Plant and Equipment Theft A Practical Guide

Plant and Equipment Theft: A Practical Guide
Second Edition
Plant and Equipment Theft: A Practical Guide

2007 OPERC With the exception of research, private study or review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Applications for reproduction should be made to the publisher. First edition 2006 Second edition 2007
Author:
Dr David J. Edwards
Editors:
Miss Philippa Spittle and Dr Gary Holt
Published by:
The Off-highway Plant and Equipment Research Centre (OPERC) PO Box 5039 Dudley DY1 9FQ Email: enquiries@operc.com Tel: +44 (0) 1384 356202
Distributed by:
IRAS Group PO Box 3258 Wolverhampton WV3 7YT Email: enquiries@irasgroup.net
Conditions of Use
The material contained within this document constitutes general guidelines only and is not, at the time of publication, mandatory. The guidance provided does not reduce, or replace, any legal obligations upon employers (or employees), for example, to comply with any statutory duties under relevant legislation. The guidance is given in good faith; but the reader must accept that because (among other things) of the infinite particular and specific hazards (risks) relating to any given item of plant operating in any given working environment, the guide cannot and therefore does not, purport to offer optimal advice for all possible circumstances. Readers must use the guide as a basis for learning about the subject only; and consult as appropriate, specific agencies, technical consultants, or specialist manufacturers etc. before acting upon any recommendations contained within it. Every effort has been made to ensure that the contents of this guide are correct, error free, and representing best practice, but no guarantee is made express or implied, that this is the case. Accordingly, this publication is offered without legal liability or responsibility on the part of the author, editors, publisher, distributor, or anyone else involved in its production. OPERC does not endorse or specifically recommend any of the products or services referred to in this guide. Any reference to a commercial organisation, product or service is for information and / or educational purposes only. Whilst written principally in a UK context, for the most part, the principles and concepts discussed within this publication hold equal international relevance.
Acknowledgements
OPERC acknowledges with appreciation all who have helped in the development and publication of this guide. In particular, special thanks go to those companies that offered direct support through sponsorship: Automatrics, Hewden, Mtrack and Thiefbeaters. Individuals who also contributed via editorial and / or other input include Mr Richard Taylor (Automatrics) and Jeff Schofield (Hewden). Finally, a thank you is extended to Mr Richard Carmichael for his original contribution on the first edition.
Welcome to OPERC
The Off-highway Plant and Equipment Research Centre (OPERC) has gained an enviable reputation as the leading international centre of excellence for plant and equipment science. OPERC represents all those associated with off-highway plant and equipment - whether industry practitioners, professionals or scholars. This combination of experience, information and ongoing scientific research, ensures that the products and services provided by OPERC are of the highest quality and of value to all stakeholders. OPERC is a non-partisan and non-profit making organisation. Its main objective is to advance off-highway plant and equipment knowledge and share this among all interested parties. Funds generated by the association are used to help research, author, publish and make available information (such as this guide), that would otherwise be too time consuming and / or expensive for any single member to produce in isolation. There are many benefits to be gained from becoming an OPERC member including access to free information and publications; access to teaching, learning and assessment materials; excellent networking opportunities; and attendance at OPERC events. More comprehensive description of OPERC benefits, along with details of how you can join the organisation, can be found on the official OPERC website at: www.operc.com. Alternatively, if you have any queries regarding OPERC, then please do contact our administration team who will be happy to assist you: Telephone: +44(0) 1384 356202 Email: enquiries@operc.com Web: www.operc.com
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Preface
Mr Graham Eaves OPERC President, 2007-2008 Since this guide was first published in 2006, the subject of plant and equipment theft has gained increased recognition throughout many sectors of industry. This is to be applauded, for the more prominence afforded the issue then the more likely are hirers, owners and operators of such equipment, to take practical steps to make their assets more secure. However, commentators presently quantify the cost of plant theft within the UK at approximately 100 million per annum. When this is considered alongside average recovery rates of between five and ten per cent for stolen plant items, the need to continue fighting back against the criminal is self evident. Fortunately, the technologies that underpin plant theft security and stolen asset recovery systems continue to evolve. If properly employed, these technologies can make it harder for criminals to carry out a theft, while also increasing the probability of stolen assets being reunited with their legitimate owners. Nevertheless, owners and operators must still maintain an awareness of the issues regarding plant theft and take practical measures to address them if they want to avoid becoming victims. This revised second edition of OPERCs guide on plant and equipment theft has been updated to include the provision of additional practical guidance, as well as the inclusion of more recent statistics and reporting on advancements in security systems. Its overriding aim remains: to contribute something to helping reduce this unfortunate criminal activity.
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Contents

Introduction The Plant Theft Process

Understanding the Theft Process Why Steal Plant and Equipment? Who Steals Plant and Equipment Opportunist Thieves Professional Thieves
1 3
3 4 5 5 5 6 6 7 8
How Plant and Equipment is Removed Plant Theft via Fraudulent Hire
The Stolen Plant Market Summary
The Nature and Extent of the Problem

The Costs of Plant Theft Some Plant Theft Statistics Summary
9
9 11 13
How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

Using the Plant Theft Process to Apply Security Categorising Security Systems Deterrent Systems Preventative Systems Recovery Systems
15
15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 23 25 25 27 30 31
Specific Anti-theft and Theft-recovery Systems Personalisation Marking Registration Schemes Alarms Immobilisers Recovery Devices
iv
Site Security Installation and Testing of Security Systems
What to do if a Theft Occurs What of the Future? Summary
31 33 33
Concluding Summary References Further Information
35 37 38
List of Figures
Figure 1 The Plant Theft Process Figure 2 The Costs of Plant Theft Figure 3 An Example of Preventing Access to the Cab Figure 4 Typical Manufacturers VIN Plate Figure 5 Adding Identification to an Excavator Using Deep
Imprint Stamping 3 9 15 19 20 20 21 21 23 24 29
Figure 6 Overtly Etched Glass Highlighted within a Warning Sign Figure 7 Example of a Concealed-marking Warning Label:
Clearly Visible on an Excavator Arm
Figure 8 Example of a Concealed-marking Warning Label:

With Security Etching in a Concealed Position
Figure 9 Example of the Type of Information Held on a Microdot Figure 10 Specimen Marking Database Registration Document Figure 11 Typical Theft Detection Recovery Report
List of Tables
Table 1
Stolen Plant Recovery Statistics: as Reported by TER in Support of the Police for the Period 2004 to 2006 Inclusive Covert Marking Methods Some Types of Mechanical Immobilisers and Their Typical Application Examples of How to Improve Site Security Examples of Shared Responsibilities to Help Combat Plant Theft 4 22 27 30 36
Table 2 Table 3

Table 4 Table 5

Introduction
Introduction
The issue of plant and equipment1 theft represents an ongoing challenge for industry. Even by the lowest estimates, the aggregated value of plant theft within the UK represents a multimillion pound (obviously illegitimate!) business. In practice (and for a variety of reasons), levels of plant security generally tend to be less than optimal providing little immediate prospect of the problem diminishing. Neither is the situation helped by an apparent degree of apathy towards plant security on the part of owners and operators. One survey for example, found that two-thirds of plant owners did not even make a record of the serial number of their plant or equipment, whilst less than one in four of those who had fallen victim to plant theft had bothered to chain up and lock their plant items (Smith and Walmsley,1999). In view of this situation, it is something of an irony that there is an increasing awareness of the plant theft problem, as is witnessed by the greater media coverage that it now attracts. This awareness has partly been encouraged by recent changes to plant insurance arrangements. For example, before issuing policies, many insurers now enquire about the specification of installed security devices (such as alarms, immobilisers and trackers) as well as the proposed usage and storage arrangements for the plant. Depending upon the answers to these kinds of queries, insurers may subsequently require increased security arrangements for the assets that they are being asked to insure, or in the extreme, refuse to offer cover. Conversely, insurers may give discounted premiums and excesses on plant and equipment that is more securely protected and stored. There is a growing realisation among plant owners of the enormous costs to business of plant theft. The financial costs are not simply limited to the value of the stolen item itself, but can also represent numerous other indirect costs which, because of their nature, are not always covered by insurance. Furthermore, for the victim of plant theft the experience can be traumatic and prove extremely inconvenient with respect to business operations. In view of this, it is essential that plant hirers, owners and operators are to some extent informed on the subject of plant theft, so that they may take whatever action is reasonably practicable to minimise their chances of becoming a victim. They need to understand the basics of the plant theft process, including how and why their plant may be vulnerable to theft, and what measures they can take to prevent or deter such theft. They also need to know what to do in the event of theft, including both reporting the theft and recovering the plant.
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The term plant and equipment embraces an almost limitless group of mechanical tools, including for example, excavators, face shovels, tracked and wheeled loaders, dumpers, rollers, generators, drilling equipment, access equipment, mechanical hand tools and so on. For ease of reading throughout this guide therefore, the shortened term plant will often be used but should be perceived by the reader, where appropriate, as potentially referring to all these types of plant and equipment. For similar reasons, the singular term thief should also, as appropriate, be perceived as referring to all parties to a theft, for example, where the act of theft might involve an organised gang comprising several members.
Introduction
There are currently many types of plant security system available, offering varying levels of theft prevention, as well as an equally broad array of theft recovery systems, all of which can take a long time to research and assess. To help offset this situation, this guide provides a useful resource for the busy practitioner, presenting an overview of the issues associated with plant theft and also some of the technologies relating to theft prevention and recovery. Remember however that the guide is only an overview and readers must consult specific agencies, anti-theft consultants or specialist manufacturers, as appropriate, before acting upon any recommendations contained within it. The following chapters make up this guide: The Plant Theft Process This chapter reviews the plant theft process, looking briefly at the motive for theft, the methods that might be used to take plant away from its legitimate owner and some of the markets for stolen plant resale. It is concluded that plant theft may be perceived as a low risk, high gain crime by some criminals, where recovery of stolen goods is lower than, for example, stolen private road vehicles and where the stolen plant might reappear anywhere in the world. The Nature and Extent of the Problem This chapter uses some basic statistics to underline the nature and extent of plant theft. The annual cost of plant theft in the UK is shown to vary depending on how it is calculated, but is always a multi-million pound figure. Excavators are identified as a favourite target item and urban located building sites as a particularly high risk plant theft environment. It is concluded that plant theft is a significant problem whether represented in terms of the numbers of thefts or by the financial value of the items stolen. How to Minimise the Risk of Plant Theft This chapter provides a categorisation of the various plant security systems, followed by a more specific description of the anti-theft and theft-recovery solutions. It is concluded that a diverse range of solutions is available and that specialist advice and close consultation with manufacturers may be called for, in seeking to choose an optimum system for a given plant item and / or a given working or plant storage environment. The guide also provides bibliographic details of reference sources used in its compilation, along with a comprehensive alphabetical listing of where additional information may be found. It is reiterated at this point that OPERC does not endorse or specifically recommend any of the products or services referred to in this guide and that any reference to a commercial organisation, product or service is for information or educational purposes only.
The Plant Theft Process

Understanding the Theft Process
Plant theft is a series of processes which begin with identification by the thief of the plant item to be stolen and conclude with its resale (or redeployment). The relationship between these processes is shown sequentially in Figure 1.
Figure 1 The Plant Theft Process

IDENTIFICATION
Thief identifies appropriate item, or sees opportune item to steal
ACCESS
Access to (e.g. the place of storage), or into (e.g. for self-propelled plant) the item is made
ACTIVATION
For self-propelled plant, activation is made (e.g. of the engine and hydraulics)
REMOVAL
Plant is transported away for processing. Easier for smaller items, but may require trailer, low-loader etc. for larger plant Preparation for resale (or redeployment*) is carried out (e.g. removal of identifying marks or features) To the point of resale (or redeployment*). Method depends upon size of asset and whether item is destined for UK or overseas Resale method is mainly dependent upon plant type - from simple auction or black market to existing well established international criminal networks
PROCESSING
TRANSPORTATION/ SHIPPING RESALE (or redeployment*)
*Redeployment means that the item was stolen to be redeployed elsewhere and not necessarily stolen to be sold on.
Why Steal Plant and Equipment?

It is implicit that the motive for theft of any kind is dishonest financial gain and this applies equally to the taking of plant and equipment. It has been suggested that thieves see plant theft as a low risk (i.e. lesser chance of being caught), high gain (i.e. in terms of financial returns) crime. This perception is somewhat borne out by the statistic for recovery of stolen plant which is estimated to be between five to ten per cent of items (depending on what source of data is used); compared for example, to 70 per cent for stolen private vehicles (Construction Manager, 2005). Based on recovery statistics of stolen plant made during the period 2004 to 2006 as reported by The National Plant and Equipment Register (TER), Table 1 illustrates that the probability of recovery will vary significantly dependent upon plant type. The table also shows that recovery rates for types of plant item may vary from year to year.
Table 1 Stolen Plant Recovery Statistics: as Reported by TER

in Support of the Police for the Period 2004 to 2006 Inclusive
Plant Type
Percentage (%) of all Recoveries

2004 2005 10 50 24 2 3 4 7
2006 17 40
26
Telehandlers Excavators Trailers Dumpers Tractors Rollers Undefined other items
33 31 18 8 4 3 3
2 n/a 4 11
Who Steals Plant and Equipment?

Those responsible for carrying out plant theft may be broadly categorised as being either opportunist thieves or professional thieves.
Opportunist Thieves
Opportunist thieves will mainly steal on impulse taking, for example, plant that has been left unattended or that has few or no security measures attached to it and therefore represents a soft target. Very often they will take equipment laying around on construction sites or that which has been left momentarily unattended by the highway (for example, by utility service workers). Workers who leave plant in such a way are failing to implement even fundamental security measures and the opportunist thief will always be on the lookout to capitalise on this. Opportunist thieves will target those assets which are easiest to steal and which equally, are easiest and quickest to sell on. They are mainly responsible for the theft of smaller equipment (such as hand-held tools, breakers, small electrical generators etc.), trailer mounted items (such as traffic signal systems and pneumatic generators) and the more commonly used plant items (which by definition therefore are also the types of item that offer the greatest prospect of a quick resale). These types of thieves will steal anything that presents them with the opportunity, which although beyond the remit of this guide, might also include construction materials or other non-plant items.
Professional Thieves
Professional thieves represent the most significant threat to the theft of higher value plant and equipment. They are normally organised criminals (individuals, gangs and networks) often with well established links to national and foreign crime syndicates. Many professional criminals have spent their lifetime in the trade, developing their expertise and expanding their contacts with fellow criminals (BSIA, 2005). They tend to target the larger, more expensive items often for export and resale and often in accordance with specific purchaser requirements. This is why professional thieves are largely responsible for the international stolen to order theft of plant, which, due to the complexities of its removal, transport and processing, is very often backed up by a considerable criminal organisation. The money generated by professional criminal activity is thought to help support a vast array of additional illegal activities ranging from other types of organised crime to the funding of illegal organisations. It has even been suggested that professional theft may also be funding terrorism (Gerrard, 2006).
How Plant and Equipment is Removed

The ingenuity of the thief has brought about many methods for the removal of plant, whether it be from a storage container, a storage compound or the actual site upon which a larger item is working, for example, from where it is parked. As a result of this, it would be folly for any owner to consider that their plant is either too small or irrelevant, or conversely, too cumbersome or large to be stolen. However, it is the case that the smaller the plant, the greater the risk, mainly because of its ease of movement (Smith and Walmsley, 1999). Equipment such as unattended power tools and road breakers can most easily be taken, as a thief can simply place them in the back of a car or van and drive off within seconds. Similarly, items of towed equipment, such as trailer-mounted generators and compressors are relatively easily hitched to any vehicle with a towing facility and in such circumstances, can be very quickly removed from site. Small earthmoving plant such as micro diggers, mini diggers and self propelled barrows, are generally taken by picking up the plant item in its entirety, often using a lorry mounted knuckle boom crane (e.g. HIAB). They can then be placed upon a trailer, or the bed of a lorry, for easy removal. If a plant item can be accessed and started, it may be loaded under its own power onto an awaiting trailer or if it is a road-going vehicle, it may simply be driven along the highway to a place where it will be processed prior to resale. Larger plant items can also be transported by a variety of other means including within cargo and shipping containers, within open or closed cargo deck lorries and on other specialist transport such as lowloaders. The fact that thieves identify the opportunity and have the confidence to take such large plant items bears testament to the poor levels of security that are often associated with them. It also reinforces the apparent ease with which theft can sometimes be carried out. Fortunately, there is much an owner or operator can do to change this situation and we look at this in more detail later in this guide.
Plant Theft via Fraudulent Hire
With plant security systems and other forms of deterrent becoming more prominent and effective, one of the latest ways that plant and equipment is stolen is through fraudulent hire. This is normally performed by professional gangs and the scam is targeted at plant hire companies. First, the gang sets up and registers a bogus company. They then proceed to build up a credit history and payment record for that company based on small purchases and legitimately paid invoices. At this point, they will hire a substantial quantity of plant from a hire company (or companies) only to then disappear without trace.
For this type of criminal activity, deterrents are not effective. What is required is thorough checks on new companies that apply to hire large plant items (for example, to consider credit history, size of previous credit purchases, settlement history, company age etc.). References should also be sourced by the hire company prior to releasing any equipment to such previously unknown customers. Note also, that if the hire company installs protection to its fleet by way of tracking equipment, this should not be disclosed to any other parties and in particular, to anyone hiring the plant!
The Stolen Plant Market

Because of the high capital cost of new plant and its much lower (i.e. depreciated) residual value as it ages, there is quite understandably a legitimate national and international market in used plant and equipment. It is not uncommon therefore, for plant to spend the latter part of its working life in other (often developing) countries, helping to improve infrastructure or assisting in agricultural operations. Unfortunately, parallel to this legitimate trade, is its illegal counterpart in stolen plant and equipment. Put simply, stolen UK plant is destined for one of either two markets. The first is the home market, where (typically the smaller) items circulate within the used-equipment sector, usually after having had their original identity erased or altered in some way. The second is the export market and a very significant amount of stolen UK plant ends up overseas (Gardner et al, 2002). Stolen plant is exported to numerous locations around the world, including via the following trafficking routes: q from England, to Ireland, to Africa, to the Middle East and Cyprus; q from England, to Ireland via France; q from the UK via sea direct to Eastern Europe; q from the UK through Western Europe, on to Eastern Europe; q from the UK to Western Europe via Ireland; and q from the UK to Western Europe, to the Balkans, Greece, The Middle East, and Africa (TER, 2004). Clearly, in view of the global market for stolen plant and equipment the demand for these illicit products is always going to exist. This in turn indicates that there will always be a financial motive to encourage this type of theft; so the problem is not simply going to go away. It is therefore a significant responsibility of plant owners (and others) to take whatever action they can to minimise their possibility of becoming another victim.
Summary
Plant theft can be considered as a series of several processes: identification, access, activation, removal, processing, transportation and resale (or redeployment). The fundamental motive for plant theft is easy financial reward. Furthermore, and partly because of the relatively low recovery rates associated with stolen plant, this type of crime is sometimes perceived by thieves as a low risk, high gain activity. Thieves are very ingenious and will steal anything from the smallest hand tool to the largest of mechanical earthmoving plant, so anyone who owns such items is at risk of becoming a victim of plant theft. In general, thieves are either opportunist (being typically amateurs who act mainly on impulse, given an easy opportunity to steal) or professional (being typically much more organised and also possibly operating in established networks at home and abroad). There are many ways in which plant may be removed for processing and resale, including in the back of a van (for smaller plant items), by being towed away, loaded onto a trailer or if road-going, by being driven along the highway. Stolen plant is destined for sale either on the used equipment market at home or, as is generally the case with larger more expensive items, on the international network of stolen goods that may end up just about anywhere in the world. Such a vast market looks set to ensure that the demand for stolen plant will long continue.

The Costs of Plant Theft
As demonstrated in Figure 2, the total cost of having a plant item stolen includes both the direct costs of the theft, i.e. the value of the stolen item, and also some of the other indirect costs associated with its loss.
Figure 2 The Costs of Plant Theft

THE OBVIOUS OR DIRECT COST
This is the value of the stolen plant item which may be expressed in several ways. For example: Its replacement (i.e. new-for-old) value Its residual (i.e. depreciated) value
...TO WHICH MIGHT BE ADDED ANY COMBINATION OF...
THE LESS OBVIOUS OR INDIRECT COSTS

These are often more obscure and relate particularly to the owner or operators business. For example: Emergency costs (e.g. repair damage to plant storage area) Short term hire of replacement plant Loss of productivity and output Increased labour to recover negative impact on work programme Other negative impact on business (e.g. client goodwill) Administration of the process (e.g. dealing with police, reporting or recovery) Insurance policy excess and increased insurance premiums Social costs such as trauma, de-motivation and stress
Even by the lowest estimates, the total value of plant theft within the UK is many millions of pounds. However, this value can vary significantly depending on exactly how it is calculated and/or the source and nature of those data used in the calculations, such as whether new replacement cost or residual plant value is used.
The value of plant theft as reported to the UK National Plant and Equipment Register (TER) for the period 200304 was 36.8 million, an increase of 1.8 million on the previous year (TER, 2004). The equivalent value based upon 2005 statistics showed a further rise, of approximately 13 per cent, reaching 43 million (TER, 2006A). Some encouragement was provided by the 2006 data, as TER reported a decrease in thefts for the first time since their records began in 1995; this decrease was 18 per cent (as compared to the preceding year), with the total value of items stolen being 31.5 million (TER, 2007). A total value as anecdotally [sic] stated by the (then) Policing and Reducing Crime Unit of the Home Office, was put at as much as 1 billion per annum in 1997 (Smith and Walmsley,1999). Note that not all plant and equipment is registered with the TER database so their particular estimates do not necessarily represent the entire value of plant theft within Great Britain for any given period, whereas one would reasonably infer that the figure provided by the Home Office does attempt to quantify the gross value of such losses (i.e. including indirect costs). As alternative comparisons, the (then) Police Scientific Development Branch (now known as the Home Office Scientific Development Branch) estimated the annual cost of stolen plant to be in excess of 100 million (Gardner et al, 2002). Meanwhile, one particular insurers records showed that stolen UK construction plant represents a depreciated cost in excess of 70 million per annum; while also pointing out that the UK construction sector alone is losing the equivalent of 400 million a year as a result of indirect theft costs such as loss of business and late delivery penalties (Allianz and Cornhill, 2005). The earlier cited TER (2007) document reported that the Home Office estimate the value of plant theft within the UK to presently stand at 1 million per week (one assumes this is a direct cost); while recent statistics presented to the Plant Theft Action Group2 quantified Plant theft costs to be valued at 100 million per year (Clancy, 2007).
The Plant Theft Action Group (PTAG) was established by the Home Office but they no longer have any direct involvement and PTAG has in effect become an industry-led group. Contact details are given under Further Information at the end of this guide.
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Some Plant Theft Statistics

Based upon previous research, the overall risk of plant theft within the UK has been quantified in terms of 26 thefts per 1,000 plant units, which compares to 18 thefts per 1,000 units for motor vehicles, on an analysis of 1997 figures (Smith and Walmsley,1999). In view of the longer term upward trend in plant theft, one might reasonably assume the risk (i.e. probability of theft or attempted theft) to have increased since that research was undertaken. Indeed, over the period 2000 to 2004 inclusive, the total value of thefts reported to The National Plant and Equipment Register (TER) increased by approximately 75 per cent (from 21 million in 2000, to 36.8 million in 2004), while the average value of each item of stolen plant increased from 7,500 in 2000 to approximately 10,200 in 2004. By 2005, comparative statistics showed a further 13 per cent increase in the value of thefts as compared to 2004 (with a 20 per cent increase in the number of thefts) to give a figure of 43 million total value (TER, 2006). According to latest statistics from the same source, total thefts reported during 2006 were valued at 31.5 million with an average value of 8,900 per stolen asset; while excavators represented just over one third of these thefts by value, at almost 12 million (TER, 2007). Based on the latest annual report (ibid.), the most commonly stolen types of plant and equipment during 2006, as defined by percentage of total number of reported thefts, were (in descending order) as follows: q other (which includes forestry equipment, compaction equipment, loading shovels, skid steers, platforms, pumps, quarrying equipment, surveying equipment) 31.2% [2005 = 26%, 2004 = 28%]; q trailers 25.5% [2005 = 25%, 2004 = 25%]; q excavators 22.3% [2005 = 27%, 2004 = 29%]; q quad bikes 7.4% [2005 = 6%, 2004 = n/a]; q dumpers 6.6% [2005 = 7%, 2004 = 6%]; q rollers 5.6% [2005 = 5%, 2004 = 4%]; and q breakers 4.4% [2005 = 4%, 2004 = 4%]. [Percentages shown in square brackets are corresponding 2005 and 2004 figures for comparison purposes]. Noteworthy from these statistics, is that excavators (here the definition of which includes all classes such as hydraulic, midi, mini and backhoe loaders) accounted for almost half of the total theft value in 2004 and 2005 and almost 38 per cent of theft value in 2006.
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Smith and Walmsley (1999) reported on research that was undertaken to assess the risk, cost and nature of plant theft within the construction sector. (Their definition of plant was limited to self propelled machinery or that which required towing and so did not include therefore, items such as hand tools, breakers or road drills). They found that most construction plant was taken from urban areas and that 15 per cent of all thefts were from the roadside (refer to the discussion about opportunist thieves in the preceding chapter). After becoming a victim of theft, approximately two-thirds of plant owners then went on to buy new, replacement plant items of which two-thirds of these purchases were supported by insurance claims and of which approximately half of these claimants subsequently witnessed a rise in their insurance premiums. While considering this latter aspect in terms of cost to theft victims, insurance policy excesses might also be considered, which for large plant items can represent quite substantial sums. Their research generally found that security relating to plant and equipment within the construction industry was very poor, with building sites in particular being cited as the places of plant operation with least security measures (see advice on site security in the next chapter for indication of how this might be addressed in practice). Conversely, it was found that depots of various types were found to have better levels of security, including measures such as closed-circuit television monitoring. Regardless of their source, plant theft statistics certainly confirm the extent of the problem to industry and the enormity of this in financial terms to business was outlined earlier. However, the reader is reminded that any calculated value of theft depends upon numerous factors, but principally: q the nature of the plant cost or value data used, for example, whether the value of a stolen item is expressed as new-for-old replacement value (purchase cost) or whether its depreciated residual value is stated; and
q the defined calculation parameters, for example, whether the direct costs alone are considered or whether (and to what extent) other indirect business costs are included in any calculation of losses.
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Summary
The overall risk of plant theft has previously been quantified as 26 thefts per 1,000 plant units. The general (longer term) trend has remained upward and this is borne out partly by the 20 per cent increase in theft numbers (13 per cent by value) as reported to TER during 2005 (albeit most recent comparative figures do show a slight decline). The average value of stolen plant per item also demonstrates a longer term upward trend. Excavators of various types remain a favourite target for thieves, the extent of their removal tending to represent between approximately one-third and almost one-half of the total value of reported thefts over recent years. Earlier research relating to plant theft within the construction sector identified urban areas as presenting a higher risk and in particular building sites. Plant and equipment security generally within this sector has been noted to be lacking. Combined, these high levels of theft represent significant financial losses, the quantum of which can vary significantly depending upon the method of calculation employed.
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Using the Plant Theft Process to Apply Security
As discussed previously (refer to Figure 1), plant theft can be considered as a series of separate processes. For each of these processes, there are some obvious actions which can be taken to help make the act of theft more difficult, and as a result, minimise the risk of theft occurring3. Some examples of these actions are as follows. If the identification by a thief of a suitable plant item can be avoided, then the temptation, particularly for opportunist theft, is removed altogether. Arguably, the simplest example of this is to lock smaller items of plant securely away and out of view. Along similar lines, it should be an objective to deny access to plant, for example to the site where it is stored in the case of smaller equipment, or to the cab or the controls in the case of larger self-propelled plant. In the latter respect, Figure 3 shows a tracked excavator that has been parked with all cab access points covered and locked up. Not only does this make access more difficult, but it also affords some protection to window glass.
Figure 3 An Example of Preventing Access to the Cab
Note here, that it is important to balance between continually developing technological responses to plant theft (some of which are discussed later); and more simple good practice in the management of plant to, from and whilst employed on site. That is, even in those situations where it would not be feasible or practical to implement emerging technologies, good management can often reduce the threat of plant theft with minimal time and cost.
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The removal of stolen plant through its activation (if carried out) and transportation, might be hampered by physically locking the item in place or by the use of other physical barriers to its movement. Methods of immobilisation may also be considered for this purpose and tracking systems, whilst not impeding the act of physical movement, have obvious benefits here too particularly real time tracking methods that can identify transportation routes. Preparation of the stolen plant for resale or redeployment during the processing stage, can be made more difficult for the thief by the use of distinct identifying marks and other traceable features. These features may be overt or covert and anything that adds time and inconvenience to the processing stage might deter the thief from taking the asset in the first place (which is why warning labels are used with covert or hidden systems). Intervention during transportation of a stolen asset to the point of resale or redeployment might be possible, but this is principally the responsibility of police and other authorities. The method of resale will depend on whether the plant is to be sold in the home or export market. Professional thieves may have a well established international network into which they feed their stolen goods and again, any intervention here is principally the remit of national and international authorities. Within the UK, smaller plant items in particular may surface for resale in auctions, private sales, newspapers or the trade press.
Categorising Security Systems

Although there are many different types of security system, they can generally be classified as either deterrent systems, preventative systems or recovery systems.
These types of system aim to make plant less appealing to a thief, usually by reducing its anonymity. This might be achieved by making a plant item more instantly recognisable with overt or covert features. Alternatively, it may be possible to increase the awareness of an ongoing theft, because of distinct, recognisable livery or by locking the plant item into a strange configuration that would make it look odd if it were being moved or transported. Deterrent systems do not always directly affect the operation or ease of removal of a plant item, but tend to increase its individuality.
Deterrent Systems
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Deterrent systems often work by making an asset and its component parts traceable to their legitimate owner for longer than would be the case, were such systems not employed. A thief would much rather steal an unmarked, unregistered plant item, of which there are thousands similar, in preference to an item covered in many forms of covert and overt markings, which is therefore more easily identifiable. Deterrent systems include distinct corporate livery, tagging methods, audible alarms, plant registration schemes and covert marking.
Preventative Systems
These systems aim to insert a barrier of some kind between the thief and their need to activate, or physically remove, a plant item. This may be achieved in a variety of ways such as by: q preventing the operation of one or more critical parts of the plant (e.g. the power source or a sub-system such as a hydraulic pump); q providing a physical barrier between the thief and the item (i.e. to make the plant inaccessible); or q employing some other physical method to prevent its removal (e.g. by locking the item in place). Preventative systems include locks, chains, lockable storage containers or compounds, barriers, key activated systems and immobilisers.
Recovery Systems
Recovery systems are not anti-theft devices in themselves, but rather, their purpose is to increase the likelihood of recovery of stolen plant items. Typically, they are covertly installed, tracking and location finding devices. Distinct markings and registration schemes can be used in conjunction with location finders in order to definitively confirm that a recovered plant item has been stolen and / or to identify its owner. Such an approach combines the deterrent system with the recovery system. The most effective plant security systems will generally comprise a combination of all three of the above classifications. That is, they deter, prevent and, if necessary, aid recovery.
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Specific Anti-theft and Theft-recovery Systems

The following discussion provides further detail on specific forms of plant security system and the method(s) by which these systems are designed to work in practice. The systems discussed are personalisation, marking, registration schemes, alarms, immobilisers and recovery devices. Wherever possible, trade or brand names have not been used in the discussion but contact details of numerous manufacturers (of these types of anti-theft system) may be found at the end of this guide under Further Information. Note that, where appropriate, processional security advice should always be sought, for example when making purchasing decisions. Two good starting points in this respect are Thatcham (see: http://www. thatcham.org/) and Sold Secure (see: http://www.soldsecure.com/) who perform testing and provide ratings for security products.
Personalisation refers to any modification made to a plant item which distinguishes it in some way from its mass-produced, standardised equivalent. Personalisation is a mechanism by which to make a given item much more readily identifiable, or traceable, to its legitimate owner. Any such distinguishing features would of course need to be removed by thieves prior to resale and this requirement makes the processing aspect of plant theft more difficult. With so many standard machines in use (and hence available to be stolen), personalisation might significantly help to reduce the risk of theft. Perhaps the easiest method of marking plant is to personalise its livery. This could for example include the addition of several highly visible instances of the company name, company logo and telephone contact number. Not only are these a deterrent to thieves but they also give the added bonus of providing a form of company advertising. Personalised plant paint schemes are the most visible of identification methods. Their use also adds significant difficulty to stolen plant processing as they will normally demand a total re-spray of the asset. Many plant manufacturers now offer a service to supply new plant in any colour scheme and many large utility and construction companies have taken advantage of this facility. In addition to the advertising aspect mentioned above, personalised paint schemes may also form a component of corporate branding.
Personalisation
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Marking
Legitimate items of plant are marked as standard with a 17 digit Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) or Product Identification Number (PIN). An example of a typical manufacturers plant identification plate showing such information as the VIN, engine serial number, transmission serial number and year of manufacture is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 Typical Manufacturers VIN Plate
Because VIN and PIN numbers are located in the same places on a given type of plant item, criminals soon learn of these locations and hence the numbers can more easily be removed or modified. It is therefore a worthwhile security measure to add VIN or PIN identities in a number of further visible and / or hidden locations. Figure 5 shows a mini excavator having additional identification numbers affixed to it in various places, using a deep imprint stamping method. Taking actions such as this will increase the amount of work required by thieves during processing to remove the additional identification, as well as providing more chance of confirming the legitimate owner of a recovered stolen item. Furthermore, evidence of identification numbers having previously been removed (e.g. ground out) on a machine might give cause for checking that it is not stolen.
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Figure 5 Adding Identification to an Excavator Using Deep

Imprint Stamping
The marking of plant can be further classified into one of three types, these being overt marking, concealed marking and covert marking. We will consider each of these in a little more detail. q Overt markings are intentionally clearly visible. Factory installed markings include product identification plates and engraved markings on major components. In addition to these standard markings it is possible to add additional overt ones. These include adhesive strips to warn potential thieves that the plant has extra covert markings, asset labels bonded to the machine and the etching of VIN / PIN numbers onto vehicle glass (in a similar way to that used for etching registration numbers onto private cars see Figure 6).
Figure 6 Overtly Etched Glass Highlighted within a Warning Sign
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q Concealed-markings are additional VIN and PIN numbers that manufacturers affix to plant in concealed locations, in case overt numbers are destroyed or otherwise become unreadable (for example due to everyday wear and tear). Their location is only revealed to authorised organizations (i.e. with a genuine interest), such as plant recovery companies or law enforcement agencies. Several specialist companies offer a service to install extra concealed-marking using a combination of stamping, etching and engraving. The exact locations for a specific asset are stored on a secure database (see later) with the information only made available to legitimate parties. Figures 7 and 8 show examples of how typical warning labels can be affixed to a plant item to confirm that it has had concealed-marking applied to it. In this context, the labels themselves become a deterrent.
marking Warning Label: Clearly Visible on an Excavator Arm
Figure 7 Example of a Concealed-
Figure 8 Example of a Concealed-marking Warning Label: With Security Etching in a Concealed Position
q Covert marking uses technology that is extremely difficult to detect and equally as difficult to remove, as a means of personalising plant. This method is also ideally used in conjunction with overt asset warning labels (as above) to act as a deterrent to thieves. A typical system employs a coded microchip transponder or electronic tag that is hidden inside a component of the asset. Each tag is pre-programmed with a unique serial number and because they are so small they are virtually impossible to find. Identity tags are but one method of covert plant identification a range of additional methods are listed in Table 2.
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Table 2 Covert Marking Methods Method Description

Microdots are less than 1mm in diameter. Upon them they show identifying information such as a unique ID number for the asset, the asset owners company name and contact information. Micro dots are applied by means of a spray (within special adhesives) or they may form a constituent of paint. They are detected by use of ultra-violet light and the information on them is read using a microscope or other (mobile) high-powered magnification method. This is very similar to the concept of micro dotting but much more difficult to remove entirely from a plant item. It comprises synthetic DNA that has been encoded with the legitimate plant owners details. It is so difficult to remove because a trace will always remain in crevices and / or upon rough surfaces to which it has been applied. This involves application to the plant item of a unique chemical compound, that when forensically identified can be used to confirm the items owner. It is similar in many ways to DNA tagging and almost impossible to remove completely from an asset to which it has been applied. This is a small device containing a microchip and an aerial with identifying data stored on it. It can be installed in locations that are hard to get at, such that it means they are very time-consuming to remove. The microchip is read with a special hand-held electronic scanner designed for that purpose. Similar in many ways to radio frequency tags, but the information on the microchip can be modified by specialist means, thereby allowing plant identifying details to be kept up-to-date (for example, where change of asset ownership, or change of contact details occurs). Additional identification numbers are applied in hidden places by more simple or traditional methods. Records of these numbers and locations are kept secure on file, for future reference to help identify stolen plant.
Micro-dotting
DNA Tagging
Chemical Tracing
Radio Frequency Tags
Radio Frequency Read/Write Tags
Stamping/Etching
Arguably, the covert marking of plant coupled with suitable overt warning of its presence might have the most significant effect on discouraging theft. This combination reduces the risk (i.e. it puts the thief off stealing the item in the first place) while also increasing the likelihood of recovery should the item indeed be stolen (by making it identifiable and traceable to its owner).
PRACTICAL NOTE Professional installation of covert marking is the most effective method of ensuring thorough application, although for smaller plant items, DIY kits are available to do this. A useful system for vehicle security is considered to be microdots, which each hold upon their surface laser-etched plant owner information (see Figure 9). The use of radio frequency tags is unregulated, with different manufacturers using different frequencies, which requires the police forces to have numerous different detectors.
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Figure 9 Example of the Type of Information Held on a Microdot
Registration Schemes
The use of manufacturer applied VIN and PIN markings (and any other proprietary marking systems) can only be used to effectively identify a stolen plant item if a suitable audit trail for these types of identifier exists. Currently there is no single, central register (similar to that of the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency in the UK for road going vehicles) that holds details of (for example), all plant VIN and PIN numbers, registered owners and marking system(s). Instead, there are numerous individual databases holding such information with many of the covert marking system manufacturers maintaining their own databases as well4.
The CESAR scheme5 is a recently launched registration scheme that also combines identifying technologies to any asset registered with it (e.g. visible ID plate, RF tags and DNA coding) (Anon, 2007). The various types of database that are available can be categorised as: registration databases, marking databases and manufacturer databases. q Registration databases are maintained commercially in return for an initial registration fee and / or an annual fee. They typically comprise a record of the subscribing legitimate owner and their plant item(s), while the information held may include such things as photographs, the VIN number and make / model details. Should the item be stolen (and the database organisation informed) it will be highlighted as being so on the database. Subsequently, interested parties such as auctioneers or sellers, potential buyers and law enforcement agencies may contact the database organisation to check if a specific plant item is listed as stolen.
Smith and Walmsley (1999) did however point out that arguably the most comprehensive database of stolen plant items is that held on the Police National Computer. However, for reasons of the way the database is structured and the way therefore that data are entered onto it (for example, stolen plant items are sometimes misclassified due to their specialist nature of intended application), it has been suggested that it can be difficult to abstract meaningful data from that database for research purposes. CESAR: The Construction Equipment Security and Registration Scheme.
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Limitations of the system include that not all plant is listed on such databases; that a database is only as good as the accuracy of those data held within it (e.g. data require updating where ownership changes or items are scrapped); and that their effectiveness relies upon people using the facility (e.g. to check if an item is listed as stolen prior to its purchase). Some companies charge a fee for access to this kind of data which may also discourage the systems optimal widespread take-up and use. Marking databases contain information to link details of covert marking systems to legitimate owners. The contact information for these database organisations is generally provided on Warning decals provided on the plant item, such as on windows or in the operators cab (refer to Figures 6 and 7 earlier). These types of database tend only to hold information for specific commercial products, for example, a covert transponder manufacturer will maintain its own database of its customers and their plant items. Figure 10 shows a specimen registration document for an excavator that has been entered onto a marking database. This example entry identifies the exact locations of where the excavator has been stamped, etched and engraved. It also shows that this plant item has an electronic tag and that it has had microdots applied to it as well.
Figure 10 Specimen Marking Database Registration Document
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Manufacturer databases are sometimes maintained by other commercial third-parties and comprise VIN and PIN information on the first owners of the plant (and sometimes subsequent ones where they are kept updated)
PRACTICAL NOTES The National Plant and Equipment Register database facility liaises fully with police forces and is a point of contact to check if any plant or equipment (e.g. that you propose to buy) is stolen. See: http://www.ter-europe.org/. A recent registration initiative (launched April 2007) is the Construction Equipment Security and Registration Scheme (CESAR). Lead organiser is the Construction Equipment Association. See: http://www.coneq.org.uk.
The main purpose of any alarm system is to raise awareness of an attempt to steal the item to which it has been fitted; either as a way of summoning help and / or of scaring the thief away. The system may be overt, in which case it may also act as a deterrent prior to attempted theft, or it may be hidden and designed to go off with an element of surprise if activated during the theft process. With respect to larger plant and equipment, alarms are usually activated when the operator cab is accessed illegitimately. Alarms are typically audible, although alternative and more sophisticated systems can send a signal when set off, for example, to a mobile phone. One failing of alarms is that people might simply ignore them even when the alarm signals that a theft really is occurring. Another disadvantage is that plant often operates in remote rural locations so an audible alarm used in these conditions (i.e. one that cannot be heard by anyone) will provide little deterrent. Once fitted, a good alarm system should be hard to detect or overcome and be able to resist attack for a minimum of six minutes.
Alarms
The fundamental purpose of immobilisers is to prevent the activation of one, or more, systems on a plant item, such as the engine, a hydraulic system, an electrical system or any combination of these. This in turn prevents the item from, for example, being started, operated or moved. In the case of self-propelled plant, immobilisation also avoids transportation under the equipments own power or its self-propelled loading onto another vehicle (such as a low-loader) for removal. Methods of immobilisation may be categorised under the three groupings of electronic immobilisers, hydraulic immobilisers and mechanical immobilisers.
Immobilisers
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q q q
Electronic immobilisers work on electrical systems within the item to which they are fitted and resultantly deactivate things such as brakes, steering or other essential plant controls. As plant technology becomes more advanced and the use of electronic engine management systems becomes more commonplace (encouraged also by the need to reduce engine emissions), there is increasing scope for the use of these electronic systems, to operate (or not, to be more precise!) and act as immobilisers to completely disable plant. The type of immobiliser selected must be able to withstand the extremities of exposure and the general wear and tear inflicted upon it, as a result of the harsh operating environments within which plant tends to work. The plant owner should therefore be aware that although there are a large range of immobilisers available, many would be unsuitable for this type of exposure. Consultation with a specialist supplier is advised. Hydraulic immobilisers operate by immobilising the hydraulic system that typically controls the movement of backhoes, loading shovels and a variety of other appendages. These types of immobiliser can also be employed to lock equipment in a certain posture such that it becomes difficult to transport or, because of the way it is locked in position, will look suspicious if the plant is being moved by a thief. Both electronic and hydraulic immobilisers are installed and become an integral part of the plant item. Normally they are operated by the use of keys, coded keypads or small radio frequency tags (for example on plant key rings). Mechanical immobilisers work by physically restraining part of a plant item. Common methods include physical (lockable) restraints for hydraulic rams, booms, tracks, legs and wheels. Though very often simple in design, they can be highly effective and particularly suited to smaller plant that normally lack more sophisticated systems such as concealed immobilisers (and equally, physical mechanical locks are typically less suitable for larger plant because their required larger size would make them difficult to use and move manually). Mechanical immobilisers are also more capable of preventing the lifting (for removal) or towing away of smaller plant items. A range of mechanical immobilisers is described in further detail, in Table 3.
PRACTICAL NOTES Electronic and hydraulic immobilisation systems are perhaps better suited to medium or larger sized plant and equipment where mechanical immobilisation is impractical (due to the physical size and hence weight of the devices required). The use of mechanical immobilisers must be well managed. Operators must be fully trained in their use and be encouraged to apply them in practice! If the daily installation of mechanical immobilisers is forgotten or neglected by an operator, then their effectiveness is removed altogether.
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Table 3 Some Types of Mechanical Immobilisers and Their

Typical Application
Immobiliser Type
Features
A device that is suited to mini or midi sized tracked plant. It is fitted to inhibit the movement of the tracks and can be used to secure the plant item to a trailer or some other large secure or heavy object using a security chain. These immobilise trailers or trailer-mounted plant such as electricity generators and air compressors, by preventing the use of the hitching mechanism. They can also accommodate a security chain to anchor the device to some other object as described for the Tracklock. This is fitted to a fully extended hydraulic ram, thereby preventing the movement of the rams hydraulic piston. It is generally installed on the steering ram. (Note: a ramlock can become difficult and cumbersome to use on larger plant items). A highly effective means of securing wheel-mounted machines (similar to those used for illegal parking of road going vehicles). There are modified / reinforced versions for commercial use. This locks the stabiliser leg(s) in a lowered position by means of a mechanism installed to the leg. This way a vehicle cannot be moved (until the leg is raised again). Generally considered effective and easy to use.
Tracklock
Trailerlock/Hitchlock
Ramlock
Wheel Clamp
Leglock
Tracking and recovery systems provide accurate location of plant via radio, satellite and cellular technologies. These kinds of device are an aid to crime detection rather than crime prevention and because of their effectiveness, they should be very seriously considered for the higher risk or more costly plant items. Trackers can either be remotely activated after a theft, or be proactive whereby movement or geofence violations cause the tracker to activate automatically. Information may then be accessed via a PC, laptop or mobile phone. More sophisticated systems utilise Secure Operating Centres (SOC) to provide a 24 hour, 7 days a week, 365 days a year service. These kinds of systems should also attract insurance incentives for plant owners that use them. Until recently, there were only two broad forms of tracking device available, these being radio frequency (RF) transmitters and Global Position System (GPS) satellite systems. A more recent development utilises the (mobile phone) Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) location facility. Devices which combine GSM and RF location are proving exceptionally effective.
Recovery Devices
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q q q
Radio frequency transmitters, when activated, emit radio frequency pulses that can be detected by police forces within the UK (i.e. that are within the vicinity of a stolen vehicle with an RF transmitter fitted to it) or in some cases, by the system providers. GPS satellite systems offer real-time location of plant fitted with this kind of device. Upon activation, the monitoring company can determine the plants location and this can be updated every few seconds to therefore track plant in transit. GPS plant management systems also allow owners or plant managers to monitor the current and historic locations of their fleet. Note however, that GPS systems can be power hungry and are likely therefore to need wiring into an assets power supply. GSM location systems are benefiting from the increased accuracy required by directives such as E9116. GSM location also has advantages over GPS in that the tracking device can be detected even when hidden undercover or when hidden inside a steel container.
When considering recovery devices, the aspect of transferability is worthy of some consideration. Many tracking systems cannot be transferred and in effect have to be written off when the asset to which they are affixed is changed or replaced. Whilst some systems can be transferred at a cost, very few can be transferred without cost. Generally, wired tracker systems cannot be transferred by owners whereas wire free systems can be easier to install and transfer any time thereafter. The latter are also more difficult to detect by potential thieves in that there is no wiring, antenna lead or visible antenna associated with them. The costs associated with recovery devices have two components. The first component is the capital cost of the device and any related cost of its installation. This can typically range from capital cost plus zero installation cost for some of the no wire interface systems, up to 2,500 (capital cost plus installation cost) for more complex arrangements. However, exact figures will of course vary from manufacturer to manufacturer and between system types. The second component is annual subscription. This can typically range from 120 to 500 dependant on the service subscribed to. The fee is paid to a management company to cover fees, user licenses, monitoring services and in some cases private finding services. The service provider will normally contact owners in the event of a theft to initiate and manage the tracking process.
The wireless Enhanced 911 (E911) rules. These deal with improved effectiveness of wireless 911 service and provision of additional information on wireless 911 calls. See: http://www.fcc.gov/911/ enhanced/.
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Specialist tracking services will often use a Secure Operating Centre (SOC) which generally provides a service 24 / 7, 365 days per year to monitor and co-ordinate finding and recovery between plant owners, the police, the insurance company and the find and recovery team. SOCs can be external to the tracking system provider and will typically also be monitoring fire and security alarms for banks, businesses and schools etc. Plant owners that require theft recovery tracking should seek services with the appropriate SOC quality assurance, such as CE FC ISO 9001 and certification to NSAI Standard 228. Detection Recovery Reports are typically used to help administer theft recovery operations within the SOC, while also providing an event log for traceability and quality assurance purposes. Figure 11 shows a typical Detection Recovery Report .
Figure 11 Typical Theft Detection Recovery Report
PRACTICAL NOTE The National Plant and Equipment Register advice on theft recovery includes to: q consider installing tracking and theft recovery systems; q give preference to a theft recovery system with an independent power source, that is also unobtrusive, easily concealed and which can be moved from asset to asset; and q only inform personnel that a theft recovery system has been fitted to an asset (or any other detail relating to the system such as where it is fitted or what type it is) if you have to. Source: TER (2006B, p10).
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Site Security
In addition to plant-specific anti-theft systems, the security of the site upon which a plant item is stored or working can have a large impact on the likelihood of its theft. It is generally accepted that if a plant item is easy to access and / or to remove from its place of work or storage, then security on the item itself is somewhat made redundant. While it is appreciated that much plant is operated within environments where more permanent security measures would not be cost effective to install, there are a number of good practice actions that can be taken to reduce theft risk. Some of these, as advocated by the Home Office, are listed in Table 4.
Table 4 Examples of How to Improve Site Security Method Comments

Secure fencing around the place of work and / or plant storage to limit access wherever possible. Types of fence can range from temporary systems to more robust and permanent forms. In terms of theft risk, it is safer to store plant in a well lit area. Consideration can be given to using motion-activated security lighting, which can identify when a person approaches an asset and may also act as a deterrent. The cost of CCTV systems has reduced considerably and they can also be combined with computer technology. Wireless, portable CCTV systems are available for internal or external use. Remote access allows video feeds to be monitored or recorded at a central location, desktop PC, laptop or mobile phone. These are best suited to semi-permanent and permanent installations. Additional configurations include covert systems, immediate police callout, warning phone calls and SMS messages (when the alarm is activated). These tend to be based on lockable access gates, management of personnel movement and good entrance lighting. May also be combined with CCTV. Keys should always be stored in lockable places and be managed such that keys are signed in and out. A separate key to activate self-propelled plant is desirable to single key systems. If costs permit their use, 24 hour guards represent a considerable deterrent against all kinds of intrusion or theft. Well designed and sensibly located signage acts as a visual deterrent to potential thieves.
Perimeter Fencing
Security Lighting
Closed-circuit Television (CCTV)
Intruder Alarms General Access Security Systems Key Security
Security Guards Security Signage
Source: Based on Smith and Walmsley (1999).
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Installation and Testing of Security Systems

To ensure maximum effectiveness, it is essential that all security systems are installed exactly as recommended by the system manufacturer and fully tested prior to their use. Poor installation might impair a systems ability to operate as designed, or reduce its effective attack time (i.e. reduce the time a system can withstand attack by a thief attempting to remove or disable it). Ideally, wired systems should be installed to Vehicle System Installation Board (VSIB) requirements, or equivalent. This may be achieved by using VSIB approved companies or plant manufacturer recommended companies. An installer must be experienced at fitting systems specifically in commercial plant, because there is a considerable difference in the complexity of plant installation in comparison to standard road vehicles, for example. Some security system manufacturers have their products tested by independent testing houses such as Sold Secure or The Motor Insurance Repair Research Centre (Thatcham) to gain a category rating (see Further Information section for website and contact details). This security rating is based on attack trials which are carried out to establish the types of attack that a product can withstand and for what period(s) of time it can withstand them. It must be noted that it is not mandatory for devices to conform to these standards and manufacturers submit devices for approval only if they so desire.
What to do if a Theft Occurs

It is difficult to be totally prescriptive as to the actions to take if an item of plant is stolen, as each site, item of plant and working environment (etc.) will be different, so specific actions may vary from circumstance to circumstance. However, there is some basic advice that should be considered and will apply to most instances. First, upon realising a theft has occurred, the plant owner (or operator) should act immediately to set the reporting and administration process in place. This will involve notifying relevant parties, which will probably include the police (remember to keep a record of any crime number the insurance company will normally require this), the asset insurer in the case of owned plant (or the hirer if the asset has been hired) and the registration or tracking company, if recovery devices are fitted to the stolen item.
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Regarding the actual scene of the theft, this should be left undisturbed if possible so that police can investigate it for evidence. Details of any witnesses should be recorded before they leave the scene and other relevant information might be noted, such as the approximate time of the theft, what is believed to have happened and who for example, was the last person to see the asset before it was taken. With respect to the stolen item, it must be appreciated that the police can only begin to find it, if they have reliable and precise information about it. Ideally, this will all be listed on the plant registration or identification document, or from a report generated by an in-house asset database for example. If no such formal documents exist, then the owner will need to compile relevant information for the police including: q machine make and model; q colour and other distinguishing or identifying features; q VIN or PIN number; q other serial numbers if relevant, such as the engine number; and q a list of any stolen appendages or attachments such as buckets, breakers or consumables. This is not necessarily an exhaustive list and generally, too much information about the item is better than not enough. In short, in the event of theft occurring: q act right away; q inform relevant parties; q preserve evidence; and q provide authorities with accurate information on the asset. Remember to report to all relevant parties should the stolen plant item be recovered!
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What of the Future?

It is of course prudent for owners and operators to take full advantage of advancements in anti-theft or theft-recovery technologies; perhaps a most recent example of this is the use of GSM for asset tracking and location finding purposes. Potential areas for future development may include swipe or electronic (micro-chipped) keys, fobs or cards to be used for access to plant and for activation of engines and (electronic, hydraulic) systems; either as a replacement or as a complement to key-operated security systems. There may also be scope for biometrics to be applied to access or key systems where, for example, an individuals personal characteristics (fingerprints, facial features, hand measurements etc.) may become an essential part of a plant items activation (e.g. start-up) process. While as in any subject it is difficult to accurately predict the future, in this context the overriding aim has to be, that plant and equipment owners keep ahead of the criminal in applying any advancements in anti-theft technology.
Summary
There are numerous ways in which plant and equipment can be modified in order to minimise the risk of theft occurring and / or to maximise the probability of recovery should theft unfortunately have taken place. These systems may be broadly defined as deterrent (to deter the temptation of theft), preventative (to make the act of theft as difficult as possible) and recovery (to maximise the possibility of recovering stolen items). Arguably, the best system will comprise a hybrid of all these and should be installed and tested professionally. In view of the greatly diverse range of plant and equipment security systems available (and their equally diverse range of operating environments), systems must be selected with care. Specialist advice and close consultation with system manufacturers may be called for. Should an owner become a victim of theft, general advice is to act right away, preserve evidence and witnesses, and inform all relevant parties with accurate asset information. Plant owners and operators must maintain an awareness of the risk of plant theft and accordingly, keep ahead of criminals by using any technological advancements that are made in anti-theft and theft-recovery systems.
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34
Conclusion
Concluding Summary
Plant and equipment theft is not only inconvenient for its victims, but in addition, is normally accompanied by significant negative impact on the victims business operations, such as delay in work progress, interruption to productivity and a loss of client goodwill. The costs of becoming a victim extend beyond simply those of the stolen plant item. They also include numerous additional indirect costs to the owners business such as administration of the theft reporting and recovery process, hire of replacement plant to maintain workflow, insurance excess payments and increased insurance premiums. There is also a social cost that might be described in terms of distress or trauma. While some recent statistics do show a slight downturn in certain plant and equipment thefts, the extent of the problem remains immense and may be conveniently stated to represent a direct cost of approximately 1 million per week within the UK. Indeed, the international demand for stolen plant looks set to ensure that the risk of theft will always exist. Excavators of all types remain a favourite target for the thief. The basic advice therefore, has to be to encourage action on the part of plant hirers, owners and operators to do all that is reasonably practicable to: q try and discourage the thief from taking plant (DETER); q try and make the process of theft as difficult as possible (PREVENT); and q maximise the probability of tracing and identifying stolen items (RECOVER). However, it has previously been highlighted that these responsibilities embrace numerous other parties too, including plant and equipment manufacturers, security system manufacturers, the police and insurance companies. A description of how plant theft can be tackled jointly by all these stakeholders is shown in Table 5.
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Conclusion
Table 5 Examples of Shared Responsibilities to Help Combat

Plant Theft
Party Responsible
Typical Responsibilities
Keep auditable, secure records of plant (e.g. VIN and PIN numbers); maintain an up-to-date asset database or use a commercial plant registration database; install security systems commensurate with the risk (taking into account the work location); pay particular attention to protecting higher risk plant; be clear as to the lines of responsibility for security; provide adequate advice and support about security and security systems for plant users and operators; engender a security minded approach throughout the workplace. Thoroughly check prospective hire clients and ask for references prior to releasing valuable plant. Use plant security systems where they are provided in exact accordance with guidance; observe and contribute to general (e.g. site) security; report suspicious activities or perceived security risks; take personal responsibility; and comply with employers security instructions. Research, continue to develop and engineer-in to plant improved security measures as inherent features; increase the marking of equipment and its sub-components with identifying features. Continue to strive for advancements in anti-theft technologies; ensure good consumer awareness of available systems; encourage use of systems particularly for higher risk assets. Improve and maintain awareness of plant theft risks; intervene in stolen goods markets; improve the recording of plant theft. Continue to drive for ongoing change and improved levels of security consciousness within industry; maybe with incentives attached to policies for better protected assets.
Plant Owners
Plant Operators
Plant and Equipment Manufacturers Security System Manufacturers
The Police
Insurance Companies
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References
References
Anon (2007). Plant Registration. Explanatory leaflet on the CESAR scheme, accessed via the Construction Equipment Association website at: http://www.coneq.org.uk/Plant_Registration.pdf (viewed Nov 2007).
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Home Office (2007). Steer Clear of Plant Theft. Published October

2006, Document Ref: PTL01.
Smith, A. and Walmsley, R. (1999). The Nature and Extent of Construction Plant Theft. The Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, The Home Office. Police Research Series Paper 117. TER (2004). The National Plant and Equipment Register 2004 Equipment Theft Report. Accessed via: http://www.ter-europe.org (viewed Nov 2007). TER (2006A). The National Plant and Equipment Register 2006
Equipment Theft Report. Accessed via: http://www.ter-europe.org (viewed Nov 2007).
TER (2006B). The National Plant and Equipment Register. Loss
prevention and Security Techniques for Equipment Owners and Hirers. Accessed via: http://www.ter-europe.org (viewed Nov 2007).
Theft Report. Accessed via: http://www.ter-europe.org (viewed Nov 2007).
TER (2007). The National Plant and Equipment Register 2007 Equipment
37
Further Information
Further Information
The following is not an exhaustive listing, but may serve to point the reader in the right direction for additional, specific plant theft information or products. The information is presented in alphabetical order.
Actiserve
These are specialists in safety, security and management control systems for heavy plant and machinery. Telephone: Email: Web: 01606 831 208 sales@actiserve.net www.actiserve.net
Alpha Scientific
These are manufacturers and suppliers of Microdot anti-theft identification products. Telephone: E-mail: Web: 01727 875 959 alpha.dot@alpha-dot.co.uk www.alphadot.co.uk
Autoleck
These are suppliers of tracking and plant management systems. Telephone: Web: 020 8303 1981 www.avoid-it.com
Automatrics
Automatrics offer theft risk consultancy to the plant and construction industry, supply of non-wired GSM+RF theft recovery systems, GPS tracking, monitoring and finding services. Telephone: E-mail: Web: 01329 663 812 mtrack@automatrics.co.uk www.mtrackonline.co.uk
BT Redcare
These are suppliers of tracking and plant management systems. Telephone: Web: 0800 800 828 www.btredcare.com
38
Further Information
Datatag
These are manufacturers and suppliers of various micro tagging systems including microdots, transponders, and decals. Telephone : Email : Web: 01932 358 100 info@datatag.co.uk www.datatag.com
Eagle Eye
These are suppliers of tracking and plant management systems. Telephone: Web: 01928 795 400 www.eagle-eye.co.uk
Eye Wave
These are suppliers of tracking and plant management systems. Telephone: Web: 01594 530 740 www.eyewave.co.uk
Kosran
These are manufacturers of diesel immobilisation systems for plant and equipment. Telephone: Web: 0161 652 3867 www.kosran.com
Lincmaster
These are specialists in anti-theft mechanical immobilisers and hardware such as track locks, wheel clamps and leg locks for all plant and trailer types. Telephone: Email: Web: 01522 544 848 enquiries@lincmaster.co.uk www.lincmaster.co.uk
Matrix Telematics
These are suppliers of tracking and plant management systems. Telephone: Web: 0870 2426 062 www.matrixonline.co.uk
39
Further Information
Mecklock
These are specialists in plant and equipment immobilisers. Telephone: Fax: Web: 01730 234 523 01730 261 084 www.mecklocksystem.co.uk
MightyDot
These are manufacturers and suppliers of Microdot anti-theft identification products. Telephone: Email: Web: 01709 525 522 info@mighty-dot.com www.mightydotdistribution.co.uk
Police 5
These are suppliers of tracking and plant management systems. Telephone: Email: Web: 01737 222 999 info@police5.net www.police5.org
Retaina Group
Retaina Group offers systems for the marking of vehicle glass, for post theft identification purposes. Telephone: Email: Website: 020 7823 6868 automotive.sales@retainagroup.co.uk www.retainagroup.com
Selectamark
These are specialists in asset marking. Telephone: Fax: Web: 01689 860 757 01689 860 693 www.selectamark.co.uk
Siemens VDO
These are suppliers of tracking and plant management systems. Telephone: Web: 0121 326 1234 www.siemensvdo.co.uk
40
Further Information
Soldsecure
This is an independent testing house for security. Telephone: Web: 01327 264 687 http://www.soldsecure.com/
Surelock
Specialise in asset tracking, monitoring and the investigation and recovery of stolen plant items. Telephone: Email: Web: 01252 547 791 info@surelock.org www.surelock.uk.com
Tag Guard
These are suppliers of tracking and plant management systems. Telephone: Web: 02392 598 218 www.tag-guard.co.uk
Thales Telematics
These are suppliers of tracking and plant management systems. Telephone: Web: 020 891 6541 www.thalestelematics.com
Thatcham
This is an independent testing house for security systems. Telephone: Email: Web: 01635 868 855 enquiries@thatcham.org www.thatcham.org
The Equipment Register (TER)

TER operates an international database of owned and stolen equipment and provides 24 hours, 7 days a week support to the police and law enforcement agencies with the identification and recovery of stolen equipment. Telephone: Email: Web: 01225 464 599 info@ter-europe.org www.ter-europe.org
41
Further Information
The Plant Theft Action Group (PTAG)

The PTAG was formed in March 1996 by the Home Office but is now entirely an industry-led group representing interests in the plant sector and beyond. It is working to tackle the problem of plant theft. Email: CEA@admin.co.uk (with FAO The Chairman, Plant Theft Action Group written in the subject field). Or in hard copy to: The Chairman, The Plant Theft Action Group, c/o The Construction Equipment Association, Orbital House, 85 Croydon Road, Caterham, Surrey, CR3 6PD.
The Plant Theft Solutions Group (PTSG)

PTSG is made up of various anti-theft system manufacturers and is supported by UK insurance companies. PTSG offers free advice to all users of construction plant and equipment and to insurers on how to achieve theft reduction by the use of specifically developed combined security. Telephone: Email: 0870 787 0148 advice@ptsg.co.uk
CITS Construction Industry Theft Solutions

CITS comprises various plant manufacturers and aims to reduce plant theft within the construction industry by encouraging adoption of best practice to defeat the criminal. Telephone: Email: 01279 112 344 enquiries@cits-uk.org
Thiefbeaters
Thiefbeaters are a theft risk management company who offer on-site security marking and tracker installation and monitoring / recovery services. Telephone: Email: Web: 0870 444 0789 info@thiefbeaters.co.uk www.thiefbeaters.co.uk
Tracker
These are suppliers of stolen vehicle tracking and fleet management systems. Telephone: Email: Web: 0500 090 909 enquiries@TRACKER.co.uk www.trackernetwork.com
42
Contact OPERC Tel: Fax: Web: +44 (0)1384 356202 +44 (0)1384 356202 www.operc.com
OPERC Off-highway Plant and Equipment Research Centre PO Box 5039 Dudley DY1 9FQ
E-mail: enquiries@operc.com

Plant and Equipment Theft A Practical Guide

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Plant and Equipment Theft: A Practical Guide

Plant and Equipment Theft: A Practical Guide

Miss Philippa Spittle and Dr Gary Holt

IRAS Group PO Box 3258 Wolverhampton WV3 7YT Email: enquiries@irasgroup.net

Introduction The Plant Theft Process

The Stolen Plant Market Summary

The Nature and Extent of the Problem

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

Site Security Installation and Testing of Security Systems

What to do if a Theft Occurs What of the Future? Summary

Concluding Summary References Further Information

Figure 8 Example of a Concealed-marking Warning Label:

The Plant Theft Process

The Plant Theft Process

Figure 1 The Plant Theft Process

TRANSPORTATION/ SHIPPING RESALE (or redeployment*)

The Plant Theft Process

Why Steal Plant and Equipment?

Table 1 Stolen Plant Recovery Statistics: as Reported by TER

Percentage (%) of all Recoveries

Telehandlers Excavators Trailers Dumpers Tractors Rollers Undefined other items

The Plant Theft Process

Who Steals Plant and Equipment?

The Plant Theft Process

How Plant and Equipment is Removed

Plant Theft via Fraudulent Hire

The Plant Theft Process

The Stolen Plant Market

The Plant Theft Process

The Nature and Extent of the Problem

The Nature and Extent of the Problem

Figure 2 The Costs of Plant Theft

...TO WHICH MIGHT BE ADDED ANY COMBINATION OF...

THE LESS OBVIOUS OR INDIRECT COSTS

The Nature and Extent of the Problem

The Nature and Extent of the Problem

Some Plant Theft Statistics

The Nature and Extent of the Problem

The Nature and Extent of the Problem

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

Figure 3 An Example of Preventing Access to the Cab

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

Categorising Security Systems

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

Specific Anti-theft and Theft-recovery Systems

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

Figure 4 Typical Manufacturers VIN Plate

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

Figure 5 Adding Identification to an Excavator Using Deep

Figure 6 Overtly Etched Glass Highlighted within a Warning Sign

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

marking Warning Label: Clearly Visible on an Excavator Arm

Figure 7 Example of a Concealed-

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

Table 2 Covert Marking Methods Method Description

Radio Frequency Tags

Radio Frequency Read/Write Tags

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

Figure 9 Example of the Type of Information Held on a Microdot

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

Figure 10 Specimen Marking Database Registration Document