THE CONSTITUTION CASE 1: De Leon vs.

Esguerra FACTS: Alfredo De Leon, petitioner, was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores under the Barangay Election Act of 1982 in the Barangay Election held on May 17, 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 (but was signed by Esguerra, the respondent on February 8,1987) designating Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores pursuant to the authority of the Minister of the Local Government. Petitioner contended that Sec. 3 of Barangay Election Act of 1982, their term of office shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified or up to June 7, 1988, and also with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the respondent Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. Respondent contends that the term of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that the petitioner continued office is by virtue of Sec. 2. Article III of the Provisional Constitution which provides All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation of appointment and qualification of the successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986 and not because their six (6) years term had not yet expired and that the provision in the Barangay Election Code fixing the term is inconsistent with the aforequoted Provisional Constitution. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the designation of respondent to replace the petitioner was validly made? 2. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987 (date of ratification) or February 11, 1987 (date of proclamation)? RULING: Considering between the two dates, December 1, 1986 (antedated Memorandum) and February 8, 1987, the latter date should be considered the effective designation, both are still within the one-year period within which replacement of elective and appointive officials shall be valid. The SC ruled that the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to make it effective on the date of its ratification, February 2, 1987. Art. XVIII, Sec. 27

clearly provided that this Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. Consequently, after that date, respondent could not validly designate the elective positions occupied by the petitioner. THE CONSTITUTION COMELEC FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representative, acting as Constituent Assembly, passed the following resolutions: 1. Resolution of Both House (RBH) No. 1 proposing that Sec. 5, Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 to 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member; 2. RBH No. 2 calling a Constitutional Convention to propose amendment to said Constitution, the convention shall be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general election to be held on second Tuesday of November 1971; and 3. RBH No. 3 proposing that Sec. 16, Art VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representative to become delegates to the Constitutional Convention without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which upon approval of the President, on June 17, 1967, became RA 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the RBH Nos. 1 and 3 be submitted for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. Sec. 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution (1935): The Congress in a joint session assembled by a vote of of all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately is necessary and such amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. RBH Nos. 1 and 3, is urged to be null and void despite of having approved by a vote of of all the CASE 2: Gonzales vs.

members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter upon the ground that the same is merely political; 2. Whether or not the members of the Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are at best, de facto Congressmen; 3. Whether or not Congress may adopt either one of the two alternatives to propose amendments and call a convention, and there for may not avail both at the same time; 4. Whether or no the election, in which the proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election; and 5. Whether or not that the election, in which proposals for amendments shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under conditions which, allegedly, do not exist as to give the people reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said amendments. HELD:
1. 5. 4.

Constitutional Provisions on Congress to be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967. Whereas RBH No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to consider proposal for amendments to the Constitution in general. Moreover, the amendments proposed under RBH Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the constitutional convention called in RBH No. 2. Although the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they were to be taken up and put to a vote separately. May a Constitutional Amendments be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election Although the majority view that it should be submitted in a special election, however votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare RA 4913 unconstitutional. Hence, the answer is YES, constitutional amendments may be submitted for ratification in a general election. NOTA BENE: Petitioners maintain that the term election, as used in Sec. 1, Art XV of the Constitution should be construed as a special. Some of the members of the Court even feel that the said term election refers to plebiscite, without any election, general or special, of public officers. Less than 8 favored the declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 4913. Would the Submission Now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violates the Spirit of the Constitution It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had eight (8) months to be informed of the amendments in question. Also RA 4913 provides for the publication and posting of the proposed amendments. :)

As a Constituent Assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the Congress derive their authority from the fundamental law, it necessarily follows that they do not have the final say whether or not their acts are within or beyond the constitutional limits, whether or not a resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable and not political, and hence subject to judicial review. Mabanag vs. Lopez-Vito is deemed modified. Legality of Congress and Legal Status of Congressmen The failure of the Congress to enact a reapportionment within the 3-year period does not automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress. Failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would not automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect. Available Alternatives to Congress The Congress may either propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose but it cannot do both, at the same time. It is noted however, that in the present case, RBH Nos. 1 and 3 proposed amendments to the

2.

THE CONSTITUTION COMELEC FACTS:

CASE

3:

Imbong

vs.

3.

On March 16, 1967, Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, pursuant to Art XV of the Constitution, passed RBH No. 2 calling for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two (2) delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of November 1970. After the adoption of the said RBH in 1967 but before the

November election of that year, Congress acting as legislative body enacted RA 4914 implementing RBH No. 2, practically stating in toto the provisions of the said RBH. On June 17, 1969, Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed RBH No. 4, amending RBH No. 2 of March 16, 1967, providing for the apportionment, composition and qualification of delegates and other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, the constitutional convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided that, it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of RBH No. 4. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6132 is unconstitutional on the ground that Congress cannot act as a legislative body, enact a statute providing the implementation of a resolution to call for a Constitutional Convention. HELD: The Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, may with concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, call a constitutional convention in general terms only. Thereafter, the same Congress, acting as a legislative body, may pass necessary implementing law providing for the details of the constitutional convention, such as the number, the qualifications, etc. The statute may be enacted in accordance with the ordinary legislative process.

ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.

4. SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-34150 APRIL 2, 1981 FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contend that such resolution is against the constitutions in proposing amendments:

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."

3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose

amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.

6. SANIDAD vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976) Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991

5.Tolentino vs COMELEC (Amendment to the Constitution) Facts: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite on the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18, before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Tolentino et al filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite and the same was granted by the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.

HELD: The propose amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a proper frame of reference in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the Doctrine of Submission which means that all the

and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L- 44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum- Plebiscite of October 16.

Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the : (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of

Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory

Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: 1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative?

HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments

7.Santiago vs Comelec G.R No. 127325, March 19, 1997 (People's Initiative, Political Law)

FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file

to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

2. Does the fact that a corporation perform certain functions of the government make them part of the Government of the Philippines? HELD: No. NACOCO may not be considered in the term Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The term Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to a government entity through which the functions of government are exercises, including various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to central, provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government. This requires a little digression on the nature and functions of our government as instituted in our Constitution. The term Government may be defined as that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them (US v Dorr). This institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constituent and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional. There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of private corporations under the Corporation Law. They do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the State.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

CONCEPT OF THE STATE

THE STATE CASE 1: Bacani and Matoto vs. NACOCO FACTS: Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch 6 of the CFI of Manila. During the pendency of the Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Sycip vs National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), Assistant Corporate Counsel Alikpala, counsel for the Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied and defendants paid the corresponding fees. Upon inspecting the books of NACOCO, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid. The Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse the said amounts contending that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from payment of the fees in question. Thereafter, the Auditor General issued an order directing the Cashier of the DOJ to deduct from the salary of Bacani and Leopoldo every payday. To prevent deduction of these fees from their salaries and secure a judicial ruling that NACOCO is no a government entity with the purview of Sec 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, this action was instituted in the CFI of Manila. ISSUE: 1. Whether or no the NACOCO may be considered as included in the term Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purposes of exemption of the legal fees provided in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court;

THE STATE CASE 2: PVTA vs CIR FACTS: On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due them. There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) denying the allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The issues were thereafter joined, and the case set for trial, with both parties presenting their evidence. After the parties submitted the case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. There was a motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same. Hence this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA is beyond the jurisdiction of the CIR as it is exercising governmental functions? HELD: While its submission as to the governmental character of its operation is to be given credence, it is not a necessary consequence that respondent Court is devoid of jurisdiction. Nor could the challenged order be set aside on the additional argument that the Eight-Hour Labor Law is not applicable to it. So it was, at the outset, made clear. The distinction set forth in Bacani vs NACOCO case between the constituent and ministrant functions is irrelevant in our jurisdiction and such distinction has been blurred because of the repudiation of the laissez faire policy in the Constitution. "The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than

is any private individual or group of individuals", continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice." The 1935 Constitution imposed a greater role on the government. THE STATE CASE 3: Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad (PARENS PATRIAE) FACTS: Contributions were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863 but part of the money was never distributed and instead deposited with Monte de Piedad, defendant bank. In an action for its recovery filed later by the Philippine Government, the defendant questioned the competence of the plaintiff, contending that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heir. It is further contended that obligation on the part of Monte de Piedad to return the deposited amount to the Government was wiped out on the change of sovereignty or in other words, the present Philippine Government cannot maintain this action for that reason. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Government can maintain an action against Monte de Piedad for the recovery of the amount deposited in the said bank? HELD: Yes, the Philippine Government can maintain an action against Monte de Piedad for the State is the parens patriae in representation of the legitimate claimants. Furthermore, when there is total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region, all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political charter, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force. But municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force unless they have been repealed by the present Government. The laws which conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and duty

THE STATE CASE 4: Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh FACTS: This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was no de facto governments. ISSUE: 1. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces; 2. Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and 3. If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and

continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands. HELD: 1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. There are three governments: kind of de facto

a) That gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter; b) That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force; and c) That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state. Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino who, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion, had organized an independent government under the name with the support and backing of Japan, such government would have been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the Unite States. 2. The proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other

government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. 3. Law once established continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty." The present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese regime and, therefore, can continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. THE STATE CASE 5: People vs. Gozo FACTS: Loreta Gozo, the accused bought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one on its place without securing a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City. On December 29, 1966, a building and lot inspector together with a police force of Olongapo City apprehended four carpenters working on the house of the accused. Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964. The Olongapo City Court found her guilty of violating the said city ordinance and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the costs. The Court of Instance of Zambales, on appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of violating such municipal ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200.00 and to demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but in her brief, she would put in issue the validity of such an ordinance on constitutional ground or at the very least its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Government is divested of its sovereignty over territory where it allowed foreign military bases pursuant to military bases agreement.

HELD: By the Agreement, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. It does not give up part of its sovereignty but only limits the exercise of sovereignty. THEORY OF AUTOLIMITATION

6.

Laurel Vs. Misa

Facts: the Supreme Court, in a resolution, acted on the petition for the writ ofhabeas corpus filed by petitioner anastacio laurel based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason definedand penalized by article 114 of the revised penal code for the reason that 1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens therto was then suspended;and 2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine republic.Issues:Whether or not the allegiance of the accused as a Filipino citizen was suspendedand that there was a change of sovereignty over the Phil Islands.Held:No, a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government of sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of theinhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate governmentor sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby theoccupier.Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Govt, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the US as well as against the sovereignty of the Phil Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of govt from commonwealthto republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the commonwealth, bec it is an

offense against the samegovt and the same sovereign people.

7.

Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff

Army. Aside from that, and in response to petitioners argument that courts-martial have no jurisdiction over the case, the Court ruled that courts-martial do have authority, being agencies of executive character. Petition isdenied. Dissenting Opinion:Perfecto, J.The fact that enemy occupation does not relieve petitioners from their sworn duties as well as from the punishment they must incur for their conduct is affirmed. However, petition must be granted on thegrounds that final judgments should come from the Supreme Courtwho has the authority to review, revise, reverse or modify judgments by military tribunals. Courts-martial are, in fact, inferior courts established by law.

75 Phil 875August 20, 1946Tuason, Facts: Outbreak of the war against Japanese invaders Ramon Ruffy, Prudente Francisco and Andres Fortus, petitionersherein, were the Provincial Commander, a junior officer and acorporal of the Philippine Constabulary garrison stationed inMindoro, respectively Japanese forces came to Mindoro which made Ruffys troopretreat to the mountains and organized a guerilla outfit calledthe Bolo Combat Team or the Bolo Area Civilians Jose Garcia, Dominador Adeva and Victoriano Dinglasanalso became members of the Bolo Area Petitioners were promoted: Ruffy was named the CommandingOfficer of the Bolo Area, Dinglasan became the Finance Officer,Garcia was named Captain while Adeva and Francisco werenamed 3rd Lt. and 2ndLt, respectively Change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected relievingRuffy of his position by Capt. Beloncio Capt. Beloncio was allegedly slain by petitioners Issue:Whether or not petitioners were subject to military law at thetime the offense for which they had been placed on trial wascommitted Held: Yes, petitioners were still subject to military law at the time theoffense was committed. The Court ruled that members of the ArmedForces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of Warand other laws relating to the Armed Forces even during the Japanese occupation. The act of unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in defiance of the 95the Article of War, held subjects liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, petitioners were officers of the BoloArea and the 6th Military District, operating under orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders of the US

PEOPLE 1. Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration GR L-21289, 4 October 1971

Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a nonimmigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter thePhilippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On thedate of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines onor before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within theperiod as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions,she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962,she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an allegedFilipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigrationto confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expirationof her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction.The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer forpreliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriageto a Filipino citizen.

HELD: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying aFilipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is notdisqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise,an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows thePhilippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalizationas Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through anaturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it shouldfollow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytimethe citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to suchcitizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed outagain and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to havebecome a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al asEdilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962 2. PO XO BI vs REPUBLIC (PDF file) SOVEREIGNTY LAUREL VS. MISA 77 PHIL 856 absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign the Filipino people is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.

PERALTA V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 75 PHIL 285

FACTS: Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. 9 of the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonmentby the Court of Special and Exclusive

FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter II of Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7.

The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio, that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights; that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: Yes. In general, the cast of the occupant possess legal validity, and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent government. But this rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed the occupants power (e.g., alienation of the domains of the State or the sovereign), to sentences for war treason and war crimes, to acts of a political character, and to those that beyond the period of occupation. When occupation ceases, no reparation is legally due for what has already been carried out. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of

The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the petitioner and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices.

the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur. The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.

RUFFY V. CHIEF OF STAFF 75 PHIL 857

FACTS: Ruffy, a provincial commander of the Philippine Constabulary, instead of surrendering to the Japanese forces, disbanded his company, retreated to the mountains and led a guerilla unit. Lieut. Col. Jurado,

ISSUE: whether Ordinance No. 7 is functus officio by reason sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government

recognized by the United States Armed Forces, was sent to replace Ruffy but was slain by the latter and his companions. The same people who killed the replacing officer claim that they were not subject to military law at the time when the offense was committed.

Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy. Reagan to be at P17912.34 and that his income tax would be P2797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in foreign soil since Clark Air Base, in legal HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law .The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction. ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax? contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.

The rule suspending political laws only affects the civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory and is not intended to bind the enemies in arms. Thus, members of the armed forces continued to be covered by the National Defense Act, the Articles of War, and other laws relating to the armed forces even during the Japanese occupation. By the acceptance of the petitioners appointments as officers in the Philippine Army they became amenable to the Articles of War.

HELD: The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagans assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This countrys jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not

REAGAN VS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 30 SCRA 968

excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted

FACTS: Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air Force. In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson Jr for $6600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of

that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence taxable.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL

FACTS: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). This Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points reached between GRP and MILF Peace Panel and of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland.

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself. 6. cralawWhether the

inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of

Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon,

Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the Homeland projected is a

Bangsamoro According to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is vested to the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as the first nation with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by the MOA-AD the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangasmoro. It was also stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its internal waters. HELD: Issue 1: 7.

justiciable question; and cralawWhether constitutional MOA-AD is

The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to the moot and academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of

ISSUES: 1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic 2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern.

repetition yet evading review. Issue 2: Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a proper matter for judicial review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate under E.O. No. 3 and the fact that the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication. Issue 3: The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding,

respondents almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Issue 4: Yes, there is a violation of the peoples right to information.An essential element of this right is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. Issue 5: No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under international law. It would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law. Issue 6: Yes. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato,

a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. Issue 7: Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled with the present constitution. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. The associative relationship between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. The court denied the respondents motion to dismiss and granted the main and intervening petitions.

Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. These petitions afford