Ireland, the Marshall Plan, and U.S.

Cold War Concerns

Whelan, Bernadette.
Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 8, Number 1, Winter 2006, pp. 68-94 (Article)
Published by The MIT Press

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Ireland, Whelan the Marshall Plan, and U.S. Cold War Concerns

Ireland, the Marshall Plan, and U.S. Cold War Concerns

Bernadette Whelan

he broad proposal for what became the Marshall Plan was laid out by U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall in his June 1947 commencement address at Harvard University. Marshall highlighted the grim conditions in Europe and offered U.S. economic assistance to speed the continents recovery. He spoke of the physical destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads and the economic dislocation that resulted in shortages of food, fuel, and raw materials affecting both urban and rural populations. He said that governments were being forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure . . . necessities abroad and therefore were unable to recover by dint of their own efforts, the living standards which their peoples enjoyed prior to the war.1 The initiative he proposed would seek to break the vicious circle and restore the condence of the Europeans in their own economic future and the future of Europe as a whole.2 Marshalls speech focused on three main points: rst, the threat to the free world resulting from the imminent economic, social, and political collapse of Europe; second, the offer of aid to interested European states acting together rather than individually; and third, the urgent need to establish conditions within which free institutions could be restored. From April 1948 to January 1952, the United States provided loans and grants worth nearly $13 billion to fteen European countries. The historiography of the Marshall Plan is immense. Thousands of books and articles provide traditional, revisionist, and post-revisionist interpretations of the plans origins, implementation, and impact. In the 1960s and
1. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofce, serial publication), 1947, Vol. III, p. 225 (hereinafter referred to as FRUS, with appropriate year and volume numbers); and Henry S. Commager, ed., Documents of American History (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1973), pp. 532534. 2. Commager, ed., Documents of American History, pp. 532534. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 6894 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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1970s, revisionist historians argued that the European Recovery Program (ERP) was a key instrument in U.S. foreign policy. They looked at the ERP largely in the context of the origins and impact of the Cold War. The increased availability of formerly secret documents in the late 1970s and 1980s led to a post-revisionist view, along with a rening of the revisionist interpretation. This latter strand is particularly evident in Sallie Pisanis 1991 study of the relationship between the Marshall Plan administration and the Ofce of Policy Co-ordination, the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Pisani convincingly argues that the Marshall Plan was used in part for covert interventionist purposes to combat Communism in selected ERP states. Subsequently, David Ellwood and Anthony Carew traced the methods used by the Marshall planners to oppose Communism in ERP countries and strengthen the democratic capitalist systems there. They argue that the planners launched extensive productivity, publicity, and propaganda campaigns in Europe to remake the old world in the likeness of the new one.3 Nevertheless, the ERP at its core was designed to use economic, nancial, and propaganda methods and structures to promote reconstruction, recovery, and prosperity in Western Europe, thereby thwarting the expansionist tactics of domestic Communist parties and Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. This article examines how Americas anti-Communist and strategic concerns were promoted in Ireland through the Marshall Plan. The article begins by considering why the United States invited Ireland to participate in the Marshall Plan, particularly when the Communist threat there appeared slight and U.S. strategic needs were being met through access to Northern Irelands territory. The article then determines whether U.S. concerns about the emerging Cold
3. Because of the increasing availability of national archives, the vast historiography on Americas role in postwar Europe now includes countless items relating to the Marshall Plan. Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 194551 (London: Methuen, 1984), minimizes U.S. inuence in the process of European recovery and evolution toward greater integration. On the other hand, Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947 1952 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), argues that the United States was somewhat successful in reshaping Western Europe in Americas image. For a solid historiographical essay on the Marshall Plan generally and from national perspectives, see John Killick, The United States and European Reconstruction, 194560 (Edinburgh, UK: Keele University Press, 1997). See also Sallie Pisani, The CIA and the Marshall Plan (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991); David Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction (London: Longman, 1992); Anthony Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987). Regarding the Cold War dimensions of the Marshall Plan, see Scott Parrish, The Marshall Plan, Soviet-American Relations and the Division of Europe, in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii, eds. The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 19441949 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 5573; and Geoffrey Roberts, Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the Onset of the Cold War, 1947, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 8 (1994), pp. 13711386. Hogan (in The Marshall Plan, p. 19) uses the phrase to remake the old world in the image of the new.

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War were fullled by two successive Irish governments during the countrys participation in the ERP from 1947 to 1952.4

A number of factors account for Irelands inclusion in the ERP. When Marshall delivered his speech in June 1947, the unrestricted nature of the invitation to participate in a recovery program attracted attention throughout Europe. In the State Department, George F. Kennan hoped that the new policy would place a severe strain on relations between Moscow and the satellite countries. He insisted that the plan be open to allies, former allies, enemies, former enemies, and neutrals.5 Accordingly, the Soviet Union and the East European countries were invited to take part, as were Italy and Germany (former enemies) and Ireland and Portugal (both neutral). Kennans Rooseveltian internationalism, however, was not shared by other U.S. policymakers. Charles Bohlen, William Clayton, and Dean Acheson supported an openended invitation for a different reason: They believed that once the Soviet Union refused to participate, the blame for dividing Europe would rest squarely on Moscows shoulders. The inclusive nature of the U.S. proposal may therefore be viewed as an attempt to create a bloc of countries centered around the United States. The identity of those countries was partly shaped by the Soviet Unions response. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov attended the Paris conference that had been convened by Britain and France in June 1947 to respond to Marshalls invitation, but he promptly indicated that the Soviet Union wanted aid without strings attached and certainly did not want any U.S. involvement or interference in the USSRs domestic economy. Within six weeks of Marshalls speech, Soviet leaders dismissed the Marshall Plan as another example of dollar diplomacy and forced the East European states not to par4. In 1947 the Irish political landscape appeared stable. Two center-right parties, Fianna Fil and Fine Gael, dominated the government. Both parties had emerged out of the divided loyalties caused by the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921, which consolidated the partition of the island, leaving six counties under the control of Northern Ireland and the rest under the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State, which remained a dominion of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The left wing of the political spectrum was lled by a small labor party that was divided in 1947 and by the emergence of Clann na Poblachta, led by Sen MacBride, whose mother was republican activist Maud Gonne. Although Eamon de Valeras government lost three by-elections in 1947, it did not expect to leave ofce after the general election in February 1948. However, the inter-party government comprising ve parties and independent politicians formed a government that had many constituencies to please. 5. John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan and Dean G. Acheson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 200.

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ticipate either. The ERP thus consisted solely of Western European capitalist democracies. Although Ireland could not be singled out and excluded without controversy and recriminations, Irish participation was not readily approved in either Washington or London. Indeed, in many ways the inclusion of Ireland was surprising. Wartime issues still inuenced the U.S.-Irish relationship in the postwar period. Irish neutrality, U.S. opposition to it and Allied efforts to offer a 32-county Ireland in return for Irish involvement have all been well documented.6 After 1945, Irelands neutrality still rankled with Washington. In January 1945, John D. Hickerson, the director of the European affairs division in the State Department, wrote to David Gray, the U.S. minister in Dublin, that the people of the United States, I believe, will not soon forget that the one time in history when Ireland had an opportunity to assist this country the Irish government turned a deaf ear.7 Hickerson was not the only State Department ofcial who was annoyed by Irelands neutrality and by the resurgence of anti-partition activity in the United States in late 1947. Although these sentiments did not prevent Ireland from being invited to participate in the ERP, they did affect the form of aid allocated during the early stages of the program.8 Nonetheless, Irelands strategic location was a crucial concern for U.S. defense and security experts. The intelligence review put out by the U.S. War Department in May 1946 noted that in the current world situation, the political disposition of West European countries had never been more signicant to U.S. interests.9 Three years later, a CIA report stated that
Ireland is potentially a valuable ally because of its strategic location athwart the chief seaways and airways to and from Western Europe. Its terrain and topography lend themselves to rapid construction of airelds which would be invaluable as bases for strategic bomber attacks as far east as the Ural mountains. . . . Irish neutrality would probably again be tolerable under conditions of global warfare. However, and assuming these conditions, because hostile forces in Ireland would outank the main defenses of Great Britain, and because it could be used as a
6. See Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 193945 (Dublin, Ireland: Gill and MacMillan, 1983). 7. Hickerson to Gray, 1 January 1945, in National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group (RG) 59, Box 20, File UKD-5(b). 8. Ireland received loans rather than grant aid until 1949. See Bernadette Whelan, Ireland and the Marshall Plan 19471957 (Dublin, Ireland: Four Courts Press, 2000), pp. 286298; and Ronan Fanning, The Anglo-American Alliance and the Irish Question in the Twentieth Century, in Judith Devlin and Howard B. Clarke, eds., European Encounters: Essays in Memory of Albert Lovett (Dublin, Ireland: University College Press, 2003), pp. 199202. 9. Intelligence Review No. 12, May 1946, in Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), Harry S. Truman Papers (HSTP), Box 16, Naval Aide File, War Department.

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base for bombing North America, the denial of Ireland to an enemy is an unavoidable principle of United States security.10

Amid increasing tensions between the superpowers, the strategic importance of Irelands geographical location affected U.S., British, and West European defense planning. Any desire to isolate Ireland in retaliation for its wartime neutrality was counterbalanced by the need to incorporate the country into some kind of U.S.-sponsored security organization. The Marshall Plan provided just such an opportunity. Of equal importance to the United States, however, was the British view of Irelands importance. The United States received British support on this matter for three reasons: rst, the strategic location of Ireland; second, a fear that exclusion might refuel the anti-partition movement, particularly in the United States; third, the interlocking nature of the Irish and British economic and nancial systems. This last factor meant that by the summer of 1947 both countries required signicant external aid in the form of dollars and raw materials.11 A 1946 U.S. War Department analysis of UK security concerns noted that Britains strategy for defense of the home islands has been based on . . . [the] strategic unity of the British isles. Britain cannot permit any part of the British isles, including ire, to be controlled by another power.12 Britain had traditionally depended on having either direct control of or a friendly ally on its western and southern anks to protect the sea and air approaches and ensure the continued ow of badly needed supplies. During World War II, these security concerns were tempered by the benevolence of Irish neutrality toward the Allies and Britains possession of bases in Northern Ireland.13 Although the latter arrangement continued into the postwar period, Irelands permanent inclusion in a collective security arrangement was a key aim of Londons defense strategy. Lord Addison, the British
10. Central Intelligence Agency Report, Ireland, 1 April 1949, in HSTL, HSTP, Segregated Records (SR)-48, Box 256, Presidents Secretarys File (PSF). 11. On the economic relationship between the two countries, see Whelan, Ireland and the Marshall Plan, pp. 3141. The U.S. State Department regarded Ireland as an economic satellite of Britain and therefore believed that assistance to Ireland would relieve the pressure on the British economy. 12. Intelligence Review No. 16, 29 May 1946, pp. 3637, in HSTL, HSTP, Box 16, Naval Aide File, War Department. 13. By 1944, 120,000 Americans were stationed in Northern Ireland. The benevolence of Irish neutrality toward the Allied side was evident from frequent contact between Irish and Allied military and intelligence authorities, the exchange of information about the movement of Axis planes, ships, and submarines, and the joint monitoring of weather conditions. In addition, Ireland permitted Allied aircraft to y over Irish territory to the Atlantic and treated captured Allied servicemen more leniently than it did their Axis counterparts. See Dermot Keogh, Twentieth-Century Ireland: Nation and State (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1994), p. 120. In 1946 the Pentagon recommended that high-ranking ofcers in the Irish army should be awarded the American Legion of Merit for exceptional meritorious and outstanding services to the United States from 1943 to 1945. Ronan Fanning, Irish NeutralityAn Historical Review, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1980), p. 35.

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dominions secretary, argued for Irish membership in the United Nations (UN) on the grounds that we should expect to nd her generally sympathetic to the western European attitudes on international problems.14 Irelands participation in the UN was blocked by the Soviet Union, but the principle of assent was maintained by Clement Atlees government in London.15 Such a course, the British government hoped, would have the further benet of normalizing Anglo-Irish relations. This bilateral relationship had many layers, but diplomatic discourse by wars end was characterized by new levels of cooperation and mutual understanding. Sir John Maffey, the British minister in Dublin, noted in his 19451946 annual review that for the rst time in history the British cabinet has been able to conduct a long war without any anxiety about Ireland.16 Some difculties lingered, especially regarding de Valeras visit to the German legation in Dublin to express his condolences upon Adolf Hitlers death, but the relationship overall was more amicable than it had been in many years. Both London and Washington feared that the exclusion of Ireland would refuel anti-partition activities in Britain and the United States. For the time being, however, the Irish patriotic slogan Englands difculty is Irelands opportunity had been moderated to Englands difculty is none of Irelands business. Maffey believed this was something new.17 Consequently, at a diplomatic level at least, moderation prevailed. British support of Irish membership in the UN aimed also to extend Irish foreign policy horizons beyond the connes of partition and provide Britain with an ally on the international stage.18 Irish participation in the ERP was favored for the same reason. Regarding Irelands anti-Communist credentials, at rst glance Washington had little to worry about. Anti-Communism had long been a central feature of Irish life. Pope Pius XIs 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (On Reconstruction of the Social Order) which condemned Communism, atheism, and materialism, had heavily inuenced the Irish Roman Catholic hierarchys public statements and parish sermons and found a ready audience among a majority Roman Catholic population. A 1946 U.S. War Department intelligence report on Ireland noted that the fervent Catholicism of the Irish is a bulwark against Communist inuence. Similarly, a 1949 CIA report

14. Addison memorandum, 9 February 1946, in The National Archives of the United Kingdom (UKNA), Prime Ministers Ofce (PREM), 8/258, 0969. 15. Record of government meeting, 21 March 1946, in UKNA, PREM, 8/258, 0969. 16. Annual Report, 19456, in UKNA, Foreign Ofce (FO), 54722, W8767. 17. Ibid. 18. Addison memorandum, 9 February 1946.

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afrmed that Communism has little appeal to the Irish whose views on political, social and economic matters are conditioned by religious beliefs.19 Political parties on both the right and the left used Red scare tactics to smear the opposition and win voters to their side. The Communist Party of Ireland had never made an impact in either local or national elections. Moreover, after the founding of the Irish state in 1922, nationalism had been at the heart of Irish politics and society, leaving little room for other political ideologies. Public dissatisfaction with the performance of a political party, in or out of government, was expressed through the ballot box during local and national elections. Yet, even if it seemed unlikely that Catholic Ireland would turn to Communism, the U.S. governments concerns about Communist activity and about the seeming deterioration of Irish economic conditions strengthened the case for including Ireland in the ERP. Given the political, diplomatic, security, and economic reasons for including Ireland in the Marshall Plan, the only remaining question, at least in the short term, was whether the Irish government would accept the invitation.

The Irish Response

The Fianna Fil government led by de Valera received a formal communication on 4 July 1947 from Norman Archer, the acting British representative in Ireland, and Stanislas Ostrorg, the minister at the French embassy, inviting de Valera to attend a meeting in Paris on 12 July and take part in the drawing up of a program covering both the resources and needs of Europe for the following four years.20 At an ofcial level, Irelands department of external affairs, under the guidance of its new secretary, Frederick Boland, was predisposed to new international initiatives. Boland welcomed the opportunity to repair Irelands international reputation after the damage inicted by a series of events: Irelands neutrality during the war, de Valeras visit to the German legation, the burning of British and American ags in Ireland on the day the war ended, and the exclusion of Ireland from the UN in 1946. Moreover, the department had nally achieved a strong standing within the Irish administration and, with de Valeras support, was ready to extend its contacts and horizons. Consequently, the ERP invitation, which also included membership in the Committee for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) and later
19. Central Intelligence Agency Report, Ireland, 1 April 1949. 20. British and French invitation to Irish government, 4 July 1947, in National Archives of Ireland (hereinafter NAI), Department of the Taoiseach Files (D/T), S14106A.

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the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), provided an ideal opportunity to expand the countrys diplomatic horizons in a multilateral context. The external affairs department also believed that participation in the ERP would mark the rst time that Ireland has had an opportunity of cooperating in an international organization in which the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations were not also participating.21 Ireland in that sense could exert its sovereign and independent status even though technically it was still a dominion within the British Commonwealth. This argument also provided the department with a reason to welcome the European dimension of the ERP, although European unity per se was not an active matter in Irish government policy in 1947. The anti-Communist and security implications of the program did not go unnoticed by external affairs personnel. Following Marshalls Harvard speech, Irish ofcials argued that U.S. motives were economic and political: to achieve economic recovery and social stability in Europe, to forestall a slump in American prices, and to provide support and leadership to the free world, as had been done earlier through the Truman Doctrine. On this last point, an external affairs memorandum described the Marshall Plan as being in line with President Trumans statements some months ago about the object of aid to Greece and Turkey. But the memorandum indicated that it was difcult to see how the USA would give large scale assistance to Eastern European countries under governments like that in Hungary.22 Although Irish ofcials were aware that American decisions about the ERP would be inuenced by political as much as economic concerns, this did not affect their support for Irish participation. Nor were they worried about the anti-Communist intent of the program. To be sure, some Irish diplomats had misgivings about Soviet and U.S. hegemonic aims in Europe and preferred to adopt a neutral and independent path between the two superpowers.23 But the views of Joseph Walshe, the Irish ambassador to the Vatican, were far more typical. In one of his frequent missives to Boland from Rome, Walsh said on 16 July 1947 that it seems to be useless to try and judge Russian reactions by ordinary standards.24 Ultimately, there was little doubt that the external affairs department would push for acceptance of the invitation. This enthusiasm, however, was
21. Memorandum, June 1947, in NAI, D/T, S14106A. 22. Ibid. 23. Desmond Dinan, After the Emergency: Ireland in the Post-War World, 194550, ire-Ireland, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 1989), pp. 85103. 24. Joseph Walshe to Frederick Boland, 16 July 1947, in NAI, Department of External Affairs (D/ EA), Condential Reports Received from the Holy See Embassy, P12/2A.

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not shared by the department of nance, headed by J. J. McElligott, who believed that Ireland could not expect any measure of salvation from the socalled Marshall Plan and wanted to avoid the indignity of accepting U.S. aid.25 McElligotts minister, Frank Aiken, was hostile to participation in the ERP because it would divide Europe and force Ireland to abandon its neutrality.26 These two departments dominated the debate on whether to accept ERP funds. Neither the Irish public nor opposition parties were consulted prior to the governments acceptance of the invitation on 4 July 1947.27 Unlike Switzerland and Italy, Ireland did not attach any conditions to its involvement in the ERP. The Swiss provisos related to protecting the countrys traditional neutral status, ensuring the CEEC economic agreements would not be binding without prior agreement, and reserving the right to maintain trade agreements with non-CEEC countries. The Swiss government regarded all three conditions as key issues of national concern.28 Ireland, by virtue of its neutral status, might have attached similar terms to its membership but decided not to do so. Italian acceptance was accompanied by the condition that the CEEC would not form an anti-Soviet bloc, which might also have been expected to cause concern to neutral Ireland.29 Clearly, de Valera, who was both prime minister and minister for external affairs, along with his departmental ofcials, believed that Irish neutrality would not be jeopardized by participation in the U.S.-sponsored program. In any case, the country urgently needed economic assistance.30 Concern about the impact of the Marshall Plan on Irelands neutrality was conned mainly to the countrys small Communist Party. In the August 1947 edition of the Communist publication The Review, M. P. ODwyer asked, Just where are we going? What is the Fianna Fil Government leading us into? Answering his own questions, ODwyer insisted that the ERP was a Wall Streetinspired imperialist plan to consolidate American control of the Ruhr region in western Germany and to create a western bloc against the Soviet Union and the new democracies. Europe, he argued, was not devas25. Finance, 3 February 1948, in NAI, Department of Finance (D/F), F 121/10/48. 26. Ireland in the European Recovery Programme 194753, in HSTL, Oral History Project 1978, Section 3. 27. The government did not release a public statement on the Marshall Plan until the ofcial statement of acceptance was published on 6 July 1947. 28. De Valera was informed of the Swiss position by Walter de Bourg, the Swiss charg daffaires in Dublin, and by W. B. Butler, the Irish representative in Berne. Finance Note 28, 30 June 1947, in NAI, D/T, F305/57I. 29. Ibid. 30. In June 1947, Ireland shared the prevailing European trend of increasing reliance on the dollar area for imports. The Irish citizen still faced shortages of basic items such as tea, sugar, butter, bacon, clothing, petroleum, oils, and lard.

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tated, not in need of reconstruction by the latest wearer of the imperialist mantle. He disparaged the recent CEEC meeting in Paris: of course it was a political conference, of course it was directed against the Russians. He also criticized the government for abandoning neutrality andunlike Switzerland and the Scandinavian countriesbringing Ireland into the British bloc with its head up. ODwyer concluded that unless national Ireland calls a halt, the nation will nd itself being walked farther yet. . . . we may as well start sprinkling a bit of chromium around Spike Island. The Yanks like things nice.31 Such views held little sway outside the small circle of Communists and socialists. Ultimately, Irish ofcials, along with politicians, farmers, factory owners, traders, and workers, who admittedly knew little about the ERP, supported the government. As George Duncan, a Trinity College economist, put it, the large majority of Irish concluded that they should not look a gift-horse in the mouth, particularly an American one.32 In the immediate postwar years, many forces drew Ireland into the Marshall Plan. The Irish government, which had been in ofce for sixteen years and needed a boost for its tired appearance, swiftly accepted the invitation. Although de Valera advised the Irish representatives attending the Paris conference in the summer of 1947 to avoid involvement in political matters that might compromise the countrys neutrality, the fact remained that Ireland had agreed to take part in a U.S.-sponsored organization consisting exclusively of West European states.33 Following the Soviet withdrawal from the Paris conference, participation in the Marshall Plan equatedat some levelto antiSovietism and alignment with the United States.

Fighting Communism in the ERP

From the start of the ERP, U.S. policymakers believed that success depended as much on ideological and psychological considerations as on economic achievements. David Ellwood has argued that the plan was more than the sum of its key operating toolsthe loans, grants, counterpart funds, and technical assistance.34 Indeed, when Marshall delivered his speech in June
31. M. P. ODwyer, Just Where Are We Going? What Is the Fianna Fail Government Leading Us Into? The Review (Dublin), August 1947, p. 3, in National Library of Ireland (NLI). 32. George A. Duncan, Marshall Aid, Journal of Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol. 19 (19491950), p. 293. 33. Whelan, Ireland and the Marshall Plan, p. 66. 34. Ellwood, You Too Can Be Like Us: Selling the Marshall Plan, History Today, Vol. 48, No. 10 (October 1998), p. 34. Each ERP government was obliged to set aside in local currency equivalent amounts to the loans and grants received. Loan set-asides could be used by individual governments for a wide range of purposes. However, using grant set-asides required the agreement of the Economic

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1947, there was no plan, no program, no blueprint in place.35 In late July, Ivan White, a counselor in the U.S. embassy in Paris, told Frederick Boland, the secretary of the Irish department of external affairs, that they had nothing in the nature of a plan in mind. . . . [T]he Europeans would have to produce it themselves.36 Yet the State Department, which was in control of establishing the ERP framework from July 1947 until the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) took over in April 1948, wanted the sixteen participant states to increase production, expand foreign trade, lower or remove all barriers to the free movement of trade and labor, achieve nancial stability, and realize European unityin short, to create a united states of Europe and remake the old world in the likeness of the new.37 The idea was encapsulated in one ERP slogan used in publicity campaignsYou too can be like uswhile Paul Hoffman, the former car salesman and president of the Studebaker car company who became the rst administrator of the ERP, saw the primary aim of the ERP as being to crystallize a free-world doctrine which reects the ideals and strivings of free men.38 Underpinning the American way was a belief in and dedication to the concepts of growth, modernization, and prosperity as the recipe for greatness and a barrier against Communism. Hoffman believed that the United States had immense responsibilities for propaganda beyond its borders: [A]s the leader of the free world, it must by deeds and words make clear to all peoples our devotion to the idea of a free, peaceful and more ample life for all men.39 Thus, propaganda described as information was central to the operation of the ERP. Authority for these activities came from Article II of the bilateral cooperation agreement signed by each participating country with the U.S. government. Under the agreement, the ECA was permitted to engage in the dissemination of information about the ERP, European-American cooperation, and European cooperation. Funds for publicity and propaganda came from a 5 percent cut in each countrys counterpart fund and from the ECAs own budget for the purpose, yielding an almost unlimited supply of money. In addition, each ECA mission in the sixteen European capital cities had the services of an information division, or an ofcer at the very least.
Cooperation Administration (ECA) and, therefore, accorded the local mission some inuence in the direction of participants economies. 35. See Hogan, The Marshall Plan, ch. 1. 36. Boland to External Affairs, Dublin, 28 July 1947, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/1. 37. On the creation of the ECA and initial objectives, see Hogan, The Marshall Plan, pp. 101108. 38. Quoted in Ellwood, You Too Can Be Like Us, p. 33; and Paul Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won (London: Michael Joseph, 1951), p. 123. 39. Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won, p. 125.

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The countries considered by the Americans to be most in need of ERP propaganda measures were France, the German Bizone, and Italy. A second group comprised Austria, the French zone in Germany, Greece, Trieste, and Turkey. In the third group were Britain and Sweden, and a fourth group consisted of Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal.40 The ECA Information Division in Paris used its own radio and lm units and independent companies, in cooperation with the local missions, to produce thousands of press releases, publications, posters, photographs, exhibitions, radio programs, newsreel stories, and documentary lms.41 No idea was too large or too daring for the Paris ofce.42 The absence of a separate information division in the Dublin mission reected the ECAs ranking of countries according to the urgency and threat posed by Communism, and in this regard Ireland was not a priority. From the beginning of the ERP in Ireland, Communist activities were meager and posed little threat to the countrys democratic capitalist system. Although ECA and U.S. State Department ofcials kept abreast of the activities of the few Communists in Ireland, they concurred with the CIA view that Irish Catholicism was a bulwark against Communist inuences.43 Nonetheless, from December 1947 to September 1948, when the State Department and its network were still responsible for the ERP, the department circulated a telegram to its diplomats in ERP countries requesting that the United States be credited through publicity as the source of ERP assistance. In this way, the dependence of the participating countries on the United States was to be stressed. Irish ofcials had no difculty implementing the request. Frederick Boland, the secretary of the Irish Department of External Affairs, agreed that publicity measures for the ERP were entirely natural and legitimate. He even went so far as to tell Vinton Chapin, a counselor in the U.S. legation in Dublin, that it is in the interests, not only of the United States, but of the receiving countries themselves that the people . . . should have clearly before their minds, throughout the period of the [ERP], the extent of their dependence from time to time on aid furnished by the United
40. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, p. 162. 41. One of the more bizarre publicity methods was a balloon used as part of the Marshall Plan Mobile Exhibit. The exhibit carried out a 6,000-mile tour. The balloon, 50 feet in diameter and emblazoned with the letters ERP, was moored over the ERP exhibit. But it broke away when ying over the West German border town of Hof in April 1950 and was blown over Czechoslovakia, where it was shot down by ghter planes and ground guns. Millions of smaller balloons were also released, each with a cord inside carrying a message, part of which read The Marshall Plana plan for democratic peace. 42. Ellwood, You Too Can Be Like Us, p. 35. 43. Central Intelligence Agency Report, Ireland,, 1 April 1949, p. 13; and Whelan, Ireland and the Marshall Plan, pp. 362363.

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States.44 Boland agreed that the Irish government information bureau, press, radio, and parliament would all give full publicity to the ERP in accordance with the governments declared policy with regard to the Marshall Plan, but also the traditional feeling of the people of this country towards the United States.45 Furthermore, Boland was amenable to the branding and labeling with the ERP logo of all U.S. goods and services supplied to Ireland. James Dillon, the minister for agriculture, agreed with Boland and noted that we here in Ireland were so fond of Old glory we make no objection, as we are glad to see this symbol anywhere.46 Irish acquiescence contrasted with the reaction in Italy. For Andrew Berding and his ECA publicity team in Rome, the labeling issue added to accusations of U.S. interference in Italian domestic affairs.47 The arrival in Dublin of ECA personnel, particularly William H. Taft in September 1948 and Clement Hoopes in May 1950, altered this haphazard approach to publicity. Two months after Taft arrived, he came under pressure from the ECA ofces in Washington and Paris to investigate Irelands plans to publicize ECA and OEEC operations. The ECA needed to reassure the U.S. Congress that the Europeans were meeting all their ERP obligations, including publicity. Taft stressed to Irish ofcials that the ECAs aim was not one of glossing over difculties or one of disguising American self-interest. It is rather one of emphasizing Europes self-interest in co-operation with other countries and as it is being worked out in the OEEC. Taft offered to meet with the Irish ERP committee to discuss the matter, and ECA ofcials in Washington solicited the assistance of Hugh McCann, a counselor in the Irish legation, to assist with the big Public Relations job in hand.48 Thus, a further aim of the ERP publicity machine throughout the period was to ensure that full acknowledgment and recognition was accorded to all U.S. exports to ERP countries. The principle of dependency was enshrined in the publicity campaign. The Irish ERP committee also recognized in December 1948 that Ireland could not avoid taking some publicity steps and that explanations of the general situation might help to dispel misunderstandings about the ERP.
44. Garrett to State Department, 13 January 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 14, File 700. 45. Boland to Chapin, 8 February 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 14, File 700. 46. Dillon to John Muir, European Correspondent, Whaley-Eaton News Service, 27 October 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 16, File 800872. 47. David Ellwood, The Marshall Plan and the Politics of Growth, in Peter M. R. Stirk and David Willis, eds., Shaping Post-War Europe: European Unity and Disunity 194557 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991), p. 19. 48. Minutes of Meeting, Commins and Taft, probably late November 1948, in NAI, D/EA, 305/ 57/122; McCann to Boland, 24 December 1948, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/122; and Taft to Commins, 1 December 1948, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/122.

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The proposed methods of publicity were a monthly ministerial public address and the publication of suitable OEEC documents.49 However, Con Cremin in external affairs was not convinced that the ERP committees proposals would satisfy ECA ofcials who have a feeling that we are not doing quite enough in this direction. He doubted the value of public lectures because the audiences were usually too small. Instead he favored the publication and broadcasting of specialized publicity matter geared at the ordinary person, along with ministerial press conferences.50 The nature and intended targets of the messages that would be transmitted to the public drew little attention from the Irish committee in 1948. For the time being, the committee had little difculty acknowledging U.S. generosity and emphasizing Irelands need for assistance. However, this soon changed. Cremins proposals found a receptive audience in the minister for external affairs, Sen MacBride. As leader of Clann na Poblachta, MacBride had overseen the operation of a highly effective and innovative campaign during the 1948 elections and, once in ofce, carried his interest in publicity further. MacBride agreed with Cremins view that a more sophisticated, specialized, and targeted ERP information campaign was needed. MacBride also viewed the campaign as an opportunity to highlight the injustice of the partition of the national territory with the existence of Northern Ireland, a message thatironicallyaccorded with Berdings operating principle of tying the ERP into domestic issues. However, MacBrides intention was certainly not what the ECA or, indeed, U.S. State Department ofcials had in mind. Nor was it what OEEC ofcials expected.51 Despite criticism from the ECA and State Department, MacBride took the opportunity to demand that the ERP publicity campaign highlight the unanswered national question. He involved himself in the minutiae of the publicity and offered guidelines about slogans for posters. One such poster, dealing with economic cooperation, featured a map of Ireland. The map included the Northern Ireland border, but it also clearly indicated the economic difculties caused by partition. Possible accompanying slogans suggested by MacBride included Our economic problem is increased by the Partition of the industrial portion of the country from the rest, along with those promoted by the ECA: Produce more, Let us work for peace and prosperity,
49. ERP Committee, 3 December 1948, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/15 pt. 1. 50. Cremin to MacBride, 29 December 1948, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/122. 51. The OEEC also came under pressure from the ECA in late 1948 to publicize the ERP, to popularize the OEEC, to extend popular understanding of the need for economic cooperation, and to encourage participant countries to become more active on the matter. Donald Mallett, OEEC Information Division to Biggar, 24 February 1949, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/15 pt. 1.

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international co-operation, full employment, full production and a better and peaceful world.52 The combination of messages reected the concerns of Irish domestic and foreign policymakers, in addition to those of ECA ofcials. A pamphlet entitled Working with Europe, produced by the external affairs department in May 1949, discussed Irelands problems, the importance of European cooperation, and the dimensions of ERP aid needed.53 Although the pamphlet elicited praise from the ECA information division in Paris and local ECA ofcials as well as congratulatory notes from Harriman, Hoffman, and Bissell to MacBride, the partitionist dimension of the posters used at the 1949 Paris exhibition in the OEEC headquarters drew criticism. MacBride made no excuses, commenting that it is difcult to see how Ireland could be expected to show an economic map of her territory without, in some way, raising the sore question of partition.54 The predominance of this domestic issue in the ministers foreign policy agenda affected the realization of other American aims for Ireland through the ERP. Not surprisingly, these political issues were omitted from the publicity campaign organized by the ECA mission in Dublin. Following the arrival of Clement Hoopes in May 1950 to oversee the publicity effort, the full range of communication media was adopted.55 Under Hoopess direction, the ECA mission rst targeted the farming community, then industrial and business employees, then executives and managers, and nally trade unions, women, and children. The ECA staff took up almost every invitation to speak and adopted special measures. The messages stressed American generosity, how improvements in agricultural research and education could increase food production, and the value of efcient industries using high-quality raw materials and craftsmanship. The bottom line, as one ofcer told his audience, was that whatever happens by . . . June 1952, the Irish will be able to look back on

52. ERP Committee, 21 February 1949, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/138/2; and MacBride Note, February 1949, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/138/2. 53. Working with Europe, May 1949, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/138/2. 54. Ireland Draws Criticism in Paris, Irish Independent (Dublin), 5 July 1949, p. 1. 55. Prior to Hoopess arrival, the ECA mission and the government had clashed once over a publicityrelated issue. In January 1950 nance ofcials objected to criticism from William H. Taft, who implied that Ireland [was] not using dollars as fast as allocated. Taft apologized and explained that the unfortunate emphasis on spending rates was not of our doing. He said that any future public statement about this matter would be checked with external affairs prior to release, but Carrigan also believed they should keep the public informed about the operation and progress of the ERP as stipulated under the Bilateral Agreement. Ireland Not Using Dollars as Fast as Allocated, The Irish Times (Dublin), 18 January 1950, p. 5; Finance, 18 January 1950, in NLI, D/EA, 305/57/209; Cremin to Hogan, 20 January 1950, in NLI, D/EA, 305/57/209; and Carrigan to Hogan, 21 January 1950, in NLI, D/EA, 305/57/209.

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real progress where, for them, it counts mostin the rehabilitation of their green and pleasant land.56

Altered Visions: June 1950

The focus of the ECA-initiated publicity programs in all ERP countries was altered from 1950 onward by the outbreak of war in Korea. In August 1950 the ECA Information Division in Paris drafted a report that recognized the changed circumstances. To strengthen European stability, self-condence and, therefore, self-respect, the ECA proposed to alter the three main themes of the publicity drive. As the report explained:
(1) Marshall aid and military assistance are good for you because they give youas Europeansa ghting chance to make Europe strong enough to discourage any aggression. (2) Butthis strength can only be achieved through unity. As separate, rival powers, the nations of Free Europe are weak, are dangerously exposed. (3) Productivity must increase because more food, more machines, more of nearly everything is needed to make Europe so strong it will be unassailable.57

Accordingly, the original Marshall Plan slogan, You too can be like us, became Prosperity makes you free.58 Europeans were now to learn, as Paul Hoffman, the rst ERP administrator, noted, that this is the land of full shelves and bulging ships, made possible by high productivity and good wages, and that its prosperity may be emulated elsewhere by those who will work towards it.59 In mid-1950 the ECA launched a productivity drive and emphasized it at information campaigns while acknowledging that such measures had to be adapted to local conditions.60 ECA ofcials by this point argued that European self-defense was an objective which over-rides in immediate importance any of the economic goals we and European leaders have established in [the] past two years. In the context of Ireland, the chief goals became, as Paul Miller, the ECA chief, told the Publicity Club of Ireland in September 1950, peace, unity and prosperity.
56. Frank Gervasi, ERP Information Division, Paris, Speech, Radio ireann Order of Program, 14 April 1950, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/148. 57. Ellwood, The Marshall Plan and the Politics of Growth, p. 25; emphasis, in original. 58. Ibid. 59. Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won, p. 91. 60. The Anglo-American Council on Productivity, the ERP Technical Assistance Program, and the ERP Productivity Program were all directed at increasing European productivity levels. Under the auspices of the second and third of these programs, an Irish trade union group visited the United States in 1951.

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ECA ofcials in Ireland stressed how much the ERP had done for Ireland and how little Ireland had been required to do in return, particularly in terms of its continued non-aligned status.61

Protecting Irish Neutrality within the ERP

The initial plan was that Ireland would receive ERP nancial aid until 30 June 1952. However, the needs of American and Western European rearmament necessitated a reorientation of U.S. foreign aid programs, shifting from economic aid to military assistance. From late 1950 on, the continuation of economic and military aid was dependent on each ERP countrys willingness to accept an amendment to the EC Act requiring the participating states to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for collective security.62 The ECA mission in Dublin informed Sen MacBride on 23 December 1950 that aid to Ireland and Portugal might be halted within a week.63 This disclosure did not come as a surprise to Irish ofcials, who were aware that discussions about the suspension of aid had been under way for some time between Washington and London. Furthermore, on 19 October 1950 ECA personnel in Dublin told the Irish government that further allotments for 1951 1952 would be reconsidered at the end of 1951 for reasons connected with the present defense effort.64 Ireland was given the opportunity to align itself formally with the United States in a defense arrangement in return for continued economic aid. In practical terms, however, the Irish government had tied its own hands on the matter through its refusal to participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in February 1949. Ireland potentially could have beneted from taking part in a U.S.-led military alliance. Geographically, it was part of the Atlantic community. Ideologically, it fully supported anti-Communist movements and was likely to join with others in resisting the godless East.65 Soon after coming to ofce,
61. Minutes of Staff Meeting, 14 March 1951, in NARA, RG 286, Agency for International Development, Mission to Ireland, Box 1, File 10; and Team of U.S. Experts to Appraise Countrys Industrial Potential, The Irish Times (Dublin), 15 September 1950, p. 1. 62. Mutual Security Act 1951, sect. 2, in NAI, D/T, S14106H. 63. External Affairs to the Government, 28 December 1950, in NAI, D/T, S14106G/1. 64. Gullick to Miller, 8 January 1951, in NARA, RG 286, Box 1, File 8463. 65. Conor Cruise OBrien, Ireland in International Affairs, in Owen Dudley Edwards, ed., Conor

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MacBride had received dire communications from the Irish ambassador to the Holy See, Joseph Walshe, that the Communists were gaining ground in the Italian elections. MacBride responded by using diplomatic channels to send 60,000 collected by the Irish Roman Catholic hierarchy to the Irish ambassador in order to support the anti-Communist political parties ghting the elections. Although MacBride had acted against the advice of his departmental secretary, Frederick Boland, he was motivated by a desire to make his mark on his new ofce and to illustrate his anti-Communist and Catholic credentials.66 Later in 1949, MacBride told Walsh that he would do everything he could to promote the interests of Irish Catholicism.67 Furthermore, whenever MacBride met U.S. politicians and ofcials, he emphasized his antiCommunist credentials. State and church found common cause in the Irish governments ght against Communism. Moreover, Archbishop Charles McQuaid of Dublin openly assured George Garrett, the U.S. minister to Dublin, that the Roman Catholic Church was in favor of Irelands accepting the invitation to join the North Atlantic group.68 Other signs from within the leadership strata of the Irish polity suggested that Ireland would participate in an international military arrangement. The coalition government that took ofce in February 1948 included senior members of the Fine Gael party who hoped that the party would commit itself to the military alliance. T. F. OHiggins, the defense minister, believed that Irelands defense policy was interlinked with Britains: [T]he likelihood of invasion from that quarter is most unlikely and . . . anybody else that attempts to invade us would have to be strong enough to burst its way through the British navy.69 Moreover, as OHiggins was well aware, membership in a U.S.-led military alliance would have brought increased resources and status for his department. Another senior gure who supported entry into an alliance was Patrick McGilligan, the nance minister, who feared that Ireland otherwise would be strategically vulnerable in a future war with the Soviet Union and that neutrality would damage Irelands international interests. His plan of
Cruise OBrien Introduces Ireland (London: Deutsch, 1969), p. 124. OBrien worked in external affairs during this period. 66. Joseph Walshe to John Charles McQuaid, 19, 22 May 1948, in Dublin Diocesan Archives (DDA), John Charles McQuaid Papers (McQP), AB8/B, Government Box 2; Dermot Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican: The Politics and Diplomacy of Church-State Relations 192260 (Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 1995); and Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe 19191989 (Cork, Ireland: Hibernian Press, 1990), pp. 212, 313 n. 1. 67. Walshe to Archbishop John DAlton, 23 November 1949, in DDA, McQP, AB8/B, Government Box 2. 68. Ronan Fanning, The United States and Irish Participation in NATO: The Debate of 1950, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1979), p. 39. 69. Parliamentary Debates, Dil ireann (PDDE), Vol. 99 (1945), col. 2150.

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campaign recommended that Ireland adhere to the Brussels Treaty and, along with Britain and the rest of the commonwealth, initiate discussions about mutual defense arrangements.70 Even more signicant was the prominence of James Dillon, the agriculture minister, in the new government. He was the sole parliamentarian who opposed neutrality during World War II, a stance that led to his expulsion from Fine Gael. Although he was soon admitted back into the party, he did not alter his views. Dillon wanted to ght against Communism around the world and drafted a plan for the establishment of a global federal structure. In the parliament in June 1946, he explained that treaties of friendship, understanding, and cooperation would create a new Federal Union encompassing Europe, the commonwealth, and the United States.71 Although Dillon did not receive parliamentary support for his proposal, he did not abandon it. He met with George Garrett, the U.S. minister in Dublin, and Vinton Chapin, the charg daffaires at the U.S. legation. In December 1947 and January 1948, Garrett circulated Dillons plan to wellplaced individuals in the United States and Britain, including Arthur Krock, a New York Times journalist; Leopold S. Amery, the former British state secretary for India; and Charles Hambro, governor of the Central Bank in London. Hambro, in his reply to Garrett, noted the similarities between Dillons plan, Winston Churchills proposal for a United States of Europe, and Ernest Bevins Western European Unionall of which he supported. Hambro promised to send the Dillon memorandum to Harold Macmillan, the future Tory prime minister of Britain.72 Both Dillon and Hambro were worried that the Communist threat was intensifying with events in Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Dillon feared that even if the comprehensive nature of the Marshall Plan could shore up the threatened democracies, the delay in getting congressional support for it would weaken the condence of European states living under the shadow of Communism. Because Dillons primary motivation was anti-Communism, his proposal would have entailed the abandonment of Irish neutrality and a diminution of Irish sovereignty. Consequently, he was sympathetic not just to the concept of European integration but also to Irish membership in a collective security arrangement. However, Fine Gael did not have complete freedom of action to decide on military arrangements. The party was only one of ve in the government,
70. Raymond J. Raymond, Irelands 1949 NATO Decision: A Reassessment, ire-Ireland, Vol. 22, No.3 (1985), p. 28. 71. PDDE, Vol. 101 (19 June 1946, col. 21882191. 72. Dillon to Garrett, 6 February 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 21, File 700.

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and the main opposition to Fine Gaels position was expected to come from Clann na Poblachta, led by MacBride. Although the Clann was known for its strong anti-Communism, it also espoused radical republicanism, which was its main electoral appeal. The Clann had fought the election on the issues of partition, breaking the commonwealth link, and establishing a republic. Thus, Irish membership in a military alliance that might lead to the presence of British troops was anathema to MacBride and his party. Moreover, de Valeras decision after his electoral defeat to set off on a worldwide anti-partition tour made it all the more imperative for the Clann leadership to emphasize the partition issue. MacBride could not be seen as less insistent than de Valera on the urgency of tackling partition, despite any allegiances he might have to the anti-Communist camp. It therefore seemed that the new government might break apart on the question of international military alignments. An early indication that Ireland might be asked to join a military alliance came in April 1948. The signing of the Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1948 had accelerated efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to develop a multilateral defense arrangement. On 22 April 1948, MacBride circulated a memorandum from J. J. Hearne, the Irish high commissioner in Ottawa, to the government reporting that an Atlantic nations agreement would be coming to a head quite soon and that we might expect to be approached at some stage. Hearne implied that the proposal to Ireland would be similar to that put to Switzerland: There is the proposal. You are free to come in if you desire.73 Signicantly, Hearne had forwarded newspaper clippings, including one from The Montreal Gazette about a recent speech in which de Valera defended ires neutrality during the war and advocated neutrality in future.74 On 7 January 1949 the Irish government received an invitation to join NATO, and on 8 February the government discussed the invitation. By this time, however, partition had come to be a central issue in Irish foreign policy. Both MacBride and Prime Minister John A. Costello had earned sharp rebukes from the U.S. State Department for seeking an amendment to the ECA legislation that would end assistance to Britain as long as partition remained.75 More signicant, the government had announced in September 1948 its decision to repeal the 1936 External Relations Act, to remove Ireland from the British Commonwealth, and to declare a republic. After the discussion on
73. External Affairs Memorandum, 22 April 1948, in NAI, D/T, S14291A/1. 74. The clipping of de Valeras speech, De Valera Defends Neutrality, The Montreal Gazette, 13 April 1948, is in NAI, D/T, S14291A/1. 75. John Hickerson to Garrett, 4 May 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 15, File 710; and Garrett to Lewis Douglas, U.S. Ambassador in London, 25 March 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 15, File 710. Irish-American politicians lobbied in the U.S. Congress to introduce the amendment. They realized that it had little chance of passage, but they believed it would embarrass both Washington and London.

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8 February, the Irish government declined the NATO invitation with the following explanation:
Ireland is essentially a democratic and freedom-loving nation. . . . Mindful of her Christian and democratic tradition, Ireland is earnestly desirous of playing her full part in protecting Christian civilisation and the democratic way of life. Therefore, with the general aim of the proposed treaty, the Irish government is in agreement. In the matter of military measures, however, Ireland is faced with grave difculties, from the strategic and political points of view, by reason of the fact that six of her north-eastern counties are occupied by British forces against the will of the overwhelming majority of the Irish people.76

In these circumstances, the government noted, NATO membership would be repugnant and unacceptable to the Irish people.77 Thus, involvement in NATO was rejected far more because of partition than because of neutrality.78 The government argued that North Atlantic security depended on ending a situation which threatens the peace of these islands and which may, at any moment, prove a source of grave embarrassment to both Britain and Ireland.79 However, the strategy of attempting to barter an end to neutrality in return for U.S. action on partition failed. MacBride had overestimated the value of Irish neutrality to the U.S. government, which already had access to Northern Ireland, and Americas interest in resolving the partition question. MacBride did not abandon his strategy, and in 1949 and 1950 he continued to lobby the Truman administration directly and indirectly through Irish diplomats and Irish-American politicians for action on partition and for arms through a bilateral treaty. Neither goal was forthcoming.80 On the last of MacBrides three visits to the United States as minister for external affairs, he met with President Harry Truman on 23 March 1951. Sec76. MacBride Draft Memorandum, 8 February 1949, in NAI, D/T, S14291A/1. At this time Ireland was also asked to take part in a league of neutral nations with Spain, Portugal, and Argentina which it declined. External Affairs Memorandum, 22 April 1948, S14291A, in NARA, Box 15, RG84 and NAI, D/T, File 710. 77. Texts Concerning Irelands Position in Relation to the North Atlantic Treaty (Dublin: Irish Stationery Ofce, 1950), No. 99934, presented to both houses of the Irish Parliament by the Minister for External Affairs on 26 April 1950. See alsoIrish Government Aide-Mmoire to the United States Government, 9 February 1949, in PDDE, Vol. 120 (1950), p. 117. 78. The State Department had already been warned by British authorities that Ireland would reject the invitation. W. Stratton Anderson, U.S. embassy, London, to Acheson, 19 October 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 15, File 707. 79. MacBride Draft Memorandum, 8 February 1949. 80. The U.S. government had no intention of moving from its traditional policy. Partition was an internal Irish issue. Regarding the arms issue, not until 1953 did U.S. diplomats and army intelligence ofcials in the Dublin embassy endorse a request by the Irish government to purchase arms and equipment from the U.S. government without reference to a bilateral defense arrangement. Huston to State Department, 4 February 1953, in FRUS, Vol. VI, pt. 2, pp. 15591560.

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retary of State Dean Acheson had advised the president to avoid discussing the partition question because it would embarrass the British government. Truman believed that partition was a domestic Irish issue, which had no place on the international stage. Acheson also advised against giving arms to the Irish government until Ireland joined NATO, a view endorsed by the British government.81 Thus, in February 1949, the Irish government had set a course for itself that ensured both non-adherence to the Mutual Security Act (which replaced the Economic Cooperation Act in 1951) and an end to U.S. economic aid to Ireland. The growing tensions between East and West led to changes in the Marshall Plan legislation. Assistance to Ireland had been furnished under the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. Section 115(b) stipulated that a country, as a condition of assistance, must adhere to the purposes and policies of that act. These conditions were summarized in January 1952 by Theobald Tannenwald, the assistant director of the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), for his director, Averell Harriman, as the promotion of industrial and agricultural production, nancial stability, increased interchange of goods and services between participating countries, the creation of counterpart funds in each participant country, and the provision of detailed information to the United States in order to operate the ERP program.82 These requirements were amended by section two of the Mutual Security Act in 1951 obliging states to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for collective security.83 Each ERP country was asked to make appropriate amendments in the bilateral agreement under which it received economic aid. Complying with the new conditions would mean that a country could use any remaining funds in the ERP pipeline and gain access to further economic and military aid from the United States. The deadline for an exchange of notes between the United States and each of the Marshall Plan countries was set for 8 January 1952.84 The Irish coalition government and, from June 1951, its successor led by amon de Valera of Fianna Fil indicated that the additional requirements
81. Acheson to Truman, 22 March 1951, in HSTL, HSTP, PSF; and State Department Brief, 11 September 1951, in HSTL, HSTP, Naval Aide File, Box 23. 82. Tannenwald to Harriman, 15 January 1952, in HSTL, Papers of Theodore Tannenwald Jr., (TTP), Box 3. 83. Tannenwald to Hon. John W. McCormack, House of Representatives, 28 February 1952, in HSTL, TTP, Box 3. 84. Tannenwald to Charles Murphy, 25 February 1952, in HSTL, TTP, Box 3.

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would prevent Ireland from receiving any new aid under the ERP. However, de Valera and his new minister for external affairs, Frank Aiken, hoped to obtain all the aid that was still outstanding, particularly $18 million of grant counterpart, without adhering to the new conditions. As the negotiations between Irish and U.S. ofcials on this matter reached the nal stages in late 1951 and early 1952, Cloyce K. Huston, the U.S. charg daffaires in Dublin, noted that the Irish government was desirous of securing a completion of the aid program . . . if that could be completed without prejudice to its policy of neutrality.85 Throughout the negotiations, the Irish government made clear that it would not adhere in any form to the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The talks reached a deadlock because of Irelands refusal to include in its note the following sentence: Whenever reference is made in any of the articles of such Economic Co-operation Agreement to the Economic Co-operation Act of 1948, such reference shall be construed as meaning the Economic Co-operation Act of 1948, as heretofore amended. Although the Irish government acknowledged its duty to promote international understanding and good will, maintain world peace, and eliminate the causes of international tension, the wording of the sentence was deemed unacceptable.86 External Affairs Minister Aiken set out the reasons in a letter dated 24 December 1951 to Francis Matthews, the new U.S. ambassador in Ireland:
[T]he Irish government wish to obtain a peaceful and early ending of the unjust partition of Ireland. . . . Ireland cannot, except in the case of an unprovoked attack . . . consider entering into any further military commitment with other countries for joint defense so long as she is denied the national unity and freedom which they already enjoy.87

Aiken did, however, ask the U.S. government to sell modern arms and equipment to Ireland to help it cope with the present dangerous world situation.88 This general approach was maintained by De Valera, who indicated that the continued partition of Ireland compelled it to remain neutral despite its support for wider U.S. strategic concerns. De Valera realized that he could not be seen to associate the country with a military alliance. This stand-off position annoyed Huston, who argued that the deadlock arose from the dogged
85. Huston to Acheson, 10 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E. 86. Aiken to Huston, 24 December 1951, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E; and Memorandum of Conversation, Irish and American Ofcials, 8 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E. 87. Aiken to Huston, 24 December 1951. 88. Ibid.

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consecration of the Prime Minister to his policy of neutrality and that the obstacles to an agreement between the United States and Ireland were political and psychological rather than technical.89 Huston informed the State Department on 31 December 1951 that the Irish response failed to meet the new legislative requirements and that Ireland now faced the possibility of losing the remainder of its ERP aid. Furthermore, Huston believed that the introduction of the question of partition or other political matter into the proposed exchange of Notes would be an unacceptable and unnecessary qualication of the assurances required under the Mutual Security Act. He also believed that the sale of arms to Ireland should have been dealt with in a separate communication.90 With three days to go to the deadline of 8 January 1952, an ofcial in the State Departments ofce of British Commonwealth and northern European affairs, William Hamilton, telephoned Huston in Dublin to discuss the matter. Huston told him that the two sides were still a long way apart, and the two men agreed that they must emphasize to the Irish government that the ERP aid could not be continued unless Ireland embraced the Mutual Security Act principles.91 Huston developed these arguments in preparation for Matthewss meeting with Aiken on 7 January, but he stressed that the proposed agreement can be so worded as to avoid any clash with Irelands present foreign policy.92 This display of greater exibility by the State Department at such a late stage arose out of what Hamilton described as the potentially extremely embarrassing implications that might arise if ERP aid committed to Ireland were cut off.93 However, following a day of meetings in Dublin and Washington on 8 January, Huston called Hamilton in Washington to inform him that the Irish government fully understood that $18 million of grant aid and $3 million of loan aid and technical assistance would be frozen if Ireland did not subscribe to the Mutual Security Act. Huston indicated that he would be in contact with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, but no further communication occurred that night, and the deadline for the exchange of notes passed.94 J. J. Hearne, the Irish ambassador in the United States, summarized the situation for State Department ofcials at a meeting on 11 January 1952: The govern89. Huston to Acheson, 10 January 1952. 90. Huston to Acheson, 31 December 1951, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E. 91. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, 8 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E. 92. Huston to Matthews, 7 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E. 93. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, 5 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E. 94. Huston to State Department, Correspondence on Termination Period 22 December 1951 to 10 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E.

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ment had refused to enter NATO openly and was unwilling to enter through the back door.95 Under these circumstances, suspension of U.S. economic aid to Ireland, including $150,000 of commodities already ordered under the ERP, $900,000 of technical assistance, and $18 million of grant counterpart funds, was required by law.96 The MSA, headed by Averell Harriman, was initially inclined to adopt an inexible attitude on the disbursement of this aid, despite a degree of exibility afforded by section 511 of the Mutual Security Act.97 Harriman agreed with many others in the U.S. administration that Ireland, having been neutral during the war, should not have been included in the ERP in the rst place. He opposed giving any assistance to Ireland outside the NATO and Mutual Security Act frameworks. However, neither the Mutual Security Agency nor the State Department wished, as Matthews in Dublin put it, to stir up the partition question or to bring trouble on themselves from the friends of Ireland on the Hill. Matthews urged George Perkins and Harry Raynor in the State Department to persuade the MSA to loosen up and be as liberal as possible on the Irish case.98 Although Perkins and Raynor agreed with the ambassador, Raynor held out little hope that the agency would agree. It appears, however, that the MSA in these early days of its existence did not wish to embroil itself in unnecessary clashes with Congress. Agency ofcials also recognized that they had a moral duty to fulll commitments made to Ireland prior to the suspension and eventual termination of ERP aid. Thus, the agency moved from its unduly rigid stance, as Tannenwald put it, and permitted existing commodity and technical assistance arrangements to be funded. With regard to grant counterpart projects, however, the agency ordered the renegotiation of all commitments undertaken before January 1952.99 By 31 July 1953, Ireland and the United States had initialed a draft bilateral agreement. All that remained was for the Foreign Operations Administration, the successor to the Mutual Security Agency, to submit the proposals to Congress for approval. Six agreements were concluded between the United States and Ireland in 1955, 1956, and 1957.
95. Department of State Memorandum, 11 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E. 96. Tannenwald to Charles Murphy, 25 February 1952, in HSTL, TTP, Box 3. 97. Tannenwald to McCormack, 28 February 1952, in HSTL, TTP, Box 3. Under this provision, the U.S. president could decide to continue economic and military aid to any country. Matthews also appealed to Truman to provide the remaining aid to Ireland, although he was disappointed with the mundane work of his Dublin posting. Matthews to Truman, 8 February 1952, HSTL, HSTP, Ofcial Files. 98. Garner Ranney to Garrett, 9 June 1950, in NARA, RG 59, Box 20, File D-5(a); and Harry Raynor to George Perkins, 22 January 1952, in NARA, RG 59, Box 20, File D-5(c). 99. Tannenwald to Charles Murphy, 25 February 1952.

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Ireland, the Marshall Plan, and U.S. Cold War Concerns

The consolidation of democratic capitalist systems in Europe and the rebuff of Communist encroachments were central aims of the ERP. In some ways, however, the ECA propaganda campaign was less problematic in Ireland than in other ERP countries. Despite Irelands wartime neutrality, ECA ofcials realized that Irish sympathies lay with the capitalist democratic countries led by the United States. Moreover, as Boland and Dillon indicated, the Irish government had little difculty participating in and supporting the ECA publicity campaign. The aims of the Dublin ECA mission personnel and the messages of the attendant publicity campaign, which focused on encouraging economic growth, improving productivity, developing greater cooperation with other ERP countries, counteracting opposition to the ERP, and emphasizing the reliance of Ireland on the United States, met with general approval among elite groups.100 Because of the minimal Communist presence in Irish trade unions, the Irish press, and Irish politics, the chief political goal of the ECAs publicity programthe undermining of Communismnever featured directly in ECA-related publicity measures in Ireland. The Irish workforce was as uninterested in Communism at the end of the ERP as it had been at the beginning. Nevertheless, opposition to Communism was an operating principle for ECA personnel in Ireland. In 1949, the CIA concluded that there is no organized opposition or obstruction to the work of the ECA in Ireland and no likelihood of any.101 Although this general assessment of the situation was accurate, the CIA failed to mention that the handful of Communists and individuals who questioned American motives were critical of the ERP. When anti-Americanism surfaced in early 1951, Paul Miller, the ECA chief, defended the ERP.102 These were isolated incidents, however, because as Tom Commins, the head of the ERP section in the External Affairs Department, noted in October 1951, our people generally have an unqualied belief in the existence of the American democratic way of life and when they think of America in this context they are more likely to hold an exaggerated idea of the well-being of the average American than to question it. 103 His colleague William Fay likewise concluded that there is no need to convince young Irish

100. The disagreements between Irish and ECA ofcials mostly concerned the pace of implementation of the ERP in Ireland. 101. CIA, Opposition to ECA in Participant Countries, 10 February 1949, in HSTL, HSTP, PSF. 102. Dr. Miller Defends Marshall Plan, The Cork Examiner, 26 January 1951, p. 1. 103. Fay, memorandum of conversation, 30 October 1951, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/273.

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men that capitalism would bring greatly higher standards of living than those available under Socialist administrations.104 In the military sphere, the outcome was different. The establishment of the Marshall Plan coincided with a change of government in Ireland in February 1948. This development brought to ofce representatives of ve parties, few of whom had been in ofce previously and all of whom were eager to implement their respective political agendas. The combination, therefore, of high expectations, the coalition nature of the government in 19481951, the presence of dominant personalities such as MacBride, and the anti-partition world tour undertaken by de Valera ensured that partition would be a priority for the government. The overriding salience of partition in Irish domestic and foreign policy guaranteed that negotiations on defense matters would be tainted by partition issues and never fully examined for their own worth. A year after the end of the ERP, Huston wrote to the State Department: Partition continues to constitute the avowed basis for Irelands policy of rm neutrality and of non-participation in any program of collective defense such as is represented by NATO or MSA.105 Irish sympathies, he realized, might lie with the capitalist democracies of the West rather than with the Communist states. But from 1947 to 1952, atavistic issues dominated the approaches of two Irish governments to the new foreign policy challenges that emerged. Ireland was neutral and partitioned when the Marshall Plan began, and it remained so when the plan ended.

104. Ibid. 105. Huston to the Department of State, 6 January 1953, FRUS, Vol. VI, pt. 2, p. 1558.

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