SHER.

\IAS WILCOX
LAKOFF. G. B"olnc'l L
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P. I !J91 Cniqueh Humaw TI . I. .
Uni ....ersity of
Press, Cambrid\!e' . Ie E'O.UllOl1 of Speech, Thougfll and Sd'ies' B I
, CI.'i C II.Jr!ur Han'iHd
D. 1992 Htmd and J/i " WI
Chicago. m. 1(11 Ge5tures Rnea/ ahoul
Thuugh:. University of Chicago Press,
I\EISSER. U. 1967 P.nc!IO!OtYl A J
RIEBER R \'i 1983 D ' "-' pp eton-Century-CroIts, New York.
, . . . ldU)gues on I/,e PSI'c11O/0g
r
of L
SAVAGE-RU\1BAUGH S d LE .', . allguage alld Thol/gh!. Plenum Press NY
N ' , . an \VII, G 1994 K ' ' .
cw )'ork. ' '. an:l: The Ape, a: file Br;nk of the Hwnal' Mmd. Wib,',
S:--JOWDON. C T, 1990 L
215-74.1. anguage capacities of non-humall prl'mO,l"s.
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(t. JSICG AtIlhrup%gy 33,
STUDDER T-KENNEDY, M, 1987 The hon
Language Puceplion and Produ( (/0 RPI erne a I All
Academic Press, London. I/. e ({IJam/,'p.1 be/IIE'en Lffif'IU".;. S ,n pon D. A. (Ed)
peakrng. Rcudmg, ([lid Wmmg.'
TATTERSALL. l. 1995 Ine Fossil TnI'! 0 d U '
TINBERGEN, N, 19':;;"") "D. '. d"' ,1 . ),; Or . nlversity Press, o.xford.
during evolution. biological significance, origin. and emancipalion
,
I
I
frj) Pergamon
L(/I!f!WIZt' & Cmllillimi("<[f/()/J. \,)1. I,t>, "" pr, 19:>-:!03. 199&
COp)rlt!hl (: 199,., Ebe\;er Snt'nce ltJ
Printed ill Gf\.:Jt Brll.lj:l ,\:1 re"encd
9t> Sl5 00 + 0,00
50271-5309(96)00007-9
SYl\T AX AND LAl\GUAGE ORIGINS
BARBARA J. KING
The role of syntax in language-origins theories
In the honer-than-ever debate about language origins, my view falls squarely into the
'continuity theory' camp. which contends that language as humans now produce and
comprehend it elaborates on. and evolved from. language-like precursors in the communi-
cation systems of nonhuman primates le.g. Gibson, 1990, King, 1994a; Savage-
Rumbaugh et 01., 1993; Zeller. 1994).
For supporting evidence. continuity theorists rely on two major sources of data. Field
studies of monkeys and apes show that some specics communicate in ways that go
beyond reporting of emotional or arousal levels, and thus beyond the typical characteri-
zation of animal communication, Using calls and screams, a varicty of monkeys and
some apes communicate meaning about the physical and social environment, for example
about the nature of predators or of opponents in intragroup fights (e.g. Seyfarth et al.,
1980; Gouzoules et 01., 1984. see Gouzoules et o/., 1995 for a review). Facial signals of
some monkeys serve to communicate information about individuals' age, sex, and kin
group membership (Zeller, 1994), Other monkeys exchange vocalizations in patterned
ways similar to those in human conversations (Biben, 1993). Research with captive apes
demonstrates capacities for production and comprehension of symbols-whether manual
gestures, keyboard lexigrams, or spoken English (e.g. Miles, 1990; Savage-Rumbaugh
et ai" 1993).
Continuity theorists suggest that differences between human language and nonhuman
primate communication are only quantitative and that these differences may be
accounted for by gradual shifts in abilities duc to changing selection pressures-perhaps
in Lhe ability to create hierarchically-organized tools and communicative utterances
(Gibson, 1990) or Lo donate information to others in order to supplement social learning
with outright guidance (King, 1994a).
The meaning of the primatological data uscd to bolster cominuity theory is avidly
debated. Discontinuity theorists examine the very same data as described above but conclude
from doing so that human language lacks precursors in animals, and that the ability to
symbolize is uniquely human (e.g. Noble and Davidson, 1991; Bickerton. 1990). They
suggest that wild monkeys' signalling behavior and apes' linguistic abilities are so inferior
to that of humans' that no meaningful comparisons, much less an evolutionary pathway,
can be drawn between the two types of systems. Noble and Davidson, for example, deny any
capacity for symbolizing to nonhuman primates, stressing the importance to language of
users' awareness of symbolic production-which they see only in humans. As I have
noted elsewhere (King, 1994b), discontinuity and continuity theorists go round and round,
---'------ ------
Correspondence rdating to this paper should be addressed to Dr Barbara 1. King, Department of Anthropology,
College of William and Mitry. Williamsburg, VA 23187, U.S.A.
19]
194
BARHAR--\ J. f..:r"'G
challenging one another's definition,. assumptions. and interprct<ltlons of the daw. with
debates in print seeming to resolve nothing (see. e.g. Pinker. 1994. Tomasello, 1995;
Lieberman, 1994, Gibson. 1994).
Despite the typically contentious nature of this debate about language origins. continuity
and discontinuity theorists have agreed--however reluctantlv-upon one point: the feature
of modem human language most difficult to derive from the primatological evidcnce is
syntax. For many linguists. syntax is defined as the hierarchical arrangement of elements
in a sentence. It thus refers not just to a sensitivity to linear order of elements, but to a
rule-based system that governs how a sentence is put together. Starting decades ago with
Chomsky's (1957) work. syntax increasingly has been viewed as the major criterion for
judging whether some communication system is properly called a language.
Discontinuity theorists see no syntactic abilities in the communication of nonhuman
primates. They claim that syntax appeared suddenly in late human evolution (Noble and
Davidson, 1991), sometimes linking it to a single mutation (Bickerton, 1990). The centrality
of syntax in assessing linguistic ability means that in order to gain credibility with
linguists and others who study language from a non-continuity perspective, continuit:
theorists must produce evidence for precursors of syntax in nonhuman primates. How
have continuity theorists responded to this situation';'
One response has been to challenge the linguists' tendency to define the important
properties of language in human terms, using human standards (King, 1994a; see Parker
and Russon, 1996). Because syntax is linked to production of sentences, and sentences
are a human construction. continuity theorists may say that defining language through
syntax automatically and unfairly excludes non humans from consideration as language
users. Snowdon recommends a much broader definition of syntax than most
linguists use: 'any rule-based system that generates predictable sequences of behavior'
(although he thennotes-tljijOnly- a syntax capab1e of generating anirillrilte -nlimbe10f
grammatical utterancl' <:QiJld_account -for -thec:ompJexi1i of human-tarrgmrge')e-5j711l1C1ic
abilities have been increasingly importa-nt tolinguTsts' assessmentsOfTiinguage. according
to Cartmill (1990), because increasingly impressive semantic abilities of animal communi-
cation have been uncovered in the last 15 years or so. The usc of human-based detini-
tions and standards may thus be seen as an attempt to preserve human uniqucness by
denying even the possibility of evolutionary development of language (Cartmill. 1990;
King, I 994a).
For the most part, though, continuity theorists have dealt with the linguistic focus on
syntax by redoubling efforts to find precursors of syntax in vocal communication
of monkeys or gestural communication of apes. The 'playback technique' in which inves-
tigators record animal vocalizations in their natural context then play them back to the
callers--in the absence of the stimuli which typically produce the call-has yielded new
information concerning possible precursors to syntax (Snowdon, 1990). A variety of
species, including birds and monkeys, communicate using predictable sequences or show
sensitivity in some way to ordering of phrases. South American squirrel monkeys, for
example, make 'chuck' vocalizations in which one monkey requests information by
calling, and another answers within a short time period. When the two call types-
request and response-are taped separately and played back. squirrel monkeys use
acoustic differences, not contextual cues, to differentiate between them. The chucks
'uttered at different points in a sequence (i.e. first or second) have biological signil1cance,
i.e. are recognized by the animals themselves and result in different behavioral responses'
IlJ5
. .tj- .. cur' onlv when chucks are pro-
lnterestinrrlv. thiS dl erentmtlOn oe , . 'r
(Bib
en
. J .. -:-. . embers of other groups make them. Recogn. lon
duced by famllwr al1lmab. "s enthm American monke;. the titi. in an experiment by
of order was found showing that indivlduab respond dlfferently to
Robinson (1979. Clle 111 .' f vocalized svllables. Research with still other
playback of natural and (reviewed in Snowdon, 1990),
South e:""
hat
Snowdon calls lexical syntax. where sequences preserve
offer> eVldence .ot or '.' .. nalooous to forming sentences from words. an
meaning of 1I1dlVlduai Ul1lb
l
ll1 a "a
k
y
a across different individuals. Considenng
. ., . WhlCh voca turn-ta 109 oc . . . {1
SOCIal syntax, 111. , 0 ate Snowdon sees rud.mentary syntax
the evidence for ammal synt,ax 10 aogre} gd' 'th t there are 'few parallels between ammal
h
e
s between ammals but conc u es a
exe ang
and human syntax (1990:229). R rch Centor Georoia State University,
d K nZl at the Langu'l
Oe
esea , . 0 l' h
The enculturate ape a C Th der of words in spoken Eng 15
d d something about syntax. e or . f
clearly un erstan s . f 1 to him in that he can differentiate signdlcantly 0 t:n
sentences appear: to the following two pair>: 'Take the rock
between suc
d
a, : 0 d 'Put the iuice in the egg/Put the egg in the JUICe (Savage-
get the rock thaI s out oors . - duces the appropnatc behavior when the
Rumbaugh et 11{.. 1993:91-9!). KanZl thus precise action is being asked of him.
word order of spoken req uests determ1l1es w . more enuivocal however. Since
. h'- syntactic productlOn are ..,. b
Other data concermng". h' \Vn gramm,tical output must e
d oken EnolIsh sentences, IS 0 " d (
Kanzi cannot pro uee sp '" d f lexioram symbols on a keyboar see
. b I .. g his use of gesture an 0 c 1 .
investigated Y ana fi Id' d Savane-Rumbaugh's (1990:572) conc USlOn
Savaoe-Rumbaugh el al .. 1993). Green e an. . ':. b sed l;roely on their finding of
o . , f evolutionary contll1Ullv IS a 'e .
that grammar 15 an area 0 . d h"; that Kanzi tends (a) to place lexlgram
two 'grammatical rules." as denved from ata s 0"1
111
" 'n regular ways so that certain
d (b) to comb1l1e aetlOn eXlgrams I
first before a gesture an . . .
. fi d rtain others 111 second posltlOn.
of them appear 111 rst an ce. d'd ! follow these rules (see Greenfield and Savage-
Frequently, however, KanZl 1 lid') . 'h.t 'ns" they can sensibly be termed 'rules'
1990) . me to won er 10 w a Se, 1 I
Rumbaugh, ,causmg. 'R cts syntactic ability or something comp y
at all and whether regulanty sholVn re e d for instance to the behavlOral
. . t' n lexigram rule correspon 5, ,
different. The act.on-ac 10 . , . . d t those of wild bonobos generally as
order inherent in Kanzi's everyday aetlons. dan S 0 Rllmballgh 1990). If Kanzi is
. l' (G eenfield an a,age- ,
observed by pnmato oglsts . r . -t 'pical repertoire, then that pattern
expressing a pattern based 111 hIS Yes dissociated from anything related to syntax
may reRect deep-seated behaVlora ten enCl
and grammar. . I,' d' . te that sequencing of communicative utterances
In short. the data from pnmato,ogy 1I1
k
lea d culturated apes (Insufficient data on
. g for wild mon evs an en . '1' .
may have some meamn ..' 'bl t conclude anything about their ablltles
communication of wild apes makes.lt e hO, 0 farther" that is even if we accept
.. h . ty ldea lS pus eu n , .
in this regard.) Even 11 t e COntll1Ul. 11 1 b tween rudimentary animal syntax and fuJl-
Snowdon's conclUSIOn of few para,: set . d' do the evident limitations on
th'r questlOn comes 0 m1l1 . f
fledged human. syntax. ano C om rehension necessarily rule out the existence 0
animal syntactiC and c 11 there is stronQ evidence for syntactic precursors,
precursol'5 to human syntax. After a . h d-den mutations or uniquely human
'ible for svntax suc as su b .
then factors seen as re,pon, . "k' 1 uaoe acquisition device in the ra1l1-
biological struetures-1I1cludmg Choms y sang <-
could neatly be ruled out.
1%
B .... RBARA 1, KI ......'(;
a Strong mot" allon t
COntmuu b 0 sho\\ that there are .
e,en stau:' h ut r.nher gradual Incremental shifts in major gaps across the pnmate
d. c cOntlnUIl) theorists such as atures of communIcative abllJt
ata constitute strong evidence for myself are hard-pressed to admit th b y,
dISmISs altog;ther the to uSing and u.nderstandlng syntaxel
S) mbol production, because as senSlllvity to sequence or
Noneth Important cognitl>e abilities upon which lelow, these and related skills may
L e ess. as Armstrong, StOkoe, and Wi!c ater syntactIc abililJes are built
GNL), In terms of and the Nature oj
a
ac 0 convincing J.
that continult' h' precursors to syntax am
a Contm t } t eOfJSts must concede that human la ong nonhuman primates mean
denyabl UI y mhodel o.f gradual shIfts over tIme: GNL IS not easll) denvable usino
e Wit In an lOcreme t I 0 ers a clear 'no' an S 0
-. opposed to
gesture-as usc; by to I thhe ongIns-of-language debate a c?nvInclOg argument
. ear Y omtnlds but b '1 . Y mamtam that mam I
I
!
the development of an abilitIes In ancest::1
argument at' the syntactIc abIlitIes to
support and extend It-and t en suggest \Yays In whIch new dat. f rst explam the
m one way, question it a rom Pr<matology
Syntax derived from visible signs
For Armstrong et a! 'th
I
" ., e essence of Ian . .
manua actIvIty Th '. IS bodllv. '. ,
signs are mad' b ' \on
gms
of syntax can be if - actIvity (p. 37), specifically
I
and overturn Throughout the bOok. the exactly how visible
question asked e.g. speech \is gesture T . a e care to question
stay that wa ? 0: theories: if language b' . hey dIsmISS the traditional
similar that it did: Speech is gesture, why didn't it
difference exists, k
on

structure of a '. po en an \' ISlble Sl<"K vislbl . . cnlIcal
--= mInI-Sentence 'Emb e SIgns them<elve .
gestures p. 161), in t at . ryo sentences arc already inherent: : s Contam
to something else Th . an SVO structure is present: someth' SImple VISible
i.e. an word .of a sign language, then, is something
'Semantic phonology']. on [th,s concept, formulated initially by
I embryo-sentence nature of visibl . . '
h
Whed
n
the authors ask readers to perfo:r:
lgns
tlSexPlained most clearly late in the book
an s (po 179)' 'Sw no Just read about . '
upraised finee; of v
lng
your nght hand across in front of your bo-
an
exerCIse with their
the right ha;d is th
our
left hand (Reverse these directions if yo dy catch wIth it the

escr< e what ha d' passage elow tho t
powerfUlly brings home the an act of signing about a
manual-brachial gest d ra leas:
be tak . ure un erstood as rep .
. en, 10 proper COntext, to stand for th . resentmg a raptor seizing prey could
e raptor, Or the prey, Or the act of catching.
f
I
I
197
Taking apart the manual gesture by focusing on the actIve hand in one situation. on the
inactive target or object hand in another. and in still another on the action itself, would
have resulted in an explosive multiplication of the lexicon of gestural words, and because
of the syntactic pattern in the gesture, the visible words in it would already be effectively
divided into nouns and verbs' (p. 185).
Signing gesturall)' thus leads to the understanding of relationships among c.oncePts in a 1
way that signing vocally cannot. This ability is accomplished specifically by the pairing
of visible events with similarly structured visible gcstures (p. 185). That IS, syntax is
metaphorically embodied in the direct actions of our hands. But how does gesture lead
to full syntactic production and comprehension? To answer this question, Annstrong et al.
make effective use of Edelman's (1987) theory of neural group selection. Edelman's work
is based on the idea that certain stimuli select certain brain circuits. strengthening their
ability to respond to that class of stimulI. This basic Hebbian notion is particularized by
Edelman via a focus on 'selection among an extremely large number of preexisting
circuits or "neuronal groups", not by the building up of circuits, de novo' (p. 139). Only
gesture, with its embryo sentences, and not vocal communication, which lacks such
sentences, could calise an incremental move toward a broader ability 'for correlating
conceptual relationships among concepts with the natural, visible, motoric combination of
noun and verb' (p. 159).
This theory not only is consistent with the evidence for the primacy of manual-visual
systems in primates, but it also does something no vocal-origins theory can do: it
accounts for an incremental increase in syntactic ability over time, taking as starting
point the nature of gesture. Perhaps only an interdisciplinary team of co-authors could
have come up with this theory. At GNL's COre is an interweaving of data from primatology
and paleoanthropology (David Annstrong is a physical anthropologist) with detailed
information from linguistics, including Langacker's cognitive grammar and, in particular,
sign language theory (William Stokoe pioneered the study of American Sign Language
as a full-fledged language with full linguistic properties, and Sherman Wilcox has written
extensively about signed and spoken languages in comparative framework).
In sum, Annstrong et al. have identified a critical feature of gesture that can explain
the incremental origins of syntax, and they have shown a way for those origins to be
elaborated upon slowly over time. According to GNL. however, all the real manual
action, so to speak, began with hominids. Can the theory embrace primatological data
that provide the foundation for a continuity theory with even deeper roots?
Links to nonhuman primates
Armstrong et al. (1995) unmistakably link themselves with continuity theorists by
claiming that 'whatever is uniquely human is most likely expressed quantitatively and
developmentally rather than qualitati"ely and structt/rally' (p. 115). Their primary goal is
to derive syntax incrementally within the hominid lineage. In so doing, they differentiate
Homo sapiens from both chimpanzees and the earliest hominids in terms of sentence-
producing abilities, but the cognitive roots for their theory clearly go deeper evolutionarily
than the time period of the early hominid,. In fact, because,gesture is seen as the critical
link between certain fundamental conceptualizing capacities (already in place) and
linguistic ability (still to come in full-blown form), Armstrong et al. 's theory depends on
their being able to argue that some complex cognitive abilities, especially those regarding
categorizing, had already evolved before the split between nonhuman primates and early
I
hominids. that i,. "ith or before the common ancestor of great apes and humans. The
authors thus pepper the book with references to non humans primates' conceptual,zing,
categorizmg and communicating abilities.
The primatological data included in GSL are up-to-date and well-interpreted (co!llra
other recent attempts from outside primatology. e.g. Kuper. 1994: Pinker, I In only one
place doe, the interpretation require rev.orking. The authors claim that the primary
function of language relates to facilitation of social life. Although this ba,ic point seems to
me right on track. it doesn't follo\\ that the evolution of complex language and higher-
order consciousness derives primarily from essential dilferences between the social structures
of hominid groups as compared to groups of other primates. Kendon is cited in ,upport
of this conclusion but I think his work has led Armstrong et al. down the wrong path.
In particular. two assertions of Kendon's do not agree with primatological data or
with logic based on evolutionary theory. Repeated separations and joinings of early
hominid groups sets apart hominid social structure, Kcndon claims. from that of other
nonhuman primates. including chimpanzees. Certainly, division of labor by sex lI!ay have
appeared early in human evolution, making hominids unique among all other primates
in ha\ing small sex-biased work parties. as Kcndon says: but We have no evidence that
this happened early on I Potts. 1988). In any case, chimpanzee and bon abo communities
\
have a fission-fasion social structure based on individuals' repeatedly separating from
and rejoining other members of theIr own communities. This tendency to split and
reform groups with constantly shifting membership has clear consequences for communi-
r cation in chimpanzees and bonobos. i.e. it is a selection pressure for signals-vocal and
non-vocal-that promote group cohesion. New field data show that male bonobos at
Wamba. Zaire. for instance. perform 'branch-dragging' actions to initiate group movemcnt.
to indicate direction of movement, to signal directional changes once movement is
underway. and to keep straggling group members together (lngmanson. 1996). Ditferent
males may drag branches in different directions, requiring a negotiation process and
eventual decision by the group about direction of travel (see also Boesch, 199Ia).
Second, Kendon speculates that chimpanzees have not de\'eloped language-like
communication because they did not need to. That is, Kendon believes that the chimpanzees'
way of life would not be significantly enhanced by symbolic communication. Yet there is
every reason to predict just the opposite, i.e. to predict that great apes might make great
use of complex symbolic communication (or to put it more formally, to predict that
selection pressures would have led to greater reproductive success for those individuals
able to produce and comprehend symbols). As Fischer (1988) says, there are many things
apes could profitably learn from conspecifies via symbolic communication. including the
habits of certain males within the community, the nature of relationships with neighboring
communities, and non-social things like seasonal variation in location of important food
items. Obviously, apes have not developed language (at least as judged by human
standards). a fact that requires explanation. There must have been increased selection
pressures of some type for symbolic communication in hominid populations as compared
to ape populations. Several scenarios that suggest selection pressures are as speculative
as Kendon's but agree better with the primatologicai data (e.g. Parker and Gibson. 1979:
Fischer, 1988: King. 19943).
More generally, however, the primatological data Can support and extend the incremental-
ist view at the heart of GNL Consider again the phrase used to explain what action is
encoded by syntax: 'something does something to something else'. This phrase also fairly
199
."',,(} LA.:-.(jL ,\C;l ORJCII:-"S
ns one monkey "pproaches
b beh'l\lor,Ji mteractIO 0 et al
'b s the proce" undcd) ,ng aSlc 'h d then bItes another. Armstron
o
de
scrl
e rOoms another. or one ape approac e, an structure of syntax and of behav-
and then g ell at thIS commonallt) between SVO hers are doing plays a major role
hInt by notIng that the observIng at "hat 0 a step further and hmt more
10
ral
tnt" aoement of soctal Itfe (p 80). Later. the) ;0 all kmds of bod11) moveme?ts
in the pOSSJbility of a syntactIc p,ut
ern
m real world events', It IS
explIcIt) uppose that homllllds dlml) suW t IS 't dimly But It IS one thmg to see
'One may s nd anthropOld ape, may alsO see I . mbolize them' (p. 184).
certamly out to reco
ol11ze
that they are patterns and SYalterns on the one hand,
patterns and ano
dlat
,; these twO pob-d,mly recog
nlZ
' g:e s and apes may clearly
Yet an them. on the other-may eXISt. So: Armstrong e/ al.
and fully ;he SVO p.ltlernS In soctal hfe and pOd,ses: of among concepts
perceI\C h I' s\ntux-the understan tn"
d at the cart 0 - 1988)
conS! er 'ust among thmgs (see also FIscher., " lations among concepts' can be
rather between 'relations among thtngs and g r:
htngs
m,ght include recognizing
. The 'd b example. Understandmg relatIons amon B or that tool A WIll efficiently fit
A comes from tr,;e type A but case the perceiving animal has
that nll - d A but not termIte moun .
into ternnte moun f the 'things' in\olved h a more abstract
some of relatIOnshIPs between for example, not
IS also a generalized
. ammal A eats m tree P '1\ cons\lmed. I e that Ig er- .
only that anllnars rank and the food type ammals tend to eat In unnpe fig
between an to eat 111 npe fig trees yvhereas low-ran I i ht realtze that bemg male and
am
mals
tend with \caves but no frUIt. Or. ammal g e it is not only the relatIOnshIP
tb
rees
tend to occur together tn one s the concepts themselves--
emg e be dtreotlv percel\e . I elvable
between ob.iects that, . and 'r:nk' are abstractions not dlr
ec
d
t
Y perc
d

, k' d 'food type, or sex . f 'mals can un erstan ..
It for granted I r
that
a that wdicates
h
nv al1lma rom a . I f hJl!h vs low ran .
among t mgs-
a
- d differently to anIma s 0 - n rimates
dilferenual. rdT,king by among things. Claimmg
has the abIlIty to perceIVe n concepts, however, requIres JUs I . recent reviews
understand relatIOnshIPs amo gb 'ble beha\lor patterns Three majOr II and
h data concerl1lng 0 sena 995' MItchell, Tomas
e
0 .
closely at t e'
t
III nonhuman primates (Byrne, I k" d apes indicate underlywg
of soctal cogl1l IOn I behaViOrs of mon eJ s an
t that certam socIa
Call, 1994) sugg
es
. hI s among concepts. '. it ve abihties
abtlitles to understand contends th"t five types of (\)
The broadest re\leW 0 omaseHo and Call, (994). These are d how they
are shared by monkeys and
d
of wd"iduals within one's or groupS
to recog
mze
mdlVlduals anderst md the relatIonships among otherhmdk'nOW ledge of both
h
elf' (2) to un' h II' (3) to use t e .
relate to t e S h ather than to t e se , . d competJllve
. . d I t onc anot er r I ooperallye an
relatIOnshIps to engage beha\lor for sombc
Irec a nderstand ho" to manlpu a infonnation may e
mteractlOns: (4) to u .. I and (5) to understand how lt'n
o
from other
cooperatIVe or competItive goa
b
, obsef\mg envIronmental change reSIl I c
. d about the em Ironment y
acqUIre
animals' behavIOr.
Some of these abilities probably involve the need for animals to understand how
concepts arc related to each other. Consider as an example the social interactions of
free-ranging vervet monkeys as observed by Cheney and Seyfarth (1990), When vervet
females form alliances with un related vervets they do so most often with those who have
previously groomed Ihem at the highest rates, Further. vervets arc significantly mOre
likely to threaten unrelated individuals following a fight with those animals close kin
than during matched control periods, These data-which are by no means limited
to vervet monkeys. as Tomasello and Call (1994) make clear-suggest not only that
monkeys can access their own memories (a claim explictly challenged by Bickerton. personal
communication) but that they relate fundamentally different concept;; to each other.
In the first finding about vervets reported above. the relationship that must be under-
stood is betwecn the abstractions 'who makes a good non-kin ally' and 'relatively high
levels of grooming'. In the second example. the relationship may be between 'kin of
other individuals' and 'previous agonistic interactions'. The concept labels that I h,ne put
in quotes here, and in the examples below, are of COurse just my speculations about what
monkeys and apes might perceive; by including these labels here. l do not intend to make
strong claims about how concepts are represented in the minds of nonhuman
My point is only to suggest that the observation" of fieIt! primatologi,ts are consi,tem
with a claim that some monkeys and apes can relate concepts in an abstract manner;
that is, they can relate concepts to each other (sec also Cheney and Seyfarth. 1990),
As impressive as the conceptualizing skills of some monkeys are. in general the data
indicate 'a remarkable cognitive difference' (Byrne. 1995: 162) between abilities of great
apes and of monkeys. The best candidates for animals who are able to understand
relationships among concepts may thus come from our closest living relatives: bonobos.
chimpanzees. gorillas and orangutans. A good example is one chimpanzee teaching another
how to master a certain skill, as when a chimpanzee mother from the Tai I\'ational
Forest, Ivory Coast, demonstrates to her offspring a tool-use technique used in nut-cTacking
(Boesch, 199Ib). The mother may be relating the concept of 'best or most efficient way
to solve this problem with a tool' to that of , my offspring is ignorant of this skill', which
leads to the mother's modification of her own behavior (what Byrne terms 'intentional
teaching'). Only very few examples of such teaching. however, have been collected by
primatologists (see King. 1994a: Maestripieri. 1995), so linking the ability to relate concepts
to the ability to teach is not very satisfactory.
Mitchell (l994:209) has argued that apes are capable of 'self-pretense and rccognition
of simulation'. by which he means that they 'know that if they re-create a kinesthetic or
vocal experience. they can produce a particular effect on another'. In pursuit of some
goal. apes do on occasion recreate some experience outside of its normal context; that is,
they act with intention to deceive. If lower-order explanations for an apparently deceptive
act can be ruled out, as both Mitchell (199.1) and Byrne (1995) indicate, then deception is
another likely candidate for a behavior that involves understanding the relationship
among concepts. Citing Menzel's famous work, Mitchell reports the following anecdOte:
a female chimpanzee led a male away from a location in which she knew food was hidden
and returned to it only when the male was searching in another. incorrect location. As
Milchell notes (1994:210). the evidence as reported allows the conclusion that the chimpanzee
used planning skills and recognized how another animal would perceive her aclions, I
would add that the female did this because she was able to understand relationships
among abstract concepts rather than just relationships among things. (See the three
20]
, I' of nonhuman primate interactions that reasonably
vieWS cited for more examp es k ," ant! apes probably can relate concepts.)
re
an
be interpreted as suggesting that mon e), 'b'111't1'es reported for great apes and some
C 'ee that the coomtlve a . f
B
e nOW you agr " ree that the' reflect understandmg 0
, " ' nd vou may even ag) .
O
nkevs are lmpreSS\\'c. a . , h otest that the abilities in questlOn
III '. tS but you rna" W1S to pr
eiationsh1Ps among concep , . " , ful recurso
rs
to it. This is correct; keep
d
r
0 not involve syntactic ablhty nor m:amn
g
s. Pcoonitive skills imply latent abilities
h
. I" is not that vervets or ape " . . '
l
'n mind t at m} calm d . b I rather that they are cogmllVe precursor,
'1 h nsion or pro uctlOn, u . I th'
for svntacl!ca compre e l' h" amono concepts, tor examp e. c
for even more complex re underpinnings for understanding
recise relationship of words 111 a sentence, "c in monkeys ;nd apes. and in my
did something to somethmg ehlse t
P
on of syntactic ;bility than a "enslti,ity
. 'ficant precursors to t e evo u J , ,
view are more Slgm .' . 'V lbolic output (as reVlewed above).
to sequence or an ablhty to pattern one s s_ n. 'Iationships amono concepts has even
I am thus arguing that ab!llty to Yet, obviously, ;he cognitive abilities
deeper evolutlOnary roots than Armstrong" a. h' n t been enough for human-hke
. d onkevs and apes dVe 0 d' ,
to which I've pom
te
among m - For' that. something more is needed, an It s
Il
'nguisl ic ab!lllles such as s)ntax to emerge, b ost cle']rl
v
seen. Armstrong et aJ.
f h t al theory can em, ) .
here that the strength 0 t e ges ur. f t ' 's itself critical: that is. the expefl-
clearly stipulate (p. 184) that the 0 in the very person of the
ence of using a self-contamed or participated in partially. There is no
communicator, not Just observed from a 1sta do'lng l't has "seen" an SVO pattern
, . - ' ntil the creature .
waY to sort words mto categone, u . . t' n that what acts and the action
) , d n obvlOus demonstra 10 c
in gesture and thus expenence . a II ' r ked' (p, 184). This point argues lor
it perfonns are distinct but phYSIcally and 't ::ctions or processes I have discussed
somethin!! different about gesture from any of t e 111 e I' d to a specific sophisticated
" . G - 's umque nature can ea ' . .. I
for nonhuman pnmates, e,ture, .' mon concepts: an abihty cntlca
type of ability to perceive hierarchIcal relauonsh1ps a g
for origins of syntax and language as we know It.
Conclusion " nd conclusions of GNL with continuity theory,
Although l have aligned the perspectl he a GII'L de'erves a deeper response than being
I want to close this essay by noung t at 1 'kl' d' 'ed by discontinuity theorists.
b
t theorists and qUlC Y 1smlSS , h
quickly embraced ) contmul J , . ther than instant alignment W1t one
"I mination on 1tS own ra 11
It merits close entlca exa . I' " 't deri,es syntax incrementa y,
h f G r\ L does somethmg tru v new, t t '
camp versus anot. cr. or J, 0 diluted that ling-uists will not recognize it as a proper y
without reducmg 11 to somethm" so d ""1 ,,_ embryo-sentence idea, combmed wllh
5t koe 'm ,';1 cox" , .
of languaoe, Armstrong. 0 . h 'data on monkey and ape cog
mtlon
,
" ". I seiectlOn and Wl1 ne" d'
Edelman's views on neurona d' h origins of syntax: an understan 109
f I
nt for understan 109 t e) h
provides a power u argume, .' h orist' talking to, rather than past, eac
that can get COllunu1ty and dlsconunulty t e
other once again.
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