Specifications (P-38L) P-38 Perspective and notes

Lockheed P-38L Lightning at the National Museum of the United States Air Force, marked as a P-38J of the 55th Fighter Squadron, based in England.[101] M2 machine gun armament in the nose of the P-38.
Data from Lockheed P-38 Lightning Pilot's Flight Manual[102]

General characteristics
Crew: One Length: 37 ft 10 in (11.53 m) (11.53 m) Wingspan: 52 ft 0 in (15.85 m) (15.85 m) Height: 12 ft 10 in (3.91 m) (3.91 m) Wing area: 327.5 ft (30.43 m) Airfoil: NACA 23016 / NACA 4412 Empty weight: 12,800 lb[103] (5,800 kg) Loaded weight: 17,500 lb[103] (7,940 kg) Max. takeoff weight: 21,600 lb (9,798 kg) Powerplant: 2 Allison V-1710-111/113 V-12 piston engine, 1,725 hp [N 7] (1,194 kW) each Zero-lift drag coefficient: 0.0268[103] Drag area: 8.78 ft (0.82 m)[103] Aspect ratio: 8.26[103]

Performance
Maximum speed: xx443 mph (713 km/h) (712 km/h) on War Emergency Power: 1,725 hp at 64 inHG and 28,000 ft (8,530 m)[N 8][N 9] Stall speed: 105 mph (169 km/h) (170 km/h) Range: 1,300 mi (2,100 km) combat (1,770 km / 3,640 km) Service ceiling: 44,000 ft (13,000 m) (13,400 m) Rate of climb: 4,750 ft/min (24.1 m/s) maximum (at WEP) Wing loading: 53.4 lb/ft[103] (260.9 kg/m) Power/mass: 0.16 hp/lb (0.27 kW/kg)

Lift-to-drag ratio: 13.5

Armament
1 Hispano M2(C) 20 mm cannon with 150 rounds 4 Browning MG53-2 0.50 in (12.7 mm) machine guns with 500 rpg. 4 M10 three-tube 4.5 in (112 mm) rocket launchers; or: Inner hardpoints: 2 2,000 lb (907 kg) bombs or drop tanks; or 2 1,000 lb (454 kg) bombs or drop tanks, plus either 4 500 lb (227 kg) bombs or 4 250 lb (113 kg) bombs; or

6 500 lb (227 kg) bombs; or 6 250 lb (113 kg) bombs

Outer hardpoints: 10 5 in (127 mm) HVARs (High Velocity Aircraft Rockets); or 2 500 lb (227 kg) bombs; or 2 250 lb (113 kg) bombs

Early variants did not enjoy a high reputation for maneuverability, though they could be agile at low altitudes if flown by a capable pilot, using the P-38's forgiving stall characteristics to their best advantage. From the P-38F-15 model onwards, a "combat maneuver" setting was added to the P-38's Fowler flaps. When deployed at the 8 maneuver setting, the flaps allowed the P-38 to out-turn many contemporary single-engined fighters at the cost of some added drag. However, early variants were hampered by high aileron control forces and a low initial rate of roll,[79] and all such features required a pilot to gain experience with the aircraft,[26] which in part was an additional reason Lockheed sent its representative to England, and later to the Pacific Theater. The aircraft was still experiencing extensive teething troubles as well as being victimized by "urban legends", mostly involving inapplicable twin engine factors which had been designed out of the aircraft by Lockheed.[26] In addition to these, the early versions had a reputation as a "widow maker" as it could enter an unrecoverable dive due to a sonic surface effect at high subsonic speeds. The 527 P-38Fs were heavier, with more powerful engines that used more fuel, and were unpopular in the air war in Northern Europe.[26] Since the heavier engines were having reliability problems and with them, without external fuel tanks, the range of the P-38F was reduced, and since drop tanks themselves were in short supply as the fortunes in the Battle of the Atlantic had not yet swung the Allies' way, the aircraft became relatively unpopular in minds of the bomber command planning staffs despite being the longest ranged fighter first available to the 8th Air Force in sufficient numbers for long range escort duties.[26] Nonetheless, General

Spaatz, then commander of the 8th Air Force in the UK, said of the P-38F: "I'd rather have an airplane that goes like hell and has a few things wrong with it, than one that won't go like hell and has a few things wrong with it."[59]

The P-38J was introduced in August 1943. The turbo-supercharger intercooler system on previous variants had been housed in the leading edges of the wings and had proven vulnerable to combat damage and could burst if the wrong series of controls were mistakenly activated. In the P-38J model, the streamlined engine nacelles of previous Lightnings were changed to fit the intercooler radiator between the oil coolers, forming a "chin" that visually distinguished the J model from its predecessors. While the P-38J used the same V-1710-89/91 engines as the H model, the new core-type intercooler more efficiently lowered intake manifold temperatures and permitted a substantial increase in rated power. The leading edge of the outer wing was fitted with 55 gal (208 l) fuel tanks, filling the space formerly occupied by intercooler tunnels, but these were omitted on early P-38J blocks due to limited availability.[81] The final 210 J models, designated P-38J-25-LO, alleviated the compressibility problem through the addition of a set of electrically-actuated dive recovery flaps just outboard of the engines on the bottom centerline of the wings. With these improvements, a USAAF pilot reported a dive speed of almost 600 mph (970 km/h), although the indicated air speed was later corrected for compressibility error, and the actual dive speed was lower.[82] Lockheed manufactured over 200 retrofit modification kits to be installed on P-38J-10-LO and J-20-LO already in Europe, but the USAAF C-54 carrying them was shot down by an RAF pilot who mistook the Douglas transport for a German Focke-Wulf Condor.[83] Unfortunately the loss of the kits came during Lockheed test pilot Tony LeVier's four-month morale-boosting tour of P-38 bases. Flying a new Lightning named "Snafuperman" modified to full P-38J-25-LO specs at Lockheed's modification center near Belfast, LeVier captured the pilots' full attention by routinely performing maneuvers during March 1944 that common Eighth Air Force wisdom held to be suicidal. It proved too little too late because the decision had already been made to re-equip with Mustangs.[84]
1. The P-38J-25-LO production

block also introduced power-boosted ailerons. These consisted of ailerons that were operated by a hydraulically-actuated bell-crank and push-pull rod, making it easier for the pilot to maneuver the airplane at high airspeeds. This boosting system was one of the first applications of powered controls to any fighter, and required only 17 percent of the previous stick forces. The hydraulic aileron booster system vastly improved the roll rate and thereby increased the effectiveness of the P-38 in combat. P-38Js with power-boosted ailerons proved to have the highest roll-rates of any fighter. Speed was up to 426 m.p.h., and best climb to 3,900 ft./min. It would climb to 20,000 ft. in 5.9 minutes. The key to extracting range from the P-38 was very much in flying technique, using low RPM and high boost (eg: P-38H 2,300/34 for 215 kt at 146 USG/hr for 600+ NM radius), and until 1944 this was the art of individual units and pilots.(4) "...Miracle of miracles, the big old P38 actually turned inside that nimble little Oscar. I was on the deck, in a vertical bank, and the yoke was bucking and shuddering in my hands. That turn was nothing more nor less than a controlled stall." -- John A. Tilley, USAAC, 475th FG.

The P-38L-5, the most common sub-variant of the P-38L, had a modified cockpit heating system which consisted of a plug-socket in the cockpit into which the pilot could plug his heat-suit wire for improved comfort. These Lightnings also received the uprated V-1710-111/113 (F30R/L) engines, and this dramatically lowered the amount of engine failure problems experienced at high altitude so commonly associated with European operations. LeVier believed too little testing at high altitudes was done before sending the P-38s to Britain. He also believed that too many experienced pilots were spread too thin in the pilot ranks, and that the cockpit heat was a serious problem. It was not just the comfort of the pilot, but when the pilots were cramped in a small cockpit under extreme cold situations, they were not in a good flying condition when encountering enemy aircraft. Also, the windows would fog up, and reduce visibility. He arrived at the 364th Fighter Group at Honington. LeVier was not spreading propaganda, and was honest with the pilots he met with. They were informed about all the known limitations of the aircraft, but he also spoke with them on all the positive aspects of the aircraft as well. Manual demonstrations were performed, such as recovering from a dive. LeVier continued his demonstration tour and arrived at Kingscliff, home of the 20th Fighter Group. The pilots of the 20th were not overly impressed with his lecture. LeVier proceeded to take up his P-38 (equipped with the new dive flaps). At 25,000 ft., LeVier dove straight down, and the pilots rushed out to see what they thought would be a crash. He easily pulled out without any problems, and for extra emphasis, he preformed several low level one-engine rolls. The current P-38s in the ETO were not equipped with this flap, but he was attempting to showcase the new features, which would be arriving soon. The pilots were shown that they would be able to pursue a German fighter diving out of trouble. The demonstration was indeed successful. Goxhill was home to a commander who could easily be considered a P-40 man. He disliked the P-38, and the pilots under his command reflected that opinion. LeVier went "all out" in his demonstrations. He convinced them that the problem was inadequate training, not an inadequate aircraft. LeVier won over the opinions of the commander and the pilots. The next stop was in Andover, the headquarters of the 9th Fighter Command. These pilots originally came from a P-47 outfit in the States, and were having difficulty transitioning to the twin-engine P-38. LeVier demonstrated several dives, low-level upside-down passes on one engine, accelerated stalls, and circled the base upside-down several times. Virtually everyone on the base came out to watch the "air show". LeVier's demonstration tour was an overwhelming success. During the four months he was in Britain, an estimated 2,000 engines were replaced on the P-38s. This staggering number was the main reason for the transfer of the P-38s out of the ETO. In his seminal work on the Allison V-1710 engine, Daniel Whitney analyzed in detail other factors that made the P-38 a disappointing airplane in combat over Western Europe.

 Many new and inexperienced pilots arrived in England during December 1943, along with the new J model P-38 Lightning. J model rated at 1,600 horsepower vs. 1,425 for earlier H model Lightnings. This power setting required better maintenance between flights. It appears this work was not done in many cases. During stateside training, Lightning pilots were taught to fly at high rpm settings and low engine manifold pressure during cruise flight. This was very hard on the engines, and not in keeping with technical directives issued by Allison and Lockheed. The quality of fuel in England may have been poor, TEL (tetraethyl lead) fuel additive appeared to condense inside engine induction manifolds, causing detonation (destructive explosion of fuel mixture rather than controlled burning). Improved turbo supercharger intercoolers appeared on the J model P-38. These devices greatly reduced manifold temperatures but this encouraged TEL condensation in manifolds during cruise flight and increased spark plug fouling. Levier was using his special P-38, which was equipped with the newly designed dive flaps. The problem was after he demonstrated the P-38s ability to recover from dives, the pilots had to go back to flying the older P-38s in their units. Lockheed quickly loaded up 400 sets of dive flaps for installation in the ETO. A C-54 cargo aircraft was loaded up and sent to Britain. The results from the installation of the flaps would be tremendous and many pilots and aircraft would be saved. However, during the flight, a British pilot mistook the aircraft for a German aircraft, and shot it down. The loss of the flaps was the final blow to the P-38 in the ETO. General Doolittle had previously started the transition to only P51s and P-47s. Lockheed would never get a chance to reproduce the dive flaps, and none were installed on P-38s in the ETO. In combat, experienced pilots flying the P-38 were able to cope with the best German fighters. Being outnumbered, and usually limited to escorting duties, the P-38s scored over 2,500 kills at the loss of about 1,750 P-38s. These losses included losses of all types, which not only included combat, but also accidents and mechanical problems. A more realistic kill ratio was 2:1, but that was mostly when flying outnumbered. The P-38s flew 130,000 sorties at a loss of 1.3% (1.3 lost P-38s for every 100 missions flown). The P-51s loss rate was 1.1%. Heres another aspect that is rarely looked at, According to the web page of 8th AF losses 8th Air Force Combat Losses in World War II ETO Against the AXIS Powers there were 451 P-38s and 2,201 P-51s lost to all causes by the 8th AF over Europe (data credited to the AF Statistical Data Files). The P-38 flew 127,000 sorties over Europe. Of those the 9th AF had 3 P38 FGs the 474th, 367th and the 370th. The 474th flew from April '44 to April '45 having flown just shy of 14,000 sorties, the others were disbanded in September and October I don't have

sortie numbers yet but they would have flown approximately half of the sorties of the 474th. That would leave the 8th AF with ~100,000 sorties. The P-51 losses of the 8th AF were 2,201 (same source). The P-51 flew 214,000 sorties over Europe. The 9th AF also had some P-51s but I will ignore the added sorties here giving the benefit of the doubt to the Mustang. To put it simply the P-38 lost 451 aircraft to all causes to 100,000 sorties (loss rate of .0045). The P-51 lost 2,201 aircraft in 214,000 sorties (loss rate of .01). There were more than twice the P51s lost per sortie as P-38s over Europe by the 8th AF. Now lets factor in conditions: 1. The P-38 flew escort alone for 2 months, Nov - Dec '44 2. The P-38s teething problems for the first 3-4 months. 3. Pilot and ground crew learning curve. New tactics, mission profiles, location etc. 4. The best German pilots 5. Outnumbered 5:1 by the Germans initially 6. From May '44 on a high percentage of pure G/A missions 7. Close escort period The P-51 program benefited directly from all that when it came into service. Not everybody looked at the P-38 favorably. Lt. Col. Mark Hubbard openly disliked the aircraft. He argued that compressibility and incorrect intercoolers eliminated the positive aspects of this aircraft. What he did not account for was the newness of compressibility. Virtually all the top scientists had no experience with this phenomena, and the NASA blocked progress for months for fear that the extreme testing would damage their wind tunnels. The problem with the intercoolers could be easily attributed to the original design specifications. Kelly Johnson had no idea the P-38 would be generating the amount of hp in the later models. He thought the amount of hp would not exceed 1060 hp. In 1944, the P-38 engines were generating 60% more power than envisioned back in 1938. Actual combat missions did not allow the P-38s to freely attack German fighters. They were either providing close escort for heavy bombers, or were flying at low levels attacking ground targets. When flying escort, they had to stay with the bombers, and could not pursue their targets. It was very limited, and reduced the aggressiveness of the pilots. The P-38 did show that it had the ability to go the distance and tangle equally with the enemy. The German fighters were not able to focus only on the bombers. If they were too focused with a bomber, it would be an easy target for a P-38. Morale was high in the initial escorting missions of the 55th Fighter Group. Missions were successful, and the bomber losses were being effectively reduced. By mid-November 1943, the winter weather was turning mostly bad. Bad flying weather posed many problems for the fighters, and mechanical problems were on the rise. Extreme cold cockpits when flying at high altitudes was making effective combat flying extremely hard. Pilot morale was on the decline, and losses were on the rise. During a November 29 mission, seven P-38s were lost, and were only able to destroy three of the German fighters. Several aspects that are attributed to the problems experienced by the P-38 are the following. 1. Were forced to operate above 30,000 ft.

2. Germans would easily perform a Split-S maneuver to get out of trouble. 3. The unique physical look of the P-38, mainly the tail-booms, enabled the German pilots to easily recognize them as enemy aircraft. 4. Extreme cold cockpits would hamper pilot effectiveness. The pilots would not be in good fighting condition when they encountered German fighters. 5. Flying above 30,000 ft. would increase chances of engine problems. 6. Weather could be deadly. The P-38s were also hard to maintain. Very tight cowled engines made it difficult to ground crews performin maintenance. Landing gear shocks would leak when it got very cold. Turbochargers would freeze up at high altitudes. To make matters worse, the turbochargers only had two settings, low (not enough to sustain high altitude flight) and high (more likely to blow up). There were instances of pilots flying much lower just to warm up, and in the process, exposed themselves to AA fire. When the equipment was working properly, the P-38 was a definite match for German fighters. In fact, when below 20,000 ft., the P-38 was superior in many ways. The problem was that the Germans rarely engaged American fighters at lower altitudes. General Doolittle was especially fed up with all the engine problems. Many theories exist as to the reason why. In other theaters, the Allison engines were fairly reliable. One theory was that the quality of the British aircraft fuel was not a high as the American developed aircraft fuel. When operating with the British fuel, this theory states that the turbochargers would become more volatile and cause terminal engine failures. Another possible theory was the nature of the combat and weather. The aircraft, especially in the fall/winter months, were constantly soaked with moisture on the grounds. Combine that with flying at extreme high altitudes, conditions were ripe for engine failures. In other theaters, the P-38s flew at lower altitudes, and were not operating in the same weather conditions. Whatever the reason for the engine problems, the P-38 was on the way out in the ETO. The P-47s were beginning to get some problems in that design worked out, and the longrange P-51s were arriving. Some of the P-38s were transferred to the 9th Air Force and mostly started carrying out tactical strikes. In January 1944, the 20th Fighter Group engaged a force of German fighters. They proceeded to destroy ten at the loss of only two P-38s. Lt. James Morris had a good day on February 8 1944. Morris was flying at a low altitude when he spotted a German aircraft. He quickly dispatched it, and spotted another German. Morris quickly downed three German fighters, a locomotive, and took down yet another fighter on his way back home. The 20th took had another good mission on April 8. They were on a sweep with no bombers to escort. They attacked several targets of opportunity and also attacked an airfield near Salzwedel. Several German fighters intercepted the P-38s, but were forced to retreat after suffering some losses. In the months leading to invasion of Normandy, the P-38s would have tremendous success, and were responsible for hundreds of targets destroyed.

The P-38s continued supporting the invasion forces after D-day. On July 9, the P-38s were out in force and engaged a large force of German aircraft. They destroyed many of the Germans without any significant losses. The 20th Fighter Group protected attacking B-24 bombers. Shot down seven Germans for the loss of only one P-38. The 55th Squadron destroyed eight FW-190s and three ME-109s without taking any losses. At the end of the day, twenty-one German aircraft were destroyed to the loss of only one P-38. Captain L. E. Blumer was flying with the 367th Fighter Group on August 25. He just completed a bombing attack. On the way back, he came to the assistance of another squadron of P-38s and proceeded to shoot down five German fighters. The P-38s played an important role in the invasion. Their aggressive attacks on German targets essentially paralyzed their communication system. Field Marshall von Runstedt and Reich Marshall Goering cited the communication system takedown was the most important factoring the defeat of the German forces in the west. The relentless attacks also instilled terror and despair into the German troops. Between April 8 and July 24, the 20th destroyed the following: 315 locomotives 100 ammunition cars 87 oil tank cars 1000 freight cars 370 motor vehicles 89 German aircraft in flight 39 German aircraft on the ground

Many barges, boats, radar installations, high-tension towers, small factories, and hangars The P-38 did more to inflict damage onto German forces while operating at low-levels than they would have flying at high altitudes. When flying low, the P-38 did not have nearly as many problems with engine problems than if flying over 20,000 ft. If the German fighters decided to engage the P-38, the low-level advantages of the P-38 would come into play and give the American pilots the advantage. The German pilots would also not be able to dive out of trouble, so dive flaps were not needed. A couple of drawbacks of flying low-level missions was the exposure to AA fire from the ground and the height advantage the German pilots would possess. The P-38 was able to take advantage of its speed. It could make quick attacks and gain altitude for another attack. This method of attack created better results than engaging in pure dog fighting. These tactics were based on the P-38 having better speed than either German fighter. It also required close teamwork between the American pilots. They preferred to take either German fighter to low altitudes. The P-38 could out-dive and overtake the German fighters. Normally they achieved good results.

Common German tactics would use a lone fighter flying low as bait. If some P-38 pilots decided to go for the "easy" kill, the rest of the German fighters would have the altitude advantage and pounce on the P-38s. American pilots quickly learned to leave some P-38s flying topside cover in these instances to prevent a German surprise attack. Here are some Germans opinions: 1) "Johannes Steinhoff, Kommodore of JG 77 in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, flying Bf 109s, had this to say about the P-38, 'I had encountered the long-range P-38 Lightning fighter during the last few days of the North African campaign, Our opinion of this twin-boomed, twin-engined aircraft was divided. Our old Messerschmitts were still, perhaps, a little faster. But pilots who had fought them said that the Lightnings were capable of appreciably tighter turns and that they would be on your tail before you knew what was happening. The machine guns mounted on the nose supposedly produced a concentration of fire from which there was no escape. Certainly the effect was reminiscent of a watering can when one of those dangerous apparitions started firing tracer, and it was essential to prevent them manoeuvring into a position from which they could bring their guns to bear." P-38 Lightning, by Jeffrey Ethell/The Great Book of WWII Airplanes, Bonanaza Books, 1984, page 21. 2) "Oberleutnant Franz Steigler, a 28 victory ace in the Bf 109 with JG 27 in North Africa, said the P-38s "could turn inside us with ease and they could go from level flight to climb almost instantaneously. We lost quite a few pilots who tried to make an attack and then pull up. The P38s were on them at once. They closed so quickly that there was little one could do except roll quickly and dive down, for while the P-38 could turn inside us, it rolled very slowly through the first 5 or 10 degrees of bank, and by then we would already be gone. One cardinal rule we never forgot was: avoid fighting a P-38 head on. That was suicide. Their armament was so heavy and their firepower so murderous, that no one ever tried that type of attack more than once."P-38 Lightning, by Jeffrey Ethell/The Great Book of WWII Airplanes, Bonanaza Books, 1984Pages 21,22. 3. (Heinz Knoke description of a duel with a P-38 (from "I Flew for the Fuhrer"): "...At once I peel off and dive into the Lightnings below. They spot us and swing round towards us to meet the attack.... Then we are in a madly milling dogfight...it is a case of every man for himself. I remain on the tail of a Lightning for several minutes. It flies like the devil himself, turning, diving, and climbing almost like a rocket. I am never able to fire more than a few potshots...."

Der Gabelschwanz Teufel

Assessing the Lockheed P-38 Lightning
Technical Report APA-TR-2010-1201 by Dr Carlo Kopp, SMAIAA, SMIEEE, PEng December, 2010

Additions by Corey C. Jordan, 1999. Text and Diagrams 1992, 1999 Carlo Kopp, Text and Diagrams 1999 Corey C. Jordan; Updated 2010 The contribution of Lockheed's twin-boom P-38 Lightning fighter to the crucial air battles of World War II has been consistently understated for the last five decades. Receiving far less publicity than its single engined stablemate, the P-51, the big twin fought the most important air battles of the 1943 to 1944 period and was a key element in breaking the back of Axis air power over Germany, and in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. The P-38 excelled in that design parameter which is pivotal to fighting a strategic air war, its combat radius in excess of 700 NM (1) had no equivalent in either camp. The Lightning's combat radius was exploited repeatedly and surprisingly, the Lightning repeatedly succeeded in catching its opponents off guard. Both in the Pacific and the Mediterranean, the P-38 provided long range escort for heavy bombers, long range fighter sweeps deep into hostile airspace and interdiction of surface targets. In the UK, the P-38 wings initially provided long range escort for the 8th Air Force, in that critical phase of the daylight bombing offensive, when Luftwaffe strength was at its best, and US bomber losses began to reach unsustainable proportions. The presence of the P-38 allowed the offensive to continue at a point, where it may have been scaled down due disproportionate attrition. The Lockheed P-38 was a complex aircraft, using innovative technology, which experienced a painful and protracted development phase and in the end, was denied the credit which it deserved for the importance of its role. This becomes all the more apparent upon closer examination. In the ETO, the 8th Air Force was still working up and the bomber commanders initially saw little use for the Lightning, as they still believed in the concept of unescorted daylight bombing. Nearly all P-38F/Gs were deployed to North Africa, to support the Torch landings in Morocco and Algiers. The P-38s flew air superiority and ground attack missions in the MTO, inflicting heavy damage on the German and Italian air, sea and land convoys attempting to reinforce the theater. The P38 was the only US fighter capable of engaging the Bf109G and Fw190A on equal terms, providing escort for bombers well out of the range of the RAF Spitfires. By mid March 1943, the Axis had a force in excess of 500 Ju-52s, Me-323s and SM.82s dedicated to reinforcing the theater. The Allies applied the long-legged P-38 to cut this air bridge from Sicily, some measure of the intensity of this battle can be gauged by three notable sorties. On the 5th April 26 P-38s engaged a convoy of 70 Ju-52s escorted by 24 Luftwaffe fighters, destroying 11 transports and 2 fighters, for the loss of 3 P-38s. On the 10th April, 41 transports and 8 fighters were dispatched, the following day 26 Ju-52s and 5 fighters were destroyed for no loss. The Allied landings in Sicily and Italy saw further successes for the P-38 force, a notable highlight being an Allied

convoy escort CAP on the 9th October, during which Lt.Col. W.L. Leverette shot down 7 Ju-87 dive bombers, another of his pilots downing another 5 aircraft. It is not surprising that German pilots nicknamed the P-38 Der Gabelschwanz Teufel (the Fork-Tailed Devil). The outstanding success of the P-38 in the Med and the Pacific was not matched by units of the 8th AF in the UK. These were applied to the long range escort role, equipped with the P-38H. The H model, a stopgap while production of the P-38J was being organised, supplanted the G in May, 1943, and differed primarily in the use of more powerful F-17 engines with automatic engine mixture controls (autolean/autorich), B-33 turbochargers and automatic oil cooler flaps, and a new AN-M2C cannon. The more powerful V-1710F-17 hit the design limits of the leading edge intercoolers, oil coolers and radiators, which limited military power output to 1,240-1,350 HP, only late build aircraft with improved oil coolers could maintain the nominal 1,425 HP. The 55th FG became operational with the P-38H at Nuthampstead in the UK, in October, 1943, deploying from McChord Field in Washington state, where it was a training unit periodically stripped of squadrons to reinforce MTO and SWPA FGs. Tasked with bomber escort at high altitude, the single group of P-38s provided deep escort outside of the range of the seven P-47 groups and numerous RAF Spitfire squadrons, which escorted bombers over the Channel. At this time the Luftwaffe was at its peak, with 8 JagdGeschwaders (JG1, JG2, JG3, JG11, JG26, JG51, JG106) equipped with Bf109G and Fw190A and 3 NachtJagdGeschwaders (NJG1, NJG2, NJG6) equipped with Bf110G available to defend the continent, each JG/NJG with typically 3 Staffels (Squadrons) per JG/NJG. The P-38s were all that stood between the Luftwaffe and the bombers, 500 NM deep inside hostile airspace. Unescorted, the B-17s and B-24s suffered up to 30% attrition on some raids and the P-38s were the only aircraft with the radius to the task. Typically, P-47 Thunderbolts provided fighter cover to and from the German border. The P-47, truly an excellent high altitude fighter, was saddled with its limited range. They were just beginning to be equipped with belly mounted drop tanks. Yet, these were still inadequate for flying beyond the German frontier. The rotund Thunderbolt would suffer from a lack of range until the arrival of the P-47D-25-RE later in 1944. This model had 100 gallons of increased internal tankage and provision for three external drop tanks. Even with the arrival of some P-51B Mustangs, the P-38 was to bear the brunt of deep penetration escort duty for the next several months. The P-51B equipped 354th (9th AF) went operational in late December, 1943, followed by the 357th and 4th FGs in February, 1944. The P-38 equipped 264th went operational in March, 1944, and the 479th as late as May 1944. During the critical late months of 1943 the P-38 stood alone, with Mustang numbers building rapidly from February 1944. With a large proportion of Pacific and Med P-38 operations flown at medium to low altitudes, Lockheed and Allison had little operational experience with the aircraft at high altitude and low ambients and this was quickly revealed. The Allisons misbehaved quite consistently, 'throwing rods, swallowing valves and fouling plugs' while the intercoolers often ruptured under sustained high boost, and turbocharger regulators froze at 10 in. or 80 in. of boost, the latter often resulting in catastrophic failures. Even with the arrival of the P-38J, engines and turbochargers continued to fail. The new intercooler/oil cooler design was actually too efficient and the enlarged radiators became a new problem. Fuel too, was a source of trouble, it is believed by many knowledgeable people that the majority of fuel used in Britain was improperly blended, the anti-knock lead compounds coming out of solution (separating) in the Allison's induction system at extreme low

temperatures. This could lead to detonation and rapid engine failure, especially at the higher power settings demanded for combat. Many of the P-38's assigned to escort missions were forced to abort and return to base. Most of the aborts were related to engines coming apart in flight, with intercoolers that chilled the fuel/air mixture too much. Radiators that could lower engine temps below normal operating minimums. Oil coolers that could congeal the oil to sludge. These problems could have been fixed at the squadron level. Yet, they were not. It took the P-38J-25-LO and L model to eliminate these headaches. Add sub-standard fuel, green pilots, poor tactics and the 8th had a serious problem in the making. Having had their numbers seriously reduced by aborts, the remaining fighters were all the more hard pressed by vastly superior numbers of Luftwaffe fighters. The single inexperienced 55th FG often fought the JGs outnumbered 5:1, and the operational debut of the 20th FG in late December 1943, equipped with a mixed inventory of P-38H and P-38J-5/10-LO did not dramatically improve the situation. There is little wonder that loss rates were relatively high and the kill to loss ratio was below that of the P-47's which could be massed by the hundreds (700 P-47's flying escort was not uncommon). The Luftwaffe quickly learned to position the bulk of their fighters just beyond the range of the Thunderbolts and repeatedly flew aggressive small unit ambushes against the handful of P-38s tied to close escort and thus denied the freedom to engage at will. To aggravate these problems, inadequate cockpit heating resulted in severe pilot frostbite, while the Luftwaffe quickly learned about the compressibility problems in dives, with German pilots evading the P-38s by executing a split-S at high speed. The initial roll rate was not spectacular and the easily recognized planform provided the Luftwaffe with yet another advantage to play. Poor serviceability and engine problems meant that initially 50 or less aircraft were available for such missions, including the first escorts over Berlin, and therefore the 55th and later also 20th FG usually fought the JGs outnumbered between three to one and five to one, as noted previously. The large number of engine failures deep inside enemy airspace exacerbated the problem, and the aggregate exchange rate, accidents inclusive, dropped to about 1:1.5 in favour of the Lightning by 1944. Aircrew morale dropped, moreso due to the large number of single engine landing accidents, thus further damaging the aircraft's reputation. The technical problems were not resolved until the introduction of the P-38J-25-LO, by which time the 8th had decided that the new Merlin powered P-51B/C was a better choice for the mission. In hindsight, while the P-38H and early J variants may not have performed to expectations in the ETO, what is overlooked is that their presence alone allowed the daylight offensive to proceed at the most crucial phase of the battle, the last quarter of 1943, leading to eventual air superiority by the middle of 1944, when the P-51's reached full strength. It is safe to say that were larger numbers of the P-38 available to offset Luftwaffe numbers, and more experienced pilots made available to crew the P-38, the overall result would have looked far better. The common conclusion that the P-38 was inadequate for the needs of the 8th is frequently based upon comparisons of the scores achieved by the 20th and 55th FGs during the late February "Argument" raids, in comparison with the P-51B equipped 354th FG (9th AF) and the 357th FG (8th AF), and the scoring performance of the P-51B equipped 4th FG in the early March raids into Germany. The factor which is ignored by critics of the P-38 is tactical and aircraft/powerplant handling experience. The 4th FG comprised the former RAF Eagle Spitfire

squadrons, and was by far the most experienced USAAF FG in the ETO. The 354th was being led by Blakeslee, formerly of the 4th FG. The 357th drew directly on the experience of the 4th and the 354th FGs. All three FGs drew on the initial long range escort experience of the 55th. In summary a valuable pool of tactical experience and engine handling experience for the Merlin equipped P-51B existed in the 4th FG, and this experience could be directly applied to the P-51B. No such experience existed for the turbocharged Allison powered twin engined P-38 in theatre. The valuable tactical and handling experience of the SWPA FGs was a theatre away. Only a limited number of MTO pilots were made available for the 20th and 55th, and both units had taken heavy losses during the early escort missions, impacting both morale and the rate at which experience could be accumulated in these FGs. Many of the P-38 handling techniques developed in the SWPA to counter the highly manoeuvrable and skilled Japanese opposition, such as differential throttle and rudder assisted roll entries, were never practiced widely in the ETO. Despite these difficulties the 55th did well on a number of sorties during this period. On the 3rd November, 1943, the 55th in concert with the experienced 4th, 56th and 78th FGs clashed with the elite JG 1. The 55th accounted for 7 Luftwaffe fighters of the 13 claimed. On the 25th November, 1943, 4 FW-190s were claimed for the loss of one P-38H, one of the Focke-Wulfs belonging to Major J. Seifert (an "expert" with 57 kills), Gruppenkommandeur of II/JG26. Other sorties were much less successful, and heavy losses were suffered on a number of occasions. A heavy price was exacted for the deployment of inexperienced pilots in a very demanding theatre in the hitherto untried long range escort mission profile. Perhaps the best critique of the ETO record of the P-38 is that by former 20th FG Capt. Arthur Heiden, who flew the P-38 during the Spring of 1944, in the company of better known pilots such as Jack Ilfrey, and Ernest Fiebelkorn, later instructed on the P-38 and P-51, and after the war went on to log in excess of 25,000 hrs of flying time: "The quality of multi-engine training during World War II bordered on the ridiculous. I am convinced that with training methods now in use we could take most of civilian private pilots who might be about to fly the Aztec or Cessna 310, and in ten hours, have a more confident pilot than the ones who flew off to war in the P-38. A P-38 pilot usually got his training in two ways. The first way, of course, was twin-engine advanced training in Curtiss AT-9s, which had the unhappy feature of having propellers you couldn't feather. After sixty hours of this, the student received ten hours of AT-6 gunnery, although he might get his gunnery training in the AT-9, since AT-6s were in short supply." "At this point he had his chance to fly the RP-322 for another twenty hours. The 322, as you know, was the British version of the airplane, and they came with assorted equipment and things on them that nobody could predict. Upon graduation from the RP-322 he was assigned to a P-38 Replacement Training Unit (RTU) or an Operational Training Unit (OTU) for 100 hours or more of fighter training. A second way to get into the P-38 was to transition from single engine fighters. In this event, someone probably took him up in a multi-engine transport or bomber and demonstrated engine shutdown a couple of times after skimming the tech order, a blindfold check, and then ignoring the check list (not for real fighter pilots!), he blasted off. More than one neophyte has described his first "launch" in a P-38 as being hit in the ass with a snow shovel."

"Either method of training, probably, made little difference as neither guy knew that much about multi-engine operations and procedures. True, he had been warned about the magic number of 120 miles per hour his Vme (editor:Vmca) or single-engine control speed. He had swam in glue during a couple of prop featherings while in formation with his instructor. He was, also, warned never to turn into a dead engine, never put down the gear until he had made the field, and never to go around with one caged. That was about it until shortly thereafter the old Allison time bomb blew up, and he was in business the hard way. Right on takeoff. "Some people lucked out if the runway was long enough. Some overshot or undershot and they bent the whole thing. Some tried a single-engine go-around anyway, usually with horrible results. Such happenings would make a son of a bitch out of any saint." "Tony Levier's spectacular demonstrations were an attempt to rectify all these problems, but the damage had been done. The Air Corps, as far as I knew, never did change its pilot training." "For perspective, it must also be remembered that two other significant events had taken place in training (in England). Theater indoctrination at Goxhill in England had received the same overhaul that had occurred in the States. The most important of all may have been the training units set up by the combat organizations themselves. Here it was possible to up-date training to the latest information and for individual commanders to put their special stamp on things and develop new tactics. "But and this is giant towering BUT this was all for the P-51 pilots." "What would have happened if the P-38 pilots and their units could have been blessed with the same wonderful opportunity?" For context, we present a previously unpublished letter from the Commanding Officer of the 20th Fighter Group, to the 8th Air Force Headquarters. The letter spells out the problems faced by the P-38 Groups in clear, unambiguous terms.

20th Fighter Group Headquarters APO 637 U.S. Army (E-2) 3 June 1944 Subject: P-38 Airplane in Combat. To: Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, APO 637, U.S. Army. 1. The following observations are being put in writing by the undersigned at the request of the Commanding General, VII FC. They are intended purely as constructive criticism and are intended in any way to "low rate" our present equipment. 2. After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours on combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is too complicated for the 'average' pilot. I want to put strong emphasis on the word 'average, taking full consideration just how little combat training our pilots have before going on as operational status. 3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising

along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced", what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure. 4. In my limited experience with a P-38 group, we have lost as least four (4) pilots, who when bounced, took no immediate evasive action. The logical assumption is that they were so busy in the cockpit, trying to get organized that they were shot down before they could get going. 5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do about it? It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five minutes before R/V and tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble". This is the signal for everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank switches on, gun heaters on, combat and sight switches on and to increase RPM and manifold pressure to maximum cruise. This procedure, however, does not help the pilot who is bounced on the way in and who is trying to conserve his gasoline and equipment for the escort job ahead. 6. What is the answer to these difficulties? During the past several weeks we have been visited at this station time and time again by Lockheed representatives, Allison representatives and high ranking Army personnel connected with these two companies. They all ask about our troubles and then proceed to tell us about the marvelous mechanisms that they have devised to overcome these troubles that the Air Force has turned down as "unnecessary". Chief among these is a unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold pressure regulator, which will control power, RPM and mixture by use of a single lever. It is obvious that there is a crying need for a device like that in combat. 7. It is easy to understand why test pilots, who have never been in combat, cannot readily appreciate what each split second means when a "bounce" occurs. Every last motion when you get bounced is just another nail in your coffin. Any device which would eliminate any of the enumerated above, are obviously very necessary to make the P-38 a really effective combat airplane. 8. It is also felt that that much could done to simplify the gas switching system in this airplane. The switches {valve selector handles} are all in awkward positions and extremely hard to turn. The toggle switches for outboard tanks are almost impossible to operate with gloves on. 9. My personal feeling about this airplane is that it is a fine piece of equipment, and if properly handled, takes a back seat for nothing that the enemy can produce. But it does need simplifying to bring it within the capabilities of the 'average' pilot. I believe that pilots like Colonel Ben Kelsey and Colonel Cass Huff are among the finest pilots in the world today. But I also believe

that it is difficult for men like them to place their thinking and ability on the level of a youngster with a bare 25 hours in the airplane, going into his first combat. That is the sort of thinking that will have to be done, in my opinion, to make the P-38 a first-class all around fighting airplane. HAROLD J. RAU Colonel, Air Corps, Commanding. Captain Stan Richardson of the 55th Fighter Group recalls some of his experiences as an instructor (before his tour with the 55th) at a stateside RTU. The airplane was a "dream" on single-engine. While I was instructing in P-38's at Muroc AAF, on occasion the instructor and three students (four ship flight) would each feather the right propeller (remember, only a single generator, and that on the left engine) for a "tail chase" which included loops, slow and barrel rolls, and just generally having a good time. The exercise was to instill confidence in the pilots ability to control the aircraft on one engine. My area of "expertise" while instructing at Muroc was single-engine demo's in a piggyback P-38. Take-off on two engines, feather the right engine shortly after take-off. Climb to 10,000'. Demonstrate various emergency procedures (landing gear and flap extension), propeller operation in fixed pitch (simulating electrical failure), high speed stalls, a loop, a roll or two, then return to the airfield for landing on one engine. Make a typical fighter approach on the deck, pitch out, drop the landing gear, then some flaps, finally full flaps and plunk it onto the runway. For a short period in my life flying P-38's I had as much time on one engine as I did on two. Keep in mind that most of my P-38 flying occurred just after my 20th birthday. Some of my P-38 combat time was while I was a 20 year old snot-nosed kid. No brains, lotsa luck. Gad! I love that bird..... It was a dandy flying machine in instrument conditions associated with poor weather. I had to return once from Berlin on one engine. No problem." Capt. Heiden went on to discuss some of the problems inherent with high altitude escort missions over Europe. He points out that all the combat instructors who gained their experience in Africa or in the Pacific, had done the vast majority of their combat flying below 20,000 feet. Therefore, new pilots were trained to fly the P-38 at altitudes below that height. Very few pilots had flown the Lightning at the altitudes required by 8th Air Force mission profiles and were loath to do so. Many of the P-38 trained pilots arriving in Britain requested assignment to the 9th Air Force in order to fly at lower levels where they had both experience and confidence in the ability of the airplane to do the job. Nonetheless, the high priority given to providing escort fighters determined that nearly all the incoming pilots were destined for the 8th. Most P-38 pilots were completely unprepared for high altitude operations nor the technical problems involved. Capt. Heiden continues: "These new pilots made their attempts to go to altitude. This is what the curriculum called for and they gave it their best, but those early airplanes, the way they were set up, just wouldn't make it. There were disastrous incidents of ignition breakdown because of high-tension leakage. The oxygen systems were woefully inadequate. This is what they put into the airplane and the pilot in the cockpit was stuck with he had. It just wouldn't do the job. No one liked 30,000 feet

anyway. There had been no training for it. There had never been any need for it. It was too cold and the windows frosted up." "All this piled up on the 8th Air Force pilots, but there they were at 30,000 feet plus and sixty below zero. It was miserable." "Then things really started to come apart. Now, suddenly, turbochargers were running away. They were blowing up engines on the basis of one engine blow up every seven hours. Intercoolers were separating the lead from the fuel and the result was lowered octane. Hands and feet were freezing; pilots were calling their airplanes airborne ice wagons and they were right. Frost on the windows got thicker than ever. Most disgusting of all was the leisurely way the German fighters made their get-aways straight down." "Another problem seldom mentioned was the single generator problem. If a generator was lost or a low battery the Curtis Electric prop would lose the Dynamic Brake and go to extreme Low Pitch. This was called a RUN AWAY. It could happen on Take Off with a low battery. Since you couldn't feather, it set up a lot of drag making it difficult to make it around to land. The Killer situation was to lose the Generator or lose the engine with the Generator on it while 2 or 3hrs into Germany. Procedure was to SET the Props then turn off all electrical power. Then momentarily turn it back on to reset the props as needed. Being sure everything electrical was also turned off -- No Radios. The forgotten thing was you were at altitude and the OAT was -60degrees and the little old battery was cold soaked. Hence, dead as a dog. Result, with a lot of altitude you have less than an hour with one or two props in RUNAWAY. I have no statistics to back me up on this, but believe, that more P-38s were lost from this than any other factor including combat. This simple problem did not receive attention until April, '44." "This leads us to another vague fact. This is the need of boost pumps to maintain fuel pressure to the engines at around 20,000' and above. No boost pumps, a pilot will need to get down to 20K or below, and if he needs more than cruise power he will have to get way down low." "My only experience in these problems, was of course the runaway prop, and once when the boost pump circuit breakers popped while we were engaged with some 109s. So there I was holding in the circuit breakers with my right hand while flying with my left, hoping to get to a lower altitude before something burned up." "P-38 units from the moment of going on initial operational status were committed to MAX EFFORT. No two ways about it. No time to shake things out, to discover your problems. You got there and zap, you were in up to your eyeballs. This meant that everything flyable went and everything that still had wings would be made flyable. No matter what. This in effect was the same as demanding, by direct order, that everyone and everything must have, immediately if not sooner, 100 percent combat capabilities. Like Casey Jones, the pressure was all the way up without any margins whatsoever." "Despite these revolting developments, the pilots of the 8th knew that the P-38 could outturn, outclimb, outrun and outfight anybody's airplane in the air so they set about rectifying their problems." "Every one of these problems was solved with the introduction of the P-38L."

"Let me repeat this again and again. It can never be emphasized too strongly. It makes up the Gospel Word. The P-38L. Now there was the airplane." "Nothing, to these pilots, after the hard winter of 1943-44 could be more beautiful than a P-38L outrolling and tailgating a German fighter straight down, following a spin or split-S or whatever gyration a startled, panicked and doomed German might attempt to initiate. You just couldn't get away from the P-38L. Whatever the German could do, the American in the P-38L could do better." (cited from [8] with permission from Arthur W. Heiden). Captain Stan Richardson comments on the slow initial roll rate of the early P-38H and J models deployed with the 8th Air Force. "The P-38 was a large fighter with much mass. 52' wingspan and long, wide-chord ailerons that contributed to slow response along the longitudinal axis of the early airplanes. The higher the indicated airspeed, the slower the response. At very high IAS it took plenty of muscle to roll the airplane. I don't believe that a joystick would have improved matters over the wheel. The Luftwaffe soon recognized the slow roll rate of the "H" and early "J" model Lightnings and used it to their advantage. It also learned of the dive restrictions caused by "compressibility" and used that advantage also. Sometime in the development of the P-38, the design engineers must have realized that P-38's didn't have great roll capability. When Tony Levier, Lockheed test pilot, visited the 55th FG, he heard a common thread of complaints from the pilots. Cold cockpit, poor "flick" roll rate, and inability to dive after the Bf-109's and FW-190's from high altitude. The complaints were relayed to the Lockheed factory, and design changes were incorporated in the P-38L. Prior to the arrival of the "L's" at Wormingford, many modification kits were shipped to Langford Lodge, North Ireland, for field modifications of the "J" model Lightning then arriving in the theater. Unfortunately, an early shipment aboard a DC-4 was lost at sea when the Brits shot the cargo plane from the sky. It took several months to replace the lost modification kits. Early P-38J-5-LO's were modified at Langford Lodge by the addition of the replacement kits. The kits added dive recovery flaps under the wings, outboard of the engines, and a 3000psi hydraulically boosted aileron system. The P-38L's were now coming down the production line with the aileron boost and "speed boards" installed. P-38's from the J-25's onward were what we should have had when we went operational in October 1943. The compressibility problem of the P-38 was also experienced by P-47 Thunderbolts, and was not a mystery to aeronautical design engineers. The P-38J25-LO and P-38L's were terrific. Roll Rate? Ha! Nothing would roll faster. The dive recovery flaps ameliorated the "compressibility" (Mach limitation) of earlier Lightnings. An added benefit of the dive recovery flaps was their ability to pitch the nose 10-20 degrees "up" momentarily when trying to out turn the Luftwaffe's best, even when using the flap combat position on the selector. Of course the nose "pitch-up" resulted in increased aerodynamic drag, and must be used cautiously. High speed is generally preferred over low speed in combat situations. Properly flown, the Fowler flaps of the P-38 allowed very tight turning radius." Arthur Heiden observed first-hand how tight a well flown P-38 could turn.

"I remember an amusing incident, Apr '44. We had run into a real mess and the Luftwafe was bouncing everybody. My flight had just been bounced, did the break, and the Luftwaffe kept on going. While I was on guard, I saw this other flight get bounced. While the rest of that flight did a halfhearted break, old tail-end Charlie's P-38 emitted a cloud of exhaust smoke (thought he had been hit), saw his nose come up and wrap up his turn. Before I could think, old #4 was in the lead of that flight. Impressed the hell out of me. Turned out to have been Fiebelkorn -- he was off to a good start." The decision to replace the P-38J in the 8th AF with the P-51, rather than the P-38L, meant that the 8th never got to exploit the full performance and combat potential of the P-38. Capt. Heiden makes some further interesting observations. "The P-51 was a new airplane and we were eager to fly it and were happy with it. It was so easy and comfortable to fly. The P-38 had kept us on our toes and constantly busy--far more critical to fly. You never could relax with it. We were disappointed with the 51's rate of climb and concerned with the reverse stick, especially if fuel was in the fuselage tank, the rash of rough engines from fouled plugs, and cracked heads which dumped the coolant. With the 38 you could be at altitude before landfall over the continent, but with the 51 you still had a lot of climbing yet to do. The 38 was an interceptor and if both engines were healthy, you could outclimb any other airplane, and that's what wins dog fights. When you are in a dog fight below tree tops, it is way more comfortable in a 38 with its power and stall characteristics and, for that matter at any altitude." To summarise the performance of the P-38 in the 8th AF, Capt Heiden notes: "Aug 43, 8thAF has retrieved some Bomber Gps and has several original Spitfire/P-47 FGs. Two P-38 FGs, 1-P-51 FG that will not be operational till late Oct and have to workout tactics and maintenance problems, which all are severe. Highly inadequate supply of A/C." "Nov. 43, P-38Hs and P-51Bs beginning ops, find themselves in a climate environment none had experienced before and a superior opponent with 10 times the numbers. Forced to take the bombers to, over and withdraw them. Lucky to get half of what they had to the target after aborts/early returns. Sometimes as few as four fighters made it to target under attack continuously going and coming. Five minutes of METO power was planned into the profile. Meaning that if you fought over five minutes you wouldn't make it home. Remember, you were being bounced continuously." "Feb 11, 44, 357thFG goes on Ops (P-51). 4thFG converts to P-51s. 2-weeks later and other groups are converting by end of Feb. Now fighter groups don't have to go the whole to, over, and from target. The escort is now Penetration, Target, and Withdrawal, each leg is assigned to only one FG. and many operational problems are being resolved. Internal fuel on P-38s has been greatly increased with Wing and Leading edge tanks. P-47s are starting to get external fuel tanks." "The last half of 43 brought horrendous losses, had forced German manufacturing underground and had forced Germany to go to synthetic oil. This had increased the cost of war exponentially to the Germans."

"Feb 44 we went back to Schwienfurt with acceptable loses. March 3rd the 20th & 55thFGs went to Berlin--Bombers were recalled. March, April, and May brought vicious battles, often with heavy loses. However, Germany were throwing their valuable flight instructors and 100hr students in to the battle. The Luftwaffe was at last starting to die." "The 8th was, at last, being flooded with Mustangs and well trained pilots. The Mustang was a delight to fly, easier to maintain cheaper to build and train pilots for, and had long legs. In those respects you can rightfully call it better, but it could not do anything better than a P-38J-25 or L. Just remember who took the war to the enemy and held on under inconceivable odds. Enough of the crap." P-51D - best climb is at 5,000ft - 3,320ft/min (7.5 min to 20,000ft) P-38J - best climb at SL - 4,000ft ave climb to 20,000ft - 3,724ft/min I have a P-38L graph that matches this 5.37min to 20,000ft) 'Planes and Pilots of WWII' site. An AAF test puts it at 4.91min to 20,000ft, I don't have it so Its just a possible at this time. P-51D - Top speed - 443mph P-38L - Top Speed - 442mph (I have a Lockheed graph and have been told there is an AAF test confirming this) however I think until more solid data surfaces (the AAF report) I'll go with 431mph. P-51D - Acceleration - 2.2mph/sec @ 15,000ft from cruise P-38L - Acceleration - 2.8mph/sec @ 15,000ft from cruise P-51D - range - 2,200mi P-38L - range - 2,300 mile mission carried off in early '45 (see Smithsonian site) P-51D - gun package - 6 .50 M2 guns - sited at 250yards P-38L - gun package - 4 .50 M2 guns, 1 cannon 20mm - effective to 1,000yrds. P-51D - load - 2,000lbs P-38L - load - 4,000lbs - 5600lbs reported from the field. Maneuvering capability. the AAF considered the F model as good from 10,000 to 15,000ft and the P-38F better that the P-40, P-47, P-39, and P-51(the best handling Mustang model) above 15,000ft.The L was reported better, and with maneuvering flaps deployed was reputed to be able to turn with anything, check the John Tilley story where he out turned a Zero at 90mph and 1,000ft. The L model had compressability slats deployable at any speed and could momentarily pop the nose up 20deg at any speed, and could dive after anything. With the aileron boost could out roll anything above 350mph (I can post a graph) or its available at the 'Planes and Pilots of WWII' site. The P-38 out performs the P-51D in all but top speed, and cruise speed, and cost. Cost was not an issue durring the war, they made ~18,000 P-47s which ranged from $500 less to ~$8,000 less and wasn't up to the job until the D model was introduced. The P-38J resolved the intercooler efficiency problems of the earlier subtypes via the use of a core type intercooler in the forward nacelle chin. While prototypes were being tested in early 1943, P-38H production continued. The new nacelle chin provided increased oil cooling capacity, and automatic control of the intercooler vent, resulting in the full availability of the 1,600 HP War Emergency rating of the F-17 powerplant. Other design changes were introduced, including enlarged glycol radiators in the tail booms, in later build aircraft additional outboard leading edge tanks, and two major control system changes. These were hydraulically boosted ailerons which decreased control forces by a factor of six, and electrically actuated dive flaps

under the wings which cured the dive compressibility problems. The latter were fitted standard from the P-38J-25-LO, sadly almost all retrofit kits intended for earlier P-38J subtypes were lost in a friendly fire incident in early 1944, thereby delaying the introduction of this important modification to theatre units by several months. Curiously, the modification entered production as a kit in late 1943, yet was not incorporated into production aircraft for another six months, until the P-38J-25-LO, although some P-38J-10/15-LO aircraft were retrofitted in the field. In addition, the windscreen was changed to flat armour glass plate, the control wheel was changed and proper cockpit heating and defrosting fitted. Although the heating and defrosting problems were not fully cured until the arrival of the P-38J-25-LO, which was nearly identical to the penultimate P-38L. The electrical fuses were replaced with breakers allowing the pilot to reset the breaker in flight rather than suffer the loss of a system. Deliveries of the P-38J commenced in August, 1943, however, the P-38J-25 did not arrive until July of 1944. Too late to affect 8th Air Force thinking as the die had been cast in the ETO and the 8th began to phase in the P-51B and C from early 1944. The P-38s were gradually shifted to the ground attack and Flak suppression roles, where their superior payload radius performance easily outclassed the single engined types. The result was an aircraft which could well exceed the Luftwaffe fighters in performance, while further extending the type's radius performance. Almost 3,000 were built and deployed to every theater, with increasing numbers to the MTO with the 15th AF, the Pacific with the 5th, 7th, 11th and 13th AF's, and Burma/India with the 10th and 14th AF's. In the Pacific, the 5th and 13th AF's used the P-38J to its fullest. The invasion of the Philippines saw redeployment from New Guinea to the Philippines, and the 475th FG, Satan's Angels, with four squadrons of P-38s led the scoring contest, well ahead of the mixed FG's. The 475th was a late entry, formed at Ipswich in mid 1943 with a mixed force of G/H models. Many aces flew with the Fifth Air Force, and the two highest scoring US pilots of the war, Richard Bong (40) and Tommy McGuire (38), both flew the P-38, Bong with the 49th Fighter Group and McGuire with the 475th. By the end of the war, the 475th had destroyed 551 for 56 losses, a ratio of 10:1. The 49th, having flown mostly P-40s and P-38s, with some P-47Ds thrown in for good measure, out scored the 475th with 668 air to air victories. This score ranked them third of all American Fighter Groups behind the the 354th and 56th in the ETO. A much publicized event in the Pacific was the 1944 visit by Charles Lindbergh, who widely disseminated the knowledge of range performance improvement through optimal cruise control technique (discussed above), getting the message to pilots and unit commanders throughout the theater.(4) In the Med, the P-38Js flew from Italy on escort and fighter sweep missions into Southern and Central Europe, attacking targets as far North as Vienna and Prague, and repeatedly raiding the Rumanian oilfields at Ploesti. The Ploesti oilfields were the target of many a B-24 raid, with questionable results, P-38 strikes however reduced production to a fraction of full capacity. The P-38s became a familiar sight all over Europe, strafing railway locomotives and Flak sites in areas once the inviolate domain of the Luftwaffe. With ability to carry two 2,000 lb bombs to substantial radii the P-38 became a major battlefield interdiction asset, playing a key role in the 1944 invasion.

The P-38J was followed by the P-38L, deliveries of which commenced in June, 1944, almost 4,000 were built by the end of hostilities. The P-38L was fitted with F-30 engines, delivering equal or better power to higher altitudes, and slightly larger fuel tanks, with booster pumps in the wings. Detail changes included the first tail warning radar in a fighter. By the end of 1944, the role of the P-38, like that of most Allied fighters, had shifted to tactical ground support largely due to the absence of serious fighter opposition. As the Third Reich crumbled and the Japanese retreated into their final defensive perimeter, the operational career of the P-38 reached its final stage. Expensive to maintain and fly, most P-38s were phased out soon after the end of hostilities in the Pacific, the F-51 Mustang assuming its role. It is interesting to note that the haste with which the aircraft were disposed of prevented their use in the subsequent Korean war, an environment where the P-38 would doubtless have thrived in its tactical interdiction role, with better payload/radius, firepower and resilience to ground fire than the F-51. The last operational P-38s remained in service with several US aligned Third World countries, but spares availability and operating costs soon led to their demise. Today only a small handful of aircraft remain, with even fewer flyable.

The Strategic Perspective

Combat radius helps to win air wars. This simple observation sums up much of what distinguished the P-38 from its contemporaries, and also why this aircraft must be considered the single most significant fighter in the US inventory in W.W.II. The critical air battles, when Allied strength was still building up and Axis strength was at its peak, were fought by the P-38 force, deep inside hostile airspace against a numerically superior enemy. All other parameters being equal, it was the radius of the Lightning which allowed the ETO daylight bombing offensive to succeed at a time when losses were high and long term success questionable. By the time Mustang numbers built up in the ETO, the Luftwaffe had already crossed the knee in the Lanchesterian attrition war curve and defeat was inevitable. While the much admired P-51 made a critical contribution, it is worth noting that cumulative deployments of the Merlin powered P-51 matched the P-38 only as late as the end of 1944, which is clearly at odds with the established mythology. With the 8th AF, the long range escort load was shared equally by the P-38 and P-51 throughout the decisive first half of 1944. 1) Ultimately, combat range of the P-38 grew until it easily exceeded the endurance of its pilots. Equipped with 310 gallon drop tanks, over 1,030 gallons in total, the P-38 was capable of a combat radius in excess of 1,300 miles. The P-38 outranged its contemporary versions of the P-51. 4) There has been much written on Charles Lindbergh's contribution to increasing the range of the P-38. Much of this falsely states why he went to the SWPA. Lindbergh's purpose in the SWPA was not originally to instruct P-38 pilots in fuel conservation methods. He arrived in the area as a consultant for United Aircraft. He visited the 5th Air Force Headquarters and managed to convince the brass to allow him to observe P-38 combat operations. He soon discovered that the pilots were not being efficient with fuel. The P-38 manual called for cruise settings of 2,200 2,400 rpm in auto-rich. Lindbergh lectured on using 1,600 rpm in auto-lean. In the Pacific, where land based air grappled with the Japanese, the Lightning was the foremost fighter, destroying more Japanese aircraft than any other Allied fighter. The air battles over New

Guinea, the Solomons, the invasion of the Phillipines and later Okinawa were all campaigns where the radius and performance of the P-38 were fundamental advantages over Japanese air assets. The perception of the P-38 as a mediocre aircraft is clearly the result of wartime propaganda run unchecked, and lay interpretations of period statements. The historical record clearly indicates that the big twin was there when it really mattered and there can be no greater a compliment for its designers. It was the aircraft which allowed the USAAF to play an offensive strategy almost from the very beginning of combat operations. The P-38 was without doubt the strategically most important American fighter of World War II. P-38 perspective by Jeff Ethell "
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"As the speed dropped below 150mph, I flipped the flap handle to the maneuver stop (which can be used up to 250mph) and steepened the turn. At this point, the 109 pilot, at full power with the right rudder all the way down, would have snap-rolled into a vicious stall if he had chosen to follow. I pulled the power back on the inside (right) engine, pushed the power up on the outside (left) engine, shoved right rudder pedal, and the Lightning smoothly swapped ends. Not only did it turn on a dime, but it actually rotated around its vertical axis as if spinning on a pole running through the top of the canopy and out the bottom of the ****pit. The maneuver was absolutely comfortable with no heavy G-loading. As the nose came through 180 degrees, I threw the flap lever back to full up, evened the throttles and headed downhill going through 300mph in less time than it takes to tell it. The 109 would have been a sitting duck." When the day arrived, I stood transfixed before the newly restored olive-drab-and-gray P-38L-5. The P-38 defines the word "big" for WW II fighters"52-foot wingspan with operational weights up to 17,500 pounds, or more if needed. Preflight is very easy; you can walk under every part of the airplane, which sits some 10 feet off the ground on massive landing gear. With twin, liquid-cooled engines, four radiators, four oil coolers and the maze of hydraulics to run landing gear and flaps, the Lightning is very complex indeed, so there is plenty to check. Fortunately, Museum maintenance chief Ted Ryder is as much a fanatic on mechanical perfection as Jack, so this P-38"after about 13 hours total time since restoration"it was operating virtually fault-free. With a flick of a small lever, the handle for the boarding ladder pops out of the upper rear of the central gondola; one pull and it swings the ladder down then locks it into place. Getting up onto the airplane is then a series of embarrassing tries at sticking feet into the rungs, falling down and scrambling for the handhold just forward of the ladder handle. This took more getting used to than flying the plane. The final system boils down to right foot into the first rung, pull forward on the handle to get centered over the ladder, left foot into the next rung and grab the handhold to pull forward for all you're worth while swinging the right leg up onto the wing. Everyone had his laugh for the day watching me try to cope with this thing. Once I was settled in the cockpit, I was taken with the vast expanse of airplane around me. Sitting deep within the center gondola and wing, I quickly got the impression of being buried in

the machine; this would intensify in flight. The cockpit is just about perfect in size: not too small, not too large and very comfortable. Having memorized the Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions, I was quickly familiar with the layout"absolutely mandatory before flying. The layout is a myriad of switches, and the labeling is often hard to read, particularly because most of the switches sit behind the control wheel. I can see why wartime instructors required a blindfold cockpit check before turning people loose. Jack, as if he'd come straight out of WW II as a transition instructor, gave me a few last-minute pointers like how to start it and what was different from a stock P-38; then he said, "Give it a try." He turned around, slid down the wing and climbed down the ladder, which I could hear retract with a firm clunk. He really must have had confidence. The most obvious difference from other wartime fighters"other than having two of everything for the engines"is the dual pistol-grip control wheel. Putting both hands on this thing brings a sense of complete authority. I can see why it was so easy to haul the aircraft into tight turns; both biceps are working. The ergonomics of the wheel are also years ahead of their time: the grips are canted inward to the exact position of one's hands when they're relaxed and held out in front of you. Dad absolutely loved the wheel instead of a stick, because he could maneuver and point the four .50s and single 20mm like a fire hose. (continued) The engine controls sprout from the left pedestal in all directions, so I carefully went over each lever, switch and propeller circuit breaker (these are Curtiss electric propellers). The large, red, round throttle knobs are an ideal size for the left hand, completing the sense of total control given by the wheel grips. The fuel-tank selectors are mounted on the floor, one in front of the other, to the left of the seat"left wing fuel forward, right wing fuel aft. This has been the cause of most P-38 accidents in the past 30 years. Not only can one get confused about which tank one is selecting, but the five detents include an off position that also doubles for the drop tank. Pilots have often selected a position either between the detents or the off/drop tank position with no tanks, starving the engines of fuel. I took several minutes to look down and memorize the positions and the feel of the selector handles. With nothing else to look at, the inevitable had arrived. Before-start checklist: battery on; fuel selectors reserve (the carburetor vapor line returns several gallons an hour here); if carrying drop tanks, the bomb selector switches go on with arming switch to safe, but they are not hung today; throttles 3/4-inch open; props full forward; prop selector switches auto; mixtures idle cut-off; oilcooler flap switches auto; generator switches on; coolant-flap override switches off (auto); intercooler flaps open; fuel-quantity check. Engine start begins with the left, then the right engine boost pump on and normal; ignition master on; magneto both; starter switch hold forward (left engine) with middle finger of right hand until maximum inertia. Like most Allison-powered WW II aircraft, a flywheel is spun up and then engaged. While still holding the inertia starter, the third finger pushes the engage switch forward at the same time the index finger holds the primer! At first, this is a real comedy of twisted fingers and contorted muscles because you have to reach under or over the control

column to get to all this stuff while the left hand is poised on the left mixture control. Much to my delight, the Allison started very smoothly. I brought the mixture up, and the engine settled down into that distinctive P-38 collected exhaust rumble. Repeat this for the right engine (except the starter and engage switches are held rearward), and the same satisfying start takes place. Dad would confound his students by starting both engines at once; this had to be a real trick. Over the next several days of flying, the sequence became quite natural without a single mis-start. In the P-38, those Allisons start about as easily as a car engine, but they are more difficult to get going in the P-40 and the P-51A. I have no idea why. Sitting there with both turbos whirling, feeling and hearing the satisfying, deep-throated growl coming from the top of the booms (on either side of the ears) is absolutely mesmerizing. There is no sound like it. Looking at those spinning props, across the broad wings, I had to be dreaming. Off the brakes and the Lightning moves easily away, even at low rpm. Like all WW II tricycle gear types, the nosewheel is non-steerable, so it casters in response to throttles or brakes. I quickly discovered that the rudders pick up the prop blast at low speed, so very little brake is needed; just push the rudder pedal, and it steers as if the nosewheel is hooked up. The brakes don't have the bear-trap power of the B-25, but one can get a bob and weave going when pushing on them too hard. Differential throttle is the primary means of steering, and what a great thrill to hear the "rrrRRRRUMMMPP" of the exhausts with each application of throttle. Run-up at 2,300rpm (once each engine has at least 40-degree C oil temp) is simple because the propeller selector switches are behind the prop levers: switch to manual, pull back to decrease rpm a few hundred, push back up to 2,300 and flick the switch back to automatic. During the War, the props were known to run away, but this was usually due to corrosion when the aircraft were left outside. On the whole, they were very reliable, but part of the drill is to be ready to reach up and pull them out of automatic to manual if the rpm go above 3,000 red line. Before takeoff: top hatch locked; side windows rolled up (they're like car windows), and engage the locking ratchet (if left open, they create enormous turbulence across the horizontal surfaces); props full forward; prop selectors auto; mixtures auto rich; fuel tank selectors reserve; dive flaps up; wing flaps up; aileron boost on; boost pumps on and emergency (this gives about 10 pounds more fuel pressure); rudder trim 0 degrees; elevator trim 3 degrees up. Once lined up on the runway, the most important thing is to have the nosewheel straight; the slightest deviation to one side will make it really lurch when the power is applied. The view forward is wonderful; unlike in the tailwheel types, runway visibility is a totally unobstructed. Hold the brakes, open the throttles. During the War, the drill was to go to full power, let the turbos stabilize, see if the props were going to run away, then let go. It must have been like a rocket because all I did was go up to 30 inches manifold pressure, glance at the engine instruments, and release"wham! The P-38 shot out from under me as I kept moving the power up to 54 inches and 3,000rpm. The first thing I noticed was absolutely no torque and perfectly straight tracking"heaven with 3,000hp screaming into my ears and a wonderful feeling of being pressed back into my seat.

The manual recommends easing back on the control column at 70mph, lift off between 90 and 100mph, retract the gear and accelerate to 120mph safe single-engine speed. After what seemed like a few seconds, noting a steady 3,000rpm, I thought I'd take a look at the airspeed indicator for an update"YOW!! I was passing through 130mph! Unlike a tailwheel aircraft, the Lightning must be rotated off the ground, or it will simply stay glued to the runway. I pulled back, shot into the air and fumbled for the gear handle on the lower portion of the engine control pedestal. The P-38 immediately clawed for altitude as I brought the power back to 44 inches and 2,600rpm for climb. It took a couple of takeoffs to get used to this, but eventually, I was able to react quickly enough to get the nosewheel off the ground at the recommended speed and rotate the fighter. It must have been a superb short-field aircraft when taking off with the flaps halfway down. The specter hovering over this exhilaration is loss of an engine on takeoff. In early 1942, when Dad and his 14th Fighter Group friends transitioned into the P-38, they had, on the whole, absolutely no twin-engine time. They were fighter pilots, weren't they? In short order, pilots were getting killed when one engine quit and the P-38 rolled over onto its back and into the ground. Soon, Lockheed test pilots Milo Burcham, Tony LeVier, Jimmy Mattern and others were showing new P-38 pilots how to bring back both throttles, get the nose down and maintain control while trimming out the yaw and bringing the power back up on the good engine, feathering the prop of the dead engine and accelerating to 120mph. This may sound a bit daunting, but during a few single-engine drills at altitude, I found the P-38 responds wonderfully to each input and flies away without a whimper. A Lightning will fly single-engine at 255mph true air speed at 20,000 feet"quite impressive indeed. Best climb is somewhere between 140 and 180mph, and this plane really climbs. The wartime technique was a shallow, high-speed climb, which would outdistance almost any enemy fighter. And what a wonderful experience not to have to hold strong right rudder; feet on the floor, relaxed, I was in paradise. After a few tentative turns, with absolutely no pressure from the ailerons, I was beginning to comprehend why everyone loved the Lightning so much: it flies like a jet with no vibration and light controls. (continued) [img]http://www.flightjournal.com/fj/images/articles/p38_ltng/cockpit.jpg[/img] Level off, power back to 30 inches and 2,000rpm, mixtures to auto-lean, boost pumps to normal, fuel selectors to main tanks. What a sight! Within the wing, I felt as if I were being absorbed by the machine"becoming a part of it rather than riding in it. One of the weak points of the design comes across right away: the engines and wings on each side really block the view down. The only way to keep one's scan up is to roll the airplane into a steep bank and then roll back, which doesn't do wingmen much good in formation. I can see why mutual scan among flight members was so critical. My first few turns were effortless; the aileron boost makes an enormous difference. Unlike with a jet, the turns have to be coordinated with a firm push on the rudders, which are stiffer than both ailerons and elevators. Without wasting any time, I decided to do the one thing I had wanted to do more than any other: a barrel-roll"Dad's favorite maneuver. Nose down for a little extra speed, pull back, turn the wheel and push the rudder pedal. The P-38 glided through just as wonderfully as I thought it would. Another, even better. Another, perfection. With one hand on the wheel and the other on the throttles, it's just as easy. With both

hands on the wheel, I pulled it into a tight turn and was delighted to find the elevators almost as light as the ailerons. Making tight turns and loops was so easy that I grinned involuntarily. When going over the top of the loop, no right rudder was needed at all; just keep the feet on the floor. This was becoming far too easy. The single dominant impression is this thing is smooth and effortless to fly"quite unlike the more complex warbird types. Managing both engines quickly becomes second nature. Stalls are docile; just a rumble as the airflow starts to break up and move toward the wingtips"no tipstalling tendencies. To recover, just relax backpressure and fly away while shoving the throttles to full power with no worry of a snap-roll. At a 15,000-pound gross weight, a power-off gearand flaps-down stall is 70mph! Those Fowler flaps are superb. While flying formation with the Cherokee Six camera ship, I was full of trepidation. The last time I did that in a Mustang, I held a bootful of right rudder, hanging on the ragged edge of a reduced power-on stall. At 100mph, I could hang the P-38 on its props, feet on the floor, and gently move the rudder to slide side to side. Within an hour, something quite astonishing and totally unexpected began to happen. Not only was I more than comfortable, but the airplane also began to "shrink" around me in my mind. The wings seemed to get smaller, the engines went almost unnoticed, and I was soon flying only the central pod with its guns sticking out front. The sense of power, freedom and effortless control movement is so visceral the machine becomes a part of you. As this dawned on me, I was abruptly sharing the cockpit with young Lt. Erv Ethell. His recollections of handling the P-38 in combat became my own; his hands were my hands. The generational circle closed around me as I soared above the Oregon coastline and I began to talk to him, even though he was 2,500 miles away.

(Clover Leaf Manuever) Without much thought, I was entering his preferred combat maneuver; power up, I pictured a 109 on my tail and began an increasingly steep right-hand climbing turn. In turning and twisting with 109s and 190s, Dad never got a bullet hole in Tangerine, his P-38F. As the speed dropped below 150mph, I flipped the flap handle to the maneuver stop (which can be used up to 250mph) and steepened the turn. At this point, the 109 pilot, at full power with the right rudder all the way down, would have snap-rolled into a vicious stall if he had chosen to follow. I pulled the power back on the inside (right) engine, pushed the power up on the outside (left) engine, shoved right rudder pedal, and the Lightning smoothly swapped ends. Not only did it turn on a dime, but it actually rotated around its vertical axis as if spinning on a pole running through the top of the canopy and out the bottom of the cockpit. The maneuver was absolutely comfortable with no heavy G-loading. As the nose came through 180 degrees, I threw the flap lever back to full up, evened the throttles and headed downhill going through 300mph in less time than it takes to tell it. The 109 would have been a sitting duck. This transitional performance is what made the Lightning great in a dogfight; it gave it far more versatility than a single-engine fighter. No doubt, if it were flown like a single-engine fighter, it would come out on the short end, but when a pilot learned to use everything available to him, it

was stunningly dangerous to the enemy. One final characteristic made all this worthwhile: there was no converging fire from the wings. A P-38 pilot could get all of his guns on target whether it was 10 feet or 1,000 yards away. Convinced they were flying the finest fighter of the War, Bong and McGuire were sold on this combination. They had no hesitation at going round and round with Zeros and Oscars, which were supposedly more maneuverable. However, once going downhill, the other Achilles heel of the Lightning comes out: compressibility. I never got there, but I passed 400mph in a dive without much time to think about it. There's a dive-limit placard in the cockpit, and observing it was absolutely mandatory. The Pilot's Instructions state, "As the airplane approaches the critical speed, it becomes rapidly nose-heavy and starts to buffet as if it were about to stall. If this condition is allowed to develop, the nose-heavy condition will become more pronounced, and it will be very difficult to pull out." Many never pulled out. Fortunately, the P-38L had dive flaps"large electrically driven surfaces under each outside wing that deflected no matter what the speed. I hit the switch on the wheel and, with no pull on the wheel at all, the plane pulled out and pitched up into a shallow climb. When I retracted the flaps, the nose pitched down into level flight"all with no input. Unfortunately, dive flaps did not come along until the late J Series"about the same time as the aileron boost"but far too late for most who had flown the P-38 in combat. Another bugaboo with the Lightning was bailing out and hitting the horizontal stabilizer; actually, it wasn't that prevalent. There were several methods: (1) slow down to around 110mph with full flaps if possible, crawl out of the cockpit and slide headfirst down the wing; Lockheed said you'd miss the horizontal stabilizer by four feet; (2) roll over with elevator trim forward and fall out; (3) at high speed, just pop the hatch and get sucked out. Reluctantly, I had to head back to Tillamook; after beating up the west coast of Oregon, I had run out of ideas. Initial for an overhead fan break: 360 degrees overhead approach at 250mph; fueltank selectors on main or reserve (whichever is fullest); mixtures to auto rich; props to 2,600rpm; boost pumps on and emergency. Racing across the numbers, I pulled up and left into the break. Move flap handle to the maneuver stop; gear down below 175mph; 50 percent flaps at 150mph and settle into the downwind. From base to final, bring the power back to 18 inches and stabilize at 140mph. With the field made, add full flaps, bleed airspeed down to 120mph; over the fence at 100 to 110mph, but never exceed 100mph on touchdown or the P-38 will really eat up some runway. Both throttles to idle and pull the wheel back. That first landing at around 80mph felt like setting a baby carriage down with a satisfying squeak"way too easy. Hold the wheel back for aerodynamic braking, then lower the nose; we haven't gone much more than 2,000 feet. Absolutely amazing. With one engine out, the landing technique is similar with the following exceptions: 160mph and 1,600 feet on downwind, aileron boost off to conserve hydraulic power, 50 percent flaps at 140mph; partially reduce rudder trim, approach no slower than 130mph. At 44 inches and 2,600rpm, the P-38 will barely hold altitude with gear down and flaps up and will not hold any altitude even with some flaps extended. Do not extend full flap until closing the throttle on the good engine for landing. Below 500 feet with full flaps, you must land as it will not make a goaround.

Off the active; brake to a stop; flaps up; coolant flaps full open; boost pumps off. Back to the parking area, throttles up to 1,200 rpm; stabilize temperatures; mixtures to idle cut-off; mags off; battery off. I have come full circle. Reining back some obvious prejudice from growing up with Dad's memories, I have come to see the P-38 in a far different light. There is little doubt in my mind I have flown the finest American fighter of WW II. It may have taken a little more time to master and certainly was more complex to maintain in the field, but the options available to the Lightning pilot were impressive. A talented, aggressive fighter pilot could clearly make the P-38 sing. I count myself fortunate to have heard, at last, that siren song.