Power and Interdependence Second Edition Robert O. Keohane Harvard University Joseph S. Nye Harvatd University HarperCollinsPublishersCGECESESCHOGSEEHDESEHEECEEOEE Contents PART I Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 UNDERSTANDING INTERDEPENDENCE, Interdepondence in World Politics 3 ‘The New Whetorle of interdependence 6 Interdependence asa lytic Concept Power and Interdependence 11 tational Reglne Change 19 and Complex Interdependence 23 sracterstcs of Complex Interdepenslonce 24 Multiple channels. Absence of hierarchy among, Issues. Minor role of military force. ‘The Political Processes of Complex Interdependence 29 Linkage strategies. Agenda setting. Transnational and transgovernmental relations, Role of {ternational organtantions. nal Regime Change 38, tation 38 sonomte Process Explant 30h Leon cero | Overall Power Structure Explanation 42 Chapter 6 The Polities of Rule-Making in Oceans Eroding hegemony. Limitations of an overall and Money 129 structure explanation Beonomic Processes and Regime Change 129 Issue Structure 49 Overall Structure and Regime Ch 132 Limitations of structural explanations rasan ofthe oceans regi. Laternationl An tnterationsl Organization Model 54 monetary regimes. Combining Explanations 58 lose Structure and Regine Change 137 Tntomational monotary lsue area. Oceans polities. PART I REGIME CHANGE IN OCEANS AND MONEY ernational Organization and Regime Change 140 ‘Oceans polites. The International monetary area Chapter ‘The Politics of Oceans and Money: y Historical Overview 63 153 ‘The International Monetary Issuo Aron 05 \ Conclusion 158 ‘The Intornationa gokl standard before 1914. International monotary regis, 1920-76, PART IIL REGIMES AND TWO BILATERAL / “The Ooeans Issue Area 80 RELATIONSHIPS i ing the nse area. The classical ree sas | “ regime. Regime periods, 1920-75. The changing Chapter 7 United States Relations with Aw, agenda of oceans polities Canada and Australia 105 \ Covelasion 98 “Chapter 5 Complex Interdependence in Ocenns and Money 89 » . ‘The Conaitions of Complex Interdepes Issues and Outcomes: ited States 178 1d Outcomes: ited States 108 fl * Role of force, Absonce of hierarchy among issucs. ‘Muliple channcls of contact. Money, wens, and | complex interdependence, | ‘The Political Process in Money and Oceans 112 Coals of actors. Instruments of state policy. ‘Agenda formation. Linkage of isues. Roles of Snternational organizations, raving the Polities of Agenda Formation 198 Accounting for Dilferences in Outcomes 202 Conclusion 120 Regine Change: Alternative Explanations 200 (SC OG ECECECEOCEOSEHOEHCEEEEECEOESECCESSeecescou: @Gee PART iV THE UNITED STATES AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE Chapter 8 Coping with Interdependence 221 Explinatoty Models and Conditions ‘of Werld Politics 292 Power in Coniplex Interdepend 2H ‘Trevids Toward Complex Interdependence 226 Leadérship in Complix tnterdejiilence 229 ‘Multiple Leadership ahd Policy Coordination 232, Building the Legitimacy of International | Regimes 234 Intertational and Domestic Organtzation 230 Conclusion — 242 PART V SECOND THOUGHTS ON THEORY - AND POLICY as 1, Princlpal Thenies of Poivr ad Inlerdependence 145 2, ‘the Research Program of Poiver and Interdependence: A Crtque 251 Inietdependence and bargelning. Complex Anterdependence, International regime change. 3. Limitailane of Structural Theory: Syetamnte Peliteal Processes 260 4. Petceptions and Learning 264 Conclusion 267 ‘Twi Cheers for Multilateralism — 208 ‘The Need for Regimes 270 Notes Index cewrents | le Uneealiste Visions 273 Do not ty to recapture the past. Ask whether ‘world really needs It. Buld on shared interest Use regimes to insure against catastrophe. The ‘host onforcement Is slf-onforeement. Lavk for the right moment, Use regimes to focus U.S. a on the future, Heglme Main eo 870 United Nations peacekeeping. International debt. xchange rates 307 srmorase =For our parents, with gratitude, Aone Preface to First Edition \] Center for International Affairs, Harvard University ‘Aastudents in tho late 19505 and carly 1960s, wo wore taught look at interna . onal polities through “realist” glasses, which emphasized the ever-present Possibility of war among sovereign states. As our earlier work indicates, we ‘s00n became unoasy about this one-sided view of realty, particularly about its {inadequate analysis of economie intogeation and of the roles played by Formal i brary of Congo Catling Fubetion Dat + Koshane Rater 0, but Owen, 04 etme ormalintornatfonal institutions. Our collaboration began in 1068 when, Z4 +, {torgrandiaterdepens Reber 0. Kecane, Joan Hye. 13 new members of the board of editors of International Organization, we (i tad slecided to edit a special issue of that journal to citcize traditional views of Ince graphs references andes world politics te the relevance of international organization to demons 2 tntertiona eco relates ‘roadly conceived.* We decided! to write the present hook, after Transnational Relations and World Politics was published in the summer of 1971, for two main reasons CGESECOECHESECEKOCECCESEEEEGES: eS ow Although in that volume we had poisted aut signifeant probleme with eases s Caprh © 180 Rote Recher. Nye theory, articlly in the area of iteration! poet economy, weld not vhaehoty trepedestnay omer sy provided an alternative theory. We sll needed to ft transnational relains 6 age em otek ey a Inaluerameveafwotdaitatis aetna cata & Sik ding tn he oes task we had gun. From a poly standpoint, we thoght tat signean me 8 neal pga ina reve. provements Amerson poley on isues valiagtemetiaet eet aa ‘nteiational organizations wero illelyunles the premises of policy wore changed, We believed that many ofthe fallires of American foreign policy in 50780 1K ‘Printed the Usted Sats f America "ImterationalOrensation 25, 0.9 (Sumer 191); lar pblshed a Tronwatona elton ‘ond Wold Flic (Cais, Mase: Hara Volver Pres 1972) G&EEOSESE 8 SSHSSBSEGE Sece Vi OG 6SGCCOCE ® i See WL | merace 10 ria eoenon those creas had their roots tn the limitations of reals assumptions. For both analytical sd polley reasons, therofore, wo sought to write a book that would put into a broader eaitot tho classo realist ahalyis that Llans Morgenthau’ folie Anions Nats, among other wars, had Beate othe carrot senor, ‘Our iitlytcil and poley concerns help io czplaln the ortentaion of ths 3k ley eoncern had to do with Anorlean foreign policy, but the books fous is completly diferent from thal of mast books nnd eticles on this subject, Becauze we are concerned with th p cae teon the changing tiatute of the international system and how to _understanlt. Only Inthe last chapter do we draw lessons for foreign policy. ‘Our two country-oriented ease studies, however, are focused on the United States. Yet throughout the book, our emphasis is on theory. The eases were selected fr thelr potential signlficance for theory as much as for thel intrinsic policy importance. Since the Unite States isthe matt important actor inthe systt, oir focis 6m Aimerian actions ean be justified on theoreti! as wel policy grounds. in addition, each of out major cars Is examined over at lens fifty-year porlod to help us understand underlying forecs of stability and change, Our method isnot simply hstoeal: ro havo nnalyzod th eases ao tording toa theoretical and éompatative scheme that we claborat in chaple 1-8. This approach bears some resemblance to what our teacher Stanley Hoff jan called “historical sociology” over x decedo ago® We ry to quantify what ‘we can, but we srest theory over method and understanding the premises of //Aooiey over charting a detailed course of action, In this book we try la tiidetstand world polities by developing ex lanations at thodawel ft onal system, Ths doesnot mean tht wo regard the omestis pots af fortgn policy as unimportant, Quite th contary. Forlgn Bolicy and domestle policy, as we repeatedly emphasize, are becoming incroas- Sete cdientangle. Nevertheless, the complex relations between for- pu and domestic policy make It essential to know how much one ean explain ‘onthe basis of information about the internation ‘we tr} to discover what cannot be explained on the basis of international fae- tors, as well as what can be so explained. Thus, although comparative forciga + Some or ought on this bk av speredin cer at bth have been mgt are In fom dnt toy sow tegen rot th ‘clase, fr hae we noe prin fom ho Uy of Wc re oa ‘rom the following articles: C. Fred Bergson, R. Keohane, and J. Nye, “Intemational Eooposias ‘odletrao ut A Fever ter An ntorationOretatin5n {cr ioroy Kohan god). Ny, Tin Cpe at Cede nen Tstrapendene" Ital Orentaton 2, (sn 14) Ny “Pate ular and rte Conf hn Empl hh Iteration! Qrtatn 38 (hatune ie. Ste Hota Cotenporey heya! eat Enloond Ci: Prenecl h race ro Hse somo | i pully Is not tho subject of this book, we hope that students of comparative Fort poe wil tour anys ustul—i only asa staring pola fore slop to cxpainpltors of mation aclion Wotlo mt ela hat our explains of change and stably a world pl ct Ia eu be devel for tls purpose, oven a he We hava wt, for oxampl, included Mera formulation Many Murase adopt what wo eal a ororll structure approach alsough te retin, thy nest wes theory af tho foreign poly proers, Soe Marist, howover, fc on dro latins emongeaplatathexe form lations, ulnational corporations are mportant ia thee ow ight ex pole actors Yo asae as wo could dotermine, there nota generally accepted ard lary arclated Marit theory of neretional eine change We tea thor smpathete enough with the Mars perspective, nor lenrned enough in its sublets, to develop Macs model four own Its tobe hoped that Maras wil dvi el otro reine change o compete ih or crmplament our own, Friends have fon asked us how we hve managed io collaborates ten: sively over such slang period of time. Tho short answers by arallowing our pre hilo wo toro pu cach ole’ chapters Although callaborstion Inve secusona ruta, it produces the been Inllecual pees ot rapid response and exploration of dons By and lege, we have enjoyed the proces. Tho theorelel chapters have gone throug so many das hat Ws Viral inposst to Mety the sures of patel Idee. Keohane took Prtnary export or the ea studes on money and Ausales Nye or oxcans and Gana, fv hore, howover, then dviton labor doe not sceurately reflect the eaality of our contributions to the Beal version, ‘Our transcontienta eollabortion would not have been pose without {ho support of Ford Foundation grant, In adliln, over the ast lve years, func help was provided to Nyeby the Rockefeller Foundation and to Kee Ine bythe Univenty Consort for Word Order Stadies, the Johnson “Tissot certainly aplosomuch of he Heratar on “inertial depen” which focuses fltns hte dovelpot al derdeveped conte (bl wills by no menat cclasvely Marsa curser Apart me cloereny Morten a see Marat pal of vow canbe founda Staphontymer, “The oration ef Crp inal of onomie ver (Maeh 197) and Ert Manel, Europe, meron Conte: of peri (Nev Yrk: Moh Rav Pres, 170), epecaly capers I-, epea Hyer, “The Bll Coroortin the Law af Uneven Development." aga Bhagwat ed Enemies, ‘World Order from th 170s othe 190s New York: Tho Free Preis, 172), pp. 11910, Joban Calton,“ Sretral Theory of imperial" Jounal of Pe ‘Oa Sunt, “Trarmattonal Captakn and Natloel Datei ‘nd Ecole tae (Univers of West inden) 2, (Mace auf et al, "A Preity Tet ofthe Theay af Dependeny.” Compra 1955)pal ME Lara 0 rere Foundation, and the Stanford University Cntor fr Hescarch in International Studie, Nye ts also grateful to Carleton Univerlly tn Otawn and to the Royal Instituteof International Afatrsin London and ssf. Weare both grateful the Harvard Center for International Ate and Bowle end Raymond Vernon relss and enrminiily supportive c 1 ut wlise help ts hard to imagine this ook. Its ls hard to 1 book without the comments we received from so many critics und friends (the | two eategories are not mitualy exclisvol). We particularly wish to thank | Grahans Allison, Jonathan Aronson, Robert Art, Francs Bator, Dan Cadel, Stephen Cohen, Jorge Domingue, Linda Cul, Da Robert Gilpin, Crauford Goodwin, Emst Haas, Noger Uanwen, Jlf Tart, Barbara Haskell, Fred Msc, Staley iain, Cavan Hoge, An Ulli i Ray Hopkins, Peer Jacobmohn,obor Jervis Jol Q. Johnson, Ptor Katz i stein, James Keeley, Janct Kelly, Peter Keni, Nance! Keohane, Chalor Kindieberger, Stephen Krasier, James Kurth, David Lat, Peter Larye, f Charles Lipson, Peyton Lyon, lachal McCulloch, Michacl Mandell Ea ward Miles, Theodore Mora, Jo Odell, Van Door Ooms, Rob Patong, 1 Wynne Plumptre, Richard Roterance, Jolin Rogie, Hubert Rusa, Philippe \ ‘Schmitter, Ian Smart, Louis Sohn, Susan Strange, Harrison Wagner, and Dan S N Yergin. Ava Feiner, Robert Pastor, Debra Miller, Alison Young, Kenneth Oye, ‘ad Constance Sth greatly helped our research on Ihe ens stu, Nun tus offal ofthe American, Ausiralian, and Canadian yovernmont gave Preface to Second Edition tional relations sulfer from being too clase to the events Uhoy discuss. When we wrote Power and Interdependence in tho mid-1070e, /’ generously oftheir timo in intorviows. Emily Uallin supervised the reproduce tion and transmission of innumerable drafts atthe Stanford end ofthis trans- continental relationship. Beverly Davenport, Amy Caziu, and Amy Contrada ably managed the typing ofthe manuscript and administrative chores at Har= yard. The contributions of Nannerl Keohane and Molly Nye would require nother book, not a mere preface, to recount. ‘Noauthor isan island. We gladly tll our bel of thanks clramatie changes wore taking place in world polities. By the beginning of the dlocade the Vietnam War Ind become highly unpopular fa the United States, tnd detente seemed to have reduced the importance ofthe U.S.-Soviet nuclear ‘competition, At the same tine, nternatfonal trade was growing more rapidly ‘than world product; transnational corporations were playing dramatic politica! rues: and from 1971 on the international monetary system was in flux. Mean while, the relative economic predominance ofthe United States was dec a the European and Japanese economies grew at more rapid rates. President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger spoke of the development of a five- power world, and futurologists such as Herman Kabn predicted the imminent Artival of a multipolar international system. On top of this cane the oll ests uF 1979, in which some very weak states cetrcted enormous resources from the strong. Hans Morgenthau weote of * what he called an unprecedented divorce between military and economic power based on-the control of raw materials The vulnerability of Western societies ata poriod of high commodity prices encouraged many less developed countries to belive that a greater transformation of power had gocurred than "Men Ka sb rae tgs,Thigs to Com (New Yorks Mecilan, 172) "Ain. Mergent, “The Rew Diplansey a Movement” Encounter (At 4) 58 GEGCUESGESRUSCCEECKEECEECESCHEESEECECEEEESR: rt Reser Nie ot SeGUSECSEECCEOEESCEHECEEEEECEHOHEECOECEEE! ‘was actually the ease. Many theorists rflocted on these concorns, A represent ative view among the modernist writers of the 1970s wast ‘The forces now ascendant appear to be dominant structure of evaporation subnational groups, and transatlonal speeal Interests ad eoonsaten would all ba or the support and loyalty of invita, and eots wkd havo ta bo ronlved lyon tho basis of ud hoe bargain in shifting conten of poor rlanh Jn. toward x global sooty without tlyarchy tn which natlon-natos, By the lle 1870s the mood began to change, bothin the United States and in the Unltd Nations. The United States Government ceive more concerned aout Soviet policy, and less sensitive to tho polis and complaints of gow trnments of less developed countries. The experience ofthe Carter administra tin lastrates this pint. While campaigning n 190, Jimmy Carter promised toreduce the defense budget, but by 1080 he was closer to Ronald Reagan's postion than fo his own provious view. Rongan's elction accontuated these trends, Amerlean polley focused on East-West confrontation and scaled down North-South isses and the oloof multilateral institutions. The defense budget Incconsed In eal terms for ive straight yoars, an tho United States vas more willing to use miltary Fore (albot against extremely woak sates suchas Gre- nada and Libya). Arms control was downgetded and the modernization of nuclear forces was intended to restore an “edge” for ndtoalwtlty of rile / ‘ary fore. This shifting agenda was accompanied by a resurgence of realist i analysis, for history seamed to have vindicated the relist model Just as some analysts inthe 1970 overstated the ubsolecenco of tl slit, the decline of force, and the irelevance of security concerns, others In the early 1980s unduly neglected the role of transnational actors and economic (interdependence. Contrary to the tone of much plitel thetorle and some ‘politica analysts, however, the 1950s did nat representa return totho world of the 1850s, justas the decline of American power was exaggerated in the 1970s, so Was the restoration of American power exiggerated in tho 1980s, Looking carefully at miltay and economie indies of power resources, one notes that there was far more change in psychology and mood than in true indicators of power retources. The dfusion of power continued as messured by shares in ‘world trade or world product. Econonte inter depeaulence a rncusured by ‘alnerabilty to supply shocks eased In a period af slack commodity mark (but t could change ifmarkotstghton again and growth of aconone ransace {ions continues). Senaitvty to exchange-rate fluctuations remained high, The costs ofthe great powers” use of fore remand higher than inthe 1950s Moreover, despite rhetoric, the relations between the superpowers Ud not show a return tothe Cold War period. Not only were alinces looser, but * Saya Brom na Forcet n Word Flues (Wainglon Howington, 1972 p 168 rsrace 10 stcono ramon | Xf Uransuetions were highor and the relations between the superpowers rellectod ‘fair dexree of learning in the nuclear area. In our view, therefore, the analy- sisthat we put forward in Power and Interdependence has not been rendered {rrelevant by events. The real questions are not about obsolescence, but about analyte engency. {Ina one, the 1970sand 1960s were merely thelatest instance ofa recurring dialectic hetweon the two main strands In what has been called the “classical tradition” of international-relations theory. Realism has been the dominant strand. The second strand isthe “Uberal” of “Grotlan tradition,” which tends to stress the impact of domestle and international soclety, interdependence, and international institutions. In thelr simplest forms, iberal theories have bbeon easily discredited, Tho proposition that gains from commercial transac. {Hons would overcome the problems inhorent inthe security dilemma and make ‘war too expensive was belied in 1914. Hopes that a system of international law and organization could provide collective securty to replace the need for self- help inherent in the security dilemma were disappointed by 1939. Nonethe- less, the sharp opposition between realist and iberal theories is overstated. fact, tho two approaches can be complementary. Sophisticated versions of lib- ral thoory address the way interactions among states and the development of {International norms ean lnteract with the domestic polities of the states In an international system to transform how those states define thelr interest, ‘Transnational as well as Interstate Interactions and norms lend to new defi. tions of interests as well as new coalition possibilities for different interests within stats, Power and Interdependence sought to explain the patterns of change th 6 observed during the early to mid-I070s by intograltig specs of the realst nd liberal dios, Thus our core argument in Chaplet I that asymmetial intelepenens ean-bo a source of power, links the liberal sess on Le terdepondence with the reall fosis on power Yet we noted Inns Pofoce to the frst edition, we were taught as studenis to fee the world through “real- {st glasses, and our book reflected our strugyle to see a more complex vision ‘Thus, realism bore the brunt of our evtigue, and our quarrels with aspects of liberalism were subdued. As a result of our rhetorical barbs at realism, our ‘approach is sometimes labeled simply ae "Uhers.” Yet thi characterization of Power and Interdependence is highly misleading, since we stressed the impor- |uneo of governments’ wiclding’of power in pursuit of their conceptions of self-interest, and we declared in Chapter | that “military power dominctes “esp Nye Js “Nelo Leng ‘ation (Semone 1987) 4 J. Mast, The DildingDictlne: Hegemony and Deer neratonel Theory (Beso ‘los & Uni, IME). [US.SoveScurty Regine; Irnatlnal Organ amon é stanoacsS e , 6 @ @ 2, @, sip]! L merce 6 won oman ‘economie power in the sonse that economic means alone are likely to be inof- ostive against the serious use of military force” (p. 16). ‘We have quite a bit to say, after more than a decade, both about how com 1 rmehtators construed or misconstrued aur work, and about our own shifts in perspective, We tould have changed the teat of our book, but this would not | hive enabled isto respond to our critics, and it would have concealed our own famiendments, shifts in point of viow, and sccond thoughts. We could have ‘writen long Prefaco—indeed, we drafted one—but our astute editor potnted jut that this would encumber the reader unaequatoted with our book with ‘beforehe o she hid read the orginal text In this edition we have therefore lft the original textat twas wetton asd havonldod only a brit nw Preface, We have, however, added an Afterword, which provides n fllor Alston of how we soe our work, as contrastod with the perspective of formers! i In Chapter 8 of Power and Interdependence we drew some implications Irom our aialyals-for poli. in our view, many of our judgiients remain ~valldforttnice, we argued that redicing the United States” vulnerability {external shook could be pat of a strategy of policy coordinationand interna tonal leadership. Bulldingan Ainerioan oll tockple std tang the loadin th {nkersiational Energy Agehey havo adeed beed the two key components of th ‘uboodsful international energy policy which has helped to transform interna- liolal bniergy polities since the 1970s. Furtherniore, they have beck, as we stigjested, compleinentary, rather than alternative, policies. We also argued Y// for effective sternatonsl pole coordination on cell esuos—as lovers of wild lands wo coal not gnoro this dimension of global plies 1at cooperation on stich issues would be difficult. In general, we called for \ intertiatlorial sttveillance and collective leadership” (p. 232), which we still \liove tobe eric if urgent world problems are tobe addrevsed \\ These preseritions, however valid, were inosty quite general. In 1965 we sight t mako te spect recominendatons, sing ot only the analyst of Poibet dnd Interdependence but also that of subsequicht work on international regithes. The article that we produced, “Two Cheots for Mul ralism,” is. feprinted from Foreign Policy at the end of this volume, following the In the clove yout since we completed Power and Interdependence, our professional paths have diverged end then converged again, Robert 0. Keo- hhane his concentrated on interpreting patterns of international cooperation and discord it light of sdcial science theory; Joseph S. Nye has served in gov- ‘erittuent and published works on nuclear deterrence, ethics and international * Mostf th Aherwordsppsced atu arti ented “Pouce od Interdependence Revd,” (published ln ateratonel Orgel 2 4 (Aut 1): 725-58, SER relations, and U.S-Soviet relations. Since 1985 we have been colleagues at arvard University, xiving us the opportunity to discuss analyieal and policy Issues intensively again, both in seminars and in personal conversations. We hhave gained enormously from our intellectual companionship and deeply salis- fying personal friendship, which now extend over twenty years. If our readers also benefit, we will be doubly pleased. g f B 5B & eUnderstanding Interdependence e < a FIPXAISSIDIODOPDDD HSOPDIAPODIH VIS HN V9 IOP DIBDBSSSSEOCGECOSEOECEESGCEECHEHETEEEEOCOES: “| INTERDEPENDENCE IN S| WORLD POLITICS Qa i a , Wo live tn aw om of interdependence, This vague phisse expresses a poorly understood but widespread feoling that the vety nature of world ie | ae even more deliente and deceptive than in previous ages”? Henry f Kissinger, though deeply roted in the cltical tradition, has satd that | powers, the security of nations — no longer defines our perils or our postt- I ‘he word a bose nerd nemo, comet, inhoman epitatonse* Hw profound ete changs? A modem sell see lecomnonin ions and ft tela exeting “global village” and elo ht bor soning social and cco Hxatinon ar creating 8 "world. wthut Borde® To grater a loser extent munboro scolar tee ou ea at on in which th total tte, which as been damant tn wor pl | ts for the four cones sie feuds nes ended, bel eclipsed by ontritral actos sich a tional coporetos, arsietonl satl i Toovements and ntersatonal ogenaitins Stato about tog ae an soonmfe it? Traditional cll dese asertions wnfounded“glbalonoy.% They pot tho eontinty in wold poles, MilinyInterdependtes hae alongsant @@ eee Cee’ ee L6G OG 660 GOSSSSSCECOE EE 2S, Mould be Ertless, Hather, our task Is to provide a 4 | mrennerennencr mi Wonta rouiTics existed, and military power is still snportant in york putes — witness nuclear deterrence; the Vietnam, Middle East, nnd Inein-Pakistan war fand Soviet fafldence in Enster Europe or Ameriain influence ty tho Caitbbean, Moreover, as the Soviot Union has shown, athortaran stator tan, lo considerable extont, contol talocormunieations sind oct tran stctiois that they consider disruptive, Even pont aud weak exntes have tere alent walt enti wl the rome iationdism casts doubt of the proposition that the natlonstate Is fad away. ‘Neither the modernists hot the traditionalists have sin adequate frano- sWatk for understanding the poites.of global liteidopendonco® Modernists polit eotrectly to the fiidémantal changes vow Unk place, but they ‘fish aadume Without sullcent analysis that advanoos in technology sd jal nd economic transactions will lead to a new world in tnd thei control of force, wll no longer be important. Tra dito fadept al showing Baws in tho modernist vision by polating ‘aut how lity Interdependence continues, bist find It very dieu ae Carty To Intrpiot today's hulidimensional sconce, vost, and ees Joglal tntetdependence ‘Bui isk in this book snot to argue ether the modérnist or traditional position. Beestise our ern is marked by both eomtinity and chinge, cnn of tiling ad “both postions by developing a coherent theorett bending the A cal imeork for the politcal analysis of Interdapendcice, We shal develop several aferest but polentlly complemedtary models, ot intel \. Tectual tools, foF grasping the Fealty of interdepondenco In contemporary |, wen pol, guy portant, we sal atonpt to expla the con \\Hons under which each model will be most likely to produce accurate Eres and satisfactory explahatios. Contemporary world polities is ‘seamless web; itis tapestry of divetse relationships. In such a Hd, one mode cannot expla al stato. The secret of understand ile ti Knowing which approach or combination of approaches to use tn analyzing a situation. There will vever be a substitute for careful anntysis of aotial situations. ‘Yet theory Is inescapable; all empirical or practical analysts rests on it Pragmatic policymakers might think that they need pay no more heed te theoretical dltputes over the natize of world politics then they pay to medieval scholastic disputes over how many angels cai dance on the head of d pin, Academie pens, however, eave inarks inthe minds of statesmen ‘eith profound reeuts for policy. Not only are “pisetieal men who be theintlves to be quite exempt from ny intelectual tflionces” icon ‘of conceptions created by “some academic seribbler of but increasingly the sribblers have been playing 4 direct INTERDEPENDENCE 18 WontD rousTiee | 5 vole tn forming foreign paliy.? appropiate images and fconeived fee a Py Reet ee | Ula eto pete atone ml etalon, rystomatlopresestaton and ayinbalin, San toe tt iy evn er flloyakey th selves, to disentangle reality from shetorte. Traditionally, classical theorles. Of word pols have potaye «Pletal "iat of wee In meh aoe Fnchavior was dombinted by the constant danger of mlitary-conflet, Dur- ing {ha Cold te ‘spectlty ‘the’ firit"decade after World War I, this conception, labled “pole realism” by Ts proponents, been ede, ‘coptd hy stunt nd prctiiones of Internation relatos nr Bae tn the Unite State rng th 1000, mary athrwie heen strane who necepted realist approaches were slow to perceive the development Of new iss tht did center on militay-secuity concen * Th ee Sonim igen he ie 1s 18 wo ely ad to een inore toralite expectations, Yet to exchange It for ay eal siople view ~ fo ota, that may fore isabelle and mond tree ondetehesige won conta neo eqaly grav, xg eet, What are the major features of world politics when interdependence, petlnlarly econonettgdependenco, iextonsive?® This eve of the {so major ution ender Inti book, In Chapter we eeose ae aveton In gover arms in Chaper 8 and pt of Caer 7 we vst gate It fartr tn four cue sts, and Chapter 8 examines th implies tions for Ameream foreign pole. To ly" the groundwerk for thes tugs, nthe rt ofthis chapter we dof nat we mean by ited pendence diferontte its war type ad relate them to the concept of power, which remains fundamental tothe analysis of world polities, acy enmots ropa . ons, Wo afer to tse giving sangeet VOPR TEE The second major questinn ofthis boo ky How and why do nterseel regimes chnnge? Chupter 3 develop a sto explanation forte develo ‘nen of interantional regime, and thelr eventual decline In Chapter 8 we spy thes explanations oles of oceans and money and in Caper 7 we tse them to widertan! some fentues of Caneian-Amesien aa {AtstetateAmericn lationship, * tn Te TrouledPartuerhi (New Yok: MeCerwl for the Cou alain, 19) yA ger nme aon shelf te cot at gh cso es were egy Solan t a serene 99 RC ASOT YATES PPE EEO PSSA NEZz aN GEGESCEEOHOCEERGECEEECCEECE G66 GEE CCE 5 6 | werendernsmeior mv wont rons ily am analytical emoopt. It Is also rhetorical dovies employed by publletsts and stat the states, eager to increase the number of people marching heneath is banner, ‘vague words with broad appos! are useful. For the analyst, such vaguenoss is the path to « swamp of confusion. Before we can construct usable ‘opts, uth less inerease nr derstanding of futerdependenes and regime change, we must cleat a way throug the thetorienl jungle, Our task isto ‘analyze the polities of interdependence, wot to eclebrate i. But interdependence is not s ‘THE NEW RHETORIC OF INTERDEPENDENCE Dring tho Cold War, “national socuity” was 1 slogan Amerienn political Teadets used to genorate ipport for hele polices. The rhetoric of mational sccurty jstlod strategies designed, at considerable cost to bolster the economic, miltary, and politcal stmcture of the “free world” Te also pro- Sided a rationale for International cooperation ane support for the United Nations, as well ax justification for alliances, foreign a, and extensive niltery tnvolvemen National geanty became the favorite symbol of the Internationals whe Favors nctepal Aiea inolvoncnt iv word alae. Th key Tareign poiey coordinating unit in tho White Howse was named Uhe Na~ tional Security Councl, ‘The Truman administration used the alleged Soviet threat to American secusity to push the loan to Britnin and thos tie Marshall Plan thiough Congress. ‘The Kennedy administration em ployed the security nrgument to promote the 1062 Trade Expansion Act Presidents invoked national security to eontsol certain sectoral economic Interests in Congress, particularly those favoring protectionist trade poll \ se Congressnon wn potted adverse ernie flan ht dis or inoreased taxes wore assed — and it turn explained to constituents — That the “national security interest” requived their sacrifice. At the sume timo, special interests Frequently manipulated the symbols of national Socurty for thair own porporer inthe even of petolenn impor quotas, promoted particularly by domestic oil producers anid their political alles. 1© National security symbolism was largely a product of tho Cold War and the severe threat Amerins then felt. Its persuasiveness was increased by realist analysts, which insisted that national sceurity is the primary na- tonal goal and that in international politic security threats are permanent. National security symbolis, and the realist mode of analysis that sup- ported it, not only epitomized a certain way of rencting to events, but Felped to codify a perspective in which some changes, pasticutrly those toward radical regimes in Third World countries, seemed inka! to na- ‘TW4 new auerone oF werenoxrenoENcr | 7 tonal security, while fundameutal changes in the economte relations nang advanced hued counter seemed esgunt ‘As the Gold War sens of sect threat slackered, farign economic pti and domes atbutlnal conf need ‘The Intellectual ambiguity of “national security” beeame more pronounced varied sid aften ontrndictry forme of volvement tok shelter undar a single she tore wnt I hs imagory ofa word balance of power amen fee nije centr (the United State, the Soviet Union, Chine, Europe, Japan President Nixon tried unsuccessfully to extend traditional realist concepts to apply to the ecanomfeebulonge poed by Amerea's postwar all, as wells the polite and mlitary ation ofthe Soviet Union and Chine, ‘As the deserptive ecuricy ofa vow of national seert dominated. by anlitry concerts dscined, 0 did the term's symbolic power. This decting relate not only the Ines smbiglty ofthe concep, but alo Arner can tention othe Vietnam inbroglia tothe les host elton with Russia ai Chia sunsmed wp bythe word detent, and tothe mine of iy thet by Belen Non nthe Wet ale hn to shar tts position as the prime symbel in the introns tescon wth erdopendonas ue ESL ‘olla! loaders often use interdependence thetori to portray dane a a fact to which policy (and rat goign) Tat alan rar Ua Sa saalod aed see jay Rslf.‘They uvuslly argue that conflets of laterest are Tediced by” dopenvdnco, and that cooperation alone holds the answer to world problems. t “Wo are all engaged fn « common enterprise. No nation or group of rations ean gun By pothing beyond th nis thet sustain world convo ‘ovth, No ome benefits ron basing progress on teste of sbength>™ There ‘words clearly Delong tom statesman dntending to lint demencs from the ‘Third Work an iflvnce public attitudes at home, rater thant saan contemporary wality, Poe tho who wish the United. States to Teta ‘world leadephip, st6Repéindonce has become part of the new metre to be used against both econe nationalism at home and accertive chal Jenges abroad Although the connotations of interdependence rhetoric may sem quite ifeent from those of national security symbian each hoe ten be sed olive Ane preset ders in Yet Interdependence rhetoric and national security symbolism eocxst only ners ns extreme formulation, the former sigests tat conte tare poss, herons the later argues that theyre, main, fundamental, and potentially violent, ‘The com “Know ‘what analytical models to apply to woild polit (as we noted earlicr) is18 | werenberenoeNex m wont roLenien ah between two dimensions, snstlty and ounerbilty, Sonat Seid depron of tesponlveness Wit foley teanowbik how qu “Eechangs noe eur bng en chang nso, an how ost tre the Sony elas? Its metsured not merely by the volume of Hows cro border but alo by the esl effects af changer in rantactons on the sodetles or governments. Sensitivity interdependence is erented by Intofaclong witha & femowork of polices. Seni nsuines Unt dhe -ffamoworkFenain tnchngod. ‘Tho Tet that a set of polices renalox constant may rofect th diet in formulating wow polices within = Sort tne, of tmay relec:a commltment toa eatatn pattem of Jmestlo tdi we path "an example of sonivty dependence Js the way the United States, Japan tnd Wester Europe were afeced by insesed ol prices i 07h and egain in 1973-74 and 1075, In the absence of new policies, which ‘ould take many years or decedes to implement, the sensitivity off teonamies wes function ofthe greater cuts of foreign ll and the pro- parton of petroleum they imported. The United States was lest seatve Tn Japan t petroleum pri ies, bxeansn smaller proportion of Ie patoloam requrements wes nccouted for by npr, bit a pid pees Irons end long lines at gwolne stations showed, the United Stats wwe ndeed weave to the cso change, Avator expla of renlty Interdependence ts provided bythe international monetary station prot to August 15,1071 Given the contrast ey eee hy th Fes ofthe Tnteratlonal Monetary Fund (ME, Krvopean governments were Semltve to changes In Amati money poly, ad th United Stats tres senave to European delsone whether or ot to dena the com Yerson of dallas into gol. Sesltvty Ieterdapendence ean be, socal or pola ay well as cc: \\ nomie* For example, there are soclal “contagion effects," such as the “vl ut rapid spread ofthe fad of “stenking” from Amerie to Karo- pean soclty in 1974, or, more siglicant, the way In which the develop. iment of radical student movements during the Tate 1860s was reinforced by knowledge of each other's activities. The rapid growth of transnational communications hae enhanced such sensiivly, "Television, by vividly senting starvation in South sla to Europeans and Americans about dow to thts ony, alot cra to increas attention to and feoncem about the ise in European and American societies. Sensitivity to such an tse may be reflected in demonstrations or other political * sioce we re eletng tothe renatty of eznnomies end plies to one another, not rowan ano nevenperennne | 19 sti, oven I wei taken to alleviat te dates (ond no canon sensitivity thereby results), othe areas (ond ig te wd intrdpedees, bows, ter ty to sey abscues some of the most Important volta espects of mutal dere donc. We must lo consider what the station Would be tthe eee, ‘ould be changed. 1 more altermtlves were valle, ory liferent plies were possibly what would be the ing to the outta chnge? In pttloun for instance, whet itr is nat only The proportion af one needs that Imperted, Eo te alternatives to Imported energy and the cots of purnuing thor alters Lves. Two ents, each importing 25 percent of tel petreloons nec sony seem equally sensitive to price rises; but Hf one cou sift to domes Me sores at moderate cont, andthe ater had no such alternative the tocond state woul be more eulnerble than the fest, The rane dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and col of the alternatives that various actors fage, lor the Bretton Woods mouetary regime during the late 1960s, both the United States mid Great Beta were senive te dectlns by foreign speculators oF conta bunks to shit noes out of dallas or steling spectively. But the United States was ley vulnerable than Ivete beens ita the option (which it oxresed in August 1971) of changing the es of tho systetn a whit tconldered tolerable cost. The undedivg cane tien of the Uaited State reduced its vlveabiliy, and threions sede Issey sve ote. Interns of the east of dependence, seaslvlty seas aiiy to costly effets Impose from outside blore polls are-alieted to try Uo Shane the situation. Vulnerability ean be defined as an actor’ Mability to su Imposed. by-extrnal events even lle pales lave bech stated, Sines i aly dh cage poles oth eet eset cater ng nt mmrent over ime., illustrate this distinction graphically by Imagining three countries faved soc with a exteral event thet impos oss on them — for example, the situation that oil-consuming eauitres face when pre Aucers raise prices. s , Figure 1.1 indicates the sensitivity of the three countries to costs im- posed by such an ontside chinge. Initally, country A has somewhat higher sensitivity to the change than B and much higher sensitivity than s a e 5 G. Over tine, fathermare, Cs sent falls ven’ ith i Smelt pce visor testo ed by soni oat re, iyals even wthout any poy == ‘fin buds on, bat dif from, Unt of Blchard Cooper, The Eeonomicr of changes. Ths change might be eased by price rises in county C, which £ aradally rece oll eonsunpton, and therefore reduce imports The total i Interdependence (New Yorks McGraw l, 1068), (6 SECTS CCEHOEECEECEESTLECEGESEECEEEOEE'1d | inrenoerznmewce i wontn roars FIGURE 1.1, Sensitivity of three Costs impoted by outside ation GURU 1.2. Vulnerability of tree nites (assume policies unchanged) _countiit (ase poly changed) = g 1 5 q & a iil 8 toto baa tine tine sensitivity of each country over the tine covered by the graph is kepre~ tented by the area winder its respective line. to saan ual ramp, tie tonpt mow cof tie ne Th extent ofthe est ae the pala i country such as Jap dowments and is esunng that each country tres SEE a i nd to rouee he cts Imposed by ove Sa ee eth tompt might hove deading 1 iat nf developing. expensive literal ining or. developing. ox teal 1 would be the measire of vuicinblity. The vulnerability of ce hatte ised prot by Unt cote’ pystsl em tually inescapable, without drastic cos. For other ‘countries, such as the United States, physical vulnerability is not so great, But sotpoltcal constants on poly eange my For ists, American elforts t formulate new vulnerability is amu Beginning of the second time period a 8 cra ssi A poley change atthe oh Ame poriod allow that ove, hy the tind ‘period, to reduce costs imposed by external change almost to the vanishing point. Country A's dimi Shed vulnerability would reflect an effective foley to Doe acy or potently sls i ptrloum, For Fistanco, t might possess new sources of energy that eoul by the government. B and changing plley, thus rema ‘be developed are lest able to alter their situations by ing vulnerable to ests Imposed by outside ‘events. Amon ater thingy, the eats af the situation : lly sgl ee i ceo, he ‘be reduced by an appropriate diacount rate, at Tater polts would, of cours have to owen an nerenperesoence | 15 ‘The semsitivity dependence of the three counteles atthe time of the frst ‘external event fe efore, the same a thele vulnerability dependenie & at that time. Measures of the immediato elfects of changes will not pre- b cisely indiente long-term sensitivities (note that C's renstivity declines £ ‘ttl verte), ut thoy ar ily tobe sten in mes | Sor lngtrm valerie, which wil depend on pole! wi gore { erumoutal ‘biity, nd resource capabilites, In our example, although | Suny nds hn cont is mache ae, L ‘Value e perteatry important for understanding th al E {ur of inerdependence rslaton Tau soso estes Se wc” aro “the dainrs of the els prtbwe Clause! or canst the ruler ‘th gama" uloeratity ts leat) moe relevant hanson Tog example in anaizng the oles of raw mater such a the supposed tcansforntion of power afer 1073. All to ften high percentage of impo ne he inet of vu Emory suggest that sett ma Aotsmining ener how seta Delgo this cm tec, what emt. Tho fet thatthe Used States Imports prcntnatey BS Faant of hs bono spply door not inte meresy, wiry to actors by nt exporter ntl we know whit I would cei de tell x ney) to btn satan iy apple osoioplteal as well x poltcn economic tle igs. The valraility of suites otrannatonal rain! movers ‘nth lato 1960 depended on ter sbltes to adjet natal pesto deal ‘ith the change an rade the cots of dvaption. Wihes Swat crtied.Ameroan ply in Vietnam, Hs valnortiy Wo. pestle Amerienn sapesion of cits contacts would ave depended bn Hoss icould adjust pole tothe new station, Could exchange profess el tourist bo atraced from elsewhere? Lotus lank gain atthe elects on the United Stats of famine in South Asa. The vdversblty of an Amertan administration to domestic [rote over te lek of 2 fod id pliey would depend onthe eae th thi 1 could nde poy or latency. shying mone gelato Indi) without incaing other high pte or coon cnt, ow does this diingioa help uy understand the relatonthip between interdependence and power? Clay it indicates at sensi nl. dence wl be kes impor valerabiity interdependence in “vig fortes san I ow soe os ee ERs pole. eer domes or nteratinally, the sensiity orl tb rt ge rs aa sider tad In wprcltral produ between the United Stats and the Soviet Union from 1972 to 19, Intl, the Amerian ccnony we20 | weesnonnenpees We wont rousrien ‘weak, specific international regines often five important effects on fater= Aopondent relationships that involve x fow emutries, oF Involve many countries on a specifi Issue, Since World War I, for instance, specific ots of rules and procedures have been developed to guide states and transnational actors in a wido varity of areas, including ald to lest do veloped countries, environmental protection, faheries conservation, inter- national Food polley, international wieteorologieal ewordination,futerational monetary policy, regulation of yulthwational corporations, international shipping policy, international telecommunications poliey, ard. interna- tional trade." In some eases these regimes have heen formal and eom- prehensivg; in others Informal and partial. Thee effectiveness has varied From issue-area to issue-nrea and from thie to time. On a amore selective oF regional level, specific groupe of countelos such as those in the Euro- pean Community or the Organtzation for Eeonomle Cooperation and Development (OECD) have developed regimes that alfect several aspects of their countries’ relationships with each other International regimes may be incorporoted into futerstate cece or treaties, as were the Intemational monetary seragements developed a Bretton Woods in 1044, or they may evolve from proposed formal aa ments that were never implomentod, as was the General Agreement 0 ‘Tariffs end Trede (CATT), which derived from the International Trade Ongantenton proposed after World War Il Or they nuty bo merely fn ple, as in the postwar Candan-Anverien relationship. They vary wot only in thelr extensivencts but in the degreo of adherence they recaive from major actors, Whon there are no agreed norms and procedures or when the exceptions to the rules aro more Important than the insanes of adherence, there is « nourime situation.” ‘To understand the international rogimes tha nileet patterns of interde- penance OME TRU TOR ell in Chapter 3, at structure and proces {in Fnternationalsystoms, as well as at how they alfoct each other, structure ofa system sefrs tothe distsliition of capabilities among. sin lag-units In futernationel politcal xystons the swest inportant waits sales, and apabiiiel have hoon rode as tele power ing elton of ealeygriring the distribution uf mmbor and importance of sesoutees. power in intestate systems according to the major actors (for instance, as unipola, bipolar, multipolar, and dispersed) just as economists deseribo the structire of market systems as mimpalise tic, duopolistic, ollgopolistc, and competitive? Structure is therefore Wo are concomed a this hick with the grea aston of alone to spect bate norms ofthe ropinor ve examine, Hynes ea ase eager tn toms of the dogres and type of pin! Intonation nin the stats her to thom. ee S Nye Pence in Parts (Boston Ll, Benvm 1571), Chapter 2, for assim of ‘measurement of the Integrative and Intttona dines of rene isos fn proces, whe refers to allctive or bang. be iio within postr stator Tae Ue mal’ ee ye a tn proces Tee! uly a interest a how the yes ply Us hans tiny have oon dealt A the scr level thy are trsted i howe thee che need the ge seated intranets ats beta tur of anorthite een hat takes place within se The structure ofthe system (he disrbution of [per euirers ang tts) profane the nature of he og {the more oes toon se offroad infra er, Fles, nd Peace digs elrant tothe syton), ‘The regime, In tafe tl soe extent governs the ult arginine anak that secur tin the yt “ey 7 Changes bn intrsationaselnes are very important tn teratons trad, for expt, nn rational regime inl, wonder de prtces tis id down bythe General Arce Tn inde (GATT) jn 147 Frans then decades the GATT aang Hae eatitted reaivey effective tration regi. it she, hist Arend, partiiy sine the st United Nos Cosferenee Trade rd Develop! 104, a on ey he pty sucess ents Of let eve ets to change ths reime. Move bs, yt titty the cnn af ese dneloped coats Tor Nes Te tinal Bomomnie Ones inwaved stages ver what itera es shld govern te i sow materi od matress wll att foreign ivestent nthe tw fe power strue-, eas that we will investigate fv Past T= ao ‘oceans — some regime changes have been rapid and dramatic: wh others have feo ada, Dramatic changes took place ia internat nwmetary policy tn 1914 (suspension of the gold standard); 1991 (abun- lonment of the gold-exchinge standard; 104 (agreement on the “Bretton Wools System”): ad J97T (abandonment of the convertibility of do lars into god) Hs governing the nore sho it ul uses of the world's occas changed im icant tumning points fn 1045 andl after 1907, ‘Yet wo have no theary inthe fle of international relations Het adequate explains such changes. Judoed, mast of our theories da wot foens this question at all In Chapter 3, we shall look closely at the problem of explaining the change or persistence in the patterns af norms, rules, and proceddres tat seven ilendepondene in vais tees There we wil ly. ot foe models, or intellectual cmstructs, designed to explain regime change, and cxamine their strengths ane weaknesses, The models rest_on dillerent assumptions about the haste conditions of world. polities, Since word polities varies, over time nnd fon place to place, there iso reason to22 | snreapernnneaer i wont routes botiove that single st of conditions will always and everywhere apply, oor that any one model is likely to bo universally applicable Thus, before ‘cxzmining tho explanatory models, wo shall establish tho eondltions under ‘which they can be expected to apply. As we iulieate tn the next chapter In periods of rapid clvange such as the current one, assumptions about the conditions of world polities exw differ matically REALISM AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE Chapter 2 One's assumptions about world polities profoundly affect what one sces and how one enstructs theories to explain events, We believe that the sssmmptions of political realists, whose theories donninated the postwar Period, are often an tnndeysate basis for analyzing the polities of inter dence, ‘The be seen af an extrome sot of conditions or ideal type, One could also ima: ‘gino vory different cnelitions. tn this chapter, we shall construct another ideal type, the apposite of realism, We call it complex interdepentence ‘Mee erasing the diferenece tween eal comple ie pendence, we shill argue that complex interdependence sometimes comes closor to tality than does wealism, When It does, teadiional explanations of cling in international rogines become questionable and the search for new explanatory models becomes more urgent. or politent roulists, international politics, ike all othes puis stniggle for power but, unlike domestic poll «-sriggle"duiated by joxganized violence, In the words of the most inflental postwar textbook, “AIL history shows that nations active in international polities ate contin ‘ously preparing for, actively involved in, of recovering from ong Violence in the form of wan”! Three assumptions are integral to the realist vision, First, states as coherent ants are the dominant actors in ‘world polities. This is a double assumption: states are predominant, and Uhoy net as eoherent unis. Sceond, realists assume that force is x usable and effective instrument of poliey, Other instruments may also. be em21 | weausie ano enatonax mevimmrsanene ployed, but using oF threatening foree is the aust effective means of ‘wielding power. Thied, partly because of their secon assumption, realists assume a hierarchy of issues in world polities, headed by questions of nilitary socurity: the “high politics” of military security dominates the “low polities” of seowomnic sd seta affatr. These realist assumptions define nw leat typeof world polities, They. allow us to laagine « world in whiels poltcs & evntinnully eharnetertzed by netive oF potential conflict among states, with the ase of force possible at any Ume, Each state attempts to defend its territory and Buterete froin teal or perceived threats. Political Integration among states Is sight aud Tasts only as Tong as Ht serves the sutfonal Interests of the most powerful states, Transnational actors alther do not exist or are pollealy wulmpor. tant, Only the adept exereise of force or the threat of foree permits states to survive, and only while statesmen suceecd iy adjusting thelr hnterests, as in a well-funetioning halanee of power, i the system stable Each of the realist assumptions eam he challenged. If we challenge th all simultancously, we eam imagine a world iw states participate dircetly in world polities, in whic issues dlogp not exist, aid fn which force is ai ineloet policy. Under these conditions — whieh we call the el plex Interdependence ono would expect world polities to he very differ! ent than under roalist condition We will explore these dilferencos in the next section of this chapter We do not argue, however, that complex huterdependonce faithfully re Meets world polities reality, Quite the contrary: hoth it and tho realist ‘portrait are ideal types, Most sitvntions will fll somewhere between these two extremes. Sometimes, realist assumptions will be accurate, or largely seca; but frequently complex Inerdopenlece wll provide 9 beier portrayal of reality. Before one decides what explanatory model to apply to. situation or problem, ono will need to derstand the degree to which realist or complex interdependence assumptions correspond to the situa- tion, ‘THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE Complex interdependdonce has three main chraeteristies: 1. Multiple channels connect societies, including: informal thes hetweet governmental elites as well as formal foreign ofice arrangement; informal ties among nongovernmental elites (Face-to-face and through telecom ‘munieations); and transnational organizations (su 2 corporis, se des Be smmrize as interstate, ts sa tna instr rane the Isms hy est Tromgovemmental apes hen toe the reas asin Mat ato ac coherently eile fn naples when esl heaton th ste ae the ey. 2h nga of inlrtte rltnshpr const of mips tat ae mot arranged tn cleo onsant hve HG ubnene of terry ann. ies wens, nmin other hing tat alta socat hci catenins the ngenday Many uot arse om wh ttl ho eosidere conte pes and the dition between dome tea foc is fee These tse econ several sven depatnents (tos foes), ela soe icv dete poly cot on tse baer volver sgcnt coats Dillevent fetes verte diferent colton, bt lin gover tents anaes thes dole diferent degrees of ole. utes does not stop tte water dg 3, Miltary force ese ws by governments toward etbr ge wii the region, or the ft when empl intrdapnce ps “alk I amy, hee, ptt these goverment late ith government nts tat rin, ore thes cst fre elt ttn, kv revi greene one svn meres all yet the sume be ey hast te thal a ty eats th 2 ales Fo the former rato this conto open nterdependene won Ire met; for the hitter, it would wat. " ™ val theres of fnte tallonal polities fof these three ass ily or explicitly dey $ ons ati Moxtore emped also to deny the relevance of ills ised on the complex ntrdependence ideal type. We believe, hnwover, that cur tyes eon Uns ato fit well aprexinated on sone global sues ef canoe and cetlogial interdependence sd tat they cme dose to chance the coir relationship hetween sone comin, One of our purposes hee to prove that etenton. fn slscat chapters We sal ecu cove plex interdepandenee tn ages policy and monetary ply and the catonships of the United States to Canada and Austral In this ape, Fuowever, we sal ey teat yu to take thee eres of adn assumption seriou. ‘Multiple Channels A visit to any major airport is « dramatic way to confrn the existence of multiple channels of contict among advaveed industrial counties; there26 | meatine ano contrnx nerenw {sa voluminous literature to prove it? Bureaucrats from different eoun- trios deal directly with one another at meetings and on the telephone as well as in writing, Similaely, nongovernmental elites frequently get to gether in the normal course of business, in organizations such as the Te lateral Commission, and in conferences sponsored by private foundath In addition, multinational inns and banks alfoct both domestic and Interstate relations. The limits on private fis, or the closeness of ts ho towoon government and business, vary emsideesbly from one aveiety to another; but the participation of large ann! dynamfe organizations, wot controlled entirely by governments, has become normal part of foreign as well as domestic relations. “Thoso actors are Important not only Wocasise of thelr activities fy pue- suit of their own interests, but aleo because they aet as trnsin making government policies {n various countries more sent nother. As the seope of governments’ domeste netivities has broadened, an as corporations, banks, and (o a lessor extent) trade wins have ymade Aecsions that transcend national hnindaries, the domestic policies of dilferont countries i ‘more and more. ‘Transnational comnnutntentio polites touch more domestic economle activity than in the past, busing the lines between domestio‘and foreign policy nnd increasing the number of fesves relevant to foreign polfey. Parallel developments. tn issues of envtvom mental regulation and control over technology reinforce this trend Absence of Hierarchy among Issues Foreign alfairs agendas — that is, sets of issues relevant to foreign policy with which govermsments ara concemed —have heenne larger andl sore diverse. No longer can all issues be subordinated to military security. As Scoretary of State Kissinger doserihod the situation in 1975 progress fn dealing with the traditional agenda is no Tomger enough. A sew and edented kind of fave has emerged, The problem of enorgy, resource, sent, population, the ses of space and the sea ue tne wt epson of military security, fdcology ancl terctoria sivalry whieh ave traditenally ‘made up the diplomatic agenda,” Kissinger’s list, which could be expanded, illustrates how governments policies, even those previously considered merely domestic, impinge on fone another. The extensive consultative arrangements developed by the OECD, as well as the GATT, IMF, and the European Community. tnd cate how characteristic the overlap of domestic and foreign poliey is ng developed pluralist countries. The organization within nine major ALAR O SB A = 3 dopa ‘of the United States government (Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health, Hdueation andl Welfare, Interior, Justice, Labor, Stat, rind Treasury) and many other ageneles rellets their extens tional commitments. The multiple, overlapping issues that result make nightmare of governmental organization’ ‘When there are anultiple issues on the agenda, many of which threaten the intorests of domestic groups but do not clearly threaten the nation as whole, the problems of forimulating a eohorent and consatent foreign policy inereuse. hv 1975 energy was a foreign poliey problem, but speclic remedios, such as n tax on gasoline and automobiles, involved domestic logislation oppose! by auto workers and companies alike, As one com inentator observed, “wetually every lime Congress has act w national policy Uat changed the way people live . .. the action eaine after a consensus Ina developed, bit hy bit, over the years that a problem existed and that there was one best way to solve it?" Opportunities for delay, for rpecinl protection, for inconsistency and incoherence abound when Internationa polities requiees aliguing the domestic policies of pluralist democratic ‘onto. jor Role of Mi tary Force Political selentists have traditionally eaplasized the role of nullity force Iw ternational polities. As we saw in the frst chapter, force dominates other means uf power: if there are no constraints on ones choice of in struments (« hypothotial situation that has ly been approximated in the lwo world wars), the state with superior military force will provail. If the sceunity dileinna for all sinter wore extremely acute, military force, sup. ported by economic and other resources, would clesefy be the dominant siuree of power, Survival is the primary goal of all states, aud in the ‘worst situations, force ts ulinmately necessary to guneantes survival. military foreo‘s always a central component of national power. ‘Yet particularly among industelalized, pluralist counties, the perceived inargin of safely Ins widened: fears of attack fn general have declined, sun! fous of ntGicks by one mother are virally nonexistent, Franco fine abandoned the fous azinuts (defense in all ditvetious) strategy that Pres dont de Gaulle advocated (it was not taken enthely seriously even at the Lime). Canada’s last war plans for fighting the United States were aban. dloned half « century no, Britain and Gerinany no longer feel threatened clationships of matual influence exist between these countees, bat in most of them force is irelovant or unimportant as nto policy. Moreover, force is often wot an appropriate way of achieving other goals (such as cermomic and ecological welfare) that are becoming more Usta ue Brestle2 | mxauame ann conten uerennerrnnnin important, Te 16 not impasible tw fungine duwsatie once oF revo onary change in whieh the ze of threat of military Torco over am eco nomic issue oF among advanced industrial eonutries night hocomne plausibte ‘Thon realist assumptions would again he a reliable guide to events But In most situations, the effets of military fores are both eostly and ine certain Even whon the direct uso romp of connties, however, military power enn still he use pute. Each superpower continues to use the threat of foree to deter attacks by other superpowers om itself or its allies; its deterronce ability hs serves a indie, protec: tive role, which i ean wse in bargaluing on other sues with its allies, This bargaining too! is partiutaely important forthe United States, whose allies are concerned about potential Sovict threats aid which has fowor other ‘means of influonee over its allies thaw does th Soviet Union over ite Eastern European partners. The United States Is, accordingly, taken advantage of the Europea (particularly the Germans) dose for tts protection and linked the issue of troop levels ju Fsrope to trade and ‘monetary negotiation qh te firstnnder elfoc of deterrent Force is essentially negative—to deny effective offensive power tn superpower opponent a state enn sito that force pontvely —to yun politcal Influence ‘Thus, even for countries whose relations approximate en pendence, twos (I) deste soa snd politcal charige-eoald cause foxce. again. to,hecoine at fmportank direct instrument ‘of jolicy; and (2) even when elites interests axe eamplemontary, mca Ley tha Hes altar Fores fo protect another may have sigaifennt polti plex intorde ‘or telations among Thied World eountties, a wall ag in East-West rolations, force is often important, Military. power helps the Soviet Union to dominate Eastern Huroje seanonically as well as politically. The threat of open or envert Americun military oo has helped to limit revolutionary changes in the Caribbean, especially In Guatemala in 1954 and fy the Dominican Republic in 1965, State Kissinger, iu January 1975, issued a veiled warning to (de Orguntzation Af Fetrolewi’ Exporting Canutries (OP United States might uso force against them “whore there is some netval strangulation ofthe industvalized work." * Even in these rather conflictual stations, Ihnwever, the reemurse to force seems less likely now than at mast tines during the eentury before 1945. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons naskes any attack against nuclear power dangerous, Nuclear weapons re mostly used as a del rent. Threats of gainst winch weaker counties way ac ceasionally be effin wre Tikely to solidly "HME POLITICA eHOCRSEES OF CONFER twTERDREENDENEE | 20 relations between one's adver fore to contrat socially aah United States Failure fn Vietn es. "The limited usetulness of conventional ized populations has heen shown by the mas well as by the rmpid decline of cole Dalisn in Afviea. Furtherwore, employing force on one isue against an Independent state vith which one has @ warety of relationships i Iikly {o rupture mutually profitable relations on other issues. In other words, {tease of Fore oft Tas costly foes on nonsecurty goals, And Bally, in Wester democracies, popu positon to prolonged military cons is very high * eis clear that these constraints bear fon the sane «x lly varus counts, or esi fern stations Nes of ner sion It dante ota fa eas eating oe sist tte ofr athotartan regional powers tha for the Gee Sy Ewope, or Jap ven suthorartan cout may be elves ees force oobi cone objectives when such tae enh be, ate snd tpt other reitoship Dath the ilety af een mest tnliized populations with foe hoops andthe ehenpg weet, Uf sweponty ny ally eae the bly of ee onsite pr he tao ae towal orea “he fet tht the nnging roe of fore has sven elles dogs pot imo seine le tpt, bt I doe nake ate ee eke ‘This camplesty ke compound by diforsees he eet es mn a esr erat a sin, iy Bo thinks nau stone, ele ene ee valuable eneept for analyzing the pallet proces: Uti thet sce her or of feds oa some Fpl tught ot gle he, tome the nee tet of force eld ee de aga eal seine wool ten ne loan 101s thos inpvtatt dstrmin the apply of essa or of compl itrdepontonc tech stanton Witt the dec Tatler analyse Il tte emia. Out pumps ene sermtive (othe reat serpin of wold poles tees Aitertted apo at digestions Sod a ‘or pes not ft smn alam observer do) to ape one arcs lation wit ter counties, oF hot effective ‘THE POLULICAL PROCESSES OF COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE. ‘The thee main chivaeteristies of complex fnterdependence give rise to Alistinetive politic processes, which traishite power resources into power0 | nxatins an contrHaK IFRAME 4s control of outcomes. AS we argued earlier, something fs usually Tost or addled in the translation, Unider conditions of compler tuterlepentonce tho translation will be dilferont than wider realist exnditons, and out predictions about outcomes wil need to he adjust! econ In the realist world, military security will be the dominant goat of states I wl even affect issues that sre vot diectly tnvolved with military Power o eral defense, Nonny pws wil wt uly ba ordinated to military ones; they will he Mudd for ther politic military Inplcatlons Balance of pryients sues, for istance, wil bo covstred at least as much in the light of their implications for_world power gene cally as for thelr purely financial ramifications. MeGeorge Bundy en formed to realist expectations when he argued in 1904 that dovaluation of the dollar should bbe seriously considered if necessary to Right the war in Vietnam? ‘To some extent, so did former Treaniny Secrotary Hemy wwler when he contended in 1971 that the United States neoded « trade surplus of $4 billion to $8 billion tn order to Tend in Western defense. Jn. world of complex Interdependence, however, ano expects so%0 coficils, particulaly at lowor love the saricy of state goals The purse. Jn. the abs rach of Hse, joa swil vary by issuo, and may not he cisely relate. Buch fnrexneraey will i oacerns, and although several agencies may eae eon hint affect thor al, thy will id that consistent pate iMfcult to maintain. Moreover, tewsnational actors Will rode diféent goals Into various groups of fc. Linkage Steategies Gonls wil therefore vary by issue area smnder complex huterdependenco, bat so will the distribution of power and the typical polital processes, Traditional analysis focuses on the international system, atl leads us to antiipate similar political processes ow a variety of iste. Miliarly and economically strong states will dominate a variety uf organizations and a variety of issues, by linking their own poliies on some issuct to other stator’ polio on other iron. By wing tee overlt dominance to prevail] on their weak issues, the strongest states will ve traditional mod ensure a congruence between the overall stictire uf military and eco nomic power and the pattorn of onteames on any ome sue area, ‘world polities ean be treated asa soniless web. lependenee, such congruence i los likely to occur lued, militarily stiowg states will Bnd i mo foul Tues helr"dverall dominance to conteol outcomes on lssues which they ai@-Weak. And sines the distabution of power tesoueos in trade, shipping, or ol, for example, may he quite dilferen, pattoms of ‘outcomes and distinctive politieal processes are Tikely to vasy feom one sot of isons to anther, I fore wore raxily applicable, nd itary eaity weve te highest forcigu poliey youl, these variations fn the lise structures of power would nal matter very mich. ‘The Tinkages dra from them to wiltary issues would ensure conastent dominance by the overall strongest states. Hut when military Coree fs largely immobilized srvng states wll fad that linkage is Tess effective, They nny still attempt sul Tins, bt fv the tof a hierarely of issues, thelr success ll he problematic. Dominant states may try to secure much the same result by using overall econamic power to alleet results on other issues. If only economic objec lives are at stake, they may suceveds money, alter all is fungible. Bue ccomomie objectives have politieal implications, and economic linkage by tho stiong is limited by domestie, transnational, ail transgovernmsgital Actors who resist having their interests traded if-Fiteriore, the inter: hational welors may Ie diferent on diferent ites, and the fnternatinal izations in which negotiations take place are often quite separate. it is difficult, for example, to Imagine a militarily or comoeall g sla Hinking eoncersions on monetary palley to teeiprucil eonee sions in oceans policy, On the other lund, poor weak slates ate not Simi. {arly inibited froin linking related (snes, pasty because their domestic interests re fess complex. Linkage of snelited issues Is often a means of structing emerssions of side payments from rich and powerlul sates And slike powerful states whose fustrimcut for linkage’ (nilitary Cores) {s often ton costly to we, the linknge instrument used by poor, weak states ~ tslernational ganization ~ available ard inexpensive. hs asthe utility of foree declines, and as Fsses Heese wore esl i Importance, the distibitiin of ower within eich iss will beeome more Important. F Tnkages econ less effective” oi the whol politi bargaining vill verona by se tea. The diferentintion among iste nreas in conplex interdependence nati. ave will mens that Tnkages anon isies will become, more proble tend red ex.tham reinforce intemational, bicrarchy:. Linkage srategtes, and defense against them, will pose eritieal strategic ehoiees for slates, Should issues he considered separately or as « package? If linkages fare fo be duawn, whi tases shi he fnked, and on which of the linked issues should concessions be made? How far exw one push a linkage before it heeones counterproductive? For instance, should ene seek forest agreements or informal, but Tess politely sensitive, wnderstanlings? ‘Th fret that workd polities wider complex interdependence is nat «sean | ‘web leads us to expect that cffrts to stitch seas together advantageously as flee Uae strategies, wll very ft, derive the shape af | the fae,299 | MRALIOM ANH) COMPLAK WrrKAORENMENE ‘The negligible role of foree leads us to expect states to rely more on other instruments in order to wield power, For the reasons we have al ready diseussed, less slates will ty to use asymmetrical Fates onree of powe al transnational IL ongautations D ie terdlepwraener inte ‘wells ts olfects om citizens’ welfare, slthangh welfare Tent thele attempts to maxima power, Mast cconaaie anil ceslygieat interdependence involves the possibility of julat gus, oF joint loses, Mutual awareness of potential galas and lasses nd the deur of worsen cach actors position throwgh overly rigaraus slegules aver the istthie tow of the gains ean Tint te use of wsynaetrcal Interdependence, dope also.try.. fv tat Agenda Setting ‘Qu second_asumption of comples interdependence, the lack of clear. leraehy among multiple Fes, lends vs Uv expect thatthe polites of goa HoweMLN snd etl will hecome wore tpontant. Tradifoal Analyses lead staan to facts ov polllerniltary tesuoe and to pay Ai, he broader poll OF agenda formation, Statamen a i wil ho ty ais the Ila of power, nt or antepated, and by porcsived thrats to the sour uf tater Other when they seen to alle soctity sd genes wil be tflucneed strongly by naltary power. Tn tote tse tnsirations of tho overall Ilan of power. Yet, today, some ronnlitry face see ciaphastil fn fotestate role tions at ono timo, whorear others of secmingly eal Importance are ne- glected or quietly handled at tocwea! level International monetary Politics, problems of commedlity torms of trae, oil. fond, and- malting onal corporations have all heen important dri the Test decade: hut not all have been high on inteatte agendis theo ht peed ‘Traditional analysts of Hnterational politics haw pai ttle attention to agenda formation: to how issies come to recive sustained attention by high offal, Tho traditional orientation toward military and security aifais implis that the ervatat probloms of forex poliey aro imposed on states by the actions or threats af other states. These are high polities as opposed to the low pales of ecole aa, Ye, athe complexity of actors and isuos in world polities increases, the utility of Fores declines and the line between domestic poliey aud foreign policy hecomes blurted a the conditions of complex interdependonee nee more closely approx: ‘mated, the polities of agends formation becomes more subtle snd difler cntiated, Under complex interdependence we cr expedt the agenda to be affegted by. Hheinteratonal tnd domestic peobles ereated by economic We rOLANICAL wnocessES OF coMrLEX MerENDEFENDKNGE | Auth wa Invesing ssty atedependnce. thao dest i. thet ate, Dicnteted deste gmp al poltcza tee wa Force mois ts ance coder deste ont the iterate gona SH nth dst of poster tears thin sts of tes wl alas allot nena. Dati ely 197 the nceased power of sik yrode ing goveraments aver the titnatona conportons and the somes ovis dramatically awed the policy agenda, Moreover, ages fo te rn of sues ny cage asst linkages from ole prope in which jer resmrs ae changin Tor examples te broad Agee of Nonhsint trate faves lang aftr the OPEC pre es wel the wi eng of 107-74, Rew I expen among sates do ot change, ea ay I alfetd hy shit ts the Importance of auntie stor: Th pully sumonidng sltvationl conportins tn the ely 1070s, cpl with thelr rapid grove over the pt twenty yes pe the regulation of suc corporations higher en both the United Nets agen and natal aon “Potton = ity the toprol the yg Ca an issue that tend sues, by Tk iis besoining Inelfective ‘or is nol serving import inereasing_ polit outed grooms pe rt hase also ai froin ci, Domesite gps iy become upset enough to fae a darmant sue of to ester with Inet baraing a high level in 107 the Aree secretary of stats wet Hage fs Sov Arnerian tale pct with progress tent as upset the nace of nwt America gr orn toh Congest oink a eae age Inet wl Soviet poles aw pet ‘The technical chatter nd tional seth in which ies ave esd wll strongly let polation patton tn the, United Stes, congressional tin ment of pleat Generally, expt rata cen ogunzations ad tan snetal metworks of bares to stk to aid piteatin, Bem ey Isr ch tk ks) amet barverates nl Tend to ese poltevaton (ptteerlymgrssonal stnton) agit th srt ie eenpettns AL ene tonal Tove we expt sates and try to “ahs or sa stg to et iss rs in tration ongatins that wll nt ze ther advantage by eng or nar the agen 1 and Teansgovernmental Relations nl fins_of complex interdepon ‘oniet among societies, further burs the distinc ult nines of ton between domesticwl polls, The avaitaitty of prtners ty pit oo tions snot necessarily Hite by national nares ns tit sis assumes. The nearer a situation is to complex moro we expect the outcomes of transational relations, Multinatio igaifewnt both ay independent actors and as instr al hy owernmnents The attitudes and poly stale of clomestic grap ane Mikey te affected by communications, organized or wot, Detweon therm and thelr counterparts abrord, “Tinustha.xistevce. of multiple chauncls of contact leads us to expect Tsnits,heyondLshose socially found in aloniestie polities, nw the ability of statesmen (0 caleulie-the snanipulition of interdependence or fallow 1 consistont strategy of linkage. Statesmen must consider «liferental as well ts aggregate effects of interdependence strategies and their likely impli cations for poitictation and agenda control. Transactions among societies = ceomomic and socal trasvetions move than security ones —aflect romps diferent. Opportunities anal costs from tncxeased transnational tes ay be reatet for cata groupe for stan, Arserian workers In the textile oF shoo industries ~ than for others, Som organizations oF groups may futeract diveely with actos in other societies ar with other govern ments to increase their benefits from « network of intestetion, Some actors may therefore be less vulnerable as well as hss sensitive to changes ole where in the network than are others, and this will affect patterns of politialaetio ‘Th multiple channels of contact fowl in complex tnterdependenee are not limited to nongovernmental actors. Contiets between governmental Daraucraciet charged with similar tasks may not ony alter thelr perspec tives but lend to transgovernmental coalitions ow particular policy ques tions. To improve their chances of success, goverment agencies attempt to bring actors from other governments into their own decision-making, processor ar alles. Agenetes of powerful state such as the United States have wed such coalitions to ponotrate wesker governments in such op tuies as Turkey and Chile. They have also heen used to help agencies of ‘other governments penetiate the Uniti States Inweueasey "Ax. we shall see in Chapter 7, transgovornmental polities frequently ehuracterires Canadian-American relations often tothe advantage of Canadian interests. ‘Tho existence of tausgovernmental poliey netwoaks leads to a diferent \lerpretation of one ofthe standard propositions about interuitonal poi- aly ntordependence, the (Ges =U states act in their ow Tnlereik. Under complex interdopen “Wenes, WE conventional wisdom’ begs two portant questions: which sel aid WHTTLAATGLES?-A government ageney may pinste its own inte ests under the guise of the national interest; aul reenerent fnterations ‘can change oficial perceptions oftheir interests, As a enreful study of the relies of United St ate has doen, cnentatng ent tm resins of erin nee for deo fends as ay ie bw onto roses a meats the Ingots ent Into i dy sg preteen “he any of tena Tatsest rae eos probes forte wp alters of act: ea ct cl es ly nee atonal ones att alg tough fog ees cent ent bones roc. Ehs tears a sat wi be ted whe ding wt forlgn gone ee ete “pnt wi ee tan Ite Say when neg wi ow to he alfacty eve sh falcon ti, Hee tlt nich ne Prince) wl be ter ee mange ee ‘pds th grt tra st a ne a ss cto pelt a diferot nwo pol, et ‘of Mans J. Morgenthau havo portrayed «wosld sich sites, acting Tn selina stage fok rnc sere Scwity iss ae doninnt, war Uates tn sucha wel, oe ay sce a iteration hats wl hve amir ae ted y tho re engrace af ch intrest open et tlewiy peripheral tn werd pen, But tra word of muple fossa perfectly liked, in which edalitons are Tome {governmentally, the potential role of fniernational fnstitutovs "i pallical ~ Frrgaiing is grat incre Th paneer tay lp et tial aged and acts stats Fr oto fonnation las eee for pla intves a age hy en tte ‘Governmonts st nay themselves fo eope with th fay of bus vss goad by inert trgantatons By deg the ‘ea deiding eich iss ext be: rnp tet oxo nay Help to determine yovermmental pie ma the nate Ito Acpurtnenta coves andthe argent within peers ‘he 1972 Stoel Eine Coneren strength pons exvizonmentalageaios in varios governments ‘the 174. Weel. Fed Ganferens oss the atenton a npn pat of the United Stes ggvernment om preset flood shortages, The Septet 10% Uae Batons spt extn proposals Torn New Inbetnal Exo40 | execamune nerramrunens snam 12000 snifes away i the sine as that of telephoning someone mach loser, Supertanters ane eter watt shaping, telly, ve Seduced the easts of ranspoting gona. Aud the sae ev, “rumen ave een dan i aypeenent,emsltatons aad nts toe with rapidly expanding testo “Tit promis fan cemvinie process ibid change and nerste in renannieflerepeadence il tn Inertial gles tte ‘he wil He hades Caps es Taceased stun of transteions new Fors ge sation repetentd, for tistanee, by transnational eorpoatons Hstalised Tatlin, rte, nl pred ll he three ith ile ve ov collage. “The socond premise f that gov unde of ve change ats le highly expose to lontats alt demands fort rs soar ug, Nati sere ekfare wil cavaily be the dart pula on ann sxng Ione sina pode wD acral ttn Tho. ie eee a sel hat te pest ggregate ene be pre ae tematlonal taovaments of cpa ons, sod bv son tes ‘Wier ol alee peverninens no incenes to ally oy sect Fer atectt sadist tetore thelr fetes, Coveronents will ee ton of gals at copa abst the Tos of eres entailed In rsh econmne ineependence (vray a ser erat), but they wil overall find that who ther are Tames pulltleat demands for rear ene were, the welfare costs sr atccupdig Internal eanorate eatin, o flowing them to econ Ghaot are grater than the autonomy bevafis, Nelveanty, they ail fami ceondle Interdependence to gros, snd c¥en more rly Per ineosably, they wil be deve into conperting tn the emnstruction of ov fnterntnal segs by evening negetel ple responses, Ts Pains change wl ea prot of grade nap to new wanes ed ee Toane of eanantionl seman ntvty. Caveat vl resist tho Tetpecion to drupe oe break regimes, becuse of he hig cost to eco nomic growth, Fe raf wn ooonomte pracst wel un shuld thovefore expect intesatonal seine tobe undornned fon te Uo ine coon InN technologie changes but thoy wilt disintegrate entirely, atleast ae oe Long hey wl ely be reconstace to dp to cnn a tecnologia condtions- “This sep econ proces model os wt errespond ext the iow of any sophisticated theorist, altho it seems to exert a powerful Jniluence on the views of many people. Prujeetions that in the yenr 2000 a handful of multinational corporations will control mast of world producy tion, and wield greater power than governments, oF assertions that al, eet st Tre fing As pent Biss a ing development intentional integration inevit ng tneaepes art of the pea wf iortanee of technological change i ex the ast eontary. ° “ ply on tertnlotea snl eemnonite treks, Quite evidently, government ily saris econ eliency to see, mt a pales dete Hustle, this aiple eamoraegrt it ine th iyo vig see st to anther and thus doesnot confront the inevitable polite! questions shat jst bn ples, ceed, power Ine Ice te hy oe peti to hve to mit to cage Tn pgp ical cue the views of gover net aot their distribution largely ets "he abi ig adjontnent i ete | ote of lange he prt ples wll mn apidly sing eamonte interepend cate fear aud ingeeuity ang ality porting. Tabor nis and comme lors nay fe that expat dein to shit. production abvond er trends towant reer imports could enise severe wnemploynent md social disess, Inistter threaten by imports press Tor governmental pret. hs, otetonfon nay ate nemo tedepedence hea rote extensive Pytctiontsn has awaye heen With tse But ns the technology of eoninunkten and largoseale corporte organization he rd the stn tr htc ts, nny dese ep fave tured \o veruen to estublish political buffers, Even ‘when a ccnutyy {swt threatened hy Inerssedvolnerablty, the ses of itt gn consid io mie pte that ret strat The eonllts generated hy increased fterdependence ave contributed te ontrveny ver Inertial reine, whieh een emp quite sid cul, Yaa snp nun grt appro 3 vy let fire patti vara its major explanatory variable fs a Jongterm sen orig ag eg ot of tn ty Cpe ar easing auch wetivity, ad Teaing and maintained at some thes whereas ater tne, no regime eam be snccesflly iti? Ignite nth ere allt expat, ove would expect Haterstiona eennonite interdependent successively to ‘ulgrow” reglae constraints, and new regimes, better adapted to the new situation of faterdependene, icky to replace them, Inereasel tek tivity would Krad to now fses snd problems ut pretense ‘orlentation woud lel potieyinakers to new regime solutions. * Yet such an explanation obviously abstracts fron interests, which way Aeveloped Voliical entity, hwever, often diverges fram expectations bused sine i42 | exetainine nvreavationas wHeann cane Alvenge sharply from group to poup, sel Wo sector, oe cant to eo trys Talioessemes tat intermntionalpaiten-nitary pole deisons aco $Sparate fom esonomte ones I 15, tana desos crtated a two-tack or wtitrack rin fn which enone nd seeuty ines were kept fairly separate fn day-tory pete procenes They fvere usually Inked only iernchically hy dnt politi, Ug a Peale to conn scr gone ns of Ui cen, Sr potent cofies withthe goats of swale yoga. Yet Os separa tin and depaieintion of econone esc ea Ue nos in weld pel ies, Indeed, it may well hava licen an anomaly, dependent on postwar bate o alliance leodership, ing cca United States coonomie and military dnoinanes Dectuse the extent of intedepondence nl ls ellets depen to m ent siderable_exten evel political decisions nd agroeents, ted tional approncios to iferationel poles, which havo eoveentated these highlxal decisions andthe overall prover stnetve, should cov \ tribute to an adequate explanation. XPLANATION OVERALL POWER STRUCTUN) Broding Hegemony ‘There nothing new about estan hinds of interdependence sng lato, ‘Aibena and Speta wore interdepeent in itary security a the ie of ‘Thucyuds. The United States and the Svket Unio have been sey Interdepondone throughout the pst perio Nit oly ate te two eo trl tena to ehmgyes tn each hers security pls, ut thy ate tho vaeble ee thers ety dunn Peay te high XC nterdependengs hn oe Isue aren itary early — coupled il “Snatual antagonigne Taisen at the heat of tlitinal analyse of work lites: Under such cfreumstances security fsues take procedonce over Brea and power (with Its supporting exo: ome bas) coves War the est impertane Sd dranatcsees of arathral hange One on vm, for fstance tl tears the marks ofthe outcome af World War TL in the tational view, powerful tales make the rvs As Thucydides put “the stone do whet they ean andthe weak slferwint Uy must.”* In bilatrat rletions, the taitonalistsexpedt thatthe stronger of two \Yy si terete ee Yr System, the strucle (Oat the detribtion of power among the states ns the ature ot rene And thet in portant power resources are military. ve Appeal of the talifonal approach base on the overall power fovenaus, rowru staverune sxrtawarion | 43 structure fies in its simplicity and parsimonious prediction. Judgments of relative power seen easy to anake on the basis of military strength and it 's possible to calculate a rational course of action in any given situation ‘Wo assne that satesien think and seth terms of intrest defied as power, aud tho ovidevee of history bears that assumption out, That assumption ‘allows 1st retrce sind aeipate, as Beer, the steps a statesman —past, present, ot future as token or wil tke on the poliieal seane. We look over his shoulder ‘when he writes his dispatches; we Ustt fn his conversation with other state. ‘men; we read id antitpats his very thoughts? I Hs more extrome fo s, this realist approach deprecates Alomestie polities by smygesting that the national interes : Inte tn tens wf power, relative to other state, I not, the result will bo catastrophic, There litle margin for cholc. If dome Politics Soterferes with diponney, disster wil follow. Less drastic Positions of the traditional view allow for the effet of domestic politics, but the prncipa foes of the theory ~ ad the segment of tt thet provices, ity oxplantony power — conters on competition among states. I is compe tion among autononons ators that provides the ble diving fore of ‘world polities ‘The traditional viow does wot have a thoroughly articulated and aggeed- ca thay of gin cing glans ate pve ard ert structure defled tn terms of power eipabiltiey =daes, however, pro: Wide th as for developing wha theron el pees Te yarn is provided hy the nsertion that ss the power of states changes (that fs, as the structie changes), the rules that comprise Internaonal regimes will change accordingly. ‘This dynamic is at the heart of ou ‘model of sgn change based on the overall power structure This overall stwctore approach docs not dilferentintesiguiicantly among issue areas in world politics. On the contrary, it predietsn strong tevileey toward congrucnee of outcomes atnong issue area, Since poses like money, is considered fungiblo, power resources will be shied. by major stats to secure equal marginal returns inal areas, When outeomes on one issue aren are markedly diferent from those on others. we show expect shifts to make outcomes in the deviant area more consistent with of military and economic power. It follows from this , tht after 1073 the incongruity between. power i petroloun politics andl power generally in world polities was a Sounee of instability. Te war to be expected that the United States and other Ind traized counties would attempt to rece the incongruity in thelr favor by muta aid, encouragement of now souress of supply, and even by Lieats of military force. Nor was it suprising that olLenporting states, ed in the Orguniation of Petvleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),44 | exrtatwine erent vould yt resale the eon i he avr yes thee eng through arms purchases, alianecs with ater ‘hi World eountis for & scree ro rh nth ome tnd unbluus lapse drop tos esse of th ve power dsprtes, nwover, tata then woul ive he OPEC ates red eee eee ee “in apesuln’ about which sie wl rv may ov may wt Be ‘confirmed, bat the realist insight fs important: ne should ‘examine closely Stony in which he dssbuton of power ieee news ven. Tensions develop at these. points of Incongul ye pe seals ak leet dain Wher dines the pve rete fone fue aren wll spread tothe syst asa whole or be messed. ea sen! eae vee fe gal wows sceulng na tool power ttre cn be ated ln hangs aera eee he tug wae hes: the tn pole tay pc hd afetentac eg, Tie ol crea aly poe sh ach tls to ogenany wil leateeip, Econ Rive tegosd that ine ecosomlereyines toque Tedethipthat ngs to fore sor tern gong in oor to pe The rene and fat tn ator & mnt Het to pve svc leadership ren sce ef atmo consume ofthe lngternbenels pede iy the regina "el wld int uh enon gine woul best lyn hogemontl syste tht, whoa stte power ct pn i oe eng nr ato Siting todo mln aalon to em ianing rg ck Tate an abvogi eating proven the adptono ls Ot op fs othe dontant role tn enstieting now rls 8 eg Ironia sytem, threor, the preponderant tte as ot postive wd negative power. Tra rest world, such a condition wld imply military prponerac, bat not cerry freuent use of itary Ce. the netenth on tay, Haan ccesonly cod ts preponderant nal owe to fre roo tnd a Sot Arr a to poet fed of Ti fom he Groahinent of couse sates, fut gory such aout were wes: tary A hogenontl power can cane the roles ator tan adapt oles tthe ales, Brnine poston dla ed of the seas, for etample ad not deter her foo ire neta Shipping wen she was at war. But during penetine, the Dish gover: nett ld in role malotenmce by sorpeluay enforcing foe sem rues taint Its ove domes Itrest, wich atepled tet broader ‘Sasa edo, "Whet the hegemonial power does not sco one lhe sats, ut ly w pro "The Vax Brita that ah leader have been rt its fet pion, ler states nay bone as wel vc fen datas Charen King hes Interatonal econ apne ion ntl thant stem tyne hen soca wth eater opty. the wactacth saree race ‘rent of Gre Dae ed the baa for 8 ay ee Nos entered pal ath wt enty on Lone rea War I theo the 1960, the ean prepondrance at the Used Sinks ena tonamge onety rebates eee nt cons toh th Ht Weds system. Dy eta ee ae in mare deta ater, the appy Inert snc apis the interwar pore ered when the United Ses war Ceeiey ‘ere semen hoo oso egemonialyowers dh mat, terefre ayy explo secondary power emo, During the heyday of the seng anda take rn auton in France evan Hn and te Une Stats ene 50 pero to400 perc ft tha ain Athol ta ed States dominated the monn syste of th posta pated: Beto Jag rr nave py tat a, ven sacs eek en Hoenn Davi Cain nett“ ns dle eeu hae dalla stom wa caning cca toe meee Why thew da legonnsh stent and Uh corerponding econ nes calla? War or maj sist the oval aes of pce thanleenss Bit these sytem ny aso be andere Te ae very eanmomie prnvsus ny ern hosp, the hana Hexen, se eset ty which hye sara ne tag se As thr vente rer nce, Sess) ee change ther pions. Nr lngr de thy hase heer sa dpetence whieh, nner one propeous, adveaely tees es ‘ed pt stats, Ar autonomy and sats Cocos poste, thee wales te taken rie ene eee a Fre oats” At Tos for son Toners a sa France the MB a LN pomp nwo agers Ths the mlvasting na leven pes oe hegemomey iste Ino ert psa seen sata ve Maly tocge ff Btw ae th poles ofthe heen state Anatase + proliferation of al te ply meres wl sam nk ey lige batting to ay. sentra gn to werd arse eat Teaerhi, Fhe, is leadrship wl ew ad es apps to ea econ and pai obetve 4 ater sates baa mae ee ‘The renewal emp of these sears yovernets ae a tutonony ad futher cpanel ea conmotton Unt i nd st prmaee Wee conse nes el such asWolved. More stais for secondary sins ma far the deta power ness In weaker rave” aohomony blag aononant done pte psitivetlleyce af easton lade "Thus the systemnteoenaton nara to een power — which iets tenets wh tote sen gee alge By move natty perspective at hoa a sn, ed y, fonneriy reeled ttle remeron te Arn hf of ney, kon When power socms{o enstre tnt risk ero misal,tls rgiont en Hes litle weights but when crmeksapponr in the hegewnlal eon Proce cous wht floney foray prose When this point iz rexehed on both skles, the hegenonte exgulbetum hhas been broken and a spiral of action snd countersetion may sot in. Ag She.nsten changes ammimpions, dong: ‘on one skle widerations of risk aversion rater independence on the other couse polis with or lest aystomfe implications. ‘The wncertainty thus rete way ba diel to slop eye of disintegration eam readily set a pnp ts pnt of cca proces ered {ng overall hegemony has a certain appeal By adding a fow assumptions itprovids an explvation Dawes the ower pwer arte tt te counts for changes iu econo eogims despite the absence. of major war ‘or major shifts ty the balance of power. Applying tit nade to the post- svar period, one tn aque that ines replies that socompanied the “Imperial Republic” or the “Aneviann Knit” aro coe Taping duc to the “doclne of American poswes.” Limitations of an Overall Structure Explanation avafully defined, the concept of hegemony’ al analysis of its exasion Sp coon pocans cep expla eine ene Bt ths overall structurg explanation fs more ambiguous than i Gest mppoars, wed en Jead to facile descriptions of change, We mast spocity what resouress are considered ellective in establishing hegemonic power, and to what range ‘of phenomena iis monn to apply” The simplest and mos parsonnins version of the eroding he tiass would be that international ceonanie reyines diver “ieoraltary patterns of capability: high polities de ‘Chiviges in imervational een ae explained by st rilitay power. This simple version explains the brad features of the postwar éeonomnie order, particularly its basi divisions. Although Soviet or Chinese purchases and sales ean affect world markets, these planned economies are seperate enough that itis more aveurate to think of tines Alistinct cooionsie systems, corresponding tothe three majar (hut wns) Somes of pales pers " Yer the mst parsimonions explanation Ineaks dovwn when one moves from explaining overall stricture to explaining change, The United Stater Position fw the world exunonsy, aval Hts dnninanes tn polieymaking, both ‘within the iudustitize areas sud with the Third World, have clearly de. clined siven 1944 or 1950. Yet dining this posiod the United States as re wines, wily, the most paver state fn te word and fe may loud over its mar coonomie partners (Japan, Canada, and Europe) hee been stendily maintained if not increased. ‘Tihs, although the distibutlon of alltary power alee the interne onal economic order, by ise it provides only'a small part of the expla tion, Three other major factors must be added. fox au-adequate overall srueture expliiation, thus reducing, its simplicity but increasing its it with the fietz of postwar change i international economic regimes: (I) shonges in perceptions of the threat of mnlitary aggression (2) changes in the relative econ strength of the United States and its trading and in ‘estmontpastners; and (3) changes tn hierarchical” patteyns. involving Eiitope nd the Thied Wonk Gncorn about w communist military deat helped stholeto Amerioans to make shortun econonnte nerifces (What is 0 exercise leadership) to ovelop snd proserve the IMborad postwar economic regimes. that ‘com tnthuted to European and Sapanese reeovery. Many of the major advancos {in Sntersational economie relations eame dining the long period of maxi ruin Cold War tension between 1047 (the Trumaen Doctine) and 1969 (tho Test Ban Treaty), Iv these years, the Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (BND), Genoral Agreement on Tails and Trade (GATD, sod Orgnnization {or Economie Cooperation and Development (BCD) began fo function; eureney convertibility was achieved and nor tevffeuts implemented; and the Common Market was established, United States secaity leadership was prized by its allies, and the Amer can peteeption of high threat from the Soviet Union encouraged United States policymakers to grant variows economic concessions to the Euro: ppoons and the Japanese, The sharp redietions in perceived thyeats recent youre have certainly helped to reduce the United States ability subtly to translate its miltwy leadership of the alliance into economic leadership without resorting to overt and highly resented linkages. Ameri an allies beeaie less willing to acta junior partners once they pereeived the externa threat ns diminished, At the same time, American vlingness to accept economic discrimination or unfavorable exchange rates way also declining, Those changes f» perceptions were reinforced by ineteases in Buropean48 | wxetanune uereaverionas mean: ane ve tw those of the United States fu th plied with, United 0. Later, the tremen- snd Japanese cenvomnke expats x Jn the early posta period, Karope as largely sup was able to bargain sind reaist 1 some Issues, 1 States lendership within an overall eeononie st lous European economie recovery and the confidence It gave, at Feast economic fsues, provide the primary explanation for the Dillon Rem turif ents, currency convertibility an suliseqent seduced reliance on the dollar, and the eonaruetion of the Goan Market. The Tater steps were rotivated by a desire to hoost the political as well as economic strength of Burope, 20 that it could better stand o is own agglnst the Soviet ‘Union (and Inter, the United States). ‘This situation created an opportunity for linkage and tnding-oll of tnitary and economic advantages, which eeane inore tempting to the United States as its economic preponderance eroded. Tt is worth noting that the deniption of the economic order was nt euwted by an erosion of “American milltry power in the 1000s, but by x decline in Ameenn eon com that such disruption would threaten vital sect relationships ‘The third factor neoded to fits theory of ering hegemony to the facts of change Tas notin Amor relatione with other counties, but tbe Seations OF Earape to the Third, Worl." Vee 3000, mont of Abie, ‘slong with other now independsit countries, remained under colonial rule. Since then, about fity countries have become independent, end over time theso former colonies have become more assertive. After the abortive British-French Suez invasion of 1056 and the withdgaveal of most British forces east of Suez in the Ite 19605, i was obvious that Europe wold 0 longer play a major role in controling events outside that continent. The erosion of European colonial hegemony, not Ameren military power, fidded to tho complexity of world polities avd to the pressure on the United States as well ag the other industrialized counties for economic regime change. In shor, the theory of eroding hegemony, thowgl a useful prt of the explanation of postwar economie regime change, i# wot as neat aw overall tictureexplpation a tft aped oes No ei very good bai for prediction. The apparent inevitability of decline, portrayed by the -srading hegemony model (vei with these. qualifientions), may to sbni6 extent be-an illusion, precisely hecause of the inadequacy’ of is assur ‘tions about domestie polite, interests, and Iswves. In the Teuding stat, Trterets In maatating Syssile’ leadership and in paying the east will persist, particularly among multinational corporations based there, the financla eit, and governmental bureaveracies charged with maintaining good relations with allies. In the governnints of secondary powers, a well, no een consensus isto he expected. Dependency may provide com fort for some partie, necesities for others, There may be coalitions across stu sraverunr | 49 ceononiie regimes. Regi salty ave tay gem, ay to wt rests In several relgn poliey inay respond to pertielar interes — wih sometins nay fave regng malatonenees The-aegument abont eroding hegemony also suffers from its disiclin tion to dillerentiteansiong i “Yet dominant rulesnsking. power incite aren does not necessarily Tinply elective control over other arent as well. Amerion dominance Ins eroded more enpidly on peteole Fsswes tla it did on isues of international monetary polley or trade in ‘manufactured products. Where the use or thrent of force is Tnellective, it will bo more dificlt for w major power, in what would formerly have byeon a heyemonisl postin across the board, to influence policy fu one wou hy wsing resources not specifi to that aren. This dilclty was [ately evident In the prtoum ts of T9TO-T: although United Sites was nich songs lity and ecmnomicaly thee the Mido Baste il produc Hts abe to pone thems to aedeee ng Hegeonny anguent td yl cst the sompliations ‘ocitce in the fo a vi te est ry al I cntnets amg bweaerades Some ofthe domes pelt one aginst an open, tnteritionntot polly rene largely fom ths sl or perce eect of frignhvestnents Uy waltatioe’ ee lu the atts soa, mtn are Hely to erase th spe ance of United States dnnanee, de to Ur sty otha eae Cairs of Avian par cates but Kathe ners wees they wally comet to United States power oversea’ Fs thy hg ace He ambit into the eleslaton of power and pone ds tons been the realty of power and ie appere ISSUE, RUCTURE ‘The clogunce of the overall stricture model derives fron it basis on @ simple siterprotivon of structure asthe distribution of power capabilities in tho aggregate, ameng states On the basis of these ditibatons, Dromises significant protictons about pattem of bhsvlor™™ Hower one must assume that there is a hiorarchy of is wi il y at the top, and that force is i I ver ilféieit patterns of ‘politics; and 1 rent issu Oven structine explanation a common Tove, dserpand fase and hie ‘hat power, will fod between which states are dominant on ono predominate on others will be eliminated in important\ 50 | rxnuamine wrunnarionss mica ean casos by linkages drawn by power states Urge ase oF ea of states, nthe aeegat, wll be abet enol “These assumptions ce called. Aer 197, frst ce vos that power in poten fs ws itd ny ie thant other sus arta work palit, al thr sere as ore tne oper pt thi isto, om tm to ase stress in which free se oly a igh at and mtr sect ts vot atthe tp of n clear Hervey fees governments. From these sumptions the tne stele sod! ifn thst Tnkages wil ot he dev relly mvt elletively nan tae areas. Power rsources, ta, canna unde thes crests ely te transfered. Power will note fangble, as In the overall stuctory nodol itary apatites wll not he elective in eet sen, and Cconorne expats relevant tone nen nny wt relevant tower Observation of eonteinory worl pitas lows gone platy to this formation. Tei ens Ut diflet te mens le have difere polite structures that ine nore or ee insulated from the ven Aistsbution of ezanome nat lirycs, Ty fer gently i thee domeatte polis, tn thir chivacteitie pallens pile fed the Interest gp tt ave eto. Po ant sal sof Inner, cond ge oi, ae very Ita om international aonetary tse where fue ot als I neh se Iroadly shred” tn cans plies the pattern s comple, wll const fishermen, dstantatr Buber, slents, a and aed neral eon panies, and tv all vowed. Sa Ari ya ran and Ki Inay be very tnportnt on poten ies Int vivully teeta fn questions relating to the Itevationl roxio for the nears ld fd prom or GATT res for trae fy nanaaetued prt Uke wise major food prover sh ne Ansan nn tpt tog conmty ach at Seon aay thy sige volt plone Yet, thou sve struts dfs portant ways fam Ue tad tional overall strctore explanations. it has sina fer agent about rogime change: the tong states (in an Rowe ven) wll abe he ls. Asc sssmpan-of theft itve m,n iat igh satos maybe tompted to rv nkapes anon ues, such linkages wl be gene waece The proms af se sett is that power rexouees fn ose ten Ise some oral af Ue eft vesswhon applied to others Thus mle te avrallsuctre exp ton, issue struction des ot pt snvence of power. hee ists. On the whol, the, analy ple have tn he eondted by Taso area. Within each Hs arene posits Ut ses vl pss Ute seatively coherent selsnterests ad thy -ystom il dominate sesker ms and de Tas stctualsn thus is eapabie of generating clear predistons for ticular situations, Yot as w theory, Iles powerful thn the overall Arctar explanation became tho analyt nee ore informations he o ae neds to hin nat only the overall structure of litany or alan = power: ut how that power i disibuted by hte are Although itis kss power ise stracurals theory te more eacrinel dng snc i ean distinguish mou ose aeas that ave eri In naling tna of exntenporary woud pate, pasteulry the polities of Intene {ional economic relations. The two astimptlons of the compton nerd brendonce mide that it Incorporates theretore increase te clerencis af ft ‘Us predictions with some aspects of realty, at enly paral saricn ef predictive power: Like the overall stuetureexplination, af the polite uf eens rege lage teas oF money, diting cstructre explanation of specifi ase syst such os His teen etity taking place win a ad activity designed to fluence the develop of ho . In the former ese, the tntertatonal rey fe he heen fade as leglinate by major actor, along ino Ulayreesonts ey Cas Nai cy pine cane by th regi Pale hg phice within the gr rules laid down by the regime, and generally iy rected owt sal ava, fone lfstnent: or exerting the rises within the General Agscemeit oie aul Trade (GATT) dvi much of the 195 wa 19608 efor to Ui peters Pastipants accepted GATT rule fut attempted to segure wai fo specie: teres of their ov ® Within the European Economie Core int, the “polities of renal inplomentation exits simon haces tevin the fgitimacy of the re it callenged, but the mero sek tad or delay than." Goveranents attempt to take advan tage of asymmetries in sei, It dn not manipulate visas ery much ~ sinc the eine sll eanstat polly thong In suleaiog (tho seed aspet of plical activity a ise acca, al challange fy vot merely ato ees Implied by. ele ba rules thensves. The tre of th rine is questioned hy mujer sore Dans, aa the potted struggle foes whether, aid in what wap the rine wil bo restructure. Thus the concept uf vulnerability tee dependence is most appropiate here ‘This dinnction simp forte structare explanations ease Drover resneos Ut provide hallicnce in pole ety ater ies with the tw aspects a the problem, Where the les ave taken fe arated, they nay rete asjutncrcy in sensieltyhtendependaa, Instn, #8 Tiga tinal eration hs eng Prot al. 1 sso severe | 53 ‘| sdequate'compensaton for th nations of frig vetnet ere 10 fon ble fa anomaly which it inet, nat host conten with wok trnnues tl ads Slate ty wish wher stata model adequately tee too more seve to He dvi of fete estar a te ‘har pol ‘ tame government) than the fveatos wre thr dss toot tie re Sa al ironing _ wth poe eal of sae: Tey gaan damon Wh the rates are questioned, or the totaal reas beled ona poieal neon, We lave sla eae ee ttre ep tht cnc vty taped nn overall sete expleaton of postwar resime ebnge, nt Heating fa ee eerchay ens dal eters me [Ratt zlntion of vie gs Tat ttn Ship poles Hogi to let diferent per rary, ten tent ome gins for example tm iat torte ae erably, nt senivity, oF what caw ho consklered a the wnderyng tres ~ have persisted despite shift in the unleriying. power rture, ower stvtire tn the fue sro. On veg vests es, fe | cthos—ay we sal ao a ta en Pere te ‘the, ermal pv inn at sr despite cmt of peer Taal tho power Keone tat afc rlemahing allo tt der More geal, wdrtunding the changing reins Hat gover toimplement tteratives and to challegesssrmptony shot the cent | satinaliteaone eons ee es a oe tc of Ince in an ve satel ss to pred alat. | proces Inter seeleet cy * rer ul ‘i planation are" generally inadequets -suhen there Is goaatincongeity nv anise are ete the esti tunes coupled with an aecount of paltiea process Tn ters of th structure, avd is distvibution in eurrent use, . Political process. In terms of the dis {inetiin developed in the previous chapter thete is HRely to bo a di disap presses for sein chav saney hetweei the structure of powers resourues (avhether military aa fu oth aspect af pier ant bt fo the fase street © stark FenlistFornmation eetnennie a fn te iasue stueture appvonch), the underlying power steueture is more haste, sine breaking or creating ul power as cout aver onteomnes and aneasuced by the pattern of outs chung Une os tht hone the pater of ses ines, The transit ton expt teams epee pl Interdependence. ‘Tora considerable extent, regime change oeeurs beens tical pices. Skill politcal are ng affects the translation, States ff the difference between the influence aud beaellty ues an exist intense preferences nnd enhesent positions will birgain more effec ‘current use rules, aun its underlying sources of power to change the rules, veal hy tho instietions and pracedres that choneeterse Sateen fssuo structuralison predicts sharp rathey than jgucdual regime: change. For “16 Figuve 3, ilustrates, as MIGUREE 3.1 Strucural modes of regime change Power capabiiies (overall or sesue-mpeifc) Power over ‘outcomes (pattern ‘of outcomes) Limi ns of Structural Explanations tse tetra i fen weal hn ths tines Foe the ab tance fag ouy coer st say erat aed Stet tht expaeteny vale of the ste el eed, Since ollie! exleanes ye patra il longer Shona for singly yal anees thse ar ote fom stato kage yee om sts wh ent ovr ower but rom pt wen ser the ang over the a he tr ome nc a the ke ts le por rom fl IE patcen of outcomes is intolerable to sate with ‘overall (risue) power at Tegime chine | weak states fine i to their advantage in conference diplamnaey. ‘This Tink: process54 | IxPLAIMNG HereaAFIORAK RRGAM CHANEE VJ In the simplest (and least fnteresting) struetutnl exphiations, a shift of all or isuespecitic capabilities (For exawnpl, ened hy war) Tends eclly to rogine change, In the more sophisticated strietnea! expl tions indicate ts tho dagen, n teow eretes nlngning sees wich ond to pitem af antes that pte feos the overall prwerstctine (or nthe surpcie vote he watering power structure nthe fe ven anf tate tte eng tte thee wit on ine cg temp in scr approach views the regio al the barging pres as hang ny omy. The validity of tat astmptioncopends he aio of eal pullics that we examine inthe st hae Tn consi, or enti a the seta esplvaons de vo ta weet thn te wna hint wake best stating point for analy reine change Oue cue tn laboring “the stctnal nals ‘f cconmaeTegine sheng at tke ha inal model, whose proponents have afew pty 1 uve nl ut ogfected toeate It caefully to femme vee change dndicates that vie bliewe-they have some explanatory power under cor. tain capisly ated male, Ove prone aa I trowel incoreties of iterations themy holt fate aes “lig caeuly reformed, i prowl ly pt exp AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MODEL one way to think of the structure of work pits sin terms of the dis fetotion of eaabtes (veal or wth earns) amnng the major tors of world polities, This isthe concept of stricture sed in the avers fall structure and sue structure mwdls, It is ly possi, however, to define another kind of struct, One enn think of governments as lke Sit merely by formal relations between Foreign offers hut nln hy iter governmental and transgovemientl ies at say Fevels-— trom Heady of overnment on down. These tics hetwcen governmcuts may be reinforced by norms prescribing behavior i portiewsr situations, and in somo oneee Joy formal institutions. We use tho term: International organization to ret {o these. multilevel linkages, nats, niLinsttutions, fnternational organ zation fi this sense is another. typeof world political structure. To our Intemational organization inde, these networks, worms, Institutions are important fndepondent factors for exp change. One may oven have international er id this sonne with n speak of the international ‘organization of Canadian-American relations even thngh, as we shall soo jn Chapter 7, formal international institutions play only ® minor wale in the relationship. toterational orgusization in the broad sense of ‘net works, norms, and instittions tneludes the norms associated with spect {nlernational reyes, Int its x broader category than regime, Decdase i al includes patterns of elite networks snd (relevant) foraal inst ons. Thus, the Bretton Wools taternational monetary reine presslbed centres’ facil dealing with ove another; but the latemdtons! or gunivation of the monotory isu aren during that period se Inehuded Formal orggutzations such us the Internationa! Monetary Fund and net works of tes among national treasuries and centeal hanks. And ths ite. ional organization of the monetary fsue aren existed within « broader pattem of international organization, imeading both the formal Init Ais of the Unite Nations nid informal networks of tes smony govern iments, putentrly anon governments of advanced industlal setetios Inlangg tothe OCD, The international on novi, and will be dificult either to eradi cate or drastically to renrrange. Even governments with muperior cape Sites eral or within the se aren wil Bd hed te rk ale will when 1 cntits with established pattoms of belivior wlth existing sctwrks and Insttions. Unter these conditions the prediction of over all structure or fave structure thors will be incorreet rogtmer wll ot Hrocome eongrent with underlying patterns of state enpabilies, hecasss International orgnizations as defined above will stand inthe way Thus, the international organization anodel will help to. aecount for fuitures! of the baste structural models of regime change. Hgimes_ are established and organized tn conformity wth dstibutions of aati but lovant networks, institutions will hems ver © these” capabilites, AS time pro: ress, the underlying capabilities of skies will become increasingly poor Dreictors ofthe charictrstis of international regimes. Power verout comes will be confer by ergunizatonally depenient eapebititen, such as voting power, ability «form eonitions, and conti of elite netrks that is, by eapabiies that are alfected by the norms, networks and ie statins asioiated with international organaation ny we have dlied fe In the United States General Assombly, for instance, une cannot predict resolutions correctly by asserting thatthe most powerful sates in the intemational system (suchas the United States and the Soviet Union) ill generally preva, Inst, one has to eximine. governments abilities to Influence, and benefit by, the ono-satenme-ote system by which the forinal decisions ofthe assembly are made, ‘Thus the international organization model Helps to resolve some of the puzzles that could aise for someone who believes in the overall steacture O Fssue structure model. Some regines may not change at rapidly \0 eranATIONAL OMEaMEeATION atovRL | BT ines anal others, we will he ply teow a kiwwledge of the 4 ‘underlying power expahilites; for these tunable to predict patterus of ontennes sh distribution of capabilities among gover zation model provides a dynamic of regi chai, as well as a explana ‘ia_fa-certain instances, of inert nate elo, fnkernational tmisklers only th sold Hines in the diagram, this system could be self perpetuating, with eoskbeabte stability, yet not dtermived eatiely by twadestying tatters of expabiities, ‘The’ dotted line indientes the source of change: other networks, norms, and institutions may interfere The notworks, norms, ad institutions of the United Nations, for instance, text within which deelsions wore nde pont the uso uf occas space and resourees. Alton the international onganteation model includes important fue {ors that ie igre or dpe by the baste structural ae i hae sone sigs Tiitations of ite own, It Is more complicated tay tre trl appreaches,reuiig moro tformation Te doc mt pie Ait ove international regia il change fromm a angle vale cack so i struct, Indeed is fsa the politcal proses asset ated vith international. argunkzation-tanpliesthat-agtarsattagle, and fected the rules about . fave afd th ntrenonal ta rogine, pct sins th ome: ton of the United Nations Conference rae and Dovey 1004 inl, the pans of he Una Netin syn fetal the - it fants et Ay in taniing« no interatioaceonme rts Sch an ty, developed vogh the United Nations wot Hl tafe te Interna ade regime an, more inant, ofc i IMP cate tar Savonel mentary copie sed pape vet tosylate te dae opment of an international regime to contzol rect investment. The tr eleven in implement thon, eu abt a several pit i er nero ene ae changed y dec tow rt es essay ale thee that are themselves alfcted by international organtation fo one sense. thaw the busi srtornl models, leaving wide lative for choice, decision, “ Figure 22 ia diagram ofthe Iterntinal organization model Exit und auipefevel barging, norms and networks, ns well ag underlying «apa turn alet| ‘the factors on whieh the international organization model depend are la snore temporary and reverstile than those of the busfe structural tmodels, If powerful governments decide to destroy tho existing regimes, ind Inve the determination as wel asthe ability todo ao, the regimes andl their associated organizations will no longer have lives ef their own, The (ftect on rime) {international organization model postulates that the costs of destroying Outcomes regime will be high whon wellintograted elite networks exist on many levels among counties, Neverthelos, the costs of 1m adverse rogime coull become so great that sone states would resolve to destroy it even though thot meant distpting those networks, At this point the basfe struct models would become wore relevant than the international organtation ‘model i ‘We expect that under realist exltions, a desoribed in Chapter 2, dhe tunuerlying distention of power is likely to he dominant (particulary since force is usable}, and the international organization model is not Ikely to add siguifieantly to explanations of regime change. Under com: which zatlonally dependent capabil FIGURE 32. An international organiza lel of rene change Underlying capabies (sae of overat) ! ! y Existing Ongsnizationaly plex interdependence, however, we expect international organieaional vomsand [pe] dependent tnnerdepetieoce norms and procedures and their associated political processes to affect pat vrecworkst capabilities mode) terns of rogine change. Please remember that the international ‘organization model is dnl: Vv “Ae the bexoning, the oruization of «repo ie afcte by underlying xpi likely to apply under complex interdependence conditions, and that veh of sates, bot nat ons continuous bal Uhen, is predictions could be rendered invalid by the actions of govern.558 | rxecamine weerawarinat, nec Hane Flore date rset change eines The lator poi can be vhta tno coaion In Cher tity snd vlortyinerdapendoes spores rane The he Mol orgavaton mld thn Devtable tale cnager ering tl he ps sl onnipuste Schaar Sens dependence forte ni ied thy nay sake nary ply attra tr nea iy ostoon. Bat share fe tf thc nto a vray te endef they change ply ton muy reine hel wile Shaenged tnd destoyed "the wldy of the model depend on its assunpton da ators wl sot detoy the rine by atoning tke mags of ove sete Yeluorsity dependon I, on tho untry. hn sec onde power ene within ise sen or over wl one gain Downe ose Inportant and stra! mode wl be hao dy han the er ont rguiation mode egne hmg, The tw strum! mds theeore dominate the tena el athe sey thle aby itedopendons dominates ty harasses rout” Abve cov ove of ole ir ternal geo thdel and envy nerdpentonce con ney efor COMBINING EXPLANATIONS. Ne sg ol hey aden ld ple, Coin vay to grey. Yow nny thetlore he tompled to stat everthing relevant end tndcimiatly combine all te ct ve fae assed. By dolng 50, you would boy the questions, lowreven, of which factors are most fnportant and how they sh comin You must also abandon hope for sper explanations, even whon they ave appre Prlate, Al problems wld tne approche sana Tov tn plexity Because of the drawbacks of « single complex synthesis, it is better to seek explanation with simplo models andl ae complexity as necessary. or eamnomle less, we can begin with the cone rows modcl lhc ignores tnteratonal peal structure enely an pred reg ange on the bass of tchaogial change al ong scone icpendonce. If such a model realy explaes Inca, we ent nt all th ‘composites of determining the relevant structure of power ‘We belive tht this wil rarely if ver, be sues The next aly cal sep, therefore, wl bo to ad polis In the simplest pstble say by Seving whether the over stactre mde, se thn eonnetion wth the econo proces model, ca explain rege change. Using the overall ‘conning varnanarions | 59) We wold expt, therfore. Ua acne sng on lay seen, Hh pelts ier wold rte Hokage to inporent semoate found tears a weak pean the te ovr arguments in thin the rove ehaplcr ae eoetet, howove. ven ths appro wl often Inuit he xe nop teen son et ten toa i setae approach Using IME ieee sss tht purr reser ave ysis spee by meter ad Inks wil bo slight Within ates, power rsouensrelted to snc sll domi resoures relent to wsity within rege, When te regime prodneesoxteoes contary to what we would epent oe the tess of fondant power seme, wo would capoet ates poset Ath valraily evel t force changes ine ens Sometimes even thi enent ll wot expla Fegine chang, ad one wil ave ty Car the Sternatonal eganeation tol snd seine Hw sas oon ands Goes tat tay ethers in sting the aoa, fn eating presumptions or paler ot Heavior that make cea Inisnvcecles tin governments ego setive on glial isn, We wil ago need toa we Ieateak re fies wee fest foes with allow them to pow aes te Elton that rong thom no ing haw appeared ‘We snl showin Iter chuprs tt each mabe els ty oxpining regine change or persistence tg ata the time fo atleast one ok ‘ur four cases (ecb, money, tnd Canadl-Amerean anid Austin ‘Amex elation). I some ets we shal ned to combine bo these mores fov a fll explanation. In several cate we shal req m sequence Of mel, On mel sy apply ste wl for oe prod bt poly fox fant. 1 ul nat he whe fovea sng aligned Butumer diferent contin, diferetcombiontins of tess wl po wie the best explanation of tatrational regime change ed pel ues If they Our ability to combine models depends, however, on a clear under studing of their dliferonecs, Table 3) sumnarizes the assumptions of the tnodels about threo key questions, Ror the structural mudel, under) Power can fe trusted into changes iterations rege wit) Ingh tsnsltion costs, Thus the states with signifeant power capabliios, overall or within issto areas, will deierinine the nature of interuational |} rogimes. For the international organization nv :0 {| Farermor, tht del the cn of dstapng tones an sad | | policy networks will beso high dt regimes il tend fo pest even when heir patterns of outcomes are not a line with undeslying power capa. Wiles. The ceomomie process model, argues thattheeconomie. est f disrupting interdependence willbe great and tht wider high seocomse. th00 | exrLawine uvrenwarionss meciM: enane TABLE 3.1 SOME KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF THK FOU MODELS OF REGIME CHANGE Overall fete Iaternational Heonone ipwetune structure organisation sensitivity CCanunderlying sources of Yes. == Yew. Nw - power be translated at low cost into changes in inter rational regimes? ‘Ace the costs of disrupting No No ver policy networks high? ‘Arethe economic costs of (Noy (No) = Ver ‘dacupting patterns of| imerdependence snd an ipl ane nattonal sonsltivkty states..will therefore be reluctant to disrupt tnt “So ro now rendy to consider vie cake stiles, Hefore proceding however, we must sate two caveats, First, the eave studios aro not repre sentative of all of world politics, We chose them for theoreti! reasons that will be explained in Parts J1 and ITF, Second, as we sit at the be- ginning of Chapter 2, none of our models is expceted to apply wniversaly We anticipate that tho closer a situation is to complex interdependence, the more the issu structure and international organization models will apply, and the less accurate will be the overall site model. When realist conditions pertain, the reverse is expected. The eeovoinie process model needs politcal speefintion befor If the overall power structure in world polities determined pattems of regime change, we would not neod to have introduced such a complex set of models.’ World polities would be: like « single great Inke: often turbulent, but with «uniform Revel. Changes i the ni ing into one part of the Inke quickly have effects am the whole body of ‘water, We assume, however, that world politics is highly dif rather than homogeneous. The appropriate image for ou analysis fore not a single Tako, but x river divided by sets of dikes, d locks, which separate and connect various tevels and “lakes.” We have developed our models to attain a better understanding of the heights and strengths of the various types of dikes, dams, ad locks in world polities, and to learn more about their architects, engincers, and lock-keepers, and the fees they charge PART I Regime Change in Oceans and MoneyTHE POLITICS OF OCEANS AND MONEY: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Chapter 4 ‘he Pax Ditaies ofthe nineteenth centry is sometimes seen asthe golden ug of iteration! oder, Intonationn exon nerdepenenea Was governed ly reies that sere lvgelyestablhed and cufrced by Great Brit, Despite the mythology of Iniseefatre, Britain applied lity fore whe necesay to mantin such noms as fee trade and freedom ofthe sess. Dit the reyes wore goneralyacceptaie to ther mir rows Raval power flowed at dominate the wo Peiphets, hough the balance of power in Europe wes multipolar, Ta {he words ofan importa Brits temorandum, th reqs she policed were “eloely dete with the pray mn ial interet of mort, Ors my as powle, af the other nating who were us les appre Iensive of ral supremacy Inthe haa of a re wade England hn they would bein th faa redminat protection Power "oo of the hey te mess he Pee Dita were monetary as and oceans space ad resource. We ave chen thes te for detaed exploration and comparison inthe net thre chapters becuse tel con tied importance tom the nineteenth centory tothe present alow wt test the applicability of our models of rege, change under. chang pelt and economic conditions. We shal rst deste and ten exit Shangesininteratonlsegimes fr the oceans and monetary Bre, be, teen World War Tand the present We expect no singe explanatory mnodel or combination af models to be uperor forth ens prtod Sch dramae changes have aken pee n communiatins aad poroy tation patterns, ocean shipphig, fishing, and mining andl fn Gter- national money markets and banking systems, ext one wold expect ‘equally striking changes in politcal behavior. Indeed, we began this study believing that our conditions of complex interdependence would be more closely approximated in the 1960s aid 1970s thaw exter, tional models of world polities would therefore become less relova time. As we shall seo In Chapter 5, to some extent this is the « ‘with Important quallfations Except for the overall structure approach, our models predict major diferences in patterns of polities among issue arcas as well as, over time, within them, Thus, we chose international monetary and oceans ise, not just for thelr Intsinie Importance, but for their differences, which sug gested to us that the patterns of change for their respective regimes would also be quite diferent. Both Issue aroas seemed tn meet the conditions of ‘complex interdependence to some extent, yet tere were significant con- trasts, In both, multiple channcls of contact exist between societies, and transnational actors are prominent, Force, however, plays & greater diruet role in oceans questions than in money. Navies, after all, still patrol the reas, and occasionally attempt to reinforce national jurisdictional claims. But despite the role of force, aceans fsues are more diverse and less closely linked, functionally, then international monetary issues. However, politial actors may sce relationships among aconns Isis and may the fore group them, For Instance, there is very litle direct functional rela~ tionship between fishing rights of coastal and distantwater states. and rules for access to deep-water minerals on tho seabed; yet in conference Aiplomaey they were increasingly linked together as oc poly vcs Finally, the issues difer in the yoogeaphical fxedness of the goods In volved, Money is one of the most Fungiblo of items; and banks, businesses, and governments have well-developed networks for moving it rapidly ‘across borders. Oceans policy issues largely involve questions of legal jurisdiction over resources Uist are specific tw particular geographical ‘The applicability of the conditions of complex interdependence to the two Issue areas will he explored in Chapter 5. In this chapter we shall Aeseribe major events in oceans and monetary allairs between 1920 and 1075, emphasizing changes in the nature of the énternational regimes for these issue areas. Before we ean analyze political processes by ise area, we must define sue; that task is more difficult than it may at frst appear. Policy issues are not the same as objective problems, such as whether life in the ovcans is being destroyed by pollution, or whether the international monetary system ean finance growing volumes of international trade and investment. Issues are problems about which policymakers are concerned, and which OnsrANY isu aka | 65 they belie subjective, ave relevant to publte poliey. Thus a poliey issue is parly woblen must be perecived as relevant to policy by peuple Is inflence wver paieye evant oi hy po Since issues are defined subjectively, so are issue areus. When the gov- ‘emiments tive un a set of issues see thom as closely interdependent, and When ‘statement about actors’ beliefs and behavior, vot about the objective realty of the problems themselves. We noted that international monetary issues are much more closely linked Sunctionally than oceans issues, which are connected largely by the py ceptions of tors that issues involving oceans should be tated toyethe Yen lng a otras fos ate eased ellectvly, a gene Hse ‘roa fn our terms ext, Cte dificult precisely to define the boundaries of an Issue aren; this dificulty is complicated by the fact that these boundaries ean change ‘overtime as issues, and thedr groupings, change, We therefore hogin our Alscussions of the international monetity issue area, and the oceans poliey Issue atea, by disesing theie boundaries az we perceive th ° ‘eal with thon collectively, we call that sot of issues nn ise we dl s0, we are ‘THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ISSUE AREA. People concerned with international monetary alles frequently assun that everyone knows the boundaries of their subject, so they often do not define the fssue aren involved. To say that intersational fuancil allairs are being discussed iy taken as definition enough, At one inight expect this lack of attention to definition reflets « great consensus on what Is volved in this issue area, and a considerable agreeient, therefore, on its hhoundaries. Richard Gooper takes the major dimensions of an international nictary regime to be: "() the role of exchange rites, (2) the nature of the reserve xset(s), and (3) the degree of contol of Hiternational capital movements."* Hew authorities would disageee.t Within an international 1 Attn nly Ut She oll oot rely. Pronmaby. pial aco won mien wali we thir ous wales hey al the porcine he lone ‘bo expected! between perceptions ¥ ih ee i ely. Neverthe, ron the bass of subj {ie percent tenia te voy that nate nt ines tht tn ten Fone tet es wath cine tyr coms fate pact t maybe Hl wel thf intrastate pte sy wee fe as 1 for sta mc the rvion Wont rps wich apt oth se itn) vig th oy te Site dio and id ete eno te eacange rts wre el an wee nt dv ws tan cen fo60 | rue rousmies oF wean an ser smonetany regs, weve, lio rs van sie fn partie probs qn, ajutinan, xl een Iie iptnt oe n hti h oy ss hat 3 ven spin, Discs the sccm the mie pl 8 fo: pole the the alrite rate wa tree hy ths eth or wheter ooh ity ested in tho carly 100, fll ny lars Alo th Atnetlon not pore, we ome questins of ren chan athe than dal ofthe police procaine ete reine. We dete te termina monetary astra ote her of owe sen ytelovant by polis to ection st nat Hn of te tain arangeotr shuld sxe on cachange rte rear wl ad ental of internation opt wervemons tng sys a ee Sant to adjstient, luis, so conleno wth & ven role Tnrogine, "To what extent are the fnlerationl meta ply themes elon and constnt thoughout the pond Syce the Trtry Depart ete snap response the Unite Sates intro cl pty, epertinot Anal ports ot Yours In ech ofthe done 102, let 1972 Conta Eiogorer dh at "noay? “un vant ontary asset, eleney belong in the former “or * Conventionally, prlens a wh ‘ouch, whi fationsrytendonces wy aaniet Useless omit an hn atop of tron ae el ‘oarly balaoo Ute payments, Adjsinent iene ent ewer Seal sal ae Aomesie “austerity” programs) or exter (sil as caves exchange Yate). Cone ‘doce refers to th ater of ldo of Ti Banc reces towed nrc: ‘confidence In the exrront vn of cueoey i Tw, He Tiel ta bs on balanes by private paras, thie pation downordl pressive te ean. Fr a fol tn atonal rientay relations nthe Oe, se Wlarl NC, The Bo amis of Interdependence (New York: MCT, fr the Conn Poe Be We, 188), nea | ges of the treasury’s reports devoted to i ‘note, within the futenyatignal nan For over threw.junctors of Ue t with gold (pn half centuyy $i nal questions, Further seven key plrsernecouter pA Table show, concern ns) as rominent throughout the these concer nnd hone ving to do with fore exchange aro elowrly related, sid since oth are abe elated To wlt oe sw ell alae of payuwtsaue, the tle stall wndesate Ue ‘entity in the reports Clea” poblons of flows of nant! sie (reign exchange and oid} andsthe balance of payments auton sso ciated with such llows have beon perceived as important throughout he Halt century: Coney, the policy sve atthe cote of the International omer itv area ae rmhted renaraly consistent 'Not only do plieyakers peresve the itrvatlonl mo 4s hy connected many fatal sages sec, in fat foes A hoch sensitivity between omictary events taking place betwoon soy ‘wo aor cies has wale, tas aways bees Signo Hetwess 1020 sod 1870, xcept whe huge’ contols have been very pwateaay daving Workd Wat I. 'This sue aren does nt neces Sc al otis in the Steno polit syatms cute. dace st chu the Set Union, Chin, und other states whose goveoments hive tod to ett thems th lets of international fnanctal flows, Neverth thal monetary ais are connccted felony, the tae area doesnot eis merely tn the eyes i is icholdrs. Perceptions of paliynahers can profoundly ae the move tury spstomy, It they dl wot erent i and, short af major politcal up Ieavas, ches in those portions cannot dentro Te enarly gold moven 8 ro ‘The International Gold Standard before 1914 Discussions of intervational monetary rogines since 1990 invite compari sons with the pro-World War I gold standard, which was viewed by con temporary bankers sn offiias as. an automatically sel-expubibratiag system. IC difficult to understand Tater events without realizing that the vious of wlelals tn the 1920s sin even therenlter were clatlered. with images of the prewar system, which many saw as an ideal to whieh the ‘world should return ‘The classe fnteypretation of how the gold standard operated was pre sented by the Culilfe Gommittes, established by the Bish government toward the enel of World War I. This committee argued that the Dank of sland reinforced tho effects of gold movements by raising the discount € when a gold drain reduced its ratio of rekerves to liabilities, thus te striting credit and reducing prices, coonomie activity, and employment. commented:mes | a afr Hid on a] dd eh hee i “* » | ee : ale. non Ha 3 seni fk an | Sige aa lal x» “LEE | recent narra ea “ 8 a anki thm he i ‘ Blo] » x om geek 3 at aking con more thoteeation of eookerclart R (a) * * re % Hg co ho ste pera wettona ately ei a ne * PESE 3 at twit nd a = He os Tat | ota eta ——— oye ® : % More never working class, wept means = : : 7 Hi wi ce vst ly ough tea te “ * “ba 2 Iaunnks wer Ie standard syst brow ral du ee ~ £ gin * i ii e sed au grenter va ae ot sa = 8 : : | i ce es th Dd ew eis te y ele bo aa Unypstons ee ee : 3 il! why cece te 2 2uge ? Ehret, Bt sey | glal* ib ee" ao te Saas he Sls at oa hl en er tats : i! ee re fective and central bank 5 sith we om lel Sess e|F) Hey wa a soovbtorar ae : 2} a]. oe tcc age aot Sent aier! 5 ehts E reso ental ts ma Sia: . Zla]* rip i ‘Keeton a ne ry soaes = : : Hl = ane ee ye upon to ea ‘other exter od z/8 agit d Mm armel eee ‘aoa cue 8 bee 2¢ Ithongh the Ca ms — = | ) i j Dak ot gla po oy es 2 a agua! ani of Rng policy, 1 don ” al | i i aut sn ays ie a . z 8 > 3,[4! igi hd pegnaionl ves of a =e re ERs g BEle geaag in As ts Me mse : ti : iH i a tucmillan Ne Natt so 3 Egahas ee a2ia9 i jotte mau wert — | | i: Wl ul a heenuse Lon pear ‘ ie | | ul Hl I iat i Kg td war tet abag 278 ai|é iG: iat att a ton ata 1. i i : . taf it Cat powerful fay in its results tert Sl2ihs gad ions to h on, Other othe a i te at en — coe the ala british int ie im ty en - forest als, ret te he oe was he most im tone tae bane to peripheral70 | rar rou oF exane An nnn areas, greatly affected short- and long-term capita Hows, ant ts balances ‘of payments, not only of Britain hut of states dependent on her These clfects vccurred even If several central banks all ralsed their rates propor- tionately to the rise in British in heeause tighter monet conditions stimulated shifts toward liquid assets, which meant increased Ibalances of key currency countries al the expense uf minor centers? Conte tuol was thus asymmetrical, as Britain shifted the burden of adjusting to change to peripheral countries such as Argentina, whieh depended heavily ‘on British tende, Tho secondary key eutroney conters, Berlin and Paris, acted similarly: the hierarchical system allowed thes to craw funds from lessor contors, as Britain was drawing fils fon thea, The the syste vas remarkably stable, though Jt was wot weary as thoroughly dlowsivted by Britain, and by sterling, ax onellr writers ind thonght ‘The extra control of the Hank of Ragland ower the stetiygmaek sth ight covcetvably have placed exces ‘om Clvsan eserves at 00 tighter ip London, The franca stnictune was sch, hanwoves ae bn the Reichsbank w similar advantage br moving the exchange tates omsvaler nsighhoring eousitis in favor of Canning. This bivnwr ly of btm fala infienee, through which fun sowed fro lesser to yrcater Rncal centers as Interest rates rose everywhere, hele! to minimize monelayy fithon arming Inajor couters by: passing the svt Seanad alstment ort log 16 the peripheral counties. It provider a stiking contrast tthe tentency of New ‘York and London to compete for tho sn ini in later years thon either contors Having decisive sewwing power aver fruls rae Continental ounlses in payments spl” ‘Tho impressive degree of British control is illustrated by the swvall amounts of gotd that the Bank of England aud the British Treasry wes required to hold. Confidenco in sterling was x0 growl that in 19K3 the Bank of England held only about $165 million worth-of old, or less than 4 percent of the total oficial gold reserves of thirty-five inajor counties al that the, Britain’s holdings of gold wore Tess thas 15 pereent of those of tho United States and less than 25 peroent of those of either Russia or France; they were also excoeded by the official yold holdings of Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Argentina? The weed to hold s0 little nor Interest-bearing gold was a mark of strength, not weakness London could economize os her gol holdings, ike any kl hake, becanse of the quality of her other quick iteration atts, er stitial stevetre, and because, such was the power of Bau rale and the Landon Market fof discount, gold would always fw inthe ast rest fn alley smnnetary ‘he stability of this system rested on its hiorarchieal structure and on Ainaneers’ confideaee in the continued convertibility of sterling. snd other major cnrencies, into gold at par value. Liquidity was increased not merely hy new gold discoveries and by diverting monetary gold stocks into olfcial reserves, Int also by increasing holdings of forelgn exchange Whereas world vffial gold reserves approximately doubled between 1900 suet 1913, oil holdings of foreign exchange ineteased more than fourfold; hy 1919 foreign exeliange accented for 16 to 19 percent of was reinforced hy political hierarchy. Britain was wot niftarify dominant over either Germany ar France, but she had suseese 0 nineh ance extensive ail presperois: areas. oversens. This ul rellected in other cuntries holdings of the foreign ex: states: Britain, France, and Germany. Ouly about Iwoldings of these three eurrenetes fn 1913 were in whereas aver 85 pereent of non-European holdings of those eur Tact stoning. Vesipheral conniries generally allowed their mougy supplies to be tv Auenced steongly by aetions af conteal hanks tn the center eonnuies, Even for advanced sinall states with wellalevaloped banking systems, the move- mont of short-term funele “was undoubtedly much more responsive. to changes fn the disenmt rates of the Bank of Englad and other large central banks than to changes in their own.” Argentina, which de- pended heavily on Britain, allowed its gold flow to determine its mowey supply; iC had vo effective central bank to contiol the process. Ths Argentina “could not wllfy the segative effects of changes in British Inferest rates on is 0 nut at all clear, indeed, that the peripheral states’ governments wilerstood the processes that were going om or the disidvantogeous position that they ocoupied. The absence of Jaalance of payments statistis, ud the lack of knowledge of the extent to whieh the system was managed hy key central banks, rather than being natura,” probably helped 1 mualitain the system's stability by waking the inequality and its causes Tess visible. In aition, local oligarchies in the peripheries bonetited fram the syste. Although often viewed as a very long period extending into the murky Past the international gold standards life span was actualy less than hall century, Some authorities date its begioning from the 1870s, when France, Holland, the Semlinavian counties, avd the United States dis continwied the use of silver coins and tied their exrencies to gold; others date it from 1880 oF even 1900, relleeting the adherence of Atstria-Hun- sary, Hossa, and Japan to the system auring the 1800s, Moreover, the international gold standard did not operate as smoothlywe ¥e 72 | vam routes oF oeran ann stoner 4 has sometimes beon suppor Tho contra hanks were wt pantintarly Sensitive to the International offs of their nets, Tiwy dhol eh anperte to manage the foterntonal gold staan inthe gevorl interest {although the contal barks of Engdand and France enaperate somo: what, Yt by tho end of the per, the nce for such eamperation ws increasingly apparent remlt wf the growth sul watt of hor term capital. Aller 1007, “there wos growing seinen feta ares in favor of some kind of systemic inertial _mmelary oope Aion the absonce of which wae m conspicuous Texture f the prosiOld rangement, inorder to minimize wndo shocks to the pine ystom {rom there snd ator sors” “Thus the prewar gold standard was by wm ey Fatale, Foreign exchange war being ued ineresingly In seserves cx nevemonts ware inecoming more disturbing and tho need for enopertion wie increasingly evident. Moro fundamental politcal changes were ls taking pe "Ax the working class gained poli! power it wld. bo able to Bight adjstonent policies Unt cnt snemploynnent dng ets es the British striker of 1920 Tater Indicted Av peviphees amt” came somewhat sore aviomonaus, ther polices ‘won hacome Toss passive ‘nd perhaps most nportant, th United State was becoming mr prom nent in the international economy. Fvon withnt the stinias of Word War It would eventally have eg to compete ith Landon fr aa, andthe heraehy woul! Rave been braken* ‘he ond ofthe international gold steed iv ty wel fetioning phase camo with tho beginning of World. War T Dut the tromls we have jst enumerated, which were ntnsied hy the war, were by no menns erate by it Ono cam therefore asnume that eventally the intentional gold standard would have cllapod or hnve been trnfirmed, even without the war; however, the conditions sinder which that -wovkd have ten pce, the form it would have taken, and it elects ean ner bo known In practice, therefore, the prewar gold stuard was shorted, ma aged (although with national erento rather than nn faternatinal One), and highly subject to linge. Te rested on pill domination ~tho domination of tho wealthy classes fn Britain over les prosperous groups, and of Bia, France, and Germany over peripieral conten. Ths Ore realty diverged substantially from the myth ‘of am eternal, aitonnti, stable, and fae sytem, which coud only ho damaged i tampered with by politician, Yet in ater years, the myth wast many ways mone prof inits effets on behavior, then the realy tel, The rales of the old voy vere no longer being followed ~ indeed, thoy had wever been followed as perfectly as people inagined — byt they reniined the standard of bo. Hvior for sateen and ane, partially in entra counties such as Britain "ive WerenMATIONAL MONETAMY He ANE | 7 ary Regimes, 1920-76 ‘Yow will rocall that we distingulsh regimes from one another om the hase of their formal or ile facto rules and norms governing the behavior of oajor actors, Whew shifts in cules and norms ae very sharp, regime pe- Fiods eau be distinguished without difeutty; but sometimes changes wre igdual or sequential, and then the choice of periods inevitably becomes somewhat arbitrary. ‘This ix partteularly the ease when, ns i the 19205, 0 series of countries joins a par value system sequentially, rather than as a result of general agreement, or when, as in the early 1990s, countries sequentially eave seh system. In such ewes we have defined the regi periods in terms of the behavior of the key currency countries — Grent Dritain until 1991 and the United States thereafter. Following this con we Ive divided the fiftysix yenrs from 1920 to 1976 into seven ts shown in Table 4.2. For each period we have indicated whether ‘un futernational regime existed, and the uetion at the pertod's beginning Unt is considered to have brought the new regime into helng or destroyed the old one ‘The following pages batelly deseribe the rules and norms charaetertaing ‘each period; the degree to which they were adhered to; and the reasons for our cloices of beginning and enxlpoints For those regimes, The dates ‘we selected are not necessarily self-evident, and any such periodization docs sume violence to the flow of history. ‘This review, although not a ‘comprehensive description of political or eoonomle process ret over the Inst illy-five years, much less. an explanation of change, will give readers vnfamiliar with the history of intemational monetary alts a general deseription of developments, and therefore facilitate the analysis f political process and regime change that follows, During World War 1 gotd exports from Great Britain virtually ceased, Although the intemational gold standard was never formally renounced ‘uring this period, iE lapse In effect. The pownel and dollar were pegged together at $4.77, about 2 percent below por." British citizens were en. couraged to sell their forcign soeurities to provide foroign exchange for the war effort. By 1919, it was clear that Britain had been seriously weakened coomomically by the war, and that at least for the thne being, no return tw the 1914 party of $4.86, with free movements of international capital, was possible. Thus, in March 1919, the golddollar peg lapsed, and from carly 1920 through 1924, “the rate fluctuated almost eomplotely free from folicial intervention.” The pound reached a low in early 1920 of $3.18, id below $4.00 until about the endl of 1924, rising to approx imately the prowar parity hy the end of 1924, fn expectation of return to a par value system,7A | re rouerics oF oorann AND Mom TABLE 4.2. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES IN THE MONETARY POLICY ISSUE AREA, 1920-75, “Action ot beginning Period Years Regime situation orpeviod 1 1920-25 Noureyime: floating cates, inning of period surveyed currency deprecation HH 1925-31 International regime Gde Brian's return to gold facta): Coldexchange Apr 1925, system focused on sterling: ‘ritalin leaves the god stare sg3-ts curceney depreciation, ards September 1931 ‘exchange controls (especially important afer 1959), IV 1946-58 Recovery regime: tetton Woods Agreement rly agrced-on system, of 1944 Decomer operative but with ad hoe modifies tions allowed; exchang controls, inconvertiblty of ‘aropean eurencis. ¥ 1959-71 Intemational regimes fixed Convertibiity of major bot adjustable partes: Buropean currencies dolla convertible into gold. achieved: December 1958 Vi 1971-75 Nonregimes no sable set of United States actions of rales, despite fourteen inaking dollar inconvertble ‘month period of ixed rates into golds August 1971. for many euerencies and i+ creased centrah bank coord- ‘toward end ofthe vin 1976- anational regines based Interim Committee agree- fon flexible exchange rates rent commend IM and SDR, with centel [ticles of Agreements bank and governmental January 1976 coordination on exchange rate polices. ve wrremaionAat stanerans #0 ANE [7 Hates for continental currencies, which were also Hating, showed greater volatility and less suength than the pound. Alter rising from 625 to 9:23 Amica cents from April 1920 to April 1928, the Freneh frane deetined rather steadily, veachiag. low point of 205 conts in July 1926, before Fong stnbilizea le fact wt the evel of that yenr at 3.02 cents — about one Sith OF prevwar parity. Under the iaypiet of German inflation, the srk Fell from alimt tn eonts fn 1920 to virtually nothing by 162320 Many observers tok these results as evidence of the dangers fuhorent i Hating exchang tates, The Tague of Nations study conducted by Tague Nurkse- and published iw 1944 argued it although short-term capital movements were at fest oquilibrating iv this period, in expectation ofr ns to prewar parities, as Continental exchange rites continticd to fall, Alisequilibrating speculation set in: ineroasee in interest rates, o exchange Alpreeintion, rather than alteneting funds, inereased speculation against tho eurreney, as each depreciation provided evidence for the imminence ‘or at Jeast eventwality of another Thus speculators’ psychology, in this view, buen & factor fn governmental dvstons.2 ‘The situation from 1920 to 1925 was not considered desteable by any ajar government involved The Cuile Committed deseription of the prowar gold standard was rogarded, at the Genoa Conferedice of 1922, not only as an necurate deseriplion of previous reality but as a desirable stato of alla to which the world should roturn as quickly as feasible, although with some modifications to reduce the dellationary effect of such a change. The major powers at Genon agreed to establish a gold exchange standard, in which everoncies would be exchanged at Bred pavities, but in which most countries wold he enenuraged to hold part of their reserves in Haid elainas on the international yold enters" The gold exchange standard was designed to economize on gold; although it vas seen ws a major Innovation, itn fact merely legitimized and extended a practice that was hcoming, ineveasingly widespread before 1914. {Centeal banks, whiel shoul be “Ere frou political prose.” were (0 6 ‘operate closely, jn order to maintain currencies at par as well as to prevent “undue tutions in the purchasing povser of gold." Unlike the rutton: Wouds Ganference of 1944, however, the Gens Conference of 1922 does not sigual a change in the international regime for monetary alfuirs, It he particularly to Benjamin Strang. of the Fodoral Hescrve Maule of New York, that stabilization of the mark ‘would have to precede reconstruction of the monetary order, Yet in late 1922, Germany defaulted on its reparations obligations; in carly 1923, French and Belgian troops oceupied the Huhr; and the mark subsequently collapsed, Only after German stabilization in late 1923, supported by the Dawes loan a year later, could monetary stability return.its propusals fore wpled lo put lato effect after Britain's return to gold In April 1925, nl the prewar parity of $4.80 per pound, Authorities sree that the return to gold was « deciatvo event that changed the nature of the international monetary regina? although most also agroo that it was a disastiows mistake, Ax the historian of Aecision puts it, the decision to retum to gpd was “unfortunate and, do- spite all the omphasis on the long rm, represented a triumph of sorte term interests and conventional assumptions over long-term considerations and hard analysis.” A return to the gold standard st other than prevear parity was not seriously considered, although in retrospect it fs clear that Sterling was overvalued by about 10 percent at that rate. Yet “gold at any rate other than $4.89 was unthinkable."** Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill was unensy about the decision, and asked some searching questions in s predecision memoran- dum, but Iho was in dificult situation, for Intlletually he cond seo no alternative to a policy of drift andl politely he had to rely wn suppwt in olfal cick, the City, business and the county which wae alot smaninone fit dese for the poliey actually chosen... ‘Thus Chel really ha Hitlealtemativn Into sccopt the advieo generaly olferad, shortsighted gl Ht was, wil to mop the god standard at $4.86" ‘The British return to gold in 1925 was influenced by international as ‘well as domestic pressures. Britain was seen as the keystone of the system, and a British decision to return to gold as n extieal step fn restoring jie ternational monetary stability, Sinall countries such as Sweden strongly urged return; more important, tho United States pressed for speedy andl decisive action. As tho major international creditor, and the «nly miajr feotry to renal on te gol standave thaonyehons this pusene pore, the United States wat quite infliontial, despite ils reluctance to oficial commnitments.2 ‘Tho British decisions, added tothe provi Cran stallzaton andl the rl uetions of the following year, marked the egtaniyg of an snes national regime that lasted untit 1931. ‘Tho rogiawe was established by « series of unilateral netions, rather than by ia ial conference or by systematic alignment of exchange rates on techie grownds, Tt was & genuine international regime, with known rules, much communication among central bankers, ad a good deal of evoperation, espocially between the United States and British central hanks. But it was woak polltically ns well as economically, reflecting Britain's diminisheel postwar position, From 1931, when Britain left the internation! gold standard, until the me ames | 77 Hedin Wands Accent of 1044 became elfetve athe bogoning of UDIG, there was eompehensivs sn agraedon set of stor mee governing intentional ometay rangement The Usted Stes, ich Sw have hil to ase iteration lars did std fr toe Ht tv yeas of ne prs American olay Ist that thers es ne ‘vnnetion Hote war des othe United States and reparations poy wets ae tis former ale; “the llr to develop n Slope [vonch to wor ceonorierocvery vay ths some bythe ote ware eofc"* The United States wont of the gold standard elec ly in Apt 199, without ensuing even the Brith an while Pris Miniter Hlamsey NieDonald was at san on his way to vist Prone Moose" Daring the sent of 190, Hoosvelt situ Toe the jounment, io spent neematy ofthe Landon Eeonnte Conference To the corteration of iy rpretentaives thee he seed #8 pul espe, the pla af confres fo enute exchange ate Rect, ss prely arial a temporary expen alfecting the unetny oo lange of afew nations only Tho old fetishes of socalled interes anal bankers ae hing rplaced’by ets to pan nao! sues {ho objetive of ging those rents a continuing. purcang Per Although Franc, Begun, Holland and Switzerland attempted to cling {wal pattern sled ga bo, the domes aensomie oo ate sus wore sharply advo. Belgium devaled in 188 fllowe by Tek Ie and Strand; Francs Bally flloyed suk th 008, aod 1867 Jet the fae Moat for alist a year Hhctuatins in ewreneyvalice were sever, The sitvaton atleast wnt 1800 was ne of pre noteyme, with vitely so iteratioal enoperation. The central baer ho Hd fees ‘vy worketeesly with one another, if wt always tn peoct habeory OF with ich sees, had aoe gry iste by" the depmesiog, ruta in the Unit State elon, deh Sopa ation slat ‘Avi judgment on the ents pio, this description ust be quaife, since the "Tpatte Monet Agent of Tah (ren Rade ts, aint the ait Stats) wa Test symbole step the deen of ne rash provided few conrete messi fr apation ‘he ese of the three canter the conta aula weed have een the cat inthe 1020 ~ agreed t ld the exchange for trey four hrs, vation, “tho ron gained assrane et the Vlad Stats in would wt nde fr conpttve exchange depec to," aldugh there wasn agree table ctreney elec terms af one another a ‘everleethe partite Agecement was not much more than a faint78 | vue ounces uF oorans ano money precursor of the international cooperation evidenced! a Bratton Wornls, 1044 and thereafter. Hot-mncy movenents played woe with exc rates even after the agreement, particularly fu 1948, the fist half of which ‘saw a speculative outow of funds from the United States, and the socond half, the roverse, Throughout the period, monetary eauperation wat i dered by economic nationalism as reflected by trade harriers, Germ exchange controls, and a variety of bilateral deioy, ave payinnts agree ments tried to manipulate exchange rates to theie advan tages ood froly Hetating exchenge tee eve rather var Tn period of workdwide ccoomieallyue and pola dstteyation, ft trout have been ssn Boal nine thing bat choles” he i of Word Wa I ning sang ange ree tng monetary alsin prculr DughtSseer rate young ght ned eon, and farther dsplaconont of diary commercial acces by intergovernmontl scrangements’™ These nnangemeats dil hot con state sn International regime with spre nes and proeedes Format agreement was rence wt th Breton Wonds Conerone in 194, but ss tly plemented tlm tan de ater That artery after the ao i DFT dat Ue Pon econ) Poe ‘The IME “at pty the om bce th Seles, guarding it resources ath Marshal anne usd tote habilitate Europe. Only in late 1958, when eurreney convertibility was achioved in Eutope, did the recovery reine: give way to Full implessent tion of the regime agreed to at Bretton Woods in 1944, Long and sometimes diffcult nogotintions heguin in 1041 Ted to the Anglo-American Joint Statoment in April 1944, which became the basis for the negotiations at Bretton Woods and the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Other allied countries had heen con sulted during 1943 and 1944, Franco and Canada procaced draft plans, and at Bretton Woods the United States and Britain hud to contend with the Soviet Union (which eventually lid not join ether the IMI or the World Tank) as well at with rovoral sinall cowntcio, Novorthaleer, al though forty-four countries attended the Bretton Woods Conference (as compared to thirty-three at Gena i 1922 and siaty-six in London in 1993), the Bretton Woods Agreement was essentially a Amerienn-Biilish creation In contrast to the practices of the 1020s, at Bretton Woods the interna- tional monetary issue area was not left primavly to conteal banks and private bankers; indeed, United States Treasury Seeretaty Henry Morgen thau's objective was to create international fuanclal institutions that would be instruments of governments sather than of py interests To the anys: ofthe American banking community, Morgen tha a eton of whe the Government sho Sn tel hese th speci aunts cl of business andthe Federal lesrve Within the United Stner government the Tressty Depart, eit tok the feats eo with the Slee Deparment ented fen the to tine between th hen of sso” 194, spt alialnnont of pas for inet en ‘The cone of the reine design at retton Wood tan the proton that cornties belonging tothe Ilematonal Manetry Fund woul st aul sonnel pa vas for ti cree, wich wer tobe lunge ony to emreet “fundamental delim 2 couse bal of payin ly station with the fd, rey convert wa th esared. Great Bata had sought ese Feed of atin for tuiidval ont, ut the Unite State had nsisted this seston. "The IME wie to help countries, nasi, par values by arranging to Ton them need eutences, upto amu deer inne in a eres scene Demme suserption ut ete IME Mat on th instonen of the United States, members re nto auntie teas to tho resources of the IMP. heyond thelr wy suits, ‘The IMM retaedseeton in jug te. vl vente roquest ad erty a ntattons wore posed. ‘The IME ius given considrale sonal powers but I ss lf to be contoed hy tnmber etn with the largest Guat sinc ves fy tho IME wer site to he soy proportion to stan. The United Slates therefore had ever 3D pect of tke voting power Inthe IM 1040; Hain hk asst 16 percent. Thee proportions el ove the yeas but hrgout de eof the IN, the nied Sater bat bat eased \eto over ast Inert IMF edison ‘Whon these aramgenents were emluded, allowance wae wade fora testinal pid, diving which the ul abligatons of the tote soul sot apply: Members could ret restsctions on nna taaseton wat thre fears ltr the MMF fngan to operate ten the TME would sept tunualy on them, After Bue year the members ware to const wil the fd on the vote of reson" Algh the tanta. peed was leven, it we gevealy expected wt ols Tong “Unt ny 1947, when the Traman atin shied ore, planer Hong ther counties won make relatively smooth and suit tranaton, ets ing longer than fv yur, fr atralism to convert ‘he titan actly ted over titeen yen from the ond of the war al twelve from the ein of fund operatonm, Tn DT Grae iti’ forts to resume convert of seslinglsted bey ore thon A wnt teat of abot $1 hills worth af gad and dll, Hschange controls were then reinstate, the Marshall Plan went Int eat Begs0 | ra ronerien oF oexans An stony penn currenctes were dovalued, and the United States accepted me that diseriminated aguinst the dollar, ‘The tutemational Monetary played a sinall role in this period, ‘The recovery rogine that extuc file Helng dusiayg 1947 bore litle re- semblance ta the arrangements that iad heen desigued at Bretton Woods. Worried about what they perceived ax 0 citieal Suviet treat to Western urope, United States leaders — prompted by the State Departnent and followed somewhat more reluctantly hy the ‘Treasury — guve increasing sid and sympathy for Europe's fianetal troubles. ‘This support wns ac- companied by an iipressive array of institutional innovations: bilateral clearing arrangements were followed by the development of the Eropean Payments Union (EPU) and the Organization for European Beonomie Cooperation (EEC). A common sense of onlitary threat, which mant- fested itself most obviously in the development of the North Adantic ‘Treaty Orgunlzation (NATO), gave the United States an incentive to ber have generously toward Europe, and the Europeans the willingness to follow the American lend, Within the framework of x political eonsens governents could allow the vohime of transnational eennome relations {o expand while retaining control aver them. ‘The success of this recovery regime was shown by movements toward currency convertibility during the 10505, enlaninating tn the formal adop- tion of convertibility hy major Europea countries in December 1958. ‘The beginning of 1050 therefore marks the start of « new international regime, the fallledged Bretton Wonds regime, which lasted until the United States suspended the convertibility of tho dollar into, gold on August 15, 1971, Economleally, the transition was made possible hy the ‘cconomle recovery of Europe tnd by Amertean nancial policies that had produced large payments deft, furnishing dollars to w formesty dollar- short world In the Inte 1050s and into the 1900s, world exports grew at the spectacular rate of 7 peroont per year; and United States direct i vestment in manufueturing abroad increased dramatically. Politically, the transition was marked not only by the hegemony of the United States, but by the development of networks of ties bet al bankers well as between treasuries. The Bank for International Settlements was the technieal agent for the European Payments Union, and central bankers “participated along with treasury officials in the managing board of the EPU, which was itself an agoncy of the Organization for Kxropean Ee nomic Cooperation in Pacis, These institutions brought the senior European financial oficials into rogular working contact." ** Yet the Bretton Woods regime had hardly been put into full operation Dofore it faced terlous tests, The price of gold in London rose in the ‘autumn of 1960, indicating spocuators’ lack of confidence that the United States government would continue to support the dollar at 1/95 of an crrany ma ata [AL snc of ol, The ist est was formal Anglo-American agreement tant he lps aS porn: Te Bk ef nd Specttve demand in Tonon” "Thistle lowed by a tee ‘etna go pool er ich center ged to erate ts tol tings tl he entra bakes devenged a ees sea Mager pv fennel ppt in tha event of speculation sgl parielar eros a Ue spits el ah leer of he Betton Wonls agreements been followed, the spective eres tt bei 1GH0-01 wold have hoon met by expnton of IMF resources, Int expansion yin resisted Dy the Continental Enropean ets thet won awe hoa te ci creditors," fn he General Argent to orow of 182 the mrs ote Grp of Ton (the aor ndvanced indnsttal conti) canted provide srry to the Tend. when rede hey int ype altel tod sin nde tn "ores ep ‘vith an imtnent of the ites! monetary systems =” Me networks fora angen and informal ngrocments were developed within «varity of engin ition tthe TM Inport ns sero malting cone bream, tough the Croup of Ton ane Working Paty Ties a the Orgetation for Heonomie Cooperation tn Developmen, sing tm and economies mst, a well “To ncn word iy, eer ofthe Inortloal Monetary Fad aggeed in 1967 to erate Spel Drawing Hig ay reserve ase. Dy 10M the quate of te IMP were duets a en yar enon ™ “Tix the Breton Won rogine went throngh antl procs of pola! and frsttton, ae well at anil adaptation, “Te tir tonal fmgiation and exiity shoo by the regimes managers on trated sharply withthe riglty of cazoney values Ut member ster sight toma, Pita! vation helped to int syste tht Ind ersetaly hoon des tn deces before. "Yt the peste othe reine cantina to grow, patty ate 1067, when Great Dit fly deal the po! ering The pogged. ine yom bane nor an or de tans he vale Sorctenn eal wnverent grew daa. The growth af the Bro dollar ® ark rte he Usted Stats ts well ts Europe cou ies, tha weekly Cow of epproninataly 45 bill hn each dhecton betwee the Ena markt snd the United Sat, Aer an Aan +s dre dss in Bk ste he Utd Sky

ported n three-aile teriortal Hilt Those slates ineluded all the major powers except the USSR (twelve miles) and Maly (six miles). ‘Twelve Sates supported a sicnitelinit, Bilorts by Eeundor, Mexico, and Tenn to ict fv ot recognized by the major miati- ven when disputes arose in such be Issues as antismnugaling zones and fisheries arrangoments between the United States and Japan ja the 1990s, the disputing parties explicitly ace cepted the legitimacy of the overall rege, Trowically, it was at tho-end of World War 11, when the Cited States was the leading naval power, that the Amerfetns inadvertently siwed the socds of the gradual postwar destruction of the regime, ‘The turning point the transition from the free seas regime to a strong quasi regime eame with the Truman Declaration of 1945. In response to changing tech nologies of Rshing and offshore oil deli, President Truman waterally established fishery conservation zones off the United States coast and as- serted Amorican jurisdiction ovor the adjacent underwater continental shelf “upportaining tothe Unites! Sta to-a depth of 200 meters. ‘Tho United States dettherately used Hinited! and ambiguous phrasing, to fornnilate its elas, hoping, overall regime. These subtloties, however, were nbs ean states, following the {great power’s example, asserted thelr own elaims to extended jurisdiction Countries such as Bexsdor, Pert, and Chite along the west coast of South America, where there is very litle continental shelf, argued that a depth criterion was unfair to then and claimed friction in terms of distance ‘nthe surface. ‘Thns extensions of shelf and fishery jurisdiction, which the United States trie! to keep separate from other fsues, precipitated both hat if Jurddietion on the high seas out to “one steaming thn frou the shore to curl smugglers during, Prohibi-94 | roe rouaries ar octane ann stnny expont se the Iroador elvis by Hatin Aseria states al the subsequent Ot Arete fang ats ander ie tae nen Dang cp her ee et nny challenge, but tho tress af ttn fey lng in ae endo es As rst the norma oes the iene dn i te iat on convene in Gece fn 18 sw TOO, Nove has ke aay tes eye apse mt Geneva th lew Te Tye Goer 1550, ering the it pro, tin sn the Nett ono ty 009 a es Wf the ws ins ean tn progesed hc Unc reo smd ma we aes caine fold acai he second pr ‘The Genova eonfevnces wer un portly real Bring the tomentose rein at op of edn tf those diet. Dnt what happavel at tke Caner confers wat a the feedom of the gh So a tached aat by cans tat he ins th toa ey sh ws uted or ot x ite lng he Til scons ning ton gon wo nega th dae I for Hint of sx strove pt tna steers another state's loss. ‘re crane sui ania | 85 New states, uuboud by the earlier Genova convent ane, Ono Inndved se forty-aine slates attended dhe New York sessions Of the Law of the S 1076, but only 51 had adhered to tho 1958 Genovn Convention on the High Seas (42 adhered to the tert, torial sea convention; 34 to the Ashorios emivention; and 50 to the cont tweutal shelf convention). ‘The ises of deep seabed resources snd. the technical developieats in olshore dilling and tanker construction raved about the “middle and Lotions” of the occans. Less devel. Fearing thatthe global commons would be exploited soley by the tcmologially advanced countries under a laissez faire regime, le to stress Inoad extension of national jurisdiction or a strong inter onal rexulatury body. The United Nations General Assembly declaved the deep seabed tw be the “somwn heritage of mankind.” China argued Hat te freedons of the seas was upheld by both superpowers merely. a pretext for superpower "hegemony and exp Jn the oceans and ther planer of the nari tesources of other countries,” Countries like wlan Australia, which during the Cold War era were closely allied ‘with the maritime powers om vcoans «questions, switched to n nore coastel iow of thelr interests, And even in the United States and Britain, impote tant groups Ike oi companies and coastal fsherinen, gradually’ gatned suppont for wide extension of jusisdietion, Although only quarter of ll ota states clainied jrisdetion of twelve mls oF beyond ih, 1900, more "ham half claimed such jurtdetin fy 1070, Between 1908 and 1972 alone, the number of states clafming twelve-mile territorial seas increased fron thitty-one to fifty-two, and the number of states claiming two Inindred. ite teritorial seas increased from five tot As important, however, as the extension of jurisdiction in the thied Period, was the challenge to the very principle of freedom of th ‘the situation alter 1967 was not merely enc o€ “cheating om the royine, wut of pressure for av alternative regi, The prineiple free ullins was challenged, ‘The mst fnlluentil broad vation that evolved ver the Tat slocade was “the claim to aecan space” eovenionlly expressed in the 1070, Montevideo Declaration, which state that “al natn have the right to sli ax iach of the aca snl seabed eat their eoasts as they doen seuce, sary to proteet their actual and potential offshore wealth." In ecard with the dominsut fnteruational philosopliy of developmentalisn, new soils sul as potential national wealth rather than tradition, defense, ov Bevieral world welfare were assorted as the basis of rights tu the wre of Seeans space and resources. ASE 0 minister sail f 1974 on hearing that the Arerican Sento nad passe « hill broadening American lisheris jusadicton to 200 rlles, “or Kewador itis highly satisfactory to see It hecoming clearer the onal eonselence that iis the sovereiga right of each eountey ns, entered the100 | cosets wvrenRPENDENER IM OCxANE AME ‘complex interdepondenee relle tga axpets of wally, the east Temulaton and rol pedetons wl ue stata eae Worst alo ask wheter world polis he fe aves change Ing Has force owomne less well ding this ty? a tho oc spe wt rons ate ee, fren pls ah wr direct ele than ft the monotry rl, Aud Deca fore tv the ane So hag endlonally boen sed avery, thong the exerci of nn pvr, changes In itu me car to le Pe orem ne aes, as we Ive dena Hf wntere a ho pence tie we end roglaton of ura space nd resorees, Teds ot inde thor spt of sategiepoitcsHetweom mar pwr tat take ple co Ue high sos-excpt as they fect the pete use of aca spoce. Clary te oceans are ervllarona oth In the aelear balance ‘Rowan the United States and the Sovit Uni an for poecting cow wentional force to dstant aren. Misil-carrylg subinvines, fre t0 ide Inthe vast ommns spec, ave necessary for second triko capil ‘Recrding to ne sures, “since TOM, the U.S. Navy hay exes ctve soasion on more than sovenly actos at al ovels a testy and pon aed of the globe rang fron the Cavthbenn to North, Koran trough Ivete” The vist of Ue esp Mon to Turkey in 104, the Deka of Cuba in 196, the vee ofthe Sat Flot diving the Jordan eta of 1070 ae he ies af as cera ‘rasta ae of ava fore to aleve scent tives tn the posta Period, Heconty, the Soviet Union hat cage Ts Hlaco mie a rent tying improve ls lity to nerve itty ort hw the Ying for patel porposes in widely watred ares ofthe work “Fics important malty wor of val foram obyioly Inrude ov the bargaining over a reine for oceans pace resources. The 1058 Cneva Confrenen eset sidestepped th a of lear testing tse; ad both the 11 treaty onthe penetl wes of the seabed and tho Law of the Sea Conferene avoided yestretingvndervatrTisteng doves used in antisubmarine warfare. On the otlr hin, potential restions on va smgaton on the surface and subains Ubugstals have bon Important in bargalning, beg tested nounegotalo by the Uaed Sates and Soviet Union. at although seal interest remain poverfl in deternining th prion of Ue perp, nyy domiones, Breast in the United States, has detined somewhat see ITO. Th ‘Amertean postion announced in May 1070, with Ws strong free seas Grlontaton, bore stung navy npr that ame blurred a domes Cconome interests boeame more ater. The lngtermn trond the ove of free thse to sues Inve een diferent fr large snd sal states. At tho begin ofthis cota, free Sins ol infrequently But eflecively by gst powers, pasta Datla newer: | 101 and tho United States, to deter snuller slates that might have wishod to take incursions on the fie news rogime, During Ue interwar period, conflict arose helween the two ur snval powers, when Ue United States nsed force to curtail Urassnational sunuggling. Betain compromised fon the resulting Amoriean extension of antiangeling jars - tines great porwers sed aval foree against sinallor ones: Britain used Fores to ensure the passage of fox! shige through w Spanish blockade dur- the Spanish Civil War? Yet, mare signilieant fn ight of future trends was the tse of forex by weaker naval powers in disputes with Britain and the United States. ‘The Soviet Union used forco agalnst British trawlers off its coast, Canada seized four American trawlers, which, along with the uf oF « Canadian ship, erented diffieult disputes i Can ‘lations inthe 1050s, Eeulor levied fines on an American he United States dil not use force to reply, beenuse it saw the Ecuadorian Voroign Ministry as a transgovernmental lly against the Beaiadorian War Office Sineo World War 1, the large powers generally have not use force in conflicts with small states over oceans resources, And although o fecasions the gront powers used foree or threats of foree to defend thoir nlitary navigational rights, these efforts have not always been successful In 1946, « Hii naval force made evstly elfrt to assert that the Corfu Strut off Allania was haternational water, Tu 1958, the United States sent ‘naval force through the strats of Lombok to protest Indonesia's claim that if was Lortortal waters! The United States and Soviet Union have refused to recognize Indonesian and Malaysian jursdletion over the stats ‘of Malaces. Belsween 1957 nnd 1967, Baitnin and the United States sod naval gestures to counter Egyptian restrictions on Israel's navigation, particularly in the Straits of Tiran, but these efforts were not suecossul As one observer wrote in 1967, “The threat of purposeful force (deserthed Minister ax gunboat diplomacy) was not pursued did more Harve tha good to Britsh and American ain, in the ev incest." 1968, the United States fled to respond with force to North Korea's ofthe electonte surveillance ship Puch; but in 1975 it responded th force to the Cainhodiau sobaire of tho freighter Mayegues. The special cirennstanoes of the Meyugues ease illustrate the limite ns well as the posit ofthe we of free to defend navigational sights. Fores was sed hy a great powcr that refused to recognize an extended tert aim ly asia power, but the politica ensts were fairly low. ‘The United Stator ind diplomatie or other relations with the now Cambodian gov- emmment that wold bo jeopardized, and lange sogments of dome opinion, resenting. a yecent deat, were ready to support rather th cris short, shayp retaliatory sneasue, Indeed inthe Meyagues ease, hi102 | contenex werenmerenence 1 OPKANE ANH MOY foroe may have been wed less to defen the sights af American oe ships on the high seas than to indiente continued United State determina tion to defend its interests fn the vwake of the defeat in Vietnam that was tho cate, then oceans spice andl resitrers wore only tangent In contrast, small states have rather frequently sed foree to extend exclusive coastal state fishing sights thor sued further frou the const, oF to assort extensive furialicion over large areas of adjacent aoe for economic oF environmental purpores. “Cambiat diplomacy” by. great powers has largely heen replaced hy the gunloat diplomacy of stall powers. Selzures of Amnorican tuna boats by Kenador and Peru or Teo- Tavulie harassment of British (rawlers—rathor than aval demonstrat by Her Majesty's Navy ~ have bocome synbulie nf the use of foree am oceans space and resoirces issues. Indeed, Britsiy fonnd its nik vse of foree hoth costly and inoffetive fits el war disputes with Teck? In addition to the eases already mentioned, force wat used snecossfully in postwar Bshery disputes hy Bravl against Frayeey by: Argentina against the Soviet Union; and by Koren, China, and the USSR against Japan. A 1960 naval display by the USSI of the coast of Ghana was at Fast partly designed to speed reloase of Hosta teters that Ghana lad held for four monthe® In general, however, the experieuce of Soviet willingness to tise force in secaring It aconns Interests Ben “Taily ewasistent secured of accepting the solzure of property and the expulsion and even loss of personnel in the interests of longor teri foreign policy objectives.” * ‘Although politcal processes are usually more complicated than statistics Indicate, in eighty instances of postwar tse of naval forco up to 1970 (ac- cording to one admittedly incomplete list) fourteen wero over the penee- time use of oceans space and resources. OF these fourteen, small powers used force successfully tn slightly more instances than did great powers." Such numbers ean be misleading, for where doterreneo is at issue, the absence of incidents may be a tribute to the effectiveness of force, Never Uheles, the fact that hth sinl-powwer extensions of jridietion aod dents over stich extensions Hnexcased fndieates n decline In deterrence by the great naval powers, which had carer preseeved the peacetime oceans regime, ‘The changing role of foree in peacetime oecans fses and the contrary trends for large and small states corresponds to one general discussion in Chapter 2. One cause is military technology. Not only are nuclear powers oterred by risks of escalation, but more recently the possessian of surfaco- to-surface antiship missiles hy some forty coastal countries has raised the potential military costs of action hy distantawater loots, General norms Against the use of foree ate a second nse of the change, A forceful ro- sponso by a big stato in a fshery dispute oftew makes it appear as a 0 reasonable bully, as the British discovered in the end wars, Finally, and ‘Hr Gonouvions oF comeaae HerRaDerENDENCR | 103 pesleaps mt important, th Inder the attaiwnent of thee © the meas fs sen, This elle ower? all ave yoae utd, ae well a win el tho United State nse of force ints shinies with Fear and Pr nd seems to have alleted Sve bon el “his the rl of Totes hat haga the occas sue area. 1 less cena snd lnger teinforn the dominac of powerfl sates. ‘The ron of the five nas ven conc by great val powers hs not nly given sina states xomeIeoway Tor using foee thas allowed Um to ue nd aes of rou explain that were acura the ok roo. Teele change hae contribute tothe devel: pment ot others, ang tod wth socovery of miner foo the feahed, of ing, an proteton af the wees eovtonment none of ‘whe ae eon solved by fore “Tih mcs oe de at tein the use of force Is complex “The cen renal sete portant and this we ha del but strongly alfectod Darga, ser ofpetans space and resources Miltary fore nso contin to dec alloc these Bowes, though hee the dranntie einige fam te ue of fare hy grat powers to seinforc a rogine (and therefore to atl detrrone) to th se of fore by soa stats to evo the estas fee sen rene by etending het Ion. hn veont year Hower, many sus have se, arly bo aso of technolo cng wd pasty heenuse of the erst of the tstalihed rin om which Tone ist elective The complexity uf thee patterns means iat ony general judguent aly the role of fren in oceans ssc must be howl) qalifed. Never {hols ene cam conch thatthe stat situation inthe eons sue aren hes somewhere Detween comple interdependence and ealsm: force ef on patil euestions, occa, Int is not the predominant factor detrnining tees on, fe scene to he important fewer oss tes that en one 11, aod on anyone st se at al." ths eonulito of complex interdependence sap. Iwoinated nue closely for the aca fe aren since TEM ea Postal tha before Warld War I “The use or thea of forces alays be Hess eden in international namely ses than incr space and resontes. In tis respect, the polis f money Ins alays approsinated comple interdependence bet ter tn the polities of curane spice and resources. There no evidence for insane, thal governments arg. pesectine have ever tveatoned tho diveat ase of fore to change exeange ates, to induce ater Indep dat governments t hold parca carted wr fo seam support fo prefrted monetury rine Tat the aggresive use force telly threatening to attack ety Hide ha follow patiealar intone104 | compas nersam:ranRnen 1 CANE AND ANE tional monetary policios —sooms to he excoodingly rare if wot nonexistent. ‘On tho othor hand, the polities of money is wot completely Isolated from the polities of mniitay foreo, Monetary instruments have occasionally been used to achieve politeal and security goals. Jacob Viner concluded that there was substantial truth in the generaltzation, for the pre-lOM period, that “diplomacy exercised a coutrolling influence over prewar International fixanco.” ¥ Germany's economic doininaneo in southeastera Europe in the 1930s was used to reinforce ts political and rilitary power.!? The United States’ 1047 decision to cease demanding full con- vertbility of the pound snd to provide increased aid for the British economy was motivated Inugely by security cancers. Conversely, in 1056 during the Suez invasion, the United States refused to support the hard-pressed Dritsh pound unless Britain changed Its Suez poly. ‘Occasionally, the links have gone the other way. Millay instruments hhave indirectly been used to achleve international monetary objective. ‘While Britain retained its empire, the colonles were a sourco of strength {for the pound, since London essentially determined their monetary poli cles, According to Susan Strange, in 1057 Britain dirtly linked military protection of newly independent Malaya to Malayan support for the ound. In 1909 and thereafter, the United States linked its continued mnlltary role in Europe with German support for American international monetary poliy.© ‘These cases indicate that international monotary issues are not entirely divorced from military security polities, Yot the uses or threats of force (oF the threat of withdrawing milltary protection) are few. Much more fre: quently, the policy Instruments used in bargaining over international monetary issues eve come from within the issue aren itself or from closely associated areas such as trade policy. In the 1920s, when the Ba ‘of France put presture on the pound, the Beltlsh ‘Treasury hinted that might presont the entire war debt of Frauco to Britain for collection. As Governor Moreau of tho Bank of France confided to his diary: “The Ba of France incontestably dominates the Bank of England, but the Tritish ‘Treasury dominates the French Tressury, so that when we put pressure fon tho institution of Threadncodle Street, M. Churchill threatens M. Poincare.” ** Tn the 1000s, monetary and trade measures were closely linked at the London Economic Conference, tmde issues could wot be settled until monetary uncertainties wero cleared up." After World War IL nection continued, as the Us trading system and eurreney convertibility at pogged rates. In 1071, Prosi- dent Nixon and Tressury Secretary Connally employed both monetary and trade instruments to compel a devaluation of the dollar; but they ‘used no explicit threat of force or of withdrawal of military protection "ine connmions oF COMPLEX MevEAMEPRDENEH | 105 frou Amerien's lies, Throughout the Mlty-sie yours ander review, ea tvomie fnstrmucts-~ within the monetary Fsswe area or in related a have hen more useful thas foree fn tnternational monetiry allies. Ts, regarding the role of force, the International monetary ise aren conforms ‘wore closely to complex interdependence than to the reals ‘but no clear or dramatic change tis taken place ever time, lal type, Absence of Hierarchy among Issues ‘Tho oceans issue area has not exhibited a consistent hierarchy of issues, Goastal interests wern powerful in the interwar period, and led to the 1045 "Truman declarations. Although security concems were domivant during the Cold War, the hierarchy of goals has been challenged by new issues’ that different organtzations oF groups rogard as more: Impottant, ‘The navy's desire for freedom of netion, for example, has not always hac higher priority than economic Interest in exploiting oceans resources oF ccological concerns about pollution, The navy, Iaege oll corporations, and the Sierra Club often disagree; and the United States government has not ‘been able to malntain a consistent hierarchy among the various issues!" ‘The inereased complesity of oceans space and resources issues is indi- ‘eted by the agendas of international conferences over the past half cen= tury. ‘There were six substantive agenda itoms at the 1990 Thague Conference, ‘The 1958 Geneva Conference, which produced four major ‘conventions, was based on an International Law Commission draft sith seventy-three prepared articles. At Caracas in 1974, there were about twenty-five major items snl nearly a bu there ‘were more contentions Items at Caraeas. ‘The increased number of oceans issues is also ovident from the perspec- tive of Ametiean foreign policy. As Table 44 showed, from 1020-45 the issue mre for the United States consisted of two major issues (coastal lisheries and infringement of navigation to enforce antismuggling me sures) and a half dozen minor ones. From 1946 to 1966, smuggling dropped Dut, hut continental shelf resources, distant water fisheries, and breadth ioral sen brought the total of snajor fsuae to Give. From 1067 ble 6.1 indicates, attontion to oil, deep seabed resources, pollution, and overall regime questions inereased dramatically. ‘These issues have become more closely interrelated fx the most recent period, There has been a compression of policy space as more agencies Ibocome tnvolved. In 1968, the Intoragency Task Force on the Law of Uh Sea emisisted of three departments: defense, interot, and state. By 1975, thirteen agencies wore involved. There are two major reasons for this frowth and linkage of issues: technological change aud international rogime change. Figure 5.1 illustates the role of regime change, Based on to 1072, as106 | coneLex ivrRnORPRAWRCH MH OCKANK AND ANNES ous x werepesenpence | 107 c TABLE 5.1 AVERAGE ANNUAL REUERENCES TO all ocuans references in the Department of State Bulletin since World SEVEN OCEANS ISSUE! War Jt, shows hove simultaneous references to diferent is ing periods of ional negotiation ovar regine change. Percentge As indieated i Chapter 4, the intemationel monctary sytem also ine a acease volves technically complox iswes. However, the issues this swe area i 1946-46 se6r-72 ‘eweocen periods have generally hess nore thy linked and have been very eonsstont Ui. The (072 An vise dur & Minerals 2 403 se in the system, With the exception of Special Drawing. Right FIGURE 5.1 Percentage of references to six secant soe incading linkages to portant in the iaternatiomal seta debe other oceans ues 20405. In the 1970s however, poor counties propos of these issues wore tons of the 10206 sd t ‘hat the tntern 4 oval setny sytem tamer egy Me & 100 Mah ada, sith tle of gol frm INDE soaks wee fos dee S - oped inte I lnc of emt ig a Hee os te for nrg the IME Ang te Cael Sc a as é +0 1950 Gen ior ndtv cont edd Ute aso ot cee : reanai Inport In cag now noma ogee shee a ey : 0 tno nthe 7h fry ena, wees ae : 2 7 Ae fT velop cnt ee ae the na eae a ' of Teo iss ing the eit Caf te I : Decl Pardo speech Ovor the lowg term, sume changes have taken place in the relative im. © portance of dire yen of fee Sse eae ne sabe 7 3 52m whch the ncn expel Usted aes Teneo g 40 thece ulwntcras (1) financtal flows in the international monetary : ie ating, wi tera Unial Seer nce : oy ge (hore the United Stites is an observer of the system, and an actor; but “ on prvi emphases not emperan wit se Gta ~ % Sines ito grooves und wegen aad) ether ; i wen ve nace ts Table 2. Met danatelly he - Z ition dete to alata fas a sa 2 a a a CTS the toporsf He T9Bs sn 1s saat aoa a we Dis aid 1550 prceat I te Ie and eee halt anes ~ “Sources Sates se derived trom Department of State Buti, 1948-72 Iatoral agecements, which received 69 the 1990s,108 | contra weteawennnenen a OCHS a TABLE 5.2. ATTENTION TO THREE TYPKS Ol ISSUE IN US, TIREASURY ANNUAL, RKFORTS (Y NUAIIER OF PAGES) ‘Type of rene® 1920819308 19108 1980819608 19708 Flows 265 AT 245 250 57K 7.10 (100) 4G) 46 bieterat 00 02 Ls 600s 0.20 6) ay a) Molter 00 09) to asad 830 Gy a) G3) 8) 4. Se text for dent of thee (ype Nuri parentheses ithe perentage of tou for tha ecu, 1940s, and 19505, have been yelegated to a minor rol, Lv genera, emphasis ton the regimes, and ow to improve uf construct tein, ha increased, as ‘opposed to the eatlier focus almost exchisively: om Bianctal Mwws ant “American actions with regned to then On tho whole, however, foreign policy by the proliferation of fatersntional monetary fuer oF hy 1 lass of bi trely umong thom thaw hy vastations fi th these questions, and other eeonamie isses, itary security has tonded to dominate forcigi policy ancl a clear i rely of Issues appears to exist. On the whole, ins wore ordered this way during the 1940s and 1950s, Dut tat was ni exceptlonal period. Tn tho 1920s, international mnonctary pulley was the subject of major political docision fy Britain and France, nnd a significant sourew of emntention be tweon them, In the 1990s it became high politically for the United States, too, In 1933, ng Herbert Peis comments, it wae the “stor center of our foreign relations.” = Despite the very duportant delibernt at Brotton Woods in 1914, international wonetiry alles were eclipsed ld War Il, an Tater (after n short pevind fn which, iy fears wens somewhat wane) hy the Cle Wa * Discusion: in tho US. Tessury Depart asl septs wees se seco ing to ehether thoy efor entrly to dive hited ates cere with alone of Ingaents the vale of the dalla a ote veins swe whether tiny elt ‘with astons of the aeration mon ne al iene fore tle Syste torn refreners wore neat ni 140, ll Intron 1 al 1955 says contd (i tre of pase) ‘rar reviewe the it Paving the past deen, political nttention to monetary Issues has been a an historic high, Wom the viewpoint of the agenda of Amertoan fede policy, and the aygmlas of other snajor enpitalistcowntsos, ths ensphas ontibuted to the apparent proliferation of “ew issues." Ih the mouetary fea, the ists ate ot new hut have become highly salient after n pertod ‘of dormancy. At tines of ussjor-alecisons aad exisi, such 1995, 1933, ul 1971, international wwonetary policy las always bea high polities. It whew erie subside niet now regliies, oF new national policies, ace de vised, the saliens of these isues declines, Thus patterns of hierarchy mong ses change as periods of eriss comme and go.” Multiple Chan Is of Contact In both the aceans and monetary issue areas, opportunities for interaction between governments, at various levels, have iereased dramatically since 1020, In the 19206 sist relationships ty these areas were bilateral. Few olicials from najor comnts knew exch ather well and met frequently Only a few governments were involved, and their bureaneratle structntes iw these issne areas were quite siple. Over the next fy” years, rn lateral ies, often theough formations! organbations, proliferated: the Inureaucracies emieermel ith these fuer greav amich lager. and, iy the e nmierons, Lntergoverumental chatuels af contact fore increased dramatically The ‘her of international orgunizations hwolved in the oceans issue area nearly quadrupled, from five dasing the frst period to the bexotng of the thitd, The number in 1975 sus else to thirty includes regular conferences, interagency coordinating, bodies, and minor Ssheviex commissions? In the monetary’ ares, the proliferation of organi ‘ations was less striking, Iut the growth of communications networks sunong olfcils evew more so, By the Tate 19604 ane early” 1970s four Dortant fntergovennmental organizations operated iv the monetaey area {Uw Bank for Tnternatioal Settlements (BES), founded in 1990; the Inter- vuational Monotaty: Fund (IME), founded ir 1044; the Organization for connie Conperation avx Development (OECD), founded in 1961 hu a reorganization of the oll Orgunization for European Economie Coopers tion (0) nd the Monetary Conimitten of the EEC, As iinpontaat for * Map pla Fun in the govermncns ennexened, ching end a vee Inve akraysfen fatuled fu onotary fs tne thoes Asam the sl {ve atontin pad to float tary Fes nthe Nevo York Tes ace ID, Iosvves, nies that te ieton pl tthe is the ate LO ey {OT whe highest, by fae the plod wna hy the prperon sysen i the Now Tor: Tne Tier dowoed to the He). Sinll tesla fond forthe US, Treasny Departivent ssn reponse se pete aed for the Devartnent of State Hallet sc WOT, Datn ay wake fom thors reqs10 | conten merranernnnes ty ancans an ate poly as any of those was the es formally emitted Gro of en, Consbinatin uf the major OECD sountses who pateate hy he Cs tral Amungements to Bucrow In 20023" Hasse the IM ad. OCD created conmittes nd workhg partes (rn tans to time, and bec svembersips eth for slater nnd the warns bodes overlapped, tho alte network stele was actully wie more eplon the opportunity for tavern eotas sgn th Tsing ofthe oxgzaions dents In vi of the ennpley of arog ments, aad hemp roles of parents, He mit sting tia segtitons on monetary rein ate sometimes chartered beg hal rene” Nonigoverninontal chai of contac have as Sore 1045, th majpr nongovemnanal ters mens foes. those offshore who tetany have een atonal aint) shipping fms, hich were nuns iene in Hn cameron tnd other cutie rangenets, Since 1015, multinational, co panes an mfg fs, nel ot atone rnp evotel tn cee cology, and world erdo, have rine the alana shippers ad Teor Hoth using th eco snd bn nang lit nano genet “hore has boen sap ginth a ifuson of matin sy the ean, patiley sce 10. ‘As transit econ sei roses il cal aetivity and contact Iv the 1 ye TM, sn tended polite effeos, a costa Iahernen ster, ineneed polly, Uutuelther were tinstiona organizations. "he tse of later al Law and the Intemational Law Assit publicly supported & Uhteemile nit. The International Mastine Camtice ornized. dsc sions tha helped to resolve the less contovesal egal iss Fle to navigation and shiping ‘nthe second poiod, transnational pola activity Iecrine more ot tensive. OM composes worked Ugh Uy lawyers nership the ternational Law Associaton, vw Infened Un Dera CCommision’s work on daft {is onguntnd transnatnaly ice om Gotan Ie seatch (SCOR) and succeslly pressed thelr governments to este the Intemational Ocensograpite Commision (10C) to eaordinate largesse sceanographleresorch. World order groupe work tration Uo Promote a stongernttational eine. neo 1967, there has ben even noe pla! ativity by tesnatoad ‘organizations. Ot! and ining compari have hibied i var coun tes for thei policy preferences ‘The Intemational Lay’ Aveta has taken stands very close to tho positons of those two indus, Jin vel, tutes have been tated by ning companies in order (Tyan thle verre i tls wes politcal support in inajor countries as well as to spread their economic Fisk Scietists have done stuns eantions lobbying, nnd Keoups prom {ng world order spats Inve organized various snollicial conferences an Aisenssions to disseainate Chet Views? In the monetary issue area, on the other bund, we do not find such steady groveth iy the tinportince of transnational actors and contact, Transnational actors were already very important in the 1920s. America bankers were prominent actors ox th international seene, float, publicly olferd foreign capital issues in the United States between 1920 and 1031 of over $11 hillio2® Politially, they were equally important, because of the offical disitorest of the United States governmont in getting formal Involved with Kunupea reeoastreton, J. Be Morgan nnd Company sas iwoelary history of the 1920s: as one allie puts it hy the United Stites authori Morgan & Cn Ales the 1920-31 eash Une importance af Danke: seh ak Mogan fll drantily wal esta atone rena cll aborts te erent poses for nvern quarter entny. Only the It 130, sna 19 lth gna rete At Dake a Ea ad te spsstocr grt of tne ener, return uate nes tr ge pone the try system, The growth af he Tvalar mre to the vito $890 ion TODA and Ue igo in deposits of the tp twenty American lingo bats to 513 hilo (0 yereot of the combined heat alco and branch wl) £978 indet nt mgt of he phannnenon, Furthermore, te eee Ja en rap ten ears el the Enrelr market wes mint ana in 105.0 6 erento tho daponts of tose twenty. hae Hel abd" ‘The monetary are, tke the eames area, shows a clear tond tov the ineressed portance a lng, splint eyusections to Sessional atvy, Darks and national eorportns ave: Becoe sore silent, nth T8G the expansion of Aericn Danks aed sas tina rap Aen hts er grt ven, eve hon bar sch Fir Natl City Dan wth unre of bel od the molto smaller banks that partite only peripheral the ite vation monetary system tr coeomdont felatonhip, The legs Seinen te npr of the monetary system os sngly ad lav th gross stakes tater than vidal spectators Hat from tine to tine tmnatioal twos af profesional economist hcg plays sigan oe he itemational monet syste IoD, tna ay HBr eens so tine lense tht eo al exchange rats to kes an pelleymaors party tnugh eters Jl area sp, and pty asa vet ofthe at tat nae pall110 | cow WEN KANE AN MET na relatons fn ean ales take place dicey Betwesn governmental suits Tar Bris sal Avie nie ee lel heop exch oer formes" Ong repent ha Ts sa the United States have probably avoided cmtvntation ner stats hy else navy-tonavy rlone Clee nayytosnyy etn ta help pov creation fa tho Dreal-Unted tater dispute ver svi hing tnrly 10704 Au we sw shove, Iv nn ele pera, the U feared ection to nap tin the cn tended limit. tn the antnugeling dp wil Hritin the 190, both the British andl Ameria governnente were Interally divided, al there tony have boon ome tenaverinetal cats awn “sf Hace ivlgeaae cinco pinay, hore tit or sat ny chaps mor, of the opportunities for tinsgovermeta ratios nt Geeant rea. ‘As ocennt es becine ply mo salty wide range of groups and agence fom plait inal city inteased that preaure for soprenaton on delegations At the Caren ao the sen mootings, tho United Sats delegation mss 130 folie oly 20 wore from the Stte Deptt) ference Th efor ofthe sorta of so tt dele tom tlm delegation of over eighty at Cenc in 1, ns iy of tho United States government to burg lective was Tnlted by thse trangovernnental conti: "Some US, llega: Inve sree ows of forlgn goverments within the selon, stern Tae aon postions with fei delogste contrary to elf ey. Utne Tonks of US. fallback postions have nt oun uncom.” Somevnat mor subi, the varius “cule” of delgates with sna functional iter tats in fahing, avis, of, ning anno forth tat were established as ppt ofthe Informal’ conferecn diplomacy ct mp rola chanel of ommuniaton tnt cnt across al cent testny tin the aed fragrentd ational potions, Miny ofthe sae a poorer tats hd simpler potions, which wore Un less lected. hy tks rayon Inonal contain larger conference diponney,tnsgimeeental Contacts helped the sal wd po to onstage a so re than vie wre ‘As expected, inthe Interiatioal monetary sue area tansgovernnentl relations wee most prominent in the IH, sa Hh an the 1008 and 197% Daring the 192s, the most important trsgoveamontal el tions took place between Montgr Norman, over if the Bank of England and Benjamin Stong, wi hended the der Nese Dank of New York? * oth nen believed in the gl stl! and nthe prop Some transgovern Tho Mak of Kagan at tat te es tpl eve, i easy prfeme 4 grcernmontal ftetion ad wr part of the Tita policing veoh {Interactions between String ned Noman ae seve trncermentle™ HE FOLITEEAL PROCESS. MonRY AND OekaNE [JT working sth indepndety a gmt sont vnke trad met ee canon es ae song a a THe thom tt” pre cone wit te wer ee rot eel nn cy a a emcees pie nuh le, foe ea meni rt sing thems ie Daeati ea te Ney a iy 4 fr ial Reeve ark aoa ata yetorso nt Noman pied thee wb Na thw cnet pect New fn ten Ne ak ho hl ny en ae gm onal Stents (1) war bring ested, Novae Cea ae {oune form of words that would place the Bank beyond the rec of Gov Moth the extent to whieh e a hanks thought tn ansgovermentl Lens sa tht ines Ietvonce genomes eek ee af pele inthe HN wa ples eee ane tweet pig aa roninence ows Hf "The ww tons ts un Geamauy appro « elias, the greater my deseo {canthe uo ey eonctins eal as a mem of preserva pee he Nome smc lt WRK] therein sk my Dish colleague, Blase a whether it would wtb posible to binges polly ore one ie {0 leave Titler « froe hand in forvign alfuirs, en haan fone ‘sven vtvity seen to have dedi prdiptouly do tho 18S, Cries ced governent to tur thee atteion et senetary pole: an the depression dsereted Kerker ea tal has, Nato police, det an. inplomented hy eat tespmuile fdas, base’ predoniant ‘The inportaac of hess Aestients waxed ato ental a ane ‘he motwork of tes revised lig nthe late 1 r rien plas for postwar reenstrcton were mae bn Wena Bra oud Ay the ton Woot me a al dics among facil oleae ince Depa aa ae governs met requ at Uo BS; they a eee fan118 | conten werenorsuonne a onan An Aton the avspices of the Group of Ten, the tee of the HIG, Strang. personal frien Tovel andl ang fiance insters themselves; dow ininistitos got together onl and the Monetary Com were developed both at thi and considerable collegiality ad espe de corps seems to have ope ‘As monotary issues became mo transgovernmental cvaitions bec sell comments, “Central bank evo pe of contral bankers recoded Int directly and prliieinad duving, the Tate. 19005, nore difcalt to anata, As Rus ion aad tragoveramental eoalitions the political background as govern- ively engages! in bargaining over ex "A low point of transgovernmental cooperation among (rasiry oils ‘wos reached during Join B, Conally’s tenure as United States socrctery Of the treasury. Convally’s deseription to « eongresstonal comnittee of the 1971 Smithsonian nogotiations gives some indication of how far his ap ‘proach was from the collegial nor: ta th Home mest whet sg the pi, mt wove eed in en Cinerely suggest te posily of fe peer vation, thee tase stunned sence for 40 ite by the sick Not a word wast bon its room fll of poole, Net a ally one of te miter ke pwnd sl cha Ulysse wwe cant agree to that, percent wat he the wt we woe evn, Recep se So thw went fom tve hs wae lly nna ap the Sica st B57 perc. ut neither Connally nor Conalyisos Insted very long Connally’ suc cessor, George Schultz, had much closor relations with hs eounterparts, ‘Transgovernmental policy conrdination among finance ministers eontinaed, and the network of ties among contra bankers remained, Hyon i the futumn of 19TH, there was sine truth i the jest of x Britsh minister that “whatever dillerences we Kinance Ministers may lave, tobe together sith onc’s fellow sullercrs axl far away from one's spending enlleagues is a most agroeable experience." Richard Caper has argued that the subsequent deliberations of the Committee of Twenty on reform of the International monotsry system were organized partly to facilitate and legitimize a transgovernmental coalition of finanee-oriented ministers ‘against more expansionist domestic pressures.” ‘This discussion indicates that our expectation fom complex interde- pendence ~ that transyovernmental polities would make it dlficalt for States to pursue clearly spelfed goss ~ ncas alifeation. Under some lreumstanezs—-vhon domestic Unersts ve sharply vided, Indes are diverse and he attention ftp polit leaders ot Foes th sts “Transgovernmental cosltons eu ake slate ols diffealt to dotne We saw this eect in the ineratinal wontiy aeea i the 192 and jn acs ning th Inirly « t, Assn eats 190s and 1s. Yet when domes interests ate nl ae top pola Tendo hg Al sb the all may purse eherot ply youl eves ede conto of complex intelpandenes, The eaheronee of tte als tide re protic yep itorependenes; but thy vo ses exe, Trnsgoveraent play evordination sens to be he herent in ones Interdependence at tagiveental costs in sic ifr sr geen wor er of Pe ss by aligning tenses th agencies fom ater governments eee amily under some conditions." s tent overnie Lnstrun of State Policy Uda ah ins oe ements wed dey oy Inka, toe the sn tte amen of tte poy, Uae Conon a eonptexInendeeneence,maipulion ef eon ee tent the ne ta nce epee a natin etm ar expected tore Inpro fa sche gt bei gh crm tl tne fee Farge states. The lshery dispute between the United State eed eet Son Ane st trae Th salle ste ety ed (sing companies) rth thy ier sates The United Sits ats al to malate the tata stove. Fer tmp, te Pahonets Pa tetvo Act af 101 wid i suoquen amending weve dep ay ater ting val fret ros te Apron ae aes A sre fr fins ald when tt ts wae see the rtd hence to prc ern South American line to extended jeteton, “eens oft ‘The salle tats provel we elt however, niplating te nto actors Not only dl the sete aud fie procedure devel ito ‘game in some stirs, bt Beam md Para see abl te aoe tae hing consi (ial Bena tana Snes ey ha ove) and ol empies hates ad ales Por gle he companies lobbied vgoocly fw Washington toed tag ce Ashing ep forthe composes When the Une Sta tented © apply eam vane, such a cunt Sach Americas eae the tte for ample explo’ dott ‘sing the Organ of Arescan States forall apn eens thon of Amann “econo ngs Beers Ate wens sles tat lo ect, th renter cnet ofthe Seth Reine le tora Bhthem to manipulate cemonie fatedepelnee anne saci te pol bug More bron, feed wih the croson of on an, the ret powers hve ted to ogatte an iterative tn internal gato rather thn anaeral exes ky forces Wi the ents Conference diplomacy, the Unite Stew snate ae fration formal group of delagter In ant dest” elitr Tv kw developed counties tthe tru naire of thir sod aetna ater st Ae hve en lowe, thar gone wae ed rnre succes by sal tates Gan hy the United Stites, More generally at we wil expe elo, slr snl per stes nto used Ittermatinal cxguizatio ss mane fae ett Hk In pola training Although te resid ot of tere af feo By the gent powes hos ated bargaining, mec fy the heat ol fore as nt boo the mt wel tum of tat ols tn moretary tans we Inve aon, fre nt tones bon inked wath oor ites tft site ploy ithe Ti, tn pra, the ed States ted th potstive slo of Ioce tr mela pole I order to alet Eoropen pce Dy wl lags, Iwever, the Hat tents ve been uke eave he 100 he Uae Bates to Santee premio on a blanc of wy by Isa pies Aged W infuonce he behavior of Avni wltetona corporations, fanco, meanvl, was contig i exc dla oo gat toile tho United Slates by enipulating asst Inerepentenee nr the tus of the Breton Woods rine Late, in Tle the Uae Staten Tanpuated exotics in acderiing vilnenbliy.Tierdaponloee when tended the convert ofthe dalla tt gl fer 17, Ame an rior ehacrac to spor the dl frlgyexinnge nara war olen than a par of a rtay tn orc ae ents trae To International monetary tlor fw hy Ue United Stats, Inno trgantaions avo nc baon es Sorta In vy nom tt srl se blo, bat saer havo rgd to hnprove hk arg pos ton iy changing mney and weighed wey forntes bn itr tonal organization, and hy suring Hawes inte for auto partialar tnganicatona fore Tn short, fone hay ben Tink th other es fo tec monetary poles, Intar hy acene, Wf wt the at Important intent ‘Agenda Formation ‘Under realist conditions we expect the agen in an sue area to be dotermined by seourty threats and shifts in the balance of power. But ‘under complex interdependence, it willbe alfected principally by ehanges the distribution of resonrees within issue areas as well as b 4 ho ati teas aswell as by a variety Hp the evetition of fatermtonal regis, and their ability to cee with changing ecomnnte ua tehvologtal cirewmatances; changes in the importance of tranrational setors; linkages from ther istics: and polltictzation asx vest of donnestic polit. Hove well this expe Fhonne ont forthe monetary anid acenns issue aeons? For international monetary fsues the fswes the agenda has hugely been dons tuated by problems of building or siutaining internationnd req the New York Fines bs etoilzed, eaten regimes, As ation ‘he inteatonl sumer syst sw mater of great ple inten A working ally hen the exchange ste of cates me oe che, whe om ate sng hie manivy by specs tba who nations ate cing whips int haunt ar busts by monclory tntalig ly Matsa omy tat the Ik sh fcr ay felon is to mike the ork tay Syston a tntretng the Dublie as poste. ” ine th gree When there lve boon no stashed reglnes, centre on ays to reemtee orderly patter af ales ad eobar ee 1920-25: 1090-16; wl 1971-76, tn 1990-31 snl 1905-71, existing feed fate reyes een nereasinglySnalyuate a the postions of. te toe eureneies wens (Uh Uris po tho fst ea the ated Sine dollar in the seed). As the reins defences became more vsble monetary ‘sues rose on alate agendas, and after the ollapse of the {eg tho rem wag so t,he 0 ets he importa of rutin corpmatony undue hy Tectia ows of fwd, snted to thse agen changes nn "ang 1n short, agen change Ins came mn poor operation of regine in celeent aid tonal Bk Kove nr The twat pros fe mamey tants withthe ston in trad, fn which the agonal, te United States at least, yw combination of liberalizing inititives by presidents requesting Irsative aor to lower taf saa ue uate Barriers, al protectionist moves hy groups that hive. buen wivecel affected hy inprts#8 18 wl contrasts wil agendaseting ot eee ses. The ects agendh has eon strongly intencad by econo a technologie changes that have precited ew threats tad oppor to domestic groups. Constl fishermen, afte by the techn! od aces of competitors, have agitated for protection; tune Belorees hace Upbied or relitory measures al ther groups, mh yo compas deep sea mining ocean-going scientists, and ecologists have. all met dns fle Wher the smal eds gen ios Ins in past een determined by wl of other govern ments to Increased jurisiliction, the ‘Truman Prochumationt of 1948 was a199 | consruan avnennrnnnen genase ARH AHN il interesta®” Increasingly, howe the agenda fae been allected by Tamiferences, at whl gv criments of poor countries, in particular, sitnted for nov arvange- iments that will more fully take into acct what they perceive to he their interests Tn the oceans 2 to domestic shine swe aren, domestic aul international political ag bent ttl vty yvonne rently to agenda formation, the aration uelay ae eens fate satience see to sll Ivey tones In th inertial egies Ty the Unto Slt at ny ray fever came tres are trad and de eto of pole es ene ay th the Treas fd State apart wt the owen, we he Bm tunity outst fe But for scone ists, raged intrest dome thd Caognationa acon to have nd tor fh fn ringing, about snot ate areas our goveal expectation — tht sc tats wil sot b's major ures of agen change =e hr aD wen in Dox latrdepenanes fy pattrn ste poste Agoden sn diferent Et ens nota chang the ney Ts vt loom ton mre appre wen e aye chang interatne etne fh nxt eer, ALT point sd at east he ler tat patios dn cane smn, se arene vay sons, eve wh hon Terdependancs ely well poroxnated. Linkages of Issues ner realist editions, one expects Hokages twenties tbo made Dlnepaly by song stts, sing Hr oer fn oe area of word pol- cs (particularly thet miltry pover) to coer ollier sates on other Ensues Under complex Interdependence, lvwewr, ove expects kas by strong states to be me iit to nak. force wll be nective. Novertels,avarety of linkages ill onde, Fenty by woak states through international organizations "Tus proces stvngly relleted In ose yes dar the past Aecae."in the Geneva conferences fn 1058 nt 1960 seve Tinkages store made, bath betwen suet that vse felbnally connected and Uetween thse that were nt. After 1067, Tiksges beeae even more i tenue, partly because of inceased functions fntewependoncies among Sou. Im contest tothe assumption of willed reoorers that widely the ol regime, a sense of aclal an! potent copitve ese developed Reinforcing this impetus toward Tikage was the Aelia, partitarly of Thtd World nari a tteratoe confront fink ses to Secure satisfactory overall bargain. wv NoNEY AND octane | 129 The major new ise siuee 1967, devp seabed resources, helped to precipitate this Hokage. ‘The promise of vast treasure at the bottom of the sea ineroased the mnnbor of countres interested in the oceans issue sea far heyond the major or moderate sess of the oceans. With general rather than ist-specifiejuterests, these new setors were a major sour of linkage, The Seabed Committee established by the General Assembly inv 1968 expanded from the original thisly-five members to ninety-one members hy 1071, Learning of theit technological disadvantage on the seabed ise, the fess advanced countrics “doggedly introduced consid tion of other inivitime logal rogimes volated to the breadth of tersitorial sea rights of passige through straits and Rshing practices, all of vwbich added not only ew dimensions of complexity but also of contioversy.” ‘The United States and the Soviet Union both teied at frst to keep the sea ‘ved issue separate from the others, but without success. Subsequently the United States linked economie zone concessions to free passage for mili- tary vessels, but generally speaking, at the conferences held on acess questions since 1967, linkage hax indeod become an instrument of the weak ‘The linkage process Ins heen quite different iy monetary polities. In tHe fist placo, Finetional Hukages aro mitch more important, On snany the last half eontury, United States Treasury Department have emphasized the ebvios connoetion between international monotary and tride policies™ International monetary policy Is tntogral to macraconnnic ply an is Uoefre necessary Hike oor eo Socond, Tnkay yes havo heen drawn in the international monetary rex by the powerful as well as by the weak, In constructing the Bretton Words system, the United States used foreign aid to affect the monetary ac well as tide systonis, Britain's promise to restore convertibility of sterling in 1947 was a condition for the American Toan of 1048." After the breakdown of the “two-track” system, in which financial and anilitary i sites were handled separately among the Western allies i€ wae once again the United Stites that most frequently demanded the linkage of fssites. This time, trade and monotary allaies wore Hoked by Nixon axl Connally: andl in discussions with Eurape in the early 1970s, the United States sought general agreement on. a set of closely connected issues ‘This linkage was justied in functional terms, but the orientation yas nonetheless clear: “The politic, military, aul economic issues in Atlantic relations are linkod by reality, not by our choieo wor for the taetiea! pur pose of trading one off against the others.” ® In the 1970s, ess developed countries did try to link agreement on a I moetuy regime to concessions by the major powers They did wot achieve this objoutive, hut they did receive some conces124 | coruex mereannenaoEacl Ww ecraNe AND Ato sions, tn the Jamaten ag ry LT, on the sale of EM gute to benefit Third World mombors, and a libexslization wf creat facilities. Yet their influence was clearly less strong inv the INU than iv the Law of the Sea Conferences. Not only were their votes fewer: they Ind fewer bargaining resourees in the monctary isso aren, On oceans, they could always make trouble by declaring extended jurisdiction and tarnssing anyone who violated their newly declared aren of control; on mavetary Issues, their only weapon was the eastly one of def ‘Out expectations about complex inierdopentenes are confirmed for the cceans area: Linkages by wonk states are important parts of the political process, But they have heen less important in the iuteruational monetary fea, where great powers continued to hole most of the polities resonrers. Roles of International Organizations ‘We have seen that international organiations fnveved in the oceans fe aren have proliferated over the ligt few decudes und that transgovern- imental polley coordination ancl enalition-builingg ean take place within these international organizations, Cis not rare ti observe stl hehavios In the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), olicnts ‘uansport ministries sought to broaden the organization's jurisdietion to include all pollution rather thaw ust oll pollution, although this wet ‘was against the position of the foreign ollces of some of their govern- ments.” We have also noted that, as expected uncer conditions of com plex interdependence, internation! organizations have been signifieant agenda-setters ‘Even more important, the polities of re area has become closely associated with internation procedures of international organizations in this area emphasize sover- Eignty and state equality. In the ninetecnth ecutury, iL was anthinkable that a landlocked state would participate fy rule-making for the oceans But at the Hague Conference convened by the cage of Nations fn 1930, Czechoslovakia had equal voice and vole. ‘The codification eonference ‘dramatized the imporeance of deviant states sual weakened the normative dominance of the great powers.* Even so, the pattern of workd communications iy the 1990s was what Galtung calls feudal, with verti! communication between powerful and werk states, but little horlzontal communieation among the weak In the 1030s, states Tike Ecuador, Turkey, and lran, whose efforts to extend their jurisdiction brought forth greut power protests, were diplomatically quite isolated, Now common membership fn a international organization ‘would transform ther potential diplomntie coalition into an active on Tn recent decades, international organizations have plitctzed oceans viking J the oceans fue corguntzations. The FMVEAK puorssE AMON AND Gens | 125 teu the ower of tates ative dese pesto He vin entered eae sce fo tensns, government f fet devel ents hve hese ac tial on these isswes, ‘the: major ma powers hve been definitely om the dese tthe Ute Naton Lar the Sen Confer The fact hat questions of eens resnurecs were raiged in the United Nations General Assombly in 1907 activated a set of potential walt is sere ttn ee a tes ineration onthe ees and pratcs Unt wld onaten nee ek regi he fact that Heer of the te develop omnes ve expects of om cont nts ese "The alton nthe manetary Imonstary fn ae is omewhat diferent Trans governmental networks were developed with via Sch the M1, te IN, was To te a new eens Aeshational organtzation Favored es nliional fluences The plex interdependence Ideal type are therefore “tie OBED hw theese cae ly shape hy the condition of the tntemational rein fo the 390s the Tet tlevelopa omnis had sme sic hy ately te tm fae inns Me atin beat sce He explxive eth of ied Weld partption aed ey Mota tes lave bos peop by to Tteatn nd ml by sale ne select “ly of nda capa smote icy have ot hen teil ae ake as ce rey hashed Se af cnt pee aa Sip Ti es ei aen ‘lst eppoatnte propia’ Sern ans, cite neo af cel bee ad tance ny al et ims tant Wome eae tte avn na ef Ewen deers nny ii de dat he naa aes Iot3 made mp xg cbs ele a a twtr we smn nese atte eae te i a a ratio " Lrceduees of an international! rgani- wonee, as they have gi we Bi nt Ivy plies he metry one I organotins are signet beth eas. Hn i the ttn metry ae theyre ily ne120 | compres nrranerexmence m9 instruments for the coordination of poliey arwong envtles with financial resources. They reflect power rorowrees wore than exereising « signifi Influence on outcomes. Jn the oceans area, by contrast, international ‘organizations have increased the influence of snvall and otherwise weak states, atthe expense of the major maritimes powers. CONCLUSION “able 54 summrizes the extent tn which oor expectation aboot the pl cal proces of complenInerdepentenee ee dsessed tn Chapior 2 te borne out for oezans snd money in the 1070s tees the pol cal proses wer closer to tone egpctd nor cmp nterdepentece Sink to tows expected dor rst condo tthe of results In our expectations was sch gontr fh the on intertfonal monetary iste are, In pater, less evelopal Gouuties Tad more tfleno the aca eat wel tert ga zations mre ffs ‘Over lnger eri, the ons case supponts the yropottion conuilons nan fs acu bs cor to eof copter pervlence, poll proses will dings ae “« Force by great poate declines sl sat snanewveraity. Multiple loues and ruliplo channels of contact wnong suctler tse ‘hore were Ineents i puitcizaton, bargaining Unkages among sue, Srrvrtunts for sl sates, and involvement ‘of Sstertone organi Uh tn oceans isues Diet "poliy interdependence heared a tes oth of ierensed ncaa ines ate hss of indnectintrdapendoncs,partetaly when sito cao of Forslton or contol wera tm. The polite cess cate tne [bay compler, with ware govern agoncls hale, nal nie op portunities for tansgovernnental ge wel av Inergovenmental relations inthe Itrmatine!ronctary ven the ee ye oa siderable contimity in the nes snd the goverment agencies that dealt with thon. Tanstalonal actors became very portant dig the inst iteon yeas of the pero It up to that Ce, ee gente portance ad beon atthe ginning ofthe prio, in te 1920 The max Important change in Use monetary fe syst was nt fn the condone of complex interdopendence (which were preset i lage does tno Gut mich of the period) but in governmental ntvites, Covemnete be tame math more stve on ination monetary questions ~ patty the United Sats government, which had boon external piv tho 19a Politely responsive ngoncin sch nthe Tresary Deptt fnlved iilonce af the expnse of the Feral Reserve Boned td New at as eoneuweion | 197 ISA POLITICAL PROCESSES OF COMPLEX DE ENDENGI: OCEANS AND MONEY, 1970-75, ata way by Vex it ue ol ie {atu dens an ‘ope weal rent Sion manic Yes though tere Sige" iat vestige ro he son sind ping een eee Yeeiner Yes seas "wii Cepuieatons pie cape atwot —anddomente i irimporn increta gis Felts ep chi rinse alge Tikes rom thr sy, Police a fics eft amate;burn cf preieion ne pede eet aretyofinage wl tate bore vt muck wee acetyl ten srry by the ‘etn iy wen te he {onal om foran tee, stro mati tere ice keto icant poli sagen Poiiteascton Epeakse128 | compLx mvrenoarHNoRNer HN cANR AND stone oder! Heserve Bank, which yoro ont aivety der pst Conte sues became polled dnt thee I nt ely 1970s to an unprecedented degreo, and international organizations be- Caine mre npotant atleast for, than Inthe prewar peti. At Sins a dan, spl win te United Ser goverment wn pentely evden Bnrgaining linger appeved st nes f sharp eit, a tevded to laerene, oso mtch Bosse tho mambo af fer rease, bt booure govern prion ha of the Une State, used manipulation of Hnked Snterdependencies as an important paley intrament re not yo expand the changes In ntervanirgies Inthe ccsts'andTogey" ius rs. ThM cy at At ss sufllent simply to ote once ngln the ferences etwoon te two tres bane 107 ration verte oye hnt. Under conditions approaching those of complex interdependence, Interatonl pole I ferent hin eval word; but Ie ot by toy mene nfo THE POLITICS OF RULE-MAKING IN o 5 = OCEANS AND MONEY Oo An Chapter 3 we asked how aul explanatory models. We a1 ‘nd presented four gested that analysis should begin with the simplest, oF most parsimonious, explanation of rogime chenge and: that tno should ad eompleaity as wecessury, As we sav tn Chapter 2, the simplest explanation of regime change would emphasize economle growth, processes, That is where we shall stat. ECONOMIC PROCESSES AND REGIME CHANGE ‘The ceonome process model of rogin ehinge is hased on welfare-oriented responses to economic and technologie! change, In It fnternatonal {transnational economic relations will tend to outgrow international ro- Bimer: the euporatructurs of work polties will no longer be able to cope With elnges in the baste relations of production and exchange. I one ‘way or another, the regime will have to bo adapted or be broken. This ‘model implies that governments will be reluctant to deny themselves the welfare benefits of economie interdependence, and that they will there. fore be under pressure to adapt the regine or yuickly to construct « mew ‘ue. Te ignores questions about the interoational distribution of power ‘Thus this model explains both the declive of international regime (due to technological change and the growth of interdependence) and tho re.130 | ‘TAULEG6.1_ REGIME CHANGE: ECONOM! sas 67 wn nis MODE ‘conn for nse aea_Deeripton of bangs procs edel? Money Money jabmant or Recunation ain rene ol sanded regime exalted tec hei in abe nce by agreement. Breton Woods resin ly implemen lgson xtesons ftlowi rd specehs UN Betton Wood fegie elapsed, aly. The earn pontine confer ede psa Rati Srp he ing {om tendepenente ave melt. aly. Heonnic ecrery made the pen ‘Woot po Na rita ea he ey portant aly, Beef fee nd {Spt we crete nent fr sgoconen te sr es ye Tenement eo Played an eprint ae Sui ice Serco sd pres plead Parialy eshte chang et fot cent appre le onl aio he le ining mat exp, ely, ceptions of beets ily, Tecnologie end en oe anges edt incened ws nds id need pend an Sas teoanic fro Erope and Hat, re ot expend, construction or adaptation of such regimes (in response to the perceived "teat that welfare ewes will be lost otherwise) ‘Table 6.1 indicates the five occasions on which regiies were established oF reconstituted and the four points at which regimes have broken dovu ‘or weakened sharply in the monctary and oeeans areas siueo 1920. The cceamomiie process mdl prediets that regime breakdown will be accounted for by teuhvologieal and eemoniie ehungo, and that regimes will be est Tished or reestablished to ensure the welfare benefits of interdependence As Table 6.1 shows, the economic process wnodel explains some sspocts of every rogime change, Teehnologteal changes have been rapid tn. both {issue areas, and changes fv econonole processes have been important. The Denefits of cooperating to manage interdependence have also heen obvi fous, even though it has not always been passe ta agree on how coopera tion should take place, But ns we said in Chapler 2, the economie process model does not provide a suficlent explanation of any change, In every change intern ional political factors wore al least as important as economie processes, evap th dl es Fo epining Dit’ 125 etn tthe go lid after pencetine conditions had beon established, and its depar- tore from gold in 1931 nnder the stress of the banking collapse and world: wide depression. ut even then, political factors were important, Britain's leaders hud w conception of their rola i 1025, derived from Baila’ ditional hegemonic position ns well as from their economic beliefs, that contributed to their decision. Similarly, we eaninot explain the events of ntely. without cansidoring the Inck of « coherent political framework among the major Westorn conntries and the actions of ance, Jn paaticular, against sterling in the preceding years." ‘The economic process model also predicts some twening points that did not ooonr, After the disaster of 1931, this model would have led one to ‘unticfpate siecess at the 19983 London Economie Conference, beeause the tosts of competitive exehnge mate mssnipnlation and tsde barriers wets evident all, Yet the conference eollapied — as proponents of an overall Structure model, pointing wut the absence of hegemony ar ellectve leader. ship, would have predicted. Its true that greater cooperation among the United States, Bitnin, and Franco was evident by 1996 in the Tripartite nt, but its provisions were quite limited, Only after World War If the politial and, to some extent, the economic conditions for cohesion among the major-eapitalist counties, was substantial progress toward a new international monetary regime wade. ‘Tho coonomic process model provides necessary but not suficient con tlitions for regime change in the monetary ind oceans issue areas. Any complete explanation will bave to include the distibution of power, The190 | ve ponsvies oF wuteatanine He BERARH AND WHE simplest explanation fn toris of powor fs the averall structure sndel — traditional high polities ~ to whiels we turn next OVERALL STRUCTURE AND 1 IME CHANGE, ‘The overall structure model rests on the premise that the strong ke the rules, International regimes must be consistent with the interosts of the most powerful sttes in the aystom, As aggregate power relations change, international regimes. change in eorespon power Is donnina fg ways ene tary emis rn, ware te Sips we develop 9 ea of ering hegemony to spa th cll of titration eines the absence of war. Whon overall power tn un tnoratonl stem Becomes diese, Taternatinal rete Ine down. What per o- {Sine meve-Soneentated, nw rims, avorble to the perl sates, ‘rl be develope. “Th simpletvesion of an ove stirs: prone tion of mltary power to exp the ate of er restigation found, however th, wth se eee, the st i ry power dar et rove wry a eaploations. For example, Britis doninance of tho oceans bene Workl War 1s wore pro> ounced than her general p-type telat to ther trent power, Bete te tay Dit esos ating fee pe rgtne wnt mot accounted for by ignore try poston, which Ted ee serio wenkoned by World Wark After Wodd. War Tl ‘Amertean demimaoe ofthe soar wns mich steoiger tan fs margin of rainy polit Soviet Unt no ave as the miftnry power truetre Hstotly ince wit the oer Te ffiner but Taorch cose ther. wore eosirle dsreeen eteeon Falenakng wth aed ovo evel ity per "similatIncmplte relationship tween the srt of the itary system andthe ity to deere he us fy evident the monetary ue arts Before ths mils te Unite State nde nonce tha tne woul have prec fron ts itary expats, and Creat Btn Tal more. fer Word War Tl, hn asi sna the Soviet Unione tn the intemational monetary system, Soviet Tener as een italy nil Bocause Is economist dacs pei 0 partpate Setvly in faterationa economies er theres of the TMP or the GATT: Inflenee over titemationt ety alas as oe one fentated anon jor ental ernie ‘Ar we rocd Tn Chapter 2th shite fm the dation of tary power only partly exp the eros ofthe Breton Won gnc dung es the disteibu- nal roger. Or hon the 19605 and its eve lve. Changes fn perceptions of anilitary Uhreats, bv the relative ecomomie strength of the United States and is partners, and in hierarchical patterns favolving Europe and the ‘Third ‘Wortd all hud an effect, Whew these variables are added, the explanatory power of the overall structure model Is much impeoved. The mote soph Uieated averall structure model ie partiearly good at explaining the eatly ecusion of the free seas regione and the postwar establishment and fnple= mentation of the Bretton Woods nionetiny regime, Erosion of the Oe tn the aftermath of World Wart woskened Britain had to make cones: slows to the United States over pursuit of smuggler onthe high sess, Dy 101, the overall porwr of the ‘United Sato teat that the eatensone caved the “Train Prociaton Went wneontested ‘Truman Pract wss wort fn way tha the Ud States Ine wo avoid any farther ens af the rn, hk many of the sun lan ont sch fre thn the Tramn Pacman, Despite United State naval preynernaee andthe fat that many of the ten stale ren Lat in a of stlged Arena ego th United Sates wen sahle to prevent nthe ton of Ue ee "he overall per stare emp nid of Uh ution 1045 andthe 10005, Arnerion donne on the ses wes silat tenor y the fata the Unltd Sates was engaged tna gla stg flr th Soviet Un an tha Berl tay strength wes et Situs superior te nal ower, To Tato ae fran. Sovlt ck va fled Dy ie global plico-niltay poston, and stmpte tain ends ‘Ui the li the Soviet Unio Tsk sokoist atti toward so portant set of the couse, Av tinea power ith sak nny sini delet by pana the begining the ee Tessa hal conta yess for ext jardin to protec Is const ded, fo 19KT an the ealy 1D, regarded the hw of the fen as “av of ras Uo shots vay fim Soviet coats Inthe estar prio, fat oly clined ad dteided a twelve teritria sea, but al “lose porta adjacent seas? Aho i ad a weak tary, Ts poston a x sage power allowed i deter any sigue nl challenge to ts ental lating, ts th teratoma Law Comision td tthe 1858 Unite Nain Conference the Ls he Sa, the Soviet Union encnmge ther sates jo ft opp te thee me te war ott the 190 tat the Soviet a Anerean postin bento conven Son, the Ble pn st 1s Regime eI the military system ante the194 | vin POLIT OF nuLA-AARINE HF OFAN ANY MOH United States the leader of «global antconununist allie During the pe iod of ight bipolaity when the pereeved security Unent fom the Soviet Union was particulary strong, the United States placed security ‘concerns and alliance iaftenance atthe top of ts pros. Far example, Jn 1654, shortly after Port successfully une forer against the. Onasis ‘whaling Heet (which the United States protest dipkinatialy), it was American poley to void a confrontation that would disrupt allies rl tionships, steal it teed to “puta cad Uo wha considers exaggerated tials of terior rights” though “pleco by picee discussion of igh Seas problema” in the UN General Assenbly. Yet hn deserting the agen, a State Department ofl admitted that the necans seston was ot vit Compared ‘with the disarmament and atomsforpatce issues In 1950, ‘whet the United States found itself isolated ona voto y the Inte-Ame fan Council of Jurist to recognize acl state's right to set is own Tits, itresorted to bistera diplomacy in Tatin America capitals 1t emphasized the threat that extended Tints woud pose to Wee defense, ht the result a8 merely an atiguowsforalt atthe wext OAS eoufercuce-* On 4 personal visit to Peru, Searelary of State Dulles won agreement in Dnciple on a fisheries pt, hut his ltention was subsequently diverted by the impending Saez esis® 7m the meantine, the United States In pase ho Fisherman's Pro: teative Act under which the United States Treasury reimbursed fines paid by tun fishermen for fishing without Keenses while: maintaining the Test postion of nonrocognition of extended jussdetion, ‘The United States ad Aeoided that it was cheer to ent ts Tega position by manipulating the domestic end of « conflictual transationa system than by etrtaling the aystem or by fnlervening abroad, Whatever the legal elec, the inter: tational politi effect wae to weaken the erediilty of American efforts to doterextondod clans to ccoans space. When the allies Tear «om fronted ts weak allcs in the oceans fase are, it wns the superpower {at blinked, As The OH Forums explained tis elentee, in prewar days nalitary reprisals would havo hoon taken, but the gavernnent wes alr {ate Toea! confrontation sng boon Morse wn nnd "Wwe needed friendly relations with South Amotica."? As « nuelear superpovwer ‘concerned with alliance leadership in bipolar itary system, the United States ha les leeway In exeredsng ts potential naval hegemniy than had Britain. Iv the multipolar military system of the nineteenth century, she Inad not had to worry thot ebjoctions fron allies nclar treats Interna tional Monetary Regimes “The sophisticated vorsion of an overall structare snodel has mixed covord of predicting regime change in the international monetary area, It does fovrman. sravervnn ano ncn enance | 135, swt expla the ft that ae 1020 Btn seine is pston s the Center of Intertoto reins amd at the Banke f age Bente the nck kr fy the aterntonal monty system Indo, esse the Une States ad the mat over mitry andr soe per afer World Wer I the overall suetare explanation wld wes predict Armiccutred pest Fone Changes i th overall pr strc dl priate the ees of the tary rey br 18, lol ts wens ae the reine me Sct tv presse ete hy the word depremion Te ovrall sre thee ss nl not In alle to prec the international one tary reine of 19253), nt oe it bad cergd ths model Would have Conroy att rine’ srt ied "The everll steel fs most successful fy Whe fntrvatloal woneary ane forthe innate pstvar prods Aedes lly nod “conone dante plyed an lnortant part inthe development of the Tretton Woods recov roe (1044-48) snd in Ue fll nplrnentaion of ton Ananth yy alter 105% Tew ay ign test overwbelnng. tn events Tein, tothe 107 regi change totais ttn Tw OT he develope of arity andthe porception of x Soviet threat ox pls Aseria linge Uy bold certain rules In abeyance for the sake {Emu recerg Th ange sound TDA toed moe genet xen patemalsie, Anica py towd. Europe and te toward Japan waft bythe changing perceptions torr the Soviet Union far ofthe Soviet Unio even sea the spring of 1846, wes er in Tnresing sport in Congres forthe Toa to Din, The ext Ape tho State Depatnent wos ly onganving generous teases Tor Bit tai, whereas the Treasury Deptinent, les sespostee to pole! and iin to, was fig ight danke, etre? Massive Ame * Amos Ino lf IDEALS tense that Neve Fork would replace Laven 1% the snr testinal Ua exter, Tl lager am sleet snl be by emp ety vith Dla harks ow by peadly “Amercoing” aad anetingthe Get the Uh Boga sat. Digests ran buokes Sin Tack it st eappet ws the sgrmnont helped tr proven Assrcon dw ‘wee Tens Hc alata dr Ue (20S joan Hal Wilson, American Bones ful For Poticy, 1980-999 (Lesa: University of Kentucky Yee, 1971), II. Sako Cat ¥.Parnl, Melo Fipte, Und Slater Betaonie Diplomacy, 1916-1903 (shure Cnet af Path Pes, 190) [No statue mel ean be expect to prod actions has on perceptions of reality 6 tho 125 Wath viento old wae Urns Tendan overetinsted. tle vom rsaees ni winlretint the teeth th Internal economy would ‘sions ding the newt deve Th fet that tinaely the Dt eflrt to Tend ‘vith sic pla rss fai as an overall strate theory maul pe ‘it he ae a iden for Ue hon this they epltnn. nso hate196 | rue rouirics oF muLe-adanINe IW OERANS AND MONE can ad, which lad not been in prospect before the Soviet th ceived, despite the economie arguments that eouldsansbly poured out to Europe, and to somo extent Japan. After the Bseo of Bri. tains attempted resumption of convertibility in 1047, the United States not only tolerted European diseriniantion against Uhe dollar but also provided the European Payments Union with $350 million in working ‘pital to establish a scheme, bused om such dsetsination, that wold ineronso intra-Europoan trado® Thought aves of he 19508 the United Star Tooked bonlguly on its pesistont balance of payments dots, I 1050 the Treasury weleomed x net gold outflow as indicating aw improve mont in other countries’ positions. I 1055 the An deficit ‘was cited as helping other counts relax thelr exelinge resets "Tus in the late 1940s and early 1050s, fear of the Soviet Union ond maltary bipolaety helpod to Inerease tho willingness of the United States Congress and the Treasury Depaetinent to make cmncsssions to Europes countries (and Iter to Japan) on international ccovount tues, This tum provided American diplomats with tnstrumts that could be used t0 ‘work gradually toward implementation of the open, anutatera. rade tnd payments fasues of the Botton Wonxlseexine. Developments fn the military system thr einforeed American pollen! leadership ns well as assisting Amorix’s partners eomnomiealy, They therefore helped t tute that the United Stuer wuld vs its capabiitics etively fy the monetary system, rather tha adopting Uhe mre pusive oF malonate pallets ofthe fnterwar years. ‘The se inthe eentomle capabilites uf ISurope al Japa clealy cone tebuted to the collapse of the Bretton Woods ogi t 107L. Yet the frequently proclaimed Ameriea eeonomle decline was hazly precipitous between 1957 and 1972, the United States’ share of world tude only fell from 168 percent to 144 percent (fee Table 6.1, ow p. 14, This gradual change hardly seams sullcent to explain the callie of the Bretton Woods regime. Furthermore, the eroding hexensony inodel does not ex- plain why the United States rather than is challengers, preepitated the rogime’s end on August 15, 171. After al, It had tried during the Ken- nnedy and Johnson presidencies to maintain the rion, avd nd used both financial ingenuity and politio-nilitary power. Ths the overall structure model gives us important background for understanding tho 3071 rogime change; but it doesnot completely explain th cage 'Nor does the overall stracture approach expla iow a nev rogine of flexible rates and coordinated intervention could bo agreed on in 1976, ‘without the United State’ retum to econornle as well as military dom nance or another powers rite to preeminence, We should have expected that if the United States were not strong enough to maintain the Bretton ‘Woods regime (due to erosion of its dominance), it should hardly have ‘sux sraueyune ano mecuMe cnaNin | 197 boon ble to impose a new regime, And without,a dominant lender, there should have been ow agreement on reform, Inftead, theie should have bbeon « prolonged perio of 10 effective rules, and perhaps even the trade ‘wars, monetary manipulations, and new mercantilism that were so widely predlicted botween 1971 nd 1974." “Table 62 shows hnw adequate we found the overall structure model to be for explainiyg our nine eases of roglane change, We found it to be aut sulequate and elegant explanation of three eases. It is most valuable, at the tnblo shows, For the 1945=40 modification of the ooewns regkimo, and for the tntornational monetary regime In the deende and a half following, World War Il vee half following Iss) STRUCTURE AND REGIME CHANGE Acending to a fase sttire mol the tong mak the rules; bt Wi strength within te ie sen tat cots, Change in telnet shi he ditbution of power within the tage men. Tis importa ssesing power inn fae ares to real the thetom In Chapt 2 between two Tovls fst n wold pote, At the a level, the ne. atonal regime fe secoped a legit, with perhaps some mine di "cement by all ap story, pte taker ples wth the grote Fas ti provide lifestivepower aver outosmes andar ach cond tins il tharetore tj th mere of the relies well a 00 unesying eeononie capabilites, Within an effective nondsetimintry tlre, for empl, the ait to impose esrninatory Wading rio wnt fete ration (ath conpuntve foie iy on tis inesion) wil tb sae power resoure tn bargl withthe es ofthe tom re " ‘Tho second lowe! of ait! havior i rulemaking: ations a th lol ealnge th rg Ln ech a ition the sla of tho ga are questioned by snr atin The ene so longer ata ‘ree evens of TE-TO aro 50 race Hat ey Htepretation af them ean only be tentative Some laforwe observer have than a much moro shelled view af de Jaen ogroaments thea wo da, See, for Instance, ‘Tom do. Veer “Jalen, the [Now-tforn of the International Menetiy Sytem” Foren Ate 84, m3 (Apel 10970), 577-005, lg wo defative fyent about the value er pormnence of he new rime ean Ie mad a Bis tg, ftine Javelopent wll rovide am ate ‘ating test of nn overall suet mel Tf the Junlen agreements else, and om tive manipulations of exchungr Yates ce sreat kaabity become prevalent the ‘xpecatons of nn overall tractre mode wile valieed. We old then ffer that {hore was nat noi erate power to wake the reine work, Convery JInaien accords succee ut Colnation ie fly ellesive, tne evel rrtone model wl ean lee vl thste 198 | sm routes OF MULRAHAKINE We OCrANE ANH Ato TABLEG.2 REGIME CHANGE OVERALL STRUCTURE EXPLANATION ue Ine area Detention of change fe Fase Weaken ss. ‘ccm Honey Money Mosey Tilia eabled to gald wand regina, area in toy ne by agreement. ‘ttn Wood repeal Implemented ington Agree 7 eskdeo sane Extention Cllowing Lvecame involved. pie alge “Accounted for by changes in power, hminance wer eco the sheen hae a wea poner sac: a power, ma ‘ren ractre model reir mo Sgreonen its hegemany ode Parr enone rere ronoesd, Eitough the wean of he's postion help toscvent or the Fen’ ules The US. wa repo in seatsined the US. (om wing ‘ho domianee nginn Soh No, Ove power rete of poor ud col tates i otc st ‘renal econ yoer hi pr Nid only pat expanatin eso eraucrne ap nei eaves | 130 but a variable: eon us favorable by some actors, unfavorable by others. al to an understanding oF issue structure srgumonts because diferent types of power resources — different power structures will be relevant at this Ievel. IE the poliey question is 10 longer how rules should be formulated within the constraints of an inter- national regime, but rather how the regime should be designed, 1 much wider range of power sources (and therefore of comparative vuluerabili- ties) becomes relovant. To continuo our example of a trade regime, if no: discriminatory trade is no longer assumed, the ability to impose harriers without effective retaliation becomes an important povrer resource. The issue structure approach relies heavily on this distinction. When the neying dltiton of power tan ue ate inconsistent withthe clfective distribution of power with change. States that are strong in the advantaged by the rules of the international regime will ty to undermine 1 dastioy the aystem. Incongruity between underlying power structires ‘and fafluence within a regine provides the dynamic for ehange, Intemational Monetary Issue Area ‘The issue structure model helps us wnderstond the collapse of the monetary fogime in 1931 nnd snakes" irjor contribution to explainiig the break down of the Bretton Woods regio in 1971, We have seen that the inter- ‘war monetary system based on Britain was weak not only because of the shaky world financial situation of the 1990s, but also because of the overall political structure thot could not effectively support the regime, France inde a nuisinco of horse, and the United States was not prepared to tako strong action to help. ‘But there was an inconsistency between the ‘underlying power structure in the Isswo area and the effects of the rules, which showed itself in two ways. Politically, France resented Dritish pre: eminence tn the international monetary area, which was syinbolized and supported by the fuct that sterling had been returned to Ils prowar parity swith gold whereas the franc Ind depreciated snuny tines over. Yet the fact that the franc’s value had been set low ~ indeed, undervalued — es sued that France could put continua} prossure on the pound. Thus France hhad politcal reasons to snipe at the regime. For Biitain, on the other hhand, it was difficult at best to maintain the prewar gold parity of the ‘and it became impossible once the banking collapse of 1991 oc- wed. Thus Britain found that she was helpless within the old rules (ecause she could not change the value of the pound in terms of gold, Fut also could not supply sulliient gold or foreign exchange to meet the domand nt the current rate). Yet Britain was still a major Bnancial power: ‘Thus when she went off gold and allowed the pound to fost (or intervenod to snipulate the flat), er poston tanita strony Un HL it vas this incosistoney eter werlyng ver a the co rains of the regine that proved ruc 4s Britain abandoned the gold standard, ‘We can ako use our iss sictne sided to snatyre the ov the Bretton Woods reyine cri the 100s, Usa this strength or weakest of onc eurreney. oar ith Isp vi, sn tho zo af ono Intertinal sora were nat sort of politcal rength or wenknoss, Within the rules of the reg, the United Stats was in an inreasingly weak poston in the TOD0e a ong ani altenptd torevoid a run on the dolla’ and devaluation, Creditor natn with ie creasing reserves, such as Germany and japan, were strong, The United States tried to persuade thom not tons the perwer ht thelr reserves represented. But ar Cerman and Japanese restver increased, although these ountses ocnine more powerfl within the asunptions of tho Dnt ton Woods sytem (in which dollars could nminally he rely exch ged for gol}, those asntiptions been inernsngly exlangerd. Germany and Japan themselves hoenme vulnerable to «dalla devalntion, which ‘would reduce the valve of thet dollar holding. Ax Henny Aubrey pointed nt in 1060, “nrely creditor's inenco over the United Star rests on ‘Avera rls to ply the aoe acing the ok eset and tuo. Ifthe Unitod State evorseiouly aie to challonge ton, hs ‘ge would take avery diferent course By breaking tho rls of tho old regime, the United Statin 1971 drew off the regime's eonatrsints on the exrcse of Anerican semamie power to tnfluenee intematonalinonetary pies, Te way thon abl toe its fundamental economic power — stony ceoony, i ow an of foreign trade to untlonal product, adits hoor size alongwith its atary ad political influence to change the rules of the nwmelary game, Having Fospended the convert of the dlr tnt gl. th United Sate wat to fongerIamstrng hy the reuiements of emery, mal Fond He self in a mach stronger bargaining positon after August 1 than befor. The diferonce between change in the wnlrying prwer struct d= ing the fftoon you eoro the brvklown of the etom Wood rei iid changes in fnflaener within the regina eanseants can bw tate by patterns of change in perontags of eld Ines ancl resver for major countries during those yes, Any figures such ae these amt be treated with ention as ince of power: thay ae very rongh approx. tions at best, Nevertheless, within the Bretton Woods rege reserve levels wore crucial, oem once currency Tad tr fe redeemed at esta ined was for gold or foreign exchange. Tie alternative of allowing the value of one's eurency to eng wa ei for any county to necome pli, but efectively imposibe (without re ort change in mes | 1A the regis) or other fo a a eaitry’s proportion af futern able 03 prosents the relevant figures. The United States’ reserve ps iow {iia its power within the existing regime) dropped muh more precipitously thas ty percentage af world trade (indicating is: psiton in the underlying power strnctuce), Were figures for grass national prod to be used, the continned strength uf the United States would be even more evident, In the carly 1970s the United States still produced between 25 sod 30 percent of the work's goods, compared with 13 to IS percent for the Soviet Union and 7 to § percent for Japan. The underlylng American position was furthor strengthened by the fact that trade con: stituted much lower proportion of national product for the United States than for its major trading partnors. The United States wus there- fore less vulnerable %0 disruptions in the Tnternational monetary trading systems than its partners were, ‘These figures reinforce our assertion that hueonssteney hetwecu unders Jying power and influence within a reghne is & source of regime change. ‘The soiking changes in the tnternational monetary system between 1957 tunel 1972 enol Ie acrounted for by & shinple thesis of decline in the Aniorican comeny, whew that decline only took the United States from 1666 percent of workd trade to 144 percent, and left it with over a quarter of world product, Had the American position really beeome a0 weak, the Alter 1971, the specter of trade wars e unerlying measures of power, sel onal trado, nwre important ns power TAMLE 6.3 MONETARY POWER RESOURCUS: 1987-72 Regimedetermined sructure Linderlyng srwctare ——— peterves as percentage (percentage of ord tude) counry w9s7 190719729857 1947 1972 Unite Sta Wk 153 M4 401 200 UUnked Kingdom 1128S France SA LTE tk 8 Gecmany 1799 Sk as0 Japan M4569 oaths leven major ons Sue Intemational Pinca Statics (Washington, Ds ternal Monetary ond, foe yon inate The fies He ane pla lg, the Need, Sw Sweden (Group nf Ten pan Suen118 | ne panarien or monaeasanane te wenn an ate United Stat International monetary syst wa haves Fens able: to Fare lense elm fi the i OTK; we wok oar aon Hs esse tial viows on the nature of a Future system prevall in the negottaltons Head ing up to the 1976 ageoement to mond the IMI"s Articles of Agreement. tis the undorlying strongth of the United States, iv the context of its ‘weak position within the pre-lSTL regime, that expla the regime ehange, hot American weuknoss anal decline (whether within the issue ae or aggregate power). ‘Novertheless, the issue structure explanation is not porfect, During the 1960s the delay in adjusting the regime to the undeslying structure’ was considerable; the issue structure expuation accounts for the romoval of inconsistency, bat not for it development tn the fest place. Moreover tho events of 1971 were followed hy other events that cannot he explained structurally. The attempt to realign exchange sates at the Smithsonian Institution in December 1971, but to eontinue with a Fixed rate system as ndor the Bretton Wood rogime, failed as teansialional money managers last confidence in the dollar. The magnitude of finanelal movements, directed frst against sterling (June 1972), theo against the dollar i Febru ary and March 1973, forced 1 move to de facto floating exchange rates Eventually, this pattorn was legitimized in the new Artieles of Agreement for the IMF agtoed upon st Kingston, Jannaiea, fm January 1976, which “embody the mort far-reaching changes i the intersational mouotary system sineo Bretton Woods.” ‘These agreements cannot be acewnted for by changes in the strteture of power It the issue area, boemuse tat did not eluange greatly among the ‘major industrialized eountsies during, Use yore in which this areemont twas negotiated, In part, the 1976 accord ean he aecnunted for hy the nomic process model. Transnational organizations in the 1970s contol ich Inge amounts of Hiquid fund, ana the mobility of those funds fs 50 igroat, that pegged exchange rates are extremely dilealt, or perhaps even npossible, to maintain. A report for the United States Senate Finance Committee hs estimated that in 1971 as ymuch as $258 billion in poton- tially liquid assets was held by multinational corporations.” Richard Cooper has argued that “large-scale changes in cxelange rates (as pro- vided for in the Bretton Woods regime) are wat compatihic with the high mobility of funds provalent today.” Because different patterns of ec0- nomic ohange in different countries make permanently Axed rates impos- sible to maintain, he concludes that some pattern of flexible exchange rates is essential. Thus economic reality sharply consteains political choice ‘The economie process model also accounts for some of the incentives that officals had during the 1971-76 porind to agree on a now regime. International trade and capital movements are important to all indus and some arrangements for regulating those movements would were clenily requiced after the tuebulent years of 1073 nnd 197A, But sels ucentives existed in 1938 ed 1930 a8 ell, ad neh ts wns agreed fon, Iwill he use, therefore, to go beyond both the issue structure and scconomiie process explanations (however useful both are) and to examine the political networks among officials that developed dring the Bretton Won regime. This the international organization made sll cont to ove anders ternational monetary polities. Oceans Polities “The ise srvetre del Ate epite well with the early eras oF oceans pulls. Tues, when the fredonn of the 4s regime was stabs there was a antistate balance of porter Inthe overall military system, Inu naval power ws spol. 14 the eal nineteenth center. the Bish navy was lager thu al other navies combined, and in 1944, Unita stil find nearly as many major wraships (198) asthe neat thiee naval powers combined (evn. 89: United States, OF, Franeo, 58), Moreover Beta wus the major ser of the sea. 188, bal the werka® merchant tormage Gis ver LOD tons) was ety sadn 19K, the Dtsh merchant Hest still represented 40 percent of world tonnage (and was four times larger than the secnn-rankingg Gera st. Brit fad oth th ¢stablsh a fre soa eine feacept a we sald rr, she treated as a speial etae) a the structural power to enfore it This aid vot mean that ores wa urd in the normal Gouge oF event, but that it use was wot dered when ws aecainally necessary to peste roginve. As ne wet deserted the pre-World War syst, “The mval power « «lolly pracias that the seas are free in tne of peace a that the war prabiens & therefore ths only problem watstaing his fon von Naval cnination opertes tive of peace fn the wrling tho la foe fire wars, tthe write of the hs of avigation, aad the Taw of ten torial wa ‘Th min mite state receives» litle attention fn the dating af a a? One fst of Wonk War Land the wasive Americas asa biking progr sscltod wth (D161) wm to tor te lr pe War nal atte Ia biplar and sequal pale tos ‘lich ws frais ate 5:3 ratio ity Aner apa Inj shipengeed on at the 1808 Wagon Naval Confer (oe Tae 04) tain aso longer able to enforce Aseria ares fo the stn. Moreover, the United Snes ws not a ater aoe tie a tal vs ter he Harding adits ene the rns tnarin building ream tho Amen merchant fet oped oa144 | ue ponsries OF mULE-MAKINE BERANE AND AMORES TABLE 6.4 DISTRIBUTION OF OCEANS-RELATED CAPAMILITIES Preise 1920-9 US Multipolae — Mulipl polar Bipolar (oncasured by expendi> tures om mil Foree) Miltary within issue Unipolar Tripolar_— Unipolar Bipolar ares (measured by (UK) (UK,US. (US) (U.S USS fava force ratio of 2:1 Japan)” ‘major naval powers) 55:3 Peaceful uses Unipolar Mutpolst—-Multipolae Dispersed merchant shipping Peaceful use: Multipolee —Mulipolar —-Multipolar Dispersed Sithing Britain's, Although the United States ranked second in fish enteh, ts fish ries wore, unlike Britni's and Japan's, essentially eoastal, vot distant water, Although the United Stater (aid Heian) usally. tnssted rdherence by lester states during the interwar period, the United States was limperfect in its own adherence, extending Jurisdiction for antisnuggting, controle in the 1020s and 19306, exerting strong diplomatic pressure t lscourage Japanese Ashing on high soas off ity coast in the 1930s, and declaring a threo-hundred-inile hemisphere neutrality zone after the ou Deeak of war in Europe in 1939. 1» 1943, the Roosevelt administration bogan planning to extend jurisdiction over the enntinewtal shelf and fishery conservation zones. Bocause of the widespread citation of the Truman Proclamation as precedent, this extension provert to Ine turning pofnt fy the transition from the regime of the fast period to the quasi regline of the second, ‘After World War I and well into he 105, the sleucture of power was again unipolar, but with the United States as the preponderant power. The United States hnd twice as many major surface ships. as second-ranking Britain and the third-ranking USI combined.!" Even in 1072, after the growth of Soviet naval power, the United States still had ‘one and a half times as many major surface ships and Targe nuclear sub- marines es the USI! When American admirals expressed alarm in 19TH that their navy hid “lost control of the sens.” Senator Sonnis replied that the United States still ne over twice the tonnage in major sueface ships, with greater range and more weapons than the Sovict navy. In short, at sss srverune ano wenn enanen: | 145 the ond of Work! War H, the United States hd more naval power than he et ofthe ward coined, thls esp, Re postion wat eualogon to thts TOU, Kena ths being of eur ied pero the Ure States wat the prepmndennt sus oneal power, with twice many entre al eur (2) 1 all th other powers combined, and tee a iy frie, destroyery, escort (19) ms the Sovlt Union and Br tain eon Forsch af the postwar period, the United States hl themval ent that woul hive been asada with hegenenie sti tute of rloanaking power ina eavir pero "The wring power strctre Inthe osans su arn was consistent in the Toate nat wi th exiting eine. Freedom of the sens was suppnted by Chet Hai, tho United States, and Japan altho the United Ste ainda excepton for measures to au smugglers: The change ig power aewlure aw renal of Work War It with the Unita Sates Dosoning the dminant val power = aco Dre log aid wot deter, the change fromm afro sea regis {oa qua rine 105, when the Unltd Stats asserted extended fo tion averting ones wn the ental soll ajpeont to Is ert Avsertenn policy rll «hg in decson-nakrs’pereptions of thi stat role anders, ae we shall demonstate elo Dut tho United Stes nity to sik such sweeping clans was undoubtedly facilitated iy is dmlinnce ln val poner wel in overall power totum “Te rege change of the prs IO67 pid, however sot seamanted for by changes the widerying power sructors New and wen states Ted the challenge to the strong rats rayne of 1045-67, Hoth the United Slats, with is neal daha tv Scone cpablts, aid the Sovit ie wth fs ply een expats, found theinseves om the defensive in negotiations aver the governanes of oesnis spaco and re sours, sue struct explanations ful to explain the mpd evasion of told free ne rls sve 1 “Ths for the wens ae, cages in interational eyimes ding the Tat tn youn ae Tse wll expand by overall lve stereo planation than previons changes ere. ‘The authority of strong states to the ule for meee spa a longer goon challange id In ite prowat or ary ent porads,Aioug the undfying power sr ture (val reser) rene ancentate, eas not Te to srg reglow tn the postwar peso. Rathor th ntematlnal rege hav becone weer. OF the nine stn Tale 62, an issue structure model helps to improve: ‘onr explanation of tho pre-1920 establishment of the aeeans regi and its curly evasion in the 10s, and it accounts for a large part oF the regiine lunges in money tu 1931 ancl 1971, which the overall structure model ‘was unable o explain adloypately, Yet nether of the two structural modelsMo | 1 vo. fits well with the recent regime hinges in ocr, sn several of ue questions about changes iv monetary regis i LITE and 1976 remain singnewered. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND REGIME CHANGE How do we account for the faire of husie stretural models to explain all eases of regime change well, yeticulaely during the last desde? Ther failure is particularly marked for the acne fst area. How do we ae count, for instance, for the Inability of the preponderant naval state to Alter the use of force against its lune Bhwerinen in x geographic area (Latin America) where it overall hegemonic power wa alleged to. be {yreat? During the Cold War, bipoarity i vevall power structure provided part of the explanation, fut it i wot adeyprate for the period nce 1967. How do we acconmt for the fwot tht tay Leck prevailed over Britain in tho ened wars? Tov do we explain the fret that the two preponderant naval powers, the United States and the Soviet Uni, have been on tho defensive in negotiations over the guvemance of vecans space ‘and resources? IE power were a Jogous to money in dame rene sat, those discrpancen woul ely was wh nya Tey sot Tg Perse, Actors song in overall mitary power resiees wold rode Ebute thom to achiove equal nmrgtat atlty of enipute nero se tens. Simny, core with pvr tho wietyng ttre Tove of an iio area wold ty to make te rogins more cbstnt with the wer Ip strate. Iv pola terns thee sens, would oan take te for of Inkages amg ees —inproving one positon where weak hy Inking rsa thore tm ston che ws tng Thre wo Be & temfancy toward eongruenes betwoun stators and ropes both tithing areas and beeen overall iltary sructure snd wars ave Tn ow monetary ease we found sich ten tol oveall one rucnes tn the IB40e and 1950s, and within the we aes IDL and Hori Yet in monctry pls, al oven sore Incangrales between strvelure and rege cx gga that power reser Instn of complex interdepem {rornlther fly homogencous nor Fogle, Capi ine sro omy ans no nc ao er ig Tees and procednes for cso, lence nthe sane Bae a One of our mos impntatsnayticl tsk sterfoe tr mndeand the SN FOHKATIONAL ONCANEATION An MetANK eAtanen: | HIT exceptions snl Hitt So use stictural hypotheses that rest on ase sumptions abwont the fungibility of pawor wad prediet high degrees structurosregiine cmggucrice, Or, to return to the metaphor we: wsed ii Chapter 3, power like water way seck w common level, but the analytical challenge 4 to understand the heights sd strengths of the dikes and dams that nitintnin separate levels ad ares of power in world politics, ‘The international organization model develiped in Chapter 3 helps by Aceonmt for sone of these diserepance between the underlying, prvver structure (overall or lso-speciic) nnd rege change. It assuines pit processes typical of complex interdependence, andl tn independent effect of rales and norms both within ad sursonmnding ai issue area. Regimes Hisheal tn conformity: with the aderlying power structure. In one period, may Inter develop lives of their awn. Underlying power resources nny he immobilized hy nas aul political processes 80 long as the regimne remains in phuce. For example, the miles of the Bretton Words regime lin mobilized widerlying American monetary power in the 1960, ane allowed Enropenn countries to put more pressive om the United States Uhromgh the hlance of payments, a8 De Gaulle did in ennverting dollars into gold Acemeing, to am international organization model, outeomes are pye- dicted by reyimeslopenddent capabilities; that is, capabilities that ‘are legitimized and mate passible by nor and processes that characterize a Fogime. It should Iwo clear that the power rolations in a regime process model are weakly based on sensitivity dependence, and afe thus con stantly suseoptihle to hein overturned by strong military states or by states that have more power in terins of vulherability interdependence within the Issue arca. Te is remarkable tht states are constenined by roghines and organizations at all. Uniler realist conditions, the overall or issue structs models shyt necount for regime change, and an intern tional organization model should only help nekomnt for regime persistence fo lags inthe tng of changes ‘A mngjor contuibtion of the international organization wigdel is indeed to explain regime persistence, but one ean als derive predictions frou it bout roginne change. Jn this miele the bn 1 weakening of rogime is exphuined hy changes in the norms aud organizational processes of world polities. A regime may he allevd hy the emergence of ew hhonns in other arcas of work polities, whiel are them transferred to the particular issue ates, or by the application of established nots (which porate in other ise areas ur in pastiewlar organizations) to that tise area. Sinn, w regine may be altered hy: polities! bargaining processes {hat diminish the position of dhe states with underlying power that gave rise to the reginis, Or, the development of networks of political interaction, often centered on international organizations, aay Faelitate agreement ‘on new prineiples for an interitional reghie14 | rim rousries oF worn In OCHARS AK NOME overnl ‘Awe ave ee, sap srt plants eae appronch of tatliions thay. they (cts wth the eee press satronel) ean expat fay lave the for eses of regi eke dum or weakening in Table 62. Yet the bese structural expats do not adequately explain erosion of the aeons rege after 1967, ‘Oceans Politics “The erosion ofthe roses ome ins INT a be ete largely nvm ad the pola pcos ofthe United Nan, Ase oe tnchupter5 the ss ae proces of Stree ations fo th tn te ae pater alt aly Ti wn tra in 1000 and 1868 bt Force sl ye greater ole in 1980, the canton pattems at the Coneva Conferonee of 1058 relleted the tera! bipolr dvs of the worl. By the i106, Uh two vt powers, the United Stator and Soviet Uni nga Mere oth concred over pose exten wf stl stat Xtra! sem Thy densed the possi of «narrowly defied co ferees to dea! wi the ws The 1007 xp hy the wats fn Mata enttptingw tecnologia! breton that would unlock the frome ehett of the deop sod, sk only spocded up the ngenda fr the grea powers but abo recast te ve Hue forts of dst, ean eedarcs than managing acca space as a publ high. ter the eaablshment of «Seabed Conn he age of tinal es by wok states, andthe Genorl Ase ell for n Conference on the To of he Ses, oceans issues wore daterived ax auch by egaltarian ngenfzatignl procedures and by confrontation Detween leh tnd por nations a by naval power or aces expaites "Th rer, ecrding toon eevee notations, was that injuring eos ve ngs ct the po The gr ne ck by he caiion whl nly lacks nr wetted sbi seta 1 res tna int dt ower ew it uit u en rem, ths ln wat ta oe Op a est Sepae by to roe: 1 tester psig he BO. Siti oe nn hss Mls seg en ot rsures ul hor come Pattems of influence in international organizations and conference diplomacy are often quite diferent from what nme would predict from the twiderlying structure, Moreover, the broader antl nore generat the forwn, the grenter the divergence is Tikely to be. ‘The structure of influence in \CANITATION AND nema enanc | 149 ional Mart enh with abut sven mame tee diferent fom the srctre Conforence with vis ny members te vitally wanted agenda, Negotiating Ia of the set ssn In the UN General Asenbly rsd nn oganaatn-dapendant stuctre f epabittes rescuing that of the United Nations Conference on Trade ined Beveopen whi the cnlon of tes veloped soutes iis Group of Seventysevn) fit Toe aol enred te abl ya ine in UNCTAD in 1960 foun sat the colton between a tnce tn UNGTAD al stretnl power as mane by a gen ind i owt over wat only, ml av meted by tone sect poner Chased om share of world exports) was only lo? Edward Mies fund n Sina pattern of ee-dopendent infec fn the UN Seabed Carmi te; the Tati Arete Alien groups wote most uel ad up eave ata ch oe prt snuee of Ines hn ht xls al ston Nat ony loin erste xparte organization: dependent srt Fane sing slate, ut also weakened the barging postin of the Tendo nal per, Potent cts intemationa conferences ate mt rested merely to states, Sometimes al genie rete 0 nT thowe win tet “nae f einpotng donee agenien, International mectngs Sponsored hy the Usted Nat proide the psc eonnet tad lg rey To on ofthe pia agora elon ty been tative, The nto tthe La of tho Se tego had ts tet. Aro weal, Avercan fallback pesiton urging were often dnclsed in advance. Apter Important stances Tbe ying hy Unto Sate ter Deptt hele eonpany oes wih ies developed omnes avr of beacons ste fein ove the covet sh (wntrary to then fie United States pally a he Geveva sos of the Sched’ Comiten™ Besides Toying tower tinea cnferee, nso! el and mg eens fave sometiner formed. ft sont tn severl eo govemnnety percepts ad ett of tly net nih Sharta nr Tn Chapt 8 we presented further examples of uensne ol nd tnsgoverinontl evo aleting politcal beegting, Al these eases inet that se “ome” intrest nthe Tesing aval power were not entrain hy nition bouares in thet cic of Pla strats enlinn prtners ‘One slik romener that the Terao orguzaton model des vot completly igure the underying power struetre In ocans nega the International Oceanographic Commission (IOC) oF Inter tine Consultative Origa :0) rnd specific fmctional oti h150 | sue soumes oF munseasanane ne wenane ane stouey inert sinc a scree ot gt ae Fogle had Boo permanonty altered by the polite changes est PAWhy dtd the predeusnant taval power allow ths cies tac a ational interest” iw Freedom of the seas moro dilfienlt to def me ‘change snot completely new. Early in this century, Chas pitted rst ul 0 ma fr on nl at the advent of car wep ter IDES as ware penta parte Sly for sees wo Cnr ot pany tone os bo te age se, pena, he sett ve egnn sceaully uring nbocts tn the postwar (Ot racly the pr tra) em As mya oes ean more edly Tor We gent pe ey tect moro willing fo tolerate rulocnakig plies erctrted by te organteaton-dopendeot power setae ater nesting othe wd Iyng power strctre ‘The International Monetary Area Monctary polities és ite difer Issue structure eaplaine the break down of the and the new rues Uiat emerged in 1976 {ere principally devine hy the major international cosmic eal ial powers. i sume extent the ehaige has been accomplished {oul the wcighted voting system of the IMP: even when votes eee et faken, the ditetbution of voting powor alfeets results, Dut It has ules boon jhe by faking cletive power nway from the IME itel, in patiodon 1 je 1002 decision establishing the Group of Ten fof which oly inde ‘laid countries ste members) in conjunction with the General Arcanige, rents lo Horo, Working Party Three of the OECD and the Beck oy {nterationl Setlencots fn Basle were also fluent; and "bat geo Were alimast eo-terminous with the Group of Ten." ‘The Sinitheenteg cegient that teparly ended the eis of AL was negotiated. hy the Gromp of Ten, Aig the agreements of 1976. were developed formally: Hough ‘cammittess of the IMI Board af Governors, the major industralicad coe tek loninated the process, Indes, tho ervelal breakthrough whe on donuecd in November 1975, alter talks Letween France and tho United new at the Hawubolet summit inceings of six mur Indeetstalisad nantes These were thew agreed to hy the Group af Tem, nol ba tently by the tateiny Counittee of the IME At the 1970 Jonicn toting the Tess developed comntries received some concessions real renee fon the fined and prseceds from tho sale of old. Neves fetes, hey hy wo means dominated the process of rege changes i stead, they wore somewhat peripheral to it er cotrast withthe Law of the Sea Conference is striking. Financial ear ate saneeutrate: policies of the major counties cat he inp Freda nals witout resort to fore, ud by incremental, cael estar Lishlons at the major induscalized outries cout simp fatablish their owe inevitional monetary ayatem apart trons the INI at reat were to prove tn diffe. And in nay eae, beet the Gro gf Ten counties alone Ive over 56 percent of the ybwotas tn the thik {even inder the new arsangenents to go io effect tn 1076) nd toe {ore uly «slightly swaller peresntage of the voting power —caratdeniic intl fs matntaned even within the organization” The general UN hors of onestate-one-vte do not apply. The international organization model is wot, herefore, essential for ex Dilaining the breakdown of the Bretton Weuds d the new re sings eelope in Janey 1876, welts accurately tho undesyng dont ‘raat of major indistial powers, Yet to conclude Unt a basic steickeat152 | se notaries oF wuuseataKane i HcmaNs AND MUNN explanation of the monetary aren yn entirely sullient would be to iguore fa vory important fouture of that Iamie area, "Controversy aver the choise of an international monetary regime,” Richard Couper says, involves wot only differences over goals and distribution of hewelits, but “certainty bout the trustworthiness of other countries with regard to thelr beliavior within any chosen regime.”* Despite high-level conflicts, a certain degree of trust was built up at the working lovel during the Breton Wous ev An extensive and deep network of relationships developed among ‘ministers, governors of central banks, and their subordinates, ‘Transgov- cemmental policy coordination became Froqjent, along with clase fnter- governmental ties. Since 1973, informal coordination sing central banks Tas become much closer, as’ a means of reyutatlng aud nox flexible exchange rate system, and tho major fhe niniseies have tlso been fn constant contact. Indeed, the 1970 agreement ois roginne ch (including changes in the IMF articles) depencled on the belie that el development of close policy coordination nmowg major countries could rmoderite the effects of flexible rates, This belie! was Insed on tho aut confidence and close ties that were built up over several years, begginnlig with the Bretton Woods regime, wnl that were disturbed! bit sot ieree vocably ruptured by the Nixou-Comally aetions of 1971 The aftermath of 1971 was very different from the aftermath of 1991, "The Tuteston Comnnit- tee proposed that the amendod Aisles of Aprocmnt shoul Huelae « provision Iy swieh th tmombers of the Fund would undortake to collaborate with the Find al fothor members inorder to ensure that thet ples with repo to recrve aa ‘would be consistent with the objectives of promoting better Intemational survellance of Intomational liqudty aul waking the seta ewe ght the Drincpal reserve asot in the fnteratiual nmetary syst Although its diffeult to document the proeise Inportance of these polley ordination networks, participants in the system consider them very significant. Those who ignore the ellects of elite networks crested under 1 previous regime risk misinterpreting reality. In summary, the international organization model Is Tess procisely do- fined than the basic structural models. Noras andl processes that will be ellective forall issue nreas are diffiult to specify in advanee. ‘The prodic- tions of the international organization model ure more indeterminate, ruling out certain ditections but leaving apen altersate paths in the direc: tions to which it does point. It is defnitely « supplemental approneh, to bbe used when simpler and more determinate structural and economic process models used! alono w yy. Vet, a8 we have seen, particularly for the oceans Issue aren over the past doende, ‘arts oF sveriatne xesanavions | 159 siguificant ways for monetary polities, the interationsl nde! provides insights that are crucial to understanding. th segone change. anization polities of SYSTEMIC EXPLANATIONS, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND LEADERSHIP Sysont apatite They ent ep fr exp, why Powell stats sont da tte Tel sane tae a eae Irate ws Tor stance, ee cn tent! Ml oly ge Moa ee, hegemony te only pnt explanation, We ned to Inieduce lage te perce hit sing eet el se ae by taking sect of domestic llc in the great power vad the donee 6 la fiat reno Ths nae te no patos were ea on Inde pes tie of ote nm ant A out pint twa the poli pce ed at el eyes nw th nen me se tnd le Atay of leery I Ilys expan one of op ease the anonal t f une ee Weld Wa ao aes fe std th hex th ro of th oa ge ae borer hs mel that spre a ning ec ne Nowy fel sat wt dase rae rk ert pes the anh Se ge ee secu tos. Puts oom pane hy for grate se ey tn pur plea een ah i i the Wok War the Ue es ak incatona acl deni, lewing ths ak oe ‘nt ance “sg poor fit mere, Mi a orpolta stg Air Ward War, ve the atl tested wad kaeip on inertial ncn quis Alter 9 te endo a icy th hg ho Wr al porns eae ese nthe Pov set & sry a a hd hy natn ety Hey tip on eee a Gh sot or athe tne Sage aye connie str alli bu Europe ae Joan, kloan al nots wor ay cn we ae ure i :15 | aie rouimies oF munatanone ORAM ANH SHORT Ailist intewsts were not allowed to iy Wt wy eae Lad st weer Ht Twenga yes for Worl Wh wy alae, Whe fis to the saa wn ect Cnr destin oro sy tio cy oy, ese My oe gly sanity Rete fc deletions he gna eat pb iy ef ta it arene merc iii es the ed Ns rh ep te a ag, seeks dying, presses the Unit tae tea dlrcntred aetna ety gh atc any: Teer fg ses» apy ieee gen, hese eta ents Uo we ae et rie hang Ty help tact for arin be aan esis ous zona theo of Work Wat 1. Trogon ae edn ad ea the To in preserving he ree a ere ted States nd tony on snating of roe der, Pedal oxeepons to tho reine whe nny dese ne aes se tbitorats an tho ute Deptt or West Coast at ation rue her denen Gms nn the res Fret ater ents of 101 aoe nt of te dest pcs of Te taken an the esti terest of th iste se een Koon ws toon bythe tevtor Deportent The se aa dente eat that the ad 0 play a ls ha the Sato op Sy ey oe se ht Pca te i a 191, Ue ie fades peeve were tl States was the de facto Tea those of a feee rider until Latin American imitators shocked perceptions ofits systemic intrest in regiane nuance ater 1G. Ta both the monetary and aeeans Kssues, attempts to exercise leadership, ‘once the need for it was perccived, sere complicated hy the diversity of Interests involved. In the pceans ise area the diversity-of fnterests én fronsed dramatically altor World War IY seth the gross in its complexity tnd navigation were the major uses of the afore tho war, after 1045 the rise of near ies sult as offshore cling, deep-sea tnining, and ceological protcetion qunfronted the United States gover Tent sith a Iarge array of “domestic” groups anal cmporatons that wore ‘Concerned about necans poliey. Moreover, ane of the new ists, oflstore Grilling reinforced nstal rather thaw high seas futorets, and. the most valuable Amerivan fishing was coastal rather th i eistont seaters. Us Tike Britain leadership, whieh facod happy coincidence of its seenvity ‘and economie interests, American leadership of free seas regime sulfered from intemal eross-pressures. Tn the monetary area, two Amer policies tended to damage domestic tunes oF svsreane exeeanations | 155 interests: allowingg Kvropse aud sud ths ayalust Aner dollar eve as pan to discriminate ugninst the doll nel wintnining a sable value for te Unpainted worker nose inden, were pr etn ety the oles, Ax the United. Sates balance of ale sipped al the nnemyployine at rset the at 00 aly T97y protests yt this ivation vse lug they at Dt tos Ufone mpl te Hae se, wot the taelary ides The AFL (0 ica etn onto te a el Tn the face of thee pesors, props what i st renal, bt acca sa monetary poy ent tht exptions bat the extent ih Amerkain pulley wer dena fn syste terms, wth tho, Usted Slater, crat the ola of Tour, On the whe the nay, Usintwater Serine fe shuppecs were bile to tein “the est" in eeu pie {kt tne faton ttwoen 17 ted TE, Uti Tt ew nce commit altude, a rlted i the vows ofthe Fed eral Hescrve Dau uf New York-aa a sezeson of high govern oii from Wall Stroy were related in postwar America term tonal sionetary policy. Jw 1U7L, however, it was not a banker who advise igo to take song Beton, but “Me. Peter Peeson, ex present of Ball fix! Howell, « wives corporation which Ween # songomerte by Urn dven sto trai photogs by Japanese competition = ‘nuit trom scrctary was nan who Tad sen through a Pll = th Wal St voute Intend ese for system eereip tha was ateetive to globaly evinte pln! Feder. Wis wt tht dnterfahermen, spe ta the ty eterna desons poley themselves, or tat the bankers contolled mumetry pulley absolutly, but that as Tong as oppston to these groupe wax nn very strong they benefit by boty ble fo Kent their proferonecs with contemporary political conceptions of America’s rile Hr world alae. The ptcalar flees of donate ro ad i frscelvd nal interes of the pola Teadrehip tfc eh ite gh ney tation ott aly: inoweans ply This tgs tt the question of donesti ctr’ pic strateles, as ty ae tna eri, eet gps Ive fet i St dresed tet the cla led set Hower noted carlier, the politics of international organizations a je Sonctines provide opportunities for de Tale or neve cliions of onal grou wane mite Ines der from Ut hewehy, Donte ional conferences150 | x {groups compete to allocate fares among. futerational forwns; to Tike or separate ines. In the process they polilicize the tewes,stionuating. the attention of a broader range of interest groups andl bureaucracies, As a result, the national strategies of major states may’ nat he shaped simply by perceptions about intornational system lealership, Int by domestic inter= tats, Predictions about congruence hetwoen inte structure avd International regimes way fall hecause key donneste nar sales capture the policy process and turn poliey toward their interests, and against the politico-military interests of the aggregate coon interests, by which realist theory assumes states ave gu In the ocenns issue area, comestie netors strateqles, particularly those of prohibitionists and fishermen, had « major elfeet in the prewar perio, but tween 1948 and the late 1000s, the navy was mare ifective, and United States polley was oriented toward leadership of the system.) Sineo 1967, 1¢ Ann Hollick has shown, the politics of rule-making through international organizations and conferences has led from international to domestie pol ticzation of the issue, has aroused and involved a broader range of Aomestic interests, and has subsoquently strengthened the position of coastal interests in the United States!" The national interest expressed in the United States policy enunciated In May 1970 largely relleted the view of the navy with is strong eamphasis on security: and free seas. Sub sequently, the Awerienn positon was ensiderably transformed as domestic actors with constal Interests interacted with resouree-orionted weak states, whieh promoted broad Tinkage of issues to improve thelr bargaining pos tlons. In a sense one ea Imagine the Law of the Sea negotiations a8 em sisting of national positions, whieh are erosscut by two large potential coalitions, one constal and one maritine. The existence of these potential coalitions influences national positions over tine as governmental subunits rental tetors pursue stenteges tat stretely and strain the onal policies. In the international monetary pol domestic groups wore mare mtd, The ‘Teessury and State cepartnents Ihave vied for dominance; and swngovernmental organizations with direct interorte in the aroa, euch ae hanks andl maltivational corporations, hawe ‘expressed policy views, But there has heen more publie controversy abut su ava, politica! strategies hy Ah the al Ke of the dfs tren “stom” ane Ta 1 intron polite, Foe gore acu wth efron, tal Policy, A Feemeork for Ava, 2d, Uened li, Nir Prentice tl, 107), yp. 353-400, {in 1048 hshory intrest: prevtel fr he eration of 4 Innate lly inthe Ste Department, Until relly the esl ontian of api ote fo Feri wl ‘lites tended tbe bey. pereme grevinly eect wih astanewiter Faber. rane waReawaONE | IT sctvitis of into corpontons. Monetary ° wore technical thin trade questions, and their ellects = en srt to ass thn thse etl pen way pnt. Represents frm labor uns prt conten sien one yk hs tela fom Inert. qb oo expanded adjustinentassistance program, than from devateation of t dalle, Anate ten unerve tha ven hen, fig a Seon pote ins ne ve ag ol est el ar si dg ecg at thyme ft ting at covets have ae te en money fltaon to reer to poplar at ett orien nay ie Une Aula nt ptt ter the sable Bed ate ene a ne tn Wo ie is itl wey tno poli a me pail es alent to th welfare eotequees of monetary py sh the nnre ret pprshoed te pg: Whether hsp any ss wenkoing afer the events he 1970 nnd unr fese ont question for the faire. ‘hs far the uncertain ets of tg ptcutly for people who dowel undone te = involved, proud song incentives fr plat acter sho sft rete tard the art ayy to fea specie Ge tal ivestnent mass dig to ores enn, tae aes, snd groups with aces to Husa sts ade fod hese Priya nn near ply We have defined! pliieization tion Unt ing controversy si agit es Hse’ privity the ley nggnda and The lene a government at which i worives attention, oxy ape ton that lest toptovel attention nme Irom two dees rvs hlow (donestte patties, whether poplar, keaive, or baronet sn fron tho nts (the sei of ther yowtenments a aetna vag) Th wat wie sues come plc set tha fvenment uty tv ap un trata matte peapetve ste han a danse peredtive. Pistwar nanny and aca proc 1, politiciza- Mune iteration snnctry poles, as well a6 cn poles, a become nme wore highly policed ta tect year: Bate the monetary area, politicization his principally been a result of interna Lional systemie ersis, in which conditions for maintenance of su interun onal rege were fnereaingly fnsonstent lh ene se plea reat: has ot Teen etna hy deste gmp tg It cea ply area, cota, elation oa fail ret ob other yernments strato patty the of lew adage set which hove uppostl the covttaints of the old opine al testes158 | vue roueTics oF nunsMAKINe HY OCRANS AK MOWRY ‘opened the issue area to competing proposals for new sels of rules. Their strategies stimulated the other source of polctzation, domestic actors, jr responded to their own elunging interests anel to the new problems ‘onl opportunitios erented by the foreign governments) netfons. Tho eon Wination of foreign andl domestle peestures Inereashngly constralned the United States government from adapting # systemic leadership appronch, ‘Our discussion of international lexeership Teas turned ant to he complex Leadership is alfectod not only by perceptions of top officials but also by domestic and transuational groups and organizations. In the oceans ares, perceptions were slow to change and the Truman Proclamations, which Tellected the domestic polites of the 1030s, contributed to a process of that worked against the intormationn! rystemfe tnterests of als bogan to viow the United regime eon the United Stats. A pollen States asa system lender, the poston of groups and organizations with inforsts in. feo sons regime was reoforeed, but their dominmnce was ‘renkened again in tho 1070s Ineoosing deste politation and Tranmational coalitions brought tse policies snide attack, In eonjncton with the opportunities provided iy intonation ngtiatios on oceans questions attr 1007, the ctvtios uf these soups made it sore aifett foe the Unlled Stator government to take = coherent stand; ths, Is tnore dial for the aly to prediet United Stats behav om the bs tastractrat mode CONCLUSION ‘We said in Chapter 3 that analysis should start with the simplest possible explanations, and add complexity only as necessary to fit reality. Adequate texplanation will offen require a combination of models. The simplest and ‘most famniligr combination is of the ceonomie process and overall structare tnodels, Indeed, this combination vnderlies many traditional analyses. A ‘Table 85 indicates, this combination of models aecounts very well for three cases (oceans, 1045-46: anoncy, 1944-48; ynoney, 1958), and quite well for the establisiment of the oceans regime before 1920, Yet five esses of regime change, including the three most recent nes, are not well ex- plained by this formulation, Britan’s decision ty return to gotd in 1985 Tequires one to take domestic polities and Teadeeship lag into “The collapse of sterling fn 1991 was allected by economie processes in the context of political weakness; but it was also strongly Influenced by the particular pattern of relationships within the issue area, as a result espe- Cally of the undervaluation of the Bench frie relative ta sterling. There twas an incongruity between the underlying power of states ad the provie concuuston | 159 TADLE 6.5 REGINU CHANGE: ECONOMIC PROCESS AND OVERALL STRUCTURE MODES ute Isaue aren Accounted for hy eombinntion of eve two models Regime Fscabtisent of Reconstitution Mme-1920 Oceans ‘Yes. Fesmomie factors explain incentives to act, Overall structure explains Britain’ abilty to act, with some modification to recognize Britain's pariculacy svong aval position, as oppose to her overall nity postion, 1925 Money ary and ezonomie power centered rope. Perceptions from previous hegeronisl situation and leadership lag te nceesary for explen 1944-46 Money Yes, patticulaey bythe over structure model, there is American economic and wilitary preponderance: 1958 Money Yes. European economic recovery occurs ina context of continued Atverican overall power 1976 Money No, The eonomie process model indicates incentives to syrees but the overall seueture model migprediee results ‘Analysis of politica networks is requted. Regime Weakening or Breakdoen 1951 Money Only partially. One needs to ook at pawer relations within the issue area, pay a result of the underalea tion ofthe franc in ration to sting, to get an adequate explanation, 1945-46 Oceans Yes. The economic procest model indicates new problems and incentives for te US. the overall sractore model xpluine why the U.S, had power to take ite acon snd why it did not stop South American extensions 1967 Oceans Partially, perceptions of anticipate Uitte de cate nological change were important. But the overall stucture mode! fails. Polite! processes of international organs tions are important. 1971 Money Paraly; eehnologcal change, and changes in overall economic capabilities, comtibated. Hut one most examine changes in the sue area stueture of power, and incom twits beuveen underlying resources andthe ules of the eine.100 | sue ponsriex OF mULALANINE 1 OEANS ARYA sions of the do facto international extn, whic Wit eon base b ‘Mlowing sterling to Unt, Lakeway Hae structure: ye ith he fs area is important for an explanation of the events i TT. One agin, tho ies of the regime were mconsstent with the vndevying power stele Tn both of these eases, ovr eu steetr nel as at eva "che combination of aver structure xl econ press nuns al does not explain the sift fn Use vecans reine alter 1967. Heve the yl tial processes of international organizations were «vost importa. Final the overall structure approach dacs not adequately explain the reenstit tion of the fnternational monary reginie fy 1076, siice wether overall military nor econoinle power beeanie incl more enneenteated eter 1971 and 1976. Knowledge of tho overall capabilities of apr states, sn their policy preferences, would Iuve eon tnsifiient to predict rogime outcomes. On the basis of those factors in 1971-72, one shout Ihave predicted a restored fad rate syst, with ajustnents fn exchange rates in favor of the United States, This wax the ininedate rest of the December 1971 Smithsonian accord, but it was incompatile with the rapidly inereasing volume offnternational nancial flaws and with changes éenational banking. Writsi’s decson to ft the pone in June 72 and the eventual foting ofthe dear fw Navel 1079 were prompted by the specter of rap fun tratsfers that naj eeutral nk dk ot batieve they could coal, The eeononie proces more! corset to the incentives that governmental oficials had for reaching agre and American strong In the swe strueture of power aceon wth the outcome, Bt without an analysis of the politcal networks auong naj countries, which developed under the Thretion Woods rege, one Cannot explain ory these incentives should Have een sori more effective in 1971-76 than thoy wore in 1981-26. Table 66 shows how well the overall sr the economie process model, exphins reine clase approximating realion and complex iverlependener. One can see thet th explanatory power of these trudifonatnvels fs high for situaions close to the realist Kea! type, but not for covtions closer to complex terdependence “Table 66 suggests three important propstons, which cannot be defi tively proved ow the basts of tw fs seas, Iu which are suppurted by ‘ou study of money and occans eure model, combined with indy condone he full epliaton of Dretton Woods eules after 15H te ysl 2 devia exe since force wes not ively used and wile clic existed tho se are. ‘Tale €6 assumes, however, tthe le of force thr Uke to overall Arereat Thegemony In the Western alisuce ae dleorsed br the ht chapter ~ represented condtiont clase to reali. coneuosion | 161 1. Wi wap tote he conn of ol pen wee he petite pes trp ey he hac een slovak. Te tes mt eee A closer to complex needopoance tae tre 2, Wi repeat tho loom of teats Sf Sel pls, seo ate lea that aio erosion overated tnd snc races noel expla rin shane er a ton btn under amie iaendeeencs ca tos. The tadton mse pany weak er erases of reenter ch the enon of eos ieee a” the whole, applied. " 8, These two proestineLogthr ply tha tonal heres of wool, te pp to nee sad antag nee Soming et wef sult vow thats sed a eae ae ‘i ert tation mods wl egy eed Crna and sg ape a epost bow wall hs rope ar astantste, or hw teil thy ese, y subsequent we fee cae Siti ements ed ens Simpler nero we wt nce et see eh Tate we dsc in snay pve he Yin oe ea thy mnjor sc mln sosty wld Ree sie jonny fue nrons nnd inrease the relevance of overall tte madely TABLE 6.6 POWER OF OVERALL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PROCESS MODELS Newer t9 comple. Explanatory power teation slantory pe ci imentepentence High Oceans, pre 1920 Oceans, 1945-46 Money, 1984-48 Money, 1958 ‘Money, 1925 Money, 1931 Oceans, 1967 Money, 1971 Money, 197612 | se sae MCHA ANH AMOK [Nor does approximation to conultions of eonsple imterdepenslenee imply tat the polities of dilflerent ase areas sil be the saae, On the eats nal again nad monetary aren, issue sete ns them snast Fully, lv oceans, this wie not the ense, As we saw earlier, at both the underlying adel reygowesetermined levels, the dlistibution of power capabilites inthe snetars ava rowetined yuile concentrated, Jy oeeans, on the other avd, 2s nudletylag powe (naval Fores) beeame constrained under cmditions of enmplex interte ppondonce, the procedures of intermtional oriniantion beeaine more Fimportant ‘We also found that the patterns of politievation in Hh ten iste were quite differont. Much of the politization in oceans tended to be “below,” inside domestic American politics, of the dominant government setors to inp fothor hand, politicization Is generally hoe Tras ests, implementation of a moro systonatially oriented policy. Be n, money received mire consistent prexicential atewtion thas le and conseyently a enherent avery polly wis exsion ta ‘model exp vent plicy, Hs Hey, aMowwing the Finally, management of a slable fnteruational monetary system comes dose to boing w public goo, that iy all states «ws Hewett ron {witout diminishing the benefits received by others, To the extent that states perceive a public good fram whieh they: all yin, they tend to be nia willing to accept leadershi oF eras whew the mnajor nse of the eoans was as a public highvway, management of oceans space andl r= sources was also frequently percefved as hein w plc good, wx dicated by the Britsh memoranda quoted in Chapter 4. With techislagien! change and the dramatization vf oil ankl mviveral resumes after (067, Deeans polities focused more on distributional questions ae ow to fence ‘or provent fencing ol parts of the global commons. Under these cont tions, many states no longer saw gest paver Teaclership f maintaining, From cone ragime ae 4 public youl, nnd thie nintaining. the regime he ‘came more costly for he great pourer Our conclusion from this comparison of the polities of reins bang fn foceans and money is wot that ene simple unalel can he replaced by a other, but that international political analysis will have to heaame more discriminating. An eminent economist has sail that a mcinber of his pr fession, like a dentist, needs both x bag full of diferent tools and the dis crimination to know which to use at the right tine." "The same is rue of politcal analysis. Or conclusion is that the tritional tools need te be sharpened and supplemented! with now tool, ot disearded, PART I Regities and Two Bilateral Relationships| UNITED. STATES — S| RELATIONS s WITH CANADA | AND AUSTRALIA ‘The emeept of complex interdependence —defived by the absence of foree, the lick of hierarehy among Ives, avd the prosence of multiple channels of contact between societies — an abstraction rather than a description of reaily. Insofar as a actual situation approximates these ideal conditions, we expect to find a polities of complex interdependence 1s outlined in Chapter 2. Wo found many features of sueh a polities fn the issue aveas of oceans and money. Yet neither issue aren ft the conditions of complex interdependence perfectly. In the last ehupter we discovered that when the eonitions of complex interdependence were approximated tmore closely, the averall structure medel was least useful for explanation, soul issn structure and international orygnizational explanations heeanv nore set ‘Our approach inthis chapter will be different from that in Past 11. First, ‘we are cutting into the reality of interdependence from a different direc tion by comparing relationships between countries rather than global ‘connie isstes, Sead, we deliberately chese a ease = Canadian-American relations ~that scemed most likely to fit the three ideal conditions of complex interdependence, We do not consider Canadian-American rela- tions a typical case from which to gonerallze about world polities. We chose to examine « half century of Canadian-Ameriean relations hecause it ‘would allow us to eximine the political processes of eompléx interdepen- dence in practice: tn see how they have changed over time, and how they alfeet the outcomes of high-level political cnliets in which military foreo100 | seen srares wrsavions WieH CANADA AND AUSTNALAA “ast likely ays mo sla, those wore signient effects sch a E20" thon, evon with quaint for diferones of egges, ae expe tations about plea proceses of complex Interdepte ywonld pro tly nt be vry fest ul for bone analy of work oe! ‘We would Uke to go furthor ad haven sree di hat wok allow us to say how broadly tho generalizations alot comp tere Pendonco in tho Canadian-Amsericn caw ok) hr extotet What aro thovllets for example a pla! ondsip lial dane, o diferent levels of scononte development? Sac abit nro beyond the prac teal spe of this volun, Inston, we chow a seen cae Aus ‘Ameieanrsalons= that would ct Test allow we Hold som factors onstant while we looked atthe elles of itrnatioal diflerces that fl ws compare the predictive power of difeet thors. We lise ‘Astrala ecru of tu cltral ae poles niarier Cana low ing wt (oe ost ono em whon tho rel wuld fs the laboratory) to hold constant the alct of size, gover cane charters, ad domestic politial systems, while wo lok at the cllects of liferencer In the two itary secty a at the coil elects of geographical dis Tis other words, we have chosen two easnt that difor tn thelr approxt- imation of complex interdependence while being as similar us possible in other ways, The Austral is mich further than the Caadian one from complex interdependeneo. In both exses, political conflicts are re- solved without resort to military force. In AvstrafiaAmeriean rclations, however, military security has clearly dominated the agenda, the protec- ve role of military force has remained eral, and distance has Himited the multiple chaimels of contact. As one observer his said, “Think of a Canada that had been towed sway from vwhere it is ail moored of Africa, and the problem of Australia’s physical ovation becomes cleat." Distance, of course, has other elfeets as well. The proximity of the United States and Canada has generated issues —sueh as those Traving to do with tho St. Lawrence Seaway, airborne pollution, and smuggling — that would not be found ssn tat partncrs, 0 matter ow extensive their relations were, Furthermore, fy the nuclear ema a shared fate binds the United Stater and Canada Ganda would be soverely damaged by an all-out nuclear atlack on the United States, regardless of whether she was herself meant to be a target of such aw attack, Neverthe lese, these cases are matched closely enough to allow us to search for the clfects of complex interdependanee on bilateral relationships, Bocause of the differences between them, we should wot be surprised that the patton of outcomes of Interstate cots in the Cansian-Ameri cean case contrasts with that in the Australian-Ameriean relationship, We 1 wearions | LOT H show that pat of the difference Is accounted for by the poli Dpcesses of complex interdepensleniee present in the Canadian ease. AL the coud of the chapter we shall show how, even in Canadian-Americn relations, stretaral and eemmomnte process anodels comtsibute part of the explanation of aotenes sual regime. Flest we ust decide how closely the {seo cases upproxinsate the conditions of vealismy nel eomplex interdepen lence anal deaonstrate how the poltieal processes predicted hy each ideal {ype allected the pattern of uatannes of politi eons, CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE, te weal Cainer cations sly he Ue eons of complex interdpwdest forth dn Cpt 2 Milary fore play ol {mle rte it the cationship. “Two carly Amertean Ilan str ‘of Canad aro sere tay ts scent hitny. Though ocean Teas ‘of American nitary invasion linger toil te ove of World War I the Fear ofr thea se prbably ove hy TO7L, nil eetalaly by 4908 "is fh Caton itary ety ln fo dene gk In 1935 4 the de pet {As we argued in Clnpter 2, the absence of mit fore at an insta went Tor eben psi gas dus mnt nea htt fore has rue, Sine World War th, the CanadiansAmerean military altace age ésxtermalUireat las n'a source of both close enoperation and aeons Frietion, Some f the nat farweaching steps toward content cooper tan acd dvi wth Snag ee ofthe vsivar relations, ad one hal Be tthe fall of divided Canadian gov rument, was over the nel are mises tavalved fn jt Cave ttieAmorean dete aint th Soviet malty. threat. Het ley Anes, or even theeats of withdrawing military protedtion, have notches We alsy nota in Chapter 2 tht miltary force ean sometimes ply tent ele ts sl sen sr silent atraetaal Ifa nthe al tea pres Sch i i Hey ext ue exten bad dt ery constating in the Cavaiindnevicin rlatonshlp. One ight sete ‘ones imagiation aid coco situations in whic miltay fone git toned at such specwtatins ae haa edie. They nly remind Soe othe ted Que eng Alice in Wendl tat she could tik of nyse thing before ast every ay GanaiteAnercn elatons are also notable Fr the mile channel108 | untren stares RELATIONS Writ CANADA ADM AURERARIA ‘TABLE 7.1 SELECTED TRANSNATIONAL PROCESSES: UNITED STATES-CANADA mMicRATION Yew US. Cade 1983 1982 isn ‘VISITS (win) ge 2 a z ata TT ecenage cain rome See le any ve Soe mM Be mE ie vm earring oft mi ann z ‘cananmacaniican aecarions | 169 of contact hetweon the two countries. Exch country is the other's most important tadings partuce. Kuch year some 38 anilion Amerteaus travel {» Canada and some 34 milion Canadians visit the United States, No- cantly there Ihave eon between 20,000 and 90,000 permanent, fmm. grants fn oach direction N magazines and television capture 4 ge portion of Cu 0. In the Inte 19605 American residents jvwned abt 29 pexcent (hy valuc).of Canadian corporations Involved fe mantel mining, rallways, ities andl merchandising. In manufacturing, the ignee was 44 percent? Moreover, at Table 7. skew, ‘many of these societal eonncetions have increased since 1820. ‘The two governments, ws well a& the societies, have multiple potuts of antoet. About thirty-one American federal agencies and. twenty-one Canadian counterparts deal directly with each other, as do some states and provinees.* A study propared for the Canadian Pasilement found that in 2668 there wore about 6500 visit back and forth across the border by government officals from the two countees. Only 190 of these visits werm {o oF from the Gavmudian Department of Ester Alfars® ‘The telephone {s nuother channel of diveet contact Iu ane week in November 1073, there was a daily averngo of 340 calls betweon the United States and Canada jpn the United Stator government's Federal Telephone Service talkfoee Hines. The clusical image of governments interacting through thelt For, ign offices is clewrly innppropriate fn the Canadian-Ametican exse, Finally, the agenda of Canadia-American relations shows “a. broad g°of fies withint a preponderance or domination of military security multiple contacts deseribed above, itis virtually impossible to inap the entire agenda of relations, but for 1920-48, we eng ‘map the relationship described in diplomatic dacuments (see Table 72). ‘The documents show « high preponderance of economic issues oa the interstate agen (except for the war years); and tpling inthe average Dumber of sina iterations, frm Ot per yar nthe 1880s, through 2 ¥ fv the 100s, to 17 per year ithe early 19405, Ax the agenda bo. complex, the proportion of issues coming before the president ed somewhat, but the most dramatio change was the decline in the Proportion of ives handled by cabinet oils (rimarily the secretary af state) and tho rise in the proportion handled by the bureaversy. Hf oe loi ourselves to the piesideits public agenda, indicated by Public Papers of the President, we fi social and economic ees comprising a imajor portion of the anwial references to Canada except in wartine (Table 73), Not only have suciovconoinie sues been prominent, but it has often been difutt to establish ave wintain a consistent hierarchy among i sues. Inthe experience of sn American alicia,170 | ori nears nations wert cana An avsrnante TAULE 7.2. INTERSTATE INTERACTIONS WITIT CANADA, 1920-46 19206 190% 1940-46 (w= 68) (wn) foe 119) Ieswe Arca Government objectioes) Miliary Paliteat Social Bconomic Level of Attention in United States President 125% 13% 16% Cabinet officers 1s rH » Other officals Bs 50 64 Sources Vorcga Relation of te United States Wanngton, DE: US, Goverament Printing Otter, 1920-40) Neither county I fona poste tH fv, wt scanners, is priors toward the other ay apelin ft conk! ote dane wit snl png ey ii pst ome ply, fsa comoquently to enettvent romps. - "Covi paper” policy mraa duu rsouee allocation papers” and sofort have sep vale when {ho components are principally ative feign nr, They ca le Wve than burenrais eters when intended te dicpine ay well some the ‘major “domestic” departments and regulator boards Although high-level attention from the president or proponderanteabi net ofl such as Trensury Secretary Connally 171-72 ean temporal Impose n set of priorities om the agendi’s muipke issues, Is alain 1 high level of attenti Ccanannanamiemcan araruns | UT ADL 7.3 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES AS PERCENTAGE Ol ANNUAL REFERENCES TO CANADA Toual number of Pevind teferences ta Canada Percentage Roasevel to 1940 16 80 World War 16 23 ‘Truman after 1945 36 65 Eisenhower 36 55 Kennedy Johnson 2 55 Sennen Pub Papers ofthe Presiden Waskngton, D.C US, Goverment Pang Olle ‘Purely proforme snd good aterents wer xsd trary, diplomats and close observers were quite able to describe the expected procedures and rules of the game, Indeed is 1965, at the behest ‘of President Johnson and Primo Minister Pearson, ambassadors Merchant eeney summarized the procedures for consultation within the all ‘ance that came to he called quiet diplomey.!* And the avoidance of ovest ge is described in tho words of wnother experienced diplomat, “mar slually you may shade a deal to create goodwill, but basically each den! ‘must stand on its own.” ‘This postwar regime isnot fwmutable. In the prewar era, although force wax not used anil economic issues dominated the agenda, the procedures {nthe relationship wore quite dilforent. Moreover, both sides frequently ed unrelated issues for bargaining pusposes, although the Amerieane it more successfully. The postwar rogime, with its symbolism of a coinmon cause and its constant consultation, developed in response tothe Gorman threat m1 World War It and the subsequent Soviet threat during te Cold Wer Again in the early 1970s it seemed that thn regime novinagainet linkage would be altered. In the Iter 1900s, the doctrine of quiet diplonsacy heal come under considerable criticism from nationalistic elements of the Canadien public. As wo shall see, the increasingly nationalistic and asser, tive Canadian barguining approach of the 19608 had positive results, at least in the short run. Outcomes of issues increasingly reflected Canada’s Position, But in response, the United States Treasury in 1871-72 took the lead in “getting tongh with Canada," politicing tnde issues, king thom to other concons, and attempting to control the tr i contacts of other agencies. At the same tine, the Canadian government was itself ying to exereise greater contiol over transnational and tran governmental relations. Somewhat surprisingly, the ellorts on both sles sgovernine172 | unrre saves meuarione wet CANADA ANH avETHALIA to politi tes and centralize bgp lo post Hong om © thor the regime fnlaaentaly ramgrvenment neato tind, snd overt Hiker again cate rare. For example, 9 HL ello by tho United Stats Treasiy to link Areca sept ‘ito Canadlan willing to rong Srking ini rarty tune roto tine, Wo sal pve the sls ship Between rege atl eons gear tall IatrInths char. AUSTRALIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE AND Since most, Amerlant —even many Ameroan suants of International mn awareness of rations with this dscusion of AUstalan-Aneicantelatlons nal complex Inerdepen- dence with «bref view ofthese goverment oles toward ench ther sine 1900 During the 1990, governmental as wll af trains trinsations were nti ow, but he 1990 became n cng rations Soe the Fee, Ati ws led ts Dovel for inpoelprofernce” win the Dit iments flsd tar lovle for outdo to Commonwealth tale ceournge Intra-Brapire or intra- ‘x a rent, Asstt but np considerable sete song Espen coutie that taded heavy wih Avstaa and nally aon yore Tnlonce of trade with Austais =. athe thon reo perl ret tmargins howeve, tho Austen goverment [ov 10341 tad to wha ape {ond to oan eat elton, IH undartek to completly overhail Unte Kito-Austalen tree relation in ar to clint the roughly site tnfvorbl lane of trade ‘The result of this iitlative was « trade war betwoon Austealla and the United States, Australia devised a diseriminatory “trade diversion pro ‘gram’ against the United States, which refused to yield to pleas for a now bilateral agreement but instend retaliated by blocklisting Aust Byentually, as Dritish-American relations improved and World War IL approached, the Australian government reversed itself under British pres- sure, and the trade war eame to an end. Negotiations for a trade treaty betsteen the United States and Australia were, however, unsuccessful ‘War brought the two countries loser together. Before the Japmese at- tack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Australia desperately and wintccessully sought @ security commitment from the United Stites, but after the Pearl surraansascaneaican niuations | 173 Hachor attack Austra Auveriea trp countries multiplied at all fovels, But relations were not entively harmon. (008, Australi fell that Ht was not belng consulted adequately by. the United States on asin fssres Lu 1944, Anstralia and Now Zealand called neo am thee Southwest uci, which was vigorously opposed by tho United States, In dlisenssions with Avstalian’ representatives, Americans even compared this initlative to Soviet tueticy arguing. dak arrangements should not bo made until after global arrangements iy hind been made, Cloatly, United States olfcals feared that their delicate nogotiations with the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe cole bho upset by actions that would soem te eronte “spheres of influence” in the South Paci." Australia and the Us good terms, ‘ecbert B. Evatt was foreign sini Labour govomment (1945-49), Aus- vuln sought a formal alliance with the United States, but such an agree. ‘ment ~ the ANZUS Treaty ~ was not signed ntl 1951, daring negotintions ‘on the pence treaty with Japan and after the Korean War had begun. By then a eonservalive gavernient was iv power in Australia Sineo 1951, Australia has depended explicitly and formally on Amertean protection, The two allies have evoperated closely on defense, particularly uving the long conservative rule i Australia between 1940 and 1673, Australia has heen one of the snast consistent supporters of American poly, al was one of the few alias of the United Stites to furnish troops fo ight in Victwam. Us forces rely heavily on American equiprsent; mil lary officers of the two armed forces mafntain close euntact; and politieal leaders have consulted frequently and fttintely on a variety of eon issues and trouble spots. Our discussion of “elit issues” between the United States and Australit showld be seen fy the context of the remark. fable amity aod warmth of the relationship duning the 1950s and 1960s Australioy parliamentary debates during those yeuts often reveal greater agreement in fact, between the Conservative foverninent sf Austria vd the United States'government, than between the Austen goverment and its Labour opposition. Against this baekgromd we ean csnisider the conditions of eomples in terdependenes as they apply to the Australlan-Ameriean relationship Uuking up frst the role of unitary force. ‘There hs never been a serious risk of war between Australia and the States: military force has not been used or threatened by one coun. tty against the other. The provectioe role of military fares, however, has bboow extremely important in the relationship, Thus: by avery indizect route, Groat Britain's desire for Amecican military support in the lateeeoeeece ¢ 174 | unten eraves niacrions S98 canna austanian TABLE 74. SELEGTED TRANSNATIONAL PROC! UNITRD STATHS-AUSTRALIA ss VAULE 2.4 (Cominued) ——- INVESTMENT U.S. § mod IMMIGRATION ue ———___ US. rer ‘Anil fw, US Veer US. to Aveta ‘Antrala to US in Autre percentage of total 1920 2066 3 wd 1938 228 9 nt is we at as 1962 1878 1097 ate i7t tos ™ nas a ~ a Source Immigration to Assia: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistica, Yearbook 18113 _ ‘ini vats yu = wae Funan ‘mmo from Sinai te US Moral Sues ofthe Une tater Wing Yer US to Aura _ Aira to sms Geren Png i, 90) se Spiers ating. on a “i nen ing oes edn er 971) oh As aa i938 oo " ses Canmore Dre of Cnn a Statistic, ees Ail and 1953, ua mM tom tGaaar ~ eee, 1962 oH na Trades Yearbook Aust, ou eto 197 in ver lan fo econacton ta Dope a ——— ism) ————— (Cainbeige, Mass. Harvasd University Pre, 1966) for 1971 (owe), Veerbok Auli, “Anata ‘ustalion 1972 an Comanche, Ove beet Ass aa 199 veer exports 10 US. import to Us. eSome ducer ext betwee sure wth oped ~ serene cee Imari ery ee the ne 1920 11Ga%) 244.0%) 4-Thisican ent, bed on he he or “cot ft dpe of manent ad 938 3am) 1846.08) toner ea tae ss 53,60) 55067%) 1 Figure fr 1971 atin US. dla Number in pence neat the peng of te 1962 109 10.28) 174.49.78) Avs expos or hnpors aecortd for by export orients am the Une Stes, a7 634 (12.1%) 1,032 02.1%) 1900s helped to resolve the trade war to the Unitod States’ advantage, and after 1909 and particularly 1941, Austlla’s need for American protection bbocame acute. Since World War 1, Australia has contin to sely on the United States. Moreover, the security relationship is highly asymimetvical Amerien could fail to protect Austealia without jeopardizing its own security, but Australia could not defend itself agninst « powerful attacker without Ameriean support, On the second dimension of enmplex interdepondence, channels of contact between societies the Austelian-Amerienn relationship also differs sharply from that between the United States avxl Canada, The fact that Vor ivstnent, (919 1936 are weer than 1920 and 1938; he Fier 1999 rn 1962 ac avenge or 1952-54 ad 1961-63 rsp, du to fe ene Mest ‘Australia Ties almost 10,000 malls from the United States makes av enor mons difference. tn the 1990s, Avstralia was three weeks’ salling distance from the United States. A pioneering, 1940 air flight took over four days. von today, the air time from Washington to Canberra is nineteen to twenty-one hours Ie is therefore nots prising that transnational links between the United States and Canada are much more extensive than between the United States nnd Australi, as tables 7. and 7.4, taken together, show. fy 1971 Jnnnigeation to Australi from the United States was 28.7 percent of the comparable figure for Canc; axl imunigration to the United States from170 | unin eran wetATION® WHT CANABA ann AUsrHaLIA Australia was only 45 percent of Canada-to-United States anigeation, Total visits to and from Australia were only 0.3 perecul ws great as visits to and from Canada, Australian exports to tho United States were only Se. pers he United States 95 percer nfted States, Amerie ‘can direct investment in Australia was similarly nich salle than American fn Canada: fess than 10 percent of Australian manufactur if ludustry was controlled in 1962 by American investors, as compared tod percont of Canada's. ‘Thus, even though Australia's economy and population age sinaller thas Canadas, tt i less dependent econonnieally ow the United States, Only about 12'percent of total Australia exports in JOTL went to the United the United imports (as direct fnvestment, and migration all inereasod sharply hotwoon 1920 an they remained much smaller for tho Australian-Ametiean relationship that for that between the United States and Canada. Between the governments, there is what one olelal culled “a tromen ddous network” of contacts, Sice 1050, Australian prise ministers have frequontly visited Washington; the ANZUS C: cabinet level, and cabinet officials have ofton 1 variety of questions. Yot most business is still ransueted in Washington, ‘where Australia maintains a Tarye and well-stalfed embassy. Although dats fon visits and telephone calls are not avallable ae they: wore for the United States and Canada, there sooms no doubt that such data would show many fewer points of direct contact between American nnd Austealian olftals with sioltar task, ‘The agenda of Austratian-American relations, like the Cunadian-Ameri ‘can agenda, is quite diverse, Yot, unlike the Canacian-Ameriam agenda, it has a clear and consistent hierarchy. ly far the sost attention has been ppald, on both sides of the Pacife, to political and uslitary issuos relating to the alliance. Memoirs und secondary works on Australi relations with the United States during the 1950s and 1960s wverwhelmingly emphasized security questions, and’the offical record of Australian foreign poliey, reflecting Australian parliamentary debates as well as governmental cone cers, was prececupied with them. So was reporting in the press and journals of foreign affairs. Issues such as those of Malaya, Indonesia and then Vietnam dominated the scene. The contrast with Camda is illus: trated by Table 75, which indicates the amount of space devoted in the Public Papers of the Prestlent to politice-military, as oppased to socio. economic, activities involving Austria since 1M5. It therefore reflects ‘what American presidents said publicly about Austalia, and ean be com surraauiancantenteate netarions | ATT TABLE 7.5. REIEIEN ‘8 TO AUSTRALIA, 1945-71 Socioeconomic or eter ‘Number Number Adiniertion of ages ercentage — of ages Percentage roman on 30 om so 945-53) Bsenhower 2s ” o4 3 (9s¥-s1) Kennedy-fohson au 4 as ‘ 1961-69) Nixon as 2 02 . 969-70) Souvee: Pai Papers ofthe Presiens Oeshog 1945-90, DG. US. Government Printing Offet, pared with Tuble 7.3, which carrios out a siallar task, with slightly difer- ‘ent tecliniques, for tho Canedian-Ameriean relationship. Except for the nl jin which Viotsan was a mujor liue, the salience of Australia to can proxidente was obviously very lo. Austulie’s often expressed concerns about snilitary security during the 1080 snd 1900s, and its sense of being a rather Isolated outpost of Anglo-Saxon ecomonitc, political, and cultural fnstituions, living next door to actually or potentially hostile Aslan neighbors, made it quite feasible to establish aud maintain this hiornrchy of issues with security alfa the ‘most important. After 1969, when our systematic analysis ends, Australian policy changed markeilly, under the Labour government that came ti power in late 1972 (but lost power in December 1975)" Neverthelos. Unowghunt the two decades after 1950, the traditional Iievavehy’ of ise remained intact, As we shall see, coficts took plce on econonie issues, hut they wore pot allowed to distur the alliance relationship on which the Australi believed their sccurity depended, Furthermore, on economic and. social lssues Australia was simply not at closely ted to, or dependent on, the United States as Canada was. Not only was there less direct investinent, trade, and travel, but mass communteations were quite different. Ame news magazines are sold in Australia, and a number of American telovi sion programs appear there: but the effect of American cultute is smuch tess pervasive than in the Knglist-speaking afeas of Canad. It may be overstatement to argue that “Australi i stil remote and separated from tho day-to-day emotions, the drive and braking forces, the flow of life in17H | unto sears wrsartont HV EANADA an AUS HARIA of eo America lbw a remote as shew he he oly mes vation wa elippen Ye the fact tht Is exigent cet Chul seriously be, mute fates ts ean ference between ‘Ratralinsylatons to the United States a Cad. sane is ently an tas, Wiest tthe Ble enim within whi AusteianAneican sso tke pe ae wry aifleeut fon thse fr Canale ‘cations. Nopetiton, crtaln aspects ofthe gine governing the poses seetermmabipe are ute afr, parila evttion ad "Rida of cee linkages In barging, etre 150 100, x Ail Tnkages were eal tbo. Alb Ue ste dso to Mi the Japanene Peace Trent ws lary nett the Ue States “usenet the formation of ANUS, dpa eto eovinge that endings thatthe two events were wt paw of sgl bargains ‘Asin tha Gant exes Inks had ote sinc tore Work War ft the Austin Arena poste eas, pict Wise neu theta ned Tg ss ot Heated, ee sie Attala did nots tn gener take sete nee toward the Unted State ‘Notes eataiw-Anertean rcitons apprninatsreatit codons hates than Canadian Ameria velatins weexpet the eral svete vet tepltn th fra tr tha the ier, We sl show hat tis Ie chser"Austdinn-Amorcanralatone exe wel explained jn terms Cr oven! strcterey Dut the ontenmes of peste CanadiAmes uly confets dverge enalderably lon expectations acd wn ch anc. To determine why Canada-Aveie sean are diferent wo LISH ane te pital mening. proves, We sal ge Cat 0-0 Sina tot pattems of empl tates king Cina Sha the United States aconnt forthe dilerensin patter of atcomes Borveen the Canon Are IDENTIFYING ISSUES AND UUTCOMES CANADA-UNITED STATES By and large, traditional approaches have nol heen very helptal in ex plaining the polities of Cannadian-Aineriew relationships. Cansdian-Amer fean relations have often bored statesmen aad scholars yeh see the world through realist Tenses, Ax one scholar wrote tn the mic-tOG0s, “study of Ganadian-American relations tells one alumst vothinye abt the big, prob Tems facing the world." Another scholar cited the unguarded herder Ioetwoen the two comitries a an example of “indifference to porver.” sem ans eurnneas cawabacowteia eaves | TO Aimee, despite the mine we of ling power the elatonsip thers are freqwent confit, andthe two gwvernens often exert the we Hi the ponte gnc sl proses of ple args Aiton of complex tmterependes ave mt eaght by teal salysce [Now awe the stan of clit predicted sel. A simple overall toe expt ells that fin» bilatra ystom fn whic ne cont Ue Uittymeven rs the mtary expealitres of Is neighbor aad was Uae tn seems, the hg country would preva nee ior dsr ta the sao. Morowor when teneatanal ators Ce hone einntry penetinie the small country nore than vice vesn, the disttion af uta should aw the large county even snore Made, sone wrtrs ead Ue to Canlaon to refer to sch uations An teste expation wok tke ncn ofthe ‘icy of raking igen ano is ut Booms of Uo prpode. redict that colts bet the two governments, ti Unit Sater woul swat len preva Ta Ue dstbtion af yal. Ab teat, wo can bypotsre that te pole process of imple: iterdopenione, ait mene. pansy the tule of temguatona id transgovernmental ator, fea to 2 me oqual pelt of ontcomor inergovernmental inning thon one would predict trou the overall A toro sphteted srt of cutenns to the tretore of the gla rather than the bilateral system Given glabal bipwlaity, the hegentonte Tender stables i aliance by lowg is nor partocrs Uo win nor cons, Its rometinos ei forex hat hv the North Avxrean relationship, "the Canaan wh gol shoo tho ne, i he bal orks the aera th no are Aerica.” A we shal show fat in Us ep, his aor nels fo elent of ath Bat the Caan peo the all park dg the Cal War, they ete yon wore ges se ns, aed Uy he ae gral changes the star roles of the ge, The eset Unt Tt Eales 20c70 oer a Hopontatconge in cape the alfetion ef the American president, ad shongh the United Sats pevaled Jn ne ofthe two eax wilh jpeaes global slog consequences ~ the 100) Cone over Canals eta to AU neear waads on HOMARC tsies ged in joint North Awerian alr denne ~ the eaict over sal’ yin cnoperatng wth the United States dung the Caan il ere wae stan (re tales 78 i 79 ole serpin of Use nfs OF cone, tall the een were equally portant md Vt wie ne nals the te colts sel hy 1 schlare ox otra ean tho pola of vie of Canadian stony, Bids Unt the Unit States di sneha better than the nent would attsibute the patter180 | unrren srares uELATIONE HH CANADA AND AURELIA ‘TABLE 7.6 CONPLICTS ON PRESIDENTIAL AGENDA, 1920-39: CANADA-UNITED STATES iret Tire Ontcome government internate —elosert conpice fetion request objectives of Regulation of fisheries, 1918-37. oth (Canada pressed U.S. for mtifiestion of treaty on fisheries issues, par tleulatly salmon, U.S. delayed on salmon treaty until 1980s when a threat developed from Japanese salmon fishing. Canadian restriction of pulpwood Canada US. us. ‘exports, 1920-23, U.S. ruccesfully protested by threttening “fereeaching reaia: ton.” Canadian objective was to encourage procesting in Canada, St. Lawrence Seaway, 1918-81" US. us, equal U.S. pressed for joint navigation and hydeocleceie development. (Canada reluctant, but agreed to 1932 treaty which then filed in US. Senate, U.S presed for new agreement Canada wil reluctant but signed in 1941, Control of liquor smuggling, us. us. vs, 1922-30. USS. succesfully presed Canada to take internal measures that ‘would make US. enforeement of Prohibition awa ensier and cheaper Chicago water divenion, 1973-28. US. Canals US, ‘Canada protested that Chicago’ diversion of Great Laker water damaged Canadian harbors. US. tefused to end the diversion. US. tails, 1928-38. us, canads US. ‘Canad unduccesfully sought to deter 1930 rie in US. earls, Canada retaliated and sought alternative trade patterns. BY 1933, Canada pressed for rade sourren erares | 181 TABLE 7.6 (Continued) Pine Firat Outcome cone fovemment interstate corr to mm _request objectives of Syren US delayed, ue Shel resets ln 1955 and 1958, Chus ge some fretceconestone Teall eter Potion 1997 US. protested damage'done vo US Washington tery fe om Ih Clune smencr snd feguested etre Ieceonal Sone Commitee). Unaee preereom frmt US te Sted Crccommenttions tnd ‘ecely peste Cade tose ‘pa speci bial bon Ligsor Fax i, 1956 Canada successfully protested a vs bropored punto designed {sore Cana tie ome {> anaprecment with US Treo State Departmen spate! with Gendt ached Sate Depuenene us. us. Cemade Canada us. us. Cenada US. propose jin onstction ofa ghvay though BG Canada feared wand wccos Gully ested wn 1942, hen wa hanged its objective Sewer Forin Rltion oie Une Sea a See Fr Hin of Une Sa ating, Ds US. Gone ‘-Trnmonalepeaon ply si Sangre latin pied pat ‘ole in the polit process rol a he polite proce, (uit indents, tt wot the felowing ttl) Testing these alten Types shut the onsomn the sere baranng pro nore cmt tae a ‘ramatically s03* (These cases are indicated in189 | uren eras ecrioMe S821 CANADA ARDY AUSTRALIA In addition to describing the pattern of outcomes, we alr wanted to see whether the processes uf complex interdepenslanee, particularly the roles ‘of transnational and tggovernmental actors, hha changed, We thas lecided to counpare bargaining too decndes before ‘World Weer IL with two deendes after the wa ‘no of tho frst obstacles to clear analysis of Caniaa-Amertean inter state bargaining that we enconntered was the wellsctected anecdote Each sido Ind it favorite Mustrations. Canaalinns tenet fess ont Few specific incidents scl as the naggivloe tax. Canada was concerned about the dominance of the Cardia magazine market by Awerican miszines— particularly the Canadian editions produced by Tine al Tewiler’s Digest. She viewed the iss won rather than of trade, and hy 1050 passed tax legislation diserininating. agalust ‘American magazines. The magaines Tabbed vigoronsly on yt sides of the border, and the United States government protested the dise tueatment. Canada then granted Time and Meader's Digest exemptions from the logislation. Canadians freqgenthy point lo this ease as typical of the postwar ceononnfe conlliets in which trxnsuational actors and the United States goveroment team wp to defeat the Canadian “Americans, on the other hand, tend to ate the auto pact ax typical of ish. In the early 1960s, fn a elfort to huevease prodnetion tn had rather thon in tho United States, Canc futesduersd 9m export subsidy for autounohile parts. Rather thaw sluply vetaliting by ra Canuntervailing tariff, the American government stggested tn agrees to allow free trade in automobiles between the two countries. Canad Agreed to the auto pact, but hy binging pressure tw bear on the transnae tional automobile companies, she wa able to ensure that their next major round of investment would take plies in Cauda, increasing production fund providing jubs on the Canadian rather than the American side of the border. Many American officials felt they hed been cheated.” Te was alinost as if blindfolded men trying to describe an elephant pocked from under thelr blindfolds in erer ty seize the part most wef Co ther diferent purpones, 1 ts wot smarual to hear Canadians cla that they do poorly in bilatoral bargaining with the United States, or to Ca Belge, “The Avtative Agvoement af 1065: A Caso Sty in Caml ‘American Heonomle Alin” Tichod A, Prstn (el), The Tice of the United States on Conaton Development (Dusham, NG Duke University Pros, 197), 0 118. A Canadlan minster went over the howd of GRE Canad to neqitate ety with Conerl Motor allie tn New Yawk If sail st witht He separate sie Parecments Cavaie would not have signed the ierannernmenal agreement (one interviews bu Ottnne. Seen tetty U8. Cnet Sea, Comme innncey Uno Stole.Canal Arwen earings fn the Come Inte om Fiance on 112, Into, Sepaber HAE, yp. 150-50. hear Amica ls coh als complain that Canalis get vay with ow uch Such myths are resi Testun they ore poltaly wife Bt what sn stan beet or at sen pony yes caer the possiblity of wp te: entire agenda of Cima Amott relations, Our aeon torte scar iss foc om sent erate st tt veh the United Slates” president. hs selation er the dings tos on pat ofthe ttl tert agony ad stats Id ts st of eas. Nowe ht sw eon Ivana. Fat, sid nest pram the pred clean tiers the best prispeet of lasing nner ke css. Cantal has a he ip tt he her eet yaar ee sword hy pacts Alngh empl discovery ill robubly patie to apnea vesoably complete tives af sgl rts, Cis ht wh rest tention a on be are import thn other, there ipl wetting of eno T's Ut sume wets pide agonist ths ni rn th cpr than wh alts Mn tly rest wa very ane eee ner lov the rasan aval toinsgovernnental aspects of comple iter einen Inve alfa ttt fltiont ove tins, ttl toe thee sap ode A, by fog on igh pay the as we atte yin reper aterdapeee these that tational an rpeernmentl lations a np. oly Uccase the president la the broadest jurisdiction over sues af any oe ermmental actor, iis at the presidential level th St Tike fd the gs aang tht ae content Bld ot for a camalan-America triton, Despite the satel disadvantage we kid 6 ase » precede yielding sal mumnber of ese when Dortance ad adic tid In terms of our torte coca (nef th die in tesying omar encom the bouts nal tomes of enc Hy ngewe en! we men sits to i wc ae erent ees 0 another tel lle, pease abjetives ave hematite or the means ave to esl. Cone * Ge U5 la, for example, dees bor fe nla Canaan cote tok ace hv waking ot new aorachto paa af ret aes rs of tn af st an the te ol tr is eutine venhee eddntaatntin ly a tdiconet in er enti sr ob donald hog Sc, in-Areview Sat Diploney, 1933-1079 (tava: Caren, 1915102 | univen srares neLATiON® WAPI CANADA AnD AUSERARAA TABLE 7.10 PATTERNS OF OUTCOMES IN IIGIELEVE!. CONFLICT: CANADA-UNITED STATES iavored by Outcome Dates US. Canada gual otal 1920-39 ‘ 2 Y 2 19505 7 6 2 19608 4 a 4 1 Toul 16 16 8 “0 Cons eatoverapped decades at ated according to whe hey hepa, The promt ‘tia Sad mot wt nd con (tom tere a Wang, ’ Nene rosea for coving ale 17,78 a7.) ws Cs tn tts con twee Cas Pe Fe of 9 tn the Prove Conran party wot mitre by va inkcations with NATO and NORAD affletals ‘ss0s ano ovreconess aurrALtA-UnrreD srarss | 199 the pattern of gate be useful, Fiest, the pattern is much more symmvetelent explanations would predict, Second, Table 7.10 shows « stiiking change over time, The outcomes were eloser (othe Canad i's objectives in only a quarter of the prowar ‘eves but iv neaily al the postwar ewes, Outcomes were elesor to Awerien government objectives in twocthirds of the prownr cares and weatly half the eases in th 1950s, but In only a quarter of the cases in tho 19605. Canada did better in the postwar thaw in the prowar period, Dotter in the 1960s than fn ths 1950s IDENTIFYING ISSUES AND OUTCOMES: AUSTRALIA-UNITED STATES ‘The same procedure was used to generate lists of Austealian-America conllit issues. Tales 711-7.13 are comparable to tables 79-79 om Canadian-Anertean relations, since tho eriterla for including and seorl lssues wore identical, Likewise similar caveats apply. For the Australfane American ease, nonconflicts sce to be more important than fn the Cana. dian case. Australia seoms to have refrained from rising eertatn issues at the presidential level for four of disrupting the general pattern of relations ‘ith the United States, Thus, our data may even understate the degree of Awverican dominance i the selationship.® Presidents of the United Staten, gretdetil velerenta In the Doprtmont of Bats Bale, and tho Count of Pvelgn Relive clippings flos (pry, Nove York Timer, New York Herald Trl, Fnwscal Pot [Tovote), Clabe and Hd reveal) Further references wore added sa interacts ot ive tea fo the st te Dare of secondary aceon 1 199 were the Canadian late of World Aft; snl forthe 1040s, the Candin Annual Review, Tho lat eee de {oater eto thong ttrvews with tity curent and former oats one Shen Gortin issues (uch es DEW Lino, ABM, bunkeing feller, Lass) Inve Lace er tluded as ot Involving sullen’ Incsnpaiity sf bietone line, aterennte Ban) havo ben excluded at lacking direct prestcntal value “1 is impose wo gota sytematle survey of nonpesdentiaevel cout, sce wy auch tues ace likly never w appear In dicmtens, report or sem, (tee tay bs tne ai fr nome president te, ptelaly om highly elesied yoblone, Lot onesumably 1 wil ot happen so frequently.) An aaa of foe importa far tho record shows) vomprestental colt Untween the US. and Atif the yor 1950-09 inter that tho ontennn war leter to Australes positon i ove {woot suction, 1950-81) and chsor to that of the United States Ie four (US. weel tel, 1000s; US, rests on dey products, 1960 Interest enatenton ta oto, sand US. Austin at routes, 1000). This analyte suggowts tat Aarteain vay Io don at Test at pry In cont with thy United States un onpretlema ws oe ‘residential tes, but Ht sho ot be then a ether comprare or se debation14 | ura eras wenn ere even An AS AHA TABLE 7.11 CONFLICTS ON PRESIDENTIAL AGENDA, 1920-9: UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ‘Onteume closer to jectves of vist Tire gorernment Conpice ‘ation pest Wheat are or us. us, ‘Naetralis resisted acreage quota at London conference. US. threatened to impote quotas only Inthe midwer,letng sestrt twnent compete with Australia in the Pacific, Australis then agreed toan arrangement regarded by, Us.ertuiumph Dilateal trade agreement, 1934-43. Aust. Aust. us, ‘Australia presied unauccesfally for ‘bilateral wade agreement. Issue ‘vas superseded after 1983 by mult lateral GATT negotiations. Matson Line controversy, 1935-38." Austr use us. ‘Matson Line competition with [eth ships led Australia to con sider preventing i from parilpating fn Tasman trade. U.S. pressure on ‘Austalia prevented action ‘Trade diversion, 1936-38. Auer us. us. Inan effort to balance US imposed discriminatory barriers on US. exports to Australia. US. retaliated by blacklisting Australian foods, Australia withdrew dix fviminatory messues. Sources Foreign Relations ofthe United Sates (Wuhingio, Ds U.S, Government Patog Otic, nna). ‘Trani exgalatons played igen sl in he plea races Australia had a conservative government betwen 1950 ant 1969, Hela tions with the United States were more crimeonfons both wnder the prev- ‘ous Labour goverment, which served until 1949, and under the Labour government that eame into power in 1972. The Labour opposition during the 1960s, in particular, was highly ertical of Australian government policy toward the United States. A Labour government would almost certainly AML 7.12 BYADI UNITED Sra CUNVLACES, 1950-69) USTRALIA Fira First government interetate Confer fetion request Woot eit us. ‘usw. “Throughout the 1950s and 19608 Australis protested U.S. woo! tariff asec in 1947, U.S. refuse to change it, iting congressional essres. Although some fegotiting took place in the Kennedy Hound (1967), Auncalia would not accept U.S. demands {ar quid pro quv on tobacco Lead and rine quotw, 1958-65. US. Austr Australia protested U.S. quotas a 1958. Eikeahower indicat willingness vo diseuse ther, but no significant U.S seion followed. Removal of quots restitions in 1965 wan nt a result of Australian presse Meat resttictions, 1964. us. us. US. urged Australia vo agree co then voluntary testeanes, which was ‘Ant. done in eatly 1964, Senate pared vertitive quot il ia July: Mensies wrote to Johnson Uhreatening retaliation, and x ‘compromise was devised. US. balance of payments guide linea 1968 ‘Austalia requested an exemption, but US. refused. I took unilater measures; bu the sve died be= fuse of Australian ability to boreow in Burope and strengthen ing of Australian reserve poition Capital inflow was not retarded ignitianly F-l11 bomber, 1963. us. Ase, Gorton expressed concern to ‘vst. roontnts AUSENALAACUNINED paves | L055 Outcome closerto objectives of us. us. Equal us. us,Dept Seate Dept. Miicary Sa Transnational Transgovere- orgem role? BEA:Crown Zellerbach Auto om, a De facro aly? Boeing Riparian Norchern oi ‘fines DEW fine Defense link? Pipeline River 5. invere Auto att specific (present? seaition? colombia Fear See. info orsalionce ‘Low cost Ye Ye Ye No : 8, 1950-69 ‘TABLE 7.17. CONFLICTS WITH OUTCOMES CLOSER TO CANADIAN GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES ? overement ‘pl Yes Ye Yes Ye Jeri “diction us. us. Joint us. us. Joint Totals Conflict Poliico-ilisary BOMARC Security informa: Economie (Chicago water Lomber auto pact casting ‘AccOUEING POH mirPERENerE I msrcont | 205 sallences the relationship was yor inpartant to Canad tha st Gana flere proved tafe willing bn five of tho conflict cases in which she was able subtly to hint at possible retaliation, Unless guarantees were reecived, Canada threatened to eat olf cooperation in seeurity ‘nforne, Mion’ The possibility of Canals diverting the Colwnbia River played x rue in the Chicago water case. Possile retaliation aigainst Amorous oon, Ppratons bv Canada played role in the Calin cose" The posit uf building erosecountry pipeline that would result in the oxclusion at Venevuclaw oll from Easter Canada was part af the bargaining over ox- cemption from oil d the possibility of « highly protected aut: tmobile instry was hte at during negotiations ont auto pat" Austelin was less able to play on American sensitivity. Only in the meat quota exse did Australi apply similar tactics, Usually. however, Australin did wot protest so vigorously or thtenten retaliation forts fens: there was less ceonomnig vulnerability ad sensitivity interepern, loves tw tho relationship, al sho wanted to ensure the malntennnes of American security protection, Australl's letiity tn responding to Armes {Gu eeonomie actions was apparent in the aftermaths both of Americas toad and zine quotes in 1958 and American bslance of payments measures ftor 1083. After a tempornry dip caused by American fmport quotas, Avatrala nereased leu and vive exports by value during the quota perio (1857-58 versus 1964-65) by shout 80 percont* As we said enlier, after 1963, Austeaia adjusted snnotlly to the American Interest eqaluatior {wx nnd capital controls, partly hecause of new revenues from incrensedl mineral exports, and partly because of borrowing in Europe, Even when Australia was hurt by American actions ~ as on the wool tall resort to {esimonious reerinination or retaliatory threats was ibited hy the yov- ernment belief, between 1950 sna 1969, that the inst important goal uf Australian foreign policy was to malutai ease tes with the United States in order receive continued protection. Australias deferonve. ty te Pnited States shows up Hoth in accessions to American roquesty and in {ashes to securo American concessions. 1¢ reflects the Departannt of I ternal Affair’ almost exclusive concer with politicosecurity lewes, and {he prevaling postwar Australian belie thatthe priority of foreign pale fer domestic interests, and of seenrty over ecimomie abjectives, call hho maintained. tn conteast to the © economic ties were minor enou Finited, that this approeh to the United nadlian-Ametican situation, socio channels of contact sulfcientl ould be sustained, at least nti the 970s. * On seplcing Venez oi seo Loy, Canada in Wi i" orld ABairs, 88. Davng te the ost of highly rated sed WH a Inet, we ld meoaly to notation the Cinna sted Iie tnt Mest Ame tl okt to ie sme elt the tld206 | unite erates weLATHONs HTH CaNAMA ant AUERABAA Subsequently, appnrs that the days of to sary of hig al Bow polities in. Acsralins foreign elaine nr ebbing, a secrty concerns Keone les wete nt oconmeitrdepandenee nd esol se ties grow. ‘On several sos, the avaller stat baal axl exhuronce of ng poston ta led to cilferct paler su cess Cann, for example, protested Abeiew exptal emits meh mare ttgorously than Aveta dd, Avs cd nl fe to red shows, on pret the interest equalization tax at the prestdntl level mn titer fs protests about tho JO95 capital ental were rele, the Aus in gvernment discovered that cul met ts pital weeds in spite ofthe.” Asatte ses nang treet toa request enna on the fs oft t ‘esta was the eel supplier of inprted sat to tho United State, aa Prine Miniter Mencics wrote 0 letter In 1064 to President Johnson Ninting strongly that Australi would elliate aginst Ameren joduets Arse lth before he eat sie” Intensity and coberonce of bargaining positon sve also related to the type of pictzation that on fue har dorgone. Whothor i Ts «pow thnoous Faction to transitional procesres of rl of manipulation by fovernment leaders, plato gy below bes obi, rope US put pressure on the government. That goverment placed ina Tong pasion to mae demands on the United Stat to rest Amerfean de- Inand o evento threaten retaiston (4s Atala didn the meal case, tras Canada did over ol and the apt) at ght fro sty Sconomie point of view he national. My contrat, policeation of isk from below in the United States is cari thy nare marrow based ‘groups focusing principally on Congress. The United States public does fot Consider ether Canada or Atstalia fnportnt chongh to generate ‘oad, popula movements. As «result, pelztion trom below in the Unite States (inthe Tomber impor a ment uta eases) often Toads to divisions botweon Congress or vaca elements in Congest ~ and the Cective Thus te roster of dence plies vetlly for the Stir stat tn the Dargining proces, ocae for them, poitiezation from below tends to lead to taglh nogotating havior ad coherent stands by governnent, whores for the United Sates nich palillzation Tends to agmentaton of pole. Likes, these presser givo Canada an fdvantage over Australia, beste the volume of teusatinal prceses that help to stimulate public rection ts sv ich renter between the + puss nine export boa a to Ite 190 lpn that iy Ye ado the {oot Ars souk stp Uvosngestesvly the US. wat. Se Ataln Fats ond Flees, vaso ver hi econ wat eof by dscass wih ‘Mics nthe hasan inony On Washington, Art 8.197 Ww ovrcones | 207 United States el Cana than betes the United State and Aust “Va seeid major explnation of Canada’s greater neces In bargin vith he Usted Stat os bn the lfc of the tna of comple Interdependence on the bryan process We observed ealer tat the sgn of postwar Cal Anserea relations fered. from the ober thre situations partly heise tation! ongantzatios, were. mee trent Hs vn. Whew we exe otteanes it becres de that otis sed volving trative argatons ave oe favorable to Carlton es st fvolvingtanatinal orgie tion Gama win sea Tne thro, with thee eal outcomes le 738 lento the vole plyed hy transnational enantio fn the pic pre aa the inprtanee of those roles Sever ces tran gations prov lave bret of thet ov that not akwayn eo withtho-United Stats governments. Thi ferent meant thatthe transatonal organization sometimes improved rates thaw weakened the Canaan goverment pstin In barging Yh the Unite States. As on Asean silof tho tle the eons Pees in the ato pe “We haw abot the Canadian plan to eekick the companies, ht we expected the compas to be bardes barges “They dt hve to gjve sway x0 ch, Ke ust have bean prof to Hen the aut pt, th fete of dertaking that Canada soled fron the auto eonpanios helped to ensure er larger share of the nt {hin In the oi ue, toying tn the United States by Tange ovthern Foner helped Casa Aad inthe Atti pllatln eae, the fect tint Hunile Oi weed Canadian approval and support before item under toke a second suyaye yretly strengthened the do facto postin of the Cavadan coin On the other and in at Teast two vies exten tovality, ieear weapons. the United. States governments bjectives were stved fyi ay to allovae teatonal oad rangovernnental actors; and in two eases (Hho sine tax and Seafarers ternational Union) ne eld argue tht Aerie ansaid gaan swore the real wines, Nevethcss, Cantda did well on thewhol, fn el fms acting Canaan atonony Canad dit even Better fs ptorar sus involving tansgovernnental ations; she enne mt aca Be of eight eases which angver imental sltons were important whens the United. States eae to shea only ene Forth ser relationship, oul tee eases seemed inclode igicanttrnsgovernmentl plies qu tas Canada TDS whet sles, Atlin, 1 and nmproeration twat, Auta, 1902) Iw each of these, fa outcomes woteclosor to Canadas 0 Atala positions than to the of the United Stites. Goverment cobeson Is important in deter atoiny, and in gene, the United. States208 | Uniten arAras mELATION WITH GANANA AND) AVREHAKIA TABLE 7.18 CASES OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, (TNos) IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS: CANADA-UNITED STATES TNO wed by osennment Outcome closer te objectives of TNO labbied Importance of. TNO to outcome Necestary Magazine tax us. Extrateritorial controls US. HOMARC Canada Seafare’s Union us. Payments go Equal Auto pact ‘canade Contributory Columbia River qual Oil import quotas Canale Lumber imports canada Acetic zone Canada Negligible ~ Carling Canad = 7 Aic routes Equal - vas less cohesive than Canada and Australia, In part this lack of cohesion {s a function of sheer size and of presidential as contrasted with paslia- mentary government, but it is also a function of asynmnetry of attention, ‘The United States government does not focus om Canada oF Australia the ‘way that Canada, oF even Australia, focuses ow the United States, Greater coliesion and concentration helps to redress the disadvantage in size. ‘The Cuban missile crisis and nuclear arins eases are informative exceptions to nena cnanens ALrAWATIVE EXPLANATIONS | 200 Ut the this cule, leology of an interdependent defense community fies wth & onunion threat helped to legitimize the successul transgov tal dofense exlition of autcomes that wo discovered have westigation indicates that the political pprscesses of complex interdependene, preticuarly the uelivities of trans Nowa and transghveronntal actors, were important, OF the fou relation ships we examined, the GamdianAmeriean postwar relationship. was closest to complex interdependence, und the expected political processes ‘help account for the surprising (from a simple structural point of view) patter of outcomes, More specifically, the diferenee between the prew and postwar Canali experionee showed that complex interdependence ‘as not merely alliance politics oF the absenee of military forec, but that the other defining conditions, particularly snultiple channels of contact, ‘wore a important Gussal clement. REGIME CLANG) ALTERNATIYI XPLANATIONS We fave scon that the pte of tcomes fn the postwar Canad Ameren slats emt ol expan by teary based oe eel pula stores 14 le tht some of the carters af tones Interdependence prtclary the absence of altary Ton nthe Hatin of cht of etal between seit hece as dat than it woutd be ser rat emaitint for the United tt “xeraisdominance nthe latins. Ths United Sater wer crate, furthorsnne, by the rie that developed etween he tow cot alter the war, which Tht epporontes fr Tage sung secs emphasized the virtues of rexponsvens nd eal Yet how that intemal mins ea eanged if thy Dine uote to states hat have overlies power, Wy, then, A the United States ot Teak the rene that has gavored Cage Asean slain the posta ea Lat Toa hw ell oe wets of regime chang fei exp the pattems tat wa hv de sere Acco to our simple comonie prices mode, the dramatic ierase in economies sensitivity intedepentene beeen the United Sates wad Canad sh ave led to gral eine chang in the destin of eee polit integration, For example, Gene Dall apeelated 1968 that thigh ype ote ingran wu alo fog Noth American ceomomie integra" Certainly econmleinepaton see vonsing, sports to the Dated States ns rm hl oes tts ot210 | usirep srares wniavions wiv GANADA AND AUSNALIS| Canadas total exports betwoon 1048 and 1970, Ax we say, ed enty was the others Target trading partaer, al tele expt etch ic rose fom 28 percent to 38 prent ofthe tal expe dg se 190. Tl vl of tds neraton apron ht oft Ep Common Markt, and wa grentor than In soverl fee tad arene Bat olla tegration was Tinted, We enn dtingsh nee (ype of nation (0) the eto of nis ins) mtn tc thorn ttn) davon common Keatty and loyalty. Yor voluitry seinen ty er, a three typat must Jovlap. Yet when we look atthe Canaan-Amerinn cave, there staking abxonce ofthe fists thd types. Andean auld argue tht although thre was some intense the seaond thet a bean decreas in the tid ype "ha elation to the growth of transnational intorttons yay wot be coincident Indeed, under conditions af anynnetry nap ing tse ‘nlite cm tas ann One on Atep father and speculate chat highly vite trnontional engine cota th fed Ie gg ht the tint of Ce alan natal, ax shown ple opinion pil hth aa do- ‘elpnet of gerne pone fat ctl of mina tho carly 1050, wha dee Invertinot grow to exer portly, vest ment (150) and nonesdent conta gre to oor thn 3D percent of Canadian manutactering (1856) ‘Whatever is eases, ring ations fits affected Canaan go ninent policies in pattems visible in high-level omits. Ax we saw fgoida switched from one marily aot by Armicnn sven aa in the 1950s to one rellcting more Canaan yovernnont seins fn the 1060s. Over the sane period, outcomes else to the Canal over tents objectives nko increased. Perhaps even ire incntive the fact {hat although several solutions to high-ovel confit nth late 10508 ad carly 100s ould be alld iterative inte let oi port exam ton, balance of payments ieatres, nr routes, auto pet, Use slats Iocimeinequant inthe lorie Silt Itesdepeotionce ae ply he tordependence didnot by themselves create uansationl eis of IOIN CHAN: ALYENNATIVN RARLAWATIONS | 211 political comunity, Nationalism and the nationsstato were not banished from the polities of hargoing fn situations of complex interdependence, Quite the eantrary: while the elephant roamed abroad, the benver Iwill The simple eoomnmic growth model does give a reason for the peri fence of the postwar nonlinkago norm in. Canadi howover. Botl governments we “American telat ware of the welfare losses they would !ncur from a disruption of economic integration, and of the neczsiy of some policy intogration ~ preferably informal to maintain the economic: system. ‘Though tnwilling to develop a new regiine that would rellec growing integration, both governments. drew back from actions. thet ‘hreatone the existing regime with its wellare benef, The overall structure explanation is best at explsining the prewar re ‘ines and the establishment of the postwar regimes in both cases, In te Postwar period, however, it fs belter at accounting for the Australians failure to ater guns From a regime that discouraged linkage than at explaining the Canadians’ postwar gatas and the United States fllure to change the regine, We fond that explicit linkages between fsues wore most siguiicant during the prewar pevind, when isolaionisny in all three eouniiee rade the bilueral sructore of power mune relevant then the plobal structure, Daring the 1920s and 1950s the United States Frequently: Hnked exteane Gus sis In oder to exert the levornge of its overall preponderance, pars Licularly tn trade, aginst Canada, Against Australia, the United stster drew Tnkages within issue areas, om such issues ns’ wheat exporte and trade diversion, The United States eonsul-gencral in Australia inthe lode Proposed linking military protection of Australia to Australian concession, dm trade issues, but because of the isolationist. mood of the limes, hie proposil was apparently rejected by the State Department*® Cane’ and Australia tried! linking issves (Canad linked salmon and halibut fisbeien and Trail Swelter pollution and Detwot sir pollution; and Austrain Heked trade diversion with a trade agreement), but without success, as the Ames, ‘ms vofused to aucepl the Fake. Before World War I, « senso of common security objectives was absent from both relationships, particularly fron that between the United Stee and Australia, Ie is therefore ot surprising that relations were vltes acrimonious and that the United States, in panticulir, felt lille need ty make emcessions to its smaller trading partners on economic tasuen, The non that helped to prosorve the much more responsive patterns of the postwar relationship arose out of a sense of eonmnon fnterst ad luring close wartiine and Cold War allinuees. Bath sides were i 4m preserving tho alliances sid the fiendly nature of the relatknship. Ia219 | unerny srares neLAavions WITH CANADA ANH AUSTHALIA nts Hal the mst diceot ty) the United States, the State and Defense depart Itrest in these goats, and sometimes supported Cnada gr (ior ra Australia against the Aygeulture or Treastny departnents Frou an overall structure point of view, however, the relationships were very different. Throughout the two postwar decades under review, Aus tralian governments believed that their eountey was dependent un Aner protection to combat threats from Asia, whether hesia, ov Ching, They, ax well as American policymakers, believed that Australia was tho more dependent partner, and their bargaining postion suffered as a result, Although tho United States devoted far les attention to Australia than vice versa, Austalla was unable to take advantage of this situation beenuse of its sense of asymmetrical dependence in security Is- sues. In this sense, the outcomes of Austrulian-American issues fn the 1950s and 1960s were largely structurally clotermined. For Australian gov- cemmonts betwoen 1950 and 1969, the fear of weakening the Amerie protective umbrella as a result of negative linkage to socurity issues was Pervasive source of concor. Beeause of the Australian subordination of Ccconomic Issues to security Issues, Amertons diplomats diel not have to spell out the consequences for sceurity of « major avd serinonions ds rgreemont on another fsmuc. ‘iy the 1050s Canada defined its security sitnation sal its coneern with global order not quite so deferentilly av did Australia, but nevertheless Tinsuch a way that it seems to have utede equal or greater stetfices to pre: sorve the global structure of relations. By the inldl- to late 1060, the decline in the Cold War's intensity, dsilisionment with UN peacekeep- Ing, technological obsolescence of defense against homber attacks, and the Vietnam War altered Canadian perceptions of security, Combined swith rising domestio nationalism, these changes diminished Canadian fear of distupting either the global or North Amerioas pattern of relationships. Inhibitions on bargaining were therefore reduced, The norms and operat- ing stratogies of the relationship hogan to change. Thus, the structural ceonstraints on Canadian policy eroded in the 190k. Although the United States continued to be much more powerful overall than Canada, the ‘Canadian government bad Teasned how to vise growing Hationalisny and public politicization to achieve greater gains i the bilateral relationship. But the overall structure explanation docs not tell us why the United States did not alter tho rogime once the Canadians hegan to dopast from ules of quiet diplomacy. According to the overall structure exphant- tion, the declining seewrity threat and eroding global hegemony should have made the United States less willing to pay” Uwe casts of Teadorship nd thus more likely to initiate a change of regline, ‘The diminished in portance of Canada in alr defense in the 19605 should have reluforced ORs AUTENNATIVE exPLAKATWONS | 219 this trond — even though the United States could not, ‘over entirely disassociate Isl from the defense of Che But this des the mde ee ‘if tterdepordene tn cetera tn tho 198 I wee Oa {he lines, wd yas Cama tat est gun to changes ace ae waa age tn as wor expected ath tin " 7 though it does wot wdoxquately explain the change in Canadian haretnleg Gaudin tetles ow bargaining and on poltiation were summed up boliticization was moro likely to strengthen the American derands alliance to relate ses to ngage ot toes, . would try to deal with issnes in the ational Joint Commission ( with border cs, a has tritionally dal th sues on te see sation ines in en font! The Canadian grvemanent dhochaes tried to steer enses into the IJC, where it could neutralize Amerie states linked issues from below and the United Stator war in a mines! Not only ddl Ganads charge OPEC loel pees te nomeneay fmt she was also able to annonce that she would completely phase ont I structure view when he14 | eweren nrares weaarions wr petroleum sales to the United States. This unfviomlly act lc not lead to fn Amerienn “ltt” (he title and expectation af a bestselling Caaian novel fi LUT), it lee to aereseence tor of 197A, ruber of Amorican legislators proposed thal Aweview's economic power be brought to bear on Canada by tariffs or taxes in the Inoades trade area, but these proposals were not impleneated, Part of tho explanation fs Gouestructural: Canada was Tess vihierable in the fue are bees she was largely selfaufficient iv ul, But that is wot the entire explanation “The international orgnniaation model contributes an important past of the explanation, Recall that this model does wut focus si aoe on formal intemational organizations stich ax the United Nations (which are not particularly important fin Canadian-Anoriean relations) as om the politic processes of complex interdependence, to explain changes in international Fegimes. Informal patterns of relations ~ such as transguveromental net~ ‘works are regarded, in this formulation, as importwnt determinants of regime maintenance oF change. “The norm of nonlinkage that tends to separate ise 9 Avverican relations represents an accommodation of foreign poliey to Conditions of complex interdependence. When multiple issues ad actors tre involved, linkage Is often too enstly in terms of hamestic polities, No {Eroup wishes to soe ils fntorests Waded away. ‘Threats of retaliation on an fxtranoous issue involve inobilization wf different sets of welons aod pro tnote domestic politicization, whielt bureaucrats fear may get out of con trol. ‘Of course there is bound to be some linkage. Diptomats admit that the overall structure of relations is kept nthe back of their minds, They were bften concerned for the interaction of Issues that wore proximate in tine (for example, the auto pact and the magazine thx) as well as for the effect fan the general ellnate uf relations, but overt bargained Hinkages were too costly to employ. ‘Moreover, the transgovernmental networks that were part of the regime process proved to be an important source of rexinie stability. The efforts Recentaltzation and prltieration inthe Canndian-Atoriean relationship hanged the style, but did not costal taunsgovernmental networks for very long, Canadian and American officials involved in “managing” the relationship Kept in clase contact. Even during the 1971-72 period, State Department officials were able to use committees and requests for studies to fend off punitive Treasury measures." Canadian avd American counter: parts reached informal understandings in such a way that the activities Appeared to be domestic matters not requiring, central oversight, For ex: Ample, while il spills fi houndary waters are @ hoated issue i the polities ‘of ecology, the two const guards i Canali voi: cnaners Aumeawarern extLanations | 215 operate ae Ws coms wh ool pil operating. «Da wae presente eam integrate! appl here i Washington, everyone fs OMB ta the Stale Departaient snl samy others might want become lnvel ve, he spas Otten wa etn Tas sr ete ee ondinatet, bat wot teyeatal, Av ICS beter antnat wats. Au HCE better and easier for everyone cow Diving nel after the the persistence of the nonlinkage regime, Finally, the economic growth for maintaining the regime. °tayeyet COPING WITH INTERDEPENDENCE Chapter 8 Interdependonee has become a fasblousble term, but Hts shetorical we fan be source of confusion if we wish to Understand work palit os foroign policy. We beg this book by examining the rhetoric tarde, Dorulenco und its implications for polly: but we quickly discover Het ve ncoded to exanie the sod, iterdepen to investigate the pls of interdependence before we could make policy judgneece he {his Gal eager we tur tthe poiey implications Although nt analysis is wot designed to provide precise preerptons {or pulley, i dacs point out tw injor poly problems Julesedloral- Jealersbip. and organization. Ou analysis impli tht more alee ah welfect of government pices om hte re: lets or destroys a benelcal international «von if its ied, tangible elects are pai. nner sud develapinent of eration Leics {ea ws to pay sure tention to problens offers in world plies What types of international leadership ean be expected Yd heey sulliient leadership he supplied? And focus om contemporary wor Ted ership stints increased attention to problem of lntertina orgenta tion, broadly defined, In this book we Have wot propused a set af deeded blueprints forthe eonstuetion of policy. Hater we have addres Polley problem at its foundation by analyzing the changing nace ot world polities. Without a fin theoretical underpinning, pulley contoveted292 | cone seer nereanesnsneNe se 98 work onler fs Hke fy accord with even the best blueprints far pes the proverbial Iwas bul on shift sa EXPLANATORY MODELS AND CONDITIONS OF WORLD POLITICS 1 cd thatthe inereasing vse of the word sntorlepe In Chapter 1 we obser i ee else nt Sri inal sr alter he caging. We therefows began with comecpualclarfeaton. Raetate types af tropes: and sve bone aa Hs Waly inesepaence ean bossa ef por 8 th Uraltonl game of paler angng mos, They hn der cavily the tare of we lls in isl pv, mn Chapter we pe tented (ring as few aston pose) oem proces dhs that govern interdopendanie hango. “ Te part tan IT eal se dh ofr cs ve the pa cnt. Weft tthe etoie mel eur pode ¢ Gn expen, gh ances Tor destin of tho charge in nirntinarehoes wth sch wu were eon Overall strcre mls spe cg to pice a redins tht, particularly in recom pets the pric wore often arg, ‘lour predictions, catching only sll pat of the angi ea, sont pled, rode based on the struct of power in spies ares sen Some oF Ure parsimony OF is fast modal hut stil yielded clear pull isso it gru sen pwwer at two differ posed eae beer " bility to account for ire Tae weve, Vy a Tir nets war Ma wow, in reine hat ese from anges the ver power sve tig fo tons of atone tiny, aly et tied pole nan, whic we ale ae Incotonasngantin tnodel. took inlg nesoant torgovernn Ad tea nL “ind therefore enhanced our ability to explain monetary issue Aas, “This result was achieved, however, at a cow ‘iderable oe-oF pavalinony and_prodictive power, because th ere tional organietion model as are ileterinte an Sse relying om conamie proces or ueecyng pital structure. : Tn devoping thse nan we chm he mint spl ad familiar t the more complex and novel we snight a syste rather than nado apes heny-iing We edo 8 ho wl oe Could explain iteration teline charge with sine nxvl before HAPLANATONY AIODELS AND CoNDMHIONE OF WoRLD FoLAFHES | 229 relaxing simply assmoptions. The were comples adel were de- signet take into newount Tents af world pits tented vith so ‘deat type of complex Interdependence. Nevertheles, we sought nly cally distinguish between the confiions of word. polities wheties ehisacterived mone acenrately hy ealisn or by compe iterdopontonee nl oe explanatory mele Ultimately, however, satsetory explanation involves showing under ‘what conditions one mel oe anther (or a combination of then) wil apply. tw ehaptors 0 and 7 we provided some evidence from the sewers anal mney ise sens, andthe United Stites yelatinahips with Const and Australis, that suggested & cooneetion between out hwo mot not Uheories (sue stuetuatsn and Intemational ergantzaton) and the eve, ditions of eomples interdependence. Sitations of ‘complex Taterdepon donee were not explained well by tlitional theories whereas conditene slosor tthe relist Sal were. Qn must be entious about generalising these dings, ‘To wako more general statements, no would need sone Information out other ise area wd other country Ylainships, Pos {he Hou area ad relationships condor, however, our resent seg Aes (wo very important propositions: (1) that sue tture eal es {nal onganiation models st rized 10 expats Hi al fnterdepensienee; and (2) tt the eondilons of complen increasingly’ chsracterizo world poles in some impattane seve mess ond mong spe countses, Frthor research is needed 0 tet thse prope tows ty other eases ane explo thom with preter pretson. Late tls ctupter we sll show that ther are yood reasons to expect aspects of complex interdependence to be important in word poles in ance ator {han those we hve investigate ley hve, ‘Av sw jndeatd ealies, however, our todels would not provide the bnss fora complete examination of the pots of Interdopentiones, eves i we eval sprfy the eonlions wider which each of thm ve coh combination of them, wond apply. tn the fst place, they donot lees directly on natal poly, but on the development and decline of into ational roines. The why ave yg to explin the polints af petite states wil find Use mores fon aint. Out lovel of analysts the werd system, rather thon national policy. To analyze national policias under. nitions of complex interdependence abe ould-nged to ask tw ques ns that are quite dillerent from those.that-we. lave pose Cl) What range of choice is avalable to scetice conta sel problem arsine from interdependonce; tht irhow severe ate the external conten {2) What determines the responss-that are choson-and. hele sesso failtro? ‘To answer the fist of these questions, one would have to analy the effect of contemporary patos of Interdependence on sate, netooons224 | corine wen werinneesnnNce ‘Tho indepondent variables would he attebutes of the system: the «iestion ‘would be how severely they constrained the governments eoneemned, Our discussion of Interdependence and reglne change is helpful hw defining these systemfe Independont variables; but i is not very helpful in doter- mining how severely particular governments are constrained hy the sys term, To answer the scennd question we would rexpice close comparative analysis of the domestic strictures anel pelileal processes of yrrtieular states, and we would neod to deaw heavily ow work iv comparative polities! We do not elain ‘world polities nodal would need we suppl international Interdependence and Jovnete pots before seh a theory could be constructed. In Chapter 7 we explored tat eatonshp to some degre for Camda and Austral but hry nore to suggest sone directions for Further researc (Our systenie models sono are wot adequate to way the ples of tuterdependoneo, But tadtion views of the International system are ven las so Indeed, they fal event Toes on nel of Uh telewant foreign policy agenda Use arnt that wot toi the secuy wad futononty of the state, Moreover, the policy tain devied fro ch trnaltiondl veadon wl often be Haspprprate, Yet tie snare Wo iaieve that socal and economic Interdependence have totally liwiged the word fll to take clements of conthnly hao scant. Ay a rel thelr poley prescriptions aften appear tae wpa, Al Tour of our eases Confined silent role, ander sae colons ortho overall itary wer structure, Appropriate plies vst take Ini acennt both eit Fly and chango ey mast combine clement of he rion wisdom wih new insights about the pote of tnterdependse POWER IN COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE carefully about the concept af power wider ‘We particularly need to thi conditions of complex interdepencence.Sttesnen avd scholars fen Power to mean an ability to get athers to do something they would other tvse not do (and at an accoptable level of cost to onesel), but as we have that Kind of power has always beew difett ty measure, ands become increasingly so, In the traditionalist view, to know the distribution that provide power capabilites isto know th dca; snd if we Koo the structure, wo ean predi@t pat jt thor are two problems with this approach. Fi foe of wold tern tuto ' the resourees that produce power capitis have changed. the ia owna my Connex urreaDRPENDINCR | 226 agement of the classical ej awh a good infantry calibrate the bakin ferred territories The tne! nies ithton-entry balance of power in Europ, vos the eueil power reser statesmen could yng th population af conned een India revlon competed fh elt alien situation, forthe wenewed. th tele Het th eg pale gee ta tary powar doos mat allow we ‘Whew thio aymnel iterependne ms pot oe wos of emplee Intoep judgment and measurement aye even more complicated, We hive soen how being less vuluerable ines stato of matt depondnce can be wed we tose reer i dite eacunt sync and, wher the ne sea oe W spect tho Tne song them, Even If we ale ly canton our astenet ofthe power struc, wheter bel on spree lle rer, we ld ot bo religous oe Th sed blan wi the oun ppm bows, tly to use except fn an ship. between nilitary wirther inthe overall lt veal olitico-niltary system or inthe peas ee Measurable poate are not sitonattealyiauaned ite sce ower aver outeones. ‘Translation osen in nc sc a ie Sue ry oa ce eg eon Loowregeof tho simctre of world plies etic atthe ave ten ‘erouly mislending, Knowledge of the power structure is the simplest sn te bt Srp fr poly i Bs toe nh poe reel ean eg orn inorait wo mater wht mode of Wo rst no Inve th ways nt te codon of epnper neds means that tu to other instruments, such as-tianipulation” of interdopendence or of. teaisiational aciors ‘i ‘shaiian-American relationship. Similarly, the inapplieablity of mili foree moms that considerable incogrty ean develsp bewes te oe in our study of money and oceans that one of the tn portant questions about bargaining was whether issues would be handled Spear ed each th olay ses eae ly way of pola! bagging cohorence ean, as we saw in our225 | copive erm nevrameeNDRNCE plley: agents forcing i to higher priority on other eo IK ove cul ass that Hage aa pean were controled by rational stitesmen fn fr control of thelr goveraments aval svefetes, then he bargaining procese of complex interdependence cial be «icky apprehended. Tut the fact that nterdeprnd dlferent groups and that theae groups press rntiple cove governments ave tpl cael of ena aes nat fie aries greatly complicates the bargaining process. By reducing tho eobe neo of national postions, this compat of sctore sad tes soy alfcts the commitment to aul eredtbiity of threatened retaliation, which ts we save fv the Canadian and tae pein imade simply on the basis of power resources, Siniuuy, they alfect Irnguining proces, as we als say iv the oer ml Canada eases, by providing transnational alles, hostages, and instruments of manipulation Furthermore, as we savy in both the vecans andl money exes, Tinkage cen stimulate domestic poltictzation, whiel ean then tum the Tinkages to new purposes. For exaniple, a eitle of Ameriean oceans poligy might sty that all that was needed to maintain the free seas regime was a stronger ‘Amerie Tend, but this statment belittle the peli problems of complex interdependance. As we saw in Chapter 5, the existenes of mtip Hinkel issues and domestic politieastion hts inereased the: nuinher snl conan of domestic Amerloan groups favoring extondedl eonstal fists, Tho Inter onal contacts and potential trinsnational allies for such groups have Alo increased, Many ofthe most serious policy problems of complex Aependence result direatly rom this Dlusing of the distinction betwecn| domestic and international politics. Policy eonecived as HF the world en sisted of bilrd-bal states guided! by philosopher-kings i wot very use For international regimes to goveru situations of complex interdependence successfully they must be congrucnt vith the interests of powedaly. Placed domestic groups within major slates, ws well as with the st of power among sates, Aanalies uoaetel ‘TRENDS TOWARD COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE, How prevalent will complex interdependence bye fn world polities? Is ita temporary aberration, or a permet featuce of workd polities? Obviously, ‘we cannot answer these questions on the basis of the four eases in this book. And the differences among those ewes should make us aware tht any answer must be phrased as a matter of degree. Complex fnterdepen dence is lese closely approximated tn military thaw in econmmie or ee logical issues and it seams Jess relevant to communist states andl many loss developed states than it docs to advanced industri eomutries. Keven mene | 287 json asanerd counties, goverment control af sia and economic exactions varies: the United Stator ie chutes by a lifeent sel Siship ete the state and society than Pra ope These caves otvithstnding, there are reams to expect that signi ‘spools of work! polities wl cote to approxtnate the eondiions of complex intordepentence. In sone Baus areas and some eountey rel Wionships, complex. inteependence ts deeply rooted. Although these covaltins aro nt Irveversite, mjor changes would be needed te reverse them. A, strong, argument could even be made that comer interdepor. dove wil: inceosingly chases wor pits, bento each he thies eouditins wf eommplex interdependence eortespend toa lig tore ural chauge wi dec ness fio ‘The multiply of youl and ilicaly To armnglag them i io aranging them hlsurelical are roy af the hong tenn development ofthe wel state, Dug entay, governments ime ‘of eountsas have increasing been held responsible m wity, Although ls or security, Although Israels slvaton ie obvonsy diferent from Pra and although m hegtoned tein iy Sov Ani flo cout increas the nenton Wet «20 counties to mitny scary, governments wll conte to bo hel respons for eaononie welfare © Mcctine be eld Tilly nd ck of Merah ied iy the ny dk i lla, ad the contradictory choices about orl wlicy to which they”, _ve se One might earkeatre altitudes toward lal scononle pulley, song Weston sates as follows: For clasts! merentise cncred swith the power ofthe state, it was more blessed to expat than to import Tho clasielHihcral economists who focused on conser welfare tagght that it was more Hesse to pot than to export The twentieth contery oli rent vb Tots employment (panes sel thing the Gent Depo psn ne prs Mee eth sha of atonal weg foe on weal ag Uetr siping saath tha heave es) ken ‘ver export? What ve find ually however 1¢ of these com h Pe re i i not the dominance of mnie goals, but their coexistence among powerful groups: anda flctuating patton of priorities. epee gon ‘The development of rasltiple che trai he teduoly of coments nal toast ft have Hrought Asia and America within a ‘day's journey from cach ator Syctrnms ort stelits have bought the ste af ine Continental phone calle tito the same range as Intercity calle Pits hn tansmision tnd inteetinental computer commnieatons rene & conte to shink sty of the ety bation Impey de hesper sind inpvoved armonnicatons are nt the ony eae of eae228 | corn atonal organs uf tasgovernnententets, bt they de tebe sty to thle Joveloenont, Alo se teed Chapter 2 athortrian governments ean at se est eens and etal trandatonl commas td etc ton erent trey to conn to rete no neepenene n voce vv “Th change nthe re of sty fre i late to tre Are any Teculogs and pater of saa sii ‘Rowe argoed fn Chap for majoras by our snd es; uncertaln and possi negative elles ia deste on ope the luman costs of. the use of ven those states least affected by the fourth conn, au the ith authwtran or ttn ernment, ny fel some consti fom th fst tres. On th ater and, esr Mates tule tn rego riviera motte eros troupe may find ese to wy fre than efor The wet ft of these eur tends nthe rol of fo to ete erry tel on ny PeTihe erosion of International Ieratehy 4s sometimes portyayedl as galing of Amoilein power, and analogies aro druwn to the neler. dosline SEM haganay! admitely ons ths pompetve of palantr Af thet here hs been cine But Adrien power esoutes have tot deine te deunatctly elon muon Aree niry Spending wn oughly td ofthe word (oul In 1530 asl ke Over Ee ane pore, the Amerean gros mtn! prt hat eee fom Stghly more than nthind to shy move thn quarter of the world Uo, but the eer figure relts the abnormal watine destruction of Europe and Jape, ai the cuent fire slr te the eof the Soviet scoomy, are tr tre nes the so Japa four times the szo of Wert Gemeny' In power renee, ke Tt teat nineteenth contry. Ameren remaits the most poeta contey nthe wel Father than retort to Kiso! snalogy, we so decline in gras n'a ystenie cnges Tv tens of ow dt Reon power over others and power over oxtcomes, the decline of hiew- trey not s0 much an eros ofthe power reste of the dma Stato compared ith tse of other sorties, asm reson of the dy tant sates power to soul uteoes ithe fteation system, The qt enson fe that the system el es become more complex, Thre ate ynore issues and more actors; and the Weak assert themselves more, The loin slates has leverage over others, but Its fr es evn gs rer th whe system entropy and geographical entropy will be so high that we very ruck alten oa an he te a er Of spt titers hh pate pe ede comeing ty ld otaly wits " vet ante ne jr sts, the remain tle of military Force wl ros seen SN ton mtay Eglin Nee so claracterized by enormons inequality of incomes among states ~ a conde Ming of vations sovercignty. ‘The fncronse in. complesity and_dlecline oi erty ny ingly ae a en ae 4 organtaing international eallecive action, ~ ils ‘LEADERSHIP IN COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE, Teadership, of cours, ean hea sele-ser to justify any ofits actions, Vet in ‘enpe with econo xucial to este that ehavior focuses on jot gi vases om joint gain rather than the yer. sun aspeets of interdependonce. As Chatles Kindleberger has argued, "11 leadership ts thong asthe provision of the pbs god of sec! nity, rather than exploitation of followers or the private good uf preatge Je reonhs a positive ics... Leaderhip is necasay fee ote delegated authority” * And such ordeey delegation of authority tr world pallies is not likely. Lendorship can take a vizety of forms, In common Drlanco, leadership ean ican: (I) to direct or-coinmaidh (ley ce fn avid (91 *4.induce, these defalin: roughly compat totes eo lnferationn! leadership: hegemony ularly, and al Uateatlg ‘We defined hegemonic leadership in Chapter ae 2 aint t eoveniing los.” Clearly, hogemonie leadership son hfe good —respisibiy ean be supe. Bi he hgemonic leader wil instutly be tempted to we leadership ng term used by a do rant state uniztion of collective tion to ‘and eeologieal interdependence, leadership is oftensii pin ty ay ‘A second type al loudership. 9 for bat ational example. etiavr of ther stent hess fs Sitios ite netions may determine the regimes that govern pendenve, both because of its diroet elle “Tisgh faitation. Tl mad by he Und Ses man wep te ma pit to domestic political pressures nd domestic scone and social needs are ohinost always much the mast nportant set of atonal sles affecting ypor- sors jn internaifonal markets... . Consider the fntemational repercussions of Inorestrate policies pursned by the Feileal Meserve Hoard, of alt txnspent go by te Cl oats Hf tick mar lng trey th Serres Eacnngs Comision, Ty a all wich en Wal on oporational bargaining, process thas Mus res fil dwn hy omy er nation-state fermphasis i he nil). ? Such lenderhip may have unintended systenfe eles (as Trin tate fn 14 el a weal ofthe fc en ree fr th ea) or it may le quite deliberate (as unilateral Annie suspension of ‘ext freed «change of the Brctio Wh eye nonlry alae). ; International leadership as unilateral initiative — going fist an setting ecm OL RRs incrdpenloyn A ve Inve ss because the Ameiiean eeiaoity & dominant wd leis vulnerable than those of such counties es Japan, Germany or rane the United States ‘nas mote leewny in foreign ceonone policy than thse eounsies do, Tus itis inaccurate to dase complex interdependence asa completely ‘hated system in which every actor has a veto power HANSON OW cOnFLX IEHAMITENDENEH | 291 {eawosie, On the other ane, the utiatves tke by the lading tate Waa et always sew gurl example fon the punt of ew of erating se tanta regione trons whieh all states gain; wless the buel “hn tlestabiliins Autti embargo on the eapost of oye to rising doutestie foot prices in the suinmet of 107. A thitd type af he is aged. on netion to, Help stobitize an international sexing, endings w in bargnining fw order to secur the lung table Intertional shovtrun saerifies, be NAS 8 Fesponse ce ale sles to ow ae tin teat ih is: Large sus wathoat ky era st se they 8 kl to be mar beeen ot therein they cn apt thr nace seme of gu ok palin Yt Tor thle to be a net Seqsnoni ions te ste mt esos see He level sae oa fee iden, yon ents ha ros inthe ag sate ma at se sete ei foegn shrtn go. Conran by miler soe, darn ta he tn teint weed | th tht Td nti nenecal ae | “oto Iv ee rly ae a pda ennpl te eperdanc tnt Son Ihe sol a eee Une Sty sl hate ma posal ney Deeds fof Aniiean hegeuiy to the pot of bane a dee aud Belton the rules ave the helio tiara cer be lw ec sch cin nat i Une den a tke pls in vorpal nich ya ena at ae i tho tity security af Weston Eupe aad oa Ship wt he of tha eatin, Th cote wal eae between sngenmniuenp and mrclcaseclont et Etecive waexennis eeip dpe soe ens ote Inti elt od exapl, It yeu ee win es aver the ong toom Te thtelos cag eee the socin a thin type of leaden dasa lore Pe these terns des not confer speetal natal bene alngheieaee Nigh st ge well te hip so I neon pers ne bl yy the agenda fordatestate dines Tene so be elective farthenmore all ojo tnt the regi being eae o malted i nd In th interests ny Tear requies eine), eek ea ingress fll sd frogs the option of fee Hing w chen th rine tht coves the ieee fo leaders at gate wiles flow partly nuttin oothope ne been the cori clement aid, tae ‘inte atin gine ie nos of complies oie wail leap toy tit gies of see236 | ian vn pina te ae Jot used by powerful states to impose suet systems on thes INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ORGANIZATION ela poblen Ong fo ies eve wt 2 puta don tale Unite Soe aa i sad that when aon sa wll polls feel Srongy, there te tnmediate ot “i ndvese turonGita elles of spear cal wth by denying landing ight he Uae tts fe Coney neler prlfrton to baste by ven! ta on te expe Ofte frm the United Stata the word be fay. Arto thot port and effective ppison enol fo be fitted hp Thanos in United Stats fovelgy ald pulser ty ence, the onl a worthy one=envrnmentl qual, contro melene proline: vain has ntti of sion pot a ina dnl by Aton pn, rt a ye this sorry nto lng sn, bo dimen vet the! a sought If ey dsnpt stops Intertoto Seo nan mains ate eatin telrigtcoumes), such apponces may doy te befor Intron rine, Soyeeanteavent ar al yale eur State wate doce wt roy ither miler yes es reset ofc aaa he Un Sn lyn the thle to feed the wor, ml Anerican ants ty ent popelation trot abroad ay be san by mal ers tnt po Gida” Peri the United Stites shoal take al Ue acon Int iin the te of ert! csi, ha, a ee ase) agreoment ath hen later ‘ As we ve Sn eat fe eto pig dei sitions of comple interdgpandone ill apent tn tet pol aa Sent aie tne neg ae cate cer wheter trough awake tosh tow of pods or pone tn tans sate erasing hte Hous et such a system, governments can intervene nt diferent poliey pints eatin | 297 oon, at teow Bn tu tteraton! organ snuthee ets Inner oti the denatie tae oe ‘only Dilfer aint of aterventon inp feat eens eae As ele segs wl are ver wh faye tht te a te Suet de ae pest or eet at lle re Proposing citable teeta shag of est or ene dea "eaining tential ears dapoponinate Avera tee leven over danse point interven wile held eh an egress espns are fe Sasa eat eda interests ‘Tins, frcgn poley lene dating with these now iss wil have to iy even mote atoton thn a fo domes police, Pei nee Sg hw to pull! strategy tin sl peo the Uited Slats to fos on is laigier gente Sera Re TF eal, trade aid owns hve dlerat pleat eee it ve thay nye th se al oo fv aly ote nn iia gpm wheres ez al trey Fae ey Te lhe te arte Ue ae terns of sells pater pera ‘They will have to pay spect atention to the way that thelr cal de a do i, trade ional bargaining linkages, heats of retalation, and chutes of knee {ional forum affect clonestic polities as well as the eration of teomnene wes: They will ave to onlicpate paints of stain, At lowe that Pell have to pay more altenton to eapensating groupe that hegre heaviest cots of ujatnent to change. A god example ts the orpere tive grnemsity uf the adjsinent assistant in the 10% trae let designed stave of the restitive aternitve Hurke-lartke bil ose bared with the narrow adjstovet assistance provision of the Taule tng Jpusslon Act Ut Prsident Kewely presse ax part f'n grand anenie Alsi in the early 0 Dain atonal interests usally fe but and ceologieal Interdependence, it beans Aireetly alfect particular romps Iv domestic inorest romps ane poweifl eno te word by the presi such as i’ pli sling large quater of pee te the Sovict Union in September 1075 —top ffeils hay oe hong able to detgrine ply, bx AFL-CIO President Woonge May easel Wat that tine, “reign potty is too daned important to be lle te the secretary of state Tu se a situation the ulgment of topeove lett ny no longo authontative, Dung the Cold War this problevn was anet by placing econ issues below illinry sccwity in the foreign pulley Ierarchy. We mw tat Astantovater fishermen, representing ks than a quarter ofthe Ameriges238 | comme: wren aerraneseen RATIONAL AND wontEEHIC HRcAMzatION | 230, K.contiol aver that eeanomy,, nercasing fovmdite environmental pcg al awareness that ather governments wareness of the need to onally will eoerist uneasily with yy have very differnt priorities : fateh, were abe, thro aw dlefine Ameriows Ysheries policy fi terns af tr Jarly, in monetary policy, the United States arsonmnntated its hatevests to considerations of alliance leadership, AMter the mil-tH006, the Soviet nl ny be extreely dic otlacnoe al fess Innninent. nthe decane ee, strengthened hy: the law 1 is possible to design judepsndent economic strategies by whieh the eotiations, Anverica evista sheriorn (thane ecpreseitingg —¢ United States cond reduce its eeonntie val events ie Hnterest) mney reset Gnas Tor 1 DOHnite — | Gonser, for tata, te alee ee a ea extension of coastal jurisdiction, over the nays objections. Iv monetary ‘one were eonecrael about other countries refusals (or Inability lee te de ne ining reserves) tse rials, one. could. restrict total policy, our allies themselves seemed to pote si commie challenge, euergy Amerie interests were defined with es ence Ter preserving. pt pars, livesly souresif sippy, build up socks, and do ie for Tope sat the spe ony pm fo rahe ae thea eld ec sctniy's wei ses sat To wsush a | Ot gern the allel Sites al oe technology ean change political consensus on priorities. i supposedly implied by Byuras about ‘The thetori of interdependence and syimbots af ecinmnie and ceokogiel Ay inexorable dppiud ' sceurity are likely, however, to be imperfect substitutes for the traditional reserves, . litany secartyimegery Heo inelseoionee alec eet Te the inertia question i wot whether Independent security sate fesonpe bn very diferent nye, Gratin sles to thn Ste Uni Ton ses ar technology fest, Int hw far they Sad be tllege al ! stance, ay ep date nt they nay It sie of the ten pee tho wae to wich hoy soul ho pat Mal e's alert to ex! j {in less developed countries. Domestically, sich salew hoost farmers (aid ery events ca be part of « nevisulatonist strategy; ut it ean al he al caportg com) Inomne Ba he ate ne lament tnt trey of pe ematon aaa aad ee | Kind prices tut ir mprend eros the population, We it weelece whet ship. If we recall our dissin in Chapter L of asymmetrical vuleceabilicg ; ‘gral sales will load ta vulnerability spondence, whlch end. pro 1 sources of power, we ean sce why this is s0, For policy coordi. | he United State aay enamine i a ton» sat ees pwr tn vee a ae hn an i the USBI. If not in the short ran, what about the more distant future? Or athers to eanpromise, snd to make meres, Tnsofur atone date eee ~ | Sat the Waited Sater be uma th pole os renee eae lini it verity Yo stan yates wl eee a Ue groups with an interest in the profitable traction: will bly. to Haye international negotiations about collective economic and ecloyi, imal the atop? Whar the eon fees itd cal security, sence, ore_uneven, and ene socety ears mre of 1K aks than ale, At low levels of cost, elforts to increase selfsufficioney are therelore . tlasedinablly pace eee Ue donna. hem are anes esa fr stay ply contin an ade pa ee When domestic burdens and benefits fall unevenly, leaders will find it for a nevisolationis! approneh, The koy ques ween the Act to make such subtle eaeations a elgg te ety bake rien ton nw fur Ug develop oF Inde judgments. Ecological davgers, hy contrast, woul ten affect everyone proceed avd at what sts, Taken separately, each “projet inde Tongptcrin threats and the sorexern iat Neoisolatenists propose te redueo our Fai equally. But incon they ray dpe | cents of ensuring against them are mevealy ssid. seenloglel sae Inight be tolerable, But when one adds them together, une has a hessy | vty” fs unlikely to bea sulfent spol ard which les ean bul fle ta inp on the American people parteulay if many ofthese | snow foreign poliey consensus. tests could be avnided by more ellective American Tenders, in wea Concern about economic and ecological issues caw lead hth to inde alfalrs, Moreover, if the environmental pessimists are even partially. cot Petdent policies and to greater tnvolveinent in international poly the ude will gia” Heavier Ever wheat Ta th -eopeety ee dination. Indeod, it i ite plble to eapect an newbies ea independant nation, the United States tomtinses to have sae en oe ‘ncohorent pattern of invlveinent ad wilawal, lations poliles interational py eonlintion = over whieh in atch « alteulon, «will be tempting as rexponses to the frustiations in dealing with world | would of eourse have eonstderable inflvence ‘io longer under hegemonte contol Thorg will hes termien betuean the sone clugialisaes the arguient for intésnationsl action is even United States’ increasing involvemeait in the wortd veunoiny and fs den Monger. When a collective good, sch asthe atmosphere othe aceae,by any counties, wet e ngain the point tHrestened with degradation by pollutants from fone state alone fy unlikely to solve the pre. Yet hy fs not simply that ecological dangers or Mite resmnces increase interde= pondence. The key Isae,iswhethor.the major emmtries of te world will Jhave the social apd.goxermmantal ality ta respon tn, tine Will Tey Rarer he ng eke aS ble tn time, or so that ‘conservation measures ent be put into effect Ivefore eves dam ‘lone? Will we know eng aunt the averse elles of tology ond have sullen contol over its dovlopnent that wed tere el plogial monsters? Will Tnteroationt, orgunzstions welte lle

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