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Bamboo Flowering Causes A Hunger Belt in Chin State
Bamboo Flowering Causes A Hunger Belt in Chin State
The Mautam
Many reports still call it "folklore", "superstition", but it is a historical and biological fact: the bamboo
species Melocanna baccifera blossoms en masse approximate every 48 years. This particular type of
bamboo grows throughout a large area of Northern India (primarily in Mizoram and Manipur States) as well
as regions of Burma (mainly Chin State) and Bangladesh (Hill Tracts.) It densely covers valleys and hillsides
in the typically rugged terrain of the region. The blossoming bamboo produces fruit, then dies off. The fruit
has a large seed, resembles avocado, and is packed with protein and other nutrients. During the fruiting
stage of the cycle, local species of forest rats feed on the bamboo fruits/seeds. The rats cease cannibalizing
their young and begin to reproduce in an accelerated birth surge, producing a new rat generation as often
as every three months. Once the burgeoning population of rats has stripped the forest of bamboo
fruit/seeds, nocturnal rat swarms quietly invade farms and villages to devour crops and stored rice, other
grains, potatoes, maize, other vegetables, chili, and sesame. The rodents often grow to particularly large
sizes and can gnaw through bamboo and wood floors, walls, storage containers and granaries. This
phenomenon has historically resulted in mass starvation among the indigenous peoples of the region
where Melocanna baccifera bamboo grows. According to The Times of India, "the last flowering in
Mizoram, in. 1958‐59, caused a famine that killed between 10,000 and 15,000 people and destroyed
hundreds of thousands of livelihoods." The bamboo flowering and rat infestation, cycle has in the past
lasted for about three years, until the rats run out of food and their populations return to normal.
The bamboo flowering cycle is called "mautam" by the Mizo people of Mizoram and the related Chin
people of Burma. It is called "Yu Li Hku" (rat famine) by the people of northern Burma's Kachin State. These
indigenous people's predictions of the cycle and its effects have been discounted by government
authorities in the past. When the Indian government ignored the situation in 1959 it resulted in a long‐
running insurgency. In "Strangers of the Mist" Sanjoy Hazarika wrote, "The Mizos formed a few famine‐
fighting squads. The most prominent of these groups was the Mizo Famine Front (MFF), launched by a
young bank clerk named Laldenga…. Eventually the Mizo Famine Front was converted into the Mizo
National Front (MNF) with independence as its goal." The MNF fought the Indian army until a peace
settlement in the mid 1980s brought a mutually acceptable level of autonomy to Mizoram. A former MNF
leader, Zoramthanga, is currently Chief Minister of Mizoram State.
India and Bangladesh Crisis
"The blossoming, the rat problem, and the food shortages began two years ago in India then moved into
Bangladesh in January and have now headed south into Burma as well." BBC News, March 22, 2008
Having learned a lesson from the late 50s ‐ early 60s famine, the government of India has been preparing
for the present bamboo flowering cycle since 2001, with the active participation of the Mizoram State
government, and the expertise of botanists and zoologists. Still, no plan was developed which could
actually prevent the first mautam of the 21st Century, or even effectively mitigate it. Rat population control
centered on incentives for rat killing, paid by government agencies which collect rat tails as proof. Some
experts advocated establishing open spaces between bamboo forests and farms or villages to keep the rats
away. Building rat‐proof granaries was another strategy that was promoted. Zoramthanga's Mizoram State
government advocated cutting and selling bamboo as it began to die off, but even culling for commercial
export did not significantly reduce the vast thickets in largely inaccessible hill areas. Perhaps the most
useful measures were the construction of roads to remote Mizoram villages, and helipads in the most
remote mountain areas, so that food relief aid could be brought in when the mautam’s inevitable effects
took place.
In October, 2005 the first bamboo flowers appeared in Northeast India. The rodent swarms followed, as
always. Indian troops stationed in the Northeast were dispatched on rat killing patrols. By 2007, the rats
had ravaged food and seed stocks. The Indian Government, US Government and non‐government
organizations (NGOs) funded food relief for the affected areas.
Despite the years of preparation, some observers (including Mizoram's bloggers) considered the response
to the mautam crisis by the Indian and Mizoram State governments inadequate, even corrupt, with
possible political repercussions. An Asia Times report predicted that Mizoram's food crisis would be at its
worst in the Fall, commenting, "That's when Mizoram will go to the polls to elect representatives to its 40‐
member assembly. Zoramthanga had better start praying for a Pied Piper to rescue his party at the polls."
The mautam had become a political issue, with the leader of India's Congress Party, Sonia Gandhi, visiting
Mizoram in mid‐June, 2008 and criticizing the Mizoram State government, commenting, "During this visit I
have seen how the MNF government has failed to tackle the famine despite huge central funds allocated to
deal with the famine."
In Bangladesh, where the bamboo flowering takes place in the politically unstable Hill Tracts (Chittagong,
Bandarban, Rangamati) there had been little preparation and the effects were obvious in 2008, with a BBC
report quoting a village rat catcher: "My wife, my five children and I normally eat rice, but the rats have
destroyed everything... All we have left are the rats and these wild potatoes." In mid‐July, 2008 the UN's
World Food Program (WFP) announced that it had commenced food relief aid (rice, cooking oil and
nutrition biscuits) distribution to mautam affected people in Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Burma Crisis
According to "Critical Point: Food Scarcity and Hunger in Burma's Chin State" a July 2008 report by the Chin
Human Rights Organization, as much as one fifth of Burma's Chin State is covered with bamboo forests.
Chin State, in Burma's northwest, borders Northeast India. It is a particularly impoverished and isolated
region of Burma. Most people are hill rice farmers, of the predominantly Christian Chin (also called Zo)
ethnic groups, related to the Mizo people of India. The Chins have suffered ethnic and religious persecution
by the military regime of Burma, and a small scale insurgency by the Chin National Front (CNF) is active. The
CNF normally imposes a tax of 3,000 kyats per person, per year on villagers in its areas of operation, but
issued a statement in February 2008 pledging to reduce that amount to just a token 10 kyats during the
mautam crisis.
"Critical Point" states that due to the mautam and other factors, "as many as 200 villages may be directly
affected by severe food shortages, and no less than 100,000 people or 20 percent of the entire population
of Chin State may be in need of immediate food aid." According to "Critical Point" the bamboo flowering
first happened in Burma in 2006, with the rodent infestation increasing through 2007 until "in the most
affected areas of Paletwa and Matupi townships, farmers are left with just a tenth of their usual harvest
after the rats attack their rice fields" The bamboo die‐off would also affect the Chins through the loss of
harvestable bamboo that they use for most of their building and implements.
In contrast to the bordering regions of India, there had been little to no government response to the
impending mautam by Burma's military regime (which calls the country "Myanmar.") As was obvious from
the regime's response to May 2008's Cyclone Nargis in the southern Irrawaddy Delta region, Burma's
regime has minimal interest in effective relief aid or sustainable development, especially in non‐Burman
ethnic regions. "Critical Point" cites other factors contributing to "food insecurity" in the Chin State even
before the mautam, particularly the regime's forced conversion of food crop land to tea and jatropha
plantations (jatropha is an introduced crop intended for biofuel use.) "Critical Point" also cited pressures on
farmers from corruption and excessive taxation such as the regime's 2,000 kyats per family "farming
permit" plus confiscation of 240 kilograms of harvested rice.
2008 has been a bad food year for the whole world, with rice shortages in much of Asia. Burma stood to
lose most of the mid‐year rice crop in its most productive region, the southern Irrawaddy Delta, due to
inundation by Cyclone Nargis in May. By mid‐2008, increasing reports had emerged of a hunger belt in
western Chin State. With grain crops gone, malnutrition had increased. Rural Chins were relying on foraging
for "famine foods": roots (wild yam) dug up in the forest, tree pith cooked to an edible state. For
agricultural people, transitioning to a hunter gatherer food economy can be very difficult. Attempting to
live on rats and roots may not provide enough nutrients and carbohydrates, particularly for children, the
elderly and pregnant or nursing mothers. Also, the rats' meat is often contaminated by poisons used to kill
them. The final and worst mautam stage happens when the rats die off, rice crops and stocks are gone, and
"famine food" sources like forest tubers are depleted. At that point, foraging is no longer an option, and
people no longer have the energy to move in search of food.
According to "Critical Point" there had been no confirmed starvation deaths from the mautam in Chin State
as of June 2008, although health problems which may be directly related to it are reported to have caused
fatalities in the affected regions. A UN World Food Program (WFP) assessment in early 2008 concluded that
there_ was no famine or starvation at that time, although "Critical Point" noted that the WFP assessment
did not take place in the more remote rural villages of the hunger belt. The WFP established a group of
Rangoon (Yangon) Burma based aid agencies to monitor the food situation in Chin State during the
mautam. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was to conduct its own assessment, and
reportedly donated emergency rice in an area to the north of the hardest hit mautam region. Overall, the
UN agencies appeared to lack a consistent presence in the most mautam affected areas during the first half
of 2008.
Chin organizations and individuals are currently emphasizing the need to bring food relief and seed stock to
affected areas before the historical syndrome of mass casualties from a mautam famine takes place again.
In a July 9, 2008 press release, the CHRO's executive director Salai Bawi Lian Mang commented, "The
situation is at a critical point. The people of Chin State are on the brink of starvation. Action must be taken
now to respond to this crisis."
Farmers from the hunger belt have reportedly sold their possessions and livestock, in order to obtain
money to buy rice. Numerous Chin families rely on money remittances from relatives who are working
overseas, in order to purchase rice, but the money transmittal process can be very slow, and the overseas
workers usually have little income to spare. Some of the rural people have moved to towns in Chin State in
hopes of being able to obtain rice there, although according to "Critical Point" it is now exorbitantly
expensive at 30,000 kyats for a 50 kilogram bag (which would feed a typical family of five for about a
month.) There has been at least one report of armed robbery of rice in Chin State.
Delegations have been sent from Chin villages to Mlzoram to offer domestic and wild animals in exchange
for rice, or to plead for food donations from churches in Mizoram. Not only is it difficult to buy rice ‐‐
Mizoram having been hit by the same mautam ‐‐ but the cost of transporting it back to the affected villages
is very high. Hundreds of villagers have reportedly migrated into Mizoram, either anticipating the affects of
the mautam in Chin State or after they directly suffered its effects. If this trend continues, it may provoke
tensions in Mizoram, which has been less than tolerant of Chin refugees in the past and now has its own
resources badly strained by the mautam. The mautam is also likely to increase the outflow of Chin people
to other countries such as Malaysia.
Burma Response
As the mautam began in Chin State, Burma's regime seemed to pay scant attention to it. The Ministry of
Agriculture was to conduct an assessment of the situation in early 2008, but if that survey was completed,
the results were apparently not made public. According to the CHRO, some church donations of relief rice
were confiscated by local regime representatives and then sold at an inflated price. Konumthung News
quoted a villager about asking Burma army troops stationed in the area for help: "The soldiers shot some
rats that weighed as much as 15 kilograms. The soldiers were amazed at the size of the rats and took
pictures for their record."
Chin underground and exile information networks have made efforts to publicize the mautam situation. In
addition to "Critical Point," CHRO has issued press releases and published reports in its Rhododendron
magazine/website. India‐based Burma exile news agencies Konumthung News and Mizzima News, and the
Chinland Guardian news website, covered the onset of the mautam. The Northeast India aspect of the
mautam has been reported on for several years by the BBC and other respected international news outlets,
including an in‐depth piece in Vanity Fair magazine by Alex Shoumatoff. But it was not until June 2008 that
news of the Chin State mautam finally reached the mainstream world press with a Telegraph UK report,
"Plague of Rats Devastates Burma Villages." The Telegraph quoted Benny Manser, a British photographer
who managed to visit the mautam‐affected area of Chin State (despite extremely restricted access for
foreigners): "We saw stick‐thin children and old women who hardly had the strength left to dig up roots to
eat. Villagers were telling of vast packs of rats, thousands strong, which would turn up overnight out of the
bamboo thickets and eat everything in sight."
In June, 2008, a Chin delegation went to London and met with Prime Minister Gordon Brown to request
relief aid for the mautam affected region of Chin State. Cheery Zahau of the Women's League of Chinland,
a delegation member, was quoted in The Telegraph:
"The reports that are trickling out to India are heartbreaking. They tell of dehydrated children dying of
diarrhea and the poorest and weakest being left behind as stronger villagers start to escape over the
border to where there is food. We don't really know what is happening deep inside Chin State where there
are no telephones or roads. We fear that thousands will die if no help is made available."
As was apparent in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, when the regime of Burma will not facilitate relief aid,
grassroots groups must take action as best they can. Such a do‐it‐yourself equivalent of a civil society
occurs without the regime's approval and often with its hindrance, but it can be powerfully effective. In the
Chin State, Protestant and Catholic churches have been vital in gathering information, requesting aid on
behalf of rural people, and distributing aid. Mizoram based churches for Chin exiles have raised funds for
relief, along with overseas Chin congregations and individuals. A series of concerts by Chin and Mizo singers
will take place in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in August/September 2008, as benefits for Chin State
mautam relief.
A Burma‐based NGO, the Maraland Social Welfare and Development Committee (MSWDC) has prepared
fact‐finding reports and alerts, brought food relief to Chin areas, and encouraged ginger planting (the forest
rats do not eat ginger or turmeric, and some believe they may be repelled by those aromatic root crops.)
Also inside Burma, a Rangoon (Yangon) based Joint Famine Relief Committee was formed to provide
"sustainable relief' through livelihood projects for the Chin State, supporting efforts by the MSWDC.
In February 2008, Chin exiles in Mizoram founded the Chin Famine Emergency Relief Committee (CFERC.)
The group dispatched fact‐finding teams to Chin State and organized fundraising through Chin churches in
Mizoram, as well as overseas churches. A CFERC informational website, went online in July 2008:
http://www.chinrelief.org/
A report by the Free Burma Rangers, an NGO with a chapter operating in northern Arakan and southern
Chin State, was released in July 2008. The Arakan FBR team reported witnessing the effects of the mautam
on villagers who were "crying with hunger" in the far north of Arakan and accused Burma regime troops of
obstructing and diverting relief aid. Additionally, the WFP was providing emergency food relief in northern
Arakan due to other factors, including heavy monsoon rains, as of July 2008.
Suggestions
Ideally, relief aid including emergency rice and seed stocks, with rat‐proof containers, would be given
directly to the hunger belt of Chin State by Burma's regime (which is wealthy, with a reported US$150
million a month income from its petroleum joint ventures with France's Total, the United States' Chevron,
South Korea's Daewoo, China, Thailand and India) or the United Nations and other international donors.
However, the Chin people struggle for survival in a much less than ideal world. Most mautam relief efforts
at present appear to be relying on underground networks to fund local food purchases and donations. For
more information on how to support such efforts, the CEFRC can be contacted through its website:
http://www.chinrelief.org/
It is too much to expect Mizoram State to support a new population of mautam refugees, when it is dealing
with its own food shortages. If people continue to flee Chin State's mautam to Northeast India, there may
have to be special internationally funded food programs for them ‐‐ even though such programs could act
as a magnet for yet more migrants and it would be far better to help people in their own homeland. Chin
hunger migrants and other refugees may need special protection in Northeast India, if local people
increasingly resent their presence.
India's national government has close economic ties (involving petroleum) with Burma's regime. Perhaps
India can encourage the sending of relief aid directly to Chin State, as an issue involved with India's own
security concerns for Northeast India. Or India could return to being an advocate for democratic change in
Burma, rather than an economic perpetuator of the present regime. At the very least, India and the border
state governments should not hinder cross‐border aid and investigation efforts for Chin State by
international journalists and relief workers.
The United Nations was less than optimally effective in persuading Burma's regime to allow large scale
disaster relief immediately after Cyclone Nargis. The UN could take a more proactive role in trying to
prevent another disaster in Chin State from becoming large scale. Expanding the World Food Program's
local partnerships to include church social welfare groups throughout the mautam‐affected areas of Chin
State would be a useful step. As the World Food Program provides emergency aid in Bangladesh due to the
bamboo flowering, the WFP should be careful not to assume that the mautam situation in Burma's Chin
State is any better than in the adjacent Chittagong Hill Tracts.
While long‐term development aid to improve agricultural livelihoods in Chin regions is obviously a very
worthwhile effort, it should be noted that the mautam is a short‐term emergency situation, requiring relief
food donations. The goal of making Chin State more food productive in the future should not be prioritized
in conflict with the immediate need to keep people whose crops are obliterated by the mautam rats from
dying of hunger.
NGOs currently active inside Burma may possibly be able to initiate efforts in the northwest Burma hunger
belt with official Burma regime permission. Other NGOs may find ways to provide relief aid on a cross‐
border unofficial basis, supporting local groups.