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Almaty 2009

BREAKING THE ORKHON TRADITION: KIRGHIZ ADHERENCE TO THE YENISEI REGION AFTER A.D. 840

MICHAEL R. DROMPP RHODES COLLEGE Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 119, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1999), pp. 390-

Many scholars of Inner Asian history have long believed that after the destruction of the Uighur empire in A.D. 840, the victorious Kirghiz followed Inner Asian political tradition and established an empire that included the Mongolian plateau, particularly the Orkhon River valley-the traditional "heartland" of many earlier pastoral empires, including that of the defeated Uighurs. These scholars further held that the Kirghiz were expelled from Mongolia some eighty years later when Khitan forces marched into the region in 924. This line of reasoning, based largely on faulty assumptions and little evidence, is untenable. An examination of Western scholarship on the subject shows how this misconception came into being; further, a close look at the available evidence-documentary, archaeological, and geographical-reveals that after their defeat of the Uighurs the Kirghiz enjoyed at best brief and inconsequential control of the Orkhon valley. For a number of reasons, the Kirghiz remained in their homeland in the region of the upper Yenisei River of south Siberia. When the Khitans extended their power into the Orkhon region in the tenth century, they did not encounter the Kirghiz there. Relying as heavily as it does on records kept by outsiders, the history of Inner Asia often suffers from a lack of continuity, particularly in early periods. One of the many troubling gaps in our knowledge of the history of eastern Inner Asia, i.e., the geographical and cultural region north of modern China that centers on the Mongolian plateau, spans a relatively brief period from the middle of the ninth century to the early tenth century A.D.-the period immediately following the collapse of the Uighur (Ch. Hui-ho [,, Hui-hu [H, etc.) empire in A.D. 840 and preceding the expansion of Khitan (Ch'itan #-f9) power into the Mongolian steppe ca. 924. This gap has proved particularly distressing to historians because it is rather a late period to be so exceedingly arid, and because it follows a lengthy period about which far more is known-a period of a reasonably (for Inner Asia, at least) well-documented series of nomadic empires that followed one after the other, beginning in the late fourth century and ending in the mid-ninth: Joujan :,,1 Turk (T'u-chiieh ::), and Uighur. These nomadic empires were essentially tribal confederations of pastoral nomadic peoples; each was multi-ethnic in nature but took its name from the dominant tribe. 2 Several of the major confederated polities of eastern Inner Asia were centered around the same general area: the valley of the Orkhon River in what is now the northcentral region of modem Mongolia. The Orkhon flows northward and joins the Selenga; the river then continues northward to flow into Lake Baikal in Siberia. The Turks in the period from the mid-sixth to the mid-eighth century, the Uighurs in the period from the mid-eighth to mid-ninth century, and the Mongols in the thirteenth century are all known to have made the Orkhon-Selenga region the political focus of their states. Ruins of cities such as the Uighur capital of Qarabalghasun and the Mongol capital of Qaraqorum, as well as important inscribed commemorative stelae from the Turk and Uighur periods, have been found there. It is also very likely that some earlier groups, such as the peoples known in Chinese sources as Hsiung-nu -J> (fl. ca. 200 B.C. to ca. A.D. 155) and Jou-jan (fl. ca. A.D. 380 to A.D. 555), viewed the general region of the Orkhon valley as their political nucleus as well. The Turks, and possibly other peoples, also regarded this region as a national center in a spiritual or religious sense, as can be seen from Old Turkic references to the Otiiken yis. The meaning of Otiiken is uncertain, but yis means a mountain forest-"the upper parts of a mountain covered with forest, but also containing treeless grassy valleys." 3 It seems that the Otiiken Mountains correspond to some part of the
1 Only the Chinese form of this name, with its variants Ju-ju 4i4r, Juan-juan 3I, etc., is known. 2 Anatoly Khazanov makes an excellent point when he argues that the term confederation can be misleading when applied to the multi-ethnic polities created by nomadic peoples, since nomadic associations are not always formed on a voluntary basis; see A. M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, tr. Julia Crookenden (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), 152. Keeping this in mind, the term retains some utility in that it suggests a polity in which the various sub-units retain a high degree of autonomy. 3 Gerard Clauson, An Etymological Dictionary of Pre- Thirteenth-CenturyT urkish( Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1972), 976. See also Drevnetiurksksilio var (LeningradI:z datelstvo Nauka,1 969),2 68.

moder Khangay Mountains, from which the Orkhon and Selenga f low; some sources indicate that the term referred to the eastern foothills of the Khangay, near the Orkhon, while others suggest that it could mean the entire Khangay range.4 It is clear from the eighth-century Old Turkic inscriptions that the Otiiken Mountains-sometimes referred to as Otiiken yer/yir, "the land of Otiiken"-had a particular, spiritual significance for the Turks. Indeed, the region is referred to in the inscriptions as "sacred" (iduq). 5 Note the following statements from those inscriptions: If the Turk qaghan rules from the Otiiken Mountains, there will be no trouble in the realm.... A land better than the OtiikenM ountainsd oes not exist at all! The place fromw hich the tribesc an be [best]c ontrolledis the OtiikenM ountains.6 If you stay in the land of Otiiken, and send caravans fromt here,y ou will have no trouble.I f you stay at the Otiiken Mountainsy, ou will live forever dominatingthe tribes!7 It was I myself, Bilge Toiiuquqw, ho [had led] the Turk qaghanand the Ttirk people to the Otiiken land. Having heard the news that [the Tirks] settled themselves in the Otiiken land, there came all the peoples who were living in the south, in the west, in the north and in the east [and submitted to us]. 8 Clearly, the Otiiken Mountains had symbolic and, one supposes, strategic importance as the national "refugium" of the Tirks.9 The significance of the Otiiken Mountains is reinforced by Chinese sources, which name them as the residence of various Turk qaghans.10 Furthermore, the Ottiken region retained its significance after the collapse of the Turk empire in 744, as can be seen from the stone inscriptions created by their successors, the Uighurs.11 In 840, the continuity of the Orkhon tradition, which had been established at least by the middle of the sixth century with the founding of the Turk empire in A.D. 555 and which continued through the history of the succeeding Uighur steppe empire, was threatened. In that year the Turkic Kirghiz (Hsiachia-ssu X,,jk , etc.), a people then living in the region of the upper (i.e., southern) Yenisei River, in the general area of present-day Minusinsk and Abakan in south Siberia, northwest of the Mongolian plateau, successfully attacked the capital of the Uighur steppe empire that had held sway over much of eastern Inner Asia for nearly a century. The Uighurs, already weakened by internal strife and court intrigue, as well as by epizootics and famine, could not withstand the Kirghiz onslaught, and were quickly routed. Groups of Uighurs f led in virtually every direction.12 What happened in the Orkhon valley after the Uighur collapse? Many modem scholars, particularly in the West, have assumed that the Kirghiz followed steppe tradition and established themselves for some eighty years as masters of the Mongolian plateau and inheritors of the Orkhon political tradition. This interpretation was based largely on an argument of silence. There are no native Inner Asian sources that provide any information on this matter.13 Chinese sources, particularly the standard historical works, in
4 See K. Czegledy, (oyay-quzi,Q ara-qum, Kok-6ng,A cta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 15 (1962): 62, n. 5. 5 Talat Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkish (Bloomington: IndianaU niv. Publications1, 968), 234, 267; see also Alessio Bombaci, QutluyB olsun! (Partt wo), Ural-altaischeJ ahrbucher 38 (1966): 17-18. 6 Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkish, 261. I have modified this and othero f Tekinst ranslationtso conformt o the styles andf orms( spellings)I have usedt hroughoutth is paper. 7 Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkish, 262. 8 Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkish, 285. 9 Ont her eligiousc onnotationosf the Otiikens, ee Jean-Paul Roux, La Religiond es Turcsd e lOrkhond es VIIee t VIIIe siecles (deuxieme article), Revue de lHistoire des Religions 161.2( 1962):2 00-201; andA lessioB ombaci, QutluyB olsun! (Partt wo),1 5-19. See also Annemariev on Gabain, Steppe und Stadt im Leben der altesten Tiirken,D er Islam 29.1 (1949): 35-37. 10 See PaulP elliot, Neufn otess urd es questionsd Asiec entrale, T oungP ao, ser. 2, 26 (1929):2 12-19. 11 For the Sine-usui nscriptions, ee G. J. Ramstedt, Zwei uigurischeR uneninschrifteinn der Nord-Mongolei,Jo urnal de la Societe Finno-Ougrienne 30 (1913): 22-27. For the Terkhinin scriptions,e e S. G. Klyashtorny,T heT erkhinIn scription, Act Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 36 (1982):3 41-46; andT alatT ekin, TheT aria(tT erkhinI)n scription, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 37 (1983): 46-51. These two scholars present readings that are often highly divergent. 12 See Michael R. Drompp, The Writings of Li Te-yu as Sourcesf or the Historyo f Tang-InneAr sianR elations(P h.D. diss., Indiana Univ., 1986), for a study of those Uighurs who fled to the Chinese border 13 Some have argued that the brief Suci Inscription (written in Turkic language and Turkic runiform script) provides evidence for Kirghiz control over Mongolia; see, for example, L. R. Kyzlasov, Istoriia Tuvy v srednie veka (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1969), 95. But there is nothing in the inscription that really provides such evidence. For the Turkic text and a German translation of the inscription, see Ramstedt, Zwei uigurische Runeninschriften in der Nord- Mongolei, 1-9.

fact reveal very little about the Orkhon region in the period immediately following the Uighur collapse. It was not long after this that China's T'ang dynasty (618-907) began its own final downward spiral; it is not surprising, therefore, that Chinese records were more concerned with problems within China itself than with what was happening in Inner Asia and elsewhere. The same scholars who presumed Kirghiz domination of the Mongolian plateau after 840 also supposed that the Kirghiz were pushed out of the region by the expanding power of the Khitans when their dynamic ruler Yeh-lii A-pao-chi [PdlJf*4l entered the Orkhon region with his troops in 924. This misconception seems to have originated, in part at least, in the works of the French scholar ltdouard Chavannes and the Russian scholar V. V. Bartol'd (W. W. Barthold), both of whom were generally cautious in their analyses. Chavannes wrote in 1897: Vers le milieu du IXe siecle cependant, les Ouigours furent rompus et disperses; les Kirghiz, qui les avaient defaits, furent incapables d'dtablir un gouvernement stable. Les Khitan en profiterent; n'6tant plus contenus par leurs redoutables antagonistes, ils ne tarderent pash devenir conqu6rants a leur tour. Dans les premieres ann6es du Xe siecle, leur chef Apaoki [i.e., A-pao-chi] triompha des Hi et se les assimila si bien, qu'a partir de cette epoque, les territoires des Hi et des Khitan ne sont plus distingu6s par les historiens chinois; poussant plus au Sud encore, il d6passa la GrandeMuraille et ravagea le Tche-li. Au Nord-Ouest, il alla jusqu'h l'ancienne residence des Ouigours sur les bords de l'Orkhon et, en l'an 924, il y 6rigea une stele pour commemorer ses exploits.14 Chavannes did not refer to a Kirghiz empire that was threatened or diminished by the Khitans; indeed, he indicated that the Kirghiz had been unable to establish a stable government in Mongolia. Writing of the Khitans as conquerors, he nevertheless did not state that they had conquered the Kirghiz; indeed, he simply skirted the issue of whom, if anyone, the Khitans encountered in the Orkhon valley in 924. Some years later, Barthold displayed a bit less caution when he wrote on the subject: Das letzte tiirkische Volk, das in der Mongolei herrschte, waren, soweit man nach den chine sischen Quellen urteilen kann, die Kirgizen, die im Jahre 840 die Uighuren besiegt hatten. Ihre Verdrangung aus der Mongolei war anscheinend verbunden mit dem Erstarken des mongolischen Volkes der Qytai zu Beginn des 10 Jahrhunderts, die im n6rdlichen China ein michtiges Reich griindeten und diesem Reiche ihren Namen gaben.15 Barthold thus suggested that the departure of the Kirghiz from Mongolia was "apparently connected with" the rise of Khitan power in Manchuria and its subsequent expansion, although he gave no source for this information. In an earlier article in Russian, Barthold had also suggested that Khitan expansion into the Orkhon region must have been preceded by a victory over the Kirghiz, but admitted that there was no real evidence for such a victory.16 This uncertainty was ref lected in a statement by Karl Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, who cited Barthold as their source. Having overthrown the Uighurs in 840, they [i.e., the Kirghiz] probably held the Orkhon region for a while but were driven back again at the beginning of the tenth century when the Ch'i-tan became the masters of Central Asia.17 The work of Chavannes apparently was the source for stronger statements by Rene Grousset in the latter's L'Empire des steppes: Les Kirghiz s'installerent a la place des Ouigour dans la "Mongolie imp6riale," sur le haut Orkhon,
14 ldouard Chavannes, Voyageurs chinois chez les Khitan et les Joutchen, Journal asiatique, neuvieme serie, 9 (1897): 381-82. He was a bit less cautious a few pages later (p. 407, n. 1), writing: Les Kirghiz, qui habitaient primitivement sur les bords du Kem ou haut Ieniss6i, avaient 6tendu leur domination jusqua lOrkhon apres leurs victoires sur les Ouigours, au milieu du IXe siecle. Still, there is no reference to a Kirghiz empire or anything of the sort, nor to the duration of that domination. 15 W. W. Barthold [= V. V. Bartold], Zwolf Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Turken Mittelasiens (1935; rpt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1962), 97. In his article on the Kirghiz for Encyclopedia of Islam, Barthold was once again cautious, indicating that the Kirghiz, after conquering the lands of the Uighurs in Mongolia, were probably driven from Mongolia in connection with the founding of the Khitan empire and the advance of the Mongol peoples. See W. Barthold, ICrgiz, Encyclopedia of Islam, first ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1913-1936), 2: 1025. 16 V. V. Bartold (= W. W. Barthold), Kirgizy, in his Sochineniia [(Collected) Works], vol. 2 (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSR, 1963), 498-99. The article was originally published in 1927 in Frunze (Pishpek). In the same article (p. 489), Barthold asnoted that after the victory over the Uighurs, the Kirghiz ruler did not establish a capital on the Orkhon, but did move (according to Chinese sources) to the south side of the Lao 4 Mountain(s), or Tu-man Mi; Barthold believed this to refer to the Tannu-Ola Mountains. 17 Karl Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, History of Chinese Society: Liao (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1949), 106.

autour de l'actuelle Qara-balgassoun et de l'actuelle Qaraqoroum. Mais ces tribus sib6riennes firent r6gresser la Mongolie vers la barbarie. Les Kirghiz resterent maitres du pays jusque vers 920, 6poque oh ils devaient etre vaincus par le peuple mongol des K'i-tan et rejet6s vers les steppes de l'Ienissei.... En 924, il [A-pao-ki, i.e., A-pao-chi] penetra en Mongolie, poussajusqu'au haut Orkhon, entra a Qarabalgassoun, en chassa les Turcs Kirghiz qui occupaient cette region depuis 840, et les refoula vers le haut Ienissei et les steppes de l'Ouest.18 This account by Grousset, in the only truly successful and hence still much consulted synthetic history of Inner Asia in a Western language, apparently led to the general acceptance of the notion that the Kirghiz remained in Mongolia, masters of the Orkhon region, until 924, when they were driven out by the invading Khitans. Later scholars, lulled into a comfortable and unquestion ing conviction by Grousset's unequivocal statements and his references to such learned scholars as Chavannes and E. Bretschneider (as well as Barthold's writings), wrote with even less caution, confidently asserting the historicity of the Khitan expulsion of Kirghiz power from central Mongolia in 924.19 Chinese sources, however, can help us put to rest the notion of a Kirghiz empire in Mongolia, and of a tenthcentury Khitan-Kirghiz conf lict there. During the reign of the T'ang emperor Wu-tsung ~- (r. 840-46), at which time the Uighur steppe empire was destroyed, at least four official Kirghiz envoys were sent to China in the years following the Uighur collapse. More than once these envoys expressed the Kirghiz intention to move into the Uighurs' former territory. 20 They also set forth a plan to seize the cities of An-hsi 5iV and Pei-t'ing jll (Besbaliq) in the northern Tarim Basin, and revealed fears concerning a possible Uighur alliance with Tibet. 21 Although Wu-tsung was intrigued by the prospect of allying with the Kirghiz and possibly recovering parts of the western regions for the T'ang empire, he was quickly talked out of the idea by Chief Minister Li Teyii ~]~, who forcefully explained the impracticality of such efforts. 22 Although some scholars have interpreted the Chinese sources as asserting that the Kirghiz attacked and subjugated An-hsi and Pei-t'ing without Chinese assistance, there is no clear evidence that such was the case. 23 Furthermore, the Chinese seem to have expected that the Kirghiz would establish themselves in the
18 Ren6 Grousset, LEmpire des steppes (Paris: Payot, 1948), 176, 181. Grousset also indicated (p. 181, n. 1) that he had obtained information regarding this topic from E. Bretschneider, Medieval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources: Fragments towards the Knowledge of the Geography and History of Central and Western Asia from the 13th to the 17th Century (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1910), 1: 265 (apparently an error for 241), but there is nothing there to suggest that Bretschneiders work did indeed contribute to Groussets information concerning a war between the Khitan and the Kirghiz. Bretschneider simply gives a brief description of the destruction of the Uighur empire by the Kirghiz. 19 Ren6 Grousset, LEmpire des steppes (Paris: Payot, 1948), 176, 181. Grousset also indicated (p. 181, n. 1) that he had obtained information regarding this topic from E. Bretschneider, Medieval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources: Fragments towards the Knowledge of the Geography and History of Central and Western Asia from the 13th to the 17th Century (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1910), 1: 265 (apparently an error for 241), but there is nothing there to suggest that Bretschneiders work did indeed contribute to Groussets information concerning a war between the Khitan and the Kirghiz. Bretschneider simply gives a brief description of the destruction of the Uighur empire by the Kirghiz. 20 A letter from the Tang court to an Uighur minister indicates that the Kirghiz expressed the desire to move into the Uighurs former territory and then extend their sway over the region of the northern Tarim Basin. This particular passage in Li Te-yiis works is problematic in that there are possible lacunae; see Tsen Chung-mien ~{fl, Li Te-yii Hui-chang fa pan chi pien cheng shang ,fi~,<j |_i, Shihhsueh chuan-kan 5 :UWJ 2.1 (1937): 203, n. 7; see also Drompp, The Writings of Li Te-yii, 224 and the pertinent notes, pp. 256-63. Another letter, written to the Kirghiz qaghan in response to a letter he had sent to the Tang court, again stated the Kirghiz plan to take the Uighurs former territory; see Drompp, The Writings of Li Te-yii, 323. 21 Li Te-yii, (Li Wei-kung) Hui-chang i pin chi (-*f i)t H- 1 (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1936), 8.64; for a translation, see Drompp, The Writings of Li Te-yii, 224. 22 Li Te-yii, (Li Wei-kung) Hui-chang i pin chi (-*f i)t H- 1 (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1936), 8.64; for a translation, see Drompp, The Writings of Li Te-yii, 224. 23 Liu Hsii iJgtJee t al., Chiu Tang shu ,f (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chii, 1975), 174.4522-23, Ou-yang Hsiu W ff et al., Hsin Tang shu ifJi-t (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chii, 1975), 180.5337; see also Ssu-ma Kuang , ,, Tzu-chih tung-chien 3iTg&_ (Peking: Ku-chi chupan-she, 1956), 247.7973-74. The account presented in Chiu Tang shu is translated in Drompp, The Writings of Li Te-yii, 284-86. See, for example, S. G. Kljastornyj, Das Reich der Tataren in der Zeit vor Cinggis Khan, Central Asiatic Journal 36.1-2 (1992): 76-77. The Chinese texts, however, are ambiguous. Tzu-chih tung-chien 246.7968 suggests that the Kirghiz had already taken An-hsi and Pei-ting, but the text from which this account is clearly derived-a letter from the brush of Li Te-yii (see n. 20 above)-indicates that i E already is an error for i 1J in order to; see Li Te-yii, Hui-chang i pin chi 8.64, translated in Drompp, The Writings of Li Te-yii, 224. Li Te-yiis letter suggests that the Kirghiz were planning such an attack, but had not actually carried it out; this would certainly make far better sense given the context, since the Kirghiz clearly were asking for Chinese assistance-something they

Orkhon region; a letter from Wu-tsung's court at Ch'ang-an :kto the Kirghiz ruler stated: "Now that the Uighur camp has been levelled, the mountains and rivers of our [two] nations are no longer separated. Now that you have become a neighbor on our border, [We are again able] to examine your tribute and petitions." 24 The Chinese were in fact interested in establishing good relations with the Kirghiz-no doubt in the expectation that they would be the new power in Mongolia-even going so far as to accept the fictive kinship ties between the two ruling houses that the Kirghiz themselves seem to have promoted. The T'ang imperial house of Li claimed as one of its eminent ancestors the Han general Li Kuang )E (d. 119 B.C.), while the Kirghiz believed that at least some of their people (including, apparently, their ruler) were the descendants of Li Kuang's grandson, Li Ling ~[R (d. 74 B.c.), a famous Han general in his own right who was captured by the Hsiung-nu in 99 B.C. and lived among them for the remainder of his life. 25 Li Ling enjoyed a position of prominence at their court, and may have served as an official with some responsibility in regard to the people then known as Chien-k'un MP, who are commonly identified with the Kirghiz. 26 On the basis of this Kirghiz claim, and his desire to maintain cordial relations with the Kirghiz, T'ang Wu-tsung went so far as to have the Kirghiz ruler's name entered into the register of the imperial family. 27 Despite the expressed intention of the Kirghiz to occupy the Orkhon region, and the expectation of the Chinese that they would do so, letters carried back to the Kirghiz ruler by subsequent envoys show that this did not occur. These letters, written by Li Te-yii in the emperor's name, mention the great dis tance between the T'ang realm and that of the Kirghiz, and the difficulty of communication between them. A letter of 843 states that the Kirghiz were separated from China by "the various foreign peoples." 28 This is not to be taken literally, but does imply a distance greater than that between Chinese territory and the Orkhon valley. Another Kirghiz envoy, who arrived in the spring of 844, complained to the Chinese of communication problems between the two nations, mentioning blocked roads and the failure of Chinese envoys to come to the Kirghiz court. He also reiterated the Kirghiz wish to move into Uighur territory, clearly indicating that they had not yet done so. Internal evidence from the letter written in reply to this envoy's message shows that there was indeed a general failure to communicate effectively; the envoy's letter from the Kirghiz ruler asked about the fate of the Chinese T'ai-ho ;cTf Princess, daughter of the T'ang emperor Hsien-tsung (r. 805-20) and therefore Wutsung's paternal aunt, who had been in Uighur hands since her marriage to an Uighur qaghan in 821, even though a previous Chinese letter to the Kirghiz qaghan, sent a year earlier in April or May 843, had already informed him of her return to the T'ang court. The Chinese letter once again speaks of the great distances which hindered communication between the two nations. Of even greater interest is its statement: "We have also heard that this autumn you wish to move to the Uighurs' [former] camp (ya-chang 5f ). By destroying their great nation and then occupying their former place, you will thereby cause all the foreign peoples to be in awe of your majesty. The Uighurs would then lose hope and draw near our border. This can be called quite a good plan." 29 It is evident from this letter that by the time of the envoy's arrival in the spring of 844, and quite possibly by the time of the
92. 24 Li Te-yii, Hui-chang i pin chi (addendum), 285. For a translation of this letter, see Drompp, The Writings of Li Teyii, 289-

25 Li Kuangs biography may be found in Ssu-ma Chien PJ ,,, Shih chi 5tE (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chii, 1962), 109.2867-76; Pan Ku ]I?H et al., Han shu * (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chii, 1964), 54.2439-49. The former has been translated by Burton Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China: Translated from the Shih chi of Ssu-ma Chien, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961), 2: 141-52; the latter by Watson, Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China: Selections from the History of the Former Han by Pan Ku (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1974), 12-23. Li Lings biography may be found in Shih chi, 109.2877-78 and in Han shu, 54.2450-59. The latter, more detailed, has been translated by Watson, Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China, 24-33. Note that this kinship arrangement places the Tang ruling house, as descendants of Li Kuang, in the senior position and the Kirghiz ruling house in the junior. 26 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6146-47. 27 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6150. On the Chinese acceptance of the existence of kinship between the two ruling houses, see Li Te-yii,H ui-changi pin chi, 6.38, translatedin Drompp, The Writingso f Li Te-yii,2 80. Note thatt his fictive kinshiph ad been recognizeda t least as early as the Ching-lung F reignp eriod( 5 October7 07-4 July7 10) of the Tange mperor Chung-tsun4gP ; see HsinT angs hu,2 17B.6149.T heK irghiz ruleri s initiallyr eferredto in Chineses ourcesa s a-jo RJ,i, the originalf ormo f whichi s unknowna, ndl atera s qaghan 28 Li Te-yii, Hui-chang i pin chi, 6.39. This letter has been translatedin its entiretyi n Drompp, TheW ritingso f Li Teyii, 303-9. 29 See Drompp, TheW ritingso f Li Te-yii,3 18-25.

letter's composition in the spring of 845, 30 the Kirghiz still had not occupied the old Uighur heartland-the Orkhon valley-or territory near it. Subsequent T'ang-Kirghiz relations were even more muddled. In May 845, Wu-tsung appointed an official to grant the Kirghiz qaghan a Chinese title, but this official still had not been sent in April 846 when the emperor died-a further indication of the distance and relative unimportancet o China of the Kirghiz. 31 W u-tsung's successor Hsiian-tsung E (r. 846-59) initially planned to carry out the appointment, but then heeded the advice of his officials, who argued against this course of action by claiming that the Kirghiz were a "secluded, distant, and small" people, and did not send the envoy. 32 Later, however, in 847, Hsiian-tsung reversed his decision once again and did send an official to grant a title to the Kirghiz qaghan. 33 What prompted the emperor's change of heart, described as "sudden" (ts'u _), 34 is unknown, but it may have been the result of an attack on T'ang territory in the region of Ho-hsi ffi by a combined Uighur-Tangut force, apparently instigated by the Tibetans, the month before the appointment was made. 35 From 847 to 874, only three more Kirghiz envoys are known to have come to China; subsequent records were lost. 36 No single source names all three envoys; two are mentioned in Tzu-chih t'ung-chien: an Alp InanE (Ho I-nan-chih f6t ), who came to China in 863, and a General Icreki (?) (I-chih-lien-chi Z iqS), who came in 867. 37 As for the third envoy, he is mentioned only in an edict from the brush of emperor Hsiian-tsung himself, dated to the spring of 856. This edict, which addressed the question of granting an appointment to the ruler of the Uighurs in An-hsi, mentions "the Kirghiz Li Chien I" who came to the T'ang court. Nothing more is known of his mission, save that he was accompanied by some Uighurs. The emperor's edict is of further interest, however, in that it refers to the Uighurs' former land as "empty"-but with walls and towns remaining-and speaks of their desire to recover it. In fact, the edict mentions that many groups of Uighurs had indicated their wish to retake their homeland; in this discussion, there is no mention of a Kirghiz occupation. 38 These last three known Kirghiz envoys seem to have been interested in trade with China and a regular annual exchange of envoys, as well as an alliance. At least one of them (Alp Inanc) once again brought up the idea of taking An-hsi and other unspecified territories (presumably Pei-t'ing) from the Uighurs, which strongly suggests that the Kirghiz still had not done so. The T'ang government refused this request. 39 In addition to mentioning these envoys, Chinese records state that in 848 a Kirghiz force, said to number 70,000, attacked the Shih-wei 1t people of eastern Mongolia-who were at that time harboring some Uighur refugees-and, after defeating them, took the Uighurs they had captured back "north of the desert" with them.40 Some of these may have been the Uighurs who later accompanied Li Chien. Hsin T'ang shu, the source that mentions that there were three Kirghiz envoys between 847 and 874, adds that the Kirghiz "unexpectedly could not seize the Uighurs."41 Since the sources make clear that the Kirghiz did engage in successful raids to capture groups of Uighur refugees, this statement most probably refers
30 On the datingo f this letter,s ee Drompp, The Writingso f Li Te-yii,3 50, n. 111. 31 Tzu-chih tung-chien, 248.8015, 8023, 8026. 32 Tzu-chih tung-chien, 248.8026. 33 Tzu-chih tung-chien, 248.8030; Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6150. 34 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6150. 35 Tzu-chih tung-chien, 248.8030. 36 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6150-51. 37 Tzu-chith ung-chien2,5 0.8107a nd8 117.T heK irghiz( presumablyT urkicf)o rmo f I-chih-lien-chihha sn otb eenf irmlye stablished. T he Tang pronunciationsu ggests somethingl ike Turkici creki, belongingt o the royal court,p erhaps court chamberlain (Clauson, An Etymological Dictionary of Pre- Thirteenth-Century Turkish, 31); this is a known element in Turkict itles, but the thirds yllable,w ith its final- n, is particularlyp roblematicS.e e T6odA kiyasu) Wt[Mf, GakkenK an-Wa daijiten -iffftoT-% [ - (Tokyo:G akushuK enkyusha1, 978), 28 (i), 562 (chih), 1320 (lien), and 416 (chi). 38 Tung Kao V et al., comps., (Chin ting) Chiian Tang wen (J1T)?JSi1 (Taipei:T a-tungs hu-chti,1 979), 80.1045- 46; and Sung Min-chiu Wt, comp., Tang ta chao-ling chi Ft^-S g (Taipei: Ting-wen shu-chii, 1978), 128.692-93. Chiian Tang wen gives no date for the edict, while Tang ta chao-ling chi dates it to the second month of the tenth year of the Ta-chung;j tP reignp eriod,t hati s, 10 March-8A pril8 56. Tzu-chih tung-chien, 249.8059, however, dates the edict to 16 April 856. The envoys name, Li Chien, which is Chinese rather thanT urkicp, ointst o the connectionb etweent he Kirghiz,L i Ling, and the Tang ruling house of Li. 39 Tzu-chih tung-chien, 250.2172. 40 Tzu-chih tung-chien, 248.8032. 41 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6150.

either to the large group of Uighurs who f led southeastward and were in the process of establishing a power base in Kansu and the northern Tarim Basin, or to the Uighur homeland in Mongolia itself. In a rather odd postscript to this relatively meager information regarding Sino-Kirghiz relations, Chinese sources indicate that both Kirghiz and Tibetan troops were allied with the Lu-lung 1tg governor Li K'uangwei >1EX and the T'u-yti-hun tf:i~ leader Ho-lien T'o G0i (who was based in the region of Ta-t'ung ) [J]) in 890 when the latter two drove into the Sha-t'o i' st Turk leader Li K'o-yung's ZAf l< territory of Hotung qt* and attacked the Che-lu )Jt, army in northwestern Ho-tung. Li K'o-yung was able to defeat Li K'uang-wei and Ho-lien T'o within a short tifie; the sources do not indicate if Kirghiz and/or Tibetan troops were present at this defeat.42 Our sources do not allow us to know if the Kirghiz and Tibetan troops involved in this event were acting on behalf of a particular ruler or were independent mercenaries. It should be remembered that by this time T'ang China was in a state of severe decline. In 875 began the great Huang Ch'ao A: rebellion that spelled the beginning of the end for the dynasty. During the last thirty years of T'ang rule, internal affairs were so pressing that the court's range of vision naturally contracted, and there was less interest in-and knowledge of-foreign peoples. The same is generally true of the turbulent Five Dynasties period (907-60). Although Inner Asia was not completely ignored in records of the Five Dynasties, there is almost no mention of the Kirghiz.43 All this evidence suggests that the Kirghiz did not expand into the Orkhon region in the mid-ninth century beyond a few raids or sorties. Their great distance from the Chinese border resulted in haphazard and frustrating contacts with the T'ang government. During the 840s the Kirghiz were able to campaign throughout parts of eastern Inner Asia, as their attack on the Shih-wei reveals, but there is no evidence to suggest that such forays continued past 848. We have already seen that their supposed attack on An-hsi and Pei-t'ing most likely is another chimera, and Kirghiz involvement in the 890 raid on Hotung tells us nothing about their power on the Mongolian plateau.44 Thus, while the Kirghiz may have exercised some brief control over the Mongolian plateau immediately following the Uighur collapse of 840, this must have been ephemeral, and no real evidence for it has been found. A Chinese source does state that after the Kirghiz attack on the Uighurs and the sacking of the Uighur capital, the Kirghiz ruler moved his standard south of the Lao Mountains, which were also known as Tu-man.45 This was a fifteen-day ride by horse from the Uighur capital.46 (The Kirghiz ruler's camp in the Yenisei region was said to be a forty-day ride by camel from the Uighur capital.47 )T he identity of the Lao Mountains, or Tu-man, is open to some debate. Basing his argument on Chinese information, Chavannes suggested that they were either the Tannu-ola Range or the Sayan Range. 48 Barthold believed them to be probably (BepoaTHo) in the Tannu-ola Range;49 this idea was expanded upon by L. R. Kyzla sov, who believed that after 840 the Kirghiz established their general headquarters (cTaBKa) south of the Tannu-ola Mountains,p robably( BepoaTHoi)n the Tes-Khem Valley near the lake called Ubsu-Nur. 50
42 Hsin Tangs hu, 218.6161; Tzu-chiht ung-chien,2 58.8404-5. See also The Cambridge History of China, vol. 5: Sui and Tang China5, 89-906, partI , 775-76, whichd oesn otm entionth ep articipationo f theK irghizo rT ibetansF. orm orei nformatioonn the location of the Che-lu Army, see Tzu-chih tung-chien, 253.8206 and Yen Keng-wang iIt , Tang-tai chiao-tung tu-kao Jft []Bti, vol. 5 (Taipei: Chung-yangy an-chiu-yiian li-shih yuwen yen-chiu-suo, 1986), 1407. On the career of Ho-lien To and his animosity toward Li Ko-yung, see Gabriella Mole, The Tuyii- hunfrom the Northern Wei to the Time of the Five Dynasties, Serie Orientale Roma, vol. 41 (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1970), xxii-xxiii, 195-206. 43 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6150-51 mentions the three subsequent Kirghiz envoys from 847 up through the Hsien-tung i m reign period (17 December 860-16 December 874), and suggests that there were some later envoys inquiring about official appointments, the records for which have been lost. Tzu-chih tung-chien mentions Kirghiz envoys to China in 863 and 867; see Tzu-chih tung-chien, 250.8107, 8117. 44 Indeed, these Kirghiz may have been mercenaries; there is no evidence that they were acting on behalf of any Kirghiz ruler. 45 See n. 16 above. 46 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6150. 47 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6148. 48 ltdouard Chavannes, Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux, recueillis et commentes, suivi de notes additionelles (1903; rpt. Paris: Librairie dAm6rique et dOrient Adrien- Maisonneuve, n.d.), 98, n. 2. According to Hsin Tang shu, 43B.1149, the Lao Mountains (and the Chien = Turkic Kern = Yenisei River) were to be found in the territory of the Kirghiz. On the identification of the Chien/Kem with the Yenisei, see Louis Hambis, Notes sur Kam, nom de lY6nissei sup6rieur, Journal asiatique 244 (1956): 281-300. 49 Bartold, Kirgyzy, 489. 50 L. R. Kyzlasov, Istoriia Tuvy v srednie veka, 94. Kyzlasov gives no evidence or source to support his location of the Kirghiz

This informationw as repeated by Peter Golden, who presented it without qualification and referred to the establishment of a Kirghiz "capital" rather than a general headquarters. 51 I t does seem that the Kirghiz enjoyed some control over what is today part of northwestern Mongolia: the region around UbsuNur, just south of the upper Yenisei River and the Tannu-ola Mountains. This would not have been much of an extension of power; indeed, we cannot be certain that this territory was not already under Kirghiz control prior to 840. Neither the duration nor the extent of this control can be determined. 52 It is possible that the movement of the Kirghiz ruler's headquarters was of a temporary nature, only intended for the length of the campaign against the Uighurs. Although Kirghiz letters to the T'ang court indicated their wish to take over the Uighurs' former lands, there is no evidence that they successfully did so. It must also be remembered that at least some of the displaced Uighurs also communicated to the T'ang court their intention to regain their former state in Mongolia-something they never appear to have actually attempted. Hsiian-tsung's edict of 856, men tioned above, indicated that both the Uighurs who had followed the Kirghiz envoy Li Chien and other Uighurs, who had recently submitted to T'ang officials at the northern border, had expressed their desire to recover their native land, and had also stated that the Uighurs in An-hsi fervently wished for this as well. 53 The T'ang court had consistently exhorted the Kirghiz to attack the Uighurs to eliminate those who remained, 54 but the Kirghiz raids did not succeed in destroying the strongest group of Uighurs at the northern frontier of China. That group, led by Oge (Wu-chieh ,,% i) Qaghan, was ultimately defeated by the Chinese themselves. 55 Given the problemso f diplomatic exchange between the Kirghiz and China, it may be that the former considered it either too difficult or insufficiently consequential to send an army all the way to the T'ang border in order to exterminate the remnants of their enemies. And what do the Chinese sources-the only pertinent ones available for this particular topic-tell us concerning the Khitan (Liao) expansion into Mongolia? In the Liao shih account of A-pao-chi's march to the Orkhon, there is no mention whatsoever of the Kirghiz. Instead, the passage mentions the Khitans attacking a tribe known in Chinese as Tsu-pu [lR , who have been identified with the Tatars (Ta-ta _,lt). 56 The passage further states that A-pao-chi defeated "all the foreign tribes in the Hu-mu-ssu S[f, Mountains."57 These also could not be construed as identical with the Kirghiz. Although the account in Liao shih consistently mentions Khitan campaigns against even minor tribes, it contains no mention at all of a campaign against the Kirghiz. In fact, Liao shih mentions the Kirghiz only twelve times, in con nection with six events or lists: a "tribute mission" to the Liao court in October/ November 952;58 another "tribute mission" in December 976/January 977;59 a mention that the general(s) of the southwest border caused people of the Kirghiz nation "who admired culture" to come [presumably to the Liao court] in 931;60 as a place of exile for A-pao-chi's seditious nephew Yeh-lii P'en-tu tg, who was sent to the
general headquarters after 840. Lake Ubsu-Nur is found in northwestern Mongolia, near the border with Tuva and the town of Ulangom. 51 Peter B. Golden, The Migrations of the Oguz Archivum Ottomanicum 4 (1972): 60. In discussing the Kirghiz attack on the Uighurs, Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6149 states that the Kirghiz ruler personally acted as commander of his troops. After sacking and looting the Uighur capital (and obtaining the Tai-ho Princess, whom he attempted to have escorted back to China), he then moved his camp to the south of the Lao Mountains. It seems that this was not a permanent move, but one involved with the Kirghiz campaign into Mongolia. The Kirghiz sent many raids into Mongolia for several more years as mop-up campaigns against the remnants of the Uighurs; this camp in the Tannu-ola or Sayan region might have served as a base headquarters for those raids. The Chinese word for campo r standard,y a If, was also used to refer to the Uighur capital, but in this case it seems better here to translatei t as camp, general headquarters,e tc. 52 It is interesting to note that just to the south of Ubsu-Nur is Hyargas-Nur, or Kirghiz Lake. 53 Chian Tang wen, 80.1046; Tang ta chao-ling chi, 128.693. 54 See, in particular, Li Te-yiis letters to the Kirghiz ruler in Hui-chang i pin chi, 6.37-38, (addendum) 285-86, 6.38-40, and 6.4042. All of these have been translated in Drompp, The Writings of Li Te-yi, 276-82, 289-92, 303-9, and 320-24. 55 The story of the Chinese defeat of the Uighur refugees is told in detaili n Drompp, TheW ritingso f Li-Te-yii. 56 Wittfogel and Feng, History of Chinese Society, 101-2. 57 To-to 1a et al., Liao shih .T[ (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chii, 1974), 2.20. 58 Liao shih, 6.70; 70.1135. 59 Liao shih, 8.96; 70.1137. 60 Liao shih, 3.32; 70.1129-30.

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Kirghiz as an "envoy" in 948;61 in the list of "Armies of Dependent States";62 and in the list of "Officials of Dependent States."63 As for the two "tribute missions," this is a standard term used for the arrival of all foreign envoys at the Liao court, and cannot be considered as evidence that the Kirghiz were politically subordinate to the Khitans. As for the lists of "dependencies," these too offer no proof, since such nations as Persia (Po-ssu /Th) and the CAbbasidC aliphate (Ta-shih ;kf ) were also included in them. The most striking information comes from the exile of A-paochi's nephew to the Kirghiz; this would indicate that the Kirghiz realm was indeed far from that of the Khitans. If there was no Khitan-Kirghiz war, and the Kirghiz nation appears by 924 by have been focused once again in the upper Yenisei region, then what of the idea of a "Kirghiz empire" that was established on the ruins of the Uighur steppe empire? This is also a fiction, based on no solid data. It would seem, then, that instead of being the site of a "Kirghiz empire," Mongolia from 840 until 924-and indeed until the rise of Cinggis Qan in the twelfth century- was politically fractured among many contending tribes. While existing records do not allow for a clear picture, all available evidence suggests that the Kirghiz never established themselves as a power on the Mongolian steppe, and that the great "Khitan-Kirghiz war" of 924 is nothing more than a figment of scholars' imaginations. In fact, Kirghiz control over the Mongolian plateau seems to have been both weak and exceedingly brief, lasting at most only a few years. The Kirghiz do not appear to have been anywhere near the Orkhon valley when the Khitans entered the region in 924. Although some scholars have avoided the fantasy of the Kirghiz empire and suggested that the Kirghiz did not establish a state centered on the Orkhon valley, 64 none has adequately explained what did happen after 840, and why the Kirghiz remained in the Yenisei basin and did not move southeastward into the Orkhon region. The question remains: if the Kirghiz did not establish themselves in the Orkhon valley, why did they not? One theory holds that the "sacred" Orkhon region held little appeal for the Kirghiz because they were not originally a Turkic people. Much has been made of Chinese statements concerning the physical appearance of the Yenisei Kirghiz: Their people are all large with red hair, white faces, and green eyes. They consider black hair to be unlucky. As for those with dark eyes, they say these must be the descendants of [Li] Ling.65 On the basis of this statement and also the survival in Chinese texts of at least one apparently non-Turkic word (and possibly others) used by the Kirghiz, it has been thought that the Kirghiz were originally a non-Turkic people who were later Turkicized. Based on references to the Kirghiz as tall and fair-skinned, with light-colored hair and eyes, and on the remnants of a few words in Chinese texts, as reconstructed in T'ang-period pronunciation, some scholars have argued that the Kirghiz may be Samoyedic or Paleo-Siberian in origin. 66 Given the prevalence of linguistic borrowing in Inner Asia, this evidence does not seem sufficiently persuasive to claim that the Kirghiz were originally a non-Turkic people, and it may neAer be possible to solve the question of the "original" Kirghiz ethnic61 Liao shih, 5.64; 61.937; 77.1257; 113.1508. 62 Liao shih, 36.431. 63 Liao shih, 46.758. 64 See, for example, Tsen Chung-mien, Sui Tang shih P (rpt. Hong Kong: Perlen Book Co., n.d.), 2: 394, as well as Peter B. Golden, An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992), 180-83. Despite his remarks here, the chimera of a Khitan-Kirghiz war crept into at least one of Goldens later works, Cumanica IV: The Tribes of the Cuman-Qlpcaqs Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi 9 (1995-97): 113. 65 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6147. For a similar statement, see Wang Pu :T_ et al., Tang hui yao ift5 (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chii, 1974), 100.1785, which attributes the idea of darkhaired and dark-eyed Kirghiz as descendants of Li Ling to one Ko Chia-yiin AV-j, who served as protector-general (normally tu-hu Ii-, but here written tu-hu JiAi) of An-hsi and wrote a work, no longer extant, entitled Record of the Western Regions (Hsi yii chi ?jgE). Note that Ko Chia-yiin served in a number of important posts in the western regions of the Tang Empire from 734 to 741; see Wu Ting-hsieh Ti: , Tang fang-chen nien-piao JtI7J, * (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chii, 1980), 3: 1203, 1221, 1232-33. 66 See, for example, W. Schott, Uber die achten Kirgisen, Abhandlungen der koniglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.hist. K1. (1864), 441-47 (but note that many of Schotts ideas have since been proven to be incorrect); Louis Ligeti, Mots de civilisation de Haute Asie en transcription chinoise, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 1 (1950- 51): 150-68; Kyzlasov, Istoriia Tuvy v srednie veka, 88-90; and Golden, An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples, 176-78.

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ity or language. It is quite clear, however, that by the mid-ninth century, the Kirghiz were indeed a Turkic people. Chinese sources reveal that they employed Turkic words such as bas ("beginning"), ay ("moon, month"), and qam ("shaman") as well as some of the Turkic (and pre-Turkic) titulature that was used by the Turks and Uighurs.67 Furthermore, inscriptions that are apparently Kirghiz have been found in the Yenisei basin that employ the Old Turkic runiform script and use a completely Turkic vocabulary. Chinese sources indicate that the Kirghiz language during the T'ang period was identical to that of the Uighurs 68 whose language was virtually identical to that of the Turks. It seems ultimately impossible to determine if the Kirghiz were a non-Turkic people who were Turkicized, or were indeed "originally" a Turkic people. It must not be forgotten that Indo-European peoples were present in Inner Asia, including Siberia, in early times, but gradually disappeared, presumably absorbed by other elements of the population. Still, because some scholars consider the Kirghiz to have been of non-Turkic origin, it has been suggested by Golden that: The Qirgiz, as might be expected in view of their varied ethnic background, were little concerned with Turkic traditions, the symbolism of the Otiukn yls, its place in Old Turkic imperial thinking.69 In another article, the same author expanded on this idea. [The Qirgiz] were a Turkicized people of an as yet undetermined palaeo-Siberian origin (perhaps Samoyedic)who, undoubtedly as a result of their non-Turkic origins (the process of Turkicization may not even have been completed by this time) and being less attuned to the Turk tradition, broke with many Turk customs. They did not attempt, in the classical manner, to assert their hegemony over the larger Turkic world. They did not, as had been customary, establish their capital in holy, Turk ground around the Orxon and Selenga rivers. Indeed, their hold on Mongolia appears to have been confined to the northwest. Thus, when Apaoki, the ruler of the Mongol-speaking Qitan', campaigned in Mongolia in 924 ands eizedt he old Turkg roundso n the Orxon-Selenga, he had no opposition.70 While one can agree with Golden's assertion that the Kirghiz did not establish an empire based on the Orkhon region, it is difficult to ascribe this to "non-Turkic origins." We have seen that the Kirghiz employed traditional Inner Asian titles, suggesting a connection with a very ancient Inner Asian (and, originally, not necessarily Turkic-although many of these titles contain elements that are undeniably Turkic) tradition, of which the centrality of the Orkhon region may well have been a part. As shown in the letters of Li Te-yii, the Kirghiz did indeed wish to continue several Turkic-Uighur imperial traditions. Not only did they request imperial appointment from the T'ang emperor, as had earlier Turk and Uighur rulers as well as others, but they specifically wished the name Tengri (Teng-li -1]j, etc.)-the Inner Asian term for the sky or heavens, as well as for the supreme god associated with the sky, and a term which had been associated with earlier Turk qaghans and nearly every Uighur qaghan71--to be employed in the
67 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6147, 6148. 68 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6148 states that the language and script of the Kirghiz were exactly the same (cheng tung IE[M) as that of the Uighurs. See also Michael R. Drompp, A Note on Interpreters of Turkic Languages in Late Tang China, in Altaic Religious Beliefs and Practices: Proceedings of the 33rd Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference, Budapest, June 24-29, 1990, ed. Gdza Bethlenfalvy et al. (Budapest: Research Group for Altaic Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and Department of Inner Asiatic Studies, Eotvos Lordnd University, 1992), 103-9. 69 Golden, The Migrations of the Oguz, 60. Golden states that the Kirghiz did not, as had been customary, establish their capital in Mongolia on the Orxon or Selenga but rather on the south side of the Tannu-ola range in the Tes-Xem valley near lake Ubsu-Nur. His reference to the Tannu-ola comes from Barthold, although Golden does not indicate that this identification of Lao Mountains/Tu-man with Tannu-ola might be questioned. 70 PeterB . Golden, ImperiaIl deologya nd the Sourceso f Political Unity amongst the Pre-(inggisid Nomads of Western Eurasia, Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi 2 (1982): 54. Again, notet he apparencto ntradictiobne tweent he finals entenceh ere and the statemenfto undi n the same authors CumanicaIV , 113, thatt he Khitansd rovet he Kirghizo ut of Mongoliai n the tenth century. 71 In the runiformO rkhonin scriptionst,h e Turkr ulerB ilge Qaghanr eferredto himselfa s Heaven-likaen dH eaven-created (Tengriteg Tengride bolmis Turk Bilge Qaghan); see Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkish, 231, 275. In addition, the penultimate ruler of the Turks was called Tengri Qaghan; see Chiu Tangs hu, 194A.5177-78.O nU ighurt itlesf romt he steppee mpire period, see Colin Mackerras, The Uighur Empire According to the Tang Dynastic Histories: A Study in Sino-Uighur Relations(ColumbiaU: niv.o f SouthC arolinaP ress,1 972),1 92-93.

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appointed title. This request was refused by the T'ang court. The Chinese letter insisted that Tengri, as a component of Uighur titles, was not suitable for the title of the Kirghiz qaghan.72 The reality was that the T'ang court was not eager to increase Kirghiz prestige; the Chinese must have understood the power of the name Tengri among Inner Asian peoples. Golden himself asserts that the Uighurs "undoubtedly to strengthen their authority after their takeover of the Turk lands, especially emphasized the use of the word Tengri in their titulature." 73 Just as the term Tengri was important to the Uighurs in their titulature, particularly in an ideological sense, so was it important to the Kirghiz. In addition, we have seen that the Kirghiz did in fact express an intention to move into Mongolia, as well as to take over parts of eastern Turkestan which had at times been under the control of the Turks and Uighurs. Again: why did they not? Part of the solution may be found in the ecology of the Kirghiz Yenisei homeland, in a combination of interrelated geographic and economic factors.74 The upper Yenisei basin is a transition zone that combines a forestmeadow mountain ecosystem with some steppe and wooded steppe zones; it is the southern edge of the Siberian taiga. Such an area of mixed vegetation zones would naturally give rise to a mixed economy, rather than to the more specialized economy of the pastoral peoples of the Mongolian steppe. Clear and significant differences in elevation and climate between the upper Yenisei and Orkhon regions should also be noted; the former, although further north, is at a notably lower elevation.75 As a result of its geographical situation, the upper Yenisei basin is quite suitable for cereal-crop agriculture, which archaeological evidence shows to have been practiced there since ancient times. Complex irrigation systems date from at least the first millennium B.C.76 It is well known that agriculture was important to the economy of the Yenisei Kirghiz. They raised millet, barley, wheat, Himalayan barley, and possibly rye. According to Hsin T'ang shu, they sowed in the third month, approximately April, and harvested in the ninth month, approximately October.77 Today,t he upper Yenisei is still known for the growing of grains, including wheat, oats, barley, and rye.78 Archaeological excavations in the upper Yenisei region have unearthed both locally made iron ploughshares and larger imported iron ploughshares from China. These were from wooden ploughs with iron ploughshares requiring draught animals to pull them. Irrigation was extensive, and remained so until the Mongol period.79 Grains were harvested with iron sickles and ground with paired rotating millstones. 80 Available evidence, both archaeological and textual, paints the Kirghiz as being far more involved with agriculture than their Turkic cousins in Mongolia. Although the ninth-century traveller Tamim ibn Bahr mentioned agriculture among the steppe Uighurs, his information is insufficient to determine its extent.81 It is not my intention to suggest that the Turks and Uighurs practiced no agriculture whatsoever,
72 Li Te-yii, Hui-chang i pin chi, 6.39; for a translation, see Drompp, TheW ritingso f Li Te-yii,3 05-6. 73 Golden, ImperiaIld eology,4 5. 74 AnatolyK hazanovh as written: Conditionallya,l l forms of pastoralismm ay be regardeda s differentm ethodso f economica daptationt,h e parameterosf which are determinedi,n the finala nalysis,b y ecology andl evel of technologicadl evelopment; see Nomads and the Outside World, 69. 75 See, for example, The Times Atlas of the World, 8th ed. (New York: Times Books, 1990), plates 3, 6, and 42. 76 Sevyan Vainshtein, Nomads of South Siberia: The Pastoral Economieos f Tuvae, d. CarolineH umphreytr, .M ichaeCl olenso, CambridgSet udiesi n SocialA nthropologyv,o l. 25 (Cambridge: CambridgUe niv.P ress, 1980), 145. 77 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6147. It should be noted that this informationre gardingK irghiza griculturea,l ongw ithm ucho ther information on the Kirghiz that is to be found in Hsin Tang shu and other sources (but is not in Chiu Tang shu, which has no separatae ccounto f the Kirghizp) robablyd erivesf roma ccounts that were written down after Tang officials interviewed the Kirghiz envoy Chu-wu Alp Sol (Chu-wu Ho Su `1,t), who arrived at the Chinese court on 16 March 843. (On Chu-wu Alp Sol and his mission, see Drompp, The Writings of Li Te-yii, 282-94.) Although these accounts have not survived, docu ments from Li Te-yiis brush indicate that the Kirghiz envoys were questioneda boutt heirl and, geographye, tc.; this seems the most likely source for the information recorded in Hsin Tang shu. See Li Te-yii, Hui-chang i pin chi, 2.11-12 and Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6150. 78 See J. C. Dewdney, USSR in Maps (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), 41 and 99; see also Oxford Regional Economic Atlas: The U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956), 34-35 and 38-39. 79 Kyzlasov, Istoriia Tuvy v srednie veka, 116. See also Alexander Mongait (tr. Yevgeny Ganushkin), Archaeology in the U.S.S.R. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), 306-7, as well as A. P. Okladnikov, Ancient Population of Siberia and Its Cultures, Russian Translation Series of the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, vol. 1, no. 1 (New York: AMS Press, 1959), 57. 80 Okladnikov, Ancient Population of Siberia, 57; Kyzlasov, Istoriia Tuvy v srednie veka, 116. 81 See V. Minorsky, Tamim ibn Bahrs Journey to the Uyghurs Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 12 (1948): 283 and 296. Minorsky believed that Tamims journey should be dated to 821.

13

for they assuredly did, but rather to suggest that the type and scope of Kirghiz agriculture was better suited to the upper Yenisei region than to the Orkhon valley, and this made it difficult for the Kirghiz to move. The upper Yenisei area is also suitable for the rearing of livestock, which has ancient roots there as well. In order better to exploit the steppe areas of the upper Yenisei, the peoples there apparently practiced not only semi-settled, open-pasture animal husbandry, but also semi-nomadic grassland pastoralism. Among their domestic animals, the most important were cattle, of which a rich farmer could own several thousand head. The Yenisei Kirghiz also raised camels, sheep, and horses. Their horses, described in Chinese records as "quite large," 82 were apparentlyn ot the typical Mongolian ponies so well suited to the steppe, but larger horses, presumably of more westerly origin. The raising of cereal grains by the Kirghiz allowed for the storage of grains and hay for fodder, so that winter foraging under the snow would have been unnecessary for these horses. 83 Hunting and fishing also were important to the Kirghiz economy in the eighth and ninth centuries. The forests and riverso f south Siberiaw ere rich in fur-bearinga nimals and fish. Furs, woolens, and other fabrics were important in Kirghiz trade with eastern Turkestan, the Arabs, and possibly Tibet. Pelts were also used for internal taxation within the Kirghiz realm. 84 Chinese sources also mention the excellence of Kirghiz metallurgy at this time. 85 Along the river valleys of the Yenisei basin, remains of ancient blast furnaces have been found, along with slag piles and supplies of coal. 86 Iron forging apparently was the predominant form of metallurgy, although the sources also mention gold and tin. Today, the region in and around Minusinsk and Abakan has significant coal deposits, and iron and gold deposits are quite nearby. 87 Hsin Tang shu states that in the winter the Kirghiz dwelt in houses with bark roofs. 88 T'ang hui yao indicates that the Kirghiz lived in groups along the rivers of their land and adds, "they make houses from wood, and cover them with bark." 89 Log houses are known to have been used in the upper Yenisei region since very early times, as shown by ancient petroglyphs. Tents, however, are also depicted.90 Chinese sources speak of the Kirghiz ruler's tent, which was surrounded by a wooden palisade "instead of walls." Other Kirghiz leaders are mentioned as living in tents smaller than that of the qaghan.91 The picture that emerges from this evidence is one of a semi-sedentary society with well-developed pastoral elements, a society which carried on such settled activities as grain agriculture and advanced metalworking with blast furnaces, as well as animal husbandry that involved some movement of herds. It would seem that at least a portion of the Kirghiz population left the settled (permanent) winter dwellings in the summer to pasture their animals. What remains unknown is just how such tasks were divided among the population, nor do we know the extent of Kirghiz transhumance and/or sedentarization. But by the eighth and ninth centuries A.D., there was clearly a highly mixed economy within the Kirghiz state.92 This mixed economy that was well suited to the mixed forest-meadow-steppe environment of the upper Yenisei would not have been easily transplanted to the Mongolian steppe, and perhaps would not have f lourished so effectively there. The Kirghiz may have experimented with some sort of political presence in that region, but these experiments would have proved difficult, given the different ecology of the Mongolian plateau and the problems of such a significant relocation/expansion. Since they were
82 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6147. 83 Kyzlasov, Istoriia Tuvy v srednie veka, 118. 84 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6147-48. 85 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6147. 86 Potapov, TheK hakasy,34 6. 87 See Oxford Regional Economic Atlas: The U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, 54-55, 62-63, and 70-71; see also George Kish, Eco nomic Atlas of the Soviet Union, 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1971), 54 and 59, as well as Dewdney, USSR in Maps, 49, 51, and 99. 88 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6148. 89 Tang hui yao, 100.1784. 90 Okladnikov, AncienPt opulationo f Siberia,3 4. 91 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6148. 92 Vainshtein, quoting the work of S. S. Sorokin, states that agriculture was a common feature of all forms of pastoralism which are tied to alluvial valleys of large rivers and to mountain regions. See Nomads of South Siberia, 164. On the question of semi-nomadism and semi-sedentarism, see Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, 19-22.

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under no pressure from other peoples to leave their Yenisei habitat, and since they received no support or encouragement from the Chinese, the Kirghiz apparently chose to retain their established lifestyle in the Yenisei valley and not to make the dramatic change required by a move to the Mongolian plateau. The general difficulty of timing in regard to migrations should also be mentioned; changing pastures was in fact a very risky business for pastoral peoples, and could result in significant loss of livestock.93 It is also possible that the large Kirghiz horse, vital to their military campaigns, was unsuited for life on the Mongolian steppe, particularly in winter when it would have been less able than the typical Mongolian pony to forage for grass under the snow, and so would have required fodder. Thus, while the Kirghiz could make military forays into the Mongolian steppe, it is quite possible that they could not easily establish a permanent military or political presence there. Another important factor is trade. Chinese sources inform us that the Kirghiz engaged in trade with other peoples, including the regions of An-hsi and Pei-t'ing (Besbaliq) and the CAbbasid Caliphate.94 They also maintained contact with T'ang China-which must have included trade in connection with the Kirghiz "tribute" missions-from 648 (near the end of the reign of T'ang T'ai-tsung ?t) 95 until 758, at which time they suffered a serious defeat by the then rising power of the Uighurs and so were unable to continue these contacts.96 But despite their inability to continue trade with China, the Kirghiz man aged to maintain lively trade contacts with the CAbbasid Caliphate, the Qarluqs (Ko-lo-lu ISjgi), and Tibet.97 The importance of this southwesterly commercial and political axis can be seen by the fact that the Kirghiz ruler who began hostilities with the Uighurs around 820 was married to the daughter of the Qarluq ruler (yabghu), and his mother was a Tirgesh (T'u-chishih -,,l ) woman.98 The Qarluqs and Tirgesh were both western Turkic peoples who lived in the region of Lake Balkhash, north of the T'ian-shan and southwest of the Kirghiz. It may well be that the Kirghiz did not wish to move into the Orkhon region for fear of being too far removed from their established trade network. Renewed trade with China would certainly have been attractive, and the sources indicate that the Kirghiz wished to trade horses with China, much as the Uighurs before them had doneto the latter's great profit. But it is also clear from our sources that, in the period immediately following the Kirghiz victory, communications between the two were poor; after Wu-tsung's death, it would have been quite apparent to the Kirghiz that the Chinese had no burning desire to reestablish contact. Further Kirghiz embassies to China met with little success. As the T'ang dynasty was becoming increasingly weak, the Chinese were delighted with the collapse of Uighur power, and no doubt pleased that the onerous horse-silk trade which the Uighurs had promoted was finally at an end (although the effect of its cessation on Chinese horse supplies is not known, and may have presented a problem of supply for the T'ang court). No one in Ch'ang-an was eager to set up the Kirghiz in their place.99 As for the Kirghiz, their well-established commercial and political ties to the southwest (which linked them to trade with the Tarim Basin, Tibet, and the Middle East) may have been too important and successful to risk in an uncertain-and apparently unwelcome-venture with a weakening China. Yet another factor in the Kirghiz adherence to their traditional Yenisei homeland may have been problems among the Kirghiz leadership. According to Chinese sources, the Kirghiz ruler who brought down the Uighur steppe empire was himself murdered by one of his officials at some point during the Hui-ch'ang H reign period (i.e., 4 February 841-6 February 847), but his death was not reported to the
93 Anatoly Khazanov, Ecological Limitations of Nomadism in the Eurasian Steppes and Their Social and Cultural Implications, Asian and African Studies 24.1 (1990): 2. 94 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6147-48. 95 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6149; Chiu Tang shu, 3.60-61. 96 Chiu Tang shu, 195.5201. For a translation, see Mackerras, The Uighur Empire According to the Tang Dynastic Histories, 66. 97 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6149. This source indicates that the route to and from Tibet went through Qarluq territory, and that the Kirghiz served as escorts at some stages of this route, so as to prevent the Uighurs from robbing the travellers. It also states that the CAbbasidsw ould trade cloth to the Kirghiz once every three years. Most likely this trade involved other products as well. For a further discussion of this trade route, see Christopher I. Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle for Great Power among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese during the Early Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1987), 147 and 147-48, n. 21. 98 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6149. 99 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6150.

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Chinese court at that time.100 It may have been that the Kirghiz leadership, already discouraged by the slowness of their communication with the T'ang court, did not want to reveal the ruler's death for fear that it would cause further delays. Furthermore, we cannot ignore the general problems of political cohesion typical of Inner Asian states. It may be that local Kirghiz leaders (chieftains) were willing to come together in order to throw off Uighur rule-and its concomitant taxes-and to plunder the Uighur realm. Once that had been accomplished, and the booty distributed, these leaders may well have realized that a continued effort to exercise control over the Mongolian plateau would yield diminishing returns, and so would have been less willing to contribute to the efforts necessary for such control. In conclusion, the historical gap for the Mongolian Plateau from about 840 to about 924 remains troublesome, but at least there is some evidence to indicate what did not happen. It seems that the Kirghiz presence there was neither long nor significant, save for its destructive power. It can be safely asserted that no Kirghiz empire was established in the Orkhon valley or near it. We hear little of the Kirghiz after the brief f lurry of contacts with China in the early 840s, save for a few diplomatic missions and other isolated references. There was no great battle for the Orkhon between Kirghiz and Khitans. As for the Uighurs, many of them had f led, although it is likely that at least some remained in the Orkhon region, but they too were unable to play an important role. It would seem plausible that the creation of a political vacuum in the Orkhon region allowed other peoples to move into the area-or, if they were already there as former subordinates of the Uighurs, to enjoy an increased level of freedom and, possibly, local power. One such people were the Tatars (Tsu-pu), who were encountered by the Khitan ruler A-pao-chi when he campaigned into Mongolia in 924 and defeated them. The Orkhon region then became-for a time-a remote outpost of the Khitan Liao empire.

100 Hsin Tang shu, 217B.6150. The text suggests that the murdero f the Kirghizr ulero ccurredb eforet he Kirghize nvoy Chu-wuA lp Sol, who arriveda t Chang-ano n 16 March8 43, was sent on his mission. Kyzlasov suggests a date of 847 for the Kirghizr ulersd eath,b 1695. utg ives no evidencet o supportth is; see Istoriia Tuvy v srednie veka,

DENIS SINOR, INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 101, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1981), pp. 133
General remarks on the tactics of Inner Asian mounted "nomads" abound even in popular literature but-their great importance for world history notwithstanding-there exists no comprehensives tudy of the traditional (re-gunpowdera) rmies of Inner Asia. Interesth ere will be focused on their key-factor: the warrior himself. Examined in succession will be: his reputation,t raining,d iscipline,h orsemanshipt,h e equipmento f his mount (stirrup, horseshoe), personal weapons (bow and arrow, sword, spear, lasso) and the means used to ensure a supply of arms. It is an undeniable fact that violence has a strange fascination for most of us. Children have always played war games and the saturation with violence of our movies and television programs is the subject of public debate which, appropriately, may turn to violence. Polls and viewer research have convincingly shown that ratings go up in proportion to the level of violence incorporated in the show and my political advisers strongly suggested that I follow the trend. As a democratically elected president I feel that it is my duty to cater to your baser instincts and-although the chances of my being reelected are nil-I think I have to give you what you want, and to treat you with violence. In doing so I also try to emulate Vergil whose bestseller Aeneid begins with the catchy phrase, "Arma virumque cano . . ." There are other, less pragmatic reasons for my choosing this subject. Inner Asia's contribution to the development of arts and sciences is relatively modest; the great inf luence it exerted on the history of mankind was through the excellence of its armed forces. Yet, the subject has never received adequate treatment. Most of the work done is rather repetitious, focusing on the well-known features of nomad cavalry tactics such as shooting from horseback and feigned retreats performed with a view of disorganizing enemy ranks. Of course all this is important but in this presentation I would like to deal not so much with the army, its tactics and strategy,1 but rather with the anonymous Inner Asian warrior on whom the success of these military forces rested. In so doing I will have to limit myself to some specific questions related to training and equipment of the traditional (pre-gunpowder) Inner Asian man-at-arms, with-here and there-a short remark on the economic factors which determined the materiel he had to make use of. *** The outstanding ability of the Inner Asian warrior has been universally recognized by friend and foe. Geographic determinism, a characteristic feature of ethnographic thinking in Antiquity, attributed the savage temperament of the "peoples of the north" to the harshness of the climate in which they lived, propitious to the development of military virtues. "Why are the inhabitants of warm regions cowardly, and those who dwell in cold regions courageous" asks Aristotle in Problemata (XIV, 16)-"Is it because human beings have a natural tendency which counteracts the effect of locality and season? ... Now those who are hot by nature are courageous and those who are cold are cowardly. The effect of hot regions upon their inhabitants is to cool them ... but those who live in a cold climate become heated in their nature...." 2 Vitruvius writes in the same vein: "Now while the southern peoples are of acute intelligence and infinite resource, they give way when courage is demanded because their strength is drained away by the sun; but those who are born in colder regions, by their fearless courage are better equipped for the clash of arms, yet by their slowness of mind they rush on without ref lection, and through lack of tactics are balked of their purpose." 3 According to Ptolemy (Tetrabiblos 11.2) the northern peoples-whom he calls by a general name Scythians-are savage in their habits because their dwelling places are continually cold. Generally speaking in these early writings the term "northern peoples" is applied indiscriminately to all the barbarians whether of the nomadic type, such as the Scythians, or sedentary as the Celts. Al1 I have touched on this very important and neglected subject in my On Mongol Strategy, Proceedings of the Fourth East Asian Altaistic Conference, ed. Chen Chiehhsien (Tainan, 1975),p p. 238-249;r eprintedi n Denis Sinor, Inner Asia and its Contacts with Medieval Europe, (Variorum Reprints, London, 1977). 2 Ed. W. D. Ross, translation by E. S. Forster (Oxford, 1927). 3 De Architectura, VI, 1, 9; ed. Frank Granger, v. II, p. 17.

THE INNER ASIAN WARRIORS

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though in his Politics (VI.4) Aristotle affirms that the pastoral peoples are the best trained of any for war, his opinion is based on general speculation rather than on direct experience. The antithesis of north and south in which the former is associated with the forces of evil and thus pregnant with danger for civilized humanity is a notion underlying the basic cosmological concepts of Eurasia and is well attested also in the Scriptures. Whether this topos is rooted in reality is a question beyond the scope of this article but it is certain that in Greece as well as in China the reputation of the Inner Asian warrior stood high since his first contacts with them. Herodotus praises the military qualities of the Scythians and his opinion is fully shared by Thucydides according to whom no people, whether in Asia or in Europe, can match the military might of the Scythians if these are united, although "they are not on a level with other races in general intelligence and the arts of civilized life."4 Speaking of the Huns, Ammianus Marcellinus (XXXI, 2, 9) states that "they could easily be called the most terrible of all warriors." In a homily attributed to Theodoros Synkellus and preached probably on the first anniversary of the unsuccessful attack of the Avars on Constantinople (625), the orator referred to the barbarian armies of this ferocious people whose "life is war": J5v Pioq 6 1n6keioq. 5 On the other end of the Inner Asian oikoumene the Hsiung-nu posed a terrible threat to the Chinese. Their historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien opined that warfare seemed to be "their natural disposition."6 He also quoted the remarks of a Chinese fugitive to the Hsiung-nu to the effect that the latter "make it clear that warfare is their business." 7 The Arab writer al-Jahiz (c. 776-869) felt that the Turks occupied "in war the position of Greeks in science and the Chinese in art."8 Speaking of the Mongol army, the Persian historian Juvaini (c. 1252-61) waxes lyrical: "With regard to the organization of their army, from the time of Adam down to the present day ... it can be read in no history and is recorded in no book that any of the kings that were lords of the nations ever attained an army like the army of the Tartars. ... What army in the whole world can equal the Mongol army?" 9 The same opinion is expressed by Thomas, archdeacon of Spalato, an eyewitness of the Mongol campaign in Hungary: "There is no people in the world as experienced [as the Mongols] in war, one which could, as they, defeat the enemy-particularly in the open field-be it by sheer force or military knowhow."10 On what grounds may such opinions be justified, what are the factors that made the greatness of the armies of Inner Asia? Conversely, what were its weaknesses and limitations? In what follows I will attempt to give a partial answer to these important questions. The study of the economic, social, and military structures of Inner Asia leave no doubt concerning the social character of the army. It was a "people's army" in the literal sense of the word. Not only were all ablebodied men permanently liable to military combatservice, they were also-at least in the Mongol Empire-under military orders even in peacetime. According to Juvaini, "It is an army after the fashion of a peasantry, being liable to all manner of contributions and rendering without complaint whatever is enjoined upon it... It is also a peasantry in the guise of an army, all of them, great or small, noble and base, in time of battle becoming swordsmen, archers and lancers and advancing in whatever manner the occasion requires."11 It seems likely that much of what Juvaini said about the Mongol soldiers was applicable to most great Inner Asian armies. Needless to say, the soldiers were unpaid. It was only very late and probably under
4 The Pelopponesian War, II, 97, 5-6. 5 Ferenc Makk, Traduction et commentaire de lhomelie ecrite probablement par Theodore de Syncelle sur le siege de Constantinople en 626. Acta Universitatis de Attila J6zsef Nominatae, Acta Antiqua et Archaeologica XIX (Szeged, 1975), pp. 16, 78. 6 Shih chi 110, la: t fJ 14-? \ . 7 Shih chi 110, 1 Ib; Translation by Burton Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China, II (Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 171. 8 C. T. Harley Walker, Jahiz of Basra to al-Fath ibn Khaqan on the Exploits of the Turks and the Army of the Khalifate in General, JRAS 1915, 631-697, p. 685. 9 Translation by John Andrew Boyle, The History of the World-Conqueror, I, pp. 29-30 (Manchester University Press, 1958) 10 Sed non est gens in mundo, que tantam habeant bellandi periciam, que ita sciat, maxime in campestri conflictu, hostes evincere, sive virtute, sive sagacitate pugnando. Ch. XXXVII. A. F. Gombos, Catalogus Fontium Historiae Hungaricae, IIV (Budapest, 1937-1943), [henceforth Catalogus] III, p. 2239. 11 Boyle, op. cit. p. 30.

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Iranian inf luence that the il-khan Ghazan decided to give some modest pay to the low ranking soldiers. The high ranking Mongol officers remained unpaid. One of them was taken prisoner by the Mameluks in Ghazan's campaign in Syria (1303). On being asked by his captors what his pay was, he replied: "The Mongol is the slave of his sovereign. He is never free. His sovereign is his benefactor; he does not serve him for money. Although I was the last of Ghazan's servants, I never needed anything."12 For the men of Inner Asia military service was a natural occupation. Neither the Turkic nor the Mongol languages have a native word for "soldier,"just as they have no generic terms for war or peace. Fighting was a precondition of survival; only collective military action could ensure the survival or the prosperity of the political community. It is thus not surprising that military training, individually as well as in groups, began very early. Speaking of the Hsiung-nu, around 200 B.C. Ssu-ma Ch'ien writes: "The little boys start out by learning to ride sheep and shoot birds and rats with a bow and arrow and when they get a little older they shoot foxes and hares, which are used for food. Thus all the young men are able to use a bow and act as armed cavalry in time of war." In the middle of the thirteenth century, speaking of the Mongols, the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini expresses himself in almost identical terms: "(The men) hunt and practice archery, for they are all, big and little, excellent archers, and their children begin as soon as they are two or three years old to ride and manage horses and to gallop on them, and they are given bows to suit their stature and are taught to shoot; they are extremely agile and also intrepid."13 In Inner Asia as elsewhere, discipline was the backbone of the armies. John of Plano Carpini-a monk, with a personal understanding of what discipline meant -could not withhold his admiration of the Mongols: "These men . . . are more obedient to their masters then any other men in the world, be they religious or secular."14 The description given by Ssu-ma Ch'ien of the seizing of power by the Hsiung-nu ruler Mao-tun (c. 209-174 B.C.) illustrates well Chinese admiration for the discipline of the Inner Asian soldier. He is said to have trained his soldiers to shoot at whatever target he himself was shooting. In succession he aimed at his best horse, his favorite wife, his father's best horse, and after each exercise he executed those who had failed to follow his example. Finally he took aim at his own father. His troops, by then well disciplined, discharged their arrows on the same target, shot his father dead, and secured the throne for Mao-tun.15 The splendid organization and discipline of the Mongol troops is described in some detail by the Dominican David of Ashby in a book Les fais des Tatars written probably in the 1270s:16 You have heard how they pitch camp and how they arrange their guards by day and night in their camps. And know that they stay as peacefully by night as by day, like monks in their cloister. Never would you hear a man shouting there nor a horse neighing, for the horses are all well-schooled, except those which remain at stud. Now I want to tell you how they move their camp and in what way all the people in the army know when they must strike their tents and load them up: for when the tent of the chief has been fastened on, a loud general summons is given, and for this occasion there is a wonderful drum as I will demonstrate and show you in this diagram. It is like a very tall whistle of bronze or copper and across the open top of it there is stretched a large piece of leather, as you find in a drum used for hunting riverbirds, and this is supported by four stakes as high as a man's waist, as I have already shown you in the diagram.
12 Based on Wassaf, quoted from H. H. Howorth, History of the Mongols, III (London, 1888), p. 472, based on dOhsson, Histoire des Mongols, IV (La Haye, 1835), p. 335. 13 IV.10, ed. Wyngaert, Sinica Franciscana I (Ad Claras Aquas, 1929), p. 50. Translation from The Mongol Mission, edited by Christopher Dawson (Sheed and Ward, London, 1955), p. 18. 14 IV.2, ed. Wyngaert, p. 45, tr. The Mongol Mission, p. 14. 15 Cf. Watson, op. cit. p. 161 16 The fragments which remain of this important text can be read in C. Brunel, David dAshby auteur m&connu des Faits des Tartares, Romania 79, 1958, 39-46. To the best of my knowledge they have never been translated into a modern language. The passage given here in English appears on pp. 42-43 of Brunels article. On David of Ashby cf. also Jean Richard, The Mongols and the Franks, Journal of Asian History 3, 1969, 45-57, p. 53.

19

And if the chieftain wishes to move camp, when midnight is passed he orders the drum to be struck and the man who is allotted this task grasps two wooden maces in his two hands, as I have shown you, and strikes as hard as his strength and breath allow him to do. And know that the wonderful thing about this drum is that it can be heard easily for a league around. Immediately great and small prepare their horsesa nd put theire quipmento n them.A ftera good interval, the drum is beaten for the second time, then they strike their tents and load up all their possessions, and the divisions assemble, and those who advance on the outside go in the vanguard and after them the others in order right up to the chief who comes last or in the middle, depending on how the order of march of the camp is arrangedT. hen the drumi s struckf or the third time and the vanguard moves off and all the others follow, in very good and regular order. Nor would you ever hear any outcry or uproar except for the noise of the horses' hooves, for no one dares to exclaim or shout when the camp moves nor can any man ride in front of another except according to the order prescribedf or the divisions.W hen the camp is led off in this way, a set of people allotted to the task, search through the whole area occupied by the army to collect up the things that have been forgotten. Some have to collect up all the animals, others, clothes and equipment of any kind, and if they find any of these things they keep them or carry them along in the wake of those who have moved the camp. Those who have lost something ask these search parties about it and bring witness and guarantor. Thus they recover by pledged word all the things they have forgotten and lost. Although discipline was very strict, the men do not seem to have suffered- unduly under it. Mirkhwond (1432-98), a Persian historian of the Timurid period remarks that when in the Syrian campaign of Ghazan khan five thousand soldiers lost their horses, they cheerfully undertook to march home. He also comments that if, after such a march that took two months, on their arrival, they had been given orders to set out again on another campaign, they would have obeyed without complaints.17 Of course, if discipline was to be strict, punishment for disobedience had -to be harsh. In 1205 the orders given by Chingis to his general Siubotei included an interdiction for the soldiers to ride at full gallop. "Once you have given such orders," Suibtei was instructed, "those who disobey should be birched." As a general guideline Chingis is reported to have said: "Those who disobey our orders, if worthy of our attention, should be sent to us; if not worthy of our attention, they should be beheaded on the spot."18 Punishment for cowardice was very hard indeed and solidarity among the fighting men highly encouraged. According to Carpini, "When they [the Mongols] are in battle, if one or two or three or even more of a group of ten run away, all are put to death; and if the whole group of ten f lees, the rest of the group of a hundred are all put to death if they do not f lee, too. In a word, unless they retreat in a body, all who take f light are put to death. Likewise, if one or two or more go forward boldly to the fight, then the rest of the ten, if they do not follow, are put to death. And if one or more of the ten are captured, their companions are put to death if they do not rescue them."19 Grudgingly though repeatedly Byzantine sources express admiration for the discipline of the barbarian soldier. The topos that they obey their chiefs "because of fear and not love" smacks of sour grapes. Even in our age the idea lingers on, probably owing to Montesquieu's vigorous and splendidly biased formulation:20 "Les peuples du nord l'Europe l'ont conquise en hommes libres; les peuples du nord de l'Asie l'ont conquise en esclaves ... le genie de la nation tartare ou getiquea toujourse te semblablea celui des empiresd e l'Asie.L es peuples,d ans ceux-ci,s ont gouvern6sp arl e baton; les peu ples tartares, par les longs fouets.... il regne en Asie un esprit de servitude qui ne la jamais quittee; et dans toutes les histoires de ce pays, il n'est pas possible de trouver un seul trait qui marque une ame libre: on n'y verra jamais que l'heroisme de la servitude."
17 DOhsson, op. cit., pp. 334-335. 18 bidanu jarliq dabaqsad-i bidana taniqdaqun metiis-i bidana kcii iretkin bidanai ili taniqdaquno lon-i min tende boet mokoriu ilutkiinpa ragraph1 99o f the SecretH istoryo f the Mongols, ed. Louis Ligeti, Histoire secrete des Mongols (Budapest, 1971), pp. 164165. 19 VI.3, ed. Wyngaert, p. 77, tr. The Mongol Mission, p. 33. 20 De lesprit des lois XVIII, ch. 5-6.

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Montesquieu's interpretation does not rest on the evidence provided by Byzantine sources. Maurice says explicitly that "the people of the Tirks is numerous and free," 21 a statement repeated almost verbatim in the Tactics of the emperor Leo VI written around 904 in which it is applied to the Hungarians. 22 The combination of inborn courage and discipline acquired through constant training accounts for the excellence of the Inner Asian warrior. According to Theophylaktos Simokattes (7th century) the Mukrian Inner Asian people living on the confines of China -displayed "great courage in armed conf licts because of experience gained in daily drills and steadfastness shown in face of danger." By the same author, the Oghur of the South-Russian steppe are said to be "among the strongest because of their number and the military drill they undergo." 23 According to Maurice, the Tirks do nothing else but practice how to fight the enemy with courage. 24 *** Although the use of infantry is not unknown in the military history of Inner Asia, the great conquests and victorious campaigns were the works of light cavalry. Its superior horsemanship has earned universal admiration. The annals of the Yuan dynasty laconically remark that by nature the "Mongols are good at riding and archery. Therefore they took possession of the world through this advantage of bow and horse." 25 In the eyes of the western writers the Inner Asian warrior is inseparable from his mount. According to Zosimus the Huns "could not plant their feet firmly upon the ground, living, even sleeping, as they did on horseback." 26 The description given by Ammianus Marcellinus is more elaborate: they are almost glued to their horses, which are hardy, it is true, but ugly, and sometimes they sit them woman-fashion and thus perform their ordinary tasks. From their horses by day or night every one of that nation buys and sells, eats and drinks, and bowed over the narrow neck of the animal relaxes into a sleep so deep as to be accompanied by many dreams." 27 According to the Strategikon of Maurice, the Avars can barely stand on the ground because, having been brought up on horseback, their legs have become weak. 28 According to the abbot Regino, the Hungarians of the 9th century are "constantly riding horses; on them they go and stand, think or converse." 29 Well-trained, well-disciplined the warrior of Inner Asia has a peerless ally: his horse. The relatively small, pony-type animal-considered ugly by foreign observers- is related to the so-called Prjewalskihorse, the only wild variety of the species which survived until modern times. The toughness and wantlessness of this breed, coupled with its relatively good speed and exceptional endurance caused it to be the most formidable single factor of Inner Asian military power. 30 Inner Asian saddlery and bridles can be dealt with brief ly as neither of them shows characteristics applicable to the whole area. Contrary to widely held opinions the stirrup does not seem to have been an Inner Asian invention. The beginnings of its use are difficult to establish partly because many of them were made in an organic material-wood, leather, bonewhich tend to disintegrate when buried in the ground. More reliable evidence can be culled from sculptures and other representations of mounted warriors, some of which are fairly detailed and prepared with an obvious attention to technical details. The earliest known representations of the stirrup come from Korea and Japan and can be dated to the 4th and 5th century A.D. There is no evidence to show that the Huns (c. 370-450) used stirrups, wellknown to the Avars a century later. It was from them that the Byzantine armies learned the use of this
21 XI, 2, 2 = ed. Mihaescu p. 268: Kai T6 gtv To6pcov nok6av6p6v te Kait ?i6e0cpov. 22 Cf. Gy. Moravcsik, La Tactique de Leon le Sage comme source historique hongroise, Acta Historica Academiae Sc. Hungaricae I, 1952, 161-184, p. 175. 23 2VII, 7, 13, ed. de Boor p. 258: E0vog6 ? TroTOTo CV ioXupoTrdTo)Kv a90TtrrlK6e td re Tirv 7ioXuav6piav Kai Trv Tp6O T6OVcn 6eCov vont?ouo K&rlacv. 24 XI, 2, 2, ed. Mihaescu, p. 268. 25 S. Jagchild-C. R. Bawden, Some Notes on the Horse- Policy of the Yuan Dynasty, CAJ. X, 1965, 246-268, p. 246 26 Historian ova, IV, 20. Translationb y JamesJ . Buchanan and Harold T. Davis (San Antonio, Texas, 1967), p. 153. 27 XXXI, 2, 6, ed. John C. Rolfe (Loeb, 1939), p. 383. 28 XI, 2, 19, ed. Mihaescu p. 272. 29 Gombos, Catalogus, p. 2039, ad annum 889. 30 In Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History, Oriens Extremus XIX, 1972, 171-183 (reprinted in collected articles cited above, footnote 1) I have assembled some data, objective as well as subjective, on this animal so there is no need here to expatiate on the same subject.

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device which then passed to the Arabs. 31 As late as in the early 7th century the stirrup was still not used in Iran. 32 The presence in Inner Asia of another piece of important equine equipment, the horseshoe, cannot be established with certainty before the Mongol conquest. Of course the use of hipposandals-the covering of the hooves with some material-might be difficult to prove since these were usually made of perishable material such as leather, ropes or even wood which would tend to disintegrate in the tombs. The iron horseshoe, the use of which is well attested in fifth century Europe, does not seem to appear in Inner Asia before the Mongol period and even then only occasionally. Jagchid and Bawden give some indica tion of its existence in Yian China, 33 and Kirakos of Gandzak reports that the Mongols in Armenia levied one horseshoe per inhabitant. 34 An anonymous Latin poem written on the occasion of the Mongol inva sion of Hungary notes that the Mongol horses are unshod: Est silex equi ungula ferri, clavi non gerula. 35 In Rashid ed-Din's version of the Turkic legend of Oghuz kaghan the use of horseshoes is mentioned as a special precautionary measure. 36 According to Thomas of Spalato, a reliable witness, the Mongol horses "run around on rocks and stones without horseshoes as if they were wild goats." 37 In the middle of the 15th century Oyirad envoys to the Ming court had to be provided with horseshoes, 38 a fact which shows that the western Mongols appreciated the advantages of using the device. Of course the shoeing of huge horseherds was impracticable. In an account of the Kalmucks' crossing the Volga in 1722 we read: ". .. the Kalmuck Tartars came over the river on the ice to take up their usual winter quarters in the desert: they covered a road with earth over the ice for their cattle to pass on, their horses for want of shoeing, as well as their other cattle, being equally unable to set their feet on the bare ice." 39
31 It would seem that stirrups are first mentioned in the Strategikon of Maurice, i.e., around 630, where they are called, by a term borrowed from Latin, oKdXa or oKaQa iTjrcKTl. Cf. Haralambie Mihaescu, La Litterature byzantine, source de connaissance du latin vulgaire, II, Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europeennes XVII, 1, 1979, 61-91, p. 53. 32 Cf. the excellent articles of I. L. Kyzlasov, O proiskhoZdenii stremjan, SA. 1973, 3, 24-36, and of A. D. H. Bivar, Cavalry Equipment and Tactics on the Euphrates Frontier, Dumbarton Oaks Papers XXVI, 1972, 273-291, particularly pp. 287 and 290.-Bivar accepts the argument that the stirrup was brought across the steppe by the Juanjuan who, according to some, appeared in Europe under the name of the Avars. The track of exiles westward across Siberia is marked by finds of stirrups derived from the Chinese prototypes (p. 287). While there can be no doubt concerning the westward move of the object itself, there is no inherent reason to link it with the migration of one single people. Of course, if the identification of the Juan-juan with the Avars is a priori admitted, then the temptation of linking the diffusion of the stirrup with the migration becomes too strong to be resisted. There is no evidence to show that the Juan-juan or even the Turks who succeeded them in Mongolia used this device. In his well-documented chapter on The Origin and Diffusion of the Stirrup Lynn White Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford 1962), pp. 14-28 reaches the conclusion that stirrups first appeared in the West some time in the early eighth century (p. 24).-- The common Turkic word for stirrup iizdngii and its variants, is a derivative of iz(di) above, on high, an etymology proposed already by W. Bang and considered likely by G. Doerfer, Turkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen III, (Wiesbaden, 1965), pp. 144-149. The very ease with which an etymology can be given would suggest that the object became known to the Turks fairly late and that its name then spread as a Kulturwort. As Doerfer, loc. cit., points out, the Mongol word for stirrup, doroge, should not be connected with the Turkic forms. It has no etymology within Mongol. Clearly, the stirrup is not the invention of Altaic peoples. 33 Op. cit., p. 249. 34 E. Dulaurier, Les Mongols dapr&s les historiens arm6niens, JA. 1858, I, p. 483. 35 Cf. Gombos, Catalogus, III, p. 2282 36 Karl Jahn, Die Geschichte der Oguzen des Rasid ad-DTn, Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse, Denkschriften Bd. 100 (Wien, 1969), p. 25. 37 8Ch. 37. Gombos, Catalogus, III, p. 2239: per rupes vero et lapides absque ferramentis its discurrunt ac si capre forent silvestres. 38 David M. Farquhar, Oirat-ChinesTe ributeR elations, 1408-1446, Studia Altaica, Festschriftfiir Nikolaus Poppe (Wiesbaden, 1957), 60-68, p. 62. 39 Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce Esq. (1783; reprint: London, Frank Cass and Co., 1970).-On the early use of hipposandals and, more generally, on the early European data concerning the protection of the horses hooves, cf. Paul Vigneron, Le Cheval dans IAntiquite greco-romaine. (Des guerres mediques aux grandes invasions), I (Nancy 1968), pp. 45-50.-There is no Common Turkic word for horseshoe and no word with this meaning is attested in Old Turkic. Some Turkic languages such as Coman, Turkish, Turkmen Kumyk use nal, a loanword from Arabic. The original meaning of shoe is maintained in Middle Turkic documents, cf. A. K. Borovkov, Leksika sredneaziatskogo tefsira XII-XIII vv., (Moskva, 1963), p. 227. Another word for horseshoe taka and its variants appear in a number of other Turkic languages, cf. Radloff, Worterbuch III, 779, 789, Tuvin, Tatar daga, Chuvash takan, etc. In some languages the two forms coexist, e.g., Kazak, Karakalpak nal and taya, Uzbek taqa, naxal, nayal. Taka has a perfectly clear Turkic etymology. It derives from the Common Turkic verbal root taq- to fix, to attach and originally it probably meant a hipposandal. From Turkic the word passed into Mongol. Classical Mongol has taqa for which Kowalewski gives the revealing definition un fer (de cheval), espece de patins quon met sur les souliers ou les bottes, ces patins sont arm6s de pointes de fer: on sen sert pour grimper sur les montagnes ou il y a de la glace. The word exists in the modern dialects, e.g., Khalkha, Kalmuck tax. Among the Tunguz languages Evenki has taka, Manchu tahan. Of course a detailed study of this word is out of the question within the framework of this article, but it is clear that the lines of penetration of the horseshoe

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*** The typical Inner Asian warrior is not only a superb horseman; his skill in archery is equally remarkable. 40 He seems to have invented the difficult art of shooting from horseback without halting. Expertise in riding and shooting is at the basis of the Greek technical term irnoToo6TTrl "mounted archer" which, applied to the Scythians, appears already in Herodotus (IV.46) and which, on occasion, is used as a synonym of their name. 41 Speaking of an ill-defined barbarian peopleprobably Pechenegs or Comans-whom she calls Scythians, Anna Comnena (writing between 1138 and 1148) describes them as "infidel barbarians, prodigious (horrible?) mounted archers."42 A contemporary of the Huns, the poet Sidonius Apollinaris pays eloquent tribute to their military qualities: "Scarce has the infant learnt to stand without his mother's aid when a horse takes him on his back. You would think the limbs of man and beast were borne together, so firmly does the rider always stick to the horse, just as if he were fastened to his place: any other folk is carried on horseback, this folk lives there. Shapely bows and arrows are their delight, sure and terrible are their hands; firm is their confidence that their missiles will bring death, and their frenzy is trained to do wrongful deeds with blows that never go wrong."43 Jordanes' judgment is more terse: the Huns are "excellent horsemen . . . skilled in the use of the bow and arrow."44 Maurice's Strategikon notes 45 that the Tirks assiduously exercised themselves in shooting arrows from horseback, a statement repeated verbatim by the Emperor Leo who applies it to the Hungarians.46 The Hungarian mounted archer was particularly dreaded by his contemporaries. A supplication of the people of Modena to St. Geminianus, their patron, contains the request that they be protected from the Hungarians' arrows.47According to the Abott Regino (d. 915), in their campaign of 889, the Hungarians "who live like wild beasts rather than like human beings . . . have killed but few with their swords but thousands with their arrows which they aim with such accomplished art from their bows made out of bone that it is scarcely possible to defend oneself against their shooting."48 In 901, in the course of the war waged by them against the Lombards, "an innumerable multitude perished by the shots of their arrows."49 The Lombard historian Liudprand in his description of the battle between Louis, son of Arnulf Duke of Bavaria and the Hungarians, states that the latter (called in the text Turci) killed many by turn ing their backs to the enemy as if f leeing and shooting their arrows backward. 50 The Seljuk horse archers won the respect of the crusaders. "From the frequent use of Latin writers of words like 'pluvia,' 'imber,' 'grando,' and 'nubea' to describe the volume of Turkish archery," writes R. C. Smail, 51 "it is probable that a high rate of fire was maintained." In fact their projectiles cloud the skies more than would rain or hail. 52 The same image is used more than a thousand years earlier by the Annals of the Former Han in the description of the ambush laid by the Hsiung-nu for the Chinese general Li-ling
into Inner Asia run from the west and the south and not from China. I feel reasonably certain that the device is a western invention. 40 A good selection of passages culled from Byzantine sources and describing the Turks skill in archery is presented by Walter Emil Kaegi, Jr., The Contribution of Archery to the Turkish Conquest of Anatolia, Speculum, XXXIX, 1964, 96-108. 1 refrain from repeating here his data. 41 Cf. E. Dark6, Influences touraniennes sur Ievolution de lart militaire des Grecs, des Romains et des Byzantins, Byzantion X, 1935, 443-469, p. 447. 42 dXoK6o0ou; toirToTo6TagA, lexiad XII, VIII,5 , ed. Leib, vol. III, p. 79. 43 Panegyric on Anthemius, 262-269, ed. and tr. W. B. Anderson (Loeb, 1936), I, pp. 30-31. 44 XXIV, ... ade quitandump romptissim.i. . et ad arcus sagittasquep arati,e d. Mommsen,M GH.AA.V, Pt. 1, p. 91. 45 XI, 2, 8, ed. Mihaescu p. 270. 46 Taktika XVIII, 50, ed. Migne PG. 107, 957-958. On the interrelatedness of the two texts cf. Gy. Moravcsik, Bolcs Leo taktikaja, mint magyar tort6neti forras, Szdzadok 85, 1951, 334-353, and also Bohumila Zasterova, Les Avares et les Slaves dans la Tactique de Maurice, Rozpravy Ceskoslovensk6 Akademie Ved, Rocnik 81, SeSt 3, 1971 47 Ab Ungerorum nos defendas iaculis. Gombos, Catalogus II, p. 843 48 Vivunt non hominum, sed beluarum more. ... perpaucos gladio, multa milia sagittis interimunt, quas tanta arte ex corneis arcubus dirigunt, ut earum ictus vix precaveri possit. Gombos, Catalogus III, p. 2039. 49 Ibid. 50 Gravis itaque hic indeque oritur pugna, versique terga ceu in fugam Turci, directis acriter boelis, id est sagittis, plurimuss ternunt.G ombos, CatalogusI I, p. 1470. 51 Crusading Warfare (1097-1193) (Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 81. 52 si grant plant6 de saietes et de quarriaux que pluie ne grelle ne feist mie si grant oscurt&.. . Continuationo f William of Tyre, Recueil des historiens des croisades. Historiens occidentaux II, p. 606.

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in 99 B.C., 53 or by Roger, Canon of Varad, relating how, in 1241, the Mongols "shot their arrows like rain" on the Hungarian troops of Ugolin, archbishop of Kalocsa. 54 Of course the Mongols of the 13th century appear as archers par excellence. In Armenian sources they are generally referred to with the term "the nation of the archers."55 In 1241, in a letter sent to the king of England, the Emperor Frederick II considers the Mongols more familiar with the bow than any other people, and describes them as "incomparable archers." 56 Matthew Paris himself uses the same epithet. 57 To give a technical description of individual pieces of armament would lead us beyond the scope of this article, the more so since there was no uniformity in the equipment of the Inner Asian warrior. It differed widely according to place, people and epoch. The most important single piece of equipment was the compound bow, the various types of which can fairly well be reconstructed. It was made of wood and horn, specially strengthened with sinews glued to the wooden core. An important feature is its asymmetry resulting from the grip being placed below the bow's center. 58 Of course almost every one of the thousands of archeological sites explored yielded some arrowheads, not all of them used in warfare. The length and the material of the shafts is less well knowp; made of wood they tended to disintegrate in the burial sites. Plano Carpini 59 does give some indication as to their length in the 13th century but the interpretation of his data is difficult. 60 In his descriptions of the Mongols' armament Thomas of Spalato notes that the notch at the end of the shaft of the Mongol arrows was so narrow that they could not be used with "our" (presumably the Hungarians) bows. According to him the Mongol arrow shafts were four digits longer than their Hungarian (?) counterparts, and the arrowheads were made of iron, bone, or horn.61 The bone arrowheads of the Huns had been noted by Ammianus Marcellinus.62 Their continued use about nine hundred years later by the Mongols is an indication not only of their high quality but also of the perennial shortage of metal which the Inner Asian armies had to overcome, and about which I will have more to say. However skilled, to defeat the enemy the Inner Asian archer had to fight him at close quarters. His most used personal weapon, the sword, is attested in many shapes, sizes, either in its straight varietyshort, dagger-like as the Scythian akinakes, or long, single- or double-edged-or as a sabre, pointed at the end, curved and sharpened on one side only. The Huns of Attila (4th c. A.D.) were armed with two swords, one of them of the long, double-edged type, the other a shorter, single-edged equestrian slashing sword.63 Sabres were used by the people-perhaps revolutionaries -who in the last decades of the 7th century replaced the former ruling class of the Avars armed with straight swords.64 An anecdote in the Russian Primary Chronicle throws an interesting light on the perennial competition between sword and sabre. It reports how the Slavic Polyanians paid one sword per hearth as a tribute
53 Chien Han-shu 54, 12a: 7 3 - F 54 Ch. 21, sagittas velut pluviam emittentes. Gombos, Catalogus III, p. 2073. 55 RobertF . Blake - RichardN . Frye, Historyo f the nation of the Archers (the Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc, HJAS. XII, 1949, 269-443, p. 384. 56 Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. Luard IV, p. 115. 57 Ed. Luard II, p. 488. 58 Hundreds of works deal with the Inner Asian bow and arrow.F or a good technicald escriptiono f the compoundb ow see W. F. Paterson, The Archers of Islam, JESHO. IX, 1966, 69-87. A wealth of information is contained in the detailed monographso f K. F. Smirnov, Vooruzenies avromatov, MIA, 101 (1961), pp. 31-70 on bows and arrows, A. I. Meljukova, Vooruzenie skifov, Arkheologija SSSR. Svod arkheologi6eskikhis to6nikon,v yp. D 1-4, (Moskva 1964), pp. 14-44 on bows and arrows, and A. M. Khazanov, Ocerki voennogo dela sarmatov (Moskva, 1971), pp. 28-43 on bows and arrows. For a more recent period: Joachim Werner, Beitrage zur Archdologie des AttilaReiches, ABA W. N. F. Heft 38A, 1956,e speciallyp p. 46-50.A good generals urveyo f Inner Asian arrows: Kathe U. Kihalmi, Der Pfeil bei den innerasiatischeRn eiternomadenu nd ihrenN achbarn,A OH. VI, 1956, 109-159. 59 VI, 9, ed. Wyngaert p. 79. 60 Cf. the comments on p. 42 of Paul Pelliot, Recherches sur les Chretiens dAsie centrale et dExtreme-Orient (Paris, 1973). 61 Sagitte eorum nostris sunt quatuor digitis longiores, ferrea,o ssea et corneac uspidec onspicates.C h. 37, Gombos, Catalogus III, p. 2239. 62 XXXI, 2, 9, ed. Rolfe, p. 384. 63 Werner, op. cit., pp. 38-46. I cannot forego the pleasure of citing William Trousdales erudite and imaginative book The Long Sword and Scabbard Slide in Asia (Smithsonian Contributions to Anthropology 17, 1975), rich in interesting data and ideas pertaining to the accoutrement of the Inner Asian warrior. 64 Gyula Laszl6, Etudes archeologiques sur Ihistoire de la societe des Avars, Archaeologia Hungarica Series Nova XXXIV, 1955, p. 236.

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to the Turkic Khazars who, upon examination of these weapons commented: "Evil is this tribute, prince. We have won it with a one-edged weapon called a sabre, but the weapon of these men is sharp on both edges and is called a sword. These men shall impose tribute upon us and upon other lands.65" Both sword and sabre are represented in the grave finds of the South Russian steppe which date from the tenth to the fourteenth century.66 The Pecheneg graves of the ninth and tenth centuries yielded massive sabres with slightly bent blades no longer than one metre and with wooden hilts. The curvature of the blades becomes more noticeable in later graves.67 Sabres and swords do not appear all too often in the graves. Pletneva's explanation that this was due to the value of these weapons and the consequent desire of the survivors to keep them for themselves, makes good sense. Plano Carpini noted 68 that swords were used by the wealthier Mongols only, the poorer soldiers carried axes. Next in importance to the bow and the sword, spears and lances must be mentioned in the inventory of the traditional arsenal of Inner Asia. Since in most cases the wooden shafts have disintegrated, it is often difficult to distinguish spears-used for hurling as well as for thrusting-from lances held rigidly in the battle. Although these constituted the principal weapons of the Sarmatians, they appear but rarely among the gravefinds.69 There is some pictorial evidence from Panticapaeum (Kerch) showing presumably Sarmatian horsemen wielding very long lances70 and such figures appear also on the rock pictures of the Upper Yenissei.71 The Sarmatians represent a distinct branch in the military history of Inner Asia and cannot be considered as typical. Military continuity on the steppe evolved from the Scythian prototype. The use of a short, light spear was probably universal. It was the preferred weapon of the Seljuks in the 12th century.72 Plano Carpini mentions a special type of lance used by the Mongols. It has a hook in its iron head with which a man can be dragged from his saddle.73 A word may be said about the use of the lasso as a weapon. The first mention is probably that made by Herodotus (VII,85) in connection with the Sagartians. According to the Suidas Lexicon74 it was used by the Parthians in whose army a whole contingent (aetpo- (p6pot) fought with this device. Speaking of the Sarmatians, Pausanias notes that "They throw a lasso round any enemy they meet, and then turning round their horses upset the enemy caught in the lasso." 75 In his Jewish Wars Josephus Flavius76 relates how in 72 or 73 A.D. the Armenian king Tiridates had a narrow escape after having been caught by a lasso (tp6Xoo) thrown by an Alan. Writing in the second half of the eighth century Moses Khorenatsci adapted Josephus's description to events posterior by some two centuries. In his narration king Trdat was caught by a "strap of sinew wound around with leather" thrown at him by the king of the Barsil.77 According to Ammianus Marcellilnus the Huns "throw strips of cloth plaited into nooses over their opponents and so entangle them that they fetter their limbs and take from them the power of riding or walking." 78 A legend related by Sozomen tells the story of Theotimus, bishop of Tomi, whom a Hun tried to drag away with a lasso but his hand remained extended in the air until the intended victim interceded
65 Samuel Hazard Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor, The Russian Primary Chronicle, Laurentian Text. Translated and edited. The Mediaeval Academy of America, Publication No. 60 (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 58. 66 G. A. Federov-Davidov, Kocevniki Vostocnoj Evropy pod vlastju zolotoordynskikh khanov. Arkheologiceskie pamjatniki (Moskva, 1966), specifically pp. 22-26, 117. 67 S. A. Pletneva, Pecenegi, torki i polovcy v jutznorusskikh stepjakh, MIA.62 (1958), 151-226, pp. 159, 168. 68 VI, 4, ed. Wyngaert p. 77. 69 Cf. Khazanov, op. cit., in footnote 59, p. 44. This is the most detailedp resentationo f the Sarmatianm ilitary. 70 Cf., e.g., M. Rostovtzeff, Iranians and Greeks in South Russia( Oxford,1 922),p late XXIX, and JosephW iesnerD, ie Kulturen der friihen Reitervolker, in Die Kulturen der eurasischenV olker( Frankfurt-am-Main19, 68),3 -192,p . 111 71 Hj. Appelgren-Kivalo, Alt-altaische Kunstdenkmdler (Hesingfors, 1931), fig. 93-at present not available to me 72 Cf. Smail, op. cit., in footnote 52, pp. 78, 113 73 VI, 9, ed. Wyngaerpt . 79. BertholdL aufer,C hinese Clay Figures. Pt. I, Prolegomena on the History of Defensive Armor, Field Museum of Natural History Publication 177 (Chicago, 1914), p. 228 referst o Chinesei llustrations( not available to me) of such lances used by the Hsiung-nu 74 s.v. o?tpaig ed. Adler, vol. IV, p. 346. 75 Description of Greece XXI, 5-6, ed. and trans. W. H. S. Jones, vol. I (Loeb, 1931), pp. 106-107. 76 VII, 7, 4, ed. B. Niese, vol. VI (reprint: Berlin, 1955), p. 602. 77 Cf. Robert W. Thomson, Moses Khorenatsi. History of the Armenians (Harvard University Press 1978), p. 237. On the historical events cf. K. Czegledy, Kaukazusi hunok, kaukazusia varok,A ntik TanulmannyoIkI, 1954, 121-140, pp. 130-131, unknown to Thomson 78 XXXI, 2, 9, ed. and transl. John C. Rolfe, vol. III, pp. 384-385.

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with God on the Hun's behalf.79 In view of such information one may wonder whether the rope which, according to Plano Carpini, 80 every Mongol soldier carried on him was really intended for the towing of war engines-as the Franciscan opined-or was, quite simply, a lasso. *** It stands to reason that the supply of materiel needed by a highly mobile cavalry force posed problems that would have taxed an industry far more advanced than that of traditional Inner Asia. In small quantities iron is a fairly ubiquitous metal but the manufacture of arms-arrowheads, lances, spearheads and, more particularly, sabres- requires a fairly sophisticated industry using the skill of specialist workers and permanent workshops. The three principal sources of arms supply were trade with the sedentary peoples, the employment of specialized craftsmen-often prisoners of war-and the taxation in kind of conquered, sedentary populations. In the involved history of trade between the peoples of Central Eurasia and the surrounding sedentary civilizations weapons and iron have played an important role. Of course most of our evidence originates with the exporter and has a negative character. It shows a constant endeavor by the sedentary states to limit trade to official, controlled market places and also failure to prevent contraband. In Han times the very soldiers charged with defending the borders of the empire are known to have sold iron weapons to their enemy, the Hsiung-nu. 81 Yet the law was quite explicit: "In the barbarian market officials as well as the common people are not allowed to carry weapons and iron out of the frontier barriers. The same regulation applies also to the market in the capital." 82 In the second century A.D. Hsien-pi auxiliary troops serving with the Chinese army insisted that their dues be paid in iron instead of money. 83 A memorial written in A.D. 177 deplores the ineffectiveness of the arms embargo: "Therefore, refined metal (bronze?) and iron were smuggled out without our notice, and fell into the possession of the (Hsien-pi) rebels. . . . Now, their weapons are even sharper and horses faster than those of the (previous) Hsiung-nu." 84 At the end of the second century A.D., in a commentary of a passage of the Ch'ien Han-shu, Ying Shao, a distinguished civil servant, remarked that "in the markets the sale for export of arms and iron to the Hu (Northern Barbarians) was forbidden to the of ficials as well as to the people." 85 The prohibition of exporting iron to the barbarian tribes is attested also for T'ang times. Illegal export continued to plague the officials of the Ming dynasty. From the rich documentation assembled by Henry Serruys 86 I will select just a few telling examples. In 1407 an imperial rescript reminded the Chinese commander-in-chief of Kansu that the "old regulations" forbade the sale of weapons. In 1437 a highranking officer defended himself against the charges of "trading helmets, harnasses, bows and arrows with Mongol tribute envoys for camels." In 1443 "an official wanted to prohibit all relations between Mongol envoys and Mongols in the Ming service residing at the capital, and simultaneously the sale of weapons, copper and iron along the road to and from the capital." The very fact that again and again over the years the interdict had to be repeated shows that the law was disregarded. Serruys cites several cases when arrowheads hidden in wine jars were smuggled to the Oyirads. The crucial role of the trade in arms is well exemplified in the rise of the Jurchen as described in the Chin-shih: "In the old times the Wild Jurchen had no iron. Whenever somebody from the adjacent states came to sell armor, they used to pay a high price in this trade. [Ching-tsu-an early leader of the Jurchen] also ordered all his brothers and clan members to buy. When they had obtained much iron, they used it
79 Ecclesiastical History, VII, 26, in Henry Wace and Philip Schaff (editors), A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Second Series, vol. II (Oxford and New York 1891), p. 395. Attention to the use of the lasso as a weapon among the Inner Asian peoples was called by MoravcsikG yula, A hunok taktikajahoz,K CsA. I, 1921-25,2 76-280, where furtherr eferencesc an be found 80 VI, 4, ed. Wyngaert p. 77: et funes ad machinas trahendas. 81 Ying-shih Yii, Trade and Expansion in Han China (University of California Press, 1967), p. 99. 82 Yii, op. cit., p. 122. See also ibid. p. 129. 83 Ibid. p. 109. 84 Ibid. p. 132. 85 Gerhard Schreiber, Das Volk der Hsien-pi zur Han- Zeit, Monumenta Serica XII, 1947, 145-203, p. 195. 86 Sino-Mongol Relations during the Ming. III. Trade Relations:T he HorseF airs( 1400-1600),M elangesc hinoise t bouddhiques XVII, 1975, 59-72.

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to manufacture bows, arrows and other weapons. His military power increased gradually and there were many people who at one time or another wanted to join him." 87 Byzantine data, although far less numerous, offer an exact parallel to the information provided by Chinese sources. In the early fifth century the Huns were as eager to trade with the Romans as the Hsiung-nu and their successors in Mongolia had been with the Chinese. After the death of Attila, in 465, the Emperor Marcian-who had always pursued on uncompromising policy towards the Hunsforbade the export to the barbarians of weapons and of any material from which they could be manufactured. 88 About a century later, the law was incorporated in Justinian's code. 89 In 562, to the dismay of the Emperor Justinian, an Avar embassy to Constantinople purchased some arms, impairing thereby their relations with Byzantium. 90 To supplement, or even to substitute for, the arms obtained through trade artisans were needed. Though probably not free, those engaged in the manufacture or repair of weapons enjoyed a special status. There is evidence to suggest that these men were linked to each other by a strong esprit de corps which-on occasion -may have led to the formation of political entities. Thus it is well known that before creating their own empire in the middle of the sixth century A.D., the Turks were the "blacksmith slaves" of the Juan-juan. A similar example is the case of Caucasian kingdom of Zarikaran mentioned by the tenth century Arab geographer Mas'udi, according to whom the name "means 'makers of coats of mail' because most of them are engaged in the manufacture of coats of mail, stirrups, bridles, swords and all other weapons made of iron." 91 A characteristic and in some respects very modern case is that of German prisoners of war "digging for gold and manufacturing arms" for the benefit of the Mongols. The Franciscan Rubruck, who in the middle of the thirteenth century vainly tried to contact and help them, placed their whereabouts at a distance of one month's travel to the east of Talas, in a certain town called Bolat.92 The exact location of that city is uncertain but its name-derived from the Persian pulad "steel"-leaves no doubt about its role. Similarly, the presence in Anatolia of place names Demirciler "Blacksmiths" led Xavier de Planhol 93 to the correct conclusion that these settlements were originally established by nomad artisans grouped together by reason of their occupational specialization. Rashid ed-Din gives a description of the organization of Persian and Mongol armorers in the realm of the il-khan Gazan. Within each city they were constituted into guilds, and the workers were paid at a standard rate for each unit produced. By switching from timework to piecework, according to our source, production quintupled.94 Scarcity of metal and of weapons led the Mongols to impose taxes payable in kind. According to the Secret History of the Mongols (paragraph 279), as part of his reorganization of the taxation, the khan Ogodei decreed that besides silk and silver, quivers (qor), bows (numun), armor (quyag) and weapons ( jebe) be collected and stored.95 Rubruck noted that in the lands lying west of the Don, even into the Balkans, the Mongols exacted a tribute consisting of an axe per annum and per household, and of all the unwrought iron they could find.96 According to the Armenian historian Kirakos of Gandzak, during the reign of Hiilegu the very heavy taxes in kind imposed upon the conquered lands included one arrow and one horseshoe, presumably by household.97 It is of course difficult to estimate the amount of metal needed for the outfit of an imaginary "average" Inner Asian warrior. On the basis of grave finds-the weight of metal weapons found buried with
87 Herbert Franke, Chinese Texts on the Jurchen. II. A Translation of Chapter One of the Chin-shih, Zentralasiatische Studien XII, 1978, 413-451, p. 421. 88 Cf. E. A. Thompson, A History of Attila and the Huns (Oxford, 1948), p. 180, with textual references 89 In: XXXXI Quae res exportari non debeant. Codex lustinianus, ed Paul Krueger (Berlin, 1892), pp. 178-179. 90 Menander, fragment 9, ed. L. Dindorf, Historici Graeci Minores, vol. II (Teubner, 1871), p. 8. Cf. also Thompson, op. cit., p. 172. 91 V. Minorsky, A History of Sharvdn and Darband (Cambridge, 1958), p. 155. 92 Rubruck XXIII, 3, ed. Wyngaert pp. 224-225. 93 Les Nomades, la steppe et la foret en Anatolie, Geographische Zeitschrift 53, 1965, 101-116, p. 111. 94 DOhsson, Histoire des Mongols, vol. IV (La Haye, 1835), pp. 431-433. 95 For the text cf. ed. Ligeti, p. 256. 96 I, 5, ed Wyngaert p. 168: totum ferrum quod invenerunt in massa. 97 98 Dulauriero, p. cit., in footnote3 5, p. 483;K . P. Patkanov, Istorijam ongolovp o armjanskimis tocnikam,I I (St. Petersburg, 1874), p. 88.

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Hungarian warriors of the time of the Conquest (9th c. A.D.)- Szabolcs de Vajay 98 estimates that some thirty metric tons of crude metal were needed to equip a cavalry force of about twenty thousand. Unfortunately archaeologists seldom indicate the weight of the weapons found. This is regrettable since such data would allow us to infer the size and nature of the industrial basis needed to produce them. Thus I have not come across any indication concerning the weight of many thousands of arrowheads found in Scythian graves. In some sepulchres they are very numerous indeed, as-for instance-in the 8th kurgan of Elizavetov (dated the second half of the fourth century B.C.) which yielded 985 bronze and 59 iron arrowheads.99 Although in the wake of a battle or a hunt some could be retrieved, arrows were an expendable commodity. The need for them and other new weapons must have been constant and quite acute. As any other soldier in history, the warrior of Inner Asia depended on the technology and the resources of the society to which he belonged for his weapons, and these were greatly determined by environmental factors. To command a supply of horses essential to ensure his superiority over the agriculturalist, the nomad mounted warrior was bound to remain within the steppe belt.100 To obtain the weapons he needed he had to rely on metallurgy which cannot operate without two essential ingredients: ore and combustible. The second of these was not available on the steppe. The supply of metal had to come from the forest-belt over which the mounted warrior had but limited control. The steppe which provided the warrior with his mounts -the key-factor in his military success-denied him the means necessary for the development of his weaponry. It could not provide the artisanal or semiindustrial basis essential to maintain the military superiority of the Inner Asian armies which, very early in history, learned to make optimum use of the natural and human resources available to them.

98 Ober die Wirtschaftsverhaltnisse der landnehmenden Ungarn, Ungarn Jahrbuch 1979, 9-19, p. 16. 99 Meljukova, op. cit., in footnote 59, p. 29. 100 I have dealt in some detail with this very important question in my Horse and Pasture . . . cited above in footnote 31.

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CHARLES J. HALPERIN, BloomingtonI, ndiana Source: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 63
In 1260 an army of Egyptian Mamluks, led by Sultan Qutuz, defeated a Mongol army from the Ilkhanate led by Ketbugha, at the battle of Ayn Jalut (Ain Jalut), 'Goliath's Well', in Palestine. Because this campaign marked the furthest advance of the Mongols in the Middle East, scholars have paid considerablea ttentiont o its militarya nd political significanceH. owever,o ne potentiala spect of IlkhanidMamlukre lationsh as only been mentionedc asually; examination of the role and image of the Kipchaks in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries may illustrate a much broader feature of the history of the Mongol Empire and its successor states. Hindsight provided an excuse for scholars to attribute to this battle the destruction of the myth of Mongol invincibility in the Middle East, a view first propounded by D'Ohsson in 1834. 2 Although this conclusion is still occasionally repeated, it has no foundation in the sources. 3 Indeed, the Ilkhanids continued to invade Syria until 1312; it was only when the Mongols in Iran had given up any hopes of conquering Syria that they could make peace with the Mamluks in 1323. Much scholarly discussion has focused on the question of why the Mongols were defeated at Ayn Jalut, and why they persisted for half a century thereafter in trying to reverse that defeat. John Masson Smith has argued that the Mamluks were superior soldiers, better trained and equipped, true professionals, i n contrastt o the amateurishle vees of the Mongol nomads.T o Smith, the question should not be why the Mongols lost, but why the Mamluks won.4 David O. Morgan insisted that in the long run the Mongols could not conquer Syria for logistical reasons. Like Hungary, as argued by Denis Sinor, 5 Syria lacked sufficientp asturest o supply Mongol horses, as Hulegu himself stated in an epistle to King St. Louis of France in 1262. In addition, as Bar Hebraeus, quoted by Morgan, noted, the Mongols and their horses suffered greatly from summer heat; Syria lacked even sufficient water for their needs.6 However Morgan weakened his case, or at least his analogy, when he later observed that the Mongols, the inadequate ecology of the Alfoldi notwithstanding, wintered in Hungary, and signified their intention to stay there after Batu's campaign by issuing coinage in Hungary. Despite questioning Sinor's statistics as improbablyp recise,h owever,M organs till endorsedh is conclusion:H ungary had attractive pastures, but not enough to provide for a sufficiently large Mongol occupation army.7 To Morgan, the failure of the Mongols to return to Hungary suggests that they tempered their ambitions with geographic common sense.8 Peter Thorau re-examined the strategy and tactics of the battle of Ayn Jalut, disputing the common description of its outcome as the result of a Mamluk ambush of the Mongols.9 Edmond Schutz emphasized the geopolitical significance of the respective Mamluk and Ilkhanid hinterlands as the explanation of Mamluk
1 My thanks to Professor Devin DeWeese for reading an earlier draft of this essay. All remaining errors are my responsibility alone. 2 Constantin DOhsson, Histoire des Mongols despuis Tchinguiz Khan jusqud Timour Bey ou Tamerlin (Le Haye-Amsterdam: Les freres Van Cleef, 1834), II, 342. 3 1 have dealt with the myth of Mongol invincibility in East Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East in Russo-Tatar relations in Mongol context, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 51/3 (1998), 325-35. 4 John Masson Smith, Ayn Jalut: Mamluk success or Mongol failure? Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 44/2 (December 1984), 307-45. 5 Denis Sinor, Horse and pasture in Inner Asia, Oriens Extremis, 19 (1972), 181-2. 6 David O. Morgan, The Mongols and Syria, 1260-1300, in Peter W. Edbury (ed.), Crusade and settlement. Papers read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East and presented to R.C. Smail (Cardiff: Cardiff Press, 1985), 231-5. 7 According to Juvaini, if the diviners had allowed it, the Mongols would have returned to attack Hungary. John Andrew Boyle, The Mongols in Europe, History Today, 9/5 (1959), 340, reprinted in John Andrew Boyle, The Mongol World Empire 1206-1370 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1977), Essay v. 8 David O. Morgan, The Mongols (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 139-41. 9 Peter Thorau, The battle of Ayn Jalut: a reexamination, in Edbury (ed.), Crusade and settlement, 236-41.

The Kipchak connection: the Ilkhans, the Mamluks and Ayn Jalut1

29

failure to hold Syria and Palestine. For the Mongols, these areas were too far away from Iran, the intervening terrain was hostile and inhospitable, and the Ilkhanids faced major threats on the north-western and north-eastern borders from the Juchid Golden Horde and the Chagatayids. By contrast, Egypt, the primary manpower source for Mamluk campaigns, was closer to Syria, faced, after neutralizing the Crusader fortresses, no inhibitions to moving troops northward through friendly territory, and bordered no rival on its south. In short, the deck was stacked against the Mongols.10 Reuven Amitai-Preiss has recently provided the most extensive study of the battle and its long aftermath in Ilkhanid-Mamluk relations.11 Amitai-Preiss disputes Morgan's emphasis on logistics, evaluating Hulegu's letter to St. Louis as an ex post facto rationalization. Fully one-third of the Mongol army was comprised of non-Mongols, mainly Armenians and Georgians, who would not have required pasture for their horses; neither would Ilkhanid infantry. Fields and supplies would have supplemented natural pasturage. Campaigning in winter would have avoided the summer heat, and provided snow for water; moreover, rivers, not just rainfall, also supplied needed water. More importantly, and unlike the Hungarian scenario, the Mongols did make further attempts to invade Syria after their defeat.12 Amitai-Preiss also disagreed with Smith's assessment of the relative fighting abilities of the two armies. According to Amitai-Preiss, Smith has exaggerated Mamluk superiority and minimized Mongol training, equipment, and tactics.13 Hulegu had led the Mongol invasion of Syria which occupied Aleppo and Damascus. However, he withdrew the bulk of his forces before the invasion of Palestine, either to reposition them to defend Azerbaijan from the rival Golden Horde, or to back up any political moves he might make in support of Khubilai against Ariq Boke in the civil war which had already broken out and which would permanently fragment the world Mongol Empire, or simply because of bad intelligence of the size of the Mamluk relief force en route from Egypt.14 It is clear that both in 1260 and later, holding Syria was more important to the Mamluks than annexing it was to the Ilkhans; for this reason, the Egyptian Arabic sources devote much more attention to the warfare there than do the Ilkhanid Persian chronicles.15This makes sense: to the Ilkhanids, the defence of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus remained the higher, if not their highest, priority. Efforts to expand into Syria could only be undertakenw hen repulsingt he Juchidsa nd Chagatayidsd id not have first claim on Ilkhanid resources. Nevertheless, the Ilkhanids did not willingly or quickly abandon their pretensions to Mamluk territory. Amitai-Preiss attributes this stubborn and ultimately futile Ilkhanid pursuit of Syria to vestigial Mongol imperial ideology. Before Ayn Jalut the Mamluks had executed Mongol envoys, a grave diplomatic offence in the Inner Asian world.16 The defeat of Ayn Jalut itself cried out for revenge. The mandate to Chinggis from Tengri to conquer all those who lived in felt tents remained, Amitai-Preissc oncludes,a n importante lemento f Ilkhanidc ulture,s ignificante nough to motivate antagonism against the Mamluks for 60 years. The 'Mongol imperial idea of manifest destiny', he argues, continued to animate Ilkhanid policy towards Syria long after Ayn Jalut.17 The Kipchaks in Mongol ideology While it is true that by 1260 the expansion of the Grand Mongol Empire had already far exceeded its original divine mandate-the East Slavs, conquered 1237-40, certainlyd id not dwelli n felt tents-AmitaiPreiss is certainlyc orrect that the Ilkhanidss haredC hinggis'sl egacy. But Amitai-Preissa lso mentions another matter which infused Ilkhanid animus against the Mamluks. There is a letterf rom Hulegut o
10 Edmond Schiitz, The decisive motives of Tatar failure in the Ilkhanid-Mamluk fight in the Holy Land, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 45 (1991), 3-22. 11 Reuven Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1260-1281 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995) 12 ibid., 26-9, 225-9. 13 ibid., 214-25. 14 Peter Jackson, The dissolution of the Mongol Empire, Central Asiatic Journal, 22 (1978), 186-244 sees the Mamluk-Golden Horde alliance as signifying the dissolution of the Mongol Empire, not the succession dispute. 15 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 137. 16 Denis Sinor, Diplomatic practices in medieval Inner Asia, in C.E. Bosworth, Charles Issawi, Roger Savory and A.L. Udovich, (ed.), The Islamic worldfrom classical to modern times: essays in honor of Bernard Lewis (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1989), 339-47; Halperin, Russo-Tatar relations in Mongol context, 322-50. 17 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 8-11, 128, 229-35. Cf. Devin DeWeese, Islamization and native religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tiikles and conversion to Islam in historical and epic tradition (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 521-2, 526-7 for some remarks upon the emphasis in Inner Asian studies on the Imperial, and Chingissid, traditions.

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Qutuzp reservedin the ArabicM amlukh istoriography, originally in Ibn al-Furat and from there to Maqrizi. The letter, obviously written by a Muslim, was couched in Islamic terms and replete with quotations from the Quran which the non-Muslim Hulegu could hardly have mustered. Despite its Islamic tinge, the epistle expressed the Chingissid theory of divine right to rule the world. Rebels would be destroyed, there was no escape, resistance was futile. But the beginning of the letter gave voice to another theme. It described al-Malik al-Muzaffar Qutuz as 'of the race of mamluks who f led before our sword into this country, who enjoyed its comforts and then killed its rulers'. Amitai-Preissa nalysest his rhetorica s a denigrationo f Qutuz's servile and refugee origins, and the method by which he came to the throne.18 Qutuz was, of course, a refugee from Khwarazm, a member of a mercenary contingent which had f led the Mongols; he is variously described as a Turkman,19 Turkman or Ghuzz, 20 or Kipchak. 21 There is no doubt that Baybars, commander-in-chief for and successor of Qutuz, not to mention the ringleader of his assassination, was a Kipchak, probably from the Burchogli tribe. 22 Amitai-Preiss writes that Baybars could not have withstood the Ilkhans without 'a constant inf lux of mamluks, the majority of whom came from territory under the control of the Golden Horde'. Efforts by the Ilkhans to interdict this trade, or even to prevent direct trade between Iran and Egypt, failed. 23 Kipchaks dominated the Egyptian Mamluk corps during the Bahri period (1250-1382), and did not relinquish that pre-eminence to the Circassians until after the disintegration of the Ilkhanate. Berke, Muslim khan of the Golden Horde, permitted his fellow Muslim, Baybars, Mamluk Sultan of Egypt and ally against the Ilkhanids, to purchase slaves in Juchid territory: 200 in 1262, 1,300 in 1263, and more in 1264. 24 Kipchak Turkic became the spoken and literary language of the Mamluk military-political elite, all of whose members, even if not of Kipchak or even Turkic origin, took Turkish names to distinguish them from their Arabic-named subjects and children. Kipchaks were not 'recruited' as eunuchs in Egypt. When a Mamluk Sultan wanted to praise his Turkman auxiliaries, he called them 'pure Kipchaks'. 25 The Mamluks knew full well that it was the Mongol conquest of Western Eurasia which created the conditions under which Egypt could purchase adolescent males to become Mamluks, and adolescent females to become their wives, from the Kipchak steppe. Amitai-Preiss quotes Nuwayri from 1332 as the earliest Mamluk historian to articulate this consciousness. After describing the previous difficulty the Ayyubids suffered in procuring Kipchak Turkish
18 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 36. The full text of the letter and the accompanying narrative of the Ayn Jalut campaign have been translated into English from Maqrizi in Bernard Lewis (ed. and tr.), Islam. From the Prophet Muhammed to the capture of Constantinople. Volume 1: Politics and war (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 84-9, letter 84-5. 19 Herbert M. J. Loewe, The Mongols, in Cambridge Medieval History iv (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936), 643; James Ross Sweeney, Spurred on by the fear of death : refugees and displaced population during the Mongol invasion of Hungary, in Michael Gervers and Wayne Schlepp (ed.), Nomadic diplomacy, destruction and religion from the Pacific to the Adriatic (Toronto Studies in Central and Inner Asia No. 1), (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994), 36. 20 A.N. Poliak, Le caractere colonial de lEtat mamelouk dans ses rapports avec le Horde dOr, Revue des Etudes islamiques, 35/3 (1935), 237-8. 21 Yuri Bregel, Turko-Mongol influence on Central Asia, in Robert L. Canfield (ed.), Turko-Persia in historical perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 59-60. According to Robert Irwin, The Middle East in the middle ages: the early Mamluk Sultanate, 1250-1382 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 13, as much as half of the Khwarazm shahs army were Kip chaks. 22 Peter B. Golden, An introduction to the history of the Turkic peoples. Ethnogenesis and stateformation in medieval and early modern Eurasia and the Middle East (Turcologia, Band 9), (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992), 349. 23 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 78-91, 207-11. Quotation from p. 85. 24 The later division within the Golden Horde between Nogai and Khan Toqtu, coupled with a steppe drought, led to an increase in the availability of Kipchaks to be sold to the Mamluks. Irwin, The Middle East, 88. 25 Poliak, Le caractere colonial, 231-48 argued that the Egyptian Sultanate was a vassal, or colony, of the Golden Horde, and that the dominance of Egypt by Kipchaks was a function of that status. For a running refutation of his argument see David Ayalon, The Circassians in the Mamluk Kingdom, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 69 (1949), 135-47, reprinted in his Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt (1250-1517) (London: Variorum Reprints, 1977), Essay iv. See also David Ayalon, The Muslim city and the Mamluk military aristocracy, Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 2 (1968), 311-29, rpt. Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt, Essay vII; Ayalon, Names, titles, nisbas of the Mamluks, Israel Oriental Studies, v (1975), 193-8, rpt. in his The Mamluk military society. Collected studies (London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), Essay Iv; Ayalon, The eunuchs in the Mamluk sultanate, in Studies in memory of Gaston Wiet (Jerusalem, 1977), 273-4, rpt. The Mamluk military society, Essay III; Ayalon, The auxiliary forces of the Mamluk Sultanate, Der Islam, 65 (1988), 16, rpt. in his Islam and the abode of war. Military slaves and Islamic adversaries (London: Variorum Reprints, 1994), Essay vii.

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Mamluks, he wrote: 'The [Mongols] fell upon [the Qipchaqs] and brought upon them death, slavery and captivity. At this time, merchants bought [these captives] and brought them to the [various] countries and cities. The first who demanded many of them and made them lofty and advanced them in the army was al-Malik al-Salih Najm al-Din Ayyub '. 26 Other Mamluk sources highlight the role of the Mongol invasions of western Eurasia in setting into effect a chain of events which led to the creation of an Egyptian Mamluk army comprised of peoples-Turkic, Mongol, and others-who had previously lived under Mongol rule, in Central Asia and the Pontic-Caspian steppes. 27 Even though the army of Qutuz contained Turkmen, Beduins and Kurds, the Egyptian Mamluks were dominated by a Kipchak military and political elite. The 10,000 or so Royal Mamluks, stationed in the Cairo fortress, supplied the majorg overnmentaol fficialsa s well as generals.A lthoughH ulegu'sp ut-down pointed directly at Qutuz and not at the Mamluks in general, it would still ref lectt he abilityo f Mongol intelligenceg atheringt o uncoverv ital information about its foes. If Hulegu knew of Qutuz's origin, then the Ilkhanate surely knew that Baybars and the majority of the Mamluks were Kipchaks. Therefore, althoughs imilara llusionst o the Mamluks'e thnicityd id not apparentlyr ecur in any further exchanges of insults between the Ilkhanate and Egypt, we can still conclude that the Ilkhanids would have perceived the Mamluk elite as Kipchaks. And therein lies a possible tale, since the Kipchaks and the Mongols by 1260 certainly had a definite history. The Kipchaks before the Mongol Conquest The Kipchaks, usually called Polovtsy in East Slavic sources, Cumans/Kumans in Latin and Greeks ources,i f they can all be consideredr eferencest o a single ethnos, 28 constituted one of the most widespread Turkic pastoral nomadic confederacies 29 ever to occupy the Pontic and CaspianS teppes.A ccordingt o Peter Golden they were 'one of the most importantt ribal confederationso f medievalE urasia,w hose representativeasr e to be found everywhereD: anubian Europe, Byzantium, Ayyubid and Mamluk Syria and Egypt, Transcaucasia, Rus', Xwarazm and Central Eurasia, India and China'. 30 Golden's identification of the five main tribal or supratribalz ones of the Kipchakst estifiest o their dispersion:C entral Asia-Kazakhstan;V olga-Ural river Mesopotamia; Don river; Dniepr river; and Danubian. 31 Because of their predominantly military roles, typical of Turkic nomads, Irwin terms the Kipchaks the Ghurkas of the Middle Ages. 32 Beginning in the eleventh century, before the arrival of the Mongols, the Kipchaks engaged in an especially wide variety of intimate contacts with the Kievan Rus'. Trade consisted in the exchange of Kipchak horses, hides and sheep for East Slavic furs, cloth, grain, slaves and artisanal goods. Intermarriager eacheds uch proportionsa mong the princelyl ines that some twelfth-centuryp rinces were literally seven-eighthsT urkic by blood. While marriageso f Riurikidp rincest o Kipchakw omen( who convertedt o Orthodox Christianity) were the norm, there was even one case of a Rus' princess marrying a Kipchak leader. The nexus of alliance and warfare included both Kipchak aid to one East Slavic prince against another, and coalitions of East Slavic princes embarking upon major campaigns into the steppe against the Kipchaks. The Kievans knew the Kipchak tribes and clans, chieftains and clan elders by name and geographic location. Bilingualism could be found on both sides of the steppe/sown divide, especially in Rus' princely households with Kipchak women, or on the frontier, and created conditions conducive to cultural exchange. Kipchak oral epics, notably the tale of Otrok and the wormwood, found expression in East Slavic
26 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 18. 27 David Ayalon, The Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan. A re-examination. The position of the Yasa in the Mamluk sultanate. C , Studia Islamica, 36 (1972), 117-23, reprinted in David Ayalon, Outsiders in the Land of Islam: Mamluks, Mongols and Eunuchs (London: Variorum Reprints, 1988), Essay Ivc. 28 Peter B. Golden, The peoples of the South Russian steppe, in Denis Sinor (ed.), The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 278, concludes that in current scholarship the relationship of the Cumans to the Kipchaks remains unclear. 29 Even the term confederation implies a greater degree of unity among the Kipchak clan and tribal groupings than actually occurred, but substituting supratribe would not help matters much. 30 Peter B. Golden, Cumanica I: The Qipcaqs and Georgia, Archivum Eurasia Medii Aevi, 4 (1984), 47. 31 Golden, The peoples of the South Russian steppe, 280. 32 Irwin, The Middle East, 17.

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chronicles. The unsuccessful campaign of prince Igor Sviatoslavovich of Novgorod-Seversko f 1186 against the Kipchaksw as commemoratedin the famous epic, Slovo o polku Igoreve. The Rus' copied military weapons (swords, taut bows) and horse accoutrement(ss addlesa nd stirrups)f rom the Kipchaks. The Polovtsy were a major factor in the history of the Kievan Rus' for far longer than any other Turkic or steppe people. 33 The Kipchaks could not remain entirely outside the Byzantine orbit. In the eleventh century Emperor Alexius Comnenus enrolled Kipchaks as foederati or hiredt hem as mercenariesa, nd used them againstt he Patzinaks( Pechenegs) in 1091. He settled some of them in the Balkans, and may have granted some pronoia. Despite this alliance, the Kipchaks continued to attack Byzantine Balkan territory through the 1160s.34 In the Caucasus,K ipchaki nfluencew as no less visible.D avut'I I of Georgia, who was married to a Kip chak, invited Atrak (Otrok) and 40,000 warriors, perhaps 200,000-225,000 people, to settle in Georgia, where they constituted part of a regular standing army. Many Georgianized and Christianized. However, when the Rus' pressure on their native Pontic steppes relaxed, many returned there; later, others left for eastern Anatolia. In the later twelfth century, under Queen T'amar, Kipchaks remained prominent in Georgian politics. Qubasar was loyal to the Bagratid dynasty, and helped Giorgi III to put down a rebellion in 1177, whereas Qutlu Arslan, the Lord High Treasurer, supported the aristocratic opposition. The Georgian Kipchaks who had not returned to the steppe fought against Kipchak elements serving rival Muslim Caucasian statelets in Azerbaijan. The Kipchak ghulam Il-Dengis (1133-72) even founded his own, albeit brief, dynasty, under Seljuk overlordship.T he twelfth-centuryA zerbaijanp oet al-Nizami had a Kipchak wife. All these Kipchaks in the Caucasus were later overrun by Jebe and Subudai, and by the resurgentJ alal ad Din, beforeb eing incorporatedin to the ChinggisidE mpire. Some may have contributed to the formation of later Muslim peoples in the Caucasus. Armenians fleeing the Seljuks founded a colony in the Crimea, where they eventually adopted the Kipchak Turkic language and, in their Polish and Ukrainiane xile, left a rich Armeno-Kipchakli terature.35 Kipchaks also appeared in the history of Central Asia, specifically Khwarazm, as objects of religious warfare or as political allies supplying military aid, mercenaries or ghulams. The first mention of Kipchaks came in 1032, the last on the eve of the Mongol invasion, c. 1216. Eventually their centre, Sighnaq, was incorporated into the empire of the Khwarazmshah. The Kipchaks attained their greatest prominence during the reign of Tekash (died 1200), the father of Muhammed, Khwarazm shah, who faced the wrath of Chinggis. The Kipchaks per se impinged only on the fringes of Muslim Central Asia, although as elements of the Qanli confederation they were to be found even in the middle Syr Darya; the inf luence of the Ghuzz far outweighed that of the Kipchaks. 36 In the twelfth century Kipchak contingents entered the military service of the Delhi sultanate as ghulams. They were joined by more fellow Kipchaks f leeing the Mongols. Supposedly 30,000 Kipchaks from Afghanistan brief ly ruled the Delhi sultanate. 37
33 For a summary with bibliography to date, see Charles J. Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde: the Mongol impact on medieval Russian history (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985), 14-20. More recent bibliography includes S. A. Pletneva, Polovtsy (Leningrad: Nauka, 1990), 66-70, 67, 92-3, 103-4 (mother of Bashkord was Rus), 144-5; Peter Golden, Aspects of the nomadic factor in the economic development of Kievan Rus , in I. S. Koropeckyj (ed.), Ukrainian economic history. Interpretive essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1991), 52, 65, 68, 71, 77-9, 83, 86, 97-101; Thomas S. Noonan, Rus, Pechenegs, and Polovtsy: economic interaction along the steppe frontier in the pre-Mongol Era, Russian History, 19/1-4 (1992), 301-26; 0. Pritsak, The Polovcians and Rus, Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevii, 2 (1982), 321-80; Peter B. Golden, Cumanica III: Urusoba, in Denis Sinor (ed.), Aspects of Altaic civilization nI (Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series, V. 145); (Bloomington, IN: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1990), 33-46; Peter B. Golden, The peoples of the south Russian steppe, 277-84; Peter B. Golden, The Qipcaqs of medieval Eurasia: an example of stateless adaptation in the steppes, in Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks (ed.), Rulers from the steppe: state formation on the Eurasian periphery (Los Angeles: Ethnographics Press, University of Southern California, 1991), 132-57; Peter B. Golden, Cumanica. iv: the tribes of the Cuman-Qipcaqs, Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevii, 9 (1995-1997), 99-122. 34 George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, tr. Joan Hussey (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), 366-7, 370; Irwin, The Middle East, 16; Omeljan Pritsak, Cumans, in A. Kazhdan, (ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), i, 563-4. 35 Golden, Cumanica I, 50-86; Peter B. Golden, The Turkic peoples of the Caucasus, in Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.), Transcaucasia. Nationalism and social change. Essays in the history of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, 1983), 59-61, 56 n. 37; Pletneva, Polovtsy, 140. 36 W. Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion (fourth ed.; Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1977), 179, 296, 320, 328, 330, 340-1,.342-4, 349, 356-8, 369-71. 37 Peter B. Golden, Cumanica II: The Olberli (Olperli): the fortunes and misfortunes of an Inner Asian nomadic clan, Archivum

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A large contingent of Kipchaks under Kotan, supposedly 40,000 archers (an exaggeration, perhaps; some lower estimates say 17,000-20,000 families), f led the Mongols into Hungary after the Battle on the river Kalka in 1223, where they became embroiled in disputes between King Bela IV and his nobles, and their herds rode roughshod over the peasants' agricultural fields. This infestation merely capped off prior Hungarian-Kipchak contacts. In 1085 Salomon had married the daughter of the Kipchak Prince Kutesc and used Kipchak aid to attack his cousin, St. Ladislas. Salomon was defeated and the Kipchaks driven from the country. In 1219 Mstislav of Novgorod brought Kipchak allies into his campaign against Hungarian-ruled Halicz. Hungarian missionaries had long striven to convert the Kipchaks. Their first Provincial, Paulus Hungaricus, endured martyrdom for his efforts. In 1227 Archbishop of Esztergom Robert baptized the Kipchak prince Barc, his son, and 15,000 people. Soon after his accession Bela IV had taken the title ' King of Comania'; he had probably had close contacts with the Kipchaks of the lower Danubian plain while still prince of Transylvania. The Kipchak immigration has left many toponyms and much fascinating archaeological evidence of its presence. 38 More Kipchaks f led to the Byzantine empire in the wake of the Kalka disaster. Theodore Lascaris, Emperor of Nicea, settled some in Asia Minor. 39 The first contact between the Mongols and the Kipchaks created bad blood between them. The reconnaissance in force of Jebe and Subudai, which broke through the Caucasus, encountered a joint force of Kipchaks and Alans. The Mongols invoked their common nomadic heritage to suborn the Kipchaks away from the Kipchak-Alan alliance, promising to give the Kipchaks the spoils after defeating the Alans. The Kipchaks, for the first and last time, believed the Mongol propaganda and broke off, permitting the Mongols to quash the Alans. Unfortunately for the Kipchaks, the Mongols, instead of keeping their promise, then turned on the Kipchaks. The defeated Kipchaks f led, and eventually made a second alliance with the Kievan Rus'. The Mongols tried another variant of the same divide-and-conquer ploy, telling the Kievan princes: We hear that you are coming against us, having listened to the Polovtsy, and we have no designs on your land, nor your cities, nor your villages, and we are not marching against you. We come only at God's will against our slaves (kholopy) and our cattle-herders (koniusy), the pagan Polovtsy. And you should make peace with us; if they run to you, you can defeat them and have their goods. Because we have heard that they have done much evil to you, for which we will defeat them. Burnt once by this diplomatic gambit, the Kipchaks did not permit the East Slavs to become its vic tims. Instead, they persuaded the East Slavs to murder the Mongol envoys, thus guaranteeing war, which eventuated in the Mongol victory which sent refugee Kipchaks into Hungary and elsewhere.40 The Kipchaks thus bore the burden of guilt for executing Mongol envoys. More importantly, this text establishes that even before the Mongols and the Kipchaks had properly been introduced, the Mongols had already subsumed them under the rubric of 'all those who live in felt tents', which they were, of course. Therefore, by the decision of Tengri the Mongols felt entitled to treat the Kipchaks as their slaves, despite the disingenuous, to say the least, fraternal sentiments expressed on the eve of a possible Kipchak/Alan battle. Moreover, we have further confirmation of this Mongol claim that the Kipchaks should be subordinate to the Mongols, and that anyone who aided the Kipchaks to avoid this fate ipso facto became enemies of the Mongols. This confirmation comes from a message from Batu to King Bela IV of Hungary, preserved in the epistle to the bishop of Perouse, apostolic legate in Hungary, by a Hungarian Dominican missionary, Julian, who had visited the Pontic steppe and ran into Mongols in 1237. Batu excoriated Bela for giving sanctuary to the Kipchaks, the Mongols' slaves (Comanos servos nostros sub tua protectione
Eurasiae Medii Aevi, 8 (1986) [1988], 26-8. 38 Denis Sinor, History of Hungary (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), 66-7; Andras Paloczi-Horvath, Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians: steppe people in medieval Hungary (Budapest: Corvina, 1989), 39-61, 68-119; Laszlo Makkai, Chapter IV. Transformation into a Western-type State, 1196-1301, in Peter Sugar (ed.), A history of Hungary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 25. 39 Irwin, The Middle East, 17. 40 On the Tale of the Battle on the river Kalka, see Charles J. Halperin, The Tatar Yoke (Columbus, OH: Slavica Press, 1986), 26-34. The quotation is from A.N. Nasonov (ed.), Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis starshego imladshego izvodov (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1950), p. 62 (complete tale pp. 61-3).

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suscepisti). In Sinor's summary, 'The reason for Mongol grievances was also plainly stated: the asylum given by Bela to the Comans, f leeing before the Mongols'. According to the Mongol ultimatum, only if Bela 'returned' the fugitive Kipchaks to their rightful rulers could he spare his kingdom a Mongol invasion.41 The Kipchaks under Mongol rule While the Mongols did not permanently occupy Hungary, their conquest of the Kipchak demographic heartland, the Pontic and Caspian steppes, exercised a profound and ultimately decisive inf luence upon the Kipchaks' later fate. The Mongols altered some previous processes of Kipchak history. According to Khazanov, the Mongols terminated the gradual transformation of the Kipchak economy to an agricultural, cattle-breeding complex with a semisedentary way of life, which had begun in the twelfth century.42 The adoption of East Slavic Orthodox Christianity and agriculture were long viewed in Russian historiography as evidence of the inf luence of 'superior' East Slavic culture over that of the nomads. The Mongols rewrote the ethnic map of central and western Eurasia, virtually extinguishing the independent existence of Kipchak clans and tribes. According to Schamiloglu, Mongol population transfers resulted in the replacement of Volga Bolgar, closer to the Chuvash language, with Kipchak Turkic languages closer to Bashkir, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Noghay, in the MiddleV olga, which came to predominatea nd ultimately led to the formationo f the modern Kazan' Tatarl anguage.43 Bartholdw rote that the Kipchaks ceased to be heard of 'as a people' (kak narod bol'she ne upominaetsiaa) fter the Mongol conquest.44 However, the Kipchaksd id not disappear that quickly or without trace. In the short run, they continued to exist in their homeland; in addition, the Mongol conquest created, in Irwin's again apt phrasing, a (new and bigger) Kipchak Diaspora.45 It is easy to overlook two facets of the disintegrationo f Kipchaks ociety: first, it did not take place overnight, so that groups of Kipchaks remained autonomous,o r at least self-conscious,d uringt he remaindero f the thirteenth century, even when under direct Mongol rule. Indeed, DeWeese speaks of the 'growing consciousness of the assimilation and common identity among the nomadic population' of the Juchid ulus, the lack of separate Mongol and Kipchak ethnic loyalties, evidenced by the attribution to Idigu (Edigei) of a decree forbidding Tatars to sell their children as slaves, thus decreasing the number of slaves in Egypt and Syria. Even if this prohibition is ascribed to khan Jani-Beka s an Islamizingm easure,i t illustratest he durabilityo f Kipchak ethnic separatismi n the Golden Horde well into the second half of the fourteenthc entury,i f not the turno f the fifteenth century.46 Second,s ome Kipchak elements had f led, escaping direct Mongol rule, temporarily or permanently and, to one degree or another, remained active, if secondary, players on the political scene. The Kipchak confederacy had never risen to the level of a nomadice mpire,n o ' KipchakK hanate' ever existed, 47 and the widelyd istributed Kipchak subclans, clans and tribes never co-ordinated their activities, before or after the Mongol incursions. Nevertheless, over a broad expanse of territory, Kipchaks remained highly visible in the second half of the thirteenth century. During the Mongol invasion of Hungary, the presence of Kipchaks in Batu's army further inf lamed popular and noble Hungarian opposition to Kotan and his people. Kotan, compromised as well by previous ties to anti-Hungarian East Slavic princes, was murdered, which led the Hungarian Kipchaks to revolt, plunder the regions of Hungary in which they had settled, and f lee to the lower Danubianp lain
41 Denis Sinor, Un voyageur du treizieme siecle: le Dominican Julien de Hongrie, BSOAS, 14 (1952), 591, 593-5; reprinted in Denis Sinor, Inner Asia and its contacts with medieval Europe (London: Variorum Reprints, 1977), Essay XI; Sinor, History of Hungary, 66. 42 A.M. Khazanov, Characteristic features of nomadic communities in the Eurasian steppe, in Wolfgang Weissleder (ed.), The nomadic alternative. Modes and models of interaction in the African-Asian deserts and steppes (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), 121. 43 Uli Schamiloglu, The formation of a Tatar historical consciousness: $ihabaddin Marcani and the image of the Golden Horde, Central Asiatic Survey, 9/2 (1990), 41. 44 V.V. Bartold (W. Barthold), Kipchaki, Sochineniia v (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), 551 (from a contribution to the Encyclopedia of Islam). 45 Irwin, The Middle East, 17. 46 DeWeese, Islamization and native religion, 339-40; Pletneva, Polovtsy, 186, dates the effective completion of Mongol assimilation of the Kipchaks to the middle of the fourteenth century. 47 The absence of a Kipchak Khanate of Kipchaks motivates my reservations at using that term to describe the Juchid ulus, in preference to the anachronistic term the Golden Horde. The East Slavic sources for the Mongol period never reference a polovetskoe tsarstvo.

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in Bulgaria.A fter the departureo f Batu's army, Bela bought their return to repopulate and defend his ravished realm in part by marrying his son Stephen V to Kotan's daughter. Many Kipchaks resettled in Hungary. They enjoyed royal privileges and rights, which were much resented, and were supposed to convert to Catholicism. But their continued paganism, the interest of Kipchak men in Hungarian women, which could not be reciprocatedb y Hungarianm en who found Kipchakw omenu gly, and the incursiono f Kipchakh erdso nto Hungarianf armlandl, ed to continued tensions and problems. Yet again some Kipchaks emigrated in the 1280s. Stephen V's half-Kipchak son Ladislas IV the Cuman infuriated much of his country by his preference for Kipchak ways. Fleeing his libertine and domineering Kipchak mother, he moved in with her Kipchak relatives, dressed like a Kipchak and married a Kipchak beauty in a pagan ceremony-or at least took her as his mistress (to scandalized Catholics, pretty much the same thing). Opposition to Ladislas IV led to his eventual assassination by Kipchaks, either as a defensive move or as hired hitmen. As freemen the Kipchaks could bear arms, which they used to support the King, who in turn defended their rights and liberties against Hungarian aristocrats and landlords who wanted to reduce them to servile status, a battle the Kipchaks later lost. Kipchaks continued to fight as separate units in the Hungarian army through the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, before assimilating and disappearing. However, from 1260 on, they seem mostly to have been employed against other Catholic Central European rulers. There were some Golden Horde raids into Hungary, but no major hostilities between the Juchids and the renegade Kipchaks. In the fourteenth century the Hungarian Kipchaks did fight fellow Kipchaks allied with voivode Basaraba of Wallachia; on the other hand, in 1284 the Hun garian king called in Kipchak aid against his own people. Obviously the Kipchaks contributed to the anarchy and disorder in the realm, which was primarily driven by the antagonism between the King and his nobles.48 Other refugee Kipchak groupings played a major role in the history of the Balkans in the thirteenth century. The Asenid and perhaps Terterid dynasties of the Second Bulgarian Empire were of Kipchak origin. Kipchaks in Bulgaria reinforced the aristocracy, formed the cutting edge of the Bulgarian army, and remained visible and active. Bulgaria paid tribute to Nogai of the Juchid ulus, whose son Chaku married into the Bulgarian house and brief ly ruled it. Mercenary Kipchaks and Tatars defended Bul garia against the Ottomans.49 Greg Rogers has speculated that there is a connection between the Kipchak presence in Bulgaria, which included direct refugees from the Pontic steppe and double-refugees from Hungary, and the salient fact that Bulgaria was the only country in east central Europe from which the Mongols did not entirely withdraw after the great European campaign of 1241-42; Bulgaria remained tributary. 50 Other Kipchaks turned again to Byzantium for employment. John III Vatatzes reputedly settled 10,000 refugee Kipchaks in Thrace and Macedonia in the Balkans, and in Asia Minor, as soldier-farmers (stratiotai). Michael VIII Paleologus employed Kipchak mercenaries in defeating the Latins at Pelagonia in 1259 in order to recover Constantinople from the Latin Empire created by the Fourth Crusade, despite an unfortunate experience in 1256 when Kipchaks had deserted the Byzantines on the field of battle and switched sides to the Bulgarians. 51 Most Kipchaks became the subjects of the Mongol Empire in the Eurasian steppes. We know something about their assimilation by the Mongols 52 in the Golden Horde, which occupied the Kipchak heartland, the Pontic and Caspian steppes. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Mongols gradually 'turkicized', adopting the Kipchak language. Contemporaries were quite well aware of the ethnic continuity in the west Eurasian steppe, and continued to designate that zone as the Desht-i Kipchak, the Kipchak steppe. The Mongols had encountereds eriouso ppositionf rom the Kipchaks,a mong others,p
48 Sinor, History of Hungary, 68-81; Makkai, Transformation, 31. 49 Charles J. Halperin, Bulgars and Slavs in the First Bulgarian Empire: a reconsideration of the historiography, Archivum Eurasia Medii Aevi, 3 (1983), 199-200. 50 Greg Rogers, An examination of historians explanations for the Mongol withdrawal from east Central Europe, East European Quarterly, 30/1 (1996), 21-2. 51 Ostrogorsky, History, 442; Pritsak, The polovcians and Rus, i: 563-4; Irwin, The Middle East, 16-7. 52 Perhaps Mongols would be preferable here; I am using Mongol as a political, not ethnic, term, to encompass all Mongol and Turkic peoples integrated into Batus invasion force and occupation army.

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reparatory to launching their campaigns against the East Slavs and Eastern Europe; they surelyw antedt o ensuret hat they neverf aced such problemsa gain. 53 For this reason, or as part of their habitual social engineering in the steppe, the Mongols restructuredt he Kipchak tribes, relocatingt hem from their native haunts to unfamiliar areas, reconstituting them into new military and later tribal groupings with Mongol names. 54 During the thirteenth century the Kipchaks still retained a good deal of their ethnic identity and language. A synaxarionf rom Sudak in the Crimea discriminatedb etween Kipchak and Tatar( = Mongol) convertst o OrthodoxC hristianitya s late as the secondh alf of the fourteenthc entury. 55 Indeed, as we have already seen, the Kipchaks remaineds ufficientlyd ifferentiatedfr om the Mongols for the Juchidst o sell Kipchaks into slavery to their Egyptian Mamluk ally. There were Kipchaks in the Chagatayid ulus, although they were never as numerous as they were further west in the Juchid realm. According to Beatrice Forbes Manz, there were a fairly large number of Kipchak emirs in Timur's service,b ut there are few referencest o the Kipchakt ribe which, perhapsa s a subjectt ribe,d oes not seemt o havep ossessedi ts own territory. 56 As Khwarazm f luctuated between Juchid and Chagatayid rule, more Kipchaks might fall under Chagatayid rule. It is difficult to tell if the presence of the ethnonym 'Kipchak' among the later Bashkirs, Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Karakalpaks, ref lectse thnic continuityo f genuinelyK ipchake lements. 57 It is not surprising that Babur, the Timurid who wrote his autobiography at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries as he lost Central Asia to the Uzbeks and founded the Mughal Empire in Egypt, should occasionally mention Kipchak amirs, the Kipchak tribe, a Kipchak Road in Afghanistan, a Kipchak Pass, and a Kipchak Gate in Herat in Khorasan. 58 The Mongols typically employed subject peoples far away from their native habitats, and it was standard operating procedure to incorporate subjected nomadicp eoplesi nto the 'Mongol' armies.T herefore,i t is not surprisingt hat Kipchaks appeared very early, even after their initial encounter with the Mongols, in Mongolia. Subudai, according to the Yuan shi, was accompanied back from the reconnaissancew hich culminatedi n the battle on the river Kalka, by Kipchaks, who he incorporated, with the permission of Chinggis, into a new, special, corps with Merkits and Naimans. 59 Kipchaks appeared, accordingt o Juwainia nd Rashida l-Din, in Karakorumin the reigno f Ogodei. An obviously 'pagan' Kipchak paid with his life for denouncing a Muslim to Ogodei for slaughtering a sheep in the Islamic manner, presumably forbidden at that time. Ogodei was said to enjoy watching wrestlers, including Kipchaks, Mongols and Khitans. Finally, Tolui's son Qutuqtu possessed a Kipchak concubine, Buta Egechi. 60 Kipchaks were widely employed in China under the Mongols. Most were recruited in the 1220s and 1230s, but their descendants resided in China and retained their Kipchak identity. Even relying only upon Chinese sources, de Rachewiltz identified numerous prominent Kipchaks, mostly generals, in Yuan service. His statistics, chronologically, illustrate the continuing presence of Kipchaks in China. From c. 1200-59, he found four Kipchaks, of whom one was a darugachi (governor); 1260-94, 12, in cluding three darugachi; uncertain ating from 1280-1330, 13, with four darugachi; 1295-1368, 15, with
53 Thomas T. Allsen, Prelude to the Western campaign: Mongol military operations in the Volga-Ural region, 1217-1237, Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi, 3 (1983), 5-24. 54 On this process, see the two classic studies of G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, Obshchestvennyi stroi Zolotoi Ordy (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1973), and Kochevniki Vostochnoi Evropy pod vlastiu zolotoordynskikh khanov: Arkheologicheskie pamiatniki (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1986). 55 Istvan Vasary, Orthodox Christian Qumans and Tatars of the Crimea in the 13th and 14th centuries, Central Asiatic Journal, 32 (1988), 260-71. 56 Beatrice Forbes Manz, The rise and rule of Tamerlane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 163. 57 Khazanov, Characteristic features of nomadic communities, 123; K. Shanijazov, Early elements in the ethnogenesis of the Uzbeks, in The Nomadic Alternative, 147, 150-1; R.G. Kuzeev, Historical stratification of generic and tribal names and their role in the ethnogenetic study of Turkic peoples of Eastern Europe, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia, in ibid., 161-3. 58 Wheeler M. Thackston (ed. and tr.), The Baburnama: memoirs of Babur, prince and emperor (New York: Oxford University Press; Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, the Smithsonian Institute, 1996), 44-5, 63, 168, 288, 280. 59 E. Bretschneider, Medieval researches from eastern Asiatic sources (London: K Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1910), Vol. I, 298. 60 John Andrew Boyle (tr.) Al Juwaini, The history of the World Conqueror (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958 [re print Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997]), Vol. i, 206-7; John Andrew Boyle (tr.), Rashid al-Din, The successors of Genghis Khan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 78, 89, 312.

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eight darugachi; no data, 16; for a total of 60 Kipchaks, including 16 darugachi.61 At the very minimum, these data establish that the Kipchak contribution to the Yuan did not diminish over the entire history of that dynasty in China. In 1286 the Kipchak Guard regiment was formed. Tugh Tugha, of whom more in a moment, was entitled to make soldiers of all Kipchaks serving as slaves but, according to the Yian shi, he exceeded his mandate and took many plain people as well. This accusation indicates that rankand-file Kipchaks in China included both slaves and civilians. A 'Seal of the Kipchak Battalion of the Imperial Army', with inscriptions in Mongolian in 'Phags-pg script and in Chinese, was discovered in north-eastern Inner Mongolia in an ancestral homeland of the Mongols and the site of cities founded by Chinggis Khan's brothers and descendants. By 1322 the Kipchak Guard regiment comprised 35 chiliarchies, and was divided into Right and Left Kipchak regiments, with eighteen and ten chiliarchies respec tively. These units were assigned teachers of Confucianism and Mongolian script. In 1328 the General Commandery of the Lung-I Attendant and Imperial Army was formed from Kipchak Turks, to which in 1330 nine chiliarchies from the Left Kipchak Guards were transferred. These three regiments were also assigned land for agricultural colonies. Not surprisingly, individual Kipchaks rose to positions of great prominence under the Yuan. Tugh Tugha proposed the creation of ethnic armies in China, including Kipchaks, Karlukh and Kangli. He became commander of the Kipchak Guards, a position inherited by his son Chonggur. A second son Temur-Buga also made a career. Chonggur's son El-Temur greatly eclipsed both his father and grandfather. He became khan-maker and eminence grise, masterminding the coups which determined the dynastic succession in 1308 and 1328-30; as sole chancellor, he was the most powerful man in China after the Emperor. The suppression of the Kipchak court clique in 1335 might have ended El Temur's ascendency, but not the Kipchak presence in China. Indeed, as late as 1397 Ming decrees specifically permitted the Chinese to marry Kipchaks, described as blue-eyed blondes, and tried to regulate un-Chinese Kipchak marriage customs, such as the levirate, suggesting that as an ethnic group Kipchaks survived the overthrow of the Yuan.62 According to the Yuan shi biography of Tugh Tugha, black mare's milk (kumiss) was imported from the Kipchak steppe to the Mongol court in China because of its especially pleasant taste.63 The Kipchaks and the Ilkhanate Therefore,w hen the Ilkhanidse ncountereda largelyK ipchakM amlukp ower in Egypt and Syria, the effect must have been similar to that of waving multiple red f lags at an already enraged bull. The Kipchaks were themselves supposed to be Mongol slaves; by definition their opposition to Mongol sovereignty constituted rebellion. Above and beyond that, these Kipchaks derived, if involuntarilyf,r omt he GoldenH orde,t he Ilkhans'f iercesta nd fraternarl ival.64 The Ilkhanate'sM ongols surelyr ecognizedi n the MamlukK ipchakst he same peoplew ho constitutedt he bulk of the GoldenH orde'sm anpowerT. he Ilkhans also knew them as militarya uxiliarieso f Ilkhanidv assals tatesi n the Caucasus. The Ilkhanate's major Catholic contacts were with the Crusader states and their sponsors including the Papacy, not with Hungary, and the Ilkhanate's primary Balkan neighbour was Byzantium because of its role in Asia Minor and as a conduit of Golden Horde/Mamluk communication. It is therefore not very likely that the Ilkhanid Mongols would have been even peripherally aware of the Kipchak presence in Hungary and the Balkans. Ilkhan-Yuan relations were particularly favourable at this time, since Hulegu supported
61 Igor de Rachewiltz, Turks in China under the Mongols: a preliminary investigation of Turco-Mongol relations in the 13th and 14th centuries, in Morris Rossabi (ed.), China among equals: the Middle Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th-14th centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 285, 289, 290-1. 62 Golden, Cumanica II , 8-12; David M. Farquhar, The government of China under Mongolian Rule. A reference guide (Miinchener ostasiatische Studien, Band 53), (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1990), 272-3; Adam T. Kessler, Empires beyond the Great Wall. The heritage of Genghis Khan (Los Angeles: Natural History Museum of Los Angeles, 1993), 165, 167 fig. 114; Henry Serruys, Remains of Mongol customs in China during the Early Ming, Melanges chinois et bouddhiques, 16 (1957), 184 n. 132; ibid, The Mongols in China during the Hung-wu period (1368-1398) (Brussels: LInstitut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1959 = Mlanges chinois et bouddhiques, V. 11 [1956-1959]), 55 n. 61, 172-5. Bretschneider, Medieval researches, V. II, 72, cited a passage from the Chinese annals Kang mu sub anno 1237 that the Kipchaks had blue eyes and red hair. Pletneva, Polovtsy, 179-88 surveys the fate of the Kipchaks after the Mongol conquest, but does not mention Kipchaks in China. 63 Bretschneider, Medieval researches, I, 94 n. 244. 64 Sultan al-Nasir Muhammed ibn Qalawun (1310-41) even managed briefly to marry a Juchid Chingissid princess, Tulubiyya, after a series of unsuccessful missions to the Golden Horde to seek a bride. Irwin, The Middle East, 108.

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Khubilai against Ariq Boke and the Ilkhans recognized, at least symbolically, their dependence on the Yuan Khagan. Ilkhanids retained fiefs in China and Mongoliau nderY uanc ontrol;s entt ribute;a nd in returnr eceiveda mbassadors, Nestorian monks and Chinggisid princesses. Despite the distances involved, therefore, the extensive relations between the Ilkhans and the Yuan create the very real possibility that the Ilkhans knew of the role of Kipchaks in China as well. The loyaltyo f Kipchakst o the Mongols uccessors tateso nly highlighted the effrontery of the Egyptian Mamluk Kipchaks in opposing Ilkhanid expansion. Two additionalf actorsc omplicatedM amluk-Ilkhanatree lationss omewhat. First, regardlesso f the fact that the Mongols were portrayed,t hen as now, as infideld estroyerso f Islam,t he Mamluksr espectedt he Ilkhanatea nd borrowed Mongol institutions and customs. Unfortunately, the strongest case for such inf luencew as made in two articlesb y Poliak,65 who is describedb y Ayalon as a misguidedg enius',66 SOi t is necessaryt o separateh istoricalf act fromf antasy on the topic. Poliak substantiatedh is theory that the MamlukS ultanatew as a vassal of the Golden Horde by asserting that Baybar's son was named for BerkeK han of the Golden Horde,h is maternalg randfathert,h at the Mamluk Sultan bore the title 'Khan', and that the Khan of the Golden Horde sent reinforcementsto Egypt. These claims and much more must be rejected.I f BerkeK han'sn ame was readi n the Fridayk hutbai n Cairo and elsewheret, his was tem porary, a diplomatic courtesy during embassies and negotiations, and in any event Baybar's name came first. Baybar's son was named after a Khwarazmiana nd was the only MamlukS ultan to use the title 'Khan'. The Golden Horde reinforcementws ere eitherr efugeeJ uchidt roops who escaped to Egypt, or Ilkhanidd efectors,t o which we will return.67 On the other hand, Ayalonr ejectst he oppositee xtremistp osition,b y Tyan,t hat sincet he Mongols never occupied Egypt and ruled Syria only brief ly, there could have been no Mongol inf luence on the Mamluks at all.68 Sultan Baybars was, it appears, a great admirer of the Mongols. It was he who supposedly copied many Mongol institutions and customs. But Ayalon expresses great scepticism in this regard. He con cedes the borrowing only of drinkingk umiss,e ating horsemeat, 69 using tent-mosques,a nd wearingc ertain types of Mongol dress. That the Sultanate copied its mounted postal service, the Barid, from the Mongol jam, Ayalon considers not conclusively shown. The Mamluks may have borrowed the tarkhan, a grant of fiscal and judicial immunity( often with a land grant, iqta),f rom the Ilkhanate;in an exceptional case, an Ilkhanate envoy to the Mamluks received tarkhan grants from both sides. However,A yalon emphasizest he significantc hangesi n tarkhana fter its importation.E ventuallyt he Mamluksc haracterizedth e Mongols, 'Tatars', as another branch of the same Turkic race as the Kipchaks.70 After scrupulouss tudy of the referencesin Mamluks ourcest o the Yasao f ChingizK han,A yalonh as seriouslyr evisedh is previousa ttitudet owards everal famous passages which emphasized Mongol inf luence on the Sultanate. Al-Maqrizi, a late Mamluk source (1364-1442), railed that the Mamluk chamberlains in his own time were trying civilians on matters which should have fallen within the purviewo f Muslimr eligiousl aw, Sharn'ao, n the basis of the Satanic, oppressive and forbidden Yasa of Chingiz Khan, which contradicted Shan'a and should never have been consulted at all. Poliak, and earlier Ayalon,
65 Poliak, Le caractere colonial, 231-48; N.A. Poliak, The influence of Chingiz Khans Yasa upon the general organization of the Mamluk State, BSOAS, 10 (1940-1942), 862-76. 66 David Ayalon, Regarding population estimates in the countries of medieval Islam, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 28 (1985), 16, reprinted in Ayalon, Outsiders in the Land of Islam, essay v. 67 Among other places, see Ayalons fullest critique of Poliak in David Ayalon, The great Yasa of Chingiz Khan. A re-examination. The position of the Yasa in the Mamluk Sultanate. C1, Studia Islamica, 36 (1972), 136-56, reprinted in Ayalon, Outsiders in the Land of Islam, Essay ivc. 68 Ayalon, The great Yasa of Chingiz Khan. A re-examination. Al-Maqrizis passage on the Yasa under the Mamluks (C2), 120 n. 2. 69 Did youths raised as Kipchaks in the Pontic and Caspian steppe need to borrow the custom of drinking kumiss and eating horseflesh? I owe this query to Devin DeWeese. 70 David Ayalon, Studies on the structure of the Mamluk army, BSOAS, 16 (1954), 68-9, rpt. Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt, Essay i; Ayalon, The Muslim City, 323-4; Ayalon, On one of the works of Jean Sauvaget, Israel Oriental Studies, I (1971), 300-1, rpt. The Mamluk military society, Essay vni; Ayalon, Discharges from service, banishments and imprisonment in Mamluk Society, Israel Oriental Studies, 2 (1972), 29-33, rpt. The Mamluk military society, Essay v; Ayalon, The European-Asiatic Steppe: a major reservoir of power for the Islamic world, Proceedings of the 25th Congress of Orientalists (Moscow, 1960), V. ii (Moscow, 1963), 47-52, rpt. The Mamluk military society, Essay vii; Ayalon, The Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan. A re-examination. The position of the Yasa in the Mamluk Sultanate. C1, 130-6.

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had lent credence to the notion that disputes among the Mamluks themselves were judged, without complaint, on the basis of the Yasa. Ayalon now doubts that anyone in the Sultanate had access to the Yasa in any language or script, and considerst his passagea rhetoricael xcessa gainstr eala dministrativaeg gression by the chamberlainsa gainst the qadis, which had nothing at all to do with the Yasa.71 Similarly, Ayalon discounts the evidence of al-Taghribirdi that Utamysh (Aitamysh, of whom more below) judged his bodyguard on the basis of the Yasa,b ecausei t is a distortedp lagiarismf rom al-Safadi,w ho wrote that Utamysh read not the Yasa,b ut the biographyo f Chinggis.72 It is instructive in this connection to note that the only Muslim Mongol ruler reported, in an unfortunatelyl ate source, even to recognizea contradictionb etweenM ongol and Muslimr eligiousl aw, was the ChagatayidT armashirinK han.73 I n correspondence with Ilkhan Abagha in 1269, Baybars himself asserted the superiority of the Mamluks'Y asa,h ere obviouslya referencet o Sharf 'a,o ver the Yasao f ChinggisK han whichA baghah ad extolled.74 ThereforeA yalond ismissese ven the possibility of the inf luence of the Yasa in the Sultanate, except perhaps ephemerallya nd superficiallyF. urtherr esearchm ay uncoverw hy late Mamluk historians had such a penchant for baseless interpolations of extravagant attributions of Mongol inf luence to the early Mamluks, especially since, as Ayalon points out, by the time those Mamluk historians wrote, the Ilkhanate had fallen on very hard times.75 Secondly, there were Mongols in Mamluk Egypt. These included Mongols in the Mamluk corps, that is Mongols who had been bought as non-Muslim slaves or prisoners-of-waar nd then co-opted into the elite. They were valued for their linguistic skills or intelligence information, but they had no impact upon the ethnic or cultural identity of the corps. For example, Aitamys, a Mongol slave purchaseda s a Mamluk,b ecauseo f his familiarityw ith Mongol language, customs, and politics, was sent as an Egyptian envoy to the Ilkhanate in the first three decades of the fourteenth century. Little has identified four Mongol Mamluks who knew 'Tatar', which might mean Mongol, Kipchak Turkic,o r both, and serveda s 'Mongol' interpretersT. his foursomed id not exhaust all Mongol-speakersh, owever.76 On the whole, Mamlukso f Mongol origin were decided rareties. More numerous were tribal Mongols who sought asylum in Egypt. The first Mongols to enter Egypt were contingents sent by Berke, khan of the Golden Horde, to aid Hulegu; when war broke out between the two Mongol khanates, Berke instructed those of his troops who could to f lee, and some succeeded in reaching Egypt. Under Baybars, 200 Mongol horses arrived in 1282, more than 1,300 in 1283 and more in 1284. A total of 3,000 Mongols entered Egypt dur71 For this passage, David Ayalon, The Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan. A re-examination. The basic data in the Islamic sources on the Yasa and its contents, Studia Islamica, 33 (1971), 97-140, especially 105-6, reprinted in Ayalon, Outsiders in the land of Islam, Essay Iva; refutation of al-MaqriziA, yalon, The Great Yasao f ChingizK han. A re-examinationA. l-Maqrizisp assage on the Yasa under the Mamluks (C2), Studia Islamica, 38 (1973), 107-27, reprinted in Ayalon, Outsiders in the Land of Islam, Essay ivd. 72 Ayalon, The great Yasao f ChingizK han. A re-examinationA. l-Maqrizisp assageo n the Yasa under the Mamluks (C2), 13140. Even in Mongol, what biography of Chinggis Khan could someone have read in the Middle East at this time? Surely not the Secret History! Even in the IlkhanateR ashida l-Din was not permittedt o readt he AltanD ebter;c ould Utemyshi n the Sultanate have had access to a text even Rashid al-Din was denied? (On the Altan Debter as distinct from the Secret History see Morgan, The Mongols, 11-2.) The version of Chingizs o rigin preservedi n Ibn ad-Dawadaris macks of oral transmission:s ee Ulrich Haarmann, Grosser Vater Mond und Schwarzer L6wenjunge-eine mongolisch-kiptschakische Ursprungssagein arabischerU berlieferungi,n StephanC onermanna nd Jan Kusber( ed.), Die Mongolen in Asien und Europa (Kieler Werksticke, Reihe F: Beitrage zur osteuropaischen GeschichteB, and4 ), (Frankfurat m Main:P eterL ang, 1997), 121-38. 73 David Ayalon, The great Yasao f ChingizK han. A re-examinationT. he attitudeo f the Mongols,a nd particularlyo f the Mongol Royal family,t o the Yasa,S tudiaI slamica,3 4 (1971), 178-80, rpt. Outsiders in the Land of Islam, Essay ivb. 74 Ayalon, The great Yasa of Chingiz Khan. A re-examination. Al-Maqrizis passage on the Yasa under the Mamluks (C2), 129-30. 75 Donald Presgrave Little, An introduction to Mamluk historiography. An analysis of Arabic annalistic and biographical sources for the reign of al-Malik an-Nasir Muhammed ibn Qalaun (FreiburgerI slamstudienB, and II), Wiesbaden:F ranz SteinerV erlag, 1970), 118-36, especially 127-8, arguesf or the mutualp enetrationv ia emigreso f influencesa nd institutionsb etweent he Sultanate and the Ilkhanate, as testified by the traffic of those very same migrants. Irwin, The Middle East, 52-3, takes a position closer to Ayalons later views, as does Peter Thorau, The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth century (tr. P.M. Holt), (London: Longman, 1992), 256-8, 261. Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, 103-105, does not even mention a possible Mongol source for the postal system (Barid), which he sees as a revival of earlier Muslim institutions. 76 The four included Qusun, who arrived in Cairo in 1330 and died 1349, and assumed responsibility for correspondence with the Golden Horde; he may have been more of a Juchid official on detached duty than an 6migr6; but did not include the amir Qipgaq, who was also fluent in Mongol but chose not to work as a translator. Donald P. Little, Notes on Aitamys, a Mongol Mamluk, in U. Haarmann and Peter Bachmann (ed.), Die Islamische Welt zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit. Festschrift fur Hans Robert Roemer zum 65. Geburtstag (Beirut: Franz Steiner, 1979), 387-401, reprinted in Little, History and historiography of the Mamluks (London:Variorum Reprints, 1986), Essay vi. (Pages 399-400 strike me as inconsistent with Littles views on Mongol influence on the Mamluks cited in the previous note.)

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ing Baybars' reign. After that, the rate slackened off, 19 in 1304, 300 in 1313. Irwin calls Badr ad-Din Janbala in 1303 the last great Mongol immigrant; he became an Amir of 100, and his daughter married the sultan's son. A few of these Mongols entered the Royal Mamluks, but the great majority did not. The Mongols were esteemed higher than Turkmans, Kurds, or beduin as free auxiliaries; many settled in Cairo, many served Mamluk amirs, many intermarried with the Mamluks, but most were assigned to the halqa, a military unit of lower status because its members had not entered Egypt as infidel slaves who were then converted to Islam and trained as Mamluks. The halqa, as well as service to amirs, did not create many opportunities for advancement to rival those of Mamluks of the sultan. But apparently from the Mongols who did enter the Royal Mamluks came an Oirat Sultan, Kitbugha. In 1317 Turghay, son-in-law of Hulegu, led either 10,000 or 18,000 Oirats to Egypt and was warmly greeted and favoured by Kutbugha. Many Mamluks married Oirat women. But these Oirats were not slaves, and the Mamluks resented Kutbugha's favouritism. When Kutbugha attempted to accord Oirat chieftains equal status with Mamluk amirs, the Mamluks reacted, first, in part for this reason, by overthrowing Kutbugha, and then repressing Turghay's revolt, executing him and his chieftains. No one could be permitted to threaten the principles of Mamlukdom. When 16 Mongol commanders defected to the Sultanate they were assigned to the Palestinian coast, far from the centre of power in Cairo, and never heard from again. A few more crossed the border during periods of famine in Ilkhanid territory. Mongols rarely rose higher than Amir of 40, but after the numeric threat of Turghay's Oirats had passed, some even made it to Amir of 100. But Mongols who entered the Sultanate as freemen or Muslims, barring subterfuge (which did happen in other cases), could not become Mamluks, and therefore could not progress to membership of the elite, which remained, during the period of Mamluk-Ilkhanid warfare, overwhelmingly Kipchak.77 Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish among Kipchaks and other Turks, Turkicized Mongols, and 'pure' Mongols among the slaves purchased in Golden Horde territory to become Mamluks.78 Ayalon concluded that the later Mamluk historians exaggerated both the numbers and inf luence of Mongol immigrants to Egypt, part and parcel of their dubious views of the utilization of the Yasa in the Sultanate. The Ilkhanate would probably have been indifferent to Mamluk borrowing of Mongol institutions. The presence of Mongol emigrants in Egypt could only have exacerbated relations between the two states.79 However, no matter how many Mongols served the Egyptian Mamluk Sultans, the Mamluk Kipchaks retained their virtual monopoly on power while the Ilkhanate existed, and the Mamluk face which met the Ilkhanid Mongols in battle in Syria was decidedly Kipchak. The Ilkhanate did not persist in trying to conquer Syria because its rulers were Kipchak Mamluks. But this phenomenon certainly would have provided a rationale for doing so which resonated with elements of Mongol imperial ideology, and probably contributed to the stubbornness with which the Ilkhanids refused to concede that they lacked the ability to bring Syria under their control. Finally, the Kipchakc onnectioni n Mamluk-Ilkhanidre lations throws into focus the pervasive inf luence of the Kipchaks, after their conquest by the Mongols, upon the fates of other Eurasian peoples from China to Hungary. When the Mongols mobilized the vast Kipchak population at the imperial level, which the Kipchaks had never done on their own, in some ways they magnified Kipchak military and political inf luence across the Eurasian steppe within and without the Pax Mongolica. How ironic that Kipchaks, who providedt he excusef or invadingt he East Slavict erritoriesa nd Hungary,w ho provided troops and cadres for the Juchids and the Yuan, should also have supplied the military muscle to stop the Ilkhanids from further expansion into the Middle East.

77 David Ayalon, The Wafidiya in the Mamluk Kingdom, Islamic Culture (Hyderabad, 1951), 89-104, rpt. Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt, Essay ii (this article contains another running refutation of Poliaks theory that the Mamluks were vassals of the Golden Horde); Irwin, The Middle East, 108. 78 David Ayalon, The Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan. A re-examination. The position of the Yasa in the Mamluk Sultanate. C1, 117-30. 79 There was also a smaller flow of Mamluks to the pre-Islamic Ilkhanate; David Ayalon, The Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan. A re-examination. The position of the Yasa in the Mamluk Sultanate. C1, 136 n. 1. See Little, Notes on Aitamys, 100-36, for a biography of Qarasunqur, who supposedly introduced Mamluk institutions into the Ilkhanate; Irwin, The Middle East, 66, 99-101, 106 on Sunqar, a Mamluk captive who married a Mongol girl, Qipjaq, who defected, fought the Mamluks for the Mongols, and later re-defected, and Qarasunqur.

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Tamerlane: or Timur the Great Amir, from the Arabic Life by Ahmed ibn Arabshah
J. H. Sanders
TIMUR RETURNS FROM DIAR-BAKR AND IRAK, AND TURNS TOWARDS THE DESERTS OF KIPCHAK, WHOSE KINGS AND KINGDOMS ARE DESCRIBED, WITH AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PLAINS AND WAYS THEN he returned from Arabian and Persian Irak in which countries he had already firmly planted his footmark, and that after Sheikh Ibrahim had come over to him and handed to him the keys of his dominions, who placing on his neck the yoke of his servitude and transferring himself to his sway, put himself among his slaves, but was treated by him like a son; soon, however, we shall relate how he went to him and in what way he gained his favour. Then Timur made for the desert of Kipchak with great eagerness and haste. This great kingdom contains vast deserts, whose Sultan was Toqtamish, the same who was the leader of the Sultans who fought against Timur, indeed the first who showed hostility to him, and met him in the regions of Turkistan and came against him and joined battle and there Said Barka overcame him as was told before. The country is called Dasht Kipchak and Dasht Barka and Dasht in the Persian language is the word for desert and the special name of it Barka who was the first Sultan,1who after embracing Islam unfolded its standards through that country; for they were worshippers of idols and given to polytheism, ignorant of Islam and the true faith and the most of them have remained idolaters to this day. He set out for these regions by way of Derbend, which was under the sway of Sheikh Ibrahim, Sultan of the Kingdom of Shirvan, whose family goes back to King Khosru Anushirvan; and he had a Qazi by name Abu Yazid, who of all the pillars of the state was in close touch with him and this Yazid was a minister of the kingdom and the first in the sultanate; and when he consulted him about the matter of Timur and the action required of himselfwhether he should submit to him or make preparations against him, whether he should take to flight or engage with himYazid replied: In my opinion [74] it is best to fly, and I think the safest and finest plan is to fortify yourself in the highest mountains. The Sultan, however, said: This does not seem to me well advised, that I should escape, but desert my subjects in time of danger, and what should I reply to Allah on the day of resurrection when I have directed their affairs and destroyed my subjects? Therefore I do not choose to attack him or engage with him, but as quickly as may be I shall hasten to him and make myself compliant to him, obeying his command, but if he restores me to my throne and confirms me in my kingdom, that is the very thing which I wish and the culmination of my prayers; but if he treats me ill or removes me from my province or throws me into bondage or kills me, at least my subjects will be defended from the evil of slaughter and rapine and captivity, and he will then set over them and over the kingdom whom he wishes. Then he ordered that supplies should be collected and gave leave to the soldiers, who scattered and withdrew, and ordered that the cities of his territories should be decorated and beautified and that their inhabitants should carry on their work secure by land and sea and devote themselves to it and that orators should recite his name from platforms and that gold and silver money should be marked with his name and sign. Then taking gifts and presents he started to meet him with good will and firm foot. And when he came near to him and stood in obeisance before him, he offered the gifts and presents and various rare and choice things. Now the custom of the Jagatais in offering gifts of homage was to give nine of whatever kind that in this way they might gain honours and higher dignity with the receiver; therefore Sheikh Ibrahim offered nine of every sort of various gifts, but of slaves eight; but when the men who received those gifts said to him Where is the ninth slave? he replied, I myself am the ninth, and Timur admired this saying, by which he won a place in his heart and said to him: Nay, you shall be my son and my deputy in this country and the support on which I shall lean, and he clad him in a precious mantle and restored him to his kingdom glad that he had gained his wish. And the supplies were divided and the fruits and foods distributed, out of which
1 Berke, son of Jochi and grandson of Chinggis Khan.

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parts like mountains were left over by that army, which was itself in number like gravel and sand. [75] Then after dismissing Sheikh Ibrahim, Timur set out to the countries of the north and of the Tatars. But the other reason of invading that kingdom, though he needed it not, was Amir Idaku, who was one of the chief leaders of Toqtamish on the left wing, and one of the ministers employed to ward off disasters and a counsellor, whose tribe was called Qomkomat; for the Turks have different tribes and nameslike the Arabs. But when Idaku saw that the mind of his master was altered, he feared for himself from him, since To qtamish was a man of stern violence; so being afraid that some day he might encounter it, he did not cease to be ware of him and to be ready to take to flight, when he saw that it was necessary for that reason, and he watched him constantly and acted prudently with him and accompanied him constantly and soothed him with flattery; but on a festive night, when the glasses like stars were revolving in the orbits of hilarity and wine was lording it over the captive judgment, Toqtamish began to say to Idaku (when the light of his prudence was being quenched and he was becoming heated) A day will come for me and you, which will bring you to hunger and remove you from tables piled with food to a wandering life and the eye of your life will be filled with the sleep of death. But Idaku put him off and flattered him, saying: Let not my Lord and Khakhan foster wrath against a slave who has not done wrong and let him not destroy a sapling which he himself has planted or overthrow a foundation which he has laid! Then he took the guise of a suppliant, humility, obedience and submission and certain of what he had thought before, he exercised his mind to find a way of escape and used cleverness and cunning for that purpose, knowing that if he neglected his threats or allowed them time, it would not be long before the Sultan would attend to their performance: then he slipped out from amidst the attendants and guards, and went out suddenly as though to answer a natural call and came hurriedly but not without determination to the stable of Toqtamish and took a horse ready saddled, of the best breed and very swift, which stood ready for any emergency and said to one of his followers, who was a loyal sharer of his secret: Whoever wishes to come to me, will find me with Timur; [76] but do not reveal this secret, until it is certain that I have crossed the deserts. Then he left him and set off, no one observing him, unless when he had already gone a great way, and riding steadily he wove long threads in the web of his journeyand they could not follow his tracks or even reach the dust which he raised; and he came to Timur and kissing his hands told his story and unfolded to him his misfortunes and said: You are seeking places far distant and rough pathless places and for that reason you charge into dangers and cut the backbones of deserts and enter upon long journeys; but this is an easy prize in front of your eyes, which you will gainrich and finewith the greatest convenience; and why should there be delay, somnolence, hesitation and postponement? Rise therefore with firm purpose and I give security that there win be no fort to repel you or fortification to check you or sword to restrain you or weapons to drive you back or soldier to attack you; for they are naught but a mixed and confused rabble of the lowest sort of men and resources collected at random and treasures as it were coming of themselves. And he ceased not to urge him to it and entreat him and in every way make him pliant, just as Othman Qara Iluk did with him, when he came to Tabriz, with wicked instigation and incited him to invade Syria after killing Sultan Burhanuddin Ahmed and besieging Siwas, as will afterwards be related. Then Timur prepared with the greatest haste to win for himself Dasht Barka, which is the proper country of the Tatars, filled with cattle of different kinds and tribes of Turks; fortified on the borders, it has well-tilled parts and wide tracts, healthy in water and air; its people nomads; its soldiers expert archers, most eloquent of speech among the Turks, pure in disposition, of charming features and perfect in beauty; their women seem suns, their men full moons; the kings are heads, the great men like chests; neither falsehood has place with them nor fraud, nor does cunning obtain among them nor sycophancy; it is the custom among them to move from place to place securely on wagons, where they are placed beyond fear; their cities are few and their settlements far apart. Dasht is bounded on the south by the Caspian Sea, violent and dangerous, and the Black Sea, which turns thither from the countries of Rum, and these two seas almost touch each other, but that the Jirkas Mountains (Caucasus) [77] put a space between them to prevent their joining. On the east it has for boundaries the Kingdoms of Khwarizm, Atrar and Sighnaq and other countries and tracts extending to Turkistan and the countries of the Jatas, going up to the borders of the Sin (Chinese), under the sway of the Moguls and Khatas. 43

On the north is Abir and Shabir (Siberia) and wastes, deserts and hills of sand like mountains; for how many deserts are there, where birds and beasts roam! And it is, like the favour of the great, an end which cannot be reached and a limit which cannot be attained; on the west it borders on Russia and Bulgaria and the country of the Christians, and its confines extend to the dominions of the son of Othman, Ruler of Rum. There used to advance convoys of travellers from Khwarizm making the journey in wagons, securely without terror or fear, as far as the Crimeaa journey of about three months; in width there is a sea of sand as broad as seven seas, through which the most skilful guide could not show the way nor the most crafty of experienced men make the journey and those convoys did not take supplies or fodder or join to themselves companionsthis because of the multitude of the people, and the abundance of security, food and drink among the inhabitants, and did not set out except tribe by tribe or turn aside except to one who would receive his guest generously, so that they were well described by that verse: All the people of Mecca go round the hill of Okaz And their sons shout: There comes a guest! But now through those places from Khwarizm to the Crimea of those peoples and their followers none moves or rests and nothing ranges there but antelopes and camels. The capital of Dasht is Serai, a city devoted to Islam and beautifully built, which I shall describe. It was founded by Sultan Barka (on whom be the mercy of Allah!) when he became a Muslim, and he made it his capital and chose it and drove in and invited the people of Dasht so that they might enter the protection of Islam, which faith having been received, the place became a resort of all good and happiness and was called Barka having before been named after Kipchak. Maulana, the venerable Khwaja Asamuddin, son of the blessed Maulana the venerable Khwaja Abdul Malik, who is of [78] the sons of the great Sheikh Burhanuddin Marghinani on whom be the mercy of Allah, when he had returned from the Hejaz in the year 8142 and in our time, that is in the year 840,3 had come to the governorship of Samarkand, recited to me in Haji Turkhan [Astrakhan] one of the cities of Dasht, this verse: (and in the pass of Dasht he had endured various troubles): When I had lately heard that there was prosperity In the deserts, which are called after their Sultan Barka, I caused the camel of my migration to halt in that country, But saw no happiness there. And the same man referring to Maulana the venerable and revered Hafizuddin Mahomed, son of Nasiruddin Mahomed Kurdi Bazazi, whom Allah Almighty protect with His mercy! at the same time and place recited this also to me: When the citizens committed their affairs into the hands of a Hafiz, Their Hafiz became their Sultan, and the Sultan was no longer a Hafiz. And when Barka Khan had been exalted by the royal garb of Islam and had raised the standards of the religion of Hanifa in the country of Dasht, he called learned men from every side and doctors, to teach the people the doctrines of their religion and show them the ways of their profession of the Unity of God and the truth of the Faith, and he paid great rewards to them and poured forth on those who assembled seas of generosity and brought reverence to the Faith and the teachers and magnified the laws of Allah Almighty and the institutes of the Prophet and he had with him at that time and afterwards Uzbeg and Janibeg Khan, Maulana Qutbuddin, the learned, of the city of Rei, and Sheikh Saduddin Taftazani and Said Jalal, Commentator of the Hajabia, and other doctors of the sects of Hanifis and Shafeites; afterwards these were followed by Maulana Hafizuddin Bazazi and Maulana Ahmed of Khajend on whom be the favour of Allah! And thanks to these famous men Serai became a meeting-place of learning and a home of every sort of prosperity and in a short time there gathered there of learned men and doctors and [79] the cultured and able, all the most excellent, eminent, brilliant and charming, and never a great city and its suburbs held so many. Between the building of Serai and its devastation there passed sixty-three years, and it was among the greatest cities in extent and abounding in population.
2 3 A.D. 1411. A.D. 1436.

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They say that a slave of one of the magnates of this city fled and fixed his abode in a place by the side of the road and opened a shop where he supported himself by trade, and that base fellow remained for about ten yearsbut his master never met him or found him or saw him, because of the size of the city and the multitude of its people. This city was placed on the bank of a river derived from the river Atal (Volga), about which it is agreed by travellers, historians and those who cross waters, that among rivers and waters which are fresh and growing in size none is greater than this; it rises from Russia, and is not useful, but carries off life, and flows into the Caspian Sea, like the Oxus and the other rivers of Persia, though that sea is shut off on all sides and is surrounded by several Persian provinces such as Gilan, Mazanderan, Asterabad and Shirwan. The name of the river of Serai is Sankila and up to now it is crossed only by skiffs and neither footman nor horseman sets foot in it and how many arms divide from this great, long and broad river which are separately greater than the Euphrates and Nile! But after Janibeg Khan became ruler of Dasht [lacuna]. THAT FLOOD COMES AND SWEEPS OVER THE PEOPLES OF DASHT AFTER BREAKING TOQTAMISH Then Timur came into those parts with a great army, nay, a turbid sea, whose soldiers carried flying arrows, sharp swords and quivering spears and were ravening lions and furious leopards, all of warlike spirit, which takes vengeance on the enemy, stoutly defends its own flag and its allies and homes and its prey and its lairs and covers with the sea of war him who opposes its waves and breakers. [80] Therefore Toqtamish sent to the lords of his subjects and the magnates of his peoples and the dwellers in sandy places and inhabitants of the borders and chiefs who were his kinsmen and leaders of the right and left of his army, whom he summoned and called to meet the enemy and wage war and they came clad in the long robe of obedience and hastening from every high mountain; and there assembled hosts and tribes of horse and foot and swordsmen and javelinthrowers and archers and attackers and defenders and warriors and slayers with the sabre and skilled archers and wielders of spears, who would not miss the mark compared with the sons of Tual, skilled spearmen. When they take their weapon and aim at what they need, they strike the mark whether sitting or flying. Then Toqtamish rose to fight, ready for onslaught and battle, with an army numerous like the sands and heavy Eke the mountains. CONCERNING THE CONTENTION THAT AROSE IN THE ARMY OF TOQTAMISH AT THE TIME OF BATTLE And when they were within sight one of another and the two fronts were engaged, from the army of Toqtamish advanced a leader of the right wing who wished to take vengeance on one of the Amirs and he asked Toqtamish for him and for leave to kill him; and Toqtamish said to him Be of good heart, truly I will grant your request: But you shall see a thing new to men and what happens. Therefore wait until, when the battle is over and according to our prayers we have survived, I shall grant you your debtor and hand over to you your enemy; then I will exact your vengeance from him and satisfy you. He replied: No, but forthwith; else I will not be loyal to you or obey you. But Toqtamish said: We are in grave trouble, which harasses us more than your purpose, and in a dark business, which torments more than your distress therefore be patient and do not hasten, and be confident and fear not, for no one shall be deprived of justice nor shall what is due be lost; do not fly to a blind precipice or be one of those who worship Allah for gain; now you are in the night of [81] distress, which has already passed, and in the dawn of prosperity, which has already grown light; therefore keep your place and face your foes and do not turn your back, but show the loyalty which you owe. Then that leader took with him a great multitude and there followed him every rebel and rogue and his whole tribe called Aktav and he went away towards the kingdoms of Rum and arrived with his followers in the country of Adrianople and remained in those parts. And thereby the army of Toqtamish was damaged and the arrows of his purposes missed their mark, but when he saw that the attack could not be avoided and that 45

the place was settled, he strengthened his spirit and the spirit of his army and put aside heaviness and levity and placed in the front line the bolder of his followers and arrayed his horse and foot and strengthened the centre and wing and made ready arrows and swords. SECTION But Timur's army was not wanting in these things, since what each one had to do was decided and explored and where to fight and where to stand was inscribed on the front of its standards. Then both armies, when they came in sight one of the other, were kindled and mingling with each other became hot with the fire of war and they joined battle and necks were extended for sword-blows and throats outstretched for spear thrusts and faces were drawn with sternness and fouled with dust, the wolves of war set their teeth and fierce leopards mingled and charged and the lions of the armies rushed upon each other and men's skins bristled, clad with the feathers of arrows and the brows of the leaders drooped and the heads of the heads [captains] bent in the devotion of war and fell forward and the dust was thickened and stood black and the leaders and common soldiers alike plunged into seas of blood and arrows became in the darkness of black dust like stars placed to destroy the Princes of Satan, while swords glittering like fulminating stars in clouds of dust rushed on kings and sultans nor did the horses of death cease to pass through and revolve and race against the squadrons which charged straight ahead or the dust of hooves to be borne into the air or the blood of swords to flow over the plain, until the earth was rent and the heavens [82] like the eight seas; and this struggle and conflict lasted about three days; then dust appeared from the stricken army of Toqtamish, who turned his back, and his armies took to flight, but the soldiers of Timur were sent hither and thither in the kingdoms of Dasht and were stationed there, whose tribes he subdued and subjected all without exception to his will and collected cattle which he distributed and gold and silver, which he stored, and took booty and divided it, and let his men despoil and make prisoners and gave leave to use force and violence and wiped out their tribes and overturned their forts and changed the whole condition and took away with him all he could of wealth, prisoners and goods ; and his vanguard reached right to Azaq and laid waste Serai, and Seraijuq and Haji Turkhan and those parts; and the dignity of Idaku became great with him; then he set out towards his Samarkand, taking ldaku with him, whom he asked to follow him. OF THE CUNNING OF IDAKU AND HOW HE DECEIVED TIMUR AND CAJOLED HIM Then Idaku sent a message to his kinsmen and neighbours and the tribes of the right hand, all of whom were his allieswithout the knowledge of Timurto leave their places, and set out in haste from their country and journey to its side and the intervening parts, where the roads are difficult and there are many precipices, and not to stay two days in the same halting-place and to accomplish it; for if Timur overtook them, he would scatter them all and destroy them all. Then doing what Idaku had advised, they departed without delay. When Idaku learnt that his people had gone forth and that his followers had escaped Timur, he said to him: My Lord and Amir, I have of kinsmen and followers a great multitude, nobles and commons, who are my strength and protection, and if they live well and prosper it is well for me also; but they are not safe, if ever they should fall after me into the oppression and tyranny of Toqtamish, nay, without doubt he will destroy them and wipe them out to a man and while my side is shielded from him by the dignity of your august threshold, he in his malice will take revenge on my [83] followers and kinsmen, since I have woven the web of these conflicts and driven him headlong into the straits of affliction and despair; and in any case, I shall not be able to be content, if they live near him, and how will my life be pleasant, if my best friends are placed in his neighbourhood? If then in your august judgment it seems good to send a messenger to those places and numerous tribes with a gracious command and high and eminent mandate to conciliate their minds and entice the hearts of the tribes and their households, and with an edict that they should change their place and condition, we shall all be under a noble shade in gardens of delight and blooming pastures and the people of Dasht will be freed from this desert and the past life will be ended and we shall spend the time that remains in gardens under which rivers flow; but the august judgment is best and to obey what it resolves concerning its slaves, is the first duty. And Timur replied to him: You are a man on whose counsel your people rely and from it they may gain advantage, since you are most experienced in these ways. 46

Then Idaku said: All mortals are your slaves and subject to your will and are your followers and to one whom you think fit for anything every difficulty is easy. And Timur replied: Nay, you are the originator of this plan: therefore undertake it yourself; since you are lord in the city. And Idaku said: Join to me one of the Amirs to be in place of vazirs over them with your noble commands according to your august judgment. And Timur consented and granting his desire, added to him whom he wished; accordingly both, having completed and accomplished their necessary affairs, prepared to carry out their purpose. But as soon as Idaku left Timur, Timur comprehended his headlong error and knew that Idaku had rent his mind and led him into error; therefore be sent a messenger to him and ordered him to return on account of a matter which had arisen and a plan which had occurred to him; but when this messenger came to him and brought to him his instructions, Idaku said to him and to the Amir who accompanied him, prohibiting both from proceeding, See to your necessary affairs and go to your master and place yourselves before him and tell him that the goal of our association is ended here; and I am free of him, since I fear Allah! [84] But they could not treat him roughly and in that difficult pass they could not but deal gently with him; therefore they let him go and departed without delay. And when Timur learnt this, he was excited and kindled with anger and seized with disgust and annoyance and ground his teeth against him with indignation and repented when there was no room for repentance and almost slew himself in anger against Idaku and drank the cup of death; on that day the wicked shall bite his hands. And since he could not cure him, he made no move concerning him, and returning to his own kingdom, then to Samarkand, paid no heed to him; this therefore was the end of his expedition into Dasht Barka, so that it was said that no one deceived and injured Timur and cheated him alike by word and deed and misled him, except Idaku, about whom I have told ; and except the Qazi of Qazis, Waliuddin Abdur Rahman, son of Khaldun Al Maliki, whose story will follow. OF THE FIGHTS AND BATTLES BETWEEN TOQTAMISH AND IDAKU FOUGHT IN NORTHERN PARTS, UNTIL THE CONDITION OF THOSE PARTS WAS UTTERLY CHANGED And when Timur departed with his booty and after returning rested in his own kingdom, Idaku reached his followers and cheered by his friends and allies began to inquire into the affairs of Toqtamish and took precautions against him and earnest care for his own safety and stood ready and prepared to oppose him, since he could not repair his friendship once severed or mend it after it was once torn; also he could not take the title of Sultan, for if that could have been done, Timur would have claimed that title, being King of Kings; therefore he set up a Sultan on his behalf and in the house of the kingdom raised a Khan to whom he called the heads of the left side and the chief men of its tribes, who, obeying his summons, came to him, since they were more powerful than the rest, safe from the injury and havoc of the Jagatais and in this way the Sultan was strengthened and the Khan equipped with armies and his foundations in that house of the kingdom became strong and his pillars high. [85] But Toqtamish, when he had recovered from fear and reason had regained its place in his brain, and his enemy Timur had gone and his quiet was restored, collected his armies and entreated the help of his people, who came to his aid. And diverse battles and clashes of war ceased not to happen between him and Idaku and the eyes of tranquillity, like eyelids of blind fortune, slept from conciliation, until they had fought fifteen timesnow one victorious, now the other. And by these frequent battles the affairs of the tribes of Dasht began to be ruined and scattered and since there were few places of refuge and forts, they became dispersed, all the more because the two lions attacked them in turn and two oppressors came upon them from either side, nay, even before, the greater part of them was driven away by Timur and in distress, constrained by his rule and held in his strict custody; and from them separated a horde, which could not be umbered or counted or contained in any reckoning or list, and betook itself to Rum and Rus, and that through ill fortune and loss of prosperity, and amid Christians, who add companions to God, and Muslim captives, became like Jabala, son of Ghasanwhich horde was called Qara Boghdan. Therefore from these causes the cultivated part of Dasht became a desert and waste, the inhabitants scattered, dispersed, routed and destroyed, so that if anyone went through it without a guide and scout, he would certainly perish losing the way, even in summer; since winds, lifting and scattering sands, hide the way, 47

passing over it, and wipe it out; but in winter, since snow falling there collects on the road and covers it, for the ground is desert without marks of a road and its halting places are thrown into confusion, its stages and watering-places are fearful wastes and the roads utterly deadly and difficult. At last in the fifteenth battle Idaku was conquered and scattered, put to flight, dispersed, a solitary wanderer, and plunged into a sea of sands with about five hundred of his companions, where none knew him. Toqtamish therefore remained unrivalled in his kingdom and Dasht Barka was clear for him; yet with that he strongly desired news concerning Idaku and his condition and he expected to be informed how he had perished in the sands; and meanwhile about half a year passed and all trace of him [86] went from mens eyes and mention of him from men's tongues; but Idaku was expert in those sandhills and one who with his own feet had cut the surface of those barren sands and hard lands; and waited, watching with meditation and attention, according to these verses of mine: Watch business rightly and expect joy and seize its fit time, if it comes, And join patience to industry; thereby the mulberry leaf turns to silk. When it was certain that Toqtamish thought him despaired of and torn by the lion of death, he began to inquire into his affairs and follow and explore his footprints and watch until he was informed that he was living in a place of pleasure, apart from his army. Therefore riding on the wing of a horse and with the night watches for his coverlet, he continued his journey by night and bartered sleep for wakefulness, climbing mountains as bubbles ascend and descending from heights as the dew falls, until he came upon him unexpectedly and rushed on him like a fate firmly knotted and he did not come to himself, until already disasters were driving him into the nets like a beast at bay and the lions of death were seizing him, and spears biting him like snakes and arrows like vipers; and he resisted them for a while and long wandered around them, then fell slain; and this sixteenth combat was the seal of mutual attack and the judgment of separation; therefore the rule of Dasht remained with the governor, Idaku, to whose orders submitted distant nd near, great and small; but the sons of Toqtamish fled hither and thither, Jalaluddin and Karim Bardi to Rus; and Kubal and the other brothers to Sighnaq. And mens affairs were governed according to the laws of ldaku, who gave the place of Sultan to whom he wished and deposed the same man at will; he ordered and none opposed him; he forbade and none transgressed the mark which he had fixed; but of those whom he made Sultans were Qubaligh Timur Khan and his brother Rashadibeg Khan; then Fulad Khan, son of Tuligh Timur, then his brother Timur Khan, in whose time troubles arose, when he would not let himself be ruled by Idaku, saying: He is neither great in skill nor birth; I am a ram to be [87] obeyed; how then should I obey? and a bull, whom it is right to follow; how then shall I become a follower? Thus the web of discord was woven between the two and from hatred was kindled animosity and there flowed evils, afflictions, battles and enmities and meanwhile the darkness of troubles was woven and the stars of misfortunes were enveloped in the thick fogs of Dasht between the two factions and when the prosperity of the rule of Jalal was in full brilliance, behold, from the East rose resplendent the offspring of Toqtamish and gained height in the country of Rus on the opposite side. And this event happened during the year 814. Then affairs worsening and misfortunes increasing and the state of Idaku being weakened, Timur (Khan) slew him and rivalry and discord endured between the kings of the Kingdom of Kipchak, until Idaku died, overwhelmed and wounded, and they drew him out of the river Jaxartes on to the dry land of Huq and cast him away abandoned, may Allah have mercy! And marvellous things are told of him and his achievements and wonderful excellence; arrows of attack well-aimed against his enemies; his thoughts ambushes; his battles hunters nets; and he had in the principles of political science a goldmine of wealth pure and base, out of whose product he drew what he wished. He was almost black in complexion, exceedingly dark, of middle height, strong in body, high-spirited, generous, polished, cheerful, in judgment keen and shrewd, a lover of the learned and able, genial to the good and fakirs, jesting with them, with subtle wit and clever suggestion, keeping fasts, rising at night (for prayer), holding the lappets of the law, putting the Koran and the traditions and the opinions of the learned to intercede between himself and God Almighty. He had twenty sons, each holding princely authority, with their own vilayets, armies and followers. He led the people of Dasht for twenty years and his days are a white star on the brow of the age and the nights of his reign like curls on the face of that time. 48

Ulrich W. Haarmann Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May, 1988), pp. 175-196
This article is dedicated to the memory of Alexander Scholch, who is remembered by his friends and colleagues as a man of rare quality and exemplary scholarship. A "nation" has been cynically but not inaptly defined as a society united by a common error as to its origin and a common aversion to its neighbors.1 I At the end of the 1950s Khalid Muhammad Khalid, whose importance for the history of modern Islamic thought and sentiment can hardly be overestimated, propagated the rather preposterous thesis that the terms "tyrant" (derived from Greek tyrannos) and "Turan," the customary (Persian) word used for the homeland of the Turks, were etymologically and, as a corollary, also semantically akin.2 What was so irritating about this anti-Turkish libel was not so much its insipidity as the reaction or, more to the point, absence of a reaction to such and similar statements in the Arab public. The lonely voices of historians such as Salah al-Din al-Munajjid3 and Abdallah Laroui,4 who from very different ideological vantage points chided their Arab audience in the late 1960s for foolishly blaming all their troubles on the Turks, remained unheeded for a very long time.5 Only in the last ten to fifteen years has this situation changed. Turks and Arabs are gradually beginning to realize that mutual feelings of hatred and inferiority are products of the past and that a serious occupation with this common past is required if a new beginning in the relations between these two peoples is to be successful, not only on the economic and political but also on the emotional plane. Turks tend to be particularly sensitive to criticism of their role in Arab history. And many Arab intellectuals persistently refuse to see the elements of prejudice and exaggeration in their own traditional attitudes toward the Turks. The subject of the following paper will be the image of the Turk as it developed among the Arabs through the centuries and the effects this image had, and continues to have, on the self-image of both peoples even today. My arguments will be restricted to the realm of ideology. My contention is that in this sphere of transferring, and rationalizing, historical experience into attitudes, ? 1988 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/88 $5.00 +.00 176 Ulrich W. Haarmann "the Turks" have played for "the Arabs" both a specific and a surprisingly consistent role through the centuries. The topic is not novel. The Turkish lawyer Ilhan Arsel, in his impressive encyclopedia of Turkish-Arab relations entitled Arap milliyet(iligi ve Turkler,6 also gives due attention to the labels attached to the Turks by the Arabs, yet he does not make a systematic study of the nature of the ethnic stereotype involved. II Ethnic stereotypes are symbols. They serve as rationalizations of underlying and-to a certain degree-perfectly
1 J. S. Huxley and A. C. Haddon, We Europeans (New York, 1935), p. 5, quoted by Otto Klineberg, The Human Dimension in International Relations (New York, 1964), p. 54. 2 2Muwdtiniunl a raayavd(C airo, 1958), pp. 17-18, cited by David C. Gordon, Self-Determination and History in the Third World (Princeton, N.J., 1971), p. 119, n. 101; see also Ilhan Arsel, Arap milliyetciligi ve Turkler, Ankara Universitesi Hukuk Fakuiltesi Yayinlari, No. 384 (Ankara, 1975), pp. 222-23. 3 3Al-tadlIl al-ishtirdkT (Beirut, 1965), pp. 73-74. The author stresses the responsibility of Turks and Kurds-not Egyptians-for the defense of Egypt in Ayyubid and Mamluk times. 4 4Lideologie arabe contemporaine (Paris, 1967), pp. 22-24 (also quoted by Gordon, Self- Determination); see also Arsel, Arap, p. 223. 5 5Bernard Lewis has commented upon this phenomenon in his History: Remembered, Recorded, Invented (Princeton, N.J., 1975), p. 81, where other contemporary witnesses also are given. 6 6See the reference in n. 2. Anyone interested in further details on the image of the Turk in medieval Arabic writing, both scholarly and popular, will profit from Arsels vast compilation. One may also want to consult Ramazan ?esens findings about the Turks as viewed by the ancient Arabs. See his Eski Araplara gore Ttirkler, Turkivat Mecmuasi, 15 (1968), 11-36. $esen is more detached from his subject than Arsel, yet he limits himself to the classical/early medieval period.

IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY, IDENTITY AND ALTERITY: THE ARAB IMAGE OF THE TURK FROM THE CABBASIDS TO MODERN EGYPT

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normal interethnic prejudices.7 They are derived from specific social, political, and cultural conditions. As such they are, at least in principle, subject to change and effacement.8 Yet when these conditions remain constant over long stretches of time, images that one group has formed of another under specific circumstances can actually achieve autonomy and begin to be regarded as mirrors of historical reality. Owing to their intrinsic inertia, these images (as well as the underlying prejudices) easily survive the temporary disappearance of the factors that originally conditioned and sustained them. "They are as true as tradition, and as pervasive as folklore."9 And finally, if properly manipulated, they begin to generate a dynamic of their own that may well transcend the limits of pure ideology. Recent European history is full of examples of such devastatingly effective ethnic and racial cliches. In the case of the Arab image of the Turk discussed in detail below, one can say: A profoundly conventional image of the uncouth and savage, yet at the same time brave and upright Turkish "barbarian" changes over the centuries into a negative-"the Turk" is distorted into a cruel and despotic power addict who, because of his innate character, is devoid of any cultural refinement. Eventually the Arabs (who, n.b., became aware of themselves as a nation in the modern sense only very late) began to relegate the real nature of their relationship with the Turks to a collective unconscious and covered it with a taboo. "Turan" and "tyrant" were equated, with the consequences noted above. Now, which were the political and social constants that over the ages contrived to nourish and energize a characteristic image of the Turk? In the first place, Turkish rule over Arab subjects. "[One] regarded a non-Turk in authority as an oddity," as Bernard Lewis has curtly and poignantly formulated this state of affairs.10 In the central lands of Islam, for one millennium, rule meant alien rule, and alien rule meant Turkish rule. Contemporary Arab observers were keenly aware of this unusual chain of continuity. In Seljuq Iraq the guards of Baghdad and Samarra were associated with Toghril Beg, and in Mamluk Egypt and Syria two hundred years later Toghril Beg was connected with al-Zahir Baybars, both men being founders of a dawla turkiyya.11 And as a correlate to power there was, on a second and loftier-or rather, more ideological-level another function ceded to the Turks from the time the Arabs began to shun (or to be excluded from) military responsibilities in the early 'Abbasid period12-that is, the role of the mujdhidun, the defenders of the (orthodox) Islamic faith. III In the perception of the Arabs, "the Turks" (Arabic: al-Turk) existed as a more or less constant and homogeneous ethnic group through the centuries, in whatever different roles and under whatever different names they appeared in their own lands. The terms "Turk" and "Turkish" seem to have evoked similar associations among the Arabs-at least those of the Mashriq-through the Middle Ages and the early modern period. Quite naturally, they tended to neglect or belittle the geographical and linguistic differentiations within the Turkic peoples whom they encountered as strangers in their own Arab environment; the farther away from Turkish lands they were, the more they were ignored. Conversely, non-Turkish ethnic entities that were assimilated to a Turkish life-style and came from regions inhabited predominantly by Turks (e.g., the Circassians and Abkhaz in the Mamluk period) were all lumped together under the term Turk/Atrak.13 We know of a similar extension of the notion "Turk" to denote Muslims in general from Hindu India and the Christian Balkans.14 And if we generalize from the available data on
7 7See Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, ed. Kenneth Clark (Reading, Mass., 1979), p. 204, on the normality of prejudgment and the purpose of stereotypes as rationalizers; he directs the readers attention to the difficulty of always keeping the terms prejudice and stereotype distinctly apart. On the distinctiveness of these two terms, see also Aenne Ostermann and Hans Nicklas, Vorurteile und Feindbilder. Materialien, Argumente und Strategien dazu, warum Menschen einander mi3fiverstehen und hassen. Zugleich eine Einfuhrung in die politische Psychologie (Munich, 1982), pp. 15-19. 8 Allport, in his research on stereotypes, has quite significantly chosen the gradual effacement of the image of the brutal Turk in the United States between 1932 and 1950 as an example for such a process. See his The Nature of Prejudice, p. 203. 9 Howard F. Ehrlich, The Social Psychology of Prejudice: A Systematic Theoretical Review and Propositional Inventory of the American Social Psychological Study of Prejudice (New York, 1973), p. 35. 10 The Middle East and the West (New York, 1964), p. 20. 11 The statements describing this continuity have not yet been systematically collected; for the time being, see the summary remarks by Helmut T6llner, Die tiirkischen Garden am Kalifenhof von Samarra. Ihre Entstehung und Machtergreifung bis zum Kalifat alMutadids, Beitrage zur Sprachund Kulturgeschichte des Orients, no. 21 (Walldorf, 1971), p. 7; one explicit connection, however, is given by Ibn al-Dawadari, Kanz al-durar wa-jamial-ghurar, vol. 8, ed. U. Haarmann (Cairo, 1971), p. 212, 11. 4-6. 12 On this delegation of military functions to peoples at the fringes of the dar al-islam, see Daniel Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System (New Haven, Conn., and London, 1981). 13 3In the Mamluk period we have the opposition: Turks (white, military slaves; Mamluks) and black slaves. 14 In the end, the Slavic Bosnians were called Turkusi, Turks. For India see Annemarie Schimmel, Turk and Hindu: A Poetical Image and Its Application to Historical Fact, in Speros Vryonis, ed., Islam and Cultural Change in the Middle Ages (Wiesbaden, Germany, 1975), pp. 107-25, esp. p. 115; eadem, Islam in the Indian Subcontinent, Handbuch der Orientalistik, II, 4/3 (Leiden, Holland, 1980),

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sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Egypt, even very distinct internal stratifications and oppositions within Turkish ruling castes (in this particular period an Ottoman cultured elite, the rumTs, faced the "Turks" [etrak], unruly and uneducated low-class soldiers from Anatolia,15 whom the former regarded as foreigners [ejnebT] in relation to themselves16) were of little or no relevance to contemporary Arab observers. After all, both subgroups were foreign and shared "Turkish" rule and power over them.17 This homogeneity of a people in space and time is a well-known postulate of traditional Islamic ethnography. Both al-Jahiz18 and Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi19 emphasize the unchanging and innate "national" traits of an umma,20 a people. Good and bad qualities are for them in balance;21 exceptions to the rule, such as a cowardly Turk, a covetous Arab, an uncivilized Persian, or a choleric Negro22 only serve to prove the validity of the cliche. IV What are the main characteristics of such ethnic stereotypes and how do they operate? On the basis of the material investigated-necessarily limited in scope and perspective-I suggest that they share four closely intertwined qualities.23 They are (1) artificial, (2) selective and relative, (3) universal, and above all (4) negative and instrumental. 1. They are artificial. As mentioned above, they reflect-and serve to justifyexisting prejudices. They are not adopted and employed on the basis of an everrenewed critical analysis of the object (i.e., the "other" people with their changing inventory of national characteristics24) but rather because they correspond to certain a priori expectations that are projected onto the foreign group. Perception is governed by these expectations, or rather prejudices, not vice versa. And such collective prejudices have a tendency to find themselves more often confirmed than disproved.25 A courageous Egyptian or Italian soldier is known 178 Ulrich W. Haarmann to have had, and still to have, a harder time proving his personal bravery than does his Turkish or Israeli26 counterpart because he is "not supposed" to be brave, according to the current cliche.
p. 12. 15 See Mustaff Alis Counsel for Sultans of 1581, ed., trans., and annotator Andreas Tietze, 2 vols., Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Denkschriften, vols. 137 and 158 (Vienna, 1979 and 1982), here 1, 57-58/150, 1. 15: etrdk-i avdmm, and II, 63/158, 1. 39: etrak-i qalfl ul-ittihad. On the pejorative usage of Turk (uncultured peasant as opposed to Ottoman citizen) before the nineteenth century, see also Gordon, Self-Determination, p. 77. 16 Mustafa AlIs Description of Cairo of 1599, ed., trans., and annotator Andreas Tietze, Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Denkschriften, vol. 120 (Vienna, 1975), p. 63/p. 146, 1. 31. Mustafa CAll passes a harsh judgment on Gtichchiik Sinan Beg: vdq,cd boyle ejnebT bir Turk, indeed, such a foreigner, a Turk. 17 This lack of differentiation continues today. In the Egyptian Arabic vernacular there is no clear distinction between Mamluks and Turks, cf. Erich Prokosch, Osmanisches Wortgut im Agyptisch- Arabischen, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, vol. 78 (Berlin, 1983), p. 31, n. 11. 18 Kitdb al-bayan wa-l-tabyfn (Cairo, 1960), III, 291. Cf. Susanne Enderwitz, Gesellschaftlicher Rang und ethnische Legitimation. Der arabische Schriftsteller Abu cUtmdn al-OGdhi(zg est. 868) uiber die Afrikaner, Perser und Araber in der islamischen Gesellschaft, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, vol. 53 (Freiburg, 1979), p. 118. 19 Kitdb al-imtda wa-l-mudnasa, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Beirut, n.d.), pp. 73-74. 20 On umma as ethnos in its Quranic usage see now Nasif Nassar, Mafhum al-umma bagn al-dIn wa- -tar kh (Beirut, 1978), pp. 11-30. 21 Kitdb al-imtca-p, . 73. 22 Ibid., p. 74. Abu Hayyan apparently did not recognize the psychological mechanisms behind the application of such stereotypical characteristics when he says that, indeed, there are cases of individuals devoid of them (thammafijumlatiha man huwa cdrin minjamfcihd), 1. 6. 23 Research on ethnic stereotypes is-if compared to the study of prejudice, in particular in American society-still in its infancy. See Howard F. Ehrlich, The Social Psychology of Prejudice, ch. 2, especially pp. 21-31, on stereotype assignments; on Turkish stereotypes in particular, see R. T. Prothro and F. D. Keehn, Stereotypes and Semantic Space, in Journal of Social Psychology, 45 (1957), 197-209, and-after its publication-William Griswolds interesting and pertinent treatise entitled The Image of the Turk in American Textbooks, read at the International Conference on the State of the Art of Middle Eastern Studies, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, August 1-3, 1986; see the conference report by Bassam Tibi in Orient, 27, 3 (1986), 374. For a list of current national stereotypes in the 1950s, see W. Buchanan and H. Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (Urbana, 111, 1953). From among recent writings on the nature and effect of ethnic prejudice, one may mention Bernd Schafer and Bernd Six, Sozialpsychologie des Vorurteils (Stuttgart, Germany, 1978); Vernon Reynolds, Vincent Falger and Ian Vine, eds., The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism and Nationalism (London, 1987). 24 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, Chs. 7 and 12, especially pp. 119 and 189, emphasizes the existence of factual differences in national characters and cautions against the careless mingling of factual and fanciful national differences. See also Otto Klinebergs highly stimulating essay The Character of Nations, in his The Human Dimension in International Relations, pp. 132-43. 25 On these self-fulfilling prophecies, see A. Ostermann and H. Nicklas, Vorurteile und Feindbilder, p. 37. 26 This does not mean that such stereotypes could not be altered or even reversed; the Jewish/Israeli example is most telling: the unmilitary Jew has changed into the tough Israeli.

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2. Ethnic cliches-both hetero- and autostereotypes-are selective and relative. The inability to understand an alien cultural system in its intrinsic equilibrium leads to the isolation of particular traits that are familiar to the observer and of particular weight in his value system.27 These traits are then singled out. Yet, depending on the external judge, those traits selected can be very different or even diametrically opposed. Thus the Uzbek warriorsat whose attacks in the sixteenth century their southern neighbors, the Persians, quivered with fear-appeared lazy to the Qazaqs, their cognate neighbors in the northern steppes.28 3. As mentioned briefly above, ethnic stereotypes are universal. Let us take our present example: The Arab stereotype of the manly, fearless, proud, and yet at the same time unsettled, savage, and uncouth Turk. This stereotype is not specific to the Turks but rather characteristic of the prototypical nomadic barbarian. We find the same paradigmatic list of qualities in descriptions by the ancient Greeks and Chinese29 of their neighbors on the steppes. And from the time of the Roman poet Lucanus (d. A.D. 65) onward, the Germans have been ostracized by their more refined western and southern neighbors for their "Teutonic fury" (furor teutonicus).30 (Incidentally, when German knights encountered Seljuq-Turkish warriors during the Crusades in Anatolia, apparently the Turks did more justice to this shared martial stereotype than did the Germans: upon their return home, some German knights forged genealogical legends asserting common Turkish-German origins, so impressed had they been by the fighting spirit and martial prowess of the Turkish ghazis.31) 4. Finally, ethnic stereotypes are instrumental and-as heterostereotypes32- predominantly negative. Besides having a delineating function, they are particularly effective and insidious vehicles of reduction. In them and through them, the complex reality is radically concentrated into a few striking and, for the most part, opprobrious characteristics ("ethnophaulisms"33) which, by contrast, enhance the autostereotype and can serve handily as ammunition in the arsenal of ideological warfare. Once you have painted your adversary in the darkest black you no longer have to apologize for attacking him fiercely over harmless issues and conflicts of interest that, taken in isolation, would never justify such aggressiveness. Derogatory stereotypes are generated and applied by a given group in order to provide a psychological release in its dealings with another group that is feared and felt to be superior to it in certain respects.34 In a rapidly changing world that is difficult to cope with, xenophobia, fear of the other, evokes such defense mechanisms. By banishing one's opponent, who has become an object of fear, one believes one has regained security. A stereotype thus stands for a suppressed and unfulfilled wish for vengeance. The English have the cruel saying "Give a dog an ill name and hang him."35 This refers to someone who no longer dares face his primary opponent in an open confrontation. Certainly an ethnic cliche tells us much about the frustrations and troubles of those who feel compelled to use it-in our case the Arabs-and very little, if anything, about those on whose backs it was stuck, i.e., the Turks. In the Ideology and History: The Arab Image of the Turk 179 following historical survey, we shall therefore see
27 7So to the Romans those people were barbarians who, like the Gauls but not the Persians, were devoid of the crucial characteristic of civilization, that is, political organization. Cf. Y. A. Dauge, Le barbare. Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation (Brussels, 1981), passim. 28 Cf. Fazlallah b. Ruzbihan Khunji, Mihmdn-ndma-yi Bukhara, ed. Manuchihr Sutuda (Tehran 1341/1962), passim. See also the German translation of parts of this text by Ursula Ott,Transoxanien und Turkestan zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, vol. 25 (Freiburg, Germany, 1974). Correspondingly, a people, when presenting itself in an autostereotype, will select from a variety of quite diverse attributes the one dominant attribute in which it believes itself to contrast favorably with the chosen object of comparison. American efficiency and industriousness may appear to be such a typical quality in a comparison with Latins, yet not with Japanese or Germans; for the latter one will instead take recourse to the rather different qualities of individuality or openness, respectively. 29 Wolfgang Bauer, ed., China und die Fremden. 3000 Jahre Auseinandersetzung in Krieg und Frieden (Munich, 1980), pp. 9-10, on the barbarians as bearers of chih (i.e., originality). 30 On this phrase, still alive today and even globally extended, see the still useful study by Ernst Duiimmler, Uber den Furor Teutonicus (Berlin, 1897). 31 Richard Wallach, Das abendldndische Gemeinschaftsgefiihl im Mittelalter (Leipzig and Berlin, 1928), p. 28, quoting the Crusader chronicle Baldrici historia Jerosolymitana. In the anonymous chronicle of the first Crusade also respect is paid to the bravery and fortitude of the Turks, cf. Louis Brehier, ed., Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum. Histoire anonyme de la premiere croisade (Paris, 1924), p. 50, 11. 13-14: Quis unquam tam sapiens aut doctus audebit describere prudenciam, miliciam et fortitudinem Turco rum? 32 On the mutual dependence of autostereotypes and heterostereotypes, see Heinz E. Wolf, Kritik der Vorurteilsforschung, Enke Sozialwissenschaften (Stuttgart, 1979), p. 108; Ostermann and Nicklas, Vorurteile und Feindbilder, p. 43. 33 Cf. E. B. Palmore, Ethnophaulism and Ethnocentrism, American Journal of Sociology, 67 (1962), 442-45. 34 On prejudice as the alibi of a weak ego, see Ostermann and Nicklas, Vorurteile und Feindbilder, pp. 19-22. 35 5James M. Dixon, English Idioms (London and Edinburgh, 1927), p. 73a.

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only Arab actors on the stage, although it is the Turk who is the constant object of the excoriations. The important reverse image, that is, the one the Turks themselves created for the Arabs, can with some justification be passed over, for it was, at least in general terms, coined by rulers in reference to their powerless subjects and therefore lacks the apologetic explosiveness of its Arab counterpart.36 v In the following pages I will undertake a historical tour d'horizon of Arab-Turkish relations and their impact on ideology. The material consulted is, quite unavoidably, exemplary and selective. The crucial first phase was the 'Abbasid period. In the ninth century the image of the Turkish 'ilj, "barbarian," certainly reflected reality. Alien Turkish pretorians, most of them former slaves, had usurped military power in the caliphate. In a vain effort to escape Turkish tutelage, the caliphs fled to the new capital of Samarra. These ruthless pretorian guards elicited feelings of horror,37 failure and, at the same time, haughty contempt among the cultured citizens of Baghdad. The poet Ibn Lankak al-Basri (d. 300/912-913) left us an anti-Turkish poem reflecting this mixture of arrogance and subdued awe toward the Turkish officers in ninth-century Iraq. "The free are gone, they are destroyed and lost. Time has placed me among 'barbarians.' I am told: You spend too much time at home, and then I answer: It is no longer fun to walk in the streets, for whom do I meet when looking around? Monkeys on horseback," he laments.38 Al-Mascidi, another contemporary, is more judicious:39 "The Turks have become the commanders. To them everyone owes attention and obedience," he curtly summarizes the metamorphosis of the Turks from exotic foreigners into foreign lords. And the universal image of the barbarian served to make living under Turkish rule more easily tolerable. But one must not forget that the term "barbarian," conveyed not only negative but also very positive connotations. Not only the martial prowess of the Turks but also their loyalty and devotion were admired. In his famous treatise on the merits of the Turks, al-Jahiz stresses not only Turkish magnanimity and pride- "rather a beggar by force than a king by excuse"40-but also, to use a modern word, their patriotism41 (a curious attribute for a nomadic people at first glance42), their natural intelligence, and their religious sensibility.43 Calling them a'rab al-ajam,44 "bedouins among the non-Arabs," he grants them the esteemed qualities of independence and versatility that distinguished the nomadic ancestors of the Arabs from other peoples. Ibn Khaldun takes up this topos and extols the naturalness of both the Arab and Turkish ways of life.45 Medieval Muslim ethnographers relate the warlike spirit
36 6It would certainly be rewarding to compare the Arab image of the Turk through the centuries with other collective, reductionist views of the Turk, both in the Middle Ages and today, both among those peoples immediately concerned (the non-Muslim and Muslim peoples of the Caucasus and the Balkans, the Germans, Hungarians, Russians) and those at a greater distance; as far as the German image of the Turk (excluding the most recent past) is concerned, one can refer to Senol Ozyurt, Die Tiirkenlieder und das Tiirkenbild in der deutschen Volksiiberlieferung vom 16.-20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1972). Further research on the relationship between Turks and Persians (as well as Persians and Arabs, to complete the ethnic picture in the central Islamic lands) on this ideological plane is particularly urgent. One may, however, also look for the projections the Arabs made themselves of other peoples with whom they came into close contact. There are, for example, unmistakable typological similarities between the Arab image of the Turk and the refractoryboth dissenting and belligerent-Berber. On the latter stereotype, see the study by H. T. Norris, The Berber in Arabic Literature (London and New York, 1982), p. xi. 37 An illuminating example of this feeling of fright is the dream of the contemporary mystic al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi (died between 295/907 and 310/922): Turks, assembled around their sultan, threaten to devastate the heros land-an allusion to the ever-menacing day of judgment. See Bernd Radtke, Al-HakTm at-Tirmidi. Ein islamischer Theosoph des 3./9. Jahrhunderts, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, vol. 58 (Freiburg, Germany, 1980), p. 10. On early Arab renderings of the Turkish barbarian, see also Arsel, Arap, pp. 61-63. 38 8See al-ThaalibT, YatTmat al-dahr (Beirut, 1399/1979), II, 348, 11. 4-6; Ignaz Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien (Halle, Germany, 1889-90), I, 152, also quotes this poem. 39 Muruj al-dhahab, ed. Ch. Pellat (Beirut, 1974), V, 89, 1. 16, #3099. 40 Risala ila l-Fath b. Khdqan fi manaqib al- Turk wacdmmat jund al-khildfa, ed. CAbd al-Salam Muhammad Harun, in Rasail al-Jdhiz (Cairo, 1384/1964), I, 59, 1. 8. See also Zekerya Kitapqi, al- Turk fi muallafat al-Jdhiz wa-makdnatuhum fi l-tartkh al-isldmi hattd awdsit al-qarn al-thalith al-hijrT(Beirut, 1972), p. 237, #19. 41 1Risala, p. 62,1. 16; p. 63,11. 6-12; p. 64,11. 3-4 and 10-11. See however also p. 52, 1. 7: wa-raaynd - TurkT... wa-la ala watan. 42 Ernst Mainz, Die Tiirken in der klassischen arabischen Literatur, Der Islam, 21 (1933), 279-85, leaves this contradiction be tween al-hanin ila l-awtdn and a nomadic way of life unresolved. Cf. also Rasdil al-Jahiz, II, 383-412. Al-Jahiz regards the feeling of patriotism-i.e., of loyalty towards ones birthplace-as a natural trait of man that is all the more acutely experienced and necessary the less stable ones way of life. 43 See Thumamas report in al-Jahiz, Risala, p. 60, 11. 4-6, and the dialogue between Junayd b. CAbd al-Rahman and the Turkish khdqdn, Risala, p. 77, 1. 6, to p. 81, 1. 6, especially p. 81, 11. 4-5. Cf. also Kitapcq, Al-Turk, pp. 247-48, no. 38-39, and Mainz, Die Tiirken, pp. 282, 284. 44 Risala, p. 70, ult. to p. 71, 1. 1 (cf. Enderwitz, Gesellschaftlicher Rang, p. 212). See also Risdla, p. 49,11. 5-6: wa-l-turkT al-wahid umma Cald hida (cf. Kitapcl, al-Turk, p. 235, #13, and Enderwitz, Gesellschaftlicher Rang, p. 122). 45 See Aziz al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldun: An Essay in Reinterpretation (London, 1982), p. 70.

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of the Turks (as well as their abstinence from the arts and sciences) to their origins in the cold and humid zone on the margins of the inhabited world. We find this theory fully elaborated in al-Mas'udi's histories,46 in Ibn Rustah's and Ibn al-Faqih's geographies,47 as well as in Ibn al-Nafis' famous Theologus autodidactus of the late thirteenth century.488 Ibn al-Nafis sees the bellicose and ferocious steppe people of the East as instruments of God's punishment of his community 180 Ulrich W. Haarmann for abandoning the "right path." The famous hadTth49" leave the Turks as long as they leave you" (utruku 'l-Atrdk ma tarakukum), which reflects the political situation in ninthcentury Iraq,50 gave rise to manifold and sometimes quite outlandish interpretations. Were the Turks perhaps the twenty-fourth tribe of the people of Gog and Magog whom Alexander had not been able to contain behind the huge wall he erected in the East?51 Certainly fear and awe dominated the discussion about these Turkish newcomers to the Arab lands in the ninth and tenth centuries. The apocryphal hadith "if they love you, they eat you, if they are angry at you, they kill you"52 (in ahabbuka akaluka, in ghadibuka qataluka), refers to Turks and speaks for itself. Fighting the Turks, "whose shoes are made of hair, whose eyes are small and whose noses are flat.. ."53 will have to take place before the Hour of Judgment arrives, as Abu Hurayra quotes the Prophet Muhammad in Abu Da'id's Sahih sunan al-Mustafa. In Nu'aym b. Hammad al-Marwazi's famous Book of Strife (Kitdb al-fitan) the apocalyptic Turks dominate the last and longest chapter.54 Inscriptions on monuments as old as the pyramids of Gizeh warn of manumitted slaves55-i.e., Turks-and of the oppressions they would bring to Egypt.56 And it cannot be ruled out that those of al-Mutanabbi's verses that chide him "who makes the slave his master" as particularly miserable may refer also to Turkish domination.57 Yet in spite of all of their sufferings under the Turkish yoke, there still remained, during the CAbbasid and Buyid periods, one domain in which the Turk had not yet become a rival to the Arab-Islam, or, more explicitly, Arab guardianship over the community of believers in spiritual matters. The Arabs, the people God had chosen to receive His final revelation in their own language, the people from whose ranks alone the divinely inspired Imam of the Muslims could spring, this people certainly could not be worried about its privileged religious status-and surely not in comparison with those illiterate warriors of the far north who still displayed the vestiges of a heathenShamanistic tradition and who could not even boast of a pre-Islamic prophet of their race to grant them a genuinely Islamic legitimacy. In this respect the Persians were much more serious competitors for the Arabs. They could claim that Muhammad was born under the rule of their just and wise Emperor Anushirwan, and they could produce Isaac, "God's sacrifice," as their hallowed alleged ancestor.58
46 Al-tanbth wa-l-ishrdf, ed. M. de Goeje, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1965), pp. 23-24; Murluj al-dhahab, I, 180, #369; II, 363-64, #1337; pp. 374-75, #1361. These references are taken from Tarif Khalidi, Islamic Historiography: The Histories of MasWtd?(A lbany, N.Y., 1975), p. 101 and n. 2. 47 7Ibn Rustah, Al-aldq al-nafisa, ed. M. de Goeje (Leiden, 1891), VII, 101, 1. 22, to 102, 1. 8. Ibnal-Faqih al-Hamadani, Mukhtasar kitdb al-bulddn, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1302/1885), p. 6, 11. 14-18. References taken from Mainz, Die Tiirken, p. 285. 48 Al-risdlaa l-kdmiliyyaff I-sTraa l-nabawiyya, ed. and trans., with a commentary, Max Meyerhof and Joseph Schacht, The Theologus Autodidactus of Ibn al-Nafis (Oxford, 1968), Arabic: pp. 41- 43, 45; English: pp. 66-67, 69; see, however, also Excursus E therein, pp. 80-81, and Annemarie Schimmels remarks in her article Turk and Hindu, p. 110, note 17. 49 9For the utrukfi variant see, e.g., Abu Dadiud, SahTh sunan al-Mustafd (Beirut, n.d.), 11Ip, . 210, 1. 24 ( Kitdb al-maldhim, bdb fT qitdl al- Turk); Yaqut, Mu jam al-bulddn, ed. F. Wiistenfeld (Leipzig, 1866-73), I, 838 (s.v. Turkistan). For the tdrikuf version see al-Jahiz: Risala, p. 58, 1. 6, and p. 76, 1. 1, as well as Ibn Hassuil, Kitdb tafdTl al-atrdk ald sdiir al-ajndd, ed. Abbas al-cAzzawi, Belleten, 4 (1940), Arabic text p. 42, 11. 14-15. Cf. also Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien, I, 270; A. J. Wensinck, A Handbook of Early Muhammedan Tradition (Leiden, 1927), p. 232b (s.v. Turks); Mainz, Die Ttirken, p. 28 1; Schimmel, Turk and Hindu, p. I 111n, . 7, on the charming poetic use of this tradition by SadT. 50 Can the text of al-Jahiz in Risdla, p. 76, 11. 1-4, also be interpreted as referring to the Turks who took the land by force? 51 Ibn al-Faqih, Mukhtasar, p. 299 (and not 229, as in Mainz, Die Tiirken, p. 280, n. 3). 52 See Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien, 1, 270. 53 Abui Daud, Sa.hh, II, 211, 1. 1. See also Yaquit, Mujam, I, 838,11. 18-20. 54 A critical edition is still lacking. For the time being, see F. Krenkow, The Book of Strife, Islamic Culture, 3 (1929), 561-68, especially 565, #14 and 566, #55. 55 Ihdhar al-abfd al-muctaqTn. The famous mystic Dhi 1-Nun al-lkhmlml translated a cryptic inscription on the pyramids of Gizeh, or on the temples of Dendera or Ikhmim respectively. See al-Masid?, Muruj, II, 88 ult., #812; Abu Nucaym al-Isfahani, Hilyat alawliyd9, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1387/1967), Vol. IX, pp. 339 and 367 (based on CAbd al-Hakam b. Ahmad al-Sadaf l; Ibn-i Jelal = Evliya Chelebl, Seydhatndme, Vol. X, ch. 55, ed. U. Haarmann, Evliya Celebis Bericht uber die Altertiimer von Gize, Turcica, 8 (1976), 202, 1. 1; see also ibid., p. 175 (n. 46), 214-15 and 229-30. 56 Paul Kunitzsch, Zur Namengebung Kairos (al-Qahir = Mars?), Der Islam, 52 (1975), 209-25, here especially 224-25, and notes 40-41. 57 See the quotation in Daniel Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam, p. vii. 58 See Ibn al-Faqih, Mukhtasar, p. 197, 1. 5, quoted by Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien, I, 144. Ibn Hassuil, who extols the

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VI In the eleventh century, however, Arab primacy over the Turks ceased to be undisputed. The Turkish (Oghuz, Ghuzz) Seljuqs-no longer a group of individual Turkish military strongmen, as in the days of al-MuCtasim and al-Mutawakkil, but a whole tribal confederation-established their protectorate over the cAbbasid caliphate. They imposed a new taxation system that accommodated their own tribal structures and needs. And the gradual cultural emancipation of the Turks followed suit. They slowly became aware of their linguistic and cultural identity (as well as dignity) within the umma Muhammadiyya and began to emulate the Iranians in their search for a place of their own in Islamic history.59 Ideology and History: The Arab Image of the Turk 181 More important still, the Turks assumed religious authority themselves, even if only indirectly. They introduced the institution of the sultanate and thus appropriated religious and political prerogatives that had previously been reserved for the Arab caliph. The new functions that were transferred from the caliph to the sultan were epitomized, by al-Ghazali, in the notion of najda.60 Najda, "intrepidity," denotes leadership in the fight against heresy and the external foes of Islam. It was only reluctantly that the traditionalist Arab ulama went along with the policy of orthodox renewal pursued by the Seljuq sultans and their Iranian advisers, although this renewal in itself should have deserved their individual support. Rather, there were cases when they sought for casuistic arguments aimed at disputing the legal competence and the probity of the Seljuq sultan and went so far as to disgrace his honor by contesting his testimony in court.61 A few pro-Turkish voices can be distinguished in Arab circles during the Seljuq period, but certainly not very many. One of them was the scholar Ibn Hassul, who served the Seljuq conqueror Tughril Beg as vizier; thus his pro-Turkish feelings are understandable. Ibn Hassul not only eulogizes the proverbial hardihood,62 the natural gift of leadership,63 the noble descent,64 and the political experience of the Turkish nation (umma)65 since the days of the Samanids and Ghaznavids66 but also praises his Seljuq lord as "savior of the Muslims" (ghiyath al-muslimmn),67 an epithet most of Ibn Hassil's anti-Turkish compeers would have hesitated to subscribe to. VII The erosion of the Arab's exclusive claim to legitimate religious leadership proceeded swiftly in the late Middle Ages. The thirteenth century in particular saw profound changes in Arab-Turkish relations. The Islamic community experienced its darkest hour when, in 1258, the pagan Mongols ravaged Baghdad, the 'Abbasid capital, and killed the last caliph, the symbol of Arab and orthodox supremacy. Sunni Islam seemed doomed in those bleak days. It was Turkish military slaves, the Mamluks, coming from the Eurasian steppes, who were successful in stemming the deadly Mongol danger. Complete political, military, and, last but not least, economic power passed into the hands of this new Turkish ruling caste that regenerated itself anew each generation from the outside. It was seen as a sign of particular divine grace and providence that Turks had contained the Mongol avalanche. Turks knew the fighting techniques of their Mongol "cousins" from their common homeland in the steppes of Central Asia. The contemporary Syrian chronicler Abu Shama rejoiced after the crucial battle of CAyn Jalut in 658/126068 in saying: "lt is verily remarkable that the Tatars were broken and destroyed by their own kinsmen, the Turks." Paying his respect to the victorious sultan of Egypt, he continues in a couplet:
Turks (in Arabic!), tries to minimize this genealogical nobility of the Iranians and makes a point of the fact that the Prophet Muhammad was the offspring of two sacrifices (dhabT.hayn), i.e., Ismacil and his father CAbdallah b. CAbd al-Muttalib; cf. Tafdll, p. 34, 11. 15-19. 59 In his preface to the DTwdn-i lughat-i Turk, Mahmuid al-Kashghari calls for an equal treatment of his language together with Arabic and Persian, and also presents a Turkish genealogy consistent with the qisas al-anbiyd: their eponym Turk appears as son of Yafith, son of Noah; cf. Robert Dankoff, Kashghari on the Tribal and Kingship Organization of the Turks, in Archivum Ottomanicum, 4 (1972), 29-30. 60 AI-Mustazhiri, pp. 82-84. See Ignaz Goldziher, Streitschrift des GazalT gegen die Bdtinijja-Sekte (Leiden, Holland, 1916), quoted from Erika Glassen, Der Mittlere Weg. Studien zur Religionspolitik und Religiositdt der spaten Abbasidenzeit, Freiburger Islamstudien, vol. 8 (Wiesbaden, 1981), pp. 34 and 162. 61 So the qadi al-qudat Abu Bakr al-Shami during Malikshahs reign; cf. E. Glassen, Der Mittlere Weg, pp. 117 and 123, and eadem, Religi6se Bewegungen in der islamischen Geschichte des Iran (ca. 1000-1501), in Religion und Politik in Iran. Mardom ndmeh-Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Gesellschaft des Mittleren Ostens (Frankfurt, Germany, 1981), p. 67. 62 Taf.ll, p. 40,11. 4-6. 63 Ibid., p. 42,11. 1-3. 64 4Ibid., p. 38. 65 5Ibid., p. 39,1. 15. 66 Ibid., p. 43, 1. 11. 67 7Ibid., p. 43,1. 18. 68 Al-dhayl ald l-rawdatavn. Tard/im al-qarnayn al-sadis wa-l sdbi, ed. Zahid al-Kawthari, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1974), p. 208; see also Meyerhof and Schacht, Theologus Autodidactus, Excursus G, p. 82.

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The Tatars conquered the lands and there came to them From Egypta Turk,u nmindfulo f his life. In Syriah e destroyeda nd scatteredt hem. To everythingt herei s a bane of its own kind. And the triumph of the Turks was compounded by the final expulsion of the Crusaders from the Holy Land; one should notice the wording of a panegyric for Sultan al-Ashraf Khall after he had conquered, in 690/1291, Acre, the last Crusader stronghold: Praise be to God, the nation of the Cross has fallen; Through the Turks the religion of the chosen Arabs has triumphed.69 The Crusaders had allied themselves to the abominable Mongols, the "vile foe," and had constituted a constant humiliation to Islam for almost 200 years. These exploits immensely enhanced the religious prestige of the Mamluks. The population of Egypt and Syria gratefully acknowledged their achievements. The folk novel of al-Malik al-Zahir Baybars gives abundant testimony to the general feeling of owing the Mamluks, that is, the Turks, thanks for saving them from an imminent catastrophe. However, this praise was much more restrained on the part of the ulama. Of course there was, in the Circassian period, Ibn Khaldun, himself a stranger to the Mashriq, who goes so far as to speak of the "blessing of slavery" when referring to the Mamluks and their legendary victory against the Mongols 150 years earlier. He consistently lauds the merits of these Turkish military slaves who "enter the Muslim religion with the firm resolve of true believers and yet with nomadic virtues,"70 thus joining the stereotype of the noble and independent nomad we heard about earlier in connection with al-Jahiz to their very concrete accomplishments and sacrifices for Islam. Ibn Khaldun, much to the dismay of some modern hypernationalistic Arab writers,71 saw Turkish rule as a given and, so to speak, natural stage of development in the history of the Arabs. In his view, the center of gravity had started long ago to move from south to north, toward the territories of the Turks and of the Europeans, the sons of Yafith.72 One more discordant voice praising the Mamluks not only on the battlefield but also as wardens of internal peace and security is the fifteenth-century scholar Abu Hamid al-Qudsi. In one of his books with the telling title Kitdb duwal al-Islam al-sharlfa al-bahivyya wa-dhikr md zahara IT min hikam Allah alkhafiyya ft jalb ta'ifat alAtrdk ild 'l-diyar al-misriyya ("... on my idea of God's hidden blessing of having brought the people of the Turks to the lands of Egypt"),73 Abu Hamid al-QudsT emphasizes the honesty, incorruptibility, and spirit of sacrifice among the Mamluks who effectively and unselfishly protected the peaceful and defenseless Egyptian population from external and internal menace. To him, at least in this treatise, the Turks were the preordained leaders of the Islamic umma. Twelve years earlier, the same Abu Hamid had still held much more conventional views. At that time the ulama, not the umara, were deemed the "salt of Egypt." His fellow scholars had treated him in the intermittent period so abominably that he went, out of sheer hatred for his torturers and certainly not out of conviction, over to the other side.74 Ibn Khaldun, an outside observer of Egyptian society, thus appears as the only true minority voice in his positive judgment of the Mamluks. The ulama in general had great difficulty in accepting the intrinsically Turkish triumph in the showdown with the enemies of Islam. The defense of Muslim belief-and that meant also the Muslims' proper culture and way of life-had passed into alien Ideology and History: The Arab Image of the Turk 183 hands.
69 TarTkhI bn al-Furat, vol. 8, ed. Qustantin Zurayq and Najla cIzz al-Din (Beirut, 1939), p. 115; see the reference in Donald P. Little, The Fall of Akka in 690/1291: The Muslim Version, in M. Sharon, ed., Studies in Islamic History and Civilization in Honour of Professor David Ayalon (Jerusalem/Leiden, 1986), p. 181 and n. 134. 70 Kitdb al-cibar (1284, rpt., Beirut, 1392/1971), Vol. V, 371. The translation is given by Bernard Lewis, Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople (New York, 1974), I, 98. See also the brief study on this citation by David Ayalon, The Mamluks and Ibn Xaldun, Israel Oriental Studies, 10(1980), 12-13. 71 Cf. the discussion of this issue by Bernard Lewis, History: Remembered, Recorded, Invented, p. 79. 72 M. Redjala, Un texte inedit de la Muqaddima, in Arabica, 22 (1975), 320-23, quoted by Al- Azmeh, Ibn Khalduin, p. 45, n. 25. On Ibn Khalduins differentiation between periods of Arab and Turkish paramountcy, see now: Cornell Fleischer, Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and Ibn Khaldfinism in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters, Journal of Asian and African Letters, 18 (1983), 198-220, here 205 and 219, n. 22. 73 The basic contents of this treatise are faithfully and mechanically recorded by Subhi Y. Labib in his article QudsTs Werk Duwal al-islam. . ., Der Islam, 56 (1979), 117-20. On the author, see also Michael Cook, Abu Hamid al-QudsT (d. 888/1483), in Journal of Semitic Studies, 28 (1983), 85-97. 74 0n Abu Hamids personal tragedy see U. Haarmann, Rather the Injustice of the Turks than the Righteousness of the ArabsChanging `ulamd Attitudes towards Mamluk Rule in the Late Fifteenth Century, forthcoming in Studia Islamica (1988/89).

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And not just any alien hands, but the hands of those despised slave officers who had spent their youth somewhere in some forsaken heathen territory, who could not speak the language of the country and of the Qur'an properly, and who-unlike the Seljuqs-did not bother to establish closer contacts with the local Arab scholarly elite. These uncivilized tyrants even practiced, for inner-Mamluk litigation, a special Turkish jurisdiction, although according to doctrine there could not exist any law beyond and beside the Shari'a which God had instituted for all believers and which was so wisely entrusted to exclusive ulama care. The ulama faced a painful conflict between, on the one hand, the religious esteem they owed to the Mamluks as valiant mujahidun and, on the other, the rejection of the same Mamluks as haughty foreign usurpers; there was also the precarious middle way of an anti-Turkish attitude somehow expressed subtly enough not to provoke reprisals from the Mamluk authorities. The ulama now vehemently propagated the traditional stereotype of the Turkish barbarian and even exacerbated it, saying that the Turks were not only without culture but by their very nature were excluded from it. Al-Sakhawi, for instance, belittled the achievement of his colleague and teacher Ibn Taghribirdi, who was the son of one of the highest Mamluk emirs of the time, when he asked disparagingly: "[W]hat else can be expected of a Turk?"75 In perusing the biographical dictionaries of the eighth/fourteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries, one encounters over and over again characterizations of Mamluks in the following vein: He was a villain, brutal, bloodthirsty, and cunning, but-what a surprise!-he was also well versed in Arabic belles lettres and other arts.76 The impressive literary and scholarly production of the Mamluks, written mainly in Turkish but also in Arabic and Persian, was passed over by local Arab chroniclers.77 My impression is that this fascinating aspect of the Mamluk achievement did not correspond to the chroniclers' preconceived ideas and stereotypes of the uncouth Turk. Mamluk "culture" was rather supposed to consist of magic, superstition, and other vestiges of their shamanistic heritage. "As if the Arabs were less susceptible to such superstitious ideas (khurdfdt) than the Turks," one historian, who was-or at least claimed to be-himself of Mamluk descent,78 bitterly remarked.79 Many of these sons and grandsons of Mamluks who were "constitutionally" barred from the lucrative posts of their fathers sought their fortunes in the realm of scholarship. Yet success was not made easy for them. A Turkish background was, to say the least, not conducive to gaining laurels in academe. In the time of Sultan Barqiq, as we learn from his endowment deed, not only Mamluks but all those who were closely associated with them were rigorously denied the right of joining the faculty of the royal madrasa.80 However this particular injunction must be understood, one thing is clear: For the ulama the maintenance of this final barrier (i.e., keeping the Mamluks out of academic and legal institutions) had become an issue of survival, after the Mamluks had arrogated for themselves so many other responsibilities that had formerly been their own. The people in the street did not share this feeling of suffocation and threat and showed a greater degree of fairness toward the Turks. Accusing the ulama of selfishness and dishonesty, they pronounced "rather the injustice (or tyranny) of 184 Ulrich W. Haarmannthe Turks than the righteousness (or selfrighteousness) of the Arabs" (zulm alturk wa-la cadl al-'arab).81 The awesome Turk could offer the Egyptians more protection and justice than could the conceited but also feeblefuqahd' and qadis of their own country. VIII This dual attitude toward the Turks also prevailed during the Ottoman period,82 varying considerably in the different social strata-little as we know about this crucial period in which the first foundations of modern statehood and of Arab national awareness were to be laid. Owing to a particularly unsatisfactory state of research, making
75 William Popper, Sakhawis Criticism of Ibn TaghrT BirdT, in Studi orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi della Vida (Rome, 1956), 11 388. 76 Cf., for example, Ibn Hajars vita of Uzdamur al-Kashif, al-Durar al-kdmina fi aydn al-mi a al-thdmina, ed. Muhammad Sayyid Jadd al-Haqq (Cairo, 1385/ 1966), I, 378. 77 Compare a similar discourse between the Turkish Qizilbash and the Iranian educated class in Roger Savory, The Qizilhdsh, Education, and the Arts, Turcica, 6 (1975), 168-76. 78 0n Ibn al-Dawadaris alleged (?) descent from Aybak al-Muazzami, lord of Sarkhad in the Hawran, see U. Haarmann, Altun Han und Cingiz Han im mamlukischen Agypten, Der Islam, 53 (1974), 7-9. 79 9Ibn al-Dawadari, Durar al-tiTjn wa-ghurar al-azman, ms. Istanbul, library of Al Damad Ibrahim Pasa, no. 913, year 615, fol. 3. 80 See Felicitas Jaritz, Ausziige aus der Stiftungsurkunde des Sultans Barqiiq, in Saleh Lamei Mostafa, Madrasa, Hdnqdh und Mausoleum des Barqiq in Kairo, Abhandlungen des Deutschen Archiologischen Instituts in Kairo, Islamische Reihe, vol. 4 (Gliickstadt, 1982), pp. 117-78; U. Haarmann, Mamluk Endowment Deeds as a Source for the History of Education in Late Medieval Egypt, in AlAbhath (Beirut), 28 (1980), 31-47, here 38. 81 Cf. Ignaz Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien, I, 271; Labib, Qudsis Werk, 118; Haarmann, Rather the Injustice, passim. 82 This period is not dealt with in the study of Ilhan Arsel.

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precarious statements on a collective mentalite even more precarious, my remarks will remain tentative for much of the following section and, furthermore, will be limited to Egypt, the country on which at least some material has been made accessible, thanks largely to the research of Gabriel Baer83 and Andre Raymond.84 At the beginning of Ottoman sway, the broad populace of Egypt seems to have accepted the new regime with composure. The craftsmen and fellahin were relieved to know that a Turkish militiaman was on guard in their vicinity, because his presence meant security from marauding gangs and impudent bedouins. More than ever, Turkish was felt to be the language of authority and security. The Mamluk Turks, especially their last brave ruler Tuman Bay,85 were remembered with fond nostalgia-an attitude persisting into our own day.86 With Tuman Bay, Egyptian independence had ended. Yet it was also in these popular quarters, especially in the crafts and guilds, that people began to display, from the late sixteenth century on, an accentuated anti-Turkish bias. In those 21/2 centuries, the irrational wholesale denigration of the Turks began, whether they were members of the Ottoman elite, simple Anatolian or Rumelian soldiers, or neo-Mamluks from the Caucasus or the Balkans. One could hear the rhyme: al-atrik hayawln min ghayr idrdk, "Turks are beasts without brains."87 In a final negative crescendo, the Turks were now, so it seems, progressively credited with various repellent abnormal and immoral characteristics. The savage and unruly yet at the same time honest Turk of the early days was now endowed with brutality and lechery-attributions whose negative effects can be felt even today. Even in the Maghrib of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one continued to hear of the "terrible Turk."88 The Janissary (inksharT) became the epitome of stupidity in the Levant. Expressions like ras turkT89 or cal turkT hagar90- leaving aside even more drastic examples91-were, and are still, commonly used in Egypt to denote both stubbornness and dullness. In the eighteenth century, a certain osmosis between the Turkish military elites and the wealthy Cairo merchants as well as between the lowly Turkish militiamen (quite tellingly called misirliyya, "Egyptians") and the local artisans and craftsmen began, reducing ethnic difference to a secondary criterion of social stratification.92 This gradual immersion of the Turkish element within Egyptian society may have reduced the pressure in the bilateral relationship,93 but it may also well have had quite adverse effects on mutual perceptions. With the Ideology and History: The Arab Image of the Turk 185 breakdown of the once clearly delineated vertical social "apartheid" between Turks and Egyptians, the Turkish foreigner now became a competitor for wealth and influence on one's own ground and within one's own class. The old negative cliche was now revitalized, fed by the immediate threat exercised by the new, alien neighbor. The more intimately in-group and out-group are intertwined in a social microcosm, the more violently conflicting interests are represented in the collective mind. How did the ulama react to the passing of rule from the Mamluk sultans to the Ottomans after 1517? As paragons of Arab Sunni culture, they had special difficulties in accommodating themselves to the new sovereigns. From the very little we know about this subject at the present time,94 it appears that they established subtle and
83 As mentioned above, it was in the crafts and guilds of premodern Egypt, to which Professor Baer devoted a major part of his scholarship, that anti-Turkish sentiment seems to have been particularly acute. A largely untapped source on ideological issues connected with the Ottoman presence in Egypt is Evliya Chelebls travelogue (vol. X of the Seydhatndme) from the late seventeenth century. 84 See his encyclopaedia of Cairo economic and social life from 1650 to 1798: Artisans et commercants au Caire au 18eme siecle, 2 vols. (Damascus, 1973-74). 85 See the report by the Franciscan Andre Thevet who visited Egypt in the middle of the sixteenth century and described the high esteem in which this tragic figure was held by the population of Cairo; cf. Jean Chesneau and Andre Thevet, Voyages en Egypte des annees 1549-1552, Institut Francais dArch6ologie Orientale (Cairo, 1984), p. 177. In this travelogue the advance of Turkish (at the expense of Arabic), at least in Cairo after the Ottoman conquest, is also given explicit attention. 86 See, among others, Husayn Fawzi, Sindibdd misrL, 2nd ed. (Cairo, 1969), pp. 18, 28-29, and 74. 87 See the anonymous Kitdb al-dhakhdir wa-l-tuhaf fT bir al-sandtic wa-l-hiraf, Gotha Research Library, Arabic ms. no. 903, fol. 10b. I owe this reference to the late Gabriel Baer, Hebrew University/Jerusalem. See his Egyptian Attitudes towards Turks and Ottomans in the seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Prilozi (Sarajevo), 30 (1980), 25-34. Andre Raymond, in his Artisans et commercants au 18eme siecle (Damascus, 1974), II, 543, also mentions the anti-Turkish bias expressed in the Kitdb al-dhakhd9ir. 88 Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge, England, 1981), pp. 73--77. 89 Erich Prokosch, Osmanisches Wortgut im Agyptisch-Arabischen, p. 6, quoting from Ahmad Amins Qdmus al-cdddt (p. 22, s.v. Atrak). 90 Gotz Schregle, Arabisch-Deutsches Worterbuch, I, 343b, s.v. h-j-r. 91 Cf. in this context, the proverb shakhdkh inhadar cald khard dl: marhabd qaraddsh, recorded in the 1870s. See. F. L. Burckhardt, Arabic Proverbs; Or the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians Illustrated from their Proverbial Sayings Current at Cairo (London, 1875), p. 113, no. 363. 92 Raymond, Artisans, II, 725-26 and 727-37, especially 729. 93 Gabriel Baer, Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt (Chicago, 1969), pp. 220-23. 94 On the contacts between Arab and Ottoman ulama in the sixteenth century which were not devoid of mutual respect we have

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reserved though positive bonds of loyalty to the Ottoman sultan. He was to them the supreme ghazi, the guarantor of Muslim sovereignty.95 However, this fealty did not encompass the whole new ruling system. The ulama must have felt more and more pushed aside toward the margins of society. The process we have observed developing in regard to the ulama in the last two sections now reached its climax: the Turks took the last remaining strongholds into their own hands. Whereas the dawla turkiyya of the Mamluks had been an Egyptian and Syrian-in modern nationalist terms, an Arab-state with an alien ruling class, now power had been transferred to distant sultans in a distant land. Egypt and Syria had become peripheral provinces in a vast empire whose center was on the Bosphorus and no longer on the Nile. The removal of prominent Egyptian artisans, many scholars, huge treasures of Arabic manuscripts, and, most important of all, the 'Abbasid shadow caliph from Cairo to the Ottoman capital was much more than a chain of symbolic acts. As early as 1521-1522 a Turkish (i.e., Hanafi) qadi replaced the local Egyptian Shafi'T qadi al-qudat as chief judge of the country.96 The Arab ulama, whose ranks were depleted after 1517, when the Mamluk state was annexed by the Ottomans, had now definitively lost out to the Turks. The last barrier protecting their-as they were likely to see it-monopoly on culture, that is, both religion and scholarship, had been swept away. The triumph of the Turks seemed complete. Now the long-cherished and elaborate idee fixe of the inferiority or even nonexistence of a Turkish Muslim culture had finally been unmasked as a self-deception. It must have been painful for those who still dreamed of the days when Egypt and Syria had been flourishing strongholds of Arab Islam to compare the contributions of Egypt and those of the heartlands of the Ottoman Empire to Arab literature and to orthodox Islam in this period. On the one hand, here were half-literate soldiers writing their campaign diaries, rustic poets without refinement and originality, introverted Sufi sheikhs and scholars whose modest efforts shunned the "hard sciences" such as mathematics completely and remained without an echo beyond their most immediate surroundings. On the other hand, here was the last efflorescence of the Arab sciences, including the study of Arabic grammar, unfolding in Constantinople under the auspices of the Ottoman sovereign, a renascence in which Turkish scholars played a pivotal role. When Muhammad AnTs, a leading Egyptian historian, maintained in the 1950s that the Ottomans 186 Ulrich W. Haarmann had not 'possessed any cultural capital to invest in the intellectual life of Egypt between 1517 and 1800,97 he gravely distorted reality. We must, however, acknowledge that he wrote under the powerful impact of twentieth-century Arab nationalist ideology and was bound to regard Ottoman rule as an alien, foreign-Turkishimperial domination; thus he was no longer able to appreciate the supranational function of the sultanate for Sunni Muslims (whatever language they spoke and to whatever race they belonged). He was nevertheless in error. IX The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are characterized, in the context of this paper, by the gradual and painful growth of this new perspective, establishing new and destroying old bonds and pitting the new idea of an Arab political nationality against the Ottoman Empire, which was no longer respected as the legitimate Islamic polity per se but was suddenly seen as a dominating alien power. From this perspective one will understand that to the Sudanese before 1871, even Egypt appeared as a dawla turkiyya. It was many years-in fact, until the end of World War I (and there were many reversals in this developmentone may mention Mustafa Kamil's staunch pro-Ottoman, Egyptian nationalism and general Arab support of Turkish, even Young Turk, policies in the non-Arab provinces of the Empire) before these new loyalties (and the ensuing new enmities) were finally firmly rooted and generally accepted. With the importation of this Western idea of secular nationalism (with its two constituents of the sovereign people and the unifying national language) to the Ottoman Empire and its Arab provinces, the hitherto subdued resentment against Turkish soldiers and officials eventually found a quasi-objective rationale. There appears a clear connection between long-standing ethnic animosities and the full efflorescence of nationalism. Latent anti-Turkish feelings now forced their way to the fore. They could be presented as falling in line with the aims of Arab nationalnow, in a first overview of a complex field, Michael Winters important study, Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt (New Brunswick, N.J., 1982); the key figure in his book is Sheikh al-Sharamn (d. 1565/66). 95 On such pro-Ottoman rhetoric cf. MarT al-Karmis Qaldid al-iqydn fifa.ddil Al Uthmdn, as quoted and analyzed by Michael Winter, Islamic Profile and Religious Policy, Israel Oriental Studies, 10 (1980), 137. 96 Winter, Society and Religion, p. 33, n. 17, referring to Ibn Ab? 1-Surur, Kitab al-tuhfa albahiyya f tamalluk Al cUthmdn aldiydr al-misriyya. 97 Muhammad AnTs, Madrasat al-ta9r-kh al-misrTft I-asr al-cuthmdan (Cairo, n.d.), p. 14. See the reference in Rifaat Abou-El-Haj, Recent Arab Historiography of Ottoman Rule, in IJMES, 14 (1982), 185-201, here 193.

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ism. Arab Christians, the spokesmen of this nascent Arab nationalist movement, hoped that cutting ties with the Ottoman sovereign would entail the liberation not only from Turkish yoke but also, and foremost, from the fetters of the Islamic social order in which they did not and could not enjoy equal rights with Muslims. The Muslim Arab nationalists, however, were precipitated into a severe conflict of loyalties, especially after 1916, when Sharif Husayn of Mecca rose against the Ottomans, calling for the establishment of an Arab national state under his leadership. Both sides, Arabs loyal to the Porte and those supporting the so-called Arab Revolt, took resort to Islamic arguments in order to attack their opponents. The pro-Husayn press, for example, vilified the Committee of Union and Progress for its blatant Turkish, even Turanian chauvinism which included-and this argument is not unfamiliar to us-the sinister intent of Turkifying the Qur'an, God's gift, given to the Arab nation in their own language.98 What counted more heavily for a Muslim Arab: fealty to the sultan, the recognized leader of the umma, and to the polity he represented, or patriotic Ideology and History: The Arab Image of the Turk 187 Arab sentiment? Fortunately, so one may daresay, the fait accompli of the treaty of Sevres-that is, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire-as well as the abolition of the sultanate and the caliphate by Kemal Atatiirk and the establishment of half-sovereign Arab states superseded such vexing deliberations. After 1919 the traditional, negative image of the Turk was incorporated into the new, secularist view that Arabs held of their own national history. The dream of golden Baghdad and Cordoba99 was contrasted with the nightmare of alien, uncivilized Turkish rule through the centuries. The Turk was pictured-perhaps bound to be pictured?-as the undertaker of Arab grandeur.100 Turkish despotism could now be declared the main if not the sole cause for the depressing age of decadence, inhitdt, in which the great achievements of Arab medieval civilization had been mischievously squandered. We are confronted here with the universal tendency to return compulsively to accomplishments long gone by and of soothing the sores of the present with memories of a brilliant past. In the search for an authentic cultural "personality" (shakhsiyya) of their own, some authors, such as the Egyptian cultural geographer Gamal Hamdan,101 go so far as to declare the "Turk" void of a history, a culture, and even a tangible identity; thus a favorable contrast supporting their own mutilated dignity is created. The Turkish slave who, in his lust for power, takes recourse to dastardly murder appears as a motif not only in modern Arab lyrics102 but also, in similar forms, in the apologetic political rhetoric of Arab leaders from Nasser to Saddam Hussein.103 The centuries of Ottoman rule and the considerable progress they brought to the Arab world under the aegis of Islam were found incompatible with the ideology of Arab nationalism and therefore passed over. In the lavish coin cabinets of the Gulf countries, Arab history is consistently presented, from the past to the present, with the notable exception of the 300 years of foreign Ottoman domination.104 Even in states like Egypt and Lebanon, with their venerable tradition of modern scholarship, it was only in the most recent past that Ottoman and Turkish were introduced into the academic curricula, although these were the languages in which, for some three centuries, these countries had been governed. x To sum up and synthesize: Why did the basically natural and inoffensive image of the Turkish 'ilj, "barbarian," ruling over Arab lands, steadily and gradually deteriorate, so that the term became an insult that provokes conster98 This is one result of research done by Professor William Cleveland on the Arab press-both in the Hijaz (al-Qibla) and in Turkey (al-Sharq, al-Alam al-islamT)-during the years 1916 to 1918; he read a paper on this subject on January 23, 1986, at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal. Another field of Arab-Turkish interaction in the period preceding World War I-out of numerous areas that have hardly been touched-is the status of authors of Turko- Circassian descent writing in Arabic. Shawqi, for example, was bitterly reproached for aristocratic collusion with the Turkish regime ruling Egypt. Al-Aqqad attacked him for treating the Egyptian patriots exactly as the Egyptianized Turks (al-atrdk al-mutamassira) did. Hafiz IbrahTm, another poetic luminary, was at least labeled a democratic Turk. Cf. Turki Mugheid, Sultan Abdulhamid II. im Spiegel der arabischen Dichtung. Eine Studie zu Literatur und Politik in der Spitperiode des Osmanischen Reichs (Berlin, 1987), pp. 309-10. 99 See also Bernard Lewis, History: Remembered, Recorded, Invented, p. 75. 100 Ibid.p, p. 78-82. 101 Shakhsiyyat Misr (Cairo, 1970), p. 448. 102 See, e.g., the poetry by Salah ChahTn or-a kind reference by Dr. Asad Khairallah, Freiburgthe poem Shajarat al-durr by the late Khalil Hawl. 103 Cf. the remarks by Arsel, Arap, pp. 196-98 and 207-11, on Gamal Abdel Nassers anti-Turkish speeches; Tyranny, oppression and ruin characterized their rule in Egypt, which continued for many dark centuries, he qualified Mamluk power; cf. this quote in Andrew Ehrenkreutz, Saladin (Albany, N.Y., 1972), p. 233. And key rationales in the Iraq war against Iran are nationalistic: warding off enemies of the Arab nation encompasses the Turks in the past and the Persians in the present. 104 Kind information given by a participant in the discussion following the presentation of an early version of this paper at the University of Frankfurt on May 23, 1985, at the invitation of Professor Barbara Kellner-Heinkele.

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nation among Turks and non-Turks even today? What were the factors-besides the quite natural resentment against foreign domination-that made the Turkish "yoke" so particularly intolerable to its Arab subjects? Why was the Turk's image, characterized by contempt and even hatred, so distorted that it remained an extremely negative one at least until the most recent past? The answer mustso is my conviction-be sought in specifically Islamic aspects of Turkish-Arab coexistence. Let us go briefly back to the ninth century. In this period the Arabs, both the educated and the uneducated circles, generated, under the impact of the seizure 188 Ulrich W. Haarmann of military power by the Turks, the very unspecific stereotype of the Turkish "barbarian," a stereotype we are familiar with from so many other cultures. The rapid acculturation of the nomadic Turks, who forced their way into the new Islamic civilization and were all too prone to betray their own cultural background, served to strengthen the Arab feelings of superiority. The Tulunid intermezzo in early medieval Egyptian history provides ample documentation for this subject of the rejection of a Turkish past and a Turkish identity by Turkish rulers who wielded power over Arab subjects. God had, after all, through the Qur'an and the Prophet, specially favored the Arabs. Then gradually the distribution of weights changed. From dynasty to dynasty the arbitrary powers and the inapproachability of the Turkish rulers grew. Turkish sway became normalcy. To give an example: From Ibn Tulun to the 1952 revolution, only Turkish dynasts (or such as were assimilated to Turkdom) ruled over Egypt-with the sole exception of the Fatimid caliphs. This growing political and economic dependency had, however, apparently less destructive effects on the ethnic self-confidence of the Arabs than did the menace to their cultural and religious preeminence and ascendancy posed by the Turkish barbarians. This threat was epitomized in the waning of the caliphate, the supreme institution of religious guidance and responsibility that had been reserved to their proper people. After the usurpation of 'Abbasid sovereignty by the Seljuqs and a last, short-lived blossoming of the classical caliphate on a very limited regional scale around 1200, Baghdad perished in the Mongol inferno. In order to give their usurpatory regime a formal legitimation, the Mamluks, who had vanquished the Mongols, installed an CAbbasid scion who had escaped the Mongol massacre as a puppet caliph. His main privilege was paying homage to the sultan and joining the four chief justices of Cairo on certain ceremonial occasions.105 In 1517 Sultan Selim deported the last of these miserable 'Abbasid shadow caliphs to Istanbul, from whence he cannot be traced further. Long before, Turkish sultans had also shouldered the duties of the caliph with admirable efficiency. With high sacrifices of their own blood, they again and again saved political Islam from demise. Turkish presence meant victory and absence defeat.106 Thus the Turks acquired high merits which the Arab ulama, the guardians of the Shari'a, were called upon to honor and praise. This constellation, however, deprived them of the possibility of attacking openly and legitimately the hated and disdained foreign despots with the legal means they had at their disposal. The result was the helpless suppression of this hatred against the successful Turks and its transformation into bilious, for the most part clandestine, and eventually desperate mockery. The component of uncouthness (i.e., a lack of morals and culture) that was available in the universal cliche of the barbarian, together with many positive and attractive features, was singled out. With apologetic consistency that one element was stressed all the more as the cultural lead of the Arabs in comparison with the Turks became smaller, until finally, in the Ottoman period, the Arabs found themselves behind the Turks even in this regard. While Persian political theorists were ready as far back as in the sixteenth century to accept a non-Arab and certainly also a Turk as imam as long as no appropriate candidate from among the sons of Isma'il could be found,107 Arab jurists by and large worked hard to eschew this conclusion until our century. Although this issue is indeed very complicated and must by no means be reduced to one simplistic thesis, still one should mention in this context that even the Islamic reformer Rashid Rida staunchly regarded the Ottoman caliphate as a makeshift solution, since the holder of office was not from among the Quraysh and had not mastered Arabic.108 He therefore
105 On the Abbasid caliphs under Mamluk tutelage see the study by Peter M. Holt, Some Observations on the cAbbasid Caliphate of Cairo, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 47,3 (1984), 501-7. 106 Alexandria would not have fallen into the hands of the Franks (king Peter of Cyprus) in 1365 if the city had not been empty of brave fighters, Turks and Turcomans; cf. al-Nuwayrl al- Iskandarani, Kitdb al-ilmam, ed. A. Atiya (Hyderabad, 1393/1973), V, 184. 107 So Fazlallah b. Ruizbihan Khunji (d. 1524), who served the Uzbek Khan Ubaydallah, referring to his source Imam BaghawT; cf. Ann K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam (Oxford, 1981), pp. 183-85, quoting from KhunjTs manual of government Suluk al-muluk. 108 Cf. Rudolph Peters, Erneuerungsbewegungen im Islam vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert und die Rolle des Islams in der

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used arguments which, in innercircle discussions among Muslims on the bounds and requirements of the institution of khilafa had, even since the Seljuq period one millennium before, lost their stringency. Arabs defended their claims to spiritual guidance in the umma defiantly, often blurring national and religious loyalties, after the bacillus of modern European nationalism had started to affect their minds. Only the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the annihilation of the legal and constitutional ties between the two peoples created the conditions for the overdue revision of their mutual relationship. The past fifty years have demonstrated how difficult and cumbersome this new beginning was. At first the gap between Turks and Arabs, behind the banners of their proper nationalisms, actually widened. This was the only way for the Turks, who resented Arab "treason" during World War I, to digest the amputation of the Arab provinces that had formed more than half the Ottoman territory. And only on such separate ways could the Arabs learn to forget the century-long Turkish domination. In recent years the two peoples have begun to rediscover not only their common interests but also their common past. Turkish authors deal, in the Arabic language, with the representation of their people, the Turks, in the works of al-Jahiz.109 Turcological chefs d'oeuvre of Western Orientalism are translated into Arabic.110 Arab scholars, especially in the Maghreb but also in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, study their respective local history in the early modern period through Ottoman archival materials and have become staunch supporters of close Arab-Turkish ties, especially in the fields of culture and scientific research. In newly founded conferences on Arab-Turkish relations,111 the unifying, not the separating, elements in this bilateral relationship are invoked. And, as it turns out, it can be helpful to have new and common enemies. The second conference on Arab-Turkish relations, for example, had the rather telling name Symposium on the Decolonization of (lit.: "removal of colonial sediments from") ArabTurkish Relations.112 Common appeals are issued to strengthen Islamic fraternity and the alliance against old and new colonialists. These first steps are cautious and often fragile, but full of optimism. One is reminded of similar changes among former arch enemies in Central Europe after World War II. I think the assumption is justified that without the systematic and wellcoordinated study and reenactment of the Arab-Turkish relationship over time, this new solidarity will hardly flourish. This will mean that critical issues such as Turkish policies toward Israel,113 the problem of the Sanjaq Alexandrette, oron a quite different level-Turkish claims for all those thousands of Arabic manuscripts that were carried away from Cairo in 1517 as an essentially Turkish national heritage cannot be excluded from this process. And one particularly sensitive theme that is both a well-suppressed product and, at the same time, a faithful mirror of these difficult bilateral relations is certainly the derogatory imagery that has been discussed in this article and is current even today. It will disappear, if only gradually, not least through the study of the historical framework in which it grew and proliferated. Reality must be confronted. Certainly today, the Arabs no longer have any reason whatsoever to feel inferior to the Turks. Political independence and the wealth hidden in Arab soil have created the necessary distance for perceiving the virtues and values that both peoples have in common and have shared in the past.

neueren Geschichte: Antikolonialismus und Nationalismus, in Werner Ende and Udo Steinbach, ed., Die islamische Welt in der Gegenwart (Munich, 1984), p. 128. 109 See the work quoted above in n. 40. 110 E.g., Wilhelm Bartholds Zwolf Vorlesungen zur Geschichte der Turken Mittelasiens, trans. Ahmad al-Sacid Sulayman and Ibrfahm Sabri under the title Ta9rTkh al-Turk fT Asyd al-wustd (Cairo, n.d. [approximately 1960]), or his Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, trans. Salah al-DTn Uthman Hashim as Turkistan min al-fath al-carabT ild l-ghazw al-mughiul (Kuwait, 1401/1981). 111 The proceedings of the first of this series of conferences are published under the title Turk-Arap iliskileri. Gecmiste, bugun ve gelecekte. I. Uluslararasi Konferansi bildirileri. 18-22 Haziran 1979, Hacettepe Universitesi Tirkiye ve Orta Dogu Arastirma Enstittisi, vol. I (Ankara, 1980). 112 Held in Tripoli/Libya December 1982; cf. my report Bericht uiber die zweite Konferenz fiber die arabisch-turkischen Beziehungen-Tripoli/Libyen 13.-18.XII. 1982, in Orient, 24 (1983), 24-27. 113 0n this issue we have an unpublished brief report, read at the International Conference on Options for Turkeys International Economic and Political Relations, June 28-30, 1979, in Istanbul (cf. the report by Udo Steinbach in Orient, 20 [1979], 14) by the director of the Cairo Center for Strategic and Political Studies, El-Sayed Yassin, together with Wahid A. El-Megid, The Image of Turkey in the Arab World. The paper begins with a presentation of al-Kawakibi, TabdJi alistibddd, and its anti-Ottoman stand and ends with an analysis of the burgeoning economic relations between Turkey and certain Arab countries, such as Libya, in the mid-seventies.

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RICHARD N. FRYE and AYDIN M. SAYILI Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1943), pp. 194-207
An examinationo f the linguistic map of the Near and Middle East at the present time reveals the extent of Turkish speaking peoples from the Balkans, across Anatolia, Adharbayjan, and Khurasan, into northern Afghanistan and Central Asia. This does not include isolated Turkish peoples, such as the Qashqai in Fars and Khuzistan, and the Khalaj in the Isfahan area. This distribution has not always been the same. The activity of the Turkicization of the Near East, including the regions of Khurasan and Transoxania, is generally supposed to have started with the advent of the Saljuqs. On the other hand, it is known that by the beginning of the fourteenth century, the areas where Turkish was the major spoken language were approximately the same as they are at the present time.1 Therefore, from about 1000 to 1300 the districts of Transoxania and Khurasan, and Asia Minor were completely or partially Turkicized, and all this was accomplished while similar occurrences were taking place in other parts of Iran, in southern Russia, and in Chinese Turkistan. The Turks were not in possession of a Turkish religious book such as the Bible or Quran by which their language would have assumed a spiritual value and which would have helped its spread. The Turkish princes and rulers of Islam did not attempt to enforce the Turkish tongue as the language to be used by their subjects. They did not even adopt it as their court language, which would have enhanced its position as the language of administration and encouraged its cultivation by those aspiring to government posts. On the contrary, they patronized and encouraged Arabic and especially Persian. In general, up to the fourteenth century the Turks made no conscious effort to enhance the dignity of their tongue; it was only after the thirteenth century that Turkish gradually began to compete with Arabic and Persian as a literary and scientific language even among the Turks themselves. Since, nevertheless, Turkish did spread rapidly among the mass of people over vast areas, certain factors must have existed which offset the abovementioned disadvantages. However, among contemporary historians, there seems to be a belief that the Turks beyond the Yaxartes river, where the Turkish migrations originated, consisted of small tribes, constituting a small total population. In addition, the Turks are supposed to have led an almost exclusively nomadic mode of life, so their chances of mixing and intermarrying with the non-Turkish city dwellers would be small. As nomads they could not have controlled the market language either, a process by which the city people usually determine or change the language of .the surrounding villages, after first making them bilingual. It is clear that under these conditions the Turks would not have been able to spread their language on as large scale as they did. Our studies have led us to believe that the supposed conditions of exclusively nomadic life and small population did not exist, but that: (a) Turks were already in the regions of Khurasan and Transoxania at the time f the Arab conquest, and remained there after the Arab domination. The Turkicization of these districts had, therefore, begun long before the Saljuqs. (b) Turks were town and village dwellers except in regions where natural conditions imposed a nomadic life on them. (c) They probably had a relatively large population in Central Asia and infiltrated in fairly large numbers into the Near East. The existence of Turks as an important element of the population in the districts between the mountains of Khurasan, the Yaxartes river, and India already in pre-Islamic and pre-Saljuq times, forms the main subject of study in this article. Anatolia and the Caucasis, which necessitate a study involving the Khazars and other Turkish peoples of the south Russian steppes, have been omitted. The presence of Turks in the regions of Khurasan and Transoxania before the Saljuqs is recognized by scholars, but it is usually qualified. One maintains, "almost all of the subjects of this (Turkish king of Kabul) and other
1 The great extension of the areas where Turkish was spoken in the beginning of the 14th century can be seen from ibn BatAtas accounts of his travels in Anatolia and in the regions north of the Caspian and the Black seas.

TURKS IN THE MIDDLE EAST BEFORE THE SALJUQS

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kings of Central Asia were Iranian, though the dynasties and the armies were Turkish." 2 The consensus of opinion is that these early Turks were mostly small groups of mercenaries or slaves. It may be added here that the districts of Khurasan and Transoxania had an exceptionally important role in the intellectual development of the Moslem world. A very large number of scientists and scholars originated from those regions during the 'Golden Age' of science and learning in Islam. 3 Byzantine, Armenian, Chinese, and Moslem sources have frequent references to Turks on both sides of the Oxus, not only before the eleventh, but also before the seventh century. Moslem historians and geographers are the primary sources in this study, while records in other languages are secondary. Several scholars have contended that the sources are not accurate in the way they use the word 'Turk.' Gibb maintains, "the Arabic records are misleading by their use of the word Turk for all the non-Persian peoples of the East. They give the impression (due perhaps to the circumstances of the time in which the chief histories were composed) that the opponents of the Arabs in Transoxania were the historical Turks."4 The historical Turks were the subjects of the West Turkish khanate and the Tiirgesh power after 740 A. D. Marquart expresses the same opinion in a more specific way when he points out that it is an anachronism when the Arabs designate the Hephthalites as Turks. 5 By anachronism he refers to the fact that the Hephthalites existed before the word Turk began to be used. That word, as it has been used since its appearance with the advent of the T'u Chiieh 6 in the sixth century A. D., denotes primarily a linguistic rather than a political distinction. It is not likely that the T'u Chiieh, as Turkish speakers, were non-existent before they founded an empire. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that the Hsiung-nu, T'o Pa, and others were Turks, although the political role of these people ended before the time of the "historical Turks." There is good reason why the Chinese sources do not designate the Uyghurs, Kirghiz, and Tiirgesh as T'u Chiieh, any more than they should call the T'u Chiieh by the name Hsiung-nu. For the Chinese the political organization or disorganization of their neighbors was of more interest to the imperial court than ethnic relationships. The Arabs, on the other hand, encountered a mixed population in Transoxania with little political unity. For the Moslems a Turk was not one who belonged to a political group of that name, but primarily a person who spoke Turkish. Even such a distinction was lost when the person adopted Islam. The story of the Arab conquests in Central Asia has already been well told by Barthold and H. A. R. Gibb. We shall consider here only a number of items on the role of the Turks in opposing the Arabs which are of significance to the subject. Indeed, it would seem that the strongest opposition was presented by just this group of the population.7 Barthold has indicated that the Turks whom the Arabs met in Transoxania were not the T'u Chiieh, but the Tiirgesh, as well as various local groups and probably some remnants of the Hephthalites. 8 There is considerable evidence that Turks dwelt in the valleys of Turkharistan, Badakhshan, and Kabul before the advent of the Arabs. It is certainly true that armies were sent by the khaqan of the Western Turks into Transoxania at various intervals, but the sustained resistance to the Arabs was borne by the local population. The conquest only began when Mu"awiya was firmly established in the caliphate. In the year 54 (674) 'Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad, newly appointed governor of Khurasan, crossed the Oxus river and defeated a force of Turks from Bukhara before retiring.9 Baladhuri gives a few additional details, but adds little to the general picture. He tells how 'Ubaydullah attacked Bukhara, whereupon Khatun, the ruler of the city,
2 Hitti, P. K., History of the Arabs, New York 1937, 208 note 6. 3 This is true not only of their quantity but also of their quality. From 800 to 1100 A.D., out of the six scientists who have given their names to the chapters of the first volume of the Introduction to the History of Science of George Sarton, only two did not originate from that corner of the vast territory of Islam. One of these, al Razt, was from Rayy, and therefore not far from Khurasan. 4 Gibb, H. A. R., The Arab Conquests in Central Asia, London 1923, 10. 5 Marquart, J., Eransahr, Abhandlungen Gittingen K Gesell. Wiss., 1901, 239 note 6. 6 Henceforth this term will be used to designate the Western Turks, authors of the Orkhon inscriptions. 7 Gibb, op. cit., 73-4. 8 Barthold, Die historische Bedeutung der alttiirkischen Inschriften, Anhang zu Radloff, W., Die Alttiirkischen Inschriften der Mongolei, St. Petersburg 1897, 3-4. 9 Tabart, Annals, 2. 169-70. Western dates are approximations within a year.

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asked the Turks for help. A large number of them came, presumably from nearby districts.10 Tabari mentions Turkish forces in Bukhara, when 'Ubaydullah was raiding the countryside.11 Although this expedition was only a raid, Narshakhi amplifies it considerably. Ie declares that 4000 Bukharans were captured when Baykand and Ramitan were taken by the Arabs. After these successful operations they laid siege to Bukhara itself. Khatun sought aid from the Turks, but their army was destroyed by the Moslems, who secured much booty. Khatun was finally compelled to sue for peace and pay a large tribute.12 'Ubaydullah was succeeded as governor of Khurasan by Aslam ibn Zur'a, who accomplished nothing in Transoxania.13 Sa'id ibn 'Uthman, his successor, in 56 (676) advanced against the infidels and defeated the army sent against him, besieging them in their city.14 The name of the city is not mentioned by Tabari, but it was probably Samarqand, for Yaquit credits Sa'id with its capture.15 The Arabs retired with fifty hostages and seized Tirmidh on the return journey to Khurasan. Baladhuri tells of a defeat of a force of Turks, people of Soghd, etc. by Sa'id, as well as his subsequent victories at Samarqand and Bukhara.16 Narshaki adds a few tales to embellish his chronicle.17 his expedition also failed to secure a lasting result. In 61 (680) Salm ibn Zivyad was appointed governor of Khurasan by Yazld, and shortly thereafter raided Samarqand.18 Later he appears in possession of the city.19 Narshakhi says that Muslim (Salm) ibn Ziyad came against Bukhara with a large force, so Khatun sent to Tarkhun, ruler of Soghd, seeking aid by offering herself and her kingdom to him. Tarkhun came, and with him a prince of Turkistan. 20 The Moslems were again victorious and Khatun was obliged to make peace. Salm did not remain in Transoxania long, but was soon obliged to return to Marw. 21 Baladhurl mentions raids of Turks as far as Nishapur during the governorship of 'Abdullah ibn Khazim 64-69 (683-688). This may refer to the raids mentioned by Tabari in his account of the revolt of ibn Khazim. 22 He says that the Turks attacked the fortress of Isfad but were repulsed by the Bani Azd, who composed the majority of persons in the castle. The garrison sent to ibn Khazim in Herat for aid. He responded with reinforcements who helped to defeat the Turks. An interesting poem on the exploits of ibn Khazim is appended to the story. 23 This capable governor was murdered in 72 (691) at the instigation of the caliph 'Abd al Malik. 24 Musa ibn 'Abdullah ibn Khazim acted more independently than his father, whom he left before the latter's death, to seek the protection of one of the rulers on the other side of the Oxus. After successively visiting Amul, Bukhara, and Samarqand, he came to Kish, where he had to fight the' inhabitants.' 25 e continued to Tirmidh, where, after feigning friendship, he drove the Tirmidhshah and his followers from the city. They f led to the Turks for aid, but the Turks mocked them saying, "a hundred men came to you and drove you from your land. We fought them in Kish and will not fight these." 26 This indicates that, according to Tabari, there were Turks among 'the inhabitants of Kish.' A coalition army of Turks and Arabs was crushed by Musa, 27 several years after which an army of 70,000 Turks, Tubbat, and Hephthalites, attacked him but were unsuccessful. 28 From Tabari it may be seen that Musa was somewhat of a hero to
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Baladhuri, Liber expugnationis regionum, ed. M. de Goeje, 1866, 410. Tabari 2. 170. 7. Narshakhl, Description topographique et historique de Boukhara, ed. C. Schefer, Paris 1892, 37. Tabari 2. 172. 13. Ibid. 179. 15. Jacuts Geographisches Wbrterbuch, ed. F. Wiistenfeld, Leipzig 1868, 3. 133. 11. Baladruri 411. Narshakhi 38-9. Tabart 2. 394. 17. Ibid. 395. 2. Narshakhi 40. Bal.adhuri confuses the sequence of events. Tabari 2. 488. This is related under the year 65 (684), but the revolt occurred several years later. Ibid. 493-4. Ibid. 833. 14. Ibid. 1147.3. Ibid. 1148.11. Ibid. 1150. Ibid. 1153.

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the people of Khurasan, for large numbers of Arabs and Turks joined him when he passed through there. 29 Mufsa was finally killed in 85 (704). In these early raids the presence of Turks is amply attested. In 82 (701) al Mughayra ibn al Muhallab died in Khurasan while his father, the governor, was in Kish fighting its people. Another son, Yazld, set out for Marw with sixty horsemen. On the way 500 Turks, coming from Nasaf, met them and demanded something from them. One of the company gave them some cloth and a bow. The Turks rode away, but deceitfully returned with new demands. Yazid was adamant and a struggle ensued. Finally, the contest came to an end and the Arabs departed, the victory uncertain. 30 These same Turks were encountered by HIarith ibn Qutbah, lieutenant of al Muhallab, on his way to Balkh. He defeated them and captured several, but soon set them free. 31 There is no reason for assuming these Turks to belong to the armies of the East Turkish khanate, as Barthold has done. 32 It is more likely that they were a band of marauders from the vicinity. Furthermore, neither the Eastern Turks nor the Tiirgesh were in a position to intervene in the affairs of Transoxania at this time. 33 The conquests of Qutayba ibn Muslim mark the beginning of the systematic conquest of Transoxania. It is impossible to mention all the skirmisheshe had with the Turks. Nor is it within the scope of this study to deal with the struggles between the Moslems and the armies of the Tiirgesh, who played an important role on the stage of Central Asian history till the disintegration of their power about 739. For our purpose it is only necessary to dwell on the conf licts of the Arabs with Turks before the rise of Tiirgesh power. In the year 88 (707) Qutayba raided Numishkath and Ramltan, two towns near Bukhara. Turks and people of Soghd and Farghana fought against him, but were defeated. 34 Two years later he raided Bukhara. Then he sent Wardan Khudat, ruler of Bukhara, to Soghd, the Turks, and those around them, asking their assistance. 35 This clearly does not refer to a foreign army of Turks which maintained an independent existence in Transoxania for many years, but rather to people who resided in the vicinity. Near Samarqand Qutayba had to fight against Ghurak, lord of Soghd, who had Turks and people of Shash and Farghana in his army. The Arab general was again successful. 36 It has been proposed that these Turks were Tiirgesh from beyond the Yaxartes. Houtsma accepts the Bahili tradition that Kur Baghanfn, the son of the sister of the king of China, was in Transoxania in 707 fighting against Qutayba. 37 There is no reason to suppose that such an individual, if he existed, was necessarily a Tiirgesh. This has been effectively discounted, and needs no further discussion. 38 After the death of Qutayba in 715 Tiirgesh armies from the present area of Semirechinsk did begin to menace the Arabs. In general the local inhabitants aided these Turks against the Moslems, for we have frequent accounts of the people of Soghd and Bukhara allied with the invaders. The Tiirgesh were quite successful for a time. In 721, Junayd, governor of Khurasan, advanced against the Tiirgesh. He crossed the Oxus without waiting for all his troops, against the advice of his generals and with the result that he was severely defeated. Mujashshar ibn Muzahim, one of the ablest Arab commanders, said, "No governor of Khurasan should cross the River (Oxus) with less than 50,000 men."39 In 110 (728), Turks were entrenched at Amul on the Bukhara-Marw road, where Ashras ibn 'Abdullah al Sulami attacked hem.40 Nine years later, under Asad ibn 'Abdullah, Turks are mentioned in Marwarruidh and Balkh. 41 Apparently, these did not consist solely of the invading Tiirgesh, but included the local Turks. For Tabarl
29 30 31 32 1899, 16. 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 Ibid. 1160.19. Ibid. 1078. Ibid. 1080.15. Cf. Ibn Khallikan, Biographical Dictionary, M. de Slane, Paris 1871, 4. 175. Barthold, Die alttiirkischen Inschriften und die arabischen Quellen, in Radloff, Die Alttiirkischen Inschriften der Mongolei, Gibb, op. cit. 30. Chavannes, E., Documents sur les Tou-kiue Occidentaux, St. P6tersbourg 1903, 282. Tabart 2. 1195. G Ibid. 1202. 12. Ibid. 1249.14. Houtsma, M. T., Review, Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen, 1889, 387. Gibb, op. cit. 13, 35. Gibb, op. cit. 73.. Tabart 2. 1512. Ibid. 1612

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writes that the khaqan of the Tiirgesh went to upper Tukharistan and remained with the Yabghu of the Kharlukh Turks who dwelt there.42 The defeat of the Khaqan Suill by Asad ibn 'Abdullah in 737, followed by his death a year later, brought an end to the West Turkish khanate. After this period the Moslem religion became firmly established in Transoxania and with the adoption of Islam individuals ceased to call themselves Turks or Persians, but considered themselves only members of the Moslem community. Maqdisi says that there were many languages spoken in Soghd.43 Transoxania undoubtedly had a mixed population, and the Turks were clearly an important element in that region and apparently were also among its older inhabitants. Narshakhi says that Soghd was first populated by people coming from Turkistan, because they found abundant water and trees there.44 While this is undoubtedly local legend, it may be mentioned together with the runic inscription of Tonyukuk from the early years of the eighth century. There it is written, "As far as Demir Kapi we followed them up; there we made them turn back. To Inal kagan there came the whole Soghd people with Suk (?) as their leader and submitted. Our forefathers and the Turkish people had (in their time) reached Demir Kapi."45 Demir Kapi is the 'Iron Gate' pass in the southwest of Soghd. The Byzantine historian Menander speaks of Turkish miners, whom Ze marchos, the Byzantine ambassador, met in Soghd on his way to the court of the Western Turks.46 This passage assumes further significance when it is observed that Mubarakshah al Marwarrudhi, writing in the opening years of the thirteenth century, speaks of the articles produced and exported by the Turks and says, " Under the province of Soghd is a mountain, the water of which comes to Samarqand. In that mountain there exist metals of silver, gold, and bituminous turquoise. In the same mountain the metals iron, mercury, and vitriol are found, (all of ) which they take around the world."47 Un-doubtedly the migrations, in the fifth century, of the hiephthalites, of whom we shall speak later, contributed considerably to the Turkish population of these lands.48 The Arabs, when they conquered Transoxania, retained the ruler of Bukhara as a puppet, which would indicate his popular support. The Fihrist clearly says that there are Turkish towns in Soghd.49 Ibn Khurdadbih mentions Turkish cities within the territory ruled by Nfuh ibn Asad, the Samanid prince who reigned in Samarqand in 204 (819). 50 At this time the Moslem frontier did not reach to the Yaxartes. Mas'iudi says that ever since the destruction of the city known as 'Amat, in the desert of Samarqand, the Turks have no more a khaqan whom all their kings obey. 51 It is also certain that the Turks remained after the Arab conquests, and did not f lee beyond the Yaxartes to return in the eleventh century. The city of Shash, near present Tashkent, was occupied by Turks who rallied to the aid of Rafi' ibn Layth during his rebellion of 191 (806). 52 Several years later Turks supported Rafi' outside the walls of Samarqand. 53 In the time of Qudama ibn Ja'far (d. 948) non-Moslem Turks lived in the territory beyond the city of Nftshjan, sixty farsakhs east of Samarqand. 54 The caliph Ma'mfn (813-833) granted fiefs to the sons of Asad ibn Saman. Yahya received Shash, the inhabitants of which were Muslims of the Ghuzz and Khalaj tribes. 55 In the jami' al hikAyat, Muhammad 'Awf l says, "Some of them (Turks) within the territory of Khwarazm became Moslems when the Islamic religion brought happiness to these regions, and (they) accomplished good deeds in Islam. . . Others, called Turkmans, left their own territory and came into the cities of Islam."56 There are many other examples of a similar nature some of which may be found in other parts of this paper.
42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 Ibid. 1612.16. Maqdlsl, BGA 3. 262. Narshakht 5. Ross, E. D., The Tonyukuk Inscription, BSOS 6. 1930. 42. Menander Protektor, ed. Bekker, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, Bonn 1829, 380. 15. Ross, E. D., Tdrtkh-i Fakhr ud-din Mubdrakshdh, London 1927, 38-9. For some other information concerning the presence of Turks in Transoxania in early times, see below p. 202. Kitdb al Fihrist, ed. G. Fliigel, Leipzig 1871, 18. Ibn Khurdadbih, M. de Goeje, BGA 6. 38. Masfidi, Les prairies dor, ed. Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille, Paris 1861-77, 1. 287. Tabari 3. 712. 5. Ibid. 775.9. Ibn Khurdadbih, op. cit. 262; cf. Houdas, 0., Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankoberti, Paris 1891, 54. Raverty, H. G., Tabaqdt-i Ndsiri, Calcutta 1881, 28 note 2. Barthold, Turkestan v epokhu Mongolskago nashestviia, St. Petersburg 1898, 1 (texts). 99.

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There are many references to Turks living in the Islamic territory. Mas'idi, says that the Khalaj (Khallukh) inhabit the districts of Farghana, Shash, and vicinity. 57 He also speaks of settled and nomad Tubbat Turks in the vicinity of Badakhshan, south of Farghana and north of Kabul. 58 It is well known that the Abbasids beginning especially with Mu'tasim used a large number of Turkish soldiers in their armies. These are considered to have been almost all slaves or foreign mercenaries. There is evidence, however, that Turks were recruited from the Eastern provinces. Yamin al Dawla (Mahmud al Ghaznawi) recruited Khalaj Turks into his army from Ghazna, and Khalaj and Ghuzz Turks from Balkh regions, in preparation for the war he fought in 389 against the Qarakhanids. 59 The following passage taken from MasTidi (tr. Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille) indicates clearly that the large Turkish army of Mu'tasim was largely recruited from the districts of Khurasan and Transoxania: "Moutagem recherchait avec empressement les (esclaves) Turcs et les faisait acheter par ses affranchis; il reunit ainsi une troupe de quatre mille esclaves, qu'il habilla d'etoffes de brocart, de ceintures et d'ornements dores, en les distinguant par le costume du reste de son armee. II affecta a son service un corps compose de soldats originaire des deux Hauf d'Egypte, du Hauf du Yemen et de celui de Kais, et les appela les Magrebins; il equipa aussi des hommes venus du Khoragan, et en particulier de Ferganah et d'Achrousnah. Ces Turcs formerent bientot une armee nombreuse." 60 This passage is also of great interest, for it indicates that Mas'udi refers to Turks when he says 'people coming from Khurasan, Ferghana and Ushrufsina.' Moslem writers often use similar terms when speaking of the conquests in the districts of Transoxania. They say, e.g., that the Arab armies fought the 'Turks and the people of Bukhara' (and many other cities). Such expressions apparently have inf luenced scholars to conclude that the inhabitants of the cities were not Turkish, that the fighting Turks were foreign armies, and that, in general, Turks were not city dwellers. We have met an example in which Tabari using the phrase ' the inhabitants of Kish' does not thereby mean to imply that there were no Turks living in Kish.61 In fact, we have already seen that Turks lived in many cities in these regions, and that the Turkish armies fighting the Arabs there usually did not come from beyond the Yaxartes. It is probable that, as most of these cities seem to have had a composite population, the Moslem writers prefer simply to use the term 'inhabitants.' Since local political power was in the hands of the Turks, and since they probably formed the main fighting element, it is natural to hear that it was always they who came to the help of the fighting city inhabitants. One important reason why contemporary scholars generally suppose that Turks did not inhabit Transoxania is the contention that that region was populated by Soghdians. One factor which helped engender this theory is the wide distribution of the places where Soghdian inscriptions and fragments have been found. In the first two decades of our century numerous expeditions to Chinese Turkistan unearthed Soghdian manuscripts at Turfan, Tun-Huang, Kucha, and other sites in the Tarim Basin. The contents of these documents, although predominantly Manichaean or Buddhist, give evidence of many Soghdian commercial colonies scattered throughout the region.62 When it was discovered that one side of the tri-lingual stele of Qarabalasagun in Mongolia was written in Soghdian instead of Uyghur Turkish, added impetus was given to the theory. One scholar even proposed the existence of Soghdian speakers from the Caspian to the China Sea, and Soghd itself was extended far beyond the Yaxartes river.63 The first historical references to Soghd are found in the Old Persian inscriptions of Bisutun and Nakhsh-i Rustem, but in neither place is a definite geographical location specified. In succeeding years Greek authors make references to the people and their country, but they too do not delineate its frontiers, although they generally understood it as the region between the Oxus and Yaxartes rivers.64 It is only
57 Op. cit. 1. 288. 58 Bailey, H. V., Iranian Studies, BSOS 6. 1932. 947. 59 Trudy of the Oriental Section of the Imperial Archeological Society, St. Petersburg 17. 1874. 224, 225. 60 Op. cit. 7.118. 61 See above, p. 197 and notes 25, 26. 62 Pelliot, P., Le cha tcheou fou, tou king et la colonie sogdienne de la region du Lob Nor, JA 1916. 111-25. Rosenberg, F. A., Sogdiiskie starie pisma, Izvestiia Akad. Nauk 5. 1932. 459. 63 Ross, E. D., The Study of the Persian Language, The Persia Magazine 1. 1921. 71. 64 Barthold, K istorii orosheniia Turkestana, St. Petersburg 1914, 5.

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after the conquests of Alexander that they become more specific and apply the name to a district on the lower Zarafshan river.65 Arabic sources also consider Soghd a small district on the lower Zarafshan, usually including the cities of Samarqand and Bukhara, and most authors designate the former as the capital. Ya'qfibi, however, gives Kish (or Kass), some hirty miles south of Samarqand, as the capital,66 while the Fihrist of ibn al Nadim has Farankath.67 This latter must be the same city that al Nasafi, in his Kitab al qand fi tarzkh al Samarqand, says G-hurak, ruler of Soghd just after the time of Qutayba, built four farsakhs from Samarqand.68 It might be mentioned, however, that the passage in the Fihrist might mean that this city, for which several variants exist, was the capital of the Turkish cities of Saghd. There are cities in Transoxania phonetically similar to most of the variants. One of the manuscripts has Nawikath. Marquart is undoubtedly in error when identifying this city with a locality near Issik Qul mentioned by Maqdlsi, thus anticipating the extension of Soghd to that region.69 Istakhri excludes Bukhara. Kish, and Nasaf from Soghd, but acknowledges that others include these cities.70 Maqdisi omits only Bukhara.71 MaIas'udoi,n the other hand, considers Soghd as lying between Bukhara and Samarqand, thus excluding both cities.72 Yaqft lists the principal towns and extols the fertility and beauty of Soghd. He alone among the geographers distinguishes two areas, the Soghd of Samarqand and the Soghd of Bukhara.73 It is not known what geographical connotation Soghd had for al Biruni; whenever he associates a Soghdian festival with a particular district, it always refers to the territory just around Bukhara.74 Moslem authors never refer to the Soghdians specifically as a linguistic or racial group, but only as the people of Soghd (ahl al Sughd). They definitely considered Soghd a small area. Ten year sago it was considered significant that no remains of the Soghdian language had been found in or near the Zarafshan valley, but only in Chinese Turkistan. Since then much has been done by Russian archeologists. A Soghdian inscription was found carved on a rock in Ladak (Western Tibet),75 and several potsherds with Soghdian inscriptions were discovered at Marw.76 Excavations in the Chu and Saryq river valleys uncovered fragments of pottery inscribed with Soghdian words.77 In 1932 a piece of paper with Soghdian writing was discovered in a ruined building on Mug Mt., 120 kilometers east of Samarqand, on the Zarafshan.78 The next year an expedition, organized by the Tajikistan branch of Akademiia Nauk, found the remains of a treasure in the same place. About four hundred objects of material culture such as coins, textiles, and weapons were found, which are of prime importance for philological tudies, the history of the calendar, and especially for the history of the Arab conquest of Soghd. Eightyone documents, twenty-five of them on paper, were found, eight of which were written in Chinese, one in Arabic, one in an unknown language, and the remainder in Soghdian. Some of these documents refer to the native rulers of Soghd, and their contents are partially substantiated by Arabic sources.79 The great importance of the documents discovered on Mug Mountain lies in the fact that they contain the best and probably the first completely satisfactory evidence that the Soghdian documents found in widely scattered sites originated from Soghd, which itself was a small area. This area, limited as it was, was not inhabited compactly by Soghdian speaking peoples, but, as we have seen, had a mixed population. It results that the total number of the Soghdians was quite small.
65 Tomaschek, W., Sogdiana, SWAW 87. 1877. 74. 66 BGA 7. 299. 14. 67 Op. cit. 18. 68 Barthold, op. cit. (Turkestan etc.), 1 (texts). 48. 69 Marquart, J., Historische Glossen zu den alttiirkischen Inschriften, WZKM 12. 1898. 158-60. 70 BGA 1. 316. 71 BGA 3. 266. 72 Op. cit. 1.287. 73 Op. cit. 3. 94, 394-6. 74 Barthold, Art. soghd, EI. 75 Miller, F. W. K., Eine soghdische Inschrift in Ladak, SPAW 1925. 371-4. 76 Freiman, A., Sogdiiskaia nadpis iz starogo Merva, Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniia, Leningrad 1939, 7. 296 f. 77 Bernshtam, A. N., Arkheologicheskie issledovaniia v Kirgizii, Kratkie Soobshcheniia Instituta Istorii Material. Kulturi, Leningrad 1940, 4. 47-8. 78 Lefort, L., Un nouveau Fonds Sogdien, Le Museon 1934. 47. 346. 79 Sogdiiskii Sbornik, ed. A. Freiman, Leningrad 1934.

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It was apparently their colonization and trading activity which spread their records far and wide. There is evidence for this in Arabic sources. Tabari describes in detail the f light of a large body of Soghdians to the region of Farghana in 721.80 Another migration occurred in 728 when Ashras ibn "Abdullah al Sulami ordered the natives, who had adopted Islam, to pay the kharaj.81 Mahmiud al Kashghari in the eleventh century says that Soghdians had settled at Balasaghun, Talas, and Isfijab, but Turkish was spoken in these towns.82 That is, here we have an example of Soghdians in Turkish territory rather than Turks in the Soghdian domain. Narshakht tells us that the inhabitants of Baykand, in the vicinity of Soghd, were predominantly merchants, and absent from the city most of the time;83 and Tabari confirms this.84 In conclusion, it is clear that the facts at our disposal concerning the Soghdians should not lead us to deny the presence of Turks as inhabitants of Transoxania and indeed of Soghd itself. It is significant that the Shahnama, the national epic of the Persians, considers the Oxus as the national and the linguistic boundary between the Persians and the Turks in pre-Islamic times. This is worthy of consideration since it is in general agreement with the information contained in other historical sources such as Arabic, Chinese, Byzantine, and Armenian. That is, the Sh,ahnama involves no contradiction with other sources in representing the Turks as living in Transoxania. It does, however, convey the idea that Turks inhabited that region as an overwhelming majority of the population, while other sources generally do not give us a quantitative picture of that Turkish population. The term 'Turk' is used quite frequently in the Shahnama, and another term that constantly occurs in connection with the Turks is 'Tura5n.' Turan is used as the name of the 'land of the Turks ' to the northeast of Iran, i. e., as Turkistan. Disregarding minor details, the boundary between Iran and Tuiran is represented as the Oxus. 85 Recently Minorski has questioned the long tradition of accepting the equation of Turan with Turkistan. He says that the term Turan became "later by a sort of phonetic calembour associated with the Turks," and adds that Firdawsi " was in a great measure responsible for this situation, for he was too vividly impressed by the misfortunes which the Samanids had suffered at the hands of the recent Turkish invaders." 86 It is definite that, according to the Shahnama, as a tenth and eleventh century source, Transoxania was the land of the Turks in pre-Islamic times. It is also true that the Shahnama must have been responsible for spreading the word Triran, as meaning Turkistan, into Arabic. For in Arabic the name Turan was given to the district of Makran. In Persian, however, Tfran seems not to have changed meaning with Firdawsi (932- 1021). Ibn Khurdadbih (ca. 825-912), writing in Arabic, associates Turan with Turk in the same manner as Firdawsi.87 This shows that the meaning of Turan as Turkistan existed in the time of ibn Khurdadbih, who was of Persian extraction. Al Khwarazmi, writing in 967 (Firdawsi began to write the Shahnuma in 975 and completed it over thirty years later), explains Marz-i Turan, i.e., the boundary of Turan, as the Frontier of the Turks; his statement also makes it clear that Turan was an old word in his time. 88 It should also be noted that Daqiqi's use of the term Turan is identical with that of his younger contemporary Firdawsi. 89 MasTfidl in his muruj al dhahab (written ca. 945) describes Afrasiyab as 'Turkish ' and as the king of the Turks.90 This is also in agreement with Firdawsi's use of the terms 'Turk' and ' Turan.' The Qara80 Tabari 2. 1439. 81 Ibid. 1509; cf. Barthold, Die alttiirkischen Inschriften und die arabischen Quellen, loc. cit. 27. 82 Divan Lughat al Turk, Istanbul 1917, 1. 30. 83 Narshakhi, op. cit. 16-17. 84 Tabari 2. 1186. 85 This is in general agreement with Sebeos, Armenian historian of the seventh century. He associates Turkistan with Dahistan or its immediate vicinity, and according to him the Oxus river rises in Turkistan. Cf. Histoire dHeraclitus, tr. F. Macler, Paris 1904, 63, 49. In a Pahlawi document the location of Soghd is described as follows: the land of Sogdiana is on the way from Turkistan to China in the region far to the north. Cf. BSOS 6. 1932. 950. 86 BSOS 9. 1938. 625. 87 BGA 6. 17. 88 Mafdtih al ulum, ed. G. van Vloten, Leyden 1895, 114. See also J. M. Unwalla, Journal K. R. Cama Oriental Institute, 1928. 11. 85. 89 Shahndma, ed. Vullers, 3.1495-1553; tr. Warner and Warner, 5. 30-87. 90 Op. cit. 1.289.

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khanids emphasized their Turkish extraction by calling themselves 'The Descendants of Afrasiyab ' (Al-i Afrasiyab) from the beginning of their rule in 932. An epic poem on this legendary hero, known chief ly through the Iranian accounts about him, existed among the Turks, nd also there existed among them a cult of lamentation over Afrasiyab. Mahmufd al Kashghari quotes fragments of that poem on this hero whose full name he gives as Afrasiyab Tunga Alp.91 That this cult of lamentation existed among the Turks long before the time of Firdawsi is indicated by a reference to it in the Orkhon Inscriptions. Gil Tegin won a victory over the Oghuz in the year 714 "having slain them at the time of the funeral of Tunga Tegin." The cult seems to have been widespread. On the wall of the Buddhist temple No. 19 of the Uyghur Turks in Bezeklik exists a portrait of a Turkish prince, whose blood-stained mouth and costume reveal that he represents a martyr. The name of the prince is to be read in the badly preserved red line " Tunga" and at the beginning of the second red line " Tegin," on the left hand black line "Tunga ol" (this is Tunga).92 According to Narshakhl, Ramltan, a settlement twelve miles north of Bukhara, was used by Afrasiyab as his capital.93 The association of Afrasiyab with this general district is strengthened by the existence of the citadel of Afrasiyab is Samarqand. In conclusion, it would seem unreasonable to deny the value of the Shahnama as a source for the history of the Turks by assuming the existence of a phonetic confusion. There is ample evidence not only that Turks inhabited the land beyond the Oxus, but also that they lived in large numbers in the territories to the southwest of that river. Dahistan, the present Kara Kum desert region and part of Jurjan, had Turkish inhabitants before the Arab conquests. Yazdegird II (440-457) built a fortress, the Shahristan-i Yazdegird, against their attacks.94 Firfz (459-483) also built a frontier city against the Turks, calling it by his name.95 Khusraw Anfshlrawan decimated the Turks who lived in Jurjan, settling the remnants in specified areas.96 Jurjan was only conquered in 716 by Yazid ibn al Muhallab, governor of Khurasan. At that time the area was ruled by a marzban, Firuz ibn Qul.97 Qul is the Turkish word for slave, but it was frequently used for nobles and rulers, e. g., Nadir Shah of 18,th century Iran. Dahistan was occupied by Turks with their leader Siul al Turki, who maintained headquarters on the island of Buhlr in the Caspian Sea.98 Firuz ibn Qul feared the designs of Suil on Jurjan and sought the aid of Yazld ibn al Muhallab. Sil, however, advanced and seized all of Jurjan. Yazld in turn caused Sul to retreat to his island, where the Arabs besieged him. He sought peace, but Yazid held out for unconditional surrender.99 Yazld finally won and proceeded to massacre 14,000 Turkish prisoners.100 The poet Sull of the ninth century was a descendant of this prince;101 other persons bearing the name Sul, some of them of the same family, are frequently mentioned by Moslem authors.102 Throughout its history Dahistan has been the habitat of nomads, quick to raid and pillage. 'Abdullah ibn Tahir (830-844) built a fort for protection against the ancestors of the Turkmans.103 The Turks of this district were not only nomads, but they also peopled the numerous irrigated oases.104 The situation was much the same in Khwarazm. We have already mentioned a statement of 'Awf l concerning the existence of Turks there in pre- Islamic times.105 In 728 Tabarl mentions Turks aiding the
91 Op. cit. 1. 44, 11-13. 92 Validi, A.-Z, On Mubarakshah Ghuri, BSOS 6. 1932. 852. 93 Op. cit. 6. 14. 94 Marquart, Eransahr, 55. 95 Tabari 1. 894.17. 96 Nbldeke, T., Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden, Leyden 1879, 123. 157. 97 Tabari 2. 1323.6. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 1325.8; cf. 1.2839. 100 Baladhuri 336; Ibn Khurdadbih 262. 101 Al Isfahani, Kitab al agh4ni 9. 21. 102 Tabarl 2. 121.15, 1226. 103 Istakhri, BGA 1.214; Samani, Kitdb al ansab, London 1913, 234b. The name Turkman apparently existed already in the eighth century, for it is used by the Chinese in that era. Cf. Hirth, F., Sitzber. Akad. Wiss. Miinchen, phil.-hist. Klasse, 2. 1899. 263. 104 Barthold, K istorii orosheniya Turkestana, St. Petersburg 1914, 35. 105 See above, p. 199 and note 56.

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people of Kardar, a Khwarazmian village, against the Arabs under Ashras.106 Similar notices for towns in Khurasan may be found. A group of Turks robbed Yazid ibn al Muhallab and his companions near Zamm, a town south of Bukhara on the Khurasan side of the Oxus river,107 and we have seen that Muttasim recruited Turks into his army from Khurasan.108 Mas'fidi mentions settled and nomad Turks living about twenty days' trip from Balkh.109 In 720 Maslama ibn 'Abd al Malik, governor of Khurasan, sent Mudrik ibn Dhabb al Kalb against a rebel al Mufaddal ibn al Muhallab. Al Mufaddal was killed and ibn Sul, ruler of Quhistan, was taken prisoner.110 Sul, as has been noted, is a common Turkish name. Turks are also mentioned in Khuttal in 737 when Asad invaded this area.111 Balkh is frequently said to be a center of the Turks by Moslem authors.112 Tarkhan Nizak was a native of Balkh and frequently raised revolts against the Arabs, as Chinese sources con firm.113 The latter are specific in saying that the western boundary of the Turks extended beyond Balkh to Marw in 630 A. D.114 Baladhuri also mentions Marw as the last outpost of the Sasanians against the Turks at the time of the Arab conquests.115 The Chinese sources give specific statements about Turks living in Zabulistan, located southwest of Tukharistan. The T'ang Shu says, 'In this kingdom live a population mixed of T'u Chiieh, people of Chi Pin (Kapicha), and Tukharistan.116 According to MasTidi there were many languages and peoples in Zabulistan, one group going back to the descendants of Jafeth ibn Nuh, the ancestor of the Turks.117 When al Hajjaj named 'Abd al Rahman ibn al Ash'ath regent of Seistan, the latter fought against the Turkish Ghuzz and Khalaj, who lived there.118 Mas'fidi says that the Ghuzz and Khalaj (Khallukh) are Turkish people who live in Bust, Bistam, and Seistan.119 It is noteworthy that the Shah of Kabul had to send 2000 Ghuzz slaves yearly to 'Abdullah ibn Tahir as tribute.120 It is attested that the Kabul Shah was a Turk.121 There are some reports of interest concerning the relations between the Turks and the Sasanians. There were Turkish soldiers in the army of Bahram Chubin, Persian general and usurper of the throne, whose most prominent bodyguards were three Turks, and Khusraw II Parwiz (590-628), after his defeat by Bahram, f led into Byzantine territory pursued by Turkish and Kabul cavalry.122 The Byzantine em peror Maurice agreed to aid Parwiz regain his throne. In the ensuing battle by the Zab river, a tributary of the Tigris, Bahram was defeated. Khusraw put to death many prisoners whom he captured from Bah ram's army, but spared the Turks because some of them bore the sign of the cross on their foreheads. This was done apparently out of respect to the religion of his ally.123 It is not known if any of these Turks were recruited from the border provinces of the Sasanian Empire. Islamic sources also mention the presence of Turks in the border regions of Seistan. In 698, 'Ubaydullah ibn Abi Bakra fought the Turks and their leader Rutbil there.124 In the biography of Ya'qfub ibn Layth, ibn Khallikan claims that this fierce Moslem leader killed Rutbll.125 We find the same confusion here as
106 Tabari 2. 1525. 107 Ibid. 1078. 108 See above, p. 199 and note 60. 109 Masufdi, Kitdb at tanbih wal ishraf, BGA 8. 64. 7. 110 Tabari 2.1411. 10. 111 Ibid. 1593-4. 112 Ibid. 156. 113 Chavannes, op. cit. 196, 252. 114 Ibid. 264. 115 Baladhuri 350. 116 Tang Shu, ch. 221. 117 Op. it. (Prairies), 1.349. 118 Ibid. 5. 302. 119 Ibid. 3. 254. 120 Baladhuri 401. 9; Ibn Khurdadbih 37. 11. 121 Chavannes, op. cit. 197. 122 Noldeke, op. cit. 274, 275. 123 Theophilactus Simocatta, History, book 5, ch. 10. 124 Tabari 2. 1037. 125 Ibn Khallikan, 4. 302.

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in the case of Tarkhun, ruler of Soghd. Rutbll may have been a title like Tarkhan.126 Turks are mentioned fighting in Seistan in the time of Hlarufn al Rashid,127 and Ya'qub ibn Layth.128 In the Seistan and Gandhara regions the Arab conquerors came into contact mostly with the Hephthalites, whom they recognized to be Turks.129 There has been objection to the contention that these once powerful opponents of the Sasanian Empire were Turkish. The descendants of the Hephthalites lived not only in the Seistan and Gandhara regions, but in many other areas considered in this article. It therefore becomes necessary to discuss this question in some detail. In the fifth century A. D. Transoxania and adjacent countries were overrun by a people called the Hephthalites. The chief sources for the early history of these people are the Chinese dynastic histories and reports of travellers. However, they give no definite indication of the ethnic composition of this people. Direct evidence from Hephthalite coins, seals, and manuscript remains is lacking. In the Berlin Academy of Science several manuscript fragments are preserved in the same script as the Hephthalite coins.130 This alphabet, it would seem, is derived from the Greek used in Bacteria by the successors of Alexander and the Kushans. The fragments were brought from Turfan by the Chinese Turkistan expedition of A. von Le Coq in the first decade of our century. Unfortunately, they have not been deciphered. The names of a few Hephthalite kings are known. Tabari, e. g., mentiones one called. Akhshunwar.131 This word has been considered a derivation from the Soghdian xs'wn or xsavan, 'power, rule,'132 and has also been equated with the Turkish personal name ' Aqsungur ' or ' Aqsunqur.'133 F. W. K. Miiller, on the other hand, claims that it is a title rather than a name.134 The Turkish title of tegin was used by the Hephthalites as well as other groups in the area of present Afghanistan.135 Some scholars have accepted the statements that the Hephthalites were Turkish, while Pelliot has declared that they spoke a Mongol tongue136 (only a few Hephthalite words have come down to us) and Stein has equated them with the Juan-Juan.137 The information gleaned from Byzantine sources, while meagre, is of importance, for the Moslems encountered the Hephthalites only after the political existence of the latter had ceased. On the other hand, the Moslems came into more intimate and longer contact with the descendants of these people whom they called Haytal. Hence, as far as their ethnic composition is concerned, or at least that of their descendants, the importance of the Islamic sources should not be minimized. Among the Byzantine sources, the most detailed information is given by Procopius, who says they are Huns and he calls them by that name. He adds, they do not mix with any of the other Huns, for they occupy a land far from them. They are not nomads, nor do they have ugly faces as other Huns.138 John Malalas, Syrian writer of the sixth century,139 and Zachariah of Mytilene,140 both designate them as Huns, as well as the Armenian historian Moses of Chosrene.141 The Byzantines generally used the name 'Hun' for Turkish peoples. They applied this name to the T'u Chiieh,142 Avars,143 Bulgars,144 and the Khazars.145
126 Tidrkh-i Sistdn, Tehran 1314 (1896), 91 note 2. 127 Ibid. 152. 128 Ibid. 215. 129 Tabart 2. 109, 156, 493. 130 Le Coq, A. von, SPAW 1909. 1049, 1061. 131 Tabari 1. 874; Dinawari, ed. V. Guirgass, Leyden 1888, 61. 14. 132 Henning, W., Neue Materialen zur Geschichte des Manichiismus, ZDMG 1934. 584. 133 Giinaltay, M. S., Ibni Sina Milliyeti, etc., in Ibni Sina, Istanbul 1937, 15. 134 SPAW 1907. 265. 135 Chavannes, op. cit. 225; cf. Pei Shih, ch. 97, under Kan to Kuo. 136 Pelliot, P., A propos des Comans, JA 1920. 140. 137 Stein, M. A., Innermost Asia, its geography as a factor in history, Geographical Journal 1925, 491. 138 Dewing, H., History of the Wars, London 1914, 13-5. 139 John Malalas, Chronicle, ed. Bekker, Bonn 1831, 451. 140 Hamilton, F. K., and Brooks, E. W., tr. The Syria*n Chronicle of Zachariah of Mytilene, London 1899, 151-3, 328, 344. 141 Langlois, V., Collection des historiens anciens et modernes lArmenie, Paris 1869, 2.351. 142 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. De Boor, Leipzig 1883, 1. 245. 143 Theophilactus Simocatta, History, ed. De Boor, Leipzig 1887, 12. 189, 263. 144 Theophanes, op. cit. 219. 145 Ibid. 316.

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Theophanes calls Baian, the Avar chief, 'king of the Huns.'146 The Armenian writer Vardan designated the Khazars and Kipehaks as Huns,147 and one scholar has proposed that the Old Syriac name for the Western Turks was 'Hun.'148 A similar sounding name, Khyon, occurs in Pahlawi and Avestan texts. There were the White Khyons and the Red Khyons, and they were among the northeastern neighbors of Iran. The word Khyon was probably later transferred to ' Hun.'149 In view of the general habit of designating the Turks as Huns, it is interesting to note the phonetic similarity between 'Hun' and Hsiung-nu. The Hephthalites were called 'Haytal' in Arabic. This form and its variations were employed by the Armenians for the Turkish people as well as their lands beyond Iran.150 This is also true of Moslem geographers.151Maqdisi uses Haytal in the same sense as Transoxania,152 while Mas'udi says the Hayatila (pl. of Haytal) are "Soghd" and live between Bukhara and Samarqand.153 Baladhuri says that they were a Turkish people although some claimed that they were Persians banished to Herat by Firuz, the Sasanian king, where they associated with Turks.154 Thus it is seen that the Islamic writers try to be critical and report any contrary opinions. Syriac sources, among them the Chronicle of Seert, designate the Hephthalites as 'Turks.'155 Thus the Hephthalites, besides being called Huns, the name generally given to the Turkish peoples, were also called Turks, not only by the Moslems but also by some Syriac authors. This constitutes a general agreement between Byzantine, Syrian, Armenian, and Mloslem authors on the ethnic constitution of the Hephthalites. Al Khwarazmi designates the Khalaj Turks as the descendants of the Hephthalites.156 This view may be said to be shared by others but only implicitly. The assertion of al Khwarazmi has been accepted in a very limited sense by Marquart and Minorski, although they claim no other people as the descendants of the Hephthalites.157 There is no doubt that the Khalaj were Turks. They are mentioned in connection with the campaigns of Ya'qub ibn al Layth al Saffar against Zabul, in the present Afghanistan area, in the second half of the ninth century.158 Istakhri, as well as ibn Hawqal, mentions the Khalaj in the Kabul area.159 Yaqft, quoting Istakhrl, says, 'The Khalaj are a kind of Turks. They came to the land of Kabul in ancient times. They are owners of land and are of Turkish appearance, dress, and language.'160 Idrlsl says much the same.161Masfidli speaks of Khalaj (Khallukh?) in the region of Seistan, extending as far as Bust.162 Mahmud of Ghazna used them in his army in 1008 and earlier, recruiting them from the regions of Ghazna and Balkh.163 Ibn Khurdadbih states that the Khalaj are on the Khurasan side of the river (apparently the Oxus) and in another passage, speaking of the vicinity of Talas, says that the Khalaj (Khallukh?) have their winter quarters there.164 From these reports of the Moslem writers it results that during the tenth century the Khalaj lived over an area well corresponding to that previously occupied by the Hephthalites.
146 Ibid. 315. 147 Muylderman, J., La Domination Arabe en Armenie, Paris 1927, 105. 148 Mingana, A., Bulletin John Rylands Library, Manchester 1925, 9. 303 note 3. 149 Bailey, H. W., op. cit. 946. 150 Drouin, E., Memoire sur les Huns Ephthalites, Le Miuson 1895. 72-8. 151 Le Strange, G., Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, Cambridge 1905, 433, 438. 152 Maqdist, BGA 3. 261. 153 Op. cit. (Prairies), 2.195. The way in which Soghd is used here is unusual. B. de Meynard and P. de Courteille translate this passage as the Hayatila are Soghdians who live between Bukhara and Samarqand. The more likely alternative would be they are in Soghd and live between Bukhara and Samarqand. 154 Baladhuri 453. 14. 155 Scher, A., Histoire nestorienne (Chronique de Seert), Patrologia Orientalia 7. 1911. 128. 156 Op. cit. 119. Abdal, considered a derivation of the name Hephthalite, is used to designate a tribe of Turkmans in northern Afghanistan at the present time. (Jarring, G., On the distribution of Turk tribes in Afghanistan, Lunds Universitets Arsskrift, Humanities series, 1939. 38, 56). On the other hand, Abdel, as a name given to a Turkish people, existed in the sixth century; cf. Eransahr 253. 157 Marquart, ibid.; Minorski, BSOS 10.1940. 426-30. 158 Ibn Athir, Kdmil, ed. C. I. Tornberg, 7. 226. 159 Istakhri, BGA 1. 244. 16; Ibn Hawqal, BGA 2. 302. 160 Op. cit. 4. 220. 161 Jaubert, A., tr. Geographie dEdrisi, Paris 1836, 1. 457. 162 Op. cit. (Prairies), 3.254; 5. 302. 163 Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, London 1928, 291 note 3. See also above, p. 199 and note 59. 164 BGA 6.31,28. Although Khallukh is a possible reading of the text, Khalaj is preferable, for Idrist also speaks of Khalaj in the vicinity of Talas. See Eransahr 253.

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Minorski finds the two statements of ibn Khurdadbih contradictory. He says, "we can hardly suppose that a tribe, living on the west of the Oxus, travelled a tremendous distance to its winter quarters across two such mighty streams as Amudarya and Sir-darya."165 It is also unlikely that a single tribe could spread over vast areas extending from Talas to Bust. There is no reason, however, to assume that the Khalaj were a single tribe. We know that the Hephthalites were city dwellers and, as we have seen, it is stated explicitly that the Khalaj were owners of land. Finally, we may consider the following passage taken from Jahiz of Basra, written about the middle of the ninth century: "And you said, I maintain that the Khurasani and the Turk are akin, and that they come from a single region, and that the case of those Easterners and the matter of that region is the same and not different, and closely connected and not divided. And if their roots are not firmly fixed in the same stem, yet they resemble one another. And the borders of the countries which include them, even if not identical, correspond. And in the aggregate they are all Khurasanis, though particular clans are distinguished by particular characteristics and discriminated in certain respects. And you expressed an opinion that the difference between Turk and Khurasani is not so great as that between Arab and nonArab or Greek and Slav or Negro and Abyssinian, not to mention other more dissimilar cases. But the difference is like that between the Meccan and the Medinite, the nomad and the villager, the man of the plain and the man of the mountain .... And you assert that even if these (Turk and Khurasani) differ in some of their idioms and are unlike in some of their characteristics, even so differ the highest tribe of Tamlm and the lowest of Qays, and the incorrect Hawazin from the correct H.ijazites; these differences, again, for the most part are similar to those between HIimyar and the provinces of Yemen."166 Jahiz presented his essay to Fath ibn Khaqan, the Turkish vezier and man of learning, whose statements he reproduces. By Khurasan is probably meant the territory under the governor of Khurasan who had jurisdiction also over other neighboring territories including Transoxania. The term Turk most likely refers to non-Moslem Turks, especially those living outside Islamic territory. In fact, there was a tendency among Moslem writers to restrict the usage of the term Turk in this manner. As will be noticed, in this article we have not discussed linguistic questions, but have limited ourselves to consideration of historical sources. We have by no means presented all of the evidence, and the material presented has led us to the following conclusions: 1. There were considerable numbers of Turks within the territory of Islam in its northeastern provinces in pre-Saljuq times and many lived in cities. 2. They were present in those areas before the Arab conquest and remained there after the annexation of these lands by the Moslems. 3. The Soghdians constituted a small population and Soghd was a small territory of which the Soghdians were not the sole inhabitants. 4. The equation of Tuiran with Turkistan which occurs in the Shaah7ima is quite acceptable, for it is in agreement with historical sources. 5. The available evidence indicates that the Hephthalites were Turks. The Khalaj, and presumably some other Turks who were incorporated into the Moslem domain, were descendants of the Hephthalites.

165 BSOS 10. 1940. 428. 166 Van Vloten, G., Tria Opuscula auctore Abu Othman Amr ibn Bahr al Djahiz Basrensi, Leyden 1903, 29 f.; Hartley-Walker, J., Jahiz of Basra to Fath ibn Khaqan on the Exploits of the Turks, JRAS 1915. 638.

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D. S. M. WILLIAMS Source: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 51, No. 124 (Jul., 1973), pp. 428-438
Reforms of the confused and inequitable systems of land-tenure and taxation were probably the most noteworthy Russian achieve? ments in Turkestan before 1914. The impetus for both came from the first gov ernor-general, General K. P. Kaufman, who had previously served in the military administration of Poland, and was familiar with the reforms introduced there after 1863. The best available source for the reforms, indeed for most aspects of life in the governor-generalship of Turkestan before 1914, is the report of the Pahlen Commission. Charged with the task of providing detailed information on which a new and comprehensive statute for the government of the region could be based, this team of govern? ment officials and specialists, headed by Senator Count K. K. Pahlen, examined all aspects of the administration and the economy. The 21-volume report was published in St Petersburg in 1910 and 1911, and can claim to be the most comprehensive, detailed, and un? biased official account of a colonial administration ever written.2 In Turkestan the Russians found a system of land-tenure well established on the basis of law and custom. Among the nomadic population land usage was determined by the nature of their pastoral economy. The pasture used for summer grazing by each group or clan depended on its ability to seize land and hold it against the pres? sure of other groups. Boundaries were only vaguely defined and changed in accordance with the changing strength of each group. The winter camp, where a small amount of land was cultivated, was more permanent.3 The settled population had a more complex system of land-tenure. As in other regions governed by the Shariat there was, in theory, an absence of private ownership, all land belonging to the ruler, who re? presented the Caliph. But in practice land was owned by private persons on the basis of customary law and of documents issued by the khans granting land in return for service. In general land fell into one of the following categories: 1. State land in unconditional hereditary use of the population for which a tax of one-tenth of the harvest (kharaj) was paid to the khan. In practice the rules laid down by the Shariat were often ignored and tax was assessed according to the amount of land cultivated or as one-fifth or even one-third of the harvest. 2. Privately owned (mulk) land with possession based on docu? ments issued by the khans. In some places the proprietor paid a tax either assessed according to area or at a rate fixed when the land was first granted to him (tanap in Bukhara and Kokand and salgyt in Khiva). 3. Land given by an individual to be held in trust by an institution or the state, the income being used for charitable purposes (waqf). 4. The remaining state land including the ruler's personal posses? sions and uncultivated and unused (mavot) areas. According to Muslim law unused land became the property of whoever brought it into use and could thus become mulk land.4 Soon after the conquest the Russian authorities turned their atten? tion to the question of land tenure. Under a system first introduced by General Kaufman and given final legal sanction by the 'Statute for the Administration of the Turkestan Region' of 1886, mulk ownership was abolished and, for the settled population, a uniform system of land-tenure introduced. However, the relevant clause of the Turkestan Statute was a compromise. The State Council went out of its way to emphasise that 'theoretical considerations based on Muslim law and the Weltanschauung of the adherents of Islam are in no way obligatory for the Russian State', and that to declare all land as state property was too much out of accord with the laws of the Empire
1 In this article Turkestan refers to the territory covered by the oblasts of Syr-Darya, Fergana, and Samarkand of the governorgeneralship of Turkestan of 1914. 2 Otchotp o revizii Turkestanskogkor aya,p roizvedennopyo Vysochayshempuo veleniyuS enatorom GofmeysteromG rafo m K. K. Palenom,h ereafter referred to as *P ahlen. 3 Alfred E. Hudson, Kazak Social StructureN, ew Haven, 1938, pp. 31-5. 4 Pahlen, Materialy k kharakteristike narodnogo khozyaystva v Turkestane, part i, section i, 5 p. 89.

Land Reform in Turkestan1

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to be practicable. Nevertheless, 'justice and political wisdom demand that the population of Turkestan be recognised as possessing a right to the land which they in fact use'. The Turkestan Statute therefore stated: 'the settled village population are confirmed in the possession, on the basis of local custom, of land that they have owned, used, and controlled continuously on a hereditary basis'.5 This established what land should be assigned to the population, but did not grant full ownership on the basis of Russian law. According to the State Council the reason for this was that the question of the distribution of water for irrigation was so closely bound up with that of landownership that the two could not be separated, and that Russian law contained no enactments governing the use of water for this purpose. The local customary law it considered too vague and ill-defined. 6 Land used by the nomads was declared state property, with the nomadic population as a whole having the right to its use on the basis of local custom.7 It was recognised that waqf property was an old established feature of the life of the region, and would need serious study in connection with the proposed changes in the system of landownership. Lists of waqf property were compiled, and studies made of the nature and historical development of waqf law. But in the year of the publication of the Turkestan Statute the State Council was only able to issue the general ruling that 'waqf lands are recognised by the Russian govern? ment and remain in existence on the basis of existing regulations'.8 The Statute of 1886 thus stated that land used by the native popula? tion which the government recognised as waqf that is land for the use of which they paid a rent to the institution to which it had been donated, should remain in the possession of village communities on the same basis as that laid down for the settled native population as a whole. Other waqf land was to remain in the possession of those per? sons for the benefit of whom the waqf was established, and pass to their descendants until these should be extinct. Land could now only become waqf with the permission of the governor-general, and then only in cases where he considered the beneficiaries especially deserv? ing. The Russian administration took over the duty of ad ministering waqf property and supervising the disposal of the income.9 By the end of the first decade of the 20th century the following pattern had emerged: 1. Land in the possession of the settled rural native population. Nearly 98 per cent of this had been officially surveyed and registered, and the right of the population to use it had thus been fully estab? lished. This land was subject to the state land tax.10 2. Waqf land. Not much progress had been made in assessing the amount of waqf land. Figures were only available for the uyezds of Fergana oblast?Margelan, Andizhan and Kokand, where land in this category amounted to 2-13 per cent, 0-43 per cent and 573 per cent of the land assigned to the settled population.11 3. Town land. 4. A small category of persons who had title deeds to their property on the basis of Russian law. 5. State land (i) Used by the nomads. (ii) In the possession of Russian settlers. (iii) In the exclusive use of the state. This included forests, and land leased for various purposes (obrochnyye stat'i). Officially state forests covered 7,362,803 desyatinas, but in fact the areas shown on official maps were never completely covered with trees and often included large areas between afforested regions. Furthermore vast desert areas covered by saksaul bushes were also classed as state forest. In these circum? stances it was obviously impossible to prevent the nomads using much of this area.12
5 Svodz akonovR ossiyskoyI mperii,2 nd edition, St Petersburg, 1913, book 1, p. 1149, here? after referred to as lSvod\ 6 Minutes of the Combined Departments of the State Council, 1886, no. 37. Pahlen, Pozemerno-podatnoye delo, pp. 9?11. New legislation governing the use of water for irrigation was drafted in 1914, but owing to the outbreak of war it never went into force: Aziatskaya Rossiya, II, St Petersburg, 1914, p. 244. This could have been the prelude to the granting of land on a full legal basis. 7 Svod, 8 p. 1151. 8 Minutes of the Combined Departments of the State Council, 1886, no. 37. Pahlen, Po9z emerno-podatnoye delo, p. 54. 9 Svod, p. 1151. 10 Pahlen, Materialy k kharakteristike narodnogo khozyaystva v Turkestane, part 1, section 1, p. 100. 11 Ibid., p. 126. 12 Ibid., 13 pp. 136-7.

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The process of determining and officially registering the land used by the settled native population was begun in 1880 by General Kaufman. In the April of this year he ordered work to begin in Fergana oblast. This involved surveying, the establishing of bound? aries, and the setting up of boundary marks, and was completed be? fore the Turkestan Statute was issued in 1886. In fact Kaufman's ideas served as a basis for the clauses of the Statute concerned with land organisation, although they were the first piece of specific legislation on the subject. After the basic ruling on land-tenure, the Statute went on to state that it was the government's intention to confirm the existing type of land-tenure (individual or communal) found in different localities in the light of local custom. It also intended to recognise a house? holder as having the full right of ownership of buildings or planta? tions established by his own efforts on land in his possession, to issue certificates of ownership for land confirmed in the possession of the native population, and to devise a method of dealing with escheated land.13 The Statute also contained a section headed: 'Rules for the introduction of a land-tax system into the Turkestan region.' The section contained twenty-three clauses, of which three were directly concerned with land assignment. These merely said that land in the possession of private persons, communities and institutions was to be established on the basis of statements of the owners and the extent of adjacent properties.14 There was no further legislation on the subject; the question was simply left to the local authorities, who were ex? pected to issue detailed explanations and instructions. Instructions concerned with land assignment appeared in 1887 and 1891, but although they dealt thoroughly with surveying procedures, on the question of establishing rights to land they went no further than the Turkestan Statute.15 As a result the officials entrusted with the task had almost complete freedom of action, each interpreting the law in his own way. For instance, there was no ruling on the question of whether uncultivated land should be assigned to the population, and the extent to which this was done varied from place to place. A definitive ruling did not appear until 1900 when it was decreed that irrigated, cultivated but not irrigated, and uncultivated land should all be assigned.16 Some obscurity also surrounded the interpretation of the term 'village community' (sel'skoye obshchestvo). As far as settled native village dwellers were concerned the local authorities decided to assign the land not to individuals but to village communities. But it soon be came clear that the official Russian view of the nature of a village community was not that held by the local population. Accord? ing to Muslim law every man had a right to land he had made pro? ductive. Although a group might at first cooperate in organising irrigation and other matters of common concern, as soon as the need for this was over, the land was divided according to the amount of work each individual had contributed, each man having the right to use and dispose of his land as he wished. Each native had also been individually responsible for the payment of his taxes. The system thus had little in common with the communal organisation of European Russia. A definitive ruling on this question was never given, and in practice the authorities of each oblast adopted different methods. In Syr-Dar'ya oblast an attempt was made to keep to the administrative unit?village community, in Fergana on the other hand a village (seleniye) was taken as the land unit, while in Samarkand the unit was determined by such factors as the irrigated area and type of crop.17 The task of determining the ownership of land was given to officials of the local Treasury Chamber (a department of the Ministry of Finance). The methods used were simple. The official called together the volost officials and respected elderly men and asked them to in? dicate the boundaries of the land that was actually in their possession. Some officials merely recorded this information but others demanded written evidence. There was always complete certainty as to who owned irrigated land, and even the boundaries of uncultivated land rarely gave rise to disputes. When the information had been checked against that obtained from the owners of adjacent land and any rele? vant documents scrutinised, most officials considered their work finished and gave instructions for the survey to be carried out. But it was quite common for the officials to give instructions to the surveyor without making any inquiries at all.18 The oblast authorities had tried to prevent this, but in fact the work of the Treasury Chamber officials was superfluous, since they did nothing
13 14 15 16 17 18 SW, pp. 1149-53. Ibid., pp. 1160-4. Pahlen, Pozemerno-podatnoye delo, 16 pp. 16-17. Polnoyes obraniyez akonovR ossiyskoyI mperii,s obraniyet retye,S t Petersburg, 1885- 181778 1/1900, hereafter referred to as PSZPahlen, Pozemelno-podatnoye delo, p. 30. Ibid., 19 pp. 36-7.

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that could not have been done equally well by the surveyors. The natives could just as well have indicated the boundaries of their land to them, and dis? putes being rare, nothing then remained but to make a record of it. Although disagreement over boundaries was rare between natives, there were fairly frequent disputes between the local Treasury Cham? ber and the local office of the ministry responsible for state properties. This even caused alarm among the senior bureaucrats in St Peters? burg, who feared that the local authorities were giving too wide an interpretation to the law governing the right of the local population to land. Consequently in 1908 the Council of Ministers ruled that land assigned to the native population should only be that which had been in the permanent hereditary use of those persons to whom it was assigned.19 But this rather ambiguous decree had little practical re? sult ; it merely gave rise to further disputes over its meaning. Another question that raised difficulties was the status of forests. The Turkestan Statute stated that 'natural forest in the possession of the native population is considered state property', 20 and from the first this had been understood by the local authorities to mean that while the trees and other plant growth were state property, the land under the trees and spaces between trees could be assigned to the population. This interpretation had never been questioned, and ap? peared completely reasonable to anyone familiar with what in Turkestan was officially given the title of'forest'. The word covered a coppice, separate trees and bushes on otherwise empty land, the plantations around native homesteads and along irrigation canals, the trees bordering town streets, and saksaul bushes covering huge areas of desert. Nevertheless when the ork of land assignment in the areas of settled population was almost complete the Council of Ministers chose to interpret the relevant clause of the Turkestan Statute as covering not only trees but the land on which they stood.21 This could have led to a complete re-examination of all land that had been allocated to the native population, but the local authorities took the sensible course of ignoring the decision.22 The question was never finally settled. Confusion and misunderstanding continued to surround the question of waqf land. In Turkestan not every waqf devoted the whole of its income to charitable purposes, and waqf land was taxed on the basis of any income not so used. Consequently the interpretation at first put upon the Turkestan Statute was that the pro cess of deter? mining the extent of this type of property must be distinct from the process of determining the degree of tax exemption. But in 1891 the governor-general ruled that only land freed from taxation could be regarded as waqf, thus placing the question on a completely different basis.23 Matters were further confused by a number of other regulations. For example, it was now decreed that tax exemption could only be granted if a document were produced bearing the seal of one of the khans, although Muslim law did not insist on such a seal being attached to a document confirming the setting up of a waqf. Documents not bearing the seal of a khan were held by the oblast authorities 'to await further instructions', which meant they were simply filed and forgotten. In Samarkand oblast these amounted to ninetyfour per cent of all the documents submitted.24 No further instructions were ever in fact issued, and only in the uyezds of Fergana oblast was any z^/property officially registered.25 The Turkestan Statute assumed that all the Kazakhs of the region lived an almost completely nomadic life with cattle as the basis of their economy. In fact many of them had adopted a way of life indistinguishable from that of the population classed as settled. Others could be described as semi-settled, and probably only a minority were true nomads. Especially in Syr-Dar'ya oblast, cattle rearing was rapidly decreasing and being replaced by the practice of agriculture. The Turkestan Statute had made provision for the transfer of nomads to the category of settled, but in practice the actual division of Kazakhs into nomad and settled bore little relation to reality. Thus in Tashkent uyezd (Syr-Dar'ya oblast) all the Kazakhs had simply been classed as settled regardless of their actual condition.26 In fact little attempt had been made anywhere to ascertain their true way of life. Many who were regarded officially as nomad obviously wished to enter the category of settled; there were a large number of petitions to this effect in the files of the administrative boards of all three oblasts.
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Ibid., p. 43. Svod, p. 1149. Pahlen, Pozemelno-podatnoye delo, p. 43. Meeting of the Council of the governor-general of 26 June 1908: Ibid., pp. 46-7. Paragraph 5 of the governor-generals Instruction of io April 1891 to oblast ad? ministrative boards: Ibid., p. 63. Ibid., pp. 64-^8. Ibid., p. 71. Ibid., pp. 239-47.

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One, from a group of fifteen Kazakh householders of Syr-Dar'ya oblast, complained of the oppressiveness and rapaciousness of the tribal chiefs, and claimed that the only way to avoid this was to transfer to peasant status (krest'yanstvo). The petitioners even pledged themselves to fulfil all the financial, labour and military obligations of the Russian population.27 But this and similar petitions were not favourably regarded by the local authorities. All were rejected on the flimsy pretexts either that not all the members of the Kazakh com? munity wished to be classed as settled or that each member was not permanently settled on his cultivated plot.28 Why the local authori? ties should have persisted in this opposition, against the wishes of the central government, is not clear. At Tashkent the Russians built a separate town to the east of the original one. This grew from one square verst in 1877 to about thirty square versts in 1909. Plans were drawn up and approved by General Kaufman in 1870 and 1871, but they only showed the position of buildings and not the total extent of the town land. 29 No general boundary survey was carried out in Turkestan, 30 and the boundary between Tashkent town and uyezd was delimited by a special com? mission set up in March 1889. The total area belonging to the town was established as 18,325 desyatinas, but the survey was, on the whole, unsat isfactory, since the town boundaries were often described with reference to the boundaries of plots of land belonging to certain natives without the identity of the owner being clearly in? dicated. 31 The disadvantages of this situation, at least from the point of view of the town authorities, were evident in the field of taxation. It was suspected that many property owners paid no tax at all. Furthermore the Russian town had outgrown the original plan, and a haphazard network of narrow, crooked lanes had appeared on the outskirts. The town administration had made some rather half hearted attempts to clarify the situation. A survey had been made in 1898, and in 1900 funds had been allocated for annual surveys, but in 1903 the money had been withdrawn. In 1908 the town board proposed that officials be appointed to carry out a revaluation of property, but the town durna postponed the measure. The results of the surveys were not very satisfactory. A number of tax-avoiders were discovered and about one hundred desyatinas of unused town land came to light, but the boundaries of properties were still not accurately determined. 32 Most of the other towns of Turkestan had been considerable native settlements before the Russian conquest. Following the troops, merchants, artisans and officials had settled in the vicinity of these towns. Kazalinsk and Petro-Aleksandrovsk were exceptions. These were originally forts, built by Russian troops in 1854 and 1874 respectively. The town of Skobelev was founded in 1877 as Novy Margelan. In no case had the town authorities more than a vague idea of the amount of land at their disposal, although the question of determining town boundaries was first raised in 1887. In some cases attempts had been made to define town boundaries with reference to land assigned to adjoining village communities, but this was only possible in regions of settled population where the task of land assignment had been completed.33 Many owners of property in towns had obtained it in the early days of Russian rule, but had had no opportunity to place the fact of ownership on a proper legal basis. Others owned property on the basis of written or oral permission given by various officials, town administrations, and uyezd commandants. Others based their claim on private agreements, often unwitnessed, or documents drawn up by native judges. In October 1881 the acting governor-general (General A. I. Kolpakovsky) issued a circular which attempted to place the ownership of town property on a proper legal basis. The result was an even more confused situation. Property continued to be owned by persons not entitled to do so (mostly Bukharans and Jews), and for tax purposes many properties were registered in the names of persons who were either dead or who had long since left the town. The town authorities were largely indifferent to the question, and only in 1899 were some measures proposed by the Syr-Dar'ya oblast administrative board for the town of Perovsk where the situation was par27 /te/., p. 262. 28 Ibid., 29 p. 277. 29 On the basis of clause 113 of the Town Statute of 1870 the governor-general con? firmed town plans and authorised changes in them. A ruling of the State Council of 5 D3e0c ember 1888 extended this Statute to the town of Tashkent: PSZ 5616/1888. 30 Ruling of the governing senate of 8 May 1900, no. 4029: Pahlen, Gorodskoye up3ra1v leniye, p. 43. 31 Ibid., p. 54. 32 Ibid., p. 46. 33 Ibid., p. 117.

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ticularly chaotic. These were approved by the governor-general for all the towns of the oblast but were never put into force.34 In 1897 the population of Turkestan was 3,910,633, of which 1,860,799 were indigenous settled natives living in the countryside.35 Almost half the population could therefore be said to have been satisfied by the new land arrangements. Although land was officially assigned to 'village communities', in fact each individual had free and unrestricted use of his land, including the right to dispose of it as he pleased. In contrast to his counterpart in European Russia, the native peasant of Turkestan received all the land to which he considered himself entitled and was, moreover, freed from the arbitrary impositions and exactions of the former rulers. This fact probably accounts for the absence in Turkestan of the peasant disturbances so common in European Russia. The nomads of Turkestan were, at first, more fortunate than those of the steppe oblasts. In the latter region the Kazakhs were much restricted by the influx of Russian peasant settlers. In theory only land superfluous to the needs of the nomads should have been taken for settlement, but the Russian peasants combined with officials of the Resettlement Administration to rob the Kazakhs of many of their permanent assets, such as cultivated land. In Turkestan, however, there were very few Russian settlers.36 Indeed the nomads were protected for, until 1910 when it was amended, the Turkestan Statute barred their lands to Russian peasant colonists. The extent of waqf land, town land, forest and other state property was never accurately determined. Nor, as far as the last two categories are concerned, was it ever entirely clear how or by whom it could be exploited, a situation that was at least in part responsible for the insignificant development of industry and mining in Turkestan before 1914. Categories of land in Turkestan (1910) (% of total area) Town 0-19 Settled native population 8-29 Private owners 0-03 Russian settlers 0-30 State 11 -68 Used by the nomads and unused state land 79*51 Total area 63,908,587 desyatinas37 Russian policy in the conquered Asiatic territories differed markedly from that adopted in Europe. In Asia no attempt was made to russify. Although in practice the conquest brought far-reaching social and economic changes in its wake, in principle the subject peoples were allowed to live as they pleased, provided, of course, that they obeyed the Russian authorities. There was no desire to interfere with the local religion, customs, language, or social organisation. Vast doctrinaire experiments in 'social engineering' belong to the modern age. Russian colonial rule was in fact very similar to colonial rule by other European powers. There was the same combination of arrogance and benevolence, and the same well-meaning assumption that they were bringing civilisation to barbarians. This was the attitude that inspired a land settlement which gave the peasants free and unrestricted use of the land they had cultivated before the conquesta measure both 'just and expedient' in the eyes of the State Council (see above p. 429). Kaufman may have drawn on his experience of the reform introduced in Poland after 1863, but the motives that inspired it were quite different from those behind the land settlement in Central Asia. Centuries of conflict lay behind the Russian fear, distrust and hatred of the Poles. The land reform was intended to separate the peasants from the ruling class, to wean them away from Polish nationalism, and eventually to convert them into Russians. No such aim is discernible in Turkestan.
34 Ibid., pp. 118-20. 35 Aziatskaya Rossiya, 1, pp. 82-3, 87. 36 In 1911 out of a total population of 5,291,152 (including the oblast of Transcaspia) there were only 202,290 Russians. Most of these lived in Tashkent and other towns and only a very small number were engaged in agriculture: Ibid., p. 87. 37 Pahlen, Materialy k kharakteristike narodnogo khozyaystva v Turkestane, part 1, section 1, pp. 93-6. These are the official figures. Except for the figure referring to land in the possession of the settled native population, they can obviously be regarded only as approximations.

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LAWRENCE KRADER Source: Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter, 1955), pp. 301-326
INTRODUCTION This paper will deal with the relationships between nomadic pastoralism and the natural environment in the steppes of Central Asia during the last eight to ten centuries and, in addition, it will treat with the relationship between the pastoral economy and the social organization of the nomads. The pastoralists under discussion occupy the steppes between the Caspian Sea and the Great Hsingan range of western Manchuria. They are Turks and Mongols, together forming two of the wings of the Altaic linguistic stock. The steppes are a region of aridity, interior drainage (none of its water courses reach the sea), continental climate. Mountain barriers, prevailing winds and distance from the sea block off rainfall, and much of its water is brought onto the steppe only by mountain run-offs in the season of spring thaws. Because of their interior drainage and distance from the sea, the steppes may also be referred to as Inland Asia. Vegetation is sparse, accordingly. On the margins of the steppe there is a transitionalz one which is competedf or by neighboringa griculturists,e .g., along the Great Wall of China and in the Altai Mountain pastures. Elsewhere peoples on the margins of the steppe have given up pastoralism for agriculture or have undertaken a mixed herding and farming economy, such as the Uzbeks, the Kalmuks, and the Buryats. We distinguish the western or Turkic steppes from the eastern or Mongol. The Turkic steppes are lowland steppes, mainly at sea level. The Mongol steppes are highlands, 1500 meters and above. The pastoralistsh ave accomplishedt heir adaptationt o a difficulta nd unpromising landscapew ith considerables uccess.I n regionsw here farming, whetherd ry or irrigatedh, asn everb eens uccessfullmy aintainetdh e pastoralisthsa vea chieved a levelo f populationd ensityt,e chnologya,n dp oliticailn tegratiown hicht he huntingb andc ouldn ot achieve( theh untinge conomyis mentioneads the onlyr ealistic alternativteo pastoralismon the steppes),l evelss urpassedon ly by industriaslo - ciety,w hichi s transforminligf e on thes teppes. Wheref arminga nd herdingj ointlyc ompriseth e subsistencbea seo f a communityt, heyg enerallyta ket he formo f transhumancUe.n dert ranshumancteh,e livestockn ot beingu sedf or foodo r worka red riveno ut to the pasturese asonally by villageh erdsmewn hilet hec oreo f thev illager emainas t homea ndt ills the soil. This is a formo f specializatioonf laborp racticedth roughouEt urasiain historic times:f romS candinavitao the BritishI sles,t hencea crosst he mountainm assifs of the PyreneesJ, ura,V osges,A lps, TyrolianA lps, BalkansC, aucasusP, ersian highlandsa, nd so far as Tibet.T he termt ranshumanceo mesf romt he Span ish transhumancviaia the FrenchI. ts distributioinn the MiddleE asti s describedin Coon's Caravan.1 Nomadicp astoralismin, contrastt o mixedp astoralisman d farming,e stablishedi tself later.I t did so by masterintgh e ecologicapl roblemos f steppel ife in an economyin volvings everals pecieso f animalsa, spatiallyd elimitedp atterno f movemenat,n dt ente xistenceI.t is not attesteda s suchp riort o the secondm illeniumB C. Becauseo f thee cologicaf la ctorsin volvedn omadipc astoralismis a highly specializewd ayo f life, ando nceg ivent he domesticatioonf animalsp, erhapisn the fifthm illeniumB C,t ookt hreet o fourm illeniain thee volutiono f its characteristic form.B y masteryo f the steppee cologyi s meantt he nomadicr ound:s easonadl epletiono f resourceasn da nnuarl eturna, llowingf or a period of replenishment. The generalf eatures of nomadismth roughoutth e steppei nvolver ecognized groupr ightsi n pasturageasn dm ovementisn a fixeds easonarl oundf romw inter campt o summerp asturea nd backt o winterc ampa gain.T here are sometimes springa nd fall pastureas s well.N omadismis not indiscriminawtea nderingp;a stures and the routesf romp asturet o pasturea re matterso f rightsw hicha re defendedA. lthought he steppei s thinlyp eopledi,t is filledb y nomadico ccupantisn all its parts. We distinguishb etweenf lat-steppneo madisma nd the mountaina nd upland nomadismof the Altai,T ienshana, ndP amirm ountainsy stemsI. n the latter,t he Kirgiz,t he DzungarianK almukst, he Altai Turks,
1 Coon, 1952, Chapter 13.

ECOLOGY OF CENTRAL ASIAN PASTORALISM

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and the Pamirm ountain Tadjiksl ivei n somewhadti fferencto nditionfsr omt heo ccupantosf theM ongolian steppest o the easta ndo f the steppeso f Turkestana ndo f the Volgat o the west. Pastoralismge nerallyc onsistso f sheep,h orse,a nd cattler aisinga, nd second-arily camel and goat. That is, the goat only supplements the sheep as the principal source of wool, milk, meat, and their further products; and the camel supplements the horse as a means of transport for nomadism and trade. Mare's milk (kumys) is imbibed everywhere on the steppe, but the sheep is nevertheless a more basic source of food than the horse. Cattle supply a source of food as well as a means of transport. There are two animals of limited distribution, the yak and the donkey. The yak is a creature of Tibet and of the highland regions immediately adjacent to it: Sinkiang, Mongolia, the Pamirs. The donkey is a creature of southwestern Asia with a restrictedr epresentationin the adjacentp arts of RussianT urkestan. ECOLOGY Agriculture is a conjunctive symbiotic pattern, for the vegetable life which the farmer grows is dependent on his plowing, seeding, fertilizing, and watering, just as the farmer is dependent on his harvest for his food. Herding, too, involvesa symbiosis.T he livestocks upply the food and the fuel (dung) of the herdsman, his clothing (wool, felts, hides and skins), his housing (tents of felt), means of transport, and his goods for trade. The herdsman, for his part, affords his herds protection against predatory beasts and men (who might slaughter rather than milk the stock); he digs wells, builds windbreaks against the winter blizzards, isolates (in some instances) the stock infected by epizootics, and supplieso bstetrici nterventionf or the herds,i ncludinge arlyp ost-natalc are in feeding (primarily of lambs in finding the teats of the ewes through the wool). The herdsmen and the herds are thus mutually dependent, by which is meant symbiosis. However, both men and herds are parasitic on the grass, which the herds consume without replenishmentT. he dung which might fertilize the grass is carefully collected as fuel by the herders. The consumption of the grass in an area is reason enough for the nomadic round. In addition, however, there is the critical supply of water. In general, it is the amount of water, the soil type, and the nature of the terrainw hich determinest he amounta nd qualityo f the grass, and the temperature which controls the length of the growing season of the grass. The water is needed for drinking as well as grass growing, and the trampling of a spring or water course may induce a decision to move the pasturage in the annualr ound,r egardlesso f whethert he grassh as been used up. Nefed'ev, an early 19th century writer, has made this point with especial clarity regarding the Volga Kalmuks: . . In summert he mostf avorablelo calitiesa reo ccupiedo, ne, by the Maloderbeut lus (Kalmuks ubdivisioni)n the Irgenc ountryo n the borderb etweent he Don and Saratov [districts]w heret he mild climate,e xcellentp asture,a nd abundanceo f fresh water affordt he greatesta ccommodationa;n dt wo,b y the Khoshouut lusw hich,i n its summer campso n the meadowso f the Volga country,u tilizeb y themselvesa lonet he excellent pasturesa, nd most importantt,h e considerablfeo rest lands.O theru luses,u nderp oor grassc onditionso, n sandy-claya nd salt steppesw hichg row grassa nd dry out in the earlys ummers un, suffere speciallyf rom lack of water,a nd the Kalmuksm ust constantly clean new springs or dig out old ones, all of which furnish whitish bitter-salt water; and not seldom do they turn to liquid dung. But there is so little of this water that it is daily baled out. 2 These conditions are true generally in the steppe region, throughout Turkestan and Mongolia, for everywherew ater is scarce and often brackish.T he herds destroyt he waterh oles, whichn eed the succeedingw inter'sa ccumulationo f frost and the spring thaw to be rehabilitated. The system of steppe and desert in the conception of a great geographer, Richthofen,3 may be compared with the conception of their environment of one of the steppe peoples, in this case the Khalkha Mongols. Richthofen differentiated four kinds of steppe. (1) Yellow-earth or loess steppe, the usual Central Asian steppe, comprisingv irtually all the depressionsw hich are not surroundedb y glaciers. This steppe may be covered in part by sand. The loess steppe is the most favorablef or vegetationa nd given sufficientw ater createst he best
2 3 Nefedev, 1834, pp. 116-117. Richthofen1, 877,v ol. 1, pp. 16-17.

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pasture.L oess is a fine, loose, friable soil, wind-depositedw, hich cleaves vertically. (2) Sandsteppeo r sanddeserot f fine sand inimicalt o the supporto f vegetation.I t is usually blown into long, parallel waves, covering the loess. (3) Gravel steppe, likewise of a desertc haracterW. here the rainfalli s sufficienti,t may supporta sparsev egetation, and hence a limited amount of grazing. Its expanse is far more restricted than the loess or sand steppe. (4) Stony or detritus steppe. To this category belong the small depressions between glaciated ranges. The vegetation in this steppe is similar to that of the loess steppe, though sparser. The Khalkha Mongols distinguish eighteen different kinds of steppe: 4 atar gadzar flat, unbroken, undissected country barta broken country b6rok sand or gravel steppe eltsim tala desert steppe tsol steppe, prairie tsolom desert (central and east Khalkha) erem tala steppe, wasteland gobi warm locality with rubble, gravel or sand cover, thin vegetation, few spring sand no water courses; also solonchak (alkali flat or salt steppe) yildam tala lushg rasslandw, ell-watered sirgigteg adzar sirig grassym eadow talla steppep, lain talmai gadzar littlep rairies;t eppec ountry xarjgai cool locality with friable soil, lush grass, trees on hillsides, well-wateredli;t erally satiatedd esire. xaxir gadzar grasslesst,r eelesps lace xelbu gadzar broken country xodo grassys teppew, ell-waterebdu, ti nsufficienfot r agriculture xxd6dgi6ng ingg aaddzzaarr deserts teppe( centraal nde astK halkha) A numbeor f marsha nds olonchakla ndscapeasr ed ifferentiated: bordzi swamps,o lonchak tsaidam idem. namak swamp sawartai mud, mire sal solonchakh, arda ndf issuredw hend ry,w ithoutp lantc over sor salt-marshso, lonchak tatsa swamp xudzir salt-marshso, lonchakl,i terally" salt" Uplandc ountryis distinguisheads : dul levelp laceo n a slope (mountainm eadow) tsaram mountaintu ndrab, arep lateau Dunes have several subdivisions: elis sands, dune country erene lis dunesw ithp lantc overl,i terally" vari-coloresadn ds" mauxa dune, sand dune Of valleyst herea re: gom wide,v aguelyd efinedv alley (westernG obi); moreo r less infertiles teppe( westernM ongolia) dzawa narrowv alley xoloi wide valley toxxom hollow, dell
4 Kazakevich1,9 34,s . w.

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Kazakevich adds the following on the subject of Gobi: The generally known term gobi is on the maps as "Gobi Desert or Shamo.. Usually this termi s givena s the propern ameo f a sandy,i nfertile,a bsolutelyw aterless place,s omethingin the natureo f the Sahara,h avingp reciseb oundaries... . By this term the Mongols understandn ot only the name of a definiteg eographicl ocality. Usually it is used to define a complex concept of known climatic, soil, hydrographic and vegetationc onditionsc, omprisinga peculiart ype of locality.T hus, e.g., a Mongol might speako f the "ArabianG obi"o r "the SaharaG obi"a nd understand" gobi"a s a regionw ith relativelyw armc limate,s and,g ravel,o r pebbles urface,f ew wells,s mall springsa nd no riverso r streams.A n expanseo f solonchakm ight be given the same term.T herei s no necessaryli nkb etweent hese" gobis." A characteristic feature is the absence in the gobi of the marmot (Arctomys bobac)5 "The Mongols place the xaygai in direct contrast to the gobi, giving it the meaning of a region with cool climate, friable soil, with dense grass cover and trees on the mountainsides;it is a region with many streams, rivers, lakes." It is also a proper name of a mountain chain in Mongol, Khangai, and is likewise applied to other ranges.6 Shul'zhenko has written: .. The nomadicp astorale conomym aintainedin the MongolianP eople'sR epublic and in other countrieso f Asia and Africa is characterizebdy a nomadicp opulation usinga vast expanseo f mountains, emideseratn d desertt erritoryw hichi s unfavorable for agriculturew, ithoutb asicallyim provingit as a pasturef or the animals;t he highly valuedh erdingp roductsa re thus gainedb y a smalld isbursemenotf labora nd of the means of production. He goes on to say that anotherc haracteristicis its variabilityi n food supply for the livestock from season to season. The weight of the animals falls in winter. The characteristicso f Mongol nomadicp astoralisma re: year-roundg razing; portable quarters for man and enclosures for animals; absence of a fixed economic center or significant storage of fodder for cattle in winter; simultaneous pasturing of stock in conjunction with each other.7 These considerationsa re part of a more general picture. Shul'zhenkow rites that there is no improvemento f the soil. This is true: man and beast are parasitic on the grass. But there is also no improvemento f the breedso f livestock; that is, selective breeding is not practiced by the pastoralist. Again, he writes that no feed is stored for the livestock in the winter. This is part of the concept that food storage in general for man or beast is not practiced; nor is storage (damming) of water for man, beast, and vegetation known. This basic pattern obtains for the steppe dwellers generally from western Manchuria to the Caspian. Since man as herdsman does nothing to increase the available water or fodder supply or to increase herd products in food, clothing, and housing, the natural factors remain operative. The critical factor in the low steppe is the amount of watera nd its rate of evaporationT. he criticalf actor in the high steppe is the short growing season. Both these factors limit the plant cover and hence the size and density of the herds and of the societies which subsist on them. In addition, the severity of winter cold and wind require sheltered winter camps. The societies of the steppe vary in complexity as the size and density of their population, as well as their participation in the various institutional nets of Asia. The factors of size and density enable them to participate in the given religions (Buddhist,I slamic,N estorian), politico-military( imperial), and commercialn ets as institutionalizedi,. e., stable,p atterns. HERDING PATTERNS The herdinge cology may be studied in termso f relationshipo f herdsmena nd herds to the environment and these again as ref lected in the internal composition of the herds, and in human and livestock densities. 1. Relations of Herdsmen and Herds to the Environment. The high steppes east of the Altai-Pamirs ystem are characterizedb y a cold, arid climate. Absolute
5 6 7 Idem, p. 7. Idem, p. 8. Shulzhenko, 1954, pp. 22-23.

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amplitude of temperature reaches 90? C.8 The lowest recordedt emperatureo f Outer Mongoliai s -57? C. The July mean at Ulan-Bator, the capital, in the center of the country, is 17-18?, with a range of 10? in the north to 25? in the southern Gobi. In January the monthly averages run -35? at 1300 m above sea level, -20? at 2,000 m, -15? at 2500 m. This last is the critical altitude, and above this level the monthly mean drops off sharply to the extremes noted above.9 Comparing the high steppes with the low, we observe a sharp gradation. Ulan-Bator and Irgiz, north west Kazakhstan, are both at about 48? North Latitude. Ulan-Bator is 1300 m above sea level; Irgiz is at sea level, in the north Caspian lowlands.T he June, July, and August temperaturem eansa t Ulan-Bator are 14?, 18?, 15? C. The June, July, and August means at Irgiz are 23?, 26?, 24? C. Half the year and more is free of frost in the low steppe: 172 days at Kazalinsk, northernK azakhstana, nd 215 days at Bairam-Ali,s outhernT urkmenia.T here are at least forty fewer days free of frost at Ulan-Bator than at Kazalinsk,10 thus well under five months in Mongolia. The most relevante ffect to pastoralismo f the frost factor is the reductiono f the vegetation growing season, which is a problem especially grave in the high steppes of Mongolia. The average period in various parts of Mongolia in which the grass grows is 100-130 days.11 Wiens points out that there is a gradual increase in precipitation in Outer Mongolia from south to north. The extreme south has less than 100 mm of mean annual precipitation, gradually increasing to 300 mm in the extreme north.12 The soil and vegetation maps appended to Murzaev's work on the physical geography show a corresponding increase in richness and favorability for human habitation.13 The western steppes, lying between the Altai Mountains and the Caspian ref lect a similar picture. Desert-steppe and desert predominate in the south, giving place to chestnut soils of the grass steppe, to the north of which in turn are the cherozems or black earths of southern Siberia. The Kara-Kum presents a typical problemt o the pastoralistw ho wishest o move onto the steppe.A t the presentt ime it consists of solonchaks (greyish to white soils, highly unproductive) and sands; the vegetationi s almosts olely psammophytics hrubs.14 It s northernl imit is marked by the Amu-Darya, where two stations, Turtkul and Nukus, each show annual precipitation totals of less than 100 mm. On its southern periphery, marked by the KopetDagh mountains, two stations, at Kerki and at Ashkhabad, have readings of 160 to 230 mm. The latter are close to the mountains.15 N owhere is there so much as 25 cm of rainfall annually. The water factor involves not only the amount of precipitation but evaporation rate. The evaporation rate in the low steppes inhibits plant growth, and is the crucial problem in the western steppes, just as the frost factor is in the eastern. The rainfall comes in winter and supports a short-lived spring vegetation. There is little change in basic herding composition between the low steppe and the high, save that the familiar cattle-sheep-goat-horsceo mplex has added to it the yak and the yak-cow hybrid (khainyk) in the high steppe. The height of the yak in the various regions in which it is found is fairly constant, about 110 cm. However,t runk-lengthi ncreasess lightly in the north over the south and the size of the chest likewise.16 This is true of all herd animals, in keeping with the general rule governing length to mass of mammals: the colder the climate, the greater the mass relative to length (Allen's and Bergman's rules). Camels are uniformly distributed through the steppe where the aridity permits. Donkeys are presento nly on the southwesternp erimeter;t heir occurrencei n Central Asia is a factor of proximity to Afghanistan, Iran, and Southwestern Asia generally. 2. Internal Composition of the Herds. In a high-steppe environment, according to Simukov's data, sheep are somewhat less adaptable than goats, for sheep founder in snow. In Outer Mongolia, sheep are more numerous than all other herding ani8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Murzaev, 1952, p. 192. Idem, pp. 201, 203-206. Suslov, 1947, p. 410; Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, 1913, pp. 181-184; Murzaev, 1952, pp. 202-203, 217. Iunatov, 1954, p. 32. Wiens, 1951, p. 350, fig. 2. Murzaev, 1952, appended soil and vegetation maps; p. 419. Cf. also Iunatov, 1954, fig. 8, facing p. 40. Suslov, 1947, appended soil and vegetation maps. Idem,p.411. Shulzhenko1, 954,p . 151.

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mals together. Nevertheless, goats increase in proportion to the total herd under less than favorable pastoral conditions. Sheep are most numerous, relatively, and goats least in the steppes of eastern Mongolia; goats increase in proportion and sheep decline under conditions of greater aridity; goats increase in altitude or in forest-steppe environment.17 There are more goats than sheep in the southern Gobi.18 Shul'zhenko has the following picture19 _____________________________________________________________________________ Sheep Goats Cattle Horses Camels (percentages) Eastern Steppe 58.6 14.0 11.7 12.8 2.9 Khangai Forest-Steppe 57.7 17.0 13.0 11.1 1.2 Gobi Desert-Steppe 51.1 27.6 4.5 9.2 7.6 Altai Mountain-Steppe 56.0 29.1 5.7 6.5 2.7 Outer Mongolia: Total 55.4 22.3 8.7 9.9 3.7 _____________________________________________________________________________ Simukov's conclusions are that cattle attain the highest proportion within the total herd in the forest steppe: 31 percent near the source of the Onon River in north-centralM ongolia. Cattle are in smallest proportionsi n arid environments. As such the position of cattle is the converse of that of the camels, which form 10 percento f total herdsi n the deserta nd steppe-deserrt egions,f alling to less than 2 percent in the forest steppe.20 Horses, like sheep, are relatively most numerous in typical steppe conditions, that is, neitherm ountainousn or desert.H orses do not adapt well to hilly or mountainous terrain. Goats, of all the Mongol herds, adapt best to mountain and desert country, almost overtaking the sheep in the Altai and Gobi. Sheep and goats are mountain animals; cattle, horses, and camels are not. Horses have a slightly more uniform distribution than cattle, adapting better to mountain and desert terrain. The relations between climate, geography, and herd composition are borne out when the herd ratios in Buryat country are analyzed. Buryatia is a forest-steppe region (mixed pine and deciduous forest), far better watered than Outer Mongolia. Suslov classifies the soils of Buryatia as podzols, grey podzolized steppeforest soils, and scattered mountain tundra (east of Baikal and in the Sayan Mountains south of Irkutsk); on the Mongolian border there are small steppedesert formations, as well as some grass steppe (Argopyron repens)21 In the early 19th century in Buryatia (1813-1829) cattle formed 50 percent of the herds, sheep 23 percent, horses 21 percent, goats 4-7 percent. At this time, agriculture was introduced by the Russians, and even a few pigs. 22 In the period 1916-1930, cattle were 32-40 percent of the herds, sheep and goats 40-53 percent, horses1 1-15p ercent,a nd pigs 3-5 percent. 23C attle decreasedi n relativep roportion in the course of the 19th century, as did horses. Sheep, goats, and pigs increased. There remains a word to be said about yaks and the cow-yak hybrid, the khainyk.T hese are found in small percentages,p rimarilyi n the mountainousr egions of Outer Mongolia, the Tienshans, and the Pamirs. In 1930 the yaks formed no more than 1.9 percent of the total Mongol herds and the khainyk 0.17 percent. They are, of course, most favorably adapted to cold of all the types of domesticated stock. 24 The herding pattern of Sinkiang has little coverage in the literature. In 1877 a report on the district of Kuldja (I-ning) in western Sinkiang on the Ili River close to the Russian border, distinguished two populations, one fundamentally sedentary: Taranchi and Sibo; and one fundamentally nomadic: Kazakh and Kalmuk. The Taranchi are Turkic; the Sibo were a Manchu military colony established on the frontier. Of
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Simukov1, 931,p p. 57-75. Shulzhenko1, 954,p . 39. Ibid. Simukov, 1931, pp. 63-66. Suslov, 1947, appended soil and vegetation maps. Girchenko, 1927, p. 74. Zhizn Buriatii, 1931, pp. 72-73. Shulzhenko, 1954, pp. 26-27.

87

the half-million total stock in one part of the district the farmers owned 10 percent, the nomadic Kazakhs and Kalmuks 90 percent. The Manchu Sibo had a few pigs. The combined herds were basically composed of horses, cattle, sheep, goats, and camels, plus a few donkeys and mules. The following table shows the herd ratios in Kuldja in 1877 and those of all Sinkiang in 1933: ____________________________________________________________________________ Horses Cattle Sheep Goats Camels Donkeys Pigs (percentages) and mules Kuldja, 187725 11 7 75 6 1 few few 26 Sinkiang, 1933 6 12 71 10 few few none ________________________________________________________________________________ Sheep were the predominant herding animal in Kuldja in the 19th century and in all of Sinkiang in the 20th. Kuldja ref lects the pastoralism of Kazakhstan, the chief herding region of Turkestan. Adjustments among the various herding animals other than sheep in the time period 1877-1933 are minor compared to the position of sheep-raisingT. here are a few yaks and khainyksi n Sinkiang which in this respect correspondst o the herding pattern of the Altai-Tienshan-Pamirs ystems. The Kalmuks or western Mongols in Sinkiang are a numerically small people who live chief ly in the north, in so-called Dzungaria. Their herding pattern is closely related to western Outer Mongolia where climatic and geographic conditions are much the same as in Dzungaria. To the west of the Altai-Tienshan-Pamirm ountains ystemsl ie the low steppes of Turkestan, comprising the country of the Kazakhs, Kara-Kalpaks, and Turkmen connected with the Dzungarian Gobi lowlands. Within the mountain complex itself are the Altai Turks, the Kirgiz, and the Tadjiks. The Uzbek country is basically farming and is physically and physiographicallyin between the Kazakh steppes and the KirgizTadjik highlands. Ivanin collected materials for the period 1846-1852 on the Kazakhs of the Inner or Bukei Horde which occupied the steppes north of the Caspian, i.e., in northwestern Kazakhstan. Three of his series are given below, the first excerpted by him from a report of General Obruchev on the Bukei Horde as a whole in 1846; the second is Ivanin's own data on seventeen clans of the Bukei Horde for 1849-1850; the third is the series for the Caspian division of the Bukei Horde for 1852, the Caspian division partly overlapping with the seventeen clans. 27 In 1876 Finschc ollectedm aterialsr egardingth e Kazakhso f northeasterKn azakhstan (Semipalatinsk)28 The BukeiK azakhisn 1846n umbereadb out1 50,000te nts.T heirh erdst otalled 1,850,000h ead.T he seventeenc lansi n 1849-1850n umberedab out1 00,000a nd owneds ome1 ,670,000h eado f stock.T he Cas piand ivisiono f the BukeiH ordei n 1852n umberedab out4 0,000p eoplea nd had 340,000h eado f stock.T he SemipalatinskK azakhsh ad 19,000p opulationin 4,550 yurts.T heir herdst otalled 166,000h ead.T he internapl roportionosf the herdso f the variousn orthK azakh groupsb etween1 846a nd 1876a res howni n the followingt able: _____________________________________________________________________________ Horses Cattle Sheep Goats Sheep/ Camels (percentages) Goats Bukei, 1846 17 11 - - 67 5 Bukei, 1849-50 13.7 9.5 65.4 7.8 - 3.5 Bukei, 1852 10 12 - - 72 6 Semipalatinsk, 1876 31 11 - - 58 under 1 ____________________________________________________________________________

25 26 27 28

Pantusov, 1881, pp. 178-179. Eksportnye Resursy, 1933, pp. 175-180. Ivanin, 1864, pp. 11-40. Finsch, 1879, p. 157.

88

The followingt ableg ives the herdingc ompositioinn KazakhstanK, irgizia, TadjikistanU, zbekistana, ndT urkmeniian the 1920s:2929 ____________________________________________________________________________ Horses Cattle Sheep Goats CamelDs onkeys Pigs (percentages)a ndm ules Kazakhstan 12 24.4 51 8.4 2.2 - 2 Kirgizia 11.4 17 55 13.6 1 negligible 1.8 Tadjikistan 3.5 22 42 22 1 3.5 Uzbekistan 9 26 44 17 1.8 6 negligible Turkmenia 3.8 12.8 * * 6.3 3.1 negligible ____________________________________________________________________________
* Sheep and goats combined total 74%.

The pig is of Slavicp roveniencine westernT urkestanto day.I n easternT urkestano r Sinkiangit is of ChineseD. onkeysa ndm ulesa reM iddleE asterna nimals; it will be seent hat thesea re foundi n theirs mallp ercentageisn thoset erritories borderingo n Iran and Afghanistane, .g., TurkmeniaU, zbekistana, nd Tadjikistan; t heya ret oo fewt o enteri ntot hes tatisticisn Kazakhstaann dK irgizia Iran shows the following herding composition (1937): sheep 55 percent; goats 28 percent; cattle 11 percent; horses one percent; donkeys and mules five percent; camels negligible. 30 A fghanistan has an almost identicalp attern:s heep 59 percent;g oats 25 percent; cattle 11 percent; horses one percent; donkeys and mules four percent; camels negligible; and a "few elephants."31 Afghanistan and eastern Iran have similar ecological conditions. The range of sheep percentages of Outer Mongolia, regardless of ecological sub-area is 51.1-58.6 percent; the mean is 55.4 percent. Goats have a greater range, from 14 percent in the grassy steppes of eastern Mongolia to 27.6 and 29.1 percent in the desert-steppea nd mountains teppe of the Gobi and Altai. The Chinese Turkestan pattern is quite different: sheep are above 70 percent of the total herds; goats are 10 percent and less. In the low steppe, sheep have a different pattern again: in the exceedingly dry region of Kenimekh, on the Uzbek-Kazakh border, sheep are 75 percent of the total herds, as contrasted with 44 percent in all of Uzbekistan and 51 percent in all of Kazakhstan. Goats at Kenimekh are on the lower edge of the Mongo lian range: 17 percent for all of Uzbekistan, 14 percent in Kenimekh. The Kenimekh region is 78 percent Kazakh and 17 percent Uzbek.32 Kirgiziaa s a whole has herdingr atiosc omparablet o those of Outer Mongolia: sheep 55 percent; goats 14.6 percent. However, in the high plateau of the Susamyr drainage, three communities studied had herds with sheep as 75 to 86 percent of the total; goats in this mountainK irgiz pattern were two to seven percent.33 The conclusioni s that east of the Altai-Pamir,g oats increasep roportionatelya s the terrain becomes more mountainous or the climate drier. West of the Altai-Pamir, sheepi ncreasep roportionallyin a drierc limate (Kenimekh)a nd in a mountainous terrain (Susamyr). It is clear from the above data that both in the high steppe and the low, horses and cattle adapt poorly to mountainous country and dry country; in respect to aridity the record of horses is somewhat better than that of cattle. Both horses and cattle are virtuallyn on-existenti n Kenimekh,a low steppe dry region;i n the Altai and Gobi, and in the Susamyr plateau, all horses and cattle figures are less than 10 percent. In the Mongolian grassy steppe and forest steppe horses and cattle are all above 10 percent; in Uzbekistan exclusive of Kenimekh horses are 10 percent; cattle are close to 30 percent. In the Karakol-Naryn region, within which the Susamyr lies, horses are 10.6 percent and cattle 12.6 percent. There are no horses in the Gorno-Badakhshraeng iono f the PamirsH. oweverh, erec attle,i ncluding yaks,a re 31 percent. 34 The highc
29 Figures for Kazakhstan as of 1925; Voshchinin, 1929, p. 47. Kirgizia, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenia as of 1924: Vsia Sredniaia Aziia, 1926, pp. 389-390, 582, 597, 654. 30 Strany, 1944, p. 217. 31 Reiser, 1946, p. 49. 32 Vsia Sredniaia Aziia, 1926, pp. 385-386, 389-390. 33 Karp and Suslov, 1927, pp. 64-65. 34 Vsia Sredniaia Aziia, 1926, pp. 389-390, 582, 654.

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attlef iguref or all of Turkestana s contrasted witha ll of Mongoliais in parta mattero f agriculturet:h erei s a closec orrelation betweenca ttlea ndf arminga, ndM ongoliah asn o agriculturIen. parti t is a matter of herdingp roductsT. he livestockd ensityis low in Turkestanh, ighi n Mongolia (seeb elow).B y wayo f com pensatiocna, ttle,w hicha rem orep roductivoef meat, milk,a ndh ides,t hans heepa ndg oats,a rei n higherp roportioinn Turkestan. The excellencoe f adaptationo f the camelt o a dry climatea nd the yak to a high,c oldt errainn eedsn o demonstration. The selectionb y the environmensut pplieso nlya partialp ictureS. ide by side witht he inf luencoe f the environmenatr et he purelyc ulturaf l actors:i nternaf l or eachp eoplei n termso f theiro wn choicea nd option;e xternabl y diffusiona nd acculturation. Clear-cucta seso f environmentsaell ectionm ayb e establisheidn certains pecies: the camela ndt he yak;t he increasien cattlep ercentagefsr oms outhernM ongolia throughc entranl orthernM ongoliato Buryatiaf,o llowingt he changef romd esert steppet o steppet o forests teppe,i s a similarm attero f environmenBt.u t the increaseo f goatsp roportionalilny the hillya nd mountainourse gionso f Mongolia is not matchedin Kirgizia. Goatsw eren ot especiallyp rizeda mongt he Kazakhso f Kuldja,a nd in the BukeiH ordeo f the Kazakhtsh e goat figurei s alsol ow.N owhered o the Kazakh datai ndicatea highp ercentagoef goats,e vent hought he naturalc onditionfso r theiri ncreasea rep resentin TurkestanM. ountainouKs irgiziaa t besth as a ratio of goats1 6p ercenbt elowt hato f mountainouMs ongolia( Altai).C ulturaf la ctors havei ntervenedin increasinsgh eepr elativet o goats amongt he Turkicn omads (Kazakhas ndK irgiz)a ndg oatsr elativeto sheepa mongt he Mongols. The Kuldjad ata mayb e regardeda s crucial.H ere, in similare nvironments live two traditionahl erdingp eoplesb, oth residenitn the regionf or periodso f a century and more. The herding ratios of the two peoples may be seen in the following:35 ___________________________________________________________________________ Horses Cattle Sheep Goats Camels (percentages) Kazakhs 12 6 76 5 1 Kalmuks 12 15 54 18 1 ___________________________________________________________________________ The horsei s importantto bothp eoplesC. attlea ren ot presentin largep ercentages: Kuldja is in the Ili River valley which is not arid. This is shown also in the low camelf igure.T he sheepf iguref or the Kazakhsis 76 percenta, highp ercentage, a lmostn everf ounda mongM ongolso, f whomt he Kalmukas rea group.T he KuldjaK almukp ercentagfeo r sheepi s 54, wellw ithint he Mongolr ange.O n the otherh and,t he Kazakhhs avea fivep ercentg oat figuret, he Kalmuks1 8 percent. The Kazakhsh avea six percentc attlef igure.A s a rule,K azakhsh avea higher proportioonf cattlet han that. The factoro f culturasl electivityis seeni n the proportionosf sheepa ndg oats. The commerciaf la ctori s relevanth erei n TurkestanT. he Turkicf at-tailed sheep,k urdiuki,s for food.T he karakosl heep,h oweveri,s raisedf or marketf, or its woolc ommandas goodp rice.T he Mongolsd o not raisek arakols heepw hose wooli s so highlys oughta ftera ndp rizedO. n the otherh and,i n Afghanistana nd Irans heepa re in proportioncsl osert o the Mongol,d espitet he marketf or the Persiana nd Afghank arakolH. owevert, he karakosl heepi s as importanitn the MiddleE asta s it is in TurkestanT. he kurdiukd eclinesin proportioans the goat rises in Iran, etc. The disappearancoef the pig fromC entralA sia is not the clear-cuct ase of religiouds eterminatiotnh atm ightb e supposedT. he pig is not a speciess uitableto pastoranl omadismI.t doesn ot occuri n the Mongolianh erdsw heret heree xists no canono f IslamT. he pig disappearfsr omC entraAl siab ecauseit is incompatible witht he nomadicp astoralismse, condarilsyu pplementebdy the impacto f Islam. Primarilyit is nomadismw ith its masteryo f the steppee cologya nd movements of herdsa nd herdsmanw hichi s the decisivef actori n the disappearancoef pigs from this part of the world.
35 35 Pantusov, 1881, pp. 178-179.

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3. PopulationD ensitieso f Pastoralistasn dH erds. Amongt he highestp opulationd ensitiers ecordedo f Asiaticp astoralistiss that of the Kalmuksw ho occupiedth e steppen orthwesot f the Caspianb, etweent he moutho f the Volgaa ndS tavropoiln theN orthC aucasusT. he richv egetationo f the chernozemst eppem ayb e seeni n the quotationfr omN efed'eva bove.H ere in some2 400 squarek m of territorya, bout1 6,800K almuksli ved in the 1890s,a meand ensityo f sevenp ers quarek m. 36 W hilei t is truet hatf armingh add eveloped amongt he Kalmukds uringt he late 19thc enturyi,t hadb eent akenu p onlyb y 17 percentin 1917. 37 T he highd ensityo f the Kalmukp opulationin the regionb etweenS tavropoal ndt he Caspianis chief lyd uet o optimumg razingc onditions. Another favorable region for herding is on the Susamyr plateau of central Kirgizia. Here an area of 321 square km supports a nomadic village of 844, a density of 2.6 per square km:38 this is but one of many in the locality. Some herding communitiesc ome seasonallyt o the Susamyrf rom 300 km away. The mean average densities of herding population in the low steppe are slightly below that of the Susamyr, between one and two per square km. In Kenimekh, a somewhat arid region by general standards of the low steppe, the mean population density is 0.9 per square km.39 In Mongolia the short period within which the grass may grow places a low limit on densities of men and herds. The mean average population density of Outer Mongolia is 0.5 per square km; the highest mean density is in the Arakhangai region, 1.4 per square km. (Above, the praise bestowed by the Mongols on the Khangai pasturage was cited.) The minimum mean is 0.2 per square km in the southern and eastern Gobi, and in the Altai. Arakhangai had a population in 1930 of 80,600 living in a region 57,400 square km in area. The Altai had a population of 39,900 in an area of 207,100 square km; the Gobi had a slightly higher density.40 The Buryatc ountryh ad been transformedi nto a mixed farming-herdinge conomy during the 19th cen tury.41 Neverthelesst he ratios found here also are found in western Turkestan. In the Amu Darya province in the 1870s 16 percent of the land was used; 15.5 percent was pasture land, 0.5 percent farm land. The ratio of pasture land to farm land was 30:1. On the other hand, in the Syr Darya province, wheret he land also supportedp astoralismp rimarily,p asturel and was 41 percent, wasteland 59 percent; farm land was less than one percent of the whole; the ratio of pasture to farmland, 50:1.42 The combined population of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya provinces in the 1890s was 1,480,000, the total area 502,800 square km, and the population density 2.9 per square km.43 The combinedp opulationo f the Trans-Caspianr egion south and west of the Aral Sea was much lower, the aridity much greater. Here the population was 382,000, the area 554,000 square km, and the mean den sity 0.7 per square km, among the lowest recorded in the low steppe. Increasing available water increases density of population on a south-north gradient: in the Turgai steppe, north of Aral it was one per square km, and in the Ural steppe to the west it was 1.7.44 The farming population densities are high in Central Asia, far higher than European.T his is one of the classicall ands of irrigateda gricultureT. he following table gives comparisonso f averageu nit of land per householdi n Turkestan.45 Land per land* Land per noSedentary Nomadic Agricultural Region Pastoral land * agricultural- madic househouseholds households households household * hold * Semirechie 26,000 163,000 7,600 198,000 .29 1.2
36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Dubrov, 1898, pp. 97-98. Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1937, vol. 30, col. 752. Karp and Suslov, 1927, pp. 32, 85 ff. Vsia Sredniaia Aziia, 1926, pp. 589-590. Sibirskaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1931, vol. 3, cols. 513-514. Zhizn Buriatii, 1931, no. 1-2, p. 8. Keane, 1882, p. 441. Schwarz, 1900, p. 37. Schwarz, loc. cit. Kostenko, 1880, p. 9.

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Syr Darya Fergana Zerafshan Amu Darya

95,000 121,000 70,000 13,00 325,000

124,000 25,000 8,000 320,000

2,300 6,500 2,100 500 19,000

198,000 33,000 14,000 14,000 457,000

.02 .05 .03 .04 .06

1.6 1.3 1.8 1.4**

* All land in square kilometers. ** Exclusive of Zerafshan.

The land per household falls into three groups. The average per nomadic household is computed as 1.4 square km; the land for agricultural households in all provinces of Turkestan, except Semirechie, is 0.04 square km. In Semirechie it is 0.29 square km per agricultural household, that is, seven times that of the agricultural households of the rest of the region. Semirechie is settled largely by Slavic peasantsw hosea griculturer equiresm orel and per individual. The average unit of land utilization of the Slavic peasant is midway between that of the Turkic pastoralist and the Turkic farmer. Thus, in Central Asia the "efficiency"o f land utilization,i .e., the ability of the economyt o support a given populationd ensity,i s highest among the irrigatinga griculturists;t he dry farmers are in between,p astoralistsl owest.T he householdu nit was arbitrarilyf ixed at five individuals for the purpose of this computation, following Kostenko. In the 1920s, the highly developed Uzbek irrigation economy was able to support 51.8 people per square km in the Khorezm district. Here the area was 5,600 square km, the population 290,000, of whom 97.7 percent were Uzbek. The famed Fergana valley had a density only slightly less: 48.3 per square km; the area was 31,000 square km and the population 1,490,000. The region was 72.2 percent Uzbek and 12.9 percent Tadjik, thus homogeneous in economy:46 Uzbeks and Tadjiks are virtuallyi ndistinguishablien economicp ractices. The mean herding density of selected areas in the high and low steppes may be seen in the table.n the next page. The selecteda reasi n the abovet ableh avea moreo r lessh omogeneoupso pulation. T he dataa rea ll fromt he 1920s.P riort o thatt ime,t hed ataa ren ot complete in the categoriesli sted; after that time the social and economicc hangesp ose entirelyd ifferentp roblems:s edentarizatioann d collectivizatioinn Turkestan, liquidationo f lamaismin Mongoliaa nd of the nobilityi n both Mongoliaa nd Turkestana rea mongt hep rincipaclh anges. In Mongoliath em eanh erdd ensitieas reh ighu nderf avorablge rassc onditions, 52 per squarek m. In poorg razingl ands,m ountaino r desert,t he herdd ensities are as low as seveno r evenf our animalsp er squarek m in Turkestana nd mean herdd ensitiesa re uniformlylo wert hant hey are in MongoliaT. he best grazing lands,i .e., thoseo n the Susamyrp lateaug, raze2 9 heado f stockp er squarek m; whilet he desert-steppoef Turkestang razese ightp ers quarek m in Kenimekhan d threep ers quarek mi n southernT urkmenia. The mountainp astoralismof the MongolianA ltaia ndo f the Pamirsa rec omparablein meanh erdd ensitiesf:o urt o sevenp ers quarek m.B ut the Mongolsh ave muchm oren umerouhs erdst hant he Kirgizo r Tadjiks,a s measuredin ratioso f livestockto man. The KudaB uryatsin 1813n umbered11 ,000-12,000T.h eyo ccupieda territory of 6,570s quarek m: thust hem eand ensityo f 1.8p ers quarek m.T heirt otalh erds numbere4d0 ,000h orsesc, attle,s heep,a ndg oats.C attlew erea bout5 0 percento f the totals tock;s heep2 3 percenth; orses2 1 percenta; ndg oatsf ourp ercentP. igs wereu ndero nep ercentT. he herdd ensityw ass ix pers quarek m;t he ratioo f livestock to man was 3.5:1. 47 Ivanin'sn orthwesterKna zakhd atas howr atioso f livestockto mano f 16:1i n 1849-50a nd 8:1 in 1852. Finsch'sd ata for 1876 in northeasterKn azakhstan (Semipalatinsks)h ow1 9,000K azakhsin possessiono f 166,000h ead,a ratioo f animals to man of 9:1.48 In the 1870sS emirechiien easternK azakhstanw as predominantnlyo madic. The nomadicp opula46 Vsia Sredniaia Aziia, 1926, pp. 385-386. 47 Girchenko, 1927, pp. 73-74. 48 Ivanin, 1864, pp. 11, 40; Finsch, 1879, p. 157.

92

tionn umbereadb out8 00,800t, he sedentarpy opulationab out 130,000T. he total livestocka t this timew as 7,800,000;t he ratioo f livestockt o man was 8:1.49 The herdd ensitiesa re loweri n the dry steppet hani n the high.T he Turkic herdsmeanr ep oorera s theirs teppei s poorerA. ridityi s moreo f a limitingf actor on the growings easono f plants,h enceo n the densitieso f the herds,h enceo n thew ealtho f theh erdsmenth, ani s altitude. The Mongolian steppe maintains a high ratio of stock to man; the Buryat, Pamir, and Turkestan pas turages maintain low ratios. The dominant stock of Buryat pastoralism was the bovine; the steppe in the vicinity of Baikal is better watered than in Mongolia, and the water is fresh. High herd ratios are not needed because the individual animals are better fed and produce more meat, milk, etc. And cattle are more productive than sheep in meat, milk, and hides, as we noted above. The live Mongol cattle have an average weight of 378 kg. The live Kirgiz bull weighs 364 kg and the cow 231 kg.50 The Mongolian sheep weighs 57.7 kg in eastern Mongolia. The sheep in the Susamyr plateau of Kirgizia weighs 40 kg.51 The Mongol herdsman on the average is richer both in quantity and quality than the Kirgiz who have access to some of the most valued pasture in Central Asia. 4. Losses of Stock The sources of stock loss must be sought among three factors: epizo6tics, predators (beast and man), and weather. Herds are subject to great and rapid changes in size. Above, data on herds of the Bukei Horde Kazakhs were given. In 1849-50, a ratio of 16:1 was derived for seventeen clans of the Horde; in 1852, a ratio of 8:1 for the Caspian division. The herds were increasing sharply in 1849. According to Ivanin, there had been terrible losses in the winters of 1845-1849 throughout the Bukei steppe. The stock loss was high; the loss of human life through starvationr eached2 5 percent. 52T he livestockr ecuperatedm ore rapidly than man. The recovery by man so as to reduce the stock ratio occurred later. The Kazakhs as a whole in the period 1917-1938 underwent even more radical changes in herd strength. Total Kazakh herds numbered 36,000,000 in 1917. By 1924, through war losses, revolution, and civil war, the herds had fallen to 19,400,000. By the spring of 1930 they had risen to 40,400,000. Three years later, in 1933,
49 50 51 52 Kostenko, 1880, pp. 9, 88. Shulzhenko, 1954, p. 155; Karp and Suslov, 1927, p. 83. Lus, 1936, p. 82; Karp and Suslov, loc. cit. Ivanin, 1864, pp. 11-12.

93

they numbered 5,000,000. This drop of 88 percent in three years was the result of a complexo f factors re volvinga round sedentarizationa nd collectivization. By 1938 the Kazakh herds almost doubled to 9,800,000.53 After the 1930s the data are no longer comparable to the older series because of social changes. Another example of oscillations in herd strength, sharp losses, and recuperations is drawn from Mongolia in the same period. In 1930 the herds increased by 72 percent over 1924, but dropped 8 percent between 1930 and 1935. However, in 1940 the total herds were 90 percent over the base year 1924, 18 percent over 1930.54 The Volga Kalmuks had herds totalling 800,000 in 1827; 450,000 in 1836; 960,000 in 1844; and 810,000 in 1850. This is a drop of 44 percent in the nineyear period 1827-1836, an increase of 113 percent in the eight-year period 1836- 1844. Wolves cause some losses, but only in minimal percentages. Three years' surveys in Kuldja in the 1870s show an average of one percent loss to wolves: the average annual loss in the period 1874-1876 was 7,590 stock of all kinds, gross total stock in 1876 in Kuldja province was 750,000. Camels suffered least: less than 0.5 percent; horses and cattle under one percent; sheep and goats slightly over one percent. 55T he gravestt hreat to the life of the herdsi s social disorder.H omo hominus lupus, yes, but also homo gregis lupus, man is as a wolf to the herd. Epizootics and weather (drought in summer, winter blizzards of snow and wind, and frost) also take their toll of the herds. But the greatest threat to the life of the herds is mankind. 5. Herding Movements The pattern of nomadic movements is relatively constant throughout the steppes. The Kalmuks in the north Caspian steppe had three pasturages per herding unit: winter camp and spring and summer pastures. They moved 15-20 km per day en route from winter to spring pasture; during the summer they moved more slowly, 10-15 km per day. This was the season of fattening herds for the winter. The fall was spent in transit to the winter camp; now they travelled quickly, before the onset of winter, 25-40 km per day. The lambs, foals, calves, kids were all grown; mother and young could move fast.56 In the 1920s Kazakh nomadicv illages in northeasternK azakhstan (southern Altai) had a parallel system of moves: one group left its winter camp in May and traveled 52 km in six days, including a two-day halt, thus averaging slightly over 10 km per day. They then moved 30 km in three weeks, about one km at a time. In July they moved to mountain pasture for one month and a half. This was the summer camp. They returned via the fall pastures to the winter camp in similar moves. The yearly round covered 72 km out and back, a total of 144 km. Other camps covered from 90 to 200 km in the annual round. Another type of movement of the northeastern Kazakhs involved breaking winter camp around June 1; they moved 30 km to their first halt where they remained a week to ten days. They then travelled 25 km to the second camp where they stayed two to three weeks, then 30 km for a three to four day camping (Russians were here, therefore the shortened stay). Another 15 km move brought them to a fourth camp in their spring pasturage. By mid-July they had moved 100 km. The village spent one month at its summer pasturage, then returned to its winter camp.57 The Kalmuks and Kazakhs are primarily flat-steppe nomads. The Kirgiz of the Tienshan are of another type. They are mountain pastoralists. Their stay in the winter pasturage is far shorter than that of the Kalmuks or Kazakhs. On the flat steppe the winter camp remains together for eight or nine months. The mountain pastoralistsr emainf rom three to six months.58T hen all types of pastoralists begin the spring move and the summer dispersal. PASTORALISM AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION Natural factors, both inorganic and biological, intervene and are closely associated in the structuralf eaturesa nd historicald evelopmentso f the nomadicp astoral societies. It is clear that, despite the great herding technology and mastery of the steppe ecology, herdsmen are nevertheless totally dependent on the bounties of nature.
53 54 55 56 57 58 Voshchinin, 1929, p. 47; Podnek and Pavlov, 1930, pp. 27-28; Krader, ms 1954. Shulzhenko, 1954, p. 27. Pantusov, 1881, pp. 103-104, 120-121. Nefedev, 1834, p. 115. Rudenko, 1953, pp. 1-10. Karp and Suslov, 1927, p. 77.

94

The pastoral nomads of Central Asia are strictly patrilineal and agnatic in organization. Membership in a group is based upon demonstrable or attributed descent in the male line from a common ancestor. These agnatic groups are corporative in character, that is, they survive the death of individual members. The groups are, in ascending order, the extended family, the kin-village, the lineage, the clan, the clan confederation, the principality (often the same as the clanconfederation), and the empire. The corporative character of the groups is also exhibited in other attributes than perpetuity. They are residence or territorial units as well. The closer the kinship of two nomads, the closer are their camps and pasturages to each other.59 From this, two conclusions follow. (1) Density of population and distribution are closely associated with social structure on the steppes of Central Asia. Within a given society there are found one or more focal points as centers of population concentration. This is the distributive factor, the presence or absence of which permits or denies the possibility of growth in size and complexity of these societies. (2) Precisely because man and herds are parasitic on the grass, density, distribution, and internal composition of the herds are closely associated with social structure. The more frequent these density concentrations, the more complex and the more stable in complexity is the social organization; and the larger is the size of the society as a whole. The Khalkha Mongols have several such focal points, in the Arakhangai, near Ulan-Bator, around Kobdo, etc. A high ordero f complexityi s found amongt he Kazakhs,t he KhalkhaM ongols, and the Kalmuks. These peoples carried into the 20th century a division into nobility and commoners and, in the case of the Khalkhas and Kalmuks, an organized priesthood as well. These peoples all have relatively high densities of populationa nd herds and high herd-to-manr atios. They also have urban centers of some antiquity,t hus peaks of populationc oncentrationi n cities. Two major sub-groups of the Altai Turks are the Telenget and the Teleut, who numbered 3,415 and 1,898 respectively in 1926.60 There is no indication of the area they occupy: they live beside rivers and lakes in the Altai region as pastoral nomadsa nd hunters.T hey have no focal points of populationc oncentrationa nd no larger political agglomerations than the clan. They have also developed no permanents tratifiedn obility,n or a hierarchizedp riesthood.T hus there is a close associationb etweenn aturalc onditionsa nd social organizationo f these pastoralists, as mediated through the economy, with its given technical and economic base. The pastoralists are entirely dependent on the bounty of nature. They have developed no method of control, save the rudimentary care of the herds; they have none of the control techniques against famine (storage) and drought (dams) which farmers have. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 61h ave propoundeda relation between political centralizationa nd populations ize, but they have divorcedp olitical centralization from considerationos f density.W hile such is the case in the African societiest hey discuss, among the steppe pastoralists of Asia there is a three-fold relation betweenc omplexityo f politicalo rganization( uponw hich centralizationis predicated there), populations ize, and density.H owever,d ensityi s consideredb y me not as a gross index, but as a pattern of permanent concentration of population in focal points and dispersion in the interstices; seasonal concentration and dispersal is another matter. Centralization of political authority is closely related to population concentrationin CentralA sia, i.e., to net density. Gross density is only a secondaryc onsiderationi n political analysis. That is, steppe herdsmen have a greater density as an order of magnitude than reindeer breeders (Tungus) or hunters (Ket) of the Siberian forest. If steppe herdsmen have densities of one to five per square km, hunters and reindeer breeders have less than onetentho f that. Concomitantlyt, he political organizationo f the latter is neither complex nor centralized. There is a relationship of herdsmen to the neighboring agricultural civilizations. This factor, the result of specializationb y farmersa nd herdsmen,h as been alluded to in this paper, but must be left for separate treatment by virtue of its complexity. Connected with it is the rise of cities (points of exchange between producers, points of rule and of tribute and tax collection), the rise of empires, and the spread of Buddhism and Islam.62

59 60 61 62

Cf. Krader1, 955. Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie SSSR . . . 1926, 1929, vol. 17, pp. 10-11. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940, pp. 7-8. Krader1, 953,p assim. 95

ANTI-ISLAMICPR OPAGANDAI N KAZAKHSTAN SINCE 1953

Chantal Quelquejay Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer, 1959), pp. 319-327

IS it true, as some Western observers believe and others fear, that the friendship shown toward the Arab countries and toward the Muslim peoples as a whole by the Soviet Government since 1954-55 implies a recognition of the "progressive" character of Islam or the possibility of a genuine alliance between communism and Islam? Does it represent a real shift in Soviet Islamic policy or is it simply a tactical move? In order to answer these questions it is necessary to examine the policy of the Soviet authorities with regard to their own Muslims, numbering around thirty million and inhabiting Central Asia, the northern and eastern Caucasus and the Middle Volga region. This policy is perfectly straightforward; neither the Government's official friendship toward the Arab countries nor its sympathy with the liberation movement of the Muslim peoples has led to the slightest modification in its basic hostility for all religion. Let us take, for example, the case of the Kazakhs, a Turkish and Muslim people numbering 3,099,000 in 1939. They inhabit the largest Muslim federal republic which has undergone, in recent years, a significant influx of Russian and Ukrainian settlers. If one considers the number of anti-religious publications which have appeared in Kazakhstan since the death of Stalin, one is forced to conclude that anti-Muslim propaganda has not ceased to exist. Between March 1, 1953 and July 1, 1957 the following publications appeared: 26 anti-religious publications311,100 copies 24 of which were printed in Kazakh -304,100 copies 1 in Russian-3,000 copies 1 in Chechen-4,000 copies The Kazakh population numbers at present around 3,3 00,000 people. It may be said, therefore, that in the last five years one anti-religious publication has been put out for every ten people or, discounting the old illiterates and small children, for each family. 1953 KAZAKH LANGUAGE GUREV, A. Ghylym men din ilemnin kurylysy turaly. ("Science and religion on the subject of the cosmic structure"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat-Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge -36 p., 20,000 copies (trans. from the Russian). IL'NISKIY, N. P. Adam sanasyndaghy din qaldyptaryn zhoju turaly. ("The struggle against religious survivals in the people's conscience"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat- Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge-40 p., 1 5,000 copies-Conference minutes (trans. from Russian by S. Akhmetov). KAGAROV, V. M. Michurindik biologija zhane onyni din qaldyktaryn zhojudaghy roli. ("Mishurinian biology and its role in triumph over religious survivals").Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat-Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge-40 p., 20,000 copies-Conference minutes (trans. from Russian by B. Mazitov). KXKIMZHANOV, A. Islam dininisi reaktstajalyq mini turaly. ("The reactionary nature of Islam"). AlmaAta, Kazgosizdat-60 p., 20,000 copies. PAVELKIN, P. D1ni soqyrsenimder zhdne onyn zyjany. ("Religious superstitions and their danger"). AlmaAta, Kazgoszzdat-Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge 172 p., 20,000 copies. Collection of articles compiled by Zh. Kulerov (trans. from Russian by M. Ishmuhametov). PROKOF'EV, V. I. Moral' zhbne din. ("Morals and religion"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat-40 p., 15,000 copies (trans. from Russian by R. Syzdykov). SOKOLOV, V. G. Din! ddet-ghuryptar men meiramdardyn shyghuy zhdne otardyi reaktsijashyl mdni. ("The origin and reactionary nature of religious rites and ceremonies"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat (trans. from Russian by Kh. Kutkhozin). 96

1954 KAZAKH LANGUAGE VATAN-OGLY. Panislamizm ham pantirkizm angloamerika imperializmnyi kuralidur. ("Panislamism and panturkism-Instruments of Anglo-American imperialism"). Alma-Ata, edited by the Jangi hayat Journal -59 p., 2,100 copies. KAGAROV, V. M. Michurindik biologija zhane dinshir dik qaldyktardy zhojundaghy onyn roli. ("The role of the Mishurinian biology in the triumph over religious survivals"). Alma-Ata, Ministry of Culture Kazakh SSR-36 p., 3,000 copies (trans. from Russian by A. Dzhokebaev) modified second edition of a pamphlet pub lished in 1953). LUPALO, I. C. Ghylym dinge qarshy. ("Science versus religion"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat-Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge (trans. from Russian by T. Balagaev). MIKHNEVICH, D. E. Marksizm-Leninizm din turaly zhane ony zhenudin zholdary degen taqyryrqa lektorgha metodikalyqkenes. ("Methodological advice to lecturers on the subject of Marxism-Leninism on religion and means of triumphing over religion"). Alma-Ata, Ministry of Culture Kazakh SSR-30 p., 3,000 copies (trans. from Russian). PROKOF'EV, V. I. Orystyii uly ghalymdary dini zhoqqa senushilikterhen kiireste. ("Great Russian scholars in the fight against religious prejudices"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat-Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge-80 p., 20,000 copies (trans. from Russian by B. Shorabaev and A. Azhiev). SATPAEV, T., President of the Academy of Sciences Kazakh SSR. Ghylym men din zherdii zharatyluy turaly. ("The origin of the world according to science and religion"). Alma-Ata, Ministry of Culture Kazakh SSR-22 p., 3,000 copies (trans. from Russian by Aytbaev). EMME, A. M. Ghylym men din zher uistinde tirshiliktini paida boluy turaly. ("The origin of life on earth according to science and religion"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizd-- 123 p., 20,000 copies (trans. from Russian under the direction of D. Kudabaev). 1955 a) KAZAKH LANGUAGE LENIN, V. I. Din turaly. ("About the Religion"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat -Kazakh affiliation of the MarxEngels-Lenin-Stalin Institute-84 p., 20,000 copies (Collection of articles translated from Russian). BISENOV, Kh. Islam dsnYnsi shyghuy zhdne onyni taptyq manV. ("The origin and nature of class in Islam"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat-Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge-3 2 p., 10,000 copies (Conference minutes). PROKOF'EV, V. Din ghylym men progrestxi zhany. ("Religion-enemy of science and progress"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat-72 p., 10,000 copies (trans. from Russian by T. Mukarov). SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV, I. I. Din turaly ojilar. ("Thoughts on religion"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat-40 p., 10,000 copies (trans. from Russian by Shalabaev). b) RUSSIAN LANGUAGE KOZLOVA, K. I. Nauka o stroenii vselennoj v bor'be protiv religioznykh predrassudkov. ("Cosmology in the struggle against religious prejudices"). Alma-Ata, Ministry of Culture Kazakh SSR-40 p., 3,000 copies. 1956 a) KAZAKH LANGUAGE BASKIN, M. P. Materializm zhdne din. ("Materialism and religion"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat-144 p., 10,000 copies (trans. from Russian by S. Orzanov). BOGUSLAVSKI', V. M. Bilhm zhdne kudajgha senu. ("Knowledge and belief in God"). Alma-Ata, Kazgo sizdat- 64 p., 10,000 copies (trans. from Russian by Z. Oryspaev). MEDVEDEV, N. V. Ghylym men din psikhialyq kublystar zhajunda ("Psychic phenomena according to science and religion"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat-84 p., 10,000 copies (trans. from Russian by K. Salabaev). b) CHECHEN LANGUAGE KOLONISKIY, P. F. 'What is religion? (Exact title unknown). Alma-Ata, Znamya Truda--44 p., 4,000 copies) 1957 and 1958 Information on anti-religious publications appearing in 1957 and 1958 is still incomplete. We know of three works published in Kazakh in 1957 and one which appeared in the beginning of 1958. 97

a) 1957 MARX-ENGELS. DYn turaly. ("Religion"). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat -Kazakh affiliation of the Marx-Engels- Lenin-Stalin Institute3 16 p., 15,000 copies (trans. from the Russian). SYDYKOV, Z. Ghsylym men din zherdsn zharatyluy turaly. ("The origin of the world according to science and religion") and a third pamphlet by MUSABAEVA whose title seems to be "The importance of Pavlov's doctrine in the struggle against idealism and religion" -written and published in Kazakh. Alma-Ata, KazgosizdatKazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge-44 p., 10,000 copies. b) 1958 GUREV, G. A. A pamphlet, whose title is: "Scientific previsions and religious prejudices," (trans. from the Russian). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat-88 p., 8,000 copies. The following assumptions are based on an analysis of these works: 1) Anti-religious efforts are directed primarily at the Kazakh community of Kazakhstan. The total population of Kazakhstan numbered 8,488,000 inhabitants1 on April 1, 1956, of which only a minority was Kazakh, the majority being Russians and Ukrainians. The last Soviet census of 1939 registered a total of 3,099,000 Kazakhs in the Union, around 2,5 00,000 of whom inhabit Kazakhstan and the remainder Uzbekistan, Kirghizia and the RSFSR. At present Kazakhs hardly represent more than 40% of the total population of their republic. One must therefore assume: - that the authorities consider Orthodox Christianity less of a danger to the regime than Islam; - that the Russian and Ukrainian population has become less attached to its religion than the Kazakhs are to Islam. Observations made by foreign visitors to Kazakhstan in the summer of 1958 prove that this last is not the case. In Alma-Ata there are two churches and close to one thousand persons attend the Sunday service; the city has only one mosque and scarcely two hundred and fifty persons and no young people attend the prayer on Friday. Among the different national minorities which inhabit Kazakhstan (Dungans, Uyghurs, etc.) only the Chechens (Caucasians deported to Kazakhstan in 1944 and rehabilitated in 1957) have access to an anti-religious publication in their own language. The tenacity with which these mountain people cling to Islam explains the importance attached to anti-religious propaganda directed at their community. 2) Kazakh authors play a minimal role in the anti-religious propaganda effort. Only five of the twenty-seven aforementioned publications are original pieces written in Kazakh by indigenous authors (KEKIMZHANOV, VATAN-OGLY, BISENOV, SYDYKOV and MUSABAEVA). The other twenty-two are translations from the Russian. Could this be, as is often implied in the Alma-Ata press, because of the fundamental aversion with which indigenous intellectuals view attacks on the Muslim religion? 3) The subjects of these anti-religious publications reflect the new so-called "scientific" method, set forth by Stalin's successors, of fighting religious prejudices. The publications are grouped as follows: Fifteen-(two of which appeared in 1953, five in 1954, two in 1955, three in 1956, two in 1957, one in 1958) deal with the irreconcilable opposition of science and religion; Five- (four of which appeared in 1953, one in 1954) condemn traditional customs and superstitions; reveal the injurious nature of religious rites; compare "reactionary" religious ethics to the "constructive" ethics of communism; Three- (one of which appeared in 1953, one in 1954, one in 1955) directly attack Islam; Four- (two of which appeared in 1955, one in 1956, one in 1957) are general works or trans 1 a tion s of Marxist-Leninist classics (Lenin, Marx). Direct attacks against Islam and religious beliefs, which gave rise to four publications in 1953 and one in 1954, ceased to appear after 1955; at that time in Kazakhstan, as in all the Soviet republics, new editions and translations of Marx's and Lenin's writings were undertaken which are, if anything, more violent and incisive than the writings of present-day antireligious propaganda specialists. 4) Of all the Muslim peoples of Central Asia, the Kazakhs have been the least "worked over" by anti-religious propaganda efforts.2
1 2 Narodnoe Khozjaistvo SSSR-Moscow, 1957, pp. 24-29. The Kazakhs, like all the old nomadic peoples of Central Asia, were Islamized in a superficial manner at a relatively recent

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We lack sufficient data in order to establish any comparisons for the period between 1 January 1953 and 1 July 1957 but certain comparisons can be drawn for the period 1 January 1955 to 1 August 1957. During these two and one half years, fortynine anti-religious tracts were published in Central Asia as a whole and 670,000 copies in local languages (not including works in Russian or other languages) were distributed as follows: Uzbek SSR-22 works-479,000 copies Karakalpak SSR-2 works-5,000 copies Kazakhstan SSR-8 works-78,000 copies Tadzhikstan SSR-7 works-38,000 copies Kirghiz SSR-6 works-38,000 copies Turkmen SSR-4 works-31,000 copies It is interesting to note that less anti-religious publications were distributed among the Kazakhs on a population basis than among the other central Asian Muslims. Number of Number of Number of inhabitants copies of inhabitants per according to antI-religious copy of anti-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Peoples 1939 census tracts religious tracts Uzbeks 4,844,021 479,000 10.1% Kirghiz 844,306 39,000 22.6% Turkmens 811,769 31,000 26.1 % Tadzhiks 1,228,964 38,000 32.3% Karakalpaks 182,559 5,000 36.5% Kazakhs 3,099,000 78,000 49.2 % ------------------------------------------------------------------------------5) After the death of Stalin in March 1953 until the middle of 1957, anti-religious propaganda efforts were relaxed in Kazakhstan as well as in the other Muslim republics of the USSR. In 1956 and in the beginning of 1957, not one anti-religious article was printed in the Alma-Ata daily press or in any Kazakh magazine. The implication was that either Soviet policy toward Islam had changed or that twentyfive years of anti-religious efforts had accomplished their purpose. As one Pakistani described the situation on returning from a trip to Central Asia in 1952: "In Kazakhstan Islam is not dead but it is on its last legs . . ."3 During the first three months of 1957, the Soviet authorities appear to have reversed their decision and realized the danger of weakening their campaign against Islam. This danger does not proceed so much from a resurgence of religious practices, of which there is no indication, as from the reappearance of "bourgeois nationalist manifestations" as it is described in the Alma-Ata press, which were favored by the unquestionableid eologicalr elaxationw hich followed Stalin's death. In the Muslim republics these nationalist manifestations" are closely bound to the "reformist" velleities which are constantly forcing their way into the Communist Party and which take the most diversified forms: idealization of the feudal past, wish to keep the native language free of Russian influence, exaggerated importance accorded to pre-revolutionary national literature, etc.... Resumption of the anti-religious campaign Summer 1957 The new anti-Muslim campaign which began in June 1957 was preceded in March of that year by a series of doctrinaire articles which appeared in a number of important Alma-Ata magazines and clearly pointed the direction the Party line was to take. In the second issue of Trudy Sektora Filosofii y Prava of the Academy of Sciences Kazakh SSR (AlmaAta, March 1957, pp. 54-67) appears an article by A. Iskakov entitled "Chokan Valikhanov4 o reakcionnoj roli
date and have therefore never been fervent followers of Islam. Their clergy has always been small (except in the southern regions of the republic inhabited by Uzbeks); Muslim religious rites are scarcely observed, if at all; in short, common law (adat) has always prevailed over Muslim law (sharrsa). 3 Riaz Ali Shah-A doctor looks at the Soviet Union-Dawn (Karachi) 3 August 1952. 4 Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov (1835-1865) -thnographer and orientalist-great grandson of Khan Ablayone of the first authors in the Kazakh language.

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Islama" which presents Valikhanov as a progressive democrat, declared enemy of Kazakh feudality, strong sup porter of his people's collaboration with the "great Russian people" and militant atheist, irreconcilably opposed to "Islamic obscurantism." Inspired by the writings of Valikhanov, Iskakov describes Islam as a "conservative, reactionary, anti-scientific and anti-Russian" religion: "Its moral code condemns its followers to fatalism" (p. 59) and "prevents them from participating in the development of their country." (p. 60) "Islam is a religion foreign to Central Asia, which was forcibly imposed on this area by the Arab invaders who destroyed a flourishing national civilization." (pp. 60-61) In the thirteenth century it was disseminatedb y the Tatar clergy and in the nineteenth century by the Tsarist administration who "used it to stultify and oppress the Kazakh masses." (pp. 64-65) "This foreign religion has proven more harmful than the ancient shamanism of the Kazakhs." (p. 66) "It has annihilated their culture and curbed the development of their language and literature." (p. 61) "Islam is a religion of hate founded on the Holy War dogma which impedes the establishment of harmonious relations between the Russian and Kazakh peoples." (p. 62) Finally, "Islam is a class religion used by the propertied classes to oppress the working masses." (p. 63) In this article, Iskakov appears to be pursuing the specific aim of providing new arguments to be used by the specialists on atheism. During the same period, two important studies appeared in Vol. I (4)5 of the News, (a series on history, economy, philosophy and law) published by the Academy of Sciences: The first study is written by D. Kshibekov,6 candidate in philosophical sciences at the Philosophy and Law Department of the Academy of Sciences Kazakh SSR; it is: "O preodolenii perezhitkov Islama." (pp. 108-115) The second study is written by N. D. Dzhandil'din, secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party: "K voprosu o kriticheskom ispolzovanii kul'turnovo nasledija proshlovo." (pp. 3-36) Kshibekov insists that "the struggle against Muslim religious prejudices" is one of the most important lessons in the education of a communist. He reiterates Iskakov's arguments: "Islam is a foreign religion imposed on the Kazakhs at a relatively recent date (XVIIIXIX centuries)." "Islam is a pessimistic doctrine, degrading to human dignity." "Islam, like all religions, is a doctrine incompatible to science." "Islam is a 'class' doctrine which defends the propertied classes, encourages social oppression and lowers the woman to a condition of slavery. Finally, "Islam is a fanatic and intolerant religion which hinders a rapprochement between peoples." Kshibekov cites numerous examples to prove the strength of religious feelings not only in the masses but also among the intellectuals; he calls attention to the vitality of the Muslim clergy which "is no longer, as in 1917, a sclerotic, traditionalist and bureaucratic cast." "The servants of the Muslim cult are now endeavoring to adapt their religion and religious rites to the new living conditions and the higher cultural level of the Soviet man . . ." (p. 114) He appeals to the intellectuals and above all the writers to resume the anti-religious struggle on a scientific basis by exposing the "idealistic" and "absurd" nature of Islam: "The continued existence of Islam is injurious because it obscures the conscience and impedes the development of communism." Kshibekov emphasizes the difference between the policy of the Soviet Government as regards religion and that of the Communist Party. The former is liberal and tolerant and acknowledges "the right of each citizen to follow the religion of his choice," while the latter which "educates the Soviet people in the spirit of scientific materialism cannot consider religion a private affair. It cannot and should not remain indifferent. It must combat religion." (p. 113) Dzhandil'din calls attention to the bourgeois- nationalist deviations which are coming to light among the Kazakh youth and intellectuals, perhaps as a result of events in Hungary. The bourgeois-nationalistp roblem is indirectly tied up with Islam. According to Dzhandil'din, the principal manifestations of nationalism at present
5 Qazaq SSR Ghylym AkademYjasynynHi abarlary-Izvestiya Akademii Nauk KazakhskayaS SR-Alma-Ata, March 1957. 6 Kshibekovs article was analyzed by H. Carrere dEncausse in his article entitled Awakening of Islam in the Soviet Union? Kazakhstan, which appeared in LAfrique et 1Asie, second quarter of 1958, pp. 35-47.

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are evidenced in the desire to protect the Kazakh language from Russification and the wish to safeguard the national culture which is unquestionably heavily influenced by Islam. Finally, an article by S. Beisembaev, the director of the Science and Culture Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, entitled "Ideino vospitatel'najar abotas redi studencheskoim olodezhi" appeared in the magazine Kommunist Kazakbstana (No. 3, March 1957, pp. 22-28-Alma- Ata) which calls for "an energetic fight against the artifices of bourgeois ideology to expose provocations and destroy 'amoral' attitudes." (In Soviet terminology this last term applies generally to such traditional customs as polygamy and marriage of minor girls.) Administrative measures were to follow the appearanceo f these three articles. On June 6, 1957, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan met in plenary session and adopted a resolution on "measurest o be taken with a view to improving the working organization and policy of the Communist Party in the Kazakh republic." This resolution was published in the June 7, 1957 issue of KazakhstanskayaP ravda. It represents a violent attack against bourgeois nationalist tendencies and religious manifestations reminiscent of the Stalinist era. . . .Atheistic propaganda is unsatisfactory . . . The Society for the diffusion of scientific and political knowledge (which leads the anti-religious fight) and the Party organizations have relaxed their educative operations, committed serious errors and politically misinterpreted several questions relating to the cultural development of Kazakhstan . . . The publication of works on anti-religious subjects is inadequate . . The Central Committee appeals for greater vigilance in all the Party organizations in the struggle against religious manifestations. One month later on July 20, a second resolution was adopted on the "discriminating utilization of the cultural heritage of the Kazakh people." This resolution was published in KazakhstanskayaP ravdao n July 21, 1957. It condemns Kazakh intellectuals for "indiscriminatelyexalting pre-revolutionarya rt and poets, independent of their ideological and political tendencies; for failing to make a distinction between progressive and reactionary elements and forgetting Lenin's thesis according to which only democratic and socialist elements may be borrowed from the past and only on condition that these elements serve as a counter-balance to the culture and to bourgeois nationalism." These two resolutions set off a seige of ideological re-adjustment directed both at cultural nationalism and at the Muslim religion. In July Kommunist Kazakhstana (No. 7, 1957, pp. 15-22) published another article by Dzhandil'din entitled "O nekotorykh voprosakh razvitiya natsional'noy kul'tury" in which he reiterates with even greater intensity the accusations launched in March against Kazakh"deviationist" intellectuals. There are among us individuals who are disseminating provocative rumors which malign the Communist Party and its national policy . . . It is true that these monsters are rare; unfortunately their mischievous ideas are shared by a section of our intelligentsia... Dzhandil'din attributes the existence of nationalist tendencies among Kazakh intellectuals to the "penetration of bourgeois reactionary ideology into our country" and to "ignorance of Marxism-Leninism."H e demonstratest hat Kazakh opposition to the Party line is concentrated around two problems: preservation of the national language and safeguarding the cultural patrimony. In concluding, he advocates the necessity of resuming the fight against "all those who are hostile to progress and friendship between peoples in the name of cultural or religious traditions." Dzhandil'din points out that the struggle against nationalism and the struggle against Islam become confused: Not all the champions of feudal customs and defenders of survivals of the past have disappeared7, They justify their attitude by their defence of national traditions. We must learn to distinguish between authentic national traditions and malicious survivals of out-dated cultures and primitive customs of certain decomposed elements. In September an important article by Kh. Bisenov entitled "Reaktsionnaya Sushchmost' religii" was pub lished in Kommunist Kazakhstana (No. 9, 1957, pp. 37-43). This article is a summary in Russian of a pamphlet
7 In Soviet terminology, the expression feudal customs applies to the traditional attitude toward the woman: polygamy, the veil, confinement of married women. The expression survivals of the past applies more particularly to observance of religious rites.

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published in Kazakh in 1955: "Islam dininYii shyghuy zhdne onyni taptyq mdni." Bisenov points out the origin of all religions, their anti-scientific nature and their utilization by the imperialists. He mentions in particular two religions prevalent in Kazakhstan: the Protestant sects (Adventists, Baptists and Jehovah Witnesses) to which the new immigrants belong and Islam which exists "in a survival form" among a section of Kazakhs and the Uyghurs. He does not even refer to Orthodox Christianity. According to Bisenov, Islam is manifested in traditional customs: polygamy, marriage of minor girls, observance of religious holidays and the Ramadhan fast, pilgrimages to local holy places: 'Anti-religious propaganda is inadequate, bureaucratic and badly organized . . .' It makes no allowances for the 'new attitude of the clergy' which has adapted itself to new Soviet conditions. 'The fight against Islam must continue with renewed vigor because the English and American imperialists are using the Muslim groups to combat the national liberation movement of the Asian peoples.' The campaign against religious survivals has not remained purely verbal. Words have been carried into actions in the application of new methods. Novikov, in an article in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 30 July 1957, gives the city of Taldy- Kurgan, the main center of the oblast of the same name, as an example: "The gorkom (City Communist Party Committee) recently began to occupy itself with anti-religious propaganda." The propaganda is now made by conferences directed by the Propaganda-Agitation Section of the gorkom on the following subjects: "Marxism-Leninisma nd religion;" "the origin of religious holidays:" "the contradiction of medicine and religion."' These conferences are conducted in business enterprises and factories and the names of the speakers are all Russian. To reach the non-workers, anti-religious discussions are held on the radio, at motion picture showings and in the public parks. "Collective or individual" discussions with "believers" are encouraged to supplement the conferences (this proposal was specifically mentioned in the gorkom resolution.) These discussions are to be held at Agitpunkt, recreation activities and at public anti-religious evenings which are organized by the Party or the society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge. Here is an example of one such evening: The following subjects were discussed before an audience of 400 persons: What is the origin of belief in God? What is the origin of life on earth? Is there life beyond the grave? Following the discussion an anti-religious film was shown and the meeting ended with entertainment. Finally, to stimulate Party vigilance, political education groups have been set up within all the basic Communist Party organizations. These groups meet once or twice a month to discuss various political and cultural problems. Anti-religious propaganda plays an important role in these discussions. The group within the basic organization of the Agricultural Bank, for example, studied "the attitude of the Communist Party toward religion." "With the Orthodox and Muslim clergy and that of the sects intensifying their action," Novikov considers this program inadequate. He proposes that anti-religious propaganda be extended to the educational institutions which have virtually "abandoned the struggle against religious feelings among the pupils and their parents." "Certain education workers falsely believe that there is no longer any need to uphold atheism among the students." Novikov considers this attitude dangerous "in view of the fact that the churches and mosques are not only frequented by old people but also by students." In September, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (20/9/57) announced that classes in atheism had been introduced into the newly created Faculties of History, Philosophy and Economy at the Alma-Ata University of MarxismLeninism. In November the Communist Party held a republic-wide seminary in Alma-Ata for propaganda and conference workers specialized in anti-religious action. Three hundred persons attended these sessions at which the following problems were discussed: "Dialectic-materialism-philosophic basis of militant atheism"; "Atheistic education of the youth in the school and in the family"; "Methods for individual work with believers"; "Medicine versus religious superstitions and sorcery"; "Scientific importance of soviet sputniks in discrediting religion." (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 23/11/57) With the resumption of the fight against religious survivals, the Party strengthened its guard against "nationalist" tendencies: At a meeting of the "artistic and literary workers" active in the city and oblast of Alma-Ata, 102

Dzhandil'din lectured on ideological work and violently attacked the Kazakh literary magazine Qazaq Adebiaty, the organ of the Union of Soviet Kazakh Writers, and Sovietskiy Kazakhstan for having published "ideologically dangerous" articles. (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 8 October 1957) On December 26, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan proclaimed in its resolution the necessity for combatting revisionism and other manifestations of bourgeois nationalism. (Kazakhstansk. aya Pravda 27 December 1957) This two-pronged campaign continued into 1958. An article by D. Kshibekov, "O feodal'no baiskikh perezhitkakh i ikh preodolenii" (the title is in Russian but the text is in Kazakh), appeared at the beginning of 1958 in the publication of the Republican Academy of Sciences. This article made quite a disturbance and received much publicity. Another important article appeared on 4 January 1958 in the magazine SovietskiyK azakhstan (No. 12, December 1957). This article was written by N. Dzhandil'din, secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party. In it he attacks "revisionist and nationalist bourgeois" tendencies which he has perceived in various Kazakh literary revues, notably in QazaqA debiatyw, hich endeavorst o defend the purity of the Kazakh language against Russification,a nd in AdabijaZt hine Iskustvo, which idealizes "reactionary" early nineteenth century poets. The Alma-Ata press also continues to publish anti-religious articles: In Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 23 January 1958, appears an article by V. Shtein entitled "Chemy nauchil sluchai v Sary-Sagane"a nd in the April 6 edition of the same newspaper appears an article by M. Burabaev and G. Valikhanov entitled "Reshitel'no borot'sja s feodal'no baiskimi perezhitkami." Notably absent in the Kazakh periodical press are attacks against the Orthodox Religion, in spite of the fact that there are now as many Russians in Kazakhstan as there are Kazakhs and they are, at least in appearancesm, ore attached to their religion than the Kazakhs are to Islam. In fact, during the whole of 1957, KazakbstanskayaP ravdap ublished only four articles against the Christian sects, of which three were directed at the Jehovah Witnesses-a sect which is particularly prevalent in Moldavia and was brought to Kazakhstan by Moldavian immigrants (the 1 September, 21 November and 8 December issues) and the fourth at the Baptists (3 April 1957 edition). What does the new anti-Islamic campaign in Kazakhstan mean? It is a known fact that Islam has always been superficially accepted in this area. In the nineteenth century, the Kazakh intellectual elite, while not openly anti-Muslim, was unenthusiastic and indifferent to Islam. The Kazakh intellectuals, Chokan Valikhanov, Ibrai Altynsarin, Abai Kunanbaev and the ideologists of Alash Orda were modernists, generally hostile to conservative traditionalism. On the eve of the Revolution, the Kazakh nomadic masses were still closer to the ancient shamanism than they were to Islam. The anti-religious struggle which began in 1924 did not, therefore, meet with a resistance anywhere near as strong as it did, for example, in the main centers of Uzbekistan. It must certainly have been much easier to separate the Kazakhs from a religion to which they had not yet been converted as late as the eighteenth century, and even the nineteenth, than it was the Uzbeks or the Tadzhiks who were Islamized in the height of the Middle Ages. Moreover, the Kazakh culture, unlike that of the Uzbeks or the Tadzhiks, owes little to Islam. Arab and Persian influences have always been weak, both in the linguistic and in the literary vein. The Kazakh national and cultural tradition, perceptible in the national epics (Koblandy- Batyr, Alpamys . . .) and in the works of the Pleiade of nineteenth century writers, stems from the traditions of the Mongol Empire and the memory of the nomadic tribes. How then can this insistence on fighting a religion, which no longer appears to present any kind of a serious obstacle to the edification of socialism, be explained? Could it be, as often occurs in the Soviet Union, a "diversionist campaign" against Islam in order to achieve indirectly Kazakh nationalism?

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Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective

Adeeb Khalid Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer, 2006), pp. 231-251

Empire has shown up in curious ways in the post-Soviet historiography of Russia. Historians of tsarist Russia, a polity that actually called itself an empire, have been quite suspicious of the analytical work of postcolonial critique. Although some marvelously sophisticated works have appeared, there remains a general wariness that such comparative perspectives may dilute the historical specificity of the Russian case. In the words of one scholar, such concepts "should be applied with caution, if at all, to the Russian context."1 Scholars of the early Soviet period, on the other hand, less constrained by the conventions or limitations of a long historiographical tradition, have been more enthusiastic in their search for new theoretical perspectives. This search for broader horizons has led them to the shores of postcolonial discourse. The experience of a small number of European overseas empires (the British, French, and Dutch) of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has become the key to understanding the nature of the transformation Central Asia experienced in the early Soviet period. The case has been put forth most eloquently by Douglas Northrop. "The USSR," he writes, "like its Tsarist predecessor, was a colonial empire. Power in the Soviet Union was expressed across lines of hierarchy and difference that created at least theoretically distinct centers (metropoles) and peripheries (colonies). . . . [While] it may not have been a classic overseas empire like that of the British or Dutch, the USSR did have a somewhat comparable political, economic, and military structure; a parallel cultural agenda; and similarly liminal colonial elites."2 To the historian of Central Asia, this appears to be a world turned upside down. My own research on Central Asia across the revolutionary divide leads me to opposite conclusions. I argue that while tsarist Central Asia was indeed directly comparable to other colonies of modern European empires, early Soviet Central Asia cannot be understood as a case of colonialism. In terms of both the scope and the nature of state action, the Soviet remaking of Central Asia makes sense only as the work of a different kind of modern polity, the activist, interventionist, mobilizational state that seeks to sculpt its citizenry in an ideal image. The differences between these colonial empires and modern mobilizational states are substantial and confusing the two leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of modern history.3 Empires have been ubiquitous in human history, and they have varied greatly in their nature. A truly universal definition, equally applicable to all cases, is impossible to achieve,4 although there has been no short1 Nathaniel Knight, Grigorev in Orenburg, 1851-1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire? Slavic Review 59, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 97. Knight is speaking specifically of the critique of orientalism first presented by Edward Said, but to the extent that Saids work underpins a great deal of postcolonial critique, Knights suspicion extends to the latter as well. Other recent treatments of tsarist rule over Central Asia find little use for postcolonial literature in understanding the dynamics: see, for instance, Daniel Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (London, 2003), or Robert Crews, Allies in Gods Command: Muslim Communities and the State in Imperial Russia (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1999). For an example of the sustained use of postcolonial literature to study tsarist Central Asia, see Jeffery Frank Sahadeo, Creating a Russian Colonial Community: City, Nation, and Empire in Tashkent, 1865-1923 (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2000). 2 Douglas T. Northrop, Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia (Ithaca, 2004), 22. While Northrop makes the colonial case most explicitly, a number of other scholars have seen early Soviet Central Asia through the prism of postcolonial studies; see Paula Michaels, Curative Powers: Medicine and Empire in Stalins Central Asia (Pittsburgh, 2003); or Cassandra Cavanaugh, Backwardness and Biology: Medicine and Power in Russian and Soviet Central Asia, 1868-1934 (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2001). 3 One might also note parenthetically the curiosity that there has been little interest in the economic relationship between Central Asia and the Soviet state, which is where the colonial argument is the easiest to make. Soviet economic planning turned the whole region into a gigantic cotton plantation in order for the USSR to achieve cotton independence. The bulk of the cotton harvest was shipped to Russia, where it was processed, and the finished goods were then sent back to Central Asia. No comprehensive study of the Soviet cotton complex exists, but see J. Michael Thurman, The Command-Administrative System in Cotton Farming in Uzbekistan 1920s to Present (Papers on Inner Asia 32, Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Bloomington, Indiana, 1999). Scholars who invoke postcolonial studies in the study of Central Asia have been much more interested in the cultural work of Soviet power, a much sexier topic than the history of cotton. 4 Here I am entirely sympathetic to the misgivings aired by I. Gerasimov et al., V poiskakh novoi imperskoi istorii, in I. Gerasimov et al., eds., Novaia imperskaia istoriia postsovetskogo prostranstva: Sbornik statei (Kazan, 2004), 24.

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age of attempts to arrive at one.5 What the Soviet Union is compared to by the "postcolonial school" of Soviet history, however, is a peculiar kind of empire-the modern overseas colonial empires of Britain, France, and the Netherlands in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Put very crudely, these empires were based on the perpetuation of difference between rulers and the ruled, which foreclosed the possibility of the acquisition of universal civilization by the native. Modern mobilizational states, on the other hand, have tended to homogenize populations in order to attain universal goals. Citizens of such states have borne enormous burdens of responsibility and obligation and have experienced transformations more massive than anything wrought by colonial empires. Colonial conquest transformed colonized societies, but colonial empires seldom used state power to transform societies, cultures, or individuals in the way attempted by the Soviet state. The British Raj in India, for instance, mapped out the country's geography and its natural resources; its classificatory apparatus reified caste and communal categories, and the economic relations it imposed vis-a-vis the metropole had a drastic effect on the lives of all the inhabitants of India.6 Nevertheless, it did not aspire to the micromanagement of society, such as promising or enforcing universal education; it preferred dealing with "martial races" to conscription; it left agrarian power in the hands of notables rather than embarking on significant land reform. The wholesale uprooting of local life in the name of bringing the natives up to a universal standard, to force them to overcome their own backwardness, to bring them into the orbit of politics-these were not things colonial authorities concerned themselves with.7 Modern mobilizational states have instead sought to cut through layers of intermediaries and to deal directly with their citizens, and they have had no compunction about destroying traditions. In what follows, I develop this argument by placing early Soviet Central Asia in two different comparative perspectives. First, I compare it with tsarist Central Asia, to show how Central Asia's relation to the center changed across the revolutionary years of 1917-1920. Second, I compare the transformations of the first two decades of Soviet rule to those that took place in the same years in another nascent mobilizational state, the Turkish Republic. The comparisons will, I hope, clarify the differences between two distinctive kinds of polity and lead to other fruitful questions: Where does empire end and other forms of nonrepresentative or authoritarian polity begin? When can empire fruitfully be used in thinking about the forms of political inequality in the twentieth century? What are the specificities of colonial difference? The Politics of Comparison The choice of comparative perspective is never an arbitrary decision, but one fraught with all sorts of politics. The subjective dimension of the comparison, as Mark Beissinger has pointed out, is always significant.8 While the Soviet Union existed, most foreign observers generally accepted its claim to being a multiethnic state. The term Soviet empire was used extensively, but usually to describe the Soviet Union's domination of eastern Europe (Mongolia was usually forgotten). Those who described the Soviet Union itself as an empire tended to come from the political right or were exiles from or advocates of various non-Russian nationalities.9 This changed during the last years of the Soviet Union, when all sorts of opposition groups used the
5 The work most often quoted in this regard is Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, 1986). For definitions devised specifically to include the Soviet Union among empires, see Ronald Grigor Suny, The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, National Identity, and Theories of Empire, in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (New York, 2001), 25; and Alexander J. Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New York, 2001). 6 Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton, 1999); Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago, 2004); Nicholas B. Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton, 2001); Matthew H. Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843 (Chicago, 1997). 7 This argument is also made by Peter Blitstein in this issue and by Yuri Slezkine, Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Socialism, Russian Review 59, no. 2 (April 2000): 227-34. Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and WestA frica, 1895-1930 (Stanford, 1997), describes how French ambitions of transforming West Africans subsided when it was discovered that this would require more than the construction of railways. Colonial authorities might have proscribed individual customs or traditions, but that seldom amounted to the intrusive state regulation we see in the mobilizational states of the twentieth century. Perhaps the most celebrated case of such a proscription in postcolonial literature is that of sati, the practice of cremating widows with their deceased husbands among some groups in India; see Lata Mani, Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India (Berkeley, 1998). 8 MarkB eissinger, Demiseo f an Empire-State:I dentity,L egitimacy,a nd the Deconstruction of Soviet Politics, in Crawford Young, ed., The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay? (Madison, 1993); Mark Beissinger, The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire, Post-SovietA ffairs 11, no. 2 (April-June 1995): 149-84. 9 These two categories of observers were not mutually exclusive, of course, although most of the scholarly literature was produced

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vocabulary of empire to discredit the existing order, and in the years since the Soviet collapse, the use of a postcolonial critique of sorts has allowed new states in the post-Soviet space to distance themselves from the Soviet past. The Republic of Turkey, on the other hand, defined itself as the very opposite of the empire it succeeded, and that self-definition has never seriously been questioned. Nevertheless, the parallels between the Soviet and the Turkish cases are striking. Both the Soviet and the Kemalist regimes originated from the same phenomenon, the collapse of the European imperial order in the flames of World War I. Both emerged in warfare that prolonged the devastation of World War I and were pro foundly marked by it. Both pursued shock modernization programs that involved mass mobilization, nation and state building, political centralization, as well as attempts at radical interventions in the realms of society and culture, featuring state-led campaigns for the "emancipation" of women, spreading literacy, the elaboration of new literary languages, and secularization. Finally, both regimes produced an official historiography that shared many elements: a glorious foundational moment and a larger-than-life founding figure; leadership by a group with clearly defined goals, to which the founders remained unwaveringly loyal; and a clear break from the past, so that all connections to the old regime were downplayed. These two official historiographies located themselves in different narratives-of class and nation-and were therefore quite hostile to comparison with each other. The Soviet narrative has collapsed, but the new historiographies that have replaced it in the former Soviet Union have equally little interest in comparative study. The Kemalist narrative still reigns supreme in public life, monopolizing school textbooks and urban spaces alike, but it has come under sustained assault in academic discourse. As far as Soviet Central Asia is concerned, disciplinary divisions further complicate the situation. Much of the work on Central Asia has been generated in the field of Russian history, where the scholars who have done admirable archival work remain largely oblivious to developments in Turkey. Scholars working on Turkey are seldom interested in Soviet developments, and in any case, few have the linguistic skills to approach Soviet history with any degree of substance. The result is that parallel developments are seldom recognized as such.10 In the literature, for instance, secularization in Turkey is treated very differently from secularization in Soviet Central Asia. For the study of Central Asia, the Turkish case is pertinent for one other important reason. Central Asian intellectuals were closely connected to intellectual currents in late-Ottoman society. Some of them had been educated in Istanbul, and many more saw the attempts by the Ottoman state to reshape itself as models to be followed.11 The interconnections between Ottoman and Central Asian intellectual milieux are too often glossed (and hence dismissed) simply as "pan-Islamism" or "pan- Turkism." As I argue below, the transformation of cultural and national identities in early Soviet Central Asia was not the work of the party-state alone. Local cultural elites radicalized by the revolution played a significant, if not always dominant, role. The cultural history of early Soviet Central Asia simply makes no sense without accounting for local discourses of modernity that predated the revolution and that were intimately connected to Ottoman ones. The Kemalists, in their turn, were also radicalized heirs to the same late-Ottoman debates. One last point is worth making. In comparing the USSR to European colonial empires, the new postcolonial literature does nothing to question the Eurocentric framework within which Russian history has been understood since at least the eighteenth century. The comparison to the nascent national state in Anatolia extends the horizons of Russian history in a new direction. This is not a move to exoticize the Soviet Union, to declare it "non-European," but rather to see with greater clarity the ideological work of "Europe," "civilization," and "modernity" in twentiethcentury history. "Europe," we find, still casts a long shadow over our subject, but it is now the object of our actors' desire rather than an unproblematic actor in its own right.
by the first group. See Sir Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism (London, 1954); Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (London, 1952); Helene Carrere dEncausse, The Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, trans. Martin Sokolinsky and Henry A. La Farge (New York, 1979); and Robert Conquest, ed., The LastEmpire: Nationality and the SovietFuture (Stanford, 1986). 10 For an attempt to see the two transformationsin comparativep erspective, see Carter V Findley, The Turksi n WorldH istory (New York, 2005). 11 I have emphasized the interconnections between intellectual currents in the two empires in much of my work to date; see also A. Holly Shissler, BetweenT woE mpires:A hmet Agaoglu and the New Turkey( London, 2003), and Volker Adam, RuJ3landmuslimien Istanbul am Vorabend esE rsten Weltkriege(sF rankfurt am Main, 2002).

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Turkestan as a Russian Colony Partha Chatterjee has argued that one hallmark of a modern colonial regime of power is the rule of colonial difference, whereby "natives" are exempted from the universalist claims of the ruling order.12 Difference built on essentialized categories of civilization, religion, or race structures the political and social landscape of the colonial order so that the gap between the colonizer and the colonized cannot be bridged. The rule of colonial difference also subverts self-proclaimed civilizing missions, for natives cannot, in the end, achieve the civilization that legitimizes the empire in its own eyes. Natives, as colonial subjects, can never become modern and acquire universal human attributes.13 Colonial difference operated in Central Asia in a way it did nowhere else in the Russian empire. The region was conquered very much in the context of imperial competition with other European powers at a time when imperial rule over "uncivilized" peoples was clearly seen as a hallmark of civilization. Turkestan was ruled under its own statute, with the governor-general answerable only to the tsar. The region was under the jurisdiction of the ministry of war, rather than internal affairs. The indigenous population was not incorporated into empirewide systems of social classification; rather, the "natives" were left simply as ino rodtsy, although locally the term tuzemtsy (natives) was used to describe them. As inorodtsy, the indigenous population was not subject to conscription. The Russian presence itself was thin and Russian administrators remained wary of this fact to the end. In general, the social and political distance between the rulers and the ruled remained greater than anywhere else in the empire, with the possible exception of Siberia and the north (where the indigenous population was much smaller and did not pose a demographic threat to Russian dominance). The Russian conquest changed a great deal in the lives of Central Asians. They were incorporated into the broader imperial economy and made subject to new regimes of power. But the Russian state had neither the desire nor the capability to assimilate the indigenous population or bring about radical cultural change. In Central Asia, many administrative practices modeled on the colonial experience of other empires were put into effect that tended to maintain-and heighten-colonial difference. The protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva (a political status new to the Russian empire and modeled directly on the princely states of India) were left with internal autonomy, which tended to have a traditionalizing influence.14 In Turkestan, on the other hand, a two-tier system of administration took shape, in which the lowest level of administration continued to be staffed by local functionaries who worked in local languages. Judicial affairs too remained largely in local hands. Among the settled population, every county and every city neighborhood elected, indirectly, a judge (qazi). The jurisdiction of the qazis was strictly defined by law: they could sentence people to arrest for up to eighteen months or assess a fine of up to 300 rubles, but they were not competent to hear cases involving documents written in Russian or cases involving non-Muslims, and their decisions were subject to review by Russian circuit courts. Among the nomadic population, native justice was provided by the biy, a tribal elder who adjudicated according to customary law (adat), rather than "Islamic law" (shariat). Needless to say, these administrative practices crystallized the distinction between adat and shariat, just as they subtly altered the status of qazi and biy. But the point is that the state recognized the native population as different and institutionalized that difference in legal practice.15 The state was primarily concerned with the maintenance of law and order, which would allow economic life to progress. Daniel Brower has highlighted the continual debate between enlightened bureaucrats, who sought to integrate Turkestan and its inhabitants into the empire on general principles of rule, and mainly military personnel who emphasized the region's peculiarities and argued for its exemption from empirewide
12 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton, 1993), 16-27. 13 In different contexts, different colonial regimes held out the possibility that individual natives (the ?volues in French West Africa or British colonial subjects resident in Britain, for example) could come to be considered full citizens, but this possibility was never opened up to natives as a group. In the British case, race came to be a significant marker distinguishing colonial subjects from one another. See Radhika Viyas Mongia, Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport, Public Culture 11 (1999): 527-56. Colonies of settle ment eventually acquired self-government (dominion status) well before decolonization swept the rest of the empire. 14 Seymour Becker, Russias Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968). On the traditionalizing impact of Russian rule in Bukhara, see Adeeb Khalid, Society and Politics in Bukhara, 1868-1920, Central Asian Survey 19, nos. 3-4 (2000): 367-96. 15 Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley, 1998), chap. 2.

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institutions. The former argued for the extension of Russian grazhdanstvennost', civic spirit or civil order, into the region, which would make the native population into ordinary subjects of the empire and result in its rapprochement (sblizhenie) to the Russians. The latter based their case on the innate "fanaticism" of the natives and pleaded for the maintenance of regulations specific to the region. The arguments for maintaining specificity (that is, colonial difference) won out, but even those who argued for integrating Turkestan into the general structures of the empire had no wish to intervene forcefully in local social or cultural life.16 Social Revolution and the Conquest of Difference This colonial difference was destroyed by the February revolution. The Provisional Government declared all subjects of the Russian empire to be free and equal citizens, regardless of sex, religion, or ethnicity, and gave them all an equal right to vote. But it was the Bolsheviks, with their relentlessly universalist project of social revolution, who set out to reintegrate Central Asia into the Russian state on a new basis. Central Asia was important to the Bolsheviks both as a source for cotton and as the gateway to "the East," where it was fated to ignite the colonial revolution that would undermine the rule of the bourgeoisie in Europe and usher in the revolution that had failed to materialize in the immediate aftermath of the October revolution. But ultimately, social revolution required no justification, for it led to a higher stage in the evolutionary path that all humanity was destined to tread. The ends of Soviet rule-the building of socialism and the achievement of a classless utopia-were common to all Soviet citizens. Still, to the extent that the Bolshe viks took the existence of ethnic ("national") difference as a given, they also ended up facing the question of the relationship between the universal and the national. What will different national groups look like when they arrive at their final destination? Eventually, the answer was deceptively simple: all groups will remain national in form but will acquire a universal socialist content. Certain cultural features would remain, but the future that beckoned humanity was universal. In the name of this universalism, the Soviet project aimed at the conquest of difference. The national form would not remain unchanged in this process of social revolution. Curiously for devoted materialists, the Bolsheviks construed backwardness in cultural as much as economic terms. Iosif Stalin, writing in 1919 as people's commissar for nationalities affairs, thought the most important tasks of Soviet power in "the East" were "to raise the cultural level of [its] backward peoples, to build a broad system of schools and educational institutions, and to conduct ... Soviet agitation, oral and printed, in the language that is native to and understood by the surrounding laboring population.17 Much about the national cultural form had to be transformed if backwardness were to be overcome. As Terry Martin has shown, "backwardness" turned into an official category and brought with it both stigma and possible rewards.18 The achievement of progress would usher in many specifically European cultural forms. Uzbek peasants would eat with a knife and fork sitting at the table, wear European clothing, and adopt "civilized" norms of social intercourse. The Soviet project was one of cultural revolution.19 The agent of this revolution was to be the Soviet party-state, which took upon itself the task of ushering humanity to its final destination. Armed with a vision of the plasticity of human culture and, indeed, of human nature, the party-state was able and willing to use methods of mobilization and coercion that its tsarist predecessor could scarcely have imagined. In 1909, the governor-general, P. I. Mishchenko, had fantasized of a network of schools that would "train the natives so that they would consider themselves Russian citizens from their earliest years, give them information about Russian history, geography, etc., [as well as] create
16 Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire. 17 I. V. Stalin, Nashi zadachi na Vostoke, Pravda, 2 March 1919. 18 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, 2001), 126-32. 19 Following the usage coined by Sheila Fitzpatrick, the Anglophone historiography of the USSR uses the term cultural revolution for a very specific campaign by the party to seize control of cultural and scientific institutions between 1929 and 1932. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Cultural Revolution as Class War, in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931 (Bloomington, 1978), 8-40. Soviet leaders used the term in a much more expansive sense; without invoking this broader understanding of the term, it is impossible to understand developments of the early Soviet period. See Michael David-Fox, What Is Cultural Revolution? Russian Review 58, no. 2 (April 1999): 181-201; Michael David-Fox, Revolution of the Mind: Higher Learning among the Bolsheviks (Ithaca, 1997); Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, 2005), chap. 5. This sense of cultural revolution was superbly captured by Rene Fiilop-Miller, The Mind and Face of Bolshevism: An Examination of Cultural Life in Soviet Russia, trans. F. S. Flint and D. F. Tait (London, 1927).

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for them economic conditions that would lead them to prosperity-and taken as a whole, would bring home to the natives the necessity and benefit of Russian dominion [and] make them equal Russian citizens."20 For the Soviets, such goals were hopelessly modest. They sought nothing less than the remaking of human nature. The Bolshevik commitment to conquer difference also resonated with local elites eager to transform their society in a modernist vein. Although this was a complex group, for the sake of brevity I will refer to them simply as the Jadids. They had arisen as a self-conscious group espousing reform in the two decades before the collapse of the old order. Their reform agenda was elaborated in the context of Muslim modernism and had nothing to do with Marx or Marxism. 21 The nation had to achieve progress in order to survive and take its place in the world with dignity.22 The Jadid project, like most nationalisms, saw the problem as a dialectic between modernity and authenticity: the nation had to be made more modern and more authentic at the same time. This replicated many orientalist conceits embedded in the colonial order, but it also subverted them by claiming for the native the ability to achieve progress and civilization. Before 1917, theJadids had argued their case through exhorting their compatriots to action. The February revolution opened up vast new possibilities for theJadids, but in the mobilizational politics of 1917, they discovered that they could not convert their enthusiasm for change into political influence or votes. 23 The nation, it turned out, did not care for their vision of change. The result was not a retreat into moderation, but further radicalization. The Russian revolution and the broader geopolitical transformation of the world further convinced them of the futility of exhortation and gradualism as modalities of change. "Many among us," Abdurauf Fitrat (1886-1938), a leading Jadid figure, wrote in 1920, "say, 'Rapid change in methods of education, in language and orthography, or in the position of women, is against public opinion [af kori umumiya] and creates discord among Muslims.... We need to enter into [such reforms] gradually.' [The problem is that] the thing called 'public opinion' does not exist among us. We have a general majority ["umum" ko 'pchilik], but it has no opinion. ... There is not a thought, not a word that emerges from these people's own minds. The thoughts that our majority has today are not its own, but are only the thoughts of some imam or oxund [Sufi master]. [Given all this,] no good can come from gradualness."24 They came to be fascinated by the idea of the revolutionary transformation of society, although they saw revolution in national, not class terms.25 They flocked into the new organs of power and threw their energies into a number of projects of cultural transformation. The nation had to be dragged into the modern world, kicking and screaming if need be. Change had to be radical, sudden, and imposed; and it was to be, above all, a revolution of the mind. The masthead of the journal in which Fitrat wrote carried the slogan, "No change can take hold until the mind is changed" (Miya o 'zgarmaguncha boshqa o'zgarishlar negiz tutmas). The enthusiasm of the revolution created a new surge of activity among the Jadids, in which they opened many new schools and established courses to train teachers to staff them. This continued all through the difficult years of the civil war, and into the 1920s, with quite a bit of the funding coming from soviets in the "old" cities. Local intellectuals also poured their energies into the creation of a self-consciously modern and "revolutionary" native culture. The theater exploded with activity, and new poetry and journalism came into existence."26This in turn gave new urgency to questions of the reform of the written language, to bring it closer to everyday speech, and of orthography. These are both questions generic to a vast array of nationalist
20 Governor-GeneralP . I. Mishchenko to Minister of War, 4 March 1909, Tsentralnygi osudarstvennyai rkhivR espublikiU zbekistan,f . 1-2,o p. 2, d. 369, 1.7 ob. This top secret memorandum is largely a meditation on the thinness of Russian rule in Turkestan, and this flight of fancy aside, is full of the usual complaints about the lack of financial and personnel resources that prevented Russian rule being established on firmer footing. 21 Khalid, Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. 22 The nation (millat) had always been a central feature ofJadid thought, although the way the Jadids imagined their nation was in flux until 1917, when an ethnic understanding of it rapidly displaced all others. After that, Jadidism became primarily a nationalist project. See Adeeb Khalid, Nationalizing the Revolution: The Transformation of Jadidism, 1917-1920, in Suny and Martin, eds., A State of Nations, 156-59. 23 For detailed accounts of the conflicts of 1917, see Khalid, Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform,c hap. 8; R. Eisener, Bukhara v 1917 godu, Vostok1, 994, no. 4:131-44 and no. 5:75-92; V L. Genis, Borbav okrug reform v Bukhare: 1917 god, Voprosiys torii, 2001, no. 11-12:18-37. 24 [Abdurauf] Fitrat, Tadrijga qorshu, Tong, no. 3 (15 May 1920): 78-80. 25 I have made this point at greater length in Khalid, Nationalizing the Revolution, 153-56. 26 A serious study of early Soviet theater remains to be undertaken. The clearest evidence of the burst of energy in the realm of theater lies in the newspapers of the time.

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movements in central Europe, the Middle East, and in the Russian empire and had long been on the agenda of Central Asian Jadids. But it was in this period that they emerged with particular clarity. The written language had been in flux for the previous two decades, but now the process of reform began in earnest, as authors coined new words and usages with the twin goals of making the language more national and more modern. Although it was to go through a number of twists and turns over the next two decades, the process created new written languages for Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Karakalpak and codified Uzbek and Tajik as modern languages.27 Language reform also involved a reform of orthography, which became a major preoccupation of the Jadids in the early 1920s. It too was discussed in terms of nation and progress. The young poet Botu (19041938) made the connection between modernity and orthographic reform most vividly. At the first conference called to discuss the issue, he took the fringe position of supporting Latinization. "The backwardness of a nation is the backwardness of its script," he argued. "If you are going to the railway station [presumably, to catch the train of progress], you get there faster by car than on foot. The [Latin] script speeds up progress in the same way."28 By 1927, Latinization was no longer a fringe position, but an imminent possibility. The drive for Latinization throughout the Soviet Union was spearheaded by Azeri intellectuals, who managed to channel the Soviet state's concerns about overcoming backwardness into the question of orthographic reform. In 1928, all Central Asian languages switched to the Latin script.29 The Jadids also took on the question of the place of women in society. Since before the revolution, the Jadids had argued for changing the position of women in local society. Using arguments from the Islamic tradition itself, they had argued that the progress of Islam and the nation required that women be educated and that they take an active part in public life. After the revolution, the Jadids emerged as major proponents of changing women's position in Muslim society. Their main concerns were education, child marriage, polygyny, and, increasingly, unveiling. 30 In all of this, the Jadids were part of an uneasy collaboration with the Soviet regime. It was the structures created by the new regime (state-funded schools, a print sphere immune to market forces, new organs of political authority) that had set both the limits and possibilities of Jadid activity in the early 1920s. But the Soviet regime had its own goals that had to be achieved through a massive mobilization of the population. It spent a great deal of energy on political education, sending out teams armed with posters, newspapers, film, and theater, to propagate the new political message. The population had to be mobilized by the new institutions, but it also had to be taught new ways of thinking about politics. A network of Red Teahouses, Red Yurts, and Red Corners sprang up at many points in the region. These served as outlets for propaganda and showpieces for the new order the Bolsheviks hoped to establish. The Soviets also created local cadres who would be more ideologically reliable and trustworthy, and whose vision of change would be less contaminated by prerevolutionary notions of change. Ultimately, it was this class that displaced the Jadids from public life and all too often consigned them to death during the Terror. 31 By 1926, the party-state felt secure enough in its power in the region to transform the tempo of change and to launch an all-out assault on traditional society. The Jadids now came to be derided as "old intellectuals" whose time was past. The parting of the ways came at the first Uzbek conference of workers in the fields of culture and education in January 1926, when Akmal Ikramov (1898-1938), the first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, denounced the Jadids as mouthpieces of the local bourgeoisie, which, now that the party-state had taken Central Asia directly from feudalism to socialism, had become reactionary and had cast
27 William Fierman, Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience (Berlin, 1991); B. S. Asimova, Iazyko voe stroitelstvo v Tadzhikistane, 1920-1940 gg. (Dushanbe, 1982). 28 1921y ily onvoridab olganb irinchoi lkao zbekti l va imloq urultoyinincgh iqorgagnq arorlari (Tashkent, 1922), 22-23. 29 On Latinizationi n the USSR,s ee Ingeborg Baldauf,S chriftreforumn d Schriftwechsel bei den muslimischen Russland- und Sowjettiirken (1850-1937): Ein Symptom ideengeschichtlicher und kulturpolitischer Entwicklungen (Budapest, 1993); Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, chap. 5; Michael G. Smith, Language and Power in the Creation of the USSR, 1917-1953 (Berlin, 1998), chap. 6; Adrienne Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton, 2004), 139-43. 30 On Central Asian debates over the position of women, see Marianne R. Kamp, The New Woman in Central Asia: Islam, the Soviet Project, and the Unveiling of Uzbek Women (Seattle, forthcoming). 31 This and the following four paragraphs represent, in very condensed form, the first results of an ongoing research project on the transformation of Central Asia in the early Soviet period. I have cited existing literature, but otherwise made no attempt at comprehensive citation of all archival sources.

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its lot with English imperialism.32 No mercy could be shown such counterrevolutionary agents of English imperialism, and theJadids were prised out of their jobs and, over the next several years, arrested or executed. The assault on traditional society was ferocious and destructive. It began with a "struggle against the old-style school," which began to be shut down, first in the Tashkent region, where their number was smaller, and then in the rest of the republic. The same fate befell the madrasas, institutions of higher Islamic learning, soon after. Their number had already shrunk, driven partly by the economic crisis and partly by the hostile political environment. Now, in 1927, they too were systematically shut down and their property confiscated. Qazi courts were similarly quickly suppressed, and property belonging to religious endowments (waqf) was nationalized. Along with schools and courts went the mosques. A few mosques had been closed earlier in the decade and their buildings given over to "socially useful" purposes, but the years between 1927 and 1929 saw a sustained campaign of closures and destruction directed against them. The same fate awaited the ulama, religious scholars who were the carriers of the learned tradition of Islam. They had long been reviled both for being relics of a superstitious past that had now been superseded and for being class enemies of the revolution and the oppressors of the toiling masses. But by the time the antireligious campaign slowed down in 1932, thousands of ulama had been arrested and sent off to atone for the sins of their social origin in forced labor camps; many died or were killed; others "fell silent." With old-method schools and madrasas closed, waqf property confiscated and redistributed, and qazi courts abolished, the patterns through which Islam had been transmitted in Central Asia were largely destroyed.33 It was this path that led the party to the hujum, the outright assault on the paranji, the heavy cotton robe that came down to the ankles, and the chachvon, a veil of woven horsehair that completely covered the face, and which together constituted the dress of modest women among the sedentary populations of the region. For both theJadids and the Bolsheviks, th paranji-chachvon was a hazard to women's health, in addition to being both the symbol and the means of their oppression and degradation. During the early 1920s, there were cases of women abandoning the veil and appearing in public places (including the theater), but most women who worked, and even those engaged in political work, continued to wear the paranji and chachvon. The party established a women's section (the Zhenotdel), which attracted numerous indigenous women, largely from marginalized sections of society-girls who had run away from home, women who had abandoned abusive husbands, and so on-but the results were meager.34 On 8 March 1927, international women's day and the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the Russian revolution, the Zhenotdel organized a series of mass meetings in which thousands of women cast off their veils and, in many cases, burned them. The story of the hujum, the violent reactions against women and the state that it provoked, and its abandonment in the face of short-term failure has been ably told by Douglas Northrop, who sees in it a clear case of colonialism.35 Yet, as Adrienne Edgar points out, the hujum had little in common with the practice of British or French colonial empires in the Muslim world. Although the condemnation of Muslim gender norms played a central role in the legitimation of the imperial order, the colonial rulers showed little interest in wholesale transformation of those norms or of the social and legal order in which they existed. The hujum was the culmination of a decade-long effort to transform society in which both the Soviets and the Jadids had participated.36 To my mind, the fact that the hujum failed to achieve its goals in the short term (which it did) is less important than the fact that the campaign took place at all. It was an indication of new kinds of power being deployed for the bold aim of remaking society. The same aim underlay the next campaign visited upon Central Asia, that of collectivization. We still need to learn a great deal about collectivization, but there is no question that by 1938 the economy of the region, and the lives and livelihoods of its inhabitants, had been utterly transformed; and unlike the hujum, there could also be no question that the campaign was successful in its aims.37
32 The text of Ikramovss peech can be found in Rossiiskiig osudarstvennyai rkhiv sotsialno-politicheskoi istorii, f. 62, op. 2, d. 734, 11. 47-55. 33 See, in general, Shoshana Keller, To Moscow, not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign against Islam in CentralAsia, 1917-1941 (Westport, Conn., 2001). As Keller points out, many of the relevant archives are still closed to researchers, and much still remains to be learned about these campaigns. 34 Kamp, New Woman in Central Asia, chaps. 6-8. 35 Northrop, Veiled Empire. 36 Here I differ from Gregory Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929 (Princeton, 1974), and Northrop, VeiledE mpire,w ho both see the hujum as the beginning of serious intervention in society. 37 The impact of collectivization on Central Asia has attracted surprisingly little attention. On Uzbekistan, see Rustambek Shamsutdinov, Ozbekistonda sovetlarning quloqlashtirish siyosati va uningfojeali oqibatlari (Tashkent, 2001); Rustambek Shamsutdinov, Qish-

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The Turkish Mirror Parallels for the kind of transformation attempted by the Soviet state in Central Asia are not to be found in the annals of European overseas empires. In the aftermath of World War II, Britain and France both gave priority to "colonial development" but this proved to be a brief phase, before the expense involved made decolonization look much the better option.38 Interwar Japanese imperialism in Manchuria, underwritten by the rhetoric of a common cause against the global status quo (here, racial solidarity and anticolonialism) and featuring considerable investment and the modernization of infrastructure, represents a closer parallel.39 But the legal fiction that bestowed sovereignty upon Manchuria makes this case more relevant to the USSR's eastern European satellites after World War II than to Central Asia, which remained an integral part of the Soviet state. On the other hand, twentieth-century history is replete with cases of states, equipped with modern means of mobilization and coercion, leading their populations on a forced march to progress and development. The common good could only be achieved through the actions of the state. The Kemalist revolution in Turkey was also a state-led cultural revolution that reshaped the contours of local culture and identity quite as thoroughly as in Central Asia. The Kemalist regime emerged out of the mass mobilization of the population of Anatolia in the course of the "War of Liberation," the military struggle to undo the terms of the Armistice. Military mobilization created new structures of power, while military success created an enormous storehouse of legitimacy for the new regime, which it used over the next two decades to transform the country.40 The war was ostensibly fought to "liberate" the sultan from the captivity of the victorious forces, but no sooner had Anatolian forces taken Istanbul than they abolished the Ottoman dynasty and replaced it with the republic. The first transformations came in the political realm, as the new regime moved to curtail the influence of Islam and its carriers from the political realm. There was no outright assault on Islam, as hap pened in the Soviet Union; instead, the state opted for laicism, the subjugation of religion to the state. The new Turkish republic made all Islamic religious activity subject to the supervision of a directorate of religious affairs, whose task it was to regulate religious observance and education throughout the country. Imams thus became government functionaries and mosques came under the control of the state. The state acted against other religious institutions, first banning Sufi lodges (tekke) in eastern Anatolia in the aftermath of a Kurdish rebellion, then extending the ban to the whole country, and outlawing religious garb from all places except mosques. A new, uniform civil code, patterned on that of Switzerland, was introduced in 1926 to replace the existing welter of civil legislation that had allowed members of different religious communities to live under the civil law of their particular community. For Muslims, this had the effect of abolishing the authority of the shariat over civil matters. Law courts that functioned on the basis of the shariat were simply abolished and replaced by state courts. Islam was to be nationalized: In 1933, the state decreed that the call to prayer was to be in Turkish, and the Qur'an was translated into Turkish for the first time. The common era calendar was adopted in 1925, and Sunday became the weekly holiday in 1934. Atatfirk's positivist views of science (a product of his late-Ottoman upbringing) led him to inveigh against "primitive" folk practices, such as shrine visits (and, ultimately, all religion), which, he thought, would have no place in the enlightened future. The Kemalist project always saw its foil as "religious reaction" (dine irtica), and the forced secularization of national culture continues to be the most tangible legacy of the Kemalist era. The Kemalist regime also dealt with the dialectic between the modern and the national, but it solved the problem with ruthless efficiency. Its thinking came directly from late-Ottoman debates and was couched in terms of "civilization," which Ottoman intellectuals had long used without quotation marks. "Civilization," Atatiurk once noted during the campaign to introduce the hat as mandatory headgear for men, "is a fearful
log fojeasi:Jamoalashtirish, quloqlashtirish, surgun (Tashkent, 2003); on Kazakhstan, Niccol6 Pianciola, Famine in the Steppe: The Collectivization of Agriculture and the Kazak Herdsmen, 1928-1934, Cahiers du monde russe 45, no. 1-2 (2004): 137-92. 38 Frederick Cooper, Modernizing Colonialism and the Limits of Empire, in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore, eds., Lessons ofEmpire: Imperial Histories and American Power (New York, 2006). 39 Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham, Md., 2003). 40 The reforms described in this and the following paragraph are treated in a number of excellent surveys. Bernard Lewis, The Emergenceo f Modern Turkey( London, 1961), still retains its importance and has been reissued several times. See also Erik J. Zflrcher, Turkey: A Modern History, rev. ed. (London, 2004), and Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (New York, 1997).

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fire which consumes those who ignore it."41 The nation had to be led to civilization, whether it liked it or not. As the nation came to be defined ethnically, the regime evoked the pre-Islamic past as the true repository of authentic national values and saw the rejection of the Ottoman and Islamic heritage as a "return" to the original values of the nation. As Deniz Kandiyoti has noted, "The 'modern' was thus often justified as the more 'authentic' and discontinuity presented as continuity."42 It was Islam and the Ottoman past that had intervened to distance the Turkish nation fromits authentic place in Europe. The republic now charged itself with undoing the work of history and bringing the Turkish nation back to its rightful place. This meant distancing the nation from Islam and the Ottoman past. The usual nationalist concerns with language and orthography appeared center stage on the state's agenda. The simplification of the written language to bring it closer to everyday speech had been debated since at least the 1870s, and partially achieved by the end of the old regime. Language had also increasingly become entangled with questions of national authenticity and progress.43 With the establishment of the republic, the question came to the fore. All through the 1920s, a sustained process of change led to the purging of vocabulary and grammatical borrowings from Arabic and Persian and to the creation of new terms. In the early 1930s, under the auspices of the quasi-official Turkish Language Society, this process was taken to new extremes with the creation of pure Turkish (Oztiirkfe) derived only from Turkic sources. Turkish was "Turkicized" with the expulsion of words of alien origin and their replacement with neologisms coined from "authentic" Turkic sources. Although the excesses of Oztfirk-e receded fairly quickly, the language reform succeeded not only in bringing the written language closer to the spoken version but in transforming both, so that the Turkish spoken today bears little resemblance to what it was on the eve of the republic.44 The debate over orthography also appeared in the public with new urgency in the early republic. Critics charged that the Arabic script was inadequate for representing Turkish sounds and thus an obstacle to progress. There were many defenders of the old script, to be sure, including the great Turkish-Jewish scholar Avram Galante, who pointed to Japan to argue that orthography was not the sole reason for lack of progress or illiteracy.45 But such cosmopolitan arguments stood little chance against the passions of the spokesmen for the nation, who pushed through a new Latin alphabet in record time in 1928, a few months after the Latiniza tion of Turkic languages was accomplished in the Soviet Union.46 Education and political mobilization occupied a central spot in the Kemalist agenda. Education was the great hope for the future of the state and the nation, and some considerable effort went into establishing a network of (secular) elementary schools. All education was brought under state supervision; religious schools were abolished, religious teaching removed from the curriculum, and higher theological education was placed under state authority. But the state went beyond that, to take on the mission of "training the people" (halk terbiyesi), which meant, among other things, "the cultivation of the spirit in such a way that the thinking, feelings, and desires of individuals will fully coincide with national ideals."47 In 1931, the state took over the existing Turkish Hearths (Turk Ocaklari), which had been established during the Young Turk period as nationalist clubs, turned them into People's Houses (Halkevleri), and charged them with spreading political education and raising the cultural level of the masses. The People's Houses were self-consciously modeled on nationalist political education institutions of contemporary central Europe, but as David Hoffmann reminds us, such civilizing missions were commonplace in interwar Europe.48
41 AndrewM ango,A tatiirk( WoodstockN, .Y.,2 000), 434. 42 Deniz Kandiyoti, Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation, in PatrickW illiamsa nd LauraC hrisman,e ds., Colo niaDl iscoursea nd Post-ColoniaTl heoryA: Reader( NewY ork,1 994), 379. 43 Ag^h Slrri Levend, TiirkDilinde Geliyme ve SadelesmeEvreleri, 2d ed. (Ankara, 1960). On the press of the late-Ottoman period, see Elizabeth Brown Frierson, Unimagined Communities: State, Press, and Gender in the Hamidian Era (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1996); and Palmira Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911 (Albany, 2000). 44 Geoffrey Lewis, Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success (Oxford, 1999). 45 Avram Galanti, Arabi Harfleri Terakkimize Mani Degildir (Istanbul, 1927). For accounts of the debates in the early republic on the question of orthography, see Lewis, Turkish Language Reform; Rekin Ertem, Elifbeden Alfabeye: Tiirkiyede Harf ve Yazz Meselesi (Istanbul, 1991), 179-213, and Bilil N. Simsir, Tiurk YazzDevrimi (Ankara, 1992), 66-83. 46 The actual compilation of the Latin alphabet and its implementation took all of three months in 1928 under the personal attention of Mustafa Kemal. Typically, the law ushering in Latinization (Tilrk Harflerinin Kabulu ve Tatbiki Hakkmnda Kanun) spoke of the adoption of Turkish, not Latin letters. The modern was by definition national. 47 Quoted by Sibel Bozdogan, Modernism and Nation-Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic (Seattle, 2001), 94. 48 David L. Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917- 1941 (Ithaca, 2003).

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The activities of People's Houses included teaching peasants a cappella singing, organizing "Western" style (alafranga) balls, and introducing the masses to classical music, theater, and sport. "Raising the Turkish people to the level of contemporary civilization" was a major Kemalist goal, and "Western" forms of culturedness and sociability were crucial to the mission of the republic. One of the first reforms was the Hat Law of 1925, which abolished the fez (which Mahmud II had adopted a century earlier as a modernizing gesture) and made the wearing of the brimmed hat mandatory for men. For Kemal, this was essential to the cultural reorientation he desired. "Gentlemen," he told his party two years later, "it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilisation, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilised world."49 The same set of concerns put the question of women at the center of the Kemalist project. This too was a debate that predated the establishment of the regime, but which the Kemalist regime solved in a radical way. The state's ideal of a modern woman was one who was unveiled and clad in "Western" dress. The veil was never outlawed, but it was turned into a sign of backwardness in ways that are starkly reminiscent of the Soviet denunciation of the paranji. "The veil: this black robe of death," wrote Ali Ridvan, a medical doctor, in 1935. "This black cloth which blocks all the healthy rays of the sun and transmits only its heat is the enemy of health. Its color and its unaesthetic shape are additional offenses to the sight. When you add to all of these the face veil, which reminds one of the tortures of the Inquisition, the creature suffering inside this elected prison has to be the object less of our pity than our anger."50 The new civil code established that only civil weddings would be recognized as legal, banned polygyny, established minimum ages for marriage for both men and women, gave women the right to civil divorce, ended the Islamic freedom of unilateral divorce for men, and equalized inheritance for sons and daughters. Women's enfranchisement began with the right to vote in local elections in 1930 and was made complete with the right to vote for and be elected to the Grand National Assembly in 1934. This came along with new modes of propriety, new notions of beauty (the first Turkish beauty pageant took place in 1929),51 and new constructions of marriage (companionate) and family (nuclear).52 States and Revolutions The Kemalist revolution has its roots in the transformations of the "longest century of the empire," the tortured history of Ottoman reform from Kiudik Kaynarca on. 53 Kemalism was a radicalized version of this project, from which it differs primarily in the force and scope of the state's intervention in society. 54 The reforms of the 1920s and the 1930s were carried out against the will of the majority of the people and involved substantial amounts of violence. The agents of this change, which overturned existing patterns
49 Mustafa Kemal, A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal (Leipzig, 1929), 721-22. 50 Quoted by Bozdogan, Modernism and Nation-Building, 84. 51 A. Holly Shissler, Beauty Is Nothing to Be Ashamed Of: Beauty Contests as Tools of Womens Liberation in Early Republican Turkey,C omparativeS tudieso f SouthA sia, Africa and the MiddleEast 24, no. 1 (2004): 107-22. 52 Alan Duben and Cem Behar, Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family, and Fertility, 1880-1940 (Cambridge, Eng., 1991), esp. chap. 7. The ambiguous legacy of Kemalist reforms for women has provoked a massive literature in recent years. For a useful overview, see Jenny White, State Feminism, Modernization, and the Turkish Republican Woman, NWSA journal 15, no. 3 (2003): 145-59. See also Deniz Kandiyoti, Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case, eminist Studies 13, no. 2 (1987): 317-38; Ye?im Arat, The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey, in Sibel Bozdogan and Regat Kasaba, eds., Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (Seattle, 1997), 95- 112; and Zehra F. Arat, ed., Deconstructing Images of The Turkish Woman (London, 1998). 53 Ilber Ortayh, Imparatorlugin EEnn Uzun Yiizyilz( Istanbul, 1983). Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state elites sought to centralize and modernize in order to strengthen the state and to ward off its disintegration. The state intruded ever more forcefully into the lives of its subjects as it sought to turn them into a citizenry that would be easier to mobilize, organize, and govern. The Ottoman state faced many obstacles in pursuing its goals, although much recent scholarship has emphasized the extent to which this project succeeded, especially during the absolutist rule of Abdfilhamid II (1878-1908). See in particular, Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909 (London, 1998). In many ways, the Ottoman centralization appears similar to the Soviet project, but there are crucial differences even apart from those of scope and thoroughness. The Ottoman state came to reinvent itself as a modern colonial empire, thus producing a new imaginary for classifying its subjects and new forms of difference among them. See Ussama Makdisi, Ottoman Orientalism, American Historical Review 107, no. 3 (2002): 768-96; and Selim Deringil, They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-ColonialDebate, Comparative Studies in Society and History 45, no. 2 (2003): 311-42. 54 Official Kemalist historiography posits a complete break from the Ottoman past, but recent scholarship has pointed to continuities with increasing insistence. For a variety of approaches, see Zfircher, Turkey; Michael Meeker, A Nation ofEmpire: The Ottoman Roots of Turkish Modernity (Berkeley, 2002); and Taner Akgam, From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Geno cide (London, 2004)

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of life for millions of people, were radicalized political elites wielding the power of the state as it had not been wielded before. The focus on the state and its use by radicalized elites helps us question the essential difference usually posited between the Central Asian and Turkish cases: that the transformation of Anatolia was the work of Turks, reshaping "their own" nation in the name of nationalism, while Central Asia was reshaped by "foreign, outside" Bolsheviks motivated by an internationalist ideology. But surely this belies a hopelessly naive view of the Turkish nation, at the same time as it ignores the role the nation played in the Soviet project. To put it bluntly, the Turkish Republic created the Turkish nation. Identity discourses among the Muslim population of the late-Ottoman empire were in a state of flux. Even at the level of the intellectual elites, the various discourses of solidarity-civic, ethnic, and confessionalwere intertwined. Moreover, the population of Anatolia was heterogeneous, with no great overlap between religion and language: Muslims lived alongside Armenian and Orthodox Christians and Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Greek, and Armenian were all spoken. The peninsula had also received vast numbers of Muslim refugees of all ethnic backgrounds from parts of the empire lost to Russia or to newly independent states in the Balkans.55 Erik Jan Zurcher has shown how ethnic Turkish nationalism was virtually absent from the political rhetoric of the Turkish "war of liberation." Its political goals were defined on behalf of a community defined in terms of millet ("nation," but lacking any explicit ethnic connotation), din (faith), and vatan (homeland) -essentially a territorially circumscribed Muslim political nation.56 It was only after the Kemalists had consolidated power that they used the newfound powers of the state to remake society and identities and to turn the porous, multivalent identities of Anatolia into a homogenous Turkish nation. The political needs of the new state demanded that all particularistic claimswhether of ethnicity or religion-be denied. In Atatfirk's words, "the people of Turkey, who have established the Turkish state, are called the Turkish nation."57 The Turkish nation, however, was to be defined in ethnic terms. Especially in the 1930s, the Kemalist regime sponsored the elaboration of a new ethnic Turkish identity, complete with an official history and myths of origin.58 This was accompanied by conscious policies of ethnic homogenization, through squeezing out non-Muslims (through discrimination or outright expulsion) and forcibly assimilating non-Turkish-speaking Muslims. The resettlement of refugees and immigrants from former Ottoman lands, as well as the relocation of the republic's own population through a process of "internal colonization" (if kolonizasyonu) served to Turkify the population 59 The primary victims of this process were, of course, the Kurds, who discovered that they were really "mountain Turks," but in some ways the disappearance of Bosnians, Albanians, Lazes, and Circassians into the common Turkishness of Anatolia is even more telling. The state also had a role in defining and crystallizing national identities in the Soviet Union as well. Yuri Slezkine has gone so far as to characterize the 1920s as a period of "chronic ethnophilia" in the Soviet Union, in which all manner of groups (even many that did not fit the official definition of nationality) received state recognition and support for the development of "national" cultures.60 Catering to nations was seen in part as a prophylactic measure to prevent the use of nationalism for opposition to socialism,61 but it very quickly came to be seen as a necessary step in the historical evolution of backward peoples, a step through which the Bolsheviks were obliged to help backward na55 Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914 (Madison, 1985); Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922 (Princeton, 1995), provides a highly charged polemical account that nevertheless contains useful correctives to the received wisdom on the Ottoman retreat from Europe. 56 Erik Jan Zfircher, The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism, InternationalJournal of the Sociology of Language, no. 137 (1999): 81-92; see also Adeeb Khalid, Ottoman Islamism between the Ummet and the Nation, Archivum Ottomanicum 19 (2001): 197-211. 57 Quoted by Soner (agaptay, Crafting the Turkish Nation: Kemalism and Turkish Nationalism in the 1930s (PhD diss., Yale University, 2003), 21-22, who provides an excellent discussion of the ethnicization of Turkish identity under Kemalism. 58 Biigra Ersanhl-Behar, lktidar ve Tarih: Tiirkiyede Resmi Tarih Tezinin Olugumu (1929-1937) (Istanbul, 1992); Etienne Co peaux, Espaces et temps de la nation turque: Analyse dune historiographie nationaliste, 1931-1993 (Paris, 1997). 59 (agaptay, Crafting the Turkish Nation, chaps. 5-6; see also Howard Eissenstat, Metaphors of Race and Discourse of Nation: State Nationalism in the First Decades of the Turkish Republic, in Paul Spickard, ed., Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World (London, 2005), 239-56. 60 Yuri Slezkine, The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism, Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 414-52. 61 This point has been made, with minor differences of emphasis, by a number of authors: Slezkine, The USSR as a Communal Apartment; Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, 1993); Martin, AffirmativeA ctionE mpire;a nd Hirsch, Empireo f Nations.

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tions. As Mahmud Tumailov, a communist official, wrote in 1927, "The Turkmen now find themselves in the period of formation into a single nation [out of a profusion of tribes] and this task, namely the task of turning them into a nation, has fallen to the lot of the Communist Party."62 If the state plays such an active role in creating national identities, can ethnic difference be made to bear the primary burden of differentiating colonial empires from other kinds of states? Nor did the Soviet state's assertion of power fall neatly along ethnic lines. The Soviet civilizing mission was not underpinned by the racial or ethnic superiority of any one group, and Russians themselves had to be transformed and modernized.63 Russian peasants, after all, also had their way of life and their culture transformed, their religion assaulted, and their modes of social intercourse civilized. The transformation of Central Asia therefore cannot be read as an encounter between "Soviet" outsiders and an authentic, indigenous population, or even simply between "state" and "society." Central Asian societies in these years were riven with all sorts of cleavages, and many groups found in the new state power suitable ways of bringing about the change they sought to achieve in their society. Moreover, the state actively intervened in society and created new cadres that helped carry out its work. It is crucially important to remember that the victim of the cultural revolution of the 1920s in Central Asia was not this "people" or that "ethnic group," this social group or that, but traditional ways of life that both the Jadids and the Bolsheviks were hell-bent on destroying. The fact that such indigenous agents of change were small in number is of little consequence, compared to the enormity of the transformation they wrought. Those who seek to revolutionize society are scarcely its most typical representatives, nor are they ever the majority. Both the Soviet and the Kemalist states sought to transform culture and to reshape their citizenries in the light of ideas of history and civilization. Both had, in other words, a civilizing mission. Does that alone put them in the company of colonial empires? Colonial empires professed such missions, but they seldom applied them to populations en masse. The rule of colonial difference ensured that civilization was accessible to only a select few colonial subjects, while the majority of the population remained beyond the orbit of politics. Both the Soviet and the Kemalist states had at their disposal the baggage, common to modern European thought, of evolution, of backwardness and progress, of ethnic classification of peoples, and, indeed, of orientalism. But it matters a great deal whether that baggage is deployed to exclude people from politics or to force their entry into it, whether it is used to assert inequalities or to preach world revolution. And if the profession of a civilizing mission turns the Soviet state into a colonial empire, then surely so it does the Kemalist state. What is then left of the utility of the label "colonial"? Is all exercise of power in the modern world a case of "colonialism"? One does not have to subscribe to the entire liberatory message of nationalist movements of the twentieth century to find this proposition absurd. Anticolonial nationalisms, with their hope of claiming for the colonized what the colonizer denied them, defined the twentieth century for the vast majority of the planet's population. The Soviet Union served for many as a source of inspiration, if not a model. To turn them all into varieties of colonialism is not just to misunderstand the passions that defined the twentieth century; it is an ideological move to foreclose all possibility of change in a universalist vein, beyond the confines of "tradition." Comparability is not the same as identity, and to find parallels between the Soviet and the Kemalist cases is not to equate them. The Kemalist project was more pragmatic than the Bolshevik, and its ambitions to remake society were likewise more circumscribed. The violence and terror that accompanied it were mild compared to the Stalinist Terror. Although the Kemalist project transformed the legal and cultural parameters of society, it left the economy largely untouched. State leadership of the economy (devletfilik) was not the same as the abolition of private property in the Soviet Union, and no substantial land reform took place during Atatiirk's lifetime. Nevertheless, both projects dealt with the dialectic of the national and the universal and answered it in ways that were not dissimilar. And they were both the result of the brutal exercise of state power over citizens. Colonial rule was coercive and brutal, but surely that coerciveness and brutality was far surpassed by the modern mobilizational states of the twentieth century. The Soviet and Kemalist cases serve to remind us of the central role states have played in shaping and reshaping life and culture in the twentieth century; they also serve to put colonial empire in its place.
62 Quoted in Adrienne Edgar, Nationality Policy and National Identity: The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, 1924-1929,Journal of CentralAsian Studies 1, no. 2 (1997): 2. 63 Hirsch, Empire of Nations, chap. 6. Even when, after the mid-1930s, Russians became the elder brothers of all other fraternal Soviet peoples, and thus the recipients of saccharine praise for their role in leading all Soviet peoples to socialism and beyond, their primacy was rooted, not in any innate racial or ethnic supremacy, but rather in the fact of their having progressed further along the evolutionary path than all others in the union.

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The CollectivizatioDnr ive in Kazakhstan

MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT Source: Russian Review, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), pp. 122-142

One of the greatest challenges for the sovietologist is to attempt to understand and interpret the events of the 1930s. The economic collapse and ensuing famine that followed the collectivization drive was a surprise to the leadership and was so widespread, particularly in the national regions, that the regime has to the present day refused to make public the extent of the damage that occurred. The collectivization drive led to even greater destruction of lives and property in Kazakhstan than was typical of the Soviet countryside in general. What follows is a study of collectivization in Kazakhstan. It has been estimated that over 1.5 million Kazakhs lost their lives in the decade of the thirties,1 and that nearly 80 percent of the herd was destroyed in the period 1928-32.2 The article discusses the Soviet interest in collectivizing the Kazakhs and the four phases of collectivization in Kazakhstan: the drive for rapid collectivization, November 1929-March 1930; a period of retreat and experimentationw ith various collective forms,3 March 1930-August 1932; the reintroduction of collectivization through the use of the TOZ, or land-use cooperative, September 1932-November 1934; and the conversion from the TOZ to more advanced collective forms, December 1934-December 1938. It also examines the costs of collectivization as well as positing some hypotheses to explain the magnitude of resistance that this policy encountered in Kazakhstan. TABLE 1 Numbers of Livestock in Kazakhstan (In Thousands of Animals) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Year Cattle Sheep Total --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1886 15,293 1895 17,259 1905 18,815 1912 22,850 1913 4,954 17,204 25,698 1920 4,103 7,360 13,802 1925 5,258 11,233 19,304 1926 6,444 16,020 27,176 1927 7,592 20,780 85,159 1928 7,972 20,510 35,139 1929 7,442 21,943 36,317 1933 1,600 1,727 3,327 1934 1,591 2,261 3,852 1935 1,835 2,618 4,453 1936 2,684 4,311 6,995 1937 2,684 4,311 6,995 1938 3,095 5,288 8,383
1 Naum Jasny, The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR (Stanford, CA, 1941), p. 323. 2 See Table 1. 3 Collectivization in Kazakhstan involved the introduction of three distinct types of collective enterprises. The commune (kommuna) was a fully communalized collective farm with all land, animals and capital owned by the farm; no individual ownership was permitted. In the artel (selsko-khoziaistvennyi artel) the principle land, animals and capital were under the control of the collective farm, but the individual household was allowed to have a small private plot and a few animals for personal use. The TOZ (Tovarishchestvo dlia obshchestvennoi obrabotki zemli) was a society for the collective working of the land on which land was cultivated jointly, but individual ownership of livestock was permitted. D. J. Male, Russian Peasant Organization Before Collectivization (Cambridge, 1971), p. 219. The fourth collective enterprise, the state farm (sovkhoz), was of limited importance in the collectivization drive in Kazakhstan and in spring 1930 there were only sixtytwo sovkhozy in the whole of the republic, and most were in Russian populated regions. See Ocherki istorii kommunisticheskoi partii Kazakhskoi SSR (Alma Ata, 1963), p. 300.

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1941 3,356 8,132 11,488 1961 5,643 28,517 34,160 1971 7,285 32,596 39,881 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The Soviet authorities approached collectivization optimistically. The policy was defended as a means to create a surplus of grain which could be sold abroad to finance the rapid industrializationm andatedb y the (first)F ive Year Plan. Furthermorec, ollectivizationw as seen as a way to break the power base of the peas antry, a group which the regime believed was seriously undermining the government program. In reality the collectivization drive fell far short of these goals. A grain surplus was not created, and in fact, agriculture was a net importer of material resources during the years of the first Five Year Plan (1928-32).4 Nor was the will of the peasantry easily broken, and the famine which resuited from the peasant resistance was probably the worst economic disaster experienced by Russia in modem history.5 The collectivization drive took on added importance in Kazakhstan, as it was to be accompanied by a campaign to vastly increase the acreage under cultivation.I n the northernp arts of Kazakhstant he output of cereal crops was to be increased, and southern Kazakhstan was to increase yields of both grain and cotton. Kazakhstan had long been viewed as a source of new farms. In the period 1896-1916 it received over one million settler families from European Russia,6 but the nomadic economy of the Kazakhs was seen as a hindrance to the expansion of grain-growinga, s the animals grazed on hundredso f thousands of acres of potential farmland. The colonial settlement policy caused great hardships for the Kazakhs as it severely restricted the access to pasturage and settled Russian and Ukrainian homesteaders on some of the choicest land. It did not, however, cause the Kazakhs to reduce their dependence on livestock breeding. When the Bolsheviks came to power they made the settlement of the Kazakh nomads an avowed goal, although they did little in fact to make it a reality. The late 1920s saw several campaigns to encourage the settlement of the nomads and the increased cultivation of grain. The most prominent of these, the land redistribution effort of 1927-28, and the livestock confiscation drive of 1928 had very limited effect. Under 200,000 hectares of land were nationalized, and less than 4 percent of all livestock changed hands.7On the eve of collectivization the Kazakhs lived much as they had under the tsar. According to 1926 census data over 97 percent were employed in the rural sector; 38.5 percent were listed as livestock breeders, another 33.2 percent combined agricultureand livestock breeding, and 24.5 percent engaged solely in agriculture.8The 1926 census reports that less than 10 percent of the Kazakh population migrated year-round, although two-thirds of the population was classified as semi-nomads because they migrated with their herds in summer.9 It was hoped that collectivization would reverse the policy failures of the 1920s and would lead to the widespread cultivation of grain while preserving or even expanding the annual output of the livestock breeding sector through the introduction of scientific techniques in both agriculture and animal husbandry. This policy, directed by Moscow, was to be accomplished through the forcible settlement and relocation of the Kazakh population. The nationalization drives of the late 1920s revealed the open hostility of the traditional clanic leadership and demonstratedt heir willingnesst o resist change by force. The campaign for the "sovietizationo f the Kazakha ul" 1925-28 was largely unsuccessful as the local authorities gained control of the rural soviets and simply refused to introduce and enforce Moscow's policies. Furthermore, although the Kazakh party leaders were critical of local practice, they were reluctant to take harsh measures against their conationals. It was also hoped that collectivization would improve the undesirable political climate in Kazakhstan. Moscow had long viewed the Kazakh leadership with suspicion and had begun dismissing and arresting Kazakh nationalists (including Party members) in the mid-1920s. The regime felt that neither a loyal Kazakh
4 See James R. Millar, Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan, Slavic Review 33, no. 4 (December 1974): 750-66, for a detailed discussion and bibliographic survey of materials relating to this question. 5 This is vividly shown in the archival materials reproduced in Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, MA, 1958). 6 George Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 1896-1916 (Bloomington, IN, 1969). 7 Martha B. Olcott, Socio-economic Change and Political Development in Soviet Central Asia, (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1978), pp. 251-57. 8 G. Chulanov, Ocherki istorii narodnogo khoziaistva kazakhskoi SSSR (Alma-Ata, 1962), 2:228. 9 A. B. Tursunbaev, Kollektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva Kazakhstana 1926-1941 gg. (Alma Ata, 1967), 2:222.

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elite nor a supportive Kazakh mass base could be created while the traditional authority structure continued to exist. The power of the traditional leadership (aul10 and clan leaders, as well as the Muslim clergy) was understood as the inevitable product of the existing traditional semi-nomadic livestock breeding economy. The center believed that collectivization would destroy the power base of the traditional leadership, the aul, and the ethnically heterogeneous collective farms would serve as the basis for a new Kazakh society. Mass education and propaganda would introduce the new socialist morality and undermine Islam, as well as provide technological education. Ultimately, loyal Kazakh Party members and a new Kazakh elite would emerge. The events of the first period are the most difficult to document. On 7 November 1929, in an article titled "The Year of the Great Turn," Stalin noted the influx of peasants into collectives and called for a "great breakthroughin the countryside,"w hich meant that the process of collectivizationw as to be speeded up. This demand was reaffirmedin the resolution of the November 1929 plenum of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which called for the formation of a committee on collectivization to consider how this goal could be achieved.11 Central Committee plenums of the various member parties were scheduledt o reaffirmt his program.O ne such meeting was held in Alma-Ata 11-16 December 1929; there the goals of the November Plenum were reaffirmeda, nd an importantp roviso was added that the settlement of the Kazakh nomads was to be a prerequisite for the socialist reconstructiono f the economy.12A detailed plan for the settlement of the nomads was included as part of the revised (first) Five Year Plan and a special Committee on Settlement was created as part of the Council of People's Commissars of the Kazakh Autonomous SSR (KASSR).13 The plenum noted, too, that rapid collectivization had already begun in the countryside and was being carried out without adequate provision for the newly collectivized households.14 During the month of November, 500 new collective farms were created in the nomadic and semi-nomadic regions of Kazakhstan.15S uch was the trend throughout the USSR, and fragmentary archival evidence supports the assumptiont hat during this period kolkhoztsentrw as sending out revised targets of collectivization.16 On 5 January 1930 the formal call for rapid collectivization was issued. The "Resolution on the Role of Collectivization and State Assistance to Kolkhoz Construction"d ivided the Soviet Union into three regions, the first to be completely collectivized by spring 1931, the second by spring 1932, and the third by the end of 1933. Early completion of the drive was encouraged in all areas. The first region was composed of the most important grain producing areas, including the lower and middle Volga, and the North Caucasus. The grain producing regions of Kazakhstan were included in the second group, which consisted of the remaining grain producing areas. The rest of Kazakhstan was included in the third group, comprisedo f the "backward"n ational regions of the East, North and Siberia (including the four Central Asian republics).17 Kazakhstan'ps lacementi n both the second and third groupss uggests the ambivalent (and often confused) way in which the republic was viewed. Kazakhstana, s a grain and cattle producinga rea, was the first link of the food supply chain for the cities of Siberia, and to a lesser extent for those of European Russia as well; as such it was integrated into the everyday economy of the USSR. In Northern Kazakhstan, Kazakhs and Russians had lived side by side for fifty years, and by this time nearly one-quarter of the Kazakhs were farmers. Kazakhstan was also a 'backward" national region, for the vast majority of the Kazakh people still followed traditional economic pursuits, within the framework of a "primitive"cu lture.T hus, Kazakhstana lso seemed part of the remote and inaccessible world of Central Asia. The collectivization drive was intended to be a spontaneous and voluntary movement of poor and middle peasants into collective farms. Where spontaneity failed, compulsion served. Recently reproduced archival materials suggest that the excessive zeal demonstrated in the overfulfillmento f collectivizationq uotas followed from the fear of local officials that they too would be guilty of right deviation if their actions were
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 An aul is the migratory and basic residential unit of the Kazaklh people. Robert McNeal, ed., Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU, vol. 3, The Stalin Years 1929-1953 (Toronto, 1974), p. 11. V. Iusupov, Iz istorii perekhoda kochevogo kazakhskogo naseleniia k osedlosti, Voprosy istorii, 1960, no. 3, p. 36. A. B. Tursunbaev, Pobeda kolkhoznogo stroia v Kazakhstane (Alma Ata, 1957), p. 133. Tursunbaev, Kollektivizatsiia Kazakhstana, 1:269. Tursunbaev, Pobeda kolkhoznogo stroia, p. 132. Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (Baltimore, 1972), p. 164. Chulanov, 2:239.

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perceived as insufficient.18 Brigadeso f "25,000ersw" ere organized in the cities of European Russia and the Ukraine and were sent into the rurala reas to "assist"in the collectivizationd rive. Althought echnically the "25,000ers"w ere supposed to be skilled workers,s uch as joiners, plumbers, welders, carpenters, and masons, voluntarily lending their skills to help build the new collective farms, in reality the vast majority of the men who made up these brigades were unemployed workers and displaced soldiers enlisted to serve in shock brigades designed to force the peasantso nto the collective farms.19 I n early spring 1930 some 1,200 such men, most from the Moscow oblast, arrived in Kazakhstan to assist in the drive. Less than 400 of these were sent to the livestock breeding regions and few of those dispatched had the background to handlethe situation they found.20 P rior to the arrival of the "25,000ers"th e collectivization drive had been supervised by urban communists mobilized in January 1930.21 The various agents of the Soviet government met with opposition when they tried to nationalize Kazakh property and force the Kazakhs to settle on the new collective farms. The story of the Kazakh resistance which followed will probablyn ever be reconstructedT. o date there has been only one Soviet study which provides direct evidence of Kazakh resistance. The archival materials reproduced there support the conclusion that resistance was widespread and often quite well organized. 22 Party activists who entered Kazakh auls to collectivize or arrest "kulaks" met with armed resistance and many party workers died. Roving bands of Kazakhs attacked newly created kolkhozy, rustling or killing the kolkhoz livestock. In some regions the aul leaders grouped together to plan concerted action to oppose the Soviets. 23 Patrols were sent out to warn the Kazakhs not to migrate to newly formed collective farms, since many of the settlements lacked water and arable land. One alternative considered by the Kazakhs was the migration of the entire Kazakh nation to the deserts of Turkmenistan, where collectivization was reportedly proceeding more gradually. 24 Although this plan was never affected, hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs fled the republic during the years of the collectivization drive. When the collectivization decree was first announced, a large number of Kazakhs gathered their animals and possessions and migrated to Chinese Turkestan. The vast majority of those who left Kazakhstan stayed within the borders of the Soviet Union, migrating to Uzbekistan, Karakalpakia and Turkmenistan. This group of internal migrants were termed otkochevniki,25 because they were nomads who as a result of collectivization had either lost or destroyed their livestock and were now wandering in search of food and employment. One source estimates that 15-20 percent of the Kazakh population left the republic during 1930-31.26 For the majority of these Kazakhs, this wandering ended in starvation and death. Nearly 300,000 Kazakhs remained in Uzbekistan 27 and a group of about 44,000 families stayed in Turkmenistan, where many joined the Basmachi resistance.28 Still others returned to Kazakhstan to live in shanty towns as they waited for resettlement. Throughout the Soviet Union the collectivization drive failed to meet the expectations of the regime. In an attempt to avert total economic collapse on 2 March 1930, Stalin published a letter in Pravda, "Dizzy with Success," which urged a slower pace of collectivization and attacked forced collectivization as contrary to Leninist principle.29 This was the beginning of a new phase in the policy of collectivization. This letter was followed on 15 March 1930 by the Central Committee resolution "On Distortions of the Party Line with Reference to the Collectivization Movement." Commitment to collectivization was reaffirmed, but it was stressed that the 5 January guidelines as to target dates and percentage of population to be collectivized by region
18 Nove, p. 165. 19 See Patricia Kolb, The Roots of Revolution from Above (MA thesis, University of Chicago, 1973). 20 Amantaev, Sotsializm i korennoe preobrazovanie sotsialnoi prirody Kazakhskogo krestianstva (Alma Ata, 1969), p. 325. 21 Tursunbaev, Pobeda kolkhoznogo stroia, p. 122. 22 Ibid., pp. 140-41 23 Ibid., pp. 142-43. The ones cited by Tursunbaev were in Aktubinsk okrug. 24 Ibid., p. 145. 25 From the term kochevnik, Russian for nomad. 26 Chulanov, 2:241. 27 Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie, Otdel perepisi. Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 17 dek 1926 goda, Kratkie svodki (Moscow, 1927), pp. xxvii, 82-84, and Morris Ulman, The 1939 USSR Census of Population (Washington, 1959). 28 lu. A. Poliakov and A. I. Chugunov, Konets Basmachestva (Moscow, 1976), p. 154. 29 McNeal, p. 48.

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were to be observed. The overfulfillmenotf these goals was labeleda dangerousd istortion of the Partyl ine,a ndt he downwardre adjustmenotf someo f the targets was considered. It is difficultto determineh ow mucho f Kazakhstawn as collectivized by the time of the policyr eversal.30 Ac cordingto archivasl ources,o n 10 March1 930,5 6.6p ercento f the populationo f the KASSRw as collec tivized.31 In the Kazakhr egionst he pace of collectivizatiown as uneven, since it dependedu pon the initiativeo f the local officials.32 In somep artso f PetropavlovskS,y r Daryaa nd Uralskp rovincesc, ollectivizationr eached7 0 percent,w hile at the same time in the nomadic areas it was often 20 percent or less.33 During the same period nearly 100 percento f the Russianp opulation,w hich includeds uch target groupsa s kulakse xiledt o Kazakhstadnu ringt he 1920sw, as completely collectivized.34 The pace of collectivizationfa r exceededt he goals and the collectivizedp opulationw as much greatert han could be accommodatebdy the limitedr esourcetsh att he Kazakhr egimeh ad at its disposalT. he situationw as particularlayc utei n the livestockb reeding regionsf, or in these areast herew erev irtuallyn o preexistingc ollective farms,w hich( in theory)w ere to have been enlargeda, nd servea s the basis of the new collectivizeds ettlements.35 Be causei t took time for wordt o reachl ocalo fficialtsh e rapidp ace of collectivizatiocno ntinued in manya reaso f Kazakhstaunn till ateA prilo re arlyM ay.36 All accountsa greet hatt he situationo n the new collectivef armsw as chaoticL. ittlew asd onet o provideK azakhws ithh omes,a nimals helter, or the meanst o cultivatet he land.A n even morec riticalp roblemw as the regime'sfa iluret o allocatea rablel andt o the new kolkhozyM. any of the settlementws erel ocatedi n deserto r semi-deserat reas,f ar from adequatew aters upplies,a ndt hus the Kazakhsw ere unablet o maintain even existing livestock.37 Some collective farms had no seed, livestock or capital. There was an acute shortage of construction materials, particularly of glass, iron and nails, which were in short supply throughout the Soviet Union. Only 15 percent of the residences and 32 percent of the livestock barns called for in the state plan for 1930 were completed.38 Most of the money allocated in 1930 for the settlement of Kazakhs was never spent. The physical organization of the first Kazakh collective farms was a further source of difficulties. An average kolkhoz consisted of between ten and twenty auls located several kilometers apart, each with ten to fifteen families; a collective farm might encompass a territory of 200 square kilometers.39 Consequently it was difficult for even the most well-intentioned kolkhoz chairman to have an accurate idea of the condition and disposition of the people, livestock and property under his control.40 Furthermore, most Kazakh kolkhoz chairmen were not wellintentioned, at least as defined by the criteria of the regime. They were illiterate or semi-literate and had little or no awareness of the philosophy of collectivization, and there were very few people to assist them in their tasks. Some regions of Kazakhstan averaged one bookkeeper for every twelve collective farms, and one technical specialist for every fifty.41 In June 1930 there were only 416 agronomists and technical specialists in all of Kazakhstan; four of these were Kazakh.42 One result of the shortage of trained personnel was that most collective farms lacked production plans and so functioned at a subsistence level. During the first months of collectivization there was a great deal of confusion about how collectivization of property should proceed. In some collective farms the animals were
30 A 20 February 1931 resolution on collectivization in backward national regions was only applied in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tadzhikstan. 31 On the same date the following percentage of households as collectivized: (Group I)-Middle Volga (57.2 percent), Lower Volga (68.6 percent) and Central Chernozem Oblast (81.5 percent); (Group III)-Uzbek S.S.R. (45.5 percent), Kirghiz A.S.S.R. (12.8 percent), Turkmen S.S.R. (27.8 percent), Tadzhik S.S.R. (17.6 percent). Bogdenko, Kolkhoznoe stroitelstvo vesnoi i letom 1930 g., Istoricheskie zapiski 67 (1965): 31. 32 In Kazakhstan, unlike the rest of Central Asia, no specific targets were devised for each economic sub-region. 33 A. B. Tursunbaev, Torzhestvok olkhoznogo stroia v Kazakhstane,i n Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii selskogo khoziaistva v soiuznykh respublikakh (Moscow, 1963), p. 281. 34 Piatiletnii plan narodno-khoziaistvennogo i sotsiarno-kurturnogo stroitelstva Kazakskoe ASSR (1928/9-1932/3) (Alma Ata, 1931), p. 18. 35 Tursunbaev, Pobeda kolkhoznogo stroia, p. 89. 36 Later than in either the central grain producing regions or in Central Asia. Bogdenko, p. 31. 37 I. Kosakov, Itogi planovogo zasedaniia i prakticheskie zadachi, Revoliutsiia i natsionalnosti, 1933, no. 5-6, p. 72. 38 Ibid., p. 68. The original plan only called for the construction of 1915 residences and seventy barns. 39 Tursunbaev, Pobeda kolkhoznogo stroia, p. 149. 40 Ibid., p. 152. 41 Ibid., p. 167. 42 A. Bogdanov, Kolkhoznoe stroitelstvo v natsionalnykh raionakh, Revoliutsiia i natsionalnosti, 1930, no. 3, p. 40.

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confiscated and then later returned, while in others it was unclear whether the kolkhoz or private individuals owned the animals, since all animals grazed in a common herd.43 Often confiscation was demanded; then, after the Kazakhs had slaughtered their animals, the regime apologized, calling the confiscation a mistake.44 The months following the "Dizzy with Success" proclamation were marked by confusion as to which type of collective was suitable for each economic region. The first specific recommendations about how collectivization should proceed were not made until the Sixteenth Party Congress, 26 June-13 July 1930. At that time it was decided that the type of collective farm to be introduced in an area was to reflect the economic needs of that region. The TOZ was chosen as suitable for the national regions of the East.45 The Resolution" OnK olkhozC onstructiona nd Measuresf or Strengthening It" made at the Seventh AllKazakh Party Conference, held immediately following the Sixteenth Party Congress, provided direction for the collectivization drive in the KASSR. It declared that rapid collectivization could best be achieved through four types of collectives: the agriculturala rtel in grainp roducingr egions;t he incompletea rtel in regions of commercial crop cultivation; the TOZ in semi-nomadic areas; and cooperative market and supply networks in nomadic areas.46A ll agricultural artels already in existence in nomadic areas were to be reconstructed as TOZ. By the end of 1930, 69 percent of all collective farms in Kazakhstan were TOZ.47 In keeping with the spirit of the resolution of the Sixteenth Party Congress, the Kazakh leadership decided to return to private control collectivized implements and animals in the nomadic and semi-nomadic regions. However, when no guidelines from Moscow were forthcoming, the Kazakh leadership retreated from their June 1930 position and called for the recollectivization of all farm implementsi n November1 930,48a nd the recollectivizationo f livestocki n June1 931.49F ollowingt he promulgationo f the latterr esolution, widespread slaughter of animals began again. During this same period in Kazakhstan, as everywhere else in the USSR the regional and local officials had begun to be made scapegoats for the failure of Stalin's policy of collectivization. Kazakh Party archives record that, because of "errorsa nd excesses,"b y mid-1930,i n two provinces alone, five raikom bureaus were dissolved, 100 officials arresteda nd 300 others rebuked for their actions.50T he high turnover of local officials continued throughout this period, and was soon followed by a purge of senior officials. F. I. Goloshchekin, Party secretary for Kazakhstan, and his supporters were all arrested and removed from office by September 1932.51 This led to a new wave of dismissals within the ranks of the Party and state bureaucracies in Kazakhstan. The total number of people arrested is impossible to determine. The constant replacement of personnel and the related fear of arrest stifled any initiative on the part of local leadership to work out solutions for the specific problems which beset their localities. Thus, although the regime had called for the restructuring of collective farms and not their dismemberment, the second period of collectivization was nevertheless characterized by dissolution of collectives, for it was the simpler and less risky course. The collectivization drive was halted throughout Kazakhstan and most collective farms were simply disbanded, leaving the kolkhozniki to fend for themselves as best they could. Break-up of collective farms was most pronounced in livestock breeding regions, where the percentage of the population that was collectivized dropped from 70-75 percent in January-February 1930 to 10-15 percent in the spring of that same year.52 At the Seventeenth Party Conference in February 1932, much of the blame for the problems of collectivization in Kazakhstan was placed on the failure of the regime to settle the nomads and semi-nomads prior to collectivization. Settlement, always implicit in collectivization, now became the focus of the collectivization
43 Gumen, Kollektivizatsiia v Baian-Aulskom raione, Bolshevik Kazakstana, 1931, no. 2-3, p. 41. 44 Tursunbaev, Kollektivizatsiia Kazakhstana, 1:287. 45 Jasny, p. 321. 46 Tursunbaev, Kollektivizatsiia Kazakhstana, 1:306 47 pF . Kolodin, TOZy v Kazakhstane v gody pervoi i vtoroi piatiletok, Trudy instituta istorii, arkheologii i etnografii AN KazSSR, 2 (1956): 194 48 . F. I. Kolodin, K voprosu o razvitii TOZov v kazakhskom aule v 1930-1934 gg., Izvestiia AN KazSSR, 1955, no. 2, p. 64. 49 . Ibid., p. 70. 50 N. Timofiev and S. Brainin, Kazakhskaia kraevaia organizatsiia KP(b) v borbe za kollektivitzatsiiu selskogo khoziaistva (1930-1939 gg.), Bolshevik Kazakstana, 1939, no. 1, p. 87. 51 Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (London, 1953), p. 266. 52 Tursunbaev, Pobeda kolkhoznogo stroia, p. 179.

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drive. At this time it was resolved that without the settlement of the Kazakhs it was impossible to "eradicate the economic and cultural anachronisms of the nationalities which are a heritage from the Tsarist colonialcapitalist regime."53 It was argued that only the settlement of the nomads could destroy the power that clan authorities exercised even within the collective farms, and ensure sufficient and scientific livestock breeding. To quote Goloshchekin, the Party Secretary in Kazakhstan: Settlement is collectivization. Settlement is the liquidation of the bai semi-feudals. Settlement is the destruction of tribal attitudes. Settlement is actively raising the economic and cultural level of the aul working mass and liberating them from the bai cabal. Settlement is simultaneously the question of socialist construction and the approach of socialism, of the socialistr econstructiono f the Kazakhm ass without divisions by nationality, under the leadership of the vanguard of the proletariat and the communist party.54 Following the failure of the 1930 collectivization drive many Kazakh Party leaders had argued that the traditional livestock breeding economy was an intrinsic part of Kazakh culture, and that the transformation of the Kazakh economy, most specifically the confiscation of the Kazakh herd, should proceed slowly. The number of people targeted for settlement during the period 1930-35 had been reduced in late 1930. Now Moscow declared nomadic or semi-nomadic economies were unacceptable and the settlement targets were increased even above their original levels.55These targets included the resettlement of large numbers of Kazakhs who voluntarily ceased migration as their animals died off, and lived on small unplanned collective farms which were dominated by clan authorities.56T he TsIK 57K azASSRr esolved that while it was wrong to collectivize the Kazakh nomads forcibly, it was perfectly proper to settle them forcibly. They mandated increased preparation for settlement, including irrigation, provision of agricultural implements and construction, as well as the introduction of technicians in remote rural areas. The drive to settle the Kazakh nomads remained in large part restricted to paper as the regime was unable to provide the necessary material or technological assistance to fulfill the task. Only 30 percent of the more than half a million people settled during the period 1930-32 could be classified as completely settled, i.e., with land to sow and buildings for animals and tools. The new collective farms were so economically nonviable that nearly 25 percent of all people settled in the period 1930-32 had resumed migration by December 1932 and were thus classified as otkochevniki, people without land or livestock.58 Conditions in the Kazakh kolkhozy did not improve during the period 1930-32. There were severe shortages of livestock, seed, agricultural implements and constructionm aterials.59In some regions people were shifted from kolkhoz to kolkhoz, in the often vain search for grain or animals to keep them alive.60 In other regions local officials simply admitted defeat and dissolved kolkhozy, dividing the meager resources among the formerk olkhoznikiL. ivestockh oldingsc ontinuedt o decline. By February1 932a pproximately8 7 percento f all collective farmh ouseholds and 51.5 percent of all non-collectivizedh ouseholdsi n Kazakhstan were without live stock.61 Whereas in 1926 nearly 80 percent of the Kazakh population had earned their living in some aspect of livestock breeding, by summer 1930 these same pursuits employed only 27.4 percent of the population.62 The agricultural sector was not expanding rapidly enough to absorb the displaced livestock breeders. In the period 1928-32 the number of hectares under cultivation increased by only 17 percent,63 and the average yield per hectare decreased as the Kazakhs lacked the technical skills to make successful farmers, and the regime failed to provide them with adequate seed, implements, or technical personnel to assist them.64
53 U. D. Kulembetov, Perekhod na osedlost v Kazakstane, Revoliutsiia i natsionalnosti, 1932, no. 5, p. 59. 54 T. A. Zveriakov, Ot kochevia k sotsializmu (Alma Ata, 1934), p. 53. 132 55 Tursunbaev,K ollektivizatsiiaK azakhstana,1 :501. 56 Kulembetov, p. 61. 57 Central Executive Committee. 58 Tursunbaev,K ollektivizatsiiaK azakhstana,1 :562. 59 Ibid., 1:497. 60 F I.. Goloshchekin, Zavershimp iatiletku v chetyre goda, Borshevik Kazakstana, 1932, no. 1, p. 21. 61 Kazakhstan k IX Sezdu sovetov (1931-1934) (Alma Ata, 1935), pp. 85-86. 62 A. B. Tursunbaev, Nekotorye voprosy istorii, kollektivizatsii selskogo khoziaistva v Kazakhstane, in Materialy obedinennoi nauchnoi sessii, posviashchennoi istorii Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana (epokha sotsializma) (Alma Ata, 1948), p. 323. 63 Chulanov, 2:242. 64 On 1 April 1932, among the newly settled Kazakhs there were only 1 engineer, 38 technicians, 14 work superintendents and 148

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By the end of 1932 the Kazakh economy was practically at a standstill. General modifications in the policy of collectivization introduced in 1930 and 1931 had failed to improve the situation. The number of otkochevniki was constantly increasing and a majority of Kazakhs faced starvation. In an attempt to prevent this and restore economic order on 17 September 1932 the TsIK SSSR issued the resolution "On the Correct Line for the Settlement of the Kazakh Nomads"; this began the third phase of the collectivization drive in Kazakhstan. This resolution, which also applied to the livestock breeding nomads' of Kirghizia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, stated that until a marked degree of economic recovery occurred the TOZ was to be the sole collective form in the livestock breeding regions. A limited restoration of private property (i.e., livestock) was encouraged,65 and 2 million pounds of grain, less than a half pound per person, were to be shipped to Kazakhstan as relief aid.66 On 19 October 1932, a Kazkraikom67 resolution provided specific instructions for the implementation of the September 17 resolution. It designated thirty-nine nomadic and semi-nomadic regions in which the TOZ was considered the most suitable form of collective. In these areas an individual household could own 100 sheep, 8 to 10 cattle, 3 to 5 camels, and 8 to 10 horses. In agricultural regions the agricultural artel was to remain the appropriate form of collective and all animals were to be owned by the artel, but the kolkhozniki could maintain small herds of animals for personal use.68 Economic conditions in Kazakhstan did not improve appreciably during 1933-34, but a sense of order was gradually restored. Increased material assistance was slow in coming, and because of the widespread destruction of livestock most Kazakhs could not expect to acquire the number of animals that they were permitted to own. It was difficult to settle the otkochevniki because there were not enough preexisting collective farms to absorb them, and the shortage of construction materials, seed and agricultural implements prevented the large scale construction of new, properly equipped settlements.69 Many of the new farms were located on marginal land where grain growing was difficult, so livestock were often driven year-round. The number of animals continued to decline in 1933, while the number of otkochevniki continued to increase, reaching by year's end 22 percent of the Kazakh population.70 One major problem for the recovery of livestock breeding was that in this area the private sector was expanding at a much more rapid rate than was the public sector. By 1934 only slightly more than half the livestock was publicly owned.71 Due in large part to the incentives of private ownership, the rate of decline in the number of livestock slowed in 1934 and by 1935 it was halted.72 The weak control exercised over livestock breeding was seen by the regime as antithetical to the long range goal of recollectivization of the herd. The disproportionate burden of taxation placed on the owners of livestock had been insufficient to reduce the size of their herds, and so in December 1934 the number of privately held livestock was ordered to be reduced, and the fourth phase of the collectivization drive began. The regime believed that the desired economic recovery was underway and so had become increasingly concerned with strengthening the collective sector. This was to occur in two stages-the transfer of livestock to the collective sector, and then the reconstruction of the TOZ as agricultural artels. Material incentives were provided to promote the economic viability of the collective farms. The TOZ were freed from required milk and grain deliveries in 1935 and 1936 and required meat deliveries for 1.935 were halved. All collectivized households were exempt from the 1935 agricultural tax. The main restrictions on livestock were levied against the kolkhozniki in the sedentary regions. Individuals in regions contiguous to nomadic regions were permitted forty sheep and goats, five cattle, and one horse. All others were permitted twenty-five sheep and goats, three cows, and one horse.73 In December 1935, with the establishment of the Model Artel Charter, the amount of livestock that could be privately owned by a kolkhoznik in nomadic and semi-nomadicr egions was furtherr educed to
foremen. Kosakov, p. 70. 65 Amantaev, p. 381. As a result of this resolution, 50,000 horses, 15,400 camels, 123,600 cattle, and 211,400 sheep and goats were returned to private ownership. 66 Kuramysov, Na putiakh sotsialisticheskogo pereustroistva kazakhskogo aula (Moscow and Alma Ata, 1936), pp. 3-4. 67 The Kazakh regional committee of the CPSU. 68 A. Savin, Bolshevistskaia programma sotsialisticheskoi pereustroiki kazakhskogo aula, Bolshevik Kazakstana, 1932, no. 12, p. 13. 69 Kazakhstan k IX Sezdu, p. 34. 70 139,600 households. Amantaev, p. 379. 71 Selskoe khoziaistvo SSSR ezhogodnik 1935 (Moscow, 1936), p. 532. 72 Tursunbaev, Kollektivizatsiia Kazakhstana, 2:180. 73 Ibid., 1:306.

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forty sheep and goats, two large cattle, and a cow. The amount of privately held livestock in sedentary regions was to be set by the authorities, using the principle that a kolkhoznik was only entitled to enough livestock to meet his personal needs.74 However, these restrictions were usually overlooked in Kazakhstan during the period of economic recovery,75 and many experts feel that the recovery of the herd was due in large part to the success of private livestock breeding. At the end of 1938 approximately one-third of all livestock in the republic was still privately held.76 However, as early as 1935 the regime felt that the ultimate supremacy of the collective sector had been assured and following the announcement of the Model Artel Charter the Kazakh government called for the conversion of all TOZ to agricultural artels. This peaceful conversion began in 1936 and was completed by the end of 1938, by which time the collectivization drive in Kazakhstan could be considered completed. The collectivization drive had a heavy cost for the Kazakh population. Hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs died of starvation during this period and untold numbers were killed or arrested while resisting collectivization. No official figure for the total loss of life attributable to collectivization has ever been made public. Using the census figures for 1926 and 1939, Jasny estimates that 1.5 million Kazakhs died in this period.77 Newly published archival materials support the conclusion that the loss of Kazakh population was even greater than this. It is reported that the number of Kazakh households declined from 1,233,000 in 1929 to 565,000 households in 1936, and some Kazakhs continued to die of starvation through 1938.78 The losses in Kazakhstanw ere proportionatelyg reater than in any other area of the Soviet Union. The collectivization drive resulted in widespread resistance in other parts of Central Asia, particularly in Tadzhikstana nd Turkmenistan,79 bu t in these areas the Soviets took only those measures necessary to end the fighting. They did not take punitive measures against the population, and even backed down on many of the economic and political goals of collectivization. They organized collective farms but were willing to leave the political and economic structure of the semi-nomads of Turkmenistan and Tadzhikstan largely intact. In Kazakhstanh, owever, the Soviets were committedt o a policy of collectivization designed to give them total control of the steppe and were determined to prevent either control by the traditional Kazakh authorities or the implicit self-regulation of the traditional livestock breeding economy. To this end they were willing to sustain great losses of human life and livestock. The collectivization drive was far more disruptive of the Kazakh economy than had been anticipated. Agriculture did not make immediate inroads among the Kazakh population, in large part because the regime failed to supply them with the resources, i.e., arable land, seed, implements and technological assistance necessary to aid in the transition, and at the end of the Second Five Year Plan the Kazakhs were still net importers of grain. Furthermore, livestock breeding also went into a period of decline which lasted for over two decades. As Table 2 shows, the Kazakh herd was reduced by nearly 80 percent in the ten years which followed the beginning of the collectivization drive, a loss largely caused by the slaughter of animals, first to prevent their force ful nationalizationan80 d later to sparet hem starvation.A rchivals ources record widespread slaughter of animals from March 1930 until mid- 1932. 81I n many areasu p to 50 percent of the herd was destroyedd uring the first few weeks of the collectivization drive. One Soviet source records a loss of 2.3 million beef cattle and 10 million sheep during 1930 alone.82 Another concludes that 35 percent of the Kazakh herd died during 1929-1930. 83T he total number of
74 Jasny, p. 345. 75 U. Isaev, 15 let Kazakhstana i nashi zadachi, Narodnoe khoziaistvo Kazakstana, 1935, no. 7-8, p. 26. 76 Tursunbaev, Kollektivizatsiia Kazakhstana, 2:440. 77 Jasny, p. 323. 78 S. B. Nurmukhamedov et al., Ocherki istorii sotsialisticheskogo stroitelstva v Kazakhstane 1933-1940 gg. (Alma Ata, 1966), p. 130. Amantaev, p. 379. 79 Resistance to collectivization was greatest in those parts of Central Asia (former Basmachi strongholds) in which the regime had been fearful of introducing land and water reforms. See Martha B. Olcott, The Basmachi or Freemans Movement in Turkestan-19181924, Soviet Studies, July 1981. 80 Kolodin, K voprosu razvitiia TOZov, p. 66. 81 Kolodin, TOZyv Kazakhstane,p . 177. 82 Tursunbaev, Kolkhoznogos troiav Kazakhstane,p . 279. 83 Tursunbaev, Kollektivizatsiia Kazakhstana, 1:353.

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livestock continued to decrease throughout 1933 and the number of cattle throughout 1934. The loss of animalsw as proportionatelyf ar greateri n Kazakhstant han in the USSR as a whole 84 (or than the losses incurred by the Kirghiz and Turkmen nomads). 85 TABLE 2 The Dynamics of Collectivization -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Percent of Rural Population Date Collectivized --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 October 1929 7.4 1 February 1930 35.3 1 March 1930 42.1 1 April 1930 52.1 1 May 1930 37.5 1 July 1930 31.6 1 August 1930 29.1 1 November 1930 33.2 1 January 1931 36.7 1 September 1931 60.8 1 November 1931 62.7 1 January 1932 62.3 1 June 1932 73.1 1 June 1933 95.0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Conditions in the steppe improved slowly, more slowly among the Kazakhs than among the Russians. In mid-1936 it was announced that there was finally enough grain to feed the population and livestock of the Republic. 86 B y the end of 1936 almost9 0 percent of all collectivized households had some animals, 87 b ut average holdings were small and the distributioni nequitable,s o that some regions particularlyi n central Kazakhstan, remained without livestock. In 1935 it was declared that Kazakh stan was still 18 to 20 million animals below an acceptable minimall evel for the territory, 88 an d in 1940a t the ThirdC ongresso f the CommunistP arty of Kazakhstani t was declared that "we still have a large number of livestockless and cowless collective farmers." 89 T he herd was growing, but as Table 1 shows, it did not return to precollectivization levels until the 1960s The collectivization drive brought an end to pastoral nomadism in the steppe, but oftentimes without an adequate substitute. During the drive, land and property in the nomadic areas were nationalized in a way which required the end of migration, and by late 1936 only about 150,000 nomadic households remained, mostly located in the deserts of central Kazakhstan.90 A total of nearly 400,000h ouseholdsw ere settled during the period 1930-36, 91b ut the majorityo f the Kazakhsl ived in rather marginal circumstances as only 38,000 new residences were constructed. 92 The Kazakhs who settled in southern Kazakhstan on sugar beet and cotton kolkhozy fared best. Those remaining in livestock breeding regions encountered the worst conditions as little capital was invested in the constructiono f residenceso r animals heds.
84 With 1929 as a base (100), in 1933 the relative number of horses in the USSR-48.4, Kazakhstan-11.4; large cattle, USSR-56.7, Kazakhstan-23.0; sheep and goats, USSR-34.4, Kazakhstan-10.6. Tursunbaev, Kollektivizatsiia Kazakhstana, 2:480. 85 B. A. Tulepbaev, Torzhestvo Leninskoi agrarnoi politiki partii v respublikakh Srednei Azii (Moscow, 1967), p. 111, and L. A. Kurbanov, Razvitie ekonomiki seskogo khoziaistva Turkmenskoi SSR (Ashkhobad, 1975), p. 114. 86 Kazakstanskaiap ravda, 22 September 1936, p. 2. 87 Kazakskaia Sovetskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika (fakty i tsifry), Bolshevik Kazakstana, 1937, no. 3, p. 73. 88 Kazakstanskaiap ravda, 30 September 1936, pp. 1-2. 89 Tursunbaev, Kollektivizatsiia Kazakhstana, 2:392. 90 Olcott, Socio-economic Change and Political Development, p. 315. 91 Tursunbaev,K ollektivizatsiiaK azakhstana2, :318. 92 Nurmukhamedov, Ocherki, p. 123.

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Nearly 70 percent of the Kazakh population was settled in the grain growing regions of Kazakhstan. Most of these lived on marginal farms in northern Kazakhstan, kolkhozy which were more poorly organized than their Russianc ounterpartsM. ost collective farms had shortageso f seed and animals or machines insufficient to work the land. The sharp reduction in the number of work horses was compounded by the poorly organized and ill-equipped Machine Tractor Stations that were established in Kazakhstan. 93A s a result, only in 1934, 1938,a nd 1939w as the goal for the republic of an average yield of seven centners of wheat per hectare achieved.94 The difficulties encountered in collectivization were caused by a failure of leadership. The Soviet authorities underestimated the complexity of trying to transform a nomadic livestock breeding population into a settled agriculturalo ne, and were unpreparedt o provide the necessary seed, implements and technical assistance to complete the task. Furthermore, they failed to realize the inherent difficulties of trying to grow grain in Kazakhstan; and that in many ways livestock breeding, including the traditional long drives to pasturage, was well suited to the natural conditions of the steppe.95 They also underestimated the commitment of the Kazakhs to preserve their traditional forms of economic and social organization and so were unprepared for the widespread resistance that the policy of collectivization provoked. Most importantly, they did not have loyal and well trained cadres capable of ideologically disarming the resistance and executing the policy. Technically, the revolution had introduced a new power structure in the countryside, but the changes were more apparent than real. Religious and clan leaders dominated the local Soviets and quickly adapted themselves to the new administrative structure of the kolkhozy becoming the brigade leaders and kolkhoz chairmen. In many regions the traditional Kazakh authorities controlled the raion level governments as well, 96 hence the popularity of 1930 election slogan "Soviets without Communists." 97 Nor could the regime rely on the Communist Party to popularize its policies since Kazakhs were underrepresented in its membership, particularly in the countryside. On 1 January 1929 there were only 16,551 Kazakh Party members and candidates, comprising 40.2 percent of the Party membership and candidates in Kazakhstan. In 1931 there were only 17,500 communists in the rural sector, and only one-fourth of these lived in predominantly Kazakh regions. At the end of 1932 the number of Kazakh Party members and candidates rose to a high of 53,869 (53 percent), but as the Party purge gathered momentum the number of Kazakh Party members declined, and on 1 January 1936, a low of 25,302 (48.8 percent) was reported.98 Only 9 percent of all kolkhozy had Party cells. The shortage was most pronounced in central Kazakhstan.Nomadic communities had far fewer Party members than did sedentary ones, and even renewed attempts at Party recruitment were not able to redress the imbalance.99 The level of preparation of the Kazakh Party members was generally quite low. Many were illiterate, and the vast majority of aul communists, as the Kazakh rural communistswere called, had no knowledge of the official Party program. Most were indistinguishable from the traditional Party leadership in social background and ideological concerns.100 The Soviet regime accurately perceived that the traditional leadership posed a threat to their social policy, and during the 1930s the traditional leadership managed to defeat Moscow's social policy. Not surprisingly laws against customary practices were simply not enforced, since most Kazakh kolkhoz officials were themselves practitioners. Most officials seemed to have felt that Soviet law and Kazakh
93 The percentage of kolkhozy served by MTSs was 1.4 percent-June 1930, 20.4 percent-1932, 31.4 percent-1933, 71.2 percent-1934. Nurmukhamedov, p. 105, and Amantaev, p. 368. 94 Chulanov, p. 285. 95 Despite the large literature of the 1920s which argued this case. See especially K. A. Chuvelev, O reorganizatsii kochevogo i polukochevogo khoziaistva, Narodnoe khoziaistvo Kazakhstana, 1928, no. 2, pp. 43-58; E. A. Polchanskii, Za novyi aul-kstay (Moscow, 1926); V. A. Sokolovskii, Kazakskii aul (Tashkent, 1926). 96 M. T. Imashev, Selskie i aulnye sovety Kazakhstana v period sploshnoi kollektivizatsii (1930-1931), Trudy sektora filosofii i prava AN KazSSR 1 (1956): 53 97 T . Soldatov, Po lepsinskimk olkhozam,B olshevikK azakstana1, 932, no. 1, p. 51. 98 . Kommunisticheskapiaa rtiia Kazakhstanav dokumentakhi tsifrakh (Alma Ata, 1960), p. 290. 99 Opportunizvm o rganizatsionno-partiirnaobi ote( Merkenskriia ion),B orshevik Kazakstana1,9 31,n o. 5, p. 74. 100 Kulturia b yt kazakhskogkoo lkhoznogaou la (AlmaA ta,1 967), p. 188.

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traditional practices could coexist harmoniously.101 Because of this, anti-religious campaigns enjoyed little success and according to some sources Islam became even more deeply entrenched in southern Kazakhstan during these years, and to this day remains a viable social force in the countryside.102 The Soviet educational policy was designed to erode the power base of the traditional authorities. Initially it encountered many difficulties. In 1934-35 the first massive campaign to eradicate illiteracy was begun, but it enjoyed limited success in the formerly nomadic and seminomadic regions because most of the school buildings in these areas, along with all other state-owned establishments, had been destroyed during the resistance to collectivization and then used as fuel during the time of the famine.103I n many areas the economic crisis was still sufficientlys evere that childrenc ould not be sent to school because they were needed to work in the fields.104E ven when Soviet authoritiess ucceeded in getting the Kazakhs into primary schools they were rarely able to keep them there for more than two years, so that in all but a few exceptional cases the seven-year program of the aul primary school existed solely on paper.105 H owever, the Soviet educational system ultimately succeeded in radically altering the clan authority structure and in introducing modem technology in the countryside, and although Kazakh society has not been totally transformed, particularly in the livestock breeding areas, where customary and religious practices continue to be integrated into daily life, evidence of the social revolution is clear in the countryside. The role of religion has been circumscribed and the hold of the patriarchal family has been drastically reduced. With each subsequentg enerationt he social transformationh as become more complete. Most importantly, there is widespread political loyalty to the Soviet state. Kazakh clan identification is of no more than symbolic importance despite the persistence of ethnically homogeneous kolkhozy. Even today many of the goals of the collectivization drive have yet to be achieved in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhs remain a rural people,106 and in Kazakhstan livestock breeding still overshadows agriculture in importance; in 1977 the value of the gross output of the livestock breeding sector was four times that of agriculture.107 Furthermore, although some of the principles of scientific animal husbandry have been introduced, in the most remote regions of Kazakhstan, such as the deserts of central Kazakhstan and the Mangyshlak peninsula, livestock breeding is practiced in a manner largely unchanged from age-old Kazakh practice. One is left then with the conclusion that the collectivization drive was in itself not a necessary prerequisite for economic development in Kazakhstan, nor for the modernization or nationalization of the agricultural economy, nor did it directly lead to the creation of a new social or political order in the countryside. It did lead to the destruction of the Kazakh livestock breeding economy and to an incredible loss of human life. Collectivization was a victory solely of persistence, demonstrating that the Soviet regime could devote sufficient resources both to introduce and maintain so unpopular a system.

101 Isaev, p. 24. 102 S . Kuzich, Vosstanoviztn acheniei rola nti-religioznopir opagandy,Bo rshevik Kazakstana, 1937, no. 9-10, p. 47. 103 P . B. Suleimenov, Iz istorii borby za likvidatsiiun egramotnostvi Kazakhstane (1933-1940) gg.), Trudy instituta istorii, arkheologii, i etnografii AN KazSSR 9 (1960): 112. 104 A. Ionisiani, Ocherkk ultury Kazakhstana,K ommunisticheskope rosveshchenie1, 935,n o. 5, p. 89. 105 T . Deinega, Korenizatsiisah koly-vazhneishaiaz adacha osushchestvleniia leninskoin atsionalnopio litiki,B olshevikK azakhstana1,9 35, no. 2-3, p. 39. 106 A ccordingto 1970 censusd ata, 73.7 percento f the Kazakhsw ere listed as rural population. Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda, vol. 4 (Moscow, 1972), pp. 223-225. 107 Narodnoe khoziaistvo Kazakhstana v 1977 (Alma Ata, 1978), p. 51.

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MOTHERHOOD, PATRIOTISM, AND ETHNICI'iY: SOVIEt kAZAKHSTANA ND THE 1936 ABORTION BAN

PAULA A. MICHAELS Source: Feminist Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 307-333

Women's reproductive capacity has long been a terrain for political struggle, linked to causes and aspirations that often have little to do with the women whose lives and destinies are at stake. The fierce and violent anti-abortionc ampaign in the United States of recent years is only one chapter in the ongoing story of women's bodies as a battleground for wars of religious faith, constitutional rights, and human rights and dignity. Be they poor African American women forcibly sterilized in the southern United States in the 1950s or Italian women encouraged by the Mussolini government to fulfill their patriotic duty by having more children, modern women and their reproductivec apabilitiesh ave been the centero f political debate the world over.1 Yet, even as public attention has centered on state policy, feminist historians are all too aware that women will ultimately seek to control their own childbearing by any means available. In the final analysis, our ability to ensure reproductive freedom for women depends on our understanding of the many dimensions of social, cultural, and political life that play themselves out in debates on state abortion policy. The history of abortion in the Soviet Union provides a powerful example of the potential for and limitations of state control over women's reproduction. Perhaps more than any other country, the USSR provides a striking counterpoint to the trajectory of the abortion question in the United States. In 1920, the Soviet Union became the first country to legalize abortion on demand. For progressive medical professionals and women's rights activists across Europe and North America, the USSR's decision became an example of pathbreaking policy and enlightened, modern thinking by the Soviet government.2 However, Soviet officials legalized abortion not because of high-minded views on the rights of women. Authorities believed that the economic crisis from which the USSR suffered, after nearly a decade of unrest, war, revolution, and civil war, made legalized abortion a temporary necessity. Soviet officials argued that under these conditions women would seek abortions by any means necessary, and only if abortion was legalized could the state oversee the procedure and guarantee that women received abortions in safe, sanitary conditions. From the beginning, Communist party and state authorities emphasized the legalization of abortion as a temporary measure that would no longer be necessary once economic conditions stabilized. After sixteen years of legalized abortion, in June 1936, the state declared that the economic situation in the USSR had changed fundamentally and that Soviet women now lived in a society free from the need for abortion. Through a proclamation commonly known as "The Decree in Defense of Mother and Child," the Communist Party of the Soviet Union banned abortion in all cases, except when the mother's life was in danger.3 Historians have viewed this decree as a turning point in the history of Soviet women and a high-water mark in Stalin's renewed emphasis on the family as the foundation of society. A more revolutionary era in Soviet women's lives had ended, and Soviet women, like women elsewhere in Europe and in North America, had to face the horrors of illegal, unsanitary abortions in order to end unwanted pregnancies The ban on abortion affected all Soviet women, but its impact was felt differently in various parts of the vast Soviet Union. This article focuses on anti-abortion discourse and legislation in Kazakhstan, a region far from the Russian heartland. To the extent that historians have addressed the abortion issue, they have focused on Russia, where the impact of the abortion ban was more profound than in non-European regions of the USSR.4
1 For two examples of the large body of literature on the history of women and reproductive control, see Johanna Schoen, A Great Thing for Poor Folks: Birth Control, Sterilization, and Abortion in Public Health and Welfare in the Twentieth Century (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1995); and Victoria de Grazia, How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 2 For an example of this perception in the West, see Henry Harris, Abortion in Soviet Russia: Has the Time Come to Legalize It Elsewhere? Eugenics Review 25 (April 1933): 19-22. 3 The decree was officially titled On the Ban of Abortions, Increasing Material Assistance to New Mothers, the Establishment of State Assistance to Mothers of Large Families, and the Expansion of the System of Maternity Wards, Nurseries, and Kindergartens. See Janet Evans, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Womens Question: The Case of the 1936 Decree In Defense of Mother and Child, Journal of Contemporary History 16 (October 1981): 757-75. 4 Ibid.; Wendy Z. Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 254-95.

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Particularly in urban areas, Russian women relied heavily on state abortion facilities. The turn toward pronatalism, however, disrupted their efforts at family planning and forced them to rely increasingly on back-alley abortions. Here I will draw attention away from the center and toward the periphery, where events unfolded in a multiethnic setting removed from the better-developed medical infrastructurep, arty cadres, and state bureaucracy of central Russia. The pronatalist and anti-abortion campaigns that operated in tandem across Kazakhstan expose the ways in which the state used the construction of gender and ethnic identities to further its political and social agenda in the periphery. The state deployed pronatalist policies and rhetoric to legitimate Soviet power, claiming that the 1936 ban demonstrated its concern for and benevolence toward all Soviet women. The example of Kazakhstan illustrates the ways in which policies and goals established at the center took on unique contours when implemented in the non-Russian periphery. BACKGROUND Few in the West had heard of Kazakhstan before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when it emerged as a newly independent, oil-rich state. Located south of Siberia, east of the Caspian Sea, and west of China, Kazakhstan had been under Russian domination for over two hundred years. A Turkic people, Kazakhs had lived for centuries as nomadic pastoralists and were renowned across Asia for their skills in horseback riding and falconry. Islam arrived in southern Kazakhstan with the Arab conquests of the tenth century, but it took nearly 900 years before this religion penetrated the inner reaches of the steppe. The Kazakhs' nomadic way of life largely precluded the emergence of certain institutions and customs associated with Islam. Kazakhstan lacked the mosques and shrines common in Muslim cities, and Kazakh women never adopted the veil. From the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, the Russian Empire conquered and brought under its nominal control all the Kazakhs'v ast territoryA. lthough many Kazakhsc ontinued to live their lives as they had earlier, Russian annexation meant the influx of hundreds of thousands of peasant settlers from European Russia. Russians and Kazakhs lived in separate communities, and the divide between the Muslim Kazakhs and the Orthodox Christian Russians remained fairly rigid in prerevolutionary times. Ethnic and sectarian divisions largely overlapped and served to reinforce one another. By 1897, Russians and other Slavs constituted nearly 16 percent of Kazakhstan's population.5 The collapse of the Russian autocracy in 1917 and the outbreak of the Civil War (1917-21) temporarily liberated Kazakhstan from Russian domination, but by 1920 the Bolsheviks were strong enough to force the Kazakh government to capitulate and join Soviet Russia. Throughout the early- and mid-1920s, the Communists largely continued the tsarist policy of benign neglect. The Soviet Union had few financial and personnel resources to attend to the nation's many diverse, pressing de mands. Marxist ideology gave the new Communist government little guidance in bringing socialism to the nomadic Kazakhs. The gulf between Central Asia and the socialist state that the Communists envisioned seemed unbridgeable until the Soviet government came to see Central Asian women as susceptible to calls for modernization of the region. Communist activists looked to women in Central Asia as a "surrogatep roletariat"th at would lead the social and economic revolution in the region.6 In lieu of an industrial workforce to act as the revolutionary vanguard, women in Central Asia would embrace the state's plans and lead the attack on the traditional, patriarchal society that officials believed threatened the Soviet monopoly of power at the local level. The state enacted legislation, disseminated propaganda, and pursued policies hostile to indigenous institutions and practices believed to oppress women. Throughout Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the Soviet government engaged in a high-profile, although largely unsuccessful, deveiling drive. In Kazakhstan, officials decried underage marriage, bride-price, and polygamy. At a time when all aspects of traditional Kazakh life were under attack, the realm of women and the family was targeteda s a particularlys ignificantb attle.T he pronatalist/ anti-abortion drive in Kazakhstan must be understood against the background of this ongoing attack on all aspects of traditional Kazakh life. To agitate among the Kazakhs and implement its policies at the local level, the Soviet government relied primarily on party and state activists drawn from Kazakhstan's Slavic population. The centralg overnmenta lso sent Russians,U krainians,J ews, and others from the USSR's European territories to remote areas of Ka5 Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Rowland, and Ralph S. Clem, Nationality and Population Changei n Russia and the USSR:A n Evaluationo f CensusD ata, 1897-1970 (New York: Praeger, 1976), 149. 6 GregoryM assell, TheS urrogatPe roletariatM: oslemW omena nd RevolutionarSyt rategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

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zakhstan and Central Asia, where they attempted to convey the economic, political, and social aspirations of the regime to the region's indigenous population. Authorities recognized that cultural and linguistic boundaries undermined the effectiveness of their efforts to reach the non-Russian population and therefore attempted to draw Kazakhs into the Soviet state and Communist Party apparatus. The state adopted a policy known as nativization, which attempted to advance local cadres and to speed the integration of non-Russians into the political system.7 The nativization program advanced the careers of some non-Russians, but the policy never drew large numbers of Kazakhs into the ranks of professionals, party activists, or government officials. Real political power remained primarily in Russian hands and the values they tried to bring to Kazakh villages reflected their biases and prejudices. In 1928, the Soviet government entered an era of rapid industrialization and forced collectivization commonly known as the Stalin Revolution. This period witnessed a full-scale war against the traditional Kazakh social, economic, and political structure. Officials saw the Kazakhs' nomadic and seminomadic pastoral econo my as inconsistent with the Soviet modernization drive. A wide variety of state-sponsored programs worked in concert to reshape Kazakh practices and fashion a new, pan-Soviet culture. Although collectivizationa nd the forceds ettlemento f the nomads formed the cornerstone of this project, the state and party attempted to bring their vision of modernity to every aspect of daily life. In industry, education, medicine, and the arts, the Soviet government mobilized the masses to forge a new culture based on socialist, urban, Russian values. Newspapers, newsreels, pamphlets, festivals, and public speeches are just some of the venues used to represent traditional Kazakh life as backward, dirty, and primitive. In contrast, Soviet economic, political, and social goals seemingly stood for progress,r ationalitya, nd modernity. ROOTS OF THE ANTI-ABORTION DRIVE As noted above, although the Soviet government legalized abortion on demand in 1920, doctors and political activists alike had ambivalent feelings about the procedure, which most endorsed only as a temporary measure to alleviate poverty and free women from the constraints of childbearing. Physicians warned from the outset that there were health risks associated with frequent resort to abortion.T heoreticiansa rgued that the combinationo f redistribution of wealth and socialized childcare facilities would eventually end the need for abortion. Beyond ideological considerations, genuine concern existed at the time for ending underground abortions,w hich babki( lay-midwives)a nd znakhark(is orceresses) across the USSR conducted in unsanitary,l ife-threateningc onditions. The state argued that only in the clean, controlled Soviet hospital environment could abortions be undertaken safely. Needless to say, abortion practices throughout the 1920s and early 1930s fell far short of the sweeping reform envisioned at the outset. More often than not, abortions were offered for a fee. Abortion clinics received no local, regional, or national funding, indicative of the state's ambivalent attitude toward abortion from the beginning. Until the 1936 ban, abortion clinics operated under a policy of khozrashche(et conomic accountability)w, hich meant they had to be fully self-supportive. Proceeds from abortions went to improving women's and children's clinics, and maternity wards run by the OkhranaM aterinstvai Mladenchestv(aD efense of maternal and child health agency [OMM]). Medical workers assessed the fee on a sliding scale based on family income. Social position also played a role in fees, as workers in cooperatives and other entities organized along socialist lines, such as collective farms, paid from one-third to one-half less than laborers in private employ in the late 1920s. Only the poorest workers and peasants, unemployed wives of Red Army soldiers, and those who had become disabled on the job qualified for free abortions.8 Women having abortions in Kazakhstan came almost exclusively from the Slavic population, which accounted for 32 percent of Kazakhstan's population by 1928.9 Of 1,997 cases in southern Kazakhstan's Kzyl7 On nativization (korenizatsiia) in Kazakhstan, see Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 169. For an in-depth study of the program, see Terry D. Martin, Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923- 1938 (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996). 8 Dr. [N.V.] Manannikova and Dr. Vilenskii, Aborty v Kazakhstane v 1928 godu, Zdravookhranenie v Kazakhstane, no. 2 (September 1929): 9. Republic of Kazakhstan Central State Archive (hereafter cited as TsGARK), Almaty, fond 82, opis 2, delo 49, listy 17-17 obverse. (Hereafter f., op., d., 1., and ob. stand for fond [fund], opis [section], delo [file], list [page], and obverse [reverse], respectively.) 9 V. Gorbunov, Putevoditel po Kazakstanu (Moscow and Alma-Ata: Kazakhstanskoe Kraevoe izdatelsvto, 1932), 17. Only 57 percent of Kazakhstans population was Kazakh by 1928. In addition to a large number of Russians (19 percent) and Ukrainians (13 per-

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Orda Municipal Hospital abortion clinic, Kazakh women accounted for only 5. If this figure is representative, only about 0.002 percent of abortions were performed on Kazakh women. This figure highlights the almost total irrelevance of legalized abortion for the indigenous population. Kazakh women married younger, had more children, and lived in a society that deemed abortion a terrible taboo. Living in remote, rural areas far from abortion facilities further inhibited Kazakh women from terminating unwanted pregnancies. In my survey of elderly Kazakhs, respondents universally denied the use of any folk remedies for abortion purposes during the 1930s.10 They expressed shock and outrage at the question, indicating the strong social constraints against abortion among rural Kazakhs even today. However, one must keep in mind that the stigma of abortion may well have prevented women from openly answering a question they perceived as sensitive. One respondent did make a vague, grudging reference to the existence of herbal abortifacients, and I therefore think it is reasonable to assume that some folk method of abortion was used by Kazakh women throughout the 1930s. Russian women, particularly in urban settings, did not share Kazakh antipathy toward abortion, saw advantages to limiting family size, and sought abortions in public medical facilities in dramatically greater numbers. One should note that even during the period of legalized abortion, Russian authorities applauded Kazakh reluctance to resort to this practice. Writing in 1932, two Kazakhstani medical workers asserted that Kazakh women's "negative relationship to abortion can only be welcomed and it hoped that Kazakh women's drive to have a 'bala' [child] will undoubtedly not change."11 Trends in Kazakhstan statistically mirrored those in Russia. The number of abortions climbed steadily in Kazakhstan during the 1920s, from 582 in 1925 to 6,127 in 1928. A particularly dramatic rise occurred from 1927 to 1928, when the number of abortions leapt by 160.2 percent. A variety of factors contributed to this jump, including increasing economic strain, a growing awareness of the availability of surgical abortion, and changing social mores.12T he increasingn umber of legal abortionsl ed in turn to a sharp decline in back-alley abortions and the injuries and infections associated with them.13H owever, the rising abortion rate began to worry state officials despite the fact that these statistics pointed to their suppression of illegal abortions to a significant degree. The state deemed abortions disproportionately high in relation to the birthrate. In Russia and across the USSR, authorities began to fear the negative relationship between women's growing reliance on abortiona nd the declining birthrate.14 Thus, the very success of legalized abortion led to its downfall, as women took their reproductive capacities into their own hands and came into conflict with the state's population agenda. The government's early disenchantment with abortion can be seen in the statistics from the Kzyl Orda Municipal Hospital abortion clinic mentioned above (see table 1). From 1928 to 1932, doctors performed a total of 1,997 abortions. In the course of three months during 1928, an average of ninety-three fetuses were aborted. This figure peaked in 1930, with 664 abortions quarterly, and then dropped off dramatically to 209 by 1932. Although one can only speculate on the reasons for the falling abortion rate, one must consider several possible explanations. Women may have been seeking abortions in fewer numbers, but given the absence alternative birth control methods and the continuing economic instability during the early 1930s, this explanation seems doubtful. More likely, abortions had perhaps become prohibitively expensive. Medical workers may have also become disinclined to perform what some of them deemed "an evil, a danger, and a social ill."15 The tragic demographic consequences of collectivization no doubt further reinperiode forced the states fears about the declining birthrate. In 1932-33, famine swept Ukraine, the lower Volga region, and Kazakhstan, where millions
cent), Uzbeks, Uighers, and other Central Asian minorities enhanced the ethnic diversity of Kazakhstans population. 10 With the help of three local research assistants, I conducted a survey of almost fifty elderly Kazakh women and men in Turkistan, Kazakhstan, in April 1995. They responded. to questions about traditional Kazakh medicine and the introduction into their community of Western biomedical techniques during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Although the sample was small, the surveys give voice to the Kazakh perspective in a way that official newspapers and archival documents do not. 11 A. N. Kustov and T. I. Skochko,A kushersko-ginekologichepskoamiao shchv periodep ervoi piatiletki po g. Kzyl-Orda Kazakhstan (Kzyl-Orda: Izdanie Gorzdravotdela i lechob edineniia, 1932), 51. 12 Manannikova and Vilenskii, 10. Goldman (275-80) offers a variety of reasons that explain why Russian women sought abortions in the 1920s. Many claimed that poverty drove them to abortions, while others simply did not want to have any more children. As a consequence of the Cultural Revolution, by the early 1930s women began to cite their desires for education and a career as motivation. Illness and illegitimacy were more common explanations for seeking abortion among rural women than urban women. 13 Novyi step, 11 Mar. 1931, 3. 14 Goldman, 291-93. 15 Kustov and Skochko, 48.

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perished from starvationa nd disease.16N ot only was the birthrate declining but mortality rates were also on the rise, Table 1 signaling to the state the pressing need to turn demograph QuarterlAy verageN umbero f of Abortionisn ictrends around. Kzyl-OrdMa unicipal Hospital From the 1920s until the eve of the 1936 abortion ban, widespread need and desire for abortion among Slavic womYear Number en, coupled with the high cost of abortion and the short1928 93 age of facilities, led to levels of back-alley abortions in Ka1929 488 zakhstan that the state found intolerable.17 Legalizationh ad 1930 664 1931 548 lowered rates of back-alley abortions among those in their 1932 209 first trimester and those in urban areas served by state-run Total 1,997 facilities, but some women were nonetheless driven into the hands of illegal practitioners. For health reasons, doctors Source: A.N. Kustov and T.I. Skochko, denied abortions to women who had passed their first triAkusherko-ginekologichespkoamiao shchvi per- mester, suffered from one of several potentially dangerous voi piatiletki po g. Kzyl-OrdaKazakhstan(K zyl- medical conditions, or were pregnant with their first child. Orda:I zdanie Gorz-dravotdelai lech-obedineniia, When turned away by the state for these reasons, in fear 1932), 48 of exposure of their pregnancy to relatives or employers, or unable to travel to a facility that provided legal abortions, Russian and other Slavic women were driven to babkia nd znakharkfio r abortions.18 Numerous press accounts covering trials of babki and znakharkdiu ring the late 1920s and early 1930s point to women's continued relianceo n illegal abortions.1A9 ccordingt o a reportt o the Deputy People's Commissar of Public Health from the OMM'sc hief administrator19, 9 percento f the women in an Alma-Ata hospital's gynecological department were undergoing treatment for bleeding and other complications associated with backalley abortions. The Alma-Ata municipal public health department (gorzdrav)c, harged with opening an abortion clinic under the city hospital's auspices and another under the district (oblast) Red Cross by June 1, 1935, was behind schedule. Given personnel shortages, the OMM remained pessimistic about its own efforts to conduct frequent, effective public lectures on the dangers of abortion and on other methods of birth control.20 Ultimately,t he continued availability of back-alley abortions and the state's failure to end these dangerous practices by offering an accessible alternative would become partial justification for abortion's recriminalization.21 U nable to supplant the babkat,h e state used her survival to support policies designed to stop falling birthrates. The state began to circulate anti-abortion propaganda even before it enacted the 1936 abortion ban. Abortion in general was depicted as a threat to women's physical well-being, particularly because the practice could lead to infertility in an era when Soviet leaders believed that the state needed an expanding workforce and military. Danger to women's health had justified the legalization of abortion, and by the mid-1930s officials invoked the same claim to back its ban. By the early 1930s, changing rhetoric about the abortion issue made its way into press accounts and debates within the healthcare community and party apparatus. Public health officials openly deemed abortion an evil, although they saw its practice as a necessity given the Soviet Union's low level of economic development. Abandoning the rhetoric that celebrated the wonders of Soviet abortion facilities and applauded their sanitary conditions, one female party activist decried that even "in the best hospital environment with the observance of all rules guiding the use of antiseptics, nonetheless [a woman] endangers herself
16 On collectivization, see Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Collectivization and the Terror Famine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). See also Martha Brill Olcott, The Collectivization Drive in Kazakhstan, Russian Review 40 (April 1981): 122-42. 17 Throughout the period of legalized abortion, Kazakhstan suffered from a severe shortage of facilities, even in the capital. As late as 1935 no specialized abortion clinic existed in Alma-Ata. Staff at womens clinics performed abortions in addition to their never-ending list of other duties. See Kustov and Skochko, 48; Manannikova and Vilenskii, 9-10. 18 Goldman, 281. 19 For example, see Dzhetisuiiskaia iskra, 26 Apr. 1928, 4. 20 Republic of Kazakhstan Presidential Archive (hereafter cited as APRK), Almaty, f. 141, op. 1, d. 10136,11 l1-lob. 21 Shymkent Affiliate of the Southern Kazakhstan Oblast State Archive (hereafter cited as ShFGAIuKO), Shymkent, f. 40, op. 2, d. 162, 1. 17. Although, of course, the ban on abortion would be expected to increase demand for the babkis services, officials had faith that they could eradicate them through vigorous legal prosecution. Pronatalist initiatives would reduce demand for illegal abortions, but the states suppression of babki would make it impossible for women who nonetheless desired an abortion to receive one.

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by having an abortion."22 Ac tivists such as this one placed increasing emphasis on the negative effect of even legal abortions and used this danger to advocate its ban. No longer did the benefits of a legal abortion outweigh those of a back-alley procedure. Party activists in Kazakhstan agreed with national leaders that Russian and other Slavic women resorted too frequently to abortion. To alleviate this situation, they argued that abortion needed to be phased out gradually, not banned outright. The party's women workers insisted that making abortion illegal overnight would drive the practice fully underground again, rather than lead to its elimination. Moreover, no decline in abortion rates could occur without expanding obstetric facilities, daycare centers, and programs for training new mothers in infant care. Party officials in Southern Kazakhstan oblast, for example, argued that such measures would re sult not only in lowering the abortion rate but also in decreasing infant mortality rates, diminishing the number of complications associated with delivery, and freeing women to pursue both motherhood and work outside the home. Women students deserved particular attention, as they represented the brightest hope for the future generation. Kazakhstan's Communist Youth League (Komsomol) activists asserted that the greatest effort should be made to teach women students about alternative birth control methods, as giving birth would affect a woman's career and having an abortion would have a negative impact on her health. One party activist suggested that women students should receive birth control advice during their years of study, so that they would finish their studies in good health and 'be able to give birth to as many babies as you [the party? society?] like."23 Held just days before Moscow issued the decree banning abortion, these discussions show that in the periphery at least some activists felt strongly that a sudden shift in abortion policy would be misguided, if not dangerous. Although Moscow's final decision ended further party debate, consensus clearly did not reign among rank-and-file party workers on this issue. Discussions also reveal that on the local level questions about the need to increase population growth played a secondary role to more pragmatic, pressing concerns. THE END OF LEGALIZED ABORTION When the Central Committee issued its ban on abortion on June 27, 1936, it ended local and regional debates by adopting an extreme stance on this issue. The state did not ban abortion entirely but made it legal only in cases when pregnancy threatened the mother's life. In practice, doctors authorized abortions only in extremely rare circumstances. In the wake of the ban, each oblast established a "medical abortion commission" which oversaw every request for termination of pregnancy. In each case, written permission had to be granted the applicant, the decision recorded, and monthly evaluationsf orwardedt o the oblastp ublic health department with a copy to the regional public health department.24 This elaborate system of controls guaranteed the state would keep access to abortion in check and hold doctors accountable for failing to implement the ban fully. Despite this system of oversight and control, after the 1936 decree Russian and other Slavic women in Kazakhstan continued to strive for control of their reproductive capacities and many turned to back-alley abortions to end unwanted pregnancies. Promises from the state about the wonders of rearing children under benevolent Soviet rule failed to eliminate the reluctance of these women to bear children. In response to women's continued resort to abortion despite its illegality, the state ordered that every single case of a woman who sought medical treatment with any symptoms that could be construed as tied to an abortion should be referredt o prosecutors for investigation.25U nder section 140 of the Soviet Penal Code, any doctor or nonmedical personnel who performed an abortion in a case when it was not a medical necessity was subject to imprisonment for not less than three years. Babki, znakharki, and other unauthorized abortionists placed themselves in jeopardy of additional prosecution under section 180, which provided for incarcerationf or up to six months or a fine of 500 rubles for practicing medicine without a license. Both the women who had the abortions and the abortionists were liable under the law.26N o cumulative figures exist on the number of illegal abortions that came to the state's attention,
22 ShFGAIuKO, f. 40, op. 2, d. 162,1. 17. 23 Ibid., 18 and 21; see also Mary Buckley, Women and Ideology in the Soviet Union (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), 132. 24 Alma-Ata Oblast State Archive (hereafter cited as GAA-AO), Almaty, f. 385, op. 1, d. 181,1. 44. 25 TsGARK, f. 1473, op. 1, d. 11, 1. 505. Criminal investigations of any suspicious cases were pursued vigorously across the USSR. For example, a Russian informant told me that when she was a girl in Siberia, her mother was falsely imprisoned following a miscarriage, as investigators believed she had had a back-alley abortion (anonymous interview by the author, Almaty, Kazakhstan, January 1995). 26 Ugolovnyi kodeks (Moscow: Iuridicheskoe izdatelstvo NKIu SSSR, 1941), 76, 89.

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let alone the total number of back-alley abortions performed, in the years immediatelyf ollowing the recriminalizationo f abortion. Kazakhstan'sR ussian-languagep ress gave high profilet o several cases of back-alleya bortionistsp rosecutedf or transgressingt he law, revealing how the state and party used these cases to buttress the anti-abortionc ampaigni n hopes of deterringf uture offenders. Rhetoric surrounding abortion prosecutions embedded anti Soviet, antipatrioticm eaning into abortion.O ne September1 936 letter to the editor of Kazakhstanskapiraa vdae mphasized that both a woman currently under prosecution for an illegal abortion and her abortionist should be considered "enemies of our socialist society." The letter was signed by G.P. Momot, a member of an elite group of workersk nown as Stakhanovitesw, ho overfulfilled production quotas and were viewed as heroes in the industrialization drive. Momot's letter reveals that he is married to a Slavic woman who underwent an abortion. The letter juxtaposes the image of him as a loyal, brave Soviet worker to his wife's betrayal of her husband and country through an abortion. A gendered reading of the Momot story points to the way in which the state used abortion prosecutions to reinforce patriarchy and the traditional roles of women in Soviet society. According to the article, Momot's wife, Anfisa Feodorovna, deceived him and made the decision to terminate her pregnancy without his knowledge or consent, while he was out of town. In the wake of her criminal act, he struggled to understand her behavior that denied him the son for whom he had long hoped. Expressing his grief, Momot lamented: "I waited so long for the arrival of that joyous day and instead of that happiness I received a blow."27 In the Momot case, the press presented a picture of a man and his unborn son as the innocent victims of the machinations of a woman driven for no apparent reason to deny her biological destiny and patriotic duty, and of the financial greed of her abortionist accomplice, also a woman. One can view Anfisa Feodorovna as a discursive symbol for the state's view of women who resist the mission of motherhood with which the state has charged them. Characterized by cruelty and disloyalty and transformed into political enemies of the state, Momot's wife and others prosecuted for abortion stand in starkc ontrastt o women concurrentlya ppearingi n the press as heroic, patriotic citizens who relish fulfillment of their roles as mothers. As part of the vilification of women who sought and performed abortions, the press had to discredit their motivations for transgressing the law. In a case against a woman named Novikova and her abortionist, Vintovkina, the press emphasized the absence of financial or other explanations that might justify her reluctance to bear a child. Novikova allegedly testified: "I am twenty-two years old. I have a child. I work at a printing press. My husband also works, and materially we are well off. I only had an abortion, because my girlfriends at work told me 'it doesn't pay to be burdened with another kid. It's better just to have an abortion.' So I found out that Vintovkinad oes abortions."28 No vikova's decision, according to this account, appeared capricious and without foundation in any objective social or economic circumstances that might have compelled her to break the law. Momot, in the case discussed above, reinforced this idea that in 1930s' Soviet society a family's economic position failed to explain resorting to abortion. In his letter, Momot emphasized: "I earn 350 rubles per month, sometimes even more. I am fully capable of supporting a family."29 Th e press and, by inference, prosecutors framed cases against these women in terms of their complete lack of rational reasons for aborting their fetuses. Men able and willing to support their families become victims of women's frivolity and lighthearted attitude toward their duty to husbands and country. Abortion prosecutions became high-profile show trials conducted typically in courtrooms, but on occasion in worker clubs and, in at least one instance,a theateri n Alma-Ata.30 In such an environment, women under prosecution became actors in a drama about good and evil, vilified in morality plays designed to teach both them and the public a lesson. Behind this facade of capricious women, victimized men, and the unmet greater needs of society lay a complex web of circumstances that made up each individual illegal abortion case. Although the scanty archival evidence paints a very different picture from the scenarios depicted in public discourse, rhetoric and real life overlap in one important respect: the ethnic composition of women having and performing abortions. Slavic last names exclusively are found among cases both that received wide press attention and that were prosecuted
27 Kazakhstanskaiap ravda (hereafter cited as KP), 4 Sept. 1936, 3. See also KP, 26 Oct. 1936, 3. 28 KP, 23 Nov. 1936,4. The name Vintovkina may be a pseudonym, derived from the Russian word for rifle (vintovka), alluding to the abortionists skill at killing. Historian Elena Osokina suggested this possible interpretation to me. 29 KP, 4 Sept. 1936, 3. 30 KP, 22 Nov. 1936, 4; and 11 Dec. 1936, 4.

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by the state. Kazakh women may have on rare occasions attempted to terminate pregnancies, but if so, they did not fall into the state's hands. Kazakh attitudes toward abortion, as seen by the dramatically lower rates while abortion remained legal, and the relative remoteness of the Kazakh population from state power concentrated in urban areas explain why prosecution for illegal abortions affected only the Slavic population of Kazakhstan. Press representationsf ocused on illegal abortionsa mong married women, but archival evidence suggests that prosecutions centered on single women. Of six illegal abortion cases for which I located the judicial files, only one involved a married woman.31 The women's motivations remained unspecified in the documents, but a variety of factors no doubt pushed them to choose abortions. Far from the selfish and almost whimsical motivations depicted in the press, financial desperation or social pressure probably drove most of the women to break the law. Given the harsh punishment for illegal abortion, it seems unlikely that women took this step lightly. For example, during 1940 eleven women past their first trimesterc ame to the Turkestanc ity hospital with symptoms that indicated they had attempted to abort their pregnancies. Hospital authorities referred each case to the prosecutor's office.32 E ven if eventually cleared of the charges, these eleven women endured detention while under investigation, separation from their families, state scrutiny, and public humiliation. Their example may have in turn deterred others from resorting to abortion lightly or, more dangerously, from seeking medical attention in the wake of a botched abortion. The eleven women at that one hospital perhaps in actuality constitute only a small sample of the total number of women who resorted to illegal abortions. Available sources do not allow for a conclusive understanding of what motivated women and how many felt compelled to jeopardize their health and freedom in order to terminate a pregnancy. However, at the very least, press accounts must be read with a skeptical eye, as other sources seem to point to greater complexity than the media depicted about who sought abortions and why. PRONATALISM IN KAZAKHSTAN Anti-abortion efforts were only part of a large-scale drive to increase population growth following the 1936 ban on abortion. The state well understood that without improved social services to support increasing birthrates, the abortion ban would merely drive women into the hands of unlicenseda bortionistsE. xpansion of maternity wards to provide care for the increasing numbers of women carrying their babies to term constituted a primary prerequisite for the state's pronatalist agenda. In Kazakhstan, eight birth clinics with accommodations for 133 expectant mothers were slated for construction immediately following the 1936 decree.33 The Kazakh Regional Committee of the Communist Party (Kazkraikom) reiterated the center's dedication to increasing the number of birth clinics and threw its support enthusiastically behind the abortion ban by demanding action on birth clinic construction plans.34 Linked to the expansion of birth clinics, other OMM facilities had to grow as well in order to accommo date the rising birthrate. To support the growth of children's clinics, nurseries, and kindergartens, the Kazakh People's Commissariat of Public Health (Kaznarkomzdrav) increased the OMM budget from 9.7 million rubles in 1935 to 17.8 million in 1936 and to 38 million in 1937. The funds were desperately needed, as the birthrate in Kazakhstan allegedly rose by 25 to 30 percenta nnuallyd uring this same three-yearp eriod.35 Other factors no doubt contributed to the rising birthrate, such as the relative economic and social stability of the late 1930s compared with earlier years. Nonetheless, Soviet officials interpreted rising birthrates as testimony to the ef31 GAA-AO, f. 438, op. 3, d. 228,1. 16; Southern Kazakhstan Oblast State Archive (hereafter cited as GAIuKO), Shymkent, f. 983, op. 2, sv. 21; d. 326, 1. 48. These cases date from 1942 and 1950, but all files from earlier years, including those immediately after the abortion ban, have unfortunately been destroyed by the archives for what archivists termed a lack of historical value. I see no reason to believe these patterns differed in any significant way from those during the 1930s. Despite the impact of the war in intervening years, the birth dates of these women indicate that they were likely never to have been married. One should bear in mind that statistically, this sample of cases is extraordinarily small, but it is all that remains for attempting to assess the abortion issue. The preponderance of single women among those prosecuted for illegal abortions indicates that the pattern during the 1920s, in which married women overwhelmingly dominated those having legal abortions, altered when abortion became illegal. The ban on abortion seems to have driven all but the most desperate women, that is, unmarried women, to stay within the bounds of the law. 32 Qyzyl Turkistan (hereafter cited as QT), 7 Feb. 1941, 4. 33 KP, 8 Aug. 1936, 3. 34 APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 10607,1. 95. 35 Sotsialistiq Qazaqistan (hereafter cited as SQ), 15 July 1937, 2; SQ, 24 July 1937, 4. The birthrate in Kazakhstan rose from 30 per 1,000 in 1935 to 40 per 1,000 in 1936 and 50 per 1,000 in 1937. These rates of growth seem extraordinary and may in fact be inflated to demonstrate the effectiveness of the states pronatalist campaign. However, no available data contradict these figures.

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fectiveness of abortion's recriminalization and dedicated increasing financial support to women's and children's health. With this greater financial support, the OMM opened women's and children's clinics. The growing ranks of medical cadres graduating from educational institutions founded during the First Five-Year Plan (1928-32) provided staff for the expanding women's and children's healthcarei nstitutionsd uring the ThirdF ive-YearP lan (1938-41). Financial assistance to women with large families served as the cornerstone of the state's pronatalism campaign.36T he state defined large families as those with seven or more children, with the youngest child under five years of age. For each child under age five, the mother received approximately 2,000 rubles per year until that child reached the age of five. Women who at the time of the 1936 decree had eleven or more children, including one child under five, received 5,000 rubles per year during 1936 and 3,000 rubles in subsequent years. These grants did not allow large families to live in luxury, but they were not insubstantial by the standards of the time. A few thousand rubles could help a family make ends meet, particularly in rural areas where wages were low and crops often unreliable. Although the abortion policy affected the Slavic population of Kazakhstan to the almost total exclusion of the Kazakhs, the pronatalism campaign had an impact on the indigenous population that was considerable, given its higher birthrate. Statistics do not indicate what percentage of applicants were Kazakh, but one can assume Kazakh women who knew about the program took advantage of its benefits. One year after the decree was issued, a total of 7,018 mothers in rural Kazakhstan had applied for the financial assistance. It is impossible to determine the percentage of eligible women that this figure represents, but it translates into the distribution of millions of rubles in assistance to women. Newspaper articles and local party and state organizations spread word of the policy following the 1936 decree, yet information about state financial support may have taken months, if not years, to reach eligible but illiterate Kazakh mothers. By 1940, in the Turkistan region (Southern Kazakhstan oblast) 134 women received a total of 268,000 rubles annually in financial assistance to large families. In this predominantly Kazakh and Uzbek region, many recipients were probably from the indigenous population. Problems occurred, including delays in payment caused by bureaucratic red tape, but overall the policy functioneds uccessfully.37 One cannot ignore that when the state finally put money behind its rhetoric, it was in order to reinforce the position of women in their most traditional role. Women, in turn, seized the state's financial assistance readily, suggesting a pragmatic assessment of genuine financial need irrespective of their views of Russians, Communist ideology, or the Soviet government. Taking advantage of state assistance can certainly not be seen as an indication of collusion with or support for the regime, despite the state's aspirations in this regard. In addition to the concrete measures the state adopted to further its pronatalist agenda, propaganda figured as a prominent strategyt o increaset he birthratei n Kazakhstana, s throughoutt he USSR.38 The government instructed the public on the political significance of procreation and, in Slavic areas of Kazakhstan, the need to abandonr elianceo n abortion.K azakhstan'sC ommissariat of Public Health ordered medical workers at OMM facilities and throughout the healthcare system to spread the word regarding the ills of abortion. Medical propagandists responded by attempting to conduct outreach programs to bring health education work into student dormitories and into the workplace, but personnel shortages limited the extent to which anti-abortion propaganda made its way to the population. Over a year after the 1936 decree, officials of Kazakhstan's Commissariat of Public Health complained that not only had medical workers failed to reach the community at large but that even within healthcare institutions propaganda against abortion was "almost completely absent." In response to this unacceptables ituation,t he Kaznarkomzdravo rdered that the directors of the local-level health departments take personal responsibility for overseeing anti-abortion propaganda, indicating its high priority in the state's eyes.39 Auditoriums in clubs, dormitories, and other public meeting facilities were to become centers for anti-abortion activity, although it remains unclear to what extent propagandists realized this goal. The state and party used a variety of venues to disseminate their pronatalist agenda. Rhetoric and visual images in republic and local newspapers offered positive representationso f motherhood and mothers, Kazakh
36 The Soviet Union was not alone in using financial incentives to encourage women to produce more children. European governments supported pronatalist agendas through both state subsidies to large families and tax incentives. See, for example, Mary Nash, Pronatalism and Motherhood in Francos Spain, in Maternity and Gender Policies: Women and the Rise of the European Welfare States, 1880s-1950s, ed. Gisela Bock and Pat Thane (New York: Routledge, 1991), 160-77. See also de Grazia, 69-70. 37 KP, 16 Nov. 1936, 4; and 27 June 1937, 3; QT, 7 Feb. 1941, 4; KP, 3 Apr. 1938, 3. 38 Buckley, 131-33. 39 TsGARK, f. 1473, op. 1, d. 11,1. 504 and 506.

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and Russian alike. Photos and articles emphasized women's primary role as mothers and motherhood as the source of all happiness. They did more than merely reiterate prevailing notions about women's roles. First, they represented the rejection of whatever remnants of revolutionary rhetoric had survived into the 1930s regarding women's position in society. Although equality of women remained a popular theme, Communists now without reservation embraced traditional, conventional images of women. Second, while the state spread images of women as mothers, it did so with the idea that the experience of Soviet motherhood represented a break with the past. The press conveyed the notion that, led by the Communist Party under the wise guidance of Joseph Stalin, Soviet mothers across the USSR found their lives easier than ever before because of the care and support accorded them by the regime. For example, one article entitled "HappyM otherhood"to ld the story of EvdokiiaP etrovna Balabanovaa, Russianw oman living in KazakhstanT. o help support her eight children, she received 4,000 rubles from the state. The paper quoted her as saying: "'Now my biggest job is to raise healthy children. The possibility for it exists. I will be receiving 4,000 rubles and I will spend it exclusively on my children. Thanks to Comrade Stalin for the concern, with which he surrounds us-happy mothers that we are.' "40W hether Balabanova actually said this is less important than the subtext that stories like hers convey to the reader. The state propagated the image of Stalin as the benevolent father at the head of a national family in which women's highest duty was to raise children. In this scenario, women were to deny any other aspirations in the face of achieving this all-consuming goal that inevitably paved the way to their personal fulfillment. Having on average more children than their Russian compatriots, Kazakh women made particularly appealing examples for these romanticized visions of maternity. The suffering of women under the yoke of traditional Kazakh society stood in stark contrast to the benefits they received under the Soviet regime. Russian- language newspapers in particular devoted considerable space to highlighting for Slavic readers the joys of large families and the Soviet government'sr ole in "liberatingK" azakh( and, by inference, other) women from the material and financial burdens of motherhood. The story of forty-year-old Mariam, which appeared in an April 1938 issue of Kazakhstanskapiraa vdai,l lustrates the way in which the Soviet press depicted the new lives of Kazakh mothers. The demands of eight children filled her day, "but Mariam had a golden touch and cheerful disposition," which facilitated her work and created a happy environment for her children. Upon receipt of 2,000 rubles from the Soviet government for supporting her youngest child, Mariam's mother exclaimed: "'In my day a new child meant new burdens, but now infants in swaddling clothes become helpers;. . . this regularized assistance for Mariam is unthinkable anywhere but on Soviet soil.' "41 These words, and the numerous newspaper photos of joyful mothers and their laughing, healthy infants, point to the state's attempt to construct an idealized, romanticized vision of motherhood and inscribe it with uniquely Soviet traits. Soviet motherhood stood for the rejection of tradition and female oppression. Expectant mothers need not fear the burden of raising a child with the Soviet state and Comrade Stalin standing by with aid. By inference, a mother overwhelmed by chores was herself to blame for not possessing the skills and easygoing demeanor of exemplary women like Mariam. The Soviet state had created ideal conditions for the mother, and she had a responsibility to fulfill her proper role and express her gratitude to the state for allowing her to realize her maternal potential. Fear, failure, financial hardship, and overwork had been written out of the script for motherhood, which became not just the biological destiny of women but the fulfillment of their every desire for personal happiness as well. Given the limited archival information available on abortion, it is difficult to assess the impact of pronatalist propaganda on its target, the Slavic population of Kazakhstan. In 1945, suggesting the long-term failure of these efforts, the party called upon its members to police the activities of medical workers following a spate of illegal abortionsi n SouthernK azakhstano blast.42 Ne arly a decade after the dawn of the anti-abortion campaign, Soviet authorities still struggled to convince women of the dangers of abortion. As noted earlier, no cumulative statistics exist on the prewar years that might allow historians to make inferences about either the influence of the pronatalism campaign or the effectiveness of abortion'sr ecriminalizationR. ising birthratesi n the late 1930s do not offer a complete picture, especially as they can be attributed at least in part to other important factors, such as the overall stabilization of economic conditions. Statistics on both legal and illegal abortions are
40 KP, 5 Dec. 1938, 1 41 KP, 3 Apr. 1938, 3. This one article illustrates a general pattern. For other examples, see KP, 28 June 1937, 3; and 4 Nov. 1939, 4; SQ, 2 July 1936, 2. 42 ShFGAIuKO, f. 40, op. 8, d. 45,1. 60.

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available for a later period, pointing toward a more long-range assessment of the state's successes. The Commissariat of Public Health amassed statistics on both legally authorized abortions and abortions later classified as "criminal."A t times the state deemed abortionsc riminalb ut did not have adequate evidence to prosecute, accounting for a difference between the number of abortions labeled criminal and those prosecuted. An abortion commission staffed by certified physicians approved legal abortions, while medical professionals without the commission's authorization or back-alley abortionists performed criminal abortions. A high proportion of legal abortions to live births in 1944 led to a 1945 evaluation of the work of abortion commissions.43 The total number of abortionsd ecreasedd ramatically in 1944, but the percent of legal abortions relative to the birthrate leapt from 2 percent in 1943 to 8 percent in 1944 (see table 2). This jump suggests that either the birthrate declined while the number of abortions remained steady, or the rate of legal abortions increased fourfold in one year. Officials attributed the rise of legal abortions" primarilyto the difficultm aterialc onditions of wartime," although, according to the 1936 abortion ban, economic grounds were not sufficient for state authorization of an abortion.44 The investigation in 1945 failed to conclude that the commissionsh ad authorizeda bortionsi n inappropriatec ases, but it is difficult otherwise to explain the high rate in 1944. The inquiry led to closer supervision of these commissions, perhaps in part accounting for a drop in the proportion of abortions relative to the birthrate to 2.3 percent.45 Amid war and dislocation, for a brief period women may have been able to find doctors sympathetic to their plight and willing to bend the rules, but by 1945 this window had closed. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 2 Abortion in Kazakhstan, 1942-1948 Year Total Percentage of Abortions Percentage of Criminal Percentage Abortions Legal Deemed Total Abortions Abortions of Criminal Abortions to Criminal Deemed Prosecuted Abortions Live Births Criminal Prosecuted 1942 11,214 1.5 1,675 14.9 1,356 80.9 1943 n/a 2.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1944 7,811 8.0 1,278 16.4 844 66.0 1945 10,303 2.3 1,684 16.3 1,409 83.6 1946 15,901 n/a 3,866 24.3 3,172 82.0 1947 16,263 n/a 3,096 19.0 2,589 83.6 1948 n/a n/a 4,079 n/a 3,541 86.0 SourceR: epublico f KazakhstanC entralS tate Archive,f . 1473,o p. 2, d. 14,1. 3; op. 2, d. 49,1. 6ob; op. 2, d. 79,1. 5ob; op. 2, d. 115,1. 6; op. 4, d. 5,1. 138; op. 4, d. 8,1. 6; op. 4, d. 85,1. 6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The postwar years saw a steady increase in the absolute number of abortions, an indication of the state's failure to reach women through pronatalist and anti-abortion propaganda. Not surprisingly, criminal abortions peaked in the harsh two-year period after the war's conclusion. Women sought marriage and companionship from returning soldiers, but economic hardship no doubt made many reluctant to start or expand their families. The state denied the validity of these obstacles and annually prosecuted an average of 84 percent of the women accused of having criminal abortions. Wartime and postwar abortion statistics are not broken down by age, marital status, or ethnicity, making it impossible to offer a substantive analysis of which women sought abortions and why. Nonetheless, official statistics suggest that after a decade a significant portion of the population remained undeterred by the state's anti-abortion and pronatalist campaign, despite the state's commitment to prosecute offenders. Figures from the mid-1940s may or may not be higher than prewar numbers, but these sta43 TsGARK, f. 1473, op. 2, d. 72,11. 24-26. 44 Ibid., op. 4, d. 5,1. 138. A 1946 report on abortion in Kazakhstan, this document gave only the percentage of abortions relative to live births for the 1941-45 period. Unfortunately, I was unable to locate elsewhere the absolute number of abortions and live births for 1943, making a more precise explanation for the 1944 jump in legal abortions impossible. 45 Ibid. The absolute numbers of both abortions and births increased in 1945, but the proportion returned to a level more in keeping with earlier years. The high ratio of abortions to live births in 1944 thus stands out as quite exceptional.

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tistics demonstrate that the state had clearly not won the battle against abortion. This fact became even clearer when the state largely abandoned prosecution of illegal abortions in the years after Stalin's death in 1953. Doctors performed firsttrimester abortions on demand without fear of reprisals by the mid-1950s, and in 1968, the state officially restored women's right to abortion on demand.46 CONCLUSION Public discourse on abortion and pronatalism in Kazakhstan reminds us that the USSR was a vast, diverse, multiethnic state. Policies designed in Moscow and driven primarily by central, Russian concerns unfolded in distinctive ways when deployed in Kazakhstan's multiethnic setting. Local conditions were an important factor in the implementation of the state's anti-abortion program, as it was largely up to local authorities to figure out how to enact policies dictated by the center. At both the national and local level, the Soviet government was well aware of the diversity of its population and shaped, redefined, and manipulated the representation of ethnic identities and ethnic stereotypes to serve its broader political agenda. When it was in the state's interests Kazakhw omen were defined as 'backward,"b ut just as easily they could be shining examples of liberation and the achievements of socialism. In fact, of course, little had changed about their reproductive patterns, gender relations, or childcare practices, despite the state's shifting representation of Kazakh women's lives. Pronatalist press coverage in Kazakhstan also underscores the supremacy of the population agenda over other considerations in the late 1930s. From its inception, the Soviet government stressed the need to transform Kazakh and other Muslim societies. Adhering to a nomadic way of life, Kazakh women were viewed as particularly backward. The central feature of the state's policies toward indigenous women in Central Asia became subordinated to the pronatalist agenda. Whatever its desires to draw women into the industrial workforce, for example, those considerations were overshadowed by the state's commitment to pronatalist policies. Above all else, women's primary political, social, and economic function in society became reduced to producing and rearing children. The Soviet government's pronatalist policies demonstrate the way in which the state legitimated its power in part through the issue of women's health and reproduction. Anti-abortion rhetoric emphasized that the 1936 ban was motivated by the state's concern for women's health and well-being. State subsidies to large families were intended not just to boost population growth but also to testify to the regime's benevolence toward and support of women and their families. Even when the expansion of OMM facilities, daycare centers, and communal kitchens fell short of ambitious goals, the state could still claim that the effort itself represented the regime's commitment to women who, in turn, should support the state's agenda in other arenas, such as collectivizationa nd industrializationB. ut frequentinga clinic or accepting a subsidy did not necessarily signal endorsement of the state or its modernization project. In the case of Kazakhstan, it seems unlikely that the regime's efforts to woo either Kazakh or Russian women could have translated into genuine support for the regime. Kazakhw omen, in particularh, ad sufferedt erriblyd uring collectivization and the subsequent famine, and the state offered little to offset the animosity many no doubt harbored toward the regime. The Soviet government was not alone, of course, in its efforts to use women's health issues and reproductive rights for political aims. Across Europe from the late 1920s to the late 1940s, pronatalism like that practiced in the USSR was common. Most European countries during this period introduced some form of tax incentives and child allowances to encourage population growth. In fascist Italy, for example, the state implemented many of the same policies adopted in the USSR, including efforts to expand the medicalization of childbirth and to establish public rituals celebrating motherhood, albeit in an ethnically homogenous setting.47 Through her examination of antinatalistp olicies such as forced abortion and sterilization in Nazi Germany, historian Gisela Bock illuminates the horrific way in which an authoritarian, multiethnic state used women's bodies in the struggle for state power and legitimation. For those of desirable racial and class background, Hitler's Germany encouraged procreation and essentially outlawed abortion, policies not unlike those in the USSR during the same period. However, the Nazi regime based its pronatalism in racialist biology and eugenic science; and it adopted antinatalist practices toward "undesirable" minority groups, including Jews, Roma, and the disabled. Bock argues that forced abortions
46 Richard Stites, The Womens Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860-1930 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 403. 47 de Grazia, 41-76.

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and sterilizations were dominant features in the regime's population policies.48 A lthough important differences exist among the Italian, German, and Soviet examples, these cases collectivelyd emonstratea pan-Europeanp reoccupationw ith and a wide range of responses to issues of women's health, reproduction, and state power. The use of women's health issues and reproductive rights to legitimate a political agenda is by no means universal. In colonial India, where the state's public health efforts played a role in British representationo f colonial rule as a positive and progressivef orce, the issue of women's health was largely ignored. British officials saw Indian women as inaccessible to the state's hand and sought to bring sanitation projects, smallpox vaccination programs, and other initiatives to the population through men. Although missionary doctors and others decried indigenous practices surrounding childbirth, such as the lack of attention to maintaining a sterile environment, little effort was made to impose biomedical approacheso n native women.49B y contrast,t he Soviet case offers an example of a system that made women's health issues central to its state-building efforts. Whether calling for women's liberation through the legalization of abortion in 1920 or declaring its support of women as mothers by offering financial support to women with large families, the Soviet state chose to keep women's health and their reproductive capacities at the center of its focus and made it an essential part of its domestic agenda. Although, especially prior to 1936, the regime did not always put financial force behind its promises, the government clearly saw women and their support as an indispensable component of its state-building efforts. Finally, the anti-abortion campaign in the Kazakhstani press reminds us that the 1936 ban on abortion, like all laws, touched women's lives in different ways and that in a diverse country like the USSR it is particularly difficult to make generalizations. The negative impact of the abortion ban on Russian and other Slavic women in all comers of the USSR, including Kazakhstan, cannot be denied. The ban forced these women to turn to back-alley abortions in unprecedented numbers despite the considerable risks to their health, freedom, and standing in the community. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that for a significant number of Soviet women the law had little or no effect. Kazakh and other Central Asian women were essentially untouched by the ban. They continued to avail themselves of whatever traditional means they used to end unwanted pregnancies. Their reproductive lives remained almost totally beyond the state's intrusive controls, even during the years of harshest oppression. In fact, for Kazakh women the ban on abortion brought with it stipends for mothers of large families, and they were quick to take advantage of this aid. The inclusion of non-Russian women in our picture of Soviet women and their reproductive lives thus greatly complicates our understanding of this period, in which Kazakh womenif only with respect to questions of pronatalism-appear to have enjoyed some real benefits. As women in the United States and around the world grapple with political battles over women's reproductive rights, it serves us well to be reminded of the limitations of state power. The Soviet example demonstrates that even with enormous resources at its disposal, from a governmental monopoly of the press to the careful state oversight of medical professionals, officials could not stop Slavic women from ending unwanted pregnancies. Threats of arrest and time in a Soviet prison did little to stem the tide of women seeking abortions. Their options were few, but these women chose to resist the state's intrusion into their private lives with little regard for the consequences. State restrictions may make it more difficult and dangerous for women to choose abortion, but they far from eliminate this option from consideration.

48 Gisela Bock, Antinatalism, Maternity, and Paternity in National Socialist Racism, in Maternity and Gender, 242-43. 49 David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth- Century India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 254-68.

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The Formation of the Virgin Lands Policy

RICHARD M. MILLS Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1970), pp. 58-69

Shrouded behind a veil of semisecrecy, the making of policy decisions in the Soviet Union has been a fertile source of endless speculation and research. From time to time, happily, it becomes possible to penetrate rather deeply into the arcana of the process and turn up some illuminating materials. The decision to cultivate the virgin lands is a good case in point, and now the older Western analyses of the politics surrounding that event can be expanded substantially on the basis of information published in recent years.1 The new materials make it possible to establish a number of important points that will, among other things, serve to correct the Khrushchevian version of how the policy was made. More particularly, it can be shown that the chief issue at stake was not the idea of turning up the virgin lands but rather the scale on which they should be cultivated. Furthermore, the opposition of the Kazakh party leadership was a major stumbling block in the early and middle stages of forming the policy, and some rather interesting methods were used to overcome that resistance. Finally, the idea of cultivating the virgin lands was not such an innovation on Khrushchev's part as has been generally thought. The circumstances necessitating an increase in wheat production after Stalin's death need only be sketched here. At the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952, Malenkov treated his audience to two pleasant surprises in claiming that since eight billion poods of grain were harvested that year, the perennial grain shortage had been overcome once and for all. But not even a year later, in his August 8, 1953, speech to the Supreme Soviet, Malenkov had to confront the unpleasant reality that the level of grain production was insufficient to meet the growing demand. He therefore proposed a series of measures calculated to raise output by intensifying production on existing farms. Shortly thereafter, Khrushchev put forth his own program for resolving the problem in his keynote speech at the epochal September 1953 plenum of the Central Committee. He favored adopting all the measures mentioned earlier by Malenkov, but suggested also that "extensive possibilities" existed for growing wheat in various regions hitherto little used for that purpose. The suggestionw as incorporatedin the plenum'sr esolution,w hich enumerated the general areas (later collectively to be called the virgin lands) where grain production was to be expanded-the right bank of the Volga, the northern CaucasusK, azakhstana, nd western Siberia. The next obviousq uestionsw ere preciselyh ow to expandp roductiona nd to what extent. In attempting to explain how the answers were arrived at, Khrushchev once claimed that sometime after the September plenum the obkom secretaries of Kazakhstan were called together in Moscow and asked those very questions: "And they stated with one voice: 'The virgin lands must be turned up. They are very fertile and will yield a great deal of grain.' At first they shyly spoke of three million hectares; they then began talking about seven, and they finally pulled it up to thirteen million."2 The Kazakh obkoms ecretariesw ere in this authoritativef ashion creditedw ith originating the idea of cultivating the virgin lands. Actually, the answers were not obtained in quite that way. While the plenum was in session (September 3-7) Khrushchev met in his office with various party officials from the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan, broached the idea of cultivating the virgin lands, and allegedly received an enthusiastic responsef rom his interlocutors. 3A pparentlyt he agreementw as in principle only, since there is no indicationt hat specifica creagesw ere mentioned.N evertheless, the agreement helped to provide a basis for Khrushchev
1 For those analyses see Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR (New York, 1961), pp. 234-43; Roger Pethybridge, A Key to Soviet Politics: The Crisis of the Anti-Party Group (New York, 1962), pp. 50-52; Sidney I. Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia (Princeton, 1965), pp. 82-83. 2 Nikita Khrushchev, Stroitelstvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie sePskogo khoziaistva, 8 vols. (Moscow, 1962-64), 2:252-53. Khrushchevs statement was made in a speech delivered in Kazakhstan in 1956, but this passage was deleted in the version published at the time. Cf. Kazakhstanskaia pravda, July 31, 1956. 3 Pravda, Nov. 17, 1960, Shevchenkos article. The question of where Khrushchev got the idea to plow the virgin lands therefore seemingly remains unanswered. But more on this matter later.

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to win the plenum'sf ormale ndorsemento f the general idea of expandingw heat production in Kazakhstana s well as in other places. On the day after the plenum ended, the entire Kazakh delegation met with Khrushchev and was "insistently advised" by him to work out plans for bringing the virgin lands into use.4 Another meeting took place shortly thereafter, this time with only the members of the Kazakh Central Committee's bureau and the obkom secretaries present. Addressing that more select group, Khrushchev gave "instructions" (and not merely advice) to prepare a plan for turning up new lands. In the ensuing three months various officials from Kazakhstanw ere calledt o Moscowb y the Secretariatt o participatein drafting the plan, but the members of the bureau were not among those summoned. 5 It was only at these later meetings that a projected total area to be cultivated was determined. At this stage in the planning, the question of how much land to turn up was problematical, largely because it had at first been assumed by all concerned that the Kazakhs would do the job on the basis of their own rather limited resources. But at some one of the later meetings Khrushchev conferred with the Kazakh obkom secretaries, asking them: "What quantity of land would it be possible to cultivate in the republic if the project were given a nationwide scope ?"6 Undoubtedly, it was in response to this question that the obkom secretaries suggested the figures that Khrushchev gave in the quotation above. The First Secretary was now able to insist upon cultivating millions of hectares of new lands in Kazakhstan. This series of encounters illustrates well how Khrushchev intervened in Kazakh party affairs to initiate policy as well as to put pressure upon the Kazakhs to expand the scope of that policy once it had been accepted in principle. The Kazakh leadership's first response to the enactments of the September plenum was published in the October 6, 1953, resolution of the Kazakh Central Committee's sixth plenum which called for an increase in the area sown to hard (winter) wheat in the republic.7 In effect, that statement was but a repetition of the terms used in the September plenum's resolution, and neither the specific hectarage to be turned up nor the virgin lands were mentioned. Pravda's report on the Kazakh plenum did, however, note that a number of speakers had called attention to the fact that in recent years the cultivation of virgin and idle lands in Kazakhstan had ceased.8 Pressure from below was already being put upon the Kazakh party leadership to make amends for that negligence. It was only in the confidential report, dated December 3, 1953, from the Kazakh Central Committee to its superior counterpart in Moscow that the first specific figure on hectarage to be cultivated appeared; the report stated that by 1955 the area sown to wheat would increase by 544,000 hectares.9 That relatively modest proposal had been worked out at another plenum of the Kazakh Central Committee held in late November, at which the main objections of the Kazakh opponents to Khrushchev's proposals were raised. They insisted that roads, warehouses, and grain elevators should be built before colossal areas of land were brought under cultivation.10A cceptance of those demands would necessarily have meant that the pace of cultivation would be slow. All these activities, it must be stressed, were taking place in the covertness which has ever characterizedt he work of the apparat.11 B ut this time the secrecy and the peculiar kinds of pressures it
4 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, Jan. 20, 1963, N. Dyshlovoi. See M. Baranov and V. Skorobogatov, eds., Gody velikikh svershenii (Alma-Ata, 1960), pp. 209-11, for a detailed account of the meeting at which representatives of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture were also present. 5 S. Baishev et al., eds., Ocherki istoris Kommunisticheskoi parti Kazakhstana (Alma-Ata, 1963), pp. 497-98. The authors of this book, the official history of the Kazakh party, took some pains to cite party archives in making the point that instructions were given. It did, after all, contradict Khrushchevs version. 6 V. I. Poliakov, Serdechnye vstrechi (Moscow, 1959), p. 5. 7 V. K. Savosko, ed., Narodnoe dvizhenie za osvoenie tselinnykh zem.el v Kazakhstane (Moscow, 1959), p. 33. 8 Pravda, Oct. 10, 1953. 9 Savosko, Narodnoe dvizhenie, p. 53. 10 Baranov and Skorobogatov, Gody velikikh svershenii, p. 211. 11 It must be stressed again that the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, and not only the party apparatus, had been involved in discussions of the project immediately following the September plenum (see note 4). In December a special governmental commission was formed to deal with the virgin lands when the huge size of the endeavor began to be apparent. See Istoriia SSSR, 1965, no. 5, p. 142.

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usually permitted the First Secretary in Moscow to put on the party leadership of any republic were not producing the desired result in the form of a commitment to a sufficiently massive cultivation of new lands. Another course of action had to be undertaken in order to impose a new kind of pressure upon the so far successfully recalcitrant Kazakh party leadership. A substantial dose of publicity was therefore administered in two lengthy articles, very similar in content, that appeared in Pravda on December 11 and 24. Their respective authors (N. Beliaev, secretary of the Altai kraikom in western Siberia, and E. Taibekov, chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers) maintained that the krai and the republic each had about six million hectares of land suitable for raising wheat. They then noted and refuted several objections to cultivating such lands, particularlyt he one that cattle farming would suffer because pasture would be reduced. Finally, invoking in effect the almost sacrosanct principle of democratic centralism, they pointed out that the policy of cultivating the virgin lands f lowed out of the decisions of the September plenum. The Pravda articles revealed several important things: their very authorship showed that Khrushchev had the support of the Altai krai's party leader, but not that of the Kazakhp arty leadershipi, n his questt o cultivates ix million hectares of new lands in each of their respective domains. Then two short but extremely important items appeared in the press. On January 6, 1954, Komnsomol'skapiraa vdap rinteda minusculeT ASS dispatchf rom Kazakhstan quoting M. Vlasenko, the republic's minister of state farms. He announced that the Kazakh state farms were to plow and sow to wheat an additional 2.5 million hectares in the next two years. This was the first time that a specificf igureo n hectaragea ctuallyt o be cultivatedh ad been reportedp ublicly. Similarly, on January 15 a dispatch from Alma-Ata in Pravda stated that the Kazakh collective farms were to cultivate "several million" hectares of virgin lands. These items clearly indicated that the expansion of the sown area was to be much greater than the one projected by the Kazakh Central Committee in its recent December report. What had happened in the interim? Quite simply, that report had been preceded by the Novembet plenum of the Kazakh committee. There, more proposals for extensively cultivating the virgin lands had been raised, only to be rejected by the top Kazakh party leadership. Khrushchev's attempts to work through intermediaries having failed, and the Pravda articles having appeared, toward the end of December the Secretariat in Moscow summoned a number of "representatives" from Kazakhstan, discussed the virgin lands in the new context, and transmitted direct orders to Alma-Ata to undertake preparations for an expanded program of cultivation.12 But all the items in the press and direct orders notwithstanding, the fact was that some basic aspects of the virgin lands program had not yet been worked out in final form. On January 22, 1954, Khrushchev found it necessary to forward to the Presidium of the party a memorandum entitled "Ways of Solving the Grain Problem." He there stated his case to his fellow collective leaders in a manner showing him to be an able practitioner of the arts of political argumentation and manipulation.13 He began by pointing out rather bluntly that the nation's grain problem had not been solved. In fact, a kind of scissors crisis had been developing, since in recent years the amount of grain purchased by the governmnent was progressively being overtaken by the quantity expended, and in 1953 it had been necessary to make up a difference of 160 million poods out of the state grain reserves. Khrushchev then hastened, in an astutely politic way, to absolve Malenkov of any culpability for having issued deceptive figures at the Nineteenth Congress: the fault really lay with the local authorities, who had raised their crop estimates so as to approach the figure for the planned payment in kind. The announced 8 billion poods had been nothing but an inf lated estimate; the amount actually harvested in 1952 was 5.6 billion poods. Now came the main point. In 1954-55, said Khrushchev, it would be possible to cultivate 13 million hectares of virgin land in various parts of the Soviet Union, 8.7 million of them on collective farms, 4.3 million on state farms. At this point, it is important to establish quite clearly that the only arresting element in Khrushchev's proposal was the scope of the endeavor, and not the idea of turning up virgin lands.
12 See ibid., and also Pravdas report (Feb. 22, 1954) dealing with the Kazakh party congress. 13 See Khrushchev, Stroitelstvo kommunizma, 1: 85-100, for the complete text. Appended to the memorandum, but not published with it, were various supporting documents, including newspaper articles on the subject.

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After all, there was already in progress a more modest program for cultivating 2.3 million hectares of new lands in 1954 as part of the current Five-Year Plan.14 If we assume, in the absence of other data, that the Five-Year Plan called for cultivation of an additional 2.3 million hectares in 1955, Khrushchev's proposal amounted to adding another 8.4 million hectares over the course of the two years. The relative roles assigned to the collective and state farms seemed both to underline that continuity and to guarantee that capital investment expenditures wouldn ot be astronomicalA. pparentlyK hrushchevh ad seized upon an existing program and was suggesting a radical expansion of it. After discussing the benefits and the imposing problems associated with the proposed program, Khrushchev argued that the additional grain from the new lands would make it possible to ease the pressure on the collective farms as a whole, since the authorities would then be able to "change the existing incorrect practice of grain purchases in which the per hectare norms of compulsory deliveries exist only nominally, but in fact as much grain as can be gotten is taken from the collective farms."15 It is not too difficult to imagine how irresistibly enticing this prospect of eliminating one of the most counterproductive practices in Soviet agriculture must have been. Now that the question was in the hands of the Presidium, Khrushchev next undertook the task of gaining support for his full program from the Soviet agriculturali nterests by attemptingt o inf luencet he course of the debates among the leaders. How fortunate (or designed?), therefore, that four major conferences on agriculture took place almost consecutively in Moscow in late January and early February. First, the scientists and production workers who attended a meeting sponsored by the All-Union Academy of AgriculturalS ciences "recognizedt he exceptional advantageousnesso f the cultivation of new lands on an extensive scale."16 However, that meeting and its endorsementr eceivedf ar less publicityt han the subsequentc onferenceo f MTS workers. Both Pravda and Izvestiia reported the proceedings (January 25-28) in great detail. Although three of the lesser speakers were quoted as remarking that preparationsw ere being made to cultivaten ew lands, the lengthy summary of the keynote address delivered by I. A. Benediktov, USSR minister of ag riculture, contained not a word about the virgin lands. A speech was also delivered by Khrushchev, but not even a summary of that was published. It is therefore somewhat curious to find a Pravda editorial on the conference devoting considerable attention to the news that "the state and collective farms are to undertake extensively the cultivation of virgin and idle lands."17 The same can be said of the appeal published by the conference which, using heavy type to accentuate the point, called the virgin lands "a huge reserve for increasing the production of grain."18 Not surprisingly, the inspiration for those statements was to be found in the speeches of Benediktov, later printed in full by Pravda on February 11, 1954, and Khrushchev, made public only in 1962.19 Benediktov's speech revealed the precise hectarage to be turned up by the collective farms, while Khrush chev's disclosed the total area to be cultivated-13 million hectares. Yet neither figure was made public at the time of the conference, and only such indefinite expressions as "extensively" and "huge reserve" appeared in print. Strikingly similar circumstances characterized the third meeting, the All- Union Conference of State Farm Workers, held on February 3-5. Once more, little was reported as having been said about the virgin lands, and Khrushchev again spoke, but no report was made of his specific remarks. This time, though, there was a significant departure. The conference's appeal published by Pravda on February 8 noted (again in heavy type): "In 1954 the state farms must plow up not less than 4.3 million hectares of
14 Khrushchev cited that figure in the memorandum when making his main point. See ibid., 1: 89. Even that more limited program was apparently lagging. See Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskogo pravitelstva po khosiaistvennym voprosain, 1917-1957 gg.: Sbornik dokumentov, 4 vols. (Moscow, 1957-58), 4:167. In many respects, Khrushchevs proposals in the memorandum bore a remarkable resemblance to two previous virgin lands programs undertaken in 1940 and 1946. See Resheniia partii i pravitelstva po khosiaistvennym voprosam (Moscow, 1967-68), 2: 749-52; see also Direktivy, 3: 135-45. 15 Khrushchev, Stroitelstvo kommunizma, 1: 96. 16 Voprosy istorii, 1962, no. 8, p. 6. See also Pravda, Jan. 25, 1954. The use of the word extensive at this stage had a significance that will be commented upon later. 17 Pravda, Jan. 29, 1954. 18 Ibid., Jan. 30, 1954. 19 Khrushchev, Stroitelstvo kosntmu-ni2m1a:, 101-33.

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virgin and idle lands...." The figure, obviously, was taken from Khrushchev's memorandum. This turn of events was important, for only at this point could one be certain that the leadership had reached a decision to accept that part of the memorandum dealing with the role to be played by the state farms. Apparently no decision had yet been made regarding the collective farms, which were to bear the brunt of the work according to the memorandum; but that was forthcoming in short order, as was made clear by the publication of Benediktov's speech on February 11. The details of the fourth meeting, the All-Russian Conference of Advanced Agricultural Workers, held on February 11-15, may be omitted, since the landmark decisions just noted had been made, and this conference played no important political role. On the other hand, there was some unfinished business to be attended to, namely, the still obstructive Kazakh party leadership. Here, too, Khrushchev's efforts were crowned with success. On January 30, 1954, the members of the Kazakh Central Committee's bureau attended a meeting of the Secretariat in Moscow, at which their behavior was criticized. The first and second secretaries were then and there deposed, a decision formalized by the Kazakh Central Committee about a week later. 20 Casting a glance backward, we may observe that the events connected with the conferences on agriculture suggest that between January 25 and February 8 (the interval between tlhe delivery of Benediktov's speech and the publication of the appeal of the Conference of State Farm Workers) an argument was taking place among the leaders in Moscow about the feasibility of carrying out Khrushchev's full program. Consequently, no specific figures on the matter could be made public in the meantime. The evidence concerning the opposition to that program in the party's Presidium unfortunately constitutes a rather weak foundation upon which to base a satisfactory analysis. Since the accusations lodged against the opponents were made public only several years later, it is not always clear just when each opponent voiced his objections. Those who expressed serious reservations when the memorandum was being discussed were Molotov, Kaganovich, and perhaps Saburov. 21Malenkov's opposition was minimal. 22 At least while Khrushchev was in power, it was virtually standard Soviet practice to accuse the entire "antiparty group" of being against cultivating the virgin lands. In all likelihood, the opposition of the remaining members of the group arose only later in the form of interfering with the execution of the policy once its high cost had become apparent: Khrushchev himself indicated that they joined the group only afterward as a result of disagreements over a number of issues, one of which was the virgin lands policy. 23 By that time, it is worth noting, both the shape and scope of the program had been altered radically; thus the issues involved in later debates were not at all the same as the ones in January-February 1954. The question of timing is not without importance in discussing the opposition. It is somewhat surprising that Khrushchev's memorandum was submitted so late, that is, so short a time before the beginning of the spring plowing. Possibly he was waiting for the final agricultural statistics for 1953 to arrive, thinking that they would buttress his point about the seriousness of the situation. But since spring was just around the corner, preparations had to be initiated and pressure put on the Presidium to get a quick answer. In that connection it would be interesting to know exactly at whose suggestion the four meetings on agriculture were called and when it was decided to convoke them. The fact that in one of his unpublished speeches delivered on January 28, a scant six days after he had completed his memorandum,
20 See Istoriia SSSR, 1965, no. 5, p. 142; Khrushchev, Stroitelstvo kommunizma, 1: 275-76; Pravda, Feb. 12, 1954. 21 On Molotov, see Plenum Tsentralnogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partil Sovetskogo Soluza, 15-19 dekabria 1958 g.: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1959), pp. 15-16, for Khrushchev on this point; D. Poliansky provides confirmation in XXII Sezd Kommunisticheskoi partil Sovetskogo Soiuza, 17-31 oktiabria 1961 g.: Stenograficheskii otchet, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1962), 2: 42. On Kaganovich, see Plenum, p. 408, for lurkins statement and pp. 421-22 for Matskevichs substantiation. On Saburov, see Plenutm, p. 408. lurkin here refers to objections raised by the State Planning Commission, then headed by Saburov, that the material resources needed to carry out the program were lacking. 22 The only mention of Malenkovs having entered a specific objection at this time came in Bulganins impassioned speech to the Central Committee in 1958. See Plenum, p. 340. One hesitates to take this statement at face value, partly because Bulganin is the only one to have made the accusation and partly because he refers here not only to the virgin lands policy but also to the proposal made by Khrushchev almost simultaneously to change the method of planning in agriculture. It is therefore not clear just which policy (if not both) Malenkov was allegedly objecting to. 23 See XXII Sezd, 1: 105-6.

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Khrushchev was able to announce that a plenum was to be held shortly indicated at least that the leadership was in agreement on the need to expand the area sown to grain. 24 But since no figures on the total area to be cultivated were published at that time, there is no reason to think that all were of one mind at the moment regarding the scope of the expansion, not to mention its precise form. The objections entered against cultivating the virgin lands were the following: the land there was not suitable for tilling; because of poor harvests, there would in fact be a drop in the per hectare yield of grain, and therefore the expenditures made would not be recovered; there were not enough resources, fiscal or material, to carry out the program. 25 Although the precise part played by the conferences discussed above in overcoming these objections remains obscure, it is at least clear that Khrushchev's statements at them served to provoke expressions of support (the appeal and editorial cited previously) which would not be without significance in the discussions then taking place in the Presidium. The outcome of the debate in that body was documented in the resolution produced by the Central Committee plenum of February 23-March 2, 1954-the adoption of Khrushchev's program. So ended the long and complex process by which Khrushchev overcame the opposition to his proposals which had arisen in both Kazakhstan and Moscow. Khrushchev first tried to eliminate the Kazakhstan opposition by attempting to work from below, largely through the obkom secretaries, who had in effect received instructions from the Secretariat in Moscow, if not from Khrushchev himself. When that tack proved unworkable, the Kazakh leadership was eventually removed. Khrushchev surmounted the Moscow opposition by seeking support outside both the party and governmental agencies in his speeches to the conferences of agricultural workers as well as to the scientists engaged in agricultural research. The key term used in the esoteric public communications dealing with the virgin lands was "extensive." All along the way, the main objections to Khrushchev's policy had to do with how much land ought to be, or could be, turned up in 1954-55. Khrushchev took a maximalist position, in fine opting for the cultivation of an enormous area roughly equal in size to Greece or the state of Alabama. Thus, to favor the "extensive" cultivation of the new lands, as the first two conferences on agriculture did, was to support Khrushchev's proposal and declare oneself against the proponents of a more limited undertaking, a category into which Kaganovich and Saburov seemed to have fallen. With the possible exception of Molotov, there is simply no evidence showing that anybody, in either Moscow or Kazakhstan, was opposed in principle to expanding the cultivation of the virgin lands. 26 But many were dubious about the wisdom of attempting to do too much in too short a time. Once the program got under way, Khrushchev was quick to press for doubling the area to be cultivated, a proposal that occasioned even more widespread opposition among the leadership. Although that entanglement is quite another matter, it ought at least to be stated that there, too, Khrushchev carried the day. The preceding analysis points toward some complexities in the Soviet policy formation and decisionmaking process that require further comment. The process in this case did not simply consist in an order given by Khrushchev which was immediately followed to the letter by the lower instances of party authority. Nor was it exclusively a matter of the disagreement among Presidium members. In broadest outline, the period under study was bracketed by two major decisions reached formally at Central Committee plenums: the general authorization in September 1953 to expand wheat production, and the spe cific elaboration in the following March. During that time a large number of issues arose and had to be resolved, alternative choices were made, a variety of institutions and politicians holding posts in them came into play, and varied communication techniques were used. In view of the past adoption of virgin lands programs, it was not surprising that Khrushchev should have conceived of a new program before the September plenum, and neither was it surprising that the
24 Khrushchev, Stroitelstvo kommnunizmn1a: ,1 39. 25 lurkin in Plenum, p. 408. lurkin here couples his enumeration of the objections with the insinuation that they were actually groundless and were raised merely for base reasons. While ill will may have played a part, the future would show that the objections had some basis in fact. 26 On Molotov, see Conquest, Power and Policy, pp. 234-43, where copious quotations assist in establishing the specific objections entered by the various opponents.

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idea was so easily accepted in principle at the time of the plenum. What happened immediately thereafter was of great importance. The Kazakhs were told to produce a proposal based upon an estimate of their own capacities. Already a choice had been made involving a tacit avowal that nationwide resources would not be committed, an obvious effort to keep expenditures down; and that was probably the main reason the program had been accepted in principle. But the Kazakhs were apparently given no other guidelines, at least partly because nobody in Moscow had a clear idea of how much could be accomplished on that basis. At the same moment, the USSR Ministry of Agriculture entered the picture, almost at the very beginning, and the Secretariat in Moscow thereafter kept a close check on developments by ordering various Kazakhs to the capital. Only in late November did the Kazakhs develop their concrete program, almost three months after the September plenum, and it was probably about then that Khrushchev raised the question of broadening the resource base of the program with the Kazakh obkom secretaries. The objections raised in the major virgin lands regions to that policy alternative were serious enough to require public refutation in the December Pravda articles, which at the same time constituted weighty support for Khrushchev's desire to expand cultivation extensively. 27 The basic outline of Khrushchev's final proposal was therefore fashioned in the following month and presented in his memorandum. Yet he was still uncertain of success. To be sure, a virgin lands policy was to be announced at the approaching plenum; but with respect to Kazakhstan, say, would it call for cultivating half a million, two million, or six million hectares? To ensure that the area would be as large as possible, Khrushchev sought additional support at the meetings dealing with agriculture even while the final decision was being made, the crucial point in the whole process. 28 By the time the February-March plenum had gathered, an imposing array of institutions, persons, and groups had in some way expressed varying opinions on the policy under consideration. Just to enumerate them suggests the complexity of the political forces involved: Khrushchev, the September plenum, the Kazakh delegation to the plenum, the Kazakh bureau, the Kazakh first and second secretaries, the Secretariat in Moscow, the Kazakh obkom secretaries, the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, the Altai kraikom's first secretary, the chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers, the interests represented at the successive conferences on agriculture, the members of the Presidium. While the totality of these factors at work in the political process outlined above did not constitute an example of democracy at work, neither was it quite totalitarianism at work. Rather, it was an illustration of the "establishment" engaging in the new brand of politics made possible by the recent demise of the Leader. There was much more involved in policy-making than just the decision of a dozen men. To be sure, the final decision was made by that handful of men, but only after considerable staff work had been done. And it was in connection with the latter activity that much of the real politics of the February-March plenum took place regarding the new lands. Prior to the plenum an extended discussion had already taken place in which the speakers at the session had either participated or with which they were at least familiar. As Western students of Soviet affairs are wont to note, the speeches at plenums often appear to be pro forma performances. Indeed, they are largely that, but a study of what precedes them takes one beyond the pale of pat addresses and into the realm of rough-and-tumble politics.

27 These articles were doubtless among those appended to Khrushchevs memorandum (see note 13). 28 The last three conferences were formally convoked by the joint decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, a fact of some importance inasmuch as, according to Khrushchev, the same two bodies also decided to convoke the plenum of FebruaryMarch. See Khrushchev, Stroitelstvo kommunizma, 1: 133. To put the matter quite accurately, the meetings were convoked jointly by the Presidium, the Secretariat, and the Council of Ministers. The surprising element, nevertheless, was that the Council of Ministers had been involved in calling a plenum. As for the last three agricultural conferences, the Presidium attended at least the opening session of each, and it seems safe to assume that the Presidium or some of its members held private meetings withdelegates at which the virgin lands were discussed.

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Murat Laumulin and Chokan Laumulin

In place of a foreword: in the centre of Eurasia Modern Kazakhstan, located at the very centre of the great Eurasian continent, is a country where diverse and at times contradictory phenomena have synthesised and become intertwined. This is a country that leans both to the East and to the West. The rudiments of a nomadic lifestyle, dating back to ancient times, stand side by side with advanced space programmes. The broadly-accepted high-society way of life does not exclude the Islamic heritage in Kazakh history, which is represented by a multitude of monuments in the south of the country. The geographical, cultural and linguistic features of northern Kazakhstan are a stark reminder of how close Siberia is from here. In the West, Kazakhstan meets the worlds largest lake, the Caspian Sea, while to the east it adjoins Asias grandest mountain system. The country is populated by many different peoples and cultures. In the course of a history that has been far from simple, Kazakhstan has acquired uniqueness in the nature of enterprising and resilient individuals who still remember the traditional values of collectivism. Their principal features are tolerance and openness. Each generation and each social group in Kazakhstan prize their personal experience and have their own values: the older generation draws strength in the nomadic tradition and ancient culture; the middle generation relies on its knowledge and splendid education, for which it has the Soviet system to thank; young people are turning more and more to the West, they are fluent in European languages, they drink in democratic values and make wide use of the Internet. From 2006, thanks to the distinctive brand of humour of the British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen, Kazakhstan, at least in name, is no longer a country completely unknown to the rest of the world. This style of humour is directed to many different targets, yet all with no bearing on the real Kazakhstan. And the real Kazakhstan is the focus of this book. Although Kazakhstan is historically and culturally a part of Central Asia, it is in fact a country lying at the very heart of geographical Eurasia. Residents of Kazakhstan class themselves equally as living in Asia and Europe. Indeed, a considerable part of Kazakhstan (in European terms), the size of the Benelux countries together, lies in geographical Europe. And yet there are other criteria, too, which enable the Kazakh people to associate themselves with Europe. We will cover these in more detail later in the book. Kazakhstan is considered to be a very rich country in terms of the resources that lie beneath its surface. In Soviet times it was customary to speak of the entire Periodic Table being presented. Some added that if some elements are missing, they can be always be created in nuclear reactors, implying the scientific potential of this Soviet republic. Kazakhstan may also compete with the largest grain and meat producers on the planet. Nature has been kind in the diversity it has given to the Kazakh land. Lost within this enormous country are endless steppes, imposing mountain peaks, beautiful oases and flowering valleys, deserts, Martian landscapes, major industrial cities and homely farmsteads. However, the most valued possession of the country is not its nature, despite the incredible extent to which it has influenced the formation of the population. Kazakhstans greatest wealth is its people. The national character of the residents of the country has been moulded under the impact of many factors, including geography, religion and culture, although the greatest influence came from radical changes in the ancient and more recent history of Kazakhstan. The last revolution of this kind occurred not so long ago, in 1991, with the collapse of the grand socialist empire, of which Kazakhstan was a part. A new Kazakh identity is now being actively shaped and we will cover this in detail. Thus, by submitting this essay on Kazakhstan, a country at the heart of Eurasia, our readers may judge for themselves the most important area of interest for them, be it the nature, culture, history or the people. We hold the opinion that a direct acquaintance is better than information received sight unseen. Nevertheless, to avoid disappointment, to reach a correct understanding, to save time and even to fall in love with the country, reading this book, although a poor substitute to the real thing, will present a reflection of the diversity of the phenomenon that is the Kazakhstan of yesterday and today. We do hope that reading this book will prove worthwhile and rewarding. 149

CHILDREN OF THE STEPPES

Who are the Kazakhs? Although Kazakhs were little known to the outside world until relatively recently, their name has been on European tongues at the very least since the 18th Century, albeit in distorted form. From Kazaks (or Kozaks in the Ukrainianised version) came the term Cossasks, the free-roaming warriors of the steppes, who spread terror with their warmongering. The Cossacks were then taken into the service of the Russian Empire and it is from here that they became known to the West. They spoke in a Russian dialect and professed Christianity. But those from whom the Eastern European Cossacks adopted their name, many customs, military organisation, vocabulary, manner of speaking and fighting, that is, the genuine Kazakhs, were completely different people, and different they remain to this day. Our tale is devoted to these people, which now attract universal attention owing to the size of their country, their natural riches, extraordinary economic successes and, most importantly, their unique national character, a fusion of Turkic-Islamic culture, steppe traditions and a post-Soviet mentality. There can be no doubt that Kazakhs, in their origins, are children of the steppes. The steppe and the nomadic lifestyle have left a lasting mark on their notions, their language, customs and behaviour. Even today, the descendants of the nomads, who settled in the towns and cities in their third and fourth generations, yearn for the limitless space of the steppe. Look into the eyes of your Kazakh companion and this yearning will be easy to see. Only dont look too long, else he may recall the warring past of his ancestors. Archaeologists have identified the remains of about 200 Neolithic settlements, spread over the entire territory of Kazakhstan. In the mid second millennium BCE this was a place for the mining and processing of copper and bronze. Residents of the region at this time were either tilling the land or rearing livestock. In the first millennium BCE the nomadic tribes arrived on the scene. The Third Century BCE saw new, Prototurkish groups of nomadic livestock farmers, who altered the Iranian substance of the local population. So, over all of two-three millennia, events have unfolded in the space now occupied by modern Kazakhstan, which have consequently defined the face of the modern world. At least this is what the Kazakhs believe, and do not try to convince them otherwise. It was here that man first tamed the horse and saddled it. It was here that the first proto-nomads broke away from their agrarian brothers and turned to a warring, nomadic way of life. It was here where the ancestors of the Kazakhs first smelted iron and wrought terror with their weaponry on bronze-sword-wielding enemies, from China to Rome. It was here that that mens trousers and stirrups for horse riding were invented. It was here that great hordes of warring nomadic tribes were born and grew in strength; it was from here that they stormed the Great Wall of China, Hadrians Wall, and the city fortifications of Byzantium, Rome, Baghdad and Damascus. At different times the terrified residents of countries where they settled gave them different names: Sakas, Huns, Turks, Kipchaks, Oguz and Tatars, but modern-day Kazakhs see them all as their anthropological ancestors. It is thought that the ancient ancestors of the Kazakhs and other pastoral peoples of Central Eurasia spoke in languages of the Persian group. One can still find roots of words in the Kazakh language which relate them to other Indo-European peoples: Iranian, Germanic and Slavic. Remote ancestors of the Kazakhs were closer in appearance to Europeans than they were to Mongoloids, as many archaeological finds display. Yet over time, with the growing demographic expansion of the Turkic tribes from Altai to Siberia, the language, external appearance, customs and culture of the local tribes came to change irrevocably. The language became Turkic , the external appearance Mongoloid, meaning more Asiatic in expression, the customs changed to display greater solidarity and organisation. Just one thing remained unchanged their warring nature. A new nation, the Turkic people, formed many states in the centre of Eurasia, many great steppe confederations and empires from the 5th to the 15th Centuries. These khaganates and hordes had different names, but the Kazakh steppe was always there, in the centre of their territory. The greatest shock for Eurasia was the formation of the Mongol Empire, stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the Arctic Ocean, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, from Korea to Trieste and from Siberia to Mesopotamia. By the Mongol era, the chroniclers of the time already knew the names of all the tribes that consequently made up the Kazakh na150

I. The breath of history

tion. These tribes were both among the opponents of the Mongols and those who contributed to their military power. By the time they were making incursions into Europe, the Mongol army was already 95% comprised of tribes, whose camps were located in Kazakhstan and southern Siberia. Soon the Turkic tribes were able to rid themselves of Mongol rule, but by this time irreversible changes had taken place: from Chingiz Khan and the Mongols they inherited political organisation, ruling dynasties and the principles of economic and political management. This is how the Kazakh nation was conceived. In the course of many wars, conflicts, annexations and transformations in the early 15th Century, parts of the tribes were able to break away from the main horde of the Uzbeks and in the region of modern-day Alma-Ata , in Semirechie, they formed their own Khanate, which, as a consequence, was given the name Kazakhskoe, and the tribes that entered the Khanate came to bear the proud name of Kazakhs. Very soon they emerged from the narrow framework of Semirechie, uniting dozens of tribes and clans around them, who adopted the general name Kazakh, while retaining their tribal identity. Thus, in the mid 15th Century several tribal groupings were formed on the territory of Mogulistan, be tween Transoxiania and Lake Balkhash, the heart of what later became known as the Kazakh Khanate. The classical Kazakh society (from the 16th to the 19th centuries) was based on a nomadic way of life, customary law (the Adat) and Islamic legislation (the Shariat). Livestock farming remained the principal occupation. The Kazakh Khanate was divided into three major parts: the Great, the Middle and the Small Zhuzes, or Hordes. A feature of traditional Kazakh society was its structural hierarchy, based on tribal- and clan-based organisation, including an aristocracy, commoners and the clergy. The Kazakhs were ruled by the Khan and the sultans, who had raised their genealogy to the Great Master of the Universe, that is, to Chingiz Khan. To the surprise of the majority of the Kazakhs neighbours in Central Asia and in the Middle East (possibly with the exception of the Great Mongol dynasty which ruled in India and the rulers of the Eastern European khanates, which had conquered Russia) they lost this dynastic continuity. Most surprising is that it was even lost by the Mongols themselves. Once they had moved to Bud dhism in its lamaistic form, they little resembled the earlier, warring, Mongols of the Chingiz Khan era. For this reason the Kazakh sultans were desired (but sometimes undesired, too) guests of the emirates, sultanates and khanates, where thrones had become vacant. That is why offshoots of the Kazakh Chingizids ruled from the Crimea to Kashgar. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Kazakhs were confronted with rivals, who dreamed of resurrecting the Mongol Empire to its primordial form. These were the western Mongol Oirat tribes, or the Jungar , who came down on the Kazakh Muslims and attempted to capture their towns, oases, mountain pastures and steppe expanses. Historic tradition and the history books assert that there was a time when the threat of physical extermination hung over the Kazakhs. However, history saw to it that it was the Jungars, who had forced the Kazakhs out to the mountains of modern-day Xinjiang, who were almost totally wiped out; epidemics and the swords of the new rulers of China, the Manchurians, did their work. The Kazakhs were able to gather breath and began dealing in economics. Very soon they understood that there was more to be gained in trading livestock than there was in conquering and surrounding oneself in the tributes of settled peoples. The Kazakhs quickly adapted to being neighbours with Russia, which became their principal sales market for livestock, leather and wool. In just one century these nomadic warriors had transformed into peaceful shepherd folk and, in the 19th Century, Russia, having suppressed several bloody rebellions, annexed the Kazakh steppes into its own territory. As a pretext to conquering this land, Petersburg used the fact that the most bellicose and wholly insubordinate tribes of western Kazakhstan were continuing to live off forays and slave trading, supplying subjects of the Russian Empire to the slave markets of Khiva, Bukhara, Tehran, Istanbul and Cairo. Russia used the Kazakh steppe as a base for this military invasion of Central Asia and, following the British, they came to call it Turkestan. Very soon the Russian forces came up against the British in Afghanistan and the Chinese in Xinjiang. A major geopolitical battle ensued, known thanks to the good graces of the American journalist Eugene Schuyler as The Great Game. At the time the Kazakhs did not suspect that the Russians had drawn them into a major geopolitical game, as a result of which, in 1991, they came to have the world's third largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. But for now this was a long way off and the Kazakhs were happy to participate in the Russians military expeditions against other infidels, agreeing however for itself 151

an immunity in the event of a war between Russia and Turkey, which was headed by the sultan, previously, we know, simultaneously the Caliph, the ruler of all true believers. In 1916 the Russians ignored this agreement, during the Great War in Europe, when Turkey was fighting on the side of the Austrian-German bloc. As a result of the call up of Kazakhs into the fighting army, a major rebellion ensued, leading to the collapse of colonial power a year before the Great Russian Revolution. This episode forces us to remember the role of Islam in Kazakh life. By an irony of fate, the Kazakhs were always seen by their more devout neighbours as poor Muslims. The Kazakhs, like their ancestors thousands of years before them, believed in the spirits of their ancestors and holy shrines, the Sun and the Sky, that is, what is seen in Arabia as paganism. Fortunately, the Kazakhs did not suspect and they still continue to cultivate pre-Islamic cults, paying not the slightest heed to what Riyadh thinks of the matter. At the end of the 18th Century, the Russian Empress Catherine II, although a protestant in origin who had switched to orthodoxy, having heard much about the weak piety of the Kazakhs and wishing to reinforce morality and the foundations of power in the steppe, resolved to instil Islam in the Kazakh steppe. It cannot be said that Catherine the Greats attempts and those of her successors yielded any success to speak of: Islamisation mainly concerned the elite. From an organisational point of view, the steppe saw not Central Asian mullahs coming from the south, but Tatar mullahs starting to come from the north, who soon became infected with pagan prejudices and who assimilated into and dissolved among the Kazakhs. Life on the eve of the Revolution boiled and bubbled in the Kazakh steppe. The Kazakhs found themselves drawn into the fashionable political movements of the time, adopted from Turkey, Russia and from Europe. Some advocated a reformed and worldly Islam, others preached liberalism in its purest form, while others still, having read their fill of Karl Marx, dreamed of world revolution for all oppressed peoples. Very soon the latter were able to apply their doctrine in practice; for the remaining Kazakhs this experiment came at a high price. Nomadism the eternal riddle of the Great Steppe For thousands of years the invasions of nomads have planted terror into the settled peoples. Residents of China, Central Asia, Iran, Eastern Europe and the Middle East have waited in fear for the latest attack from the Great Steppe. All the great steppe empires finally collapsed and died out, leaving science the still unsolved riddle of nomadism. So what contribution to the history of humankind have the nomads made? Were they just merciless destroyers or did they promote the cultural, technological and political interaction of different, remote parts of the world, and were they the creators of a unique ecological civilisation, adapted to the harsh conditions of Central Eurasia? Humankind has entered the 21st Century, yet problems linked with its ancient history continue to concern scholars and the public at large. The study of the phenomenon of nomadism is classed as one of the most interesting and, at times, painful problems. This is particularly relevant for Kazakhstan, as a significant part of its history is indeed the history of nomadic society. And this problem can be deemed painful because already by the 20th Century, nomadic societies had practically disappeared, and their destruction was accompanied by genocide, violent settlement, assimilation, and loss of unique ethnic identity. All this has occurred in the history of Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, at least two main questions accompany the history of nomadism: the first concerns its ecological aspects, i.e. the interrelations of nomadic systems with nature and the creation of ideal ecological and economic relationships between people, animals and the wild, based on a nomadic system. The second question relates to the nature of interrelations between nomadic people and settled people. This aspect of history is equally painful for both civilisations. Generally speaking, the study of nomadism as a particular historical civilisation goes far beyond the research of nomadism itself and it touches a very broad group of disciplines: ethnography, archaeology, Turkology, comparative linguistics and so on, that is, it actually represents a fragment of the entire history of Central Asia. Surprising though it is, but for a considerable time there was no special study of nomadism as such; it just found itself roaming between different disciplines. For the Soviet period, such a situation is fully explicable: the study of history was forced to follow the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine and this restricted the study of the nomadic way of life to just dogmatic theory. The study of Kazakh nomadism progressed 152

thanks to the efforts of individual enthusiasts, who could shed light on only narrow aspects, and this also continues as a parallel tradition in the West. Certain scholars in the West placed the following theses at the basis of their concept of nomads. First of all, a specialisation means a stronger dependence. This thesis is deciphered in the following way: the more specialised mobile livestock farmers are, the more they depend on the outside world. Secondly, nomadism is a special kind of manufacturing economy. The Kazakh steppes were one of the few regions on the planet where nomadic livestock farming could be observed in its pure form. Thirdly, nomadic livestock farming is not fully adapted to the natural and geographic surroundings; nomads are also forced to adapt to the outside world. Finally, the nomadic economy needed resources from the agricultural and municipal world; in this way, conquering others was a means to subordinate and receive the products required; a means brought to its logical end. The most intriguing question in the history of the Great Steppe is the reason why the nomads were pushed to mass re-settlements and to destructive marches against agricultural civilisations. Modern historiography counts a number of concepts or theories that try to explain this phenomenon. In their most generalised form they can be brought down to the following theses: various global climate changes (such as drought, or, to the contrary, excessive humidity); the warring and greedy nature of the nomads (this point of view originates in Chinese historiography); the over-population of the steppe; the growth in production forces and the class struggle, the weakened position of the agricultural societies as a consequence of feudal compartmentalisation (a classic Marxist concept); the need to replenish the extensive livestock farming economy with forays into more stable agricultural societies; the lack of desire on the part of centres of settled economies to trade with nomads; an excessive surplus of livestock produce; the personal qualities of the leaders of steppe communities; impulses towards ethnographic integration (passionarity). It should be noted that there is a grain of rationality in each concept, although all of them, to one degree or another, suffer from an exaggeration of their own particular case. Modern Paleographic data prove no direct link between global periods of drought or humidity with a rise or fall in nomadic empires. The Marxist theory of class struggle in a nomadic society has also proved to be unfounded. The demographic factor is unclear due to the lack of sources. As for the warring nature of the nomads, the history of settled civilisations demonstrates that it was the settlers who finally created the most effective military technologies and infrastructures. It is noted that nationality in the form of nomadic empires and other political formations developed among the nomads only in those regions where they had regular and intensive political and economic contacts with more organised agricultural and especially urban societies. This thesis is illustrated by the following dichotomy: Scythians and ancient states; Huns and the Roman Empire; Turks and China; Turks and Ancient Rus; Turks and Khorezm; Arabs, Turks and Byzantium, etc. The steppe empires had a nature that was two-sided: from the outside they were reminiscent of the classical despotism of the East whose purpose was to procure additional wares from beyond the steppe, but from within the nomadic empires remained based on tribal links, without a stable tax system and a classical feudal hierarchy, implying the exploitation of the livestock farmers. The authority of the lords of the steppe was based on common law, the ability to organise military campaigns and to redistribute income from trade contributions and forays into neighbouring countries. In general, this is a rough outline of the system most applicable to the Pre-Mongolian Era. It is considered that in their relations with settled territories the nomads used several strategies: there was the strategy of forays and plundering (Cian-bi, Turks and Mongols in relation to China; the Crimean Khanate in relation to Ukraine, Poland and the Moscow state and others); the subjection of the agricultural society and the taking of tributes from it (Scythians and Skoloti, Khazars and Slavs, the Golden Horde and Rus), and also the controlling of the trade routes (the Turks and the Great Silk Road, the Kazakhs and the trade routes joining Central Asia, China, Iran, the Caucasus and Siberia); the conquering of a settled state, the infiltration of the nomads, the creation of a new dynasty, a new ruling class and a new state with the subsequent assimilation of the nomads (the Manchurians in China, the Mongols in China, the Khorezm in Iran, and the Kazakhs in Bukhara etc); the tactics of alternating forays with pillaging and the gathering of tributes, used both prior to and after the conquering by all the major nomadic formations, from the Hun in China to the Turks and 153

Mongols in the late Middle Ages). The term remote exploitation was coined in the early 1990s to explain the essence of the relations between the nomads and the people who worked the land. It should be noted that western scholars raised the question of the role of the early nomads back in the 1950s. They proceeded from the fact that the advent of the European peoples should be traced back to Central Eurasia. Were the early pre-Turk nomads, in their material and spiritual culture, the forerunners of the IndoEuropean peoples who settled in Europe in the Bronze Age? Delving deeper into the essence of the subject, German archaeologist Karl Jettmar concluded that the civilisation of the early wanderers was both unique and self-sufficient. It was the forerunner of classic nomadism, created by the Turko-Mongol nomads of Eurasia in the Common Era. A cultural foundation of sorts, from both an ethnic and a linguistic point of view, which formed the basis for both civilisations, was the so called Animal Style. From an archaeological point of view one can only assume that nomadism was conceived in the late Palaeolithic Age. Nomadism was an active reaction of ancient peoples, familiar with working the land and rearing livestock, to changes in climatic conditions. This relates fully to Central Asia. A number of academics believe that, based on written sources on the Middle East, we can speak of an intensive development of nomadism at the end of 1000 BCE. The universal historical significance of nomadism is characterised by features that are both positive (expansion of the oecumene), and negative (the transition from a more productive to a less productive form of land use). The historical significance of nomadism involves the advent and development of forms of exploitation (loan of livestock) and, as a consequence, of social differentiation. However, the relationship between exploitation and dependence did not lead to antagonism. This is where we should look for the reason why the nomads could not create their own nation on the basis of a nomadic economy. Another reason is that the nomads livestock was not used in the production sector; it was just a consumer product and a means to accumulate wealth. A group of researchers approached the study of nomadism from the standpoint of the horse and the pasture in its history. The American academic Denis Sinor attempted to reveal a link between the rearing of horses and the economy and politics of the nomads; the creation of great cavalries and the rise and fall of the great nomad empires. Sinor believes that the staying power, modest needs and adaptability to severe climatic conditions are what distinguished the Central Asian horse and which gave it an undisputed superiority over other fighting breeds from the times of the Scythians and up to the Second World War. However, the rearing of this breed was a universal occupation throughout the entire history of Central Asia and yet only a few livestock rearing peoples were able to create a nation of long-standing significance. Some scholars believe that to reveal what nomadic culture really is requires analysis of the ancient art of the nomadic peoples of Central Asia. The wandering people of the steppe region of Central Asia turned partially to working the land in the 7th-9th Centuries BCE. A feature of the art of this period is the depiction of human faces with vivid mimicry. The best known art of the nomadic people comes from the early ScythianSarmat period. At this time, the most distinguishable art form involved noble metals, on which images were made, predominantly of animals and humans. Then comes the Turko-Mongol period (4th-15th Centuries), which is characterised by manuscripts and pictures on burial sites. Characteristic features of the art of the nomadic people can be highlighted over a considerable expanse, from Turkestan to Korea. It is based on the Siberian-Scythian animal style, where the depiction of nature is only a supplemental element, with the image of the person or animals, in dynamic poses, tending to predominate. This art of the nomads transpired to have an important influence on Chinese art. Some scholars believe that the history of the great expanses of Inner Asia (Central Asia, Siberia, Mongolia, China, Tibet and the Middle East), the Caucasus and Eastern Europe should be read in a unified context over the entire historical period, from the moment the nomadic people entered the stage of world history. The single culturological type of Central Eurasia was based on a similar type of economy and the social-hierarchical structure that came from it. Despite the abundance of theories and concepts, modern nomadistics has many questions which remain unanswered. The central issue in the study of the nomads, as before, is the relationship between the wandering and settled civilisations: were they antagonists or did they supplement one another in the historical process of human development? 154

The horse in Kazakh history The horse played a colossal role in the formation of the Kazakhs as a nation. Therefore, this short chapter is dedicated to this creature, a creature that has played an even greater role in the history of Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs than the elephant in ancient India, the sheep in early-bourgeois England and the camel for the Arabs. The horse is surely the most wonderful, the wisest, most faithful and hard-working creature, accompanying humans throughout their historical development. This duet, or symbiosis if you wish, between Homo sapiens the wise man, and equus, the horse, arose at the dawn of our time and was completed very recently, in the 20th Century. There would be no exaggeration to say that without the horse there could have been no human history, at least not in the form we know and it would certainly not have made the progress it has. Throughout history, people have used the horse as a means of transport, for food, haulage and military power, for sport and as an item of worship and adoration. People saw horses as the fellow companions of celestial beings (the Horses of Helios), vested them with the divine power of inspiration (the Greek Pegasus) and magical flight (the Kazakh Tulpar), simply deified them (Alexander the Greats Bucephalus) and even elected them to the senate (which is what Roman Emperor Caligula did with his favourite stallion in the 1st Century CE). Besides mythology, horses have become literary characters with their own inner world. Finally, for many peoples of our continent, this four-legged friend has become a part of our common folklore, which sometimes has a precise way of relaying the essence of comparison (to work like a horse), although not always deserved (to drink like a horse). However, before coming a part of human mythology, the horse was destined to play a great role in the establishment of human society, its economy and in the economic development of the planet. We owe much to horse meat and horse milk in medicine and dietetics. Horse meat is considered to be the best meat product for asthmatics, while koumiss, fermented horse milk, is the most effective treatment for tuberculosis. It is generally believed that humans tamed the horse in about the 4th Century BCE, in the Eneolithic Age. However, modern science struggles to answer the question as to when and where humans really patted the withers and fed their new animal friend with fragrant straw for the first time. However, one thing is certain: this historical event for all the world took place somewhere in the expanses of Eurasia and, most likely, in the steppes of Central Asia There are far greater grounds to assert that another historical event actually took place in Central Asia: at the turn of the second and first millennia, nomadic horsemen broke away from the herdsmen and farmers on the land; for them, life with and on the horse had become their main occupation and way of life. This was the second revolution after that of the Neolithic Age nomadism broke away from agriculture and became a special form of manufacturing economy. Throughout the first millennium, the nomads of Central Asia perfected the nomadic means of production and, in parallel, they developed new geographical expanses, encroaching into settled areas. The horse for the nomad was the main mode of transport and, less frequently, the main source of food. For the peoples working the land, the horse acquired three principle functions: to be ridden, to be harnessed and to haul. Horses had a decisive influence on three most important aspects of human activity: transport, agricultural and military. For a considerable time the settled world managed without the development of horse breeding, until it had to come up against the superior force of the nomads, who relied on the use of horses. The first historical encounter of the settled world with those on horseback took place in about 1700 BCE when tribes of Hyksos invaded Egypt from Asia Minor and conquered. The Hyksos, whose origin is still a mystery, brought horse breeding and harnessed transport to Egypt. The Hyksos disappeared, having dissolved among the Egyptians, while, from this moment on, and for the foreseeable future, the state on the Nile gained a military and technological advantage over its neighbours. With time, horse breeding came to spread universally throughout the agricultural civilisations of western Asia and the entire Mediterranean. However, every time the agricultural countries were forced to enter military battle with the Central Asian nomads, they suffered defeat after defeat. The Mediterranean states relied on their naval fleets and the strength of their land forces, predominantly infantry. Moving deep into the continent they were beaten by incomparably more mobile nomad forces. This is a fair appraisal, even in relation to those who had created the most advanced military machines of ancient times, the Greek Macedonians and the Romans. The invincible 155

army of Alexander the Great was stopped by the Sakas on the right bank of the Syr-Daria (now the territory of Kazakhstan) in 329 BCE, while the Romans, headed by Marcus Crassus, suffered a catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Parthians in the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE. In both cases the reason for the invincibility of the steppe armies can be clearly traced: complete supremacy in manoeuvrability, which gave a tactical opportunity to withdraw from battle in unfavourable conditions and impose battle against the opponent at the right moment. At Carrhae the Parthians demonstrated another superiority, which the Mongols under Chingiz Khan were later to repeat over their opponents: an inaccessibility, thanks not only to a rapid horse cavalry, but also to heavy horse cavalry that was impenetrable for the infantry. Until the 5th Century the Europeans were able to hold back the onslaught of the nomadic people from the depths of Eurasia. However, in the fifth century, the peoples who entered history known as the Huns destroyed the Roman Empire, leaving a long-standing reminder of the supremacy of mounted armies over land armies. On the whole, the long and hard historical process known as the Migration Period and which touched the entire history of Eurasia, could have taken place only thanks to the people from the Great Steppe with their horses. From the first millennium of the Common Era the nomads of Central Eurasia enter historys centre stage, at the same time playing the role of creators of great empires and cultural-technological intermediaries between remote civilisations. From the outset the horse in this epoch is a military form of transport, the basis of military might and power, and a subject for barter and trade. The aristocracy of the agricultural people wanted passionately to acquire possession of a horse, which had become a symbol of a privileged position and military might. The European feudal society saw the formation of a class of feudal horsemen, the cavalier, chevalier and the caballero, together with the heavy cavalry. The advent of the heavy horses is attributed to the Middle Ages. In time, knights moved on, but this breed of horse remained, fulfilling heavy agricultural work honestly and without complaint until the 20th Century, when they were replaced by machines. The heavy knightly cavalry was fine in European conditions, where they were faced with poorly armed peasant infantry. However, coming up against a mounted opponent, which used the horse not as a sluggish, armoured monster, rather as a means to acquire a strategic advantage in speed and manoeuvrability, the European armies of knights, as was to be expected, suffered defeat. This first occurred during the crusades when the knights had to fight the fast-moving Arabian cavalry. Then followed the invasion of the Mongols, after which Eurasia found itself for several centuries in the grip of the total military supremacy of the nomads. However, in the new era, the settled civilisations acquired their own military and technological advantage over the nomads. This occurred not only thanks to the development of firearms, as it was customary to believe, but to a great extent thanks to the development of horse breeding and the creation of an effective cavalry. In this way the Spanish conquered the New World, while the Russian Empire made advances far into Central Asia. While the nomads, actually stagnating, bred the same breed of horse for century after century with their narrow fields of specialisation, principally for pasture, transport and for food, Europe saw an explosive formation of new breeds. During the 18th and 19th Centuries about 200 species of horse appeared in Europe. In the time of the Napoleonic wars, whole mounted armies fought each other on the fields of Europe, forces no less than those that existed during the era of the steppe empires. The largest and most catastrophic loss of horses, about half a million in total, occurred in the course of Napoleons march on Russia in 1812. Throughout the entire 19th Century, priority in military might moved over to the possession of naval and fire power, but the horse retained its strategic importance right up until the First World War, but on the battlefields it finally lost its significance as a strategic military resource. The horse went into battle at the soldiers side for the last time during the Second World War: the Polish Horse Cavalry bravely yet recklessly endeavouring to stop the German tanks near Warsaw in 1939; the mistake was repeated in 1941 by Soviet Marshal Budenny. Finally, the Mongolian mounted forces took part in the destruction of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in 1945. With technological progress and the universal spread of machines, the number of horses in the world fell steadily. By 1930 there were about 120 million horses, while in 1970 there were just a little over 60 million. Today there are fewer than 40 million horses across the world. In the early 20th Century Russia had the worlds largest number of horses, with about 40 million grazing on its fields, meadows and steppe lands. On the eve of collectivisation in the USSR there were 32.6 million; after it there were 21.1 million. At the end of 156

its existence the Soviet Union had 7-8 million horses (about 10% of the worlds equine population) and this is with the USSR having the worlds greatest potential for horse herding. In the mid 19th Century there were about 4 million head of horses in Kazakhstan (on average 13% of the total head of livestock), while from the moment the country joined with Russia the number steadily fell, a result of both political and socioeconomic reasons. In the second half of the 19th Century a market mechanism came into play: the type of livestock reared by the Kazakhs in response to heightened market demand for sheeps wool and lamb. The catastrophe that was the collectivisation of 1931-32 had at its heart a purely political motivation: the numbers of horses in Kazakhstan fell to a mark never seen before, to about 300,000 head in all (in 1928 there were 3.5 million). Development of Virgin Lands, which required the taking of an enormous number of pastures, also put pay to a blossoming in horse herding. And all the same, by the early 1970s thanks, they then said, to the committed policy of the party and the government, the number of horses was brought up to 1.2 million and, on the eve of Perestroika, to 1.5 million. After a dramatic change in the economic model in the early 1990s, this number began to fall at catastrophic rates. At present there are 985,000 horses in this country, although some experts believe these figures are understated, as a considerable part of the livestock, as a result of privatisation, was taken away from state control and, accordingly, from the statistics. So, Kazakhstan, a great steppe state, the prosperity of which was ensured for thousands of years by its herds of horses, is now experiencing a dramatic period of separation from its equine past. In the face of an ever-decreasing number of horses in the republic, perhaps it is time for a moratorium to be declared on their slaughter, to recover the horse-breeding industry in Kazakhstan. The best response to this issue must come from Khan Kasym: We are residents of the steppe; our possessions and goods are not rare and they are not valuable. But our greatest riches are our horses. Kazakhstan in the early 20th Century In 1900, Kazakhstan was a territory that was set in its ways on the outside and still patriarchal in nature. On the great steppe expanses, just as hundreds and thousands of years before, the nomads grazed their livestock, moving in a century-long rhythm that remained unchanged from season to season, from north to south and from south to north. Yet this system, in existence for at least two thousand years, was experiencing intense internal changes. Major rail routes were being built through the steppe, towns grew and developed, coupled with an infrastructure, social institutions, education and healthcare and, most importantly, trade was developing at a fast rate. At the start of the century, Kazakhstan was controlled from three centres Tashkent (Turkestan), Orenburg (the Steppe District) and Omsk (General Governorship of western Siberia). A decree was issued in 1900, which obligated and encouraged the settlement of the Kazakhs from the Syr-Daria Region. However, the European colonisation of the steppe regions progressed at a much faster rate. In the first twenty years of the 20th Century, 17 million dessiatinas (a dessiatina being the equivalent of 2.7 acres) were given to three million Russian settlers (500,000 families). The Slavic population in these regions grew in the pre-Revolutionary period from 15% to 42%. The traditional nomadic economy of the Kazakhs, built upon the extensive pasturebased livestock rearing was eroded away and their way of life was destroyed. In the northern regions the Kazakhs quickly turned to agriculture. In the southern regions, where there were considerably fewer Russian settlers, there were also fewer settled Kazakhs. In the northeastern regions Kazakh farms that dealt with agriculture accounted for about one half. However, the Kazakhs who could not or had no wish to change their way of life had only one thing they could do, and that was to move south. In this way, a potential for conflict accumulated in the southern regions of Kazakhstan and it was here where the most acute struggle unfolded for the possession of the irrigated lands, which were equally suitable for grazing livestock and for agriculture. As a whole, the ratio of settlers to local population, as a result of the grand programme of colonisation, which was implemented over three waves, from the 1860s to 1912, was 3 million Slavs to 5 million Kazakhs. The numbers of urban population also grew. 40,000 people dealt in steppe trade, with the network of fairs scattered all over northern Kazakhstan and southern Siberia. Thanks to British capital, Kazakhstans mineral resources were developed and by 1916 over 18,000 Kazakhs were employed in the mining industry. And yet 90% of Kazakhs continued to remain nomads, combining, to a certain extent, livestock breeding and agri157

culture. The livestock numbers in the steppe grew (1885-1916) from 17 million to 30 million. At the same time there were structural changes afoot in livestock farming: there was a rise in the relative number of cattle, which required less pasture land and which were more lucrative to maintain. Changes in the Kazakhstan economy progressed in parallel with the transformation of political and social structures. Literature in Kazakh, written in Arab script and, as a rule, on religious themes, became more widespread. Throughout the entire Nineteenth Century about 70-80,000 of such books appeared but, in the early Twentieth Century the Kazakhs saw a real explosion in publishing. Books and periodicals in the Kazakh language were printed in St. Petersburg, Kazan, Ufa, Tashkent and other centres of Islam in the Russian Empire. Between 1900 and 1917 over 200 books were published and a major part of them involved publications of a social nature, the heroic epos and other models of traditional verbal creativity. The first Kazakh-language newspaper appeared in 1888; much more came after 1905 but not one lasted very long, for political reasons. The main content of this period was the Kazakhs switch from a tribal conscience to a national one. The world view of the Kazakhs, which previously often ended at the limits of a mountain village or family group, now reached a generally national level. By the start of the century four political trends had arisen in Kazakh society. The first of such trends was that of the so-called enlighteners. These were the first generation of intellectuals who had encountered Russian education. They viewed the union with Russia as a positive step and they sincerely believed that the Kazakhs needed to learn Russian and adopt the European style of education. They had a critical view of Islam and they spoke out against the activity of the Tatar mullahs, while at the same time marvelling at the pure and unclouded Kazakh traditions. They were the bearers of tradition, which proceeds from famous characters in Kazakh history - Chokan Valikhanov, Ibrahim (Ibrai) Altynsarin and Abai Kunanbaev. What was most important for all these people was the acknowledgement of the need to become familiar with Russian language and Russian culture as a principal condition for modernising Kazakh society and helping it to survive. Much less is known of another trend, which could be called the conservatives. This group of poets could be characterised by the term Zar-Zaman, meaning time of lament. These poets were fierce antagonists of everything Russian and they idealised orthodox Islam and traditional social and moral values. Their works tell of the era of the Khans' power as being a golden age, free of corruption and the exploitation of the colonial period. The third group are classed as the nationalists. This movement arose after contact had been made with Russian culture and education, when, in the early 20th Century, young Kazakh doctors, teachers, engineers, writers and poets no longer wished to strive towards a copying of European culture and concerned themselves with the search for their own national identity, only within the social, cultural and political reality of the Russian Empire. A major step in this direction was the struggle to use Islam as an element of the Kazakh identity. Although the nationalists set themselves no specific objectives, the effect of this was a strengthening of the political role of Islam among the nomads. The activity of the nationalists also gave rise to two trends in the spiritual life of the Kazakhs and their renaissance. The first was a heightened interest in the family and tribal history of the Kazakhs, popularisation and absolutisation of genealogy, where a set, conceptualised and idealised image of the Hordes and the family-based structure arose in the conscience of the intellectuals. The second trend was an interest in the Turkic heritage. In political terms the result of this was a growing liking for Turkey. Many young Kazakh intellectuals travelled to the cities of the Turkic world, right as far as Istanbul, thus forming a fabric of a unified intellectual Turkic community. The representatives of this generation or of these social layers in a political sense shared the views of the Russian liberals; they formed the Alash party, condemned or took a neutral stance on the uprising of 1916 and in 1917 they formed two governments, in Orenburg and in Kokand. The fourth movement was a rudimentary socialist group. Although in composition it was predominantly Russian, it had an influence upon the Kazakh workers in the major cities, in the mines and on the railways. This group put forward a number of leaders for the future revolution across the entire former empire. The failed harvest of 1912 and the mass impoverishment and epidemic that followed as a result promoted a growth in the socialist movement. From 1894 to 1906 there were sixteen Marxist groups in Kazakhstan, whose views were undoubtedly more radical than those of the representatives of the other liberal groups. From the point of view of education they were, as a rule, not so well educated as the representatives of other groupings, but they 158

always combined visits to the madrasah and the Russian school. The ideology of the Kazakh elite, which was destined to totally change the face of Kazakhstan, formed from precisely these latter two movements. From the merger of nationalism and communism came the phenomenon of the so-called Muslim National Communism, which withstood the principles of the class division of society into nations, those being oppressed and those who have been oppressed and which called the poor nations to fight for their freedom from the rich. This phenomenon was characteristic for all Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire. The involvement of the Kazakhs in the political struggle on the Russian political stage between two revolutions led to an ever more active demand for Kazakhstan autonomy within the empire. The moderate wing of the intelligentsia and the elite strived in this direction, but a large part of the Kazakh population believed that the solution to the problem was to be totally rid of the Russians and return their lands. The moment of truth came in 1916, when the government in Petrograd, through its nave decree on mobilisation of those of different faiths into the Russian Army, which fought a war against the Turkish Sultan, the leader of all Muslims, gave rise to a mass uprising in central and southern Kazakhstan and also in a large part of Turkestan. The uprising shook the very foundations of Russian rule in Central Asia and it would only be a matter of time until the region was to join the Russian Revolution of 1917. In the course of the uprising, which was accompanied by terrible violence from both sides and where it was bitterest in the regions of the greatest expropriation of land from the Kazakhs for transfer to the settlers or to public funds, a split occurred within the Kazakh opposition: part of the intellectuals condemned the extreme nature of the armed battle, while another part (Dzhangildin, Bokin) saw the armed battle as the only way to get rid of the hated tsarist regime. This side was later to join the Bolsheviks, whose ultraradical ideology for a time appealed to the Kazakh nationalists, while the first side was to make up the skeletal structure of the future Alash Horde. From early 1918, the Alash Horde competed for power with isolated and poorly supported Marxists. These were still just isolated groups, united around charismatic leaders in the Syr-Daria region, where the main battles of 1916 had unfolded. With its moderate and collaborationist policy, the government of the Alash Horde was doomed. Its flirting with Kolchak and dithering between reds and whites led to a situation where the remnants of its power and authority were lost. In 1919 the revolutionary-minded Kazakhs took centre stage in Kazakh politics; they were resolute in their support of the Socialist Revolution and the Bolshevik regime and they supported the reds in their battle with the Basmachi movement in Central Asia. A greater political intimacy became possible between the Bolsheviks and the radical Kazakh nationalists thanks to the opportunities that the new regime opened up for them: the dispossession of the Kulaks (the devastation of the Kazakh and Russian farms), the secularisation (the closing of orthodox schools) and the socialisation (the shift of control over nationalised property into their hands). The Muslim National Communists directed their foreign policy ambitions, to use the term of the great French orientalist Alexandre Bennigsen, against Bukhara, Khiva, Iran, Afghanistan and British India, to where they dreamt of spreading the great proletariat revolution. The Soviet legacy The Soviet experience is the most painful and, at the same time, most important recollection in modern Kazakh history. Essentially speaking, without this episode in history, there would not be todays independent Kazakhstan. At the same time, recollections of the imperial Soviet policy continue to echo painfully in the hearts of many Kazakh families. The Kazakhs should be given the credit they deserve: as opposed to their more Islamised neighbours they responded with greater willing to the slogans of the Russian communists and supported the Bolshevik Revo lution. The calculation was a simple one: use the Revolution to gain independence (or at least an expanded form of autonomy). Moreover the Kazakh intellectuals actively carried the revolutionary teachings to other countries to the colonies of the European powers in Asia, which had become objects of Cominterns mission to spread world revolution. The Kazakhs, of course, are proud of this part of their Soviet history. However, very soon, the Kazakhs, as all the peoples of the Soviet Union, fell beneath the millstone that was Stalins dictatorship. In the 1930s, the revolutionary intellectuals were wiped out, the achievements of the Revolution in terms of autonomy were scaled down and the traditional nomadic culture was subjected to total destruction. Recollections of this period continue to evoke a bitter taste throughout the Kazakh nation. 159

The traditional nomadic way of life was almost completely wiped out and Kazakhstan took the path of industrialisation and the extensive development of agriculture, as a major resource base for the Soviet economy. As a result there was a great influx of populations from other parts of the USSR into the republic, predominantly of a Slavic origin. In addition, Stalin conducted incredible experiments from time to time, involving the resettlement of populations, evidently trying to repeat fifth-century history. As a result of the Soviet dictator's experiments, Kazakhstan found itself (against its will) housing not only Russians and Ukrainians, but also many other peoples from Eurasia: Germans, Koreans, Caucasians, Dungans, Uygurs etc. This is how the ethnic face of contemporary Kazakhstan was formed: a face that surprises, one that is a blend, beautiful and benevolent and where one can discern features both of Europe and of Asia. The Kazakhs shared all they had with their guests, remembering the misfortunes and even despite these misfortunes, which they had suffered not all that long ago in the course of the communist collectivisation. The mixing of the races and peoples in Kazakhstan continued even after the death of the great dictator. In the 1950s and 1960s new settlers continued to arrive in their millions, to open up the valuable lands of the Soviet Frontier. The Kazakhs fought bravely and heroically on the fronts during the Second World War and hundreds of thousands of soldiers returned to the steppe after exhausting battles, decorated for the taking of Warsaw, Budapest, Vienna, Prague and Berlin. They returned with surprise to see how their ancient land was being rapidly modernised: mines and factories, plants and highways, railways and pipelines were springing up everywhere. The modern European world, the total self-destruction of which they had just witnessed in Europe, had suddenly returned to Kazakhstan. But there was more. Moscow chose Kazakhstan to implement its strategic projects in the creation of missile and nuclear weapons, ventures into space and the testing of the very latest strategic weaponry. Kazakhstan came to house the nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk, the Baikonur space station, missile bases and strategic bomber commands. In the 1970s Kazakhstan thus became an important element in the strategic might of the Soviet Union in its confrontation with the West. The Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, under whom the USSR reached the peak of its powers and became a superpower on a par with America, was much indebted to Kazakhstan, where he had worked in the 1950s. In the future, Brezhnev retained his affection for Kazakhstan, demanding that it supplied ever more meat and grain to Russia and provided more and more land for strategic objects. A figure like Leonid Brezhnev is worthy of a special digression. Brezhnevs work in Kazakhstan had several consequences. First, there were the political consequences: through party and political lines he supported his friend Dinmukhamed Kunaev , who also became a symbolic figure for Kazakhstan, an icon for an entire era, just as Brezhnev was for the entire Soviet Union. Secondly, there were economic consequences: Brezhnev always devoted particular attention to ensure Kazakhstan always received its share of subsidies and followed the path to transformation into an agrarian and industrial republic. Thirdly, Brezhnev was fond of the Kazakhstan capital and did much to turn Alma-Ata into one of the most beautiful cities in the country. Now only the older generation recall that in the mid 1950s the future general secretary once lived in a small green house in the centre of the city. Those from Alma-Ata and Kazakhstan who encountered Brezhnev recall that he remained a jolly optimist and a responsive comrade, one who loved a good joke and a party. Evidently Brezhnev was reluctant to leave Kazakhstan. The wicked tongues asserted that he left behind not only decent comrades, but a host of delightful swarthy girlfriends as well. His friendship with Dimash, as he liked to call Dinmukhamed Kunaev, stood the test of time and the test of political intrigues. As soon as he came to power, Brezhnev supported the return of Kunaev to the post of first secretary of the republic and the removal of the previous secretary, a protg of Krushchev, who had supported separatist projects related to the creation of an Uygur autonomy within Kazakhstan and the appropriation of Virgin Lands into Russian territory. He later brought Kunaev into the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the supreme political authority in the USSR, which significantly en hanced Kazakhstans status within the Soviet hierarchy, placing it third after Ukraine, while, in a strategic military sense it could even have been the second most important republic of the Union. In his turn Kunaev repaid Brezhnev with loyalty and purely human warmth. After the death of the general secretary, the Kazakh 160

stan leader tried to continue Brezhnevs line in the Politburo and to support his people in the power struggle, which he paid for in 1986, when he was ousted. Brezhnev travelled many times to Kazakhstan and to his beloved Alma-Ata. However, now his seat as leader of the republic was occupied by his friend Dinmukhamed Kunaev, combining the features of a leading academic and cunning political fox, a committed communist and secret nationalist. Understanding the need to bow to Moscow, which was still able to suppress the displeasure of the union republics with an iron fist, Kunaev elected a strategy of the gradual Kazakhisation of Kazakhstan. In fact, this concerned the creation of a national Kazakh elite, which could take the fate of the nation into its own hands at the right moment. When Gorbachev commenced his ill-fated Perestroika, an unsuccessful attempt to reform what was an already unviable Soviet economic and political system, the first thing he did was to try and reinforce Moscows power in Central Asia and other parts of the Soviet Union. In 1986, the Soviet centre's removal of Kunaev from office resulted in a student revolt, who demonstrated to the world that the days of the Soviet empire were numbered. And, indeed, there was something symbolic in the fact that five years after Soviet troops had crushed the students' uprising, in December 1991, an agreement was signed in Alma-Ata, placing a full stop to the history of the USSR, this incredible, geopolitical and socioeconomic phenomenon of the 20th Century. The Soviet Union was no more and, in 1992, Kazakhstan entered unknown territory, which the U.S. President Bill Clinton was later to call the Brave New World. Not for the first time in its history, Kazakhstan was setting out on a road, both exciting and dangerous, to build a new country. How to create Kazakhstan: a little geopolitics and economics To say that Kazakhstan after the fall of the Soviet Union was in a difficult position is to say almost nothing at all. The situation for the republic was extraordinarily difficult in every sense, with its geography, geopolitical climate, demographics, history, economics and politics all presenting unique traps and dilemmas. Independent Kazakhstan had at its disposal an enormous territory, with borders of a colossal length and with little protection (with the exception of the Chinese direction), with a low population and a poorly developed transport and communications system. Kazakhstans economy was totally designed for existence under the Soviet system and entire regions of the country were tied into the external market and not to that of the republic. There was almost nothing connecting these regions apart from an administrative attachment to the same country. The regions of Kazakhstan have become seriously separated in terms of economic structure, nature of production, and demographic and national composition. One of the most complex problems inherited by Kazakhstan from the pre-Revolutionary and Soviet eras and which is rigidly tied in with the external factor was the ethnic problem. The ethnic composition of Kazakhstan was distinguished by a clearly defined dichotomy: Kazakh-Russian, Turkic-Slav, Muslim-European and so on. Built into this system were various corporate, group-based and social interests, which by no means promoted national unity in the young Kazakhstan nation in the process of its formation. The external factor was expressed primarily in the fact that the overwhelming part of the so-called Russian-speaking population was accustomed to living not in Kazakhstan but in the USSR. Their interests, life experiences and moods were oriented towards the Soviet way of life. Therefore it was natural that after the fall of the empire their sympathies shifted automatically to Russia. The German population voted with their feet: in the first half of the 1990s saw mass emigration of the Germans of Kazakhstan to Germany, which had a considerable downward impact on the economy. In the mid 1990s the outflow of the Russian and Russianspeaking population reached its peak. Against this background a swift change to the demographic balance in the republic became possible and Kazakhstan came to acquire the features of a Kazakh state. From the first days of its independence, and even prior to the official fall of the USSR, Kazakhstan, like it or not, found itself dragged into a grand geopolitical game. It concentrated all the problems of the post-Soviet period: the fall of a superpower and Russia's weakness, which played into the hands of the West; the problems of the nuclear heritage; the Caspian Knot ; the onset of Islamist fundamentalism from the south; the shadow of China, which had risen sharply over the East; the persistent striving of the West, of the United States in the first instance, to impose its rules of the game, and much, much more. 161

It still seems improbable how, in these most complex of conditions, the leadership in Kazakhstan managed to find the right way through the various, and generally contradictory pressures coming from all directions. What resulted came to be known as the multi-vectored policy. A kind of black hole appeared in the region following the departure of Russia, a so-called geopolitical vacuum, which many powers rushed to fill. The leadership in Kazakhstan observed with surprise how Moscow was letting a strategic and economic infrastructure that was so hard to create simply fall to pieces. It treated its former Union republic partners as tiresome spongers. This was particularly evident in the history of the rouble zone, from which Kazakhstan and other republics were simply pushed out. Fortunately, there were no serious consequences from this error. What is more, Kazakhstan and Russia were able to unravel the other problems they faced: the fate of the Baikonur space station, the Soviet debts, the delimitation of the Caspian Sea and so on). However, as a result of Moscows short-sighted policy in the early 1990s, Russias departure came to acquire an irreversible nature. In the early 1990s Central Asia came face to face with the world of Islam, which considered the region as its part. The events of the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s confirmed the foresight of those who had warned of the threat of militant Islamism for Central Asia immediately following the fall of the USSR. This is a world of many faces and each of the Muslim players was pursuing its own policy. The greatest activity in the early stages came from Turkey, although its strategy in Central Asia bore no relation to Islam, rather it was founded on an illusory concept of Turkic unity. With time this concept proved to be a failure; the countries in the region rejected the new elder brother Ankara, which was being imposed upon them by the West. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan succeeded in directing the development of links with Turkey to purely trade and economic ends, to the mutual benefit of both parties. The greatest concerns in relation to the export of militant Islam to Central Asia existed in connection with Iran. However, in the second half of the 1990s Iran joined the anti-Taliban coalition with Russia, India and countries of Central Asia. The real threat from militant fundamentalism was of an indirect nature and came from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In its relations with the World of Islam, Kazakhstan had to decide many unknowns. It was necessary to show the Islamic countries that Kazakhstan is one of them, while at the same time not putting the wind up Russia and the West with its excessive intimacy with the Muslim world. Naturally, Kazakhstan was not flirting with the Islamic world, seen by the West as alien and dangerous, without good cause. At the same time, Kazakhstan was searching and feeling out new opportunities on the international stage to reinforce its own security. It was detected unexpectedly for all that the countries of the region had much in common with their eastern neighbour. Kazakhstans relations with China deserve special attention. This is an instance where the leadership of the young and independent state had to break the stereotypes in relation to its neighbour; stereotypes that had been imposed from outside and those of its own. Concerns were unwittingly aroused by the colossal demographic parameters of this country and its direct vicinity with Central Asia. In short, a certain psychological barrier had to be overcome in order to become closer with the People's Republic of China. It has to be said in honour of Beijing that it structured its policy in such a way so as to almost totally disperse the concerns harboured by the post-Soviet states and the West as regards its geopolitical ambitions relative to Central Asia. For a long time Russia believed that there were no reasons to be wary of China, that it could not take its place as the patron of the region. The West, on the contrary, proceeded from the fact that China could render a favourable economic influence on the region. In the early 1990s, neither Russia not the West could have thought that China would dare to claim the role of a fully-fledged geopolitical player in the region. Using gentle diplomatic pressure with a latent demonstration of its might, Beijing was able to convince its partners in negotiation of the need to acknowledge the problem of the disputed territories and then to agree that the disputed territories belong by right to the Celestial Empire. It should be said that China managed to really sweeten the pill and shroud the parting with territory with an intensification of economic cooperation and even with the formation of a broad political organisation the Shanghai Five (later the SCO). In this way Kazakhstan was able to improve its relations with its huge neighbour. As far as the geopolitical ambitions of Beijing were concerned, it diligently masked them, thus gradually dispersing almost all doubts. Furthermore, after the events of 2001-02, the impression was formed that China was consciously withdrawing from any geopolitical games in their traditional sense. 162

The history of how the USA came to Central Asia and consolidated its position is a part of that great geopolitical game that the American strategists have been playing some fifty years now, under the influence of their own theoretical and geopolitical designs, and which they just cannot get round to finishing. That complex diplomatic and political game that began for Kazakhstan with Washington back in 1991, still continues to this day. Bringing the Soviet Union to collapse, the United States believed that they had a legal right to handle its legacy as they saw fit. Falling under the most important geopolitical legacy was the great expanse of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia, control over which would establish a dominant position in all of central Eurasia. It was these considerations that formed the basis of Washingtons strategy in the region and its focus was directed toward Kazakhstan, the most important and most valuable geopolitical section of the former USSR. Kazakhstan did hold a means of political manoeuvering in its relations with the USA, in the form of the Soviet nuclear weaponry held on Kazakh soil and which the USA was very keen to be rid of. And so Chevron came to the Caspian, followed by other western and transnational companies. These events had serious geopolitical consequences; if at first Washington saw the Caspian project as dead in the water, economically speaking, it soon saw the broad geopolitical opportunities to be gained from control over Caspian oil. The USA kept a close eye to ensure that the intimacy of the states of Central Asia with Russia and Iran did not go beyond certain limits, beyond which they could fall under the influence of Moscow and Tehran. As noted above, the West initially looked kindly on the activity shown by China. Furthermore, the USA was trying not to permit a strengthening of fundamentalism, of whatever form and to prevent the region becoming a source of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their materials and technologies. In this way, the international and domestic policies of Kazakhstan in the first decade after it acquired independence were formed in strictly predetermined conditions. Today it can be asserted that the Kazakhstan leadership, of course, had a choice. However this was often a choice of the lesser of two evils; between the bad and the very bad. In the geopolitical, economic and political chaos of the early 1990s the logic of survival and the striving to preserve stability pushed Kazakhstan to create a behavioural model which would help us to emerge unscathed from the difficult situations into which we had been driven by geopolitics and the con tradictory interests of the big players. With time Kazakhstans leaders came to master the skills of diplomacy and foreign policy. Kazakhstan was generally successful in finding common ground with different powers and, more or less, it kept itself on a par, even in the face of an obvious inequality in political power. Of course, if Kazakhstan diplomacy was backed up by serious economic potential, an effective army, large population etc, the Kazakh foreign policy and its debut on the geopolitical chessboard would have been more effective. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan could produce politicians from its ranks, who could guide the ship of state on a stable course through the storms and reefs of world politics. As with other nationalities in Soviet society, Kazakhs had a hierarchy made up primarily on the basis of professional and corporate solidarity. The ancestral remnants of the Kazakhs should be sought in such customs as respect for ones elders and an affinity with like-minded people. The consequences of the collapse of the previous socioeconomic system and the introduction of market relations came in two forms: first, a killer blow was dealt to the privileges and social status afforded to the previous Soviet elite; the intelligentsia and its structures (the academic institutes and universities) were literally laid to waste. Secondly, however, another process followed immediately afterwards, and even in parallel: the elite set about teaching its children in the new, prestigious spheres, linked with the market economy, management and finance. In this way, the principles of stable traditions and the reproduction of the elite were preserved in their principal features. On the whole, the Kazakh elite had to fulfil the same objective it faced in Soviet times, under a state-controlled economy, but under new conditions: to retain control over resources. And in this it was successful. In Soviet times the Kazakh elite had to bow to Moscow and this restricted its ability to control economic resources. However, western sociology states that, in addition to the so-called economic capital, there is also the cultural capital and the symbolic capital, which are understood to mean the acquisition of knowledge, specific skills, the accumulation of prestige and respect. Once Moscows control had gone, the Kazakh elite made full use of the cultural and symbolic capital they had at their disposal. 163

The ruling trend of the early 1990s, one of ethnic unity, made way for the fragmentation of Kazakh society. One thing that divides Kazakhs is the relationship to the Russian and Kazakh languages, as an attribute of ethnic belonging and social status. A sign of this trend is the striving of the Kazakh elite to preserve their childrens knowledge of Russian and to educate them in Russian-speaking schools. However, this trend occurs against a background of a more extensive process, that of the upbringing of an internationally-oriented (i.e. pro-Western) generation in the new Kazakh elite. And it is this part of the elite, no longer exclusively Russian-oriented, yet also not purely Kazakh in upbringing, who will have to play the decisive role in the future Kazakhstan. The explosive events of the late 1990s and early 2000s proved a major test of security, statehood and independence in foreign policy. While market reforms were being implemented a generation of young entrepreneurs had grown up. Gaining financial resources, they came to hanker after power. After this new opposition came to receive moral and political support from outside, the stability of the Kazakhstan society was seen to be under threat. And yet Kazakhstan is now acknowledged by Washington and Brussels as the most stable and dynamically developing country in Central Asia. President Nazarbaevs difficult and initially unpopular reforms of the previous decade have appeared to produce results and the population is now living under a more liberal climate, with a lesser dependence on the state. Nursultan Nazarbaev, Kazakhstans leader and first president, enjoys immense popularity, even if alleged voting irregularities and Parliament voting for him to remain in power for an unlimited number of terms are taken into account. He is seen as popular both in the West and in the East, among Kazakhs and Russians who live in Kazakhstan. He is a welcome guest in Moscow and throughout the CIS, where he is seen as a main proponent of close integration of the post-Soviet states. How to survive in the modern world: Kazakh diplomacy Continuing and supplementing the previous chapter, this section also demonstrates how Kazakhstan has survived in the modern world. Kazakhstan officially uses the term multi-vectored diplomacy, which was first introduced in the mid 1990s. In fact, concealed beneath the term multi-vectored was a balancing of the different geopolitical centres of power that had exerted an inf luence on Kazakhstan and on Central Asia as a whole. The multi-vectored approach to foreign policy first came into play in the early 1990s, a time we all remember well. Kazakhstan received its independence at the end of 1991, coupled with a whole host of problems: a thousand or more Soviet nuclear warheads, a huge territory to keep secure and a diverse, polyethnic population, one half of which still did not feel itself as citizens of a sovereign Kazakhstan. This was in addition to having two enormous neighbours, extensive, unprotected borders and unresolved frontier issues, incredibly rich natural resources, eyed by neighbours near and far and a remoteness from the sea and communications with the world. As soon as Kazakhstan had obtained independence, a multitude of advisors poured forth, both desired and undesired. There were those who taught us how to build democracy and a market economy, others how to protect human rights. Others called on us to return to our historical, cultural and ethnic roots and, finally, there were those who wanted to persuade us not to break the Soviet economic and political umbilical cord. Accordingly, each party, with their own vested interest, depending upon its geopolitical and international weight, tried to apply pressure on Kazakhstan. The countrys first test of flexibility was with the issue of the Soviet nuclear legacy. As luck and the geo political status would have it, our republic found itself in the same team with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, all inheritors of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. But it was upon Kazakhstan that the greatest pressure was brought to bear. The West suddenly came to suspect a liking for the Islamic world and a striving to assist in the creation of a so-called Islamic nuclear bomb for certain Islamic countries. This all proceeded against a bloody conflict that had unfolded in Tajikstan on regional and confessional grounds. In order not to miscalculate and to bargain coherently with Washington on the nuclear issue, Alma-Ata needed distinct advice or consultation from Moscow, but it did not get any. Left very much to its own devices, the Kazakhstan leadership set about a cautious game, either declaring itself to be a temporary nuclear state or agreeing to the unconditional removal of missiles. As a result Washington was simply unable to work out what they were really to expect from 164

Kazakhstan. It seemed that Moscow understood what was going on, but in response to the puzzled questions of the Americans, they only shrugged their shoulders helplessly. Soon a new and very important element entered the picture, Caspian oil, and Kazakhstan exercised the principle of nuclear weapons in exchange for investment to good effect. We should remember that at the time that Washington still had no idea of the true scale of the reserves that had been discerned and predicted in the Caspian Sea and, also, it was wary of Russias reaction, without knowing how weak Yeltsins regime actually was. In these conditions, the administration of George Bush Snr. tried not to take risks, but in exchange for Kazakhstans agreement to remove ballistic missiles from its territory, it applied pressure on Chevron and encouraged it to come with investment into what was then perceived to be an unlucrative Caspian enterprise. It was later that the Caspian was to become a pivotal element in American geopolitics in Eurasia. Relations between China and the Soviet Union had started to improve even in Gorbachevs time. After the fall of the union, the separate republics had to deal with the Asian giant individually. However, even back in the time of Perestroika, Beijing had clearly set Moscow a condition: total normalisation of relations would be possible only if the frontier question was resolved, along with the problem of the so-called disputed territories. Incidentally, these territories were disputed only for China. With a vested interest in economic cooperation with the Peoples Republic and also proceeding from completely logical considerations that it was better not to have problems with such a neighbour, Kazakhstan was also forced to agree to acknowledge the sovereignty of China over the desert wastelands, which, during the era of Soviet-Chinese confrontation, actually belonged to no one. However, from a social and psychological point of view, the very fact of the transfer of territories was a painful thing for our public opinion. The well-known aphorism that it is harder to be a friend of America than to be its enemy is fully applicable to Kazakhstan and its complex, to say the least, relations with the USA. In 1994 the presidents of Kazakhstan and the USA signed a Charter on strategic partnership. And while the charter imposed no obligations on the USA, Kazakhstan, as it was soon revealed, had to observe the spirit and the word of the agreement strictly, namely to build democracy and a market economy, observe human rights, run honest elections under international monitoring and all this under the watchful eye of the strategic partner, America. It was revealed that the White House was seriously intent on intervening in Kazakhstans internal affairs. Nevertheless, Astana was able to get away with a course for Kazakhstan, which was more or less independent, especially in matters of an internal nature, the strengthening of the vertical of power and statehood. The reasons, as always, lay in Washingtons geopolitical obsession; its striving, at any cost, to implement its Caspian strategy. The Caspian direction of foreign policy proved to be the most complex and the most multi-vectored aspect in all of Kazakhstans foreign policy. On the one hand ever-growing pressure was to be felt from the principal investor, the USA, and also from the brotherly Turkey, while on the other hand a difficult dialogue had to be maintained with the closest ally, Russia and other post-Soviet states, including such an ambiguous partner as the leader of Turkmenistan, the now-deceased Turkmenbashi and also Iran, which put forward businesslike and, at first, apparently reasonable proposals. A firm Yes could not be given to one side for fear of offending the other. A categorical No was not an option, either, to protect the national interests and even the security of Kazakhstan. In such conditions Kazakh diplomacy displayed the utmost resourcefulness and balancing skills. For a considerable time Astana kept completely silent about the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and used this time to intensify negotiations on the legal status and regulation of disputed matters with Russia, the principal partner on the Caspian Sea. At the same time, Kazakhstan came out with wholly non-binding statements about the acceptability of the Iranian route, which was sure to appease Tehran. In 1998, Kazakhstan and Russia achieved a breakthrough in delimiting their sections of the Caspian Shelf, which heralded the start of a genuine process of the delimitation of the sea and the resources found beneath it. It is true that Iran was cut out of the equation, but this became more a problem for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which Moscow and Astana gave the opportunity to sort out with Tehran themselves. Moreover, after reaching agreement with Russia, Kazakhstan found its hands were not tied in terms of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. Kazakh diplomacy could now speak out on the subject of this pipeline with relative freedom. The meaning behind the statements made by the Kazakh side and which it continues to 165

make comes down to the following: build what you like; we are prepared to pump our oil over any pipeline and even over all of them at once, as long as there are buyers and as long as oil prices dont fall. It is probable that Russia did not like this position much. To complete the picture, Kazakhstan managed to bring two more players into the Caspian game. The first was China, with which a ten-billion dollar agreement was signed and which was christened from the start as the project of the century. However, with Beijing, Kazakhstan encountered a partner that was at least if not more skilled in the diplomatic and multi-vectored game. The southern, or Islamic direction, always remained among the most complicated in Kazakh diplomacy. In its relations with the Islamic world, Kazakhstan, for a time and in the interests of progress, had to discard its European image and, depending upon the specific situation, don a turban, fez or dhoti. Put directly, Kazakhstan did not stop those who wanted to see it as a close Turkic relative, a part of the Islamic world and at times as a true heir of Soviet-Indian friendship. Following this path and adhering to specific political and economic objectives, Kazakhstan enabled itself to become involved in various, previously exotic international associations: the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation), ICO (Islamic Conference Organisation) and the union of Turkophone states, headed by Turkey. To be fair, it should be pointed out that our flirting with Ankara, waving the flag of pan-Turkism, Turkic unity and acknowledging Turkey as a new, elder brother, soon ended. It was replaced by a real and intense, mutually beneficial, economic collaboration. However, in Turkish high society, Kazakhstan also saw another channel in relations with the West and with NATO. The matter was more complex with Iran and Pakistan; Islamic states in spirit and in form. Relations with Pakistan and India required that a distinct parity be observed in the number of visits and agreements signed and in the volume of diplomatic activity conducted. There is another aspect of our foreign policy which should not be overlooked and, as you may have guessed, it relates to the integration of the post-Soviet space. From the very first days of the advent of the CIS, Kazakhstan applied truly titanic efforts to achieve integration, both under the Commonwealth of Independent States and other formations in a narrower format. And Kazakhstans policy was sincere: with its previous, close dependence on the union-wide economy, Kazakhstan, like no other republic of the former Soviet Union, was keen to retain traditional links. Furthermore, the matter also related to securing joint strategic security. Despite the fact that such a line was not altogether welcomed by our friends in the West, Kazakhstan was persistant in putting forward more and more new integration initiatives. And all the same, the multi-vectored policy did bring wholly tangible results. Kazakhstan was able to make full use of the advantages it had been bestowed by history and by geology and it endeavoured to minimise the risks and threats that had arisen from its not altogether successful geopolitical and geographical position, becoming a leader in economic reforms and economic development among the countries of Central Asia and even the CIS. In so doing, Kazakhstan retained good relations with all the players in the grand political game and with its neighbours and countries further afield that were important to it. Problems of security were also resolved by entering or co-operating with various associations, blocs and unions, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the NATO Partnership for Peace. It is specific people who form policies, including foreign policy. It is obvious that our foreign policy direction was formed and directed by the countrys senior leadership, yet a major role in the successful implementation of the multi-vectored foreign policy course was played by managers who easily found common ground both with the West and with the East. Kazakhstan was very fortunate in that the foreign policy authority and other structures, responsible for national security, were peopled by a generation of specialists, Eurasian in spirit and patriotically-minded, enthusiasts for their cause with an open view of the world and, most importantly, loyal to the interests of their country. Kazakhstan and its neighbours: who thinks what of whom The old saying goes, If you want to know who you are, ask what your neighbour thinks. Wording it differently you could say that if you want to know who you are, compare yourself with your neighbours. The time has now come when it would be opportune for the Kazakhs to adopt both versions of the saying. For centuries, the Kazakhs' neighbours and their ancestors saw these people as ruthless nomads, who had crashed down from nowhere atop their wild horses upon the peaceful farming folk and townspeople. The Chi166

nese were of the same opinion and they tried to keep out the nomadic world with their Great Wall. The Russians, too, had felt the full delights of political control of the nomadic horde, which remained in the national memory as a yoke. There are some sharp-witted scholars in California who call the nomads conquest and enslavement of the settled countries, along with the collection of tributes, a remote exploitation. More or less the same opinion of the nomads was retained by their Muslim neighbours of Khorezm, Persia, India and the Arab peoples of the Middle East. However, historical memory is a tenacious thing; it turns to stone and transforms recollections into stereotypes. This is how the settled neighbours have retained a stereotype from the time of the Middle Ages that the Kazakhs are warring and, therefore, dangerous nomads. Human psychology tends to assign the most negative features to all that is alien and hostile: wild, ignorant, pagan, living in unsanitary conditions, smelling of goats milk etc. As the settled civilisations progressed, their ruling classes came to see the nomads as backward barbarians. This became characteristic for the Russians, who, in the New Age managed to gain command over the eastern territories of the Golden Horde, to which it had once had to bow before as slaves. The Russians saw the Kazakhs as nomads, frozen in a time gone by and who had forgotten the military glory of their great ancestors. The Russians saw themselves, starting from the reforms of Peter the Great, as unequivocally European. This would have been funny if it had not been so sad: the residents of the agricultural oases of Turkestan, speaking in tongues similar to that of the Kazakhs and confessing the same religion, Sunni Islam, also tried to look upon their immediate neighbours as poor relations from the past and, accordingly, they regarded them with a feeling of superiority. Thus, they devised jokes with the main character being a steppe-Kazakh, who is terribly afraid upon first hearing the loud call of the muezzin to prayer in the big city. Credit should be given to the Kazakhs where it is due: they, too, made up countless witty jokes and funny stories about their neighbours, who behaved in their natural environment like little children. The Kazakhs found much to mock in the mercenary, small-minded nature of their neighbours and what they saw as their slave-like psychology. The principal difference lay elsewhere: the Kazakhs had managed to preserve their reigning aristocracy, which was highly revered in the East. After Kazakhstan had been joined first to Tsarist and then to Soviet Russia, when the Kazakhs displayed a fine sense of adaptation to changing conditions and culturalisation, they again became the butt of the jokes for their more traditional neighbours, for trying hard not to be separated from Islam and for other attributes of their medieval way of life. At this time the Kazakhs were laughed at and accused of excessve Russification, although in reality there was only talk of modernisation. To be fair, it should be said that to one degree or another, modernisation concerned all peoples of Central Asia, but it was only the Kazakhs who were able to turn it into a real tool to build a bridge to the future. This became clear several years after independence was obtained. While Kazakhstan was confidently conducting economic reforms and the Kazakh elite was effectively investing its incredibly rich human potential, a young generation of market-oriented, western-thinking representatives, into the post-Soviet market modernisation, its neighbours were concentrating on a return to their historical roots. In practice this meant the revival of archaic public institutions and relations, the Islamisation and degradation of the education system. This divide between the Kazakhs and their neighbours became fully obvious at the start of the new century, when no one would think to laugh or look down upon the descendants of the ungovernable nomads. On the contrary, hundreds of thousands of the descendants of the proud bearers of the ancient Islamic civilisation rushed to Kazakhstan in search of work, to find markets for their fruit and, generally, for a better life. Very quickly they became an integral part of the local economy, occupying its least prestigious niches. Similar processe were witnessed in Russia, too. Credit should be given to the Kazakhs, who, rather than making a habit of humiliating or laughing at the new Gastarbeiters, even though they used them for their own benefit, wisely prepared for the time when their neighbours would begin to find a way out of the economic hole into which they had been led by arrogance and poor management on the part of their own governments. This confirms once again the truth that the tolerance and flexibility acquired by the Kazakhs over the course of their history leads to wisdom, as long as the lessons of history are correctly perceived. However, sometimes the price can be too high. No one knows better than the Kazakhs the price of this truth. 167

With time the Kazakh elite taught their Russian and western partners to speak with them as equals. The greatest puzzle today, and the greatest challenge for them are the Chinese, with whom economic and political necessity dictate business should be done. However, the Kazakhs have not forgotten their eastern origins, so the chances are incredibly high that the Kazakhs will not allow their dialogue with the Chinese to become a monologue. In so doing, without flattering themselves over their current successes or drawing comparisons with that famous character from the La Fontaine fable who could be bought with flattery, the Kazakhs always remember how their neighbours treated them in the past. They are diplomatically silent as to their opinion of them, remembering the past but thinking about the future. Far from home: Kazakhs abroad Meeting our compatriots abroad no longer generates surprise. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, many Kazakhs and Kazakhstanis work, study, do business and simply travel all over the world. However, there are times when we encounter Kazakhs with a different past. They do not speak Russian and their Kazakh tongue has a strong Turkish accent. At times they have exotic passports, from such countries as the Peoples Republic of China (i.e. Kuomintang, or Taiwanese), Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. These are the Kazakhs whom history has flung to the distant corners of the world and further, yet they still see themselves as Kazakhs. We know that the most significant Kazakh diasporas are presented in China, Mongolia and Turkey (except the post-Soviet space Russia, Uzbekistan etc., where more than 2 million Kazakhs are concentrated). Kazakhs may also be encountered in such countres as India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, in Arab countries and in Western Europe in France, Germany and Sweden. Their appearance in these places, far from Kazakhstan, is a consequence of the dramatic historical events which shook Central Eurasia from the 18th to the 20th Centuries. The history of the resettlement and movement of the Kazakh clan families from their native steppes is worthy of comparison with the biblical Exodus. The appearance of Kazakhs within what is now Xinjiang dates back to the early 1760s. We imagine what this time was like: only recently had the cruel battles with the Jungars calmed down, The Small Horde had already accepted citizenship of the Russian Empire and Ablai-Khan was manoeuvering between Russia and Qing China, trying to preserve the Kazakh state. By this time the Qing had finally disposed of the remnants of the western Mongols (Kalmyks and Jungar Oirats), weakened by long wars with the Kazakhs for domination in Central Asia. The final strike on the remnants of the Jungars, who had forced their way from the Caspian-Volga region back to their native Tarbagatay mountains, came in the form of savage epidemics. Following this and utilising the fact that the Jungars were dying out, the Manchurians set about their indiscriminate slaughter. As a result of this genocide by the Manchurian powers, the pastures of the Iliisk district were almost completely cleared and, after 1761, Kazakh tribes began to occupy them without preliminary arrangement (predominantly representatives of the Kerei and Naiman tribes. This movement towards Eastern Turkestan was not arranged politically: the migratory mountain villages, or auls, having came out from under the jurisdiction of Ablai-Khan and the local Chinese authorities had come to see them as citizens of the Qing Empire. After Ablais death in 1781 they were finally fixed with the status of Chinese subjects. From this time on the Kazakh population became an important element in the ethnic, economic and political history of Xinjiang. However, it should be pointed out that for an entire century the Kazakhs moved freely from Xinjiang to the Kazakh steppes, knowing no boundaries between empires and often even totally unsuspecting of their presence. There was a new influx of the Kazakh population into western China after the crushing of the uprising of Kenesary Khan in 1847. A border was finally established between the Russian and Chinese empires in 1883, under the Tarbagatay Protocol. The main reason for resettling Kazakhs into areas controlled by China was the political and economic instability in the Kazakh steppe. We recall that the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw a period of active Russian colonisation of the steppe. The next mass influx of Kazakhs into Xinjiang occurred in 1916 after the crushing of a vast uprising, encompassing all of Russian Turkestan. This event saw the movement of about 300,000 Kazakhs. However, this episode had no impact on the demographic situation in the region: in 1918 almost all Kazakhs were returned back by the admnistration of republican China. The next major wave of refugees was not long in coming: in addition to the huge number of victims among the nomadic population, the collectivisation 168 in Kazakhstan brought about another wave of resettle-

ment: tens and hundreds of thousands of our fellow tribesmen fled the USSR for China from 1928 to 1937. Whole mountain villages (or auls) of Kazakhs ran not only to western China, but also to the south, through Turkmenia to Iran and Afghanistan and to the Far East: according to eye-witness reports, some of the auls even got as far as the Pacific Ocean, travelling across all of Siberia. As opposed to the Kazakh population in Soviet Kazakhstan, the Kazakh refugees did not simply try to preserve, they actually fought for the right to maintain their previous, traditional way of life. By the mid 20th Century a cultural and linguistic gulf had arisen between the Kazakhstani Kazakhs and their fellow tribesmen abroad. The Kazakhs in China saw themselves as Kazakhs, just as before; free-roaming nomads and Muslims. They tried to live as their ancestors had lived for centuries, and they distanced themselves primarily from the Chinese and also often from the local Uygur population. Yet the political storms that had raged in China in the first half of the 20th Century were sure to have drawn the Kazakhs into the battle for the selfdetermination of Eastern Turkestan. There were two attempts to create an independent state in the region: first, in 1933, the Islamic Republic of Eastern-Turkestan was proclaimed in Kashgar, which the military governor Sheng Shicai dealt with in the same year, using detachments made up of Russian migrants and with the support of the USSR. The Kazakhs took part in an anti-China uprising and chose Sultan Sharip as their leader. The repressions on the part of the Chinese led to the Kaakhs moving deeper to the east and northeast. In 1943 there was an uprising among the Altai Kazakhs. The insurgents were given refuge and military support from Mongolia, which had been controlled by the USSR. The following year the rebellion spilled over into the Ili District and in November 1944 it was again proclaimed the Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR). The main reason for the Kazakhs active involvement in the rebellion against Chinese rule was the same as in Soviet Central Asia: the attempts by the authorities to sedentarise the nomads, disarm them and force them to live by the rules of settled peoples. The Kazakh detachments became the principal military force of the ETR, in which the major political power belonged to the Uygurs. In the course of the rebellion from among the military leaders came forward a fearless and charismatic Osman-Batyr, who became a symbol of the liberation movement; a kind of Kazakh Robin Hood. OsmanBatyr fought the Chinese from 1939 to 1950 and in this period of over ten years his name became shrouded in legend and fables, turning him, especially after his death, into a figure of epic proportions, comparable with heroes the likes of Koblandy-Batyr or Kambar-Batyr. The ever-changing military and political situation forced Osman-Batyr to either fight with the Uygurs against the Chinese, or against the Uygurs, the Russians, the Mongols etc. However, the main objective for Osman-Batyr and his army was to ensure independence for the Kazakhs, their freedom and a nomadic way of life away from the infringement of any outside force. This was a case that was doomed to fail. From 1945 the Soviet Union openly turned away from Kuomintang and came to support the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, Osman-Batyr fought his last battles against the communist forces of the PLAC. Osman-Batyr also ended his life as hero and legend, just as he had fought: he was captured when trying to save his daughter, but his horse slipped on the ice of Lake Gaz Kul. The hero was executed in Urumchi as a bandit and robber but, to his last seconds, Osman-Batyr remained proud, with the virtue of his epic ancestors. The Muslim minorities in Xinjiang continued their resistance up until 1954, but the remains of OsmanBatyrs army made their choice; in 1951 about 15,000 people crossed Tibet into India. This was not the first time the Kazakhs had crossed the immense mountains of Tibet and the Himalayas, yet the route of OsmanBatyrs army could not have been more dramatic. It covered over 4,000 km, during which, in search of freedom, the Kazakhs overcame the lifeless Lob nor and Taklimakan deserts and the worlds highest mountains of the Himalayas in Tibet. The route, during which the Kazakhs fought enemies, the cold and their hunger, lasted two years. All their livestock and the majority of the passages participants were lost on the way, leaving only 350 emaciated people to finally reach India. This passage had a definite resonance across the world: in February 1955 member of the British Parliament Godfrey Lias published a description of these events in the Times newspaper (later, Lias was to write a book about the Kazakhs, which he actually called The Kazak Exodus). In the summer of 1953 astonished residents of the Indian part of Kashmir watched the arrival from the mountains of ragged and emaciated men and women (practically all the children had perished). They were what was left of Osman-Batyrs Kazakh 169

army. Negotiations to decide their fate lasted almost a month (the Indian authorities had no wish to accept another section of the Muslin population into the already restless Kashmir and damage relations with China and the USSR). However, in the end it was British tolerance that won the day when Jawaharlal Nehru personally gave permission for the Kazakhs to reside in the Indian Republic. The Indian climate was to have a catastrophic effect on the natives of Central Asia and hundreds of Kazakh refugees died during the rainy season. Pakistan, too, attended to the fate of the Kazakhs. The last of the Kazakhs left Srinagar in 1969. Some of them, following the example of their relations, the Uygurs, chose to go to Saudi Arabia. Yet it was in their kindred Turkey where the Kazakhs found their second homeland, where many Kazakh migrants from Iran, Afghanistan and Indostan found true shelter. Of course, such a policy was set in the Turkish strategy to support Outside Turks (the official name of the Turkic people beyond the confines of Anatolia). Together with the Uzbeks and the Uygurs, the Kazakhs were considered under official Ankara policy as Turkestanis. Some of the Kazakhs were settled in Turkeys mountainous regions, where the geographical conditions were suited to their customary nomadic way of life. In time the Kazakh emigrants mastered their own field in the processing industry: tanning, which be came their calling card in Turkey and Western Europe. In 1961 the new Turkish constitution permitted migration from the country and the Kazakhs made full use of this right and the agreements on migrant employment, signed by Ankara with West Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Sweden and Australia had a part to play in this. As a result, with rights of Turkish Gastarbeiters, the Kazakhs gained the ability to live and work in these countries. Preference in migration went to Cologne and (West) Berlin, to where Kazakhs often migrated directly from the nostalgically named Altai-Koi region in Turkey. And today the most united and well-organised Kazakh diasporas are found in these cities. In the early 1980s, Kazakhs could be found across Western Europe, Australia and the USA. A major reason for this was the military coup in Turkey and the general deterioration on the employment market. Thus, the descendants of Osman-Batyr, who to his very death had fought for the Kazakh nomadic identity, gradually transformed into peaceful peasants, honest craftsmen and skilled tradesmen; a kind of irony of fate and a sign of the times. While historical storms were raging over the Kazakhs in the USSR and China, the Mongol Kazakhs could live in relative peace and quiet. In socialist Mongolia our fellow tribesmen were able to live and develop in stable economic and political conditions. What is more, the totalitarian regime and Moscow gave a certain preference to the Kazakhs when recruiting party and administrative personnel, as they constituted a kind of counterbalance to Mongolian nationalism. The Mongolian Kazakhs were the only ethnic minority in this country to have at their disposal a sufficient administrative and cultural autonomy. For Ulan-Bator the Kazakhs also played the role of a buffer between the Khalkha Mongols and the Oirats (the western Mongols), extinguishing the secessionist mood of the latter. The privatisation that began in the 1990s worsened the economic status of the Kazakh farmsteads. This process coincided with the halt in Soviet economic assistance and the collapse of the entire previous economic infrastructure of socialist Mongolia. In the early 1990s these Kazakhs began to return to Kazakhstan, believing that they would discover their true motherland. The reasons for the migration of the Mongolian Kazakhs lay in the downfall of the socialist system, in the accompanying change in the previous political and economic relations in the former Peoples Republic of Mongolia and the wave of privatisation that then followed. Mongolian Kazakhs are mainly associated with the phenomenon of the current internal social life of Kazakhstan, with the Oralman, the ethnic Kazakh who has returned to his or her ethnic homeland from elsewhere in the Central Asian region. The greater mass of migrants from Mongolia was comprised of urbanised Kazakhs who, having lost their jobs in the towns and cities, preferred to leave for Kazakhstan than return to the rural localities in western Mongolia. The intellectuals and students settled in Alma-Ata. The resettlement of the Mongolian Kazakhs in the fertile southern regions of the republic was blocked both by administrative measures and by the objective situation on the market. The settlers found it hard to find their feet in the homeland of their ancestors and some of them decided to return to Mongolia. The Mongolian government supported the Kazakh migration, but then it also welcomed their return to Mongolia, proceeding from concerns of Oirat separatism and from economic considerations, as the Aimak territorial units of western Mongolia had simply been deserted. 170

From the mid 1990s the government of Kazakhstan has been conducting a wide-ranging policy on the return of the Oralmans to the homeland of their ancestors. In addition to Kazakhs from Mongolia, fellow tribesmen come here from Iran, Afghanisatan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. This process is incredibly complicated from social, cultural and linguistic points of view. Kazakhstan today is a government that is European-orientated in its development, with a considerable part of its population preferring to speak Russian. The process of adaptation is slow and is accompanied by specific problems. This process cannot influence the principal strategic vector in the development of Kazakhs, both within Kazakhstan itself and the Kazakh diasporas. This vector involves the unavoidable rejection of the traditional nomadic heritage and the move to a contemporary, modernised way of life. Tellingly, this process has not only touched the life of the Kazakhstani Kazakhs, for whom it was to a great extent a forced choice, but also of the descendants of the Chinese Kazakhs who settled in Turkey and countries of the West, for whom the choice was purely voluntary. In summary: how Kazakhstan came to be To understand modern Kazakhstan and to answer the question as to how this unusual and fascinating country came to be, we should look at its geography and its history. Kazakhstan is the worlds ninth largest country and the second largest state of the CIS after Russia. It is also one of the richest in terms of its natural resources and it is seen as the most stable of all the post-Soviet states. The territory that was traditionally seen as Kazakh lands and where the Kazakhs performed their seasonal nomadic cycle was somewhat larger than the Kazakhstan of today. It stretched from the banks of the Volga and the Caspian Sea in the west to the Tarym and Ili rivers in the east, from Siberia in the north to the Syr-Daria River in the south. This region covers an area of about 3 million square kilometres. From about the end of the 18th or the early 19th centuries and until the Russian Revolution of 1917 Kazakhstan was a part of the Russian Empire. From 1790 to 1916 the Kazakhs organised many rebellions and uprisings, and they staged a national war of liberation against the Tsarist colonial administration. The main consequence of the Kazakhs contacts with the Russians was their influence on the regions economy. The frontier fortifications soon turned into centres for trade and economic growth. The strategic railway from Orenburg to Tashkent crossed the Kazakh steppe and gave rise to active Russian colonisation, breaking down the traditional nomadic society. In 1920, Kazakhstan became a Soviet republic, a part of the USSR. The Soviet rule became a kind of experiment in the creation of a modern Kazakh identity. The central Soviet government made significant efforts to transform the traditional Kazakh society so as to incorporate it more quickly into the Soviet system. From the 1920s, Soviet power began attacks on Islam. The tragedy of collectivisation and forced settlement led to a radical breakdown of the Kazakh culture in the 1930s. And then the Soviet regime started industralising Kazakhstan, a process that continued throughout the Second World War and especially into the 1950s and 1960s. By this time, Kazakhstan had turned into a major industrial republic for the USSR. The second important event saw the development of the so-called Virgin Lands in the 1950s, to increase grain production. A consequence of this campaign was the mass Russian and European colonisation of the Kazakh steppes. In the 1960s to 1980s Kazakhstan strengthened its position as a key republic and a major centre for raw material production for power generation, a major grain and meat producer, a home for the Soviet Unions considerable nuclear arsenal and where its space programme was implemented. In this time, the ruling Kazakh elite started to exert active control over the economic and political life of the republic and support a cultural renaissance. The summit held in Kazakhstans capital Alma-Ata on 2021 December 1991 officially heralded the end of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A little before this Kazakhstan had proclaimed its independence, which took place on 16 December 1991. The socioeconomic and political system that formed thereafter in Kazakhstan cannot be considered outside the full context of international relations that existed at the moment the Soviet system fell. The forming of modern-day Kazakhstan, with its financial, economic and political system, with all its pros and cons, its foreign economic strategy, investment, regional, social and tax policies etc all this was to a great extent determined by two powerful factors: the external environment and the political will of the countrys leadership. 171

After the fall of the USSR Kazakhstan found it had at its disposal an enormous territory with extensive and unprotected borders, with a low population and a poorly developed transport and communications system. The economy of Soviet Kazakhstan was totally designed for existence under the Soviet system of division of labour. Whole regions were tied more to the external market than to that of the republic. There was almost nothing connecting these regions apart from an administrative attachment to the same country. The regions of Kazakhstan had become seriously separated in terms of economic structure, nature of production, and demographic and national composition. One of the most complex problems inherited by Kazakhstan from the pre-Revolutionary and Soviet eras and which is rigidly tied to the external factor was the ethnic problem. As we know well, the ethnic composition of Kazakhstan was distinguished by a clearly defined dichotomy: Kazakh-Russian, Turkic-Slav, MuslimEuropean and so on. Built into this system were various corporate, group-based and social interests, which by no means promoted national unity in the young Kazakhstan nation in the process of its formation. It is customary to call Kazakhstans diplomacy a multi-vectored policy. This was a forced and, to a great extent, intuitive decision, to draw a balance of relations with partners that, in terms of political and economic power, were superior to Kazakhstan in many areas, using the contradictions and interests of one against the other. The Kazakhstan leadership drew such a mechanism of relations with Russia, which enabled Kazakhstan, on the one hand, to retain full sovereignty and on the other, retained the ability to manoeuvre on the international stage in the complex geopolitical battle that had commenced over Central Asia. In its relations with the Islamic world Kazakhstan was faced with addressing many unknowns. The Islamic countries had to be shown that Kazakhstan was one of them, so to speak, while not getting the wrong side of Russia and the West with an excessive intimacy with the Muslim world. The principle objective involved insuring the country from any unexpected surprises, linked with the activity of the militant Islamists, who were gaining in strength on all fronts. At the same time Kazakhstan was searching and feeling the international stage for new opportunities to enhance its own security. In this way, on the international stage, Kazakhstan experiences a so-called cross, restricting from various sides. Kazakhstans new partners have begun to stick to a specific dialogue, in which their perception of the young state varies according to their own cultural, economic and political requirements. With time Kazakhstans leaders came to master the skills of diplomacy and foreign policy. As a rule, Kazakhstan was successful in finding common ground with different powers and, more or less, it kept itself on a par, even in the face of an obvious inequality in political power. Kazakhstan could produce politicians from its ranks, who could guide the ship of state through the storms and reefs of world politics. A major test of our security, sovereignty and independence in foreign policy came with the stormy events of the early 2000s, which led to a new geopolitical situation in the region. The internal development of Kazakhstan in the period of its independence was no less dramatic. There are wide-ranging and acute discussions in Kazakhstan society about the place and the role of traditional culture and the nature of Kazakhstan's modern identity. In todays Kazakhstan, nomadism is no longer a vibrant tradition among the Kazakhs, although it continues to retain its place as a fundamental element of the national consciousness. It is connected with art and poetry, rituals and language; it is a link between the Kazakh people and surrounding nature. Nevertheless, traditionalism is still alive among the Kazakhs and other ethnic groups of the country, despite the westernisation and modernisation that is taking place. The traditional Kazakh society was characterised as a mixture of dependence and independence, subordination and insubordination. The structural hierarchy of traditional Kazakh society, which represents a long historical tradition, was constantly undermined by the everyday need of the nomadic way of life to make decisions in its own right. Thus, despite the outwardly very strict framework for mutual kinship, loyalty and subordination, each nomadic community, for purely objective reasons, continued to remain an independent economic subject with its own economy and potential to choose its own location for itself. Such a flexibility added a certain dynamism to the tribal structure, enabling it to feel itself freely during constant changes within the intra-regional balance of political forces. This elasticity was lost after Kazakhstan was annexed and after the forced settlement, after which the tribal structure lost its real functional significance and re tained only a genealogical status. 172

Many experts believe that the Soviet heritage is the foundation stone of the modern-day Kazakh identity. The changes that occurred in Kazakh society during the Soviet era represent the chasm that divides the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan from their brethren in China, Mongolia and other countries. Its not yet Islam In connection with the famous events of 2001 and the years that followed, which in world public opinion are often associated with the not unknown theory of the clash of civilisations, a few words should be devoted to Islam in Kazakhstan (and in Central Asia as a whole), as countries with such names (ending in stan) are usually associated with Islam (or worse still, with Islamism). In so doing it is somehow forgotten that Kazakhstan was relatively recently a Soviet republic, where religion (Islam included), if not banned, was restricted in every way possible by the authorities in the way it had an impact as a public institution. But lets take things one at a time. As we have already mentioned, Islam came to Kazakhstan in the 8th Century together with the Arabian cavalry. In 751, at a battle on the River Talas in southern Kazakhstan, the Arabs and their Turkic tribe allies stopped the Chinese from attacking deep into Central Asia. Strictly speaking, it was this date that is considered to be the starting point for the history of Islam in the region, although certain researchers believe the 7th Century to be the earliest date that Islam was present in Central Asia. However, the region was actually really Islamised later, in the 11th to 12th centuries, where many pre-Islamic cultural and religious traditions of the Turkic peoples were preserved. The history of Central Asian Islam is distinguished by two principal trends: Sufism and Jadidism. Sufism played the alternative role of a social organisation and a form of local resistance to alien hegemony. It was Sufism that played a major role in the spread of Islam; through Sufi missionaries Islam was introduced among the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz in the 15th Century. In future Sufism played an important role in organising the spiritual and political resistance to Russian rule, both in tsarist and Soviet times. The oldest orders in the region were Yassawi (founded in the mid 12th Century by Ahmed Yasavi, traditionally deemed to be the first Turkic mystic) and Nakshbandiya (founded in the 14th Century). We should dwell separately on the phenomenon of Sufism, which, it is considered, was conceived in the non-Arabic space of the Islamic world. The contradictions between Sufism and official Islam intensified in the 9th Century. The Sufi strove wherever they could to establish their monastery structures, which in time began to render a considerable political, economic and financial influence of the world around them. The Sufi included the key principle of Shiism of a messianic figure (Mahdi) into their teachings. The active propaganda of the Sufi sheikhs, who moved from town to town and from country to country, had eclectic inclusions from different religions and it tried to form its own interpretation of the Hadith, which led to unavoidable confrontation with official Islam. In the 10th Century, the relationships between Sufism and Orthodox Sunnism came to a head. In the 12th Century, Sufism was finally structured from separate associations in to a well-organised system, which led in the following century to its transformation into a mass, international movement. The most widespread form of the organisation of the Sufi were the orders (the tarika), while the form of spiritual influence was the religious messages (the baraka). The internal hierarchy of Sufism was based on subordination to the advisors and mentors: the sheikhs (Pirs and Marabouts) of the scholars (Murids, Dervish and Fakirs). The Sufi community was known as the Ikhvan and it consisted of an internal, closer circle of associates. The major Sufi orders were the Kadiriya and the Yasavia. The latter experienced a considerable influence from other Asian religions and even from Shamanism; in essence it was a Turkic order. Another major Central-Asian order was the Nakshbandiya, founded in Bukhara in the 14th Century. This was considered to be the youngest and the most loyal order to Orthodox Islam. It became the most widespread order in central and southern Asia and, from recently, in the West. Contacts with Hinduism and other elements of Pantheism had a significant influence upon the Sufi ideology, as we know. With time, thanks to the conquering and the resettling, the Sufi orders came to Europe. Thus, Nakshbandiya became very popular among the European intellectuals who adopted Islam. Some of them became missionaries themselves, and active preachers of Sufism. By the time the Kazakh Khanate was formed and during its blossoming in the 15th-17th centuries, the Kazakh elite and aristocracy had already become Islamised. However, on the whole the population was 173

wholly indifferent to the norms of official Islam and they saw themselves as Muslims on a purely nominal level. Spiritual life was dominated by various forms of Shamanism, the cult of the sky, the spirits of ancestors and holy places (Khazret). Therefore, Sufism, with its mystic and hidden paganism, found a living echo in the Kazakh nomads. It is needless to say that there was a complete lack of any forms of restrictions and segregation of women, widespread in other parts of the Muslim world, including among the Kazakhs immediate neighbours. The praying five times a day (namaz) was seen in the Kazakh steppe as an onerous and unnecessary formality. In this way, the Kazakhs deservedly acquired the title of bad Muslims from other peoples, a term they use with pride to this day. With time the impulses of Islamisation, coming from the south, subsided and the Kazakhs found themselves left to their own devices. However, the threat of Islamisation suddenly reappeared among the Kazakhs, from where it was to be least expected. At the end of the 18th Century, when about one half of the area of Kazakhstan was already annexed by Russia, the Russian Empress Catherine II conceived the idea of civilising the wild nomads, encouraging not Christianity among them, as one would have assumed, but specifically Islam. However, on this occasion the role of religious missionaries were played by Tatar mullahs, representatives of a people, whose language was very close to that of the Kazakhs. The Tatars by that time had already two hundred and fifty years had exchanged places with the Russians, transforming from the upper classes into the vassals of the Russian crown and they were faithful champions of the Russian policy offensive in Siberia and Central Asia. They also adopted the role of the bearers of Islam in the Kazakh steppe, but they were more successful in popularising their cuisine and their women, thus considerably enriching the gene fund of the Kazakh nation in the process. After Russia finally conquered Central Asia, the European influence was greatly intensified in the region, which in turn called into being a reformatory movement in Islam, which gained the name Jadidism. The impulses of the Jadidistic movement came from the Caucasus and the Crimea. The new movement had two sides and it followed two objectives: on the one hand, it aimed to raise the education of the Muslim population of the Russian Empire to a modern level and bring it to unified standards; on the other hand it aimed to unite the Turkic people from the Bosphorous to the Kashgar, on a common cultural and linguistic basis, including by way of the introduction of a common Turkic alphabet. In future the battle between Jadidism and the advocates of the old method (the Kadims) grew into a political flat plane. The Bolsheviks found many supporters among the Jadidistic intelligentsia, while the Basmachi had a slogan during the civil war: death to the wrongdoers and the Jadids! However it was later revealed that the Jadids support nationalistic rather than class-based ideals, which led to their departure from Muslim Communism. It should be said that the majority of the Kazakhs supported the communist ideas. They willingly fought with the Red Army, sorting out relationships with the Basmachi, who were formed predominantly from their neighbours the Uzbeks and Tajiks. However, there were also Kazakh clans who did not support the Revolution and who left into Chinese Turkestan, Afghanistan and Iran. In the 1920s a campaign was inspired in Central Asia to secularise education, free women and attack Islam (Khudjum). In 1937-39 almost all jadidistic intellectuals were destroyed and the Sufi orders became the centre for resistance to Soviet atheism. Soviet power destroyed the Sufi shrines in the Fergana Valley and drove the tradition Sufi doctrine for the region underground, although it was in the Soviet period that the Kadiriya order gained a foothold in Central Asia, which had appeared in the region together with Igushi and Chechens, deported from the Caucasus. Leading roles in the Central-Asian Sufi orders were often occupied by women. The Kadiriya was es pecially widespread across Kazakhstan after 1945 and it subsequently continued to increase its influence. During the Second World War, Islam, just as the Orthodox Church, saw a certain relaxing of restrictions, although under Krushchev the attacks on religion were resurrected with renewed vigour. Under Brezhnev, the reinforcement of national cultures and the growth of nationalism had a side effect in the intensification of the growth of interest in the Islamic legacy of the Central-Asian peoples. At this time the church and the mosque were under the full control of the state and other Soviet institutions, such as the part and the KGB. A popular joke of that time told of the priest who was forced to return his communist party membership card as a punishment for poor propaganda work on his part. However, the actual truth of the matter, and your author has been the witness to this, was that church ministers who wished to obtain academic and theological 174

degrees, were forced, on the same basis as everyone else, to sit masters examinations, which included such an indispensible attrbute as Marxist (i.e. atheist) disciplines. The Gorbachev era witnessed a strengthening of the positions of the so-called official Islam and its final structuring under several spiritual forms of governance. In parallel there was a demarcation of the official and unofficial Islam of the Sufi. The most dramatic indications of an Islamic renaissance in Central Asia after the fall of the USSR involve the increase in the number of mosques (by the end of the century the number had increased from 37 to 100 in Kazakhstan and from 260 to 5,000 in the region as a whole) and the restoration of the Hajj. However, the contact of local Islam with that on the outside had a dangerous effect: the advent of the Wahhabi in Central Asia. As official Islam in the Central-Asian republics began to appeal to the Sufi legacy as a part of the cultural and national legacy (especially in Kazakhstan), there was an intensification of opposition between Sufism and Wahhabism, where the latter is openly persecuted in Uzbekistan since 1997. The USA closely tracked the possible intensification of Islam in Central Asia in the early 1990s. The conclusions made by USIA were unexpected and and sounded calming for the West: despite the fact that one half of Uzbeks and Kazakhs and 45% of Kyrgyzis see themselves as true Muslims, only one in five Uzbeks or Kyrgyzis practice their religion and with Kazakhs this number is lower still. Nevertheless, Islam has become one of the most important elements in the formation of a new national identity for the people of Central Asia. And yet this process has a terribly contradictory nature: Islamic organisations are under strict state control, religious parties are banned and government institutions are distinctly secular in their nature. In order to create a certain spiritual counterweight in their countries, from time to time the leaders of new states render demonstrative support for the Orthodox Church. The constitutions of the republics of Central Asia secure a secular nature for the government. The Islamic factor for the new, independent, states of the region also possesses a foreign policy dimension. While all the republics have joined the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and established relations with the Arab world and other Islamic countries, relations with Russia, China, the USA and Europe play an important role for them. In making a general assessment of the evolution of Islam in Central Asia, the conclusion can be made that, over many centuries, this region has been the centre of Islamic philosophy, science and theology. In the Soviet period religion was almost entirely subordinate to and placed under the control of the state. Its elements were only preserved on an individual or local level, in certain customs and domestic ceremonies. Islam today is now officially proclaimed as a part of the cultural and historical heritage in all the states of the region, although the government is trying to keep Islam under its control in the style of the Soviet age. Any attempts to politicise Islam or to turn it into a force in opposition to authority are suppressed immediately. As far as the Kazakhs are concerned, they have not betrayed their national character: Islam continues to be a cultural and historical abstraction, an empty formality that should be observed, so as not to offend ones elders. In real life religion plays no part at all, although there are now more outward signs of the presence of a Muslim culture than there were some twenty years ago. Open displays of piety are considered bad form, especially in the presence of representatives of other confessions or from another ethnic origin. In 2001 Kazakhstan was unexpectedly visited by Pope John-Paul II, which generated a sharp rise in the interest in religion. As a result, Kazakhstan has declared itself a world centre of religious tolerance and it holds conferences in its new capital city for representatives of all the worlds religions. Such a demonstration of confessional tolerance is only possible, it can be said, in a country that is completely deprived of any religiousness. Therefore, we will leave it up to you to answer the question: are Kazakhs Muslims in the generally-accepted sense, and is Kazakhstan an Islamic country. However, the answer is clear for all to see.

175

Boris Rumer, Associated Professor of the Davis Center at Harvard University

This article is focused on political, social, and economic development in Central Asia since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. The countries of this region face a growing challenge to the status quo, above all from a wave of Islamic radicalism that demands a share of political power or even the exclusive right to rule. The fundamental question is whether the former Soviet Central Asian republics will preserve their secular character or give way to Islamic regimes. The danger of destabilization in this region derives, first and foremost, from an internal situation that has become ever more explosive. The intraregional dynamics of destabilization (which previous volumes in the series have treated at length) are becoming ever more salient and powerful. The states have become increasingly disunified, as each acts to defend its own interests and ensure its survival. And with each passing year, the fundamental social and economic problemsa dearth of investment capital (the capital famine), the surfeit of unskilled labor resources, the shortage of water resources - are becoming increasingly critical. Tensions between the countries of Central Asia are steadily rising, partly because of the conflict over water and energy and partly because of long-standing territorial claims and border disputes. Internally, the countries of Central Asia have constructed and consolidated authoritarian regimes based upon clannish, mafia-like authority structures (with the inherent patron-client relations). The ruling bureaucracy is fused with legal and illegal business. This fusion of political and business elites is based on three components: clan-based ties, the mutual dependency of patron and client, and the possession of kompromat (compromising materials) against each other, all of which serve to prevent feuding and internecine strife among clans. It is in the interest of the ruling class to support an authoritarian leader who provides, in effect, the requisite patronage and protection. Censorship has become increasingly pronounced and ever more information is considered classified. Even in the Brezhnev era, the Soviet regime did not exercise the level of control over public opinion and information that now prevails in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The growing proclivity in Central Asia toward secrecy has been accompanied by an expansion of a shadow economy and the seamier sides of social behavior. The illegal sphere has come to embrace virtually every aspect of life and activity: not only the economy (including the trade and service sectors), but also the bureaucracy, law enforcement, culture, education, and medicine. In essence, so far as the broad masses of the populace are concerned, this is a survival economy. The development of an economy that flouts the law and evades taxation is a savior for many people, for it helps, at least in part, to absorb the growing unemployment and thus ameliorate social stress and hardships. In the noneconomic sphere, however, the shadow activity causes palpable harm. In any case, corruption and bribery have become the norm of everyday life and business activity. The phenomenon is systemic and ubiquitous. The number of people who are willing to pay bribes significantly exceeds the number who take them. If something is forbidden, it can simply be purchased. Moreover, all the countries of Central Asia gradually squandered all that they inherited from the former Soviet Union - most significantly, intellectual capital and the institutions required for its reproduction. Indeed, the states in this region have even failed to ensure the reproduction of the most essential components required for economic growth. The aging of the productive base (the depletion of fixed capital and, especially, the ob solescence of industrial equipment) and the technological backwardness are increasing at a rapid pace. The expenditures on maintenance, not to mention replacement and upgrading, are woefully inadequate. The decline in the quality of human capital is particularly striking. Ethnic conflict, a deterioration in the status of the nonindigenous population, and the violation of the latters rights have triggered a massive emigration - that is, an exodus of irreplaceable specialists from industry and the service branches of public health and education. The educational level of the youth has undergone a particularly sharp decline. For the broad strata of the impoverished, especially in rural areas, it has become increasingly difficult (and often impossible) for people to give their children a modern education. Instead, a growing number of young people now receive religious schooling, which has become much more accessible because of the material support from foreign Muslim foun176

CENTRAL ASIA: 15 YEARS AFTER

dations and organizations. The stratum of semiliterate, religiously indoctrinated youth is growing. As a result, this process is creating a fertile environment for the propagation of radical Islamism and an increase in the opportunities to recruit warriors for Islam. At the same time, in recent years the Central Asian countries have all demonstrated patterns of economic growth. As a result, their gross domestic products (GDP) have risen substantially above what they were in the mid-1990s. Thus, in 2000 annual GDP growth was nearly 10 percent in Kazakhstan, 18 percent in Turkmenistan, more than 8 percent in Tajikistan, 5 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 4 percent in Uzbekistan. After years of sharp contraction, both the industrial and agricultural sectors have begun to grow again. Apart from the dubious accuracy of official statistics (particularly for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where the question of reliability is especially serious), the dynamics in main macroeconomic indicators are tangible and positive. However, one must not overlook the magnitude of contraction in the early and mid-1990s: all these countries began from an exceedingly low starting point. Indeed, not a single country here has as yet recovered the level of production reported for 1990. Moreover, in assessing the likelihood that this growth will be sustained, one must also bear in mind that the decisive factor was a favorable dynamic in the prices of oil, metals, and other raw material exports, and that these prices are highly volatile and unreliable. During the past two years, the conditions that determine development in the economies of these countries have become increasingly distinct. The jump in the world prices of oil and natural gas has powered the surge of economic growth in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Expectations of an enormous growth spurt in the production of oil at the Kashagan oil fields in Kazakhstan are extremely high (although perhaps premature, since these reserves have not been confirmed). Uzbekistan, which does not possess such significant opportunities to export mineral resources, finds itself in a less favorable position. Indeed, the government there has essentially renounced a liberalization of the exchange rate and intensified state planning, with the familiar characteristics of a command economy becoming ever more salient. Its economic policies are characterized by half-measures that aim only to simulate government action, not to carry out cardinal changes. Uzbekistan's principal foreign economic partner, the South Korean firm Daewoo, has gone bankrupt, thereby rendering hopes for the de velopment of an Uzbek automotive industry highly dubious. Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, has liberalized virtually everything and joined a plethora of world economic organizations (including the World Trade Organization), but none of that has been able to stop the steady degradation of its economy. Tajikistan has shown rather high rates of growth, but they merely reflect its extremely low starting point: indeed, the situation is worse there than in Kyrgyzstan. It bears noting that the activity of Islamic militants has compelled all the countries of this region to increase their military expenditures, which create a heavy burden on state budgets that are already stretched to the limit. In the decade that has elapsed since the breakup of the Soviet Union, it is perfectly clear that the countries in Central Asia have failed to create real mechanisms to ensure sustained economic growth. As a result, all these regimes have entered a phase in which they must appeal for foreign credits, fend off the claims of neighbors with respect to territories and water resources, and preserve the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of an increasingly impoverished populace. Insofar as the remaining chapters of this volume provide a fundamental analysis of all five Central Asian states and their prospects in the foreseeable future, the goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the most important economic and social questions in the two regional superpowers - Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In my view, several American observers have given a rather distorted picture of the economic gains in the countries of Central Asia. Kazakhstan Until recently, one could say that the political situation in Kazakhstan appears to be stable. The threat of militant Islam has been less visible in Kazakhstan than in neighboring countries, and it is virtually nonexistent in the most industrially developed parts of the country (that is, the northern and eastern areas that border on Siberia). However, since the end of 2001, the political climate in Kazakhstan has been changing and has begun to show signs of an impending storm. The oppositionist forces, which until recently had been divided and which had nothing in common with Islam, have now joined forces in opposition to the authoritarian, thoroughly 177

corrupt regime of President Nursultan Nazarbaev. The mood of protest in the population has been heightened by Western press reports of enormous sums that the Nazarbaev clan and his cronies have plundered and have stashed away in foreign bank accounts; and the discontent is further intensified by the repression of the independent mass media. All this has energized the oppositionist groups and created an explosive situation. The confrontation with the regime has led to coordinated actions by communists, oligarchs-entrepreneurs, the Young Turks from the intelligentsia, and the bureaucratic elite. However, the regime has by no means exhausted its resources. It can still count on several factors: fear of destabilization, popular skepticism toward the promises of politicians in general (the result of a decade of postSoviet experience), and political inertia of the masses. In addition, up until now, a significant part of the population has come to the conviction that the rule of President Nazarbaev, whatever its negative aspects, nevertheless ensures internal stability. Indeed, many common citizens believe that a change in leadership would lead to no good and that the clash of potential successors could destabilize the situation in the country. Given these contradictory forces, it is important to reassess the assumption (dominant both inside and outside Kazakhstan) about the political stability of the existing regime. Stability is, after all, a critical issue: if uncertainty about political stability in the country should increase, that would undoubtedly have an adverse impact on the flow of foreign investment into its economy. Uzbekistan The political situation in Uzbekistan presents a peculiar admixture: attempts at partial economic reforms together with simultaneous steps to strengthen the military and police (repression) organs. The threat of Islamic extremists forced President Islam Karimov to make the army more combat-ready and to reform the armed forces. It seems that Karimov, like the other Central Asian leaders, faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the regime must bolster its armed forces, a task made all the more urgent because of the threats of Islamic militants and the deterioration in its relations with neighboring states. On the other hand, the leaders of Central Asia must fear that the army will turn into a force that plays an independent, perhaps decisive, role (as happened in Pakistan and Turkey). Will President Karimov risk allowing the formation of a powerful bloc that includes the National Security Committee, the Ministry of Interior, and the Procuracy? Apparently Karimov is attempting to forestall such a development. That is perhaps why he appointed two intellectuals -Mirakbar Rakhmonkulov (a law professor) as secretary of the Security Council and Kodir Gulomov (a physicist and professor) as the minister of defense. Nevertheless, the likelihood that the military will become a "third power" has recently increased. That development stems from the peculiar division of powersnot the traditional paradigm (executive, legislative, and judicial), but a characteristic post-Soviet structure (presidential, law-enforcement, and military). As before, the government does not contemplate the inclusion of moderate Islamic activists in positions of authority: Karimov simply refuses to countenance the idea of power-sharing. Still, one cannot exclude the possibility that he will include a few loyal Islamic clerics that is, those who are willing to collaborate with the regime, while preserving the full plenitude of his own power. From the perspective of maintaining stability and preventing the Tajikization of his country, Karimov may be justified in his uncompromising position at the present time. The experience of Tajikistan, where Russian mediation helped fashion an artificial consortium (consisting of the regime of Emomali Rakhmonov, entirely dependent on Moscow, and the Islamist opposition), shows that such a symbiosis is neither stable nor functional. Particular attention must also be given to the droughts that have repeatedly stricken Uzbekistan. Although the main factor in the disaster was climatic (i.e., drought), the water supply problem of the region has steadily worsened in recent years. The lack of water, to be sure, is an objective phenomenon. Nevertheless, given skillful, professional management of the sixty water reservoirs constructed in Uzbekistan during the Soviet era, it is entirely possible to provide a sufficient supply of water for the crops and even to increase the yields. That is evident from the severe droughts in the Soviet era, especially in 1974 to 1975 and in the early 1980s. An analysis by experts from the United Nations confirmed that, apart from the climatic factor, the severity of the drought was due to poor water management practices at both the national and regional levels, along with inefficient irrigation techniques and technology as well as agricultural and crop production policies. The sharp decline of agricultural output in 2000 was due not only to drought but also to the lack of incentives for peasants to conserve water and to save the harvest. In addition, however, there was also a marked 178

deprofessionalization of the personnel who regulate the water resources. One should think that if the authorities were seriously concerned about the exodus of such essential specialists, they could create conditions that would entice them to remain in Uzbekistan. But here, once again, is an example of how the government has mindlessly squandered its supply of precious human capital. Along with a decline in water resources, Uzbekistan has also experienced a degradation of its soil. For an agrarian country like Uzbekistan, that process is of course fraught with grave consequences. The attempt to achieve self-sufficiency in cereal production (thereby avoiding the traditional reliance on imports from Kazakhstan) resulted in a gradual exhaustion of the soil. Given the policy toward the agrarian sector as a donor of financial resources for the state budget, expenditures for such purposes are exceedingly small. The peasants themselves cannot finance capital-intensive projects: the majority of agricultural enterprises are already operating at loss as a result of government orders for cotton and cereal at low state prices. How, under such conditions, can one contemplate the possibility of attracting foreign investment for melioration? Uzbek television has broadcast reports of how the state procuracy exercises control over field work, and in a number of cases the peasants bear criminal accountability for either cultivating the soil or harvesting the crops at a low level of quality. Previous volumes in this series have examined in detail the gradualist model of economic reform in Uzbekistan and its practical results. Indeed, the economic problems that beset Kazakhstan also apply to Uzbekistan: the decline in the standard of living (especially in rural areas), a low level of consumer demand, pervasive corruption, ubiquitous bribery, and dissipation of the intellectual capital inherited from the Soviet era. Nor has the situation substantially changed during the last two years in Uzbekistan in any event, such that it would improve the plight of the population. Most important, the principal agent of development in Uzbekistan (unlike Kazakhstan) continues to be the state. At present, the main tendencies include more state planning in key economic sectors, intensification of import substitution, and the continual drain of resources from agriculture. In 2000-2001, the government undertook several attempts to liberalize the economy, but failed to achieve appreciable progress. Why Did Uzbekistan Take a Different Path than Kazakhstan? Given the historical, ethnic, social, and political characteristics of each of the Central Asian countries, and given the opportunities for political elites (nomenklatura) to profit from the redistribution of state property (through privatization), it would be naive to fantasize about the sudden emergence of effective, competent, and uncorrupt governments. The bacchanalia of plundering national wealth reached its zenith in the mid-1990s; but the process varied from country to country. Whereas it was most spontaneous and intense in Kazakhstan, it was much more orderly and restrained in Uzbekistan. The conception of reform embraced in Kazakhstan, the massive privatization, the governments renunciation of control over the basic sectors of the economy all these factors generated chaos and much greater opportunity for people to plunder the national wealth, and to do so with impunity. Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan did not offer conditions where avarice could run amok. Rather, Tashkent preserved many features of a command-administrative economic system, limited the privatization (with the state preserving ownership or at least control over the main part of the economy), erected a more rigidly structured system of authority, and had greater capacity to punish those guilty of venality. As to why Kazakhstan applied the recipe of shock therapy, one must remember that it shares more than 7,000 kilometers of border with Russia (which is virtually free from controls) and that the economies of the two countries are inextricably intertwined. By contrast, Uzbekistan does not have a common border with Russia, and its economybased on a single product, as the cotton plantation of the former Soviet Union did not have such close links to Russia. Hence Karimov could take a different path: that is, refuse to copy the Russian reform and heed the directives of the IMF and World Bank, and instead juxtapose his own gradualist conception to their formula for shock therapy. No less important, however, is a subjective, personal factor. Although the Kazakh and Uzbek leaders both came from the same incubator (both headed the republic communist parties at the point when their countries became independent), they were quite different when it came time to conduct economic reform. Specifically, they differed in their capacity to understand the enormous complexity of the tasks, in their knowledge of the real situation in their countries, and in their ability to foresee the social consequences of reform. In terms of educa179

tion and experience, the Kazakh president was far less prepared to adopt independent decisions in the economic sphere. As a result, he relied heavily on the recommendations of foreign advisors. But not all of these were pro fessionally qualified to play this role; moreover, the majority knew very little about Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, the influence of such advisorstogether with the customary proclivity to follow Moscow's lead determined the policies adopted in Almaty. President Karimov is of a quite different caliber and background. Having worked as a professional economist trained in the Soviet school, he earlier served as the republic's minister of finance, headed the republic-level Gosplan (State Planning Agency), and for only a short period during perestroika served as head of the Uzbek communist party. Hence Karimov clearly stands apart from the other Central Asian leaders - in terms of his understanding of the economy of Uzbekistan and its macroeconomic interdependency (in a private conversation with the author, he replied to a question about the balance of payments by immediately citing current data, with no need to make recourse to aides), and in terms of his capacity to comprehend the realities of the day. This perhaps explains why he did not dash off headlong in a campaign to demolish the old system. He apparently understood what would happen, given the specific conditions in his country, if he were to follow the formula pushed by the IMF and the World Bank. He understood the special characteristics of his society, and how neo classic ideas are transformed in practice and how, under the conditions of Uzbek reality, they would inevitably be distorted. In this respect, he had no illusions. Foreseeing the consequences of shock therapy (which, given the conditions prevailing in Uzbekistan, would have been more severe than in Kazakhstan), Karimov refused to undertake a fundamental liberalization of the economy and essentially retained the command system. As a result, Uzbekistan suffered the smallest contraction among the post-Soviet states. Karimov thus avoided the chaos characteristic of transition in other countries, thereby ensuring stability in the economic sphere and less stress for society as well. But that stability has turned into economic stagnation, which has in turn led to a depressed economic situation. Although Karimovs economic policy had some positive results, by the mid-1990s it had become necessary to make corrections and modifications. Karimov, however, proved unable to diverge from the previously chosen trajectory. As an experienced economist of the Soviet school, he understood the social consequences if price deregulation, large-scale privatization, and a sharp reduction of state control over the economy were carried out in a drastic, single-stage action. In particular, Karimov perceived the danger that such an experiment could pose for a regime that had not yet consolidated power. His assessment was indeed correct: one must take into account the fact that Uzbekistan lacks the export opportunities of Kazakhstan, depends on grain imports, and faces a difficult situation with respect to cotton prices on international markets. Nevertheless, Karimov was apparently so encouraged by the relatively favorable results of his policy in the first half of the 1990s (compared to the dire situation emerging in the other former Soviet republics, including Russia) that he failed to see the downsides and ignored growing signs of the need to diverge from the initial path. And here he revealed his own shortsightedness and failure to recognize the three essential problems in his policy: "First, agriculture is still used as a donor for other branches. Second, the industrial policy still relies chiefly on import-substitution, not export. Third, the excessive emphasis on authoritarian power impedes the development of grassroots capitalism. Karimov is procrastinating on the need to make critical decisions, but he cannot fail to understand that the longer he remains on the present course, the more difficult it will be to take another path. And the present course is most assuredly leading to a dead end. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Relations with the Big Three However great the influence of states with an interest in Central Asia, stability in the region to the extent that it depends upon external powers concerns three main actors: Russia, China, and the United States. It is important to see how their relations have developed with respect to the two key Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan Without doubt, the foreign policy of Kazakhstan is exceedingly complex. Above all, this country finds itself pulled by two opposing poles of gravity (Russia and China), at the very time that it feels obliged to demonstrate fealty to the United States. All this leaves the Kazakh leadership in a very difficult position. The key point is 180

that, precisely because the government must constantly try to strike a proper balance in this triangle (itself so loaded with contradictions), it cannot achieve either consistency or coherence in its foreign policy. With all the means at its disposal, the Kazakh leadership seeks at once to maintain good relations with its powerful neighbors and to demonstrate a strong sensitivity to any encroachment on its territorial integrity. Although both Russia and China display friendship at the official level and avoid giving grounds for accusations of aggrandizement, an abiding, covert distrust and suspicion undergirds Astana's relations with Moscow and Beijing. The Kazakh political community is well aware that Russian jingoists cannot abide the idea that Kazakhstan is truly independent; nor can Astana ignore their claims to the northern and eastern territories of Kazakhstan. Similarly, a visceral mistrust of China is widespread and deeply rooted, not only among policymakers but also among the broad masses of the population. Kazakhstani- Chinese Relations: Tensions Behind a Facade of Friendship. In the post-Soviet period, the top Chinese leaders have frequently reprised the view that Kazakhstan is to play a key role in their strategy for Central Asia and hence ranks as their most important partner in the region. Yet it must be remembered that in the nineteenth century a significant part of Central Asia belonged to the Chinese Empire. The public pronouncements of Chinese irredentists, while unofficial and less explicit than the claims expressed in Russian publications, have attracted predictable alarm in Central Asian capitals, first and foremost in Astana. As a result, many in Central Asia see the good relations with China as temporary, a sentiment grounded in deep distrust of Beijing's true intentions. To be sure, both Astana and Beijing attempt to conceal their mutual disputes from public view. However, despite the frequent declarations of friendship and good-neighborly relations, in fact this relationship is far from idyllic. In particular, the Kazakh press was highly critical of an agreement on redrawing state borders that the Kazakh parliament approved in the spring of 1999. Moreover, Kazakh public opinion is greatly concerned that China plans to construct a canal to divert water from the Chernyi Irtysh River (which crosses through both countries) in order to provide water for irrigation in Xinjiang and industrial development of the Karamay oil field. As it is, Kazakhstan suffers from a shortage of water, with half of its water supply coming from the territories of neighboring states (a significant part of which is the Chernyi Irtysh itself). If China diverts more water, this will have severe economic and ecological repercussions for Kazakhstan. Astana also has other reasons for concern. First, in 1996 Kazakhstan (together with Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China) signed an agreement in Shanghai that provided for the demilitarization of a 100-kilometer border zone. The problem is that during the Soviet period the government constructed its fortifications in close proximity to the border. As a result, the new agreement creates enormous difficulties for Kazakhstan, since it lacks the wherewithal to construct a new line of border defenses and must leave its borders virtually unprotected. Furthermore, Kazakhstan is deeply concerned about the influx of Chinese. Indeed, it has even classified statistics on this subject, although this censorship has not prevented the most fantastic figures from circulating among the general populace. The Kazakh leadership is making a maximum effort to establish good relations with its powerful eastern neighbor and to avoid giving any grounds for dissatisfaction. But the Kazakh government finds itself in a very difficult situation, since it must contend with a public opinion that is strongly anti-Chinese. This latent conf lict between Astana and Beijing sometimes comes to the surface. This is even true in the case of Kasymzhomart Tokaev, who earlier served as the Kazakh minister of foreign affairs and became prime minister in October 1999. Even Tokaev, an extremely cautious professional diplomat of the old Soviet school, could not conceal the contradictions in Kazakh-Chinese relations. One issue (perhaps the most important in terms of mass psychology) is the immigration of Chinese in other words, a peaceful Sinification of the immense, unpopulated, and economically undeveloped territories of the country. It is a moot point whether this Sinification is actually occurring or whether it is merely the hallucination of a paranoid populace. The abolition of visa requirements between the two countries in the early 1990s effectively dismantled controls over Chinese migration to Kazakhstan. The Kazakh press has been conducting an anti-Chinese campaign, with a steady stream of reports that the Chinese are resettling in massive numbers and buying up housing and property in Kazakhstan. As a result, the Kazakh authorities have 181

had to act unilaterally and to reimpose the former visa requirements in an effort to establish control over Chinese travel to their country. For its part, Beijing has a vested interest in supporting and preserving the secular regimes of Central Asia, all of which seek to prevent the dissemination of Islamic extremism and, more generally, the diffusion of politically active Islam in Central Asia. After all, that same threat hangs over the predominantly Muslim region of Xinjiang, which has witnessed a plethora of explosions, assassinations, and terrorist acts by Uigur separatists since the eany 1990s. The Chinese leaders are duly concerned about the activities of Islamic militants in areas of Central Asia that border on Xinjiang. The penetration of Islamic extremists, weapons, explosives, and religious teachings from neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan into Xinjiang has bolstered the Uigur movement and its demands for the secession of Xinjiang from China. The Xinjiang situation lends credibility to press reports that Beijing had been putting pressure on Pakistan to suspend its support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to these reports, China gave Pakistan to understand that it opposes the latter's pro-Islamic foreign policy. China regards Pakistan as a key to neutralizing Islamic fundamentalists and the export of aggressive Islam to Central Asia and Xinjiang. Slowly but surely, the Central Asian states are being drawn into the Chinese orbit, in the first instance economically, but also politically (if more gradually). This tendency is most apparent in China's two contiguous neighbors, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In general, however, one must acknowledge that Beijing has thus far conducted itself - at least, to all external appearances - in a very peaceful manner, displaying much caution in relations with its Central Asian neighbors. Kazakhstan and Russia: Neither Together nor Apart. Notwithstanding the current importance of Kazakhstan's relations with China, in the immediate future Russia will continue to hold top priority. But relations between the two countries are problematic. A storm of indignation among Kazakhs ensued after declarations by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (proclaiming the northern and most economically valuable - part of Kazakhstan as Russian territory) and the provocative rhetoric of Vladimir Zhirinovskii that evoked a strong resonance among Moscow irredentists. However, neither former President Boris Yeltsin nor the current President Vladimir Putin has given reason for Kazakhs to accuse them of expansionist intentions. However, for whatever reason, the mass consciousness of Kazakhs (not to mention the non-Kazakh population) is not seriously concerned about Russian expansion. The cultural bonds with Russia are still strong; the Russian language is still predominant in Kazakhstan. The majority of the population watches Moscow television, and the Russian press fills the newspaper stands. Relations with Russia are considerably more important for Kazakhstan than for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan is seen as one of Russia's loyal allies in the post-Soviet realm, and a supporter for the maximum possible integration within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Kazakhstan (together with Belarus, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan) helped initiate and create the Customs Union. Indeed, its chief foreign trade partner is Russia. And Astana emulates development in Russia and, in fact, borrowed the latter's ideology of economic reform. The link with Russia is deeply rooted. More than any other republic, Kazakhstan developed demographically, economically, and culturally during the Soviet era and, therefore, strongly reflects the Russian heartland. Moscow created the industry of Kazakhstan, especially its branches in the northern and eastern parts of the country, as an integral component of the technological complex in the Urals and western Siberia. Nevertheless, relations between Astana and Moscow are subject to constant tension, with economic problems constituting the principal cause. For example, the two countries ultimately failed to reach an agreement on the value-added tax (VAT) for the customs clearance of transit goods. The result was a customs dispute in January 1999, when Astana, despite its membership in the Customs Union, imposed a strict ban on the import of twenty-one categories of food products from Russia. It took this protectionist action because after the devaluation of the ruble in August 1998, Russian food products became considerably cheaper than those produced domestically (with obvious negative consequences for domestic producers). Another reason, perhaps even more important (though not publicized by Kazakh decision-makers), that Astana launched this attack on Moscow lies in the fact that devaluation of the ruble made it unprofitable for Kazakhstan to export its own goods 182

to Russia. Moscow's arrears in paying for its lease of the space-launching site at Baikonur is still another cause of tension. Moscow displayed the cooling in its relations with Kazakhstan by reinforcing their common border, which, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, had been virtually open. In June 1999, the Russian government issued a Decree on the Strengthening of Borders and the Creation of Control Posts, the purpose being to regulate and restrict all movement across its border (above all, with respect to goods). Nevertheless, despite such outbreaks of tension, Kazakhstan remains loyal to Russia in military and political spheres. Thus, it is still a member of the Treaty on Collective Security (which is admittedly semidefunct). Moscow encourages Astana to participate in a refurbished military coalition by providing weapons under extremely favorable terms and even gratis. Relations with the United States: Ups and Downs For most of the post-Soviet period, relations between Kazakhstan and the United States have been very good, but in 1998 they began to sour. From the start, Washington sought to cooperate with Kazakhstan in order to achieve several strategic objectives: eliminate all Soviet weapons located on Kazakhstan's territory, ensure American participation in the development of hydrocarbon resources (dear to the interests of American corporations), and channel the transportation of these commodities over routes that Washington deemed in its own best interest. The transformation of Kazakhstan into a nonnuclear state and its signing of the nonproliferation treaty led to the establishment of particularly warm relations between the two governments. This process was further abetted by a tight monetary policy (which Washington approved), strict adherence to the IMF's prescription for the transition to a market economy, the rapid pace of the transformation process, and the relative liberalism of the governing regime (especially when compared with the overtly authoritarian rule in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). All this created the impression of internal stability, while the tantalizing opportunities to develop a broad range of Kazakhstan's abundant mineral resources made the country highly attractive to foreign investors, including Americans. The prospects for a productive business and political partnership with a country situated in the center of Eurasia evoked considerable enthusiasm in Washington. There is no need to explain why the Kazakh side has been so acutely interested in a partnership with the United States: one need think only of the alluring prospects of ties in the private and public sectors, as well as the promise of financial assistance and political support from Washington. As the Clinton administration formulated and implemented its energy strategy on the Caspian region, it assigned top priority to Kazakh oil exports and the direction that these would flow in any East-West pipelines. For Washington, the principal strategic objective was to ensure that the pipeline bypass both Iran and Russia. The U.S. government assigned Kazakhstan the key role in the region, and it dispatched one of its most capable and best-trained diplomats, William Courtney, to serve as ambassador. This extraordinary interest in Kazakhstan, reinforced by what are likely to be inflated accounts of potential oil and gas reserves in the Western mass media, gave rise to great expectations and encouraged a tendency to exaggerate. The high point in U.S.-Kazakhstan relations came in late 1997 when President Nazarbaev came to Washington to participate in a session of a bilateral commission. Thereafter, however, a distinct chill set in. Kazakhstan's poor economic performance (aggravated by the economic crisis in East and Southeast Asia and in Russia), the fall in the prices of Kazakhstan's exports, growing skepticism about the real magnitude of unexplored hydrocarbon resources, and more sober assessments of the investment required to develop and transport these commodities to world markets all served to undermine the interest of the American government and business circles. But the key reason for Washingtons cooling toward Kazakhstan was its domestic policies: hopes for a liberalization of public life and for the development of democracy proved illusory. In particular, Kazakhstan failed to meet the standards of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the presidential elections of January 1999 and the parliamentary voting in October 1999. The intervention of the executive branch in the voting, the outright falsification of voting returns in many parts of the country, and the suppression of opposition provoked an extremely negative reaction among the governments and public organizations of the United States and Europe. All this had a correspondingly negative impact on relations with Kazakhstan. Another serious blow to U.S.-Kazakhstan relations occurred in the summer of 1999, when Astana sold MiG-21s 183

to North Korea for eight million dollars and became a target of American sanctions. This deal - which is difficult to fathom in rational terms - inflicted great harm to Kazakhstan's relations with the United States. Still, even if Kazakhstan does not recover its erstwhile top-priority status in American eyes, it can expect to improve its relations with Washington. The Americans will favor a rapprochement because of their own vested interest in a pipeline that skirts both Russia and Iran and, specifically, passes through Turkey to the port of Ceyhan. At the European summit meeting in Istanbul in November 1999, President Nazarbaev joined the presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in signing an agreement to build a pipeline through Turkish territory. In so doing, Nazarbaev chose Washington over Moscow, an act that should earn the gratitude of the U.S. administration. Uzbekistan Islam Karimov evidently has two main foreign policy objectives: first, to quash attempts by Islamic radicals to topple his regime and, second, to establish his dominance as the principal leader of Central Asia. His campaign against Islamic fundamentalists has support not only from his neighbors in Central Asia, but also from the United States, Russia, and China. Although Karimovs aspirations to regional leadership are not openly articulated, no one can doubt the existence of this grand design and his own personal ambitions. All the fluctuations, flip-flops, and gyrations in Karimovs foreign policy over the last decade are subordinated to achieving both of his foreign policy goals. The anti-Iranian policy in the first half of the 1990s gave way to a cautious, wait-and-see posture in the second half of the decade. The stormy love affair with Turkey from the beginning of independence ended suddenly in 1999 with a marked cooling in their relations. Similar shifts have also been characteristic of Uzbekistans relations with Russia and its neighbors in the region. Karimov assigns top priority to joining Washingtons circle of client states and to establishing close ties with NATO. In 1999, Tashkent joined the pro-Washington GUUAM bloc (a regional association consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova), decided to open a mission at NATO headquarters, and has supported Washington in virtually all of its actions (including the operation in Kosovo and the war in Afghanistan). Karimov not only endorses American policy in the Middle East but also has established close economic and political ties with Israel - a policy that earned him particular enmity in many Muslim circles. Whereas the West favored Kazakhstan in the first half of the 1990s, it reassigned top priority to Uzbekistan in 1997. Washington and its Atlantic partners close their eyes to the absence of democracy in Uzbekistan, pretend to take seriously the cosmetic measures to liberalize the regime, and rely on Uzbekistan to be the key strategic partner in pressing their interests in Central Asia. At the end of 1999, Tashkent and Beijing established much closer relations. The improvement in ties was at least partly due to their mutual interest in suppressing the militant Islamic movements, which had become far more active and threatened to destabilize Uzbekistan and, as noted, western China. In November 1999, Karimov made a state visit to Beijing and held two meetings with the Chinese President and Party Chairman Jiang Zemin. While in Beijing, Karimov declared that both countries are united by the effort to combat international terrorism and to maintain regional security. As a result, Uzbekistan - which itself has tens of thousands of ethnic Uigurs - became Chinas ally in the struggle against Uigur separatist movements. Significantly, the Uigur diaspora in Uzbekistan has remained neutral in the struggle by the Uigurs of Xinjiang to gain their independence from China. Karimov also assured President Jiang that the Uigurs in Uzbekistan will not pose a problem for China. In return, the Chinese leader offered his countrys assistance in the struggle against Islamic extremists, including the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both sides also agreed to work together in the struggle to suppress the drug trade. During this visit, Karimov also signed a number of agreements on trade and economic cooperation. Moscow poses the most complicated problem for Uzbekistan, with periods of frosty relations alternating with brief thaws. The key problem is that Moscow cannot reconcile itself to the fact that Central Asia is slipping out from under its domination. While Nazarbaev periodically tries to tran-quilize Moscow politicians by playing integration games and by espousing the idea of a single economic space, Karimovfrom the very outset has openly voiced his irreconcilable opposition to association with Russia, even in the most nominal, symbolic form. In essence, the assertion of Uzbek hegemony in the region is simply incompatible with the active presence of Moscow. Tashkent has therefore endeavored to exclude Moscow from any significant role in regional affairs. As one observer pointed out: The Russian vector in Uzbek policy, while remaining substantial and sometimes a 184

painful zone of Uzbek foreign policy striving, is increasingly dropping to secondary (after the West) and even tertiary importance. Russia does not actively participate in an investment program for Uzbekistan. Moreover, commercial and economic relations between the two countries have been reduced to a bare minimum. Tashkent has also minimized the presence of Russian mass media in the country. While it is not easy to disentangle the real motivations behind this hot-and-cold fluctuation in relations be tween Moscow and Tashkent, it is important to remember that both are tightly intertwined in a complex web that involves other countries in the region. On the one hand, the other Central Central Asian countries fear Moscows control and encroachment on their independence; on the other hand, they also seek Moscows protection - not only to combat Islamic extremism but also to restrain the ambitions of Tashkent. Moscow of course exploits these fears as an opportunity to maintain and enhance its presence in the region. The most contentious sphere of conflict dividing Moscow and Tashkent is Tajikistan. For its part, Tashkent simply cannot abide Moscows dominance in Dushanbe, which has left Tajikistan in virtually total political, economic, and military dependency on Russia. Nor is Tashkent willing to accept the inclusion of the Islamic opposition in the Tajik government (a step fraught with far-reaching implications) or the ever-increasing flow of narcotics through Tajikistan. Conclusion In the period since the events of 11 September 2001, the worlds mass media (in any case, the media in Russia and the West) have given considerable attention to Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The press and electronic news agencies have illuminated many aspects of the domestic and external situation pertaining to these regions. The media give particular attention to a number of sensitive, significant subjects: - the peripeteia of the political struggle in the upper echelons of power; - the corruption scandals that involve people at the very top of the government; - court intrigues and possible scenarios for succession, so important in countries with a cohort of aging leaders; - the activities of opposition groups; - repressive measures leveled against the independent press; - the mounting tensions in relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan; - the conflictive situation surrounding the allocation of water resources; - the increasing incidence of border clashes; - the maneuvering of the Central Asian leaders between the two polar forces - the United States and Russia. In shaping policy toward Central Asia and Russia, U.S. policymakers need to be keenly aware that they have stepped inside the chalk line long drawn by Moscow to define its post-Soviet geopolitical space. It may not be in U.S. long- or short-term interests to sacrifice its relationship with Russia to its relationship with Central Asia. Central Asia may not be as important to China as Taiwan, but for Russia, to see Central Asia fall under U.S. dominance would be tantamount to a final collapse of the great power ambitions that reside in the minds of its political class and majority of its people. Russian concerns have undoubtedly already emerged. Nonetheless, it is possible to find ways to keep these concerns from resulting in confrontation. But it will take flexibility on the part of the Bush administration, as well as compromises in other spheres of U.S.Russia relations. Prominent Russian specialists on U.S. politics had to force themselves to come to terms with Putin's proAmerican U-turn. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, they put up with U.S. use of air bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and the U.S. military presence there. But opposition to Putins proAmerican course is strong. The top echelons of the armed forces and security services are traditionally antiAmerican. They grumbled at Putins quiet response to the U.S. announcement that it would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Later in 2002, they will have to come to terms with NATO membership for the three former Soviet republics on the Baltic Sea. But they are not likely to remain docile if Central Asia jumps out of Moscow's orbit and accepts U.S. patronage. This would be a call for a requiem for Great Russia and signal Putins failure as a leader. He and his pro-American foreign policy course would be discredited. 185

Such potential consequences of U.S. penetration of Central Asia need to be taken into account as the Bush administration forges ahead in the region. Washington should also consider the likely costs of its new acquisition. Of course, gaining a springboard for operations in the heart of Eurasia is important, especially after September 11. But one must not forget that the United States is now supporting corrupt dictatorial regimes in these predominantly Muslim countries. Their populations are not radicalized, but their prospects for economic prosperity are quite elusive. The region is also rife with traditional rivalries, fueled by a growing competition for land and water. A U.S. embrace of the Central Asian regimes would likely entail American responsibility for regional security and stability, including support for authoritarian, even dictatorial, regimes and the suppression of radical Islam. Choosing the lesser of two evils - radical Islam and corrupt dictatorships - will mean support for the latter, just as the United States has done in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Optimism about Central Asia's economic prospects, which has appeared in U.S. press reports from the region, is misguided and inappropriate. In essence, the region's economic existence is dependent on raw material exports and investment from the West. If the United States wishes to become the dominant power and chief donor in the region, it should be realistic and candid about the price it will have to pay. There is no middle road for Washington. Policies such as partial debt relief (especially important for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), new loans and credits, and help in opening markets for Central Asian goods would leave Central Asia addicted to cash injections from abroadas has already happened with Kyrgyzstan - and will only sustain a downward trajectory. Most of the population would end up living below the poverty line, with all the ensuing implications for stability in these countries. To prevent such a turn of events, a more ambitious investment of intellectual and financial resources would be required. And even so, if the United States finds those resources and makes the commitment, how will they be used? Will they create conditions for sustainable economic growth in Kazakhstan, with its entrenched clans and mafias and pervasive corruption? And what about Uzbekistan, which is no less corrupt and where reforms have stalled and the old Soviet-style command economy still exists? The Bush administration needs to think clearly about the advantages and disadvantages of U.S. predominance in Central Asia. The advantages include short-term stability, access to energy resources, and proximity to Afghanistan. But there are many disadvantages too. U.S. support for existing regimes will help ensure short-term stability, but the real, systemic causes of instability will be swept under the rug. It is only a matter of time before they resurface. Economic growth is possible in Central Asia only if the local institutions are reformed, which inevitably requires tackling powerful entrenched interests. The United States does not need to become Central Asias hegemon: that is, to assume responsibility for its economic development and its stability. It would be far more practical to seek a joint venture with Russia - a U.S.-Russian consortium for socioeconomic development of Central Asia. The region needs to be strengthened as a bulwark against the spread of militant Islam in Eurasia. Russia alone does not have the resources to support Central Asia economically, to be a source of credits and loans. It cannot be its security manager either. But Russia remains economically important in Central Asia. It provides the region with important hidden subsidies by supplying it with goods and fuel at below-market prices. Landlocked Central Asia carries out the lion's share of its trade with the West through Russian transport links and at favorable tariffs. China will seek to expand its economic and political presence in Central Asia. Russia will have to accommodate it. Moscow's policymakers will have to give up the illusion of monopolistic control over its former southern provinces. But it is more advantageous for Russia to coexist there with the United States than with China. Central Asia is extremely interested in U.S. patronage. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan retain special ties with Russia. They would be more comfortable accepting greater U.S. presence in the region while maintaining ties with Moscow if U.S.-Russian partnership in this part of Eurasia were to become a reality. The optimal approach toward Central Asia is to establish U.S. leadership there in partnership with Russia. It is not in U.S. interests to corner Putin and deny him the opportunity to continue his policy of integrating Russia with the West. 186

However, one should not focus excessively on the shortcomings and thereby ignore the obvious achievements attained during the post-Soviet years. In general, it is an obvious truism that there are serious limitations on the ability of even the most perspicacious expert to draw unqualified conclusions about a given situation at critical junctures of history. As Charles Dickens wrote, in A Tale of Two Cities, about a tumultuous epoch in the last quarter of the eighteenth century: It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us. . . . With respect to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, one must bear in mind not only the problems described above, but also some clear achievements. Namely, these two countries did carry out radical economic reforms, created the foundations of a market, conducted large-scale privatization, made the national currency virtually convertible and its exchange rate quite stable, sharply increased the share of service and consumer sectors of the economic structure, eliminated the idea of shortages of goods from everyday language, and awakened the entrepreneurial spirit that had been systematically repressed under Soviet rule. In the case of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, however, it is too early to speak of any substantial social-economic progress; as for Turkmenistan, there has been an absolute social-economic degradation. One should also keep in mind that the processes associated with rebuilding the economy and the liberalization of public life (even if only in relative terms) have been initiated essentially ab novo, without experience and without historical memory (since so much had been effaced from mass consciousness during the seven decades of Soviet rule). The population on the southern periphery of the former empire (as, however, in the case of those living in the central regions) was utterly unprepared for the adaptation of market reforms. The brilliant Russian historian V.O.Kliuchevskii once made the following sagacious observation: The law of life of backward states among the more advanced is this: the need for reform comes before the people are ready for it. It is easy to imagine as well the condition of the leaders of the new states, who, at the moment when their countries unexpectedly gained independence, lacked the requisite knowledge appropriate to the scale of the tasks faced, who had no understanding of the fundamentals of a market economy, and who had no experience on the international arena. One can well appreciate the inevitable perplexity and confusion in the face of the unexpected, extraordinarily onerous challenges that they faced. Notwithstanding the fact that for many years they had been in the melting pot of the highly placed party bureaucracy, each of them had preserved his individual character and traits, and these could not fail to have an impact on political policy, on economic strategy, and on the harshness of the repression. Despite all this, the new post-Soviet leadership has succeeded in completely demolishing the former political and economic system, and indeed they did so in historically short periods of time. It would therefore be neither fair nor accurate to come away with a one-sided, purely negative assessment of the post-Soviet development of the countries in this region.

187

Central Asia: a Gathering Storm?

Rumer B.
The United States: The Interested Bystander Prior to 11 September 2001, Central Asia thus witnessed a significant realignment of forces and policy. In the case of Russia, once Putin came to power, the Kremlin refocused the primary emphasis in its Central Asian policy from economic ties to military cooperation. China, for its part, significantly enhanced its presence in the region, above all, through the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation. How did Washington, prior to 11 September, respond to all these changes? In essence, the United States chose not to become directly involved in Central Asia and instead opted for an attentive, wait-and-see policy. From Washington's perspective, it made little sense to become actively embroiled in so explosive a situation, one fraught with rising tensions between Russia and China and further compounded by the threats posed by Islamic extremism. That cautious approach ref lected Washington's view that the region was not a priority in terms of fundamental American interests. Indeed, given the American involvement in a host of other global problems, Washington saw no need to add to this list. To be sure, the United States did cultivate relations with countries in the region and actively supported the activities of various NGOs. It also subsidized, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), various projects and tactfully closed its eyes to the ineffective use of its funding.63 The United States also criticized the ruling regimes for human rights violations. But it declined to take concrete sanctions, recognizing that the alternative was not democracy but either an Islamic theocracy or a variant of the bloody chaos found in the Balkans. In effect, the regimes there had a greater interest in the United States (as a sponsoring agent) than its principal competitors, Russia and China. The United States saw itself as better positioned to provide tangible financial assistance, whether directly or through international financial organizations. No less obvious was the American supremacy in military technology. But, above all, American policymakersas eversought to preserve the status quo and stability in the region. No less important to Washington was ensuring that none of its geopolitical opponents enhanced its inf luence at the expense of the states of Central Asia. In short, the United States declined to exert control over the region, a policy that would simply have required too great an effort and devoured too many resources. Perhaps the most apt description of American policy is found in the Latin phrase, tertius gaudens ("the third party smiles"): the United Statesgiven its clear but limited interest in the regiongleefully preferred to remain a bystander and to let events unfold in ways that would ultimately redound to its own advantage. Nevertheless, in the long run, the United States could not ignore the competition between Beijing and Moscow for dominance in the region. It was perfectly clear that China would eventually gain ascendancy and push Russia into a subsidiary position. And that "eventuality" is not in some remote future, but in the foreseeable future. When that does happen, Washington will have to choose between asserting its own dominance in Central Asia and letting China assume that role. It is, after all, obvious that Russia possesses neither the economic nor the military capacity to establish a protectorate over the region. Although the United States in the short term preferred the modest role of bystander, it ultimately faced the question of challenging or acceptingthe prospect of Chinese hegemony. After 11 September The terrorist assault of 11 September 2001 forced the United States to make a radical change in its policy toward Central Asia, with far-reaching consequences for the balance of power in the region. It has already become a cliche to say that the attacks on 11 September have caused a geopolitical tectonic shift. But that is indeed what has happened. And this change has had a direct and profound impact on Central Asia. The relocation of Central Asia from the periphery to the very center of American strategic interest has fundamentally altered the balance of the three "Great Players" described above. Tashkent's decision to place itself squarely under the patronage of Washington, accompanied by the stationing of American forces in Uzbekistan, is tantamount to a violation of the Russian equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine. It is 188

hardly any more agreeable to Beijing, which has seen the appearance of American military presence on its western f lank. All this is demolishing the system of restraints and counterweights that Russia and China, within the framework of the Shanghai pact, had created and that took into account the interests of the Central Asian states. Having no common borders with China or Russia, Uzbekistan had long refrained from participating in the Shanghai Five; not until 2001, and without great enthusiasm, did it join the new Shanghai Organization of Cooperation. Karimov's attitude toward membership in this organization was clearly apparent when he failed to participate in an emergency meeting that the SOC held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on 10-11 October of that year. By this time, Washington and Tashkent had already indicated their mutual interest in a strategic partnership. However, even with Uzbekistan's participation, the Shanghai alliance is nonetheless still important for its remaining members. So far as Moscow and Beijing are concerned, the SOC is important not only (and not so much) as a tool for delimiting state boundaries and for creating a regional economic association (a dimension that remains essentially unrealized), but rather as a militarypolitical bloc to counteract the military shadow that America has now cast over the region. As for the Central Asian participants of the SOC, the fact that Uzbekistan has become the regional favorite and de facto client of the United States (with all the ensuing political and economic consequences, including promises of economic assistance and practically a security guarantee) has elicited a complex, contradictory response in Astana, Bishkek, and Dushanbe. They cannot have any doubts about the inevita bility of preserving their status as junior partners of Russia and as allies of China. But America's economic, political, and military support of Tashkent has created a major shift in favor of Uzbekistan. The latter's neighbors, with good reason, fear that the well-known pretensions of Islam Karimov to regional leadership will receive a powerful new impetus. They fear that, in the territorial disputes that have emerged in recent years between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, the Uzbek leader will be tempted to resort to force to resolve these conf licts. In all probability, Washington would not support such aggression on Tashkent's part. But the interest of the United States in its new ally may outweigh any irritation over such aggression, as indeed as happened repeatedly in the history of American foreign policy. The political elites of the Central Asian countries are alarmed by the intensification of interest in the region. The Kyrgyz press, for example, has begun to show nervousness with respect to the Uzbek-American partnership. The following statement is typical: "Tashkent may attempt to manipulate U.S. power to hammer its neighbors, specifically, Kyrgyzstan, into obedience. In this case, we will have to seek protection from someone else, like Russia. Russia and China will not tolerate the presence of their strategic rival next to them."64 The assertion of American power in a region where two great powers have already divided influence has provoked similar concern among Kazakh politicians. In the words of one Kazakh politician: "As if it was not enough that Central Asia is squeezed by China, Russia, and the Muslim world, now we also have an American eagle flying over it."65 At the same time, the Central Asian regimes, the westernized establishment, and anti-Islamic population in the region cannot fail to recognize, with satisfaction, that the American presence in the region (in addition to China and Russia) is creating an insuperable barrier against the Islamist assault on the region. Moreover, many believe that the American presence will have a positive impact on the economy in the region as a whole: "Anyone knows the patronage of the U.S. or NATO promises not only a reliable defense shield, but also prosperity, good roads, and modern technology." American patronage of Uzbekistan elicits contradictory views in the region and in Uzbekistan itself as to its possible inf luence on the notoriously repressive regime of President Karimov. Optimists hope that this inf luence will be favorable and lead to a liberalization in public life and in the economy. Pessimists hold that political and economic liberalization is mortally dangerous to the regime, and that Karimov absolutely will not, under any circumstances, embark on such a path. The latter argue theft Washington's support will only strengthen the Karimov regime and its opposition to real democratization, and that the probable attempts by the Bush administration and American human rights organizations to promote lib eralization will prove fruitless. But that will not alter America's relations with Tashkent. Here one can cite the example of Saudi Arabia: its cooperation with America has lasted for decades, but without bringing about a democratization of the ruling regime. Russia, China, and America share a common interest in blocking the dissemination of radical Islam in the region. Given this fact, hypothetically one can imagine how this triumvirate would establish a uni189

fied, anti-Islamist front there. Since 11 September, one can clearly discern a tendency for Washington and Moscow to admit the possibility of such a consensus. The situation with respect to Beijing is more complex, but one should not discount the possibility that it will join an anti-Islamist alliance (which, indeed, could coexist simultaneously with the Shanghai pact). Of course, the creation of such a grand design would require that the parties exhibit extraordinary skill, f lexibility, and capacity to make mutually advantageous compromises. However, given the solidarity of interests, such a course would be optimal for the present situation; one must not foreclose the possibility that the strategic competition of these three powers will give way to cooperation in this part of Eurasia. Implications for U.S. Policy In shaping policy toward Central Asia and Russia, U.S. policymakers need to be keenly aware that they have stepped inside the chalk line long drawn by Moscow to define its post-Soviet geopolitical space. It may not be in U.S. long- or short-term interests to sacrifice its relationship with Russia to its relationship with Central Asia. Central Asia may not be as important to China as Taiwan, but for Russia, to see Central Asia fall under U.S. dominance would be tantamount to a final collapse of the great power ambitions that reside in the minds of its political class and majority of its people. It is not entirely clear why Secretary of State Colin Powell is so "... sure we can have better relationships with these countries without causing the Russians to be concerned about it."67 Russian concerns have undoubtedly already emerged. Nonetheless, it is possible to find ways to keep these concerns from resulting in confrontation. But it will take f lexibility on the part of the Bush administration, as well as compromises in other spheres of U.S.Russia relations. Prominent Russian specialists on U.S. politics had to force themselves to come to terms with Putin's pro-American U-turn. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, they put up with U.S. use of air bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and the U.S. military presence there. But opposition to Putin's pro-American course is strong. The top echelons of the armed forces and security services are traditionally anti-American. They grumbled at Putin's quiet response to the U.S. announcement that it would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Later in 2002, they will have to come to terms with NATO membership for the three former Soviet republics on the Baltic Sea. But they are not likely to remain docile if Central Asia jumps out of Moscow's orbit and accepts U.S. patronage. This would be a call for a requiem for "Great Russia" and signal Putin's failure as a leader. He and his pro-American foreign policy course would be discredited. Such potential consequences of U.S. penetration of Central Asia need to be taken into account as the Bush administration forges ahead in the region. Washington should also consider the likely costs of its new acquisition. Of course, gaining a springboard for operations in the heart of Eurasia is important, especially after September 11. But one must not forget that the United States is now supporting corrupt dictatorial regimes in these predominantly Muslim countries. Their populations are not radicalized, but their prospects for economic prosperity are quite elusive. The region is also rife with traditional rivalries, fueled by a growing competition for land and water. A U.S. embrace of the Central Asian regimes would likely entail American responsibility for regional security and stability, including support for authoritarian, even dictatorial, regimes and the suppression of radical Islam. Choosing the lesser of two evilsradical Islam and corrupt dictatorships will mean support for the latter, just as the United States has done in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Optimism about Central Asia's economic prospects, which has appeared in U.S. press reports from the region, is misguided and inappropriate. In essence, the region's economic existence is dependent on raw material exports and investment from the West. If the United States wishes to become the dominant power and chief donor in the region, it should be realistic and candid about the price it will have to pay. There is no middle road for Washington. Policies such as partial debt relief (especially important for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), new loans and credits, and help in opening markets for Central Asian goods would leave Central Asia addicted to cash injections from abroadas has already happened with Kyrgyzstanand will only sustain a downward trajectory. Most of the population 190

would end up living below the poverty line, with all the ensuing implications for stability in these countries. To prevent such a turn of events, a more ambitious investment of intellectual and financial resources would be required. And even so, if the United States finds those resources and makes the commitment, how will they be used? Will they create conditions for sustainable economic growth in Kazakhstan, with its entrenched clans and mafias and pervasive corruption? And what about Uzbekistan, which is no less corrupt and where reforms have stalled and the old Soviet-style command economy still exists? The Bush administration needs to think clearly about the advantages and disadvantages of U.S. pre dominance in Central Asia. The advantages include short-term stability, access to energy resources, and proximity to Afghanistan. But there are many disadvantages too. U.S. support for existing regimes will help ensure short-term stability, but the real, systemic causes of instability will be swept under the rug. It is only a matter of time before they resurface. Economic growth is possible in Central Asia only if the local institutions are reformed, which inevitably requires tackling powerful entrenched interests. The United States does not need to become Central Asia's "hegemon": that is, to assume responsibility for its economic development and its stability. It would be far more practical to seek a joint venture with Russiaa U.S.-Russian consortium for socioeconomic development of Central Asia. The region needs to be strengthened as a bulwark against the spread of militant Islam in Eurasia. Russia alone does not have the resources to support Central Asia economically, to be a source of credits and loans. It cannot be its security manager either. But Russia remains economically important in Central Asia. It provides the region with important hidden subsidies by supplying it with goods and fuel at below-market prices. Landlocked Central Asia carries out the lion's share of its trade with the West through Russian transport links and at favorable tariffs. China will seek to expand its economic and political presence in Central Asia. Russia will have to accommodate it. Moscow's policymakers will have to give up the illusion of monopolistic control over its former southern provinces. But it is more advantageous for Russia to coexist there with the United States than with China. Central Asia is extremely interested in U.S. patronage. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan retain special ties with Russia. They would be more comfortable accepting greater U.S. presence in the region while maintaining ties with Moscow if U.S.-Russian partnership in this part of Eurasia were to become a reality. The optimal approach toward Central Asia is to establish U.S. leadership there in partnership with Russia. It is not in U.S. interests to corner Putin and deny him the opportunity to continue his policy of integrating Russia with the West. Alt Karaosmanoglu

I. Introduction The emergence of the trans-Caucasian and Central Asian states as independent actors has significantly changed the geopolitics of Eurasia. The new republics are facing the problems of transition to a market economy and making efforts to open up to the international economic system. They are seeking ways to be the masters of their own resources and to change the terms of their relationship with Moscow. Their major concern is the consolidation of their independent status. Moreover, after the cold war, the Caspian region has grown in importance as a source of energy. In the words of Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, the resources of the Caspian Sea Basin should be considered together with those of the Persian Gulf and the 'Gulf-Caspian energy ellipse' has become 'one of the most significant geostrategic realities of our time'.1 The Caspian region is also an essential link between Central Asia, the Black Sea and Turkey. The issue of energy and possible oil transport routes has come to be regarded by regional and extra-regional states as a significant 'determinant for the long-term geopolitical orientation of the region'.2 This has in turn has exacerbated rivalries among the regional states as well as between Russia and the United States. Since the breakup of the USSR Turkey has become increasingly involved in this new and dynamic geopolitical environment, which presents it with opportunities as well as challenges. The Turkic world which was previously closed to Turkey has opened up to it. Turkey's foreign relations have acquired new 191

political and economic dimensions with a new Russia and with the emergence of independent Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. For various reasons, however, Turkey's initial high expectations about the expansion of its inf luence in the newly independent states have not fully materialized. This is particularly true of Central Asia; in the South Caucasus, by contrast, Turkey has gradually consolidated its position since the early 1990s. The South Caucasus is of particular geopolitical interest for three reasons. First, the region is a gateway to Central Asia. Second, it provides direct access to the markets of the West for the Caspian oil and gas. Here Iran's anti-Western policies and US 'containment' of Iran have made the region even more significant. Third, Azerbaijan and Georgia are of the utmost strategic importance to Turkey. Their independence and territorial integrity are regarded as indispensable for the security and stability not only of the Caucasus but also of Central Asia. This chapter examines Turkey's objectives and strategies in the Caspian region in general and in the South Caucasus in particular. It focuses on Turkey's priorities not only from a regional perspective but also in terms of trans-regional linkages which usually exert considerable inf luence on Turkey's decisions and actions. Turkish policy is widely viewed as being motivated almost solely by economic considerations, particularly by the energy (oil and gas) issue. Turkey's political and other non-economic interests are often neglected or, at best, only touched on brief ly. In fact, Turkey's primary long-term objective is political the creation and maintenance of a pluralistic Eurasia which is open to the West in general and to Turkey in particular. It also has other serious concerns environmental concerns about the transport of oil by tanker through the narrow straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles (the Turkish Straits) and the maintenance of good, cooperative relations with Russia in the interests of regional stability and economic benefit. This, however, is not to overlook the energy issue, which is undoubtedly important both in itself and because of Turkey's rapidly growing energy needs. It is also regarded as an instrument for the realization of the long-term political objective of building a pluralistic Eurasia. In this sense, the exploitation of energy resources and the transport of oil and gas are often seen as promoting stability, nation-building and independent statehood rather than the causes of rivalry and conf lict. The energy issue is in one way or another related to other objectives. This raises the question of the compatibility of different objectives. To what extent does Turkey's policy in the region contribute to minimizing conf lictual tendencies and promoting stability? Finally, trans-regional linkages should be taken into account in dealing with Turkey's objectives in the Caspian region. Turkey's regional policies cannot be adequately understood separately from its Western vocation and its relations with the United States and the European Union (EU).

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Kazakhstans Emerging Middle Class

John C. K. Daly
Executive Summary Kazakhstan's development as a rising petro-state from the debris of the collapse of the USSR in 1991 is Central Asia's leading success story. Unlike many nations that have recently developed their energy reserves, the rise in revenues from foreign energy sales have had a trickle-down effect in Kazakhstan, producing the embryo of a new middle class, a social development that was anathema in the USSR, whose ideology persistently sought to eradicate class distinctions. Kazakhstan, ruled since independence by President Nursultan Nazarbayev, has made a cornerstone of its social policy to foster the development of an indigenous middle class, seeing it as a social and political guarantor of stability. The worlds largest landlocked country, Kazakhstan is an ethnically diverse nation the 1999 census determined the population to be Kazakh (Qazaq) 53.4 percent, Russian 30 percent, Ukrainian 3.7 percent, Uzbek 2.5 percent, German 2.4 percent, Tatar 1.7 percent, Uygur 1.4 percent and other 4.9 percent. This study charts the development of this new phenomenon in Kazakh society from the end of the USSR to the present day. The nurturing and development of this middle class, which is composed of former members of the Soviet apparat, younger professionals and newly minted businessmen, stands in contrast to events in the other post-Soviet stans - Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. While in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR Kyrgyzstan was initially regarded by many Western analysts as the most reformist post-Soviet republic in moving swiftly towards Western-style political and economic infrastructures, it is in fact Kazakhstan that has emerged as the most progressive regional economic reformer, and it is unclear if its successes could be repeated elsewhere. Underpinning Kazakhstan's rise to prosperity is its immense reserves of oil and natural gas. Kazakhstan, however, shared with its fellow former Soviet republics the fiscal chaos emanating in the wake of the sudden collapse of the USSR in 1991, which included hyperinflation, plummeting industrial production and, in Kazakhstan's case, an exodus of many of its most highly trained ethnic Russians. Between 1989 and 2005, Kazakhstan lost two million of its six million Russian Soviet inhabitants. Kazakhstan still retains a Russian minority of around 30 percent, the highest percentage in the region. More than 4 in 5 unemployed Kazakhs lost their livelihood in the aftermath of the Soviet economic implosion. In 1992, the first year of independence, inflation soared to 2,960 percent. Nazarbayevs government quickly moved to stanch the flow of some of its most highly skilled population by instituting major economic reforms. The Kazakh government has subsequently used its oil revenues not only to reform the economy, but to restructure the countrys Soviet educational legacy and begin creating an educational system on a par with more economically advanced countries. Nazarbayevs government realized that the country's future prosperity was inextricably linked to deepening commitments with Western fiscal and governmental institutions, and the Kazakh government swiftly began to implement reforms that would make the nation increasingly attractive to foreign interests, while avoiding the more severe consequences of the financial shock therapy that Western advisers inflicted on neighboring Russia. Kazakhstan's rising oil revenues have given the Kazakh government very deep pockets with which to institute its reforms. Estimates of Kazakhstan's oil-related wealth over the next two-three decades vary from $27 billion to $96 billion. Accordingly, among Kazakhstans firsts among its CIS neighbors, it was the first to pay off its debts to the International Monetary Fund in 2000 following economic reconstruction (seven years ahead of schedule), the first to obtain a favorable credit rating, the first to implement financial institutions approaching Western standards of efficiency and reliability, and the first to develop and introduce a fully-funded nationwide pension program. Besides rising oil revenues, one of the key elements in Kazakhstans economic success has been its ability to attract foreign investment, which in 2001-2003 surged to 13 percent of GDP and is currently running at almost ten times the rate of its neighbors. In validating the structural reforms carried out by the Kazakh government, the European Union formally recognized Kazakhstan as a market-based economy in October 2000, while Washington accorded Kazakhstan similar recognition in March 2002. 193

Proof of the trickle down effect of oil revenue has been the dramatic drop in the nations poverty; according to UN figures, Kazakhstan halved its poverty rate in just five years, which fell from five million or 39 percent of the population in 1998 to three million or 20 percent in 2003, the lowest poverty rate among the Stans. As the reforms continued, a Kazakh professional middle class began to emerge. While estimates vary, some analysts put its numbers at 25 percent of the total population, representing people who consume 50-80 percent of the financial value of all goods sold in Kazakhstan. Analysts further divide this group into two sections, a lower middle class, with individual annual incomes of $6,000-9,000, (an estimated 70 percent of the stratum,) and the upper middle class, with annual individual incomes of $9,000-15,000, (30 percent of the total group.) According to official Kazakh statistics, salaries increased by 21 percent in 2001 and by 12 percent in 2002 and have consistently risen each year since. The principal criterion used by analysts to define Kazakhstan's middle class is not the nature of labor, professional association or property, but income level. Other Kazakh experts give figures on the extent of the group as ranging between 18 percent and 60 percent of the population. In Kazakhstan, approximately 50 percent of the population lives in urban areas, and this is where the middle class is concentrated. As noted above, in 1998 Kazakhstan adopted an economic reform that impacted every citizen, a pension reform program based on the Chilean model, which introduced private pension funds. By 2004 nearly six million people, accounting for almost eighty percent of the economically active population, were participants in the program. The U.S. State Department in 2005 estimated Kazakhstans Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at $125.3 billion (purchasing power parity,) its GDP per capita income at $8,300 (purchasing power parity) and GDP growth at 9.5 percent. Highlighting the discrepancies between foreign and indigenous statistics, in 2006 Kazakhstans Statistics Agency calculated the monthly income level of the lower middle class to be 35,000 tenge ($290) per month, for an annual salary of $3,480. Despite the disparities, however, the incontestable fact is that after a period of economic turmoil immediately following independence, incomes in Kazakhstan have not only stabilized but consistently risen over the last decade. One of the more striking aspects of Kazakhstan's post-independence economic development has been the strong support that it's economic reforms have received from various foreign governments and institutions, including the U.S., EU, the Asia Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. To give but one example, in 2006 the USAID observed, Thanks to the Government of Kazakhstan's (GOK) commitment to market reforms and the rise of the energy sector, Kazakhstan has achieved steady economic growth, with an estimated 9.2 percent GDP growth rate in 2003. The country made major advancements in banking reform and supervision, fiscal reform, small-scale privatization, pension reform, and attracting foreign investment to the energy sector. The country's output has increased 50 percent in the past four years. However, there is a growing danger of overreliance on the oil sector. Kazakhstan faces major challenges of diversification and corruption that hamper the growth of a middle class. About 25 percent of the population still lives below the poverty line, and there are huge disparities between urban and rural areas and among regions. This underscores a need to develop further small and medium enterprises (SMEs), promote the rule of law, transparency, public accountability and to expand domestic and foreign investment outside extractive industries. All this will foster the middle class. Another government priority was to privatize state property, which began in 1993 with the auction of some stores in Almaty. The program was extended nationwide, with the government privatizing trading companies, food suppliers and other services. Most importantly for the nascent middle class, as part of a parallel process, the mass privatization of apartments created a private housing market. The ambitious program by 1996 saw private companies account for around 80 percent of the economy while private ownership of agricultural production soared to 97 percent. While privatization of state-owned industries was a priority, for most Kazakhs, the most important single element in the government's privatization drive was its effect on housing. In Nazarbayevs Decree no. 1388 of June 11, 2004, on Kazakhstans State Program on Housing Construction Development for 2005-2007, he made his most explicit promise yet to the middle class, with their dream of owning their own home, naming the middle class as the intended direct beneficiary of the government's housing construction program, as 96.8 percent of Kazakhstans housing stock, 2.5 million sq. ft., was already private property by then. The purchases were initially financed through mortgages from the government-supported Kazakhstan Mortgage Company (KIK). The countrys mortgage program was subsequently expanded to include the banks Kaspian, 194

Astana-Finans, TsentrKredit, ATF, BTA-mortgage, Nurbank, Nauryz Kazakhstan bank, TekhakaBank, Alliance and Tsesnabank national banks, all operating under the auspices of the KIK. A further indicator of the rise of a Kazakh middle class is the increasing private ownership of automobiles. As of January 1, 2006, private automobiles accounted for 1,556,453 of Kazakhstans total motor pool of 1,807,737 transport units, or a total of 86.1 percent of all vehicles, giving a ration of 120 automobiles per 1,000 citizens, a ratio that authorities project will rise by 2012 to 300 vehicles per 1,000 citizens. Another government reform benefiting the middle class was a complete overhaul of the country's educational system. To a certain extent, educational reform was imposed on Kazakh authorities by necessity following the collapse of the USSR. Kazakhstan began actively to solicit foreign educational institutions to set up facilities in Kazakhstan. The establishment of private higher education institutions (HEIs) in Kazakhstan began in 1992. They were listed as non-commercial organizations, joint stock companies or private limited companies. A decade after independence, the countrys approximately 130 HEIs had 130,000 students enrolled (32 percent of the national total, including private fee-paying students) as opposed to 270,000 at Kazakh public institutions. The HEIs offered more than 130 specialties, with economics, law, pedagogy and humanities predominating. In 1992 Turan University, a non-state and nonprofit institution was established in Almaty. Many others would follow. The following year, the Kazakhstan government instituted its Bolashak program, a competitive scholarship program providing complete tuition and living expenses for the country's brightest students to study abroad. The program now enrolls more than 3,000 students annually; the most popular destination for the scholars is the United States. The flourishing interest in higher education meant that by 2007 Kazakhstan had a total of 181 higher education institutions with 81 branches. Graduates of all these programs moved swiftly into the growing middle class. The growth of the middle class parallels that of Kazakhstan's business community. Business incubators and innovation centers (BIIC) to assist the development of small businesses were first established in Kazakhstan in 1997. Two years later the Kazakh government integrated fiscal support of business incubators into its economic policies. Parallel to the BIIC initiatives, the Almaty Association of Entrepreneurs was founded in April 1998, with its stated mission to protect the rights of entrepreneurs and to inform and educate entrepreneurs on their legal, normative, and regulatory rights in a rapidly changing environment. The tireless AAE members drafted 253 specific legislative changes to the Administrative Code based on their findings and public input while conducted a media campaign both to raise awareness of problems in the Code and AAEs proposed solutions. Realizing the thoroughness of the AAEs efforts, Nazarbayev publicly announced support for the AAEs proposed reforms and the Majlis took up the AAEs administrative reforms during its 2005 session. By 2006 the government was also seeking input from Kazakh BIICs to help draft business legislation. While government reforms helped emerging groups secure the basic necessities of housing, transport and education, an increasing level of disposable middle class income manifested itself in other ways as well. Many middle class Kazakhs began to use their disposable income to travel abroad. Increasing salaries also allowed many Kazakhs to acquire items essential for the Western lifestyle such as computers and cell-phones. According to Kazakhstans Statistics Agency, in mid-2006 there were 6,103,00021 mobile users in Kazakhstan, representing 39.9 percent of the population. And to fuel this rising consumerism Kazakh banks began to offer low-interest loans and even credit cards. As the Kazakh middle class became increasingly visible, new political parties and the government itself began to vie for its support. In November 2001 disaffected anti-Nazarbayev political activists founded the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK) party, which further fissured in March 2002 when members broke away and established the Ak Zhol (White Path) party. Ak Zhol unabashedly promoted itself as the protector and promoter of middle class interests, and contested the September 2004 parliamentary elections, when it only won one seat. Disaffected members blamed the loss on governmental manipulation of the election. Even if this occurred to some extent, a number of thoughtful Western observers have concluded that in fact most of the population was genuinely supportive of the Nazarbayev administration's reforms, which had produced the rising prosperity noted above. As the Kazakh economy became increasingly integrated with global markets, it could not avoid reverberations of foreign fiscal difficulties. Kazakhstan initially was largely able to ride out the fiscal turmoil that began to roil the U.S. beginning in August 2006, but by late 2007 the ongoing instability forced banks sharply to curtail access to credit, while the government threatened to intervene on the international stock market to shore up the value of the 195

shares of publicly traded Kazakh financial institutions. Between August 31, 2007, and February 8, 2008, the tenge dropped from 126.5 to the dollar to 120.24, losing 5 percent of its value. The fiscal uncertainties roiling the global markets on February 6 was addressed by President Nazarbayev in his annual state of the nation address to Parliament. He assured Kazakh citizens of their financial security, stating, The government should temporarily, until problems in the financial sector are settled, reduce expenditures in all spheres and programs, except social ones. Everything that can wait, without which we can live one-two years, should be suspended - maybe roads, construction and something else. For better or worse, Kazakhstan's heavy and inevitable reliance on its oil revenues has exposed the country to the volatility of the global energy market. In 2006 oil revenues accounted for at least two-thirds of the countrys budgetary revenues. Kazakhstan's economy is now larger than those of all the other Central Asian states combined (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan), largely due to the country's vast natural resources and relative political stability. According to Kazakh government forecasts, the economy is expected to expand at an average annual rate of 9.5 percent in real terms from 2007 to 2011 because of both foreign investments and increasing oil exports. Significant problems remain if Kazakhstans middle class is to consolidate further. The disparity between rural and urban incomes, the need for equitable and orderly distribution of housing, the battle against corruption, the need to shield the national economy from global turmoil even as it further integrates into it, the effort to tighten academic standards, and controlling inf lation - these are but a few of the problems that face Kazakh officialdom in the years ahead if it is to undergird the emerging middle class. The middle class is currently unwilling to jeopardize Kazakhstans present stability and prosperity by supporting radical political alternatives. The larger question remains whether President Nazarbayev will continue to be able to respond consistently and sufficiently to the middle classs inevitably growing expectations. While little is certain, in a world of rising energy demand that outstrips global production, Kazakhstan for the foreseeable future will have sufficient cash reserves with which to address the challenges before it, including those relevant to the middle class. First and foremost, the state must represent the interests of the middle class. President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 1998 Kazakhstans Sudden Prosperity It is an obvious truism that rising energy exports are the engine that drives Kazakhstan's economy. The petroleum largesse has allowed the Kazakh government the wherewithal swiftly to move beyond its Soviet past, and in a development that would have Lenin spinning in his mausoleum, actively seek to foster the growth of a bourgeois middle class as a bulwark of social stability. Among other things, oil revenues have been used to reform the economy and build upon the countrys Soviet educational legacy to begin creating an educational system on par with more advanced nations. Nearly all of the economy has been privatized, and most Kazakhs now own their own dwellings, all courtesy of the countrys black gold. Furthermore, it seems likely that such trends will continue. The chart below tells the tale: from a level of 2002 exports of approximately one million barrels per day, projections estimate that by 2021 Kazakhstan could be pumping nearly 4 million barrels a day. What is most interesting about the graph is that it sees onshore Kazakh production peaking in 2011, while Caspian offshore developments, most notably Kashagan, then begin to surge to first supplement and then increas ingly replace onshore production. Estimates of Kazakhstan's oil-related wealth vary from $27 billion to $96 billion, depending on key variables over the next two-three decades, which include oil prices, total economic reserves and extraction activities, extraction costs, company-level investments, and the rate of return on the fiscal assets in which oil-related wealth is shelter. Converted to per capita terms, this ranges from $1,800 to $6,490 depending on differing projections for the same set of variables. Under the assumption that an average annual rate of return of about 4 percent can be sustained on incoming oil revenue, Kazakhstan could increase its level of spending by between $72 and $260 per person a year, but the amount is not large relative to the expected per capita spending of about $750 in 2005. 196

Figure 1: Kazakhstans Potential Oil Production, 1999-2035 (mln bpd)

Major oil operators in Kazakhstan include the U.S. Tengizchevroil (ChevronTexaco), Italy's Agip, Britain's BG Kazakhstan, Canadas PetrolKazakhstan (Hurricane), the Belgian-French conglomerate Total Fina Elf and Kazakhstan's Kazmunaigaz. Among the global service providers are Parsons, Fluor & Daniels, Halliburton, Schlumberger, Baker-Hughes, Weatherford and Enka/Bechtel, among others. The oil revenues have provided rich soil for the emergence of a Kazakh middle class. Since 1991 Kazakhstans economic accomplishments, by any yardstick, have been significant, impressing international institutions such as the UN, World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and Wall Street. Among Kazakhstans firsts among its CIS neighbors, Kazakhstan was the first to pay off its debts to the International Monetary Fund in 2000 following economic reconstruction (seven years ahead of schedule), the first to obtain a favorable credit rating, the first to implement financial institutions approaching Western standards of efficiency and reliability and the first to develop and introduce a nationwide fully funded pension program. Besides rising oil revenues, one of the key elements in Kazakhstans economic success has been its ability to attract foreign investment, which in 2001-2003 surged to 13 percent of GDP and is currently running at almost ten times the rate of its neighbors. In validating the structural reforms carried out by the Kazakh government the European Union formally recognized Kazakhstan as a market-based economy in October 2000, while Washington accorded Kazakhstan similar recognition in March 2002. The 1999 Civil Service Law was a major institutional reform, delineating political appointees from professional 66,000 civil servants, who are now appointed on merit via competitive examinations and are required to attend programs aiming to modernize attitudes, orientation and status.1 Perhaps the most dramatic proof of the trickle down effect of oil revenue has been the dramatic drop in the nations poverty; according to UN figures, Kazakhstan halved its poverty rate in just five years, which fell from five million or 39 percent in 1998 to three million or 20 percent in 2003, the lowest poverty rate among the Stans. Foreign experts also lauded Kazakhstans creation of the National Fund, a stabilization fund designed to protect the Kazakh economy against external fiscal turmoil, as proof of the countrys reputation for innovative financial institutions designed to address the countrys particular needs. Among recent visitors to Kazakhstan who have been quick to spot the change that has occurred was the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. During a visit to Astana on October 13th 2005 she declared: One needs only to look around here in Astana to see the beginnings of a diverse and independent middle class. (Emphasis added in the original.)2 Rice prefaced her remark to a student audience at the Eurasian National University with, Since its independence, Kazakhstan has also set an example in this region with bold economic reforms that have attracted investment, created jobs, and established a vibrant banking system. The Government of Kazakhstan has also made wise choices to begin diversifying its economy and ensuring that its vast oil wealth can become a source for social mobility, not social stagnation.3) Rice added, "The future of any state depends on its level of education. This is my
1 Caspian Information Center Occasional Paper No 6 - Kazakhstans Emerging Middle Class: a Factor for Stability, November 2004. 2 Truth about Kazakhstan at http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/en/content/truth/society. 3 Remarks at Eurasian National University, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Astana, Kazakhstan, October 13, 2005 @ http://www. state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/54913.htm.

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fourth visit to Kazakhstan, I have already been to Atyrau and Almaty and I have been able to see for myself the high level of education of your nation, which is a key to success of any country." Who are the Kazakh Middle Class? Kazakh sociologists have attempted to define the parameters defining the countrys nascent middle class. On attempting to define middle class in a Kazakh context S.M. Shakirova writes, The middle class is the part of the society, which occupies the mid-position between the highest and lowest classes. It is characterized by the high level of cohesiveness, incomes, consumption, the possession of material or intellectual property and a capability for the highly skilled labor.4 Dimtrii Burminskii offers a fascinating neo-Marxist analysis of Kazakhstans classes.5 Burminskii begins by arguing that Kazakhstan possessed an embryonic middle class even during the Soviet era. He delineates eight distinct classes in modern day Kazakhstan, which he identifies as the ruling class, oligarchs, the intelligentsia, the peasantry, the working class, the army and the "authorities," the middle class and what he terms the revolutionary middle class. Burminskii maintains further that Kazakhstans middle class actually began to appear in the USSR during the period of perestroika, acquiring its initial "seed capital" by shuttle trading visits to Poland, Turkey and other countries. After independence, when the Kazakh economy began to liberalize, the middle class continued to evolve out of the level of small-scale property ownership, yet it is still in the process of emerging. According to Burminskii, this class does not yet posses its own worldview, preferring instead initially to "swim upstream." Sooner or later "class consciousness" will arise, at least at the level of class selfishness, despite the fact that members of this group have no inherent cohesiveness, as their strata was created randomly across society. Burminskii believes that once this class acquires a sense of identity, it will increasingly become antagonistic towards the bureaucracy as it seeks to consolidate and protect its economic gains. Within this atomized middle class Burminskii postulates a subset that he labels the revolutionary middle class, which seeks to secure its gains by emulating the accomplishments of the Ukrainian "orange revolution" in November 2004. In Ukraine, elements of the middle class supported Yushchenko, if for no other reason than it knew what it did not want, allowing Yushchenko's supporters to win. In a cautionary note Burminskii observed that the middle class in Ukraine subsequently needed to struggle with bureaucrats attempting to elicit revenge after the revolution. Whether Burminskiis hypothesis applies to Kazakhstan remains far from clear. Burminskiis argument turns on the notion of a high standard of living; another sociologist defines this as, The essential characteristic of the degree of the satisfaction of the physical, spiritual and social needs of people. It is measured by the following indices: the volume of consumer goods and services per capita of population real income per capita, residential security, the provision of different public services, transport public health and culture. Also involved are issues of employment, working conditions, including the duration of working hours, personal social safeguards, safety, demographic indices, ecology, health, secure access to nutritional food, material and financial acquisition and accessibility to social services.6 Quality of life is a value derived from the standard of living. It is determined by a number of objective and subjective indices. Among its components is the consumption of material goods, food, a high quality of housing and employment, the development of services, culture and social welfare. Among subjective criteria relating to quality of life are job satisfaction, conditions of employment, social status, financial position and family relations.7 According to Kazakhstans Statistics Agency, Lifestyle defines the life of people as a whole, in the first place, how they their expend time and money, all therefore reflecting peoples activities, interests and opinions. Poverty is the absence not only of sufficient income or basic nutritional needs, clothing, housing, access to public health care, but also the lack of the necessities for a healthy and lengthy life, the lack of possibilities for participating in public life, or an income level insufficient for satisfying other socio-cultural needs.8
4 S.M. Shakirova, Uroven I kachestvo zhizni, sotsialnoe samochuvstvie, identifikatsiia srednego klassa Almaty (po dannym focus-grupp i interviu, Srednii klass Almaty: uroven zhizni, gendernye razlichiia, identichnost Vypolneno v ramkakh mezhdunarodnogo issledovaniia po granty INTAS (Evropeiskaia komissiia, Briussel), Almaty, 2007. 5 Dmitrii Burminskii, Klassovoe stroenie kazakhstanskogo obshchestva. 15.01.2008 @ http://www.kub.info/article. php?sid=20371. 6 Uroven Zhizni, at Http://abc.informbureau.com/html/odiaaiu_aeecie.html. 7 Nikita Krichevskii, Shto takoe sotsialnye investitsii? at http://www.apn.ru/?chapter_name=advert&data_id=873&do=view_single. 8 Uroven zhizni naseleniia i bednost v Respublike Kazakhstan (statisticheskii monitoring.) Agenstsvo RK po statistike; Almaty,

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With such variables in definitions, some estimates of the Kazakh middle class put its numbers as high as 25 percent of the total population, and including people who consume 50-80 percent of the financial value of all goods sold in Kazakhstan. Analysts further divide this group into two sections, a lower middle class, with individual annual incomes of $6,000-9,000, an estimated 70 percent of the stratum, and the upper middle class, with annual individual incomes of $9,000-15,000, which is 30 percent of the group. According to official Kazakh statistics, salaries increased by 21 percent in 2001 and by 12 percent in 2002, and were projected to rise further thereafter.9 The principal criterion of reference to the middle class is not the nature of labor, professional association or relation to property (worker, owner), but income level. Other Kazakh experts give figures ranging between 18 percent and 60 percent of the population. According to one classification about 17 percent of the adult urban population in Kazakhstan is middle class, a figure estimated to be slightly higher in Almaty, where the proportion of the population belonging to the middle class is estimated at about 20 percent.10 Income remains unevenly distributed across Kazakhstan, with prosperity concentrated in the two urban centers Astana and the southern capital Almaty along with the countrys two major oil producing provinces, Atyrau and Mangistau. Table 2: Average regional monthly wages by province, 200311 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Region Tenge Republic Kazakhstan (average) 23,721 ($158.56) Astana 15,183 ($101.49) Aktyubinsk 24,522 ($163.91) Almaty oblast 16,875 ($112.80) Atyrau 48,678 ($325.38) eastern Kazakhstan 20,357 ($136.07) Zhambyl 16,227 ($108.46) western Kazakhstan 27,974 ($186.99) Karaganda 21,214 ($141.80) Kostana 17,675 ($118.15) Kzylorda 19,758 ($132.07) Mangistau 44,081 ($294.65) Pavlodar 22,898 ($153.06) northern Kazakhstan 15,613 ($104.36) Southern- Kazakhstan 15,805 ($105.65) Astana (capital) 31,862 ($318.62) Almaty (former capital) 33,714 ($337.14) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------As the statistics show, the disparity is most extreme between Almaty and the poorest rural provinces, with the average salary of an inhabitant in the former capital earning 332 percent more per annum than his rural compatriot. The numbers do not tell the entire story however, as in the oil-rich provinces of Atyrau and Mangistau employees of the oil companies and petroleum workers, numbering in the low 10s of 1,000s earned anywhere from $500 to $1,000 a month or more, while doctors, teachers and other professionals in the same province earned salaries ranging between 7,000-10,000 tenge ($47-67) per month.12 In 2006 Kazakhstans Statistics Agency calculated the monthly income level of the lower middle class to be 35,000 tenge ($290) per month. The portion of population in the second quarter of 2006 belonging to the lower middle class was 6.3 percent.13
IUNIFEM, PROON, 2004. 9 Industry Canada International Market Insight, Report Date: 09/16/2003. 10 Srednii klass v Kazakhstan: stil zhizni, 24 October 2007 http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php4?st=1193213700. 11 Source: Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe razvitie Respubliki Kazakhstana (Kratkii statisticheski spravochnik.) Ianvar-dekabr2003 goda. Almaty, 2004, p.64.2003 average exchange rate - 149.6 tenge = $1.00 12 Nurtai Mustafaev, Almaty gorod konstrastov. Chast 1, 8 December 2004, Internetgazeta ZONA.kz, Kazakhstan at http:// www.zonakz.net/articles/7627. 13 Roman Shpitalskii, Srednii klass opora obshchestva, Ekspress K, No. 144, 08.08.2007.

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In the graph More democracy where middle-class larger, EBRD teamed up with Freedom House to produce the following statistics, estimating Kazakhstans middle class at approximately 10 percent of the countrys population: Figure 3: More Democracy Where Middle Class Larger14

In any case, if Kazakhstans middle class is to become a bulwark of social stability, its numbers must increase to be a larger plurality or even majority of the population. Statistics Kazakhstan, the worlds largest landlocked country, is an ethnically diverse nation the 1999 census determined the population to consist of Kazakh (Qazaq) - 53.4 percent, Russian - 30 percent, Ukrainian - 3.7 percent, Uzbek - 2.5 percent, German - 2.4 percent, Tatar - 1.7 percent, Uyghur - 1.4 percent and others 4.9 percent. Many ethnic Russians resent the lack of dual citizenship and having to pass a Kazakh language test in order to work for government or state bodies. Unlike many political systems and economies in transition, Kazakhstan has not seen a major exodus from the agricultural sector into the cities; in 1995, Kazakh authorities put the country's urban population at 55.7 percent, which by 2006 had risen only to 57.4 percent, with United Nations ranking in 2003 Kazakhstan 107th of 199 countries surveyed.15 In 2005 the State Department estimated Kazakhstans Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at $125.3 billion (purchasing power parity,) its GDP per capita income at $8,300 (purchasing power parity), and GDP growth at 9.5 percent.16 The report contained mixed praise for the countrys economic progress, noting, Kazakhstan continues to play a leading role in Central Asia in economic reforms, with a solid banking system, growing mortgage markets (with $2.74 billion in total lending), and approximately $6.48 billion in pension accumulations as of October 2006, more than eight percent of the nations GDP. However, challenges remain in addressing problems related to the country's competitiveness and economic diversification, its over-reliance on the oil sector, widespread corruption, concentration of political power, and the need for increased rule of law and good governance. All of these challenges hamper the growth of a middle class and, consequently, economic prosperity. The incidence of poverty has fallen significantly in recent years, reaching 9.8 percent in 2005 according to official statistics; however, poverty rates between rural and urban areas still differ significantly.
14 Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD Transition Report 2007, at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/ econo/tr07p.pdf. 15 Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries; Kazakhstan, Asian Development Bank, 2007, United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. New York, 2002, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects, Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. 16 Country Assessments and Performance Measures Kazakhstan, U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia - FY 2006, State Department Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, January 2007.

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Figure 4: Kazakhstan GDP growth 2002-200617

In 2006 oil revenues accounted for at least two-thirds of the countrys budgetary revenues, increasing its per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) to $5,100, up from $3,620 in 2005.18 Kazakhstans steady and impressive economic performance has impressed the U.S. government; in 2006 the USAID observed, Thanks to the Government of Kazakhstan's (GOK) commitment to market reforms and the rise of the energy sector, Kazakhstan has achieved steady economic growth, with an estimated 9.2 percent GDP growth rate in 2003. The country made major advancements in banking reform and supervision, fiscal reform, small-scale privatization, pension reform, and attracting foreign investment to the energy sector. The country's output has increased 50 percent in the past four years. However, there is a growing danger of over-reliance on the oil sector. Kazakhstan faces major challenges of diversification and corruption that hamper the growth of a middle class. About 25 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, and there are huge disparities between urban and rural areas, and among regions. This underscores a need to further develop small and medium enterprises (SMEs), create a vibrant middle class, promote enhanced rule of law, greater transparency, and public accountability, and expand domestic and foreign investment outside extractive industries.19 The previous year an Asian Development Bank study cited an even more impressive poverty reduction figure; of the percentage of population living below the subsistence minimum falling to 15 percent in 2004, with Kazakhstan on course to meet the Millennium Development Goal target on income poverty by 2015 as well as several non-poverty MDG targets.20 The Asian Development Bank reported in 2006 that wage increases and substantial expansion of bank credit fueled private consumption spending, as construction expanded by 38 percent, largely on residential dwellings. Kazakhstans accomplishments in poverty reduction are all the more impressive that many of its causes were legacies of the collapse of the USSRs centrally planned economy, as shown in Table 2.1 below, which indicates that more than 4 in 5 unemployed Kazakhs lost their livelihood in the aftermath of the Soviet economic implosion. Table 5: Main Causes of Poverty in Kazakhstan according to Survey Participants21

17 Source: Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 18 Kazakhstans Per Capita GDP at $5,100 in 2006, Novosti at http://en.rian.ru/world/20061225/57774824.html. 19 USAID Budget: Kazakhstan, 2006 at www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ee/kz.html. 20 Implementation of the Country Strategy and Program, Asian Development Bank, http://www.adb.org/Documents/CSPs/ KAZ/2005/csp0200.asp. 21 Source: Human Development Report- Kazakhstan 2000: Fighting Poverty For A Better Future, Almaty: United Nations Development Program, 2001.

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A 2005 United Nations Development Program Country Programme Action Plan noted of the economy, Extensive reforms since independence in 1991 have brought good results. As a result of improved production capacity and high world prices in the oil sector, the economic rebound started in 1999: real GDP grew 13.5 percent in 2001, 9.8 percent in 2002 and 9.2 percent in 2003.(Non-oil sector growth averaged 9 percent in the past three years.) It is estimated that GDP will continue to grow approximately 7 percent per annum for the next several years, and then correlated it the issue of poverty, noting, Due to this strong economic performance, the incidence of poverty decreased from 35 percent to 19.8 percent between 1996 and 2003, as per capita income grew to USD 1,520 by 2002. However, the incidence of poverty varies across the country and the rural-urban divide, with rural poverty twice as high. The inability of the oil, gas and mining sectors to create a large number of jobs continues to hamper poverty reduction efforts.22 Figure 6: Population of ECA by Poverty Status (mln)23

A 2007 World Bank study concluded that several FSU nations had achieved significant reductions in the number of citizens living below an absolute poverty line of $2.15 per day in a study using national currencies converted 2000 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates. The study concluded that, Poverty rates continue to fall in ECA (Europe and Central Asia Region), and since 1998-99, have halved. The proportion of the poor (defined as those below $2.15 per day in 2000 PPPs) fell from roughly 20 percent in 1998 to 11 percent by the end of 2005The resurgence of growth in the region, particularly in CIS countries, has moved about 58 million people out of poverty. Much of this poverty reduction has occurred in the populous middleincome CIS countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) where most of the poor live. Much of the growth in incomes has come in the large middle-income CIS countries, where the bulk of the poor reside. In Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, continued shared economic growth has led to increased household consumption, and significant poverty reduction. Post-Soviet Kazakhstan Between 1989 and 2005, Kazakhstan lost two million of its six million Russian Soviet inhabitants. Kazakhstan still retains a Russian minority of around 30 percent, the highest percentage in Central Asia.24 The decade following the collapse of Communism in 1991 widened the urban-rural divisions in many former Soviet republics, including Kazakhstan. The GDP share of Kazakhstans agriculture shrank by 280 percent, from 34 percent in 1990 to 11.9 percent in 1998, while grain production in 1997-1998 decreased by 210 percent from the 1986-1990 averages. In the same period meat production declined 47 percent, dairy items by 42 percent, while vegetable and other produce production dropped precipitously as well.
22 Country Programme Action Plan 2005-2009, Government of Kazakhstan United Nations Development Program, UNDP Kazakhstan CPAP 28 February 2005 @ http://www.un.kz/img/docs/en/1105.doc.) 23 (Europe and Central Asia Region Poverty Team, issue 19, World Bank Quarterly Newsletter, April 2007. 24 Russians left behind in Central Asia , BBC, November 23, 2005.

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Figure 7: Share of Total Employment in the State Sector in Selected CIS Economies, 2001 and 2003

In the labor market, the most immediate effect of the collapse of the USSR was the shedding of state jobs; by 2003, state employment had dropped dramatically, as shown in the graph below. While Kazakhstan created new jobs after 2004, the government sector continues to account for one quarter of total employment and two fifths of dependent employment.25 One of the first and highest priorities of Kazakhstans government in the years immediately following independence was to control raging inflation, which in 1992, the first year of independence, soared to 2,960.8 percent. Table 9: Changes in Inflation in Kazakhstan, 1990-99

Another government priority was to privatize state property, which began in 1993 with the auction of some stores in Almaty. As the program picked up pace it was then extended nationwide, with the government privatizing trading companies, food suppliers and other services. Most importantly for the nascent middle class, as part of a parallel process, the mass privatization of apartments created a private housing market. The ambitious program three years later saw private companies account for around 80 percent of the economy, while private ownership of agricultural production soared to 97 percent.26 According to official estimates, Kazakhstan's GDP grew by about 13 percent in 2001, the highest rate among the former Soviet republics. That year the government made considerable efforts to improve the economic condition of the population, as the average monthly wage reached 15,516 tenge (around $110), an 18.9 percent nominal increase from 2000 (9.6 percent in real terms). Yet unemployment remained high. For the first time, the Labor and Social Ministry used a new method for estimating unemployment and admitted that there were almost 900,000
25 Ekonomicheskaya aktivnostnaseleniya Kazakhstana, Almaty, 2004. 26 Caspian Information Center Occasional Paper No 6 - Kazakhstans Emerging Middle Class: a Factor for Stability, November 2004.

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unemployed people in the country, or 12.7 percent of the work force (previous official figures were 3.8 percent), Panorama reported in its May 2001 issue. According to some estimates, unemployment was even higher in the southern and southwestern regions of the republic, reaching up to 20 percent, while in Almaty oblast and some industrial regions in the north it was below the national average. Figure 10: Money Incomes of Population for Different Regions27

The economic transition affected the living standards of rural residents, particularly their earnings and pensions. Surveys in 1997 reported that per capita incomes of rural residents were 2.5 times lower than in cities, with the agricultural median monthly wage being the lowest compared to other sectors. In 1997 rural workers earned an average of $51, while the figure for industry was $164, transport, $144 and construction, $149, while the national median monthly wage was $112. In 1997 rural residents earned three times less than industrial workers and 2.2 times less than the national average. A poverty survey carried out in 1996 by the Kazakh Statistical Agency found that 33.9 percent of rural residents live below the poverty line, versus urban areas 27.9 percent. Despite the governments efforts, a level of inequity remains. Similar rural-urban inequalities existed in social security payments, which represented 20.5 percent of the nations earnings and with pensions constituting the bulk of social security payments. With one pensioner per every 1.8 worker, funds allocated for social security drained rapidly. In 1998 however, Kazakhstan adopted a drastic pension reform program based on the Chilean model, which called for private pension funds. Laying the groundwork for pension reform, in June, 1996, the Majlis adopted a law establishing a legal framework for creating voluntary private pension funds, with the National Bank playing a regulatory role. In March 1997 the Kazakh government approved the transition to a three-tier system to start in January 1998. Workers were supposed to contribute to a private pension fund, which would guarantee minimum pensions to each worker with a pre-decade work record. Once again however, the countryside lagged behind the urban centers, as pensions, a vital source of rural income, were 1.5 times higher in cities than in villages.28 Despite the disparities however, as of 2004 nearly six million people, accounting for almost eighty percent of the economically active population, were participating in the scheme, a fifty percent growth since January 2002. Their old age secured and the countrys economy stabilized, Kazakhs could now look forward to increased consumerism rather than saving all their money for a rainy day. As the country moved further away from its Soviet past, Kazakhs began to spend their disposable income on good and services that went beyond mere survival needs. One of the more striking indices of the rising power of Kazakh consumers is contained in the above chart, which lists private consumption in 1990, the last full year of Soviet power at 47.9. Sixteen years later, the index had risen to 10,139.5, an increase of 2,116 percent. Since monetary parities are useless for comparison in a study such as this, it will cover what most in the West regard as essential accoutrements to a middle class existence, including
27 Source: Kazakhstan Statistics Agency, over 9 months in 2000, tenge 28 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Strengthening Income-Generating Opportunities for Rural Women in Kazakhstan, New York: United Nations, 1997, at http://www.unescap.org/rural/doc/women/Kazakhstan.pdf.

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employment, housing, transportation, education, banking and access to credit lines, communications, including cellular telephones and access to the Internet, along with such lifestyle choices as diet, fashion and vacations. Housing If anything epitomized Kazakhstans break with its Soviet past, it was its rapid privatization of the nations housing stock, turning the average citizen into the owner of a valuable equity asset. Less than a decade after the collapse of the USSR, most housing in Kazakhstan had been privatized. In President Nazarbayevs Decree No. 1388 of June 11, 2004, on Kazakhstans State Program on Housing Construction Development for 2005-2007 he made his most explicit promise yet to members of the middle class, with their dream of owning their own home, naming the srednii klass as the direct beneficiary of the government's housing construction program. After noting that 96.8 percent of Kazakhstans housing stock (2.5 million sq. ft.) was already private property, largely financed through mortgages from the governmentsupported Kazakhstan Mortgage Company (KIK), President Nazarbayev proposed further funding of $12.5 million to support a state program of home construction for 20052007. The mortgage program was also to involve the national banks Kaspian, Astana-Finans, TsentrKredit, ATF, BTA- mortgage, Nurbank, Nauryz Kazakhstan bank, TekhakaBank, Alliance and Tsesnabank national banks, operating under the auspices of the KIK. Article 5 of the decree concerned the overall direction and mechanisms for implementing the program, with section 2 specifically stating, The measures are directed towards encouraging buildings of dwelling for the middle class. Article 5 section 1.4 set forth quality controls in building materials and heating systems to assist construction of housing for the middle-class, a sharp break with the shoddy construction techniques of the Soviet era. The decree concluded, The Program pays special attention to providing housing to the middle class and socially vulnerable groups.29 In a report on Astanas real estate market for the second quarter of 2007 prepared by the Swiss Realty Group, some interesting facts emerge about Astanas 584,800 inhabitants. The survey rates the both the capitals standard of living and educational levels as higher than average, with the city's inhabitants earning an average salary of $550 per month. The report notes that in 2006 11,019,500 square feet of new housing was constructed. The rents paid for the various grades of housing are also of interest. Luxury residential housing in the city center rents for $1,8004,500 monthly, upscale residential $1,200-2,700 per month, while mid-budget housing in the suburbs goes for $1,000-1,600 per month, while luxury suburban mansions can rent for up to $2,500-10,000 per month. The sale prices for housing in the capital are equally illuminating. Luxury Residential units in the center of the capital can sell for $400-700 per square foot, with Upscale Residential fetching between $300-500 per square foot. Suburban Mid-Budget dwellings in the capital's outlying districts sell for $200-300 per square foot, while detached cottages typically sell for $150-300 per square foot.30 Farther to the south, in the former capital Almaty, even three years ago a 2,000 square-foot two-room apartment in the newly constructed elite Stolichnyi tsentr, Nurly Tau sites or along the Zhailiadu golf course could cost $430,000 or more, while a five-room apartment in the same upscale complexes could run up to $1 million, with mini-mansions going for considerably more.31 The building boom in Almaty has passed by some poorer residents. On July 14, 2006 skirmishes occurred between residents in Almatys Bakay district when authorities attempted to enforce a slum clearance plan. Five hundred dwellings had already been demolished by court order, with portions of the Shanyrak district also targeted for demolition. When 150 police officers attempted to dismantle a barricade thrown up by local residents, they were met with rocks and Molotov cocktails; 16 police officers were hospitalized, and one died from burns twelve days later.32 Social tensions were further exacerbated when on August 1, 2006, the Kazakh government passed a
29 Ukaz President Respupliki Kazakhstana ot 11 iunia 2004 god N 1388 O Gosudarstvennoi programme razvitiia zhilishchnogo stroitelstva v Respublike Kazakhstan na 2005-2007 gody at www.nr.kz/nrkz/analytics/downloads/files/GP2005_2007.doc. 30 Rynok Nedvizhimosti Kazakhstan, Astana, Q2 2007,Osnovnye Pokazateli, 10 September 2007 Stroitelnyi Vestnik (n.d.) at http://builder.kz. 31 Nurtai Mustafaev, Almaty gorod konstrastov. Chast 2, 13.12.2004, Internet-gazeta ZONAkz, Kazakhstan at http://www. zonakz.net/articles/7662. 32 Joanna Lillis, Civil Society: rich-poor gap fuels tension in Kazakhstans commercial capital, Eurasianet.org, August 9, 2006 at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav080906.shtml.

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law promising all adult citizens free title to a plot of land totaling .10 hectare (.247 acres.)33 The decrees wording seemed to indicate that the citizens had merely to present their official documents to the local authorities. As over half Kazakhstan's population is now urban, unruly long lines quickly formed in the capital Astana and Almaty as citizens sought to claim their property. The mayors of Astana and Almaty quickly declared that they were unable to fulfill the decrees terms, while the head of the Almaty administration land department Kozhakhan Zhabagiev said simply, The cabinet decreeis not applicable in the conditions of our city. Investment in housing construction for eleven months of 2006, compared with the same period of 2005 increased by 37 percent and amounted to $2.4 billion.34 Transportation Kazakhstan is meeting the middle-classs hunger for automobiles in a number of ways, from importing both new and used automobiles to encouraging foreign firms to set up manufacturing under licensing agreements. Kazakhstan's 2002 market (imports plus local production) for passenger cars was estimated at $800 million, based on statistics from customs and industry sources, which in three short years increased by 50 percent to $1.277 billion. At the time, cars produced in the CIS and Baltic countries made up about 80 percent of those vehicles. According to Kazakh Ministry of Industry and Trade data, as of January 1, 2006, private automobiles accounted for 1,556,453 of Kazakhstans total motor pool of 1,807,737 transport units, or a total of 86.1 percent of all vehicles, giving a ration of 120 automobiles per 1,000 citizens, a ratio that authorities project will rise by 2012 to 300 vehicles per 1,000 citizens. The Ministry of Industry and Trade further reported that in 2005, 237,147 automobiles were imported into Kazakhstan. Of these, 141,000 were seven years old or more, and only 36,816 were new. During the same period 684,588 used vehicles changed hands within the country. During the period 2001-2005 800,000 used automobiles were imported into Kazakhstan. Specialists estimate that in 2005 Kazakhstans automobile market was worth $1.277 billion, which was expected to rise in 2006 to $1.8 billion, a 29.1 percent increase in a single year. Currently 11 companies producing 24 different brands of automobiles are either assembling or manufacturing vehicles in Kazakhstan.35 In 2002 automobile sales were spurred when liberalized banking laws allowed Kazakhs increased access to previously unavailable bank loans, allowing people in some instances to receive three to five year loans equivalent to theirannual salary. Kazakhs quickly took advantage of the liberalized terms and now more than a third of registered banks now provide credit for automobile purchases. While actual automobile production began in Kazakhstan in 2003, the Kazakh government had earlier held discussions about establishing assembly production lines with a number of foreign firms, including Russias Zil, Swedens Volvo, Italys Fiat, South Koreas Hyundai and Kia concerns, and Americas Chrysler and General Motors companies. In 2000 the Russian AvtoVAZ (Volzhskii avtomobilnyi zavod) better known internationally as Lada, won the race to produce vehicles in Kazakhstan, signing a number of agreements with Bipek Auto to develop vehicle and spare parts production facilities, a network of maintenance facilities, and production agreements providing for an eventual output of 20,000 automobiles annually. In 2003 the countrys automobile inventory consisted of approximately 1.2 million vehicles, while 108,300 automobiles were imported from abroad, of which 49,800 were German, 30,900 were Japanese, and 23,100 came from CIS countries. Beginning in January 2003 the privately-held company Avziia-Auto Ust'- Kamenogorsk facility began producing the AvtoVAZ Lada 4x4 Niva under license. Since then it has produced nearly 9,500 of the ve hicles, with projected production for 2007 set at 3,000 cars. In 2004 Avziia-Auto Ust'-Kamenogorsk facility built 32,206 Lada 4x4s, a 20 percent increase over its 2003 production run. The 2004 Lada output was worth $18,797,000. While the locally built Nivas had a good reputation, demand for them remained comparatively low because of their relatively high price of $5,500, while a used Japanese car could be purchased for the same amount. In 2004 the top 10 best selling brands in Kazakhstan included Audi, Toyota, Mazda, Volkswagen, Opel, Ford, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Nissan, and Daewoo. Half of all imported cars are used in Almaty. Sta33 Postanovlenie Pravitelstva Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 1 avgusta 2006 goda No. 726, Ob utverzhdenii Pravil predostavlenia prav na zemelnye uchastki pod individualnoe zhikishchnoe stroitelstvo at http://base.zakon.kz/doc/lawyer/?doc_id=30064437&sub=SUB0. 34 Gulbanu Abenova, Stroitelnaia otrasl Kazakhstana ravivaetsia dinanichno, Stroitelnaia Gazeta, No. 5, 07 February 2007. 35 AutoWorld Astana 2007, 15 November 2006 at www.autostat.ru.

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tistics for best-selling car brands there included Toyota, Mazda, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Nissan, Volkswagen, Ford, Daewoo and Mitsubishi.36 According to Avziia-Autos President Erzhan Mandiev, in 2004 Avziia-Auto paid more than $2 million in taxes, and planned a major upgrade of the facility.37 The 203-acre Avziia-Auto Ust-Kamenogorsk facility contains welding and assembly equipment from the Finnish company Valmet, which previously assembled Russiandesigned AvtoVAZ Samara automobiles in Finland under the brand name Samara Baltik. The German firm Durr provided the painting equipment.38 Counting indigenous production, in 2006 more than 13,000 Ladas were sold in Kazakhstan. In 2006 AvziiaAutos Ust'-Kamenogorsk facility announced its intention in 2007 to manufacture 1,000 Lada Samara 21099 cars under contract from Russias AvtoVAZ, which produced the automobiles from 1984 to 2004. On March 10, 2006, the Avziia-Autos Ust'-Kamenogorsk facility celebrated the production of its 8,000th Lada 4x4.39 AvtoVAZ subsidiary Bipek Auto owns Avziia-Autos Ust'-Kamenogorsk manufacturing plant. While the plants initial offerings were based on former Soviet designs, following its success with the Lada 4x4 in 2004 Bipek Auto reached an agreement with the Czech Republics Skoda Auto, now a subsidiary of Volkswagen, to begin production of the firms Octavia and Superb vehicles. Technical difficulties delayed the launch of the vehicles from the third to the forth quarter of the year, but Aziia-Avto was optimistic that, beginning in 2005, that it could manufacture under license up to 1.5 thousand various Skoda models annually.40 The Ust'-Kamenogorsk plant currently has a capacity of producing 45,000 automobiles per year.41 According to the head of the General Motors division in Kazakhstan, Ianos Iendrusak, Kazakhstan also has great potential as a market for GM vehicles. Iendrusak was speaking before members of the media at an event where the company undertook a test-drive of its Chevrolet Captiva sports utility vehicle. Construction of Chevrolet Captivas in Kazakhstan as a General Motors joint venture began in April 2007 at Avziia-Autos Ust'-Kamenogorsk facility, with a projected vehicle production run for the year of 1,000 units. The projected production of the SUV for 2008 is 3000 vehicles. Iendrusak is confident that GM's indigenous network of dealers will provide increasing sales. General Motors began operations in Kazakhstan in 2004 and now is fourth in sales among foreign-produced brands in the Kazakh market. Besides Captivas, Chevrolet Epicas and Lacettis are now manufactured by AvziiaAuto in Kazakhstan as well.42 China too is attempting to enter the Kazakh market. In 2007, China overtook Germany to become the worlds third largest manufacturer of automobiles, with its more than 8 million units exceed by only the United States and Japan. In the first six months of 2007 China exported 241,000 motor vehicles worth $2.7 billion, with Russia the biggest market importing 38,600 vehicles at an average cost per car of $11,200. In that year Kazakhstan was Chinas second-largest export market, with 6,443 vehicles.45 While the manufacture of Chinese automobiles has yet to be established in Kazakhstan, ChongQing Asia-China Automobile Sales Co., Ltd is involved in exporting vehicles to Kazakhstan.44 For the less affluent middle class citizen, Kazakhstan now has a thriving used car market. While traffic in Kazakhstan moves on the right-hand side of the road, there are no laws against vehicles with right-mounted steering wheels, so used Japanese cars with right-hand steering are becoming popular with Kazakh consumers, as righthanded Japanese vehicles are sold up to 50 percent cheaper than the same left-hand brands. Education If home ownership and an automobile are the bedrock of Western middle class values, access to quality higher education is no less a major aspiration of the middle class. While Kazakhstans post-Soviet legacy includes an
36 Overview of Passenger Cars and SUV Market: International Market Insight [IMI] ID: 120518 at www.buyusa.gov/kazakhstan. 37 Itogi raboty Azia Avto v 2004 g., Press-tsentr OAO AvtoVAZ, 03 February 2005. 38 Kratkaia kharakteristika avtoproma Kazakhstana I kompanii Aziia-Avto, Avtomobilnyi rynok Rossii-2004, 25 October 2004. 39 Press-tsentr OAO AvtoVAZ, 14 March 2006 at www.autostat.ru. 40 Aziia-Avto planiruet nachat sborku Skoda v kontse 2004 goda, 28 October 2004 at www.autostat.ru. 41 Plan proizvodstva Aziia Avto v 2007 g., Praim-TASS 16 July 2007 at www.autostat.ru. 42 Kazakhstan otkryvaet bolshie vozmozhnosti na rynke avtomobilei, Natsionalnoe informatsionnoe agentstvo KazInform 12.12.2007. 43 Xinhua, August 6, 2007. 44 See company website at Http://www.made-in-china.com/showroom/sinotruck/ companyinfo/Chongqing-Asia-China-Automobile-Sales-Co-Ltd-.html.

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excellent university system, many middle-class Kazakhs view foreign education as an essential component of a prosperous existence, quite aside from any question of prestige. Since the 1991 collapse of Communism Kazakhs have taken increasing advantage of studying overseas. To a certain extent, educational reform was imposed on Kazakh authorities by necessity. Following the collapse of the USSR, Kazakhstan was the Central Asian republic that was most seriously effected by the withdrawal of Russian labor, leading the government quickly to explore human resource alternatives. Almatys energetic efforts paid off; by 2004, Kazakhstan was the only country of the four Central Asian Republics with a positive net migration flow. The establishment of private higher education institutions (HEIs) in Kazakhstan began in 1992. They were listed as non-commercial organizations, joint stock companies or private limited companies. As of 2002 the countrys approximately 130 HEIs had 130,000 students enrolled (32 percent of the national total, including private feepaying students) as opposed to 270,000 at Kazakh public institutions. The HEIs offered more than 130 specialties, with economics, law, pedagogy and humanities predominating. The same year Turan University, a non-state and nonprofit institution was established in Almaty. In early 2002, according to the Association of Kazakhstan Education Institutions, the country had 45 state higher education institutions and 130 private HEIs. The Kazakh government has granted accreditation to 44 of the 45 state higher education institutions, but only 16 of the 130 HEIs.45 Education reform had strong support from the outset from the Kazakh government. In 1993 it introduced the Bolashak (The future in Kazakh) program as an interim solution to develop young specialists in new fields as quickly as possible while Kazakhstan was retooling its educational system to prepare qualified professionals locally. On November 9, 1993 President Nazarbayev issued a decree stating, "In Kazakhstan's transition toward a market economy and the expansion of international contacts, there is an acute need for cadres with advanced Western education, and so, it is now necessary to send the most qualified youth to study in leading educational institutions in foreign countries."46 Hundreds of students from across Kazakhstan were sent to leading European, East Asian and American universities exclusively to study business-related subjects. They did this with the proviso that upon completing their studies they would return to work in Kazakhstan for five years. In 2005 the number of students sent to foreign universities was increased to 3,000, about one percent of the countrys total student body. The downside of the program was that between five and fifteen percent of those students chose not to return. Most Kazakh students enrolled in the Bolashak program are sent to U.S. universities. As President Nazarbayev noted, "We are learning from the positive example of American democracy." President Nazarbayev told participants at the Eurasia Economic Summit 2000 held in April in Almaty, "Our common agenda must begin with education. First and foremost, we must transform our population, which is already educated and motivated into a work force for the future: 21st century training for the 21st century jobs The battle for the future will be determined not by armies but by education, not by tanks but by technology, not by cannons but by computers. It is vital that we insure that Central Asia is on the right side of history in all respects - politically, economically and technologically." U.S. universities enrolled in the Bolashak program include Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Columbia, Duke, Georgetown, Emory, Carnegie Mellon, Indiana University, Vanderbilt and Johns Hopkins. Since its inception the Bolashak program has expanded to sponsor Masters and PhD. programs in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The final selection is made by the Republican Commission, chaired by the State Secretary and composed of the Ministers, members of Parliament, and members of the Office of the President. The Republican Commission also approves the host country and study program. Bolashak scholarships cover all costs related to education, including tuition and fees, travel, and a living stipend. Scholars are expected to maintain academic excellence. According to Bolashak Moscow representative Lydia Shaykenovoi, there are currently about 1,800 Bolashak scholarship students studying in 24 countries, of whom about 1,000 attend U.S. universities. About 400 Bolashak scholarship recipients attend British univesities while another 400 at45 V. Belosludtseva, S. Tasbulatova, T. Tasbulatov, Private Higher Education, International Institute for Educational Planning Policy Forum No. 16, Tbilisi, Georgia 25-26 April 2002. 46 Kazakhstan Embassy to the U.S., Education and Culture page, Http://www.kazakhembus.com/systemofeducation.html.

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tend Russian higher education institutes, of whom 337 are based in Moscow.47 Participating British institutions include Oxford, the University of Glamorgan, Exeter University, the University of Essex, Dundee University, Brunel University, the University of East Anglia, Loughborough University, University College London, Aston University, of Warwick University, Manchester University, Stirling University and Manchester City College. If a student is interested in studying business administration, they most frequently go to American schools. The U.S. and Britain also top the list for students wishing to study information technology, while students attending Russian institutions usually major in medicine, space technologies oraviation.48 In popularity, the United Kingdom is a close second to the U.S., as are other European Union members France, Germany and the Netherlands. Of the other formerly Soviet states, Kazakh Bolashak recipients most frequently study engineering in the Russian Federation, Latvia and Ukraine. Interestingly enough, the only Muslim nation to host Kazakh Bolashak students is Malaysia, where they are involved in economics and management studies. One Bolshaker, as participants in the program describe themselves, recorded his impressions of being at the University of Texas at Austin during his first month there. The first portion of his letter is taken up with describing the extensive computer facilities available, both on and off campus, while the Internet is rapid, very accessible everywhere and free of charge. Besides the campus computer lab there a student Internet cafe with several hundred computersyou go, find a computer, type in your student login and password and use. The correspondence noted the prevalence of Internet wireless connections, both on and off campus in Internet cafes.49 For middle-class students not fortunate enough to be awarded a Bolashak scholarship, opportunities for higher education in Kazakhstan outside of the former state educational system nonetheless increased. As indicated in the graph below, while from 2000 to 2005/2006 the number of students receiving government stipends remained unchanged, those attending private institutions as fee-paying students more than doubled. Table 11: Higher Education Enrolment by Status50

Interest has grown dramatically in higher education, as young Kazakhs see it as the road to a better life. The flourishing interest in higher education meant that by 2007 Kazakhstan had a total of 181 higher education institutions with 81 branches. Of these nine were national, 46-state owned or partially stateowned, 14 military and 107 private institutions, as well as 76 Kazakh institutions and five Russian institutions. In 2006 Kazakh institutions of higher learning had 775,800 students enrolled, or 5.17 percent of the population. The former capital Almaty has the highest number of universities 66, southern Kazakhstan - 19, the Karaganda region - 15, the capital Astana 11 and East Kazakhstan - 10. Among the most visonary international educational projects in Kazakhstan is the University of Central Asia, founded in 2000 by the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and the Aga Khan. Spread across three countries, the UCA is a private, independent, self-governing institution. The three campus are located in Tekeli, Kazakhstan; Naryn, Kyrgyzstan and Khorog, Tajikistan. When complete a decade hence, UCA will accommodate nearly 4,000 students, faculty and staff. Students will study English and computers before beginning course work, and undergraduate degree courses will be taught in English. UCAs programs will include a School of Professional and Continuing Education, the Graduate School of Development, School of Undergraduate Studies, English Preparatory Support, Distance Education and Research Programs.51 All students able to do so will be expected to pay tuition.
47 Molodost protiv obrazovannosti at http://starosti.org/?id=25161. 48 Dmitrii Kosyrev, Molodost protiv obrazovannosti, RIA Novosti, 28 November 2007. 49 Opit Bolashakera in da (sic) United States at http://www.bolashaker.com/page/2/. 50 Source: Jose Joaquin Brunner and Anthony Tillett, Higher Education in Central Asia; the challenges of modernization an overview, January 31, 2007 at http://mt.educarchile.cl/mt/jjbrunner/archives/RevAlldoc2c.pdf. 51 University of Central Asia - Curriculum & Academic Programmes @ http://www.ucentralasia.org/.

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In 1998 the International Academy of Business was founded to meet the interests of young Kazakhs in business. The IAB offers MBA and DBA programs in Economy, Marketing, Finances, Accounting and Auditing, Management, Informatics and Information Systems.52 The Kazakh-British Technical University was established in August 2001 and officially opened in October 2002. KBTUs objective is to train highly skilled staff for Kazakhstans industrial complexes by using advanced international technologies and experts, as well as the best local specialists. KBTU offers programs in Information Technologies, Oil and Gas, Finance, and Economics. In January 2005, an agreement between the London School of Economics and KBTU for establishing a bachelor program was signed.53 Suleyman Demirel University is a privately supported, coeducational institution founded in 1996 and named after the former Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. SDU with 1,150 undergraduates and 15 graduates, provides quality undergraduate education leading to degrees in computer engineering, computer sciences, economics, business, finance, marketing, information systems, mathematics, translation and interpreting, Kazakh language and literature. Here too, instruction is in English.54 The Kazakh-American University was founded in 1997. KAU is the first university in Kazakhstan that teaches according to Kazakhstan and American standards. All the subjects are taught in English and its departments include Law, Computer Sciences and Telecommunication, Economics, Humanities and Life Sciences and Medicine.55 Among other U.S. educational initiatives is the Kazakh-American Free University, opened in 2001 in Oskemen, which offers bachelor and baccalaurete degrees.56 In 2006 the U.S. government offered eleven education and exchange programs to Kazakhs, ranging from the high school to professional to graduate level. These include the Future Leadership Exchange Program for high school; the Eurasian Undergraduate Student Program, offering a junior year abroad; the Edmund Muskie Graduate Fellowship Program, a Master's degree program; the Junior Faculty Development Program for university instructors; the Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program, bringing midcareer professionals to the United States for a year; the Fulbright Visiting Scholar Program for Kazakh scholars to conduct research at U.S. universities and the International Visitor Leadership Program.57 Competing in marketing of educational services with the newly formed private education institutions is an exploding number of state universities. Of the $930 million spent on higher education in Kazakhstan in 2006, almost half, $426 million, went to private universities. Unfortunately, many educational institutions, in pursuing students income, focused only on the most lucrative popular professions, legal and economic. Accordingly, the number of students studying for a bachelor of law degree grew from 25,800 during the2004/2005 academic year to 47,900 in 2005/2006 academic. A similar growth pattern in bachelor of science and business specialties was also observed, with numbers rising from 63,500 students in the 2004/2005 academic year to 119,500 in 2005/2006. Emphasis on legal and business studies skewed university enrollment to the point that in 2006 majors in these two professions constituted 37.5 percent of all students, causing the government to intervene.58 The governments response to the explosion of higher education programs and a decline in standards was to have the Kazakhstan Ministry of Education and Science together with National Security Committee and Prosecutor Generals Office undertake a compliance inspection of higher education institutions, which concluded on June 16, 2007.59 The Kazakhstan Ministry of Education and Science inspected 143 institutions of higher education and 66 branches, excluding medical or military institutions, as well as institutions accredited in 2007 and those that had earlier lost their licenses to operate.
52 Glavnaia and Departamenty @ http://www.iab.kz/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1. 53 Kazakh-British Technical University, The 3rd Annual Global Education and Training Event for Oil & Gas Report, Getenergy Dubai 2007 @ http://www.getenergyevent.com/Upload/File/Get07/Getenergy_2007_Report(1).pdf. 54 Engineering at http://sdu.edu.kz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=198&Itemid=41; Philology at http://sdu. edu.kz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=89&Itemid=42; Economy at http://sdu.edu.kz/index.php?option=com_content &task=view&id=33&Itemid=43. 55 Dobro pozhalovat! Obrashcehnie Prezidenta KAU k postiteliam saita at http://www.kau.kz/. 56 Obshchie svediniia o KASU at http://www.kafu.kz/obshie-svedinija-o-kasu.html. 57 Country Assessments and Performance Measures Kazakhstan, U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia - FY 2006, State Department Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, January 2007. 58 Rakhmam Alshanov, Chastnoe obrazovanie v Kazakhstane: stanovlenie I sovremennye vyzovy, (Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 02 November 2007. 59 Kazinform, 16 June 2006.

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According to Kazinform, inspectors uncovered numerous violations of legislative and educational standards, including insufficient library resources, shortages of professors with advanced degrees and unqualified teaching staff in institutions offering legal and economic majors. All this negatively impacted student performance and degraded the quality of education. Fifteen institutions were placed on four-month probation, including Aktobs Kazakh- Russian International University. Six institutions cancelled their licenses before the inspection including several branches of Kainar University, one of the countrys first private institutions, while 15 institutions or branches lost their accreditation entirely, including the International Kazakh-Turkish University named after H. A. Yassaui and the Kazakh-Russian International University.60 Interest in Western education has also trickled down to the secondary school level. Britains Hai leybury and Imperial Service College, more usually referred to simply as Haileybury, a coeducational public school founded in 1862 for students 11-16 years old, is to open a $26.5 million branch in Almaty. Haileybury-Almaty, scheduled to open in September 2008, will host Kazakh adolescents and the children of British embassy staff. Students will follow the English primary and secondary school curriculum in preparation for taking international General Certificates of Secondary Education (GCSE) examinations, with all instruction conducted in English.61 The initial class will consist of 640 male and female pupils aged three to 18 but, but authorities hope to eventually expand the student body to 940. Eighty percent of pupils are expected to be Kazakh, but as fees could top $20,000 per annum, it will only appeal to the most aff luent. School master Stuart Westley told journalists that market research determined that there was a demand for a British public school in Kazakhstan, commenting, "Haileybury is delighted to be part of this exciting opportunity, which reflects the great interest in and respect for the values of the British public school clearly evident now in many parts of the world. We feel very complimented to know that there is a desire for another Haileybury in Kazakhstan. The education system in Kazakhstan is predominantly a government education system so there is a very small independent sector."62 In Kazakhstan, middle class concern about the importance of education for their children extends even down to the kindergarten level; a 2004 UNESCO report found that the majority of children attending POs (Preschool Organization: the generic term used in Kazakhstan to refer to early childhood care and education services catering to children of age 1+ - 6+) are from middle class families, with only 20 percent of children from poor families in attendance. The cost of the increasing parental contribution is one of the factors widening the social gap. In 2000 the parental contribution to preschool education was 19 percent of the cost, but by 2004 had increased to 33-34 percent.63 As the table below shows, the number of pre-school organizations during the period 1995-2000 shrank dramatically and the number of statefunded grade schools declined even as the private sector flourished. Tourism One of the ultimate accouterments of the middle-class lifestyle is tourism, a $3 trillion a year industry worldwide, second only to oil as a source of revenue and generating 1/10 of the world's GNP. Kazakhs are increasingly taking advantage of this middle class luxury, with their wanderlust taking them to distant locales from Abu Dhabi to South Korea. In 2003 the survey firm KOMKON-2 Eurasia conducted a telephone survey of 300 households in Almaty, focusing on that city because about threefourths of all the travel agencies in Kazakhstan are located there. The pollsters initially asked city residents if they were planning any tourist trips within the next six months. Seventy-eight percent of the respondents answered no, 18 percent answered yes, and 4 percent had no answer. Extrapolating the data, KOMKON-2 Eurasia concluded that 87, 926 Almaty residents were planning to undertake tourist travel over the next six months, with each trip estimated to cost on average $1,347.
60 Zinaida Rumleanscaia, Kazakhstan Completes Major Shakedown of Higher Education Institutions, 9 September 2007, American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers. 61 Evening Standard, 25 January 2007. 62 UK public school for Kazakhstan, BBC, 25 January 2007. 63 The Background Report of Kazakhstan - The Status of Preschool Education in the Republic of Kazakhstan December 2004, Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan, UNESCO Cluster Office in Almaty for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan ED/BAS/EIE/8.

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The destination of those polled is shown in the chart below: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 12: Tourist Destinations Kyrgyzstan (Issyk Kul) 26.4% Russia 15.1% The Ukraine 3.8% Turkey 18.9% Germany 9.4% UAE 5.7% France 3.8% Egypt 1.9% Italy 1.9% South Korea 1.9% Regions of Kazakhstan South Kazakhstan 11.3% North Kazakhstan 9.4% Central Kazakhstan 1.9% West Kazakhstan 1.9% The data is quite interesting, showing over one-fourth of the respondents visiting neighboring Kyrgyzstans scenic Lake Issyk Kul, with 45.3 percent of respondents opting for fellow CIS countries Kyrgyzstan, Russia and the Ukraine; an additional 24.5 percent of respondents opted to spend their vacations within Kazakhstan. In spite of this the remainder of the respondents demonstrated a remarkable wanderlust, visiting countries as far afield as Italy to South Korea.64 In February 2007 Iulia Semykina published a fascinating article in Kontinent about winter tourism from Kazakhstan. For affluent Kazakhs, the number one winter destination is the United Arab Emirates and particularly the Emirate of Dubai, despite hotel rooms ranging in price from $175 to more than $3,000 a night. As a sign of the Gulfs popularity Air Astana flies a minimum of one flight a day to the UAE and sometimes more if bookings demand it. "Jean-Arc" charters and budget flight Emirate Airlines "Air Arabia" ferry in still more Kazakhs. Other popular winter destinations for Kazakhs include Egypt (a relative bargain destination), Thailand and Indonesias Bali. Tickets for the 10-hour flight to Bali cost an average of $1,500-1,600. For Kazakhs whose wanderlust extends westwards the Dominican Republic and Cuba are increasingly popular destinations. Another up and coming destination for affluent Kazakhs is Mauritius, despite the fact that average vacation there for two costs $6-7,000. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 13: 2005 Outbound Tourist Flows from Kazakhstan by Country65 Country Number of Tourists Purpose of Visit Russian Federation 1,654,616 business, tourism and private trips China 84,963 business, tourism and private trips Turkey 60,802 tourism and business trips Germany 50,965 private and business trips U.A.E. 22,894 tourism and business trips Netherlands 16,352 business and private trips Austria 10,811 private trips United Kingdom 6,563 business and private trips ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Malaysia has been actively soliciting Kazakh tourists; in autumn 2006 Malaysias Minister for Tourism Datuk Seri Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor visited Kazakhstan on an official visit to promote his "Visit Malaysia in 2007" campaign, promising that Kazakh tourists who visit Malaysia could count on a warm welcome, especially on the island of Borneo, reached by a 15-hour flight on the Uzbek air carrier "Uzbek Havoyolari" via Tashkent and Kuala Lumpur.
64 Kazakhstanskii rynok: pynok turisma g. Almaty, 5 December 2003, Marketing Zhurnal at http:///www.4p.ru. 65 Source: Kazakhstan Embassy in the UK, at http://www.kazakhstanembassy.org.uk/cgi-bin/index/266.

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According to Semykina, few Kazakhs consider charter winter vacations to Europe because of the difficulties involved in securing Schengen visas.66 According to the Pacific Area Travel Association's Strategic Intelligence Center, international flights into Kazakhstan are showing strong international growth. Foreign travel receipts by Kazakhstan have more than doubled in six years, from $356 million in 2000 to $840 million in 2006, an average annual growth rate of more than 15 percent. Inbound air access also increasing; during the period 2000-2007, scheduled weekly seat capacity increased by more than 88 percent.67 In another measure of the increasing prosperity of the Kazakh population and its willingness to use disposable income on domestic and foreign travel, in 2007 Kazakhstan's flag carrier Air Astana reported that passenger traffic increased by 46 percent to 2.13 million people. It explained the increase was due to the carriers acquisition of two Boeing-767-300s, two Airbus A-320 and two A-321 airliners, bringing the fleets 2007 increase to 18 aircraft. In the near future Air Astana plans to an additional 15 new aircraft and has already placed a $1.7 billion order to buy six Boeing-787-8 Dreamliners and nine Airbus A- 320 passenger jets The first Airbus is slated for delivery in 2012 and the first Boeing 787-7 Dreamliner in 2016.68 Air Astana, in which Britain's BAE Systems holds a 49-percent stake, now flies direct to Western Kazakhstan and Almaty from Heathrow and Amsterdams Schipol airport. The main foreign airlines serving Almaty are Air France KLM, Lufthansa, British Air, Turkish Airlines, and Transaero. Communications, Computers & Internet For Western middle class consumers, cellular telephones, computers and the Internet have become indispensable elements of modern life. The same thing is happening in Kazakhstan. Telephone services have grown rapidly. By April 2005 four companies had been licensed to provide international and longdistance services and by January 2006 over 1,000 licenses had been issued to provide a range of telecom services. Kazakhstan now has 369 local phone companies, seven international and long distance service providers. There are four licensed mobile operators in Kazakhstan, of which two control the vast majority of the market; GSM Kazakhstan with a 45 percent market share69, Kar-Tel, dominating the market with a 47.2 percent market share 7370, and Altel with 7 percent of the Kazakh cellular market.71 In 2006 the Kazakh government moved further to develop its telecom sector with its wide-ranging Program for the Development of Telecommunications Sector in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2006-2008. The programs ambitious goals slated for implementation by the end of 2008 included increasing hardwiring the country with fixed landlines by 23 percent, increasing cellular usage by 50 percent and Internet growth by 10 percent. Under the program 80 percent of local telecommunications networks were to utilize digital equipment, with the telecommunications sectors revenues slated to provider 4-5 percent of the countrys GDP.72 The programs goals n the cellular market were quickly realized. According to Kazakhstans Statistics Agency, in mid-2006 there were 6,103,00021 mobile users in Kazakhstan, representing 39.9 percent of the population, up from 35.6 percent in December 2005.73 Cellular usage surged to almost 50 percent by early 2007.74 Kazakhstans geography makes satellite communications important, and Kazakh satellite services were given a boost following the launch of the Kazsat-1 communications satellite on June 18, 2006. Kazsat-1 has 12 Ku-band transponders with 72 MHz bandwidth and covers Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and a part of Central Russia.75 Further increasing the countrys capabilities, Kazsat-2 is scheduled for launch in 2009. In 2005 the United Nations Human Development Report 2007/2008 surveyed Kazakh access to landline telephones, cellular telephones and the internet for the period 1990-2005 and assigned the country a ranking
66 Iulia Semykina, Turizm: Zimnie kanikuly, Kontinent No. 2 (187) 31 January - 13 February 2007. 67 Strong Inbound Growth into Central Asia, Pacific Area Travel Association, News, 22 August 2007. 68 Itar-Tass, 4 February 2008. 69 Novosti at http://www.kcell.kz/ru/?l=news. 70 Novosti at http://www.beeline.kz/news/index.wbp. 71 Dobro pozhalovat na ALTEL; Glavnaia novost at http://www.altel.kz/. 72 Programma razvitiia otrasli telekommunikatsii na 2006-2008 godyat www.unescap.org/icstd/events/RW_JUNE2007/kz.pdf. 73 Chislo osnovnykh telefonnykh apparatov I uroven obespechennosti imi.xls, Agenstsvo RK po statistike. 74 2007 Asia - Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband in Central Asia at http://www.budde.com.au/buddereports/4323/2007_Asia_- _ Telecoms_Mobile_and_Broadband_in_Central_Asia.aspx?sub=EXECUTIVE. 75 Pervyi kazakhstanskii sputnk byveden na zadannuiu orbitu, 18 June 2006 at http://www.newsru.com/world/18jun2006/orb.html.

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of 73 in its HDI index. As the table below indicates, while during the period the number of landlines doubled, the growth in cellular telephones was even more dramatic, starting from 0 in 1990 and reaching 327 per 1,000 inhabitants by 2005. Table 14: Technology: Diffusion and Creation76

An important Western middle class commodity, Internet accessibility, remains largely unavailable to members of the Kazakh middle class at home, primarily because of cost. According to the United Nations 2006 International Telecommunication Union survey, in 2006 Kazakhstan had 360,000 Internet subscribers, or 2.43 per every hundred citizens, while Internet users totaled 1,247,000, or one of every 8.42 Kazakhs. Kazakhstan also had 30,500 broadband subscribers.77 Kazakhstan had 1,247,000 Internet users as of August, 2007, constituting 8.5 percent of the population,78 while the 2007 edition of the CIA World Factbook reported that Kazakhstan had 33,217 Internet hosts. Internet use has grown exponentially, as indicated in the chart below: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 15: Internet Users in Kazakhstan79 YEAR Users Population % Pen. GDP p.c.* Usage Source 2000 70,000 14,841,900 0.5 % US$ n/a ITU 2005 400,000 14,711,068 2.7 % US$ 2,930 ITU 2007 1,247,000 14,653,998 8.5 % US$ 2,930 ITU ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The 2006-2007 World Economic Forums Global Information Technology Reports Networked Readiness Index (NRI) reported that Kazakhstan dropped from the 60th place in 2005 to 2006 to the 73rd in 2006 to 2007.80 As the table below indicates, during the period 2004-2005 the number of Kazakhs accessing the Internet at home actually declined 2.2 percent, even as the free options of office usage increased 4.3 percent, school usage .8 percent, and library use 1.5 percent. In a September 2006 interview, Kazakhstans Information and Communications Agency head Askar Zhumagaliev said that the on January 1, 2006, the number of Kazakh Internet users had grown to 4 percent of the popula76 (Human Development Report 2007/2008, United Nations Development Program, [MacMillan: London], 2007.) 77 Internet Indicators: Subscribers, Users and Broadband Subscribers 2006, International Telecommunication Union @ http:// www.itu.int/ITUD/ icteye/Indicators/Indicators.aspx#. 78 Internet World Stats, Usage and Population Statistics at http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia/kz.htm. 79 Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 80 Country Details: Kazakhstan, Global Information Technology Report 2006-2007 at http://www.insead.edu/v1/gitr/wef/main/ analysis/showcountrydetails.cfm.

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tion from 2.7 percent the previous year. He ascribed the increase to a drop in Kazakhtelecom Internet connectivity prices, noting that the decline was part of a company strategy to increase the number of users. The strategy worked, as in Janury 2006 2.7 percent of the population used the Internet, but by September, 4 percent were active users.81 Table 16: Internet Access by Point of Access, 2004-200582

Internet prices remain prohibitively high for most Kazakh Internet users, however. According to Rachid Nougmanov, General Director of the International Freedom Network NGO, who in 2001 founded KUB.kz, one of the first and most popular blog services in Central Asia, reported in February, 2007, that Kazakhstans largest national ISP service provider, the state-owned Kazakhtelecom monopoly, charged their customers per minute rates equivalent to 95-$1.16 per hour.83 In addition, a customer would pay about $44 a month for basic email exchange without attachments, plus occasional web browsing, a few pages per session without file downloads, online chatting or video conferencing. An unlimited dial-up plan would cost about $120 per month, clearly an unthinkable luxury to a Kazakh earning an average monthly salary of $427 in January 2007.84 For DSL, an unlimited 1.5Mbps connection costs $3,355 a month, without the required ADSL modem, while a 6Mbps cable connection costs a prohibitive $22,032 per month. Nougmanov notes that that the 6Mbps rate is about 100 times more expensive than the price charged customers in Western Europe, even while the average monthly salary is 10 times lower in Kazakhstan. The OSCE report concludes by suggesting that the OSCE should monitor Kazakh networks to determine if the government is still filtering content and that Astana should work to "support affordable and safe hosting web sites with the national ISPs. President Nazarbayev has acknowledged the core problem concerns the Kazakhtelecom monopoly. On May 26, 2006, he stated that it was necessary to end Kazakhtelecom's monopoly over the telecommunications market, telling students at the National Eurasian University in Astana, "According to information that I have, there are already about one million Internet users in Kazakhstan. I am following this issue... The entire problem is that we have no competitive environment. We should destroy Kazakhtelecom's monopoly and introduce a competitive environment, so that the market itself will reduce prices. I think that the government must deal with this issue so that more people could use the Internet."85 National finance and banking institutions are expanding their use of the Internet. Interestingly, Kazakhstan is leading its neighbors in using the Internet to provide transparency in accounting for national resource income, as the National Bank publishes online revenue statistics about income accruing from oil sales.86 In the summer of 2000 Texakabank, Halyk Bank and Kazkommertsbank began to offer online banking for individual customers.87
81 Kusariia Ishangali, Telekom mutasii, National Business, 30 January 2007 @ http://www.profit.kz/articles/000149/. 82 Andrew Beklemishev, Kazakhstan, European Commission, 2006 at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/internationalrel/docs/pi_study_rus _ukr_arm_azerb_bel_geor_kaz_mold/8_kazakhstan.pdf. 83 Rachid Nougmanov, Internet Governance in Kazakhstan, Governing the Internet: Freedom and Regulation in the OSCE Region, The Representative on Freedom of the Media Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Vienna, 2007 at http://www. osce.org/publications/rfm/2007/07/25667_918_en.pdf. 84 Tarify na uslugi seti peredachi dannykh i dostupa k seti Internet, utverzhdaemye na respublikanskom urovne, Vvoditsia v deistvie s 1 febralia 2007 goda, CTC Almatytelecom, Almaty 2007 @ http://www.almatytelecom.kz/php1/tariffs/tariffs_PD.php.. 85 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 27 May 2006. 86 Mezhdunarodnye rezervy i aktivy Natsionalnogo Fonda Respubliki Kazakhstan, ianvar 2008 g. 7 February 2008 at http:// www.nationalbank.kz/cont/publish109341_4262.pdf. 87 Http://www.texakabank.kz; Chto takoe Internet-banking dliia iuridicheskikh lits? at http://www.halykbank.kz/business/internetbanking; Finansovyi portalhomebank.kz Eto svoboda deistvii! at http://www.kkb.kz/services/homebank.asp?mid=22..

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Three years later BTA and ATF banks also began offering the service. Most of Kazakhstans 35 banks have now implemented online banking systems for corporate customers. Diet Increasing prosperity is also having an impact on the national diet. Kazakhstans rising middle class has increased disposable income to spend on convenience foods and services, with the urban middle to higher class consumers dining out more frequently, spending up to 30 percent of their food dollars on restaurant services. Higher income consumers also tend to take an interest in foreign cuisine and are fond of imported foods: from 2001 to 2006, Kazakhstan's meat imports alone increased an annual average of 28 percent.88 Fashion Kazakh middle class fashionistas no longer need to jet to paris or Milan for the latest haute couture, as Almaty is now a major retail center, with multi-brand stores selling Prada, Chloe and Giorgio Armani products. In a bid to cut down the desire for Western couture, Designer Saida Azikhan opened her first boutique in Almaty in 2005. Azikhans spring 2007 collection was showcased during Kazakhstan Fashion Week, which began in November 2006. The event, which originated in 1999 to showcase European designers, in 2004 expanded to include Kazakh designers. By 2006 the event included 28 Kazakh designers. As disposable middle class income rises, so does the desire for more up-market fashion. According to market research firm Euromonitor International, in 2005 Kazakhs spent more than $1 billion on apparel and shoes annually, mostly on imported clothing.89 Lifestyle In yet another indication of the rising prosperity of the Kazakh middle class, in January IKEA, the worlds largest home-furnishing retailer with 273 stores in 36 countries, announce plans to invest $500 million opening its first two shopping malls in Astana and Almaty. Rising middle class affluence is also impacting furniture imports. The most expensive furniture on the Kazakh market is primarily from Italian and Spanish manufacturers, with prices for single pieces varying from $2,000 to $30,000 and more. The major Kazakh importers of Italian, Spanish and German furniture are Zhanna, Sergio, Bravo, Azimut, Ak-Niet, and Daniyar, but as demand is growing, more companies are expected to enter the market.90 Politics The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the largest investor outside the oil and gas sector in Kazakhstan, in its 2006 report, EBRD-World Bank, Life in Transition Survey, provides a revealing look at the perceptions of the emerging Kazakh middle-class. Statisticians interviewed 29,000 households scattered across 28 transition countries including Turkey. Figure 17: Satisfaction Levels with Transition91

88 89 90 91

Agri-Food Trade Synopsis, Kazakhstan, November 2007, Market Information Europe, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. For Make Fabulous Kazakhstan, New York Times, November 23, 2006. Kazakhstans Emerging Middle Class Design and Lifestyle Newsletter, March 2006, Trade Commission of Denmark, Almaty, Kazakhstan. Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/tr07p.pdf

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A generic conclusion that could apply to Kazakhstan was, Most people are strongly committed to markets and democracy but large groups are dissatisfied. More specific data on Kazakhstan is also included. The Special theme section asked the question, How has the transition affected people? and concluded, 17 years of transition have taken a tollbut more people are satisfied than dissatisfied. This is illustrated in the map above. According to the survey, 50-60 percent of Kazakhs are satisfied with life now. Interestingly, the following graph suggests a different picture, i.e., that Most people perceive a relative decline; (Views on changes in relative household wealth in 1989) Figure 18: Views on change in Relative Household Wealth Since 198992

According to this chart, while slightly more than 20 percent of Kazakhs see a relative improvement in their lives, more than 60 percent of Kazakhs surveyed felt they have experienced a relative decline in their situation since 1989. As regards the nexis between rising economic prosperity and increased political involvement by a burgeoning middle class, President Nazarbayev has persistently promoted his vision of a Kazakh indigenous middle class, as he stated during a May 2004 interview, "I was personally preoccupied with the development of small and midsized businesses because I understood that this is stratum which will give stability to both the state and the entire political system. Now we want to put together such a society, in which the top 10-15 percent will be wealthy and probably 10 - 20 percent will be poor; and between will be the middle class. Here is this middle class, which has something to lose, which does not want revolution, does not want changes in policy and laws and is a stabilizer and bulwark of the state. Understanding this, I have studied the middle class."93 The following year President Nazarbayev, speaking to participants in the conference "Kazakhstan Attracts a New Wave of Investments: Diversification and Stable Growth Strategy," cautioned his audience that Kazakhstan would selectively borrow Western values, remarking, "We ask our Western partners to abandon the idea of 100 percent transfer of Western values in their current form to Kazakhstan. We accept everything else. We can listen to friendly advice and criticism of ourselves, and, taking notice of them, make our conclusions, but we take our own characteristics into account in doing so." Nazarbayevs subsequent comments on the concept of democracy made explicit his governments belief that economic reform would produce a rising class of entrepreneurs, who would have a stake in developing a democratic system in order to guard their prosperity. In this context he remarked, "For Kazakhstan, this is not the beginning of the road but the main goal. We believe that democracy is a culture that needs to be developed, and we intend first to form a responsible electorate, which would develop smallscale businesses and a middle class."94
92 Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/tr07p.pdf 93 Dinara Sherieva, Pervyi raz v crednii klass, Ili komu v Kazakhstane budet zhit khorosho, Liter, 10 June 2004 @ http://www. liter.kz/site.php?lan=russian&id=151&pub=153. 94 Interfax Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin, 15 June 2005.

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On September 1, 2005 President Nazarbayev, during a joint Majlis session, reiterated his administration's commitment to encouraging small and medium businesses as a means of fostering the growth of a Kazakh middle class as a guarantor of stability. He told parliamentarians, The success of our economic and, particularly political programs depends on strengthening a layer of (private) owners, and I tell you about this all the time. They represent the middle class that is currently being formed. This is precisely what states with developed democracy have and this is precisely why those states are stable irrespective of elite successes. This is why I am always dealing with the development of small and medium businesses in the country and support them. We have done a lot together but this is only a start.95 A 2004 survey by Polyton, a Kazakh NGO agreed with the president on two points: first, that the Kazakh middle class is still in the process of emerging and,second, that such a class is defined not only by income but also by a particular mentality or psychology. The poll found various definitions of Kazakhstans middle class. Top officials and representatives of big business defined it as intellectuals working at state organizations. They characterized Kazakh society as divided between very rich and very poor people, with a middle class of relatively self-sufficient people. According to the poll respondents, the main defining factor of the middle class is its stable income. The specialists polled during the survey added that the establishment of a Kazakh middle class is not only connected to their living standards but includes their mindset and psychology. Respondents state that such people have a sense of responsibility for their lives, a deep sense of individualism, an understanding of the value of educational and professional standards as a guarantee of ones prosperity, and a desire to pass these values to their children. A prominent lawyer surveyed in the poll defined the burgeoning Kazakh middle class by noting, Middle class people are neither multibillionaires nor beggars. They provide their own security. The situation of a human being is to be a master of his/hes life and fate, which is shown by their activity and income.96 One of the respondents, a prominent political party leader, complained that this commitment to stability produced political passivity. He asserts that, Intellectuals who could initiate stabilitydo not do it in Kazakhstan. They follow the guidance of top officials or even beg from them, so to speak. According to the pollsters, being middle class also relates to the idea of selfgovernment. Indeed the participation of the middle classes in public life constituted an important mechanism (that will) impact on the political decision-making process of Kazakhstan. The middle class is also associated in the minds of those polled with the idea of stability in that it leads to a nation of self-managing citizens.97 Pollsters found that the Kazakh middle class was far from homogenous. Respondents indicated that it includes top officials who made their fortune with the help of corruption or abuse of their positions to enrich their own businesses, qualified and highly-paid staff that worked for Western oil and banking companies, small and medium size business owners, intellectuals, and people who own significant real estate. Experts consulted during the poll found a contradiction in the middle classs priorities and socio-economic interests, determining that few of those polled had a firm commitment to liberal values and political freedom, but rather supported changes without change, overall, they claimed, such people favor their status quo compact with the government in exchange for a guarantee of stable economic growth, all of this producing an indifference towards politics and loyalty to the political regime in return for the government guaranteeing the middle classs welfare. Business Given that post-Soviet Kazakhstan had no tradition of hereditary wealth, the fastest way to affluence was business, and it is here that many ambitious Kazakhs directed their energy. Business incubators and innovation centers (BIIC) to assist the development of small businesses were first established in Kazakhstan in 1997. Two years later the Kazakh government integrated fiscal support of business incubators into its economic program. The business incubator models included publicly financed business incubators, nongovernmental organizations and public-private partnerships. In September 2000 Kazakhstans Association of Business Incubators and Innovation Centers (KABIIC) was established in Almaty, with the goal to assist in the development of entrepreneurial infrastructure by supporting BIICs, technological parks, and other related organizations. By 2004, 43 business incubators of vari95 Kazakh Television first channel, 1 September 2005, Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 1 September 2005. 96 Dimash Alzhanov, Srednii klass v Kazakhstane, Diskussionnyi Klub Polyton 24 June 2004 at http://www.club.kz/. 97 Caspian Information Center Occasional Paper No 6 - Kazakhstans Emerging Middle Class: a Factor for Stability, November 2004.

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ous types and performances were operating in Kazakhstan. The projects were largely clustered in urban centers and received not only international assistance but also private corporate funding. In 1999 the Atyrau Business Development Center opened with financial support from Chevron and the United Nations Development Project, quickly dispersing more than $1,000,000 in loans and grants to entrepreneurs. KABIIC defined its tasks to create a single entrepreneurial infrastructure information network, reduce unemployment, disseminate information on BIICs and protect and advance the interests of KABIIC members in the government, society and other entities.98 Washington also continued to play a major role in the development of a climate conducive to business, with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assisting in opening five Enterprise Development Centers (EDC.) USAID assistance extended to the countrys educational system, as its Resource Network for Economics and Business Education (EdNet) provided Kazakh college students greater access to information and opportunities to succeed in the free market by training professors in economics and business education and providing teaching materials, research opportunities and scholarships. The U.S.-based Eurasia Foundation has also supported such work. European institutions also played a part, with the EBRD providing business loans to SMEs. Parallel to the BIIC initiatives, the Almaty Association of Entrepreneurs was founded in April 1998, with its stated mission to protect the rights of entrepreneurs and to inform and educate entrepreneurs on their legal, normative, and regulatory rights in a rapidly changing environment. The AAE showed no shyness in expressing its concerns about government policies that hindered entrepreneurial business. In early 2005 it initiated a program on Reducing Administrative Barriers to bring to the governments attention the damage the Administrative Code (drafted behind closed doors in 2001) inflicted on the nascent Kazakh business community. In a litany of complaints that could be lifted straight out of the pro-Republican U.S. business community, the AAE charged that the complexities of the Administrative Code created a stifling business environment through excessive regulation, burdensome licensing requirements, arbitrary inspections from myriad enforcement agencies, complex tax codes, a weak financial sector and poor banking practices. Setting to work with a vengeance, the AAE compiled statistical data to identify the conditions hindering entrepreneurship development with a nationwide survey of small- and medium-sized business owners, researched the Administrative Code to identify its shortcomings, organized working groups to bring together lawyers, entrepreneurs, representatives of international and local NGOs and government and parliamentary officials to identify specific clauses where the Code should be modified. The tireless AAE members drafted 253 specific legislative changes to the Administrative Code and conducted a media campaign both to raise awareness of problems in the Code and AAEs proposed solutions. Realizing the thoroughness of the AAEs efforts, Nazarbayev publicly announced his support for the AAEs proposed reforms and the Majlis took up the AAEs administrative reforms during its 2005 session.99 Not resting on its laurels, the AAE then brought together business leaders to examine legislation and business regulations, which resulted in the addition of a new Article 5 to the Law About Private Entrepreneurship providing for a mandatory period of public review for all draft regulations affecting small business interests.100 By 2006 the government was seeking input from KABIIC and Kazakh BIICs to help draft business legislation. In June 2006 at a BIIC symposium held in Shymkent specialists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology explained the application of the recently enacted law About Private Entrepreneurship, recent regulations on the establishment of public-private Expert Councils for entrepreneurial issues, and the accreditation of the entrepreneurs unions representatives. It was believed that the establishment of the Councils would move collaboration between local and national governments and entrepreneurs to a new level due to the active participation of the Councils, whose recommendations were to be sought before the Majlis passed business laws. The model for this input was the passage in January 2006 of a new law On Private Entrepreneurship, which was developed with direct input from the Kazakh entrepreneurial community.101
98 Maria Bezerra, Cristy S. Johnsrud and Ryan P. Theis, Business Incubation: Emerging Trends for Profitability and Economic Development in the U.S., Central Asia and the Middle East, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce Technology Administration, Office of Technology Policy, May 2003. 99 Associations in Action: Local Agents for Change, Economic Reform Case Study, No. 0502, 8 March 2005, Center for International Private Enterprise. 100 2006 Annual Report, Center for International Private Enterprise. 101 Biznes-inkubator Sodbi, Predprinimetleli smogut bliat na zakony, 15 June 2006 at http://www.sodbi.kz/php/modules.

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The Expert Councils soon exhibited problems, however, as many were staffed by pro-government NGOs that rarely provided negative feedback on government policies. Further hindering the work of the Expert Councils were government-imposed timetables, typically only one-three days, for submitting feedback from the business community. In a somewhat surprising reversal of urban-rural power flows, however, the Expert Councils operated more effectively in Kazakhstans more remote regions, demonstrating an impressive capacity for local self-rule. Analysts attributed this to the fact that in the more isolated areas the Councils were more likely to meet in person and debate legislation, rather than rubberstamp decisions made in Astana.102 The Kazakh BIICs also began to develop international contacts; a number of Kazakh entrepreneurs attended the 5th Annual UBICA Conference held in April 2004 in Kiev with the financial support of the InfoDev Initiative of the World Bank. There they shared their experience and ideas with Ukrainian and Belarus BIIC representatives.103 The Kazakh government now saw the nations fledgling business organizations as a valuable potential political ally in advancing larger national agendas, such as assuring Kazakhstans entry into the World Trade Organization. In January 2006 the Almaty Association of Entrepreneurs and Forum of Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan conducted a roundtable discussion on Kazakhstan's WTO accession potential and its effect on small- and mediumsized enterprises. The well attended event included representatives of 22 business associations, 34 small businesses, 4 international organizations, the Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning, the Customs Committee of the Ministry of Finance, the Department of Customs Control of Almaty, and the Institute of Economy of the Ministry of Education and Science, while the roundtable was covered by 7 TV channels, 14 newspapers, 2 magazines, and 3 internet news sites.104 Politics Parties Contend for Middle Class Support After a decade of independence the Kazakh political landscape was flourishing, with more than a dozen political parties either being established or seeking registration. While the nascent middle class did not yet constitute a plurality of the electorate, many of the new political groupings began to court it as a possible electoral base. Given that many class members were highly educated professionals, the parties focus was understandable. Of the two contenders for the middle class vote, the leading contenders were President Nazarbayevs Otan (Fatherland) party and Ak Zhol (Bright Path.) Otan, originally established in February, 1999, after the several previously independent pro-presidential parties merger, among them the People's Union of Kazakhstan Unity, the Liberal Movement of Kazakhstan, and the "For Kazakhstan - 2030" Movement had the inestimable advantage of being able to run on the governments accomplishments, which had largely lifted the standard of living of every Kazakh. Otan furthermore was able to tout stability as key to maintaining increasing prosperity, while the opposition parties were forced to offer untried political solutions, however progressive they might be. One opposition party, Atameken, would garner international visibility after being established in the autumn of 2006. Led by Yerzhan Dosmukhamedov, the party claimed that the government threw up numerous roadblocks when they attempted to register. Dosmukhamedov during a press conference on January 18, 2007, proclaimed, I would like again to emphasize that the Atameken party is pro-president. We sincerely believed in the program of democratic modernization, which the Head of State proclaimed and we want to take a direct part in its realization.105 Given the increasing international visibility of the Kazakh electoral process, Western criticism was inevitable. In March 2007 Delawares Democratic Senator Jospeh Biden wrote privately to President Nazarbayev expressing his concerns about the electoral process. While Bidens office declined to release the correspondence Dosmukhamedov provided what he said was a transcript, where Biden wrote, that he was "disap pointed . . . that Kazakhstan is not moving more quickly towards becoming a transparent democracy that enjoys full freedom of the press, recognized political parties and the other vital institutions that 15 million Kazakh citizens deserve. Moreover, I am troubled by recent reports indicating that officials
php?name=news&menu_id=0&page=1. 102 Center for International Private Enterprise Overseas Report, No. 35, Winter 2008. 103 Biznes-inkubator Sodbi, Sovmestnye shagi na puti k mezhregionalinomu sotrudnichestvy, 28 April 2004 at http://www. sodbi.kz/php/modules.php?name=news&menu_id=0&page=4. 104 Update on Key Activities, January 2006, Center for International Private Enterprise. 105 Olga Steblova, Kto podderzhit Atameken, Gazeta.kz, January 19, 2007.

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within your government have been interfering with the efforts of political parties to organize, such as in the case of the Atamekan (sic) party."106 In November, 2001, political activists who were dissatisfied with the Nazarbayev administration founded the Demokraticheskii Vybor Kazakhstana (DVK) party, which further fissured in March 2002 when members broke away and established the Ak Zhol party. One supporter claimed that this action changed society, after waking up in it new progressive democratic forces.107 Ak Zhol sought to appeal to the majority of the population, which opinion polls numbered at more than 60 percent. But one analyst argued that the majority both feared authority and did not believe it could change the prevailing political situation, numbed as it was by the endlessly repeated slogan, If youre able, get rich. The crass materialism affected everyone from traffic cops up to high-level government officials that led to increasing social dissatisfaction among the less fortunate classes as they saw the affluent enrich themselves through shady deals, producing rising class tensions that the countrys miniscule emerging middle class was powerless to alter. Ak Zhol proposed to capitalize on the thwarted fiscal expectations of Kazakhstans embryonic middle class by demanding greater political transparency, which it saw as essential to an increased standard of living. The party grew swiftly; by the end of 2002 it claimed to have as many as 65,000 members.108 The rise of Ak Zhol and its avowedly pro-business agenda subsequently caused President Nazarbayev to observe that while medium and large scale businesses were essential for the economic advancement of Kazakhstan, the business community should not interfere either directly or indirectly, through their people in power with political decisions.109 Ak Zhol co-chairman Alikhan Baimenov during an interview with Kazakhstans Vremiia in September, 2003, expounded at length on his partys platform. Following Kazakhstan's 1991 independence, Baimenov served in a number of government posts, primarily in the Labor Ministry. In 1998-1999 Baimenov headed the presidential administration and subsequently served as labor minister in 2000-2001. Baimenov said, It was possible to preserve public stability in our multinational country, to create conditions to attract enormous investments and to expand the key branches of industry and improve state institutions. Ak Zhol leadership members who many years worked and continue to work under President N. Nazarbayev's management, saw what efforts this cost and the resistance to reforms. Many of us participated in implementing reforms and therefore know the enemies of reforms rather better than ideologists who do not have practical experience. Moreover, we are proud by the fact that it is precisely in the ranks of the Ak Zhol party rather than in another party are concentrated reformist forces, who are not only in the party leadership of party but are among the rank and file. Today we number more than 112,000, to whom the fate of the country and reforms are significant. Ak Zhols program and our initiatives are directed toward strengthening our statehood and creating conditions which ensure the irreversibility of reforms. The tasks which stand before the country in the sphere of strengthening statehood and economy are enormous.110 The same month that Baimenov was expounding his party's platform, Kazakh Prime Minister Imangali Tasmagambetov, speaking to the Kazakhstan business forum in Astana, hastened to assure his audience that the government was carefully monitoring and encouraging business development, as the government believed that the rise of a prosperous middle class was the foundation of Kazakhstans future political and economic stability. He told forum members that the government was interested in instituting a constructive dialogue to develop specific governmental initiatives to support small- and medium-sized businesses.111 Altynbek Sarsenbayev joined Ak Zhol after a long career in senior Kazakh government positions, including Mayor of Almaty, Information Minister and served as Kazakh ambassador to Russia. During an October 2003 interview Sarsenbayev said, When the arduous reforms began, they were accompanied by the disruption of peoples patterns of living, leaving more than 90 percent of the population unhappy I am convinced that the strengthening of the transparency of federal expenditures will alone considerably increase the state budget and raise the peoples
106 Guy Taylor, Kazakhstan Reform Gains Advocate in Sen. Biden, World Politics Review, March 20, 2007. 107 Elena Brusilovskaia, Grustnye itogi, Gazeta Epokha, Nos. 1-2 (24), 19 January 2003 at http://www.akzhol.kz/modules.php? name=News&file=article&sid=453. 108 Novoe Pokoleniie, 15 November 2002. 109 Khabar Television, 30 March 2002. 110 Alikhan Baimenov, Nashi opponenty boiatsia konkurentsii, Vremiia.kz, 11 September 2003 at http://www.akzhol.kz/modules. php?name=News&file=article&sid=914. 111 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 18 sentiabr2002.

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standard of living. Therefore the question of democratization in this context is not so much political as it is social and economic, in light of its direct influence on the welfare of people.112 Sarsenbaev contested the December 2005 Kazakh presidential elections. On February 13, 2006, he was murdered along with two aides. Ten people were subsequently convicted of being involved in his death. At the third Ak Zhol party congress in Almaty November 2003 Bulat Abilov directed his campaign against foreign oil companies, telling delegates, We understand that only a strong middle class can ensure societys stability. Not that the large petroleum companies, offshore companies, which arrived in Kazakhstan, think about the democratization of the country. They are today a brake on democracy. Everything that they produce is exported. We do not benefit from the the products of their labor. Only owners who produce for the domestic market are interested in the fair distribution of the income of the petroleum. Only small and mid-sized businesses are interested in this! Today we must clearly say that Ak Zhol - the party of the small and mid-sized businesses, is together with us todayWe understand that only small and mid-sized businesses and a strong middle class can ensure stability in society.113 Without citing evidence, Ak Zhol also claimed that in January 2004 Astanas decision to lower tax rates was directly due to its manifesto, Proposals on tax and budgetary policy of Kazakhstan for 2003-2005. Seeking to convert its manifesto into political capital, Ak Zhol noted that the major beneficiaries of the new tax code were the middle class, which saw its rate drop from a maximum 30 percent rate to 20 percent, while wage earners making 13,785 tenge ($92.14) - 36,760 tenge ($245.72), saw their tax rate drop to 8 percent from 10 percent. Those earning 36,760 tenge ($245.72) - 183,800 tenge ($1,228.60) per month saw their rate reduce from 20 percent to 13 percent. The party further proposed reductions in health insurance as well.114 According to Sarsenbaev, Ak Zhols ambitious 2004 program included lobbying for a two-fold increase in the minimum wage and indexing it to the rate of inflation and doubling social benefits. He further argued that this program was in accord with President Nazarbayevs own Strategic plan of the development of the Republic of Kazakhstan to 2010, part of the governments plan to realize the goals set out in its Kazakhstan 2030 program. For his part, President Nazarbayev in an interview with the French weekly Le Nouvel Economiste in January 2004 touted his administrations political accomplishments, remarking, Almost half of the states budget is spent on social programs. Included are measures aimed at reducing unemployment, developing a system of micro-credit, creating additional jobs, professional training, raising qualification and retraining of the unemployed. Emphasizing Kazakhstans importance to foreign investors, President Nazarbayev added, The fact that Kazakhstans economy attracted $23.4 billion from 1993 through 2003 speaks about the countrys attractive investment climate and image. I would be remiss if I dont mention the majorcountries of origin for this investment: they are the U.S. with a share of 30.7 percent, the UK, 13.7 percent, Italy, 7,0 percent, and Switzerland with 5.7 percent. For the next 25 years, we have contracts signed with foreign investors for an overall amount of $100 billion.115 These and related arguments were broadly reinforced by the Presidents Otan party. At the time of the Majlis elections, besides the Otan party, Ak Zhol and the DVK, other contending political parties included the Agrarian Party, Asar (All Together), Auyl (Village), the Civil Party, the Communist Party, Rukhaniyat (Renaissance) and the Party of Patriots. With the exception of President Nazarbayevs Otan party and Ak Zhol however, none of the other parties specifically addressed the concerns and issues of interest to the middle class, either concentrating on regional issues of local concern (the Agrarian Party) or recycling tired ideology from the past (the Communist Party.) the only commonality that united the parties was their opposition to the current state of affairs and the Nazarbayev administration. Their arguments did not resonate with the electyorate. Ak Zhol received only 12 percent of the votes. Following the September 19, 2004, legislative elections Baimenov refused to accept the only seat the party received at
112 Vadim Boreiko, Altynbek Sarsenbaev: no porazhenia ot pobedy ty sam ne dolzhen otlichat, Vremiia.kz, 23 October 2003. 113 Bulat Abilov, My prinimaem vyzov vremenem. Vystuplenie sopredsedatelia DPK Ak zhol Bulata Abilova na III sezde parti, Epokha, No. 45 (67) 14 November 2003 at http://www.akzhol.kz/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=115, Interfax- Kazakhstan, 9 November 2003. 114 Berik Temirbayev, Spasibo Ak zholy!, Gazeta Epokha, No. 1 (73), 9 January 2004 at http://www.akzhol.kz/modules.php? name=News&file=article&sid=1538. 115 Democracy, With Traditional Values, Kazakhstans Echo, 12 February 2004, No. 7.

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the 77 member Majlis until October 2006 when he reversed his position and joined parliament as the only deputy of an opposition party. Inevitably, opposition groups contested the 2004 elections. But while the OSCE and other serious monitors considered them flawed, they acknowledged improvements over previous votes. Brushing this aside, the opposition and part of the Western media worked to present the conflict as a struggle between a valiant Western-style and prodemocratic opposition and an authoritarian government that was secretly maneuvering to cut back its own reforms. Far more likely, though, is the more obvious conclusion that most of Kazakhstans voters were pleased with their lives. Like President Reagan in the U.S. President Nazarbayev could ask the average Kazakh, Are you better off than you were 10 years ago, to which the majority of the population, notably including the rapidly expanding middle class, answered a resounding yes. The August 2007 Majlis Elections In the August 18, 2007 Majlis elections President Nazarbayev's Nur-Otan party won all 98 available seats. Dampening the hopes of the opposition parties was a new requirement to win seven percent of the popular vote, a two percent increase from the previous electoral requirement in order to qualify for parliamentary representation. Further dampening the oppositions prospects, on June 18 the Majlis approved an amendment to the electoral law that prohibited parties from forming blocs shortly after the Nagyz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path) and Nationwide Social Democratic Party (OSDP) opposition parties announced their intentions to form an electoral bloc to contest parliamentary elections. They could still have merged to reach the seven percent floor but for whatever reason chose not to do so. For many Western observers the election was a foregone conclusion. The OSDP, the most successful opposition party, received 4.5 percent of the vote. The Atameken opposition party, claiming to represent Kazakhstan's entrepreneurs and the countrys rising middle class, failed to gain registration. Internecine squabbling tarnished the partys image, as well as the fact that its founder, Yerzhan Dosmukhamedov, lives abroad.116 The opposition complained that it had limited access to the nations 31 TV channels, which severely limited their chances to reach the electorate. Going into the elections the main opposition parties had some self-inflicted public relations image problems to overcome. Following Ukraines December 2005 Orange Revolution the leaders of Kazakhstans three main opposition parties in Kazakhstan - Ak-Zhol, the nearly moribund Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) - rushed to Kiev to express solidarity with Presidential incumbent Viktor Yuschenko, with the DCKs newspaper Azat trumpeting the headline, Georgia Yesterday, Ukraine Today, Kazakhstan Tomorrow?117 For Kazakh middle class voters, such sentiments seemed directly to threaten their new sense of fiscal stability. In contrast, President Nazarbayev had consistently stressed stability, saying in late 2004 that, A forced modernization of social and political systems could have destabilized society and the state.118 Ak Zhol party leader Alikhan Baimenov countered, We are faced with the challenges of globalization, and if we want Kazakhstan to be competitive economically, we must have political competition inside the country. Prior to the August 2007 presidential election Kairat Kelimbetov, Director of the Kazyna Fund for Sustainable Development and former Minister of Economy and Budget Planning, insisted that President Nazarbayevs progressive fiscal policies would translate into political support at the ballot box. The Kazyna Fund was established in April 2006 to spur investment in Kazakhstans non-hydrocarbon industrial sector and now has capital assets of over $1 billion. In response to a question about Nazarbayevs controversial constitutional initiatives Kelimbetov replied that fifteen years earlier Nazarbayev had created private property institutions while downplaying market mechanisms During the intervening 15 years, Kazakhstan began to form a propertied class, a new middle class, and in each social strata appeared the possibility to declare its aspirations and interests, including its political concerns. In response, the President began to accelerate democratization. Kelimbetov concluded that Kazakhstan's growing middle class strongly supported the president's policies and that furthermore, President Nazarbayevs Nur Otan party had an 80 percent base of popular support.119
116 Political forces, The Economist, 27 September, 2007. 117 Caspian Information Center Occasional Paper No. 9 - Failing Democracy: How the Kazakh Opposition Endangers Reform, April 2005. 118 Arkady Ostrovsky, Politics: Pressure for reform is growing, Financial Times, 15 December 2004. 119 Proprezidentskie sily rasschityvaiut na podavliaiushchee bolshinstvo v novom parlamente Kazakhstana, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, No. 165, 01 August 2007.

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Subsequent events proved Kelimbetovs estimates to be low. Observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe were skeptical, however, commenting that while the election again showed improvements, "in over 40 percent of the polling stations visited, (vote counting) was described as bad or very bad." Even accepting a measure of such criticism, the Majlis elections seem in fact to imply that Kazakhstans emergent middle class in fact largely supports Nazarbayevs policies and goals, which have delivered broadly based rising economic prosperity, and are unwilling at this point to jeopardize the countrys current stability and economic advancement by supporting untried radical alternatives. In this respect Kazakhstans current political evolution emulates India and Japan, where a single party or faction has usually dominated, retaining power for decades after the country emerged from a long period of authoritarian rule and despite the introduction of relatively unfettered, competitive elections. Ironically, Nazarbayev may also be benefiting from Kazakhstans Soviet experience, which inculcated respect for strong leaders, a legacy that persists in most CIS countries. In turn President Nazarbayev understood that the support of Kazakhstans rising middle class is essential to cementing his reputation as the founding father of independent and modern Kazakhstan. So often has he referred to the stabilizing influence of a middle class and its role as the repository of certain virtues that it is impossible to dismiss it as mere rhetoric. During one interview Nazarbayev succinctly summed up his policy, saying, We are consistently moving toward an open society according to the basic principle: economy first, politics second.120 In the same spirit, in 1998, he asserted, First and foremost, the state must represent the interests of the middle class.121 Some political scientists divide the opposition between those who would seem to change the direction of the existing government and those who would like immediately to replace it. The former contests the government but does not want to come to power. The objectives of the moderate and loyal opposition include partial reforming of the system, without touching the issue of presidential powers, with reforms to be carried out by the initiative of the government itself. The latter opposition, in contrast, is for immediate and maximal democratization of society and the political system. In his study, Regime maintenance in post-Soviet Kazakhstan: the case of the regime and oil industry relationship (1991-2005), Wojciech Ostrowski argued that even before the rise of Ak Zhol the Nazarbayev administration, despite being relatively secure, worked persistently to co-opt the Kazakh business and middle classes, that what appeared at the time to analysts to be a short-term rapprochement with Kazakhstans rising middle class was actually part and parcel of a larger strategy intended to replace patrimonial-based relationships with more formal relationships in an effort to do assure the regimes longterm stability.122 Figure 19: Support for Democracy versus Authoritarianism123

120 Le Nouvel Economiste, 23 January 2004. 121 Kazakhstans Emerging Middle Class: a Factor for Stability, CIC Occasional Paper No. 6, November 2004. 122 Wojciech Ostrowski, Regime maintenance in post-Soviet Kazakhstan: the case of the regime and oil industry relationship (19912005), Ph.D. dissertation, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, June 2007. 123 Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/tr07p.pdf

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A clue to the recent thinking of the Kazakh population on the nations political evolution is contained in a report issued last year by the EBRD. The statistics suggest that Kazakhs have decisively broken with their Soviet past. According to the findings below, slightly over 20 percent of Kazakhs support authoritarianism, while nearly 80 percent favor democracy.124 By contrast, almost half of those polled in Russia supported authoritarian rule. Kazakhstans Continuing Financial Success President Nazarbayev can be said to have applied former U.S. Bill Clintons dictum, its the econ omy, stupid. His administrations careful attention to the national economy indicates a prudent stewardship that has impressed virtually all Western financial institutions, even hard-bitten IMF specialists, who wrote last year, A remarkable transformation of Kazakhstans economy has taken place over the past decade. The country has implemented prudent macroeconomic policies and greatly expanded its oil production capacity. Aided by the surge in world oil prices and global liquidity expansion, this has led to impressive macroeconomic achievements.125 Four years earlier, the IMF had put its seal of approval on Kazakhstans economic reforms, announcing on March 11, 2003, that, the IMF resident representative in Kazakhstan will not be replaced when his term ends in August 2003. The decision to do this results from the impressive achievements made in stabilizing the economy, the extremely favorable mediumand long-term economic outlook for Kazakhstan, and the very low probability that the country will need to borrow from the Fund in the future.126 The IMF noted that since 2000 Kazakhstans real GDP growth has been about 10 percent or more annually, resulting in a 500 percent increase in per capita GDP in dollar terms, even as the percentage of the Kazakh population living in poverty declined from an estimated 35 percent to 10 percent (Figure 22). During the same period the ratio of bank deposits to GDP almost tripled to 30 percent. Kazakhstans GDP per capita, measured in purchasing power parity, is nearly twice that of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, and four times that of Tajikistan. Figure 20: Income and Poverty127

Table 23 below places Kazakhstans GDP growth over the last decade in the context of its oil-exporting colleagues; for the period, Kazakhstans GDP growth rate even exceed Russias; of the former Soviet republics, only Azerbaijan produced a greater annual percentage growth in GDP.
124 EBRD Transition Report 2007; Office of the Chief Economist at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/tr07p.pdf. 125 World Economic and Financial Surveys: Regional Economic Outlook - Middle East and Central Asia, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2007. 126 Press Release No. 03/33, March 11, 2003, Statement by IMF Mission to the Republic of Kazakhstan, International Monetary Fund at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2003/pr0333.htm. 127 Source: World Economic and Financial Surveys: Regional Economic Outlook - Middle East and Central Asia, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2007, p.26.)

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Table 21: Real GDP Growth128

Table 24 places Kazakhstans GDP growth in the larger context of Middle East and Central Asian oil exporters Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iran and Iraq; for the period 1998-2008 (est.), the group achieved a 278 percent increase; in contrast, Kazakhstans growth during the same period was 535 percent, a 192 percent increase. Table 22: Nominal GDP129

Figure 23: Kazakhstan: Two Transitions, 1990-2004130

128 Source: World Economic and Financial Surveys: Regional Economic Outlook Middle East and Central Asia, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2007., p. 52 129 Source: World Economic and Financial Surveys: Regional Economic Outlook Middle East and Central Asia, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2007, p. 53. 130 Source: Republic of Kazakhstan: GETTING Competitive, STAYING Competitive: The Challenge of Managing Kazakhstans Oil Boom, Joint Economic Research Program of the World Bank and Kazakhstans Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning, March 20, 2005.

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As Figure 25 above shows, Kazakhstans economy in the immediate post- Soviet period slowly declined, bottoming out until approximately 1995, when it remained level for several years until 1998-1999 when it dipped slightly further, most likely as a combined result of low oil prices and Russias 1998 fiscal crisis, as Russia was Kazakhstans largest trading partner. Since then, Kazakhstans economy has enjoyed sustained growth, as Figure 3 below shows. Figure 24: Kazakhstan Real GDP Growth, 1997-2005 (% Change over Previous Period)131

By 2003 Kazakhstan had an estimated 490,000 small and medium-sized businesses.132 Three years later Kazakhstans Statistics Agency reported 823,156 small business entities as registered. Many of them apparently existed only on paper however, as only 48,739 were active. While the number of small businesses during 2006 grew by 22.7 percent, the number of actively operating small business entities remains small, primarily because of a lack of knowledge and experience in creating new businesses. Still, there have been gains: in 2006 the share of small business (small business and households) in Kazakhstans GDP was 35.2 percent. Small enterprises are heavily skewed towards the urban centers, with Almaty containing 35 percent of the total, followed by Astana with 9.1 percent and the South Kazakhstan region also registering 9.1 percent. From the Present to the Future Banks, Domestic And Foreign Today Kazakhstans banking sector epitomizes the countrys decisive economic break with its Communist past. While in other post-soviet republics the state only slowly relinquished control over the national fiscal sector, Kazakhstan moved quickly to reform its financial structure and adopt Western banking practices, shrewdly anticipating that such a move would entice foreign investment. When Kazkommertsbank started up in 1990 in the shadow of the imminent demise of the USSR, its $1 million in assets was dwarfed by the state-controlled savings bank. By now it has grown into the biggest bank in Kazakhstan with $4 billion in assets and $400 million in capitalization. With its shares listed in London and Frankfurt exchanges, it now issues investment grade international bonds. Furthermore, it has recently acquired a small bank in Moscow to facilitate Kazakh business in Russia. Nipping at its heels is the Halyk Bank, privatized in 2004. The banking systems growth has been facilitated by governmental reforms, which privatized all its banks while requiring the newly independent banks to adhere to international banking standards, including the riskweighted eight percent capital-adequacy ratio set by the Bank for International Settlements. Further governmental legislation required financial institutions to disclose shareholder information and to publish audited accounts. The fallout from the consolidation process has pared Kazakh banks to 35 in 2005 from 200 in the early 1990s, with the
131 Republic of Kazakhstan: GETTING Competitive, STAYING Competitive: The Challenge of Managing Kazakhstans Oil Boom, Joint Economic Research Program of the World Bank and Kazakhstans Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning, March 20, 2005. 132 Interfax-Kazakhstan 31 October 2003.

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three emerging giants Kazkommertsbank, Halyk Bank and Turam-Alem Bank together accounting for two-thirds of Kazakhstans market. In 2000 the National Bank introduced deposit insurance to boost the confidence in the banking sector, which saw banking deposits during the next four years increase 600 percent to $7.5 billion, pushing the ratio of deposits to GDP from 11.3 to 21 percent.133 The same year that the National Bank introduced deposit insurance Kazakh banks began lending mortgages and Turam-Alem Bank established its BTA Ipoteka subsidiary exclusively for that purpose. The untapped market grew rapidly and by 2004 the market was tripling in size annually. Up to 2005 Turam-Alem Banks subsidiary BTA Ipoteka was the countrys sole specialized mortgage bank, and that year received a $10 million loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, repayable for 10 years. Financial analysts predict that the Kazakh mortgage market will reach $1.5 billion in 2008, with 30 percent of house purchases financed with mortgage loans. Specialists attributing the increase to government and national bank support, a good regulatory environment, a new government mortgage insurance company and a housing construction development program. In the interim BTA Ipoteka has become one of Kazakhstans four biggest mortgage providers, seeing its portfolio grew from $12.2 million in 2002 to $160 million by early 2005. BTA Ipoteka is seeking to expand its market share to around 27 percent by expanding geographically by making at least half of its loans outside Almaty and Astana and by developing additional financial products.134 Kazakh banks are deeply involved in Kazakhstan's surging property market, with about 70 percent of loans reportedly directly or indirectly connected to real estate.135 Further enticing Kazakh consumers has been the 2006 decrease of the interest rates charged by commercial banks which dropped from 30 percent to 12-14 percent. In an additional benefit to small and medium enterprise (SME) entrepreneurs, at the same time 10 percent annual rate loans became available through the Small Business Development Fund, a governmental source of finance established specifically to further SME development. Analysts believe that rising competition in the banking sector will further drive down interest rates to 6-8 percent. Loan repayment schedules have been broadened to five years. Another factor encouraging SMEs is that previously loan guarantees were required to be twice the size of the loan, but were changed to require only 20 percent of the money be covered by a deposit and 80 percent of the loan sum as acquired fixed assets.136 Such innovations in the countrys banking sector resulted in its rise on a World Bank index evaluating access to financial resources from the 117th to the 48th position. As the table below shows, the net result of falling interest rates to the Kazakh middle class was to insure its access to credit: Table 25: Short-Term Interest Rates and Credit to the Non-Government Sector in Selected CIS Economies, 2002-2004137

133 Arkady Ostrovsky, Banking: raising the standards drives consolidation, Financial Times, 15 December 2004. 134 Kazakh home-buyers get new loan options, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development press release 28 February 2005. 135 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Kazakhstan: Global Financial Turmoil Hits Credit Rating, RFE/RL, 13 October 2007. 136 The Country of Kazakhstan - Barriers of Entrepreneurship and Support for Entrepreneurship, European Economic Commission, June 18-19, 2007, Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 137 Source: National statistics and direct communications from national statistical offices to the UNECE secretariat; IMF, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.), various issues. Note: Definition of interest rates: Credits Kazakhstan: weighted average interest rates for new credits. Deposits Kazakhstan: weighted average interest rate (for new deposits.) The real deposit rates are the nominal rates discounted by the average rate of increase in the CPI for the corresponding period. a Total outstanding claims of commercial banks on the non-government sector. GDP data for 2004 are preliminary estimates. b January-September; for Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: January-August. c January-September; for Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: January- June

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In another benefit to the countrys rising business class, Kazakhstan has begun to lower taxes. Currently SMEs pay a value added tax (VAT) assessed at 14 percent of taxable income, a corporate tax of 30 percent of taxable profits and a 20-22 percent salary social tax, with the share of taxes on gross profit amounting to 40 percent. Beginning in 2008 the VAT will be reduced to 13 percent, and in 2009 to 12 percent. Tax reform has also occurred in the personal sphere; while earlier Kazakhstan had a progressive individual income tax scale, a flat 10 percent income tax has been introduced.138 While no sector of Kazakhstan's economy is currently off-limits to foreign investment, outside funding in the banking sector is capped.139 Several Kazakh banks including Kazkommerts, Halyk Bank, and Alliance Bank are listed on the London Stock Exchange, as are KazMunaiGas and KazMyz, the copper company. In 1998 Citigroup, the worlds largest provider of financial services, with assets exceeding $700 billion, and with a presence in 102 countries, decided to enter the Kazakh market, establishing Citibank Kazakhstan, a fully licensed commercial bank in Almaty. Citibank representative Reza Ghaffari stated, Citibank is proud to play a part in building a stable economy for Kazakhstan. Citibank Kazakhstan is a fully owned subsidiary of Citibank, Citigroups banking arm. Foreign investment banks are also eyeing the lucrative Kazakh mortgage market. Kazakh Finance Minister Bolat Zhamishev said on February 1 during a meeting with businessmen from United Arab Emirates, "Our partners - Dubai International Capital - are interested in setting up a mortgage bank. The possibility of setting up (a mortgage bank) on the basis of the Kazakh Mortgage Company was suggested as an alternative." Owned by the Finance Ministry, the Kazakh Mortgage Company was established in December 2000 as part of a government housing program and is acquiring the rights to issue long-term mortgage loans, raise capital for mortgage loans and issue mortgage bonds, which boomed after the introduction of mortgages in the early 2000s.140 As a result of eased and inexpensive credit options the Kazakh real estate industry quickly expanding, especially in the more affluent urban areas of Astana and Almaty. Almaty residents have been particularly active and currently hold almost half of all outstanding mortgages in Kazakhstan. Since 2005 the market began to overheat. As unregulated speculation took hold the unprecedented growth of real estate prices began to marginalize potential middle-class homebuyers. The Kazakh middle class also now have access to one of the ultimate icons of the middle class lifestyle, as last September American Express partnered with Kazkommertsbank to launch of the American Express Gold and Platinum Cards, available in tenge or dollar denominations. American Express Vice President and General Manager Debra Davies said, "We are extremely proud to partner with Kazkommertsbank to offer these innovative card products in the Kazakhstani (sic) market. The financial and lifestyle needs of consumers in this market have been evolving rapidly in recent years, and these American Express Cards are deigned to meet the needs of Kazakhstani consumers when they are shopping at home or traveling abroad." The American Express concession is not a first for Kazkommertsbank, which already issue both VISA and Europay/Mastercard credit and debit cards, giving access to the Cirrus/Maestro system, as well as regular American Express and Diners Club cards. As at 31 December 2005, Kazkommertsbank had issued 615,000 cards. Other innovative Kazkommertsbank services for its customers include an automatic teller machine ("ATM") network with 381 ATMs and 2664 point-of-sale terminals.141 Not all specialists are convinced that current government policies will foster the growth of a Kazakh indigenous middle class. In a July 2006 interview Kanat Berentaev, director of Kazakhstans Center for the Analysis of Social Problems said, A middle class cannot be created simply by simplifying (tax) regimes; the middle class is composed of civil servants of average means teachers, doctors. Up to now they have not had a normal wage level and the issue will not be decided like the problems of small business. Meanwhile, the wage aspirations of the population remain low. What is necessary is a minimum-wage law whose level would exceed the living level 1.5-2 times, taking into account the familial coefficient. Measures must be taken in the sphere of social policy, particularly in the realm of the salary of hired workers.142
138 Ibid. 139 CIC Special Briefing - Kazakhstans economy: The Transition to the Free Market. 140 Itar-Tass, 1 February 2008. 141 American Express and JSC Kazkommertsbank launch the first American Express issued in Kazakhstan, Almaty, September 18, 2007 at http://home3.americanexpress.com/corp/pc/2007/kaz.asp. 142 Aigul Kisykbasova, Nichevo na LICHNOGO, Liter, 13 July 2006.

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Growing Pains for the Economy that Supports the Middle Class The risks of easy credit and increasing social fiscal obligations were foreseen several years ago. In November 2004 a joint Kazakhstan-World Bank assessment report stated that while Kazakhstan has made commendable progress in a short period of time in developing its banking sector, securities markets and the related pension system Today, however, the financial sector stands at a key crossroads: the sectors competitiveness and to some extent the commendable past accomplishments-- are being threatened by growing financial sector vulnerabilities related to the fast pace of the sectors expansion, borrowings abroad, the concentrated nature of the non-oil economy (including the existence of conglomerates), and bottlenecks and imbalances in the pace of development of the various components of the financial sector architecture (e.g., pension assets.) The report concluded by recommending the adoption of a package of measures to slow down the pace of credit growth and banking sector expansion.143 Despite the impressive accomplishments of the Kazakh economy, a March 2005 World Bank report further cautioned that while the country had swiftly instituted banking supervision systems and commercial banks strove to improve risks management systems, the rapidly rising availability of credit posed a potential threat to the country's economic well-being, even as credit in private expenditure underlay a significant portion of the expansion of nonoil GDP. In early 2005 World Bank economists estimated bank credits to stand at about 40 percent in real terms. This raised doubts about the countrys financial sector as the credit boom stimulated a sharp rise in expenditure, which poses a significant risk to sectors such as real estate. Furthermore, much of this credit boom was financed by foreign borrowing, increasing the possibility of significant exposure to foreign exchange risk. If the foreign loans were suddenly converted to local transactions in Tenge, banks would face huge potential losses, as the value of their assets would decline relative to that of their liabilities.144 In the summer of 2006 overdependence on oil revenue caused Kazakhstan's Deputy Prime Minister Karim Massimov to caution, "With the high price of oil, it's easy to become lazy. We have to manage to survive even we had no oil."145 According to the IMF, Kazakhstan initially was largely able to ride out the fiscal turmoil that began to roil the U.S. beginning in August 2006, reporting, The recent global credit market turmoil has so far left the regions capital markets largely unscathed. Following the sharp equity market correction in 2006, most markets have stabilized or partially recovered their losses. The pace of initial public offerings (IPOs) has eased, but sukuk (Islamic bonds) issuance continues to grow. Signs of stress have been evident in a tightening of liquidity and a widening of bond spreads of banks that have borrowed heavily from abroad, notably in Kazakhstan.146 The financial crisis in the United States sub-prime credit market did impact some banks in Kazakhstan, however, which found it more expensive to raise funds, increasing their rollover risk from external borrowing. The countrys rising oil revenues saw Kazakhstans ratio of private credit to GDP continue to rise, which helped to finance middle class investments in real estate and consumer goods. Despite such notes of caution, in its July 2007 emerging markets report, PriceWaterhouseCooper was optimistic about Kazakhstans future, ranking it 9th overall in manufacturing and services out of 20 emerging markets, with a rank of 14 (index 82) in manufacturing and 9th in services (index rating - 32.) The report advocated that its targeted emerging markets might well provide better returns than other, more traditional investor emerging markets, noting, When seeking the optimal investment destination, the result of the PwC EM20 Index illustrates the value of locations beyond the traditional BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). When risk (which includes a wide range of macroeconomic factors) is taken into account, better potential rewards may well be available elsewhere.
143 Quick response note on priorities for financial sector reform selected issues and options - Preliminary Assessment - Republic of Kazakhstan and the World Bank Joint Economic Research Program, 12 November 2004. 144 Republic of Kazakhstan: Getting Competitive, Staying Competitive: The Challenge of Managing Kazakhstans Oil Boom, Joint Economic Research Program of the World Bank and Kazakhstans Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning, March 20, 2005. 145 Almaty Journal: Up, Up and Away: New Towers, and Ambitions to Match, New York Times, 22 June 2006. 146 World Economic and Financial Surveys: Regional Economic Outlook - Middle East and Central Asia, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2007.

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Table 26 PWC EM20 Manufacturing and Services Indices -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Manufacturing Services Rank Index Country Index Country 1 95 Vietnam 95 UAE 2 95 China 70 Saudi Arabia 3 94 Poland 61 South Korea 4 93 Chile 56 Czech Republic 5 93 Malaysia 55 Hungary 6 91 Thailand 54 Poland 7 89 India 39 Russia 8 90 South Africa 36 Chile 9 89 Hungary 32 Kazakhstan 10 88 Audi Arabia 32 Malaysia 11 86 Russia 29 Mexico 12 86 Brazil 22 Brazil 13 85 Indonesia 20 South Africa 14 82 Kazakhstan 17 China 15 80 Mexico 17 Thailand 16 75 Turkey 16 Turkey 17 64 Czech Republic 5 Vitenam 18 62 Argentina 5 India 19 42 South Korea 5 Indonesia 20 26 UAE 5 Argentina --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The report noted, The markets ranked from 6th to 10th (Poland, Russia, Chile, Kazakhstan and Malaysia) are all middle-income countries The remaining EM20 markets, Kazakhstan (14th) and Hungary (9th), both offer relatively high rewards. As medium risk countries, they rank in the middle of the index.147 The impact from the U.S. sub-prime credit market financial crisis came in August 2007. Between August 31, 2007, and February 8, 2008, the tenge dropped from 126.5 to the dollar to 120.24, losing 5 percent of its value.148 On October 8, 2007, Standard and Poor's ratings agency downgraded Kazakhstans sovereign credit rating to BBB-, citing as the reason for the downgrade an unacceptably high rate of borrowing by Kazakh banks, signs of an economic slowdown and the impact of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis. S&P sovereign-ratings analyst Ben Faulks told RFE/RL, "Kazakhstan's case is arguably more extreme than most. What you have had in Kazakhstan is that the rate of increase of the borrowing of the banks has been really exceptionally fast - much faster than in most countries. We have taken this step of moving Kazakhstan down by one rating but we still keep it within the 'investment' grade. In other words, we still consider it a solid country from the point of view of commercial debt repayment and we have a stable outlook, so we expect the difficulties to be managed." Even before the sub-prime crisis fully developed, Kazakh authorities showed a surprising speed and flexibility in responding to the challenges by adjusting their policies. Beginning in mid-2006 monetary policy was tightened, with more wide-ranging and higher reserve requirements and increased policy interest rates, while the tenge was allowed to appreciate significantly. In order to mitigate risks to the countrys banking sector, new regulations were introduced, including rules on loan-loss provisioning, asset classification, bank liquidity, and capital-related limits on banks external borrowing, as in Since mid-2007, the sharp decrease in capital inflows to Kazakhstan because of the financial turmoil in global markets saw Kazakh fiscal authorities introduce tighter liquidity conditions. Given the governments strong measures, reaction to the S&P downgrade was swift; Kazakhstan's central bank issued a statement noting, "The National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan has...the necessary means and resources at its disposal and is also ready to undertake all necessary measures to maintain financial stability,"
147 Emerging markets: Balancing risk & reward, July 2007, The PricewaterhouseCoopers EM20 Index. 148 Historical exchange rates between the Kazakhstan Tenge (KZT) and the US Dollar (USD) between 12 August 2007 and 9 February 2008 at http://www.exchangerates. org/history/KZT/USD/G.

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while on October 12 President Nazarbayev stated that he had ordered the government to investigate buying back shares of the publicly traded Kazakh Kazkommertsbannk, Alliance and Halyk Savings Bank and crticized the S&P action as "unfounded," commenting that the agency had acted "without taking into consideration at all the level of Kazakhstan's economic development." The government had earlier taken action to assist Kazakh banks, having since July making more than $10 billion available in emergency finance for financial institutions.149 Prime Minister Karim Masimov said, "Kazakhstan is under attack from hedge funds and we will fight back," as the government announced that it would buy stock of banks until prices reach "pre-August levels" and will do the same for nonbanking stocks "if warranted," while preparing to lend $4 billion to the beleaguered banks to ensure liquidity.150 Masimovs concerns were well founded, as two months previously the banks had suffered "massive withdrawals." The downturn and a lack of global liquidity forced Kazakh banks to tighten credit standards and raise interest rate, which abruptly ended the speculative demand-driven real estate market; since June 2007, the price of one square meter on Almatys real estate market fell nearly 25 percent from a price of nearly $4,000. The credit squeeze isolated Kazakh middle class homebuyers and amateur speculators playing the market from funding as mortgage rates quickly doubled and even tripled. The situation was aggravated by the construction sectors ongoing dependence on easy bank credit to continue operations; the vanishing of easy credit stranded construction companies without the resources to finish projects in early stages of construction or start new ones. The silver lining for Kazakhstan in the global credit crisis is that it ended the giddy exuberance of the Kazakh property market before it caused more damage on Kazakhstans developing financial system, as the Kazakh government quickly stepped in to allocate funds to the largest builders and banks affected by the crisis, stabilizing the market and calming investors.151 In the end, the interests of Kazakhstans emerging middle class appear secure. Western fiscal analysts have belatedly acknowledged that Astanas cautious fiscal policies have been a stabilizing force. On February 6 Western analytical firm Fitch Ratings commented in a special report that the institutional structure of Kazakhstan sub-nationals have in fact proven their viability since they were amended in 2005, demonstrating gradual decentralization and shielding the economy against risk. Fitch's International Public Finance Associate Director Vladimir Redkin observed, "A centralized system of control and limited borrowing possibilities have increased the budget sustainability of Kazakhstan sub-nationals during periods of vulnerability." While acknowledging that Kazakh governmental caution had in fact shielded the economy, Redkin still advocated further reform, saying, "Greater decentralization is needed to achieve stable long-term economic development, and recent legislation changes in regional borrowing procedures could be viewed as the first step in that direction."152 The fiscal turmoil roiling the global markets on February 6 led President Nazarbayev in his annual state of the nation address to the Majlis to direct government officials to curb all but social expenditures, saying, "The government should temporarily, until problems in the financial sector are settled, reduce expenditures in all spheres and programs, except social ones. Everything that can wait, without which we can live one-two years, should be suspended - maybe roads, construction and something else," as such actions "will facilitate the lowering of the inflation and will further increase the country's reserves in case of a fall in prices for energy and raw material resources, which also may take place."153 Seeking to ally the fears of the countrys pensioners living on fixed incomes President Nazarbayev went on to say that "The new three-year budget should by 2012 ensure the increase of the average retirement pensions 2.5 times, compared with 2007, including in 2009 and 2010 - by 25 percent and in 2011 - by 30 percent by 2011 the size of the basic pension payments should increase to 50 percent of the minimum subsistence level," adding that beginning in 2009 state social and special allowances will increase annually by nine percent, while in 2010-2011 child care allowances for children under one year old will increase 250 percent over their 2007 level. President Nazarbayev concluded by telling his listeners that in 2009 the wages of employees of state-financed organizations will increase 25 percent, in 2010 - by 25 percent and in 2011 - by 30 percent.154
149 The Financial Times, 13 October 2007. 150 David Litterick, Angry Kazakhstan props up bank shares, The Daily Telegraph, 13 October 2007. 151 Lessons from Kazakhstans real estate crisis, Silk Road Intelligencer, 1 February 2008. 152 Interfax, 6 February 2008. 153 Itar-Tass, Almaty LITER, 6 February 2008. 154 Itar-Tass, 6 February 2008.

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The speech also contained clear indications that President Nazarbayev seeks to involve the middle class in the country's political development: Political parties, NGOs and other civil society institutions should play a more prominent role in developing an up-to-date political system in Kazakhstan, which would integrate universally recognized principles of democratic development and the values of our society.155 Foreign investors focused on President Nazarbayevs comments about the countrys energy resources: "The main direction in the oil and gas sector is to strengthen the positions of the state as an influential and responsible participant in international oil energy markets. For that we are consistently strengthening state influence in the strategically important energy areas state stakes in existing mining and metals companies must be sorted out and the actual management of them must begin; we must take up the rights of license holders to explored deposits of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, including rare-earth metals, which we have stopped doing in recent times." In an unsubtle allusion to earlier contracts he said, some owners of the resources are sitting there and doing nothing, simply awaiting the time when they will get paid 10 times more. I have ordered the government to check whether the responsibilities (for development of the fields) are being violated and, if so, to take them and return them to the state."156 President Nazarbayev also laid out a multi-tiered foreign policy agenda which, while underlining the need further to strengthen cooperation with Russia, China, and the states of Central Asia, stating that Kazakhstan would expand its cooperation with the U.S., the EU, and NATO. Indeed, Kazakhstan had already drawn up a "Path to Europe" program, which the World Bank immediately endorsed.157 Underlining Kazakhstans relative fiscal stability, the Kazakh banking sector is now seeking an international role beyond the countrys borders. On February 5, Halyk Banks managing board chairman Grigorii Marchenko said at a press conference in Almaty that his institution is investigating the possibility later this year of raising Islamic financing and placing bonds on Asian markets. Marchenko told reporters, "We are looking at one option, entering the Islamic bond market, the so-called sukuk market, and a second variant, entering the Asian bond market with socalled samurai-bonds, which are issued in Japan in yen and kimchi bonds, issued in South Korea in won. Money is now available, primarily in East Asia and the Persian Gulf states, therefore, major Western banks with great pleasure are selling their share stakes to investors based in these regions. If it becomes too expensive to borrow money in London and New York, then it could be found in Hong Kong, Singapore, Dubai or Bahrain." The net inflow of foreign banking capital continues apace, with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2007 total business volume in Kazakhstan reaching $4.7 billion, with 73 percent being invested in the private sector. Marchenko did not say how much would be raised, saying only that plans are "still preliminary." In June 2007, according to the Interfax-1000: CIS Banks ranking prepared by the Interfax's Center for Economic Analysis Halyk Bank was rated 13th by assets among the CIS banks and 4th among the Kazakh commercial banks.158 The same report ranked Kazkommertsbank as the fourth largest in the CIS and the biggest bank in Kazakhstan.159 More recently, in a Euromoney corporate governance survey of 146 companies Halyk Bank was deemed "A Leading Bank in Corporate Governance in Emerging Europe." Euromoney Director for CEE, Russia and CIS Martin Born said, "The banks that received Euromoney's Corporate Governance Awards were rewarded for their stable market positions, high yield level, growth potential and efficient management."160 Kazakhstans BTA is among the largest banks in the CIS, with 22 banks in Kazakhstan. According to BTAs unaudited consolidated statement, its assets jumped by 50.91 percent over the first nine months of 2007, clearing $373 million in net income. As of the end of the third quarter of 2007, Slavinvestbank ranked as the 69th largest bank in Russia by assets, according to the Interfax-100, compiled by the Interfax Center for Economic Analysis.161 The recent economic unrest in Kazakhstan has not dissuaded international financial organizations from expanding their operations there. The Asian Development Bank recently announced that it will enlarge its office in Almaty in order to boost its private sector operations and promote regional cooperation activities.162
155 President Nazarbayev delivers annual State of the nation address, announces Kazakhstans Road to Europe, Kazakhstan News Bulletin Special Issue No 3, 8 February 2008. 156 Interfax, 7 February 2008. 157 Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 8 February 2008. 158 Interfax, 5 February 2008. 159 Interfax Financial and Business Report, 7 February 2008. 160 Kazakhstan News Bulletin, No. 3, 7 February 2008. 161 Interfax, 5 February 2008. 162 The Post, 8 February 2008.

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While the hydrocarbon sector remains the most visible of Kazakhstans investment arenas, Western venture capitalists are now looking further afield at investing in Kazakh small and medium-sized businesses. In November 2007 Aureos Capital held a $50 million first closing for its Aureos Central Asia Fund (ACAsF), with a $100 million final close expected by June 2008. Aureos Capital is a private equity fund management company specializing in investing $2-10 million in small to mid-cap businesses through regional funds across Asia, Africa and Latin America. The new fund will focus on Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, but sees the investment climate in Astana as particularly positive. UK-based Aureos Advisers CEO Sev Vettivetpillai, whose organization provides funds advisory services to Aureos Capital, said, "Central Asia's economy is growing rapidly and medium-sized businesses are seeing more opportunities for regional expansion, so we believe that it is the right time for Aureos to enter the market," while Aureos Central Asia Fund Partner Tamerlan Hamidzada noted, "Significant economic growth in many of the region's economies has led to an expansion of a middle class which boosts consumer demand and creates new opportunities in domestic markets."163 Further dismantling the remaining vestiges of the countrys Soviet legacy, on February 7 Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov announced that he is not ruling out the possibility of abolishing the moratorium on the sale of state property introduced in connection with the creation of social business corporations, echoing the comments of Finance Minister Bolat Zhamishev who said, at a staff ministry meeting, "It is time that the moratorium on the sale of state property be abolished." State property and privatization committee chairman Eduard Utepov supported Zhamishev and Masimov himself added, "As for my position on this issue, I think I will sign and lift it (the moratorium.)"164 The Future Kazakhstan's economy is now larger than those of all the other Central Asian states combined (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan), largely due to the country's vast natural resources and relative political stability. According to Kazakhstan Government forecasts, the economy is expected to expand at an average annual rate of 9.5 percent in real terms from 2007 to 2011 because of both foreign investments and increasing oil exports. At a time of record-high energy prices, rising oil exports are expected to increase private consumption, boost retail sales and construction. This trend will only intensify when the Kashagan offshore Caspian oil field and other large-scale oil sector investment projects come on line. In the first quarter of 2007 Kazakhstans GDP increased more than 10 percent while output grew 11 percent in the manufacturing industry and 19 percent in machinery and equipment production. The nominal wages of Kazakh citizens increased 26 percent in the first quarter of 2007 alone. Kazakhstans state statistics agency reported that in 2007 the countrys GDP reached $104.5 billion, noting, "The GDP volume index for January-December 2007 compared to the same period in the previous year reached 108.5 percent." According to the agency commodity production, primarily oil, accounted for 43.9 percent, (with industrial production accounting to 28.7 percent of the percentage), and the services sector 49.4 percent. The 8.5 percent growth figure was only slightly below the governments 2007 projected growth figure of 8.7 percent.165 Figure 27: International Reserves (Bln USD)166

163 Aureos Raising Central Asia Fund, 28 November 2007 at http://www.pehub.com/article/articledetail.php?articlepostid=9063. 164 Almaty Interfax-Kazakhstan 7 February 2008. 165 Agenstsvo RK po statistike, Interfax, 7 February 2008. 166 World Economic and Financial Surveys: Regional Economic Outlook Middle East and Central Asia, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2007, p. 33.

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The economy that supports Kazakhstans emerging middle class continues to go from strength to strength. In February the National Bank of Kazakhstan reported that the countrys gold and foreign exchange reserves increased by 5.9 percent to $40.7 billion, including $21.55 billion from the country's National Fund, with the National Bank's own international reserves increasing by 10.2 percent to $1.76 billion. Kazakhstans gold reserves also rose by $158 million, as international gold prices rose by 11.5 percent.167 Kairat Kelimbetov, former Minister of the Economy and director of the state sustainable development fund Kazyna and now head of the presidential administration, said that the economy is expected to triple by 2015 from its 2004 level as a result of increased oil production.168 The increased production is also projected to have a dramatic impact on the countrys foreign reserves, which during the period 1999-2007 increased by nearly 250 percent. Business associations represent an institutional link between the new national wealth and the middle class: Kazakhstan now has a thriving community of dozens of business associations. Rising tycoons can join the Forum of Entrepreneurs, the Financial Association, the Association of Best Business Enterprises, the Confederation of the Employers of Kazakhstan, or the Kazakhstan Businesswoman Association. The Pharmaceutical Products Importers Association of Kazakhstan, the Almaty Association of Dentists, the Association of Medical Doctors and Pharmacists of Kazakhstan and the Association of Medical Businessman (Otandastar Farmatsiya LLP) represent the medical profession. Journalists, radio and television broadcasters can join the Association of Independent Electronic Mass Media or the Association of TV and Radio Broadcasters. Those involved in developing the countrys rich natural resources have the Oil Union of Kazakhstan and the Mining Association of Kazakhstan, while the Association of Milk and Milk Products of Kazakhstan and the Union of Food Producers represent agriculture. Kazakhstan even has an Association of Polygraphists. 169 The associations will be busy, as in 2008 the Kazakh economy is predicted only to rise a modest 8-9 percent before rising above 10 percent in the period 2009-2011, as indicated in the table below. In contrast, according to Congressional Budget office projections, the U.S. GDP will grow by 1.7 percent in real terms for 2008 as a whole, about half a percentage point less than the growth recorded last year.170 Figure 28: Kazakhstan Economic Forecast

In a measure that will undoubtedly engender massive political support, the government also plans to cut payroll taxes by up to 30 percent in 2008. A notable Western criticism of Kazakh economic reforms is the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal 2008
167 Itar-Tass, 4 February 2008. 168 Arkady Ostrovsky, Economy: Oil rich and having a ball, Financial Times, December 15 2004. 169 Associations and Unions in Kazakhstan, Economic Section, the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland at http://www.kazakhstanembassy.org.uk/cgi-bin/index/211. 170 CBO Testimony - Statement of Peter R. Orszag Director, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 to 2018 before the Committee on the Budget United States Senate January 24, 2008 at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8935/01-24-Senate_Testimony.shtml.

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Index of Economic Freedom. In its Index of Economic Freedom World Rankings Kazakhstan placed only 76th of 162 nations, even though ahead of Caspian neighbors Azerbaijan (107), Russia (134), Iran (151) and Turkmenistan (152.) This ranking can only be disappointing, even though Kazakhstans ranking earned it a place in the mostly free category of the Global Distribution of Economic Freedom survey of 157 nations. As we have seen, the new wealth has under-girded the emergence of a new middle class that is moderate, pro-democratic and prowestern in outlook and committed to educate their children in these values. Nonetheless, there remains a steady if muted level of foreign criticism directed against official economic policies that sustain the middle class. Table 29: Index of Economic Freedoms World Rankings171

Figure 30: Global Distribution of Economic Freedom172

The criteria used to determine Economic Freedom are: Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government Size, Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property Rights, Freedom from Corruption and Labor Freedom. Overall, Kazakhstan fares higher than the reports median average, as the Index states, The global economic freedom score is 60.3 percent, essentially the same as last year. In the years since the Index began in 1995, world economic freedom has improved by 2.6 percentage points. According to the Index criteria, Kazakhstan rates as moderately free. The rankings of all other former Soviet republics are Estonia (12), Lithuania (26), Armenia (28), Georgia (32), Latvia (38), Kyrgyzstan (70), Kazakhstan (78), Moldova (89), Azerbaijan (107), Tajikistan (114), Uzbekistan (130), Ukraine (133) Russia (134), Belarus (150)
171 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, 14th edition, Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal. 172 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, 14th edition, Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal.

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and Turkmenistan (152.) The report gave Kazakhstan 56.5 for Business Freedom, 86.2 for Trade Freedom, 80.1 for Fiscal Freedom, 84.7 for Government Size, 71.9 for Monetary Freedom, 30 for Investment Freedom, 60 for Financial Freedom, 30 for Property Rights, 26 for Freedom from Corruption and 80.0 Labor Freedom. Kazakhstans overall rankings in ten categories are given in the graph below: Table 31: Kazakhstans Ten Economic Freedoms173

Even as these data may raise concern, or at least eyebrows, in some quarters, more immediate concerns will affect the future of Kazakhstans emerging middle class. While government intervention has managed to minimize the potential impact of the U.S. sub-prime financial imbroglio, Kazakh economists remain concerned about the rising rate of inflation. During a recent interview Evgenii Porokhov, director of the Kazakhstan Scientific Research Financial and Tax Law Scientific Research Institute, noted that while the government in 2007 projected an 8 percent inflation rate, it actually soared to more than 18-20 percent, with food costs rising 200-300 percent. Porokhov stated that, According to the personal calculations of Prime Minister Karim Masimov, the inflation rate in the period January-November 2007 reached more than 25percent. The basic external and internal factors were the mortgage crisis in the USAthe financial crisis in Europe and the consequent credit price rises on the world markets for Kazakh banks and the world food crisis, which involved an increase in the prices of foodstuffs on the world markets. Internally, rising inflation and increased wages exceeded labor output in all branches of Kazakhstan economy, as inflation and rising salaries combined with an increase in taxes on the monopoly services (electric power, gas supply, transport services etc.) and state expenditures on social programs. When queried about governmental solutions to the problem, Porokhov gave a stirring response, linking social, economic, legal and ethical development in a manner that fits squarely with the history of emerging middle classes in the West: The sole prescription (for our problems) is a transparent economy, healthy competition, developed small and mid-sized business contributing 70 percent of volume production, a solvent and prosperous middle class, and the state enforcing the rule of law to guard the interests of society and of citizens. Obviously, the solution cannot be accomplished in a single day or even a year.174 Conclusions The government remains well aware that it has much still to do in nurturing a middle class. When asked about what was needed to ensure the growth of Kazakhstans middle class and the policies that the government should pursue to foster its emergence, the head of the presidential administrations division for social and economic analysis, Edilom Mamytbekov replied, The experience of the developed peaceful countries clearly shows that the middle class forms the most numerous and stable part of the society, which has a direct effect on the economic growth, per173 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, 14th edition, Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal. 174 Est opaseniia, shto v 2008 g. inflatsiia v Kazakhstane prevysit 25 percent; interviu direktora NII financovogo i nalogovogo prava, Regnum informatsionoe agentstvo, 21 January 2008.

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mitting the implementation of long-term social changes. The presence of a middle class is a guarantee of the stability of the modernization of the economy, being itself the social motive power of modernization. Therefore, state support of small and mid-sized businesses guarantee an increase in the effective demand of the population relating to the key tasks of the systems transformation. The opinion of our experts is that people currently involved in small and mid-sized businesses are still largely marginalized and do not have sufficient freedom to develop large businesses In this connection it is necessary to continue the state policy of the support of enterprise.175 Significant challenges remain if the position of Kazakhstans middle class is to be consolidated. The disparity between rural and urban incomes, the equitable and orderly distribution of housing, the battle against corruption, the need to shield the national economy from global turmoil even as it further integrates into it, the improvement and tightening of academic standards and containing inflation - these are but a few of the problems that face Kazakh officialdom in the years ahead. As for the future of the emerging Kazakh middle class, it remains to be seen to what extent Kazakhstans changing social profile will eventually resemble Western norms. Indigenous factors that are difficult to gauge include the future role of Kazakhstans clan system, which survived three generations under Soviet power despite numerous attempts to destroy it. This can take purely benign forces or can distort the middle class economy through patronage and influence having little or nothing to do with performance. Other indigenous factors that could impede the development of a middle class have been noted earlier in this report. What is clear at this point is that a decade of economic and educational reforms have produced a young, highly professional and motivated class of Kazakh administrators and businessmen who would definitely not benefit by turning back the clock and who are increasingly moving into positions of power as the remnants of the Soviet-era apparatchiki retire or die off. For the present, Kazakhstans middle class, which has emerged over the last decade and a half, appears broadly supportive of Presidents Nazarbayevs goals, and he in turn has lost no opportunity to advance their interests, frequently stating that he sees the class as a prime guarantor of national stability. Despite economic disparities, there is increasingly little to differentiate a young Kazakh businessman from his counterpart in New York, Hamburg,Tokyo, or Shanghai. While none may be a millionaire, all are sufficiently wealthy to own their own apartment, car, computer and cell phone. They can surf the Internet, wear Versace, take their girlfriend or wife out for dinner and pay with a credit card, vacation abroad, dabble in the stock market and dream of sending their children to the U.S. or Europe for college. While the young Kazakh professional will have attained his middle class lifestyle largely through his own efforts he is equally aware that his style of life is undergirded by his countrys oil wealth, by national policies that have supported the middle class, by international investors who have placed their confidence in Kazakhstan, and the larger system of free markets and the political institutions that protect it everywhere. Furthermore, as there are now more than 8,500 foreign companies in Kazakhstan employing more than 410,000 Kazakhs, their exposure to foreign ideas and concepts is developing at a level undreamed of by their parents a mere decade and a half ago. The implicit social contract seems to be that the middle class is currently unwilling to jeopardize Kazakhstans present stability and prosperity by supporting radical political alternatives, but the larger question remains of whether President Nazarbayev will continue to be able to deliver consistently and sufficiently on the middle classs inevitably growing expectations. While little is certain, in a world of rising energy demand outstripping more slowly rising global production, Kazakhstan for the foreseeable future will have sufficient cash reserves with which to address its problems.

175 Sistemnost upravleniia v strategii ustoichivogo rosta, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 22 January 2008.

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Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan

Anthony Clive Bowyer
Summary And Recommendations The parliament of Kazakhstan, consisting of the bi-cameral Senate and Majilis, has often been overlooked when regarding centers of power in the country. A dominant executive branch led by the President prevails in Kazakhstan, and in fact in every country in Central Asia, where traditionally the legislature and opposition political parties have been weak and relegated to an afterthought. Recent developments in the region have seen a somewhat new model of party politics emerging, one in which a strong president is complemented by a dominant super party in the national legislature as the result of competitive though well-managed elections. This trend has been seen most famously in Russia, where the United Russia party has asserted total dominance over the political landscape. Such a model may be both new and retro all at once, and is spreading into neighboring countries. In Kazakhstan this party is Nur-Otan, or Fatherlands Ray of Light, which captured every seat via the new all party-list system in the August 2007 legislative elections. To dismiss the Senate and Majilis out of hand, however, as a rubber stamp body would be a mistake. The parliament is comprised of professionals who, while working under one platform, are well-educated individuals who lobby for the regions of the country they represent and the needs and concerns of their local constituents. Perhaps somewhat ironic is the fact that an all-party list Majilis1, the lower house of the parliament, while dominated by Nur-Otan retains an almost regional f lavor to it with individual deputies working for their citizens in their home constituencies. As will be discussed, the present, fourth convocation of the parliament, born out of the sweeping constitutional changes of 2007, represents not the evolutionary ending point of parliamentarism in Kazakhstan but rather the latest stage of it. Similarly, the election law remains a work in progress in spite of the move to reduce the impact of individual candidates by moving to a system emphasizing, as one official put it, ideas over personalities. 2 The opposition is in recovery mode from the 2007 elections at present, and one must take a look at who the opposition is and how they have developed over time into the present landscape that we see today. Does the landscape appear somewhat monotone at present? Perhaps, though a greening is inevitable, and one should not ignore the developments taking place within what one would incorrectly judge a dormant political environment. This paper will examine the current state of political parties and parliamentarism in Kazakhstan, as the country prepares to lead the OSCE in 2010, offering insight into their development as well as conclusions and recommendations. Among those are: While strong leadership has a history among the Kazakhs, so does participatory decision-making. The parliament of Kazakhstan (Majilis and Senate) functions much as a parliament in any country does. There is genuine debate and discussion in the Majilis, in spite of the fact that all members represent or are favorably inclined towards Nur-Otan. Debate and discussion in the parliament mainly takes place along regional and not ideological lines. Deputies in the parliament are more experienced and professional than their predecessors. Opposition parties have undergone dramatic transition; and though generally very weak remain a po tentially viable force for the future. The rise of Nur-Otan appears to be part of a trend towards creation of super parties in the former Soviet Union. Kazakhstani parliamentarians are broadening contacts with counterparts in Russia and China, and playing a more inf luential role in parliamentary politics in neighboring Central Asian states.
1 As per the constitutional changes of May 2007, nine members of the Majilis are chosen from among representatives of the multiethnic Assembly of Peoples. 2 Interview with Majilis and Senate deputies, March 19, 2008.

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The United States Congress must increase contacts directly with the Kazakhstani Senate and Majilis to fortify its strategic interests in the country and region, with visits and exchanges much more frequent, as well as broadening contact on key issues of mutual interest. The U.S. Government should consider increasing direct professional assistance to the Central Election Commission, to assist with reforms on a legal and procedural level. The U.S. should also maintain assistance efforts for all political parties on operating under a party list system. Kazakhstan is a large country, and international democracy assistance providers should do more to work on a regional level.

Introduction The independent Republic of Kazakhstan came into being following its declaration of independence on December 16, 1991, from the Soviet Union, leaving it and the other fourteen new countries that joined it the unenviable task of quickly developing the institutions of government. The legacy of Soviet governance meant that each of the 15 newly independent states technically had a version of the executive, legislative and judicial branches in place, albeit in the form of the First Secretary of the Kazakhstan SSR Communist Party (as well as its first president - Nursultan Nazarbayev), the Supreme Soviet (legislature) and the Supreme Court. Far from being a bastion of multi-party democratic debate and discussion, the Kazakhstan SSR Supreme Soviet entered independence having undergone an election in 1990 that saw over 2000 candidates (of whom 90 represented republican public organizations) vie for 360 seats. The focus of the present research is to examine the evolution of parliamentarism and multi-party democracy in Kazakhstan, using history and comparative analysis as a guide. Kazakhstan is the first of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union to be vested with the responsibility of Chairing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in 2010. As it prepares to assume this great responsibility, one may consider whether there is such a thing as a unique Kazakhstani model of democratic development, and if so, does it inf luence other states in the region, and does it meet the strict requirements mandated by the OSCE itself? In 2007 the Parliament of Kazakhstan underwent its most radical transformation over a decade when seats were added to both the Senate and Majilis, with the latter body elected exclusively through a system of proportional representation, with nine members elected from within the 400- member Assembly of Peoples. This was the first time in the brief history of post-Soviet Kazakhstani parliaments that deputies were not directly elected to at least one house of the legislature (a breach of its OSCE commitments). What can explain this phenomenon, and how can we view this with respect to the trajectory of democratic development in Kazakhstan and within the Central Asian region as a whole? Forecasting political development is never a simple task, even in Central Asia. Given Kazakhstans importance as a key exporter of energy resources, its strategic position among neighboring world powers Russia and China, and its own hegemonic status vis--vis the other Central Asian states, we best become more familiar with this important countrys political trends and tendencies, to both continue to engage it as a key partner as well as understand the broader implications for democracy development in the regional and other transitional democracies around the world. Development Of Political Parties Kazakhstans law on political parties prohibits parties based on ethnic origin, religion, or gender. A 2002 law raised from 3,000 to 50,000 the number of members that a party must have in its ranks in order to register with the Ministry of Justice, divided up proportionally by oblast with no fewer than 700 members in each of the fourteen oblasts and two major cities. In order to gain seats in the parliament, a party must attain no less than 7% of all votes cast, a high percentage retained from the previous mixed-system parlia mentary election. In an all party-list election this percentage is inordinately high. Given the weakness of the opposition and the very short turnaround time from the adoption of a new constitution to the dismissal of parliament and holding of elections (a matter of three months), any but the most organized and wellfinanced political parties would face serious challenges in competing. Nur-Otans sweep of all 98 party list 240

seats can be understood in light of the partys presidential status, its expansive platform, virtually limitless resources, and the oppositions own reliance on personality-driven politics, all within the framework of limited preparation and campaign time. To better understand the present status of party politics, one must first review the origins of organized political movements in Kazakhstan. The first political movement that could be constituted a party, with a broad organizational structure and popular support, was the Alash Orda movement, borne out of the chaos of the civil war in the Russian Empire in 1917 and officially constituted in November of that year. The Party was formed by the intellectual elite and essentially became a Kazakh nationalist movement, the precursor of similar movements that developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of the decline of the Soviet Union and reinvigoration of Kazakh nationalism. Prior to the Alash Orda movement governance in the ethnic Kazakh territories of the steppe was divided among the Middle, Small and Great Hordes of the Kazakh Khanates, each in turn being ruled by local clans and alliances. The events in the Russian Empire of 1917 enabled the Kazakh elite to pursue the possibility of creating a territorially-defined state for the first time with an ethnic Kazakh home rule majority. The Alash Orda Central Executive Body consisted of eight ethnic Kazakh members representing each of the seven regions plus the chairman 3 as well as fifteen deputies of non-Kazakh origin. It is interesting to note the participation of deputies of non-Kazakh origin, which included members of Tatar-Turkic tribes, as recognition of the multi-ethnic nature of the steppe and the desire to include representatives of such groups to help legitimize the government. This legitimacy was necessary particularly to support a tottering regime in the face of serous external and internal pressures, when not all of the Kazakh tribespeople could be comfortably labeled as enthusiasts of the Alash Orda regime. The main issue seemed to stem over tribal differences and an East-West cleavage in Kazakh society at that time, which was essentially related to ownership of land. Public opinion seemed to be divided between being pro-Alash Orda or indifferent4. Gazing upon the political landscape in 2008, one may find similar indifference among the general population as to the system of political parties in Kazakhstan. With five elections to parliament in the last twelve years, including two Constitutional referenda and two parliaments dismissed prior to fulfillment of their mandates, the population of Kazakhstan may have moved beyond skepticism regarding politics towards a degree of indifference, judging by the limited public engagement in the political process seen in recent years. Public skepticism with elected leaders or political parties in independent Kazakhstan is not a new phenomenon. Following the dismissal of the parliament in March 1995 and elec tions to the newly-constituted Majilis in December 1995 (a condition repeated in 2007), skepticism set in as more citizens believed Kazakhstan was not a democracy than was a democracy by a difference of 44% to 36%, according to survey results. This contrasted with data from the previous year, in which 42% believed Kazakhstan was a democracy and 33% did not. 5 In addition, in 1996, 70% of persons re sponding to a survey could not name their deputy in the Majilis, versus only 24% who could name their representative. Further, 41% believed the country was in need of election law reform in 1996 versus 27% who felt that way in 19956. Three persons in five (61%) reported that they were not interested in matters of politics and government in the country. Political party identification was just as tepid, with nearly half of respondents (44%) being unable to name a party which best represents the views and interests of people like them. 7 While support for a multi-party system was high (61%) only one of the twenty parties or movements in existence in 1996 garnered double-digit support, with the Communist Party receiving the highest support at 10%. Only three others received so much as 5% or more support: the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement (9%), the Party of Peoples Unity (5%) and the Slavic Movement LAD (5%).8 At that time it could be said that the Kazakhstani political party system was extremely dispersed and underdeveloped with none of them having established a level of organization or record that garnered substantial identification with the public.
3 4 5 6 7 8 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, Hoover Institution Press, 1995, p. 143. Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 140. Public Opinion in Kazakhstan, International Foundation for Election System, April 1997, p. 28. IFES Survey 1996, p. 33. IFES Survey 1996, p. 52. IFES Survey 1996, p. 52.

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The nature of political parties up to 1995 was somewhat confined, with parties clearly based upon personal appeal or narrow platform interests. The Communist Party was not allowed to field candidates in the 1994 elections, thus removing from the ballot the one party that enjoyed any kind of name recognition. Fourteen years later, parties are still largely known for their leaders or leadership conf licts than for ideas. Some would argue this condition applies to Nur-Otan as well, led by President Nazarbayev. Current Political Party Landscape Kazakhstans political party landscape is currently dominated by the ruling Nur-Otan party, which dominates parliament and the public debate. However, numerous other political parties exist. Outside of Nur-Otan, the present-day political parties in Kazakhstan can be grouped into three categories: Pro-presidential, Soft Opposition, and Hard Opposition. Numbering among the current Pro-presidential political parties are Rukhaniyat and the Party of Patriots. Those falling into the category of Soft Opposition are the recently reconstituted party Adilet, Ak-Zhol, Auyl, the Communist Party, and the Communist Peoples Party. Those in the category of Hard Opposition, those most opposed to the current leadership, include the All-National Social Democratic Party, Azat (formerly Naghyz Ak-Zhol) and the unregistered political movement Alga. As will be discussed, at present the political opposition in Kazakhstan is exceptionally weak and on its heels following the August 2007 elections to the Majilis. The state of multipartyism can be seen as going through a crisis phase at present, with no party strong enough in terms of its popularity, inf luence, outreach, financial wherewithal, or stature to be considered an effective counterweight to official power in the country. This is of course due to a combination of factors, some directly attributable to the parties own conduct, and much due to the political environment in which they currently find themselves, and in which they have been mired for nearly the last fifteen years. Nur-Otan Nur-Otans party headquarters in Astana sit a stones throw away from the gleaming new buildings that are home to the Senate and Majilis of the parliament. One could argue that the Majilis building itself serves as a de facto second headquarters for the party, which occupies all of the 98 party list seats in the 107-member Majilis. The 47-member Senate, comprised of 32 deputies elected by Oblast Maslikhats as well as another 15 appointed by the President 9 (half are elected every three years with each Senator serving sixyear terms) can also be considered unanimous supporters of the President. Upon entering the Majilis building one is struck not only by the numerous display cases housing the many gifts and awards presented by foreign parliamentary delegations and dignitaries, but also by the larger-than-life Nur-Otan poster that greets visitors to the building. In fact, one can hardly consider Nur-Otan without regarding the parliament, and likewise cannot consider the parliament without a discussion of Nur-Otan. Such is the present state of political affairs in Kazakhstan, where the distinction between parliament and the presidential super-party are blurred. By far the largest political party in the country, Nur-Otan has 740,000 members nationwide, with 3400 deputies serving in oblast maslikhats and lower levels of government. Nur-Otan formally came into being in 2006 as a result of the merging of two other pro-presidential parties which had competed separately during the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Civic Party (grazhdanskaya partiya) and Asar (led by President Nazarbayevs daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva) with the Otan party, which had won 4 party list seats (and 24 overall) in the 1999 elections to the Majilis. While harboring few ideological differences, the parties were united in their support for the president and the chance to compete as a super party in subsequent elections, with the promise of a centralized structure and the allure of being on the winning team. At the same time, the move signaled the decreasing independent politicalauthority of Dariga Nazarbayeva, which had been eroding since of the President failed to make his customary appearance at the Dariga-organized annual international media conference conducted in 2005. In addition, with President Nazarbayev indicating he would run again for the presidency, it eliminated the immediate need to elevate presidential daughter Dariga to prominent role in party politics, and as a result Asars mandate and popularity began to wane.
9 Eight additional deputies to be appointed by the President was added to the Constitution as part of the May 2007 constitutional amendments.

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With the power of the Otan organizational structure, unlimited financial resources, and of course the backing of the president, the union of these three parties created the first Central Asian super party which would go on to dominate the August 2007 parliamentary electionsThe high 7% party threshold added another barrier and created a nearly insurmountable hurdle for an already weakened and fractured opposition, none of whom could muster enough votes to win a single seat. The relatively modest state of financial wherewithal of the opposition, and restrictions on its ability to campaign, were two additional confining conditions for the opposition parties to deal with during the hastily-scheduled elections. One of the more noteworthy conditions hampering parties effectiveness is the fact that parties still tend to revolve around one or more magnanimous personalities, and less on ideas and issue-based platforms. Even the fractured Communist Party faces this, having split into two different parties, one led by the godfather of post-Soviet communism in Kazakhstan, Serikbolsyn Abdildin, and the other by his former associate, the head of the Peoples Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Vladislav Kosarev. The AkZhol party faced a similar circumstance, with Bulat Abilov, Altynbek Sarsenbaev, Oraz Zhandosov, and Tulegen Zhukeyev breaking away from co-leader Alikzhan Baimenov to form the True Ak-Zhol (Naghyz Ak Zhol) party in 2006. They announced a merger in June before the parliamentary elections, though efforts to form an electoral bloc were rebuffed by a new law that prohibited the forming of electoral coalitions. The party did not compete independently, with their former colleagues in Ak-Zhol, now nominally pro-presidential, receiving but 3.09% of the party list vote and falling short of the minimum required to win seats. Cynics in the parties affected suggest that the fracturing of their parties was in fact orchestrated by the government or Nur-Otan. The truth may lie as much in personality clashes and egos, however, as in the nefarious actions of the government or Nur-Otan. Nur-Otan claims to have 740,000 members nationwide, with 3400 deputies elected to oblast or local Maslikhats. Nur-Otan claims to be the only party in Kazakhstan to have representation in every electoral district in the country. In fact it certainly is the only one to have the resources to operate in every electoral district. It reaches out to constituents through its party newspaper, via its website in Kazakh, Russian and English languages, and through the quarterly meetings that the 98 Nur-Otan members of the Majilis conduct in their home districts. The partys youth wing, Zhas-Otan, has over 200,000 persons younger than 30 as members. Three have become deputies of the Majilis, and 220 (age 36 or younger) have been elected as deputies to Maslikhats at different levels10. In keeping with its emphasis on youth, the party states that every third member is younger than 30 years of age. The party is already discussing strategy for the next elections in 2012, and continues to forge alliances and work cooperatively with NGOs, private businesses, and trade unions. Indeed, one is struck at the sensation that the party is omnipresent handling affairs of the state and intends, by all appearances, to be accountable to the voters. As one deputy put it, we won the elections. Now we have to fulfill our promises.11 As further evidence of its benevolence, the party has undertaken a number of local community improvement projects as well as instituted a grievances department, though which people can appeal to Majilis or Maslikhat deputies and file complaints. For example, in 2007 the party reports that 1727 grievances were received by the Astana branch out of a total of 66,230 nationwide. It is not clear how many were resolved successfully, but it does seem, on the surface, to challenge the notion that citizens are entirely apathetic or unenthusiastic about addressing their problems to their local Nur-Otan or local government official. Among Nur-Otans most heralded achievements of the last six months is the formation of local anticorruption councils, charged with investigating reported instances of official abuse and taking corrective action. While the typical forms of official abuse are most often associated with shakedowns by traffic police, increasingly cases have been brought to light of corruption among local government officials. With Nur-Otan dominating government at all levels, this effort amounts to essentially an internal housecleaning. Nonetheless, acknowledgement of the problem and a mandate for addressing corruption now exists on the level of government and not only on the agendas of special interest groups. Nur-Otan underscores its strong contacts with everyday people and the partys philosophy of maximizing the intellectual potential of every person in the country, using the best mix of European and Asian
10 From Nur-Otan website, www.ndp-nurotan.kz 11 Interview with members of the Senate and Majilis, March 19, 2008.

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experiences.12 When asked about the merits of a party list system over elections of individual deputies via single mandate, this author suggested that the exclusive party list method removes the degree of personal responsibility and accountability of each deputy to his or her region of origin, along with personal contact with constituents, creating an ambiguous collection of deputies for whom no citizen directly voted. This is typically one of the arguments levied against proportional representation systems, that direct accountability of members elected via party list is absent and they are somehow less legitimate in their position than those elected through single mandate constituency voting. However, this is often balanced by mixed systems in which a proportion of deputies are elected by either method, such as the system Kazakhstan had up until the 2007 elections. In response, the Nur-Otan senior leadership countered that the party list system is actually more legitimate than previous elections to the Majilis in that for the first time the election centered around ideas and not around personalities. In other words, the element of individuals winning seats due to their charismatic personalities was a dangerous thing of the past, to be avoided. Indeed, those who re-engineered the constitution believed the Kazakhstani electorates maturation allowed it to focus exclusively judging parties ideas for addressing the most pressing needs of the country. In this sense, Nur-Otan claims, the electorate dismissed the opposition parties precisely for their deficit of clear ideas as well as personality-driven politics as usual. It can be argued that political parties in Kazakhstan and elsewhere in Central Asia have always tended to revolve around one or more charismatic leaders. In fact a public opinion survey conducted in Kazakhstan by the International Republican Institute in 2004 suggested that more voters still believe that apartys leader was the most important factor in deciding whether or not to vote for them (38%), with the party and its ideas second (26%) and another 22% who believe both factors are equally as important13. Looking back eight years, when asked whether people were more likely to vote for a candidate affiliated with a political party or one who was not, 54% of respondents would have chosen an independent candidate over a party-backed one, with 26% stating that they would more likely select a party-backed one14. It is exactly the reliance of personalities and deficit of ideas that, in the minds of Nur-Otan leaders, doomed the opposition political parties. One could reasonably add to that argument that a deficit of funding and political space played as much a role in this, as did the fracturing of two of the more wellknown opposition parties, Ak-Zhol and the Communist Party, prior to the 2007 elections as well as the prohibition of party coalitions. The irony in suggesting that personalities have been driven out of politics or discredited as a factor in parliamentary elections is, of course, the ever-present image of President Nazarbayev as leader of Nur-Otan. Nazarbayevs popularity and image as Papa to the masses certainly has had a positive impact on theparty he governs, which is visible in the billboard and literature maintained and distributed by the party across the country. When asked whether the party list system of voting and the 4th session of the Majilis represents the evolutionary goal of Kazakhstani political reformation, few were in agreement that the current system is perfect, though, it was stated, it does appear to best suit the realities in Kazakhstan, and moreover why shouldnt one party claim all the seats in the Majilis if it is the will of the people? In 2004, 57% of respondents to the IRI survey reported a low interest in politics, a figure which undoubtedly has risen since the 2007 elections, according to the data provided by the Association of Sociologist and Politologists of Kazakhstan in their quarterly public survey project. Results also suggest that the country is still recovering from a postelection trauma, with a low level of political activity. Respondents were also diagnosed with a very low level of recognition for political parties, with an equally low level of interest in politics and the work of political parties15. Dr. Bakytzhamal Bekturganova, Head of the Association, suggests that Nur-Otan and the government is seriously out of touch with the rest of the country, that they are operating in a vacuum and are unable to see the real situation beyond their own immediate interests, while the opposition, stinging from electoral defeat and the massive changes in the political landscape, is at present weak and passive.16
12 13 14 15 16 Interview with Nur-Otan members, March 19, 2008. IRI Public Opinion Survey, 2004. IFES Public Opinion Survey in Kazakhstan, 1996. Public Opinion Survey, Association of Sociologist and Politologists of Kazakhstan, December 2007, www.asip.kz Interview with Dr. Bakytzhamal Bekturganova, March 21, 2008.

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One metaphor used more than once to describe the current state of Nur-Otan (by members themselves) and the state of the parliament was that a crystallization of the system had taken place after the August 2007 elections. Whether this crystallization was natural or artificial remains to be seen, as does the verdict on whether the process has led to a desirable result. Nur-Otan in The Parliament Though dominant in the Majilis for at least the next five years, Nur-Otan does not appear to take for granted its role as custodian of a multi-party political system. Though vocal of other parties failure to successfully oppose them, they do make an attempt to reach out to citizens, businesses and other political parties through a forum known as the Citizens Alliance of Kazakhstan, with whom Nur-Otan shares a Memorandum of Understanding. This forum is set up as an all-inclusive open microphone type of discussion opportunity in which ideas can be freely shared and criticisms expressed. Opposition parties interviewed confirmed the Nur-Otan has led such outreach sessions, though dismissed them as ideologically biased. Actual levels of public participation were difficult to ascertain, though it is true that Nur-Otan members of parliament are required on a quarterly basis to visit their constituencies for no less than ten days, which evokes the irony of how a party-list elected parliament in essence functions as if its members were individually elected. The answer is, of course, that by winning all of the 98 seats in the Majilis Nur-Otan has the ability to meet with constituents in all Oblasts and major regions of the country without exception, having members in parliament from most major cities in each oblast of the country. In addition, television coverage on state-run channels is frequent, and showcases the partys latest initiatives. Nur-Otan keeps abreast of the mood of the electorate through quarterly surveys conducted through its Center for Social Research, via which it measures the problems and issues most pressing to voters. The surveys provide data based on which the party makes any necessary course corrections. Bakytzhamal Bekturganova confirmed that Nur-Otan contacts her Association regularly to obtain comparative polling data, though often does not agree with the results. If debate cannot be reasonably had within a one-party parliament on ideological grounds, then on what basis can we compare this parliament with those in other fully-f ledged or emerging democracies? How do we assess the state of parliamentary democracy in Kazakhstan in 2008, less than two yearsremoved from Kazakhstans ascension to the Chairmanship of the OSCE? The casual observer might invoke the dreaded rubber stamp moniker or suggest Nur-Otans status as a Super-Party. The latter of these statements invariably elicits a negative response from Nur-Otan members, who consider the Super-Party term more in line comparatively with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, not a progressive party in post-Soviet independent Kazakhstan. As for the rubber stamp notion, it is dismissed as well though acknowledged that disagreements with the president on substantive issues are few and far between. It cannot happen, remarked one deputy, we are all from the same party.17 Still, members of parliament have the right to voice their opinions during parliamentary sessions and object to particular courses of action proposed. For example, deputies cannot approve of ministers appointed by the Prime Minster, but they do vote on his choice for Prime Minister. If members of parliament dont vote to confirm the nominated candidate for prime minister candidate, the president must nominate a different one. They can discuss the merits of the individual cabinet ministers but they dont have any power to vote against them, as outlined in the constitution. This was one of the constitutional amendments approved in 2007, as previously it was President who appointed the Cabinet of Ministers. Party fractions in the parliament have serious discussions on major issues including: the state budget, development of Kazakhstans territory, social protection, cultural issues, tariffs and tax law. Taking exception to the notion of the fourth convocation of the parliament being entirely submissive to the president, deputies in both the Senate and Majilis insist that the government has no cart blanche over this parliament!18 If there are any internal disagreements among Nur-Otan members, it exists on a regional basis. Deputies do hold spirited discussions on issues such as resource allocation and infrastructure development, arguing in favor of their home regions, a condition unique to Kazakhstans party list system and result17 Interview with members of the Senate and Majilis, March 19, 2008. 18 Interview with members of Nur-Otan, March 19, 2008.

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ing one-party parliament. This now allows deputies to function as individuals within the party structure. Competition along regional lines within Nur-Otan is likely to continue. The party dismisses any notion of disunity and points out that they have the only political party capable of addressing all regional needs systematically. It can be argued that not all parties are capable of mounting national programs to the degree that Nur-Otan is, although as will be seen many claim a high level of activism in all oblasts (among these the soft opposition Peoples Communist and Auyl parties). The lack of a serious political opposition from among the ranks of political parties or individual leaders does not necessarily signal that there is no opposition whatsoever to speak of; rather, it may lay in islands of power19 related to business leaders or oligarchs within Kazakhstan that affect the course of discussion to a greater degree than other forces outside of the president or parliament. Though not a topic of the present paper, the role of the business elite does bear serious consideration when contemplating the centers of power beyond the president and his Nur-Otan party. Pro-Presidential Parties Rukhaniyat The Rukhaniyat (Rebirth) Party is a small party that was registered in 2003. Led by Altynshash Zhaganova, it tends to support the ruling governments position. Zhaganova is a well-known writer and worker in state television dating back to Kazakhstan's days as a Soviet republic. The party pledges to expand the economy, address social issues and develop the spirituality of society. Rukhaniyat registered a proportional list consisting of nine candidates for the 2007 elections, receiving 1.51% of the party list vote in 2007, a slight improvement over the 0.44% received in 2004. It maintains a party website, www.rukhaniyat.kz, and claims a nationwide base of constituents. Party of Patriots The Party of Patriots of Kazakhstan (PPK) was established in 2000 and had eleven candidates on its party list for the 2007 elections. A small party, like Rukhaniyat, the PPK is sometimes critical of certain government policies, but in general supports most presidential initiatives. Led by Gani Kasimov, who once ran opposite Nursultan Nazarbayev as a candidate for the presidency, the party aims to establish a governmental system based on the rule of law and democratic principles, and promote a civil society with a market economy where living standards are raised. In addition to its party newspaper, it maintains a website www. ppk.gl.kz. Having won 0.6% and 0.75% in the 2004 and 2007 elections, respectively, it appears to lack broad appeal. The party claims to have over 130,000 members and attracts the support of military officers and the official endorsement of the Union of Officers. Soft Opposition Adilet (Justice) The recently re-constituted Adilet Party, which merged with Ak-Zhol for the 2007 elections, has assumed the status of a pro-presidential party. It maintains an extensive website of information, www.dpadilet.kz, and fights for justice and against corruption. It developed out of the foundation of the Democratic Party and the For a Just Kazakhstan movement in 2004. It is led by Maksut Narikbayev, and is active in its critique of government, recently criticizing a state project on economic development of the regions of the country. Ak-Zhol (Bright Path) Ak-Zhol is led by Alikhan Baimenov, who ran as the partys candidate for president in the 2005 elec tion. Just before that election, Ak-Zhol split, with the more vocally critical wing of the party re-registering under the name Naghyz (True) Ak Zhol. The only opposition party to win a seat in the 2004 elections, Ak-Zhol characterizes itself as constructive opposition, with Mr.Baimenov later becoming a key player in the Presidents Commission for Further Democratization of Kazakhstan. In 2006 the party signed an agreement of cooperation with the Adilet party and the two parties ran a joint list consisting of 98 candidates for the 2007 elections. Ak-Zhol advocates an independent, democratic and free Kazakhstan, and supports the fundamental values of democracy, independence, freedom and fairness. Ak-Zhol claims over 150,000 members nationally, though acknowledges that their ranks have likely thinned somewhat since the August
19 Public Opinion Survey, Association of Sociologist and Politologists of Kazakhstan, December 2007, www.asip.kz.

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2007 elections. They acknowledge that the reality of their situation, and for that matter of all parties, is that they need to maintain good relations with Nur-Otan in order to advance their own interests. But when looking back at the 2007 elections, Ak-Zhol leader Baimenov acknowledged that financing and public exposure were among the biggest downfalls the party faced in order to be able to compete on a level playing field 20. While the party does publish a newspaper (dormant since the elections, however) and maintains a website, www.akzhol.kz, a more important, and expensive, medium is television. Baimenov outlined an interesting problem: most citizens of Kazakhstan have access to Russian Federation television, which portrays political change in other republics, the so-called color revolutions, in a very negative light. This affects public opinion on opposition parties inside Kazakhstan, he claims, as citizens are fearful of what their true objectives are, and see them not as potential agents of change but agents of disorder. Baimenov believes a 50-50 split between proportional representation and single-mandate elections would be optimal, arguing that single-mandate elections are better for voters on a regional level, but the party list votes are better to diffuse tribalism in Kazakhstan. He admits that one of the problems is that political parties are still largely personality-driven. As with other parties, Ak-Zhol found it pointless to press their electoral grievances far in the court system, though it did try, albeit unsuccessfully. Ak-Zhol claims to be best in tune with the public interest, a public that they claim has become more religiously devout. Religion in society is seen as a positive element that Ak-Zhol has developed plans to address. Its other plans focus on literacy and empowerment of young persons. Although they cooperate with trade unions, their access to finances have been significantly reduced since the elections, a problem which Baimenov suggests is endemic among all opposition parties. Ak-Zhol does not participate in the Nur-Otan led discussion groups, instead preferring to wait to dialogue with the dominant party in the forum of parliament (should it win seats in the future). It does hold its own inclusive discussion groups in Almaty and Astana, though it was unclear whether Nur-Otan or other parties participated in those sessions. It appears that being an outspoken member of Ak-Zhol in the regions of the country elicits a negative response these days, as those many members of the party who function in local Maslikhats and Akims must conceal their party allegiance. 21 Of the split with his former colleagues, who went on to form True Ak-Zhol and newly renamed Azat Party, Baimenov is ref lective in suggesting that all the likes of his former colleagues wanted were money and power, and left while acknowledging that they could not win an internal struggle for the hearts and minds of the party faithful. Baimenov added proudly that 80% of Ak-Zhol party members stuck with the party during the split. Ak Zhol gained 12.04% of the vote in 2004 but fell to just over 3% in the 2007 elections. The Kazakh Social Democratic Party Auyl (Village) Auyl was established in 2002 and promotes itself as a party for the defense of rural districts and social justice. As such it focuses on the development of agriculture and the protection of the interests of agricultural workers. Auyl furthermore supports economic and political reforms aimed at the further democratization of society, and increasing the living standards of citizens. It works cooperatively with the president and Nur-Otan (though likening it to a communist party)22 , generally supporting the presidents policies. Auyl is headed by Gani Kaliyev and succeeded in registering 33 candidates on its proportional list, though did not have any members elected to the Majilis in the 2007 (or preceding) elections, as it earned but 1.51% of the vote. In the 2004 elections it had received 1.73% of the vote. It maintains representation in all 14 oblasts, 160 regions and in the cities of Almaty and Astana, claiming it is the only party to have such widespread support in the country. It has earned seven seats in oblast Maslikhats and another 30 in local Maslikhats around the country. Auyl members found the election results from August 2007 to have been problematic, as they feel they should have won at least 20% of the seats. They found it pointless to appeal the results, however, citing their experience from past elections. It goes without saying that they are against the current party list system, and feel that the system will change before the next elections. They do acknowledge having financial issues, though cited some private financing and sponsors. When asked whether they have heard of
20 Interview with Alikhan Baimenov, March 20, 2008. 21 Interview with Alikhan Baimenov, March 20, 2008. 22 Interview with Auyl party representatives, March 20, 2008.

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the discussion groups led by Nur-Otan, they acknowledged they had (and mentioned their own discussion clubs), but said they refused to participate in them. The party tries to meet with representatives of other parties, and participated in the For Fair Elections coalition. Auyl publishes a monthly newspaper for supporters, conducts regular meetings at the oblast level, holds four party meetings per year, and maintains a party website, www.ksdpauyl.kz. Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK) The Communist Party of Kazakhstan, the original successor to the Communist Party of the Kazakhstan SSR, was reformed in October 1991 and registered in February 1994. The party has been led by Serikbolsyn Abdildin since its re-inception, and functioned as the only registered communist political movement in the country until 2004. In that year, Abdildin and prominent party member Vladislav Kosyrev split when the latter accused Abdildin of questionable fundraising practices. The resulting schism led to the forming of the Communist Peoples Party, which ran as a separate party in both the 2004 and 2007 elections (failing to win seats on either occasion). Abdildins Communist Party boycotted the 2007 elections and has arguably suffered a drop off in prominence vis--vis the Communist Peoples Party led by Kosyrev, which tends to support the policies of the President. The Communist Party in its post-1991 history has frequently cooperated with other movements, having participated in the opposition coalition entities Azamat and Pokolenie ("Generation") as well as initiating the unregistered "National-Patriotic Movement-Republic" in 1996. In 1998 it joined the People's Front of Kazakhstan movement, an opposition bloc, and during the December 2005 presidential elections the Com munist Party, Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and Naghyz Ak Zhol Party formed a coalition movement, For a Just Kazakhstan, and supported Zhamarkan Tuyakbai as its presidential candidate, who was soundly defeated by President Nazarbayev. The partys electoral history in the 1990s was consistent (if unspectacular, considering its relative popularity among all political parties during the period) after its organizational reformation, winning two seats in both the 1995 and 1999 elections. The party was not permitted to field candidates in the 1994 elec tions. In the 2000s once again the Communist Party sought alliances and in 2004 it joined with the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and won 3.4 %, short of the 5% threshold and resulting in no seats gained in the parliament. In addition to its electoral boycott of 2007, the party remains in a low intensity conf lict with the Communist Peoples Party for the hearts and minds of its constituents, many of whom are older-generation voters. Communist Peoples Party The Communist Peoples Party of Kazakhstan (CPPK) was registered prior to the 2004 parliamentary elections, competing with the opposition Communist Party of Kazakhstan, though not winning any seats in parliament. The CPPK, headed by Vladislav Kosarev, registered a proportional list numbering 20 can didates for the 2007 elections. Largely propresidential, the party promotes Marxist-Leninist ideology, but adapted to the new realities of social development. They expected to have won at least seven seats during the 2007 elections, and claim that were unfairly denied hese seats but did not take the matter to court. While recognizing that cooperation with Nur-Otan is a necessity, they do not embrace this alliance, referring to their Nur-Otan colleagues instead as fanatics. The party claims that 30% of its 70,000 members are younger than age 30, addressing the charge that the party only appeals to nostalgic, older-generation citizens. They maintain contacts with other communist parties throughout the world, including those from Kyrgyzstan, China, Cuba and the Czech Republic, though described relations with Gennady Zyuganovs Communist Party in Russia as testy. When describing the split with Serikbolsyn Abdildin and the other communists, Kosarev claimed that those who split away from the CPPK were interested only in power, not in serving the people based on true Marxist ideology. 23 The party does not appear to have representatives in local government, though it holds that the actual process of the election is more important that the outcome, an oblique reference to electoral struggles at the lower levels. While unabashedly anti-western, the party leadership does agree with the OSCE on at
23 Interview with Vladislav Kosarev, March 21, 2008.

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least one thing, that the threshold, or barrier, for parties to have members elected via party list should be lowered, in the CPPKs opinion to 3%, and that each registered party should have at least some members serving in parliament. The party acknowledges having participated once in the Nur-Otan led all-party discussion groups, but refused further invitations to participate due to the heavy-handed nature of NurOtans leadership of those sessions24. The party publishes newsletters regularly and maintains a party website, www.knpk.kz. Hard Opposition Azat (former Naghyz Ak-Zhol, True Bright Path) The newly-renamed Azat party claims to be the most structured and popular democratic opposition party in the country. Its founders, which split with Alikzhan Baimenovs Ak-Zhol party in 2005, include famous businessman Bulat Abilov, ex-governor of the National Bank Oraz Jandosov, and the late Altynbek Sarsenbayev, ex-minister of information, murdered in February 2006. They claim their former Ak-Zhol colleagues to be puppets of the administration, while they alone are true standard-bearers of opposition to the ruling elite. In February 2008 the party called a congress and formally changed its name to Azat [Freedom] party. The name selection was the result of a contest, in which party leaders selected two names to put to a vote out of some 300 suggestions received: Azat and Azamat (the name of a political movement from the late 1990s), meaning citizen. Azat won overwhelmingly with 88 votes to Azamats 58. Other popular suggestions included Akikat (truth), Adal (honesty), and even the names of some political movements, which already exist, such as Adilet (justice) and Atameken (fatherland). 25 The rebranding of the party included not only a new name, but a leadership shakeup as well (Abilov was elected party chairman). Party leaders hope that the makeover will infuse new energy and momentum into attempts to open up Kazakhstans political system. The party, which still needs to register with the Ministry of Justice (rarely an easy or straightforward process), abandoned its policy of having three cochairs. Another former co-leader, Tolegen Zhukeyev, was elected secretarygeneral, with overall responsibility for party strategy. The third former cochairman, Oraz Zhandosov, is likely to become a deputy leader and will remain the partys chief economic strategist. The existence of two similarly named parties had been a source of confusion to voters, and Azats leaders are hoping they can finally put the split behind them and create a new brand that will have public recognition by the next parliamentary election, due in 2012. The new name has positive connotationsfor many Kazakhstanis: a movement called Azat was formed in 1990 and lobbied for independence from the Soviet Union. 26 Leaders of that movement, which still exists but is not active, condemned the decision to adopt the name. We are surprised and perturbed that they have taken the name Azat, as if there werent any other words in Kazakh, the movements former chairman, Toleubek Seytkaly-uly, said during a March 4 news conference, as reported by the Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency. The party claimed that the parliamentary vote was marred by widespread fraud, as have been previous elections, according to Zhukeyev. Votes are regularly stolen from the opposition, Zhukeyev said, who added that if conducted fairly, the party would have gained 30to 40 percent of the vote.27 As Kazakhstan continues to be hurt by the effects of the global credit crunch, and as public dissatisfaction rises along with the countrys inf lation rate, Abilovs demand that the party of power must take responsibility is not lost on many Kazakhstanis. Therein lies political opportunity, Abilov believes. Azats leaders insist they dont need seats in parliament to inf luence the legislative and policy process, and are able to put pressure on the regime from the outside. Azat, which will now have to seek re-registration under its new name, plans to draw up a three-year political strategy and a longer-term program, Azat- 2012, to prepare for the next parliamentary elections. It will be pushing for laws to improve the lives of ordinary people, Abilov said, singling out several pri24 25 26 27 Ibid. Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Opposition Party Tries to Make a Fresh Start, Eurasia Insight, 4 March 2008. Ibid Ibid

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orities: making public information about foreign companies role in energy exploration, resource export issues, labor migration restrictions, setting up a public-service TV channel; bringing laws on elections, the media, and freedom of assembly into line with OSCE commitments; introducing elections for all mayors and governors; and lobbying for Kazakhstan to join the Council of Europe. 28 All-National Social Democratic Party (NDSP) Following his unsuccessful presidential bid in 2005, Zharmakhan Tuyakbai established the NSDP in January 2007. In June 2007, before the elections were called, it announced its intention to unite with True Ak Zhol jointly run candidates. In the end it won 4.62% of the vote, which was good enough for second place but not enough to gain any representation in parliament. NSDP positions itself as a radical opposition. The party platform emphasizes the establishment of democracy, rule of law, and a socially-oriented state, an innovative economy and a new humanist system of politics, as well as the principles of the social-democratic movement. The weakness of the All-National Social-Democratic Party is that, like many parties, it does not enjoy broad, genuine popular support. Tuyakbai appears to have lost a measure of his political prestige after his defeat in the last elections; he has done relatively little to maintain his hard-won image of a political leader. 29 The party appears somewhat distant from alienated from the ethnic values of Kazakhs. Such popular demands as the promotion of the Kazakh language in public offices, or social and financial aid to repatriated Kazakhs, have never been on the priority list of the Social Democratic Party. Ironically, party Tuyakbai comes from South Kazakhstan, the most densely Kazakh-populated region, with a host of lingering social problems. When Tuyakbai toured South Kazakhstan during the presidential election as part of his election campaign, residents of the cities of Shymkent and Turkistan posed many questions on how he was going to address the long overdue problems of improving of education and medical service standards, the rising costs of public utilities, and unemployment. Zharmakhan Tuyakbai walked away with another heap of promises. 30 Nevertheless Tuyakbai remains a wellknown figure through his ability to mount a serious opposition. Although more successful in this regard that other individuals, his popularity and drawing power over the long term are, at best, questionable. Alga (Forward) Peoples Party (unregistered) The Alga Party, still unregistered and not a participant in the 2007 elections, faced a leadership void in 2007. In spite of the apparent disarray, the partys headquarters office in Almaty is relatively opulent by the standards of most opposition parties in Kazakhstan, maintains two newspapers, conducts its own public opinion surveys, and monitors the work of parliamentary deputies. They appear not to share the same challenges of funding as their opposition cohorts, yet appear part of a reactive political opposition instead of a proactive one. Alga emerged from the banned, former Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) after that movement weakened in early 2005. The DCK had been among the country's strongest opposition groupings before its demise. Alga has had continual issues with registration, being denied registration four times since its inception. The decision to apply for registration was adopted at the founding conference of the newly born movement, which took place on September 10, 2006. Since then, the Ministry of Justice has repeatedly declined to register the party under various pretexts. Opposition leaders capitalized on the delayed registration of Alga to win back public sympathy, albeit with little success. Similar protest actions in support of Alga were simultaneously organized by opposition activists in some regions, but failed to gain popular support.31 Political Movements of Note 1995-present Republican People's Party (RNPK) In October 1998, after a reported falling out with President Nazarbayev, former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin announced the formation of the Republican People's Party (RNPK) and his decision to
28 Ibid. 29 Tuyakbai finished second in the 2005 presidential election with 6.61% of the vote. 30 Marat Yermukanov, Election Authorities in Kazakhstan Warn of Black PR Syndrome, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 25 July 2007. 31 Marat Yermukanov, Kazakh Opposition Forces Press Government for Genuine Democracy, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 2 May 2007.

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run in the 1999 presidential elections. Soon thereafter, the government declared his candidacy void due to an administrative conviction for participating in an unsanctioned public gathering. In October 1999, members of the opposition founded the Forum of the Democratic Forces of Kazakhstan to strengthen their efforts against the increasing power of President Nazarbayev. Kazhegeldin was named chairman of the Forum, though obstacles erected by the government as well as internal organizational stunted its development. For two years it remained nearly dormant and in the end Kazhegeldin himself had to f lee the country and seek exile abroad. Azamat In 1996 the Azamat political movement was founded by former prominent government officials Peter Svoik, Murat Auezov, and Galym Abilseitov. Azamat attempted to play the role of constructive opposition, and formally registered in 1999 to participate in parliamentary elections of that year. It did not reregister in 2003, a prerequisite for participation in the 2004 parliamentary elections. In 2003, Auezov accepted a government-funded position as the head of the National Library. In late 2001, Svoik joined forces with the Republican People's Party and the People's Congress to form the United Democratic Party, whose slogan was "Kazakhstan without Nazarbayev." Neither party, however, participated in the 2004 elections. Because both Azamat and the United Democratic Party were plagued by a lack of funding, neither became a viable force capable of opposing Nazarbayev. In fact, neither the first nor second generation of political opposition could effectively overcome the general problem of disorganization and lack of resources. A key commonality that these opposition movements shared is that, during their emergence, Kazakhstan's elite base had not yet undergone the process of division and conf lict that later arose as a result of diversifying economic interests. In addition to their lack of independent economic resources, opposition leaders including Suleimenov and Auezov were unable to overcome social and political cleavages that they shared with others from their generation of intellectuals. Until economic interests caused a split, elites of this generation were more or less homogenous. Their political movements thus did not represent intraelite competition, which is important to party leadership development. 32 Azamat is no longer an inf luential movement, having suffered from financial woes and intimidation that weakened the movements leadership and support base. Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan movement represented a new stage in the evolution of opposition movements in Kazakhstan, if not all of post- Soviet Central Asia, brought on by the emergence of a new economic cleavage within the country's previously homogenous elite. In November 2001, ten years removed from Kazakhstans declaration of independence, the growing authoritarian rule of President Nazarbayev experienced perhaps its most significant political challenge to date. The DCK movement was created by elements of Kazakhstans business and political elite to challenge the leadership of the country, and called for decentralization of political authority (via the direct election of regional governors), a strong legislature and independent judiciary to balance presidential power. The DCK's driving force to create a competitive political system represented its desire to ensure that fair, transparent, and impartial laws would apply to everyone, including the president's family and associates-irrespective of position in the patrimonial hierarchy. The government's response to the new political movement was quick and decisive. In an early speech, then-Prime Minister Kasymzhomart Tokaev condemned the DCK and demanded the resignation of "all those who disagree with the government's policy and wish to be involved in political movements," calling the movements founders "nonprofessionals" and "schemers." Within weeks, DCK members holding government posts were replaced through presidential decree, and criminal charges alleging tax evasion and misuse of office were filed against the movement's two most outspoken leaders, Galymzhan Zhakiyanov and Mukhtar Ablyazov. Unknown "hooligans" shot up a television station sympathetic to the new movement, and firebombs were detonated in the offices of a newspaper run by one of DCKs founders. As a result of this pressure, some of the DCK's original members renounced their support for the movement, while others outright withdrew their participation. Some joined to create the new, moderate Ak-Zhol
32 Barbara Junisbai, Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intra-elite Cleavage, and the Political Opposition, Demokratizatsiya, Heldref Publications, Summer 2005, pp. 6.

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political party. Zhakiyanov and Ablyazov were jailed on criminal charges. Foreign observers, including the OSCE, characterized their trials as suspicious and politically-motivated. In the case of the DCK, the opposition's key interests and political agenda is more fully understood in the context of, and in opposition to, the existing clientelistic or patrimonial system rather than the expression of competition between clans or other traditional forms of social cleavage. 33 Although many of their founders had managed to amass large personal fortunes, they were not permitted to compete with those in the inner circle made up of Nazarbayev's family and close associates. 34 As Barbara Junisbai writes in Demokratizatsiya: As many Central Asian political observers have noted, Kazakhstan's political opposition is the most developed in the region in terms of its organizational abilities and resources. Armed with their own financial assets, direct experience with and knowledge of the government's decision-making processes, as well as public relations savvy, they have yet to translate these organizational advantages into the creation of a wide base of popular support. Sergei Duvanov, a well-known Kazakhstani journalist, has criticized the opposition's inability to rouse public sentiment in its favor, noting that not only is Kazakhstan far from Ukraine in terms of its chances for mass support for widespread political change, but also that Kyrgyzstan's opposition has been more successful at garnering public support than have their counterparts in Kazakhstan. At the same time, Duvanov argues that as the initial elite split that the DCK signaled continues, and as more of the elite f lock to the opposition and take their government experience with them, the opposition will grow more credible and stronger, and there will be greater chances for real political reform.35 In the years since DCKs primacy among alternative political movements, the opposition has stagnated and largely failed to generate public excitement or work under a unified banner, and was later officially banned. For a Just Kazakhstan Perhaps the most significant event that occurred in 2004 was the resignation of Otan party leader and parliamentary speaker Zharmakhan Tuyakbai in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections. Publicly condemning local election officials for deliberately rigging the election results and stating that he could no longer represent a party that had won due to fraud, Tuyakbai joined the opposition and was elected the chair of the opposition coalition For A Just Kazakhstan. The For a Just Kazakhstan (also known as For a Fair Kazakhstan) political movement was founded by a coalition including the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, the Ak Zhol Party and Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan as an opposition coalition to nominate a single candidate in the 2005 presidential elections. Gearing up for the 2006 presidential elections, this "radi cal opposition" united with the express purpose of presenting a unified political platform and nominating a viable single candidate for president. For a Just Kazakhstan advocated democratization of the political system, election of the regional governors, investigation of corruption cases involving the family of the president Nazarbayev and the fair redistribution of national wealth.36 Tuyakbai was officially declared the united opposition's presidential candidate in March 2005. Many political analysts in Kazakhstan have concluded that Tuyakbai's defection to the opposition signaled the continuation of internal conf lict and division within the country's political elite. Taken together, these developments suggest that Kazakhstan's current political evolution is a direct result of an ongoing intra-elite competition, which was brought on by the twin processes of economic liberalization and interest diversification among the country's elite. 37 The For a Just Kazakhstan opposition alliance suffered numerous attacks and incidents of harassment against its members throughout the year preceding the presidential elections in 2005. In May, a group of
33 Barbara Junisbai, Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intra-elite Cleavage, and the Political Opposition, Demokratizatsiya, Heldref Publications, Summer 2005, pp. 12. 34 Ibid, pp.12. 35 Ibid, pp. 17. 36 Pannier, Bruce. Kazakhstan: Can Opposition Compete In Presidential Elections? RFE/RL Daily Report, August 22, 2005. 37 Barbara Junisbai, Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intra-elite Cleavage, and the Political Opposition, Demokratizatsiya, Heldref Publications, Summer 2005, pp. 15.

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men stormed a For a Just Kazakhstan meeting and threatened to kill Tuyakbai, who escaped unharmed. Several people suffered minor injuries while police on the scene reportedly did not intervene to stop the violence. In November 1995, For a Just Kazakhstan member Zamanbek Nurkadilov was found shot dead in his home, and two nephews of Naghyz Ak Zhol leader Altynbek Sarsenbayev were beaten by off-duty police officers.38 As with other inspired political movements this decade, For a Just Kazakhstans leadership suffered under pressure and intimidation. It eventually would form the All-National Social Democratic Party and run for seats in the 2007 elections. Conclusion The present state of multi-partyism in Kazakhstan would seem to suggest a period of pause and ref lection for the opposition, which has been fragmented due to internal dissention and external pressures. While some parties such as Adilet and Azat have plans to play the role of overseers of the parliament and government, their overall popularity remains a question among a very skeptical, depressed electorate. NurOtan has successfully fended off all challengers though a mix of bullying and immense, almost bottomless, financial and political resources. The current period will undoubtedly give way at some point to a more pluralistic system, though the prospects of outside voices being heard and listened to remains questionable in the short term, even with the seemingly well-intentioned efforts of Nur-Otan to reach out to other political parties and movements. At the same time, opposition in Kazakhstan tends to be resilient, and although on the surface its apparent dormancy can be described in terms of self-assessment and reconstitution, the present state of multi-partyism in which a single party dominates should not be taken as a given over the longer term. Political opposition will revitalize, though it will require several conditions to be fulfilled. First, political parties must develop along the lines of platforms and ideas, and move away from personality-based politics. It is perhaps inevitable that some level of politics based on personal charisma or notoriety should continue in Kazakhstan; it is in fact a common feature of politics in many parts of the world and especially in post-communist transitional states. It is a sign of the overall immaturity of the political system that personalities should still by-and-large define the political system. Even Nur-Otan faces this dilemma; the ever-pervasive image of Nursultan Nazarbayev still defines the party. Nur-Otan, though, has worked hard to be a party of ideas, enjoying of course the tremendous resources, notoriety and other benefits that go along with being a presidential party-in-power. Opposition parties, which have fought hard (in some cases) to define themselves based on a platform of issues, have continued to find themselves on the margins of the political spectrum or overshadowed by parties with far better resources. Lack of funding was a recurring theme in discussions this author had with several opposition political party representatives; while they were loathe to admit this was a factor, quite truly it was among the most serious impediments they face. So, too, are the legal restrictions that parties generally must confront in funding and contributions, though some parties such as Alga appear to be a bit more buoyant in this regard 39. Nevertheless, most parties operate with very limited resources and must learn how to perfect their grassroots campaigning efforts in order to become inf luential at the national level. Opposition parties must also recognize that the party list system of voting, while an inherent disadvantage, is nevertheless the system that currently exists, which requires them to adjust their tactics in order to compete. Granted, parties had precious little time to prepare for the August 2007 legislative elections, and were ill-prepared to compete on an all party-list basis. Moreover, the ban against electoral coalitions, which was allowed in previous elections, meant that each party was truly on its own. With a 7% electoral threshold and the requirement that parties achieve a certain percentage per each oblast or major city, it was a tall order for any but the strongest parties with the most resources at their disposal to hope to compete. Ironically it was Nur-Otan itself which represented perhaps the grandest of party coalitions, when it merged with the Asar and Peoples parties, well before the 2007 elections.
38 Freedom House, Freedom in the World report, 2006. 39 It is well-known that many opposition party leaders are also businessmen, with the implication that those parties benefitting from their leaderships personal fortunes do so with the approval of the government, which has the ability to intervene decisively should the use of those personal fortunes for political activities become offensive to the regime.

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While it is inevitable that some form of single-mandate voting will return to the Kazakhstani electoral system, as the requirements of an OSCE-member state (let alone one to lead the organization in 2010!) demand that at least one house of parliament have its deputies elected directly, such is not the case now and parties need to plan accordingly. This will mean old-fashioned, grassroots political activity in the regions of the country which over time will allow the expansion of a partys base. Again, however, funding limitations and a fairly narrow operating environment will prove extremely challenging, though not impossible, to the opposition in this regard. Another dilemma surfaces for political parties with limited resources: the ability to project platform positions across all issues. While those which base themselves on one major issue, such as the revitalization of Kazakh language or on environmental issues, may gain a measure of popularity, they hardly will generate enough support to be considered a major national movement capable of having large numbers of deputies elected to parliament. As long as restrictions against electoral blocs remain in place, such parties will continue to poll low single digit numbers, at best. Likewise, parties who attempt to generate national platforms on issues affecting all voters tend to suffer from overstretch and dilution of their message by taking on more than they can easily demonstrate their ability to affect. In other words, voters remain skeptical that any party can or will improve the general situation in the country (one of the reasons why political parties and individual parliamentarians still remain fairly low in name recognition and popularity), especially those lingering in the opposition. Parties may have platforms, but the lack of demonstrated achievement together with the ever-present personality issue makes their real popularity suspect. Looking generally at Central Asia, successful opposition parties are few and far-between. One that may have evolved into more of an ideas party rather than one relying on personalities is the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). It should immediately be noted, however, that this party is the only one of its kind in Central Asia; nowhere else are religion-based political parties allowed to register. In the case of Tajikistan, this came about as a result of the June 27, 1997, National Accords on Peace and Reconciliation signed between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition, of which the IRPT was a leading member. Said Abdullo Nuris death in 2006 brought about significant changes. While not a classic, soap-box politician, Nuri did have great personal appeal as the leader of the Islamic opposition movement during the 1992-1997 Civil War. His passing brought the rise of the moderate Mohiaddin Kabiri, who assumed the partys leadership mantle. With its obvious ideological orientation towards Islam, the party has nevertheless functioned as a progressive loyal opposition that has attracted many more new followers that the government would like to acknowledge, based on genuine ides and plans to address poverty, unemployment, education, labor migration, and human rights, among other issues. This is even more remarkable considering the exceptionally tight operating environment in which they exist. Kabiri, a Ph.D holder who unlike Nuri wears western dress and is f luent in several languages, including English, is far more moderate in his approach and willing to work with the government without compromising the partys ideals, in spite of continued repressions and defections of conservative party members. Yet the partys focus remains on its policies, not on its leaders. While such a party by law could not evenregister in Kazakhstan (in fact any hint of Islamic political activity brings about harsh counter-measures by the government), it is at a minimum proof that ideas can triumph over personality-driven politics in the region. Opposition political parties in Kazakhstan have truly moved from needing basic organizational assistance or help in campaigning or strategizing to becoming a more sophisticated loyal opposition that doesnt blindly accept its fate as outsiders to the political process but which does not continue to keep itself perpetually at odds with the authorities. This is not to say that opposition parties need to fall into line or begin attending the Nur-Otan sponsored discussion clubs, but rather focus on positive elements and connecting with voters on a grassroots level hat they have previously not seen or been energized to see. Parliament: the Majilis And Senate When regarding Kazakh parliamentary tradition, one needs to begin by looking at the traditional council of biis that prevailed from the 15th to the 18th centuries. Though not a nation-state in the traditional sense, the Kazakh nomadic civilization under the Khans did live under a legislative system in which 254

regulated the Khans authority by a strict customary law called tore. The Khan was elected by a council of biis, which had important consultative, administrative functions that shared the power of khan.40 The Courts of bii used in their practice the traditional customary laws (adat) and the laws of Islam. Later, the Russian imperial administration would use this system in its governance over the region of what is now Kazakhstan. One other way of understanding the biis are as all-Kazakh congresses making collective decisions based on the guidance of the three Kazakh tribal unions or great hordes (zhuzes) Tole-bi, Kazbek-bi and Aiteke-bi. Decisions in communities in many parts of Kazakhstan today follow a form of this tradition, with Councils of Elders serving as unofficial decision-makers among clans or extended families in villages. This phenomenon is common throughout Central Asia, with the sage wisdom of Ak-Sakals governing community relations in Kyrgyzstan, in Uzbekistan through Mahallas, and in Tajikistan through Avlods. The erosion of Russian imperial power coincided with the rise of a young intellectual elite in the Kazakh territory promoting Kazakh national consciousness and identity and promoting land rights and autonomy. This eventually led to the short-lived Alash Orda government41, which nominally governed parts of northern Kazakhstan and presided over the three main tribes during the early period (1916-1919) of the Russian Revolution. Upon consolidation of power by the Bolsheviks over the regions of ethnic Kazakh pre dominance, a Supreme Soviet was set up as the exclusive domain of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (as part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) to serve as legislature of the eventual Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.42 Following its formation Alash Orda was described as a progressive and revolutionary force and was supported by the masses in large measure.43 In terms of other political movements, there was a growing pro-Bolshevik contingent who believed that the Bolsheviks would make good on their promises of equitable land reform and preservation of an autonomous Kazakh homeland. While some of the intellectual elite saw the writing on the wall and joined ranks with the pro-Bolshevik faction, others including Kolbai Togusov formed a socialist political caucus called Ush Zhuz from among the supporters of the young intellectuals Berlik (Unity) organization 44. Ush Zhuz did not enjoy a particularly long shelf life in Kazakh politics and soon disbanded, with its members later joining the Communist Party. Other groups of young intellectuals also formed in the waning days of Russian imperial rule to raise ethnic Kazakh consciousness, including Erkin Dala (Free Steppe), Igylykti Is (Good Deeds), Jas Qazaq (Young Kazakh) and Umyt (Hope), each of which were forerunners to the Alash Orda movement publishing extensively in local newspapers such as Qazaq. The Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR first formed in 1937 on the establishment of the union republics constitution, and behaved much the same way as its fellow republican legislatures in the other fourteen Soviet Socialist Republics up until the dissolution of Soviet power in 1991, that is, as an obedient republican legislature under the strict purview of the Communist Party. Technically the deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR gained their seats via elections, thirteen of them to be precise, in the life of the republic, with the first taking place on June 24, 1938. Forty years later, the Kazakh SSRs constitution was modified, which somewhat changed the way deputies were elected and formally confirmed the Supreme Soviet as the highest organ of state power.45 The legislature dealt with the issues and concerns of the republic and, as with all other union republics, ultimately deferred to Moscow on issues such as budget and development. The damage done to the republic during the years of Soviet Communism, including the disastrous impact of the Virgin Lands project on the Aral Sea as well as the long-term health effects of the horrific nuclear testing program at Semipalatinsk, were certainly issues considered in the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR, though deference to Communist Party prerogatives and priorities set in Moscow took precedent. Only in the waning days of Soviet power did issues such as these evoke a political response,
40 Anuar Galiev, Traditional Institutions in Modern Kazakhstan, The Slavic Research Center, 1998. 41 As discussed in the section of this paper dealing with political party formation in Kazakhstan. 42 The Kazakh territories were initially included as part of a Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic from 1924 and later as the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic until 1936, when it achieved full Union Republic Status. Source: Abazov, Rafis. The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central Asia, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, maps 34-39. 43 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 140. 44 Ibid p. 141. 45 http://www.parlam.kz/Information.aspx?doc=5&lan=ru-RU

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with the Semipalatinsk (Nevada-Semipalatinsk) movement becoming an inf luential interest group with international recognition and renown. It was on the basis of giving up the inherited nuclear stockpile that President Nursultan Nazarbayev made his name as leader of independent Kazakhstan; he was certainly a well-known quantity prior to this time as one of the staunchest backers of Michael Gorbachev and, ultimately, Boris Yeltsin during the coup attempt in August 1991. One challenge that pre-dated the environmentally-based and nationalist political movements of the late 1980s involved an ethnic dispute concerning the party leadership in Alma-Ata. In 1986 the Soviet authorities in Moscow installed a Russian official, Gennady Kolbin, as first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. Thousands of Kazakhs rioted in Almaty to protest the ouster of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, a Kazakh official who had held the post since the 1960s. The Soviet leadership had replaced Kunayev in an attempt to eliminate the corruption associated with his government. Exactly how many people died in the riot is unclear, though over twenty years later memories of the incident remain fresh in the minds of those who recall this almost unprecedented challenge to a decision made by the central party leadership. In the mid-to-late 1980s cracks began to appear in the Soviet political system that were ref lected at the republic level. The Kazakh uprising against the appointment of Kolbin generated several days of protests and streets riots in Alma-Ata, which many claim was a portend of other local issues that would hasten the fall of Soviet power (the next being the Nagorny Karabakh conf lict between the Armenian and Azerbaijani SSRs which erupted in 1988). While Soviet rule was never threatened in Kazakhstan, the events did revive a sense of Kazakh nationalism that would lead to new political associations and movements by the end of the decade, and ultimately lead to the rise of Nursultan Nazarbayev. These movements included the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, the ethnic Kazakh parties Alash, Azat, and Zheltoksan, and the ethnic Russian movements Edinstvo and Vozrozhdyenie. Kolbin was a supporter of the extensive political and economic reforms that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had begun to implement in the mid-1980s. In 1989 Kolbin was transferred to Moscow, and Soviet authorities appointed Nazarbayev, at the time a prominent Kazakh official, in his place. In March 1990 the USSR Supreme Soviet selected Nazarbayev for the newlyestablished post of president of the Kazakh SSR. Nazarbayev ran unopposed in the republics first democratic presidential elections, held in December 1991, and won 95 percent of the vote. Kazakhstan declared its independence later that month, shortly before the USSR broke apart. Parliament and Elections There have been four convocations of the Majilis of the parliament of the independent state of Kazakhstan, with the most recent beginning in August 2007, after the early elections to the Majilis. Following the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR on April 24, 1990, that body found itself standing as the first parliament of independent Kazakhstan in December 1991. From the beginning questions arose over the qualifications of deputies to serve in the new countrys highest legislative body. Party loyalty was perhaps an insufficient quality in ones resume to legislate, though in the early days of the parliament it stood for experience. Interestingly in 2007 similar questions arose about the deputies on Nur-Otans party list, though as will be seen the professional resumes of newly-elected were arguably more accomplished than those of previous parliaments, with professional, on-the-job training a feature of the orientation process for new deputies. Elections in 1994 The holdover parliament from 1990 began to serve as a voice of discontent as inf lation had grown exponentially in the first two years of independence, and was ultimately persuaded to self-dissolve two years prior to the end of its mandate in 1995. The new parliament was designed to be a permanent, profes sional body consisting of 177 seats, with forty of them filled by individuals chosen by the President.46 The first elections to the new parliament on March 7, 1994, included 135 seats competed for by 692 candidates, or roughly five for each seat. Just under 74% of voters participated in the election. Representatives of four political parties were elected, including the party of President Nursultan Nazarbayev the Party of Peoples Unity (32 seats won), the Peoples Congress Party of Kazakhstan (22 seats), the Socialist Party (12 seats),
46 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002, p. 102.

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the Federation of Trade Unions (12 seats) and deputies from fourteen different groups. The election was carefully managed by the authorities to exclude Communist Party members and ensure Kazakh majorities. Nearly seven in ten had never held public office before, and nine out of ten came from the ranks of state or private organizations, possibly serving as a challenge to the president. Nationalist or ethnic-based parties did not enjoy much success in the results of the election, with the Kazakh nationalist party Azat and the Slavic Union LAD-affiliated movements gaining one and four seats, respectively. An increasingly vigorous media combined with a somewhat lethargic (at least in terms of its prowess in considering and passing legislation) yet increasingly vocal parliament was hampered by a lack of legislative experience of its members, as well as the notion of the privilege of public service. This parliament, technically the thirteenth parliamentary convocation, was dismissed in March 1995 based on a constitutional court decision (resulting from a dispute filed by one complainant) which ruled that the parliamentary elections of one year prior were invalid due to administrative irregularities involving the vote counting process. Following nine months of a handpicked Peoples Assembly to succeed the parliament in an interim period, new elections were held in December 1995. Although the 1994 parliament, which existed for only one year, passed only seven pieces of legislation, individual members did begin to develop a sense of personal responsibility and civic duty rather than primarily using the office to accumulate political capital. As Martha Olcott points out, when discussing the growth toward parliamentary responsibility, parliamentary speaker Abish Kekelbayev encouraged deputies to develop committees and subcommissions to better address the business of the country, and reminded colleagues of the responsibility of the legislature to serve as a check on executive power, evoking the traditions of the historical Kazakh legislative system of biis which dated back to the fifteenth century.47 The years 1994-1995 could be considered a watershed period of sorts in the short history of parliamen tarism in Kazakhstan. The 1994 parliament, though it served but a year, could technically be considered the first professional national legislature of Kazakhstan in which deputies worked on a permanent basis. However, major lessons were learned both by the deputies and the president in terms of the role of a parliament in an emerging democracy; the president learned that the actions of a parliament elected even within severe restrictions could still not be predicted with certainty, and the deputies themselves learned the limits of parliamentarism in newly-independent Kazakhstan. 1995 Elections The First Convocation of Parliament The December 1995 elections were the outcome of a constitutional reform process that led to the pass ing of a referendum by nationwide vote on August 30, 1995, with 81.9% of voters voting in favor of the changes, which created a two-chamber parliament consisting of the upper house, the Senate (with members serving six year terms, half elected every three years) and the lower house, or Majilis (with members elected for five-year terms). The forty-seven member Senate consisted of forty deputies elected from oblast and city Maslikhats, with seven members appointed directly by the president. The Majilis featured 67 members elected in single-mandate constituencies. The December 1995 elections saw 24 deputies elected from Nazarbayevs Party of Peoples Unity, 12 from the upstart and nominally opposition Democratic Party, 21 from various trade unions and youth organizations loyal to the President, and the remaining seats divided up between the new Communist Party (2 seats) and independent candidates.48 58 deputies were male and 9 female. Deputies came with a variety of academic and professional qualifications, with all deputies having a higher education with seven having achieved doctoral degrees and another 10 Kandidat Nauk degrees.49 Thus began the first convocation of the new two-chamber Kazakhstani parliament. 1999 Elections The Second Convocation of Parliament In 1999 Kazakhstan featured the first parliament in Central Asia to have a portion of its parliament elected via party list. It is interesting to consider the state of political parties during this time; as mentioned in the section on political party formation the condition of political parties was relatively weak and tenuous at best, with none but the old Communist Party (banned from running as such in the 1994 elec47 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, pp. 109. 48 Olcott, Martha Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, p. 113. 49 http://www.parlam.kz/Information.aspx?doc=5&lan=ru-RU

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tions) garnering even 10% of the support of the population in survey polls. The mixture of single mandate constituencies and party list seats was still tilted towards individual candidates, who undoubtedly had greater appeal and recognition locally than did political party platforms. This has been and continues to be an inherent weakness of political parties in the post-Soviet sphere, which tended to be associated more with charismatic leadership and less with ideas. Political opposition began to organize more concretely after the 1995 elections, with the Azamat movement forming in 1996. 50 The Azamat Party considered itself a constructive (read: soft) opposition and was comprised of a three-person team of intellectuals and former civil servants, who advocated reform of the current system of government. They were joined by the Republican Peoples Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK), a hard opposition which sought to replace the presidential system of power. This party was led by the former Prime Minister-turned-opposition Akezhan Kazhegeldin. Kazhegeldin was disqualified from the party list for the Majilis elections. This was due to a deficient appeal for a contempt of court conviction based on an earlier administrative penalty, which was later dropped from the list of penalties barring the registration of candidates. One day after the disqualification, Mr. Kazhegeldin was detained in Moscow, based on an unrelated arrest warrant issued by Kazakhstani authorities. Following the developments, the RNPK withdrew from the party list election, citing a prior decision taken by the party congress not to run if Mr. Kazhegeldin was not registered. These were the most serious opposition parties, though the small Peoples Congress of Kazakhstan (formed in 1991) and the Republican Party of Labor and the Kazakh nationalist party Alash also claimed positions mildly critical of the president. The remaining parties to compete were all pro-presidential, and included the newly-minted OTAN (fatherland) party, the new Civic Party, the Communists, Agrarian Party, and the Kazakhstan Renaissance Party. A similar system which governed the 1995 elections was in place, with 67 of 77 Majilis seats elected via single mandate constituencies and 10 via party list, with a high 7% threshold in place. The small number of seats and application of a 7% threshold for participation in the allocation formula, considered relatively high in comparison with standard thresholds used in more established democracies, limited the number of parties that would benefit. As an initial gesture it represented a significant opportunity to strengthen political party structures as opposed to reliance on individual political personalities in local constituencies. However, the introduction of proportional representation for this small number of seats with the high threshold attached offered little risk of upsetting the existing power base in the Parliament. The republic-wide constituency for the seats elected through the party list ballot ref lects the national support for competing political parties. Opposition groups claimed that this made it particularly important as a means of illustrating the breadth of opposition to or support for the Presidents programs in general. 51 Results showed that 60% of the 77 deputies elected to the Majilis were incumbents or employed directly by the state, with another 26% emerging from the ranks of commercial enterprises. While only 39% of incumbent Majilis deputies were re-elected, more than half of the candidates from Akimats were elected. 52 Only four parties were able to surmount the 7% barrier, including OTAN (30.89%, 4 seats), the Communist Party (17.75%, 2 seats), the Agrarian Party (12.63%, 2 seats) and the Civic Party (11.23%, 2 seats). In the single mandate elections, 20 of the 67 seats were won by OTAN, with 9 more from the Civic Party and one each by the Communists, the Agrarian Party, and the opposition RNPK, with the remainder going to government-associated or business persons. Considering itself the only real opposition party, the Communists maintained at least a nominal representation, though the hard opposition parties, the RNPK and Azamat, were nearly shut out. 2004 Elections The Third Convocation of Parliament In the 2004 elections to the Majilis, which again featured 77 seats, ten elected via party list, four parties of 12 who competed successfully passed the 7% threshold, including Otan (60.61%), the opposition party Ak Zhol (formed from out of the split of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) movement after its two other leaders were sentenced to prison on charges widely viewed as politically motivated 53)
50 51 52 53 Political party formation during this period is discussed separately in this report. OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections, 10 and 24 October 1999, p. 5. OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections, 10 and 24 October 1999, pp. 28-29. Cutler, Robert M. Kazakhstan Holds Elections for a New Parliament, Central Asia- Caucasus Analyst, 6 October 2004.

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(12.04%), Dariga Nazarbayevas party Asar (11.38%), and the AIST Bloc (a coalition of the Agrarian and Civic parties ) (7.07%). The new Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan party ran candidates in a bloc with the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK), which could no longer trace its roots to the Soviet-era Kazakh SSR Communist Party. The Agrarian and Civic Parties together formed the AIST bloc for the 2004 elections. Most of the 12 political parties registered for these elections, either individually or in blocs, described themselves as pro-presidential. The largest party was Otan (Fatherland), of which President Nazarbayev was honorary chairman. The two other main pro-presidential forces were Asar, led by Ms. Dariga Nazarbayeva, daughter of the President, and the AIST bloc, a coalition of the Agrarian and Civic parties. Sixteen self-nominated candidates also played a significant part in the campaign, although a number of these were members of or supported by political parties. The campaign was generally calm, with relatively few large demonstrations or rallies. After the elections, the opposition made unsuccessful attempts to request invalidation of the elections and joined in a statement that called the elections illegitimate. The only Ak Zhol candidate elected to the parliament (Baimenov) declined to take up his seat, stating that this was in protest at the conduct of the elections. This left the Majilis without any formal opposition, as only Otan (42 total seats), the AIST Bloc (11 total seats), Asar (4 total seats) the Democratic Party (1 total seat) and Ak-Zhol (1 total seat) won seats, with 18 self-nominated candidates winning seats as well (with several of these individuals associated with Otan, formally or otherwise). The Majilis again featured deputies of high professional and academic qualification, with several Kandidati and Doctors of Science, lawyers, economists, engineers, journalists, and other professionals. Yet the results were once again far from satisfactory to the opposition. 2007 Elections The Fourth Convocation of Parliament In May 2007 a series of constitutional amendments were proposed that would fundamentally change the way deputies to the Majilis were elected, relying exclusively on the party list vote. The quantity of deputies serving in the Majilis and Senate was also changed, with 98 deputies to the Majilis elected via party list (again with a 7% threshold) with the territory of Kazakhstan representing a single national elec toral district, and 9 selected by the Assembly of Peoples. The Senate increased in size to 47 members, with 8 additional members appointed by the President totaling 15 of the 47, with the remainder continuing to be elected by representatives of Oblast Maslikhats. The Election Law was amended as well on June 19, 2007, primarily to ref lect the relevant changes to the Constitution and to define a new election system. On June 20, the President dissolved the lower house of Parliament and called early Majilis elections for August 18. Maslikhat (local council) elections were already planned for 2007, but the calling of the election to the Majilis came as a surprise to some parties. While there was a keen interest by most parties to contest the early Majilis election, they had little time to prepare. As the deadline for submitting candidate lists fell less than one month after the election was called, parties had a short time to make decisions on merging party structures and to adjust campaign strategies to the new electoral system, including the fact that parties were not allowed to form pre-election coalitions as they had been able to do in previous elections. In late 2006, well in advance of the changes to the election legislation, the Asar, Agrarian and Civic parties merged with the governing Otan party to become Nur-Otan. Nazarbayev became the leader of the party on July 4, 2007. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan did not nominate candidates for the Majilis election, stating that this was in protest to changes in the election system. 54 On election night, the CEC announced an unofficial voter turnout of 5,726,544 from an electorate of 8,870,146 (64.56 per cent). There were significant differences in turnout among the regions. In Almaty City, only 22.5 per cent of registered voters participated compared to 90 per cent in Almaty region. The CEC revised voter turnout the next day. Leaders of the All-National Social Democratic Party, Ak Zhol, and the Peoples Communist Party of Kazakhstan made a joint appeal to Nazarbayev, demanding that the parliamentary elections be canceled as illegitimate. The losing parties called for repeat elections and warned the president that
54 OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections, 18 August 2007, pp 4-5.

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the domination of a single party in parliament amounts to political stagnation and the resurrection of the one-party Soviet system. 55 It is not out of the question that a "one-party-dominant" system in Kazakhstan around a pro-presidential (rather than "ruling") party may lead to a genuine multiparty system that culminates in the legitimate alternation of another party in power. If that occurs, Kazakhstan's level of social and economic development suggests that it should not be necessary to wait many decades for this to come to pass. Also, the cultural requisites for a multiparty system are better established in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, the present political system remains highly "presidential" with little substantive role for parliament. The question for Kazakhstan, under its present constitution, is whether the political executive will allow a multiparty system genuinely to emerge.56 Institutions of the Parliament Committees The Majilis and Senate are divided into seven committees devoted to agrarian questions; legal and judicial reforms; international affairs, defense and security; social and cultural development; ecology and the environment; finance and the budgetary issues; and economic reforms and regional development. Each deputy serves on multiple committees. The committees meet regularly during the course of a well-defined parliamentary schedule, with membership determined internally by the party. In a one-party Majilis, with several current members having served in previous parliaments, Nur-Otan is able to populate the committees based on deputies relative expertise in the subject areas and based on their knowledge of parliamentary mechanisms. Each committee meets separately and as part of the entire Majilis or joint session of parliament along with the Senate during the course of the legislative calendar, which for the Fourth Convocation of parliament is scheduled from September 2007 through June 2008. Committees also take part in key regional questions, such as standardization of laws and approaches to CIS collective treaties or other agreements with neighboring countries, by meeting with counterparts from foreign legislatures at home or abroad. As with any national legislature, the schedule is demanding and deputies to multi-task and have the support staff to keep their schedules in order. The relatively small staff support enjoyed by deputies would seem to call into question their capacity to organize and meet deadlines, though no doubt the party provides overall organizational support and direction that helps guide their activities. Young volunteers from the Boloshak program are also playing an important role in assisting the work of individual deputies, which in turn gives them direct experience in the inner workings of parliament and sets them further along a course towards public service. Parliamentary Fractions and Deputies Groups Political parties represented in the parliament as well as individual deputies on behalf of their parties have the right to form political party fractions as well as deputies (interest) groups within the Majilis. Fractions are comprised of no fewer than seven deputies representing a political party, with a deputy only able to serve in one fraction at a time. The fractions serve as would-be special interest entities, advancing discussion on important issues from their constituents to the entire Majilis. They may represent the interests of farmers, for example, or other sectors within society affected by pending or proposed legislation, which of course corresponds to their party platforms. They can also lobby other deputies on certain issues such as regional problems and weigh in on the choice of Prime Minister or members of the cabinet. The organization of fractions is highly regulated according to legislative rules and procedures. There is one party fraction in the Majilis, appropriate given its one-party status, which consists of all 98 members. Deputies groups can form which consist of members of different political parties joining ranks on an issue-specific basis or through other common interest areas. Such groups must have the participation of fifteen members at a minimum. They work on legislation on a bi-partisan basis and, in theory, maintain their party lines while jointly pursuing interests of their constituents, compromising and working together to get legislation
55 Farkhad Sharip, Kazakh Parliamentary Elections Resurrect Communist-Style One- Party Rule, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 162, 4 September 2007. 56 Robert M. Cutler, Kazakhstan Holds Elections for a New Parliament, Johns Hopkins University, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 6 October 2004.

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passed. In a one-party parliament the existence of deputies groups is essentially irrelevant, though clearly this structure can have benefits for a multi-party parliament. At present there is one deputies group in the Majilis, Zhana Kazakhstana, which is comprised of 16 members who serve on various committees. All are members of Nur-Otan or the Assembly of Peoples. Legislative Plans Both the Majilis and Senate have well-defined legislative plans which guide their work from Septem ber through June. The parliamentary schedule conveniently follows a fall-to-spring approach thanks to the early August 2007 elections (parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan were previously held in the month of December). The legislative plans involve committee work in both houses, full-Majilis and Senate meetings, and joint sessions of parliament with both houses. They also meet with representatives of foreign parliaments to discuss international laws and treaties and Kazakhstans obligations to various international membership groups. Meetings are held quarterly, others even more frequently, and deal with all issues regarding legislative input and intervention, with committees meeting most frequently, followed by full sessions of the Majilis and Senate separately, and least frequently joint sessions of those two chambers. Topics range from agrarian reform, labor migration, climate change, financial planning and a host of other issues that most legislative bodies in the world address. The legislative plans for both houses are well-publicized and available online as well as in state newspapers. Education of Deputies Newly-elected, first-time deputies are trained to become working members of parliament through an on-the-job education process. They are presented with a package of key documentation to read and review, which is augmented by a special series of seminars through which to familiarize the new deputy with the relevant working document of parliament as well as with his or her duties and responsibilities. Entering parliament with a legal background is clearly a plus. The key documents to be reviewed are numerous, and include the Constitution; the Law on Parliament and the Status of its Deputies; the Law on Elections; the Law on Commissions and Committees within Parliament; the Law on Normative Rights Acts; the Codes of Conduct for the Senate, Majilis, and joint Parliament; and the Informational Directory of the Apparat of the Majilis of the Parliament, which includes fourteen sections dealing with issues such as How to Work with the Mass Media; Fostering Interparliamentary Contacts; Work of Parliamentary Committees; Information and Analytical Resources; How to Draft Laws; Organizational Structuring; How to Document and Record; Structural Functioning of the Apparat of the Majilis; and Technology Training. Additional material includes a section on Methods of Preparation of Legal Acts to be Reviewed in Parliament. The deputies also receive a crash course in the functions of the Parliament vis-vis the executive and judicial branches. But new deputies encounter a steep learning curve, with the pressing business of the country at hand; there is often precious little time to bury oneself in study. As conveyed by one deputy in the Majilis My first month was immersed in review of documentation, but that was all the time available.57 In describing ones five-year term in office (for those who have been able to serve a full term without the interruption of parliamentary dismissals or calls of early elections), the same deputy stated that the first year you are wide-eyed, the second year you begin to gain your voice, the third year you are a confident and active member of the parliament, the fourth year you begin to worry about the next election, and in the fifth year you are a lame duck.58 Todays deputies are a much betterprepared lot than the group who first entered parliament in 1994, with a combination of higher education, professional accomplishments outside of government, and often international experience. A new, young cadre of parliamentarians is beginning to make itself known, with four deputies in the newly-elected Majilis younger than age 40, and another 36 deputies between 40 and 50 years of age. Still, the median age for a deputy in the Majilis is 52, with 44 deputies falling between the ages of 50 and 59 and another 23 over the age of 60.59 Leadership in the Majilis is still dominated by experienced hands - case in point Sergei Dyachenkos unprecedented third term out of four Majilises as Deputy Chair as well as in the Senate,
57 Interview with Nurbak Rustemov, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, Defense, and Security, March 20, 2008. 58 www.parliament.kz 59 Anthony Clive Bowyer

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where the youth movement has yet to be felt and the media age is slightly higher (57 years of age). Women comprise two seats of the 47 in the Senate and 17 deputies of 107 in the Majilis. Ethnic minorities are present through the Assembly of Peoples (nine members) as well as through Nur-Otans party list, dominated by ethnic Kazakhs and, to a lesser degree, Russians. Contact with Other Parliaments The parliament maintains close contacts with a number of other parliaments in the former Soviet Union and other countries and international organizations. During its current session which began in the autumn of 2007 after the Majilis elections, deputies met with representatives of parliamentary delegations from the Russian Federation, Kyrgyzstan, Greece, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Latvia, Uzbekistan, the Council of Europe, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, CIS countries summit, NATO, Parliamentary Union of the Organization of Islamic Confederation, and others. Contact was perhaps most frequent with members of the Russian Duma, though the breadth of contacts by the current parliament is truly international and very much in keeping with what a parliament should be doing. As mentioned previously, one of the issues under discussion internally and with foreign governments is labor migration, certainly an issue of major discussion in many recipient countries in the world, including the United States. The Kazakhstani parliament has had contact with counterparts in the Jogorku Kenesh in Kyrgyzstan and the Oliy Majlis in Uzbekistan on the impact of labor migration in Kazakhstan and the rights of citizens immigrating from those countries as seasonal laborers or as permanent immigrants. The Russian Duma has also considered the question, which passed laws in 2007 tightening the laws on the number of legal migrants permitted to obtain working papers on an annual basis. Kazakhstan has thus far not established a quota, though may be heading in that direction. Both countries need skilled labor in their rapidly expanding economies, though there has been growing popular resentment in Kazakhstan (and certainly well-known cases in Russia for years) against labor migrants. This ref lects a growing sense among Kazakhstanis of difference with their Central Asian neighbors, who have traditionally sent shuttle traders to both Kazakhstan and Russia. The situation has become more of a hot button topic with uneven economic development and unemployment in Kazakhstan, yet which is still below the surface as a major issue. This is no doubt due to Kazakhstans multi-ethnic makeup and long history as a place of diverse nationalities. But 17 years of independent Kazakhstan and the forging of a national Kazakhstani identity has had an effect on the publics image of its place in the region, and in the world. Thus relations with Central Asian neighbors are critically important, though Kazakhstan clearly sees itself as a larger brother to these countries, which in an economic sense it most certainly is, if not in a military one as well (a notion no doubt disputable to the Uzbeks). Relations with Russia are open and strong; both countries share an energy nexus and realize their important role as a hub of energy export. While Russias relations with the west have cooled of late, Kazakhstan has worked to balance both Russian and Chinese interests with its many suitors in the west. Kazakhstans founding membership in the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) as well as pending chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 places it in an exceptionally unique position to be a bridge between East and West, all the more reason to engage it on a full and equal level. The parliament and its recent election have clearly had an effect on other countries in the region. Kyrgyzstans Jogorku Kenesh held an election in December 2007 that also featured an exclusive party list vote of its ninety members, though a complicated formula for determining the winners (based on 5% of the national vote and .5% of votes in each oblast) and its subsequent interpretation by the Constitutional Court left it also with an entirely progovernment legislature. Many in Kyrgyzstan have cited a Kazakh model of parliamentary development as possible and appropriate for Kyrgyzstan. The controversial degree to which the Kyrgyz elections were managed, though, amidst the known vibrancy of the political parties in the country (as opposed to Kazakhstan) cast doubt on the direction of Kyrgyz democracy less than three years after its Tulip Revolution. In fact, a super-party phenomenon may be asserting itself disguised by party list elections, as has happened with United Russia, Nur-Otan and now Ak Jol in Kyrgyzstan. A super party which assimilates other, pro-presidential parties appears necessary only in countries where there is a credible, active opposition. Such in the case in Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It has not yet happened in Uzbekistan, as there are a number of pro-presidential parties officially registered (and 262

none from the opposition) and is certainly not the case in Turkmenistan, which does not go to the pretext of needed more than one propresidential party. Tajikistan is a curious case in this sense, as the government has absorbed individual leaders of opposition movements (Lali Badakhshan, the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party, the Democratic Party, among others) into its realm, yet the all-powerful Peoples Democratic Party, while behaving as a super party, has not absorbed other parties into its realm. In fact, it has spawned two new, recently-registered parties, the Agrarian Party and the Party of Economic Reforms since the last parliamentary elections in 2005, ostensibly to compete with the main opposition Islamic Renaissance Party, Communist Party, and the Social Democratic Party. Staffing Deputies in the parliament have a surprisingly small staff, with senior leaders having a main deputy, secretary, and perhaps 2-3 assistants. All offices are outfitted with computers and internet access, and have a distinctly modern feel to them. This is no surprise given the newness of the parliament buildings, and most other things in Astanas new city. Parliamentary staff is charged with maintaining the deputies schedules and appointments, and organizing all elements of their day, much as any parliamentary staff would function. Each deputy may bring in volunteers to work on their staffs consisting of university students including those in the vaunted Boloshak program. Several young persons were seen during a recent tour of the Majilis building serving in various capacities. Research and Information The Majilis and Senate both feature small libraries where deputies, or their staff, can come to conduct research and obtain information. In the Majilis, the library is staffed permanently by a team of three researchers, including a head librarian and two assistants. A random visit during a recent work day to the library found two staffers on duty. While modest by the standards of some parliaments, the library nonetheless features a number of paper titles sorted by topic area in two main rooms, with a bank of computer terminals available for internet access. Several of the publications were in English language, including many U.S. weekly journals and quarterly political science publications. According to the Deputy Head of the Information and Research Department, Mr. Arkady Babkin, the parliament will be expanding its resources to include wireless access for researchers, including students, in the near future.60 When a deputy needs research to be conducted, he or she may do so directly, send a staff person, or more commonly make a request of the head librarian. No doubt understaffed, the library is looking to upgrade its research personnel as well as expand its holdings. There is also a parliamentary archive that is located off-site in the main library in Astana, with holdings from previous parliaments of Kazakhstan and the Kazakh SSR situated in Almaty. Access to these records, as the parliamentary library itself, is restricted and requires special permission. Contact with Constituents The deputies in the Majilis are required by Nur-Otan to meet their respective constituents for no fewer than ten days every quarter, though town hall-type forums and meetings. These meetings and information on deputies visits are chronicled on the Nur-Otan website as well as through party newspapers, as well as the parliament website. Deputies are to use this opportunity to connect with constituents, who it must be said did not directly elect them, though who nonetheless represent their interests in parliament. The phenomenon of a one-party parliament affords Nur-Otan the opportunity to behave as if its members were elected on single mandate votes, by ensuring that each electoral region has either a home grown deputy as its representative or a designated one representing their region who will meet with voters no fewer than twenty times during the course of their term in parliament. Regular constituent surveys are also conducted. A more mixed, balanced Majilis would have forced Nur-Otan to re-think its national strategy; in essence they have achieved the best of both words: used the party apparatus to gain all seats in the parliament and eliminate the so-called evils of personal demagoguery, and by virtue of this clean sweep make personal connections with voters and establish, at least in theory, a popular base of support on an individual and party level. Apathy of the voters of Kazakhstan and the relative weakness of alternative political parties notwithstanding, the election and its results represented a perfect storm of sorts for the ascension and total dominance of Nur-Otan in the political life of the country.
60 Interview with Arkady Babkin, Deputy Head of the Information and Research Department of the Parliament, March 20, 2008.

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Ethnic Dimension Would any cleavages perhaps exist or play themselves out on an ethnic basis in the parliament? In recognition of the ethnic tapestry that is Kazakhstan, the constitutional amendments adopted in 2007 added nine members of the Assembly of Peoples as deputies to the Majilis. The nine deputies are elected by members of the 400-person strong Assembly of Peoples, who are in turn elected by lower-level assemblies. In the fourth parliamentary convocation, i.e. the present version of the Majilis, the nine deputies represent the ethnic Russian, Ukrainian, Tatar, Uzbek, Belorussian, German, Korean, Uighur, and Balkar communities. These deputies behave as any other in their parliamentary duties and responsibilities, and are elected to office as any other, that is, indirectly. The Assembly of Peoples has been around for a decade, though it had not previously enjoyed a nine-seat quota in parliament, which officials hasten to point out corresponds with world experience. Kazakhstan is one of the least ethnically homogeneous countries in the world, and the notion of designated seats being made available for some of the countrys ethnic minorities is a noble one, as the constitution prohibits political parties to be created based on a nationalist or religious basis. The Assemblys role appears to be one of diffusing potential ethnic conf lict and maintaining harmony among peoples. The members of the Assembly that this author met with hailed the institution as a harbinger of good will, though under the surface it was clear, for example, that Kazakhstani Azerbaijanis and Armenians opted not to share the same yurt as one another, so to speak. Nur-Otan members added that technically it is not a one-party parliament after all, as some of the deputies from the Assembly of Peoples were not registered with Nur-Otan. Construction cranes continue to dominate the rapidly expanding Astana skyline, and housing is being built at breakneck speed in Almaty and other cities. Nevertheless, the global credit crunch seems to have affected the pace of construction, at least in the capital, where several projects have been delayed or faced slower timelines for completion, including the new 35,000 retractable roof sports stadium on the outskirts of Astana. The gleaming new buildings of Astana, an oasis on the steppe, are clearly part of the presidents priority and grand vision to project a new image of Kazakhstan, fueled by the earnings of the natural resource industry. Infrastructure development has been somewhat less even in other parts of the country, and unemployment remains a major concern of the population; the problem of unemployment was the most often-mentioned response in a question asking respondents to name the most important issue Kazakhstan is facing.61 Trailing closely behind were responses also addressing financial issues, increase of living minimum and economy development. The problem of unemployment was the most frequently cited problem at the local level, and financial difficulties and (lack of) jobs were cited most commonly at the household level.62 Housing problems (47.7%) and migration and migrants (36%) were cited in a survey sponsored by IRI and BRIF in 2006 as areas in which there are real tensions in society along with interethnic relations (35.5%).63 Kazakhstans expanding middle class is in need of affordable housing, and natural tensions are arising with groups of migrants who, ironically, have sought employment in the construction sector mainly from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. While tensions with those groups do not appear to have reached a tipping point, incidents among ethnic groups already residing in Kazakhstan have raised the temperature among the public to a small though noteworthy degree, including last years clashes between ethnic Kazakhs and Chechens in the villages of Malovdnoye and Kazatkom, an incident which caused some soul-searching among citizens of a country that had heretofore no reason to question the level of interethnic harmony in their multi-national, multi-cultural country.64 Members of the Senate, Majilis and Assembly of Peoples were quick to point out, however, that these were isolated events and not symptomatic of brewing ethnic discord, in spite of the Chechen diaspora leaderships claims that facts in the case were covered up by local authorities. One other potential cleavage with a much higher potential to cause debate among members of parliament involves regionalism. In matters of budgetary discussion, clearly among the most heated in the
61 62 63 64 IRI Public Opinion Survey , 2004. IRI Public Opinion Survey , 2004. IRI-BRIF Public Opinion Survey, 2006. Bruce Pannier, Kazakhstan: Deadly Melee Leaves Unanswered Questions, RFE/RL, 2 April, 2007.

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Majilis, deputies tend to lobby for their home regions over others, which is a totally natural and expected condition (compare it with the congressional budget debates in the United States and the instances of pork barrel politics). While bridges to nowhere and lobster museums may not find their way into the annual budgets of Kazakhstan, economic investment and infrastructure development are hot button issues and a source of serious discussion in the parliament. Parliamentary Watchdogs Among the non-governmental organizations keeping watch over the work of parliament are the Association of Sociologists and Politologists of Kazakhstan (ASIP) and the Kazakhstan Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, which both have projects to monitor the work of the Parliament (Majilis). The Bu reau is not supported by any donor specifically, and started this project under their own institutional support. They have established contacts with some members of parliament who have sent draft laws related to human rights to the Bureau for review, based on their expertise. The Bureau also gathers information on public activities of members of parliament, including their written articles and interviews to the press, etc. They also are monitoring the implementation of campaign promises made by the party during the election campaign and plan to make a comparison of these promises with actual results achieved at the end of the calendar year.65 The Bureau, led by long-time human rights activist Evgyeni Zhovtis, maintains a somewhat tenuous though respected place among the few parliamentary monitoring organizations active in the country. Zhovtis is skeptical of the positive impact of the May 2007 constitutional amendments on the advancement of democracy in Kazakhstan, which he suggests led to the inevitable condition of (the return of) one-party rule in the country. ASIP is another of the prominent monitoring groups. Which conducts public opinion polling on a quarterly basis on a variety of topics including the work of the parliament, the president, and issues related to economic and political development. ASIP, which publishes survey information on a weekly basis through the newspaper Moskovskiy Komsomolets and makes results available through the mass media as a whole. Members of parliament have also requested specific ASIP data to take the pulse of public opinion and compare results with those derived from their own survey research. Although the authorities do not interfere in the work of ASIP, they dont actively support this work either.66 Survey results indicate that the country is still recovering from a post-election trauma and things are quiet with a low level of political activity at present. Results from a recent survey indicate that respondents have a very low level of recognition for political parties, and moreover, a very low level of interest in politics and the work of political parties. Further, the survey suggests that Nur-Otan and the government is seriously out of touch with the rest of the country, that they are operating in a vacuum and cannot see the real situation beyond their own immediate interests.67 ASIP gets funding support from a variety of sources, including both international and domestic. Changes Introduced Via Constitutional Amendment In May 2007 the Senate and Majilis were granted greater authority to serve as a check-and-balance over the executive branch as a result of a number of amendments to the constitution. The Senate received greater decisionmaking powers, including assuming the legislative powers of the Majilis if that house was dissolved by presidential decree prior to the end of its term, a prophetic development as it turned out. The parliament has now been vested with the ability to call a vote of no confidence on the government with a simple majority vote, as opposed to a 2/3 vote as required before. The government is also to be formed according to parliamentary majority, which considering the current dominance of Nur-Otan offers little drama, though in theory it could spark debate among several different parties should there be such diversity in the future. The Senate seems to be the beneficiary of the changes, as they now can appoint two members of the Constitutional Council as well as two members of the CEC. In terms of the elections, those who designed and approved the system insist the all-party list vote to the Majilis and the 7% barrier were consistent with European standards and in keeping with the mental65 Interview with Evgyeni Zhovtis, Chairman of the Kazakhstan Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, April 4, 2008. 66 Interview with Dr. Bakytzhamal Bekturganova, Head of the Kazakhstan National Association of Social and Political Scientists, March 20, 2008. 67 Interview with Dr. Bakytzhamal Bekturganova, Head of the Kazakhstan National Association of Social and Political Scientists, March 20, 2008.

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ity of the Kazakhstani public.68 Senator Kuanysh Sultanov, Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Policy, Defense and Security, acknowledged that he had expected more parties to gain seats in the new Majilis as a result of the changes, which were introduced to strengthen multi-party democracy and move elections away from personality-driven beauty contests. In Sultanovs words, this was done to stimulate ideas and the electorate. It appears to have stimulated Nur-Otan, at least in the short term, and served to demoralize the opposition, which had scarce little time to prepare for the campaign. Sultanov was scarcely able to contain his disappointment at the low number of parties with representatives in the Majilis, and added quickly that the process of election law reform remains evolutionary and subject to further revision; to wit, a new CEC-led taskforce has been set up to include the participation of political parties, NGOs and other electoral stakeholders to study the election law and examine western experience in elections as well as the mentality of the Kazakh voter.69 Whether or not subsequent discussions lead to changes in the system of electing deputies to the Majilis, it is clear that the opposition itself certainly bears some responsibility for its poor showing in the August 2007 elections. Infighting and weak leadership played a deleterious role on the standing of several parties, including the ever-present funding challenges and access to media. But the infamous split of Ak-Zhol and, some would argue, the Communist Party as well as the near obscurity of several other, smaller parties and the somewhat limited effectiveness of independent watchdog groups left the voters to ponder their real alternatives. Countdown to 2010 Less than two years remain until Kazakhstan assumes the rotating mantle of OSCE leadership, and while the western democracies including the United States are openly supportive, they are privately worried at the prospect of a Kazakhstan-led, Russian-inspired effort to remake the organization, long viewed as being at odds with Moscow in key areas of policy. In his speech to the Madrid organizing conference in December 2007, Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin reacted to the conditions put upon Kazakhstan by the OSCE that needed to be met in calendar year 2008 in order for Kazakhstan to formally comply with the terms of its pending chairmanship. These include amending the law on the media, reforming the election law, including liberalizing registration regulations for political parties, making media coverage of the elections more equitable, increasing the authority of local government vis-vis the central government, and creating a more effective system of dialogue between the government and civil society.70 When questioned as to the progress made in these areas to date, Tazhin acknowledged that Kazakhstan was still studying the requirements, but pledged that the changes would be undertaken in the second half of 2008. With one quarter of the year nearly passed, Kazakhstan would appear to have much work remaining to address the issues mentioned by the OSCE as essential items to be solved prior to the end of the year as a condition on their chairmanship. The CEC Taskforce thus assumes an even greater, more urgent role, as it must consider political party and media laws in addition to the election code. While it is unlikely that any special elections to the parliament will be called as a result of this process, something significant will need to take place in the area of legislative change in order for Kazakhstan to be judged compliant with its obligations as incoming Chair in 2010. One can expect, at least to start, that the 7% party list barrier and the 50,000 signature requirement for political parties to register will be high on the list of possible changes to the code. This alone will not satisfy the OSCE, however, which will be closely watching and carefully monitoring the work of the CEC Taskforce.

68 Presentation by Senator Kuanysh Sultanov, Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Policy, Defense and Security, Parliament of Kazakhstan, delivered at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, April 9, 2008. 69 ibid 70 Socor, Vladimir. Kazakhstan to Chair the OSCE: Splitting the Russia-Led Bloc? Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 266 226, December 6, 2007.

Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia

S. Frederick Starr
Summary and Recommendations This Silk Road Paper was written by S. Frederick Starr at the request of the Policy Panning Unit of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was commissioned after a joint seminar s conducted in Helsinki in January 2006, focusing on priorities toward the Caucasus and Central Asia for the Finnish EU Presidency in the second half of 2006. The writer is grateful to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for this initiative and for its support for this research. The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the Finnish government, or the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Clans, regional elites, and financial magnates are a formidable presence in the politics of all Central Asian countries. Working behind the scenes, they have placed leaders in power for over forty years and define the nature of politics today. The fundamental political dynamic in each country is between the president and these power brokers, not between president and parliament, as is often assumed in the West. Any effort to advance democratic norms must be built on the recognition of this reality. Because of their lack of resources and personnel and their dependence on largely invisible power bro kers, authoritarian rulers view themselves as weak. The countries they rule are in fact not over-governed but under-governed. The presidents desire to emancipate themselves from control by the power brokers who put them in office and thus strengthen their rule can lead them to look favorably on parliaments and parliamentary elections, albeit for their own purposes. This is true even though parliaments may ultimately challenge the rulers authority. Day-to-day parliamentary practice helps create a political class and concept of citizenship that is independent both of the authoritarian rulers and of the clans, magnates, and regional power brokers who put the parliamentarians in office. Recognizing the above, Europe, in its efforts to advance democratization, should: 1. Focus more on parliamentary elections than on presidential elections, as these have the greatest potential for advancing the concept of citizenship with the least threat to overall stability. 2. Focus more on parliamentary practice and on political parties through exchanges and support, rather than on the development of NGOs. The day-today practice of parliaments and parties develops a political class that in turn reshapes government at both the local and national levels. NGOs, by contrast, are generally viewed as the creations of external interests and not part of the normal political process. 3. Pressure to remove authoritarian rulers is likely to lead either to the indefinite prolongation of their rule or to a descent into crises. The most likely outcome of crises in Central Asia is either the reaffirmation of the former inter-clan pacts, with dire consequences for the losing factions, or the creation of new pacts, leading to the repression of all those regions, clans, families and magnates who formerly held sway. Either outcome would be gravely destabilizing for each country and for the region as a whole. Europe will be in a position to inf luence the evolution of political life in Central Asia only to the extent that it also makes a commitment to the regions security and to its economic development. As noted above, national leaders feel themselves to be weak and beholden to clans, regional power brokers and magnates, as well as to external powers (mainly Russia) with whom the latter are often aligned. To the extent that Europe responds to the leaders security concerns and need for investment it will have a voice in how political life in the region evolves. Central Asias Dual Political Systems Politics in Central Asia, as well as in Azerbaijan, puzzle and frustrate western observers. To varying degrees. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have all 267

been dismissed as authoritarian systems, hostile to democracy and the rights of citizens. Similar concerns have been voiced for Georgia and Armenia. Yet the prescriptions favored by the EU and USA for addressing these supposed pathologies have had little positive effect and may be making matters worse. Given the growing importance of these states, a better understanding of their politics is past due. Immediately after these countries gained independence in 1992, western countries focused their assistance on developing new parliaments, parties, laws, and courts. Gradually, however, it became clear that the presidential (as opposed to parliamentary) systems adopted everywhere had opened the door for powerful individuals to rise to the fore and claim authoritarian powers. Notwithstanding the fact that they came from substantially different cultures (Turkic versus Persian; nomadic versus oasis versus mountain), presidents Akaev, Aliyev, Karimov, Nazarbayev, Niyazov, and Rokhmonov all consolidated their grip in very similar ways, and to the detriment of political parties and parliaments. Western critics viewed these presidential systems as a long step backwards, notwithstanding that they trace their genealogy through Yeltsins Russia back to the France of de Gaulle. Accordingly, western governments have supported NGOs that work outside the systems rather than political forces that work within them. Naively convinced that matters could not get worse, the westerners policies towards all six countries at times border on calls for regime change. It should be stressed that the problem of Central Asian politics is not simply one of presidential might versus feckless parliamentsa relationship which we might call Politics A. Indeed, that relationship is something of a sideshow to what is occurring on the main political stage, which is dominated by great power brokers and the networks they control. On that main stage, presidents and parties, as well as parliaments, are engaged in a constant struggle with these power brokers and networks, which western analysts misleadingly refer to as clans. It is convenient to refer to this second pair of contests as Politics B. Because the key factors in Politics B are virtually invisible to outsiders, they have proven frustratingly elusive. Family Networks, Regional Power Centers, and Economic Barons The so-called clans that dominate the invisible politics (Politics B) of Greater Central Asia (includ ing Azerbaijan and Afghanistan) can be divided into three groups. First, the formerly nomadic peoples, the Kyrgyz Kazakhs, and Turkmens, are comprised of large kinship systems that are in turn subdivided into lower units culminating in individual families. The three Kazakh hordes or zhuses extend deep into Xinjiang and embrace all people calling themselves Kazakh. Analogous groupings divide northern and southern Kyrgyz. The next lowest level in both peoples can fairly be called a tribe or clan. For both the Kyrgyz and the Turkmen these remain an important source of identity, as they were formerly among the longer-settled Uzbeks. These family groups have long memories. The present president of the Kyrgyz Republic, Kurmanbek Bakiev, is described in the West as a south erner. Yet among the Kyrgyz it is know that back in the 1880s his tribe or clan broke ranks with the other southern tribes and cooperated with the hated Uzbeks of Kokand. Thus, some of his most bitter foes are fellow southerners. Second, are the regional networks that exist in every country. Based on close economic and political ties and accent (in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also on language) these regional networks are extremely powerful, ref lecting the diverse emirates and local power centers of earlier centuries. The largest of these, acting alone (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan) or in alliance with another regional power center (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan), have long dominated the politics of each country. Control of the territory of present-day Uzbekistan long fell to local elites from the two largest cities, Tashkent and Samarkand. Gorbachevs effort to dethrone this alliance and replace it with one based on Ferghana and Khorezm failed dismally. In Tajikistan, the transfer of power from north (Khojent) to south (Kulyab) led to civil war, while Kyrgyzstans 2005 Tulip revolutions shifted political power from north to south, which gravely destabilized that country. No wonder that Niyazov in Turkmenistan presents himself as above tribal and regional groupings and stresses (to the point of absurdity) a general Turkmen nationality. The third source of Politics B power in Central Asia derives from control of resources. In pre-Soviet times this meant the emirs control of irrigation systems. Today it means control of whole sectors of the 268

economy, whether cotton, power, mineral extraction, construction, or transport. The authority of these magnates often dates to Soviet times, and is therefore deeper than that of Russias recently minted oligarchs. The inf luence of some of these magnates or barons often overlaps or merges with regional power centers or even kinship groups. In the case of a number of individuals, their inf luence is reinforced by illegal activity. The renowned Gafur in Tashkent may resemble a mafia don but his power extends deep into the central government. How the Soviet System Dealt with the Power Brokers or Clans A paradoxical result of the Soviet colonial system is that it transformed local power brokers and clan leaders into civic and even national leaders. They may have been in conf lict with one another locally, but they had a common interest in protecting their republics from Moscow. During the 1920s and 1930s Moscow tried to suppress such locally-based political networks in the region. Later, during the less repressive era following Stalins death, Moscow allowed them free rein so long as they delivered the production and social control that the Communist Party demanded of all republics. Clan and local interests differ sharply within each country. Under Soviet rule the task of balancing these divergent interests fell to the Politbureaus, meeting behind closed doors. To achieve this they backed strong local leaders like Rashidov in Uzbekistan, Usubaliev in Kyrgyzstan, Kunaev in Kazakhstan, Aliyev in Azerbaijan, Gapurov in Turkmenistan, and Rasulov in Tajikistan. These men gained legitimacy because the local power brokers supported them. The resulting authoritarian systems of rule f lourished under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and lasted for thirty years. The rise of Gorbachev in the 1980s brought a decisive end to these arrangements. In the name of anticorruption and the restoration of Soviet norms, Gorbachev effected a revolution.1 Between 1982 and 1986 all five Central Asian leaders disappeared from the scene, whether through death, retirement, or firing. In their places Gorbachev named reliable servants of Moscow, all of whom quickly proved themselves incapable of maintaining the old balances, of protecting the interests of the titular nationality against Russia, and of maintaining the local economy. Local dissatisfaction spread, and burst out in violence in the first major anti-Soviet revolt of the era of glasnost, in Almaty in 1986. Even where there was no violence, the power brokers, clan leaders, and magnates who had heretofore controlled local affairs began to regroup. With the first elections in 1989 they re-imposed the balances that had worked for thirty years, and then lent their backing to new, younger leaders who could serve in their behalf. Thus, it is the power brokers, clan leaders, and magnates who launched presidents Akaev, Nazarbayev, and Karimov, rather than vice versa. In Tajikistan their failure in this effort led directly to the civil war of 1993-97. Only in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan did the new leaders arise with a broader and more personal mandate. Everywhere, however, the new leaders were confirmed by election during the last year of Soviet rule, and then reconfirmed by subsequent votes immediately after independence. 2 This was the case also in Azerbaijan where Ayaz Mutalibov had himself elected in late 1991, but was unseated by a popular revolt linked to his poor performance in the Karabakh war. Thus, independence in four of the five Central Asian republics and in Azerbaijan was, in political terms, less a revolution than a restoration. People in all five new countries believed they had reversed the revolution that Gorbachev had attempted to impose on them. In doing so, they expected that the relative prosperity of the 1970s would soon return, and that their lives would continue as formerly, but with the added benefit of full national sovereignty. Politics A, Politics B, and the Authoritarian Rulers Many dismiss the professed interest of Central Asian leaders in national elections and even parliaments as mere cynicism. After all, if they were to apply systematically the principle of one person one vote they would upset delicate regional and other balances and risk throwing their country into chaos. But
1 James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republics Road to Sovereignty, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1991, Ch. 3, esp. p.43. 2 A good study of the phenomenon of deals between clans and the post-Soviet leaders is Kathleen Collins, The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories, World Politics, vol. 56 no. 2, January 2004, pp.224-61.

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their involvement with elective politics is not mere cynicism. For no sooner were the new leaders in office than they began working to emancipate themselves from the control of the power brokers, clan leaders, and magnates. The presidents appreciated that carefully controlled national elections could strengthen their own hand without upsetting any of the internal balances on which their rule depended. Of course, it was out of the question that any of the presidents would follow Yeltsin and allow the local election of governors or hakims. This would have allowed local magnates to create what in effect would have become states within states. This happened in Russia under Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin made apriority of reversing this once in power. The presidents of Central Asian states all opposed this on the same grounds that the French have always done. For the same reason the presidents embraced the notion of carefully controlled national parliaments. True, in every country local magnates worked hard to shape the electoral processes, as had occurred in the early history of all the western democracies. From the presidents standpoint, the goal was to use parliaments to dilute the magnates control locally. It did not hurt that election to parliament brought more than a few of these magnates to the capitals, where they were under the presidents constant watch and control. The only president who doubted his ability to control the situation was Niyazov, who therefore established a council of clan elders that worked in parallel with the parliament and could be invoked as a brake on parliamentary restiveness. Bicameral legislatures in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also served as effective brakes on parliamentary caprice, since the upper houses invariably included local officials who had been appointed by the president. Karimov, who initially thought he could prevail with a unicameral legislature, shifted in 2004 to a bicameral system, with the upper house dominated by officials and other presidential appointees. From the rulers perspective, this was a completely logical step. Periodic national and parliamentary elections could serve a useful purpose to the extent they would engage the populace with the presidents programs and ratify the presidents general course. What was not acceptable was to turn over the great question of balancing regional, clan, and family interests to the principle of one person one vote. Instead, legislatures dominated by an unofficial presidential bloc, provided solid assurance that the elective principle would not undermine the fragile presidencies or, equally important, tamper with the political balances or deals on which those presidencies depended. Presidential Power, Parliaments, and Politics B Authoritarianism requires an authoritarian ruler. It is tempting to explain the appearance of such rulers in terms of their personalities. But in Central Asia the individuals in question, Presidents Akaev, Kari mov, Nazarbayev, Niyazov, Rokhmonov, and also Aliyev differ, so sharply in background and outlook as to question whether they share any authoritarian profile. Alternatively, one could explain such rulers in terms of culture. In Central Asia, this usually means defining these five states as uniformly oriental and therefore inclined to oriental forms of despotism. Yet the diverse cultural heritages of the countries in question --Turkic versus Persian, formerly nomadic versus formerly oasis dwellers-- throws this hypothesis into question. Or, finally, one could blame authoritarianism in the region on acculturation gained through years of Soviet rule. This thesis has some merit, but it, too, must be qualified. While it is true that most former Soviet states followed Russia in endowing their presidencies with Gaullist powers, the Baltic republics chose a very different path and others may yet do so. Why, then, did the others opt for authoritarian rule? Because it promised to resolve a genuine problem in the polity that might otherwise have posed dangers to the states very existence. This common problem, evident across Central Asia, is posed by the continued existence of powerful sub-national local networks, clans, families, and wealthy magnatesin short, Politics B. This explains why Central Asian presidents view elections more as a means than an end. The end is to emancipate themselves from control by the local networks, clans, and magnates who put them in office, but without at the same time making themselves subservient to parliaments which those same power brokers could control. Presidential elections serve this end well, for they enable the president to say he is beholden only to the people. Parliamentary elections pose greater problems, however, because they can be controlled by the very networks, clans, and magnates from whom the presidents are trying to free themselves. 270

In the history of democratization, there is nothing unusual in rulers viewing the vote as a means of strengthening their control rather than an end in itself. But any attempt to use democracy in this way entails great risk. Karimov in Uzbekistan tried to do this when he embraced an alliance with the U.S. It was the hope of his key advisors that the democracy promotion clauses that they inserted prominently in the Strategic Partnership agreement signed after 9:11 could be used to exert pressure on the main power base of the regional networks and magnates, namely, the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, the U.S., preoccupied with the operations in Afghanistan, did not exert the pressure that the reformers around Karimov (Safayev, Gulyamov, etc.) had hoped it would. This undercut the reformers and forced Karimov himself back into the hands of the power brokers. As this happened, Uzbekistan again embraced the Russian/Chinese authoritarian model, which posed no danger to the countrys traditional power brokers. A Further Paradox: The Deficit of Government Under Authoritarian Rule The notion of independence as a restoration of the status quo ante in Central Asia helps explain a peculiarity of the dilemma in which the new leaders found themselves. For in spite of the publics expectations of a smooth return to prosperity enhanced by independence, the new states faced a formidable challenge. For independence destroyed the capacity of the state to collect taxes and in turn use them to pay civil servants who would deliverneeded services. At the same time, it generated an urgent need to create new and costly institutions like armies and ministries. It fell to the new presidents to meet these demands. Both the international and national communities expected them to do so, while grossly underestimating the complexity of the task and their lack of human and financial resources. The international community may have been impressed by the presidents exceptional powers de jure, but the presidents themselves were overwhelmed by the acute awareness of their actual weakness. This gave the presidents an interest in strengthening the de facto powers and resources of their office, an interest that set them at odds with the regional elites and clans that had installed them in power and upon whom they depended. Anyone watching from this perspective would have sensed how privatization, demanded by international donors and financial institutions, revealed the presidents power or lack of it. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the presidents embraced privatization. While the resulting process created many instant millionaires, presidents Nazarbayev and Akaev were nonetheless able to maintain control and balance in the polity. In Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan the presidents encouraged the establishment of small and medium businesses but shied away from privatizing larger firms as this would inevitably have upset the fragile political balances in the country. Paradoxically, it is precisely those presidents whom the outer world judged as most authoritarian who were least able to use their supposedly limitless powers to privatize in such a way that it would strengthen, rather than undermine, the prevailing balances. In long refusing to privatize larger firms, presidents Rokhmonov, Niyazov, and Karimov acknowledged the severe limits of their power vis--vis local elites and clans. The weaker they felt themselves to be, the more they tried to exploit national symbols to generate centripetal force. Meanwhile, regional elites and clans controlled whole sectors of the economy by their domination of state industries. To elevate the voice of the capital and their own authority, the presidents all promoted nationalism (Rokhmonovs cult of the Samanids, Karimovs cult of Timur, and Niyazovs cult of himself, not to mention Akaevs cult of Manas, and Nazarbayevs new capital at Astana) and undertook populist policies that reached over the main power blocs directly to the people. The supposedly authoritarian rulers of Central Asia have all been functioning under conditions of actual under-government, which they lack the resources to correct. In the absence of such resources, they resort to bluster and bombast, and to direct appeals to the public at large. This explains Niyazovs decision to subsidize cooking oil and electricity and Karimovs decision to increase expenditure on health and education, even after the economy began to falter after 1998. It also explains Nazarbayevs successful effort to renationalize part of the Kazkah oil industry, and Akaevs wifes attempt to create a national foundation under her exclusive control that would promote Kyrgyz welfare. Above all, it helps explain the presidents efforts to enrich themselves or, in Karimovs case, seize control over the use of assets. Venality doubtless played a role in this, but it was also driven by the authori271

tarian rulers perceived need to redress their actual weakness. Indeed, control over financial resources whether personal or through the states became equated with control over the political system. Why Civil Society May Not be an Effective Agent of Change This, then, is the peculiar nature of authoritarianism in post-independence Central Asia. While many politicians and journalists who have come afoul of the prevailing system have good grounds for complaining about the presidents seemingly unlimited powers, the reality is different. The countries all suffer not from too much but from too little government. They suffer from high officials who lack the resources to provide the basics of normal governance and welfare, and from lower civil servants who are both grossly under-qualified and under-paid. Above all, they suffer from presidents who are beholden to ironclad understandings with powerful but largely invisible regional, clan, and economic power brokers. Even if they wanted to do so, the presidents cannot escape from these arrangements and embrace fully democratic forms of legitimacy. To do so would, in their view, threaten the stability of the state. How, then, can more open and participatory systems come into being? What forces, if any, will soften the prevailing presidentialism and bring about a greater degree of civic participation? Is it possible for this to occur through a process of evolution? Or will such changes come about only through crisis? For a dozen years after independence western countries all assumed that the systems would quickly evolve in the way they desired. To hasten the process they lent support to what they called civil society, groups and forces outside the government that could be provided with training and financial support from abroad in the expectation that they would gradually take root at home and spearhead greater openness. The evidence to date suggests this tactic has not worked. On the one hand, few members of the broader public in the region consider such civil society organizations to be truly indigenous, as they depend almost entirely on foreign funding and foreign-educated locals drawn mainly from the elite of the capitals. On the other hand, members of the governments, especially officials at the local level, see these foreign-sponsored groups as undermining their own authority. Such organizations rarely work through or with local officials, whom they (correctly) judge to be largely unreformed holdovers from the Soviet era. Being comparatively well-funded, they daily remind the governments of their own lack of resources, incompetence, ineffectiveness, and overall fragility, but without providing those same governments and the bureaucrats who comprise them with the means of improving the situation from within. No wonder the bureaucrats view the foreign-sponsored civil society organizations as elements of instability. The Wests strategy for introducing greater openness into the governance of Central Asian states has led on both sides to an unproductive confrontation. During 2005-6 this blossomed into full-blown conf lict between the governments and civil society organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. Earlier, Turkmenistan had severely restricted such organizations. By late 2005 Kazakhstan began to move in the same direction. Many NGOs are choosing to leave the region, if they are not meanwhile expelled. As a result, many international groups have abandoned the hope of a peaceful transition and are looking instead to regime change as a precondition to progress. Yet Kyrgyzstans experience since March 2005 gives cause for concern as to the viability of this option. And so we return again to the question: are there any evolutionary processes that might in time bring about change in the direction of more open and participatory systems? NGOs may not be a very effective tool for achieving this but there is mounting evidence that specific aspects of the electoral process and associated activities are. However, not all elections and activities are equally efficacious in this regard. It is therefore worth examining in turn presidential elections, parliamentary elections, parliamentary practice, and the life of political parties in order to pinpoint which have of these are most likely to foster democratization. Why Presidential Elections Are Weak Agents of Reform Presidential elections garner national and international attention like no others and become a litmus test for the state of democracy in a given country. This is unrealistic. Not only are the stakes highest in these elections but they most directly affect those with the greatest capacity to inf luence improperly the outcome, i.e., the presidents. 272

The simplest means of shaping the outcome of a presidential election is to eliminate potential opponents. Long before Putin jailed potential rival Mikhail Khodorkovskii, Presidents Nazarbayev and Karimov had driven their rivals Akezhan Kazhegeldin (Kazakhstan) and Abdurrahim Pulatov and Muhammad Solikh (Uzbekistan) from the country, and Presidents Akaev and Niyazov had their rivals Feliks Kulov and Boris Shikhmuradov jailed. President Rokhmonov neutralized his Islamist rival Akbar Turajonzodah through jobs and money but made sure his other rival, Abdumalik Abdulajanov, would be arrested if he reentered the country. In all these instances we see authoritarianism in its most ruthless form. More sophisticated measures for controlling presidential elections are also readily at hand, as President Akaev demonstrated when he introduced a Kyrgyz language test into the election law and then used it effectively against his rival, Kulov. The president needs do nothing. The entire bureaucracy, including those charged with managing elections locally, are beholden for their positions solely to the president. Under such conditions, an official in charge of any region that votes less than overwhelmingly for the incumbent can reasonably fear for his job. In the rare case that an authoritarian leader warns local bureaucrats not to interfere, as occurred in Azerbaijan in the 2003 presidential elections, local administrators still have good reason to stuff the ballot boxes. These and countless further examples show that presidential elections, because they often reinforce the worst tendencies in a polity, are the least likely agents of positive evolutionary change. Indeed, they can even make authoritarian regimes more durable. Acknowledging this, the ability of authoritarian presidents to manipulate presidential votes is subject to more constraints than a generation ago. The new states all turned over the management of elections over to electoral commissions, which operate according to written rules and procedures and whose members and heads, unlike the presidents, cannot hide from international evaluators and critics. The recently introduced practice of international ballot watchers has also introduced new elements of transparency. It is unlikely that many American or European elections in the nineteenth century would have passed the kind of scrutiny that is now normal for elections in developing countries. Parliamentary Elections as a More Promising Arena of Change In most countries democratization began when elites sought to curtail the absolute authority of the throne. They acted through and in the name of parliaments, which began as the institutional channel for the assembled elite to parlez collectively with the monarch. Over time these bodies claimed the right to offer their collective views on such matters as the levying of taxes and the waging of war. This did not come about smoothly: in England in required the multiple crises that led to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and in Sweden soon afterwards it entailed the mass execution of the challenging elites. But if relations between parliaments and thrones often descended into armed conf lict (France in 1788- 9 and Russia in 1907-17) the process of selecting assembly members has been regularized and gained acceptance through multiple smaller confrontations. Thus, regularized electoral processes can serve as a stepping stone along a path leading out of authoritarianism. 3 Corrupt parliamentary elections can trigger regime-change,4 which occurred in the Kyrgyz Republic with the Tulip Revolution of 24 March 2005. But parliamentary elections in Central Asia have more often been a source of steady, evolutionary progress. This is what occurred in the November 2004 parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, and the December 2004 elections in Uzbekistan. 5 As the OSCE and other observers noted, these were both f lawed elections, yet they were both significantly less f lawed than previous parliamentary elections in those countries. The fact that the party led by President Nazarbayev did poorly at the polls and the heretofore marginal White Path (Ak Zhol) party did relatively well attests to the fact that in both cases the electoral principle actually worked. Ak Zhols scathing retrospective critique of the elections was quite justified, but does not
3 Axel Hadenius, Jan Teorell, Authoritarian Regimes 1972-2003: Patterns of Stability and Change, paper presented at a conference on democratization in the Middle East and Central Asia, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, May 2005. 4 Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, OSCE/ODIHR, 28 February, 2005, available at http://www.osce.org/ item/13831.html. 5 M.K. Dior, Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan, 2004, Himalayan and Central Asian Studies,, vol. 9, 1-2, January-June, 2005, pp.34-40.

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refute this conclusion. Similarly, many international observers did not even bother to monitor the 2004 parliamentary elections in Uzbekistan, yet those elections featured included such improvements as published statements by all parties and televised debates among candidates. Even when votes are obviously falsified, as occurred in the February, 2005, Tajik parliamentary election, the resulting crises are commonly handled through negotiation. In the end, the Tajik president rejected the oppositions demand that the vote be nullified, but had to accept the votes unexpected conclusion, which advanced the Islamic Renaissance Party to the second spot in the Parliament.6 Situations such as occurred in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have increased both national and international expectations regarding the conduct of parliamentary elections in Central Asia. For this reason the 2005 parliamentary elections in both the Kyrgyz Republic and Azerbaijan were looked to with great anticipation. In the former case, the reality fell short of expectations, giving rise to the Tulip Revolution. In the latter case President Aliev spent most of 2005 taking substantive measures to assure that the vote would strengthen rather than undermine his own legitimacy, both at home and abroad. Both cases testify to the possibility that rising expectations regarding the conduct of parliamentary elections can be agents for positive change. One may conclude from this that even in Central Asia parliamentary elections serve as a kind of school that spreads understanding of the elective principle among the public. Because battles over the conduct of parliamentary elections are fought at both the national and local levels, they actively engage local clan heads, power brokers, and economic elites, even in cases like Tajikistan in 2005, where the broader public remained passive. Even at their worst, then, parliamentary elections are a source of ongoing civic education, which continues even in the face of occasional steps backwards. Most important, they are the best means available for diverting the energies of local clans, magnates, and power brokers into constructive channels. The Role of Parliamentary Practice No institution in authoritarian states is the object of more withering criticism and outright cynicism than pocket parliaments. Whether in Egypt, Nigeria, Russia, or any of the states of Central Asia they are seen as the willing tools of the national leader and hence ineffective. Yet across Central Asia the daily practice of parliamentary bodies has become a powerful if largely unacknowledged force for evolutionary change. However limited their mandate, even quasi-parliamentary bodies introduce thousands of members of the political class and even larger numbers of ordinary citizens to the idea that government should be responsive and responsible to the people. The fate of President Akaevs budgets in the Kyrgyz parliament typifies the manner in which parliamentary processes can become powerful educational tools. Most members of the Jogorku Kenesh down to April 2005 were Akaev loyalists, local cl;an heads, power brokers and other notables who, we now know, received bribes (called stipends) from the president. The Kyrgyz constitution at the time gave delegates the right to debate the budget but not to change it. Notwithstanding this, by 1998 President Akaev was exposed to astonishingly blunt criticism every time he presented his budgets to parliament. Even nominally loyal delegates vied with one another to demonstrate their independence and their command of budgetary matters, conspicuously parading their oratorical skills before a packed visitors gallery. Akaev had no choice but to listen patiently and respond in detail. The slightest sign of condescension on the Presidents part was met with a barrage of scorn, which forced the president and delegates to interact, if not as equals, at least as citizens. It might be objected that Central Asian parliaments are packed with notables from the regional groupings and clans, and with people representing the magnates who control both publicly and privately owned enterprises. But how different is this from the eighteenth-century Virginia House of Burgesses, or from the British parliament prior to the First Reform Bill of 1832, let alone from the French parlements on the eve of the Revolution, or the nineteenth-century Prussian Landtag, which represented not the interests of individuals but of estates (Staende)? Yet each of these bodies played significant roles in the development of representative government in their country.
6 Rashid Abdullo, Tajikistan:The 2005 Elections and the Future of Statehood, Central Asia and the Caucasus, 3(33),2005, p. 133.

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The fact is that normal parliamentary processes sets in motion developments that more often than not favor democratization. Interviews with parliamentary delegates in all five Central Asian parliaments confirm this truth. A delegate may have been designated to stand by local clans, magnates, or power brokers. Or he or she may have been nominated from above and selected through a dubious election. Yet when that person acquires an office, a government telephone, a visiting card identifying him as a member of parliament, and a conspicuous badge for his lapel, he comes to view himself differently. Visits from foreign parliamentarians, participation in national and international conferences, and appearances on local television all serve to reinforce the delegates view of himself as a significant element in the national political process, no longer a mere subject but a true public citizen. These processes have been going forward steadily even in Uzbekistan. Annual meetings with key delegates to the Oily Majlis over three years between 2001 and 2004 produced clear evidence that they were being steadily acculturated to parliamentary life. All had used the time to study the practices of parliaments abroad. All had had contact with foreign parliamentarians and all had grown more astute in their analyses of the good and bad features of each. Nor should this be surprising. As noted above, President Karimov understood that parliament could provide a counterbalance to the unlimited aspirations of clans, families, and magnates. This has actually strengthened the parliament. But Karimov evidently considers this a small price to pay if it increases his own freedom of action vis--vis the all-powerful clans and families that put him in power. Tajikistans bicameral Majlisi Oli lags far behind its counterparts elsewhere, thanks to President Rokhmonovs ability to control its members financially. Yet even there the daily processes of parliamentary life have fostered a growing independence among members of the Majlisi Oli, with consequences that have yet to be seen. In Kyrgyzstan as in Armenia, the liberalization of central control over parliamentary elections led to the elections becoming a marketplace pure and simple rather than a marketplace of ideas. Businessmen, many of which involved in organized crime, secured a place in parliament, immunity, and influence over the legislative system. Finally, what about Turkmenistan, where President Niyazov enjoys Khanlike powers and has reduced the Mejlis to a meaningless status? In contrast to Karimov, Niyazov so fully accepted his partnership with the major Turkmen tribes that he for years vetted his major policy initiatives with their collective council of elders, the Khalk Maslakhaty or Peoples Council, rather than the parliament. Yet the Mejlis has continued to meet, and its handpicked members are being steadily acculturated to the possibilities of parliamentary life, even as they are daily reminded of their own total subordination. At some point President Niyazovs rule will end. Parliament is one of the more likely settings from which Niyazovs successor might emerge, and definitely the place where many future alignments and interests are already being quietly defined and shaped. The Role of Political Parties Formal political parties developed late in the West, and in many countries they were greeted as an unhealthy pathology.7 All the Central Asian states have taken great pains to assure that political parties not become the institutional expression of regional or ethnic divisions.8 All but Tajikistan rule out parties based on religion. This means that one of the main functions remaining for political parties in Central Asia might be to serve as the organizational base for dominant or rival elites. But even this is severely constrained. Following Yeltsin in Russia, all the regional presidents long resisted calls for them to organize their own party. Only Niyazov embraced the idea of a presidential party from the start. By the end of the first decade of independence, however, all had come to understand that they, too, needed solid party backing. Nazarbayev and Akaev tried to achieve this by getting their daughters to organize pro-government parties. Karimov, who had begun his presidency by de-legitimizing religious and nationalist parties on the right and social democratic parties on the left, eventually formed four (later five) legal parties of the center, all of them avowedly pro-government. By the 2004 parliamentary elections he went further, and began stating his preferences among them. Rokhmonov, faced with the entry of the Islamic party into parliament, immediately set up his own pro-governmental group, the Peoples Democratic Party.9
7 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist Papers, Baltimore, 1981, pp. 16-23. 8 On parties and ethnicity in Kazakhstan see Valentina Kurganskaia, The Party System in Kazakhstan and Ethnic Issues, Central Asia and the Caucasus, No., 2(32), 2005, pp. 67-74. For an overview of parties in the region see Mira Karybaeva, Development of a Multiparty System in Central Asia, Central Asia and the Caucasus, No.2(32) 2005, pp. 41-60. 9 Parviz Mullojanov, Party Building in Tajikistan, Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3(33), 2005, pp,. 88-87

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This process demonstrates the gradual, if reluctant, acceptance of political parties by authoritarian rulers across Central Asia. Their early reluctance was due to the potential of parties to effect changes in the fundamental balances among regional networks, clans, magnates, and families upon which the presidents personal power rested. From the presidents perspective, parties, like parliaments, were fine so long as they constrained these forces, but would pose a threat as soon as they aspired to change fundamentally the relations among them. President Bakiev has already sought radical redress for the Norths long-term dominance of Kyrgyz politics, and the consequences may prove destabilizing.10 In the long run parties may bring about a fairer balance of power in each country, but the authoritarian rulers rightly judge that in the process this could undercut their own power base. Uncontrolled parties, even more than the principle of one person one vote, could unleash uncontrollable forces within these new yet deeply conservative states. This realization has led to the non-registration or banning of parties in every country in the region. This runs the danger of moving powerful forces outside the system, where they can pose a yet greater danger. A more effective method, practiced in all states except Uzbekistan, allow candidates to run as individuals, unaffiliated with any party. This retards the growth of parties, but at the potential price of elevating the status of rivals to the president. Detailed laws on everything from party finances to the maintenance of membership lists by region can also be used effectively to curtail party activity. In Tajikistan the election law requires parties to publish their platforms in full; when a party competing in the 2005 parliamentary elections failed to do so it was banned.11 A simpler and more effective method by which governments can keep parties in check is through cooptation. This can mean giving key party figures or their supporters remunerative administrative posts or handing them outright payments, as Akaev earlier, and, more recently, Rokhmonov and Niyazov, have done. This cursory account of the techniques by which authoritarian rulers can control the work of political parties might suggest that it is a one-sided battle, with all the most effective weapons in the hands of the state. If this were so, one would have to conclude that political parties, like presidential votes, offer few prospects for evolution towards more open systems. Yet the picture is more complex and, in the end, more positive. Take, for example, the decision by all Central Asian leaders to champion a presidential party. As of this writing, only Niyazov has accomplished this without serious problems. In Tajikistan, Rokhmonovs Peoples Democratic Party received all possible support from the president prior to the 2005 parliamentary elections, yet it placed a weak third in the balloting.12 Presidential parties in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic fared no better. In Kazakhstans November 2004 parliamentary vote Dariga Nazarbayevas Azhar Party received substantial subsidies, not to mention unlimited access to the national television station run by Ms. Nazarbayeva herself. Yet Kazakhs gave more votes to the heretofore marginal Ak Zhol Party. The differential might have been yet greater had not many local officials illegally promoted Azhar. Similarly, Bermet Akaevas presidential party failed to shine even in the grossly corrupt first parliamentary election of March, 2005, and fared still worse in the revote that followed. Even though she had disingenuously tried to distance herself from her father, Akaeva herself lost the election in her Bishkek constituency. Nor has Karimov succeeded in his efforts to champion one of Uzbekistans five pro-government parties over the others. Initially, he lent his support to the Fidokorlar or Self-Sacrificers Party, a grouping of younger professionals who favor a market economy and more open society, as opposed to the more popular Halq Demokratik Partiyasi, or Peoples Democratic Party, made up mainly of older former Communists. No sooner had he accepted the nomination of this group than the Liberal Democratic Party began to advance rap idly. Appealing to young entrepreneurs, this group presented itself as the outspoken champions of economic reform. Following the voters shifting loyalties, Karimov changed horses, and by the December 2005 parliamentary elections was actively signaling his support for the LDP. The consistent picture in all Central Asian countries except Turkmenistan is for the legal parties to develop slowly and steadily, for them to use all legal tools at their disposal to challenge dubious restrictions imposed by the government, and, when improprieties occur, to turn for help to the international monitoring organizations and both national and international media in order to advance their claims against the government. In every instance enumerated here the supposedly
10 Kyrgyzstan After the Revolution, Crisis Group Asia Report No. 97, 4 May 2005, pp. 4-8. 11 Abdullo, p.132-133. 12 Ibid., p. 130.

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authoritarian ruler either failed to manipulate the parties as he wished, failed in his effort to elicit from voters the preferred outcome, or was forced to follow rather than lead the electoral process. All this is possible due to the experience that parties have gained through day-to-day practice. This can be observed in every country but emerges with particular clarity in the country where political parties would seem to be at a particular disadvantage, Uzbekistan. The four (later five) legal parties wereall creations of the state, and are by definition pro-government. Yet over the three years in which the author met with their heads, a steady evolution was evident. Viewed retrospectively, the process seems to have been all but inevitable. Created from above, each party nonetheless had to define its program and hence its constituents. The Democratic National Rebirth Party opted for a nationalistic path, championing national unity and appealing to government officials, older civic leaders, and the moderate Sunni Muslim majority. Fidorkorlar (also known as the National Democratic Party) presented itself as the party of the progressive intelligentsia, supporting openness and free markets. The Peoples Democratic Party found a niche for itself as the defender of social welfare programs, and therefore appealed to poorer farmers, the urban lower middle class, retirees, and former Communists. The Adolat or Justice Party staked out similar territory but proposed more moderate left-centrist solutions, even rebranding itself as the Social Democratic Party. And the Liberal Democrats took up the cause of young business people in the major urban centers. As they groped to translate these programmatic and social foci into practical actions, all five parties benefited from contacts with like-minded parties abroad. The Russian Communists lent support to the PDP while the German Social Democrats shared their experience with the Fidorkolar. Other European parties sought out what they considered their counterpart parties in Uzbekistan and rendered them assistance. Meanwhile, a host of international organizations, including the US National Democratic Institute and National Republican Institute, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the Freidrich Ebert Stifftung, and many others provided nonpartisan training in the conduct of elections and in practical aspects of party organization. Similar activities occurred in all the other countries of the region, with the exception of Turkmenistan. Even there, however, the voice of international organizations was audible, and, according to Turkmen parliamentarians, have given rise to the hope of more normal party activity in the future.13 Concluding Note: the EU and Domestic Politics in Central Asia The preceding discussion can have one of two purposes. First, it can simply inform the EU presidency on some of the realities of domestic politics across the region. By identifying some of the potential pitfalls of domestic politics it can help European statesmen avoid them. At the same time, because it treats these realities as normal aspects of the development of new states and their evolution towards more democratic systems, it can put some of the current problems in a broader and more positive perspective. Second, it can provide the context for more active EU programs and activities designed to foster the gradual evolution of these polities in directions compatible with European practice. If the arguments presented herein are correct, they suggest that progress towards democratization can be achieved by 1) fostering party-to-party contacts between legal political parties from Central Asian countries and counterparts in Europe 2) promoting direct parliament-to-parliament contacts between Central Asia and European countries, and 3) concentrating on election practices, especially parliamentary elections. The great potential of such activity is gradually to loosen the grip on the regions political life now exercised by clans, regional elites, and economic power brokers. and by the nominally authoritarian rulers through whom they work but with whom they are in very unstable alliance. This can be achieved only by working through the governments and legally recognized parties and not around them. Yet this cannot be done in isolation. With the exception of Kazakhstan, all the national leaders are beset by a sense of their own weakness and of their governments lack of resources. Only if the EU shows itself willing to engage with these issues can it expect cooperation from the Central Asian side on political reform. This means taking measures that will help address the real security concerns of these new states and it means investing in their economies and infrastructures to promote economic growth. It is entirely possible for the EU to advance the cause of political evolution in Central Asia, but only if it is prepared also to take an active role in the regions security and economic development.
13 Interviews by the author with Turkmen parliamentarians, October, 2002.

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Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia

Richard Weitz
Preface During the past half-decade Kazakhstan has accomplished something which no other state formed from the ruins of the USSR has achieved: beginning as a largely rural country with a small but politically powerful urban elite, it has emerged with a large and growing middle-class that increasingly seeks to make its voice heard in national affairs. Oil has been the engine of this change, but Kazakhstan is now working hard to diversify the sources of its wealth. Under any circumstances, such progress as has occurred would not have been possible without prudent reforms and innovative legislation. Nor could it have happened without a foreign policy that assured the country's security without tying it to any one outside power. In 200 8, the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center undertook a review of Kazakhstan's progress and current status in three areas: social evolution, political reform, and international security. This has already resulted in two monographs issued by the Joint center as Silk Road Papers: John C. K. Daly's Kazakhstan's Emerging Middle Class and Anthony Clive Bowyer's Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan. With this paper by Richard Weitz, we conclude the series. Dr. Weitz, a Senior Fellow and Director for Program Management at the Hudson Institute, offers a detailed overview of Kazakhstan evolving role in regional security and economic relations, as well as its relationship with major international organizations and powers. Indeed, Dr. Weitz shows how Kazakhstans cautious and multi-vector foreign policy has contributed to strengthening the country and making it an increasingly independent powerhouse in Eurasia, with balanced and positive relations with all major and regional powers. We hope readers find this of interest. Executive Summary Thanks to its large territory and population, vast energy wealth, relative political and ethnic stability, and skillful diplomacy, Kazakhstan has emerged as a leader of efforts to promote regional economic and political integration in Eurasia. Under President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakh officials have pursued a multi-vector foreign policy that has sought to maintain good relations with the most important external great powers and multinational institutions engaged in the region. Furthermore, Kazakh officials have sought for over a decade to strengthen ties among the countries of Central Asia and the Caspian Basin regionareas that define Kazakhstans extended neighborhood. In addition to their recurring proposals for a Eurasian union, Kazakh representatives have promoted concrete cooperation regarding a range of specific economic, political, and security areas. Kazakhstan plays a prominent role in Eurasias most important international institutions, either as a participant in their decisions or as a partner in their programs: The Kazakh government has remained a loyal if frustrated supporter of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and was a founding member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); Kazakh officials have been leading advocates of strengthening the Eurasian Economic Community (Eurasec), especially in the areas of water management and standardization of members customs and tariff policies; The Kazakh government has sought to strengthen the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) while preventing that institution from becoming overtly anti-American; Kazakhstan has developed closer ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) than any of the other former Soviet republics of Central Asia; The European Union (EU) has identified Kazakhstan as a key partner in Central Asia due to its energy resources and Kazakh support for regional integration efforts; In 2010, Kazakhstan will become the first Eurasian country to assume chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation inEurope (OSCE). 278

Kazakh officials have pursued several initiatives independent of these institutions to enhance the security of Central Asia and the Caspian region from diverse threats: Kazakh officials have worked directly with Russia, the United States, and other countries to eliminate the weapons of mass destruction Kazakhstan inherited following the disintegration of the Soviet Union; Kazakhstan has promoted and signed the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which established a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone; Astana has joined Moscow, Washington, and other governments in supporting multilateral initiatives aimed at averting nuclear terrorism or illicit trafficking in nuclear materials; Kazakh authorities have participated in diverse bilateral and multilateral counterterrorist initiatives; The Kazakh government has strengthened the countrys armed forces to enhance Astanas ability to contribute to regional security initiatives and international peacekeeping missions; Kazakh officials and security experts have been the driving force behind the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia process, which seeks to extend OSCE-like security enhancements throughout Asia. In line with President Nursultan Nazarbayevs stated objective of making Kazakhstan a transcontinental economic bridge and a regional locomotive of economic development, Kazakh officials have promoted closer commercial integration among Eurasian nations at multiple levels, with priority given to: Improving regional transportation, pipeline, and communication networks; Reducing customs and other manmade barriers to trade; Encouraging tourism and other nongovernmental exchanges while strengthening regulations governing labor mobility in Eurasia; Promoting Kazakh private investment in other Eurasian economies, especially through joint ventures. The strong Kazakh support for greater regional integration results in part from a recognition that Kazakhstan would strongly benefit from enhanced ties among Eurasian countries: Kazakhstan and its neighbors would achieve greater room to maneuver among the great powers active in the region, reducing the risks of their coming under the control of a great power condominium or becoming overly dependent on any single supplier, customer, investor, or market; Economic, political, and security problems in one Eurasian country could easily adversely affect neighboring countries, either through direct spill-over or by discouraging external investors; Kazakhstans ability to realize its potential as a natural crossroads for east-west and north-south commercial linkages depends on reducing manmade political and economic obstacles to the free flow of goods and people among Eurasian nations; The increase in regional prosperity that economists predict would ensue from greater regional integration would help Kazakhstan expand its economic activities into new horizontal and vertical markets. Kazakhstans ability to realize its regional objectives will depend on several factors. Its transition to a post-Nazarbayev generation of political leaders, the effectiveness of Astanas stewardship of the OSCE, and the state of the Eurasian economies will all play crucial roles in determining Kazakhstans success. Also important will be the policies of other countries engaged in Central Asia and the Caspian regionChina and Russia above all, but also the United States. Introduction The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 ushered in a novel era in the international relations of Eurasia. The newly independent states of the region confronted the problem of achieving the twin goals of establishing their national independence while retaining beneficial relations with other former Soviet republics. One technique these countries have used is to deepen their ties with China, Europe, and the United States as well as the other major powers active in the region to balance Russias continuing preeminence. Another approach has been to promote cooperation among regional states, in a manner independent of, though not in conflict with, the great powers. Kazakhstan has emerged as a natural leader in these latter endeavors due to the size of its territory, its vast energy wealth, its relative political and ethnic stability, its early and sustained decision to transition from a command to a market-based economy, and its skillful diplomacy. Kazakhstans geography has allowed it to exercise decisive influence in two of Eurasias most important subregionsCentral Asia and the Caspian Sea. These areas are sometimes referred to as Greater Central 279

Asia, but from Astanas perspective might be termed Kazakhstans extended neighborhood. At a minimum, analysts traditionally include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia. This approach may reflect the practice of Soviet ethnographers and political leaders, who divided the region into these five republics during the 1920s.1 In contrast, the Caspian Basin region typically includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, as well as parts of Iran and Russia. The past decade has made clear that other nearby countries also decisively affect political, economic, and security developments in these regionsnotably Afghanistan, Iran, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Turkey. All of these countries help shape the international politics of Eurasia. Their independence has made regional relations much more complex than during the original great game between Russia and Great Britain in the 19th century, when St. Petersburg and London could largely ignore or control local actors in their bipolar struggle for mastery of Eurasia. The involvement of so many external actors in the region, with their changing mixture of common and diverging interests, also has complicated the international politics of Eurasia, especially by expanding the local states room to maneuver.2 Although Russia, China, Europe, and the United States substantially affect regional developments, they cannot dictate outcomes the way imperial governments frequently did a century ago. Yet, since the USSRs collapse, the local nations have found it difficult to cooperate with one another. These states share unresolved disputes over borders, trade, visas, transportation, illegal migration, and natural resources such as water and gas. The Eurasian governments closed ranks behind theUzbek government after the May 2005 anti-regime violence in Andijan, accepting the need for solidarity despite misgivings about the regional policies and domestic practices of Uzbek President Islam Karimov.3 Even so, the poor state of their mutual relations has meant that these countries regularly enjoy closer ties with external actors (through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms) than with each other. Under President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has been in office since independence, Kazakhstan has remained committed to a multi-vector foreign policy that seeks to maintain good relations with Russia, China, Japan, the United States, and the European Union as well as other countries with important economic, political, or other roles in Eurasia. Nazarbayev and his team have managed to stand largely aloof from the quicksand of regional great power diplomacy, which has ensnarled rival Uzbekistan, while eschewing the extreme isolationism of the government of Turkmenistan under former President Saparmurat Niyazov. In 2004, Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev justified Kazakhstans balanced and multidimensional policy as an objective necessity. The policys application has sometimes annoyed Moscow (regarding Kazakhstans Trans-Caspian initiatives) as well as Washington (regarding Astanas dealings with Tehran). Yet, it is hard to disagree with Tokayevs explanation that, Limiting ourselves to certain countries and regions could do serious harm to our national interests.4 As early as March 1994, Nazarbayev proposed the establishment of a Eurasian Union, but the plan failed to gain support among the other newly independent states that had only just rid themselves of a different (Soviet) type of union and were not eager to try another.5 Nazarbayev has subsequently reaffirmed his commitment to a union, launching a new initiative in April 2007 that focused on borders and water management, issues that had long complicated relations among Central Asian states but which they could clearly manage more effectively together than in isolation.6 A union of Central Asian states would represent a logical culmination of Kazakh efforts to strengthen regional autonomy and deepen local integration processes. Although the union would be independent of the CSTO, SCO, and other regional groups, and would exclude Russia,
1 Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 55, 64-65. 2 Matthew Edwards, The New Great Game and the New Great Gamers: Disciples of Kipling and Mackinder, Central Asian Survey, vol. 22, no. 1 (March 2003), pp. 83-102. 3 Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005: An Independent Assessment (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2005), pp. 39-40. 4 Cited in Ibragim Alibekov, While Russia Watches, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Explore New Ties, Eurasia Insight, March 3, 2004, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav030304.shtml. 5 Konstantin Syroezhkin, Kazakhstans Security Policy in the Caspian Sea Region, in Gennady Chufrin, ed., The Security of the Caspian Sea Region (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 213-214. 6 Timur Dadabaev, Central Asian Regional Integration: Between Reality and Myth, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, May 2, 2007, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4604.

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China, and other great powers from membership, the Eurasian grouping would not be directed against these institutions or countries. In fact, Nazarbayevs union proposal effectively presumes that the great powers would remain sufficiently engaged in regional security issues to balance one another and thereby allow Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries room to maneuver.7 Kazakh experts consider the deeper integration of Central Asian countries a natural process that, although often impeded by man-made obstacles, accords with the genuine national interests of these nations, which share historical and cultural ties as well as common borders and economic incentives for collaboration. To realize these advantages, proponents of greater unity argue that effective integration should entail the sharing of water and energy resources; additional improvements in the regions transportation infrastructure; the establishment of common customs and trading tariffs; mechanisms to respond collectively to environmental threats and natural disasters; and support for region-wide tourist networks. More generally, supporters envisage a process of evolution from a free trade zone to a customs union to an economic union with ancillary political and other institutions.8 Another economic factor, with political implications, inducing Kazakh leaders to promote regional integration is the belief that instability in neighboring countries could easily spill across state borders, either directly through imitative popular protests and refugee flows or indirectly by discouraging international capital markets from investing in the region. Despite recent Kazakh efforts to diversify their economic partners, Kazakhstans economy remains heavily dependent on foreign companies for capital and technology.9 Kazakh and foreign experts argue that greater cooperation is required to resolve these disputes and better exploit the natural resources and pivotal location of Central Asia and the Caspian as natural transit routes for commerce between Europe and Asia. Enhanced collaboration is especially needed, they maintain, to counter transnational terrorist and criminal groups as well as exploit the economic comparative advantages enjoyed by Kazakhstan and neighboring states. By reducing inter-regional tensions and promoting deeper economic integration, these countries will become more attractive to foreign investors and enhance their collective leverage with external actors.10 Since 2006, Nazarbayev has repeatedly proclaimed the goal of transforming Kazakhstan into one of the worlds 50 most competitive developed countries.11 Kazakh leaders believe that strong regional cooperation ideally with a degree of integration that would both help harmonize regional economic policies and promote political, security, and other forms of collaborationis essential for realizing this objective. Above all, it would allow Kazakh businesses to access new markets and exploit superior economies of scale from the resulting increase in labor, capital, and other factors of production. The Kazakh government has also sought to develop extensive security, economic, cultural, and other international links to enhance the countrys autonomy by limiting Kazakhstans dependence on any single supplier, customer, investor, or market. At an October 22, 2007 conference in Washington, D.C., Erlan Idrissov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United States, told the audience that, since independence, Kazakhs had resolved not to take as a curse their countrys landlocked status, but instead to turn it into an opportunity and a benefit by leading the drive for regional integration. In its foreign policies, Idrissov added, Kazakhstan operates on the principle that one cannot prosper without being surrounded by prosperous countries.12 Furthermore, Kazakhs realized that their countrys large population of ethnic Russians and other ethnic communities makes it unlikely that Kazakhstan could remain unaffected by developments in neighboring
7 Syroezhkin, Kazakhstans Security Policy in the Caspian Sea Region, p. 233. 8 L. M. Muzaparova, Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Problems and Prospects, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, November 27, 2007, http://www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=1788. 9 Mevlut Katik, Kazakhstan Entertains Grand Economic Development Plan, Eurasia Insight, April 6, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav040606.shtml. 10 V. N. Sitenko, ShOS i Problemy Bezopastnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii: Znacheniye dlya Kazakhstana, Kazakhstan-Spektr, no. 1 (2008), http://www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=5369. Many reports of the International Crisis Group have identified inadequate regional cooperation as a source of Eurasian economic, political, and other problems; for a list see http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index. cfm?id=1251&l=1. 11 Nazarbayev reaffirmed this goal in his latest state-of-the-nation address, delivered on February 6, 2008, available at http://www. akorda.kz/www/www_akorda_kz.nsf/sections?OpenForm&id_doc=0793 D9432423DDE5062573EC0048005B&lang=en&L1=L2&L2=L2-22. 12 Conference on Integrating Central Asia into the World Economy: Perspectives from the Region and from the U.S., co-hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Wolfensohn Center for Development at the Brookings Institution.

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countries.13 At independence, the countrys titular nationality actually constituted less than half the population. According to the 1989 Soviet census, ethnic Kazakhs comprised 39.5% of the population: Russians, 37.7%, Ukrainians, 5.4%; and Belorussians, 1.1% (i.e., ethnic Slavs amounted to 44.2% of the republics population). National identity, bilingualism, and dual citizenship emerged as especially important issues during the first few years of Kazakhstans independence. Some observers thought that the northern provinces, with their Slavic majorities, might seek unification with Russia. The salience of these concerns subsequently declined due to the emigration of many ethnic Slavs, the higher birth rate of ethnic Kazakhs, the return of many exiled ethnic Kazakhs to their homeland (or that of their ancestors), the governments tolerant language and ethnic practices, and the countrys booming economy, which has benefited large numbers of ethnic Slavs as well as ethnic Kazakhs. The decision of Kazakhstans leaders to stress loyalty to the state rather than any particular national identity was also essential in decreasing ethnic tensions.14 According to a 1999 census, 53.4% of the countrys population consisted of ethnic Kazakhs, 30% Russians, 3.7% Ukrainians, 2.5% Uzbeks, 2.4% Germans, 1.7% Tatars, 1.4% Uighurs, and 4.9% belonged to other ethnic groups155 As of January 2007, Kazakhstans population consisted of 15,396,600 people59.2% ethnic Kazakhs, 25.6% ethnic Russians, 2.9% ethnic Ukrainians, 2.9% ethnic Uzbeks, 1.5% Uighurs, 1.5% Tartars, and 1.4% ethnic Germans.16 Although two of six million ethnic Russians have left Kazakhstan since its independence, the four million Russians that have remained have contributed considerably to the countrys economic development, educational achievements, and other socioeconomic advances. Many belong to Kazakhstans middle class, but this stratum encompasses many ethnic Kazakhs as well, including young professionals who have thrived as entrepreneurs under the governments pro-business policies. This diverse composition has meant that no one ethnic group predominates in Kazakhstans middle class.17 The November 2007 decision to award Kazakhstan chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010 recognizes the countrys growing importance in Eurasia. Kazakh officials are characterizing this long-sought status as an endorsement of their countrys successful economic and political reforms, their leading role in Europe and Central Asia, and their contribution as a bridge between the former Soviet republics and other OSCE members. While acknowledging problems with Kazakhstans adherence to the principles of liberal democracy as practiced in the European Union and the United States, other governments hope that the OSCE chairmanship will encourage movement towards those standards in Kazakhstan as well as bolster the OSCEs influence in the former Soviet bloc. The Kazakh government has launched a Road to Europe reform program to prepare the country for the economic and political challenges and opportunities the OSCE chairmanship will present.18 In addition to skillful diplomacy, Kazakhstans emergence as the most important driver of regional integration within Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region has been attributed to the countrys powerful but not overwhelming attributes of state power. Kazakhstan possesses more energy resources than its less endowed neighbors. It also enjoys the regions most dynamic economy and capital markets. Yet, Kazakhstan lacks the economic and military foundations to aspire for regional hegemony, especially given that its power and influence is dwarfed by that of Russia and China. The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections that present different perspectives on Kazakhstans role in its extended neighborhood. The first chapter considers how the most significant international institutions shaping regional politics relate to Kazakhstan. Astana plays an important role in all of them either as a major partner in their programs or as a participant in their decision making. The next section ana13 Rafis Abazov, Kazakhstans Security Challenges in a Changing World, in Michael Intriligator, Alexander Nikitin, and Majid Tehranian, eds., Eurasia: A New Peace Agenda (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), pp. 229-231. 14 Sally N. Cummings, Kazakhstan: Centre-Periphery Relations (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), pp. 4647; and Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity, pp. 152-154. 15 John C. K. Daly, Kazakhstans Emerging Middle Class (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, March 2008), pp. 20-21. 16 Embassy of Kazakhstan in the USA and Canada, Population Grows to 15.4 Million, More Births, Less Emigration Are Reasons, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, April 20, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/042007.html. 17 Daly, Kazakhstans Emerging Middle Class, pp. 5-6. 18 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, President Nazarbayev Delivers Annual State-of-the-Nation Address, Announces Kazakhstans Road to Europe, News Bulletin, February 8, 2008, http://www.kazakhembus.com/NBSpecialIssue_3_020808.html.

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lyzes the manner in which Kazakh leaders have sought to promote security and stability throughout Central Asia and the Caspian region as well as contribute to countering global nonproliferation and other threats. Kazakh officials recognize that adverse regional security developments could present both direct threats to Kazakhstans security as well as indirect damage to the countrys economic and political aspirations by deterring foreign investment, disrupting Eurasian trade and tourism, and generally making Kazakhstans environs less pleasant. The third chapter discusses Kazakhstans potential to become a regional energy and economic leader as well as various obstacles to the realization of this objective. The second and third sections are intimately linked in that security is essential for the continued energy and economic development of Kazakhstan and its neighborhood. To take but one example, Central Asian governments will remain reluctant to relax their border controls, which impede regional commerce, if they fear that transnational criminal organizations will exploit the opportunity for illicit purposes. The final section of the paper surveys Kazakhstans bilateral relationships with its immediate neighbors in order to provide yet another view on how Kazakhstan is responding to the challenges and opportunities presented by the new international politics of Eurasia. The Institutional Framework The following section reviews Kazakhstans relations with the major multinational political, economic, and security institutions active in Eurasia. Kazakhstan also belongs to other organizations. These include universal bodies like the United Nations as well as institutions that have members in Eurasia but either are not very active (e.g., the Economic Cooperation Organization) or whose main efforts focus outside the region (such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which Kazakhstan joined in 199519). The ones below, however, most affect Kazakhstans relations with its Eurasian neighbors. Commonwealth of Independent States The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), consisting of all the former Soviet republics except for the Baltic countries, initially represented Kazakhstans most important regional institution after the USSRs disintegration. Kazakhstan and eight other members signed a CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST) at their May 15, 1992, summit in Tashkent. According to its provisions, they pledged to refrain from joining other alliances directed against any other CST signatory. The CST signatories also agreed to cooperate to resolve conflicts between members and cooperate in cases of external aggression against them. The main effect of the Tashkent Treaty was to help Russia legitimize its continued military presence in many CIS members. The CST did not, however, fulfill Kazakhstans objective of establishing a system of collective security in the former Soviet Union.20 The CIS itself initially played a useful role in facilitating a civilized divorce among its members. Compared with the chaos that arose in the former Yugoslavia, another communist-dominated multinational state that had failed to resolve its underlying ethnic divisions, the disintegration of the Soviet Union occurred with surprisingly little violence, with the notable exception of the Caucasus region. For the most part, the leaders of Kazakhstan and the other newly independent former Soviet republics accepted the USSRs administrative boundaries as their new national borders.21 Russian President Vladimir Putin has praised the organization for clearly help[ing] us to get through the period of putting in place partnership relations between the newly formed young states without any great losses and play[ing] a positive part in containing regional conflicts in the post-Soviet area. 22 After its first few years, however, the CIS ceased having a great impact on its members most important polices. For example, the agreement establishing a collective air defense network, which began to operate in 1995, had to be supplemented by separate bilateral agreements between Russia and several important participants such as Ukraine. Georgia and Turkmenistan withdrew from the system in 1997.23 The influence
19 Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Member States, 2008, http://www.oicoci. org/oicnew/member_states.asp. 20 Konstantin Syroezhkin., Kazakhstans Security Policy in the Caspian Sea Region, in Gennady Chufrin, ed., The Security of the Caspian Region, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 213-214. 21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Aktualnye Voprosy Vneshney Politiki Kazakhstana: Delimitatsiya i Demarkastsiya Gosudarstvennoy Granitsy, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/issues/delimitation. 22 Vladimir Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, May 10, 2006, http://www.kremlin.ru/ eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.sht ml. 23 Marcin Kaczmarski, Russia Creates a New Security System to Replace the C.I.S., December 21, 2005, http://www.pinr.com/

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of the CIS reached nadir in 1999, when Russia withdrew its border guards from Kyrgyzstan and its military advisers from Turkmenistan, while three members (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan) declined to renew their membership in the CST.24 Despite the CST, CIS governments proved unable to collaborate sufficiently to end the civil war in Tajikistan or establish a common front regarding the Taliban and related terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan, exposing the weakness of the Tashkent Treaty at the time it was most needed. 25 It was only in March 2000 that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan finally announced the estab lishment of the long-discussed CIS antiterrorist center.26 The CIS historically has had difficulties securing implementation of many of the economic, political, and security agreements its member governments have signed. Although the institution does provide opportunities for dialogue among its members, especially among government ministries and agencies dealing with common problems such as customs and migration, and legislatures through the CIS Parliamentary Assembly, the lack of effective enforcement or oversight mechanisms severely limits effective cooperation. According to President Nazarbayev, of the 1,600 agreements formally adopted by the CIS, its members had signed and implemented fewer than 30% of them.27 Even Russian lawmakers ratify only a small percentage of CIS accords, making it hard to reconcile members conflicting legislation and policies. The problems of achieving consensus among twelve governments with increasingly divergent agendas, combined with the organizations weak, opaque, and inefficient institutions for making and implementing decisions, have led to its stagnation and steady decline relative to the other major multinational institutions with a presence in Central Asia. Perennial plans to reform its ineffective decision making structures have failed to achieve much progress. Besides its structural weaknesses, policy differences among CIS members also have called into question the institutions viability. Major frictions between Russia and other members have arisen over a number of issues. For example, they disagree over the appropriate prices for Russian energy and Russias restrictions on labor mobility.28 Plans to establish a CIS free trade zone have been repeatedly postponed due to the disparities among its members in terms of economic policies and attributes. At present, many members trade more with Western countries than they do with each other. Similar divergences are evident in the desire of some but not all members to move closer to seemingly rival Western institutions like the European Union and NATO. The wave of color revolutions a few years ago has widened divergences among the members political systems, with certain countries seeking to establish European-style liberal democracies and other regimes committed to preserving their authoritarian status quo. Ironically, a core weakness permeating the CISits inability to reduce the differences in goals, policies, and values of its membersalso probably will prevent its complete disintegration. Much more than the EU, the CIS encourages its members to pursue multi-speed integration arrangements in which the pace of integration varies by issue and the participants. Since it exercises so few limits on their freedom of action, these governments lack a strong reason to break with inertia and formally leave the organization. Instead, the CIS likely will persist, but as a decreasingly influential institution as its members redirect their attention and resources elsewhere.29 President Nazarbayev has been pushing for years for a major restructuring and strengthening of the organization. At the July 2006 informal summit of CIS leaders in Moscow, he offered a comprehensive program for reforming the CIS that proposed concentrating reform efforts in five main areas: migration, transportation,
report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=416&language_id=1. 24 Jim Nichol, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 1, 2005), p. 4. 25 Maulen Ashimbaev and Murat Laumulin, The Role of the Central Asian Countries in Providing Security in Asia, Central Asias Affairs, no. 2(2005). 26 Konstantin Syroezhkin., Kazakhstans Security Policy in the Caspian Sea Region, in Gennady Chufrin, ed., The Security of the Caspian Region, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 226. 27 CIS Summit Brings No Progress on Post-Soviet Borders, Reform, RIA Novosti, November 28, 2006, http://en.rian.ru/ world/20061128/56131971.html. 28 Sergei Blagov, The CIS: End of the Road?, Eurasia Insight, August 29, 2005, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ articles/eav082905.shtml. 29 Oskana Antonenko, Assessing the CIS, February 14, 2006, http://www.russiaprofile.org/international/2006/2/14/1035.wbp.

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communications, transnational crime, and scientific, educational, and cultural cooperation.30 Nazarbayev also suggested several cost-cutting measures that would have allowed for the more efficient use of the organizations resources.31 At the November 2007 meeting of CIS Prime Ministers in Ashgabat, Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov called for the establishment of a common CIS food marketing and pricing policy. Masimov stated that food prices have been growing lately so our governments should draft specific measures and take specific steps for lifting administrative and other non-market barriers in food deliveries. The CIS leaders decided to create a group of CIS agricultural ministers to develop a food market development strategy.32 In most cases, however, other CIS leaders have ignored Nazarbayevs reform proposals. The leaders of Georgia and Ukraine still see the organization primarily as a mechanism for consultations with fellow CIS leaders, a concept derisively referred to as a presidential club by its critics. Even such close CIS allies as Russia and Belarus are divided over key issues like whether to adopt a common currency and over the price other CIS members should pay for Russias oil and gas.33 In October 2007, the member governments did agree to establish a special CIS body to supervise migration among their countries, but other organizations have assumed the lead role in promoting regional integration regarding most other issues.34 Collective Security Treaty Organization Soon after becoming president, Vladimir Putin launched a sustained campaign to re-channel the CIS by enhancing cooperation among a core group of pro-Russian governments and reorienting it from a collectivedefense organization towards one directed against transnational threats such as drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and especially terrorism, a more pressing concern to most of its participating governments. In 2001, the CIS members authorized the formation of a Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF). Although the CRDF was designed primarily to provide for a collective response to terrorist attacks or incursions, it initially was not a standing force. Instead, it consisted of earmarked battalions based in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan.35 More importantly, on May 14, 2002, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan (with Armenia and Belarus) agreed to transform the CIS CST into a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).36 They established an ad hoc group composed of deputy ministers of defense and other senior government representatives to draft the main regulations for the CSTO, a process completed on November 1, 2002.37 Since the formal inauguration of the CSTO the following year, when all its member states ratified its founding documents, the organization has developed a more defined legal basis, including a charter committing members to coordinate their foreign, defense, and security policies. It also has established several standing bodies: a Foreign Ministers Council, a Defense Ministers Council, the Committee of Security Council Secretaries, a secretariat in Moscow, and a CSTO staff group stationed in Bishkek. The most authoritative organ is the CSTO Collective Security Council, which consists of the members heads of state. The member governments nationalpresidents chair the Council in succession. The CSTO Permanent Council coordinates CSTO activities between sessions of the Collective Security Council. A CSTO Parliamentary Assembly Council also exists. It seeks to harmonize security-related legislationsuch as in the areas of terrorism, narco-trafficking, and illegal migrationamong member governments. The CSTO provides for the mobilization of larger multinational military formations in the event of external aggression. Two such groups presently
30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan i integratsionnyie protsessy: SNG: Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimyx Gosudarstv, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/inegration/CIS. 31 RIA Novosti, CIS Summit Brings No Progress on Post-Soviet Borders, Reform, November 28, 2006, http://en.rian.ru/ world/20061128/56131971.html. 32 CIS: Rejuvenation or Disintegration, November 27, 2007, http://www.newscentralasia.net/Articles-and-Reports/196.html. 33 Yuri Filippov, CISUnembellished Results of the Year, RIA Novosti, December 19, 2006, http://en.rian.ru/ analysis/20061219/57216450.html. 34 CIS Leaders Agree to Form Body Controlling MigrationPutin, RIA Novosti, October 6, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/ world/20071006/82769544.html. 35 Oksana Antonenko and Kathryn Pinnick, Russias Foreign and Security Policy in Central Asia: The Regional Perspective, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003, p. 6. 36 V. Nikolaenko, Collective Security Treaty: Ten Years Later, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 48, no. 3 (2002), p. 186. 37 Rafis Abazov, Kazakhstans Security Challenges in a Changing World, in Michael Intriligator, Alexander Nikitin, and Majid Tehranian, eds., Eurasia: A New Peace Agenda (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), p. 236.

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exist: an East European group (between Russia and Belarus) and a Caucasian group (between Russia and Armenia). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan are currently in the Southern group of forces, which in wartime would come under the command of the standing combined headquarters.38 The CSTO also assumed control of the CRDF and transformed it into a standing force with a small multinational staff and a mobile command center. At present, the CRDF comprises 10 battalions of about 4,000 troops in total. Russia and Tajikistan each provide three battalions; Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have each allocated two battalions to the force. CRDF units, joined by other military formations from CSTO member states, have engaged in several major exercises on the territory of its Central Asian members. These have included the rapid deployment anti-terrorist exercise Rubezh-2004 (Frontier 2004) in August 2004, and Rubezh-2005 in April 2005, which involved some 3,000 troops.39 The CSTO members also have largely taken over development of the CIS collective air defense network, with Russia alone paying for 80% of its mainte nance costs.40 The other CIS governments either send observers to these CSTO military activities or do not participate at all. (Thus far, Armenia and Belarus have also proved less active CSTO members than Russia and the Central Asian countries.) The governments of Kazakhstan and other CSTO members stress that the organization represents more than just a military bloc, and can contribute to meeting a range of regional security problems. For example, countering narcotics trafficking and terrorism within Central Asia have become CSTO priorities. Since 2003, their intelligence, law enforcement, and defense agencies have jointly conducted annual Kanal (Channel) operations to intercept drug shipments from Afghanistan through the regions porous borders to markets in the former Soviet republics and Western Europe. Azerbaijan, Iran, Uzbekistan, and other non-CSTO members have participated in these exercises. The CSTO has established a working group on Afghanistan to strengthen its government law enforcement and counternarcotics agencies. The CSTO member governments have agreed to coordinate their nonproliferation and export control policies, paying particular attention to the need to prevent illegal shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), WMD-related materials, and their means of delivery.41 CSTO law enforcement and internal security officials regularly exchange information about regional terrorist threats. CSTO governments also update their partners about their basing arrangements, weapons sales, and other security ties with other countries. For example, Kyrgyz representatives have kept their partners abreast of the negotiations concerning the renewal of their Manas base agreement with the United States.42 In June 2005, CSTO members signed agreements to enhance joint military training, including by exchanging students at their military education establishments and by compiling a list of testing sites and target ranges for use during joint exercises. They also created a commission to promote closer ties between their defense industries. Its responsibilities encompass establishing more joint ventures and research and development projects, defining common standards for military equipment, ensuring sufficient production of spare parts and other defense items, and helping implement the program for military-technical cooperation for 2006-2010.43 In December 2005, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov announced that he and his CSTO colleagues had agreed to coordinate their defense programs relating to nuclear, biological, or chemical security against terrorist attacks.44 CSTO planners have made strengthening members special forces a priority due to their superior effectiveness in combating terrorists and drug traffickers.45 The CSTO governments
38 CSTO to Create Central Asia Military Group, Interfax, February 7, 2006. 39 For a description of the 2004 exercise see Erica Marat, CSTOs Antiterrorist Exercises Rubezh-2004 Score High Rating among Member-States, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, August 25, 2004, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2614. For the 2005 exercises see Counter-Terrorist Exercise Rubezh-2005 to End in Tajikistan Soon, RIA Novosti, April 6, 2005, http://www. globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/04/mil-050406-rianovosti09.htm. 40 CIS Air Defense to Hold Command-and-Staff Exercise in October, RIA Novosti, August 21, 2006, http://en.rian.ru/ russia/20060821/52872338.html. 41 CSTO Experts Discuss Export Control Issues and Adopt List of Terrorist Organizations, International Export Control Ob server, no. 6 (April 2006), pp. 25-26. 42 CSTO Should Be Briefed on U.S.-Kyrgyz Base Talks-Lavrov, Interfax, June 7, 2006. 43 Putin: CSTO to Establish Anti-Drug Structure, RIA Novosti, June 23, 2005, http://en.rian.ru/world/20050623/40751672.html. 44 Maria Danilova, Putin Calls for Strengthening Security Pact of Ex-Soviet Nations, Associated Press, November 30, 2005, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/browse_JJ_T282-200511_1801_1875. 45 Anatoly Klimenko, Russia and China as Strategic Partners in Central Asia: A Way to Improve Regional Security, Far Eastern Affairs, vol. 33, no.2 (2005), p. 5.

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subsequently devoted much attention to refining the technical, financial, and organizational issues raised by their decision to create a mechanism to deploy a collective peacekeeping force. The Russian government has adopted a policy of allowing CSTO members to purchase Russian-made military equipment and supplies at the same prices paid by the Russian armed forces, avowedly for the purpose of facilitating the arming of their CRDF contingents. Although delays have occurred due to the need to develop effective control mechanisms against unauthorized reexports, and Central Asian militaries have adopted some NATO standards and procedures, they still rely heavily on Russian-manufactured hardware. The Russian Ministry of Defense also heavily subsidizes the costs of training officers from CSTO states, whose senior commanders were trained at Soviet academies, at its professional military education institutions. Whereas the United States, China, and other countries typically offer short-term courses, Russian training curriculum often last for years.46 Russian diplomats led the successful effort to secure formal observer status for the CSTO in the U.N. General Assembly in December 2004. They also have been pressing NATO to develop formal ties with the organization. The CSTO has developed into a stronger institution than the CIS. The threat perceptions of the CSTO governments overlap more than those of the larger, more diverse CISsome of whose members want to join NATO whereas others see the alliance as a major threat. In contrast, CSTO leaders jointly focus on terrorists and other groups perceived as seeking to overthrow them. Their attention concentrates on Afghanistan, which they also see as the main source of narcotics trafficking in Central Asia. CSTO members haveshown some interest in providing the institution with economic functions. In August 2006, the CSTO member governments formally began reviewing a package of documents aimed to strengthen the legal basis for military and economic cooperation under CSTO auspices.47 The CSTO also has been developing ties with the Eurasian Economic Community and the International Organization for Migration. Kazakhstan has been a very active participant in CSTO activities. In August 2006, for instance, the CSTO held its largest military exercises of the year in Kazakhstan. Rubezh-2006 (Frontier-2006) involved some 2,500 defense personnel as well dozens of armored vehicles, artillery pieces, and warplanes from CSTO member governments Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, as well as Russia. All the CSTOs major command componentsits standing joint headquarters, permanent joint staff, and secretariatparticipated in the exercise, which occurred on Kazakhstans Caspian coastline, about 30 kilometers northwest of the Kazakh town of Aktau. From Kazakhstans perspective, however, the CSTO presents the problem of enshrining Russian military dominance in Central Asia. For example, Moscow justified establishing the Kant airbase, offered rent-free by the Kyrgyz government, on the grounds that it provided air support for the whole of the Collective Security Pact right up to the Afghan border.48 Putin himself described Russias newly legal military base in Tajikistan as a CSTO facility that, along with the air base at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, will be an important part of the united system of collective security for the region.49 In addition, involvement with the CSTO imposes some clear constraints on Kazakhstans security policies. For example, in October 2005, Russias Defense Minister argued that if Kazakhstan or any other CSTO member was considering hosting foreign military bases, they should take into account the interests of Russia and coordinate this decision with our country.50 Eurasian Economic Community At Nazarbayevs initiative, some of the former Soviet republics established a Eurasian Economic Community (Eurasec; or EEC) on October 10, 2000. Nazarbayev made his proposal after the CIS proved unable to
46 Roger N. McDermott, Tajik Military Weary of NATO, Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 4, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/ article.php?article_id=2370946. 47 Roger McDermott, Boucher Visit to Bishkek Reveals Widening Gap in U.S.- Kyrgyz Relations, Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 15, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371382. 48 Olga Dzyubenko, Kyrgyzstan: US Forces Can StayIf They Pay More, Reuters, September 21, 2005, http://go.reuters.com/ newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=9716375&src=rss/to pNews. 49 Cited in Bruce Pannier, Central Asia: Russia Comes on Strong (Part 2), November 17, 2004, http://www.rferl.org/ featuresarticle/2004/11/ffdd150c-4daa-4577-9d8a-893ff8613e82.html. 50 Radio Mayak, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, October 11, 2005, cited in Stephen J. Blank, U.S. Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2007), p. 8.

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make adequate progress in the pursuit of economic integration and the customs union then existing between Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan seemed equally ineffective. (The economic crisis experienced by Russia and Kazakhstan in the late 1990s led them to levy heavy tariffs on each others imports.) Eurasecs main function is to promote economic and trade ties among countries that formed a unified economic system during the Soviet period by reducing custom tariffs, taxes, duties, and other factors impeding economic exchanges among them. Its stated objectives include creating a free trade zone, a common system of external tariffs, coordinating members relations with the World Trade Organization and other international economic organizations, promoting uniform transportation networks and a common energy market, harmonizing national education and legal systems, and advancing members social, economic, cultural, and scientific development and cooperation.51 In 2005, Eurasec absorbed the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation, whose members included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Besides Kazakhstan, its membership roster now includes Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and most recently Uzbekistan. Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine enjoy observer status. With its smaller number of members, all favorably disposed toward Moscows leadership, Eurasec (like the CSTO) represents a logical alternative to the more unwieldy and contentious CIS. Eurasecs members account for approximately three-fourths of all foreign commercial transactions occurring among CIS members. Given the difficulties that Belarus and Russia alone have had in negotiating a possible currency union, Eurasecs members have lost enthusiasm for creating a currency union. In recent years, the organization has strengthened ties with the CSTO. Since the CSTO contains the same members as Eurasec, plus Armenia, their leaders often hold sessions of both organizations when they assemble at regional summits. Kazakhstan has been a leading advocate of strengthening the Eurasec. At the Eurasec summit of August 2006, Nazarbayev said he was always ready to discuss questions concerning integration within the EEC framework.52 A recent Kazakh priority has been to promote cooperative initiatives within Eurasec to assess how to regulate Central Asias unevenly distributed water resources and exploit the regions potential to generate hydroelectric power. Analysts working with Eurasec have proposed a general set of principles for members consideration. These include determining a suitable fuel and energy balance for the countries, restoring Soviet principles of irrigation for downstream states, promoting joint investment in building power stations, removing barriers for electricity companies in a common market for member states, and establishing multinational regulatory bodies.53 The International Crisis Group (ICG) and other institutions have long warned that the continued lack of an effective region-wide mechanism for managing water supplies could engender further conflicts among Central Asian countries. For example, a May 2002 ICG report warns that, Tensions over water and energy have contributed to a generally uneasy political climate in Central Asia. Not only do they tend to provoke hostile rhetoric, but they have also prompted suggestions that the countries are willing to defend their interests by force if necessary.54 During the Soviet period, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would store excess water in winter and then release it in summer to the downstream countries of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. According to the Soviet economic plan, these latter countries would use the water to support agriculture and cotton harvesting, receiving fossil fuels in return for winter heating. The break-up of the USSR has made it easier for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, despite complaints by the other three countries, to use more water for hydropower to generate electricity for their own uses.55 In January 2006, Russia and Kazakhstan created a Eurasian De-

51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan i Integratsionnyi Protsessy: Evraziyskoe Ekonomicheskoe Soobshchestvo, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/inegration/EEC. 52 Sergei Blagov and Igor Torbakov, EEC Summit Focuses on Energy, Security and Free Trade, Eurasia Insight, August 17, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav081706.shtml. 53 Lillis, Central Asia: Water Woes. 54 International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Water and Conflict, May 30, 2002, p. ii, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400668_30052002.pdf. 55 Joanna Lillis, Central Asia: Water Woes Stoke Economic Worries, Eurasia Insight, April 28, 2009, http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/insight/articles/eav042808.shtml.

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velopment Bank, with a subscribed capital base of $1.5 billion.56 Its purpose is to help finance infrastructure and development and private sector activities in Central Asia. Analysts believe it could become an important instrument in enhancing Eurasecs effectiveness.57 The current Eurasec Secretary General, Tair Mansurov, was governor of North Kazakhstan region and a former Kazakh ambassador to Russia. In late 2007, he replaced Grigory Rapota, from Belarus, who had served as Secretary General since October 2001, almost its entire history.58 The members diverging status with respect to the World Trade Organization (WTO) remains a major factor complicating their efforts to establish a customs union. Whereas Kyrgyzstan has been a WTO member since 1998, Belarus has not even begun formal accession negotiations. Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan are negotiating their terms of entry. Russias efforts to join the WTO remain blocked by several unresolved disagreements with the United States, which Moscow and Washington proved unable to resolve at bilateral meetings during the July 2006 G-8 summit in St. Petersburg. Economics Minister German Gref, presidential aide Sergey Prikhodko, and other Russian officials have made statements suggesting that they see a Eurasec customs union as an alternative, at least for a while, to WTO membership. At an October 6, 2007 session of the Eurasec Intergovernmental Council in Dushanbe, Presidents Nazarbayev, Putin, and Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus signed agreements to accelerate formation of a customs union among their three countries. Putin predicted that the customs union would become operational within three years.59 As of April 2008, the three governments had signed over a dozen documents defining the legal basis for the union.60 Only Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia would commit to a Eurasec customs union because they alone have made substantial progress towards harmonizing the relevant legislationa development that may foreshadow the evolution of a multi-speed Eurasec in which a core group of countries, including Kazakhstan, achieve deeper and more rapid economic integration than most members. In any case, Nazarbayev has made clear that he does not want to rely exclusively on the CIS, Eurasec, or other Russian-dominated institutions. Within Eurasec, Russia enjoys a 40% share in the voting and financial rights, whereas Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan only have 15% each while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan control merely 7.5% each.61 At the October 2007 Eurasec meeting, Nazarbayev expressed unease at Russias domination of Eurasec and other former Soviet institutions, which he argued should function very differently than during the Moscow-dominated Soviet period: Of course Russia is the biggest economy and we cooperate smoothly. But although the special role of France and Germany is taken into account in the European Union, they cannot make decisions without smaller member states.62 At this Dushanbe summit, Nazarbayev repeated his longstanding call for the creation of a union of Central Asian countries that would allow the region of 50 million people to create a self-sufficient market using both economic and political means.63 At a Eurasec meeting the following January, Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov proposed convening a major business forum in Astana to consider creating a Eurasian Economic Union as well as establishing a Eurasian scientific club and a Eurasian bank devoted to promoting new technologies.64 Shanghai Cooperation Organization Russias overwhelming preeminence in the CSTO has led Kazakhstan and other Central Asian governments to cultivate military ties with additional regional security institutions, especially the Shanghai Coop56 Russia to Contribute Another $600 mln to Eurasian Bank, RIA Novosti, January 14, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/ russia/20080114/96607471.html. 57 Johannes F. Linn, Central Asia: A New Hub of Global Integration, November 29, 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/ articles/2007/1129_central_asia_linn.aspx?emc=lm&m=21050 8&l=50&v=105274. 58 Tajikistan to Hold Rotating Presidency in Eurasec in 2008, RIA Novosti, October 6, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/ world/20071006/82768497.html. 59 Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan Sign Agreement Moving Closer to Customs Union, Associated Press, October 6, 2007, http:// www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/06/asia/AS-GEN-Tajikistan-Ex-Soviet-WT.mc_id=rssap_news. 60 Eurasec Deputy PMs to Discuss Customs Union in Moscow, RIA Novosti, April 24, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/ russia/20080423/105680383.html. 61 Sergei Blagov, Moscow Signs Series of Agreements within Eurasian Economic Community Framework, Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 5, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372777. 62 Unhappiness with Moscow Sours CIS Summit, Moscow Times, October 8, 2007, http://www.moscowtimes.ru/ stories/2007/10/08/011.html. 63 Unhappiness with Moscow Sours CIS Summit. 64 Sergei Blagov, Moscow Signs Series of Agreements within Eurasian Economic Community Framework, Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 5, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372777.

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eration Organization (SCO), which is not dominated by a single country like the CIS or CSTO. In the words of an unnamed Central Asian diplomat, With the Chinese in the room, the Russians cant resort to their usual tricks.65 Despite the possible emergence of a Sino-Russian condominium, this condition presumably reduces fears of external subordination and gives them more room to maneuver. Kazakh leaders cite the contribution of the SCO to preserving the national sovereignty of its members as one of the main reasons they value the organization.66 Another reason for the SCOs popularity in Kazakhstan is that it allows Central Asian governments to manage Beijings growing presence in their region multilaterally, backstopped by Russia, rather than deal with the China colossus directly on a bilateral basis. For example, when Kazakhstan conducted its August 2006 Tianshan-I exercise with China, which the Chinese Peoples Daily termed a joint anti-terrorism drillthough it involved only some 1,000 law enforcement and special forces personnel, including some cavalry unitsit did so within the SCO framework.67 The first phase occurred in eastern Kazakhstan Almaty region; the second in Chinas Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, where the other SCO members sent over 100 observers.68 The SCO arose from arose from a border delimitation and arms control process between China and its new post-Soviet neighbors. During the 1990s, Kazakhstan, China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan negotiated several confidence-building and disarmament measures limiting their permissible military deployments and holdings along their mutual frontiers. After Uzbekistan joined this Shanghai Five process, the member governments transformed their dialogue into a formal international organization. Since then, they have undertaken a number of initiatives within the SCO framework. The title of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremismsigned at the organizations founding summit in June 2001aptly highlights the SCOs security priorities. Cooperation against terrorism (broadly defined to include the two other evil forces of ethnoseparatism and political extremism) resulted in the creation of the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. Since it officially began operations in June 2004, the RATS has coordinated studies of Eurasian terrorist movements, exchanged information about terrorist threats, and provided advice on counterterrorist policies. It also has coordinated exercises among SCO security forces and organized efforts to disrupt terrorist financing and money laundering. In July 2005, the SCO governments formally pledged not to extend asylum to any individual designated as a terrorist or extremist by a SCO member. The resulting accord, entitled Concept of Cooperation Between SCO Member States on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, provided for enhanced cooperation under the auspices of the RATS against terrorist financing and terrorist efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.69 For several years, SCO members have undertaken numerous joint initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking and organized crime. In late 2005, they signed an agreement providing for mutual assistance to manage the consequences of natural disasters and other emergencies. Their national emergency management agencies are now developing enhanced modalities of cooperation.70 Since the SCOs establishment, member governments have conducted increasingly ambitious military exercises under the SCOs auspices. In October 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan conducted the first bilateral antiterror exercise within the SCO framework, involving joint border operations by hundreds of troops. It marked the first instance of joint maneuvers by the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) with another countrys armed forces. In August 2003, the militaries from all the member governments, with the exception of Uzbekistan, participated in the first formal SCO-sponsored combined exercise (Cooperation 2003). It involved over
65 Cited in Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asias Second Chance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 198. 66 Yerzhan Kh. Kazykhanov, On Kazakhstan, American Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 28, no.3 (July 2006), p. 190. 67 China, Kazakhstan Hold Anti-Terror Drill, Peoples Daily Online, August 25, 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200608/25/ eng20060825_296744.html. 68 China Kicks off Second Phase of Joint Anti-Terror Drill, Xinhua, August 26, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200608/26/content_5009293.htm. 69 Matthew Oresman and Zamir Chargynov, The Shanghai Cooperation Summit: Where Do We Go from Here?, CEF Quarterly: The Journal of the China-Eurasia Forum (July 2005), pp. 5-6, http://www.chinaeurasia.org/files/CEF_Quarterly_August_2005.pdf. 70 Interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Alexeyev, Interfax, January 3, 2006, http://www.interfax. com/17/118163/interview.aspx.

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1,000 troops engaging in several counterterrorism scenarios in eastern Kazakhstan and the bordering Xinjiang region of China.71 During the unprecedented Russian-Chinese military exercises of August 2005, all six SCO defense or deputy defense ministers attended as observers. Representatives from the United States and other Western countries were not invited. In early March 2006, Uzbekistan affirmed its elevated commitment to the SCO by hosting a multilateral exercise under its auspices, East-Antiterror-2006. Representatives from the member governments special services and law enforcement agencies practiced rescuing hostages and defending critical infrastructure from terrorists.72 The SCOs activities also have expanded to encompass bilateral and multilateral projects in the areas of economics, energy, culture, and other fields. In September 2003, the SCO prime ministers adopted a Multilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation Program that established several general economic objectives. For example, the participants pledged to facilitate trade and investment among themselves while working towards the free movement of goods, services, capital, and technology by 2020. At a September 2004 meeting in Bish kek, Kyrgyzstan, the prime ministers considered over one hundred cooperative projects in such sectors as customs, communications, and public health.73 In 2005 and 2006, the SCO governments established a series of institutions to help implement the Program and these cooperative projects. The Development Fund, the Business Council (also known as the Entrepreneurs Committee), and the Inter-Bank Agreement aim to en courage investment in regional projects by promoting collaboration among members state enterprises, private businesses, and government agencies responsible for foreign economic ties. In November 2005, China hosted a Eurasian Economic Forum under the joint auspices of the SCO Secretariat, the United Nations, and the China Development Bank. It involved about 1,000 political and business leaders from many countries, including from several non-SCO members such as Japan and South Korea. President Nazarbayev attended the SCOs founding meeting in St. Petersburg in June 2001, along with representatives of China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. At the session, he stated that the new organization could contribute to security, economic prosperity and closer relationships between our peoples and countries. 74 The Kazakh government plans to organize a conference on cultural exchanges within the SCO.75 Some Kazakh experts have become attracted to the idea of creating an energy club within the SCO. In August 2007, Nazarbayev himself proposed creating a SCO energy agency to maintain an oil-and-gas database as well as another SCO body to manage energy transactions among member countries.76 Within this framework, oil and gas exporters such as Kazakhstan as well as Iran, Russia, and Uzbekistan would provide reliable energy supplies to China, India, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Mongolia and Tajikistan.77 Astana hosted the July 2005 heads of state summit that made the SCO infamous in many Western circles. The attending SCO governments issued a statement asking the United States and other members of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition to establish a deadline for vacating their temporary military bases in Central Asia considering the completion of the active military stage of antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan. 78 Although all SCO members signed the declaration, they appear to have done so for different reasons. Uzbekistan seems to have seen the statement as a useful mechanism to eliminate a large NATO mili71 For descriptions of these exercises see Roger N. McDermott and William D. OMalley, Countering Terrorism in Central Asia, Janes Intelligence Review, vol. 15, no. 10 (October 2003), pp. 16-19; Robert Sae-Liu, China Looks Outward with its Exercise Pro gramme, Janes Defence Weekly (September 24, 2003); and Jing-dong Yuan, Anti-Terror Exercises Only a First Step, Moscow Times, August 14, 2003. 72 SCO Member-States Hold Anti-terrorism Exercises in Uzbekistan, UzReport.com, March 10, 2006, http://jahon.mfa.uz/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2202& mode=thread&order=0&thold=0&POSTNUKESID=1a2788d7b8af4f13a e1ee52d22602e6c. 73 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Speech by SCO Secretary General Zhang Deguang at the Press Conference of the Eurasian Economic Forum, September 6, 2005, http://www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=513&LanguageID=2. 74 Rafis Abazov, Kazakhstans Security Challenges in a Changing World, in Michael Intriligator, Alexander Nikitin, and Majid Tehranian, eds., Eurasia: A New Peace Agenda (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), p. 236. 75 Erica Marat, The SCO and Foreign Powers in Central Asia: Sino-Russian Differences, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, May 28, 2008, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4867. 76 Kazakhstan Proposes Establishing Oil and Gas Regulator, Exchange, RIA Novosti, August 16, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/ world/20070816/71834663.html. 77 See for example G. Rakhmatulina, Economic Integration in the Framework of the EEC and SCOThe Most Important Priority of the Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan, June 12, 2007, http://www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=1509. 78 SCO Secretariat, Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, July 5, 2005, http://www. sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=500&LanguageID=2.

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tary presence that it no longer welcomed after Western governments refused to support the Uzbek security crackdown in Andijan. Moscow and Beijing appear to have sought to reaffirm their expectation that NATO would eventually reduce its substantial military footprint in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan employed the declaration as leverage to extract greater rent payments from Washington in exchange for continuing to host the U.S. military base at Manas International Airport. Finally, some signatories might have used the statement to signal their displeasure with certain Western policies in the region. For example, they may have hoped to galvanize the United States and NATO into more vigorously combating the terrorist and narcotics threats emanating from nearby Afghanistan. SCO members have repeatedly complained about the alliances failure to undertake this responsibility, which they believe NATO assumed upon occupying the country. Whatever their motives, that only Uzbekistan eventually proceeded to expel most NATO forces from its territoryending in particular American use of the Kharshi-Khanabad airbasesuggests that most SCO leaders, upon reflection, realized that any major Western military withdrawal from Central Asia under current conditions would substantially worsen their security given the probable inability of Russia, China, or any other country or multilateral group to stabilize Afghanistan as effectively. Kazakhstan has continued to allow U.S. and other NATO warplanes to overfly its territory on a regular basis in support of its operations in Afghanistan. In addition, Kazakh leaders have repeatedly cited, as a positive attribute, that the SCO is not an anti-Western bloc. In June 2006, Nazarbayev listed one of the organizations achievements that, The SCO is neither a military bloc nor an exclusive alliance targeting [a] third party. 79 Kazakh security experts and government officials value the contribution the SCO makes to countering regional terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other illegal transnational activities that would prove difficult to manage on a national level.80 In supporting the agreement on establishing a database for the SCO RATS, the deputy head of Kazakhstans National Security Committee, Vladimir Bozhko, said that information exchanged through the RATS had already enhanced the governments regional threat awareness.81 The Kazakh government also backed the Russian initiative to establish a SCO crisis response mechanism.82 Yet, Kazakhs also want the SCO members to deepen their cooperation in such areas as education, culture, and commerce. In a 2006 interview, Nazarbayev urged the SCO to pay attention to the development of trade and economic cooperation. 83 Kazakhstan presently enjoys a unique position within the SCO. China and Russia enjoy the most influence within the organization, but their differences, and the considerable attention they need to devote to other regions, have prevented the emergence of a genuine duopoly within the organization. The other Central Asian states enjoy substantially less influence within the SCO, appearing most often as objects of SCO policies determined by Beijing and Moscow. Due to its economic development and other advantages, Kazakhstan occupies an intermediate position between the two great powers and the four other Central Asian states. Observers speculate that this consideration probably dampens Astanas interest in expanding the SCOs membership further since the entry of India, Iran, or Pakistan would dilute its influence by incorporating another middle power, with a larger population and stronger military than Kazakhstan, into the organization.84 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Kazakhstan has also sought to balance off Russias military preeminence and Chinas emerging economic dominance of Central Asia by cultivating enduring ties with Western institutions. NATO had developed some contacts with Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics before September 2001. With the exception of Tajikistan, which until 2002 was preoccupied with domestic reconstruction following its civil war, Central Asian representatives have participated in NATOs Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and its related
79 Xinhua, Interview: Kazakh President Underlines SCOs Great Achievements, Peoples Daily Online, June 8, 2006. http:// english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/09/eng20060609_272308.html. 80 V. N. Sitenko, ShOS i Problemy Bezopastnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii: Znacheniye dlya Kazakhstana, -, no. (2008), http://www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=5369. 81 Kazakh Parliament Votes for Regional Antiterror Database, Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency, March 6, 2006, http://www. eurasianet.org/resource/kazakhstan/hypermail/200603/0015.shtml. 82 Valery Agarkov and Oral Karpishev, Kazakhstan Backs Russias Bid to Work Out SCO Anticrisis Mechanism, TASS in English, February 25, 2005. 83 Interview: Kazakh President Underlines SCOs Great Achievements. 84 Stephen Blank, Russia Tries to Expand the SCOs Membership, Central Asia- Caucasus Institute Analyst, March 5, 2008, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4807.

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Partnership for Peace (PFP) program since the mid-1990s.85 In December 1995, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan even organized a short-lived Central Asian peacekeeping battalion (CENTRASBAT) under the aegis of NATO and the United Nations. Although Central Asian governments initially expressed interest in participating in international peacekeeping missions, the subsequent increase in local terrorism resulted in their focusing their military resources to counter threats closer to home. Two events led NATOs interests and activities in Central Asia to soar. First, the alliance decided on a controversial second wave of expansion to offer membership to several other countries besides Turkey that border the Caucasus/Central Asiaand are therefore very concerned about developments in the area. After most East European countries became NATO members, in effect graduating from PFP, the program shifted focus towards promoting military reform and cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus (as well as the western Balkans). Second, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan resulted in asubstantial increase in NATOs military presence there. When then NATO Secretary General George Robertson visited the region in 2003, he said that the events of September 11, 2001, had led the alliance to appreciate that our security is linked closely to security in remote areas. Central Asia is now going to be very much part of NATOs agenda.86 By taking charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003, NATO has become engaged in a protracted project of promoting longterm stability and security in Central Asia. In line with its enhanced role, alliance representatives have sought military transit agreements, secure lines of communication, and other supportive arrangements from the Central Asian governments. At their June 2004 Istanbul summit, the NATO heads of government affirmed the increased importance of Central Asia by designating it, along with the Caucasus, as an area of special focus in their communiqu.87 They also decided to station a liaison officer there. The primary mission of the first incumbent, Tugay Tuner, was to improve implementation of NATOs cooperation and assistance programs in the region. The decision to locate his headquarters in Almaty signifies the importance NATO governments ascribe to Kazakhstan in their regional strategy.88 The summit participants also established a Secretary General Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia. Besides explaining to Central Asian governments what activities and programs NATO has available and how they can best use them, the incumbent, Ambassador Robert F. Simmons, has strived to inform their publics about the alliances positive contributions to regional security, such as in Afghanistan.89 The disintegration of NATOs ties with Uzbekistan after the governments military crackdown at Andijan in May 2005 precipitated a sharp collapse in the alliances influence in the region. NATOs North Atlantic Council issued a statement condemning the use of excessive and disproportional force by the Uzbek security forces. 90 The alliance also cancelled some cooperative programs with Uzbekistan and scaled back others. In response, the Uzbekistan government told all European NATO members except Germany in late November 2005 to cease using Uzbek airspace or territory to support peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. (Germany was allowed to continue using the Termez airbase and even develop it further).91 As a result, the alliance refocused its security cooperation with other countries, especially Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan began participating in NATOs Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 2002, becoming the first Central Asian country to enter the program, which aims to improve the ability of its armed forces to work with NATO.92 In 2003, Kazakhstan joined NATOs Maintenance
85 Tajikistan joined the PFP in February 2002. 86 Cited in Vladimir Socor, Heroin Hunting and Security for Tajikistan, Wall Street Journal Europe, August 22, 2003. 87 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Istanbul Summit Communique, Istanbul, June 28, 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/ pr/2004/p04-096e.htm. 88 Aynur Khasenova, NATO Dobralos do Turkestana, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 7, 2005, http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005-1007/1_nato.html. 89 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Cooperation with the Caucasus and Central Asia, Video Interview with Robert Simmons, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040910b.htm. 90 Gleb Bryanski, Russia Says UN, NATO Calls for Uzbek Probe Unfair, Swiss Radio International, May 27, 2005, http://www. rusnet.nl/news/2005/05/27/currentaffairs03.shtml. 91 Alyson J. K. Bailes, ed., SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 61-62. 92 North Atlantic Treaty Organziation, NATOs relations with Kazakhstan, February 29, 2008, http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-

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and Supply Agency and, in January 2004, began a 19+1 relationship with NATO in the area of discus sions on interoperability.93 Another sign of Kazakhstans importance to NATO is that only Astana among the Central Asia governments has negotiated an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with the alliance. This agreement came into force on January 31, 2006.94 An IPAP provides for more extensive dialogue and specifically tailored cooperation between the alliance and the signatory. It typically specifies detailed military and political ob jectives and the relative contribution of both parties in achieving them. The agreement provides additional opportunities for the partner to cooperate with alliance experts, receive military training, and participate in NATO activities in such areas as defense reform, managing emergencies, and projects related to science and the environment. The Kazakh government has assisted NATO to realize its Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T). This initiative aims to share intelligence within NATO and with other allied organizations, develop and maintain national counter-terrorism capabilities, and improve border security.95 The Kazakhstan Peacekeeping Battalion (KAZBAT) under development is scheduled to become fully operational in 2011. The Kazakh government plans to make the unit available for use by NATO, the United Nations, and other multilateral security institutions.96 Kazakhstan has also deployed a small number of engineers (approximately 30 demining specialists) to Iraq to express solidarity and support of the U.S. efforts to build democracy and civil society there. 97 NATOs close ties with Kazakhstan have helped the alliance maintain an important presence in Central Asia despite its deteriorating relationship with Uzbekistan. At the same time that Uzbekistan was curtailing NATOs use of its territory, Kazakhstan ratified a framework agreement regarding its involvement with NATOs PFP. The Kazakh government also ignored the SCOs call to impose a timetable for the coalitions withdrawal from its Central Asian military bases. Kazakh officials kept their troops in Iraq, despite popular disapproval of the deployment. In September 2005, Kazakhstan established a new military language institute in Almaty in September 2005 to enhance the Kazakh militarys regional area expertise and language skills in English, French, and other predominately NATO foreign languages.98 In June 2006, Kazakhstan held its first NATO Week during which Almaty hosted three NATO-organized scientific symposiums that addressed issues of concern for Central Asia: radiological risks, information security, and improved trans-border water management.99 In September 2006, Kazakhstan hosted the latest NATO Steppe Eagle exercise. These annual exercises have been held since 2003 to improve compatibility between Kazakh and NATO units and also practice anti-terror missions. The second NATO week occurred April 7-11, 2008, and coincided with a visit by NATO Special Envoy Simmons to Kazakhstan. Simmons met Kazakh government leaders and delivered several public speeches that included a ceremony marking the opening of the NATO depository at the National Library of Kazakhstan.100 At the June 2007 meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Kazakhstans Deputy Minister of Defense, General Bulat Sembinov, reaffirmed his governments commitment to help achieve stability in Afghanistan by allowing coalition aircraft continued use of Kazakh air space. According to Sembinov, over
kazakhstan/practice.html. 93 Roger McDermott, Kazakhstans Emerging Role in the War on Terror Terrorism Monitor, May 20, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=236741. 94 For details of the NATO-Kazakh IPAP see Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Kazakhstan and NATO Approve Individual Partnership Plan, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, February 16, 2006, http://www.homestead.com/prositeskazakhembus/ 021606.html. 95 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATOs Relations with Kazakhstan, February 29, 2008, http://152.152.94.201/issues/ nato-kazakhstan/practice.html. 96 Roger N. McDermott, Kazakhstans Partnership with NATO: Strengths, Limits and Prognosis, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1 (2007), p. 13, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/February_2007/McDermo tt.pdf. 97 Kassymzhomart Tokaev, Kazakhstan: The Democratic Path for Peace and Prosperity, Heritage Foundation WebMemo no. 877, October 7, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/wm877.cfm. 98 Kazakhs Open Center to Boost NATO Ties, September 15, 2005, United Press International, http://www.washingtontimes. com/upi/20050915-010222-7627r.htm. 99 NATO Week to Inaugurate New Cooperation Level, Assistant General Secretary, June 19, 2006, http://www.inform.kz/showarticle.php?lang=eng&id=142780. 100 NATO-Kazakhstan Week to be Held in Kazakhstan on 7-11 April, Trend News Agency, April 8, 2008, http://news.trendaz. com/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1171602&lang=EN.

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5,200 aircraft have overflown Kazakhstan in support of OEF since 2003 and more than 80 aircraft have made emergency landings at Kazakhstan airfields. NATO has reciprocated by continuing to assist Kazakhstan to reform and strengthen its military. For example, the alliance is working to bring the countrys rapid deployment forces to NATOs standards.101 In recent months, Uzbek President Islam Karimov has signaled his interest in renewing ties with NATO. Karimov attended the April 2-4, 2008 alliance summit in Bucharest, where he offered to allow expanded use of Uzbek territory to support NATO operations in Afghanistan.102 Even so, Kazakhstan will probably remain an important regional security partner for NATO as long as the Afghan campaign continues. Kazakh and NATO officials are presently discussing how the alliance might be able to transship goods from Russia to Afghanistan through Kazakhstan as well as across Uzbekistan. The Kazakh leadership intends to remain involved in NATO projects, while recognizing that the alliances priorities still focus elsewhere (especially in the Balkans, the South Caucasus, and in managing relations with the EU in the west and Russia in the east). European Union Several factors have led to Central Asias assuming a prominent place on the EUs agenda. First, continued friction with Russia over energy issues has increased European interest in importing oil and natural gas from the Caspian countries as well as in promoting these states independence from Moscow. Second, some EU members, such as Germany, have substantial commercial interests in Central Asian countries that extend beyond their energy trade. Third, the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, which has seen a resurgence of both the Taliban insurgency and drug cultivation, has stimulated EU efforts to bolster neighboring states against terrorism and narcotics trafficking. Fourth, the general importance that EU governmentsassign to promoting political and economic reforms has led these states to press for such reforms in Central Asia. For example, EU leaders only endorsed Kazakhstans bid to chair the OSCE after Kazakh officials pledged to expand political and economic freedoms. Finally, the EUs eastward expansion, even if it has not encompassed Turkey, has made these and other issues increasingly prominent from the perspective of many EU members. In the words of the European Commission, EU enlargement and development of the European Neighborhood Policy are bringing Central Asia closer to the EU. Important security and economic interests argue for a higher profile of this region in European external policy.103 Kazakhstans importance to the EU in this context is undeniable. The country is the EUs largest trade partner in Central Asia. The volume of trade between the EU member states and Kazakhstan amounted to EUR 14.287 billion euros in the first three quarters of 2007.104 The EUs bilateral trade with Kazakhstan exceeds in volume the organizations combined trade with the four other Central Asian states.105 When Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, vis ited Kazakhstan in October 2006, she praised Kazakhstans economic achievements and progress towards democratization, and noted that the EU views Kazakhstan as a prospective partner in combating terrorism, the drug trade, and other forms of transnational crime.106 When the senior EU officials involved in Central Asia assembled in Astana in March 2007, Ferrero- Waldner said they chose the Kazakh capital as their venue because Kazakhstan has a special importance for us as the first pillar in this region, and we talked about our desire to have special relations, special partnership with Kazakhstan, at the same time that we maintain intensive cooperation with the entire region.107 In addition, the EU has signed other agreements with Kazakhstan concerning textiles, steel, and nuclear safety.
101 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, NATO and Kazakhstan to Expand Ties, February 7, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/020807.html. 102 Uzbekistan: Karimov Approves Overland Rail Re-Supply Route for Afghan Operations, Eurasia Insight, April 7, 2008, http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav040708a.shtml. 103 Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner to Visit Kazakhstan 19/20 October, Europa, October 18, 2006, http://europa.eu.int/rapid/ pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1420&format=HT ML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 104 German Foreign Office, Kazakhstan, March 2008, http://www.diplo.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01-Laender/Kasachstan.html. 105 The EUs Relations with Kazakhstan, Europa, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/kazakhstan/intro/index.htm. 106 EU to Strengthen Relations with Kazakhstan: EC Commissioner, Asia Pulse, October 24, 2006, p. 70. 107 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Europeans Focus on Central Asia in Key Astana Meeting, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, March 29, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/032907.html.

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The EU interacts with Kazakhstan primarily within the framework of its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which the two parties signed in 1995.108 Since it entered into force in 1999, the PCA has established a legal foundation for negotiating more specific trade, investment, energy (including nuclear safety and nuclear power) and other agreements between Kazakhstan and the EU.109 The latter typically commits to hold a sustained dialogue on democracy, human rights, economic development, the rule of law, and other issues. An EU-Kazakhstan Republic Cooperation Council, consisting of annual meetings at the ministerial level, supervises the PCAs implementation. More frequent exchanges occur between civil servants, policy experts, and legislators within committees or subcommittees focusing on trade, investment, energy, transport, justice, and other issue areas. Two of the most important are the Subcommittee on Trade and Investment and the Subcommittee on Justice and Home Affairs. The EUs main areas of concern in Kazakhstans neighborhood are developing the regions energy and transportation routes, expanding opportunities for trade and investment, and promoting political, economic, and social reforms. For at least a decade, the European Union has sought especially through its TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe, Caucasus, Asia) and the INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) programsto redirect some commercial and energy flows from the traditional north-south pattern to new east-west corridors connecting from Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. Launched in 1993 and subse quently expanded, TRACECA aims to construct highways, ports, and railways in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions.110 INOGATE seeks to facilitate the export of oil and gas from these regions to Europe. The EU sees Kazakhstan as a vital element in realizing these programs objectives. For example, the February 13, 2007 meeting of the Cooperation Council underlined the importance of regional cooperation in Central Asia as an effective means of conflict prevention and economic development in the region and welcomed the increasingly active role Kazakhstan is playing in different regional initiatives.111 The EUs security agenda in Central Asia also includes working with Kazakhstan and other governments to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan and curb the flow of drugs, weapons, and other illegal activities throughout the re gion and into Europe. Kazakh officials have endorsed the EUs vision for developing their countrys potential as an energy supplier to Europeans and a key transit country between Europe and Asia.112 At an international conference on Kazakhstan- 2030 held in 2007, President Nazarbayev declared that his government is aware of its responsibility for providing global energy balance and security in the world. We will rank among top ten hydrocarbon exporters by 2017, and this will determine Kazakhstans economic role in the dynamically changing global economic system in the 21st century to a large extent. We count on close cooperation with the European Union in this respect.113 The focus of much recent European attention has been on securing access to Kazakhstans oil supplies. Recent energy confrontations as well as oil and gas delivery cutoffs involving Russian government-controlled firms have reminded European leaders of the desirability of limiting their growing double dependency on Russian natural gas and Russian-controlled pipelines by diversifying their sources of supply. Russia currently sells the entire EU approximately 40% of its natural gas imports, accounting for some 25% of its aggregate demand. Some former Soviet bloc states now in the EU import a much higher share of their energy from Russia. Experts forecast the overall dependency to increase to 60% of all EU gas imports by 2030 unless European governments radically change their energy policies.114
108 The European Union and the Republic of Kazakhstan, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ceeca/pca/pca_kazakhstan.pdf. 109 European Commissions Delegation to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, EU Relations with Kazakhstan, November 7, 2006, http://delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24 &Itemid=36. 110 Additional information is available at http://www.traceca-org.org. 111 Council of the European Union, Ninth Meeting of the Cooperation Council between the European Union and Kazakhstan, Brussels, 13 February 2007, Press Release 6294/07, http://delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory &id=14&Itemid=90. 112 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Europeans Focus on Central Asia in Key Astana Meeting, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, March 29, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/032907.html. 113 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Kazakhstan Seeks Diversification of Routes for Energy SuppliesPresident Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, October 17, 2007, http://prosites-kazakhembus.homestead.com/NB12-101707.html. 114 Geopolitics of EU Energy Supply, July 18, 2005, http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-14266516&type=LinksDossier.

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In addition to gaining access to Kazakhstans oil, the European Commission is also negotiating an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with Kazakhstan, which possesses the second-largest reserves of uranium in the world. Of the five Central Asian countries, only Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have their own nuclear power programs.115 Joint civilian nuclear projects and technological exchange might be included in an EU-Kazakh uranium deal.116 To enhance its presence and effectiveness in the region, the EU in July 2005 appointed Jan Kubis as its first Special Representative for Central Asia.117 In October 2006, French diplomat Pierre Morel assumed the position.118 The EU also operates Commission Delegations in several Central Asian capitals as well as in nearby Kabul. In addition, a Europa House exists in Tashkent. The near doubling of the number of EU member countries has substantially increased the number of EU-affiliated embassies and diplomats in the region.119 To exploit synergies, the EU tries to coordinate its policies towards Central Asia with other international institutions (especially the OSCE) and the United States. According to a February 2005 Department of State fact sheet, Brussels and Washington work together to support democratic and economic transition, protection of human rights, promoting good governance/rule of law, increased regional trade, and humanitarian and human development. We also cooperate in the effort to combat trade in opium and heroin from Afghanistan.120 Except in the realm of energy, the EUs influence in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries has been limited by two main factors. First, the EU governments have refused to allocate substantial resources for promoting their political reform objectives in Central Asia. Second, the EU has given priority to its relations with other regionsespecially the Caucasus and Russia. Limited resources have constrained the EUs influence in Kazakhstan. For 2006, the European Commission allocated only 66 million euros to help all five Central Asian governments reduce poverty, expand regional cooperation, and support ongoing administrative, institutional, and legal reforms.121 Thesmall scale of the EUs activities in Central Asia contrast to those it has pursued in the neighboring South Caucasus region. The EU has assigned a Special Representative for the South Caucasus, initiated a European Security and Defense Policy rule of law mission in Georgia, and activated the European Commissions Rapid Reaction Mechanism to help secure democratic gains and avert conflict in that country following its Rose Revolution.122 In June 2004, the EU governments decided to let Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia participate in the organizations European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), while continuing to exclude those of Central Asia. Be sides Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, the ENP encompasses the non-member countries of Eastern Europe and even North Africa, but not those of Central Asia. ENP participants receive financial assistance, wider ac cess to EU markets, and other benefits in return for implementing economic and political reforms as specified by their individual action plans.123 EU officials apparently consider Central Asian states too distant and too unreformed for inclusion in the initiative, but this approach has weakened perhaps the EUs most important source of potential influence in Central Asiathe prospects of greater access to the prosperous economies of the member governments. The Kazakh government has actively lobbied to enter the ENP.124
115 Bruce Pannier, Central Asia: Region Pledges to Remain Free of Nuclear Weapons, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 8, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/9/FA5076CE-85DF-46DF-879DAE78DBA16429.html. 116 Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Europeans to Buy Kazakh Uranium, News Briefing Central Asia, October 30, 2006, http://iwpr.net/?p=bkz&s=b&o=324938&apc_state=henh. 117 Khiromon Bakoeva, Central Asia: New EU Envoy a Familiar Face in the Region, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 19, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/07/d85d610a-9322-4c4f-953b- 3e812b8834e6.html. 118 EU Appoints New Point Man for Central Asia, News Central Asia, October 17, 2006, http://www.newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1912. 119 Patton Speech on The EU and Central Asia, March 15, 2004, http://europa-euun. org/articles/et/article_3297_et.htm. 120 U.S. Department of State, U.S.-EU Cooperation on Reform in Eurasia, February 17, 2005, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/ fs/42562.htm. 121 Iran News Agency, EU Aid for Central Asia to Fight Poverty, January 3, 2006. 122 International Crisis Group, Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EUs Role, March 20, 2006, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4037. 123 Pal Dunay and Zdzislaw Lachowski, Euro-Atlantic Security and Institutions, in Alyson J. K. Bailes, ed., SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 61-62. 124 Andrew Rettman, EU Gas Needs Pull Kazakhstan Closer to Brussels, EUobserver.com, May 16, 2006, http://wennberg.newsvine.com/_news/2006/05/16/198527-eu-gas-needs-pullkazakhstan-closer-to-brussels.

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Another problem for the EU in Kazakhstan is that its members have often acted as if they recognize Russias superior interests in Central Asia. For the last few years, most EU diplomacy directed at Russia has focused on securing Moscows agreement to extend its PCA with the EU to the ten new member countries, some of which have acute differences with Moscow regarding treatment of their Russian-speaking minorities and other issues. Disputes over the terms for Russias entry into the World Trade Organization, the governments human rights policies, and border controls and visa requirements have also preoccupied the EURussian dialogue. At their May 2005 summit in Moscow, moreover, Russia and the EU agreed to a Road Map for the Common Space on External Security that envisaged enhancing cooperation primarily in their shared neighborhoodwhich they define as the regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders (i.e., not Central Asia).125 Reflecting EU concerns about sanctioning a de facto spheres-ofinfluence arrangement, Commission er Ferrero-Waldner has warned, Our challenge now is to try to reverse Russias drift to a bloc mentality.126 Kazakh officials recognize that EU governments will probably continue to prioritize relations with Russia given the much lower level of economic and other ties between the countries of the EU and Central Asia. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe On January 30, 1992, Kazakhstan and all the other former Soviet republics joined the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). As part of the accession process, they signed the core CSCE accession documents, including the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. The subsequently renamed Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) remains Europes most comprehensive institution in terms of both membership and areas of responsibility. It has 55 member states including Canada, the United States, and most European and Central Asian countriesand concerns itself with political, economic, and security issues. Since the shocks of 9/11, the OSCE has devoted much greater attention to Central Asia. Current OSCE priorities include curbing illicit trafficking in drugs and small arms, strengthening the security of travel documents and border controls, and countering terrorist financing and other transnational criminal activities. Although the expansion of NATO and the EU has led to a decrease of the OSCEs influence in most of Europe, this consideration has less influence among Central Asians since their countries chances of being incorporated into these other two Euro-Atlantic institutions as full members remains remote. In addition, while Russia and the Central Asian states disapprove of the OSCEs stress on improving their respect for human rights and insistence on reforming their other domestic policies, the EU and NATO are making similar demands. The economic and defense benefits of cooperating with the EU and NATO also have declined now that the primary security focus of the Central Asian governments is domestic and regional terrorism andseparatism. The OSCEs leverage over its members derives mainly from its prestige and respect. Its Office for Demo cratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) sends well-respected electoral observers to member states. Their assessment regarding a ballots fairness has a major impact on whether the international community deems the election legitimate. For this reason, Central Asian governments regularly seek its endorsement. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities also has sought, primarily through quiet diplomacy,to secure better treatment of minority ethnic groups in Central Asia and other OSCE members. Although the OSCE has long sought to resolve regional conflictsinitially, by helping end the 1992-97 civil war in Tajikistan, and subsequently by focusing on the so-called frozen conflicts in the former Soviet bloc, including those in Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijanits progress in recent cases has been minimal. ODIHRs seventeen field missions have been more effective at shaping behaviorso much so that they some times have run afoul of the incumbent host government. On July 3, 2004, nine of the twelve CIS heads of state endorsed a statement criticizing the OSCE for interfering in members internal affairs, employing a double standard that unduly focuses on abuses in CIS countries, and for becoming overly preoccupied with human rights issues at the expense of managing new challenges and promoting members security and economic well-being. The declaration also criticized the ODIHR and the OSCE field operations for spending too much, making unwarranted criticisms of members domestic political practices, and promoting their own reform
125 European Commission, The EUs Relations with Russia, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm. 126 Cited in Ahto Lobjakas, Russia: EU Commissioner Criticizes Moscows Assertive Policy Toward Neighboring States, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 26, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/01/16bf50ce-4f6d-479e-bf52-5f807eebc3b6.html.

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agenda.127 In December 2005, the Chief of the Russian General Staff accused the OSCE of becoming a surveillance agency for overseeing the adherence of democratic principles in CIS states heedless of these governments right to determine their own destiny.128 That same month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said ODIHR had become too independent and required more specific directions to guide its work.129 Since 2004 Russian officials have sought to reduce the OSCEs election monitoring missions and other democracy-promotion activities.130 For several months, the Russian government even refused to approve the OSCE budget until its members agreed to hold talks on its proposals. Since decisions are made by consensus, the other members have had to pay heed to these concerns. Although in the end the OSCE rejected most Russian demands, they did agree to reduce Moscows share of the OSCE budget.131 Resource limitations also constrain the OSCEs influence in Central Asia. The organization allocates far more funds and personnel to its field missions in southeastern Europe than to Central Asia.132 The OSCE has established a Special Representative for Central Asia, but the incumbent lacks a dedicated staff. Yet, of all the institutions affecting Kazakhstan, the OSCE could well become the most important. At their November 29-30, 2007, meeting, the foreign ministers of the 55 OSCE member governments designated Kazakhstan as the first Central Asian countryand also the first former Soviet republicto assume the position of rotating OSCE Chairman. Kazakh Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin, who would become OSCE Chairman-in- Office, called the decision by the 15th annual meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council to grant Kazakhstan the OSCE chairmanship in 2010 a testament to the transformation our country has undergone since independence and as a strong vote of confidence by OSCE Member States for the Central Asian region as a whole.133 Nazarbayev told foreign diplomats in Astana on December 10 that Kazakhstan would seek to strengthen the organization, which he maintained offered a unique dialogue platform that unites the north Atlantic and Eurasian spaces. The Kazakh government had waged a multi-year campaign to secure the OSCE Chairmanship.134 President Nazarbayev had personally lobbied foreign governments to support Kazakhstans candidacy. During his March 2006 visit to Kazakhstan, Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht, then OSCE chairman-in-office, characterized Kazakhstans bid as both a challenge and an opportunity since, while Kazakhstan lagged in certain desirable political variables, the country was the worthiest candidate in the very important region of Central Asia. Like other observers, de Gucht believed that it was also important for the OSCE as an institution that one of the countries that, as we say, is east of Vienna should chair the organization because it could help reduce the growing tensions that had characterized relations between the OSCE and many CIS countries.135 Kazakh officials had originally hoped that their country would assume the OSCE Chairman in 2009. Most European governmentsincluding Russia and Germanypublicly endorsed Kazakhstans candidacy. But several Western governmentsnotably Great Britain, the Czech Republic, and the United States considered 2011 a better date. Their main argument was that Kazakhstan needed to make further progress in upholding democratic principles and human rights at home before taking charge of the main organization
127 Liz Fuller, Analysis: Russia Coordinates New Broadside Against OSCE, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 12, 2004, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/7/031A1656-7D0C-4B74-8EA1-5B7B15F2E296.html. 128 Russian General Talks NATO, Nuclear, Missile Proliferation, RIA Novosti, December 1, 2005, http://en.rian.ru/ russia/20051201/42284792.html. 129 Valentinas Mite, 2005 in Review: Does the Presence of Western Election Observers Make a Difference?, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, December 22, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/6a02d87b-fb58-46e4-8e4a- 197bfbc3bf9d.html. 130 Vladimir Socor, Moscow: Defying OSCE on the Democracy Front, Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 4, 2004, http://www. jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3130&article_id =2368797. 131 Roland Eggleston, OSCE: U.S.-Russia Confrontation Expected at Meeting, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 2, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/61147e03-d455-425f-a22dce7cd548c430.html. 132 Solomon Passy, Transforming the OSCE, Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 3 (Fall 2004), http://www.turkishpolicy.com/ default.asp?show=fall2004_Solomon_Passy. 133 Government of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan to Assume Chairmanship of OSCE in 2010, PR Newswire, November 30, 2007, http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/release?id=214176. 134 For background on this issue see Security versus Democracy, The Economist, July 26, 2007, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=9537446&fsrc=RSS. 135 Mevlut Katik, Kazakhstan Entertains Grand Economic Development Plan, Eurasia Insight, April 6, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav040606.shtml.

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tasked with promoting these values throughout Eurasia.136 In particular, skeptics about awarding Kazakhstan the OSCE chair worried that Kazakhstans commitment to maintaining good relations with Russia and China as well as Europe and the United States could lead its OSCE representatives to resist censoring Eurasian governments for violating OSCE political and human rights principles.137 The lack of a consensus regarding Kazakhstans OSCE aspirations prevented earlier sessions of the OSCE Ministerial Council from reaching a decision on the 2009 chairmanship before the November 2007 session.138 The overwhelming victory of the pro-government party in the August 2007 elections for the national legislature reinforced the doubts of those Western governments and analysts concerned about the commitment of the Kazakh government to meeting OSCE political standards. Though noting some improvements since the previous ballot, OSCE election monitors had faulted Kazakhstan's parliamentary elections of August 18, 2007, for failing to meet international standards for a genuinely free and fair vote. Nazarbayev's Nur Otan party received 88% of the votes and won all available seats in the polls. All the opposition parties fell short of the 7% threshold required to enter parliament through the countrys proportional representation system. OSCE monitors complained about overly restrictive legal provisions such as the use of a high threshold for representation in the parliament, rules allowing parties to select after the ballot which of their candidates will become members of the legislature, and excessive restrictions on the Kazakhs rights to seek public office.139 Kazakh and OSCE representatives subsequently exchanged views on how to overcome these election problems.140 In addition, Kazakh leaders reaffirmed their commitment to promote democracy in Eurasia, though primarily indirectly by promoting economic development in their region, which Kazakhs argue would establish the large middle classes that underpin strong democracies.141 In the end, Western governments apparently decided that Kazakhstan was too important a country to alienate over the OSCE issue. European governments, for instance, were reluctant to antagonize a country that could provide vital oil supplies to planned Trans-Caspian oil pipelines connecting Central Asia to Europe. According to U.S. officials, moreover, their Kazakh counterparts have pledged to improve their countrys civil rights practices by 2010. In explaining Washingtons decision to back Kazakhstans candidacy at the November 2007 OSCE Ministerial, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns said: These are very important commitments by the Government of Kazakhstan. We intend to see that these commitments are implemented.142 The United States and its allies also worried that Russian officials might have exploited their differences with Kazakhstan to bind Astana closer to Moscow. In early November 2007, Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Grushko had warned the OSCE Permanent Council that, If the Madrid meeting does not unequivocally and unconditionally make a positive decision on Astanas candidacy, then we do not rule out that the OSCE may remain without any chairmanship, and not only in 2009.143 At the Madrid meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov openly attacked Western countries for seeking to link Kazakhstans appointment to changes in its governments polices: Unfortunately, during the several years that have preceded today's meeting, there were absolutely unacceptable and unseemly maneuvers concerning this bid aimed at creating conditions on the right of a specific countryan equal member of the OSCEto chair this organization by making demands on its internal and external policies.144
136 German Foreign Minister Calls for Reforms in Central Asia, Deutsche Welle, October 31, 2006, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/ article/0,2144,2221637,00.html. 137 See for example Security Versus Democracy, The Economist, July 26, 2007, http://www.economist.co.uk/displayStory. cfm?story_id=9537446. 138 Esbergen Tumat, Setback Likely for Kazaks OSCE Hopes, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, November 16, 2007, http:// www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hen&s=o&o=l=EN&p=rca&s=f&o=340703. 139 Organization for Co-Operation and Security in Europe, Kazakh Elections: Progress and Problems, http://www.osce.org/ item/25959.html. 140 Kazakhstan, OSCE to Continue Election Cooperation, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 8, 2007, http://www.rferl. org/featuresarticle/2007/11/20F6C86FEBFF-4F62-BA1F-37A2548405B9.html. 141 Andrew Rettman, EU Gas Needs Pull Kazakhstan Closer to Brussels, EUobserver.com, May 16, 2006, http://wennberg.newsvine.com/_news/2006/05/16/198527-eu-gas-needs-pullkazakhstan-closer-to-brussels. 142 R. Nicholas Burns, Press Conference at OSCE Ministerial Meeting, U.S. Department of State, November 30, 2007, http:// www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/96054.htm. 143 Vladimir Socor, Russia-Led Bloc Emerges in OSCE, Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 16, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/ edm/article.php?article_id=2372597. 144 Cited in Bruce Pannier, Kazakhstan to Assume OSCE Chairmanship in 2010, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 1,

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Some human rights and democracy advocates criticized Kazakhstans designation as OSCE chair as premature. Holly Cartner, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said that placing Kazakhstan in charge of the OSCEs human rights policies was a singularly bad idea.145 Jennifer Windsor, executive director of Freedom House, indicated her organizationwhich rates Kazakhstan as not free and had opposed allowing Kazakhstan to assume the OSCE chairmanship in 2009146 would withhold judgment pending evidence that the Kazakh government would fulfill its promises to make its domestic political system more democratic such as by changing its election law before 2010and support the OSCEs human rights objectives internationally.147 One of the most important issues for the Kazakhstan presidency could be resolving the dispute between Western governments on the one hand, and Moscow and its allies on the other, over the functions and authority of the OSCE Organization for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The governments of Russia and the other former Soviet republics have called for reducing the OSCEs democracy promotion efforts, especially in the area of election monitoring. At Madrid, Lavrov said the OSCE was facing a moment of truth since, in his assessment, the organization either had to change its ways or the whole European security architecture could collapse.148 In contrast, most Western governments urge the OSCE to continue strong efforts to promote democracy and human rights in the former Soviet Union, where these values are seen as gravely threatened. At the Madrid meeting, Tazhin pledged to support ODIHR and its existing mandate. He also committed to strengthen Kazakhstans own political reform efforts in such areas as media freedoms and electoral processes.149 Yet, Tazhin also said that Kazakhstan, whose next nationwide elections are scheduled for 2012, plans to work with all OSCE members to achieve a clear understanding on the criteria and standards ODIHR should use in assessing elections throughout the OSCE region, which suggests an openness in principle to revising OHDIRs activities. Russian officials likely will perceive Kazakhstans chairmanship as an opportunity to advance their OSCE reforms in a favorable institutional environment, but the OSCEs consensus decision-making rules would still allow any government to veto proposed changes affecting ODIHR. In addition, the appointment of a Central Asian country as OSCE chairman could help strengthen the organizations currently beleaguered position in several of the former Soviet republics.150 Burns applauded Kazakhstans designation as recognition by the rest of us that this organization is more than just about West Europeans and Americans. Its about the people who live in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans, as well. So, symbolically its important.151 Kazakhstan will soon begin transitioning to a leadership role within the OSCE. In 2009, it will join the OSCE Troika, in preparation to its becoming the OSCE chair in 2010. As one of the leading proponents of economic integration within Eurasia, the Kazakh government likely will use the opportunity to reinforce the OSCEs commitment to ensuring the development of transit and transportation corridors linking the Central Asian countries with one another and with other OSCE members. In addition, Kazakh Foreign Minister Tazhin has expressed a desire to work with Islamic governments to address issues such as Muslim migration and integration in Europe, the rights of Muslim women and young people in Western countries, and international legal and environmental problems.152
2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/12/30DF587F-31EC-4350-867BAFBE80517D2A. html. 145 Cited in Kazakhstan Picked to Chair OSCE, BBC News, December 1, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asiapacific/7123045.stm. 146 Freedom House, Groups Strongly Urge U.S. to Remain Opposed to KazakhstansLeadership of OSCE, September 21, 2007, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=556. 147 Freedom House, Kazakhstan Pledges to Improve Democratic Performance in Compromise Decision to Assume OSCE Chairmanship in 2010; Freedom House Urges Monitoring of Implementation, December 3, 2007, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template. cfm?page=70&release=594. 148 West and Russia Row at OSCEMoscow Warns of Collapse Summary, DPA, November 29, 2007, http://www.earthtimes. org/articles/show/150473.html#. 149 Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Officials Pledge to Act as OSCE Bridge Connecting North Atlantic, Eurasian States, Eurasia Insight, December 10, 2007, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav121007.shtml. 150 Isabel Gorst and Stefan Wagstyl, Kazakhstan To Bbe Offered Deal by Watchdog, Financial Times, November 27, 2007, http:// www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0fa10af0-9c75-11dcbcd8-0000779fd2ac.html. 151 Burns, Press Conference at OSCE Ministerial Meeting. 152 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan at the

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Regional Security Kazakh leaders have adopted a policy of seeking to promote security and stability throughout Central Asia and the Caspian Region as well as contributing to nonproliferation initiatives and international peacekeeping operations throughout the world. In addition to desiring to avert weapons proliferation, terrorism, wars, and other threats to the lives of Kazakh citizens and their neighbors, this approach results from an appreciation that adverse regional security developments would present a major threat to Kazakhstans growing economic and political potential. Instability in Kazakhstans neighborhood could scare off investors, disrupt region-wide trade and tourism flows, generate refuges and other unneeded migrants, as well as create other conditions that could adversely affect Kazakhstan. Countering Regional WMD Threats Kazakhstan constituted a core republic of the former Soviet Union. Its territory housed important elements of the USSRs military, nuclear, and aerospace industries. In particular, the Soviet military exploited Kazakhstans favorable geography to conduct numerous weapon tests.153 The Soviet government used the test sites at Vladimirovka and Saryshaghan to assess aerospace, air defense and ballistic missile systems. They also used facilities at Emba and especially Semipalatinsk for testing the Soviet militarys nuclear weapons and related systems. In terms of operational deployments, the Soviet strategic community exploited Kazakhstans pivotal location at the heart of Eurasia to deploy a robust nuclear force that could reach Europe, Asia, and the Middle East as well as against more distant targets in North America. Kazakhstan also contributed to the Soviet Unions nuclear weapons and nuclear energy programs by mining and processing its extensive stockpiles of atural uranium. At independence, Kazakhstan found itself the unhappy owner of one of the worlds largest nuclear arsenals. If the Kazakh government had retained these weapons1,040 nuclear warheads, 104 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 40 Tu-95 Bear heavy bombers equipped with 370 nuclear-armed Kh-55 long-range cruise missilesit would have possessed the fourth largest nuclear force in the world.154 The Soviet Union also researched biological and chemical weapons using production and testing facilities on Kazakh territory. The main facilities for biological weapons included the Vozrozhdeniye Island Open-Air Test Site in the Aral Sea (half of which is located on the territory of Uzbekistan), the Scientific Experimental and Production Base in Stepnogorsk (then the worlds largest anthrax production and weaponization facility), the Scientific Research Agricultural Institute in Gvardeyskiy, and the Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute in Almaty (since renamed the Kazakh Scientific Center for Quarantine and Zoonotic Infections). Diseases tested at these Kazakh facilities include anthrax, plague, smallpox, botulinum toxin, and Qfever.155 The Soviets used the Pavlodar complex for researching chemical weapons.156 Following independence, the Kazakh government worked with the United States and other international bodies to eliminate or secure these materials (e.g., by upgrading safety and security measures). The hoped-for conversion of some of these facilities to civilian use has proven more difficult than expected. For example, the dismantling of the Stepnogorsk facility, located 100 miles north of Astana, was successfully completed. After a joint U.S.-Kazakh program in drug-packaging at Stepnogorsk failed in 1997, however, Congress restricted further funding of civilian conversion projects.157 The Kazakh government also acted expeditiously to eliminate its unwanted nuclear weapons inheritance. Astana received considerable foreign assistance in this endeavor, especially from the U.S.-funded Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. In August 1991, President Nazarbayev signed a decree prohibiting any nuclear weapon tests on the Kazakh territory and closing the Semipalatinsk test range. In December 1994, Kazakhstan signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state. In return for re11-th Summit of the Islamic Conference, Dakar, Republic of Senegal, March 13-14, 2008, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/en/ content/ministry/minister/speeches /2008/2008.03.06._VYSTUPLENIE_MINISTRA_ANGL.doc. 153 John Pike, Federation of American Scientists, Kazakhstan Special Weapons, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/kazakhstan. 154 Dmitry Kosyrev, Nuclear-free Kazakhstan: An Example to Follow?, RIA Novosti, August 29, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/ analysis/20070829/75634106.html 155 Nuclear Threat Initiative, Kazakhstan Biological Overview, March 2008, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Kazakhstan/ Biological/index.html. 156 Toghzan Kazzenova, Central Asia: Regional Security and WMD Proliferation Threats, Disarmament Forum (2007), http:// www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdfart2684.pdf 157 Toghzan Kazzenova, Central Asia: Regional Security and WMD Proliferation Threats, Disarmament Forum (2007), http:// www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdfart2684.pdf.

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nouncing Astanas nuclear arsenal, Britain, Russia, and the United States offered Kazakhstan formal security guarantees.158 By the following year, Kazakhstan had removed all nuclear warheads and strategic delivery systems from its territory and destroyed all nuclear missile silos associated with these weaponsbecoming the first former Soviet republic to abandon its nuclear arsenal.159 At the same time, under Project Sapphire, Kazakh and U.S. officials cooperated to transfer 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) stored under vulnerable conditions at the Ulba Metallurgical Facility in Ust-Kamenogorsk to a more secure storage site in the United States.160 During the late 1990s, the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan permitted American scientists and intelligence experts to survey the vast stocks of biological weapons that the Soviets had buried on Vozrozhdeniye Island.161 More recently, in cooperation with the U.S. government and the independent Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Kazakh government hasagreed to downgrade nearly all of Kazakhstans remaining highly enriched uranium (HEU), which could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. It also committed to convert the countrys nuclear research reactors to use low-enriched uranium (LEU).162 At the end of January 2008, Senator Richard Lugar cited Kazakhs support for nonproliferation initiatives in arguing that Kazakhstan should be exempted from the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act. The amendment, which applies sanctions to countries that improperly limit freedom of emigration, has prevented Kazakhstan from formally obtaining permanent normal trade relations with the United States. He told listeners that, earlier that month, Kazakhstan had allowed a team of U.S. scientists to remove Soviet-era samples of bubonic and pneumatic plague to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Fort Collins, Colorado. American and Kazakh scientists are now undertaking joint research to develop means to prevent and cure these plague strains.163 Furthermore, on September 8, 2006, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan agreed to create a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ). The signing ceremony at Semipalatinsk in eastern Kazakhstan coincided with the fifteenth anniversary of the clo sure of the nuclear testing ground there. In accordance with Article 3, the signatories pledge not to research, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise try to acquire a nuclear explosive device. They also agree not to allow other parties to conduct such activities on their territorieswhich cover more than 3.8 million square kilometersor assist them to do so elsewhere. Several distinctive features of the CANWFZ make the accord a landmark from the perspective of nuclear nonproliferation. First, Kazakhstan is the first former nuclear weapon state to adhere to a NWFZ. Second, the Treaty established the worlds first NWFZ solely in the Northern Hemisphere, which contains the preponderance of nuclear weapons states. Its geographic coverage also resulted in the first multilateral security agree ment to embrace all five Central Asian countriesan important accomplishment because Turkmenistan has traditionally remained aloof from such initiatives. Third, the United Nations, including the General Assembly and members of the UN Secretariat, directly participated in drafting the Semipalatinsk Treatys provisions. The Central Asian governments made a deliberate effort to ensure that the Treaty conforms to the principles and guidelines on establishing NWFZs adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999. Fourth, the Semipalatinsk Treaty represents the first NWFZ to contain a provision recognizing the environmental damage associated with nuclear weapons production. Under Article 6, its members pledge to support rehabilitation of areas damaged by past nuclear tests and other Soviet-era nuclear activities on their territories. Fifth,
158 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan i Voprosy Globalnoy Bezopastnosti: Razoruzhenie i yadernoe neraspostranenie, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/security/disarmament. 159 Kazzenova, Central Asia: Regional Security and WMD Proliferation Threats, and Kazakhstans Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Model for a Safer World (Washington, DC: Embassy of Kazakhstan and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2006). 160 John A. Tirpak, Project Sapphire, Air Force Magazine (August 1995), http://www.afa.org/magazine/Aug1995/0895sapphire. asp. See also Dee Dee Myers, US-Kazakh Accord Helps Meet New Proliferation Challenges, November 23, 1994, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/kazakh/941123-368630.htm. 161 Judith Miller, Poison Island, New York Times, June 2, 1999, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9507E1D81030F 931A35755C0A96F9582 60. 162 Joshua Kucera, Bush: Kazakhstan is a Free Nation, Eurasia Insight, September 29, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092906.shtml. 163 Office of Senator Richard G. Lugar, Lugar Offers Repeal of Jackson-Vanik for Kazakhstan, Press Release, January 29, 2008, http://lugar.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=291402.

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Article 8 of the treaty explicitlyrequires signatories to adopt the so-called Additional Protocol, which grants the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) enhanced inspection rights at members civilian nuclear facilities. (Kazakhstan accordingly ratified the Additional Protocol on February 19, 2007.) The Treaty signatories also pledge to meet IAEA-approved international standards for the physical protection of their nuclear facilities and radioactive materials. Finally, the CANWFZ uniquely borders two declared nuclear-weapon states, China and Russia. On June 11-12, 2007, Astana hosted a major international assembly of the countries participating in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Representatives from 38 countries attended, while the European Union and the IAEA sent observers. At the session, the participants reviewedrecent progress, addressed implementation problems, and discussed how to further integrate new partners into GICNT projects.164 In welcoming the June 2007 GICNT meeting in Astana, Foreign Minister Tazhin reaffirmed his countrys determination to actively combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. . . . The adoption of effective measures to counter and prevent terrorism is a priority of Kazakhstan's internal and external policies.165 The attendees agreed to sponsor almost 20 activities during the next two years as part of their revised work plan.166 Priorities include limiting the availability of nuclear material to terrorists; improving the capabilities of participating nations to detect, search for, and prevent trafficking in such materials; pro moting information sharing and law enforcement cooperation; establishing appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks; minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in civilian facilities and activities; denying safe haven and financial resources to terrorists; and strengthening national response capabilities to minimize the impact of any nuclear terrorist attack.167 By virtue of its sustained commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, Kazakhstan was selected as the only Central Asian country to serve as a member of the GICNT leadership body, the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG), which coordinates the GICNTs implementation. The IAG provides assistance to other governments seeking to implement the GICNT Statement of Principles and have organized activities designed to advance these principles. IAG members also help develop the work plan and measures of effectiveness for these activities.168 In early June 2008, the Kazakh military conducted a large-scale exercise under GICNT auspices that simulated a mock terrorist seizure of a nuclear research facility near Almaty. According to Adil Shayakhmetov, head of the security services antiterrorism unit, the scenario allowed the almost 1,000 military and emergency personnel involved to improve their joint communication and operations skills.169 At the end of 2007, the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry hosted an international conference entitled Kazakhstan's Way To a Nuclear Weapon-Free World, to mark the 16th anniversary of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site's closure. The symposiums organizers described its purpose as intended to attract the world's attention to the example of Kazakhstan, which has shown that the most effective and preferable path to ensuring the security of a nation lies through a nuclear weapon-free choice and a consistently peaceful foreign policy, and not through the creation and development of weapons of mass destruction.170 Kazakhstan has joined with Washington, Moscow, and other governments in a multinational effort to apply the CTR process to third-party nonproliferation threats, thereby transforming the traditional donor-recipient model employed by CTR programs into a joint partnership against common WMD challenges. In June 2007, Kazakhstan, Russia, the United States, and other governments discussed how they could best adapt the
164 U.S. Department of State, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Joint Statement, June 12, 2007, http://www.state. gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/jun/86331.htm. 165 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Welcoming Remarks by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Mr. Marat Tazhin, at the Opening of the Third Meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, June 11, 2007, http://www. mfa.kz/eng/?news=1&selected=216. 166 John C. Rood, Keeping Nuclear Arms Out of Wrong Hands, Miami Herald, June 16, 2007, http://www.miamiherald.com/851/ story/141745.html. 167 U.S. Department of State, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Joint Statement, June 12, 2007, http://www.state. gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/jun/86331.htm. 168 U.S. Department of State, Terms of Reference for Implementation and Assessment, November 20, 2006, http://www.state. gov/t/isn/rls/other/76421.htm. 169 Kazakhstan Holds Exercise to Hone Response to Nuclear Terrorism Threat, Associated Press, June 6, 2008, http://www.iht. com/articles/ap/2008/06/06/asia/ASGEN-Kazakhstan-Terror-Exercise.php. 170 Kazakhstan to Host International Conference against Nuclear Weapons, RIA Novosti, August 16, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/ analysis/20070816/71788996.html.

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equipment and techniques developed in their bilateral CTR programs for monitoring radiological movements outside the former Soviet Union.171 Kazakh officials share the belief of American, Russian, and other international security experts that the problematic experience the international community has experienced with Irans nuclear activities requires a restructuring of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Along with Putin and other world leaders, Nazarbayev has proposed establishing a body under the auspices of the IAEA that would guarantee fuel supplies for civilian nuclear power plants and store or reprocess the resulting spent fuel as a way of addressing a root cause of nuclear proliferationthe desire of countries to develop their own uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities in order to have the ability to manufacture and dispose of nuclear fuel.172 Analysts hope that such centers will discourage individual countries from developing their own nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, which can also be used to produce nuclear weapons if their operators enrich the uranium to sufficiently high levels. Last year, the Kazakh government acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The general purpose criterion used in Article I of the convention does not ban biological agents or toxins directly, but requires that they be used only for prophylactic, defensive, and other peaceful purposes. The agreement does explicitly prohibit weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. On April 24, 2008, the parliament of Kazakhstan ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which obliges State Parties to take steps to avert and punish attempts to use nuclear materials in terrorist acts.173 Kazakhstan has become a State Party to many other nonproliferation institutions and agreements, including the U.S.-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative.174 These decisions confirm Kazakhstans continued commitment to WMD nonproliferation. In the assessment of several Western experts, Since its independenceKazakhstan has been a model state, cooperating in the removal of nuclear arms from its territory and fully embracing international nuclear nonproliferation norms.175 Enhancing Regional Security Like the other newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan had to design new military institutions based initially on the few resources it managed to inherit from the former Soviet armed forces. The initial focus was on developing military forces suitable for self-defense, especially against the regional terrorist groups that have presented the main transnational military threat to Kazakhstan and other Eurasian governments. Kazakhs have been especially concerned about potential terrorist attacks on the countrys valuable (and vulnerable) oil and gas infrastructure, such as the offshore oil drilling platforms along Kazakhstans Caspian coast. But terrorist operations anywhere in Kazakhstans neighborhood could cause a deterioration of the regions investment climate as well as other economic damage.176 More recently, the Kazakh governments basic approach to international securitywhich posits that Kazakhstan requires a secure environment to develop politically and economicallyhas led Kazakh officials to seek the capacity to project military power beyond Kazakh territory in support of wider regional security objectives, including peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction missions. In these endeavors, Kazakh authorities have pursued an eclectic approach. Since independence, they have readily sought military training, weapons donations, and other defense assistance from Russia, China, NATO and other foreign sources. For example, under the U.S.-Kazakh Five Year Partnership Plan announced earlier this year, the United States will provide Kazakhstan with Hummer vehicles, communications and en171 John J. Fialka, Russia, U.S. Step Up Nuclear-Control Drive, Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2007. 172 Anar Khamzayeva, Denuclearized Central Asia: An Example to Follow, Central Asias Affairs, no. 1 (2007). 173 Kazakh Parliament Ratifies UN Nuclear Terrorism Convention, RIA Novosti, April 24, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/ world/20080424/105825941.html. 174 For a partial inventory see Nuclear Threat Initiative, Kazakhstan, http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/ pdfs/kazak.pdf. 175 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar: Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, second edition (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 370. 176 B. K. Sultanov, Problemy Sotrudnichestva Stran-Chlenov ShOS v Svere Bezopasnoti, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, May 13, 2008, http://www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=5485.

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gineering equipment, and other military support.177 More recently, the Kazakh government has used some of its surging budget revenue to increase its own defense spending considerably. Soon after independence, the terrorist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) emerged as the main threat to the security of the region. The IMU formally came into being in 1998, but precursor organizations had been active in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia since the USSRs collapse in 1991. The IMU developed extensive connections with al-Qaeda and the Taliban when they ruled Afghanistan. IMU forces fought alongside Taliban forces and their al-Qaeda allies during the subsequent American-led OEF campaign in Afghanistan. In their August 1999 communiqu, IMU leaders proclaimed their objective of overthrowing the secular regime of Uzbek President Islam Karimov and establishing a Taliban-style Islamic republic. To realize this objective, the organization set off bombs in Uzbekistan and attempted to assassinate Karimov. They also invaded southern Kyrgyzstan, where they seized foreigners as hostages, whom they ransomed for money. IMU guerrillas sought but failed to establish a base of operations in the Ferghana Valley in order to gather recruits and wage a protracted insurgency against the Uzbek government.178 Before it could launch its next major offensive, however, the IMU lost its bases, and many of its members, in Afghanistan following the large-scale U.S. military intervention there starting in October 2001. After a year-long hiatus, the IMU renewed military operations in Kyrgyzstan, especially along the Kyrgyz-Uzbek frontier. Its members allegedly detonated several bombs, including in an alleged attempt to kill National Security Council Secretary Misir Ashirkulov in September 2002. Kyrgyz authorities also feared that IMU operatives had established sleeper cells within their territory, especially the Ferghana Valley, by blending into the local population.179 In April 2003, Uzbek authorities discovered a possible IMU bomb plot when construction workers found a probable improvised explosive device in the basement of a Tashkent hotel. The explosives were reportedly similar to those used in the 1999 car bombings. The detection occurred a month before Tashkent hosted the annual meeting of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop ment in early May 2003.180 The present status of the IMU and its offshoots remains unclear, but some of its operatives may have been involved in the bombings that occurred in Uzbekistan in March-April 2004 and the terrorist incidents that reportedly occurred in Tajikistan in 2006.181 At this time, IMU leader Tahir Yuldashev was still issuing threats against Central Asian leaders: We will avenge Muslims in Central Asia or in Russia. We insist that all regimes in the region put an end to the practice of persecution of Muslims, the practice of harassment and terror. [Uzbek President] Karimov, [Tajik President] Rahmonov, and [Kyrgyz President] Bakiyev had better remember that they will be punished for the crimes they are committing.182 Press reports also repeatedly cite the presence of ethnic Uzbeks, many suspected of being remnants of the IMU, in the ranks of the Islamist fighters active in northwest Pakistan.183 In May 2008, Dutch, French, and German authorities arrested ten people suspected of involvement in an international network to raise money for the IMU.184 In any case, Kazakh and other Central Asian security officials remain concerned about a possible revival of Islamistinspired terrorism in their countries. Kazakh authorities have stressed that countering the threat from the IMU and other transnational terrorist movements in Eurasia requires a multilateral effort. Terrorists regularly move from country to country,
177 Embassy of Kazakhstan in the USA and Canada, Kazakhstans Defense Ministry Hails Military Cooperation with the United States, Kazakhstans News Bulletin, January 23, 2008, http://www.kazakhembus.com/NB1-012308.html. 178 Ahmed Rashid, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistans Incursion Assists the Taliban, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, September 13, 2000, http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/?q=node/268/print. 179 Arslan Koichiev, Skirmishes Suggest IMU is Changing Tactics, Europa Insight, August 6, 2001, http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/insight/articles/eav080601.shtml. 180 Terrorism Scare Hits Upcoming Tashkent Conference, Europa Insight, April 15, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/ insight/articles/eav041503a.shtml. 181 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Central Asia: Is Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Really Back?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 2, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/81E06ED8-77DA-4BF3-ADE9-5B74EBC07FE0.html. 182 Rober McDermott, IMU Issues New Threat to Central Asian Leaders, CentralAsia-Southcaucasus.com, September 18, 2006 www.centralasiasouthcaucasus. com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=58&Itemid=53. 183 Ismail Khan, Foreigners among Rebels Killed Near Afghan Line, Pakistan Says, New York Times, October 12, 2007, http://www. nytimes.com/2007/10/12/world/asia/12pakistan.html?ex=1349841600&en= 099056ebac38e1a9&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 184 Lisa Bryant, At Least 10 Detained in EU Countries in Connection with Terror Probe, Voice of America, May 16, 2008, http:// voanews.com/english/2008-05-16-voa46.cfm.

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seeking safe havens wherever they can. Although bilateral cooperation with other Central Asian governments has been minimal, Kazakh officials have collaborated with Russia, China, the United States, and other militarily powerful countries to manage such threats. In addition, they have worked within the SCO, NATO, and other international institutions to make counterterrorism an important element of these organizations security programs. Kazakhstan supports all twelve of the U.N. conventions against international terrorism.185 The revival of Kazakhstans economy since the late 1990s, combined with the post-9/11 influx of foreign militaries into Central Asia and the Caspian region, has more recently enabled the government to pursue its objective of developing a dual-purpose military, one capable of both self-defense andpromoting international peace and security. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, Kazakhstan committed troops to the Central Asian Rapid Reaction Force designed to defend members against a major terrorist incursion such as that led by the IMU in previous years. Kazakhstan also created a 500-strong peace-keeping battalion to contribute to regional and extra-regional security operations.186 In March 2007, when the Kazakh government approved a new military doctrine, it also announced a 74% increase in defense spending over the previous year. The increase was designed to enhance troop training and readiness as well as fund the acquisition of more advanced military equipment.187 Kazakh defense firms also plan to sell arms manufactured in Kazakhstan to other Eurasian countries. For example, through a technical cooperation agreement with Israel, they plan to sell Israeli-designed artillery systems to other Central Asian countries.188 A more recent priority of Kazakhstans regional security efforts has been to help defend the natural resources of the Caspian Sea, along with the growing infrastructure developed by foreign and increasingly domestic capital, from terrorists and other threats.189 The sea contains large reserves of oil and natural gas as well as considerable quantities of sturgeon and other fish. In a March 2006 interview, Kazakh Foreign Minister Kassymzhomart Tokaev argued that, while several security mechanisms deal with Caspian security threats, they all suffer from the fact that none of them is of a comprehensive nature with universal participation of the Caspian states. Although he acknowledged that the littoral states were unlikely to agree to disarm, Tokaev reaffirmed support for Kazakhstans 2004 confidence-building initiative to create a five-sided mechanism of controlling and deterring the armaments on the Caspian, providing a balance of armaments and defining their limits. He added that while Russias proposal for a joint Caspian Force (the CASFOR) warranted further study, a more effective means of enhancing military collaboration among Caspian countries would be to adopt a Pact on Stability on the Caspian Sea, which would entail cooperative efforts to counter terrorism, aggressive separatism, illegal trafficking of weapons and drugs, illegal immigration, as well as other forms of organized crime and other new threats and challenges.190 To contribute to these Trans-Caspian security initiatives as well as defend its other national interests, the Kazakh government has long aspired to develop a navy. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan divided its Caspian flotilla, which was not very large to begin with. Although the United States and Germany have donated ten small ships, it was not until recently that Kazakhstans growing budget revenue, due largely to world energy prices, has provided the country with the resources to begin procuring modern naval armaments. According to the latest plans, the government aims to acquire several modern warships, military equipment, and a coastal support infrastructure over a two-decade period, with the final of the three modernization stages scheduled for completion in 2025.191
185 Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations, Kazakhstan Against Terrorism, http://www.kazakhstanun.org/policy_priorities/terrorism/Terrorism.html. 186 Rafis Abazov, Kazakhstans Security Challenges in a Changing World, in Michael Intriligator, Alexander Nikitin, and Majid Tehranian, eds., Eurasia: A New Peace Agenda (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), p. 239. 187 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Kazakhstans New Military Doctrine Tackles Security Challenges, Provides Guidance for Further Reforms, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, April 11, 2007. 188 Kazakhstan Rising, Silk Road Intelligencer, May 26, 2008, http://silkroadintelligencer.com/2008/05/26/kazakhstan-rising. 189 Roger N. McDermott, Kazakhstani Bids for Regional Antiterrorism Agenda, Eurasia Insight, November 20, 2002, http://www. eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112002a.shtml. 190 Mevlut Katik, Kazakhstan Has Huge Plan to Expand Energy Links With China, Eurasia Insight, March 13, 2006, http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav031306.shtml. Russias CASFOR proposal is discussed in Stephen J. Blank, Turkmenistan and Central Asia after Niyazov (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2007), pp. 43, 45. 191 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Kazakhstan Develops New Navy Concept: Will Pool Resources to Fight

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Kazakh officials stress that a strong navy would help promote transnational as well as Kazakh security interests, including those of foreign business enterprises and investors.192 In February 2003, Kazakh First Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Abuseitov told reporters the country needed a navy that "could fight against new threats, primarily terrorism. Nobody is insured against the possibility that the Caspian could become, in future, an arena of terrorist acts, a place of drug transit, illegal arms trade and even illegal migration.193 Less overtly, a stronger navy could help Kazakhstan moderate Tehrans ambitions regarding the Caspian 194 Sea. Iran continues to differ with Kazakhstan and the other littoral countries regarding how to divide and manage the sea and its valuable subsurface natural resources. The main dispute is whether to treat the Caspian as if it were a sea (despite its being landlocked) or an inland lake (despite its large size and natural resources) according to international law. If the littoral states were to manage the Caspian as if it were a sea, then each country would control the territorial waters along their coasts and corresponding seabeds. The Kazakh government naturally prefers this approach since such a division would leave Kazakhstan with the largest and potentially most lucrative natural sector.195 If the Caspian were treated legally as a large inland lake, more flexible legal standards would apply. All five littoral states could commonly own the sea and share equally in its collective natural resources, or they could reach some other arrangement. The first leadership summit of the five countries bordering the Caspian Sea occurred in Ashgabat in 2002, but made little progress in establishing a mutually agreeable legal framework. In May 2003, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Russia reached a trilateral agreement that divided the northern 64% of the Caspian Sea into three unequal shares, with Kazakhstan receiving the largest portion, some 29%.196 Iran and Turkmenistan, however, refused to endorse this trilateral agreement and restated their claim to larger economic zones than the 2003 formula would provide. In October 2007, Tehran hosted the second presidential summit of Caspian Sea nations. Nazarbayev joined Azerbaijans Ilham Aliyev, Irans Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Russias Vladimir Putin, and Turkmenistans Gurbanguli Berdymukhamedov in adopting a joint declaration affirming their solidarity on important regional se curity issues. The statement asserted the Caspian should only be used for peaceful purposes, that the five littoral states should resolve their conflicts without force, and that the Caspian governments would not allow anyone to use their territory for launching a military attack against another littoral country.197 The presidents also insisted that only the littoral states could deploy military forces in or near the sea. They again failed, however, to resolve their differences over how to delineate the littoral states competing territorial claims. As of April 2008, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was still insisting on the continued validity of two Soviet-era treaties that describe the Caspian as a common sea, pending their replacement by a new convention ratified by all five Caspian states.198 These treaties, signed in 1921 and 1940, assign Tehran and Moscow joint management of the Caspian beyond territorial zones, but do not address undersea mining, only navigation and fishing. The unresolved dispute among the five Caspian states has impeded implementation of plans to exploit undersea energy resources or transport oil and gas through underwater pipelines. Iran has the second-strongest navy in the Caspian and has also used it to enforce its claims over Caspian resources.199 In 2001, Iran dispatched military ships and aircraft to threaten two Azerbaijani research vessels exploring oilfields in the southern Caspian.200
Caviar Poachers, March 29, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/032907.html. 192 Kazakhstan: Astana Puts New Emphasis on Military, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 17, 2003, http://www.globalse curity.org/military/library/news/2003/06/mil-030617-rfel-163415.htm. 193 John Daly, Analysis: Kazakhstan Rules Oceans, United Press International, February 19, 2008, http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Energy/Analysis/2008/02/19/analysis_kazakhstan_rules_oceans/5032. 194 John Daly, Division of the Caspian, United Press International, August 9, 2007, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Division_Of_The_Caspian_999.html. 195 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Aktualnye Voprosy Vneshney Politiki Kazakhstana Pravovoy Status Kaspiyskogo Morya, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/issues/caspian_sea. 196 Hooman Peimami, Iran Intent on Keeping Pace with Caspian Basin Energy Development, Eurasia Insight, August 19, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav081903.shtml. 197 Caspian Sea Leaders Sign Declaration, Tehran Times, October 17, 2007, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View. asp?code=155078. 198 Kaveh L Afrasiabi, Iran Homes in on the Caspian, Asia Times, April 17, 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/ JD17Ag01.html. 199 Blank, Turkmenistan and Central Asia, p. 50. 200 Andrew Katan, Irans Territorial Disputes with its Caspian Sea Neighbors, Power and Interest Report, May 31, 2006, http://

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Another unresolved dispute concerns possible Trans-Caspian energy pipelines. The governments of Russia and Iran argue that all the littoral countries must approve construction of each energy pipeline that would traverse any part of the Caspian. Their stated reason for requiring consensus on regional energy projects is that all five countries could suffer from any environmental damage to the Caspian Sea caused by the pipelines.201 A desire to block east-west energy conduits that circumvent Russian and Iranian territory by traversing the Caspian might also explain Moscows and Tehrans demand for veto rights. Energy producers in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are eager to diversify their export routes. An obvious means to do so is shipping oil and gas to Europe via pipelines that run along Azerbaijans sector of the Caspian seabed as well as through Soviet-era pipelines. Although these latter routes are unavoidable given the imperatives of geography and Moscows preeminent status in Eurasian energy markets, these pipelines fall under the control of Russias state-controlled energy monopolies, which typically extract monopoly rents for their use. At the October 2007 summit, Nazarbayev called on the Caspian governments to negotiate a stability pact to limit naval weapons and activities in the sea.202 Putin declined to support Nazarbayevs proposals, however, which could compromise Russian influence over the region. Instead, he reaffirmed Russias interest in establishing a joint naval group among the Caspian Sea states (the CASFOR) to improve the security of maritime navigation and provide protection for critical energy facilities against terrorist and other threats.203 Enhancing Regional Confidence-Building Measures At the 47th Session of the UN General Assembly in October 1992, President Nazarbayev called for convening a Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia (CICA). During the following decade, Kazakh officials and security experts, supported by representatives of other countries, drove the CICA pro cess forward. These efforts included the convening of meetings of Asian governments, scholarly conferences, and other activities intending to promote multilateral approaches towards promoting peace, security and stability in Asia. On September 14, 1999, the foreign ministers of the 15 governments then involved in CICA signed a Declaration on the Principles Guiding Relations among the CICA States. This initial phase of institution building, which required agreeing on both fundamental principles and administrative procedures, culminated in the first CICA Summit of the Heads of States and Heads of Governments on June 4, 2002. The 16 governments that attended the first CICA summit signed the Almaty Act and The CICA Declaration about the Elimination of Terrorism and Promotion of Dialogue between Civilizations.204 The signatories of the Almaty Act commit to develop the CICA as a forum for dialogue, consultations and adoption of decisions and measures on the basis of consensus on security issues in Asia. 205 The CICA Declaration affirms the belief of the governments involved in CICA that, We consider CICA as a unique Asian forum which comprises states of different cultures and traditions making it one of the most important mechanisms to promote dialogue among civilizations and cultures. The document also states that, The CICA Member States intend to comprehensively and actively promote such a dialogue taking into account that Eurasia has not only been a cradle of some of the world's largest civilizations but has also served as a bridge between them.206 In October 2004, the member governments adopted a CICA Catalogue of Confidence Building Measures. They subsequently sought to refine the principles and procedures for implementing these measures in the entire range of fields that could contribute to conflict, encompassing military, political, economic, environmental, humanitarian and cultural issues. The measures under discussion included those related to
www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=499&language_id=1. 201 Vladimir Isachenkov, Putin Warns Against Attacks on Iran, Associated Press, October 17, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wpdyn/ content/article/2007/10/16/AR2007101601060.html. 202 Vladimir Socor, Caspian Summit Envisions Creation of Regional Institutions, Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 19, 2007, http:// www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372518. 203 Caspian Sea Leaders Sign Declaration, Tehran Times, October 17, 2007, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View. asp?code=155078. 204 Jandos Asanov, Evolution of the CICA, Todays Zaman, September 21, 2007, http://www.todayszaman.com/tzweb/detaylar.do ?load=detay&link=122679&bolum=109. 205 Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the UN office and Other International Organisations in Geneva, Almaty Act, June 4, 2002, http://www.kazakhembus.com/Almaty_Act.html. 206 Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the UN office and other international organisations in Geneva, CICA Declaration on Eliminating Terrorism and Promoting Dialogue among Civilizations, June 4, 2002, Almaty, http://missions.itu.int/~kazaks/ eng/cica/cica06.htm.

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traditional disarmament and arms control; military confidence-building measures; actions to prevent trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and nuclear materials; and activities aimed at countering terrorism and managing transnational refugee flows. In June 2006, the member governments established a CICA Secretariat as a permanent administrative body to assist with this process.207 To accelerate progress, some of these measures are designed to apply primarily at the subregional level, rather than CICA-wide, to issues of most relevance for the relevant countries. The present full members of CICA include the most important countries affecting Asian security: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Palestine, Republic of Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. These countries contain approximately half the worlds population and a growing share of the worlds gross economic output. The governments of Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Ukraine, Vietnam, and the United States have observer status within the CICA, as do the United Nations, the OSCE, and the League of Arab States.208 The members are assessing how the CICA should interact with the other (less comprehensive) security institutions active in Asia. Kazakh experts believe that certain characteristics of their country and the Asian security environment made Kazakhstan an ideal leader to expand the role of confidence-building measures in post-Cold War Asia. They note that, as of the early 1990s, the major Asian military powers still had important national differences (China-India, Russia-India, etc) that impeded their security cooperation. In addition, Kazakh analysts argue that Kazakhstans multi-vector diplomacy, which eschewed both exclusive alignments and isolationist neutrality, made it a suitably disinterested but benign participant in Asian security disputes.209 Kazakh officials and security experts adduced similar arguments to justify their successful leadership aspirations regarding the OSCE, which like the CICA also addresses political-military, economic; and humanitarian issues within an overarching multilateral framework. The continued development of the CICA process could help ameliorate the problem identified by international security experts that Asia is not covered by region-wide confidence-building and transparency measures like the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.210 In June 2002, the Almaty summit of the CICA provided an opportunity for Kazakh officials to promote engagement and reconciliation between visiting Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.211 Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin believes that, CICA has good prospects of becoming an effective mechanism for collective security in Asia. 212 The Kazakh government aims to host another Conference on Confidence and Security Measures in Asia in 2010, a period that will coincide with its OSCE chairmanship. Managing Regional Emergencies The unduly harsh weather and floods suffered by Central Asian countries this past winter reminded many that managing the consequences of natural disasters represents an important regional security issue. Kazakhstan has suffered its share of these problems. More positively, Kazakh authorities are playing a leading role in helping to improve the capabilities of the region to respond to these challenges. From June 7-12, 2007, the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Emergency Situations jointly hosted Regional Cooperation 2007 (RC07). This computer-simulated disaster response exercise involved approximately 230 military and civilian personnel from Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and the United States. It was organized jointly by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The exercise aimed to strengthen the ability of the participating countries to collaborate in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from the effects of a natural or manmade disaster under the framework of a Regional Cooperation Center. Although the scenario involved a natural disaster,
207 Asanov, Evolution of the CICA. 208 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan i Voprosy globa;noy bezopastnosti: Soveshchanie po Vzaimodeystviyu, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/security/conference. 209 See for example A. G. Kozhikhov, CICA: Realities and Outlooks, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, July 26, 2002, http://www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=516. 210 Eric Hundman, CFE Treaty: Prospects for Asia Reinvigoration, Expansion, Center for Defense Information, April 24, 2008, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18902. 211 Marat Yermukanov, Kazakhstan-India Relations: Partners or Distant Friends?, Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 16, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3142&article_id=2368860. 212 Marat Tazhin, Kazakhstan in a Changing World, speech at U.S.-Kazakhstan Business Association dinner, Washington, D.C., May 8, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/050907.html.

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RC07 sought to develop national capabilities that can also apply to countering terrorism, narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, and human trafficking. The exercise addressed such goals as effective information sharing, interoperability, and coordinating regional response efforts. As part of the exercise, the Kazakhstan Ministry of Emergency Situations employed its National Crisis Management Center in Astana. The other participating countries staffed national response cells in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Prior to the exercises, representatives from the participating countries held two working meetings and three conferences. Afterwards, they held a postexercise lessons learned seminar to evaluate the results of RC07 and consider next steps. Since the late 1990s, numerous symposiums, seminars, and computer-assisted command post exercises have been held under the auspices of the Regional Cooperation series. The United States and its NATO allies have sought to organize collective activities on issues related to emergency management with the countries of Central Asia. This type of cooperation is typically less controversial than collaboration involving other military activities such as collective interventions in neighboring countries or domestic anti-terrorist operations. The experience with Uzbekistan has made Western governments wary of enhancing the military instruments available for the regions authoritarian governments to suppress domestic rivals or popular protests. Yet, cooperation on disaster management can, by improving interoperability among participating countries, provide a basis for segueing to more demanding forms of joint military operations in the future. Participation in collective security activities also helps develop military-to-military relations between the armed forces engaged in the region, including with NATO forces hitherto excluded from CSTO and SCO exercises. Economics and Energy Thanks to its natural riches and wise economic policies, Kazakhstan has achieved the strongest economy in Central Asia. The gross domestic product (GDP) of Kazakhstan is larger than that of all the other Central Asian countries combined, amounting to an estimated $161 billion in 2007. 213 The Nazarbayev administration has encouraged Kazakhs to engage in regional commerce as well as wider economic intercourse in order to limit Kazakhstans dependence on any single supplier, customer, investor, or market. In addition, the president has a vision of his country as a nexus of the Eurasian economies. In 2005, Nazarbayev told the attendees of an international conference entitled Strategy Kazakhstan2030, that, I see Kazakhstan as a junction country in the Central Asian region, an integrator of intra-regional economic ties, a center of gravity of capital and investments, and a location of regional production or the subsidiaries of the worlds major companies aimed at the Central Asian market and international services. In time, he added, Kazakhstan might perform the function of an important link, a transcontinental economic bridge, for interactions between European, Asia- Pacific and the South Asian economic regions. 214 In his February 2007 annual state of the nation address, Nazarbayev said he wanted Kazakhstan to become a regional locomotive of economic development.215 In October 2007, Nazarbayev reaffirmed his intent to develop a Eurasian transport corridor that would eventually connect the Persian Gulf on one end and the Baltic Sea on the other through the creation of a hightech system that includes railroads, highways, power transmission lines, gas, and oil pipelines. 216 Kazakhstans extraordinary economic growth during the past decadeafter the country recovered from the rupture of the integrated Soviet economy and world oil prices rebounded in the late 1990sresulted in its becoming the first former Soviet republic to receive an investment-grade credit rating from a major international credit rating agency. The macroeconomic boom the nation has experienced since the late 1990s enabled Kazakhstan to liquidate its debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2000. Kazakhstans economic upturn, though initially driven to a considerable degree by increased oil revenues, has also been sustained through market reforms. During the Soviet period, the countrys industrial sector had been closely integrated
213 Kazakhstan, CIA World Fact Book: 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html. 214 President of Kazakhstan, Vystuplenie Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan N. Nazarbaeva na mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii Strategiya Kazakhstan2030 v Deystvii, October 11, 2005, http://www.akorda.kz/www/www_akorda_kz.nsf/sections?OpenForm&id_ doc=DE8 C9CA216A02A3F462572340019E7BF&lang=ru&L1=L2&L2=L2-15. 215 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, A New Kazakhstan in a New World: President Nazarbayevs Strategic Vision, Kazakhstans Echo, no. 36 (March 2, 2007), http://www.kazakhembus.com/echo36.html. 216 Central Asia: Kazakh, Russian Leaders Discuss Transport Corridor, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 5, 2007, http:// www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/4482ab28-5ab9-4756-8386-48471d684d3f.html.

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with enterprises in Russia and the other republics. For example, Kazakhstans defense companies depended on exchanging supplies and parts with other elements of the Soviet military industrial complex. The countrys oil and gas often underwent processing in Russia, while Kazakhstan would import oil from Siberia and gas from Uzbekistan. The rupture of these commercial ties led to the collapse of many Kazakh firms and induced the newly independent Kazakh government to rely primarily on the extraction and export of the countrys raw materials, especially hydrocarbons, to sustain the economy.217 Though the primary export commodities of Kazakhstan are oil and gas, Kazakhstan has actively sought to expand its range of economic activities through vertical (new products) as well as horizontal (new partners) market diversification. Its leaders realize they cannot rely solely on hydrocarbon exports alone for the revenue needed to continue their robust economic growth and relative political stability. Kazakh officials have there fore been using the countrys oil and gas revenue to try to finance the development of an economic foundation for expanding into new markets. An important element in this strategy was the creation in 2001 of the National Fund, under the direct authority of the President of Kazakhstan. The Fund, whose reserves now total billions of dollars, collects revenue by taxing the countrys commodity exports. The government then uses the money to finance projects that aim to strengthen the countrys socioeconomic infrastructure, especially in the non-energy sectors. More recently, the government has launched a 30 Corporate Leaders project to promote the development of state-run holding companies and breakthrough macroprojects in leading-sector industriessuch as petrochemicals, metallurgy, and bio-energy to make Kazakhstan more internationally competitive in non-energy sectors.218 In subsequent statements, Nazarbayev has reaffirmed the governments intent to use the countrys expanding oil and gas revenue todiversify Kazakhstans economy and help make the country one of the fifty most developed states in the world. The recent turbulence in global financial markets, which originated with problems relating to sub-prime mortgages in the United States, has not spared Kazakhstan. In 2007, high borrowing by Kazakh banks led Standard and Poors (S&P) to downgrade the Kazakh governments sovereign credit rating to BBB-, its lowest investment grade category. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Kazakhstan experienced an 8.5% growth rate in 2007, admirable by world standards but somewhat of a slowdown from its recent pace and a figure that lags behind the growth rates of Georgia, Armenia, and especially Azerbaijan. The ADB concluded that a sharp curtailment in capital flows to the country triggered an abrupt reduction in lending and a major downturn in the non-oil economy, especially real estate. The country also suffered from relatively high inflation (17.4%). The ADB estimates that the country will achieve only 5.0% GDP growth this year and perhaps 6.3% growth in 2009.219 Along with Russia, however, Kazakhstan is still the only former Soviet republic whose bonds remain at investment grade (though Russias rating is higher due to its larger international reserves, lower exposure to domestic property prices, and other factors). In addition, analysts at S&P, the ADB, and other institutions did not see any fundamental problems with the Kazakh economy, especially since the credit crunch could prove self-correcting by reducing bank borrowing and cooling off Kazakhstans overheated property markets.220 Despite worries about domestic inflation, large foreign exchange inflows, and the countrys current account deficit, the IMF remains optimistic about Kazakhstans potential to resume its impressive economic performance of recent years, especially if Kazakh leaders continue to pursue prudent macroeconomic, oil revenue, and structural diversification policies.221 Energy Oil is Kazakhstans main export commodity, accounting for over half the value of its annual exports. 222 In 2007, Kazakhstan produced an estimated 1.45 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil; of this total, some 1.2
217 Pinar Ipek, The Role of Oil and Gas in Kazakhstans Foreign Policy: Looking East or West? Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 59, no. 7 (November 2007), pp. 1180-1181. 218 American Chamber of Commerce in Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Planning Foreign Trade Increase to $200 Billion, June 19, 2007, http://www.amcham.kz/article.php?article_id=710. See also the speech, entitled Kazakhstan in a Changing World, by Foreign Minister Tazhin to a Washington, D.C., audience on May 8, 2007, reprinted at http://www.kazakhembus.com/050907.html. 219 Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2008 (Washington, D.C.), pp. 112-114. 220 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Kazakhstan: Global Financial Turmoil Hits Credit Rating, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 13, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/C2DCD031-A3E9-4B23-90EC-4491EDF89C85.html. 221 IMF Executive Board Concludes 2007 Article IV Consultation with the Republic of Kazakhstan, Public Information Notice (PIN) no. 07/77, July 5, 2007, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0777.htm. 222 Kazakhstan CIA World Fact Book: 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html.

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million bbl/d went to foreign buyers.223 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Kazakhstan has the largest recoverable oil reserves in the Caspian Basin.224 Estimates of its combined onshore and offshore proven hydrocarbon reserves range from 9 to 40 billion barrels of oil (equivalent). At the low end, this estimate is comparable to Algerias oil reserves, and at the high end, to those of Libya. At present, the countrys most productive oil fields are Tengiz (280,000 bbl/d), Karachaganak (250,000 bbl/d), CNPCUzenmunaigas (135,000 bbl/d), Aktobemunaigas (120,000 bbl/d), and Mangistaumunaigas (115,000 bbl/d)). Yet, it is the Kashagan field that has received the most media attention because it contains an estimated 13 billion barrels of recoverable reserves of oil, making it the largest oil discovery in the world during the past 30 years and the largest oil field outside the Middle East.225 What also makes these hydrocarbon resources of particular interest to the international community is that Kazakhstan is situated at the heart of the emerging network of energy pipelines traversing Eurasia. The Kazakh government has been a strong supporter of developing multiple energy pipelines for exporting Kazakh oil and, when it becomes available in large quantities a few years hence, natural gas. Its tout azimuth approach envisages Kazakh energy flowing westward to Europe through the Caucasus, eastward to China through its Central Asian neighbors, and possibly southward through Iran to South Asian markets. In an April 6, 2007, television interview, Nazarbayev explained that pragmatic economic considerations the search for the most cost-effective optionsunderpinned his governments support for multiple pipelines: If it is beneficial for us to transport all Kazakhstans oil and gas through Russia, we will go that way. If transportation via Baku-Ceyhan is 15 dollars cheaper, we will go that way. And if neither is beneficial, we will go to China. 226 Until now, the overwhelming share of Kazakh oil has been transported northward through Russia. Yet, Kazakh officials are aware of the dangers of relying on Russian-controlled transportation routes, which allows Moscow to unilaterally decide how much oil can leave the country and to which destination it can flow. It will still take several years before many of Kazakhstans oil and gas projects begin producing enough output to sustain these new export routes, especially given that much of the countrys existing energy production is locked in long-term preferential agreements with Russian energy companies. Even now, however, Kazakh exporters have increased negotiating leverage with Russia thanks to the expanding export options. On March 11, 2008, Gazprom was forced to agree to start paying considerably higher prices in 2009 for the natural gas it purchases from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.227 In the past, the company had been able to buy Central Asian gas at below-market rates and then resell it on European markets with a hefty markup. Increasing competition from possible European and especially Chinese buyers compelled the Russian energy firm to increase its payments. The Kazakh government continues to rely heavily on Western energy companies for the advanced technologies needed to develop some of Kazakhstans most challenging oil fields, though these relations have sometimes been strained. During the 1990s, when energy prices were low and Kazakhstan desperately needed government revenue, the Kazakh government offered generous terms in a successful effort to attract Western capital and technology. Since oil prices rebounded starting in 1999, the governments of Kazakhstan and other energy-producing countries have sought more favorable terms for their national companies. Like their foreign counterparts, Kazakh leaders are depending on increased oil and gas revenue to fund their countrys ambitious development plans. The technical and other problems experienced by the multinational consortium operating the field, the Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company (Agip KCO), has made it a particular target of increased pressure from Kazakh authorities. The start-up delays, soaring production costs, and other performance problems at the field climaxed in late July 2007, when the consortium announced it was postponing yet again the
223 Energy Information Administration, Kazakhstan: Oil, February 2008, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/Oil.html. 224 Energy Information Administration, Kazakhstan: Background, February 2008, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/Background.html. 225 Energy Information Administration, Kazakhstan: Oil, February 2008, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/Oil.html. 226 Joanna Lillis, Energy Profits Provide Kazakhstan with Foreign-Policy Heft, Eurasia Insight, April 18, 2007, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav041807a.shtml. 227 Brian Whitmore, Central Asia: Behind The Hype: Russia And China Vie For Regions Energy Resources, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, March 22, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/3/584864dc-0805-4a5e-b878-edd3e9255760.html.

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scheduled start of production (to 2010 or 2011) and raising the projects estimated costs from $57 billion to $136 billion. In August, the government suspended for three months the license of Italys Eni SpA, which then led the consortium,alleging that the company had violated Kazakh environmental regulations. On September 26, the lower house of the Kazakh parliament approved legislation authorizing the government unilaterally to alter contracts with firms involved in extracting the countrys mineral resources if such changes were neces sary to uphold Kazakhstans economic and security interests. The redistribution of power between the Western oil firms and the Kazakh government became apparent on January 15, 2008, when Kazakh officials announced that the state-run KazMunaiGaz National Co, Kazakhstans national oil and gas company, would henceforth assume a lead role in developing the Kashagan oil field. Previously, Italy's Eni SpA, Exxon Mobil Corp., Royal Dutch Shell PLC, and France's Total SA each owned 18.5% of the Kashagan project, while ConocoPhillips held 9.3%, and Japan's Inpex and KazMunaiGas possessed 8.3% each. Under the new deal, KazMunaiGaz has a 16.8% share of the project, while the shares of the other firms in the consortium have proportionally decreased. In addition, Eni now shares the role of main operator with that of the other largest shareholders. The Kazakh government will pay the other members $1.78 billion for these shares, but will recoup about $5 billion from royalties and compensation for lost revenues due to the earlier project delays.228 Nazarbayev said that the January 14 deal represented a restoration of justice because the foreign companies involved had failed to meet the outlined deadlines, and Kazakhstan has been losing its share of profits. 229 The Kazakh authorities have already begun developing alternative energy sources to supplement their oil and gas exports as well as provide additional export revenue. A special area of emphasis has been on developing civilian nuclear power. Kazakhstan possesses 19% of the worlds reserves of uraniumwith an estimated 444,000 tons of recoverable uranium deposits, second only to that of Australia 230 and ranks among the four largest producers of natural uranium. Its national nuclear energy company, KazAtomProm, extracted 5,279 tons of natural uranium in 2006. KazAtomProm aims to raise its level of uranium extraction to 30,000 tons by 2018, which would establish Kazakhstan as the largest global supplier.231 It also plans to advance from only selling natural uranium to also manufacturing and selling uranium fuel for use in civilian nuclear reactors.232 The Kazakh government has been cooperating with other countries to develop its nuclear energy resources as well. For example, the governments of Japan and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum on peaceful nuclear cooperation when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi became the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Central Asia in August 2006.233 Due to the subsequent purchase of shares in Kazakh uranium mining projects by Sumitomo Corp. and Kansai Electric Power Co., Japan has locked in about one-third of its annual uranium imports from Kazakhstan.234 In July 2007, Kazatomprom bought a 10% stake in Toshibas Westinghouse Electric, in order to gain access to its advanced technologies for manufacturing nuclear power plants and their fuel. The company intends to construct a nuclear fuel production center at its Ulby plant in East Kazakhstan to make fuel for Russian and European atomic power plants.235 Russian energy officials and companies have long been interested in gaining access to Kazakhstans large stocks of uranium to supplement Russias domestic production, which Russian experts fear may prove insufficient to meet the growing international demand for nuclear energy. In July 2006, Russia and Kazakh228 Kazakhstan to Double Stake in Kashagan Oil Field in $1.8 bln Deal, RIA Novosti, January 14, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/ business/20080114/96606642.html. 229 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Kazakhstan Reaches Consensus with Foreign Oil Companies over Giant Oilfield, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, special issue No 1, January 18, 2008. 230 From Car Salesman to Nuclear Tycoon, New Zealand Herald, April 26, 2008, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/3/story. cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10506242. 231 Nariman Gizitdinov and Benjamin Rahr, Kazakhstan to Increase Uranium Output Fivefold, Overtake Canada, Bloomberg, January 10, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=aRlO4YTF2cog&refer=europe. 232 Kazakhstan Rising, Silk Road Intelligencer, May 26, 2008, http://silkroadintelligencer.com/2008/05/26/kazakhstan-rising. 233 Kazakh, Japanese Leaders Sign Up to Nuclear Cooperation, RIA Novosti, August 28, 2006, http://en.rian.ru/ world/20060828/53234564.html. 234 Mari Iwata, Japan Steals March on Asia Rivals over Uranium Supply, MarketWatch, November 14, 2007, http://www.marketwatch. com/news/story/japansteals-march-asiarivals/story.aspx?guid=%7BBC3F3B7D%2D09EB%2D42A0%2D9F0F%2DFE3CAF5E4862%7D. 235 From Car Salesman to Nuclear Tycoon, New Zealand Herald, April 26, 2008, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/3/story. cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10506242.

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stan agreed to launch three joint ventures, with an estimated cost of $10 billion, to conduct uranium mining (at Yuzhnoe Zarechnoe and Budenovsk), uranium enrichment (at Angarsk in eastern Siberia), and develop low- and medium-power nuclear reactors.236 Kazakhstan thereby became the first foreign country to join Rus sias international uranium enrichment center at Angarsk, which will manufacture nuclear fuel for delivery to countries with civilian nuclear power plants that lack their own uranium enrichment capabilities. Russias nuclear industry is also eager to build new nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan (the Soviet-era plant in Aktau ceased operating in 1999), but popular opposition to their construction remains high among Kazakhs. Many people are aware of the catastrophichealth and environmental consequences inflicted on the local population from activities at the former nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk.237 Kazakhstan has also been an active participant in the U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). The stated dual purpose of the partnership, launched by the Bush administration in February 2006, is to develop new technologies and new fuel-lending arrangements to allow for the expanded use of nuclear energy globally without encouraging further nuclear weapons proliferation. In implementing the program, the Department of Energy has pursued four broad objectives: decrease U.S. reliance on foreign energy sources without impeding U.S. economic growth; employ improved technologies to recover more energy and reduce waste when recycling spent nuclear fuel; encourage the use of energy sources that emit the least atmospheric greenhouse gasses; and reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation. When Nazarbayev met with Bush in Washington at the end of September 2006, the two presidents signed a joint statement that referred to an energy partnership that would facilitate the participation of US companies in developing reserves in Kazakhstan, including nuclear energy. 238 On September 16, 2007, Kazakhstan formally became a GNEP partner by signing the GNEP Statement of Principles. India, Pakistan, and other Eurasian countries might become future GNEP partners. Labor Mobility The Russian Federation is the most important destination country for labor migrants from the other CIS countries, including those from Central Asia. Russian authorities periodically harden their approach to foreign laborers by tightening restrictions on the issuance of work permits and employee visas, as well as giving Russian citizens priority in highly visible small retail businesses, where the previously large number of foreigners aroused popular animosity. Yet, they desire to attract more Slavic immigrants to bolster the declining number of ethnic Russian workers in the Russian population. In June 2006, for instance, the Russian government launched a State Program to Aid the Voluntary Repatriation of Compatriots. The programs impact has proved minimal thus far, but Russias higher standard of living regularly pulls millions of non-Slavic migrants from Central Asia into the Russian labor market, especially in the booming construction industry. Only a small percentage of these immigrants have obtained official permission to work in Russia, where even documented workers of Central Asian ethnicity encounter discrimination and abuse.239 Their remittances make an essential contribution to the GNPs of their countries of origin, remove potentially dissatisfied social elements from these states, and give Central Asian governments another reason to stay on Moscows good side.240 Joint Kazakh-Russian initiatives have helped curb the flow of illegal migrants across their lengthy joint frontier. In 2007, Vladimir Pronichev, deputy director of Russia's Federal Security Service, stated that these endeavors had improved border security substantially in recent years.241 Another factorcurbing Kazakh migration into Russia has been the continuing improvement in Kazakhstans economy, which has enhanced liv236 Sergei Blagov, Nazarbayev Reassures Russia on Energy Cooperation, Eurasia Insight, March 20, 2007, http://www.eurasianet. org/departments/insight/articles/eav032007a.shtml. 237 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Kazakhstan: Government Pushing Nuclear Power Despite Public Fears, Eurasia Insight, February 25, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/pp022506.shtml. For a graphic description of these environmental problems see Walton Burns, Not Another Disaster Tourist, Financial Times, January 24, 2008. 238 Office of the White House Press Secretary, Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan, September 29, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060929-1.html. 239 Erica Marat, Russia Decreases Immigration Quota Threefold in 2008, Central Asia- Caucasus Institute Analyst, January 9, 2008, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/477. 240 For more on the implications of this development see Fiona Hill, Beyond the Colored Revolutions, Brooking s Institution, September 30, 2005, pp. 9-10, http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/hillf/20050930.pdf. 241 Central Asia: Kazakh, Russian Leaders Discuss Transport Corridor, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 5, 2007, http:// www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/4482ab28-5ab9-4756-8386-48471d684d3f.html.

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ing standards of many potential emigrants and expatriates. At present, some one million ethnic Kazakhs live in Russia, but they are generally long-term residents engaged in legal employment. In recent years, Kazakhstan has emerged in its own right as an important center of attraction for labor migrants from the other Central Asian countries. The countrys improving socioeconomic conditions, political stability, and harmonious ethnic relations have pulled laborers from the surrounding regions. Conversely, negative factors in nearby Central Asian countriesincluding excess labor resources, low workers compensation, unemployment as well as underemploymentpush workers into Kazakhstan.242 Nazarbayev considered the migration issue sufficiently important to select it as the single subject of priority discussion for the CIS in 2007, the year Kazakhstan held the CIS presidency.243 In October of that year, the member governments created a special body to supervise migration among their countries.244 As of July 2007, the largest number of legal immigrants to Kazakhstan arrived from Uzbekistan, Russia and China: 49.5%, 18.9% and 11.4%, respectively, of the 28,100 total number of immigrants. In addition, the government has an annual quota for government-supported resettlement of Oralmans (Kazakhs returning to the country from abroad) to their historic homeland. In 2008, the quota was set at 15,000 families. Nazarbayev has asked that the figure be raised in 2009 to 20,000 families.245 Kazakhstans citizens emigrate mainly to Russia and Germany: 86.5% and 5.9%, respectively, of the total number of emigrants (16,700 people).246 One noteworthy fact is that so many ethnic Russians have been moving to Kazakhstan from Uzbekistan that, in 2003 and 2004, more ethnic Russians entered Kazakhstan than departed the country, a major reversal of the migrant flows seen one decade earlier.247 These official figures probably vastly underestimate the number of labor migrants entering Kazakhstan. Since the government has a visa-free entry regime with all other CIS countries except Turkmenistan, migrants most often enter the country legally, but some then undertake work in unregulated status (i.e., outside of legally recognized labor contracts).248 Various sources estimate unregulated labor migration into Kazakhstan as ranging from 300,000 to 1 million people annually in recent years. Many of these illegal immigrants come from other Central Asian countries, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Workers can normally earn much higher salaries in Kazakhstan than in their home countries, and in a currency that is easier to convert.249 The large number of illegal workers in Kazakhstan relative to the size of its population has led some experts to urge the Kazakh government to adopt measures to encourage foreigners to obtain Kazakh citizenship and develop legal businesses in Kazakhstan by, for example, simplifying procedures for obtaining work permits and citizenship.250 Kazakh authorities are also considering allowing seasonal migrant laborers from Kyrgyzstan to work legally in Kazakhstan for up to 90 days under special regulations.251 Transnational Trade and Commerce During the Soviet period, the central government ministries in Moscow controlled Kazakhstans foreign economic activity. This situation allowed Soviet planners to dispose of the territorys rich natural resources unilaterally, directing many Kazakh products to other Soviet republics or to the USSRs fellow socialist countries within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. When Western countries purchased Kazakh exports, Moscow-based planners used the hard-currency revenue for whatever schemes the Soviet government supported at the time.
242 Yelena Sadovskaya, Labor Migration and Remittances in Central Asian Countries: New Challenges and Solutions, Central Asias Affairs, no. 3 (2006). 243 CIS Leaders Pledge Further Integration, RIA Novosti, June 10, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/world/20070610/67047803.html. 244 CIS Leaders Agree to Form Body Controlling MigrationPutin, RIA Novosti, October 6, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/ world/20071006/82769544.html 245 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, President Nazarbayev Delivers Annual State-of-the-Nation Address, Announces Kazakhstans Road to Europe, News Bulletin, Febraury 8, 2008, http://www.kazakhembus.com/NBSpecialIssue_3_020808.html. 246 Yuri Shokamanov, Statistical Overview on Economy and Society, Kazakhstan International Business Magazine, no. 3 (2007). 247 Sebastien Peyrouse, The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and Language, Occasional Paper no. 297 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2007), p. 5. 248 Yelena Sadovskaya, Labor Migration and Remittances in Central Asian Countries: New Challenges and Solutions, Central Asias Affairs, no. 3 (2006). 249 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2007: Kazakhstan. 250 Sadovskaya, Labor Migration and Remittances in Central Asian Countries. 251 Bruce Pannier, Central Asia: Kyrgyz President Returns from Astana with Wheat-Export Deal, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 18, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/04/a6fc862a-649e-4cc3-acf4-57dc77effa9c.html.

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The disruption of economic ties that followed the breakup of the USSR triggered a collapse in the trade among the former Soviet republics. This development proved especially traumatic for Kazakhstan. In 1992, 92% of Kazakhstans exports and 85% of its imports involved these other republics.252 At first, this disrup tion of Soviet-era commerce induced Kazakh government and business leaders to widen the scope of their economic intercourse to encompass a larger number of countries. As the economies of many of the former Soviet republics have rebounded, Kazakhstans trade flows with its former Soviet neighbors have resumed and, in many cases, exceeded Soviet-era levels. Nevertheless, most analysts believe commerce throughout Eurasia remains considerably below desirable levels, with bilateral and multilateral relationships characterized by widespread undertrading due to poor policy choices and the absence of effective international institutions at the regional or global level (Kazakhstan and many other former CIS states have not yet joined the World Trade Organization). According to the 2005 U.N. Development Report, greater cooperation among the core Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan could yield many political and economic gains, including 50%-100% increases in their citizens average incomes over the next decade. 253 At the time of the report, only 2-2.5% of Kazakhstans trade went to the four other core Central Asian countries of Kyrgyzstan ($2.51 billion in bilateral goods turnover in 2005), Tajikistan ($1.11 billion), Turkmenistan ($540 million), and Uzbekistan $3.85 billion).254 Nazarbayev has lamented this failure to achieve deeper economic ties, which threaten to deprive Kazakhstan of its natural status as Eurasias commercial linchpin. He warned that, the destiny of all Central Asian peoples depends on this most important factorwhether we can become a transportation route of global significance or will be pushed off to the side of the road again.255 In February 2005, the president argued that a failure of the Central Asian states to improve their economic integration would invariably leave them too weak to resist falling under the control of yet another extra-regional power: We have a choice between remaining an eternal supplier of raw materials for the world economy and waiting patiently for the arrival of the next imperial master or pursuing genuine economic integration of the Central Asian region. I propose the latter. 256 Nazarbayev has emphasized that, thanks to Kazakhstans strong economic development, successful imposition of market reforms, and commitment to regional prosperity, the country can become a driver in regional economic integration mechanisms among Eurasian states. Such a process, in the view of Kazakh leaders, would in turn promote Kazakhstans own development by making Kazakhstan a more attractive market for foreign investors as well as by increasing the number of possible consumers of Kazakh goods. Kazakhstan has pursued this objective through the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program. Its membership encompasses Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as six multilateral institutions (Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, United Nations Development Program and the World Bank). The institution focuses on economic cooperation among its participants in the areas of transport, trade and energy. On November 2-3, 2007, CAREC held its 6th annual Ministerial Conference in Dushanbe. At the meeting, the ministers approved a long-debated multibillion dollar Transport and Trade Facilitation Strategy.257 The plan foresees substantial infrastructure investments to improve the flow of goods along six main transnational corridorsincluding both road and rail linksconnecting countries within the region as well as with the rest of Eurasia:
252 Markhamat Khasanova, Kazakhstan: Foreign Trade Policy in Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov, eds., Central Asia: The Challenges of Independence (Armonk, New York: Sharpe, 1998), pp. 169-170. 253 United Nations Development Programme, Bringing Down Barriers: Regional Cooperation for Human Development and Human Security (New York, 2005), http://europeandcis.undp.org/archive/?wspc=CAHDR2005. 254 Sanat Kushkumbayev, Kazakhstan, in S. Frederick Starr, ed., The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2007), pp. 278-279. 255 Cited in Yerzhan Kh. Kazykhanov, On Kazakhstan, American Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 28, no.3 (July 2006), p. 191. 256 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, President Nazarbayev Calls for New Stage of Accelerated Economic, Political Reforms, Drastic Upgrade in Life Quality, Kazakhstans Echo, February 23, 2005, http://www.kazakhembus.com/echo13.html. 257 Asian Development Bank, CAREC Transport and Trade Facilitation Strategy, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2007/6thMinisterial-Conference-CAREC/Transport-Trade-Strategy.pdf.

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from northwestern Kazakhstan to Xinjiang, to facilitate traffic from Europe to East Asia; from Baku across the Caspian through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Ferghana Valley in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan into Xinjiang, roughly following the old Silk Road; from Siberia to Iran through eastern Kazakhstan, splitting into two parts one through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the other through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan; from Siberia to China through Mongolia; from Pakistan to China through Afghanistan and Tajikistan, to make it easier to ship Chinese goods to South Asia; and from western Siberia to the Middle East and South Asia; through western Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and either Afghanistan and Iran or Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The summit statement declares that, in addition to deepening their economic integration over the next decade, the CAREC members would like to cooperate more in managing other regional challenges such as environmental problems, communicable diseases, and consequences of natural disasters.258 The Ministers also supported increased cooperation with other regional organizations, a sensible recommendation given that the CIS, Eurasec, the SCO, and most recently the CSTO have affirmed an interest in promoting economic integration among their members. The CAREC nations have already begun to implement some of these measures, though the continued absence of Russia from the process may complicate its implementation in the long run.259 (Turkmenistan has given indications that it may soon join.) Kazakhstan has sought to realize its potential as a land-based transportation hub connecting Europe and Asia through participation in other regional economic integration initiatives. These include the EuroAsian Transport Links Project, the International Transport Consortium, the Common Transport Policy, and the North-South Meridian Transport Corridor agreement (a Russian-Indian-Iranian project that Kazakhstan joined in 2003). Astana has also pursued this objective within Eurasec, the OSCE, the SCO, and other multilateral institutions. Inside Kazakhstan, various complementary public and private efforts have constructed new railway lines (Ays-Kyzylorda-Aktobe-Uralsk; Arys-Lugovaya; Chu-Almaty-AktogaiSemipalatinsk) to integrate its disparate regions with each other as well as these emerging international transportation lines. 260 On the negative side, developments during the last few months have called into question Kazakhstans potential to remain a leading grain supplier to neighboring countries. In recent years, Kazakhstan has been the only Central Asia country to export grain, including to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.261 The harsh winter, combined with the rising food prices in the country, led the authorities in April 2008 to curtail gain and bread exports until September.262 Although the measure will likely prove temporary, it will reinforce the reluctance of other countries to rely on Kazakhstan grain supplies in the future. Kazakh Foreign Investment Kazakhstan still seeks large-scale foreign direct investment for its own needs, most notably to finance improvements in the countrys energy and transportation infrastructure as well as to access the most advanced global technologies. At the same time, many more Kazakhs are acquiring the means to invest in other countries, especially by buying shares of foreign companies. In terms of purchasing power parity, Kazakh citizens per capita GDP is almost twice as high as that of citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, and about four times greater than the citizens of Tajikistan.263 As of last year, Kazakh entrepreneurs had invested more than $18 billion in foreign countries.264
258 Raphael Minder, Plan Agreed on $19bn New Silk Road, Financial Times, November 5, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/ s/0/8974eef0-8b40-11dc-95f7-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1. 259 Joshua Kucera, Central Asia: A Vision For a Regional Transport Network Takes Shape, Eurasia Insight, January 14, 2008, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav011407.shtml. 260 Kushkumbayev, Kazakhstan, p. 290. 261 Bruce Pannier, Central Asia: Kazakhstans Neighbors Await Decision on Grain Exports, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 9, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/04/9AA08A9D-12EF-4076-812A-8F77326996D3.html. 262 Ellen Rosen, The Bread Basket Takes a Hit, New York Times, April 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/nyregion/ nyregionspecial2/27Rflour.html?page wanted=1. 263 Daly, Kazakhstans Emerging Middle Class, p. 73. 264 Marat Tazhin, Kazakhstan in a Changing World, speech at U.S.-Kazakhstan Business Association dinner, Washington, D.C., May 8, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/050907.html.

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In his February 2007 annual state of the nation address, Nazarabyev said he wanted to work with neighboring countries to create a more favorable business environment for Kazakh companies, especially by removing protectionist, bureaucratic, and other unnatural barriers.265 Longstanding factors discouraging foreign investment in Central Asia include the regions limited transportation connections with markets in Europe, America, and Asia as well as an undeveloped and unstable legal foundation that increases foreign investors uncertainties about the expected return on their capital. The Astana government encourages Kazakh investors to assist in the development of other Central Asian countries because increasing prosperity could lead their national businesses and consumers to purchase more Kazakh products, decrease the flow of illegal migrants into Kazakhstan, and potentially reduce a source of domestic discontent and political instability. But Kazakh officials also support investment flows to more distant countries, such as those of the South Caucasus, where improvements in transportation and related infrastructure could facilitate the transit of Kazakh goods through these countries and on to European and other international markets. This latter process also helps reduce Kazakhstans dependence on Soviet-era transportation, communication, and other networks that bind the countrys economic activities perhaps uncomfortably closely to Russia. Regional Commercial Services Given its pivotal location and region-wide business enterprises, it is only natural that Kazakhstan is emerging as an important linchpin of regional commercial networks. In the communications sector, the state-owned KazTelecom has become a leading Internet service provider throughout Central Asia.266 Each year, Kazakhstan hosts a Eurasian Media Forum, which helps leading global news and information outlets understand developments within Central Asia and the Caspian region. Hundreds of editors, reporters, policy experts, and business leaders from dozens of countries regularly attend. According to the organizers of this Aprils session, the forum is aimed at defining the strategic role of Eurasia in world affairs, exploring a new approach to international relations, promoting equality of access to reliable public information throughout the area and encouraging the highest standards of journalism. 267 In the area of financial services, President Nazarbayev has set the goal of turning Kazakhstan into the financial centre of the Central Asian region of 2020.268 Starting in 1995, the Kazakh government launched a sustained effort to reform the countrys banking system in order to meet international commercial standards. Along with the overall growth of the economy, these measures (increasing transparency, adopting internationally recognized accounting methods, etc.) have led to a substantial growth in the countrys financial sector. At present, Kazakh banks offer financing and other services to business projects throughout Eurasia. For example, TuranAlem, Kazakhstans second-largest bank by assets, aims to develop its presence in Armenia, Georgia, and Russia to become the biggest private bank in the CIS by 2010, surpassing Russias Alfa-Bank. 269 Kazakh banks are continuing to extend their range of operations as well as their range of services. For instance, Kazakh banks have begun providing Islamic financial products to their clients and are considering offering more in the future. In July 2007, the deputy head of the state agency that regulates Kazakhstans financial market, Gani Uzbekov, said that discussions with various Muslim companies and countries had led him to hope that Kazakhstan stands a good chance of becoming a regional center of Islamic banking. 270 The government took a major step towards realizing its financial objectives by creating the Regional Financial Center of Almaty (RFCA) in February 2006. The RFCA, which officially began operations in October 2007, aspires to become a financial center for greater Central Asia, providing commercial services to clients east of Dubai and west of Hong Kong. The center is managed by the Agency for RFCA development, a gov265 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, A New Kazakhstan in a New World: President Nazarbayevs Strategic Vision, Kazakhstans Echo, no. 36 (March 2, 2007), http://www.kazakhembus.com/echo36.html. 266 Central Asia: OSCE Appeals to Kazakhstan to Restore RFE/RL Website, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 22, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/05/9D3C6B1B-6A99-490C-AE52-16513B333F13.html. 267 Eurasian Media Forum, http://www.eamedia.org/. 268 Speech at Otan Party Congress, reproduced in Kazinform, The Times of Central Asia, September 11, 2005. 269 Kazakh TuranAlem Aims to Become Leading CIS Bank, Reuters, September 27, 2006, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/ article.php?enewsid=55124. 270 Jean-Christophe Peuch, Central Asia: Governments, Banks Gradually Open Up to Islamic Banking, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 13, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/07/7B16FE17-3F7B-4AB9-A081-4CACDB00FFB1.html.

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ernment body that directly reports to the countrys president. The RFCA has introduced special legal and tax regimes to encourage foreign and domestic businesses to establish a presence there.271 The Kazakh government has also sought to strengthen the role of independent directors in national companies throughout Eurasia. Recent legislation, for instance, requires that at least one-third of the board members in a joint stock company should be independent. From November 27-28, 2007, Almaty hosted the first Summit of CIS Independent Directors. According to the media, the summit participants discussed a number of current issues of the development of the institute of independent directors in the Commonwealth of Independent States, share their experience of introduction of the best Western practices in terms of independent directors operation, and hear success stories from Russian and Ukrainian companies. 272 Kazakhstans landlocked location has made developing air connections with foreign countries essential for promoting tourism, trade, and other transnational ties. During the Soviet period, travelers could not fly directly from an international location into Kazakhstan. They had to fly first to Moscow or Leningrad (St. Pe tersburg) and then take a connecting flight to Kazakhstan. Shortly after independence, Kazakhstan Airlines began to operate as the countrys national carrier. In 2001, it was superseded as Kazakhstans flag carrier by Air Astana, a joint venture with 51% owned by the Kazakh government (through Samruk State Holding) and 49% by BAE Systems. Air Astana has a fleet of modern Western commercial aircraft, employs almost 2,000 employees, and serves 21 international routes as well as 25 domestic locations from its hubs in Almaty, Astana and Atyrau. In August 2005, the industry journal Airline Business rated the carrier fourth among the worlds 200 leading airlines in terms of the rate of growth of passenger volume and total number of kilometers traveled by passengers in 2004.273 Its revenue rose by over 100% in the first half of 2007.274 According to its Strategic Business Plan, the airlines fleet will expand from 18 aircraft at present to 63 aircraft in 2022.275 In addition, a number of foreign airlines fly to Almaty several times a week from locations in Europe, Asia, and the former USSR.276 Due to its central location, Almaty International Airport (ALA) is the natural hub for air travel within Central Asia. Besides Air Astana, passenger airlines serving ALA include Altyn Air, Asiana Airways, Atyrau Aue Joly, British Airways, Carat, China Southern Airlines, Imair, Iran Air, Irbis, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Kokshetau-Avia, Krasair, Lufthansa German Airlines, Pulkovo Aviation, Semeyavia, Skat, Tochikiston Air, Transaero Airlines, Turkish Airlines, Turkmenistan Airlines, UM Air, Uzbekistan Airways, and Zhezkagan Air. United Parcel Service, Aeroflot Cargo, and Cargolux use ALA to transfer air cargo to, from and around Central Asia.277 Culture and Tourism Kazakh leaders have identified the promotion of tourist, academic, and other cultural ties with foreign countries as important national goals. Not only do such efforts showcase Kazakhstans achievements in this area, but they also reinforce national pride and, by enhancing mutual understanding, contribute to the development of commercial, scientific, and other links between Kazakhstan and foreign partners.278 Given Kazakhstans status as an ethnically and culturally diverse nation, cultural and humanitarian cooperation also helps counter what the former Secretary of the Kazakh Security Council, Marat Tazhin, called the whole gloomy prognosis on the future of Eurasia, which Tazhin observed is postulated on the inevitability of the conflict of cultures and civilizations. 279 The population of Kazakhstan includes over a hundred different ethnic groups. Many of these enjoy cultural ties with co-ethnics in other Eurasian countries.
271 Regional Financial Centre of Almaty City, Dobro Pozhalovat http://www.rfca.kz/. 272 Embassy of Kazakhstan in the USA and Canada, First Summit of CIS Independent Directors to be held in Almaty, 27-28 November 2007, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, November 14, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/NB16-111407.html. 273 Air Astana, About Air Astana, http://www.airastana.com/kaz/gb/history. 274 Cargonews Asia, Kazakhstan Carrier Posts Record First Half Growth, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, January 7, 2007, http:// www.kazakhembus.com/2NB080807.html. 275 Embassy of Kazakhstan in the USA and Canada, The Breakthrough of Kazakh Aviation, Kazakhstans News Bulletin, January 14, 2008, http://www.kazakhembus.com/NB1-011408.html. 276 Reuel R. Hanks, Central Asia: A Global Studies Handbook (Santa Barbara: ABCCLIO, 2005), p. 201. 277 Almaty International Airport, Almaty International Airport Meets New Aircrafts, September 4, 2007. 278 G. G. Rakhmatulina, Economic Integration in the Framework of the EEC and SCOThe Most Important Priority of the Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies, June 2007, http://www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=1509. 279 Yuri Kozlov, Interview with Secretary of Kazakhstans Security Council Marat Tazhin, Nazavisimaya Gazeta, March 16, 2000, p. 5.

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The governments commitment to developing Kazakhstans tourism potential became evident earlier this year when the Ministry of Tourism and Sports announced it would spend $2.5 billion to develop 24 priority infrastructure projects.280 Some of this construction relates to preparing Kazakhstan to host the 7th Asian Winter Games in Almaty in 2011. In addition, at Nazarbayevs initiative, the Kazakh government has organized widely attended meetings of the leaders of the world and traditional religions. The first Congress of World and Traditional Religions occurred in Astana in September 2003 and the second in September 2006. Kazakhstan will host the third congress in 2009. In addition to affirming Kazakhstans commitment to cultural and sectarian diversity, hosting these congresses boosts the countrys international profile.281 Kazakhstan encourages tourism and cultural exchanges with other former Soviet republics by maintaining a visa-free tourist regime within the CIS. The government has also negotiated special arrangements with neighboring states. For example, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement in 2007 that involves the mutual recognition of tourist visas in adjacent regions of the two countries for nationals of third countries permitting, for example, Western tourists to visit the Lake Issyk Kul region of Kyrgyzstan without a visa.282 Kazakh authorities have also relaxed the visa requirements for short-term (under 90 days) tourists and business visitors from Western countries. Kazakhstans popularity as a tourist destination increased substantially following the extraordinary success of the film, Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan, and the skillful way in which the Kazakh tourist industry has transformed what could have been a cultural disaster into a tourism bonanza.283 Although not its primary purpose, the Kazakh governments policy of sustaining Russian, still widely used in the other Soviet republics as well, as the language of interethnic communication among Kazakhs, as well as the policy of promoting knowledge of English as the language of international commerce has also facilitated cultural exchange and tourism with non-Kazakh speakers. For various reasons, the number of people traveling to Kazakhstan as tourists from other Eurasian countries, and vice-versa, is small. According to government figures, the most popular outbound destinations for Kazakhstans 3.0 million tourists were Russia (1,654,616 tourists), China (84,963), Turkey (60,802), Germany (50,965), United Arab Emirates (22,894), the Netherlands (16,352), Austria (10,811), and the United Kingdom (6,563). In terms of the 3.3 million foreign tourists who visited Kazakhstan in 2005, the Russian Foundation again provided about half the total (1,696,691 tourists), followed by tourists from Germany (72,529), China (76,806), Turkey (42,064), the United Kingdom (16,530), the United States (19,513), and South Korea (9,311). 284 Although Western tourists still come to Kazakhstan far less than visitors from Russia, they probably spend more per capita, especially when they combine their private excursion with a business trip, helping to sustain the boom in luxury hotels seen in Astana and a few other cities in the last few years. Kyrgyzstans scenic Lake Issyk Kul district is probably the most popular foreign destination in Central Asia for Kazakh tourists. But this case well illustrates a major factor decreasing tourist flows within Central Asia: inadequate transportation networks. Although Issyk Kul is located only 50 miles from Almaty, the citys 1.5 million residents (and potential tourists) must travel 300 miles along a circuitous mountain road to reach the vacation spot.285 Kazakhstan has some of the leading academic institutions in Central Asia. The Lev N. Gumilev Eurasianist University in Astana has the explicit mission of teaching and researching subjects relating to Eurasia. 286 It
280 Embassy of Kazakhstan in the USA and Canada, Kazkhstan to Spend $2.5 bl on Tourism Infrastructure Projects, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, January 23, 2008, http://www.kazakhembus.com/NB1-012308.html. 281 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Aktualnye Voprosy Vneshney Politiki Kazakhstana Sezd Liderov Mirovyx I Traditsionnyx Religii, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/issues/congress. 282 Embassy of Kazakhstan to USA and Canada, Nazarbayev Visits Bishkek, Pledges Economic Investment, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, April 26, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/042607.html. 283 Dan Mangan, Kazakh Tourisms Borat Boom, New York Post, December 4, 2006, http://www.nypost.com/seven/12042006/ news/nationalnews/kazakh_tourisms_borat_boom_nationalnews_dan_mangan.htm. 284 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the United Kingdom, The Market for Tourism, Hospitality and Recreational Services in Kazakhstan, http://www.kazakhstanembassy.org.uk/cgi-bin/index/266. 285 Embassy of Kazakhstan to USA and Canada, Kazakhstan is Kyrgyzstans Largest Investor, Plans More Provided Political Stability Is There, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, March 9, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/030907.html. 286 Marlene Laruelle, Russias Central Asia Policy and the Role of Russian Nationalism (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, April 2008), pp. 55-56.

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sponsors conferences on pan-Eurasia topics that engage scholars from neighboring countries. Kazakhstans educational institutions, as well as the Kazakh government, also support academic exchanges programs with foreign countries. These enable Kazakh students and scholars to study at foreign institutions as well as support Kazakh institutions seeking to host foreign visitors on short- or long-range exchange programs. The well-known Bolashak (Future) international scholarship program presently permits some 3,000 Kazakh students to win competitive fellowships to study abroad, though they typically enroll in American and European universities to take courses in engineering, science, and technical subjects. While the improving quality of Kazakhstans own higher education institutions, including those run on a feepaying basis, probably decreases interest among young Kazakhs in studying in other Central Asian or Caspian institutions, it does make study in Kazakhstan more attractive to potential students from other Eurasian countries. Key Bilateral Relationships This section presents a third perspective on Kazakhstans role in Eurasias evolving international system. Whereas the first section examines the most important international institutions shaping regional politics, and the next two chapters employ a functional approach to the main security and economic factors affecting Kazakhstans neighborhood, this chapter examines each of Kazakhstans most important bilateral ties in Eurasia as a discrete relationship. The intent is to consider how some of the broader issues discussed previously manifest themselves with each country. Major Powers China For centuries, Kazakh leaders perceived China as their main security threat, inducing them to ally with Russia as a great power balancer.287 During the Cold War, Kazakhstan served as a forward base for potential Soviet military operations against China. After the USSRs collapse, the initial focus of Astana and Beijing, after establishing diplomatic relations in 1992, was to delineate their new 1,782-km common border. They progressively resolved their frontier differences in their joint communiqu of November 23, 1999, their bilateral protocol on border demarcation on May 10, 2002, and their comprehensive border agreement of December 20, 2006. The two governments also signed a bilateral accord to govern the use and protection of their cross-border rivers on September 12, 2001.288 Excluding Russia, Kazakhstan has now become Chinas most important strategic and economic partner in Central Asia. In 2002, the Kazakh and Chinese governments signed a Good Neighbor Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, an Agreement on Cooperation Against Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism and an Agreement Between the Chinese Government and the Kazakhstani Government on Preventing Dangerous Military Activities. 289 In May 2004, the two countries established a China-Kazakhstan Cooperation Committee, which has served as a major governmental mechanism for developing their bilateral relationship. It includes ten specialized sub-committees consisting of policy makers and technical experts from both governments. For example, the Economic and Trade Cooperation Sub-Committee seeks both to increase the overall volume of trade between the two countries and rebalance the exchange to counter Kazakhstans growing trade deficit. The bilateral Cooperation Committee also supervises the work of the Cross-Border Rivers Joint Committee, an important group given the tensions that have arisen over water rights and water management between both countries. The Kazakh and Chinese presidents typically meet several times a year in bilateral and multilateral gatherings; other senior government officials often meet more frequently.290 A major Chinese concern in relations with Kazakhstan is securing Astanas support for Beijings efforts to curb separatism among Chinas Uighur population. About 180,000 Uighurs reside in eastern Kazakhstan. In addition, some one million ethnic Kazakhs live in China, especially in Xinjiang. 291 The
287 Shireen T. Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence (Washington, DC: Praeger, 1996), pp. 124-125. 288 Embassy of Kazakhstan in China, Relations between China and Kazakhstan, http://www.kazembchina.org/create/bike/home. jsp?tablename=itemcontent&iiid=738 6256821857348225&tableFlag=itemtable. 289 Eugene Rumer, Dmitri Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao, Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing, (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 170-172. 290 Embassy of Kazakhstan in China, Relations between China and Kazakhstan, http://www.kazembchina.org/create/bike/home. jsp?tablename=itemcontent&iiid=7386256821857348225&tableFlag=itemtable. 291 Cummings, Kazakhstan: Centre-Periphery Relations, p. 35; and Nichol, Kazakhstan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests, p. 3..

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Chinese government has long been concerned about Muslim-inspired ethnic separatism in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, an area constituting one-sixth the land area of China that contains the worlds fourth largest concentration of Turkic peoples (after Turkey, Iran, and Uzbekistan), effectively requiring analysts to view China not as a neighbor of Central Asia but as a part of Central Asia. 292 Of the regions twenty million inhabitants, approximately half are non-Han Chinese Muslims with ethnic and religious links to neighboring Turkic populations in Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Xinjiang adjoins Afghanistan, Pakistan, and several Central Asian countries. Many of its local Muslims, like the Buddhists of Tibet, oppose the continuing inf lux of Han Chinese into their traditional homeland, which enjoyed de facto independence before 1949, when Beijing incorporated Xinjiang into China. Although their economic standards of living have improved under Chinese rule, many perceive that Beijing discriminates against them. Some Uighurs have responded to the Chinese presence by joining anti- Beijing groups, most prominently the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. The United Nations, the U.S. government, and other bodies list the movement as a terrorist group. Some of its members have employed violence against Chinese civilians in their campaign to secure Xinjiangs independence. Chinese officials accuse the organization of collaborating with al-Qaeda and, more recently, the Dalai Lama.293 The Chinese government has employed primarily diplomatic initiatives and direct security assistance to bolster Central Asian governments against domestic threats as well as induce them to crack down on East Turkestan activists. Chinese pressure forced the dissolution of the independent associations of Uighurs that had existed in Kazakhstan as well as the closure of the Institute of Uighur Studies that had been based at the Institute of Oriental Studies in Almaty.294 By 2004, Beijing had signed bilateral counterterrorism agreements with all four of its Central Asian neighbors. They include provisions for joint law enforcement operations, bilateral police training, and enhanced intelligence sharing.295 To bolster ties with these governments as well as enhance their counterterrorist capabilities, Beijing has also supplied Central Asian governments with defense equipment, military training, and intelligence information regarding terrorist threats. The National Security Committee of Kazakhstan and the Public Security Ministry of China regularly conduct joint antiterrorist exercises in border regions. Kazakh and Chinese law enforcement agencies also collaborate against trafficking in narcotics and weapons. Chinas defense academies now enroll Kazakh military personnel in their classes.296 Kazakhs and other Central Asians often sympathize with the Uighurs separatist aspirations, especially since Uighur activists may have been inspired by the Central Asians own successful drives for independence and share the same Muslim faith as do many Central Asians. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian governments, while allowing Uighurs to practice limited degrees of political activity, do not permit Uighurs to engage in unauthorized activities in China and have deported Uighurs accused of terrorism by the Chinese.297 In line with Chinese preferences, Central Asian governments also regularly profess solidarity with Beijings counterterrorist concerns. For example, when Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Astana in June 2004, the two governments issued a joint declaration that stated: The two sides are determined to continue to take effective measures and work together in cracking down on all forms of terrorism, including the terrorist force of the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement in order to safeguard the peace and stability in the two countries and this part of the world. In addition, the communiqu affirmed that, The two sides maintain
292 Graham E. Fuller and S. Frederick Starr, The Xinjiang Problem (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), p. 10; italics deleted. 293 Chris Buckley, Chinese Anger and Terror Warnings Cloud Olympics, Reuters, April 12, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ topNews/idUKPEK20364920080411?feedType=RSS&fee dName=topNews. 294 Sebastien Peyrouse, The Economic Aspects of Chinese-Central Asia Rapprochement (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2007), p. 12. 295 Chinese Parliament Okays Anti-Terrorism Pact with Neighbours, Press Trust of India, October 28, 2004. For a review of how Kazakhstan has tried to meet Beijings concerns regarding Xingjian (and Taiwan), see Marat Yermukanov, Chinese Conundrum of Kazakhstans Multi-Vector Policy, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, July 13, 2005, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article. php?articleid=3463. 296 China-Kazakhstan Relations Grow Stronger, China Daily, October 15, 2007. 297 Kathleen Moore, Central Asia: Chinas Mounting Influence, Part 4Facing Militant Threats, Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib erty, November 18, 2004, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/11/d541f15b-c660-4310-8afd-33c787f5ecae.html. 323

that the crackdown on the terrorist force of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement is an important part of the international fight against terrorism. 298 Joint Kazakh-Chinese declarations also normally include a clause affirming the mainlands position regarding Taiwanthat Beijing is the only legitimate government of China and that Taiwan is an insepa rable part of Chinese territory. The communiqu issued when Hu visited Astana in August 2007, for in stance, states that, On the Taiwan issue, the Kazakh government reiterated its steadfastness in upholding the one-China policy and throws its support behind China for all efforts it has made to realize national reunification, recognizing that the Taiwan issue is China's internal affair. 299 When Taiwan held a referendum on March 22, 2008 on Taiwans joining the United Nations as a separate country, the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared Astanas opposition to Taiwans independence aspirations and any attempt to create two Chinas. 300 During the past year, as various international groups have called on foreign government leaders to boycott the Beijing Olympics, or at least the opening ceremonies, to signal disproval of Chinas policies regarding Darfur, Tibet, or other issues, the Chinese government has sought to solicit their endorsement of Beijings management of the Olympics. The governments of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, have normally obliged. After Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov met with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2008, they issued a communiqu declaring that, Kazakhstan supports China's efforts in the preparations of the Beijing Olympics and will enhance coordination with China on strengthening the Olympic security work to ensure the successful and smooth holding of the Beijing Olympics. 301 The long border and overlapping ethnic groups between the two countries has also encouraged cultural and commercial ties between Kazakhstan and China. As one Chinese scholar observed, Kazakhstan represents a type of connecting bridge between the states of Central Asia and China on the Eurasian continent. That is why once Chinese-Kazakhstan free economic zone will be created; it must become such an element that will push forward the creation of free trade zone of the SCO. 302 Although it took years to overcome the legacy of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, when trade between Kazakhstan and China was minimal due to the defense and security barriers along the Sino-Soviet border, Kazakhstan has become by far Chinas largest economic partner in Central Asia. Of the $8.7 billion in total trade between China and Central Asia in 2005, approximately $7 billion involved Kazakhstan, making Kazakhstan the second-largest trading partner of China among the CIS members.303 (Precise figures are difficult to establish since the Kazak and Chinese governments report widely divergent totals, which results from underreporting and other distortions due to efforts to minimize customs and other payments.) In late 2007, the Kazak Ministry of Transportation offered for consideration the possible construction of a railway that wouldconnect China with the Caspian port of Aktau, which could allow Chinese goods to travel overland from the Caspian to European markets.304 Chinese officials have been especially eager to enhance commerce between their countrys relatively impoverished northwestern regions and their Central Asian neighbors. This consideration applies particularly to restless Xinjiang since over half the provinces income derives from trade with Central Asian countries, with Kazakhstan being Xinjiangs largest foreign trading partner.305 Trade across Chinas other borders with Central Asia also has been increasing since Beijing began opening Chinas western border after 1985, albeit starting from very low levels. The Chinese government has granted hundreds of millions of dollars in cred298 Chinese, Kazakh Leaders Issue Joint Declaration, BBC Monitoring, June 4, 2003. 299 China, Kazakhstan Sign Joint Communiqu on Promoting Relations, Trade, Xinhua, August 18, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet. com/english/2007-08/18/content_6561247.htm. 300 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Zayavlenie MID Respubliki Kazakhstan po Vstupleniyu Tayvanya v OON, March 25, 2008, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/press/statement/2008. 301 Kazakhstan Supports China on Beijing Olympics, Taiwan Issues: Joint Communiqu, Xinhua, April 12, 2008, http://english. cri.cn/2946/2008/04/12/48@345120.htm. 302 Lu Gang, Creation of a Free Trade Zone in the Framework of the SCO: Importance in Advancing Chinese-Kazakhstan Coop eration, Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies, September 26, 2006, http://www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=1434. 303 Rumer, Trenin, and Zhao, Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing, p. 171. 304 Sergei Blagov, Russia Urges Formation of Central Asian Energy Club, Eurasia Insight, November 7, 2007, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110707a.shtml. 305 Zhao Huaheng, China, Russia, and the United States: Prospects for Cooperation in Central Asia, CEF Quarterly: The Journal of the China-Eurasia Forum (February 2005), p.24, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/CEF_Quarterly_Winter_2005.doc.pdf; and Peyrouse, p. 16..

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its to the Central Asian countries for the purchase of Chinese goods. In 2006, according to Kazakh figures, official bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and China amounted to $8.36 billion, a 22.8% increase over the previous year.306 In addition, the underground shuttle trade between Kazakhs and Chinese merchants, which evades taxation, amounts to several more billion dollars.307 The two governments now aim to increase their bilateral trade volume to $15 billion by 2015.308 If current trends continue, the volume of Kazakhstans trade with China will exceed that with Russia for the first time in centuries. Increased commerce could help pro mote the economic development of Xinjiang, Tibet, and other regions that have lagged behind Chinas vibrant eastern cities. Although trade with Central Asia represents less than one percent of Chinas overall foreign trade, it will likely continue to play a more important role for western China due to their geographic and other links with the region. The Chinese government has also sought to increase its economic ties with Kazakhstan and other countries in Greater Central Asia because they see this region as an important source of raw materials, especially oil and natural gas. Chinese policy makers are uneasy about relying so heavily on vulnerable Persian Gulf energy sources. Gulf oil shipments traverse sea lanes susceptible to interception by the U.S. or other navies. In addition, the Chinese government recognizes that terrorism, military conflicts, and other sources of instability in the Middle East could abruptly disrupt Gulf energy exports. Since Chinese efforts to import much additional oil and gas from Russia have proven problematic, Beijing has strongly pushed for the development of landbased oil and gas pipelines that would direct Central Asian energy resources eastwards towards China. The new inland routes would provide more secure energy supplies to China than existing seaborne links. These burgeoning energy ties have also made avoiding political instability in these countries a concern of Chinese policy makers. Beijings cultivation of energy ties with Kazakhstan has been making steady progress. While retaining a strong presence in Pakistan, Chinese firms have been increasing their investments in new South and Central Asian markets, especially in India and Kazakhstan. The Chinese government has been helping finance the de velopment of roads, ports, and energy pipelines linking South and Central Asia to China because significantly increasing Chinese economic intercourse with these regions will require major improvements in the capacity and security of east-west transportation links. Over the past decade, two countries have been establishing the core infrastructure required by their expanding economic tiescreating border posts, energy pipelines, and roads and railways that have converted the informal shuttle trade that arose in the 1980s to a large-scale, professional economic relationship.309 Yet, much additional progress is needed in this area to achieve the higher levels of bilateral commerce sought in both Astana and Beijing. When Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov met with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on April 9, 2008, he stressed Kazakhstans commitment to enhancing bilateral commerce through infrastructure development, specifically citing the need to improve Kazakhstans ports, customs and banking systems, railways, highways and other commercial networks involving China.310 In addition to the underdeveloped economic infrastructure connecting the two sides, other impediments to expanded commercial exchanges include unsupportive visa policies, special regulations on Chinese consumer products, corrupt commercial practices in both countries, and Kazakhstans nonmembership in the WTO. (Ironically, one factor working against Kazakhstans rapid entry into the WTO has been Kazakhs concerns about having their national industries devastated by Chinese competition in the absence of protective barriersas happened with neighboring Kyrgyzstan). China has imported Kazakh oil via railroad for a decade. In addition, hydropower plants in China supply about 20 percent of Kazakhstans electricity consumption.311 Western firms were initially able to block the
306 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Chinese President Visits Kazakhstan, Signs Important Agreements, Kazkahstans News Bulletin, August 20, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/NB4-200807.html. 307 S. Frederick Starr, Introduction, in S. Frederick Starr, ed., The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2007), p. 14. 308 China, Kazakhstan to Strengthen Extensive Co-op in Economic, Energy, Environment, Cultural Sectors, Xinhua, April 12, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/12/content_7966399.htm. 309 Peyrouse, Economic Aspects of Chinese-Central Asia Rapprochement, pp. 10ff. 310 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Premier Wen Jiabao Holds Talks with Kazakh Prime Minister Masimov, April 9, 2008, http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t423831.htm. 311 Ian Pryde, Another Big Player for a Neighbor, Eurasia Insight, March 23, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/pp032306.shtml

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efforts by Chinese energy companies to join Kazakhstans largest oil and gas projects.312 But energy cooperation has accelerated in recent years after the Kazakh government fully committed to directing a share of its energy exports eastward to China. In July 2005, Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a declaration of strategic partnership with Nazarbayev that, among other things, provided for expedited development of the 1,300-km Atasu- Alashankou pipeline to transport at least ten million tons of oil annually from Kazakhstans Caspian coast to Chinas Xinjiang province.313 This 50-50 joint venture between the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNCP) and KazMunaiGaz began operating on a limited basis in December 2005, marking the first eastward flow of Central Asian oil and Chinas first use of a pipeline to import oil. In August 2007, the CNPC signed an agreement with KazMunaiGaz to extend the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline 700km westward, linking China directly to Kazakhstans Caspian fields.314 The CNCP has also acquired a substantial stake in a new natural gas field in western Kazakhstan. Chinese oil firms operate four oil fields in the country, and in 2005 purchased Petrokazakhstan, a leading Kazakh energy firm. Sinopec, CNPC, and other Chinese energy firms produce about 13 million tons of oil annually in Kazakhstan.315 Beijing views Kazakhstans cooperation with China on energy imports as an important contribution toward realizing its goal of becoming less dependent on Middle East oil supplies.316 Although many Kazakhs welcome Chinas increasing involvement in their economy, especially as a supplier of cheap consumer goods and a potential market for Kazakh products, they also fear Chinese long-term ambitions in their country. A widespread worry is that demographic imbalances Kazakhstan has the lowest population density in Central Asiacould entice Chinese immigration that would eventually lead to Chinas de facto annexations of Kazakh territory. A related anxiety is that Chinas growing wealth will result in Chinese ownership of important sectors of Kazakhstans economy. 317 These concerns became most evident in 1999, when the media criticized the decision by the national legislature to ratify what many Kazakhs deemed as excessively generous concessions to Beijing regarding where to demarcate the China-Kazakhstan border. Popular concerns about peaceful Sinification of Kazakhstans under-populated regions compelled Kazakh authorities to re-impose visa requirements on Chinese nationals seeking to enter Kazakhstan. More recently, Kazakhs have complained about Chinas excessive consumption and unilateral management of transborder water resources.318 Concerns also have arisen in Kazakhstan about the growing imbalance in Sino-Kazakh tradewith Kazakhs urging the Chinese to buy (and help develop) Kazakhstans non-resource sectors. The continuing attractiveness of Russian culture and the Russian language has also limited Chinese influence in Kazakhstan. Although some 3,000 Kazakh students are studying in Chinese universities and colleges, the number of Chinese speakers in Kazakhstan is miniscule compared to the many Kazakhs who are fluent in Russian.319 It was only on May 29, 2008, that the first direct passenger train, which will make one run every week, began operating between Astana and Urumqi Railway Station. The 1,898-km route takes 37 hours to travel.320 Even so, as Nazarbayev himself observed about China in his March 2006 annual address to the Kazakh parliament and nation, There is no alternative to mutually advantageous ties with that dynamically developing country.
312 New Rebuff for China on Kazakh Oil, New York Times, May 17, 2003, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05 E0DD143EF934A25756C0A9659 C8B63. 313 Courting Kazakhstan, Eurasia Security Watch, July 7, 2005, http://www.afpc.org/esw/esw93.shtml. 314 XFN-ASIA, China, Kazakhstan Agree on Sino-Kazakh Oil Pipeline Extension to Caspian Sea, Kazakhstans News Bulletin, August 20, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/NB4-200807.html. 315 Zheng Lifei, China, Kazakhstan Build on a Solid Foundation, China Daily, October 15, 2007, http://french.10thnpc.org.cn/ english/international/228117.htm. 316 China-Kazakhstan Pipeline Starts to Pump Oil, China Daily, December 15, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/ doc/2005-12/15/content_503709.htm. 317 The Economic Crusaders, Asiamoney, September 7, 2006, http://www.asiamoney.com/default.asp?Page=7&PUBID=185&IS S=22460&SID=64955 2&SM=ALL&SearchStr=The%20Economic%20Crusaders. 318 Sebastien Peyrouse, Flowing Downstream: The Sino-Kazakh Water Dispute, China Brief, May 16, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373402 319 Zheng Lifei, China, Kazakhstan Build on a Solid Foundation, China Daily, October 15, 2007, http://french.10thnpc.org.cn/ english/international/228117.htm. 320 New Passenger Rail between China and Kazakhstan Opens, Peoples Daily Online, May 30, 2008, http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90882/6421620.html.

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Russia At independence, two factors made Kazakhstans relationship with Russia unique among the Central Asian states. First, the country had the largest percentage of ethnic Russians among the former Soviet republics. Second, Kazakhstan was the only Central Asian country that shared a lengthy frontier with the new Russian Federation. Many observers believed that the disintegration of the Soviet Union could be followed by the division of Kazakhstan along ethnic lines, with the Slavicdominated provinces of northern Kazakhstan seeking to join the Russian Federation, with which they enjoyed deep economic as well as ethnic ties. Some Russian nationalistsmost notably Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his 1990 publication, Rebuilding Russiaexplicitly argued in favor of Russia incorporating northern Kazakhstan, with its large ethnic Russian population and relatively prosperous economy, into the Russian Federation. The initial electoral strength of Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky (whom Kazakh authorities eventually banned from visiting their territory) in postSoviet Russia stimulated some support among Kazakhstans ethnic Russians to join the Russian Federation. They had experienced declining living standards, deteriorating education opportunities, restrictions on their political activities, and limits on employment in certain key government and business sectors. Some of these trends began in the late Soviet period, while others affected all Kazakh citizens regardless of nationality due to the deteriorating economic conditions after independence. The end result, however, was to generate considerable ethnic Russian dissatisfaction with their status in newly independent Kazakhstan and a sharp increase in their emigration from the country. As a result, Kazakhstans population decreased considerably between 1989 and 1999, leading to shortages of skilled personnel in some economic sectors.321 Several factors prevented an even larger movement of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan to Russia. The political and economic chaos that characterized Yeltsins Russia did not make that country an especially attractive new home. Within Kazakhstan, the government strove to assuage the anxieties of ethnic Russians and other national minorities even while advancing the social, economic, and political status of ethnic Kazakhs. In addition, the Russian governments under both Yeltsin and Putin rendered little practical assistance to ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan seeking to move to Russia.322 Despite a desire to sustain the size of Russias ethnic Slav population and concerns that Central Asian governments discriminated against their Russian conationals in seeking to advance the status of the republics titular nationalities, Russian leaders have actively discouraged ethnic Russian separatism or irredentism in Kazakhstan or the other Central Asian states. The May 1992 bilateral treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid helped stabilize the situation by confirming Kazakhstans territorial integrity while still allowing for extensive ties between border communities across their shared frontiers.323 Many Kazakh citizens, including non-Russian ethnics, desired to maintain close economic, cultural, and other ties with Russia. Conversely, the departure of many of the most alienated ethnic Russians served as a safety valve by removing potential regime opponents and weakening Russian independent groups in Kazakhstan. The end result of all these factors was a de-politization of most of the four million ethnic Russians who chose to remain in Kazakhstan.324 Under Vladimir Putin, who became Russias prime minister in late 1999 and president in early 2000, the Russian government has continued Yeltsins policy of supporting Kazakhstans preservation as an independent state. Yet, Putin has made restoring Moscows influence in Central Asia more of a priority than his predecessor. In his April 2005 state-of-the-nation address, Putin described the collapse of the USSR as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.325 Under Putin, Russian officials strove to ensure that Russian firms participate in developing the regions energy resources and that Central Asian oil and gas ex-

321 Kazakhstans ethnic problems during the 1990s are reviewed in Martha B. Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp. 51-86. 322 Nonna Chernyakove and Russell Working, Hurry Up and Wait, Moscow Times, November 30, 2001. 323 Cummings, Kazakhstan: Centre-Periphery Relations, pp. 34-35. 324 For a detailed discussion of these factors see Sebastien Peyrouse, Nationhood and the Minority Question in Central Asia: The Russians in Kazakhstan, Eurasia-Asia Studies, vol. 59, no. 3 (May 2007), pp. 481-501; and Sebastien Peyrouse, The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and Language, Occasional Paper no. 297 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2007). 325 Putin Deplores Collapse of USSR, BBC News, April 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4480745.stm.

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porters continue to use Russian pipelines.326 With Russian government assistance, state-controlled companies such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Rosneft, and Unified Energy System of Russia have substantially expanded their presence in Kazakhstans energy sector since 2003.327 Russian negotiators have sought to secure a durable presence in the Central Asian energy market by securing preferential longterm sale agreements for Russian energy companies. Thanks to the legacy of the integrated Soviet economy, Central Asias landlocked states continue to rely heavily on transportation, communications, supply-chains, and other networks that either traverse Russia or fall under Russian control. Russian officials have also waged a low-keyed but effective campaign to limit American, Chinese, and other foreign economic competition in Kazakhstan and the neighboring Central Asian countries. From Moscows perspective, Kazakhstans foreign and domestic policies have proven much less problematic for Russia than that of many other former Soviet republics. Since independence, Russia has remained Kazakhstans most important economic partner, especially for Kazakh energy exports, which are still heavily dependent on Russian-controlled pipelines first constructed during the Soviet period (such as the Central Asia-Centre pipeline, which carries all of Kazakhstans gas exports).328 In March 2000, then Secretary ofthe Kazakh Security Council, Marat Tazhin, nicely characterized the attitude of many Kazakh leaders when he stated in an interview with the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, I am a supporter of simple truths: one does not choose ones neighbors; they are from God. 329 The Russian-Kazakh frontier represents the worlds longest continuous land borders at over 7,000 kilometers. During the Soviet period, ethnic Russians and ethnic Kazakhs sprawled across either side of the then largely meaningless administrative borders separating the two republics, which were highly integrated as economic entities. The transformation of these administrative boundaries into national frontiers almost overnight in 1991 created real problems for the communities on either side. In addition, the issue of border security arose as the Russian authorities were torn between wanting to allow ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan easy access to their relatives that happened to have found themselves north of the boundary after 1991 while also desiring to prevent the entry of terrorists, illegal migrants, and other undesirable aliens across the virtually unmonitored frontier.330 The Kazakh and Russian governments also found it difficult to monitor crossfrontier trade or collect customs duties on even legitimate commerce given the length of the border and its many possible crossing points. Further problems arose concerning dual taxation, the lack of uniform railroad freight tariffs, the exploitation of transborder mineral deposits, and the environmental protection of trans-border rivers.331 On the whole, the parties have managed this problematic situation well. On January 17, 2005, Nazarbayev and Putin signed a comprehensive border delimitation agreement that, while still not satisfying all Russian and Kazakh nationalists, nevertheless has settled the issue at the governmental level.332 The two governments have established a bilateral commission to manage the more than 70 rivers and 20 lakes that traverse their common boundary.333 Each year, the heads of the frontier regions of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan meet to discuss mutual concerns. From Kazakhstans perspective, the main issue now is the failure of the Russian border authorities to match Kazakhstans efforts to develop an integrated commercial and transportation infrastructure to facilitate cross-boundary commercial exchangesan issue Nazarbayev raised during the October 2007 Russian-Kazakh border regions summit with Putin.334
326 Martha B. Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 323. 327 Marlene Laruelle, Russias Central Asia Policy and the Role of Russian Nationalism (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, April 2008), pp. 22-24. 328 Ibid., p. 24. 329 Yuri Kozlov, Interview with Secretary of Kazakhstans Security Council Marat Tazhin, Nazavisimaya Gazeta, March 16, 2000, p. 5. 330 Marat Yermukanov, Kazakh Foreign Ministry Refutes Arguments About Territorial Concessions, Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 10, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=407&issue_id=3432&article_id=2370131; and Dmitri Trenin, Southern Watch: Russias Policy in Central Asia, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), p. 126. 331 Iu. V. Levashov, Prospects for the Development of Transborder Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 47, no. 12 (April 2005), pp. 56-57. 332 Marat Yermukanov, Russian-Kazakh Border Agreement Sparks Nationalist Reaction, Eurasia Daily Monitor January 27, 2005, http://www.Jamestown.Org/Publications_Details.Php?Volume_Id=407&Issue_Id=3212 &Article_Id=2369163. 333 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Aktualnye Voprosy Vneshney Politiki Kazakhstana: Voprosy Transgranichnyx Rek, February 23, 2006, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/issues/rivers/01. 334 Andrey Kolesnikov, Pogranichnoe Stoyanie, Kommersant, October 5, 2007, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=811630.

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More generally, Kazakh officials have sought not to antagonize Moscow as they have cultivated ties with other countries. They normally take care to emphasize the positive dimensions of the mixed cooperativecompetitive energy relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia. Although both countries sell oil to European and Chinese consumers, Nazarbayev insists that he sees Kazakhstan and Russia as energy partners, not competitors. Even though Kazakh officials have continued to express interest in these underseapipelines, and have relied heavily on Western energy firms to provide the technologies to exploit Kazakhstans vast but difficult-to-access offshore oil resources, they have regularly assured Russian energy firms active participa tion in any multinational consortium operating in Kazakhstan. In practice, overlapping energy dependencies require Kazakh-Russian collaboration in this as in other areas. Astana still needs access to Russian energy pipelines to reach many consumers in Europe, while Moscow relies on imports of Central Asian gassome of which passes through Kazakhstanto meet its domestic demand and free up Russian energy supplies for export to Europe. For the past decade, Russia has profited immensely by being able to buy Central Asian energy supplies below market prices while selling oil and gas to foreign customers at much higher rates, yielding Russian energy players a hefty mark-up. The new Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, appears just as interested in his predecessor in sustaining Russian influence in Kazakhstan. Astana did not become the first foreign capital that I have visited as president of Russia by chance, Medvedev, who assumed office on May 7, observed after completing discus sions with Nazarbayev on May 22 in the Kazakh capital. Rather, his choice was deliberate because Russia values the genuinely friendly and mutually-advantageous relations with Kazakhstan, our strategic partner.335 Medvedev also added that the high degree of economic integration between the two countries means that Russians and Kazakhs converse in a single economic language.336 Nazarbayev reciprocated by describing their ties as tighter than that between any other two countries: I think that nowhere in the world can we see such close and fraternal relations as those between Kazakhstan and Russia, as those between us and Russia and the CIS.337 Medvedev seems keener than Putin to strengthen the institutional role of the CIS, which coincides with Nazarbayevs priorities. It is our duty to pay close attention to cooperation with countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Medvedev observed during a joint news conference with Nazarbayev. The time has come for ties to be intensified.338 The Russian president also endorsed the Kazakh governments proposal to make energy cooperation the priority issue of the CIS agenda in 2009.339 Although Medvedevs background as a former chairman of Gazprom may have contributed to his interest in making energy a core element of CIS as well as Russian diplomacy, one reason both sides readily agreed to have the CIS focus on energy issues is that Kazakh and Russian negotiators still have not finalized the de tails of their plan to more than double the capacity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). In April 2006, the two countries signed an accord to increase the volume of Kazakh crude oil transported through the CPC, which extends from the Tengiz field in western Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Novorossiysk, to 67 million tons annually by 2012.340 Russia's state pipeline monopoly Transneft has a 24% stake in the CPCwhich was commissioned in 2001 as a joint project of Gazprom, Lukoil, and Yukos while Kazakhstan owns a 19% share.341 Russian negotiators have been demanding a greater share of the CPCs profits in return for agreeing to the expansion.342
335 Cited in Joanna Lillis. Russia-Kazakhstan: Medvedev Tries To Pick Up Where Putin Left Off, Eurasia Insight, May 23, 2008, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav052308.shtml. 336 Medvedev nazval svoy visit dobrym prodolzheniem kursa Putina I Nazarbayeva, Ferghana.ru, May 22, 2008, http://www. ferghana.ru/news.php?id=9232&mode=snews. 337 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Russian Federation, Beginning of Russian-Kazakhstani Talks in Expanded Format, May 22, 2008, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/0b95f9340bf2587fc325745200217fbf?OpenDocument. 338 Nikolaus von Twickel, Medvedev Plugging CIS on First Trip, Moscow Times, May 23, 2008, http://www.themoscowtimes. com/article/600/42/367645.htm. 339 Kazakh, Russian FMs Discussed Agenda of 1st Medvedevs Visit to Kazakhstan, Kazinform, May 6, 2008, http://www.inform.kz/showarticle.php?lang=eng&id=164075. 340 Sergei Blagov, Russia Registers Significant Victory In Caspian Basin Energy Contest, Eurasia Insight, May 4, 2006, http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050208.shtml. 341 Russia, Kazakhstan Agree to Double Pipeline Capacity by 2012, RIA Novosti, May 7, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/ business/20080507/106846493.html. 342 Joanna Lillis. Russia-Kazakhstan: Medvedev Tries To Pick Up Where Putin Left Off, Eurasia Insight, May 23, 2008, http://

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In May 2007, the Kazakh, Russian and Turkmen governments also agreed to construct a major new natural gas pipeline whose route would wind around the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan to Russia. Although the planned Caspian gas pipeline is scheduled to enter into service in 2011, the details of this arrangement remain under negotiation. Kazakhstan is supposed to contribute half of the volume while Turkmenistan will supply the remainder.343 These oil and gas pipelines are seen as the main competitors for those backed by Western governments that would circumvent Russia by crossing under the Caspian Sea. The Russian government has objected to the development of such underwater pipelines until the littoral states resolve the Caspian Seas legal status. Moscow has also raised concerns that undersea pipelines could cause environmental damage. This deadlock has thus far ensured that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan send most of their oil and gas northward overland to Russia. The Russian and Kazakh governments also continue to disagree regarding Nazarbayevs proposal to build a canal linking the Caspian and Black Seas, a connection that could potentially provide currently landlocked Kazakhstan a more direct outlet to the worlds oceans. Nazarbayev has called for the creation of a Eurasia Canal that would traverse Russias mountainous North Caucasus, whereas Russian officials have advocated simply upgrading the existing Volga-Don waterway. Before Medvedevs election, Nazarbayev had argued that, The Central Asian and Caspian regions are rich in energy resources ... but these reserves have to be delivered to world markets [the new canal] would be a powerful corridor providing an outlet for the whole of Central Asia to the sea via Russia.344 Nazarbayev implicitly threatened to circumvent Russian opposition on this and other transport issues if Moscow proved too unyielding: We never intend to bypass anyone, still less Russia, if the opportunities are provided.345 Even pending the canals construction, commercial relations between Russia and Kazakhstan continue to expand. Russian-Kazakh bilateral trade amounted to $16.3 billion in 2007, a 27% increase over 2006.346 Some 3,500 Kazakh-Russian joint ventures were operating in Kazakhstan in 2006, while Kazakh investors were active in the Russian Federation, if on a smaller scale.347 According to Kazakh government data, during the first three months of 2008, bilateral trade rose to $4.13 billion, a 26% increase over the January-March 2008 period.348 Nevertheless, Moscows recent efforts to induce Lufthansa to relocate its transshipment facilities from Kazakhstan to Siberia underscore that Russian and Kazakh economic interests do not always coincide. In any case, the two governments also signed accords aimed at promoting cooperation in high-technology sectors that could dominate the world economy in coming decades. Medvedev explained that, Of course energy is a very important sphere, but the 21st century cannot be without innovative development.349 To encourage bilateral cooperation in nanotechnology, Russia's state-owned Development Bank agreed to loan $300 million to the Kazakh Development Bank.350 Medvedev also said that the two governments sought to transition to deeper nuclear energy integration.351 He confirmed that Russia and Kazakhstan would estab lish a joint venture to build nuclearpower plants in Kazakhstan.352 Resolving Kazakh-Russian disagreements relating to their joint operation of the Baikonur space launch facility was another important high-technology item on the summit agenda. During the Soviet period, this facility
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav052308.shtml. 343 Russian, Kazakh Leaders Sign Accords, Calgary Herald, May 23, 2008, http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/calgarybusiness/story.html?id=a8b68a8f-1ccb-4f8d-88e8-b5150b458d92&k=89570. 344 John C.K. Daly, Analysis: Russia, Kazakhs Eye Rival Canals, United Press International, February 7, 2008, http://www.upi. com/International_Security/Energy/Analysis/2008/02/07/analysis_russia_kazakhs_eye_rival_canals/5702. 345 Lillis. Russia-Kazakhstan: Medvedev Tries To Pick Up. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav052308.shtml. 346 Oleg Sidorov, Abroad Debut of Dmitriy Medvedev, Gazeta.kz, May 22, 2006, http://www.gazeta.kz/eng/art.asp?aid=110776. 347 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Kazakhstan and Russia Stress String Ties, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, March 21, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/032107.html. For instance, Kazakh investors were helping to build the Ritz-Carlton Moscow Hotel. 348 Sergei Blagov, Medvedev Kicks off Kazakhstan Courtship, Eurasia Insight, May 15, 2008, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav051508.shtml. 349 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Russia Approves Baikonur Deal with Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, June 22, 2005, http://www.kazakhembus.com/062205.html; and Russian, Kazakh Leaders Sign Accords, Calgary Herald, May 23, 2008, http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/calgarybusiness/story.html?id=a8b68a8f-1ccb-4f8d-88e8-b5150b458d92&k=89570. 350 Nikolaus von Twickel, Medvedev Plugging CIS on First Trip, Moscow Times, May 23, 2008, http://www.themoscowtimes. com/article/600/42/367645.htm. 351 Kazakhstan Set for Long-Term Cooperation Deal with Russia, RIA Novosti, May 22, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/world/20080522/108135208.html. 352 Twickel, Medvedev Plugging CIS on First Trip.

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contributed to the Soviet governments military as well as civilian space programs. After Kazakhstan declared independence, debate raged about ownership of the facility. Russian officials believed Moscow should retain control of the installation since most of the operations, mandates, and funds came from the Kremlin. Kazakhstans new government argued that the cosmodromes location on its territory warranted greater Kazakh control. In 1994, the two governments ratified an agreement that recognized Kazakhstans ownership of the site but allowed Russia to continue to use the location under a 20-year lease. A January 2004 accord, which entered into force in 2005, extended the leasing arrangement through 2050, with Russia paying $115 million annually to use the facility.353 The document also established a joint venture with both countries providing $223 million to construct a Baiterek complex to launch Angara carrier rockets, capable of delivering 26 metric tons of payload into low-Earth orbits.354 Although some Kazakhs oppose the facilitys continued use as an environmental hazard, others consider Kazakhstans major role in space as an important driver of scientific and technological development, as well economic growth. The Kazakh space industry launched its first satellite in 2006 and aims to launch a second this year. Kazakh officials want to have one of their astronauts visit the International Space Station.355 The debate over Baikonur sharpened in 2007, when a Russian rocket crashed on Kazakh territory shortly after launch. Kazakh authorities claim that the mishap produced approximately $60 million in damage. The Russian government subsequently offered only $2.5 million in compensation.356 On April 12, 2008, Anatoly Perminov, the head of the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos) told journalists that Russia intended to use the Baikonur center until 2050.357 The joint declaration at the May 2008 summit pledged that the parties would employ Baikonur in a way that benefited Kazakhstan, Russia, and other countries. Kazakhstan also agreed to support development of the Russian-controlled Glonass navigation system, a competitor to the U.S. Global Positioning System that also has military applications. The two governments continue to deepen their defense cooperation. Before Medvedev arrived in Astana, Kazakh Defense Minister Daniyal Akhmetov reaffirmed Astanas interest in purchasing additional Russian weapons systems and in sending Kazakh personnel for training in Russian military academies.358 A Kremlin source stated that the Kazakh government had inquired about purchasing Russian air defense systems.359 Other media sources reported that Kazakhstan will buy new warships solely from Russia. According to Interfax, the Kazakh Defense Ministry plans to order smaller ships from the Kazakhstan-Russian Zenith joint venture wharf in Uralsk,Western Kazakhstan, but will arrange for more sophisticated warships to be constructed by Russian shipyards.360 Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov accompanied the Russian delegation to Astana. Following the presidential consultations, Medvedev and Nazarbayev released a statement that, while not detailing any specific new weapons purchases, declared that, Russia and Kazakhstan will maintain close cooperation aimed at securing a solid joint defense within the comm on military strategic space under the Collective Security Treaty.361 Russia sells weapons to Kazakhstan and its other close allies at subsidized prices. This policy simultaneously helps fortify Russian allies against internal and external threats while also keeping these countries dependent on Russianmade weapons and susceptible to the Kremlins influence. United States Both Republican and Democratic administrations have sought to maintain good economic, political, and security relations with Kazakhstan since it gained independence from the Soviet Union. Many Washington
353 Russias Medvedev Travels to Kazakhstan, Associated Press, May 22, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/05/22/news/ Kazakhstan-Russia.php. 354 Kazakh President Signs Law Re Baiterek Rocket Center, SPX, October 24, 2005, http://www.spacetravel. com/reports/Kazakh_President_Signs_Law_Re_Baiterek_Rocket_Center.html. 355 Joanna Lillis. Russia-Kazakhstan: Medvedev Tries To Pick Up. 356 Ibid. 357 Russia to Use Baikonur Space Center until 2050Roscosmos, RIA Novosti, April 12, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/ science/20080412/104910818.html. 358 Russia and Kazakhstan Defence Ministers Announce Military Cooperation Programme, February 13, 2008, BBC Monitoring. 359 Medvedev to Discuss Space Center, Arms Deals During Kazakh Visit, RIA Novosti, May 22, 2008 , http://en.rian.ru/ russia/20080522/108063754.html. 360 Sergei Blagov, Medvedev Kicks off Kazakhstan Courtship, Eurasia Insight, May 15, 2008, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav051508.shtml. 361 Medvedev in Kazakhstan, Leaders Agree to Expand Ties, RTTNews, May 22, 2008, http://www.rttnews.com/Content/GeneralNews.aspx?Node=B1&Id=613291.

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policy makers believe Kazakhstans growing role in its extended neighborhood has advanced significant American interests. Through its increasing economic engagement in Eurasiawhich has involved both direct investment and trade as well as support for improving regional commercial and transportation infrastructureKazakhstan has helped transform Central Asia and the Caspian region into an arc of opportunity rather than an arc of crisis. Hundreds of American companies directly benefit from their large foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan, which presently amounts to over $15 billion. In addition, a strong Kazakhstan helps check excessive Chinese and Russian influence in Central Asia. Kazakh authorities have supported the development of energy pipelines that do not rely exclusively on Moscow and have endorsed a continued U.S. and NATO military presence in the region even after the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes. Of course, the inherent volatility of the region and bilateral differences over democracy promotion means that relations could change at any time. At present, however, the general impression in Washington is that Kazakhstan has become the most important U.S. partner in Central Asia. Since the Cold War had precluded the development of substantial direct ties between the United States and Kazakhstan, the initial focus of bilateral relations was establishing mutual diplomatic representation. On December 25, 1991, the United States became the first government to recognize Kazakhstans indepen dence.362 The State Department opened a new embassy in the then capital of Almaty in January 1992. Since then, U.S. policies have consistently aimed to facilitate Kazakhstans transition to a stable, democratic country with a prosperous free market and harmonious relations with its neighbors and the larger international community.363 For Kazakhstan, the political support of the USA during the first years of inde pendence was very important, President Nazarbayev later remarked. This support made entry to the world association and the world economy much easierit helped to choose the more effective and far-sighted political reference points.364 Under President Bill Clinton, the U.S. government had two main priorities regarding Kazakhstan.365 Both objectives were important for the preceding and subsequent Bush administrations as well. The first goal was to eliminate or better secure the nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction Kazakhstan inherited following the demise of the Soviet Union.366 American officials worked with the Kazakh government and other groups to destroy or transfer to Russia the nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems (longrange bombers and missiles) located on Kazakhstans territory in the early 1990s. U.S.-Kazakh nonproliferation initiatives have also included dismantling the Stepnogorsk anthrax production facility and enhancing joint cooperative efforts against bioterrorist threats.367 More recently, the two countries have begun collaborating to dispose of spent nuclear fuel from the closed BN-350 reactor in Aktau.368 The two governments have also assumed leading roles in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and other multilateral nonproliferation efforts.369 Kazakhstan received approximately $240 million under the U.S.- funded Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction.370 President Clintons second priority was to increase the volume of Kazakh energy product entering world markets, especially along routes that did not traverse Russian territory. The administration encouraged U.S. companies such as Chevron and Exxon-Mobil to invest in Kazakhstans energy sector, resulting in Americans becoming a leading source of private investment capital in Kazakhstan.371 In 2006, U.S. capital accounted for
362 U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Kazakhstan, February 2007, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5487.htm. 363 Office of the White House Press Secretary, Joint Declaration on Relations Between the United States and Kazakhstan by President Bush and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, May 19, 1992, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_n21_v3/ ai_12511837/pg_1?tag=artBody;co l1. 364 Kazakhstan Emerges as a Major World Player, Washington Times Advertising Supplement, December 20, 1999, http://www. internationalspecialreports.com/ciscentralasia/99/kazakhstan/3.html. 365 For a more comprehensive listing of joint U.S.-Kazakh goals and objectives during the 1990s see Office of the White House Press Secretary, Joint Statement on U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations, November 18,1997, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Kazakhstan/6184.html. 366 Martha Brill Olcott, Towards a New Stage in US-Kazah Relations, Kazakhstan and the USA Conference Remarks, August 23 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18700&prog=zru. 367 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Extends Strategic Partnership with Kazakhstan, December 13, 2007, http://www. defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=11560. 368 National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Mezhdunardnoe Sotrudnichestvo, http://www.nnc.kz/ru/cooperation.html. 369 Nuclear Threat Initiative, Kazakhstan, http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/kazak.pdf. 370 Department of State, Background Note: Kazakhstan. 371 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Central Asia: Could Regional Dynamics Spell Closer U.S.- Kazakh Ties?, Radio Free Europe, June 08,

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27% of all foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan.372 Due to geography and other factors, bilateral trade is of lesser importance in their economic relations. Neither country is a leading trade partner of the other.373 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States expanded its security cooperation with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries. American policies aimed primarily to secure support for NATO military operations in Afghanistan and to bolster regional governments national capacity to counter transnational terrorist threats, especially those that could involve unconventional weapons. Although the United States does not have a permanent military base in Kazakhstan, whose location is less useful for providing logistical support for OEF than some of Afghanistans other neighbors, the Kazakh government has granted American warplanes permission to fly over Kazakhstans territory and to make emergency landings at Almaty national airport.374 Furthermore, American officials appreciate the support Kazakh diplomats have given to U.S. efforts to retain access to the Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan and to dissuade the SCO from veering in an overtly anti-American direction. The Bush administration has also welcomed the small but symbolically important Kazakh military contribution to the war in Iraq. The Kazakh government has kept around 30 engineers in Iraq to assist with de-mining and water purification despite widespread public opposition to Kazakhstans involvement in the conflict.375 By expanding the number of countries nominally part of the coalition of the willing in Iraq, the troop deploymentone of the few from a primarily Muslim country (Azerbaijan and Albania being the others) and the only ground force commitment made by a Central Asian governmenthelped legitimize the American military presence. More generally, American officials argue that Kazakhstans growing role in regional affairs will help pro mote a range of U.S. security goals in Eurasia. In May 2007, for instance, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eurasia Policy James MacDougall maintained that, Kazakhstan as a strong and stable country in the Central Asia region has the ability to play a leadership role and a stabilizing role to ensure in part that the Central Asia region geographically doesn't become more susceptible than it may already be to terrorism and to terrorist elements.376 One bilateral relationship promoting the two countries regional military, economic, and energy security objectives has been joint U.S.-Kazakh efforts to strengthen the security of Kazakhstans land and maritime borders. The U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Department of Defense and other U.S. agencies provide the Kazakh government with training and equipment to increase its border control capabilities. Prominent joint efforts include the Caspian Guard initiative and the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program.377 Although some estimates of the probable recoverable energy resources in the Caspian have declined during the Bush administration, American officials have continued previous U.S. efforts to ensure that Kazakhstan exports at least some of its energy production westward through the South Caucasus. Vice President Richard Cheney and other senior U.S. government representatives have made recurring visits to Kazakhstan to promote U.S. energy objectives in Eurasia. In particular, American policy makers launched a sustained diplomatic campaign to secure Kazakh participation in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. More recently, U.S. officials have sought to direct some of the countrys expected natural gas exports through undersea Trans-Caucasus pipelines. Conversely, Washington has sought to minimize the flow of Kazakh energy products to Iran pending changes in that countrys foreign policies.
2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1069000.html. 372 Department of State, Background Note: Kazakhstan. 373 For example, Kazakhstan is currently the 75th largest export market for U.S. goods 2005; Office of the United States Trade Representative, Kazakhstan, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2008/2008_NTE_Report/asset_up load_file942_14631.pdf. 374 Jim Nichol, Kazakhstan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests, May 4, 2004, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 4, 2004, p. 4, http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_971058f_04may04.pdf. 375 Olga Oliker, Kazakhstans Security Interests and their Implications for the U.S.- Kazakh Relationship, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 2 (2007), p. 68, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May_2007/Oliker.pdf. 376 Cited in Saidazimova, Central Asia: Regional Dynamics. 377 GlobalSecurity.org, Caspian Guard, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/caspian-guard.htm; and U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Kazakhstan, U.S. and Kazakhstan Team up to Improve Border Security, May 17, 2007, http://kazakhstan.usembassy.gov/pr-05-17-en.html.

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American officials have also attempted to enhance regional economic integration in areas other than energy. In June 2004, the United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian countries.378 The TIFA process aims to overcome impediments to intra-regional trade, economic development, and foreign direct investment through ongoing dialogue and other initiatives. Representatives from the governments of Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan also typically participate since U.S officials seek to deepen economic ties between Central and South Asian countries to exploit their complementary economies, as well as to create a larger potential market to entice foreign investors. The State Department has designated a Special Ambassador for Trade in Greater Central Asia and, in February 2006, reorganized its geographic bureaus in order to place South and Central Asian issues within a single office.379 A current U.S. government priority is assisting Kazakhstans entry into the World Trade Organization under mutually acceptable conditions. The TIFA process also presumes a close connection between economic and security issues in Eurasia. American officials hope that by promoting the regions socioeconomic development, they will reduce the appeal of extremist ideologies and transnational criminal activities, especially terrorism and narcotics trafficking. Ensuring Afghanistans continued economic development is seen as an essential component of this process given the resurgence of the Taliban insurgency and the drug production networks in that country. During a December 2001 visit to Washington, Nazarbayev and Bush issued a joint statement expressing their mutual belief that the expansion of trade and economic ties among the states of Central Asia, and deepening of regional integration in important areas, such as the environment, water resources, and transportation systems are a basis for regional security.380 The current Bush administration has launched numerous programs designed to improve conditions for private businessKazakh as well as foreignin Kazakhstan. Educational, training, and other programs seek to expand employment opportunities for Kazakhs. Particular priority has been placed on elevating Kazakh commercial and financial standards. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has established a Public-Private Economic Partnership Initiative between the two countries that aims to expand opportunities for private enterprises in Kazakhstan.381 While American business activity in Kazakhstan still consists primarily of firms engaged in the oil, gas, and other extractive industries, a number of American companiesincluding small and medium-sized businesseshave extended their activities to other sectors in recent years.382 U.S. officials have also backed Nazarbayevs vision of Kazakhstan as a locomotive for increasing re gional commerce. In an October 2005 speech in Astana, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued that the country could enhance regional stability through its growing commercial role in Eurasia: As this nations economy continues to develop, Kazakhstan should view its role as an engine for growth within Central Asia. Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would benefit immensely from Kazakhstani investment and energy to stimulate growth and create jobs. And Afghanistan needs the full partnership of this entire region to overcome the destitution that tyrants, and extremists, and warlords, and civil war have compounded over several decades. A secure and prosperous Afghanistan, which anchors Central Asia and links it to South Asia, is essential to the future of economic success.383 At present, a large number of U.S. government agencies are engaged with Kazakhstan. Formal U.S. government assistance programs to Kazakhstan in Fiscal Year 2007 amounts to $26.80 million. This figure in cludes $9.55 million for peace and security programs; $5.72 million for democracy and governance programs;
378 The text of the agreement is available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/TIFA/asset_upload_file683_7722.pdf. 379 The Bureau of South Asian Affairs merged with the Office of Central Asian Affairs to create a newly renamed Bureau for South and Central Asian Affairs. The Office for Central Asian Affairs had been part of the Bureau for European Affairs, a legacy of the Cold War, when the Central Asian republics were part of the USSR 380 Office of the White House Press Secretary, Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Nursultan Nazarbayev on the New Kazakhstan-American Relationship, December 21, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011221-10.html. 381 American Chamber of Commerce in Kazakhstan, U.S.-Kazakhstan Public Private Economic Partnership Initiative Inaugural Forum, June 24, 2008, http://www.amcham.kz/event.php?event_id=181. 382 Evan A. Feigenbaum, The U.S.-Kazakhstan Relationship, Press Roundtable, Astana, Kazakhstan, U.S. Department of State. November 20, 2007, http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/95676.htm. 383 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Rice Calls Central Asia Arc of Opportunity and Kazakhstan Engine for Growth for Region Stretching to Afghanistan, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, February 3, 2006, http://www.kazakhembus.com/020306.html.

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$2.93 million for human resource programs (Investing in People projects); and $7.73 million to promote economic growth. The bulk of these funds were appropriated under the Freedom Support Act.384 Two factors have most limited U.S. influence in Kazakhstan. First, although the United States is a global superpower, it is a distant one from the perspective of Kazakh officials, who are constantly engaged in managing relations with Russia, China, and other neighboring countries. Although Kazak leaders desire a sustained major U.S. role in Eurasia to provide geopolitical balance as well as economic, military, and other resources, many in Kazakhstan and elsewhere remain uncertain about the durability of the major American presence in Central Asia, which is a relatively new historical phenomenon. Second, Americas strong commitment to promoting human rights and democratic principles in Eurasia has irritated some Kazakh officials. Bilateral tensions over the pace of political and economic reforms as well as allegations of corrupt practices by Kazakh officials and their American partners have persisted since the countrys independence.385 Differences became especially acute when these considerations initially led U.S. officials to resist Kazakhstans receiving the rotating chair of the OSCE. American political culture, with its emphasis on civil liberties, and the U.S. political system, which provides democracy advocates with considerable influence within Congress and the media, ensures that promoting democracy and human rights will remain a constant feature of U.S. policies towards Kazakhstan and other countries. American representatives are now working with Kazakh officials to implement the political and other reform commitments endorsed by the Kazakh government as it prepares to assume the OSCE chair in 2010.386 Regional Powers India President Nazarbayevs visit to India in 2002 led Kazakh leaders to consider more clearly that countrys role as another component of Eurasias post-Cold War international system. In April 2003, Kazakhstan joined the Indian- Iranian-Russian initiative to develop a large-scale North-South transportation corridor that would extend from northern Russia to the Persian Gulf.387 In March 2006, Foreign Minister Tokaev indicated that, while his government welcomed the increasing presence of Chinese energy companies in Kazakhstan and other Eurasian markets, We also would like to see other countries [coming into the region]. For example, we are negotiating with India. The general balance of interests must be thoroughly sustained.388 While the presence of Indian energy companies in Kazakhstan remains limited, in October 2007, President Nazarbayev reaffirmed interest in sending Kazakh oil and gas southward through Iranian territory to Persian Gulf ports, where tankers could transport the supplies to India and other countries.389 The previous month, Kairat Akhmetalim, Counselor in the Embassy of Kazakhstan in New Delhi, said that his government would like a great economic power like India to become a member of the SCO, where it is presently only an observer.390 Although India does not share a land border with Kazakhstan or any other Central Asian country, the two regions of Central and South Asia have extensive historical ties. For centuries, Central Asian leaders such as Tamerlane and the Moghuls ruled much of northwest India. The March 2008 decision of New Delhi's Jamia Millia Islamia University to open Indias first Centre for Kazakh Language and Studies should help further these cultural ties. The center will come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Persian Studies and its Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution.391
384 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Kazakhstan, April 16, 2008, http://www.state.gov/p/ eur/rls/fs/103634.htm. 385 See for example Nikola Krastev, Kazakhstan: Country Again Features In U.S. Efforts To Combat Corruption, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 23, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058968.htm; and Ron Stodghill, Trial Puts Spotlight on U.S.-Kazakh Relations, International Herald Tribune, November 7, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/07/business/kazoil.php; AgenceFrance Presse, Rice Calls For More Democracy in Central Asia, October 13, 2005, http://www.sras.org/news2.phtml?m=458#4. 386 U.S. Envoy To OSCE Says Kazakhstan Lagging In Reforms, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 26, 2008, http://www. rferl.org/content/U.S._Envoy_OSCE_Says_Kazakhstan_Lagging_Reforms/1145556.html. 387 Kushkumbayev, Kazakhstan, p. 288. 388 Mevlut Katik, Kazakhstan Has Huge Plan to Expand Energy Links with China, Eurasia Insight, March 13, 2006, http://www. eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav031306.shtml. 389 Central Asia: Kazakh, Russian Leaders Discuss Transport Corridor, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 5, 2007, http:// www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/4482ab28-5ab9-4756-8386-48471d684d3f.html. 390 India-SCO-Entry, IRNA, September 3, 2007, http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-236/0709032581170740.htm. 391 Jamia Launches Indias First Centre for Kazakh Language and Studies, ANI, March.29, 2008, http://www.keralanext.com/

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Contemporary Indian policy towards Central Asia, as during the British Raj, often treats the region as Indias extended strategic neighborhood.392 Given New Delhis concerns about geopolitical encirclement, Pakistani and Chinese activities in Central Asia have traditionally received much attention. Since the USSRs disintegration, Indian security policy towards Central Asia has sought to prevent Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states from joining any Islamic camp that could adopt anti-Hindu policies. New Delhis nightmare would be the emergence of a bloc of hostile Islamic governments in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, linked closely with China, which would seek to contain India, support terrorism in Kashmir, and perhaps stir up trouble among Indias other Muslim minorities.393 The growth of terrorism and Islamic radicalism has become a more recent concern. In June 2005, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee said that India had a vital stake in the outcome of the struggle between extremist and moderate interpretations of Islam in the region.394 Indias limited military capabilities and inability to access Central Asia easily by a land route constrain Indians ability to affect security developments in the region. As a result, Indian strategists have largely welcomed the increased American presence in Central Asia since 9/11 as well as Russias persistent influence in Central Asia. Both security and economic concerns have led Indian governments to work with the United States and other countries to stabilize Afghanistan. New Delhi never recognized the radical Sunni Taliban, with its ties to Pakistan and anti-Hindu terrorists in Kashmir, as the official government of Afghanistan. The Indian government instead supported the Northern Alliance throughout the Afghan civil war.395 Since 2001, Indian officials have strongly backed the anti-Taliban regime in Kabul, extending hundreds of millions of dollars in reconstruction aid. Both the Afghan and Indian governments have been pressuring Pakistan to relax border controls that hinder Indian-Afghan trade, as well as Indias commercial ties with Central Asia. Besides geopolitical concerns, Indian policy makers have been motivated by a desire to obtain access to additional energy supplies to supplement Indias traditional reliance on Persian Gulf oil, which presently accounts for approximately two-thirds of its domestic needs. The countrys booming economy will require it to import increasing volumes of oil and natural gas in future years.396 The director general of the Tata Energy Research Institute, R.K. Pachauri, pointed out the implications of this trend for Indian foreign policy: We now realize we have to get a large part of our energy from our extended neighborhood, and that means we have to engineer and structure new relationships.397 Like China, Indian policy makers express concern about their excessive dependence on Persian Gulf oil supplies. Former Foreign Minister K. Natwar Singh advocated making energy cooperation a SCO priority, including by convening regular meetings of energy ministers under its auspices.398 On a bilateral basis, Indian firms, including the stateowned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), have invested in Kazakhstans Alibekmola and Kurmangazi oil fields. They also are considering various hydroelectric projects in several Central Asian countries.399 A major purpose of President Nazarbayevs trip to India in 2002 was to deepen economic ties between the two countries. Nazarbayev was especially eager to entice greater Indian technological and pharmaceutical investment in Kazakhstan, including through joint ventures with Kazakh firms.400 Economic ties between Kazakhstan and India substantially expanded after Nazarbayevs visit, though they lag behind the levels
news/?id=1203420. 392 Pakistan, India Both Eye Central Asia, Daily Times, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_12-8-20005_pg7_57. 393 Stephen Blank, Indias Continuing Drive into Central Asia, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, January 14, 2004, http:// www.cacaianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3459. 394 Robert McMahon, Central Asia: Defense Minister Touts Indias Potential Moderating Influence in Region, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, June 28, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/06/908899c2-7a6a-4de2-8ca7-a2a5391a12dc.html. 395 Hooman Peimani, The Afghan and Central Asian Factor in Indian-Pakistani Rivalry, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, April 10, 2002, http://www.cacaianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3459. 396 Detailed projections can be found at Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs: India, January 2007, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/India/Full.html. 397 Cited in Somini Sengupta, Indias Quest for Energy is Reshaping its Diplomacy, International Herald Tribune, June 6, 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/06/05/news/energy.php. 398 Press Trust of India, India Pitches for Full Membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Org, Asia Pulse, October 27, 2005, http:// goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4843981/INDIA-PITCHES-FOR-FULLMEMBERSHIP.html. 399 Blank, Indias Continuing Quest. http://www.cacaianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3459. 400 United Nations Development Programme, Bringing Down Barriers: Regional Cooperation for Human Development and Human Security (New York, 2005), p. 73, http://europeandcis.undp.org/archive/?wspc=CAHDR2005

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desired by both sides. Kazakh-Indian trade increased from $60 million in 2002 to almost $200 million in 2007. Kazakhstans main export items to India consist of salt, lime, brimstone, cement, raw leather, and ferrous metals. India mainly sells coffee, tea, spices, tobacco, organic chemical compounds, pharmaceuticals, plastics, rubber, electrical machines, equipments and mechanical devices.401 In 2006, Indian investment in Kazakhstan increased to $16 million, while Kazakh investors purchased shares in Indias oil exploration firm, Kaspain Shelf.402 The two governments have recently been considering how Indians might cultivate idle lands in Kazakhstan, perhaps through an arrangement in which Indians would grow crops in leased plots, and then ship the food to India.403 A major impediment to expanding commercial ties between Kazakhstan and India is the lack of a direct land route between them. The conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir and other issues has compounded this natural barrier with manmade complications. Lacking inexpensive direct transit routes, most Indian exporters to Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, and the rest of Central Asia have had to ship goods via Irans port of Bandar Abbas and a lengthy overland road system.404 In order to bring Eurasian oil and gas to Indian industries and consumers, and to increase Indian commerce with Central Asia more generally, Indian officials have pro moted the development of the regions transportation and commercial infrastructures. The Indian government is helping Iran develop its new Persian Gulf port of Chabahar as well as supporting construction of a highway connecting Chabahar through Afghanistan into Tajikistan.405 The previous Indian government under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh conducted a strong campaign to obtain access to Kazakhstans oil resources. With government encouragement, Indian firms sought a formal role in the international consortium involved in the Tengiz and Kashagan oil fields and the Kurmangazy and Darkhan exploration blocs. They also expressed interest in working elsewhere in the Caspian Sea region. Indian Energy Minister Mari Shankar Aiyar also proposed that Indias Gail Ltd., join the consortium help ing to construct Kazakhstans three energy pipelines with China. Gail and other Indian companies sought to invest in the natural gas processing and petrochemical plants in Atyrau and Akhtau and improve the recovery infrastructure at older oil fields in Kazakhstan.406 Indian and Kazakh officials established a Joint Working Group to develop a comprehensive plan for involving India in Kazakhstans diverse oil and gas projects.407 Thus far, however, India has largely lost out to China in its quest for Kazakhstans energy resources.408 In 2005, after an intense bidding war, CNPC outbid ONCG for PetroKazakhstan, previously a private, Canadianowned energy company. This $4 billion purchase of Kazakhstans secondlargest foreign oil producer represented the most expensive acquisition by a Chinese company.409 Another obstacle has been Indian investors unease about the continuing changes in Kazakhstans legislation regarding foreign investment in the countrys energy sector.410 Continued instability in Afghanistan and Pakistans Baluchistan province, uncertainties about the capac ity of Turkmenistans Dauletabad field to supply sufficient natural gas, and Indians reluctance to become excessively dependent on Pakistan for their vital energy supplies have thus far impeded construction of a Trans-Afghan pipeline from Turkmenistan to India through Afghanistan and Pakistan.411 The envisaged
401 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstans Respublikoy Indiya, July 12, 2006, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/asia_africa/17. 402 John C.K. Daly, Analysis: India Eyes Kazakh Energy, United Press International, April 11, 2008, http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Energy/Analysis/2008/04/11/analysis_india_eyes_kazakh_energy/4684. 403 Vishnu Makhijani, India to Boost Energy Ties with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, April 10, 2008, IANS, http://www.thaindian. com/newsportal/business/india-to-boostenergy-ties-with-kazakhstan-turkmenistan_10036545.html. 404 S. Frederick Starr, Introduction, in S. Frederick Starr, ed., The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2007), p. 18. 405 Sudha Ramachandran, India Revels in New Diplomatic Offensive, Asia Times, November 22, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/ atimes/South_Asia/EK22Df05.html. 406 Blank, Indias Continuing Quest. 407 Stephen Blank, Indias Energy Offensive in Central Asia, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, March 9, 2005, http://www. cacaianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3459. 408 Chietigj Bajpaee, India, China Locked in Energy Game, Asia Times, May 17, 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian_ Economy/GC17Dk01.html. 409 Christopher Pala, China Pays Dearly for Kazakhstan Oil, New York Times, March 17, 2006, http://www.nytimes. com/2006/03/17/business/worldbusiness/17kazakh.html. 410 India Eyes Kazakh Oil, neweurasia.org, April 15, 2008, http://kazakhstan.neweurasia.net/2008/04/15/india-eyes-kazakh-oil. 411 Svante E. Cornell and Mamuka Tsereteli, After the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Looking Ahead, Central Asia-Caucasus

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Trans-Afghan Pipeline (TAP) enjoys the strong backing of the Asian Development Bank and Washington, which sees the project as a way to promote Indian-Pakistan reconciliation, provide the pro-U.S. regime in Afghanistan with transit revenues, and build additional energy pipelines not under Russian or Iranian control. In April 2008, the Indian government, previously an observer, formally joined the now renamed TurkmenistanAfghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline.412 Although energy experts remain dubious about the projects realization, events in April 2008 may finally precipitate the long-sought upturn in Kazakh-Indian energy relations. In Astana, President Nazarbayev told visiting Indian Vice-President Hamid Ansari that India could play its part in Kazakhstans plan to double oil output to 100 million tons over the next 10 years. The two leaders agreed to make their cooperation more concrete by developing detailed plans for Indian participation in Kazakh energy projects. An Indian official told the media after the meeting that, Both agreed that given our closeness, there was a need to get into projectspecific cooperation.413 Kazakh representatives, besides indicating that Nazarbayev expected to visit India in the near future, expressed most interest in gaining access to Indian energy technologies.414 The Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) subsequently announced that it had begun evaluating whether to establish a refinery and other petrochemical facilities in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which Ansari had visited immediately before arriving in Astana. KMG would be the local partner in Kazakhstan, and might also work with the IOC in developing its new petrochemical complex at Ceyhan in Turkey.415 A senior Indian Foreign Affairs Ministry official related that, during the April 2008 Kazakh-Indian summit, the two sides agreed on enlarging exchange of visits and expanding cooperation in areas of mutual complementarities, which he identified as food and textile production, education, and information technolo gy as well as energy.416 An Inter-Governmental Commission, chaired by both governments energy ministers, is seeking to expand cooperation in these and other sectors, including outer space exploration and possible Indian purchases of Kazakh uranium. Both governments are also providing mutual support for Kazakhstans efforts to join the WTO and Indias efforts to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.417 One factor working in Indias favor is the long-term perspective of its leaders. Although Ansari admitted to certain obstacles in realizing his vision for a more vibrant relationship with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the energy sector, he observed that, We are not looking at one or two years but thinking in terms of decades.418 Iran If it were not for the Iranian governments self-induced political alienation, its territory would have long served as a natural transit route between Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries and the worlds oceans. Even now, Nazarbayev has reaffirmed interest in sending Kazakh oil and gas southward through Iranian territory to Persian Gulf ports, where tankers could transport the supplies to India and other countries.419 At present, Kazakhstan only ships a small flow of oil to Iran under a swap arrangement. Every year, somewhat more than one million barrels are transported from Aktau, a Caspian port in southwest Kazakhstan, to other Persian Gulf countries. The improvements in Aktaus port facilities have positioned Kazakhstan well to benefit from any change in Irans semi-pariah status.420
Institute Analyst, June 15, 2005, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3374. 412 India Joins Mega Gas Pipeline Project, Economic Times, April 25, 2008, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/News_ By_Industry/Energy/India_ joins_mega_gas_pipeline_project/articleshow/2980537.cms. 413 Kazakh Offers India Greater Role in Oil, Gas Exploration,Indian Express, April 9, 2008, http://www.indianexpress.com/ story/294364.html. 414 Kazakh Offers India Greater Role in Oil, Gas Exploration,Indian Express, April 9, 2008, http://www.indianexpress.com/ story/294364.html. 415 Anupama Airy, IOC Plans Refinery, Petrochem Units in Central Asia, Financial Express, April 11, 2008, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/IOC-plans-refinerypetrochem-units-in-Central-Asia/295763. 416 John C.K. Daly, Analysis: India Eyes Kazakh energy, United Press International, April 11, 2008, http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Energy/Analysis/2008/04/11/analysis_india_eyes_kazakh_energy/4684. 417 John C.K. Daly, Analysis: India Eyes Kazakh Energy, United Press International, April 11, 2008, http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Energy/Analysis/2008/04/11/analysis_india_eyes_kazakh_energy/4684. 418 Vishnu Makhijani, India to Boost Energy Ties with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, April 10, 2008, IANS, http://www.thaindian. com/newsportal/business/india-to-boostenergy-ties-with-kazakhstan-turkmenistan_10036545.html.. 419 Central Asia: Kazakh, Russian Leaders Discuss Transport Corridor, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 5, 2007, http:// www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/4482ab28-5ab9-4756-8386-48471d684d3f.html. 420 American Threat Looms over Kazakh-Iranian Talks, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, October 20, 2004, http://www. cacianalyst.org/?q=node/2534.

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When he attended the Second Caspian Summit in Tehran in October 2007, Nazarbayev promoted construction of a railroad that would run along a 650- km Usen-Gyzylgaia-Bereket-Etrek-Gorgan route. The line would link Kazakhstan directly to the Persian Gulf. Nazarbayev and other Kazakh officials also endorsed deepening mutual investment. They invited Iranian financing of infrastructure, manufacturing, telecommunications, and transportation projects in Kazakhstan, while urging opportunities for Kazakh participation in the privatization of Iranian state enterprises.421 In 2006, commodity turnover between Iran and Kazakhstan amounted to $2 billion dollars. The total for 2007 approached $3 billion and could rise much further if Iran carries out its plan to build a massive trade and port facility at Bandar-e Anzali on its north Caspian shore. Iranian officials are trying to entice Kazakh investors by offering to allow Kazakh (and Turkmen) goods duty-free transit. Construction of the half-billion dollar project is scheduled to begin in early 2009.422 Russian and Indian representatives are seeking to construct a road and railroad connection between Russia and the Persian Gulf that would traverse Kazakhstan and Iran as well as Turkmenistan.423 The resulting reduction in the costs of transporting cargo to Iran from its northern neighbors would make many Kazakh goods more competitive. At present, for instance, it is cheaper for Iranians to import grain from distant Australia by sea than to bring it overland from neighboring Kazakhstan.424 One issue that has not had a major negative effect on Kazakh-Iranian relations has been Kazakhstans close ties with Israel, a reflection of Astanas multi-vector foreign policy as well as Kazakhs desire to pro mote understanding among diverse religions and civilizations. Kazakh officials have used their good relations with both countries to help Irans isolated Jewish community develop contacts with Jews in Israel and other countries. Nazarbayev also sought to use his contacts with then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to secure the release of Israeli military personnel captured in Lebanon by pro-Iranian groups.425 Yet, Kazakh-Iranian relations are not trouble-free. Iranian and Russian officials have colluded to impede the construction of Trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines linking Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan without transiting Iranian or Russian territory. Besides the absence of an agreed legal framework to govern underwater mining and shipments, the two governments have cited alleged environmental concerns to hinder Kazakhstans expanding energy ties with European countries. Kazakh officials also do not appear especially eager to help the current Iranian government realize its ambitions to join the SCO. Tehrans entry could compromise Kazakh leaders position that the organization is not directed against any bloc or country. In addition, being too associated with Iran at a time when the latters nuclear intentions remain dubious could detract from Kazakhstans exemplary nonproliferation record. According to media accounts, in June 2006, Nazarbayev wrote a letter to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in which he reaffirmed Kazakhstans oppositions to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and stressed that the entire international community had an interest in resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis.426 Kazakh leaders do not object to an Iranian civil nuclear energy program, as permitted under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but oppose any Iranian effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Pakistan Pakistani policy-makers see both opportunities and dangers in Central Asia. Pakistani officials originally welcomed the decline of Moscows control over Afghanistan and Central Asia, and anticipated gaining strategic depth and geopolitical maneuvering room vis--vis India by expanding their influence in the region.427
421 Embassy of Kazakhstan to USA and Canada, President Nursultan Nazarbayev arrives in Iran to take part in the Second Caspian States Summit, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, January 5, 2007, http://prosites-kazakhembus.homestead.com/NB12-101707.html. 422 John C.K. Daly, Iran Develops Caspian Port, United Press International, May 21, 2008, http://www.upi.com/International_Se curity/Energy/Analysis/2008/05/21/analysis_iran_develops_bandar-e_anzali/4876. 423 Frederick Starr, Introduction, in S. Frederick Starr, ed., The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2007), p. 22. 424 Kushkumbayev, Kazakhstan, p. 290. 425 Lev Krichevsky, In Kazakhstan, Strong Hand Maintains an Ethnic Peace, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 11, 2002, http:// www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/110402JTAd.shtml. 426 Marat Yermukanov, Kazakhstan Seeks Irans Reconciliation with the West, Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 16, 2006, http://www. jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371193. 427 Stephen Blank, Indo-Pakistani Negotiations: Whats In Them For Central Asia?, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, February 11, 2004, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/1854.

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Some Pakistanis even hoped that, out of Islamic solidarity, the new Central Asian regimes would support Pakistans policies in its competition with India (e.g., over Kashmir). More recently, Indias increased presence in the region has aroused concerns about strategic and economic encirclement. During the 1990s, suspicions surrounding Pakistanis ties with Islamic terrorism impeded efforts to strengthen ties with the secular elites of Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian countries. In Afghanistan, Pakistan provided essential support to the Mujahedeen guerrillas battling against Soviet occupation forces and their local allies. Once in power, the Taliban, with the assistance of influential parts of the Pakistani se curity apparatus, provided support for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other Sunni extremist groups seeking to establish Islamic republics in Central Asia. In 1999, IMU operatives narrowly failed to assassinate Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov but did manage to infiltrateand disrupt life inseveral Central Asian states, especially Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Since the Pakistani government formally broke with the Taliban and other terrorist groups operating in Central Asian following the 9/11 attacks, the regions leaders have gradually become more receptive to working with Islamabad. Thanks to strong Chinese backing, Pakistan finally received formal observer status in the SCO at the organizations July 2005 summit. Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said the SCO would provide a platform to Pakistan to present its views and interface with countries who are very important in the region and they transcend from European coast to Asian continent.428 Economic considerations have underpinned Pakistans reintegration into the region. Pakistani leaders regularly highlight the countrys pivotal location at the crossroads of South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia. In presenting his case for Pakistans becoming a full SCO member at the June 2006 summit, President Pervez Musharraf said: Both in geo-political and geo-economic terms, Pakistan is most suitably positioned to promote the interests of the SCO. Pakistan provides the natural link between the SCO states to connect the Eurasian heartland with the Arabian Sea and South Asia. We also offer important overland routes for mutually beneficial trade and energy transactions.429 Central Asians appreciate Islamabads efforts to make Pakistani ports available for regional commerce. Musharraf said Pakistan wants to serve as a trade and energy corridor between China and Central Asia.430 The deepwater port of Gwadar, located along the Arabian Sea in southwest Baluchistan, provides the shortest route to the sea for many landlocked parts of Central Asia. With appropriate supporting infrastructure, especially improved road and rail networks linking Gwadar with the rest of Pakistan and its neighbors, goods can proceed from there by ship to China, India, the Middle East, and other global markets.431 The port of Karachi is also well-situated to offer Central Asia trade wider access to world markets.432 Air services between Almaty and Pakistan provide an additional link for high-priority commerce and passenger travel. In December 2002, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to construct a pipeline that would transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Although the project subsequently stalled, the recent decision of the Indian government to support the Trans-Afghan pipeline has revived its prospects. The three countries are also considering constructing railways that would link Turkmenistan and Pakistan through Afghanistan, though transiting through Afghanistan remains too insecure for now for any large-scale rail or road traffic.433 Pakistani authorities are working with China to improve the Karakoram Highway that links the two countries via a tortuous route through Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. At present, high transportation costs and other barriers limit Pakistans trade with Central Asian countries to low figures, but realization of these infrastructure projects could increase this level substantially.
428 Prime Minister Leaves for Moscow to Attend SCO Meeting, Balochistan Times, October 26, 2005. 429 President Musharrafs Address at SCO Summit, June 16, 2006, http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/FilesSpeeches%5CFo reignVisits%5C6152006103647PMAddress_SCO_Summit.pdf. 430 Press Trust of India, Pak Offers China Use of Port, http://www.thestatesman.net/page.news.php?clid=8&theme=&usr sess=1&id=107651. 431 Besides the need to develop a suitable infrastructure, the anti-Islamabad (and occasionally anti-Chinese) insurgency in Baluchistan presents another threat to Gwadars role as a possible gateway for Central Asia; see Zahid Hussain, Its War Now: A Major Rebellion Puts President Pervez Musharafs Tribal Policies to the Test, Newsweek (international edition), January 16, 2006. 432 Asma Shakir Khwaja, The Changing Dynamics of Pakistans Relations with Central Asia, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, February 23, 2005, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/2824. 433 Ibid.

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Pakistan and Kazakhstan both belong to the Economic Cooperation Organizationwhich also includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistanbut this organization has not proven an effective framework for regional economic cooperation, as Aziz himself noted. In May 2004, Pakistan and Kazakhstan also signed, along with China and Kyrgyzstan, a Quadrilateral Agreement that aims to promote regional trade through Pakistans Karakoram Highway and onward road connections. Perhaps most useful has been the Joint Economic Commissions that Islamabad has established with each Central Asian government to enhance trade and other commercial ties.434 Besides transiting oil and gas through their territory, Pakistanis agreed in 2006 to purchase hydropower power from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for their own consumption.435 Turkey During the Cold War, political differences between Ankara and Moscow made it hard for Turks to take advantage of their considerable cultural, historical, ethnic, religious, and linguistic ties with Central Asians. After the Soviet Unions demise, some Turks believed these connections wouldalong with Turkeys proximity to Central Asia and the status Turkey enjoyed as a NATO memberenable Turkey to establish a leading presence in the post- Soviet republics. At times, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel and President Turgut Ozal spoke of establishing a commonwealth of Turkic peoples or an association of independent Turkic states. Americans and Europeans encouraged Turkish engagement and eagerly sought to market Turkey as a model for Central Asias newly independent states. In the early 1990s, Turkish officials provided substantial technical assistance to the region, and offered thousands of scholarships Central Asian students to study in Turkey. It soon became apparent, however, that Turkey lacked the resources to compete at the same level as Russia or China. In addition, Turks realized that Western governments, despite their declarations of support, were unwilling to provide substantial backing to help realize Turkeys ambitions in Central Asia. Finally, although Central Asian leaders would stress their affinity with the Turks whenever expedient, they did not especially welcome a major political role for Turkey in their region. As a result, cultural issues increasing dominated the agenda of the annual Turkic summits. Turkish governments refocused their political attention to managing their complex relations with the European Union, Washington, and Iraq.436 At present, the most important dimension of Turkeys ties with Kazakhstan and the other countries of Central Asia lies in the realm of energy and economics. Turkey currently imports most of its oil and gas from Russia. In addition to the long-standing deliveries of gas through a convoluted pipeline that traverses Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria, the two countries began using a new direct $3-billion Blue Stream natural gas pipeline on a limited basis in February 2003. It became fully operational in November 2005. Since January 2002, Turkey has also has imported natural gas from northern Iran through a much-delayed Tebriz-Ankara pipeline, but deliveries have been interrupted by disagreements over the quality and price of the gas.437 To diversify its sources of energy imports further, Turkish officials have been seeking to develop options to transship, and possibly purchase for domestic use, natural gas from Kazakhstan as well as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan especially by constructing additional pipelines that bypass Russia. Central Asian governments, hoping to reduce their own dependence on Russiancontrolled pipelines, have supported this endeavor. The slow-down in the Turkish economy in the early 2000s, which resulted in Turkey contracting for more imported natural gas than it needed, dampened Turkish interest temporarily in purchasing Kazakh gas for domestic consumption. The recent surge in world energy prices, however, has reinforced Turkish interest in serving as a natural energy bridge between the supplier countries to Turkeys east and international energy markets to Turkeys north, west, and south.438
434 Asma Shakir Khwaja, The Changing Dynamics of Pakistans Relations with Central Asia, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, February 23, 2005, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/2824. 435 Rizwan Zeb, Pakistans Bid for SCO Membership: Prospects and Pitfalls, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, July 26, 2006, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4085. 436 Daniel Pipes, The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet Muslim Republics Change the Middle East, in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 49-52, 71-73. 437 Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs: Iran (March 2005), at http://www. eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html. 438 Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs: Turkey (July 2005), at http://www. eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkey.html.

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Environmental considerations are another factor prompting the Turkish government to seek to import energy from Kazakhstan primarily via pipelines. For years, Turkish officials have expressed alarm about accidents resulting from the increasing oil and gas tanker traffic through the already congested Bosporus Straits, which connect the Black and Mediterranean Seas and flow along Istanbul, Turkeys largest city. For this reason, they have encouraged Central Asia exporters to make greater use of Turkeys southwestern port of Ceyhan, which already adjoins the Mediterranean. In June 2006, Kazakhstan agreed to transport from the Kashagan fields through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project (BTC). The BTC and other possible pipelines have the potential to relieve some of this pressure, as well as yield the Turkish treasury billions of dollars in transit revenue. Nevertheless, much Central Asian oil will continue to transship the Black Sea from the Russian port of Novorossiysk to world markets.439 Turkish small businesses and merchants have developed a substantial presence in Kazakhstan and other Central Asia countries, especially in such sectors as banking, construction, telecommunications, trade, textiles, and food processing.440 Turkish investment in Kazakhstan is about $1.1 billion, which involves almost 1,700 joint ventures.441 Both Turkish and Kazakh-Turkish construction firms have a major presence in Kazakhstan. They have been most visible in constructing the new international airport and parliament building in Astana and in developing Almatys Financial District. The Turkuaz group of 11 Turkish companies involved in Central Asia established its head office in Almaty in 1998. Of its 22 offices in Central Asia, 18 of them are in Kazakhstan. The Turkuaz Foundation provides financial and other support for social and cultural activities in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries.442 The Turkish government provides the Kazakh military with some defense equipment and training.443 In addition, the two governments cooperate on counterterrorism issues. The levels of these security interactions remain low, however, compared to Kazakhstans more extensive cooperation with NATO and Russia. Another factor limiting Turkeys influence in Kazakhstan is the longstanding practice of Turkish firms of hiring Kazakhs primarily as cheap laborers while employing Turkish migr nationals as managers and skilled laborers.444 Whatever the original logic of such a policy, Kazakhstans strengthening socioeconomic conditionswhich includes an improving educational system and growing commercial sophisticationmakes this approach both obsolete and counterproductive. Kazakh investment in Turkey amounts to some 350 million dollars.445 These projects range from holiday homes in southern Turkey to Kazakh purchases of securities through Turkish investment funds to the plans of KazMunaiGas to construct an oil refinery on Turkeys Black Sea coast. Turkish President Abdullah Gul has urged Kazakh businesses to help construct the Kars-Tbilisi-Ahalkalaki railroad since it could enhance Kazakhstans potential to ship goods to Europe and the Mediterranean region.446 The number of Kazakh tourists visiting Turkey has also been increasing, with over 100,000 tourists visiting Turkey in 2005.447 Turkey itself
439 For more details on these pipelines see two recent reports by the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy: Country Analysis Briefs: Caspian Sea (September 2005), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/Full.html, and Country Analysis Briefs: Turkey (July 2005), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkey.html. 440 Reuel R. Hanks, Central Asia: A Global Studies Handbook (Santa Barbara: ABCCLIO, 2005), pp. 195-196; Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 111-113; and Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia, in Asian Aftershocks: Strategic Asia 2002-03 (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002), pp. 244-245. 441 President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, In the Akorda Palace, President Nursultan Nazarbayev Meets with President of the Republic of Turkey Abdullah Gul Who Arrived in Kazakhstan on State Visit, December 13, 2007, http://www.akorda.kz/www/www_ akorda_kz.nsf/4db47a8e8f1a638d4625723300323d1c/4e04df8d83959c4d462573b00058de8b?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,turkey. 442 American Chamber of Commerce in Kazakhstan, Turkey, A Central Link In Eurasian Economic Integration, http://www. amcham.kz/article.php?article_id=578 443 Roger McDermott, Kazakhstans Parliament Ratifies Strategic Partnership with Azerbaijan, Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 5, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371246 444 President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, In the Akorda Palace, President Nursultan Nazarbayev Meets with President of the Republic of Turkey Abdullah Gul Who Arrived in Kazakhstan on State Visit, December 13, 2007, http://www.akorda.kz/www/www_ akorda_kz.nsf/4db47a8e8f1a638d4625723300323d1c/4e04df8d83959c4d462573b00058de8b?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,turkey. 445 Marat Yermukanov, Kazakhstan And Turkey Search For Common Ground, Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 04, 2005, http://www. jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=407&issue_id=3319&article_id=2369694. 446 Kazakhstan and Turkey Conducts Business Forum, RIA Oreanda, December 17, 2007. 447 Kazakhstan, Turkey to Boost Tourism Cooperation, Open New Flights, Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency, BBC Monitoring, April 28, 2006.

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contains many ethnic Kazakhs, some of whom came from Chinas Xinjiang province.448 Kazakh officials see Turkey as both a consumer of Kazakh energy exports as well as a potential transit country for Kazakh goods entering European and Mediterranean marketsa view that corresponds well with the vision of many American, European and Turkish analysts about Turkeys role as an emerging gateway between the Caspian region and Western markets. Three bilateral accords signed in the 1990s continue to define the framework for economic relations be tween Kazakhstan and Turkey: the 1994 Agreement on Encouraging and Protecting Bilateral Investment; the 1996 Agreement on Preventing Double Taxation; and the 1998 Agreement on Encouraging and Protecting Bilateral Investments. The two governments are seeking ways to strengthen their economic ties still further. Kazakh and Turkish officials and business leaders see the potential for much greater interaction given that only a little over 1% of Turkeys trade now goes to Kazakhstan, despite the extensive cultural, personal, and other ties between their nationals.449 In December 2007, Astana hosted a business forum that included representatives from over 100 Kazakh and 80 Turkish companies working in the fields of energy, telecommunica tions, transportation, construction, and other sectors.450 One mechanism Kazakh officials have sought to mobilize local support for regional economic processes independent of the great powers is by endorsing increased cooperation among Turkic-speaking nations. On November 17-18, 2006, the first summit of the leaders of Turkish-speaking countries in five years assembled in Turkeys Mediterranean resort city of Antalya. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan attended along with high-level representatives from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkey had regularly held such meetings in the 1990s, but the practice had fallen into abeyance by the end of the decade, when Ankaras gaze focused on Brussels. Turks increasing frustration with their halting efforts to join the EU, however, has been stimulating their interesting in reaffirming ties with the Turkish-speaking nations of Central Asia. At the summit, Nazarbayev called for creating a Turkic parliamentary assembly. He nominated former Turkish president and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel as its first chairman. Nazarbayev also endorsed the idea of creating a Turkic commonwealth in order to galvanize the regions 200 million Turks into pursuing enhanced regional cooperation.451 Central Asian States Afghanistan Kazakh leaders are very eager to help restore political and economic stability to Afghanistan, given that the countrys troubles have presented security threats and disrupted economic development throughout Kazakhstans extended neighborhood.452 As soon as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began, Kazakhstan sold 15,000 metric tons of wheat to the USAID. The UN World Food Program then distributed the wheat to Afghans as emergency food assistance.453 The Kazakh government also allowed coalition forces supporting Afghanistan through OEF to use Kazakhstans air space and permits NATO warplanes to enjoy emergency landing and refueling rights. Kazakh officials have subsequently offered to help develop oil fields in northern Afghanistan.454 Trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan in 2006 amounted to $179.40 million. The commerce remains imbalanced. Afghanistan exported only $891,000 worth of goods to Kazakhstan, while importing $178.51 million worth of Kazakh merchandise. In the first half of 2007, the trade turnover be tween the two countries totaled to $79.62 million, continuing the trend of the previous year in terms of share of import and export of each country. Kazakhstan exported $79.31 million worth of goods and imported only
448 Ozgecan, Kazakh Refugees in Turkey50th Anniversary, October 4, 2006, http://kazakhstan.neweurasia.net/2006/10/04/ kazakh-refugees-in-turkey-50thanniversary. 449 Marat Yermukanov, Kazakhstan and Turkey Spearhead Integration of Turkic Nations, Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 07, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=414&issue_id=3947&article_id=2371713 450 Kazakhstan and Turkey Conducts Business Forum, RIA Oreanda, December 17,2007. 451 Mevlut Katik, Spirit of Cooperation Dominates Turkic Summit, Eurasia Insight, November 20, 2006, http://www.eurasianet. org/departments/insight/articles/eav112006.shtml. 452 Yerzhan Kh. Kazykhanov, On Kazakhstan, American Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 28, no.3 (July 2006), p. 189. 453 Alima Bissenova, Nazarbayev, Seeking Oil Favor, Positions Himself as Central Asian Reformer, Eurasia Insight, January 4, 2002, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav010402a.shtml. 454 Julie A. Corwin, Central/South Asia: Forum Examines Regional Trade Prospects, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 5, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/F7BC6B94-E54B-447F-8729-35089CB109A3.html.

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$550,000.455 In 2007, the two countries formed a joint intergovernmental commission to promote bilateral trade and economic cooperation. One of its tasks will be to make the trade more balanced as well as increase its aggregate volume. A current Kazakh security priority regarding Afghanistan is to dampen the export of narcotics from that country. General Amangeldy Shabdarbayev, Chairman of Kazakhstans National Security Committee, has warned that the wave of illicit drug trafficking sweeping through Central Asiaalong the northern route extending from Afghanistan to Russia and Europethreatens Kazakhstans economic prosperity.456 Kazakh officials have undertaken a vigorous domestic counternarcotics campaign as part of the governments Astana without Drugs program, but Shabdarbayev and other Kazakh officials have called for a multinational effort to revitalize the Afghan economy and provide alternative means of livelihood to the narcotics industry. In March 2007, for instance, Berik Imashev, the head of Kazakhstans National Security Council, urged the international community to work out concrete economic programs aimed at providing large-scale financial and economic aid to Afghanistan in order to de-narcotize its economy and stimulate conditions for exporting legal products from that country. Imashev said Kazakhstan was eager to contribute to such an endeavor, which he argued should involve both Afghanistans neighbors and other countries.457 Given that Eurasian narcotics trafficking is one of the regions most integrated transnational industries, the Kazakh government has stressed the need to improve integration of regional counternarcotics efforts, which presently involve a plethora of overlapping and poorly resourced national and multinational programs. Kazakh officials share the belief of Afghan officials and other experts that Afghanistans long-term eco nomic viability depends on the development of improved transportation, communication, and other networks that would better integrate their country into regional economic processes. The Kazakh Foreign Ministry warns that, Peace and security in the entire Central Asian region depend on stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, but adds that Kazakhstans support for regional integration will help solve the problems associated with Afghanistans transformation into a peaceful and constructive country.458 Afghanistan is wellsituated to benefit from increased commerce between Europe and Asia, but only if rail, road, and pipeline construction extends throughout their territory. As future chair of the OSCE, Kazakhstan likely will play a role in helping shape the OSCEs new initiative, launched at the 2007 Madrid summit, to help curb the trafficking of narcotics, weapons, and people across the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. For instance, the Ministerial Council decided to expand an OSCE project, which began earlier in November, to train anti-drug police in Afghanistan by allowing counternarcotics officers from Afghanistans Central Asia neighbors to participate. The OSCEs current Chairman-in-Office, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos, told a press conference at the end of the session that, With this new contribution, this new involvement of the Organization in Afghanistan we hope to bolster our security and we acknowledge the link between OSCE countries and the problems and challenges which exist in Afghanistan.459 Last year, Foreign Minister Tazhin indicated it would be quite useful to combine the efforts of the CICA, the CSTO, and especially the SCO with those of the OSCE to solve the acute problems of Eurasia including [the] one of Afghanistan.460 Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have established deep economic ties. Bilateral commerce amounts to some $400 million annually. Kazakhs provide the main source of foreign capital in Kyrgyzstan, with over $300
455 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Islamskoy Respublikoy Afghanistan, November 29, 2006, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/asia_africa/21. 456 Interview with Kazakhstan Today, March 2, 2007, cited in Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Kazakh Security Chief Says Drug Emergency Growing, International Cooperation Is Key to Defeating Scourge, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, March 11, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/031407.html. 457 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Kazakhstan Urges Financial, Economic Aid to Afghanistan, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, March 21, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/032107.html. 458 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan i Voprosy globalnoi i regionalnoy bezonasnocti uregulirovanie situatsii v Afganistane, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/security/afganistan. 459 Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE Ministers Agree Chairmanship Bids, Greater Engagement in Afghanistan, November 30, 3007, http://www.osce.org/item/28621.html. 460 Marat Tazhin, Kazakhstan in a Changing World, speech at U.S.-Kazakhstan Business Association dinner, Washington, D.C., May 8, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/050907.html.

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million invested in various projects.461 Kazakh entrepreneurs have established hundreds of joint ventures in Kyrgyzstan in such sectors as banking, construction, and energy.462 According to one estimate, Kazakh investors hold one third of the total equity of Kyrgyzstan banks.463 Kyrgyzstan imports about one-fifth of its wheat from Kazakhstan.464 In recent years, Kazakhstans booming economy has led more Kyrgyz labor migrants to seek work in neighboring Kazakhstan than in more distant Russia. An estimated 200,000 Kyrgyz migrants work in Kazakhstan.465 During his April 25-26, 2007 visit to Kyrgyzstan, Nazarbayev indicated intent in principle to in crease Kazakhstans support substantially for Kyrgyzstans economic development. He told his hosts that, under the right conditions, Kazakhs were ready to invest billions of dollars in Kyrgyzstans economy.466 For example, Nazarbayev offered to support Kyrgyzstans hydropower sector by helping finance its 1,900 MW Kambarata-1 and 240 MW Kambarata-2 power plants, despite the fact that Kazakhstans own plants can generate electricity at cheaper prices than Kyrgyzstan. 467 Kazakh economists worry that their country lacks adequate generating capacity to meet the countrys surging domestic demand for electricity. Investing in Kyrgyzstans hydropower facilitiesincluding the two Kambarata plans, whose combined projection costs could exceed $2 billionwould benefit Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, who share water and electricity. 468 Recognizing that the investment could take some time to materialize, Nazarbayev pledged $100 million in emergency humanitarian aid as well as wheat and fuel supplies. 469 Yet, Nazarbayev bluntly warned that political instability and widespread corruption were discouraging Kazakh businessmen from investing in Kyrgyzstan, a view shared by the Asian Development Bank and other international financial experts.470 We propose Kazakhstans experience of development and modernization, which only comes in conditions of stability. Investment does not come to an unstable country, Nazarbayev explained.471 In an interview on Khabar and Kyrgyz state TV, Nazarbayev told listeners that all Kyrgyz political factions must peacefully negotiate a political compromise to their disputes and use their power to establish order in the country in a democratic and lawful way. Otherwise, Kyrgyzstan will be left with the alternative of being the same as Afghanistan was in its time: disturbances, anarchy . . . Kyrgyzstan will turn into an enclave of instability. . . .Does anybody really want this? I would rather not wish this on the Kyrgyz people.472 Another impediment has been cultural sensitivities, specifically Kyrgyz fears and resentment that their country could become a dependency of neighboring Kazakhstan.473 Tensions have arisen in the way Kazakh authorities have deported Kyrgyz migrant laborers caught working illegally in Kazakhstan. In addition, popular protests have occurred after the Kyrgyz government ceded contested territories claimed by Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan. Even so, some influential Kyrgyz politicians are prepared to sacrifice some autonomy for the
461 Joanna Lillis, Nazarbayev Flexes Diplomatic Muscle During Visit to Kyrgyzstan, Eurasia Insight, May 1, 2007, http://www. eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050107.shtml. 462 Embassy of Kazakhstan to USA and Canada, Nazarbayev Visits Bishkek, Pledges Economic Investment, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, April 26, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/042607.html. 463 Meri Bekeshova, Central Asia: A Kyrgyz-Kazakh Step Towards Regional Union, IPS, May 24, 2007, http://www.ipsnews.net/ news.asp?idnews=37887. 464 Bruce Pannier, Central Asia: Kyrgyz President Returns from Astana with Wheat-Export Deal, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 18, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/04/a6fc862a-649e-4cc3-acf4-57dc77effa9c.html. 465 Erica Marat, Nazarbayev Promises Economic Assistance, Urges Political Stability in Kyrgyzstan, Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 3, 2007, http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=420&issue_id=4094&article_id=2372141. 466 Joanna Lillis, Nazarbayev Flexes Diplomatic Muscle During Visit to Kyrgyzstan, Eurasia Insight, May 1, 2007, http://www. eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050107.shtml. 467 Erica Marat, Nazarbayev Promises Economic Assistance, Urges Political Stability in Kyrgyzstan, Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 3, 2007, http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=420&issue_id=4094&article_id=2372141. 468 Joanna Lillis, Central Asia: Water Woes Stoke Economic Worries, Eurasia Insight, April 28, 2009, http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/insight/articles/eav042808.shtml. 469 Lillis, Nazarbayev Flexes Diplomatic Muscle. 470 Some Western analysts have cited concerns about corruption and instability in Kazakhstans legal structure (rather than political instability) as a factor impeding foreign investment in Kazakhstan; see for example Maureen S. Crandall, Energy, Economics, and Politics in the Caspian Region: Dreams and Realities, (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 85-92. 471 Lillis, Nazarbayev Flexes Diplomatic Muscle. 472 Ibid. 473 Marat, Nazarbayev Promises Economic Assistance.

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economic benefits of moving closer to Kazakhstanconfident that China and Russia will retain sufficient influence to avert any serious risk of their countrys becoming overly dependent on their Kazakh neighbors.474 Kyrgyz leaders are particularly eager to use their ties with Kazakhstan to become more deeply involved in regional oil and gas projects. When President Kurmanbek Bakiyev traveled to Kazakhstan in April 2008, he lobbied Kazakh officials to help finance gas pipelines that would traverse Kyrgyz territory.475 Kazakh officials also pledged to provide Kyrgyzstans underused refineries with over 300,000 tons of oil annually to help them meet domestic demand.476 One way Kazakhstans influence over Kyrgyzstan has manifested itself has been support Kyrgyz leaders have given to Kazakh proposals for increased regional integration. In April 2007, Nazarbayev and Bakiyev signed an agreement to create a bilateral International Supreme Council. Kazakh officials characterized the agreement as a step towards realizing Nazarbayevs goal of creating a wider Central Asian Union. Furthermore, the two presidents issued a joint statement pledging increased bilateral political and economic cooperation in such areas as countering terrorism, illegal migration, narcotrafficking, organized crime, and other threats to either countrys independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.477 In April 2008, Bakiyev committed to attend a conference the following year in Kazakhstan that would create a Central Asian union that, among other functions, would attempt to resolve disputes among Central Asian countries over how to distribute the regions energy and water resources.478 Mongolia Kazakhstan and Mongolia established diplomatic relations in 1992. During Nazarbayevs visit to Ulaanbaatar the following year, the two governments signed basic documents establishing a basic legal and diplomatic framework for their bilateral economic relationship.479 Since then, Kazakhstan and Mongolia have been striving to increase economic ties, which declined sharply in the mid-1990s due to the post-Soviet economic implosion in both countries. Trade has been increasing, but remains heavily skewed in favor of Kazakh exports to Mongolia. These include grain, petrochemicals, tobacco, and pipes, while Kazakhstan imports mostly meat, wool, and pear spar.480 In 2006, the sales turnover between the two countries amounted to $67.4 million.481 Economic ties are stronger between nearby regions. In particular, increasing trade between the East Kazakhstan Province and the western aymags of Mongolia has been a mutual priority.482 Besides a mutual desire to increase bilateral trade, the two governments have sought to increase the flow of Kazakh capital into Mongolia. Kazakhstans political and business leaders have shown most interest in contributing to the development of Mongolias mining industries. Mongolian leaders are eager to secure Kazakh contributions to developing their countrys housing, construction, and other basic economic infrastructure.483 To encourage Kazakh investments in Mongolia, the two governments have signed agreements that, for example, provide legal protections for Kazakh investment within Mongolia as well as exempt it from double taxation.484 When Mongolian President Nambaryn Enkhbayar visited Kazakhstan from August 13-15, 2007, he participated in a business forum in Astana that sought to promote commercial cooperation in such areas as agriculture, construction, and mining. Representatives from Mongolias twenty largest businesses showcased investment projects at the event.485
474 Meri Bekeshova, Central Asia: A Kyrgyz-Kazakh Step Towards Regional Union, IPS, May 24, 2007, http://www.ipsnews.net/ news.asp?idnews=37887. 475 Bruce Pannier, Central Asia: Kyrgyz President Returns from Astana with Wheat-Export Deal, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 18, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/04/a6fc862a-649e-4cc3-acf4-57dc77effa9c.html. 476 Kazakhstan Will Keep Kyrgyz Refineries Running, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 18, 2008, http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.ph p?id=2365&PHPSESSID=be1b21f9220577cc82faa. 477 Lillis, Nazarbayev Flexes Diplomatic Muscle. 478 Pannier, Central Asia: Kyrgyz President Returns from Astana. 479 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Mongoliey, May 30, 2008, http://portal. mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/asia_africa/10. 480 Mongolian President Travels to Kazakhstan on August 13-15, Kazakhstan General Newswire, August 9, 2007, BBC Monitoring. 481 Presidents of Kazakhstan and Mongolia Discussed Cooperation, Kazakhstan General Newswire, August 14, 2007, BBC Monitoring. 482 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstans Mongoliey, May 30, 2008, http://portal. mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/asia_africa/10. 483 Kazakhstan, Mongolia Agree on Investment Projects, Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency, August 14, 2007, BBC Monitoring. 484 Mongolia to Enhance Economic Cooperation with Kazakhtsan, Xinhua, November 13, 2006. 485 Mongolian President Travels to Kazakhstan on August 13-15, Kakzakhstan General Newswire, August 9, 2007, BBC Monitoring.

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Another area of economic focus has been on improving the transportation networks connecting the two countries. Direct air flights do occur twice a week between East Kazakhstan and Mongolia.486 Both sides agree on the desirability of expanding rail and road traffic between the two countries, but this process re quires cooperating with the Russian Federation since Kazakhstan and Mongolia do not border each other. For example, driving Mongolian livestock on foot to Kazakhstan requires passage through the territory of Russias Altay Republic. Representatives of Altay, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan are considering creating joint enterprises and other economic mechanisms to enhance trilateral cooperation.487 The presence of large numbers of ethnic Kazakhs in Mongolia also shapes bilateral relations between the two countries. During the 1930s, over a million ethnic Kazakhs sought to flee Soviet-era collectivization, which resulted in mass starvation among the traditionally nomadic Kazakh people, by migrating to other countries. An estimated 100,000 Kazakhs took refuge in Mongolia. Due to the weaker performance of the Mongolian economy as compared with that of Kazakhstan, many ethnic Kazakhs in Mongolia have experienced economic hardships. Kazakh officials have sought to ensure that these individuals have all opportunities to preserve their ethnic identity, national language, culture and tradition.488 The Astana government has provided Mongolias Kazakhs with literary works in the Kazakh language, including school textbooks, and supported various cultural exchange programs. Tens of thousands of ethnic Kazakhs have moved from Mongolia to Kazakhstan, which has required Kazakh authorities to sponsor various educational, occupational retaining, and other assimilation programs. Although Mongolia is not a member of the CIS, CSTO, or OSCE, it does have observer status within the SCO, which allows for some institutional interaction with Kazakhstan. In addition, Mongolia and Kazakhstan also cooperate on security issues. Mongolia participates in the Kazakh-led CICA process, supports the Central Asian Nuclear-Free-Zone, and has signed an agreement with Kazakhstan on averting and managing the consequences of natural and man-made disasters.489 Representatives of the two countries also interact in the United Nations and other large multinational organizations. Academic exchange programs allow students and scholars from Kazakhstan and Mongolia to enroll in each others educational institutions. Tajikistan On January 13, 1993, the governments of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement defining the fundamental principles that govern their bilateral relations.490 Until recently, however, interactions between Kazakhstan and Tajikistan remained marginal. From 1992-1996, Tajikistan was engulfed in a vicious civil war. Even after the 1997 peace accords, when Kazakhstan and other CIS members authorized the deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force in the region, the attention of the countrys political and business elite remained focused inward.491 During the early 2000s, Tajik leaders became preoccupied with managing relations with Afghanistan, Iran, and Russia. It has only been in the last few years that bilateral relations with Kazakhstan have developed robustly. For example, bilateral trade turnover increased by 183.5% between January-March 2005 and January-March 2006, making Kazakhstan Tajikistans third-largest trade partner after Russia and Uzbekistan among other CIS countries.492 Kazakh-Tajik trade grew by a still respectable 57% between January-July 2007 over the same period of the previous year.493 The trade is very imbalanced in Kazakhstans favor. In 2007, Tajikistan imported $278.5 million worth of Kazakh goods, while exporting only $27 million worth directly to Kazakh486 Kazakhstan, Mongolia to Negotiate Road Building Project with RF, August 14, 2007, BBC Monitoring. 487 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Mongoliey, May 30, 2008, http://portal. mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/asia_africa/10. 488 Presidents of Kazakhstan and Mongolia Discussed Cooperation, Kazakhstan General Newswire, August 14, 2007, BBC Monitoring. 489 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Mongoliey, May 30, 2008, http://portal. mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/asia_africa/10. 490 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstans Respublikoy Tadzhikistan, February 22, 2008, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/CIS/04. 491 Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests. 3rd ed. (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 197-198. 492 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Respublikoy Tadzhikistan, February 22, 2008, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/CIS/04. 493 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Kazakhstan: Nazarbaevs Regional Tour Shows Growing Economic Influence, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, September 14, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/09/5ae4b7b0-0cbc-4d60-8078-004574570ae1.html.

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stan. Tajikistans imports from Kazakhstan include 90% of its wheat and flour and 40% of combustivelubricating materials.494 When President Nazarbayev visited Tajikistan in September 2007, he offered to help establish a special bilateral investment fund of $100 million. The Kazakh side will contribute its significant part. The fund will work for the benefit of the Tajik economy.495 Besides pledging to provide 80% of the money for the joint fund, Nazarbayev offered to export grain to Tajikistan and help finance the construction of the Nurobod hydroelectric plant in the north of the country.496 Some Kazakh investors are also interested in investing in the Tajikistans Nurobod power plant, scheduled for commissioning in March 2009.497 The existing Nurek hydroelectric power plant, Tajikistans main energy source, has experienced debilitating water shortages recently. The growing demand for electricity in Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia has led the Eurasian Development Bank, a Russo-Kazakh venture, to explore providing financial support for the construction of Tajikistans Rogun hydroelectric power station.498 Kazakhstan has also emerged recently as a leading provider of assistance to Tajikistan. For example, Astana made important contributions to international humanitarian relief efforts to help Tajikistan survive this winters unusually cold weather. In February 2008, the Kazakh government offered 1,000 tons of fuel oil, food supplies, and other emergency assistance worth approximately $3 million.499 In a gesture of appreciation, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon said that Tajiks regard Kazakhstan as a model. 500 Kazakh banks (e.g., Kazkommerzbank and BankTuranAlem) already have a strong presence in Tajiki stans financial sector. 501 Turkmenistan Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed a delimitation and demarcation agreement for their 379-km border on July 5, 2001.502 Under Saparmurat Niyazov (a.k.a. Turkmenbashi, the father of all Turkmen), Turkmenistans first president as an independent state, the country pursued an isolationist policy that limited contact with Kazakhstan and other countries. Although Niyazov and Nazarbayev met frequently, a recurring source of Kazakh- Turkmen tension was Niyazovs opposition to regional integration processes, which Nazarbayev normally championed. Niyazov followed a doctrine of positive neutrality regarding Central Asias Russiandominated international institutions such as the CIS, the CSTO, and the SCO. Since Niyazov died unexpectedly on December 21, 2006, Nazarbayev and other Kazakh leaders have vigorously sought to engage Turkmenistans new president, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov. At a minimum, they want to assess his plans for his country, especially its foreign policies. Ideally, they would like to pursue opportunities for mutually beneficial ties shunned by his predecessor. When Nazarbayev and Berdymukhame dov met at the end of May 2007, much of their attention focused on improving transportation links between their two countries. The meeting marked the renewal, on May 26, of direct air links between Ashgabat and Almaty. Nazarbayev and Berdymukhamedov discussed whether also to open direct bus connections between Aktau and Turkmenbashi.503 In any case, the two leaders committed to establishing a new road connecting Zhetybai in Kazakhstan with Turkmenbashi City, some 237 kilometers distant. The two governments envisage this road as constituting an element of the transnational ground corridor that will connect Astrakhan in
494 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Respublikoy Tadzhikistan, February 22, 2008, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/CIS/04. 495 Bruce Pannier, Central Asia: Is The Region Entering a New Era of Cooperation? Eurasia Insight, September 20, 2007, http:// www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/09/8E31E2AA-C311-4216-925E-424DEB998442.html. 496 Saidazimova, Kazakhstan: Nazarbaevs Regional Tour. 497 Joanna Lillis, Central Asia: Water Woes Stoke Economic Worries, Eurasia Insight, April 28, 2009, http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/insight/articles/eav042808.shtml. 498 Ibid. 499 Chronicle of the Month: February 19, 2008, Asia-Plus, March 3, 2008, http://www.asiaplus.tj/en/news/61/28802.html. 500 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Kazakhstan Considers Tajikistan Important Partner in Central Asia, Kazakhstans News Bulletin, September 19, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/NB8-190907.html. 501 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Respublikoy Tadzhikistan, February 22, 2008, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/CIS/04. 502 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Turkmenistanom, February 22, 2008, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/CIS/03. 503 Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Underlined a Significant Potential in Bilateral Cooperation in Transport and Transit Spheres, Kazakhstan Today, May 29, 2007, http://eng.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=91732.

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Russia to Turkmenistan. They also agreed to reestablish a direct railway link that would enable commodities from Turkmenistan to proceed through Kazakhstan and Russia to European markets.504 When they met again in September 2007, Berdymukhamedov told Nazarbayev that, One of the priority aspects of our cooperation is the further intensification of bilateral trade and economic relations. He added that the two countries have great potential in the realization of large-scale projects in the field of trade, energy, transportation, and telecommunications.505 Nazarbayev and Berdymukhamedov also discussed constructing a railroad that would connect Kazakhstan to Iran via Turkmen territory.506 Bilateral trade was already growing robustly under Niyazov: in 2007, it increased by almost 44% as compared to 2006, amounting to $220.6 million.507 Berdymukhamedov has already demonstrated a more open attitude toward dealing with the SCO. Along with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, he was a guest of honor at the August 2007 SCO summit in Bishkek. The other SCO members are eager to cooperate with Turkmenistan in the energy sector even if its government refrains from formally joining their organization. In the joint communiqu issued at the end of the Bishkek summit, the heads of the SCO member governments maintained that they would develop their energy coordination according to the principle of openness for all interested states and organizations that share the goals and tasks of the SCO.508 Cooperation with Turkmenistan would go far toward realizing Nazarbayevs ambitions to convert the SCO into an influential energy body. If Turkmenistan were to formally join the SCO, or merely coordinate its energy policies with its full members (China, Russia, and the other Central Asian countries) and formal observers (which include gas-rich Iran), the organizations weight in world energy affairs could increase dramatically. Until now, the legacy of the USSRs integrated pipeline system has compelled Turkmenistan to rely on Soviet-era energy pipelines to reach world markets. The countrys dependence on transit routes through Russia allowed Gazprom to buy Turkmen gas for lower than market prices$65 per 1,000 cubic meters before August 2006; $100 per 1,000 cubic meters since then and then resell it at much higher prices (recently around $250 per 1,000 cubic meters) to European customers.509 While reaffirming a commitment to uphold long-term contractual obligations, which require Turkmenistan to continue shipping more than 50 billion cubic meters annually to Russia, the Berdymukhamedov administration has been exploring additional export routes, including eastward into China and southward toward Pakistan. In addition, the governments of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are eager to diversify their energy export routes westward to supplement their deliveries through Russia, Iran, and to China. An obvious means to do so is shipping oil and gas to European markets via pipelines through the sectors of the Caspian seabed closest to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Since the distance between their shores is the shortest route across the Caspian Sea, one or more Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan pipelines would present the most economically suitable route for exporting Turkmenistans oil and natural gas to Europe via the South Caucasus. The recent improvement in relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan could help remove one major obstacle to the exploitation of Caspian Sea energy reserves. When Berdymukhamedov arrived in Baku on May 18, he became the first Turkmen president in over a decade to visit Azerbaijan. The two countries broke off relations in 1999 over an Azerbaijani decision to develop an oil and natural gas field that the Turkmenistan government also claimed.510 During his recent visit, Berdymukhamedov stated that the two governments had
504 Kazakhstan/Turkmenistan: Resource-Rich Central Asian Duo Seeks Cooperation, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 29, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/05/37aaf34c-7953-4d98-bf89-9042ef739cb5.html. 505 Bruce Pannier, Central Asia: Is the Region Entering a New Era of Cooperation? Eurasia Insight, September 20, 2007, http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112006.shtml. 506 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Kazakhstan: Nazarbaevs Regional Tour Shows Growing Economic Influence, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, September 14, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/09/5ae4b7b0-0cbc-4d60-8078-004574570ae1.html. 507 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Turkmenistanom, February 22, 2008, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/CIS/03. 508 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Joint Communiqu of Meeting of Council of Heads of SCO Member States, August 16, 2007, http://www.sectsco.org/html/01721.html. 509 Ilan Greenberg, Russia to Get Central Asian Pipeline, New York Times, May 13, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/ world/europe/13putin.html. 510 Turkmen-Azeri Thaw Could Create New Caspian Axis, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, http://www.iwpr. net/?p=btm&s=b&o=344827&apc_state=henh.

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agreed in principle on the need to resolve their longstanding differences regarding the Caspian Seas legal status. He observed that a resolution to the dispute would create favorable conditions for exploiting its offshore oil and gas resources.511 Berdymukhamedov also underscored the strategic importance of the two countries in world energy markets. Not only do they possess important oil and gas reserves within their territories, but they are situated at both ends of the Caspian Sea, allowing them to function as potential gateways for Caspian energy exports to international oil and gas markets: The advantageous geopolitical location of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, located at the intersection of Europe and Asia, offers the opportunity to use this fortunate location for the good of neighboring countries and for the interests of the two countries--and also for other countries in the West and in the East.512 Although much uncertainty persists regarding the extent of Turkmenistans natural gas reserves, which industry experts estimate at almost 3 trillion cubic meters but which may not prove adequate to meet all Turkmenistans commitments to international purchasers, representatives of foreign governments and energy companies have flocked to the country during the last year. In October 2007, Nazarbayev, Berdymukhamedov and Putin agreed in principle to build a pipeline that would carry billions of cubic feet of Turkmenistans natural gas through Kazakhstan along the Caspian shore. The gas would enter Russias network of gas pipelines and, unless used for Russian domestic consumption, would then be transshipped to European customers.513 Nazarbayev later made clear that he envisaged the gas deal as part of a larger arrangement to establish Kazakhstans role as a leading transit nation for Eurasian commerce: Kazakhstan is already building a modern structure in the Caspian zone that will become the central element in the establishment of an international Caspian energy and transport corridor from north to south, which follows up the agreement reached by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to build a gas pipeline.514 The parties confirmed the agreement on December 20, 2007, though they are still negotiating the details.515 Uzbekistan Kazakh leaders see establishing good ties with neighboring Uzbekistan as essential for advancing their regional integration agenda. In March 2006, Nazarbayev observed, The geopolitical situation in our region and the future of integration processes among our neighbors depends on Kazakh-Uzbek relations.516 Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the two most influential of the stans, having the largest land mass and population in Central Asia. Uzbekistan is also Kazakhstans major trade partner within Central Asia. Since both countries became independent in 1991, their governments have signed approximately one hundred bilateral agreements.517 The most important of these documents include the Program of the Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for 2006-2010 and the Strategy of the Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for 2007-2016. Yet, relations between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have long been strained. Many of their bilateral agreements have been implemented partly, if at all. The two countries, along with their presidents, have become perennial competitors for regional primacy. Uzbekistan has the largest population (some 27 million compared with Kazakhstans 15.4 million), but Kazakhstan has the richest natural resources (especially oil) and most successful economy (measured in terms of comparative growth rates and levels of foreign investment). In addition, Uzbek President Islam Karimov has pursued confrontational policies with Kazakhstan and other neighboring states, often berating them for failing to oppose regional terrorist movements sufficiently. Uzbek authorities have unilaterally mined their borders, leading to the deaths of dozens of pedestrians an511 Ibid. 512 Bruce Pannier, Caspian: Azerbaijani-Turkmen Summit Marks Potentially Lucrative Thaw in Relations, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, May 21, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/05/39c3e275-82e7-4750-ba2e-6769b6adffe5.html. 513 Russia to Get Central Asian Pipeline, New York Times, May 13, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/world/ europe/13putin.html. 514 Central Asia: Kazakh, Russian Leaders Discuss Transport Corridor, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 5, 2007, http:// www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/4482ab28-5ab9-4756-8386-48471d684d3f.html. 515 Associated Press, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan sign Caspian gas pipeline deal, International Herald Tribune, December 20, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/20/news/Russia-Caspian-Pipeline.php. 516 Mevlut Katik, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Strive for Closer Cooperation, Eurasia Insight, March 27, 2006, http://www.eurasianet. org/departments/insight/articles/eav032706a.shtml. 517 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Uzbekistan/Kazakhstan: Summit Is a Sign of Changing Times, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 18, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/03/7234E505-1452-4508-9315-BCADE393B371.html.

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nually in border regions. The Uzbek government has also periodically sealed border crossings, interrupting regional commerce and leading to shooting of Kazakh (and other) citizens seeking to visit relatives in neighboring Uzbek communities. Although some of these closures have aimed to disrupt international smuggling networks, Uzbek security bodies fear that terrorists and other regime opponents would exploit loosened border controls to infiltrate fighters and weapons into the country.518 Furthermore, some Uzbek nationalists have asserted claims to territories in southern Kazakhstan that once belonged to medieval Uzbek Khanates.519 In 2000, Uzbek border guards unilaterally moved border markers deep into Kazakhstans territory.520 Kazakhstans contentious and difficult border demarcations with Uzbekistan were finalized only in August 2002.521 Even so, in September 2003, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry issued a statement claiming that its border service had detected 1,127 border violations by the Uzbek side since the previous November.522 Kazakhstan has become Uzbekistans major trading partner, accounting for 8.4% of its foreign trade.523 According to Uzbek sources, trade between the two countries reached $1.193 billion in 2007, a 63.3% surge over 2006, but still below the level desired by the two countries.524 (Kazakh sources cite a higher figure of $1.4 billion.525) Furthermore, Kazakh and Uzbek investors have established a number of joint business ventures. At present, 167 firms in Uzbekistan are financed in part though Kazakh capital, whereas 94 joint ventures in Kazakhstan involve Uzbek partners.526 (Kazakh sources again cite a much higher number of 715 small and medium scale enterprises operating in Kazakhstan with some Uzbek investment.527) These joint ventures operate in such commercial sectors as food, pharmaceutics, construction, chemicals, and manufacturing.528 In Uzbekistan, Kazakh capital is currently concentrated in the cotton fiber, construction, and chemical industries.529 The southern regions of Kazakhstan traditionally rely on Uzbek natural gas, especially in winter, both for heating and for electricity generation. Under the terms of a recent deal, the Uzbek state energy company Uzbekneft has agreed to supply 5 billion cubic meters of natural gas to southern Kazakhstan in 2008.530 The two countries are engaged in various multinational projects that would increase the flow of gas from and through their territories to Russia, China, and other countries.531 Kazakh firms already use Uzbekistans territory as a transshipment route for some non-energy exports. Nonetheless, the similar economic profile of both countries, along with their excessive customs duties and border controls, unduly constrain their bilateral commerce. Kazakh business managers complain about an unwelcoming investment climate in Uzbekistan, especially compared with the opportunities offered
518 Ibragim Alibekov, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Clash over Border Policy, Eurasia Insight, September 29, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092903a.shtml. 519 Tom Bissell, Chasing the Sea: Lost Among the Ghosts of Empire in Central Asia (Westminister, Maryland: Knopf Publishing, 2003), p. 145. 520 Rafis Abazov, Kazakhstans Security Challenges in a Changing World, in Michael Intriligator, Alexander Nikitin, and Majid Tehranian, eds., Eurasia: A New Peace Agenda (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), pp. 229-231. 521 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Aktualnye Voprosy Vneshney Politiki Kazakhstana: Delimitatsiya i Demarkastsiya Gosudarstvennoy Granitsy, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/issues/delimitation. 522 Ibragim Alibekov, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Clash over Border Policy, Eurasia Insight, September 29, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092903a.shtml. 523 Erkin Akhmadov, Uzbekistan: Central Asian Union Destined to Remain on Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, April 30, 2008, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4850. 524 Press Service of the President of Uzbekistan, Presidents Official Visit to KazakhstanFruitful and Effective, April 23, 2008, http://www.pressservice.uz/en/mcontent.scm?sectionId=4489&contentId=15865. 525 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Respublikoy Uzbekistan, February 22, 2008, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/CIS/02. 526 Press Service of the President of Uzbekistan, Presidents Official Visit to KazakhstanFruitful and Effective, April 23, 2008, http://www.pressservice.uz/en/mcontent.scm?sectionId=4489&contentId=15865. 527 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo RespublikiKazakhstan s Respublikoy Uzbekistan, February 22, 2008, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/CIS/02. 528 Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan May be Crucial for Central Asian Stability, April 23, 2008, http://news.uzreport.com/aziya. cgi?lan=e&id=45228. 529 Erkin Akhmadov, Uzbekistan: Central Asian Union Destined to Remain on Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, April 30, 2008, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4850. 530 Kazakhstan Gears Up for Electricity Shortages, Reuters, April 22, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssEnergyNews/ idUSL2251073820080422. 531 Gulnur Rakhmatullina, Visit of President of Uzbekistan Islom Karimov to Kazakhstan, May 6, 2008, http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=en&nic=expert&pid=1548&qmonth=0&qyear=0.

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Kazakh capital in other Eurasian countries. Unlike Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia, where Kazakhstan's economic presence has been expanding, the Uzbek government is closed to its neighbor," says one Kazakh entrepreneur who has chosen to make his fortune in Bishkek rather than Tashkent.532 Another complication is the large number of illegal immigrants from Uzbekistan that work in Kazakhstan, especially at urban construction sites and in the cotton fields of southern Kazakhstan.533 The two countries have also found it difficult to manage the Aral Sea, which borders both countries. Inefficient use of the Syrdarya and Amudarya rivers for fertilizing cotton production has led to a disturbing shrinkage in the seas surface area, increasing harmful atmospheric dust. Nazarbayev has called for establishing a water energy consortium among Central Asian countries to help manage such problems.534 On the other hand, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan do share interests regarding the issue of regional water management. The two countries use Central Asian water supplies primarily to irrigate crops as well as for direct consumption. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan seek to convert the regions water resources into electricity, some of which they can sell to neighboring countries.535 The interests of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan seem to overlap most on issues of national security, especially countering threats from Muslim extremists. On April 23, 2008, Nazarbayev affirmed the commitment of both countries to combine efforts in the fight against extremism and drug trafficking from Afghanistan.536 During Nazarbayevs March 2006 state visit to Uzbekistan, he told his Uzbek hosts that they defended the peace ... not only of Uzbeks, but also Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Tajiks by confronting trained extremist groups in Andijon the previous May.537 A few hours after Karimov concluded his most recent visit to Kazakhstan, moreover, the Kazakh authorities arrested an asylum seeker whom the Uzbek government had accused of participating in the Andijan events.538 Even so, Kazakhstan has not always followed Uzbekistans lead on these issues. In March 2006, Kazakh authorities allowed one of Karimovs fiercest domestic opponents, dissident Imam Obidkhon Qori Nazarov, to leave Kazakhstan for asylum in Europe a few days before Nazarbayev visited Uzbekistan rather than accede to Uzbek extradition requests.539 During Nazarbayevs March 2006 visit, Kazakh and Uzbek officials signed cooperative agreements in a variety of sectors. They also agreed to establish a bilateral commission to regularize and improve economic, political, and security contacts. Nazarbayev told a March 2006 news conference that the commission is to become a regular body for promptly solving all topical issues. He also called for expanding military and technical cooperation since our special services and special agencies should work in an environment of complete trust to fight terrorism and drug trafficking and other actions by extremists in our region. Nazarbayev underscored the importance that improving Kazakh-Uzbek relations would have for his ambitions to increase wider regional political and economic cooperation: The geopolitical situation in our region and the future of integration processes among our neighbors depends on Kazakh-Uzbek relations.540 In a March 2006 interview, Foreign Minister Tokaev also observed that, We may have differences on a number of issues, but we are sincerely interested in friendly and predictable relations with Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is interested in political stability in Central Asia and the Caspian region. Good cooperation and stable relationships between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is, therefore, essential to ensure and sustain stability
532 Cited in Erica Marat, Karimov, Bakiyev React Differently To Nazarbayevs Central Asia Union, Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 25, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373006. 533 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2007: Kazahhstan, 534 Office of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Today, President Nursultan Nazarbayev Meets President of the Repub lic of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, Who Arrived in Astana for a Two Day Official Visit, April 22, 2008, http://www.akorda.kz/www/ www_akorda_kz.nsf/newsopen?OpenForm&idn=3&idno=4DCB67C0C6113A6806257434000FCEBF&lang=en. 535 Karimovs Once and For All for Nazarbayev, Journal of Turkish Weekly, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=54681. 536 Quote from President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan will combine efforts in the fight against extremism, drug trafficking from Afghanistan, Interfax News Agency, April 23, 2008, http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDispl ayFullDocument &orgId=574&topicId=100007185&docId=l:780585624&start=11. 537 Mevlut Katik, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Strive for Closer Cooperation, Eurasia Insight, March 27, 2006, http://www.eurasianet. org/departments/insight/articles/eav032706a.shtml. 538 Kazakhstan Detains Uzbek Wanted on Terror Charges, Reuters, April 23, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/ idUSL23749894. 539 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Uzbekistan/Kazakhstan: Summit Is a Sign of Changing Times, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 18, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/03/7234E505-1452-4508-9315-BCADE393B371.html. 540 Katik, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Strive for Closer Cooperation.

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in the region.541 Kazakh and Uzbek officials have recently coordinated their energy polices to induce Russian firms to pay more for their oil and gas exports, which Russian middleman often resell to European consumers with a hefty markup.542 From April 22-23, 2008, President Karimov conducted his first official visit to Astana since September 2006. In a joint media appearance following his talks with Nazarbayev, Karimov observed that, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan may play a crucial role in solution of a number of principal matters, connected with the stability in the Central Asian region and prospects of its sustainable development. 543 The two leaders agreed to authorize their government to prepare a draft agreement on a bilateral free trade zone, which Karimov said would increase volume of mutual trade significantly by unifying customs duties and other trade practices of both countries. 544 Nazarbayev noted that, since he visited Uzbekistan two years earlier, bilateral commerce doubled. Economic integration is growing, he added enthusiastically, and it excites us.545 A working group headed by the Kazakh and Uzbek Prime Ministers is now drafting the terms of the bilateral free trade zone and how it would integrate with the regions other multinational economic frameworks. 546 Yet, Karimov again dismissed as premature the concept of a Central Asian Union, something Nazarbayev has long championed. Before the trip, Karimov observed that, Seeking cheap popularity, some colleagues of mine make high-flown speeches on cooperation and come up with all sorts of slogans. Unfortunately, nothing at all is being done in practice.547 Karimov continued to employ rather undiplomatic language even during the trip: As far as Uzbekistan is concerned, this initiative is unacceptable. I'm saying it right here and now to prevent any further speculations on the matter.548 Karimov justified his objection on socioeconomic rather than geopolitical grounds: In order to establish a union between the states, their socioeconomic development level and potential should be comparable, Karimov told the media. Secondly, policy and directions the countries' leaders work at should be comparable as well.549 Karimov also argued that, Unfortunately, we have too many matters to address yet... all and any alliances are therefore untimely.550 Furthermore, Karimov insisted that Uzbekistan provided more favorable conditions for international business than Kazakhstan, a claim reflecting the often fierce competition between the two countries for foreign investment and international business opportunities.551 According to Karimov, international rating agencies place Uzbekistan above Kazakhstan from the standpoint of business, adding that no other postSoviet country could match the preferences businesses enjoy in Uzbekistan.552 Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are now both maneuvering to become the preeminent transit country for pan-Eurasian commercial and transportation networks (including a possible Europe-Asian highway).553
541 Mevlut Katik, Kazakhstan Has Huge Plan to Expand Energy Links With China, Eurasia Insight, March 13, 2006, http://www. eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav031306.shtml. 542 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Uzbekistan: President Karimov Meets with Close Ally Putin, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 6, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/02/BADF8DB0-1DDD-414A-A603-82AB88A065D1.html. 543 Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan May be Crucial for Central Asian Stability, April 23, 2008, http://news.uzreport.com/aziya. cgi?lan=e&id=45228. 544 Dina Yermaganbetova, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Create Free Trade Zone, Kazinform, April 22, 2008, http://www.inform.kz/showarticle.php?lang=eng&id=163528. 545 Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan May Play a Crucial Role in Insuring Security in the RegionUzbek President, Kazakhstan Today, April 22, 2008, http://eng.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=108997. 546 Erkin Akhmadov, Uzbekistan: Central Asian Union Destined to Remain on Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, May 2, 2007, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4850. 547 President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov is on a Two-Day Official Visit to Astana, Kazakhstan, Ferghanu.ru, April 22, 2008, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=54659. 548 Uzbek Presidents Visit to Astana Exposed Existence of a Serious Obstacle on the Road to a Central Asian Alliance, May 5, 2008, http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=2373. 549 Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan May be Crucial for Central Asian Stability, April 23, 2008, http://news.uzreport.com/aziya. cgi?lan=e&id=45228. 550 Uzbek Presidents Visit to Astana Exposed Existence of a Serious Obstacle on the Road to a Central Asian Alliance, May 5, 2008, http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=2373. 551 Uzbekistan Grants More Favorable Terms for Making Business, than in KazakhstanKarimov, Kazakhstan Today, April 23, 2008, http://eng.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=109074. 552 Karimovs Once and For All for Nazarbayev, Journal of Turkish Weekly, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=54681. 553 Frederick Starr, Introduction, in S. Frederick Starr, ed., The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2007), pp. 8, 21.

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Karimovs pessimism regarding Nazarbayevs Union of Central Asian States may reflect the difficulties the two countries experienced after they agreed to establish a bilateral customs union in 1994. Karimov recalled during his April 2008 trip to Astana that problems with this structure led the two governments to join additional regional economic structures (e.g., the Central Asian Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Community), which also proved largely ineffective.554 We've been through it already," he remarked to journalists.555 But Karimovs opposition also reflects longstanding Uzbek aversion to Kazakh-led regional integration initiatives, which Uzbek leaders perceive as efforts to strengthen and legitimize Kazakhstans primacy in Central Asia. In June 2002, Karimov boycotted the first Summit of the Heads of States and Heads of Governments associated with the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia (CICA), the Kazakhled effort to enhance regional security through non-military security initiatives. The Uzbek envoy sent in his place lacked the authority to sign the Almaty Document and The CICA Declaration about the Elimination of Terrorism and Promotion of Dialogue between Civilizations, the two main products of the summit.556 South Caucasus States Armenia Although both Kazakhstan and Armenia are former Soviet republics, they have not developed the close ties Kazakhstan has achieved with Azerbaijan or Georgia. Both Kazakhstan and Armenia are members of the CIS and the CSTO, which ensures that their government leaders meet at their various summits. Nevertheless, Armenias involvement with the CSTO has not been as great as that of the other members and Armenia is not a member of the SCO. Within the framework of the CIS, the two countries in January 1993 signed the Treaty of Fundamentals of Relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and Republic of Armenia in January 1993, and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation during President Kocharians official visit to Astana in early September 1999. 557 During Nazarbayevs May 2001 visit to Yerevan, the two governments signed additional political and legal agreements regarding intergovernmental obligations in the areas of standardization, security, criminality, expansion of parliamentary ties, and legal cooperation. 558 Kazakh-Armenian economic ties have lagged behind. Bilateral commerce and investment have remained relatively limited despite the presence of some 25,000 Armenians in Kazakhstan, who could in principle help promote ties between the two nations.559 In September 1999, the two governments signed a Free Trade Agreement, which came into effect in December 2001. Besides eliminating mutual tariffs, the agreement created an Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation to promote bilateral economic ties, but it did not meet until 2005.560 It was only in November 2006, when President Robert Kocharian visited Kazakhstan, that the two governments signed such fundamental economic agreements as those curtailing double taxation, providing for the mutual protection of investments, and others aimed at establishing a basis for expanding commercial exchanges. In his remarks, Kocharian acknowledged Armenias laggard position with respect to its commercial relations with Kazakhstan: Recently Kazakhi businesses pay more attention to the countries of the South Caucasus. We welcome your presence in Georgia and hope that your presence in Armenia will be more substantial than it is now.561
554 Press Service of the President of Uzbekistan, Presidents Official Visit to KazakhstanFruitful and Effective, April 23, 2008, http://www.pressservice.uz/en/mcontent.scm?sectionId=4489&contentId=15865. 555 Karimovs Once and For All for Nazarbayev. 556 Uzbek Presidents Visit to Astana Exposed Existence of a Serious Obstacle on the Road to a Central Asian Alliance, May 5, 2008, http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=2373. 557 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Respublikoy Armeniya, November 29, 2006, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/CIS/09. 558 Increase Cooperation Dynamic, Kazakh Pravda, May 25, 2001, http://www.kazpravda.kz/index. php?uin=1152243624&act=archive_date&day=25&month=5&year=2001. 559 Public Radio of America, Armenia and Kazakhstan Willing to Develop Bilateral Relations, July 11, 2007, http://armradio.am/ news/?part=off&id=10200. 560 Free Trade Agreement Between Armenia and Kazakhstan, September 2, 1999, www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/cisfta.pdf. 561 President of the Republic of Armenia, Official Visit of President Robert Kocharian to The Republic of Kazakhstan, November 6, 2007, http://news.president.am/eng/?sub=official&id=155&from=0&year=2006.

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Following Kocharians visit, Kazakhstan Investment Promotion Center (KAZINVEST) established a special delegation to explore potential opportunities for Kazakh capital in Armenia.562 In addition, the Kazakh government upgraded its diplomatic presence in Armenia and opened a formal embassy complex in Yerevan.563 In December 2007, the Kazakh Charge dAffairs in Yerevan, Yerlan Kubashev, announced that Kazakhstan would hold an exposition of Armenian goods in 2008. He also stated that the members of the bilateral Intergovernmental Economic Cooperation Commission would meet, for only its second time, in Kazakhstan later in 2008.564 During his April 2008 visit to Yerevan for the inauguration of the newly elected president, Mukhambet Kopeev, the Vice President of the Senate of Kazakhstan, indicated that he sought to further strengthen interparliamentary cooperation through the establishment of a parliamentary cooperation group. He also expressed gratitude for Armenias support for Kazakhstans aspirations to chair the OSCE.565 Armenian backing for Kazakhs OSCE aspirations arises not only from their existing politicalmilitary tieswhich operate both bilaterally and through the CIS and the CSTObut also because many Armenians hope that Kazakhstans OSCE chairmanship will enhance that institutions ability to resolve the Armenia-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Kazakh officials have expressed their hope for a resolution of the Karabakh conflict as well as an improve ment in Armenias relations with Azerbaijan. Kubashev alluded to the harmful effects of the conflict on the regional economies when he lamented how unsettled conflicts in Eurasia affect the regions development.566 Kazakhstan, like the rest of Eurasia, is adversely affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As long as it threatens to flare up again, some foreign investors will shun the region. Perhaps more seriously, the trade barriers imposed on Armenia for its occupation of Azerbaijani territory has excluded realization of potentially valuable Trans-Caspian trade and transportation routes that would traverse the conflict region. Kazakh officials have sought to avoid taking sides over the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. The Kazakh government abstained in the voting on the March 2008 UN General Assembly resolution that called for the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan. I want to reassure you that there are friendly relations between our countries and these relations are more important than any resolution, the new Kazakh Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Serik Primbetov, told the local media. We have always supported Azerbaijans territorial integrity and our position will remain unchanged. On the other hand, we support peaceful settlement of conflict. We keep friendly relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. I will do my best for much more improvement of relations between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.567 Despite the problems resulting from the unsettled Karabakh conflict, the robust performance of the economies of Armenia and Kazakhstan in recent years has established a good basis for future economic cooperation. Two-way trade turnover rose to $191.3 million in January-October 2007, a 62.4% increase compared with the corresponding period of the previous year.568 Bilateral trade, which is very imbalanced in Kazakhstans favor, mainly consists of Kazakh sales of grain, oil, and refined petroleum products in exchange for imports of Armenian beverages, chemical products, as well as machinery and equipment. Azerbaijan The governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have cooperated most comprehensively in the energy sector. Early on, they collaborated with the United States to defeat terrorist threats to Caspian energy infra562 American Chamber of Commerce in Kazakhstan News Release, Armenian President Visits Astana, November 7, 2006, http:// www.amcham.kz/article.php?article_id=534. 563 Kazakhstan Opens Embassies in Armenia, Qatar, Kazakhstan Today, December 15, 2006, http://eng.gazeta.kz/art. asp?aid=84699. 564 Armenian-Kazakh Relations Enhancing, ARKA News Agency, December 11 2007, http://www.arka.am/eng/ economy/2007/12/11/7363.html. 565 Vice President of the Kazakh Senate in the National Assembly, Official Press Release of the Armenian National Assembly, April 10 2008. http://www.parliament.am/chairman.php?id=meetings&NewsID=2719&month=04&year=2008&lang=eng. 566 Kazakhstan for Resolution of Armenian-Turkish Problem through Direct Dialogue, ARKA News Agency, August 29 2007, http://library.aua.am/library/news/archive/2007_08-28.htm 567 Kazakhstan Supports Friendly Relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia Ambassador, TrendNews, March 18, 2008, http:// news.trendaz.com/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1159028&lang=EN. 568 Kazakhstan Interested in Armenias energy sector, ARKA News Agency, December 11, 2007, http://www.arka.am/eng/ energy/2007/12/11/7365.html.

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structures. In addition, Kazakh and Azerbaijani officials sought to resist Iranian efforts to delay developing underground hydrocarbon resources along their Caspian coasts pending the adoption of a new convention defining the Caspian Basins legal status. Whereas Tehran wants to divide the sea into equal shares and provide for multilateral management of undersea mining activities, Astana and Baku have sought to divide the seas underwater resources in proportion with the size of their coastal zones. During a November 2001 CIS summit in Moscow, their presidents signed an agreement delimitating the surface of the Caspian Sea.569 Along with Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan agreed to partition the northern sector of the Caspian Sea into three unequal shares.570 More recently, Kazakh and Azerbaijani officials have sought to explore opportunities for Kazakh energy and other exports to transit Azerbaijan en route to European and Mediterranean markets. Kazakhstan currently ships as much as 5 million tons of oil by tanker between terminals in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The oil then moves via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to the Mediterranean.571 Previously, Kazakh exporters did ship a few million tons of oil to Baku by tanker from the port of Aktau, but then the oil was moved to Georgias Black Sea coast by rail.572 In September 2005, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev created a special government commission to address issues related to facilitating the transportation of Kazakh oil through Azerbaijani territory. 573 Thanks in part to the commissions work, the two governments signed a transportation cooperation agreement in June 2006 to support the BTC pipeline.574 The accord provided Kazakhstan with a third export route for its oil, supplementing the existing northern route through Russian-controlled Atyrau-Samara and pipelines and the newer eastward route to China through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline. The two countries national energy companies subsequently signed a memorandum on implementing their Trans-Caspian project. The memo covers joint use of Azerbaijans oil and gas infrastructure and other issues relating to implementing the agreement signed by Nazarbayev and Aliyev in June 2006.575 On May 29, Nazarbayev signed into law a bill ratifying the treaty allowing Kazakh oil to use the BTC pipeline. The BTC is currently transporting one million barrels of oil per day; this total should rise to 1.6 million barrels daily by 2013 once Kazakh oil joins that from Azerbaijan's own fields.576 Although long-term proposals to construct pipelines under the Caspian Sea remain under consideration, legal and environmental impediments have led Kazakh policy makers to focus their near-term plans on developing a Kazakhstan Caspian Transport System (KCTS). Following construction of an oil terminal at Kuryk, ships will be able to load as much as 500,000 barrels of crude oil daily and transport it across the Caspian to Azerbaijan, where their cargo will be unloaded and channeled into the BTC pipeline. On January 24, 2007, major oil companies including Chevron, ExxonMobil, LUKarco, Agip, Total as well as KazMunaiGs (KMG) signed a memorandum of understanding launching the KCTS consortium, which will work directly with the Azerbaijani and Kazakh governments.577 Although Russian policy makers have expressed unease at the creation of a direct connection between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, an oil executive involved said that the Nazarbayev administration and KMG are now fully behind the project.578 In January 2008, KazMunaiGaz
569 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Kazakhstan s Azerbaydzhanskoy Respublikoy, July 26, 2006, http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/content/policy/cooperation/CIS/10. 570 Ibid. 571 Marat Tazhin, Kazakhstan in a Changing World, speech at U.S.-Kazakhstan Business Association dinner, Washington, D.C., May 8, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/050907.html. 572 Ibragim Alibekov, While Russia Watches, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Explore New Ties, Eurasia Insight, March 3, 2004, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav030304.shtml. 573 Sevindzh Abdullayeva and Viktor Shulmann, Kazakhstan Oil Transit via Azerbaijan Territory Planned, TASS, September 14, 2005. 574 G. G. Rakhmatulina, Kazakhstans Joining to the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan Project, Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies, July 4, 2006, http://www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=847. 575 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Sign Documents on Oil and Gas Cooperation, Kazkahstans News Bulletin, August 15, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/NB3_081507.html. 576 Kazakhstan Ratifies Oil Transit Treaty with Azerbaijan, Kazinform, May 30, 2008, http://www.inform.kz/showarticle3. php?lang=eng&id=165101. 577 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, New Export Route for Kazakh Oil Gets Closer to Reality, Kazkahstans News Bulletin, January 25, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/012507.html. 578 James Delly, Kazakhstan Eyes New Oil Export Route via Caspian Sea, Eurasia Insight, April 11, 2007, http://www.eurasianet. org/departments/insight/articles/eav041107.shtml.

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announced plans to send oil from the fields at Tengiz and Kashagan (which, barring further delays, should be producing large quantities of oil by then) to Kuryk for tanker shipment to Azerbaijan and the BTC starting in 2012.579 Observers expect that, should the tanker system produce poor results, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan might commit to construct an undersea pipeline that would feed oil directly into the BTC.580 Azerbaijani and Kazakh officials are now seeking ways to deepen other economic exchanges between their countries, which have two of the most rapidly growing economies of the Caspian region. In early April 2007, Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov visited Azerbaijan. In Baku, he marked the launch of a terminal that stores and processes Kazakh grain shipped across the Caspian from the Kazakh port of Aktau.581 The Baku Grain Terminal is a joint venture between Planeta L of Azerbaijan and the Food Corporation of Kazakhstan. The facility, which cost $6 million to construct, grew out of the 2004 visit to Kazakhstan by Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev. The terminal has a capacity to process up to 800,000 tons of grain annually; some of this is for domestic Azerbaijan consumption, but the terminal also aims to supply Georgia, Turkey, and North Africa.582 When Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited Astana in August 2007, he told Kazinform, the main Kazakh news agency, that he was eager to involve Kazakh investors in the construction of the BakuTbilisi-Kars railway.583 An Azerbaijani-Kazakh intergovernmental commission is actively considering new joint commercial projects. In addition to their economic cooperation, the two countries have collaborated to enhance maritime security in the Caspian Sea. When Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited Kazakhstan in early March 2004, the two countries signed a military cooperation agreement aimed at enhancing collaboration between their Caspian Sea f lotillas.584 Some Kazakh officials share Azerbaijani concerns about Iranian efforts to contest control of Caspian Sea resources. The U.S. Caspian Guard initiative has aimed to strengthen the capabilities of both countries to counter security threats to Caspian countries and commerce from regional terrorist groups.585 Georgia A series of high-level political visits made relations between Kazakhstan and Georgia especially prominent in 2005. At the beginning of June, Kazakh Prime Minister Danial Akhmetov visited Georgia to discuss commercial exchanges with Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli. They conducted a joint excursion to Georgias Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi. In October, Nazarbayev visited Georgia and spoke enthusiastically about deepening economic ties between the two countries. Kazakh-Georgian commercial exchanges, which were already on the upswing after the 2003 Rose Revolution increased political stability in Georgia while decreasing corruption, grew substantially after the visits. We are grateful to Kazakhstan because the first investment to Georgia in the most difficult time for us came from Kazakhstan, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili remarked at a joint news conference with Nazarbayev in Astana in March 2007. When we started, Kazakhstan was the first to believe in Georgia, and today we are seeing investments from this country ranging in billions.586 Kazakhs hope to benefit from Georgias potential as a key transit state for goods exchanged between Kazakhstan and Western markets via the Black Sea region, including through energy pipelines and by rail and other surface transportation. When Saakashvili visited Astana in March 2007, Nazarbayev told him that,
579 Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Astana Set to Make an Energy Export Break with Russia, Eurasia Insight, May 2, 2008, http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050208.shtml. 580 Chevron to Help Kazakhstan Skirt Russia with Pipeline, Bloomberg News, June 6, 2008, http://www.chron.com/disp/story. mpl/business/energy/5822320.html. 581 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, PM Massimov Visits Azerbaijan and Georgia Talking Oil Transportation and Trade, Kazakhstans News Bulletin, April 5, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/040507.html. 582 Kazakhstan Has Resumed Grain Supplies for Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan Business Center, May 25, 2008, http://abc.az/cgi-bin/ wnews_one.cgi?nid=24398&lang=eng. 583 Kazinform, President Aliyev: Azerbaijans Border Remains Open for Resources Transportation to Europe, Kazakhstans News Bulletin, August 15, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/NB3_081507.html. 584 Ibragim Alibekov, While Russia Watches, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Explore New Ties, Eurasia Insight, March 3, 2004, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav030304.shtml. 585 Roger McDermott, Kazakhstans Parliament Ratifies Strategic Partnership with Azerbaija, Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 5, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371246 586 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Kazakhstan Will Pursue Large Scale Diverse Investments in Georgia, Kazakhstans News Bulletin, March 9, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/030907.html.

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The Caucasus corridor to Europe and the Mediterranean is becoming very important for us, and Georgia is our very active partner in this endeavor.587 Kazakh investors also praise the Georgian government for creating an attractive investment climate by offering favorable tax conditions and by making it easy for investors, foreign and domestic, to start new businesses. The two governments have signed over 70 agreements designed to establish a favorable legal framework for bilateral economic relations. These include an agreement for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments; an accord to avoid double taxation, and a free trade agreement. Since 2005, Kazakh firms have invested over $1 billion in various projects in Georgia.588 According to Georgian sources, during the first three quarters of 2006, Kazakh investments approximated $142 million in Georgia.589 Kazakhs are very active in Georgias tourism and real estate markets. For example, Kazakhstans Turan Alem Bank is financing the construction and renovation of a number of luxury hotels in Tbilisi, Batumi, and other Georgian cities.590 Kazakh banks have also participated in privatizing Georgias communication and power industries. Two of the most important Kazakh investments in recent years are KazTransGas $12.5 million purchase of Tbilisi gas distributor Tbilgazi and Bank TuranAlems $90 million purchase of a controlling share in United Telecom of Georgia, the countrys largest telephone company.591 Trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Georgia has increased considerably in recent years. In 2005, Kazakhstan imported $9.80 million worth of Georgian goods and exported $11.55 million. In 2006, Kazakh imports from Georgia rose to $15.43 million, while exports soared to $25.4 million.592 Kazakh and Georgian officials hope these record figures will increase even further as Kazakh investment continues to help develop Georgias transportation network and other infrastructure. The Georgian government wants natural gas from Kazakhstan to be transported through the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline and hopes that Kazakh investors will support the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway.593 Kazakh Transportation and Communications Minister Serik Akhmetov indicated that Kazakh businesses aim to ship at least 10 million tons of cargo annually via the Baku-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway, which is scheduled to become operational in 2010. Private Kazakh companies are constructing an oil refinery plant at Batumi and a wheat storage terminal at Poti in anticipation of its opening.594 The Poti terminal will establish a Caspian network by interconnecting with the grain terminals in Aktau and Baku. When he visited Georgia in early April 2007, Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov inspected both facilities and participated in a meeting of the KazakhAzerbaijani-Georgian high-level working group on transportation issues.595 Despite its close political ties with Russia, Astana has not followed Moscows negative line toward Tbilisi. For example, this March, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that the Russian government had unilaterally lifted financial, trade, transport, and other economic sanctions on Abkhazia imposed as a collective decision of the CIS Council of Heads of State on January 19, 1996.596 In addition to explicitly blaming Georgias supposedly unconstructive approach towards its separatist regions as warranting the reversal, the Foreign Ministry called on other CIS countries to follow its example. David Bakradze, then acting Georgian foreign minister, subsequently thanked Kazakhstan for declining to follow this advice.597 Kazakh officials have always opposed separatism, especially within the SCO, but also in the case of Georgia.
587 Diana Petriashvili, Georgia Pins Investment Hopes on Kazakhstan, Eurasia Insight, April 17, 2007, http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/insight/articles/eav041707a.shtml. 588 Erica Marat, Nazarbayev Promises Economic Assistance, Urges Political Stability in Kyrgyzstan, Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 3, 2007, http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=420&issue_id=4094&article_id=2372141. 589 Dinara Salieva and Asset Matayev, Kazakh Invests in Georgian Market, Brosse Street Journal, May 30 2007, http://www.bsj. ge/newspaper/2007/05/30/EElEyFklZAYyGwtrwH. 590 Petriashvili, Georgia Pins Investment Hopes on Kazakhstan. 591 Ibid. 592 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Relations between Georgia and the Republic of Kazakhstan, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/ index.php?sec_id=445<_id=ENG. 593 Ibid. 594 Petriashvili, Georgia Pins Investment Hopes on Kazakhstan. 595 Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, PM Massimov Visits Azerbaijan and Georgia Talking Oil Transportation and Trade, Kazakhstans News Bulletin, April 5, 2007, http://www.kazakhembus.com/040507.html. 596 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation Withdraws from Regime of Restrictions Established in 1996 for Abkhazia, March 6, 2008, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/79c58f476caec4e8c32574040058934c?OpenDocument. 597 N. Kirtskhalia, Georgia Thanks Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan & Ukraine for their Support Foreign Minister, TrendNews, April 8, 2008, http://news.trendaz.com/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1171467&lang=EN.

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Conclusion Eurasian international politics could well experience major discontinuities in coming years. None of the most important historical forces shaping Kazakhstans neighborhood are necessarily linear. It is unclear whether Eurasia is experiencing a democratic wave or crest. The transformation of Islamic extremism continues with no visible end. The fate of WMD proliferation now lies at a tipping point, with the cases of Iran and North Korea still very much in doubt. The potential contribution of the regions energy resources to global markets also remains uncertain until Afghanistan becomes more stable. Major ambiguities surround the future policies of Russia, China, and the other countries and institutions engaged in Eurasia. Besides sud den geopolitical shifts, cases of abrupt regime collapse are also possible, as seen in Kyrgyzstan.598 Even the biologically inevitable transition to a new generation of Central Asian leaders as the current cohort of elderly strongmen fade from the scene is fraught with uncertainty.599 Central Asian political systems are so tightly controlled by their leaders and their immediate circles that sweeping policy transformations could easily ensue from turnover at the top. Kazakhstans ability to achieve its regional objectives will depend on several factors, including the state of the Eurasian economies, Kazakhstans success in transitioning to a post-Nazarbayev era of political leaders, the effectiveness of Astanas stewardship of the OSCE, and the policies of the other important countries engaged in Central Asia and the Caspian regionabove all China and Russia, but also the United States. Kazakhstans tremendous economic growth largely explains its emergence as a major force in the new international politics of Eurasia. Thanks in particular to the recovery of world oil prices during the last decade, Kazakh citizens have been able to enjoy a rising standard of living as well as acquire the capital to exploit investment opportunities in neighboring states. These nations in turn have eagerly sought to bolster trade and other economic ties with Kazakhstanincluding by supporting Kazakh efforts to chair the OSCE and assume other leadership roles within Eurasia. Any sustained slowdown in Kazakhstans economic development would weaken Astanas claims to regional leadership. In the near-term, the main challenge is the potentially disruptive effects of the world financial crisis, which has threatened the viability of many banks and lowered stock prices and growth rates throughout the world. Most experts expect that Kazakhstan should be able to weather the current storm due to its strong banking sector and growing revenue from surging prices for its oil exports. Ironically, this very oil revenue presents a double long-term danger to the Kazak economy. A collapse of world oil prices, as occurred a decade ago and regularly before then, could derail Kazakhstans economic prospects. Alternately, the country might fall victim to the same kind of oil curse that has afflicted Nigeria and other energy exporting countries, where easy profits from the sale of natural resources have undermined entrepreneurship and stoked corruption. The present leadership seems committed to pursuing vertical as well as horizontal market diversification, but its successor might prove more susceptible to the resource curse. This consideration raises the question of which individual, group, or regime will replace Nazarbayev as Kazakhstans chief policy maker when the president leaves the scene. Nazarbayevs inevitable departure could present a major transition crisis for a political system that, since its creation with Kazakhstans independence in 1991, has known only his stewardship. Even were a successor able to consolidate as much power as Nazarbayev, it is unlikely that the new regime would pursue the same set of policies, with the same skill, as the current president. Kazakhstans chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 will also affect the countrys aspirations to regional leadership. Kazakh officials are characterizing this long-sought prize as an international endorsement of their countrys successful economic and political reforms, Kazakhstans leading role in Eurasia, and their contribution as a bridge between the former Soviet republics and other OSCE members. Many of the OSCEs most ardent supporters are counting on Kazakhstans diplomats to restore the institutions prestige and influence
598 In January 2007, then U.S. Director of National Intelligence, John D. Negroponte, warned about the risks of the collapse of state authority resulting from competition among regions or clans for power, which he feared could open a vacuum for criminal and terrorist activities (Annual Threat Assessment and U.S. National Security Challenges, Statement for the Record to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007), http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/79065.htm. 599 For an outline of several possible succession paths for post-Niyazov Turkmenistan a process that is still occurringthat could easily apply to other Central Asian regimes see International Crisis Group, Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy (November 4, 2004), pp. 21-22.

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in the former Soviet republics. There is also hope that, in preparing for the OSCE chairmanship, Kazakh officials will liberalize their own political practices to better conform to OSCE principles. Yet, fears are also widespread that Astana will prove reluctant to confront the governments of Russia or other member countries should they continue to violate OSCE norms regarding elections and civil rights. On the other hand, Kazakhstans regional leadership could also be challenged should the countrys OSCE chairmanship prove highly successful and the countrys economy continue to surge ahead of many of its neighbors. One reason for Kazakhstans emergence as the most important driver of regional integration within Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region has been the countrys powerful but not overwhelming attributes of state power. Thus far, Kazakhstan has lacked the economic and military foundations to aspire to regional hegemony, though even now multiple membership categories are emerging within Eurasec, the CIS, and the SCO that reflect participants diverging economic and military progress. A widening gap between Kazakhstan and its Central Asian neighbors could reinforce the already visible resentment in Kyrgyzstan and especially Uzbekistan about Astanas progress, and might lead other Eurasian governments to seek countervailing ties with Beijing, Moscow, Washington, or even Tehran. Heightened geopolitical competition could in turn weaken the regional integration processes most sought by Kazakh leaders. The same consequence would ensue should Central Asia again emerge as a region of active great power rivalry. Kazakhstan has striven to maneuver between China, Russia, and the United States by pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy that cultivates good relations with all these countries (and others) while eschewing alignment with any particular bloc. Astana would find it hard to resist a sustained effort by Beijing and Moscow to establish a condominium within Central Asia, even with Washingtons help. Likewise, managing growing difference between Beijing and Moscow, an equally likely scenario, would require considerable diplomatic skill. Acronyms ADB Asian Development Bank ALA Almaty International Airport BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline BWC Biological Weapons Convention CANWFZ Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone CAREC Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation CASFOR Caspian Force CENTCOM U.S. Central Command CENTRASBAT Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion CFE Conventional Forces in Europe CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CNCP Chinese National Petroleum Corporation CPC Caspian Pipeline Consortium CRDF Collective Rapid Deployment Force CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CST Collective Security Treaty CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council EEC/Eurasec Eurasian Economic Community ENP European Neighborhood Policy EU European Union GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism GNEP Global Nuclear Energy Partnership HEU highly enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 360

IAG Implementation and Assessment Group IMF International Monetary Fund IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IOC Indian Oil Corporation INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe IPAP Individual Partnership Action Plan ISAF International Security Assistance Force KAZINVEST Kazakhstan Investment Promotion Center KAZBAT Kazakhstan Peacekeeping Battalion KCTS Kazakhstan Caspian Transport System KMG KazMunaiGs LEU low-enriched uranium NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty NWFZ Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone ODIHR Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OEF Operation Enduring Freedom ONGC Indias Oil and Natural Gas Corporation OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PAP-T Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism PARP Planning and Review Process PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement PFP Partnership for Peace PLA Chinese Peoples Liberation Army RATS Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure RC07 Regional Cooperation 2007 RFCA Regional Financial Center of Almaty SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization TAP Trans-Afghan Pipeline TAPI Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline TIFA Trade and Investment Framework Agreement TRACECA Transportat Corridor Europe, Caucasus, Asia USJFCOM U.S. Joints Forces Command WTO World Trade Organization

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CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE U.S.: THEIR INTERESTS, POSTURES, AND INTERRELATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA
Zhao HUASHENG
Central Asia is a separate geopolitical space, newly defined since the end of the Cold War. The region gains its importance from its abundant raw materials, particularly oil and natural gas, and its unique geographic location. Generally speaking though, the region has been geographically and psychologically isolated from most of the nations across the world, especially the United States and Europe. The events of 9/11 catapulted the region into the world's spotlight. The region quickly became known to the world and has grown in strategic importance. Following the events of 9/11, Central Asia emerged from the shadows of the international arena to the forefront of global attention. China, Russia, and the U. S. are the main actors in Central Asia. Europe is also interested in Central Asia and, after 9/11 in particular, is deeply concerned about and involved in the region. Europe, moreover, has demonstrated the potential to become a fourth power in Central Asia. While Turkey and Iran have particular interests and inf luence in the region, thanks to their historical vantages, they should not be seen as major powers in Central Asia. What is more, India is quietly penetrating the region, but its inf luence is considerably limited. The special statuses of China, Russia, and the United States in Central Asia are mainly attributed to their involvement and inf luence in the region, on the one hand, and to the framework of the special relations the three powers have forged in international relations, on the other. The U. S. military presence in Central Asia has deeply affected the strategic structure in the region. A three-way confrontation looms on the horizon. Dealing with the bilateral and trilateral relations among them has become a strategic issue for China, Russia, and the United States. China's Interests in Central Asia Chinese interests in Central Asia are clear and explicit: first, to constrain the separatist forces of "East Turkestan"; second, to keep Central Asia as China's stable strategic rear area; and third, to make Central Asia one of China's diversified sources of energy resources and a regional economic cooperation partner. Constraining the separatist forces of "East Turkestan". The term "East Turkestan" was first used by the Russians and Europeans in the 18th century to designate the south part of Xinjiang in western China. The contemporary movement of "East Turkestan" in Xinjiang originated in the early 20tth century. In 1933 and 1944, two "East Turkestan" republics were established in Xinjiang, but both of them were short-lived. These events were the first round in "East Turkestan's" independence movement. The "East Turkestan" separatists aimed to set up an independent "East Turkestan" state, sometimes engaging in terrorism and violence. The rise of international terrorism seen in the 1990s brought with it an increase in extreme activities by the "East Turkestan" forces. From 1990 to 2001, the "East Turkestan" terrorists launched more than 200 terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, killing 162 and injuring 440 people. 1 "East Turkestan" is a movement whose political goal is to set up an independent "East Turkestan" state to split China. To reach this goal, the "East Turkestan" terrorists have never hesitated to resort to violence and other terrorist means. On 15 December, 2003, China published the first list of identi fied "East Turkestan" terrorist organizations, namely, the "East Turkestan" Islamic Movement, the "East Turkestan" Liberation Organization, the World Uighur Youth Congress, and the "East Turkestan" Information Center. 2 These four "East Turkestan" organizations insist on creating an independent "East Turkestan" state using violence and were involved in the series of terrorist attacks that occurred in Xinjiang, China. Therefore, the contemporary "East Turkestan" terrorist forces have epitomized the characteristics of political separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism. Since the Han Dynasty, combating separatism and maintaining national unity have been the persistent mission of the Chinese government with respect to China's northwest. Striking at separatism is a traditional policy, which is 362

deep-rooted in the historical past and has profound significance. It is, in a sense, a continuation of the struggle that China launched to maintain national unity. Central Asia, as a region, is closely associated with the "East Turkestan" forces. Due to the historic, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious factors, the "East Turkestan" forces have countless ties with Central Asia. A lot of ethnic groups live in Xinjiang, China, and Central Asia, including Kazakhs and Uighurs. Ethnic Uighurs in Central Asia are estimated at about 350,000, two-thirds of all the Uighurs living outside China. 3 Many Uighurs living in Central Asia came from Xinjiang. Against the background of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, not without encouragement from the Soviet Union, a number of different "East Turkestan" organizations were formed in Central Asia. Thus Central Asia turned out to be the main arena for "East Turkestan" at that time, though most of the Chinese Uighurs in Central Asia are not separatists or terrorists. Some of these organizations were active even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The independence of the five Central Asian states greatly encouraged the "East Turkestan" activists. A number of them f led from China to Central Asia and made Central Asia one of their bases. In the 1990s, the "East Turkestan" organizations in Central Asia grew quickly. There are no precise statistics on the "East Turkestan" organizations in Central Asia. According to different sources, the total number of "East Turkestan" organizations in Central Asia, big or small, varies to a large extent. According to one research study, there are at least 11 "East Turkestan" organizations in Central Asia (in 2002 year). Four of the 11 organizations openly state their desire to create an independent "East Turkestan" state using force. 4 Central Asia lies on the periphery of the region where international terrorism and religious extremism are concentrated, that is, Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Middle East. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's, international terrorism and religious extremism surged in Central Asia and mixed and prospered with Central Asia's own homegrown terrorism and extremism. The dramatic geopolitical changes in Central Asia, as well as the growing presence of terrorism and extremism in the region, are now affecting the security of northwest China. Many organizations of the "East Turkestan" forces conduct their activities via Central Asia. The "East Turkestan" forces obtain spiritual and financial support, as well as military training, from international terrorist organizations, including those in Central Asia, such as the Taliban, Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Turkestan Islamic Party. In addition, Central Asia is a safe haven for the "East Turkestan" forces f leeing China. The region is the most important conduit connecting the "East Turkestan" forces with international terrorism and serves as the main channel through which international terrorism penetrates China. Terrorist forces beyond China's borders smuggle arms and terrorist paraphernalia into China through Central Asia, and from Central Asia organize and control terrorist activities in Xinjiang and China's other areas. China's Central Asian policy is also clear and explicit: to prevent Central Asia from becoming the external base of the "East Turkestan" forces and a conduit between the "East Turkestan" forces and international terrorism. Thus, China's Central Asian policy requires that the Central Asian governments do not pursue a policy that impairs China's unity and supports China's separatism, but instead restrict and prohibit the "East Turkestan" forces from conducting activities on their territory and prevent terrorist and extremist forces from sneaking into China through their territory. Since the security of Central Asia and the security of China's Xinjiang are closely associated and Central Asia's instability bears on the security of northwest China, as an extension of its policy, China is willing to join Central Asia and Russia in establishing a regional security mechanism, which can provide regional security with a collective security guard. This is in the security interests not only of Central Asia, but also of China. This is a central function of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Securing Central Asia as China's stable strategic rear area is part of Beijing's overall security interests, but is also an important aspect of grand strategy and geopolitics. This differs from the above-mentioned domestic security interests, which involve combating the "East Turkestan" forces. Securing Central Asia as China's stable strategic rear area means involving Central Asia in China's overall external strategy and, in doing so, defining Central Asia's position in China's foreign strategy, as well as China's strategic interests in Central Asia. Currently, and for the foreseeable future, China's primary strategic mission and 363

foreign policy priority lie to its southeast. To be more specific, the most paramount and arduous mission of China's foreign strategy in the coming decades is to prevent Taiwan from its independence and to respond to the challenges that Taiwan could raise at any time. China's greatest strategic pressure comes from the U. S. 's possible support of Taiwanese independence and the U. S. 's containment of China's rise; both are likely to precipitate a Sino-U. S. strategic confrontation. Therefore, China should concentrate its resources on the main strategic front and keep other fronts stable and tranquil. This priority clearly establishes Central Asia as China's strategic rear, though it in no way diminishes Central Asia's importance for China's overall national security. Central Asia can serve China's main interests, as long as it remains stable and part of China's strategic rear area. For Central Asia to emerge as an area of primary strategic concern would mean a significant threat to regional stability and China's national security. Securing Central Asia as China's stable strategic rear area depends on three conditions. First, on resolving the disputed border issues between China and Central Asia and maintaining peace and security in the border areas. Both tasks have been entirely fulfilled, save a few remaining negotiations over uninhabited and inconsequential border areas. Second, on the Central Asian nations adopting a goodwill foreign policy toward China and China maintaining fairly good bilateral relations with the Central Asian nations. Third, on Central Asia not falling under the control of any major power or group of major powers, especially those that have complicated geopolitical and strategic relations with China. It can be inferred that, as another basic principle and target of China's Central Asian policy, China must maintain amicable relations with the Central Asian nations and prevent these nations from being controlled by any major power or group of major powers. Central Asia is persuaded to become one of China's diversified energy sources and regional economic cooperation partners. It is a key strategic task of the Chinese government to guarantee the energy supplies demanded by China's sustainable economic development and to diversify a stable energy supply. China's energy import has been increasing rapidly in recent years. Between 1997 and 2002, China's oil import amounted to 35.47 million tonnes: 27.32 million tonnes, 36.61 million tonnes, 70.26 million tonnes, 60.25 million tonnes, and 69.40 million tonnes per year, respectively. China's energy import doubled in five years. In 2003, China's energy import reached 90 million tonnes. China is bound to depend heavily on the international market. About 50% of China's energy import is from the Middle East and over 22% from Africa. 5 In an effort to diversify energy supplies, China developed energy links with Russia and Central Asia. The first large-scale energy cooperation project between China and Russia for importing oil via the pipeline that runs from the Siberian city of Angarsk to Daqing on China's northeast has yet to reach final agreement. If the project can be implemented in due time, China could import 30 million tonnes of oil every year, beginning in 2010, about 20% of China's total oil import, presumably 150 million tonnes per year. Energy cooperation between China and Central Asia, mainly between China and Kazakhstan, the main oil producer in Central Asia, is presumed to be another effort aimed at diversifying China's energy supplies. In 1997, China and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to build a 3,000- kilometer oil pipeline from Atyrau in west Kazakhstan to Alashankou in Xinjiang. This project was to be completed and put into operation in 2005, but it has been delayed due to an insufficiently guaranteed oil supply, which could make the pipeline economically unprofitable. According to Chinese experts, a minimum oil supply of 20 million tonnes per year is required for economic feasibility. In 2003, this project received a new lease on life when President Hu Jintao of China, during his visit to Kazakhstan in June 2003, signed an agreement to promote building the Atasu- Alashankou pipeline. This pipeline, once built, will be connected to the Kenkiyak- Atyrau pipeline, which is already in operation. This pipeline is very likely to be built in the next few years. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan's oil production has been growing rapidly and the problem of oil supply will no longer be a serious obstacle. 6 If this project is realized, China could import at least 15-20 million tonnes of oil from Kazakhstan every year. That means Kazakhstan will cover more than 10% of China's oil import, if China's yearly oil import totals about 150 million tonnes. As Russia and Central Asia become China's stable energy supply bases, China will have a long-term and stable energy supply and considerably reduce the risks created by the volatile international situation. 364

Both Russia and Central Asia are geographically close to China. Maximum safety of the pipelines will be guaranteed, because they avoid the necessity of using long sea-lanes and risky sea passages and straits, which could easily fall under the powers of other states. But this has not yet been achieved. The volume of energy China imports from Central Asia has not reached the level of strategic significance. In 2002, China imported about only one million tonnes of oil from Kazakhstan by rail. For the time being, China has access to only two oil fields in Central Asia, namely the Aktiubinsk and Uzen oil fields, which are rather small. Regional economic cooperation is important to China's economic interests. Northwest China, particularly Xinjiang, is China's major beneficiary in Central Asian regional economic cooperation. Among the five northwest provinces of China, Xinjiang is the largest. Ten of the 16 ports in Xinjiang, authorized by the central government, are linked to Central Asia. There are also another 11 land ports, authorized by the local government. Economic cooperation with Central Asia plays a very significant role in Xinjiang's economic development. Trade with the Central Asian countries accounts for over 60% of Xinjiang's foreign trade volume. Between 1991 and 2000, the total trade volume between Xinjiang and the Central Asian countries has been calculated at about seven billion dollars, with a 45-percent-per-year increase, and it continues to grow. In the first ten months of 2003, the volume of trade in Xinjiang reached 3.5 bil lion dollars, about two billion of which came from trade with Kazakhstan, and was almost twice as high as that of the previous year. To promote economic development of China's West, including the northwest, the Chinese central government launched the "Go West" campaign. In so doing, the Chinese government is encouraging closer cooperation between the West and the East of China, on the one hand, and between China's West and the rest of the world, on the other. It is stimulating economic relations between China's northwest and Central Asia. In the long run, China is interested in turning Central Asia into a free trade zone within the framework of the SCO. Of course, there is still a very long way to go. In summary, China's policy orientation toward Central Asia is based on China's main interests in Central Asia: 1) to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism; 2) to maintain stability in the region; 3) to foster economic prosperity in the region; 4) to ensure that the Central Asian nations are amicable toward China; 5) to ensure that the Central Asian nations will not fall under the control of any major power; 6) to ensure that no military bloc directed against China is formed; and 7) to ensure that Central Asia's energy resources are open to China. China's Posture in Central Asia China's entry into Central Asia occurred naturally as the region became an independent geopolitical space. Since the beginning of Central Asian independence, China has exerted considerable inf luence over the region. First, China is geographically close to Central Asia and shares common borders of over 3,000 km with three of the Central Asian nations, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. China is also close to another two Central Asian nations, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Geographically, China is a country that shares common borders with most of the Central Asian states and is the closest territorially to them. Secondly, settling border issues was an important area of work between China and Central Asia. Sino-Soviet border negotiations were underway when Central Asia gained its independence. Most of the western Sino-Soviet borders became Sino-Central Asian borders after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Three Central Asian nations decided to side with Russia and continue border negotiations with China. The third reason is that the Chinese minorities have countless ties with the Central Asian nations with respect to ethnicity, religion, culture, history, and customs, which can only but lead to special relations between China and Central Asia. Fourthly, China and Central Asia shared more than a two-thousand-year-long history of interrelations, which came to a halt only one-and-a-half centuries ago. However, deep-rooted historical relations were only frozen, never lost. The region's independence brought these dormant historical relations to the surface again. Historic memory closes the gap between China and Central Asia. The above reasons make it possible for China to become an inf luential major power in the region as soon as Central Asia emerges onto the world arena. Among all the inf luential potentials China possesses in Central Asia, the most distinct advantages are its geographical proximity, growing economy, convenient transportation network, its use of Central Asia as a possible alternative 365

energy route with stable consumption of the region's energy resources, and its image as an equal and friendly partner. Compared with the other great powers in Central Asia, China is weaker in military inf luence and does not have the ability to offer the same amount of economic aid as the U. S. In addition, China's cultural and political model is less attractive to the Central Asian elite, particularly to the young generation. The Central Asia economy was relatively backward in the Soviet era . With the fall of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the unified economic ties, the former Soviet Union states fell into an economic recession without exception. Given this situation, Chinese goods, cheap and practical, poured into Central Asia and became the source of staple consumer goods for local citizens with a very low purchasing power. Border trade gradually developed and Chinese goods had a large market share in Central Asia. International trade is an important channel and an important representation of China's re-entry into Central Asia. As Mr. Ashimbaev, director of the Kazakhstan Presidential Institute of Strategic Studies, puts it, "trade of commodities is the key base on which China places its foot in Central Asia. "7 In the mid-1990s, with the Taliban in power in Afghanistan, Central Asian security worsened and the threat of terrorism, separatism, and extremism grew in the region, which posed a common threat, though in different forms, to China, Central Asia, and Russia. In order to continue their cooperation and deal with the common threat after completing their border negotiations, China, Russia, and three Central Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) formed the Shanghai Five in 1996. The Shanghai Five is an important mechanism for protecting the security of each nation, as well as an important way for China to participate in Central Asian security affairs. In 2001, the Shanghai Five was transformed into a more permanent regional cooperation organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The founding of the SCO is China's strategic pass into Central Asia, and also a breakthrough in China's Central Asian diplomacy. The founding of the SCO provides China with a security protection mechanism, an established channel for China to participate in Central Asian affairs, and a platform for China to cooperate with Central Asia comprehensively. The founding of the SCO further indicates that China and Russia have reached strategic compromises and achieved a strategic balance in Central Asia, and that they have recognized each other's interests in Central Asia and are making progress in strategic cooperation. In the Western media, however, the SCO has been described as China and Russia's attempt to prevent the U. S. and NATO from entering the Central Asian region. In summary, the founding of the SCO makes it possible for China to maintain a posture in Central Asia with strong dynamics and potential. An important change occurred on the security and geopolitical scene in Central Asia following the post-9/11 U. S. troop deployment and fall of the Taliban. Russia and the U. S. cooperated in Central Asia beyond all expectations, the Central Asian nations leaned toward the U. S. politically, and the U. S. 's inf luence over Central Asia grew remarkably. This change has substantially affected China's posture in the region. Commentators believe that the events of 9/11 compromised the role of the SCO in its protection of Central Asian security and stemmed China's growing inf luence in Central Asia, which had an unfavorable effect on China's posture in Central Asia. As Eugene B. Rumer puts it, "A regional power broker prior to 11 September, China now finds itself marginalized, displaced, and virtually alone, pondering the unenviable (for Beijing) option of playing second fiddle to the United States and a host of its newfound best friends. No matter how much China gains from the U. S military campaign-and there can be little doubt that it has been a beneficiary of the campaign against Taliban and the ensuing blow to the operations of its own Uighur militants-U. S. preponderance in Central Asia must be a serious setback to a government that aspires to the role of an Asian superpower. "8 It is true that the geopolitical changes in Central Asia in the wake of 9/11 came as a surprise to China. Notwithstanding, its impact on China and China's self-assessment of its situation are not as strong and pessimistic as perceived by some foreign analysts. The main reason for the discrepancy lies in the fact that these foreign analysts are highlighting the competition and rivalry between China and the U. S. and observing Sino-U. S. relations through the lens of geopolitics, while China, though aware of the geopolitical factors, does not regard Sino-U. S. relations as natural competition and confrontation, nor does China automatically regard an encounter between China and the U. S. in any region as equivalent to a Sino-U. S. confrontation. Sino-Russian relations have not changed since the improvement of Russo-U. 366

S. relations. China's relations with the Central Asian nations have not been ostensibly undermined. The SCO sustained its development and grew, rather than becoming paralyzed, as some analysts anticipated. Thus, China's strategic standing in Central Asia has not been devastatingly undermined, only challenged, by the post- 9/11 geopolitical changes in Central Asia. Russia's Interests in Central Asia Russia's interests in Central Asia are very complicated. Russia has countless nexuses with Central Asia in terms of history, culture, humanity, and psychology. Furthermore, Russia is still in the process of adjusting its relations with Central Asia after the latter ceded from the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Overall, their relations are still in a state of f lux. History matters in identifying Russia's interests in Central Asia. Russia's interests in Central Asia depend not only on material benefit, but also on nostalgic feelings and psychology. In other words, Russia's interests in Central Asia are in part real, and in part emotional and psychological, which is surreal and virtual, and even unrealistic. Russia's core interests in Central Asia are to maintain its special relations with Central Asia with respect to politics, economics, security, culture, history, and language. While Russia's policies in Central Asia do ref lect real interests, they are also based on the historical legacy of Russian-Central Asian relations. This legacy continues to color Russia's perception of reality and of Central Asia. Great changes have occurred in Central Asia, and Russia has been slow to react to these developments. These changes, which include politics, economics, culture, social life, and geopolitics, will eventually lead to a redefinition of Russia's concept of Central Asia and to an eventual change in Russia's overall interests in Central Asia. Among Russia's realistic interests in Central Asia, security interests are the most vital, especially while Russia is still adjusting to its post-Cold War position. Russia's security interests in Central Asia are multifaceted. The first includes the struggle against international terrorism and religious extremism, and the second is fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic, while the Russian government also considers drug trafficking a threat to Russia's national security. The third dimension of Russia's interests in Central Asia is regional stability. Central Asia is near Russia, and the five newly independent CIS nations are Russia's neighbors or part of its "near abroad." The regimes in the Central Asia countries are weak, their economies are limping, and their societies are severely fragmented, which provide fertile soil for terrorism and extremism and are elements of regional instability. Any instability in Central Asia will have immediate repercussions in Russia, which will incur undesirable political and economic costs for Russia, given the fact that Russia is actively present in Central Asia and has special relations with and commitments to the region. Russia's security interests in Central Asia are to ensure Central Asia as Russia's backyard and prevent it from being controlled by other major powers and posing a strategic threat to Russia. After 9/11, Russia allowed the U. S. to deploy its troops in Central Asia to attack the Taliban in Afghanistan, which helped to eliminate or alleviate the security threat inf licted by international terrorism on Russia and was thus in Russia's security interests. Actually Russia could have done nothing to stop the U. S. 's military entry, given the international atmosphere at the time and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan's invitation. Although the U. S. set up military bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan after 9/11, Russia does not want to see a long-term U. S. military presence in Central Asia. 9 Economic interests are Russia's important interests in Central Asia, both in economic and political terms. In spite of the weakening economic relations between Central Asia and Russia during the last decade, the Central Asian nations still maintain close economic relations with Russia and are one of the most likely regions in the CIS to integrate with Russia economically. This is in Russia's interest, and the region's transportation infrastructure currently makes Russia the best avenue of export for Central Asia goods. Russia's other important interest in Central Asia is controlling the energy outlets. Central Asian nations are rich in energy, but in the past their export routes have been entirely controlled by Russia. Russia takes advantage of its geographic privileges and infrastructure to control the transportation of Central 367

Asian energy export, which not only helps Russia to exert its political inf luence on Central Asia, but also brings enormous economic benefit to Russia. Russia has an enduring cultural connection with Central Asia. Central Asia is home to a great many ethnic Russians, which constitutes Russia's special interests in Central Asia. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, ethnic Russians accounted for about 20% of the total population in Central Asia. Now ethnic Russians in Central Asia are estimated at about six million and account for about 12% of the to tal population in Central Asia. 10 Protection of Russians' rights and equality in Central Asia has been increasingly regarded as one of Russia's important national interests and policies in Central Asia. Thus, ethnic Russians have become an important lever by which Russia exerts its inf luence on Central Asia. Russia's Posture in Central Asia Russia's standing in Central Asia is different from China's. While China is raising its posture in Central Asia from scratch, Russia is retrogressing continually from the days when Russians were ubiquitous in Central Asia. Russia lost its overall inf luence on the Central Asian nations, which sought independence and tried their best to throw off Russia's control. As the Russian media reports, "Russia today is politically unstable and economically unattractive. The lifestyle and standard of living of a considerable number of Russians are not attractive to most Central Asians. Russia's culture is not unique. Finally, Russia's armed forces today are not exalted or emulated. "11 It was natural that Russia's inf luence in Central Asia would decline. It was not until the late 1990s that the decline of Russia's inf luence in Central Asia went into reverse. Since taking office in 2000, President Putin paid more attention to Russia's strategic and economic input in the CIS, including in Central Asia, and made some tactical adjustments. Russia shifted to a more placatory policy toward Central Asia, with less highhandedness. It replaced pure high pressure with the combination of carrot and stick, thus increasing Central Asia's attraction to Russia. Tactically, Russia assumed a new approach to Central Asia, emphasizing bilateral instead of multilateral approaches. Putin's policy worked. Since 2000, Russia's inf luence in Central Asia has risen. Bilateral relations have developed between Russia and the Central Asian states. In particular, Russia's relations with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, lukewarm in the past, have improved remarkably. In terms of economic cooperation, Russia is recovering its inf luence in Central Asia. In October 2000, the Eurasian Customs Union, involving Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus, was transformed into the Eurasian Economic Community, a significant advancement in economic integration between Russia and Central Asia. The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has seen substantial progress. In May 2001, the CSTO, comprising Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and some other CIS states, decided to set up the Rapid Reaction Force. On 23 May 2003, the first military airbase of the CSTO, Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan, went into operation. Russian President Mr. Putin and Kyrgyzstan President Mr. Akaev attended the ceremony. Kant airbase is located near Bishkek, the capital of the country, and it is very close, about 30 kilometers, to Manas airport, where American and alliance's military forces are deployed. About 10-15 Su- 25 and Su-27, some military helicopters, transporters, and about 500 troops will be permanently stationed at Kant airbase. 12 This demonstrated that Russia has made new progress in the military sphere in Central Asia, though it is still unclear whether this move is more about politics than about practical security needs. The events of 9/11 undoubtedly dealt a blow to Russia's presence in Central Asia. 13 The U. S. presence in Central Asia undermined the concept that Russia was the only power entitled to deploy troops and have a military presence in the region. This is a major U. S. encroachment into Russia's sphere of inf luence and constitutes one of the tremendous changes in Russia's geopolitical posture. In fact, no part of Russia's sphere of inf luence has been able to deny U. S. troops since. Following the events of 9/11, the Central Asian nations began leaning toward the U. S. to various degrees. Although the U. S. has not made any explicit commitment to Central Asian security, its military presence in Central Asia per se offered a security alternative to the Central Asian nations, which further eclipsed Russia's role in Central Asian security and especially the role of the CSTO. 368

Notwithstanding Russia's declining strategic presence and inf luence in Central Asia in the wake of the Soviet disintegration, and the events of 9/11 as well, Russia is still the most deep-rooted power in Central Asia. Russia has been in Central Asia for one-and-a-half centuries and has strong political, economic, military, cultural ties with Central Asia, which cannot be cut off overnight. Most of the Central Asian elites were educated in the Soviet Union, and in Russia in particular. Central Asians speak Russian, listen to Russian broadcasts, watch Russian TV, and are familiar with the members of the Russian elite and celebrities. Many Central Asians have relatives and friends in Russia. Central Asia has close ties with Russia in social life as well. There are no obstacles in language and thinking habits between the elites of Central Asia and Russia. Russia is still the most important trade partner of the Central Asian nations, though their share in Russia's foreign trade has fallen. Russia is the largest trade partner of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Russian-Uzbekistan and Russian- Kazakhstan trade accounts for 16% and 35% of the latter's foreign trade, respectively. Although the Central Asian nations place great hopes on the West's developed countries, Russia is still the major market for their products. Energy is Central Asia's most important asset, but its outlet is basically controlled by Russia. Turkmenistan's natural gas and Kazakhstan's oil generally need Russia's pipelines for their export notwithstanding. The situation will not change much until the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is put into operation. The Central Asians depend greatly on Russia for their security and defense. Tajikistan's border is patrolled by Russian troops. Central Asian officers are trained in Russia. Central Asian armaments are provided mainly by Russia. The Eurasian Economic Community and the CSTO are two levers with which Russia can rally the Central Asian nations. The Eurasian Economic Community is a political and economic lever, and the CSTO is a military and security one. It should not be forgotten that the shock which the post-9/11 and the Central Asian geopolitical changes gave Russia nevertheless boosted Russia's strategic presence in Central Asia. In May 2002, Russia hosted the conference that decided to turn the Collective Security Treaty into the CSTO. Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan was the first one Russia set up in Central Asia following the fall of the Soviet Union. The former Soviet Union, including Russia and the Central Asian nations, has sped up its economic integration since February 2003, when the Eurasian Economic Community held its first summit in Moscow. In April 2003, Russia and Turkmenistan signed a 25-year-long agreement on energy coopera tion, which indicated great progress in their relations, not only in economic, but also in political terms. Undoubtedly, Russia has resumed the momentum of its political, economic, and security expansion in Central Asia.

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NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW GEOPOLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA: AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

INTRODUCTION This book, prepared by the group of authors from the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of RK, is devoted to geopolitics and international relations events after the events of September 11, 2001 and antiterrorist operation of USA and their allies in Afghanistan and Central Asia. These changes in world politics and global balance of power had an impact on world and regional situation, and foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan as well. Actually, the geopolitical picture of the contemporary world has rapidly changed before our eyes. Thus, the purpose of this research is to reflect all factors of world politics, positions of the main powers and other actors involved into the geopolitics of Central Asia, and to analyze the influence of qualitatively new international situation on Kazakhstan. Especially the issue of the radical change in balance of power in Eurasia during last year is examined. The US military and political presence at the heart of our continent has become a reality. It is difficult to predict whether positive or negative consequences to expect in the future. The book New challenges and new geopolitics in Central Asia: after September 11 is based on not chronological, but problematic principle. We have tried to examine all main events in world politics after acts of terrorism in USA proceeding from positions of all interested and involved actors. The first part of the book is devoted to the development of the events within the frameworks of preparation, realization and consequences of antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan. As is well known, the direct and the very first result of antiterrorist campaign was the overthrow of Taliban regime, actually threatening the security of Central Asia, and also to the interests of nearby powers for the last few years. Actually, having carried out the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 years and having placed the bases in Central Asian countries, the USA have undertaken a role of the main military arbitrator in the center of Eurasia; a role which all other conducting powers of region have refused. It is became obvious that only American military power could eliminate Taliban regime and remove the direct threat to Central Asia. However, the internal political situation in Afghanistan is still a matter of great concern. The threat of internal peace violation in this country is still exist. In spite of the international peace-making forces presence in Afghanistan as guarantors of stability, the threat of destabilization is still high. Hence, indirect threat to the security of Central Asia is also exist. Besides, the international community has not solved another urgent issue of drug trafficking from Afghanistan, what is actual not only for Central Asia, but also for more remote regions of the CIS and Europe. The second part of the book examines the new geopolitical situation from the point of view of its impact on Central Asian countries and on its neighbors. We tried to reflect not only changes in international relations, but also to show the interrelation between the internal and external factors. The main task of the second part is to reveal the impact of new international situation on the policy of the countries of the region and their neighbors toward great world powers. We acknowledged that the countries examined in this part were more objects, than subjects of world geopolitics, excluding Iran. It is obvious, that these states had to test the most powerful outside influence caused by the sharp changes in regional disposition of forces and the appearance here of the new regional actors such as the United States and their NATO allies. Pakistan had to go through the dramatic transformation. Under the pressure of the antiterrorist coalition the country was compelled to turn from the ally of Taliban to antitaliban position. Internal political development in this country and stability of P. Musharrafs regime, especially after autumn 2002 parliamentary elections, is still worrisome: the threat of destabilization of Pakistan and the strengthening of the influence of Islamic moods on the foreign policy of Islamabad is kept. Confrontation of Pakistan with India, in many respects provoked by the weakening of the strategic positions, first as the result of antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, has put South Asia region on the edge of military and nuclear confrontation in spring 2002. In the beginning of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan the chance of stopping of the long-term confrontation between Iran and United States has appeared. This would have a positive effect on situation in 370

the Middle and Near East, in Caspian Sea region. However, Washington, despite of the support by Teheran the antitaliban operations, not only continued the confrontation with IRI, but also has toughened its policy toward Teheran, having ranked the latter as a part of the so-called axis of evil in February 2002. It is possible, that increased US involvement and weakened positions of Iran in Central Asia have resulted in taking more tough position by Teheran on Caspian Sea delimitation issue under the pressure of internal conservative forces. The third part of the book examines the policy of great world powers, whose interests, anyhow, lay in Central Asia. These great world powers and the centers of geopolitical force involved in Central Asia are Russia, the USA, China and the European Union. It is argued that the geopolitical configuration in the Central Asian region, as well as the balance of power between these large actors have changed. The influence of the West, first of all the United States which have carried out the unprecedented for the modern epoch military operation in Afghanistan and have created military infrastructure not only on the territory of this country, but also in the number of Central Asian states, has greatly increased. The policy of such largest neighbors of Central Asia as Russia and China has also undergone some changes. Moscow and Beijing, who were among the first countries rendered the support to American efforts in the struggle against international terrorism in 2001, faced qualitatively new situation in the region, touching their national interests, in the beginning of 2002. In this connection it was worth analyzing for us the reaction of Russia and China to these changes in order to find out, how our great neighbors are trying to elaborate strategy in new conditions and how this will be reflected on the Central Asian countries. The most obvious consequence of geopolitical changes was quite frank and for the long time expected movement of Russia towards the West. Rapprochement of Russia to USA, and the European Union as a whole represents certainly a positive process with really predicted positive consequences provided that the legitimate interests of all sides there will be taken into account. It is should be mentioned, that existed before suspiciousness, jealousy and misunderstanding of Moscow have almost completely disappeared on the issue of independent contacts of CA countries with the West. At the same time, the policy of Russia became some kind of a signal for all the countries of the region to develop high-level contacts with the West in militarypolitical and strategic spheres. On the other hand, such organizations as CST (Collective Security Treaty) and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) have faced in new situation with new challenges. All members of these organizations have felt an urgent necessity to reconsider the purposes and tasks of their participation in these organizations. Being the largest economic power the European Union aspires to be also one of military-political and geopolitical centers in the world. The EU actively develops its common foreign and defensive policy, tries to act as one actor on the world scene though not always successfully. Nevertheless, the existence of an objective trend is obvious: the EU prepares in future if not to compete with USA but certainly to promote independent policy and to occupy its own geopolitical place on international scene. This touchs on Central Asia since the EU tries to include into its sphere of geopolitical interests not only the countries of Eastern Europe, but also a significant part of the Central Eurasia, that is the CIS, including Caucasus, Caspian Sea and the Central Asian region. The expansion of EU is frequently treated as economic, technological and cultural domination. It is important and necessary to promote the development of this process on equal and civilized conditions as it was with the development of the European Community being the standard of voluntary and successful integration. In the future the development of following scenario should not be excluded, when the development of events will go in such a manner that the certain consensus on the division of geopolitical roles between Europe, America and Eurasia will be found. It is also possible, that instead of the notion Atlantic Europe dominating for the last half-centuries, the notion the Eurasian Europe will emerge. On the eastern part of Eurasia there is a grandiose process of appearing of new economy of the future and new geopolitical force China. Reunion of Hong Kong with Peoples Republic of China at once has transformed China into one of the largest financial powers of Asia. Reunion of Taiwan with China will transform Beijing into the strongest military-political and economic power in Asia and in all Asian Pacific Region. Interests of China will certainly spread and already are spreading on western direction Central Eurasia. These developments will touch on the interests of other great actors USA, Russia, Europe and other regional actors, and also the security of Central Asia stucked between all these main actors of the large geopolitical game. 371

Changed military-political situation in the beginning of 2002 in Central Asia was regarded by many experts as the weakening of strategic positions of China in which rear the USA and the NATO military bases had appeared. Thus, the long-term efforts of Peoples Republic of China, within the framework of SCO as well, on formation of stable and friendly space along its western borders were substituted under doubt. There was an impression, that Beijing throughout 2002 concentrated its efforts on strengthening of SCO mechanism and powers, maintaining of achieved level of mutual relations with Moscow and other Central Asian countries. The evolution of China-American relations is of great interest to examine. During the period after September events these relations had a dual, or waiting (on the part of China) character. Beijing initially having supported USA in the struggle against terrorism, later showed an extreme restraint about American policy in Central Asia being disturbed by the presence of the latter in the region. Internal political developments such as recent change of Chinese leadership in November 2002 at the XVI congress of Communist Party of China should have an impact on foreign policy of China. Nevertheless, Jiang Zemin tried to keep continuity in China-American relations and to bring to the White house the position of Beijing. The last part of the book is devoted to the foreign policy and interests of Kazakhstan in new geopolitical situation. Our purpose was not only to observe the evolution of the foreign policy of Kazakhstan during the last year, but also to focus on one of its central problems Caspian Sea, which presents the quintessence of the geopolitical struggle in the region, the mirror in which the interests of all actors involved into Central Asian geopolitics are reflected. Though, certainly, the problem of geopolitical struggle around Central Asia is much wider than only the Caspian problem which is a part of extensive picture. Nevertheless, we hope, that we managed to reflect all moments concerning rapid changes of international situation and global geopolitics in respect of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Thus, the issues examined in our book touch on a wide range of problems: international relations, security, geopolitics, international terrorism, globalization, bilateral and multilateral relations, geoeconomy etc. However we tried to focus the attention of readers first of all on political and geopolitical aspects of considered problems. We hope, that our book can be useful since it contains the materials which were not published in the scientific and mass media earlier, and also because it presents an analysis of current world politics and geopolitics and their impact on national interests of Kazakhstan. Actually the main reason and the purpose of this book concerned prospects for RK in world politics in new strategic environment. In this connection the following issues remain actual: whether international positions of Kazakhstan after September events have become more secure? What should Astana expect from the main geopolitical actors in the nearest future? What security and foreign policy should promote Kazakhstan toward its neighbors, world powers, international organizations and other actors? Whether geopolitical stability in Eurasia, the balance of powers and interests will be kept? This book does not pretend to answer all these questions, but since it examines the main trends in international relations and the process of formation of new geopolitical environment, it will be valuable for both scholars of international relations and broad readership. Authors of the book are confident, that the problems considered in the book will be actual within the nearest years. THE DRAMA OF AFGHANISTAN 1. Afghanistan before and after September 11 From the moment of April revolution of 1978 and till today Afghanistan is the main source of instability for the Eurasian continent. Now the situation in this country and around it still remains rather difficult and confusing, and still nobody can make the unequivocal estimation of the further development of the situation in Afghanistan, when and on what conditions the war in this country will be finished. Till the end of 2001 the situation in Afghanistan was characterized as a deadlock. Taking into account the real opportunities of the confronting sides (Taliban movement and the Northern Alliance), and also forces supporting them, none of the sides could achieve the overweight. Position of Talibs, supervising the biggest part of Afghanistan was rather unstable as inside the country this movement met with the resistance both from the side of so called united anti-Taliban coalition and from the local mostly non-Pashtun population. 372

Meanwhile the consequences of preservation of this military-political conflict in Afghanistan became more and more serious both inside the country, and far behind its limits. Afghanistan has turned into one of the main world manufacturers and suppliers of drugs, into a springboard for export of terrorism, political and religious extremism. Instability in Afghanistan had extremely destructive consequences for the countries, directly neighboring Afghanistan, including the countries of Central Asia, suffering from all the real and potential consequences of being close neighbors, first of all, military, social, and humanitarian ones. The influence of this constant war in Afghanistan on the situation in the Central Asia is diverse: export of radical ideology, terrorism and support of the extremist organizations of some of the countries of Central Asian region, a refugee problem, growth of interethnic and interstate intensity, drug trafficking and the weapon, potential military threat etc. In the whole, the analysis which was made before October 2001 of the difficult military-political situation in Afghanistan allows to outline the following hierarchy of the basic potential and real threats for the regional security of Central Asia. First, the export of religious extremism, terrorism and support of Islamic opposition by some of the countries of Central Asian region. The events of the last years which have occurred on the south of Kyrghyzstan and Uzbekistan once again proved that some analysts were right, saying that one of the basic and real threats for the stability of the existing secular regimes in Central Asia occurs from the part of religious extremists. These groups reject the results achieved in Central Asia on modernization and oppose the existing principles of the organization of the Central Asian countries and societies, and, hence, against the working political elite /1/. The basic external factor of the development of religious extremism in the region of Central Asia was the Afghan conflict. The only one naturally interested ally of the radical opposition of the extremist character of the countries of Central Asia there became in the middle of 90s Taliban movement supporting the return to the values of the initial Muslim community and actually that rejecting the right of traditional secular elite of the Central Asian Newly Independent States for legitimacy of its governing in Muslim societies of some of the countries of the region, first of all Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The interest of IMU and forces supporting it in the state reorganization according to the model of the organization of an initial Muslim community wahhabism in the Central Asia, in Muslim communities of all post-Soviet space was expressed until now mainly by the way of direct support of the religious extremist organizations of some the countries of the Central Asia, such as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Afghanistan supervised according to different estimations up to 90 % from all the territory of the country by the movement of Taliban, has turned into the main base for the preparation of religious extremists, including citizens of the countries of Central Asia. Second, not less dangerous threat, which was constantly kept in suspense the governments of the countries of Central Asia was the possible uncontrollable streams of refugees from Afghanistan, provoked by the continuation of military actions that should destabilize the situation in all the region. Here it is necessary to take into account, that besides huge human streams of peaceful inhabitants of the North of Afghanistan, the stream of weapon smuggling, and the most important penetration among the peaceful citizens the members of the extremist organizations there was expected. In this case, next close to the Afghanistan country of Central Asia, first of all Tajikistan, hardly by the virtue of its own weakness could sustain such an impact and keep the control over the situation in its own country. Third, it was impossible to dismiss the potential danger of the direct military threat on the part of Taliban movement. Taliban with the help of the allies had a serious and skilled military force, for the govern ability of which military actions were necessary. Having estimated all the volume of the existing and potential threats, certainly, it is possible to assert, that without the stability in Afghanistan it is impossible to provide security in the region of Central Asia. Naturally enough, that the countries of Central Asia, all without exception, are deeply interested in normalization of the situation in Afghanistan. It is in the interests of Central Asia to keep to the policy of maxi373

mum assistance to the process of the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan, reconciliation of the conflicting sides and the establishment in the country of the disposition of the forces, adequate to the interests of the countries of Central Asia. That is, the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan does not mean simply the establishment of peace, but the establishment of such a peace which would be stable, in which Afghanistan would stop to be a source of drug trafficking, international terrorism and religious extremism. Terrorist acts of September 11 in New York and Washington and the operation which has followed them of the American and British armies in Afghanistan had a consequence of such a process of cardinal change of geopolitical arrangement of forces in the world, and in very quick terms. The very country, which greatly felt the consequences of the events of September 11, was Afghanistan. Concealing terrorist number one Usama bin Laden became the reason of the sharp change of the attitude of the world community and mainly USA to the Taliban movement. United States have received 46 multilateral declarations of support, including on the part of the United Nations, NATO, OAS, ANZUS. 17 states have directed to the zone of the responsibility of the Central command of USA over 16 500 of military personal. 136 countries in this or that form have offered the military help. 142 states issued decrees and laws on freezing actives of terrorists of the organizations suspected in their support. The list is made of 189 organizations, structures and the individuals rendering financial help to terrorism. Totally on various bank accounts there is blocked $ 104,8 million (34,2 million in USA; 70,6 million abroad). Since September 11, there were arrested about one thousand agents of Al-Queda in 60 countries. 2. The antiterrorist operation October 7 of 2001, USA and their allies have begun the full-scale operation in Afghanistan. The results of the military antiterrorist action have shown, that United States are if necessary ready for the most rigid and resolute actions. So, the White House has rejected the offer of IOC on cease-fire in Afghanistan for the period of Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, and also the request of the International Red Cross not to use nuclear weapons during the antiterrorist operation. These facts became indirect proofs of the course of USA for the revision of the usual system of the international relations (non-use of the nuclear weapon and others weapons of mass destruction against the sides which are not having those, or non-use of the nuclear weapon first). The beginning of the military operation started with the series of the bombing attacks, made by Air Forces of USA and Great Britain on strategically important objects occupied by Taliban. In the first days city of Kabul was subjected to mass air attacks, then there were attacked Kandahar, Herat, Jelalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif etc. As the result there were practically completely destroyed the airports in these cities which were used by the Talibs in the military purposes. According to Pentagon, all the aviation park of the Air Forces of Talibs, consisting of 80 warplanes (basically the MIG 21) and the system of air defense were destroyed within several days. Strikes were rendered also on military camps of Al-Qaeda and Taliban, on governmental agencies, power stations and other strategically important objects. In the first day of the operation there were involved 40 warplanes. On the targets on the territory of Afghanistan from the American and British submarines there were launched more than 50 cruise missiles. At the first stage of the operation number of the peace-making contingent was: Germany 1200, Great Britain 1500, Spain 700, Argentina 600, France 400, Italy 300, Czech 200, Greece 150 and Turkey 300. Totally more than 5 thousand people. Practically having destroyed completely the main strategically important objects of Talibans military infrastructure and having taken under control the air space, allies gradually began to shift to the tactics of ground operations which purpose was the annihilation of the opponent on all the territory of the country. In this connection USA have transferred the basic accent on the amplified help to the Northern Alliance for drawing military defeat to Talibs. Since November USA have begun mass delivery of weapons and ammunition to all the participants of the anti-Talib coalitions, including Tajiks and Hazaras. The Pentagon has managed to organize the interaction with the forces of Northern Alliance on the tactical level. Groups of communication of USA, were working all over again only in the ranks of supporters of General R. Dostum, have adjusted coordination with Tajiks 374

of General M. Fakhim, and also with groups of the former governor of Herat Ismail Khan. Simultaneously the Air Forces of USA were making active actions on the destruction of alive force, combat techniques and vehicles of Talibs from the air. The opponent has practically lost the opportunity to maneuver armies to move reserves and to supply the armies on the front line. As the result all conditions for the large-scale offensive of the armies of Northern Alliance on the positions of Talibs there were created. If in the north of Afghanistan the victory over Talibs was achieved basically as the result of conducting military actions, in the south by means of revolts of so-called insurgents from Pashtun population. Today it is difficult to make an exact estimation concerning the structure and the ideological belonging of the insurgents in Kandahar and Jelalabad. There is a version that the mutiny against Talibs was organized by the supporters of the former king of Afghanistan Zahir-Shah. However the more possible variant represents the organization of the revolt on the part of Pashtuns with the support of Pakistan which is interested in their active participation in the post-war government of Afghanistan. Most likely, there were launched the financial resources which traditionally played an essential role in the success of mujahideens in the 1980es and Talibs in the middle of 1990es. As the result, in Afghanistan there was a political configuration in which dominant positions were oc cupied by Northern Alliance. Taliban as the influential political force has been actually ousted from the political scene of Afghanistan. The circumstances have compelled Talibs to take a role of opposition and to proceed to the methods of conducting guerrilla war. Taking into account the natural landscape of Afghanistan such war can proceed for rather a long time, but it will not result in the restoration of the political influence of Taliban. Today it is possible to speak in Afghanistan there started the post-Talib period. In the whole it is necessary to note, that the military success was achieved, first of all, due to the organized interaction between all the opponents of Talibs under the leadership of USA /2/. Pentagon used various methods for the realization of the operation. They were based on mass bombardments from the air; in the cases when Americans faced with the fierce resistance of the guerillas, the basic weight of the direct collisions with them was shifted on the Afghani governmental sides. Thus, the American military officers have undertaken the amplified support of Afghans and the financial compensation for the participation in the operations on their side. In the middle of March, 2002 the President of USA G. Bush has declared the end of the first stage after the struggle against the global terrorism and transition of the antiterrorist campaign onto the second phase. The basic contents of the second stage is its qualitative change which consists in the following: 1. Transition to the ground conventional forces tactics of conducting operations; 2. Decrease of the activity of USA and Great Britain in antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan; 3. Gradual taking over the leading parts of the military divisions of the allies of USA and Great Britain: Turkey, Australia, the European countries; 4. Shifting of the operations to the Pakistan territory, bordering Afghanistan. Very constantly from Afghanistan there were coming messages about the next appearance on public of Usama bin Laden. Reliability of this information is not confirmed, but the fact of realization in mountain areas on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan of some special operations does not allow to reject these facts completely. The most efficient groups of insurgents were fixed by means of the investigation of allies in southern areas of Afghanistan. In spite of the fact that groups of Talibs and Al-Qaeda during the operation Indestructible freedom have had serious casualties, they have still kept the fighting ability. Practically on all the territory of Afghanistan there happened attacks on some objects and patrols of coalition forces. The antiterrorist coalition was compelled to increase the military contingent because it is hardly possible with the help of only rocket bombing strikes from the air without the conventional armed forces and special operations to destroy groups of extremists in the specific conditions of mountain districts. It was proved by the operation Anaconda (February, March 2002) in province Paktia which didnt not result in the complete liquidation of the opponent. Growth of the volume of the next Afghani campaign compelled Washington to shift the part of tasks on their allies on the coalition, expanding the degree of their participation in the antiterrorist operation. From this moment, USA 375

any more do not plan to operate in Afghanistan alone and closely aspire to coordinate the actions with the allies. The Security Council of the United Nations has accepted on May 23, 2002 the resolution 1413 about the prolongation of the mandate of the international forces on the security safeguarding in Afghanistan for the additional 6-months period /3/. Command of the international contingent since June 21, 2002 will be transferred to Turkish general Hakimi Zurullu, which within 6 months will be heading more than 4 thousand 600 military men from 18 states /4/. Transferring of the command to Turkey as to a Muslim country, USA insisted to show, that the war in Afghanistan is not the war of the West with Islam, but its the war with the international terrorism which is not having either national, or religious identification. Divisions of the US special force, Great Britain, Canada and Australia within the Spring Summer of 2002 have carried out a number of large joint special actions in the east and southeast of the country. Operations have begun from March in the mountains directly to the south from Gardez in Paktia province near the border with Pakistan. The largest operation from the beginning of the action Anaconda was finished by the destruction from 800 up to thousand people of the opponent. From the beginning of May in southern areas of Paktia province 60 km from the Pakistan border in the active phase included the operation Snipe in which there have taken part about a thousand of special force soldiers and approximately 700 members of the personnel. After the operation Desert Storm it is the most large-scale operation for the divisions of special force of Great Britain. Practically simultaneously on the neighboring Pakistan territory in the province Northern Vaziristan, in a so-called zone of residing of free Pashtun tribes, large-scale operation began from the code name Mountain leopard. The American and Pakistan divisions of special forces have taken part in it. In the time of the counter terrorist operation American commandos for the first time acted on Pakistan territory. Official Islamabad, being afraid of the anti-American performances, tried to keep it secret. Pashtuns extremely painfully perceive the presence of foreigners on the patrimonial grounds which are supervised by the government of Pakistan only nominally. In May of 2002 in the province of Paktia joint American British-Australian military operation which has received the name Condor also was implemented. In June the forces of the international antiterrorist coalition have made a large scale operation in the mountains of three southern and central provinces of Afghanistan Gor, Helmand and Uruzgan where there were supposed to be the former head of Taliban regime mullah Omar and his nearest environment can hide. According to the American investigation, they can be in the region of Marco (a province of Gor). Other areas of search outskirts of the cities of Sangin, Musakala and Girishk in the province of Helmand. Analyzing the results of the operations it is possible to draw a number of conclusions. The first: in general, implementation of the tasks of the operation Enduring Freedom appeared not so successful practically. An overall objective the complete annihilation of the armed Talib-formations and AlQaeda was not done. If in the beginning the question was a combination of air strikes and actions of special forces the further operation has developed into the overland war. This was promoted by a number of factors: transparency of Afghan-Pakistan border; double game of Pashtun field commanders in the south of Afghanistan; complexity of transferring the actions on pursuing terrorists to the border territory of Pakistan. In this case is too early to speak about approximate terms for the finishing of the operation. But it is obvious, that this process will be delayed for many years. The second: the situation is aggravated by the periodical mistakes of the American military men resulting in human victims among the peaceful population. Aiming on the targets, it was frequently done according to some Afghani field commanders who, using the opportunity, focused aircraft of allies on the competitors in their struggle for the powers in the regions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan has called the leadership of AISEF to take all necessary measures not to let within the framework of this antiterrorist operation the actions leading to victims among the peaceful population. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan has distributed the special application in connection with the incident in province Uruzgan in the south of the country where as the result of the air strike of Americans some peaceful inhabitants died and some were wounded /5/. In the document, there is underlined the necessity of more careful check by the leadership of AISEF of all the secret-service information before 376

implementing operations on the destruction of insurgents of Al-Qaeda, in particular, is emphasized. Incident in Uruzgan has caused also the more rigid reaction of local population. On July 12 near the settlement of Tarinkut (Uruzgan) the staff of American special forces was attacked. It is possible, that in this case the local residents could organize the attack, as the revenge for their lost fellow tribesmen. That is among the local population the discontent by the actions of foreign military men is clear, that seriously complicates the conditions in which it is necessary to operate for the of divisions AISEF. The third: the United States are interested in the quick finishing of the operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, at least that part where the American armed forces are involved. It has been already practically solved, that the following stage of antiterrorist operation should become Iraq. Conducting operations at once in two parts of the continent removed from each other it is rather inconvenient even for USA. In this case it is possible the further decrease of the military activity of USA in Afghanistan and transfer of the basic role to the allies. And, most likely, it does not concern Great Britain which started a process of the withdrawal of the divisions from the country. The British military contingent in Afghanistan and around of it by the end of summer is reduced more than twice. After the withdrawal in July there stayed the basic part of the contingent 400 British military men, mainly engineering staff and technical experts /6/. It is possible to assume, that it is connected with the fact that British army will be claimed in Iraq. The fourth: during the antiterrorist operation military department of USA could receive useful practical experience. In particular, new military tactics, so-called swarming expansion of small divisions of soldiers connected among themselves and with aircraft for the first time is applied. This tactics means conducting the war in the style of guerrilla actions without using special powerful types of the weapon. The basic emphasis is made on mobility, the precision weapon, an effective communication facility and full interaction of ground and air forces. This new type of war has received the name of the Network war. Thus, USA used the war in Afghanistan for the approbation of the new system military technologies which development was done from the beginning of 1990es that means the introduction of military science into the new era. In practice the questions of the interaction of USA and allies are fulfilled by means of conducting operations against terrorists. There were tested various kinds of weapons and military equipment in mountainous conditions. So, in Afghanistan there were widely used a satellite global item system GPS, unmanned flying vehicles, complex RLS for the detection of attacks and targets J-stars. For the first time unmanned flying vehicles Predator were used for the destruction of the ground targets by the missiles Hellfire. In bombing of mountain massive vacuum bombs were widely applied. According to the Afghani experience the new supermodern regimentals for the army of USA will be created also. As has officially declared the Massachusetts institute of technology, for the realization of this project there was singed a five years contract with the institute for the sum of 50 million dollars. According to the foreign mass media, in April of this year scientists from the ministry of power of USA have begun the development of a new kind of the nuclear weapon, capable to destroy the underground strengthening with giving the least harm to the ground infrastructure /7/. The fifth: in these conditions the chapter of a transition government of Kh. Karzay also stakes on cre ation of powerful armed forces which could take a conglomerate of military groups under control. Basically, USA and the Great Britain support this decision and are ready to render the financial and military technical help. Simultaneously, in order to win the time for strengthening the mode, Karzay demands from the West to strengthen the international forces in the frameworks of antiterrorist coalitions and to expand the peacekeeping contingent. Events of the beginning of April have made USA more seriously think of strengthening of the regime of the new government and maintenance of stability in the country with the help of the strong government. The American side considers, that the army and security service of the regime should achieve 60-70 thousand people, USA will train and train these forces, and also, most likely, will provide their financial support. Germany, Great Britain and Italy also support the direction of strengthening of the in dependence of Afghans in the business of security in the country. It is connected to the unwillingness of Europeans to increase the peace-keeping contingents in Afghanistan by financial and political reasons. 377

*** In the whole, military experts consider, that the situation in the country from the point of view of maintenance of stability and prevention of risk of the new military collisions is still extremely difficult. It is connected with that fact that the system and the infrastructure of the militarized formations was kept, not submitting to the central government and entering the antagonism with each other. Sooner or later, the American and peace-keeping forces could be involved into inner Afghan civil war. Government of Karzay really supervises only Kabul and some large cities, that completely reminds the situation of the beginning of 1990es. 3. Clash of strategic interests The geopolitical structure of Afghanistan in the strategically important region in the center of Eurasia predetermines the presence of the interests of some large international players. Each of competing Afghani groups is based on the external support coming from this or that country. This factor became one of the most determining in the development of the situation in the country. *** Afghanistan and the events, developing in this country during the last years always were on an edge of attention of the government of Russia. The most undesirable for Moscow consequence of the Afghani conflict was the possible spreading of instability on the other countries of Central Asia that represented danger for the security directly to Russia. At the same time, the war in Afghanistan promoted the rapprochement of Central Asian countries of CIS with Russia with the increase of the influence of the latter. This contradiction, prob ably, also determined the position of the Russian government towards the inner Afghan conflict. Among the sides struggling in Afghanistan the smallest threat the Kremlin saw in the anti-Talib coalition. Moreover, the territories under the control of Northern Alliance began to be considered as the last barrier for the expansion of destabilizing phenomena extremism, terrorism etc. Regarding this fact, Moscow rendered the feasible help resisting Taliban. Clearly, that this help was not advertised. Nevertheless, Russia, alongside with Iran and Tajikistan, has turned into the basic sponsor of anti-Talib coalition. Moreover, the preservation of the Northern Alliance as a political force in Afghanistan became possible in many respects due to the support of the Kremlin. Apparently, political maneuvers of Washington in the region have taken Moscow aback. Quick strengthening of the American positions in Afghanistan and Central Asia as a whole has compelled Russia to begin a complex multi-step game based on compromises and concessions to United States. This game covers Afghanistan, Central Asia, Caspian region and Caucasus. Kh. Karzays visit to Moscow has confirmed the positions of Russia in Northern Afghanistan and its influence on the Northern Alliance, though already not in that degree as it was before September, 11th. It is obvious, that the Afghani Government so far is compelled to take the Russian factor into consideration. To speak about complete ignoring by Pandzher Group of the Russian interests is a little bit prematurely. The Kremlin continues to keep the certain control above the old allies. The evidence of it were the visits of leaders of Northern Alliance to Moscow. The Afghani army, supervised by general Fahim, continues to use the Soviet standards. Besides there is no yet alternative to the Russian weapons, as to the cheapest and well mastered by the local groups. It is quite probable, that this situation became possible from the silent consent of United States. Washington has allowed Moscow to keep some levers of influence on the further actions of the Afghani administration. The present structure of the transition government of the ISA is rather acceptable for the Russian Federation. It is proved by the following factors: 1) Domination of friendly Tajiks promotes the reduction of tension in the southern direction for Russia; 2) Due to the lobby in the Afghani government Moscow strengthens the geopolitical positions, both in Afghanistan, and in all Central Asian region; 3) Finding by the government and giving for the creation of the Afghani army the significant financial assets create a new commodity market for the Russian MIC. *** After the acts of terrorism in September 11, there occurred some softening of the relations of Iran and USA in the beginning of this year and then it has returned into the former confrontation style. It is typical, that Teheran which together with Moscow rendered the essential help to the anti-Talib forces, expected, that 378

USA will undertake reciprocal steps. However, Washington has intentionally returned to the former strategy of restraint of Iran. Thus USA started with fear of growth of the Iranian influence on the post-Talib Afghanistan. Iran now is afraid of that its territory would be surrounded by the American military bases on Middle East, in Central Asia and complete strengthening of Americans on Caspian Sea. These circumstances sooner or later can push Iran to support the anti-American forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and also to strengthen connections with Russia on the anti-American basis and to attempt to strengthen the influence in the Central Asia on the basis of compromises on disputable questions. In the Afghani conflict Iran which until recently gave a political asylum to one of the leaders of mujahideens G. Khekmatiar who doesnt recognizing the power of the transition government of Kh. Karzay and calls to struggle against the international forces in Afghanistan. The Iranian armed forces did not prevent the penetration of the armed groups Hezb-i-Islami on territory of the province of Bamian. In the beginning of April the accusations of USA in the address of Iran that Teheran encourages the penetration of islamists and guerillas of Al-Qaeda to Afghanistan have increased. According to the opinion of Washington, Iran will not reconcile with the insufficiently Islamic character of the new Afghani regime and its pro-Western orientation, and also with the presence of the American bases in the Central Asia and the preparing military action against Iraq. At the same time, the government of Karzay considers the relations with IRI as strategic, taking into consideration the importance of the western region of Afghanistan and the role of Iran in observing of the stability in this region. Besides, its role is being played by the representation of Shiite communities in the administration of Karzay, having close connections with Teheran. First of all it is the leader of Hazaras Karim Khalili. Some Islamic character of the new Afghani government also predetermines the special attention to the mutual relations with Teheran. *** The policy of India concerning Afghanistan is based on the strategy, which essence is to coordinate Taliban problem with the Kashmir, i.e. to put an equal-sign between Talibs and Kashmir separatists as the representatives of the international terrorism. Such formulation is intended first of all for Washington, from which Delhi intended to get support in their struggle against terrorists in Kashmir. In turn, USA have offered India to create the American base of tracing in the state of Jammu and Kashmir /8/, that would allow Pentagon to hold under the control the East and the North East of Pakistan, North East and South East of Afghanistan and the Northern India. In the political circles of India there is a belief that USA is transforming the antiterrorist operation into a struggle for the establishment of the control above the power resources of Central Asia and Middle East. In general, for Delhi it would be favorable to weaken Islamism in the region, but India is afraid of the excessive weakening of Russia and the establishment of the complete American strategic control in Central Asia. The attitude of India to the growth of the American threat to China which potentially follows from the American military presence in Central Asia has also changed. The increase of the confrontation in the region and use of Central Asia as jumping-off place of USA is the negative variant of the development of the events for India. Simultaneously Delhi would like to fix a break of the strategic alliance between Peoples Republic of China and Pakistan and to achieve the maximal weakening of the latter in political and strategic areas, and also in the regional policy of Southern Asia. *** On a background of the position of the other external players there was a little weakened the positions of Pakistan. The tactical purpose of Islamabad always was the maximal decrease of the influence of the repre sentatives of Northern Alliance and the preservation of the authority of Pashtuns. However traditionally supported by Islamabad the Pashtun leaders have failed to receive the majority in the government of Afghanistan. It appreciably reduces the degree of the Pakistan influence on the decisionmaking process of the new leadership of the ISA. The different situation for the administration of Musharraf is aggravated with the spreading of the antiterrorist operations on actually Pakistan territory. So, within the frameworks of the operation Mountain 379

Lion divisions of special forces of ISEF operated in the Pakistan province of Northern Vaziristan, populated by Pashtun tribes and only nominally submitting to the Central government. Islamabad unsuccessfully tried to hide the fact from the wide public. The government of Pakistan is not ready so far to the beginning of the operation in the bordering Afghanistan Pashtun areas on the search of terrorists as the separate tribes are ready for the cooperation, and others categorically oppose the presence of the Pakistani military personal there. In the beginning of April the alliance of six leading religious parties has demanded from him to remove the American armies from the country /9/. The situation develops in such a manner that Musharraf should deal in the near future with the strong and incorporated Islamic opposition. It is obvious in this connection, that just before the operation Mountain Lion in the Pakistan city of Peshawar, there was the missile bombardment of the building with the American military men. Population of Vaziristan, the majority of which are Pashtuns, has expressed the discontent with the joint special action of the Pakistan forces of security and sea infantry men of USA on search of militant on the territory of madras in the point of the Miram-Shah. All these factors seriously complicate the position of the administration of Musharraf, trying to overcome the difficult home and foreign crisis. Sharp turn from the support of the regime of Talibs created by Islamabad to its condemnation (P. Musharraf personally supervised this direction, being the chief of the Joint Staff) has put the Pakistan leader into a difficult position inside the own military and political elite. Apparently, for Musharraf it was possible to come to the certain compromise with the significant part of his own generals. The compromise consists in that Musharraf having victimized Taliban both the ideology and regime, has managed to keep as a whole the influence of Pashtuns in Afghanistan, or at least, not to allow the complete victory of anti-Pashtun coalition. The other component of this compelled compromise was the preservation of the role of Pakistan as the key strategic partner of United States in the region. All this strengthens the internal instability in Pakistan and can force to accept by the Pakistans leadership some radical steps in the foreign policy so that it would direct the internal discontent into other channel. *** The position of Chinese Peoples Republic concerning Afghanistan has been more shaped during the visit to Beijing the leaders of the transition government of Kh. Karzay in January 23-24 of 2002. During the negotiations of the Prime-minister of the State Council Zhu Rongji again has drawn parallels between Xinjiang separatists and Talibs. As a whole for China there was favorable the elimination of fundamentalist regime of Taliban supporting the Uighur radicals. To compensate the inf luence of the West China has given the additional financial help to Afghanistan, and also has concluded agreements on military technical cooperation. The strengthening of the positions of USA in the Central Asia and as a whole the offensive policy of Washington on a global scale push China to the strengthening a cooperation with Iran, Lebanon and a number of other Arabian countries that is connected to the search of allies on the anti-American basis. This tendency was shown in the first half of April 2002, but such policy does not represent the general strategy, and these are the only first steps of China searching for the exit from the strategic impasse in which Beijing appeared after the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan and the planned step back of Russia from the partnership with Chinese Peoples Republics in the anti-American spirit. *** The geographical neighborhood of Central Asian states of the CIS with Afghanistan has determined their active involvement into the antiterrorist coalition of the world community. The first who has shown readiness for cooperation, was Uzbekistan having agreed for the accommoda tion on its territory the divisions of the armed forces of foreign states led by USA. Uzbekistan represented one of key points in the operation by the Pentagon. Presence at Tashkent of the former Soviet military bases and the air stations used even in the 1980es years for the same purpose, promoted the implementation of the American plans. The air station Hanabad located in the Kashkadarinsk area of Uzbekistan, in 400 kms to the South West from Tashkent and in 150 kms from the Uzbekistan-Afghani border became the first American base on the territory of the CIS. Then at disposal of the American armies near Termez, there is the air station Kokajdy in 40 kms from the border with Afghanistan. Under the agreement 380

signed between USA and Uzbekistan, these objects were given to Pentagon for using in military, humanitarian and search and rescue operations in Afghanistan. As a whole, Uzbekistan has continued the rate on strategic cooperation with USA, herein it was incorporated earlier. During the visit of President I. Karimov to Washington in the middle of March, 2002 the American side has actually received the confirmation of Tashkent on its loyalty to United States in imple mentation of antiterrorist operation and its further support. Uzbekistan was afraid, that in reality the military infrastructure of islamists in Afghanistan was not destroyed, and in future it is necessary to expect new attacks of extremists both in Afghanistan, and against Uzbekistan. Despite doubts in the ability of the western peacemakers to supervise the situation in this country, Tashkent is interested in longer military presence in Afghanistan of USA and their allies. Uzbekistan has managed to provide the representation of its interests in Afghani government. To the traditionally close to Tashkent numerous Uzbek share there was given the post of the vice-president with the appropriate powers. In the situation when it is premature to speak about the complete annihilation of Taliban movement and, that especially important about the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan as a political force, the strengthening of positions of Tashkent in Afghanistan is extremely important. Dostum as a controllable figure is capable to facilitate the decision of the problem of IMU on the initial territory of its activation. It is necessary to note, that the project of creation of the confederation in Afghanistan offered by Dostum, is for the Uzbek leadership potentially favorable. In this case on the Afghan territory bordering Uzbekistan, the authority will have under the control the Uzbek group that will provide practically the complete security of southern borders of Uzbekistan and the powerful tool of influence on geopolitical processes in this strategically important region. *** Tajikistan also has declared the consent to give the territory for the actions within the framework of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan. Readiness to allocate the air stations in Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab for the accommodation of military divisions of the international coalition there was expressed. However still there is no actual military presence of the NATO in Tajikistan. Some objects in the territory of the country are used as reloading points for the aircrafts of the antiterrorist coalition and for that purpose some of technicians have arrived to the republic. However the fact of readiness of the official Dushanbe allows to draw some conclusions. Specifics of the foreign policy of Tashkent and Dushanbe on many parameters is directly opposite. Tajikistan is one of closest allies of Russia in the CIS, depending on it much greater, rather than the others Central Asian states. In many respects due to the intervention of Moscow in this republic, there was established peace after the four-years of civil war. The 18-thousand Russian 201 motor-shooting division located here, plays the role of a stabilizing factor in rather unstable and explosive Tajik society. In the connection with latest events in the region on the Tajik-Afghani border the division was made into the condition of the increased readiness, additional reserves of military divisions are deployed. It is possible to assume, that the actions of the Tajik leadership are the direct consequence of changes in external course of Russia. So it is rather a step of Moscow, than Dushanbe, or one of the concessions made by Vladimir Putin to Washington. *** Participation of Kyrghyzstan in the operation in Afghanistan consists in granting the main airport of the country in Bishkek for the accommodation of forces of the antiterrorist coalition and rendering of the humanitarian help to the Afghani population. The reasons which have compelled the Kyrghyz authorities to make this step, objectively coincide with Uzbek the help in liquidation of threat of intrusion of the armed formations on the part of Afghanistan. Moreover, the aspiration to use the external factor in the decision of the internal political and economical problems, plays the additional role. *** The leadership of Turkmenistan has declared, that it supported the initiative on the creation of the international coalition on struggling against terrorism, only if its activity would be coordinated with the United Nations. The question is, first of all, information and humanitarian cooperation, instead the accommodation 381

of the foreign armed groups. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan has denied statements that the republic was going to give the territory and military objects for the implementation of military operation by the foreign states. So, Ashghabad precisely keeps to the neutrality in this case. *** The geographical and geopolitical arrangement of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Central Asia predetermines the support to the purposes and tasks of the antiterrorist operation realized by the Western community in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan repeatedly announced the initiatives on the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. The Kazakhstan approach was based on the necessity of termination of any external additional sources for the contradictory sides and holding of the special session of the Security Council of the United Nations over Afghanistan. These initiatives were sounded at the summit of Millennium of the United Nations in September of 2000. Just after the events of September 11, the leader of Kazakhstan has made the official statement in which the brutal actions of terrorists were condemned, and he expressed readiness of our republic to provide with any assistance in their pursue and punishment. According to the opinion of the President of RK, Kazakhstan people admits that terrorists and their patrons should be punished. Kazakhstan was initially ready to support the antiterrorist operation of USA by all means. At the meeting with the state secretary of USA Collin Powell the President of RK Nursultan Nazarbayev has declared: It is known, that the American government has addressed to many states with such requests. If such request would be addressed to the government of Kazakhstan, we shall solve it positively /10/. In the report the Position of Kazakhstan concerning the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan /11/, distributed as the official document of the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, the basic moments of the point of view of RK on these question are marked. The first. Afghanistan in which as in a miniature many global and regional problems are reflected, can become some kind of a proving ground on which the effective formula of the real partnership and trust without geopolitical ambitions and narrow national approaches there will be produced and tested. We think that collective measures in Afghanistan ignoring these conditions, can appear fruitless. The second. All participants of peace process in Afghanistan under supervision of the United Nations should find the acceptable formula of coexistence which would began the basis for the creation of permanent state structures and civil institutes, establishment in the country of the atmosphere of trust and friendship. The third. The rendering by the international community of the humanitarian help should be put to Afghanistan on a long-term basis, down to the complete implementation of the comprehensive plan on restoration of a national economy. The fourth. During all the process of rehabilitation of the country, actions of the international community should be directed to the neutralization of sources of new threats like an illegal migration and a distribution of ideas of religious extremism, an illegal circulation of drugs and weapons. Kazakhstan, from its part, is ready to bring the practical contribution to the actions of the coalition to Afghanistan, especially in their economical and humanitarian phase and, taking into account our affinity to Afghanistan, offers: foodstuffs (grain, rice, meat), fuel, building materials and other production for the humanitarian help formed by the donor community; creation on the territory of Kazakhstan the humanitarian warehouses of advanced basing under the United Nations and the international coalition; sending to Afghanistan the civil experts physicians, teachers, builders, engineers etc.; despite lacking wide experience, we are ready to consider the opportunity of participation in the In ternational forces of assistance of security in Afghanistan the Kazakhstan peace-making battalion Kazbat in the post-disputed period; in the long term it is possible to think over the question of the integration of Afghanistan into the Special Program of the United Nations for economy of Central Asia with the allocation of agriculture as the priority area for Afghanistan. 382

Thus, Kazakhstan is extremely interested to establish in Afghanistan the normal peaceful life and to establish with this state close political and economical relations. So, Afghanistan continues to remain one of the most brisk crossroads of interests of external players. Discrepancy of these interests is the main reason which transforms this country into the permanent center of instability. 4. Afghanistan after Talibs does the threat still exist? In Afghanistan there is preserved the extremely difficult economical and financial situation. Now the conversations on the economical condition of Afghanistan practically have no sense for the reason, that economy as such in this country is not observed. At present there are two basic financial sources: first, the aid of donating countries, and second, the manufacture and sale of drugs. The international community has given for the restoration of Afghanistan 4.5 billion dollars, including in 2002 1.8 billion dollars. USA have allocated for 2002 the help in the sum of 300 million dollars. Within the frameworks of the World Food program to Afghanistan, there is delivered 333 thousand tons of the foodstuffs. USA have given unilaterally 10 sets of medicines and medical equipment (for the treatment of 100 thousand people within 3 months), 4.4 million dollars for clothes, school accessories are spent for the delivery of products, within the frameworks of the humanitarian help to the Afghani children. For the restoration of medicine in Afghanistan within the nearest two years, it will be given 200 million dollars by the World Bank allocates 10 million dollars for the creation in Afghanistan of the effective system of the governing. In the beginning of April of 2002, USA decided to give in addition 22.5 million dollars for the reconstruction of the social infrastructure. However, experts are unanimous in their opinion, that the rendered economical aid for Afghanistan is not enough. Despite of the decision on granting help by the international community to this country for the sum of 4.5 billion dollars, the effective mechanism of its realization until now is not developed. In the long term it is not excluded, that means will be spent inefficiently, or their allocation will be frozen. Restoration of Afghanistan will be possible only in the case that in the country internal stability and the civil world will be kept. The authorities of the country have no real budget; the international financial help (4.5 billion dollars) will be allocated within several years and only under concrete projects. The government does not have even the access to those small sums which are already transferred by the international community since in the country there is no banking system. Heterogeneity and discrepancy of the transition government led by Kh. Karzay objectively reduce the prospects of financial assistance of the West to its actions. All this strengthens centrifugal forces in Afghanistan and pushes field commanders in their aspiration to keep real political authority and the military control in the territories. Difficult internal political and social and economical position of Afghanistan was aggravated recently because of strong earthquakes in northern provinces Samangan and Baghlan. Position is complicated also by the struggle for reshaping the heroin market since Northern Alliance aspires to establish the complete control over the stream of drugs from Afghanistan through the so-called northern route (through Central Asia and Russia to Europe). USA and their allies on the antiterrorist coalition are compelled to agree with the military leaders on places as the success of all the operation depends on their loyalty. Moreover, a number of groups have been seriously strengthened due to the financial and military help on the part of USA which was given for the purpose of the destruction of Al-Qaeda. The appearing information shows that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda guerillas continue their resistance (distribution of leaf lets with the announcements of awards for the heads of peacemakers, assassination attempts for the members of the transitional government etc.). The groups act against the government and the presence of the international forces there which are led by the field commander R. Mansur, who in turn has close contacts with the leader of party Hezb-i-Islami G. Khekmatiar, and also the group of J. Hakkani. Khekmatiar has made a stake on rendering the assistance for that pashtun tribes, which have gone from the north to the south to the border with Pakistan in the areas of 383

Jelalabad and Hardez. There is simultaneously conducted the propaganda and ideological work in the anti-western sense. Kh. Karzay tries to reduce the anti-western moods and accusations of the pro-Western position of his cabinet. Aiming at these purposes, he has come into contacts and has visited such countries as Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arabian Emirates and Pakistan, in order to emphasize the Islamic orientation of Afghanistan. The disturbing symptoms of the increasing internal political struggle are assassination attempts on some members of Karzay government, especially the unsuccessful attempt for a very influential and powerful Minister of Defense, the representative of the Northern Alliance M. Fahim. The total number of military groups in Afghanistan reaches 200, and only a part from them is recognized by the authority of the government in Kabul. The arrest of 700 people suspected in the plot with the purpose of overthrowing of Karzay government on April 3 of 2002, testifies to the aggravation of the internal political struggle. The majority of supporters of the party Hezb-i-Islami of G. Khekmatiar are ethnic Pashtuns, what transfers the conflict not only into a political one but also into the ethnical one. It became known, that the initiators of these arrests were the Tajik representatives of Northern Alliance who have concentrated in their hands all the police authority in the capital. H. Karzays position as the head of the government at the this moment looked relatively strong. He managed to get support from USA and the Western allies, and from some of the Islamic countries. Between the political forces in Afghanistan, Karzay manages to keep a fragile but a visible balance. His popularity among the population gradually grows. The self-detachment of Zahir-Shah from the political processes who has come back in the country in the middle of April, the absence of G. Khekmatiar in the country, split inside the Northern Alliance and Pashtun leaders have made his figure practically non-alternative nominee for the post of the head of the government. According to observers, the position of the Minister of Defense M. Fahim as a military leader and a successor of Ahmad Shah Massoud are kept. The durability of Northern Alliance and the preservation of its influence on the Afghani policy depends on Fahims position in many respects. Other outstanding figure of Northern Alliance R. Dostum is dissatisfied with the policy of Kabul. His political program is based on the change of the state and administrative device of Afghanistan into the form of a federation. Thus, the purpose of this political and military leader is the creation of Uzbek (or UzbekTajik-Hazara) autonomies on the north of the country that gives his requirements already foreign and regional aspect. However as a whole, taking into account the positions of Pashtun leaders, the claims about federalization of Afghanistan bear big destructive potential. Nevertheless, Dostum carried out consultations with the number of Pashtun tribe representatives from the south of the country about the opportunity of Afghanistans federalization. As the political tool for the realization of this program, Dostum plans to create a party on the multiethnic basis which would consist of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras, i.e. would reflect interests of the national minorities supporting Northern Alliance. A number of regional leaders Ismail-Khan and A.K. Khalili among the allies of Northern Alliance, adhere a pro-Iran orientation. This fact involves a number of strategically the major areas of Afghanistan in the sphere of Iranian policy provinces Herat, Farokh, Gur, Batgiz and Bamian. Some military leaders of Northern Alliance aspire the establishment of the personal control above the provinces and to decrease the influence of the central government, not depending on its future ethnical structure. Thus, Northern Alliance after Talibans defeat is not a united and politically monolithic force. The most influential (from the military point of view) leaders pursue their own interests connected with the regionalization or crushing of the country, and also with the external forces. The Pashtun South now represents an isolated conglomerate from the political point of view, which does not have a leader who could be strong, charismatic and recognized by all tribes. Thus, one of lines of the political break in Afghanistan passes between the desire of national minorities to have the autonomy, federalization and regionalization and the attempts of Pashtun majority to preserve the internal political unity of the country. This tendency was already precisely designated today. According to Bonn agreements achieved in December of 2001, since June 11 to June 20 of 2002, the general Loya Dzhirga (common Afghan assembly) has passed in Kabul. The convocation of such all Afghan 384

assemblies was the primary goal of the temporary administration led by Khamid Karzay. The main task of the Council of the elders consists in the determination of the ways of development of the country within the nearest two years. Despite of the outbreak of political activity of the society, this kind of assembly has not introduced the essentially new changes, and in many respects has kept the existing status quo. Among 1450 delegates, 1051 were elected in May April by the population in 381 constituencies, 163 places were occupied by women, 100 representatives of refugees, 6 representatives of internal migrants and 25 places were given to nomads. Other places were occupied by the members of the government and other very important persons. In the Council of the elders there were elected educated Afghans not younger than 22 years. And the absence of the connections with the terrorist organizations was considered as the basic criteria; candidates should not be involved into the distribution and trafficking of drugs, violation of human rights, war crimes, plunders of the public property and smuggling of cultural or archeological values. In the whole, there were presented all ethnic groups, religious confessions and social groups though the process of the selection of candidates was rather difficult. In the number of districts there was a barefaced pressure upon candidates, the payoff for voters was used. The influential field commanders and local leaders, abusing authority, actively pushed their candidates during the elections of Loya Dzhirga what troubled the representatives of the commission concerning the spreading frauds and bribery. According to the results of the voting, the head of the temporary administration Khamid Karzay will govern the country during the period of two years. According to the official information, the overwhelming majority of delegates 1295 people voted to him. The success was provided with that during the first days of Loya Dzhirga two major candidates -the former King Zahir-Shah and the former president Burkhanuddin Rabbani have refused to apply for the post of the head of the state, and in general, for any post in the new administration. President Karzay appointed members of the government. The analysis of the structure of the new cabinet allows to draw some conclusions. The first. More than half of all posts in the government were given to the representatives of Northern Alliance, including the key ones: Mohammad Kasem Fahim vice-president, Minister of Defense; Abdulla Abdullo Minister of Foreign Affairs; Yunus Kanuni the special adviser on the questions of internal security, minister of education; Mohammed Arif the head of the intelligence service. The arrangement of forces in the cabinet of the Afghani president testifies that the ruling group of Tajiks from the Pandzher Gorge received the significant political power based first of all the energy resources. The only one powerful post in the government that is the Ministry of Internal Affairs was given to Pashtuns control. The head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was appointed Tadj Mohammad Wardak who, nevertheless, will have to face the fierce opposition of Tajiks making up the majority in the law enforcement bodies. As an example it is the fact that 12 out of 15 police stations of Kabul are supervised by the people appointed by the Northern Alliance /12/. Thus, the former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Yunus Kanuni in the new status of the adviser for the questions of internal security, also keeps serious resources of influence on the actions of his successor. The second. The largest ethnic group of Afghanistan the Pashtuns, apparently, are transferred to the position of a minor political force though they still keep the key economical; and financial ministries through which the western help comes: Ministry of Finance (Ashraf Gani Akhmad Zai); Ministry of Public Labor (Hadzhi Kadir Khan); Ministry of Reconstruction (Mohammed Amin Farhang); Ministry of Mining Industry; Ministry of Communications. Pashtuns hope, that, keeping the control over the treasury, they can implement the effective control over the government. However, to win the influence in the cabinet there time is required, and much will depend on receiving of the foreign help. Despite of the promise to give this year 1.8 billion dollars, the donating states do not hasten to transfer money to Afghanistan. 385

It is rather indicative, that there were practically completely discharged from the power people which were close to the ex-King of Afghanistan Mohammad Zahir-Shah except the one (Karzay has introduced a royalist, Mohammed Amin Farhang into the government as the minister of reconstruction). These steps have caused the even greater irritation of Pashtuns. The third. Some the governmental posts were given to local military leaders. It was not possible for Karzay, to convince two most powerful field commanders Uzbek General Rashid Dostum from the North and General Ismail Khan ruling on the West, to hold their posts in the Kabul government. However, he provided their representation in the cabinet, having included in the government the son of Ismail Khan and ethnical Uzbek Nahmatulla Shahrani. This name Shahrani emerged at the latest moment which makes us think about some negotiations between Karzay and Dostum. Karzay hoped that including the representatives of field commanders into the structure of the government will compel them to occupy national, rather than regional positions. However there are serious doubts that influential field commanders voluntarily will refuse the authority in controllable areas. Cases of the open opposition between divisions of Dostum and Fahim on the North of the country speak about the opposite. Besides this, there is some information about the secret negotiations between Dostum and a number of Pashtun leaders in the South about the promotion of the federal state system in Afghanistan. The fourth. Until now, the major influence on the political life of Afghanistan is kept by the conservative religious elite. The post of minister on the affairs of women was given not to the activist of the womens movement Samar (she had occupied the post before) but to Manbuba Hogugmal. Samara was superseded from the post under the pressure of Islamic groups, first of all lead by the former president of Afghanistan Rabbani. Islamists didnt like her statements against Muslim laws. At the same time, it is significant the assignment for the post of the head of the Supreme Court of the country Fazul Shinvary which supported the preservation in Afghanistan the laws of Shariat including the custom of executing people with stones /13/. That is in Afghanistan there is kept the significant influence of conservative-minded Islamic clergy, that means hopelessness (at least within the nearest years) the plans of liberalization of the public life in the country. The fifth. As an attempt to provide the nominal representation in the government of all basic ethnical groups, it is possible to consider the assignments for thee posts of vice-presidents of one of leaders of Tajik community Mohammad Fahim, the leader of Hazara people Karim Khalili, the former governor of Nangarhar province, ethnical Uzbek Nahmatulla Shahrani and Pashtun leader Hadzhi Kadir Khan. The situation was seriously complicated by the murder of the latter one. In spite of the fact, that he was one of the active participants of Northern Alliance, in post-Talib period Kadir became one of leaders of Pashtun military elite. The factor promoting his associations with Pandzher group, was his contradictions with Talib leaders. In the post-Talib period its was shown, Kadirs actions pursued his own interests and the tasks closely connected to the interests of the other Pashtun leaders. Actually Kadir was the second person representing the interests of Pashtuns in the Afghani government. Many observers regarded him as the natural successor of President Karzay. The prospects for the investigation of his murder are not looked optimistically. Undoubtedly, that rather influential persons are involved into murder, what strongly complicates the situation in the present balance of forces. Objectively, the death of Kadir is favorable for the pro-Tajik group in the government of Afghanistan since its basic competitor has been eliminated. On the other hand, this murder could become a sufficient occasion for more tough actions from the side of Pashtun elite, having given its firm reasons for the accusations of the competitors in their aspiration to take the power in the country. *** All these factors complicate the prospects of the process of interethnic settlement even more. On the basis of the aforesaid, it is possible to draw the following conclusions. The first. The results of Loya Dzhirga showed all the contradictions in the Afghani society. In the formation of the transitive Afghani government it was not possible to balance the interests of all ethnical and politi386

cal groups present on the political arena of the country. In result, there was rather a shaky formation from the field commanders or their protgs and creatures, lobbied by the Islamic groups. The second. A possible strengthening of the interethnic tension can cause the halt in the financing of the process of reconstruction of Afghanistan on the part of some donating countries. The third. The thesis that the one who forms the first government, will form also the following ones, can be quite referred to Afghanistan. Karzays gaining the power and together with the people appointed by him, has determined the condition of the political elite in Afghanistan for the nearest period. The fourth. The current arrangement of forces in the government is a maximum for representatives of Northern Alliance consisting mainly from ethnic Tajiks. Numerical prevalence of Pashtuns in Afghanistan has always determined their domination in the system of authority. Now again, there is a plan of Pashtun leaders on the restoration and the establishment of the leading role in government. The observed misbalance in Karzays government already causes a serious discontent mainly from the Pashtuns, which can increase, having caused sympathies for the Pashtun nationalists and radical islamists, including Taliban. 5. The problems of drug producing and trafficking Considering the problem of the negative influence of the military-political conflict in Afghanistan on the region of the Central Asia, it is necessary to mention such a problem, as a drug business. For today drug business in Afghanistan has got greater scales than earlier. The unprecedented growth of the volumes of drug producing in Afghanistan during the last time is one of the main negative results of the war continuing already for 20 years in this country where drugs are the main source of incomes, both for the ordinary population, as well as for leaders of opposing groups. Currently, Afghanistan is a whole network of laboratories, concentrated basically along the border, for manufacturing heroin, with the capacity of 40 kg per day. Within the world market of heroin, the share of Afghanistan for the last few years has increased from 40 up to 75%. Approximately 80% of heroin is consumed in Europe where about 1 million people use the narcotic of the Afghani origin. According to the sources, such as the specialized structures of the United Nations, and the Ministry of Justice of USA, Afghanistan has already surpassed the countries of The golden triangle (Myanma, Laos, Thailand) where it is annually made approximately 2500 tons of opium, and left far behind itself all the regions of Latin America in which there is received about 100 tons of opium. Besides this, Afghanistan according to the productions volumes of one more famous drug hashish has caught up Morocco, the former long time world leader in the delivery of this drug /14/. Despite of the change of the political situation in Afghanistan, the problem of drug trafficking remains rather actual. While the transition government of Afghanistan reflects on the ways of construction of the new economy, in the country the main article of export there is illegally made opium. After the decrease in 2001, experts of the United Nations consider, Afghanistan this year will reach the level of production of the middle of 1990es /15/. According to the information of the representative office of the United Nations for the control over drugs and for the prevention of crime in the Central Asia, approximately 65% of the Afghani drugs go now through the Central Asia through Tajikistan. Kyrghyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China and Russia, and then to Europe and the United States /16/. Now, the volume of drug business in Central Asia has become menacing. The amount of drugs taken through Central Asian states and sold on their territory, sharply grows. There was a real threat of transformation of the Great Silk Road into the basic global drug way. It is truly, the drug stream for the present day has not increased, but confidently it is possible to predict that in the next year there will be more Afghan drugs, rather than in the past. According to the available information, in Afghanistan the amount of the areas, with the opium poppy, has achieved the recorded level of 1999. Now in this country, mainly in the provinces Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar, there were opium poppy areas approximately from 45 thousand up to 65 thousand hectares /17/. For its cultivation this year there are all climatic conditions in comparison with the drought of last years now there is enough of water. The experts from the Program of the drug control of the United 387

Nations predict sharp growth of manufacture of it in Afghanistan in 2002. Due to their estimation, by the end of the year Afghanistan is capable to collect 1.9 2.7 thousand tons of opium poppy against 185 tons of the last year /18/. For today, the antiterrorist forces havent destroyed practically any laboratory on manufacture of the raw opium and heroin. Events in this country have shown weak dependence of drug producing from the change of the political regime and operations against Talibs. In drug producing there are involved a lot of the simple peasants making instead of grain poppies, marihuana, hashish and other potions. According to the United Nations, 3.3 million of the Afghans live for the money received from the cultivation of these cultures. The ban imposed in January of 2002 by the transition of Afghani government, practically has not had any effect in any way on heroin market. The practice of the struggle of special divisions of USA against the Colombian drug cartels shows that the using of force solves the problem only for a while. In the Afghani province Helmand where in autumn of the last year the significant areas of the agricultural grounds were given to the opium poppy, there were collisions between peasants and police divisions. The latter arrived there for the implementation of the decree of the head of temporary administration of Afghanistan Khamid Karzay according to which in the country the growing of opium poppy crops and making drugs from it, are forbidden, first of all heroin. Shortly be fore, Minister of Defense Mohammad Fahim had faced these collisions in Helmand followed his attempt to persuade peasants of Nangarhar province against cultivating of the opium poppy, what provoked the attempt of assassination /19/. The repayment of drugs from peasants does not justify itself. After the reduction of crops of the opium poppy because of the bans imposed by Taliban regime, the prices for opium have grown approximately up to 380 dollars per 1 kg, thus again having made this culture most attractive to the Afghani peasants. While administration of Karzay offers peasants the repayment for the sum of 1250 dollars for the destruction of one hectare of crops of the poppy /20/. However, peasants do not agree, saying that only for the sowing they have spent the sum exceeding more than twice the size of the offered monetary compensation. They demand also to pay them for already grown up crop. On the average from one hectare this year gathering the raw opium makes up to 40-50 kg, and in some places even 75 kg is expected. In accordance with the drug price on the black market, it is possible to make about 8 000 US dollars, whereas from the sale of grain from the same area makes only 800 dollars. The situation is complicated also by the struggle for changing of the heroin market since Northern Alliance will aspire to establish the full control above the stream of drugs from Afghanistan along the so-called Northern route (through the Central Asia and Russia to Europe). Russian frontier guards on the Tajik-Afghani border detained over 350 kgs of drugs in the first half of 2002, including 310 kg of heroin. The Iranian law enforcement bodies on the border with Afghanistan in this period had taken about 900 kg of drugs, mainly hashish and raw opium. Nothing is known about the productivity of the actions of the special service of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Thus, it is possible to ascertain, that the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan practically did not render any positive influence on the problem of drug producing. *** So, in spite of the fact that still there is no the complete annihilation of the groups of Taliban movement and Al-Qaeda, the tendency that Afghanistan as the sphere of the application of the basic forces of United States, gradually loses the its priority. Judging by the constantly coming data, Pentagon is on the finishing stage of preparing of the operation against Saddam Husseins regime in Iraq. In this connection USA, and their nearest ally Great Britain gradually reduce the share of the participation in the international forces of peace keeping (AISEF) in Afghanistan. The main result of the allies activity since the end of 2001 there became the holding of all Afghan assembly Loya Dzhirga, and the creation of the transition government led by Khamid Karzay. Considering the prospects of the new administration of ISA, it is necessary to note, that it has failed to avoid all drawbacks by which the previous regimes were characterized. The basic problem consists in that practically it was not possible to create the balance of the representation in the government of the country of the main ethnic groups and groups of interests. 388

Thus, in Afghanistan there are kept all the prerequisites for the new contradictions and the disputed lines, capable to result in the armed conflicts. The negative role in the developing situation is played by the presence in this country of many interests of the external players which are at times contradicting with each other. The decrease of USA activity results in that, in the Afghani question on the foreground the regional centers of force again start to come. Distinctions of their foreign interests has the effect on the internal political dissociation of the Afghani society. Prospects of the economical development of Afghanistan also are in the strong dependence on the external financial aid. However, the volume of means coming from abroad will depend on the process of the settlement of the internal political contradictions. At the present stage in the country, practically, there is no industry. The main source of the income of the population there is still the drug manufacturing. The weak dependence of drug manufacturing from the change of the political regime is obvious. The antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan practically did not render any positive influence on the problem of manufacturing of drugs. In this connection, the increase of the delivery volume of the Afghani drugs at the world market is predicted in the nearest period. All the factors, mentioned above, give reasons to have the skeptical view on the prospects of normalization of conditions in Afghanistan in the nearest period. Afghanistan continues to remain the arena of collisions of internal and external players, and as the consequence, alongside with Middle East one of the hottest points of the planet. Notes: 1. Akimbekov S. Afghani knot and the problems of security in the Central Asia. Almaty, 1998. P. 136-137. 2. Sizdikov M. The antiterrorist operation and the problems of the post-war establishment in Afghanistan // http://www.kisi.kz 3. RIA Novosti. 23.05.2002. 4. RIA Novosti. 21.06.2002. 5. RIA Novosti. 03.07.2002. 6. RIA Novosti. 20.06.2002. 7. Streshnev R. How long will the Indestructible freedom last? // Red Star. 11.06.2002. 8. RIA Novosti. 22.01.2002. 9. RIA Novosti. 04.04.2002. 10. Interfax, 24.09.2001. 11. See: www.mfa.kz 12. Rashid A. The arrangement of forces in the new Afghani cabinet displeases pashtuns // Eurasianet. 25.06.2002. 13. Korneeva K. Trishkin caftan of Karzay // politcom.ru. 25.06.2002. 14. Comissina I. Curtov A. Drug dawn above the Central Asia a new threat for the civilization. // Central Asia and Caucasus. 5 (11) 2000. P. 122-123. 15. The report of the United Nations Global tendencies of the illegal circulation of drugs in 2002. See: Todd Diamond Taliban has fallen: the circulation of opium is returning to the former level // EurasiaNet. org. 04.07.2002. 16. Plotnikov N. This haggling is inappropriate // Independent newspaper. 1 April, 78. 18, 2002. 17. Heroin production increase after Taliban fall // www.ananova.com. 26.09.2002. 18. NTVRU.COM. 18.04.2002. PART II. CENTRAL ASIA IN REGIONAL CONTEXT The contemporary peculiarity of the international relations is that by virtue of the combination of various political, geographical, religious and other factors of the states of Central Asian Region (CAR) are more and more put forward on the foreground of the world policy. At the same time it is necessary to note, that the situation in Central Asia during the last years was uneasy enough. Besides there in CAR today are the interests of both the world powers, as well as the regional players located in the region and in the immediate proximity near the region Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and India. In Central Asia now there were bound into a complex knot local, regional and global interests. 389

The basic purpose of the chapter is the analysis of the development of the situation in CA under the influence of anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, military-political presence of USA to the region. 1. Central Asia before and after September 11 Uzbekistan The most steadfast attention of the experts of Central Asia on Republic of Uzbekistan is absolutely not a casual circumstance. The largest by the population (more than 25 million people.), this regional country has a significant economical potential, the most numerous armed forces, the serious regional influence caused by the presence of large Uzbek community in neighboring republics. In this connection, special interest to this state and to the condition of the internal political, economical situation in this country is represented quite clear and proved, taking into account the importance of Uzbekistan by way of maintenance of regional security, economic cooperation, development of integration processes on the space of the post-Soviet Central Asia. It is interesting to make a comparative analysis of the situation in Uzbekistan before and after September 11. In terms of social and economical development, the last decade for Uzbekistan was rather uneasy. The further strengthening of negative tendencies was observed as a whole in social and economical sphere that certainly could result in the crisis of all economic system. Thus, the main reasons of the crisis are hidden in failures of the state regulation of economy. Within each year, the opportunities for the state regulation of social relations and resources for the acceptance of protective measures against the rise in prices, inflation, other negative consequences of the economical policy were reduced for the government of Uzbekistan. The government of the country had great hopes for the stabilization of the situation and economical strengthening of Uzbekistan following the attraction of the Western financial aid. At the same time, according to IMF, direct foreign investments since 1992 till 1998 put into Uzbekistan for the total sum of 363 million US dollars. Totally, at the rate of on one inhabitant of the country, there is invested 15,4 US dollars per capita, for comparison in Kazakhstan this parameter makes 283,3 US dollars. The reason of weak inflow of direct foreign capital investments into the economy of Uzbekistan were not sufficient investment conditions, that is the split system of exchange rates, limitation of the access to converting, the complicated taxation laws, compulsory converting of a part of export proceeds, customs problems and so forth. Alongside with it, according to IMF, golden currency reserves of the country were reduced approximately twice up to 1 billion, and the external debt has grown up to 4,6 billion. So, the expenses for its service only in 2000 have made 900 million The credits of IMF for Uzbekistan were inaccessible because of the failure by the country of the program of cooperation (the question was first of all absence of converting of the Uzbek currency soom). *** The internal political situation in Uzbekistan before September 11 as well as social and economical one, was possible to characterize as the extraordinary complicated one according to the possible consequences. On the one hand, the tendency of all-round strengthening and of the regime of I. Karimov was precisely traced. In this connection, the realization of some internal political actions, such as parliamentary and, first of all, presidential elections of 2000, was directed on the strengthening of the authority of I. Karimov inside Uzbekistan. At the same time, in the internal political life of Uzbekistan there were a number of serious problematic moments with far-reaching negative consequences. First of all, the problem of more and more growing armed opposition of the authority and radical Islamic groups. The events of last years in Uzbekistan have clearly shown that in the conditions of the absence in the republic of real, legitimate opposition (secular, moderately Islamic), the Islamic radical groups concentrated in the towns of Fergana valley basically, and they became that force that is capable to throw a serious challenge to the authority. The Islamic opposition, first of all its radical part, rather successfully, despite of the counteraction of the authorities, was transformed into a real, independent and powerful political force. Judging by the events in Surkhandaria, Yagiabad etc., it is becoming more difficult to the government of Uzbekistan with each year to resist to well organized and armed extremist groups. 390

Thus, during the years of the independent development of Uzbekistan, the Islamic opposition in its radical form has become one of the long-term and most dangerous threats of political stability of the country, and regional security as a whole. Situation after September 11 After September 11, in our opinion, the situation in Uzbekistan as a whole has undergone certain basic changes. Geopolitical changes in the Central Asian region as a whole and around Uzbekistan, in particular, occurring during the antiterrorist operation made by USA in Afghanistan, were making and continue to make the certain influence on the internal political and social and economical situation in the republic and bring some corrective amendments in its foreign policy. The entry of Uzbekistan into the first lines of the global antiterrorist coalition created by USA fully complied with the interests and tasks of Washington in the implementation of the special action in Afghanistan. Taking into account a favorable geopolitical arrangement of Uzbekistan, its neighborhood with Afghanistan, the advanced military infrastructure and rather efficient army, higher political independence from Moscow Uzbekistan is the optimal among the three Central Asian countries surrounding Afghanistan ally for USA for the decision of its own intermediate term and long-term strategic tasks in region. Besides in Uz bekistan contradictory to Pakistan, the society as a whole, is more loyal to military presence of USA in the country. In the short-term view the task of USA in Uzbekistan basically was the following: First, creation of a jumping-off place for the military penetration into Afghanistan. The military infrastructure of the air stations of Uzbekistan (Hanabad, Kokajdy, Termez all are in very close from the border with Afghanistan) quickly allows USA to deploy great forces and means for the implementation of the antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan. Second, USA are vitally interested in the creation of the favorable and justifying the activity of Washington in Afghanistan moral and psychological and legal conditions by uniting of the countries into the created coalition. Thus the most valuable in this plan are the states with the Muslim population, with the purpose of reducing of opportunities of creating in the Islamic community the anti-American coalition. In this connection, involving Uzbekistan into the coalition as a historically significant and known state in the Islamic world is for USA the important condition for the achievement of geostrategical tasks in Afghanistan. Third, Uzbekistan is important for USA as a secure to Pakistan. As it is known, Pakistan is extremely non-stable and in this connection the unpredictable state. By escaping the game, Pakistan threatens USA with serious difficulties in the implementation of the operation in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is the more pre dictable and stable ally. In the intermediate term and long-term perspective, the purposes of USA in Uzbekistan, in the region of the Central Asia as a whole, in many respects depend on the development of the situation in Afghanistan and success or failure of the special action in this country. Thus, the basic fundamental purpose of USA in the region still is strengthening of its own geopolitical influence in the strategically important Caspian Central Asian region, with the purpose of the solving of the specific targets: oil, restraint of Russia and China, struggle against terrorism, the Islamic factor etc. The most one of the demonstrative performances clearly formulating the long-term interests of USA in the region and in Uzbekistan in particular, was the comment of the commander-in-chief of the Central Command of Armed Forces of USA Gen. Tommy Franks the activity, which USA will be implementing on the territory of Uzbekistan can qualitatively vary from day-today, from week to week /1/. Deification of the American Uzbek rapprochement there became the signing in March 12, 2002 in Washington two countries of the Declaration on the foundation of strategic partnership and cooperation. Having outlined briefly the basic circle of interests and tasks of USA in Uzbekistan, in the context of the implementation of the special action in Afghanistan, it is necessary to regard the Uzbekistan in the more detailed way. In this connection there is a lot of natural questions: what determined the choice of Islam Karimov, what principal reasons of supporting USA in Afghanistan were and what will be the basic positive and negative consequences of the policy undertaken by Tashkent concerning Afghanistan? In our opinion there are four basic factors, but with the different degree of importance, giving the greatest influence on the maintenance of the operation of USA by Tashkent in Afghanistan: 391

First, support of USA by Tashkent is connected, first of all, with the questions of internal political character. For Islam Karimov the real chance to solve all problems with the existing internal political opposition, first of all with the religious extremists supported in general by the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, has appeared. The IMU as the advanced flank of Islamic radical opposition in Uzbekistan, is the main irreconcilable opponent of the authority for today. The foreign steps of Tashkent connected with the support of USA in Afghanistan, are a real way to solve in general the problem with IMU and considerably to weaken the positions of the Uzbek opposition as a whole. Second, a support of Washington has allowed I. Karimov, not to fear the serious criticism on the part of the international organizations to hold a referendum and legitimately to provide the prolongation of the imperious powers. Results of the referendum mean that since 2005 I.Karimov can be elected on two terms for 7 years each. Third, one of deciding motives for Tashkent became the opportunity of solving questions of economical character. As well as in the case with Pakistan, the promise of USA of the financial help to Uzbekistan became the award for the loyalty and support in implementation of the special action in Afghanistan. Despite of failure of the promises given earlier on the part of USA to Uzbekistan about the financial help for the sum of 8-9 billion US dollars as the interest-free credit, nevertheless, Tashkent in 2002 received the essential economical injections. So, for example, the help of USA to Uzbekistan in 2002 made 161,8 million dollars whereas in 2001 it was 55,9 million dollars /2/. Besides, Tashkent with the help of USA managed to restore contacts with the international financial organizations, IMF, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and so forth. The essential reduction within the last years of the volumes of crediting of Uzbekistan on the part of the world financial organizations IMF, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank substantially complicated the economical situation in the country. Thus, according to the opinion of economists, the main reason of the usual position concerning Uzbekistan with the leading creditor organizations was the poor development of the financial system of the republic which was shown first of all in the absence of the convertibility of the Uzbek monetary unit soom. So, as the result of the financial policy in the internal currency market of Uzbekistan, there was a unique situation when the rate of the Central Bank by the beginning of November of the last year made 432 sooms for US dollar, the commercial rate in exchange offices changed in limits from 912 up to 935 sooms for US dollar, and the rate of the black currency market exceeded the mark 1300 soom for US dollar. With the support of IMF, in 2002 Uzbekistan carried out a number of actions directed to the liberalization of the sphere of currency regulation. Besides, the Government of Uzbekistan hopes for re-structuring of the external debts. According to IMF the external debt of Uzbekistan by the end of 2001 made about 9 billion dollars. By 2001 one third of the budget of the republic 1 billion dollars has gone for payment of the interests on the loans. The period since 2002 to 2007 will be the peak of payments. At the same time, as the experience shows from September 11, 2001, economical dividends of Uzbekistan from the participation in the anti-terrorist operation still dont fit the initial promises. Hopes of Tashkent for the financial superprofits on the part of the Western countries appeared groundless. It is explained by the significant expenditures of USA for the military operation in Afghanistan and antiterrorist operation as a whole. Besides the western countries rigidly coordinate the financial help with the implementation by Uzbekistan of the requirements of reforming of the national economy. It concerns the realization of market reforms, liberalization of economy, with the purpose of narrowing of the opportunities of the state to influence the economical processes and connections of Uzbekistan to the various international trade and economic unions which are in the sphere of the American control (first of all, the WTO). Third, the important reason for promoting the support of Uzbekistan by the USA is the opportunity to strengthen considerably the foreign positions, in the context of maintenance of national security. The conclusion of the sort of the the contract on cooperation between Tashkent and Washington opens for the first one the essential geopolitical opportunities, considerably expands its field of maneuvering in the foreign policy, first of all in the relations with Moscow. 392

Despite of rapprochement with Moscow from the moment Putins becoming the president, Uzbekistan and Russia are more the competitors than the allies in the region. In the strategic view, Uzbekistan is interested in the reduction of the Russian influence in the region (first of all, in Tajikistan) and as in the counterbalance, interesting to increase its own one; and for that there are necessary conditions: the solid demographic potential, the controlled Uzbek communities in the neighboring countries, a military power etc. A formation of real partner relations with Washington (military bases, the material and financial aid etc.), allows Tashkent to operate in its regional policy more freely and to represent itself as a counterbalance against the influence of Russia in the Central Asia, that is accorded with the interests of USA. Concerning Afghanistan, Tashkent is using the situation to the maximum, and it will try to strengthen the influence in this country. In this direction there are two primary goals for Tashkent: The reanimation of buffer zones in Afghanistan, in particular by the reconstruction of the pseudo-state associations on the territory of residing of ethnic Uzbeks (six provinces of the country with the center in Mazari-Sharif), controllable now by General Dostum. Restoration of the buffer zone allows Tashkent essentially to strengthen the control above the southern boundaries and to lower the threats of security proceeding on the part of Afghanistan; Participation in the formation of the coalition government in Afghanistan. In this connection it is important not only the coming of ethnic Uzbeks into the coalitions government, but also not letting the participation in it the forces with the negative attitude to the secular regime of I. Karimov. *** Thus, acts of terrorism on September 11 against the USA and initiation of special action by Washington in Afghanistan as a reciprocal course, have changed a political situation in all world community, in the Islamic world, together with in the countries of the Central Asia. There are global changes in the arrangement of forces in the world community, rules constructed within the system of world relations vary, and these changes directly concern also the states of the Central Asia. Moreover, the region of Central Asia again experiences strengthening of the geopolitical struggle between the leading centers of forces of influence, first of all, they are Russia and the US. The detailed analysis of the development of the situation in Uzbekistan in the context of its introduction into the antiterrorist coalition shows, that the consequences of it for this state are ambiguous. On the one hand, there are really some essential advantages and the positive moments for the interests of Uzbekistan and for the regional security for Uzbekistan in framework of the coalition created by USA, for the decision of military-political tasks in the course of the special action in Afghanistan First of all, there is a real chance of final settlement of the situation in Afghanistan as the main source of instability, terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking in the region, has appeared. All states of the region are interested in this solution, including Uzbekistan. At the same time, there is the strengthening of positions of I. Karimov in the internal political life of Uzbekistan following the participation in the coalition, that provoked some political (destruction of militants of IMU, resource opportunities in the struggle with the widely understood anti-Karimov opposition etc) and economical dividends. Besides, foreign opportunities of Tashkent are growing. First of all, it concerns the relations with Moscow, Dushanbe, Islamabad and certainly, with USA. But, the same quite obvious and negative consequences exist together with the obvious benefits from the participation in the anti-terrorist operation of USA. What do they, in our opinion, in short-term and long-term prospect? As the Russian researcher Yuri Morozov considers, there is another negative side of the medal that is the joining of Uzbekistan to the antiterrorist coalition of USA. It can be shown in the case of the failure of Washington in Afghanistan. In this case, there is a number of possible ways of the development of this situation, such as delaying of the special action of USA in Afghanistan, expansion of the zone of the Afghani conf lict, destabilization of the situation in Pakistan etc. In this connection, it is necessary to agree with the opinion of experts that active inclusion of the Central Asian states of the CIS not only into the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, but also into a large geopolitical game of Washington could become the catalyst of the aggravation of their internal and external problems /3/. 393

All this considerably increases the risk of serious destabilization of the situation in the country with the destructive consequences for the security of Uzbekistan and the region of Central Asia, as a whole. Kyrghyzstan Kyrghyzstan the smallest country in the Central Asia with the population 4,6 million people and territory 199.9 thousand sq. km, geographically closed by the mountains and surrounded with the other less developed countries. Among the factors describing the position of the republic in the region, first of all, it is necessary to allocate the characteristic structural misbalance of the resource base. Kyrghyzstan has no significant natural resources. Experts mark almost the complete absence of the oil and gas deposits, and in this sense, Kyrghyzstan is dependent seriously on the next states of region. The features of the resource base of the land suitable for economic development and agriculture are limited since as 95 % of territory of the country is occupied by mountains. However, the main distinctive feature of the country is the abundance of water resources in its territory. One of the greatest waterways of the Central Asia is the river Syr-Daria which provides with water of the countries belonging to the so-called the lower current in the region, and it is formed here. A problem of providing of national security after the establishing of the statehood had the special urgency in Kyrghyzstan however, and in other post-Soviet states, as well. The understanding of the importance of this question was coming within the process of increasing of problems with which the state faced in internal and foreign policy. Today any expert in the countries of Central Asia among the basic weak points in the system of security of Kyrghyzstan, will name the following: the position of the republic as a storage terminal for the trafficking of drugs; regionalism; the general decrease in the production and due to it the irritation and frequency of conflicts in the society is growing; political-economical dependence on the other states etc. The situation in the national economy in the whole and in the country as well, continues to be difficult even now. Analyzing the results of economical development of Kyrghyzstan during the last years, it is possible to note, that the country has not strongly moved forward. The growth of the deficiency of the budget has not stopped, the tendency to increase of the level of poverty is still kept, unemployment is growing, the process of stratification within the society increases, the growth of crime is also observed. The majority of social and economic problems have remained unsolved. Thus it is necessary to note, that at the beginning the escalation of the economical crisis was mainly caused by the external factors (break of the usual industrialco-operation connections, loss of the traditional markets), but nowadays it is resulted in larger measure by the influence of internal factors (physically and morally old technical base and know-how, the low level of management, in many cases measures accepted by the government have no careful economical study). Now, it is possible to conclude very confidently that the refusal from the advantages of the naturally established competition which was usual in the past between the countries of the post-Soviet space, and accordingly, the market which existed between these countries, for the benefit of the world market, that is entering the WTO, has not brought those expected dividends which there were connected with this entry by the government of Kyrghyzstan. The noncompetitive industry of the country is under double pressure on the part of internal macro- and micro-economic instability and on the part of the external expansion of foreign industry. Moreover, Kyrghyzstan has not managed yet to enter the world market with the competitive goods of its own manufacture. A significant part of the Kyrghyz manufacturers survive, first of all, due to the export of production into the Central Asian countries. Besides Kyrghyzstan is rigidly depended on the Western investors. Foreign investments and credits of the international banks are practically one of the basic sources of maintenance of the economy of Kyrghyzstan and payments of the external debt. During last years, there was the increase of the influence, of both internal, and the external factors, capable to destabilize the internal political situation. The absence of the unity among the ruling elite causes the prevalence of the regional interests over the national ones. The permanent clan struggle in the whole supports the condition of the constant internal political intensity in the state and, in the certain degree, is the reason of the prolongation of the solving of social and economical problems of the country. In turn, the crisis condition of the economy and, accordingly, the sharp decrease of the standard of living of the population create not only the threat of growing of protesting moods in the Kyrghyz society, but also 394

the conditions for the activization of the extremist religious organizations on the territory of Kyrghyzstan, that causes a high probability of the radicalization of the social moods. Thus, a number of the basic threats to the security and stability of Kyrghyzstan have the internal character and are connected, first of all, with the disability of local authorities to cope with the main difficulties lumpenization of the population, growth of discontent, crisis in economy. The influence of the external factors as a threat of extremism, terrorism and growth of drug trafficking, also are serious destabilizing factors for Kyrghyzstan. The famous events in the south of Kyrghyzstan (Batken) in 1999 and 2000, have clearly shown the confusion and the limited opportunities of the military divisions to react effectively to a sudden threat of spreading of religious extremism and to keep the control over the situation. In the whole, these events have shown the significant dependence of the internal stability on the influence of the external factors. Kyrghyzstan has the limited resource opportunities to solve independently arising foreign problems. The republic is a subject for negative influence of the great number of internal and external factors and, alongside with Tajikistan, is rather a weak part in the unified system of maintenance of regional security. Practically from the first moment of independence gaining, this republic constantly felt necessity of external support on the part of regional powers for the decision of some internal political and foreign problems. The foreign policy line conducted by the government of the republic after the events of September 11, is one more acknowledgement of this thesis. Bishkek was one of the first states in the region which has declared the complete support of Washington in the planned operation in Afghanistan and readiness for the cooperation in the antiterrorist coalition created by USA. Kyrghyzstan alongside with Uzbekistan, became the basic jumping-off place of the military presence of USA and their allies in the region. The largest airport in Kyrghyzstan and one of the largest in region Manas constructed in 1974, is given to the American military forces according to the agreement for the period of one year which will be prolonged automatically until USA or Kyrghyzstan would not notify the withdrawal for 6 months. Now on the territory of Kyrghyzstan, there are foreign contingents from the coalitions forces, in particular, bases of the American Air Forces at the Airport Manas and the limited contingent of the West-European countries of the Air Forces on the Gansi Air Base. It was initially supposed, that the American military personal will be deployed in Kyrghyzstan only for the period of realization of the operation in Afghanistan, however their presence is delayed. According to the opinion of the military-political leadership of USA, Manas Airport should become a jumping-off place for the long-term military presence of USA in the former Soviet republics of the Central Asia. In the whole, from the point of view of national interests of Kyrghyzstan as many Kirghiz experts mark, the arrival of USA to the region was the positive factor. Before the introduction into the antiterrorist coalition, the government of Kyrghyzstan started with two basic aspects maintenance of national security, including the internal political stability, and economical dividends. From the point of view of questions of maintenance of national security for the Kyrghyzstan which has directly faced in 1999-2000 years with the direct armed intrusion of groups of the extremist organizations on the territory of the republic, realization of the anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan, accommodation of the armed forces of USA, the countries of the NATO, stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan had the extremely important value. Kyrghyzstan really suffered according to the results of the operations in the south of Kyrghyzstan in 1999 and 2000, known as Batken-1 and Batken-2, by the activity of the international terrorist organizations. For example, Kyrghyzstan lost its 25 citizens in 1999 during the Batken events, and eight and a half thousand people were compelled to migrate. Together with the human causalities the country carried essential financial expenses. As the result of military actions in the south of the country besides the internal political destabilization, Kyrghyzstans relations with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have greatly worsened. High probability of recurrence of the Batken events put the Kyrghyz leadership, taking into account the modest financial, military opportunities of the country, in a rather difficult position. Therefore, it is quite clear that the arrival and accommodation of the American armies has considerably increased a degree of security of Kyrghyzstan, have provided in the country the long-awaited stability on the southern boundaries. 395

Besides Bishkek using the favorable usual situation, tries to carry out the reforming of the armed forces under the general supervision of USA. In the near future in the armed forces there will be significant structural changes. Kyrghyzstan is one of the first among the countries of the CIS which plans to transfer the army into the professional basis, completely. Henceforth the basis of the armed forces will be made by small mobile groups. It follows from the existing threats in the region and according to them the military tasks. The accommodation of the armed forces of the antiterrorist coalition for Bishkek has also obvious eco nomical interest. The deciding economical motive for Bishkek is not as much the size of potential payments for takes off and landings (from 5 up to 7 thousand dollars for each one), rent and the use of the airport, but a desire to press the Western investors for the re-structuring of the external debts. As the prime minister of Kyrghyzstan has declared recently, the external debt of the country makes up about 1,5 billion dollars, that for the state with five million population and the undeveloped economy is the significant sum. For today, the United States are perhaps, the largest of all countries donors of Kyrghyzstan, and the influence of Washington on the decisions of such international financial institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund which practically influence on the aid to the Kyrghyz economy, is in many respects determining. The government of USA has considerably increased the volume of the help given to Kyrghyzstan by 2002 as the result of the expansion the of cooperation after the acts of terrorism happened in USA on September 11, 2001. Means for the sum of 49.9 million dollars assigned by USA for the programs of the aid to Kyrghyzstan in 2002, are distributed approximately as follows /4/: - Programs of support to democracy 11.4 million dollars; - Market reforms 12. million dollars; - Programs of security 12 million dollars; - The humanitarian aid 6.2 million dollars; - Inter-sectoral initiatives 8.3 million dollars. Besides, during his visit to Kyrghyzstan in July, 2002 the Minister of Finance of USA Paul ONeill has declared that USA will assist further to Kyrghyzstan in strengthening its defense. In turn, the USAs choose of Kyrghyzstan was based on the following circumstances: First, Kyrghyzstan in contrast to Uzbekistan, has no direct border with Afghanistan that is the important circumstance, in case a of negative development of the situation through realization of the anti-terrorist operation; Second, it is the absence comparing to Tashkent and Dushanbe, of the ethnic, political involvement in Afghanistan; Third, from the territory of Kyrghyzstan, except for Afghanistan, The US air forces can supervise the western areas of China, Tajikistan and the most part of Kazakhstan. Now, the territory of Kyrghyzstan, alongside with Uzbekistan, is the optimum for American variant to create the jumping-off place, as for conducting operations in Afghanistan in the frameworks of anti-terrorist operation, and for the realization of the long-term interests in the region of the Central Asia, as well. Tajikistan Despite of the general positive changes of the process of stabilization of the situation in post-conflict Tajikistan from the moment of the conclusion in June of 1997 of peace agreements, a number of the essential problematic moments, the negative influence is still kept in the country. Thus, Tajikistan faces with the problems both of the economical and political character. The further prospects of development of the country there depend on the decision of the existing social and economical, internal political problems of the postconflict Tajikistan. Social and economical sphere As the practice of the post-conflict period shows, the state institutes of Tajikistan are practically not capable to adjust and effectively to influence the occurring social and economical processes in the country. In the whole, in Tajikistan there is not observed any serious shifts in economy. As the experts of the United Nations think, Tajikistan remains for today one of the poor countries of the world. During the years 396

of the civil war, the economy and social sphere of the republic have suffered so, that some years, past after the restoration of peace to normalize the economical life for the government of the country there is not possible. The political instability and civil war of 1992-1997 have brought the huge irreplaceable losses for the social and economical sphere of Tajikistan and were extremely negatively reflected on the level and quality of life of the population. According to IMF, the general (minimal) losses as the result of the military actions in Tajikistan are estimated about 7 billion US dollars. According to the official data, the volumes of Gross National Product for 1992-1998 in Tajikistan there were reduced approximately twice, and according to the World Bank, approximately in 2.5 times. According to the official data, the monthly average wages in 2001 were 33 sooms about 11 US dollars. Thus, as the State Statistics Committee of the republic marks, the wages have decreased in comparison with the last year for 32,4 %. The size of pension does not exceed 3 dollars, besides it is not paid both as childrens grants. Incomes of the population in comparison with the same 2000 have decreased for 1.7 %; and charges and savings for 9,4 %. The real consumer ability of the population, in connection with outstripping rise in prices for consumer goods in comparison with the increase of the salary has decreased in some times. The volume of retail commodity circulation in 2000 in comparison with 1999 has decreased for 9 % that speaks about the sharp falling of a consumer demand. According to the estimations, the total internal product in calculation per capita does not exceed 330 dollars per one year. The inevitable result of the catastrophic social and economical position of the Tajik society becomes the criminalization of the separate kinds of economic activities and blossoming of drug trafficking, representing the real threat of security of Tajikistan, the Central Asia in the whole. The shadow economy clearly prevails over the open sector. In the shadow there is hidden about 80 % of gross national product. According to the experts to provide population efficiently with the incomes equal to the cost of the minimal consumers basket, the resources equal to the internal total product of the country are required. The support of Tajikistan on the part of foreign investors and the international banks is so far a unique way of the survival of the economy. At the same time, intensity still preserved in the country and the instability and the absence of prospects of high-grade normalization of the conditions in the near future makes Tajikistan unattractive for foreign investors. It in turn removes the prospects of overcoming in Tajikistan the post-war economical crisis. In conditions of the kept high natural increase of the population preservation of the crisis phenomena in social and economical sphere it is fraught with the most serious consequences for the Tajik society. It is necessary to remind, that the socio-economic factor finally has appreciably caused political the instability in Tajikistan in 1992-1997. As a matter of fact the inner civil war represents the struggle of regions for the survival, caused by the overpopulation of valleys, catastrophic shortage of water-ground and food resources. *** Despite of the planned positive shifts in the mutual relations between ruling forces and UTO, by the systematic realization of the treaties established earlier between them, continuation of the process of integration of the opposition into the governmental structures including powerful ones, political conditions in Tajikistan still remains intense. The Tajik society till now is in the condition neither war, nor peace. In the country there is only kept the visibility of the internal stability, which at any moment can be broken. The basic obstacle for the normalization of the conditions in Tajikistan still is the problem of regionalism, even more amplified in the course and after the civil war. In the conditions of Tajikistan, the establishment of power over the capital Dushanbe, over the separate regions of the country, does not mean a victory in the all Tajik scale as immediately causes the aggravation of the struggle for the regional interests. It is necessary to remind, the exactly regional-clan contradictions were the major reason of the conf lict. The regional factor continues to remain the basic and dominant in the public processes of the republic. Only under the condition of taking into the account of the interests of all regions for the republic, formation of a steady national political elite in Tajikistan as an indispensable condition of the preservation of the integrity of Tajikistan in the long-term prospect, so strengthening of the monitoring system above all the territory of Tajikistan it is possible. Otherwise there is a danger of the renewal of an open civil opposition in Tajikistan. 397

*** Due to the number of the objective reasons the development of the situation in Tajikistan in many respects depends on the influence of the external forces, first of all the countries of the first circle which includes Russia and Uzbekistan as the basic and most influential external players, Afghanistan, and also in the certain degree Iran. In this connection, the further course of events in Tajikistan in many respects will depend on the development of the situation in the specified countries, first of all in Afghanistan, on the development of relations between them, especially between Russia and Uzbekistan. The basic external destabilizing factor of the development of the situation in the region of Central Asia including Tajikistan, prior to the beginning anti-terrorist operations, preservation of the military-political opposition still acting in Afghanistan. For Tajikistan, in the whole for the region of Central Asia, the preservation of this military-political instability in Afghanistan carried the threats connected to the export of the idea of the radical Islam and support of the religious opposition of some countries of the region, refugee problem, growth of interethnic and interstate intensity, trafficking of drugs and weapons. In the context of these threats, the basic problem for Tajikistan was the support for the religious extremist organizations, such as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan on the part of Taliban movement. The central, most conflicting knot for the regime of E. Rakhmonov, there was the presence on territory of the country of bases of the extremist opposition organizations, first of all Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, directly connected with Taliban movement. The constant threat of the renewal of the armed actions on the one hand, impossibility of a ruling regime of E. Rakhmonov is effective to neutralize the problem, from another, was the basic source of tension concerning the states of Central Asia, first of all in the triangle of UzbekistanKyrghyzstan Tajikistan. Taking into account direct communication between Taliban movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and separate Tajik field commanders, it is possible to assert, that all assurances on the part of Taliban movement about the observance of the principle of non-interference into the internal affairs of the states of Central Asia is only a mere formality. In reality, the strategic interest of the certain forces in the destabilization of the situation in the countries of Central Asia was kept. For Tajikistan these circumstance carried the threat of the final de-fragmentation of the Southern Tajikistan into the zones of the influence, controllable by local field commanders from various ethnic groups, that, certainly is the most undesirable variant of the development of the situation, both for the integrity of Tajikistan, and for the system of security of the region of Central Asia /5/. Thus, in the post conflict Tajikistan there were all the preconditions for the next destabilization of the internal situation in the country kept. There were not solved sharp social and economical problems, a problem of regionalism, the adverse foreign situation connected, first of all with the non-stable situation in Afghanistan, and these were the basic moments of the development of Tajikistan before September 11. Situation after September 11 In the whole, also it is possible to speak about some positive effect on the development of the situation in Tajikistan in the context of the implementation of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Because of characteristic for Tajikistan as the post conflict state, permanent non-stable situation, preservation of the direct dependence of the security on the external influence, first of all on the development of the internal po litical situation in Afghanistan, Dushanbe always showed great interest in supporting of the external forces. Therefore it is absolutely not casual, just after the acts of terrorism in September 11 in the USA, Tajikistan has opened the air space for the planes participating in the military operation in Afghanistan, and in November of 2001, the official Dushanbe has given the consent for the presence of foreign armies on the territory of the country. So, for example, in the air stations of Kulyab (there can be based up to 60 planes) and Kurgan-Tyube 80 kms to the south of Dushanbe (there can be based up to 70 planes). Though the operative capacity of these air stations is insignificant, from the operative strategic point of view, they are located favorably enough and alongside with use of air stations in Kyrghyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan allow to take under the control whole Central Asian region. Antiterrorist forces lead by USA, according to the different reasons, meanwhile have not taken the complete advantage of the offer of Dushanbe on the topic of the deployment of the armed bases. 398

The USA also makes efforts for strengthening sites of the Tajik-Afghani border independently controllable by the Tajik military (70 kms). It is considered, that these sites are most poorly protected and used for drug trafficking. Actions of the USA are reduced to granting the financial support and preparation of experts for the protection of the border. Besides, after the beginning of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan of USA have cancelled the embargo on the delivery of weapons and military techniques of Dushanbe, kept during ten years /6/. As the result of the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, changes of the disposition of political forces in this country, Tajikistan has objectively got a number of essential dividends, basically of political and geo-strategic character. First, in the question of preservation of security and territorial integrity the positive tendencies connected to the improvement of the situation on the Afghan-Tajik border there were obviously planned. It is necessary to note, that prior to the beginning of operation in Afghanistan directly being close to the TajikAfghani border there was the largest Talib formations not less than 40-50 thousand people. After the defeat of IMT and accordingly strengthening of the Tajik armed formations in Afghanistan, there was the general strengthening of the monitoring system above all the territory of the south of Tajikistan as the important condition of preservation of the integrity and security of the country. The following factor is closely connected with the first, the improvement of conditions of preservation and strengthening of peace process in the country. Strengthening of the general control over the south of the country, considerably strengthens the positions, a field for political maneuvering of the ruling elite of Tajikistan, that in turn renders positive influence on the preservation of stability in this state. Besides in the context of the expansion of military-political cooperation with the USA, for the Tajik ruling elite there is a unique opportunity of the realization of the old desire to decrease the Russian influence in this country. In case of the further essential expansion of such cooperation, in the political, economical, military technical areas, it is possible due to the deployment of the American military bases, that Dushanbe appreciably can strengthen the foreign positions in the decision of some key questions for the country in the relations with Moscow, Tashkent, Kabul etc. At the same time, taking into account the military-political inf luence of Moscow in Tajikistan, Dushanbe, as a whole, will carry out rather a cautious policy in the context of the expansion of the American presence in the territory. Only in the capital of the country of Dushanbe there is 201 motor-shooting division, 670 air group, 92nd motor-shooting regiment, a separate tank battalion, self-propelled artillery and anti-aircraft missile regiments. In Kulyab there is deployed 149-th motor-shooting regiment, in KurganTyube 191st motor-shooting regiment and a separate jet artillery battalion. Except for the soldiers of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, in Tajikistan there are frontier divisions of the Federal frontier guards-service of Russia deployed. The factor of the Russian military presence will remain a leading one for a long time in Tajikistan, thus, carrying out the restrictive functions for any other foreign military-political presence. An economic component is very important in the activity of the anti-terrorist coalition also is extremely important for the national interests of Tajikistan. Tajikistan catastrophically requires foreign investments. According to the World Bank, for the restoration of the national economy of the republic destroyed by the war there is required not less than 4 billion dollars. At the same time the total sum of direct foreign investments given in the middle of 1998 was about 150 million dollars. In 2000, the volume of investments made up all 23,2 million dollars. In 2001 it made up hardly less than 29 million dollars of USA. The expansion of the military-political presence of USA in the region, gives Dushanbe chance to improve as well as the other Central Asian states, the difficult financial position. In case of the successful disposition, Dushanbe hopes for the increase of financial injections on the part of the West, first of all from the USA, as the help, credits, investments. In this connection, the certain steps in this question already are available. So, in 2002, Tajikistan, by the volume of the aid on the part of the USA took in the countries of Central Asia the second (85,3 million US dollars) after Uzbekistan place in the region /7/. At the same time, the prospect of the essential increase of financial injections into the economy of Tajikistan on the part of USA looks rather insignificant. 399

As a whole as shows the analysis of the development of the situation in the period after September 11 of 2001, Tajikistan, as well as Uzbekistan with Kyrghyzstan, by the way of maintenance of security issues, strengthening of foreign positions, appeared in the profitable position. At the same time, it is obvious, that in the conditions of the initial process of the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan, incompleteness of the process in the Tajikistan, real threats are also kept. Among them in the foreground still are the problems of drug trafficking and political and religious extremism. For Tajikistan one of the most dangerous and real threats for national security is the problem of drugs from Afghanistan. Overwhelming part of the drugs is sent by the Afghani drug dealers through the northern route, first of all passes through territory of Tajikistan (by different estimations from 65 % up to 70 %). In this sphere, unfortunately, the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan practically did not render any positive influence on the problem of manufacture and sale of drugs. This year, according to the forecasts of experts, Afghanistan can make tone of opium from what follows that the expected after the defeat of the Talibs the reductions of drug producing have not taken place. Moreover, the serious rise in prices for heroin after September 11, absence of the effective plan in the Afghani government and the world community for directing the Afghani peasants from manufacturing of drugs to the other kinds of activity, is created with favorable conditions for the further expansion of drug business in Afghanistan and over the borders. So, for example, during ten months of 2002 in Tajikistan there were extracted from the illegal circulation of 4300 kgs of drugs of the Afghani origin of which three thousand kgs are made from heroin. Thus, the problem of drug business continues to play the extremely negative role in Tajikistan. Despite of significant weakening of the extremist organizations in Afghanistan, including directly connected to the region, first of all the IMU for Tajikistan, the problem is still very actual. Within 2002 in the country the obvious tendency of the aggravation of the religious situation, connected to the activization of the extremist Islamic organizations first of the known Hizb-ut-Takhrir was predicted. The Tajik authorities take measures on the suppression of the activity of this movement involving more and more supporters. According to some estimations, more than 1500 inhabitants of Tajikistan are trained today at schools of the extremists located on the territory of the country/8/. The extremist organization Hizb-ut-Takhrir, in spite of its nonviolent methods of conducting struggle, nevertheless, represents a serious danger to Tajikistan, which still is in the stage of restoration of the country after the civil war of 1992-1997. Still non controlled by the official Dushanbe territory the part of Karateginskaya zone and Badakhshan, again threatens to turn into a jumpingoff place for extremists in Central Asia. A potential threat of the renewal in the long-term armed actions on the territory of Tajikistan can complicate the relations of the states of Central Asia, first of all in the triangle of Uzbekistan-Kyrghyzstan-Tajikistan. Though also the possibility of the development of the negative script in the region (like the Batken, Surkhandaria events) on the todays moment is rather low, but still we cant completely exclude the opportunity of its recurrence. Turkmenistan At the first sight, the geopolitical changes which have occurred and are proceeding now in the world community, in the region of the Central Asia in particular, in the least degree there is mentioned Turkmenistan. As it is known, out of the countries of the region, only Turkmenistan under the own initiative, according to the accepted obligations of the neutral state, practically was not involved into the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan. Ashghabad has agreed to provide the free way for the humanitarian help on the territory of the country to Afghanistan, that was a maximum. However in reality, the events of September 11 and the operation, which has followed in Afghanistan, and also scale geopolitical changes in the region, have affected the development of the situation in Turkmenistan significantly with some possible far-reaching consequences. As a whole, for the last period in Turkmenistan, there are clear tendencies to change in immediate prospects of the situation in the country. In the conditions complete transport dependence on Russia, the absence of the f lexibility in the questions of transit of Turkmen gas to the foreign markets, insolvency of the basic consumers of Turkmen gas mainly Ukraine Ashghabad is compelled to be engaged into the search of the new ways of transportation of its own hydrocarbon stocks on the world markets. Taking into account change of a situation in Afghanistan, a special activity of Ashghabad began to show again its promotion of realization of gas main Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan. Turkmenistan with the support of the USA has resolutely started to 400

study the old project of a gas pipeline to Pakistan through Afghanistan with the capacity of 15-20 billion cubic meters per one year. Besides the economical profits, the realization of the project for S. Niyazovs ruling regime carries serious political dividends on the part of Washington, which in this case can be interested in the preservation of political stability in Turkmenistan and in the preservation of the usual regime of authority. However, taking into account the preservation of political instability in Afghanistan, the project, at least, in the near future, constructions of pipeline TurkmenistanAfghanistanPakistan remains very distant. In the internal political sphere, the most significant event closely connected to the events of September 11, became the activization of oppositional forces, and its strengthening and unification. The revival of Turkmen opposition was caused by two main reasons: First, as the result of the change of the situation in Afghanistan, in the region of the Central Asia as a whole, in S. Niyazovs ruling regime the field for the foreign policy maneuverings was considerably narrowed. To the greater degree it was connected not so much with the dangerous and compromising former connections with Talibs, but with the obvious unwillingness of Ashghabad to cooperate within the frameworks of realization of the international antiterrorist operation in the necessary way. The official reason of refusal became the status of neutrality and the accepted appropriate obligations to the United Nations. Actually the refusal of Ashghabad can be regarded as some obvious fears of the intervention into the internal affairs of the country, the opportunity to use foreign forces for pressing or neutralizations of the existing authority. It is natural, that the usual situation has really shown strongly limited opportunities and high vulnerability of the stability of the regime of Turkmenbashi. Changes in the established during the last 10 years of the geopolitical disposition around the republic block for the official Ashghabad the opportunity of easy maneuvering between the centers of forces in the region. /9/ Before Turkmenistan was in the original geopolitical vacuum that allowed him without any serious consequences to ignore the external inf luence. Now the situation, apparently, will develop in a different way. Second, in the short period up to and basically after September 11 due to the policy of Turkmenbashi there was a mass outflow for the opposition of high-ranking officials, before being the nearest environment of Turkmenbashi, first of all it concerns B. Shikhmuradov, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, the spe cial representative of the president on the Caspian and Afghanistan. The activization of Turkmen opposition abroad has not casually coincided with the events of September 11, which have served as the powerful catalyst for the strong anti-Niyasov opposition. A number of former high-ranking Turkmen politicians, turned into opposition, have formed in Moscow the National Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan, which has united the numbers of earlier isolated opposition Turkmen groups. Now the objective of the activity of Turkmen opposition is the inclusion of Turkmenistan into the zone of steadfast attention of the West, first of all USA, as the state requiring for serious political changes. All the efforts of Turkmen opposition are directed, on the one hand, on the creation around S. Niyazovs ruling regime of the extremely adverse external background, realization of propagation of inadequacy, inefficiency and instability of his governing. Simultaneously, the efforts of Turkmen opposition are aimed at the expansion of the activity inside Turkmenistan, both among the population, and among elite groups, especially among dissatisfied or suffered. Thus, under the influence of the external and internal factors now outside Turkmenistan, first of all in Moscow, there was a newly formation of Turkmen opposition. Regarding its potential (financial, human) more exact than earlier the program of actions, presence of good connections among the Russian, American, European elite, it has serious prospects of transformation into a real political force that Turkmen authorities should take into account. 2. Regional players Pakistan The extreme process of the world situation connected to the explosions in the USA, and the US decision to implement in Afghanistan the anti-terrorist operation, have put Islamabad into the critical situation. As the result the administration of Musharraf appeared, as a matter of fact, between two evils. 401

On the one hand, thee was a pressure of the USA and practically all world community and at the same time the chance to decide some problems of social and economical and foreign policy character connected with the preservation of the international economical and political isolation. Alongside herewith, the serious fears of destabilization of the situation on the part of its own influential radical islamists, threat of a mass stream of refugees and passing of the military actions from Afghanistan to the territory of Pakistan. The field for the maneuvers for the administration of Musharraf was narrow enough and acceptance of one of the sides threatened Pakistan with bad consequences. Nevertheless, having weighed all pro et contra Islamabad dared to support the USA. Thus, the administration of Pervez Musharraf dared to risk. In this connection there is a lot of natural questions: what determined the choice of Pervez Musharraf, what principal causes of support of USA in Afghanistan there were and what will be the basic positive and negative consequences of the policy undertaken by Islamabad concerning Afghanistan in the actual development of the situation in the world? There are four basic factors they are important in the different degree rendered the greatest influence on the maintenance of the operation of the USA by Islamabad in Afghanistan: First, the support by Islamabad of USA is a demonstration of the intentions of the administration Musharraf essentially to correct the policy concerning Afghanistan, concerning Islamic movement Taliban in particular. Preconditions for the radical revision of its own policy in their relation with have ripened in Islamabad already for a long time. The events of September 11 have served only as a push for the activization of administration Musharraf in Afghanistan. For the complete understanding of logic of the behavior of Islamabad now concerning Islamic movement Taliban (IMT), the occurrence of contradictions in their relations, the brief analysis of principal causes of occurrence and the evolution of IMT there is necessary. As it is known, the Taliban movement was created by Islamabad (interdepartmental investigation service ISI, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) for the decision of quite specific targets in Afghanistan. In conditions of military-political instability, division of the country into various zones of influence, for the Taliban movement it was necessary to solve according to the rules strictly established by Islamabad in the military way the problem of the war in Afghanistan. In order to end military actions in Afghanistan and to establish their power answering the interests of Pakistan, Talibs needed to establish the control above territories of residing of ethnic Pashtuns, to unite tribes under their governing, to take authority in Kabul and to begin the process of formation of the new government together with other ethnic centers of influence, basically with Tajiks and Uzbeks. As the result Islamabad would provide coming to power in the country under its the supervision of a regime where the leading position would be occupied by Talibs, with the purpose of the decision of the following tasks: Opening of transport corridors in the countries of Central Asia. In the conditions of absence of the significant source of raw materials, the advanced industry, Pakistan is objectively interested in additional sources of maintenance of its own economic and military development. The control above the transport corridor into rich in the sources of raw materials countries of the Central Asia should strengthen the geopolitical position of Pakistan essentially. This circumstance becomes rather important in the conditions of preservation of the firm opposition with the old regional opponent India. Prevention of the unification of Afghani and Pakistan Pashtuns with the purpose of the creation of the state Pashtunistan. The greatest potential threat to the territorial integrity and security of Pakistan is represented by the opportunity of the revision of the frontier line of the Pakistani-Afghani border along the former, so-called Durand Line. As the result of this territorial boundary change the most part of the ethnic Pashtuns appeared outside Afghanistan. Now about 8-9 million of Pashtuns live in Afghanistan while the number of Pashtun population of Pakistan is made together with the Afghani refugees about 20 million people. Such objective discrepancy together with the desire of Pashtun elite of the creation of their own state (the question on Durand line all Afghani governments headed by Pashtuns raised Zahir-Shah, Daud, Nadzhibulla, Khekmatiar) promotes the growth of separatist moods among Pashtuns of Pakistan. Naturally enough, that Pakistan should disturb the desire of Pashtun elite to change the line of the Pakistani-Afghani border. Anyone not under the supervision of Islamabad the government in Afghanistan is a permanent threat of the revision of the Afghani-Pakistani border, the 402

so-called Durand Line. Therefore for Pakistan the ideal variant in Afghanistan there would be the creation under the supervision of Islamabad of the regime of government in Kabul. Carrying out in Afghanistan with the help of Talibs of these two tasks, Pakistan essentially would be improve its own geopolitical position and conditions and to solve many internal political and economical questions. At the initial stage the activity of Talibs in Afghanistan completely answered the interests and the expectations of Islamabad. Talibs quickly enough and effectively could establish the control above the most part of the territory of Afghanistan and take the capital of the country Kabul. However in the process of strengthening of its own presence in power, instead of the realization of the next stage, namely the creation of the national government on the basis of ethnic proportionality or a degree of the influence, Talibs, using usual favorable for them circumstances, have decided to establish the complete control on all the territory of Afghanistan and to monopolize the authority in the country. Such actions were included into the sharp contradictions not only in the initial plan of Islamabad on the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan, but also with interests of other countries involved into the Afghani conflict, first of all NIS, Central Asia, Russia and Iran. Further as the result of Talib actions there occurs the appreciable ethnicalization of the Afghani conflict on the line Pashtuns (Talibs) Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras (Northern Alliance), there is made a firm inter-block opposition around Afghanistan (NIS, Central Asia, Iran, Russia on the one hand and Pakistan on another). The continuation of the opposition of Northern Alliance with Taliban, support of radical Islamic opposition by the some of the countries of the post-Soviet space, substantially complicates relations of Islamabad with many countries of the world community, including NIS, Central Asia, Iran, Russia as the states most involved into the Afghani conflict. Thus, Islamabad, initially not wishing that, due to the policy of Talibs is included into the tough confrontation with the number of the countries of the Central Asia and their allies that does not enter the interests of Pakistan. Simultaneously with the growth of contradictions between Islamabad and Talibs, and in the process of strengthening of their own presence power, the degree of Talibs, being controllable to Pakistan is gradually reduced. Talibs with each year were deeper and deeper involved into the conflict, the tension of Pakistan with the countries of Central Asia has amplified, the degree of Talibs being controllable to Islamabad has considerably decreased, the certain split in the leadership of Talibs was seen, the loyalty and support of the peace population of the country, including Pashtuns as the basic support in the country has considerably decreased. As the result after 7 years of the renewal of the active operations connected to the occurrence of Talibs on the military-political stage of Afghani-stan, the situation in the country was possible to characterize as a deadlock. In the same deadlock position there was also Pakistan, as a matter of fact, the main organizer and the originator of the usual situation in Afghanistan. The Talibs not only have not justified the hopes of Islamabad in Afghanistan, but gradually they became a serious problem for Pakistan threatening its integrity, interests and relations with many countries of the world community. In these conditions, the readiness of Islamabad to take part in the realization of antiterrorist operation of the USA in Afghanistan becomes completely clear. Thus, Pakistan could with the minimal costs for itself change the situation in Afghanistan in the benefit, adjust relations with NIS, Central Asia and all World community. Second, one of deciding motives for the administration of Musharraf to support the USA in Afghanistan, there was a sharp necessity of the termination of the international economical and political isolation. Pakistan feels catastrophic shortage of money for the decision of the complex of social and economic, internal political problems. According to the opinion of experts, the economy of Pakistan has entered the long and the heaviest crisis in the history, caused by the numerous internal and external reasons, such as a drought, preservation of the international sanctions etc. Therefore from the very beginning of P. Musharrafs governing has proclaimed, that the most important task for his administration is overcoming the heaviest for last decade economic crisis. According to the IMF dates, the income per capita in Pakistan decreased for last two years for 20 % and does not exceed nowadays 400 dollars. The inequality in distribution of incomes grows. Not less than 25 % of 403

the population of this category of people owing to the fast growth of the population making about 3,2 % per year, lives now below official poverty line, and has the continuous tendency to increase. The amount of people with a level below the living level has increased to 17,6 million person of the period in 1988-89 up to 44 million in 1998-99. An unemployment is growing. The level of literacy is steadily reduced: 80 % of Pakistani people are not able to read, write, the labor age (14-65 years). According to the index of social development, in the beginning of 2000 Pakistan occupied number 134 within 173 states of the world. According to the local mass-media, at the beginning of 2000 the annual growth of gross national product was cut by half twice, making up to the 3 %, growth of the industrial production has decreased and makes 1.8 % per one year, foreign capital investments do not achieve even 1 billion dollars, deficiency of foreign trade about 2 billion dollars basically due to the Islamic countries. Now for Pakistan needs 5,2 billion dollars for payment of debts, and from the internal resources it is possible to expect only for 2.75 billion. This gap the country can liquidate only by the activization of economy, reception of credits and foreign investments, re-structuring of the debts. Meanwhile, in the country the reserves and the inflow of foreign investments, and inflation are apprecia bly reduced golden currency in the first half-year 2001 made about 6 %. The further economical, political isolation would threaten with the deepening of the economic crisis and strengthening of destabilizing factors in the country. In this connection the certain steps already are available: President of the USA George Bush has suspended the American sanctions concerning India and Pakistan entered in 1998 after the series of nuclear tests and has renewed the financial aid to the country. Besides, the USA have made the decision to re-structure the Pakistan debt for the sum of 375 million dollars, including percentage. In the nearest decade Islamabad will be excused from payments and will receive the right to pay all sum of the period till 2022. Nevertheless, the haggling between Islamabad for the loyalty to Washington proceeds, and Pakistan hopes for the greater, taking into account its size of the external debt making more 37 billion. Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Abdul Satar has expressed on this occasion transparently enough: We support the international community in its struggle against terrorism not in the exchange for economical purposes. However, taking into account the development of the events in the region and their influence on the global economical situation, our economic interests should be taken into account /10/. Therefore, Islamabad hopes for essential financial injections as successful on the part of the West, first of all USA. Thirdly, besides it became pure economic gains, an important motive for Musharrafs administration to support the USA is an opportunity to legitimate both an own mode of regime, and the nuclear status of Pakistan. As it is known, the coming to power of Pervez Musharraf was carried out as a result of military coup detat and displacement of government of Navaz Sharif. Therefore, a very convenient chance was presented for Musharrafs administration to renew the cooperation with the USA and to struggle together against the world terrorism to legitimate its own model in authority in the eyes of the World community. Fourth, the important reason for promoting the Islamabads support for the USA is the factor of rivalry with India. The restoration of the status of the US strategic partner appreciably strengthens the positions of Islamabad in the long-term rivalry with India. In many respects due to the status of the strategic partner of USA during the war in Afghanistan 1979-1989, Pakistan provided parity of forces with its regional opponent India. In the last years followed the leaving of the USA from the region, deterioration of relations between Islamabad and Washington, introduction of sanctions, Pakistan began to lose its former relatively strong positions in competition with India. Finally, after the lines of failure external actions concerning Delhi, and because of huge military technological, economic backlog, Pakistan has actually recognized the non-readiness to participate in the equal rivalry with India. As the result of the events of September 11 and its subsequent consequences the administration of Musharraf should take advantage of the chance again to take the position the main strategic partner of the USA in Southern Asia and by that considerably to strengthen its positions in the region. *** Beside the above named positive moments, real and potential negative consequences from the planned special action in Afghanistan with the participation of Islamabad, in our opinion, can be the following: 404

Possible transfer of military actions on to the territory of Pakistan. The presented variant of the development has a hypothetical character, but, nevertheless, it is still impossible to exclude it completely. In Pakistan there are many influential forces against the regime of Musharraf. The current intense internal political situation in the country promotes the activization of anti-Musharrafs forces. Thus the tool there can become the pro-Taliban part of the population of the country, including the Afghani refugees, members of the radical Islamic organizations etc. Expecting it, Musharraf has made two completely necessary steps. First, he has displaced from the command posts in the army of five most pro-Talib highranking generals, including the chief of Pakistani interdepartmental investigation service ISI. And he is obliged to some of them with his coming to power two years ago as the result of military coup. Second, he has closed the Afghan-Pakistan border. This action of Islamabad is directed neither against the Afghani civil refugees, either against a penetration into the territory of Pakistan of the destructive elements aimed at the destabilization of the situation inside Pakistan, escalation of the Afghan conflict and its output out of the borders of Afghanistan. Refugees problem. This problem is one of the most actual and financially burdensome for Pakistan. According to the commission of the United Nations on the affairs of refugees, in Pakistan there is now about 2 million of Afghans. Pashtun Problem. In current Afghanistan, it is clear that there is the problem of the ethnicalization of the political situation: on the one hand, Uzbek, Tajik and Hazaras ethnic groups, on the other hand, numerous Pashtun tribes is more are more contradicted. Such situation should disturb Pakistan where there lives mullions of Pashtun relatives they are ready to help their brothers by birth from Afghanistan in any ways, including the armed one. Pakistani Pashtun are discontent with the Islamabad policy. So, the situation in Pakistan could be destabilized very seriously, especially within the boundary territories, is could strengthen the traditional separatist tendencies to create an independent Pashtunistan, and aggravate interethnic relations. Internal reaction of the Islamists. However, the main threat to Pakistani security consists in the reaction of the local influential Islamic organizations, first of all the radical ones, on foreign actions of Musharraf administration. Having supported the actions of USA, Islamabad thus has considerably aggravated the tense relations with its own influential radical Islamic organizations. The massive demonstrations supporting Usama bin Laden and against the turn of Islamabad to the US are the first but not the most terrible parameter of the significant worsening of these relations. The variant of possible transition of many thousands demonstrations into the armed opposition between the authority and the Islamic radical organizations, is much more dangerous. The situation also is aggravated with that fact that foreign actions of Musharrafs administration, according to the sociological researches, are supported only by 7 % of the inhabitants of the country while 63 % of Pakistani people sympathized the Talibs. Recognizing the degree of threat of the internal security of Pakistan from the extremist religious organizations and terrorists, the authorities of the country were undertaking the attempts of the settling of this problem for a long time. However, up to the moment of coming to power in Pakistan of P. Musharraf, attempts of the previous ruling regimes were basically unsuccessful and had as a whole the declarative character. At the same time, the situation in the country in the context of spreading of the religious extremism and terrorism during the last years started to escape from the control of authorities and gradually entered into some serious contradictions with the interests of the ruling elite of the country, threatening its stability. The murders of political and religious is a serious reason to tough the struggle against the extremist organizations which pass rather frequent recently, the acts of terrorism becoming the daily phenomenon. Despite the efforts of the authorities to establish the order in the country, the chief of the department of researches of Ministry of Defense Seid Zafar Hussein, the executive director of the state petroleum company Pakistan State Oil Shaukat Mirza, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Navaz Sharif Mohammed Siddik Kandzhu were lost within only one week in the city of Karachi from the hands of killers. The tragedies have caused the mass protests on the part of the population in the number of cities of the country, and the participants of demonstrations reproached the government with the passivity and inability to resist to terrorism. Therefore there was the completely logical and consecutive step on the part of administration of Pervez Musharraf was toughening of the state policy concerning the radical Islamic organizations. The detailed plan 405

of the struggle against the sectarian terrorism, officially known as the Law on struggle against religious terrorism, was soon worked out. According to the local experts, the new law is directed, first of all, against extremist Islamic groups, such as Jamaat-i Islami(the Islamic society), Harakat ul-Mujahedeen (the Movement for the fighters for the faith); Lashkar-i Taiba ( Army of the followers) etc. It provides very serious punishment against the organization and the realization of terrorist acts on the religious ground. Besides other the law forbids the activity of many Muslim sects /11/. Thus, according to the experts, the new law is made to settle specific contradictions between Sunni and Shiite and to try to neutralize negative consequences from the destructive potential of the civil war in Afghanistan caused the radicalization the Pakistan society, which objectively represents the threat to political stability of Pakistan, and its integrity. Thus, the acceptance of the law testifies to the determination of the government to eradicate collisions on religious ground. At the same time, the aspiration of military authorities to put an end to the use the religion in political purposes, has met with the open resistance of the leaders of influential religious communal parties and the radical Islamic organizations. The actual development of the situation in the world community, in Afghanistan in particular, in connection with the attacks on the USA has given a new pulse to the expansion of the opposition of radical islamists toward the administration of Musharraf. Pakistan and the Central Asia Pakistan never hid the intentions to play the role of one of the regional centers of power in Central Asia. Our region is included directly into the orbit of geopolitical interests of official Islamabad. However, up to the end of 2001 the factor complicating the mutual relation of Pakistan with the Central Asian states, Afghanistan, or more truly, is the regime of Talibs, predominating there. Islamabad was the main ally of Taliban movement with all the consequences following hereby. From its part the post-Soviet states of Central Asia regarded the Taliban regime as the basic threat to the security. This contradiction has played the decisive role in the political fragility of Pakistani-Central Asian mutual relations. After the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, the arrangement of forces, both in the country, and around it has undergone sharp changes. The crush of Taliban on the political arena and the creation of the new coalition government with the representation of practically all interested parties, there were new opportunities for the realization of the Pakistan interests in Central Asia. It is possible to show two basic spheres of the interests of Pakistan in Central Asian region political and economic ones. And frequently, these spheres are interdependent. Among the factors of political attractiveness of the states of Central Asia for Pakistan, it is possible to allocate the following ones: The first is the Pakistani-Indian conflict. As well as in any other interstate conflict parties aspire to get the support of as many states as possible. Certainly, the role of Central Asian states in this case is not determining, but their relative geographical affinity to the zone of the opposition and gradual growing international authority make Islamabad and Delhi to show the arguments for the substantiation of their positions. At the first stage Pakistan tried to use the religious factor, namely Islam, as the connecting force. However the further experience has shown, that contrary to the expectations this tool brought the opposite result pushing away the leadership of Central Asian republics underlining the secular character of the development of these countries. Today the religious factor, and it concerns not only Pakistan, practically is not used or used very accurately in the adjustment of mutual relation with the Central Asian states. The second one is economic cooperation. The economic component of Pakistani interest to cooperate with Central Asian republics of the CIS is based, first of all, on the raw material potential of some of them. In this connection, one of priorities for IRP still have the formation of transport communications with Central Asia where Islamabad pays special attention on the creation of main means of communication through Afghanistan. The most brisk discussion now goes around of the project of the gas pipeline TurkmenistanAfghanistan Pakistan which is one of alternative variants of delivery of natural gas to Pakistan and further on the markets of Southeast Asia. The project stipulates the construction of the gas-compressing factory near to Karachi. The project of the gas-line has extended of 1500 kms and cost 2-2,5 billion US dollars. The political-economic negative factors in the realization of this project consists in the following: 1) The gas pipeline crosses a number of unstable regions, in particular provinces of Afghanistan where local interests do not coincide with the interests of the center. 406

Political situation along the route of the gas pipeline stays rather tense. Permanent tension between Pakistan and India. Economically, it is not expedient to build a gas pipeline only for one consumer. Transit rates on the territory of Afghanistan and the final price of the final consumer that is Pakistan, are not stipulated. 6) Industrial stocks of gas in Turkmenistan, for the realization of the project, do not provide economical feasibility of giving gas it is necessary to transfer of prognosis resources into the category of the industrial ones what requires the billions of investments. 7) Participants of the project they are Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, have no financial resources. In 2000, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund have officially rejected Turkmenistan giving financial resources. Russia and Ukraine invited to take part in the project, have no financial resources, too. 8) In the 2002 year, the deposit Southern Pars started up the operation in Iran with the share of Russia. Industrial stocks of Iran make 22 billion cubic meters of gas. Besides, Iran has the agreement with Pakistan on the gas delivery. Having started up the development of the deposit Southern Pars Iran can provide through Turkey the markets of the West and Asia with the gas. Thus, Iran has an opportunity to block transport corridors of Turkmen gas, both to Europe and Asia /12/. Thus, the realization of the desire of Islamabad to conduct active policy in Central Asia faces with the material financial difficulties, preservation of the high level of potential instability in Afghanistan, significant involvement into the Afghani conflict, proceeding confrontation with India, and actually problems of internal development in the Pakistan. Iran The events of September 11 rendered serious influence on the development of the internal political and external political situation around Iran. Thus, contrary to Pakistan, for Iran, in the context of the course of the anti-terrorist operations, extremely important value has not only the development of the situation in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq. The Afghani factor As well as for other foreign neighbors of Afghanistan, the consequences for Iran from the realization of anti-terrorist operations in this country, the rule of Talibs and accordingly changes of the existing political disposition of forces, have a dual character. On the one hand, elimination of the radical Taliban regime (Sunni) from the political scene of Afghanistan, which according to some reasons of religious, political character were hostile to Shiite communities, is rather favorable development of the situation from the point of view of security of Iran. The murder of the Iranian diplomats by Talibs in 1998 has essentially complicated Iran-Afghani relations. During the ruling of the IMT, the stream of refugees to Iran, basically Shiites, has considerably increased. Therefore, it is no wonder, that Tehran has always been the consecutive and uncompromising opponent of Talibs and during all the inner Afghan wars was one of few countries, rendering the moral, political, material and financial support to anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. As a whole, the policy of Tehran concerning Afghanistan can be divided into two stages before the events September 11 and after. Till September 11, Iran was a leader regarding the granting political, military and material aid to antiTalib to groups in Afghanistan. Iran assisted not only to Ahmad Shah Massoud, but also to the other groups, first of all to Hazaras, to political clans and leaders of the Uzbek ethnic organizations. As the experts mark, Iran did not make distinctions between ethnic and religious groups regarding the granting the aid if their activity would be directed against Taliban regime. In these conditions, it is natural, that the defeat of Taliban movement was the positive moment from the point of view of security of Iran. Besides, during the last forty years there was the first official visit of the Iran head to Afghanistan. During this visit, the parties discussed the question of Iranian assistance for the restoration of the local economy, issue the credits promised by Tehran (560 million dollars within five years). Now, the administration of Karzay includes also the representatives of Shiite communities they are having close connections with Iran. First of all, it is the Hazara leader Karim Khalili (vice-president). A strongly expressed Islamic character of 407

2) 3) 4) 5)

the new Afghani government also predetermines the special attention to the mutual relations with Tehran. Alongside with the positive moments there are some negative moments for Iran in the context of current situation in Afghanistan. Among the new and old negative consequences of the Afghani problem the following ones occupied the special place for Iran: First, the refugees problem: more than 1.5 million Afghani refugees in Iran. Overwhelming majority of them does not wish to come back to Afghanistan. The Afghani refugees are huge financial expenses for Iran having not the best times in the economy. Second, the drug business. Antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan practically did not render any positive influence on the problem of manufacture of drugs. In this connection in the nearest period the increase of standard items of the Afghani drugs on the world market is predicted. One of the basic channels of transportation of the Afghani drugs on the world market is still Iran. For Iran, the problem of drug business and drug addiction is one of the most dangerous and real threats for national security for today. About 2.5 million or more than three percents from all the population of Iran making about 70 million people, are drug addicts. They daily consume four tons of drugs, which illegally filter into Iran. For the arrangement of the Afghani part, the creation of the boundary infrastructure Tehran annually spends 800 million dollars. The cost of one special alarm system equipped on the border to Afghanistan, is estimated in 25 million dollars. On capturing of drugs on the border, Iran takes now the first place in the world. The drugs make up about dozens of tons. According to the expert estimations, within the last years, Iranian frontier guards and special services extracted up to 80 % of the withdrawn opium. Last years during, the World Day of struggle against drugs already there was tradition of burning of drugs taken from the drug-mafia. At the last time, there it was destroyed 50 tons of drugs for the sum more than 3 billion dollars. However it was not so simple. Since 1979 more than 3 100 Iranian police- and military men were lost in the clashes with the drug dealers. All these factors also predetermine the special state program in Iran on the struggle against White Death, which the special staff is created for. It consists of the heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Investigation Bureau, the Corp of the Guards of Islamic Revolution, the army, and also the General public prosecutor of the country. The Central administrative department on the struggle against drugs submits to the staff. Third, the American presence in Afghanistan also creates certain problems for Iran. The offensive political line of Washington shown after September 11 in the global scale, and in Afghanistan in particular, directly touches the national interests of Tehran. As it is known, for Iran Afghanistan is not only the important direction of foreign policy, but also takes place in projects to form a zone of the Iranian influence. The obviously expressed sympathies for cooperation of Iran with Tajik and Shiite political and military groups of Afghanistan undoubtedly confirm the intentions of Tehran, strongly to adhere Afghanistan or its part into the sphere of the Iran influence. In this connection, military-political presence of the USA in Afghanistan essentially doesnt coincide both from the point of view of questions of national security of Iran, and its geopolitical aspirations with the role of the regional leader. Tehran openly declares the fears on the official level. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran Kamal Kharrazi , the Iranian government has the serious evidence, testifying that now USA are creating on the border to Iran (in Afghanistan) criminal and terrorist groups which activity is directed against the Islamic Republic. The Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran also has rejected the accusations of Washington that Tehran supports the terrorists from Al-Qaeda. We support the efforts of the transition government of Afghanistan on the restoration of stability in this country, has emphasized Kamal Kharrazi. As he said, the Irans authorities conduct the resolute struggle against the supporters of Al-Qaeda group. But, unfortunately, continues Kamal Kharrazi, the administration of the USA doesnt try to notice the sincere aspiration of Iran to promote the struggle against terrorism /13/. Tehran is rather anxious about the pro-American positions of the government of Afghanistan led by Kh. Karzay. Today, Washington tries to design in Afghanistan a system of authority, completely under the supervision of Washington where there will be no place for the other geopolitical competitors, first of all, Iran. In these conditions, coincidence (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) or partial neutralization of Pakistani (partly 408

Russian) interests, Tehran has remained the unique country which seriously can interfere with the promotion of interests of USA in Afghanistan. Moreover, traditionally, neither Russia, nor Uzbekistan as a whole were never interested in strengthening of Iran in Afghanistan, before September 11, and especially after. Strengthening of the positions of USA in the region have sharply aggravated the internal political struggle in Iran between liberals and conservatives, between the supporters of the normalization of the relations with USA and their opponents. Inclusion of Iran alongside with Iraq and Northern Korea into a category of the socalled countries axes of evil made by the president of USA, and also the preparation of United States for the forceful decision Saddam Husseins problem in Iraq, have extremely complicated the Iranian-American relations. If to assume, that Washington will manage to overthrow S. Husseins ruling regime and to generate in Baghdad the under control government, in this case Iran practically will be completely surrounded by pro-American, and so, for today and the anti-Iran regimes. Fears of Tehran have under themselves the serious bases if to take into account, that Iran has the extensive border to Afghanistan, and Washington has a new lever of influence on Tehran. Thus, USA in the struggle against Iran on the Afghani field has quite specific targets: to put political pressure upon the Islamic Republic and to spoil connections of Tehran and Kabul, using actively anti-Iranian rhetoric (accusations of Iran of the attempt to destabilize the new government in Afghanistan, with the help of some (basically Hazara) Afghani fractions, and also in helping to the Al-Qaeda guerillas). But Iran in turn, taking into account the importance of the Afghani direction for the interests and criticality of the developing situation, shows maximum of efforts to keep the influence on Afghanistan which was traditionally distributed on Afghani Shiites, first of all Hazaras, and also on the inhabitants of the western and partly the northern region of the country. In this connection, today the discontent of Tehran is expressed in the insufficient from the point of view of the interests of Iran representation of Shiite-Hazara in the formed power structures of Afghanistan. In this case, the occurrence of a real threat from Afghanistan, Tehran, using the traditional levers of influence, first of all by means of the agents of influence (Afghani Shiites), can take drastic measures. As it is known, 2 million Hazara community, compactly living in the western provinces of Afghanistan (basically in Bamian), and also under the control of the field commander Ismail Khan of the territory (Herat) in the whole keep loyalty to Tehran and can be if necessary used in the Iranian interests. Taking into account great opportunities of Iran in Afghanistan, Washington probably with the purpose of avoidance of the aggravation will go for the certain updating of the positions for observance of the interests of Tehran. Iran Central Asia Iran considers its relations with republics of Central Asia as an absolute necessity caused by the task of strengthening of the positions in the new geopolitical area. In the conditions of preservation of the elements of isolation, first of all on the part of USA, the IRI shows the attempts to strengthen the economic, political and cultural presence in the Central Asian region of more persistently. These aspirations, still, are based on the sober estimation of the advantage of the geographical position, concerning stable internal political conditions. Iran considers favorable geopolitical and geographical position as a link between Central Asia and the countries of Middle East, Turkey, Europe. And in this context determines the relations with the countries of the region. The political component of the activity of Iran in Central Asian direction is determined by a number of strategic interests. The first. The policy of security. One of the main tasks of Tehran is the security of the northern borders. And this task is treated as the necessity of maintenance of stability and security in Central Asian states. The second. Iran regards the relations with the states of the region as important ones within the framework of its general policy targeting to exit from the international isolation. Central Asia is considered as a possible bridge for the relations with EU and the states of Southeast Asia (first of all, with China and Japan). The aspiration of Iran as soon as possible to leave from the international isolation is stated in the program of President of IRI M. Hattami at a special session of General Assembly of the United Nations in December of 1997 /14/. The third. The main factor of the policy of Iran toward Central Asia is the Caspian problem. A development of deposits of the Caspian shelf is a task completely not a primary one for Iran owning a significant part 409

of petroleum stocks of Persian Gulf. Preservation of access to the Caspian bioresources is important, but, first of all, Tehran aspires to use participation in the Caspian affairs for the strengthening of the political influence in the region, with the prospect to use this influence as one of aces in the big geopolitical game /15/. The component of the realization of foreign policy of Iran is its aspiration to take the most of the favorable geostrategical position in quality of the most convenient route of transportation of petroleum and gas. For Iran, the operation of the old pipelines, and also the lining of new ones, is vitally important. Therefore, the decision of the following tasks is a priority for Iran in this sphere: finishing of the construction of the ramified network of internal transport communications, in particular, pipelines which would connect the northern countries to the terminals on the coast of Persian Gulf, and also the pipelines connecting the countries of Central Asia with the communications network in Iran; construction of the railway Meshed-Bandar-Abbas which will reduce to 900 kms the distance from Central Asia up to Persian gulf; the rapid development of the economic infrastructure of some provinces and free economical zones of the country. For today, 3 free economical zones located on the coasts of Persian and Oman gulfs exist in Iran. The shortest way to the countries of Central Asia runs through the free economical zone Chabakhar located in the southeast of Iran /16/. Tehran has appreciably strengthened the pressure upon the neighbors, again having confirmed the adherence to the principle of the division of Caspian Sea into five equal parts, 20 % to each state. Official Iranian authorities declare, that the littoral states should solve the problem of the legal regime of Caspian Sea only through the consensus, and Iran will not allow the infringement of the national interests. This position can block the interstate compromise planned recently on the question. We shouldnt forget, that Iran, the only one of Caspian states, enters into the number of most active members of OPEC that renders great influence on its position. Despite of the interest of Iran in the broadening of relations with the countries of Central Asia, the parties couldnt to the full use the opportunities of each other for the expansion of the general economic cooperation. According to the available statistical data, the volume of commodity circulation between Iran and all the countries of Central Asia has made about 900 million dollars. Thus, if to take into account, that the volume of commodity circulation in the markets of these countries makes 28 billion dollars, for the share of Iran it is only 4 % /17/. Proceeding from this, the following basic priorities of the Iran policy towards the states of Central Asia appear: strengthening of political cooperation; cooperation in the Caspian Sea zone; development of transport corridors; development of trade and economical cooperation; interaction on the settlement of regional conflicts, in particular, in Afghanistan. *** Thus, the events of September 11 and the antiterrorist campaign which has followed them USA, have appreciably affected the development of the internal political, economical situation, both for Iran, and Pakistan, there was essential to updating their external political activity. The especially appreciable changes have taken place in Pakistan, and basically they had a positive character. Simultaneously, both states, taking into account the complexity and ambiguity of the usual situation in these states, are in an uncertain position. In this connection, it is necessary to note, that in many respects, the prospects of development of these states will depend on the continuation of the course of antiterrorist operation, and on its practical results. Notes: 1. Saidov A. The new friendship has flashed instantly // http://www.gazetasng.ru. 2. Laumulin M.T. Central Asia after September 11 // Central Asia and Caucasus. 2002. Nr 4. ( 22 ) p. 36. 3. Yu. Moroz. New division of the political map? // Asia and Africa today. 2002. 7. p 9. 4. The information of embassy of USA in Kyrghyzstan, Money to democracy. http://delo.to.kg/2002/22/03.html 5. Akimbekov S.M. Afghani knot and problems of security of Central Asia. Almaty, 1998.p. 144. 410

6. Burnashev. R. Tajikistan: policy and armed forces // Continent (Almaty). 2002. 14. p. 30. 7. Laumulin M.T. Central Asia after September, 11 // Central Asia and Caucasus (Sweden). 2002. 4. p 36. 8. Davron V. In Tajikistan there is stirred the activity of Hizb-ut-Takhrir // Eurasianet, 07.09.2002. 9. Baitursynov A. Once upon the time in Turkmenistan // Continent (Almaty). Nr 10. p. 27. 10. Abarinov V. The USA hope, that the stopping of sanctions will help general Musharraf to keep the control over Pakistan // http://www.svoboda.org/. 27.09.2001. 11. Moskalenko V. Difficulties on the way of democratic development // Asia and Africa today (Moscow). Nr 4. p. 21. 12. Suyunov. N. The comment on the project of a gas pipeline Turkmenistan Afghanistan-Pakistan // http //:www.dogryyol.com.30.05.2002. 13. The next is Iran? // vip.lenta.ru. 17.10.2002. 14. Messamed V. Iran: 10 years in the post-Soviet Central Asia // Central Asia and Caucasus (Sweden). Nr 1. 2002. p. 32. 15. Oil: interests of the countries of the region // Trans Caspian project. 01.06.2000. 16. Ashimbaev M., Erekesheva L. Iran as the future regional power // Analytic (Almaty). Nr 2. 2001. p. 26-29. 17. General political line of Iran the development of the relations with the countries of Central Asia // iran.ru, 30.04.2002. PART III. NEW GEOPOLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE GREAT POWERS The proceeding changes of a geopolitical world picture already have resulted in formation of cardinally new situation in Central Asian region (CAR). Now there is a transformation of Central Asia (CA) from peripheral region into the region occupying one of a key position in system of geopolitical coordinates of the Eurasian space. Growing value of the region is caused by presence of a lot of the factors determining its new geopolitical role. First, arrangement of CAR in the center of the Eurasian continent has strategic value from the point of view of its influence on security and stability of a significant part of the continent. Second, the orientation of development of the situation in each of the states of the Central Asia and in the region in the whole, in many respects can determine prospect of balance of forces on the extensive space of the Eurasian continent. Third, a concentration in the region of natural resources of world value, first of all, hydrocarbon raw mate rial. Many states of the world have the increased interest in their development, and not only Turkey and Pakistan with poor natural resources, but also rather provided with them China, the countries of Europe, the USA, Japan, and South Korea. Therefore, these strategies pursue the concrete geopolitical purposes, as the control of fuel and energy resources and ways of their transportation enables to supervise the situation in the region. Fourthly, it is an arrangement on a joint of the Eurasian transport corridors and presence of a wide transport-communication network. Through the Iran, the countries of CAR have an exit to Persian Gulf, through Afghanistan and Pakistan to Indian Ocean, through China into the Asian-Pacific region. The adequate estimation of contemporary situation in the Central Asia shows precisely enough, that today ambitions of new players and traditional rivalry of leading powers here are bound. Within the world and regional powers rendering essential influence on formation of the geopolitical situation in the Central Asia, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, the Chinese National Republic and the states of the European Union are especially allocated. In this connection, a consideration of key interests of these countries, of their policy, their current and perspective positions in the Central Asian region demands separate attention. 1. The Central Asian strategy of Russia The Central Asia is included traditionally into a zone of interests of the Russian Federation, whose priority and the hierarchy of importance at the certain stages was determined by various circumstances. In the general set of geopolitical, economic and military interests the key directions of the Russian policy in the region are based on the following factors of long-term character: 411

- Central Asia is considered as traditional buffer or the belt of security for Russia, in the context of security of southern borders; - the oil factor and desire of Russia to keep influence on Caspian Sea have the special importance of the region for Russia; - the territory of the region has the big value for Russia as a zone of disposition of power resources for acceptance of the appropriate measures in case of occurrence in the nearby regions of full-scale conflicts, including nuclear; - the maintenance of the control over the basic transport-communication ways and pipelines of the region has a great external political and economic value for the Russian Federation; - the region represents for Russia so called responsibility zone for the Russian and the Russian-speaking population, a preservation of a significant political role of Russian language and culture. Thus, the aspiration for the implementation of these four dominant interests in the whole determined the general character of the Russian strategy in the Central Asia in the period since 1991 to 2001. However, it is necessary to note at once, that until recently Russia practically did not produced the highgrade policy understood as a circuit of consecutive steps, precisely formulated strategic purposes aimed at their achievement concerning the Central Asian region. The Central Asian policy of Russia had mainly a reaction character and at different stages was subject to influence of some the factors causing those or its other directions. In this connection, it is expedient to lead its designation of periodicities with the accentuation of attention on a number of central aspects determining it for more system representation of dynamics of the Russian policy in the region. In our opinion, the Russian policy in the Central Asian region has passed in the newest history some stages, which can be designated as follows: I stage (1992-1995) support of limited Russian presence in the region; II stage (1996-1998) definition of contours of the new strategy and returning in the region; III stage (1999-2001) development of the basic approaches to form the system of mutual relations with the states of CAR and strengthening of vectors of mutual relations; IV stage (2001) transformation of foreign policy directions within conditions of change of forces arrangement in the region; V stage (2002 till present time) forming of the new foreign policy models in CA in accordance with the US presence in the region. I stage. After the existence termination of the USSR in December of 1991, a process of self-determination of new political elite of Russia has resulted in occurrence of the tendency to self-isolation from many important directions of foreign policy of the former Soviet Union. In this period, the interest of the new government in Moscow to an expensive support of Russian presence in the region has considerably decreased. Russia was absorbed by the decision of the internal problems and at the beginning of the 1990-th years, and it kept only on inertia minimally necessary presence at the Central Asian republics. Besides, the rate on the prompt entry in number of the European countries had dominated in a foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The aspiration to associate itself with Europe and in the whole with the West was obviously shown in its external political strategy of Russia. In this connection, the Central Asian states were considered while the original ballast that complicated a process of organic inclusion of Russia in the West-European civilization. In turn, the new independent states (NIS) of Central Asia, as well as many other countries of the post-Soviet space are independent, experienced the period of centrifugal tendencies, searches of new identity and new reference points and models of economic, social and political development. In the whole relations of the Russian Federation and the countries CAR at this stage were characterized frequently by the ambiguity of the purposes and inconsistency, the sides gave a priority to shortterm interests. At the same time, to one of the basic directions in foreign policy of Russia on the post-Soviet space and in the Central Asian region in particular in this period began aspiration to formation of the regional system of security. In this connection, in May of 1992 in Tashkent the Treaty on Collective Security (TCS) of countries some members of the CIS was signed, called to provide political stability for the period of transformation. In its frameworks Russia used three basic directions in the external political activity: peace-keeping mea412

sures, joint protection of borders and (partly) military presence. Thus, the basic stress was made on militarypolitical methods. However in the whole positions of Russia in the region CA quickly enough weakened. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have created own military both frontier formations, and Moscow during this period has kept the direct control only above frontier forces in Turkmenistan and Kyrghyzstan /1/. Qualitatively other situation has developed concerning Tajikistan. The civil war in this republic in 1992 /2/ has not left Russia a choice in this period it was practically impossible to transfer the control over the armed formations of former Soviet army /3/. Pursuing in Tajikistan the double purpose: stabilization of the situation and protection of the Russian interests, Moscow appeared involved in the inflamed inter-Tajik conflict. At that time Russia has selected a policy what can be characterized as support of the Tajik government and preservation of peace-making mission as inner regional affairs of the CIS. Within the framework of implementation of this policy in September of 1992, the president of the Russian Federation signed the decree about creation of a Frontier Group FFS of Russia in Republic of Tajikistan. Then, the Russian leadership has accepted the decision on transition of the frontier forces, which are taking place on the territory of Republic of Tajikistan under jurisdiction of Russia. In 1992, Russia applied for an exclusive role in settlement of conflicts in the region. To middle of 1990th stresses of the Russian policy were displaced in the direction of the recognition of the necessity of more active connection with the international organizations (the United Nations, OSCE) to settlement of conflicts on the post-Soviet space. Cooperation of the Russian Federation with Iran and Pakistan in peace-keeping Russia in Tajikistan was a new element in Russian policy. In 1994, peace talks have begun between government of Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik opposition (U) with the active participation of the Russian side in Moscow under aegis of the United Nations. However, the first rounds of negotiations in Moscow, and then and in Tehran were not productive. So, the peace agreement was not signed in Tehran, as the governmental delegation did not agree on a number of the conditions, which have been put forward by opposition, in particular to release political prisoners. Not having achieved political results on negotiations, the opposition has developed large-scale operations in Tajikistan, captured valley Tavildara, Darvaz, some areas of Karategin and Pripyandzh. Having suffered a number of failures and had in appreciable losses in alive force and engineering, the government of Tajikistan was compelled to direct delegation to which now only needed to agree with conditions of opposition to Teheran. In result in October of 1994, the provisional Agreement on cease-fire on the Tajik-Afghani border and inside the country was signed. In October 21, in Islamabad the first plenary session of the third round of the inter-Tajik negotiations was held. The disagreements of the parties were sharp, and only on November 1 of 1994, the communiqu about prolongation of provisional Agreements cease-fire and other hostile actions on the Tajik-Afghani border for three months (till February 6 of 1995) was possible to sign. It is necessary to note, that at that moment Russia did not act fully as third mediating party. The main Russian priority in a political line concerning Tajikistan was given to support Rahmonovs regime, that in the subsequent has essentially narrowed contacts to the inner Tajik opposition. Within 1995, the military-political conditions has not undergone essential positive changes: attempts of penetration on territory of republic from Afghanistan separate groups of guerillas and larger groups proceeded, bombardments having found and frontier posts from adjacent territory etc. By the end of 1995, the situation in Tajikistan has gone to impasse. Negotiating process marked time, and the opposition started military approach from internal areas of Tajikistan. Only the presence of the powerful grouping of the Russian troops (participation of the Central Asian countries in formation CMF had symbolical character, and the basic weight on creation and maintenance of CMF was undertaken by Russia) allowed keep the situation. In the whole, the Russian presence in Central Asia at the first stage was actually kept faster contrary to an official policy and opportunities of Moscow mainly because of weakness of the Tajik political elite /4/. Economic relations of Russia with the Central Asia in this period were not its priority. By way of the external economic policy, a calculation was made that close economic relations existing earlier between the republics and making parts of a uniform economic complex, will stimulate naturally re-integration. However, in trade and economic relations to this time, there was a barter character of the external economic bargains 413

that has considerably weakened intensity of economic interaction. In same time, the largest Western companies were fixed in the Central Asian market, appreciably having reduced the Russian economic presence. At the same time, Russia continued to show interest in transportation of energy resources of the region in a favorable direction. In the whole, the narrow orientation of the Russian interests has significantly had an effect on the general level of relations of Russia and the countries of the Central Asia which intensity at this stage has appreciably decreased. The policy of Russia in the Central Asia remained relatively a reaction able, without the precise strategic purposes, and it was based mainly on the account of short-term priorities. II stage. The tendencies to revision of foreign reference points of the Russian Federation were designated to the second half 1990th years. In this period the certain motions aside activization of the Russian policy in the region began to be marked that, on ours view, a sight was caused by a number of factors. First, an increase of contradictions between geopolitical and geo-economic interests of Russia and the USA was designated, there was a loss of illusions concerning idea of development of relations of strategic partnership with prospect on the alliances relationship with the USA, and in the whole the Russian leadership has come to understanding, that fast and painless integration to Europe to achieve it is not possible. Second, the supreme political elite of Russia gradually began to comprehend of scales of threat of loss of geopolitical influence in the Central Asia and necessity of strengthening of the positions on a southern geostrategic direction. Third, an occurrence of movement Taliban in 1994 on the Afghani political stage that recommended itself as a serious political force, and the further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan especially since 1996, have precisely designated the necessity of closer interaction for maintenance of stability and security for Central Asia. The interdependence of the situation in Afghanistan and the neighboring states is doubtless. This argument has played the decisive role in returning and fastening of Russia in Central Asia what happened in the next years. The Afghani threat promoted that the states of the region the basic hopes, in the case of the adverse development of events, began to assign to Russia. As a matter of fact, this period actually is the beginning of definition of the major contours of the Central Asian policy of Russia. Its main priority became preservation of the regional system of security as the major factor providing the Russian influence in the region. On February 14, 1995 the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation About the statement of a strategic rate of the Russian Federation with the state-participants of the Commonwealth of Independent States was signed /5/. The thesis that development of the Commonwealth of Independent States goes along the vital interests of the Russian Federation, and relations with the states of the CIS is the important factor of inclusion of Russia into the world political and economic structures was fixed in the document. In the context of the Central Asian region, the policy of Russia in this deciding degree began to be determined by the objective need for joint actions and cooperation in the decision of pressing questions of security. Since 1996, after the period of some uncertainty, the Russian Federation began to undertake additional measures on the termination of the armed opposition and political settlement of the conflict in Tajikistan. After five rounds of the inter-Tajik negotiations under the initiative of Boris Yeltsin, it was offered to hold in Moscow a meeting of president of RT of E. Rakhmonov and head of U A. Nuri. After meetings in Tehran (October, 1996) and Hoshded (Northern Afghanistan December, 1996), E. Rakhmonov and A. Nuri have declared readiness to arrive to Moscow. Negotiations in Moscow were held in December, 1996 and passed with the serious difficulties. In these conditions, the Russian party has offered a compromise variant of the Report on Functions and Powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation. The negotiations holding with participation of the chairman of the government of the Russian Federation V. Chernomyrdin, were finished by signing of some the documents which have determined term and the contents of a transition period from war to the world and the mechanism of achievement of the national consent in Tajikistan /6/. In February March of 1997, the seventh round of the inter-Tajik negotiations also has passed in Moscow. On their results the Report on military problems the key document in the inter-Tajik settlement was signed. 414

On June 27 of 1997 in Moscow, the final round of negotiations was held, and the General agreement on the establishment of peace and national consent in Tajikistan there was signed. At the same time, Moscow conducted work in the Afghani direction with the simultaneous participation during the inter-Tajik settlement. In 1996, the anti-Talib alliance was formed with the Russian efforts, which included, except Russia, the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, as well as Iran. From all the participants of the alliance, some special positions were occupied by Uzbekistan, that in many respects was caused by its rather independent policy and presence at Tashkent of its own levers of influence on the situation in Afghanistan through the Afghani Uzbeks led by general Dostum. However, a capitulation of troops of general Dostum before movement Taliban in August September of 1998 has resulted in the crash of all regional system of security existing on that moment. The groups of movement Taliban went to the Uzbek part of the former Soviet-Afghani border in area of city of Termez. In this period, complications concerning Russia and the separate Central Asian countries began. On November 30 of 1998, I. Karimov at the press conference devoted to the visit of the president of Kyrghyzstan A. Akaev, has acted with sharp statements into the address of the Russian special services in Tajikistan /7/. All this has put Russia into a difficult position: obviously coordinated actions of Tashkent and Bishkek were objectively directed to the weakening of presence of Moscow in the Central Asia. It was relatively difficult for Russia, to keep the presence in Central Asia in the conditions of the policy of these two states. III stage. The period from 1999 to the first half of 2001 in the whole could be possible to characterize as the period of the gradual active policy of Russia in the Central Asian region. Thus the characteristic moment became the understanding within the Russian leadership, that the approach to the Central Asia as to a complete region was insufficient. The states of the region differed from each other already in many respects: by the rates of social and economic development, and by the character of the course of the internal political processes. Besides, the increased level of conflicts in the region has designated with all clearness for Russia a necessity of more weighed approach for development of mutual relations, and of differentiation in the approach to partners depending on their readiness for the cooperation and precise comprehension of mutual interests in relations with each other. In the whole, as a arms tactics of strengthening of vectors of the bilateral interaction supplemented by activization of activity in the regional interstate associations, was taken. Change of Russian political dynamics in the region in this direction has especially received development with the coming of V. Putin on the post of the prime minister, and then and the president of the Russian Federation. The Uzbek vector, certainly, has acted as one of the priority directions of the Russian foreign policy in the region. Interests of Russia in this case consist in the establishment of more stable and predicted system of interaction with Tashkent in the avoidance, becoming already traditional to this time, the periods of rapprochement and cooling of mutual relations. This interest is caused by that Uzbekistan is one of the key states of the region by way of maintenance of the regional security and in the whole represents influential force in the Central Asian region. Besides, Uzbekistan has significant economic resources and opportunities (cotton, metals, a geopolitical arrangement, strong enough army etc.), which requires both economy and a policy of Russia. Thus, conducting a policy of creating of an ally, Russia could expect the promotion of the interests not only within the framework of the region but also use results of cooperation as the factor of external influence on the states located on perimeter of the region, first of all, Afghanistan and partly of Chinese Peoples Republic. At the same time, concerning Russia and Uzbekistan the certain intensity was still kept to the beginning of this period. The next tendency to their warming was planned in connection with so-called Batken events of the summer of 1999. Groups of guerillas of Islamic movement of Uzbekistan under the leadership of Dzhuma Namangani attacked the mountain areas of Kyrghyzstan from territory of Tajikistan. Guerillas aspired to break in the Uzbek part of Fergana Valley and to lift there revolt against I. Karimovs regime. In these conditions Tashkent was extremely interested in renewal of military technical cooperation with Russia. Moscow, in turn, has chosen effective enough tactics of rapprochement with Uzbekistan on the basis of joint struggle and prevention of the general threat distributions of Islamic extremism, as in Uzbekistan, first of all in the field of Fergana Valley, and on the territory of Russia on Northern Caucasus. 415

The new stage of the Russian Uzbek relations began from December of 1999 since the visit of the Prime Minister of Russia V. Putin to Uzbekistan. During a meeting, the Contract about the further deepening of widespread cooperation in military and military technical areas was signed. After V. Putins election by the President of the Russian Federation, the Russian Uzbek relations developed especially actively. In May of 2000 Vladimir Putin has paid the first official a visit to Tashkent. At the press conference in Tashkent Putin has declared, that any threat to Uzbekistan is a threat of Russia. Islam Karimov has answered, that its country addresses to Russia for the help as Uzbekistan could not resist to hostile forces independently. However, this stabilization of relations appeared only for a time. In August of 2000, the IMU guerillas attacked territory of Uzbekistan in the Surkhandaria area, in autumn the Talibs, having crushed in fights the armed groups of Northern alliance, have practically went on borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In this period Tashkent has rejected the idea of Russia about creation of collective regional armed forces and has gone on direct dialogue with the Talibs. Practically simultaneously with it the president of Uzbekistan has made with the application in which has called Russia to not frighten Uzbekistan and other countries of this region with the Talibs as a danger. Itself the Taliban threat, as well as the danger of internal Islamism is strongly exaggerated, he has told, actually its simply invented by Moscow which pursues exclusively purposes to keep the military-political control over Central Asia /8/. The leadership of Uzbekistan has acted in December against the American and Russian plans of drawing over Afghanistan military impacts and proposed to all states of the CIS to make a dialogue with the Talibs /9/. Islam Karimov declared, that the long unnecessary war with the Talibs which became the real force in Afghanistan /10/ is not necessary for the country. However, in the subsequent strategy chosen by Uzbekistan, has not brought expected results, and the problem of the Talibs appeared insolvent. In December, the Security Council of the United Nations entered sanctions relating the Talibs. In the spring, Northern Alliance began the counterattacks, and it not only has returned the previously lost positions, but also has seriously pressed the movement Taliban. The development of the events again has caused the activization of the Russian policy in the region and promoted the next rapprochement of Russia and Tashkent. In March of 2001, Tashkent was visited by the military delegation of Russia. As a result of the meeting, the arrangement on the delivery to Uzbekistan of military equipment was achieved. In the beginning of May, Moscow was visited by Islam Karimov. During his visit for the first time for ten years of independence Karimov recognized the right of Russia for the protection of its interests in Central Asia. In the words meant for Vladimir Putin, he has emphasized: the Central Asian region is a southern fron tier of Russia which is interested in peace in this area. Activity which you are showing there, is completely supported by Tashkent... On behalf of Russia we have not only the guarantor of security, but also the strategic partner /11/. On results of the meeting there were signed the Contract about Cooperation on the frontier questions and the agreement on the deliveries of the Russian arms to Uzbekistan. Thus, in the conditions of the attempts of forces of the international terrorism and religious extremism to complicate the situation in the Central Asia, Russia and Uzbekistan periodically went on the certain strengthening of the interaction, both on bilateral, and on the multilateral basis. It was decided, that Uzbekistan will join the Shanghai Five, which at that time already existed as the mechanism of the regional military-political cooperation. So, in June of 2001, the presidents of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have signed documents on transformation of the Shanghai Five into the Shanghai Organization on Cooperation (SOC) with simultaneous connection to it Uzbekistan. And though Tashkent in many respects adhered to an independent position , nevertheless, inclusion of Uzbekistan as the sixth member SOC was extremely significant event for system of collective security in the region. Also, in this period in spite of the fact that the basic theme of the development of relations remained military, Russia partly aspired to involve and an economic component of mutual relations. In this context it is necessary to note, that in the whole Russia and Uzbekistan have mutual geo-economic interests. They consist, first of all, in keeping rather capacious and geographically close markets for the export of production. In spite of the fact that the sphere of trade and economic cooperation between two countries still continued to remain enough narrow. Russia still remained the basic trade and economic partner of Uzbekistan. In 2000 the trade circulation between Uzbekistan and Russia has made 1.1 billion dollars. In 2001 416

the parameter of mutual trade has increased on 15 % and has made 1,286 billion dollars. For share of Russia in 2000-2001 years was from 16 up to 18 % of the volume of foreign trade of Uzbekistan. As priority directions the industrial and medical equipment, automobiles, wood and other building materials, which Uzbekistan traditionally buys in Russia, were trading between two countries. In turn, the Russian side has increased the volume of purchase of cotton and the production of textile branch of Uzbekistan. With the participation of the Russian investors in Uzbekistan it was created more than 400 enterprises, about 40 from which work with the 100-percentage Russian capital. One more most significant direction of the Russian policy in the region became the further relations with Tajikistan which more than other republics required the help of the northern neighbor. In the general the set of geopolitical and military factors the key directions of a policy of Russia in Tajikistan were based on the following Russian interests: First, the presence Russian of military contingent on the basis of 201st motor-shooting division and frontier group FGS in Tajikistan gave Moscow the real opportunity to strengthen the inf luence in the region. Due to the active participation during the opposition for Afghani Talibs on the Afghani-Tajik border, Russia got a role of the strong defender, both in the eyes of Tajikistan, and other states of the Central Asia. In one of the interviews the Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Republic of Tajikistan in the Russian Federation R. Mirzoev has declared: Tajikistan has a huge external border with Afghanistan. We count, that its not only the Tajik-Afghani border, but also, first of all, the border of Russia and Tajikistan with Afghanistan /12/. Second, it was important for Russia to provide the support of more or less stable internal political conditions in Tajikistan, to avoid the negative chain reaction in all Central Asian in region. Third, Moscow used bases on the Tajik-Afghani border, for the private support of Northern Alliance military and economically in the struggle against the Talibs. Fourth, Russia aspired to prevent attempts of separate citizens and the whole groups among which there were also preachers of ideas of a pure slam illegally to immigrate from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and further to Russia. Fifth, Russia together with Tajikistan solved the problems connected to the growing threat of drugs penetration to Russia and further to Europe. In April of 1999, the official visit of president E. Rakhmonov to Russia took place, during which a number of the important documents were signed. Concerning Moscow and Dushanbe on the foreground there was put forward all the complex of the questions connected to the security. In this regard, the special place among the signed documents has occupied the Agreement about the allied interaction between RT and the Russian Federation, focused on the XXI century, and the Agreement about the status and conditions of the location of the Russian military base on the territory of RT. In these years, Russia also paid the certain attention to the questions of economic cooperation with Tajikistan. In 1999 the Russian export made 92,5 million US dollars, in 2000 and 2001, accordingly 105,0 and 129,4 million US dollars. In 2001 the volume of the foreign trade turnover between two countries has made 234 million dollars, or 17,5 percents from total amount of the foreign trade turnover of Tajikistan. To this period in Tajikistan it was created about 100 enterprises with participation of the Russian capital. With the assistance of Russian organizations there were developed the technical and economical foundations of a stage-by-stage construction of Rogunskaya hydroelectric power station, creation of a joint venture on the basis of Adrasman of ore dressing combine and a deposit East and Western Kanimansur with the subsequent development of a deposit Big Kanimansur. The development of mutual relations with Kyrghyzstan for Russia, from the point of view of expansion of its presence and inf luence in the region, the maintenance of the regional security, as an element of its own security, also represented the sufficient interest, and in the whole Moscow aspired to support more or less stable relations with Bishkek. Besides, in the conditions of changing of the periods of warming and cooling of relations with Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan was for Russia some kind of a strategic point, providing transit to the Russian military base in Tajikistan. However it is necessary to note, that in the whole regional positions of Kyrghyzstan were insufficiently powerful, that in many respects determined a place of Kyrghyzstan in the general structure of the Central Asian policy of Russia. 417

But in the whole relations of Russia and Kyrghyzstan not always were unequivocal. Moscow was not always considering the strategic position of Bishkek, originally having addressed to many political-economical models (the Asian tigers, Japan, Switzerland, China, the American system). At the end of 1990th years, rapprochement of the Russian Kyrghyz mutual relations in many respects was promoted by the strong deterioration of conditions in Kyrghyzstan. In conditions of reduction of the western financial activity, of difficult position, both in social and economic, in internal and external political way the cooperation with Russia for Kyrghyzstan began one of the most significant directions. In this period, the policy and Russia and Kyrghyzstan was characterized by search of possible ways of rapprochement. In this context it is possible to note the basic directions of cooperation, in which development Russia and Kyrghyzstan were interested. First, Batken events 1999 and 2000, showed the weakness of the Kyrghyz army and political instability, caused the aspiration of Moscow and Bishkek to expansion of military technical cooperation. In this con nection Russia rendered the military technical help for counteraction to bands of the Islamic extremists who have intruded in August of 1999 on the south of Kyrghyzstan from territory of Tajikistan and assistance in the field of technical re-equipment and modernization of means of the protection of the state frontier of Kyrghyzstan. In the whole, realizing the vulnerability, Kyrghyzstan persistently and consistently supported the collective efforts in struggle against the international terrorism and religious extremism. In the connection with kept threat the leadership of the country connected the hopes to bilateral interaction in sphere of security in which the strategic partnership with Russia is especially allocated, and with the Treaty about collective security within the framework of the CIS. With same purpose the initiative about basing forces of fast reaction Treaty on Collective Security in Bishkek was put forward. Second, one of the problem moments for Kyrghyzstan, that was forcing it to search protection of Russia, that is actually all industry of Kyrghyzstan (it is especial the enterprises former Soviet military industrial complex) desperately needed new technologies. The most real and perspective for Kyrghyzstan, there was the attraction of the Russian technologies. Economic cooperation with Russia helped enough as a good opportunity somewhat to stabilize the social and economic situation in the country in the whole. First of all, due to restoration before the destroyed economic connections and the opportunity of real selling of the Kyrghyz goods, competitive only in the Russian market and the markets of other post-Soviet states. In turn, Russia was interested in reception of the control over a number of the strategic enterprises of Kyrghyzstan which shares were offered by Bishkek as the repayment of a part of the external debt. At this time it was renewed the cooperation in the field of manufacture of uranium production, color and precious metals and other strategic materials, interrupted after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Third, service of external debts was one of the most significant problems for Kyrghyzstan. In conditions of adjustment of close connections with Russia there was an opportunity effectively to negotiate for re-structuring the debt in front of Russia. Fourth, Kyrghyzstan actively aspired to get support of Russia in quality as the restrain of pressure on the part of the regional powers. Bishkek had difficult enough relations with the nearest neighbors, in particular with Uzbekistan, and in this context strong relations with Russia gave the basis to Kyrghyzstan to expect to Moscow as the guarantor of observance of its interests. In turn, preservation of some intensity concerning Kyrghyzstan with the next states, in particular with Uzbekistan, allowed Russia to represent itself as the arbitrator and, thus, promoted distribution of its influence to region. If the basic attention of Russia in the relations with Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan was concentrated in the sphere of military technical cooperation, so concerning Turkmenistan this sphere of cooperation remained practically non-realized. The low level of interaction between Moscow and Ashghabad in the field of maintenance of the regional security in many respects was caused by that Turkmenistan adhered to the status of the Neutral state. The insisting on the implementation of the independent neutral policy of Ashghabad abstained from practical participation in any interstate systems of collective security. In these conditions, interests of Moscow were concentrated mainly in economic sphere, in particular concentrated on a task of transportation of Turkmen power resources in the direction favorable to Russia. It is 418

necessary to note, that for Russia it is not so much an economic one, but more a political question. Participation in the transportation of power resources allows Russia to provide the certain control over the situation in the region. In this respect, Russia used interest of Ashghabad in the development of export routes as the certain levers of influence for the expansion of the presence in the region and in Turkmenistan in particular. Russia actively mastered the markets for which Ashghabad, thus, narrowing a field of external activity of Turkmenistan applied. The autumn of 2000 there was stopped the most advanced from lines of Turkmen projects civil-engineering project of Trans-Caspian gas pipeline (TCG) according to which Turkmenistan annually was going to deliver 30 billion cubic meter of gas through Azerbaijan to Turkey. In October of 2000, Russia has agreed with Turkey upon the deliveries of the Russian gas through the pipeline Blue Stream. It meant, that Gazprom would take the basic place in the local market, becoming in 2010 the supplier of 30 billion c. m. of gas, what naturally reduced the opportunity of development of Turkmenistan on this market. The other projects of pipelines developed by Turkmenistan to China (30 billion c. m., a cost more than $ 6 billion) and to Pakistan (20 billion c. m., a cost ca. $ 2 billion), developed as the alternative of export of gas through the Russian route, have not received the necessary development. Thus, in the conditions of having practically no alternatives of routes of transportation of Turkmen gas, Russia tried to use this situation as the mechanism of strengthening of the influence, including as counterbalance the strengthening of the positions of USA in the Caspian region. Thus, since 1999 Moscow began to come back to the active policy in the Central Asian region and by 2001 Russia occupied a leading position in geopolitical force balance in Central Asia determined by mainly military-political component and its functions as the guarantor of security in the region. The aggravation of the problem of extremism, activization of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, irreconcilable part of the incorporated Tajik opposition with the direct support of Talibs have created in 1999-2000 years a real threat for the countries of the region. These events have evidently shown the limited security factor and practical absence of sufficient internal opportunities of the states of the Central Asia for maintenance of the necessary level of stability, both on national, and on regional levels. In these conditions only Russia was considered by the states of CAR as the real factor of maintenance of political, military and in the certain degree of economic stability in the region. The important role in the Russian policy thus was given to the Treaty on Collective Security. In conditions of happening of any real threat the participants of the Treaty in 2000-01 were compelled to undertake a number of steps for the answer to new calls for the security. So, by the summer of 2001 the participants of TCS closely came to the necessity of creation of their own collective forces of rapid deployment (CFRD), which already the USA and NATO have been having for more than 20 years before. The sphere of the action of CFRD should become Central Asia, and in the future any region of the sphere of CFRD application were the threat of the international terrorism could occur. Kazakhstans assault battalion Kazbat, the Kyrghyz mountain rif le battalion, the Russian tactical group were included into the structure of CFRD on the level of battalions and a separate signal battalion, and also the Tajik landing-assault battalion. Thus, the rapid deployment forces were intended for the implementation of mobile operations and rapid fights on liquidation of the limited groups of terrorists on Batken type. But these forces were insufficient for the resistance against the large-scale intrusion or implementation of large peace-making operations on a regional level. Besides, the special policy of Uzbekistan made inconvenient the effective interaction of all interested sides. It is typical, that already right after the creation of CFRD a number of the countries of the NATO took a keen interest to the opportunity of rendering assistance on the preparation, ammunition and training of shooters for Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan and Kazakhstan. This fact can be considered as the elements of the policy on the restraint of CFRD formation. At the same time, despite of all the growing role of USA, China, the countries of the Muslim world in Central Asia and other external players, the role of Russia in the maintenance of the stability in the region still remained the leading one. In this period the USA and China did not apply for the role of a military-political force in the region. 419

IV stage. Events of September 11, 2001 and the followed anti-terrorist operation of the USA in Afghanistan became the reference point of one more stage in the Central Asian policy of Russia. After September 11 the geopolitical situation in the Central Asia has undergone significant changes there was completely new military-political configuration, which in many respects has caused the weakening the Russian positions. Just after the tragic September events and the announcements of United States about the intention shortly to begin the punishing actions against terrorists, active consultations between Russia and the states of Commonwealth, including the highest level, there begun. The trip of the secretary of Security Council of the Russian Federation V. Rushailo to all the states of Central Asia was made. In October 1-2, there was the meeting of the heads of power structures and special services of the countries of the CIS in Dushanbe where the questions of the coordination of actions in the sphere of struggle against the international terrorism with special services of the countries which are not included in the CIS, there were discussed. In October 8-9 of 2001 in Dushanbe, the emergency meeting of Committee of secretaries of Security Councils of the state-participants of the Treaty on Collective Security there was held. Practically in all above-stated actions, the questions of the implementation of joint actions of the CIS on their struggle against terrorism there were mentioned. However the subsequent events have shown, that there was not possible to create the general block. Besides, the state-participants of TCS had no appropriate military technical and financial opportunities for the fullscale participation in the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, the basic threat of the security of Central Asia whence proceeded. In the result the influence of Russia on partners in Commonwealth began to decrease considerably. Thus, the former geopolitical order in the region based on the original triangle the West (USA plus Europe) Russia China and characterized by the external military-political domination of Russia, gradual penetration of the American investments into oil-and-gas sector of Caspian Sea and a neutral policy of China, was broken. In result there was a change of positions occupied by the leading players and redistribution of forces in the region. The general situation in this period clearly reflected reduction of the activity of Russia and simultaneous strengthening of the role of United States of America. In the whole, the weakening of the positions of the Russian Federation has taken place in the number of directions. First, Russia has ceased to be the unique force dominant in the military-political plan in the region. USA, in turn, actively expanded their influence in terms of military-political presence. The basic component of the process of full-scale military-political entry to the Central Asia there was the deployment of the American military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan. Second, the USA in Central Asia, becoming not only economical, but also military-political force, claim for the functions of the guarantor of the security in the region, thus, starting to occupy a niche which was taken only by Russia before. Third, the events connected with the actions of USA on searching of the ways of transportation of hydrocarbon raw material bypassing Russia, are clear in this regard. After the states of OPEC have actually agreed with the independent oil exporters on behalf of Russia, Mexico, Norway and Oman upon the coordinated export policy, pipelines from the Central Asia through the territory of Russia can not be considered as independent from OPEC. The USA are extremely interested in construction of an oil pipeline going around of Russia that has caused an activization of actions concerning the project of BakuDzheikhan and the beginning of its practical implementation since September of 2002. The prospect of implementation of the pipeline will mean loss of the powerful tool of influence on the countries of the Central Asia for Russia. Fourth, the former prospects of closer integration of the countries of the region are lost within the framework of the CIS and the Treaty on collective security. Presence of the armed forces of the antiterrorist coalition in region makes it problematic the further development of the CFRD state-participants of TCS on the immediate prospects as they were created with the purpose of removal of threat from Afghanistan. From the strategic point of view, the network of military bases of the countries of the NATO in Afghanistan and the Central Asian states provides the complete control over the region and enables to react on the strategic situation operatively. 420

Thus, there was a process of the certain expression of Russia of the region and narrowing of spheres of its influence. In this period Russia had no sufficient political and economic opportunities completely to close the region for other centers of force and privately owned influence on its development. V Stage. The weakened positions of Russia in the region have put Moscow before the necessity of rethinking of its foreign policy and new construction of relations with partners in Central Asia already in the view of USA presence in the region. As a matter of fact, now Russia is only at the initial stage of foreign policy new to it in the region. In this connection to state an unequivocal estimation to the prospects of its development it is represented premature, but at the same time revealing the basic tendencies which, in our opinion, will determine the further development of events, there is already possible. In this context, first of all, it is necessary to note, that the very new partnership between US and Russia creates opportunities for the cooperation, instead of confrontations in Central Asia. USA should consider that Russia has the interests in the region, namely, in economic and political areas, and also in the sphere of security. At the same time, the strategic alliance Washington Moscow if it nevertheless will develop, would have a number of essential lacks. First, it will have an unequal character, since, the role of the younger partner will be imposed to Russia. Second, allies of the USA and Russia do not trust each other. Third, sooner or later geo-strategic divergences and different national interests of two actors will result in strengthening of tension between the partners. An elimination of such lacks can be promoted, in our opinion, by the policy of so-called regional parity. USA should understand that after the termination of the military decision of an existing problem in the region CA, in Trans-Caucasia, in Asia in the whole on the foreground there will be strategic and political tasks where it will be necessary to use other methods: economical, ideological, political and information. Russia has built control system of inner regional processes and the appropriate experience, to Americans in many aspects could not independently solve these tasks. Thus, the essence of a policy of regional parity is, that Russia in separate regions of Eurasia and in some situations could represent itself as to equal USA and the West geopolitical force and to represent in such cases the general Russian-American interests as the USA still long time it is necessary to accumulate that experience which Russia has concerning Asia in the whole. Certainly, between Russia and USA practically on many parameters there exists sufficient asymmetry. The existing distinctions not only with a view of and approaches to a policy in the region, and vision of its future, but also asymmetry in that, on what degree the countries need each other, do not allow to speak about full consolidation of these countries on all complex of existing questions. At the same time, there is a wide sphere of concurrence of the Russian and American interests in the Central Asia in the questions concerning strengthening of political stability, struggle against illegal circulation of drugs, prevention of large-scale regional conflicts, where the application of the weapon of mass destruction is potentially possible. Using the policy of regional parity, Russia and US rather could come to the manufacture of special contracts and agreements on cooperation in Central Asia and a number of other regions. On intermediate term prospect, one more of the basic directions of the Russian policy in the context of presence of USA in the region most likely will be destiny of the Caspian oil and pipelines. By development of the situation, for Moscow real economic cooperation with the states of the Caspian region and Central Asia, and also from the USA outweighs the prospects of confrontation with some unknown result. Thus, the Russian policy in the region can develop under the following circuit: oil and gas deposits will be maintained on full power, Russia will receive a significant share of profits, the Russian companies will take part in construc tion and operation of the Baku Dzheikhan pipeline. However this scenario does not exclude in the future of occurrence of conflicts in the region since its destiny besides in many respects will depend on the stability of the Russian-American relations. 2. The US aims and strategy in Central Asia After disintegration of the USSR, the positions of USA in the region began to strengthen greatly. The first, in some years after gaining independence by the Central Asian republics were characterized by the 421

most active adjustment of relations of the states of the region from USA and the West-European countries. In turn, interest of United States in the region of the Central Asia was caused by the importance of the region having as a strategic site between Russia, China and the states of the Islamic arch, and having rich natural resources, in particular hydrocarbon. In this connection, foreign strategy of USA concerning the countries of the Central Asia was based mainly on geopolitical reasons, the pragmatic approach which is taking into account own strategic priorities and interests. In the whole, the basic interests of United States in the region can be presented with the following major aspects: First, in the whole the establishment and expansion of presence at region is an element of the general strategy of USA on consolidation of the global leadership in long-term prospect; Second, the USA are extremely interested in maintenance of guaranteed access to natural resources of the Caspian region within the framework of implementation of the power policy: namely, reduction of dependence on deliveries of energy carriers from the Arabian oil countries and maintenance of resource bases and transport routes, maximum free from influence present and possible in the long term opponents of USA and their allies; Third, US aspire to provide access to political and economic potential of the states of the Central Asia with a view of implementation of a policy of restraint of China and influence on Iran which act as opponents of United States on a number of world and regional problems; Fourth, by means of distribution of the influence on the Central Asian region of USA aspire to not allow the situation when one of powers or a group of powers, such as Russia and Chinese Peoples Republic will dominate in the region in a degree excluding here the American presence; Fifth, US are interested in use of territory of the region to form the reserve space on the one hand with the purpose of creation of potential threat for so-called the problem states to which number of USA carry Iran, Iraq, Northern Korea, and with another for rendering support to the allies; Sixth, the United States are interested in purchase on behalf of the Central Asian republics qualitatively new and enough a capacious commodity market of the industrial goods from the countries of Europe and US; Seventh, presence at developing Eurasian strategic transport unit is of great importance for USA (a transport corridor Northern Europe India, the Western Europe China Japan, gas-and oil pipelines of various directions); According to these interests, the main vector of the policy of USA in the region is directed, first, on re duction of economic and political presence of Russia in the region and creation of the conditions providing impossibility of restoration with it of the influence. The second component of this vector discharge from the great geopolitical game such potential players as China and Iran, and creation of the conditions providing the opportunity of USA to render economic and political influence on these countries from territory of the Central Asia. From the point of view of chronology in the policy of USA in the Central Asia it is possible to allocate four periods: I stage (before and after 1991). The Central Asian policy of USA was characterized by some uncertainty. In conditions of the objective necessity of adaptation to the occurred geopolitical changes after the disintegration of the USSR, Washington did not have consecutive and complete policy in relation to the countries of the region. America was limited to the diplomatic recognition of the sovereignty of the new states of the region and acknowledgement of former administrative borders between the Soviet Central Asian republics as the international /13/. Washington conducted the general political line concerning all post-Soviet states, including Central Asian, paying attention to development of processes of democratization and implementation of market transformations. II stage (1992 1995). In this period, began to leave on the foreground in a policy of USA the economic component. A promotion of interests of US in the Central Asian region was carried out mainly on means of economic mechanisms and fastenings of positions in strategic economic spheres, first of all, oil-and-gas. Thus, the USA showed the interest in the basic in the questions connected to extraction and export of hydrocarbon raw material, their overall objective consist in construction of gas-and oil pipelines around of territory of Russia, Iran and China. In the first years after finding independence of the countries of the region the 422

largest western campaigns were fixed in the local market, appreciably having reduced the Russian economic presence. In this period military-political connections between the countries of the region (first of all, Kyrghyzstan and Uzbekistan) and the NATO also began to arise within the framework of the program Partnership for Peace. III stage (1996 2000). In this period, there was a certain cooling concerning USA and Russia behind which Washington continued to give a special role to the Central Asian region. In the Central Asian policy, the US has decided to concentrate on the basic efforts to develop the relations with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In turn, Uzbekistan tried to conducted a policy independent from Russia and searched the strong external partner, which in an ideal as saw to the Uzbek policy could become Washington. However, the development of American-Uzbek relations went slowly enough and only on the limited circle of questions. IV stage (2001- until now). To the beginning of this period as a result of a combination of unique geopolitical factors it was found out, that the USA in the region practically do not have real contender for the influence: Russia in many respects has lost political and economic levers of influence; Iran and China did not aspire to establish the control over region; the European Union assumed to strengthen the influence in the region only in the remote prospect. Thus, to the moment of coming to power of administration of G. Bush (junior) it became clear, that the former plans of Clinton administration on the implementation of long and multi-track tactical struggle are not so actual. The new administration has planned rather dynamical and pragmatic plan of the action concerning Central Asia. The establishment of constant American military-political presence and the economic control in the region became only a matter of time. As an occasion for this purpose have served events September 11, 2001 and antiterrorist operation of USA in Afghanistan. Thus, in the beginning of 21st century the American policy in the region has entered a new stage, which is characterized by the aspiration to establish there the direct political, military and economic control of USA. By the end of 2001, the USA have practically finished the basic part of the military operation against the Talibs, have helped to establish the international control over this country and to generate a transition government. And already in the beginning of January, 2002 there was a question on military-political presence of America in the region of the Central Asia with the purpose of guarantees of preservation of stability in Afghanistan. Washington looked at these guarantees through creation of the military bases on the territory of the countries of the region. It was far ambiguous step on the geopolitical consequences, actually begun the American military-political penetration and fastening into the Central Asia. According the experts, the American military presence at the Central Asia is to solve except for the Afghani problem and other tasks, important for national security of the USA, namely: - to have in the region of force of rapid deployment which can appear claimed in case of internal political destabilization in Pakistan and, especially, in case of the next aggravation of the India-Pakistan conflict; - to have in the region the infrastructure for the active policy concerning Iran and its nuclear program; - to project the American military presence on power resources of Caspian Sea; - to supervise the territory of Chinese Peoples Republic, especially those areas where there are missile installations, and somewhat and the further growth of China. In the whole, the traditional American rhetoric about interest of the USA in political stability, democratization and economic prosperity of the Central Asia at this stage has got quite concrete sense. Thus, the USA actively used a policy traditional for aspiring to reduce to a consensus of two incompatible things: the first, it is strategic interests of USA which compel messages of an affair with any regimes; the second, it is the mentor character of political system of America which is expressed in intervention of the Congress, various public organizations and other lobbyist forces in foreign policy of the country with the purpose to strengthen the stress on the protection of the American values. Thus the next administration willingly uses the factor as it gives it the additional levers of pressure. The Central Asian plot of the American policy in 2002 is opened by the report on visit of delegation of the senate of the Congress of USA to Uzbekistan in the beginning of January. The visit was not ordinary for foreign policy activity of the USA as in the delegation there participated ten percent from the structure of all American senate, representing committees on armed forces, the international relations and investigation. Senators J. Lieberman (he was nominated with Gore as the vice-president during last elections) and J. Mc423

Cain, have thanked Tashkent, given to States the air stations. The American senators emphasized, that the Central Asia shows one of the major regions of the world in strategic, economic and political senses. Concerning Uzbekistan Lieberman has clearly showed, that Tashkent can expect that it will be concern a friendly state (the help by IMF). At the same time the American senators let them know that the theme of human rights will be present in the American Uzbek relations further. In the whole, this visit of the American senators has allowed to highlight the basic priorities of strategy of USA in the region and methods of its implementation. The choice of priorities was dictated by strategic value of the region, and methods vulnerability of local regimes that allows influence them. Practically it is possible to consider the display of these methods the refusal of the State Department and OSCE on January 28 to send observers for the referendum on the prolongation of legislative power of I. Karimov as these elections were considered as not free and dishonest. However already in February 11 the representative of the State Department E. Jones (the former ambassador of the USA to Kazakhstan) has calmed Tashkent, having declared the following: even if Uzbekistan does not carry out the requirement in the field of democracy, it doesnt not mean our cease to the help to this country which is also provided to the groups supporting democracy and human rights. In the beginning of March one more delegation of the American Congress has arrived to Uzbekistan. These events passed on the eve of I. Karimovs visit to Washington. It is typical, that congressmen have practically excluded subjects of human rights in Uzbekistan and have completely concentrated on the American military and financial help to this country. In the whole, the American members of Congress especially emphasized strategic value of the help of the countries of the Central Asia for operation in Afghanistan. At the end of February, admiral K. Quigly, the director of the Central command of USA for public relations and general R. Mayers, the chairman of the Joined Committee of chiefs of staffs at press conference in Manas actually have confirmed, that the American forces on this base will be increased. In February, Tajikistan has joined to the program of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), becoming thus the 27-th state the participant of this program and having reduced the distance between Dushanbe and Brussels extremely to the category of geographical concepts. The joining of Tajikistan had the great symbolical value: it once again underlined that value which Central Asia has for Europe and the Atlantic alliance. The deification of the American Uzbek rapprochement was the signing of the Declaration on the bases of strategic partnership and cooperation on March 12 of 2002 in Washington by the two countries. By its structure this document repeats the similar declaration signed seven years before by N. Nazarbayev and B. Clinton, which also contained five basic directions of cooperation. The difference between two declarations consists in the qualitatively new military-political situation in Central Asia. Within the framework of the expansion of the American Uzbek relations Washington has given Uzbekistan on the line of Eximbank the credit of 55 million dollars (in 2001 138 million dollars in support of the American export to Uzbekistan). However, as the further events have shown, neither these means, nor loans from the international financial institutions ($ 40 million from the World Bank), the money received by Tashkent for rent of military bases, considerably could not improve the financial and economic situation in Uzbekistan. At the end of March, Tashkent was visited by one more delegation of the Congress which has confirmed, that Washington will allocate to Uzbekistan the help for the sum of $ 161 million. At the same time, the senators have emphasized that USA will not recede from the position on human rights. Concerning Kyrghyzstan on the part of USA, as a number of actions of financial character was imple mented. The American congressmen have actually confirmed in Bishkek, that the USA will increase financial and military technical help to Kyrghyzstan on the same bases, as Uzbekistan strategic value of Bishkek for antiterrorist operation. So, in the beginning of April the World Bank at support of the USA has allocated 1 million dollars to Bishkek within the framework of the program of microfinancing, and IMF in July $ 16 million. In middle of September, A. Akaev has visited Washington where he has signed together with G. Bush the Declaration for the continuation of strategic partnership (economic reforms, democratization, observance of human rights in Kyrghyzstan). At the end of September the inquiry in the Washington folder about the American help to Kyrghyzstan in 2002 for the sum of 92 million US dollars has followed. In the middle of April of 2002, Washington has made the attempt to show that the USA have a distinct strategy concerning the Central Asia to prevent potential conflicts in the region. In this connection the 424

Agency on the International development (USID) has decided to support the establishment of a civil society, to promote the growth of employment to improve education, public health services and ecology. However, means for achievement of these purposes in scales of all region AMR has allocated only symbolical (for example, to Uzbekistan 37 million this year and 27 million for 2003). Thus, rendering assistance, USID precisely coordinated with the observance of human rights and free activity of NGO. Already at the end of April the US Minister of Defense D. Ramsfield during its visit to the states of the Central Asia outlined the mainstream of the American policy forces of the coalition will stay in the region as much time as much as it is required. In the same style there was the trip of Ramsfield to Astana where he has probed a question on use of the Kazakhstan air stations was held. Due to the results of this visit such information is known: from the moment of the beginning of military operation in Afghanistan through air space of Kazakhstan there has passed more than 600 planes. Ramsfield practically succeeded to achieve the arrangement in Astana on the use of the Kazakhstan airport (in case of emergency); later, in July of 2002 this arrangement was fixed documentary. In Ashghabad Ramsfield has not simply thanked Turkmenbashi for the assistance for the coalition, but has taken advantage of a case deliberately to act with the anti-Iranian applications. An attempt to issue strategy of USA concerning the Central Asia at a conceptual level was made by the assistant to state secretary B. Linn Pasko in speech at the Yale University at the end of September. In his speech Pasko, on the one hand, has tried to give his point of view of changes in the region and the American policy for the last ten years, and with another to outline a circle of tasks facing Washington. Thus, Pasko has noted, that USA should put more arrogant tasks and be engaged into the decision of fundamental problems in the Central Asia. As the main problems of the region, Pasko again has named corruption, mutual responsibility, violation of human rights and principles of democracy of local regimes. At the same time he has rejected the accusations in the address of Washington that shuts eyes on their violation to provide their support for itself. In the whole, it is possible to consider the main theme of the policy of Washington the application of the assistant to the US secretary of state: the Central Asia and Caucasus represent a very difficult challenge for the USA, but, nevertheless, they should (owing to the events of September 11) meet this challenge. Traditionally the American foreign strategy concerning the Central Asian region is structured on eight basic directions. In spite of the fact that priority these directions and their place in a policy of USA at different stages varied, in whole their combination and a sequence remain constant. In this connection in the Central Asia after September 11, a little that has changed formation of a new geopolitical situation. Programs on assistance and investment policy concern first direction of foreign policy activity. Wash ington always gave this direction of its foreign policy the important value. Considering that fact, that USA are interested in the further expansion of the presence of the American companies in various sectors of the industry of the Central Asian republics, this state will conducted large-scale actions on rendering material aid during democratization and to transition to market relations. So, in the period since 1992-1998 the total sum of the American aid to the Central Asian states has achieved 1.3 billion US dollars. During all period of the existence of Central Asian NIS Kazakhstan was in the lead on volume of the American help: 1997 35.5 million US dollars; 1998 40.5 million US dollars; 1999 44.2 million US dollars; 2000 53.5 million US dollars. This tendency is still kept: 2001 71.5 million US dollars; 2002 81.6 million US dollars (planned). However in the structure of the American financial help of the Central Asia in 2002 there was a rather sharp change: on the first place there is Uzbekistan (161.8 million US dollars; in 2001 55.9 million US dollars); on the second Tajikistan (85.3 million US dollars in 2001 56.4 million US dollars). These transformations in the priorities of USA are connected to the changed geopolitical situation in the region in the context of implementation of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan and sharply evolve the strategic importance for USA of these Central Asian republics. The second direction of the American strategy means involvement of USA into the regional affairs and active personal interaction of the American politicians with leadership and political elites of the countries of the region. This process includes regular visiting the USA by leaders of the Central Asian states and periodic visits of high-ranking American politicians of a various level to the countries of the region. In this sphere until recently the leader was Kazakhstan. The president of Kazakhstan repeatedly visited USA with the official 425

visits, and also within the framework of summits of the United Nations and the NATO: in 1992, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001. Official visits of the President of Uzbekistan to USA were held in 1999 and 2002, the President of Kyrghyzstan in 1997 and 2002 the President of Turkmenistan has visited the USA in 1998. In turn, the Central Asian republics there have visited the vice-president of USA (1994, Kazakhstan), the first lady of USA H. Clinton (1997, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan), the state secretaries (1992, G. Backer Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan; 2000, M. Albright Uzbekistan), the ministers (Minister of Defense D. Ramsfield, 2001 Tajikistan, 2002 Kyrghyzstan) and other members of administration, congressmen and senators. All this confirms that fact, that Washington gives the great attention to this direction in the foreign policy strategy. In the long-term prospect personal interaction remains the important tool of the American policy. Recession on this direction will be a signal that concerning this or that country from USA there was rather cold. The third direction of the American strategy covers such spheres as democratization and human rights. Formally, they are proclaimed as the principles of the American policy, however in a reality as it was already marked, they are quite often used as methods of political influence and tools of pressure. As the illustration of this direction it is possible to give the concrete succession of events. So, on February 5, the representative of the USA in OSCE A. Davidson has a statement about the violation of political and re ligious freedoms in the Central Asia, and representatives of State Department and the Department of Defense on the observance of human rights in Uzbekistan. In E. Jones and M. Ricardel declared about a new atmosphere in business of the improvement of democracy and human rights in Uzbekistan. Totally in two weeks (February 20) the USA acted in OSCE with the statement already about democratization in Kazakhstan. Now Washington unambiguously shows intention to not be limited to conducting military operation in Afghanistan and to provide the adjustment of prospect of implementation of democratic changes in the countries of the region which has the deserved reputation of a black hole in human rights /14/. So, on March 4, the State Department has acquainted the Congress with the Report on the situation with human rights in Eurasia. Kazakhstan and Kyrghyzstan have received the unsatisfactorily mark, Tajikistan unsatisfactorily, Uzbekistan is rather unsatisfactory, Turkmenistan is extremely unsatisfactory. At the end of March, the USA appeared to have a very concerned position in Kyrghyzstan (events in Dhzelalabad area). Washington rendered pressing on Bishkek by means of the Commission of the congress and the administration of USA on security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with the purpose to provide progress in the field of human rights. The basic contents of document of the CSCE concerns happening in Kyrghyzstan a street policy that is a disturbing symptom, that the normal policy has became practically impossible. Though more recently the White House regarded it as an attribute of most advanced civil freedom in the Central Asia. Quite really, that further the help on the part of USA and the international financial organizations can be more rigidly coordinated to requirements of support offered to programs on development of democracy and legality. The beginning of the development of these tendencies is already designated. So, for example, the Commission of USA on religious freedom in the world has developed a number of recommendations to the Government in which it recommended to stop all the projects of the help to the Government of Turkmenistan, except for humanitarian delivery, and also temporarily to stop the exchange of official visits between USA and Turkmenistan until in the country improvement of the situation with human rights and religious tolerance will not be observed. Also precisely it is recommended to the government of USA to specify the quality and the order of actions in Turkmenistan, required for restoration of economic cooperation and cooperation on security between USA and Turkmenistan. In the whole, completely precisely strategic purposes on this direction of foreign policy of USA in CA were designated in the application of the assistant to the state secretary B.Linn Pasko before congressmen: despite of the violations of democracy and religious freedom to use our influence further. The policy of support of market reforms concerns the fourth direction. Concerning Kazakhstan this policy has achieved its peak in 1999, when almost half of American financial help (21.2 of 46 million dollars) was directed on re-structuring of the industry, implementation of privatization, legal and administrative reforms, the technical help, professional training and change of a business climate. In some cases, the financial help of USA frequently coordinates with the requirements of other sort conducting to the intrusion into the economical strategy of the national governments and absorption of strategically important economic objects. Overall 426

objectives of administration of USA on this direction within the framework of formation of a business climate is prompting the governments of the region to eradication of such realities as domination sub-legal acts above laws, the revision and the refusal from the earlier taken obligations, and removal of contradictions between decisions and rules of the central government and regional and local authorities. Decrease of conflict potential and struggle against the potential threats it was always proclaimed by the government of USA of one of the major foreign tasks and the purposes of a policy in sphere of security. Within the framework of this preventive policy Washington has carried out the accommodation of the military contingents in some states of the Central Asia. However, the basic source of threat for the states of the region is, that they are involved into possible confrontation of USA with other regional powers (Russia, Chinese Peoples Republic, Iran). At the same time last years the steady tendency on the reduction of the level of participation of the American troops in peace-making operations was planned. With reference to the situation around of Afghanistan it means, that Washington maximum will aspire to connect the allies and the state of the region, to participation in the accommodation of peace-making parts. With the previous direction it is closely connected the cooperation in the security field. One of the basic forms of co-operation in the field of security of USA with Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan and Uzbekistan was the implementation of international peace-making doctrines Centrazbat (the Central Asian battalion) in the frameworks of the program of NATO Partnership for Peace. Washington in every possible way encouraged the activity of Centrazbat and the cooperation of the Central Asian states with NATO. Accommodation of the American armies in the region during the antiterrorist operation not only has shown, that USA are actually ready to take the responsibility for security in the region in the hands, but also has confirmed that fact, that Washington stakes on bilateral cooperation with the states of the region in the field of security in every possible way rendering them the financial and economical help in the military construction. So, it is planned that within the framework of the complex program of struggle against terrorism, Washington renders Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan the financial support for the sum of 110 million US dollars, which will go for the re-equipment and modernization of armed forces of these countries /15/. In the present pe riod, Washington using the moment, aspires to establish the closest military relations with Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan. Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, certainly, represent in the long-term huge strategic interest for USA, but the firm position of Russia deduces, at least, in intermediate term prospect these republics, in the greater degree of Kazakhstan, from sphere of direct strategic plans of the White House. Other direction of the American strategy in the Central Asia also is global integration, i.e. integration of these countries into a system of global political, economic, technological, information, and financial-economic relations. One of steady methods on this direction is the appendix of efforts for connection of these states to cooperation with such global organizations as WTO, IMF and the World Bank. The American strategists do not hide, that the main task of this policy is the prevention of vacuum of force and not the assumptions of economic influence on other powers. One of directions of the American policy in the Central Asian region before events of September 11, there was the aspiration to create a buffer around Russia. Pursuing the purpose of the maximal weakening of positions of Moscow and not an assumption of its new strengthening, Washington actively promoted the creation on the basis of four countries: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldavia in 1997 of the organization GUAM with a well defined anti-Russian orientation. The organization represents the regional structure of military-political and economic character uniting a number of the states of the former USSR with the orientation on close cooperation with the NATO. According to the plan of its founders, a ridge of the organization should become a strategic axis Ukraine Caucasus Central Asia. It is not casual, as the axis coincides with a route of so-called Eurasian transport-communication corridor (EATC) which is called to provide integration Caspian states of the Central Asia and Caucasus, and also the countries of the European part of the CIS in the Euro-Atlantic space. Actually, EATC acts as the economic base of GUAM. In turn, GUAM is defensive component EATC. Up to certain time, the country of the Central Asia remained away from the process, despite of the objective interest determined by economic forces. The situation has cardinally changed with connection to GUAM one of the leading states of the Central Asian region Uzbekistan. An axis Ukraine Caucasus the Central Asia has received real outlines. 427

However in June of 2002, it was declared by Uzbekistan about an intention to leave from this organization. In this context it is necessary to note that the USA supporting and directing development of GUAM, have negatively reacted to applications of Uzbekistan. The White House hardly hid the disappointment an exit of Tashkent from GUAM; in declaration of the State Department it was emphasized that the participation in this organization would promote strengthening of the role of Uzbekistan as the regional leader, and the hope was expressed that Tashkent will reconsider the decision. As an original signal to Uzbekistan in this direction by the representative of the State Department L. Creiner it was informed about progress with human rights in this country. In parallel, the State Department has promulgated the corrected variant of the inquiry on the help to Uzbekistan (since 1992 about 600 million dollars). The visit of the Minister of Finance P. ONeile with new offers on the development of business in Uzbekistan and other republics of the region also was held, and then has followed 3,5-million grant on line for development of transport and communications. ONeil also declared, that Uzbekistan carries out reforms with the thought over speed. As a reinforcement of the gesture Washington at the end of August has given Tashkent the humanitarian help for the sum of 53 million dollars. In result Tashkent has declared that Uzbekistan is not going to leave association GUAM and has only temporarily stopped participation in separate actions of this organization /16/. However, without participation of such key state of the Central Asia as Kazakhstan, it is impossible to consider the process of formation of an axis Ukraine Caucasus Central Asia as completed. Therefore now much depends on a position of Kazakhstan whose choice in many respects will predetermine foreign reference points and priorities of all Central Asian region. And, at last, the most important direction of the American strategy in the region during all period of independent development of NIS of the region always was upholding power interests of USA. Concerning all Caspian and Central Asian region, it is necessary to search for sources of the formed strategy of USA in the belief which has usually been in the American political establishment, that this region will be the largest energy-manufacturer in the new century. Practically, it has resulted in that the region began to associate by the American strategists with the natural continuation of the region of Persian Gulf, i.e. a zone of the American vital interests /17/. Here separately it is necessary to note the presence of completely concrete economic interests of USA concerning the Caspian region, which consists in the maintenance of power security of America. This power strategy is based on the following principles: binding to the American policy the maximum number of conventional, and non-conventional sources of hydrocarbons; diversification of the world production of oil; implementation of a policy of maintenance of the prices for oil on the market level (i.e. playing on the reduce of prices); technological domination of USA in the world production of oil; improvement of the investment climate for the American and transnational companies; the economic control over the pipelines and routes of transportation of oil and gas. The establishment of the control over oil-and-gas resources of the Central Asian region is a strategic task in protection of interests of USA. For achievement of these whole than USA have chosen two basic ways: direct investments into the oil-and-gas manufacture; establishment of the control over the routes of transportation and construction of pipelines. It is necessary to note, that the first purpose is already achieved, the second still remains on the agenda of the American foreign policy and will determine its character and methods on the immediate prospects. The results of the war in Afghanistan and difficulties in the implementation of antiterrorist operation on the part of USA, and also new doctrine G. Bush on the Axis of evil allow to draw a conclusion, that Wash ington will assert resolutely the American interests on Caspian Sea: replacement of Russia, isolation of Iran, the further implementation of the civil-engineering design of an oil pipeline of BakuTbilisiDzheikhan. The strategy will be inevitable for the necessity of the American military-political presence on Caspian Sea that can become the major line of the following stage of the USA policy in the Central Asia. *** Thus, if to try to make some forecasts concerning the prospects of USA policy in the region today, it is possible to speak about the following possible direction of the development of the situation. It is quite prob428

able, that on the nearest and intermediate term prospect the interests of USA concerning the Central Asian region can be determined as follows introduction and holding the republics of Central Asia on the orbit of the American regional and global strategy. The further steps of USA will about accordingly with the achievement of this purpose, in particular the foreign policy of the United States of America in Central Asian region will be aimed at the decision of the following tasks: use of the military-political conjuncture favorable for USA, which have been usual during the antiterrorist operation for all-round strengthening of relations with the countries of the Central Asian region; creation of conditions in which the external forces could not supervise direct development of pro cesses in the Central Asia to the detriment of the American interests; expansion and modernization of the USA given to the armed forces of military bases and getting additional objects of the defensive infrastructure in Central Asian region; weakening of the Shanghai process as a system of the regional security; use of the military presence for pressing China in case of need; gradual establishment of the effective international control over illegal manufacture and circulation of drugs; support of the processes of democratization in the NIS with the purpose of strengthening of the inf luence on the public opinion and expansion of political opportunities for the indirect dialogue with the governments; maintenance of access of the American business to fuel and energy and other resources of the Central Asia; stage-by-stage connection of the countries of the region to the various international trade and eco nomic unions which are taking place in the sphere of the American control, first of all to WTO; opening of the market of Central Asian region for the American investments, the goods and services, stimulation of structural economic reforms. Besides, in the context of the estimation of possible directions of USA policy in the region of CA, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact of acceptance by the United States on September 17 of 2002 promulgation of new strategy of national security. The new document qualitatively differs from the previous themes, that it precisely outlines the position of USA on all the most important problems of the world policy, shows, how Washington is going to build the policy concerning those or other states and regions, gives a complete enough representation of the purposes, tasks, and also methods of their achievement or the decision. Washington has developed a foreign policy program, which concerns not only all the systems of the international relations and USA policy concerning the large powers, but also mentions in any way the Central Asia and the Caspian region. The document even more shows the intention of USA actively to be present in the world policy. It means, that USA proclaims for itself a role of the leading power in the world which by virtue of the unsurpassed military, political and economic power should lead all other states and form the world order on the discretion. According to the new strategy of national security, henceforth USA will operate in the more full scale way, firmly and if it is necessary, independently for maintenance of national security and protection of the interests worldwide. For achievement of everything USA will combine military, political and economic means. For the Central Asian states, the important point of Strategy is the firm intention of USA not to stay outside of the zone of the strategic influence of the regions of the Central Asia and Caspian Sea. In particular in the sixth section of strategy it is spoken about strengthening of power security of USA due to deliveries of power resources, including, and from the Central Asia and the Caspian region. However, despite of the proclaimed declaration on the energy importance of these regions for the American economy, it is obvious enough, that USA on the intermediate term prospect, first of all, are going to establish and strengthen the strategic presence at Central Asia which more and more becomes the necessary element of the American strategy concerning China, Russia, Southern Asia and Afghanistan, and Middle East. 3. The Chinese politics towards Central Asia The collapse of the USSR, certainly, was the event which begun a new historical stage of the development of relations between the countries of the Central Asia and the Chinese Peoples Republic. CAR is included 429

by Beijing into a so-called sphere of external strategic boundaries of Chinese Peoples Republic, which directly infringes its national state interests. Conducting the foreign policy relating to the region, China basically adheres traditional for the Chinese state constrained foreign policy tactics. Beijing, asserting the interests on the international political arena, will not carry out a rigid rate, preferring in some cases to sustain tactical pause, operating in CA with rather not ordinary foreign methods, bringing to Beijing strategic dividends without straining of relations with the new states of the region /18/. Adhering to these positions, China aspires to realize the foreign strategy in the region in view of the following basic national interests: The first maintenance of stability on the restless western borders and in frontier areas. The general border of Chinese Peoples Republic with NIS of CA extending about 3700 km, acts as a subject of special attention of Chinese leadership. Besides separatist Taiwan, exactly on the western direction they consider in Beijing, the basic threats of stability, to the sovereignty and integrity of Chinese Peoples Republic appear now. In the greater degree Beijing fears are connected to the possible aggravation of the problem of Uighur separatism. The democratic freedom which was developed in the number of states of Central Asia there have created favorable conditions for the activity of the Uighur organizations of various sense. In this connection, one of the basic directions of foreign policy of China in the region is counteraction to the development of separatism and suppression of its support from the outside. The second creation of necessary conditions for the embodiment of plans for the development of the western areas of Chinese Peoples Republic, in particular reduction of a gap in the economic development of coastal and internal areas. At the end of 1990th years the Chinese government has developed a strategy of openness of the western area of China. The strategy should promote the gradual alignment in the economic development of western the poorest and lagging behind areas and the advanced eastern areas of the country. Thus, the Chinese government hopes to solve many problems of Xinjiang to destroy economic preconditions of national separatism, including those due to the strengthening of trade and economic cooperation of the western provinces with the countries of Central Asia. The third maintenance of guaranteed access to the energy sources for the growing industry. In the process of economic development and implementation of a policy of openness of the western area of China, the need of the country for oil and gas resources constantly grows. In this connection, the essential place in strategic plans of the state there occupies a question of diversification of the sources of import of hydrocarbon resources. Though now the economy of Chinese Peoples Republic does not experience energy hunger (export of oil from traditional sources is well enough adjusted), by 2010 it is required for the growing economy of China much more mineral oil. The Chinese scientists consider, that Central Asia becomes the major source of oil and gas. According to experts, the region is the third oil-and-gas base in the world after the Middle East and Western Siberia, oil and gas-oil pipelines from this region to China are less extended and safer, than the alternative routes. Due to the objective and subjective reasons for one of the basic sources of oil and gas deliveries to China in the long term there can be Kazakhstan. In this context naturally, that already now the special place in the mutual relations between China and Kazakhstan is given to the oil cooperation. Whether during the visit of the premiere of the State Soviet Chinese Peoples Republic Li Pen to Almaty in September, 1997 there were signed two important intergovernmental agreements About the cooperation in the field of oil and gas and About the lining of two oil pipelines from the west Kazakhstan to the Western China, and to Iran. As the main sphere of financial investments of China into the Kazakhstan market there acts the oil-and-gas industry. In this connection it is possible to speak, that in the near future China will make the maximal efforts for the deepening of trade and economic cooperation, for the expansion of activity existing and construction of the new enterprises for extraction, processing and transportation of hydrocarbons in the zone of the Caspian pool. The fourth formation of the reliable transport corridors for the exit on the markets of the countries of the CIS and Europe. China, except rich natural resources of the region interests also its transportation-transit potential. The territory of the countries of CA is the important overland corridor and one of the best transport channels for the implementation of barter with the countries of the CIS and Europe. Chinese Peoples 430

Republic already has the exit to Kazakhstan through the railway station Druzhba and a highway through the check point Khorgos and as there are plans to lead the railway in the extent of 296 km from the station Xingkhe of the Northern-Xinjiang trunk-railway up to the city of Kuldzha and further up to the check point Khorgos. At the present time, this state develops opportunities of the construction of transportation ways for the expansion of the access to the markets of the Central Asia, Caucasus and Europe through the territories of Kyrghyzstan and Uzbekistan. Taking into the account the rates of the development of the Chinese industry, Chinese Peoples Republic is rather interested in the implementation of a wide spectrum of transport corridors through the Central Asian region. The fifth other direction substantially determining the foreign activity of Chinese Peoples Republic in the region, there is aspiration due to the distribution of the influence in the CA to render counteraction to the unipolar system and the leading position of USA at economic, political and military levels. During last years, China sure collecting economic and military power, becomes one of the conducting geopolitical working players, rendering growing influence on development of the situation in the region. At the same time, it is necessary to note that in first half 1990th years China did not show appreciable activity in the Central Asian region. Having established diplomatically relations with the states of CA in 1992, Beijing was interested, first of all, in preservation of political stability in Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomic Region (Xinjiang). However, the processes and the political realities in the Central Asia (the increase of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, struggle for hydrocarbon resources of the region, search by the states of the region of external partners etc.) have induced here, suppressed Beijing in subsequent to conduct to a little bit more active policy. In the whole, the foreign policy of China with second half 1990 is characterized by aspiration to strengthen the influence in the region of CA on means of expansion and an intensification of economic relations. Businessmen of China count Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrghyzstan as the most stable countries for the external economic operations. Less attractive because of the last political instability the Republic of Tajikistan acts in the country and military operations on the Afghani-Tajik border. In foreign economic relations with Chinese Peoples Republics, the Republic of Kazakhstan is leading, and it is followed by the Republics of Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan. Hereby, in 1995 on trade with Asia there it was necessary 14 % of cumulative export of the Central Asian countries and 15 % of their import /19/. Thus of 26,5 % of export to Asia went to China. In import Asia in the same year densities of China made 29 %/20/. Today the states of ATR of steel the third on the importance the foreign trade partner of the Central Asia after Russia and Europe. Thus, to the second on importance the export market for the Central Asian region became China, is especial for such states, as Republic of Kazakhstan and Republic Kyrghyzstan. Nevertheless, economic relations of the states of the Central Asia with Chinese Peoples Republics require an objective estimation, in a withdrawal from excessive euphoria and at the same time their obvious reassessment. Trade and economic mutual relation between Chinese Peoples Republic and the countries of the region for today do not reflect real opportunities of economy of China. So, for example, volume of trade Chinese Peoples Republic with Kazakhstan the leader in this area makes only approximately 0,15 % of total amount of foreign trade of Chinese Peoples Republic that makes about 1,5 billion dollars. USA. In the whole, the trade turnover of CPR with the countries of the region makes less than 1 % of its cumulative foreign trade turnover. In the long term, trade and economic relations of the Central Asian states with CPR should have character not only interchange as it exists nowadays, but the complementarily, allowing to change mainly raw character of export of the Central Asian countries and to fill up with its goods of industrial manufacture. In process of perfection of market economy, increase of competitiveness of production of barter, a deepening of process of integration in the world market, forms and character of trade and economic cooperation in conditions of stability and a favorable international situation, undoubtedly, will change, and its scales steadily to extend. Therefore, today in the whole Central Asian-Chinese economic relations should be analyzed under a corner of strategy and prospects, which have huge potential opportunities more. In the whole, in spite of the fact that the foreign trade turnover of Chinese Peoples Republic with Central Asia yet does achieve potentially possible volumes in usual to middle of 2001 balance of interests of the 431

region between Chinese Peoples Republic, Russia and USA, China strongly occupied one of three strategic niches namely commodity raw, carrying out in the region export of the goods and import of a source of raw materials. However, change of a geopolitical situation in the Central Asia after September 11, and in particular, the present political rate of USA strategic impasse have put China into a certain particular deadlock and have brought attention of Beijing to the a lot of difficult questions. The region, which China has got used to consider the more or less quiet rear, now, contrary to its will, becomes the first line of the Chinese foreign policy. Offensive tactics of Washington on a global scale, strengthening of positions and increasing of military presence of USA in Central Asia, is included into the contradiction with plans of China on all set forth items of national interests. First, military presence of foreign powers in immediate proximity from Xinjiang /21/, creates the potential threat of national security and territorial integrity of China. Second, as a result of strengthening USA in the region really occurrences of the conditions interfering implementation of the program of development of the western areas of Chinese Peoples Republic. Third, China, which is extremely interested in power resources of the countries of the Central Asia (first of all the Kazakhstan oil), should disturb the tendency of fastening of Washington on rich deposits of the region, it is especial in a zone of the Caspian pool, with prospect monopolization of this sphere and fastening to self of the right of definition of directions, scales and ways of transportation of power resources on the world markets. Such prospect bears a potential threat of power security of China. Thus, regimen geopolitical position of China is characterized by the factors with two different directions. It is obvious, that in the context anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, China, on the one hand, has received for itself some opportunities, but at the same time, on the other hand, has faced a number of new calls of the security. So, in conditions of struggle against terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomic Region, China has received the certain political dividends, first of all due to liquidation of a regime of Talibs, supporting separatists in Xinjiang, after events September 11 and the changes, which have followed them. Last years separatist group from Xinjiang received active material and moral support from the side of Talibs. Experts report on total 27 organizations connected with Xinjiang whose methods are intensified from mass actions to acts of terrorism. These are such organizations, as the Organization of the incorporated national revolutionary front of Eastern Turkestan, Islamic movement of Eastern Turkestan, Yana Ayat, Lobnor tigers, Kharakat and others. Some of these and other organizations had contacts with the Talibs. In the whole, reduction of threats on the part of extremist groups in the region, coming to power of the new government in Afghanistan, have affected conditions in Xinjiang positively. Extremist groups from Xinjiang have lost a strategic support on behalf of movement Taliban. However, this positive result from a part was neutralized by other negative factor occurrence of military bases of USA and their allies on the territory of two Central Asian states Kyrghyzstan and Uzbekistan, one of which borders on China, another though has no the general borders from Chinese Peoples Republics, but declares the membership in the Shanghai organization of cooperation. It is known, that China has intently enough considered these changes, in many respects having seen in the military bases in long-term prospect threat of the security. Some Chinese experts have openly declared, that these bases in the remote prospect are directed against China and that operation in Afghanistan is only an occasion for a concentration of a military infrastructure of USA at the western borders of Chinese Peoples Republic. Thus, China actually, has faced new and unprecedented calls for itself the security. These new calls have called into question achievements of the Chinese foreign policy of last years: its stable relations with the countries of the Central Asia, a rate on military-political rapprochement with Russia, further existence of SOC. In this context it is possible to note, that in the long term two major factors substantially can determine a new policy of China in CA. On the one hand this strengthening of positions of USA in the region, with another the certain tendencies of rapprochement between Russia and USA. 432

It is obvious, that China has intently considered the occurred changes. In long-term prospect for Beijing, the military bases of the USA in the Central Asia are threat of security undoubtedly. Certainly, here it is not necessary to exaggerate their value in the military relation as the USA have small military divisions in the Central Asia which, most likely, will not be increased in foreseeable prospect. But at the same time, the certain fears from the Chinese side are not groundless probably. In hypothetical variant the military bases can that or otherwise to be involved for influence on the situation in separate regions of Chinese Peoples Repub lic. Besides, on any time political value of the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation, which represents the important tool of the regional influence for Chinese Peoples Republic, has decreased. Thus, in conditions of the changed arrangement of forces in the region, formal connection to the antiterrorist coalition has allowed Beijing to keep the certain, though also small freedom of maneuvering on the political arena. Simultaneously, Chinese diplomacy aspired to use cooperation in sphere of struggle against terrorism for the decision of the priorities for China of questions. In particular, to achieve from USA recognition of that struggle of Chinese Peoples Republic against Uighur terrorists in Xinjiang is an integral part of efforts of the world community on counteraction to the international terrorism. In this connection Beijing has estimated entering of the organization by Washington Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan in the category terrorist as the certain signal of the American side to improvement of relations between them. The Chinese experts do not exclude, that USA have gone on this step before the action against Iraq, hoping for certain understanding in this question on the part of China. Now China is occupied with development of new model of relations with the USA in conditions of their strategic presence to the west from Chinese Peoples Republic and of rapprochement between America and Russia. Some parameters of new regimen of relations between two countries were sounded during visit Jiang Zemin to Washington in October, 2002. This visit in many respects has determined foreign style of a new leadership of Chinese Peoples Republic and has put in pawn continuity of the Chinese policy in relations with the USA. At the same time, the list of problem areas where positions of Chinese Peoples Republic and USA sharply miss, is impressive enough. Antimissile defense of USA, the Taiwan problem, the Korean question, the American Japanese allied relations, the American Indian military cooperation, a policy concern to them concerning Iran and Iraq, expansion of the NATO to the east, the Balkan question. It means, as at a new Chinese leadership (after congress of CPC) comes, relations between Chinese Peoples Republic and USA will be uneasy enough. China is deeply convinced, that the American program is aimed at neutralization of its strategic potential as for Russia it does not represent serious threat, and so-called rogue states have no rocket carriers of strategic radius of action really to threaten United States. Now, the Chinese experts and policy consider possible scripts on which the Sino-American relations in the nearest and intermediate term prospect can develop. For Beijing there are such five variants: confrontation with USA; such development of events is possible only in case of serious crisis around Taiwan; completely independent both neutral political and economical development of China from USA this variant in the greater degree represents the hypothetical script; dependence from USA and following the American course the variant is unacceptable for Chinese Peoples Republic; strategic partnership bases for this purpose were incorporated in Clintons administration, but the new administration rejects this variant; equal in rights cooperation between Chinese Peoples Republic and USA in political and economic areas the scenario of development of events most acceptable to Beijing. As the Chinese experts consider, Washington also now examines possible variants of development of the relations with China. The question is three possible scripts: 1) restraint of China (potentially possible script, but fraught with large economic costs and military charges; the uncooperative altitude to such policy of USA is probable on the part of all countries of APR); 2) pressure upon China, including military 433

(it is possible only in case of the conf lict between Chinese Peoples Republic and Taiwan); 3) involving and cooperation (process already going on during two decades, but constantly interrupted by various conf lict situations). Beijing is interested in both cases itself, and attributes the same interest to Washington, that the best exit for both powers would be escalating cooperation on all direction. Thus, the Beijing leadership is not ready to go on the compromise on the most basic for Washington to a problem Taiwan. Translating all this in a plane of a real policy, it is possible to speak, that China would like to become in new century the strategic partner for USA. However, presence of some serious geopolitical contradictions between Chinese Peoples Republic and the USA from which the main thing is Taiwan, will complicate regularly the China-American relations in the future. It means, that on intermediate term, and it is possible, and long-term prospect China will search constantly for partners (first of all, like Russia) for a counterbalance to America and to try to increase the presence in Central Asia. In this context, the movement of Russia aside the West, which was observed recently, causes in Chinese Peoples Republic still the big vigilance. These changes have taken place by virtue of various circumstances and factors. But one of key from them is that fact, that the Russian leadership maximum has decided to take advantage of the situation when the help was extremely necessary for USA on the part of Russia in the decision of the Afghani problem. Russia in exchange for the help in Afghanistan (expressed in the influence on Northern Alliance, on Tajikistan, in the consent to accommodation of military bases of USA in the zone of Russian geopolitical interests, an exchange of the prospecting information etc.) has received large mutual relation from USA and a level of real strategic partnership, and also entry on equal terms in the western economic and political community. Thus, a longterm objective of Russia, most likely, is creation of conditions for powerful economic break of the country through rapprochement with the West. And this line of Russia essentially differs from a policy which it conducted during last years, is especially for the former leadership of this country. In the previous periods Russia and China somewhat cooperated in the policy directed on restraint of the USA. A number of strategic arrangements of Russia and the West, in particular, on START, to the nuclear disarmament, a new format of mutual relation with the NATO essentially raising the level of cooperation of the Alliance and Russia, are met in Beijing with the certain fear for the interests in nearby regions and in the whole on strategic questions in world politics. In this connection the policy of China, which all these years created a zone of stability and security on perimeter of the borders that should promote internal reforms, has faced with a number of problems. One of the key principles in the Eurasian direction of foreign policy of China a principle of the safe neighborhood today undergoes the check on durability. All these factors make uncertain the geopolitical position of Chinese Peoples Republic in Central Asia at the present stage, and Beijing is compelled to concretize the primary goals in foreign policy in the Eurasian direction. *** Now within the framework of some forecast of development of the situation in the Central Asian region in the context of the Chinese interests, it is possible to speak approximately about three probable scenarios. The first scenario expansion of cooperation of Russia and USA, strengthening of military bases, reduc tion of influence of China, implementation of a policy of Chinese dispassionateness from the regional affairs, maintenance basically of economic contacts. It is not most favorable development of events for Beijing. Though now there is a certain set of political preconditions for implementation of such variant, a number of the moments specifies, that to the full its implementation is impossible. Expansion of cooperation between Moscow and Washington has the natural limitations, which are determined by various approaches to many international problems, including Iran, Iraq, Caspian Sea etc. The second scenario strengthening confrontation between China and US, a position of principle of China in the regional questions, strengthening of interaction with Russia, the certain influence on the states of the Central Asia. 434

Such hypothetical script would result in destabilization of the situation in the region, to infringement of the settled economic relations, inevitable growth of terrorism, extremism and separatism. The third scenario the larger involving of China in affairs of the region, reduction of threats of security to China, an active policy of Beijing, expansion of cooperation with the Central Asian states. It is desirable variant for China. At the same time, today still it is difficult to speak, which script from the mentioned above ones will be realized. It is possible, that the real situation will develop within the framework of the combined variant consisting of elements two or even of three scripts. But in any case, there were preconditions at this stage that the government of Chinese Peoples Republic gave the western neighbors to the Central Asian republics the most steadfast attention. Among them they are also economical, but, certainly, political factors, and first of all, the American factor and the problem of Xinjiang separatists of China are the main ones. Systematic development of the Central Asian direction of the Chinese policy, probably, will promote the decision of these big problems of China. In the whole, concerning the Central Asian states, the policy of China will be under construction in really foreseeable prospect of the nearest 10-15 years, most likely, within the framework of the following directions: stimulation of the economic relations with the countries of CA as the factor for strengthening political contacts, increase of the tendency financial and partly strategic influence of China in CA with obvious stress to Kazakhstan. strengthening of interest on the part of the Chinese oil companies to oil-and-gas, power projects, first of all in Kazakhstan; active cooperation in frameworks of SOC, CICA for the preservation of the Chinese presence in region; counteraction for the weakening of the expansion of the USA and their allies on NATO, creation of pos sible counterbalance for the penetration into the region of Turkey, Iran and others neighboring states; joint struggle against extremism and terrorism, first of all in the context of struggle against Uighur separatism in Xinjiang. At the same time it is necessary to mean, that the policy of Chinese Peoples Republic concerning region in many respects will be determined and be determined by character of mutual relationship of China with the USA and Russia. However, already today it is abundantly clear, that without active participation of China or, at least, without taking into account its interests in security and stability issues, any system of the regional security in the Central Asia will not be enough effective and perspective. 4. The EU Strategy towards Central Asia: Geopolitics and Security The policy of the European Union concerning the Central Asia in 1990th was formed under influence of the new geopolitical situation, which have been usual as a result of disintegration of the Warsaw block, and then the USSR in 1991. The EU began the nearest to a stable east space both the largest economic and geopolitical center of force. In new conditions, EU and the West in the whole have taken purposeful measures on distribution of the influence on the former socialist countries. They are first of all such steps as eastward expansion of the NATO and EU. The European Union has undertaken also extraordinary steps on stabilization of the CIS: large-scale programs of economic help (CIS) and strengthening of the regime of OSCE. At the same time, disintegration of Soviet Union has resulted in creation of the unique situation allowing to EU to play a new geopolitical role. Thus, relations between EU and the Central Asia were formed under influence of this new and unique geopolitical situation. On the other hand, distribution of the European influence on the Central Asia was limited to a number of objective and subjective factors: the strengthened help to the countries Central and the East Europe, which distracted forces and means of EU; conflicts in Southeast Europe; expansion of the NATO; active penetration of USA into the Caspian region; struggle for influence in Central Asia between USA, Russia, China and the Islamic world. At the first stage (1990-1994), strategy of EU concerning the Central Asia was under construction in view of achievement of tactical political ends: stabilization of the post-Soviet space, rendering of the emergency economic help, encouragement of pluralism, democracy and market relations. These purposes were achieved 435

both by the direct economic help, and by means of rendering political pressure through the international both European organizations and institutes (OSCE, the Council of Europe, Euro-Parliament, the European Commission, the Commissariat of the United Nations on refugees etc.). The main tool of a policy of EU was signing the agreements on cooperation and partnership with the post-Soviet states which should formalize political and economic relations with Europe /22/. At the second stage (1994-1998), the disappointment of results of the European policy has prevailed in EU concerning the CIS and Central Asia. It became obvious, that the post-Soviet states basically are still far from standards of representative democracy and market economy. Moreover, by the end of 1990th threat of destabilization of the Central Asia in view of an aggravation of social relations and sharply increased threat was precisely designated on the part of the Islamic south. At the same time, at this stage more distinct understanding of geopolitical interests of the Euro-Union which are connected to the general geopolitical stability in the Central Eurasia has come. Thus, by the end of XXth century in political circles of EU and, first of all, in Germany, the tendency to expansion of geopolitical influence of EU further to the east was planned. Actually, EU is beginning to consider the limits of the future geopolitical interests within the limits of official the sphere of action of OSCE that is down to borders of Central Asia with Afghanistan, Iran and China /23/. The third stage (1998-until now), into which the relations between EU and the Central Asia now enter, develops under the inf luence of three major factors: the further expansion of EU to the east, distribution of inf luence of the Euro-Union on the post-Soviet space in the East Europe and implementations of common European foreign and security policy /24/. Thus, in the nearest years it is necessary to expect the implementation of more active European policy concerning extensive space of Caucasus, Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Hereby, it is necessary to take into account, that other geopolitical factors will operate still and struggle for inf luence in the region between other largest players will proceed: the USA, Russia, China and the Islamic countries. All this makes the forecast of development European-Central Asian relations extremely inconvenient, as well as situations in the Central Asia in the whole. After implementation of antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, military-political presence of the Euro-Union in the region became a reality. The attention in Central Asia was involved in problems of security in Europe in August of 1999 when guerillas for the first time have intruded Kyrghyzstan, and in Bishkek has passed summit of chapters of the states of the Shanghai five Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan. As for Kyrghyzstan, the European political circles considered the attack as an attempt to assassinate the real democratic regime in the region. The anxiety of Europe caused also obvious rapprochement of Russia and China and creation on the basis of the Shanghai five of the certain similarity of the military-political union with participation of Central Asian states with their role of younger partners. On August 31 of 1999, in the German society for foreign policy in Berlin, it was officially declared that Germany shows the interest to Central Asia, especially by the way of maintenance of its security. Leading German institute in the field of foreign policy the German society for foreign policy has de veloped for the government the concept of so-called Stabilization pact for the Caspian Sea. It consists of three elements: 1) creation of a network of transport communications on the line the East West as a counterbalance existing for two hundred years to the ways the North South; 2) strengthening of democracy and market economy in the new independent states of the region; 3) transition from geopolitics to the economic competition. These requirements answer interests of EU, and it would be ready to invest into the economy of the countries of the Caspian region. Thus, the European circles quite realize that such policy would be included into the contradiction with the American strategy of double restraint against Iran and Russia. Besides, the EU wishes to soften the strategic consequences of the expansion of the NATO to the East and to transform the program Partnership for Peace as the stabilization tool and the opportunity for the cooperation, instead of confrontations with Russia. Thus, German political scientists push the politicians to more active position in Central Asian region not only in the interests of Germany, but first of all the European Union. This tendency proceeds from the understanding of that fact that the EU has considerably lagged behind the other world powers in the statement of the political and economic interests in the region. The basic deterrent for Europe there is yet not finished the distribution between the USA and Russia of the spheres of influence /25/. 436

I. Karimovs visit to Berlin in April of 2001 has coincided with the occurrence in Europe of the leader of Northern Alliance and the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan in the government of Rabbani Ahmad Shah Massoud in France and its performance in Strasbourg before the European Parliament. Massoud has actually got the support of Paris and has received from it the financial help. The visit of Massoud has shown, that Europe is more and more anxious about the situation in Afghanistan which renders the destabilizing influence on the following regions, first of all to the Central Asia, and also threatens the security of the world community. The arrest of the Islamic groups in April 4 of 2001 in Frankfurt, preparing explosions in Strasbourg and connected with U. bin Laden who has convinced the European politicians, that the situation in Afghanistan represents direct the threat of the European security. The German police has revealed the whole underground network, connecting the islamists in Germany, Italy, Belgium and Great Britain. All traces led to Afghanistan. Besides, during the last years German investigation and forces of security of Germany undertake efforts on the development of the program, which would block drug trafficking from Afghanistan through the Central Asia and Russia to Europe /26/. It is typical, that Germany is seriously anxious with the situation in the Central Asia. In February, 2001 German investigation service BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) has prepared the report in which the situation in Central Asian region for 2001 was predicted. As German experts who operated with the data on purchase of islamists in Europe, mean on mobile communication and other engineering for conducting operative communication in field conditions, did not cause doubts, that Islamic movement of Uzbekistan was preparing for the large-scale operation in the spring summer of 2001. In the report of German investigation service, concerns are expressed that Russia independently can not cope with the coming of the islamists in Tajikistan, Kyrghyzstan and Uzbekistan. Berlin has unequivocally drawn a conclusion that guerillas managed to create a well worked infrastructure and thoroughly to be prepared for approach. This problem was discussed during visit of Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany J. Fischer to Moscow in February, 2001. J. Fischer revealed to the Kremlin serious Berlins concerns regarding the development of the situation in the Central Asia. The German side has drawn a conclusion, that islamists aspire to strengthen the position in Central Asian region with the purpose of the expansion of the deliveries of drugs on all Europe /27/. Kazakhstan also intensified the relations with Europe in 2000. The President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev visited Paris in the summer 2000 and London in November where he was hearty enough welcomed. The British queen has handed over the Kazakh president the supreme award of the Great Britain St. Michaels and Georges award that was considered not only as a recognition of its former merits, the contribution to nuclear disarmament, but also became acknowledgement of its reputation of the reformer and the supporter of democratic transformation of Kazakhstan. But the central item of the Kazakhstan-British relations was the English interests in oil sphere. Recently the position of Germany concerning region of Caspian Sea and the Central Asia was issued more clearly. On the eve of visit of Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany by J. Fischer to the states of the Central Asia to the newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung the memorandum of the head of department of planning of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Germany of A. Schmillen was published, in which the German vision of the European interests in Central Asian region /28/ was formulated. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognizes that approximately by 2015 of border of the NATO and the EU will come closely to Russia, and Ukraine will be involved into the strategic partnership with these organizations on various levels. In these conditions Europe is already concerned with the preservation of stability in Russia and Central Asia. Approximately at the same time, the exhaustion of energy resources of Northern Sea is expected. A. Schmillen recognizes that any instability in Central Asia in the near future will have the direct consequences for Europe. A. Schmillen considers improbable that in the future in the Central Asia any concrete power could dominate. At the same time, the economic, political and strategic values of the region will grow. Germany and the European Union recognize that a policy in Central Asia should be under construction in view of interest of all interested parties. Germany and EU are interested first of all in an establishment of stability in the region. The practical purpose of EU is diversification of the oil-and-gas import involving energy resources of Central Asia and Caspian Sea in the European power system. Other purpose of EU is blocking the drug-traffic, which 437

pass from Afghanistan through Central Asian region, and also the ways for the distribution of the organized crime and the international terrorism. For this purpose, the EU and Germany, whose interests A. Schmillen represents, should bring in the contribution to strengthening Central Asian states through the support of the regional cooperation, maintenance of the access to the world markets and the help in the decision of humanitarian, social and environmental problems. It demands from Europe the direct political involving in a regional policy. The EU should participate in construction in the region of the oil-and-gas industry and an infrastructure, multiple systems of pipelines with participation of the Russian side. Other form of political engagement of the Euro-Union in the Central Asia could be, in A. Schmillens opinion, prevention of the regional conflicts. Thus German policy offers to determine limits of opportunities of EU clearly. In opinion of Berlin, for stabilization of the region participation of other powers is necessary for Russia, China and USA. Political accounting of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Germany concerning the Caspian region are based on development of German experts which in details are engaged in the problematic of the region. Last report in this area is research Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea and Caucasus the German institute of a world policy and security which was generated in the beginning of 2001 as a result of transfer to Berlin and merge two leading institutes Fund of a Science and a Policy and Federal Institute for Eastern European and International Researches /29/. In the report there were reviewed tendencies, proceeding from which should be under construction the strategic purposes of the European Union and Germany: creation of favorable conditions to German and European concerns for deliveries on the European market of oil, which consumption in Europe grows with an advancing, than consumption of gas; creation of such political and infrastructure changes which will result in liquidation of a monopoly position of countries manufacturers of oil of Persian gulf and OPEC; diversification of European energy with the preference of mineral, instead of the renewed energy carriers. However, the interests of EU in the Caspian region concern not only oil, but also gas. German experts recognize that to connection of the Caspian space with the European gas system there is no alternative. Further, the problem of consumption, development and the main thing deliveries of gas to the potential markets carries European, but not the American character. The European countries should undertake the decision of infrastructures questions in the region. Concerning the decision of a problem of dependence from OPEC to Europe, in opinion of German experts, it is necessary to create such attractive political and economic preconditions which would force them to refuse the introduction in OPEC for the states of the Caspian region. Participation of the Caspian littoral states creates such opportunities in the Energy Charter of EU and their reception in various European structures, for example in the Council of Europe. Finally, the EU should undertake, but in cooperation with Russia, the responsibility for stability in the region. Thus, German analytics mean that participation of the states of the region in OSCE, the European Energy Charter and the Agreements on partnership and cooperation with EU recognize that the countries of Persian Gulf dont have a comparable degree of connection to Europe. All that gives to the Caspian problem a strongly expressed European character. Thus, the European tasks and interests in the Caspian region, as see in Berlin, consist in the following: separating of the European interests from American and development of own European strategy; connection of Caucasus and the Caspian region to Europe as to the more attractive alternative, than OPEC; involving of Europe into the settlement of conflicts on Caucasus, as much possible with the participa tion of Russia with the purpose of creation here of equal competitive opportunities and conditions for cooperation; active support of transport infrastructure on the line the East West and especially gas network for the linkage of resources of the region, including Iran, through Turkey with the European market; development of the European position concerning project of main pipelines from the Caspian region to Europe; overlapping of national interests of the various countries of EU in the region within the framework of common European foreign and security policy. 438

J. Fischers visit to Kazakhstan in May of 2001 showed that Germany started the strengthening of the positions and policy of EU in Caucasus Central Asian region. This process goes along with the actually European interests from American and development of own European strategy. One of the purposes of a policy of Germany is attachment of Caucasus and the Caspian region to Europe, involving EU in the decision of conflicts and preservation of stability. The strategic purpose of the Euro-Union there is an active support of process of creation of a transport infrastructure on the line the East West, and also the development of the European position concerning the project of main pipelines from the Caspian region to Europe. Besides, Berlin should be responsible for overlapping of national interests of the various countries of EU in the region within the framework of common European foreign and security policy. In first half 1990th, the European policies have made absolutely a fallacy of the tendencies developing in the region. They ignored necessity of passage by these republics of a phase of creation of nation-state that demanded consolidation of economic and political interests of the new born elites. At this time, the strategy of EU was aimed at encouragement inner regional integration in the Central Asia though process disintegration unequivocally developed. The EU hoped for development of democratic and market institutes, while the new independent states needed to create all over again specific regimes to keep internal stability and external security. Europe took into account also the geopolitical and foreign factors working in the region insufficiently. OSCE were kept with formal understanding of that fact, that the Tajik-Afghani border represents simultaneously and southern flank of the European space. However, OSCE appeared powerless to settle the conflict inside Tajikistan and the more so to secure region against the threat, which are starting from Afghanistan. Now events develop in such direction, that a limit European space from political and cultural civilization view, could become the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In second half 1990th in Europe, it is especial in Germany, about to understand, that in the geopolitical context the EU considerably lags behind other external players on Caspian Sea and in Central Asia. The performance of German Social-Democrats in 1998 with the purpose to make active the European policy in the region remained ineffectual. The most inf luential member of EU Germany was occupied with the European problems, first of all expansion of the Euro-Union and formation by common foreign and security policy. This area of a policy of EU forces today the European politicians to pay attention on Central Asian the region laying in sphere of the European interests. Thus, in 2000 the tendency to growth of concern of Europe by the various threats which are starting with Central Asia drug trafficking, by illegal migration, growth of social intensity, stopping democratic processes, growth in some republics of threat of an economic collapse and at last, an exit on a stage radical and militant Islam supported by interested forces from the outside and by internal instability and social despair. In April of 2001 during visit of Uzbek leader I. Karimov to Berlin, and also during meetings of the German Vice-chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs with Central Asian leaders in May, and during the negotiations of Kazakhstan president N. Nazarbayev with a leadership of Germany in October, it became clear, that Europe is seriously concerned with development of the situation in the Central Asia. All questions are as far as the European interests, and the European alarms are shared by other large players in the region Russia and the United States. But the political prospect specified that Europe turns to one of participants of the Great Game. Disintegration of the Warsaw block, and then the USSR at the end of 1980 the beginning of 90th have created completely new geopolitical situation in the world and new balance of forces of Europe. From the beginning of 1990th, in the political circles of the countries of EU the approach to necessity of transformation of the EU for the military-political union which would be free from influence of the United States. At summits of EU in Brussels in 1994 and in Berlin in 1996, the leaders of the EU emphasized, that the com mon European foreign and security policy would be carried out only within the framework of the NATO. It was caused by unsuccessful experience of the participation of the European states in settlement of conflicts on the Balkan when the political and military technical superiority of USA was shown. But from the end of 1990th, aspiration of the European states, independently to provide the security and to play a new role on international scene as an independent pole of force, gathers force /30/. 439

On November 20-21 of 2000 in Brussels, the session of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and defenses of the countries of the European Union was held. This meeting was the major step since 1992 when the purpose of creation of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was given, for the sake of achievement of this purpose. At the Brussels session the concrete contributions of each participant to the united armed forces of EU, the purpose and the task of CFSP, interaction and position of united forces of EU were determined concerning NATO, the framework of the strategic responsibility of the European forces both their quantitative and qualitative characteristics, structure of leadership, questions of interaction and management of CFSP by European governments. Speaking about the problem of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, it is necessary to note, that in this area three positions were planned. The British point of view proceeding from which London forms the attitude to CFSP, is based on the idea of strengthening of the European wing of the NATO. The French position consists in the maximal strengthening independence in CFSP relation to the NATO. The German position occupies the average position between English and French and offers active construction of United European military-political structure which would exist in close interaction with the Atlantic Alliance. The weak point of CFSP is a significant technological and financial gap between the USA and the Euro pean countries. Having the total number of armed forces of USA in 1.37 million, Pentagons spends for each military man per one year 26 800 dollars; number of armed forces of the European participants of the NATO makes 2,3 million people, and annual average expenses of each military man is 4 000 dollars. In the whole expenses for military technological needs in the European states members of the NATO, make 60 % from American, and their efficiency 10 % from the level of the American army. The decision on the creation of own strategic forces of EU is accepted already for a long time, however till now a number of the vital issues concerning concrete problems of implementation of this project, still remain without the answer. As the expert in the field of security A. Middel thinks, there are such questions: 1) from what sources there will be financing of 60-thousand contingent of EU, its equipment with the newest kinds of arms, transport and communication; 2) how these forces will be perceived by the states, not included in NATO, EU and WEU but adjoining them or getting in a zone of the strategic responsibility of EU armed forces; 3) as it will be possible to prevent crisis inside the NATO which naturally can arise on the basis of mistrust of USA to the forces of EU by virtue of their fighting readiness; 4) where there geographical borders of the zone of application of forces of the European Union come to an end; 5) whether neutral members of EU will be able to block the decision on the application of these forces; 6) when the EU is going to create a unified war industry which would function under the unified technological standards and would be capable to compute a comparing to the American one? For Central Asia the question on the geographical limits of the zone of the responsibility which can take on itself the European forces of rapid deployment within the framework of the NATO, EU or OSCE is very important. The German expert in the field of security L. Rhl has come to the conclusion, that the West builds the policy on the basis of a New Strategic Concept in NATO, accepted in April of 1999, actually does not have a real anti-terrorist strategy. The West is helpless before the growing threat of destabilization of the extensive region covering as L. Rhl considers, two basic arches of instability: from Caucasus through the Middle East up to the Balkan; from Central Asia through Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan up to Kashmir and India. Thus, now transatlantic cooperation experiences a number of the serious problems following from strengthening of centrifugal forces inside the NATO, strengthening of geopolitical ambitions of EU and restructuring of a world parity of forces. Now Paris sees in the CFSP a unique opportunity for the direction of development of Europe in the Gaullist direction creation of the military-political union that is a strong and equally distant from the USA and Russia. France watches closely all the political steps of the EU authorized on foreign policy and defense J. Solana, and blocks all his attempts to hamper the European strategic ambitions for the benefit of the NATO. Berlin is anxious first of all to save the political unity of EU, it sees in the united defensive and foreign policy the tool for strengthening the European unity, but at the same time badly imagines the security of Europe without the USA. For London the joint strategic project of EU represents really not enough interest in the context of maintenance of own security, which is initially focused on the Anglo-Saxon union and the NATO. The Great Britain considers it, first of all, as a part of the obligations to its EU partners. 440

As counts the number of the most far-seeing experts of Germany, in bowels of the Atlantic alliance there is a process dictated by the objective reasons. It consists that the policy of Europe more and more gets continental character, and the Atlantic component of its security, first of all its dependence on the NATO and the USA, decreases. The question is, as far as far will go continental character of development of EU, whether it will accept the Eurasian character. The European strategists do not hide, that interests of EU lay not only actually in Europe, but reach far for its limits regions of the Mediterranean, Northern Africa, the Arabian world, the East Europe, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. The question on the subordination and relations between the NATO and CFSP remains the main problem of a leadership of the future uniform European forces. To other problems CFSP concern such, as its place in OSCE, WEU and the United Nations. It is obvious, that the future European army is planned as the tool for implementation of military and peace-making operations far outside Europe. The legal mechanism of application of the European forces till now is not clear. The tendency goes to that strategy simply can copy the actions of the NATO as it took place in the war against Yugoslavia, i.e. intervention without the appropriate mandate of the international organizations. Large problem of military technical character there is an impossibility without the help of USA and the NATO to give to uniform European forces mobile character and to create the appropriate operative mechanisms. Among military-political difficulties which implementation CFSP inevitably will face, it is necessary to name creation of the effective mechanism of acceptance of political and military decisions. Accepted in EU and European Council the mechanism of consultations can appear inefficient. Expansion of EU also is closely connected to problem CFSP. There is an assumption, that CFSP became the original answer of the EU to expansion of the NATO to the east which has sharply strengthened influence of USA in the East Europe. Inclusion of these countries in EU and accordingly in uniform European military structure should compensate loss of influence of the European powers. Thus, behind creation CFSP interests of the large European states, first of all Germany and France, are looked through. Destiny of CFSP in many respects will depend on a position of Berlin which, on the one hand, while emphasizes the loyalty to the idea of cooperation within the framework of the Atlantic alliance, and with another, acts as basic ideological, financial and political sponsor of CFSP with a ultimate goal to transform EU into world force not only economic, but also strategic character. Thus, Germany as German strategists believe, will play EU the leading part. *** After the events of September 11, on the agenda there was a question on rendering of the direct military help to United States on the part of the European allies. This problem became the basic contents of the foreign policy of EU since September till December of 2001. The European countries for the first time for many decades again have felt the front states. So, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Germany of O. Schily has officially declared, that in Germany there is no threat of an attack on any concrete objects. However, the Departments on protection of the constitution have made a shocking action on the German public: the number of islamists in the country was estimated in 31 450 people, who entered 17 organizations considered radical Islamic. The number of participants of the Arabian radical groups makes 3 100 people, and 800 are members of terrorist group of Hezbollah. In the beginning of October of 2001 when the military operation of USA against the regime of Talibs in Afghanistan began, positions of the European allies were finally issued. It became clear, that Great Britain will take part in antiterrorist operation in any case within the framework of the NATO or outside of them. Its contribution was estimated in 8,5 thousand people of elite troops and 20 thousand auxiliary; except for that connection of the Air Forces and the Navy. France was ready to render the United States first of all the material help. In the same, Paris in case of need could sent the temporary special contingent from Djibouti numbering 2 600 people. The most difficult foreign character had process of decision about the participation of Germany in the operation in Afghanistan. German militaries could be involved in three areas: 500 military men for systems AVACS; two frigates and one auxiliary vessel with 550 military men; 2 mine trawlers. The concrete help on the part of Germany also could consist in granting to allies of transport planes of strategic radius of action, tanks with protection against the weapon of mass defeat and sea prospecting aircraft. The USA expected for German planes infirmaries and systems of air tracking which should be thrown from Eu441

rope to the USA on replacement American forces, used for operation in Afghanistan. In opinion of Washington, Germany should play a leading role in granting to Afghanistan the humanitarian help on the part of EU. The final decision of EU on participation in military operation in Afghanistan became in many respects result of meeting of chapters of some the states of the Euro-Union in London which was held in the beginning of November, 2001. Heads of the states and the governments of Germany, the Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and Netherlands have taken part in it, Belgium and the Authorized EU on J. Solanas external and defensive policy. Number of the German military men directed to Afghanistan, was planned almost 4 000 people. This number should enter the representatives of 5 kinds of armed forces. Besides, Germany in the op eration as it was planned originally, the other members of NATO and Japan should take part. Canada should sent 2 200 people, 7 planes and 6 courts; Great Britain 4 800 people And some of aircraft; Italy 1000 people, 12 planes and 2 vessels; Czech republic 300 people; Turkey 90 people; Japan 1000 people and 3 vessels. France prepared to sent landing armies, Navy and the Air Forces (1200-1500 people). Besides Germany in operation as it was planned originally, other members of the NATO and Japan should take part. Canada should direct 2 200 people, 7 planes and 6 courts; the Great Britain 4 800 people And some of aircraft; Italy 1000 people, 12 planes and 2 vessels; Czechia 300 people; Turkey 90 people; Japan 1000 people and 3 vessels. France prepared to sent landing armies, Navy and the Air Forces (12001500 people). Principal cause of sharp increase of military-political activity of Germany was the fear, that the EU and Germany will lose foreign policy influence which was possible to achieve during the last years due to the development of Common European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to the establishment of strategic dialogue with the countries of Middle and Far East, Southern Asia and R. The persistent aspiration of Berlin on equal to participate in military operations of USA and the Great Britain specified that Germany is not going to refuse from CFSP as the tool of transformation of EU in the geopolitical player and the factor of global value. At the same time, the European policy suffered from non-coordination. Last chord in the participation of Germany in the Afghani drama became the final decision on sending of German contingent to Afghanistan. The extraordinary session of the Bundestag on which the question on sending of a contingent of the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan was considered on December 22, 2001 was held. Number of contingent has made of 1200 people The specified contingent was included alongside with forces of the Great Britain (1500), Spain (700), Argentina (600), France (300-400), Italy (300), Czechia (200), Greece (150) and Turkey (300) in structure of forces of the United Nations directed to Afghanistan within the framework of peace-making operation. In this connection the Chairman of the Bundestag W. Tirse has declared, that Germany should incur more responsibility in the international affairs. An important point is that Berlin has insisted to insubordination of the contingent to the American command. After the long and intense negotiations between Germany, France, the Great Britain and the USA the European states came to the common point of view that peace-making forces should not submit to the general American leadership of military operation. Thus, it is impossible to underestimate a role of the European Union and especially Germany in struggle against the international terrorism and in stabilization of Afghanistan. At the same time, 2001 year became critical in a policy of Germany concerning the Central Asia and in mutual relations between the states of the region and Germany. The meeting of the German government under presidency of chancellor G. Schroeder, which was held in November of 2001, has called all interested departments to turn its face to Central Asia. It means, that the Afghani policy of Germany and EU should be considered in the context of the European concern by the security of the Central Asian region which is included into the sphere of strategic and geopolitical interests of the Euro-Union. Summit, which took place in the middle in February of 2002 in Istanbul, between the Organization of Islamic Conference and the European Union has shown, that Europe is ready to support dialogue with the Islamic world further. Estimating with short historical prospect the role of EU in the 2001 years conflict, is evident, that it had positive character. Europeans from the first hours after the tragedy of September 11 morally and directly have supported the American ally at difficult moment of its history. On the other hand, the voice of the European countries rendered constraining influence on Washington at that moment when USA were ready for the escalation of the antiterrorist operation and expansion of a zone of the conflict on the 442

Middle and Far East. Due to the position of Germany and France it was possible to achieve the decision on implementation of peace-making operation in Afghanistan under aegis of the United Nations, instead of USA or the NATO. In the near future the European Union should bring in the large economic and financial-technical contribution to the restoration of Afghanistan (at the Tokyo conference of countries donors in January this year, the EU promised to allocate 495 million dollars and Germany 362 million dollars). And at last, for us the most important is the stabilizing role of EU in the extensive space from Caucasus up to Pakistan. In the view of intensity, which in the near future can cause military presence of USA in Central Asia between Washington, on the one hand, and Moscow or Beijing, from another, stabilizing the role of Europe can be one of the main, if not the basic, stabilizing factor. *** Central Asia, during centuries repeatedly changing the historical role from brisk crossroads of trading ways and national interests of the various states up to silent outskirts of great empires, now again appeared in focus of the events of global scale. The time period beginning after the events of September 11 and proceeding now, is characterized for Central Asia by the process of dynamical regrouping of forces and the influence in the region, as on the part of world powers, so between the Central Asian states. The above-stated analysis of the situation in the region shows, that basic elements of new geopolitical conditions in the Central Asia steel: military penetration of USA into region and sharp strengthening of their political influence on a number of the states; increase of process of replacement of Russia from spheres of its former military-political and economical influence; creation of potential threat to the USA and the NATO to China from the Central Asia and neutralization of so-called Islamic threat. The current situation in Central Asia and character of mutual relation of the states of the region among themselves, world powers and other countries experiences a phase of active transformation. The region enters a new stage of the development, connected with closer integration in managing and political processes. However it is necessary to note, that if on the one hand the Central Asian region has received for itself some opportunities with another, faced a number of new challenges of the security. The present geopolitical reality, unfortunately, has not resulted in full stabilization in the region. The place of former threats of security was occupied with new rivalries of geopolitical forces following from the character for influence in the Central Asia. Leadership of the USA in the international antiterrorist company does not give the bases to believe, that other world will accept a policy unconditionally conducted by Washington, that superpower will exclude criticism and contradictions. First of all, they are concerns also the leading world powers Russia, China, the countries of EU which will be reconciled hardly with aspirations of US, to one of which directions the aspiration to establish in particular is and maximum to strengthen the influence in the region of the Central Asia. Besides not only world powers, but also the states of the region will aspire to use the situation for the achievement of the purposes that, probably, will be arranged not always by Washington. All this means that the region has entered some other stage of its historical development and in this case there is unequivocal to estimate its prospects at the present moment it is rather difficult. However it is quite clear, that the Great Game in the Central Asia experiences something new one but it is far from being the last phase. Notes: 1. Akimbekov S. The Russian policy in Central Asia (conditions and prospects) // Pro et Contra. Volume 5, Summer 2000. 2. The military conflict on the territory of Tajikistan arisen in the beginning of 90th years during the change of the political leadership of the republic. Ruling clans of the republic appeared dissatisfied with E. Rakhmonovs coming to power and have acted against him within the frameworks of the united Tajik opposition. 3. Akimbekov S. Op. cit. 4. Ibid. 5. Collection of the legislation of the Russian Federation. M, 1995 Nr 49. p. 480. 443

6.Olimova S. Tajikistan-Russia from the divorce to integration // Central Asia and Caucasus (Sweden) 2000. Nr 3. p 41-48. 7. News. 10.09.1998. 8. Kuznechevskiy V. President of Uzbekistan has started the direct negotiations with the government of Islamic movement Taliban // Russian newspaper. 10.10.2000. 9. Sergienko V. Successors of Timur // Continent (Almaty). 2002. Nr 20. p. 16-19. 10. Chernogaev Ju. Uzbekistan will be not let insult the Talibs // Commersant (Moscow). 30.11.2000. p. 11 11. Charodeev G. Oaths we shall leave to pioneers // News (Moscow), 05.05.2001, p. 5 12. Panfilova V., Russia for us is not only a partner, but also a close friend // Independent Newspaper. 30.08.2001. 13. Braterskiy M.V., Policy of USA in Central Asia: results of decade // USA-Canada (Moscow). 2002. Nr 9. p. 55-64. 14. The Helsinki Commission of the Congress of USA has discussed the position in Central Asia // Official site of the Incorporated opposition of Turkmenistan, http://www.erkin.net/chronicle/obse.html 15. Bushuev S., Crossing of geopolitical interests in the Central Asia // http://www.stratcom.kz, 26.08.2002. 16. Uzbekistan is not going to leave association GUAM, and has only stopped temporally the participation in some separate actions of this organization // http://www.mirtv.ru, 26.06.2002 17. See Laumulin M. Central Asia after September 11 // Central Asia and Caucasus (Sweden). 2002. Nr 4. pp. 33-44. 18. Can Sam Gu. China and Central Asian region // Problems of the Far East Nr 5, 2002. p. 39. 19. Resnikova O. The Central Asia and Asian-Pacific region // Economic and the international relations (Moscow). 1999. Nr 4. p 100-105. 20. Ibid. 21. One of key tasks of Beijing prevention of support of separatism in Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomic Re gion of Chinese Peoples Republic. 22. See: Laumulin M.T. Kazakhstan and the European Community. // Kazakhstan Spectrum.. (Almaty) Nr 1-2. 1997. P. 125-144. 23. See: Laumulin M.T. Strategic interests of the European Union and the Central Asia // Kazakhstan Spectrum. 1999. Nr 4. p 66-96. 24. See: Laumulin M. European Union as a new geopolitical force // Kazakhstan Spectrum. 2001. Nr 1. p. 63-69. 25. GUS-Barometer. DGAP (Berlin) Nr 25, November 2000. 26. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 11.04.2001; Der Spiegel. Nr 15/2001. S.22-23. 27. Die Welt. 15.02.2001. 28. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 15.05.2001. 29. Halbach U., Mueller F. Persischer Golf, Kaspisches Meer und Kaukasus. Entsteht eine Region strategischen europaeischen Unteresses? Berlin: SWP/DIIPS, 2001. 30. Pradetto A. Nationalstaat und transnationale Organisationen in der europaeischen Sicherheitsstrukturen // Beilage zum Parlament. 17.11.2000. B 47/2000. S.13-21. PART IV. CASPIAN FACTOR It is necessary to consider the situation in the Caspian region for complete evaluation and analysis of the geopolitical situation around Kazakhstan after the September 11. Value of the oil factor determin ing the international relations on the global and regional levels is especially great in the region of the Caspian Sea. Strategic value of the Caspian Sea is determined by the following factors: Enormous volumes of stocks of hydrocarbon raw material. The Caspian shelf is one of the richest oil fields in the world. According to the western experts only the proved extracted stocks of oil of the Caspian Sea make approximately 4 billion tons (29 billion barrels), that makes 2,6 % from world reserves. The reconnoitered stocks of gas are about 7 trillion cubic meters /1/. 444

Division of the Caspian Sea between the basic existing and potential commodity markets of oil and mineral oil Europe and Asia, and also between the basic suppliers of energy resources the Near and Middle East, Northern Africa, Russia. Therefore geopolitical conditions around the Caspian Sea, as well as around the region of the Persian Gulf, contrary to other oil regions of the world, is rather difficult and intense for today. The situation in the region of the Caspian Sea has especially important value for Kazakhstan as one of the states near the Caspian Sea. First, the main interest consists in use of power resources for decision of economic problems and development. Second, the midland location of Kazakhstan and the absence of a direct exit to the open sea, creates the certain difficulties with transportation of oil to the world market. It is important to diversify the ways of transportation of power resources for Kazakhstan for decrease of its dependence on Russia, who is monopolizing now the basic pipeline. Third, Kazakhstan faces a task to defend the national interests and security in the conditions of aggravated geopolitical game on the Caspian Sea between the littoral Caspian states, the neighboring states and the states out of the region. It is necessary to note in this connection that the basic struggle for the streams of the Caspian oil is conducted today around Kazakhstan and its sector of the Caspian Sea /2/. Access of the foreign capital to the oil pools of the Russian Caspian shelf is appreciably limited. The Iranian sector is practically deprived of any large deposits. Turkmenistan also has rather small stocks of oil and will carry out a foreign policy on isolation from global and regional processes. Development by the foreign companies of some deposits in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea has not given the expected results yet. 1. Caspian Geopolitical Game and Its Key Players The region of the Caspian Sea includes huge territory on a joint of Europe and Asia from the geopolitical point of view. It is accepted to include in it five actually littoral Caspian states. Besides, the neighboring countries belong to sub-regions of the Northern Caucasus, Trans-Caucasia and space of the Central Asia. A number of experts rank the republics of Uzbekistan and Georgia as the Caspian, and Ankara has proclaimed Turkey a Caspian state in 1997. It is possible to allocate the following groups of interests as a whole: The first circle: coastal Caspian countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran). These states try to solve internal problems due to deliveries energy raw material to the world market. The second circle: countries-zones of transit (Russia, Iran, China, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and others) try to take dividends from transportation energy raw materials on their territory. The third circle: traditional regional players (Russia, Iran, China, Turkey) maximum aspire to strengthen strategic positions in the region. The fourth circle: large global players (the USA, the EU, Russia, China) consider the Caspian Sea as an element of geopolitical struggle for the control above strategically important regions of the world. Process of transformation of a policy of the basic interested states in the Caspian region can be divided into three basic periods conditionally. The first period is from the end of the 1980s till first half of the 1990s. the occurrence on the world political arena of a new geopolitical region Caspian basin and the new states in this region. If the Caspian Sea was divided in the Soviet time between two states the USSR and Iran, that the new independent states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) have appeared on the Caspian Sea after disintegration of the USSR. There were no exact data concerning volumes of stocks of power resources on the Caspian Sea in this period. The occurrence of the new states has resulted the necessity of the development of tactics of behavior in the forming field of this geopolitical game by the Caspian states and by the global political players. Naturally, there was the formation and revealing of positions proceeding from the interests pursued by the various countries /3/.The Caspian region represented a certain geopolitical vacuum in which only there it was necessary just to be determined as the basic participants and both in terms of their interests and policy. The second period is since the middle of the 1990s prior to the beginning of the XXI century. In this period the positions of the majority of participants of the Caspian geopolitical game were more or less determined. It became obvious in this period that the Caspian oil-and-gas pool really contains the big stocks of hydrocarbon raw material of world value. 445

The major factor rendering influence on processes in this region there was the competing line between the West and Russia. The latter began to be considered as the basic competitor first of all to the American in terests on the Caspian Sea. It was connected with that almost all oil pipelines from the Caspian states, anyhow, passed and still pass through the territory of the Russian Federation. Today only one pipeline of the Caspian region passes not through Russia a low-power oil pipeline of Baku-Tbilisi-Batumi. Accordingly Russia received economic and political benefits, being the proprietor of the majority of exits of the region to the foreign market. The consequences of it began to create active aspiration of the external and internal players new alternative transport arteries of the exit of the Caspian oil to the world markets. The third period is from the beginning of the XXI century till present time. An analysis of the current tendencies allows speak about the beginning of a new phase of processes in the region of the Caspian Sea, caused by the increase of value of the Caspian source of raw materials on the global scale. Consideration of the Caspian Sea is more and more actual, like some alternative to the Persian Gulf, as one of the basic oilextracting areas of the planet. Other factor determining the new period, followed the events of the September 11 when the changes of strategic conditions in the world have resulted in changes of a geopolitical situation in the region of the Central Asia and accordingly on the Caspian Sea. The Caspian Basin States Russia Russia is one of key players of the Caspian region. It occupies the firm positions in the region that is caused by the following factors: Historical-cultural factor. Russia has been present in the region already during one and a half century. The control above the region, provided the Tsarist Russia and then the Soviet Union, whose successor subsequently became Russia, have served as the powerful base to the leading position of modern Russia on the Caspian Sea. The common coexistence in the structure of one state has connected Russia with others near Caspian republics close historical and cultural connections that has substantially determined the great weight and the influence of Russia on the Caspian Sea. Transit potential. Russia is on the edge of Europe and Asia and has an exit to the seas that provides it with the important strategic position as the transit state. Now the basic route of transit of the Caspian oil is carried out through the territory of Russia as earlier it there was a united system of main oil pipelines of the USSR. In this situation Russia has the additional lever of pressure and can influence a policy of others littoral Caspian states. Military potential. In spite of the fact that the military potential of Russia is weakened owing to war in the Chechen Republic, lack of the economic resources necessary for modernization of army and the military industrial potential, and also slow process of reforming of armed forces, nevertheless, Russia has strong enough armed forces compared with others near Caspian states. The level of alertness and military potential of Russia on the Caspian Sea is the highest in the region that can be potentially used by Moscow for upholding the positions on the given question. The Caspian Sea is one of priority directions in foreign policy of Russia. It has here both economic interests and geopolitical ones. Geopolitical interests. The Caspian region is a traditional zone of the national interests of Russia. Russia is interested in strengthening the positions on the Caspian Sea and it doesnt allow the domination of the third forces in the region. During the first time after the disorder of the USSR geopolitics instead of the economic force completely determined the Russian policy on the Caspian Sea. Moscow had no opportunity to unwrap the full-scale development of the Caspian oil fields in this period and tried not to allow the independent development of hydrocarbon resources of new near Caspian states at the same time. Moscow occupied the firm position on the question of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, counteracted creation of the international oil consortia with participation of the third countries. Using force methods, Russia, and namely its foreign policy and defensive offices, were interested in fastening the leading Russias position in the Caspian region, that sometimes was spoiling its economic interests which would be realized during mutually advantageous cooperation with others littoral Caspian countries. The similar policy was carried out up to middle of the 1990s. 446

Economic interests of Russia consist in development of resources within Russian and other national sectors of the Caspian Sea that allows to provide own power security and inf lows of hard currency in the state treasury. Realization of economic interests began approximately from middle of the 1990s when Moscow has occupied more constructive position aimed at realization of mutually advantageous projects and development of cooperation with others near Caspian states. Nevertheless, Russia aspires to keep the monopolization of the routes of transportation of the Caspian power resources to the world market through the territory in this period. Founded on the above mentioned interests, Russian policy is directed to solve three basic strategic goals: Protection and extending of Russian positions on the Caspian Sea. Preservation of stability in the region. Development of regional cooperation. It is necessary to note two moments determining common condition in development of relations between Russia and Kazakhstan on the Caspian Sea. It is necessary to note the geopolitical dependence of Kazakhstan on Russia in the question of transportation of the Kazakhstan oil to the world market. Transit of the Caspian oil for export is carried out today basically on territory of Russia as earlier it there was a unified system of main oil pipelines of the USSR. The situation limits the independence of Kazakhstan as Russia depending on the interests independently can adjust volumes of the pumped oil. The specified lever of pressure can be applied by Moscow very actively in situation when Kazakhstan potentially is the competitor of Russia in the world power markets. Other moment, which was already positively reflected in mutual relations, is conversations about the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan, Russia, and also recently Azerbaijan, occupy identical positions in this question. The sides have concluded a number of the agreements regulating their interaction on this question. In particular Kazakhstan and Russia have signed the Agreement on differentiation of a bottom of northern part of the Caspian Sea with a view of realization of sovereign rights on using of the deposits from July 6, 1998 /4/. The similar agreement was signed between Russia and Azerbaijan in September of 2002. According to agreements achievement of the consensus should be found on conditions of the fair division of the bottom of the Caspian Sea preserving in the common use of the water surface, including freedom of the navigation, the coordinated norms of fishery and protection of the environment. The sides in particular have put forward the following offers: ) The bottom of the sea is divided with its mineral resources under the arrangement between the adjacent and opposite states, and each state on its site of the bottom has sovereign rights on using of the deposits, but not territorial jurisdiction. b) The most part of water space with its biological resources remains in the common possession and joint use without borders over water (except for two coastal zones of the coordinated width, one of which would be analogue of the territorial sea, and the second would be a fishing zone which is stipulated by the SovietIranian agreement (1940). Thus the delimitation of the bottom should be carried out (as in 80 % of cases known in the world practice) by a principle of a median line. Kazakhstan and Russia have agreed, that they will carry out the differentiation of the sites on the bottom on the modified median line (in view of islands, geological structures, other special circumstances and already suffered geological expenses). However, the states originally did not manage to solve up to the end this question by virtue of existence of the certain disputable moments despite of rapprochement of positions. The big progress was achieved in 2002 when Kazakhstan and Russia have signed in 13th May of 2002 the Report to the agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan about differentiation of a bottom of northern part of the Caspian Sea with a view of realization of sovereign rights on using the deposits from July 6, 1998. This report already was ratified by the Kazakhstan Parliament in October of the same year. The Russian party plans to ratify this agreement in the near future. The sides have established coordinates of a median line which divides the sea between two countries, and have determined rules of development of the deposits. Thus northern three sites Kurmangazy, Khvalynskoe and Central will be developed in common. 447

Thus, Russia and Kazakhstan became the first littoral Caspian states, which have completely settled questions of division of a sea-bottom. Settlement of this question between two large oil-extracting states, probably, will provide still the big stability and investment appeal of oil projects in the region /5/. Iran Iran owns oil stocks in the Persian Gulf and in the Caspian Sea. The significant part from them is in the Persian Gulf, therefore the development of deposits of the Caspian shelf is a task of secondary importance. Nevertheless, Iran firmly asserts the interests on the Caspian Sea not simply to provide the greatest possible access to Caspian with power resources but also to strengthen the geopolitical positions and opportunities in the region. The policy of Iran in the Caspian direction is determined by the following strategic interests: The security of northern borders through maintenance and maintenance of stability and security in the Central Asian states. Forming of mutual relation with the states of region within the framework of the common policy of an exit from the international isolation. Necessity to support good mutual relation with Russia and Turkey. With last the condition of relations is in direct dependence on the current degree of disagreements on a Kurdish question. At present, Iran is categorically against the creation of the pro-Western government in Baghdad and participation of Turkey in the anti-Iraq operation as Ankara, since Ankara, on Iranian experts opinion, could renew the old claims for the main oil-and-gas region of Iraq the Iraq Kurdistan and, accordingly, oil-and-gas arteries from this region to ports of Syria, Lebanon and Israel /6/. The big value is given by Teheran to cooperation with Russia, as to a counterbalance of the USA and the West. Russia for Iran is the basic supplier of military engineering and technologies. Both states also are interested in maintenance of stability in the regions of the Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The Central Asia and Caucasus are considered by Iran as a possible basis for normalization of relations with the EU, China and Japan /7/. For the realization of its interests Iran will take the most of the favorable geostrategical position and to develop the transit potential. Azerbaijan After gaining independence Azerbaijan appeared in the center of a so-called geopolitical triangle of the inconsistent interests of Russia, Iran and Turkey. In the beginning of 90ties government of the country was before a choice external policy orientations on any one of these competing centers of force. Pro-Western strategy of development with a stress on close interaction with Turkey representing in this case interests of the West, mainly the USA finally was elected. For today, among all states of region Azerbaijan is the closest ally of the United States. Baku actively uses the oil factor in maintenance of close mutual relation with the advanced states of the West. Reorientation of Baku to the West has taken place in many respects due to idea of realization of the project of Baku-Dzheikhan, which gives the big opportunities for Azerbaijan interested in transportation of the oil around of Russia. On the part of the USA also is appreciable to adjust desire closer mutual relation from Baku. By means of Azerbaijan Washington carries out the policy on the Caspian Sea. Recently Azerbaijan has faced new tendencies of development of a situation in the region of the Caspian Sea, namely appreciable rapprochement of positions of the main ally the USA with the recent contender Russia. It has resulted Baku in necessity of search of ways of the compromise with Moscow. This tendency finally has resulted in signing the bilateral Russian-Azerbaijan Agreement on differentiation of adjacent sites of a bottom of the Caspian Sea in June of 2002. The similar agreement was signed in November 29, 2001 and with Kazakhstan that speaks about the common positions of two countries on a question of the Caspian Sea. Development of the Azerbaijani-Iranian mutual relation goes practically in the opposite direction. Be tween the sides there is a number of serious contradictions mainly for rich and disputable oil deposits Alov, Araz and Sharg. The situation became especially intense after the military ships of the Iranian Navy under the threat of application of the weapon have forced to stop works on the investigation of the shelf oil which carried out Azerbaijan on the basis of the agreements of Baku with British Petroleum. 448

Turkmenistan On stocks of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons among littoral Caspian states, Turkmenistan takes the third place. The government of republic initiated the program 10 Years of Well-being according to which by 2002 increase of an oil recovery up to 28 million tons was expected from which 10 million it was planned to export. Being the midland country, deprived an easy approach to the world market, Turkmenistan is extremely interested in development of a wide network of export routes. Dependence of Ashghabad on the question of transportation can be used as levers of influence on the part of the certain states for expansion of the presence at region as a whole and in Turkmenistan in particular /8/. Interests of external players in Turkmenistan concern, first of all, stocks of gas. So, Washington actively lobbied the project of Transcaspian gas pipeline which should go around the territories of Russia and Iran on the bottom of the Caspian Sea, through territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia, and further to Turkey. That practically repeats the route of the oil pipeline of BakuDzheikhan. However the project has met with the big difficulties, and soon Ashkhabad practically from it has refused. That fact is interesting, that it has taken place after visit of the president of Russia Putin in this country when he managed to achieve participation of Turkmenistan in the project The Blue Stream transportation of the Russian gas Turkey. Probably, the role of the Turkmen-Azerbaijan disagreements concerning the disputable deposit Serdar there have played. Azerbaijan, as it is known, is the closest ally of the USA in the region, and it would be quite logical to expect, that in this situation Washington, let informally, will support Baku. For Turkmenistan the policy of Russia has determining value. The big dependence of Turkmenistan in the decision of some questions of deliveries of natural gas on export from the Russias point of view is obvious enough. Recently Russia actively masters the markets for which Ashkhabad, thus narrowing a field of the external activity of Turkmenistan. Projects of pipelines to Turkey, China, Pakistan and to Ukraine, developed as alternative of export of gas on the Russian route, yet have not received to present time of due development. Now Turkmenistan is capable to deliver the gas in plenty only to Russia. All this appreciably complicates tasks of a government of the country in development of the oil-and-gas branch. By virtue of the geopolitical position Turkmenistan at realization of strategy of export routes of gas tests strong enough influence on the part of Iran. Recently Iran makes active the activity in the Central Asia, and, aspiring in the prompt image to strengthen the positions in the region, tries to leave on more high level of economic relations with the states of the region. In this context the development of cooperation with Turkmenistan is considered by them a perspective direction. Ashkhabad in its turn always showed special interest in the opportunity of transportation of energy raw materials to the territory of Iran. The conducting of pipelines on rather safe Iranian territory, with an exit to the main world market of power resources the Persian Gulf, is a powerful enough prospect. For today for Turkmenistan that fact is determining, that the Iranian direction (pipeline Korpedzhe KurtKui) is a unique opportunity to export the gas without use of the Russian pipelines. To present time the Iranian experts have finished construction of gas processing factory in Korpedzhe (Turkmenistan). This enterprise is a component of the project in cost in 190 million dollars on export of Turkmen gas to Iran. At the same time it is necessary to mean, that last years Teheran successfully develops the project of development of a gas deposit Southern Pars. Besides in Iran are found out a deposit of natural gas in Ramkhormoz on the border with Iraq, and also a significant oil and gas deposit in the Iranian part of the Caspian Sea. Therefore in the future Iran, probably, will be interested any more in import of Turkmen gas northern areas, and in export of own gas to northern direction: to Turkey and Armenia /9/. Turkmenistan represents the big interest for Kazakhstan as a near Caspian state. However between two states there are appreciable disagreements concerning questions of the status and division of the Caspian Sea. Nevertheless, the position of Turkmenistan recently has come nearer to Kazakhstan and Russian to divide a bottom proceeding from existing frontiers. Today both states the aspiration to creation of mutual favorable conditions for realization of macro-projects in oil-and-gas branch, among which there is the project of the oil pipeline of Kazakhstan-TurkmenistanIran. Besides Kazakhstan is the transit country for transportation of the Turkmen gas in the basic northern direction. 449

Traditional Regional Players The important part of geopolitical processes in the Caspian region is the closest neighboring it of some large regional states and presence of their interests here. Besides Russia and Iran, the Caspian direction is one of the prior in the foreign strategy of China and Turkey. Each of these states adheres to the model of development, both in internal, and in external policy spheres that brings new features in geopolitical processes on the Caspian Sea. China Power resources of the Caspian Sea are one of the basic interests of China in the Central Asia besides interests in maintenance of stability and a security in this region, and also in adjoining to it the Chinese province Xinjiang suffering from the separatist moods. This interest will grow in process of economic development of China. High rates of development of economy determine the great need of China for energy resources. The Chinese Peoples Republic today independently makes about 160 million tons of oil per one year, and consumes 200 million tons /10/. Therefore for the Chinese Peoples Republic energy resources of the Caspian Sea are a potential source of oil and gas, as, in opinion of the Chinese scientists oil and gas pipelines from this region shorter and safe, rather than alternative routes /11/. At the end of the 1990s the Chinese government has developed a strategy of opening of the western area of the country. One of tasks of this program is an extraction of resources in the west and revival of the markets of this part of the Chinese Peoples Republic. Thus, the Central Asian region becomes the center connecting China and Europe. Among all near Caspian states Beijing gives priority attention to Kazakhstan, as to the richest in the raw material state of the region. In 1998 Kazakhstan and China have signed the developmental agreement with the Chinese National Oil Company (CNOC) of a deposit in the Western Kazakhstan. This project became the largest investment project with participation of the Chinese company abroad /12/. Now oil from Kazakhstan to China is delivered basically by a track. In the long term China is interested in construction of an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan. This idea is not realized yet though it was stipulated in the signed agreement with CNOC. Readiness of China to build the pipeline will depend on the political necessity to diversify sources of hydrocarbon raw material, the world prices for oil and rates of growth of internal demand for oil in the country. Thus, China has basically economic interests on the Caspian Sea. Now the official line of the Chinese policy in relation to the Central Asian neighbors represents close similarity of a policy of the USA, but in the most constrained variant. The constrained position of Beijing on the Caspian Sea, probably, speaks a recognition of this region as zones of natural interests of Russia from which China aspires to support the good relations necessary for the decision of more important strategic tasks at the global level. However in long-term prospect in the process of economic growth and in case of easing positions of Russia in the region it is impossible to exclude occurrence and political interests on the Caspian Sea and on all Central Asia. Turkey After the disintegration of the USSR one of the key players competing for the influence of promotion of its interests in the Central Asia, there was Turkey. Ankara saw the role as a state bridge between the West and the East, as the representative of the western partners in the Central Asia /13/. On the Caspian Sea Turkey operated cautiously and with restraint that is connected to its interest in maintenance of good relations with Russia, economic cooperation with which develops fast rates. The basic interests of Turkey in the Caspian region consist in the following. First, strengthening of foreign positions due to the states of Caspian basin. Second, strengthening of dependence of the West from a policy of Ankara in the region. A long-term objective is the aspiration to achieve the full membership in the European Union that on a lot of the reasons at this stage is unreal. The big oil is capable to give Turkey additional levers of influence on the European community and to promote greater economic and there as a consequence, political integration of this country in structures of the EU. Meanwhile the European politicians are cold enough concerning similar prospects. Positions of Turkey as the transit country, in the eyes of the Europeans are not stable enough /14/. 450

Third, maintenance of deliveries of energy resources to the home market. Turkey is the state-importer in terms of energy resources. Allied relations of Ankara with Washington, in conditions of sharp cooling of mutual relation of the latter with the Arabian world, can be reflected in cooperation of Turkey with the oilextracting states of the Near East negatively. Fourthly, the control above export streams of the Caspian hydrocarbons on the world market, and, as the consequence, realization of the first determining task. Ankara is the main driving force of realization of the project of basic export pipeline BakuTbilisiDzheikhan (BTD). For the increase of the attractiveness of this project Ankara has undertaken a number of the strict measures limiting the pass of the oil tankers through its channels. Motivating the actions by ecological value of passages, Ankara thus, apparently, tries to reduce a role of the pipelines focused on the Russian port in Novorossisk. Among all neighboring Caspian states, Turkey supports the closest mutual relation with Azerbaijan. It is caused by a historical, cultural and ethnic generality, similarity of foreign priorities (orientation to the West), the common interest in the realization of the project of the pipeline of BakuTbilisiDzheikhan. Cooperation of two countries is done practically in all the spheres of interaction from the economic up to militarypolitical. For example, during incident between Azerbaijan and Iran on the Caspian Sea, Turkey has declared the readiness to support Azerbaijan in case of military actions. However positions of Ankara in the Central Asia, it is especial in Kazakhstan, not such strong as in Azerbaijan. Probably, it is connected by that the Central Asian states originally not approving of the pan-Turkic ideas of Turkey in the first years of independence, continue to be afraid of active Turkish aspirations in the re gion including on the Caspian Sea. The Central Asian states prefer to adjust relations with the West directly. Besides recently calls in question durability of the American-Turkish strategic union. Washington de claring about support of Turkey, nevertheless, is guided by extremely own interests. Especially it concerns the Cent-ral Asia where the USA have strongly become stronger in terms of the military, having taken the advantage of the favorable current geopolitical situation. Low effectiveness of the mediator efforts of Turkey, misunderstanding of the local specificity and uncertainty of national priorities doomed the policy of Ankara for the incompleteness and obvious inconsistency /15/. Foreign positions of Turkey in the region were even more weakened after the economic crisis which it had suffered and practically full curtailing of the projects of external financing /16/. The Global Players The United States of America The oil factor traditionally occupies one of priority places in the foreign policy of the United States. The big value of oil in a policy of a superpower means importance of this factor and in all world politics. Maintenance of the easy excess to energy resources is one of paramount questions of national security of the USA. Only for last ten years the consumption of oil in the USA has increased by 14 % for the increase of internal extraction on 2 %. This implies, that the demand for raw material becomes covered due to the increase of import deliveries. For the similar period import of hydrocarbons has increased on 30 %. These data with all evidence speak about the increase of the dependence and vul nerability of the United States from the external deliveries of oil. To weaken this dependence, the USA are interested in the diversification of the external sources of oil and maintenance of their reliable deliveries. Search of various sources of imported energy resources and the control above them is one of the important tasks in business of maintenance power and in general national security of the USA. Therefore world regions of oil extraction and routes of transportation of oil and mineral oil are a zone of the vital interests of the United States. In this connection the zone of the Caspian region with its rich stocks of power resources has strategically important value as the control above this region allows realize a policy of Washington on the diversification of the sources of imported energy resources and maintenance of their reliable deliveries to the USA. According to global power strategy of the United States the Caspian region is one of three priority directions alongside with the American continent and the Middle East. The importance of the Caspian region has even more amplified in the connection with the critical situation in the Middle East and the opposition between the USA and OPEC. Geopolitical conditions favorable for 451

the USA after events of 11th September promoted the even greater strengthening of positions of the USA in the region and in particular on the Caspian Sea. The policy of the United States in the region of the Caspian Sea is based on the three key principles: increase of the level of reliability for the USA in questions of maintenance with power resources; the decision of geo-strategic tasks; development of commercial opportunities. In 1997 the administration of the USA declared the Caspian region a zone of the interests and has formulated a number of the wide tasks connected to it: to provide reliability of global deliveries of power resources so that it to the full answered strategic and economic interests of the United States, and also interests of their regional partners; to promote economic development, strengthening of political independence and strengthening of democ ratization of the countries of the region; to support the American companies in their attempts to speed up the development of energy resources of the region; to develop reliable and viable alternatives of export of energy resources extracted in the region, that, in particular, assumes conducting of transit pipelines around the territory of Iran. The European Union Various sources of power resources and routes of their transportation have the direct relation to both geo political and geo-economic interests and spheres of external political influences of the states of Europe. The European Union is the largest consumer of hydrocarbon raw material. In 2000 consumption of the EU of oil has made 14,4 million barrels per day (20,5 % of world consumption). 60 % of used oil it is imported from the outside, from them of 29 % it is imported from the post-Soviet states, basically Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Prospects of substantial growth of oil extracting in the pool of the Caspian Sea, planned increase of its role in world power supply predetermines the special interest of Europe to this region. The basic practical interest of the EU is the diversification of the oil-and-gas import involving energy re sources of the Central Asia and the Caspian Sea in the European energy system. Europe gives especial interest to the Caspian gas. In opinion of the European experts, connection of the Caspian space with the European gas system does not have alternative. For realization of the interests the EU has undertaken a number of steps. In 1991 the EU initiated development of the program of rendering assistance to the countries of the Trans-Caucasia and the Central Asia in business of reconstruction of transport highways and constructions of new units of transport infrastructure (TACIS). A part of this program became the project of creation of the international transport corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia. The project provides the integration of transport system, communication networks, infrastructures and material base of some former republics of the Soviet Union with similar international systems. In 1995 the EU began to realize the Inter-state project on oil-and-gas pipelines. The purposes of the project is technical assistance in the maintenance in the working order and management of oil and gas pipelines of the countries of the CIS, and also the study of new ways of transportation of the Caspian oil to Europe /17/. Concerning the presence of Europe on the Caspian Sea, inclusion of the European Union into geopolitical processes in the Caspian region in comparison with other world players occurred much less actively. The basic deterrent for Europe there is yet not finished distribution of spheres of influence between the USA and Russia /18/. Here it is necessary to note, that, despite of the allied relations with the USA, the purposes and tasks of the EU on the Caspian Sea not necessarily converge with the American ones. So Europe avoided from support of a policy of expression of interests of Russia from the region, used by Washington until recently. The European states are in significant dependence on deliveries of the Russian gas and oil. In a question of routes of transportation of oil of the EU never insisted on obligatory construction of pipelines around of the Russian territory. The European countries welcomed construction of the basic export pipeline of Baku-TbilisiDzheikhan only as the opportunity to unload the channels Phosphorus and Dardanelle and additional support of Turkish economy. In this respect, rapprochement of positions of the Russian Federation and the USA in the energy sphere answers the interests of the EU and gives it new opportunities in the Caspian region. 452

The other factor explaining moderate presence of Europe on the Caspian Sea, probably, is the disappointment with the results of the European policy concerning the CIS and the Central Asia. As the consequence, the EU has considerably lagged behind other world powers in terms of establishing of the political and economic interests in the region. Nevertheless, in the period after the events of September 11on the Caspian Sea, the tendency of activization of the EU was planned. So in 2001 wide publicity was received with the memorandum of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Germany in which German view of the European interests in Central Asian region there was formulated /19/. According to this document, approximately by 2015 the border of the NATO and the EU will adjoin closely to Russia, and Ukraine will be involved into strategic partnership with these organizations on various levels. In these conditions Europe is already concerned with the preservation of stability in Russia and the Central Asia. Approximately at the same time the exhaustion of energy resources of the Northern Sea is expected. A. Shmillen recognizes that any instability in the Central Asia in the near future will have direct consequences for Europe. Thus, the European tasks and interests in the Caspian region as it is represented, consist in the following: separation of the European interests from the American ones and development of its own European strategy; connection of Caucasus and the Caspian region to Europe as to the more attractive alternative, than OPEC; involving Europe into the settlements of conflicts on Caucasus, as more as possible with the participa tion of Russia with the purpose of creation there of some equal competitive opportunities and conditions for cooperation; the active support of transport infrastructure on the line the East-West and especially gas network for the linkage of the resources of the region, including Iran, through Turkey with the European market; development of the European position concerning the project of main pipelines from the Caspian re gion to Europe; overlapping of national interests of the various countries of the EU in the region within the framework of unified European foreign policy and their policy in the sphere of security /20/. 2. Geopolitical Conditions in the Caspian Region after September 11 New strategic conditions in the world, after the events of 11th September have resulted in the certain changes of the geopolitical situation in the Caspian region. First, the geopolitical situation favorable for the USA has created the conditions for political and military presence of United States at the Central Asia. Strengthening of the position of the USA in Central Asia after the events of 11th September was also strengthened on the Caspian Sea. Second, the attitude of the USA to the questions of power has changed. This question began to prevail in the foreign policy and external strategy of Washington. Representatives of the White House have officially proclaimed a policy of the creation of the new opportunities for receiving energy resources from different areas of the world and with this purpose stimulate the conclusion of new trading agreements and the development of new resources. According to the strategy of national security of the USA accepted in September of 2002, the Administration of the USA sees the strengthening of strategic security in cooperation with the allies, trading partners and manufacturers of energy with the purpose of the expansion of sources and types of global power deliveries, especially in the Western hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia and the Caspian region. Therefore Washington in immediate prospects will make active efforts for the development of new sources of energy resources in Russia and the Central Asia. However the activization of the USA on the Caspian Sea should not be considered only in the context of diversification of the sources of energy resources. Basically, the share of export of the Caspian oil into the USA is insignificant, and its transportation to the American continent is very expensive. The other cause probably even the principal of the enhanced attention of Washington to the Caspian Sea, is its difficult relations with the OPEC. The USA are extremely interested in the drop in prices for oil as according to some estimations, the economy of the United States can dynamically develop only at the price of 18 dollars for one barrel /21/. The 453

increase of the price for oil can provoke serious crisis in the economy of the USA, which conduct military actions in Afghanistan and plan to undertake the other actions in the context of struggle against terrorism. In this connection the USA, probably, try to push together Russia and Caspian states with OPEC. Escalating of rivalry of these groups inevitably will result in their mutual weakening and, as the consequence, to decrease the world price for the raw material the main task of the energy policy of the USA. Therefore in intermediate term prospect the USA will be interested not so much in real transformation of the Caspian states (first of all, Russia and Kazakhstan) into significant exporters of oil on the market, and in the liquidation of the monopoly of OPEC on pricing and the establishment of the control above the world oil market. Thus, the new phase of the processes in the region of the Caspian Sea is characterized by the activization of United States in the region. Cooperation of Washington with the Caspian states is favorable for the successful realization of the plans on the Caspian Sea, first of all with Russia and Kazakhstan having potentially the largest stocks of energy resources. The distinctive feature of the new period is that the actions of the USA will be already directed not on pushing out of Russia on the Caspian Sea, and on the adjustment of partner relations with it. Therefore Washington reconsiders its attitude to the role of Russia in the context of energy, and in the narrower sense, the Caspian problem. One of the most important consequences of this tendency is the occurrence in the American energy strategy of a new team RussiaKazakhstan from what one more tendency activization of the American factor in mutual relation of the RK and the Russian Federation in the oil sphere there follows directly. Washington emphasizes cooperation in oil sphere with these states. Thus the USA are interested in that Russia and Kazakhstan should carry out the common policy in the Caspian region which would correlate with the American interests. Another words, now the most serious questions in this sphere will be solved with the active participation of Washington. Separately our states are considerably less attractive in the economic and investment terms. It can be called a cardinal change of the American strategy in the region. Structural changes in the world policy and the geopolitical situation in the Caspian region move Russia to enter some the certain corrective amendments into its policy on the Caspian Sea. Russia should take into account such important factor, as full-scale presence of the USA in the region. Russia has faced the following consequences of the close cooperation of some the post-Soviet states with the West. The first. The level of political influence of Russia in the neighboring regions has appreciably decreased. The second. Economic presence of the West in the region is supplemented with the military one, which together is the powerful lever of the implementation of its policy. Another words, economic levers of pressure of Russia on the partners in the CIS, in particular on its near Caspian neighbors, also are weakened. Now Russia is in a difficult situation, which can result in the changes of the Russian positions in the re gion of the Caspian Sea. Moscow faces with two contradicting factors. On the one hand, Moscow pins the great hopes on the transport potential, being the basic route of the exit of the Caspian hydrocarbons to the world markets. Besides the development of riches of Russian and the other sectors of the Caspian Sea has strategic value for Russia from the point of view of maintenance of own power security. The Russian Federation, despite its high potential of oil-and-gas stocks, already faces a problem of introduction into the industrial revolution of new perspective deposits. On the other hand, activization of work on increase of volumes of extracted oil the Caspian states can result in the occurrence in Russia strong contenders in the world oil markets. At the same time, the great interest of the West in the increase of volumes of the extraction of the Caspian hydrocarbons and diversification of the export ways increases. The situation for today has developed in such a manner that the most part of oil is extracted by western (mainly American) companies, the basic part of means of delivery of the Caspian hydrocarbons while is in hands of Russia. Moscow has such a powerful lever of pressure upon the neighbors on the region as quotas of swapping of hydrocarbons on the territory. Threat of loss of the control above the export routes of the Caspian oil promoted the attempts of Moscow to show the big flexibility in a policy of transportation of hydrocarbons. Intention of Lukoil to join the consortium on the construction of the basic export pipeline of Baku-Tbilisi-Dzheikhan from the shares of 454

7,5 % is the indicative one in this sense. It is possible to assume, that self-elimination of Russia, which until recently considered the Western project unprofitable, geo-politically is unjustified. The determination of United States to promote realization of the main energy pipeline (MEP) by all measures allows assume, that despite the huge expenses and not finally proved efficiency of the pipeline into the Turkish port Dzheikhan there will be carried out. In this connection, a new position of Lukoil reflects the aspiration of the Russian government, which share in the company makes up 35 %, to stake out for the future the Russian interests on the Caspian Sea. The analysis of the present stage of the development of processes on the Caspian Sea allows speak about a new role of Russia. This tendency is caused by the revision of bases of mutual relation of Moscow and Washington. Most likely, the period of rivalry of two powers in the region varies a little, and their interests are pulled as much as possible together, that determines the further course of events. For Kazakhstan the planned tendencies of the development of the geopolitical situation on the Caspian Sea are favorable. The enhanced attention of the United States at the present moment to the region can promote the further development of the oil-extracting industry of the republic. Internal consumption of energy resources in Kazakhstan is rather insignificant, in this connection there is an opportunity to increase the export of raw material on foreign markets. Such situation is stacked in power strategy on diversification of the ways of deliveries of raw material to the world market. In intermediate term prospect Kazakhstan has an opportunity to occupy more appreciable niche in the market of energy resources. Besides, there is an opportunity of more active attraction of foreign (first of all American) investments in oil-extracting branch of the country. Fears of that the increase of the stream of Kazakhstan oil can influence the prices, are not proved, since in any case its volumes are not comparable with the Middle East and Russian. It is possible, for this reason Kazakhstan has not undergone the serious pressure of OPEC when this organization aspired to affect the independent oil produces in the spring-summer of this year. The planned activization of the American-Russian cooperation in the energy sphere allows assume some mitigation of the position of Moscow concerning the plans of construction of the oil pipeline of BakuDzheikhan. Taking into account the low profit of this project without involving of the Kazakhstan resources, connection of the RK to its realization is obviously possible. The other favorable factor is the final decision of the question on the status of the Caspian Sea between Kazakhstan and Russia. This fact will give a new impulse to the development of oil-extracting branches of two states. Another words, Kazakhstan has new opportunities for the development of oil-extracting sector of the economy and the occupation of the niche in the world market of energy resources. Notes: 1. Analytical materials of KazISS // www.kisi.kz. 2. Chebotarev A. Kazakhstan: problems and prospects of choosing of a priority route of the export of oil // Central Asia and Caucasus (Sweden). 2001. Nr 3. p 35. 3. Kushkumbaev S. Geopolicy of transport communications in the Caspian region // National and regional security of the Central Asian countries in the basin of the Caspian Sea. Almaty, 2000.p. 73. 4. National security: results of the decade. Astana, 2001. p. 380 383. 5. http: // www.khabar.kz/index.php3? lang=rus*chapter=1036078363* parent_id=1 004525074*1036078363 6. Chichkin A. The price of the Iranian card // GazetaSNG.ru. 12.09.2002. 7. Abishev A. The Caspian Sea: oil and policy. Almaty: Foreign policy and analysis center. 2002. p. 354 355. 8. Guseva L Contemporary condition of the oil-and-gas complex and export routes of gas of Republic Turkmenistan // Analytic Nr 2. 2001. p. 36-39. 9. the same source 10. Bessarabov G., Sobyanin A. Oil of China and prospect of Russia // profi.gateway.kg/china_oil 11. Bao I. China: strategic interests in the Central Asia and cooperation with the countries of the region // Central Asia and Caucasus (Sweden). 2001, Nr 5., p. 117123. 12. A.Abishev. The Caspian Sea: oil and a policy. Almaty: Foreign policy and the analysis center, 2002. p. 352. 455

13. Ibid., p. 356. 14. Kushkumbaev S. Geopolicy of transport communications in the Caspian region // National and regional security of the Central Asian countries in the basin of the Caspian Sea. Almaty, 2000. p. 76. 15. Abishev A. The Caspian Sea: oil and policy. Almaty: Foreign policy and analysis center, 2002. p. 358. 16. Dzhilavyan A. Modernization of globalism //Independent Newspaper. Nr 198. 23.10.2001. 17. Nakashidzhe D. Oil of the Caspian Sea and international relations // Authority (Moscow). 6. 2002. p. 64. 18. GUS-Barometer. DGAP (Berlin) Nr 25, November 2000. 19. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 15.05.2001. 20. Laumulin M., Seifullina . Interests and policy of the European Union in Central Asia and Caspian region // www.kisi.kz. 21. Zverev A. For the USA now it is very important to reduce its dependence on the Middle East oil // www.aina.kz. 27.11.2001. PART V. KAZAKHSTAN IN THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 1. Foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan: establishing, formation and development The foreign policy of Kazakhstan can be divided into three main periods. The first period is the period of foreign policy establishment and formation (first half of 1990-s). During the second period the foreign political activity of the republic became more developed. The third period begins after the tragic events of September 11 when the foreign activity of Kazakhstan has undergone through some certain changes in new strategic environment. Kazakhstan declared its independence on December 16, 1991 and became the subject of the international system. At that time the young independent state had nothing to do but to establish its own foreign policy, national security, defense concepts. With the development of foreign policy concept Kazakhstan has successfully coped. Geopolitical situation of Kazakhstan between two large regional powers Russia and China, landlocked position and the absence of the exit to the sea, rich ethno-social structure of the population, weak economy, military potential and other factors have determined the necessity of promoting reasonable and weighed foreign policy relying on not military, but political means. At the first stage the foreign policy of Kazakhstan was aimed to create favorable conditions for worthy entering into world community. Primary objectives of foreign policy of Kazakhstan were following: - preservation of common economic, cultural and humanitarian space within the framework of the CIS; - to obtain membership of the United Nations, OSCE and other international organizations in order to enter international relations system, to be introduced to the achievements of the world civilization in political, economic, social, humanitarian, scientific, educational spheres, on the one hand, and to ensure world community involvement in solving problems of Kazakhstan society in its transition from administrative system to democracy and market economy relations on the other hand; - to ensure security guarantees from nuclear powers, such as USA, Russia, Great Britain, China for Kazakhstan, which obliged to be a non-nuclear state; - to enter world financial organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, World bank, the Euro pean bank for Reconstruction and Development, to attract financial assets for national economy development; - to establish and develop cooperation with foreign countries on a bilateral basis. During this period Kazakhstan established diplomatic relations with many countries of the world. It became a member of a number of international and regional organizations, determined the main priorities, tasks and character of the foreign policy. The basis of foreign policy of Kazakhstan, situating between Europe and Asia, became Eurasian Bridge concept. Since the first days of independence, Kazakhstan has shown peaceful character of its foreign policy directed to the creation of atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation on the regional and international levels, formation of a good neighborhood belt along its borders, development of equal relations with all countries and international political, financial and economical organizations. Strategic tasks of foreign policy were identified as following: to create favorable external conditions to fulfill social and economic and political reforms in 456

Kazakhstan, to promote national interests of the republic, especially its territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers. One of the key questions of the first period was a nuclear issue. After gaining independence Kazakhstan declared its non-nuclear status. The republic signed START-1, Nuclear Weapon Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Treaty on Universal Prohibition of Nuclear Tests (TUPNT). In December 1994 the Memorandum on security guarantees was signed in Budapest in connection with joining by the Republic of Kazakhstan to NPT. According to this document, nuclear powers confirmed the obligation to refrain from use or threat to use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and that no military means will be used against the Republic of Kazakhstan, except for self-defense purposes . By 1995 Kazakhstan had closed its nuclear test-site and firing grounds, and finished nuclear weapons dismantling and liquidation. During the second period (second half of 1990-s) the concept of Eurasian Bridge gradually was transformed into the doctrine of multivector diplomacy. The principle of multivector diplomacy means developing equal and diverse relationships in all important directions for the country: the CIS, Central Asia, the East and the West, Europe and Asia, the Muslim World, sian Pasific region, industrial powers. According to the Foreign policy concept of R priority directions of foreign policy are following: development of integration processes in the frameworks of Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), Shanghai Five (since 2001 Shanghai Cooperation Organization), Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Collective Security Treaty (CST), the Central Asian Eco nomic Union; bilateral cooperation with Russia, China, CIS countries, USA, EU countries, as well as Japan, India, Turkey, Iran; Caspian region problems; national frontiers delimitation and demarcation processes; development of transit-transport potential of the country; transfrontier rivers problem; development of economic aspect of foreign policy, aimed at promoting Kazakhstan products to the world market, on the one hand, and attracting foreign investments to such sectors of Kazakhstan economy, as new technologies, mechanical engineering, infrastructure, agriculture, small business, and etc., on the other hand. From the very beginning the foreign activity is implemented on two levels: multilateral and bilateral. On the multilateral level Kazakhstan began active cooperation with international security structures, such as the United Nations, OSCE, NATO. In 1992 Kazakhstan became a member of the UN, OSCE and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994 of Kazakhstan entered NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, created to establish new security relations between NATO and its partners. At the end of 1990-s Kazakhstan and the NATO initiated two-years Individual Program of Partnership to develop long-term and consecutive cooperation between two sides. The program was approved by Security Council of Kazakhstan and the NATO Council. Kazakhstan also develops cooperation with the international cultural and humanitarian organizations: the United Nations units UNICEF (UN International Childrens Emergency Fund), UNDP (UN Development Program), UNFPA (UN Population Fund), UNESCO (United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), UNDCP (UN International Drug Control Program), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). After refusal of the nuclear weapon and joining NPT, Kazakhstan became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1994. In the framework of this organization Kazakhstan signed conventions on nuclear security (1996) and on safe handling of radioactive waste products (1997). Multilateral cooperation of Kazakhstan developed not only in security sphere, but also in the sphere of integration. Since the first days of independence the foreign policy of sovereign Kazakhstan had been directed on deepening integration processes in the post-Soviet area within the framework of the CIS, Eurasian Economic Cooperation and Central Asian Economical Community (then Central Asian Union). 457

On December 8, 1991, 11 of 15 former Soviet Union republics established the Commonwealth of Independent States. Its principal organ became the Heads of states and governments Council, which was responsible for the political and strategic decision-making. The sides cooperate on the level of heads of member-states, and also on parliaments, various ministries and departments levels. In January, 1992 Kazakhstan and Russia initiated signing Collective Security Treaty (CST) in the framework of the CIS. The Treaty was designed to create collective security system between members. The Treaty was joined by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. According to this document, the sides took an obligation to refrain in their international affaires from using or threatening to use force and to ensure each other guarantee of joint defense in case of aggression against one of the state-members. Another regional integration organization is Eurasian Economic Community. It was founded in January, 1995 on the basis of the Customs Union Treaty, signed by Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. Kyrghyzstan joined the Customs Union in March, 1996, and Tajikistan in February, 1999. Creation of the Customs Union became an important precondition for the creation of commodity, services, capital and labour common market. Within the framework of the Union members signed a number of documents and solved problems in the field of tax laws, transport, trade regimes, formation of united economic space, tariffs regulation, transit and others. Besides the sides signed the Treaty on integration in economic and humanitarian spheres in 1996. In 1998 Kazakhstan, which was at that time the Chairman of the Customs Union Interstate Council, initiated legal and visa procedures simplification for CIS citizens (Ten simple steps towards ordinary people). In February, 1999 five states signed the Treaty on the Customs Union and united economic space. In 2001 they established new integration association Eurasian Economical Community with aim to deepen further economic integration between members. Kazakhstan also participates in the regional integration association Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC, since 2002 Central Asian Union). It was formed on April 30, 1994 by Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan and Uzbekistan. The basic document is the Treaty on common economic space. In July, 1994 CAEC members founded the Interstate Union, Prime-ministers and Foreign Affairs Ministers Councils, working body the Executive Committee of the Inter State Council, and the Central Asian bank on cooperation and development. In February and December, 1995 two summits of CAEC were held in Kazakhstan. Both eco nomic and political issues (creation of Centrazbat, drugs struggling) were widely discussed in the framework of the organization. Power and water resources problems were also put into the agenda of CAEC members meetings in 1995-96. In March, 1998 CAEC was joined by Tajikistan. It is important to mention about one of the most significant foreign initiatives of Kazakhstan the idea of Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). This idea was first represented by President N. Nazarbayev at the 47-th UN General Assembly session in October, 1992. The key of the idea is to create universal and wide system of Asian security. One of the most perspective and effective regional organizations is Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Before 2001 it was called Shanghai Five according to the number of original members: Kazakhstan, China, Kyrghyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Initially Shanghai Five was created to solve boundary questions. The member-states signed such founding documents as the Agreement on Confidence Measures Strengthening in military sphere along the borders (Shanghai, April 26, 1996) and the Agreement on armed forces mutual reduction in the border area (Moscow, April, 24, 1997). Afterwards the parties to treaties met regularly at the levels of heads of states, Defense and Foreign Affairs ministers, heads of law enforcement bodies and special services. During following regular summit held in June 200 in Shanghai the organization was enlarged by new member Uzbekistan. At this summit Shanghai Five was transformed into Shanghai Cooperation organization. The members also signed Convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism. Kazakhstan pays great attention to development of bilateral relationships with the foreign states. By 1995 the Republic of Kazakhstan was recognized by 111 states of the world. Now Kazakhstan has established diplomatic relations with 120 countries of the world. The main directions of foreign policy of Kazakhstan include Russia, China, USA, and the Central Asian states. 458

Russia is the important foreign partner of Kazakhstan. In May, 1992 Kazakhstan and Russia signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual aid, based on a principle of mutual respect of sovereignty and borders of both states. From this moment the process of creation of legal base of relations between two sides has began. In 1998 they signed an important document the Treaty on Eternal Friendship and Alliance. Kazakhstan-Russian relations also develop on multilateral level. Both states actively participate in the development of integration structures of the CIS, Eurasian Economic Community, political and military organizations CST, SCO, CICA, multilateral negotiations on a legal status of Caspian Sea. Russia is also an observer at CAU. Starting point of development of relations between Kazakhstan and the Peoples Republic of China was the Joint declaration on friendly relations between two sides. The document was signed during the first official visit of President N. Nazarbayev to China in October, 1993. Starting on this declaration Kazakhstan and China exchanged several high-level visits and signed a number of treaties and agreements, namely the document about obligation of Peoples Republic of China to give security guarantees to Kazakhstan, Agreement on Kazakhstan-Chinese border and etc. One of the important aspects relationship between two countries became the participation in SCO, CICA. The USA officially recognized the Republic of Kazakhstan as the sovereign state in December, 1991. In early 90-s Washington paid an enhanced attention to Kazakhstan due to its possession of nuclear weapons. After declaring by Kazakhstan non-nuclear status interest of USA temporarily had decreased. However in second half of 90-s and afterwards the USA became again involved in the Central Asian region. It is connected to USA interests in developing cooperation with Kazakhstan in energy sphere and geopolitical interests in post-Taliban period. The development of relations with the Central Asian states is also important for the foreign policy of the republic. Kazakhstan shares common borders, close economic ties, historical, cultural and ethnic roots with other Central Asian states. All these factors unite Central Asian states into one complex of security, in which security of one state is closely connected to security of the other state of the region. Kazakhstan signed Treaties on friendship and cooperation with all Central Asian states. Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan participate in integration processes within the framework of the CIS and the CAU. The European Union established diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan in 1992. Agreement on partnership and cooperation between RK and EU was signed in 1995. According to this document Kazakhstan and the European Union obliged to promote political dialogue and to hold consultations not only on European, but also on international problems. Kazakhstan also cooperates with the Eastern Europe countries. Their experience of successful social and economic transitions is of great interest to the republic. The relations with the states of the Islamic World are based not on an ideological or religious basis, but on mutually beneficial cooperation. 2. Foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan after the events of September, 11th September 11 events have changed strategic environment in the world. In new strategic conditions many states faced the problem to redefine their foreign activities. These events had a certain impact on the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan as well. After the period of foreign policy establishing in the beginning of 90-s and its further development afterwards, the republic has been challenged by necessity to redefine its foreign activity in new security conditions caused by the consequences of terrorism acts in September, 11, 2001. Kazakhstan and the West From the very beginning, Kazakhstan condemned the acts of terrorism in New York and Washington. On that tragic day the president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev expressed the condolence on behalf of the people of Kazakhstan to the President of USA George Bush in connection with the tragedy. N. Nazarbayev emphasized in his message: We are indignant about these acts of terrorism which have caused numerous human victims. We can not forgive these acts directed against humanity. All civilized community should be united and take the effective measures to struggle international terrorism. The same day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan officially condemned the acts of terrorism and expressed the need to unite efforts of all countries, governments and international organizations 459

in joint ruthless and total struggle against this global evil. It was stressed in the document of MFA that Kazakhstan is ready to render any possible assistance to USA, both in overcoming the consequences of this event, and in global fighting against all forms of terrorism. Later after the tragic events N. Nazarbayev had a telephone conversation with the USA President G. Bush, in which he mentioned that Kazakhstan is ready to participate in struggle against terrorism and to render all-round assistance to this process. Nazarbayev also mentioned that the struggle against terrorism should not develop in civilizations clash and bring civilian victims. Thus, Kazakhstan tool up clear and principal position: to support USA in its struggle against the international terrorism. Kazakhstan appealed to join efforts of world community and to conduct balanced and long-term approach for counteraction to terrorism. Terrorism combating issues defined new period in foreign policy of Kazakhstan intensification of bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and USA. The U.S.-led antiterrorist operation and joint struggle against international terrorism became the most important factor influencing Kazakhstan-American relations. Wash ington intensified its contacts with Astana not only in economic, energy and investment spheres as it was before September events, but also in political and military spheres. If USA interests in early 1990-s years concerned a nuclear issue, lately in 90th years in the sphere of energy resources, so after September 11th the USA strengthened political dimension of cooperation with Kazakhstan. At this period political contacts between two countries have become more frequent and on a high level. During the first months after the acts of terrorism two countries exchanged visits at the level of the heads of foreign departments. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of RK E. Idrisov visited USA at the end of September. During the visit he met with the USA State secretary C. Powell. Ministers exchanged views on situation in the world after September events, discussed the situation in Afghanistan and planned the U.S.-led antiterrorist operation. C. Powell informed his colleague about US approaches to terrorism problem and ways of struggling it, and that Washington conducted wide consultations with various states. E. Idrisov highly appreciated the intention of USA to follow balanced, long term and directed approach in conducting this operation and US willingness cooperate closely with the world community in the framework of coalition. The sides also discussed a number of other issues, including the issue of allocation of American additional financial assets to strengthen borders of Central Asian states within the framework of the Central Asian initiative on security program. Idrisov also met with the UN Secretary General K. Anan. The sides discussed the development of global and regional situation after the acts of terrorism in USA and stressed topicality of President N. Nazarbayevs initiative about over-all consideration of Afghani problem at the Security Council, presented during the Millenium summit in 2000. By the end of 2001 the relations between RK and USA became more intense. The state secretary C. Powell visited Kazakhstan. He presented an official invitation for President N. Nazarbayev to visit Washington. During negotiations with Nazarbayev C. Powell stressed the importance, paid by the United States to the cooperation with Kazakhstan, and the intention of Washington to develop with Astana relations of strategic partnership. The sides also discussed issues of cooperation in economic, energy and military spheres. N. Nazarbayevs visit to USA in December 18-22, 2001 became an important event in bilateral relations of two countries. During the visit N. Nazarbayev had negotiations with the President G. Bush, vice-president R. Chainy. He also met with 41st US President G. Bush (senior), the UN Secretary General K. Annan, the group of senators and congressmen, the former state secretary James A. Backer, heads of some of the large companies. The main theme of the visit was interaction between two states within the framework policy on promoting security and stability in Central Asia in the view of US antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, providing humanitarian help to the latter, and also energy sphere issues. The sides signed the joint statement on cooperation, called New mutual relations. According to this document, two countries intent to strengthen long-term strategic partnership both in the sphere of struggle against terrorism, and in economic sphere. The presidents also signed Memorandum on energy partnership between RK and the USA. The sides declared to support Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Dzheikhan oil export route on commercial terms. The USA expressed 460

its readiness to support the entering of Kazakhstan into WTO and to consider the possibility to abolish Jackson-Wanick clause for Kazakhstan, imposing restrictions on mutual trade. This visit defined the future directions of Kazakhstan-US relationship. Its main result was that USA emphasized the role of Kazakhstan as the most stable country in Central Asia and as the main initiator of economic integration. Throughout 2002 Kazakhstan and the USA continued active cooperation at the level of foreign departments. Working visit of American delegation headed by US state secretary assistant on Europe and Eurasia Elizabeth Jones to Kazakhstan was held in January 2002. During the meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Idrisov the sides discussed the issues of energy partnership, cooperation in the spheres of trade, economy and investments, as well as the issues of international and regional security, and the situation in Afghanistan. In February the Minister of Foreign Affairs of RK of K. Tokayev visited USA. He met with the vice-minister R. Chainy, state secretary C. Powell and national security adviser to President C. Rais. Besides security issues, questions of cooperation in energy and investment spheres, the opportunity of creation of the separate investment program for Kazakhstan were discussed. Major landmark in trade and economic relations between RK and USA became the decision of US administration in March 2002 on behalf of the Ministry of Trade to remove the non-market economy status from Kazakhstan according to the US anti-dumping law. The decision was made on the basis of the analysis of such parameters, as national currency convertibility, free level of wages, foreign investments, state ownership, manufacture control, the level of corruption and barter bargains. The issue of abolishing JacksonWanick clause was also discussed throughout 2002 year. Cooperation of two countries has received a new impulse in the military sphere. Astana was the first among the CIS countries who has agreed to give its air space for the aircrafts of the allies. This decision was confirmed during N. Nazarbayevs visit to Germany in the beginning of October 2001, and then within the frameworks of consultations with Washington. Later in July 10, 2002 Kazakhstan and USA signed the Memorandum on mutual understanding between the governments of two countries about the conditions of granting of the international airport Almaty for US military planes. This step did not mean the creation of military bases on the territory of the republic, it is just stipulated conditions on the use by the US Air Forces of Kazakhstans airports in an emergency cases. According to this arrangement Americans have already used this right of transit through the air space of Kazakhstan 11 times by November 2002. Military cooperation of two countries is also expressed in training the Kazakhstan students at the USA high military colleges, preparation of the special forces of Kazakhstan army by the American instructors for the realization of joint military doctrines. Moreover, Minister of Defense RK M. Altynbayev during his November visit in 2002 to USA declared the readiness of Kazakhstan to buy some types of US military equipment. At a multilateral level Kazakhstan continues to cooperate with USA and the European countries within the framework of the NATO. Minister of Defense M. Altynbayev took part in the work of regular session of Council of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership of NATO (P) in December 2001 in Brussels. The issues of cooperation within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace program were discussed at the session. In 2002 Kazakhstan joined the NATO program the Process of Planning and the Review. In August 2002 the commander of the central command of US armed forces General Tommi R. Franks visited Kazakhstan. He met with N. Nazarbayev and Minister of Defense M. Altynbayev. During all political contacts with Kazakhstan Washington showed its readiness to support in solving some issues in trade and economy spheres, emphasized the importance of development of relations with Kazakhstan and marked the republic as the leader in reforming economy and political system in Central Asian region. On the European direction the foreign policy of Kazakhstan has not undergone radical changes in the post-September period. Security issues were the main issues of cooperation between Kazakhstan and European states before September events. The attention of Europe to Central Asian security issues was first at461

tracted in August 1999, when religious units of militants intruded region for the first time. Europe also was concerned with other threats emanating from Central Asia drug trafficking, illegal migration, growth of social tension, reducing democratic processes, threat of economic collapse, and, at last, rise of radical and militant Islam. After September 11 European-Central Asian relations were designated during the visit of the president of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev to Germany in the beginning of October 2001. Kazakhstan and German leaders confirmed the solidarity with the US and its antiterrorist campaign. The sides signed an agreement on military cooperation, which pawned a basis for the future close cooperation of Kazakhstan with Germany, and other EU states in military sphere. However this document is more declarative, therefore it cannot be considered as the document leading to more active relations between Kazakhstan and European states in political and military sphere, as it is between Kazakhstan and USA. Firstly, the EU has no common strategy in the region, including Kazakhstan. Economic and political interests of main European states in Central Asia are different. It is connected both to internal features of the European policy, and to geopolitical situation, including relations of EU with USA and Russia. Secondly, besides security problems in Central Asia the main domains of cooperation between Kazakhstan and Western Europe include economic, trade and investment spheres. The cooperation in these spheres is mainly conducted on bilateral level. Unlike the USA Western European states are guided more not by geopolitical reasons of political involvement in the region, but by pragmatic interests of mutually beneficial economic cooperation with the state having good economic prospects and rich natural resources. Moreover, 2001 crisis brought the issue of stopping of Europes dependence on Arab oil to European agenda. After September 11 a serious search of alternative sources of energy resources have been initiated. Caspian oil seemed to bring good prospects for Europe in this respect. This factor will determine the development of relations between Kazakhstan and European states and with the EU in general as with political and economic entity. Kazakhstan is in turn interested in attraction of massive European investments to raise national economy. Kazakhstan and Russia Strengthening US positions in Central Asia and activization of relations between Astana and Washington have not resulted in radical change of foreign policy and main priorities of the republic in the period after events September 11th. This fact shows the real balanced approach of foreign policy of Kazakhstan based on the multivector principle. On the one hand, the multivector approach of Kazakhstan brings certain costs. It creates difficulties for making concrete decisions on issues facing the republic. On the other hand, the multivector approach is justified in view of geopolitical position of Kazakhstan between large regional powers Russia and China. In such situation Kazakhstan has no other alternative as to support and develop relations both with the world powers, and with neighbors. Relations RK with such states as Russia, China, Central Asian states have a strategic character which objectively can not be put under doubt. Now it is possible to ascertain, that as the result of geopolitical situation changes in the region Astana has not moved away from Moscow. Relations of Kazakhstan with Russia continue to develop both on bilateral, and multilateral basis. During the period from the end of 2001 till the beginning of 2002 such issues as security in Central Asia, common attitude to the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, creation of allies military bases in the region became important issues on the agenda of political relations between RK and the Russian Federation. After some days after the events of September 11 President N. Nazarbayev met with the Russian Federation Security Council secretary V. Rushailo in Almaty. The sides agreed to organize exchange of information between security structures of two countries concerning US military operation in Afghanistan. Practical measures on international terrorism combating, in particular the issue of possible realization of collective rapid reaction forces doctrines, were discussed during negotiations. 462

President RK N. Nazarbayev and the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin regularly exchanged opinions concerning the situation in Afghanistan, the ways of achievement of national reconciliation in this country, joint cooperation to struggle against terrorism, liquidations of terrorist bases and the centers of drugs manufacture in Afghanistan. Besides bilateral contacts the leaders of two countries actively used multilateral mechanisms. In 2002 N. Nazarbayev and V. Putin met within the framework of CST (May), Eurasian Economic Community (May), CICA (June) and SCO (June). Cooperation was not limited to security issues. The final arrangement on the delimitation of a shelf in the northern part of Caspian Sea between Kazakhstan and Russia was achieved and the appropriate agreement was ratified. It meant, that positions of both states on the Caspian problem coincided. Kazakhstan took part in the naval maneuvers carried out by Russia on the Caspian Sea in summer 2002. Thus, during the period after events September 11th the Kazakhstan-Russian relations dynamically continued to develop in sphere of security and other important issues. Both states have shown readiness for co operation. Actually, the foreign policy of RK toward Russia is based on the factor, that the Russian Federation represents the major partner for Kazakhstan in all areas of cooperation. Kazakhstan and China One of the priority directions of foreign policy of Kazakhstan is cooperation with the Peoples Republic of China. In the post-September period both states actively continued to cooperate in economic and political spheres. It was proved by the visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Tokayev to Beijing in May of 2002. This visit besides the preparation of CICA and SCO summits was intended to intensify the cooperation of two countries and reveal new directions in trade and economic spheres. In the conditions of the aggravation of threats of terrorism and extremism Kazakhstan and China actively continued to contact on bilateral and multilateral level in the frameworks of SCO and CICA. Beijing rendered necessary political support in holding the first summit of CICA in June of 2002. Nevertheless, there is still a number of unsettled issues between two countries the decision of which is one of the important tasks of foreign policy of Kazakhstan. One of them is the issue of trans-border rivers. China, lucking sufficient water resources, carries out significant water-fence from trans-border rivers running to Kazakhstan and Russia, for its industrial needs. It directly infringes the interests of Kazakhstan. Firstly, it deteriorates the water problem in the Central Asian region, very seriously suffering from water resources shortage. Secondly, the possible increase of water-fence can have negative consequences for economy of Kazakhstan, undermining the work of industrial plants of the republic. National agrarian and fish sectors can be threatened as well. Thirdly, the Chinese irrigation projects can deteriorate the ecological situation not only in Xinjiang, but also in the nearby countries. In particular, the ecological balance in Zaisan lake area in Eastern Kazakhstan will be disturbed. There is also a threat of shallowing and salting of Balkhash, and it will in turn be reflected in climatic balance of all southeastern and central parts of Kazakhstan. Consequences can be similar to the consequences of Aral Sea shallowing. Epidemiological conditions in many regions can be worsened in connection with the reduction of stocks of drinking water. Thus, the water problem is one of the factors of security in the region, therefore its solving is extremely important for maintenance of stability and economic growth of Kazakhstan. The realization of all subsequent irrigation projects of China will depend on how the national interests of Kazakhstan in settling the problem of use of transborder rivers Irtysh and Ili. The decision of this problem will testify to certain extent success or failure of foreign policy of Kazakhstan toward China in the middle-term. Kazakhstan and regional security organizations CICA One of the important foreign steps of Kazakhstan in the period after September events is holding the first summit of the heads of CICA member-states on June 4-6, 2002 in Almaty. 16 members of CICA took part in the summit, the majority of which were represented on the highest level. Representatives of the United Nations, OSCE, League of Arab States (LAS), as well as the representatives of states-observers were invited to this event. The summit resulted in signing of two documents: Almaty Act 463

and CICA Declaration on eliminating terrorism and promoting dialogue between civilizations. CICA Declaration became the actual document in terms of struggle against terrorism and reflected the current situation in the world in this sphere. The document expressed a view of the Asian states on the problem of combating terrorism. In general, the documents created a basis for further development of the idea of Asian security system initiated by Kazakhstan. The CICA summit was held in turbulent time when the Middle East and India-Pakistan conflicts became aggravated. Holding this summit in the period when there was a real threat to regional and international security became an actual and duly event. Though the participants of Almaty meeting could not manage to achieve any reconciliation between India and Pakistan, CICA served as a good forum for the establishment of more confident relations between the states of Asia. The first steps of CICA in solving security issues promote overcoming such barriers as mistrust and suspiciousness between the states by means of dialogue. On the one hand, the maintenance of cooperation through dialogue and interaction, and promoting trustful inter-state relations in solving important problems of regional and global character is a direct task of CICA meeting. On the other hand, the meeting is limited in practical decision of the important problems on multilateral level. Geographical scope of CICA members is very wide and there is a lot of work for the foreign department of Kazakhstan in searching the common grounds for diverse national interests of member-states. Now CICA is not a real mechanism of regional security maintenance in Asia and it can play only supplementary role to other institutes providing security in CA. Nevertheless, for Kazakhstan the realization of such large-scale international forum helps to strengthen positions of the country and increase the authority of the republic on an international arena, that in turn raises credit trust to Kazakhstan not only as to the stable state, but also as to the state open for cooperation and dialogue in various spheres. CIS As well as in the previous years, Kazakhstan actively continued to participate in the work of CIS. The meeting of heads of the CIS governments was held at the end of September 2001 in Moscow. The issues of combating terrorism, tasks of the CIS Antiterrorist Center were discussed. The regular informal meeting of presidents of eleven countries of CIS was held in the beginning of March 2002 in Almaty. The agenda of the summit was headed by questions of elaboration of common position of the Commonwealth in conditions of the changed geopolitical situation, realization of antiterrorist operation and struggle against international terrorism. Thus, the CIS members declared the support of antiterrorist operation, but that was only a declaration. In the new geopolitical conditions the multilateral mechanism of the CIS/CST was not fully claimed. During all meetings CIS member-states preferred bilateral character of negotiations due probably to the existence of various disagreements between the members of Commonwealth. For the period of more than ten years of its existence the Commonwealth has undergone strong changes during which the value of this international organization for its participants was gradually reduced. In spite of the fact that CIS member-states created an expanse treaty-legal base and attempted to join their efforts in struggling international terrorism through the establishing Antiterrorist Center, the Commonwealth still remains not efficient enough. If in the second half of 1990-s the CIS was unable to resist to the centrifugal forces and to become an effective organization, while at the end of 1990 the beginning of 2000 various foreign and geopolitical priorities of its participants became more obvious. Nevertheless, the main historical merit of the CIS is that it helped to carry out the civilized divorce of the former Soviet republics, to keep economic relations at the first stage between them and to prevent the interstate conflicts. CST (Collective Security Treaty) The Collective Security Treaty was signed with the purpose of formation of military and political alliance of the CIS countries in the long term. An extensive treaty and legal base was created, however real practical actions in the framework of CST were not observed. If in first half of 1990-s the post-Soviet states did not face serious threats to national security, while in the second half, when regional and local conflicts in the post-Soviet Tajikistan, Caucasus, Pridnestrovie broke out, CST has shown its inefficiency to cope with 464

emerged threats. The organization proved to be insufficiently capable to carry out peace-making operations, to promote preventive policy and to liquidate conflicts. Nevertheless, in new changed geopolitical environment the CST members have made a number of steps in terrorism struggling in 2001-2002. Even before the events of September 11th the members of CST tried to undertake the actions to cope with the threat on southern boundaries of Central Asia. At the Erevan summit, held in May, 2001, the decision on the creation collective forces of rapid deployment (CFRD) of Central Asian region was made. Primary goals of CFRD are fighting with external military aggression and realization of joint anti-terrorist operations. After the September events president N. Nazarbayev met in November of 2001 with the Secretary General of the CST Council V. Nikolaenko. Such issues as strengthening security, military-technical cooperation between CST member-states, interactions with the international antiterrorist coalition, joint efforts in settling the situation in Afghanistan and assistance for the creation there of a government friendly to the world community were discussed during the meeting. The Kazakhstan side informed, that special documents promoting blocking of financial flow of terrorists and channels of illegal arms traffic in the region were accepted at the level of state organs of the republic. Thus, CST reacted to September events by acceptance of some decisions and arrangements aimed to adapt the organization to new geopolitical environment and to increase considerably the efficiency of CST. Nevertheless, cooperation in the framework of CST has not been completely realized its potential yet. Prospects of the organization remain unclear due to the existence of some problems of objective and subjective character. First, certain barriers on the way to military cooperation arise on the part of bureaucratic systems of CST countries. Many arrangements accepted on the level of Heads of states, today actually are not implemented on the level of executors. Some role in this insufficiency of the Treaty is also played by accepted concept of reforming. Differentiation of subsystems inside the Treaty somewhat influences the integrity of collective security system on the basis of CST. The cooperation within the CST is mainly conducted on the regional subsystems of security, and even on bilateral: Russian Belarus, Russian Armenian, Russian Kazakhstan etc. The Western and Caucasian security systems are initially based on such bilateral relations. Only Central Asian subsystem has some elements of multilateral cooperation. Second, interests and priorities of the Treaty members are frequently inconsistent. This creates a serious barrier on the way to integration in such sensitive area as military sphere. The rigid internal opposition between some members was a principal reason of leaving CST by such states as Uzbekistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1999. For Central Asian member-states of CST, one of the most urgent tasks was the struggle against terrorism and extremism in 2000-2001, while for Belarus and Armenia situating far from Afghanistan this issue was not so important. Third, CST does not possess strong military technical component needed for the establishing militarypolitical block of value. The majority of the Treaty members have unsatisfactory condition of armed forces and military infrastructure. Moreover, being a nucleus of the organization Russia not always capable to compensate military technical weakness of other members. This urged on some members of the organization to find other sources of military and technical assis tance. One of the sphere of cooperation in military sphere with the western countries has become granting by some CST members of their territories and air stations as military bases. Presence of armed forces of an antiterrorist coalition makes problematic the development of CST Rapid Reaction Collective Forces for the nearest future, because they were created with the purpose of removal of threat from Afghanistan. From the strategic point of view the network of NATO military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asian states provides full control above the region and enables operatively to rule the strategic situation that considerably reduces the value of CST in the region. At the same time, despite the existence of some problems, CST continues to develop and still has potential to become an effective military-political organization in the long-term prospect. It will mainly depend on political will of member-states to cooperate actively in facing common threats, readiness for mutually beneficial, effective and constructive forms of cooperation between CST members. 465

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Comparing to CST, SCO looks rather more effective regional organization in security sphere. From the moment of its creation in 1996 SCO has shown the effectiveness solving boundary questions between the state-members. For example, in frameworks SCO of Kazakhstan has finally settled a question on Kazakhstan-Chinese border. Development of the organization proceeded during the late 1990-s and in the beginning of the new century. For the events of September 11 SCO reacted with a joint statement from the September 14, strongly condemning the acts of terrorism. In connection with the events the sides agreed to speed up the creation of regional antiterrorist structure within the frameworks of the organization. An extraordinary meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of SCO member-states was held in January 10, 2002 in Beijing. The sides achieved the unity of opinions on the issue of the settlement in Afghanistan and the quick restoration of its economy, and also expressed the support to the temporary government of Afghanistan led by H.Karzay. Ministers once again discussed the question on creation of antiterrorist structure, which would become the important tool of interaction in the struggle against the international terrorism and extremism. The necessity of strengthening of close cooperation on duly revealing and liquidation of the centers of terrorism were suggested. An important event in the evolution of SCO became a regular summit, held on June 6 of 2002, in Saint Petersburg. The summit resulted in signing three documents: SCO Charter, Agreements on Regional antiterrorist structure and Declaration of Heads of the member-states of the organization. Signing of the main document the SCO Charter has marked complete institutionalization of the organization. On the basis of the signed arrangements the beginning of work SCO Secretariat in Beijing, and the beginning of functioning of Regional antiterrorist structure headquarter in Bishkek are expected. Thus, interaction of Kazakhstan with Russia, Peoples Republic of China, and Central Asian states in new period continued in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation organization as well. However if on the initial stage SCO has shown its effectiveness in solving of some issues, the further prospects of this organization depend on a number of factors. Relations between Russia and China, forming the main axis of the organization, are uncertain. On initial stage of functioning of the organization an obvious rapprochement of Russia and China was observed, while in new strategic environment the tendency of rapprochement of two states to certain extent depends on Russian-American relations. THE CONCLUSION Events of September 11, 2001 have already become a history. Only now scholars in political science and international relations start to acknowledge how serious the geopolitical effect of these events was. In the book we tried to avoid to use cliches and standard arguments of modern concepts, such as for example clash of civilizations. Though, certainly, that deep geopolitical shift which took place during the last year and which we intended to describe in respect to Central Asia, will require a deeper philosophical and conceptual explanation in the future. But already today it is quite obvious, that the geopolitical map of Central Asia has been seriously changed since the collapse of the USSR. This conclusion concerns the roles played by both of leading geopolitical actors, and regional ones. We would not overestimate the fact of American military-political presence in the region, since it is not yet significant from the point of view of military parameters. This fact is important from geopolitical point of view, because the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan and their presence in Central Asia have demonstrated actual military and political potentials and real roles, which other geopolitical actors actually can play. As the result many scholars and policy-makers had to reconsider the role and place of their countries in the Big game in Central Asia. As far as antiterrorist military operation in Afghanistan is concerned there are two main conclusions. The first conclusion lays on the surface and follows from that effect which was produced on world community by practically rapid implementation of the military phase of the operation by the United States. It became clear, that terrorist regime of Taliban actually was extremely fragile, and it was supported not by the Afghani population but mainly from outside. It became obvious for military experts, that the United States have for 466

today the perfect military machine on the planet allowing Washington to promote its national interests and implement its geopolitical strategy. At the same time this operation has marked a new phase in military art development from military-technical, tactical and strategic innovations point of view, in which the leadership of the USA is indisputable. Our second conclusion from the analysis of the situation in Afghanistan shows, that it is impossible to solve difficult social, ethnical and economic problems only by military means. USA and their allies have actually removed the consequence of the Afghan conflict by operation in Afghanistan, but have not touched its deep roots. There are still contradictions in the country, having not once lead to conflicts between political and ethnical groups. Social hopelessness and economic decay present more serious threat, than talibs. The problem of Afghan drugs not only fatally influences the prospects of political settlement and economical stabilization in this country, but also turns the Afghan problem from local level to regional and global ones. It is quite obvious, that all these problems touch the security Central Asian states. Thus, the Afghan conflict is still far from complete settlement. The only positive factor is that all involved sides both great powers, and regional actors are interested in stable peace settlement in Afghanistan and its soon stabilization. However, besides its own acute problems, the situation in Afghanistan in under negative influence of developments in remote regions. In particular, the question is the escalation of tension in the Middle East. As it is known, the development of events during the last 15-20 years have resulted in interconnection of Afghanistan and Middle East: a phenomenon called by the experts from the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London) in the middle of 1990-s as Islamintern, i.e. the formation of the wide-spread international terrorist network under Islamic slogans, has appeared. As a matter of fact, the events of September 11 were also the direct consequence of such course of events. Now the question is, whether the possible military actions of the USA and the West in the Persian gulf and against Iraq will lead to the activization of the armed islamists in Afghanistan? There are all grounds to believe that military organizational bases of talibs are not completely eliminated. Thus we can not exclude a new outburst of military actions, or the beginning of protracted guerrilla war against American and international peace-making forces in Afghanistan. And if the war against Iraq does not affect directly Kazakhstan and all Central Asia, the renewal of military actions in Afghanistan and using in this connection of Central Asian bases and air stations, will lead to involvement of Central Asia to certain extent into a long military conf lict. However, the intensity of possible guerrilla war against Americans in Afghanistan will depend on the policy of the countries directly bordering with Afghanistan and Central Asian region. All these actors have their own interests and perception of geopolitical processes in the region. We shall try to summarize the key parameters, motives and interests of these actors. In the analysis of this changing geopolitical situation in Central Asia we acknowledge that besides the world powers the countries located in the immediate proximity from the region involved into the struggle for influence in the region. Thus we took also into account the fact, that Central Asian countries, at least some of them, are not just passive subjects of world and regional politics, but promote their own national interests. One of such regional actors is Uzbekistan. Before the events of September 11 Uzbekistan represented the most interested country in the region in strengthening national security since its territory was already under attacks of militant extremists. Therefore there was no surprise that Tashkent actively supported the US actions in Afghanistan and deployment of American military bases on Uzbek territory. Natural questions concerning the prospects of further long-term deployment of these bases arise in connection with the policy of Tashkent in the frameworks of Central Asian Economic Community, the CIS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its relations with the neighbors, Russia and China. Practically it is no doubt, that for the sake of security, and also strengthening of the international importance of Uzbekistan, it is interested in preserving the American presence. However, with gradual disappearance of the Afghan factor for the security of Uzbekistan inevitably will face with a question of necessity of its further cooperation with USA in such a form. The American bases in Central Asia can be claimed for Persian Gulf military operation in the short-term. But it is possible, that in the middle- and long-term prospect the USA military presence will be an element of the American Chinese and American Russian relations. Also it is impossible to predict whether positive 467

or negative consequences it will have for these relations, and for the stability in Central Asia. Like Uzbekistan, all other Central Asian states, and may be to a lesser degree Turkmenistan, have obviously benefited from the changed situation in Afghanistan and disappearance of the radical Taliban regime. But each of these countries tried to use this new situation for its own benefit. Kyrghyzstan, alongside with Uzbekistan, became the main place of the USA and the NATO states military presence in the region. All issues relating to the prospects of American military presence in Uzbekistan, to some extent concern this Central Asian republic. However, if geopolitical changes in the region went on the background of a relatively internal stable situation in Uzbekistan, in Kyrghyzstan internal situation was quite opposite. Throughout 2002 the internal political situation in this country was consistently disturbing. Thus, the foreign priority of Bishkek and the destiny of American military bases depend on future destiny and stability of A. Akaevs regime. Thus, for Kyrghyzstan, unlike Uzbekistan, the problem of stability and security has become not external, but internal one. Tajikistan is that state of Central Asia, which recent history is closely connected with the conflict in Afghanistan. Taking into account the links of Dushanbe with the Northern Alliance, it is possible to assert, that Tajikistan (together with Russia) actually represented one of the sides of the conflict, as well as earlier Afghanistan directly and indirectly was the party to Tajik conflict. But the analysis of processes and events inside and around this republic unequivocally does not allow to assert, that after the antiterrorist operation stability here has become stronger. There are still problems of drug trafficking, acute social and economical problems, and particularly fragile internal situation, threatened by the activity of the radical organizations. Turkmenistan due to the subjective and objective reasons stands distinctly from other states of the region. Factors, determining a distinct position of Ashghabad during the antiterrorist operation, are well-known. It is officially declared policy of neutrality, long border with Afghanistan, quite friendly relations with the Taliban regime, moving away from integration processes in Central Asia and the CIS. It is possible to say, that the international positions of Turkmenistan have slightly changed as a result of falling of Taliban. From the geopolitical point of view these changes will affect Turkmenistan when pipelines projects via the territory of Afghanistan will be initiated. At present time it is not clear to what extent the big geopolitical game around Turkmenistans resources depends on durability of Turkmenbashi regime and internal stability in this country. To the number of regional actors of the foreground we have attributed first of all Pakistan and Iran the states directly neighboring with Afghanistan and playing significant role in the development of events in this country. Both sides Islamabad and Teheran are old participants of the Afghan drama: during the Soviet intervention they were on one side of barricades, then, during the civil war and talib governing they supported the opposite sides, and after overthrowing of Taliban again try to play an important role in internal political struggle in Afghanistan. It is natural, that events in Afghanistan touch on Islamabad and Teheran. After the events of September 11 and before the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan Islamabad found itself in extremely difficult situation. Actually, General P. Musharraf had to make a historical choice which would determine the geopolitical destiny of Pakistan for long-term prospect. The decision of Musharraf to support antiterrorist coalition side and to sacrifice of Islamabads client Taliban was a crucial both for Afghanistan, and for Pakistan. Unlike other actors of this geopolitical game, Pakistan has benefited nothing in terms of external security, but has put its internal political stability under the threat. Moreover, its relations with India again deteriorated, having put the traditional contenders on the edge of large scale conflict. From now on the internal stability and security of Pakistan are directly depend on the success or failure of the American policy in global struggle against international terrorism, to be exact, from the developments in Afghanistan itself, and also in the Middle East. The outbreak of the anti-American moods in the region easily can provoke the anti-American Dzhikhad on the part of the islamists in Pakistan. One of direct consequences of changes in the region has become the weakened positions of Pakistan, not allowing to play an independent (without the support of USA) geopolitical role in the region. The role of Iran in geopolitical situation around Central Asia is quite different from the roles of other regional power, because Teheran acts as a regional power simultaneously in several regions of the world: in Afghanistan and Central Asia, on Caucasus and Caspian Sea, in the Middle East and the Islamic World. Thus, the international influence of IRI is seemed bigger than the real geopolitical and military-political opportuni468

ties of Teheran. Unlike Pakistan which in some time unsuccessfully tried to play a certain geopolitical role in Central Asia, the Iranian factor is constant for our region. Iran always will be the direct geographical and geopolitical neighbor of Central Asian, Caspian and the Caucasian states. Understanding of this fact should be the main key in examining relations between IRI and Central Asia. For Central Asian states there are two important moments, besides interests in strengthening trade and economic relations with Iran. First, inevitable process of liberalization and declericalization of the Iran society should be developed in possibly a more stable way and that it should not spill over into confrontation between the reformatory and conservative forces. Second, Central Asian states are interested in soon stabilization of normal political relations between Iran and the West, first of all with USA. This will speed up the implementation of Caspian projects and will positively affect situation in this region of the world in the a whole. Despite of relatively considerable weight of regional actors in Central Asia, the present geopolitics in the region is determined by the great world powers. First of all they are Russia and China, directly neighboring with our region, and also the United States played before a role of investor and remote geopolitical force, but in 2001-02 has turned into a real military-political power in Central Asia as the result of the deployment of the military bases and active involvement into the region. We defined the EU as the geopolitical center of power, though rather conditionally. Indisputable before point of view that Central Asia represents the sphere of the vital interests of Russia was seriously undermined when V. Putin accepted the deployment of military bases of the antiterrorist coalition in the region. But to consider this fact only in terms of weakness of Russia, or its geopolitical retreat, would be too is simplified. In reality we are observing a process, which reference point have become the events of September 11, 2001, and which means gradual movement of Russia towards the West. Considering the foreign policy of Russia from this point of view, it is possible to understand its logics during 2001-2002 years, and to explain all the events in relations between Russia and the West in this period, including the support of the antiterrorist operation by Moscow in Afghanistan, the constrained attitude to the deployment of NATO military bases in Central Asia, the appearance of rigidity elements in relations with Iran on the Caspian Sea, adoption of the United Nations Resolution on Iraq, expansion of the NATO to the East. It should be mentioned, that the rapprochement of Moscow toward the West is not an unilateral process. The support rendered to Russia by Washington and the European countries during the act of terrorism in Moscow in October 2002, and the changed position of the West on the Chechen problem were significant. Understanding of the current political processes taking place between Russia and the West is especially important for Kazakhstan, having traditionally close links in economic, political, social and historical spheres with Russia. Objectively the rapprochement of Russia with the West strengthens the relations between Kazakhstan and the Western countries as well. Anyway, it is impossible nowadays to treat any rapprochement of Kazakhstan with the West in anti-Russian spirit as it was made by some scholars in 90-s. The most difficult task in doing this research was to interpret and understand American policy logics in Central Asia after September 11. Former stereotypes of classical geopolitics made it difficult to give an ob jective analysis of the US strategy. The tone in this direction was given by Z. Brzezinskis book The Grand Chessboard (1997). The very fact of appearance of American soldiers in Central Asia was initially treated as rapid geopolitical strengthening of US positions, threatening the interests of Russia and China etc. But since that time one year has already passed and now it is possible to analyze this situation more sober. Military-air bases of USA and their allies in Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan remain at this stage simply a military-technical element within the framework of the operation in Afghanistan. They had no cardinal influence on the re gional situation and internal political situation in Central Asian countries so far. The only visible change has become the activization of political contacts between the USA and Uzbekistan in the form of numerous visits of the White House and the US Congress representatives to Tashkent. It is necessary to note, that the US policy on Caspian Sea and in Central Asia has not undergone any radical changes. Washington conducts the same strategy, as it was before September 11, promoting its national interests in energy sphere and criticizing Central Asian states for the lack of democracy and human rights violation. To talk about rapidly increased influence of the United States in Central Asia is possible only in terms of existing military, political and economic means which this superpower possess. That is, the USA is 469

potentially capable to intervene actively into regional affairs, blocking the interests of Russia and China, and to create favorable conditions for promoting its policy. Only one thing does not cause any doubts, according to numerous statements of American officials: Central Asia is a zone of US national interests. This statement was also officially confirmed in The National Security Strategy of the USA, published in September 2002. In this book we have made an attempt to review the main directions of US strategy in Central Asia. To summarize briefly all aforesaid, American interests are following: energy resources, geopolitical stability, military security. While the struggle of the White House for democracy and human rights values all over the world is not an end in itself, but, first, the tool of pressure upon different regimes, and second, the reflection of a rather disputable belief of American political elite, that only democratic regimes can provide social stability. All this should be taken into account in the analysis of US strategy in Central Asia. Strategic interests of China in Central Asia are similar to Russian interests. Beijing to not less extent than Moscow is interested in economic cooperation with the states of the region, their natural resources, and keeping stability on the western borders. For those experts, who considered the American military bases in the region as a threat to security of China, that restraint which Beijing showed throughout 2002 should be astonishing. There can be only one explanation: real intersection of geopolitical interests of USA and China and contradictions between them lay far from Central Asia, they are in Asian Pacific Region, in Taiwan strait. China-American relations present so complex structure, in which mutual interests and mutual contradictions are closely interconnected, that geopolitical rivalry between them in Central Asia is only one of many elements. Nevertheless, despite of outward restraint, China looked disturbing about future prospects of Central Asia, not clear position of Russia and destiny of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. To our opinion, Beijing gives excessive value to this organization, considering it as the only way to geopolitical influence on Central Asia and consensus with Moscow. Swift appearance of USA in the region has shown that SCO is a weak geopolitical structure so far. Apparently, Beijing has drawn a conclusion from this experience. But Chinese strategy toward Central Asia, as well as the foreign policy of the country, will be determined by new party leadership. It means, that Beijing will be occupied with the revision and modernization of its foreign policy for some time. Now it is difficult to predict what directions new Chinese leadership will take as prior. But in any case and in spite of the state of Chinese-American or Chinese-Russian relations, the former priorities of Beijing toward Central Asia will be kept. Thus, it is possible to predict that China will remain a stable geo political partner for the countries of the region. Several years ago Europe was considered as the alternative economic and political power to USA, capable to influence the Caspian region and Central Asia. These hopes of the European Union political circles were based on various large projects in Eastern Europe and the CIS, financed by the EU. This case, like the war on Balkans, once again has proved that an economic giant the EU can not be considered as a serious geopolitical power due to the number of objective reasons so far. Claims of European politicians to consider the EU as a geopolitical power, having global influence, are shown by two examples. First is creation of European army and conducting common foreign policy and strategy of the EU. Second, Europe aspires to control energy resources of Central Eurasia, first of all in the Caspian region. The events after September 11 and the operation in Afghanistan have shown illusiveness and untimeliness of such expectations. The contribution of European powers (except the Great Britain) into the military operation was symbolical, and the solidarity with USA rhetorical. The European companies hardly promote their interests in Iran and on the Caspian Sea, but there is no massive inflow of investments from the EU countries so far. The European idea to establish the Pact of stability for the Caspian Sea under the supervision of EU has not been fulfilled. The only tool for European influence in this sphere is European Energy Charter, joined by Kazakhstan several years ago. All this creates reasons for active economic cooperation between EU and Central Asian states. Geographical and economic realities show, that the European market is the most perspective one for the Caspian energy resources. In the whole, the EU is certainly strong stabilizing factor in the world, as it is proved by example of the Middle East. Thus, strengthening of geopolitical positions of EU and increasing its influence on Central Asia through intensification of economic, political and institutional cooperation in the future can be considered as positive process. And we should not forget, that as OSCE members we are regarded in Brus470

sels as a part of European political and civilization space, as an element of Big Europe from Vancouver up to Vladivostok. The Caspian problem deserves to be examined in a separate book. Two large books on the Caspian Sea were published in 2002. One of them was written by our colleagues from KazISS. Nevertheless, we considered it necessary to review briefly the main geopolitical issues, relating to the struggle for Caspian resources, in order to present complete geopolitical picture. The essence of the geopolitical intrigue around the destiny of Caspian oil, is well-known and it is revealed in an answer to the following question: who will control the main pipeline routes connecting the Caspian resources with the potential markets? According to classical geopolitical point of view the one who will hold oil pipelines under control will be considered as a winner. Such approach to a certain extent explains the former persuasive aspiration of Washington to make sure at any cost that pipeline routes are not dependent from Russia and Iran. But it nevertheless does not give a complete picture of the situation. There is no accurate data about Caspian oil resources volumes, real cost of their exploration and transportation etc., so far. Since the USA are engaged in very complex game in Persian gulf, aimed at radical and long-term decrease in oil prices after getting control in Iraq, it is difficult to predict something about Caspian projects. If world oil prices fall to 16 dollars per barrel and below, the commercial exploration of Caspian oil, including Kazakhstans oil, will be problematic. On the other hand, the USA shows its willingness concerning the resources of the Caspian Sea and other regions of Central Eurasia lately. They intend to transform them into the serious alternative energy sources to Middle East oil for the Western economies. The same position is also occupied by European countries. If the events develop according to this scenario, the geopolitical picture in Central Asia should be stabilized in the long term. This book concludes with the review of the foreign policy of Kazakhstan after the events of September 11. The foreign policy of our state was extremely active during this period. First, Astana has supported the struggle against international terrorism and the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan at once. Since the first days Kazakhstan not only has expressed the solidarity with the USA, suffered from the terrorist attacks, but also the first has agreed to give its air space to the aircrafts of the antiterrorist coalition. This decision had the big political sense and has influenced the foreign policy of RK during the last year. This factor promoted that the problem of security was one of the central issues of foreign policy of Kazakhstan throughout this year. The theme of security in Central Asia was mentioned within the framework of the CIS summit in Almaty, and also summits of Collective Security Treaty and Shanghai Cooperation Organization in which Kazakhstan actively participated. The most significant event in security sphere was the first CICA summit, held in June 2002 in Almaty. Summit of CICA not only has shown the importance of security problems for our region and for Asian continent in general, but also has practically proved, that Kazakhstans initiative, first declared by President N. Nazarbayev ten years ago at the United Nations, has turned into a political reality and an integral part of international relations. Foreign chronicle of RK for the last year shows, that Astana supported intensive relations with all traditional partners in Central Asia, the CIS, Europe, America and Asia. Kazakhstan has kept and further developed the main directions of its multivector foreign policy. The multivector approach of foreign policy of RK has once again confirmed its expediency in complex conditions of international antiterrorist campaign. It is necessary to pay attention to the following aspect of the foreign policy of RK in this period: in spite of the fact that Kazakhstan promoted active cooperation on bilateral level, the importance of regional factor and multilateral level of cooperation has greatly increased in our policy for the last year. The main conclusion, which follows from the analysis of our foreign policy, is that it has kept the balanced and weighed character. The book New challenges and new geopolitics in Central Asia: after September 11 is designed for scholars and wide readership in the way so that not only to go into the peripetias and nuances of geopolitical game around Central Asia, but also to allow them to realize the fragility of such substance as security in our region. Kazakhstan is in rather more favorable position in comparison with its neighbors in the region from the point of view of external security. But national security and stability issues, nevertheless, are actual ones for country. The analysis of complex and contradictory processes in international life and geopolitics after September 11, 2001, into which Kazakhstan and all Central Asia region was involved, only confirms this fact. 471

Notes: 1. Sultanov B. Foreign policy of the republic of Kazakhstan: the basic stages of development. (1991-2001) Kazakhstan and the contemporary world (Almaty). Nr 1, 2001. p. 7 2. Ibid. p 9 3. The collection of documents on the international law. Vol.1. Almaty, 1998. p. 265. 4. The message of the President RK of N. Nazarbayev to the President of USA G. Bush // Kazakhstanskaya pravda. 13.09.2001. 5. The Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan //Kazakhstanskaya pravda. 13.09.2001. 6. The chronicles of foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 2001.Foreign policy and analysis center. Almaty. 2002. 7. Accords will be implemented. // Kazakhstanskaya pravda. January, 25, 2002. 8. Implementing accords. // Kazakhstanskaya pravda. July, 11, 2002. 9. Official visit of the Minister of Defense of Kazakhstan to USA http: // www.khabar.kz/index.php3 proceeds? lang=rus*chapter=1037428422* parent_id=1 003479943*1037428422 10. Laumulin M.T. Asian security and CICA // Kazakhstan and the world community. 1995. Nr 1. p. 40-48. 11. Ashimbaev M., Laumulin M. A difficult way to the regional security // Continent (Almaty). 2002. Nr 10. p. 19-23. 12. Ibid. 13. Extraordinary meeting in Beijing // Kazakhstanskaya pravda. January 10, 2002. ABBREVIATIONS ANZUS Australian, New Zeeland, United States ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations CAEC Central Asian Economic Community CAU Central Asian Union CFSP- Common Foreign and Security Policy CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe EC/EU European Community/European Union EurAsEC Eurasian Economic Community GA UN General Assembly IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IMF International Monetary Fund INF the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty IRI Islamic Republic of Iran KAZBAT Kazakhstan Assault Battalion LAS League of Arab States MFA Ministry of Foreign Affaires NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGOs non-governmental organizations NIS OAS Organization of American States OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PfP NATO Partnership for Peace program PRC Peoples Republic of China SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SC UN Security Council 472

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 . // -Policy (). 2001. 9. . 31-36. . : . : , 2001. 229 . . // - (). 2001. 10. . . 24-45. ., . . : . 2001.- 369 . . // (). 2002. 8. . 17-20. . // (). 2002. 7. . 95-102. . : // v (). 2002. 10. . 59-73. . : // Analytic (). 2001. 3, . 37-41. . // Analytic () 2002. 4. . 22-27. 5 . 17-19. . // Analytic () 2002. 5. . 44-47. . // . . 2001. . 149-152. . ( ) // (). 2002. 5. . 39-44. . : , . : . 1998. . 280 . 10 // (). 2001. 1. . 53-71. ., . // (). 2002. 1. . 118-120. . . // (). 2001. 1. . 113-126. . : // Analytic (). 2002. 3. . 23-24. . . Analytic // Analytic (). 2002. 2. . 3-4. ., . . // (). 2000 . 5. . 123. . . // (). 2002. 1. . 7 14. .. // v (). 2002. 10. . 16-38. ., . : . : -. 2002. 213 . ., . : . 3 . . Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George Marshall Center, 2001. 91 c. . , // (). 2002. 12. . 14-15. . : , , . : . 2002. 200 . ., . // - (). 2002. 2. . 40-43. 478

 . : , , . : , - . 2000. 480 . . : // Analytic (). 2002. 4. . 9-13. . 11 // (). 2002. 4. . 33-44. . . . // - (). 1997. 1-2. .125-144. . . . .: . 2001. 352 . . // (). 2002. 5. . 6-14. . // (). 2002. 8. . 64-68. . // (). 2002. 2. . 16-24. . : // (). 2002. 7. . 112-120. . // (). 2002. 1. . 120-122. . : ? // (). 2002. 3. . 97-108. . . : , 2001. 141 . - . XXI ( ) // - (). 2001. 10. . . 46-66. . . : . 2001. 194 . : . : , 2001. 463 . . : , 2002. 216 . . . // (). 2002. 6. . 117-119. . - : // (). .8. - 2002. .49-52. ., ., . 11 2001 // v (). 2002. 6. . 3-18. . , . , // (). 2001. 9. . 5-11. ., - . : . : . 2000. 34 . ., . // (). 2002. 4. . 45-52. . // (). 2002. 5. . 21-32. . // (). 2001. 20. . 33-35. . : -. 2002. 238 . // . : , . . 2001. 58 . . 11 2001 // v (). 2001. 11. . 3-24. . // (). 2002. 6. . 112-117. 479

 . // Analytic (). 2002. 4. . 28-34. . // (). 2002. 3. . 107-109. . // (). 2002. 24. . 4. . // (). 2002. 6. . 4. . : // (). 2002. 10. . 21-24. . // (). 2002. 4. . 104-110. . ( ) // (). 2001. 11. . 21-24. . : // (). 2002. 3. . 102-107. // . : . 2001. . // (). .8. - 2002. . 36-48. . // . : , 2001. 267 . . : (1991-2001) // (). 2001. 1. . 7-33. .. // Analytic (). 2002. 2. . 11-13. . Step by step // (). 2002. 2. C. 30-31. . // (). 2001. 19. C. 20-22. ., . // (). 2001. 11. . 18-20. . . // (). 2002. 3. . 86-96. . . // (). 2002. 6. . 119-123. . : // Kazakhstan-USA (). 1. 2002. . 8-12. . . // v (). 2002. 3. . 94-107. . // . , 2001. . 11-15. . - // Analytic (). 2001. 4-5. . 59-61. . . // . : , . . 2001. . 37-49. ., . // . : ., . . 2001. . 71-79. ., . // . : , 2001. . 249-266. 480

- . // (). 2002. 4. . 53-57. 11 : . : , 2002. 209 . : . : . 2002. . . : , 2002. 254 . . : // (). 2001. 10. . 75-86. . : // v (). 2002. 10. . 3-15. . // - (). 2001. . 10. . . 88-102. ., . / . : , 2002. 488 . . - // Analytic (). 2002. 3. . 4-8. . // (). 2002. 3. . 99-102. . // (). 2001. 11. . 24-26. . - : // (). 2002. 1. . 27-30.

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The Awakening of Central Asian Islam

IGOR LIPOVSKY Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Jul., 1996), pp. 1-21

During the long years of Soviet rule, the Muslims of the USSR were the silent, submissive face of an Islam whose passivity surprised and disappointed many observers. In comparison with the militant and dynamic Islam of the Third World, Soviet Muslims seemed to have become nothing more than an inert appendage to the ideological apparat of the Communist Party. The USSR had the fifth largest Muslim population after Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh; yet it remained a blank spot on the political map of Islam. It seemed that Soviet ideologues had in fact succeeded in creating their muchproclaimed synthesized 'homo sovieticus', a creature in whom all national and religious bonds had supposedly been eliminated. 'Neglected' Islam first delivered a reminder of its existence in the period of reform initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, when political liberalization led to an increase in religious activity. On the eve of the disintegrationo f the USSR the country's Muslim population numbered 56 million, that is, 20 per cent of the overall population. Almost 70 per cent of all Soviet Muslims lived in Central Asia. Ethnically, an absolute majority of Central Asian Muslims are of Turkic origin, and of the major Central Asian peoples only the Tadjiks are Iranianspeaking. From a chronological point of view, the population of Central Asia was the first of the peoples of the former USSR who are presently Muslim to adopt Islam; they did so during the Arab conquest of the region in the seventh to eighth centuries. The Islamization of Central Asia, however, was completed only later, in the ninth century. Moreover, the Arabs managed to Islamize the local populations using mainly economic rather than military means. From the very beginning Central Asian Islam was distinguished by two features: the large number of pre-Islamic beliefs and cults which made their way into the local variety of Islam; the special role played by the unofficial clergy in the religious life of the region. In Central Asia, as in most Muslim countries, there were for a long time two categories of Muslim clergy. The first category - the official clergy - consisted of clergymen holding an official position sheikhul'islams, kadis, raises, muddarrises, imams, and so on; these were supported by numerous fanatical mullah-bashis (the students of madrasahs), and constituted a highly unified corporation with a strong inf luence over all social groups amongst the population. In Bukhara, for example, even the emir was unable to put his decisions into practice without first receiving the approval of a member of the higher clergy: for this reason the emirs generally tried not to come into conf lict with the official clergy. The Bukhara clergy was always able to count on support from among the large numbers of students of madra sahs - mullahbashis. The latter were also divided into groups, of which there were two main ones. The first group consisted of children of officials from Bukhara and the surroundinga rea;t he second, of those who had come from elsewhere (mainly from Eastern Bukhara). The more important officials usually tried to secure the backing of the muddarrises, in as far as the latter had the support of the mullah-bashi and their authority could be counted on to strengthen the officials' position. At the end of the nineteenth century the city of Bukhara had a population of 80 to 100 thousand, and contained 365 mosques and 103 madrasahs attended by 15 to 20 thousand mullah-bashis.1 The economic inf luence of the Muslim clergy was especially powerful. In the Emirate of Bukhara, for example, at least 25 per cent of all land under cultivation - and in the khanate of Khiva, as much as 40 per cent - belonged to Muslim institutions (waqf ). The Muslim clergy played a less important role only in the Khokand khanate. The second category of Muslim clergy in Central Asia was made up of dervish sheikhs - ishans. The latter took up a position opposed to that of the official clergy, and preached asceticism as well as many beliefs which were animistic or pre-Islamic. The ishans had a broad network of dervish-murid organizations embracing all sections of the population; the more important of these organizations even had the support of the Bukhara emirs and Khiva khans. All these dervish organizations traced their origins back
1 Istoriya tadzhikskogon aroda, vol. 11( Moscow, 1964), p.18 4.

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to the Sufi orders which had spread widely not just in Central Asia, but throughout the Muslim East. Sufi ideology and ritual, as is well-known, had close links with ancient local cults as well as with elements from various philosophical systems (pantheism, in particular). Sufism's syncretist ideology gave its followers the opportunity to accept whatever aspect of the faith most fitted in with their world outlook and level of culture. This explains why Sufism's ideology had equal popularity in Central Asia among both the aristocracy and the simple people. Whilst keeping intact its general content, Sufism subsequently spilt into a number of different orders and branches. The branch with the largestf ollowing on the territoryo f modem Uzbekistanw as the order of Naqshbandi, founded by the Bukharan sufi Bagoutdin Naqshband in the fourteenth century. Also popular - especially in the Fergana Valley - was the order of Kadyr, founded in the twelfth century by Abdulkadyr Gilyani. The order of Kubraviya, named after its founder Nadzhmeddin Kubr (twelfth century) had a particularly strong following in Khorezm. In the north of Uzbekistan the dominant order was that of Yasaviya, founded in the twelfth century by Ahmed Yasevi, who was responsible for spreading Islam amongst the nomads. In the sixteenth century the order of Hodzhagon gained in inf luence in Bukhara; to this order belonged the famous dzhuibar hodzhis, who had strengthened their position during the rule of Abdul-khan of the Sheibanid dynasty, and who preserved their inf luence over the emirs of Bukhara until the very end of the Bukhara emirate. 2 Each of these orders was headed by descendants of its founder ('pirzoda'). Some Sufi communities were headed by ishans who received the right to mentorship ('irshad') either by descent or with the blessing of their own mentor. Everyone entering an order became a Murid, delivering himself wholly into the power of a particulari shan. The muridr enouncedh is own free will, and undertook to keep no secrets from his mentor whilst at the same time keeping the latter's secrets religiously. Murids also engaged to hand over every year a part of their income to their ishan. Notable among the dervish orders of Central Asia was the organization of the begging dervishes - the Kalyandars - who lived on charity. Considering their founder to be Bagoutdin Naqshband, the dervishes of this order set up closed communities in which begging was a hereditary profession providing sufficient income to give the Kalyandar and his family a comfortable existence. Folk legend dates the order's foundation to the eighteenth century, attributing it to a certain sheikh Safa, who lived in Samarkand. The head of the Kalyandars was a descendant of Safa, who called him 'tyurya' or 'Sir'. The CentralA sian Kalyandarsd id not practiset he usual kind of 'zikr', nor did they work themselves up into a condition of ecstasy. In place of the latter rituals, they held, usually in the momings, special prayer gatherings in the house of the tyurya and under his supervision, at which they chanted religious verse and prayers in unison. By the beginning of the twentieth century the link between the dervish organizations and their origi nal Sufi orders was recognizable only with difficulty. Sufism had degenerated into Ishanism, and every ishan of any reputation became in time the founder of a separate order. On the other hand, Ishanism, as a Central Asian variety of Sufism, had absorbed a large number of pre-Islamic beliefs and elements of ancient cults. A typical pre-Islamic belief was the widespread respect which was given to fire. People believed that fire should not be put out by blowing, and that nothing unclean should be poured onto the ashes; at festivals it was the practice to light fires and jump through them (this was regarded as purifying); newly-wed brides were also led around the fire. Traces of ancient beliefs can also be seen in the cosmogonic notions which are to this day common amongst the Tadjiks. Typical are, for example, the notion of thunder as the deity Tundur, who appears in the form of an old man or old woman beating the dust out of his or her fur coat; the idea of the clouds as cows; the idea of the rainbow as Rustam's bow (in Islam the place of the latter was taken by the holy men Hasan and Husayn). Particularly strong was a belief in various magical actions as capable of bringing good to a man or of inf licting harm on his enemy. The cult of mazars or venerable places is widely practised to this day. Such places are generally the tombs of Muslim holy men, but can be other objects which are in some way or otherr emarkable- trees, large stones, caves, springs. One of the most venerable mazars, and one which attracts a large number of pilgrims, is the grave of Kussam ibn Abbas, Muhammad's cousin; situated in Samarkand, this is known
2 Istoriya Uzhekskoy SSR (Tashkent, 1957), p.203.

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as Shahi-Zinda ('Living shah'). According to legend, Kussam ibn Abbas, who had been killed in a fight between the Muslimsa nd the local population,d escendedu ndergroundb earingi n his hands his own severed head. The irrigationd itch f lowing neart he mazari s to this day called Obi-Mashad ('The river of the place of the martyr's death'). Various details in the legend and the place-name point to the cult of the Muslim saint overlaying an older cult - the ancient cult, common in ancient Central Asia, of the god who dies and is born again. One of the most venerable mazars in the city of Bukhara is the mausoleum of Ismail Samanid. According to a popular superstition, the king of Samanid, though dead, continues to engage in state business. There is a specially-made crack in his tomb through which believers post their petitions. No less famous are mazars in other parts of Central Asia - the mausoleumo f Hodji Ahmed Yasavi in Kazakhstana, nd, in Kyrgyzstan,t he Suleyman mountain near the town of Osh. Several mazars are located in the vicinity of healing springs (for example, the mazar of Hazret-Ayub in Jalalabad),o r in areasf avouredw ith an outstandingn aturalc limate (the mazar of Shahimardanin Fergana,f or instance). The keepers of the mazars- called sheikhs - have always lived on the offerings brought by believers who come seeking help. There are particularly many sheikhs in mazars such as Shahi-Zinda. Far from remaining constant, the number of mazars has steadily increaseda s a resulto f the appearanceo f new mazars,i ncludingi n many cases the tombs of famous ishans. The cult of the mazar is deeply rooted in other ancient cults. Many mazars had been places of worship in pre-Islamic times; the legends about them are a complex conglomerate of Muslim and pre-Islamic elements which have intertwined with each other in a whimsical way. In spite of this, veneration for mazars has become a firm part of Central Asian Islam and has the backing of the official clergy. In pre-Soviet and especially in Soviet times only a very few could make the pilgrimage to Mecca (hadj); for this reason up until the 1 970s the Muslim clergy in Central Asia used to recommend that hadj be replaced by visits made to local holy mazars. It is interesting to note that the Muslim Spiritual Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, far from speaking out against the practice of making pilgrimages to mazars, in fact at many such sacred places actually supported people to attend the sites. It is only in recent times, and especially following the break-up of the USSR, that the CentralA sian Muslim religious authoritiesa nd authoritiesa t mosquesh ave started to speak out both against the cult of mazars and against any comparison of visits to local sacred places with the hadj to Mecca. This has a lot to do with the fact that Muslim fundamentalistsw, ho take a confrontationaal ttitudet o the official clergy, have started to make active use of the cult of mazars in order to strengthen their inf luence amongst the population. Central Asian Islam has also taken over the ancient cult of the chiltanis. The latter are anonymous just men who are selected from among the living, forty at a time, and who, whilst continuing their former lives, exert an inf luence on the course of events and save people from disaster. Also Islamized were the ancient Central Asian cults of female divinities; the latter are now well-known as Muslim holy women - Bibi-Seshanbi (Lady Tuesday) and Bibi-Mushkilkusho (Lady Who Resolves Difficulties). Another example of the Islamization of ancient Central Asian cults and rites is the holiday of the vernal equinox - Navruz ('New Day'). This holiday was first celebratedb y Iranian-speakingp eoples in the ninth-tenth centuries BC, and was linked to the solar calendar. The Muslim calendar is lunar. The Arabs who brought Islam to Central Asia very quickly realized the enormous importance of Navruz for the local population, and accordingly gave the holiday their encouragement - whilst imparting to it an Islamic character. The Islamization of Navruz is evident in particular in changes made to the holiday's ritual symbolism: wine, which was disapproved of by the Shariat, was excluded from use at the holiday, as were candles, which symbolized worship of fire. Subsequently,M uslim ideologues hit upon an importantc oincidence:i t so happened that the day marked by Navruz was the day when imam Ali came to power in the Caliphate. Following the establishment of Soviet rule in Central Asia, the communists made frequent attempts to forbid the celebration of Navruz out of fear of its religious character. Popular pressure, however, forced them to back down, and, on the eve of the break-up of the USSR, they went so far as to declare the day a public holiday. At the same time, the local authorities continue even now to underline the holiday's pre-Islamic origins and its traditionala griculturacl haracter. There are very few Shiites in Central Asia; approximate estimates put their numbers at no more than 50-60 thousand. The Shiites started to appear in CentralA sia in the sixteenthc entury,a t the time when 484

the northernp arto f Iran suffered systematic raids. This explains why the first Muslim Shiites appeared in SunniteC entralA sia as prisonerso f war. They were subsequentlyj oined by Shiites from the city of Merv who had been forcibly resettled on Bukharan territoryb y Shah-Muradt,h e emir of Bukhara.I n additiont o such resettlement by force there was also a certain amount of voluntary migration of Shiites from the northern regions of Iran and Afghanistan. A further element in the Shiite population of Central Asia consisted of part of the Pamiran peoples of Badakhshan, who profess an Ismailitic form of Shiism. The Shiites of Central Asia are generally given the name of 'Ironi'. This name is an ethnographic description of the group of which a considerable part was Iranian in origin and which has retained the Shiite faith. Linguistically, the Ironi living in the various parts of Central Asia are divided into Tadjikand Turkic-speaking peoples. The majority of Tadjik-speaking Shiites live in Bukhara, Darvaz, Kulyab, whilst the Turkic-speaking Shiites are to be found in SamarkandD, zhizak and Kamashi. In some cases the old names for certain neighbourhoods serve as an indication of the mixed ethnic origin of the Ironi. In the kishlak of Zirobod, for example - a village whose population is mostly made up of Ironi - the guzar (neighbourhood) of Kypchok takes its name from the kypchaks, immigrants from Afghanistan; whilst the guzar of Buludzh is named after the Beludzhes, who moved here from the town of Kuchan in northern Khorasan. It is worth noting that the ancestors of some of these immigrants (in particular, the Kypchaks, Beludzhes and even the Arabs) were originally Sunnites, but, on settling amongstt he Ironi, where they were surroundedb y a Shiite population, had by the second generation become Shiites. 3 It should be stressed that the Ironi-Shiites in the past settled in concentrated groups, but not in isolation from the surrounding population. Amongst the Shiites there were many craftsmen; and these were linked with the greater part of the Sunnite population (Uzbeks and Tadjiks) by the fact of their shared profession. Also to a large extent responsible for bringing Shiites and Sunnites closer togetherw as the administrativer ole which had been assigned the Ironi in Bukhara from as far back as the rule of the first emirs of the Mangyt dynasty. Under Daniyalbiy (1758-85), for instance, the Shiite Davlet-biy was ap pointed Grand Vizier 'Kushbegi'. The armed guard of the rulers of Bukhara was largely made up of Ironi slaves. During the reign of the last emir of Bukhara not merely the post of Kushbegi, but many other high-ranking posts were filled by Ironi-Shiites. The position of the Shiites in the emirate improved to such an extent that they began to perform their religious rites, or ashuri, not in special rooms ('husaynia' or 'husayniyakhona'), but in the open air outside the city walls. Such a marked strengthening of Shiite inf luence in the emirate of Bukhara earned the displeasure of the Sunnite clergy, and particularly of the large numbers of those studying in the madrasahs (mullah-bashis). This resulted in January 1910 in an explosion of butchery between the Sunnites and Shiites, following which the opponents of the Shiites, headed by Mir-BurkhanuddinB adriddinov, succeeded in removing the Ironi Astanakul from the post of Kushbegi.4 An attempt by the Russian political agent in Bukhara to protect the Shiites from pogroms and to punish the initiators of such pogroms had only short-lived success, and was a factor in the intensification of anti-Russian sentiment amongst the Muslim clergy. In Soviet times the existence of the Ironi-Shiites as a distinct ethnographic and religious group in Central Asia was often ignored; alternatively, the Ironi-Shiites were viewed merely from the point of view of ethnology, namely as Persians (Iranians). For example, in the census of 1959 the Ironi-Shiites were passed over altogether without mention, whilst in that of 1970 they were marked down only as Iranians (Persians). Moreover, the extent of the Ironi-Shiite population was for various reasons played down: the Tadjik-speakingI roni of Bukharaw ere counted as Tadjiks,w hilst the Turkicspeaking Ironi of Samarkand were counted as Uzbeks. 5 Whereas under Soviet rule the activities of official Sunnite Islam were subject to restriction and suppression, the religious life of the Central Asian Shiites was altogether paralyzed. Until the disintegration of the USSR the Shiites had not a single working husayniyakhona. The Ashuri - Shiite mysteries dedicated to memories of the death of Husayn, the son of Ali - were celebrated in secret in people's houses. Following the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978-79, the Soviet authorities began to look with still greater suspicion upon all re3 4 5 Etnicheskie protsessy y natsionalnykh grupp Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana (Moscow, Nauka, 1980), p.203. Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR (Tashkent, 1957), p.314. Vsesoyuznyep erepisi naseleniya, 1959, 1970, 1989

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ligious activity undertakenb y the CentralA sian Shiites, and suppresseds uch activity without hesitation. As a result, the Ironis underwent widespread assimilation, merging more and more, in terms of culture and language, with the surrounding Tadjik and Uzbek populations; mixed marriages between Sunnites and Shiites became common. The break-up of the USSR and the reanimation of religious life amongst the Ironi-Shiites halted the process of loss of religious self-identity amongst this group. The future of the group nevertheless remains unclear. The official Sunnite clergy of Central Asia continues to be highly circumspect in its attitude to the growth of activity amongst the Shiites; the same attitude is shown by the ex-communist leadership of the Central Asian republics. Today, as in the past, the Ironi-Shiites take pains to underline that they are much less fanatical in their performance of religious rites than are the Sunnites. Such assertions, though, could well be taken as exemplifying an article from the Shiite code of behaviour - 'takiya', which permits the Shiite to conceal his faith and refrain from carrying out the instructions of the cult if circumstances call for it. On the other hand, the religious tolerance shown by the Central Asian Shiites could just as well be a consequence of the long time they have spent in separationf rom theirn ative environmenta nd surrounded by people of an alien faith. Understandingt he very small weight possessed by the Shiites amongst the overall Muslim population of Central Asia, the official clergy of Iran prefers not to give them special attention or favour. In the eyes of Iranian fundamentalists, though, the fact that part of the Pamiran peoples in Gomiy Badakhshan (in Tadjikistan) close to the border with Afghanistan are Ismaili Shiites has very real value. Ismailism was an important factor contributing to the isolation of these peoples' ethnical development and was a brake preventing their drawing closer to Tadjik supporters of Sunnism. The interference of the Afghan fundamentalists in the civil war in Tadjikistan (1992-94) greatly accentuated the importance of the Pamiran peoples living on both sides of the Tadjik-Afghan border. The fact that both Tadjik and Afghan Muslim fundamentalists managed to find refuge and support amongst the people of Gorniy Badakhshan is indicative of the important role played by Sunnite and Shiite fundamentalismin this region. Relations with the authorities became a serious problem for the Muslim clergy only with the annexation of Central Asia to Russia in 1864-85; this put Central Asian Muslims under the rule of a non-Muslim secular state for the first time in many centuries. The loss of the almost limitless power which had been enjoyed by the theocratick hanatesa nd the enforced subordinationt o the Russian administrationw as taken very badly by all categories of the Central Asian clergy. It is no coincidence that it was the latter who became Russia's main and most consistent opponent in Central Asia, notwithstanding the extremely cautious policy adoptedb y the Russian administrationw ith regard to Islam and Islamic institutions. It should be noted, however, that in the period between Russia's conquest of Central Asia and the establishment of Soviet rule the position of the Muslim clergy in different parts of the region was by no means identical. Whereas the Khokand khanate suffered liquidation - its entire territoryb eing absorbedb y the new General-Governorshipof Turkestan- the emirate of Bukhara and the Khivan khanate, although subject to large territorial losses, nevertheless managed to retain a degree of independence; under the terms of an agreement signed in 1873 they were placed under the protectorate of Russia. The Russian political agent Lessar, taking the example of Bukhara, described Russian policy in these khanates in the following terms: 'The system we adopt with respect to a khanate is based upon complete noninterference in its internal affairs. Our concern is for the stability of the Bukhara market, as well as for political and strategic goals ... the emir and his officials can do with their people whatever they want. In this way, without expenditure of resources or effort, we get from Bukhara all that we need.'6 Russia's refusal to admit Bukhara into the Russian Empire is to be explained not so much by the desire not to strain relations with England or by a reluctance to take upon itself unwanted expenditure, as by an attempt to use Bukhara's religious authority to strengthen Russian inf luence in neighbouring Muslim countries. Thus the Muslim clergy of Bukhara and Khiva managed on the whole to retaini ts privileges and inf lu ence in those Russianp rotectoratesalthough, of course, this inf luence and these privileges were now by no means unlimited. At the same time, Russia intervened in the religious affairs of the Central Asian khanates only in exceptional circumstances. Following the pogroms against the Shiites in 1910, for ex6 D.I. Logofet, Strana bespraviya (St Petersburg, 1909), p.59.

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ample, those responsible for the troubles were dismissed from their posts and exiled from Bukhara at the request of the Russian political agent. The Muslim clergy in what had been the Khokand khanate found themselves in an altogether different position, being under the constant and direct control of the Russian administration of Turkestan.N ot surprisingly,i t was here, in the FerganaV alley in the 18 80s and 1890s, that the Russians met with the greatest resistance from the Muslim clergy. The latter were generally headed by ishans, that is, by the unofficial section of the local clergy. Many ishans declared themselves the legitimate khans of Khokand and called upon the Muslim faithful to take up arms against 'the infidels'. About 50 such 'khans' were captured. The phenomenon became known as the movement of the 'dzhetim-khans' (false khans). All these incidents were purely local in character and easily suppressed by the Russian administrationR. atherm ore serious were the troubles of 1885 organized by the Dervish-khan, a large landowner and former official of the khanate. He similarly proclaimed himself khan of Khokand, but acted in collaboration with the ishans of Fergana. The largest anti-Russian action organized by the ishans, though, was the Andizhan uprising of 1898. This was led by the ishan of the Naqshbandi order, Muhammad-Ali (Madali), who, having enlisted the support of the Sultan of Turkey, declared jihad against the Russians, but was quickly defeated in a clash with regular Russian forces. With the aim of undermining the economic prospects of Russia's opponents in Central Asia (namely, the Muslim clergy and feudal aristocracy), in 1886 Kaufman, the first Governor- General of Turkestan, initiated a series of radical agrarian reforms. The essence of this openly 'Bolshevik' initiative was that land was to be made the property of those who cultivated it. In this way the local feudal aristocracy and clergy were stripped of 90 per cent of the land they had originally owned.7 This reform did not lead to any increase of warm sentiment towards the Russians, but did significantly weaken the economic inf luence of Russia's opponents. The Russian protectorateso f the emirate of Bukharaa nd the Khivan khanate were not affected by the new measures. The Andizhanu prisingo f 1898 put the Russian administrationo n its guard against the Muslim clergy. As a result, there was an increase in Russian control over religious teaching establishments and over contacts between the Central Asian clergy and Turkey. However, right up to the beginning of the First World War, Central Asia's Muslim clergy preferred to avoid direct confrontation with the Turkestana dministrationT. he Young Turkr evolutiono f 1908-9; the coming to power in Turkey of the pan-Turkic party 'Unity and progress'; the increase of activity at this time amongst the local jadids - all this helped to move the main area of conf lict from the religious and Islamic sphere to the nationalo r pan-Turkico ne. The greatests ourceo f anxiety for the authoritiesa t the time was the activities of Turkish emissaries. 'Here,' wrote the Turkestan Governor-Generatlo the Ministero f War in March 1909, 'there are fanatical preachers of Islam appearing from Arabia .. . agents of the Young Turks'. In 1910 the Governor-Generaol f Turkestana nnouncedt hat merely 'in the first half of this year twice as many preachers of Islam have entered the country as in the whole of 1909'. 8 The First World War complicated relations between the Russian administration and the CentralA sian clergy still more. Turkey's participationi n the war as an opponent of Russia and the defeats suffered by the Russian troops on the German front made the Central Asian Muslim clergy excessively bold. As always, the first to come forward with anti-Russian incitements were the ishans - but on this occasion not merely the ishans of Turkestan, but those of Bukhara and Khiva as well. In February 1915 the famous Bukharan ishan Shayakhsi called upon Muslims to take part in a general uprising against the Russians. Propaganda spread by the ishans played a not insignificant role in the organization of the largest anti-Russian revolt in Central Asia in 1916, in the course of which ishans such as Nazyr-Hadji declared 'ghazawat', or holy war, on Russia. The official Muslim clergy in Tashkent, however, refused to join the revolt (although it did not conceal its sympathy for the rebels). A similar position was taken by the Muslim leaders in Bukhara and Khiva. The February and October revolutions of 1917, which led to the civil war of 1918- 21, created a shortlived political vacuum in Central Asia. This the local Muslim clergy lost no time in exploiting in order to strengthen their position. The imposition of Soviet rule initially in Turkestan, and then in Bukhara
7 8 E. Zelkina, Ocherki po agrarnomu voprosu v Sredney Azii (Moscow, 1930), pp.35-6. Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR (Tashkent, 1957), p.285.

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and Khiva, marked the beginning of an entirely new stage in relations between the authorities and clergy. From this time onward all categories of clergy in all regions of CentralA sia were undert he rigid control of the totalitarianS oviet system. The liberalism and tolerance of the old Russian administrationw as now something that could only be dreamed about. In practice the Marxist- Leninist ideology meant not merely the separation of religion and state and the secularization of all areas of life, but also the public opening of hostilities against Islam, which was now considered an ideological enemy. In this lay the essential difference between the militant atheism of the Communists in Central Asia and the policy of laicism (secularism) followed by the Kemalists in Turkey. At the same time, however, it should be noted that in the initial period of Communist rule (1918-28, approximately) the Communist attitude to Islam was extremely cautious. This is to be explained by the following factors:a n understandingo f the role played by Islam in the lives of the peoples of Central Asia; the rather special attitude to Islam taken by the Communist Party of Turkestan, and the considerable inf luence held by local Muslim Communists; attempts to export the revolution into neighbouring Muslim countries; and the Basmach movement in Central Asia. The second period in relations between Communism and Islam began at the end of the 1920s and lasted until Germany's attack on the USSR in June 1941. This period was characterizedb y total secularizationo f the entire region and by severe suppression of the activities of the Central Asian clergy. Those who suffered most were ishans well-known for anti-Russian agitations in the past. The abrupt hardening of Communist policy was caused both by the consolidation of the Soviet regime in the USSR and by the strengthening positions of Stalin and his group in the Partya nd state apparatusI. n CentralA sia itself, the Basmach movement was almost entirely liquidated (with the exception of regions in South Tadjiki stan), and the local communist parties were 'purged' of Muslims. The attempt to export the revolution to neighbouring countries in the Muslim East was put off until another better time. At the November plenary session of the VCP(b) in 1929, Stalin announced an all-out attack against class enemies in the cities and in the country, whilst proclaiming a new historicals tage in the buildingo f communism.9 Industrializationw ent ahead in the cities of Central Asia; country settlements were plunged into intensive collectivization. The Muslim clergy were viewed by the Communists as a typical class enemy. Some were accordingly repressed; others f led abroad; those who remained were forced to become a submissive instrument in the handso f the Soviet authorities.T he position of the Muslim clergy deteriorated still further when, in the middle of the 1930s, Stalin put forward his new conception of intensified class struggle as a means of advancing towards socialism; this conception was to become the theoretical basis for the mass repressions of 1937. The very fact that by the beginning of the 1940s there were 20 times fewer mosques than there had been before the Revolution (in spite of an increase in the size of the Muslim population) is indication of the extreme persecution which Islam was under (as were all religions in the USSR).10 Only the arrival of the Second World War put a stop to the Soviet authorities' merciless attack on Central Asian Islam. During the war, needing the support of the local population as well as the positive neutrality of neighbouring Muslim countries, the Communist Party relaxed its 'class' policies towards Islam and improved the position of the Muslim clergy. Following the war, the need to restoret he shatterede conomy and the ideological destalinizationo f the time were factors in prolonging the relative lull in relations between the authorities and Islam; this lull lasted until the beginning of the 1960s. The first half of the 1960s, however, were markedb y new attacksf rom the authoritiesattacks which were provoked by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU and its adoption of a programme for building communism. The new ideological principles ruled out peaceful co-existence with any religion, and let alone with a religion so 'backward and reactionary' as Islam. Islam was accused of barbarity, primitivism, anti-modemism, anti-feminism, and of being an impediment to friendship between nations. This period, though, did not last long - only until the middle of the 1960s. Nikita Khruschev's removal from power in 1964 and the appearance of new Muslim allies of the USSR in the Third World, and in particular in the Arab East, caused relations with Islam to take another sharp tum. Out of a desire to make socialism more attractive for the Muslim nations, the Soviet authorities put a halt to open attacks on Islam and the Muslim
9 KPSS v rezolyutsiyakhi rescheniyakhs ezdov, konferentsiy,p lenumov TsK, vol.4 (Moscow, 1970), p.323. 10 M. Rywkin, Russia in Central Asia (New York, 1963), p.91.

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clergy, and began to propagandize a new conception according to which Islam could serve progressive goals just as well as reactionary ones. It goes without saying that the right to evaluate the role played by Islam in various countries was assigned by the Soviet ideologues to themselves. The progressiveness of the Muslim clergy was to be judged on the basis of the latter's political views and attitude to socialism and the USSR. In practice, this conception proved very convenient and was used widely both in home and foreign policy-making until the disintegrationo f the USSR in 1991. The reformsi nitiatedb y Mikhail Gorbachev during the period of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' put an end to atheisticp ropagandaa nd, for the first time in all the years of Soviet rule, gave the Muslim clergy a measure of freedom of action. The subsequent declaration of independence by the Central Asian republics and the latter's solemn announcemento f theirM uslim characters ignalled liberationf or CentralA sian Islam, but not however for the official clergy, who remained under the control of the ex-communist leadership (which was neither as humiliating nor as severe as it had been). The situation of the unofficial Muslim clergy is more complicated. The latter had always been harder for the authorities to control, and were considerably closer than the official clergy to the common people. Today, as in the past, the ishans and those with a claim to the role of the ishans oppose both the authorities and the official clergy; many have adopted positions which are openly fundamentalistT. heir extremismi s to be explained not so much by the inf luence of Iranian and Afghan fundamentalists as by the persecution to which Islam was subject over the course of many years, and by the fact that the official clergy was forcibly controlled by the authorities. Only pressure from the Soviet authorities can explain statements made by the former Head of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, mufti Ziyautdinkhanib n Ishan Babakhan.H e, for example, as sertedt hat 'if a non-Muslim state, whilst guaranteeing Muslims the opportunity to follow the instructions of their religion - as does the Soviet Union, - at the same time helps them to attain modem civilization and free themselves from a condition of political dependencea nd economic backwardnesst, hat state is indeed doing much to fulfil the aims set by Islam.11 Another member of the official Muslim clergy, the imam-khatybo f the principal mosque of Talkhatan-Baba( in the lolotan region of Turkmenistan), went still further during discussion of the draft of the last Soviet constitution. At a crowded meeting of Muslims he declared that 'a very large number of articles in the draft constitution are close to the teaching of the sacred Koran and the utterances of the prophet Muhammad.W e wholly and entirely approvet his draft.12 The Soviet authorities demanded support from the higher clergy not only in internal, but in foreign affairs as well. In an interview with Soviet journalists on 11 January 1980 the abovementioned Sheikh Babakhan declared that 'today, when imperialists and reactionaries are trying impu dently to interfere in the intemal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Soviet Muslims again want to make clear their brotherly solidarity with the freedom-loving people of Afghanistan and wish the Afghan people much success in converting their ancient country into a modem, independent and prosperous state.13 The loyalty of the official Muslim clergy to the Soviet authorities was noticed also by eminent specialists on Islam in the USSR such as A. Bennigsen and C. Lemercier-Quelquejayw, ho emphasizedt hat not only had no mullah ever challenged the Soviet state, but there had never been any sign of opposition to the regime from the official clergy.14 Notwithstandingt he pronounced dependence of the official Muslim clergy on the Soviet regime, it would be wrong to attribute the clergy's loyalty merely to pressure from the authorities. The enormous advances in economic, social and cultural development amongst the Muslim nations of Central Asia, combined with a standard of living which is higher than in neighbouring Islamic countries, could not fail to exert an inf luence on the region's Muslim clergy. The majority of specialists in the West consider the above to be one of the indisputable merits of the Soviet system.15 Following the declaration of independence by the Central Asian states, the official clergy became an ally of the authorities in the conf lict with the Muslim fundamentalists. Almost all the representa11 12 13 14 15 Courier UNESCO, Sept.-Oct. 1981, p.29. A. Akhmedov,I slam v sovremennoyi deyno-politicheskoyb orbe (Moscow, 1985), p.1 43. Ibid., p. 129. Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe (London, 1975), p.99. H. Carrere dEncausse, Lempire eclate (Paris, 1978), p.278.

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tives of the official clergy have declared themselves opposed to the formation of a party on a religious basis. 'That should not be allowed to happen,' declared, for instance, the mufti of Kazakhstan, Ratbek Nysanbaev. 'We should not forget, when it comes down to it, that religion is an eternal law whereas a party is simply a policy, which is subject to change; it is a sin when politicians want to use Islam for the fulfilment of their own narrowly ambitious goals.16 At the same time attempts to break away from under the control of the authorities are usually unsuccessful. In Uzbekistan, for instance, when mufti Muhammad Sadyk Yusuf, the Head of the Muslim Spiritual Board for Central Asia indulged in criticism of the president Islam Karimov, he was dismissed from the post he held as spiritual head of the Muslims. The mufti was accused of financial misconduct, and his office was searched. In general, the position of the official clergy following the disintegrationo f the USSR has become noticeably more difficult. Previously, the off icial clergy had to reckono nly with the authorities;n ow it has to act whilst keeping an eye open for both the Islamicf undamentalistsa nd the local nationalists.M oreover, as yet its relations with neither group are on a f irm footing. The Muslim fundamentalists and the nationalists accuse the off icial clergy of betraying the ideals of Islam and of complicity with the authorities. Sometimes the verbal warfare between the two parties crosses over into open clashes. At the end of 1991 for instance, Kazakh nationalists seized the residence of the mufti of Kazakhstan, beat up the mufti, and declared that he had been dismissed from his post. Only the interventiono f the authoritiesa nd the arresto f his attackerss aved the mufti from violent reprisals. The events of 1992-95 show that in almost all the Central Asian republics (with the excep tion of Tadjikistan) the ex-communist leadership has more or less succeeded in retaining control even if of a noticeably weaker variety - over the off icial clergy. On the other hand, the off icial clergy itself, having lost some part of its inf luence over the common people as a result of the opposition it faces from the nationalists and Muslim fundamentalists, is in need of the support of the authorities. I'his explains why the Central Asian leaders, for as long as they maintain a f irm hold on the political and economic situation in their countries, will be assured the loyalty of the off icial clergy. At the present time the chief problem confronting both the authorities and the off icial clergy is not their mutual relations with each other, but theiro ppositiont o Muslim fundamentalismI. n the f ight with the latter,t he ruling regimes cannot get by without the off icial clergy, whilst the off icial clergy are unable to face the extremists without help from the authorities. On the other hand, open collaboration with the present authorities involves the risk of sharing the latter's fate in a post-communist Central Asia where the prevailing atmosphere is one of political uncertainty. The revival of Islam in Central Asia began at the end of the 1980s when Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of 'perestroika' and 'glasnost' allowed people in the USSR, for the f irst time in all the years of Soviet r ule, a measure of religious freedonmT. he revival of Muslim religious life saw the immediate emergence of two different directions. The first direction was under the control of both the authorities and the off icial clergy; its visible result was a shar pincrease in the number and level of activity of Muslim institutions. In 1990-91, for example, the number of working mosques alone increased from 160 to 5,000. The building of new mosques and madrasahs was f inanced by Arab countries, and Iran and Turkey, who were competing for the support of the Central Asian Muslims; such operations were carried out legally, for the most part, and without opposition from the authorities. The second - and far more radical - direction in the Muslim renaissance was shaped by the unoff icial Muslim clergy. The latter had been subject to the most intense persecution during the years of Soviet rule, and this had an evident effect on the radicality of their views. From the very beginning, and especially in Tadjikistan and in the Uzbek part of the Fergana Valley, the unoff icial clergy took up fundamentalistp ositions and were hostile to both the ex-communistl eadership and the off icial clergy, whom they accused of collaboration with the authorities. The fundamentalistsim mediatelyb egan to set up, alongside legal institutions, a complex networko f undergroundc ells; these cells allowed them very quickly to escape the controlo f the authorities.B ecause of the existence of this parallel and highly secret network of organizations, subsequent bans on the Islamists' activities proved ineffective.
16 ITAR-TASS, 26 March 1992.

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Officially, the first legal Islamic party was founded a year before the breakup of the USSR, in the summer of 1990, in the city of Astrakhan (Russia). As was the case before the October Revolution (1917), the initiators of the new Islamic party were Tatar Muslim activists. The choice of location for the party was also not accidental: Astrakhan, the capital of the Tatar khanate, was annexed to Russia in the middle of the sixteenth century. The founding congress, attendedb y representativesf rom the majorityo f the Muslim nations of the USSR, announced the formation of the Party of Islamic Renaissance. For political reasons (the Communists were still in power), the compilers of the party's programme limited themselves to a document of great modesty which emphasized that the party's activities were aimed at providing Muslims with the opportunity to live according to the demands of their religion. The unofficial pronouncements of the party's leaders, however, left no doubt that their goal was in fact the creation of an Islamic state, and that they themselves were Muslim fundamentalistsO. n returningt o CentralA sia from the congress in Astrakhan, the members of the new party made attempts to set up regional branches of the party in their own republics, but did not succeed in doing so through legal means. This was not simply because the communist leadership of the Central Asian republics was significantly less democratic than its Russian counterpartT. he local authoritiesu nderstoodv ery well that a liberal attitude towards Islamism, though possible in Russia, could have very dangerous consequences in Muslim Central Asia. For this reason in almost all the Central Asian republics (with the exception of Tadjikistan) the activists of the Party of Islamic Renaissance were forced to conduct their constituent assemblies undergroundI. n Tadjikistan,a s everywhere else in CentralA sia, their applicationf or registrationo f a new partya lso initially met with refusal. However, as it transpired, the position of the Muslim fundamentalists was considerably stronger, and the inf luence of the communist leadership considerably weaker, in this republic than in other Central Asian republics. The unofficial clergy was traditionally very inf luential here, and this played a decisive role in strengthening the position of the extremists. In October 1990 activists of the Party of Islamic Renaissance managed to hold a constituent assembly of the Tadjik branch of the party almost without hindrance, under the eyes of the authorities. Subsequently, it was the Tadjik fundamentalists who were able to exploit best of all the state of shock which overcame the communist leadership following the failure of the coup attempt in August 1991. Their inf luence grew quickly. In October 1991 the official ban on the activities of the Party of Islamic Renaissance in Tadjikistan was revoked, and the party held its first legal congress, attended by 657 delegates representing 20,000 party members.17 In the struggle against the Communists the Tadjik fundamentalists succeeded, as subsequent events were to show, in obtaining the support of both the nationalists and the democrats. Moreover in Tadjikistan, unlike in the other Central Asian republics, the Muslim fundamentalists became the main oppositional force, acting as an organizing focus for weaker anti-Communist groups of a nationalist or democratic character. Attempts by the ex-communist leadership to play along with Islam and find points of compromise agreeable to both sides led to nothing - or rather, as a result of concessions made, only strengthened the hand of the Islamists. As a result, the ex-communists, stripped of ideological and political legitimacy in the eyes of the population, tried to avoid using force and quickly lost control of the situation. In September and October 1992, after receiving a large quantity of armaments from the Afghan mujahidin, the Tadjik Islamists decided openly to seize power. The ex-communists, headed by President Rakhmon Nabiev, turned to Russia with a request for help, but were refused. On 25 October 1992 the Islamists, supported by groups of nationalists and democrats, succeeded, after intense fighting, in seizing the capital of the republic, Dushanbe.N abiev was forced to retire,b ut his supporters,u nwilling to accept his retirement,c ontinuedt o fight. The civil war in Tadjikistana ddedn ew fuel to the old enmity between the north and south of the republic, and brought the interests of the various clans into collision with each other. The northerners, who are distinguishable even by the way they look (having a lighter shade of skin), have always considered themselves superior and, in the past - including during Soviet times - filled the majorityo f administrativep osts. Nabiev, for example, was born in the northern town of Khodzhent (formerly Leninabad). The coalition between the Islamists, nationalists and demo crats was, in the main, a coalition of southerners. During the years of Soviet rule the south of Tadjiki17 Ibid., 21 Jan. 1992

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stan, including the region of Dushanbe, developed at a faster pace than the north, and this led to a breach of the historical equilibrium between the various regions. The southerners demanded greater representation in the organs of power. The regional and clan conf lict was most vividly exemplified in the presidential elections in Tadjikistan in November 1991. The north's candidate was Rakhmon Nabiev, head of the Communist Party of Tadjikistan until 1985; the south was represented by Davlat Khudnazarov, a famous director and a man without either party or religious affiliation who had the support of the Islamists, nationalists and democrats from the south of the country. Thus the fight against the Communists was in fact based on a regional rivalry between north and south. The elections were won by the excommunists from the north: Nabiev received 57 per cent of the votes; Khudnazarov3, 1 per cent. The subse quents hort-livedr evenge of the southern Islamists can hardly be considered a victory for Muslim fundamentalism. Rather, it would be more correct to talk of exploitation of the factor of regional rivalry by the Tadjik Islamists. The latter, however, failed to take account of one very important circumstance: the possibility of a reaction from the ex-communist leaders of other Central Asian republics, and especially of neighbouring Uzbekistan. The victory of the Islamists in Dushanbe delivered a severe fright to Islam Karimov, the Uzbek President, who very rightly feared a domino effect, whereby the fall of secular power in Tadjikistan would bring crashing down post-communist regimes all over Central Asia. An additional concern was that at least 20 per cent of the population of Tadjikistan consisted of Uzbeks. This explains Islam Karimov's decision to send his crack troops to help the northem ex-communists. In this he had the support of the leaders of the other Central Asian republics as well as the tacit assent of Moscow. In December 1992 Uzbek tanks bearing Tadjik f lags took Dushanbe by storm, whilst Uzbek aeroplanes bombed the Islamist bases in the Pamir mountains and Uzbek security forces guarded the new Tadjik government (which was headed by the President of the Supreme Soviet of Tadjikistan, Imamaly Rakhmonov). The Tadjik Islamists and the Afghan mujahidin who supported them were driven from their positions almost everywhere, even in the regions of Kulyab and Kurgan-Tube, where the Islamist opposition had strongholds. Use of the Uzbek army would have been impossible without the assent of the Russian military command, which to this day secretly controls, supplies and trains the armed forces of all the Central Asian states. Russian politicians and military had good reason to fear that the idea of militant fundamentalism would spread throughout Central Asia and head westward from the Urals into Tatarstan, then engaged in a fight for its independence. The option of intervening in events in Tadjikistan was, however, rejected by the new Russian leadership, which had no desire to link itself with the corrupt Communist circles of 'the time of stagnation'. According to the views held by Boris Yeltsin and his team, it was best for democratic Russia to rid itself of the problems caused by its Muslim republics with all possible haste. Moreover, memories of the unsuccessful war against the Muslim fundamentalists in Afghanistan were still painfully fresh. Thus, following consultation with the leaders of the Central Asian republics, a decision was taken to send the Uzbek army into Tadjikistan. The Russian troops in Tadjikistan were given the task of guarding the Russian population, which continued to be responsible for keeping the entire economy of the republic running. For the attempt to establish Islamist fundamentalist rule in Tadjikistan the population of this small republic paid very dearly: there were more than 20,000 deaths; 120,000 Tadjiks f led to Afghanistan; and about half a million people were left homeless. As a result of the war, the Tadjik economy was reduced to a state of complete collapse, and will require many years before it can be restored. Furthermoret, he returno f the ex-communists to power has not stopped the bloodshed in Tadjikistan. Instead of putting down arms after the military defeat they had suffered,t he Tadjikf undamentalistsr etreatedt o Afghanistan, where they receive large-scale support from the Islamic Party of Afghanistan headed by Hekmatyar. Helped by the local population, they mount periodic attacks on the Russian border posts and carry out partisan raids deep into Tadjik territory. Like the Afghan mujahidin, the Tadjik fundamentalists call themselves 'irreconcilable' and have declared that they will continue to fight even if 'the pro-Communist and pro-Russian government gains control over the entiret erritoryo f the republic'.18 A declarationo f this kind can be regarded only as an intention to continue the war from Afghan territory.
18 Ibid., 25 Dec. 1992.

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Following its painful experience in Tadjikistan, the Party of Islamic Renaissance closed down its regional branches in all the Central Asian republics. The Islamic fundamentalistsw ent undergroundA. fter Tadjikistan, their inf luence is strongest in Uzbekistan, particularly in the Fergana Valley. In 199192, for example, Namangan, the largest city in the Fergana Valley, was almost paralyzed by a division of power: whilst the authorities had control of the city's new districts, the older part of the city was ruled by the Islamic fundamentalists; here traditional Muslim law was in force. According to unofficial information, the Uzbek Islamists succeeded in holding their constituenta ssembly undergrounda, nd in 1993 the Uzbek brancho f the Party of Islamic Renaissance numbered around 10,000 members. Uzbek fundamentalist leaders addressed an appeal to the republic's leadership in which they asserted that 'Uzbekistan should be an Islamic state. The Uzbek people has no sympathy for, and no understanding of, Western values, and any politician who takes it into his head to impose these values on the nation's consciousness will be making a big mistake.' The appeal went on to recommend that 'we should follow the example of the Islamic republic of Iran, which has rid itself of the false ideals of the West and gone its own way, paving the way for all other countries in the region'.19 In reply to numerous such appeals from the fundamentalistsI, slam Karimovh as limited himself to the cautious statementt hat 'the fundamentalistsc an profess whatevero pinions they have, but they should not call for changes in the constitutionals tructureo f the republic'. 20 The growing inf luence of militant Islamic fundamentalism, however, combined with the tragic events in Tadjikistan, have forced the ex-communist leadership of Uzbekistan to give up experiments with democracy and tum to a strict authoritarianp olicy with regardt o all opposition to their regime. The 'Islamic spring' which set in in 1990 had by the beginning of 1992 given way to harsh winter. The Islamic Party of Uzbekistan (never registered), the 'Adolat' ('Fairness') movement and other religious organizations were crushed; the leaders of the 'Islamic spring' were put on trial and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. 21 Muslim fundamentalistsw ere not alone in being persecuted;t he same treatmentw as given to members of the democratic and nationalist organizations. These measures, however, have failed to eliminatet he threato f destabilizationp osed by Islamic fundamentalism. Reports by the national security forces paint a threatening picture. Tadjikistan continues to act as a channel through which arms, extremist religious literature, fighters and fundamentalists propagandists f low into Uzbekistan. Tourist, business and even diplomatic channels are widely used for the same purpose. In 1993 alone, more than 50 Islamic emissaries were caught and thrown out of Uzbekistan; several batches of armaments were intercepted; and, not far from Fergana, stores of military supplies were unearthed, together with camps for fighters undergoing special trainingf or an anticipatedI slamic coup. 22 In 199394, in connection with the growth of the Islamic fundamentalistt hreat,s trictc ontrol was placed over the content of sermons in the mosques, and over sources of financial support for priests and religious institutions. All deviations by religious activists from the prescribed rules now end in dismissal or even arrest. Religious activists are forbidden to express their views in the media, to leave the country without special permission, to associate with colleagues from other countries, and so on. Believers now have difficulty in building mosques even with their own money. The Uzbek authorities have tightened up the system by which visas are granted, exercise careful control over all bank, commercial and charitable operations involving companies from Muslim countries, and have closed down all banks suspected of links with Islamic fundamentalisto rganizations. President Karimov considers his greatest achievement to be peace and stability in Uzbekistan. 'We are ready to knock sense into hundreds of troublemakers,' he wamed, 'if the stability of the republic calls for it'. 23 In the opinion of a majority of political observers, Uzbekistan, with its powerful economy and the largest population in Central Asia (21 million), is the key to the whole region. The numerous Uzbek minorities in neighbouring Central Asian republics give Uzbekistan added political pull. Thus, victory for the Islamic fundamentalists in Uzbekistan would mean their accession to power throughout Central Asia - and vice versa. This explains why the openly secularist policy pursued
19 20 21 22 23 Ibid., 1O Jan. 1993. Ibid. S. Peterburgskie vedomosti, 16 Feb.1994, p.4. Ibid. ITAR-TASS, 15 July 1992.

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by the ex-communist leadership of Uzbekistan ensures it the support both of the West and of Russia, drowning out the latter countries' criticism of human rights violations in the republic. The increasing inf luence of Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia forces all political forces in the region - and not merely the ex-communists - to make serious allowance for this factor in their policy-making. It is worth noting that even the President of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev - a democrat dependent on an alliance with the ex-communists - was forced to assure his parliament that 'Kyrgyzstan will be a Muslim state in which Islamic values will prevail over universal human ones.' 24 All the Central Asian republics have officially declared themselves Muslim states, and President Karimov of Uzbekistan, well-known for his uncompromising struggle against Muslim fundamentalism, even found himself having to kneel during an election campaign as a mark of respect to Islam. The Muslim Renaissance in Central Asia has to be perceived as a natural and inevitable phenomenon following the 70 years of Soviet rule. As was only to be expected, attempts to ban Islam, to use it to export revolution or for the purpose of building socialism, have been unsuccessful. The majority of the native population of Central Asia has retained its Muslim faith. Islam represents an integral system of conduct in life which it was beyond the power of the Soviet regime to destroy. It would be more correct to say that the Soviet system came to accept the existence of Islam, whilst Islam adapted itself to suit the dogmas of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The break-up of the USSR in 1991 to a large extent returned Central Asia to the situation it was in before the imposition of Soviet rule. However, just as it is impossible to enter the same river twice, so it is impossible to make any direct comparison between Central Asia in post-communist and pre-Soviet times. The long years of Soviet rule have left a heavy imprint on Central Asian Islam. Muslim religious institutions have suffered worst of all: the number of mosques and madrasahs has decreased by tens, and in some districts by hundreds, of times. A severe blow was delivered to the unofficial Muslim clergy to the ishans, who were notable for their lack of submissiveness to the authorities even in pre-Soviet times. The majority of ishans have shared the fate of members of the Basmach movement. The official clergy had a much easier time. The Soviet regime aimed not to eliminate the official clergy, but to tame it, and in this was largely successful. The sudden increase in Muslim extremism was a direct result of the violence inf licted over many years on the living soul of Islam. This increase was caused not so much by external inf luences - Iranian policy-making or the military aid coming from Afghanistan - as by a reaction among Central Asian Muslims to the militant atheism of the local and Russian communists. The second most important factor was the dramatic weakening of the position of the official Muslim clergy during the years of Soviet rule. All this has led to a situation untypical of the history of Central Asian Islam: the Turkic Sunnite nations, well-known for the moderation of their religious views, have unexpectedly proved a source of large-scales upportf or the Islamic fundamentalistsO. n the otherh and,t here is good reason to suppose that this is only a temporary phenomenon, and that a cautious, controlled de-Sovietization of Central Asia will reduce the inf luence of the fundamentalists- at least in those regions where the Turkicp eoples are in the majority. A lot will depend on an improvement in the position of the official clergy, which has almost always exerted a moderating inf luence on the faithful in times of crisis. Events in Tadjikistana nd in the city of Namangan in Uzbekistan have shown the authorities how important is the development of mutual relations with the unofficial clergy, which tends to have more radical views. In the final analysis, the ability of the ex-communist leadership to preserve economic and political stability in the Central Asian states, even if this is effected by authoritarianm eans, will have a decisive importancef or the future of Islam in Central Asia.

24 Ibid., 10 April 1993.

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Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell
Summary and Recommendations Islamic Radicalism has become a serious problem in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Though these areas are bastions of moderate and traditional Islam and among the most secularized areas of the Muslim world, radicalism has made a forceful comeback in the past two decades. Beginning in the late 1980s, alien Islamic proselytizing has gathered speed across the Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union, and has resulted in the spread of radical ideologies, militancy, and even terrorism. Worst hit have been the Russian North Caucasus and some parts of Central Asia, especially the Ferghana valley shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Patterns of radicalism differ among the regions. In the North Caucasus, a Salafi revival in Dagestan coincided with the brutal war in Chechnya, and contributed to the radicalization of the Chechen resistance and its spread to adjoining republics. Coupled with backfiring Russian centralization efforts, the entire North Caucasus is now on the brink of long-term destabilization. Central Asia, on the other hand, has seen stronger external link, as foreign radical groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al Qaeda have established a presence directly, as in the former, or through local allies, as in the latter. Adding to the problem, these groups in Central Asia have splintered into smaller entities difficult to identify let alone counteract. In Azerbaijan, long spared a significant radical presence, an increase in both Shia and Salafi Sunni radicalism can be observed. The causes of this radicalization are hotly debated. In the west, radicalization is often blamed on the socio-economic crisis, or political repression radicalizing oppositional forces. These explanations are only of limited validity, at best interacting with complex post-Soviet identity crises, personal vendettas, regional rivalries, relative deprivation, and most importantly foreign proselytizing, a factor widely underestimated in the West. To this should be added the criminalization of many of the most notorious militant armed groups, whose involvement in drug trafficking and other organized crime has been well-documented. In the past few years, radical and militant Islamic groups have adapted to the pressure states and the international community have put on them. In the North Caucasus, this has led to the conscious decision to spread the insurgency and activate indigenous sleeper cells across the North Caucasus, and not only as previously limited to Chechnya. The West, without a presence in the North Caucasus, has remained a bystander to these events. The western reaction has been one the one hand understanding for the challenges faced by the Russian government in the region and support for its policies; and on the other mild criticism for its counter-productive centralization policies and repressive rule in the region. Criticism of the brutal conduct of the war in Chechnya and of the poor management of Russias counter-terrorism efforts that have put hundreds of civilians in harms way has been relatively muted. In Central Asia, where the West has had a considerable presence, the reaction has been different. In fact, the West has shown little understanding, let alone support, for the seriousness of the radical and militant challenge faced by Central Asian states. Instead, the west has focused on the governments mismanagement of the situation, while refraining from responding to calls for assistance. This culminated in 2005 following the insurgency and crackdown in Andijan in Uzbekistan, which left several hundred people, mainly civilians, dead. The result of the episode and the mismanagement of the crisis by both the Uzbek and western governments was the loss of western inf luence and presence in Uzbekistan. It is apparent that radical groups now seek to emulate the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, aware of the fact that popular rebellion against authoritarian governments attracts support and not condemnation from the West. Hence, several groups appear to have adapted to this environment and benefited from the breakdown in Uzbekistans relations with the West. In this environment, there are several important implications for the West and the European Union in particular, explored in further detail in this paper: 495

1. Develop skills, especially in the intelligence community, in understanding the ideological framework of the radical and terrorist groups. 2. The radical and externally sponsored Islamic movements and organizations existing in the region offer little hope for a meaningful dialogue. Instead, it is the moderate majority and the secular parts of the population, that should be engaged in dialogue. 3. The West needs to support reform-minded officials within governments, not just anti-government forces. The West needs to find points for collaboration within the governments, to support progressive groups and work toward evolutionary change. 4. The link between drug trafficking and religious extremism is proven beyond doubt, and the majority of demand for drugs arises from EU countries. Lending major financial support to counter-narcotics would hence be a major effort in fighting militancy and terrorism. 5. The EU should promote continental trade across Central Asia and the Caucasus, which would bring new economic opportunities to these populations and reduce the appeal of radicalism. 6. EU educational exchanges should increase, and extended to the provinces, including those experiencing Islamic radical movements. 7. The EU should focus assistance on the delivery of governmental services to deprived areas, and in general, on greater degrees of decentralization and self-government. 8. Further, the EU should treat the issue of support for extremism in Central Asia, including Afghanistan, and the Caucasus as a subject for bilateral discussion with relevant Arab states and Iran. 9. The EU may find it useful to look at the Turkish example, which is relevant to understanding the tension between trying to create a modern and open democratic system and dealing with the threat of fundamentalist and militant Islamic political ideology. To this end, the EU should engage Turkey as it addresses issues of Islamic radicalism in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Muslim Mainstream and Secularism Islamic radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus cannot be divorced from the regions larger religious context or its overall cultural environment. Thus, any measures to combat or limit Islamic radicalism must be evaluated not only in terms of their impact on the Islamists themselves but also on the larger society in which the extremists are a small minority. That larger society is dominated by two currents that would appear to be poles apart: a large Muslim mainstream and a smaller but equally important secular realm. On closer inspection, these two components of the regions culture today turn out to be deeply, even inextricably, intertwined with one another. Indeed, both parties to this interrelationship see their links with the other as a source of strength, not of weakness. Any sound western measures against Islamic radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus must be calculated to strengthen these two elements of the social mainstream and to preserve a harmonious relationship between them, and not alienate them. The Muslim Mainstream Islam is by no means the only religion to have f lourished in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Prior to the Arab invasions of the seventh century, this region was the main locus of Zoroastrianism. This fundamental religion of both East and West gave the world the concepts of both Heaven (paradise) and Hell, and also of saints, and thus directly inspired Judaism, Christianity and Islam itself. Central Asia was also a great center of Buddhism, the region where that faith was consolidated and codified in a way that enabled it to be transmitted to China, Korea, and Japan. Absorbed into this world, Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus took on several distinctive features that long distinguished it from its Arab variant. First, it had a strong and consistent practical streak. The traders who adopted Islam naturally favored the Hanafi school of law, Islams most pragmatic and worldly system of regulating conduct. Second, it possessed a strong analytical streak that interacted easily with classical and secular learning. Thanks to this, Central Asians played an exceptionally powerful role in codifying Islam, with al Bukharis compendium of the sayings of Mohammed remaining the standard text. Third, it was indifferent and even hostile to formalism. When by the eleventh century Arab Islam had gelled into a stultifying array of external rituals, Central Asian Islam reacted by developing the Sufi movements, which rapidly took root also in the Caucasus. 496

Directly inf luenced by Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity, Sufism stressed inner spirituality, mysticism, and the cult of saints. The latter led to an intensive localization of Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus, with shrines to local saints dotting the landscape in a way that aside from South Asia has its closest parallel not in the Muslim world but in Mediterranean Catholicism. Tradition asserts that the relics of Old Testament patriarchs like Solomon and Daniel, the Christian apostle St. Matthew, and many of the founders of Islam itself are all to be found in the region. Whether or not this is true, it has left Muslims there convinced that their region is the heartland of the faith, not a provincial outpost. The one point on which Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus followed the Arabs was its close links to political power. St. Pauls dictum to Render unto Caesar has no meaning for either Arab or Central Asian Islam, which assume instead that the secular powers first responsibility is always to protect the faith. The Secular Strain The rich preexistent culture of Central Asia and the Caucasus adapted Islam as much as it adopted it. In no area was this more evident than in secular learning. Ibn Sina (known to Europe as Avicenna, the founder of modern medicine), al Khorezmi (inventor of algorithms), and many other scientists advanced secular learning, even as they affirmed Islam. This strain died out even before the Mongol conquest but remains a cultural factor to this day, its memory having been reclaimed in Soviet times. Soviet rule in Central Asia and the Caucasus found an Islam that was stagnant, dogmatic, and illiterate, and which had lost contact with its greatest days. The Soviets repressed most Muslim institutions and reduced them to the conduct of life-cycle rituals. Mass Soviet education successfully imposed both literacy and secular western learning on the entire population. By the 1960s one could be Muslim in the sense of practicing birth, marriage, and death rituals, but meanwhile participate fully in the secular world. This was the easier since many of the great thinkers Central Asia gave to the world had practiced the same dualism centuries earlier. It is fair to say that nearly the entire intelligentsia of Central Asia and the Caucasus came to fit this pattern, while the rest of the population absorbed large doses of Soviet popular culture at the expense of a fading knowledge of Islam. Secularism was, and remains, equated with social mobility and modernity. It is also intertwined with western links and orientations, whether via Russia during Soviet times or directly today. At the same time, it was organized around the secular religion of Communism, which was particularly important among the less educated. The erosion of faith in salvation through Marxism-Leninism opened a cultural and psychological gap. Secular parts of the population filled it by looking directly to the West for the first time. The rest of the population tried to follow suit, but at the same time began groping into the regions Muslim heritage for a new base of identity. The states supported both developments simultaneously, seeing them as complementary. Mainstream traditional Muslim practice revived to some extent. As this happened, positive links between Islam and the states were forged anew, using old patterns. Meanwhile, new channels into the broader secular world opened with the help of state support in the form of international scholarships, etc. For a small number of both secular and traditional inhabitants of the region, this new arrangement proved inadequate. Both the modern secular world and the world of traditional Central Asian Islam re mained for them remote and inaccessible. For such people, the present became a very uncomfortable place, for they found themselves unable to move either forward or back. This is the dilemma into which Islamic radicalism imposed itself. Islamic radicalism emerged as a means of filling the psychological gap left by both traditional Islam and secular modernism. Some western analysts and NGOs claim that this gap exists because the governments, especially in Central Asia, are hostile to Islam and because they pursue repressive policies towards the especially pious. Alternatively, they claim that official Islam has sold out to the state and no longer has at heart the interests of true believers. Neither claim is on the mark. Without exception, Central Asian governments support the practice of Islam among their people as it has evolved over the centuries. Their methods vary, and, especially in Turkmenistan, are mixed inextricably with the interests of the state. Yet in their strong opposition to forms of Islam that are deemed irregular, let alone foreign, the secular and religious leaders are at one. Pluralism among religions may be practiced in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and to some extent also in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (but definitely not in Turkmenistan), but pluralism within Islam is all but nonexistent, with the partial exceptions of Azerbaijan, with its coexistence of Shia and 497

Sunni currents, and Tajikistan, where Sunni and Ismailis coexist. The greatest danger to the faith is from being smothered by the states embrace rather than being ignored by civil authorities. And the subservient relation between the local religious elites (Muftis, etc.) and governments differs little from what existed prior to Russian colonization. Indeed, the shared hostility of religious and secular leaders to all nontraditional forms of Islam is virtually identical to the hostility that the regions emirs and muftis showed to religious deviants over the past five centuries. Significantly, this stance today enjoys the strong support of the vast majority of the regions population, just as it did in 1800, or 1500. Islamic radicalism, in short, presents genuine and serious dangers to the societies of Central Asia and the Caucasus but nowhere is it likely to become a mass movement. It is significant that no election or authoritative opinion poll in the region has found more than 5 percent sup port for radical Islamists of any stripe. Currents of Islamic Radicalism in the Region Islamists have long been interested in Central Asia, a historic center of classical Islam located in a region of strategic importance. Yet, they entered the region in significant ways only since the late 1980s, as it had been closed off to the rest of the Islamic world by decades of harsh Soviet rule. As for the Caucasus, the South Caucasus is the only major Shia center in the former Soviet Union, while the Northeastern Caucasus mainly Dagestan has been a center of Sunni activism. Islamic currents in Central Asia and the Caucasus display significant similarities but also important differences. The North Caucasus is a particular case, where the war in Chechnya has been a major incubator of extremism, bringing foreign Islamic volunteers and groups to the region, which pushed parts of the Chechen resistance toward Islamic militancy and terrorism. Geographic Focal Points An Islamic revival has taken place across Central Asia and the Caucasus. This revival represents a natural return to spiritual values following decades of Communist atheism. In turn, the Soviet heritage has survived in the sense of a level of acceptance of secularism that is substantially higher than in most other parts of the Muslim world. Yet the strength of this revival, and in particular signs of Islamic radicalization, have been largely confined to specific localities within this larger region. This has been partly related to differing strength of Islamic tradition, but also to external factors such as foreign proselytizing, and to domestic political and social developments, such as armed conf lict and political systems. In Central Asia, the focus of Islamic revival and of radical groups has been the Ferghana valley, a densely populated and ethnically mainly Uzbek territory divided politically between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The valley has traditionally been a center of Islamic fervor, and was the area where foreign radicals first established a presence. As we will see, though, there are other factors besides tradition at work here. Aside from the Ferghana valley, the main other localities of radicalism have been Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan. The spread of radical Islamic political movement in Tajikistan in the 1980s was very much a result of the growing interaction between Afghanistan and Tajikistan during the Soviet occupation there. Islamic radicalism was the key force behind the resistance to the Soviet occupation, and spread to Tajikistan where important political movements on an Islamic basis emerged. South Kyrgyzstan is exposed to most of the same currents that prevail in neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. By contrast, northern Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have seen considerably lower levels of Islamic activity. Dagestan is probably the most traditionally Islamic area in the Caucasus. This was true in Soviet times and remains the case at present. Indeed, Dagestan was one of the earliest areas to convert to Islam, and Derbent was a major outpost of the early Islamic armies in their struggle with the Khazar state in the North Caspian. Whereas Azerbaijan later came under the Map of the Ferghana Valley inf luence of Shia Islam, Dagestan stayed strongly Sunni. By contrast, Chechnya and Ingushetia were not converted to Islam until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, roughly the time of the conversion to Islam of the northwestern Caucasus. Hence pre-Islamic traditions and pagan beliefs remain stronger in all of these republics than in Dagestan, where Islam took an early hold on society. This has also made Dagestan the most promising area for Islamic proselytism. Salafi movements first came to Dagestan in the late 1980s, and Dagestan in the 498

1990s gradually became a base for Salafi movements. Following the Russian defeat in Chechnya in 1996, radical Islamic groups acquired an ever stronger foothold there as well, greatly inf luencing Chechnyas political development. Only since the onset of second Chechen war did radicalism further spread in a significant manner to the remaining republics of the North Caucasus, taking advantage of the grave socioeconomic problems there and the Russian governments failure to address these problems, enabling these groups to recruit among the disenfranchised youth of the region.1 As for the South Caucasus, three areas of Azerbaijan and one in Georgia have been particularly affected by radicalism. Azerbaijans southern areas around Lenkoran are historically the most fervently Shia regions of the country, and are also the areas where Iranian state-sponsored proselytism has been most active. A resurgence of Shia movements has been observed here, though the radical elements remain relatively weak. In the predominantly Sunni North of Azerbaijan, bordering Dagestan, a parallel growth of Islamic fervor has been observed, inf luenced strongly by Dagestan but also to some extent by Turkish Islamic groups. Finally, in the capital Baku and its surroundings, both Shia and Sunni Islamic activity has grown. As for Georgia, the Pankisi gorge bordering Chechnya was a center of Islamic activity following the renewed Chechen war in 1999, where foreign Chechen as well as Arab movements brief ly prospered. It is notable that radicalism in the South Caucasus has a strong element of contagion from bordering regions. The Origin of Radical Groups The first recent Islamists came to Central Asia in the 1970s. By this time, many of the repressed clergy members had begun to lose contact with the traditional Hanafi school of Islam and began to be inf luenced by Salafi- Wahhabi thought thanks to the initial work of the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, the Muslim Brotherhood. The first Ikhwan group to arrive in Central Asia consisted of an ethnically diverse collection of Muslim students from countries such as Jordan, Iraq and Afghanistan. These students created the Tashkent Group, which sought to establish clandestine cells in Central Asian universities with the goal of recruiting local students into their movement and ultimately establishing an Islamic state. While at first they operated secretly, the Ikhwan and other Islamists began to act more openly as the reforms of perestroika were implemented. They were further emboldened in their openness by the Taliban takeover of neighboring Afghanistan in the 1990s. For most radical Islamists, the main point of entry to the region was the Ferghana Valley, a densely populated area with a traditionally deeply religious population. The valley is shared among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. At first, four radical Islamist groups were active there: Adolat (Justice), Baraka (Blessings), Tauba (Repentance), and Islam Lashkarlari (Warriors of Islam). These groups existed underground during the Soviet period, but emerged in the era of Gorbachevs reforms. Over time, other groups also became active in the region, including Hizb ut-Tahrir and its splinter groups Akramiya and Hizb unNusrat, as well as Uzun Soqol (Long Beards), Tabligh Jamaat, Lashkar-i-Taiba, Hizballah, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Since the operation in Afghanistan following 9/11, the IMU has apparently splintered into additional groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Islamic Movement of Central Asia (IMCA), and the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG). The Turkish Nurcular (followers of light), a less radical group working openly, has also established a presence. In Azerbaijan, radical movements sponsored by Iran and organizations in the Persian Gulf region have led to the growth of Salafi and radical Shia thought, but the growth of clandestine organizations has been controllable. In the North Caucasus, the Islamic groups are less clearly structured in identifiable groups, given their merger with Chechen guerrilla formations. Indeed, the militant element in the Chechen war was grafted upon it by Arab volunteers, most prominently the late Emir Al-Khattab (Samer bin Saleh bin Abdallah al-Sweleim), a Saudi veteran of the wars in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Bosnia who made the Chechen cause his own, while contributing greatly to changing the course of the war from a nationalist to a religious conf lict similarly to what like-minded groups had tried to do in Kosovo in 1998-99. Kosovo, as Chechnya, was predominantly Sufi in tradition, implying a moderate, introspective and tolerant form of Islam that radicals despise. The grafting of the Jihadi element succeeded in the Chechen war but failed
1 For further detail, see the report released in parallel with this paper, Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe, Washington & Uppsala: Silk Road Paper, CACI & SRSP Joint Center, 2006. (www.silkroadstudies.org)

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in Kosovo due to the glaring contrast in international reaction. 2 NATO supported the Kosovo Liberation Armys fight against Serbian oppression, contributing to the movements choice to mainly remain aloof of Islamic radicals courting them. On the other hand, the Chechens were isolated with no external support, leading several important field commanders to gradually embrace the foreign jihadis, in the process marginalizing the moderate, secular-minded Chechen political leadership. In the North Caucasus more generally, the Islamic radicals are organized in the form of small Jamaats or societies, which operate politically and militarily in an undercover fashion. While their methods and strategies may differ, almost all of the groups listed above have as a shared goal the overthrow of the secular government and society and the establishment of an Islamic state, typically a Caliphate. Hizb ut-Tahrir, however, is the only group with a coherent ideology. Neither Osama bin Laden, nor former Taliban leader Mullah Omar, nor IMU leader Tahir Yuldashev has come up with an ideological and theological framework that justifies their actions. Instead, these and other leaders have relied on the comprehensive teachings of Hizb ut-Tahrir which is currently the most popular radical movement in Central Asia. Radical Groups: A Survey The following pages provide a short survey of the radical Islamic groups active in the region. This will include groups across a political spectrum ranging from self-proclaimed peaceful groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tabligh Jemaat, to militant and terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the North Caucasian groups tied to Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev. Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islamiyya (The Islamic Party of Liberation)3 Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) was founded in 1952-1953 by Shaykh Taqiuddin al- Nabhani in Jordanian-ruled East Jerusalem. Its main goal is to recreate the Caliphate, the Islamic state formally brought to an end in 1924 following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Al-Nabhani died in 1977 and was succeeded by Abu Yusuf Abdul Qadim Zallum, another Palestinian cleric who led the movement until his illness and death in 2003. He was succeeded by Ata Ibnu Khaleel Abu Rashta, who previously served as the partys official spokesman in Jordan. Abu Rashta, alias Abu Yasin, is a Palestinian who is believed to have lived most recently in the West Bank. Under his leadership, HT activities have become more aggressive. During fall 2003, the governing body (kiedat) is believed to have instructed members to engage in acts of aggression towards the diplomatic representations of countries that supported the Iraq War. At the same time, members are urged to reach out to the liberal politicians and media, as well as pro-democracy and human rights NGOs to obtain their support in their own freedom agenda. Today HT is active in over 40 countries, with its ideological nerve center in London, and official headquarters in Jordan. Whereas the West has seemingly forgotten the ideological dimension of the war on terror the war of ideas HT is openly discussing how it is engaged in such a war, which is aimed at undermining the legitimacy of both liberal democracy and market economy. Indeed, over the last several years, HTs longstanding vision of creating a global Caliphate has become a mainstream terrorist goal. Although HTs immediate aim is to create a Caliphate somewhere in the Muslim world, ultimately it seeks a global reach. This is evidenced in a 1999 leaf let, which states: In the forthcoming days the Muslims will conquer Rome and the dominion of the [nation] of Muhammad will reach the whole world and the rule of the Muslims will reach as far as the day and night. (Rome is characteristically used to refer to the U.S. in Islamist writings.) HT claims to be non-violent, and this is the basis for its successful aspiration to function legally in western Europe, where only Germany has banned the movement. Yet HT openly acknowledges that violence may eventually be necessary in order to overthrow the regimes standing in the way of the Caliphate. Thus HT cannot be called non-violent; rather, its ideology suggests that it is not using violence yet but will do so when the time is right. HTs decision not to use violence stems from a pragmatic policy, having learned from the experience of other Islamist groups (and most recently from the Georgian and Ukrainian
2 See Brian Glyn Williams, Jihad and Ethnicity in Post-Communist Eurasia. On the Trail of Trans-National Islamic Holy Warriors in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Chechnya, and Kosovo, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 2 no. 3-4, March 2003. (www.ethnopolitics.org) 3 For a detailed analysis of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, see Zeyno Baran, Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Islams Political Insurgency, Washington DC: The Nixon Center, 2004. (http://www.nixoncenter.org/Monographs/HizbutahrirIslamsPoliticalInsurgency.pdf).

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revolutions) that the peaceful overthrow of authoritarian or corrupt governments receives international commendation, whereas violence and coup attempts lead to imprisonment or worse. The ideology that forms the basis of HTs work is by no means non-violent. It is viciously anti-Semitic and anti-Western, and disseminates a radical Islamist ideology fundamentally opposed to liberal democracy, the free market, and to Western concepts of freedom more broadly. While HT as an organization does not engage in terrorist activities, it operates as an ideological vanguard that supports and encourages terrorist acts. Furthermore, its members appear to be recruits of movements that do involve in violence. HT calls for the unity of the umma a unity which it seeks to bring about by emulating the steps that the Prophet Muhammad took to establish the original Caliphate. According to al-Nabhani, the Prophets work was performed in clearly defined stages, each of which he used to perform specific clear actions that led, in the end, to the creation of a Sharia-based Islamic government. HT effectively combines MarxistLeninist methodology and Western-style slogans with reactionary Islamist ideology to shape the internal debate within Islam. As an organization, HT also bears striking similarities to the early Bolshevik move ment. Both have an ultimate, utopian political goal (whether true communism or the Caliphate), and both show an intense dislike for liberal democracy, while seeking to establish a mythical just society. Both also function with a secretive cell system. And while it insists on non-violence until the final stage, HT does justify the use of force, just as Lenin and the Bolsheviks did in 1917. In a recent interview, an HT member put the organizations vision succinctly: Islam obliges Muslims to possess power so that they can intimidate I would not say terrorize the enemies of Islam In the beginning the Caliphate would strengthen itself internally and it would not initiate jihad But after that, we would carry Islam as an intellectual call to all the world And we will make people bordering the Caliphate believe in Islam. Only if they refuse, then well ask them to be ruled by Islam And after all discussions and negotiations they still refuse, then the last resort will be a jihad to spread the spirit of Islam and the rule of Islam. This is done in the interests of all people to get them out of darkness and into light.4 Its partly leaf lets, accessible over the Internet in various languages, provide the umma with timely and coherent explanations of current events that fit HTs ideological framework. The language of these leaf lets is simple and direct; for instance, many repeat the call to Muslims to kill Jews wherever you find them. The tight compartmentalization of HT ensures that little information is known about its financial structure. The movements cell structure ensures that data obtained from all but the most senior members is of little importance. Hence Central Asian and Western authorities have been unable to deny the group access to its funding sources. Moreover, HT does not require a great deal of money to sustain its activities. Its ability to create a virtual Islamic community on the Internet has allowed the movement to reach the hearts and minds of many without investing in an elaborate communications network or in party offices. Interviews with arrested HT members indicate that local entrepreneurs, party members and other sympathizers tend to make individual donations to HTs local organs. Meanwhile, more detached businessmen and Islamic charities are most likely to direct their money to HTs leadership committee, which in turn sends money to the movements various regional branches. Funding is essentially drawn from a combination of private donations and the dues of party members. The latter is particularly significant, since in Central Asia each member is obliged to donate between 5 percent and 20 percent of their monthly income to the party. Since 2001, there has been a clear and consistent trend towards the radicalization of HT. In June 2001, the HT publication Al-Waie (Consciousness) stated unequivocally that it is acceptable to carry out suicide attacks with explosive belts. In March 2002, HT argued that suicide bombs in Israel are a legitimate tactic of war. Over the next two years, HT leaf lets and writings continuously emphasized that in the context of a clash of civilizations, offensive jihad against the Americans and the Jewish people is acceptable. It went as far as declaring, in a May 2003 leaf let, that jihad against unbelievers is the only type of jihad. At the time, an HT website displayed an image of American soldiers superimposed over the burning of the twin towers, carrying the legend U.S. Troops: Die Hard. It is yet to be established whether HT has already
4 James Brandon, The Caliphate: One nation, under Allah, with 1.5 billion Muslims, Christian Science Monitor, (10 May 2006)

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formed a militant wing or whether it is simply inspiring members independently to join terrorist groups or engage in terrorist acts. HT has made Central Asia its main battleground. The post-Communist identity crisis there implies a limited popular knowledge of the tenets of traditional Islam, which benefits a radical, unorthodox movement such as HT. Furthermore, poor economic performance by some Central Asian governments has denied them a high level of popular support among people who feel they lack opportunities for socio-economic improvement. HTs public relations campaign has already succeeded in diverting the world communitys attention away from its activities in Uzbekistan. As a result of this propaganda effort, western observers are concerned more with the prison conditions of HT supporters than the possibility of a successful HT coup dtat. Also assisting HTs campaign in Central Asia is the proximity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, two primary bases for terrorists and radical sympathizers. While in principle a centralized movement, HT is known to have splintered, including into specific Central Asian splinter groups. To date, known HT splinter groups include: Palestinian Islamic Jihad ( founded in 1958)Shaykh Assad Bayyoud Tamimi, a former HT member, founded both PIJ and a second splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Organization (also known as the al-Aqsa Battalions), which was created in 1982. PIJ has no known presence in Central Asia or the Caucasus. Al-Muhajiroun (1996)Omar Bakri Muhammad, a former HT member, founded this extremely radi cal organization. Bakri has claimed to be the eyes of Osama bin Laden and reports indicate that communication between the two men dates back at least as far as 1998. Bakri f led London after the July 2005 bombings there. Al-Muhajiroun has no known presence in Central Asia or the Caucasus. Akramiya (1995)Formed in the Uzbekistani section of the Ferghana Valley, it is a group with a primarily local focus (mentioned below). Hizb un-Nusrat (1999)The Party of Assistance (mentioned below). HT material was first brought to Uzbekistan in the late 1970s, but its activities there took shape in earnest only during 1992-1995, in the Ferghana Valley. HT is still most active in the Ferghana Valley, but has successfully spread to the rest of Uzbekistan and to all other Central Asian countries, as well as Azerbaijan. The February 1999 bombings in Tashkent were wrongly attributed to HT, though the charge was later retracted. Yet this sparked the activation of the movement in the region. As a result of the repressive methods used by the authorities in the subsequent crackdown, many HT members left Uzbekistan and moved to more open Central Asian states, thus becoming excellent missionaries for the movement. At first, many settled in the ethnic Uzbek regions of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, but the groups activities have since expanded. Within the last year, Hizb ut-Tahrir members have been arrested in northern Kazakhstan, the Bishkek area of Kyrgyzstan, and in Tajikistans capital of Dushanbe areas that are neither near the border with Uzbekistan nor known for significant Uzbek minority populations. The precise number of Hizb ut-Tahrir members in Central Asia today is difficult to estimate. HT is numerically strongest in Uzbekistan, with estimates there ranging from 7,000 up to 60,000 members. There are 3,000 5,000 members in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The number in Kazakhstan is no more than a few hundred. But numbers are not central to HTs strategy which is based on penetrating political power centers as a method of obtaining power. Recent arrests indicate that support for HT is growing throughout the region, including among teachers, military officers, politicians (especially those whose relatives have been arrested), and other members of the elite. Akramiya Akramiya is named after its leader Akram Yuldashev, born in 1963 in Andijan. Yuldashev is believed to have been a member of HT for one year before founding a splinter group in 1992. He is believed to be profoundly inf luenced by al-Nabhani, and founded Akramiya in his native Andijan region, preaching widely among the youth of the area. He was first arrested in 1993 and later that year received amnesty and was released. Following the bomb attacks in February 1999, he was re-arrested and sentenced to over ten years in prison. In 1992, Yuldashev wrote a theological pamphlet in Uzbek titled Yimonga Yul (The Path to Faith), which aims to call people to Islam. According to Uzbek scholar Bakhtior Babajanov, Yuldashev wrote a 502

supplement (in March 2005) to this more philosophical piece, in which he outlined a fivestage process to establish an Islamic leadership. Those few analysts who have read the supplement believe that Akramiya shares HTs conspiratorial methodology and its multistage process for achieving the ultimate objective of the Caliphate. The aim of Akramiya is to gather enough strength to exert inf luence on regional authorities, if not to control them directly. With this aim in mind, Akramiya promotes a simplified version of Islam, in order to maximize its potential support base. Its structure is communal and cult-like, and members have limited exposure to outsiders. Akramiya seems to have been rather successful in developing a following by delivering on socioeconomic promises that the Uzbek government has been unable to fulfill: jobs and money. Wealthier followers set up small businesses such as bakeries, cafeterias, or shoe factories, in which they employ young males who are then required to attend study groups after work a practice also known from other Islamic movements across the world to recruit followers. The owners of these businesses contribute about a fifth of their profits to a fund, which then assists poorer members of the group. This is one of the most successful examples of the bottom-up approach of pro-Islamic social engineering. Hizb un-Nusrat Hizb un-Nusrat (the Party of Assistance) was founded by a group of HT members in Tashkent in 1999. Its current leader and founder is believed to be Sharipzhon Mirzazhanov. Like HT, this group is fundamentally clandestine in nature, and prospective members must undergo six months of training in The System of Islam, HTs guidebook. Members are also required to donate money to the partys communal fund. Unlike HT, however, this group does not spread propaganda among the general public. Instead, it only recruits those whose backgrounds are first investigated. The group is thus mainly comprised of former members of other Islamic fringe groups, and those accused by Uzbekistans government of engagement in Islamic radical activities. Its supporters also include HT sympathizers who fear public exposure. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) The IMU was formed in 1992 by Tahir Yuldashev, an underground Islamic cleric who operated out of the Otavalihon mosque, in the Namangan region of Uzbekistan. Yuldashevs views were shaped by extensive travel to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, where he was inf luenced by Wahhabism and Deobandism. 5 His radical message spread throughout the network of mosques and madrassas in the Ferghana Valley. With the help of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Harakat-ul-Ansar and al-Jihad, Yuldashev unified the four radical Islamist groups mentioned above (Adolat and Islam Laskarlari, both of which he led, as well as Barak and Tauba), under the framework of the IMU. At first, all four groups consisted of only a few hundred members, but in the absence of decisive action by the Uzbekistani government, they were able to disseminate their propaganda in the Ferghana Valley and recruit many more followers.6 Yuldashevs ally, Juma Khodjiev Namangani, became the military commander of the IMU. Along with a Saudi-trained militant, Abdul Ahad, Namangani was Yuldashevs main supporter. By 1998, there were reports of hundreds of Uzbek mujahidin training in and operating between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, taking advantage of Tajikistans civil war. The first instance of IMU violence occurred in August 1999, whenNamangani and his associates abducted Japanese geologists, along with Kyrgyzstani government officials and military personnel in southern Kyrgyzstan, thus expanding its activity to a third country. The IMU was also believed to be
5 Established in India in the 1860s, the Deobandi school was a purist form of reform within Islam, nominally within the majority and normally tolerant Hanafi school of thought, but with much influence from the rising orthodoxy of Wahhabism in Saudi 6 For further detail on the IMU, see Vitaly Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Spring 2003; Michael Fredholm, Uzbekistan and the Threat from Islamic Extremism, Sandhurst: United Kingdom Royal Military Academy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Report no. K39, March 2003; Ahmed Rashid, Jihad:The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.; Ahmed Rashid, Theyre Only Sleeping Why Militant Islamicists in Central Asia Arent Going to Go Away, The New Yorker, 14 January 2002; Bakhrom Tursunova and Marina Pikulina, Severe Lessons of Batken, Sandhurst: United Kingdom Royal Military Academy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Report no. K28, November 1999; Mahmadamin Mahmadaminov, The Development of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Turkestan), Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, 2003; Richard Weitz, Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)?, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 27 no. 6, 2004, p. 505-530; Svante E. Cornell, Narcotics, Radicalism and Armed Conflict: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Terrorism and Political Violence , vol. 17 no. 3, 2005, 577-597.

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launching carefully orchestrated attacks against Uzbekistan from neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, including the 1999 Tashkent bombings. Soon thereafter, when Namangani declared his aim to seize the region by force, thousands of refugees f led the Ferghana Valley. Namangani then headed for Afghanistan where, with the permission of the Arabia. Like Wahhabism, Deobandi Islam rejects the concept of Ijtehad or interpretation of religious tenets according to context and circumstance. Taliban, he established an IMU training camp. Militants from all over the Ferghana Valley began to f lock to the camp to receive instruction in terrorist tactics, under the guidance of the Taliban. In the only interview he has ever given, Yuldashev declared, The goal of IMU activities is the creation of an Islamic State. We declared a jihad in order to create a religious system and government. We want the model of Islam which is nothing like in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. In late 2001, the IMU joined forces with the Taliban and al-Qaeda against U.S.-led forces during the Afghanistan campaign. After suffering grave losses (including the death of Namangani in Afghanistan), some IMU fighters f led to South Waziristan (a Federally Administered Tribal Area in Pakistans Northwest Frontier Province along the border with Afghanistan), along with other jihadists who also escaped U.S. entrapment at Tora Bora. On orders from Bin Laden, IMU militants have taken a leading role in South Waziristan, with Yuldashev in command of military activities. Since the conclusion of Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMUs infrastructure and manpower has been significantly weakened, but today there are at least 150 IMU militants who still have the capacity to fight. HT and the IMU do not have a formal alliance, as it runs contrary to HTs interests to be directly associated with a terrorist group. The main difference between the two groups is one of focus: The IMU openly advocates and carries out militant operations, while HT concentrates on the ideological battle. The two nonetheless admit to the closeness of their goals, and both are propelled closer to the achievement of their ends by the weakness of Central Asian states. The Islamic Movement of Central Asia (IMCA) Central Asian governments believe that in 2002 the regions Islamic radicals united in a framework of a new underground organization called the Islamic Movement of Central Asia (IMCA), which would bring together the IMU, Kyrgyz and Tajik radicals, and Uighur separatists from China, whose East Turkestan Islamic Movement had recently broadened to include Afghans, Chechens, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Kazakhs who share its new goal of forming an Islamic state in Central Asia. Kyrgyz authorities believe that the IMCA was indeed formed in 2003, with the immediate goal of creating a Caliphate in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, while reserving expansion to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and northwest China for a second stage. The headquarters of IMCA, which is led by Yuldashev, are believed to be located in Afghanistans northeastern Badakhshan province. This unified, militant Islamic force seeks to destabilize Central Asian governments by attacking American and Israeli targets. The main insurgent targets are the American bases in Uzbekistan (now closed) and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the embassies in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. While many other radical Islamist organizations have mushroomed in the region over the last two years, they can all be considered, in one way or another, to be under the IMCA umbrella. Tabligh Jamaat (TJ) TJ was established in India in the 1920s by Maulana Mohammad Ilyas as a direct response to Hindu proselytizing. The group claims to follow the Prophets sunnah (way of life), which to Tabligh members means wearing long beards, robes, and leather shoes to replicate the Prophets dress; the group firmly believes in outwardly showing that one is Muslim. Members are also required to conduct Tabligh, that is, to try and convert others to Islam, on a regular basis. Members can spend this time camping in small groups in order to preach the Prophets way in mosques. In Central Asia, they also preach in bazaars. Today, Tabligh has offices and schools in Canada and the UK, though its main centers are on the Indian subcontinent. Its annual gatherings in India and Pakistan attract hundreds of thousands. Tablighs annual summit in Raiwind is the largest Muslim gathering in the world following the hajj. The group does not involve itself in politics (and has been criticized by radical Islamists for being apolitical), but over time Tabligh has become an international movement, active mostly in South and Central Asia. Tabligh has succeeded in introducing Islamic networks to Europe and the U.S., and often functions 504

in parallel to the Wahhabi Muslim World League. In recent years, like many other Islamic movements, Tabligh has also become radicalized. Consequently, those who learn about Islam via the Tabligh are today at risk of supporting or joining terrorist groups. The group has been accused of having indoctrinated its followers to fight for the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups are believed to have used Tabligh as their cover to travel and smuggle operatives across borders; because the group is apolitical, Tablighs members can fairly easily travel between countries. Other terrorist groups may have used the movement as a recruitment pool; its failure to discuss politics leaves room for others to provide a political message. In Central Asia, Tabligh is currently most active in the Ferghana Valley, especially in Andjian. Following their arrest in the summer of 2004, 14 members of Tabligh were sent to prison. Jeyshullah The Jeyshullah group is a terrorist Salafi group in Azerbaijan. It was mainly active in the late 1990s, reportedly responsible for several murders and an attack against the Hare Krishna societys Baku headquarters. In spite of being Salafi in orientation, the group according to Azerbaijani authorities had clearcontacts with Iran, and potentially is related to a group with the same name that was brief ly active in Turkey in the mid-1990s. Jeyshullah is thought to have planned to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Baku. The groups leaders were apprehended and sentenced in 2000.77 Little more is known about the groups origins and finances. The North Caucasus Militant Network Islamic radical groups in the North Caucasus are somewhat different from those in Central Asia, given the very specific conditions of the region being a part of Russia and a zone of war. The radicalization of parts of the Chechen resistance took place mainly after the first war in Chechnya. The first war had been mainly a nationalist affair, though isolated mujahids made their way there. The first presence of Gulf organizations reportedly took place in 1995, when the Illinois-based Benevolence International Foundation is thought to have established links to the first Islamists in Chechnya. The group was originally devised to channel funds to the Afghan jihad, but later also was heavily involved in Bosnia before it shifted its focus to Chechnya. In 2002 the U.S. government identified it as a funder of terrorism. Unlike in Central Asia, the Islamist movements of the North Caucasus have not developed into clear and visible organizations, but rather as networks of individuals and sub-groups that are known variously under different names. Hence the main radical figures are associated variously with entities that are often known by a variety of names, such as the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, the Riyadus-Salikhin (Garden of Martyrs) Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs; in Dagestan the Sharia Jamaat and in Kabardino-Balkaria Yarmukh.8 These labels are at any rate nevertheless secondary to informal personal and often clan ties and loyalties to charismatic individuals. Hence the amorphous character of the threat they pose, and the ease with which they change shape. For example, the Riyadus-Salikhin group was unknown when it appeared in the siege of a Moscow theater in 2002. The key native figure that came to lead the radicals is the notorious Chechen field commander, former computer engineer and terrorist Shamil Basayev. Alongside Basayev was a Saudi-born veteran of the Afghan, Tajik, and Bosnian wars, Samer Bin Saleh Bin Abdullah Al-Swelim, better known by his nom de guerre, Amir Khattab. Khattab provided the chief linkage between the radicalized parts of the Chechen resistance and the jihadi international, including elements associated with Al Qaeda such as the Benevo lence International Foundation. Yet it should be noted that rather than an organic link between Basayev and Al Qaeda, the North Caucasus radicals have mainly sought to emulate the tactics and language of their more famous role model. Khattab was killed in 2002, and his role was taken over by another Saudi known as Amir Al-Walid (Abd Al-Aziz Bin Ali Bin Said Al Said Al-Ghamdi).9 Walid was in turn killed in April 2004, leaving a vacuum in terms of contacts with the Arab world. This also took place at the time of increasing focus on Iraq by militant Islamic groups, further contributing to pushing Chechen groups into the periphery of the Jihadi international. Basayev and Khattab controlled areas of southeastern Chechnya in
7 8 9 Analyst, Azeri Gods Army Cult Members to Stand Trial for Murder, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 25 July 2000. Gordon M. Hahn, The Rise of Islamist Extremism in Kabardino-Balkariya, Demokratizatsiya, vol. 13 no. 4, 2005, p. 574. Murad Batal Al-Shishani, The Killing of Abu Al-Walid and the Russian Policy in Chechnya, Central Asia-Caucasus 5 May 2004.

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the 1996-99 inter-war period, and worked incessantly to unite Dagestan and Chechnya into a joint, Islamic state on the model of the Imamate of Imam Shamil in the nineteenth century. Hence Basayev organized and led the Islamic Majlis of Chechnya and Dagestan, an organization devised to be the nucleus of the joint state. From there, they invaded mountain areas of Dagestan in September 1999, sparking the second Chechen war. In Dagestan, meanwhile, Salafi Islam had been spreading steadily since the arrival of missionaries there in the late 1980s. Several villages (Chabanmakhi, Karamakhi, and Kadar were seized and controlled by Salafi groups who set up their local laws and denied Russian or Dagestani authorities control.10 Khattab seized on the opportunity by building links through marriage with these jamaats and training young men in camps in Chechnya. Even though the Khattab-Basayev invasion failed and resulted in the debacle of the second Chechen war, Salafi radicals have continued to exist in Dagestan. Indeed, just as Moscow gradually managed to reduce the intensity of the war in Chechnya, the problem has grown worse in Dagestan. The Dagestani rebels are led by Rabbani Khalilov, an ethnic Lak who married into the same Dagestani family in Karamakhi that Khattab had married into. Khalilov is thought to be responsible for a major terrorist attack on a victory parade in the Dagestani city of Kaspiysk in May 2002.11 The group reorganized itself as the Sharia Jamaat in early 2005. Presently, the frequency of military clashes between Islamic fighters and security forces in Dagestan equals or surpasses the number in Chechnya.12 Following the same pattern young men trained in militant camps in Chechnya, who then returned to their home republics militant cells have been formed also in Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia. The Yarmuk group in Kabardino-Balkaria, which was the main responsible group for the carnage in the local capital Nalchik in October 2005. Current Issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus and Implications for Islamic Radicalism If September 11 and its aftermath brought a strong blow to radical Islamists in Central Asia and the Caucasus, this was mainly a lull. Since 2004, a series of events have taken place that indicate that the problem of Islamic radicalism is not going away. However, it is also apparent from these developments that the radical groupings are continuously able to alter their shape, methods and tactics in order to evade attempts by governments to fight them. In this sense, the regions have come to differ. In the North Caucasus, the Chechen rebellion gradually morphed into a region-wide insurgency with Islamist overtones, negating all efforts by Russia to control the situation. In Central Asia, however, Islamists seem to have drawn important lessons from the color revolutions in Eurasia, and the western reaction to them. Uzbekistan, 2004: Terrorism Re-Emerges In light of the inability of Central Asian governments to deal effectively with corruption, poverty, and basic governance issues more than ten years after independence, it is not surprising that the wellorganized and focused ideological work of HT is producing results. Following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the Islamists seem to have decided it is also time for them to rise. Radical Islamist and terrorist activity in Central Asia has increased markedly since early 2004. Having seen no major terrorist activity since 2000, Uzbekistan was hit by two waves of terrorist attacks between March 28 and March 31, including the regions first ever female suicide bombing. The attacks, which caused 47 fatalities in total, were aimed primarily at police and Uzbek private and commercial facilities. A second attack targeted the American and Israeli embassies as well as the prosecutor generals office. The scale and level of preparation for these attacks suggests strongly that they received support from outside Uzbekistan. The countrys chief prosecutor alleged that all 85 individuals (including 17 women) arrested had been trained as suicide bombers.
10 Lorenzo Vidino, The Arab Foreign Fighters and the Sacralization of the Chechen Conflict, AL-Nakhlah, Spring 2006. (Fletcher School Online Journal), p. 4. 11 Paul Tumelty, Chechnya and the Insurgency in Dagestan, Chechnya Weekly, vol. 6 no. 18, 11 May 2005. 12 Murad Batal Al-Shishani, From Grozny To Nalchik: Is the North Caucasus Heading Back to The Nineteenth Century?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 October 2005.

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Yet another group, the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), released a statement claiming responsibility for the Uzbek attacks, which was followed by the U.S. State Departments May 2005 designation of this group (un der ten different names) as a terrorist organization. In the State Departments statement, IJG is described as a splinter of the IMU, and is held responsible for the July 30, 2004 bombing attacks in Tashkent targeting the U.S. and Israeli Embassies, and the office of the Uzbek Prosecutor General. The State Departments designation also called attention to the fact that those arrested in connection with the attacks in Bukhara have testified to the close ties between the IJG leaders and Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Kazakhstani authorities have declared that IJG members were taught by al-Qaida instructors to handle explosives and to organize intelligence work and subversive activities. Despite all this information, most of the attention in the West from the spring of 2004 onwards was on the Uzbek governments reaction and not on the terrorists even though these attacks were the first major violence in Uzbekistan since the 2000 insurgency. And despite being in the midst of the war on terror, the U.S., a self-avowed strategic partner of Uzbekistan, highlighted the need to improve democracy and human rights while doing very little to help the Uzbek government in its investigation or its response to the attacks. Overall, the terrorists were greatly emboldened, concluding that western opinion would allow them literally to get away with murder. The Kyrgyz Revolution, 2005 In November 2004, in Jalal-Abad, where some of the strongest antigovernment protests took place in March 2005, HT reportedly collected some 20,000 signatures on a petition calling for more Islamic instruction in schools and segregation of sexes. In the February 2005 parliamentary elections, candidates who supported this view received backing from HT. While there was almost no overt Islamist activity during the revolution, the events began and gained momentum in the southern part of the country, which is where HT and other groups have, for several years, been urging people to rise against poverty, corruption and injustice all of which were blamed on the central government. Following the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions, opposition forces in the Kyrgyz Republic overthrew their government in March 2005. Unlike the Georgians and the Ukrainians, however, the Kyrgyz opposition used violence, and in the post-revolutionary period failed to bring stability and order to the country. Indeed, the March 24 revolution ushered in a period of chaos, with the new government unable to control the countrys borders or to bring about internal stability. This risks leading to ever deeper popular disappointment with secular politics in Kyrgyzstan. Unless the new government is brought to establish a democratic order and deliver on its promises, HT and others are certain to gain strength from this growing disillusionment. The Wests reaction to the collapse of the Akaev government emboldened the terrorists even further. They drew three key lessons from the experience: First, if a revolt were to be framed the right way, i.e. as another color revolution against an oppressive, corrupt regime, neither the US nor the Europeans would be likely to step in. Second, that the West would, within limits, also tolerate the use of force, as in the Uzbek attacks the preceding years. Third, the radicals found that by using the excitement and anticipation of color revolutions among the Western media and the various democracy and human rights NGOs, they could convince the world that they were the unalloyed champions of human rights and good governance. Andijan, 2005: Insurgency, Crackdown, and the Western Reaction The third significant event of lasting importance to the region took place in Andijan in May 2005. In fact, Andijan may prove to be a turning point in the Wests loss of inf luence in Central Asia and the further strengthening of the radical groups. Andijan is close to Osh, where the Kyrgyz uprising began, and even closer to Jalalabad, where only weeks before the Andijan events the majority Uzbek population successfully laid armed siege to the provincial governments headquarters. It is also close to Namangan, a center of Salafi activity in Uzbekistan. In many ways, Andijan is the heart of the Ferghana Valley, which itself is the heart of Central Asia. Akram Yuldashev realized that Andijan is the first stop along the path to power in Uzbekistan, which is the prize of the Islamists because of its geostrategically central location in Eurasia, and because of its historic and cultural position in the Islamic world. Its under-government and stagnation is also making it an increasingly easy target. In June, 2004, 23 businessmen, followers of Akramiya, were arrested and in February w005 they were put on trial. Peaceful demonstrations in support of the defendants went on for several weeks. Accord507

ing to reports from the region, Akramiya organized the uprising in a carefully planned way: the accused businessmen promised to pay their staff a full days salary if they attended the protests. Moreover, their relatives organized transport for others to come from more distant regions. The protesters were orderly and asking merely for justice for their relatives and friends. By May 12th, the presumed final week of the trial, there were already several thousand peaceful demonstrators. That night, the Uzbek government arrested some demonstrators. This arrest marked the start of the uprising. On the morning of May 13, armed militants first seized a police station, then a military post, and then a high-security prison, collecting weaponry in each place and killing officials and others along the way. Negotiations between the government and the militants broke down, in part because the release of Akram Yuldashev was the main demand of the insurgents. Expecting a harsh reaction from the government, the insurgents then formed human shields with women and children.13 While it is yet to be determined who shot first, by the end of the day, some two hundred persons were dead, most killed by government troops but a large number killed by the armed insurgents. Over a year later, many in the West still do not have a sense of who the insurgents were. In fact, few have shown much interest in the insurgents, and instead blamed only the Karimov regime for conducting what was immediately labeled a massacre of peaceful protestors. As of June 2006, the number of people killed by both sides is still contested, although the Moscow Human Rights organization Memorials estimate that the total was probably around 200 will probably prevail. But Western governments were quick to rush to conclusions, without carefully weighing the evidence and without seeking detailed knowledge of the mode of operation of groups like HT and Akramiya. The Uzbek scholar Bakhtiyor Babajanov (who served as a states witness in the trial) interviewed Yuldashev in November 2005 in his prison cell. During a May 2006 visit to Washington DC, Babajanov stated that Yuldashev had told him that in a March 2005 article published a month and a half before the Andijan attacks, he had claimed that Akramiya was in the process of waging a jihad against the oppressors and infidels and stated that death in the way of Allah is not death but a return to your Lord. There is as yet no independent verification of Babajanovs claim. The planners of the Andijan uprising seem to have waited to initiate it until they felt that the local and international context was right. Specifically, they seemed to have been inspired by the successful Uzbek uprising in alalabad in the Kyrgyz Republic and also by the subsequent breakdown of civil authority there. Following the events in Andijan, western intelligence agencies, governments, and media did a poor job of seeking and weighing the many conf licting strands of evidence left by the events. Most simply rushed to whatever conclusions they were predisposed to reach, attacking those who questioned them. The overall inability of many analysts to understand how Islamic radical groups operate is one of the reasons for why the analysis of the Andijan events has been inadequate. The role of Islamists in the uprising was generally not recognized, in spite of the fact that the organizers of the uprising are recorded as shouting religious slogans. On the other hand, it must be noted that Islamist groups are growing increasingly sophisticated, focusing on secular slogans that are likely to elicit more positive reactions internationally. It is also important to understand the growing role of women in Islamic radicalism. The first suicide killings in Central Asia took place in 2005, and were conducted by women who did not fit the traditional profile of poor, uneducated and repressed. For example, the 19-year old Dilnoza Holmuradova and her 22-year old sister Shahnoza Holmuradova came from a relatively aff luent family in Tashkent and were well-educated.14 Dilnoza reportedly spoke five languages and had attended the police academy. What seems to have turned them into extremists were the people they met. According to an interview with their mother, they began studying Islam in 2002they began to change a great dealstopped wearing modern clothes, listening to music and watching television. They left home in 2004 and soon after carried out their attacks.
13 Margarita Assenova, Uzbekistan is Running Out of Time, Internationale Politik: Transatlantic Edition, Fall 2005. See also Igor Rotar, Uzbekistan: What is Known About Akramia and the Uprising?, Forum 18 News Service, 16 June 2005, including the following quote: The hostages had wire tied round their necks and were placed at the perimeter of the square as human shields. (http://www. forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=586) 14 Uzbekistan: Affluent Suicide Bombers, IWPR, RCA No. 278, (20 April 2004)

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It is likely that at some vulnerable moment these women made contact with Islamists, who in turn inf luenced them ideologically, and led them to become terrorists. In the future, increasing numbers of women may be used in terrorist attacks, since they are harder to profile than men and more likely to slip through security controls. This process has already taken place in the North Caucasus. The Long-term impact of Andjian Sadly, what really happed in Andjian, how many people were killed, and by whom, has lost much of its relevance. Radical Islamist groups have won the information war. While the insurgency was an attempted coup dtat, international media framed the story as the massacre of innocent civilians comparable to the Tiananmen Square incident. Even some Uzbek dissidents in exile have deplored the Wests reaction, and called sanctions counterproductive.15 While many in the West condemned Uzbek President Islam Karimov, leaders from the Muslim world either remained silent, or, in the case of the Great Shaykh of Al-Azhar University, Mohammad Sayed Tantawi, focused on the threat of a radical takeover. He reportedly stated that the methods and tactics used by Andijan extremists resemble acts of terrorism in Egypt in 1974, when commandos of Salah Sirriya, the former chief of the military wing of the Hizb ut-Tahrir division in Egypt, attacked the military technology institute in an effort to obtain enough weaponry for a coup. Russia benefited most from the post-Andjian fallout. Russian government officials have publicly supported the Uzbek government, and declared that the uprising was planned and carried out by foreign groups wanting to overthrow the government. With scant evidence, Russia also backed the governments claims that about 50 foreigners were detained or killed. It also noted the ideological similarities with Chechen terrorist groups, citing the posting on a Chechen website of the IJGs call for jihad. Following his meeting with Putin, in Moscow, shortly afterwards, Karimov said that the attacks were planned from abroad, by mercenaries who were trained at military training camps We have enough facts to prove that the operation was prepared several months and perhaps several years in advance from outside Uzbekistan. Putin backed Karimov and even added that Russians had information that militants had been crossing from Afghanistan into Tajiikistan and Uzbekistan prior to the Andijan uprising. The end result of Andijan is that the U.S. military lost its base in Uzbekistan, a major setback for essential intelligence and counterterrorism work. No less significant, the West lost whatever possibility it previously had to inf luence the Uzbek government to reform or open up the system. Its precipitous condemnation of the governments actions, without corresponding attention to the insurgents, effectively discredited whatever reformist currents had existed earlier within the Uzbek government. Instead, Uzbekistan now leans on Russian and Chinese guidance, which gives carte blanche to the most repressive forces within the Uzbek government. Indeed, the pro-Western liberal forces that had slowly strengthened their positions within the Uzbek elite over that past decade have now been almost completely purged and marginalized. Another consequence of Andijan is the f light of hundreds of people who are seeking refuge in various parts of Central Asia. The question is whether these are all indeed innocent civilians, or whether there are radical Islamists among them, something that interviewers have not been trained to identify. Many of these refugees sought refuge in the Kyrgyz Republic (and some in Tajkistan), as did many Uzbek Islamists, who for years have been f leeing the repression at home to operate in a more open neighboring country. In fact, it is believed that the Central Asian HT leadership is based in the Kyrgyz city of Karasu, which has a large ethnic Uzbek population. There have been numerous reports of Uzbek militants trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan going back to Uzbekistan. The militants are using networks of terrorists, criminals, as well as Islamist sympathizers to cross borders, traveling either via Tajikistan or Iran. Former IMU members have identified Mashhad, Irans second largest city, as the transit center for Uzbek militants. In this context, the May 2006 incursion of militants from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstans Batken region is worrisome. Armed men attacked a border post killing several guards, before seizing a stockpile of weapons and killing additional people while crossing into the Kyrgyz Republic. It is surely not accidental that the site of these events lies astride an important and contested drug route. These events were reminiscent of a January 2006 incident, when militants raided
15 I.e. former Birlik leader Abdumannob Polat, see Sanctions Urged on Uzbekistan, Washington Times, 17 June 2006; Can USUzbekistan Relationship be Saved, Registan.net, http://www.registan.net/?p=6277.

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a Tajik prison, killed the warden, and freed a prisoner with alleged IMU ties. It is clear that numbers of heavily armed people are operating in and around the borders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It is less clear who these are, given the interaction of organized crime and radicalism, and whether they have any links with the Andijan uprising. Government officials in all three countries seem to be confused, variously blaming different radical groups, but in all likelihood simply do not know who they are. Azerbaijan Compared to Central Asia, the situation in Azerbaijan is rather calm. Thanks to its location, Azerbaijan is more open to inf luences from the West and its people much better off economically. This is partly due to the relatively small size of the country and the increased amount of money becoming available following oil and gas related developments. President Ilham Aliyev has also pursued careful, pragmatic and evolutionary policies and is more popular than any of his opponents secular or Islamic. That said, it is widely known that both Saudi Arabia and Iran are actively trying to spread their Islamist views to Azerbaijan, building new mosques, and supplying local imams with radical Islamist literature. But they have so far failed to make much headway. Groups like HT also have not found a fertile ground in Azerbaijan, in part due to Azerbaijans exposure to the West and close ties to Turkey. Consequently, the Turkish model of a democratic, secular, pro-Western vision is a commonly shared one by the majority of the Azerbaijanis. They are also closer to Israel than Iran, which not only sided with Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conf lict, but also challenges Azerbaijans oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea. While there is little support for radicalism inside Azerbaijan, the country itself is a target for terrorists, precisely because it is a secular democratic country where Sunnis and Shiites live together peacefully. There have been several rounds of arrests of people who targeted the U.S. embassy and other strategic allocations. Radicalization and Insurgency in the North Caucasus The spread of Islamic radicalism across the North Caucasus has been advancing steadily in the past several years. This has been exacerbated by Russian policies of extreme centralization, which have brought increased amounts of repression to the region since 2002. To that is added the dislocation of entrenched government elites and the appointment of politicians loyal to Moscow without strong grounding in the region to lead the republics of the North Caucasus. The alienation of the population has progressively increased, and Russias failure to resolve the socio-economic situation in the North Caucasus in spite of its newly found oil wealth is making matters worse. Yet the radicalization of Islamist groups in the North Caucasus is mainly a result of the lingering ulcer in the region, the conf lict in Chechnya. The emergence of the militant cells in the other republics of the region follows a general pattern: they are typically formed by a small number of individuals that have fought in Chechnya and received training by militants linked to Chechen radicalized formations, led by Shamil Basayev and in the past also by the Arab leaders in the Chechen Jihad, Al-Khattab and Abu Al-Walid. They are then sent back to their home republics, where they silently developed a greater following by recruiting young and disaffected members. Young and frustrated men without jobs or prospects for either creating a family or self-realization are then further alienated from the political leadership of their republic, and attracted to the radical message of the Islamic jamaats. In this way, the local militant groups have been able to grow and multiply. Clearly, they still form a small minority of the population, yet the mismanagement by the region of the federal and republican authorities demonstrably increases the number of people either willing to or considering taking up arms against the government.16 In particular, the Russian policy of assassinating moderate Chechen separatist leaders is gradually leaving the playing field in the hands of the radical groups. The murder of Aslan Maskhadov, Chechnyas legitimate president, in 2005 was followed by the murder of his successor, Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev, in June 2006. His successor in turn, Doku Umarov, appointed Shamil Basayev as Vice President and his successor should he be killed as well. Whether by design or by accident, Moscow is ensuring that there are no moderate Chechen leaders left to negotiate with, while the radicals control over the resistance in the North Caucasus becomes cemented.
16 See the report written in parallel to this one, Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe, Washington and Uppsala: Silk Road Paper, June 2006, for a detailed discussion.

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The Sociology and Economics of Islamic Radicalism Many facile claims have been advanced about the social profile of radical Islamists in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Since these claims have also served as justification for western policies on the issue, it is some importance to get right the social and economic dimensions of the phenomenon. The Sociology of Radicalization Various explanations have been advanced to explain the development and spread of Islamic radical ideologies. These have centered around economic as well as political explanations, or the class origins of the militants. Yet these hypotheses offer at best a partial and insufficient explanation. Socio-Economic Factors In the West, the most frequently repeated claim regarding the social profile of radical Islamists in the Caucasus and Central Asia is that they come from the post-Soviet poor of the region. The fact that the North Caucasus is among the most impoverished regions of Russia and the Ferghana Valley a relatively poor region of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, would seem to support this hypothesis. On this basis, all four governments are criticized for their failure to create economic opportunity in these zones of poverty, and generally to embrace reform. It is undeniable that governments have failed to alleviate poverty in these and other areas in which Islamists have found a welcome. Yet poverty per se can scarcely be seen as the incubator of Muslim extremism. Andijan, for example, with its large Daewoo factory and international tennis center, is far more prosperous than most neighboring towns. Moreover, the Uzbek city of Khojent in Tajikistan is far poorer than any city in either Uzbek or Kyrgyz parts of the Ferghana Valley yet has not generated the same level of extremism. This does not exonerate governments from the duty to address issues of poverty, but it should not be assumed that, in doing so, they will also remove the cause of extremism. The fact is that of those Islamists whose social profile is known (mainly on the basis of evidence brought forward in trials) the overwhelming majority are not poor, and are in fact drawn from middle class backgrounds or higher. This is, of course, the case with many Islamic movements elsewhere. The Class Origins of Militants A second widely cited hypothesis focuses on the middle or upper middle class origins of many of the leaders of the extremist movements, and on their education in the technical fields. Drawing mainly on the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and also on the Saudi leaders of al Qaeda, it is frequently claimed that radical Islamists in the Caucasus and Central Asia are drawn mainly from the technical intelligentsia, and even from the elite of that group. This hypothesis in turn leads to several possible corollaries. One faults the cultural vacuum created by Soviet-style technical education, with its absence of humanistic learning and values. Another criticizes the states for training young men for jobs that do not exist, leaving them in a professional limbo from which Islamism becomes a plausible avenue of escape. The trouble with this hypothesis is not that it is false but that it explains too little. It is undeniably true, for example, that most identified Islamists have had technical training. But so have many others. The Soviet-type educational system that still prevails across the region one-sidedly focuses on technical fields, at the expense of the humanities. Thus, nearly of all those who advance through secondary school and beyond are of the technical intelligentsia. Yet only a tiny fraction of these have found their way into the radical Islamists camp. Political Participation and Repression A much-touted hypothesis, often advanced in both Central Asia and the West, is that repression and authoritarian rule is a direct cause of Islamic radicalism. With avenues of political activity closed, the assumption goes, frustrated opposition-minded young individuals are driven into the arms of radical groups that form the only possible avenue for political activity. There is some merit to this hypothesis, as the prohibition of moderate and secular forms of opposition leaves the playing field open to radical groups. Yet neither in Central Asia nor globally does the growth of Islamic radicalism seem to be correlated with levels of repression. Uzbekistans Ferghana valley was affected by determined Islamic radical movements in the early 1990s, and their presence formed a cause of Karimovs repressive policies toward political opposition rather than being a consequence thereof. Meanwhile, southern Kyrgyzstan a relatively liberal political atmosphere has seen a growth of radicalism in the past few years comparable to that in Uzbekistan. Outside Central Asia, the picture is similar: radical groups prosper not only in repressive societies such as Egypt 511

or Syria; their performance has been even stronger in Pakistan, where the state, far from being repressive, long followed a policy of appeasement toward radical groups. Moreover, a major element in radical Islamic recruiting is what French researcher Olivier Roy terms Euro-Islam the Islamic communities of western Europe. In global perspective, Turkey seems to be a successful balance: a political atmosphere that is generally liberal, but a state that simultaneously understands the dangers of Islamic radicalism and that draws clear lines in the sand to prevent radical groups from emerging and threatening secularism. These examples show that it may not necessarily be repressive political systems as such that lead to a radical backlash, but the relative deprivation and alienation of specific communities. Even this brief overview shows the difficulty in tracing radical Islamism to simple issues of class, economic deprivation, or political systems. Why do some follow this path, but not most others? It is worth noting that no single explanation covers more than a portion of the known Islamists. Because of this, we are reduced to citing multiple factors that occur with enough frequency to draw attention. Vendettas and Relative Deprivation First among these are personal vendettas against a political leader, whether at the national or local level. These may have arisen from the officials perceived mistreatment of the future Islamists or a relative of his. While statistical evidence is lacking (this type of information is obviously suppressed in state trials), it is probable that this is the single most common factor leading to radicalization. But unlike Sicily, where a vendetta culture leads to personal retribution against individuals, in the Caucasus and Central Asia the reaction is more often focused on the system and its local defenders. Closely related is the sense among rising members of a regional intelligentsia that their province lacks real power in the capital. This feeling unites such otherwise disparate groups as Ferghana Valley residents of both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Chechens and Ingush in the North Caucasus, and even the Pashtuns in post-Taliban Afghanistan down to 2005. To speak only of the Ferghana region of Uzbekistan, this region has been systematically excluded from national power for all but three years over the past four decades. Some have claimed that the radicalization of the Ferghana Valley traces to old traditions of religiosity. But these are equally developed in Bukhara and Samarkand, yet these centers have not produced radical Islamists in numbers. It is relevant that these cities are far more closely linked with national power centers than is the Ferghana region. The Drugs-Crime-Radical Islamist Nexus. A third specific element concerns links with drug traffickers and criminal groups in general. It is not clear the extent to which this is cause or effect but the close tie between the more violent Islamist groups and organized crime has been undeniable from the time the IMU emerged as a major drug dealing enterprise. Indeed, in this sense Central Asia and the Caucasus are examples of a worldwide trend, the increasing involvement of violent groups in organized crime, particularly the drug trade. In fact, the traditional division of non-state armed groups into mutually exclusive ideal types the ideological and the criminal is an increasingly misleading description of most armed groups today. A criminal element is increasingly visible in the financing of most groups, but also in the motivations of many. This fusion of crime and terrorism or insurgency can be most clearly seen as regards the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and certain formations in the North Caucasus. For some of these groups, it is unclear whether they are mainly driven by ideological zeal or by criminal pursuits. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Though the IMU incursions of 1999 and 2000 were ostensibly waged in the name of the creation of a Caliphate with a base in the Ferghana valley, a strong body of evidence suggests they are in fact best explained by more mundane motivations, especially the drug trade. The geographical areas targeted, the timing of the attacks, as well as the tactics used, all point in this direction. Rising Afghan opium production in the late 1990s led to increasing smuggling into Central Asia. This in turn led traffickers to seek out new smuggling routes. A new important route crossed the Tajik-Kyrgyz border from Tajikistans Garm province.17 The Jirgatal and Tavildara areas of Tajikistan had been IMU strongholds during the civil war, and the IMU used these areas as a base from which to launch two armed
17 See Maral Madi, Drug Trade in Kyrgyzstan, Structure, Implications, and Countermeasures, Central Asian Survey, vol. 23 no. 3-4, December 2004.

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incursions into Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000. IMU militants established routes for crossing the border with the help of drug barons in Kyrgyzstans Osh region.18 The geographical overlap in the late 1990s of the IMUs camps and activities with the main areas of drug trafficking into Kyrgyzstan point at a symbiosis between the group and drug trafficking networks. Yet other evidence shows that the IMU was in fact a leading actor in the drug trade in its own right. It had well-established links with the Taliban government and Al Qaeda,19 while maintaining close contacts with old comrades-in-arms in the former Tajik opposition, who were now in government, and in turn had close links with the ethnic Tajik-led Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Only the IMU had a network of contacts on all sides of the Afghan conf lict, which enabled it to freely move across Afghanistan and Tajikistan unlike any other known organization. The IMUs insurgencies into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were in the form of simultaneous but smallscale incursions by comparatively small groups of fighters. This makes little military sense as the IMU could neither hope to defeat government forces nor to trigger an uprising that way. However, considered as a diversionary measure intended to create instability, confuse law enforcement and military structures, and gain access to mountain passes for trafficking, the incursions make perfect sense. 20 There is a significant consensus that the IMU was strongly involved in drug trafficking from Afghanistan toward Osh in Kyrgyzstan, where opiates are handed to trafficking networks that ship them further north and west. Drug control experts concurred with the estimate that the IMU controlled up to two thirds of opiates entering the Kyrgyz Republic. 21 Interpol labeled the IMU a hybrid organization in which criminal interests often take priority over political goals, whose leaders have a vested interest in ongoing unrest and instability in their area in order to secure the routes they use for the transportation of drugs. 22 Kyrgyz government officials noted that the volume of drugs trafficked into Kyrgyzstan increased significantly after the 1999 incursion. 23 This does not mean, however, that the IMU completely jettisoned its religious ideology. In fact, the IMU was not a monolithic organization. Most studies of the movement indicate the coexistence of a more guerrilla-oriented and criminal faction and a more religious one within the group. 24 As such, different actions attributed to the IMU were likely caused by different motivations. The IMU is best understood as an amalgam of personal vendetta, Islamism, drugs, geopolitics, and terrorism. Chechen Armed Groups Since the late 1980s, there have been strong connections between the Chechen separatist movement and Chechen organized crime, and this has evolved into the involvement of various types of Chechen militant groups and organized crime. Much like other Caucasian peoples, the Chechens were wellrepresented in Soviet-era organized crime. But as the conf lict developed, militants in Chechnya increasingly appropriated the ability to directly engage in criminal activities instead of allying with criminal groups. This was partly related to changes on the field, with Chechen groupings becoming smaller in size and less centrally coordinated. Meanwhile, the North Caucasus became an increasingly prominent smuggling route for drugs, arms, people, and various commodities. Chechnyas position as a territory outside Russian jurisdiction also attracted criminal interests in the early 1990s, including prominent Russian figures who needed this free-trade zone. In the 1996-99 inter-war period, Chechnya was threatened by economic collapse as reconstruction funds were stolen and diverted in Moscow before they reached Chechnya. 25 This
18 Mahmadamin Mahmadaminov, The Development of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Turkestan), Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, 2003. 19 See eg. Michael Fredholm, Uzbekistan and the Threat from Islamic Extermism, Sandhurst: United Kingdom Royal Military Academy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Report no. K39, March 2003, pp. 9-10. 20 Makarenko, Traffickers Turn from Balkan Conduit to Northern Route; Madi, p. 7. 21 Personal communications from international drug control officials, Washington, May 2001; Tamara Makarenko, Crime and Terrorism in Central Asia, Janes Intelligence Review, July 2000. 22 Ralf Mutschke, The Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drugs Trafficking and Terrorism, Testimony to the Subcommittee on Crime of the Judiciary Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 13 December 2000. Also testimony to the same hearing of Donnie R. Marshall, Drug Enforcement Administration administrator, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/00121301.htm. 23 Bolot Januzakov, quoted in Glenn E. Curtis, Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groupings in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, October 2002, p. 14. 24 Makarenko, Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade. 25 President Boris Yeltsins famous quote in this connection is only the devil knows where that money went.

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further increased incentives among decommissioned troops to engage in crime, given the absence of other economic alternatives. In the second war, Chechen groupings experienced increasing financial problems. The first to be hit were the secular, moderate leadership which lacked wealthy patrons abroad. Yet the radical groups, led by Shamil Basayev and Ibn ul-Khattab, benefited from a steady f low of funds from the Middle East. This has nevertheless changed. Growing international measures to curb terrorist funding after 9/11 were followed by the killing of Khattab, who had been the main channel of funding. Subsequently, the Iraq war diverted the attention of the sponsors of the Chechen Islamic resistance, contributing further to isolating Chechnya. As a result, the Chechen rebel groups have had increasing a incentives to turn to organized crime for their financing. Near Chechnya, Georgias Pankisi Gorge became a center of drug trafficking when now deceased Chechen warlord Ruslan Gelayev was in the valley in 1999-2002. Likewise, it is believed that Shamil Basayev ran narcotics operations between the two wars with his brother Shirvani Basayev, which may very well have been taken up again. The war in Chechnya has gradually been criminalized, on both sides of the conf lict: the Russian military and internal forces in Chechnya are known to be plagued by widespread corruption at all levels, not least among the top brass, which profits from involvement in the smuggling of oil products and other commodities. This is the background against which the conf lict has in many ways changed from a war to a criminal operation. Vested interests on both sides of the divide profit from the conf lict through criminal involvement; and moreover, Chechen and Russian armed groups are known to cooperate in criminal operations. This is facilitated by the fragmentation of forces on both sides: Russia has successfully fragmented the hierarchical structure of the Chechen resistance, leading to smaller units dependent on crime for their survival, with no one to rein in wayward commanders. On the Russian side, there is little coordination between troops loyal to the pro- Russian Chechen government; the army; the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the Federal Security Service; the border patrol forces; or the military intelligence. Hence various Chechen groups may cooperate in smuggling with one Russian formation while actively fighting another, and vice versa. This includes Islamic radical groups. An excellent example is the late Arbi Barayev, one of the most brutal and criminalized Chechen field commanders with an Islamist leaning, and one of the most wanted men in Russia. As Anna Politkovskaya reported, Barayev was able to live calmly in a luxury villa a few miles from a Russian checkpoint, with an FSB sticker on his car allowing him free travel across Chechnya. These examples show the complex nature of radical Islamic groups in the region, and in particular the violent formations. Socio-economic conditions, political systems, external inf luences, and crime are all factors that contribute to the development of radical Islamic groups in Central Asia and the Caucasus. How Should the EU Respond? The prospects of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus remain unclear. On the one hand, it is evident that radical groups do not have strong following in local societies. In spite of repression, poverty, and foreign proselytizing, only a minority of the population of the region appears to find the message of the radicals appealing. What is worrying, though, is that this message appears increasingly tempting to segments of the youth in the region. This does not appear to be related to levels of economic development or the openness of political systems. Indeed, if radical groups are finding an attentive audience amidst the poverty and repression of the North Caucasus, they have shown equal skill at attracting the relatively wellto-do middleclass youth that f lock around Bakus Abu Bakr mosque, or among businessmen in Andijan. The regional scene is also far from positive. The insurgency in along Afghanistans border with Pakistan has grown again, and Western countries have shown a disturbing inability to deal with the ideological element of the war on terror. Aside from the energy-rich countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the regions governments are failing to meet their citizens basic socio-economic needs. All this fosters and environment in which Islamic radical groups can thrive. Islamist and terrorist organizations have also shown an ability to modify their tactics and increasingly cooperate with one other based on the needs of local conditions. For example, HT distributed free meals and toys during the last Islamic holiday in Kyrgyzstan, in spite of never having done any social work before. It is therefore essential to regularly review assumptions and analyses as the radical groups are constantly adopting their tactics based on changing conditions 514

on the ground. Meanwhile, western inf luence in Central Asia has been decreasing rapidly, and is non-existent in the North Caucasus. Only Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan can be said to be increasingly linked with the western realm. With the West more or less out of the picture, and Russian and Chinese inf luence growing, the Central Asian governments are likely to become more repressive and less reformist. Thus, the regional environment is moving in a direction where the worst authoritarian tendencies of the local governments will come out, while it will do little to improve the economic conditions. This will make the Islamist message of injustice increasingly appealing, and help the Islamists to grow stronger. In comparison, the carrots that the EU and the U.S. can offer the Central Asian governments will not be attractive enough, while the sticks that the West can use will not be painful enough to induce change. If this general situation is less than rosy, there are indeed areas where the West in general and the EU in particular can be effective. First and foremost, it is crucial to develop skills, especially in the intelligence community, in understanding the ideological framework of the radical and terrorist groups. Unless this happens, even if there is increased human intelligence capacity (which is also needed), western governments will continue to be unable to put the information into the right context. As the preceding discussion has shown, the radical and externally sponsored Islamic movements and organizations existing in the region offer little hope for a meaningful dialogue. Even if they were prepared to engage in such dialogue with the West (for which there is no evidence), it would constitute a gross breach of normal diplomatic relations with countries of the region. The moderate majority is less organized and much weaker financially. However, it is quite possible to engage representatives of this majority, and also of the secular parts of the population, in dialogue. This could prove useful and should be pursued. In seeking to foster more constructive approaches within the region, the West needs to support reformminded officials within governments, not just anti-government forces. Unfortunately, some recent EU policies have indiscriminately hounded the same reformers who are being punished by their own governments. To move beyond this situation will require a much higher quality of information than the EU states now command. Such information must focus on informal groupings and networks within the governments as well as groups outside. European governments and the various NGOs are today perceived in the region as exclusively supporting the opposition, with strongly counterproductive effect. Especially since the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and the overthrow of the Akaev government in the Kyrgyz Republic, Central Asian leaders were convinced that both the U.S. and the EU sought to oust them from office. Segments of the mainstream public appear to agree with them. This in turn led to deteriorating relations and the closure of NGOs. It is important to change this perception, to be able to invest in internal change and to provide political space for reformers and NGOs to function properly. For that, the EU, together with the U.S., needs to find points for collaboration within the governments. It must quietly and deftly support progressive groups within the system and work patiently but tenaciously toward evolutionary change. This will lay the foundation for a new generation of pro-democratic, tolerant, and competent leaders who provide alternatives both to the current leaders and to the Islamists who raise the banner of radical change. The link between drug trafficking and religious extremism is proven beyond doubt. While most drug traffickers may have no connection to religious extremism, those who do are sufficiently important to provide a steady income stream for Islamic militant and terrorist groups. The drug trade in Afghanistan and Central Asia is demand-driven, with the majority of the demand arising from EU member countries. The one action by the EU that would do most to address the problem of religious extremism in the region would be to lend major financial support to counter-narcotics efforts. Such support must be commensurate with the huge European demand that sustains the industry and, indirectly, much of the extremism. Beyond this, the EU should understand that the expansion of continental trade across Central Asia and the Caucasus (i.e. trade involving Europe, China, India, and the Mediterranean) is likely to be the single most powerful and positive engine of change in the coming years. As roads, railroads, pipelines, and electric lines increasingly link the region to the great economic centers of Eurasia, local populations will be drawn out of the isolation that breeds extremism, and into a larger multi-cultural mainstream. The EU should understand that in promoting continental trade, it is bringing these regions into the larger world, and opening to them opportunities that do not exist at present. 515

Related to this increasing economic engagement with Europe and with other Eurasian economic centers, is the value that comes from educational and cultural exchange. EU educational exchanges should be moved out of the exclusive control of the capital cities and the national elites, and extended to the provinces, including those now experiencing Islamic radical movements. The presence of a few dozen young men and women with cosmopolitan outlooks in such places can open prospects to thousands of others. Significantly, they can also be a source of future leaders at the regional level. Educational exchange is a productive and cost-effective means of fighting sectarian extremism. In dealing with governments throughout the region, the EU should focus on the delivery of governmental services to deprived areas, and in general, on greater degrees of decentralization and self-government, which is essential to reintegrate alienated regions to national polities, and also to providing social and economic prospects for their citizens. To be effective, such programs must receive the support and cooperation of the central governments, without therefore being allowed to slip into cooptation by central ministries. Striking a deft balance in this regard could allow the EU to present itself as a credible champion of civic improvement without cutting off its access the governments whose performance it seeks to improve Further, the EU should treat the issue of support for extremism in Central Asia (including Afghanistan) and the Caucasus as a subject for bilateral discussion with relevant Arab states and Iran. The governments of Central Asia and the Caucasus all know full well that extremist movements receive support from abroad. If the EU, with its extensive ties with the countries in question, fails to include this matter in its bilateral talks with them, it will be signaling to the Caucasus and Central Asia that the EUs priorities lie elsewhere. On dealing with religious radicalism and government repression, the EU may find it useful to look at the Turkish example, which is relevant to understanding the tension between trying to create a modern and open democratic system and dealing with the threat of fundamentalist and militant Islamic political ideology. Eurasias Muslim majorities countries that want to maintain their secular regime, will not listen to nave suggestions from Western countries that have never dealt with the holistic nature of Islam. They will, however, listen to advice on creating the right legal and constitutional safety nets so that radical groups, or sleeper cells, cannot take over secular systems. To this end, the EU should engage Turkey as it addresses issues of radical Islam in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Besides underscoring a common interest between Turkey and the EU, this would bring benefit in the form of better focused initiatives on the EUs part, and even possibly to initiatives that are coordinated between the EU and Turkey.

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CONTENTS
BREAKING THE ORKHON TRADITION: KIRGHIZ ADHERENCE TO THE YENISEI REGION AFTER A.D. 840..............................................................2 THE INNER ASIAN WARRIORS.................................................................................................................................16 THE KIPCHAK CONNECTION: THE ILKHANS, THE MAMLUKS AND AYN JALUT...........................................................................................28 TAMERLANE: OR TIMUR THE GREAT AMIR, FROM THE ARABIC LIFE BY AHMED IBN ARABSHAH ....................................................................................41 IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY, IDENTITY AND ALTERITY: THE ARAB IMAGE OF THE TURK FROM THE CABBASIDS TO MODERN EGYPT...................................................................................................48 TURKS IN THE MIDDLE EAST BEFORE THE SALJUQS.................................................................................62 LAND REFORM IN TURKESTAN.............................................................................................................................75 ECOLOGY OF CENTRAL ASIAN PASTORALISM................................................................................................81 ANTI-ISLAMICPR OPAGANDAI N KAZAKHSTAN SINCE 1953....................................................................95 BACKWARDNESS AND THE QUEST FOR CIVILIZATION: EARLY SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE...........................................................103 THE COLLECTIVIZATIODNR IVE IN KAZAKHSTAN....................................................................................116 MOTHERHOOD, PATRIOTISM, AND ETHNICI'IY: SOVIET KAZAKHSTANA ND THE 1936 ABORTION BAN............................................................................128 THE FORMATION OF THE VIRGIN LANDS POLICY.......................................................................................141 CHILDREN OF THE STEPPES...................................................................................................................................148 CENTRAL ASIA: 15 YEARS AFTER..........................................................................................................................175 CENTRAL ASIA: A GATHERING STORM?...........................................................................................................187 KAZAKHSTANS EMERGING MIDDLE CLASS.................................................................................................192 PARLIAMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN KAZAKHSTAN......................................................................238 CLANS, AUTHORITARIAN RULERS, AND PARLIAMENTS IN CENTRAL ASIA...................................266 KAZAKHSTAN AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF EURASIA.............................................277 CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE U.S.: THEIR INTERESTS, POSTURES, AND INTERRELATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA......................................361 NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW GEOPOLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA: AFTER SEPTEMBER 11..............369 THE AWAKENING OF CENTRAL ASIAN ISLAM...........................................................................................481 ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU..............494

HYSTORY OF KAZAKHSTAN
COLLECTION OF ARTICLES