Neil Hilton

PSPA 296

Professor Farid el Khazen

May 27, 2009

Parties of the Same God: Finding Commonality Between

Hezbollah and Hamas

Political scientists and theologians alike are continuously attempting to understand the

background, methods, and role of political Islam in the Middle East. This phenomenon has been studied

extensively since the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s and before, but many

still fail to understand modern groups. The most prominent of these organizations in modern political

discourse and global events are Hezbollah and Hamas. This paper will demonstrate that the two have one

key fundamental difference in their operational framework, but are otherwise remarkably alike. By

examining separately their origins, mission statements compared to recent proclamations, tactics and

social participation, and then looking into their current situations, we can attempt to understand more

about these groups that are still enigmatic to many despite their prominence in daily news.

Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, stated in a 1996 interview that “The raison d

´etre for [Hizbollah’s] formation was the [Israeli] occupation…Jerusalem and Palestine was on our minds,

culture, thoughts and conscience. But Palestine had been occupied and Hizbollah had not been formed.

What led to Hizbollah’s inception was the invasion of Lebanon in 1982”1 In June of that year, the Israeli

Defense Forces first occupied southern Lebanon, then pushed north to fully enter the fray that was the

Lebanese Civil War. Over the next three years, members of the Amal militia and other militant Shia

groups coalesced into a faction that was “neither East nor West,” acting as an anti-imperialist force based

off of the example provided by the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It wasn’t until 1985 that a cohesive

1
“Interview with Nasrallah.” The Middle East Insight. May-August 1996. Pg. 38.
1
organization named Hezbollah became a noticeable force in the violence across Lebanon.2 Hezbollah was

then and remains today a Lebanese national group. As will be discussed, it exists within the framework of

the Lebanese Republic as a legal political party that participates in the confessionalist parliamentary

government. This is what differentiates it most from Hamas.

Hezbollah’s “charter” lays out an interesting introduction to who the organization is composed of

as well as what its goals are. Citing Ayatollah Khomeini as their sole leader, Sheik Ibrahim al-Amin wrote

an “open letter to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World” in 1985 that is today considered more

or less the founding document of the organization. The letter makes a mixture of moderate and extremist

claims. On one hand, the letter stresses that its authors

want all the oppressed to be able to study the divine message in order to bring
justice, peace and tranquility to the world. This is why we don't want to impose
Islam upon anybody, as much as we [oppose] others that impose upon us their
convictions and their political systems. We don't want Islam to reign in Lebanon
by force as is the case with the Maronites today. 3

Furthermore, it stresses the commonality that all oppressed peoples have, Muslim and otherwise,

and tells the Christian community that their “fears are unjustified” in relation to Shia retaliation

for crimes committed. Simultaneously, though, al-Amin makes it clear that military action will

be an essential part of their movement. Defensive jihad is openly called for in order to realize the

goals of the organization.4 Additionally, he and his colleagues include some harsh vitriol directed

towards the West—“We combat abomination and we shall tear out its very roots, its primary

roots, which are the US.” The document goes on to make clear Hezbollah’s commitment to the

destruction of Israel by stating that “our struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated. We

2
Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Pg 36-38.
3
Hezbollah. An Open Letter: The Hizbullah Program. 1985.
<http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/hezbollah_program.pdf>.
4
Qassem, Naim. Hizbullah: The Story from Within. Beirut: Saqi Books, 2005.
2
recognize no treaty with it, no cease fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or

consolidated.”

More recently, however, Hezbollah has been forced to compromise some of what could be

interpreted as its basic tenets. It has existed in a state of off-and-on conflict with Israel since the IDF

pulled out of southern Lebanon in 2000, punctuated by short wars or incursions and periods of cease fires.

A series of “understandings,” written or not, have been agreed upon by the two parties, such as those that

ended Israel’s 1993 Operation Accountability invasion, or the 1996 Grapes of Wrath Understanding.

During the 2006 July War, which will be discussed in slightly more detail later, Hezbollah officials were

the ones to request an unconditional ceasefire.5 That war was ended with UN Resolution 1701 and an

internationally-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, including mediation from the United

States. The party refuses to use such terminology, but in effect it presently advocates for a two-state

solution to the issue of Palestinian sovereignty—as long as it can do so without officially recognizing

Israel’s right to exist.6 This contradiction obviously makes their goal difficult to achieve, but it is at least

more judicious and cogent than a policy of continual war with no possibility for peace. Also, it has been

widely reported that Hassan Nasrallah himself admitted that an Islamic state in Lebanon would probably

never happen, and the party has made little note of that goal recently.7 In fact, Hezbollah favors a more

secular state, as spiritual leader Sayyed Fadlallah stated as far back as 1998 that “the sectarian system

bars the feeling of national unity" and leads to “short-sighted policies merely aimed at consolidating the

powerbases for the governing elites and their client networks.”8

5
"Hezbollah wants an unconditional ceasefire," CTV.ca 17 July 2006. 18 May 2009.
<http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060716/mideast_template_060717/20060717? >.
6
Dilanian. Ken. "Iran: 2-state solution possible," USA Today 27 April 2009. 20 May 2009.
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-04-26-iran-us_N.htm>.
7
Shatz, Adam. "In Search of Hezbollah." The New York Times Book Review Vol. 54 No. 7. 31 March 2004. 20 May
2009. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17060>.
8
Fadlallah, Sayyed. Personal interview with Mats Wärn. 8 June 1998.
3
 Hezbollah’s extensive social policies are very much worth noting. Timur Göksel, former Press

Information Officer/Spokesman to UNIFIL and later Senior Adviser of the same organization, commented

that the Lebanese state is incapable of providing essential services like power, water, and security, and

accordingly the poor turn to non-state actors who can offer them.9 This continues a long tradition of the

zuama patronage system. Hezbollah is one such provider, and it has been noted that it does an exceptional

job of fulfilling that role. Indeed, even when the government does provide services, it has been noted that

those supplied by Hezbollah are often superior. This frequently takes place in poorer Shia regions such as

Southern Lebanon or the Bekaa Valley, where support for the party is strongest. Health care is a prime

example. Judith Harik noted that “The poor health facility situation in Shiite areas combined with

Hezbollah’s better-run, cleaner and more up-to-date hospitals and clinics, is yet another example of how

Hezbollah has been able to cut across class lines in its appeal and out-perform its rivals.”10 In addition, the

party provides education, electricity, and security to many in Beirut suburbs like Dahiyeh and in rural

communities. The cycle of patronage is strengthened, creating a stronger link between Nasrallah as a zaim

to his constituents, who are far more loyal to him than to the government itself. Hezbollah also controls

its own media outlets, broadcasting from Al-Manar TV station and Al-Nour radio station, which allows it

to directly influence the views of its audience. Furthermore, Hezbollah participates in the current unity

government and holds veto power over major decisions, with 11 deputies.

At the same time, Hezbollah maintains a considerable armed presence throughout the country. At

the onset of the 2006 July War, it was estimated that the organization had “about 1,000 full-time

Hezbollah members, along with a further 6,000-10,000 so-called volunteers.”11 There is much debate over

what exactly its military capabilities are at present, but all parties agree that they have only increased

9
Göksel, Timur. Class notes, “Conflict and Conflict Management in the Middle East.” American University of
Beirut. Spring semester, 2009.
10
Harik, Judith. "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's
Hizbullah." Journal of Conflict Resolution 40.1 (1996). Pg 53-54.
11
Rao, Prashant. "Analysis: Hezbollah a force to be reckoned with." 18 July 2006. International Institute for
Strategic Studies. 19 May 2009 <http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/july-2006/>.
4
since then.12 The organization became known for using suicide bombers to carry out attacks until 2000,

when the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon. Since then, the party has denounced their use by other

groups such as Al Qaeda and militants in Iraq. Its tactics since 2000 have been limited to cross-border

rocket strikes and raids, as well as attacks on Israeli soldiers whenever they enter Lebanon.13 Hezbollah is

classified a terrorist organization by the United States, Israel, Canada, and the Netherlands, though only

parts of its apparatus have been condemned by Britain and the European Union.14

Hezbollah’s recent and current activities warrant note, as the organization is very involved

regionally. On July 12th of 2006, the organization sparked a war with Israel by crossing the Lebanese

border and kidnapping two IDF soldiers, Eldad Regev and Udi Goldwasser. The primary attack was

expertly coordinated organizationally, performed by highly skilled operatives, and carried out with

tactical precision. All signs point to the militants having gathered precise intelligence, as well as

familiarity with crossing the border and evading Israeli troops.15 The Israeli response was swift and

punishing, and a 34-day conflict raged throughout southern Lebanon, with bombings and air strikes

throughout the rest of the country. Hezbollah and its supporters in other organizations waged an intensive

guerrilla war against the Israeli troops, and maintained rocket fire into Israel proper. The final tally was

more than 1,200 dead and four times that injured, the vast majority Lebanese civilians.16

All accounts point to Israel losing the war, though not necessarily to Hezbollah winning it. Before

withdrawing from Lebanon, the IDF lost fewer soldiers than Hezbollah (121 compared to 250-500), but it

should be noted that the ratio of Israeli to Arab casualties was much higher than it has been in previous

12
Amin, Rula. "Hezbollah: Stronger than ever?" Al Jazeera English 11 July 2007. 19 May 2009.
<http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/lebanon/2007/07/200852519438683569.html>.
13
"Timeline of Hezbollah Violence." Media Analyses. 17 July 2006. Committee for Accuracy in Middle East
Reporting in America. 19 May 2009 <http://camera.org/index.asp?x_context=2&x_outlet=118&x_article=1148>.
14
United States. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 109th Congress Senate Res. 82. Washington DC: 2005.
15
Harel, Amos, and Avi Issacharoff. 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008. Pg 11.
16
United Nations General Assembly. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights
Council resolution S-2/1. 2006. Pg 7.
5
conflicts. 17 The fact that Hezbollah was able to survive more than a month of bombardment from the

Israeli military is remarkable in itself, but the organization managed to inflict an impressively high

number of casualties as well. However, the cost to Hezbollah and to Lebanon was drastic, and even the

top ideologues expressed regret. Shortly after the war ended, Nasrallah “admitted [on Lebanese TV

channel NTV] that Hezbollah would not have kidnapped the two Israeli soldiers if it had known that it

would have led to war.”18

Domestically, Hezbollah’s influence has been rapidly expanding. Its takeover of Beirut in May

2008 showcased its military strength and distinguished it as the strongest voice of opposition against a

West-supporting government in all of the Middle East.19 A year later, Hezbollah and its allies in the March

8th bloc stand to make considerable gains in parliamentarian elections. Al-Akhbar newspaper aggregated

the predictions of four large polls and posted its predictions earlier this month, calculating that the

majority will end up with between 48 and 71 seats, and the opposition will carry a total of 57-80.20 This

upset would put March 8th with a modest lead in parliament, giving Hezbollah more power to enact its

desired policies but certainly no hegemonic or undisputed rule. It is also worth noting that the party’s

leaders have pledged to continue forward with a unity government in the event of a March 8th victory, a

promise yet unmade by the Future Movement or other March 14th parties. The impacts of this upcoming

election will be felt across the region and even in the broader scope of international politics.

Matthew Levitt, an American counter-terrorism expert and Johns Hopkins University professor,

offers a very succinct history of the Sunni Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya in his work “Hamas:

Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad.” Heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s

17
"The Second Lebanon War (2006)." 16 July 2008. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
18
Harel and Issacharoff. Pg 250.
19
Whitney, Mike. "Why Hezbollah's Victory may lead to peace in the Middle East." 14 June 2008. Centre for
Research on Globalization. 20 May 2009 <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9328>.
20
Muhanna, Elias. "Pollsters Predict Lebanese Election Results." [Weblog Qifa Nabki] 11 May 2009. 18 May 2009.
<http://qifanabki.com/2009/05/11/lebanon-elections-part-3/>.
6
Palestinian branch, it was formed in 1987 during the First Intifada. It served as a Palestinian nationalist

and Islamist resistance organization against Israel, calling for an “Islamist state in all of what was once

British Mandatory Palestine.”21 Though it has existed and been active in fighting against Israeli

occupation for more than two decades, Hamas was pushed much more firmly into the international

spotlight in the January 2006 parliamentary elections of the Palestinian Authority when it surprised

everyone (including itself) by winning a majority of seats over the rival Fatah party and thus gaining the

ability to form its own majority government. To better understand the implications of this crucial election

though, more background must be provided on the organization.

One of the most critical factors necessary to understand in order to properly study Hamas is its

geopolitical status—Hamas operates as a perpetual revolutionary movement in a territory that is occupied

by a foreign power. The most important and lasting of its goals is independence (or re-independence,

depending on one’s historical interpretations). The organization does not operate in a normal international

affairs framework, as Palestine is the only recognized territory in the entire world that is denied statehood

by another nation through military occupation. This is especially important for the purpose of this study

as it is the largest point of difference between Hamas and Hezbollah.

An interesting insight into Hamas can be drawn by examining the discrepancy between its

original 1988 covenant and statements made very recently by top officials. In its infancy, the organization

focused strongly on the destruction of Israel and its replacement with an Islamist state. In its first lines,

The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement credits Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna

with a particularly militant quotation: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will

obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.”22 It makes clear its intention to create an Islamic state

in Article 6, stating that

21
Levitt, Matthew. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2007. Pg 8.
22
"The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement." The Avalon Project. 18 Aug 1988. Hamas. 13 May 2009
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp>.
7
 [Hamas] is a distinguished Palestinian movement, whose allegiance is to Allah, and
whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of
Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security
and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned. In the absence of
Islam, strife will be rife, oppression spreads, evil prevails and schisms and wars will
break out.

Shortly afterwards, in Article 9, the charter states that their prime objective will be fulfilled when “from

[Palestine’s] mosques would the voice of the mu'azen emerge declaring the establishment of the state of

Islam.” A fully Islamic state is clearly central to Hamas’ vision of the future according to its founding

document. Furthermore, it goes onto state that “Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and

international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement…

There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad.” This statement is self-explanatory

—the only way that Hamas’ leaders in 1988 envisioned victory was through violent struggle against

Israel, which they expected to win. Like Hezbollah’s, the organization’s founders were confident enough

in this course of action to cement their vision into their covenant, effectively promising that there would

be only one outcome for the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict: destruction of the Zionist entity, and the

creation of a truly Islamic state following the historical borders of British Mandate Palestine.

However, the idealism of Hamas’ founders seems to have been overzealous. Hamas has been

forced to tone down its rhetoric to face the realities of existence inside of the hated enemy. In several

instances, its leaders have grudgingly admitted the need to negotiate with Israel for cease fires and pacts,

and have participated in internationally-mediated conferences several times. A brief background report for

the Council on Foreign Relations in 2006 entitled “Hamas’ Leaders” notes that the newer generation of

leadership contains more moderate voices, some of whom appear more willing to talk with Israel and

engage in the peace process than the old guard. 23 Khalid Meshal, the exiled leader of Hamas, was

interviewed by the New York Times earlier this month and promised that he was committed to being “part

of the solution,” as well as expressed that he seeks “a state on the 1967 borders, based on a long-term [10-

23
Silver, Alexandra. "Hamas' Leaders." Council on Foreign Relations 10 Feb 2006. 16 May 2009.
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/9811/>.
8
year] truce.” 24 Though Hamas vehemently opposes the phrase “two-state solution” since it implies

Israel’s statehood, geographically this is essentially what the organization seeks. Because of the nature of

the Arabi-Israeli conflict this is of course unlikely to be realized in the very near future, but it is certainly

more rational than calling for the total destruction of the “Zionist entity.” The Hamas chief also used the

fact that rocket strikes from Gaza into Israel have dropped off dramatically in April and May of this year

to demonstrate potential overtures of moderation.

In other instances, Hamas’ leaders have rhetorically stuck to their guns, so to speak, but acted in a

more “ambiguous” manner. Jeroen Gunning’s fascinating “Hamas in Politics” uses Stephen Stedman’s

work on spoilers in conflict to show how the organization operates—essentially claiming to be a “total

spoiler” (an actor that is unwilling to compromise on its broad vision or goals and demands hegemony

over a situation), while in reality acting at times more like a “limited spoiler” (an actor with more specific

goals, that can be induced or enticed).25 Gunning provides several examples of Hamas limiting its attacks

against Israel, discontinuing the use of suicide bombings, and agreeing to form a national unity

government with Fatah. Thus, there is a definite contradiction between Hamas’ original charter and its

more recent statements and actions. The organization is far from liberal or moderate, but seems to have

necessarily shifted to a more central position in order to best fulfill its needs. This is important to keep in

mind when drawing comparisons to a similar trend in the evolution of the rhetoric and actions of

Hezbollah’s leaders over time.

The tactics and activities of Hamas likewise mirror those of Hezbollah in many ways. In the

social and political arena, Hamas has a mixed record of charity and coercion. Since its inception, Hamas

has funded charities and social programs that provide food, healthcare, education, electricity, and

necessary supplies to millions of Palestinians. Most analysts agree that without that level of aid given to

the people, Hamas never would have performed so well in the fateful January 2006 elections that saw it

24
El-Khodary. Taghreed. "Addressing U.S., Hamas Says It Grounded Rockets ," New York Times 05 May 2009. 16
May 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/world/middleeast/05meshal.html?scp=1&sq=meshal&st=cse>.
25
Gunning, Jeroen. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
Pg 195-196.
9
elevated to power.26 Though budgetary numbers are impossible to find, it is clear that the organization

gradually won the respect of the Palestinian people in a large way through its commitment to

humanitarian assistance. Mousa Abu Marzouk, Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, noted

that “If you went [to the West Bank and Gaza Strip] and asked about Hamas’ people, you would find that

they are widely trusted because of the help they have given to the community. They are the people who

built the schools, the universities, the clinics.”27 However, after the 2006 election, Hamas-Fatah

infighting, and subsequent Hamas seizure of the Gaza Strip, the organization’s ability to dole out aid to

constituents has been hamstrung by the ongoing Israeli blockade. Ironically, the Palestinian people voted

for the party that had helped them most in the past, leading to the same organization’s inability to help

them now. MSNBC reported in the summer of 2008 that

97 percent of Gaza's industry has shut down for lack of raw materials and the ban on
exporting abroad… 500 of Gaza's brightest students, accepted in universities abroad can't
leave the territory… Fuel shortages have forced some 80 percent of Gaza's registered
vehicles off the roads, and there is no electricity in the territory for around eight hours
every day. That's meant most Gaza residents don't have more than a few hours of drinking
water around three times a week, because there's no power to work well pump.28

However, regardless of their current inability to do so because of the massive crackdown on funds and

materials entering Gaza, Hamas has proven its dedication to assisting Palestinians in the past.

Any characterization of Hamas as a solely charitable organization is, of course, overlooking their

much more obvious and dangerous side. Matthew Levitt’s admittedly pro-Israeli work on Hamas states in

its introduction that “Since its founding in 1987, Hamas has committed countless acts of violence against

both military and civilian targets, including suicide and other bombings and Qassam rocket, mortar fire,

and shooting attacks.”29 By Levitt’s count, Hamas killed 562 people and wounded 3,276 more between

1989 and March 2004. Its rocket capabilities are often cited by the Israeli government and military

26
Gunning. Pg 53.
27
Gaess, Roger. “Interview with Mousa Abu Marzook.” Middle East Policy 10, no. 2. 1997. Pg 113-128.
28
Jabari, Lawahez. "As Hamas’ power grows, life for Gazans worsens ," MSNBC 13 June 2008. 16 May 2009.
<http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/06/13/1138804.aspx>.
29
Levitt. Pg 12.
10
apparatus as terrorizing countless Israelis that lay within the ever-increasing range of strikes from Gaza.

Additionally, Hamas operatives have frequently carried out individual attacks at border crossings or areas

frequented by Israeli civilians, generally on “suicide by police” missions where they expect to be killed

during their spree. Finally, the organization’s widely-documented use of suicide bombings has also raised

considerable attention. Hamas bombers carried out at least 70 attacks, killing 480 people. 30 However, the

organization vowed to stop using suicide bombing in April of 2006. “Yihiyeh Musa, a Hamas member of

the Palestinian Legislative Council, said Hamas had moved into a 'new era' which did not require suicide

attacks. 'The suicide bombings happened in an exceptional period and they have now stopped,' he said.

'They came to an end as a change of belief.'”31

Hamas was founded as a militant resistance movement, and by its own portrayal, still very much

operates as one. Many others, however, classify the group as a terrorist organization because of its

continued attacks on Israeli civilians since its inception. This becomes a question of political semantics

with very large impacts, as the difference between a legitimate opposition to an illegal occupation and an

organized terrorist group responsible for indiscriminate killings is huge. Hamas’ military wing clearly

states its opinion on its website:

Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades (EQB) was established in the midst of the Palestinian
Intifada (1987-1994) against the Zionist occupation. Established at the height of the
occupation crackdown against popular and armed resistance, EQB considers its effort as
part of the resistance movement against the Zionist occupation of Palestinian lands,
which has been ongoing since the British occupation.32

The opposing opinion of Hamas is often reiterated by American, Israeli, Canadian, Japanese, and

European Union statements. Each of the above classifies the group as an official terrorist organization,

making no distinction between the EQB and Hamas’ political or social structure. Former US Secretary of

State Condoleezza Rice stated after the 2006 elections that the “U.S. position on Hamas as a terrorist

30
Gunning. Pg 43.
31
Urguhart, Conal. "Hamas in call to end suicide bombings," The Guardian 09 April 2006. 16 May 2009.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/apr/09/israel>.
32
"About Us." Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades Information Office. Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades. 17 May 2009
<http://www.alqassam.ps/english/?action=aboutus>.
11
organization has not changed,”33 and President Barak Obama has maintained the classification despite

making potential overtures towards cooperating more with Palestinians than his predecessor did.34

As a final level of comparison between Hamas and Hezbollah, its current status must be

investigated. As evidenced by the 2006 elections, Hamas has enjoyed increasing popularity over the more

secular and compromising Fatah party. Many view Fatah as corrupt, and some extremists even see it as a

pawn of Israeli and American interests, working for the “enemy” more than for the Palestinian cause.

Since being confined to the Gaza Strip in 2007, Hamas has had a mixed record of leadership. Conditions

in Gaza are deplorable, but who is to blame for that is debatable because of the blockade. Relations

between Hamas and Fatah have also suffered, though Abu Marzouk stated on April 23rd that “We extend

our hands and hearts to dialogue [with Fatah].”35 The two parties have now gone through five rounds of

mediated talks with no deal on a unity government, and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas announced

this week the formation of a new government. There has been much disagreement about what effect this

cabinet will have on Fatah/Hamas relations, but it has been pointed out that “most of the new ministers

are known supporters of reconciliation with Hamas.”36 A resolution to the political conflict seems like a

distant goal, but both parties still hope for some sort of compromise on which they can agree.

The other point of focus on Hamas at present relates to its recent war with Israel in December

2008 and January 2009. The conflict followed a six month “lull” that saw multiple violations from both

sides but a tangible decrease in attacks overall, and was short but ferocious. In what has been recorded as

the “highest one-day death toll in 60 years of conflict,” Israeli jets and helicopters killed 205 Palestinians

33
Associated Press. "Rice: Stance on Hamas Unchanged After Election," Fox News 06 Jan 2006. 17 May 2009.
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,182857,00.html>.
34
Richter. Paul. "Obama move alarms Israel supporters," Los Angeles Times 29 April 2009. 17 May 2009.
<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-obama-hamas27-2009apr27,0,4563512.story>.
35
"Interview with Abu Marzouq." Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades Information Office. 23 April 2009. Ezzedeen Al-
Qassam Brigades. 18 May 2009. <http://www.alqassam.ps/english/?action=showinet&inid=33>.
36
"Abbas unveils Palestinian cabinet," Al Jazeera English 19 May 2009. 20 May 2009.
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/05/2009519133817748184.html>.
12
and injured more than 700 more on December 27th as it launched Operation Cast Lead.37 Such airstrikes

continued for a week, until IDF infantry and armor units entered Gaza on January 3rd. Until a unilateral

ceasefire two weeks later, IDF troops battled Hamas militants in densely populated Gaza City and the rest

of the territory, leading to high numbers of Palestinian casualties but very few Israeli deaths. Though the

final tally is still unclear, most accounts put the toll between 1,166 and 1,417 Palestinians and 13 Israelis.

The civilian:militant ratio is, of course, hotly contested by the two sides, with estimates as far ranging as

295 to 956 of the deaths being civilians. Because of the grey zone of what constitutes a Palestinian

“militant” and the lack of clear information available due to very limited media and humanitarian access

to Gaza, these numbers are not likely to be decisively agreed upon. However, a few basic facts have

become clear in the wake of the conflict: Hamas performed embarrassingly poorly in inflicting damage on

the IDF, the Israeli military preferred a “shock and awe”-style campaign over a more targeted one, and

Hamas’ rocket-striking capabilities were damaged during the conflict.38 However, this last detail is widely

regarded as a temporary state of affairs, as Hamas’ weapon stores will inevitably be restocked through the

smuggling tunnels that yet provides access between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Hamas is a major

beneficiary of Iranian military aid, and will likely continue to serve as a proxy for the Islamic Republic in

its ongoing campaign against Israel.39

This brief examination of the two separate movements has afforded some insight into their

similarities and differences. The common ground that the two organizations share is considerable, but

must be taken into consideration of their separate operational frameworks. There is a large and often-

overlooked fundamental difference between Hezbollah and Hamas—one exists in a sovereign state as a

37
"At least 205 killed as Israel pounds Gaza," Al Arabiya 27 Dec 2008. 18 May 2009.
<http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/12/27/62895.html>.
38
Makovsky, David. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Preliminary Assessment of Israel's Operation
Cast Lead. 23 Jan 2009. <www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf.php?template=C05&CID=2997>.
39
Sharnoff, Michael. The Jewish Policy Center. Hamas' Rocket Threat After Operation Cast Lead. 16 March 2009.
<http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/863/hamas-rocket-threat-after-operation-cast-lead>.
13
party that happens to have both wide social programs and a highly-professional militia independent from

the government, and the other is a resistance movement in an occupied territory, fighting against an

oppressive foreign regime. This is not a question of legitimacy as much as it is of mission—Hamas

operates as a revolutionary movement fighting for the creation of a Palestinian state in the territory it

currently occupies, while Hezbollah is just as much an external actor in the situation as Iran or the United

States. However, this appears to have relatively little effect on the organizations’ activities or the

statements of their leaders. Despite their basic difference, they operate in very similar ways.

The similarities between Hamas and Hezbollah are easy to see. Both started with militant and

extreme doctrines, calling for the absolute and unconditional destruction of Israel and strongly advocating

for the creation of Islamist states. Over time, however, both have moderated their goals and accepted

various peace treaties, ceasefires, or internationally-sanctioned conferences to cohabitate the Levant with

Israel. Both seem more willing to compromise on their Islamist vision. They both essentially seek a two-

state solution to the Palestinian problem, though they can’t say it in so many words because such

terminology involves official recognition of a “state” of Israel. The two organizations operate on both

political-social and military levels, providing vital services to needy people and participating in

government while simultaneously waging guerilla wars and nearly constant pressure against their much

more powerful neighbor. Both have been responsible for extensive suicide bombings in the past, but have

since publically forsworn them and committed to not use such tactics. Both have wide-reaching

international support networks, in which Iran factors heavily. Hezbollah and Hamas both recently

provoked Israel into short but intense wars, both of which ended with Israel without fully accomplishing

its goals but killing many Arab civilians in the process. Though Hezbollah’s war went considerably better

than Hamas’, both parties managed to tenaciously pressure the IDF until it withdrew, enjoyed widespread

support from around the world, and were likely left with substantial military capabilities. Finally, both

organizations are at critical moments, as the coming months will greatly affect the governance of their

respective territories.

14
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