Legacies and Devises [G.R. No. L-22036. April 30, 1979.

] TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, RespondentsAppellees. SYNOPSIS In his will, the late Father Pascual Rigor of Victoria, Tarlac, devised forty-four hectares of ricelands to his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood and provided that the administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the parish priest of Victoria during the time that there is no qualified devisee as contemplated in the will. During the testate proceedings, the trial court approved the project of partition and directed the administratrix to deliver to the devisees their respective shares. Inasmuch as no nearest male relative of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to him. The latter, however, petitioned for delivery of the ricelands to the church. The lower court, after first declaring the bequest inoperative, later reconsidered its findings in an order, on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew (born after the testators death), who was a seminarian, and directed the administrator of the estate to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the order. The Supreme Court ruled that the will referred to the nearest male relative of the testator who was living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter, because in order to be capacitated to inherit, the devisee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper. Decision affirmed. SYLLABUS 1. TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION; TESTATORS INTENT IS THE LAW OF THE CASE. In testamentary succession cases, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where the intention of the contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the determination of the t estators intention which is the law of the case (dicat estor et eirt lex). The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different from that literally expressed. 2. ID.; CAPACITY TO INHERIT. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper (Art. 1025, Civil Code). 3. ID.; WHERE BEQUEST IS INOPERATIVE. If the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists (Art. 956, New Civil Code). The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testators will is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property covered by the said legacy. 4. ID.; WHERE WILL DOES NOT DIPOSE OF ALL PROPERTIES. Legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator (Art. 960(2), New Civil Code). This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty-four hectares. That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria, Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor v. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).

The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda. In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing supplied to facilitate comprehension of the testamentary provisions): To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratrix in 1940 submitted a project of partition containing the following item: "5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH "That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the real properties hereinbelow indicated, to wit: "Title No. Lot No. Area in Has. Tax Dec. Ass. Value T-6530 3663 1.6249 18740 P340.00 T-6548 3445-C 24.2998 18730 7,290.00 T-6525 3670 6.2665 18736 1,880.00 T-6521 3666 11.9251 18733 3,580.00 "Total area and value 44.1163 P13,090.00" Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project of partition, directed that after payment of the obligations of the estate (including the sum of P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria parish) the administratrix should deliver to the devisees their respective shares. It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the meaning and implications of Father Rigors bequest to his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained pending. About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased administratrix, Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new administrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the ricelands to the church as trustee. The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957 praying that the bequest be declared inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria. Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge Bernabe de Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the testators legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The parish priest file d two motions for reconsideration. Judge De Aquino granted the second motion for reconsideration in his order of December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.

The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities." It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testators death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code. The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and to prevent intestacy. As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals declared the bequest inoperative because no one among the testators nearest male relatives had studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court. They point out that appellant priests change of theory cannot be countenanced in this appeal.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where the intention of the contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the determination of the testators intention which is the law of the case (dicat testor et erit lex. Santos v. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546). The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333). "The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life and soul of a will." It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving effect to a will." (See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos v. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-8.) One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testators intention is to be ascertained from th e words of the will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the testators oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the Philippines). To ascertain Father Rigors intention, it may be useful to make the following restatement of the provisions of his will: s virtual 1aw library 1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest. 2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands. 3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue enjoying and administering the same up to the time of his death but the devisee would cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood. 4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every year twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor and his parents. 5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and the administration of the ricelands would pass to the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors. 6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee, as contemplated above, the administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors, and 7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate annually the products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce five percent thereof for his administration and the fees corresponding to the twenty masses with prayers that the parish priest would celebrate for each year, depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the name of his bequest. From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.

On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testators nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated. What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado", or how long after the testators death would it be determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has brought about the controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the testators legal heirs. Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the testator contemplate only his nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest male relatives at anytime after his death? We hold that the said bequest refers to the testators nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code). The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to the testators nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention. In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest legal heirs were his three sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the sons of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative." It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon Quiambao, the testators nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigors death, her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for his nearest male relative belonging to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal). Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in Father Rigors will and that Edgardos father told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of Victori a before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testators grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary. Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate courts order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellants brief). Of course, Mrs. Gamalindas affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the testators intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testators nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will. Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiastica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his will. He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest. What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado" ? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest,

was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testators nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated. Following that interpretation of the will, the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priests petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "no nearest male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was likewise inoperative. The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee. That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest. It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testators nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen, in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado . . . por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto, se refundir en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer"). This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960(2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands, the same should be distributed among the testators legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands. The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testators will is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property covered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham v. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).

[G.R. No. L-17587. September 12, 1967.] PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUI SHE, in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate of Wong Heng, deceased, SYLLABUS 1. LEASE CONTRACT; RESOLUTORY CONDITION; OPTION, VALIDITY OF. Plaintiff-appellant assails the validity of the lease agreement for want of mutuality. Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that the lessee may at any time withdraw from the agreement. It is claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code. Held: Art. 1256 (now 1308) of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a contract of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of cancellation; for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall exist, the exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject of agreement. Indeed, the cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment (Taylor v. Tang Pao, 43 Phil. 873). In the case of Singson Encarnacion v. Baldomar, 77 Phil. 470, the lessees argued that they could occupy the premises as long as they paid the rent. This is of course untenable, for as this Court said, "If this defense were to be allowed, solong as defendants elected to continue the lease by continuing the payment of the rentals, the owner would never be able to discontinue it; conversely, although the owner should desire the lease to continue, the lessee could effectively thwart his purpose if he should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment of the rentals." Here in contrast, the right of the lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said that the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. At any rate, even if no term had been fixed in the agreement, this case would at most justify the fixing of a period but not the annulment of the contract. 2. PURCHASE AND SALE; CUSTODIA LEGIS; SALE, VALIDITY OF. That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he had or might have in the land under administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration." (Jakosalem v. Esfols, 73 Phil. 628). 3. CONTRACTS; CONSIDERATION; EFFECT OF. The fact that no money was paid at the time of the execution of the document does not rule out the possibility that the considerations were paid some other time as the contracts in fact recite. What is more, the consideration need not pass from one party to the other at the time a contract is executed because the promise of one is the consideration of the other. 4. ID.; ALIENS; CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION, CIRCUMVENTION OF. Where a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens is readily revealed as the purpose for the contracts then the illicit purpose becomes the illegal cause rendering the contracts void. Thus, if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi jus utendi, just fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi) rights the sum total of which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, is indeed in grave peril. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY OF PARTIES. It does not follow that because the parties are in pari delicto they will be left where they are without relief. Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides as an exception to the rule in pari delicto that "when the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered."cralaw virtua1aw library 6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TRANSFER OR ASSIGNMENT OF PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND; REASON

FOR PROVISION. The constitutional provision that save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines (Art. XIII, Sec. 5) is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN; PROHIBITION AGAINST ALIEN LANDHOLDING; RECOVERY OF PROPERTY IN SALES ENTERED INTO PRIOR TO THE KRIVENKO DECISION NOT AVAILABLE IN VIEW OF THE PARE DELICTO DOCTRINE. The doctrine as announced in the case of Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827 is that while the sale by a Filipino-vendor to an alien-vendee of a residential or a commercial lot is null and void as held in the Krivenko case, still the Filipino-vendor has no right to recover under a civil law doctrine, the parties being in pari delicto. The only remedy to prevent this continuing violation of the Constitution which the decision impliedly sanctions by allowing the alien vendees to retain the lots in question is either escheat or reversion. Thus: "By following either of these remedies, or by approving an implementary law as above suggested, we can enforce the fundamental policy of our Constitution regarding our natural resources without doing violence to the principle of pari delicto. 2. ID.; ID: ID.; ID.; APPLICATION OF THE PARI DELICTO RULE IN PREVIOUS CASES TOO EXTREME. Since the sales in question took place prior to the Krivenko decision, at a time when the assumption could be honestly entertained that there was no constitutional prohibition against the sale of commercial or residential lots by Filipinovendor to alien-vendee, in the absence of a definite decision by the Supreme Court, it would not be doing violence to reason to free them from the imputation of evading the Constitution. For evidently evasion implies at the very least knowledge of what is being evaded. The new Civil Code expressly provides: "Mistakes upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith." (Art. 526, par. 3). According to the Rellosa opinion, both parties are equally guilty of evasion of the Constitution, based on the broader principle that "both parties are presumed to know the law." This statement that the sales entered into prior to the Krivenko decision were at that time already vitiated by a guilty knowledge of the parties may be too extreme a view. It appears to ignore a postulate of a constitutional system, wherein the words of the Constitution acquire meaning through Supreme Court adjudication. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESTORATION BY ALIEN-VENDEE OF PROPERTY TO FILIPINO-VENDOR MAY BE ALLOWED UPON RESTITUTION OF PURCHASE PRICE. Alien-vendee is incapacitated or disqualified to acquire and hold real estate. That incapacity and that disqualification should date from the adoption of the Constitution on November 15, 1935. That in capacity and that disqualification, however, was made known to Filipino-vendor and to alienvendee only upon the promulgation of the Krivenko decision on November 15, 1947 Alien-vendee therefore, cannot be allowed to continue owning and exercising acts of ownership over said property, when it is clearly included within the constitutional prohibition. Alien-vendee should thus be made to restore the property with its fruits and rents to Filipinovendor, its previous owner, if it could be shown that in the utmost good faith, he transferred his title over the same to alien-vendee, upon restitution of the purchase price of course. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REACQUISITION OF PROPERTY SOLD THE BETTER REMEDY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE DICTATES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY. The Constitution frowns upon the title remaining in the alienvendees. Restoration of the property upon payment of price received by Filipino vendor or its reasonable equivalent as fixed by the court is the answer. To give the constitutional provision full force and effect, in consonance with the dictates of equity and justice, the restoration to Filipino-vendor upon the payment of a price fixed by the court is the better remedy. He thought he could transfer the property to an alien and did so. After the Krivenko case had made clear that he had no right to sell nor an alien-vendee to purchase the property in question, the obvious solution would be for him to reacquire the same. That way the Constitution would be given, as it ought to be given, respect and deference. Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenza were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila. This parcel, with an area of 2,582.30 square meters, is located on Rizal Avenue and opens into Florentino Torres street at the back and Katubusan street on one side. In it are two residential houses with entrance on Florentino Torres street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue. The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property, having a monthly rental of P2,620. On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. Then

already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with. Her only companions in the house were her 17 dogs and 8 maids. Her otherwise already existence was brightened now and then by the visits of Wongs four children who had become the joy of her life. Wongs himself was the trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including rentals from her property at the corner of Ongpin and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong himself paid as lessee of a part of the Rizal Avenue property. Wong also look care of the payment, in her behalf, of taxes, lawyers fees, funeral expenses, masses, salaries of maids and security guard, and her household expenses. "In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the Lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on November 15, 1957, a contract of lease (Plff Exh. 3) in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was P3,120. The contract covered an area of 1,124 square meters. Ten days later (November 25), the contract was amended (Plff Exh. 4) so as to make it cover the entire property, including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360. For his part Wong undertook to pay, out of the rental due from him, an amount not exceeding P1,000 a month for the food of her dogs and the salaries of her maids. On December 21 she executed contract (Plff Exh. 7) giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned. On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one (Plff Exh. 5) extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and another (Plff Exh. 6) fixing the term of the option at 50 years. Both contracts are written in Tagalog. In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959 (Def. Exhs. 285 & 279), she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil (Plff Exh. 17) of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practised by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts. On November 18 the present action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint alleged that the contracts were obtained by Wong "through fraud, misrepresentation, inequitable conduct, undue influence and abuse of confidence and trust of and (by) taking advantage of the helplessness of the plaintiff and were made to circumvent the constitutional prohibition prohibiting aliens from acquiring lands in the Philippines and also of the Philippine Naturalization Laws." The court was asked to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts and to order Wong to pay Justina Santos the additional rent of P3,120 a month from November 15, 1957 on the allegation that the reasonable rental of the leased premises was P6,240 a month. In his answer, Wong admitted that he enjoyed her trust and confidence as proof of which he volunteered the information that, in addition to the sum of P3,000 which he said she had delivered to him for safekeeping, another sum of P22,000 had been deposited in a joint account which he had with one of her maids. But he denied having taken advantage of her trust in order to secure the execution of the contracts in question. As counterclaim he sought the recovery of P9,210.49 which he said she owed him for advances. Wongs admission of the receipt of P22,000 and P3,000 was the cue for the filing of an amended complaint. Thus on June 9, 1960, aside from the nullity of the contracts, the collection of various amounts allegedly delivered on different occasions was sought. These amounts and the dates of their delivery are P33,724.27 (Nov. 4, 1957); P7,344.42 (Dec. 1, 1957); P10,000 (Dec. 6, 1957); P22,000 and P3,000 (as admitted in his answer). An accounting of the rentals from the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue properties was also demanded. In the meantime as a result of a petition for guardianship filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the Security

Bank & Trust Co. was appointed guardian of the properties of Justina Santos, while Ephraim G. Gochangco was appointed guardian of her person. In his answer, Wong insisted that the various contracts were freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties. He likewise disclaimed knowledge of the sum of P33,724.27, admitted receipt of P7,344.42 and P10,000, but contended that these amounts had been spent in accordance with the instructions of Justina Santos; he expressed readiness to comply with any order that the court might make with respect to the sum of P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession. The case was heard, after which the lower court rendered judgment as follows: " [A]ll the documents mentioned in the first cause of action, with the exception of the first which is the lease contract of 15 November 1957, are declared null and void; Wong Heng is condemned to pay unto plaintiff thru guardian of her property the sum of P55,554.25 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint; he is also ordered to pay the sum of P3,120.00 for every month of his occupation as lessee under the document of lease herein sustained, from 15 November 1959, and the moneys he had consigned since then shall be imputed to that; costs against Wong Heng." virtua1aw library From this judgment both parties appealed directly to this Court. After the case was submitted for decision, both parties died, Wong Heng on October 21, 1962 and Justina Santos on December 28, 1964. Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant in this case, While Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation. Justina Santos maintained now reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporation that the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3) should have been annulled along with the four other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) because it lacks mutuality; because it included a portion which, at the time, was in custodia legis, because the contract was obtained in violation of the fiduciary relations of the parties; because her consent was obtained through undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation; and because the lease contract, like the rest of the contracts, is absolutely simulated. Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at any time withdraw from this agreement." It is claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides that "the contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them." library We have had occasion to delineate the scope and application of article 1308 in the early case of Taylor v. Uy Tiong Piao. We said in the case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a contract for personal service of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of cancellation; for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall exist, the exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject of agreement, Indeed, the cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment. 2 And so it was held in Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay 3 that a "provision in a lease contract that the lessee at any time before he erected any building on the land, might rescind the lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code." library The case of Singson Encarnacion v. Baldomar cannot be cited in support of the claim of want of mutuality, because of a difference in factual setting. In that case, the lessees argued that they could occupy the premises as long as they paid the rent. This is of course untenable, for as this Court said "If this defense were to be allowed, so long as defendants elected to continue the lease by continuing the payment of the rentals, the owner would never be able to discontinue it; conversely, although the owner should desire the lease to continue the lessees could effectively thwart his purpose if they should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment of the rentals." Here, in contrast, the right of the lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said that the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. At any rate, even if no term had been fixed in the agreement, this case would at most justify the fixing of a period 5 but not the annulment of the contract.

Nor is there merit in the claim that as the portion of the property formerly owned by the sister of Justina Santos was still in the process of settlement in the probate court at the time it was leased, the lease is invalid as to such portion. Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property upon the death of her sister Lorenza on September 22, 1957 by force of article 777 of the Civil Code. Hence, when she leased the property on November 15, she did so already as owner thereof. As this Court explained in upholding the sale made by an heir of a property under judicial administration: "That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration." 6 It is next contended that the lease contract was obtained by Wong in violation of his fiduciary relationship with Justina Santos, contrary to article 1646, in relation to article 1941 of the Civil Code, which disqualifies "agents (from leasing) the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them." But Wong was never an agent of Justina Santos. The relationship of the parties, although admittedly close and confidential, did not amount to an agency so as to bring the case within the prohibition of the law. Just the same, it is argued that Wong so completely dominated her life and affairs that the contracts express not her will but only his. Counsel for Justina Santos cites the testimony of Atty. Tomas S. Yumol who said that he prepared the lease contract on the basis of the data given to him by Wong and that she told him that "what ever Mr. Wong wants must be followed." 7 The testimony of Atty. Yumol cannot be read out of context in order to warrant a finding that Wong practically dictated the terms of the contract. What his witness said was: "Q Did you explain carefully to your client, Doa Justina the contents of this document before she signed it? "A I explained to her each and every one of these conditions and I also told her these conditions were quite onerous for her, I dont really know if I have expressed my opinion, but I told her that we would rather not execute any contract anymore, but to hold it as it was before, on a verbal month to month contract of lease. "Q But, she did not follow your advice, and she went with the contract just the same? "A She agreed first . . . "Q Agreed what? "A Agreed with my objections that it is really onerous and I was really right, but after that, I was called again by her and she told me to follow the wishes of Mr. Wong Heng. "Q So, as far as consent is concerned, you were satisfied that this document was perfectly proper? "A. Your Honor, if I have to express my personal opinion, I would say she is not, because, as I said before, she told me "Whatever Mr. Wong wants must be followed." 8 Wong might indeed have supplied the data which Yumol embodied in the lease contract, but to say this is not to detract from the binding force of the contract. For the contract was fully explained to Justina Santos by her own lawyer. One incident, related by the same witness, makes clear that she voluntarily consented to the lease contract. This witness said that the original term fixed for the lease was 99 years but that as he doubted the validity of a lease to an for that length of time, he tried to persuade her to enter instead into a lease on a month-to-month basis. She was, however, firm and unyielding. Instead of heeding the advice of the lawyer, she ordered him, "Just follow Mr. Wong Heng." 9 Recounting the incident Atty. Yumol declared on cross examination: "Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the time and her condition, she is a wealthy woman, it is just natural when she said This is what I want and this will be done. In Particular reference to this contract of lease, when I said This is not proper, she said "You just go ahead, you prepare that, I am the owner, and if there is any illegality, I am the only

one that can question the illegality." Atty. Yumol testified that she signed the lease contract in the presence of her close friend. Hermenegilda Lao, and her maid, Natividad Luna, who was constantly by her side. 11 Any of them could have testified on the undue influence that Wong supposedly wielded over Justina Santos, but neither of them was presented as a witness. The truth is that even after giving his client time to think the matter over, the lawyer could not make her change her mind. This persuaded the lower court to uphold the validity of the lease contract against the claim that it was procured through undue influence. Indeed, the charge of undue influence in this case rests on a mere inference 12 drawn from the fact that Justina Santos could not read (as she was blind) and did not understand the English language in which the contract is written, but that inference has been overcome by her own evidence. Nor is there merit in the claim that her consent to the lease contract, as well as to the rest of the contracts in question, was given out of a mistaken sense of gratitude to Wong who, she was made to believe, had saved her and her sister from a fire that destroyed their house during the liberation of Manila. For while a witness claimed that the sisters were saved by other persons (the brothers Edilberto and Mariano Sta. Ana) 13 it was Justina Santos herself who according to her own witness, Benjamin C. Alonzo, said "very emphatically" that she and her sister would have perished in the fire had it been for Wong. 14 Hence the recital in the deed of conditional option (Plff Exh. 7) that" [I]tong si Wong Heng ang siyang nagligtas sa aming dalawang magkapatid sa halos ay tiyak na kamatayan," and the equally emphatic avowal of gratitude in the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3). As it was with the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3), so it was with the rest of the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) the consent of Justina Santos was given freely and voluntarily. As Atty. Alonzo, testifying for her, said: " [I]n nearly all documents, it was either Mr. Wong Heng or Judge Torres and/or both. When we had conferences they used to tell me what the documents should contain. But, as I said, I would always ask the old woman about them and invariably the old woman used to tell me: Thats okay. Its all right." But the lower court set aside all the contracts, with the exception of the lease contract of November 15, 1957, on the ground that they are contrary to the expressed wish of Justina Santos and that their considerations are fictitious. Wong stated in his deposition that he did not pay P360 a month for the additional premises leased to him because she did not want him to, but the trial court did not believe him. Neither did it believe his statement that he paid P1,000 as consideration for each of the contracts (namely, the option to buy the leased premises, the extension of the lease to 99 years, and the fixing of the term of the option at 50 years), but that the amount was returned to him by her for safekeeping. Instead, the court relied on the testimony of Atty. Alonzo in reaching the conclusion that the contracts are void for want of consideration. Atty. Alonzo declared that he saw no money paid at the execution of the documents, but his negative testimony does not rule out the possibility that the consideration were paid at some other time as the contracts in fact recite. What is more, the consideration need not pass from one party to the other at the time a contract is executed because the promise of one is the consideration for the other. 16 With respect to the lower courts finding that in all probability Justina Santos could not have intended to part with her property while she was alive nor even to lease it in its entirety as her house was built on it, suffice it to quote the testimony of her own witness and lawyer who prepared the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) in question, Atty. Alonzo: "The ambition of the old woman before her death, according to her revelation to me, was to see to it that these properties be enjoyed, even to own them, by Wong Heng because Doa Justina told me that she did not have any relatives, near or far, and she considered Wong Heng as a son and his children her grandchildren; especially her consolation in life was when she would hear the children reciting prayers in Tagalog." "She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much, and she told me to see to it that no one could disturb Wong Heng from those properties. That is why we thought of the ninety-nine (99) years lease; we thought of the adoption, believing that thru adoption Wong Heng might acquire Filipino citizenship; being the adopted child of Filipino citizen." 18

This is not to say, however, that the contracts (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are valid. For the testimony just quoted while dispelling doubt as to the intention of Justina Santos, at the same time gives the clue to what we view as a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of land of aliens. "The illicit purpose then becomes the illegal cause rendering the contracts void. Taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this said in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds: " [A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution form the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire." But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, 21 this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi) rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within this pace of one year, with the result that Justina Santos ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 22 is indeed in grave peril. It does not follow from what has been said, however, that because the parties are in pari delicto they will be left where they are, without relief. For one thing, the original parties who were guilty of a violation of the fundamental charter have died and have since been substituted by their administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt. 23 For another thing, and is not only cogent but also important, article 1416 of the Civil Code provides, as an exception to the rule on pari delicto, that When the agreement, is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered." The Constitutional provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines 24 is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. As this Court said in Krivenko: "It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. "For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs." That policy would be defeated and its continued violation sanctioned if, instead of setting the contracts aside and ordering the restoration of the land to the estate of the deceased Justina Santos, this Court should apply the general rule of pari delicto. To the extent that our ruling in this case conflicts with that laid down in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun 26 and subsequent similar cases, the latter must be considered as pro tanto qualified. The claim for increased rentals and attorneys fees made in behalf of Justina Santos, must be denied for lack of merit. And what of the various amounts which Wong received in trust from her? It appears that he kept two classes of accounts, one pertaining to amounts which she entrusted to him from to time, and another pertaining to rentals from the Ongpin property and from the Rizal Avenue property, which he himself was leasing.

With respect to the first account, the evidence shows that he received P33,724.27 on November 8, 1957 (Plff. Exh. 16); P7,354.42 on December 1, 1957 (Plff. Exh. 13); 10,000 on December 6, 1957 (Plff. Exh. 14); and P18,928.50 on August 26, 1959 (Def. Exh. 246), or a total of P70,007.19. He claims, however, that he settled his accounts and that last amount of P18,928.50 was in fact payment to him of what in the liquidation was found to be due to him. He made disbursements from this account to discharge Justina Santos obligations for taxes, attorneys fees, funeral services and security guard services, but the checks (Def. Exhs. 247-278) drawn by him for this purpose amount to only P38,442.84 27 Besides, if he had really settled his accounts with her on August 26, 1959, we cannot understand why he still had P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession, or a total of P25,000. In his answer, he offered to pay this amount if the court so directed him. On these two grounds, therefore, his claim of liquidation and settlement of accounts must be rejected. After subtracting P38,442.84 (expenditures) from P70,007.19 (receipts), there is a difference of P31,564 which, added to the amount of P25,000, leaves a balance of P56,564.35 28 in favor of Justina Santos. As to the second account, the evidence shows that the monthly income from the Ongpin property until its sale in July, 1959 was P1,000 and that from the Rizal Avenue property, of which Wong was the lessee, was P3,120. Against this account the household expenses and disbursements for the care of the 17 dogs and the salaries of the 8 maids of Justina Santos were charged. This account is contained in a notebook (Def. Exh. 6) which shows a balance of P9,310.49 in favor of Wong. But it is claimed that the rental from both the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue properties was more than enough to pay for her monthly expenses and that, as a matter of fact, there should be a balance in her favor. The lower court did not allow either party to recover against the other. Said court: " [T]he documents bear the earmarks of genuineness; the trouble is that they were made only be Francisco Wong and Antonia Matias, nick-name Toning, which was the way she signed the loose sheets, and there is no clear proof that Doa Justina had authorized these two to act for her in such liquidation; on the contrary if the result of that was a deficit as alleged and sought to be there shown, of P9,210.49, that was not what Doa Justina apparently understood for as the court understands her statement to the Honorable Judge of the Juvenile Court . . . the reason why she preferred to stay in her home was because there she did not incur in any debts . . . this being the case, .. the Court will not adjudicate in favor of Wong Heng on his counterclaim; on the other hand, while it is claimed that the expenses were much less than the rentals and there in fact should be a superavit, . . . this Court must concede that daily expenses are not easy to compute, for this reason, the Court faced with the choice of the two alternatives will choose the middle course which after all is permitted by the rules of proof, Sec. 69, Rule 123 for in the ordinary course of things, a person will live within his income so that the conclusion of the Court will be that there is neither deficit nor superavit and will let the matter rest here." Both parties on appeal reiterate their respective claims but we agree with the lower court that both claims should be denied. Aside from the reasons given by the court, We think that the claim of Justina Santos totalling P37,235 as rentals due to her after deducting various expenses, should be rejected s the evidence is none too clear about the amounts spent by Wong for food, 29 masses 30 salaries of of her maid. 31 His claim for P9,210.49 must likewise be rejected as his averment of liquidation is belied by his own admission that even as late as 1960 he still had P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession. ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation; Wong Heng (as substituted by the defendant-appellant Lui She) is ordered to pay the Philippine Banking Corporation the sum of P56,567.35, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint; and the amounts consigned in court by Wong Heng shall be applied to the payment of rental from November 15, 1959 until the premises shall have been vacated by his heirs. Costs against the defendant-appellant.

[G.R. No. 48627. February 19, 1943. ] TESTATE ESTATE OF VICENTE SINGSON PABLO, deceased. ROSALIA ROSARIO VDA. DE SINGSON, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JOSEFINA F. VDA. DE LIM, oppositor-appellee, EMILIA FLORENTINO ET AL., oppositors-appellees, EVARISTO SINGSON ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants. SYLLABUS DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; INTERPRETATION OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISION IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE 751 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Don Vicente Singson Pablo, a lawyer, died without any descendant or ascendant, his nearest surviving relatives being his widow, four brothers, and four nieces, the children of a deceased sister. He left a will which was duly probated, clause 8 of which provides that "all of my properties not disposed of otherwise in this testament shall be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled thereto." Article 751 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides that "a disposition made in general terms in favor of the testators relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree." The authorities differ on the interpretation of article 751. Some hold that under said article the nephews and nieces inherit by representation together with the brothers and sisters of the testator, as in legal succession; while others, Manresa among them, hold that said article excludes nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive. Held: That the testator, by referring to "all who are entitled thereto," instead of referring to his "relatives," precisely meant to avoid the uncertainty of the interpretation of article 751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his estate be distributed in equal parts to all who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he died intestate. Don Vicente Singson Pablo, a lawyer of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, died on April 15, 1938, without any descendant or ascendant, his nearest surviving relatives being his widow Doa Rosalia Rosario, four brothers, and four nieces, the children of a deceased sister. He left a will which was duly probated, clause 8 of which reads as follows: The widow, as administratrix, presented a project of partition in which the properties not disposed of in the will were adjudicated to the four brothers and the four nieces of the deceased "in the proportion provided in paragraph 8 of the will." The brothers, appellants herein, objected to the project of partition insofar as it includes the nieces of the deceased, on the ground that under clause 8 of the will, in relation to article 751 of the Civil Code, they were not entitled to any share. The nieces also objected to the project of partition, alleging that certain other specified properties had been omitted therefrom, which formed part of the properties not disposed of and which under clause 8 of the will "should be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled thereto." The trial court sustained the contention of the nieces (appellees herein) and ordered the administratrix "to amend the project of partition so as to include therein the said properties and that all of those not disposed of in the will be adjudicated in equal parts to the brothers and nieces of the deceased." library The only question raised in this appeal is the interpretation of clause 8 of the will above quoted. Said clause provides that "all of my properties not disposed of otherwise in this testament shall be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled thereto." In this connection appellants invoke article 751 of the Civil Code, which provides that "a disposition made in general terms in favor of the testators relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree." virtua1aw library The trial court noted that the testator, who was a lawyer, did not use the word "relatives" in the clause in question. We do not need to decide here whether, had the testator used the word "relatives," the nieces would be excluded. The authorities differ on the interpretation of article 751. Some hold that under said article the nephews and nieces inherit by representation together with the brothers and sisters of the testator, as in legal succession; while others, Manresa among them, hold that said article excludes nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive. We think the testator, by referring to "all who are entitled thereto," instead of referring to his "relatives," precisely meant to avoid the uncertainty of the interpretation of article 751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his estate be distributed in equal parts to all who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he died intestate. The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

[G.R. No. L-18753. March 26, 1965.] VICENTE B. TEOTICO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ANA DEL VAL CHAN, ETC., Oppositor-Appellant. SYLLABUS 1. CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN WIFE OF CITIZEN NOT AUTOMATICALLY CITIZEN BUT MUST PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen does not automatically become a Philippine citizen upon her husbands naturalization. She must first prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON FOR RULE; POLICY OF SELECTIVE ADMISSION TO PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological belief, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions. Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses. In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could dispose of all her estate. Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrixs niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned. Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear. Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisco Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness. After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrixs heirs by way of intestate succession.

Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor. The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several error which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; and (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico? These issues will be discussed separately. 1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, Et Al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefitted by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem.). On the other hand, in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, Et Al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said: "According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person. An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefitted by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G., 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Trillana v. Crisostomo, G. R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa v. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311)." library The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate? Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will. In the supposition that the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; . . ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil., 128, as follows: "Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. In this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumptive will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is

thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more them recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d ed., p. 110.)" The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. "The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between, the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either." (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652) "Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal." (An Outline of Philippines Civil law by Justice Jose B. L, Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil law, 1955, Vol. 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515) It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo. 2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent. The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses. Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it. Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health. Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and that all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures. This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively, that the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law. The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following observation: "The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law

to sustain the conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those facts may have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to, from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and in Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to talk with her." We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 Phil., 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is sufficient but was disproved by the testimony the instrumental witnesses. 3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may be cited: "Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 O.G. 220) ". . . The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. . . . "From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does not follow that such provisions lack of efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals." (Montaano v. Suesa, 14 Phil., pp. 676, 679-680) "To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid." Castaeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426, 428) Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements, touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason. WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

[G.R. No. 2599. October 27, 1905. ] CARMEN LINART Y PAVIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIA JUANA UGARTE Y ITURRALDE, DefendantSYLLABUS 1. INTESTATE SUCCESSION; COLLATERAL HEIRS; REPRESENTATIONS. The intestate left as heirs T., the daughter of a sister of the deceased, and C., a granddaughter of another sister of the deceased: Held, That C. was entitled to no part of the inheritance. (Arts. 921, 925, Civil Code.) 2. ID.; CHILDREN; GRANDCHILDREN. The word children in intestate estates can not include "grandchildren." Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December, 1900, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant line of succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateral descendant - that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased. Her mother, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, as well as the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, were children of Manuel Iturralde and Josefa Gonzalez. The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to the estate, having been heard in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at the time, intestate proceedings were instituted, and she was declared, in an order made on the 31st of January, 1901, without prejudice to third parties, to be the heir of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez. In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzales, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased a fact which this new relative did not deny be required to render an account of the property of the estate. The father of the petitioner was in the same collateral degree of succession as Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde. Pablo Linart, the father of Carmen Linart, was the legitimate son of Maria Josefa Iturralde y Gonzalez, another sister of Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez. They, and Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez are the common trunk from which the three branches issue. Carmen Linart does not claim that her father, Pablo, who was of the same degree as Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, should have succeeded Ramon, for the reason that the latter died first. This, however, was not alleged, much less proved. What she claims is that, although she is one degree lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation that is to say, that even though a grandniece, she is entitled to the same share in the estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde. The court below on the 24th of February, 1905, entered judgment declaring that the petitioner had the same right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, and ordered the latter to render an account of the estate, enjoining her, at the same time, from disposing of any part thereof until such accounting had been made and the estate distributed. Maria Juana Ugarte excepted to the judgment and has brought the case to this court. After a consideration of the case, this court finds: (1) That the relative nearest in degree excludes those more distant, with the exception of the right of representation in proper cases (art. 921, par. 1 of the Civil Code); and (2) that the right of representation in the collateral line shall take place only in favor of children of brothers or sisters whether they be of whole or half blood (art. 925, par. 2). In the light of the foregoing, the error which the appellant claims was committed in the court below is very clearly shown. The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was entitled to, when, as a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been quite different had it been shown that

her father, Pablo Linart, had survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin, Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited the portion of the estate corresponding to her fathers. It is not an error to consider that the word "children" in this connection does not include "grandchildren." There is no precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant such a conclusion. The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899, and December 31, 1895, relied upon, are not applicable to this case. Those decisions were rendered in cases relating to testate and not to intestate successions. In both cases, and in many others decided by the supreme court of Spain, prior to the operation of the Civil Code, where a testator had named certain persons as heirs and, they failing, that the property should pass to their children, it was held that "grandchildren" were necessarily included in the word "children," and that in such a case the grandchild does not, properly speaking, inherit by representation, "for the reason that he must in any event succeed the child in the natural and regular order," and pointed out in the last decision referred to. And, as is also pointed out in the first decision, "the fact that it was stated with more or less correctness in the prayer of the complaint that the action was based upon the right of representation, is not sufficient to deny to the appellant a right which he had under the terms of the will." The difference is this, that in the case of a testamentary succession, we must take into consideration and give force to the intention of the testator when he substitutes the children for the heirs first named by him. The descendants are ordinarily considered as included in the term "children," unless they are expressly excluded, whereas in intestate successions, reference should only be had to the provisions of the law under which it is evident that the rights of representation in the collateral line do not obtain beyond the sons and daughters of brothers or sisters. We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle. For the reasons above stated, we hereby reverse the judgment of the court below, and declare that Carmen Linart has no right to succeed the deceased with said Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who was once declared to be the lawful heir, and who is now in possession of the estate, as to whom we hereby dissolve the injunction issued from the Court of First Instance. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, without special provisions as to the costs of this instance, and let the record be remanded to the Court of First Instance from whence it came for execution of the said judgment. So ordered.

[G.R. Nos. 89224-25. January 23, 1992.] MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSONREYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; FINAL AND EXECUTORY; PETITIONERS SHOULD HAVE SEASONABLY APPEALED THE DECREE OF ADOPTION. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. Assuming that the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth. 2. ID.; ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS; CHALLENGE TO THE VALIDITY OF ADOPTION CANNOT BE MADE COLLATERALLY. A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue. The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. 3. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; BIRTH CERTIFICATE; ONE OF THE PRESCRIBED MEANS OF RECOGNITION. On the question of Doribels legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribels birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENTIARY NATURE OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS TO BE SUSTAINED ABSENT STRONG, COMPLETE AND CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF ITS FALSITY OR NULLITY. Mauricios testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandably suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."cralaw virtua1aw library 5. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMACY OF CHILD CAN BE QUESTIONED ONLY IN A DIRECT ACTION. Another reason why the petitioners challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribels legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party. The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. I, p. 559.) 6. ID.; SUCCESSION; LEGITIMATE AND ADOPTED CHILDREN SUCCEED THE PARENTS AND ASCENDANTS; RATIONALE. The philosophy underlying this article is that a persons love descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth. 7. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION; GRANDDAUGHTER HAS A RIGHT TO REPRESENT HER DECEASED FATHER. There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents other children.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATIONSHIP CREATED BY ADOPTION DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE BLOOD RELATIVES OF EITHER PARTIES. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting it for themselves to the exclusion of all others. The relevant genealogical facts are as follows. Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabels mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents lawful descendants. On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couples four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoros share in his parents estate by right of represe ntation. Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence. Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26, 1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate. Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil Case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects. SO ORDERED. That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt" (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction." Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural

mother. The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple. On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming that the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth. As the respondent court correctly observed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded. Not having any information of Doribels birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified. A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue. The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, this Court declared:chanrob1es virtual 1aw An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.) On the question of Doribels legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribels birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar. Mauricios testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandably suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribels legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party. The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose . In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:. ARTICLE 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child. The philosophy underlying this article is that a persons love descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth. Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ARTICLE 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. ARTICLE 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. ARTICLE 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation. There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents other children. 13 But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14 In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

[G.R. No. L-23828. February 28, 1966.] PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS v. GREGORIA ARANZANSO and DEMETRIA VENTURA, SYLLABUS 1. ADOPTION; ABANDONMENT BY PARENTS; CONSENT OF PARENTS NOT AN ABSOLUTE REQUISITE. Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices. 2. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF ABANDONMENT. In adoption proceedings abandonment imports "any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care an support which parents owe to their children." (2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, Sec. 32, pp. 886-887.) 3. ID.; ID.; REVIEW OF TRIAL COURTS FINDING OF ABANDONMENT; CASE AT BAR. The settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of the fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order (In re Mckeags Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74 Pac. 1039, 1040; In re Camps Estate, 131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736). It follows, therefore, that in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of the adopted children had abandoned them. 4. ID.; NATURE OF PROCEEDING; WHEN NOTICE NOT REQUIRED. Adoption is a proceeding in rem (Jacinto, Special Proceedings, 1965 Ed., p. 347; Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 111. 536; 36 N. E. 628), and constructive notice, such as the publication duly made in a newspaper of general circulation, is enough where the residence of the parents is unknown (2 Am. Jur., 2d, Adoption, Sec. 56 p. 906). Moreover, notice is not required in adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent (Parsons v. Parson, 101 Wis. 76 77 N. W. 147, 148). 5. ID.; PHILOSOPHY BEHIND ADOPTION STATUTES. The philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of the child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption (Prasnik v. Republic, 52 Off. Gaz., 1942) and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. 6. JUDGMENTS; SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT ON GROUND OF EXTRINSIC FRAUD; SEPARATE ACTION NECESSARY. A judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud only in a separate action brought for that purpose; not by way of collateral attack (Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717; Ramos v. Maalac, 89 Phil. 270). Res. of May 19, 1966. 7. ADOPTION; ABANDONMENT OF CHILD; FAILURE TO PERFORM DUTIES OF PARENTHOOD. Negligent and careless failure to perform the duties of parenthood is a significant element of abandonment, regardless of actual intention. (Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 133 NE 2d 56.) 8. ID.; ID.; LEAVING CHILD IN CARE OF OTHERS CONSTITUTES ABANDONMENT. A strong basis for a finding of the parents abandonment of his or her child is found in the case where the parent has left the child permanently or indefinitely in the care of others, given it to another, or surrendered it entirely. (2 Am. Jur. 2d 888.) 9. ID.; PARENTAL CONSENT. The parental consent required by the law in adoption proceedings refers to parents who have not abandoned their child (Sec. 3, Rule 100, Rules of Court.) 10. ID.; ID.; PERSONAL SIGNATURE BY PETITIONER NOT REQUIRED. Personal signature by the petition of the petition to adopt is not among the requisites of the law. 11. ID.; FINDINGS OF ADOPTION COURT CANNOT BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY; CASE AT BAR. Movants contends that according to the Court of Appeals, the findings of abandonment by the adoption court had totally no support in the evidence. For the Court of Appeals to arrive at such a conclusion, however, it had to pass under review the entire proceedings in the adoption court, and it cannot do so in a collateral suit, but only in a direct action for that purpose. What was before the Court of Appeals was not an appeal from the decision of the adoption court, or a direct suit

assailing the adoption, but an appeal from an order in the settlement proceedings where the adoption was sought to be collaterally attacked. Accordingly, said Court was not in a position to determine that the findings of the adoption court had totally no support in the evidence. For even assuming that the finding of abandonment is jurisdictional, the settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exist, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceedings, for a presumption arises in such cases, where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked, that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven. (Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720.) A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 4, 1949. 1 Paulina Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old. The petition, which was under oath, alleged inter alia, that the whereabouts of the minors nearest of kin, particularly their parents, were unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors have been abandoned by their respective parents; and that for years, since their infancy, said children have continuously been in petitioners care and custody. A guardian ad litem Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the minors. Said guardian ad litem forthwith gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina Santos, being over fourteen years of age, likewise gave her written consent thereto. 2 After due publication and hearing, the adoption court (CFI) rendered on August 25, 1949 a decision, hereunder quoted in full: "This is a petition for the adoption of the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes by the spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana R. Santos. After due publication in the National Weekly, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of a Manila, once a week for three consecutive weeks, the case was then set for trial. The office of the Solicitor General was duly notified of the petition and at the hearing did not offer any objection. "From the evidence presented at the hearing, it appears that the petitioners have been married for the past twenty-seven years and have no children of their own. They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes, both of whom are and for years have been living under their care and custody; that the former, since she was barely three months old has already been taken cared of by them up to the present time, and the latter has been cared for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos Reyes is now seventeen years old and has given her consent to the adoption as shown by her signature at the foot of the petition. She ratified the same in open Court. Both parents of the minor have long been unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them, they could not be found. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. The petitioners are both proprietors and have substantial income, more than enough to support and educate the minors. The Court is of the opinion that this adoption will be for the best interest and welfare of the minors. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the petition of the spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana R. Santos to adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes and in accordance with Rule 100 of the Rules of Court in the Philippines, hence forth, the minors are freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to their natural parents and are, to all legal intents and purposes the children of the petitioners. "NOW ORDERED. "Manila, Philippines, August 25, 1949."cralaw virtua1aw library No appeal was taken from the aforesaid decision. Subsequently eight years later on October 21, 1957, Juliana Reyes died, in Manila, without testament. On November 25, 1957 Simplicio Santos filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. 3 In said petition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age, respectively. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate. Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed on January 2, 1958 an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator. For her grounds she asserted that Simplicio Santos marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void; and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them. An answer to the opposition was filed by Simplicio Santos on Mar 7, 1958 and oppositor Aranzanso filed a reply thereto on Mar 17, 1958.

Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is the first cousin of the deceased Juliana Reyes and adding that she is the mother of the child Paulina Santos, filed on March 19, 1959 an opposition to the petition of Simplicio Santos to be named administrator, and, moreover, thereunder adopted, as her own, the pleadings filed by Gregoria Aranzanso. By order of April 6, 1959, the Court of First Instance decided the point in dispute, ruling that the validity of the adoption in question could not be assailed collaterally in the intestate Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision, promulgated on September 14, 1964, the Court of Appeals reversed the appealed order, finding instead that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the absence of consent thereto by the natural parents of the minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to collateral attack. After denial of their motion for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos appealed to this Court by way of petition for review, filed on November 18, 1964, to which due course was given. Five months after submission of this case for decision or on October 14, 1965 petitioners herein filed a petition for preliminary injunction, and later, on October 26, 1965, a supplemental petition therefor, to stop the trial court from allowing Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, as well as of two other persons, namely, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, to intervene in the settlement proceedings or to withdraw cash advances from the estate. It was alleged in the petition and supplemental petition for preliminary injunction that on September 22, 1965 the probate court issued an order allowing Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura to intervene in the settlement proceedings of Juliana Reyes estate (Sp. Proc. No. 34354); that on October 2, 1965 said court issued an order allowing, on previous motions therefor, withdrawal of the sum of P7,000 each, under bond, to all the parties, including Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura; that on October 7, 1965 two strangers to the proceedings the aforesaid sisters Consuelo and Pacita Pasion filed a motion, stating that they are also first cousins of the decedent and praying that an order be issued allowing them to withdraw the sum of P7,000 each under bond; that on October 13, 1965 the same Pasion sisters filed a supplemental motion in the same proceedings praying that their motion of October 7 be treated as a motion to intervene; that on October 18, 1965 the probate court issued an order allowing the Pasion sisters to intervene in the settlement proceedings and allowing them to withdraw under bond the sum P7,000 each from the funds of the estate. On November 4, 1965 respondents, together with Consuelo and Pacita Pasion who thereby submitted themselves to this Courts jurisdiction and stated that they, "for purposes of expediency, are also denominated respondents" filed their "Comment", as required by this Court, opposing the aforesaid petition for preliminary injunction. On November 15, 1965 this Court granted the prayer for preliminary injunction and the writ was issued upon posting of a bond of a bond of P5,000 on November 20, 1965. Respondents however moved for reconsideration or modification thereof on November 23, 1965, stating inter alia that they would now be precluded from taking part in the scheduled hearing for settlement of the accounts of the special administratrix (Araceli A. Pilapil). November 26, 1965 we ordered modification of the preliminary injunction, so that on November 29, the writ was modified so as to enjoin the probate court, until further orders: (1) from hearing and/or approving the settlement of special administratrixs accounts; (2) from allowing any sale, disposition or disbursement of the estate except when essential for strictly maintenance purposes; and (3) from allowing respondents, Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, or Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, or any of them, to receive any advance, cash or otherwise, from the funds of the intestate estate. The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos. In sustaining their right to make such a collateral attack, the respondent Court of Appeals rested as abovementioned on the premise that failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio. In its view, said consent was not properly dispensed with, not only because the evidence adduced in the adoption proceedings was insufficient to support a finding that the parents had abandoned the children, but also since the adoption court fatally omitted to expressly and specifically find that such abandonment in fact occurred. In this regard it should be stated the Court of Appeals completely relied on American jurisprudence and authorities to the effect that parental consent to the adoption is a jurisdictional requisite (E.g., 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, Section 45 [a] p. 435; Whetmore v. Fratello, 282 P2d 667, 670). The point to remember, however, is that under our law on the matter, consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite:

"SEC. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if over fourteen years of age and not incompetent, and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian or guardian as litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, childrens home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required." (Rule 100, Old Rules of Court) 4 Stated otherwise, if the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent to the adoption by the guardian ad litem suffices. This brings us to the question whether in the proceedings at bar the Court of Appeals can still review the evidence in the adoption case and conclude that it was not sufficiently established therein that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them. First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the adoption court made no determination of the fact of abandonment. As quoted earlier, it is stated in the decision of the adoption court, that: "From the evidence presented at the hearing it appears that the petitioners have been married for the past twenty-seven years and have no children of their own. They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos [y] Reyes and Aurora Santos [y] Reyes, both of whom are and for years have been living under their care and custody: that the former, since she was barely three months old has already been taken care of by them up to the present time, and the latter has been cared for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos [y] Reyes is now seventeen years old . . . Both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them, they could not be found. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court . . ." (Italics supplied). Abandonment under persuasive American rulings imports "any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children." (2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, Sec. 32, pp. 886-887.) It can thus readily be seen that altho the CFI judgment approving the adoption does not use the word "abandoned", its findings sufficiently contain a set of facts and circumstance which truly constitutes a finding of abandonment. Coming now to the power of the Court of Appeals to review in this case the finding of abandonment made by the adoption court, we find that even under American jurisprudence relied upon, as stated, by said Court the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order (In re: McKaegs Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74 Pac. 1039, 1040; In re: Camps Estate, 131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736). Anent this point the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75 p. 922, thus: "An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of the minor by his parent, or the consent of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence can not be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail." library Freeman on Judgments says the same thing: "In general, therefore, where the right of the court to assume jurisdiction of a cause and proceed to judgment depends upon the ascertainment of facts in pais and the court retains jurisdiction it thereby impliedly adjudges that the requisites jurisdictional facts exist and having found such facts in favor of jurisdiction, its decision in this respect, whether erroneous

of not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceedings, for a presumption arises in such cases, when the validity of the judgment is attacked, that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven . . ." (Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, construing a statute akin to our law in this regard, said in Parsons v. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147, 148:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "The statute to be considered is section 4022, Rev. St. 1878, which reads as follows: No such adoption shall be made without the written consent of the living parents of such child unless the court shall find that one of the parents had abandoned the child or gone to parts unknown. Thus it will be seen that upon the fact being established that the living parent had abandoned his child, he is deemed by the statute to have thereby relinquished all parental right to be consulted in respect to the childs welfare, and his consent to the adoption is therefore dispensed with. The term abandon obviously means no more than neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children. The fact of abandonment, judicially determined, was essential to the jurisdiction; not essential that it should be determined on proper evidence, necessarily, or in accordance with the truth, because mere error in that regard does not affect jurisdiction. If jurisdiction be obtained to determine a fact, its determination wrong or on the insufficient or improper evidence is immaterial on the question of legal right to proceed judicially to the next step. That is deemed to be elementary, . . . A judicial determination may be contrary to conclusive evidence, or legal evidence, or without any evidence, yet cannot be impeached for want of jurisdiction. Van Fleet, Coll. Attack, Secs. 663, 665. That rule applies to all judicial proceedings . . ." library It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents, of Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them. This is do even if such fact of abandonment is deemed jurisdictional, a point which we need not and do not rule upon in this case. For the same reason, it is not in point to argue here that Simplicio Santos in fact concealed the adoption proceedings from the natural parents thereby rendering the judgment obtained therein null and void for being secured by extrinsic fraud. The rule is well recognized that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud only in a separate action brought for that purpose; not by way of collateral attack (Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717; Ramos v. Maalac, 89 Phil. 270). Anent the alleged lack of notice of the adoption proceedings on the natural parents, suffice it to mark that adoption is a proceeding in rem 5 and that constructive enough where the residence of the parents is unknown (2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, Sec. 56, p. 906). Notice, moreover, is not required in adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent (Parsons v. Parsons, supra). Assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly married to Juliana Reyes, it will not make any difference as far as the right of respondents to intervene in the intestate proceedings is concerned. Juliana Reyes should then be deemed to have filed the petition for adoption as a person whose status is single, not married. The defect would then lie only as to Simplicio Santos, who, as allegedly married to another person (a point that we do not decide in this case), could not adopt without joining his wife in the petition. 6 It being the estate of Juliana Reyes that is the subject matter of the settlement proceedings, the flaw, if any, would not affect the consideration of the right of Paulina and Aurora Santos to succeed as adopted children of Juliana Reyes, to the exclusion of respondents. It must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of the child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption (Prasnik v. Republic, 5 O. G. 1942) and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. From 2 Corpus Juris Secundum 375-376 we quote: "Accordingly, as the main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of children, bereft of the benefits of the home and care of their real parents, whenever possible without doing violence to the terms of the statute, such a construction should be given adoption laws as will sustain, rather than defeat, this purpose. "Although, as against the interests of the child, the proceedings must be strictly in accordance with the statute, there is a tendency on the part of the courts, however, where the adoption has been fully consummated, to construe the statute with a reasonable degree of liberality, to the end that the assumed relationship and the intention of the parties be upheld,

particularly as against strangers to the proceedings collaterally attacking them . . ." library From all the foregoing it follows that respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura and those who, like them (Pasion sisters), claim an interest in the estate or Juliana Reyes as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must be as in the instant case considered valid. Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the order of the probate court a quo sustaining the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is affirmed. Respondents Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura as well as Consuelo and Pacita Pasion are declared without right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved, except insofar as it enjoins the intervention or allowance of withdrawals of properly from the estate by Gregoria Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, in the concept of heirs, as to which it is hereby made permanent. No costs. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 77867. February 6, 1990.] ISABEL DE LA PUERTA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional rights to the estate of her alleged grandmother. Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving her properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will. 1 The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively. 2 Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate court. 3 Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. 4 On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was granted. 5 However, the decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the case. 6 On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. 7 At the hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed status to which Isabel was allowed to submit counterevidence.chanrobles law library : red On November 12, 1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. The court added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was) too weak to discredit the same." 8 On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the respondent court, 9 which is now in turn being challenged in this petition before us. The petitioners main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelitas real parents are Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan. Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that Carmelita was the legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were legally or presumably married. Moreover, Carmelita could not have been a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta because he was already married at the time of her birth in 1962. To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who testified that he was a neighbor of Austrial and Jordan. According to him, the two were living as husband and wife and had three children, including a girl named "Puti," presumably Carmelita. He said though that he was not sure if the couple was legally married. 10 Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, identified herself as Vicente de la Puertas wife but said they separated two years after their marriage in 1938 and were never reconciled. In 1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de la Puerta in his house, which was only five or six houses away from where she herself was staying. Genoveva said that the relationship between her husband and Gloria was well known in the community. 11 In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library . . . By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the Court that she was born on December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate (Exh. A); that her father was Vicente de la Puerta and her mother is Gloria Jordan who were living as common law husband and wife until his death on June 14, 1978; that Vicente de la Puerta was married to, but was separated from,

his legal wife Genoveva de la Puerta; that upon the death of Vicente de la Puerta on June 14, 1978 without leaving a last will and testament, she was the only child who survived him together with his spouse Genoveva de la Puerta with whom he did not beget any child; that she was treated by Vicente de la Puerta as a true child from the time of her birth until his father died; that the fact that she was treated as a child of Vicente de la Puerta is shown by the family pictures showing movant with Vicente de la Puerta (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2) and school records wherein he signed the report cards as her parent (Exh. E and E-1); that during the hearing of her adoption case in Special Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court at Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta categorically stated in court that Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria Jordan (Exhs. B and B-1); that it was Vicente de la Puerta during his lifetime who spent for her subsistence, support and education; This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent any of those circumstances we have laid down in a long line of decisions that will justify reversal. 13 Among these circumstances are: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. The petitioner insists on the application of the following provisions of the Civil Code to support her thesis that Carmelita is not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta but the legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the hus bands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library (1) By the impotence of the husband; (2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible; (3) By the serious illness of the husband. Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. These rules are in turn based on the presumption that Juanito and Gloria were married at the time of Carmelitas birth in 1962, pursuant to Rule 131, Sec. 5(bb) of the Rules of Court, providing that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library (b) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable and may be refuted with evidence to the contrary. As the Court sees it, such evidence has been sufficiently established in the case at bar. The cases 14 cited by the petitioner are not exactly in point because they involve situations where the couples lived continuously as husband and wife and so could be reasonably presumed to be married. In the case before us, there was testimony from Vicentes own wife that her husband and Gloria lived together as a married couple, thereby rebutting the presumption that Gloria was herself the lawful wife of Juanito Austrial. Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and Gloria did not continuously live together as a married couple.

Moreover, it is not explained why, if he was really married to her, Juanito did not object when Gloria left the conjugal home and started openly consorting with Vicente, and in the same neighborhood at that. That was unnatural, to say the least. It was different with Genoveva for she herself swore that she had separated from Vicente two years after their marriage and had long lost interest in her husband. In fact, she even renounced in open court any claim to Vice ntes estate. 15 The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been destroyed, it became necessary for the petitioner to submit additional proof to show that the two were legally married. She did not. Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private respondents filiation, we reject the petitioners contention that Article 278 of the Civil Code is not available to Carmelita. It is error to contend that as she is not a natural child but a spurious child (if at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing. On the contrary, it has long been settled that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library The so-called spurious children or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known as bastards, include adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights (Art. 287, CC). But their filiation must be duly proven. (Ibid, Art. 887) How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious children under the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children. Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rule on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children. 16 This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the private respondents certificate of birth as proof of her filiation. That status was sufficiently established by the sworn testimony of Vicente de la Puerta at the hearing of the petition for adoption on September 6, 1976, where he categorically declared as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Q What relation if any do you have with Carmelita de la Puerta? A She is my daughter. Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta? According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Art. 970 Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child. It is settled that In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of the person represented to succeed by right of representation. 18 The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have had if still living. In the present case, however, said deceased had already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein. . . . It is a fact that at the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He died two months after her (testatrixs) death. And upon his death, he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners he rein Elisa Cuison Et.

Al., the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy. . . . In other words, the herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right to the property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property. Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her fathers death, which c ame after his own mothers death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir. But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court declared:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library . . . even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged fathers first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate chil d who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment." 22 Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make one for their kindred." 23 The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own fathers estate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revueltas will. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private Respondent. It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. L-22469. October 23, 1978.] TOMAS CORPUS v. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS SYNOPSIS Teodoro R. Yangco was the acknowledged natural son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, one of whom was Jose Corpus. Jose Corpus had a daughter, Juana Corpus. Petitioner Tomas Corpus is the son of Juana Corpus. As the sole heir of Juana Corpus, petitioner Tomas Corpus filed an action in the Court of First Instance to recover his mothers supposed share in the Yangcos intestate estate, claiming that the project of partition made pursuant to the order of the probate court as invalid and hence, the estate should be disposed of under the rules of intestacy. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground of res judicata stating that the intrinsic validity of Teodoro R. Yangcos will had already been passed upon in a special proceedings approving the project of partition. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was certified to the Supreme Court as it involved more than P50,00 pursuant to the Judiciary Law before it was amended. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts judgment on another ground, namely that since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child, and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supported hereditary share of his mother, because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. SYLLABUS 1. CIVIL LAW; WILL; DULY PROBATED WILL FORM PART OF JUDICIAL OR PUBLIC RECORDS; CASE AT BAR. Appellants contentions that the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, dated June 14, 1907 which states that Teodoro R. Yangco was his acknowledged natural son, cannot prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in Section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and the statement of Teodoro Yangcos biographer that Luis Yangco had two marriages, the first with Ramona Arguelles (Teodoros mother) and the second with Victoria Obin have no merit. The authenticity of that will which had been admitted and duly probated is incontestable. That will is now part of a public or official judicial record. 2. ID.; FILIATION; PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY; CHILD BORN OUT OF A UNION OF A MAN AND A WOMAN IS PRESUMED LEGITIMATE. It is disputably presumed "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" ; (Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio) "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life." 3. ID.; ID.; SUCCESSION; NO SUCCESSIONAL RECIPROCITY BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE RELATIVES. Article 943 of the old Civil Code "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The rule is now found in article 992 of the new Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children and relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child." 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 943, OLD CIVIL CODE (ART. 922 NEW CIVIL CODE); BASIS OF. The rule found in Article 943 of the old Civil Code prohibiting successional reciprocity between legitimates and illegitimates is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family, while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUCCESSION OF ACKNOWLEDGED OR LEGITIMATE CHILDREN. Under Article 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to his entire estate and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share like. In default of natural ascendants,

decedents natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters. Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Courts 1941 decision in Corpus v. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision. Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio, (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales. Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel. Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partition was not in conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. The probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar rados por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a perpetual prohibition against alienation, that condition would be regarded "como no puesta o no existente." It concluded that "no hay motivos legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada." (See Barretto v. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.) From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco appealed to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in this Courts resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise agreement. As the resolutions dismissing the appeals became final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17). On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controversy over the Yangco estate. On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate, He alleged ill his complaint that the disp ositions in Yangcos will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedents estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.chanrobles law library

The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangcos will was passed upon in its order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testators estate. Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in CA-G.R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17[5], Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613). Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized, and (3) that plaintiffs action is barred by res judicata and laches. In the disposition of this appeal, it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangcos will had been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal may be resolved by determining whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of appellant Tomas Corpus, was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mothers supposed intestate share in Yangcos estate? To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangcos filiation. The trial court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco." The basis of the trial courts conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are: "Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, llamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos." (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco). That will was attested by Rafael del Pan, Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales Diez. Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, identified as Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin, implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro. These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit 1 herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangcos will, in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record. On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumed "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" ; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and [cc], Rule 131, Rules of Court). Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangcos estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus. Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que lo haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado." Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" (6 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola, Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 465-6) . ..

Appellant Corpus concedes that if Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangcos estate (p. 8, appellants brief). The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child." That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185-6). Under articles 944 and 945 of the spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangcos half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy. Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho v. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman v. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991). Where the testatrix, Rosario Fabie, was the legitimate daughter of Jose Fabie, the two acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Fabie, her fathers brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey v. Fabie, 88 Phil. 128). By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente v. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno v. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde v. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909). The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran v. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).chanrobles law library : red WHEREFORE the lower courts judgment is affirmed. No costs.

[G.R. No. L-66574. February 21, 1990.] ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, Et Al., Petitioners, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, Respondents. SYLLABUS 1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION; NOT AVAILABLE TO ILLEGITIMATE DESCENDANTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN IN INHERITANCE OF A LEGITIMATE GRANDPARENT; ARTICLE 982 OF NEW CIVIL CODE, GENERAL RULE WHILE ARTICLE 992 OF SAME CODE, EXCEPTION. Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLES 982 AND 902 OF NEW CIVIL CODE, SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATION THAT AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD HAS NO RIGHT TO INHERENT AB INTESTATO FROM LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND RELATIVES OF HIS FATHER OR MOTHER. The rules laid down in Article 982 that grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiaes Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12) 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUCCESSION AB INTESTATO BETWEEN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AND LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND RELATIVES OF FATHER OR MOTHER OF SAID ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, ABSOLUTELY PROHIBITED; RATIONALE. "Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fabie 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196). 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGITIMACY OR ILLEGITIMACY OF PERSON TO BE REPRESENTED, DETERMINING FACTOR. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed in Article 992. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WORD "RELATIVE" IN ARTICLE 992 OF NEW CIVIL CODE, BROAD ENOUGH TO COMPREHEND ALL KINDRED OF PERSON SPOKEN OF; CASE AT BAR. It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti

Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouviers Law Dictionary vol. II, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, Et. Al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Et Al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being challenged in this Second Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed their respective pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to grant the request of the petitioners for oral argument before the court en banc, and the case was set for hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term "relatives" in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which reads: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child." library include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited to discuss as amici curiae during the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane. The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows: "It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisas mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa." library Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this - who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero - her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)? The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. In connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de. Santero. library Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that time merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate succession). Again, We do not deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist. Let us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.

"Art. 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. (933). Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation. (940a). Art. 990. The hereditary lights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a)" Emphasis for emphasis). Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. "The rules laid down in Article 982 that grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother." (Amicus Curiaes Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12) "Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fabie 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196). According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above-quoted are based on Articles 939 to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil Code and to the case at bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted by this Court in the cases of Llorente v. Rodriguez, Et Al., 10 Phil., 585; Centeno v. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao v. Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited by former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself), is already abrogated by the amendments made by the New Civil Code and thus cannot be made to apply to the instant case. Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial changes in our law of succession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction of Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters which are now the subject of the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in

conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed in Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that the three aforecited cases may be said to be still applicable to the instant case. Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also find support from other civilists. We quote: "In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 992 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quarter, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7, Decision; p. 196, Rollo) It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouviers Law Dictionary vol. II, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say: "The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus.." According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.chanrobles.com : virtual law library Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense which, as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. To recapitulate, We quote this:

"The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates, which goes back very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased by present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done away with the sub classification of illegitimates into natural and spurious). It would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiaes Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12). In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended to clarify the term "relatives", there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners. WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. L-19281. June 30, 1965.] IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SATILLON, CLARO SANTILLON v. PERFECTA MIRANDA SYLLABUS 1. APPEALS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; ORDER OF COURT DETERMINING DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE OF HEIRS APPEALABLE. An order of the Court of First Instance which determines the distributive shares of the heirs of a deceased person is appealable. 2. SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE CONCURRING WITH A LEGITIMATE CHILD ENTITLED TO ONEHALF OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE. When intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only one legitimate child of the deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the deceased spouse under Article 996 of the Civil Code. This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro Santillon. On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province. About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate. On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon. On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties as the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code, to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedros inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2. After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads: "IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. . . ." virtua1aw library From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions of law are involved. The first, raised in Perfectas Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the lower court is appealable. And the second, raised in appellants lone assignment of error, is: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child? The First Issue: It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and therefore appealable to this Court. Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the Court of First Instance where

such order determines . . . "the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled." library The Second Issue: Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his fathers estate on Art. 892, of the New Civil Code which provides that: "If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives, the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. . . . As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites Art. 996 which provides: "If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children." library Replying to Perfectas claim, Claro says the article is unjust and inequitable to the extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2. Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular, "child." Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his fathers estate. Art. 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply; i. e. Art. 996. Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claros contention; at least, his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court. This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Codes chapter in legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows: "One child Surviving. If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular is applicable in his case." The theory of those holding otherwise, seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of "children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child" ; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because whereas in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate. A. Children: It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied): "if the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children", the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child" in the following articles:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and descendants . . . ART. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate . . .

ART. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive . . . are entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate . . . (See also Art. 901.) In fact, those who say, "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children", not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child", the same meaning should be given to Art. 996. B. Unfairness of Art. 996. Such position, more clearly stated is this: In testate succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate, if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist. On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament) whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor. Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislators desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations. The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain, and this we are not called upon to discuss but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to enforce. The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.

[G.R. No. L-22402. June 30, 1969.] CLEMENTE ALVIAR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CESAREO ALVIAR, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants. SYLLABUS 1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; INTESTACY; CONCURRENCE OF FULL BROTHER AND HALF BROTHERS IN INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED FULL SISTER; RULE. Where at the time Belen Alviar died intestate, she was single and had been survived by her full brother Clemente Alviar, and five other half brothers and sisters, who were children of her father by his second marriage, the lower court decided correctly in holding that Clemente Alviar does not exclude their half brothers and sisters from the intestate estate of said Belen Alviar. Article 1006 of the Civil Code leaves no room for doubt that brothers and sisters of full blood do not exclude those of half blood, for, otherwise, there would be no occasion for the concurrence of both classes and the application of said Article 1006. Moreover, Clemente Alviar had entered into a contract with his half brothers and sisters for the extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased Belen Alviar and there is nothing in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties to warrant the annulment or rescission of said agreement. Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, originally taken to the Court of Appeals, but subsequently certified by the latter to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that only questions of law are involved therein, the facts having been stipulated by the parties. Clemente Alviar, the original plaintiff herein, and Belen Alviar were legitimate children of Florentino Alviar and Bibiana Carillo. Sometime after the latters death on January 30, 1901, Florentino Alviar married Flora Erasga, who begot him five (5) children, namely: Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor, all surnamed Alviar. On September 6, 1951, Belen Alviar died intestate. She was single and had been survived by her brother Clemente Alviar, and five (5) half brothers and sisters, said Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor Alviar. Belens estate consisted of two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated in the Barrio of Sukol, Calamba, Laguna, with an area, respectively, of 17,199 and 6,422 square meters, more or less, otherwise known as lots 2 and 3 of subdivision plan Psu-3720, and more particularly described in TCT No. 3033 of the Province of Laguna, and a residential lot in Pasay City, of about 237 square meters, otherwise known as Lot No. 223-D of subdivision plan Psd-18972, and more particularly described in TCT No. 1578 of the Province of Rizal. On June 28, 1955, these six (6) brothers and sisters executed a deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating to Clemente Alviar the two (2) parcels of agricultural land in Calamba, Laguna, and to the five (5) half brothers and sisters of the deceased the residential lot in Pasay City. In pursuance of said deed, the parties took possession of their respective shares. Moreover, Clemente Alviar secured TCT Nos. 15307 and 15308 to said lots 2 and 3 of subdivision plan Psu-3720 in Calamba Laguna. The residential land in Pasay City was, in turn, partitioned among his aforesaid half brothers and sisters and subdivided into lots Nos. 223-D-1 and 223-D-2. The first was alloted to Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, who secured thereto TCT No. 8495 in their names, whereas the second was covered by TCT No. 8496 in the name of Cesareo Alviar, his sister Fabiana having renounced her share therein in his favor. Their brother Castor had, likewise, waived his share in said residential land. Over five (5) years later, or on September 4, 1962, Clemente Alviar commenced the present action, against his half brother and sisters, Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa and Zenaida Alviar and their mother, and his step-mother, Flora Erasga, to annul the deed of extrajudicial partition above referred to and the aforementioned TCT Nos. 8495 and 8496, covering the residential lot in Pasay City, as well as to recover the possession thereof and the title thereto, upon the ground that, acting in bad faiths and conspiring, confederating and conniving with each other, as well as "taking advantage of plaintiffs lack of education, illiteracy and ignorance, and knowing full well that" the "children by second marriage of Florentino Alviar had no rights, participation and interest over" the three (3) lots left by Belen Alviar, the defendants had "misled" the plaintiff "into signing" said deed. Inasmuch as Clemente Alviar died soon thereafter, his widow, Paulina Pamulaklakin and their children, Ramon and Norma Alviar, substituted him as plaintiff in this case. The defendants having filed an answer denying specifically the allegations of the complaint regarding the irregularities allegedly attending the execution of the deed of extrajudicial partition, both parties later filed a stipulation of facts on the relationship between them, the civil status of Belen Alviar, the properties constituting her estate, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial partition and the steps taken to carry out its provisions, and submitted the case for the determination of

only one question, namely: "who are the parties entitled to participate in the inheritance of Belen Alviar, and in what proportion?" Plaintiffs maintained that since Clemente Alviar was a full brother of Belen Alviar, whereas the main defendants herein are merely her half brother and sisters, Clemente is a relative of Belen nearer in degree than said defendants, who are more distant to her, so that they (defendants) are excluded by Clemente, and he is entitled to succeed to the entire estate of Belen. The trial court in effect overruled this pretense and rendered a decision holding that both parties "are entitled to inherit from Belen Alviar, . . . plaintiffs to receive two-seventh (2/7)" of the residential lot in Pasay City, and "each of the defendants" Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Castor and Zenaida Alviar "one-seventh (1/7) thereof, with no pronouncement as to costs." library The defendants moved for a reconsideration of this decision, upon the ground that the same should have ordered the redistribution, not only of the lot in Pasay City, but, also, of the two (2) parcels of agricultural land in Laguna. This motion having been denied, the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, as above pointed out, subsequently certified the case to the Supreme Court. The main issue raised by the parties in this case is whether or not, as a full brother of Belen Alviar, the degree of relationship to her of the deceased Clemente Alviar was nearer than that of their half brothers and sisters, the children of their father by second marriage, and he excluded them in the succession to her estate. The lower court decided this question in the negative and correctly. Indeed, "proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations" and "each generation forms a degree." 1 In relation to Belen Alviar, her full brother, Clemente Alviar, is, therefore, in the same degree of relationship as their half brothers and sisters, the aforementioned defendants, for all of them constitute the first generation of descendants of their common father, Florentino Alviar. In fact, this rationalization is rendered superfluous, apart from being confirmed, by the explicit language of Art. 1003 and 1004 and 1006 of our Civil Code, reading: "ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles." virtua1aw library "ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares." virtua1aw library "ART. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter." library These provisions, particularly the last, leave no room for doubt that brothers and sisters of full blood do not exclude those of half blood, for, otherwise, there would be no occasion for the concurrence of both classes and the application of said Art. 1006. More important that this, however, is the fact that Clemente Alviar had entered into a contract with his half brothers and sisters for the extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased Belen Alviar and that there is nothing in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties to warrant the annulment of rescission of said agreement. The validity thereof thus being indubitable, there is absolutely no reason why the same should be disturbed. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered absolving the defendants- appellants from the complaint, and dismissing the same, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellees. It is so ordered.