.XI,Sec.2.xxx[T]hemembersoftheConstitutionalCommissionsxxxmayberemovedfrom office,onimpeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery, graftandcorruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalofpublictrust.xxx

7.FunctionsoftheCSC Art. IX, B, Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government,shallestablishacareerserviceandadoptmeasurestopromotemorale,efficiency,integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalizeamanagementclimateconducivetopublicaccountability.ItshallsubmittothePresident andtheCongressanannualreportonitspersonnelprogram.

Art.IX,A,Sec.7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseor matterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.A caseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,or memorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself. Unlessotherwise providedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,orderorrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought totheSupreme Court on certiorari bythe aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of acopy thereof.

Id.,Section8.EachCommissionshallperformsuchotherfunctionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

8.ScopeoftheCivilService

Art.IX,B,Sec.2(1)Thecivilserviceembracesallbranches,subdivisions,instrumentalities,and agenciesoftheGovernment,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswithoriginalchart ers.

Art. XII, Sec. 16. xxx. Governmentowned or controlled corporations may be created or establishedbyspecialchartersintheinterestofthecommongoodandsubjecttothetestofeconomic viability.

NationalServiceCorp.v.NLRC,168SCRA125(1988) ThecivilservicedoesnotincludeGovernment ownedorcontrolledcorporations(GOCC)whichareorganizedassubsidiariesofGOCCunderthegeneral corporationlaw. F:

EugenioCredowasanemployeeoftheNationalServiceCorporation. Sheclaimsshewasillegallydismissed. NLRC ruledorderingher reinstatement. NASECO argues thatNLRC has nojurisdictionto orderherreinstatement. NASECOasagovernmentcorporationbyvirtueofitsbeingasubsidiaryoftheNIDC,whichiswhollyownedbythePhil. NationalBankwhichisinturnaGOCC,thetermsandconditionsofemploymentofitsemployeesaregovernedbythe CivilServiceLawcitingNationalHousingvJuco.

ISSUE:W/NemployeesofNASECO,aGOCCwithoutoriginalcharter,aregovernedbytheCivilServiceLaw. HELD:NO.TheholdinginNHCvJucoshouldnotbegivenretroactiveeffect,thatistocasesthatarosebefore itspromulgationofJan17,1985.TodootherwisewouldbeoppressivetoCredoandotheremployeessimilarly situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court recognized the applicabilityoftheLaborjurisdictionoverdisputesinvolvingtermsandconditionsofemploymentinGOCC's, amongthemNASECO. InthematterofcoveragebythecivilserviceofGOCC,the1987Constistarklydiffersfromthe1973 constiwhereNHCvJucowasbased. Itprovidesthatthe"civilserviceembracesallbranches,subdivisions, instrumentalities,andagenciesoftheGovernment,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationwith originalcharter."Thereforebyclearimplication,thecivilservicedoesnotincludeGOCCwhichareorganized assubsidiariesofGOCCunderthegeneralcorporationlaw.Adapted.

TradeUnionsofthePhilippinesandAlliedServices(TUPAS)VS.NHA,173SCRA33 F:
RespondentNHCisacorporationorganizedin1959undertheUniformCharterofGovernmentCorporations.Its sharesofstockhavebeen100%ownedbytheGovernmentfromitsincorporation.PetitionerTUPASisalegitimatelabor organization with a chapter in NHC. TUPAS filed a petition for certification election with DOLE. It was denied. Adapted.

HELD: Thecivilservicenowcoversonlygovtownedorcontrolledcorporationsw/originalorlegislative charters,thatisthosecreatedbyanactofCongressofbyspeciallaw,andnotthoseincorporatedunderand pursuanttoagenerallegislation. xxx Thereis,therefore,noimpedimenttotheholdingofacertificationelectionamongtheworkersofNHC foritisclearthattheyarecoveredbytheLaborCode,theNHCbeingagovtownedand/orcontrolledcorp.w/o

anoriginalcharter.RAM.

AllianceofGovernmentWorkersvMinisterofLaborandEmployment,124SCRA1(1983) F:
Petitionerisafederationofunionsingovtownedcorps.andingovtschools.ItpetitionedtheSCforarulingthat PD851,requiring"allemployers...topaytheiremployeesreceivingabasicsalaryofnotmorethanP1,000amonth...a 13thmonthpay,"appliestogovtemployees.VV.

HELD:NO.Itisanoldruleofstatutoryconstructionthatrestrictivestatutesandactsw/cimposeburdenson thepublictreasuryorw/cdiminishrightsandinterests,nomatterhowbroadtheirtermsdonotembracethe Sovereign,unlesstheSovereignisspecificallymentioned.TheRepublicofthePhil.asasovereigncannotbe coveredbyageneraltermlike"employer"unlessthelanguageusedinthelawisclearandspecifictothateffect. ISSUE2:Maygovernmentemployeesactthroughalaborfederationwhichusesthecollectivebargainingpower tosecureincreasedcompensationforitsmembers? HELD:NO.ThetermsandconditionsofemploymentintheGovernmentincludinganypoliticalsubdivisionor instrumentalitythereofaregovernedbylaw. Andthisiseffectedthroughstatutesoradministrativecirculars, rulesandregulationsandnotthroughCollectiveBargainingagreements. Underthepresentconstitution,(1973),GOCC'sarenowpartofthecivilservice,thus,notallowedtouse concertedactivitiestogetotherbenefitsorhighersalariesdifferentfromthatprovidedbylawandregulation. Adapted.

OVERRULED: GovernmentownedorcontrolledCorporations,ConsideredandDefined. NationalHousingCorp.v.Juco,134SCRA172(1985) F:

Juco was an employee ofthe NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was dismissedbythelaborarbiteronthegroundthattheNHAisagovtownedcorp.andjurisdictionoveritsemployeesis vestedintheCSC. Onappeal,theNLRCreversedthedecisionandremandedthecasetothelaborarbiterforfurther proceedings.NHAinturnappealedtotheSC.VV.

ISSUE:AreemployeesoftheNationalHousingCorporation,aGOCCwithoutoriginalcharter,coveredbythe LaborCodeorbylawsandregulationsgoverningthecivilservice? HELD:Sec.11,ArtXIIBoftheConstitutionspecificallyprovides:"TheCivilServiceembraceseverybranch, agency,subdivisionandinstrumentalityoftheGovernment,includingeverygovernmentownedandcontrolled corporation. TheinclusionofGOCCwithintheembraceofthecivilserviceshowsadeliberateeffortattheframers topluganearlierloopholewhichallowedGOCCtoavoidthefullconsequencesofthecivilservicesystem.All

officesandfirmsofthegovernmentarecovered. ThisconstiprovisionhasbeenimplementedbystatutePD807isunequivocalthatpersonnelofGOCC belongtothecivilserviceandsubjecttocivilservicerequirements. "Every"meanseachoneofagroup,withoutexception.ThiscasereferstoaGOCC.Itdoesnotcover casesinvolvingprivatefirmstakenoverbythegovernmentinforeclosureorsimilarproceedings.Adapted. xxx ForpurposesofcoverageintheCivilService,employeesofgovtownedorcontrolledcorps.whether createdbyspeciallaworformedassubsidiariesarecoveredbytheCivilServiceLaw,nottheLaborCode,and thefactthatpvt.corps.ownedorcontrolledbythegovtmaybecreatedbyspecialcharterdoesnotmeanthat suchcorps.notcreatedbyspeciallawarenotcoveredbytheCivilService. xxx Theinfirmityoftheresp'spositionliesinitspermittingthecircumventionoremasculationofSec.1, Art.XIIB[nowArtIX,B,Sec.2(1)]oftheConsti.Itwouldbepossibleforaregularministryofgovttocreate ahostofsubsidiarycorps.undertheCorp.Codefundedbyawillinglegislature. Agovtownedcorp.could createseveralsubsidiarycorps.Thesesubsidiarycorps.wouldenjoythebestoftwoworlds.Theirofficialsand employeeswouldbeprivilegedindividuals,freefromthestrictaccountabilityrequiredbytheCivilServiceDec. andtheregulationsoftheCOA. Theirincomeswouldnotbesubjecttothecompetitiverestraintintheopen marketnortothetermsandconditionsofcivilserviceemployment.Conceivably,allgovtownedorcontrolled corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application.Certainly,suchasituationcannotbeallowed.VV.

Quimpov.Tanodbayan,146SCRA137 TanodbayanHasJurisdictionoverallGovernmentOwnedFirms RegardlessofHowOrganized. F:

F.Quimpofiledacomplaintw/theTanodbayan(TB)chargingG.DimaanoandD.Remo,managerandanalystof Petrophil, w/viol. ofRA3019fortheirrefusaltopayQuimpo'sfeesassurveyor. TheTBdismissedthecomplaint, however,onthegroundthathisjurisdictionextendedonlytogovtownedcorps.organizedunderaspeciallaw.Petrophilis acorp.organizedundertheGen.Corp.Code;itwasacquiredbythegovttocarryoutitsoilandgasolineprograms. Quimpofiledapetitionforcertiorari,questioningthedecisionoftheTB.ThenewTBconfessedjudgment.VV.

ISSUE:WONPETROPHILisagovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationwhoseemployeesfallwithinthe jurisdictionalpurviewoftheTanodbayanforpurposesoftheAntigraftandCorruptPracticesAct? HELD: YES. UpholdtheTanodbayanjurisdiction. WhileitmaybethatPETROPHILwasnotoriginally "created"asaGOCC,PETROPHILbecameasubsidiaryofPNOCandthusshedoffitsprivatestatus.Itisnow fundedandownedbythegovernmentasinfact,itwasacquiredtoperformfunctionsrelatedtogovernmental programsandpoliciesonoil.Itwasacquirednottemporarilybutasapermanentadjuncttoperformessential governmentrelatedfunctions.Adapted. xxx Themeaningthusgivento"govtownedorcontrolledcorps."forpurposesofthecivilserviceprovision

[Art.IX,B,Sec.2(1)]shouldlikewiseapplyforpurposesoftheTBandSBprovisions[Art.XI,Secs.4and 12],otherwise,incongruitywouldresult;andagovtownedcorp.couldcreateasmanysubsidiarycorps.under theCorp.Codeitwishes,w/cwouldthenbefreefromstrictaccountabilityandcouldescapetheliabilitiesand responsibilitiesprovidedbylaw.xxx

a.Terms,conditionsofemploymentintheCivilService

(1)OathofallegiancetotheConstitution Art.IX,B,Sec.4.Allpublicofficersandemployeesshalltakeanoathoraffirmationtouphold anddefendtheConstitution.

Art.XI,Sec.18.PublicofficersandemployeesowetheStateandthisConstitutionallegianceatall times,andanypublicofficeroremployeewhoseekstochangehiscitizenshiporacquirethestatusofan immigrantofanothercountryduringhistenureshallbedealtwithbylaw.

(2)MeritSystem (a)Appointmentoflameducks Art.IX,B,Sec.6. Nocandidatewhohaslostinanyelectionshall,withinoneyearaftersuch election, be appointed to any office in the Government, or any governmentowned or controlled corporationsorinanyoftheirsubsidiaries.

(b)Banonholdingmultiplepositions Art.IX,B,Sec.7. Noelectiveofficial shallbeeligibleforappointment ordesignation inany capacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure. Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficial shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

Art.VII,Sec.13.ThePresident,VicePresident,theMembersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputies orassistantsshallnot,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,holdanyotherofficeoremployment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any

franchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agency,orinstrumentality thereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Theyshallstrictly avoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheiroffice. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices, includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

Art.VI,Sec.13. NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayholdanyother officeoremploymentintheGovernment,oranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,including governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries,duringhistermwithoutforfeitinghis seat.Neithershallhebeappointedtoanyofficewhichmayhavebeencreatedortheemolumentsthereof increasedduringthetermforwhichhewaselected.

Art.VIII,Secs.8(1)(3)and12 Art.VIII,Sec.8.(1)AJudicialandBarCouncilisherebycreatedunderthesupervisionofthe SupremeCourtcomposedoftheChiefJustice,as exofficio Chairman,theSecretaryofJusticeanda representativeoftheCongressasexofficioMembers,arepresentativeoftheIntegratedBar,aprofessor oflaw,aretiredMemberoftheSupremeCourt,andarepresentativeoftheprivatesector. xxx (3)TheClerkoftheSupremeCourtshallbetheSecretaryexofficiooftheCouncilandshallkeep arecordofitsproceedings.

Sec.12.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandofothercourtsestablishedbylawshallnotbe designatedtoanyagencyperformingquasijudicialoradministrativefunctions.

CLUvExecutiveSecretary,194SCRA317(1991) F:
ThepetitionerchallengedEx.OrderNo.284whichineffectallowedCabinetmembers,theirundersecretariesand asst.secretariesandotherappointiveofficialsoftheExecutiveDepartmenttoholdotherpositionsinthegovt.,albeit, subjectofthelimitationsimposedtherein. Therespondents,inrefutingthepetitioners'argumentthatthemeasurewas violativeofArt.VIII,Sec.13,invokedArt.IXB,Sec.7,allowingtheholdingofmultiplepositionsbytheappointive officialifallowedbylaworbythepressingfunctionsofhispositions.

HELD:Byostensiblyrestrictingtheno.ofpositionsthatCabinetmembers,undersecretariesorasst.secretaries mayholdinadditiontotheirprimarypositiontonotmorethan2positionsinthegovt.andGOCCs,EO284 actuallyallowsthemtoholdmultipleofficesoremploymentindirectcontraventionoftheexpressmandateof

Art.VIII,Sec.13prohibitingthemfromdoingso,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthe1987Constitutionitself.If maximumbenefitsaretobederivedfromadept.head'sabilityandexpertise,heshouldbeallowedtoattendto hisdutiesandresponsibilitieswithoutthedistractionofothergovt.officesoremployment. xxx ThestricterprohibitionappliedtothePres.andhisofficialfamilyunderSec.13,Art.VIIascompared totheprohibitionapplicabletoappointiveofficialsingeneralunderArt.IX,B,Sec.7,par.2areproofofthe intentofthe1987Consti.totreatthemasaclassbyitselfandtoimposeuponsaidclassstricterprohibitions. Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employmentinthegovtduringtheirtenurewhensuchisallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheir positions,membersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistantsmaydosoonlywhenexpresslyauthorizedby theConsti.itself.xxx However,theprohibitionagainstholdingdualormultipleofficesoremploymentunderArt.VII,Sec.13 mustnotbeconstruedasapplyingtopostsoccupiedbytheExecutiveofficialsspecifiedthereinw/oaddition compensationinan exofficio capacityasprovidedbylawandasrequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsofsaid official'soffice.Thereasonisthatthesepostsdonotcomprise"anyotheroffice"w/inthecontemplationofthe constitutional prohibition butareproperlyan imposition ofadditional duties andfunction on saidofficials. Adapted.

Floresv.Drilon,223SCRA568(1993) F:
MayorRichardGordonofOlongapoCitywasappointedChairmanandChiefExecutiveOfficeroftheSubicBay MetropolitanAuthority(SBMA)underSec.13,par(d)ofRA7227"BasesConversionandDevelopmentActof1992.

ISSUE:W/NprovisoinSec13par(d)ofRA7227whichstates,"Provided,howeverthatforthefirstyearofits operationsfromtheeffectivityofthisAct,themayoroftheCityofOlongaposhallbeappointedasthechairman andchiefexecutiveofficeroftheSubicAuthority,"violatestheconstitutionalproscriptionagainstappointment ordesignationofelectiveofficialstoothergovernmentposts. HELD:YES.Sec7ofArtIXBoftheConstiprovides: "Noelectiveofficialshallbelegibleforappointmentordesignationinanycapacitytoanypublicoffice orpositionduringhistenure." Inthecaseatbar,thesubjectprovisodirectsthePresidenttoappointanelectiveofficial,i.e.Mayorof OlongapoCity,toothergovernmentalpost.Sincethisispreciselywhattheconstitutionalproscriptionseeksto prevent,itneedsnostretchingoftheimaginationtoconcludethattheprovisocontravenesSec.7,1stparofArt IXB. Whilethesecondpar.authorizestheholdingofmultipleofficesbyanappointiveposition,thereisno exceptiontothefirstparagraphexceptasareparticularlyrecognizedintheConstitutionitself. Futhermore,theprovisoisalegislativeencroachmentonappointingauthoritytoonlyoneeligiblei.e. theincumbentMayorofOlongapoCity.Theconfermentoftheappointingpowerisaperfectlyvalidlegislative actbuttheprovisolimitinghischoicetooneisanencroachmenttohisprerogative. Thus,MayorGordonisineligibleforappointmentthroughouthistenurebutmayresignfirstfromhis electiveofficebeforehemaybeconsideredforappointment.Hehasachoice.

Sec.13par(d)isdeclaredunconstitutionalandtheappointmentofMayorGordonisinvalidbuthis previousactsasChairmanofSBMAshallbeconsideredthatofadefactoofficer.Adapted.

(3)Standardizationofpayandbandoublecompensation Standardizationofpay Art. IX, B, Sec. 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of governmentofficialsandemployees,includingthoseingovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswith original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualificationsrequiredfortheirpositions.

Banondoublecompensation Art.IX,B,Sec.8. Noelectiveorappointivepublicofficeroremployeeshallreceiveadditional, double,orindirectcompensation,unlessspecificallyauthorizedbylaw,noracceptwithouttheconsentof theCongress,anypresent,emolument,office,ortitleofanykindfromanyforeigngovernment. Pensionsorgratuitiesshallnotbeconsideredasadditional,double,orindirectcompensation.

Sec.56.AdditionalorDoubleCompensation.Noelectiveorappointivepublicofficeroremployee shallreceiveadditionalordoublecompensationunlessspecificallyauthorizedbylawnoracceptwithout theconsentofthePresident,anypresent,emolument,office,ortitleofanykindfromanyforeignstate. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation. (BookV,TitleI,Chapter8,AdministrativeCodeof1987.)

(4)Banonpartisanpoliticalactivities Art.IX,B,Sec.2.xxx (4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneeringorpartisanpoliticalcampaign. Comparewith Art.XVI,Sec.5.xxx (3)Professionalisminthearmedforcesandadequateremunerationandbenefitsofitsmembers shallbeaprimeconcernoftheState.Thearmedforcesshallbeinsulatedfrompartisanpolitics. Nomemberofthemilitaryshallengagedirectlyorindirectlyinanypartisanpoliticalactivity excepttovote.

Caillesv.Bonifacio,65Phil328(1938) F:
ThisisaquowarrantopetitiontooustrespondentBonifaciofromtheofficeofProvincialGovernorofLaguna.It iscontendedthatatthetimehefiledhiscertificateofcandidacyandwaselectedtooffice,respondentwasaCaptaininthe PhilippineArmyandforthisreason,isineligibletothatoffice.

HELD:Section2,Art.XIofthe1935Const.(similartothe1987provision)prohibitsmembersoftheArmed Forcesfromengaginginanypartisanpoliticalactivityorotherwisetakingpartinanyelectionexcepttovote,but itdoesnotexviterminigrantorconferuponthemtherightofsuffrage.AsSection431oftheElectionLaw,as amendeddisqualifiesfromvotingonlymembersintheactiveserviceofthePhilippineArmyandnoclaimis madethatthisdiscriminationisviolativeoftheConstitution,itfollowsthattherespondent,beinginthereserve force,isnotdisqualifiedfromvoting.Therespondentbeingaqualifiedelectorandthepossessionbyhimofthe otherqualificationsprescribedforanelectiveprovincialofficenotbeingchallenged,heisnotineligibletothe officeofprovincialgovernortowhichhehasbeenelected. Theconstitutionalprovisionmentionedcontemplatesonlythoseintheactiveserviceotherwiseitwould leadtowidespreaddisqualificationofthemajorityoftheablebodiedmenwhoarepartofthereservecorpsof thearmedforcesfromvotingandfrombeingvotedupon. Raisond'etreforthedisqualification:MembersofthearmedforcesareservantsoftheStateandnotthe agentsofanypoliticalgroup.Adapted.

Santosv.Yatco,590G548(1959) F:
ThisispetitionforprohibitionseekingtoenjointheenforcementoftheorderofJudgeYatcodisallowingthen SecretaryofDefenseAlejoSantosfromcampaigningpersonallyforGovernorTomasMartinintheprovinceofBulacan.

Thepetitionwasgrantedfortheff.reasons: The position of department secretaries is not embraced and included within the terms officers and employeesintheCivilService; WhenSantos,aNacionalistacampaignedforGov.Martin,acandidateoftheNacionalistaParty,hewas actingasamemberoftheCabinetindiscussingtheissuesbeforetheelectorateanddefendingtheactuationsof theAdministrationtowhichhebelongs; The question of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such campaign because of its deleterious influenceuponthemembersofthearmedforces,whoareadministrativelysubordinatedtotheSecretaryof NationalDefenseandwhoareoftencalleduponbytheCOMELECtoaidintheconductoforderlyandimpartial elections,isnotjusticiablebythecourt.Adapted.

(5)Removalorsuspensiononlyforcause Art.IX,B,2.xx (3) Noofficeroremployeeofthecivilserviceshallberemovedorsuspendedexceptforcause providedbylaw. DelosSantosvMallare,87Phil289 F:

EduardodelosSantos,petitioner,wasappointedCityEngineerofBaguioon7/16/46bythePres.Hethenbegan theexerciseofthedutiesandfunctionsoftheposition.On6/1/50,GilMallarewasextendedanadinterimappointmentby thePres.tothesameposition,afterw/c,on6/3,theUndersec.oftheDPW&CommunicationsdirectedSantostoreportto theBureauofPublicWorksforanotherassignment.Santosrefusedtovacatetheoffice,andwhentheCityMayorandthe otherofficialsnamedasMallare'scodefendantsignoredhimandpaidMallarethesalarycorrespondingtotheposition,he commencedtheseproceedings.

HELD:TheprovisionofSec.2545oftheRev.Admin.CodethatthePres.mayremoveatpleasureanyofthe saidappointiveofficersisincompatiblew/theconstitutionalinhibitionthat"NoofficeroremployeeintheCivil Serviceshallberemovedorsuspendedexceptforcauseasprovidedbylaw."WethereforedeclareSec.2545of theRACasrepealedbytheConsti.andceasedtobeoperativefromthetimethatinstrumentcameintoeffect. Forcauseasprovidedbylaw.Thephrase"forcause"inconnectionw/removalsofpublicofficershas acquiredawelldefinedconcept. "Itmeansforreasonsw/cthelawandsoundpublicpolicyrecognizedas sufficientwarrantforremoval,thatis,legalcause, and notmerelycausesw/c theappointing powerinthe exerciseofdiscretionmaydeemsufficient.Itisimpliedthatofficersmaynotberemovedatthemerewillof thosevestedw/thepowerofremoval,orw/oanycause. Moreover,thecausemustrelatetoandaffectthe administrationoftheoffice,andmustberestrictedtosomethingofasubstantialnaturedirectlyaffectingthe rightsandinterestsofthepublic." Threespecifiedclassesofpositionspolicydetermining,primarilyconfidentialandhighlytechnical areexcludedfromthemeritsystemanddismissalatpleasureofofficersandemployeesappointedthereinis allowedbytheConsti.xxx Theofficeofcityengineerisneitherprimarilyconfidential,policydetermining,norhighlytechnical. Primarilyconfidential.Thelatterphrasedenotesnotonlyconfidenceintheaptitudeoftheappointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy w/c insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassmentorfreedomfrommisgivingsofbetrayalsofpersonaltrustorconfidentialmattersofstate. Policydetermining.Noristhepositionofcityengineerpolicydetermining.Acityengineerdoesnot formulateamethodofactionforthegovtoranyofitssubdivisions.Hisjobistoexecutepolicy,nottomakeit. Highlytechnical.Finally,thepositionofcityengineeristechnicalbutnothighlyso.Acityengineer isnotrequirednorishesupposedtopossesatechnicalskillortraininginthesupremeorsuperiordegree,w/cis thesenseinw/c"highlytechnical"is,webelieve,employedintheConsti.RAM.

Corpusv.Cuaderno,13SCRA591(1965)

F:

MarianoCorpuswastheSpecialAssistanttotheGovernor,InChargeoftheExportDepartmentoftheCentral Bank,apositiondeclaredbythePresidentofthePhilippinesashighlytechnicalinnature.Hewasadministrativelycharged byseveralcoemployeesintheexportdepartmentwithdishonesty,incompetence,neglectofdutyandviolationofinternal regulationsoftheCentralBank. Hewassuspendedfromofficewhileaninvestigationwasbeingconductedoverhis complaint. Theinvestigating committeefoundnobasisuponwhichtorecommendhimfordisciplinaryaction,hence, recommended that he be immediately reinstated to his office. Despite such recommendation, the Monetary Board approvedaresolutiondismissingCorpusfromOfficeonthegroundthatthelatter'scontinuanceinofficeisprejudicialto thebestinterestsofCentralBank.Corpusmovedtoreconsidersaidresolutionbutthesamewasdenied.Hefiledanaction withtheRTCwhichdeclaredtheresolutionnullandvoid. CentralBankappealsandallegesthatofficersholdingtechnicalpositionsmayberemovedatanytimeforlackof confidencebytheappointingpowerandthatsuchremovalisimplicitinSec.1Art.XIIoftheConstitutionwhichprovide that:"xxxAppointmentsintheCivilService,EXCEPTastothosewhicharepolicydetermining,primarilyconfidential orhighlytechnicalinnature,shallbemadeonlyaccordingtomeritandfitness."CBalsoarguesthatforthethreeclasses ofpositionsreferredtointheConstitution,lackofconfidenceoftheonemakingtheappointmentconstitutessufficientand legitimatecauseofremoval.

ISSUE: W/N the removal of Respondent by resolution of the Monetary Board on the ground of loss of confidencewasvaliddespitethefactthatthecommitteewhichinvestigatedthechargesagainsthimfoundno basisforhisremoval HELD:NO.Theremovalofrespondentonthegroundoflossofconfidenceisaclearandevidentafterthought resortedtowhenthechargessubjectmatteroftheinvestigationwerenotprovedorsubstantiated.Itwasamere pretexttocuretheinability tosubstantiate thechargesuponwhichtheinvestigation proceeded. Thecourt therefore dismissed the reason of "loss of confidence" for the dismissal of Corpus. That being so, the constitutionalmandatethatNoofficerintheCivilServiceshallberemovedorsuspendedexceptforcauseas provided bylawmust be applied. Persons holding positions which are highly technical in nature mustbe affordedtheConstitutionalsafeguardrequiringremovaltobeforcauseasprovidedbylaw,andifthedismissal for"lossofconfidence"beallowed,itmusthavebasisinfact,whichdoesnotexistinthecaseatbar. TheexemptionofthethreepositionsadvertedtoearlierfromtherulerequiringAPPOINTMENTStobe madeonthebasisofMeritandfitnessDOESNOTEXEMPTsuchpositionsfromtheoperationoftherulethat noofficerintheCivilServiceshallberemovedexceptforcauseasprovidedforbylaw.Thisruleisabsolute,in fact,theCBCharterprovidedforthesameabsoluterule. Furthermore,theCivilServiceLawwhichclassifiedCorpus'positionasnoncompetitiveprovidesthat suchpositionsareprotectedbytheCivilServiceLawandthathisremovalmustonlybeforcauserecognizedby law(GarciavExec.Secretary.) Whilethetenureofofficialsholdingprimarilyconfidentialpositionsendsuponlossofconfidence,the tenureofofficialsholdinghighlytechnicalpostsdoesnotenduponmerelossofconfidence.TheConsti.clearly distinguishedtheprimarilyconfidentialfromthehighlytechnical,andtoapplythelossofconfidenceruletothe latterincumbentsistoignoreanderasethedifferentiationexpresslymadebyourfundamentalcharter.Officers holdinghighlytechnicalpositionsholdofficeonthebasisoftheirspecialskillsandqualifications.Thecourt alsosaidthatifmechanicsandengineersenjoysecurityoftenurewithmorereasonshouldahighlytechnical officer,asRespondentCorpus,beprotectedbytheConstitutionalprovisiononsecurityoftenure.RAM.

Inglesv.Mutuc,26SCRA171(1968)

F:

Plaintiffshereinarecivilserviceeligibles,holdingpositionsundertheOfficeofthePresident.Aboutthesecond weekofJanuary,1962,plaintiffsreceivedacommunicationfromExecutiveSec.Mutucadvisingthemthattheirservicesin thegovernmentwereterminated.TheyappealedtothePresidentbutsaidappealwasdenied.Theyfiledanactionagainst theExec.Sec.allegingthattheyhadbeenremovedfromofficewithoutjustcauseandwithoutdueprocess.Defendant,on theotherhand,averredthatthepositionswhichplaintiffswerethenoccupyingwereprimarilyconfidentialinnatureand therefore,theirappointmentsweresubjecttoremovalatthepleasureoftheappointingpower.

ISSUE: W/Nplaintiffsareoccupyingpositionswhichareprimarilyconfidentialandthereforearesubjectto removalatthepleasureoftheappointingauthority. HELD:NO.Thefactthattheplaintiffsheldofficeforthe"president'sPrivateOffice"undersubdivisionentitled "privatesecretaries"andthattheyhandled"confidentialMatters"eveniftheyonlyperformedclericalworkdo notmakethemofficersandemployeesoccupyinghighlyconfidentialoffices.Thereisnothingintheitemsofthe plaintiffs(whowereclerksandsecretaries)toindicatethattheirrespectivepositionsare"primarilyconfidential" innature. Thefactthattheyhandled attimes "confidential matters" does notsuffice tocharacterizetheir positionsasprimarilyconfidential.NoofficeroremployeeintheCivilServiceshallberemovedorsuspended exceptforcauseasprovidedforbylawandsinceplaintiffspositionswereprotectedbythisprovision,their removalwithoutcausewasthereforeillegal.Adapted. xxx Officer holding position primarily confidential in nature; Statement in De los Santos v. Mallare declaredasmereobiter. Theassumptionthatanofficerholdingapositionw/cisprimarilyconfidentialin nature is "subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power," is inaccurate. This assumption is evidentlybased upona statement inDe losSantosv.Mallare tothe effect that "three specified classes of positions policydetermining, primarily confidential and highly technical are excluded from the merit systemand dismissalatpleasureofofficersandemployeesappointedthereinisallowedbytheConsti . xxx. Thiswas,however,amereobiter,bec.,theofficeinvolvedinsaidcasethatofCityEngineerofBaguiodid notbelongtoanyoftheexceptedclasses,and,hence,itwasnotnecessarytodeterminewhetheritsincumbents wereremovableornotatthepleasureoftheappointingpower.Whatismore,said obiter,ifdetachedfromthe contextofthedecisionofw/citformspart,wouldbeinconsistentw/theconstitutionalcommandtotheeffect that"noofficeroremployeeintheCivilServiceshallberemovedorsuspendedexceptforcauseasprovidedby law"anditisconcededthatoneholdingintheGovtaprimarilyconfidentialpositionis"intheCivilService." Meaning of "term merely expires"; Distinguished from "removal" and "dismissal." When an incumbentofaprimarilyconfidentialpositionholdsofficeatthepleasureoftheappointingpower,andthat pleasureturnsintodispleasure,theincumbentis not "removed"or"dismissed"fromofficehistermmerely "expires,"inmuchthesamewayasanofficer,whoserighttheretoceasesuponexpirationofthefixedtermfor w/chehadbeenappointedorelected,isnotandcannotbedeemed"removed"or"dismissed"therefrom,upon theexpirationofsaidterm.Themaindifferencebet.theformerprimarilyconfidentialofficerandthelatter isthatthelatter'stermisfixedordefinite,whereasthatoftheformerisnotprefixed,butindefinite,atthetime ofhisappointmentorelection,andbecomesfixedanddeterminedwhentheappointingpowerexpressesits decisiontoputanendtotheservicesoftheincumbent.Whenthiseventtakesplace,thelatteris not"removed" or"dismissed"fromofficehistermmerely"expired."RAM.

 [NOTE:TheCourtinthiscaseruledthattheoneholdinginthegovernmentaprimarilyconfidential positionis"intheCivilService"andthat"officersintheunclassifiedaswellasthoseintheclassifiedservice" areprotectedbytheprovisionintheorganiclawthat"noofficershallberemovedfromofficewithoutcauseas providedbylaw".Whileincumbentofaprimarilyconfidentialpositionholdsofficeatthepleasureonlyofthe appointingpowerandsuchpleasureturnsintodispleasure,theincumbentisnot"removedordismissed"butthat histerm,merelyexpires.]

Cristobalv.Melchor,78SCRA175ACivilServiceEmployeeisNotBarredbyLachesifbeforeBringingSuit HeContinuouslyPressedHisClaimforReinstatement. F:
Cristobal,athirdgradecivilserviceeligible,wasemployedasaprivateSecretaryintheOfficeofthePresidentof thePhilippines.InJanuary1962,heandsomeothersweregivennoticeofterminationoftheirserviceseffectiveJanuary1, 1962.OnMarch24,1962,fiveoftheemployeesconcernedfiledanactionwiththeCFI,whichculminatedinanSCruling orderingtheirreinstatement(InglesvMutuc).Cristobal,however,wasnotapartytothecasebecauseduringthependency ofsuchcase,hesoughtreinstatementandinfact,theExec.SecretaryandseveralotherExec.secretariespromisedtolook forplacementforhim.AftertheSupremeCourtrenderedthedecisionintheMutuccase,CristobalwrotethePresident requestingreinstatement.ThisrequestwasdeniedinfivesuccessivelettersfromtheOfficeofthePresident,thelastletter declaredthematter"definitelyclosed". CristobalfiledanactionintheCFI(nowRTC)ofManila. Thedismissalwas basedonRule66oftheRulesofCourt(QuoWarranto)whichprovidesthatanactionforquowarrantomaynotbefiled unlesscommencedwithinoneyearafterthecauseoftheouster.SinceCristobaldidnotbringtheactionuntilafterthe lapseofnineyears,hiscasewasbarredbylaches.

HELD: Cristobalisnotguiltyoflaches.Hesoughtreconsiderationofhisseparationfromtheserviceand althoughhedidnotjoinintheInglescourtaction,hecontinuedtopresshisrequestforreinstatementduringthe pendencyofthecase.InfactSecretaryMutucassuredhimthathewouldworkforhisreinstatement. The continuedpromisenotonlyofMutucbutofthesubsequentSecretariesledCristobaltowaitbutdepitewaiting forsuchalongtime,hisreinstatementnevercameabout.ItwouldbetheheightofinequityifafterCristobal reliedandreposedhisfaithandtrustonthewordandpromisesoftheformerExec.Secretaries,thecourtwould rulethathehadlosthisrighttoseekreliefbecauseofthelapseoftime. Cristobal,justlikethePlaintiffsintheInglesvMutuccase,wasnotholdinganofficecharacterizedas "highly confidential", he was performing purely clerical work although he handled "confidential matters" occasionally.Heisthereforeprotectedinhistenureandmaynotbethereforeremovedwithoutjustcause.Heis entitledtobackwagesforfiveyearsalthoughhehadbeendismissedfornineyears,applyingbyanalogythe awardofbackwagesincasesofunfairlaborpractice.Adapted. (6)RightofSelfOrganization Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,toformunions,associations,orsocietiesforpurposesnotcontrarytolawshallnotbeabridged.

Art.IX,B,Sec.2.xxx

(5)Therighttoselforganizationshallnotbedeniedtogovernmentemployees.

(notinVV'soutline) Sec.38. Coverage. (1) Allgovernmentemployees, including those ingovernmentownedor controlledcorporationswithoriginalcharters,canform,joinorassistemployees'organizationsoftheir ownchoosingforthefurtheranceandprotectionoftheirinterests. Theycanalsoform,inconjunction withappropriategovernmentauthorities,labormanagementcommittees,workcouncilsandotherforms ofworkers'participationschemestoachievethesameobjectives. (2) TheprovisionsofthisChaptershallnotapplytothemembersoftheArmedForcesofthe Philippines,includingpoliceofficers,policemen,firemenandjailguards. (BookV,TitleI,SubtitleA, Chapter6,AdministrativeCodeof1987.)

AllianceofGovernmentWorkersvMinisterofLabor,124SCRA1(1983) F: supra.

HELD:Thedismissalofthispetitionshouldnot,byanymeans,beinterpretedtoimplythatworkersingovt ownedorcontrolledcorporationsorinstatecollegesanduniversitiesmaynotenjoyfreedomofassociation. Theseworkerswhomthepetitionerspurporttorepresenthavetherighttoformassociationsorsocietiesfor purposes not contrary to law. But they may not join associations w/c impose the obligation to engage in concertedactivitiesinordertogetsalaries,fringebenefits,andotheremolumentshigherthanordifferentfrom thoseprovidedbylawandregulation.

NationalServiceCorp.vNLRC,168SCRA122(1988),supra.

TUPASvNHA,173SCRA33(1989),supra. ISSUE:W/NemployeesofNHChaveundoubtedlytherighttoformunions. HELD:Therighttounionizeisnowexplicitlyrecognizedandgrantedtobothemployeesinbothgovernmental andtheprivatesectors.Thereisnoimpedimenttotheholdingofacertificateofelectionamongtheworkersof NHCforitisclearthattheyarecoveredbytheLaborCode,forNHCisaGOCCwithoutanoriginalcharter. StatutoryimplementationoftheConsti(par5sec2artIXB)isfoundinArt244oftheLaborCode.Adapted.

(7)Righttostrike SSS Employees Association v CA, 175 SCRA 690 [Public Sector LaborManagement has jurisdiction of

disputeconcerningtermsandconditions(ofemployment)butnotdamagesarisingfromactsofaunion.] F:SSSfiledw/theRTCQCacomplaintfordamagesw/aprayerforawritofprelinj.againstpetitionersSSSEA,alleging
thatthe officers and members of the latter staged anillegal strike andbarricaded the entrances to the SSS building preventingnonstrikingemployeesfromreportingtoworkandSSSmembersfromtransactingbusinessw/SSS.ThePublic SectorLaborManagementCouncilorderedthestrikerstoreturntoworkbutthestrikersrefusedtodoso. TheSSSEA wentonstrikebec.SSSfailedtoactontheunion'sdemands. Petitionersfiledamotiontodismissthecomplaintforlackofjurisdiction,w/cmotionwasdenied.Therestraining orderw/cwaspreviouslyissuedwasconvertedintoaninjunctionafterfindingthestrikeillegal.Petitionersappealedthe casetotheCA.ThelatterheldthatsincetheemployeesofSSSaregovtemployees,theyarenotallowedtostrike.

HELD:EmployeesintheCivilServicemaynotresorttostrikes,walkoutsandothertemporaryworkstoppages, likeworkersintheprivatesector,inordertopressuretheGovt.toaccedetotheirdemands.Asnowprovided underSec.4,RuleIIIoftheRulesandRegulationstoGoverntheExerciseoftheRightofGovt.EEstoSelf Organizationwhichtookeffectaftertheinitialdisputearose,thetermsandconditionsofemploymentinthe Govt,includinganypoliticalsubdivisionorinstrumentalitythereofandgovt.ownedandcontrolledcorporations withoriginalcharters,aregovernedbylawandemployeesthereinshallnotstrikeforthepurposeofsecuring changesthereof. ThestatementofthecourtinAllianceofGovtWorkersv.MinisterofLaborandEmployment(124 SCRA1)isrelevantasitfurnishestherationalefordistinguishingbet.workersintheprivatesectorandgovt employeesw/regardtotherighttostrike?
Sincethetermsandconditionsofgovt.employmentarefixedbylaw,govt.workerscannotuse thesameweaponsemployedbyworkersintheprivatesectortosecureconcessionsfromtheiremployers. Theprinciplebehindlaborunionisminprivateindustryisthatindustrialpeacecannotbesecuredthrough compulsionoflaw.Relationsbet.privateemployersandtheiremployeesrestonanessentiallyvoluntary basis. Subjecttotheminimumrequirementsofwagelawsandotherlaborandwelfarelegislation,the termsandconditionsofemploymentintheunionizedprivatesectoraresettledthroughtheprocessof collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegatedpower,theadministrativeheadsofgovtw/cfixthetermsandconditionsofemployment.And thisiseffectedthroughstatutesoradministrativecirculars,rules,andregulations,notthroughCBA's.

EO180,w/c providesguidelines fortheexerciseoftherighttoorganizeofgovt employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditionsofemploymentinvolvedarenotamongthosefixedbylaw. Govtemployeesmay,therefore,throughtheirunionsorassociations,eitherpetitiontheCongressforthe bettermentofthetermsandconditionsofemploymentwhicharew/intheambitoflegislationornegotiatew/the appropriategovtagenciesfortheimprovementofthosew/arenotfixedbylaw. Iftherebeanyunresolved grievances,thedisputemaybereferredtothePublicSectorLaborManagementCouncilforappropriateaction. RAM. Issue:W/NtheRTCcanenjointheSSSEAfromstriking. Held:Yes.EO180veststhePublicSectorLaborManagementCouncilwithjurisdictionoverunresolvedlabor

disputesinvolvinggovernmentemployees. Clearly,theNLRChasnojurisdictionoverthedispute. TheRTC was not precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under BP 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdictionovertheSSS'scomplaintfordamagesandissuingtheinjunctivewritprayedfortherein.Unlikethe NLRC,thePSLMCouncilhasnotbeengrantedbylawauthoritytoissuewritsofinjunctioninlabordisputes withinitsjurisdiction.Thus,sinceitistheCouncilandtheNLRCthathasjurisdictionovertheinstantlabor dispute,resorttogeneralcourtsoflawfortheissuanceofawritofinjunctiontoenjointhestrikeisappropriate. Adapted. ManilaPublicSchoolTeachersAssociationv.Laguio,200SCRA323(1991) F:
OnSeptember17,1990,Monday,atleast800publicschoolteachersproceededtothenationalofficeoftheDECS andairedtheirgrievances.ThemassactioncontinuedintotheweekdespitetheDECSSecretary'sRETURNTOWORK order.TheSecretaryfiledadministrativechargesagainsttheprotestingteachers.TheSecretaryrenderedthequestioned decisions in the administrative proceeding. He dismissed some teachers and placed others in under suspension. Two separate petitions werefiledtoassailthevalidity ofthe returntoworkorder andhis decisions in the administrative proceeding.

ISSUE:WHETHERORNOTTHEMASSACTIONSARECONSIDEREDASSTRIKES? HELD: Yes.Themassactionsconstitutedaconcertedandunauthorizedstoppageof,orabsencefromwork, whichitwastheteachers'dutytoperform,undertakenforessentiallyeconomicreasons. ISSUE:WHETHERORNOTPUBLICSCHOOLTEACHERSCANSTRIKE? HELD:No.Employeesofthepublicservicedonothavetherighttostrikealthoughtheyhavetherighttoself organizationandnegotiatewithappropriategovernmentagenciesfortheimprovementofworkingconditions. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS? HELD:Thiscourtisacourtoflastresort.Itresolvesquestionsoflawwherethereisnodisputeofthefactsor thatthefactshavebeenalreadydeterminedbythelowertribunals.Itisnotatrieroffacts.Itcannotresolvethe issuewhichrequirestheestablishmentofsomefacts.Theremedyisforthepetitionerstoparticipateinthe administrativeproceedings. Iftheylost, they mayappealto theCivilServiceCommission. Ifpending said administrativeproceedings,immediaterecoursetojudicialauthoritywasbelievednecessary,recourseiswiththe RTCwheretherewouldbeopportunitytoproverelevantfacts.Adapted.

9.ReviewofthedecisionsoftheCSC Art.IX,A,Sec.7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseor matterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.A caseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,or

memorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself. Unlessotherwise providedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought totheSupreme Court on certiorari bythe aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of acopy thereof.

BARLONGAYCASES: Dariov.Mison,176SCRA84(1989)

Manalansangv.CSC,,203SCRA797(1991) F:
ThisisaresolutionoftheCourt enbanc denyingpetitioner'ssecondmotionforreconsideration. TheCourt wishes,however,todevoteafewwordstooneissueraisedbythepetitionerw/cappearsofsufficientimportancetomerit separatetreatmentanddisposition:thatconcerningtheeffectofthefilingofamotionforreconsiderationofadecision,or finalorderorresolutionoftheCSConthe30dayperiodprescribedfortakinganappealtherefrom.Adapted.

HELD:TheCourtholdsthatthethirtydayperiodprescribedbySec.7,PartA,Art.IXoftheConsti.shallbe interruptedfromthetimeamotionforreconsiderationistimelyandproperlyfiled untilnoticeoftheorder overrulingthemotionshallhavebeenservedupontheaccusedorhiscounsel.Inotherwords,incomputingthe periodofappealfromtheCSC,thetimeduringw/camotionforreconsiderorsetasideitsjudgment,orderor resolutionhasbeenpendingshallbededucted,unlesssuchmotionfailstherequirementssettherefor.RAM. Mancitav.Barcinas,216SCRA772(1992) F:

On 10/15/90, Mayor Divinigracia, Jr., who had succeeded Mayor Prila, informed pvt. resp. Nacario that her servicesasMPDCwouldbeterminatedeffective11/16/90topavethewayforthereinstatementofpetitioner(w/cCSC ordered.) xxx Meanwhile,on11/8/90,pvt.resp.Nacariofiledw/theRTCofPili,CamarinesSur,apetitionfordeclaratoryrelief andprohibitionw/prel.inj.againstCSCxxx Asprayedforbythepetitioner(nowpvt.resp.Nacario),theresp.Judgeissuedonthesamedayatemporary restrainingorderandsetthehearingoftheapplicationforawritofprel.inj.on11/22/90. Petitionerfiledamotionto dismissthepetitiononthegroundthatthecourtaquohasnojurisdictiontorule,passuponorreviewafinaljudgment, orderordecisionoftheCSC.On2/25/91,resp.Judgeissuedanorderdenyingthemotion.MFRwasalsodeniedHence, thispetitionforcertiorari.

HELD:TheCSC,undertheConsti.,isthesinglearbiterofallcontestsrelatingtothecivilserviceandassuch, itsjudgmentsareunappealableandsubjectonlytothisCourt's certiorarijurisdiction.(Lopezv.CSC,et.al,195 SCRA777.) Sincethedecision,order,orrulingoftheCSCissubjecttoreviewonlybythisCourton certiorariunder Rule65,ROC,theRTChasnojurisdictionoverthecivilcase,anactionw/cseeksareviewofadecisionofthe CSC.RAM.

10.FiscalAutonomy Art. IX, A, Sec. 5. The Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

ApprovalofappointmentsbytheCSC BARLONGAYCASES: Barrozov.CSC,198SCRA487 F:

On11/10/88,DavidBorjaretiredasCityEngineerofBaguio. Atthattime,petitionerTeodoroBarrozowasa SeniorCivilEngineerofDPWHassignedtotheofficeoftheCityEngineerofBaguioandresp.V.JulianwastheAsst. CityEngineerofBaguio.On12/27/88,MayorLaboextendedtoBarrozoapermanentappointmentasCityEngineerof Baguio. On2/16/89,afterhisprotestwasrejectedbyMayorLabo,pvt.resp.JulianappealedtotheMSPBoftheCSC, claimingthatasaqualifiednextinrankofficer,hehadapreemptiverightoverBarrozo. TheCSCCordilleraAdmin. Region,tow/ctheappealwasreferred,declaredBarrozo'sappointmentvoidforbeingviolativeofCivilServicepromotion rules.MFRwasdenied.CSC,onappeal,affirmedthedecision.Adapted.

HELD: TheCSChasnopowerofappointmentexceptoveritsownpersonnel.Neitherdoesithavetheauthority to review the appointments made by other officers except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the requiredqualifications.Thedeterminationofwhoamongaspirantswiththeminimumstatutoryqualifications shouldbepreferredbelongstotheappointingauthorityandnottheCSC.Itcannotdisallowanappointmentbec. itbelievesanotherpersonisbetterqualifiedandmushlesscanitdirecttheappointmentofitsownchoice. xxx Thelawdoesnotabsolutelyrequirethatthepersonwhoisnextinrankshallbepromotedtofilla vacancy.Infact,thevacancymaybefillednotonlybypromotionbut"bytransferofpresentemployeesinthe govt service, by reinstatement, by reemployment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by appointmentofpersonsw/thecivilserviceeligibilityappropriatetotheposition.WhattheCivilServiceAct providesisthatifavacancyisfilledbypromotion,thepersonholdingthatpositionnextinrankthereto"shallbe consideredforpromotion." xxx Onewhoisnextinrankisentitledtopreferentialconsiderationforpromotiontothehighervacancybut itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthatheandnooneelsecanbeappointed. Theruleneithergrantsavestedright totheholdernorimposesaministerialdutyontheappointingauthoritytopromotesuchpersontothenext higherposition.RAM.

B.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS 1.CompositionandqualificationsofCommissioners

Art.IX,C,Sec.1.(1) ThereshallbeaCommissiononElectionscomposedofaChairmanandsix Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirtyfive years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidatesforanyelectivepositionintheimmediatelyprecedingelections.However,amajoritythereof, includingtheChairman,shallbemembersofthePhilippineBarwhohavebeenengagedinthepracticeof lawforatleasttenyears. Art.VII,Sec.13.xxx The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices, includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

Cayetanov.Monsod,201SCRA210 F:
MonsodwasnominatedbyPresidentAquinoasChairmanoftheComelec.TheCommissiononAppointments confirmedtheappointmentdespiteCayetano'sobjection,basedonMonsod'sallegedlackoftherequiredqualificationof 10yearlawpractice.Cayetanofiledthiscertiorariandprohibition.

ISSUE:W/NMONSODHASBEENENGAGEDINTHEPRACTICEOFLAWFOR1OYEARS? HELD:YES.Thepracticeoflawisnotlimitedtotheconductofcasesorlitigationincourt.Itembracesthe preparationofpleadingsandotherpapersincidenttoactionsandspecialproceedings,themanagementofsuch actionsandproceedingsonbehalfofclients,andotherworkswheretheworkdoneinvolvesthedeterminationof thetrainedlegalmindofthelegaleffectoffactsandconditions(PLAvs.Agrava.) Therecordsofthe1986constitutionalcommissionshowthattheinterpretationofthetermpracticeof lawwasliberalastoconsiderlawyersemployedintheCommissionofAuditasengagedinthepracticeoflaw providedthattheyusetheirlegalknowledgeortalentintheirrespectivework. ThecourtalsocitedanarticleintheJanuary11,1989issueoftheBusinessStar,thatlawyersnowadays havetheirownspecializedfieldssuchastaxlawyers,prosecutors,etc.,thatbecauseofthedemandsoftheir specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corporationlawyersareinvolvedinmanagementpolicyformulation. Therefore,Monsod,whopassedthebarin1960,workedwiththeWorldBankGroupfrom19631970, thenworkedforaninvestmentbanktill1986,becamememberoftheCONCOMin1986,andalsobecamea memberoftheDavideCommissionin1990,canbeconsideredtohavebeenengagedinthepracticeoflawas lawyereconomist,lawyermanager,lawyerentrepreneur,etc. ISSUE:W/NTHECOMMISSIONONAPPOINTMENTSCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETION INCONFIRMINGMONSOD'SAPPOINTMENT? HELD: NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the

presidentismandatedbytheconstitution.Thepowerofappointmentisessentiallywithinthediscretionofwhom itissovestedsubjecttotheonlyconditionthattheappointeeshouldpossessthequalificationrequiredbylaw. Fromtheevidence,thereisnooccasionfortheSCtoexerciseitscorrectivepowersincethereisnosuchgrave abuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheCA.Adapted.

2.AppointmentandtermofofficeofCommissioners;Ruleagainstreappointment Art.IX,C,Sec.1.xxx (2)TheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentof the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,threeMembers shallholdofficeforsevenyears,twoMembers forfiveyears,andthelast Members forthreeyears,withoutreappointment. Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbe onlyforthe unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporaryoractingcapacity.

NacionalistaPartyv.AngeloBautista,85PHIL103(1949) F:
PresidentQuirinodesignatedtheSolicitorGeneralasActingmemberoftheComelecinNovember,1949.The NacionalistaPartyfiledthisprohibitiononthefollowinggrounds:(1)theSGdidnotresignfromtheofficeoftheSolicitor General;(2)thereisnovacancyintheComelecbecausetheretirementoftheComelecmembercausingthevacancy,was acceptedbythe Presidentin badfaith; and(3)thefunctions ofa SolicitorGeneralareincompatible withthoseofa Comelecmember.

ISSUE:W/NTHEDESIGNATIONWASVALID? HELD:NO,itwasnot.BythenatureoftheComelec'sfunctions,theComelecmustbeindependent.Members arenotallowedtoperformotherfunctions,powersanddutiestopreserveitsimpartiality.TheSolicitorGeneral's duties also require an undivided time and attention for efficiency. Furthermore, when there is a vacancy, appointmentispreferredtodesignation. ISSUE:W/NPROHIBITIONWOULDLIE? HELD: NO. The case is by nature a quo warranto proceeding because it questions the legality of the respondent'sdesignationorhisrighttooffice.Theproceedingisinstitutedbytheotherpartyclaiming the positionoccupiedand/ortheSolicitorGeneral.Prohibitionhowever,hasadifferentpurpose,whichistoprevent theusurpationofjurisdictionbyasubordinatecourt. AlthoughthereisnootherpartywhoclaimsarightoverthepositionoccupiednorwilltheSGfilea caseagainsthimself,thecourtmustgranttheremedyofaquowarrantoproceedingbecausetheSG'scontinued

occupancyasmemberoftheComelecisillegal.Adapted.

Brillantesv.Yorac,192SCRA358(DEC.18,1990) F:
AssociateCommissionerHaydeeYoracwasappointedbyPres.AquinoasActingChairmanoftheCommission onElections,inplaceofChairmanHilarioDavide,whohadbeennamedchairmanofthefactfindingcommissionto investigatetheDec.1989coupd'tatattempt.

ISSUE:WONtheappointmentisunconstitutional HELD:NO.Art.IXA,Section1,oftheConstitutionexpresslydescribesalltheConstitutionalCommissionsas "independent".Althoughessentiallyexecutiveinnature,theyarenotunderthecontrolofthePresidentofthe Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedingsundertheapplicablelawsanditsownrulesandintheexerciseofitsowndiscretion.Itsdecisions, ordersandrulingsaresubjectonlytoreviewon certioraribytheSCasprovidedbytheConstitutioninArt.IX A,Section7. Thechoiceofatemporarychairmanintheabsenceoftheregularchairmancomesunderthatdiscretion. Thatdiscretioncannotbeexercisedforit,evenwithitsconsent,bythePresidentofthePhilippines.Adapted. NPv.Vera,85Phil149 F:
This is an action brought by the Nacionalista Party against De Vera on the ground that his appointment as ChairmanoftheCOMELECisaviolationoftheConstitutionparticularlyArt.X,Sec.1ofthe1935Constitutionwhich providesthatthemembersoftheCOMELECshallholdofficefornineyearswithoutreappointment.

Held:TheprohibitionagainstreappointmentcomesasacontinuationoftherequirementthattheCommission shallholdofficeforatermofnineyears.Reappointmentisnotprohibitedprovidedhistermwillnotexceed nineyearsinall. InJuly1945,threeCommissionerswereappointed.DeVerawasappointedforthreeyears.Ifhewere tosucceedhimself,hecannotbereappointedtodosobecausethatwouldprecludetheappointmentofanew memberafter3yearsandwouldfurthermoreincreasehistermto12yearssinceupontheexpirationofhisterm, hissuccessormustbeappointedfornineyears. Butinthiscase,deVera'sappointmentwasbyvirtueofthedeathoftheChairmanin1947andhewas promotedtooccupythechairmanshipoftheCommissionfortheunexpiredtermonly.Thus,thisisnotoffensive totheConstitutionbecauseitdoesnotincreasedeVera'stermofofficetomorethannineyearsnordoesit precludetheappointmentofanewmemberupontheexpirationofthefirsttermofthreeyears.Adapted.

Republicv.Imperial,96Phil770 F:
ThisisaquowarrantoproceedingtotestthelegalityofthecontinuanceinofficeofImperialasChairmanand PerezasmemberofCOMELEC. WhenChairmandeVeradiedinAugust1951,beforetheexpirationofthemaximumtermofnineyearsofthe

ChairmanoftheCommission,ImperialwasappointedChairmantosucceeddeVera.Hisappointmentprovidedforaterm expiringJuly12,1960.TheSGcontendedthatthetermforwhichhewilllegallyserveasChairmanlegallyexpiredonJuly 12,1954,theexpirationofthe9yeartermforwhichthefirstChairmanwasappointed. ComelecmemberPerezontheotherhand,wasappointedforatermof9yearsexpiringon24November1958. The SG contended that his term legally expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term of 6 years for which CommissionerEnage,hispredecessorwasappointed.

Held: ThetermscannotbeginfromthefirstappointmentsmadeinJuly12,1945butfromthedateofthe organizationoftheCOMELECunderCA657onJune21,1941.Thus,thetermofofficeofthefirstChairman, LopezVitobeganonJune21,1941andendedJune20,1950.ThatofmemberEnagebeganonJune21,1941to June20,1944(butthiswasnotfilled). Sincethefirst3yeartermhadalreadyexpiredin1944,theappointment ofDeVeraonJune12,1945mustbeforthefulltermofnineyears(June1944toJune1953).Thefirstvacancy occurredbytheexpirationofthetermofEnage.Hissuccessor,Perez,wasnamedforafull9yeartermwhich shallhavestartedonJune1947toJune1956. ThesecondvacancyhappeneduponthedeathofLopezVitoonMay1947.Tosucceedhim,deVera appointedandlastedonlyuptoJune1950,theunexpiredperiodofLopezVito'sterm.Thus,onJune1950,a vacancyoccurredwhichDeVeracouldnolongerfillbecausehisappointmentwasexpresslyprohibitedbythe Constitution.Thus,thenextChairmanwasrespondentImperialwhosetermof9yearsmustbedeemedtohave beganonJune21,1990toexpireonJune20,1959.Adapted.

3.Appointmentofpersonnel Art.IX,A,Sec.4.TheConstitutionalCommissionsshallappointtheirofficialsandemployeesin accordancewithlaw.

4.Salary Art.IX,A,Sec.3.ThesalaryoftheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbefixedbylawand shallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise x x x the Chairmen of the ConstitutionalCommissions(shallreceive),twohundredfourthousandpesoseach;andtheMembersof theConstitutionalCommissions,onehundredeightythousandpesoseach.

Thesalary,ofcourse,canbeincreasedandtheincreasecantakeeffectatonce,since,liketheJudiciary, theConstitutionalCommissionshavenotpartinthepassageofsuchalaw.

5.Disqualifications

Art.IX,A,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdany otherofficeoremployment. Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactive managementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice, norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseor privilege granted bythe Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries. NomembersofaConstitutionalCommissionshallduringhis"tenure":(IX,V,2) a.Holdanyotherofficeoremployment. Thisissimilartotheprohibitionagainstexecutiveofficers.Itappliestobothpublicandprivateoffices andemployment. b.Engageinthepracticeofanyprofession. c.Engageintheactivemanagementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythe functionsofhisoffice. d.Befinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseorprivilege granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.

6.Impeachment Art.XI,Sec.2.ThemembersoftheConstitutionalCommissionsmayberemovedfromoffice,on impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcor ruptionandotherhighcrimes,orbetrayalofpublictrust.

7.PowersandfunctionsoftheCOMELEC TheCommissiononElectionsshallexercisethefollowingpowersandfunctions: a.Enforceelectionlaws Art.IX,C,Sec.2.(1) Enforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductof anelection,plebiscite, initiative,referendum,andrecall.

Sanchezv.COMELEC,114SCRA454 F:
Sanchez,amayoraltycandidate,wholostinthe1980SanFernando,Pampangaelections,filedwiththeComeleca petitiontonullifythesaidelectionsduetolargescaleterrorism,whichtookplaceafterthepeoplehadcasttheirvotes.The Comelec,afterhearing,issuedtheresolutionwhichorderedthenullificationoftheelectionsandthecertificationofthe failureofelectionstothepresidentorprimeministerforremediallegislationandtheappointmentofmunicipalofficials. Thewinningmayoraltycandidatequestionedthevalidityoftheresolution.

ISSUE: W/NTHECOMELECHASTHEPOWERTO NULLIFYELECTIONSON THEGROUND OF POSTELECTIONTERRORISM? HELD: YES,ithas.TheComelecisnowthesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelections,returnsand qualificationsofallmembersoftheBatasangPambansa,electiveprovincialandcityofficials.Inlinewithits duty to protect and preserve the integrity of the elections, the Comelec must be deemed possessed of the authoritytoannulelectionswherethewillofthevotershasbeendefeatedandthepurityofelectionssullied.The factthatthefailureofelectionswasduetoterrorismafterthevoteswerecastisnotmaterial. ISSUE:W/NTHECOMELECHASTHEPOWERTOCALLSPECIALELECTIONS? HELD:YES.TheComelec,beingthesolejudgeofelections,returnsandqualifications,hasthepowertocall specialelections.DuringthetimetheComelecwasnotthesolejudge,thepresident,uponcertificationtohimby theComelecofafailureofelections,hadthepowertocallspecialelections.TheComelechasthedutytotake necessarystepstocompletetheelections,thatis,toseetoitthattherealwinnersareproclaimed.Butwhenthe winnerscannotbedeterminedfromtheelections,whichwasmarredbymassiveandpervasiveterrorism,the Comelecmustcallforaspecialelectioninordertoproclaimtherealwinners.Adapted. b.Decideadministrativequestionspertainingtoelectionexcepttherighttovote Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx (3)Decide,exceptthoseinvolvingtherighttovote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors,andregistrationofvoters.

c.Petitionforinclusionorexclusionofvoters Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx (6) File,uponaverifiedcomplaint,oronitsowninitiative,petitionsincourtforinclusionor exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, includingactsoromissionsconstitutingelectionfrauds,offensesandmalpractices.

OmnibusElectionCode

RighttoVote TherighttovotemaybechallengedintheMTCby: a)aproceedingchallengingtherightofavotertoberegistered; b)anactioninstitutedbyavoterforreinstatement; c)proceedingfiledbyanindividualtoexcludeanyvoterwhosenameappearsinthelistofvoters. Therearedateswhichthelawallotsfortheregistrationofvoters.Anyperson,under136,duringthis periodmaychallengetheregistrationofvotersonthegroundsofthequalificationsanddisqualificationsinthe exerciseoftherightofsuffrage. Qualifications(Articles5,117) a)Filipinocitizen b)18yearsold c)ResidentofthePhils.,foroneyearandofthemunicipalitywhereheproposestovotefor6months. Disqualifications(Art.118) a)Thoseconvictedbyfinaljudgmentandhavebeensentencedtoimprisonmentforatleastoneyearandsuch disqualificationshasnotbeenremovedbyabsolutepardonoramnesty. Thisdisqualificationlastsfor5years unlessrestoredbyabsolutepardonoramnesty.(CristobalvLabrador) b)Thoseconvictedofcrimesinvolvingthenationalsecurity,ordisloyaltytothegovernment,rebellion,sedition, subversion,etc. c)Insanityorincompetency InclusionProceedings IftheBoardofRegistrationcancelsthenameofavoter,hecanfileintheMTCapetitionforanorderto includehisnameinthelistofvotersortoreinstatehim.Actionmustbefiledwithin20daysformthelastdayof registration.AppealcanbemadetotheRTCwithin5days,andthedecisionshallbefinalandunappealableand nomotionforreconsiderationshallbeallowed. ExclusionProceedings(Articles138,139,142) ApetitionforexclusionmustbefiledwiththeMTCwithin20daysfromthelastdayofregistration.

d.Prosecuteelectionlawviolators Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx (6) File,uponaverifiedcomplaint,oronitsowninitiative,petitionsincourtforinclusionor

exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, includingactsoromissionsconstitutingelectionfrauds,offensesandmalpractices.

BPBlg.881,Sec.265
Sec.265.Prosecution.TheCommissionshall,throughitsdulyauthorizedlegalofficers,havetheexclusive powertoconductpreliminaryinvestigationofallelectionoffensespunishableunderthisCode,andtoprosecutethe same.TheCommissionmayavailoftheassistanceofotherprosecutingarmsofthegovernment:Provided,however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing the complaint, he may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigationandprosecution,ifwarranted.

EO134,Sec.11,February27,1987
Sec.11. Prosecution. TheCommissionshall,throughitsdulyauthorizedlegalofficers,haveexclusive powerto conduct preliminary investigation ofall election offenses punishable as provided forin thepreceding section,andtoprosecutethesame:Provided,ThatintheeventthattheCommissionfailstoactonanycomplaint withintwo(2)monthsfromfiling,thecomplainantmayfilethecomplaintwiththeOfficeoftheFiscalorwiththe DepartmentofJusticeforproperinvestigationsandprosecution,ifwarranted. TheCommissionmayavailoftheassistanceofotherprosecutingarmsofthegovernment.

DeJesusv.People,120SCRA760 In De Jesus v People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983), it was ruled that a government official (COMELEC Registrar) who violated the election law ( tampering with returns to make it appear that there were more registeredvoters)mustbeprosecutedbytheCOMELEC,beforetheRTC,nottheSandiganbayan. The1978 ElectionCodeisclearthattheCOMELECshallhavethepowertoconductpreliminaryinvestigationsofall electionoffenses,andthattheRTChasexclusiveoriginaljurisdictiontotryanddecidesuchcases.Itisnotthe characterorpersonalityoftheoffender(publicofficial)butthecrimecommitted(violationofelectionlaw)that determinesjurisdiction.Thisprovisionofthe1978ElectionCodehasbeenintegratedinthe1987Constitution. Adapted.

Corpuzv.Tanodbayan,149SCRA281 F:
ThecomplaintforelectioneeringagainsttheDirectorofTradeet.al.,filedbeforetheComelecwaswithdrawnand later on refiled with the Tanodbayan. The Comelec Legal Assistance Office moved to enter its appearance for the complainants.TheTanodbayandeniedthemotiononthegroundthatithasexclusiveauthoritytoprosecutetheelection offensesofpublicofficials.

ISSUE: WHETHERORNOT THETANODBAYANHASEXCLUSIVEAUTHORITYTOPROSECUTE ELECTIONOFFENSES?

HELD: NO. There is no constitutional provision granting the Tanodbayan, either explicitly or implicitly, authority to prosecute, investigate and hear election offenses. Instead the constitution granted such power exclusivelytotheComelecinordertoinsureafree,orderlyandhonestelections.Itisthenatureoftheoffense thatdeterminestheexclusivejurisdictionoftheComelecregardlessofwhotheoffenderis,whetheraprivate individualorapublicofficer.Adapted. Peoplev.Basilia,179SCRA87 F:
ThreecomplaintswerefiledwiththeprovincialfiscalallegingviolationsoftheOmnibusElectionCode.After conductingpreliminaryinvestigation,thefiscalfiledtheinformationwiththeRTC.Thejudge, motuproprio,dismissedthe informationonthegroundthattheComelechastheexclusiveauthoritytoconductpreliminaryinvestigationandprosecute electionoffenses.Hencethisreview.

ISSUE: W/N FISCALS MAY CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTE ELECTIONOFFENSES? HELD: YES, they may. Although the Comelec is granted the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigationandprosecuteelectionoffenses,itisalsoauthorizedbytheOmnibusElectionCodetoavailitself of theassistance ofother prosecuting armsof government. To ensurecredible elections, the Comelec may deputizelawenforcementagenciesandinstrumentalities,whetherbeforeorafterelections.Pursuanttosuch authority granted by law, the Comelec issued Resolution no 1862 providing that fiscals may conduct preliminaryinvestigationsandprosecuteelectionoffenses.Adapted.

Peoplev.Inting,187SCRA788(1990) *ENBANC F:
In 1988, Mrs. Barba filed a letter complaint against OIC Mayor Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Or. with the COMELEC,forallegedlytransferringher,apermanentNursingAttendant,intheofficeoftheMayortoaveryremote barangayandwithoutobtainingpriorpermissionorclearancefromtheCOMELECasrequiredbylaw. TheCOMELECdirectedtheProvincialElectionSupervisorofDumagueteCity(Atty.Lituanas)to,amongothers, conductthepreliminaryinvestigationofthecase.SaiddirectivewaspursuanttoaCOMELECresolutionwhichinturn,is basedontheconstitutionalmandatethattheCOMELECischargedwiththeenforcementandadministrationofalllaws relativetotheconductofelections. Afterapreliminaryinvestigation,Atty.Lituanasfounda primafacie case.Hence,hefiledwiththerespondent RTCofDumagueteCityacriminalcaseagainsttheOICMayor.TheRTCissuedawarrantofarrestagainsttheaccused whichwaslatercancelledonthegroundthatAtty.LituanasisnotauthorizedtodetermineprobablecausepursuanttoSec. 2,Art.IIIofthe1987Constitution.Thecourtstatedthatit"willgiveduecoursetotheinformationfiledifthesamehasthe writtenapprovaloftheProvincialFiscalafterwhichtheprosecutionofthecaseshallbeunderthesupervisionandcontrol ofthelatter." Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the condition. Hence the RTC quashed the information. A motion for reconsiderationwasdenied. Hence,thispetition.

ISSUE: W/NapreliminaryinvestigationconductedbyaProvincialElectionSupervisorinvolvingelection offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal, before the RTC may take cognizance of the investigationanddeterminewhetherornotprobablecauseexists. HELD:NO.TheCourtemphasizestheimportantfeaturesoftheconstitutionalmandatethat"xxxnosearch warrantorwarrantofarrestshallissueexceptuponprobablecausetobedeterminedpersonallybythejudge xxx."(Art.III,Sec.2,Constitution) First,thedeterminationofprobablecauseisafunctionoftheJudge.ItisnotfortheProv'lFiscalnorfor theElectionSupervisortoascertain.OnlytheJudgeandtheJudgealonemakesthisdetermination. Second,thepreliminaryinquirymadebyaProsecutordoesnotbindthejudge.Itmerelyassistshimto makethedeterminationofprobablecause.ThejudgedoesnothavetofollowwhattheProsecutorpresentsto him.Itisthereport,theaffidavits,thetranscriptsofstenographicnotes,andallothersuppportingdocuments behindtheProsecutor'scertificationw/carematerialinassistingthejudgetomakehisdetermination. Third,judgesandprosecutorsalikeshoulddistinguishthepreliminaryinquiryw/cdeterminesprobable causefortheissuanceofawarrantofarrestfromthepreliminaryinvestigationproperwhichascertainswhether theoffendershouldbeheldfortrialorreleased.Evenifthetwoinquiriesareconductedinthecourseofoneand thesameproceeding,thereshouldbenoconfusionabouttheobjectives.Thedeterminationofprobablecausefor the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation properwhether or not there is reasonablegroundtobelievethattheaccusedisguiltyoftheoffensechargedand,thereforewhetherornothe shouldbesubjectedtotrialisthefunctionoftheprosecutor. ArticleIXC,Sec.2oftheConstitutionprovides: "Sec.2.TheCommissiononElectionsshallexercisethe followingpowersandfunctions: (1)Enforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite, initiative,referendum,andrecall. xxxxxxxxxx (6)File,uponaverifiedcomplaint,oronitsowninitiative,petitionsincourtforinclusionorexclusion ofvotes,investigateand,whereappropriate,prosecutecasesofviolationofelectionlaws,includingactsor omissionconstitutingelectionfrauds,offenses,andmalpractices." Ineffect,the1987ConstitutionmandatestheCOMELECnotonlytoinvestigatebutalsotoprosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigationsincasesinvolvingelectionoffensesforthepurposeofhelpingthejudgedetermineprobablecause andforfilinganinformationincourt.ThispowerisexclusivewiththeCOMELEC. Hence,theProv'lFiscal,assuch,assumesnoroleintheprosecutionofelectionoffenses.IftheFiscal filesaninformationcharginganelectionoffenseorprosecutesaviolationofelectionlaw,itisbecausehehas beendeputizedbytheCOMELEC.Hedoesnotdosounderthesoleauthorityofhisoffice. It is onlyafter a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputiesthatSec.2,Art.IIIofthe1987Constitutioncomesin.Thisisso,because,whentheapplicationfora warrantofarrestismadeandtheinformationisfiledwiththecourt,thejudgewillthendeterminewhetheror notaprobablecauseexistsfortheissuanceofawarrantofarrest.Adapted.

Peoplev.Delgado,189SCRA715(1990) F:
Uponrecommendationoftheprovincialelectionsupervisor,whoconductedapreliminaryinvestigationofthe allegedelectionoffensesofDelgado,et.al,theComelecfiledaninformationagainstthelatter.Therespondentsmovedfor reconsideration and the suspension of the warrants of arrests on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted.Thetrialcourtorderedforreinvestigation.TheComelecopposedtheorderonthegroundthatonlytheSCmay reviewthedecisions,orders,resolutionsoftheComelec.ThetrialcourtdeniedtheComelecmotion.Hencethiscertiorari.

ISSUE:W/NTHECOMELECACTIONMAYBEREVIEWEDONLYONCERTIORARIBYTHESC? HELD:NO.Accordingtotheconstitution,theComelechasthefollowingfunctions:(1)enforcementofelection laws;(2)decisionofelectioncontests;(3)decisionofadministrativequestions;(4)deputizinglawenforcement agencies; (5) registration of political parties; and (6) improvement of elections. What are reviewable on certioraribytheSCarethoseorders,decisions,etc.,renderedinactionsorproceedingsbeforetheComelecin theexerciseofitsadjudicatoryorquasijudicialpowers.ThusdecisionsoftheComeleconelectioncontestsor onadministrativequestionsaresubjecttojudicialreviewonlybytheSC.Inthiscase,noComelecadjudicatory powerisexercised.Asapublicprosecutor,theComelechastheexclusiveauthoritytoconductpreliminary investigationandprosecuteoffensespunishableundertheelectioncodebeforethecompetentcourt.Butwhen theComelecfilestheinformation,thesubsequentdispositionofthecaseissubjecttothecourt'sapproval.The Comeleccan'tconductreinvestigationunlesssoorderedbythatcourtnorrefuseitsorderofreinvestigation. Adapted.

e. Recommend pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence of election law violators Art.IX,C,Sec.5.Nopardon,amnesty,parole,orsuspensionofsentenceforviolationofelection laws,rules,andregulationsshallbegrantedbythePresidentwithoutthefavorablerecommendationof theCommission.

f.Deputizelawenforcementagentsandrecommendtheirremoval Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx (4)Deputize,withtheconcurrenceofthePresident, law

enforcement

agencies

and

instrumentalitiesoftheGovernment, includingtheArmedForcesofthePhilippines, fortheexclusive purposeofensuringfree,orderly,honest,peaceful,andcredibleelections. xxx (8)RecommendtothePresidenttheremovalofanyofficeroremployeeithasdeputized,orthe impositionofanyotherdisciplinaryaction,forviolationordisregard,ordisobediencetoitsdirective, orderordecision. xxx

g.Registrationofpoliticalparties,organizationsandcoalitionsandACCREDITATION ofcitizens'arms Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx (5) Register,aftersufficientpublication,politicalparties,organizations,orcoalitionswhich,in additiontootherrequirements,mustpresenttheirplatformorprogramofgovernment;andaccredit citizens'armsoftheCommissiononElections.Religiousdenominationsandsectsshallnotberegistered. Thosewhichseektoachievetheirgoalsthroughviolenceorunlawfulmeans,orrefusetoupholdand adheretothisConstitution,orwhicharesupportedbyanyforeigngovernmentshalllikewiseberefused registration. Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,coalitions,orcandidatesrelatedtoelectionsconstituteinterferenceinnationalaffairs,and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commissions,inadditiontootherpenaltiesthatmaybeprescribedbylaw. Thefollowingshallnotberegistered: a.Religiousdenominationsandsects. b.Thoseseekingtoachievetheirgoalsthroughviolenceorunlawfulmeans. c.ThoserefusingtoupholdandadheretothisConstitution. d. Those which are supported by any foreign government. Financial contributions from foreign governmentandtheiragenciestopoliticalpartiesorcandidatesrelatedtoelectionsconstitute"interferencein nationalaffairs,"andwhenaccepted,shallbeanadditionalgroundforcancellationofregistration,inadditionto otherpenaltiesthelawmayprescribe.

Art.IX,C,Sec.7. Novotescastinfavorofapoliticalparty,organization,orcoalitionshallbe valid,exceptforthoseregisteredunderthepartylistsystemasprovidedinthisConstitution.

Art.IX,C,Sec.8.Politicalparties,ororganizationsorcoalitionsregisteredunderthepartylist systems,shallnotbepresentedinthevoters'registrationboards,boardsofelectioninspectors,boardsof canvassers,orothersimilarbodies.However,theyshallbeentitledtoappointpollwatchersinaccordance withlaw.

Art.VI,Sec.5.xxx (2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representativesincludingthoseunderthepartylist.Forthreeconsecutivetermsaftertheratificationof thisConstitution,onehalfoftheseatsallocatedtothepartylistrepresentativesshallbefilled,asprovided bylaw,byselectionorelectionfromlabor,peasant,urbanpoor,indigenousculturalcommunities,women,

youth,andsuchothersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector.

Art.XVIII,Sec.7. Untilalawispassed,thePresidentmayfillbyappointmentfromalistof nomineesbytherespectivesectorstheseatsreservedforsectoralrepresentationinparagraph2,Section5 ofArticleVIoftheConstitution.

h.Regulationofpublicutilitiesandmediaofinformation Art.IX,C,Sec.4. TheCommissionmay,duringtheelectionperiod,superviseorregulatethe enjoymentofutilizationofallfranchisesorpermitsfortheoperationortransportationandotherpublic utilities,mediaofcommunicationorinformation,allgrants,specialprivileges,orconcessionsgrantedby theGovernmentoranysubdivision,agency,orinstrumentalitythereof,includinganygovernmentowned orcontrolledcorporationoritssubsidiary. Suchsupervisionorregulation shallaimtoensureequal opportunity,time,andspace,andtherighttoreply,includingreasonable,equalratestherefor,forpublic informationcampaignsandforumsamongcandidatesinconnectionwiththeobjectiveofholdingfree, orderly,honest,peaceful,andcredibleelections. Suchsupervisionorregulationshallaimtoensure(i)equalopportunity,timeandspace,(ii)therightto reply,includingreasonableequalratestherefor,forpublicinformationcampaignsandfromamongcandidates,in connectionwiththeobjectofholdingfree,orderly,honest,peacefulandcredibleelections.

NationalPressClubV.COMELEC,176SCRA84 F:
Petitionershereinwererepresentativesofmassmediawhichwerepreventedfromsellinganddonating spaceorairtimeforpoliticaladvertisementsunderRA6646.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. RULING:NO.TheComelechasbeenexpresslyauthorizedbytheConstitutiontosuperviseorregulate theenjoymentorutilizationofthefranchisesorpermitsfortheoperationofmediaofcommunicationand information.Thefundamentalpurposesofsuchpoweraretoensure"equalopportunity,time,andspace, andtherighttoreply,"aswellasuniformandreasonableratesofchargesfortheuseofsuchmedia facilities,inconnectionwith"publicinformationcampaignsandforumsamoongcandidates." Ofcourse,thelawlimitstherightoffreespeechandofaccesstomassmediaofthecandidates themselves.Thelimitationhowever,bearsaclearandreasonableconnectionwiththeobjectivesetoutin theConstitution.Foritispreciselyintheunlimitedpurchaseofprintspaceandradioandtelevisiontime thattheresourcesofthefinanciallyaffluentcandidatesarelikelytomakeacrucialdifference.Charo.

Adiongv.COMELEC,207SCRA712 F:
Petitoner,Adiong,a1992senatorialcandidate,assailsComelecResolutionNo.2347insofarasitprohibits thepostingofdecalsandstickersonmobileplaces,publicorprivate,andlimitstheirlocationorpublicationto authorizedpostiingareas.

ISSUE:Whetherornottheresolutionisconstitutional. RULING:NO.Theprohibitionundulyinfringesonthecitizen'sfundamentalrightoffreespeech.Thereis nopublicinterestsubstantialenoughtowarrantthekindofrestrictioninvolvedinthiscase.Thepostingof decalsamdstickersinmobileplacesdoesnotendangeranysubstantialgovernmentorpublicinterest. Undertheclearandpresentdangerrule,notonlymustthedangerbepatentlyclearandpressinglypresent buttheevilsoughttobeavoided,mustbesosubstantiveastojustifyaclampoverone'smouthora writinginstrumenttobestilled. Significantly,thefreedomofexpressioncurtailedbytheprohibitionisnotsomuchthatofthe candidate orthepoliticalparty.Theregulationstrikesatthefreedomofanindividualtoexpresshis preference and,bydisplayingitonhiscar,toconvinceotherstoagreewithhim.Astickermaybe furnishedbyacandidatebutoncethecarowneragreestohaveitplacedonhisprivate vehichle,the expressionbecomesastatementbytheowner,primarilyhisownandnotofanybodyelse. Morever,Therestrictionissobroadthatitencompasseseventhecitizen'sprivateproperty,which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal right guaranteedundertheConstitutionisviolatedwhichisthatnopersonshallbedeprivedofhisproperty withoutdueproocessoflaw.Charo.

Art.IX,C,Sec.9.UnlessotherwisefixedbytheCommissioninspecialcases,theelectionperiod shallcommenceninetydaysbeforethedayofelectionandshallendthirtydaysthereafter.

i.Decideelectioncontests Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx (2)Exerciseexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionoverall contestsrelatingtotheelections,returnsand qualificationsofallelectiveregional,provincial,andcityofficials,andappellatejurisdictionover all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involvingelectivebarangayofficialsdecidedbytrialcourtsoflimitedjurisdiction. Decisions,finalorders,orrulingsoftheCommissiononelectioncontestsinvolving electivemunicipalandbarangayofficesshallbefinal,executory,andnotappealable.

Art.IX,C,Sec.3. TheCommissiononElectionsmaysit enbanc orintwodivisions,andshall promulgate its rules of procedures in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre

proclamationcontroversies.Allsuchelectioncasesshallbeheardanddecidedindivision,providedthat motionsforreconsiderationofdecisionsshallbedecidedbytheCommissionenbanc.

RA7166,Sec.22 Sec.22.ElectionContestsforMunicipalOffices.Allelectioncontestsinvolvingmunicipaloffices with the Regional Trial Court shall be decided expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the Commissionwithinfive(5)daysfrompromulgationorreceiptofacopythereofbytheaggrievedparty. TheCommissionshalldecidetheappealwithinsixty(60)daysafteritissubmittedfordecision,butnot laterthansix(6)monthsafterthefilingoftheappeal,whichdecisionshallbefinal,unappealable,and executory.

"Contests" Priortotheproclamationofthewinningcandidate,thecaseisdeemedtobestillinitsadministrative stage,andsoistoberesolvedbytheCOMELECunderitspowertoadministerallelectionlaws,andnotunder itsauthorityasthesolejudgeofelectioncontests. Onlyafterawinnerhasbeenproclaimedcantherebea "contest",withacontestantwhoseeksnotonlytoousttheintruderbutalsotohavehimselfinstalledintooffice. UndertheOmnibusElectionCode(OEC),apreproclamationcontroversyconcernstheregularityof proceedingsofaboardofcanvassers.Itincludesthequestionsof:i)thelegalityofthecompositionoftheBoard ofCanvassers,andii)questionsoffraudulentelectionreturns. Candidatesforpublicofficeusuallygrabtheproclamationtobeabletotaketheoffice,andthusanyone filinganelectoralcontestagainstthepersonwouldnowfindhimselfatadisadvantagebecausehisopponentis nowenjoyingthepoweroftheoffice.(Lagumbay v COMELEC). Thus,thepurposeofapreproclamation contestistopreventtheproclamationofhisopponent. i.MunicipaloriginalwiththeRTC;appealtotheCOMELEC II.Barangayoriginalwithinferiorcourt;appealtoCOMELEC Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 (1986) Under the 1973 Constitution, even PreProclamation ControversiesInvolvingMembersoftheBatasangPambansaMustbeDecidedbytheCOMELECenbanc. F:
PetitionerEvelioJavierfiledapetitionfor certiorari toannuladecisionoftheCOMELEC'sSecondDivision proclaimingArturoPacificadorelectedmemberoftheBPrepresentingAntiqueProvince. Hecontendedthatunderthe 1973Consti.,allcontests,involvingmembersoftheBP,mustbedecidedbytheCOMELECenbanc.

Art.XII,C,Sec.2(2)ofthe1973Consti.providedthattheCOMELEC"(shall)bethesolejudgeofall contests relatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsofallmembersoftheBPandelectiveprovincialandcityofficials."Sec. 3,ontheotherhand,providedthat"Allelection casesmaybeheardanddecidedbydivisionsexcept contests involving membersoftheBP,w/cshallbeheardanddecidedenbanc."TheformerSol.Gen.arguedthatthecontroversyinthiscase isstillintheadmin.stageandsoistoberesolvedbytheCOMELECunderitspowertoadministerallelectionlaws,not underitsauthorityassolejudgeofelectioncontests,bec.untiloneofthecandidateswasproclaimed,therecouldbeno contest,inw/cthecontestantseeksnotonlytoousttheintruderbutalsotohavehimselfinductedintooffice.Ontheother hand,thenewSolGensoughtthedismissalofthecaseasmootandacademiconthegroundthatthepetitionerhadbeen killedapparentlyforpoliticalreasonandthattheBPhadbeenabolishedaftertheFeb.1986Revolution.

HELD:xxx (2) Itisworthobservingthatthespecialprocedureforthesettlementofwhatarenowcalled"pre proclamationcontroversies"isarelativelyrecentinnovationinourlaws,havingbeenintroducedonlyin1978, throughthe1978ElectionCode.Bef.thattime,allproceedingsaffectingtheelection,returnsandqualifications ofpublicofficerscameunderthecompletejurisdictionofthecompetentcourtortribunalfrombeginningtoend andintheexerciseofjudicialpoweronly.Itthereforecouldnothavebeentheintentionoftheframersin1935, whentheCommonwealthcharterwasimposed,todividetheelectoralprocessintothepreproclamationstage andthepostproclamationstageandtoprovideforaseparatejurisdictionforeachstage,consideringthefirst admin.andthesecondjuridical. Contests. Theword"contests"shouldnotbegivenarestrictivemeaning;onthecontrary,itshould receivethewidestpossiblescopeconformablytotherulethatthewordsusedintheConsti.shouldbeinterpreted liberally.Asemployedinthe1973Consti.,thetermshouldbeunderstoodasreferringtoanymatterinvolving thetitleorclaimoftitletoanelectiveoffice,madebef.orafterproclamationofthewinner,whetherornotthe contestantisclaimingtheofficeindispute. Elections, returnsandqualifications. Thephrase"elections, returnsandqualifications"shouldbe interpretedinitstotalityasreferringtoallmattersaffectingthevalidityofthecontestee'stitle. Butifitis necessarytospecify,wecansaythatelectionreferstotheconductofthepolls,includingthelistingofvoters, holdingofelectoralcampaign,andcastingandcountingofvotes."returns"tothecanvassofthereturnsandthe proclamationofthewinners,includingquestionsconcerningthecompositionoftheboardofcanvassersandthe authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceedingagainsttheproclaimedwinner,suchashisdisloyalty,orineligibility,ortheinadequacyofhiscertifi cateofcandidacy. Ascorrectlyobservedbythepetitioner,thepurposeofSec.3inrequiringthatcasesinvolvingmembers oftheBPbeheardanddecidedbytheCommissionenbancwastoinsurethemostcarefulconsiderationofsuch cases. Obviously,thatobjectivecouldnotbeachievediftheCommissioncouldact enbanc onlyafterthe proclamationhadbeenmade,foritmightthenbetoolatealready.Weareonlytoofamiliarw/the"grabthe proclamationanddelaytheprotest"strategyinthefrustrationofthepopularwillandthevirtualdefeatofthe realwinnersintheelection.VV.

ThejurisdictionoftheCOMELECasthejudgeofelectioncontestsinvolvingtheelection,returns,and qualificationsofelectiveofficialshasbeenbeerestrictedtoelectivelocalofficialsunderthe1987Constitution. ThejudgeinthePresidentialElection,asnoted,isthe SCactingasElectoralTribunal. Thejudgeinthe

Congressionalelections,istherespectiveElectoralTribunaloftheSenateandHouseofRepresentatives.

Pimentelv.COMELEC,101SCRA769(1986) *ENBANC F:
Herein petitioners arethe contestants while herein private respondents are the contestees in 3electioncases pendingbeforetheCFIofQuirino. Petitionersallegeintheirelectionproteststhattheyweredulycertifiedcandidatesformayor,vicemayorand membersoftheSangguniangBayanofDiffun,Quirino,inthegeneralelectionsofJanuary30,1980,buttheywerenot consideredassuchbytheMunicipalBoardofCanvasserswhodidnotcountthevotescastintheirfavorandproceeded insteadtoproclaimtheprivaterespondentsasthedulyelectedofficialsofDiffun. Theprivaterespondentsfiledtheiroppositiontosuchprotests.Theyalsofileda"JointMotiontoLimitReception ofEvidencePursuanttoMaterialAllegationsintheProtests,"whichwasdenied.Accordingly,theCFIorderedtheopening of the ballot boxesandthecounting ofthevotesas reflected in the ballots and notin theelectionreturns. Private respondentsfiledw/theCOMELECapetitionfor certiorariandprohibitionwithpreliminaryinjunctionseekingtorestrain theCFIfromenforcingitsorders.TheCOMELEC,onMay25,1980,issuedaresolutionrestrainingtheCFIfromenforcing itsorder.Consequently,theCFIissuedanorderpursuanttotheCOMELEC'sresolution. Thus,petitionersfiledthispresentpetitionfor certiorari andprohibitionw/preliminarymandatoryinjunction seekingtoannulthesaidCOMELEC'sresolution.Petitionersallege,amongothers,thattheCOMELEChasnojurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the private respondents questioning an interlocutoryorderissuedbytheCFI,muchlesstorestrainsaidcourtfromenforcingsaidorder. On the other hand, private respondents contend that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari,prohibitionandmandamusinvolvingelectioncasesassupportedbythefollowing:thatthe1978ElectionCode grantstheCOMELECthepowerto"prescribetherulestogoverntheprocedureandothermattersrelatingtoelection contests";thatunderSec.4,Rule65oftheROC,petitionsfor certiorari,prohibitionandmandamus"mayalsobefiled with the Court of Appeals if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"; that since the COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdictionoverelectioncasesfiledw/theCFIinvolvingmunicipaloffices,pursuanttothe1978ElectionCode,said Commissionisthusvestedw/jurisdictionoverpetitionsfor certiorari,prohibitionandmandamus,applyingbyanalogythe quotedprovisionofSec.4,Rule65oftheROC.

ISSUES: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involvingelectioncasesfiledw/theCFI. HELD:NONE SettledistherulethatjurisdictionisconferredonlybytheConstitutionorthelaw.Thus,itcannotbe conferredbytheRulesofCourtw/careneitherconstitutionalprovisionsnorlegislativeenactmentsbutmere proceduralrulespromulgatedbytheSCintheexerciseofitspowertoprescribe"rulesconcerningpleading, practiceandproceduresinallcourts." Accordingly,theaforequotedprovisionofSec.4,Rule65oftheROC,cannotbeconstruedasagrantof jurisdiction tothe Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving cases appealable toit.Muchlesscansuchprovision beinterpreted,byanalogy,asagranttotheCOMELECof jurisdictionoverpetitionsfor certiorari,prohibitionor mandamus involvingelectioncasescognizablebythe CFIandappealabletosaidCommission. While itistruethattheCAhasjurisdiction overpetitions for certiorari,prohibition or mandamus

involvingcasesappealabletoit,thegrantofjurisdictionisnotbyvirtueoftheROC,butbyexpresslegislative fiat,namely,Sec.30oftheJudiciaryAct. NosuchlegislativegrantofjurisdictionexistsinthecaseoftheCOMELEC.Consequently,respondents' contentioncannotbesustained.Adapted.

Garciav.DeJesus,206SCRA779 *ENBANC F:
Twoelectioncasesareconsolidatedhereinforbothcasesinvolvedthesameissue,whichis,thejurisdictionofthe COMELECtoissueWritsofCertiorari,ProhibitionandMandamusinelectoralcontests. In the Antipolo case, petitioners Garcia and O'Hara were the winning candidates for mayor and vicemayor respectivelyofAntipolo,Rizalinthe1988LocalElections. PrivaterespondentsDeJesusandDavidinstitutedanelectionprotestbeforetheRTC.TheRTCorderedforthe examinationoftheballotsandtherecountingofthevotes.ThepetitionersfiledaMotiontoDismissOpeningofBallot Boxesand/ortoDismisstheProtest.Consequently,theRTCissuedanorderlimitingtheopeningoftheballotboxes. Themotionforreconsiderationfiledbyprivaterespondentswasdenied.TherespondentsthenfiledaPetitionfor CertiorariandMandamusbeforetheCOMELEC.PetitionersobjectedtheassumptionofjurisdictionbytheCOMELEC. TheCOMELEC,nevertheless,directedtheRTCtoopenalltheballotboxes. IntheIsabelacase,respondentNeyrawasproclaimedmayorofIsabelaoverpetitionerUyin thesamelocal election. PetitionerUyfiledanelectionprotestbeforetheRTC.TheRTCinturn,declaredUythewinner.Neyrafileda NoticeofAppeal,whileUyfiledaMotionforExecutionPendingAppeal. Later,NeyrafiledbeforetheCOMELEC,a petitionfor Certiorari and/orProhibition,seekingtoenjointheRTCfromfurtheractingonUy'sMotionforExecution. TheRTCgrantedUy'sMotionforExecution,whiletheCOMELEClater,onmotionbyNeyra,declaredasnullandvoidthe writofExecutiongrantedbytheRTC.

ISSUES: 1.W/NtheCOMELEChasthepowertoissueWritsof Certiorari,Prohibitionand Mandamus in electoralcontests. HELD:NONE.IntheabsenceofanyspecificconfermentupontheCOMELEC,eitherbytheConstitutionor bylegislativefiat,theCOMELECisbereftofjurisdictiontoissuesaidWrits. ItistheCOMELECalone,invokingitsconstitutionally(Rep.v.Feliciano,Garciav.DeJesus,Peo.v. Dramayo)investedappellatejurisdictionandrulemakingpower,thatarrogateuntoitselftheauthoritytoissue the aforementioned Writs, in Rule 28, Sec. 1 of its Rules of Procedure. However, neither the appellate jurisdictionoftheCOMELECnoritsrulemakingpowerjustifiessuchselfconfermentofauthority. Jurisdictionorthelegalpowertohearanddetermineacauseofactionmustexistasamatteroflaw.It maybeclassifiedintooriginalandappellatejurisdictions.OriginaljurisdictionisthepoweroftheCourttotake judicialcognizanceofacaseinstitutedforjudicialactionforthefirsttimeunderconditionsprovidedbylaw. AppellatejurisdictionistheauthorityofaCourthigherinranktoreexaminethefinalorderorjudgmentofa lowercourtw/ctriedthecasenowelevatedforjudicialreview. InthePhilippinesetting,theauthoritytoissueWritsof Certiorari,ProhibitionandMandamusinvolves theexerciseoforiginaljurisdiction.Thus,suchauthorityhasalwaysbeenexpresslyconferred,eitherbythe Constitutionorbylaw.Itisneverderivedbyimplication.

 Significantly,whattheConstitutiongrantedtheCOMELECwasappellatejurisdiction.TheConstitution makes no mention of any power given the COMELEC to exercise original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus unlike in the case of the SC which was specifically conferred such authority.Theimmutabledoctrinebeingthatjurisdictionisfixedbylaw,thepowertoissuesuchWritscannot impliedfromthemereexistenceofappellatejurisdiction. Althoughtheremaybeauthoritiesinotherjurisdictionsw/cmaintainthatsuchWritsareinherentinthe power of higher Courts exercising appellate jurisdiction, the same refers to judicial tribunals, w/c the COMELECisnot.Whatthisagencyexercisesareadministrativeandquasijudicialpowers. Certiorariisa"writfromasuperiorcourttoaninferiorcourtortribunalcommandingthelattertosend uptherecordofaparticularcase."ThefunctionofaWritof Certiorari istokeepaninferiorcourtw/nthe boundsofitsjurisdictionortopreventitfromcommittingsuchagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtoexcess ofjurisdiction.ThegrantofappellatejurisdictiontotheCOMELECdoesnotnecessarilymakeita"superior court"visvisRTCs.

2.W/NRTCscanorderexecutionpendingappealinelectioncontestsdecidedbyitinvolvingelective municipalofficials. HELD:YES. TheCOMELECisbereftofauthoritytodepriveRTCsofthecompetencetoorderexecutionpending appeal.Forone,itisessentiallyajudicialprerogative.Foranother,itisapronouncementoftheCOMELEC aloneinitsproceduralrules,w/obenefitofstatute,unlikeinthepast. There is no express provision of law, therefore, disauthorizing executions pending appeal, and the COMELEC,initsproceduralrulesalone,shouldnotbeallowedtodivestRTCsofthatauthority.Itdeprivesthe prevailingpartyofasubstantiverighttomoveforsuchreliefcontrarytotheconstitutionalmandatethatthose Rulescannotdiminishnormodifysubstantiverights. Section2,Rule39oftheROC,w/callowsRTCstoorderexecutionspendingappealupongoodreasons statedinaspecialorder,maybemadetoapplysuppletorilytoelectioncontestsdecidedbythem.IntheIsabela case, good reasons exist w/c justified the RTC's order, granting execution pending appeal. Among others mentionedbytheRTCarethecombinedconsiderations ofthenearexpirationofthetermofoffice,public interest,thependencyoftheelectioncontestformorethan3years,andthatUyhadfiledabond.Adapted.

Veloriav.COMELEC,211SCRA907 *ENBANC F:
PetitionersVeloria,et.al.,aswellasprivaterespondentsSales,et.al.werecandidatesformayor,vicemayorand membersoftheSangguniangBayanofManaoag,Pangasinan,inthe1988localelections. Theprivaterespondentsweredeclaredaswinners.Dissatisfied,thepetitionersfiledelectionprotestw/theRTCof Ardent,Pangasinan.TheRTCorderedtherevisionofballots. Priv.repondentsfiledaMotiontoDismissonthegroundthattheRTChadnotacquiredjurisdictionoverthe electionprotest.Suchmotionwasgrantedleadingtothedismissalofthecase. However, instead of perfecting an appeal w/n 5 days as provided by law, the petitioners filed a Motion for

Reconsideration,whichwasdenied.Thepetitionersinturn,filedaNoticeofAppeal,whichwasgivenduecourse. Theprivaterespondentssoughtrecoursew/theCOMELECbyapetitionfor Certiorari andProhibition w/a PrayerforaWritofPreliminaryInjunctiontoannultheordergivingduecoursetotheappeal. TheCOMELECenbancgrantedthepetition.Hence,thisspecialcivilactionof CertiorariandProhibitionw/a PrayerfroaWritofpreliminaryinjunctionfiledbythepetitioners.

ISSUE:W/NtheCOMELEChasjurisdictiontogranttheprivaterespondents'petitionforcertiorari. HELD:NONE. ThereisnomeritinthispetitionforreviewfortheCOMELECcorrectlyfoundthatthepetitioners' appealfromthecourt's orderdismissing their election protestwasindeedtardy.It wastardybecause their motionforreconsiderationdidnotsuspendtheirperiodtoappeal.Thepetitioners'relianceonSec.4,Rule19of theCOMELECRULESOFPROCEDUREw/cprovides: "Amotiontoreconsideradecision,resolution, order,orrulingwhennot proforma,suspendstherunningoftheperiodtoelevatethemattertothe SupremeCourt."ismisplaced.The"motionforreconsideration"referredtoaboveisthemotionforrecon.filed intheCOMELEC,notinthetrialcourtwhereamotionforrecon.isnotentertained. Nevertheless, this petition for certiorari must be granted, for the COMELEC does not possess jurisdiction to grant the private respondents' petition for certiorari. The SC in the consolidated cases of GARCIAv.COMELECandUYv.COMELEC(GARCIAV.DEJESUS206SCRA779),theSCruledthatthe COMELEC has not been given, by the Constitution nor by law, jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibitionandmandamus. "Significantly, what the Constitution granted the COMELEC was appellate jurisdiction. The Constitution makes no mention of any power given the COMELEC to exercise original jurisdiction over petitionsforCertiorari,ProhibitionandMandamus.Theimmutabledoctrinebeingthatjurisdictionisfixedby law,thepowertoissuesuchwritscannotbeimpliedfromthemereexistenceofappellatejurisdictionxxx." (GARCIAv.DEJESUS) Inviewofsuchpronouncement,anoriginalspecialcivilactionof certiorari,prohibitionormandamus againstaRTCinanelectioncontestmaybefiledintheCourtofAppealsorintheSCbeingtheonlycourts givensuchoriginaljurisdictionundertheConstitutionandthelaw.Adapted. 8.Rulemaking Art.IX,A,Sec.6.EachCommissionenbancmaypromulgateitsownrulesconcerningpleadings andpracticebeforeitorbeforeanyofitsoffices. Suchruleshowevershallnotdiminish,increaseor modifysubstantiverights.

Art.IX,C,Sec.3. TheCommissiononElectionsmaysit enbanc orintwodivisions,andshall promulgate its rules of procedures in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre proclamationcontroversies.Allsuchelectioncasesshallbeheardanddecidedindivision,providedthat motionsforreconsiderationofdecisionsshallbedecidedbytheCommissionenbanc. 9.Otherfunctions

Art.IX,A,Sec.8.EachCommissionshallperformsuchotherfunctionsasmaybeprovidedby law. 10.ActasNationalBoardofCanvassersforSenators EO144,Sec.2,March2,1987

Sec.2.BoardofCanvassers.TheChairmanandMembersoftheCommissiononElectionssitting enbanc shallbetheNationalBoardofCanvassersfortheelectionofSenators. Itshallcanvassallcertificatesofcanvass comingfromandpreparedbythedistrict,provincial,andcityboardsofcanvassers(ofthosecitieswhichcomprise oneormorelegislativedistricts.) Furthermore, thereshall bea board of canvassers for each province, city, municipality and district of MetropolitanManila,asfollows: (a)Provincialboardofcanvassers.Theprovincialboardofcanvassersshallbecomposedoftheprovincial electionsupervisororaseniorlawyerintheregionalofficeoftheCommission,aschairman,theprovincialfiscal,as vicechairman,andtheprovincialsuperintendentofschools,asmembers. Thisboardshallcanvasscertificatesofcanvassfromthemunicipalitiesandthecitieswhichdonotcomprise atleastonelegislativedistrict. ItshallproclaimaselectedthecandidatesfortheHouseofRepresentativeswho obtainedthehighestnumberofvotesintherespectivelegislativedistricts. Withrespecttotheelectionofsenators,theprovincialboardofcanvassersshallprepareinduplicatea certificateofcanvasssupportedbyastatementofvotesreceivedbyeachcandidateineachmunicipality/city,and transmitthefirstcopythereoftotheCommissiononElectionsforcanvassing.Thesecondcopyshallbekeptbythe provincialelectionsupervisor. (b) CityBoardsofCanvassersforcitiescomprisingoneormorelegislativedistricts. Thecityboardof canvassersforcitiescomprisingoneormorelegislativedistrictsshallbecomposedofthecityelectionregistraror lawyeroftheCommission,aschairman,thecityfiscal,asvicechairman,andthecitysuperintendentofschoolsas member. Thisboardshallcanvasselectionreturnscomingfromthepollingplaceswithinthejurisdictionofthecity, andshallproclaimaselectedthecandidateorcandidatesfortheHouseofRepresentativeswhoobtainedthehighest numberofvotesinthelegislativedistrictorrespectivelegislativedistricts. With respect to the election of senators, this board shall prepare in duplicate certificate of canvass supportedbyastatementofvotesreceivedbyeachcandidateineachpollingplaceandtransmitthefirstcopytothe CommissiononElectionsforcanvassing.Thesecondcopyshallbekeptbythecityelectionregistrar. (c)DistrictBoardofCanvassers.Thedistrictboardofcanvassersshallbecomposedofalawyerofthe Commission, as chairman, and a ranking fiscal in the district, as vicechairman, and the most district school supervisorinthedistrict,asmember,tobeappointedbytheCommissionuponconsultationwiththeDepartmentof JusticeandtheDepartmentofEducation,CultureandSportsrespectively. This boardshall canvass election returns comingfromthepollingplaceswithinthejurisdictionofthe districtandshallproclaimaselectedthecandidatefortheHouseofRepresentativeswhoobtainedthehighest numberofvotesinthelegislativedistrict. With respect to the election for senators, the same procedure shall be followed by this board as that observedbythecityboardofcanvassersforcitiescomprisingoneormorelegislativedistricts. (d)City/MunicipalBoardofCanvassers.Thecity(forcitiesnotcomprisingatleastonelegislativedistrict)

ormunicipalboardofcanvassersshallbecomposedofthecity/municipalelectionregistrar,aschairman,thecity fiscal/municipaltreasurer,asthecasemaybe,asvicechairman,andthecitysuperintendent/districtsupervisoror inhisabsenceanypublicschoolprincipal,asthecasemaybe,asmember. Theboardshallcanvasselectionreturnscomingfromthepollingplaceswithinitsjurisdiction,butshallnot proclaimanywinnerintheelectionforMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesorforSenators. Thisboardshallprepareintriplicateacertificateofcanvasssupportedbyastatementofvotesreceivedby eachcandidateineachpollingplace,andtransmitthefirstcopythereoftotheprovincialboardofcanvassersfor canvassing.ThesecondcopyshallbetransmittedtotheCommissionforrecordpurposesandthethirdcopyshallbe keptbythecity/municipalelectionregistrar.

11.ReviewofCOMELECdecisions,orders,andresolutions

Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx (2)Exerciseexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionoverallcontestsrelatingtotheelections,returns,and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contestsinvolvingelectivemunicipalofficialsdecidedbytrialcourtsofgeneraljurisdiction,orinvolving electivebarangayofficialsdecidedbycourtsoflimitedjurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipalandbarangayofficesshallbefinal,executory,andnotappealable. Art.IX,A,Sec.7. EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityofallitsMembersanycaseor matterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.A caseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,briefor memorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself. Unlessotherwise providedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought totheSupreme Court on certiorari bythe aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of acopy thereof. Floresv.COMELEC,184S484(1990) F:
RFwasproclaimedaspunongbarangay.HiselectionwasprotestedbyNR.TheMunicipalCircuitTrialCourt sustainedNR&installedhimaspunongbarangay.RFappealedtotheRTCw/caffirmedthechallengeddecision.RFthen wenttotheCOMELECbuthisappealwasdismissedonthegroundthattheCOMELEChadnopowertoreviewthe decisionoftheRTCbasedinSec.9ofRA6679(LocalGov'tCode)

Issue:W/intheCOMELEChasjurisdiction Held:UnderArtIXC,Sec2(2)oftheConsti,theCOMELECshallhavejurisdiction,hence,Sec.9ofRA6679 insofarasitprovidesthatthedecisionofthemunicipalormetropolitancourtinabarangaycaseshouldbe appealedtotheRTCmustbedeclaredunconstitutional. Phadarighttopresumethelawasvalid. HencehisappealtotheRTCwouldbeconsideredasan

appealtotheCOMELEC. DecisionsoftheCOMELEConelectioncontestsinvolvingmunicipal&barangay officershallbefinal&unappealablewithrespecttoquestionsoffact&notoflaw.ArtIX6Sec2(2)ofthe ConstiwasnotintendedtodiverttheSCofitsauthoritytoresolvequestionsoflawasinherentinthejudicial powerconferreduponitbytheConsti.Adapted. Galidov.COMELEC,193S78(1991) F:

InanelectioncontestinvolvingtheelectedmayorofGarciaHernandez,Bohol.TheCOMELECdeclaredGaleon asthedulyelectedmayor.Fifteenballotsinthenameofhisrival,Galido,wasinvalidatedforbeingmarkedballots. Galidofiledthepetitionfor certiorari &injunction wprayerforarestrainingorder. Galeonmovedforthe dismissalofthepetitiononthegroundthataccordingtotheConsti,ArtIX(C)Sec2(2),finaldecisions,ordersorrulings oftheCOMELECinelectioncontestsinvolvingelectivemunicipalofficesarefinal&executory&notappealable.Galido citedArtIX(A)Sec.7w/csaidthatthedecisionmaybebroughttotheSC.

Issue:W/ndecisionsoftheCOMELECareappealable Held:Yes.Thefactthatdecisions,finalordersorrulingsoftheCOMELECincontestsinvolvingexecutory& notappealabledoesnotprecludearecoursetotheSCbywayofaspecialcivilactionofcertiorari. AstudyofthecasewouldhowevershowthattheCOMELECcommittedNOgraveabuseofdiscretion inrenderingthequestioneddecision.Adapted. Riverav.COMELEC,199S178(1991) F:

PetitionerRivera&privaterespondentGarciawerecandidatesforthepositionofmayorduringthelocalelections inJan1988. Inanelectioncontestbetween,Garciawasproclaimedmayor. Riveraappealedthesaiddecisionbutsaid decisionwasaffirmedbytheCOMELEC.RfiledapetitionwiththeSCseekingannulmentoftheCOMELECdecision. He contends that the decisionhas not yetbecome final & executory. G however contends that the decisions of the COMELEConelectioncontestsinvolvingelectivemunicipal&barangayofficialsarefinal,executory&notappealable.

Issue:W/ndecisionsoftheCOMELEConelectioncontestsinvolvingelectivemunicipal&barangayofficials areunappealble Held: No. Thefactthatdecisions,finalordersorrulingsofthe COMELECincontestsinvolvingelective municipal&barangayofficialsarefinal,executoryandnotappealabledoesnotprecludearecoursetotheSCby wayofaspecialactionofcertiorari.(Galidov.Comelec.)Adapted.

12.FiscalAutonomy Art. IX, A, Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

C.CommissiononAudit 1.CompositionandQualifications Art.IX,D,Sec.1.(1)ThereshallbeaCommissiononAuditcomposedofaChairmanandtwo Commissioners, who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,atleastthirtyfiveyearsofage,certifiedpublicaccountantswithnotlessthantenyearsof auditingexperience,ormembersofthePhilippineBarwhohavebeenengagedinthepracticeoflawforat leasttenyears,andmustnothavebeencandidatesforanyelectivepositionintheelectionsimmediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession. Art.VII,sec.13.xxx The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices, includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries. 2.AppointmentandTermofCommissioners Art.IX,D,Sec.1.xxx (2)TheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentof the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,theChairmanshallholdofficeforsevenyears,oneCommissionerforfiveyears,andtheother Commissionerforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforthe unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity. 3.AppointmentofCOApersonnel Art.IX,A,Sec.4.TheConstitutionalCommissionsshallappointtheirofficialsandemployeesin accordancewithlaw. 4.Salary Art.IX,A,Sec.3.ThesalaryoftheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbefixedbylawand shallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise x x x and the Chairmen of the ConstitutionalCommissions(shallreceive),twohundredfourthousandpesoseach;andtheMembersof theConstitutionalCommissions,onehundredeightythousandpesoseach.

Thesalary,ofcourse,canbeincreasedandtheincreasecantakeeffectatonce,since,liketheJudiciary, theConstitutionalCommissionshavenopartinthepassageofsuchalaw. 5.Disqualifications Art.IX,A,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdany otherofficeoremployment. Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactive managementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice, norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseor privilege granted bythe Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

NomembersofaConstitutionalCommissionshallduringhis"tenure": a.Holdanyotherofficeoremployment. Thisissimilartotheprohibitionagainstexecutiveofficers.Itappliestobothpublicandprivateoffices andemployment. b.Engageinthepracticeofanyprofession. c.Engageintheactivemanagementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythe functionsofhisoffice. d.Befinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseorprivilege granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries. 6.Impeachment Art.XI,Sec.2.ThemembersoftheConstitutionalCommissionsmayberemovedfromoffice,on impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcor ruptionandotherhighcrimes,orbetrayalofpublictrust.

7.Powersandfunctions Art.IX,D,Sec.2.TheCommissiononAuditshallhavethepower,authority,anddutytoexamine, audit,andsettleallaccountspertainingtotherevenueandreceiptsof,andexpendituresorusesoffunds andproperty,ownedorheldintrustby,orpertainingto,theGovernment,oranyofitssubdivisions,

agencies, or instrumentalities, including governmentowned and controlled corporations with original charters,andonapostauditbasis: (a)constitutional bodies,commissionsandofficesthathavebeen grantedfiscalautonomyunderthisConstitution;(b)autonomousstatecollegesanduniversities;(c)other governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such nongovernmental entitiesreceivingsubsidyorequity,directlyorindirectly,fromorthroughthegovernment,whichare requiredbylawofthegrantinginstitutiontosubmittosuchauditasaconditionofsubsidyorequity. However,wheretheinternalcontrolsystemoftheauditedagenciesisinadequate,theCommissionmay adopt such measures, including temporary or special preaudit, as are necessary and appropriate to correctthedeficiencies.ItshallkeepthegeneralaccountsoftheGovernmentand,forsuchperiodasmay beprovidedbylaw,preservethevouchersandothersupportingpaperspertainingthereto. TheCommissionshallhaveexclusiveauthority,subjecttothelimitationsinthisArticle,todefine the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowanceofirregular,unnecessary,excessive,extravagant,orunconscionableexpenditures,orusesof governmentfundsandproperties.

Art. IX, D, Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the CommissiononAudit.

Art.VI,Sec.20. TherecordsandbooksofaccountsoftheCongressshallbepreservedandbe opentothepublicinaccordancewithlaw,andsuchbooksshallbeauditedbytheCommissiononAudit whichshallpublishannuallyanitemizedlistofamountspaidtoandexpensesincurredforeachmember.

8.Rulemaking Art.IX,A,Sec.6.EachCommissionenbancmaypromulgateitsownrulesconcerningpleadings andpracticebeforeitorbeforeanyofitsoffices. Suchruleshowevershallnotdiminish,increaseor modifysubstantiverights.

9.Otherfunctions Art.IX,A,Sec.8.EachCommissionshallperformsuchotherfunctionsasmaybeprovidedby law.

10.ReviewofdecisionsofCOA

Art.IX,A,Sec.7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseor matterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.A caseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,or memorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself. Unlessotherwise providedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought totheSupreme Court on certiorari by theaggrieved party within thirty days from receipt ofa copy thereof. 10.FiscalAutonomy Art. IX, A, Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

D.Sandiganbayan Art. XI, Sec. 4. The present antigraft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to functionandexerciseitsjurisdictionasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw. PD1606,asamendedbyRepublicAct7975 Nunezv.Sandiganbayan,111SCRA433DecreeCreatingSandiganbayanIsValid. F:
TheconstitutionalityofthelawcreatingtheSandiganbayanwasquestionedasbeingviolativeof(a)dueprocess andequalprotection(sinceprivatepersonschargedwithestafaormalversationareguaranteedtherighttoappealfirstto theCAandthereaftertotheSC,whileprivatepersonschargedwithpublicofficersbeforetheSBareallowedonlyone appeal,andthatis,totheSC),and(b)no expostfactorule(sincebeforethepromulgationofPD1606,therighttoappeal totheCAandthentotheSCwasalreadysecuredbySecs.17and29oftheJudiciaryActof1948).Adapted.

HELD:(1)TheclaimthatPD1606deprivespetitioneroftheequalprotectionofthelawishardlyconvincing consideringthattheDecreeisbasedonavalidclassification.TheConsti.providesforthecreationofaspecial court,knownasSandiganbayan(SB),andtheruleissettledthatthegeneralguaranteesoftheBillofRights, amongw/carethedueprocessandequalprotectionclauses,mustgivewaytospecificprovisions,suchasthe provisiononthecreationoftheSB. (2) Ithardlycanbearguedthataparticularmodeofprocedureprovidedinastatutecanbecomethe vestedrightofanyperson."Anaccusedhasnovestedrightinparticularmodesofprocedureasindetermining whetherparticularstatutesbytheiroperationtakefromanaccusedanyrightthatwasregarded,atthetimeofthe adoptionoftheConsti.,asvitalfortheprotectionoflifeandliberty,andw/cheenjoyedatthetimeofthe commissionoftheoffensechargedagainsthim. WouldtheomissionoftheCAasanintermediatetribunal,deprivethose,likethepetitioner,whoare

chargedintheSB,ofarightthatisvitaltotheprotectionoftheirliberty?Itsanswermustbeinthenegative. Theinnocenceofguiltoftheaccusedispasseduponbya3judgedivisionoftheSB.Moreover,aunanimous voteisrequired,otherwise,thePresidingJusticedesignatestwootherJusticesfromamongthemembersofthe SB to sit temporarily in a division of 5 until a decision is rendered w/ the concurrence of 3 Justices. If convicted,theaccusedcanseekareviewintheSConaquestionoflaworthesubstantialityoftheevidence. PetitionermakesmuchofthefactsthatthereisnoreviewbytheSCoffacts. Whatcannotbetoostrongly emphasizedisthattheSC,indeterminingwhethertogiveduecoursetoapetitionforreviewofadecisionofthe SB,mustbeconvincedthattheconstitutionalpresumptionofinnocencehasbeenovercome.Thus,itcannotbe saidthatthereisnowayofscrutinizingwhetherthequantumofevidencerequiredforconvictionincriminal caseshavebeensatisfied.VV.

Makasiar,J.,concurringanddissenting: Thedissentingopinionnotedthediscriminationintreatmentascontentedbyallowingonlyoneappeal, andonlybywayof certiorari whichisbasedonmeresubstantialevidenceandnotproofbeyondreasonable doubt.Adapted.

E.OfficeoftheOmbudsman SeealsoPD1603,July18,1979 RA6770,Nov.17,1989 1.Composition Art.XI,Sec.5.ThereisherebycreatedtheindependentOfficeoftheOmbudsman,composedof theOmbudsmantobeknownasTanodbayan,oneoverallDeputyandatleastoneDeputyeachforLuzon, Visayas,andMindanao.AseparateDeputyforthemilitaryestablishmentmaylikewisebeappointed. 2.Qualifications Art.XI,Sec.8. TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbenaturalborncitizensofthe Philippines, andat thetime oftheirappointment, atleastfortyyearsold,ofrecognized probityand independence,andmembersofthePhilippineBar,andmustnothavebeencandidatesforanyelective officeintheimmediatelyprecedingelection.TheOmbudsmanmusthavefortenyearsormorebeena judgeorengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines. During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as providedforinSection2ofArticleIXAofthisConstitution.

3.AppointmentandTerm

Appointment Art.XI,Sec.9.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalist ofatleastsixnomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil,andfromalistofthreenomineesfor everyvacancythereafter.Suchappointmentsshallrequirenoconfirmation.Allvacanciesshallbefilled withinthreemonthsaftertheyoccur.

Term Id., Sec.11. TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies shallserveforatermofsevenyearswithout reappointment.Theyshallnotbequalifiedtorunforanyofficeintheelectionimmediatelysucceeding theircessationfromoffice.

4.Rankandsalary Id.,Sec.10.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallhavetherankofChairmanandMembers, respectively,oftheConstitutionalCommissions,andtheyshallreceivethesamesalary,whichshallnotbe decreasedduringtheirtermofoffice.

5.Disqualifications

Art.IX,Sec.8.xxx During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as providedforinSection2ofArticleIXAofthisConstitution.

Art.IX,A,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdany otherofficeoremployment. Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactive managementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice, norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseor privilege granted bythe Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

(notinVV'soutline) Art.XI,Sec.16.Noloan,guaranty,orotherformoffinancialaccommodationforanybusiness purposemaybegranted,directlyorindirectlybyanygovernmentownedorcontrolledbankorfinancial

institution to the President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court,andtheConstitutionalCommissions,theOmbudsman,ortoanyfirmorentityinwhichtheyhave controllinginterest,duringtheirtenure. 6.Jurisdiction Id.,Sec.12.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies,asprotectorsofthepeople,shallactpromptlyon complaintsfiledinanyformormanneragainstpublicofficialsoremployeesofthegovernment,orany subdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations andshall,inappropriatecases,notifythecomplainantsoftheactiontakenandtheresultthereof. Quimpov.Tanodbayan,146SCRA137(1986) TanodbayanHasJurisdictionoverallGovernmentOwned FirmsRegardlessofHowOrganized. F:
F. Quimpofiledacomplaintw/theTanodbayan(TB)chargingGregDimaanoandDannyRemo,managerand analyst ofPetrophil, w/viol. of RA 3019fortheirrefusaltopay Quimpo's fees assurveyor. The TB dismissed the complaint,however,onthegroundthathisjurisdictionextendedonlytogovtownedcorpsorganizedunderaspeciallaw. PETROPHILisacorp.organizedundertheGen.Corp.Code;itwasacquiredbythegovttocarryoutitsoilandgasoline programs.Quimpofiledapetitionforcertiorari,questioningthedecisionoftheTB.ThenewTBconfessedjudgment.

HELD:(1)InNHAv.Juco,134S172(1984),itwasheldthatforpurposesofcoverageintheCivilService, employeesofgovtownedorcontrolledcorps.whethercreatedbyspeciallaworformedassubsidiariesare coveredbytheCSlaw,nottheLaborCode,andthefactthatpvt.corps.ownedorcontrolledbythegovtmaybe createdbyspecialcharterdoesnotmeanthatsuchcorps.notcreatedbyspeciallawarenotcoveredbytheCivil Service.(Thisrulinghassincebeenoverruled.) (2)Themeaningthusgivento"govtownedorcontrolledcorps."forpurposesoftheCS[Art.IX,B, Sec.2(1)]provisionshouldlikewiseapplyforpurposesoftheTBandtheSBprovisions[Art.XI,secs.4and 12],otherwise,incongruitywouldresult;andagovtownedcorp.couldcreateasmanysubsidiarycorps.under theCorp.Codeasitwishes,w/cwouldthenbefreefromstrictaccountabilityandcouldescapetheliabilities andresponsibilitiesprovidedforbylaw.xxx[T]herecanbenogainsayingthatasofthedateofitsacquisition bytheGovt,utilizingpublicfunds,PETROPHIL,whileretainingitsowncorporateexistence,becameagovt ownedorcontrolledcorp.w/intheconstitutionalprecept. Itsemployees,thereforearepublicservantsfalling w/intheinvestigatoryandprosecutoryjurisdictionoftheTBforpurposesoftheRA3019.VV.

7.Powersandfunctions Art.XI,Sec.13. TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallhavethefollowingpowers,functionsand duties: (1) Investigateonitsownoroncomplaintanyactoromissionofanypublicofficial,employee, officeoragency,whensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improper,orinefficient (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the

Government,oranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,aswellasofanygovernmentowned orcontrolledcorporationwithoriginalcharter;toperformandexpediteanyactordutyrequiredbylaw, ortostop,prevent,andcorrectanyabuseorimproprietyintheperformanceofduties. (3)Directtheofficerconcernedtotakeappropriateactionagainstapublicofficialoremployeeat fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliancetherewith. (4)Directtheofficerconcernedinanyappropriatecase,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybe providedbylaw,tofurnishitwithcopiesofdocumentsrelatingtocontractsortransactionsenteredinto byhisofficeinvolvingdisbursementoruseofpublicfundsorproperties,andreportanyirregularityto theCommissiononAuditforappropriateaction. (5)Requestanygovernmentagencyforassistanceandinformationnecessaryinthedischargeof itsresponsibilities,andtoexamine,ifnecessary,pertinentrecordsanddocuments. (6) Publicizematterscoveredbyitsinvestigationwhencircumstancessowarrantandwithdue prudence. (7)Determinethecausesofinefficiency,redtape,mismanagement,fraudandcorruptioninthe Governmentandmakerecommendationsfortheireliminationandtheobservanceofhighstandardsof ethicsandefficiency. (8)Promulgateitsrulesofprocedureandexercisesuchotherpowersorperformsuchfunctionsor dutiesasmaybeprovidedbylaw. Barlongay:ThefunctionsoftheOmbudsmanmaybedividedintofour:(1)Investigatory;(2)Prosecutory;(3) Disciplinary;and(4)Assistory.

8.FiscalAutonomy Id., Sec.14. TheOffice ofthe Ombudsmanshallenjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyrelease.

9.Appointmentofpersonnel Id.,Sec.6.TheofficialsandemployeesoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,otherthantheDeputies, shallbeappointedbytheOmbudsmanaccordingtotheCivilServiceLaw.

E.OfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor

Id., Sec. 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special

Prosecutor.Itshallcontinuetofunctionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedby law,exceptthoseconferredontheOfficeoftheOmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution.

Zaldivarv.Sandiganbayan,160SCRA843(1988)andResolution,May19,1988 F: Petitioner,governorofAntique,filedapetitionforcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamustorestrainthe Sandiganbayan&TanodbayanRaulGonzalesfromproceedingwiththeprosecution&hearingofcriminalcases againsthimonthegroundthatsaidcaseswerefiledbytheTanodbayanw/olegal&constitutionalauthority since under the 1987 Consti., it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. HELD: (1) Wefindthepetitionsimpressedw/merit. UnderArt.XI,Sec.13,par.1oftheConsti.,the Ombudsman(asdistinguishedw/theincumbentTB)ischargedw/thedutyto:
"Investigateonitsown,oroncomplaintbyanyperson,anyactoromissionofanypublicofficial,employee,office oragency,whensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improperorinefficient."

Ontheotherhand,Art.XI,Sec.7oftheConsti.providesthat
"TheexistingTanodbayanshallhereafterbeknownastheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor.Itshallcontinueto functionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthoseconferredontheOfficeofthe OmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution."

Now,then,inasmuchastheaforementioneddutyisgiventotheOmbudsman,theincumbentTB(now calledSp.Pros.)isclearlywithoutauthoritytoconductprel.investigationsandtodirectthefilingofcrim.cases, exceptuponordersoftheOmbudsman.ThisrighttodosowaslosteffectiveFeb.2,1987 ResolutionontheMotionforReconsideration,May19,1988 (1) Thepowerofinvestigationconferred ontheOmbudsman coversbothadministrativeand crim. offenses.Accordingly,theSpPros.cannotclaimthatheretainsthespecificpowerofprel.investigationwhile concedingthegeneralpowerofinvestigationtotheOmbudsman.Thegreaterpowerembracesthelesser. (2)Thefactthattheinformationsfiledbytheresp.fromFeb.2,1987,wereinvalidbec.theywerenot authorizedbytheOmbudsman,isnotajurisdictionaldefect.TheInformationscouldhavebeenchallengedina motiontoquashunderR117,ROConthegroundoflackofauthorityonthepartoftheofficerfilingthesame. Ifthisgroundwasnotinvoked,itisdeemedwaivedunderSec.8ofthesameRule.xxx Atanyrate,tosettlethisquestion,weherebyrulethatthedecisionofthisCourtinthiscaseshallbe givenprospectiveapplicationonlyfromApril27,1988.xxx To recapitulate, the Court holds that, in the interest of justice, its ruling in 4/27/88 shall apply prospectivelytocasesfiledinCourtpriortosaidresolutionandpendingtrialnortoconvictionsoracquittals pronouncedtherein.Theexceptioniswheretherehasbeena timelyobjectionandaspecificchallenge,asinthis case, where the Court ordered the nullification of the Info. filed for lack of authority on the part of resp. Gonzales.VV.

SeePDNo.1630,secs.10,1215(administrativeinvestigations)andsec.17(criminalinvestigations)
Sec.10.Powers.TheTanodbayanshallhavethefollowingpowers: (a)Hemayinvestigate,oncomplaintbyanypersonoronhisownmotionorinitiative,anyadministrative actwhetheramountingtoanycriminaloffenseornotofanyadministrativeagencyincludinganygovernmentowned orcontrolledcorporations; (b)Hemayprescribethemethodsbywhichcomplaintsaretobemade,received,andactedupon;hemay determinethescopeandmannerofinvestigationstobemade;and,subjecttotherequirementsofthisDecree,he maydeterminetheform,frequency,anddistributionofhisconclusionsandrecommendations; (c)Hemayrequestandunlessashereinprovidedforheshallbegivenbyeachadministrativeagencythe assistanceandinformationhedeemsnecessarytothedischargeofhisresponsibilities;hemayexaminetherecords anddocumentsofalladministrativeagencies;andhemayenterandinspectpremiseswithinanyadministrative agency's control, provided, however, that, where the President in writing certifies that such information, examinationorinspectionmightprejudicethenationalinterestorviolateexistinglaw,theTanodbayanshalldesist. Allinformationsoobtainedshallbeconfidential,unlessthePresident,intheinterestofpublic service,decides otherwise; (d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn testimony, or produce documentaryorotherevidencetheTanodbayandeemsrelevanttoamatterunderhisinquiry; (e)Ifafterpreliminaryinvestigationhefindsaprimafaciecase,hemayfilethenecessaryinformationor complaintwiththeSandiganbayanoranypropercourtoradministrativeagencyandprosecutethecase; (f)Hemayfileandprosecutecivilandadministrativecasesinvolvinggraftandcorruptpracticesandsuch other offensescommitted bypublic officers and employees, including those ingovernmentowned orcontrolled corporations,inrelationtotheiroffice; (g)Hemayundertake,participatein,orcooperatewithgeneralstudiesorinquiries,whetherornotrelated toanyparticularadministrativeagencyoranyparticularadministrativeact,ifhebelievesthattheymayenhance knowledgeaboutorleadtoimprovementsinthefunctioningofadministrativeagencies. Incarryingouthisfunctions,theTanodbayanmaywiththeapprovalofthePresident,deputizeorcallupon anyofficial oremployeeofthegovernment oranyagency oroffice and duringsuch deputation theofficial or employeeconcernedshallbeunderthesupervisionandcontroloftheTanodbayan. Sec.12. MattersappropriateforInvestigation. (a)Inselectingmattersforhisattention,the Tanodbayan shouldalsoaddresshimselftoanadministrativeactthatmightbe 1.contrarytolaworregulation; 2.unreasonable,unfair,oppressive,orinconsistentwiththegeneralcourseofanadministrativeagency's functioning; 3.mistakeninlaworarbitraryinascertainmentoffacts; 4.improperinmotivationorbasedonirrelevantconsiderations; 5.unclearorinadequatelyexplainedwhenreasonsshouldhavebeenrevealed; 6.inefficientlyperformed;or 7.otherwiseobjectionable (b)TheTanodbayanmayconcernhimselfalsowithstrengtheningproceduresandpracticeswhichlessen theriskofoccurrenceofanyobjectionableadministrativeacts.

Sec.13.ActiononComplaints.(a)TheTanodbayanmayreceiveacomplaintfromanysourceconcerning anadministrativeact. Atnoexpensetothecomplainant,hemayconductasuitableinvestigationintothethings complainedof. (b) After completing his consideration of a complaint, whether or not it has been investigated, the Tanodbayan shallsuitablyinformthecomplainantand,whenappropriate,theadministrativeagencyoragencies involved. (c) Alettertothe Tanodbayan fromapersoninaplaceofdetentionorinahospitalorotherinstitution underthecontrolofanadministrativeagencyshallbeimmediatelyforwarded,unopenedtotheTanodbayan. Sec.14.ConsultationwithAgency.Beforeannouncingaconclusionorrecommendationthatcriticizesan administrativeagencyoranyperson,theTanodbayanshallconsultwiththatagencyorperson.

Sec. 15. Recommendations. (a) If, having considered a complaint and whatever material he deems pertinent,theTanodbayanisoftheopinionthatanadministrativeagencyshould(1)considerthematterfurther,(2) modifyorcancelanadministrativeact,(3)alteraregulationorruling,(4)explainfullytheadministrativeactin question, or (5) take any other step, he shall state his recommendations to the administrative agency. If the Tanodbayansorequests,theagencyshall,withinthetimehehasspecified,informhimabouttheactiontakenonhis recommendationsorthereasonsfornotcomplyingwiththem. (b) Ifthe Tanodbayan believesthatanadministrativeactionhasbeendictatedbylawswhoseresultsare unfairorotherwiseobjectionable,heshallbringtotheofthePresidentandtheNationalAssembly(Congress)his viewsconcerningdesirablestatutorychange.

Sec.17. InvestigationandProsecutionofCases. TheOfficeofthe Tanodbayan shallhavetheexclusive authoritytoconduct preliminaryinvestigation ofall cases cognizablebythe Sandiganbayan tofile information thereforandtodirectandcontroltheprosecutionofsaidcases.The Tanodbayanmayutilizethepersonnelofhis officeand/orwiththeapprovalofthePresident,designateordeputizeanyfiscal,stateprosecutororlawyerinthe governmentservicetoactasspecialinvestigatororprosecutortoassisthimintheinvestigationandprosecutionof saidcases. Thosedesignatedordeputizedtoassisthim ashereinprovidedshallbeunderhissupervisionand control. Nopublicityshallbeallowedduringthependencyofsuchpreliminaryinvestigationandthenameofthe complainantandtheaccusedshallnotbemadepublicuntilaninformationisfiledbytheTanodbayan. TheTanodbayan,hisinvestigatorsandprosecutors,whetherregularmembersofhisstaffordesignatedby himashereinprovided,shallhavetheauthoritytoadministeroaths,toissuesubpoena ducestecum,tosummonand compelwitnessestoappearandtestifyunderoathbeforethemand/ortobringbooks,documentsandotherthings under their control, and to secure the attendance or presence of any absent or recalcitrant witness through applicationbeforethe Sandiganbayan orbeforeanyinferiororsuperiorcourthavingjurisdictionoftheplace wherethewitnessesorevidenceisfound. TheresolutionsandactionsoftheTanodbayanshallnotbesubjecttoreviewbyanyadministrativeagency.

G.CentralMonetaryAuthority

1.Compositionandqualifications

Art.XII,Sec.20. TheCongressshallestablishanindependentcentralmonetaryauthority,the membersofwhosegoverningboardmustbenaturalbornFilipinocitizens,ofknownprobity,integrity, andpatriotism,themajorityofwhomshallcomefromtheprivatesector.Theyshallalsobesubjectto suchotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesasmaybeprescribedbylaw.Theauthorityshallprovidepolicy directionintheareasofmoney,banking,andcredit. Itshallhavesupervisionovertheoperationsof banksandexercisesuchregulatorypowersasmaybeprovidedbylawovertheoperationsoffinance companiesandotherinstitutionsperformingsimilarfunctions. Until the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the Philippines, operating under existinglaws,shallfunctionasthecentralmonetaryauthority. JoaquinBernas,THECONSTITUTIONOFTHEREPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINESAcommentary,1988 firstedition,vol.II(hereinafterIIBernas): AnIndependentCentralMonetaryAuthority.Theimportantconceptis"independent."Thishasreference toallformsofunduecontrolorinfluencewhetherforeignorlocal.xxx Asenvisioned,whatseemstobeenvisionedisthediminutionofgovtcontrolonmonetarypolicybec. thebodywillbecomposedofamajorityfromtheprivatesector,w/ccanincludepeoplefromthelaborand peasantsector. 2.Functions Id.,Sec.20,supra. Id.,Sec.21.Foreignloansmayonlybeincurredinaccordancewithlawandtheregulationofthe monetaryauthority. InformationonforeignloansobtainedorguaranteedbytheGovernmentshallbe madeavailabletothepublic. SeeRA7653

H.EconomicandPlanningAgency

Id.,Sec.9.TheCongressmayestablishanindependenteconomicandplanningagencyheadedby the President, which shall, after consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors,andlocalgovernmentunits,recommendtoCongress,andimplementcontinuingintegratedand coordinatedprogramsandpoliciesfornationaldevelopment. UntiltheCongressprovidesotherwise,theNationalEconomicandDevelopmentAuthorityshall

functionastheindependentplanningagencyofthegovernment.

Id.,Sec.10. TheCongressshall,uponrecommendationoftheeconomicandplanningagency, whenthenationalinterestdictates,reservetocitizensofthePhilippinesortocorporationorassociations atleastsixtypercentumofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchcitizens,orsuchhigherpercentageasCongress mayprescribe,certainareasofinvestments.TheCongressshallenactmeasuresthatwillencouragethe formationandoperationofenterpriseswhosecapitaliswhollyownedbyFilipinos. Inthegrantofrights,privileges,andconcessionscoveringthenationaleconomyandpatrimony, theStateshallgivepreferencetoqualifiedFilipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdictionandinaccordancewithitsnationalgoalsandpriorities. I.NationalCommissions 1.CommissiononHumanRights a.CompositionandQualifications Art.XIII,Sec.17.(1)ThereisherebycreatedanindependentofficecalledtheCommissionon HumanRights. (2)TheCommissionshallbecomposedofaChairmanandfourMemberswhomustbenatural borncitizensofthePhilippinesandamajorityofwhomshallbemembersoftheBar.Thetermofoffice andotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesoftheMembersoftheCommissionshallbeprovidedbylaw. (3) UntilthisCommissionisconstituted,theexistingPresidentialCommitteeonHumanRights shallcontinuetoexerciseitspresentfunctionsandpowers. (4)TheapprovedannualappropriationsoftheCommissionshallbeautomaticallyandregularly released.

b.PowersandFunctions

Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions: (1) Investigate,onitsownoroncomplaintbyanyparty,allformsofhumanrightsviolations involvingcivilandpoliticalrights; (2)Adoptitsoperationalguidelinesandrulesofprocedure,andciteforcontemptforviolations thereofinaccordancewiththeRulesofCourt; (3)Provideappropriatelegalmeasuresfortheprotectionofhumanrightsofallpersonswithin thePhilippines,aswellasFilipinosresidingabroad,andprovideforpreventivemeasuresandlegalaid

servicestotheunderprivilegedwhosehumanrightshavebeenviolatedorneedprotection; (4)Exercisevisitorialpowersoverjails,prisons,ordetentionfacilities; (5)Establishacontinuingprogramofresearch,education,andinformationtoenhancerespectfor theprimacyofhumanrights; (6) RecommendtotheCongresseffectivemeasurestopromotehumanrightsandprovidefor compensationtovictimsofviolationsofhumanrights,ortheirfamilies; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on humanrights; (8) Grant immunity fromprosecution toany person whosetestimony orwhosepossession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducedbyitorunderitsauthority; (9)Requesttheassistanceofanydepartment,bureau,office,oragencyintheperformanceofits functions; (10)Appointitsofficersandemployerinaccordancewithlaw;and (11)Performsuchotherdutiesandfunctionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

Id.,Sec.19.TheCongressmayprovideforothercasesofviolationsofhumanrightsthatshould fallwithintheauthorityoftheCommission,takingintoaccountitsrecommendations. IIBernas: FunctionsoftheCommission.TheprincipalfunctionsoftheCHRisinvestigatory.Infact,intermsoflaw enforcement,thisprettymuchisthelimitofitsfunction.Beyondinvestigation,itwillhavetorelyontheJustice Dept.w/chasfullcontroloverprosecutions. Thus,underSec.18(9),itcanonly requestassistancefrom executiveoffices. xxx OperationalMeasures. Theauthoritytosetits"operationalguidelines"wasadoptedinlieuofauthorityto "setitsownpriorities"inordertoavoidthesuspicionthattheCHRmightnarrowthescopeofitsinvestigationto militaryviolationsofhumanrightsonly. LegalMeasures. Whatthelegalmeasuresarew/ctheCHRmayadoptunderSec.18(3)wasexplainedas includingthepowertoissuedirectivesforthepreservationof"thebodyofthedetaineeandtopreventthe authorities from hiding it, or from torturing or transferring the body until further orders of the court, w/o prejudicetotherightoftheaggrievedpartytopetitionfortheissuanceofawritofhabeascorpus..."xxxThe Commission,however,hasnopowertoorderthereleaseofadetainee.

BARLONGAYCASES: Carinov.CommissiononHumanRights,204SCRA483(1991)

ThethresholdquestioniswhetherofnottheCHRhasthepowerundertheConsti.toadjudicate;whether ornot,likeacourtofjustice,orevenaquasijudicialagency,ithasjurisdictionoradjudicatorypowersorthe power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violationsinvolvingcivilorpoliticalrights. TheCourtdeclarestheCHRtohavenosuchpowerxxxThemostthatmaybeconcededtotheCHRin thewayofadjudicativepoweristhatitmay investigate,i.e.,receiveevidenceandmakefindingsoffactas regardsclaimedhumanrightsviolationsinvolvingcivilandpoliticalrights.Butfactfindingisnotadjudication, andcannotbelikenedtothejudicialfunction ofacourtofjustice,orevenaquasijudicialagencyorofficial. xxxTobeconsideredajudicialfunction,thefacultyorreceivingevidenceandmakingfactualconclusionsina controversymustbeaccompaniedbytheauthorityofapplyingthelawtothosefactualconclusionstotheend thatthecontroversymaybedecidedordeterminedauthoritatively,finallyanddefinitely,subjecttosuchappeals ormodesofreviewasmaybeprovidedbylaw.Thisfunction,torepeat,theCHRdoesnothave. Investigate. Thelegalmeaningof"investigate"is"(t)ofollowupstepbystepbypatientinquiryor observation.Totraceortrack;tosearchinto;toexamineandinquireintow/careandaccuracy;tofindoutby carefulinquisition;examination;thetakingofevidence;alegalinquiry;toinquire;tomakeaninvestigation," "investigation"beinginturndescribedas"(a)nadministrativefunction,theexerciseofw/cordinarilydoesnot requireahearingxxxaninquiry,judicialorotherwise,forthediscoveryandcollectionoffactsconcerninga certainmatterormatters. Adjudicate.Inthelegalsense,"adjudicate"means:"Tosettleintheexerciseofjudicialauthority.To determinefinally.Synonymousw/adjudgeinitsstrictsense;"and"adjudge"means:"Topassonjudicially,to decide,settleordecree,ortosentenceorcondemnxxxImpliesajudicialdeterminationofafact,andtheentry ofjudgement."RAM.

EPZAv.CHR,208SCRA125 F:
On5/30/80,PD1980wasissuedreservinganddesignatingcertainparcelsoflandinRosarioandGen.Trias Cavite,asthe"CaviteEPZA.Forpurposesofdevt,theareawasdividedintoPhasesItoIV.AparcelinPhaseIVwas boughtbytheFiloilRefineryCorp.,w/cinturnsoldittoEPZA. Bef.EPZAcouldtakepossessionofthearea,severalindividualshadenteredthepremisesandplantedagricultural productsthereinw/opermissionfromEPZAoritspredecessor.Toconvincetheintruderstodepartpeacefully,EPZA,in 1981,paidP10,000financialassistancetothosewhoacceptedthesameandsignedquitclaims.AmongthemwereTeresita VallesandAlfredoAledia,fatherorresp.LoretoAledia. After10yrs.,resp.T.Valles,LoretoAlediaandPedroOrdonezfiledintheresp.CHRajointcomplaintpraying for"justiceandotherreliefsandremedies." xxx On5/17/91,theCHRissuedanorderofinjunctioncommandingEPZA,the125thPNPCo.andGov.Remullaand theirsubordinatestodesistfromcommittingfurtheractsofdemolition,terrorism,andharassmentuntilfurtherordersfrom theCHRandtoappearbef.theCHR.SubsequentordersofinjunctionwereissuedbyCHR.Themotionfiledw/EPZA fortheliftingoftheorderofinjunctionwasdenied. MFRwaslikewisedenied. Hence,petitionerfiledinthisCourta specialcivilactionofcertiorariandprohibition,w/aprayerfortheissuanceofarestrainingorderand/orprel.inj.,alleging

thatCHRactedinexcessofitsjurisdictionandw/graveabuseofdiscretioninissuingtherestrainingorderandinjunctive writxxx

ISSUE: DoestheCHRhavejurisdictiontoissueawritofinjunctionorrestrainingorderagainstsupposed violatorsofhumanrights,tocompelthemtoceaseanddesistfromcontinuingtheactscomplainedof.? HELD: No. Theconstitutionalprovision directing theCHRdirecting theCHRto"provide forpreventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" maynotbeconstrued toconferjurisdiction ontheCHRtoissue arestraining orderorwritof injunctionfor,ifthatweretheintention,theConsti.wouldhaveexpresslysaidso.Jurisdictionisonlyconferred bytheConsti.orbylaw."xxx Evidently,the"preventivemeasuresandlegalaidservices"mentionedintheConsti.refertoextrajudicial andjudicialremedies(includingprel.writofinjunction)w/ctheCHRmayseekfromthepropercourtson behalfofthevictimsofhumanrightsviolations.Notbeingacourtofjustice,theCHRitselfhasnotjurisdiction toissuethewrit,forawritofpre.inj.mayonlybeissued"bythejudgeofanycourtinw/ctheactionispending (w/inhisdistrict),orbyaJusticeoftheCA,oroftheSC.ItmayalsobegrantedbyajudgeofaRTCinany actionpendinginaninferiorcourtw/inhisdistrict.RAM.

c.FiscalAutonomy

Art.XII,Sec.17.(4)TheapprovedannualappropriationsoftheCommission(onHumanRights) shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased. 2.NationalLanguageCommission Art. XIV, Sec. 9. The Congress shall establish a national language commission composed of representatives of various regions and disciplines which shall undertake, coordinate, and promote researchesforthedevelopment,propagationandpresentationofFilipinoandotherlanguages.

3.NationalPoliceCommission Art.XVI,Sec.6.TheStateshallestablishandmaintainonepoliceforce,whichshallbenational inscopeandcivilianincharacter,tobeadministeredandcontrolledbyanationalpolicecommission.The authorityoflocalexecutivesoverthepoliceunitsintheirjurisdictionshallbeprovidedbylaw. BARLONGAYCASES: Carpiov.ExecutiveSecretary,206SCRA290(1992)

F:

ThePetitioner,ascitizen,taxpayerandmemberofthePhil.Bar,filedapetitiontodeclaretheunconstitutionality ofRA6975,"AnActEstablishingthePhilippineNationalPoliceUnderaReorganizedDILGandForOtherPurposes."

HELD:1. AstotheviewthatRA6975emasculatedtheNPCbylimitingitspowertoadministrativecontrol overthePNP,thuscontrolremainedw/theDept.Sec.underwhomboththeNPCandthePNPwereplaced. Itisanacceptedprincipleinconsti.lawthatthePres.hascontrolofallexecutivedepartments,bureaus, andoffices. Thispresidentialpowerofcontrolovertheexecutivebranchofgovtextendsoverallexecutive officersxxx AsacorollaryruleistheDoctrineof QualifiedPoliticalAgency. AsthePres.cannotbeexpectedto exercisehiscontrolpowersallatthesametimeandinperson,hewillhavetodelegatesomeofthemtohis Cabinetmembers. Underthisdoctrine,allexecutiveandadministrativeorganizationsareadjunctsoftheExec.Dept.,the headsofvariousexec.depts.areassistantsandagentsoftheChiefExec.,andexceptincaseswheretheChief Exec.isrequiredbytheConstiorlawtoactinpersonortheexigenciesofthesituationdemandthatheact personally,themultifariousexecutiveandadministrativefunctionsoftheChiefExec.areperformedbyand throughtheexec.depts.,andtheactsoftheSecretariesofsuchdepts.,performedandpromulgatedintheregular courseofbusinessare,unlessdisapprovedorreprobatedbythePres.,presumptivelytheactsoftheChiefExec. Thus,thePresident'spowerofcontrolisdirectlyexercisedbyhimovertheCabinetmemberswho,in turn,andbyhisauthority,controlthebureausandotherofficesundertheirrespectivejurisdictionsintheexec. dept. Additionally,thecircumstancethattheNPCandthePNPareplacedunderthereorganizedDILGis merelyanadministrativerealignmentthatwouldbolsterasystemofcoordinationandcooperationamongthe citizenry,localexecutivesandtheintegratedlawenforcementagenciesandpublicsafetyagenciescreatedunder RA6975,thefundingofthePNPbeinginlargepartsubsidizedbythenationalgovt. 2.AstotheissuethatinmanifestderogationofthepowerofcontroloftheNPCoverthePNP,RA6975vested thepowertochoosethePNPProv'lDirectorandtheChiefofPoliceinGovernorsandMayors,respectively;the powerofoperational"supervisionandcontrol"overpoliceunitsincityandmunicipalmayors. Thereisnousurpationbec.underthisverysameprovision,itisclearthatthelocalexecutivesareonly actingasrepresentativesoftheNPC.Assuchdeputies,theyareanswerabletotheNPCfortheiractionsinthe exerciseoftheirfunctionsunderthatsection. 3.AstotheissuethatinmanifestderogationofthepowerofcontroloftheNPCoverthePNP,RA6975vested intheCSC,participationinappointmentstothepositionsofSeniorSupt.toDeputyDirectorGen.aswellasthe administration.ofqualifyingentranceexaminations. Sec.31(a),(b),(c)andSec.32ofsaidActpreciselyunderscorestheciviliancharacterofthePNPand willundoubtedlyprofessionalizethesame. 4.AstotheissuethatinmanifestderogationofthepowerofcontroloftheNPCoverthePNP,RA6975vested disciplinarypowersoverthePNPmembersinthePeople'sLawEnforcementBoards(PLEB)andincityand municipalmayors.

Pursuant to Sec. 20 (c) of the Act, the NPC exercises appellate jurisdiction, through the regional appellateboard,overdecisionsofboththePLEBandthesaidmayors.Further,itistheCommissionw/cshall issuetheimplementingguidelinesandprocedurestobeadoptedbythePLEBfortheconductofitshearings,and itmayassigntheNPChearingofficertoactaslegalconsultantsofthePLEBs. xxxThepurposeoftheestablishmentofPLEBistoprofessionalizethePNP. 5.AstotheissuethatSec.12ofthelawconstitutesanencroachmentupon,interferencew/,andanabdication bythePres.ofexec.controlandcommanderinchiefpowers. Sec.12givesmuscletoandenforcesthepropositionthatthenationalpolicedoesnotfallunderthe CommanderinChiefpowersofthePres.Thisissosincethepoliceforce,notbeingintegratedw/themilitary,is notpartoftheAFP.Asacivilianagencyofthegovt,itproperlycomesw/intheandissubjecttotheexerciseby thePres.ofthepowerofexec.control.xxx 6.Astotheissuethatthecreationof"ASpecialOversightCommittee"underSec.84oftheAct,especiallythe inclusion of some legislators as members is an unconstitutional encroachment upon and diminution of the President'spowerofcontroloverallexec.depts.,bureausandoffices. TheCommitissimplyan adhoc ortransitorybody,establishedandtaskedsolelyw/planning and overseeingtheimmediatetransfer,merger,and/orabsorptionintotheDILGofthe"involvedagencies." 7.The3ConstitutionalCommissions(CSC,COA&COMELEC)andtheadditionalcommissioncreatedbythe Consti(CHR)areallindependentoftheExecutive;buttheNAPOLCOMisnot.Infact,itwasstressedduring theCONCOMdeliberationsthatthiscommissionwouldbeunderthePres.,andhencemaybecontrolledbythe Pres.,throughhisorheralterego,theSec.oftheInteriorandLocalGovt.Adapted.

NAPOLCOMv.DeGuzman,229SCRA801(1994) F:
ThecaseatbarhaditsoriginintheimplementationofthecompulsoryretirementofPNPofficersasmandatedin Sec.39,RA6975.Amongothers,theActprovidesforauniformretirementsystemforPNPmembersxxxforofficer(s) andnonofficer(s)upontheattainmentofage56.BasedonSec.39ofthesaidAct,petitionerssentnoticesofretirementto privaterespondentswhoareallmembersofthedefunctPCandhavereachedtheageof56. Inresponse,pvt.resps.filedacomplainton12/19/91fordeclaratoryorderand/orinjunctionbef.theRTC.In theircomplaint,resps.averthattheageofretirementsetat56cannotbeappliedtothemsincetheyarealsocoveredbySec. 89ofthesamelaww/cprovidedforatransitionperiodoffouryrs.followingtheeffectivityoftheActinsettingthe retirementage.xxxItisthesubmissionofresps.thattheterm"INP"includesboththeformermembersofthePCandthe localpoliceforcewhowereearlierconstitutedastheINP.Ontheotherhand,thebeliefofthepetitionersthatthe4yr. transitionperiodprovidedinSec.89appliesonlytothelocalpoliceforceswhopreviouslyretired,compulsorilyatage60 forthoseinranksofPolice/FireLt.orhigher;whiletheretirementageforthePChadalreadybeensetat56undertheAFP law. xxx

ISSUE:DoestheRA6975distinguishINPfromthePC?

HELD:Fromacarefulperusalofsomeprovisionsofthelaw(Secs.23,85and86),itappearstherefore,thatthe useofthetermINPisnotsynonymousw/thePC.Haditbeenotherwise,thestatutecouldhavejustmadea uniformreferencetothemembersofthewholePNPforretirementpurposesandnotjusttheINP.Thelawitself distinguishesINPfromthePCanditcannotbeconstruedthat"INP"asusedinSec.89includesthemembersof thePC. Ascontrarytothepronouncementofresp.judgethatthelawfailedtodefinewhoconstitutestheINP. Sec.90ofthelawstatesthat"xxxTheIntegratedNationalPolice,whichistheciviliancomponentofthePC INPxxx." xxx ThelegislativeintenttoclassifytheINPinsuchmannerthatSec.89isapplicableonlytothelocal policeforceisclear.Thequestionnowisw/ntheclassificationisvalid.Thetestforthisisreasonablenesssuch thatitmustconformtotheff.requisites: (1) itmustbebaseduponsubstantialdistinctions;(2) itmustbe germanetothepurposeofthelaw;(3)Itmustnotbelimitedtoexistingconditionsonly;and(4)itmustapply equallytoallmembersofthesameclass. Theclassificationisbaseduponsubstantialdistinctions.ThePC,bef.theeffectivityofthelaw,were alreadyretirableatage56whilethelocalpoliceforceat60andgovernedbydifferentlaws.Thedistinctionis relevantforthepurposeofthestatute,w/cistoenablethelocalpoliceforcetoplanfortheirretirementw/c wouldbeearlierthanusualbec.ofthenewlaw.Sec.89ismerelytransitory,remedialinnature,andlosesits forceandeffectoncethe4yr.transitoryperiodhaselapsed.Finally,itappliestoalllocalpoliceofficers.xxx RAM.

HimaganV.PEOPLE,237SCRA538(1994) F: Petitioner,apolicemanassignedw/themedicalco.ofthePNPHQatCampCatitigan,DavaoCitywas implicatedinthekillingofBenjaminMachitar,Jr.andtheattemptedmurderofBernabeMachitar. Afterthe informationsformurderandattemptedmurderwerefiledw/theRTC,thetrialcourtissuedanordersuspending petitioneruntilterminationofthecaseonthebasisofSec.47ofRA6975,w/cprovides:

Sec.47.PreventiveSuspensionPendingCriminalCase.Uponthefilingofacomplaintorinformationsufficient informandsubstanceagainstamemberofthePNPforgravefelonieswherethepenaltyimposedbylawissix(6)years andone(1)dayormore,thecourtshallimmediatelysuspendtheaccusedfromofficeuntilthecaseisterminated .Such caseshallbesubjecttocontinuoustrialandshallbeterminatedwithinninety(90)daysfromarraignmentoftheaccused.

PetitionerfiledamotiontolifttheorderforhissuspensionrelyingonSec.42ofPD807,thathis suspensionshouldbelimitedto90daysandalso,onourrulinginDelosov.SB,andLaynov.SB.Themotion andthesubsequentMFRweredenied.Hence,thispetitionforcertiorariandmandamus. HELD:Wefindthepetitiontobedevoidofmerit. (1)Thelanguageofthefirstsentenceisclear,plainandfreefromambiguity.xxxThesecondsentence xxprovidingthetrialmustbeterminatedw/in90daysfromarraignmentdoesnotqualifyorlimitthefirst sentence.The2canstandindependentlyofeachother.Thefirstreferstotheperiodofsuspension.The2nd dealsw/thetimeframew/inw/cthetrialshouldbefinished.

Supposethetrialisnotterminatedw/inthe90dayperiod,shouldthesuspensionofaccusedbelifted? Certainlyno.Whilethelawusesthemandatoryword"shall"bef.thephrase"beterminatedw/in90days,"there isnothinginthelawthatsuggeststhatthepreventivesuspensionoftheaccusedwillbeliftedifthetrialisnot terminatedw/inthatperiod.Butthisisw/oprejudicetotheadministrativesanctions,and,inappropriatecases wherethefactssowarrant,tocriminalorcivilliabilityofthejudge.Shouldthetrialbeunreasonablydelayed w/othefaultoftheaccused,hemayaskforthedismissalofthecase.Shouldthisberefused,hecancompelits dismissalbycertiorari,prohibitionormandamus,orsecurehislibertyby (2)PetitionermisappliesSec.42ofPD807.Ameticulousreadingofthesectionclearlyshowsthatit referstotheliftingofthepreventivesuspensioninpendingadmin.investigation,notincrim.cases,ashere.xxx Sec.91ofRA6975w/cstatesthattheCSlawanditsimplementingrulesshallapplytomembersofthePNP insofarastheprovisions,rulesandregulationsarenotinconsistentw/RA6975. (3)Thepetitioner'srelianceonLaynoandDelosoismisplaced.xxxSec.13ofRA3019uponw/cthe preventivesuspensionoftheaccusedinLaynoandDelosowasbasedwassilentw/respecttothedurationofthe preventivesuspension,suchthatthesuspensionoftheaccusedthereinforaprolongedandunreasonablelength oftimeraisedadueprocessquestion.Notsointheinstantcase.Petitionerischargedw/murderundertheRPC anditisundisputedthathefallssquarelyunderSec.47RA6975w/ccategoricallystatesthathis suspension shalllastuntilthecaseisterminated. (4)ThedeliberationsoftheBicameralConferenceCommitteeonNationalDefenserelativetothebill thatbecameRA6975revealthelegislativeintent toplaceonpreventivesuspension amemberofthePNP charged w/ grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six yrs. of imprisonment and w/c suspensioncontinuesuntilthecaseagainsthimisterminated.RAM.

4.CommissiononIndigenousCulturalCommunities

Art.XVI,Sec.12.TheCongressmaycreateaconsultativebodytoadvisethePresidentonpolicies affectingindigenousculturalcommunities,themajorityofthemembersofwhichshallcomefromsuch communities.

UPDATED1/15/96 RAM

III.LOCALGOVERNMENTS
A.Localgovernmentunits

IIBernas: LocalGovernmentUnits. "Localgovernment"hasbeendescribedas"apoliticalsubdivisionofanationor statewhichisconstitutedbylawandhassubstantialcontroloflocalaffairs.Inauunitarysystemofgovt,such asthegovtunderthePhil.Consti.,localgovtcanonlybeaninfrasovereignsubdivisionofonesovereignnation. Itcannotbeanimperiuminimperio.

Structureoflocalgovernmentunits (notinVV'soutline) Art.X,Sec.1.TheterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesarethe provinces,cities,municipalities,andbarangays.ThereshallbeautonomousregionsinMuslimMindanao andtheCordillerasashereinafterprovided. TheterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesarethe(a)provinces,(b) cities,(c)municipalitiesand(d)barangays. IIBernas: TheconstitutionalsignificanceofSec.1isthatprovinces,cities,municipalitiesandbarangayshavebeenfixedas thestandardterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsofthePhils.Tothesethe1987Consti.addedthe"autonomous regions." This manner of subdividing the Phils. cannot go out of existence except by a constitutional amendment.

Art.II,Sec.25.TheStateshallensuretheautonomyoflocalgovernments.

Art.X,Sec.2.Theterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsshallenjoylocalautonomy. IIBernas:Localautonomyasaconceptisrelativeandsimplymeans,asindicatedinSec.3,decentralization. Themeasureofdecentralizationforthelocalunits,however,willbelessthanfortheautonomousregions. Ganzonv.CA,200SCRA271(1991).Localautonomymeans"amoreresponsiveandaccountablelocalgovt structureinstitutedthroughasystemofdecentralization. TheConsti.doesnothingmorethantobreakupthe monopolyofthenationalgovtovertheaffairsoflocalgovts."toliberatelocalgovtsfromtheimperialismof Mla."Autonomy,howeverisnotmeanttoendtherelationofpartnershipandinterdependencebet.thecentral administrationandlocalgovtunits,orotherwise,tousherinaregimeoffederalism.xxx Decentralizationmeansdevolutionofnationaladministration,butnotpower,tothelocallevels.

1.GeneralsupervisionoflocalgovernmentsbythePresident

Art. X, Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalitieswithrespecttocomponentbarangaysshallensurethattheactsoftheircomponentunits arewithinthescopeoftheirprescribedpowersandfunctions.

Id.,Sec.16.ThePresidentshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverautonomousregionstoensure thatlawsarefaithfullyexecuted.

Supervision Defined. Supervision means overseeing or the power of an officer to see that subordinate officersperformtheirduties.Ifthelatterfailorneglecttofulfillthem,theformermaytakesuchactionorstep asprescribedbylawtomakethemperformtheirduties.(Ganzonv.CA,200SCRA271.)

2.LocalGovernmentCode Art.X,Sec.3.TheCongressshallenactalocalgovernmentcodewhichshallprovideforamore responsiveandaccountablelocalgovernmentstructureinstitutedthroughasystemofdecentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, elections,appointmentandremoval,term,salaries,powersandfunctionsanddutiesoflocalofficials,and allothermattersrelatingtotheorganizationandoperationofthelocalunits.

RepublicAct7160,"LocalGovernmentCodeof1991"

LocalGovernmentCode TheCongressshallenactalocalgovernmentcodewhichshall: (1) Provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure, instituted through a systemofdecentralization,witheffectivemechanismofrecall,initiative,andreferendum. (2)Allocateamongthedifferentlocalgovernmentunitstheirpowers,responsibilitiesandresources. Legislativebodiesoflocalgovernmentsshallhavesectoralrepresentationasmaybeprovidedbylaw. (Art.X,Sec.9) (3) Provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and

functionsandduties,oflocalofficials. Thetermofofficeofelectivelocalofficialsexceptbarangayofficialswhichshallbedeterminedbylaw, shallbe3years. Nosuchofficialshallserveformorethan3consecutiveterms. Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredaninterruptioninthe continuityofhisserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected.(Art.X,Sec.8) The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneouswiththeelectionofthemembersofCongress.(Art.XVIII,Sec.1.) (4)Allothermattersrelatingtotheorganizationandoperationofthelocalunits.(Art.X,Sec.3.)

ValidityofCreationofMunicipalityBeforetheLocalGovernmentCode. Torralbav.MunicipalityofSibagat,147SCRA390(1987) F:
ThepetitionersquestionthevalidityofBP56creatingthemunicipality(mun.)ofSibagatinAgusanProvince,on thegroundthatitwasnotpassedinaccordancew/thecriteriaoftheLGCasrequiredbyArt.IX,Sec.3ofthe1973Consti. (nowArt.IX,Sec.10oftheConsti.)

HELD:TheLGCtookeffecton2/10/83,whereasBP56tookeffecton2/1/80.TheConsti.doesnotmakethe enactmentoftheLGCaconditionsinequanonforthecreationofanewmun.,butonlythatitmustbeapproved bythepeopleintheareaorareasaffected.UnlikeinthecaseofTanv.COMELEC,thereisnoquestionhere thataplebiscitewasheldinsuchareaanditslegalityisnotquestioned.VV.

a.Termofofficeoflocalofficials,exceptbarangayofficials

Art.X,Sec.8.Thetermofofficeofelectivelocalofficials,exceptbarangayofficials,whichshall bedeterminedbylaw,shallbethreeyearsandnosuchofficialshallserveformorethanthreeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefulltermofwhichhewaselected.

XVIII,Sec.1.xxx ThefirstlocalelectionshallbeheldonadatetobedeterminedbythePresident,whichmaybe

simultaneouswiththeelectionoftheMembersoftheCongress. Itshallincludetheelectionofallthe MembersofthecityormunicipalcouncilsintheMetropolitanManilaarea.

b.Termofofficeofbarangayofficials Art.X,Sec.8.Thetermofofficeofelectivelocalofficials,exceptbarangayofficials,whichshall bedeterminedbylaw,shallbethreeyearsandnosuchofficialshallserveformorethanthreeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefulltermofwhichhewaselected. RepublicActNo.6679,Sec.1inconjunctionwithSec.43(c),RA7160

Sec.1.TheelectionsofbarangayofficialssetonthesecondMondayofNovember1988byRepublicActNo. 6653areherebypostponedandresettoMarch28,1989.Theyshallserveatermwhichshallbeginonthefirstday ofMay1989andendingonthethirtyfirstdayofMay1994. ThereshallbeheldaregularelectionofbarangayofficialsonthesecondMondayofMay1994andonthe samedayeveryfive(5)yearsthereafter.Theirtermshallbeforfive(5)yearswhichshallbeginonthefirstdayof Junefollowingtheelectionanduntiltheirsuccessorsshallhavebeenelectedandqualified: Provided,Thatno barangayofficialshallserveformorethanthree(3)successiveterms. Thebarangayelectionsshallbenonpartisanandshallbeconductedinanexpeditiousandinexpensive manner.(RA6679)

Sec.43.TermofOffice.xxx xxx (c)Thetermofofficeofbarangayofficialsandmembersofthesangguniangkabataanshallbeforthree(3) years,whichshallbeginaftertheregularelectionofbarangayofficialsonthesecondMondayof1994.(RA7160.)

c.LocalLegislativeBodies Art.X,Sec.9.Legislativebodiesoflocalgovernmentsshallhavesectoralrepresentationasmaybe prescribedbylaw.

d.Creation,abolition,divisionormergeroflocalgovernmentunits Art.X,Sec.10. Noprovince,city,municipality,orbarangaymaybecreated,divided,merged,

abolished,oritsboundarysubstantiallyaltered,exceptinaccordancewiththecriteriaestablishedinthe localgovernmentcodeandsubjecttoapprovalbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteinthepolitical unitsdirectlyaffected. RepublicAct7160,Secs.610

Sec.6. AuthoritytoCreateLocalGovernmentUnits. Alocalgovernmentunitmaybecreated,divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sanggunian panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction,subjecttosuchlimitationsandrequirementsprescribedinthisCode. Sec.7.CreationandConversionAsageneralrule,thecreationofalocalgovernmentunitoritsconversion fromoneleveltoanotherlevelshallbebasedonverifiableindicatorsofviabilityandprojectedcapacitytoprovide services,towit: (a)Income.Itmustbesufficient,basedonacceptablestandards,toprovideforallessentialgovernment facilitiesandservicesandspecialfunctionscommensuratewiththesizeofitspopulation,asexpectedofthelocal governmentunitconcerned; (b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdictionofthelocalgovernmentunitconcerned;and (c)LandArea.Itmustbecontiguous,unlessitcomprisestwo(2)ormoreislandsorisseparatedbya local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions;andsufficienttoprovideforsuchbasicservicesandfacilitiestomeettherequirementsofitspopulace. CompliancewiththeforegoingindicatorsshallbeattestedtobytheDepartmentofFinance(DOF),the NationalStatisticsOffice(NSO),andtheLandsManagementBureau(LMB)oftheDepartmentofEnvironment andNaturalResources(DENR.) Sec.8.DivisionandMerger.Divisionandmergerofexistinglocalgovernmentunitsshallcomplywiththe samerequirementshereinprescribedfortheircreation:Provided,however,Thatsuchdivisionshallnotreducethe income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local governmentunitorunitsshallnotfallbelowitscurrentincomeclassificationpriortosuchdivision. The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6) months from the effectivityofthisCodetoreflectthechangesintheirfinancialpositionresultingfromtheincreasedrevenuesas providedherein. Sec.9.AbolitionofLocalGovernmentUnits. Alocalgovernmentunitmaybeabolishedwhenitsincome, population or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creationunderBookIIIofthisCode,ascertifiedbythenationalagenciesmentionedinSection7hereoftoCongress ortothesanggunianconcerned,asthecasemaybe. Thelaworordinanceabolishingalocalgovernmentunitshallspecifytheprovince,city,municipality,or barangaywithwhichthelocalgovernmentunitsoughttobeabolishedwillbeincorporatedormerged. Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of

boundariesoflocalgovernmentunitsshalltakeeffectunlessapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscite calledforthepurposeinthepoliticalunitorunitsdirectlyaffected. Saidplebisciteshallbeconductedbythe CommissiononElections(Comelec)withinonehundredtwenty(120)daysfromthedateofeffectivityofthelawor ordinanceeffectingsuchaction,unlesssaidlaworordinancefixesanotherdate.

In Tan v COMELEC,142SCRA727(1986),theSCruledthattheplebiscitetobeconductedinthe creationofanewprovince(NegrosdelNorte)mustbeconductednotonlyamongtheconstituentsofthenew province, butalsotheconstituents ofthoseunitstobeleftbehind. Inotherwords,theplebiscite mustbe conductedamongtheinhabitantsofboththeoldandnewtowns.Thereasonis,theoldtownsareasdirectly affectedbythecreationofthenewprovincefortheymayloseincomeorotherbenefit.

Tanv.COMELEC,142SCRA727(1986) F: PromptedbytheenactmentofBP885w/cwasenactedtocreatethenewProvinceofProvinceofNegros delNorte,petitionersherein,whoareresidentsoftheProv.ofNegrosOccidental,inthevariouscitiesand municipalitiestherein,filedw/thisCourtacaseforprohibitionforthepurposesofstoppingresps.COMELEC fromconductingtheplebiscitew/cwasscheduledtobeheldfor1/3/86. Petitionerscontendthatthelawis unconstitutionalanditisnotincompleteaccordw/theLGCasinArtXI,Sec.3ofour(1973)Consti.xxxThe plebiscitesoughttobeenjoinedbythemwasheldasscheduledbuttherearestillseriousissuesraisedinthe instantcaseaffectingthelegality,constitutionalityandvalidityofsuchexercisew/cshouldproperlybepassed uponandresolvedbythisCourt. TheplebiscitewasconfinedonlytotheinhabitantsoftheterritoryofNegrosdelNorte. Bec.ofthe exclusionsofthevotersfromtherestoftheprovinceofNegrosOcc.,petitionersfoundneedtochangetheprayer oftheirpetitiontotheendthattheconstitutionalissuesw/ctheyhaveraisedintheactionwillbeventilatedand givenfinalresolution. HELD:WenowstatethattherulinginthecasesofLopezv.COMELECandParedesv.Hon.Exec.Sec.,etal. sanctioningtheexclusionofthevotersbelongingtoanexistingpoliticalunitfromw/cthenewpoliticalunitwill be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation of anotherpoliticalunit,isherebyabandoned. 1.Factthattheplebiscitewhichthepetitionatbarsoughttostophadalreadybeenheldandofficialsof the new province appointed does not make the petition moot, as the petition raises issues an issue of constitutionaldimension.TheConsti.makesitimperativethattherebefirstobtained"theapprovalofamajority ofvotesintheplebisciteintheunitorunitsaffected"wheneveraprovinceiscreated,dividedormergedand thereissubstantialalterationoftheboundaries. Itisthusinescapabletoconcludethattheboundariesofthe existing province of Negros Occ. would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundariesinorderthattherecanbecreatedtheproposednewprovinceofNegrosdelNorte.Plainandsimple logicwilldemonstratethatthe2politicalunitswouldbeaffected. Thefirstwouldbetheparentprovinceof NegrosOccbec.itsboundarieswouldbesubstantiallyaltered.Theotheraffectedentitywouldbecomposedof thoseintheareasubtractedfromthemotherprovincetoconstitutetheproposedprovinceofNegrosdelNorte.

2. Aplebisciteforcreatinganewprovinceshouldincludetheparticipationoftheresidentsofthe motherprovincefortheplebiscitetoconformtotheconstitutionalrequirements. Noamountofrhetorical flourishescanjustifyexclusionoftheparentprovinceintheplebiscitebec.ofanallegedintentonthepartofthe authorsandimplementorsofthechallengedstatutetocarryoutwhatisclaimedtobeamandatetoguarantee andpromoteautonomyoflocalgovt.units.Theallegedgoodintentionscannotprevailandoverrulethecardinal preceptthatwhatourConsti.categoricallydirectstobedoneorimposeasarequirementmustfirstbeobserved, respectedandcompliedw/. 3.ThecreatedprovincedoesnotevensatisfythearearequirementprescribedinSec.197oftheLGC. Tothisissue,itiseventhesubmissionoftherespondentsthatinthisregardthemarginalseaw/inthethreemile limitshouldbeconsideredindeterminingtheextentoftheterritoryofthenewprovince.Suchaninterpretation isstrained,incorrectandfallacious. Useoftheword"territory"inSec.197oftheLGCrefersonlytothelandmass,nottothewaters, comprisingthepoliticalentity.Assostatedthereinthe"territoryneednotbecontiguousifitcomprisestwoor moreislands."TheuseofthewordterritoryinthisparticularprovisionoftheLGCandintheverylastsentence thereof,clearlyreflectsthat"territory"asthereinused,hasreferenceonlytothemassoflandareaandexcludes thewatersoverw/cthepoliticalunitexercisescontrol. Saidsentencestatesthatthe"territoryneednotbe contiguous."Contiguousmeans(a)inphysicalcontact;(b)touchingalongallormostofoneside;(c)near, next,oradjacent."Contiguous"whenemployedasanadjectiveisonlyusedwhenitdescribesphysicalcontact, oratouchingofsidesof2solidmassesofmatter.xxxInthecontextofthesentenceabove,whatneednotbe contiguousisthe"territory"thephysicalmassoflandarea.Therewouldarisenoneedforthelegislatorsto usethewordcontiguous iftheyhadintendedthattheterm"territory"embracenotonlylandareabutalso territorialwaters.

e.MetropolitanPoliticalSubdivisions Art.X,Sec.11. TheCongressmay,bylaw,createspecial metropolitanpolitical subdivisions, subjecttoaplebisciteassetforthinSection10hereof. Thecomponentcitiesandmunicipalitiesshall retaintheirbasicautonomyandshallbeentitledtotheirownlocalexecutivesandlegislativeassemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic servicesrequiringcoordination. Art. XVIII, Sec. 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all local government units comprising the MetropolitanArea. SeeRA7924

Art.XVIII,Sec.1.xxx xxx ThefirstlocalelectionswhichshallbeheldonadatetobedeterminedbythePresident

xxx.ItshallincludetheelectionofallmembersofthecityormunicipalcouncilsintheMetropolitanarea. IIBernas: Thearea ofjurisdiction ofthemetropolitan political subdivision willnotbethetotality of the concernsofmunicipalgovt.butonlybasicservices. Assuchitwillbeajuridicalentityw/mun.powers police, eminent domain, and taxation powers exercised by alegislative assemblytotheextent needed for providingbasicservices. f.Righttovote Id.,Sec.12.Citiesthatarehighlyurbanized,asdeterminedbylaw,andcomponentcitieswhose chartersprohibit theirvotersfromvotingforprovincial electiveofficials,shallbe independent ofthe province.Thevotersofcomponentcitieswithinaprovince,whosecharterscontainnosuchprohibition, shallnotbedeprivedoftheirrighttovoteforelectiveprovincialofficials.

RepublicAct7160,Sec.451
Sec.451. Cities,Classified. Acitymayeitherbecomponentorhighlyurbanized: Provided,however, ThatthecriteriaestablishedinthisCodeshallnotaffecttheclassificationandcorporatestatusofexistingcities. Independentcomponentcitiesarethosecomponentcitieswhosechartersprohibittheirvotersfromvoting forprovincialelectiveofficials.Independentcomponentcitiesshallbeindependentoftheprovince.

UndertheLocalGovernmentCode,ahighlyurbanizedcitymusthaveapopulationofatleast150,000 people,andanannualincomeofP30million.(Sec.166) Inhighlyurbanizedcities,thevotersdonotvoteintheprovincialelections,thecityisindependentof theprovince. Incomponentcities,itdependsifthecharterprohibitsvotersfromvotingintheprovincialelection,then theycannotparticipateintheprovincialelection.Thatthecitypaystotheprovinceisnobasisforthecomplaint. If,ontheotherhand,theircharterdoesnotexpresslyprohibit(itdoesnothavetoallow),thentheycanvotein theprovincialelection. CenizavCOMELEC,95SCRA703(1980)exemplifiesthecaseinwhichacomponentcitythatisnot highlyurbanized(Mandaue)becauseofitsincomecannotvoteintheprovincialelection(Cebu)becauseits charterprohibitsthevotersfromvotingunlikeothercomponentcitieswhosechartersdonotcontainasimilar prohibition. Theclassificationofcitiesintohighlyurbanizedcitieswouldshowwhetheritiscapableofsupportof provincialgovernments,thusjustifyingtheprohibitiontovoteforprovincialofficials.

ClassificationofCitiesinto"HighlyUrbanized"and"Component"Cities. Cenizav.COMELEC,95SCRA763(1980) F:
BP51calledfortheelectionoflocalofficialson1/30/80and,inconnectiontherewith,classifiedcharteredcities into"highlyurbanized"and"component"citiesonthebasisoftheirregularincome(P40M). Theregisteredvotersof componentcitiescouldvoteintheelectionoftheprovinceofw/cthatcityisacomponentistheirchartersoprovided, whilevotersinthehighlyurbanizedcitieswerenotallowedtoparticipatenorvoteintheelectionsoftheprovinceinw/c suchcitiesarelocated.CebuCitywasclassifiedasahighlyurbanizedcitywhileMandaue,w/lessthanP40Mincomewas classifiedasacomponentcity,butitsvotersbec.ofitscharterprovisionswerenotallowedtovoteintheelectionsofthe CebuProvince.Petitioners,asTPsandregisteredvotersofCebuandMandauecities,filedanactiontostoptheelectionin theaffectedprovincestoallowvoterstovoteinprovincialelections.

HELD:(1)TheclassificationofcitiesinBP51isbasedonsubstantialdistinction.Therevenueofacitywould showwhetheritiscapableofindep.existence. Citiesw/smallerincomeneedthecontinuedsupportofthe provincialgovtsthusjustifyingthecontinuedparticipationofthevotersintheelectionofprovincialofficials.It istruethatMandaueisclassifiedasacomponentcitybutbec.oftheprovisionofitscharteritsregisteredvoters arenotallowedtovoteintheelectionsoftheProv.ofCebu,whiletheothercomponentcitiesareallowedtodo so.Butthisdifferenceintreatmentisamatteroflegislativediscretion. (2)Theprohibitionagainsttheimpositionofburdensontherightofsuffragereferstosuchirrelevant requirementsaspolltax,etc. (3)Highlyurbanizedcitiesareindep.oftheprovinceintheadmin.oftheiraffairs.Suchbeingthecase itisbutjustandpropertolimittheselectionandelectionofprovincialofficialstothevotersoftheprovince whoseinterestareaffectedandexcludethevotersofhighlyurbanizedcities (4)ThecharterofMandauew/ctookeffecton6/21/69didnothavetoberatifiedbytheresidentsasthe requirementorratificationintheConsti(1973)wasprospectiveincharacter. (5)NeithercanBP51andthe CharterofMandauebesaidtohavebeenenactedforagerrymanderingpurpose."Gerrymandering"isaterm employedtodescribeanapportionmentofrepresentativedistrictssocontrivedastogiveanunfairadvantagetoa partyinpower.Thestatutesheredonotinvolveanapportionment.Norhasitbeenshownthattheexclusionof votersintheaffectedcitiesgiveanunfairadvantagetocandidatesofthepartyinpower.xxxVV. . 3.PowersofLocalGovernments a.Revenueandtaxingpower Art.X,Sec.5. Eachlocalgovernment unitshallhavethepowertocreateitsownsourcesof revenuesandtolevytaxes,fees,andchargessubjecttosuchguidelinesandlimitationsasCongressmay provide,consistentwiththebasicpolicyoflocalautonomy. Suchtaxes,fees,andchargesshallaccrue exclusivelytothelocalgovernments. IIBernas: Sec.5doesnotchangethedoctrinethatmunicipalcorporationsdonotpossesinherentpowersof taxation.Whatitdoesistoconfermunicipalcorps.ageneralpowertolevytaxesandotherwisecreatesources ofrevenue.Theynolongerhavetowaitforastatutorygrantofthesepowers.Thepoweroflegislativeauthority relativetothefiscalpowersofLGUshasbeenreducedtotheauthoritytoimposelimitationsonmun.powers.

Moreover,theselimitationsmustbe"consistentw/thebasicpolicyoflocalautonomy."

b.Shareinnationaltaxes Id.,Sec.6.Localgovernmentunitsshallhaveajustshare,asdeterminedbylaw,inthenational taxeswhichshallbeautomaticallyreleasedtothem.

c.Shareintheproceedsofnationalwealth Id., Sec. 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilizationanddevelopmentofthenationalwealthwithintheirrespectiveareas,inthemannerprovided bylaw,includingsharingthesamewiththeinhabitantsbywayofdirectbenefits.

d.Coordinationofefforts,servicesandresourcesforcommonbenefit Id.,Sec.13.Localgovernmentunitsmaygroupthemselves,consolidateorcoordinatetheirefforts, services,andresourcesforpurposescommonlybeneficialtotheminaccordancewithlaw.

RA7160,Sec.33
Sec. 33. Cooperative Undertakings Among Local Government Units. Local Government units may, throughappropriateordinances,groupthemselves,consolidate,orcoordinatetheirefforts,services,andresources forpurposescommonlybeneficialtothem.Insupportofsuchundertakings,thelocalgovernmentunitsinvolved may,uponapprovalbythesangguniangconcernedafterapublichearingconductedforthepurposes,contribute funds,realestate,equipment,andotherkindsofpropertyandappointorassignpersonnelundersuchtermsand conditionsasmaybeagreeduponbytheparticipatinglocalunitsthroughMemorandaofAgreement.

4.TheTwoAutonomousRegions

a.Creation Art.X,Sec.15. Thereshallbecreated autonomousregionsinMuslimMindanaoandinthe Cordillerasconsistingofprovinces,cities,municipalities,andgeographicalareassharingcommonand distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristicswhichtheframeworkofthisConstitutionandthenationalsovereigntyaswellasterritorial integrityoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.

Id., Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointedbythePresidentfromalistofnomineesfrommultisectoralbodies.Theorganicactshalldefine thebasicstructureofgovernmentfortheregionconsistingoftheexecutivedepartmentandlegislative assembly,bothofwhichshallbeelectiveandrepresentativeoftheconstituentpoliticalunits.Theorganic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistentwiththeprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationallaws. Thecreationoftheautonomousregionshallbeeffectivewhenapprovedbymajorityofthevotes castbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose,providedthatonlyprovinces,cities,and geographicareasvotingfavorablyinsuchplebisciteshallbeincludedintheautonomousregion.

Id.,Sec.19.ThefirstCongresselectedunderthisConstitutionshall,withineighteenmonthsfrom thetimeoforganization ofbothHouses,passtheorganicactsfortheautonomousregionsinMuslim MindanaoandtheCordilleras. IIBernas: Intheprocessofdeterminingtheterritorythatwillcomprisetheautonomousregions,thereare3 steps:(1)thereisapreliminaryadministrativedeterminationofwhatareasshouldbeconsideredforinclusion intheautonomousregion;(2)CongressthroughtheOrganicActmakesadeterminationofwhatareasshouldbe includedandthereforeshouldparticipateintheplebiscite;(3)Plebiscitecanfurthermodifythedetermination madebytheOrganicActbec.Sec.18saysthat"onlyprovinces,etc.votingfavorablyinsuchplebisciteshallbe includedintheautonomousregion.

Abbasv.COMELEC,179SCRA287(1989) F:
Thepresentcontroversyrelatestotheplebiscitein13provincesand9citiesinMindanaoandPalawanscheduled for11/19/89,inimplementationofRA6734providingforanOrganicActfortheAutonomousRegioninMuslinMindanao. TheseconsolidatedpetitionspraythattheCourt:(1)enjointheCOMELECfromconductingtheplebisciteandtheSec.of Budget from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. TheargumentsagainstRA6734raisedbypetitionersmaygenerallybecategorizedintoeitheroftheff: I.Thatcertainprovisionsofthelawconflictw/theTripoliAgreement. II.ThatRA6734,orpartsthereor,violatestheConsti.

HELD: I. WefinditneithernecessarynordeterminativeofthecasetoruleonthenatureoftheTripoli AgreementanditsbindingeffectonthePhilGovtwhetherunderpublicinternationalorinternalPhil.law.Itis nowtheConsti.itselfthatprovidesforthecreationofanautonomousregioninMuslimMindanao. II.Petitionercontendsthatthetenoroftheaboveprovisionmakesthecreationofanautonomousregion absolute,suchthatevenifonly2provincesvoteinfavorofautonomy,suchanautonomousregionwouldstillbe createdxxx.

HELD: UndertheConsti.andRA6734,thecreationoftheautonomousregionshalltakeeffectonlywhen approvedbyamajorityofthevotescastbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscite,andonlythoseprovincesand citieswhereamajorityvoteinfavoroftheOrganicActshallbeincludedintheautonomousregion.xxxThe singleplebiscitewillbedeterminativeof(1)whetherthereshallbeanautonomousregioninMuslimMindanao and(2)whichprovincesandcities,amongthoseenumeratedinRA6734shallcompriseit. Q: TheConstimakeseffectivethecreationoftheautonomousregionuponapproval"bymajority ofthevotescastbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose."Thequestionis:Doesitreferto amajority ofthetotalvotescast in theplebiscite inallthe constituent units, oramajority ineachofthe constituentunits,orboth? A: IftheframersoftheConsti.intendedtorequireapprovalofamajorityofallthevotescastinthe plebiscite,theywouldhavesoindicated.Thus,inArt.XVIII,Sec.27,itisprovidedthat"[t]hisConsti.shall takeeffectimmediatelyuponitsratificationbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteheldforthepurpose xxx."Comparingthisw/theprovisiononthecreationofautonomousregion,w/creads:
"The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituentunitsinaplebisciteheldforthepurposexxx(Art.X,Sec.18,par.2.)

itwillreadilybeseenthatthecreationoftheautonomousregionismadetodepend,notonthetotalmajority voteintheplebiscite,butonthewillofthemajorityineachoftheconstituentunitsandtheprovisounderscores this.xxxItisthusclearthatwhatisrequiredbytheConsti.isasimplemajorityofvotesapprovingtheOrganic Actinindividualconstituentunitsputtogether,aswellasintheindividualconstituentunits. [Barlongay:Whatisrequiredissimplemajorityandnotdoublemajority] SeparationofPowers.TheascertainmentbyCongressoftheareasthatsharecommonattributesisw/in theexclusiverealmofthelegislature'sdiscretionandanyreviewofthisascertainmentwouldhavetogointothe wisdomofthelaw. xxx Thepowertomergeadministrativeregionsisapowerwhichhastraditionallybeenlodgedw/thePres. tofacilitatetheexerciseofthepowerofgen.supervisionoverlocalgovts.Noconflictbet.thepowerofthePres. tomergeadministrativeregionsw/theConstitutionalprovisionrequiringplebisciteinthemergeroflocalgovt units.WhatisreferredtoinRA6734isthemergerofadmin.regions.RegionsItoXIIandtheNCR,are(mere) groupingsofcontiguousprovincesforadmin.purposes,w/cwasmadeaspartofthelawoftheland.Admin. regionsarenotterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisions.Whilethepowertomergeadmin.regionsisnotexpressly providedforintheConsti.,itisapowerw/chastraditionallybeenlodgedw/thePres.tofacilitatetheexerciseof thepowerofgen.supervisionoverloc.govts.xxxRAM.

Ordillov.COMELEC,192SCRA100(1990)

F:

On1/30/90,thepeopleoftheprovincesofBenguet,Mt.Prov.,Ifugao,andKalingaApayaoandtheCityofBaguio casttheirvotesinaplebisciteheldpursuanttoRA6766w/cwasanActProvidingforanOrganicActfortheCordillera AutonomousRegion.TheCOMELECresultsoftheplebisciteshowedthatthecreationoftheRegionwasapprovedbya majorityofthevotesinonlytheIfugaoProv.andwasoverwhelminglyrejectedintherestoftheprovincesandcityabove mentioned. Consequently, the COMELEC, issued a resolution stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approvedand/orratifiedbymajorityofthevotescastonlyintheprovinceofIfugao.xxx Petitionersfiledapetitionw/theCOMELECtodeclarethenonratificationoftheOrganicActfortheRegion. ThepetitionersmaintainthattherecanbenovalidCordilleraAutonomousRegioninonlyoneprov.astheConsti.andRA 6676requirethatthesaidRegionbecomposedofmorethanoneconstituentunit.

HELD:Thesoleprov.ofIfugaocannotvalidlyconstitutetheCordilleraAutonomousRegion.LookingatArt X,Sec.15,thekeywordsprovinces,cities,municipalities,andgeographicalareasconnotethat"region"isto bemadeupofmorethanoneconstituentunit.Theterm"region"usedinitsordinarysensemeans2ormore provinces. Thisissupportedbythefactthat13regionsintow/cthePhilsisdividedforadmin.purposesare groupingsofcontiguousprovinces.Ifugaoisaprov.initself.Tobecomepartofaregion,itmustjoinother provinces,cities,municipalities,andgeographicalareas.xxx TheentiretyofRA6766creatingtheCARisinfusedw/provisionsw/cruleagainstthesoleprovinceof IfugaoconstitutingtheRegion. Art.III,Secs.1&2ofthelawprovidethattheCARistobeadministeredbytheCordilleragovt consistingoftheRegionalGovtandlocalgovtunits. Fromthesesections,itcanbegleanedthatCongressneverintendedthatasingleprovincemayconstitute theautonomousregion.Otherwise,wewouldbefacedw/theabsurdsituationofhaving2setsofofficials,aset ofprovincialofficialsandanothersetofofficialsexercisingtheirexecutiveandlegislativepowersoverexactly thesamesmallarea. Art.V,Secs.1&4ofRA6766vestthelegislativepowerintheCordilleraAssemblywhosemembers shallbeelectedfromregionalassemblydistrictsapportionedamongprovincesandcitiescomposingoftheCAR. Ifwefollowresp'sposition,themembersofsuchCordilleraAssemblyshallthenbeelectedonlyfrom the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having 2 legislative bodies the Cordillera AssemblyandtheSangguniangPanlalawiganexercisingtheirlegislativepowersovertheprov.ofIfugao. xxx Art.XII,Sec.10ofthelawcreatesaRegionalPlanningandDevtBd.composedoftheCordilleraGov., alltheprovincialgovernorsandcitymayorsortheirrepresentatives,2membersoftheCordilleraAssembly,and membersfromthepvt.sector.TheBdhasacounterpartintheprovinciallevelcalledtheProvincialPlanning andDevt.Coordinator.TheBd.'sfunctionsarealmostsimilartothoseoftheProvincialCoordinator's. Art. XXI, Sec. 13 (B) (c) allotting the huge amount of P10M to the Regional Govt for its initial organizationalrequirementscannotbeconstruedasfundingonlyaloneandsmallprovince. OtherProvisionsw/careeitherviolatedorw/ccannotbecompliedw/. Sec.16ofArt.Vicallsfora Regional Chairman on Appointments w/ the Speaker as Chairman and 6 members coming from different

provincesandcitiesintheRegion. Underrespondent'sview,theComm.wouldhaveaChairmanandonly1 member.Itwouldneverhaveaquorom.Sec.3ofArtVIcallsforcabinetmembers,asfaraspracticable,to comefromvariousprovincesandcitiesoftheRegion.Sec.1ofArt.IIcreatesasystemoftribalcourtsforthe variousindigenousculturalcommunities oftheRegion. Sec.9ofArt.XVrequiresthedevtofacommon regionallanguagebaseduponthevariouslanguagesanddialectsintheregionw/cregionallanguageinturnis expectedtoenrichthenationallanguage.RAM.

b.Powersofautonomousregions Art.X,Sec.20.WithinitsterritorialjurisdictionandsubjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitution andnationallaws,theorganicactofautonomousregionsshallprovideforlegislativepowersover: (1)Administrativeorganizations; (2)Creationofsourcesofrevenues; (3)Ancestraldomainandnaturalresources; (4)Personal,family,andpropertyrelations; (5)Regionalurbanandruralplanningdevelopment; (6)Economic,social,andtourismdevelopment; (7)Educationalpolicies; (8)Preservationanddevelopmentoftheculturalheritage;and (9)Suchothermattersasmaybeauthorizedbylawforthepromotionofthegeneralwelfareof thepeopleoftheregion. Id.,Sec.21.Thepreservationofpeaceandorderwithintheregionshallbetheresponsibilityof thelocalpoliceagencieswhichshallbeorganized,maintained,supervised,andutilizedinaccordancewith applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.

c.GeneralsupervisionbythePresident Art. X, Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensurethatlawsarefaithfullyexecuted. LegalSuccession Benitov.COMELEC,235SCRA436 F:
Petitioner Benito and deceased Ogca were candidates for mayor in the mun. of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. COMELECDeputy(Makinug)forthatareafiledapetitionfordisqualificationagainstOgcaallegingthataton4/28/92, whileinsideabilliardhall,Ogcaaskedhimtoworkfortheformer'sreelection.However,whenMakinugrefused,Ogca struckhimontheheadw/abilliardcue.Subsequently,theRegionalElectionDirectorofCotabatoCityissuedaresolution

statingthattherewasaprimafaciecaseagainstOgcaandthelatterwasprobablyguiltyofthechargesinthepetitionfor disqualification.Thereafter,nothingmorewasheardofthepetition.Thereafter,theelectionswereheld,w/Ogcareceiving thehighestnumberofvotesforthemayoraltyposition.xxx[O]n5/20/92,Ogcawaskilledinanambush.Onthesame date,petitioner,probablynotawareofhisopponent'sdeathfiledamotiontosuspendtheprocl.ofOgcaaselectedmayorof Balabagan,contendingthattherewasstrongevidenceofguiltagainsthiminthedisqualificationcase. Themotionwas denied.xxx TheMunicipalBoardofCanvasserswhenaskedtoexcludefromtallying,countingandcanvassingallvotesfor andinthenameofthedeceasedmayoraltycandidateruledinfavoroftheprayer. xxx On6/30/92,theMun.Bd.of CanvassersproclaimedpetitionerBenitoasthedulyelectedmayorofthemunicipalityofBalabagan.

HELD:Theprocl.ofpetitionerBenitowasnotavalidprocl.Itappearsfromtherecordthatduringthe5/11/92 elections,thedeceasedOgcaobtainedatotalvoteof3,699asagainstpetitioner's2,644.Thereupon,itwasthe dutyoftheMun.Bd.ofCanvasserstoproclaimaswinnerthecandidatewhoobtainedthehighestnumberof votes. However,theMun.Bd.ofCanvassers,insteadofperformingwhatwasincumbentuponit,thatis,to proclaimOgcaaswinnerbutw/theinfo.thathedied,togivewaytolegalsuccessiontooffice,wentonto proclaimhereinpetitioner.Thiscannotbecountenanced. xxx Thefactthatthecandidatewhoobtainedthehighestnumberofvotesdies,orislaterdeclaredtobe disqualifiedornoteligiblefortheofficetow/chewaselecteddoesnotnecessarilyentitlethecandidatewho obtainedthe2ndhighestnumberofvotestobedeclaredthewinneroftheelectiveoffice. Fortoallowthe defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate w/o anyfault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracyandthepeople'srighttoelectofficialsoftheirchoice.RAM.

IV.ACCOUNTABILITYOFPUBLICOFFICERS

A.PublicOfficeisapublictrust Art.XI,Sec.1.PublicOfficeisapublictrust.PublicOfficersandemployeesmust,atalltimes, beaccountabletothepeople,servethemwithutmostresponsibility,integrity,loyaltyandefficiency,act withpatriotismandjustice,andleadmodestlives.

N.B.LocalGovernmentCodeof1991,Sec.40(f)andSec.60(g)[reelectivelocalofficialswhoapplyfor foreigncitizenshiporpermanentresidenceinforeigncountries.
Sec.40. Disqualifications. Thefollowingpersonsaredisqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocal position: xxx (f) Permanentresidentsinaforeigncountryorthosewhohaveacquiredtherighttoresideabroadand continuetoavailofthesamerightaftertheeffectivityofthisCodexxx

Sec.60. GroundsforDisciplinaryAction. Anelectivelocalofficialmaybedisciplined,suspended,or removedfromofficeonanyofthefollowinggrounds: xxx (g) Applicationfor,oracquisitionof,foreigncitizenshiporresidenceorthestatusofanimmigrantof anothercountryxxx

Art.IX,B,Sec.4.Allpublicofficersandemployeesshalltakeanoathoraffirmationtouphold anddefendthisConstitution.

SeeCodeofConductandEthicalStandardsforPublicOfficialsandEmployees(Rep.Act6713,effectiveMarch 25,1989)

B.DisclosureofAssets,LiabilitiesandNetWorth Art. XI, Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafterasmayberequiredbylaw,submitadeclarationunderoathofhisassets,liabilities,andnet worth. In the case of the President, VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armedforceswithgeneralorflagrank,thedeclarationshallbedisclosedtothepublicinthemanner providedbylaw.

C.BanonFinancialAccommodations Art.XI,Sec.16. Noloan,guaranty,orotherformoffinancialaccommodationforanybusiness purposemaybegranted,directlyorindirectly,byanygovernmentownedorcontrolledbankorfinancial institutiontothePresident,theVicePresident,theMembersoftheCabinet,theCongress,theSupreme Court,andtheConstitutionalCommissions,theOmbudsman,ortoanyfirmorentityinwhichtheyhave controllinginterest,duringtheirtenure.

D.AgenciesforInsuringPublicAccountability 1.CongressImpeachment Cruz,PhilippinePoliticalLaw:Impeachmenthasbeendefinedasamethodofnationalinquestintotheconduct ofpublicmen.Corwindescribesitas"themostformidableweaponinthearsenalofdemocracy.xxx[I]tisan

extraordinarymeansofremovalexercisedbythelegislatureoveraselectednumberofofficials,thepurpose beingtoensurethehighestcareintheirindictmentandconvictionandtheimpositionofspecialpenaltiesincase ofafindingofguilt,takingintoaccountthedegreeofnatureoftheoffensecommittedandthehighstatusofthe wrongdoers. Art.XI,Sec.2.ThePresident,theVicePresident,theMembersoftheSupremeCourt,the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftand corruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmaybe removedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.

Art.XI,Sec.3. (1) TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateall casesofimpeachment. (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of RepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbe includedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithin threesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the correspondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithinten sessiondaysfromreceiptthereof. (3)AvoteofatleastonethirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded. (4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastonethirdofall theMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenate shallforthwithproceed. (5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithin aperiodofoneyear. (6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensitting forthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesison trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwothirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate. (7) Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthanremovalfromofficeand disqualificationtoholdanyofficeundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,butthepartyconvictedshall neverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw.

Lecarozv.Sandiganbayan,128SCRA324(1988),supra. ThebroadpoweroftheNewConsti.veststheresp.court(Sandiganbayan)withjurisdictionover"public

officers and employees, including those in govtowned or controlled corporations." there are, exceptions, however,likeconstitutionalofficers,particularlythosedeclaredtoberemovablebyimpeachment. Art. XIII, Sec. 2 of the 1973 Consti (now Art. XI, Sec. 2.) proscribes removal from office of the constitutionalofficersmentionedtherein)byanyothermethod;otherwise,toallowapublicofficerwhomaybe removedsolelybyimpeachmenttobechargedcriminallywhileholdinghisofficewithanoffensethatcarries thepenaltyofremovalfromoffice,wouldbeviolativeoftheclearmandateofthefundamentallaw. xxx Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallbelimitedtoremovalfromofficeanddisqualificationtohold anyofficeofhonor,trust,orprofitundertheRepublicofthePhils.,butthepartyconvictedshallneverthelessbe liableandsubjecttoprosecution,trialandpunishment,inaccordancew/law.xxx[T]heeffectofimpeachment islimitedtothelossofpositionanddisqualificationtoholdanyofficeofhonor,trust,orprofitunderthe Republic. Itisequallymanifestthatthepartythusconvictedmaybeproceededagainst,triedandthereafter punishedinaccordancew/law. Theclearimplicationis,thepartyconvictedintheimpeachmentproceeding shallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trialandpunishmentaccordingtolaw;andthatifthe samedoesnotresultinaconvictionandtheofficialisnottherebyremoved,thefilingofacriminalaction"in accordancew/law"maynotprosper.RAM. 2.Sandiganbayan Art. XI, Sec. 4. The present antigraft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to functionandexerciseitsjurisdictionasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw. 3.OmbudsmanknownasTanodbayan Art.XI,Sec.5.ThereisherebycreatedtheindependentOfficeoftheOmbudsman,composedof theOmbudsmantobeknownasTanodbayan,oneoverallDeputyandatleastoneDeputyeachforLuzon, Visayas,andMindanao.AseparateDeputyforthemilitaryestablishmentmaylikewisebeappointed.

Id., Sec. 6. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor.Itshallcontinuetofunctionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedby law,exceptthoseconferredontheOfficeoftheOmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution.

Id.,Sec.8. TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbenaturalborncitizensofthePhilippines, andatthetimeoftheirappointment,atleastfortyyearsold,ofrecognizedprobityandindependence,and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediatelypreceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or engagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines. During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as providedforinSection2ofArticleIXAofthisConstitution.

Id.,Sec.9.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofat leastsixnomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil,andfromalistofthreenomineesforevery vacancythereafter.Suchappointmentsshallrequirenoconfirmation.Allvacanciesshallbefilledwithin threemonthsaftertheyoccur.

Id.,Sec.10.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallhavetherankofChairmanandMembers, respectively,oftheConstitutionalCommissions,andtheyshallreceivethesamesalary,whichshallnotbe decreasedduringtheirtermofoffice.

Id., Sec.11. TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies shallserveforatermofsevenyearswithout reappointment.Theyshallnotbequalifiedtorunforanyofficeintheelectionimmediatelysucceeding theircessationfromoffice. Id.,Sec.12.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies,asprotectorsofthepeople,shallactpromptlyon complaintsfiledinanyformormanneragainstpublicofficialsoremployeesofthegovernment,orany subdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations andshall,inappropriatecases,notifythecomplainantsoftheactiontakenandtheresultthereof.

Id.,Sec.13.TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallhavethefollowingpowers,functions,duties: (1) Investigateonitsownoroncomplaintanyactoromissionofanypublicofficial,employee, officeoragency,whensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improper,orinefficient (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government,oranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,aswellasofanygovernmentowned orcontrolledcorporationwithoriginalcharter;toperformandexpediteanyactordutyrequiredbylaw, ortostop,prevent,andcorrectanyabuseorimproprietyintheperformanceofduties. (3)Directtheofficerconcernedtotakeappropriateactionagainstapublicofficialoremployeeat fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliancetherewith. (4)Directtheofficerconcernedinanyappropriatecase,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybe providedbylaw,tofurnishitwithcopiesofdocumentsrelatingtocontractsortransactionsenteredinto byhisofficeinvolvingdisbursementoruseofpublicfundsorproperties,andreportanyirregularityto theCommissiononAuditforappropriateaction. (5)Requestanygovernmentagencyforassistanceandinformationnecessaryinthedischargeof itsresponsibilities,andtoexamine,ifnecessary,pertinentrecordsanddocuments. (6) Publicizematterscoveredbyitsinvestigationwhencircumstancessowarrantandwithdue prudence.

(7)Determinethecausesofinefficiency,redtape,mismanagement,fraudandcorruptioninthe Governmentandmakerecommendationsfortheireliminationandtheobservanceofhighstandardsof ethicsandefficiency. (8)Promulgateitsrulesofprocedureandexercisesuchotherpowersorperformsuchfunctionsor dutiesasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

Id., Sec.14. TheOffice ofthe Ombudsmanshallenjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyrelease.

4.OfficeofSpecialProsecutor

Id., Sec. 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor.Itshallcontinuetofunctionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedby law,exceptthoseconferredontheOfficeoftheOmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution.

Zaldivarv.Sandiganbayan,160SCRA843(1988)andResolution,May19,1988 F: Petitioner,governorofAntique,filedapetitionforcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamustorestrainthe Sandiganbayan&TanodbayanRaulGonzalesfromproceedingwiththeprosecution&hearingofcriminalcases againsthimonthegroundthatsaidcaseswerefiledbytheTanodbayanw/olegal&constitutionalauthority since under the 1987 Consti., it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. HELD: (1) Wefindthepetitionsimpressedw/merit. UnderArt.XI,Sec.13,par.1oftheConsti.,the Ombudsman(asdistinguishedw/theincumbentTB)ischargedw/thedutyto:
"Investigateonitsown,oroncomplaintbyanyperson,anyactoromissionofanypublicofficial,employee,office oragency,whensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improperorinefficient."

Ontheotherhand,Art.XI,Sec.7oftheConsti.providesthat
"TheexistingTanodbayanshallhereafterbeknownastheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor.Itshallcontinueto functionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthoseconferredontheOfficeofthe OmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution."

Now,then,inasmuchastheaforementioneddutyisgiventotheOmbudsman,theincumbentTB(now calledSp.Pros.)isclearlywithoutauthoritytoconductprel.investigationsandtodirectthefilingofcrim.cases, exceptuponordersoftheOmbudsman.ThisrighttodosowaslosteffectiveFeb.2,1987

ResolutionontheMotionforReconsideration,May19,1988 (1) Thepowerofinvestigationconferred ontheOmbudsman coversbothadministrativeand crim. offenses.Accordingly,theSpPros.cannotclaimthatheretainsthespecificpowerofprel.investigationwhile concedingthegeneralpowerofinvestigationtotheOmbudsman.Thegreaterpowerembracesthelesser. (2)Thefactthattheinformationsfiledbytheresp.fromFeb.2,1987,wereinvalidbec.theywerenot authorizedbytheOmbudsman,isnotajurisdictionaldefect.TheInformationscouldhavebeenchallengedina motiontoquashunderR117,ROConthegroundoflackofauthorityonthepartoftheofficerfilingthesame. Ifthisgroundwasnotinvoked,itisdeemedwaivedunderSec.8ofthesameRule.xxx Atanyrate,tosettlethisquestion,weherebyrulethatthedecisionofthisCourtinthiscaseshallbe givenprospectiveapplicationonlyfromApril27,1988.xxx To recapitulate, the Court holds that, in the interest of justice, its ruling in 4/27/88 shall apply prospectivelytocasesfiledinCourtpriortosaidresolutionandpendingtrialnortoconvictionsoracquittals pronouncedtherein.Theexceptioniswheretherehasbeena timelyobjectionandaspecificchallenge,asinthis case, where the Court ordered the nullification of the Info. filed for lack of authority on the part of resp. Gonzales.VV.

5.CivilServiceCommission(asaddedbyProf.Barlongay)

UPDATED1/16/96 RAM

V.THENATIONALECONOMYANDPATRIMONY A.Goal Art. XII, Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities,incomeandwealth;asustainedincreaseintheamountofgoodsandservicesproducedby thenationforthebenefitofthepeople;andanexpandingproductivityasthekeytoraisingthequalityof lifeforall,especiallytheunderprivileged. The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development andagrarian reform, throughindustriesthat makefull andefficient use of humanand naturalresources,andwhicharecompetitiveinbothdomesticandforeignmarkets.However,theState shallprotectFilipinoenterprisesagainstunfairforeigncompetitionandtradepractices. Inthepursuitofthesegoals,allsectorsoftheeconomyandallregionsofthecountryshallbe

givenoptimumopportunitytodevelop. Privateenterprises,includingcorporations,cooperatives,and similarcollectiveorganizations,shallbeencouragedtobroadenthebaseoftheirownership. IIBernas:ThreebasicdirectionsmaybegleanedfromSec.1:(1)itsetsthegoalofdynamicproductivityand a more equitable distribution of what is produced; (2) it seeks complementarity bet. industrialization and agriculturaldevt;(3)itisprotectiveofthingsFilipino.xxx Industrializationandfullemploymentbasedonsoundagriculturaldevelopmentandagrarianreform. What is envisioned by the provision is not necessarily agriculturallyrelated industrialization but rather industrializationthatistheresultofreleasinglockedupcapitalthroughagrarianreform. xxx Moreover,the policydoesnotmeanahardboundrulethatagriculturaldevtmusthavepriorityoverindustrialization.Whatis envisionedisaflexibleandrationalrelationshipbet.the2asdictatedbythecommongood.

Mirasolnotes: Thegoalsofthenationaleconomyare: (1)Amoreequitabledistributionofopportunities,income,andwealth. (2)Asustainedincreasedbytheamountofgoodsandservicesproducedbythenationforthebenefitof thepeople;and (3) An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

B.NaturalResources 1.CitizenshipRequirement

Art.XII,Sec.2. Alllandsofthepublicdomain,waters,minerals,coal,petroleum,andother mineraloils,allforcesofpotentialenergy,fisheries,forestsortimber,wildlife,floraandfauna,andother naturalresourcesareownedbytheState. Withtheexceptionofagriculturallands,allothernatural resourcesshallnotbealienated.Theexploration,development,andutilizationofnaturalresourcesshall beunderthefullcontrolandsupervisionoftheState.TheStatemaydirectlyundertakesuchactivities,or itmayenterintocoproduction,jointventure,orproductionsharingagreementswithFilipinocitizens,or corporationsorassociationsatleastsixty percentum ofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchcitizens. Such agreementsmaybeforaperiodnotexceedingtwentyfiveyears,renewablefornotmorethantwentyfive years,andundersuchtermsandconditionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw. Incasesofwaterrightsfor irrigation,watersupply,fisheries,orindustrialusesotherthanthedevelopmentofwaterpower,beneficial usemaybethemeasureandlimitofthegrant.

TheStateshallprotectthenation'smarinewealthinitsarchipelagicwaters,territorialsea,and exclusiveeconomiczone,andreserveitsuseandenjoymentexclusivelytoFilipinocitizens. TheCongressmay,bylaw,allowsmallscaleutilizationofnaturalresourcesbyFilipinocitizens,as wellascooperativefishfarming,withprioritytosubsistencefishermenandfishworkersinrivers,lakes, bays,andlagoons. The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,andothermineraloilsaccordingtothegeneraltermsandconditionsprovidedbylaw,based onrealcontributionstotheeconomicgrowthandgeneralwelfareofthecountry.Insuchagreements,the Stateshallpromotethedevelopmentanduseoflocalscientificandtechnicalresources. ThePresidentshallnotifytheCongressofeverycontractenteredintoinaccordancewiththis provision,withinthirtydaysfromitsexecution. II Bernas: If natural resources, except agricultural land, cannot be alienated, how can they be explored, developedorutilized? xxxAdistinctionmustbemadebet.alienablelandsandinalienablelands. Alienable landsmaybethesubjectoflease,andtherulesarefoundinSec.3.xxxInalienablelands,however,canonlybe developedandutilizeddirectlybytheStateorinconjunctionw/qualifiedindividualsorcorps.through"co production, joint venture, or productionsharing" and thus "full control and supervision of the State" is preserved. Howsoevernaturalresourcesmightbeexploitedordeveloped,therighttodosoisreservedfor"Filipino citizens,orcorps.,orassociationsatleastsixtypercentumofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchcitizens

Id.,Sec.7.Saveincasesofhereditarysuccession,noprivatelandsshallbetransferredorconveyed excepttoindividuals,corporations,orassociationsqualifiedtoacquireorholdlandsofthepublicdomain.

Takingintoaccounttherequirementsofconservation,ecology,anddevelopment, andsubjecttothe requirementsofagrarianreform,theCongressshalldeterminebylaw,thesizeoflandsofthepublicdomain whichmaybeacquired,developed,held,orleasedandtheconditionstherefor. Exploration,Development,andUtilization a.All(a)landsofthepublicdomain,(b)waters,(c)mineraloils,(d)allforcesofpotentialenergy,(e) fisheries,(f)forestortimber,(g)wildlife,(h)floraandfauna,and(i)othernaturalresourcesareownedbythe State.(ThisistheRegalianDoctrine.) b.Allnaturalresources,withtheexceptionofagriculturallands,shallnotbealienated. c.Theexploration,development,andutilizationornaturalresourcesshallbeunderthefullcontroland supervisionoftheState(astheownerthereof.)

d.Insoexploring,developingorutilizingitsnaturalresources,theStatehastwooptions: One,itmayundertakesuchactivitiesdirectly,or Two,itmayenterinto(a)coproduction,(b)jointventure,or(c)productionsharingagreementwith Filipinocitizens,orcorporationsorassociationswithatleast60%Filipinocapital. In thecase ofthe second option, anysuch agreements aresubject tothe following limitations and qualifications:

(A)AstoTermsandConditions (i) Suchagreements(fortheexploration,developmentorutilizationofnaturalresourcesexcluding waterrightsotherthanthedevelopmentofwaterpower)maybeforaperiodnotmorethan25years,andunder suchtermsandconditionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw. (ii)Butincasesofwaterrightsfor(a)irrigation,(b)watersupply,(c)fisheries,or(d)industrialuses otherthanthedevelopmentofwaterpower.Beneficialusemaybethemeasureandlimitofthegrant. (B)Astowhomaygrantwhatprivilegedtowhom (i) TheStateshallprotectthenation's(marinewealthinitsarchipelagicwaters,territorialsea,and exclusive economic zone, and shall reserve its use and enjoyment "exclusively" to Filipino citizens. (Corporations,eventhoughownedbyFilipinosarenotincluded.) WhoState WhatMarineWealth WhomFilipinoCitizensonly (ii)TheCongressmay,bylaw,allowsmallscaleutilizationofnaturalresourcesbyFilipinocitizens.It mayalsoallowcooperativefishfarmingwithprioritytosubsistencefishermenandfishworkersinrivers,lakes, bays,andlagoons. WhoCongress Whatsmallscaleutilizationofthenaturalresources WhomFilipinoCitizensonly (iii) The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either "technicalorfinancialassistance"for"largescale"exploration,developmentandutilizationof(a)minerals,(b)

petroleum,(c)othermineraloils,accordingtothegeneraltermsandconditionsprovidedbylaw. Suchagreementsshall(i)bebasedon"real"contributionstoeconomicgrowthandthegeneralwelfare ofthecountry,and(ii)promotethedevelopmentanduseoflocalscientificandtechnicalresources. ThePresidentshallnotifytheCongressofeverycontractenteredintoinaccordancewiththisprovision within30daysfromitsexecution. WhoPresident Whatminerals,petroleum,othermineraloils; Whomforeignownedcorporations Thisisreally"servicecontracts"overagain."Technically",thisprovision"falls"underthegeneralrule thattheStatemayenterintocoproduction,jointventureorproductionsharingagreementsonlywhichFilipino citizensor60%Filipinocorporations,sincewhatininvolvedhereisonly"technicalorfinancialassistance"for the exploration, development and utilization of these specific natural resources, and not the exploration, development,andutilizationthemselves.Inreality,however,itisanexceptiontothegeneralrule. Notmorethan12hectaresthereofby(i)purchase,(ii)homesteador(iii)grant,(Art.XII,Sec.3,parI.) ThemannerofacquiringalienablelandsofthepublicdomainisgovernedbyCom.ActNo.141(Public LandAct),whichprescribes5waysofacquiringsuchlands. Homestead Thisisavailabletocitizens,atleast18yearsofage(orlessifaheadofthefamily)residentofthe Philippines,andnottheownerof24(now12)hectaresinthePhilippines. StepsforApplication: One,theapplicationisfiledwiththeBureauofLands,uponpaymentofanominalfilingfee. Two,theBureauofLandsconductsaninvestigationtofindoutifthelandisalienable,ifitisfreefrom adverseclaimorbetterrightsofprioroccupants,ifthereispossessioninfact,andiftheapplicanthasthe qualificationsoflaw.Areportisthenmade,whichisthebasisforan"orderofapproval'. Three,uponapproval,theapplicantismadepracticallytheownershortoftitle.Itisconditionedonthe following;(a)Thatheenterthelandwithin6monthsfromthedateofapproval,ifhehasnotyetdoneso;(b) Thatwithin5years,hemustcultivateatleast20%ofthelandandmustestablishhisresidenceonthelandsitself orinthemunicipalitywhereitislocatedand(c)Thatheprovescompliancewiththecultivationandresidence requirementsaswellashisnonviolationoftheprovisionsofthelaw,throughaswornstatementknownasthe "finalproofpaper".ThisissubmittedtotheBureauwhichthenconductsanocularinspectionandthensubmits afinalreport.

Fourth,afavorablereportgivesrisetoan"orderofissuanceofapatent".Itisonlyatthispointwhenhis titleisvested,evenifthepapertitleisnotyetinhisname,ortheapplicantisstillsingleatthispoint,oris alreadyawidower,thepropertyiscapital.Ifheismarriedalready,itisconjugalproperty

PublicLands Taking into account the requirements or conservation, ecology and development are subject to the requirementsofagrarianreform,theCongressshalldetermine,bylaw,thesizeoflandsofthepublicdomain whichmaybeacquired,developed,heldorleased,andtheconditionstherefore.(Art.XII,Sec.3,par2)

MarineWealth TheStateshallprotectthenation'smarinewealthinitsarchipelagicwaters,territorialsea,andexecutive economiczone.(Art.XII,Sec.2.par2.)

2.Classification,Size,andConditionsforGrantofPublicLands Art.XII,Sec.3. Landsofthepublicdomainareclassifiedintoagricultural,forestortimber, minerallands,andnationalparks.Agriculturallandsofthepublicdomainmaybefurtherclassifiedby lawaccordingtotheusestowhichtheymaybedevoted.Alienablelandsofthepublicdomainshallbe limitedtoagriculturallands. Privatecorporationsorassociationsmaynotholdsuchalienablelandsof thepublicdomainexceptbylease,foraperiodnotexceedingtwentyfiveyears,renewablefornotmore thantwentyfiveyears,andnottoexceedonethousandhectaresinarea.CitizensofthePhilippinesmay leasenotmorethanfivehundredhectares,oracquirenotmorethantwelvehectaresthereofbypurchase, homestead,orgrant. Takingintoaccounttherequirementsofconservation,ecology,anddevelopment,andsubjectto therequirementsofagrarianreform,theCongressshalldetermine,bylaw,thesizeoflandsofthepublic domainwhichmaybeacquired,developed,held,orleasedandtheconditionsthereof.

IIBernas: ThefirstruleestablishedinSec.3isthatonlyagriculturallandsofthepublicdomainmaybe alienated. Thesecondruleisthatonlyqualifiedindividualsmayacquirealienablelandsofthepublicdomain. The third rule establishes the size of the land w/c may be acquired by individuals or leased by individualsorcorps. ThefourthrulelimitsthediscretionofCongresstoopenpubliclandsforleaseoracquisition. Disqualification of private corporations. One purpose of this constitutional prohibition is to equitably diffuselandownershiportoencourageownercultivatorshipandeconomicfamilysizefarmsandtherebyprevent

therecurrenceofhugelandholdingsbycorps.orprivatepersons.Itwasalsoaimedagainstundueexploitation ofourpubliclandsandnaturalresourcesbylargecorps. xxx Nocitizenshiplimitation?TheimpressionmightbegiventhatSec.3opensutilizationofalienablelandsto foreignindividualsorforeigncorps.bec.Sec.3makesnomentionofcitizenshiprequirement. Butalienable landsarepartofthenaturalresourcesandthegen.ruleontheutilizationofallnaturalresourcescanbefoundin Sec.2. xxx Thus,theutilizationofalienablelandsisopenonlytothosequalifiedunderSec.2andinthe mannerprescribedbySec.2. MirasolNotes: PublicLands a.Classification Landsofthepublicdomainareclassifiedintoagricultural,forestortimber,minerallands,andnational parks.Agriculturallandsofthepublicdomainmaybefurtherclassifiedbylawaccordingtowhichtheymaybe devoted. b.Alienability Withtheexceptionofagriculturallands,allothernaturalresourcesareownedbytheState.(Art.XII, Sec.2) Alienablelandsofthepublicdomainshallbelimitedtoagriculturallands.(Art.XII,Sec.3.) Ifthepubliclandisnonalienablewhichisthecaseifitisforestortimber,mineralland,ornational parks,thenitcannotbeheldbyanyone.Thegeneralruleonnaturalresourcesappliesandthatis,thattheState canonlyenterintocoproduction,jointventuresorproductionsharingagreementswithFilipinocitizensor60% Filipinoownedcorporationsfortheexploitation,developmentandutilizationoftheselands. Butifthepubliclandisalienable,thatis,agricultural,thenitmaybeheldbyaprivateperson,naturalor juridical,inaccordancewiththefollowingrules. c.WhoMayHoldAlienableLandsofthePublicDomain (i)Corporations:Lease Privatecorporationorassociationsmaynotholdalienablelandsofthepublicdomainexceptbylease. Limitations:

i.Period:Notmorethan25years,renewablefornotmorethan25years. ii.Size:Nottoexceed1,000hectaresinarea. Asworded,itwouldseemthatevenforeigncorporationsmaybecomethelesseesofalienablelandsof thepublicdomain,because(Art.XII,Sec.3)doesnotspecifythe60%Filipinoownedrequirement. Itis unlike the case for the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources other than public agricultural lands, in which the Constitution specifies the ownership requirement. Whether this is a mere oversightinavalidquestion,consideringthenationalistsintentoftheConstitution,ontheonehand,andthe presenceofantinationalistfarmers,ontheotherhand. (ii)FilipinoCitizens:AcquireorLease CitizensofthePhilippinesmay(a)leasenomorethan500hectares,(subjecttothesameconditionsas inFilipinocorporations)or(b)notmorethan12hectaresthereofbypurchase,homesteadorgrant.

SaleorPurchase ThisisavailabletoFilipinocitizens,oflegalage,andnottheownerofmorethan12hectares. The land is sold at public auction to the highest bidder, even if there are applications for sale or purchase.Theapplicant,however,isgranted"preferentialrights"topurchasetheland,inthefollowingmanner. Asealedbiddingisfirstconducted.Ifheisthehighestbidder,thelandisawardedtohim.Ifthereare2 ormorehighestbids,andthebidoftheapplicantisoneofthen,heispreferred.Iftheapplicant'sbidisnot amongthehighest,thebiddingwasconvertedintoanopenbidding. Intheopenbidding,ifthehighestbidisnotthatoftheapplicant,heisaskedneverthelessifhewantsto watchthehighestbid.Ifhedoes,heisthenrequiredtopay10%oftheprice. Theawardisconditionedonhisabilitytocultivate20%ofthelandwithin5years,andhispaymentof the10%deposit,thebalanceofwhichispayablein10equalannualinstallments.Noresidenceisrequired. Uponcompliancewiththeseconditions,heisthenentitledtoapatent.

AdministrativeLegalizationofImperfectTitle Theapplicant"must(a)beanaturalborncitizen,(b)byhimselfofhispredecessorininteresthave occupiedthelandandcultivateditsinceJuly4,1945(assetbytheParedesLawof1955)and(c)notbethe ownerofmorethan24(now12)hectares.Thereisnoagerequirement. Mostunregisteredlandsbelongtothiscategory:publiclandsbutwithimperfecttitledusuallyprovenby

taxdeclaration.Sincetheseareneitherpublicnorprivate,theoccupantsaregiventhechancetoperfecttheir titleadministratively,afterwhichhecanapplytohavehistitleregistered.

JudicialConfirmationofImperfectorIncompleteTitle Theapplicantmust(a)beaFilipinocitizen,(b)havebeeninopen,continuos,exclusive,andnotorious possessionofpublicagriculturalland,underabonafideclaimoftitlesinceJune12,1945(originallyJuly26, 1894,Further,underR.A.1942,anapplicantwasentitledifhecouldprove30yearsofsuchoccupationpriorto filing.ButthiswascutofftoJune12,1945byP.D.1073) Thelaworiginallyallowedatotalgrantof144hectares,asagainstadministrativelegalizationwhich granted24hectares.The1987Constitutionisdeemedtohavelimitedthisto12hectares. Query:Maycorporationsacquirelandsofthepublicdomain? Answer:Therulehasalwaysbeeninthenegative.However,therealissueiswhethercorporationscanbethe transfereesoflandstowhichatransferorisentitledtoeitheranadministrativelegalizationofimperfecttitleora judicialconfirmationofimperfectorincompletetitle,priortotheactualgrantthereofinaccordancewiththe proceedingsrequiredbythePublicLandAct?Inotherwords,canthecorporationitselfmakeapplicationforthe grantonthegroundthatwhenitacquiredthelandfromitspossessor,suchpossessortransferorifheappliedfor agrantwouldhavequalifiedwithoutdoubt? Underthepresentstateofjurisprudencein Director of Lands V. IAC and Acme Plywood and Veneer Co...(Dec.1986),acaseinvolvingtheapplicationforconfirmationoftitlebyAcmewhichpossessedtheland since1961,afteracquiringitfromtheDumagatsofIsabelawhointurnpossesseditsincetimeimmemorial,the answerisintheaffirmative. AccordingtotheSC,althoughacorporationcanonlyholdalienablepubliclandsbylease,itcanacquire fromprivateindividualswhoarecitizensandhadbeeninopen,continuos,exclusiveandnotoriouspossession ofalienable(oragricultural)publiclands,intheconceptofanownerforatleast30years.Whenitdoes,itdoes notviolatetheConstitutionprovisionsincewhatitisacquiringisreallyalreadyaprivateland. For an individual who has satisfied the requirements under sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is conclusivelypresumedtohaveperformedalltheactsneededforatitle,andisthusentitledtotheissuanceof one.Thatindividualacquiresavestedrighttothepublicland,andso,byoperationoflaw,thelandisdeemed isolatedfrompublicdomainandeffectivelybecomesprivateland.Thusthecorporationcanfilethetitleforthe actualissuanceoftitleisbutamereformalitytotheperfectionofarightalreadypreviouslyacquired,accrued, andvested,uponthecompletionofpossessionfor30years.Whenacorporationappliesforthetitle,itisnot acquiringpubliclandsbutmerelyformalizingitsacquisitionofaprivateland. Thisoverrulesthecaseof Meralco V. Castro Bartolome,114SCRA799(1982),acaseinvolving2 residentiallotsof65sq.metersinTanay,whichMeralcoboughtin1976fromonewho,byhimselfandhis predecesssorsininterest,possessedthelandinsince1941.

Inthiscase,theSCruledthatiftheindividualinpossessionofthelandneglectedtoapplytothecourt forconfirmationofimperfecttitle,andinthemeantimesoldthislandtoacorporation,thecorporationcannot laterbringanactiontoconfirmtheimperfecttitle,becausethelandhasnotceasedtothepublic,andunderthe lawaswellastheConstitution,corporationsmaynotacquirealienablepubliclands. ThisalsooverrulesRepublicV.Villanueva,114SCRA675(1982),acaseinvolvingacorporationsole (INK)whichappliedforjudicialconfirmationoftitleforalanditacquiredfromoneinpossessionfor30years.

Meralcov.CastroBartolome,114SCRA799(1982) CorporationsMayLeaseButNotAcquirePublicLands F:
TheMeralco,adomesticcorp.,appliedfortheconfirmationofitstitleto2residentiallotsw/atotallandareaof 165sqm.locatedinTanay,Rizal,butitsapplicationwasdismissedonthegroundthatundertheConsti.(nowArt.XII, sec.3),nopvt.corp.orasso.mayholdlandsofthepublicdomainexceptbyleasenottoexceed1,000hectares.Thelots wereformerlypossessedbyO.Ramosin1941.TheyweresoldtoRafaelPiguingin'47andsoldbythelattertoMeralcoin '76.Meralco'sapplic.wasfiledpursuanttosec.48(b)ofthePublicLandLaww/cprovidesthatFilipinocitizens,who"by themselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeenincontinuous,exclusive,andnotoriouspossession,and occupationofagriculturallandsofthepublicdomain,underabonafideclaimofownershipforatleast30yrs.immediately precedingthefilingoftheapplicationforconfirmationoftitleexceptwhenpreventedbywarorforcemajeur.Theseshall beconclusivelypresumedtohaveperformedalltheconditionsessentialtoaGovtgrantandshallbeentitledtoacert.of titleundertheprovisionsofthischapter."

HELD:(1)Asbet.theStateandMeralco,thelandisstillpublicland.Itwouldceasetobepubliclandonly upontheissuanceofthecert.oftitleunderSec.48(b)ofthePublicLandLaw.SinceMeralcoisajuridical person,itisdisqualifiedtoapplyforitsregistration.TherulinginSusiv.Razon,48Phil424,totheeffectthat anopen,continuousandadversepossessionofthelandfromtimeimmemorialconfersontheindividualandhis precedessorininteresteffectivetitledoesnotapplyheresinceMeralcoanditspredecessorsininteresthavenot beeninpossessionofthelandsincetimeimmemorial. (2)TheargumentthatifMeralco'spredecessorininterestcanapplyunderSec.48(b),socanthecorp dothesameinrepresentation,isuntenablebec.Meralco'spredecessorsininterestdidnotacquireavestedright astheydidnotfileanapplic.,w/cisaconditionprecedent.VV. Republicv.Villanueva,114SCRA875(1982) ReligiousCorporationsAreDisqualifiedfromAcquiringPublicLands F:
On9/13/77,theIglesianiKristo(INK)appliedforregistrationof2lots,invokingtheprovisionsofthePublic LandLaw: Sec.48.ThefollowingdescribedcitizensofthePhils.,occupyingthelandsofthepublicdomainorclaimingto ownanysuchlandsoraninteresttherein,butwhosetitleshavenotbeenperfectedorcompleted,mayapplytotheCFIof theprovincewherethelandislocatedforconfirmationoftheirclaimsandtheissuanceofacert.oftitlethereforunderthe

LRA,towit... "(b)Thosewhobythemselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeenincontinuous,exclusive,and notoriouspossession,andoccupationofagriculturallandsofthepublicdomain,undera bonafideclaimofownershipfor atleast30yrs.immediatelyprecedingthefilingoftheapplicationforconfirmationoftitleexceptwhenpreventedbywaror forcemajeur.TheseshallbeconclusivelypresumedtohaveperformedalltheconditionsessentialtoaGovtgrantandshall beentitledtoacert.oftitleundertheprovisionsofthischapter." FromthedecisionoftheCFIorderingregistrationofthe2lots,thegovtappealed.

HELD:TheINK,asacorp.soleorajuridicalperson,isdisqualifiedtoacquireorholdalienablelandsofthe publicdomain,likethelotsinquestion,bec.oftheconsti.prohibitionmentionedandbec.thesaidchurchisnot entitledtoavailitselfofthebenefitsofSec.48(b)w/cappliesonlytoFilipinocitizensofnaturalpersons.A corp.solehasnonationality. Thecontentionthatthe2lotsarepvt.lands,followingtherulelaiddowninSusiv.Razonisnotcorrect. What was considered pvt. lands there was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial.Thelotssoughttoberegisteredinthiscasedonotfallw/inthatcategory.Theyarestillpublic lands. "AlllandsthatwerenotacquiredfromtheGovt,eitherbypurchaseorbygrant,belongtothepublic domain. Anexceptiontotherulewouldbeanylandthatshouldhavebeeninthepossession ofthesame occupant and of his predecessorsininterest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumptionthatthelandhadneverbeenpartofthepublicdomainorthatithadbeenapvt.prop.evenbef.the Spanishconquest.VV.

DirectorofLandsv.IAC,146SCRA509(1986) PublicLandsPossessedExclusivelyBecomesPrivateByMereLapseofatLeast30Years. F:
In1962,AcmePlywood&VeneerCo.,acquiredfrommembersoftheDumagattribeaparceloflandw/anareaof 481,390sq.m.,inMaconacon,Isabela.On7/17/81Acmeappliedfortheconfirmationofitsimperfecttitletotheland,on thebasisofitspossessionfrom1962andthatoftheDumagatsandthelatter'sancestors,w/cwasfromtimeimmemorial. TheCFIorderedtheregistrationofthelandinfavorofAcme.ItsdecisionwasaffirmedbytheIAC.However,theDirector ofLandsappealedtotheSConthegroundthatundertheConsti.(nowArt.XII,Sec.3of)Acmecouldnotownlandsof thepublicdomain.

HELD:TheCourtxxxisoftheview,andsoholds,thatthemajorityrulinginMeralcomustbereconsidered andnolongerdeemedtobebindingprecedent. Thecorrectrule,asenunciatedinthelineofcasesalready referredto,isthatalienablelandheldbyapossessor,personallyorthroughhispredecessorininterestopenly, continuouslyandexclusivelyfortheprescribedstatutoryperiod(30yrs.underthePublicLandAct,asamended) isconvertedtopvt.prop.bythemerelapseorcompletionofsaidperiod, ipsojure. Thelandsubjectofthis appealwasalreadyprivatepropertyatthetimeitwasacquiredfromtheInfielsbyAcme. Acmeacquireda registrabletitle,therebeingatthetimenoprohibitionagainstsaidcorp'sholdingorowningpvt.land.VV.

Republicv.CourtofAppeals,155SCRA344(1987)

F:

Initsapplicationforregistrationbef.thetrialcourt,resp.CirculoBantayanoFoundation(CBF)allegedthatitis theownerinfeesimpleorthroughapossessoryinfo.titleofaparceloflandincludingthebuildingsandimprovements thereonsituatedatPoblacion,Bantayan,Cebuthroughpurchaseon12/5/74fromtheheirs(representedbyAnunciacion Escario)ofthelatePedroEscario,Sr.,whointurninheritedsaidlandfromhisfatherMargarito;thatthesaidlandis assessed for taxation purposes of P7,850 for 1978; that the same is occupied and possessed openly, continuously, notoriouslyandpeacefullyintheconceptofownersformorethan40yrs.byapplicantanditspredecessorsininterest. Petitioneropposedtheapplicationallegingthatpvt.resp.didnothavetitleinfeesimpleorimperfecttitletothe landanditwasdisqualifiedunderthe1973Consti.,beingacorp.,toownlandsofthepublicdomain.xxxThetrialcourt ruledinfavorofCBF.TheCAaffirmedthetrialcourt'sdecision.Hence,thispetitionforreview.

ISSUE:W/nprivateresp.isqualifiedunderthe1973orthe1987Consti.toacquireandsubsequentlyregisterin itsnamethedisputedlot. HELD:Itistruethatunderboththe1973and1987Consti,apvt.corp.(evenifadomesticone)cannotacquire (andthereforecannotregister)landsofthepublicdomain,butinthepresentcase,thelandinvolved,atthetime it was acquired by the corp. in 1974, was no longer part of the public domain; long years of exclusive, continuous,andadversepossessionofthesamebyitspredecessorsininteresthadgivenownershipthereof ipso jure tosaidpredecessors,enablingthelattertoconveytitletosaidcorp. True,theCorp.'sacquisitionwasin 1974,orafterthe1973Constiwasalreadyineffect.Butthenasofthattime,thelandwasnolongerpublicland. Itwasprivateland.RAM.

3.Conservationofforestlandsandnationalparks Art.XII,Sec.4. TheCongressshall,assoonaspossibledeterminebylawthespecificlimitsof forestlandsandnationalparks,markingclearlytheirboundariesontheground.Thereafter,suchforest landsandnationalparksshallbeconservedandmaynotbeincreasednordecreaseexceptbylaw.The Congressshallprovideforsuchperiodasitmaydetermine,measurestoprohibitlogginginendangered forestsandwatershedareas.

4.Protectionofancestrallandsofindigenousculturalcommunities

Art.XII,Sec.5.TheState,subjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationaldevelopment policiesandprograms,shallprotecttherightsofindigenousculturalcommunitiestotheirancestrallands toensuretheireconomic,social,andculturalwellbeing. TheCongressmayprovidefortheapplicabilityofcustomarylawsgoverningpropertytightsor relationsindeterminingtheownershipandextentofancestraldomain. IIBernas: TheancestrallandsreferredtoinSec.5includeboththoseoutsideantthoseinsideautonomous regions.xxx Thephrase"ancestraldomain"isabroaderconceptthan"ancestrallands."Theformerincludeslandnot yetoccupied,suchasdeepforests,butw/cgenerallyisregardedasbelongingtoaculturalregion."Ancestral

lands"arethosew/chavebeensubjectedtooccupation.

C.PrivateLands 1.Citizenshiprequirement Whomayacquireprivatelandsbytransferorconveyance? Art.XII,Sec.7. Saveincasesofhereditarysuccession,noprivatelandsshallbetransferredor conveyedexcepttoindividuals, corporations,or associations qualified toacquireor holdlandsofthe publicdomain.

IIBernas: MayaFilipinoprivatecorp.acquireprivateland? Theanswermustbethatpvt.corps.canstill acquireprivatelandsinceSec.7makescapacitytoacquireprivatelanddependentoncapacityto"acquire or holdlandsofthepublicdomain."Theprovisionusesthedisjunctive"or."Eithercapacityto acquirelandsof thepublicdomainorcapacityotherwisetoholdsuchlandconferscapacitytoacquireprivateland. MirasolNotes: Alienablelandsofthepublicdomainshallbelimitedtoagriculturallands. Privatecorporationsor associationsmaynotholdsuchalienablelandsofthepublicdomainexceptbylease...CitizensofthePhilippines maylease...oracquire...(Art.XII,Sec.3,par1.) Notwithstandingtheprovisionsofsection7,anaturalborncitizenofthePhilippineswhohaslosthis Philippinescitizenship,maybeatransfereeofprivatelands,subjecttolimitationsprovidedbylaw.(Art.XII, Sec.8.) As a general rule, the acquisition of private lands is limited to individuals or corporations (and associationswhoarequalifiedtoacquireorholdslandofthepublicdomain).Theseare: a. CitizensofthePhilippinesbecausetheyarequalifiedtobothacquireandleases(hold)alienable landsundersec.3. b."PrivateCorporations"becausetheyarequalifiedtoholdalienablepubliclandsundersec.3byway oflease. Theissueiswhethertheterm"privatecorporation"islimitedto60%Filipinoownedcorporation, whichshouldbetheintentoftheConstitution,asinthecaseofothernaturalresources.Ifnot,thenevenforeign corporationscanpurchaseprivatelands,notonlyleasealienablepubliclands. Allothers,includingaliens,cannotbethetransfereeorconveyeeorprivatelandsexcept: a.Aliensincasesofhereditarysuccession(Art.XII,Sec.7.)Thisislimitedtocompulsoryandlegal

successionanddoesnotincludetestamentarysuccession,asruledinRamirezv.Ramirez. b.AnaturalborncitizenwholosthisPhilippinecitizenship.(Art.XII,Sec.8.)Thelawprovidesthat theymayownnotmorethan2lotsof1000sq.m.ifurbanor2000sq.m.ifrural. Statusofcontractofsaleofprivatelandtothosewhoarenotqualifiedtoholdthem. TherulingsoftheSContheissuecanbesummarizedthus:Althoughthesaleofprivatelandstoaliens notallowedtoacquirethemisvoid,thevendororhissuccessorsininterestcannolongerseekrecoveryifinthe meantimethelandhasfallenintothehandsofonewhoisnotdisqualifiedtoacquirethem.

LandSoldtoanAlienCannotbeRecoveredIfintheMeantimeHehadSoldIttoAFilipinoorHeHasBecomea Citizen. Godinesv.PakLuen,120SCRA223(1983) F:

JoseGodinessoldaparceloflandinJolotoFongPakLuen,aChinesecitizen.On1/11/63,PakLueninturnsold thelandtoTrinidadS.Navato,aFilipino.On9/30/66,theheirsofGodinesbroughtsuittorecoverthelandontheground thatthesaletoPakLuenwasnullandvoid. TheCFIdismissedthecaseonthegroundthattheactionhasprescribed. Hence,thisappeal.

HELD: The Krivenko ruling that "under the Consti aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands includingresidentiallands"isadeclarationofanimperativeconstitutionalpolicy. Consequently,prescription mayneverbeinvokedtodefendthatw/ctheConsti.prohibits.Butneithercanthevendororhisheirsrelyonan argumentbasedonimprescriptibilitybec.thelandisnowinthehandsofaFilipinocitizen.Ifthebanonaliens fromacquiringnotonlyagriculturalbutalsourbanlandsistopreservethenation'slandsforfuturegenerations ofFilipino,thataimorpurposewouldnotbethwartedifinthemeantimethelandissoldtoFilipinocitizens. xxx.VV.

Yapv.Grajeda,121SCRA244(1983) F:
OnApril12,1939,MaximoKicoexecutedadeedofabsoluteSaleinfavorofpet.,YapwhowastheaChinese NationaloveraresidentiallotinAlbay.Afternearly15yearsfollowingthesale,YapwasadmittedasaFilipinoCitizen. OnDec1,1967,pet.cededthemajorportionofthelottohissonwhowasalsoaFilipinocitizen.Resp.vendorsalmost30 yearsafterthesalefiledanactiontorecoverthesaidproperty.Thetrialcountorderedreconveyancedeclaringthesaleas null&voidasbeingviolativeofSec.5Art.XIII1935Consti.beinganabsolute&unqualifiedprohibitionofAliens acquiringpriv.agrilands.

ISSUE:WONtheconveyancewasvalidatedoritsvoidnaturealteredbythesubsequentnaturalizationofthe vendor HELD:YES.AsheldinSarosaVda.deBusabiav.Areneo(113SCRA547),themandatoryprovisionofthe

`35Consti.isanexpressionofpublicpolicytoconservelandsontheFilipinosxxx.Sincethelitigatedprop.is nowinthebandsofanaturalizedFil.,heisnolongeradisqualifiedvendors. Asanaturalizedcitizen,heis constitutionallyqualifiedtoownthesubjectproperty.Therewouldnolongerbeanypublicpolicytobeserved inallowingrecoveryofpropinthebandofaqualifiedperson. Further,asheldinVasquezv.LiSengGrap(96Phil.447),"xxxifthebanonaliensfromacquiringnot onlyagriculturalbutalsourbanlandsxxxistopreservethenation'slandforfuturegenerationsofFilipinos,that aimorpurposewouldnotbewastedbutachievedbymakinglawfultheacquisitionofrealestatebyalienswho becameFilipinocitizensbynaturalization."Adapted.

Tejidov.Zamacoma,138SCRA78(1985) F:
Theappellantsbroughtanactionfortherecoveryof18parcelsoflandinLaCarlota,NegrosOcc.,claimingthat theconveyanceofthelandsbytheirpredecessorsininterestwaybackink1926wasvoidbec.thepersontowhomthey wereconveyed,thelatePedroUriarte,wasaSpanishcitizens.However,thetrialcourtdismissedthecaseontheground thattheprohibitionin1935Consti.againstaliensholdingpublicorpvt.landsinthePhils.tookeffectonlyon11/15/35. Hence,thisappeal.

HELD:Theappealhasnomerit.Bef.theeffectivityofthe1935Consti.,therewasnobanonaliensowning privatelandsinthePhils.TheprohibitioninAct2874againstaliensappliedonlytopublicagriculturallandsor landsofthepublicdomain.Art.III,Sec.5ofthe1935Consti.,w/cineffectprohibitedthetransferofpvt.lands to aliens, cannot be retroactively applied to contracts in this case w/c was entered into bef. its effectivity, otherwise,theappelleeswouldbedeprivedofpropertyw/odueprocessoflaw.Moreover,sincethelandsare nowinthehandsofFilipinocitizens,thereisnopublicpolicytobeservedbyallowingtheappellantstorecover thelands.VV.

Mossv.DirectorofLands,80SCRA269(1977) RightsAcquiredbyAmericanCitizensundertheOriginalOrdinancetotheConstitutionDoNotLapse. F:
EugeneMoss&AlberCassidy,AmericannationalspurchasedatenhectareislandonJan.20,1945fromFilipino vendors.InanactiontoquiettitlebyMossvs.Cassidy,MosswasadjudgedsoleownerinadecisiondatedMarch27,1962. Hesubsequentlydeclaredthelandfortaxationpurpose&paidrealtytaxesthereon. OnApril3,1965Mossfiledon applicationfortheregistrationofsaidlandw/cwasdeniedbytheTCT.holdingthatMoss,beinganAmericancitizen,was disqualifiedtoacquirelandsundersec.5Art.XIII1935Consti,asheldinKrivenkov.Reg.ofdeeds.

ISSUE:WONMossisdisqualified.NO. HELD: Whilealiensaredisqualifiedtoacquirelandsunderthe1935Consti.,citizensoftheUScanacquire landslikeFil.citizens.Theordinanceappendedtothe1935Consti.byResolutionno.39oftheNat'lAssembly datedSept.15,1939&approvedbythePres.oftheUSonNov.10,1939,providesthatcitizens&corps.ofthe USshallenjoyintheCommonwealthofthePhils. Allthecivilrightsofthecitizens&corps.respectively, thereof.ThisOrdinancewasmadepartofthe1935Consti.asdirectedbySec.2oftheTydingsMcDuffieLaw.

TheproclamationofPhil.Indep.onJuly4,1946didnotimpairMoss'proprietaryrts.overthesaidlandbec.the 1935Consti.providesthatuponproclamationofPhil.independence,"allexistingpropertyrightsofcitizensor corps.oftheUSshallbeacknowledged,respected&safeguardedtothesameextentasprop.rights.ofcitizenof thePhils.[sec.1(1)Art.XVII.]ThiswasimplementedonArt.VIoftheTreatyofGeneralrelationsbet.theUS &thePhils.Adapted.

Republicv.Quasha,46SCRA160(1972) UndertheParityAmendmenttoourConstitution,citizensoftheUnitedStatesandcorporationsandbusiness enterprisesownedorcontrolled bythemcannotacquireandown,saveincasesofhereditarysuccession, privateagriculturallandsinthePhilippinesandthatallotherrightsacquiredbythemundersaidamendment willexpireon3July1974. F:

Quasha,anAmericancitizen,purchasedonNov.26,1954alandwithpermanentimprovementsthereon,atForbes Park,Makati.OnMarch19,1968hefiledpetitionfordeclarationofhisrightsunderParityAmendmentbecauseofficialsof Phil.Gov'tclaimedthatonexpirationofParityAmendmentonJuly3,1974,therightsacquiredbyUScitizensoverlands willceaseandbeofnofurtherforceandeffect.QuashasoughtadeclarationofhisrightsundertheParityAmendment, said pltff. contending that the ownership of properties during the effectivity of the Parity Amendment continues notwithstandingtheterminationandeffectivityoftheAmendment.

ISSUE:WhatarerightsofQuasha,ifany,overtheland? HELD:(1)UnderParityAmendment,QuashacouldnotacquireownershipofFobresParklandbecause"parity" betweenFilipinosandAmericansreferredonlytotwomatters: (a)disposition,exploitation,dev'tandutilizationofagricultural,timber,andminerallandsofthe publicdomainandothernaturalresourcesofPhils.(Sec.1,Art.XIII'35Consti.) (b)operationofpublicutilities(Sec.8,Art.XIV.) xxx NootherprovisionofourConsti.wasreferredtobythe"ParityAmendment";norSec.2ofArt.XIIIof the1935Consti.limitingthemaximumareaofpublicagriculturallandsthatcouldbeheldbyindividualsor corporationsorassociations;norSec.5restrictingthetransferorassignmentofprivateagriculturallandsto thosequalifiedtoacquireorholdlandsofthepublicdomain(w/cundertheoriginalSec.1ofArt.XIImeant Filipinos exclusively) save in cases of hereditary succession. these sections 2 and 5 were therefore left untouchedandallowedtocontinueinoperationasoriginallyintendedbytheConsti.'sframers. (2)Assumingownershipcouldbeacquired,allrightsconferredunderParityAmendmentweresubject tooneandthesameresolutoryterm:theyaretolastduringeffectivityoftheExec.Agreemententeredintoon July4,1946,butinnocasetoextendbeyondJuly3,1974. (3)TherightofAmericanstoacquireprivateagriculturallandsinthePhilsvanishedwiththeadventof theRepubliconJuly4,1946.Theonlyexceptionishereditarysuccession.Adapted.

Whenthecasewasdecidedin1972,theexpirationoftheParityRightshadnotyettakenplace. The pronouncementofJBLReyesinthiscasewasovertakenbythe1973Constitutionwhichprovidedthat"therights andprivilegesgrantedtocitizensorcorporationsownedbycitizensoftheU.S.undertheordinancesappended tothe1935Constitution(grantingtocitizensandcorporationsoftheU.S.allthecivilrightsofthecitizensand corporations,duringtheCommonwealthperiod)shallautomaticallyterminateonJuly3,1974.Titlestoprivate landsacquiredbysuchpersonsbeforesuchdateshallbevalidasagainstprivatepersonsonly.(Art.XVII,Sec. 11.) (ThusonlytheStatecanquestionsuchtitles,AFilipinoisbarredfrombringingandactiontorecovera privatelandhesoldtoanAmerican.)

QuashaandMossCompared. ThedifferencebetweenQuashaandMossisthatMossacquiredthe privatelandduringtheCommonwealthperiod,andwasthusgovernedbytheoriginalOrdinanceappendedto the1935Constitution,whileQuashaboughttheprivatelandin1954duringtheregimeoftheParityRights.

2.Exceptions (a)AcquisitionbyLEGALSuccession PD471

FIXINGAMAXIMUMPERIODFORTHEDURATIONOF LEASESOFPRIVATELANDSTOALIENS WHEREAS,theConstitutionbanstheacquisitionbyaliensandalienownedentitiesofpublicandprivatelands; WHEREAS,leasesofunreasonablylongdurationwouldamounttoavirtualtransferofownershipinviolationof theintentoftheConstitutionalprohibition; WHEREAS,thereisacompellingneedtofixareasonablemaximumperiodforthedurationofleasesorprivate landstoaliensandtoenforcecompliancethereofbypunishingviolations; NOW,THEREFORE,I,FERDINANDE.MARCOS,PresidentofthePhilippines,byvirtueofthepowersvested inmebytheConstitution,doherebyorderanddecree: Sec.1. Themaximum periodallowableforthe durationofleasesorprivatelands toaliens or alienowned corporations,associations,orentitiesnotqualifiedtoacquireprivatelandsinthePhilippinesshallbetwentyfiveyears, renewableforanotherperiodoftwentyfiveyearsuponmutualagreementofbothlessorandlessee. Sec.2.Anycontractoragreementmadeorexecutedinviolationofthisdecreeshallbenullandvoid abinitio, andbothpartiestotheagreementshallbepunishedbyafineofnotlessthanfivehundrednormorethanonethousand pesos,orbyimprisonmentoffromsix monthstooneyear,orbothinthediscretionofthecourt, Provided,thatthe presidentormanagersanddirectorsortrusteesofcorporations,associationsorpartnershipsviolatingthisdecreeshallbe criminallyliableinlieuthereof. Sec.3.Thisdecreeshalltakeeffectimmediately.

DoneintheCityofManila,this24thdayofMay,intheyearofOurLord,nineteenhundredandseventyfour.

Ramirezv.Vda.deRamirez,111SCRA704(1982) F:
TheappellantsclaimthattheusufructoverrealpropertiesoftheestateinfavorofWanda,whowasanAustrian livinginSpain,isvoidbec.itviolatestheconstitutionalprohibitionagainsttheacquisitionoflandsbyaliens. TheCourtaquoupheldthevalidityoftheusufructgiventoWandaonthegroundthattheConsti.coversnotonly successionbyoperationoflawbutalsotestamentarysuccession.

HELD:WeareoftheopinionthattheConstitutionalprovisionw/cenablesalienstoacquireprivatelandsdoes notextendtotestamentarysuccessionforotherwisetheprohibitionwillbefornaughtandmeaningless. Any alienwouldbeabletocircumventtheprohibitionbypayingmoneytoaPhil.landownerinexchangeforadevise ofapieceofland. Thisopinion,notwithstanding,weupholdtheusufructinfavorofWandabec.ausufruct,albeitareal right,doesnotvesttitletothelandintheusufructuaryanditisthevestingoftitletolandinfavorofaliensw/cis proscribedbytheConsti.RAM.

(b)AcquisitionbyformerNATURALBORNcitizens Art.XII,Sec.8.NotwithstandingtheprovisionsofSection7ofthisArticle,anaturalborncitizen ofthePhilippineswhohaslosthisPhilippinecitizenshipmaybeatransfereeofprivatelands,subjectto limitationsprovidedbylaw.

BP185
BATASANGPAMBANSABLG.185 ANACTTOIMPLEMENTSECTIONFIFTEENOFARTICLEIVOFTHECONSTITUTIONANDFOROTHER PURPOSES. BeitenactedbytheBatasangPambansainsessionassembled: Sec.1. InimplementationofSectionfifteenofArticleXIVoftheConstitution,anaturalborncitizenofthe PhilippineswhohaslosthisPhilippinecitizenshipmaybeatransfereeofprivateland,forusebyhimashisresidence, subjecttotheprovisionsofthisAct. Sec.2.AnynaturalborncitizenofthePhilippineswhohaslosthisPhilippinecitizenshipandwhohasthelegal capacitytoenterintoacontractunderPhilippinelawsmaybeatransfereeofaprivatelanduptoamaximumareaofone thousandsquaremeters,inthecaseofurbanland,oronehectareinthecaseofruralland,tobeusedbyhimashis residence.Inthecaseofmarriedcouples,oneofthemmayavailoftheprivilegehereingranted:Provided,Thatifboth shallavailofthesame,thetotalareaacquiredshallnotexceedthemaximumhereinfixed.

Incasethetransfereealreadyownsurbanorrurallandsforresidentialpurposes,heshallstillbeentitledtobea transfereeofadditionalurbanorrurallandsforresidentialpurposeswhich,whenaddedtothosealreadyownedbyhim, shallnotexceedthemaximumareashereinauthorized. Sec.3. AtransfereeunderthisActmayacquirenotmorethantwolotswhichshouldbesituatedindifferent municipalitiesorcitiesanywhereinthePhilippines:Provided,Thatthetotalareathereofshallnotexceedonethousand squaremetersinthecaseofurbanlandsoronehectareinthecaseofrurallandsforusebyhimashisresidence. A transfereewhohasalreadyacquiredurbanlandshallbedisqualifiedfromacquiringruralland,andviceversa. Sec.4.AsusedinthisAct (a)AnaturalborncitizenisonewhoisacitizenofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyact toacquireorperfecthisPhilippinecitizenship; (b)Urbanareasshallinclude: (1)Intheirentirety,allmunicipalcorporationswhich,whetherdesignatedascharteredcities,provincial capitalsornot,haveapopulationdensityofatleast1,000personspersquarekilometer; (2)Poblacionesorcentraldistrictsofmunicipalitiesandcitieswhichhaveapopulationdensityofatleast 500personspersquarekilometer; (3)Poblacionesorcentraldistricts(notincludedin1and2)regardlessofpopulationsizewhicharethe following: (a)Streetpattern,i.e.,networkofstreetineitheratparallelorrightangleorientation; (b) At least six establishments (commercial, manufacturing, recreational and/ or personal services);and (c)Atleastthreeofthefollowing: 1.Atownhall,churchorchapelwithreligiousservicesatleastonceamonth; 2.Apublicplaza,parkorcemetery; 3. Amarketplaceorbuildingwheretradingactivitiesarecarriedonatleastoncea week;and 4.Apublicbuildinglikeaschool,hospital,puericultureandhealthcenterorlibrary. (4)Barangayshavingatleast1,000inhabitantswhichmeettheconditionssetforthinsubparagraph(3) orparagraph(b)above,andinwhichtheoccupationoftheinhabitantsispredominantlyotherthanfarmingor fishing. (c)AllotherareasofthePhilippineswhichdonotmeettheconditionsintheprecedingdefinitionofurbanareas shallbeconsideredasruralareas. Sec.5.TransferasamodeofacquisitionofprivatelandunderthisActreferstoeithervoluntaryorinvoluntary sale,deviseordonation.Involuntarysalesshallincludetaxdelinquency,foreclosuresandexecutionsofjudgment. Sec.6.Inadditiontotherequirementsprovidedforinotherlawsfortheregistrationoftitlestolands,noprivate

landshallbetransferredunderthisAct,unlessthetransfereeshallsubmittotheregisterofdeedsoftheprovinceorcity wherethepropertyislocatedaswornstatementshowingthedateandplaceofhisbirth;thenamesandaddressesofhis parents,ofhisspouseandchildren,ifany;thearea,thelocationandthemodeofacquisitionofhislandholdingsinthe Philippines,ifany;hisintentiontoresidepermanentlyinthePhilippines,thedatehelosthisPhilippinecitizenshipandthe countryofwhichheispresentlyacitizen;andsuchotherinformationasmayberequiredunderSection8ofthisAct. Sec.7.ThetransfereeshallnotusethelandsacquiredunderthisActforanypurposeotherthanforhisresidence. Violationsofthissection,anymisrepresentationintheswornstatementrequiredunderSection6hereof,anyacquisition throughfraudulentmeans orfailuretoresidepermanentlyin thelandacquiredwithintwoyearsfrom theacquisition thereof,exceptwhensuchfailureiscausedbyforcemajeure,shall,inadditiontoanyliabilityundertheRevisedPenalcode anddeportationinappropriatecases,bepenalizedforforfeitureofsuchlandsandtheirimprovementstotheNational Government.Forthispurpose,theSolicitorGeneralorhisrepresentativeshallinstituteescheatproceedings. Anytransfereeliableunderthissectionshallmoreoverbeforeverbarredfromfurtheravailingoftheprivilege grantedunderthisAct. Sec.8.TheMinister(nowSecretary)ofJusticeshallissuesuchrulesandregulationsasmaybenecessarytocarry outtheprovisionsofthisAct. Suchrulesandregulationsshalltakeeffectfifteendaysfollowingitspublicationina newspaperofgeneralcirculationinthePhilippines. Sec.9.IfanypartofthisActshallbedeclaredunconstitutional,theremainingprovisionsnottherebyaffected shallremaininfullforceandeffect. Sec.10.ThisActshalltakeeffectuponitsapproval. Approved,March16,1982.

ReadRepublicv.CA,235SCRA567(1994)

3.AgrarianReform

Art.XIII,Sec.4.TheStateshall,bylaw,undertakeanagrarianreformprogramfoundedonthe rightoffarmersandregularfarmworkers,whoarelandless,toowndirectlyorcollectivelythelandsthey tillor,incaseofotherfarmworkers,toreceiveajustshareofthefruitsthereof. Tothisend,theState shallencourageandundertakethejustdistributionofagriculturallands,subjecttosuchprioritiesand reasonableretentionlimitsasCongressmayprescribe,takingintoaccountecological,developmental,or equityconsiderations,andsubjecttothepaymentofjustcompensation.Indeterminingretentionlimits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntarylandsharing. Sec.5. TheStateshallrecognizetherightoffarmers,farmworkers,andlandowners,aswellas cooperatives,andotherindependentfarmers'organizationstoparticipateintheplanning,organization,

and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technologyandresearch,andadequatefinancial,production,marketing,andothersupportservices. Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicableinaccordancewithlaw,inthedispositionorutilizationofothernaturalresources,including lands of the public domainunder lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homesteadrightsofsmallsettlers,andtherightsofindigenouscommunitiestotheirancestrallands. TheStatemayresettlelandlessfarmersandfarmworkersinitsownagriculturalestateswhich shallbedistributedtotheminthemannerprovidedbylaw. Sec.7.TheStateshallprotecttherightsofsubsistencefishermen,especiallyoflocalcommunities, tothepreferentialuseofthecommunalmarineandfishingresources,bothinlandandoffshore.Itshall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conservesuchresources.Theprotectionshallextendtooffshorefishinggroundsofsubsistencefishermen againstforeignintrusion. Fishworkersshallreceiveajustsharefromtheirlaborintheutilizationof marineandfishingresources. Sec.8. TheStateshallprovideincentivestolandownerstoinvesttheproceedsoftheagrarian reformprogramtopromoteindustrialization,employmentcreation,andprivatization ofpublicsector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprisesoftheirchoice.

4.Urbanlandreformandhousing

Art.XIII,Sec.9.TheStateshallbylaw,andforthecommongood,undertakeincooperationwith theprivatesector,acontinuingprogramofurbanlandreformandhousingwhichwillmakeavailableat affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centersandresettlementareas.Itshallalsopromoteadequateemploymentopportunitiestosuchcitizens. Intheimplementationofsuchprogram,theStateshallrespecttherightsofsmallpropertyowners. Sec.10.Urbanorruralpoordwellersshallnotbeevictednortheirdwellingsdemolished,except inaccordancewithlawandinajustandhumanemanner. Noresettlement ofurbanorruraldwellersshallbeundertakenwithoutadequateconsultation withthemandthecommunitieswheretheyaretoberelocated.

D.Leasetoforeignersofprivatelandsvalid

SmithBell&Co.v.RegisterofDeeds,96Phil53(1954)

E.DurationofLease
Article1643.Intheleaseofthings,oneofthepartiesbindshimselftogivetoanothertheenjoymentoruse ofathingforapricecertain,andforaperiodwhichmaybedefiniteorindefinite.However,noleaseformorethan ninetynineyearsshallbevalid.(NewCivilCode.)

F.Regulationofeconomicactivities 1.Rationale SocialisticEconomy Art.XII,Sec. 6. Theuseofproperty bearsa social function, andall economic agentsshall contributetothecommongood. Individualsandprivategroups,includingcorporations,cooperatives, and similar collective organizations shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises,subjecttothedutyoftheStatetopromotedistributivejusticeandtointervenewhenthe commongoodsodemands.

The Constitution announces the policy of free enterprise tempered by state intervention when the commongoodsorequires.Theeconomictheoryisoneinbetweenpurecapitalismandpuresocialism,witha tendencytowardssocialism.

NationalisticEconomy

Art. XII, Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials,andlocallyproducedgoods,andadoptmeasuresthathelpmakethemcompetitive.

Art.XII,Sec.13.TheStateshallpursueatradepolicythatservesthegeneralwelfareandutilizes allformsandarrangementsofexchangeonthebasisofequalityandreciprocity.

2TheNEDAanddevelopmentprogram ArticleXII,Sec.9.TheCongressmayestablishanindependenteconomicplanningagencyheaded bythePresident,whichshall,afterconsultationswiththeappropriatepublicagencies,variousprivate sectors,andlocalgovernmentunits,recommendtoCongress,andimplementcontinuingintegratedand coordinatedprogramsandpoliciesfornationaldevelopment. Until Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic and Development Authority shall functionsastheindependentplanningagencyofthegovernment. IIBernas: The1987Consti.hasmadethecreationoftheindependenteconomicplanningagencyoptional. Commissioner Villegas explained that there was a consensus in the Committee that an economic planning agency should not be constitutionalized since formal economic planning is not an indispensable part of managingthenationaleconomy. xxx CommissionerMondsodaddedthat"ifwearegoingforlessgovtand moreprivatesectorinitiative,lateronitmaynotbenecessarytohaveaplanningagency. Sec.10.TheCongressshall,uponrecommendationoftheeconomicandplanningagency,when thenationalinterestdictates,reservetocitizensofthePhilippinesortocorporationsorassociationsat leastsixtypercentumofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchcitizens,orsuchhigherpercentageasCongress mayprescribe,certainareasofinvestments.TheCongressshallenactmeasuresthatwillencouragethe formationandoperationenterpriseswhosecapitaliswhollyownedbyFilipinos. Inthegrantofrights,privilegesandconcessionscoveringthenationaleconomyandpatrimony, theStateshallgivepreferencetoqualifiedFilipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdictionandinaccordancewithitsnationalgoalsandpriorities.

3.Organizationandregulationofprivatecorporations

Art. XII, Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization,orregulationofprivatecorporations.Governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsmay becreatedorestablishedbyspecialchartersintheinterestofthecommongoodandsubjecttothetestof economicviability. IIBernas:ThepurposeofthefirstsentenceistoinsulateCongressagainstpressuresfromspecialinterests:"To permitthelawmakingbodybyspeciallawtoprovidefortheorganizationorformationorregulationofpvt. corps.,itwasbelievedxxx,wouldineffecttooffertoitthetemptationinmanycasestofavorcertaingroupsto theprejudiceortotheprejudiceoftheinterestofthecountry.

4.Operationofpublicutilities Art.XII,Sec.11.Nofranchise,certificate,oranyotherformofauthorizationfortheoperationof apublicutilityshallbegrantedexcepttocitizensofthePhilippinesortocorporationsorassociations organizedunderthelawsofthePhilippinesatleastsixtypercentumofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchciti zens,norshallsuchfranchise,certificate,orauthorizationbeexclusiveincharacterorforalongerperiod thanfiftyyears.Neithershallanysuchfranchiseorrightbegrantedexceptundertheconditionthatit shallbesubjecttoamendment,alteration,orrepealbytheCongresswhenthecommongoodsorequires. TheStateshallencourageequityparticipationinpublicutilitiesbythegeneralpublic.Theparticipation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionateshareinitscapital,andalltheexecutiveandmanagingofficersofsuchcorporationsor associationmustbecitizensofthePhilippines. IIBernas:Forthepurposeofthisprovision,acorp.orassociationisconsideredaFilipinoif:(1)itisorganized underPhil.lawsand(2)atleast60%ofitscapitalisownedbyFilipinocitizens. xxx ItshouldbenotedxxxthattheConsti.doesnotprohibitthemereformationofapublicutilitycorp.w/o therequiredproportionofFilipinocapital.xxxWhatitdoesprohibitisthegrantingofafranchiseorother formofauthorizationfortheoperationofapublicutilityalreadyinexistencebutw/otherequisiteproportionof Filipinocapital.

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, duringtheemergencyandunderreasonabletermsprescribedbyit,temporarilytakeoverordirectthe operationofanyprivatelyownedpublicutilityorbusinessaffectedwithpublicinterest.

5.OnMassMediaandAdvertisingIndustry A.Policy Art.XVI,Sec.10. TheStateshallprovidethepolicyenvironmentforthefulldevelopmentof Filipinocapabilityandtheemergenceofcommunicationstructuressuitabletotheneedsandaspirations ofthenationandthebalancedflowofinformationinto,outof,andacrossthecountry,inaccordancewith apolicythatrespectsthefreedomofspeechandofthepress.

B.OwnershipandManagementofMassMedia Sec.11.(1)Theownership andmanagementofmassmediashallbelimited tocitizens ofthe

Philippines,ortocorporations,cooperativesorassociations,whollyownedandmanagedbysuchcitizens. TheCongressshallregulateorprohibitmonopoliesincommercialmassmediawhenthepublic interestsorequires.Nocombinationsinrestraintoftradeorunfaircompetitionthereinshallbeallowed. xxx

IIBernas: "Massmedia"inSec.11(1)includesradio,televisionandtheprintedmedia. Itdoesnotinclude commercialtelecommunicationsw/caregovernedaspublicutilitiesunderArt.XII,Sec.11.

C.OwnershipofAdvertisingCompanies Id., (2)Theadvertisingindustryisimpressedwithpublicinterest,andshallberegulatedbylaw fortheprotectionofconsumersandthepromotionofthegeneralwelfare OnlyFilipinocitizensorcorporationsatleastseventypercentumofthecapitalofwhichisowned bysuchcitizensshallbeallowedtoengageintheadvertisingindustry. Theparticipationofforeigninvestorsinthegoverningbodyofentitiesinsuchindustryshallbe limitedtotheirproportionateshareinthecapitalthereof,andalltheexecutiveandmanagingofficersof suchentitiesmustbecitizensofthePhilippines.

Art.XVIII,Sec.23.Advertisingentitiesaffectedbyparagraph(2),Section11ofArticleXVIof thisConstitutionshallhavefiveyearsfromitsratificationtocomplyonagraduatedandproportionate basiswiththeminimumFilipinoownershiprequirementtherein.

6.Practiceofprofessions Art. XII,Sec. 14. Thesustained development ofa reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, highlevel technical manpower and skilled workersandcraftsmeninallfieldsshallbepromotedbytheState.TheStateshallencourageappropriate technologyandregulateitstransferforthenationalbenefit. ThepracticeofallprofessionsinthePhilippinesshallbelimitedtoFilipinocitizens,saveincases prescribedbylaw.

7.Stateoperationofprivateenterprises Art.XII,Sec.17.Intimesofnationalemergency,whenthepublicinterestsorequires,theState may,duringtheemergencyandunderreasonabletermsprescribedbyit,temporarilytakeoverordirect theoperationofanyprivatelyownedpublicutilityorbusinessaffectedwithpublicinterest.

Sec.18.TheStatemay,intheinterestofnationalwelfareordefense,establishandoperatevital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other privateenterprisestobeoperatedbytheGovernment.

8.Monopolies,combinations,andunfaircompetition Art.XII,Sec.19. TheStateshallregulateorprohibitmonopolieswhenthepublicinterestso requires.Nocombinationsinrestraintoftradeorunfaircompetitionshallbeallowed.

PhilippinePortsAuthorityv.Mendoza,138SCRA632(1985)
F: In1977,thePPAadoptedapolicyofallowingonlyonearrastreoperatorforeveryportinthePhilippines.Incom pliance with this policy, eleven operators at the Cebu City port merged into one corporation called United South Dockhandler,Inc. However,otherarrastreoperatorsquestionedtheoneportoneoperatorpolicyandobtainedfromthe resp.judgeofRTCaninjunctionagainsttheimplementationofthepolicy.PPAappealed.

HELD:(1)ThepowergrantedtoPPAunderPD857,Sec.6(2)(v)toprovideserviceswithintheportdistricts includesthepowertoadoptthepolicyinquestion.AsheldinAngloFilTradingvLazaro,PPAhasdiscretionto choosethestevedoringcontractorinaccordancewithreasonablestandards. (2)ThegrantofpermittoonlyoneoperatordoesnotviolateArt.XIV,Sec.2(nowArt.XII,Sec.10)on monopolies. Private monopolies are not necessarily prohibited. The use of the word "regulate" in the Constitutionindicatesthatsomemonopolies,properlyregulatedmaybeallowed."Competitioncanbestregu lateafreeeconomy.Likeallbasicbeliefs,howeverthatprinciplemustaccommodatehardpracticalexperience. Thereareareaswhereforspecialreasonstheforceofcompetition,whenleftwhollyfree,mightoperatetoo destructively tosafeguardthepublicinterest.Publicutilitiesareaninstanceofthatconsideration."(Oleck, ModernCorporationLaw,Vol.IV,p.197).Inthecaseatbar,theareaaffectedismaritimetransportationinthe portofCebu.TheoperationsthereofarrastreandstevedoringaffectnotonlythecityofCebu,theprincipalport oftheSouth,butalsotheeconomyofthewholecountry. Anyprolongeddisjunctionoftheservicesbeing renderedtherewillprejudicenotonlyinterislandbutalsointernationaltradeandcommerce. PPA'spolicyofintegrationthroughcompulsorymergermaynotevenbeinthisinstanceconsideredas promotingamonopolybecausethefactofthematteristhatactuallyUSDIiscomprisedoftheelevenport servicecontractorswhichpreviouslyusedsaidport. Petitiongranted.Ordersappealedfromarereversed.VV.

9.Money,bankingandcredit Art.XII,Sec.20. TheCongressshallestablishanindependentcentralmonetaryauthority,the membersofwhosegoverningboardmustbenaturalbornFilipinocitizens,ofknownprobity,integrity andpatriotism,themajorityofwhomshallcomeformtheprivatesector.Theyshallalsobesubjectto

suchotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesasmaybeprescribedbylaw.Theauthorityshallprovidepolicy directionintheareasofmoney,bankingandcredit.Itshallhavesupervisionovertheoperationsofbanks andexercisesuchregulatorypowersasmaybeprovidedbylawovertheoperationsoffinancecompanies andotherinstitutionsperformingsimilarfunctions. Until the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the Philippines, operating under existinglaws,shallfunctionasthecentralmonetaryauthority. Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of monetaryauthority. Informationonforeignloansobtainedorguaranteedbythegovernmentshallbe madeavailabletothepublic.

10.Cooperatives

Art.XII,Sec.15. TheCongressshallcreateanagencytopromotetheviabilityandgrowthof cooperativesasinstrumentsforsocialjusticeandeconomicdevelopment. IIBernas:WhatiscontemplatedhereisalineagencyundertheOfficeofthePres.andoutsidethejurisdiction oftheDAR.

UPDATED2/17/96 RAM

IV.SOCIALJUSTICEANDHUMANRIGHTS A.SocialJusticeDefined Art.XIII,Sec.1. TheCongressshallgivehighestprioritytotheenactment ofmeasuresthat protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the commongood. Tothisend,thestateshallregulatetheacquisition,ownershipanddispositionofpropertyandits increments.

Calalangv.Williams,70PHILS726(1940) F:
CANo.458authorizesDirectorofPublicWorkswiththeapprovaloftheSecretaryofPublicWorksandComms. topromulgaterulesandregulationsforregulationandcontrolofuseandtrafficonnationalroads.TheDirector,with approvalofSecretaryofPubWorksandComm,anduponrecommendationofNat'lTrafficCommission,issuedanorder closingtoanimaldrawnvehiclescertainpartsofRizalAve.andRosarioStreet.Petitionerchallengesconstitutionalityof theAct(andorder)asbeinganunduedelegationoflegislativepowers.

ISSUE:W/Nthereisunduedelegation HELD:No.TheauthoritydelegatedtoDirectorandSecretaryisnottodeterminewhatpublicpolicydemands butmerelytocarryoutthelegislativepolicylaiddownbytheNat'lAssembly,"topromotesafetransituponand avoidobstructionon,roadsandstreetsdesignatedasnat'lroads"andtoclosethemtemporarilytoanyorall classesofvehicles"whenevertheconditionoftheroadorthetrafficmakessuchactionnecessaryoradvisablein thepublicconvenienceorinterest."Thedelegatedpower,ifatall,isnotthedeterminationofwhatthelaw shouldbebutmerelytheascertainmentoffactsandcircumstancesonwhichtheapplicationofthelawistobe predicated.Thisisanadministrativefunctionwhichmustdependondiscretionofanothergovtofficialtowhom isconfidedthedutyofdeterminingwhetherthereisproperoccasiontoexecutethelaw.Buttheexerciseofsuch discretioncannotbesaidasmakingthelaw. ISSUE:W/Nthereisproperexerciseofpolicepower HELD:Yes.TheActaimstopromotesafetransit,relieffromtrafficcongestionandtoavoidobstructionson nat'lroadsintheinterestandconvenienceofthepublic.Publicwelfarethenliesatthebottomoftheenactment ofthelawandthestate,inordertopromotethegeneralwelfare,mayinterferewithpersonalliberty,property, businessandoccupations. ISSUE: W/N, as averred by the petitioner, the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutionalpreceptregardingthepromotionofsocialjusticetoinsurethewellbeingandeconomicsecurityof allthepeople.Adapted. HELD:NO.Thepromotionofsocialjusticexxxistobeachievednotthroughamistakensympathytowards anygivengroup. "SocialJusticeis'neithercommunism,nordespotism,noratomism,noranarchy,'but thehumanizationoflawsandtheequalizationofsocialandeconomicforcesbytheStatesothat justiceinitsrationalandobjectivelysecularconceptionmayatleastbeapproximated.Social justicemeansthepromotionofthewelfareofallthepeople,theadoptionbytheGovernmentof measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the component elements of society, throughthemaintenanceofapropereconomicandsocialequilibriumintheinterrelationsofthe members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governmentsonthetimehonoredprincipleofsaluspopuliestsupremalex."

B.AspectsofSocialJustice 1.Labor Art.XII,Sec.3.TheStateshallaffordfullprotectiontolabor,localandoverseas,organizedand unorganized,andpromotefullemploymentandequalityofemploymentopportunitiesforall. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations,andpeacefulconcertedactivities,includingtherighttostrikeinaccordancewithlaw.They shallbeentitledtosecurityoftenure,humaneconditionsofwork,andalivingwage. Theyshallalso participateinpolicyanddecisionmakingprocessesaffectingtheirrightsandbenefitsasmaybeprovided bylaw. TheStateshallpromotetheprincipleofsharedresponsibilitybetweenworkersandemployersand thepreferentialuseofvoluntarymodesinsettlingdisputes,includingconciliation,andshallenforcetheir mutualcompliancetherewithtofosterindustrialpeace. TheStateshallregulatetherelationsbetweenworkersandemployers,recognizingtherightof labortoitsjustshareinthefruitsofproductionandtherightofenterprisestoreasonablereturnson investments,andtoexpansionandgrowth.

2.Agrarianandnaturalresourcesreform Art.XIII,Sec.4.TheStateshall,bylaw,undertakeanagrarianreformprogramfoundedonthe rightoffarmersandregularfarmworkers,whoarelandless,toowndirectlyorcollectivelythelandsthey tillor,inthecaseofotherfarmworkers,toreceiveajustshareofthefruitsthereof.Tothisend,theState shallencourageandundertakethejustdistributionofallagriculturallands,subjecttosuchprioritiesand reasonableretentionlimitsastheCongressmayprescribe,takingintoaccountecological,developmental, orequity considerations, andsubjecttothepayment ofjustcompensation. Indeterminingretention limits,theStateshallrespecttherightsofsmalllandowners.TheStateshallfurtherprovideincentivesfor voluntarylandsharing. Sec.5. TheStateshallrecognizetherightoffarmers,farmworkers,andlandowners,aswellas cooperatives,andotherindependentfarmers'organizationstoparticipateintheplanning,organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technologyandresearch,andadequatefinancialproduction,marketing,andothersupportservices. Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicableinaccordancewithlaw,inthedispositionorutilizationofothernaturalresources,including lands of the public domainunder lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homesteadrightsofsmallsettlers,andtherightsofindigenouscommunitiestotheirancestrallands. TheStatemayresettlelandlessfarmersandfarmworkersinitsownagriculturalestateswhich

shallbedistributedtotheminthemannerprovidedbylaw. Sec.7.TheStateshallprotecttherightsofsubsistencefishermen,especiallyoflocalcommunities, tothepreferentialuseofthecommunalmarineandfishingresources,bothinlandandoffshore.Itshall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop and conservesuchresources.Theprotectionshallextendtooffshorefishinggroundsofsubsistencefishermen againstforeignintrusion. Fishworkersshallreceiveajustsharefromtheirlaborintheutilizationof marineandfishingresources. Sec.8. TheStateshallprovideincentivestolandownerstoinvesttheproceedsoftheagrarian reformprogramtopromoteindustrialization,employmentcreation,andprivatization ofpublicsector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprisesoftheirchoice. SeeComprehensiveAgrarianReformLawof1988(RepublicActNo.6657andExecutiveOrderNo.229,July 22,1987.) AssociationofSmallLandownersofthePhilippinesv.SecretaryofAgrarianReform,175SCRA343(1989) F: PDNo.27waspromulgatedalongwithmartiallawtoprovideforthecompulsoryacquisitionofprivatelandsfor
distributionamongtenantfarmersandtospecifymaximumretentionlimitsforlandowners. OnJuly17,1987,Pres.AquinoissuedEONo.228declaringfulllandownershipinfavorofthebeneficiariesofPD 27andprovidingforthevaluationofstillunvaluedlandscoveredbythedecreeaswellasthemanneroftheirpayment. This was followed by Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program, and EO No. 229 providingthemechanicsforitsimplementation. Subsequently,afteritsformalorganization,CongressenactedRA6657knownastheComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Law. This law gives the previous enactments suppletory effects inosfar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. These4casesareconsolidatedquestioningtheconstitutionalityoftheabovelaws.

ISSUE:Thedoctrineofjudicialsupremacy. HELD:Althoughregardedastheweakestofthe3departmentsofthegovt,thejudiciaryisnonethelessvested with the power to annul the acts of either legislative or executive or both when not conformable to the fundamentallaw.Thisisthereasonforthesocalledjudicialsupremacy.xxxThedoctrineofseparationof powersimposesuponthecourtsaproperrestraint,bornofthenatureoftheirfunctionsandoftheirrespectfor theotherdepartments,instrikingdowntheactsofthelegislativeandtheexecutiveasunconstitutional.xxxThe theoryisthatbeforetheactwasdoneorthelawwasenacted,earneststudiesweremadebyCongressorthe President,orboth,toinsurethattheConstitutionwouldnotbebreached. ISSUE:Essentialrequisitesofajudicialinquiryintoaconstitutionalquestion.

HELD:Theremustbeanactualcaseorcontroversyinvolvingaconflictoflegalrightssusceptibleofjudicial determination; the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party; and the resolutionofthequestionisunavoidablynecessarytothedecisionofthecaseitself.Alltheserequirementswere metinthiscase. ISSUE:ThepowerofPres.AquinotopromulgateProcl.No.131andEO's228and229. HELD:Suchpowerwasauthorizedundersec.6oftheTransitoryProvisionsofthe1987Constitution.Thesaid measureswereissuedbyPres.AquinobeforeCongresswasformallyconvenedandtookoverlegislativepower fromher.Astatutedoesnotipsofactobecomeinoperativesimplybecauseofthedissolutionofthelegislature thatenactedit.Bythesametoken,Pres.Aquino'slossoflegislativepowerdidnothavetheeffectofinvalidating allthemeasuresenactedbyherwhenandaslongasshepossessedit.Moreover,Congresshassubstantially affirmedthechallengedmeasuresandhasspecificallyprovidedthattheyaresuppletorytoRA6657. ISSUE:W/Nthecreationofthe50BpesofundunderProcl.No.131andEO229doesnotconformtothe requirementsofavalidappropriationasspecifiedintheConstitution. HELD:Procl.No.131isnotanappropriationmeasureevenifitdoesprovideforthecreationofsaidfund,for thatisnotitsprincipalpurpose.Anappropriationlawisonetheprimarypurposeandspecificpurposeofwhich istoauthorizethereleaseofpublicfundsfromthetreasury.Thecreationofthefundisonlyincidentaltothe mainobjectiveoftheproclamation,whichisagrarianreform. ISSUE: AstoinvalidityofProcl.131andEO229becauseofthelackofretentionlimitsasrequiredbythe Consti. HELD:RA6657doesprovideforsuchretentionlimitsnowinsec.6ofthelaw. ISSUE: W/N EO 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressedinthetitle. HELD:NO.Thetitleofthebilldoesnothavetobeacatalogueofitscontentsandwillsufficeifthematters embodiedinthetextarerelevanttoeachotherandmaybeinferredfromthetitle. ISSUE:PolicepowerandPowerofeminentdomain. HELD:Recenttrendswouldindicatenotapolarizationbutaminglingofthepolicepowerandthepowerof eminentdomain,withthelatterbeingusedasanimplementoftheformerlikethepoweroftaxation. Totheextentthatthemeasuresunderchallengemerelyprescriberetentionlimitsforlandowners,there isanexerciseofthepolicepowerfortheregulationofprivatepropertyinaccordancewiththeConstitution.But where,tocarryoutsuchregulation,itbecomesnecessarytodeprivesuchownersofwhateverlandstheymay owninexcessofthemaximumareaallowed,thereisdefinitelyatakingunderthepowerofeminentdomainfor whichpaymentofjustcompensationisimperative.Thetakingcontemplatedisnotamerelimitationoftheuse ofthelandbutrequiresthesurrenderofthetitletoandphysicalpossessionofthesaidexcessandallbeneficial rightsaccruingtotheownerinfavorofthefarmerbeneficiary.Thisisdefinitelyanexerciseofthepowerof

eminentdomain. ISSUE:W/Nthereisadenialofequalprotectionbecauseoftheabsenceofretentionlimits. HELD:Thishasbecomeacademicbecauseofsec.6ofRA6657. ISSUE:W/Ntherequisitesforavalidclassificationhasbeenviolated.(Thesmallfarmersandsugarplanters claimtheybelongtoaparticularclasswithparticularinterestsoftheirown.) HELD:NO.Noevidencehavebeensubmittedthattherequisitesforavalidclassificationhasbeenviolated. Classificationhasbeendefinedasthegroupingofpersonsorthingssimilartoeachotherincertain particulars anddifferent fromeachotherinthesesameparticulars.Tobe valid,itmustconformtothe ff. requirements: (1)itmustbebasedonsubstantialdistinctions; (2)itmustbegermanetothepurposesofthelaw; (3)itmustnotbelimitedtoexistingconditionsonly; (4)itmustapplyequallytoallthemembersoftheclass. Alltheserequirementshavebeenmetbythemeasures. Equalprotectionsimplymeansthatallpersonsorthingssimilarlysituatedmustbetreatedalikebothas totherightsconferredandtheliabilitiesimposed.Thepetitionershavenotshownthattheybelongtoadifferent classentitledtoadifferenttreatment ISSUE:PowerofEminentDomain. HELD: Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intendedforpublicuseuponpaymentofjustcompensationtotheowner.Itisonlywheretheownerisunwilling tosellorcannotacceptthepriceorotherconditionsofferedbythevendee,thatthepowerofeminentdomain willcomeintoplaytoasserttheparamountauthorityoftheStateovertheinterestsofthepropertyowner. Privaterightsmustthenyieldtotheirresistibledemandsofthepublicinterestonthetimehonoredjustification thatthewelfareofthepeopleisthesupremelaw. However,thepowerofeminentdomainisnotabsolute.Thelimitationisfoundintheconstitutional injunctionthat"privatepropertyshallnotbetakenforpublicusewithoutjustcompensation." Basically,the requirementsforaproperexerciseofthepowerare: (1)Publicuseand (2)justcompensation (1)Astotherequirementofpublicuse: Itisnotcorrecttosaythatonlypublicagriculturallands(asarguedbypetitioners)maybecoveredby the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the distributiontodistributeprivateagriculturallandsundertheCARPwasmadebythelegislativeandexecutive departmentsintheexerciseoftheirdiscretion. ThepurposesspecifiedinPD27,Procl.131andRA6657areonlyanelaborationoftheconstitutional

injunctionthattheStateadoptthenecessarymeasures"toencourageandundertakethejustdistributionofall agriculturallandstoenablefarmerswhoarelandlesstoowndirectlyorcollectivelythelandstheytill.That publiclawisbindingonus." (2)Astotherequirementofjustcompensation: Thereiscompensabletakingwhentheffconditionsconcur: (a)theexpropriatormustenteraprivateproperty; (b)Theentrymustbeformorethanamomentaryperiod; (c)theentrymustbeunderawarrantorcoloroflegalauthority; (d) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;and (e)theutilizationofthepropertyforpublicusemustbeinsuchawayastoousttheowneranddeprive himofbeneficialenjoymentoftheproperty. Alltheserequisitesareenvisionedinthequestionedmeasures. ISSUE: W/N the manner of fixing the just compensation is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violationofjudicialprerogatives. HELD:NO.Thedeterminationofjustcompensationisafunctionaddressedtothecourtsofjusticeandnottobe usurpedbyanyotherbranchorofficialofthegovt. Sec. 16(d) of the CARP Law shows that although the proceedings are described as summary, the landownerandotherinterestedpartiesareallowedanopportunitytosubmitevidenceontherealvalueofthe property.ThedeterminationofthejustcompensationbytheDARisnotfinalandconclusiveuponthelandowner oranyotherinterestedparty.ThedeterminationbytheDARisonlypreliminaryunlessacceptedbyallparties concerned.Otherwise,thecourtsofjusticewillstillhavetherighttoreviewwithfinalitythesaiddetermination intheexerciseofwhatisadmittedlyajudicialfunction. ISSUE:W/Nsec.18ofRA6657,whichprovidesforthevaluationandmodeofcompensationisunconstitutional insofarasitrequirestheownersoftheexpropriatedpropertiestoacceptjustcompensationthereforinlessthan money,whichistheonlymediumofpaymentallowed. HELD:NO.Thetraditionalmediumforthepaymentofjustcompensationismoneyandnoother.However,we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriationwhereonlyaspecificpropertyofrelativelylimitedareaissoughttobetakenbytheStatefromits ownerforaspecificandperhapslocalpurpose.Whatwedealwithhereisarevolutionaryexpropriation. Theexpropriationbeforeusaffectsallprivateagriculturallandswhereverfoundandofwhateverkindas longastheyareinexcessofthemaximumretentionlimits.Thiskindofexpropriationisintendednotonlyfor thebenefitofaparticularcommunitybuttheentireFilipinonation.Finally,itisnolessthantheConstitution itselfthathasordainedthisrevolutioninthefarms,callingfor"ajustdistribution"amongthefarmersoflands. Suchaprogramwillinvolvehundredsofbillionsofpesoswhichamountwillnotevenbefullyavailable atthistime.ItcanthereforebeassumedthattheintentionoftheframersoftheConstitutionwastoallowsuch mannerofpaymentasisnowprovidedforbytheCARPLaw,particularlythepaymentofthebalance(ifthe

ownercannotbepaidfullyinmoney),oroftheentireamountofthejustcompensation,withotherthingsof value. Acceptingthetheorythatpayment ofjustcompensationisnotalwaysrequiredtobemadefullyin money,theSCfindsthattheproportionofcashpaymenttotheotherthingsofvalueconstituting thetotal payments,asdeterminedonthebasisoftheareasofthelandsexpropriated,isnotundulyoppressiveuponthe landowner. Theothermodesavailabletothelandownerathisoption,arealsonotunreasonablebecausepaymentis madeinsharesofstock,LBPbonds,otherpropertiesorassets,taxcredits,andotherthingsofvalueequivalent totheamountofjustcompensation. ISSUE: W/N the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation,incontraventionofawellacceptedprincipleofeminentdomain. HELD:NO.ItistruethatPD27expresslyorderedtheemancipationoftenantfarmerasofOct.21,1972and declaredthatheshall"bedeemedasowner"ofaportionoflandconsistingofafamilysizedfarmexceptthat "notitletothelandownedbyhimwastobeactuallyissuedtohimunlessanduntilhehadbecomeafullpledged memberofadulyrecognizedfarmers'cooperative.Itwasunderstoodhowever,thatfullpaymentofthejust compensationalsohadtobemadefirst,conformablytotheconstitutionalrequirement. WhenEO228statedinitsSec.2that"Allqualifiedfarmerbeneficiariesarenowdeemedfullownersas ofOct.21,1972ofthelandtheyacquiredbyvirtueofPD27"itwasobviouslyreferringtolandalreadyvalidly acquiredunderthesaiddecree,afterproofofmembershipinthefarmers'cooperativesandfullpaymentofjust compensation.Hence,itwasalsoproperundersec.2thatthe"leaserentalspaidtothelandownerbythefarmer beneficiaryafterOct.21,1972(pendingtransferofownershipafterfullpaymentofjustcompensation),shallbe consideredasadvancepaymentfortheland. TheCarpLawconditionsthetransferofpossessionandownershipofthelandtothegovtonreceiptby thelandownerofthecorrespondingpaymentorthedepositbytheDARofthecompensationincashorLBP bondswithanaccessiblebank.Untilthen,thetitlealsoremainswiththelandowner.Nooutrightchangeof ownershipiscontemplatedeither.Adapted.

3.UrbanLandReformAndHousing Art.XIII,Sec.9.TheStateshallbylaw,andforthecommongood,undertakeincooperationwith theprivatesector,acontinuingprogramofurbanlandreformandhousingwhichwillmakeavailableat affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centersandresettlementareas.Itshallalsopromoteadequateemploymentopportunitiestosuchcitizens. Intheimplementationofsuchprogram,theStateshallrespecttherightsofsmallpropertyowners. Sec.10.Urbanorruralpoordwellersshallnotbeevictednortheirdwellingsdemolished,except inaccordancewithlawandinajustandhumanemanner. Noresettlement ofurbanorruraldwellersshallbeundertakenwithoutadequateconsultation withthemandthecommunitieswheretheyaretoberelocated.

SeePDNo.1517,June11,1978.

4.Health Sec.11.TheStateshalladoptanintegratedandcomprehensiveapproachtohealthdevelopment whichshallendeavortomakeessentialgoods,healthandothersocialservicesavailabletoallthepeopleat affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women,andchildren.TheStateshallendeavortoprovidefreemedicalcaretopaupers. Sec.12.TheStateshallestablishandmaintainaneffectivefoodanddrugregulatorysystemand undertakeappropriatehealthmanpowerdevelopmentandresearch,responsivetothecountry'shealth needsandproblems. Sec.13. TheStateshallestablishaspecialagencyfordisabledpersonsfortheirrehabilitation, selfdevelopmentandselfreliance,andtheirintegrationintothemainstreamofsociety.

5.Women Sec. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions,takingintoaccounttheirmaternalfunctions,andsuchfacilitiesandopportunitiesthatwill enhancetheirwelfareandenablethemtorealizetheirfullpotentialintheserviceofthenation.

C.People'sOrganizations Sec.15.TheStateshallrespecttheroleofindependentpeople'sorganizationstoenablethepeople topursueandprotect, within thedemocratic framework,theirlegitimate andcollectiveinterestsand aspirationsthroughpeacefulandlawfulmeans. People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promotethepublicinterestandwithidentifiableleadership,membership,andstructure. Sec.16.Therightofthepeopleandtheirorganizationstoeffectiveandreasonableparticipation atalllevelsofsocial,political,andeconomicdecisionmakingshallnotbeabridged.TheStateshall,by law,facilitatetheestablishmentofadequateconsultationmechanisms.

D.HumanRights Art.XIII,Sec.17.(1)ThereisherebycreatedanindependentofficecalledtheCommissionon

HumanRights. (2)TheCommissionshallbecomposedofaChairmanandfourMemberswhomustbenatural borncitizensofthePhilippinesandamajorityofwhomshallbemembersoftheBar.Thetermofoffice andotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesoftheMembersoftheCommissionshallbeprovidedbylaw. (3) UntilthisCommissionisconstituted,theexistingPresidentialCommitteeonHumanRights shallcontinuetoexerciseitspresentfunctionsandpowers. (4)TheapprovedannualappropriationsoftheCommissionshallbeautomaticallyandregularly released.

Sec.18.TheCommissiononHumanRightsshallhavethefollowingpowersandfunctions: (1) Investigate,onitsownoroncomplaintbyanyparty,allformsofhumanrightsviolations involvingcivilandpoliticalrights; (2)Adoptitsoperationalguidelinesandrulesofprocedure,andciteforcontemptforviolations thereofinaccordancewiththeRulesofCourt; (3)Provideappropriatelegalmeasuresfortheprotectionofhumanrightsofallpersonswithin thePhilippines,aswellasFilipinosresidingabroad,andprovideforpreventivemeasuresandlegalaid servicestotheunderprivilegedwhosehumanrightshavebeenviolatedorneedprotection; (4)Exercisevisitorialpowersoverjails,prisons,ordetentionfacilities; (5)Establishacontinuingprogramofresearch,education,andinformationtoenhancerespectfor theprimacyofhumanrights; (6) RecommendtotheCongresseffectivemeasurestopromotehumanrightsandprovidefor compensationtovictimsofviolationsofhumanrights,ortheirfamilies; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on humanrights; (8) Grant immunity fromprosecution toany person whosetestimony orwhosepossession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducedbyitorunderitsauthority; (9)Requesttheassistanceofanydepartment,bureau,office,oragencyintheperformanceofits functions; (10)Appointitsofficersandemployerinaccordancewithlaw;and (11)Performsuchotherdutiesandfunctionsasmaybe providedbylaw.

Sec.19.TheCongressmayprovideforothercasesofviolationsofhumanrightsthatshouldfall withintheauthorityoftheCommission,takingintoaccountitsrecommendations.

VII.ESTACS(Education,Science,Technology,Arts,CultureandSports) A.Education

1.RightToEducation Art.XIV,Sec.1.Thestateshallprotectandpromotetherightofallcitizenstoqualityeducation atalllevels,andshalltakeappropriatestepstomakesucheducationaccessibletoall. InVillarv.TIP,135SRCA706(1985),SCsaidthatwhiletherighttocollegeeducationisasocial, economic,andagricultural right,itisavailableonly"onthebasisofmerit",asprovided,inArt.26ofthe DeclarationofHumanRights.Accordingly,therefusalofadmissionofstudentactivitieswithmarkedacademic deficiencies(failureincertainsubjects)isvalid;buttherefusaltothosewho,withoutincurringdeficiencies, werejustexercisingtheirconstitutionalrightoffreespeechandpeaceableassembly,isunjustified. InTangonanv.CruzPano,137SCRA(1985),theSCruledthatpartoftherightofacademic(institutional freedomistherightofinstitutionsofhigherlearningtodecideforitselfhowbesttoattainthesearchfortruth, which includes the choice of students, free from outside coercion or interference, save possibly when the overridingpublicwelfarecallsforsomerestraint.Thus,itupheldtherefusaloftheCapitolMedicalCenter SchoolforNursingtoadmitpetitionerforherfailureinPsychiatricNursing,whichsubjectshefailedtotakeup inanotherschoolwhenshetriedtobribetheDeaninthatschool.

Villarv.TIP,136SCRA706(1985) F:
ThepetitionerswerestudentsoftheTechnologicalInstituteofthePhils.(TIP).Theyfiledanactionfor certiorari andprohibition,allegingthattheTIPhaddeniedthemenrollmentbec.oftheirinvolvementinstudentdemonstrationsand activism. Ontheotherhand,theTIPclaimedthatthestudentsweredeniedenrollmentbec.ofacademicdeficiencies. TheirrecordsshowedthatRufinoSalconandRemeoGuilatcoeachfailedin1subjectinthefirstsemesteroftheSY1984 1985.VenecioVillarfailedin2subjectsinthefirstsemofSY19831984.InocencioRecitispassedallsubjectsinthefirst semof19831984butfailed1subjectinthe2ndsem.ofthatyearandthenextyearhehad2failinggrades.Ontheother hand,NovertoBarretofailedin5subjectsinthe1stsemofSY19831984andinyear19841985,heagainfailedin6 subjects.EdgardodeLeonhad3failinggradesinthe1stsemoftheSY19841985.ReglobanLaxamanahad5failing gradesandnopassinggradeinthe1stsemofthe19841985SY.VV.

ISSUE:W/Ntheexerciseofthefreedomofassemblyonthepartofcertainstudentsofresp.TIPcouldbea basisfortheirbeingbannedfromenrollment. HELD:NO.AsinReyesv.Bagatsing,theinvocationoftherighttofreedomofpeaceablesassemblycarriesw/ ittheimplicationthattherighttofullspeechhasalsobeendisregarded.Bothareembracedintheconceptof freedom ofexpression w/c isthelibertytodiscuss publicly&truthfully,anymatter ofpublic interestw/o censorshiporpunishment&w/cisnottobelimitednordeniedexceptonashowingofaclear&presentdanger ofasubstantiveevilthatthestatehasarighttoprevent. Theacademicfreedomenjoyedby"institutionsofhigherlearning"includestherighttosetacademic standardstodetermineunderwhatcircumstancesfailinggradessufficeinexpulsionofstudents. However,it cannotbeutilizedtodiscriminateagainstthosestudentswhoexercisethisconstitutional rightstopeaceable assembly&fullspeech.Ifitdoesso,thenthereisalegitimateguidancebythestudentsprejudiced,theirright

totheequalprotectionclausebeingdisregarded. ISSUE:W/Ntheconstitutionalprovisionastothestatemaintaining"asystemoffullpublicelem.educ.&in areaswherefinancespermit,est.&maintainasystemofthepub.educ.uptohighschoollevelexcludesthe exerciseofthatitincolleges&universities. HELD: The Constitutional provision does not per se exclude the exercise of that right. in colleges & universities.Itisonlyatthemostareflectionofthelackofsufficientfundsforsuchadulytobeobligatoryin thecaseofstudentsincolleges&Universities.Asfarastherightitselfisconcerned,Art.26oftheUniversal DeclarationofHRsprovides:"Everyonehastherighttoeducation.Educ.shallbefullattheleastintheelem. &fundamentalstages.xxxTechnical&professionaleduc.shallbemadegenerallyavailable&highereduc.shall beequallyaccessibletoallonthebasisofmerit." Hence,tothatextent,thereisjustificationforexcluding3ofthepets.bec.oftheirmarkedacademic deficiency.Adapted. Righttoqualityeducationavailableonlyonthebasisofmerit.Whiletherighttocollegeeducationis asocial,economicandculturalright,itisavailableonly"onthebasisofmerit,"asprovidedinArt.26ofthe DeclarationofHumanRights. Accordingly,bec.ofmarkedacademicdeficiency,thedenialofenrollmentto Barreto,DeLeonandLaxamanawasjustified.However,w/regardtoVillar,Salcon,GuitlatcoandRecitis,the refusaloftheTIPtoallowthemtoenrollwasunjustified. Theycouldnotbeexpelledforexercisingtheir constitutional right of free speech and peaceable assembly. As J. Fortas said, students do not shed their constitutionalrightsattheschoolhousegate.VV.

Tangonanv.CruzPano,137SCRA245(1985) F:
PetitionerbroughtsuitformandamustocompeltheCapitolMedicalCenterSchoolofNursingtoadmitherforthe academic year 19761977. She hadbeen previously provisionally admitted theprevious schoolyear, but she failed in PsychiatricNursing.Shetriedtotakethecourseagaininanotherschool,butshewasrefusedadmissionbec.shetriedto bribethedeanoftheschool.WhenshetriedtoreenrolattheCapitolMedicalCenter,shewasdeniedadmission.She broughtthematteroncertiorari.VV.

ISSUE:WONtheschoolcanbecompelledbythecourttoreadmitpetitioner.NO. HELD:Anydutyonthepartoftheschooltoenrolpet.isnotmerelyaministerialdutybutonew/cinvolvesthe exerciseofdiscretionnotcompellablebyMandamus.Capitolwasperfectlyjustifiedinrefusingtoadmither,its refusal(being)sanctionedbytheManualofRegulationsofPriv.Schoolsw/cconsidersacademicdelinquency& violationofdisciplinaryregulationsasvalidgroundsforrefusingenrollmentofastudent.Adapted. Further,tograntrelieftopet.wouldbedoingviolencetotheacademicfreedomenjoyedbyCapitol enshrinedunderAct.XVsec.8(2)Consti.Academicfreedomincludesnotonlythefreedomofprofessionally qualifiedpersonstoinquire,discover,publish&teachthetruthastheyseeitinthefieldoftheircompetence subjecttonocontrolorauthorityexceptofrationalmethodsbyw/ctruthsandconclusions aresoughtand establishedinthesedisciplines,butalsotherightoftheschoolorcollegetodecideforitselfhowbesttoattain themthegrantbeingtoinstitutionsofhigherlearningfreefromoutsidecoercionorinterferencesavepossibly

when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide spread of autonomy certainly extendingtothechoiceofstudents.Saidconstitutionalprovisionisnottobeconstruedinaniggardlymanneror inagrudgingfashion.Thatwouldbetofrustrateitspurposeandnullifyitsintent.VV.

2.Educationalmandateofthestate Art.XIV,Sec.2.Thestateshall: (1)Establish,maintain,andsupportacomplete,adequate,andintegratedsystemofeducation,

relevanttotheneedsofthepeopleandsociety; (2)Establishandmaintainasystemoffreepubliceducationintheelementaryandhighschool levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to reach their children, elementary, education is compulsoryforallchildrenofschoolage; (3)Establishandmaintainasystemofscholarshipgrants,studentloanprogram,subsidies,and other incentives, which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especiallytotheunderprivileged; (4) Encouragenonformal,informal,andindigenouslearningsystems,aswellasselflearning, independent,andoutofschoolstudyprograms,particularlytothosethatrespondtocommunityneeds; and (5)Provideadultcitizens,thedisabled,andoutofschoolyouthwithtrainingincivics,vocational efficiency,andotherskills. (6) Sec.5.(1)TheStateshalltakeintoaccountregionalandsectoralneedsandconditions,and encouragelocalplanninginthedevelopmentofeducationalpoliciesandprograms. (7) Sec.5.(5)Assignthehighestbudgetaryprioritytoeducation,andensurethatteachingwill attractandretainitsrightfulshareofthebestavailabletalentsthroughadequateremunerationandother meansofjobsatisfactionandfulfillment. (8)Sec.5.(2)Adademicfreedomshallbeenjoyedinallinstitutionsofhigherlearning. Academicfreedomistherightofthefacultytopursue,investigate,andpublishinhisfieldofinquiry, withoutfearofecclesiastical,civil,orpoliticalreprisal,exceptonlythejudgmentofhiscompetencebyhisown peers. Institutionalautonomyistherightoftheinstitutionofhigherlearningtosetitownpoliciesonhowto achieveitseducationalgoals. (9) Sec.5.(3)Everycitizenhasarighttoselectaprofessionorcourseofstudy,subjecttofair, reasonable,andequitableandacademicrequirement. (10)Sec.5.(4)TheStateshallenhancetherightofteacherstoprofessionaladvancement.Non teachingacademicandnonacademicpersonnelshallenjoytheprotectionoftheState.

UniversityofthePhilippinesv.Ayson,176SCRA571(1989) F:
Sometimein1972,theUPBoardofRegentsapprovedtheestablishmentofUPCollegeofBaguioHighSchool (UPCBHS)aspartofthegraduateprogramineducationtoserveasalaboratoryanddemonstrationschoolforprospective teachersprovidedthatitbeaselfsupportingunitandshouldnotentailanysubsidyfromthebudgetofUP.xxx xxxIn1989,theUPBoardofRegentsapprovedthephaseoutofUPCBHSasUPCBdoesnotofferprogramsin educationthusthepurposeforwhichitwascreatedwasnotservedanditwasnotselfsupporting. Theprincipalof UPCBHSfiledaninjunctionwithRTCBaguiowhichwasgranted.MFRbyUPdeniedhence,thispetition.

ISSUE:IssecondarypubliceducationdemandableinaninstitutionofhigherlearningsuchastheUniv.ofthe Phils.? (Academicfreedom[Art.XIVsec.5(2)]vs.righttofreepublicsecondaryeducation[Art.XIVsec.2(2)] HELD:Weruleinthenegative.ItisbeyondcavilthatUP,aninstitutionofhigherlearning,enjoysacademic freedomtheinstitutionalkind. ScopeofacademicfreedomasrecognizedintheConstitution. Itisthebusinessofauniversityto providethatatmospherew/cismostconductivetospeculation,experimentalandcreation.Itisanatmospherein w/cthereprevailsthe'fouressentialfreedoms'ofauniversitytodetermineforitselfonacademicgroundswho mayteach,whatmaybetaught,howitshallbetaught,andwhomaybeadmittedtostudy. RA6655(FreePublicSecondaryEducationActof1988),includesinitscoveragestatecollegesand universitiesofferingsecondarycourses. xxx Atthisjuncture,itmustbepointedoutthattheUPCBHSwas establishedsubjecttoanumberofconditionalities,e.g.,itmustbeselfsupporting,itcanserveasafeederforthe UPatBaguio,itcanserveasalaboratoryanddemonstrationschoolforprospectiveteachers,failinginw/cthe Universitycanorderitsabolitiononacademicgrounds,speciallywherethepurposeforw/citwasestablished wasnotsatisfied. UPwascreatedunderitscharter(Act1870)toprovideadvancedtertiaryandnotsecondaryeducation. Sec.2ofAct1870statesthat"thepurposeofUPshallbetoprovideadvanceinstructioninliterature,philosophy, thesciencesandarts,andtogiveprofessionalandtechnicaltraining."Itisapparentthatsecondaryeducationis notthemandatedfunctionofUP;consequently,itcanvalidlyphaseoutorabolishUPCBHSespeciallysowhen therequirementsforitscontinuancehavenotbeenmet,RA6655(FreePublic2ndaryEducationActof1988) notwithstanding. xxx RA6655implementsthepolicyoftheStatetoprovidefreepublicsecondaryeducationandveststhe formulationofasecondarypubliceducationcurriculum,thenationalizationofpublicsecondaryschoolsandthe implementationoftherulesandregulationsthereofupontheSec.ofDECS.xxxHowever,thismandateisnot directedtoinstitutionsofhigherlearninglikeUPbuttogovtthroughtheDECS. Asaninstitutionofhigher learningenjoyingacademicfreedom,UPcannotbecompelledtoprovideforsecondaryeducation. However, shouldUPoperateahighschoolintheexerciseofitsacademicfreedom,RA6655requiresthatthestudents enrolledtherein"shallbefreefrompaymentoftuitionandotherschoolfees."RAM.

Alcuazv.PSBA,178SCRA135(1989) F:
Tamayo, Encarnacion & Magtalas, teachers from PSBA, were dismissed from work due to findings of the investigationthattheyparticipatedintheunlawfuldemonstration.Theyallegethattheyhavebeenarbitrarilyandwantonly terminated.

HELD:NO,theywerenot.Fulltimeteacherswhohaverenderedsatisfactoryservicefor3yrs.areconsidered permanentandthuscannorberemovedfromofficeexceptforjustcauseandafterdueprocess. Although Tamayohasservedfor31/2yrs.,hisservicescannotbedeemedsatisfactoryasheparticipatedintheunlawful demonstration.Theothertwohaveonlyservedfor21/2yrs.Thus,validlyterminated. TheCourtrespectstherightofthestudentstoresorttoralliesanddemonstrationsfortheredressoftheir grievancesandaspartoftheirfreedomtospeechandtoassemble.However,suchralliesanddemonstrations and assemblies should be conducted peacefully and without resort to intimidation, coercion and violence. Academicfreedom inallitsforms,demandsthefulldisplayofdiscipline. Toholdotherwisewouldbeto subvertfreedomintodegeneratelicense.Adapted.

Guingonav.Carague,196SCRA221(1991) F:
UnderPres.Aquino'sadministration,PetitionersSenatorsGuingona&PimentelquestiontheConstitutionalityof the automatic appropriations for debt service in the amount of P86.8 B in the 1990 budget. The said automatic appropriationfordebtserviceisauthorizedbyPD81,PD1177&PD1967,allpromulgatedbyformerPres.Marcos. PD1177,Sec.31Automaticappropriations.Allexpendituresforprincipal&interestonpublicdebt,nationalgovt guaranteesofobligationsw/caredrawnupon,areautomaticallyappropriatedprovidedthatnoobligationsshallbeincurred or payments made from funds thus authomatically appropriated except as issued in the form of regular budgetary allotments. PD 1967, Sec. 1. There is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriatedsuchamountsasmaybenecessarytoeffectpaymentsonforeignordomesticloansxxx PetitionersseekthedeclarationoftheunconstitutionalityofPD81,Sec.31ofPD1177andPD1967.Adapted.

ISSUE:IstheappropriationofP86BillionintheP233Billionof1990budgetviolativeofSec.5,Art.XIVof theConstitution? HELD: WhileitistruethatunderSec.5(5),Art.XIVoftheConsti.,Congressismandatedto"assignthe highestbudgetaryprioritytoeducation"inorderto"insurethatteachingwillattractandretainitsrightfulshare ofthebestavailabletalentsthroughadequateremunerationandothermeansofjobsatisfactionandfulfillment," itdoesnottherebyfollowthatthehandsoftheCongressaresohamstrungastodepriveitthepowertorespond totheimperativesofthenationalinterestandfortheattainmentofotherstatepoliciesorobjectives. Asaptlyobserved byrespondents, since1985, thebudget for education hastripled toupgrade and improvethefacilityofthepublicschoolsystem.Thecompensationforteachershasbeendoubled.Theamount setasidefortheDECSundertheGeneralAppropriationsActisthehighestbudgetaryallocationamongall departmentbudgets.Thisisclearcompliancew/theaforesaidconstitutionalmandateaccordinghighestpriority toeducation. Havingfaithfullycompliedtherewith,Congressiscertainlynotw/oanypower,guidedonlybyitsgood

judgment,toprovideanappropriation,thatcanreasonablyserviceourenormousdebt,thegreaterportionofw/c wasinheritedfromthepreviousadministration.Itisnotonlyamatterofhonorandtoprotectthecreditstanding ofthecountry.Moreespecially,theverysurvivalofoureconomyisatstake.RAM.

3.TheEducationalSystem ArticleXIV,Section3.(1)AlleducationalinstitutionsshallincludethestudyoftheConstitutionas partofthecurricula. (2)Theyshallinculcatepatriotismandnationalism,fosterloveofhumanity,respectforhuman rights,appreciationoftheroleofnationalheroesinthehistoricaldevelopmentofthecountry,teachthe rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge,andpromotevocationalefficiency. (3)Attheoptionexpressedinwritingbytheparentsorguardians,religionshallbeallowedtobe taughttheirchildrenorwardsinpublicelementaryandhighschoolswithintheregularclasshoursby instructorsdesignatedorapprovedbythereligiousauthoritiesofthereligiontowhichthechildrenor wardsbelong,withoutadditionalcosttotheGovernment. StateSupervision Sec.4.(1)TheStaterecognizesthecomplementary,rolesofpublicandprivateinstitutionsinthe educational system, and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.

RequirementsforEducationalInstitutions Sec.4.(2)Educationalinstitutionsotherthanthoseestablishedbyreligiousgroupsandmission boards,shallbeownedsolelybycitizensofthePhilippinecitizensorcorporationsorassociationsatleast sixty percentumofthecapitalofwhichisownedbysuchcitizens.TheCongressmay,however,require increasedFilipinoequityparticipationinalleducationalinstitutions. ThecontrolandadministrationofeducationalinstitutionsshallbevestedinFilipinos. Noeducationalinstitutionshallbeestablishedexclusivelyforaliens,andnogroupofaliensshall comprisemorethanonethirdoftheenrollmentinanyschool.Theprovisionsofthissubsectionshallnot applytoschoolsestablishedforforeigndiplomaticpersonnelandtheirdependents,andunlessotherwise providedbylaw,forotherforeigntemporaryresidents. (In general, then, there are 3 requirements for any educational institution: (1) ownership, (2) management,and(3)studentpopulation.Inthecaseofschoolsforforeigndiplomats,andforeigntemporary residents,however,these3requirementsaredispensedwith)

TaxationofEducationalInstitutions Sec.4.(3)Allrevenuesandassetsofnonstock,nonprofiteducationalinstitutionsusedactually directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolutionorcessationofthecorporateexistenceofsuchinstitutions,theirassetsshallbedisposedofin themannerprovidedbylaw. Proprietaryeducationalinstitutions,includingthosecooperativelyowned,maylikewisebeentitled tosuchexemptions,subjecttosuchlimitationsprovidedbylaw,includingrestrictionsondividendsand provisionsforreinvestment. Alllands,buildings,andimprovementsactually,directly,andexclusivelyusedforreligious,charitable, oreducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxation.[Art.VI,Sec.28(3)] Art.XIV,Sec.4(3),anewprovision,referstoincometax(revenues)andpropertytax(assets),Art.VI, Sec.28(3),anoldprovision,refersonlytorealpropertytax(lands,buildings,andimprovements). A) Educational institutions, whether nonstock and nonprofit or proprietary, whether sectarian or secularfallunderArt.VI,Sec.28(3)andareexemptfromrealpropertytax. But additionallyif an educational institution is nonstock and nonprofit, whether it is sectarian or secular,itfallsunderArt.XIV,Sec.4(3),andsoisexemptfromtaxesonitsrevenuesand,assets(assumingthat theseareactually,directly,andexclusivelyusedforeducationalpurposes). Ifitisproprietary,itwouldfallunderArt.VI,Sec.28(3)andArt.XIV,Sec.4(3),par.2.Thismeans thatitmaybeentitledtocertainexemptionsbylaw,butitisalwaysexemptfromrealpropertytaxonitslands, buildingsandimprovementsactually,directlyandexclusivelyforeducationalpurposes.

Sec. 4. (4) Subject to conditions described by law, all grants, endowments, donations or contributionsusedactually,directly,andexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtax.

Thisreferstodonor'sandgifttaxesmadeouttoeducationalinstitutions.Whethernonstockandnon profitorproprietor/sectarianorsecular,solongasthepropertyisactually,directly,andexclusivelyusedfor educationalpurposes.

MandatesofEducationalInstitutions (1)Includethestudyoftheconstitutionaspartofthecurricula.[Art.XIV,Sec.3(1)] (2)Developthetotalpersonthroughthefollowing:

(NationalisticMandates)

(a) Inculcatepatriotismandnationalism,(b)fosterloveofhumanity,(c)(foster)respectforhuman rights,(d)(foster)appreciationoftherolesofnationalheroesinthehistoricaldevelopmentofthecountry,(e) teachestherightsanddutiesofcitizenship. (MoralSpiritualMandates) (f)Strengthenethicalandspiritualvalues,(g)developmoralcharacterandpersonaldiscipline. (IntellectualMandates)

(h)Encouragecriticalandcreativethinking,(i)broadenscientificandtechnologicalknowledge,and(j) promotevocationalefficiency.[Art.XIV,Sec.3(2)]

(3) Allowtheteachingofreligioninpublicelementaryandhighschoolsattheoptionexpressedin writing bytheparents orguardians totheir childrenorwardswithintheregularclass hours by instructors designatedorapprovedbythereligiousauthoritiesofthereligiontowhichthechildrenorwardsbelong,without additionalcosttothegovernment.[Id.,Sec.3(3)] Thisisthefirsttimethatthisisallowedbytheconstitution.UndertheAdministrativeCode,theteaching ofreligionwasallowed,butonlyoutsideofclasshours.IfweviewthisprovisionwithArt.359oftheCivil Codewhichallowstheintegrationofreligioninthecurriculumuponcertainconditions,thenstudentsmaynow evenbegradedandmayfailtheirreligionsubjects. (4) Undertake regular sports activities in all educational institutions throughout the country in cooperationwithathleticclubsandothersectors.[Art.XIV,Sec.19(2)]

B.Language ArticleXIV,Sec.6.ThenationallanguageofthePhilippinesisFilipino.Asitevolves,itshallbe furtherdevelopedandenrichedonthebasisofexistingPhilippineandotherlanguages. SubjecttoprovisionsoflawandastheCongressmaydeemappropriate,theGovernmentshall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as languageofinstructionintheeducationalsystem. Sec.7.Forpurposesofcommunicationandinstruction,theofficiallanguagesofthePhilippines areFilipinoand,untilotherwiseprovidedbylaw,English. The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall serve as auxiliarymediaofinstructiontherein.

SpanishandArabicshallbepromotedonavoluntaryandoptionalbasis. Sec.8.ThisConstitutionshallbepromulgatedinFilipinoandEnglishandshallbetranslatedinto majorregionallanguages,Arabic,andSpanish. Sec.9.TheCongressshallestablishanationallanguagecommissioncomposedofrepresentatives of various regions and disciplines which shall undertake, coordinate, and promote researches for the development,propagation,andpreservationofFilipinoandotherlanguages.

1.NationalLanguage:Filipino 2.OfficialLanguages:FilipinoandEnglish 3.Auxiliaryofficiallanguages:RegionalLanguages 4.Voluntaryandoptionallanguages:SpanishandArabic TheCongressshallestablishanationallanguagecommissioncomposedofrepresentativesofvarious regions and disciplines which shall undertake, coordinate, and promote researches for the development, propagation,andpreservationofFilipinoandotherlanguages.(Art.XIV,Sec.4.)

C.ScienceandTechnology Policy Art.XIV,Sec.10. Scienceandtechnologyareessentialfornationaldevelopmentandprogress. TheStateshallgiveprioritytoresearchanddevelopment,invention,innovation,andtheirutilization;and toscienceandtechnologyeducation,training,andservices.Itshallsupportindigenous,appropriateand selfreliant scientific and technological capabilities and their application to the country's productive systemsandnationallife.

Incentives Sec.11.TheCongressmayprovideforincentivesincludingtax,deduction,toencourageprivate participationinprogramofbasicandappliedscientificresearch. Scholarships,grantsinaid,orother forms of incentives, shall be provided to deserving science students, researchers, scientists, inventors, technologists,andspeciallygiftedcitizens.

Technologytransfer

Sec.12.TheStateshallregulatethetransferandpromotetheadaptationoftechnologyfromall sources for the national benefit. It shall encourage the widest participation of private groups, local governments, and communitybased organizations in the generation and utilization of science and technology.

IntellectualProperty Sec.13.TheStateshallprotectandsecuretheexclusiverightsofscientists,inventors,artists,and other gifted citizens, to their intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial to the people,forsuchperiodasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

D.ArtsandCulture Guidingpolicy Sec.14.TheStateshallfosterthepreservation,enrichment,anddynamicevolutionofaFilipino national culture, based on the principle of unity in diversity in a climate of artistic and intellectual expression.

ArtsandLetters Sec.15.ArtsandlettersshallenjoythepatronageoftheState.TheStateshallconserve,promote, andpopularizethenation'shistoricalandculturalheritageandresources,aswellasartisticcreations.

Nationaltreasures Sec. 16. All the country's artistic and historic wealth constitutes the cultural treasure of the nationalandshallbeundertheprotectionoftheStatewhichmayregulateit'sdisposition. IndigenousCultures Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communitiestopreserveanddeveloptheircultures,traditions,andinstitutions. Itshallconsiderthese rightsintheformulationofnationplanandpolicies.

Culturalopportunities Sec.18.(1)Thestateshallensureequalaccesstoculturalopportunitiesthroughtheeducational system, public or private cultural entities, scholarship, grants, and other incentives and community culturalcenters,andotherpublicvenues. (2)Thestateshallencourageandsupportresearchesandstudiesontheartsandculture.

E.Sports Sec.19.(1) Thestateshallpromotephysicaleducation,andencouragesportsprogram,league competitions, and amateur sports, including training for international competitions, to foster self discipline,teamwork,andexcellenceforthedevelopmentofahealthyandalertcitizenry. (2)Alleducationalinstitutionsshallundertakeregularsportsactivitiesthroughoutthecountryin cooperationwithathleticclubsandothersectors.

VII.GENERALPROVISIONS A.Ontheflag ArticleXVI,Sec.1.TheflagofthePhilippinesshallbered,whiteandblue,withasunandthree stars,asconsecratedandhonoredbythepeopleandrecognizedbylaw. ActNo.2928,March26,1920,AnActtoAdoptAnOfficialFlagforTheGovernmentofthePhilippineIslands, PrescribingTheRulesforItsUse,AndProvidePenaltiesforTheViolationsofSaidRules. Texasv.Johnson,491US397(June21,1989) Flagburningwhendonetoexpressdissentisprotectedspeech. F:

RespondentJohnsonparticipatedinapoliticaldemonstrationwhereheburnedanAmericanflagwhileprotesters chanted.Noonewasphysicallyinjuredorthreatenedwithinjury,althoughseveralwitnesseswereseriouslyoffendedby theflagburning. JohnsonwasconvictedofdesecrationofaveneratedobjectinviolationofaTexasstatutewhich(1) prohibitedthedesecrationof,amongotherthings,astateornationalflag,and(2)defineddesecrationasthephysical mistreatmentofsuchobjectsinawaywhichtheactorknowswillseriouslyoffendoneormorepersonslikelytoobserveor discovertheact.Astatecourtofappealsaffirmed.TheCourtofCriminalAppealsofTexasreversed,holdingthatthe desecrationstatuteasappliedviolatedthedefendant'srighttofreedomofspeechundertheFederalConstitution'sFirst Amendment,becausethestatute(1)wastoobroadforFirstAmendmentpurposesasitrelatedtobreachesofthepeace,and (2)wasnotadequatelysupportedbythestate'spurportedinterestinpreservingasymbolofunity.

ISSUE:Whethertheflagdesecrationstatuteisunconstitutional

HELD:YES.DecisionAffirmed. Johnson's conviction wasinconsistent with theFirst Amendment undertheparticular circumstances because(1)Johnson'sconductwassufficientlyimbuedwithelementsofcommunicationtoimplicatetheFirst Amendment,giventhatthisflagburningwastheculminationofapoliticaldemonstrationandthatthestate concededthattheprotester'sconductwasexpressive;(2)thestate'sinterestinpreventingbreachesofthepeace was not implicated on the record in this case, since (a) no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatenedtooccurbecauseoftheflagburning,(b)itcannotbepresumedthatanaudiencewhichtakesserious offenseataparticularexpressionisnecessarilylikelytodisturbthepeace,and(c)theflagburningdoesnotfall withinthesmallclassof"fightingwords"thatarelikelytoprovoketheaveragepersontoretaliationandthereby causeabreachofthepeace;and(3)thestate'sassertedinterestinpreservingtheflagasasymbolofnationhood andnationalunitydoesnotjustifytheconviction,since(a)theattemptedrestrictiononexpressioniscontent based,andthussubjecttothemostexactingscrutiny,giventhattheflagdesecrationstatuteisaimednotat protectingthephysicalintegrityoftheflaginallcircumstances,butonlyagainstimpairmentsthatwouldcause seriousoffensestoothersandisaimedatprotectingonlookersfrombeingoffendedbytheideasexpressedbythe prohibitedactivity,and(b)althoughthestatehasalegitimateinterestinencouragingpropertreatmentofthe flag,itmaynotfosteritsownviewoftheflagbyprohibitingexpressiveconductrelatingtoitandbycriminally punishingapersonforburningtheflagasameansofpoliticalprotest. Rehnquist,White,O'Connor,JJ.,DissentingOpinion: (1)TheTexasstatuteisnotinvalidundertheFirstAmendmentasappliedinthiscase,because(a)the AmericanFlaghascometobethevisiblesymbolembodyingournationandisnotsimplyanotherideaorpoint ofviewcompetingforrecognitioninthemarketplaceofideas,andthepublicburningoftheAmericanflagin thiscasewasnoessentialpartofanyexpositionofideasandhadatendencytoinciteabreachofthepeace;and (2)thestatuteisnotunconstitutionallyvagueoroverbroad. Stevens,J.,DissentingOpinion : (1)Sanctioningthedesecrationoftheflagwilltarnishitsvalueasanationalsymbol,atarnishwhichis notjustifiedbythetrivialburdenonfreeexpressionthatisoccasionedbyrequiringthatalternativemodesof expression beemployed; (2)theflagdesecration statute doesnotprescribe orthodox viewsorcompelany conductorexpressionofrespectforanyideaorsymbol;and(3)thedefendant wasprosecutednotforhis criticismofgovernmentpolicies,butforthemethodhechosetoexpressthoseviews,andaprohibitionagainst that methodis supported by a legitimate interest in preserving the quality of an important national asset. Adapted.

Ebranilagv.DivisionSuperintendentofSchoolsofCebu,219SCRA256(1993) ConscientiousObjectorscannotbecompelledtosalutetheflag. F:
AllthepetitionersinthesecaseswereexpelledfromtheirclassesbythepublicschoolauthoritiesinCebufor refusingtosalutetheflag,sincethenationalanthemandrecitethepatrioticpledgeasrequiredbyRA1265andbyDept.

OrderNo.8datedJuly21,1955oftheDECSmakingtheflagceremonycompulsoryinalleducationalinstitutions.

ISSUE: W/Nschoolchildren whoaremembers ofareligious sectknownasJehovah'sWitnesses maybe expelledfromschool(bothprivateandpublic),forrefusing,onaccountoftheirreligiousbeliefs,totakepartin theflagceremonywhichincludesplaying(byaband)orsingingthePhil.NationalAnthem,salutingthePhil. flagandrecitingthepatrioticpledge. HELD:NO. Theideathatonemaybecompelledtosalutetheflag,singthenationalanthem,andrecitethepatriotic pledge,duringaflagceremonyonpainofbeingdismissedfromone'sjoborofbeingexpelledfromschool,is alientotheconscienceofthepresentgenerationofFilipinoswhocuttheirteethontheBillofRightsw/c guaranteestheirrightstofreespeechandthefreeexerciseofreligiousprofessionandworship. xxx xxxForcingasmallreligiousgroup,throughtheironhandofthelaw,toparticipateinaceremonythat violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. xxx The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existenceofagraveandpresentdangerofacharacterbothgraveandimminent,ofaseriouseviltopublicsafety, moral,healthoranyotherlegitimatepublicinterest,thatthestatehasarightanddutytoprevent.Absentsucha threattopublicsafety,theexpulsionofthepets.fromtheschoolsisnotjustified. xxx Althoughpetitionersdonotparticipateinthecompulsoryflagceremony,theydonotengageinexternal actsorbehaviorthatwouldoffendtheircountrymenwhobelieveinexercisingtheirloveofcountrythroughthe observanceoftheflagceremony.Theyquietlystandatattentionduringtheceremonytoshowtheirrespectfor therightofthosewhochoosetoparticipateinthesolemnproceedings.Asthereisnodisruption,expulsionis unwarranted. However,iftheyshouldcommitbreachesofpeacebyactionthatoffendthesensibilities,bothreligious andpatriotic,ofotherpersons,theschoolauthoritieshavethepowertodisciplinethem.Adapted.

B.OntheName,AnthemandSeal Art.XVI,Sec.2.TheCongressmay,bylaw,adoptanewnameforthecountry,anationalanthem, oranationalseal,whichshallallbetrulyreflectiveandsymbolicoftheideals,history,andtraditionsof thepeople.Suchlawshalltakeeffectonlyuponitsratificationbythepeopleinanationalreferendum.

Com.Act382,Sept.5,1938
COMMONWEALTHACTNO.382 ANACTTOADOPTTHEORIGINALAUTHENTICFORMOFTHEPHILIPPINENATIONALANTHEMANDTO

APPROPRIATEFUNDSFORITSPRINTINGANDFREEDISTRIBUTION. TopreservethemusicaladaptationandmotiveintheoriginalauthenticcompositionofthePhilippineNational Anthemassetbyitsauthor,JulianFelipe,andtoattainuniformperformancethereofinthePhilippines: BeitenactedbytheNationalAssemblyofthePhilippines: Sec.1.ThemusicalarrangementandcompositionofthePhilippineNationalAnthemassetbyitsauthor,Julian Felipe,isadopted. Sec.2.Thereisappropriated,outoftheunappropriatedfundsintheNationalTreasury,thesumoffivehundred pesosforthepreparation,printingandfreedistributionofcopiesofthePhilippineNationalAnthemasadjustedtoits originalauthenticoutline. Sec.3.TheNationalLibraryofthePhilippinesisentrustedwiththeaccomplishmenthereof. Sec.4.ThisActshalltakeeffectonitsapproval. Approved,September5,1938.

C.OntheArmedForcesofthePhilippines 1.Conceptofcitizenarmy Art.XVI,Sec.4.TheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshallbecomposedofacitizenarmedforce whichshallundergomilitarytrainingandserve,asmaybeprovidedbylaw.Itshallkeeparegularforce necessaryforthesecurityoftheState. 2.RegulationofTheArmedForces Sec.5.(1) Allmembersofthearmedforcesshalltakeanoathoraffirmationtoupholdand defendthisConstitution. (2) TheStateshallstrengthenthepatrioticspiritandnationalistconsciousnessofthemilitary, andrespectforpeople'srightsintheperformanceoftheirduty. (3)Professionalisminthearmedforcesandadequateremunerationandbenefitsofitsmembers shallbeaprimeconcernoftheState.Thearmedforcesshallbeinsulatedfrompartisanpolitics. Nomemberofthemilitaryshallengagedirectlyorindirectlyinanypartisanpoliticalactivity, excepttovote. (4) No member ofthe armed forces inthe activeservice shall, atany time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government including governmentowned or controlledcorporationsoranyoftheirsubsidiaries. (5)Lawsonretirementofmilitaryofficersshallnotallowextensionoftheirservice. (6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited proportionatelyfromallprovincesandcitiesasfaraspracticable. (7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However,intimesofwarorothernationalemergencydeclaredbytheCongress,thePresidentmayextend suchtourofduty.

Art.XVIII,Sec.24.Privatearmiesandotherarmedgroupsnotrecognizedbydulyconstituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution shall be dissolved or, where appropriate,convertedintotheregularforce.

D.OntheNationalPolice Art.XVI,Sec.6.TheStateshallestablishandmaintainonepoliceforce,whichshallbenational inscopeandcivilianincharacter,tobeadministeredandcontrolledbyanationalpolicecommission.The authorityoflocalexecutivesoverthepoliceunitsintheirjurisdictionshallbeprovidedbylaw.

E.OnRetirementandOtherBenefits 1.Warveterans Sec. 7. The State shall provide immediate and adequate care, benefits, and other forms of assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans. Funds shall be provided therefor and due consideration shall be given them in the disposition of agriculturallandsofthepublicdomainand,inappropriatecases,intheutilizationofnaturalresources. 2.Governmentandprivatesectorretirees Sec.8.TheStateshall,fromtimetotime,reviewtoupgradethepensionsandotherbenefitsdue toretireesofboththegovernmentandtheprivatesectors.

F.OnConsumerProtection Sec. 9. TheState shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardousproducts.

IX.THEAMENDINGPROCESS Cruz,PhilippinePoliticalLaw,1991ed.(hereinafterCruz):

AmendmentandRevision. Art.XVIIprovidesthattheConsti.maybechangedeitherbyamendmentor revision. Amendmentreferstoisolatedorpiecemealchangeonly,asdistinguishedfromrevision,whichisa revamporrewritingofthewholeinstrument. Procedure.TwostepsareinvolvedintheamendmentorrevisionoftheConsti.Thefirstistheproposaland thesecondistheratification. A.Proposal Art.XVII,Section1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby: (1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsMembers;or (2)Aconstitutionalconvention. Cruz:Thechoiceofthemethodofproposalliesintheexclusivediscretionofthelegislature. Sec.2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethrough initiativeuponapetitionofatleasttwelve percentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhich everylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein. Noamendmentunderthissectionshallbeauthorizedwithinfiveyearsfollowingtheratificationofthis Constitutionnoroftenerthanonceeveryfiveyearsthereafter. TheCongressshallprovidefortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright.

Gonzalesv.COMELEC,21SCRA774(1967) F:
On3/16/67,theSenateandtheHReps.passedtheff.resolutions: (1)R.B.H.(ResolutionofBothHouses)No.1proposingthatSec.5,ArtVIoftheConsti.beamendedsoasto increasethemembershipoftheHRepsfromamaximumof120toamaximumof180,tobeapportionedamongtheseveral provincesasnearlyasmaybeaccordingtothenumberoftheirrespectiveinhabitants,althougheachprovinceshallhaveat least1member; (2)R.B.H.No.2,callingaconventiontoproposeamendmentstosaidConsti.,theconventiontobecomposedof2 electivedelegatesfromeachrepresentativedistrict,tobe"electedinthegeneralelectionstobeheldonthesecondTues.of Nov.,1971;"and (3)R.B.HNo.3proposingthatSec.16,Art.VIofthesameConsti.beamendedastoauthorizetheSenatorsof theMembersoftheHRepstobecomedelegatestotheaforementionedconstitutionalconventions,w/oforfeitingtheir

respectiveseatsinCongress. Subsequently,Congresspassedabill,w/c,uponapprovalofthePres.,on6/17/67,becameRA4913,providingthat theamendmentstotheConsti.proposedintheaforementionedResolutionsNos.1and3besubmitted,forapprovalbythe people,atthegeneralelectionsw/cshallbeheldon11/14/67.

ISSUE NO. 1: Alternatives Available to Congress. Atty. Juan David, as amicus curiae, maintains that CongressmayeitherproposeamendmentstotheConsti.orcallaconventionforthatpurpose,butitcan notdo both,atthesametime. HELD:Thistheoryisbaseduponthefactthatthe2alternativesareconnectedintheConsti.bythedisjunctive "or."Suchbasisis,however,aweakone,intheabsenceofothercircumstancessupportingtheconclusiondrawn bytheamicuscuriae ISSUENO.2:MayConstitutionalAmendmentsbesubmittedforratificationinageneralelection? HELD:Yes.The1935Consti.provides:
Art.XV,Sec.1.TheCongressinjointsessionassembled,byavoteofthreefourthsofalltheMembersofthe SenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesvotingseparately,mayproposeamendmentstothisConstitutionorcalla conventionforthepurpose.SuchamendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthisConstitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityof thevotescastatanelectionatwhichtheamendmentsaresubmittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.

Thereisinthisprovisionnothingtoindicatethatthe"election"thereinreferredtoisa"special,"not generalelection.Thecircumstancethat3previousamendmentstotheConsti.hadbeensubmittedtothepeople forratificationinspecialelectionsmerelyshowsthatCongressdeemeditbesttodosounderthecircumstances then obtaining. It does not negateits authority tosubmit proposed amendments forratification in general elections. ISSUENO.3:WouldthesubmissionnowoftheContestedAmendmentstothePeopleViolatetheSpiritofthe Constitution? HELD:No.xxxAlegislationcannotbenullifiedbyreasonofthefailureofcertainsectorsofthecommunity todiscussitsufficiently. Itsconstitutionalityorunconstitutionalitydependsuponnootherfactorsthanthose existingatthetimeoftheenactmentthereof,unaffectedbytheactsoromissionsoflawenforcingagencies, particularlythosethattakeplacesubsequentlytothepassageorapprovalofthelaw. xxx Thedetermination oftheconditions underw/c theproposed amendments shallbe submittedtothe peopleisconcededlyamatterw/cfallsw/inthelegislativesphere.Wedonotbelieveithasbeensatisfactorily shownthatCongresshasexceededthelimitsthereofinenactingRA4913.xxx J.Sanchez,Dissenting: In order that the proposed amendments could be considered to have been properly submitted, "the people must be afforded opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them w/ the proposed

amendments,andtrytoreachaconclusionasthedictatesoftheirconsciencesuggest,freefromtheincubusof extraneousorpossiblyinsidiousinfluence. Theremustbeafairsubmission,intelligentconsentorrejection." Suchfairsubmissionwouldbepossibleonlyiftheplebiscitewerescheduledonaspecialdate.RAM.

1.ByCongress Art.VII,Section1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby: (1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsMembers;or (2)Aconstitutionalconvention. 1935Constitution,Art.XV Art.XV,Sec.1. TheCongressinjointsessionassembled,byavoteofthreefourthsofallthe MembersoftheSenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesvotingseparately,mayproposeamendments tothisConstitutionorcallaconventionforthepurpose.Suchamendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthis Constitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastatanelectionatwhichtheamendmentsare submittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.

Gonzalesv.COMELEC,supra.

2.ByConstitutionalConvention Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of twothirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention,orbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,submittotheelectoratethequestionofcallingsucha convention.

3.ByThePeoplethroughInitiative RA6735,Secs.5(b)&9(b)
Sec.5.Requirements.xxx (b)Apetitionforaninitiativeonthe1987Constitutionmusthaveatleasttwelvepercentum(12%)ofthe totalnumberofregisteredvotersassignatories,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleast threepercentum(3%)oftheregisteredvoterstherein.InitiativeontheConstitutionmaybeexercisedonlyafterfive (5)yearsfromtheratificationofthe1987Constitutionandonlyonceeveryfive(5)yearsthereafter.

Sec.9.EffectivityofInitiativeorReferendumProposition.xxx (b) ThepropositioninaninitiativeontheConstitutionapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastinthe plebisciteshallbecomeeffectiveastothedayoftheplebiscite.

B.Ratification 1.InCaseofAmendmentProposedbyCongressorConvention Art.XVII,Sec.4. Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionunderSection1hereof shallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscitewhichshallbeheldnotearlier thansixtydaysnorlaterthanninetydaysaftertheapprovalofsuchamendmentorrevision. xxx 2.InCaseofAmendmentProposedthroughInitiative Sec.4.xxx AnyamendmentunderSection2hereofshallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certificationbytheCommissiononElectionsofthesufficiencyofthepetition.

3. PlebiscitetoBeCalledbyCongressAndSupervisedbyCOMELECButTheInitiativeon ConstitutionWillBeCalledByCOMELEC.

C.Theoriesregardingthepositionoftheconstitutionalconventioninoursystemofgovernment Cruz: Position of the Constitutional Convention. There are 3 theories on the relative position of the constitutionalconventionvisvistheregulardepartmentsofthegovernment: 1.TheoryofConventionalSovereignty.Thefirstholdsthattheconstitutionalconventionissupreme overtheotherdepartmentsofthegovtbec.thepowersitexercisesareinthenatureofsovereignpowers. 2. Thesecondtheoryconsiderstheconstitutionalconventioninferiortotheotherdepartmentsofthe govtsinceitismerelyacreationofthelegislature.(LegislativeControlTheory.) 3.Thethirddeclaresthataslongasitexistsandconfinesitselfw/inthesphereofitsjurisdiction,the constitutionalconventionmustbeconsideredindependentofandcoequalw/theotherdepartmentsofthegovt. (CoequalityTheory.) Thethirdofthesetheories,w/cisthemostpopular,hasbeenobservedinthisjurisdictionsincethecase ofMabanagv.LopezVito,78Phil.1.

Tolentinov.COMELEC,41SCRA702(1971)

F:

Thisisapetitionforprohibitionprincipallytorestraintheresp.COMELECfromundertakingtoholdaplebiscite on11/8/71atw/ctheproposedconstitutionalamendmentreducingthevotingageinSec.1ofArtVofthe1935Consti.to 18yrs.shallbesubmittedforratificationbythepeoplepursuanttoOrganicResolutionNo.1oftheConConof1971and thesubsequentimplementingresolutions,bydeclaringsaidresolutionstobew/otheforceandeffectoflawinsofaras theydirecttheholdingofsuchplebisciteandbyalsodeclaringtheactsoftheresp.COMELECperformedandtobedone byitinobediencetotheaforesaidConContobenullandvoid,forbeingviolativeoftheConsti. xxx ThemainthrustofthepetitionisthatOrganicResolutionNo.1andtheotherimplementingresolutionsthereof subsequentlyapprovedbytheConConhavenoforceandeffectaslawsinsofarastheyprovidefortheholdingofa plebiscitecoincidentw/theelectionof8senatorsandallcity,provincialandmunicipalofficialstobeheldon11/8/71, hencealloftheComelec'sactsinobediencethereofandtendingtocarryouttheholdingoftheplebiscitedirectedbysaid resolutionsarenullandvoid,onthegroundthatthecallingandholdingofsuchaplebisciteis,bytheConsti.,apower lodgedexclusivelyinCongress,asalegislativebody,andmaynotbeexercisedbytheConvention,andthat,underSec.1, Art. XV of the1935 Consti., theproposed amendment in question cannot bepresentedto thepeople forratification separatelyfromeachandalloftheotheramendmentstobedraftedandproposedbytheConvention.

ISSUE:Inthecaseatbar,theultimatequestionis:IsthereanylimitationorconditioninSec.1,Art.XVofthe Consti.w/cisviolatedbytheactoftheconventionofcallingforaplebisciteonthesoleamendmentcontainedin OrganicResolutionNo.1? HELD: TheCourtholdsthatthereis,anditistheconditionandlimitationthatalltheamendmentstobe proposedbythesameConventionmustbesubmittedtothepeopleinasingle"election"orplebiscite. InorderthataplebiscitefortheratificationofanamendmenttotheConsti.maybevalidlyheld,itmust provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendmentperseaswellasitsrelationtotheotherpartsoftheConsti.w/w/cithastoformaharmonious whole. Inthecontextofthepresentstateofthings,wheretheConventionhashardlystartedconsideringthe meritsofhundreds,ifnotthousands,ofproposalstoamendtheexistingConsti.,topresenttothepeopleany singleproposalorafewofthemcannotcomplyw/thisrequirement.UnderSec.1,Art.XVoftheConsti.,a proposaltoamendtheConsti.,shouldbesubmittedtothepeoplenotseparatelyfrombuttogetherw/allthe otheramendmentstobeproposedbythispresentConvention. Limitstothepowerofaconstitutionalconvention. Astomattersnotrelatedtoitsinternaloperation andtheperformanceofitsassignedmissionstoproposeamendments totheConsti.,theconventionandits officersandmembersareallsubjecttoalltheprovisionsoftheexistingConsti.Nowweholdthatevenastoits lattertaskofproposingamendmentstotheConsti.,itissubjecttotheprovisionsofSec.1ofArt.XV.Thismust beso,bec.itisplaintousthattheframersoftheConsti.tookcarethattheprocessofamendingthesameshould notbeundertakenw/thesameeaseandfacilityinchanginganordinarylegislation.RAM.

D.JudicialReviewofTheAmendingProcess Gonzalesv.COMELEC,supra. Theissuew/naResolutionofCongressactingasaconstituentassemblyviolatestheConstitutionis

essentiallyajusticiable,notpolitical(question),andhence,subjecttojudicialreview. Nature of Power to Amend the Constitution. The power to amend the Consti. or to propose amendmentstheretoisnotincludedinthegeneralgrantoflegislativepowerstoCongress. Itisapartofthe inherentpowersofthepeopleastherepositoryofsovereigntyinarepublicanstate,suchasourstomake, andhence,toamendtheirownfundamentallaw.CongressmayproposeamendmentstotheConsti.merelybec. thesameexplicitlygrantssuchpower.Hence,whenexercisingthesame,itissaidthatSenatorsandMembersof theHReps.act,notasmembersofCongressbutascompetentelementsofa constituentassembly.Whenacting assuch,themembersofCongressderivetheirauthorityfromtheConsti., unlikethepeople,whenperforming thesamefunction,fortheirauthoritydoesnotemanatefromtheConsti.theyaretheverysourceofallpowers ofgovt,includingtheConstitutionitself. Since,whenproposing,asaconstituentassembly,amendmentstotheConsti.,themembersofCongress derivetheirauthorityfromtheFundamentalLaw,itfollows,necessarily,thattheydonothavethefinalsayon w/ntheiractsarew/inorbeyondconstitutionallimits.Otherwise,theycouldbrushasideandsetthesameat naught,contrarytothebasictenetthatoursisagovtoflawsandnotofmen,andtotherigidnatureofour Consti.xxx Judicial power to nullify executive or legislative acts, not violative of principle of separation of powers.ThesystemofchecksandbalancesunderlyingthejudicialpowertostrikedownactsoftheExecutive oroftheCongresstranscendingtheconfinessetforthinthefundamentallawisnotinderogationofpowers, pursuanttow/ceachdept.issupremew/initsownsphere.

Tolentinov.COMELEC,supra. ISSUE:W/NSChasjurisdictionoveractsofConstitutionalConvention? HELD:YES. ThecourtsmayreviewthevalidityofanactoftheConstitutionalConventionproposingaparticular amendmenttotheConsti.xxx Powertoreviewactsoftheconstitutionalconvention. Aconstitutionalconventionissupremew/inthe domainofitslegitimateauthority.Arevolutionaryconventionw/cdraftsthefirstConsti.ofanentirelynewgovt born either of war or liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing govt or of a bloodlessseizureofpower alacoupd'etat iscompletelyw/orestraintandomnipotent. The1971ConCon, however,cameintobeingonlybyvirtueoftheprovisionsofthe1935Consti. True it is that once convened, this convention became endowed w/ extraordinary powers generally beyondthecontrolofanydeptoftheexistinggovt,butthecompassofsuchpowerscanbecanbecoextensive onlywiththepurposeforwhichitwascalledandastheamendmentsitmayproposecannothaveanyeffectas partoftheConsti.untilthesameareratifiedbythepeople,itnecessarilyfollowsthattheactsoftheConvention, itsofficersandmembers,arenotimmunefromattackonconstitutionalgrounds.ThepresentConstiisinfull forceandeffectinitsentiretyandineveryoneanditsparts,theexistenceoftheConventionnotwithstanding,and operatesevenwithinthewallsofthatassembly.AstheConstiConventionissubjecttotheConstitutionandthe ruleoflaw,thusuponprinciple,reasonofauthority,itiswithinthepower,asitisthesolemndutyofthecourt, undertheexistingConsti(1935)toresolvetheissuesinthiscase.

Rationaleforthepowerofjudicialreview.InupholdingthejurisdictionoftheCourtoverthecaseat bar,itisnotbec.theCourtissuperiortotheConConorthattheConventionissubjecttothecontrolofthe Court,butsimplybec.boththeConConandtheCourtaresubjecttotheConsti.andtheruleoflaw,and"upon principle,reasonandauthority,"perJ.Laurel,itisw/inthepower,asitisthesolemndutyoftheCourtunderthe existingConsti.,toresolvetheissuesinw/cpetitioner,respondentsandintervenorshavejoinedinthiscase. RAM.

Javellanav.ExecutiveSecretary,50SCRA30(1973.) Byvirtueofthemajorityofsixvotesw/fourdissentingvotes,allthecasesweredismissed.Thisbeing thevoteofthemajority,thereisnofurtherjudicialobstacletotheNewConstitutionbeingconsideredinforce andeffect.

Art.VIII,Sec.1. ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlower courtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw. xxx

E.WhenWillProposedAmendmentsTakeEffect? CompareArt.XVII,Sec.4withArt.XVIII,Sec.27 Art.XVII,Sec.4. Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionunderSection1hereof shallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscitewhichshallbeheldnotearlier thansixtydaysnorlaterthanninetydaysaftertheapprovalofsuchamendmentorrevision. AnyamendmentunderSection2hereofshallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certificationbytheCommissiononElectionsofthesufficiencyofthepetition. Art. XVIII, Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon ratification by a majority of the votes case in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. xxx

Recall DeLeonvEsguerra,153SCRA602(1987)whichheldthat: The1987Constitutiontookeffect on February2,1987,thedateoftheplebiscitenotonFebruary11,1987,thedateofProclamationNo.58,which proclaimedthattheConstitutionwasratifiedbythepeople.

UPDATED1/25/96 REVISED5/13/96 RAM